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Hegel's *Phenomenology*: Reverberations in His Later System

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Abstract

Hegel indicates toward the end of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* that there would be a parallelism in the categories of his later system to the various configurations of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*. Some general correspondences have been indicated by Otto Pöggeler and suggested by Robert Grant McRae, but I argue in this paper that there are at least four important and more specific parallels, bringing out simultaneously a similarity of content and a difference of approach and methodology in the two works: 1) in the philosophical construal of "categories"; 2) in the conceptualization of a "phenomenology"; 3) in the analysis of the dialectical relationship of religion and art; and 4) in the relationship of the history of philosophy to the Absolute.

As is well-known, Hegel initially visualized his Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an introduction to his projected system. He even remarks, toward the end of the *Phenomenology*, that there will be a correspondence between the various *Gestalten* in the *Phenomenology* and the Categories that will be generated in his later system of philosophy:

In general, to each of the abstract Moments of [philosophical] Science there corresponds a configuration of appearing [phenomenological] Spirit. Just as Spirit in its existence is not richer than Science, so also Spirit in its content is not poorer

than Science. When the pure concepts [categories] of Science are known in their present form (as configurations of consciousness), this brings out the aspect of their reality; after this, their essence, the Concept, which is established in them as *thought* in *simple* mediation, breaks the Moments of this mediation apart and is exhibited [in philosophical Science] according to its inner opposition.¹

This definitely seems to imply that in the course of the exploration of consciousness and Spirit in the *Phenomenology*, certain important configurations will be encountered that Hegel will return to as Categories in his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, and other systematic endeavors, in order to develop scientifically their essential oppositions. But it is a matter of dispute as to whether he actually carried out this intention, and, if so, what "correspondences" should be particularly noted.

Otto Poggeler maintains that the best way of interpreting this statement from the final parts of the *Phenomenology* is in terms of a projection that Hegel made *before* publishing the 1807 *Phenomenology*.² In his *Realphilosophie* of 1805-1806, Hegel had projected his future system as consisting of six parts: Being, Relation, Life and Cognition, Knowing Knowledge, Spirit, and the Self-Knowledge of Spirit. Thus, Poggeler suggests, there are some *general* correspondences in the *Phenomenology* with this initial projection: The phenomenology of Sense-certainty with the category of Being; the dialectics of Perception and Understanding with the category of Relation; the "Truth of Self-Certainty" with the category of Life; Reason with the category of Knowledge; the phenomenology of Spirit with the Category of Spirit; and the sections on Religion and Absolute Knowledge with the projected Category of the "Self-knowledge of Spirit." But Poggeler finds no other *specific* and *significant* correspondences of elements of the *Phenomenology* with the later system.

Before proceeding any further on this question, we should take into account the fact that Hegel's later system included not only his *Wissenschaft der Logik* and his *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, but also numerous works and lectures which branched out from the system, expanding and clarifying elements of the system. For instance, Hegel's publication of the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* was a more detailed development of topics outlined in the

section on Objective Spirit in his *Encyclopedia*. His lectures on the Philosophy of History expanded on the general remarks in the sub-section on Universal History in Objective Spirit in the *Encyclopedia* (§§548-549) and on the more detailed remarks on universal history in the *Philosophy of Right* (§§341-360). Likewise, Hegel's lectures on aesthetics expand on the basic divisions of symbolic, classical and romantic art discussed in the *Encyclopedia* in the Philosophy of Art; parts of Hegel's lectures on Religion expanded on the sub-section on Revealed Religion in the section on Absolute Spirit in the *Encyclopedia* (§§564-571); and Hegel's lectures on the History of Philosophy are, of course, a further development of the sub-section on Philosophy which brings the final triad of Absolute Spirit (after Art and Religion) to completion in the *Encyclopedia* (§§572-577).

If we take into account all these *wider* developments of Hegel's system, do we find any significant correspondences which may help us to gain a greater insight into Hegel's possible fidelity to his original plan? Robert Grant McRae maintains that there are some obvious dialectical processes that carry over from the *Phenomenology* to the System.³ For example, the movements of Force and Concept in the chapter on Understanding in the *Phenomenology* have their counterpart in Subjective Logic in Hegel's *Science of Logic*, the chapter on Reason has reverberations in the final section of Subjective Logic on the Idea, the discussion of the emergence of the family and the state in Chapter VI on Spirit in the *Phenomenology* is reflected in the philosophy of Objective Spirit in the *Encyclopedia*, and the final chapter on "Absolute Knowledge" in the *Phenomenology* obviously corresponds to the final segment of the *Encyclopedia* on "Absolute Spirit."

