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Reflections on Persons in Petri Dishes

by

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I. Introduction

These thoughts were occasioned by a question I was asked some time back in an *Ethics* class. In course of a discussion of in vitro fertilization (IVF), I made the comment that IVF seemed to reduce the procreation of a human being to the making of a product. Consequent on that, I continued, the relationship of parent to child was being replaced by one more resembling that of producer to product, of maker to something made -- indeed, of creator to creature. In other words, IVF would be a real instance of "playing God". The question, which one of my students asked innocently enough, was whether or not there were "any studies to show that" parents of IVF children played God over them, any more than natural parents did over their children.

When I heard the question I was a bit nonplussed. I tried to explain that this was not what I was talking about. I tried to explain that rather than make such a study which, even presuming for the moment its validity, might give us some statistical follow-up on IVF procedures, my approach as a natural law ethicist was in the opposite direction. I was not out to measure results in some utilitarian way. Rather I first wanted to explore the reality of the act of IVF and, once having done that, judge its morality. My aim was to think about the ontology of the

situation, to ask if it implied a radically new relationship of producer to product in place of the old one between parent and child. Yet, as I left the classroom, I was not entirely satisfied with my answer. What follows is a profile of my thoughts since then on in vitro fertilization and related matters, thoughts which came again to mind after the cloning of "Dolly."¹

II. The Question of the Personal Reality of the Zygote

Let me state at the outset that the very fact of in vitro human zygotes highlights the distinct and separate existence of the same. Obviously, the zygote in vitro is not part of its mother, or of its "parent" in the case of a clone. It is instead a whole, separate organism and it is human, not in basic kind different from other humans at this stage of their development.² The immediate and key question then concerns its personal status. Is the zygote a person? And if it is, what difference does that make? But first what is a person?

III. What is a Person? Personhood and Intelligence

If we speak of human persons, anyone can see that these must be associated with, or even inextricably bound up with, being intelligent. Because a human being is intelligent, he or she has the characteristics we spontaneously associate with personhood. Because a human being is intelligent, he can think and he can think upon his thinking. Because a human being is intelligent, he can talk, which is to say he can manage syntactical speech. Because a human being is intelligent, he can express his thought not just in speech but also in writing. Correspondingly, because he is intelligent he can read.

Because a human being is intelligent, he can laugh. Consider for a moment that to smile at the most moronic pun needs an ability to reflect on the fact that a single word can simultaneously bear two meanings. Such a reflection, which in its own way transcends time and space, is pre-eminently a function of immaterial intelligence. To be sure, we may sometimes refer to animals or things as laughing or smiling. On second thought, however, we know that in such references we are using figures of speech. It is perfectly correct to speak of laughing hyenas or smiling meadows, as long as we are aware of the

metaphors involved in our speaking.

Because a human being is intelligent, he can enter that person-to-person relationship which is love. More pointedly, he can love not just in a selfish way, for his own gratification or utility. But he can, instead, love another for that other's sake. Not slotted in to a simplistic sense pleasure, a human being, because he is intelligent, can have an expansive, altruistic, even God-imagining, love of benevolence.

In possession of intelligence, human beings can establish societies, which are more than mere packs or herds. They can commit themselves to marriages and form families, replete with love, mutual respect, authority, traditions, and values. Beyond this, intelligent human beings can and do build cities, states, cultures and great civilizations. In these one can find laws, courts, schools, and other institutions, any of which would suffice to set human persons apart from all else in the material world.³

Because they are intelligent, human beings can note the passage of time, as well as mark and record their history. At home and in school, they can pass that history on from generation to generation. In line with this, intelligent human beings can correct themselves and make progress, both individually and in community with one another.

