

"FORMS" AND "TYPES" IN THE STUDY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
An Examination of the Generalizing Concepts of Mead and Schutz

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Since the fields of symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology have been increasingly linked in recent sociological writings, the author examines the generalizing concepts of George Herbert Mead--theoretical fountainhead of symbolic interaction-- and Alfred Schutz--phenomenological sociologist and theoretical godfather of ethnomethodology.

Similarities of content abound in the writings of these two men, e.g., analysis of the self, other, language, social act, motives, ends or projects, mind, consciousness, durée, and the vivid present. However, their methodological positions diverge sharply with the result that their generalizing concepts are dissimilar.

For Mead "forms" are abstractions of real, objective, and natural phenomena and part of a morphological system; for Schutz, "types" are conventions and part of a static, typological system and ultimately dependent upon consensus. Mead seeks to explain processes of emergence and change of social forms; Schutz seeks to describe and understand subjective human action in terms of typicalities. Ultimately both generalizing concepts do rely on subjective interpretations or inductive leaps at the point at which the allocation of particulars to forms or types is left to the subjective judgment of the observer or sociologist.

Sociologists should thus exercise caution in drawing parallels between symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology or phenomenological sociology. Further research of Schutz's conception of the world of everyday life as one of typicalities is certainly warranted. Indeed, a sociology of knowledge based on such typicalities and their systems of relevance is a promising possibility.

Sociology, like the other social sciences, has from its inception made extensive use of generalizing concepts. This fact is abundantly attested in introductory texts, dictionaries of sociology, and innumerable theoretical treatises. Indeed, recent interest in theory construction has contributed to a renewed concern with the nature of such terms. Distinctions between and among them, however, are not at all clear, and some sociologists use terms such as class, construct, type, ideal type, typology, classification, form, model, global concept or even definition or concept in a rather loose way. Theodorson and Theodorson, in a rather admirable attempt to compile a dictionary of sociological terms, have used Mead's notions of "I," "me," and "generalized other" as illustrations of "constructs" even though Mead himself considered them to be emergent "forms" (Modern Dictionary of Sociology:74).

Usage of generalizing concepts does entail, of course, assumptions and problems of application which most sociologists only vaguely or intermittently recognize.

Although an examination of these problems sometimes leads into the realms of methodology and the philosophy of science, it seems at times a necessary task in the interest of theoretical clarity and progress.

The present paper originated from a comparative analysis of symbolic interaction and what has come to be known as phenomenological sociology, particularly as represented in the writings of George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz. This author found the fact that both men described certain patterned behavior similarly but generalized it differently rather puzzling. What Mead referred to as a "role" and related to the emergence of the self, Schutz typified as a "course of action" and related it to his rather intricate system. Was this merely a linguistic convenience, or were the theoretical contexts of these two approaches basically similar as a number of sociologists have recently insisted.¹ Related to this question was a lesser one, namely the synonymous usage of the terms "form" and "species" in the writings of Mead, which seemed unusual given the prevailing association of "forms" with the Kantian categories (Mead, 1964:3-18). Moreover, Mead wanted to be known as a social behaviorist; Schutz, a follower of Husserl, appeared as the more thoroughgoing idealist.

Thus, the present analysis which began as a rather narrowly delimited task of distinguishing the notions of "form" and "type" led to an awareness of more fundamental philosophical differences between an empiricist and an idealist construction of generalized concepts. For Mead the term "form" applies to an emergent from the objective life process, and for Schutz the notion of "type" is a cognitive convention which is simply present as part of the social tradition and human interaction.

For the research sociologist a myriad of questions present themselves in the application and use of types and forms. Do these terms really refer to structures, functions, or some sort of visible attributes? By what process can they be established? Should the scientist enumerate and identify a series of characteristics (and if so on what basis does he select them), or should he perform a subjective judgment to determine a given type or form. If the latter, what effect does it have on his commitment to an "empirical science"? Or is a type simply a statistical average or central tendency? Furthermore, how are particular instances, especially marginal cases, to be allocated to the generalizing term? If, as some scholars maintain, a type is an ideal or an idea for which no empirical instances--only approximations--can be found, who is to decide whether a specific instance illustrates a type, for example, is a cancer patient who refuses to go to the doctor committing suicide? And who should judge the action as typical, the actor or the observer?

These then are some of the broader methodological considerations which form the background for the present paper on the analysis of the terms "form" and "type" in Schutz and Mead.

I

The context for Mead's use of the terms "form" and "species" was the distinction between two versions of the theory of evolution, an organic one--as found in the writings of the naturalists such as Darwin and Lamarck--and an earlier philosophical theory of evolution found in the writings of the Romantic idealists, especially Hegel. Hegel had proposed, wrote Mead, that there is an encompassing process, guided by an Absolute, which produces new forms when a new synthesis arises from the conflict of two "universals"--a thesis and an anti-thesis--which seeks

resolution in a new synthesis (Mead, 1964; Mead, 1936:127-152). While Mead admired this Hegelian stress on the emergence of forms, he criticized it for viewing the conflict as one between two "universals"; in fact, argued Mead, the opposition is between a universal--a thesis or theory--and a "particular"--a fact in the world of nature which does not bear out the theory. In its attempt at reconciling the ensuing conflict, a synthesis emerges, a new theory, a new form. Science works precisely in this dialectic fashion, as could be amply illustrated from such discoveries as the conquest of typhoid fever in medicine. By stressing the emergence of forms, Romantic idealism had thus broken with the Kantian position that forms preexist in the mind and provide the structure for all human experience. Mead considered this turning away from a theory of static and a priori forms to one stressing the development of forms in a larger process of experience as correct.

At the same time, Mead also rejected the older mechanical position in science because it provided no explanation for the emergence of forms at all: "the mechanical conception of the world did not seem to be one that gave any explanation to the form of things (Mead, 1964:7). Mechanical science could analyze wholes into parts but could not account for the form of objects--trees, plants, animals, etc. Indeed, forms had no meaning for them! But, insisted Mead, the world of experience is a world of forms, and a scientific explanation of forms had to be provided (Mead, 1964:8).

