ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: TO CAMPAIGN, PROTEST, OR TAKE UP
ARMS: ETHNIC MINORITY STRATEGIES
UNDER THE SHADOW OF ETHNIC
MAJORITY FRAGMENTATION

Agatha Skierkowski Hultquist
Doctor of Philosophy, 2019

Dissertation directed by: Professor Johanna K. Birnir
Department of Government and Politics

Why do some ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence to achieve their political goals, whereas others eschew force and engage in nonviolence or take part in elections? The literature leads us to expect that the more fragmented the ethnic minority group is, the more likely it is that ethnopolitical minority organizations will use violence against the state. Ethnopolitical minority organizations, however, vary considerably in their strategies.

To explain this puzzle, I argue that an under-explored factor - fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the state - affects how minority organizations select their strategies. Using two original measures of majority fragmentation in combination with existing data on minority strategies in Sri Lanka for 1960-2005, I find that ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use violence when fragmentation within the political majority is relatively low and more likely to engage in nonviolence or to participate in electoral politics when majority

fragmentation is relatively high. I also determine that minority organizations are more likely to use mixed strategies of electoral politics and violence and violence and nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases. Finally, I find that majorities are more likely to outbid in positions and policies against minorities when minorities use violence than nonviolence. These results demonstrate that the shadow of majority group fragmentation impacts the nonviolent and violent strategies of ethnic minorities, and introduce a new avenue for research on the role of ethnicity in conflict processes.

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by

Agatha Skierkowski Hultquist

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2019

Advisory Committee:
Professor Johanna K. Birnir, Chair/Advisor
Associate Professor Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham
Professor Ernesto Calvo
Professor Paul Huth
Professor Laura Dugan (Dean's Representative)

Dedication

To C, E, and S.

Acknowledgments

There are many people without whom this dissertation would not have not have possible. First, I'd like to thank my advisor, Hanna Birnir, for her unwavering support. I am extremely thankful to have found a mentor and friend who has provided me with so much guidance, advice, and kindness; I have grown tremendously under her tutelage. I'd also like to thank Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Paul Huth, Ernesto Calvo, and Laura Dugan for their valuable feedback and support on this project. I also benefited greatly from comments about the project from Isabella Alcaniz, Kanisha Bond, Scott Kastner, John McCauley, and Joel Simmons. Second, I am grateful for the friendships that I made throughout graduate school with Kimberly Wilson, Mary Kate Schneider, Emma Cutrufello, and others that continue until today. I am indebted to my parents, Urszula Szych-Skierkowski and Bogdan Skierkowski, for supporting and encouraging me to work toward realizing my aspirations, not only for this particular project, but throughout all my life. My sister, Dorothy Skierkowksi-Foster, has been a great source of laughter, commiseration, and encouragement. And lastly, I want to thank my husband, Chuck, for his unwavering support and encouragement throughout this process, and my daughter, Erika, and her yet to arrive little sister, for inspiring and reminding me about what is truly important .

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List of Abbreviations

ACTC	All Ceylon Tamil Congress
CDP	Ceylon Democratic Party
CWC	Ceylon Workers' Congress
CP	Communist Party
DLF	Democratic Left Front
DUNF	Democratic United National Front
EDP	Eelavar Democratic Front
ENLF	Eelam National Liberation Front
EPDP	Eelam People's Democratic Party
EPRLF	Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
EMFI	Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index
EMSI	Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index
FP	Federal Party
HMF	High Majority Fragmentation
JHU	Jathika Hela Urumaya
JVP	Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
LSSP	Lanka Sama Samanja Party
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LTTE-Karuna	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Karuna faction
LMF	Low Majority Fragmentation
MEP	Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
NLF	National Liberal Front
NLF	National Liberation Front
NUO	Nationalities Unity Organization
PFLT	People's Front of Liberation Tigers
PLOTE	People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
SBP	Sinhala Basha Peramuna
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party

SLFSP	Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party
SLMC	Sri Lankan Muslim Congress
TCC	Tamil Coordinating Committee
TELA	Tamil Eelam Liberation Army
TELO	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TNA	Tamil National Alliance
TNA	Tamil National Alliance
TUF	Tamil United Front
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front
UF	United Front
UNP	United National Party
VLSSP	Viplawakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party

Chapter 1:   Introduction

1.1   The Puzzle

Why do some ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence to achieve their political goals whereas others eschew force and employ non-violence or engage in conventional politics? The literature leads us to expect that the more fragmented the ethnic minority group is, the more likely it is that ethnic organizations will use violence against the government (Cunningham et al. 2012; Cunningham 2014). Empirically, however, we see that ethnopolitical minority organizations within fragmented minority groups just as often use non-violence or conventional politics to achieve their strategic goals.

For example, in Sri Lanka, Tamil ethnopolitical minority organizations varied considerably in their use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence, despite high levels of minority group fragmentation (Bush 2003). The same variation in strategies can be found in other fragmented ethnic minority groups, sucht as the Chechens in Russia, the Basques and the Catalans in Spain, the Palestinians in Israel, the Albanians in Serbia, the East Timorese in Indonesia, and the Kashmiri Muslims in India (Cunningham 2014; Cunningham et al 2017). Most recently, Hamas, an ethnic Palestinian organization that has engaged in armed conflict against the Israeli state,

supported and participated in massive protests along the Israel-Gaza strip border (Alsoos 2018). These examples illustrate the puzzle that motivates this research - why do ethnopolitical minorities vary in using violence, nonviolence, and electoral politics to achieve their strategic goals?

1.2   Gaps in the Literature

To understand this puzzle, I argue that while the effects of fragmentation have been studied extensively for disadvantaged ethnic minorities, the same attention has not been paid to an equally important actor - ethnic groups that control the government.[1] Ethnic groups that control the government, like the Serbs in Serbia, Bosniaks in Bosnia, Jews in Israel, Tutsis in Burundi, and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, may be represented by many parties that compete for the same ethnic base of support. Although these groups may be just as fragmented and competitive as the ethnic minorities that they govern, they are generally assumed to be unitary.

I argue that this is problematic, since it is reasonable to expect that fragmentation *within* the dominant ethnic group impacts the strategic choices of minority organizations as they bargain with the government. Indeed, Cunningham (2011) notes that "states, rebel groups, political parties, economic classes, and religious groups have all been treated as unitary - with unified preferences and strategies. Yet there is no reason to believe that internal divisions should be less important among these actors than they are among [self-determination] movements" (295).

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[1]Ethnic political majority groups are defined as ethnic groups that control the executive branch of government and are politically dominant relative to other ethnic groups in the country. Ethnic political majorities may be large or small in population size.

Bakke et al. 2012 echo this contention. In spite of this, to my knowledge no studies have unpacked the unitary actor assumption for ethnic groups that control the government.

1.3   The Contribution

This study contributes to a fundamental question in the literature - why do some organizations use violence to pursue their political goals whereas others choose nonviolence or electoral politics? In contrast to much of the literature, which focuses on the role of ethnic factors within minority groups or state-level factors, I show that *ethnic factors* within *the state* influence minority strategies. In doing so, this project demonstrates the value in unpacking the unitary actor assumption for majority groups and suggests a new avenue for research on how ethnicity in both political minorities *and* political majorities affects conflict processes.

This project makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. First, research shows that peace, and not conflict, among ethnic groups is the norm (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Birnir et al. 2016). However, most studies focus on one side of the ethnic relations coin - violence - without examining the far more common other side - non-violence. By focusing on the conflict-promoting effect of fragmentation, the literature does not explore how it also may have a complementary conflict-mitigating impact. This leads to a one-sided understanding of the violent and/or nonviolent strategies that ethnic organizations employ. My dissertation demonstrates how fragmentation within majority groups not only affects the choice of minority orga-

nizations to use violence, but also impacts their decisions to take part in electoral politics or use nonviolence.

Second, although studies have found that governments negotiate differently with ethnic groups that are highly fragmented versus those that are not (Cunningham 2011, 2014), no works to date have explored how fragmentation within *ethnic groups that control the government* affects the strategic interactions of ethnic minority organizations. By expanding the theoretical lens to include ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities, this project provides a new theoretical framework for understanding ethnic group fragmentation and demonstrates empirically with new data how it can be conflict mitigating, rather than conflict inducing.

Third, this project generates an original dataset on majority fragmentation. In spite of the fact that ethnic majority groups may be just as fragmented as ethnic minorities, existing datasets focus on ethnic minority organizations only. This project brings ethnic majority groups into the analysis and develops two original ethnic fragmentation variables - one based on roll call votes collected during field work in Sri Lanka and the other based on ethnic majority party seat share - that capture ethnic fragmentation in a novel way. Although there is a rich tradition in political science of employing roll call data to ascertain preferences (Clinton et al. 2004; Pool and Rosenthal 1997; Reed et al. 2008; Voeten 2004; Voeten and Rosenthal 2004), utilizing roll call data to study fragmentation dynamics in ethnic conflict processes constitutes a novel approach.

Fourth, the findings from this project have implications for an emerging trend in Europe and elsewhere - the rise of nationalist parties. Although previous research

has shown that majority groups, at least in Eastern Europe (Stroschein 2012), have not ethnically mobilized, recent events throughout Europe and the Middle East suggest that this trend may be changing to some extent. For instance, within the past few years, Europe has seen a rise in nationalist and far-right parties in several countries, including Italy, Germany, Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland (BBC 2018, Brookings 2018, NYT 2016). In Israel, the parliament recently voted that the right of national self-determination is "unique to the Jewish people," in essence declaring that Israel is privileging its Jewish identity over its identity as a democratic state for Jews and minorities alike (Fisher 2018).

While nationalist parties in Europe have made electoral gains, they have not reached the same level of political support as mainstream parties. If they do, however, and they dominate politics by becoming the main parties that represent an increasingly ethnically mobilized majority group, my theory predicts that this may have detrimental effects on minority-majority relations.

1.4   The Project

I address this gap by unpacking the unitary actor assumption for ethnic groups that control the state and developing and testing a theory for how fragmentation within them conditions the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use violence, nonviolence, or conventional politics.

1.4.1 The Theory

The theory builds on but expands the "dual contest" theoretical framework in the ethnic fragmentation literature (Cunningham et al. 2012). Per this framework, factions within ethnic minorities compete with the government for public goods for their own ethnic group (i.e., the first contest at the inter-ethnic group level) and factions within ethnic minorities compete with each other for club and private goods for their own faction (i.e., the second contest at the intra-ethnic group level). This project expands this framework by introducing a "third contest" - the level of fragmentation within the *ethnic group that controls the state.*

I contend that fragmentation within political majority groups shapes the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of minority organizations as they decide how to achieve their strategic goals through electoral politics, nonviolence, violence, or a mix of these strategies. Since each strategy requires a different set of resources in order to be used successfully, I expect that majority fragmentation conditions minority choices through three different mechanisms.

Low majority fragmentation results in an increased use of violence by minority organizations because unlike the case of high majority fragmentation, it is less likely to trigger costly outbidding within the majority group that can lead the government to increase its resolve and become harder to defeat or coerce into concessions with force. In contrast, high majority fragmentation leads to an increased use of electoral politics or nonviolence because there are far more opportunities for minority organizations to serve as coalition partners or to leverage elite divisions with non-

violence than during low majority fragmentation. Subsequently, as summarized in Table 1.1 below, I expect that when majorities are minimally fragmented, minority organizations are more likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics and the opposite to obtain during periods of high majority fragmentation.

Table 1.1: Minority single strategies conditional on majority fragmentation

	Minority Violence	Minority Nonviolence	Minority Electoral Politics
LMF	More likely	Less likely	Less likely
HMF	Less likely	More likely	More likely

To explicate further, when minority organizations use violence, their actions are likely to trigger outbidding - *a shift toward more extreme positions and/or policies toward minority organizations* - by ethnic parties within the majority group.[2] When majority fragmentation is low, however, outbidding is less likely to change the governing party's policies toward the minority or its costs for using violence against it, since the governing party's competitors are relatively weak and outbidding among them is not likely to sway the governing party into changing its position.

On the other hand, when majority fragmentation is relatively high, outbidding by strong co-ethnic competitors can motivate the governing party to outbid as well in order to remain competitive. When the governing party outbids, its costs for using violence against the minority decrease, making it harder to defeat or coerce into concessions. Since a minority organization is already likely to be weaker

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[2]When discussing my theory, I use the term outbidding to refer to cases when majority parties outbid in positions and/or policies vis-a-vis the minority group. In cases where I focus on just one of these factors, I refer to it by name (i.e., outbidding in positions or outbidding in policies). Otherwise, I use the term "outbidding" as shorthand for outbidding in positions and/or policies.

than the governing party, it will be more likely to use violence under low majority fragmentation, when the prospects for triggering a costly cycle of outbidding in the majority are reduced.

Majority fragmentation affects the costs and benefits of using nonviolence or participating in electoral politics through a different set of mechanisms.[3] When majority fragmentation is high, there are more divisions for minorities to leverage and because many majority parties are relatively strong, there is a greater chance that shifting the loyalties of these parties can weaken the governing party and coerce it into offering concessions. Likewise, minority organizations can take advantage of divisions among majority parties to serve as coalition partners for a governing party that is weakened by co-ethnic competition. Under low majority fragmentation, in contrast, there are fewer divisions to leverage and limited opportunities to serve a coalition partner.

For the choice to use mixed strategies, I argue that majority fragmentation conditions the choice of organizations to take part in elections and use nonviolence in the same year in the same way that it affects the choice to use these strategies separately. However, there are two pathways through which majority fragmentation can condition the choice of minorities to use violence and nonviolence in the same year. On the one hand, minority organizations may be more likely to use this mixed strategy when majority fragmentation is low because it is less likely to

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[3]Triggering outbidding in the majority group is less of a concern for nonviolence or electoral politics, since these strategies are less threatening than violence. Instead, minority organizations focus on a different set of opportunities. To use nonviolence, minority organizations need to leverage elite divisions and engender loyalty shifts to strip away support from the government. For electoral politics to be effective, minority organizations need to have legislative access and policymaking power.

trigger outbidding and because nonviolence can be used to signal the organization's strength and mobilization capabilities to the government, which can increase the organization's ability to exact concessions. On the other hand, a minority organization may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is high because it can limit the fallout of outbidding by avoiding targeting moderates, thereby allowing it to continue using nonviolence to leverage existing divisions. These expectations are summarized in Table 1.2, below.

Table 1.2: Minority mixed strategies conditional on majority fragmentation

	Minority elections & nonviolence	Minority violence & nonviolence
LMF	More likely	Less likely OR More likely
HMF	Less likely	More likely OR Less likely

Finally, I argue that majorities respond to the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use in distinct ways. Since violence is more threatening that nonviolence, majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence. In addition, I contend that majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when they are highly fragmented.

1.4.2 Testing the Theory

To test the theory, I used a mixed method approach. The quantitative portion consists a longitudinal analysis of ethnopolitical minority organization strategies from 1960-2005 in Sri Lanka that uses an original measure of majority fragmentation based on roll call voting data collected during field work in Sri Lanka, a secondary original measure of majority fragmentation based on party seat share, and existing

data on minority strategies. I focus on the organization-year as the unit of analysis since I am interested in examining how variation in majority fragmentation conditions the strategies that minority organizations use over time. I also use the roll call data from Sri Lanka to examine whether majority parties are more likely to outbid when minority organizations use violence than nonviolence and whether majorities are more likely to outbid when they are highly fragmented.

To complement the quantitative study, I test the causal mechanisms of the theory with a process-tracing analysis of two periods of relatively low and high majority fragmentation in Sri Lanka. This analysis includes interviews with local experts and representatives of political parties conducted during fieldwork in Sri Lanka, as well as secondary sources from the comparative politics literature on Sri Lanka.

I focus on Sri Lanka because fragmentation within the group that controls the government - the Sinhalese - varies considerably over time, as does the use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence by ethnopolitical minority organizations. Moreover, having experienced a civil war from 1983-2009, Sri Lanka has been studied extensively. As such, I can control for many of the variables that have been found to affect the long-standing conflict between the Tamils and Sinhalese while also examining the role of an understudied but important factor - majority fragmentation. In both the quantitative and qualitative analyses, I find strong support for the theory.

1.5 The Organization of the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews and outlines two gaps in the ethnic politics and conflict literatures. First, although ethnic majority groups may be as highly fragmented as ethnic minorities, they are generally assumed to be unitary. This is problematic, since it is reasonable to expect that fragmentation within majority groups impacts the strategic actions of minority organizations. Second, although recent studies have shown that ethnic competition and outbidding within groups can be moderated by institutions, the literature has not examined how another factor - the actions of the opposing ethnic group itself - may affect outbidding dynamics within ethnic groups.

Chapter 3 describes the theory guiding the project. First, I describe the main actors - majority parties and minority organizations - what minority organizations advocate for, and how they pursue their political objectives. Thereafter, I describe how I conceptualize majority fragmentation to vary along three dimensions - the preferences of parties, the relative power of the majority government, and the relative power of the majority opposition. Next, I describe how this variation in majority fragmentation changes the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of minority organizations as they decide how to pursue their goals. I then develop hypotheses about how minority organizations select their strategies under relatively low and high levels of majority fragmentation. Finally, I develop hypotheses about how majority fragmentation impacts the likelihood that majority groups respond to minority violence with outbidding.

Chapter 4 details the quantitative and qualitative data and methods used to test the hypotheses outlined in the preceding chapter. Specifically, it consists of a longitudinal analysis of ethnopolitical minority organization strategies from 1960-2005 in Sri Lanka, using an original measure of majority fragmentation based on roll call voting data collected during field work in Sri Lanka, a secondary original measure of majority fragmentation based on party seat share, and existing data on minority strategies. I also use the roll call data from Sri Lanka in an analysis to examine whether majority parties are more likely to outbid when minority organizations use violence than nonviolence and whether majorities are more likely to outbid when they are highly fragmented.

Chapter 5 presents the results of the quantitative analysis and discusses its implications. In this chapter, I explore how majority fragmentation conditions the likelihood that minority organizations (1) use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence only and (2) engage in a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence. I focus on these two mixed strategies because they are used far more frequently than other types of mixed strategies.[4] I also explore whether (3) majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence and nonviolence and whether outbidding is more likely when majorities are highly fragmented.

To complement the quantitative analysis, Chapter 6 focuses on a qualitative

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[4]According to the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), which codes yearly information on electoral participation, nonviolence, and violence for 1,124 ethnopolitical organizations in 77 countries from 1960 - 2005, a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence was used 11% of the time, followed by a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence, which was employed 10% of the time. In less than 1% of cases, minority organizations took part in elections and used violence or used all three strategies in the same year.

analysis of the Sri Lankan case. To test the causal mechanisms of the theory, I conduct a process-tracing analysis of two periods of relatively low and high majority fragmentation in Sri Lanka. For this analysis, I use secondary sources and interviews with local experts and political elites that I conducted during fieldwork in Sri Lanka. This chapter provides further support for the theory and sheds additional insights on the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies.

Chapter 7 concludes by revisiting the theoretical contributions, as well as the quantitative and qualitative findings. This chapter also discusses policy implications and several avenues for future research. In terms of future directions, I first describe how I test the theory beyond the Sri Lankan case with an original dataset on majority fragmentation in two regions of the world that are often associated with ethnic parties - Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. While more data is needed to fully test the generalizability of the argument, this analysis shows partial support for the theory.

Thereafter, I discuss other avenues for research, including how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of governments to repress, accommodate, or co-opt minority organizations, how majority fragmentation affects the choice of majority parties to reach across ethnic divides and invite minority organizations into their coalitions, especially in the context of ongoing ethnic conflicts, and how majority fragmentation impacts the choice of minority organizations to use the same strategy always or to switch strategies over time.

Chapter 2:   The Literature

2.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature that speaks to the puzzle motivating this dissertation - why do ethnopolitical minority organizations participate in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence to achieve their strategic goals? My theory explains how fragmentation within ethnically mobilized groups that control the state conditions the strategies that ethnopolitical minority organization use to achieve their political goals. This theory, which is novel in several ways, is grounded within and builds on the nonviolence, violence, and ethnic outbidding literatures. While the literature has generated considerable insights into how minority groups and organizations press their demands against the state and how outbidding dynamics affect minority-state interactions, there are two gaps in our understanding of how ethnicity affects minority-state interactions that this project seeks to fill.

