

Time and International Relations Theory

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Abstract

In this thesis, I promote the relevance of time to International Relations theory, arguing that the meaning and character of time often taken as given or natural is actually the result of material, historical, and sociopolitical processes, and that ignoring these processes effectively prolongs and empowers them. I develop these themes in the following ways. First, utilizing a temporal lens from social theory, I briefly typologize the theoretical canon. Second, I employ a genealogical history to uncover the coeval rises of Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty. Third, I argue that the dominance of abstract, Western temporality continues virtually unchallenged, implicating IR scholarship in the reproduction of that hegemony. Finally, I address theoretical developments that have the potential to contribute to a greater understanding of time's role in international relations by showing how time is productive of the social subject.

For Mom and Dad

in whose lives I have tried to include a steady diet of surprise

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Introduction and temporalized literature review

Very much more do we value the distinct, the geometric, the universal . . . To the . . . obsession of Time, with its emotional urgency and visceral agitation, we prefer [the] ‘obsession of Space’.

—Wyndham Lewis

This is the time. Now is the place.

—Senator Edward Kennedy¹

Introduction

To date, theories of international relations have little space for time. While enjoying extensive treatment in other disciplines including philosophy, social theory, and political theory, the study of time has received short shrift from International Relations (IR)² scholars. However, time is a crucial component of world politics. Ultimatums (temporal deadlines) mark and sometimes hurry the onset of violent conflicts, quick victories in those conflicts equate to greater power, and the historical taxonomy of wars

¹ Kennedy’s comment was made while introducing an immigration bill on 2 July 2007 (Smith 2007).

² By convention, I use capitals and the acronym to denote the academic discipline of International Relations while referring to the political phenomena that occur between or across nation-states as international relations.

frequently characterizes them by their duration.³ International institutions and regimes emerge over years, decades, or centuries rather than appearing instantaneously in the global milieu. Innovations such as telegraphs, telephones, televisions, and the internet have induced a diplomatic upheaval in the past two centuries, compressing timeframes in which negotiations and decisions take place from months or weeks to hours and sometimes minutes. Some political research employs time-series analyses or implies temporality by discussing long cycles in historico-political developments. This list, while no means comprehensive, is demonstrative of the *implicit* nature of time in the study of international relations: time functions as context or as analytical indicator, but not as a distinct component deserving judicious investigation.

This research project has two primary purposes. First, I promote the relevance of time to international relations and IR theory by demonstrating that an *explicit* discussion about temporality can aid in our understanding of world politics. Second, I argue that the meaning and character of time often taken as given or natural is actually the result of material, historical, and sociopolitical processes, and that ignoring these processes effectively prolongs and empowers them. These objectives are pursued in three ways. In this chapter, I develop a temporal lens from social theory and show how it can usefully typologize the theoretical canon and facilitate critique. Because my goal is to argue for time's relevance to IR, the literature review that follows does not provide a

³ Some wars have come to be conventionally known by their duration, including the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), the Nordic Seven Years' War (1563-1570), the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), and the Six Days' War (5 June 1967–10 June 1967).

comprehensive summary of IR theory.⁴ Such an endeavor is more suited to the goal of demonstrating time's *power* in IR theory as a competitor to other modes of analysis such as spatial (geopolitical) accounts⁵ or agent-structure orientations.⁶ Rather, the stated goal demands the exploration of aspects of IR theory that include temporal claims (implicit and explicit, negative and positive) and the effects of these claims on theory. In methodological parlance, I freely admit to selecting on the dependent variable and argue that a straightforward demonstration of the existence of such variables is supportive of the contention that temporality needs to be incorporated into IR in a more systematic and self-conscious way.

In chapter two, I use a genealogical history to demonstrate the contingency of time as it is most commonly conceived (consisting of seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc). This history is based on the connection between standard time and a coeval⁷ phenomenon of the European Enlightenment: state sovereignty. Such a connection may seem, at first glance, to be tantamount to tethering a mole hill to a mountain. But I hope to show that this particular method of reckoning time—as the linear progression of rational, consistent,

⁴ For an excellent and equitable example of a more comprehensive yet thematic review, see (Rengger 2000).

⁵ See (Herz 1957, 1968). Also see Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, excerpted in (Keohane 1986), which receives attention in later in this chapter. More recently, see (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, Yiftachel 2005).

⁶ Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* also features an agent-structure discussion, as does his earlier work, (Waltz 1959). For a seminal constructivist account of the agent-structure problem, see (Wendt 1999). For a survey of the debate in IR from a scientific realist perspective, see (Wight 2006).

⁷ Coeval in this sense means basic contemporaneity but also implies intersubjectivity, or an interaction between two elements sharing the same time (Fabian 1983:30-31).

infinitely divisible units measured by a mechanical timepiece and thus divorced from their natural (celestial) foundations—is a forgotten product of modernity.⁸ I characterize it as forgotten because acceptance of clock-based time, evidenced by a dearth of contestations of the concept, effectively naturalizes an Enlightenment phenomenon deserving of much closer scrutiny. Another phenomenon that *has* received scrutiny is territorial state sovereignty, a foundational concept of both the international system and IR. Might modern temporality also buttress the international system in important ways? Exploring these issues more closely reflects the observation that the arrangement of international affairs has *both* spatial and temporal components. However, this ostensibly mundane observation may be more provocative than it initially appears if the proliferation of geopolitics but not chrono- or temporo-politics is any indication.⁹

A genealogical account of modern time as a global standard uncovers the historical contingency of this particular method of reckoning time. After its birth in Western Europe, modern time was globalized, along with territorial sovereignty, via colonialism. And much as sovereignty as a spatial organizing principle persisted past colonial independence, so did the regime of Western European standardized time.

Founded in critical social theory,¹⁰ genealogical techniques challenge a “logic of

⁸ I frame the historical era associated with modernity as broadly as possible—from the Protestant Reformation to present day—in order to give adequate attention to the germination and proliferation of modern temporality.

⁹ Although, der Derian has begun to advocate the study of chronopolitics. See (der Derian 1990).

¹⁰ Risking irony, for ‘foundational’ examples, see Foucault’s (1971) exploration of Nietzsche (2003 [1913]).

calculability and an appearance of scientific objectivity that places . . . fundamental assumptions . . . beyond discussion and debate” (de Goede 2005:3). Genealogies have been used in studies of international politics to historicize such concepts as finance (de Goede 2005), diplomacy (der Derian 1992), and sovereignty (Bartelson 1995). Inherent in all these efforts is the belief that the concepts under investigation have become reified and naturalized—that they have come to be viewed as given, timeless, or universal.

Genealogies are thus a process of rediscovery that challenges the naturalness of such social facts, all of which were constituted somewhere and somewhen.¹¹ Given IR’s prior inattentiveness, incorporating temporal issues into the discipline without historicizing them would further reify the omission of time as a sociopolitical object.¹²

In chapter three, I discuss some ways in which this accepted view of time has influenced scholarly efforts to comprehend international affairs. I argue that modern temporality now exerts an even greater influence on world politics than modern

¹¹ Understanding these elements as ‘social facts’ relies on a constructivist “emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge” (Adler 1997:322), which is appropriate given that all of the listed elements have no value independent of some agreement between social actors. The benefit of this reliance is that it can “illuminate important features of international politics that were previously enigmatic and have crucial *practical* implications for international theory and empirical research” (Adler 1997:323). Treatments of sovereignty in IR have often explicitly acknowledged its social foundations. For example, see (Weber 1995, Biersteker and Weber 1996, Ruggie 1998, Hall 1999, Philpott 2001). Giddens has called explicitly for such a treatment of clock time, contending that it “should not be accepted simply as an unquestioned dimension . . . but must be regarded as itself a socially conditioned influence upon . . . actors in modern societies” (1984:132-33).

¹² A genealogical inclination is even more appropriate to this topic in light of der Derian’s discussion of genealogical critiques, based on an understanding of temporal contingency as insecurity, as undercutting the promise that security and stability can be accomplished through knowledge production (1992:35-38).

sovereignty. Current IR research devotes substantial space to arguments regarding the demise of the territorial sovereign state. However, the hegemony of abstract, clock-based temporality continues virtually unchallenged, implicating IR scholarship in the reproduction of that hegemony. Furthermore, IR has displayed a tendency to accept without question a dichotomized view of time as having either a cyclical or linear nature. This dichotomy is itself a convention that exerts disciplinary power on the field, treating as schizophrenic the few theoretical movements that conceptualize time as neither exclusively cyclical nor linear before forcing those movements into an either-or binary that limits their theoretical relevance. Thus, IR scholarship loses time in two ways. First, it overwhelmingly favors spatial concepts and constructions over temporal ones. Second, when it does address time, IR acquiesces to the immutability of what is, in reality, a historically conditioned means of dealing with temporality as a concept. IR has always used time, albeit blithely, tacitly, or haphazardly, to understand the international realm. However, few scholars have critically examined any aspect of time's usage, and those who have adopt the cyclical-linear dichotomy without reflection. Rectifying this error can lead to reduced theoretical dissonance within the field, so the chapter closes by proposing the corrective metaphor of time as a wheel.

I conceive this thesis as an initial effort of a research program committed to the methodical and explicit treatment of temporality in IR. In chapter four, I address theoretical developments that have the potential to contribute to a greater understanding of time's role in international relations by showing how time is productive of the social

subject. These developments are occurring primarily in foreign policy analysis and critical studies concerned with self, memory, and trauma. Combining insights from these areas of study, I suggest that the next step in taking time more seriously is to depart the privileged present that typifies positivist theorizing; by doing so, IR can rediscover its past, invigorate its future, and embrace other academic disciplines.

A note on temporal metaphors

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to say a few words about the use of metaphors in temporal studies. It is virtually impossible to conduct research on time without encountering the standard dyad of cyclical and linear time.¹³ The supremacy of this dyad is intriguing given that it coincides with a treatment of time as divisible into past, present, and future. Indeed, part of my objective in the rest of this chapter is to argue that this binary, especially treated as an Enlightenment either-or dichotomy (Adam 2004:10), is ill-suited for constructing IR theories.

But we need metaphors for that which resists easy explication, and few concepts are more resistant than time. In Saint Augustine's words, "If you do not ask me what time is I know, but if you ask me, I do not know" (quoted in Robinson 1920:653).¹⁴ But then it was also Augustine who rejected the possibility of combining metaphors since time was

¹³ For example, see (Gould 1987, Price 1996, Morris 1985, Jablonsky 1997).

¹⁴ Augustine's comment may be the most widely cited in general studies of time, amounting to a fortifying "ritual incantation" (Fabian 1983:ix) to which no graduate student should be so brave as to refuse recourse.

undoubtedly linear in the sense of Christianity's vision of progression toward the Rapture (Lane 2000:241). So it would seem that Kant, who claimed that time is an ontological result of the human mind's need to make intuition explicit (Wight 2006:25), was right. We 'know' time when we try to explain what we experience. But if we accept Kant, we must also remember that the time of the mind always resists discursive efforts (Mooij 2005:67).

Discursive and philosophical issues notwithstanding, time is clearly playing a role in international politics, necessitating an engagement with the standard metaphors used in its explication. The cyclical conception of time is usually thought to derive from nature's countless "cycles of eternal return" such as the movement of the planets and biological life cycles (Adam 2004:18). Thus, cyclical time is often associated with the absence or insignificance of change. The basic linear conception of time claims that there are some characteristics distinct to each moment. Time differs depending on how it is approached and is thus asymmetric or "anisotropic" (Mooij 2005:228, Adam 2004:32). The more seductive vision of linearity sees time as the movement—ever *forward*—of events toward some ultimate goal. This is the linear-progressive time for which Augustine argued, the vision with which I will associate all subsequent discussions of linear temporality,¹⁵ and the reason for one final disclaimer.

¹⁵ I base this choice on theoretical preponderance rather than any personal belief in a bright future. For a concise history of the varieties of linear and cyclical metaphors, as well as of arguments about time in general, see (Mooij 2005).

Subsequent references to ‘progress’ *do not* refer to merely welcome developments. Distinguishing progress as *inevitable development* from progress as *welcome developments* is important in IR, since few theorists would decry, say, less violence or more justice.¹⁶ However, I subsequently examine several theorists who insist on a vision of time as marking inevitable, irreversible movement toward some endpoint. In this sense, ‘progress’ may be the caricature of asymmetric time mentioned above—the conflation of the belief that every moment is unique with a belief that those moments constitute a knowable trajectory.

Social theory

The rarity of explicit temporality in IR theory¹⁷ necessitates a turn to social theory, where time enjoys a more prominent and lucid role. In this section, I begin by summarizing substantial efforts to incorporate time in twentieth century social theory.

¹⁶ Barkin conflates the two when he tabulates scholars who accept human rights norms “uncritically as *good ones*” as “liberal-idealists” (2003:335 emphasis added). Liberal-idealists should be categorized as such because they subscribe to some sort of inevitable, irreversible vision of welcome developments, not merely because they view those developments as good or just. Holding ‘progressive’ beliefs, in the sense of wanting the world to be better than it currently is, in no way necessitates an uncritical acceptance of what counts as ‘better’, and in no way prevents a critical examination of betterment in action. For an example, see (Lang 2001).

¹⁷ This could be referred to as the ‘thin’ or ‘short’ argument for the importance of temporal studies in IR. I am aware of only five scholars working on international politics topics who have explicitly discussed temporality: James der Derian (1990, 1992, 2001), R.B.J. Walker (1991, 1993), Stephen Hanson (1997), William Callahan (2006), and Kimberly Hutchings (2007). However, of this quintet, only der Derian and Walker have made temporality a recurring feature of their research—the other three seem to have come upon time while slaying other dragons. As I discuss in chapter four, including related fields such as foreign policy analysis and critical memory studies enlarges this group considerably and importantly.

Anthony Giddens' thinking has already been influential in the constructivist movement in IR, while the work of G. H. Mead, Eviatar Zerubavel, and Barbara Adam all grant a privileged position to time. I conclude by focusing on the work of Patrick Baert, whose social theory provides an insightful way to temporally evaluate IR theories.

Giddens is best known for introducing structuration theory, which posits that all social acts are “recursive”—that their structured properties are “constantly recreated out of the very resources which constitute them” (1984:xxiii).¹⁸ Structurationism relies on “time-space distanciation”, the idea that social interaction persists beyond face-to-face, synchronic encounters (Giddens 1984:37). Because the “history” of agents’ continuous reflexivity regarding the constraints on and consequences of their many habituated actions precedes any future behavior, Giddens views structuration as beginning with temporality (1984:3). Temporality also plays an important part in explaining actor intent. For Giddens, the greater the temporal duration between an act and its consequence(s), the more difficult it becomes to ascribe specific intentionality to the actor. Combined with his understanding of consequences as outcomes for which the act(s) were necessary but not sufficient (1984:11), Giddens’ intentionality posits a social world in which complexity and indeterminacy are positively related to time.

¹⁸ Structuration theory has been well-cited in discussions on the relationship between agents and structures. For constructivist positions on this discussion, see (Adler 1997:325, Wendt 1992:399, and 1999). For a scientific realist account that discusses Giddens, see (Wight 2006). Additionally, Giddens is foundational to recent work on the importance of self-identity in state behavior (Steele 2005, 2007c).

Giddens' effort to incorporate time as an equal partner to space is meant as an antidote to purely structuralist or functionalist accounts of social life. Mead leans further toward temporality by devising a social theory based on humans' experience of the present as the locus of reality. For Mead, reality is essentially an overlapping of "specious presents" or "emergent events" constituted by the interplay between continuity and discontinuity (Maines 2001:42). The idea that the past leads to the present is simply a mental construct: "It rests with what we call our mental processes to place these images (of the past) in a temporal order. We are engaged in spreading backward what is going on so that the steps we are taking will be a continuity in advance to the goals of our conduct" (Mead, quoted in Maines 2001:42). This "spreading backward" amounts to a continual reconstruction of the past based on the fluid relationship between novelty and expectation that characterizes any present (Maines 2001:43). The past remains capable of influencing the present and future; Mead's contribution is to equalize the relationship by placing the meaning of each period in perpetual tension with its temporal counterparts. In this sense, Mead's "philosophy of the present" can be considered a purely temporal analog to structurationism.

Adam and Zerubavel examine more empirical topics through temporal lenses, treating specific uses of time as entry points to general social theorizing. Zerubavel has been prolific, generating numerous articles and more than a few books that examine the negotiations of calendars (1977, 1982b), the seven-day week (1985), the use of timetables

(1976), and collective memory (1996, 2003, 2004).¹⁹ The common thread running through these works is that human time is not a natural phenomenon but rather is a cultural component that structures, and is structured by, daily social life.

Adam challenges predominant understandings of social time by criticizing the “classical” view of temporal development, which delineates between archaic societies (cyclical, presentist) and modern civilizations (linear, past- and future-“extensive”), as an oversimplification (2004:75).²⁰ She explores alternate approaches to the study of time based on either premodern “creative” acts of tempering, transcendence, knowledge and know-how, or the modern “five Cs”: control, compression, colonization, commodification, and clock time (2004:124). This framework forms the basis of Adam’s critique of modern efforts to abstract and objectify time as independent of lived, human experience. Adam also adapts Ulrich Beck’s reflexive modernization, concluding that the temporal principles that underpin modern, industrialized society also contain threats to the continued cohesiveness of that society (2004:147, see also Beck 1994).²¹

As may be inferred from her five Cs, Adam is highly critical of modern, Western, standardized time and its conventional uses. An element of tragedy inheres to modern temporal power dynamics: in pursuit of stability and control, the prediction of the future produces unintended outcomes that are “lived” in the very locales in which indigenous

¹⁹ In addition to those cited in this discussion, see also (Zerubavel 1982a, 1987).

²⁰ Adam refers to the “classical view” out of a concern to critique the history of scholarship on temporality. As mentioned above, I take a similar position with regard to temporal metaphors.

²¹ The idea of modernity’s internal temporal tension figures prominently in some of the theorists I later refer to as “accelerationist” (see chapter three).

time has been usurped by modern, standard time (Adam 2004:124). This idea in particular relates strongly to the colonial phenomena discussed in chapter two, Giddens' time-distanciated outcomes, and Baert's concern with unintended consequences, to which I now turn.

Temporalized Sociology

While Adam is likely the preeminent patron of time in social theory,²² Baert offers the best opportunity to tease out temporality in IR theory. His framework may be less finely parsed than Adam's nine-celled taxonomy, but it is significant as a direct and innovative response to the limiting dichotomy of cyclical versus linear metaphors of time. Since that dichotomy disciplines much of the IR canon, Baert's framework is ideal for a canonical evaluation.²³

Baert's central concern is how time operates in social theories.²⁴ His "temporalized sociology" is based on a denial of "the reality of the abstract moment that is supposed to define the knife edge of the present, dividing the frozen past from the labile future" (Baert 1992b:viii). This yields a "research program featuring diachronic analysis and

²² Zerubavel's contributions notwithstanding, Adam has not only published widely on the subject, but also founded the journal *Time and Society*.

²³ Adam's taxonomy may become more relevant as interest in time in IR grows, although readers who find a high degree of theoretical unity in IR may not have use for so many options (four creative acts plus the five Cs). I acknowledge Adam's most subtle construction of social time, but now opt for Baert's conceptual clarity.

²⁴ Baert characterizes his work as a metatheoretical correction—an attempt to erect a more effective theoretical edifice from which to analyze real-world issues (1992b:11).

process²⁵ (in the sense of both novelty and continuity) as its methodological rules, as opposed to structural synchronic research” (1992b:4). But temporalized sociology is not only a methodological assertion: “becoming, process, and diachrony are considered as the ontological grounds of human life” (1992b:12).²⁶ Baert opposes structural and positivist mainstreams by focusing on endogenous determinants, such as the development of self-consciousness and “meta-descriptive capacity” (1992b:12), and by taking what Colin Wight refers to as a scientific realist perspective (2006:14-61).²⁷ This perspective lends a different “asymmetry” to social time than the ontological claim discussed earlier. Baert’s social time is asymmetrical due to the distinction between the actual nature of time and human’s experience of time: “The real past has occurred in a particular way and . . . nothing in the present or future can change that. Its meaning or representation, however, can change and does so regularly” (1992b:76).²⁸

Temporalized sociology builds on Giddens’ vision of the co-constitutive relationship between individual (agent) and structure and Mead’s succession of specious presents,²⁹ resulting in a “pragmatist” image of time in social behavior. Pragmatist temporality contends that “when confronted with unexpected events . . . people may

²⁵ The use of “process” indicates temporalized sociology’s link to process (or processual) philosophy (Baert 1992b:viii).

²⁶ For a recent discussion of the inextricable links between ontology and methodology, see (Wight 2006:19).

²⁷ Wight defines scientific realism as the belief “that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to know it”(Wight 2006:25-26).

²⁸ Baert also refers to this as an “objectivist” or “interpretativist” view of the past (1992b:76).

²⁹ In contrast to Giddens’ prominence, I am aware of no substantial reference of Mead in IR theory. Given Mead’s focus on temporality, his absence in IR may be considered symptomatic of the central thrust of this thesis.

reconstruct the past symbolically and reflect discursively upon previously tacit presuppositions and practices”. If collectively established, these reflections “can be . . . important source[s] of intended change or deliberate maintenance of social structures”.³⁰

Baert offers three important contributions to IR, two of which I discuss now before devoting the remaining balance of the chapter to his temporalized theoretical framework. First, Baert distinguishes between first order self-reflection, seen as the contemplation of alternate lines of action within a given structure or rule-based situation, and second order self-reflection, which involves discovery of the processes and structures that constitute that rule-based situation (1992b:17). First order self-reflection corresponds to the “recipient present”, or the “past *in* now”, when conceptualizations of the present are unintentionally filtered through existing intellectual patterns (1992b:86). By contrast, second order self-reflection involves the “reconstituted present”, or the “past *for* now”, when novelty in the current context is used to rebuild images and patterns that would otherwise be received from the past as is (Baert 1992b:86). The important distinction is captured in the verbs that Baert uses to modify the present. “Received” implies passivity and therefore continuity; “reconstitution” implies activity and change.

Accordingly, Baert conceives three types of recipient past: “past as [a] sequence” of events that have occurred leading up to the present; “past as categorized”, which encompasses the meanings and values attributed to past events; and “past as order”, a

³⁰ The preceding quotes are taken from Baert’s research description on his staff website at the University of Cambridge. <<http://www.sps.cam.ac.uk/soc/staff/pbaert.html>> accessed 1 December 2007.

reference to the patterns and rules of social order that have been constructed and accepted in the past and thus affect one's encounter with the present (1992b:87). Second order self-reflection can change recipient presents in the following ways: "re-sequencing" the past, involving the selection of past events not in the received sequence or an argument for a different sequence of the included events; "re-categorizing" the past, or reassessing the validity of previously held categories and values into which events may be placed; and "re-ordering" the past—the discovery of previously undiscovered causal or constitutive importance in past processes, or the discovery of new processes altogether, both of which allow a reconceptualization of the "past-as-order" (Baert 1992b:87).

Second, Baert insists that both first and second order self-reflection, as well as any of his types of present, are amenable to collectives, not just to the individual mind. In fact, collective second order self-reflection is necessary (but not sufficient) for "episodic change" or any "rupture of structure" (1992b:89), and thus accommodates both continuity and change.³¹ This necessity differentiates Baert from earlier structurationists who place too much emphasis "on the accomplished production of order" and too little interest in "collective self-steering of the second order" (Baert 1992b:121).³² While second order self-reflection is necessary for social change, the process itself merely uncovers the underlying

³¹ Primary sources of collective self-reflection include public discussion and debate (Baert 1992b:144), making self-reflection amenable to textual and discourse analysis in IR. Baert's emphasis on collective reflectivity represents one of his two major departures from Mead. The other concerns the use of second order self-reflection as a process to anticipate future situations and thus affect outcomes—an important point for exploring the potential of second order self-reflection to serve status quo as well as transformative purposes (Baert 1992b:86-89).