In this context, Mead introduced the findings of Darwin in The Origin of Species, for he had attempted not only to describe the plants and animals that exist, but to explain how plant and animal forms had arisen from a natural process. Nor was the term "species" unusual, argued Mead, for "species" is nothing but the Latin word for "form." Indeed, the theory of evolution is a theory which "undertakes to explain how the forms of things may arise" (Mead, 1964:9). It is therefore concerned with origins or causation and is more than a mere classifying of kinds that already exist.

According to Mead, Darwin, the leading exponent of organic evolution, assumed that in the beginning there was relatively formless protoplasm from which life forms gradually emerged through a natural process. Significantly this was a theory of the evolution of the form and not of the particular individual animal or plant--as one might have in embryology or genetic theories. "What this theory is interested in is the evolution of the nature of the object, of the form, in a metaphysical sense" (Mead, 1964:10, emphasis mine). Taking his cue from Malthus' theory of population, Darwin had argued that certain variations of forms result when the pressure of overpopulation forces those plants and animals to survive who are most fit and best adapted to the conditions of life. This culling out process would lead to the emergence of new forms. There is thus a separate life process and the forms of life within it; the process and the forms are separate. This same process exists in plants and animals from the simplest separation of carbon and oxygen to the most complex; it flows through all life forms. The theory of evolution "involves a process as its fundamental fact," and this process appears in different forms. Forms or species are thus the product of the fundamental life process.

On the whole Mead's interpretation of Darwin is correct. Darwin had sought to establish through observation and description of animal and plant life the species and sub-species existing in the world of his time, and to explain this existence more adequately than the earlier theory of Divine intervention or Divine Creation of individual species. He was particularly aware of the inability of the theory of Divine Creation to explain the existence of variations or sub-species (Darwin, 1899: 456). Nor was Darwin alone in his pursuits. Other scientists were engaged in

similar undertakings, and surprisingly the terms "form," "species," and "type" appear interchangeably in the literature. Thomas Huxley wrote in 1859,

we view 'Persistent Types' in relation to that hypothesis which supposes the species living at any time to be the result of the gradual modification of preexisting species, a hypothesis which, though unproven . . . is yet the only one to which physiology lends any countenance . . . (Darwin, 1899:xiv).

Darwin himself realized clearly that the terms "species" and varieties were used with various connotations by different naturalists and that no one definition suited everyone. Still he seemed satisfied with the fact that "every naturalist knows vaguely what he means when he speaks of a species" (Darwin, 1899:39). In part, the problem of the meaning of species and varieties was related to the criteria used to distinguish them: sometimes subvarieties were considered the result of different climatic conditions (plants in the Alps are smaller), isolation, or structure. Yet structural differences--as in ants for instance--are hardly indicators of subvarieties! The criteria for determining membership in a species or the defining characteristics of a species are not simply related to size, structure or distribution, but depend to a considerable extent on subjective interpretation. And Darwin realized that in actual practice, naturalists tended to rely on scientific consensus, the "sound judgment and wide experience" of fellow naturalists (Darwin, 1899:41, 46). Novices have to learn these criteria for determining species not simply from observing particular plants and animals, but from their contact and interaction with fellow scientists. Since Darwin believed in gradualism--the fine gradation of individual differences in the natural world--the allocation of individual instances to species was a task of high priority.

For present purposes, Darwin's substantive writings are not of primary importance. Rather, our interest is in the fact that he construed the natural world as comprised of forms, which naturalists distinguished as types or species, sub-species and varieties. He firmly believed in the existence of natural resemblances in the world of animals and plants, no matter whether they were called species or sub-species. In connection with the latter distinction he wrote:

. . . that I look at the term species as one arbitrarily given, for the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, for convenience's sake (Darwin, 1899:47).

Do species exist or are they merely verbal conveniences?

The difficulty of assigning particulars to places in the natural classification was increased by Darwin's commitment to gradualism, the belief in the existence of infinite diversity in nature and natural development, or as it has come to be known, "Natura non facit saltum." Thus the judgment of the naturalist assumes great importance in recognizing individuals as belonging to particular kinds or forms in the natural order of life. Yet there is no doubt that Darwin believed in the actual existence of life forms, even though the definition of the terms species and sub-species might be arbitrary.

In the context of the present paper it is significant that Mead mis-interpreted Darwin as deriving the origin of forms from a vague formlessness. While Darwin

did deny Divine Creation of all forms, he admitted to the belief in a few original forms of life--and who knows where they had come from! He wrote that all subsequent forms had evolved from a few primordeal ones through natural selection:

. . . I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces all the members of the same great class or kingdom. I believe that animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number (Darwin, 1899:469).

And somewhat later, in defending his theory as not entirely beyond Divine intervention:

When I view all being not as special creations but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to be to become enobled (Darwin, 1899:473).

In short, Darwin held that present life forms are by gradual differentiation and survival of the fittest derived from a very few original forms whose source he left undisclosed, except to say that all life "having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one" (Darwin, 1899:473).

Mead saw Darwin's theory of the natural process whereby forms emerge as only one phase of the even more general life process which exists everywhere. "We are concerned with a theory which involves a process as its fundamental fact, and then with this process as appearing in different forms" (Mead, 1964:13). Another phase of this process, as Mead interpreted it, was the dynamic process of the self with its alternating forms of subject and object. The process takes place within the form, but is still distinguishable from it. "Form" as Mead uses the term here, seems to refer to the structural configurations, separately or as wholes: "we could not have the process if there were not some structure given, some particular form in which it expresses itself" (1964:14). The social form, whatever it may be, will survive, be modified or disappear in its interaction or adjustment with the conditions around it, just as occurs in organic evolution.

Mead also took his cues from the Romantic idealists and held that the self as a form must be viewed in its relations to the social conditions in which it exists; and the human form must be recognized as part of the social whole. Underlying the emergence of the human form is a life process of adjustment of a simpler form to the changing conditions around it. The Romantic idealists were thus correct in viewing all social phenomena in relation to a context, to sets of conditions--that is, as a self to a nonself, or subject to object. But Mead placed even greater stress on the self in relation to the social organization and the interactive process whereby the form of self emerges.