First, although we know that ethnic-factors and state-level factors affect the strategies that minority organizations use, studies have yet to examine how *ethnic factors within the state* condition the strategies that minority organizations use. This is problematic, since fragmentation dynamics within political majority groups are likely to affect how minorities realize their political objectives. Second, while

studies have shown that ethnic fragmentation does not necessarily lead to outbidding in appeals, policies, or positions - instead, ethnic competition and outbidding can be moderated by institutions - scholars have not examined whether another factor affects outbidding in ethnic groups - *the actions of minority organizations themselves.* In this project, I address these gaps by developing a theory that explains how majority fragmentation conditions the strategies of minority organizations while also taking into how minority strategies affect outbidding dynamics within majority groups.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on how minority organizations select their strategies, focusing on the role that grievances and ideologies, resource mobilization capacities, and political opportunity structures play in these choices. I argue that while the literature has explored how ethnic-factors and state-level factors condition minority strategies, there is a need to address how *ethnic factors within the state* affect the strategies that minority organizations use. Next, I review the literature on ethnic outbidding, focusing on the classic model of ethnic outbidding and recent challenges and improvements to that model. Building on this latter work, I contend that outbidding is not only affected by institutions, but it is also impacted by *the strategies that minority organizations use.* Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of the literature and the gaps that this project fills.

2.2 Strategies of ethnopolitical minority organizations

What causes ethnopolitical organizations to pursue their goals through electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence? A substantial literature examines how organizations choose from a menu of strategies that includes elections, nonviolence, and violence. Generally, studies expect that organizations assess the costs and benefits of pursuing their goals via different strategies and choose the one that is less costly and more likely to succeed (Birnir 2007; Asal et al. 2013; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham et al. 2017).

Since elections operate within the realms of institutional politics, it is generally less costly for ethnopolitical minority organizations to campaign for office than to take to the streets in protest or to take up arms and fight (Cunningham 2013). Nonetheless, participating in elections is only beneficial if an organization can use electoral politics to realize its goals. If an organization is denied access to the legislature or executive, or if access does nothing to help advance its goals, nonviolence or violence are likely to become more attractive strategies.

Nonviolent resistance is "the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent" (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 271). To use nonviolence, organizations need to mobilize the masses, remain resilient against repression, and gain leverage by engendering loyalty shifts among opponents (Schock 2013). Leverage refers to "the capacity of a challenger to sever the opponent from the sources of power upon which it depends, either directly

or through allies or third parties" (Schock 2013, 283). Leverage is especially important for successful nonviolent resistance; indeed, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017) note that "elite divisions may provide one of the most important perceived opportunities for nonviolent mobilization, as this particular kind of division within the opponent may convince would-be participate that opposition leaders might respond to nonviolent appeals but reunite with the regime if confronted with arms" (309).

Violent resistance relies on direct coercion through attacks on a government or indirect coercion through attacks on civilians (Schock 2013, 283). Acts of violence can include sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla insurgency, or quasi-conventional or conventional warfare (Butler and Gates 2009; Dudouet 2013). To use violence, organizations need military capabilities to defeat the government outright or to inflict enough costs on a government or civilians to coerce concessions (Dahl et al. 2017; White et al. 2015). The ability to inflict costs is a function of an organization's military capabilities, and is approximately proportional to the number of troops, police officers, or civilians that die at the hands of an organization (Dahl et al. 2017). These capabilities include civilian support, recruits or people power, military technology, and revenue (Walter 2009).

There is a vast literature that examines how various ethnic minority-related and state-level factors shape the grievances and ideologies, resource mobilization capabilities, and political opportunity structures that motivate groups and organizations to participate in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence. These factors include political, economic, and cultural grievances; demands for political independence; exclusion from political power; gender and leftist ideologies;

domestic, transnational, and diaspora support; the size and geographic concentration of ethnic minority groups; the internal fragmentation of ethnic minority groups; the level of democracy and state capacity in the country; and government repression. Since this literature is so large, I do not review it completely here. Instead, I highlight examples of works that capture the theoretical expectations and empirical assessments about the role of grievances, resource mobilization capabilities, and political opportunity structures in the mobilization strategies of ethnic actors.

In general, grievances provide the *incentives* for minority organizations to take action, and include such factors as political, economic, and cultural discrimination, horizontal economic inequalities, lack of political access and exclusion, and repression. While earlier literature focused on whether grievances matter at all for rebellion (e.g., Cederman et al. 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), today, scholars accept that grievances, in combination with opportunities for mobilization, play an important role in nonviolent and violent action (Berdall 2005; Wolff 2007).

For instance, Cederman et al. (2013) find that horizontal political and economic inequalities affect ethnic conflict onset. Likewise, Birnir (2007) determines that lack of political access to the executive increases the likelihood that ethnic minority groups engage in violent rebellion, although access to government does not impact protest; instead, the larger the representation in the legislature, the lower the probability for protest. Cunningham 2013 shows that ethnic groups that advocate for independence or have economic grievances are more likely to engage in nonviolent campaigns or civil war than conventional politics, and that ethnic groups that

are excluded from power are more likely to be in a civil war than to pursue conventional politics. Studies have also found that mild repression of nonviolence increases the likelihood of nonviolence, whereas violent repression decreases it (Carey 2006; Davenport 2007; Francisco 2004).

In terms of ideologies, Asal et al. 2013 find that ethnopolitical organizations that espouse a gender inclusive ideology are more likely to engage in nonviolence and less likely to use violence or a mixed strategy of protest and violence. They also show that organizations that advocate a religious ideology are more likely to use a mixed strategy of protest and violence and that leftist organizations are more likely to use violence only.

Scholars also point to the role of *resource mobilization* capabilities in determining how ethnic minority groups and organizations press their demands (Collier and Sambanis 2002; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Resource mobilization arguments expect that mobilization takes place when groups and organizations have the human, financial, and informational resources to mobilize a vast population; the focus is on how people are willing and able to mobilize, how much support a group or organization receives from potential sponsors, and how much organizational capacity and skills it has to mobilize for action. Some of the factors that matter for resource mobilization arguments include group size, geographic concentration, transborder kin, diaspora support, and minority group fragmentation.

For example, studies have found that relatively large ethnic minority groups are more likely to use violence but less likely to engage in nonviolence (Cunningham 2013). Ethnic groups that are geographically concentrated are more likely to rebel

(Toft 2003) and less likely to use nonviolent campaigns (Cunningham 2013). Having transborder kin increases the likelihood that minority groups will engage in violence (Cederman et al. 2009), but has no effect on whether minorities use nonviolence (Cunningham 2013). Ethnopolitical minority organizations that receive support from diasporas are more likely to engage in nonviolence or use violence (Asal et al. 2013).

Fragmentation within ethnic minority groups also impacts strategic choices in a variety of ways. First, internal divisions within ethnic minorities create information and commitment problems that increase the likelihood that ethnic organizations use violence (Cunningham et al. 2012; Cunningham 2014). Second, the more fragmented the ethnic minority group, the more intense the competition among factions and the more likely it is that minority organizations will outbid and use violence against the state (Bloom 2004; Cunningham et al. 2012). Third, since the ability to mobilize people is required for large-scale nonviolent resistance (DeNardo 1985; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), the greater the number of active organizations, the greater the resource constraints on each organization. Subsequently, the greater the number of ethnic organizations that use a high resource intensive tactic, like protests or economic strikes, the more likely it is that an organization will use a low resource tactic, such as sit-ins and and vise versa (Cunningham et al. 2017).

The *political opportunity structures* within which ethnic minority groups and organizations operate also condition the strategies that they use to achieve their political goals, and are at least as important as group and organization characteristics (Tarrow 1998). Constraints or opportunities for mobilization stem from the nature

of the state itself or from the state's interaction with minorities. Studies suggest that minorities mobilize for nonviolence or violence when the costs of mobilization are low and the likelihood of realizing their goals is high, generally because the government allows mobilization, is going through a transition, or is unable to repress mobilization (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, McAdam 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

For instance, Tilly and Tarrow (2007) contend that democratization creates opportunities for mobilization, whereas violence is more likely in authoritarian and low capacity regimes. Likewise, high levels of democracy increase the likelihood that minorities engage in conventional politics relative to nonviolence or violence (Cunningham 2013), whereas violent repression decreases the likelihood that minority organizations use conventional politics or nonviolence, making violence a more likely strategy (Asal et al. 2013). Further, stable regimes encourage participation in electoral politics since it is deemed more effective, whereas political stability creates incentives for nonviolence and violence (Cunningham 2013).

2.2.1 Gaps in the literature

While these studies have advanced our understanding of how ethnic minority and state-level characteristics impact minority strategies, one aspect that the literature hasn't yet considered, however, is how *ethnic factors within the state* condition the strategic choices of minority organizations. Ethnic groups that control the government may be mobilized along ethnic lines. For example, at various points in time, nine Serbian parties have represented the Serb political majority group's

interests in the parliament. In Bosnia, up to five ethnic majority Bosniak parties have held seats in the legislature. In Sri Lanka, more than ten ethnic parties have advocated on behalf of the majority Sinhalese. While they were in control of the government, the Tutsis in Burundi were represented by four ethnic parties.

While studies have shown that fragmentation within ethnic minorities impacts their use of violence and nonviolence (Cunningham et al. 2012; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham 2014; Cunningham et al. 2017), no studies to date have examined the effect that fragmentation with ethnic political majorities has on the strategies that minority organizations use. Given that fragmentation within minorities affects their strategic choices, it is reasonable to expect that fragmentation within majorities affects how minorities select their strategies as well.

For instance, when fragmentation within the political majority group is relatively high, the governing party may be stymied from implementing its preferred policies by opposition parties that wish to undercut its success to gain an electoral or legislative advantage. Subsequently, ethnopolitical minority organization may assign different utilities for engaging in violence, using nonviolence, or taking part in electoral politics depending on the level of fragmentation within the dominant ethnic group.

In spite of this, few studies have examined how ethnic political majorities affects the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations. This suggests that there is a need to unpack the unitary actor assumption for dominant ethnic groups and bring them into the analysis.

2.3 Ethnic outbidding

In general, outbidding refers to the practice of parties taking extreme positions on a political issue dimension (Chandra 2005). The outbidding model of ethnic party competition (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985) argues that when ethnicity is politicized and voters have fixed and homogeneous preferences that lie at the extremes of a single issue dimension on ethnicity, ethnic parties will "outbid" each other by taking increasingly more extreme positions in order to capture a greater share of the ethnic vote. The practice of outbidding *within* ethnic groups is expected to lead to detrimental outcomes *between* ethnic groups: the ethnic majority group will be more likely to restrict the rights of the ethnic minority group, and the ethnic minority group will be more likely to preemptively use violence to prevent being excluded or to use violence after it is excluded.

Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985) introduced the classic model of outbidding under ethnic competition. Although they differ in their approaches (Rabushka and Shepsle advocate a rational choice perspective whereas Horowitz's model is based on social-psychology) and in their beliefs about individual preferences, their assumptions about how preferences are distributed within and across ethnic groups are the same, leading both models to make similar predictions about ethnic group behavior. In order to understand how outbidding works, it is worth delving into the assumptions of each model.

In Rabushka and Shepsle's model, there are two ethnic groups, A and B, and these groups are organized completely separately. There is a single issue axis

that dominates politics. All people within ethnic groups A and B have identical preferences about this issue axis, and all people within opposite ethnic groups have diametrically opposed preferences - all people within ethnic group A prefer endpoint A the most and B the least, and vise versa. Since people within ethnic groups hold intense preferences about the ethnic issue, group preferences are likewise intense, and people in both groups are "risk-acceptant." The outcome of the conflict on this single issue axis is decided by majority rule (Chandra 2005).

In Horowitz's model, there are also two ethnic groups, A and B, and they are similarly organized separately. The ethnic issue trumps all other issues, which is similar to Rabushka and Shepsle's single issue axis. People within each ethnic group have similar preferences (they want self-esteem and belonging). Competition over the ethnic issue is a zero-sum game: parties make "either-or" appeals to their voters, suggesting that, like in Rabushka and Shepsle's model, people within each ethnic group have diametrically opposed preferences. Also like Rabushka and Shepsle, Horowitz assumes that people are intensely emotionally attached to their ethnic identities. The outcome of the conflict over ethnicity is decided by simple majority rule (Chandra 2005).

Given these assumptions, what happens when parties compete for votes? It is possible for parties to join together in a multi-ethnic coalition that crosses both ethnic groups; however, given that the preferences of voters in ethnic group A and B are concentrated at opposite endpoints, this coalition "can only gain support by playing an ambiguous strategy that simultaneously promises each group some probability of obtaining its preferred option. This "lottery" is able to defeat positions

distributed around the center of the issue axis" (Chandra 2005, 237).

If a party from ethnic group A or B wants to compete against this multi-ethnic coalition, it must promote a position that is closer to the endpoints of the ethnic issue axis, where the preferences of its ethnic group members lie. Subsequently, at some point in time, a multi-ethnic coalition will be challenged by parties in ethnic groups A or B that outbid it for support by adopting non-centrist positions that are closer to the preferences of its own members. Once a party makes this first ethnic bid, other parties that want to compete with it will need to take more extreme positions. Because the preferences of voters are concentrated at the extremes, any party that wishes to out-compete its peers will have incentives to adopt positions that are closer to their ethnic group's extreme ideal point.

If there is even a small difference in the size of the ethnic groups, and if the majority ethnic group A wins the election, it will restrict the rights of the minority ethnic group B and/or ethnic group B will preemptively use violence to avert this outcome. As such, according to the classic model of outbidding, when ethnicity is politicized outbidding within ethnic groups is likely to lead to exclusion and violence between ethnic groups.

The outbidding model gained considerable traction in the ethnic conflict literature (Kaufman 1996; Toft 2007; Boylan 2014), and has inspired numerous works that apply outbidding dynamics to a variety of outcomes, including why organizations use terrorism (Fortna 2015; Kydd and Walter 2006), why terrorism is common in democracies (Chenoweth 2010), why ethnopolitical organizations use suicide terrorism (Bloom 2004), why ethnopolitical organizations use violence against the state,

each other, and co-ethnic civilians (Cunningham et al. 2012), why democratization leads to outbidding dynamics and violence (Snyder 2000), and why terrorist organizations target children (Biberman and Zahid 2016).

Nonetheless, the expectation that competition within ethnic groups necessarily leads to outbidding and violence has not gone unchallenged. More recent literature has critiqued the outbidding model on both empirical and theoretical grounds.

Theoretically, the outbidding model is based on an outdated understanding of ethnicity. The model assumes that ethnic groups are fixed in their identities, internally homogeneous, have one-dimensional preferences, and are unaffected by political competition or institutions. These assumptions, which mirror a "primordialist" understanding of ethnicity, have been challenged by and replaced with a constructivist conceptualization of ethnicity, which argues that ethnic groups are fluid, internally fragmented, multidimensional, and impacted by political competition and institutions (Chandra 2005).

Empirically, a number of studies have found no relationship between increased ethnic competition and outbidding, or that increased ethnic competition can lead to moderation. Regarding the former, in a global analysis of terrorism from 1970-2004, Findley and Young (2015) found no support for the outbidding argument; an increase in the number of opposition actors did not lead to an increase in suicide terrorist attacks or other terrorist attacks. Brym and Araj (2008) found a similar outcome in the case of Palestinian organizations in Israel.

In terms of competition leading to moderation, Chandra (2005) shows that counter to outbidding expectations, although parties in India initially started off

making extreme bids, over time they moderated their positions and adopted more centrist platforms. She argues that this dynamic of extreme outbidding and stable moderation results from the institutionalization of multiple and cross-cutting ethnic identity cleavages: "institutions that artificially restrict ethnic divisions to a single dimension destabilize democracy, whereas institutions that foster multiple dimensions of ethnicity can sustain it" (Chandra 2005, 235).

Birnir 2007 focuses on the role of "ethnic attractors" parties or groups that claim to represent the interests of an ethnic group or non-ethnic parties that nonetheless represent ethnic group interests in a cross-national analysis of new democracies. Since ethnic attractors represent an ethnic constituency, and because voters use ethnic identity as an informational shortcut for deciding which party to support, ethnic attractors have incentives to gain access to the executive, where they can use their positions to leverage benefits for the ethnic group. The best (and least costly) way to gain access to the executive is through peaceful means, rather than violence. When ethnic attractors do resort to violence, it is not because ethnic competition drives them to the strategy; instead, violence occurs when ethnic attractors are excluded from access the executive in the first place.

In a similar vein, other works have shown that ethnic competition can lead to a moderation in appeals, positions, or policy outcomes. In terms of appeals, Coakley 2008 focuses on Northern Ireland and argues that although new parties that want to challenge existing parties in an ethnically-based system can engage in outbidding, they can also pursue ethnic *underbidding*, in which they seek to undermine ethnic polarization by focusing on a centrist, middle ground between

the two groups. Alternatively, ethnic parties also can advocate non-ethnic counter-bidding, in which they try to mobilize a separate, non-ethnic cleavage that can bring the two groups together.

Examining variation in appeals in Serbia, Zuber 2012 argues that when party competition is nested when ethnic groups are not perfectly segmented and some, but not all, ethnic parties make appeals across ethnic lines ethnic minority parties that try to make cross-ethnic appeals (i.e., lateral bidding) are likely to moderate their position on the ethnic minority issue in order to appeal to voters from other ethnic groups.

Focusing on ethnic party appeals throughout Europe, Zuber and Szocsik 2015 propose that when the ethnic market is segmented, ethnic parties have incentives to take more extreme positions. However, if an ethnic cleavage is less salient than an economic cleavage, parties are more likely to moderate their positions on ethnic issues.

Focusing on appeals and positions, and using a case study of Hungarian and Bosniak minorities in Serbia, Zuber 2011 identifies five viable strategies that parties can pursue, only one of which leads to more extreme appeals and positions. In addition to outbidding, parties can also engage in static bidding, in which they do not change their position; ethnic underbidding, in which they make exclusive ethnic appeals but take more moderate positions on ethnic issues; lateral bidding, in which they make cross-ethnic appeals but maintain their existing position on ethnic issues; and lateral underbidding, in which they widen their appeal and moderate

their existing position on ethnic issues.[1]

Regarding moderation of policy outcomes, Mitchell et al. 2009 show that even when parties continue to hold extreme positions, as is the case in Northern Ireland, power-sharing arrangements can moderate outbidding in policy outcomes. They argue that in order to ensure that an ethnic group is well-represented under power-sharing, which requires inter-ethnic bargaining and cooperation, ethnic voters are likely to select the strongest party that can represent their interests. Practically, this translates into parties that hold more extreme positions. These "ethnic tribune parties" are likely to be strident about ethnic identity but pragmatic over resources, leading to outbidding in positions but moderation in policies.

2.3.1 Gaps in the literature

Taken together, the more recent literature demonstrates that competition within ethnic groups does not necessarily lead to outbidding in appeals, positions, or policy outcomes. Instead, when the outbidding model's primordial assumptions about ethnic groups are replaced by constructivist assumptions, it becomes clear that competition can be countered by institutions, leading to moderation in appeals and outcomes, rather than extremism in positions and violence.

Although these studies have advanced our understanding of the dynamics of ethnic competition, I argue that there is an important element to ethnic competi-

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[1]Zuber 2012 also identifies a sixth type of strategy lateral outbidding, in which parties widen their appeal across ethnic groups but take a more extreme position on ethnic issues. However, since it is likely to be difficult for a party to make a legitimate cross-ethnic appeal while holding an extreme position (i.e., territorial separation) on ethnic issues, this strategy is unlikely to be seen in practice.

tion that has not been addressed adequately ethnic competition is strategic, and outbidding does not take place in a vacuum that is independent of ethnic politics. Instead, whether parties outbid or underbid is in part influenced by the actions of parties within the opposing ethnic group.

The classic outbidding model's assumption that ethnic groups are homogeneous and have diametrically opposed ideal points implies that outbidding within groups occurs independently of what happens between groups. Since ethnicity is the sole issue dimension and preferences are homogeneous and fixed, parties within ethnic groups are primarily concerned about what their fellow co-ethnic are doing and whether their co-ethnic competitors are outbidding to get closer to their own groups extreme preferences. If all members of ethnic group A prefer an extreme ideal point A, then all parties within ethnic group A that want to beat a centrist multi-ethnic coalition will take positions that are increasingly more extreme, irrespective of what parties in ethnic group B do. The same obtains for ethnic parties in ethnic group B. As such, what parties within the opposing ethnic group are doing should have little bearing on whether parties outbid within their own ethnic groups.

However, this takes the inter-ethnic dimension out of inter-ethnic politics. Once we adopt a constructivist-based assumption that ethnic groups are internally divided, it becomes clear that what happens within ethnic groups is indeed influenced by what happens in the opposing ethnic group. If we assume that ethnic groups are internally divided with heterogeneous preferences and that these preferences may change over time, it's reasonable to expect that these preferences may be influenced by what parties in the opposing ethnic group do.

For instance, if ethnic group A is divided between members who advocate extreme and moderate positions and/or policies toward ethnic group B, and parties in ethnic group B launch a wave of suicide attacks against civilians in ethnic group A, it is possible that some moderates in ethnic group A may feel threatened by their actions and shift toward more extreme positions and/or policies. If enough moderates turn into radicals, and moderate ethnic parties start losing their supporters, it is possible that moderate parties will begin outbidding in an attempt to regain their support.