³² This is Baert's main criticism of Giddens' structuration theory; Baert refers to his own version as "re-structurationist" (1992b:103).

principles of social order. The use of those principles is up to the individual or collective engaged in the process. Thus, second order self-reflection can be seen as a mechanism supportive of both the status quo and of emancipation—themes with clear links to such disparate IR theories as neorealism and critical theory as well as to scholarly practices involved in the continued reliance on the standard temporal dichotomy.

Baert's third contribution facilitates IR theoretical analysis³³ through a temporalized comparison of social theories based on synchrony-diachrony and variability-invariability "axes" or binaries (1992a:318).³⁴ Synchrony involves holding time constant during the analytic process and results in a 'snapshot' view of contemporaneous objects that facilitates positional or spatial comparisons. Diachrony often manifests as "historical range" (Hall 1999:9), and at minimum can be understood as acknowledging the passing of time as a contextual factor important to the research question. With regard to Baert's second axis, diachronic analysis assumes some significant variability in the social object over time—if there were no change over time, a synchronic view would suffice. Such a synchronic, 'snapshot' view suggests that all important variation is positional or functional, and that this configuration does not change significantly over time. Thus, synchronic views assess spatial variation through an assumption of temporal continuity.

³³ Showing that temporality can contribute to our understanding of IR theories may be referred to as the 'thick' or 'long' relevance of time in IR.

³⁴ The use of axes may evoke the 2 x 2 matrix, especially to political science readers. However, Baert's temporal focus inherently refuses such an abstract spatialization (a sort of snapshot) of social phenomena. For a problematization of 2 x 2 matrices in IR, see (Wight 2006:86-87).

Diachrony focuses on temporal change, often by holding spatial relations in stasis. Baert combines these axes to identify three types of social theory:

Theories or views of reality can be classified according to: (i) whether or not it is assumed that a synchronic analysis is sufficient to reveal the main principles of order; and (ii) (if diachronic analysis is considered necessary) whether or not these principles of order are conceived as changing through time. We then arrive at three conceptions of time: the *eternal permutational view*, the *closed historical view*, and the *relatively-open historical view* (Baert 1992a:318 emphasis added).³⁵

Before discussing these types in relation to IR theory, it should be noted that temporalized sociology generally gives ample treatment to past, present, and future as continuously interrelating concepts and that Baert's use of "history" in the above passage indicates only some inclusion of temporality, rather than a focus on the past. Also, Baert's typology is meant to criticize rather than herald understandings of time in social theory. His critiques of the eternal permutational and closed historical views can be distilled to a single claim that they both spatialize time using the standard metaphors. Eternal permutational theories view time as a reliable cycle. Closed historical views conceive time as a linear-progressive arrow, flying straight and true toward an inevitable endpoint extrapolated from a snapshot of the present or past. Thus, while ostensibly diachronic, closed historical conceptions cannot account for novelty or unpredictability. Beneath

³⁵ Baert's temporalized framework relies heavily on Luhmann's efforts to develop a social theory that accounts for continuity, discontinuity, and emergence. Luhmann includes a past and future conceived as time horizons of the present, and relies on the idea of a "relatively-open future" (Baert 1992b:13), which becomes Baert's third conception of time.

their affect of dynamism, Baert finds only the reproduction of the same snapshot over and over again. In this way, his framework understands two basic options: theories that privilege space over time (and thus understand time using space), or theories that take a realistic view of time into account. Disclaimers having been dispensed with, I now turn to explicating and adapting Baert's temporal framework to a review of IR theory.

Eternal permutational theories: neorealism and world systems theory

The eternal permutational conception assumes that the fundamental principles of social order are fixed and that they manifest in either time or space (if holding the other constant). Any variations in the principles of order are understood as imperfect "permutations" or combinations of "eternal principles" (Baert 1992b:5). Baert traces this view from the Greek philosophers Plato and Parmenides to the seventeenth century Cartesian mathematical worldview which argues that time tells us nothing that "cannot be deduced from space" (1992b:5). Descartes' adjustment is important because it tips the balance toward spatialized accounts. While Plato and Parmenides acknowledge that holding either time or space constant produces eternal permutational outcomes, Descartes not only privileges space *over* time, but also allows for the spatialization *of* time. Space was easily represented in two or three dimensions in Descartes' lifetime; the progression of time enjoyed no similar technological advocate (i.e. moving pictures were centuries away). However, any elegance in Descartes' proposal holds no necessary correlation to social reality, an assumption made by some theorists. This mistake results in overly spatial,

positional, and unvarying accounts of social reality which give priority to arrangement and repetitious cycles while marginalizing change and novelty as phenomenal aberrations or conceptual failures. Baert mobilizes this view primarily to criticize functionalist, 'snapshot' accounts (1992b:6), epitomized in IR by structural or neorealism and by world systems theories (see figure one, page 50).

Neorealism

Kenneth Waltz's neorealism is born out of desires to distinguish the international realm from the domestic, to depart from an "inside-out . . . correlational logic" that relies on "impressionistic associations between internal conditions and international outcomes" (Waltz 1986b:51), and out of a commitment to "elegant" theorizing that prefers generality, explanation, prediction (1986b:57), and simplification (abstraction) to specificity, understanding, complexity, and "factual studies" (1986a:37-38). These objectives lead to a theory that deliberately moves away from "the reality of international practice" and prioritizes anarchy as an intervening variable between state intentions and international outcomes (Waltz 1986b:56). Responses to Waltz have been vociferous,³⁶ and the ensuing debate extremely durable.³⁷ As there have already been book-length treatments of the subject, I neither summarize neorealism nor the reactions against it. Instead, I focus on

³⁶ By at least one account, initial reactions to Waltz impelled the development of critical theory in IR (Hutchings 2007).

³⁷ Debates concerning neorealism have subsumed the last three decades of IR. See (Ashley 1986, Cox 1986, Walker 1993, Wendt 1999, Wight 2006).

the eternal permutational (ahistorical) aspects of neorealism and the relevant debates to demonstrate how Waltz's specific temporal orientation leads to particular theoretical outcomes.

Waltz's structural image is a reaction against "traditionalist" accounts of international politics. While development and progress may occur inside nation-states, the international realm is distinguished by its sameness: "Continuities and repetitions defeat efforts to explain international politics by following the familiar inside-out formula" (Waltz 1986b:54). This criticism clearly rejects linear-progressivism, but its understanding of continuity is actually produced by uncertainty. This might seem to indicate an "open" future, but in Waltz, contingency contributes to the anarchic structural variable that constrains the future. As with firms in the economic market, uncertainty imposes a condition of insecurity on nation-states that requires them to "worry" about relative gains above all other interests (1986d:102). Thus, indeterminate futures beget only cyclical anxiety and a structure of anarchy that *always* limits the range of possible outcomes of state behavior and interests. Waltz's theoretical response to uncertainty recalls Friedrich Nietzsche's observation that stability is often associated with good while contingency is linked to evil (der Derian 2001:35). Caught between traditionalist correlations of domestic linear-progressivism and his own perception of radical indeterminacy, Waltz rejects the flow of time altogether and turns instead to a cyclical conception in hopes of establishing and preserving predictability.

In this way, Waltz's initial rejection of diachrony³⁸ effects his theoretical product. His conception of structure relies on the belief that it must "produce a uniformity of outcomes despite the variety of inputs" from its units (Waltz 1986b:62). This commitment leads to a purely spatial account. For instance, Waltz eliminates "relations" between states as a unit-level phenomenon that has no place in a "purely positional picture of society" concerned with "how [states] stand *in relation* to one another" (1986c:71 emphasis added). Furthermore, whereas Baert associates synchronic analysis with functionalism (1992b:5), Waltz reduces the international structure even further: "States are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them" (1986c:91). States are discernible only by their varying capabilities. Functionally, every state acts as a firm, pursuing survival and relative gains.

Changes in capabilities may lead to different sub-types of anarchic organization (alterations within structure), as in the move from multi- to bi-polarity after World War II (Waltz 1986b:59), but the overarching anarchic character of the international system is unalterable. This contention is tied up with Waltz's distinction between hierarchically organized domestic politics and the horizontal arrangement—and therefore unitary systemic nature—of the international realm (1986b:58). If theory explains change across systems, then claims about the sameness of international politics allow no more than one system full of functionally undifferentiated units whose varying capabilities "can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states *within* a given

³⁸ For a longer discussion of Waltz as an opponent of change and progress, see (Walker 1993).

system” (Waltz 1986b:59 emphasis added). In this way, Waltz epitomizes the eternal permutational view laid out by Baert that postulates “immutability”, a “fixed and unchangeable” image in which any “temporal flux is nothing more than an imperfect reflection of an eternal world of forms” (1992b:84). In this case, the eternal structural form *within* which all variations occur is anarchy (Walker 1993:134), and all analysis is purely synchronic.

R.B.J. Walker relies on temporal metaphors to counter neorealism’s imposition of continuity on the international realm. He argues that neorealism, in constructing a spatial organizational theory, confines temporality—understood as either linear-progressive or cyclical—to separate political spaces. Inside the nation, progress is possible and a worthwhile pursuit. Outside, in the space between states, only eternal concerns of power and violence can be considered (Walker 1993:63). Although I disagree with his standard dichotomization of temporality, Walker’s analysis of Waltz is accurate. He points out that an assumption of homogenous continuity leads to a “spatial history” of international politics (1993:134), and in the absence of “radical change” or the imposition of a more universal political authority, the only possibility is positional, relative, capability-based change (1993:136). This exposes how Waltz’s initial confrontation with temporality pervades his subsequently spatial, and therefore ahistorical, account of international

politics. Or, as Michael C. Williams most succinctly puts it, how neorealism posits a structure whose “nature precludes its transcendence” (2005b:56).³⁹

World systems theory

Structural Marxism, or world systems theory, exemplifies the eternal permutational world view in a different manner. Unlike neorealism, world systems theory does not take a completely ahistorical view of international politics. On the contrary, much of the explanation offered by Immanuel Wallerstein for the rise of the “world capitalist system” concerns developments stemming from “a series of accidents—historical, ecological, geographic” that situated northwest Europe as the dominant economy in the sixteenth century (1974:400). This development is the first of Wallerstein’s four stages of world capitalism, the other three being, in order: “the system-wide recession of 1650-1730 that consolidated the European world-economy” as the global economy (1974:407), the industrial revolution that largely replaced “agricultural capitalism” (1974:408), and, finally, “the *consolidation* of the capitalist world-economy” (1974:414). While the use of stages seems an intrinsically historical or temporal mode of

³⁹ Political theorist David Carvounas suggests that temporalities prohibiting an open future are premodern (2002:4), implying that IR theories such as neorealism may actually be “ancient” or “medieval”. This is ironic in the case of Waltz, who offers neorealism as an antidote to “traditional” theorizing and as an example of systems theory inspired by the more progressive natural sciences of the period.

analysis,⁴⁰ I argue that world systems theory demonstrates a more subtle form of eternal permutational theorizing where history becomes reified as a cycle from which we cannot hope to break free. Wallerstein's description is not as purely spatial as Waltz's, but he makes certain moves that privilege the present and diminish the importance of temporality to his theory.

Like Waltz, Wallerstein insists on analyzing systems (totalities) instead of nation-states; he also views the current world system as being without a "common political system" (1974:390, see also Ruggie 1986:132-36) although for Wallerstein this leads to a focus on world economy rather than on the conditioning effects of anarchy. Wallerstein begins to depart temporality and history when he argues that the emergence of a worldwide capitalist economy is the "obverse" of the rise of capitalism: "One does not cause the other. We are merely defining the same indivisible phenomenon by different characteristics" (1974:391). Given that Western Europe rose to prominence due to historical "accidents", this is a curious contention. But it may be necessary due to Wallerstein's commitment to being "analytically universal" in spite of historical specificity (1974:391).

Wallerstein further distances himself from any linear temporality by relying on Mao's conception of class struggle as a continuous process, a result of his engagement with the debates between Russian and Chinese Communists about whether socialism could

⁴⁰ Wallerstein himself cautions against reifying stages since they are not really "discrete but continuous in reality; *ergo* they are 'stages' in the 'development' of a social structure, a development which we determine however not *a priori* but *a posteriori*" (1974:389).

occur in one country or must be, by necessity, worldwide (1974:395). Such a view of class struggle replaces any association between stages and linear development with a more permutational understanding by which “we can talk then of the relative tightness or looseness of the world-system as an important variable and seek to analyze why this dimension tends to be cyclical in nature, as it seems to have been for several hundred years” (Wallerstein 1974:406). This move reifies the *longue durée* approach initially associated with class struggle by replacing a developmental time frame of centuries with a cyclical vision (Wallerstein 1974:396). This is a kind of presentist myopia that understands the current situation as the end-state of world history,⁴¹ the future being constituted solely by eternal permutations of this present.

Cyclicity in hand, Wallerstein commences a spatial conceptualization of the world system in which the prosperous core exploits peripheral regions for natural resources and cheap labor. An essential component of this hypothesis is the idea of the semi-periphery, a region that separates core from periphery as well as sub-divides the exploited “majority into a larger lower stratum and a smaller middle stratum” in the interest of preserving the core’s political dominance (1974:404). The manner of conceptualization here is highly suggestive of Waltz’s relative positional arrangement as well as his turn away from linear historical explanations. So is Wallerstein’s assertion that “one cannot reasonably explain the strength of various state machineries at specific

⁴¹ On the tendency of IR scholars to conflate an analysis of the present with historical lineage, see (Schmidt 1998).

moments of the history of the modern world system primarily in terms of a genetic-cultural line of argumentation, but rather in terms of the structural role a country plays in the world economy” (1974:403). The resulting configuration self-maintains by ignoring the possibility and importance of change. The core has little incentive to change since it is in the dominant position. The periphery has little means to change no matter its desires. And discontinuities are insignificant in the semi-periphery, whose “specific economic role is not all that important” compared to its role as “exploited [by the core] and exploiter [of the periphery]” (Wallerstein 1974:405).⁴²

Consequently, Wallerstein’s readings of historical international phenomena serve his vision of a tightening or loosening world capitalist cycle, often at the expense of those events’ intrinsic significance. For instance, he views the Russian Revolution as the reaction of “a semi-peripheral country” that had begun to “decline towards a peripheral status” but managed to salvage its spatial position “by using the classic technique of mercantilist semi-withdrawal from the world economy” (Wallerstein 1974:411). This explanation does little justice to the bold, non-permutational, temporal vision displayed in the writings of Marx that inspired revolt (Hanson 1997). Similarly, Wallerstein understands World War II as being caused in part by Nazism’s attempt to “recoup lost ground” for Germany in the world system, and as the means by which the US accessed

⁴² In light of this configuration, the inward-domestic turn of subsequent world systems work, with foci on “hegemonic” civil societies (historic blocs or structures) as sources of change in the international system (superstructure) may be seen as the only option available to those who desired a world systems approach that could accommodate continuity *and* change, see (Cox 1983).

the core of the system. Thus, the period often associated with the Cold War can be viewed as the fourth, consolidating phase of the capitalist world economy (1974:414). Finally, decolonization after World War II, instead of marking a revolution in self-determination, becomes simply a means of “tightening” the world capitalist system by reinstating the semi-periphery, thus “mobiliz[ing] productive potential” and mitigating the polarization of core and periphery (1974:412,414). Such readings of world politics offer little more than the image of countries jockeying for position amid concentric regions of influence, an image more reminiscent of the organization of English football leagues than momentous and sometimes catastrophic ruptures whose political effects are still being discovered.

Given his structural turn, it is unsurprising that Wallerstein echoes Waltz’s opinion that the only source of change available to the international realm is not only wholesale systemic in nature, but reliant on the appearance of a global political authority. Wallerstein avoids pure ahistoricism in that he holds out a nominal possibility of “the creation of a new kind of *world* system” based on the emergence of a “socialist world government” (1974:415), whereas Waltz’s international anarchy is all there ever can be. But Wallerstein’s myopic move effectively reifies the present as part of a capitalist cycle from which there can be little hope of breaking free. Therefore, both theorists pre-explain any diversity in future outcomes as hazy, imperfect reflections of what came before and what is thus already established.

Closed historical theories: liberal democratic peace theory and teleological constructivism

The closed historical conception retains an assumption of the invariability of ordering principles, but breaks methodologically with the eternal permutational view in claiming that those principles can only be revealed by holding space constant and analyzing diachronically (Baert 1992b:6). This conception is rooted in Judeo-Christian theology and Enlightenment philosophies of history found in Kant and Condorcet (Baert 1992b:7). Its logic relies on extrapolating from the known present or past into the future, which will therefore strongly resemble the present or recent past. A closed historical view affects some dynamism through diachrony, but nevertheless privileges continuity over disjuncture. This is because its dynamic element is restricted to the trajectory of past or present events and order identified in the snapshot view of society that serves as its basis. As such, the closed historical conception always runs the risk of slipping into teleological explanations, proffering views of social time as a “serial, orientated, cumulative type: the discovery of . . . evolution in terms of ‘progress’ ”, which bolster the development of a *technique disciplinaire* based on a sequenced, final future predicted from the present (Foucault, quoted in Baert 1992b:8). In sociology, this view can be linked to “planning for freedom” and rational control policies (Baert 1992b:10). Within IR, liberal-idealism, or liberal democratic peace theory, and Alexander Wendt’s particular brand of constructivism typify closed historical theories vulnerable to temporal critique (see figure one, page 50).

Liberal democratic peace theory

A fashionable topic in the decades after the end of the Cold War, liberal democratic peace theory (LDPT)⁴³ makes three claims. First, it observes that liberal democracies rarely fight each other. Second, and consequently, “while democracies undoubtedly have as many conflicts of interests as other kinds of regimes, they do not see war as an appropriate method for resolving such disputes *between democracies*” (Rengger 2000:114). This claim weds the initial empirical observation to a belief that democracies are cultures of peaceful conflict resolution and contain bureaucratic-political mechanisms that prevent easy resort to violence. However, this union portends less security for non-democratic regimes: “although liberal democracies rarely (never) fight each other they *are* likely to fight non-democracies” (Rengger 2000:114). The reasoning behind the third claim follows that of the second, explaining different results by the lack of certainty on the part of democratic regimes about the behavior, and absence of institutional checks on that behavior, of their non-democratic counterparts.⁴⁴ While the literature on LDPT is substantial, the reasoning typically proceeds along these lines,⁴⁵ envisioning a linear-progression stretching from the empirically known present (and recent past) through the

⁴³ I follow Rengger in distinguishing LDPT from the earlier theory of the liberal peace associated with the first era of globalization during the late nineteenth / early twentieth centuries because arguments of that time made much less of the democratic nature of states than the importance of interconnectedness due to globalized trade (2000:113). For a historical account of the first era of globalization, see (Ferguson 2006). For a vivid account, see (Kern 1983).

⁴⁴ As a logical corollary to the third claim, two non-democratic regimes are viewed as highly likely to go to war, since neither possesses cultural or political constraints on use of force.

⁴⁵ For a seminal effort, see (Russett 1993). For an overview of the debate, see (Owen 1994, Spiro 1994, Elman 1997). For a more general examination of the link between domestic politics and international conflict, see (Clark and Nordstrom 2005).

future toward a predictable conclusion. The practical and theoretical dangers of this reasoning highlight the vulnerabilities of closed historical views.

LDPT begins with an empirical observation of the present and recent past that, in the second half of the twentieth century, armed conflicts between democracies have diminished to near obsolescence (Rosato 2003:599-600, Maoz and Russett 1993).⁴⁶ The first ensuing normative claim extrapolates this present into the future and constrains contingency toward a closed historical world view: since democracies do not fight each other, and since the world “community [is] moving toward democracy” (Modelski 1990:24), the world must be growing more peaceful—the future will strongly resemble the present. The second normative claim regarding conflict involving at least one non-democratic regime has come to serve a legitimating purpose in political practice, so I will address it a little later.

An important theoretical effect of LDPT is that, in an effort to construct a linear progression supportive of its empirical claim and first normative extension, proponents use rarefied evidence. For instance, LDP theorists define ‘war’ by a minimum threshold of 1000 battle fatalities (Russett 1993:12-16).⁴⁷ Such a definition omits much of the international violence conducted since 1945, including terrorism, covert operations,

⁴⁶ Some LDPT advocates have attempted to extend the temporal window from which the image is drawn further back in history, see (Doyle 1983).

⁴⁷ LDP theorists also take liberties with the meaning of liberal democracy. For instance, Owen specifies a “liberal democracy as a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions. . . . When liberals run the government, relations with fellow democracies are harmonious. When illiberals govern, relations may be rockier” (1994:89). For a more extensive discussion of the flexible meaning of ‘democracy’, including definitions assigned by politicians, see (Rosato 2003:586,595).

proxy wars, (counter-) insurgencies, and more (Rengger 2000:120), effectively disciplining a theoretical concern of IR.⁴⁸ Thus, the peace that LDPT observes and predicts may actually be just “the absence of a certain kind of ‘war’ ” (Rengger 2000:118). This criticism also begs the question of whether democracies are actually fighting each other less, or simply going about it below the macro-scale on which LDPT focuses.⁴⁹ Finally, such definitional omissions suggest that, if theorists are to deduce a linear movement from the present picture, the more accurate lines would be simply *away* from conventional, major interstate war rather than *toward* any particular future.

A more practical disciplining effect of LDPT arises from its second normative claim regarding the greater likelihood of violence in any conflict involving at least one non-democratic regime. “The thesis of the liberal democratic peace actually helps to provide a normative justification for the role and power of the dominant states in contemporary world politics” (Rengger 2000:120). That this observation, or even an attempt at liberal democratic hegemony,⁵⁰ may seem obvious now is largely attributable to the rise of neoconservatism in the US and the ongoing war in Iraq. For instance, the neoconservative contention that democracy is not just a method of government but also the mark of a “healthy political order” displays clear links to LDPT (Williams 2005a:309-

⁴⁸ Williams has recently discussed the “discipline of the democratic peace” in terms of Western European security practice after World War II (2007 Chp. 3).

⁴⁹ If violence is substituted for “war” or, especially, “major war”, then it becomes possible to claim that “liberal democracies have behaved much as ‘states’ have always behaved—that is, badly” (Rengger 2000:120).

⁵⁰ This possibility is discussed in (Brilmayer 1994).

10).⁵¹ Also, the George W. Bush administration's rationale for invading Iraq in 2003 relied on three claims related to LDPT: 1) a non-democratic regime's willingness to use weapons of mass destruction,⁵² 2) the suffering of the Iraqi people under a despotic ruler (Woodward 2002:339),⁵³ and 3) the effort to spread liberty and peace throughout the Middle East.⁵⁴ Regardless of the credibility of these claims, the outcomes to date have been neither democratic nor peaceful. In fact, violence in the region today is more intensive than at any time since the Iran-Iraq war—a conflict between two non-democracies.

The Iraq War and LDPT expose another flaw of the closed historical conception. This error concerns the connection between the initial picture, or starting point, and the constrained account of the future that emanates from it. Closed historical conceptions

⁵¹ For a critique connecting LDPT and neoconservatism as “eschatological” (predictive of a final endpoint) variants of IR theorizing, see (Steele 2007a). Eschatologies can be distinguished from teleological ideas, covered in the next section, which understand causation as growing out of that final end-state, equilibrium point, or attractor.

⁵² Vice-President Cheney, discussing the situation in Iraq if Saddam Hussein had not been removed from power: “You'd have a man who had a demonstrated capacity for violence, who'd started two wars, who had, in fact, been involved with weapons of mass destruction, who had every intention of going back to it when the sanctions were lifted” (2006).

⁵³ President Bush claimed that in “Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. This undertaking is . . . critical to our security” (2003).