But these are still very general correspondences. Are there any more specific areas where the *Phenomenology of Spirit* actually lays the groundwork for developments in Hegel's later system, and thus can contribute to the elucidation of parts of that system? I suggest that there are four such areas:

1. One of the first places to look for a specific and important correspondence between the *Phenomenology* and the System would be in chapter 5, "Reason," where Hegel differentiates the "Category" which characterizes true, authentic philosophical idealism from, on the one hand, the ten object-oriented "substantial" *Aristotelian* categories and, on the other hand, the twelve subjectively-conditioning "thinking

realities," i.e., the *Kantian* categories (and Fichte's Kantian revisionism in terms of the ego's self-identity). Hegel compares these two types of categories with his own construal, as follows:

The *Category*, which formerly had the connotation of being the substantiality of what exists—either (*indefinitely*) the substantiality of existence-in-general, or the substantiality of existence over against consciousness—is now the *substantiality*, i.e. the simple *unity*, of the existent only insofar as it is a thinking-reality Only a one-sided, defective Idealism lets this unity come to the fore again as consciousness, on one side, and, over against consciousness, an *in-itself*. But the present *Category*, that is, the *simple* unity of Self-Consciousness and existence, has *difference* within itself. For its essence is just this: to be immediately identical-with-self *in otherness*, in absolute difference.⁴

The standpoint of the *Category* is finally attained only at the end of the *Phenomenology*. At this point, the series of oscillations and ironical developments that took place in the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" are superseded by a new perspective in which the oppositions of self-consciousness and existence, and all other related oppositions, are viewed serenely in the overall interrelationship between Spirit's Consciousness, coming to its culmination in chapter 6, and Spirit's Self-Consciousness emerging in chapter 7, thus making possible true philosophical Science. The stage is set for further "categorical" development, in which unity is coordinated with difference: For example, in Hegel's subsequent *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, starting with the *Logic*, "Being" is portrayed in its intimate relationship with nothingness, quality with quantity, essence with existence, form with matter; in the *Philosophy of Nature*, space and time are portrayed in their interrelationships, and polarities are highlighted (for example, in chemistry, electricity, and magnetism); and finally in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, we examine the unity-in-difference of consciousness and the unconscious, freedom and determinism, rights and laws, family and state, and the ultimate unification of Self-consciousness and Being in art, religion, and philosophy.

2. Another, and more obvious, locus where the *Phenomenology* impacts on the later System, is in the first section of the third part of the *Encyclopedia*, where Hegel treats of the "Phenomenology of Spirit."

The topics discussed in this section are topics also discussed in chapters 1-4, and the beginning of chapter 5, of the *Phenomenology*. But this section of the *Encyclopedia* is by no means just a summary of the early chapters of the *Phenomenology*, nor is it a revised and improved version, overcoming the deficiencies of the earlier work, as Michael Petry, translator of the "Berlin Phenomenology," has suggested. Rather, it takes up the phenomenological topics from a new vantage point—the perspective of the Category. Thus we find no "phenomenological" series of ironical development—Sense-Certainty initially deceived about the particularity of the "Here" and "Now," but then forced to construe them as universal; Sense-Certainty moving from realism to idealism; Perception initially believing the properties of the Thing were essential, but then realizing that the ego is constantly uniting and differentiating aspects of the perceptual object; Consciousness examining the laws of objects and forced into examination of itself formulating the laws; Master and Slave consciousnesses ending up in a reversal of roles; Self-Consciousness reaching a point at which it needs to unite with Consciousness in the new configuration of Reason; and so forth. Rather, in the section on "Phenomenology" in the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel treats of the same topics "scientifically," from the standpoint of the Category of the unity of subject and object. Rather than letting consciousness meander through various "determinate negations" in trying to raise its certainties to truth, Hegel now stands as a third party observer, making explicit the dialectical relationships that exist in subjective spirit. He describes how the relationship to space and time involves a coordination of particular and universal "Heres" and "Nows," how the viewpoint of Perception coordinates Consciousness and sensory properties, how Understanding as it focuses more deeply on laws ends up at Self-Consciousness, how Master and Slave as types of consciousness result from the desire of Self-Consciousness to find equilibrium with its special kind of object, and how Reason finally brings about the Categorical synthesis of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. The treatments of these subjects in the Jena *Phenomenology* and the later systematic section on "Phenomenology" are different but complementary. Sometimes opacities that may exist in the earlier work can even be cleared up by rereading of the later work, and vice versa. But by no means is the later work merely a summary or abridgement of the earlier.