Because they are intelligent, human beings can reflect upon the meaning of their lives. With Socrates they can agree that "the unexamined life is not worth living."⁴ Everywhere human beings can meditate upon their origin and their destiny. Alone among all creatures on earth they can and do have religion.⁵ Indeed, even if they reject religion and the examination of life itself, if their rejection is rational, human beings evidence Aristotle's dictum: "Even if I choose not to philosophize, I must philosophize."⁶

Possessing intelligence, human beings are able to range over a multitude of eligible goods and realize that none of them is so perfect that it *must* be chosen without fail. For this reason, human beings, unlike animals, insects, or plants, are not necessitated to act. They are indeed what each of us experiences himself to be, namely, *self-determined or free*. That is to say, human beings, in possession of intelligence, are in charge of themselves. They are, in this, able to set goals or ends for themselves and to use other things as means to those ends. So doing, they manifest their mastery over the order of means to ends. And thus they show themselves, as Kant well understood, to be

ends in themselves and never simply means.⁷

This last is the foundation of human beings having rights. They are ends in themselves, never to be used as means for or by others. And others who act in an intelligent way ought to respect that and base their conduct on it. Equally, this is the foundation of human beings having responsibility, obligation, or duty. Because they are intelligent and in charge of themselves, they have control over themselves and their actions, and to that extent they are responsible for what they do. For this reason, they are held to standards both by themselves and by other human beings. In a word, we have here the basis for those distinctively human and personal realities which are morality and law.

IV. Not the Exercise of Intelligence

Nevertheless, most people (certainly all who are in a universe of moral discourse with me) will allow that persons exist even when they are not exercising intellectual activity. Human beings may be asleep. They may be unconscious; they may even be in prolonged coma. They may be newborn or they may be old and senile. They may be retarded or they may be insane. Still, most other people will correctly see them as continuing persons and will accord them rights, even though they will not ask them to assume duties. Personhood is thus in everyday practice acknowledged as remaining even in the absence of intellectual activity. Most certainly, a person is regarded not as that activity itself (except in an indefensibly counter-intuitive "stream of consciousness" view of personhood), but rather as *the enduring subject and source* of such activity. Concretely, a person is the continuing "self" which is the source of intellectual activity. This self, even when it is not exercising intellectual activity, is still, from its capacity or potency to give rise to such activity, correctly and commonly said to be of intellectual nature.

V. Nature and Person

Reflecting on our own experience of ourselves, we are all aware that this one same self which is the abiding subject and source of our intellectual activity is also the subject and source of our bodily activities as well. This is to say, right now, each of us experiences

himself or herself to be one thing and one substrate source of both intellectual and bodily activity. We experience this now and we also remember it from past experience. This is why we accept responsibility not just for our past and present thoughts but also for our freely chosen bodily actions. This is also why we hold others responsible for all their free activity, both past and present.

Involved with this are at least five concepts. The first is "nature", the enduring source of a thing's activity, what Aristotle describes as "the essence of things which have in themselves, as such, a principle of activity."⁸ The second is the common sense, Scholastic notion that an essence or a nature can be (at least in part) known and named from its activity inasmuch as "acting follows upon being" (*agere sequitur esse*).⁹ Third is the realization that although human activity is varied, especially as regards physical and mental, it all traces back to one substrate source, which is the self. Fourth is the ordinary practice of defining things from their highest activity, e.g., plants from vegetative life or animals from sensation. Connected with all four of these is yet a fifth: that definition of "person" which is of oldest continuous standing in the Western (and world) philosophical tradition. Going back to Boethius (d. ca. 525 A.D.), this describes a person as "an individual substance of rational nature."¹⁰

VI. Unity Entailing Continuity and a Harder Question

Immediately based upon the underlying unity of the self, which we can experience, there is a continuity between our intelligence and sensation. Plato¹¹ and Descartes¹² notwithstanding, all human intellectual activity begins and ends in sensation. While sensation and intellection are not identical, we human beings never have thought without sensation.¹³ On its face, that may seem plausible enough, particularly to people of Aristotelian or more broadly empirical bent. But the really hard question, the one which immediately touches the reality and the value of the unborn, including the zygote in a petri dish, the newborn, the profoundly retarded, the Alzheimer's patient, and others, is in the opposite direction. Can we ever have properly human sensation, or properly human organic activity, without intelligence?

My first reply is affirmative. Yes, if we mean without the actual exercise of intelligence. Examples could be multiplied. I have already

spoken of persons asleep or in coma. Think beyond that only for a moment about your own digestive functions, which are right now human and going on without your being in control of them or even for the most part aware of them.