Based on his interpretation of both Darwin's organic evolution and Hegel's Romantic idealism, Mead was convinced that process was the fundamental fact of all life. Life itself is a moving whole and the life forms which emerge within it from earlier or simpler forms do so in their adjustments to the conditions of their existence. The process thus always entails forms adjusting to the conditions in their environment in a fashion similar to the Hegelian dialectic except that the problem calling for resolution is always a particular fact and not a universal.

From this perspective Mead examined the thought systems of others, praising what he admired, criticizing what ill-fitted his own orientation. For instance, he admired Bergson's theory of time and his notion of the emergence of forms in the

process of duration, but rejected his parallelism between experience--or qualities and images--and knowledge--quantities and concepts--because they rested on an unacceptable notion of intuition. And just as all forms were emergents and subject to change, so scientific knowledge was for Mead always tentative, hypothetical, an approximation of reality and subject to new developments in the life process.

Although Mead did not systematically present all social forms as emergences from the life process, many of them can be identified and their development indicated. The three basic notions of self, society and mind with which he pre-occupied himself might function as our points of departure.

Actually, Mead discusses not only one but two kinds of selves, the familiar individual self and a collective self. The existence and reality of both is never doubted and they are both presented as emergents from the general life process. The collective, or historical self which Mead described emerged as part of the Romantic movement in Europe through a process of role playing very much like that among young children. Assumedly such an historical self awareness can exist at any time, but Mead provided only this one detailed illustration. During the Napoleonic period, he tells us, the nationalistic spirit in Europe, especially in France, was so strong that the earlier class and caste ascriptions became insignificant and citizenship in the nation made everyone equal. Everyone was a Frenchman and equal in his citizen status to everyone else. This feeling of freedom and equality persisted into the post-revolution years when the disillusionments politically led many men to seek a reestablishment of the older social order. But these new men, with new equalitarian attitudes, accustomed to political rights irrespective of class, caste and occupation, could never really return to an older way of life. They had a new perspective which included the experiences of independence and political rights. Thus the new man "came back with a different self-consciousness from that with which he had left" the older order, and he "looked at it through different eyes . . ." (Mead, 1936:59). As he turned back the years, he noticed advantages of the older system--such as security--which he had not appreciated earlier and he played the roles of the older order with an attitude of "living over" the old life. From this experience of turning from the present to play the roles of the past, to appreciate its advantages, and to live over what else he could, the romanticist reconstructed his own self, developed a new self awareness, a new form of himself. Mead provides a succinct summary of this collective self notion:

Europe discovered the medieval period in the Romantic period, then; but it also discovered itself. In fact, it discovered itself first. Furthermore, it discovered the apparatus by means of which this self-discovery was possible. The self belongs to the reflexive mode. One senses the self only in so far as the self assumes the role of another so that it becomes both subject and object in the same experience. This is the thing of great importance in this whole historical movement. It was because people in Europe, at this time, put themselves back in the earlier attitude that they could come back upon themselves. When they had done this, they could contact themselves with the earlier period and the selves which it brought forth. As a characteristic of the romantic attitude we find the assumption of roles. Not only does one go out into adventure taking now this, that or another part, living this exciting poignant experience and that, but one is constantly coming back upon himself, perhaps reflecting upon the dullness of his own existence as compared with the adventure at an earlier time which he is living over in his

imagination. He has got the point of view from which he can see himself as others see him. And he has got it because he has put himself in the place of the others (1936:63).

The details of the development of the individual self, are, of course, much better known by sociologists. There is the child who at first lacks organization of experience and slowly acquires it by playing the roles of others, first singly and then in some sort of interrelation, who learns to abide by the rules of the game and eventually responds to the general social attitudes of the community in terms of a generalized other. The unity of even the most primitive form of response by the child is never in question, but of course the organization of attitudes of those around him which he acquires through role playing, leads him to develop a much more complex unity over time. Eventually, the mature individual is able to judge himself from the perspective of all of the others in his environment. This judgment is the sign of true self consciousness. The individual self is thus an emergent, something more than the assemblage of conditions and attitudes of others, and indeed it is something unique, for every individual develops his own perspective or point of view.

Within the self there are further phases which interact, namely the "me" and the "I." It is the "me" which answers to the organized attitudes of others and gives the "form" and structure to the self, while the "I" remains the unconventional, the novel, and the unpredictable. Most members of society have a moderate balance between these two phases of the self, but variations are possible and do exist. The artist, for instance, is a person in whom the novel part of the self is developed to a much higher degree, and the "me" or conventional aspect exists only in a minimal manner. Still, both phases must always be present, for it is through their interaction that the higher form emerges.

Both forms of the self can thus be said to entail the reciprocity of interaction between a simpler subjective form and its objective, human environment, the emergence of more complex wholes through assuming for a time established patterns of behavior (roles) belonging to others earlier in time or differing in status, and the eventual development of an awareness of oneself as an object and the ability to make judgments about oneself. These selves are never static, but always continue to change within the social process. Thus they are not "types" in Mead's sense of static, unchanging abstractions (Mead 1936:409).

Mead also considered society or social organization as a social form. Since fulfillment of the needs for food and reproduction are essential to the survival of any living organism, no creature "could exist or maintain itself in complete isolation from other living organisms" (Mead, 1934:228-336). On the human level this relationship to others, to society, lead to the crucial emergence of self and mind.

Like many other scholars of the turn of the century, Mead was committed not only to evolutionary theoretical formulations, but he generally agreed with the substantive content of these theories. Thus he incorporated into his social psychology the same stages of societal evolution found in other writings: for example, primitive, feudal, early industrial, etc. In addition he also compared human societies to those found among the insects--especially the ants and bees--and the vertebrates. Ants and bees, he observed, have a complex organization based on special physiological plasticity, so that there is "a different type of form adjusted to certain function" (1934:230). Among the vertebrates different organizational patterns are found, which are not yet human. Fishes, birds and cattle have a rather loose form of social life which provides them with defense and protection.