⁵⁴ Vice-President Cheney conceptualized the war in Iraq as follows: “In the Middle East, we are encouraging free markets, democracy, and tolerance, because these are the ideas and the aspirations that overcome violence, and turn societies to the pursuits of peace” (2003). On the proposed “domino effect” of democracy in the region, President Bush averred that “A free Iraq will inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, and send a signal across the broader Middle East that the future belongs not to terrorism but to freedom. A free Iraq will show the power of liberty to change the world.” In those same remarks, President Bush also confirmed that he “believe[s] that democracy helps keep the peace” (2006).

predict that the future will closely mirror the present or recent past. Recall that part of LDPT's starting point, or recent past, is liberal democratic culture and institutional design, both of which LDPT envisions as constraining the resort to force by policy makers. But democratic institutions and values do not exist in stasis. They exist *in* actual time—in all its contingency—and are thus susceptible to, among other things, IR theories that legitimate foreign policy.⁵⁵ Linear-progressive accounts such as LDPT forget that the initial picture may have shifted while progress “away” from that starting point was (ostensibly) being made. Recently, the US run-up to the Iraq war displayed a remarkable absence of balanced political debate or bureaucratic brakes on the use of force,⁵⁶ phenomena that LDPT can exploit but for which it cannot account.

⁵⁵ This is a form of subject-object contamination, in which statements made about an actor as an object of study affect that actor's beliefs, commitments, and future behavior, see (Steele 2007a). Other phenomena that might be seen as altering democratic regimes internally are a general disinterest in the political process, or the descent into nihilism—a core component of the neoconservative reaction against “corrupt liberal society” (Williams 2005a:312).

⁵⁶ Classical realist Reinhold Niebuhr was openly skeptical of the ability of democratic populaces to stem the momentum of policy elites: “Theoretically it is possible to have a national electorate so intelligent, that the popular impulses and the ulterior interests of special groups are brought under the control of a rational mind. But practically the rational understanding of political issues remains such a minimum force that national unity of action can be achieved only upon such projects as are either initiated by the self-interest of the dominant groups, in control of the government, or supported by the popular emotions and hysterias which from time to time run through the nation” (2001 [1932]:88). The public debate on the justifications for the Iraq war has occurred mostly after the initiation of hostilities, as evidenced in the 2004 and 2006 elections as well as the 2007-2008 primaries. Many citizens of newly democratic Iraq might have preferred that their US counterparts, as democratic exemplars, had exercised their constitutional rights a little sooner.

Teleological constructivism

I shall soon argue that constructivism generally represents a relatively open historical world view. However, recent declarations made by a most prominent constructivist, Alexander Wendt, have exchanged openness for bold prediction. So it becomes necessary to distinguish between mainstream (broadly understood) constructivism—for which behaviors, identities, and interests are co-constitutive and the future is contingent on but not necessarily predictable from those components—and Wendt’s conservative constructivism—which finds in the same features and in the condition of anarchy a causal power channeling or disciplining international behavior toward the singular outcome of a world state.

Interestingly, Wendt distinguishes his teleological approach from “liberal progressivism” by pointing out the latter’s indeterminacy: “The forecast is based on extrapolating law-like regularities from the past into the future, assuming certain conditions continue to hold. Since there is no guarantee they will, we cannot say that any given future is inevitable” (2003:492). Since Wendt is “not concerned here with historical contingencies or timing” (2003:491), he excises them by turning to self-organization theory, “which hypothesizes that order in nature emerges . . . ‘spontaneously’ from the channeling of system dynamics by structural boundary conditions toward particular end-states” (2003:492).⁵⁷ Wendt combines this form of emergence with constructivist

⁵⁷ Wendt’s most substantial work prior to his conservative turn nevertheless hints at this move. In discussing “type” identities, which are those characteristics of actors that are recognizable, shared,

principles of collective identity formation and recognition (2003:507-16), and with anarchy, which “conditions struggles for recognition . . . by making it possible to seek recognition through violence and by generating improved military technology that makes such violence increasingly intolerable” (2003:517), in order to propose a Hegelian teleological conclusion writ global. Whereas Hegel finds that the struggle for recognition between individuals results in the state but insists that states will remain autonomous due to the acceptable costs of political violence, Wendt’s era of mass destructive devices alters the calculus to produce an outcome of “supranational solidarity” (2003:493). This conclusion will arrive in five stages:⁵⁸ 1) system of states; 2) society of states; 3) world society; 4) collective security; and 5) world state, accomplished by the establishment of a global sovereign authority and the replacement of state sovereignty by the concept of recognition, which Wendt characterizes as “particularism within universalism” (2003:517-25).

Wendt differs from LDPT in both argumentation—based on self-organization and anarchy instead of democratic culture—and conclusion—a single global authority instead of LDPT’s plural but pacific international system. However, temporal affinities between the two efforts persist. Both propose an inevitable linear progression from the observed present and recent past toward a conclusively more peaceful future. Thus, some of the

and relevant in social interactions, Wendt refers to social systems as self-organizing in terms of intrinsically separating relevant from irrelevant identities simply through social interaction. He illustrates this point by reference to the ongoing internalization of “the belief that democratic states do not make war on each other” (Wendt 1999:226-27).

⁵⁸ The first three stages rely heavily on English School theorists such as Hedley Bull (2002 [1977]).

problems associated with the linear-progressive temporality of LDPT discussed above also manifest in Wendt.

First, teleological proposals also discipline history, albeit differently than LDPT. Teleology gives meaning to past, present, and future processes by explaining their relevance or utility to an end-state of the organism (system, collective, or individual) in question. Wendt refers to this as forward- and backward-looking explanation (2003:497), using an analogy from biology: “Imagine trying to explain the development of an organism without a conception of what it will look like as an adult—clearly something would be missing from such an account” (2003:501).⁵⁹ An initial reaction to this analogy might be to ask what mature, adult version(s) of world politics we have to explain the “development” of our current situation, which would entail a turn to history. I argue that a commitment to temporality in theorizing necessitates a different way of going back in time that problematizes Wendt’s teleology from within.

Wendt’s approach is “developmental” or forward looking, and thus requires us to ask “how some trait or behavior serves the functions of a larger system” (2003:497), which in turn requires envisioning an end-state. As Wendt himself observes, teleology has a long history (2003:496); and he builds on two such historical proposals: Kant’s “pacific federation of republican states” and Hegel’s emergence of the state as the Spirit (2003:493).

⁵⁹ In this way, teleology is the inverse of ahistorical, cyclical accounts like world systems theory that read in the present, the inevitable conclusion of history, and in the future, only the continuing cycle of this conclusion. Wendt’s teleology imagines a future and then analyzes the present and recent past so as to ensure progress toward that imagined future.

However, Wendt fails to acknowledge a counterfactual challenge to teleology⁶⁰—that if Kant and Hegel had not made their proposals (whether right or wrong), the world Wendt confronts might be very different. Put another way, he ignores the productive, creative, and constitutive effects of teleological, and all linear-progressive, proposals. Wendt also ignores the cautionary value of historical examples. Examining how others have erred in their imaginings of end-states, and the effects of those efforts on the more general imagination of theorists as well as on real-world events, may do much to attenuate or even comprehensively discredit teleological theorizing.

Furthermore, Wendt's theory exerts a disciplining influence on international politics that will be ethically unconscionable to most. Dual commitments to teleology and constructivism necessitate a search for endogenous causes of increasing order in the international system. Wendt locates these in self-organizational "positive feedback, in which behaviors or effects are amplified by a dynamic of 'increasing returns' or 'autocatalysis'. Importantly, when positive feedback effects cross a threshold or 'tipping point' the resulting . . .⁶¹ dynamics can induce systems change" (Wendt 2003:499). As this

⁶⁰ This phrase evokes an array of possibilities. The most straightforward version used here is counterfactual teleology—if what was proposed as the end-state was not proposed, how would the historical future have unfolded differently? Alternatively, teleological counterfactuality might provide some much-needed self-reflexivity in teleological theorizing. Teleological counterfactualizing would consider if certain events had unfolded differently in history, whether different end-states then would have been proposed at some point along the way.

⁶¹ In the interest of transparency, I want to note that I have elided the phrase "non-linear" from Wendt's quote in the pursuit of clarity. This is because the non-linearity he refers to is in the context of the difference between "efficient" causation (the province of positivist mechanical accounts) and "formal" or "final" causality which deal with the causal power of structures,

part of Wendt's hypothesis is concerned with "micro-foundations" which show "how order can emerge in a system as a result of the interactions of elements" (2003:498), it begs the question of whether noxious affairs such as the decades-long pandemic of ethnic violence should be seen as an ongoing processes of positive feedback whose tipping point has simply not yet been reached.

This critique is not meant to link Wendt to arguments diminishing or rationalizing genocide. Rather, I mean to illustrate how his brand of linear progressivism, much like LDPT, disciplines theoretical conceptions of social reality. In this case, Wendt's desire to connect the present to a peaceful end-point "attractor" (2003:501) creates a slipstream that consumes all international affairs, even some that might otherwise be viewed as evidence of regress. This is a fundamental flaw in linear-progressive or closed historical theories: by theoretical necessity all roads—no matter how circuitous or treacherous—lead to Rome.

Relatively open historical theories: constructivism and classical realism

Unlike the two previous views, which rely on a spatial conception of time, the relatively open historical view treats space and time as having comparable significance (but not theoretical equivalency). It assumes that all ordering principles are variable and susceptible to change in "every present" (Baert 1992b:8). Every present thus holds the

processes, and systemic "purpose" (Wendt 2003:495). As such, "non-linear" here should not be understood as a refutation of my holistic view of Wendt's constructivism as historically closed.

possibility of disjuncture between the past and future.⁶² This conception is epitomized by Mead's contention that "every present contains 'the novel' (that is, 'the emergent'), which is not only not predicted but actually unpredictable, and thus a point of departure for a new, symbolically-reconstructed past, as well as for goals and desires in the future" (quoted in Baert 1992b:9). A relatively open historical world view understands novelty as stimulating reality through these ongoing reconstructions and thus contravenes conventional sociological understandings of novelty—based on closed historical conceptions—as the product of scientific and policy interventions (Baert 1992b:10).

An open temporal conception also transitively grants time an ontological status: Each specious present holds the possibility of novelty, and novelty itself constitutes reality by contravening past symbolic reconstructions. Time, understood as the flow of these specious moments, thus functions as the enabler of new novelties and thus new realities. Without time, only recycled recollections would pertain. However, even those recollections were at some point constituted by some symbolic reconstruction stimulated by some relatively novel event that emerged in some moment. Thus, time has ontological significance as the present impulse to new realities in the future and the past basis for persistent recollections in the present. Time is not only real in the relatively open historical conception. In fact, it produces reality.

⁶² Baert links this conception of time to research in the natural sciences on thermodynamics including bifurcation and dissipative structures (1992b:8). It is significant that Baert limits the view of the present to a subjective division between past and future rather than some discrete objective duration, a distinction on which I reflect in chapter four.

Most significantly, an implication can be drawn from Baert's exposition of the relatively open historical world view that any theory hoping to explain novelty or change must take temporal issues, in all their indeterminacy, into account. Accordingly, I turn to two theoretical movements in IR that incorporate continuity and change without relying on the restrictive spatial metaphors of progressive linearity or cyclicity. These movements, mainstream constructivism (henceforth referred to simply as constructivism) and classical realism, envision open futures based in part on their (implicit) assumption that only novelty truly recurs (see figure one, page 50). I propose that many of the strengths of constructivist and classical realist theorizing stem from this open view of time. Furthermore, I argue that their similar approaches to time bolster recent arguments about the strong theoretical linkages between them as well as the possibility of a constructivist realism.

Constructivism

In IR, constructivism comes closest to a truly open historical world view. This is unsurprising, given its links to Baert via structuration theory. With the exception of Wendt, foundational constructivist works display a fairly consistent openness or indeterminacy in their views of the future, avoiding the cyclical cynicism of neorealism and world systems theory as well as the disciplining progressivism found in liberal democratic peace theory and Wendt's conservative constructivism. I argue that the reason

that constructivism can avoid ahistoricism and closed historicism is that it relies on a fusion of linearity and cyclicity at a basic level of social organization.

“Constructivism is the view that *the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world*” (Adler 1997:322). This is based on an “emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge” (Adler 1997:322). Such knowledge “persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings” (Adler 1997:327).

Constructivism weds social interaction to both agents and structures. Nicholas Onuf argues that people become “human” through their social relations predicated on language (1998:59, also see Adler 1997:328). Humans in turn “make society and society makes people. This is a continuous, two-way process”, linked by rules, that students can only hope to understand if they “start in the middle” (Onuf 1998:59). Thus, constructivism avoids the fixed start- and end-points of linear progressive theories.

Similarly, Emanuel Adler’s view of constructivism as a median theoretical stance necessitates the avoidance of both poles of the temporal dichotomy—constructivism can only be “synthetic” because it is neither “pessimistic [n]or optimistic by design” (1997:323). As Onuf denies linear-progressive constructivism, Adler ensures that intersubjectivity is much more than a loop: “[K]nowledge structures are continually constituted and reproduced by members of a community and their behavior. At the same

time, however, they determine the boundaries between what these agents consider to be real and unreal” (1997:326-27). In this way, cyclical interactions actually provide impulse force for both continuity and change—the acceptance of social facts by a community grants continuity to what have, at one time, been new or unique ideas.⁶³ For the purposes of this essay, the crucial implication drawn from these nuances is that “progress 1) is not based only on what theorists say but also, and primarily, on what political actors do; 2) occurs through the redefinition of identities and interests of the actors themselves; and 3) is inescapably about universal normative ideas, even if their meaning varies from time to

⁶³ Adler refers to this as “cognitive evolution”, the cyclical impulse for change. It is important to distinguish Adler’s phrase from ‘evolution’ in a more deterministic sense, as found in some liberal accounts of the connection between knowledge acquisition and optimistic/progressive political outcomes. By cognitive evolution, Adler simply means that “at any point in time and place of a historical process, institutional or social facts may be socially constructed by collective understandings of the physical and the social world that are subject to authoritative (political) processes and thus to evolutionary change” (1997:339). Adler’s evolution refers only to the emergence of social conventions, not inevitable progress toward a determinate end-state. These social conventions can only emerge through the communication and diffusion of ideas and, crucially, through the “creation of political stakes”. By contrast, liberal institutionalism prioritizes the potential for cognitive evolutionism to create a basis for cooperation and “transcend ‘prevailing lines of ideological cleavage’” (Krasner 1982:203). Krasner’s focus on overcoming political contests seems, to me, to be a higher-order version of cognitive evolution whereas Adler’s insists only that some amount of cooperation is necessary for any social interaction, and that that cooperation must have come from somewhere involving a prior social interaction. Krasner and Stein use health policy as an example of higher order cognitive evolution, claiming that the increase in scientific knowledge de-politicizes health regulations so that “national behavior [is] determined by an international regime, or at least a set of rules, dictated by accepted scientific knowledge” (Krasner 1982:203-4, Stein 1993 [1982]:50). However, recent work on the emergence of a “counter-epistemic” community in South Africa, which opposed accepted scientific knowledge about AIDS treatment because of collective beliefs about European exploitation, goes a long way toward discrediting Krasner’s and Stein’s optimism (Youde 2005). Modelski utilizes an interesting understanding of evolution as “selection” of the “hidden plan of nature” that he has conveniently re-discovered—Kant’s perpetual peace. Modelski concludes that world politics is a mechanism of “evolutionary learning”, an antidote to other studies of world politics which have “had problems coping with the time dimension and with political transformation at the global level” (1990:4-5,1).

time and place to place” (Adler 1997:334). Focusing on political actors’ behavior and internalization of social constructs retains the possibility of both cyclical and linear-progressive outcomes, thus preserving an essentially open view of the future. Onuf’s and Adler’s careful theoretical constructions mesh well with Baert’s focus on pragmatic reflectivity, in which understandings and explanations of the past influence actors’ confrontations with the present but are always re-negotiable in that present and influential in the view of the future.

Unintended consequences also play a prominent role in Onuf’s understanding of institutions, which are constituted through agent-agent and agent-environment interactions. Unintended consequences, rather than impeding this process, actually contribute to the overall resolution of the institution because, while they may be unanticipated by some agents, they nevertheless result from the intentional acts of other agents within the system (Onuf 1998:61,63). In support of this argument, Onuf chooses the conspicuous example of the “perfect competitive market” (1998:61). Market price has been used by Waltz to demonstrate the “tyranny of small decisions”, whose aggregate outcomes tend to thwart individual intentions (1986d:105). But on a constructivist reading, the “unintended consequence of setting a price for that good” becomes simply part of the “recursive” negotiation of the societal structure of the market (Onuf 1998:61).

Onuf’s exposition of constructivism also suggests a compelling parallel with Baert’s first and second order self-reflection. The importance of agents’ acceptance of unintended consequences in their social institution may be seen as an instance of first

order self-reflection, or a commitment to choose to follow (or not to follow) the “rules” of the situation in pursuit of specific results. Likewise, distinguishing between structure, understood as “what observers see”, and institutions, which are “what agents act within” hints at Baert’s second order self-reflective practice of the discovery and contestation or maintenance of the foundations and processes that make possible those “rules” that affect action (Onuf 1998:62). Understood in this way, any theoretical investigation of social organization is an exercise in second order self-reflection necessitating an account of novelty and change. Constructivism does this by first denying spatialized views of temporality, which in turn accommodates unintended consequences within a broader system of social interactions. Analysis of those consequences then exposes previously unknown institutional ligatures, effecting second order self-reflection.

Classical realism

Another theoretical movement exhibiting a relatively open historical conception is classical realism, likely the most widely recognized and misunderstood theory of international relations. Critics of classical realism often conflate it with neorealism (Barkin 2003:331) or accept Waltz’s claim that neorealism is a significant improvement on, and thus a replacement for, classical realism. Recently, a growing body of literature has sought to rehabilitate classical realism as ethically inclined theory (Lang 2001, Lebow 2003, Williams 2005a, 2005b, Steele 2007b). In the following discussion, I argue that classical realism and neorealism should be considered separately based on their temporal

conceptualizations, a distinction that may assist the aforementioned ethical recovery project. To do this, I argue that classical realism is neither historically closed nor deterministic, but is instead open to, and dependent on, contingency. As such, classical realism is compatible with pragmatic temporality and constructivism.

Classical realism's conflation with neorealism often includes its characterization as eternal permutational. For example, Robert Cox, in his initial response to Waltz, writes,

Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, . . . though individuals of considerable historical learning, . . . have tended to adopt the fixed ahistorical view of the framework for action characteristic of problem solving theory, rather than standing back from this framework, in the manner of E. H. Carr, and treating it as historically conditioned and thus susceptible to change (1986:211).

Similarly, Walker's postmodern evisceration of "political realism" claims that it should be treated as "an historically specific consequence" of sovereignty and not, "as is so often asserted, an expression of ahistorical essences and structural necessities" (1993:7). But classical realism is self-consciously rooted in an indeterminate temporality. This can be shown by reference to the thinking of two prominent realists: Morgenthau's concern with history, novelty, and prudence, and Carr's insistence that all judgment is historically conditioned.

Morgenthau poses a realist theory of international politics inspired by the confrontation with contingency. Presenting his second principle of realism,⁶⁴ “interest defined in terms of power” (1993 [1948]:5), Morgenthau includes ethical concerns while insisting that those concerns on their own are not enough for good policy. This is because there is “a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible—between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:7). Forgetting this distinction can derail morally intentioned policy if “residues of formerly adequate modes of thought and action [are] rendered obsolete by a new social reality” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:7).

For Morgenthau, novelty places continuity and change in tension: “man responds to social situations with repetitive patterns. . . . Yet when matters are subject to dynamic change, traditional patterns are no longer appropriate: they must be replaced by new ones reflecting such change” (1993 [1948]:7-8).⁶⁵ Knowledge and policy making are thus dependent on self-reflection. “That which reveals itself as a simple truth in retrospect was either completely unknown in prospect or else could not be determined by anything but an uncertain hunch” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:21), an observation reminiscent of Baert’s contention that discursive knowledge only becomes available after the “I” acts, when the

⁶⁴ In addition to the second, I also cover the third and fourth principles in this section. The other principles are, in the order given: 1) the objectivity of politics based on human nature; 5) the inescapable particularity of national morality; and 6) the autonomy of the political sphere (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:4-13).

⁶⁵ One of the sources of novelty that Morgenthau lists is international terrorism, a phenomenon sometimes invoked to antiquate realism. For an argument that realism is ill-equipped to contend with international terrorism, see (Beyer 2006). For an attempt to “revise” realism in response to militant Muslim groups, see (Matesan 2006).

actor can then reflect on her act as a “me” (1992b:121). Unlike neorealism, which attempts to discipline contingency by attaching to it rigorous and predictable structural affects, Morgenthau embraces contingency as an argument for carefully crafted policy.

Morgenthau qualifies his second principle with a third: “interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (1993 [1948]:10). Instead, “the kind of interests determining political action in a particular period of history depend upon the political and cultural context” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]:11).⁶⁶ Williams has argued that Morgenthau’s reaction to Weimar Germany’s descent into Nazism committed him to such an understanding of the ‘political’ as inextricably linked to historical contingencies (2005b:83), and thus requiring ethical delimitation to mitigate violent abuses.

Finally, Morgenthau’s fourth principle relies on the vagaries of international politics to champion “the supreme virtue of politics”—prudence, defined as the “consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action (1993 [1948]:12). Prudence reins supreme because it represents the best possible reconciliation of abstract morality and political possibility. For classical realism to be closed historical or eternally permutational, one or the other of abstract morality or political possibility would have to be preeminent. In such a situation, either moral ends would be blindly pursued with an aura of certainty, or capabilities would count as morality itself. Morgenthau obviates both

⁶⁶ Interestingly, one political context that Morgenthau openly considers is the replacement of the nation-state system with a “larger unit” of a “different character” (1993 [1948]:12), less deterministic but still reminiscent of Wendt’s teleology.

conceptions by holding morality and possibility in tension, predicting not specific results (as neorealism and LDPT do) but rather reminding those who pursue specific results to take heed of this inevitable but infinitely variable tension.

Like Morgenthau, Carr is concerned with the past as an antidote to the universal morality espoused by utopianism in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries (1964 [1939]:65). For Carr, there is “no reality outside the historical process” (1964 [1939]:67). Those who ignore this process when evaluating events run the risk of starting “from the presupposition that things could not have turned out otherwise than they did” (Carr 1964 [1939]:67). Thus, utopian universal morality was, in reality, a historical outcome—as will be all moralities that seek to supplant it—summed up as “What was, is right” (Carr 1964 [1939]:67). The crux of the matter is the “relative and pragmatic character of thought itself” (Carr 1964 [1939]:67-68). Building on German sociological accounts of knowledge, Carr contends that thought, while sometimes shaped directly by external events and always relative, is primarily purposeful. “For the realist” he writes, “truth is ‘no more than the perception of discordant experience pragmatically adjusted for a particular purpose and for the time being’ ” (Carr 1964 [1939]:71).⁶⁷ This links between Carr’s comment and Baert’s pragmatism could hardly be stronger. Combining this pragmatism with Morgenthau’s cautionary effort to delimit politics in the shadow of contingency indicates that in addition to the hidden ethical dimension discussed earlier, classical realism also

⁶⁷ Examples of purposeful thought include theories “designed to discredit an enemy or potential enemy” and sensitivity toward purposefulness in the thinking of Others (Carr 1964 [1939]:71-72).

contains a latent temporal foundation that is the basis of its understanding of human behavior in general and politics in particular.




Figure 1: IR theory in a temporalized framework

Constructivist realism

Theoretical affinities between constructivism and classical realism are not limited to their shared view of temporality, and the possibility of synthesizing the two has already been broached (Barkin 2003, 2004, Jackson and Nexon 2004, Lebow 2004, Mattern 2004, Sterling-Folker 2004). I will not treat this possibility extensively here, except to offer an alternative, based on an additional temporal link between the two

movements, to J. Samuel Barkin's conclusion that the appropriate combination of the two concepts is "realist constructivism" (2003:336). Turning to Reinhold Niebuhr's critique of domestic political power indicates that constructivist realism is also possible.

In this critique, Niebuhr critically anticipates Baert's maintenance-based self-reflection in a manner reliant on constructivist principles. Niebuhr finds the ability of the nation to compel and inspire allegiance (and bloodshed) on "the panoply and ritual of the state" and "the symbols of unity and greatness, which inspire awe and reverence in the citizen. . . . Thus the sentiment of patriotism achieves a potency in the modern soul, so unqualified, that the nation is given *carte blanche* to use the power . . . for any purpose it desires" (2001 [1932]:92). Niebuhr leaves unanswered how ritual and symbolism lead to awe, reverence, or patriotism. The reader can only accept or reject that the former inspire the latter *prima facie*.