But can we ever have properly human sensation or organic activity without the presence of the enduring subject and source of intellectual activity? The answer to this is decidedly negative! Not as long as we are talking about *human* organic activity. The bottom line is this: In a human being there is only one enduring subject and source of all of its activity. And that subject is properly called "intellectual" from the highest activity to which it can give rise.

VII. Not an Angel on a Motorcycle

Now if at present we are just one single thing and if that single thing, which is our "self", is of intellectual nature, the fact is that we have always been that same one thing. There is not now, nor was there ever in the past, any evidence to suggest that we are or have been two things -- a kind of angel (a pure intelligence) riding a motorcycle (a body).

Continuing with an imperfect analogy, let me observe that immediate, present experience indicates that any imagined angel and motorcycle would be facets of one and the same nature, self, or person. Right now, even when we are not showing the "angelic" side of our nature, it is nevertheless present in the reality of "the motorcycle". In fact, that presence, through the unitary self, is what ultimately makes the living human organism different from a motorcycle or from any other machine.

But staying with the analogy, sputtering though it is, let me say that it is beyond dispute that the "motorcycle" (that is the body which each of us now *is* [and not just *has*]) existed intact before the exercise of angel-like intellection. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that it was the exact same identical motorcycle that it is now. More properly, this is to say that a single same whole organism, recognizable as biologically human, existed prior to any exercise of intellectual activity and continues to exist now.

Furthermore, it is this same whole organism which is now in each of us to be identified as the unitary subject and source of all

human activities, organic, sensitive, and intellectual. In sum, we ourselves, our same still imperfect selves, have existed continuously from our conception, the first moment of our organic existence, right up to the present time. And if we are persons now, we have always been persons. We have indeed always been, basically if not phenomenally, the same imperfect persons we are now.

Once again, what this means is that the one underlying subject of all our present activities, intellectual and sensitive, as well as merely organic, existed from the beginning even though we were not then -- as we are not now -- acting in every way we ever would act. Looked at from a slightly different angle, none of us has ever been any other kind of thing from what we are now. Right now we are persons. Right now we are individuals of a certain nature, which from its highest manifestation is properly called rational or intellectual. We have never been anything else. We have never been radishes, turnips, fish, monkeys, or mere "protoplasm." From our conception we have been human, which is to say, our own human selves and nothing but our human selves.

VII. Alternative Thoughts

Were one to think otherwise, for example, that at some time after the motorcycle was fully made or manufactured, some angel person came to ride it, the obvious question would be, where did it come from? Or by what agency did it come? Evidently not from the previously existing body, for in this view that body (like the motorcycle) would be of a different and inferior nature from the person who (like the angel) would come to ride it. Not from the air surely? Perhaps from God? I for one would not deny God's power to intervene in His creation. But, employing Ockham's razor,¹⁴ I think it unreasonable to multiply such interventions without necessity. I further find it hard to suppress a wry smile at the thought that in the advent (perhaps at birth?) of every human person there is a Divine intervention *of this character*. Could that be something known, say, only to advocates of partial birth abortions?

I think this unlikely. While I have no problem with God's intervention in the creation of each human person, I see no reason to understand it as putting a quasi-angel into an already fully formed body.

Instead, the facts point in another direction. For from the moment of its conception, in truth, a living human organism of a single nature builds itself up in myriads of ways, psychically as well as organically. This buildup essentially from within, if it is otherwise unimpeded, will culminate in intellectual and also affective activity. Indeed, it will culminate in all the personal activity, and more besides, of which I spoke earlier.

Returning to our admittedly poor analogy of an angel riding a motorcycle, let me make one more point. All too frequently, a view which regards personhood as coming at some later stage of development fails to distinguish between the growth of any living organism and the fabrication of a machine. Organisms grow from within, machines are fabricated from outside. To follow this, one need only contrast the coming to be of a rose from its bud with the coming to be of, say, a clock, part after part from without.

