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# Teaching for Social Justice in the Engaged Classroom: The Intersection of Jesuit and Feminist Moral Philosophies

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# 8 Teaching for Social Justice in the Engaged Classroom

## *The Intersection of Jesuit and Feminist Moral Philosophies*

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Jesuit and feminist educators, despite what ideological differences exist between them, embrace the moral necessity of teaching for social justice.<sup>1</sup> Teaching for social justice involves creating a pedagogy focused on improving the lives of those disenfranchised by the larger culture.<sup>2</sup> This common goal reflects similar core values and assumptions arrived at from two different ethical perspectives: Christian ethics and an ethic of care.<sup>3</sup> While Jesuits and feminists share this common ground, they teach in a culture in which the moral concept of justice dominates. The concept of justice assumes independence, equality, and reason, while Christian ethics and an ethic of care assume interdependence, reason, emotion, care, and love. The tension that arises from these conflicting assumptions has underscored the care-justice debate in feminist literature and has enormous implications for the teaching of social justice in Jesuit institutions. Yet this debate and its implications have not been examined from a pedagogical perspective.

Thus this chapter seeks to fill this void by weaving together the threads related to social justice, Christian ethics, and the ethic of care. In the process, we establish a framework within which to interrogate feminist and Jesuit pedagogical practices related to teaching for social justice. This framework allows us to determine how social justice-related concepts, including emotion, power, and self-reflexivity, might more effectively be taught in university classrooms.

Specifically, we do the following in this chapter: First, we offer a definition of social justice. Second, we explore the similarities in foundational assumptions that animate both care-based and Christian moral theories and contrast those with the assumptions that underpin justice-based moral theories. We draw on the commonalities between Christian-and

care-based assumptions to frame our critique of pedagogical practices germane to teaching for social justice and its related concepts. Third, we present and offer a critique of an example of teaching for social justice that took place in an undergraduate communication course offered by a university instructor who describes herself as a feminist. The critique allows us to explore how the intersections of Jesuit and feminist moral thinking inform teaching for social justice and, in turn, how practices of teaching for social justice inform the shared theories and concepts of feminism and Jesuit education.

In our application, we pay particular attention to the concepts of emotion, power, and self-reflexivity. Emotion is important to consider because both Christian- and care-based moral perspectives, in direct contrast to Kantian and Rawlsian justice-based ethics, acknowledge that emotions play a critical role in moral reasoning. According to ethics of care philosopher Held, emotion provides “at least a partial basis for morality itself, and for moral understanding.”<sup>4</sup> Both Christianity and care are concerned with conditions of vulnerability and inequality, which give rise to issues of power.<sup>5</sup> Emotion grounds empathy, which in turn allows us to see and understand vulnerability and inequality, that is, those conditions that give rise to issues of power.

Power is an important concept because feminist and Jesuit quests for social justice recognize that disenfranchised people possess much less power than other groups. Feminist and Christian traditions compel feminist teachers at Jesuit institutions to help students recognize and understand their social, economic, and political interrelationships to others and to motivate students to engage in action that addresses unequal relationships and other factors that systematically promote inequality within a culture. Instructors interested in teaching for social justice must find ways for students to recognize the relationship between intellect and emotion in moral decision making.

Finally, self-reflexivity is formative and necessary for effective action. Empathy is needed to understand the emotional connection to vulnerability, which then leads to the recognition of power inequities and, when coupled with self-reflexivity, enables social action and change. This chapter examines specifically how we translate Christian ethics and an ethic of care into pedagogical practices.

## Social Justice

The term “social justice,” scholars generally agree, is difficult to define precisely because definitions are relative to one’s political, economic, and social perspectives; what some may perceive as just, others may perceive as unjust.<sup>6</sup> Rawls’s work on distributive justice is viewed as a major contribution to contemporary Western thinking on the issue. He notes that justice is required when people with competing interests “press their rights on one another.”<sup>7</sup> He anchors justice to the individual rather than to the overall well-being of the greatest number of members of society, as utilitarian philosophers did, and advocates equality of basic liberties and rights to the resources necessary for survival. Rawls argues that primary social goods, including income and wealth, should be equally distributed unless an unequal distribution is to everyone’s advantage. Injustices arise when unequal distribution of primary social goods advantages some people and disadvantages others. Amid the vast literature responding to Rawls’s conception of distributive justice, feminist scholars, in particular, have argued that the possession of material goods is not synonymous with well-being and have expanded the concept of primary goods to include the right to care.<sup>8</sup>