Human societies, no matter how simple or complex, entail several critical differences from those found on the lower, animal levels: language communication (especially the use of significant symbols) and the existence of selves. Mead posits human interaction to occur, as the Romantic idealists had held, between a subject and an object, with his own peculiar modification, that the subject or self must arise from the social context. Today society and the existence of a community of attitudes always precedes the existence of selves, but at first human social organization was "merely a resultant of, and wholly dependent upon, the physiological differentiations and demands of the individual organisms implicated in it" (Mead, 1934:227). These were the necessary

lower stages of the human social process. . . because minds and selves, consciousness and intelligence, could not otherwise have emerged . . . because . . . some sort of an ongoing social process in which human beings were implicated must have been there in advance of the existence of minds and selves in human beings, in order to make possible the development, by human beings, of minds and selves . . . (Mead, 1934:227).

Thus the physiological differentiation of the earliest human form led to primitive forms of social organization which in turn were the forerunners of more recent forms of social organization.

Rather than describing societies as wholes, however, Mead focused on several critical institutions, tracing them from certain basic physiological tendencies. These "forms" of social organization are the major means for progress, the growth of universality in social interaction, and in the course of history they take one form or another. Ultimately the general life process is moving toward a complex and universal form of social organization, a society "in which the individual members are interrelated in a multiplicity of different intricate and complicated ways . . ." and where they share more interests, have more individuality, and more highly developed selves (Mead, 1934:307).

For human social organization and behavior the most important physiological impulse, the need for sex and reproduction, is the basis of the institution of the family. The family, in turn, is the fundamental unit of social organization and "all such larger units or forms of human social organization as the clan or the state . . ." "Kindliness, helpfulness, and assistance" are in "the very structure of the individuals in a human community" (Mead, 1934:258) and they are the basis of religious institutions. These manifest themselves in neighborliness and tend to move human interaction into universal association. Social reconstruction is largely the outcome of these religious attitudes, and in this connection Mead examines the major universal religions of Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Finally, man also has economic inclinations, such as a tendency to exchange surplus goods, and such exchanges occur whenever men are able to communicate with one another. Once an attitude of production develops, it quickly leads to the establishment of markets, means for transportation, media of exchange, banking systems, etc., thereby increasing the economic interdependencies through the world (Mead, 1934:258, 291).

Although Mead refers all of these institutional forms to basic human, physiological impulses, he does not thereby imply either a biological or an environmental determinism. Rather he proposed an intricate theory of sensitivity with which he hoped to avoid the ontological problems of the existence of objects in the natural world. He maintained that each living organism creates its own environ-

ment by virtue of its peculiar sensory mechanisms; man is aware and responds to that part of the natural world which his senses allow him to perceive. This does not mean that a tree exists only when a man looks at it. But the objective world relevant to the emergence of the human form is that world which human sensory equipment allows man to perceive. When an adult is socialized his environment includes the interests and values of the generalized others around him. "It is the sensitivity of the organism that determines what its environment shall be, and in that sense we can speak of a form as determining its environment" (Mead, 1934:328, my emphasis).

Perhaps the most important emergent from the social process--at least with respect to social behavior--is the development of mind. Mind is the one aspect of human social behavior not shared in any way with the creatures of the animal kingdom; it is unique to man. It alone requires a conscious reflexiveness which involves on the one hand a potential awareness of the whole social process and on the other a conscious taking of the collective attitudes of others and adjusting to them. Mind is not self, for although both are emergent wholes or unities, mind is restricted to conscious thought:

The unity of the mind is not identical with the unity of the self. The unity of the self is constituted by the unity of the entire relational pattern of social behavior and experience in which the individual is implicated, and which is reflected in the structure of the self; but many of the aspects or features of this entire pattern do not enter into consciousness, so that the unity of the mind is in a sense an abstraction from the more inclusive unity of the self (Mead, 1934:144, fn.).

The functions of mind is best seen in the context of the various "forms of social conduct" (Mead, 1934:357, 354-378). Although Mead gives a long and detailed analysis of four of these forms, he does not himself label them nor does he always make sharp, categorical distinctions between and among them. It must be remembered that Mead assumed that animal behavior is based on instinctual tendencies, which, once they are evoked, must move directly to certain fulfillments or be entirely negated; and human behavior arises from basic impulses which could lead to various responses in spite of obstacles, conflicts, or interruptions.

The first or simplest form of social conduct occurring both on the animal and the human levels "may be defined as that conduct arising out of impulses whose specific stimuli are found in other individuals belonging to the same biologic group" (Mead, 1934:357). These stimuli, which Wundt called gestures, may appeal to any of the senses and in their simpler forms tend to call forth instinctive or impulsive responses, often of a motor sort. Examples can be cited from the lower animal species, such as the bees, ants, beavers, etc., who have no past or future, no self as an object, no reflection and no rational conduct. The relationship is simply one of stimulus and response.

A second form of conduct is one in which the animal providing the stimulus evokes the same response in itself as in others. Some birds heighten their own responses at the same time that they evoke other birds to sing, and some dogs howl, stimulating others as well as themselves. This self-stimulation by the use of gestures is a second form of conduct.

Immature human conduct exemplifies the third form. It does not yet exhibit the existence of mind although a self is in the process of emergence. Mead assumes that the child's behavior is based on impulses and, since they are universal to

humans, these will involve a common meaning of conduct based on them. Basically the child stimulates himself to respond in the same fashion as others do to him: so he utters soothing sounds to his own crying just as he later plays more complicated adult roles and responds to them. Given the many years of human dependence, the child plays roles of others for a long period of time. Yet he expresses adult responses only incompletely, and thus his responses are relatively truncated or immature in contrast to animal forms which instinctively express complete responses. Moreover, the child responds only to the role as a stimulus; he does not grasp the role as a whole. During these years of role playing, self-consciousness slowly arises as the child addresses himself from the perspective of various other roles and gradually comes to integrate those responses. Nor does the taking of the role of others stop with childhood. Adults still perform this taking the role of others when, as parents, they take the role of the crying infant. Indeed, this taking the role of a helpless person--an extension of the parental attitude--is the expression of universal sympathy.