The important fact, once more, is that all human growth, including bodily as well as intellectual development, inasmuch as it is the growth from within of a single self of intellectual nature, is at every stage from conception on, beyond any reasonable doubt, personal. The distillate from all of this is that persons exist at all stages of human development. Likewise, persons exist at all stages of human decline. Moreover, at all stages, just as little persons do not differ in kind from big persons and young persons do not differ in kind from old persons, their value is not different in kind. Concurrently, their rights should not differ in basic kind.¹⁵ This is so even though obviously they will and they must differ in degree and in accord with persons' conditions and circumstances.

IX. In Vitro Fertilization

Returning now to in vitro fertilization, including the cloning of human beings, the basic question is whether it is morally right to bring a person into existence by such a procedure. Before answering, let me first explain that I have no qualms about bringing lower animals, Dolly for instance, into existence in this or a comparable way. Lacking the activities and characteristics enumerated above, such animals are not persons. Contrary to the prevailing *Zeitgeist*, they have no rights¹⁶ and I see no problem about their being used as means for someone else's

end.¹⁷ The question is about using persons -- ends in themselves and never simply means. Is it morally right to bring them into existence in the isolation of a petri dish?

In this connection, I want specially to note that the issue of isolation relates to the question of the natural character of human society, starting with the inherently social character of natural procreation and the nuclear family itself. Alone in its earliest state, whose child will or should the zygote in vitro be? Who should be responsible for it? Who immediately should assume the task of caring for it, and later educating it? These are not idle questions. They relate to the reality of a human person, which would be present in vitro.

X. Worst Case Scenarios

If we are talking about the simple, detached, objective laboratory production of a zygote, it might seem that none of these questions would arise. The isolation mentioned might simply be accepted, or even required by proper scientific and experimental practices. But then, of course, the fundamental issue would remain: can it be morally acceptable to reduce the human person to a mere thing, a simple laboratory specimen? The answer should by now be plain. "Science without conscience can only lead to man's ruin."¹⁸ And: "No biologist or doctor can reasonably claim, by virtue of his scientific competence, to be able to decide on people's origin and destiny."¹⁹

If we are talking about a zygote or embryo in vitro, which is made to be manipulated, to be frozen and thawed, to be bought and sold, for the benefit of others, again questions relate to the reality of a human person. At a minimum we can say that the responsibilities of others are not clearly assigned. But more than this, it would be a patent understatement to say that for such embryos very important things, which go right to the core of human personhood, as well as to person-to-person relationships, would be lacking. And that lack could only be seen as an injustice committed against incipient persons.²⁰

XI. Cloning and a Best Case Scenario

But now consider a futuristic human cloning in which only a single progenitor would be involved, a progenitor claiming an absolute

right to his body and to his own replication. Or again consider, what is perhaps a best case²¹ -- a man and wife, respectively contributing sperm and ovum, no donors, no surrogates (paid or unpaid), no experimentation, no freezing, and with implantation of every zygote in the wife's womb. What moral objection could anyone have in either case?

Utilitarians would probably have none. Indeed, strong utilitarians would have few or no objections to even the worst cases. For them the end result of happy, fulfilled, parents or progenitors would justify almost any means. For non-utilitarian moralists, however, especially those of natural law personalist variety, this kind of justification will not suffice. Good results or increased happiness alone will not justify some action which is morally unacceptable to begin with.

The exact question then is: in an instance of human cloning, or even in the best case scenario, is IVF morally right or wrong? And whichever it is, for what precise reason is it so? My first inclination is to reply that it would still be morally wrong, for the reason that the offspring would be exposed most likely (or even if only possibly) to increased risk of physical harm, as compared to a normally conceived child, and this would be not for its own benefit (unlike risk in other medical interventions) but primarily, if not exclusively, for the benefit of others.

This, of course, relates to the development of IVF techniques and issues which can be separated from IVF itself -- such as the destruction of imperfect or superfluous zygotes prior to implantation, or the abortion of others after successful implantings, or the intent to abort imperfect fetuses, or any concomitant fetal experimentation. But suppose, as in the just mentioned best case, that all these things would be behind us (in contrast with the days of Steptoe and Edwards squashing and flushing their rejects or the 276 failures before the advent of Dolly²²). Could we then simply sit back and enjoy the benefits of in vitro fertilization without any moral issue arising?