But if parties in ethnic group B hold peaceful demonstrations and denounce the use of violence, moderates in ethnic group A are unlikely to feel threatened by their actions, and the party or parties that represent them would likely see no reason to start outbidding. Moreover, it is possible that some more extreme members of ethnic group A might moderate their positions and/or policies in response to tactics that do not threaten their lives. If they start shifting their support to more moderate parties, the parties representing more radical positions might start to underbid and moderate their own stances in an attempt to recapture their supporters.

The first of these two scenarios results in an outcome that is similar to what the outbidding model expects, but the second does not. This suggests that there is a strategic aspect of competition within ethnic groups that should be incorporated into a model of bargaining between ethnic groups.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter provides a brief overview of the literature upon with the theory is grounded, as well as gaps in the literature that it fills both theoretically and empirically. To date, the literature has focused primarily on how ethnic and state-level factors affect the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations. My theory focuses on an under-explored but equally important factor - *ethnic factors within the state* itself. I expect that majority fragmentation shapes the political opportunity structures within which minority organizations operate, making certain strategies more or less costly under varying levels of fragmentation.

In addition, recent studies show that outbidding within ethnic groups can be moderated by institutions. My theory updates this literature by demonstrating that outbidding within majority groups is affected by what happens *within the opposing ethnic group*. Specifically, I expect that majority groups are more likely to outbid when minorities use violence than nonviolence, and that outbidding is more likely when majorities are highly fragmented. As strategic actors, minority organizations are likely to account for the characteristics of majority fragmentation and outbidding as they make their cost-benefit calculations for participating in elections, using nonviolence, and engaging in violence.

Chapter 3:   The Theory

3.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I return to the puzzle that motivates this research - why do eth-
nopolitical minority organizations vary in their use of electoral politics, nonviolence,
and violence? I argue that while the effects of fragmentation have been studied ex-
tensively for disadvantaged ethnic minorities, the same attention has not been paid
to an equally important actor - ethnic groups that control the government.[1] Ethnic
groups that control the government, like the Serbs in Serbia, Bosniaks in Bosnia,
Jews in Israel, Tutsis in Burundi, and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, may be represented
by many parties that compete for the same ethnic base of support. Although these
groups may be just as fragmented and competitive as the ethnic minorities that
they govern, they are generally assumed to be unitary.

I argue that this is problematic, since it is reasonable to expect that frag-
mentation *within* the ethnic group that controls the state impacts the strategic
choices of minority organizations as they bargain with the government over their
self-determination rights. In this project, I address this gap by unpacking the uni-

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[1]Ethnic political majority groups are defined as ethnic groups that control the executive branch
of government and are politically dominant relative to other ethnic groups in the country. Ethnic
political majorities may be large or small in population size.

tary actor assumption for ethnic groups that control the state and developing a theory about how fragmentation within them conditions the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations. Specifically, I focus on how fragmentation within political majorities conditions the choice of ethnopolitical minority organizations to (1) use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence only and (2) to engage in a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence. I focus on these two mixed strategies because they are used far more frequently than other types of mixed strategies.[2] I also explore whether (3) majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence and nonviolence and whether outbidding is more likely when majorities are more fragmented.

I contend that fragmentation within political majority groups shapes the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of minority organizations as they decide how to achieve their strategic goals through electoral politics, nonviolence, violence, or a mix of these strategies. Since each strategy requires a different set of resources in order to be used successfully, I expect that majority fragmentation conditions minority choices through three different mechanisms.

To summarize the theory, I argue that low majority fragmentation increases the likelihood that minority organizations use violence because unlike in the case of high majority fragmentation, violence is less likely to trigger costly outbidding

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[2]According to the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), which codes yearly information on electoral participation, nonviolence, and violence for 1,124 ethnopolitical organizations in 77 countries from 1960 - 2005, a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence was used 11% of the time, followed by a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence, which was employed 10% of the time. In less than 1% of cases, minority organizations took part in elections and used violence or used all three strategies in the same year.

within the majority group that can lead the government to increase its resolve and become harder to defeat or coerce into concessions with force. In contrast, high majority fragmentation results in minority organizations increasing their participation in electoral politics or nonviolence because there are far more opportunities for organizations to serve as coalition partners or to leverage elite divisions with nonviolence than during periods of low majority fragmentation.

To explicate in greater detail, I anticipate that in order to use violence, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have enough resources to defeat the governing party or coerce it into making concessions. In contrast, for nonviolence to be successful, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have enough people power to mobilize the masses and inflict costs on the government through non-cooperation. Equally important, there need to be divisions within elites that minority organizations can leverage to strip away support from the governing party. Finally, to press its claims through electoral politics, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have legislative access and the ability to push through its preferred policies.

When minority organizations use violence, their actions are likely to trigger outbidding - a shift toward more extreme positions and/or policies toward minorities - by ethnic parties within the majority group. When majority fragmentation is low, however, outbidding is less likely to change the governing party's positions or policies toward the minority or its costs for using violence against it, since the governing party's competitors are relatively weak and outbidding among them is not likely to sway the governing party into changing its stance toward the minority group.

When majority fragmentation is relatively high, outbidding by co-ethnic competitors can motivate the governing party to outbid in order to remain competitive. When the governing party outbids, its costs for using violence against the minority decrease, making it harder to defeat or coerce into concessions. Since a minority organization is already likely to be weaker than the governing party, I expect that it will be more likely to use violence under low majority fragmentation, when the prospects for triggering a costly cycle of outbidding in the majority are reduced.

Majority fragmentation affects the costs and benefits of using nonviolence or participating in electoral politics through a different set of mechanisms. When minority organizations are considering whether to use nonviolence or electoral politics, they are less concerned about triggering outbidding in the majority, since these strategies are less threatening than violence. Instead, minority organizations focus on a different set of political opportunity structures.

Under high majority fragmentation, there are more divisions for minorities to leverage and because many majority parties are relatively strong, there is a greater chance that shifting the loyalties of these parties can weaken the governing party and coerce it into offering concessions. Likewise, minority organizations can take advantage of divisions among majority parties to serve as coalition partners or to trade votes in support for pro-minority policies with a governing party that is weakened by co-ethnic competition.

At the same time, minority organizations may expect that majority parties will be more willing to cooperate with them during periods of high fragmentation. When majorities are highly fragmented, the party that controls the government has

less institutional power than it would under periods of low fragmentation. In this case, the government may face resistance from strong co-ethnic opposition parties that hold different positions on legislative issues and wish to stymie the government's legislative agenda.

If the governing party is unable to work with fellow co-ethnic parties, it may have incentives to reach across ethnic lines and trade concessions with minority parties in exchange for their legislative support. Once this history of cooperation has been established, minority organizations may expect that subsequent majority parties may be willing to work with them during periods of high fragmentation. Moreover, the prospects for cooperation are likely to be higher when minority organizations use nonviolence or engage in electoral politics, since these tactics are less threatening and less likely to trigger outbidding than violence.

Under low majority fragmentation, in contrast, there are fewer divisions to leverage and limited opportunities to serve a coalition partner or to trade support for votes. As such, minority organizations will be more likely to use nonviolence or to take part in electoral politics under high majority fragmentation, when the opportunities for using these strategies successfully are greater.

For the choice to use mixed strategies, I argue that majority fragmentation conditions the choice of organizations to take part in elections and use nonviolence in the same year in the same way that it affects the choice to use these strategies separately. Therefore, I expect that minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics and use nonviolence in the same year as majority fragmentation increases.

There are two pathways through which majority fragmentation can condition the choice of minorities to use violence and nonviolence in the same year. On the one hand, minority organizations may be more likely to use this mixed strategy when majority fragmentation is low because it is less likely to trigger outbidding that can lead the governing party to adopt more extreme policies or positions that are detrimental to the ethnic minority group. Likewise, nonviolence can be used to signal the organization's strength and mobilization capabilities to the government, which can increase the organization's ability to exact concessions. On the other hand, a minority organization may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is high because it can limit the fallout of outbidding by avoiding targeting moderates, thereby allowing it to continue using nonviolence to leverage existing divisions.

Finally, I argue that majorities respond to the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use in distinct ways. Since violence is more threatening that nonviolence, majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence. In addition, I contend that majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when they are highly fragmented.

This theory is novel in that whereas prior studies focus on how fragmentation within minority groups or state-level factors affect the likelihood that ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence or nonviolence, I explore how *fragmentation* within *the state* - i.e., the political majority group that controls the government - conditions the choices of minority organizations to use violence, engage in nonviolence, or take part in electoral politics. In doing so, I demonstrate the value in

unpacking the unitary actor assumption for majority groups and introduce a new avenue for research on how ethnicity in political minorities *and* the political majorities that govern them affects conflict processes.

In this chapter, I begin with a brief discussion about the assumptions and scope conditions related to the theory. I then introduce the two actors in the theory - ethnic political majority groups that control the executive branch of government and ethnic political minority groups that do not.[3] I first define ethnic minorities, discuss their political goals, and review the strategies that they use to achieve those goals. I then introduce the main actors in my theory - ethnic political majorities. I define ethnic political majorities and discuss how I conceptualize characteristics of fragmentation within them. Since outbidding within fragmented majorities plays an important role in conditioning the strategic choices of minority organizations, I also introduce my definition of outbidding and discuss how it differs from current conceptualizations. I then review how the strategies that minority organizations use affect outbidding dynamics within fragmented majority groups.

Thereafter, I discuss how variation in majority fragmentation conditions the decision of minority organizations to (1) use a single strategy of participating in electoral politics, engaging in nonviolence, or using violence only and (2) use a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence in the same year. Finally, I discuss how fragmentation affects the responses of majorities to the strategies that minority organizations use, in particular focusing on how minority

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[3]I draw on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database (version 3) to determine which ethnic groups are ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities, as EPR identifies which ethnic groups control the executive branch and which do not. In addition, I cross-referenced and confirmed EPRs list against AMARs coding of ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups (AMAR 2015).

strategies affect outbidding dynamics within fragmented majority groups.

3.2   Assumptions and scope conditions

Before discussing the theory, I review some assumptions and scope conditions. First, I use a constructivist-based approach to ethnicity, and assume that ethnic groups are fluid rather than fixed, internally fragmented rather than homogenous, multidimensional rather than unidimensional, and endogenous rather than exogenous to institutions and political competition (Chandra 2005).

Since ethnic groups are internally fragmented, I expect that some people may hold more extreme positions regarding an ethnic issue while others may be more moderate. Likewise, I expect that ethnic parties vary in the positions and policies that they advocate for - some may campaign for extremist platforms or policies while others may espouse moderation toward the opposing ethnic group. Because of this heterogeneity in preferences, ethnic parties may engage in outbidding against the opposing ethnic group by advocating more extreme positions and policies to capture votes and support, but they can also underbid and take on more moderate stances. I also anticipate that people vary in the intensity of their ethnic preferences, although I expect that if the benefits of making a concession to the opposing ethnic group are greater than the costs, on average, most people will prefer concessions over conflict.

Second, I assume that ethnopolitical minority organizations choose from a menu of strategies that includes electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence. It may be the case that not all organizations are equally able or willing to make these

choices. For example, some organizations may never consider violence as a strategy on ideological or moral grounds, while others may not have enough capabilities to use resource-intensive strategies, like violence or nonviolence. Nonetheless, I expect that on average, majority fragmentation impacts organizations that have limited choices in the same way as it does for organizations that can choose among all three strategies.

In terms of scope conditions, I focus on how fragmentation within political majorities affects a specific set of outcomes - the decision of ethnopolitical minority organizations to achieve their strategic goals by: (1) running in elections, using nonviolence, or engaging in violence only, or (2) using a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence.

However, I do not expect that fragmentation precludes ethnopolitical minority organizations from cooperating with each other. Indeed, in some instances, organizations may find that fragmentation within the majority drives them to band together in an electoral coalition or a military alliance. Likewise, it is possible that majority fragmentation creates incentives for minority organizations to attack each other, rather than the government. While fragmentation is likely to condition a range of outcomes, I concentrate on how it impacts the choice of ethnopolitical minority organizations to press their demands through electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence.

Having reviewed these assumptions and scope conditions, I move on to a discussion about the actors in the theory - ethnic minorities and the ethnic political majorities that govern them.

3.3   Ethnic minorities

In this section, I introduce one of the two actors in the theory - ethnic political minorities. I define ethnic minorities, describe what they want and advocate for, and review how they use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence to achieve their political goals.

3.3.1   Defining ethnic minorities

Ethnic political minorities are groups that do not control the executive branch of government; subsequently, they are *political* minorities, irrespective of their population size. An ethnopolitical minority organization is defined as an association with some form of structure and delineation of membership that represents the interests of an ethnic political minority group and/or whose members are primarily from an ethnic political minority group. These ethnically mobilized organizations are political in their goals and activities.

3.3.2   What ethnic minorities want

Just as states bargain with each other over the status quo distribution of benefits at the international level (Powell 1996, 1999; Reed et al. 2008), ethnopolitical minority organizations and governments bargain over the status quo distribution of benefits at the domestic level. These benefits relate to the self-determination goals of the ethnic minority group, and can vary considerably among ethnopolitical minority organizations. For example, some organizations may advocate for terri-

torial independence for their ethnic group or call for a revanchist change in state borders. Others may campaign for political autonomy, including self-government at the local or regional level. Yet others may seek to address political, social, or economic discrimination against the minority group, such as increasing participation and representation in the legislature, providing for language or cultural protection and expression, or increasing access to education in their native language.

3.3.3 How ethnic minorities press their demands

Ethnopolitical minority organizations can press their demands by participating in elections, using nonviolence, or engaging in violence. These tactics fall along three general dimensions: legal versus illegal, institutionalized versus non-institutionalized, and nonviolent versus violent (McAdam and Tarrow 2000).

Electoral politics is a legal, institutionalized, and nonviolent tactic. It consists of using institutional procedures, like legislating, litigating, and lobbying, in situations of conflict (McCarthy 1990). I focus on the act of participating in electoral politics, and refer to this as electoral politics or conventional politics interchangeably.

Nonviolent resistance, which is also called civil resistance, nonviolent struggle, or strategic nonviolence (Sharp 2005), is a transgressive, non-institutionalized, and nonviolent tactic (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Nonviolent resistance is "the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm

against the opponent (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 271). It is used strategically or instrumentally, although it can also be adopted for normative or moral reasons. In this project, I assume that it is used primarily for strategic or instrumental reasons.

Nonviolent resistance involves acts of omission, through which people refuse to engage in actions specified by norms, customs, laws, or decrees; acts of commission, by which people engage in actions that they normally do not perform, are not expected to perform, or are prohibited from performing by laws, regulations, or decrees; or a combination of both (Sharp 1973). As a mechanism of coercion, nonviolent resistance relies on a variety of social, psychological, economic, and political methods, including protests, rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, occupations, blockades, hunger strikes, self-immolation and other self-harm, electoral boycotts, and withdrawal from participation in the government (Cunningham et al. 2017).

Like nonviolent resistance, violent resistance also works outside of institutionalized channels, uses irregular and illegal tactics, and is a mechanism of coercion (Dudouet 2013). Unlike nonviolent resistance, however, it directly "threatens physical violence against the opponent (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 10). Acts of violence can include sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla insurgency, or quasi-conventional or conventional warfare (Butler and Gates 2009; Dudouet 2013).

I assume that minority organizations are rational actors who assess the costs and benefits of pursuing their goals via electoral politics, nonviolent resistance, or violent resistance, and will decide to use one tactic when it is less costly and more likely to succeed than others (Asal et al 2013; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham et

al. 2017). The same applies to organizations that choose between a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence. Since minority organizations have resource constraints, they are likely to select the strategy that gets them the best bang for their buck.

In general, working through regular channels, like electoral politics, is less costly than using tactics that fall outside of institutional politics, like nonviolent or violent resistance. However, the ability to participate in elections is not an option in all institutional contexts, such as in authoritarian regimes that restrict political participation to some or all parties. Even if these channels do exist, some organizations may find that they still cannot realize their objectives via electoral politics. If an organization is denied access to the legislature or the executive, or if access does nothing to help advance an organization's goals, nonviolence or violence are likely to become more attractive options than electoral politics.

For violent resistance to work, non-state actors need to mobilize military capabilities and skills, control territory from which to launch assaults, and directly challenge the capacity of the state (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 300). Violent resistance relies on direct coercion through attacks on a government or indirect coercion through attacks on civilians. Organizations need military capabilities to defeat the government outright or to inflict enough costs on a government or civilians to coerce concessions (Dahl et al. 2014; White et al. 2015). These capabilities include civilian support, recruits or people power, military technology, and revenue (Nygard and Weintrau 2015; Walter 2009). The ability to inflict costs is approximately proportional to the number of troops, police officers, or civilians that die at the hands

of an organization, and is a function of an organizations military capabilities (Dahl et al. 2014).

To use nonviolence, non-state actors need to mobilize the masses, remain resilient against repression, and gain leverage by engendering loyalty shifts among elites (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Schock 2013). Unlike violence, which "works like a hammer," nonviolence "works more like a lever" (Schock 2013, 283) by "dislocating the regime from its pillars of support - the security, economic, and civilian elites on whose obedience the power holder depends (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 299). Nonviolence inflicts costs on the government by making it more difficult for the state to obtain resources or implement policies (Dahl et al. 2014; Lake 1999).

The costs of nonviolence are approximately proportional to the number of people mobilizing for nonviolent collective action. Mobilization involves getting resources, people, and support for a movement or campaign (Schock 2013). Studies have found that widespread mobilization increases the success of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), although it is not sufficient for their success (Schock 2013).

In addition to mass mobilization, nonviolent campaigns need to "withstand and recover from repression; that is, to sustain a campaign despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities" (Schock 2013, 283). To do so, campaigns rely on tactical interactions and adaptations; for example, changing from concentrated methods of resistance (e.g., demonstrations) to dispersed methods (e.g., strikes and boycotts) when confronted with state repression.

Lastly, campaigns that are well mobilized and can stay resilient are most suc-

cessful when they can leverage loyalty shifts in their opponent's political, economic, social, and military sources of support (Schock 2005). Leverage refers to "the capacity of a challenger to sever the opponent from the sources of power upon which it depends, either directly or through allies or third parties (Schock 2013, 283). Leverage is achieved when "the adversary's most important supporting organizations are systematically pulled away through mass noncooperation" (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 44).

Leverage is especially important for successful nonviolent resistance. The strength of nonviolence relies on its use of tactics that directly sap an opponent's sources of power and legitimacy or sever ties with the opponent's critical sources of support. Indeed, Schock (2013) states that "the crucial variable in determining the outcome of nonviolent struggle is not repression, as is commonly assumed, but rather dependence relations that can be leveraged by challengers to undermine the opponent's power (Summy 1994)" (293). Tarrow (2011) further notes that "Divisions among elites not only provide incentives to resource-poor groups to take the risk of collective action, they encourage portions of the elite that are out of power to seize the role of 'tribunes of the people'" (166).

Nonviolence is especially well suited for leveraging elite divisions and shifting loyalties among key sources of support. Unlike violence, which is likely to unite elites against a common perceived threat, nonviolent tactics are unlikely to have a polarizing effect. Instead, regime members, such as civil servants, security forces, and judges, are more likely to shift their support in favor of organizations that use nonviolence than violence (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Chenoweth and Ulfelder

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(2017) argue that "elite divisions may provide one of the most important perceived opportunities for nonviolent mobilization, as this particular kind of division within the opponent may convince would-be participate that opposition leaders might respond to nonviolent appeals but reunite with the regime if confronted with arms (Goldstone 1991; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011)" (309).

In sum, electoral politics should be less costly for an ethnic minority organization to use than nonviolent or violent resistance, assuming that opportunities for electoral participation exist. When electoral politics is not a viable strategy, however, a minority organization may need to use nonviolence or violence to inflict costs on the government and coerce it into meeting its demands. Nonviolence inflicts costs through non-cooperation and requires leveraging divisions and engendering loyalty shifts to exact concessions. In contrast, violence inflicts costs by physically harming troops, police forces, or civilians and requires military capabilities that can be used to defeat the government or coerce it into making concessions.

3.4   Ethnic majorities

Having discussed who minorities are, what they want, and how they press their demands, I now introduce my theoretical contribution about another equally important actor - ethnic political majorities. In the following section, I define ethnic political majorities, describe how I conceptualize the characteristics that define them, and discuss how I expect majority outbidding against minorities to be endogenous to the strategies that minority organizations use.

3.4.1 Defining ethnic majorities

I define ethnic majorities as groups that control the executive branch of government, and refer to them as politically dominant groups, political majorities, or majorities, interchangeably. Within politically dominant ethnic groups, parties can be characterized as non-ethnic, multi-ethnic, or ethnic based on the types of appeals that they make, the positions and policies that they advocate for, and the support that they receive.