The fourth and final form of conduct is one involving mind, which, of course, is not a substance but a process. It is:

. . . constructive or reflective or problem-solving thinking, is the socially acquired means or mechanism or apparatus whereby the human individual solves the various problems of environmental adjustment which arise to confront him in the course of his experience, and which prevent his conduct from proceeding harmoniously on its way, until they have thus been dealt with. And mind or thinking is also--as possessed by the individual members of human society--the means or mechanism or apparatus whereby social reconstruction is effected or accomplished (Mead, 1934:308).

Once the roles of others have become organized, and the biological individual responds to them and to himself as an organized personality, a self, then he can begin to view himself consciously as responsive to a variety of expectations of others and of himself--as friend, competitor, a good sport, etc. The world becomes one of composite objects with a variety of functions, features and taboos, and man becomes a rational animal. Problematic conduct passes into a reflective form, the subject being the biological individual and the object being the self adjusting itself to an environment.

When conduct becomes reflective, it means essentially that the self enlarges the realm of objective alternatives as well as altering the temporal sequences by means of imagery. Images which gather about vocal gestures of the act either as stimuli or as attitudes to action, may be simply percepts or they may be ideas associated with phases of the act which are not there in the immediately perceived present. They may have originated in past experience, but they allow man to reconstruct the social act in terms of possible, alternative goals or plans for the future as well as interpretations of the past. For lack of a better locus, Mead places images in the mind. The primary purpose of reflection, thought, and mind is to determine alternative courses of action, imagining alternative results or responses.

From the above descriptions it is evident that Mead conceived of forms as the emergences from a fundamental process encompassing all life forms. These forms have real existence and are not merely conventional labels applied arbitrarily to some sort of behavior. Their emergence can be described as the adjustment of a prior or simpler form to its conditions of life. Forms are always wholes, unities, or configurations, and their relationship to their environment is of determining

significance. Forms may have subvarieties. No form is ever static or absolute; they are always adjusting to new conditions, and many social forms seem to be changing toward some sort of universalism or perfection. Social roles may be grasped as wholes, but usually a role is used to refer to visible behavior on the part of others which the actor is imitating or otherwise using as a model or stimulus for his own development.

II

Although Schutz succeeded Mead by a generation, the roots of both men's theories were deeply embedded in similar European and American intellectual traditions, including neo-Kantianism, the researches in the newer psychology, and the writings of Henri Bergson and William James. Still their solutions to the problems of human behavior veered in different directions, Mead bearing toward a dynamic system built on his interpretation of Hegel and Darwin, and Schutz inclining more sharply toward an intricate social typology based on the philosophy of Husserl and the sociology of Max Weber.

A complete, even schematic summary of Schutz' system is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few highlights as they pertain to his use of types and typicalities will be attempted.²

As an admirer of Edmund Husserl, Schutz was notably influenced by several aspects of the philosopher's work, primarily in the realm of psychological phenomenology rather than his eidetic or transcendental phenomenologies. Husserl had contended that one should seek to describe, not causally explain, the phenomena of the mind, that is, subjects and their intended meanings. Thus one should begin with immediate experience of conscious human beings in the everyday world. Such experience is always directed toward some object, for consciousness is by its very nature always consciousness of something. The only question is toward which object is one's attention directed, and this depends upon one's perspective as an actor, other or observer, one's system of relevance, and one's biographical history. The philosophical problem of the reality of the outer world which is experienced, Husserl left in "brackets," that is, for the time being he by-passed it. In directing his attention at objects of his world, the individual does not merely perceive single objects, proposed Husserl, rather he engages in a special process of "pairing." Pairing occurs through apperception and appresentation and the results are not consciously questioned but are taken for granted. Apperception is the spontaneous interpretation of sensory perception in terms of past experiences and previously acquired knowledge of the perceived object; appresentation is an actual experience which refers to another experience not perceptually given, such as seeing the front of a building and having images of its inside and back. Through these processes man associates objects from various perceptual, referential and interpretational systems; he associates types with particulars or vice versa, one's own cogitations with those of one's fellow men, and typical motives with typical actions.

From the writings of Max Weber, Schutz derived his focus on the interpretative understanding of social action. However, after careful reexamination of Weber's work, he concluded that Weber had not differentiated the notion of motivation clearly enough. While retaining Weber's commitment to ideal types, Schutz was much more careful to distinguish the perspective from which typical motives are attributed to social action. As a result of both influences, Schutz formulated a phenomenological theory including an examination of the nature of the self, intersubjectivity, and the structure of the social world.

American readers of Schutz' works must remember however, that even though he is referred to as a sociologist, he did not automatically share all the American assumptions about science and scientific method. In his The Phenomenology of the Social World he noted that this work was the result of "rigorous philosophical reflection" (1967:xxxix). His conception of his problem as the establishment of an objective understanding of subjective human behavior, must be viewed in the context of the European distinction between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. Schutz construed the world of the natural sciences as containing facts and an observational field which were not or pre-interpreted. Therefore the natural scientist could follow specified rules of procedure in his examination of them. The social world, in contrast, is pre-selected in terms of systems of relevance appropriate to the Lebenswelt and the "multiple realities" to which the actors belong. The types of action, typical motives, means, projects-- in short, all the objects and observational fields of the social sciences are pre-selected by the actors living in a social world, and this necessitates different methods in the scientific study of social action.

All actors experience their world from the outset in terms of types and typicalities. This involves no judgment, for through apperception all experience is paired with previous experience, though the type may thereby be enlarged and divided into sub-types. Such types are taken for granted. Indeed it is characteristic of the world of everyday life that we take for granted the physical objects as we see them, the socio-cultural world as we have been taught to experience it, and our fellow men as sharing these typicalities. At times, however, as a result of interests from other systems of relevance, the taken for granted world may be questioned. Interests are the forces which move individuals to action, to project goals into the future in terms of the experience of the past, and to re-define the applicability of given types.