I think not. That is, not if we are going to take our moral bearings from a real natural order, which exists anterior to any action of ours. There is still the physical separation from parents for the in vitro offspring. That has to be seen as something not natural, and as thus entailing a burden of justification -- inasmuch as we are talking not

about the production of an animal but of a person. Moreover, that justification cannot be offered in terms of the benefit that is in the action for others; persons are never simply for the benefit of others. Nor do even married parents, much less any others in the bizarre generation of clones, possess an absolute right to have children.²³

But neither can justification be offered (for a present IVF procedure) in terms of future benefits which may accrue to the still non-existent person to be conceived *in vitro*. To clarify this, let me say that "the still non-existent person" relates to its status prior to conception. For after conception has occurred, even though there is no manifestation of the higher activities we associate with persons, nevertheless, because of the enduring unitary reality of every human being, personhood is present. The point, made above, is that experience does not support a dualist conception of a human being. The body, from its inception, is part of the one human being and shares in human personal reality.

XII. Natural Law and Biology

Something to emphasize here is the nuanced connection between the natural law and biology. We must avoid an excessive "biologism" of the sort implied in the ancient Stoic conception of natural law as a kind of attunement with nature at large.²⁴ But at the same time, even as we stress the personal character of natural law and morality, we should remember that personal for human beings includes corporeal. Because of this, and to avoid some sort of entirely notional conception of morality, we cannot be indifferent to the kind of markers of what is natural versus unnatural which biology furnishes. While we do not want to reduce personal to biological, we also do not want to oppose them. A person is not an angel enclosed in an impersonal, ultimately mechanistic, and inimical body.

This last goes back even to the question of the separation of the unitive and procreative aspects of human generation which is involved in *in vitro* fertilization.²⁵ While stress on both aspects together may seem to some to be "biologistic", if one looks at the matter from the viewpoint of a unified human nature, the biological norm -- far from being extrinsically introduced from some impersonal objective realm of science -- becomes an intrinsic, and personal, guide to what is

natural versus unnatural.

Returning then to the original remark I made in class, a central problem I have with all in vitro fertilization is that in its rejection of biological norms, its separation of the unitive and procreative aspects of human generation, its necessary isolation of the child from a mother and father, its consideration of the child only or primarily in view of others' purposes or desires, it has arbitrarily established a new relationship between the child and its progenitors. Floating free from any biological norm, the progenitors of an in vitro human being assume a dominance over it, and the natural order of which it is a part, which is closer to that of a creator over its creature than to that of a parent over his child. For their own greater glory, they are acting as to imply that they are owners of the in vitro person in a way that no natural parent owns his child. Even in the absence of "studies" of later behavior of parents toward their born children, the point I was making is that the relationship itself has radically changed. And no one can be indifferent to this change when questions of morality arise.

XIII. Finally

A final point is this. If one can ignore biological markers at the start of life, if one can replace them at will, and with that assert the dominance of one's own will over the natural order, why cannot the same be done at the end of life? If one has total freedom to effect the advent of a zygote, apart from any natural order, why would one not have the same freedom a moment later to effect its demise? If there's nothing in the nature of things to constrain or limit the will to power at the first moment, what can be said against squashing and flushing "rejects" at any subsequent moment? Indeed, what can be said against anyone with power simply using it to eliminate any other person at any stage of development?

Perhaps you will reply that while I may be free in the first moment I am not equally free in the next, because by my action I have assumed a new responsibility. Analogous situations can be imagined. Thus I may be free to marry or not to marry, but once I marry I am no longer simply free to leave my wife. I would answer, why not? For without some appeal to a nature of things (involving biological realities as norms), I would seem to be quite free. I can at will take something

or leave it, which is in fact exactly where many (most?) people are with respect to marriage and other moral realities. In this, however, against their own better nature, they are living by the maxim of tyrants: "let my will suffice for a reason" (*sit pro ratione voluntas mea*).²⁶