Parties are non-ethnic if they don't make any explicit or implicit appeals to an ethnic group or ethnic groups, don't advance any positions specific to an ethnic group, and/or have members and supporters who don't identify with an ethnic category. Multi-ethnic parties are those that make appeals or advocate positions that support all the significant ethnic groups within a country without explicitly excluding any, and/or have a multi-ethnic support base. Parties are ethnic if they make explicit or implicit appeals to an ethnic group to the exclusion of others, pursue policies that privilege one group to the exclusion of others, and/or have an ethnic support base (Chandra 2005).

Party systems within politically dominant groups can take one of several forms. At one end of the continuum, all parties within a majority may be non-ethnically mobilized, while at the other, all parties may be ethnically mobilized.[4] I situate the theory within a party system that is characterized by a predominantly ethnic constellation of parties, in which the main political players within the ethnic majority

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[4]These party systems are not fixed and can change over time.

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group are ethnic parties. Examples of ethnic political majorities include the Serbs in Serbia, Croats in Croatia, Macedonians in Macedonia, Israeli Jews in Israel, Alawi in Syria, Tutsis in Burundi, Kikuyu in Kenya, Fon in Benin, and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. Ethnic political majorities can be large or small in population size relative to ethnic minorities.

3.4.2 Characteristics of fragmentation within ethnic majorities

I conceptualize that fragmentation within political majorities varies along three dimensions - the preferences of parties and the distribution of power among them, the institutional power of the governing party, and the institutional power of opposition parties. These characteristics, which are summarized in Table 3.1, shape the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of ethnopolitical minority organizations as they decide how to achieve their strategic goals.

Table 3.1: Characteristics of majority fragmentation

	Party preferences, power distribution	Governing party	Opposition parties
Low Majority Fragmentation (LMF)	Fewer divisions, unipolar	More power	Less power
High Majority Fragmentation (HMF)	More divisions, bipolar, multipolar	Less power, coalition	More power

When majorities are minimally fragmented, there are fewer divisions in the preferences and policy positions that majority parties hold and there is a unipolar distribution of power, in which one party dominates over others. Under relatively

high majority fragmentation, majority parties are more divided in their preferences and policy positions and there is a bipolar or multipolar distribution of power, in which two or more parties are relatively equal in power.

In terms of the governing party, under low majority fragmentation the governing party has more institutional and political power at its disposal, while its power is likely to be limited by co-ethnic competition when fragmentation is relatively high. Indeed, when the political majority is highly fragmented, the governing party may need to form a coalition in order to govern.

Since many ethnic majority parties may hold seats in the legislature, but only one ethnic majority party may control the executive, I expect that fragmentation is likely to impact the governing party's resources for legislating. When the governing party does not have a majority in the legislature, it may be less successful in making legislation than when it controls a majority of seats in the legislature. Consequently, I expect that the more fragmented the ethnic majority group, the more likely it is that the government faces resource constraints on its legislative power.

For opposition parties, institutional and political power is relatively limited under low majority fragmentation, since the governing party controls a preponderance of power. Consequently, opposition parties are relatively weak. In contrast, when fragmentation is relatively high, opposition parties have more institutional and political power and pose a more powerful check on the governing party.

3.5 Majority outbidding against ethnic minorities

Before describing my theory about how majority fragmentation affects the single and mixed strategies of minority organizations, I first discuss ethnic outbidding, which plays an important role in conditioning these outcomes. In the section below, I introduce my definition of ethnic outbidding and explore how it differs from classical and current conceptualizations. I then discuss how outbidding within fragmented majority groups is affected by a previously unexplored factor - the strategies that minority organizations themselves use to pursue their political goals. This perspective differs from that of the literature, which has focused on how institutions, rather than the actions of minority organizations themselves, ameliorate outbidding dynamics within ethnic groups.

3.5.1 Defining outbidding

The classic outbidding model of ethnic politics (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985) contends that competition among ethnic parties in democracies leads to ethnic outbidding, in which parties that are competing for the same base of ethnic support adopt increasingly extreme *positions* vis-a-vis an opposing ethnic group in order to gain more support from their co-ethnics. This practice of outbidding *within* ethnic groups is expected to lead to detrimental outcomes *between* ethnic groups: the ethnic majority will be more likely to restrict the rights of the ethnic minority, and the ethnic minority will be more likely to preemptively use violence to prevent being excluded or to use violence after it is excluded.

More recently, the outbidding model has been adopted to explain a number of outcomes in the conflict literature, such as why organizations use terrorism (Fortna 2015; Kydd and Walter 2006), why terrorism is common in democracies (Chenoweth 2010), why ethnopolitical organizations use suicide terrorism (Bloom 2004), why ethnopolitical organizations use violence against the state, each other, and co-ethnic civilians (Cunningham et al. 2012), why democratization leads to outbidding dynamics and violence (Snyder 2000), and why terrorist organizations target children (Biberman and Zahid 2016). In contrast to the classic model of outbidding, in these studies outbidding is defined as the use of *violence* by a group (e.g, an ethnic minority organization, a terrorist group) against the state in order to increase that group's base of support relative to its competitors.

I define ethnic outbidding in a way that differs slightly from both of these formulations. In this project, ethnic outbidding is conceptualized as ethnic majority parties taking *positions* or *policies* that run counter to the demands of ethnic minority organizations in order to increase their support vis-a-vis co-ethnic competitors. For example, a majority party can outbid in *positions* by adopting an increasingly hard-lined stance against the minority group, in which the party refuses to negotiate with minority organizations or to entertain the prospects of compromising with minority organizations to meet their demands. A majority party can also outbid in *policies* by supporting a bill that restricts the rights of a minority group or by championing the use of repression against a minority group.

My definition of ethnic outbidding incorporates positions and policies in order to capture both the *intended* and *actual* actions that majority parties may take

against minority groups. This definition also expects that while ethnic outbidding can occur under low and high levels of majority fragmentation, the effect on *positions* and *policies* is likely to be greater under high majority fragmentation, when the co-ethnic opposition is more equal in power to the majority party that controls the government. In this situation, strong co-ethnic competition may create incentives for the governing party to not only adopt an extreme position against the minority group to expand its support, but to also follow through on more extreme policies against the minority group. In contrast, since opposition parties are relatively weak vis-a-vis the governing party under low majority fragmentation, outbidding among them is less likely to sway the governing party into adopting more extreme positions or policies toward the minority group.

1.5.2   Outbidding in fragmented majority groups

Like other political parties, ethnic majority parties compete to remain in office and retain their hold on political power. Specifically, ethnic parties within the majority group compete *electorally* against their fellow co-ethnics for political office and once they are in office, they compete *legislatively* against each other over their policy agendas.[5]

Also like other parties, ethnic parties within political majority groups hold different positions on a variety of policy issues, such as the economy, health, education, security, the environment, etc. However, since ethnicity is a mobilizing force for po-

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[5]This is not to say that ethnic majority parties don't compete with ethnic minority parties, multi-ethnic parties, or non-ethnic parties. However, since ethnic majority parties derive their support primarily from members of the ethnic majority group, their main competitors are fellow co-ethnic parties.

litical organization, these parties also espouse positions on policy issues related to their ethnic group and ethnic minority group(s). These positions can vary within and across parties, with some parties advocating for more inclusive policies toward minorities and a more conciliatory approach to resolving conflicts with them, and other parties being unwilling to cede any ground to minorities and calling for a more hard-lined approach.

The literature leads us to expect that ethnic party positions change in response to elite incentives, voter preferences, and political institutions. On the one hand, studies suggest that elites in competitive ethnic groups may be more likely to play the ethnic card and campaign on hard-lined positions toward minorities in order to gain an electoral or legislative advantage against co-ethnics (Bloom 2005; Boylan 2014; Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 1996; Toft 2007). Other scholars argue that political institutions can create electoral incentives for elites to tamp down the ethnic card and advocate for accommodations to minorities (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2005; Coakley 2008; Mitchell et al. 2009; Zuber 2011, 2012; Zuber and Szocsik 2015).

I argue, however, that majority parties also change their positions in response to *what minority organizations do*, and that minority organizations recognize and account for these expectations when they select their strategies. Ethnic groups have heterogeneous preferences that can change in response to external factors, including the strategies that minority organizations use. For example, if an organization in minority group B launches a wave of suicide attacks against civilians in majority group A, people within the majority group may harden their preferences in response to this threat, and majority parties may adopt extreme positions toward the eth-

nic minority in order to remain competitive with voters. But if an organization in minority group B holds peaceful demonstrations, people within majority group A are less likely to feel threatened by their actions and less likely to harden their preferences. Consequently, majority parties may have few incentives to outbid against the minority group.

Ethnopolitical minority organizations care about how majorities respond to their actions because it affects their ability to realize their goals. In particular, when majorities respond to their actions by outbidding, it is more difficult for minorities to achieve their strategic objectives. When voters and parties in the majority group outbid, the governing party may adopt a more extreme position in order to remain competitive with its fellow co-ethnics. When the governing party outbids, its resolve for using violence against the minority group is likely to increase (i.e., its costs for using violence decrease). When the governing party's costs for using violence decrease, the bargaining range is likely to decrease as well, making it less likely that an ethnopolitical minority organization will be able to get concessions or achieve its goals without resorting to violence. Violence, however, is costly for ethnopolitical minority organizations, since it leads to a loss of life, materials, and resources.[6]

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[6]This is not to say, however, that ethnopolitical minority organizations always prefer that the majority does not outbid. In some cases, outbidding in the majority may be beneficial for minority organizations. For example, if outbidding in the ethnic majority leads the governing party to use indiscriminate violence against civilians in the ethnic minority, backlash against this indiscriminate violence may increase support for an ethnopolitical minority organization, thereby increasing its power relative to the government. Lake (2002) makes a similar case for terrorist organizations. However, while this may help with an organization's proximate goal of increasing its resources, a continued strategy of provoking the governing party to use indiscriminate violence against civilians may backfire against an organization, as the costs that its co-ethnic citizens bear may become too great. Therefore, although triggering outbidding in the majority may have some benefits for minority organizations, I expect that on average, minority organizations prefer that the ethnic majority does not outbid.

I contend that as strategic actors, ethnopolitical minority organizations recognize that their actions can trigger outbidding in the majority group and account for these expectations when deciding which strategy to use to advance their goals.

In the next two sections, I describe how minority organizations make these strategic choices as fragmentation in the majority group varies from low to high. In particular, I focus on two types of choices - (1) the decision to use a single strategy of electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence in a given year, and (2) the decision to employ a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence in a given year.

1.6   How minorities select single strategies against fragmented majorities

Ethnopolitical minority organizations bargain with the government over a variety of benefits for their ethnic group. As strategic and rational actors, minority organizations assess the costs and benefits of pursuing their goals via different strategies. Given resource constraints, they are likely to select the strategy that is less costly and more likely to succeed (Asal et al. 2013; Cunningham 2013; Cunningham et al. 2017).

As summarized in Table 3.2, each strategy requires different resources and political opportunity structures in order to be effective. To use violence, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have enough resources to defeat the governing party or coerce it into making concessions. At the same time, if an ethnopolitical

minority organization expends the costs of using violence to bring the governing party to the negotiating table, it needs to be sure that the government will not renege on its concessions.

In contrast, for nonviolence to be successful, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have enough people power to mobilize the masses and inflict costs on the government through non-cooperation. Equally important, there need to be divisions within elites that minority organizations can leverage to strip away support from the governing party. Finally, to press its claims through electoral politics, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have legislative access and the ability to push through its preferred policies.

Table 1.2: Theoretical mechanisms

Minority strategy	Political opportunity structure	LMF	HMF
Violence	No increase in govt. resolve from outbidding	Available	Limited
Nonviolence	Elite divisions to leverage	Limited	Available
Elections	Policymaking, coalition	Limited	Available

I argue that variation in majority fragmentation changes the costs, benefits, and opportunities of using each strategy. In the next two sections, I examine how ethnopolitical minority organizations choose to participate in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence as fragmentation in the majority group varies from relatively low to relatively high.

1.6.1 Minority strategies when majority fragmentation is low

I expect that using violence is a more cost-effective strategy for ethnopolitical minority organizations than engaging in nonviolence or participating in elections when fragmentation in the dominant group is relatively low.

When majority fragmentation is low, outbidding dynamics within the majority group are less relevant and less likely to influence how the government interacts with minorities. When the governing party does not face strong competition from its co-ethnics, it is less likely to be swayed into changing its position or policies toward the ethnic minority by co-ethnic parties who have minimal power. For example, even if minor parties start to advocate extreme positions or policies, the governing party may have few incentives to follow suit, since these minor parties do not challenge it electorally or legislatively.

Consequently, the use of violence by minority organizations is less likely to trigger outbidding dynamics that can shift the preferences and policies of the governing party. Without the push of outbidding, the governing party's costs for using violence against the minority organization may not decrease. Without an increase in resolve or a decrease in costs, the underlying distribution of power between the ethnopolitical minority organization and the government is unlikely to change. This can increase the ability of an ethnopolitical minority organization to coerce the government into making concessions.

In contrast, when fragmentation in the majority group is relatively low, elite divisions are less pronounced and the opportunity to leverage them is greatly re-

duced. This dearth of divisions decreases the costs that an ethnopolitical minority organization can bring to bear on the governing party through nonviolent resistance, since its ability to strip enough politically relevant support away from the government is limited.

In addition, under low fragmentation, the governing party is likely to face minimal resistance from co-ethnic parties in advancing its preferred policies or agenda. When the governing party doesn't need other parties to help it legislate, ethnopolitical minority organizations will have limited opportunities to serve as a coalition partner. Subsequently, low majority fragmentation limits the ability of an ethnopolitical minority organization to serve as a "kingmaker" in legislative politics.

As such, an ethnopolitical minority organization may anticipate that using nonviolence or conventional politics is not particularly effective when majority fragmentation is relatively low. Instead, it may calculate that it can get a greater bang for its buck by using violence. This expectation leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: Ethnopolitical political minority organizations are more likely to engage in violence than to take part in electoral politics or use nonviolence when majority fragmentation is relatively low.

1.6.2   Minority strategies when majority fragmentation is high

I argue that when fragmentation in the dominant group is relatively high, nonviolence or electoral politics are more cost-effective strategies than violence for ethnopolitical minority organizations.

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When majorities are fragmented, outbidding dynamics are more relevant and more likely to influence the governing party. In a competitive environment, parties have incentives to edge out their co-ethnics since this can make a difference between being in the government or the opposition, in the legislature or out of the legislature, or in control of the ethnic group or on the sidelines of the ethnic group. If a governing party sees that its co-ethnic competitors are gaining an electoral or legislative edge by outbidding, it may be more likely to adopt a similar strategy in order to remain competitive.

When an ethnopolitical minority organizations uses violence against a competitive majority group, its actions are likely to trigger outbidding dynamics in the majority. In response to violence, people within the ethnic majority are likely to harden their preferences. When people's preferences harden, ethnic majority parties are likely to shift their positions as well. A governing party that needs to remain viable in a competitive environment is also likely to shift its preferences and become more resolved, which decreases its costs for using violence against the minority group. Since the balance of power is already likely to be titled in favor of the majority group, an ethnopolitical minority organization may decide that it does not have enough resources to bring a more resolved governing party to the negotiating table. Employing violence against a fragmented majority group, therefore, may not be an effective use of resources.

In contrast, using nonviolence is unlikely to trigger a cycle of outbidding in the majority group. Indeed, scholars note that states perceive nonviolent forms of dissent to be less threatening than violent actions (Carey 2010; Chenoweth and

Perkoski 2017; Chenoweth et al. 2017; DeMerritt 2016; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Poe 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002). When people within the majority group are not threatened with violence, majority parties may be less likely to harden their positions or unite against the ethnic minority. If moderate members of the majority group do not shift their preferences, the parties that compete for their votes are less likely to alter their positions. This can increase the ability of ethnopolitical minority organizations to leverage divisions within the majority group.

Moreover, elite divisions are more pronounced and there is a greater opportunity to leverage them when majorities are fragmented. Since opposition parties have more institutional or political power, shifting the loyalties of these parties has the potential to yield greater benefits. This can increase the ability of ethnopolitical minority organizations to engender loyalty shifts and inflict costs on the governing party through non-cooperation.

At the same time, minority organizations may anticipate that majority parties will be more willing to cooperate with them during periods of high fragmentation. When majority fragmentation is relatively high, the governing party is likely to face strong resistance from co-ethnic parties in advancing its preferred policies or agenda. In this type of competitive environment, a governing party that needs coalition partners to implement its agenda may reach across the ethnic divide and invite an ethnopolitical minority organization to join the government, especially if it holds similar positions with the organization on non-ethnic issues.

Even if the governing party has an adequate number of seats in the legislature, in a competitive environment it may be helpful for it to work with minority

organizations in order to advance its agenda. If the governing party is unable to work with fellow co-ethnic parties, it may have incentives to reach across ethnic lines and trade concessions with minority parties in exchange for their legislative support. A minority organization may find that the governing party is willing to offer some concessions on minority issues in exchange for its support on non-ethnic issues. If an ethnopolitical minority organization can use its partnership with the government to realize its political objectives, engaging in electoral politics may be a cost-effective strategy.

Once this pattern of cooperation has been established, minority organizations may expect that majority parties may be more likely to work with them during subsequent periods of high fragmentation. Using nonviolence or electoral politics is likely to increase the odds of this cross-ethnic cooperation, since these tactics are less threatening and less likely to trigger outbidding than violence.

Subsequently, when fragmentation in the dominant group is relatively high, an ethnopolitical minority organization may find that it gets a greater return on its resources by engaging in nonviolence or taking part in elections than using violence. These expectations lead to the following hypotheses, which are summarized in Table 3.3:

H2: Ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence than violence when majority fragmentation is relatively high.

H3: Ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use violence when majority fragmentation is relatively high.

Table 1.3: Minority strategies conditional on majority fragmentation

	Minority Violence	Minority Nonviolence	Minority Electoral Politics
LMF	More likely	Less likely	Less likely
HMF	Less likely	More likely	More likely

1.7 How minorities select mixed strategies against fragmented majorities

In most cases, minority organizations tend to use just one strategy in a given year. Data from the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), which codes yearly information on electoral participation, nonviolence, and violence for 1,124 ethnopolitical organizations in 77 countries from 1960 - 2005, shows that in nearly three-quarters of cases, organizations use just one strategy in a given year.

Nonetheless, minority organizations also used mixed strategies in about a fifth of cases. According to the SRDP data, a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence was used 11% of the time, followed by a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence, which was employed 10% of the time. In less than 1% of cases, minority organizations took part in elections and used violence or used all three strategies in the same year. As such, in addition to theorizing about how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of minority strategies to use a single strategy, I develop expectations about how majority fragmentation affects the likelihood that minority organizations use mixed strategies. Since the most commonly used mixed strategies are electoral politics and nonviolence and violence and nonviolence, I focus on these

two cases.

1.7.1 Electoral politics and nonviolence against fragmented majorities

I anticipate that majority fragmentation conditions the choice of minority organizations to participate in electoral politics and use nonviolence in the same way that it does for when these strategies are used separately. When fragmentation in the majority group is low, there are few divisions for minority organizations to leverage with nonviolence and few opportunities for organizations to serve as coalition partners in the government. These political opportunity structures change and become more favorable for using electoral politics and nonviolence together as majority fragmentation increases.

Since there are more divisions to leverage under high majority fragmentation, minority organizations can use nonviolence more effectively. Likewise, co-ethnic competition in the majority group opens possibilities for minority organizations to join the government as a coalition member or to trade votes with a governing party that is weakened by co-ethnic competition in exchange for support on minority issues. In addition, a minority organization that serves as a coalition member can use nonviolence to pressure the governing party into making concessions or adopting policies that benefit the minority group, since the governing party needs its support. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis:

H4: Ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to take part in elec-

toral politics and use nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation is
relatively high.

1.7.2 Violence and nonviolence against fragmented majorities

The effect of majority fragmentation on the choice of minority organizations to use violence and nonviolence in the same year is less clear. On the one hand, it is possible that minority organizations may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is low. Since violence is less likely to trigger outbidding that can increase the government's resolve under low majority fragmentation, a minority organization can avoid expending more resources to defeat or coerce the government into making concessions.

While there are few divisions to leverage with nonviolence under low majority fragmentation, a minority organization may use nonviolence for another purpose - to signal its strength to the government. If an organization holds a massive rally that is attended by thousands of supporters, the government may update its beliefs about the mobilization capabilities and power of the organization. This signal can increase the ability of the minority organization to coerce the government into making a concession.

On the other hand, minority organizations may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation is relatively high. While using violence against a fragmented majority group is likely to provoke out-bidding, a minority organization may anticipate that if it avoids targeting moderates

in the majority group, it may be able to lessen the extent of outbidding. Research shows that voters respond differently to violence depending on where it is located. For instance, Berrebi and Klor (2008) demonstrate that in Israel, terror fatalities within a locality increased the local population's support for right-leaning parties, whereas voters living outside of the affected areas tended to increase their support for left-wing parties. Similarly, Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) show that voting for right-wing parties in Israel increased in localities that were within the range of rocket attacks from Gaza.