Frey, Pearce, Pollock, Artz, and Murphy moved us closer to understanding how to teach for social justice when they urged a shift away from the focus on a precise definition of the concept and toward the development of a “social justice sensibility.”<sup>9</sup> They stipulated that social justice is the “engagement with and advocacy for those in our society who are economically, socially, politically and/or culturally under-resourced.”<sup>10</sup> A social justice sensibility, these scholars suggest, is “a sufficient guide for action” in most of the unjust circumstances that require people to react.<sup>11</sup> This sensibility is informed by four commitments. To develop the sensibility, one must first be willing to foreground ethical concerns when thinking about community. Second, one must commit to examining and resolving structural problems that cause or perpetuate injustice. Third, one must adopt an activist orientation toward resolving the social injustice. Finally, one must move beyond oneself and be open to identifying with the other. Frey and his colleagues caution against confusing social justice with kindness, charity,

or hospitality. They also note that this sensibility is not impartial; emotion plays a role in recognizing and acting on perceived social injustices.

Embedded within this concept of social justice sensibility are themes common to both Christian ethics and an ethic of care, which, as noted, differ from justice-based ethics in significant ways. Before describing the tension between justice- and care-based ethics, we offer overviews of care- and Christian perspectives and point to the intersections between the two. Then we explore how feminists and Jesuits can work together to reduce this tension on a practical level.<sup>12</sup>

### Christian and Care-Based Theories of Morality

Christian ethics is the study of morality that draws on Judeo-Christian tradition to frame moral matters. Within this theoretical tradition, Harkness identifies frames of reference within which the term “Christian ethics is used,” which includes the ethical teachings of Jesus, the Bible, the New Testament, and the ethics of the Christian church.<sup>13</sup>

These frames share a similar grounding in the concept of Christian love that is selfless and spiritual. The Roman Catholic religion describes Christian love as more than just affect. The Holy See describes it as “the service that the Church carries out in order to attend constantly to man’s sufferings and his needs, including physical needs.”<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, these frames assume the interrelatedness of God and all human beings. Jesus underscored the value of relationships when he told the Pharisee that the greatest commandment is to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.” The second greatest commandment is to “Love your neighbor as yourself.”<sup>15</sup>

Situated within Christian ethics, and of particular interest here, is Catholic social teaching, a set of social and moral principles developed in the Catholic Church’s writings since the late 1800s that address its positions on economic, political, and cultural issues. These principles relate to the individual and how they relate to one another. The dignity of personhood, rights and responsibilities to others, participation in and promotion of the common good, economic justice, stewardship of God’s creation, peace, and global solidarity are assumed by these principles.

Governments, according to Catholic social teaching, play a role in promoting the principles. These writings are rooted in scripture, as well as the Catholic Church's philosophy and theology.<sup>16</sup>

Jesuit pedagogy reflects the principles of Catholic social teaching. The Society of Jesus formally adopted the pursuit of social justice as part of its educational mission in 1975 at its Thirty-second General Congregation when it decreed that the Society's mission was "the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute requirement."<sup>17</sup> The mission has evolved since then to recognize that injustices are rooted in cultural attitudes and economic structures, and that social justice emerges when cultures transform through the "liberating power of the Gospel."<sup>18</sup>

Christian ethics has been associated with the Christian church in its various forms. Likewise, the ethic of care, which has been associated with women's morality, is reflected in a range of perspectives. Here we will briefly address the contributions of three: the feminine, maternal, and feminist perspectives. The feminine perspective offers the ethic of care as a corrective for Western moral philosophers' disregard or trivialization of female characteristics or traits that inform moral thinking. Gilligan points out that mainstream moral philosophers have privileged male voice, which speaks in terms of abstractions, justice, rights, and rules.<sup>19</sup> She argues that women use a language stressing relationships, responsibilities, and contexts, identified by Tong as a language of care.<sup>20</sup>

The maternal approach to the problem of morality relates to this feminine perspective. Maternalists advance a model based on relationships as they appear in the private sphere (e.g., between a mother and her child) to frame moral thinking. This model is a corrective for the contractual model at the heart of most traditional Western moral theories. The contractual model draws from relationships as they occur in the public sphere (traditionally dominated by males), where relationships are assumed to be independent, anonymous, and equal. However, maternalists point out that, as a practical matter, most relationships occur within specific contexts and between people of unequal power, knowledge, and access to resources.<sup>21</sup> Humans, they argue, are contextualized and interdependent rather than independent in both private and public spheres.<sup>22</sup>

The feminist perspective, while sharing many values with the feminine and the maternal, emphasizes the political. Care, from this perspective, as Tronto, among others, argues, is revisioned as a concept that, along with justice, should inform decision making in the public sphere. This reflects feminism's commitment to eliminating those institutions, structures, and attitudes that subordinate women and others who are oppressed.<sup>23</sup> Feminist thinking, while inclusive of many different perspectives, including Marxism, multiculturalism, globalism, and ecofeminism, aims to advance social justice.