Constructivism fills in the middle of Niebuhr's equation by examining social groups' "dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of [a] material world" presented by political elites to compel their allegiance (Adler 1997:322).⁶⁸ Without shared understandings, rituals and panoplies are impotent. But when combined with the "ethical paradox in patriotism . . . which transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism" (Niebuhr 2001 [1932]:91), these shared understandings allow symbolic performances to

⁶⁸ Likewise, constructivism can provide the mechanism(s) behind Morgenthau's typology of political power which, while robust, is not without theoretical lacunae. Morgenthau conceives political power as "a psychological relation" derived from three sources: "the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men [sic] or institutions" (1993 [1948]:30).

resonate and thus bolster collective sentiments. Crucially for Niebuhr, these multiple levers of power not only contribute positively to political capabilities, but also aid elites in “thwarting” dissent as a threat to domestic unity:

“So nations crucify their moral rebels with their criminals upon the same Golgotha, not being able to distinguish between the moral idealism which surpasses, and the anti-social conduct which falls below that moral mediocrity, on the level of which every society unifies its life. . . . It is . . . probably inevitable that every society should regard criticism as a proof of want of loyalty” (Niebuhr 2001 [1932]:88-89).

Baert observes that self-reflection can lead not only to social change, but also to intentional maintenance of the existing organizational structure. In Niebuhr’s case, elites who reflect on the underlying organizational processes of the nation-state may be inclined to engage in a form of maintenance by rhetorically discouraging public discourse that could expose the contingency of those processes, and by implication, the state itself. Thus, Niebuhr discovers the potential for systematic abuse of temporality inherent in the modern nation-state. This abuse is facilitated through elites’ understandings of the knowledge structures that are “continually constituted and reproduced” by a political community (Adler 1997:326-27), which is the collective manifestation of temporalized sociology. Thus, Baert’s ideas about public discourse as collective self-reflection and his understanding of first order self-reflection as behavior intended to instantiate an outcome within an established social structure can contribute much to studies of how governments

mobilize popular support at home. It can also speak to the topic of how those same governments legitimate their actions abroad.⁶⁹

Barkin claims that the appropriate synthesis of constructivism and realism is a “realist constructivism”, in which hard-headed realism dissociates constructivism from liberal-idealism (2003:338).⁷⁰ An understanding of the temporal differences between liberal-idealism and constructivism (other than Wendt’s) exposes Barkin’s proposal as logically unnecessary—constructivists are in no way necessarily liberal-idealists (Steele 2007a:26-30). By contrast, a constructivist realism is appropriate in that constructivism’s concern with intersubjectivity and social meaning can expose the inner workings of many of the phenomena that realists attack.⁷¹ Two of these phenomena are the mobilization of support and the disciplining of dissent, both of which link constructivist understanding to

⁶⁹ This in no way means that constructivism and temporalized sociology are merely tools for exploiting populaces and rationalizing actions. For instance, disputes regarding the legitimacy of use of force can be either maintenance-based (as in the case of the U.N.-supported right to self-defense) or transformative (as in the case of the extent and quality of human rights) with regard to international social norms. For coverage of both options, see (Wheeler 2000).

⁷⁰ In the forum on Barkin’s article, Jackson and Nexson accuse him of actually proposing a “constructivist realism—a realism that takes norms and ideas seriously as objects of analysis”(2004:338). To this, they offer their own version of “realist-constructivism—a constructivism that involves a self-consistent set of arguments about why power cannot be, in any way, transcended in international politics” (Jackson and Nexson 2004:338). While Jackson’s and Nexson’s proposal for a realist-constructivism is an improvement on Barkin’s essentially non-idealist constructivism, their reading of Barkin is only salient if it is accepted that realism did *not* previously (or originally) take norms and ideas seriously and was instead a “commitment to understanding the social world as a result of natural necessity” (Jackson and Nexson 2004:338), a charge more appropriate to neorealism than classical realism.

⁷¹ This is somewhat akin to the general approach adopted by Lebow in the forum (2004), although the focus here on time is distinct.

realist critiques through Baert's temporally based, pragmatic self-reflection. Thus, time provides the bond to the constructivist realist synthesis.

Conclusion: unseen by God, championed by humans

This chapter endeavored to demonstrate the relevance of time to extant IR theory. I mobilized a pragmatic and process oriented understanding of temporality to typologize and critique several theoretical movements, and concluded by proposing a corrected theoretical synthesis. The next chapter complements this one by exploring another dormant synthesis—that of territorial state sovereignty and Western standard time. As a stepping stone to that effort, and to its genealogical intent, I return to Adler's discussion of the social character of knowledge. Recall that intersubjective knowledge has ontological status because of the

‘collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition’. Thus, God could not see money or private property. Instead he would see ‘*us treating* certain objects’ as money and private property. In other words . . . ‘there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agreement (Adler 1997:328).

In what follows I will argue that God could not see time or sovereignty, either. Instead, God would see humans mechanically reckoning arbitrary subdivisions of a rationalized solar day on the one hand, the earth's territory on the other, and treating those subdivisions as having a functionality that really exists only through social agreement. I

will also argue that, unlike sovereignty, the uncontested globalization of time has allowed us to forget the intrinsic contingency of its social nature, to the detriment of international relations and their study.

**Hegemonic metronome:
The ascendancy of Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty**

Even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; . . . they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived *ex nihilo* by human consciousness; and . . . these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted.

—Emanuel Adler

Rather like one . . . in whose ear the clock has just thundered with all its force its twelve strokes of noon, suddenly wakes up, and asks himself, ‘What has in point of fact just struck?’ so do we at times . . . ask in complete astonishment and complete embarrassment, ‘Through what have we in point of fact just lived?’

—Friedrich Nietzsche

In the previous chapter, I asserted that a temporal lens can be useful in critiquing IR theory. I offer now a genealogical historical sketch of the interwoven developments of Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty. The purposes of this chapter are twofold. First, as an empirical complement to the previous chapter, the general aim in linking modern temporality to state sovereignty is to elevate the relevance of time to IR and to support a stance that the modern arrangement of international affairs has important spatial *and* temporal components. In his seminal account of the development of clocks and modernity, David Landes calls the mechanical timepiece “one of the great inventions in the history of mankind—not in the same class as fire and the wheel, but comparable to movable type in its revolutionary implications for cultural values,

technological change, social and political organization, and personality” (2000:6).

However, viewed from the position of the IR canon, a history of time and sovereignty represents an unequal yoking. Sovereignty is accepted as a constitutive element of the modern international system, whereas standardized time remains a feature peripheral to world politics. Contra this view I argue that, like its sovereign spatial sibling, the emergence of the contemporary method of reckoning time was an important factor in the rise of political modernity, and thus critical to studies of international relations. Second, as indicated by the genealogical modifier discussed earlier, this history seeks to denaturalize the time wrought by modernity as a step toward uncovering the relations of power in which modern time is involved.

The chapter begins with a preliminary discussion of terms. I then draw conceptual connections between Enlightenment epistemological trends and the rational, abstract organization of sovereignty and time, arguing that both territorially organized polities and abstract temporal units and mechanisms belong to a cosmopolitical image of modernity predicated upon a belief in the philosophical affinities between natural (physical) and social organizing principles. The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections corresponding to the conception of Western time in Europe, its diffusion around the world, and its standardization as a global social institution.

In order to demonstrate the imbrication of temporality and spatiality during the rise of the modern international system, in each section I locate ‘sites’ of the emergence of territorial state sovereignty and explicate contemporaneous processes and events

implicated in the rise of Western standard time at those sites. Essentially, I am arguing for the coeval rise of modern space and time by showing that both developed in the same places at the same times. The sites are: churches, cities, factories, ships, railroads and telegraphs, colonies, the trenches of World War I, and postcolonial nation-states. While the literature on sovereignty is substantial,⁷² I have tried to choose sites common to many accounts so as to avoid detouring into debates regarding specific hypotheses about sovereignty's emergence and establishment as a modern world political organizing principle. One such example is the eminence of the 1648 treaties of Westphalia, whose status fluctuate between marking the "origin" of modern international society (Philpott 2001:75-96) and amounting to a "myth" of mainstream IR (Teschke 2003). Instead, by aiming for breadth, I can demonstrate that modern temporality is relevant to the general question of how the modern international system came to be organized as it is. By revealing the importance of time in the spaces of sovereignty, I advocate for an infusion of time into IR.

Terms

Before proceeding any further, I must clarify three terms that feature prominently in the subsequent discussions. First, when referring to modernity, I take an inclusive—if Eurocentric—approach that deems ideas and technologies even loosely associated with

⁷² At a glance, (Herz 1957, Falk 1981, Kratochwil 1986, Ruggie 1986, Jackson 1990, Toulmin 1990, Onuf 1991, Ruggie 1993, Walker 1993, Spruyt 1994, Bartelson 1995, Weber 1995, Biersteker and Weber 1996, Ruggie 1998, Hall 1999, Krasner 1999, 2001, Philpott 2001, Teschke 2003).

the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and later historical periods as ‘modern’.⁷³ Thus, the ‘modern era’ refers to the time period from the thirteenth century to present. This includes what might be considered the late medieval era, but in terms of Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty, the late medieval is better understood as premodernity, since the roots of both concepts reach back at least to the thirteenth century (Landes 2000:48, Philpott 2001:16n7).⁷⁴

Second, when referring to territorial state sovereignty, or modern sovereignty, I adopt an understanding based on “internal hierarchy and external autonomy” (Spruyt 1994:3)—the division of the earth’s “land surface . . . into discrete territorial units, each with a government that exercises *substantial* authority within its own territory” (Murphy 1996:81 emphasis added). This understanding requires neither “supreme” domestic authority (Philpott 2001:16) nor internal monopolization of violence (Teschke 2003:2-3) and it elides, for the most part, important discussions of mutual recognition by like units

⁷³ For a discussion of what modernity and the modern age includes and excludes, see (Toulmin 1990:7-13). I do not distinguish between modern and postmodern in this chapter. The importance of postmodern thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of IR will become apparent in the next chapter. For now, it is a discussion that I bracket in order to preserve momentum toward a general spatio-temporal image of international relations. For an excellent account of ‘modern’ thinking, the responses of ‘postmodern’ theorists, and the implications of both for IR and political theory, see (Rengger 1995).

⁷⁴ Although he remarks, “Not until the fourteenth century do we get our first unmistakable reports of mechanical clocks”, Landes also discusses “legend and speculation” about the rise of mechanical timekeeping as dating back to the turn of the millennium (2000:48). Skeptics may criticize such a liberal historical window, but my investigation is premised on the belief that, while a more rigorous and nuanced understanding of the modern age may not incorporate as large a window, the processes visible through that window have been a long time coming.

(Strang 1996:22-3).⁷⁵ Much as in the proposed meaning of modernity, these omissions facilitate argumentation by subsuming nuance to relevance.

Third, by Western time, modern time, or clock time I am referring to the time now commonly associated with contemporary clocks and watches, a form of reckoning based on the “continuous indication of equal hours” abstracted from celestial motions (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:282).⁷⁶ In modern daily life, hours are further subdivided into minutes and seconds, producing a unified, elegant, rational manner of marking daylight that is, in reality, highly variegated depending on one’s earthly and seasonal location. The modifier ‘Western’ refers to the distinctly European, and later North American, roots and impulses of this form of time reckoning. Alternate time conventions existed in non-European cultures before and after the development of clock time, and most certainly persist in some cultures today. However only the Western version of standardized reckoning achieved a global hegemony—we do not currently coordinate our temporal lives by global time zones based on the Chinese or Islamic *clepsydrae* (water clocks, see Landes 2000:7,21-22), or by ancient sundials—so it will be my sole concern now. A final

⁷⁵ Yet another understanding of modern sovereignty is based on the idea of “separate, independent . . . states, each of them organized around a *particular nation*” (Toulmin 1990:7 emphasis added). The restrictiveness of this understanding is exposed by Hall’s more complex and dynamic rendering which distinguishes between dynastic, territorial, and national forms of sovereignty within the same general period (1999).

⁷⁶ Landes counts the common mechanism of modern time reckoning as some “*oscillatory device* [that] tracks the passing moments; it is what the Germans call a *Zeitnormal*, or time standard . . . It beats time” (2000:8).

modifier, 'standard' or 'standardized', appears in passages referring to the global institutionalization of Western, modern, clock time.⁷⁷

Enlightenment epistemology and cosmopolitics

Before turning to the sites of the dual rise of territorial state sovereignty and Western standard time, I want to adumbrate their shared Enlightenment lineage by pointing out the conceptual affinities between them. The attention given to territorial state sovereignty often applies equally well to modern time. In his critique of sovereignty's reification in IR, Walker claims that "As a practice of states, [sovereignty] is easily mistaken for their essence" (1991:458). Rediscovering Western time's historical specificity as a reckoning convention (Adam 2004:112-13) suggests that it is also a practice that is easily mistaken for the essence of its object. Walker goes on to point out that "As a category of analysis, [sovereignty] is easily treated as the silent condition guaranteeing all other categories" (1991:458). The same is true of modern time in political science, especially that of the quantitative variety. In this way, modern time reflects an

⁷⁷ In this chapter, Western standard time does *not* include calendrical time. Historically, calendars have undergone extensive rationalization and standardization efforts (Adam 2004, Zerubavel 1977, 1982a, 1982b, 1985, 2003), but today lunar and solar calendars coexist in many cultures such as Japan, where official documents are dated from the year of the current Emperor's ascension alongside the BCE-CE convention. For this reason, as well as limited pages, and by way of bracketing calendar time, I will only remark that the rise of territorial sovereign states produced and was produced in part by increased interests and abilities in controlling *all* of the manners of time reckoning of their populaces, from clock time to calendar time. A cross-cultural historical comparison of calendrical practices would likely yield further insights into the complex relationship between political power and time reckoning, including a connection between conceptualizations of temporality and authority relations.

Enlightenment tendency to “conceal” or “hide” the origins of epistemological practices, which began as propositions among alternatives and attained efficacy only through social argumentation and agreement (Edkins 1999:2).

But Enlightenment epistemology contributes much more than reification. It is primarily responsible for the germination of the spatial and temporal propositions that currently predominate. Modern sovereignty and time both represent highly ‘rational’ images of social organization. In the case of sovereignty, the multitude of peoples and cultures around the world are organized by the discrete partitioning of the earth’s land into self-contained units. In the case of time, a highly nebulous, intuitive concept is explicitly described via the discrete partitioning of abstracted averages of celestial motions. Both display a seventeenth century Cartesian faith in a unified natural structure that privileges permanence over contingency, certainty over skepticism, and theoretically rigorous covering laws over conclusions derived from case-based inquiries (Toulmin 1990:34).⁷⁸

In the seventeenth century, such preferences represented an attempt to introduce to virulent ideological competitions an alternative system of assessment that would delimit debates in such a way as to preclude their ultimate settlement on the battlefield. The Thirty Years’ War threatened Europe with ruin, and philosophers such as Descartes believed that changing the nature and process of foundational debates was the only way

⁷⁸ Toulmin refers to this shift in preferences as the process by which philosophy became “timeless” (1990:34).

to limit symptomatic political violence. In lieu of appeals to lineage, Church doctrine, or religious texts, Enlightenment philosophers substituted materialism (the ontological privilege of physical matter), empiricism (the sensory limitation of epistemology), and Reason (the epistemological privilege of self-evident propositions).⁷⁹ If a claim could not be ascertained through the examination of physical nature, or through rigorous logic,⁸⁰ it became invalid as a philosophical and political topic. Williams describes these boundaries as “epistemic ethical practices” that constituted “a *negative ontology* . . . in the name of opposing innatist ontologies of privilege and traditional authority” (2007:14). Such delimitations further championed “abstract universality” over particularity so that “political violence was . . . removed from the private or personal realm and the public, political realm was . . . insulated from personal acts of violence” (Williams 2007:16, see also Toulmin 1990:80).

The rise of the modern state is often associated with the secularization of politics, and discussions of moves away from innatism certainly seem to support such a claim. However, Stephen Toulmin argues that rationalism was not so much a removal of religion and tradition from philosophy and politics as it was a new version of “Cosmopolis”, the idea that the order of the *cosmos* (nature) and the *polis* (society) emanate from a single,

⁷⁹ Empiricism and Reason seem to oppose each other in that the former relies on experience and the latter relies on context-less propositions. I include them here because they both oppose “the various forms of innatism and essentialism” that had led to persistent religio-political violence in Europe (Williams 2007:14), and because they both hold implications for the attractiveness of modern clock time.

⁸⁰ Toulmin refers to this as the prioritization of “epistemological proofs” over religious doctrine (1990:30).

fundamental source (1990:67). During the wars of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, European society nearly collapsed, compelling a search for a more convincing basis for social order understood through the lens of the natural sciences, so that “the structure of Nature reinforces a rational Social Order” (Toulmin 1990:68). As the *cosmos* was being more and more accurately described by the “causal necessity” of mechanical processes, so could the *polis* be stabilized by grafting “enticing new analogies” from those processes into social and political thought (Toulmin 1990:107).

One of these analogies was the “geometrical certainty” (Toulmin 1990:62) achieved by territorial partition of political authority. But a more compelling illustration from that era exposes the importance of rationalized time to the rise of modernity. Since the modern version of cosmopolitical thinking retained the idea of “treating natural systems like the planetary system as templates for social systems” (Toulmin 1990:114), images of the organization of the *cosmos* exerted great influence—so much so that an image of the “State as modeled on the solar system dominated the imagination of respectable Europeans and Americans for generations” (Toulmin 1990:127). During the Enlightenment, the ascendant image of the celestial realm was that of a “cosmic clockwork” (Toulmin 1990:108), indicating that the analogy of the mechanical timepiece provided the essential link between nature and society in the emerging cosmopolitical system.⁸¹ For those “who reconstructed European society and culture after the Thirty

⁸¹ While vertical, hierarchical visions of domestic authority coexist with horizontal, autonomous relations between states in most accounts, Toulmin uses the clockwork metaphor to give an orbital

Years' War . . . it was important to believe that the principles of stability and hierarchy were found in all of the Divine plan, down from the astronomical cosmos to the individual family" (Toulmin 1990:128).⁸² Obviously, this included the rational ordering achieved by territorial state sovereignty. What is less obvious, but conceptually prior, is that the Divine plan was understood by the metaphor of the mechanical clock, an image that would not have been convincing absent the increasing consistency and accuracy—the rationality—of modern time reckoning. Rationalism's greatest social theoretical achievement may have been imagining politics spatially in order to reduce conflicts of authority, but it was a temporal vision that provided the inspiration.

Time bred: the birth of modern temporality and spatiality in Western Europe

In this section, I examine three sites where modern sovereignty arose and find a common interest among them in modern time reckoning techniques and concepts. The first two sites, churches and cities, laid the groundwork both temporally and spatially for the emergence of modern modes of social organization exemplified in the third site, the factory. As with all the sites to follow, there are admitted historical overlaps between

explication of the modern nation-state: "the *Roi Soleil*, or Solar King, wields authority over successive circles of subjects, all of whom know their places, and keep their proper orbits" (1990:127). This description overlaps with world systems theory accounts of the international system as constituted by a core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Interestingly, such accounts recognize their debt to an iconic rationalist, Karl Marx, but pay little homage to the cosmopolitical roots underpinning his philosophy.

⁸² The Enlightenment version of Cosmopolis argues against a secularized state because it retains the belief that "Everything in the natural order testifies to God's dominion over Nature. That dominion extends through the entire fabric of the world, natural or human, and is apparent on every level of experience" (Toulmin 1990:127).

churches, cities, and factories. However, I will point out some historically sequential relationship between each site and the next in order to move the story along and to accentuate common themes running through it.

Churches

Despite the tangled ligatures of feudalism that often subjected a person or territory to multiple claims of obligation based on religious, secular, or personal bonds (Spruyt 1994:36), medieval time emanated from a single source. Combined with a general indifference to time in daily, secular life, the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church⁸³ to ensure orderly religious observance resulted in a common view of time as belonging to God alone, ciphered solely by scriptural revelation, and associated primarily with the afterlife. The Church alone “kept the day and times of year, it told people which days were holy and which not, it determined when to work and when not to” (Spruyt 1994:70). Daniel Philpott makes the counterfactual claim that modern sovereignty would not have emerged when it did without the challenge of “Protestant propositions” to the Church’s predominance, the violent responses of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, and the resulting alliances between kings and religious pluralists against the Catholics (2001:23-50). These alliances typically led to an increase in secular authority and the eventual impotence of ecclesiastical claims within territorial realms. Philpott discusses the “Janus-faced” nature of the new sovereign states, staring “inward” at their subjects and “outward”

⁸³ Any references to the Church denote the Roman Catholic variety.

at a world of equals devoid of “robed ecclesiasts who claim temporal authority⁸⁴ within their borders” (2001:18). Concomitant with this revolution in authority was the de-monopolization of time.

However, the time that secular authorities wrested from the Church’s grasp was already rationalized and abstracted in two important ways. First, time had already come to be viewed as a commodity, in large part due to monastic communities. The monks’ vocation “was to pray and pray often” (Landes 2000:55), but they also had to keep monasteries functioning on a daily basis. In order to ensure a balance between the sacred and the mundane, “canonical hours” dictated a specific number of services each day as well the times of their observance (Landes 2000:56). As more services were added, the longstanding habit of dividing the day into quarters became inadequate (Landes 2000:54).⁸⁵ Thus, the celestially determined day was increasingly subdivided to enable religious observance, and the usage of time came to be understood as a form of worship—

⁸⁴ The phrase “temporal authority” plays a short role in studies of sovereignty. Philpott uses it to convey secular offices and powers held by the Church (2001:18,33), and mentions the rise of German sovereigns as being linked to the end of “the involvement of the Church in temporal affairs” (2001:86). This decline occasioned a vigorous reaction from the Church: “Sensing the defeat of universal Catholic temporal authority, [Pope Innocent X] issued a bull, *Zel Domus*, condemning the treaties [of Westphalia] as ‘null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time’ ” (Philpott 2001:87). However, as modern sovereignty emerges in the accounts used in this chapter, “temporal authority” disappears. This may be due to its association with the Church’s interference in secular affairs so that, as the Church declined in world politics, it took with it the distinction between eternal and temporal authority. One result of this disappearance has been an effect of timelessness in the current arrangements of political (temporal) authority, an effect this study seeks to expose.

⁸⁵ This convention dates back at least to the early third century, when Tertullian recommended that, in addition to the morning (sunrise) and evening (sunset) prayers, “there would be devotions at the third, sixth and ninth hours” (Landes 2000:54).

the good monk attended to his duties in such a way as to maximize the amount of the day he could devote to prayer. Thus, the subdivision of the monastic day encouraged a commodified view of time. This view was extended to the secular realm, becoming “axiomatic” by the early twelfth century, when the “churchman and political thinker” John of Salisbury wrote that nothing was more “unworthy . . . than the man who wastes time—this precious time, the one thing you can’t get back once you lose it. The man who, wasting time, wastes his own life . . . dishonors himself” (Landes 2000:58). In this critique can be found an early association of productivity with virtue, a connection later institutionalized in, among other places, modern industrial capitalist factories.