References

1. Cf. I. Wilmut, A.E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A.J. Kind and K.H.S. Campbell, "Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells," *Nature*, vol 385, n. 6619 (February 27, 1997), pp. 810-813; and Colin L. Stewart, "An Udder Way of Making Lambs," *ibid.*, pp. 769-771. In the aftermath of Dolly, the words of the *Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith* ("Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation" [hereafter: "Instruction ..."], *Origins*, XVI, n. 40 (March 19, 1987), p. 710) are most relevant: "The spread of technologies of intervention in the processes of human procreation raises very serious moral problems in relation to the respect due to the human being from the moment of conception, to the dignity of the person, of his or her sexuality and of the transmission of life."
2. Cf. "From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a new life is begun which is neither that of the father nor of the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would never be made human if it were not human already." "Instruction ...," p. 701.
3. In line with this, at one of the great progress points in the moral consciousness of the human race, Francisco de Vitoria, O.P. [d. 1546] -- arguably the founder of International Law -- attested to the humanity of the American Indians, and their rights *vis à vis* the Spaniards, by pointing to such achievements; cf. "Reflection on the American Indians (*De Indis*)," I, 6, in *Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings*, ed. by Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 250.
4. See Plato, *Apology*, 38A, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, tr. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), I, 420.
5. On the natural character of religion among human beings, cf. Vitoria, "Reflection I: On the Power of the Church" (*De Potestate Ecclesiae prior*), q. 4, a. 2, in Pagden and Lawrance, p. 75.
6. Cf. *Protrepticus*, fr. 50, 1483b 29, 42; 1484a 2, 8, 18.
7. Cf. I. Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, tr. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 47.

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8. *Metaphysics* V, 1015a 13-15.

9. Cf., e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 79; III, cc. 42, 69, and 85.

10. Cf. *Contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, in *Patrologia Latina*, 64, cols. 1343-5.

11. "All learning is remembering." *Meno*, 81 D, tr. B. Jowett, I, p. 360.

12. Cf. his famous "I think, therefore I am." *Discours de la Méthode*, IV^{ième} Part., ed. Étienne Gilson (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1947), p. 32; and *Meditationes de prima philosophia* II, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis (Paris: Vrin, 1966), p. 25.

13. On this, cf. "... the mind's knowledge has its origin in sensation, not because some sense apprehends everything which the mind knows, but because from what the senses know the mind is led to things beyond, in a way that sensible things even lead the mind to understanding the things of God." St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 6, ad 2.

14. "It is pointless to do with more what can be done with less." (*Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora.*); for a recent article on the character of razor and its use by Ockham, cf. Armand Maurer, "Ockham's Razor and Dialectical Reasoning," *Medieval Studies*, 58 (1996), pp. 49-65.

15. Cf. "In his unique and irrepeatable origin, the child must be respected and recognized as equal in personal dignity to those who give him life." "Instruction ...," p. 706; and: "... the dignity and equality that must be common to parents and children." *ibid.*, p. 707.

16. Which is to say that we do not owe duties to them, but not to say that we have no duties that regard them.

17. On this, cf., e.g., St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 96, aa. 1-2 and *In Sent.* II, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3.

18. "Instruction ...," p. 699.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 700.

20. Cf., e.g.: "The child has the right to be conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up within marriage." "Instruction ...," p. 704.

22. Cf. Michael Specter with Gina Kolata, "After Decades and Many Missteps, Cloning Success, *The New York Times* (March 3, 1997), p. A9.

23. Cf. "... marriage does not confer upon the spouses the right to have a child, but only the right to perform those natural acts which are per se ordered to procreation. A true and proper right to a child would be contrary to the child's dignity and nature. The child is not an object to which one has a right nor can he be considered as an object of ownership." "Instruction ...," p. 708.

24. For some of this, cf. Richard Wollheim, "Natural Law," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), V, p. 451; and John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 374-8.

25. Cf. "The church's teaching on marriage and human procreation affirms the 'inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning.' Contraception deliberately deprives the conjugal act of its openness to procreation and in this way brings about a voluntary dissociation of the ends of marriage. Homologous artificial fertilization, in seeking a procreation which is not the fruit of a specific act of conjugal union, objectively effects an analogous separation between the goods and meaning of marriage." "Instruction ...," pp. 705-706.

26. Cf. Juvenal, *Satires*, VI, I. 223.