While feminine, maternal, and feminist perspectives differ in some ways, each has evolved in response to criticism of mainstream philosophies that systematically ignore the relevance of women's ways of thinking and knowing. Together, they advocate an ethical system that acknowledges the experiences of all men and women, including the poor and the oppressed, and one that addresses the importance of interdependence among human beings rather than independence. They argue against ideas that the most fully developed self is separated from, or independent of, others and that reality is most truthfully captured by knowledge that is rational, universal, and abstract.<sup>24</sup> For the purpose of convenience, we will refer to these approaches as "care-based" in the rest of this chapter.

This broad overview of care-based and Christian moral thinking sets the stage for us to examine the ways in which these two approaches to moral thought intersect. Understanding the intersections offers insight into how Jesuit and feminist instructors might work together to enhance teaching for social justice in higher education.

## Intersections

Christian-based and care-based moral theories intersect on at least four important points: the concept of human interdependence, the emphasis on humans as relational beings, the acknowledgement of an interplay between emotion and reason in moral thinking, and the link between justice and care.

The first important similarity between care-based and Christian moral theories is the assumption of human interdependence, although each grounds the claim differently.

Care-based theories are grounded in a pragmatic naturalism perspective and assume human interdependence as given. Accordingly, the human subject is understood as living in relationships with others in community to survive. Infants, for example, begin life dependent on others to meet their basic human needs.<sup>25</sup> As Tronto states, “All humans have needs that others must help them meet.”<sup>26</sup> The Christian tradition, in comparison, draws on spirituality, as opposed to material needs, to frame human interdependence. Yet similar to the care perspective, Christian spirituality assumes a caring God reflected in all of us as “persons in community who can enrich or impoverish the lives of those around us by our actions.”<sup>27</sup>

Deeply connected to this assumption of interdependence is the second important similarity—a shared emphasis on relations to others. Catholic social teaching underscores relations between oneself and others when calling on all people to “consider one’s every neighbor without exception as another self, taking into account first of all life and the means necessary to living it with dignity, so as not to imitate the rich man who had no concern for the poor man Lazarus.”<sup>28</sup> Care theorists point out that our humanity is “mutual,” and as humans, we are “already and potentially in relation.”<sup>29</sup> Therefore, care must be “the most basic moral value.”<sup>30</sup>

In addition to emphasizing interdependence and relationships, both Christian and care-based moral perspectives view the interplay between emotion and reason, rather than rationality alone, as necessary for the development of the complete person. Christianity emphasizes the interconnectedness of reason and emotion, and the primacy of Christian love. Freedom and rationality are necessary if we are to decide what kinds of persons we wish to become.<sup>31</sup> The Catholic Church posits that the will and intellect must be engaged if Christian love is to mature.<sup>32</sup>

Rationality is a necessary part of the process of caring for the other according to the ethic of care. Noddings argues that the “well-spring of human behavior is grounded in human affective response.”<sup>33</sup> Caring does not diminish rationality and may in fact, Noddings contends, enhance care through instrumental thinking. At the very least, she says, rationality ought to be engaged when one cares for the other.

While emotion is viewed as a necessary component of morality, it is important to note that Christian- and care-based ethicists differ in their



views of the exact nature of emotion at the core of moral development. Christian theologians argue that the emotion is Christian love, that is, the love of God reflected in all human beings. Care theorists such as Noddings alternatively argue that the basic human affect is joy, an emotion rooted in the concept of relatedness.<sup>34</sup> We note that an exploration of the distinction regarding the exact nature of the emotion or emotions that underpin moral development is important; however, it is beyond this chapter's scope.