Second, and in support of the commodified view, Church time reckoning was accomplished with the assistance of mechanical invention. By the end of the thirteenth century, mechanical timekeepers were an established item in cathedral accounts (Landes 2000:51).⁸⁶ While the development of various types of measuring devices had been ongoing for centuries, Landes argues that this period marks the ascension of the mechanical reckoning device because churches spent large amounts to construct them, and because their attachment to bells to signal the hours to observers necessitated that

⁸⁶ The long, labyrinthine, highly technical history of mechanical timekeeping defies all but the most basic generalization. In this context, mechanical timekeeping marks the distinction between, on the one hand, devices with no moving parts (sundial) or devices that relied on an exhaustible material (water or sand) for their impulse, and on the other hand, devices that stored human energy in moving parts (gears, springs, etc). Histories of the development of mechanical timekeeping include (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996, Landes 2000, Cipolla 2003, and to a lesser extent, Mooij 2005). O’Malley offers an account of the commercial aspects of mechanical clocks that includes a fascinating discussion of the association of standard time with social surveillance and discipline in the US (1990).

they be placed “in high places—the better to hear them” (Landes 2000:51). Older reckoning devices such as water clocks were unsuitable for tower placement since “no one hauls water any higher than he has to” (Landes 2000:51);⁸⁷ smaller and lighter mechanical clocks were the solution, and they began to appear atop church towers during the fourteenth century (Landes 2000:48). An important corollary of this argument is Landes’ observation that rationalizing and abstracting “sensibilities preceded the invention of the mechanical clock; indeed helped create the need and gave birth to its realization” (2000:58).⁸⁸

Thus, the existing temporal knowledge that sovereigns annexed from the Church was of a particular character that anticipated the abstract, rationalizing tendencies of modernity. As I will argue during the rest of this chapter, struggles over temporal authority did not involve questions about the nature of temporality itself, and thus served to reproduce and refine it rather than challenge or alter it. Modern temporality in turn helped to produce particular modes of social life. The roots of modern sovereignty trace back to conflicts over secular-religious authority relationships, and the roots of modern time can be found in religious authority. A largely unacknowledged result of those struggles was the export of commodified, mechanized time from the religious to the

⁸⁷ In addition, a “tower is no place for a water clock” because “lofty exposures make it very difficult to keep water from cooling and freezing” (Landes 2000:51).

⁸⁸ Thus, temporal knowledge was one of the few aspects of medieval European science that flourished rather than receded (Landes 2000:59).

secular realms, manifested in the rise of cities in early modern Europe, where tower clocks and commodified views of time became increasingly prevalent.

Cities

Territorially delineated cities, and later city-states, were important antecedents to the modern state because, as an alternative to the cross-cutting jurisdictions of the medieval period (Spruyt 1994:36), they provided an example of a unified polity ruled by a distinct authority (Philpott 2001:14, Spruyt 1994:149).⁸⁹ As discussed above, Protestantism provided a crucial impetus to political change by challenging Catholic authority (Philpott 2001:125), but Protestantism was also significantly related to the rise of urban life. Philpott argues that the growing urban commercial class displayed an “elective affinity” for Protestant propositions in that higher literacy rates and a burgeoning sense of “administrative autonomy” predisposed urban populations to embrace challenges to Church and imperial authority, in contrast to rural areas where Protestantism “took root the least” (2001:145-46). Although cities eventually gave way to sovereign states as the dominant mode of political authority, Hendrik Spruyt argues that city-states displayed important features of modern sovereignty: “the city-state developed notions of

⁸⁹ Spruyt claims that city-states and city-leagues represented a significant challenge to the Church, the Holy Roman Empire, and feudal obligations as early as 1300 (1994:36).

sovereignty and the public realm. . . . And like the sovereign state, the city-state had territorial borders” (1994:150).⁹⁰

Compared to their role in the development of modern sovereignty, cities were even more central in the development of modern time. Borrowing directly from the Church, cities relied on a commodified view of time and on mechanical tower clocks for much of their daily social organization. In contrast to rural consciousness, which merely “received” or “perceived” time, urban consciousness “tracked” and “used” time itself (Landes 2000:76).⁹¹ To the emerging middle class “Time was no longer the ephemeral time of the afterlife” (Spruyt 1994:74). The bourgeoisie had cultivated its sociopolitical relevance by acquiring wealth through commerce and trade, and such activities “required formalized calculation of time” as well as a common, commodified understanding of time’s passage. Whereas medieval time had belonged to God alone, urban businessmen utilized “mathematical precision” to calculate interest rates on loans based on the belief that “time itself had value” (Spruyt 1994:74). Altered time consciousness was essential to the urban challenge to Church authority: “Throughout Western Europe towns constructed clock towers which were strategically placed opposite belfries of the churches” (Spruyt 1994:74), offering to city life new sources of daily order. Crucially,

⁹⁰ Importantly, Philpott claims that Italian city-states “did nothing to bring about” the sovereign system of states because they remained Catholic polities and were therefore not predisposed to Protestantism (2001:21). However, Spruyt places Italian city-states within the broader historical momentum toward modern sovereignty as an important early alternative to feudalism (1994:130-50).

⁹¹ Landes’ comment typifies his “functionalist” account of cities and the rise of modernity, but should not be confused with the claim that cities intrinsically “desired” modernity or modern time (Hanson 1997:7).

such alternatives challenged only the Church's temporal authority, not the authority of Church temporality. "[T]he rulers of Europe seized upon and delighted in the new bell-ringing clocks . . . costly to build and maintain, but well worth it for their plangent ubiquity—the ideal, quotidian reminder and symbol of high authority" (Landes 2000:75). High authority was viewed as emanating from the constructor rather than the construction of time. Nevertheless, by wresting the right to mark time from the Church, the mechanized calculation of city time contributed to the overall rationalization of social and business activities that helped carve out an urban niche in the emerging modern social order.⁹²

The temporal transformation in fourteenth century social life that rationalizing and standardizing efforts wrought cannot be overestimated. Whereas the daily life of the rural peasant was defined solely by the sun, city time was "man-made . . . an invitation to serial engagements: with careful planning (that is, timing), one can multiply oneself" (Landes 2000:75). In municipalities, serial engagements both facilitated and responded to an expanding array of services and opportunities available to urban populations. As Dorhn-van Rossum explicates, municipal governments and citizenries bore much of the responsibility for a "growing flood of deliberative and decision-making processes" epitomized by burdensome committee, court, and guild participation, all regulated by the new tower clocks and bells (1996:237). As responsibilities increased, temporal

⁹² Such rationalized alternatives to medieval practices are epitomized by the urban institution of standardized and predictable taxation as a replacement for the arbitrary revenue extraction practiced under feudalism (Spruyt 1994:89,163).

rationalizing techniques further subdivided the urban day, and vice versa. But “What appears in retrospect as a long-term development toward greater temporal precision amounted within the purview of contemporary experience above all to many steps of abstraction . . . away from the natural system of reference” (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:239). Such abstraction held the kernel of the idea of compartmentalization endemic to modern, urban life—multiplying oneself implies adopting different roles in different contexts at different times.

Not only did citizens increasingly engage in the clock-driven life of the city. They also began to have their working lives regulated by a commodified, calculated time consciousness. For example, by the late fourteenth century statutes for day laborers and artisans alike were based not on sunrise and sunset but on specific points on the tower clock face (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:234-35). The new time regulations “were uniformly restrictive in nature, that is to say, they determined, for reasons of competition and quality safeguards, the maximum amount of working time permitted” (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:235).⁹³ In an interesting twist, whereas commodified time had helped John

⁹³ These restrictions were widespread and quite comprehensive. By way of examples, the following lengthy passage is indicative: “Weavers of fustian, armorers, and purse-makers could not begin before five in the morning and could work at the very most until nine in the evening. Coppersmiths and needlemakers had to stop at eight o’clock. Joiners (chestmakers) were allowed to work from four until eight, felt hat makers from four until ten”. Smiths “could start at eight o’clock in the morning” but “had to cease working as early as five”. Seasonal and weekly variations were also accounted for: “Only during winter could [belt makers] continue by candlelight until nine. . . . On Saturdays and on evenings preceding high holidays, belt makers had to stop at four, needlemakers and smiths in the winter at four, in the summer at six and seven, respectively. Tailors who worked past eight o’clock on evenings preceding feast days had to pay penance of one pound of wax”(Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:235).

of Salisbury to turn productivity into a virtue, it now served the purpose of constraining that work ethic. In this way, modern temporality was both the creator and master of modern labor. Social control based on time was made possible in two new ways afforded by the ever-growing precision and consistency of mechanical clocks. First, “events, whose previous temporal determination was vague or nonexistent”, were “fixed on a temporal axis”, as in the case of market hours of operation, a term suggestive of the change (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:236). Second, the concept of duration in social and commercial activities was revolutionized in that requiring a maximum or minimum length of time to those activities was made possible by the presupposition of “abstract times that are always of equal length” (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:236).

The increasingly autonomous urban bourgeoisie welcomed political bargains offered by such kings as France’s Louis IX and Henri IV that included a “legal framework and ideological legitimation” based on territorial boundaries and “an exact locus of authority” instead of medieval cross-cutting (Spruyt 1994:105), bolstering the momentum of territorial sovereignty. Prior to these bargains, such bourgeois self-sufficiency was facilitated in part by constructing secular tower clocks that offered an alternative marker but similar mode of time reckoning to that of the Church, whose commodified and rationalized understanding of time was well-suited to the development of commerce and abstraction of daily life upon which urban vitality relied. As a result of the appropriation of Church time, social and commercial relations became more predictable, but such

acclimation was not accomplished without conflict. Nowhere was this conflict more apparent than in labor relations, in particular disputes in the urban, modern factory.

Factories

Capitalism, here emblemized by the industrial factory, is a nearly ubiquitous component of conventional accounts of the rise of territorial state sovereignty (Walker 1991:450).⁹⁴ Wallerstein explains the existence of the sovereign states system as part of a “unilinear” process related to capital in general, and specifically a response to the “needs of class forces operating in the world economy”, an argument whose causal relationship Spruyt reverses without challenging the fundamental connection between the two (1994:18-19).⁹⁵ Rodney Bruce Hall goes as far as to claim that modern states that accomplish the Janus-faced task of providing a “favorable forum” for citizenship while competing well internationally are linked significantly by their ability to “provide favorable forums of capitalist production” (1999:21), and that the dominant unit in international affairs is the specifically modern, capitalist, nation-state (1999:22).⁹⁶

⁹⁴ The conventional account traces the roots of the territorial, capitalist, nation-state back through the Renaissance to feudalism, to the age of empires (especially Roman), to the Greek city-states, and finally to primitive tribes, in an effort to traditionalize and naturalize the modern sovereign state (Walker 1991:450).

⁹⁵ Spruyt also explains the division of labor on which capitalism is based as partially due to the rise of cities, arguing that as villages grew into towns, and towns grew into territorially distinct cities, revenues were best-maximized by specialization of labor (1994:62).

⁹⁶ The crux of Hall’s argument is that surplus capital simultaneously encourages the sustenance of the state, civil society, and individual citizens (1999:22).

Clearly, it is not easy to imagine the historical rise of modern sovereignty without the presence of capitalism. It is even more difficult to imagine capitalism, especially as embodied in factory life, without a commodified understanding of time and the controlling presence of a common, mechanical, signaling clock. Giddens contends that this understanding of time “is surely one of the most distinctive features of modern capitalism” (1984:144). Furthermore, Landes argues that the rise of modern time consciousness encouraged the industrial revolution by exposing a conflict in the eighteenth century between the traditional putting-out system, in which rural and cottage workers operated unbound by any time other than sunrise and sunset,⁹⁷ and owners/employers, who had adopted a sense of time-as-commodity. The perception of profits lost by the employers due to the poor efficiency of the dispersed labor force could only be reconciled by “bringing the workers together in a place where the employer could directly oversee their performance” (Landes 2000:240).

Just as in the monastic day⁹⁸ and in city commerce, during the industrial revolution “the importance of a rational economic use of time and the new forms of time discipline⁹⁹ moved to the forefront of public interest. Mechanization of production, [and]

⁹⁷ Labor time in the putting-out system is known as “task orientation”. For a discussion of the putting-out system as well as the shift from rural to factory time consciousness, see (Thompson 1967:60,71-79).

⁹⁸ Mumford connects monasticism and capitalism more directly, calling the Benedictines the founders of modern capitalism because they gave “human enterprise the regular collective beat and rhythm of the machine” (quoted in Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:34).

⁹⁹ “Time-discipline” here is in the sense of external control of factory workers based on time, a usage generalized fairly consistently across the literature. However, Adam proposes a more useful distinction between “time-obedience”, the “public call of time from the bell tower”, and the

industrial working conditions . . . made [employers and workers alike] more keenly aware of the economic implications of the organization of time and working time” (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:8). Capitalism is predicated on a distinctly modern and Western notion of efficiency in which “each unit of time is utilized in as productive a manner as possible given scarce resources” (Hanson 1997:viii), contrasted to the premodern notion of efficiency as constant busyness. Thus, “Control of time is a major part of capitalist life” (Giddens, quoted in Tucker Jr. 1998:113).

Concurrent with the widespread transition to industrial production beginning in the eighteenth century, the combination of notions of productivity with the mechanical clock’s ability to specify precise start-points, end-points, and duration produced a factory life in which the worker’s entire existence outside the home was at the beckon and mercy of the clock (Tucker Jr. 1998:113). Attached to a whistle or bell, and often architecturally reminiscent of Church and town towers (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:318), the factory clock signaled every step of the workday. Its control by management abetted the maximal extraction of value creation from the labor force by setting the length of a day’s labor during which foremen would spur workers to contribute more than a day’s product (Hanson 1997:50).

This clock exerted a most direct and unyielding influence on factory life, so it is not surprising that it became a primary source of conflict between labor and management.

“internalized” character of “time-discipline” based on the individual’s decision to obey a personal timepiece (2004:113, see also Landes 2000:2).

Rural persons who came to work in factories often viewed their new jobs as “a kind of jail, with the clock as the lock” (Landes 2000:241).¹⁰⁰ The primary reason for this sentiment was management’s control over the shift clock: “the employer knew the time, whereas the employee had to take his word for it” (Landes 2000:241). During the early stages of the industrial revolution, labor forces often suspected management of tinkering with the shift clock. Their suspicions were exacerbated by the absence of coordination between clocks from one location to another (for instance between their town square clock and the factory clock), for while clocks were more and more accurate, they still had no global referent against which to be set in the first instance, resulting in a proliferation of local times.¹⁰¹ The natural response, increasingly within the economic reach of laborers due to the proliferation of inexpensive personal timepieces in the nineteenth century, was for workers to keep their own clock in order to check the factory’s time against their own.¹⁰² For instance, in 1863, workers at a power-loom spinning mill in Wiltshire, England, refused to return from a strike until a workers’ clock was procured to monitor the factory horn (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:317).

In this manner, factory laborers, like city leaders before them, contested authority *over* time without challenging the authority *of* a particular type of time—they fought “not against time, but about it” (Thompson 1967:85). As the cities imported the Church’s

¹⁰⁰ Lateness was one of the most egregious errors an employee could commit, while a personal clock was often offered as a prize to productive workers (Landes 2000:241).

¹⁰¹ For an extended discussion of such variation, see (O’Malley 1990).

¹⁰² This proliferation was, of course, spurred on by increasingly modern manufacturing processes, completing a clockwork cycle of sorts in the industrial revolution.

time within their walls, workers imported capitalist time into their individual lives. This is most evident in the emergence and establishment by the late nineteenth century of the concepts of 'leisure time' and 'free time', ideas responding to a 'labor time' controlled by someone else. As Stephen Hanson notes, "Early liberal capitalist regimes forced newly urbanized workers to adjust to the idea that the rule of abstract time is inexorable; work must therefore be steady and disciplined and 'free time' kept within strict bounds" (1997:viii). Correspondingly, leisure time came to be seen as a measure of wealth, and thus deserving of equally zealous safeguarding (Hanson 1997:52).¹⁰³ Much like urban serial engagements, such practices contributed to a further compartmentalization of the modern individual life and the embedding of rationalized time consciousness in Western Europe.

As I will argue in the next section, modern time and territorial sovereignty were exported to the colonial frontier during the nineteenth century period of colonial nationalism. By then, modern time had become Western Europe's standard method of time reckoning while territorial sovereignty accommodated the majority of Western European geography; thus both were part of the effort to re-make colonial cultures in the Western European image. Both standards resulted from sociopolitical interactions epitomized in churches, cities, and factories. Technologies associated with the rise of modern time also facilitated colonial territorial expansion, necessitated a truly globalized

¹⁰³ The rise of leisure, free, or 'disposable' time parallels an emerging distinction between 'private' and 'public' time discussed by Kern (1983:34).

time standard, and set the stage for a cataclysm far more destructive than the religious wars that provided crucial motive force to the initial rationalization of modern time and space.

Time spread: the diffusion of Western time

Even though modern sovereignty and time had appeared and in many ways had become established in Europe by the nineteenth century, the majority of the world still operated based on more locally determined principles. The spread of particularly European methods of organizing spatial and temporal social life occurred over the following two centuries, and required the ability to first subdue, and then assimilate, indigenous territories and cultures. Momentous technological innovations brought the world at large within the grasp of European powers, and assimilationist practices associated with colonial nationalism effectively remade the frontier in the spatial and temporal image of Western Europe.

Ships

Accounts of the rise of territorial sovereignty typically view the contribution of European mariners either in terms of the importance of navies to military balances of power or in terms of the significance of burgeoning long-distance trade (Spruyt 1994:61) to the economic mobility of Europe's emerging middle class. However, maritime exploration also made possible a cartographic comprehension of the world and thus

underpinned the “geographic imagination” necessary for territorial sovereign delineation (Harvey 1990). The epic efforts of seafaring explorers to chart the earth’s surface, and later of colonizers to acquire territorial assets for their sovereign homelands (Hall 1999:77-104) would not have been possible without a consistent, accurate mode of navigation. Accurate navigation became a reality with the clock-based discovery of the longitude.

Sailors had long been able to discern latitude by making use of the North Star and the sun (Landes 2000:109). However, longitude was much more problematic: “Since the earth turns continually on its axis, there is nothing visible from one longitude that is not visible in the course of the day from every other [longitude]” (Landes 2000:110). This difficulty results from the earth’s motion, which also brings day and night and makes it the “original clock”; ironically, clocks would eventually provide the solution of the longitude (Landes 2000:110). Accurate longitude became important in the fifteenth century as soon as Europeans undertook transoceanic voyages. By the sixteenth century, long-distance trade gave longitude “the highest political and commercial urgency” because navigational errors not only risked the lives of those aboard but the substantial investments of European entrepreneurs (Landes 2000:111). Accordingly, European powers interested in colonial expansion, including Spain, Holland, France, and England, initiated contests offering lucrative awards to anyone who could devise an accurate

method of determining longitude (Landes 2000:116).¹⁰⁴ Better navigation also held obvious implications for European navies at the time. Importantly, though, the quest for longitude was not viewed as solely a matter of national competition or security. Perhaps because it “was the great mystery of the age, a riddle to seamen, a challenge to scientists, a stumbling block to kings and statesmen”, and had attained an aura matched only by “the fountain of youth and the philosophers’ stone” (Landes 2000:115), longitudinal precision was seen as a project “transcending national interests and boundaries” (Landes 2000:168), an early example of cooperation in the embryonic international system.

The full story of the determination of the longitude deserves more space than is presently available.¹⁰⁵ In this context, the relevant aspect of its discovery is the crucial role that modern time played. The final solution used increasingly accurate chronometers¹⁰⁶ to monitor time at a place of known longitude, which could then be compared with local times at uncharted locales and the difference transformed into a measure of distance (Landes 2000:111). Clearly, the further explorers traveled from their European points of reference, the more important chronometric consistency and accuracy became. Life on the high seas was not conducive to the precision instruments employed

¹⁰⁴ Landes catalogs the awards, all of which were sufficient to make the recipient financially secure, even wealthy, for life (2000:116).

¹⁰⁵ The paragraph-length treatment here summarizes a centuries-long process of discovery, in which successive waves of explorers made use of increasingly accurate devices. For accounts that do greater justice to this monumental endeavor, see (Howse 1980, Landes 2000).

¹⁰⁶ Landes discusses different understandings of what constituted a chronometer, although generally it denoted only an “instrument for the precise measurement of time” (2000:310). This understanding may imply a distinction from other timekeepers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries based on expense and technical exactitude. In any case, the historical accounts nearly always refer to ship timekeepers as chronometers.

in land-based clocks, and it was not until the late seventeenth century¹⁰⁷ that inventors could find a way to make marine chronometers “more or less impervious to motion” (Landes 2000:135), allowing for accurate long distance measurement and mapping. Thus, the comprehension of the world’s seas was dependent on innovations in time. This causal relationship was reversed on land, where railroads and telegraphs both allowed and necessitated greater temporal coordination.

Rails and wires

Much as maritime knowledge and strength allowed Europeans to seek out and subdue peripheral coasts¹⁰⁸ around the world, railroads and telegraphs played a crucial role in the comprehension and conquest of colonial interiors. Such processes preceded colonial wars over territorial delineation of European holdings across Africa and Asia that effectively set the boundaries along which future modern states would be constituted following the World Wars of the twentieth century. Contrary to maritime pursuits, which depended on temporal innovations, railroads and telegraphs revolutionized time reckoning conventions as they covered more and more of the globe.

¹⁰⁷ As with nearly every other step in the history of Western time, the discovery that allowed accurate timekeeping at sea is one whose authorship and date are disputed. In order to respect these disputes without engaging them, I have generalized the historical dates, a move further justified by the wide historical lens employed in this chapter. For more detailed accounts, turn again to (Landes 2000).

¹⁰⁸ I take ‘peripheral’ to spatially denote the many cultures that were “pushed aside, enslaved, and in most conceivable fashions exploited” by European “commercial quasi-military enterprises and the settlers that followed on their heels” (Hall 1999:100) rather than to imply any ranking of civilizations or to indicate the division of the world based on modes of production (Wallerstein 1974).

Railroads provided the fastest travel and communication over long distances in human history. They also crossed a plethora of “local times”, times based on a town or city tower clock, itself set against some natural marker such as high noon, and thus dependent on the geographic position of the locality (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:323). Railways initially set each rail line to the time of the largest city or town it served and kept two clocks at all stations, one for the line time and one for local time (O'Malley 1990:82). This practice lost efficacy as more and more track was laid, placing multiple large cities on the same line and running multiple lines through the same city. Along with local reckoning, crisscrossing rail lines only exacerbated the confusion caused by the multitude of pertinent times involved in train travel (Landes 2000:303), and travelers disembarking one train for another at a rail junction often missed their connection.

Telegraphs, following fast on the heels of trains globally, and even preceding them in some colonies, had been developed to aid in “imperial defense” and “as a stimulus to colonial trade” (Kesner 1981:135). They also provided a solution to the problem of temporal coordination. By broadcasting a daily time signal, they facilitated the uniform correction of local clocks by a single, master clock. Convincing localities to change their time to match some distant source was another matter altogether, and required the rhetorical, commercial, and political mobilization of arguments running along the lines of “an advanced society demand[s] ‘a common standard, to which every individual timepiece

shall be made to conform' ” (O'Malley 1990:105).¹⁰⁹ But where railroads covered extremely broad distances, such as the US and Russia, a single national time was insufficient, and in 1883 time zones were instituted in the US for the first time (O'Malley 1990:100).

In 1884, the International Meridian Conference (IMC) proposed a system of time zones covering the entire earth, with the prime meridian marked by the Greenwich observatory in England (Landes 2000:304). Unlike the quest for longitude, the IMC and subsequent ratification process were sources of persistent international dispute, suggesting that time was at least as important to Western national identities as cartography. During the conference, Americans claimed that using Greenwich mean time (GMT) challenged the “sovereignty” of the American National Observatory (O'Malley 1990:57) and imposed “English time” on the US (O'Malley 1990:94). The French delegation refused to accept Greenwich unless the US and England adopted the metric system (O'Malley 1990:109). France’s proposal was rejected, and the French abstained from the final vote, portending a lengthy ratification process. In Europe, Germany did not adopt GMT until 1893, when Count Von Moltke argued, “we have in Germany five different units of time . . . which, since we have become an empire, it is proper should be done away with” (O'Malley 1990:107). Portugal, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Russia, Ireland, and most of South America

¹⁰⁹ A more standardized time was further a mark of territorial unity. American entrepreneurs marketed an accurate, single time signal as the solution to the problem that “ ‘from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, every city and town is keeping a time of its own . . . founded not in natural necessity’ and merely a legacy of the past” (O'Malley 1990:77).

did not adopt GMT until after 1905. France was most intransigent, refusing to ratify until 1911, and then only by “defining their standard as ‘Paris Mean Time, retarded by nine minutes twenty-one seconds’ ” from GMT (O'Malley 1990:109). These arguments for and against GMT indicate both the unifying appeal as well as the subordinating specter of globally standardized time. However, the coordinating power that a global standard offered to commerce, factories, railways, governments, and militaries eventually prevailed.¹¹⁰ Once France gave its mitigated assent, the IMC system, much like the telegraphy that facilitated it, covered most of Europe and the Americas.