These findings suggest that if a minority organization is selective about where it uses violence, it may be able to limit the extent to which most people and parties within the majority group outbid. With this limit on outbidding, a minority organization can continue to use nonviolence to leverage existing divisions and rally support among moderates for its cause.

Alternatively, a minority organization may prefer to use violence and nonviolence in the same year because it has the resources to withstand a potential counter-attack by a more resolved government and because it can use outbidding as a recruitment tool. In this case, a minority organization may not want to limit the fallout of violence because outbidding can help it increase its own resources and mobilization capabilities.

For example, a minority organization may expect that using violence will trigger outbidding in the majority against the minority. When majority group members, opposition parties, and the governing party adopt more hard-lined positions on ethnic minority issues, a minority organization can argue that there is good reason for

co-ethnics to support its fight for the rights of the minority group. Indeed, studies have found that terrorist organizations use violence strategically to provoke government responses that can increase their recruitment (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007). In this way, provoking outbidding through violence can serve as a rallying cry for mobilizing members and supporters.

In turn, this can help a minority organization increase its mobilization capacity and ability to coerce the government into concessions. At the same time, an organization may use nonviolence as a signaling tool for demonstrating its strength and capabilities to the government. For either reasons, a minority organization may prefer to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is relatively high.

Since it is not clear how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of minority organizations to use violence and nonviolence in the same year, I test the following two competing hypotheses:

H5a: Ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use violence and nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation is relatively <u>low</u>.

H5b: Ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use violence and nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation is relatively <u>high</u>.

1.8   Majority outbidding in response to minority strategies

Finally, I also theorize that majority parties respond to the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use in distinct ways. I contend that

on average, majorities are more likely to outbid and promote hard-lined positions or policies against minorities when minority organizations use violence than nonviolence, since violence threatens the lives of the majority group in ways that nonviolence does not.

Studies have found that after suicide terrorist attacks, for example, public opinion often becomes more supportive of hard-lined responses, as was the case in Northern Ireland, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, the Philippines, and Russia (Abrahms 2010). Although research shows that this effect is most pronounced in areas that are hit by violence (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014), studies also demonstrate that on average, nonviolence is less threatening than violence (Carey 2010; Chenoweth and Perkoski 2007; Chenoweth et al. 2017; DeMerrit 2016; Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Poe 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002).

When public opinion coalesces around a hard-lined position, majority parties, including the governing party, are likely to change their positions in order to remain responsive to voters. Subsequently, following an act of violence by minority organizations, majority parties may be more likely to adopt policies or positions that are more confrontational toward minorities.

In contrast, since nonviolence is less threatening than violence on average, the use of nonviolent tactics is less likely to lead to a "rally around the flag effect" or a hardening of positions or policies against the ethnic minority. Instead, when an ethnopolitical minority organization uses nonviolence, some majority parties may promote hard-lined positions or policies, but others may not. For example, parties that already advocate hard-lined positions or policies on ethnic minority issues may

continue their calls for hard-lined responses, but parties that hold moderate positions may be unlikely to change their stances or call for more extreme measures to resolve the ethnic issue. Consequently, following an act of nonviolence by minority organizations, majority parties may be less likely to shift toward more extreme positions or policies vis-a-vis the minority group.

I also anticipate that the effects of outbidding in response to minority strategies is conditional on the level of fragmentation within the majority group. When majorities are minimally fragmented, opposition parties may outbid in response to violence, but this is unlikely to sway the governing party into adopting more hard-lined positions or policies toward the minority, since there is minimal co-ethnic competition and the governing party has command over the majority group. In contrast, when majorities are highly fragmented and there is strong competition among co-ethnics, opposition parties and the governing party may be more likely to outbid in response to minority violence. In this case, if opposition parties outbid, the governing party may do the same in order to remain competitive against its relatively strong co-ethnics. As such, I argue that majority parties are more likely to outbid as majority fragmentation increases.

These expectations lead to the following hypotheses:

H6: Majority parties are more likely to outbid against the minority group after ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence than nonviolence.

H7: Majority parties are more likely to outbid against the minority group when majority fragmentation is relatively high.

1.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that fragmentation within ethnic political majorities conditions the strategies that ethnopolitical minority organizations use to achieve their political goals, shaping the political opportunity structures within which organizations operate and their cost-benefit calculations for using different strategies.

As it decides how to achieve its goals, an ethnopolitical minority organization wants to pick the strategy that minimizes its costs while maximizing its chances of success. In order for violence to be effective, a minority organization needs to have military capabilities to defeat or inflict enough costs on the government, either directly through violence or indirectly through the threat of violence, to coerce it into making concessions. In contrast, for nonviolence to be successful, a minority organization needs to inflict costs through non-cooperation by leveraging elite divisions and engendering loyalty shifts. Likewise, to press its claims through electoral politics, a minority organization needs to be able to run for office and have enough legislative power to push through its policies.

Variation in majority fragmentation conditions the single and mixed strategies of minority organizations by shaping the political opportunity structures in which they operate. When majorities are minimally fragmented, there are fewer divisions among majority parties and one party holds a preponderant share of power. In this environment, nonviolence and electoral politics are less effective strategies, since there are limited divisions to leverage and few opportunities for minority organizations to serve as coalition members or to trade votes with weakened governing party.

On the other hand, since opposition parties are relatively weak, the governing party is less likely to be pulled into adopting a more resolved stance against a minority organization that uses violence. Minority organizations may find, therefore, that violence is a better use of their resources than nonviolence or electoral politics when majority fragmentation is relatively low.

When fragmentation in the majority is relatively high, majority parties are more divided in their preferences and policies, and two or more parties are relatively equal in power. If the governing party is unable to work with fellow co-ethnic parties, it may have incentives to reach across ethnic lines and trade concessions with minority parties in exchange for their legislative support. Since the opposition is relatively strong, minority organizations can leverage existing divisions and build cross-ethnic support for their cause. At the same time, minority organizations can serve as coalition partners or exchange votes in support for minority concessions with a governing party that is hamstrung by co-ethnic competition.

Once this history of cooperation has been established, minority organizations may expect that subsequent majority parties may be willing to work with them during periods of high fragmentation. Moreover, the prospects for cooperation are likely to be higher when minority organizations use nonviolence or engage in electoral politics, since these tactics are less threatening and less likely to trigger outbidding than violence.

In contrast, since there is a greater chance of violence leading to outbidding among voters and parties that can sway the government into becoming more re-solved, violence is a not an effective strategy under high majority fragmentation.

In this political opportunity structure, minority organizations may prefer to use nonviolence or to engage in electoral politics than violence.

Regarding the choice of minority organizations to use mixed strategies, I expect that majority fragmentation conditions the choice of organizations to take part in elections and use nonviolence in the same year in the same way that it affects the choice to use these strategies separately, making minority organizations more likely to take part in electoral politics and use nonviolence in the same year as majority fragmentation increases.

The effect of majority fragmentation on a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence is less clear. Minority organizations may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is low because it is less likely to trigger outbidding and because nonviolence can signal the organization's strength to the government, which can help an organization exact more concessions. Alternatively, a minority organization may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is high because it can limit the fallout of outbidding by avoiding targeting moderates, thereby allowing it to continue using nonviolence to leverage existing divisions.

Finally, I argue that majorities respond to the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use in distinct ways. Since violence is more threatening that nonviolence, majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence. In addition, I contend that majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when they are highly fragmented.

In the next chapter, I describe the methodology that I used for testing the

theory and hypotheses.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

To test the theory, I used a mixed method approach. The quantitative portion consists of a longitudinal analysis of ethnopolitical minority organization strategies from 1960-2005 in Sri Lanka, using an original measure of majority fragmentation based on roll call voting data collected during field work in Sri Lanka, a secondary original measure of majority fragmentation based on party seat share, and existing data on minority strategies. Since I am interested in examining how variation in majority fragmentation affects the strategies of minority organizations over time, the unit of analysis is the organization-year. I also use the roll call data from Sri Lanka in an analysis to examine whether majority parties are more likely to outbid when minority organizations use violence than nonviolence and whether majorities are more likely to outbid when they are highly fragmented.

To complement the quantitative analysis, I conduct a qualitative analysis of majority fragmentation and minority strategies in Sri Lanka over the same time period. The qualitative analysis includes interviews with local experts and representatives of political parties conducted during fieldwork in Sri Lanka, as well as secondary sources from the comparative politics literature on Sri Lanka.

I focus on Sri Lanka because fragmentation within the group that controls the government - the Sinhalese - varies considerably over time, as does the use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence by ethnopolitical minority organizations. Sri Lanka has been studied extensively because it experienced a civil war from 1983-2009, and studies have established which factors matter for explaining the long-lasting ethnic conflict between the Tamils and Sinhalese. At the same time, no studies have examined how fragmentation within the majority group affected the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations. Focusing on the Sri Lankan case also allows me to control for several country-level variables, such as the system of government, electoral system, and history of the country. Subsequently, Sri Lanka presents an ideal case for testing the argument. In this chapter, I start with a brief overview of the Sri Lankan case, in terms of ethnic groups and the history of conflict between them. I then review the quantitative and qualitative methods used to test the theory.

4.2   The Sri Lankan Case

As an ethnically diverse country, Sri Lanka is comprised of three main ethnic groups - the Sinhalese, Tamils (Indian and Sri Lankan), and Moors/Muslims. The Sinhalese are the largest in size, with about 70% of the total country population. The Tamils are the largest minority group (the Sri Lankan Tamils comprise about 11% of the total country population, while the Indian Tamils constitute about 12% of the population), followed by the Moors/Muslims, at about 6% of the population.

Geographically, the Sri Lankan Tamils are concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (they are the majority in the former). The Indian Tamils reside mostly in the hills of the Central Province. The Muslims are located in the Central and Eastern Provinces, as well as in the southern cities. The Sinhalese constitute the majority in the south-west and central parts of the country (Birnir et al. 2015; Vogt et al. 2015).

Both the executive and legislative branches of government have been controlled exclusively by the Sinhalese since the country gained its independence from the British in 1948. At the same time, politics has been characterized by ethnic mobilization for all three ethnic groups. Specifically, from 1960-2006, the Sinhalese have been represented by a total of 16 political parties, 17 ethnic organizations have advocated for the interests of the Tamils, and one party has campaigned for the Muslims.

Relations between the Sinhalese and Tamils have been punctuated by periods of conflict and cooperation. Initially, Tamil organizations used electoral politics or nonviolence to press their demands to the Sinhalese with some level of success. However, following setbacks in the 1970s, a new set of Tamil organizations that rejected nonviolent strategies and advocated for the use of violence began to emerge. These militant organizations increased in number and size during the late 1970s and early 1980s. With them, came an increase in the level of violence, and by 1983, the conflict had escalated to a civil war. In spite of several negotiation and mediation attempts, the civil war continued for decades. During this time, however, not all minority organizations used violence; indeed, many engaged in electoral

politics, nonviolence, or a mix of these strategies, and even the dominant militant organization representing the Tamils - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - employed a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence for many years. The civil war finally came to an end in 2009, when the remaining militant Tamil organization, the LTTE, was militarily defeated by the Sri Lankan Army (Ratner 2012).

4.3 Quantitative

The quantitative analysis examines how majority fragmentation conditions the likelihood that minority organizations (1) use electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence only and (2) engage in a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence. I focus on these two mixed strategies because they are used far more frequently than other types of mixed strategies.[1] I also explore whether (3) majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence and nonviolence and whether outbidding is more likely when majorities are highly fragmented.

The data collection includes two original measures of majority fragmentation - one based on roll call data collected during field work in Sri Lanka and the other based on ethnic party seat share. I combine these original variables with existing longitudinal data of minority strategies from 1960-2005.

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[1]According to the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP), which codes yearly information on electoral participation, nonviolence, and violence for 1,124 ethnopolitical organizations in 77 countries from 1960 - 2005, a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence was used 11% of the time, followed by a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence, which was employed 10% of the time. In less than 1% of cases, minority organizations took part in elections and used violence or used all three strategies in the same year.

The analysis consists of two multinomial logistic regression models; the first uses single strategies as compared to no strategies as the dependent variable, while the second uses mixed strategies as compared to no strategies. Specifically, the first dependent variable consists of four categories, three of which are single strategies - no action at all, just elections, just nonviolence, and just violence. The second dependent variable consists of three categories, two of which are mixed strategies - no action at all, elections & nonviolence, and violence & nonviolence.

Ideally, I would have ran just one multinomial logistic regression that includes no strategies, all three single single strategies, and both mixed strategies as the categories of the dependent variable; however, this model did not converge. Subsequently, I coded the dependent variables as described above for two reasons. First, by focusing on each strategy separately, I can isolate the effect of majority fragmentation on single and mixed strategies only as compared to cases when organizations don't take any action, rather than comparing single strategies to no action *or* mixed strategies, and vise versa.

While this approach does not select on the dependent variable since I include the category of not taking any action, if an organization frequently alternates between using single and mixed strategies in each year, running two separate analyses would arbitrarily remove some years for some organizations.[2] This may be problematic if there is a distinct causal process that motivates organizations to alternate strategies that is not being captured by the theory or the analysis. As I describe

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[2]Selection on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990) would occur if the dependent variables *only* included cases of single or mixed strategies, without incorporating instances of organizations not taking any action in a given year. Since both dependent variables include a category of organizations doing nothing, the analysis is not subject to this type of selection bias.

in the subsection on the dependent variable, I examined this issue empirically and found that it was not a problem.

Second, although I coded another set of dependent variables that took advantage of the full sample, only the model with the mixed strategies dependent variable converged. In this case, the base category for the single strategies dependent variable consisted of no action *and mixed strategies*, while for mixed strategies, the base category included no action *and single strategies*. I show results for this recoded version of the mixed strategy variable in Chapter 5, but focus on the results from the models that converged.

Below, I discuss the independent, dependent, and control variables, as well as the methods and models used in the analysis. I also provide some descriptive statistics about the independent and dependent variables.

4.3.1   Independent Variables

To examine how majority fragmentation conditions minority strategies, I use two independent variables. The first - the Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index (EMFI) - is based on original roll call voting records for the Sri Lankan Parliament from 1960-2006 that I collected during fieldwork in Sri Lanka. I use the roll call data to construct an ethnic party version of the Rice Cohesion Index, which is used commonly in legislative studies to measure the degree of cohesion within and among parties. As a robustness check, I created a second measure of majority fragmentation - the Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index (EMSI) - which uses ethnic

party seat shares to assess fragmentation. This measure is an ethnic party version of the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index, which is used to capture the degree of electoral or legislative competition among parties. In the sections below, I describe the roll call data and the EMFI and EMSI variables.

4.3.1.1 Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index (EMFI)

To measure majority fragmentation, I use original roll call voting data collected during fieldwork in Sri Lanka. Roll call votes have been used in political science to map legislator preferences in an ideological space across many countries and institutional contexts, including the U.S., various parliamentary and presidential systems across the world, the European Union, and the United Nations (McCarty et al. 2001; Clinton et al. 2004). Roll call votes in the United Nations also have been used to assess the likelihood that states go to war with each other (Reed et al. 2008) and to predict treaty commitments (Lupu 2014). I use roll call votes for another purpose - to measure majority fragmentation and assess how it affects the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations. To my knowledge, this is a novel use of roll call data in the conflict literature.

The roll call voting database was created from hard copy records (daily hansards) that are housed at the parliament building in Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte, Sri Lanka (the hansards before 2006 are not available on-line). Roll call votes are initiated when a member of parliament (MP) specifically calls for a vote to be recorded by name.[3] Roll calls were initiated for substantively important votes (i.e., MPs did not

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[3]MPs can also vote by voice or by a show of hands.

call for a roll call to adjourn parliament early for the day.)

I collected and recorded all available roll call votes from 1956-2005 that were noted in the daily hansards. For these votes, I recorded the name of the MP and whether she/he voted yay, nay, abstained, or was absent. In the analysis, abstentions and absences were coded as missing (in most cases, abstentions were less than five percent of votes). Since the MPs party was not listed in the hansards, I researched and matched each MP who cast a vote to her/his party. I also researched and coded whether parties were in the government or opposition, whether parties represented ethnic majority or ethnic minority groups, the ideology of parties (left, center, right), whether a vote was on a government-related or an ethnic-related issue, and general information about each vote (name of the bill, type of vote). I coded a party as ethnic if it made an appeal to an ethnic group, advocated for a position specific to an ethnic group, and/or received the majority of its support from an ethnic group. Each ethnic party was matched to an ethnic group, and each ethnic group was classified as being politically dominant (controls the executive) or not politically dominant (does not control the executive).

Table 4.1 lists roll call votes for parliaments 5-13 (the years for which data on minority strategies is available).[4] As seen in this table, the number of roll call votes in each parliamentary session varied substantially. Parliaments 5, 6, 8, and 10 have several votes, but parliaments 7, 9, and 11 have only three roll call votes each, parliament 13 has two roll call votes, and parliament 12 has one roll call vote. The

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[4]Parliament 13 ended in 2010, but since data on minority strategies is only available through 2005, I list the EMCI score through 2005.

Figure 4.1: Collecting roll call data in Sri Lanka

limited number of votes in parliaments 7 and 9 is due to a lack of access to voting

records for these years[5], while the few votes in parliaments 11-13 reflects the fact

that MPs did not use this form of voting very often in these parliaments.

Using these roll call votes, I created the Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index

(EMFI). The EMFI is an ethnic party version of the Rice roll call cohesion score

(Rice 1928). Rice cohesion scores have been used extensively in legislative studies

to examine party cohesion across a variety of countries and contexts, including Ar-

gentina, Brazil, Finland, Israel, Italy, Norway, Russia, the U.S., and the European

Union. They have also been calculated for subgroups of legislators, such as rep-

resentatives from particular states, regions, or voting blocs (Gile and Jones 1995;

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[5]It is possible that the actual number of roll call votes during these parliaments is higher than
what I was able to record.

Table 4.1: Roll Call Voting in Sri Lankan Parliament

Parliament	Year	Roll calls	EMFI
Parliament 5	1960 - 1964	29	0.5166
Parliament 6	1965 - 1970	31	0.7051
Parliament 7	1970 - 1977	3	0.3146
Parliament 8	1977 - 1988	20	0.1042
Parliament 9	1989 - 1994	3	0.7570
Parliament 10	1994 - 2000	15	0.6671
Parliament 11	2000 - 2001	3	0.6598
Parliament 12	2001 - 2004	1	0.9186
Parliament 13	2004 - 2005	2	0.0281

Source: Sri Lanka Voting Database

Mainwaring and Linan 1997; Samuels 1996).

To create the EMFI, I calculated Rice cohesion scores for each vote for all ethnic majority parties. I then averaged across all votes in each parliament to obtain an average cohesion score for the ethnic majority group in each parliamentary session. Specifically, the EMFI is calculated for each vote by taking the absolute difference between yay and nay votes for ethnic majority parties divided by the total number of votes by ethnic majority parties -

$$EMFI_j = \mid Aye_{pj} - Nay_{pj} \mid / Aye_{pj} + Nay_{pj} \tag{4.1}$$

for all ethnic majority parties p on vote j.

Rice scores usually range from 0 to 1, where a value of 0 indicates that a bloc of parties was split 50-50 and a value of 1 indicates that parties voted in unity. I transposed the EMFI score so that higher values reflect higher levels of fragmentation in the dominant group. As seen in Table 4.1, the EMFI ranges from 0.028 to 0.919.

I expect that when ethnic majority parties vote in a relatively cohesive bloc, there is little difference among their preferences on issues and that fragmentation among them is relatively low. On the other hand, when there is little cohesion in voting among majority parties, parties are likely to differ substantially in their positions and preferences, indicating that fragmentation among them is relatively high. Subsequently, the EMFI variable measures variation in majority group fragmentation over time, at least as reflected in the cohesion of roll call votes for ethnic majority parties in the legislature.

It is important to address two factors related to the roll call data that may bias the EMFI measure. First, it is possible that the roll call votes may misrepresent the degree of fragmentation within the ethnic majority group. In the Sri Lankan parliament, roll calls are initiated when an MP calls for a vote to be recorded by name. Since these votes are neither routine (not every vote is a roll call) nor random, they may be affected by selection bias (Hug 2012).

On the one hand, this selection bias may over-estimate the degree of fragmentation within the majority group, if roll calls are only initiated on votes for which divisions among majority government and opposition parties are likely, like votes of no confidence. On the other hand, rolls call votes may under-estimate fragmentation in the majority group, if they are called for on votes of limited consequence, like a vote to adjourn the parliament for the day. Since roll calls are initiated on a variety of votes, including no confidence measures and other substantively significant bills, such as election laws, regional bills, and language bills, this bias may be in partially ameliorated.

Second, there are few roll calls for some parliaments, suggesting that the EMCI estimates for these parliaments may be imprecise. In particular, parliaments 7, 9, and 11 have only three roll call votes each, while parliament 13 has two roll call votes and parliament 12 has one roll call vote.