With respect to the use of types Schutz makes two crucial assumptions, that all knowledge entails constructs, and that names are merely conventions.

All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts selected from a universal context by the activities of the mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts. . . . This does not mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us. . . (1967:5).

To this basic premise must be added the second one, borrowed from Aristotle, that names are merely conventions. In his discussion of marks, indications, signs and symbols, Schutz noted Aristotle's position that "Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience. . . . Just as all men do not have the same writing, so all men do not have the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences. . . are the same for all" (1967:291). Schutz accepts this same universality of human experiences and the variability of symbols and quotes again from Aristotle that "a name is a sound significant by convention." And he concluded that "language and artificial signs in general are matters of conventions. But the concept of convention presupposes the existence of society and also the possibility of some communication. . ." (1967:291). The significance of these assumptions for Schutz' entire orientation becomes evident in his interpretation of the cognitive structures of everyday life and of science, especially those phases having to do with human conduct.

The world of everyday life has structure as a result of the thought objects which human beings living in a given social world have established to help them get their bearings in their socio-cultural world. Unlike Mead and other sociologists, Schutz does not concern himself with the genetic process whereby the child acquires these thought structures. Instead he simply begins with the fully mature adult, the wide-awake, grown-up man. The world in which he lives existed before his birth as an organized world, and his interpretations of it are based on a "stock of previous experiences" handed down to him from his parents and teachers which becomes his "stock of knowledge at hand." He interprets objects as having more or less definite qualities as well as horizons of familiarity, and he takes such knowledge for granted unless or until questioned by some special circumstance. These taken for granted, pre-experiences are from the outset accepted as typical and as somehow linked with anticipated similar experiences. Through apperception men experience mountains, trees, fellow men, et cetera, and not an arrangement of unique objects. Thus experience will confirm the type, sometimes enlarging it and further subdividing it, or it may be interpreted as a more unique object with a different form of typicality. In the long run it is the "selecting activity" of the mind which determines to which typicalities an object or event is related, and this selection depends on the system of relevance.

In spite of the fact that men live in a world of typicalities, they are still unique individuals by virtue of their own peculiar biographical histories. Each event and every action is uniquely his own in the sense that physically each man can only be in a certain place at a certain time and can have only his own accumulation of social experiences, his own history. Given his own past, he has his own unique future and his own purposes at hand for which he utilizes whatever knowledge he possesses. Although the cultural tradition provides him with typical knowledge, information and relevance systems, it is his own unique situation which determines the actual selectivity at any given time. Most investigations of the common sense would proceed with an investigation of the acting individual and his private world.

But our world is really an intersubjective one because we live and work among other men, we understand others and they understand us, and we live in a world of culture, that is, a texture of meanings which has been instituted by human actions of the past and present. Cultural objects are understood primarily in terms of the function they have for those who originated and use them. There are three assumptions in connection with intersubjectivity which need comment. First we take for granted that there is a reciprocity of perspectives, that is, we assume that intelligent fellow men exist and have access to the same knowledge as we ourselves, but that given their own peculiar place in space and time, they will have a somewhat different perspective. If individuals were to interchange positions, they would have a similar perspective as long as their systems of relevance are the same.

A second assumption with respect to the social nature of knowledge is that only "a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experience" (Schutz, 1967:13). Knowledge is simply transmitted through friends, parents or teachers, and possess typical features. In addition to this accumulation of typical constructs the individual learns how to construct typicalities in accordance with the accepted system of relevance. The foremost medium for all typification is language, both vocabulary and syntax. Finally, knowledge is not evenly distributed throughout society. Individuals within the social world learn that knowledge varies in clarity, distinctness, precision and familiarity, and individuals within the social world share it differentially. Some knowledge is mastered by specialists or by other groups in the society with the result that there is a social distribution of knowledge.

Some of the common sense constructs used in the social world for its typification derive directly from the nature of intersubjectivity, from the relations of the actor with others. From the perspective of the acting individual, the social world is comprised of an "I" and a "we," "you," and a "they" depending on how the actor includes himself as a point of reference. In addition, "I" exist at this moment in time, but there were people before my time upon whom I can no longer act but whose actions may still influence me, they are my predecessors. Those who share my time period are my contemporaries; and those who follow are my successors, for I cannot experience them, but I may orient my actions toward them. Relations with these types of fellow men may vary in terms of intimacy of anonymity, familiarity or strangeness, and intensity or extensity. Contemporaries, or those with whom I share the present, are further differentiated into consociates, or persons with whom I also share my special world; we exist in the same face-to-face world and are mutually involved in one another's biographies; we grow old together; we live in a pure "we" relationship. Using Bergson's concept of duration, consociates may be grasped in their unique individuality because they share the same durée. But the other relationships are the ones in which typical reactions are involved:

In all the other forms of social relationship. . . the fellow-man's self can merely be grasped by a 'contribution of imagination of hypothetical meaning presentation. . . that is, by forming constructs of a typical way of behavior, a typical pattern of underlying motives, of typical attitudes of a personality type, . . . of which the Other and his conduct . . . are just instances or exemplars (Schutz, 1967:17).

Such a system of structures includes "course of action types" and various "personality types." Usually as the anonymity increases, less content will be involved in each type, that is, fewer aspects of personality and behavior will be part of the type.

As the actor typifies the conduct of his fellow men, he constructs the other as a partial self, as a performer of typical roles, -- as for example, bus driver, tax collector, producer, etc., and he thereby engages in self typification as passenger, taxpayer, consumer, etc. Thus in typifying others' behaviors the actor typifies himself in a partial way. (Schutz identified this notion with Mead's "I" and "me," but it would be more accurate to associate it with Mead's concept of self and role.) Most if these types or roles are socially derived from members of the in-group and are socially approved, indeed frequently they are institutionalized.