As railroad tracks and telegraph wires enveloped more and more of the earth, territory and time came increasingly under the coordination, regulation, and control of Western European (and now American) powers.¹¹¹ Technological dominance on the oceans had facilitated European conquests in the eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth, it furthered the interior development of Europe and its ‘frontier’. When colonialism took on a nationalist character, Western European notions of spatial and temporal organization were part of a particular vision of ‘civilization’ that was exported to the colonies.

¹¹⁰ Standardizations of “national times” accomplished by many of the IMC signatories (Dohrn-van Rossum 1996:349) may also have eased the transition to a global standard by providing a positive domestic analogy.

¹¹¹ Bayly elaborates: “Across the world, the time that [European] watches and clocks displayed was also itself converging. Russian imperial expansion into Siberia and eventually to northern China required that schemes of local time had to be coordinated. As the nineteenth century progressed, more exact and synchronized timekeeping was also required in dependent non-European societies” where “local systems of time still prevailed” (2004:17).

Frontiers

Hall distinguishes between eighteenth century mercantilist imperialism, motivated by a desire for increased tradable commodities and taxable wealth available through the attainment of colonies (1999:95), and nineteenth century nationalist imperialism, “a crusade to transmit [Western European] national culture and institutions to the periphery—a process that transformed peripheral societies” (1999:8,215). Railroads and especially telegraphs buttressed the kind of order and control necessary for such transmissions, aiding the colonial development of commerce, modern administrative practices and economic structures, and helping to quell political unrest (Kesner 1981:138, Hall 1999:231). As I discuss later, the penetration of the concept of territorial sovereignty in the postcolonial era is evidenced by the retention of colonial geographic borders. But the Western time that rails and wires helped to standardize and import also remained behind when imperialists relinquished the frontier.

Nationalist imperialism operated at nearly every level of colonial life, and “Every form of social power at the command of the imperialist states was harnessed to thoroughly penetrate and transform peripheral society, economy, ideas, and self-perceptions” (Hall 1999:37). Particularly important in the course of modern sovereignty’s expansion was the view of territorial statehood as communicating authority, simplifying enforcement, and reifying power (Murphy 1996:90). Furthermore, territorial sovereignty was seen as an important part of the positive legal tradition communicated to colonies (Murphy 1996:98), as well as the context for modern political administration.

It was through administrative and missionary education that Western European nationalists applied a sociocultural pressure to indigenous populations that “left only one rational response: abject imitation as a condition of survival and self-affirmation” (Von Laue, quoted in Hall 1999:240). Some of the most successful socialization projects took place in missionary schools, where the sub-Saharan African schoolboy was “educated in the language of his colonial master, according to a curriculum devised by his colonial master, within a strict schedule laid out by, *and in the time of his colonial master*,¹¹² to prepare him for service in the military, bureaucratic, ecclesiastical and administrative institutions of his colonial master” (Hall 1999:233 emphasis added). Matriculants thus came to value the “rubber stamp and the row of pens in the breast pocket” (Ranger, quoted in Hall 1999:232) along with the ordering precision of the pocket watch.¹¹³

C. A. Bayly describes the temporal assimilation of peripheral societies as a disciplinary process, noting that “Slave plantations . . . were controlled by bells sounded to the time of the master’s watch” (2004:17).¹¹⁴ Western standard time was part of the “great domestication” of the periphery, encouraging the “creation of modern societies from Indochina to central Africa” (Bayly 2004:51). One of the primary indicators of this domestication, or abject imitation, occurred in India and China when “municipal

¹¹² In his discussion of modern schooling, Giddens concludes that “it is surely right to trace the origins of school discipline in some part to the regulation of time and space which a generalized transition to ‘clock time’ makes possible” (1984:135).

¹¹³ Indeed, Hall views time as one of the most vivid indicators of the full penetration of Western values in peripheral societies (1999:237).

¹¹⁴ While this example may correlate historically with European mercantilist imperialism, evidence of the use of personal clocks in eighteenth century plantations supports the contention that Western time was ingrained in peripheral society by the nineteenth century.

grandees began to build great clock towers to regulate the rhythm of bazaars and offices where once they would have put their money into temples or mosques” (Bayly 2004:17).¹¹⁵

Departing their homelands on ships equipped with accurate navigational instruments, national imperialists expanded the reach of Western culture around the world, transforming nearly every local convention and further delineating the earth’s territory. Whereas eighteenth century imperialism was based on the material interests of European metropolises, the nineteenth century variety stemmed from a “will-to-manifest identity”—a particularly Western European identity with specific understandings of space and time (Hall 1999:91). If the export of sociocultural conventions was in fact an effort to “become the composers and fiddlers of the tune to which . . . the rest of the world would dance” (Hall 1999:91), Western standard time provided the tempo. The embeddedness of modern time and space in peripheral society became evident in the postcolonial period following two World Wars. Ironically, railroads and telegraphs, so crucial to the diffusion of modern spatial and temporal understandings, contributed directly to the first of these cataclysms.

¹¹⁵ Strang shows how such processes also took root in non-colonized, non-Western societies as a form of “defensive Westernization”, perhaps an even more forceful argument for the sociopolitical power of Western Europe at the time. “By following European conventions and standards”, peripheral countries lowered the likelihood that Western states might interfere in their affairs “on the side of an ‘outraged civilization’ ” (1996:37).

Time embedded: the destructiveness and durability of Western standard time

By the beginning of World War I, Western ways of confronting time and space, coupled with superior technologies, had penetrated societies and cultures on every continent, permanently transforming local reckonings of space and time. As a measure of the effect of European spatio-temporal colonialism, when a long chapter of indigenous challenges to external authority culminated in the 1960 United Nations declaration that all colonies deserved the right to self-determination, existing map borders (Philpott 2001:35-36) and clock faces were accepted with little contest. But before this era of colonial independence could gain momentum, European metropolises had to exhaust themselves in a pair of devastating World Wars, exacerbating the political and material costs of maintaining colonies. The First World War displayed the tragic potential of Europe's own territorial and temporal creations, as both nationalized territorial states and modern time conventions hastened the onset of hostilities.

Trenches

Territorial nationalist accounts of World War I will be familiar to most students of international politics. The standard story is woven from threads such as the entangling effect of alliances, the Balkan tinder box ignited by the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, historical and ethnic links binding sentiments across territorial lines, and volleyed accusations of overly belligerent heritages. Here, I seek only to call out the

importance of modern time to the arrival of the war, as well as the effects and experiences of time and space during its prosecution.

By the eve of World War I, railroads and telegraphs networked much of the European continent together, revolutionizing diplomatic communications and military mobility. Whereas previous centuries had imposed significant logistic limitations on troop movements (Keegan 1993), the speed and span of railways allowed powerful European nation-states to deploy forces to any continental locale in a matter of days, rather than weeks. *Prima facie* an improvement on history, deployment by rail contained a hidden danger in that it reduced mobilization timeframes and thus limited opportunities to reverse decisions or utilize the appearance of belligerence to thaw diplomatic impasses. For instance, once initiated by statesmen, French mobilization plans obeyed only the clock and the map:

From the moment mobilization is ordered, every man must know where he has to join, and must get there in a given time. Each unit . . . must be ready to proceed on a given day at the appointed hour to a prearranged destination in a train awaiting it, which in its turn must move according to a carefully prepared railway scheme. . . . No change, no alteration is possible during mobilization (Taylor, quoted in Kern 1983:269-70).

The most extreme example of thoroughly modern mobilization was the German Schlieffen Plan which, to preserve the element of surprise and initiative, drew no distinction between mobilization and the immediate invasion of Belgium (Kern 1983:270-

71). Once German troops were spirited away from their barracks on rail cars, there was no mechanism for returning them until the battle had been joined and done.

Similarly, although telegraphs and telephones facilitated unprecedented speed of communication, contemporaries described telephonic conversations as a “vision of death”, apropos of the diplomatic July Crisis that awakened the guns of August in 1914 (Kern 1983:268). Technologically accelerated exchanges at the highest levels added to “the spectacular failure of diplomacy” including “crossed messages . . . sudden surprises, and . . . unpredictable timing” (Kern 1983:268). Wrought by the new technologies of the era, multiplied temporalities combined with a shared confidence in the “soundness” of the basic, territorial organization of Europe (Kern 1983:268) to allow states and their increasingly nationalist populations to associate boldness and bravery with quick, decisive action (Kern 1983:264). The effect of the new technologies was not a single acceleration, but a “series of new and variable paces that supercharged the masses, confused the diplomats, and unnerved the generals” (Kern 1983:268). On the eve of World War I, time—the traditional “conciliator” of diplomatic crises—effectively disappeared, drawing in its wake millions of lives (Kern 1983:274).

The temporal experience of the war is exemplified in the daily life of the trenches. Stephen Kern generalizes this as a “thickened” perception of the present, when past and future slipped away and the paradoxical duo of boredom and danger bound the imagination to an endless progression of days in the trenches (1983:279,290,293). World War I also saw the proliferation of the military wrist watch, a timepiece hitherto

considered “unmanly” (Kern 1983:288). As important as clocks had been for delivering the common soldier to his deployment locale on time, wrist watches were even more crucial in the trenches, when the importance of a coordinated instant of attack necessitated a pre-offensive ritual in which “a runner distributed watches which had been synchronized at field headquarters” (Kern 1983:288). The relationship between the wrist watch and thickened, now-time is best characterized by Edmund Blunden, who observed that “Time went by, but no one felt the passage of it, for the shadow of death lay over the dial” (quoted in Kern 1983:293).

Wrist watches more often marked the occasion of mass casualties rather than any moment of success. But Western standard time and all its associated technologies outlived the war, as did a belief in territorial nation-states. At the end of the war, the Treaty of Versailles, in addition to setting the terms of peace, took another substantial step in the comprehensive partitioning of the earth’s surface by setting borders in Eastern Europe and much of the Middle East.¹¹⁶ European colonies would be the sites of significant fighting in the next World War, further reifying the sense of claimable territory and preceding claims by those territories’ indigenous populations. At the end of World War I, the writer James Joyce provided a synopsis of the new, deadly nexus of modern territoriality and temporality that would dominate the next half-century: “I hear the ruin

¹¹⁶ For an account of the Paris Peace Conference that pays particular attention to the tragic parlor games of territorial negotiations, see (Macmillan 2003).

of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame” (quoted in Kern 1983:293).

Nascent states

After Europe and the rest of the world narrowly survived a second apocalypse, holding colonies became an increasingly difficult and indefensible practice (Philpott 2001:153-250). Philpott argues that the abrogation of colonial claims throughout Europe’s periphery embedded the idea of territorial sovereignty, “extend[ing] globally the formula of 1648” (2001:155). For instance, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, adopted toward the end of 1960, granted the right of self-determination to colonial peoples without establishing an explicit criterion for international recognition of the new polities. Without a criterion, and with independence within reach, former colonies largely accepted colonial borders as the limits of their new states (Philpott 2001:155,36). The reification of Western organizational concepts was further encouraged during this period by the return of European- and American-educated indigenous elites, who brought with them Western ideas and ideals such as national pride, the value of freedom, and capitalism (Philpott 2001:93-94).¹¹⁷ Similarly, many indigenous soldiers were sent to the fronts of World War II, where to some extent they became indoctrinated with the Western ideals for which they were presumably fighting (Philpott 2001:194). Philpott

¹¹⁷ Consequently, Western-educated elites shared few concerns with indigenous social struggles related to economic justice or concerns other than national independence (Philpott 2001:198).

concludes that the particular character of successful postcolonial independence movements, based on Western concepts, thus encouraged the subsequent era of economic neocolonialism (Philpott 2001:198).

I argue that, along with Western territorial and economic ideals, former colonies adopted without significant opposition the temporal conventions contained in Western standard time. As discussed earlier, modern European temporality featured significantly in colonial education and governance training during the nineteenth century, hence Western temporal conventions were already in place by the 1960s. And since ideas have the ability to shape identities (Philpott 2001:8, Hall 1999:215-16), we cannot omit the significance of a specific type of temporal reckoning, in this case that propagated by Western European colonial powers, in shaping the daily lives and roles of indigenous peoples around the world. As many colonies gained their formal independence in the 1960s, they evoked the earlier struggles for autonomy in cities and factories by challenging the sources of political control without questioning the modes of organization of that control. If the reasoning in this chapter has been persuasive, then the conclusion that authority *over* time is a component of postcolonial struggle while the authority *of* Western standard time remains a colonial artifact should also hold.

The authority of Western standard time was not a given outside the European continent—political and social power embedded it around the world. In the periphery, authority over time has lately been “culturally neutralized” as “ ‘modernization’ or simply ‘development’ ”, part of a general attempt to create “ ‘westernized’ societies in aboriginal

dress as a salve to ‘national’ pride” (Hall 1999:240).¹¹⁸ It follows from this that ‘aboriginal’ garments today, in addition to holding a row of pens, continue to make room for a Western standardized timepiece.

Conclusion: modernity’s most global hegemon

Standard accounts of the twentieth century describe two eras of globalization. The first ended almost as soon as the century began, subverted and subsumed in three decades of world wars (Ferguson 2006). The second era followed colonial independence, and continues today. But taking a trans-economic view of modern history allows a different image to clarify. While trade and commerce have expanded in fits and starts, dominant conceptions of political space and social time have matured, expanded, and solidified their hold on the international system. Today, territory subject to multiple authority claims is the exception rather than the rule. And while transnational or multinational governance and political power represent an emerging challenge to the territorial sovereign state, the outcome of this struggle is far from decided.

The case for the global dominance of Western standard time is even stronger. At the time of this study, there is only one prominent system of global time zones—that instituted by the 1884 IMC. Furthermore, outside of scientific laboratories and other highly specialized sites, daily modern life almost anywhere runs according to readily

¹¹⁸ For postcolonial analyses of development and modernization in terms of temporality, see (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, Blaney and Inayatullah 2006).

available, standardized timepieces counting off uniform seconds, minutes, and hours of the day. Challenges to modern, rationalized, abstract clock time have yet to be found.

There exist no multinational corporate efforts to offer a different method of reckoning the progress from day to night to day again, no rogue actors calling for a 23-hour day, and common clichés that describe fundamentalist regimes as trying to ‘turn back the clock’ only signify the hegemony of the metaphorical referent.

In this chapter, I offered a history of the present method of time reckoning, Western standard time, arguing that it was an Enlightenment sibling of one of the essential constitutive features of IR—territorial state sovereignty. In addition to advocating a greater place for temporality in studies of international politics, this history had the genealogical intent of uncovering—or rediscovering—the contingent, abstract, and particular roots of a mode of reckoning that is today largely understood as given, natural, and universal. I freely admit to doing violence to the sophisticated accounts of sovereignty and time used in this sketch, and appeal to the relationship between the necessary historical span and the available space as rendering such decisions unavoidable. Furthermore, since the most basic objective of this chapter was to increase scholarly attention to time in IR, its inherent sketchiness might also serve as a catalog of empirical research opportunities. It is only in such efforts and opportunities that IR can begin to unpack the dynamics and components of modernity’s most global hegemon: Western standard time.

3

(Re)Inventing the wheel

Truth is only a mobile army of metaphors.
—Friedrich Nietzsche

Having argued in the first chapter that a significant gap exists between the use and study of time in IR, I offered in the second chapter an empirical illustration by charting the coeval emergence and reification of modern sovereignty and modern temporality from the European Enlightenment through colonial independence. In this chapter, I contend that while sovereignty has lately received significant scrutiny in IR, its modern sibling remains a theoretical doppelganger. Spatial components construct most of IR, a trend persistent in recent developments committed to accommodating new international political realities. Even as they challenge the canon on some grounds, scholars fail to examine the modern temporal underpinnings of the discipline and so buttress the edifice they seek to remake.

To demonstrate this persistent hegemony, I analyze movements that question the centrality of the state and that unearth the social significance of new technologies, finding that their proponents continue to treat time as either cyclical or linear. This Enlightenment iniquity further reifies modernity's temporal dominance in IR. I then

return to Baert's social theory to understand this disciplinary dynamic, proposing that IR evinces a maintenance-based second order self-reflection in which temporally open theories are vulgarized in order to square them with the dominant metaphorical framework. As an antidote, I propose a new metaphor for thinking about time that accommodates both the cyclicity and the linearity of social reality.

Conventional challengers

The end of the Cold War exposed space, but not time, to diversity in IR theory. With the demise of the bi-polar world of superpowers that had fascinated (especially neorealist) theorists for several decades, questions about trans-state actors and sub-state political processes gained relevance as scholars looked for additional components and phenomena to understand the rapidly transforming international realm. I identify and analyze two movements, postinternationalism and accelerationism, that attempt to reconcile theory with contemporary international reality by looking beyond and within the state. Both movements mount challenges to the IR canon in terms of their substantive focus. However, both acquiesce to the canonical view of time by relying on cyclical (postinternationalism) or linear (accelerationism) metaphors, thus excluding temporality from their updates to IR theory.¹¹⁹ I contend that this blithe use of a particular, static understanding of time in

¹¹⁹ This chapter therefore presents a 'hard case' of sorts by showing the persistence of status quo temporality in theoretical movements that otherwise swim outside the IR mainstream.

forward-looking theory demonstrates the organizing power of modern temporality. Much as the last chapter found that challenges to authority *over* modern time unwittingly strengthened the power *of* modern time in sites of contestation, this section exposes presumably avant-garde IR as temporally traditional and thus reproductive of the status quo.

Postinternationalism

Exemplified by James Rosenau, postinternationalism seeks to understand the “extensive and rapid alteration” in world politics precipitated by processes that base authority and legitimacy more and more on performance—a trend with which the nation-state is ill-equipped to keep pace (1992:4). As its ability to comprehensively perform all of the tasks that populaces expect diminishes, so does the state’s legitimacy, impelling citizens to look for solutions in both more global and more local settings (Rosenau 1992:7-8). The overall result is the emergence of disaggregated or “bifurcated” subsystems of spheres of authority—clusters of legitimate power reaching both beyond and beneath the nation-state (Rosenau 1992:10). Bifurcation of authority, along with the ongoing globalization of capitalist economies, results in a “new world order” of “permanent commotion” (Rosenau 1992:13) in which processes of local fragmentation—sometimes portrayed as the resurgence of ethnic communities—and global integration combine in a single phenomenon known as “framegration” (Rosenau 1997:364).

Postinternationalism holds an inclusive ontological understanding of the international system that treats the aforementioned spheres of authority, along with individual citizens, industrial production networks, and transnational organizations as the analytic equals of nation-states (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:13).¹²⁰ It can therefore accommodate a variety of new topics and approaches to the study of world politics, painting a considerably more complex and textured picture than traditional accounts which elevate the state above all other considerations.¹²¹ For example, an insistence on the importance of individuals and processes has great potential for inquiries into political identity, nationalism and ethnic strife, NGOs and the UN, and economic interdependence and globalization. But in spite of its focus on revolutions in international affairs and its interest in ontological egalitarianism, postinternationalism ignores the continuity of Western standard time in world politics and thus privileges a spatial image that biases investigations and restricts theoretical conclusions.

Like so much of IR, postinternationalism favors spatial imagery, as in its reading of the sudden end of the Cold War as caused in large part by economically networked individuals overflowing traditional nation-state political jurisdictions (Rosenau 1992:13). Likewise, postinternationalists understand globalization not as simply capitalism universalized, but as a process occurring at numerous sites of fragmentation, which are

¹²⁰ Rosenau proposes to manage this proliferation of variables by borrowing the idea of an adaptive system from complexity theory (2007:94-5).

¹²¹ By this criterion, traditional accounts include, but are not limited to, classical realism, neorealism, neoliberalism, conservative constructivism à la Wendt, and LDPT.

also the loci for overlapping spheres of authority (Rosenau 1997:361). Yale Ferguson's and Richard Mansbach's "nested polities" approach further develops this image by pointing out how "some polities are encapsulated by others and embedded within them" (2004:24). Networks, spheres, nests, encapsulating, and embedding—all descriptive terms in the service of 'new' theory that evoke a distinctly spatial image of world politics. In fact, the postinternationalist lexicon appears to have been adapted from world systems theorists' account of concentrically nested spheres of production.

This imbalance in favor of spatiality penetrates beyond basic descriptive terminology. Postinternationalism misses altogether the importance of Western standard time in the globalizing processes that helped make politics international. Ferguson and Mansbach acknowledge that territorial sovereignty was exported through colonialism and the application of bureaucratic skill (2004:81), but exclude from their discussion any treatment of how notions of efficiency and a unified method of time reckoning facilitated technological domination and civilizing missions. As well, Rosenau's examination of globalization makes room for a variety of ideational, normative, and practical considerations (1997:362) but excludes modern temporality—one of the most globalized of all ideas, norms, or practices. Commenting that "few cascading sequences actually encircle and encompass the entire globe" (Rosenau 1997:361) implicitly calls attention to those that do, but postinternationalism remains preoccupied with global capitalism and information technological innovation, thus prohibiting any contributions originating from the study of globalized modern time. Finally, without time postinternationalism

self-confirms via selection on the dependent variables of turbulence and change. The continuity of Western standard time poses an important counter to images of pure upheaval in the international system, but this warning goes mostly unheeded in postinternationalist theory's spatial offering.

Recent postinternationalist work makes a nominal effort to incorporate time (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:67-105), but understands it only as a developmental proxy locating a given polity's nested position in political space.¹²² This does not move beyond purely spatial geopolitics (such as that found in neorealism) as much as it proliferates a distributional account across levels of analysis.¹²³ Time in this sense is important only as a determinant of relative positions within and between clusters of political authority. Such a demure offering seems at odds with the significant changes to traditional theory that postinternationalists herald, but becomes predictable when viewed through a temporalized lens. Postinternationalists cling to an ahistorical world view epitomized by Ferguson's and Mansbach's insistence that if time (as development) be at all studied in relation to space, one must be held constant while analyzing the other (2004:71). This resolve allows only a "ceaseless and universal" (eternal and permutational) vision of a future constituted solely by cycles of fragmentation in which the emergence of large

¹²² This view of time is typical of Western modernity and has been implicated in cultural Othering practices related to colonialism (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004:55-58).

¹²³ Similar to their omission of time from globalizations, Ferguson and Mansbach address identity and loyalty under the rubric of political space (2004:67), subordinating the processes by which those elements are formed—processes that may rely on a sense of history and time distancing—under an interest in their distributional position.

polities produces problems of control that can only be solved by “fission” within traditional social units (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:104,4). Such fission reduces capacity, necessitating a renewed pursuit of larger polities that lead to new problems of control, and the process iterates ad infinitum (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:99,103). Thus postinternationalism’s ahistoricism transforms a preoccupation with change into a source of continuity, not in the sense of temporal hegemony (which it elides) but in the restriction of future possibility—the only disruptions accommodated are extant ones.