3. The chapter on Religion in the Jena *Phenomenology* analyzes the evolution from nature-religions like Zoroastrianism to "art religion" (exemplified primarily in ancient Greek statuary, architecture, hymnody, poetry and drama) to "revealed religion" (i.e., the phenomenological emergence of Christianity out of Hebrew religion). In the *Encyclopedia*, unlike the *Phenomenology*, Art and Religion are treated as *separate* moments in the development of Absolute Spirit—art being an immediate sensuous synthesis of being and thought, religion being a synthesis mediated by the imagination. But there are many similar topics; and here again, the later treatment differs from the earlier by being "scientific" and categorial. Thus, the movement which takes place from the "happy consciousness" of Greek comedy to the "unhappy consciousness" of Judaism in the *Phenomenology* is restructured in the *Encyclopedia* as an analysis (§§556-563) of the embodiment of the absolute in classical art, as compared with the embodiment of the absolute in the doctrine of the Incarnation; and the earlier phenomenological development from internal Trinitarian relationships of the deity to creation, and then to the knowledge of good and evil, to the fall, and to the subsequent atonement by the God-man, is analyzed in the later system (§§564-571) as an unfolding of the concept of the Trinity. In other words, the dialectic from creation to atonement in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* gives way in the *Encyclopedia* to the "timeless" consideration of the moments of the Concept of the Absolute in Religion.

4. As mentioned above, Hegel's lectures on the philosophies of aesthetics, religion, and history are mostly expansions in greater detail of concepts developed in the Philosophy of Spirit in the *Encyclopedia*. But his lectures on the history of philosophy not only expand the final section in the *Encyclopedia*, showing how philosophy synthesizes the absolutes arrived at in art and religion, but also are even more directly connected with the *Phenomenology*. In a brief sketch covering a few pages in the chapter on "Absolute Knowledge" in the *Phenomenology*,⁵ Hegel describes how the attainment of the "absolute" standpoint of the identity-in-distinction of Being and thought had been attained in the history of modern philosophy. No names are mentioned, but it is clear to which philosophers Hegel is referring in his succinct overview of the previous two centuries: With Francis Bacon, modern philosophy began emphasizing observation, to discover the rationality within nature; then Descartes discovered Being in thought; Spinoza emphasized the

immediate unity of thinking and existence; Leibniz reacted against the selfless characteristics of the Spinozan synthesis, and "asserted the claims of individuality"; Voltaire and Diderot and other *philosophes* "externalized individualization in culture"; Helvetius and other utilitarians "arose to the thought of utility"; then philosophy began to "grasp existence as its own will" with Rousseau's *volonté general* and Kant's apolitical and idealist reconstruction of Rousseau's "general will" in his categorical imperative; finally, a subjective construal of the relation of self to otherness was attained by Fichte's ego=ego, and Schelling produced an objective, substantial construal of the same relation, which unfortunately ended up as an abyss of absolute identity, into which everything could be arbitrarily tossed. Hegel then mentions the solution he himself has come up with, to mediate between the Fichtean and Schellingean extremes: a type of knowledge which "consists rather in this apparent inactivity [of Spirit] that merely considers how what is differentiated moves itself in itself and devolves once again into its unity."⁶

Hegel's later lectures on the history of modern philosophy follow almost the same series of philosophical positions, with a few additions, and leading up to the then-present state of German idealism in which the one-sidedness of both Fichte and Schelling have finally given away to Absolute Knowledge as the privileged unity-*in*-distinction of thought and Being which can provide a trustworthy foundation for a truly "scientific" philosophical system.

It is arguable that these lectures on the history of philosophy fulfill Hegel's earliest systematic intentions, encompassing what Hegel had in mind when in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* he writes,

The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of truth. The goal which I have set before myself is to collaborate to bring it about that philosophy approximates the form of Science, that philosophy can put aside its name, "the love of knowledge," in order to be *real knowledge*. The inner necessity for knowledge to be Science lies in its very nature, and the satisfactory clarification on this issue is simply the exposition of philosophy itself. But the *external* necessity, insofar as it can be comprehended in a universal fashion, aside from the accidents of person and individual occasions, is exactly the same as the *inner* necessity-[but] in the form of the way that time presents the existence of its moments. *To demonstrate that the elevation of philosophy to Science is*

*immanent in our time would be the only valid justification of the attempts that are directed towards the goal of philosophical Science, because "the times" would bring about the necessity for this to happen, or rather actually accomplish the goal.*⁷
(emphasis added to the last sentence)

Hegel here refers to an "external necessity" that can be comprehended in a temporal fashion, and there can be no doubt that Hegel, a consummate student of the history of philosophy, saw this history as leading up inevitably to his own approach to the systematization of philosophy. Otto Pöggeler may have had this in mind when he speaks about an "external" introduction to Hegel's system of philosophy:

In the *Encyclopedia*, §§13-14, Hegel says that the history of philosophy is, in the element of externality, just what the philosophical system is, in the element of thought. What previously was a prerogative of the *Phenomenology* is now a function of historical reflection. This historical approach demonstrates, for example, that the time is ripe for the content of religion to be raised to the conceptual level, and for the then-contemporary philosophy to be involved in presenting the truth as "objective thought." (*Encyclopedia*, §§24ff.)⁸

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* was, of course, meant to be the Introduction, as well as the First Part, of Hegel's system of philosophy. Whether or not the history of philosophy, as an *external* introduction to his system, is an improved introduction over the *Phenomenology* itself, it seems Hegel may have had this alternative introduction in mind when, after finishing the *Phenomenology*, he sat down to write those words in the Preface.

Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clainnont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), p. 529: *Entspricht jedem abstrakten Momente der Wissenschaft eine Gestalt des erscheinenden Geistes überhaupt. Wie der daseiende Geist nicht reicher ist als sie, so ist er in seinem Inhalte auch nicht ärmer. Die reinen Begriffe der Wissenschaft in dieser Form von Gestalten des Bewußtseins zu erkennen, macht die Seite ihrer Realität aus, nach welcher ihr Wesen, der Begriff, der in ihr in seiner einfachen Vermittlung als Denken gesetzt ist, die Momente dieser Vermittlung auseinanderschlägt und nach dem inneren Gegensatze sich darstellt.*

2. Otto Pöggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber Verlag, 1973), pp. 222, 226.
3. Robert Grant McRae, *Philosophy and the Absolute* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 31-32, 41.
4. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 160: "Die Kategorie, welche sonst die Bedeutung hatte, *Wesenheit des Seyenden zu seyn*, unbestimmt des *Seyenden überhaupt oder des Seyenden gegen das Bewußtseyn*, ist *itzt* *Wesenheit oder einfache Einheit des Seyenden nur als denkende Wirklichkeit*; ... *Nur der einseitige schlechte Idealismus läßt diese Einheit wieder als Bewußtseyn auf die eine Seite, und ihr gegenüber ein Ansich treten.*—*Diese Kategorie nun oder einfache Einheit des Selbstbewußtseyns und des Seyns hat aber an sich den Unterschied; denn ihr Wesen ist eben dieses, im Andersseyn oder im absoluten Unterschiede unmittelbar sich selbst gleich zu seyn.*" In the next paragraph, Hegel criticizes the notion that there is a specific number of categories, and finds it disgraceful that Kant thought we could "scare up the multiplicity of categories in any old manner—for example, out of the types of judgement—as a 'find,' and to let oneself be satisfied with this state of affairs.
5. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, pp. 526--527; §§803-804 in the Miller translation (Oxford University Press, 1977). For a line-by-line analysis of this section, see my *Hegel's Phenomenology: Selections* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 164-169.
6. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 527: *Das Wissen besteht vielmehr in dieser scheinbaren Unthätigkeit, welche nur betrachtet, wie das Unterschiedene sich an ihm selbst bewegt, und in seine Einheit zurückkehrt.*
7. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 6: *Die wahre Gestalt, in welcher die Wahrheit existiert, kann allein das wissenschaftliche System derselben sein. Daran mitzuarbeiten, daß die Philosophie der Form der Wissenschaft näher komme,—dem Ziele, ihren Namen der Liebe zum Wissen ablegen zu können und wirkliches Wissen zu sein,—ist es, was ich mir vorgesetzt. Die innere Notwendigkeit, daß das Wissen Wissenschaft sei, liegt in seiner Natur, und die befriedigende Erklärung hierüber ist allein die Darstellung der Philosophie selbst. Die äußere Notwendigkeit aber, in so fern sie, abgesehen von der Zufälligkeit der Person und der individuen Veranlassungen, auf eine allgemeiener Weise gefaßt wird, ist dasselbe, was die innere, in der Gestalt, wie die Zeit das Dasein ihrer Momente vorstellt. Daß die Erhebung der Philosophie zur Wissenschaft an der Zeit ist, dies aufzuzeigen würde daher die einzig wahre Rechtfertigung der Versuche sein, die diesen Zweck*

haben, weil sie die Notwendigkeit desselben dartun, ja weil sie ihn zugleich ausführen würde.

8. Otto Pöggeler, *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 226: *In der Enzyklopädie (§§13 und 14) sagt Hegel, die Geschichte der Philosophie sei das im Element der Äußerlichkeit, was das System im Element des Denkens sei. Was Früher der Phän. vorbehalten war, wird jetzt von der geschichtlichen Besinnung geleistet: diese stellt nun den Weg zur Wissenschaft dar. Sie zeigt z.B., daß es an der Zeit ist, die Gehalte der Religion in den Begriff zu erheben, daß die neuzeitliche Philosophie darauf hinausläuft, die Wahrheit als den 'objektiven Gedanken' zu erweisen (Enzyklopädie §§24ff.).*