The "course of action types" in terms of which individuals relate to others are meaningful in the context of social action. Schutz distinguished between "act" and "action" meaning by the latter human conduct devised by the actor beforehand, while "act" refers to the completed conduct. The course of action type refers to conduct as yet uncompleted and as such it must involve a phantasied or imagined "project" or anticipated outcome. These projects are based on the actors knowledge at hand at a given time including experience with performing the act previously. Projecting thus involves repetition, or what Husserl had called the idealization of "I-can-do-it-again," namely the assumption that "I may under typically similar circumstances act in a way typically similar to that in which I acted before in order to bring about a typically similar state of affairs."

Obviously there is in all repetition of activity the experience of a previous trial which then becomes a factor in making the second action slightly different from the first. Having a second baby is different from having the first. But Schutz insisted that in the idealization of the "I-can-do-it-again" the actor is

merely interested in the typicalities of the action, the typical initial action "A," the circumstances "C," and the anticipated state of affairs "S."

Course of action types include not only a project based on the I-can-do-it-again idealization, but they entail a motive. As a result of his study of Max Weber's ideal types of social action, Schutz concluded that there are essentially two kinds of motives. From the point of view of the observer the motives may refer to the experiences and conditions which determined the act and of which the actor is himself not particularly aware. These latter are the "because" motives. In typifying behavior these two kinds of motives must be distinguished.

Even though types of action exist and are widely used on the common sense level of everyday life, the study of behavior in terms of its rationality must occur on a higher, that is, a scientific, plane. The basic reason for this is that behavior may be interpreted or understood from at least three perspectives--that of the actor, of the other person, and of the observer. Since each one of these persons has his own biographical experiences and peculiar problems at hand, his interpretations will be more or less different. And this difference comes to play a role in the interpretation of the "rationality" of behavior. Indeed, what is reasonable, sensible, or rational varies considerably.

We may say that someone acted "sensibly" if his "action is in accordance with a socially approved set of rules and recipes for coming to terms with typical problems by applying typical means for achieving typical ends" (Schutz, 1967:27). Sensible behavior requires no insight into one's motives or the means-ends context; it may simply involve a strong emotional reaction which others would also expect under similar circumstances. If an action which seems sensible to an observer also entails a "judicious choice" on the part of the actor, it may be called reasonable, even if simply habitual or traditional. Rational action, which is considered categorically different from affectual or traditional action, assumes that the actor has a clear and distinct insight into the ends, the means, and the secondary results and thus the alternatives on all levels of action. This interpretation is especially difficult to apply on the common sense level because both the actor and the observer may have different points of view. It can occur only "within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting, the motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved and taken for granted (Schutz, 1967:33). Both the actor and the fellow man must take these typicalities for granted and they must share certain cultural assumptions for the concept of rationality to be at all applicable. At best it will be only a partial rationality, a matter of degree. Moreover, rational insight into action patterns decreases with the increase in the anonymity of the situation. In spite of all these difficulties, rational understanding of subjective behavior is possible, but Schutz seeks this on the scientific level where the models of rational behavior can be described in accordance with specified rules.

The scientific structure of the social world is built upon the common-sense typicalities, of interpretations of action by the actor, but it must be more specifically defined. While the common sense world is concerned with practical workings, the scientific world is concerned with cognitive understanding. Therefore its explanation of social reality must adhere to the ultimate goal of providing "objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning structures" (Schutz, 1967:62). Scientific constructs must be what Schutz calls second level constructs, that is, free from the biographical situation of the scientist and possessing relatively few connotative meanings. The system of relevance on this second level of constructs is the scientific situation and the

scientific problem. The scientist uses the stock of knowledge which belongs to his discipline, including the methods for forming constructs.

In the analysis of social action the scientist proceeds somewhat as follows. Having observed certain events, he constructs typical courses of action patterns and coordinates them with personal types of actors, whom he imagines as having consciousness. To this fictitious consciousness he ascribes typical "in order to" motives corresponding to the goals of the observed action and typical "because" motives upon which the "in order to" motives are based. Both types of motives are assumed to be invariant. In a sense, the scientist has created models or puppets whose actions, given a constructed stock of knowledge, make the action subjectively understandable. Such an homunculus knows no emotional states of hope and fear, he is not free to choose, and thus cannot have conflicting interests or make errors. He can have only those characteristics which the scientist has ascribed to him. Given such an homunculus, the scientist can create others until he has a network of interlocking actors with appropriate motives and goals. Only such a scientific model is truly rational, for all the difficulties of real actors have been eliminated (Schutz, 1967:40-43).

There are three restrictions which are placed on such scientific constructions: 1) logical consistency, 2) subjective interpretation, and 3) adequacy. He contended that scientific constructs would remain consistent with common sense types only if the conceptual framework remained compatible with the principles of formal logic, if it was stated in terms of motives and goals or outcomes--because that is the way the mind works--and if the constructed model made sense and was understandable to the actor on the everyday life level.

Schutz was convinced that rational models of behavior could be used in the social sciences in a variety of ways. Patterns of social interaction could be studied in isolation if the actors behave rationally within the sets of conditions, means, ends, and motives. Rational behavior of constructed types is by definition predictable and thus could be used as a standard for the ascertainment of deviant behavior. And finally several models or sets of models of rational action could be developed and compared, and the most adequate selected for further use.

III

The preceding presentation of some of the usages of forms and types in the writings of Mead and Schutz permit a few comparable observations, some comments on their methodological implications, and finally some indications of their consequences for theory construction and sociological research.

Etymologically the words have had similar meanings. "Form" traces its origins to the Latin word "forma" meaning figure, model, mold, and sort, which during the history of thought came to mean more directly structure and patterns and even essence--as a result of the scholastics' distinction of substance and essence. In Kant, of course, forms were associated with the a priori categories of the mind. "Type" had its roots in both Greek and Latin and meant kind, class or group, and later an individual or thing embodying certain characteristic qualities. Significantly, a type has "recurrent, general, distinctive features which are not properties of the individual as such," writes Tiryakian, and while types are parts of classificatory systems, forms belong to the study of morphology (1968:178). Mead and Schutz' use of the terms as referring to unities, patterns, and configurations is thus consistent with their etymological derivations.