To address these concerns, I used a second measure of majority competition based on ethnic party seat share, which I describe next.

4.3.1.2 Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index (EMSI)

As a robustness check, I use a second measure - majority party seat share - to assess majority fragmentation. This measure, which is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculates the probability that two individuals picked at random from the legislature will belong to different parties, and varies from 0 in a perfectly homogeneous legislature to 1 in a completely heterogeneous one. The values of this variable range from a low of 0.077 to a high of 0.623. I calculated this variable for both the Sri Lanka and the cross-national data.

In comparing the two measures, for the EMSI variable, majority fragmentation is higher when there are more parties. In contrast, for the EMFI variable, fragmentation is higher when there is less cohesion in voting among parties. Since party positions and preferences may change within a legislative session, whereas party seat share is relatively static, I use the roll call variable as the main measure of majority fragmentation. However, to examine the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies in a more comprehensive fashion, I also use

the seat share measure in a supplementary analysis.

Table 4.2 lists the EMFI and EMSI scores for parliaments 5-13 in Sri Lanka. Because the number of seats in some parliaments changed at times, as some seats were vacated and vacant seats were filled, the EMSI variable includes two or more measures of majority fragmentation for some sessions of parliament. Overall, the correlation between these two variables is relatively strong, at 0.7411. The two measures are relatively similar for 6 of the 9 parliaments, with a difference of about .10. For the remaining parliaments, the scores are different. The greatest difference is Parliament 13, which the EMFI variable identifies as being minimally fragmented (EMFI = 0.0281) and the EMSI variable codes as being highly fragmented (EMSI = .536 - .537). Excluding the two years when the EMFI and EMSI scores differ, the correlation is even stronger at 0.8694.

Table 4.2: EMFI and EMSI scores for Sri Lanka, 1960-2005

Parliament	Year	Roll calls	EMFI	EMSI
Parliament 5	1960 - 1964	29	0.5166	.591
Parliament 6	1965 - 1970	31	0.7051	.623
Parliament 7	1970 - 1977	3	0.3146	.493 - .496
Parliament 8	1977 - 1988	20	0.1042	.077 - .137
Parliament 9	1989 - 1994	3	0.7570	.454
Parliament 10	1994 - 2000	15	0.6671	.513
Parliament 11	2000 - 2001	3	0.6598	.513 - .541
Parliament 12	2001 - 2004	1	0.9186	.557
Parliament 13	2004 - 2005	2	0.0281	.536 - .537

Source: Sri Lanka Roll Call Database

4.3.1.3 Majority Votes on Minority Issues after Minority Strategies

To assess whether majority parties are more likely to outbid against minorities following minority acts of violence than nonviolence and whether outbidding is more likely when majorities are more fragmented, I created a variable, *Majority Votes on Minority Issues after Minority Strategies*, which identifies votes on ethnic minority issues after minority organizations used nonviolence or violence. I constructed this variable using the roll call data that I collected in Sri Lanka in combination with existing data on minority strategies and minority violence. Using my roll call data, I first identified votes on ethnic minority issues. I then consulted coding notes from the SRDP data and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program for Sri Lanka to identify which votes took place within one month of minorities using nonviolence or violence.[6] I use one month as a cut off because I expect that acts of nonviolence or violence conducted any further out from roll calls are less likely to influence majority outbidding against minorities.

Based on this criteria, I identified four votes that took place during Parliament 8, a period of low majority fragmentation, and two votes that were held throughout Parliament 10, a time of high majority fragmentation. These votes are listed in Table 4.3 below.[7]

Parliament 8 includes a mix of votes on minority issues that were held after

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[6]I thank Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham for sharing these notes with me.

[7]I coded vote 107 as an ethnic minority vote because the parliament was considering whether to reinstate citizenship status for Indian Tamils, who had been previously stripped of their citizenship. Vote 114 vote 115 were about the establishment of local election councils, which would have granted Tamils some limited rights to local governance. Finally, votes 119, 130, and 131 concerned whether the government had the right to institute emergency powers to combat terrorism and ethnic violence.

minorities used nonviolence or violence, whereas Parliament 10 only includes votes on minority issues after minorities used violence (there were no ethnic minority votes after minorities used nonviolence).[8] For Parliament 8, the *Majority Votes on Minority Issues after Minority Strategies* variable is coded 1 for acts of minority nonviolence that took place within one month of a vote on a ethnic minority issue and 0 for acts of minority violence that occurred within one month of an ethnic minority issue vote. For Parliament 10, this variable is coded 1 for acts of minority violence within one month of an ethnic minority issue vote and 0 for all other votes.

Since Parliament 8 includes a mix of votes on minority issues that were held after minorities used nonviolence or violence, I examine whether majorities are more likely to vote cohesively after minorities use violence than nonviolence, which allows me to test hypothesis 6. Parliament 10, however, only includes votes on minority issues after minorities used violence. Here, I compare how majorities vote on minority issues after minorities use violence with how majorities vote on non-ethnic issues, irrespective of whether violence or nonviolence is used. Since there are no votes on minority issues after minorities use nonviolence, I cannot test whether majorities are more likely to outbid after violence than nonviolence during high majority fragmentation. Subsequently, I only partially test hypothesis 7.

As explained in detail in the Methods and Model section of this chapter, I

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[8]There was one vote that took place within a month of a minority organization using nonviolence; however, since it was a vote of No Confidence in the Minister of Telecommunications and Media, it does not appear to be on an ethnic minority issue. Further, while minority organizations did use nonviolence 15 days before one of the two ethnic minority issue votes, minority organizations used violence 3 days before this vote. Subsequently, I only coded minority violence before a majority vote on a minority issue for this parliament.

Table 4.3: Ethnic votes after minority nonviolence or violence

Parliament and Vote	Date	Name of vote	Minority strategy	Date of strategy
8 - Vote 107	1/30/1986	Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Bill	Violence	1/20/1986
8 - Vote 114	1/22/1988	Provincial Councils Elections Bill	Nonviolence	12/23/1987
8 - Vote 115	1/22/1988	Provincial Councils Elections Bill	Nonviolence	12/23/1987
8 - Vote 119	12/17/1988	Public Security Proclamation	Violence	11/6/1998
10 - Vote 130	5/9/1996	Public Security Proclamation	Violence	5/6/1996
10 - Vote 131	4/8/1996	Public Security Proclamation	Violence	4/6/1996

Source: Sri Lanka Voting Database

conduct a two-sample t-test to examine whether the mean EMFI score was significantly higher for majority votes on minority issues after minority organizations used violence versus nonviolence for Parliaments 8. For Parliament 10, I compared the mean EMFI score for majority votes on minority issues after minorities used violence to the mean EMFI score for all other votes in the parliament. While this test doesn't control for other factors that may influence majority voting on minority issues, it does allow me to test the mechanisms of the theory in a preliminary way.

It is worth addressing that the distribution of strategies used before votes on minority issues may seem to contradict the theory. In Parliament 8, which was a period of low fragmentation that I theorize was characterized by minority violence, there were two votes on minority issues after minorities used nonviolence. Likewise, when majority fragmentation was high in Parliament 10, both votes on minority issues followed minority acts of violence, and not nonviolence, as expected by the

theory. However, not all acts of minority nonviolence and violence are captured in the *Majority Votes on Minority Issues after Minority Strategies* variable. Indeed, there are many acts of minority nonviolence and violence that did not take place within one month of a roll call vote on an ethnic minority issue, and therefore were not included in this analysis. Consequently, the distribution of nonviolent and violent acts that preceded these votes is not representative of how often minorities used these strategies during periods of low and high fragmentation overall.

4.3.2 Dependent Variables

To test the impact of ethnic majority fragmentation on the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations, I use data from the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) (Cunningham et al. 2017). The SRDP collects data on whether ethnopolitical minority organizations participate in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence against the state for 1,124 ethnopolitical organizations in 77 countries from 1960 - 2005. For Sri Lanka, the SRDP data consists of 304 organization-year observations for 19 ethnopolitical minority organizations, making it well suited for testing the theory.

Using the SRDP data, I constructed two dependent variables - the first codes cases when minority organizations use electoral politics, nonviolence, violence, or no strategy in a year. The second captures instances when minority organizations use two of these strategies or do nothing in the same year. I focus on two mixed strategies - elections & nonviolence and violence & nonviolence - since these are the

most frequently used mixed strategies in Sri Lanka and the SRDP data as a whole.[9]

4.3.2.1   Minority single strategies

The first dependent variable, *Minority Single Strategies*, focuses on cases when minority organizations use just one tactic in a given year. It consists of four mutually exclusive categories - no action, electoral politics only, nonviolence only, and violence only. To create this variable, I assigned a "0" to any ethnopolitical minority organization that did not use any strategy in a given year, a "1" to any organization that used only institutional politics in a given year, a "2" to any organization that used only nonviolence in a given year, and a "3" to any organization that used only violence against the state in a given year.[10]

The institutional politics category consists of running in elections or registering as a political party. The nonviolence category is comprised of five types of nonviolent action: protests or demonstrations, economic non-cooperation (strikes, consumer boycotts), social non-cooperation (hunger strikes, self-immolation), nonviolent intervention (sit-ins, occupations, or blockades), and political non-cooperation (boycotts of elections, withdrawals from political office or government coalitions).[11]

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[9]In the SRDP data, a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence was used 11% of the time, followed by a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence, which was employed 10% of the time. In less than 1% of cases, minority organizations took part in elections and used violence or used all three strategies in the same year.

[10]I excluded observations in which an organization used a mixed strategy from this dependent variable.

[11]The political non-cooperation variable includes election boycotts. If an organization decides to boycott an election, the SRDP would code it as 1 for the political non-cooperation variable and 0 for the institutional politics variable in the same year, suggesting that the organization engages in a mixed strategy. However, since boycotting an election and not running for office are essentially the same, I do not consider these cases to be mixed strategies and instead code them as 0 for institutional politics only. This applies to 4 organizations for 4 observations.

The violence category includes violence against the state only (i.e., it does not code violence against co-ethnics or civilians).

4.3.2.2 Minority mixed strategies

In addition to using one tactic in a given year, ethnopolitical minority organizations can also use two or more tactics in the same year. Since the most commonly used mixed strategies are (1) elections & nonviolence and (2) violence & nonviolence, I focus on these categories.

The second dependent variable, *Minority Mixed Strategies*, consists of three mutually exclusive categories - no action, elections and nonviolence, and violence and nonviolence. To construct this variable, I assigned a "0" to cases when an ethnopolitical minority organization did not use any strategy (either single or mixed) in a given year; a "1" to cases when a minority organization only participated in electoral politics and used nonviolence in the same year; and a "2" to cases when an ethnopolitical minority organization only used violence and nonviolence in the same year. The electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence categories are defined in the same way as noted above for the *Minority Single Strategy* variable.

4.3.2.3 The issue of separating the panel data

It would have been preferable to run an analysis with a dependent variable that included all the strategies in one measure (no action, all three single strategies, and both mixed strategies). However, this model did not converge. Subsequently,

I ran two separate multinomial logistic regression models with single and mixed strategies as the dependent variables.

Separating the panel data in this way does not select on the dependent variable because I include the category of not taking any action in both dependent variables.[12] Nonetheless, separating the panel data by single and mixed strategies may be problematic for two reasons. First, it may be an issue if the causal mechanisms that link majority fragmentation and minority actions differ substantially between single and mixed strategies. Second, separating the cases may be problematic if organizations choose to alternate between single and mixed strategies for reasons that are not captured by the theory. I examine each of these issues in turn below.

With respect to the first issue, my theory specifically speaks to whether majority fragmentation conditions minority single and mixed strategies in different ways. As described in the theory chapter, I anticipate that the causal mechanisms for a single strategy of elections or nonviolence and a mixed strategy of elections & non-

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[12]As described by Geddes (1990) in a seminal article, selection on the dependent variable occurs when a researcher excludes cases in which the outcome of interest does not occur. For example, Geddes (1990, 132-133) notes that a research may be interested in examining why certain countries are more developed than others, and expects that an independent variable X is associated with more rapid development. If the researcher incorporates only developed countries A and B in her or his analysis and excludes less developed countries C through G, it is not possible to conclude whether independent variable X is indeed causally linked to development. This may be the case for two reasons. First, if higher values of X are linked to more development and the only countries that are included in a statistical analysis are countries that have high values of X, the analysis may find that there is no relationship between X and development when in fact there is one. Second, if countries A through G have high values of X but only countries A and B are developed, focusing on countries A and B and excluding the remaining countries would suggest that a relationship between X and development exists when in fact it does not.

In my analysis, the dependent variables include cases in which organizations do *and* do not take part in a single or mixed strategy. Since the dependent variables include cases when organizations take some action and do nothing, the type of selection on the dependent variable that is described by Geddes is not an issue.

violence are the same. I also theorize that the relationship between a single strategy of violence and a mixed strategy of violence & nonviolence may or may not be subject to the same causal mechanisms, and specifically test for this in the statistical analysis.

In terms of the second issue, separating the panel data may be problematic if many organizations alternate between single and mixed strategies in a way that runs counter to the theory. For instance, the theory expects that organizations are more likely to take part in elections, use nonviolence, or employ a mixed strategy of elections & nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases. As such, I anticipate that organizations that frequently used electoral politics or nonviolence under high majority fragmentation would also employ a mixed strategy of electoral politics & nonviolence under similar levels of majority fragmentation. If this was the case, then there may be no issue with separating the panel data into two samples for statistical analysis. However, if organizations that used a single strategy of elections or nonviolence often turned to something other than a mixed strategy of elections & nonviolence during periods of high fragmentation, this would suggest that the theory does not explain this switch in strategies and that there may be an issue with separating the panel data into two analyses.

To address this issue, I examined organizations that alternated between single and mixed strategies over time. Out of 19 organizations, 11 alternated between a single and a mixed strategy from one year to the next at least one time in their history (3 organizations alternated once, 6 organizations alternated twice, and 2

organizations alternated three times).[13]   Among these 11 cases, 7 organizations alternated between a single strategy of elections or nonviolence and a mixed strategy of elections & nonviolence, nearly all of which took place during periods of majority fragmentation. Since these organizations engaged in strategies that are expected by the theory, it does not appear to be problematic to separate these cases into two regression analyses.

Just one organization - the LTTE - alternates between a single strategy of violence and a mixed strategy of violence & nonviolence. However, the LTTE does so on two occasions only. From 1976 to 1984, the organization used a single strategy of violence or no strategy at all. Beginning in 1985, when it ostensibly became the dominant militant organization representing the Tamils, the LTTE used a mixed strategy of violence & nonviolence or no strategy for all but two years; in 1991 and 2000, when majority fragmentation was relatively high, the LTTE engaged in a single strategy of violence. Subsequently, there does not seem to be an issue with running two separate analyses for the LTTE, since the organization essentially used single and mixed strategies in two distinct time periods.

Finally, there are three organizations - the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), LTTE-Karuna faction (LTTE-Karuna), and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) - that alternated between a somewhat unexpected set of strategies from one year to the next. Specifically, the EPRFL switched from

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[13]Organizations that alternated single and mixed strategies once are the All Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Eelavar Democratic Front. Organizations that alternated twice include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, People's Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, Tamil National Alliance, and Tamil United Liberation Front. Organizations that alternated three times include the Ceylon Workers' Congress and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front.

a single strategy of elections to a mixed strategy of elections & violence during a period of low majority fragmentation; the LTTE-Karuna alternated between a mixed strategy of elections & nonviolence and a single strategy of violence during low majority fragmentation; and the TELO switched between a mixed strategy of elections & nonviolence and a mixed strategy of elections, nonviolence, & violence during a period of low fragmentation.

In nearly all of these cases, the organizations engaged in actions that either run counter the theory (using elections or elections & nonviolence during low fragmentation) or are unexplained by the theory (engaging in elections, nonviolence, and violence in the same year.) The former is to be expected, since the theory is probabilistic and not deterministic. The latter is not explained by the theory, but only constitutes one observation in the entire sample. Subsequently, it is unlikely to have a large impact on the analysis.

I also recoded the dependent variables to *not* separate the panel data by including all observations. In this case, the first dependent variable consisted of four categories - no action at all *and all cases of mixed strategies*, just elections, just nonviolence, and just violence. The second dependent variable consisted of three categories - no action at all *and all cases of single strategies and the remaining cases of mixed strategies (of which there are only two)*, elections & nonviolence, and violence & nonviolence.[14]

However,the model with the first recoded version of the dependent variable did

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[14]There was one organization that took part in elections and used violence in the same year and one organization that ran in elections, used nonviolence, and engaged in violence in the same year.

not converge since one of the variables (whether an organization held office in the previous year) perfectly predicted the outcome; when this variable was dropped, the results were similar to those with the separated data. Since this model is missing a control variable, I do not present the results in Chapter 5. The model with the second recoded version of the dependent variable converged and the results are substantively similar to those with the separated data. I present these results in Chapter 5 but focus the discussion on the models that converged.

4.3.3 Control Variables

I use four control variables in the analysis. Since fragmentation within ethnic minorities has been shown to matter for the use of nonviolence and violence (Cunningham 2014; Cunningham et al. 2017), I control for the number of other co-ethnic organizations that are active in the ethnic group. The *Number of Other Co-ethnic Factions* variable ranges in value from 0 (i.e., just one organization is active) to 11 (i.e., 11 other organizations are active). Based on the literature, I expect that fragmentation in the ethnic minority increases the likelihood of violence and nonviolence, although the impact on participating in elections is less clear.

I also control for whether it is an election year, since organizations are more likely to engage in electoral politics when elections are being held. *Election Year* is coded 1 if it is an election year and 0 if it is not. Lastly, I control for the past use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence, since there may be some path dependence to these strategies. Specifically, I control for whether an organization

held office in the year before an election, used nonviolence in the past year, or used violence in the previous year. *Held Office Prior to Election Year* is coded 1 if an organization held office in the year before an election and 0 if it did not. *Past Nonviolence* is coded 1 if an organization used nonviolence in the preceding year and 0 if it did not. Finally, *Past Violence* is coded 1 if an organization used violence in the preceding year and 0 if it did not. Data for these variables is from the SRDP. To code the *Held Office Prior to Election Year* variable, I researched whether organizations held office before an election year. In the analysis, I cluster standard errors on the ethnopolitical political minority organization.

4.3.4 Methods and Models

4.3.4.1 Multinomial logistic model

To examine the effect of majority fragmentation on minority strategies, I use a multinomial logistic regression model. This model is preferred when the dependent variable is comprised of categories that are nominal (i.e., there is no order to the categories) and distinct from one another. The multinomial logit model is akin to estimating simultaneously a series of binary logits for all comparisons among the alternatives of the dependent variable (Long and Freese 2007, 224). However, unlike the separate binary logits, all the logits are estimated simultaneously, which preserves the relationship among the parameters and uses the data more efficiently.

The multinomial logit model is described as

$$\ln \Omega_{m|b}(x) = \ln \frac{Pr(y = m \mid x)}{Pr(y = b \mid x)} = x\beta_{m|b} \ for \ m = 1 \ to \ J \qquad (4.2)$$

where b is the base outcome or reference category. The probabilities for each

outcome can be computed as:

$$Pr(y = m \mid x) = \frac{exp(x\beta_{m|b})}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} exp(x\beta_{j|b})} \qquad (4.3)$$

If a model was fit with the third outcome out of three possibilities as the base,

the estimates would be for $\beta_{1|3}$ and $\beta_{2|3}$, with $\beta_{3|3} = 0$, and the probability equation

would be

$$Pr(y = m \mid x) = \frac{exp(x\beta_{m|3})}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} exp(x\beta_{j|3})} \qquad (4.4)$$

In the analysis, I estimate four models: Models 1 and 2 examine single strate-

gies using the EMFI and EMSI variables, respectively, and Models 3 and 4 focus on

mixed strategies using the EMFI and EMSI variables. Since hypotheses 1-3 expect

that majority fragmentation affects the choices to use violence versus electoral pol-

itics and violence versus nonviolence, I use violence as the base category for Models

1 and 2. For hypotheses 4 and 5, I use no strategy as the base outcome.