Finally, the relationship between the concepts of care and justice commands the attention of Christian and feminist scholars. Theologians link justice to Christian love, arguing that the ideal of justice grows out of faith that is social and communal.<sup>35</sup> Joseph Daoust, S.J., points out that the scripture loosely situates the idea of justice with "love, compassion, and the fullness of peace."<sup>36</sup> In his encyclical letter *Deus Caritas Est*, Pope Benedict XVI writes that "love—*caritas*—will always prove necessary" even in the most just of states.<sup>37</sup> He further describes the Church's duty to the ideal of justice, saying that while the state has the responsibility of structuring a just society, the Church has an obligation to "contribute to the purification of reason and to reawakening of those moral forces without which just structures are neither established nor prove effective in the long run."<sup>38</sup>

At the same time, care theorists continue to examine the relationship between justice and care. Some argue that care and justice are separate ethics, while others reason that care must logically precede justice, for without care there would be no reason for justice.<sup>39</sup> Held argues that care, as the most basic moral value, offers the "the wider moral framework into which justice should be fitted."<sup>40</sup> Feminist scholars extend their analyses into many arenas of society, including culture, the professions, and politics.<sup>41</sup>

Intersections between Christian ethics and the ethic of care inform our understanding of how to teach for social justice, a topic that we take up next. Before doing so, we must point out that these shared values and assumptions contrast starkly with those underpinning traditional Western moral philosophies, often categorized as justice-based moral theories. Justice-based theories, including Kant's duty ethics and utilitarianism, assume that humans are independent of one another, moral reason is only rational, and emotion rarely, if ever, should factor

into the moral equation. Relationships qua relationships, likewise, are not called into play when one is making moral decisions. Justice-based theories assume the impartial application of abstract moral principles to humans, who are, in theory, equal and autonomous. In contrast to this liberal paradigm of justice, however, we contend that the intersections between Christian and care-based ethics, particularly as they relate to interdependence and emotion, offer a powerful perspective from which to think about teaching for social justice.

### The Practice of Teaching for Social Justice

It is not surprising, given the shared assumptions between Christian- and care-based moral theories outlined here, that Jesuit and feminist pedagogies also share important commonalities related to teaching for social justice. Both call attention to the roles of context, lived experience, the integration of emotion and reason, and action in the student-centered learning process. Intersections between the moral and pedagogical perspectives of Jesuit and feminist educators, therefore, offer a common place from which to examine pedagogical practices related to teaching for social justice sensibilities in Jesuit higher education and elsewhere. Here we apply the framework developed in the previous section to one of our experiences of teaching for social justice in a communication course.

We use as an example a class project in a multicultural/international advertising and public relations class offered at a Jesuit university. Students majoring in advertising or public relations who completed basic introductory courses are eligible to take the course, and the multicultural component typically includes a service-learning project, in which students gain real-world experience with a local client from an organization. The relationship between students and service-learning partners simulates that of an advertising/PR professional and client, with the students creating a product of value to the client.

The course instructor and the director of a Native American economic development organization collaborated on a project with an assignment aimed at overcoming barriers to successful fund-raising. The organization set a goal of increasing its funding from grants and

contributions from individual sponsors and philanthropic organizations. The organization's leaders, however, recognized that many potential donors lack an understanding of their mission and harbor misperceptions of Native people, many of which are based on inaccurate stereotypes. Failure to address these misperceptions and a lack of understanding would jeopardize the fund-raising efforts.

The Native American project was designed to encourage learning on two levels. On an intellectual level, the assignment charged students with helping the organization and its Native American administrators with their promotional activities. Students could accomplish this by identifying misperceptions that could tarnish the organization's image in the community and by providing strategic solutions, given that reputation management is a common need of organizations. On an emotional level, the assignment challenged students to care. Presumably, this could occur if students gained a better understanding of Native American people, were touched by the oppression that this group experiences, and felt a connection with Native American people. This blending of goals aimed to help each student develop as a "whole person, head and heart, intellect and feelings," which follows the Ignatian worldview.<sup>42</sup>

To meet the Native American organization's goal of more effective fund-raising, each of the twenty students in the class read a first-person account by Native writers and then interviewed five non-Native American people about their perceptions of Native Americans. None of the one hundred interviewees identified themselves as Native Americans. Four of the students in the class were African American, three were Asian American, and one was Hispanic; the rest were Caucasian. Most students reported that prior to this assignment, they had had little to no contact with Native people, and that their understanding was informed by media images, stereotypes, and reports about conflicts over the Native American mascots of athletic teams.

### *Recognizing Emotional Dimensions of Learning*

While classroom activities such as the Native American project provide intellectual stimulation and opportunities for rational thought, it is critical to acknowledge the role of emotion in the process and to recognize

its relationship to cognition. As Guerrero, Andersen, and Trost note, “clearly emotional experience and expression is part of a fabric of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that blend together to characterize the tapestry of interpersonal interaction.”<sup>43</sup> The interaction in classrooms is no less grounded in the blend of emotion and reason.