The postinternationalist ceaseless frammegrative dialectic constrains contingency in a manner reminiscent of world systems theory’s reification of the world capitalist system. Both theories make substantial contributions to the understanding of how the world, as it is today, came to be. However, temporal ignorance and spatial biases trap both in an analytical cul-de-sac. World systems theory offers a perpetual struggle in which states move between the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Postinternationalism offers persistent commotion whose periods are distinguishable from each other only by the size and arrangement of their various spheres of authority and sub-systems. Neither movement can imagine a means by which the international system might someday come to be other than as it is now.¹²⁴ Like world systems theory, postinternationalism is “Whig

¹²⁴ Among postinternationalists, Rosenau comes closest, predicting an eventual “uneven frammegration” when globalization increasingly sets the terms of localization (1997:364). But uneven frammegration is not much more flexible a vision of the future than tightening and relaxing capitalist cycles—both understand potential changes as permutations of the eternal form.

history”¹²⁵ in that it most effectively describes an endpoint¹²⁶ rather than a moment on an unfixed temporal continuum (Schmidt 1998:18). Both theories are ostensibly concerned with challenging the priority of the sovereign nation-state—world systems theorists do so by subjugating the state to economic forces, postinternationalists by immersing it in a plurality of factors. However, by finalizing the outcome of their respective challenges, both abort the ongoing process of reflection by which wisdom can be gleaned from novelty,¹²⁷ elevating the present and marginalizing ‘future shocks’.

Accelerationism

A second challenge to statist IR concerned with new international political developments but employing an approach and viewpoint distinct from postinternationalism is actually an amalgam of postmodernist’s¹²⁸ efforts. Research threads within the movement are fairly diverse but a common temporality binds them together, and is most aptly summarized as the belief that time, ever hastening, is overwhelming

¹²⁵ Schmidt defines Whig history as the tendency to see historical events as progressing up to this particular point in time. This may be seen as the forward-reading version of presentism. Linking analytically similar elements to each other historically writes the present backwards (Schmidt 1998:18).

¹²⁶ In both cases discussed here, the endpoint is described by a cycle.

¹²⁷ As such, both theories may also be examples of “contextualist” theoretical views, in which real-world events overdetermine academic developments (Schmidt 1998:33).

¹²⁸ In this discussion, I ignore theorists’ self-conscious affiliations and deem them all postmodernists because their shared concern with the relationship between speed, acceleration, and politics focuses on a problematization of modern social life. Der Derian, for instance, refers to himself as a poststructuralist but examines “postmodern practices” of technology that defy “the grand theories or definitive structures which impose rationalist identities or binary oppositions to explain international relations” (1990:297).

space.¹²⁹ Thus, I use the umbrella term ‘accelerationism’ to begird the scholars discussed in this section. Accelerationism begins with the observation that traditional, territorial understandings of the world are outmoded: “There is a movement from geo- to chrono-politics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of time” (Virilio, quoted in der Derian 1990:307). In place of territory, an era of increasing social velocity, introduced by material innovations, holds sway. Paul Virilio refers to this as a “dromocratic revolution”—the age of the accelerator—in modern politics concerned with the impact of technology and automation on, among other things, war-making capabilities (quoted in der Derian 1990:307). Dromocratic conflict “inaugurates the *war of time*”, focusing less on destructive power and more on payload delivery speed and simulated capabilities (Virilio 1998 [1986]:49).

James der Derian applies Virilio’s thinking to the growing “military-entertainment nexus” made possible by increased representational capabilities, which make conflicts “more ‘real’ in time than in space” (1990:297) by making “image . . . more credible than fact” (1992:134). Sinister byproducts of this nexus include the “valorization of velocity”, which transforms change itself into an object (1992:136); a decline in empathy;¹³⁰ and the rise of “cyberdeterrence”, a triptych of media voyeurism,

¹²⁹ Der Derian most glibly characterizes this as “pace” over “space” (1992:3), a view stylized slightly differently in (Virilio 1998 [1986]:46, and Walker 1993:5).

¹³⁰ Der Derian explains that the closer technology comes to simulating the “Other”, the less we will be able to see ourselves in “others” (1990:298, and 1992:4).

technological exhibitionism, and strategic simulation (2001:18). These effects combined replace the trauma of warfare with “drama without tragedy” (der Derian 2001:11).¹³¹

Accelerated social velocities unerringly expose and exacerbate persistent paradoxes of modernity. Virilio, for example, claims that speed is negatively related to political freedom,¹³² and that “the violence of speed has become both the location and the law, the world’s destiny and its destination” (1998 [1986]:57). Virilio’s future is a world in which “time becomes flattened out, there is no room either for the working of deeper level causes and forces or for the kind of self-conscious planning with which counter-hegemonic action is associated” (Hutchings 2007:80).¹³³ Likewise, der Derian’s growing and inextricable link between weapons systems and entertainment technologies produces futures concerned only with simulating without really ‘knowing’ in the sole service of killing without seeing (2001:89). These phenomena overwhelm reflective and ethical subjectivity in an apocalyptic vision distinct from LDPT or teleological constructivism in tone but not in temporality. Accelerationist time is unique in its pessimistic predictions about the technologized deconstruction of modern social life which occupy the opposite pole from linear-progressive outcomes. While I have hitherto equated Baert’s closed

¹³¹ Der Derian seems to be speaking exclusively to the new war-making experience of high-technology armies such as the United States, rather than their more conventionally defended targets. It is safe to assume that the objects of dromocratic warfare still experience both tragedy and drama.

¹³² Speed is a “region of time” that “shrinks” political space, the “field of freedom of political action” (Virilio 1998 [1986]:51).

¹³³ Virilio, among others, concludes that progress is being replaced by “the concept of ‘accident’ ” (Hutchings 2007:80), a claim with stark implications for liberal democratic military interventions as well as Just War principles such as double effect (Owens 2003, for a summary of the Just War tradition, including double effect, see Bellamy 2006).

historical conception with linear-progressivism, accelerationism suggests a linear-regressivism. However, in terms of temporality, the former part of the hyphenated term takes precedence over the latter—Virilio's and der Derian's retention of closed, linear images of the future mimics rather than challenges linear-progressivists.¹³⁴

Virilio and der Derian provide material technological complements to R. B. J. Walker's most extensive critique of spatial understandings in IR, which also poses the best example of modern temporality's hold on accelerationist thinking. Walker eviscerates the canon's constraint of "all intimations of a chronopolitics within the ontological determinations of a geopolitics" that delimits "temporal possibilities" along nation-state boundaries (1993:6). However, his critique is based on an inside/outside binary that conceives two mutually exclusive temporal possibilities, and so reproduces through a basic theoretical choice not only the linearity of other accelerationists, but also its general metaphorical context. The first possibility, linear progress, Walker attributes to political theory's interpretation of history as the "long march to modernity", which occurs within the sovereign state's political community (1993:30). The second possibility is cyclical violence, associated with IR's prioritization of state power over ethics (Walker 1993:30) and a territorial delineation of sovereignty that precludes any politics and thus any

¹³⁴ Virilio and der Derian are further vulnerable to temporal critique because they leave the character of Western standard time un-scrutinized. The very speed with which they are fascinated drives performance via standardized temporal conventions (nanoseconds and smaller). Similarly, der Derian's exposition of the prison as panopticon (1990:304) misses the fundamental importance of time to its performance. In the prison, surveillance works in tandem with an ability to regulate activities through time obedience (Adam 2004:113): activities and locales are only open to prisoners at specific times and for specified durations.

progress between states (Walker 1993:63).¹³⁵ While innovatively applied to the sovereign state, Walker's binary maintains the Enlightenment segregation of time that delimits theory by requiring a selection *between* (amoral) cyclicity and (progressive) linearity. Within this framework the contradiction between inside and outside, not technology, produces a sense of temporal acceleration (1993:5), which can only exacerbate international cycles of violence by increasing their frequency. This is not so much the regressive endpoint of Virilio and der Derian as it is a self-reinforcing theoretical tension.

Walker's theory is more coherent than other accelerationists, and his treatment of linear temporality progressive rather than regressive. I include him under the umbrella movement due to his purely negative assessment of the relationship between international cycles of violence¹³⁶ and domestic linear progress. Furthermore, the modern dichotomy that Walker exegetically extracts from modern sovereignty and maps onto political theory and IR is limited in two ways. First, it assigns to IR a singular, cyclical temporality rather than the dichotomized choice that actually characterizes the discipline. Second, Walker treats domestic politics as subordinate to international relations, assuming that external conditions preclude the diffusion of progress across state borders.

¹³⁵ Walker discusses temporal Othering as a feature of territorial sovereignty, which depicts the "outside" as a "realm in which to be brave against adversity or patient enough to tame those whose life is not only elsewhere but also back then" (1993:174).

¹³⁶ Another implication of Walker's failure to challenge linear-progressive and cyclical-violent assumptions is that he misses the potential of recursive social processes to produce increasing ethical or normative momentum. This is the optimistic thesis of mainstream constructivism, see (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Engaging with the political theory of William Connolly counters this bias within a broader argument against accelerationism's cynical view of technology.

In spite of his common concern with speed, Connolly finds ample alternatives to accelerationist doomsdays. For instance, der Derian sees in the "valorization of velocity" echoes of fascism's emergence during the European interwar period (1990:306). But Connolly views fascism as the "failure" of the first trial of modernity and detects the sources of a successful second attempt in the opportunities for democratic coordination and greater autonomy of identity construction made possible by technological innovation (2002:160-2).¹³⁷ He further opposes accelerative technologies to nationalistic, ethnic, and fundamentalist movements, all attempts to "decelerate" late modern social time via a return to an "imagined past" (2002:143).¹³⁸ Finally, he refutes accelerationist assumptions regarding the negative relationship between speed and sociopolitical subjectivity by pointing out that "deliberative" democratic practices often serve to iron out differences, producing a homogenized, "circumscribed politics of place" (2002:142-4). For Connolly, accelerative phenomena challenge rather than amplify modern dilemmas by promoting a "time of becoming" that emphasizes the creative potential of contingency and thus

¹³⁷ This contention pits Connolly not only against IR accelerationists, but also other political theorists such as Sheldon Wolin, who bemoans the loss of the "leisurely pace" necessary for democratic deliberation (1997). More generally, Baert suggests that self-reflection requires time, and is thus threatened by temporal accelerations (1992b:145).

¹³⁸ In fairness, this analysis of fundamentalist movements as desiring deceleration may be understood as a negative potential outcome of humanity's confrontation with acceleration.

opposes modernity's reified "time of being"¹³⁹ (Hutchings 2007:156). Furthermore, new technologies open up greater possibilities for "experiments of the self" and "fugitive democracy", a "plurality of interconnected sites of democratic action . . . shaping . . . working conditions, educational possibilities, forms of identity, income levels, ecological environment, border relations and citizen entitlements" (Connolly 2002:153). Crucially, fugitive democracy crosses and even marginalizes territorial sovereign boundaries with regularity.

Connolly's contemplation of social acceleration is based on a fundamentally indeterminate view of temporality that treats irreversible "rifts" in time as constitutive of political experience rather than as a threat to political stability (2002:144-6). Rifts open up alternative times and "life-paces" which are crucial to variation in political identities (Connolly 2002:142). This understanding is reminiscent of the ontological function attached to time, via novelty, in Baert. It also furthers Connolly's proposition that technological speed can be helpful rather than harmful in that faster technologies foster greater experimentation and thus proliferate variation and plurality. Connolly thus simultaneously opposes both strands of accelerationism. He challenges Virilio's and der Derian's linear-regressivism by treating the affects of technological innovation as speed, a scalar rate of activity, rather than as velocity, which attaches a direction to that rate.¹⁴⁰ He

¹³⁹ A time of being exists "when relatively stable contexts for political judgment and action inform meanings of "progress in accordance with given, sedimented criteria" (Hutchings 2007:156).

¹⁴⁰ As such, Connolly cannot be considered an optimistic accelerationist because his treatment of the affects of faster technology is based in the constitution of politics rather than on specific

also argues that developmental progress need not acquiesce to international power politics, as Walker concludes. In these ways, Connolly's assessment of technological innovation provides a useful balance to the downward spiraling specter of conflict and violence imagined by accelerationists, and suggests that postmodernism need not necessarily move beyond hope.

Academic culpability: schizophrenia in theory

Postinternationalists and accelerationists grapple with new international political realities but reach for the leading edge of history with an ill-equipped grasp of time, further reifying the modern temporality fundamental to the world they claim is outdated. The cyclical presentism of postinternationalism and the linear-regressive visions of accelerationism demonstrate that even ill-equipped conventions retain their embedded power for as long as they remain in the uncritical employ of scholars. The irony of this phenomenon is instantiated in Walker, whose spatiotemporal critique of IR theory unwittingly reproduces some contents of the sovereign container he seeks to unpack. Why does this happen? Are postinternationalists and accelerationists disingenuous renovators of the theoretical edifice? Or are they examples of an ongoing paradigmatic failure on the part of IR to understand time? Drawing propositions about academic culpability from Baert's discussions of presentism, novelty and maintenance-based second

political outcomes. In this sense, the term 'accelerationism' captures the inherent linearity in Virilio's and der Derian's analysis of changes in social velocity understood as speed *and* direction.

order self-reflection, I argue for the latter possibility—IR has not yet adequately engaged with time as a concept, an oversight evidenced by the conventional temporality running through the field from core to frontier. Additionally, that temporality reinforces itself, serving a disciplinary function within the field that constrains efforts to imagine alternative temporalities.

Baert argues that knowledge construction in the scientific community is itself a temporalized phenomenon (1992b:89). Real time is asymmetrical, in that “the real past has occurred in a particular way and . . . nothing in the present or future can change that” (1992b:76). However, understandings of time are always negotiable in that “its meaning or representation . . . can change and . . . does so regularly” (Baert 1992b:76). Such epistemic alterations are only accomplished in the present, granting it a “special philosophical status” that enables scholars to “escape the [understandings] of the past” and treat “the past and future [as] temporal horizons of the present” (Baert 1992b:76). Brian Schmidt has conducted an incisive examination of IR based on this idea, criticizing as “presentist” research that attempts to construct a historical lineage based on an analytical framework in which scholars “stipulate certain ideas, themes, genres, or texts as functionally¹⁴¹ similar” (1998:25). To the extent that the past and future are always less

¹⁴¹ Baert claims that functionalism is the result of failed sociological attempts to discover the “engines of history” (1992b:138). These failures caused a reactionary withdrawal from historicism and a “retreat to the present” using as its “central metaphor for understanding society . . . the human organism, with the different parts functionally interrelated and directed towards the equilibrium, survival or reproduction of the larger whole” (Baert 1992b:138-9).

complete realities compared to the present, Baert views such biasing as inevitable to interpretation. By making presentism endemic to knowledge, Baert cautions scholars who wish to understand the historical underpinnings of current affairs and reinforces Schmidt, who argues that it encourages “a retrospectively created construct determined by present criteria and concerns” that prioritizes current functionality over discursive evidence from the real past (Schmidt 1998:25).

Baert’s claim about the present is not that it is more important than past or future, but simply that it is defined and differentiated by encounters with novelty (1992b:80).¹⁴² Marginalizing novelty thus constrains understanding in the present and hinders attempts to reconvene the historical context from which “received” understandings—such as Western standard time—emerged victorious (Baert 1992b:80).¹⁴³ Along this line of reasoning, the omission in IR of explicit discussions about time goes beyond reifying Enlightenment temporality. It also reduces the ability of scholars to accommodate novelty, which in turn restricts open images of the past, present, and future.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² It is only after the present has emerged in a novel way that agents can seek to understand it, as well as reconstruct the past in light of present novelties (Baert 1992b:81).

¹⁴³ In his account of the English School, Dunne provides a discursive historical reconstruction of the origins of a movement that counters the mythologized academic encounters and ideological revolutions that pass down a “received . . . identity of the discipline” (1998:1).

¹⁴⁴ This claim holds special significance for rationalists who evaluate theory empirically, partly based on its ability to ‘predict’ future events. For example, see (Keohane 1988). For a critique of the failure of nearly all IR theories to predict the novel end of the Cold War, see (Gaddis 1992).

Presentism is pervasive in scholarship because novelty is viewed as a condemnation of theory—a mark of its inaccuracy (Baert 1992b:91).¹⁴⁵ Novelty is itself social in that it must contradict some prior “ ‘cognitive frame of reference which gives meaning and intelligibility’ ” (Baert 1992b:91). One response to novelty reconstructs the past so as to remove the oppositional relationship between the reference frame and the novel event.¹⁴⁶ My criticism of IR is not that this reconstruction occurs, but that its occurrence is then denied via a naturalization of the aspects of the past that confirm the current account—what is, was inevitable. The neglect of Western standard time and modern temporality epitomizes this naturalization, making IR scholars culpable in the continued dominance of a particular, and once conditional, understanding of temporality and time reckoning.¹⁴⁷ Challenging this trend by treating time and temporality as contingent, contestable, and inherently social reconciles theorizing with novelty, and allows for the recovery of missing dimensions of the past, present, and future (Baert 1992b:132).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ In this sense, the persistence of novelty indicates paradigmatic theoretical failure rather than reality itself.

¹⁴⁶ This may entail a paradigm shift in which ‘marginal’ events are “re-categorized” as having greater importance (Baert 1992b:132).

¹⁴⁷ For instance, scholars may have a vested interest in maintaining cyclical understandings of time. There is an etymological link between the Hebrew “sh-b-th”, meaning to “cease laboring”; the Jewish Sabbath, occurring every seven days; and the academic sabbatical tradition based on seven-year cycles (Zerubavel 1985:7). It has also been suggested that scholars preserve “a cyclical semester system and a traditional conception of leisure [time] institutionalized as tenure” (Hanson 1997:18).

¹⁴⁸ This contention is itself a result of Baert’s sense of diachronic irony, which suggests that work within existing paradigms often has the unintended consequence of undermining that paradigm by exposing lacuna and novel events that the paradigm is ill-equipped to understand (1992b:131). As

A second response to novelty subordinates it to the past by denying its essence as contradictory of the received frame of reference. Treating theories as metatheoretical 'events' or moments uncovers this disciplinary dynamic in IR.¹⁴⁹ Temporally open movements such as constructivism and classical realism may be considered novelties in IR because they refuse the Enlightenment dichotomy that instructs theorists to choose *either* ahistorical *or* closed historical models. Viewed in the standard, dichotomized frame of reference, these movements appear schizophrenic, "a state characterized by the coexistence of contradictory or incompatible elements" (2007).¹⁵⁰ Intradisciplinary responses to such perceived incompatibilities engage in the mechanics of denial¹⁵¹ by vulgarizing these movements in order to make them more amenable to the dominant frame of reference (see figure two, page 118). As discussed in chapter one, responses to

an example of imagining a social dimension of time, Bourdieu argues that substituting strategy for rule-following "reintroduce[s] time, with its rhythm, its orientation, its irreversibility" (quoted in Tucker Jr. 1998:69). This notion suggests that strategy may serve a decelerating purpose meant to make social exchanges less automatic in the pursuit of an unconventional outcome. In his incorporation of Bourdieu in security studies, Williams refers to fully inculcated rules and strategies as "nearly timeless" (2007:37).

¹⁴⁹ Yet a third response already covered is that of world systems theorists and postinternationalists: the announcement of a new epoch to which elided historical phenomena have been contributing, and from which there is no escape (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:24). This response over-privileges rather than denies novelty in the present. Its social aspect concerns the possibility that the events enlisted in its defense may have always been present but theoretically ignored until they exerted an undeniable influence on world politics. Genealogical histories prefer the pluralistic benefits of light shed on marginalized aspects of social life to the revolutionary heat of a supposed 'new world order' based on newly 'discovered' causal factors.

¹⁵⁰ This encounter between novel theories and standard frameworks can also be related to Foucault's critique of the examination as a "normalizing gaze" that constitutes a "whole field of knowledge" rather than evaluating it (1977:184-86).

¹⁵¹ In psychology, denial is generally defined as "an unconscious defense mechanism used to reduce anxiety by denying thoughts, feelings, or facts that are consciously intolerable" (2007).

constructivism have conflated it with liberal idealism, filtering out all but the constrained, optimistic worldview from constructivism's relatively open temporality.¹⁵²

In relation to classical realism, temporal disciplining involves multiple moves. First, classical realism's nuanced understanding of power is hewn down to pure material capabilities (Waltz 1986c). Then, its concern with setting limits on what constitutes the political is read not as a preventive response to political abuses, but as a constriction of all politics to the exercise of material power by the strong against the weak.¹⁵³ Finally, nuance and ethics having been disposed of, classical realism is conflated with neorealism's ahistorical cycle and treated exclusively as an argument meant to legitimize eternal (permutational) violence between states (Walker 1991:459, 1993:63). In Baertian terms, these moves shift classical realism from the relatively open historical type to the ahistorical type, necessitating recent efforts to recover the ethical concerns of the movement's origins (however conceived).¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² This conflation may be due in part to the confusion of constructivism's cognitive evolution with the linear-progressive evolution favored by Modelski. Such confusion bolsters the liberal idealist charge by ignoring the critical potential of constructivism's politicization of norm emergence.

¹⁵³ This move is epitomized in the common, presentist reference to Thucydides' ostensibly 'realist' observation that "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (2002 V.89). For example, Gilpin contends that "there have been three great realist writers; it is difficult . . . to conceive that anyone would deny them inclusion in the tradition. They are Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Carr". In the same passage, Gilpin criticizes Ashley for holding "an amazingly narrow and *time-bound* conception of the realist tradition" (1986:306 emphasis added). For a discussion of Thucydides as a political theorist, see (Brown, et al. 2002:20).

¹⁵⁴ Such efforts include, but are in no way limited to (Lang 2001, Lebow 2003, Williams 2005b, discussed as 'reflexive' recoveries in Steele 2007b).




Figure 2: Schizophrenia in IR theory

Conclusion: a metaphorical response

The disciplining of constructivism and classical realism via theoretical vulgarizations levers both movements into the dominant dichotomized framework that demands a choice between cyclical or linear-progressive temporality. In this way, responses to constructivism and classical realism deny those movement’s novelty, and are a form of Baert’s maintenance-based second order self-reflection—maintenance by denial. His third temporal type—the relatively open historical world view—offers a rejoinder to

intradisciplinary maintenance by providing a more effective metaphorical image with which to understand continuity and change as mutually *inclusive* features of IR theory rather than as symptoms of theoretical schizophrenia.

Recalling Baert's argument that effective theorizing makes use of synchrony and continuity as well as diachrony and change, the appropriate metaphorical treatment of time is not as an either-cycle-or-arrow choice, but might instead be as the image of the wheel (Zerubavel 1985:84).¹⁵⁵ The wheel captures aspects of both cyclicity and linear development. But rather than eternal return, the wheel derives motive force from the many permutations that ensure that no two circumvolutions are exactly the same. And instead of a closed historical conception that predetermines the destination of linear movement, the wheel's course is constantly affected by the ground over which it rolls, thus incorporating novelty. In these ways, the motion of the wheel manifests habitual elements that can be studied to uncover implicit structuring principles, while also ensuring that we always move somewhere from here and somewhen from now (see figure three below).

¹⁵⁵ Zerubavel conceives the wheel as the more accurate description of calendrical images: "locating an instant within '1981' along the arrow of historical time does not prevent us from also designating it as '11:19 A.M., Thursday, November 26,' and thus locating it within four different wheels (the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual cycles) that roll along that historical road" (1985:84). My use of the metaphor is more concerned with an adequate, general accommodation of continuity and change in social life.




Figure 3: The wheel of time

As is likely obvious, time's wheel is essentially a metaphorical image of the constructivist approach that views the relationship between agents and structure as intersubjective and co-constitutive (Baert 1992b:70). Since explicating a theory using a metaphor inspired by it would risk tautology, I will instead suggest how the wheel can understand classical realism. In this briefest of sketches, the ground along which the wheel rolls is historical contingency—the various (patterns of) circumstances that constitute social reality uniquely in each moment. Political behavior constitutes the circumvolutions, since classical realism understands politics as being habitually concerned with the pursuit of interests. Politics among nations, and more importantly what constitutes 'the political', can be understood as determining the diameter of the wheel. This is a crucial feature because diameter greatly affects momentum, constituted of speed and mass, which is related to the ground of historical contingency in two ways. First, greater ground speed corresponds to greater sensitivity on the part of the wheel to major features of that ground, which may induce dramatic changes of course. Second, greater

mass has the effect of flattening, ‘ironing out’, or homogenizing the ground of international politics. Thus, Morgenthau’s realism may be understood as criticizing failures to constrain overly liberal¹⁵⁶ understandings of the political. In the instance of Weimar Germany, the result of such failure was the irreversible political momentum of Nazism which could only be halted by a resort to brute force. The implication now is not that violence is a political necessity, but that violence has no place in politics. When political wheels of time are imprudently constructed, violence provides the fatal indicator that they have careened out of control.