The equations for Models 1-4 are described as follows:

Model 1, where E = elections and V = violence -

$$\ln \Omega_{E|V}(x_i) = \beta_{0,E|V} + \beta_{1+E|V} EMFI + \beta_{1+E|V} Number \ co-ethnic \ factions$$

$$+\beta_{1+E|V} Election\ year + \beta_{1+E|V} Held\ office\ before\ election\ year$$

$$+\beta_{1+E|V} Past\ nonviolence + \beta_{1+E|V} Past\ violence \quad (4.5)$$

Model 2, where N = nonviolence and V = violence -

$$\ln \Omega_{N|V}(x_i) = \beta_{0,N|V} + \beta_{1+N|V} EMFI + \beta_{1+N|V} Number\ co-ethnic\ factions$$

$$+\beta_{1+N|V} Election\ year + \beta_{1+N|V} Held\ office\ before\ election\ year$$

$$+\beta_{1+N|V} Past\ nonviolence + \beta_{1+N|V} Past\ violence \quad (4.6)$$

Model 3, where EN = Elections-nonviolence and N = no strategy -

$$\ln \Omega_{EN|N}(x_i) = \beta_{0,EN|N} + \beta_{1+EN|N} EMFI + \beta_{1+EN|N} Number\ co-ethnic\ factions$$

$$+\beta_{1+EN|N} Election\ year + \beta_{1+EN|N} Past\ nonviolence + \beta_{1+EN|N} Past\ violence$$

$$+\beta_{1+EN|N} Held\ office\ before\ election\ year (4.7)$$

Model 4, where VNV = Violence-nonviolence and N = no strategy -

$$\ln \Omega_{VNV|N}(x_i) = \beta_{0,VNV|N} + \beta_{1+VNV|N} EMFI + \beta_{1+VNV|N} Number\ co-ethnic\ factions$$

$$+\beta_{1+VNV|N} Election\ year + \beta_{1+EN|N} Past\ nonviolence + \beta_{1+EN|N} Past\ violence$$

$$+\beta_{1+VNV|N} Held\ office\ before\ election\ year (4.8)$$

Using a multinomial logistic regression model requires making an assumption about the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumption states that the odds of an outcome do not depend on the other alternatives that are available, i.e., that adding or eliminating alternatives does not change the odds for the remaining categories.[15]

Tests can be used to assess whether a model violates the IIA assumption, the two most common of which are the Hausman-McFadden (HM) test (Hausman and McFadden 1984) and the Small-Hsiao (SM) test (Small and Hsiao 1985). These tests evaluate the estimated coefficients from a full model with those from a restricted model that drops one or more of the alternatives. The IIA assumption is rejected if the test statistic is significant, which indicates that the multinomial logistic regression is not appropriate for modeling the data.

However, Long and Freese (2014) caution against using the HM or SM tests, since they often come to contradictory conclusions about whether the IIA assumption is violated. Indeed, Long and Freese mention that in a series of Monte Carlo simulations (Cheng and Long 2007), the HM test fared poorly even with a relatively large sample size (more than 1,000) and that although the SM test was better for

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[15]To illustrate this assumption, the red bus-blue bus example is commonly used. In this example, people have three ways to get to work: they can take a car, they can take a bus that is run by a company that uses red buses, or they can take a bus from a company that uses blue buses. It's assumed that people have a preference between taking a car or bus but they don't care whether they take a red bus or a blue bus, and that the odds of taking a car versus a bus are 1:1.

The IIA assumption expects that these odds will not change if people no longer have the option to choose between a red bus or a blue bus (e.g., because the company moves out of state or goes out of business). However, this seems unlikely, because people who had been taking the blue bus would probably prefer to take the red bus instead. This would change the odds of taking a car versus a bus from 1:1 to 1:2. Subsequently, because the red and blue buses are so similar, including both in a multinomial logistic model would underestimate the odds of taking a red bus versus a car (Long and Freese 2014, 407).

sample sizes of 500 or more, their size properties are "extremely poor" and do not improve with a larger sample. Therefore, "they conclude that these tests are not useful for assessing violations of the IIA property" (Long and Freese 2014, 408).

Instead, Long and Freese (2014) suggest that the multinomial model should be used only when the alternatives "can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighted independently in the eyes of the each decision maker" and when the alternatives cannot be swapped for each other.

In this analysis, the choice to participate in elections, use nonviolence, and engage in violence are dissimilar, and one alternative is unlikely to draw unevenly from the other possibilities. In addition, the options are relatively fixed, in that parties are not banned from participating in elections, organizations have the choice to use nonviolence, and depending on their resources, organizations can consider using violence as well. As such, there is less of a concern about the emergence or exit of different alternatives.

4.3.4.2 Two-sample test of group means

To examine whether majority parties are more likely to outbid after an minority organization uses violence than nonviolence, I test whether the mean EMFI variable is significantly higher among majority parties on minority issues votes after minorities use violence versus nonviolence. I test the difference in group means using a two-sample t-test for Parliaments 8 and 10, although the comparison for Parliament 10 is between majority votes on ethnic minority issues after minority

violence and majority votes in general, since there are no ethnic minority votes after minority nonviolence. Since Parliaments 8 and 10 differ in their level of majority fragmentation, I also use the t-test to explore whether majority outbidding is more likely under high levels of majority fragmentation.

For Parliament 8, I compare majority votes on minority issues following acts of minority nonviolence versus minority violence. For Parliament 10, the two groups that I compare are majority votes on ethnic issues after minority violence and majority votes on non-ethnic votes in general. Since the standard deviations differ by groups, I include a correction for unequal variances.

To assess effect size, I computed Cohen's delta (δ) (Acock 2008, 148-149).[16] This statistic calculates how much of a standard deviation separates the two groups in a two-sample t-test. It is calculated as

$$Cohen's\ \delta = \frac{mean\ difference}{pooled\ standard\ deviation} \tag{4.9}$$

or

$$s_p = \sqrt{\frac{(N_1 - 1)s_1^2 + (N_2 - 1)s_2^2}{df}} \tag{4.10}$$

A Cohen's δ of 0.01 to 0.19 is a small-sized effect, 0.20 to 0.49 is a medium-sized effect, and 0.50 and larger is a large-sized effect (Acock 2008, 149).

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[16]I used the "esize" command in Stata to calculate Cohen's δ.

4.3.5   The issue of endogeneity

Part of my theory expects that minorities strategies affect whether majorities are more likely to outbid against them by adopting more extreme policies or positions. In the two-sample test of group means described above, I use majority cohesion on ethnic minority issue votes following acts of minority nonviolence and violence as a proxy for outbidding. I focus on votes on ethnic minority issues because they directly pertain to positions and policies that majorities hold toward minority organizations. The roll call votes, therefore, capture the extent to which majorities change their policies and positions on ethnic issues in response to what minority organizations do.

It is possible, however, that minority strategies not only affect outbidding against the minority group, but that they also influence the extent to which majorities are fragmented in the first place. For instance, if majority parties are more likely to outbid against minorities on minority issue votes after minorities use violence, they may be equally likely to coalesce in their positions on non-ethnic issues after minority violence. If this was the case, minority strategies would not only impact majority outbidding on minority issues, but they would also influence majority fragmentation in general. This would suggest that the EMFI variable, which is based on roll call votes, is not exogenous to minority strategies, but instead, is endogenous to the very strategies that I am trying to explain.

Endogeneity refers to cases when a regressor is correlated with the error term. It is problematic because it leads to estimates that are biased even asymptotically,

and this bias extends to all estimated coefficients, not just to the one that is correlated with the error term. Endogeneity may stem from several factors: 1) omitted variables (e.g., an independent variable is correlated with unobserved factors that are not included in the regression model because of data availability and/or self-selection); 2) measurement error in the independent variables, and/or 3) simultaneity or reverse causality (when one of the independent variables is determined simultaneously along with y or when the causal relationship flows from y to x and not vise versa) (Kennedy 2008, 139-141).

In this case, the potential source of endogeneity may stem from simultaneity - in contrast to majority fragmentation affecting minority strategies only, it may be the case that minority strategies also affect majority fragmentation. This would result in the errors of the minority strategies equation being correlated with the fragmentation variable, leading to biased estimates on the fragmentation coefficient in the main relationship of interest - minority strategies. This may occur if minority strategies affect divisions within the majority group on non-ethnic minority issues and/or the distribution of power among parties within a majority group.

For example, if minority strategies affect how majorities vote on non-ethnic issues, and the majority of non-ethnic roll call votes were held within a month of a minority organization using nonviolence or violence, it may be possible that the level of cohesion recorded by the EMFI score is endogenous to minority strategies and not exogenous to them. Alternatively, if minority strategies affect the distribution of power, the EMSI variable, which uses party seat share to calculate majority fragmentation, would also be endogenous to minority strategies. In chapter 5, I

address this issue both theoretically and empirically in greater detail.

4.3.6   Descriptive Statistics

The SRDP data for Sri Lanka consists of 304 organization-year observations for 19 ethnopolitical minority organizations from 1960-2005. These organizations represent two ethnic minority groups - the Moor/Muslims and the Tamils. The Moor/Muslims are represented by 1 organization, while the Tamils are represented by up to 11 organizations. As seen in Table 4.4, when ethnic minority organizations decide to take action, they most often participate in elections only, followed by the use of violence only and then nonviolence only.

Table 4.4: Dependent Variable 1 - Distribution of Minority Organization Single Strategies

Minority Strategy	No.	Col %	Cum %
(0) No action	168	65.12	65.12
(1) Elections only	46	17.83	82.95
(2) Nonviolence only	21	8.14	91.09
(3) Violence only	23	8.91	100.0
Total	258	100.0	

Source: SRDP

Ethnopolitical minority organizations also vary in the types of strategies that they use over time, with some organizations using a variety of strategies and others sticking to the same strategy in all years. As seen in Figure 4.2, among cases when organizations use a single strategy in a given year, five organizations take part in elections or use nonviolence at different points in their histories, while four organizations alternate among participating in electoral politics, using nonviolence,

or engaging in violence. Some organizations use only one strategy for all years: three take part in electoral politics only, one uses nonviolence only, and four use violence only. Two organizations do not use any strategy at all.

Figure 4.2: Variation in single strategies by organization in Sri Lanka

Single strategies used by organizations

N = 19 organizations

Minority organizations in Sri Lanka mostly use just one strategy each year, rather than two or more strategies in a year. As seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, which compare the frequency of single and mixed strategies, organizations use a single strategy two-thirds of the time and a mixed strategy one-third of the time. This proportion is not driven by a single organization or a few organizations; instead, most organizations in Sri Lanka either use a single strategy the majority of the time (9 organizations) or use only one strategy for all years (4 organizations). Two organizations are split evenly between using single and mixed strategies, although these cases constitute only 2 observations each.

Figure 4.3: Variation in minority strategies by organization-year in Sri Lanka

Frequency of strategies by minority organization year

N = 304

There are only two organizations that use mixed strategies more often than single strategies - the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The TNA used a mixed strategy of participating in elections and nonviolence for a total of two years and a single strategy of nonviolence for one year (for a total of 3 observations). The LTTE used a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence for a total of 18 years, followed by a single strategy of violence for 7 years total, and no strategy for a total of 5 years.[17]

In Sri Lanka, the most frequently used mixed strategy is electoral politics and nonviolence (12 organizations used this mixed strategy for 24 observations), followed

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[17]Prior to 1986, the LTTE used violence only. Beginning in 1986, the LTTE primarily used a mixed strategy of violence and violence, although it also used violence only in 1991 and 2000. It is likely that the LTTE's use of mixed strategies reflects the fact that starting in about 1986, it became the dominant organization (politically and militarily) representing the Tamil ethnic group; subsequently, it had the capabilities to use two relatively high-resource intensive tactics for several years.

Figure 4.4: Variation in single and mixed strategies by organizations in Sri Lanka

by violence and nonviolence (used by 3 organizations in 20 observations, though the LTTE comprises 18 of these observations), elections and violence (1 organization for 1 observation), and elections, nonviolence, and violence (1 organization for 1 observation).

The distribution of single versus mixed strategies in Sri Lanka reflects a broader trend in the SRDP data. Across all categories (including no strategy), organizations use a single strategy about 20 percent of the time and a mixed strategies about 6 percent of the time. Organizations use violence and nonviolence in the same year in about 3 percent of cases and elections and nonviolence in the same year about 3 percent of the time. Comparing single versus mixed strategies (and excluding the choice to take no action), in more than three-quarters of cases organizations use a single strategy. Among mixed strategies, the most frequently used combination is

Figure 4.5: Variation in single and mixed strategies by organizations worldwide

Data: Strategies of Resistance Data Project. N=3137

violence and nonviolence (12 percent of cases), followed by elections and nonviolence (10 percent of cases).

4.4 Qualitative

To complement the quantitative analysis, I use process-tracing in the Sri Lankan case to probe the theoretical mechanisms that link my proposed causes with the outcomes under study. As noted by George and Bennett (2005, 6), process-tracing is the use of "histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case." Further, "the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable

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(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett 2005, 206). As a methodological tool, process tracing is well-suited to testing the causal mechanisms in a theory.

According to Seawright and Collier (2010, 318), the types of evidence that "provide information about context, process, or mechanism and contribute distinctive leverage in causal inference" are causal-process observations (Seawright and Collier 2010, 318). To marshal this evidence, I use a combination of secondary sources on Sri Lanka and interviews with local experts on Sri Lankan politics and representatives from political parties while I was in Sri Lanka. The secondary sources include biographies about leaders of Sinhalese and Tamil parties that were written by local historians and scholars.

In terms of the interviews, while in Sri Lanka, I met with five local experts and five representatives from political parties, including the United National Party, the Ceylon Worker's Party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, and the Lanka Sama Samanja Party in Colombo and Kandy. After my return, I met with a Sri Lankan expert living in the U.S. and held a Skype interview with a local expert in Sri Lanka. I wasn't able to meet with as many party representatives as I would have liked, in part because parliamentary elections were taking place while I was in Sri Lanka. Since many politicians were out on the campaign trail, my access to party representatives was somewhat limited.

The interviews were based on open-ended questions about the political system, political competition and fragmentation within the ethnic majority Sinhalese and ethnic minority Tamils and Muslims, and the conflict between the Sinhalese and

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Tamils. The questions are listed below:

1. In Sri Lanka, political competition is often characterized as being bipolar, with the UNP and the SLFP as the two major parties, although other Sinhalese parties (old leftist parties, new leftist parties, nationalist and religious parties) and ethnic minority parties are active.

   - What are the main issues areas around which parties compete?

   - Do they differ by ethnic group?

   - Has this changed over time?

2. Does the number of seats held in Parliament accurately reflect the level of political competition? Is there a better measure for capturing the level of competition and fragmentation among parties?

3. How has fragmentation and competition, and the fact that sometimes, no single party has won a majority of seats in Parliament, affected the ability of the government to deal with ethnic minority grievances?

4. How has the number and plurality of parties within ethnic minority groups affected their ability to advance and negotiate their demands with the government?

5. What are the prospects for resolving ethnic minority group grievances now, under the UNP and SLFP national government?

6. Many attempts were made to resolve the conflict between the Tamils and the Sri Lanka Government through negotiations and concessions, such as concessions in 1956 and 1965, conferences and negotiations in 1984 and 1985, and peace talks in 1994 and 2002. But, the government faced a lot of resistance from its co-ethnic opposition, and wasn't able to resolve conflict through peaceful means.

   - Why hasn't the government been able to overcome opposition to concessions and negotiations? Why hasn't the government been able to unite the opposition to support its efforts?

   - What about when the UNP under J.R. Jayewardene had a super-majority in parliament from 1977-1988? What about the attempt to introduce the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Councils? Why was the government unable to address minority grievances then?

   - What about when the UNP and the SLFP held similar views on the need for political and economic reforms, such as in 1997-2002, but were still unable to work together?

   - Why couldn't President Chandrika Kumaratunga get the UNP behind the new constitution in 2000?

   - Why did the two major parties support the peace process when they were in the government but then flip flopped and resisted it once they were in the opposition?

The information from secondary sources and interviews was helpful for pro-

viding more detail and nuance about the causal mechanisms and how fragmentation within the majority Sinhalese affected the strategies of minority Tamil and Muslim organizations.

4.5   Conclusion

In this chapter, I reviewed the data and methods that I use to test the hypotheses that were developed in Chapter 3. For the quantitative analysis, I use two original variables to measure majority fragmentation, the Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index and the Ethnic Party Seat Share Index, in combination with existing data on ethnopolitical minority organization strategies in Sri Lanka from 1960-2005 and various control variables. To assess how majority fragmentation conditions the single and mixed strategies of minority organizations, I use four models and multinomial logistic regression.

To flush out the mechanisms of the theory, I use the roll call data that I collected in Sri Lanka to examine whether majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities in response to minority violence than nonviolence and whether outbidding against minorities is more likely when majorities are highly fragmented. I also discussed how endogeneity due to simultaneity may bias the analysis, and how I plan to address this in the subsequent chapter.

Finally, to complement the longitudinal analysis on minority strategies in Sri Lanka, I conduct a qualitative analysis of minority-majority interactions in Sri Lanka, which includes information from secondary sources and interviews with local

experts and political party representatives conducted during fieldwork in Sri Lanka.

In the next chapter, I present results from the quantitative analysis; findings from the qualitative analysis are discussed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5:   Quantitative Results - Sri Lanka

5.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I present results from the statistical analysis that tests the hypotheses that I developed in Chapter 3. In the theory chapter, I argued that fragmentation within political majority groups shapes the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of minority organizations as they decide how to achieve their strategic goals through electoral politics, nonviolence, violence, or a mix of these strategies. I contend that minority organizations will be more likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics when majority fragmentation is relatively low (H1), more likely to engage in nonviolence than violence when majority fragmentation is relatively high (H2), and more likely to take part in electoral politics than use violence when majority fragmentation is relatively high (H3).

For the choice to use mixed strategies, I argue that minority organizations will be more likely to participate in electoral politics and use nonviolence in the same year as majority fragmentation increases (H4). How majority fragmentation affects the choice to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, however, is less clear; on the one hand, minority organizations may be more likely to use violence and nonviolence under low fragmentation (H5a), though on the other, this strategy

may be more likely under high fragmentation (H5b).

I also theorize that majorities respond to the nonviolent and violent strategies that minority organizations use in distinct ways. Since violence is more threatening that nonviolence, majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when minority organizations use violence (H6). In addition, I contend that majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities when they are highly fragmented (H7).

In general, the findings strongly support the theory, although they also suggest more nuance about the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than expected. The statistical analysis for minority single strategies (Models 1 and 2) shows that as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are (1) more likely to engage in electoral politics by 14 and 4 percentage points, although the latter effect is not statistically significant, (2) more likely to use nonviolence by 13 and 9 percentage points, and (3) less likely to use violence by 12 and 13 percentage points.[1]

Across strategies, there is also a statistically significant difference in the effect of majority fragmentation on minority strategies. When majority fragmentation is relatively *low*, minority organizations are (4) more likely to use violence than nonviolence and (5) more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use nonviolence. At the *highest* levels of majority fragmentation, minority organizations are (6) more likely to use nonviolence than violence and (7) more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use nonviolence or violence, although at the highest

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[1]In Model 2, the change in predicted probability for the choice to take part in electoral politics is not large (4.0), and therefore is not statistically significant. However, the probabilities at the lowest and highest levels of majority competition are rather high (15.5 and 19.5) and similar to Model 1.

level of majority fragmentation, the difference between electoral politics and non-violence is not statistically significant. Finally, starting at relatively *medium* levels of majority fragmentation, minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use violence. As I discuss in greater detail below, these findings mostly support Hypotheses 1-3, although they also indicate that there is more to the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than expected.

For the choice to use mixed strategies (Models 3.2 and 4.2), I find that as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are (7) more likely to participate in electoral politics and use nonviolence by 15 and 16 percentage points and (8) more likely to use violence and nonviolence by 4 percentage points, although this effect is not statistically significant for Model 4.2. These findings lend support to Hypotheses 4 and 5b, which expect that minority organizations will be more likely to use both mixed strategies as majority fragmentation increases.

Finally, in terms of how majorities respond to minority strategies, I find that majorities are more likely to vote cohesively on minority issues following acts of minority violence than nonviolence. This suggests that majorities are indeed more likely to outbid after minorities use violence than nonviolence, which supports Hypothesis 6. While I cannot assess Hypothesis 7 fully due to a lack of comparable data on ethnic votes after minorities use nonviolence, the analysis shows that under high majority fragmentation, majorities are less likely to vote cohesively on ethnic issues after minorities use violence than on non-ethnic issues in general. I discuss the implications of this finding in detail in Part III.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. I start by reviewing the findings from Models 1 and 2 on minority single strategies (Hypotheses 1-3). I then move on to a discussion about Models 3 (3.1 and 3.2) and 4 (4.1 and 4.2) on minority mixed strategies (Hypotheses 4-5b). Thereafter, I discuss how minority strategies affect majority outbidding against minorities (Hypotheses 6-7). I then explore whether majority fragmentation is endogenous to minority strategies. Finally, I summarize and discuss some unexpected and interesting implications about the findings.

5.2   Part I - Single strategies

In this section, I present results from the two models that I use to test Hypotheses 1-3, about how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use a single strategy of electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence in a given year. The first model uses the roll call-based EMFI variable, while the second employs the party seat share-based EMSI measure. Across both models, I find support for the theory.