We as educators, however, must recognize that universities traditionally value intellectual accomplishment more highly than emotional expression. When faculty members set goals that involve not only the head but also the heart, they often go beyond the stated learning outcomes that they are trained to assess—even in Jesuit universities and colleges. Thus, attempting to teach emotional intelligence in the classroom is a complex and difficult endeavor that students, some instructors, and the university may resist unless the campus culture explicitly supports it.

While this assignment provided participants an unanticipated opportunity to examine the relationship between emotion and cognition, the presence of intense emotion should have been expected. Rockquemore and Schaffer note that students progress through three stages of development during this type of learning experience: shock, normalization, and engagement.<sup>44</sup> These stages certainly bring emotion to the forefront in the classroom. In this case, the initial shock occurred when Native American people suddenly went from being *invisible* to *visible*. Despite the presence of a Native American–owned casino near campus, students vastly underestimated the number of Native people in the area. They were equally surprised at their lack of awareness of two Native American schools located within a two-mile radius of their campus and a Native American senior citizens’ group that met at a church across from the university dental school. One student commented that it is as though Native Americans and non–Native Americans live in parallel universes with no intersections.

In this particular exercise, some classroom attempts to grapple with the emotion raised by the assignment brought about fruitful discussions, and others did not. Students eventually got past the initial shock and normalized their understanding of Native American people, but not all students reached the engagement stage, going beyond identifying social problems to developing a new understanding. Moments when students spontaneously raised questions usually generated more

insightful interactions than planned discussions, and critiques of negative perceptions were more powerful when delivered by students than by the professor.

Dealing with issues that arouse intense emotion compels us to set aside time in the classroom for discussion. It is often difficult, however, to anticipate how open to discussion the students will be, how the relationship between the teacher and students will evolve, and how much insight will emerge. Discussions on sensitive topics are often beyond the comfort level of many faculty and students, who may remain silent out of fear of saying the wrong thing. Faculty members must recognize that an open atmosphere where students can speak without judgment is essential so that prejudicial attitudes can be critically evaluated. Professors also must recognize that they need to prepare for surprises and be flexible, striking a balance between emotion and cognition.

Feminists and Jesuits recognize emotion and intellect as involved in experience, which leads to action and, hopefully, social change. Understanding problems relating to emotion and reason is critical because “reason working in our emotional life forces us to take our feelings as an awareness of things outside us, as a consciousness of meaning and value of things other than ourselves.”<sup>45</sup>

### *Power Relations and Minority Audiences*

Challenges related to power dynamics are clearly tied to the emotional dimensions of learning in an engaged classroom. The issue of power emerges from the assumption of interdependence, a hallmark of both Catholic social teaching and the ethic of care. Relationships vary in levels of equality. It follows that developing a social justice sensibility requires one to explore issues associated with the imbalance of power. In this particular exercise, the issue of power emerged in unexpected places as students worked their way through the process.

First, the assignment inadvertently viewed the students and faculty member as benevolent helpers, and the Native Americans from the local community as those in need of help. Service-learning classes in communication often partner with the clients of nonprofit organizations for class projects at the university. When partners are members

of minority groups, however, the potential for reinforcing feelings of superiority among the students and for perpetuating the unequal power relationships that accompany white privilege intensifies.<sup>46</sup> Students and faculty members often believe that helping a group such as Native Americans leads to a positive outcome because it engages students and teachers in altruistic behavior. However, this model—which can, arguably, be ego driven—risks reinforcing unequal power relationships, and encourages belief in a one-directional learning experience in which only the Native Americans, not the students and teachers, are helped and educated.

Interrogating the dynamics of helping (especially as it differs from partnering) is one means of advancing the discussion on power relationships. A class discussion that challenges students to think about who is actually being helped may actually create new ways of thinking. For instance, Jesuits argue that learning experiences such as the one examined here are two-way experiences. As members of the “middle-class tribe,” most students live in a world where they are too distanced from the life-and-death struggle that is the daily fare of the poor.<sup>47</sup> They see the poor as marginalized when, in fact, the marginalized are really at the center of things. As Dean Brackley, S.J., maintains, the middle and upper classes actually need the victims of oppression—the poor, abused women and children, racial and sexual minorities, and prisoners—more than the latter need the former, because they reveal both “the horror of evil in the world and the possibility for a more human way of living together.”<sup>48</sup>