Although sociologists do not generally distinguish between structure and classification, it is evident from the writings of Mead and Schutz, that the contexts within which forms and types occur is quite different. For Mead forms are realities within a larger social process, they are the configurations which emerge in the course of the dynamics of life, while for Schutz types are static idealizations of patterns of behavior, motives, actions, goals, etc., which are logically interrelated with other types into a total system--common sense, scientific, religious, etc., whatever other realms of the "multiple realities" prevail.

It is consistent with these distinctions of intellectual contexts that Mead was more interested in the explanation of the emergence of form and Schutz in the descriptions and understanding of the prevailing types. Living in the era in which he did, Mead's interests were in the origins and development of social behavior, and in the scientific social control of the processes of evolution and social reconstruction. He assumed that causal processes operated with respect to human behavior just as they did for the world of nature, and that social scientists were to discover these natural laws. The explanation of the emergence of social forms was intimately linked to this problem.

Schutz was caught up in the aftermath of the polemic between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften, and thus he was concerned with the objective ordering of the social world and social action, and the structuring and defining of its parts. He therefore stressed careful description of the types of motives, means and goals taken for granted in the world of everyday life and their refinement for use of the scientific level. Types and typicalities could then become elements in his larger theoretical system. While Mead had searched for explanations of the emergence of forms, Schutz assumed types and sought to describe and define them.

Sociologists today may find both forms and types useful in their work, and there is no reason why either notion should be arbitrarily preferred to the other. Scientists interested in differentiating various kinds of social behavior may find Schutz' approach more useful, while social reconstructionists might be more inclined toward explanations of the processes whereby social forms have emerged. Using Schutz' terms we might say that scientific sociology seems to have not one but several systems of relevance.

In the application of both types and forms there are, however, some basic difficulties which the empirical scientist cannot overlook. At some point or other there must be reliance on subjective judgment. Neither term is the result simply of combining or adding a series of attributes or characteristics to make a whole; both positions assume that the whole is greater than the parts. Therefore they both necessitate human judgment either in establishing the form or type or in allocating individual instances to it. Just as Darwin realized that a naturalist determines a given species from a combination of observations and judgments, so Mead's notion of the "me" as the form of the "I," or of social institutions as forms of social organization entailed a subjective judgment. Schutz encountered similar difficulties. In his paper on the stranger, he defines the stranger and then according to his own best judgments selects aspects of this social type for closer examination. Thus subjective judgment enters either at the point of formulating the whole or in the selection of the characteristics which are essential to it.

Once established, a form or whole, if it is to be used in science, must be related to particular instances, and here again the interpretation of the scientist enters in. If both types and forms are wholes which are somehow more than the separate parts, and if, in addition, they are idealizations, that is, typicalities not expected to correspond to the particular instances, then how is a particular instance ascribed to such a type or form? Schutz partially avoided the issue by assuming that all named objects are types. However, he was faced with the issue of ascribing the correct type to an object. As indicated earlier, he relied on Husserl's notion of apperception and appresentation to make this association, and on the scientific level he relied on consensus of the scientific community. According to Mead's position, forms could only be exemplified by particulars, at the discretion of the scientist, or vice versa, the scientist could by his subjective judgment interpret a particular as being an illustration of a given form. This problem has been tackled in an empirical manner recently by Harold Garfinkel who attempted to determine the actual criteria used by individuals in allocating instances of death to various types of suicide (Garfinkle, 1967: esp. Chap. I, pp. 17-18). Schutz' writings seem particularly helpful in connection with these types of problems because he stresses the taken for granted phases of social life.

The criteria for our subjective judgments and our taken for granted behavior are part of what Schutz has called systems of relevance. By suggesting that these systems may vary from one culture to another, he has taken a position rather different from Mead and the earlier social scientists who believed in the unity of the natural world, the unity of all science, and the universality of human interests. Accepting the variability of systems of relevance means that the social sciences should build their theories around the variations of human interests. For the sociology of knowledge such an orientation may mean a new lease on life by providing a more focused problem formulation. And indeed there are projects under way seeking to establish just these existential or folk typologies and systems of relevance.³

There remains only one more major problem which affects the research scientist: the problem of change. Mead's dynamic system provides more flexibility at this point since he allows for the constant modification and the re-emergence of new forms in accordance with the interaction of the existing form with its enviroing conditions. Social roles, social conduct, institutions and selves may all be different tomorrow from what they are today. But in typologies the system is fixed and the types are static, usually defined in terms of essential characteristics. And for such systems change is a difficult problem. Schutz has tried to allow for some flexibility by allowing open horizons for the types on the common sense level, but his types on the scientific level are much more rigid and thus difficult to change. In the social sciences the phenomena do change--witness the different kinds of criminal offenses today from those of fifty years ago! With this problem of change we have arrived full circle at the problem of the origin of types and forms. For Schutz who simply assumed the existence of types, the creation of new types becomes a major scientific obstacle.

While this paper has not solved any of the problems pertaining to the formation and use of generalizing concepts in the social sciences, it is hoped that it has provided some enlightenment with respect to selected, basic problems. Neither types nor forms are arbitrarily created, although the ultimate test of the one is found in the natural world and the other on the level of human consensus. In the opinion of this writer, Schutz has indeed raised a series of fruitful topics to which sociologists may address themselves, including the criteria of social types and scientific types, the determination of social objects and social rules which

are taken for granted, and the question whether social life is indeed a network of types and typicalities and not the idiosyncratic world most sociologists have usually assumed.

Footnotes

¹Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Dengin, 1970:28; Schutz, 1967:Vol. I, pp. 19, 189, 216-217, 223-225.

²The following summary is based primarily on Schutz, 1967b; Schutz, 1970: Vol. I, esp. pp. 3-47, 207-245, and Wagner, 1970.

³For instance the anthropological works of C. R. Leach and Rodney Needham in England and Claude Levi-Strauss in France.

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