To traditionalists and skeptics, metaphorical counterproposals may seem little more than literary sport using international politics as its playing field. However, “within the academy there is little incentive to take international temporal plurality seriously, and . . . even if we wanted to do so, we lack a philosophical vocabulary adequate to the challenge” (Hutchings 2007:83). The extant temporal metaphorical dichotomy is pervasive, giving it an aura of power which masks its inadequacy. Any attempt to construct an adequate vocabulary of temporality must improve on this convention, and the image of the wheel is provided as one example. Such ongoing attempts should not proceed smoothly—if IR diagnoses real (open) temporality as a schizophrenic condition, then the project of a truly temporal vocabulary in IR will disrupt most theoretical traditions and confirm Baert’s observation that temporalized theorizing makes

¹⁵⁶ “Liberal” here means overly inclusive in the sense that too many elements of social life were viewed as eligible for political contestation; it is not meant to implicate any liberal political movement.

“iconoclasts” of us all (1992b:145). Disruption need not be an intrinsic objective, but if iconic metaphors are no more than bankrupt vaults within which all theoretical diversity is imprisoned, then iconoclasm is a necessary part of the process of understanding variegated temporality. In the final chapter, I discuss what might constitute the next step in this process.

**Conclusion:
When-to from now?**

The distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.
—Albert Einstein

The central thrust of this thesis has been that thinking about time and temporality contributes to a richer understanding of international politics. In prior chapters, the argument proceeded along two main paths. First, I demonstrated that canonical IR theoretical movements can be usefully typologized by their (mostly) implicit temporal attitudes. Temporalized analysis exposes a theory's approach to surprises and incongruities—both unavoidable features of social life. Furthermore, analyzing movements based on their image of the future highlights important assumptions and bargains that are constitutive of every theoretical edifice. Ahistorical theories such as neorealism and structural Marxism depict purely spatialized international relations, substituting a 'snapshot' view for a moving image. Closed historical theories like democratic peace theory and Wendtian constructivism accommodate only one dynamic view of the world, in which international relations are moving inexorably along a highly constrained path toward a predetermined end point.

Whereas ahistorical and closed historical movements marginalize surprises and future possibilities, relatively open historical theories incorporate such features within their theoretical image of the world. Classical realism, misunderstood as a rationale for repetitive violence, is actually an attempt to delimit the focus of political contestation as a prudential measure against the vagaries of temporal contingency.¹⁵⁷ Accepting an inability to ‘see’ the future, classical realists endeavor to paint a picture of the political world using as little violence as is possible. Constructivism embraces indeterminacy and possibility in a more methodological manner by proposing a co-constitutive loop between agents and structures. As actions and their consequences play out in time, interests, identities, and habituated interactions change, and in turn change social actors.

In addition to analyzing major theoretical movements, I likewise appraised two recent trends that were premised on a greater accommodation of complexity and change in international politics. From a temporalized standpoint, both trends emphasize rather than escape the traditional limitations of IR theory. Postinternationalism, for all its attention to non-state actors and new dynamic processes, fails to imagine an exit from “framegrative” cycles and thus offers only an updated but still Whiggish snapshot of the social world. Accelerationism, based on a well-founded concern with the relationship between technological innovation and society, becomes entrenched in a singular vision of the degradational affects of those innovations, privileging the increased velocity of social

¹⁵⁷ Morgenthau’s vision of political science is based in part on avoiding “the neglect of the contingencies inherent in political prediction” (1993 [1948]:21).

life over the steering potential of all social actors. This restricts the accelerationist imagination of possible futures to purely negative endpoints. Both emerging movements persist in choosing between a cyclical or linear progressive view of time, reproducing the Enlightenment dichotomy as well as the conditions of temporal schizophrenia that have plagued IR since its inception. As an antidote to such theoretical dissonance, I proposed the metaphor of a wheel as a more useful image of time in IR. The wheel insists on some amount of change in every repetition while retaining an indeterminate view of the path along which changes proceed.

As an empirical complement to these theoretical critiques, the second line of investigation offered a genealogical history of modern time and sovereignty. By demonstrating that many of the spaces or 'sites' where modern sovereignty developed also contained the roots of modern, Western, standardized time, I argued that the current international system has been constituted by both spatial and temporal organizing principles. Sovereignty, much en vogue in post-Cold War IR, represents a spatial ordering principle of the modern political world, and time is its counterpart. Because it has received significantly less critical attention than sovereignty and has thus become more naturalized or taken for granted, Western standard time in many ways is a hegemonic organizing principle of the international realm.

This project is conceived as an initial effort in a potentially long research program. If time is as neglected by IR as I have contended, future research topics should abound. By way of conclusion, I propose in this chapter the first step of a research agenda

intended to facilitate both a greater understanding of time *in* IR and a better comprehension of time *by* IR. Implied in foreign policy analysis and adumbrated by a few critical theorists, this initial step challenges the influence of positivism in IR by interrogating the epistemological (and by implication the ontological) status of the present in order to move toward an understanding of time as a ‘flow’ of processes rather than as a march of abstract, discrete units. In addition to its critical intent, this step also represents an interdisciplinary move in that it provides IR with an entry point to a substantial body of thought on the philosophy of time. By departing the present, IR can make better use of the diverse intellectual world in which it is theoretically situated.

Foreign Policy Analysis and subjectivism

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is unique within IR for its explicit and systematic treatment of time. Additionally, in its focus on the subjective experiences of foreign policy elites during times of crisis, FPA offers a directive to IR theory in general and specifically to inquiries about time. Reintroducing social subjectivity to the core of analysis is an important step toward incorporating time into IR in a pluralistic manner.

While FPA is topically rich, I am currently concerned solely with the treatment of temporal factors in foreign policy crises, a longstanding interest in FPA¹⁵⁸ of which

¹⁵⁸ Explaining his seminal research during the height of the Cold War, Hermann observed that, despite the relative stability of that period compared to the decades of World Wars, foreign policy crises remained frequent enough that they “not only *permit* but also *warrant* investigation” (1963:63).

time has been a foundational factor. Charles Hermann posits three dimensions of foreign policy crises: an external threat to “high priority values” or organizations, an element of surprise, and a restricted amount of time in which to respond to the situation (1963:64).¹⁵⁹ Simulations of crisis situations devote significant effort to replicating their temporal dimensions, including mechanisms meant to “further the sense that the initial [crisis] periods [are] to be embedded in a series of longer time units” (Hermann and Hermann 1967:403) as well as variations in the time permitted to respond to new diplomatic messages during the crisis (Hermann 1972b:192).¹⁶⁰ The notion of crisis has undergone repeated modifications, but these typically concern the importance or specificity of the first two dimensions suggested by Hermann. Some sense of “time pressure” on decision makers has remained an enduring and central feature (see the discussion in Stern 2003:186-87).

Related research on conflict negotiation operationalizes time as an imposed limit on diplomatic encounters (Bartos 1964, Komorita and Barnes 1969, Alcock 1974, Brookmire and Sistrunk 1980). Strategic choice models of both crises and negotiations suggest that time-pressure, by reducing information exchange, aspirations, and flexibility, is a boundary condition on rationality (Pruitt and Johnson 1970, Carnevale and Lawler

¹⁵⁹ Hermann notes similar crisis dimensions in (Hamblin 1958, Milburn 1961, Robinson 1962).

¹⁶⁰ These projects, focused on simulating the outbreak of World War I, included messenger role-players (Hermann 1972a, Hermann and Hermann 1967), but would have benefited from Kern’s subsequent explication of the varied temporal dissonance effected by new communications technology on diplomats during the July Crisis (see chapter two). By showing how shocking the new experiences of telegraph and telephone usage were to some, Kern also indicates a difficulty in comprehensively simulating temporal dissonance after populations have been widely exposed to such technologies.

1986). Furthermore, time-pressure often overwhelms methodical intelligence analysis, heightens ambiguity, and encourages a bias toward intuitions and pre-conceptions, making surprises and failures “inevitable”¹⁶¹ in foreign policy decision making (Betts 1978:68,70).

Recent FPA has diversified its consideration of time to include contemporary media coverage of crises, a factor thought to increase time-pressure on elites to make “snap decisions” while reducing the influence of traditional diplomacy (Gilboa 2003:99-101). Echoing Kern’s discussion of the July crisis, slow responses to events are often characterized by the media as “indecisive” or as evidence that an administration has been caught by “surprise” (Gilboa 2003:100).¹⁶² Finally, some research on decision making and crises relies on diachrony to assess the “sequential” importance (Ozkececi-Taner 2006:547) of the numerous “occasions for decision” (Beasley, et al. 2001) that actually constitute what scholarship later describes as a single “crisis”. Sequential analysis allows a more nuanced conceptualization of the innards of crises, as in the observation that elites

¹⁶¹ As suggested by their association with failures, the inevitable surprises that Betts concludes should not be seen as related too closely to Baert’s novelty, since the FPA literature treats them as symptomatic of abnormal situations beset by constrained rationality and/or inadequate intelligence rather than as constitutive of reality.

¹⁶² A particularly striking example of the affect of real-time media coverage is Gilboa’s contention that President Kennedy had approximately *624 times* longer to respond to the Cuban missile crisis than President Clinton would have been afforded had a similar dilemma arisen three decades later (Gilboa 2003: 100).

initially tend to prefer “shortcuts” before later turning to “limited value maximization” (James and Zhang 2005).¹⁶³

In addition to being more fecund than in IR theory, time in FPA draws attention to the importance of social subjectivity in international politics. Research on crises and decision making treats time as an intrinsically diverse factor experienced by individual humans rather than as a fixed social object or behavioral context. The very idea of crisis depends on the experience of duration, and a “subjective notion of crisis makes it impossible to neatly demarcate a beginning and an end to these events because different actors perceive they are in a crisis at different points in time” (Boin 2004:167). The focus in FPA on subjective time also crucially distinguishes between examining the effects *of* time (e.g. on sequential policy making processes) and the analysis of events or processes that simply take place *in* time. In the latter, time exists strictly as an analytical context. In the former, time affects the social (inter)actions of individuals, each of whom have a unique time consciousness. Time means different things to different people, a simple enough observation whose potential and importance has hitherto been tapped only by the focus on social subjectivity found in FPA. Investigations into the plurality of subjectively experienced times can make at least two contributions to IR theory. First, they can

¹⁶³ Another related concept is the effect of time on belief. While not directed exclusively at crises, work such as that of Haven (1956), Gergen and Back (1965), and Campbell (2003) points out that individual interests, preferences, and beliefs are not fixed or static but instead change as time passes—a constitutive element of constructivism.

introduce an element of heterotemporality¹⁶⁴ to a discipline dominated by modern temporality and Western standard time (Hutchings 2007:82-89). Second, they can provide empirical referents to theoretical problematizations of the objective reality of the 'present', the topic I turn to now.

Post-presentism, post-positivism

FPA compels a concern with subjective experience that can be amplified by turning to critical theory concerned with the self, memory, and trauma. While FPA and critical theory may have few obvious overlaps, connecting them facilitates a subjectified understanding of temporality that moves well beyond standardized time. This link in turn allows a stronger relationship between IR, temporalized social theory, and philosophical investigations of time, and thus the potential for a robust interdisciplinary dialogue.¹⁶⁵

In the context of memory and trauma, Jenny Edkins examines the political contest between the sovereign state and survivors of war over meaning and commemoration. Briefly put, continually confronted by contingency and uncertainty, sovereign states rely on a narrative of historicity and heroism to cleanse the violent methods by which they reproduce themselves as principal political actors (Edkins 2003:1-

¹⁶⁴ Drawing from the thought of Deleuze and Chakrabarty, Hutchings describes heterotemporality as a plurality of temporalities and argues that it "is an irreducible feature of history" (2007:85).

¹⁶⁵ Social theories of time and/or philosophies of time have already received substantial treatment in numerous other academic disciplines including political theory (Lane 2000), anthropology (Fabian 1983, Turner and Falgout 2002), geology (Gould 1987), physics (Price 1996) and quantum studies (Hameroff and Penrose 1996).

19).¹⁶⁶ Homogenous time is a crucial part of this maintenance: “In the linear time of the standard political processes, which is the time associated with the continuance of the nation-state, events that happen are part of a well known and widely accepted story” (Edkins 2003:xiv). All state actions, especially those that produce citizen casualties, must be positioned within such narratives. Trauma and memory are important sources of dissent because they “disrupt” such linear accounts, demanding the invention of “a new account, one that will produce a place for what has happened and make it meaningful” (Edkins 2003:xiv). Trauma, as a “betrayal of trust” by “the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security”, involves events that are outside the bounds of language, which itself is socially constituted by relations of power (Edkins 2003:7). Acts and subsequent recollections that are literally ‘unspeakable’ are what constitute trauma, so trauma inherently resists narrativization. Thus, when they attempt to incorporate it into dominant, heroic narratives, states automatically “gentrify” trauma by using conventional language to describe it (Edkins 2003:15).

Edkins proposes that a more just approach to trauma “is ‘to *encircle* again and again the site’ of the trauma” so as to mark its perpetration without “re-inscripting” its memory (2003:15). This circular solution responds predictably to her understanding of state political time as linear by looking to the other pole of the Enlightenment dichotomy

¹⁶⁶ In his examination of national humiliation days, Callahan (2006) provides an interesting complement to Edkins’ approach, arguing that state power results from the mobilization of national shame instead of heroism, and that the state controls citizens through calendrical coordination.

for an alternative.¹⁶⁷ However, in the process of critiquing that linearity, Edkins pits the individual subject as the preserver of memory against the state social structure that attempts to erase uncertainty and novelty—social reality itself, suggesting a view of social action and memory highly amenable to temporalized social theory.

This psychoanalytic account of the subject further exposes linear temporality as a purely mental construct that the mind employs to bring order to the complexity of lived experience. “A certain non-linearity is evident: time no longer moves unproblematically from past through present to future. In a sense, subjects only retrospectively become what they already are [T]he social order too shares this retroactive constitution” (Edkins 2003:13). Interaction is crucial because it is only when the actor receives responses to her actions (including speech) that she recognizes her own subjectivity. “This recognition is belated when viewed through the lens of a linear temporality: it is not at the moment we decide to speak that we see who we are, but only a moment later, when we get a response” (Edkins 2003:13).¹⁶⁸ This view of subjectivity and social order posits that both are “in a continual process of becoming” (Edkins 2003:13), and differs from that of FPA,

¹⁶⁷ Edkins’ approach may also contain a response to the metaphor of time as a wheel proposed earlier. As she observes, “Trauma time is inherent in and destabilizes any production of linearity. Trauma has to be excluded for linearity to be convincing . . . similarly, trauma time cannot be described in the language we have without recourse to notions of linearity” (Edkins 2003:16). This suggests that trauma may yet problematize all temporal metaphors that include linear or cyclical elements.

¹⁶⁸ Edkins’ account of subjectivity and linear temporality relies on some self-Other relationship. A recent account of ontological security in IR poses an alternative source of subjectivity, located within the Self. In this account, subjective “possibilities arise not just in the dialectic between the self and other, but within the internal dialectic that arises from the ontological security-seeking process” (Steele 2007c:32). This raises the question of whether temporality is created *within* as well as *between* individuals, a possibility that bolsters arguments for the subjective study of time.

which situates the social subject in some present now, however experienced. Edkins' subjects exist without such a present, always looking a little into the past to see who they were becoming, and always dependent on future interactions to tell them retrospectively who they currently are.

Edkins' subjectivity is quite similar to Baert's temporal foundation, which posits that every act requires an "I", but that that "I" can only be appraised as "me" by an immediately subsequent "I" (1992b:121).¹⁶⁹ Part of Baert's aim is to deny an "objectivist" or "asymmetrical" view of time which assumes that "the real past has occurred in a particular way and . . . nothing in the present or future can change that" (1992b:76). Baert grants that the past unfolded in a particular way, but insists that the meaning or representation of that past "can change, and it does so regularly", both subconsciously and intentionally (1992b:76).¹⁷⁰ A further objective of such pragmatic, process oriented theorizing is to deny the philosophical and ontological dominance of the present, which relegates past and future to its temporal horizons and thus diminishes their importance and reliability (Baert 1992b:76). Giddens' account of time likewise diminishes the present as little more than an affect of the temporal ordering accomplished by memory and

¹⁶⁹ Edkins' and Baert's accounts of the subject, as well as the constructed nature of the present, were foreshadowed in Niebuhr's classical realism. Discussing human creative potential, Niebuhr claims that "Man's freedom to transcend the natural flux gives him the possibility of grasping a span of time in his consciousness and thereby of knowing history. It also enables him to change, reorder and transmute the causal sequences of nature and thereby to *make* history" (Niebuhr 1943, quoted in Steele 2007c:46). Morgenthau makes a similar point: "That which reveals itself as a simple truth in retrospect was either completely unknown in prospect or else could not be determined by anything but an uncertain hunch" (1993 [1948]:21).

¹⁷⁰ Such alterations are the cornerstones of Baert's first- and second-order self reflection (1992b:86).

perception that inhabit both past and future in a continuous, processual flow. Far from subordinating the past and future, the Giddensian present cannot be constructed without them (Giddens 1984:49). Similarly, the self is not an “I” acting in the present now; it is the sum of forms of recall that the social agent uses to characterize the origins of its actions (Giddens 1984:51). Thus, memory, perception, and social subjectivity extend fore and aft of the superficial present, granting a kind of symmetry to time.

Temporal symmetry relates inversely to the epistemological and ontological status of the present, and this relationship holds crucial implications for IR as a social science. Positivist philosophy of social science has exerted a strong influence on IR (especially the American variety) for several decades (Smith 1996:16), and is most often diagnosed by the desire for Deductive-Nomological, or ‘covering law’ explanations (Wight 2006:21). I argue that positivist IR is founded on an assumption of the primacy of the present. Steve Smith defines positivism in part by a belief “that it is empirical validation or falsification that is the hallmark of ‘real’ inquiry” (1996:16). In his response to Smith, Wight places empiricism within “Phenomenalism: the doctrine that holds that we cannot get beyond the way things appear to us . . . appearances, not realities, are the only objects of knowledge” (2006:21). Both empiricism and phenomenalism imply that the present is more reliable than the (recollected) past or the (imagined) future. Only what we can see before us can be reliably ascertained, granting epistemological privilege to the present.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Dovetailing with this privilege is the positivist explanation of unanticipated consequences as modeling failures that require “ironing out” in theory (Baert 1992b:69).

Memory research outside of IR has linked these loyalties to the Western tendency to “*objectify* time; to view time as an aspect of the world as it exists rather than as an aspect of the way Western minds experience that world” (Turner and Falgout 2002:102). Phenomenalism, while skeptical of reliable knowledge by virtue of its reliance on ‘perception’, marginalizes imagination and memory even further because of that very reliance, which binds people “in what really *is*, the present” (Turner and Falgout 2002:103). If we can only know what we see before us now, then what has come before and what may be are merely “derivative” of present perception (Turner and Falgout 2002:103).¹⁷² The egalitarian stance of symmetrical time with regards to past and future thus problematizes positivism’s underpinning in the present and places it back within the historical context of Western modernity. Critical investigations into subjectivity, self, and memory have consistently sought to challenge the Western modern state’s permanence. By exposing the illusory nature of the present, critical theory can also emancipate the past and future from the margins of IR, giving time in IR a more egalitarian character while further expanding the discipline beyond the presentist horizon of positivist social science.

Situating IR in time, philosophy, and social theory

Critical IR theory opposes positivist understandings of the ‘verifying’ role and exclusively empirical conduct of social science. At the root of this dissent is a

¹⁷² Turner and Falgout also locate the roots of quantified understandings and spatialized metaphors of time in this Western privileging of the present (2002:103).

philosophical debate about the ontological and epistemological aspects of time. By acknowledging the temporal foundations of a significant portion of its intradisciplinary dialogue, IR gains access to substantial scholarship on the sociology and philosophy of time. For instance, concurrent with the emergence of IR as a discipline, philosophers of time were discussing whether time could be conceived of as tripartite (past, present, and future, known as Type A) or only as the past moving into the future (known as Type B, McTaggart 1908:458).¹⁷³ Exploring this dialogue may further explicate debates over positivism within IR, as well as illuminate new considerations in the philosophy of social science. But MacTaggart's typology is but a single gear in the clockwork muse¹⁷⁴ of philosophies of time. Martin Heidegger's influence on international politics is usually epitomized by his relationship to the Nazi party, but perhaps IR will also find useful his effort to counter the objectivist present with a hypothesis of "presencing" which involves encountering "something that is already a 'being' " (1996 [1953]:85).¹⁷⁵ IR might also make use of Einstein's relative reply to abstract, Newtonian time (2001); the contemporary

¹⁷³ McTaggart actually divides Type A time into five parts made up of "a series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future". Type B time he describes as "The series of positions which runs from earlier to later" (McTaggart 1908:458).

¹⁷⁴ Ironically, this phrase comes from the title of Zerubavel's guide to completing theses and dissertations (1999).

¹⁷⁵ Heidegger's presencing is not necessarily related to "co-presencing", defined as "intersubjective" or shared time (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004:90).

views of time employed in physics (Price 1996); or the more radical propositions of quantum studies (Hameroff and Penrose 1996).¹⁷⁶

Philosophies of time overlap with social theories of time, just a few of which have been discussed in this project. For instance, IR might turn to Max Weber, whose theory of traditional (cyclical), modern (rational), and charismatic / transcendent time offers an innovative exploratory framework. The usefulness of Weber's temporality has already been exemplified in Hanson's fascinating account of the influence of an amalgamated rational-charismatic temporal conceptualization on the design of Soviet institutions (1997). Adam's sophisticated temporal framework, discussed briefly in the first chapter, may also hold great potential for postcolonial studies of international politics focused on the temporal Othering of marginalized cultures (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004).

Within IR, even the standard Enlightenment binary can serve dissident efforts, as Kimberly Hutchings recently demonstrates in a temporalized critique of critical theory (2007).¹⁷⁷ In a more empirical vein, all of the sites discussed in chapter two deserve closer examination in order to determine whether and how much the relationship between time and sovereignty exceeds historical correlations. As I have argued throughout, more discussion, dialogue, and debate about time within IR will increase the richness of our image of the international political realm. Finally, by building on the subjectivity of FPA;

¹⁷⁶ Wendt has already begun down this path (2006), although it remains to be seen how (and how much) time will feature in his account.

¹⁷⁷ Hutchings' critique is based on the contention that "a particular relationship between clock and calendar time" characterizes critical IR theory, producing studies of international politics from the "perspective of a singular, progressive temporality" (2007:72).

notions of self, memory, and trauma from critical theory; and a broader reappraisal of positivism and the privileged present, IR can both enrich itself and enjoy a more robust interdisciplinary exchange by exposing the international political dimensions of time as we now know and live it.

This project began with the observation that IR has had little space for time. In this initial running together of two social dimensions, I hinted at both the imbalanced diet of IR theory and the impending metaphorical discussions that are ubiquitous in studies about time. If Edkins is right that all language has a lineage in relations of power, then predominantly spatialized metaphors of time suggest that it is not only IR that fails to fully accommodate the topic. The language we possess to discuss time indicates the dominance of space in ways of knowing, seeing, and speaking about social life. Time is an arrow, a line, a cycle; it expands and contracts; moves forward or backward; marks the motion of cosmic masses through astronomical voids.

By contrast, I can think of no temporalized metaphors that stand in for statements about space. Perhaps the emergence of such terms will mark the *fait accompli* of time's escape from space. On the other hand, dynamic understandings of emancipation focus on "process utopias" rather than fixed end points (Booth 1999:44), a view from within somewhen focused on small, 'tactical' objectives more consistent with the contingent and assuredly kinetic nature of the wheel. If we are ever to meet St. Augustine's challenge to both 'know' and 'describe' time, then the discovery of uniquely temporal terms must impel every whirl of time's wheel rather than simply striking the final hour of its study.

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