Second, this assignment may have unintentionally reified unequal power relationships between students and their client. When students submitted their collected interview data, it was clear that some very negative perceptions existed among the one hundred members of the larger community who had been interviewed, none of whom reported themselves to be Native American. Two perceptions stood out: the belief that Native Americans have become wealthy from running casinos and the contrasting view that Native American people are unemployed alcoholics living in poverty. Some participants interviewed were sympathetic in regard to the oppression that Native Americans experience. Others, however, expressed resentment that Native Americans receive too many “handouts” from the U.S. government, are powerless

to take control of their lives, and have taken political correctness to an extreme with their sensitivity to university mascots that derive from Native American traditions (e.g., the Warriors, Fighting Illini).

Course readings and interviews, though intended to connect students to a minority group in a positive way, may have had the negative effect of reinforcing harmful stereotypes or, worse, creating them where none previously existed. Judging from the commentary on their interviews, some students clearly bought into their interviewees' inaccurate views, perhaps because the interviews offered a more accessible perspective and, therefore, one more real to students than the Native American first-person accounts they read for class.

Students were required to present their interview findings to the client, a task that might have required greater sensitivity than the students possessed. It was unclear how the findings themselves would be received—whether the harsh perceptions of the community would come as a surprise or whether they would confirm what the Native Americans already knew from experience. Clearly, the delivery of this information would require sensitivity. Otherwise, students might appear egotistical, arrogant, and prejudiced.

These power issues must be addressed because both the Jesuit and feminist traditions call upon us as faculty, when teaching for social justice, to confront issues; thus passing up important teaching moments is not an option for the Jesuit feminist classroom.<sup>49</sup> Jesuit universities and colleges are charged with providing students with significant intellectual training and morally preparing them “to change the world when they leave the university.”<sup>50</sup> To be morally prepared requires, according to Brackley, an understanding of the world's suffering, its causes, and possible solutions. It also means caring about others.

Although an understanding of the world's suffering and its causes helps people to be morally prepared, faculty and students may need additional tools in order to confront power issues such as those discussed here openly. A class discussion about how students balanced interviewees' perspectives against their own as well as the first-person Native American accounts served as a first step in confronting power issues. However, the issues arose so unexpectedly that more work was needed to unpack all the nuances of the experience. In particular, discussions of how students felt changed as a result of the process were required.

One possible solution may lie in the concept of attentiveness, which requires the recognition of one's own need for care and the care-related needs of another.<sup>51</sup> An exploration of care of the self may put students in the position of having their own needs met by those who are receivers of care, resulting in a two-way exchange. If the concept of attentiveness and self-care were applied as a starting point, it would place the care-giver and care-receiver in the same space at the same time. This could lead to a shift in the balance of power and require systematic attention to emotions and self-reflexivity. In this case, the instructor unwittingly approached the class exercise from Rawls's liberal distributive justice paradigm, which focuses on rationality as opposed to emotion. Changing the beginning pedagogical stance to a care-based ethic, which includes attention to self-care, might have been a way of avoiding some of these difficulties.

Addressing these issues can be particularly difficult for faculty with no training in teaching people to care. They can set an example of caring and offer students the opportunity to be touched by the people with whom they interact. Yet some students will predictably regard the assignment as merely an intellectual exercise. For them, the Native American assignment was no different from other exercises about managing a client's reputation. Such assignments offer great opportunities for students to learn to engage with and care about the Other and ultimately learn to share power. There are no guarantees, however, that meaningful learning will occur.

### *Self-Reflexivity in Engaged Learning*

Self-reflexivity, or evaluation, is an important part of the transformation process. This step leads to "a deeper understanding of how one's experience relates to the lives of others."<sup>52</sup> This part of the process enhances the integrity and wholeness of a person and the person's connections with others, which, in turn, can lead to social justice.<sup>53</sup>

Self-reflexivity is a significant goal; however, as with the challenge of teaching students to care, exerting control over how, when, and to what extent it occurs is not easy. Teaching students to engage in self-reflexivity requires that faculty members give up some control in the classroom and engage in difficult discussions. However, it also depends



upon students' willingness to be introspective and honest with themselves. Confronting one's own prejudices and correcting stereotypical attitudes toward others can be painful.

One class session during the Native American project spontaneously generated some discussion about the level of responsiveness on the client's part, which directly led to a degree of self-reflexivity among some class members. During this class period, a student expressed criticism of the client's time commitment to the project and the amount of time he took to answer the students' questions. After a brief discussion, the faculty member defended the client by making note of the client's extensive involvement in meetings in the planning stages of the project, suggesting that the client's commitment to the project extended beyond what students were able to see. Though it was unintentional, this exchange probably sent the message to the class that the student's criticism of the client was incorrect. More important, the student's comment may have related to the larger and more complex issue of gratitude. When work is driven by altruism, the "helpers" usually expect some degree of gratitude from those who are "helped." The student's comment may have been an expression of frustration that the client had not shown proper gratitude. Going beyond the surface complaint and examining what was really happening could have led to a more fruitful discussion regarding students' expectations of gratitude, as well as a moment of reflection about different expectations for clients who are minority members.

Because the exchange was unplanned and occurred on a day when other course material needed to be covered, the discussion was cut short. Students, as a result, lacked enough time to explore the criticism, and the instructor realized too late that she had lost a valuable teaching moment. Such discussions provoke anxiety because faculty members do not have the power to prevent students from making disparaging comments. The instructor's real concern at the time was that the criticism of the client's action would be taken as one of the individual and, in turn, Native Americans in general. The reaction in such situations might be to try to maintain order and respect for the client, particularly if the client is the member of another race. However, the temptation to close the discussion and move on to a safer topic silences a voice that should be heard, precisely because it reflects a genuine although

uncomfortable position. When these thoughts are spoken out loud, the student's voice conveys a concrete idea with which the instructor can deal. Left unspoken, the idea remains but is inaccessible and therefore potentially more damaging.

The responsibility to foster self-reflexivity in the engaged classroom rests on the instructor's shoulders, and first attempts at working through these pedagogical issues are predictably imperfect. Despite the lack of in-depth class discussions on issues such as the client's perceived commitment, some students engaged in self-reflection on their own, as evidenced by comments in their course evaluations. Furthermore, some students continued working with the organization through independent studies the following semester, and one pursued a summer job with the organization. Those who embraced what the Native American people could teach them benefited from the two-directional learning process, and engaging in self-reflexivity further enabled their personal transformation.

This class project and others like it, from the Jesuit perspective, encourage students to let the reality of others into their lives so that they can, in part, feel it and critically think about others in ways that help achieve social justice.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, a feminist approach to pedagogy focuses on the whole person and strives to enhance students' connections with others. As Shrewsbury states, feminist pedagogy "requires continuous questioning and making assumptions explicit, but it does so in a dialogue aimed not at disproving another person's perspective, nor destroying the validity of another's perspective, but as a mutual exploration of explications of diverse experiences."<sup>55</sup>

The demands of feminist and Jesuit perspectives can be difficult for faculty and students. Fear of rejection and retaliation for personal views about gender, race, ethnicity, social class, and sexual orientation can run quite high. These fears are especially apparent in classroom situations where the racial and gender composition of the students is mixed. At predominately white universities and colleges, where students of color are definite minorities in a classroom, these fears can promote student silence and faculty reluctance to confront difficult issues that need to be addressed. Issues of power, discrimination, representation, prejudice, and privilege come to the forefront and often challenge students' sense of identity and position within their communities. These

issues likewise challenge a faculty member's own comfort level in dealing with these sensitive matters in an empathetic and caring, yet pedagogically responsible, manner.

Within feminist and Jesuit pedagogical approaches, discussion of the topics of race, gender, and class requires that courses function as seminars that actively encourage discussion, reflection, and the exchange of views. Working with minority groups can be an especially effective way to encourage students to begin talking, sharing, and reflecting upon their position within the larger culture vis-à-vis those different from themselves. Illustrating that everyone has a stake in the outcome helps move discussions from personal stances to the larger issues in question.

## Conclusions

Jesuit and feminist educators are charged with teaching for social justice in Jesuit institutions of higher learning. These institutions are situated in a larger culture in which justice-based theories of ethics that presuppose independence and equality dominate. These presuppositions create tension for Jesuit and feminist teachers, since their philosophical underpinnings assume human interdependence. This tension manifests itself in pedagogical practices. The common ground between Jesuit and feminist approaches offers a place to begin exploring ways to ameliorate such tensions and enhance teaching for social justice.

Our exploration of these intersections of Christian- and care-based ethics offers a solid position from which we offered a critique of an example of teaching for social justice by a feminist in a Jesuit classroom. We discovered that, in the teaching process, issues of emotion, power, and self-reflexivity were inescapable. For instance, a project designed to make students aware of social stereotypes and power relations with Native Americans may have inadvertently reinforced stereotypes and reified inequitable power relations for some students. We also noted the difficulties of addressing emotion, particularly when Native Americans became visible to students for the first time. Finally, we identified the difficulties in helping students learn to be self-reflective. Sometimes self-reflection occurred without specific action, and other times it faltered, despite the instructor's best intentions to foster the process. Furthermore, although we examined emotion, power, and self-reflexivity

as discrete elements, we recognize their interconnectedness as they relate theoretically and practically to social justice. We suggested how theory can inform practice, so we now turn our attention to how practice can inform theory.

In the process of reflecting on this experience, it became apparent that faculty members can only go so far in solving problems related to emotion, power, and self-reflexivity in the classroom, given that each problem reflects issues too large for a single teacher to address. These issues must be engaged at the institutional level if helping students effectively develop social justice sensibilities is to become a reality. With this in mind, we propose institutional self-reflexivity and action in the following three areas: furthering the knowledge and understanding of emotion, the development of pedagogies appropriate to disseminating that knowledge, and the understanding of how justice and care relate.

First, we advocate scholarship and intellectual inquiry within the academy directed toward uncovering the knowledge of emotion. MacMurray points out that moral behavior depends on the “absolute value of human beings as free human spirits,” not as male or female, child or adult, black or white, or young or old.<sup>56</sup> Part of the human spirit, he argues, has an emotional core, so being human requires a clear understanding of our intellectual *and* emotional selves.<sup>57</sup> Intellectual or rational approaches to the problems of social justice are not enough. Relational thinking as it applies to our emotional beings must be developed in order to bring about social justice grounded in care and spiritual love.

A true understanding of emotional knowledge should be on the university’s research agenda, much the way that science has been for the last several centuries. Further, the subject of emotion should not be housed in women’s studies departments or taught in an occasional philosophy course by a part-time instructor or in the psychology department, where it is treated as a variable that must be defined, categorized, isolated, and tested. Emotional knowledge as it relates to our physical and spiritual beings ought to permeate the entire university curriculum, particularly since we are told that the “central core of our experience is seeking to accept one another and to be accepted for what we are, so that we may be ourselves and express ourselves for one another.”<sup>58</sup> That

process requires a genuine emotional understanding of the significance of subjects outside ourselves. Such understanding and knowledge lead to genuine communion with others, which in turn evolves into friendship, cooperative living, society, and community. Within this sort of communion, social justice may flourish.

Second, if emotion, as some argue, is central to moral thinking, then developing pedagogies that foster meaningful engagements with emotion within the learning environment becomes imperative. In the short term, instructors must continue to rely on intuition and a willingness to take risks. The long term, however, requires a genuine commitment to fostering social justice sensibilities based on a knowledge of how to teach intellectual *and* emotional skills and knowledge.

Third, we insist on the pressing need to examine the relationship between justice and care. The theory of justice spelled out by Rawls, which accounts for much of our society's thinking about justice, does not account for care or emotion as do Christian- and care-based ethics. Rawls locates the starting point for justice within the individual on the assumption that individuals are autonomous and independent—not in relation to one another.<sup>59</sup> Rawls's theory of justice does not account for Christian love or care and its relationship to human well-being. We have identified bodies of thought that link care and justice, but the work in this area is incomplete. Certainly, scholars from Okin and Tronto to Kittay and Sevenhuijsen as well as Jacobson and Sawatsky and Daoust have explored the implications of the Christian- and care-based ethics from philosophical and theoretical perspectives. This debate, however, is not fully developed.

We encourage the academy to examine this argument further. We encourage Jesuit institutions of higher learning to put that problem before its faculty and students and ask for their best thinking. Theoretical and pedagogical questions such as “When might the individualism and rationality of the justice paradigm offer a counterbalance to the challenges of a caring paradigm?” and “How does justice inform caring practices in the classroom?” deserve to be asked and answered. We believe that the importance of the linkage between care and justice and its implications for understanding and teaching for social justice cannot be underestimated.

As a final note, we argue that Jesuit universities and colleges must continually engage in self-reflexivity about linking the theory of social justice with practice within their own institutions. If the institutions in which students are trained model injustice in any of their own behaviors, then one must ask whether it is reasonable to expect young men and women to move into the larger world and seek justice for all. Jesuit institutions must ensure that faculty genuinely understand Jesuit moral and teaching philosophies. Likewise, those who work within these institutions of higher learning must be willing to hear the voices of others, including feminist instructors. For it is only with a shared understanding of one another that we will realize our best efforts to provide opportunities for the transformation of students into men and women in service for others.