5.2.1   Model 1 - Single Strategies and EMFI

Findings from Model 1 - a multinomial logistic regression for the single strategies outcome using the EMFI variable - are listed in Table 5.1. As seen below, the coefficient on the EMFI variable is statistically significant and in the expected direction for the main categories of interest - nonviolence relative to violence and elec-

toral politics compared to violence; the former is statistically significant at p<0.01, while the latter is statistically significant at p<0.05. Controlling for the number of other co-ethnic organizations, whether it was an election year, and the past use of electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence, the results suggest that as the level of fragmentation in the majority Sinhalese increased, ethnopolitical political minority organizations were more likely to (1) take part in elections than to use violence and (2) more likely to use nonviolence than to engage in violence. This lends support to Hypotheses 1-3, which expect that minority organizations will be more likely to engage in electoral politics than violence and nonviolence than violence as majority fragmentation increases.

Table 5.1 also shows that as majority fragmentation increases, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to do nothing than to use violence, suggesting that taking no action is preferable to incurring the costs of using violence against a fragmented majority group.

Turning to the control variables, Table 5.1 indicates that minority fragmentation impacts the use of minority strategies. As the number of co-ethnic organizations increases, ethnopolitical minority organizations are less likely to take part in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or do nothing than to use violence. These results offer additional insights into the relationship between minority fragmentation and violence, suggesting that as minority fragmentation increases, violence is a preferred strategy over other options for minority organizations.

Using a strategy in the previous year affects its use in the current year. The

Table 5.1: Model 1 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority single strategies

	No strategy/ Violence only	Elections only/ Violence only	Nonviolence only/ Violence only
Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index	2.330**	3.739**	4.184***
	(1.134)	(1.464)	(1.235)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	-0.193***	-0.211**	-0.186*
	(0.0748)	(0.0952)	(0.111)
Election Year	-0.399	1.493	0.397
	(0.677)	(0.965)	(1.257)
Held Office Before Election Year	13.64***	14.05***	12.72***
	(0.796)	(0.842)	(1.430)
Past Use of Nonviolence	13.15***	13.62***	13.59***
	(0.613)	(1.273)	(1.520)
Past Use of Violence	-2.448***	-18.55***	-1.013
	(0.597)	(0.683)	(1.246)
Constant	3.245***	0.646	0.00258
	(0.865)	(1.237)	(0.980)
Observations	258	258	258

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

coefficients on the holding office before an election year, past use of nonviolence, and past use of violence variables are statistically significant at p<0.01 across most of the outcomes; as anticipated with lagged dependent variables, the coefficients are quite large (Achen 2000; Beck and Katz 2011). On average, ethnopolitical minority organizations that held office in the year prior to an election are more likely to take part in electoral politics, engage in nonviolence, or do nothing than to use violence, suggesting that engaging in electoral politics in the past year increases the likelihood that minority organizations will eschew violence in the present year in favor of non-violent strategies. Likewise, using nonviolence in the past year increases the probability that minority organizations will take part in elections, use nonviolence

again, or do nothing relative to violence. At the same time, using violence in the past year decreases the likelihood of participating in electoral politics or doing nothing in the following year, although it does not have a statistically significant effect on the use of nonviolence.

Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the election year variable is in the right direction for the elections/violence outcome, but is not statistically significant. It is possible that this null finding stems from how this variable is coded. In the SRDP data, the electoral politics variable identifies cases when an organization decides to run for office or to register as an official political party. While an organization's choice to run for office depends on whether elections are held in a given year, an organization's decision to register as a political party may or may not depend on it being an election year. Since the electoral politics variable combines both decisions, the relationship between election year and electoral participation may be muddled by how this variable is coded.

5.2.1.1 Substantive effects within categories

To examine the substantive impact of the statistically significant variables, I calculated average marginal effects in cases when (1) a qualitative independent variable changed from 0 to 1 or (2) a continuous variable changed from its minimum to its maximum value.[2] As shown in Table 5.2 and Figures 5.1-5.3, on average, a change from the lowest level of majority fragmentation (0.028) to the maximum

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[2]I compute the average marginal effect by calculating the predictive margins for each observation at its observed value and then taking the average of these effects (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012; Long and Freese 2014).

value of majority fragmentation (0.919) increases the probability that ethnopolitical minority organizations take part in electoral politics by 14 percentage points (p=0.080) and use nonviolence by 13 percentage points (p=0.004). A similar change in majority fragmentation significantly decreases the probability of using violence by 12 percentage points (p=0.003).

Table 5.2: Discrete change in the probability of ethnic minority single strategies

	No strategy	Elections	Nonviolence	Violence
Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index				
Min (0.028)	0.701	0.120	0.038	0.141
Max (0.919)	0.555	0.260	0.165	0.020
Change	-0.146	0.140	0.127	-0.121
p-value	0.092	0.080	0.004	0.003
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions				
Min (0)	0.692	0.198	0.084	0.026
Max (1)	0.624	0.162	0.081	0.132
Change	-0.067	-0.036	-0.003	0.106
p-value	0.715	0.737	0.975	0.002
Held Office Before Election				
Min (0)	0.655	0.163	0.088	0.093
Max (1)	0.720	0.240	0.040	0.000
Change	0.065	0.077	-0.048	-0.093
p-value	0.370	0.097	0.384	0.000
Past Use of Nonviolence				
Min (0)	0.654	0.175	0.079	0.092
Max (1)	0.642	0.236	0.121	0.000
Change	-0.012	0.061	0.042	-0.092
p-value	0.956	0.591	0.706	0.000
Past Use of Violence				
Min (0)	0.682	0.184	0.078	0.056
Max (1)	0.467	0.000	0.233	0.300
Change	-0.216	-0.184	0.156	0.244
p-value	0.220	0.000	0.409	0.009
Average predictions Pr(y | base)	0.636	0.195	0.084	0.085

Figure 5.1: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority participation in elections

These relationships are also illustrated in Figures 5.1 - 5.3. Figure 5.1 graphs how the predicted probability of an ethnopolitical minority organization participating in electoral politics changes as majority fragmentation increases. Figure 5.2 shows a similar relationship for the choice to use nonviolence, while Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship between majority fragmentation and violence. These figures provide further visual evidence in support of the hypotheses - on average and controlling for other factors, as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics and use nonviolence and less likely to use violence.

Figure 5.2: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority participation in elections

Figure 5.3: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority violence

In terms of the control variables, Table 5.2 indicates that as the number of other co-ethnic organizations increases from the minimum to the maximum value, the predicted probability of engaging in violence significantly increases by 11 percentage points (p=0.002). Although the coefficient on this variable was statistically significant for the elections/violence and nonviolence/violence outcomes, the effect sizes are not statistically significant at p<0.10.

For the past strategy variables, holding office in the year before an election increases the likelihood of taking part in elections by 8 percentage points (p=0.097) and decreases the probability of using violence by 9 percentage points (p=0.000). Minority organizations that used nonviolence in the preceding year are less likely to use violence in the subsequent year by 9 percentage points (p=0.000); while the coefficients for the other outcomes were statistically significant, the effects are not. Finally, the past use of violence significantly decreases the probability that ethnopolitical minority organizations will take part in electoral politics by 18 percentage points (p=0.000) and will use violence by 24 percentage points (p=0.009) in the following year.

Tying the threads together, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics as (1) majority fragmentation increases, (2) if they held office in the past year, and (3) if they didn't use violence in the previous year. Nonviolence is a more likely strategy as (1) majority fragmentation increases. Lastly, minority organizations are more likely to choose violence when (1) majority fragmentation decreases, (2) the minority group is more fragmented, (3) they didn't hold office or use nonviolence in the past year, and (4) they engaged in violence in

the past year.

These results also demonstrate that although the largest effect on minority strategies stems from the past use of violence variable, majority fragmentation is just as important for conditioning the strategies that minority organizations use as minority fragmentation. This illustrates that there is indeed a need to bring ethnic majorities into existing models of ethnic conflict processes.

5.2.1.2   Substantive effects across categories

In addition to examining the effect of majority fragmentation *within* each category of strategic choices, I also explore how the effect of majority fragmentation differs *across* categories of strategic choices. Figure 5.4 lends further support for the theory, but also suggests more nuance to the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than expected.

First, as expected by the theory, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use violence than nonviolence under low levels of majority fragmentation and more likely to do the opposite under high levels of majority fragmentation. There is a statistically significant difference between the probabilities that ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence versus nonviolence at the lowest and highest levels of majority fragmentation, although there is no statistically significant difference across the strategies in between these levels.

Specifically, at the lowest level of ethnic majority fragmentation, EMFI=0.0282, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use violence than nonvio-

Figure 5.4: Difference in predicted probability across ethnic minority single strategies

lence by 10 percentage points.[3] In contrast, at relatively high levels of majority fragmentation, when the difference across categories becomes statistically significant, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence than violence; the difference in predicted probabilities across these categories is 9 percentage points at EMFI=0.705, 10 percentage points at EMFI=0.757, and 14 percentage points at EMFI=0.919.[4]

Second, also as anticipated by the theory, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to take part in elections than to use violence as majority fragmentation increases. Starting at relatively medium levels of majority fragmentation, there is a statistically significant difference between the probabilities that ethnopo-

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[3]A Wald test of the null that the probability of violence is equal to that of nonviolence was rejected at p=0.0217.

[4]A Wald test of the null that the probability of violence is equal to that of nonviolence was rejected at p=0.0329, p=0.0145, p=0.0018, respectively.

litical minority organizations use violence versus elections. In particular, at EMFI = 0.517, ethnopolitical minority organizations are 14 percentage points more likely to participate in elections than to engage in violence.[5] This difference increases to 24 percentage points at the highest level of majority fragmentation, EMFI = 0.918.[6]

Third, elections appear to be a dominant strategy for ethnopolitical minority organizations. Starting at relatively low levels of majority fragmentation, EMFI=0.315, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to engage in electoral politics than to protest by 10 percentage points.[7] Beginning at relatively medium levels of majority fragmentation, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to engage in electoral politics than to use violence; as noted above, minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use violence by 14 percentage points. At the second highest level of majority fragmentation, EMFI=0.757, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to take part in elections than to use violence or nonviolence by 20 and 10 percentage points, respectively.[8] At the highest level of majority fragmentation, EMFI=0.918, there is a statistically significant difference of 24 percentage points between elections and violence, although the difference between elections and nonviolence is not statistically significant.[9]

At nearly all values of majority fragmentation, therefore, ethnopolitical mi-

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[5]A Wald test of the null that the probability of violence is equal to that of electoral politics was rejected at p= 0.0009.

[6]A Wald test of the null that the probability of violence is equal to that of electoral politics was rejected at p= 0.0000.

[7]A Wald test of the null that the probability of participating in elections is equal to that of nonviolence was rejected at p=0.0294.

[8]Wald tests of (1) the null that the probability of participating in elections is equal to that of violence was rejected at p= 0.0000 and (2) the null that the probability of participating in elections is equal to that of nonviolence was rejected at p=0.0226.

[9]A Wald test of the null that the probability of nonviolence is equal to that participating in elections was not rejected at p=0.1507.

nority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics than to use either nonviolence or violence. There are a few reasons why this may be the case. It is likely that differences in political goals affect the strategies of ethnopolitical minority organizations. Some minority organizations, like the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, the Ceylon Workers' Congress, and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, advocated for ending political or economic discrimination against their ethnic group. In contrast, other minority organizations, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, campaigned for independence. It is reasonable to expect that organizations may be more successful in using electoral politics to get the state to end discriminatory policies than to get the state to allow them to secede.

It is also possible that some ethnopolitical minority organizations lack the resources needed to engage in violence. As compared to taking part in elections, using violence is a relatively costly strategy; not only does violence require that organizations amass weapons and have the skills and ability to engage in armed attacks, but violence may also lead to a substantial loss in lives and resources. In contrast, unless organizations are repressed when they run for office, hitting the campaign trail and rallying supporters to come to the polls is unlikely to incur significant costs. Subsequently, some ethnopolitical minority organizations may lack the resources needed to engage in violence, even if it is an efficient use of resources when majority fragmentation is relatively low. Subsequently, it is possible that the goals and resources of organizations, which I do not control for in this project, also affect the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies.

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5.2.2 Model 2 - Single Strategies and EMSI

As a robustness check, I use the ethnic party seat share variable, EMSI, in a similar multinomial logistic regression analysis. Results from this Model (Model 2) are presented in Table 5.3.[10] As seen below, the findings for the EMSI variable are substantively similar to those for the EMFI variable. The coefficient on the EMSI variable is positive and statistically significant for the elections/violence and nonviolence/violence outcomes, as expected by Hypotheses 1-3. As fragmentation in the ethnic majority group increases, ethnic minority organizations are more likely to use elections or nonviolence than violence.

In terms of the control variables, although the sign on the minority fragmentation variable is in the expected direction, the coefficient is not statistically significant at p<.10. This runs counter to the results from Model 1, in which the minority fragmentation variable was statistically significant. This null finding may be influenced by the range in values of the two fragmentation variables; while the EMFI variable ranges in value from 0.028 to 0.919, the EMSI variable has a more limited range of 0.077 to 0.623. It is possible that the coefficient on minority fragmentation variable would have been statistically significant in Model 2 if the values of the EMSI variable were similar to those for the EMFI variable.

Similar to Model 1, the coefficient on the Election year variable is positive but not statistically significant; it is likely that this null finding also stems from how this variable is coded in the SRDP data. The results for the past strategy

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[10]I include all the variables from Model 1 except for the past use of nonviolence since there are not enough degrees of freedom to include this outcome in the model.

Table 5.3: Model 2 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority single strategies

	No strategy/ Violence only	Elections only/ Violence only	Nonviolence only/ Violence only
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	4.033**	4.612**	5.904***
	(1.730)	(2.067)	(1.795)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	-0.136**	-0.148	-0.0986
	(0.0582)	(0.111)	(0.108)
Election Year	-0.728	0.790	-0.355
	(0.699)	(0.866)	(1.262)
Held Office Before Election	13.57***	14.17***	12.83***
	(0.851)	(0.888)	(1.446)
Past Use of Violence	-2.518***	-18.86***	-1.235
	(0.587)	(0.578)	(1.224)
Constant	2.564***	0.478	-0.594
	(0.806)	(1.377)	(1.040)
Observations	258	258	258

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

variables are also similar to Model 1. Ethnopolitical minority organizations that held office in the year prior to an election are more likely to participate in elections, engage in nonviolence, or do nothing than to use violence in the subsequent year. In contrast, ethnopolitical minority organizations that engaged in violence in the preceding year are less likely to do nothing or participate in electoral politics than to pursue violence in the following year. Aside from the coefficient for the ethnic minority fragmentation variable, the results using the EMSI variable echo those using the EMFI variable, lending further support for Hypotheses 1-3.

Table 5.4: Discrete change in the probability of ethnic minority single strategies

	No strategy	Elections	Nonviolence	Violence
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index				
Min (0.077)	0.653	0.155	0.046	0.146
Max (0.623)	0.648	0.195	0.136	0.021
Change	-0.006	0.040	0.090	-0.125
p-value	0.953	0.616	0.006	0.005
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions				
Min (0)	0.695	0.195	0.070	0.040
Max (1)	0.628	0.165	0.094	0.114
Change	-0.067	-0.030	0.023	0.074
p-value	0.738	0.830	0.764	0.006
Held Office Before Election				
Min (0)	0.660	0.158	0.087	0.094
Max (1)	0.687	0.267	0.046	0.000
Change	0.027	0.108	-0.041	-0.094
p-value	0.729	0.030	0.494	0.000
Past Use of Violence				
Min (0)	0.681	0.186	0.078	0.055
Max (1)	0.481	0.000	0.204	0.314
Change	-0.200	-0.186	0.126	0.259
p-value	0.238	0.000	0.487	0.004
Average predictions Pr(y | base)	0.651	0.178	0.081	0.089

5.2.2.1 Substantive effects within categories

I examine the substantive effects of the statistically significant variables by computing average marginal effects in cases when (1) a qualitative independent variable changed from 0 to 1 or (2) a continuous variable changed from its minimum to its maximum value.[11] The results are mostly similar to those from Model 1.

As shown in Table 5.4, on average, a change from the lowest (0.077) to the maximum value of majority fragmentation (0.623) increases the predicted proba-

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[11]I compute the average marginal effect by calculating the predictive margins for each observation at its observed value and then taking the average of these effects (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012; Long and Freese 2014).

bility that ethnopolitical minority organizations use nonviolence by 9 percentage points (p=0.006) and decreases the likelihood that minority organizations use violence by 13 percentage points (p=0.005). However, unlike the result in Model 1, a change from the lowest to the highest value of majority fragmentation increases the predicted probability that minority organizations take part in electoral politics by only 4 percentage points, a difference that is not statistically significant. Since the EMSI variable covers a smaller range of values than the EMFI measure, it is possible that the effect of majority fragmentation on the predicted probability of participating in elections would be statistically significant across a larger range of values.

The relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies is illustrated in Figures 5.5 - 5.7. As was the case with the results from Model 1, as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence (Figure 5.6) and less likely to engage in violence (Figure 5.7). Although the relationship between majority fragmentation and the predicted probability of participating in elections is positive, the effect size is small and not statistically significant (Figure 5.5).

In terms of the control variables, like was the case in Model 1, organizations that held office in the past year are more likely to participate in electoral politics in the following year by 11 percentage points (p=0.030) and less likely to use violence by 9 percentage points (p=0.000). Also similar to Model 1, using violence in the preceding year decreases the likelihood that organizations will take part in electoral politics by 19 percentage points (p=0.000) and increases the probability that they

Figure 5.5: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority participation in elections

Figure 5.6: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority nonviolence

Figure 5.7: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority violence

will use violence again by 26 percentage points (p=0.004); like Model 1, using violence in the past year does not have a statistically significant effect on engaging in nonviolence in the following year.

In sum, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to take part in elections if (1) they held office in the past year and (2) did not use violence in the past year. Minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence (1) as majority fragmentation increases. Finally, minority organizations are more likely to use violence when (1) majority fragmentation is low, (2) there are more co-ethnic organizations, (3) they did not hold office in the past year, and (4) they used violence in the preceding year.

Substantively, the effect of majority fragmentation is not as large as that for the past use of violence, but it is just as big as the effect of holding office in the past

year. Consequently, while the path dependency of violence has the largest effect on minority strategies, majority fragmentation nonetheless remains a significant influence on the strategies that minority organizations select.

5.2.2.2   Substantive effects across categories

I also examine whether the effect of majority fragmentation differs across categories of strategic choices. As seen in Figure 5.8, the results are similar to those in Model 1, with the EMFI variable. First, as anticipated by the theory, ethnopolitical organizations are more likely to use violence than nonviolence when majority fragmentation is low and more likely to reverse their strategies as majority fragmentation increases. There is a statistically significant difference between these categories across the lowest and highest levels of majority fragmentation.

In particular, when majority fragmentation is low (EMSI = 0.077 - 0.103), ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to engage in violence than to use nonviolence by 9-10 percentage points, a difference that is statistically significant at the p<.10 level.[12] At relatively high levels of majority fragmentation (EMSI = 0.493 - 0.623), minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence than violence by 7-11 percentage points.[13]

Second, as expected by the theory and similar to the results for the EMFI

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[12]Wald tests of the null that the probability of using violence is equal to that of nonviolence was rejected for (1) EMSI = 0.077 at p=0.0578, (2) EMSI = 0.102 p=0.0811, and (3) EMSI = 0.103 at p=0.0822

[13]Wald tests of the null that the probability of using violence is equal to that of nonviolence was rejected for (1) EMSI = 0.493 at p=0.0448, (2) EMSI = 0.496 at p=0.0169, (3) EMSI = 0.513 at p=0.0260, (4) EMSI = 0.536 at p=0.0133, (5) EMSI = 0.541 at p=0.0114, (6) EMSI = 0.557 at p=0.0069, (7) EMSI = 0.591 at p=0.0024, and (8) EMSI = 0.623 at p=0.0010.

Figure 5.8: Difference in predicted probability across ethnic minority single strategies

variable, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics as majority fragmentation increases. Starting at relatively high levels of majority fragmentation (EMSI = 0.454), minority organizations are more likely to take part in elections than to use violence by 14 percentage points.[14] At the highest level of majority fragmentation (EMSI = 0.623), this difference increases to 17 percentage points.[15] In between these range of values, the difference between participating in elections and using violence is statistically significant at p<0.01.

Finally, electoral politics appears to be a common strategy for ethnopolitical minority organizations. At a relatively low level of majority fragmentation (EMSI = 0.137), ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to participate in

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[14]A Wald test of the null that the probability of taking part in electoral politics is equal to that of using violence was rejected at p=0.0002.

[15]A Wald test of the null that the probability of taking part in electoral politics is equal to that of using violence was rejected at p=0.0000.

elections than to use nonviolence by 11 percentage points.[16] Starting at relatively high levels of majority fragmentation (EMSI = 0.454 - 0.591), this difference ranges in value from 6-8 percentage points; it is statistically significant at p<0.05 for EMSI = 0.454 - 0.537 and at p<0.10 for EMSI = 0.591. As noted above, at relatively high levels of majority fragmentation (EMSI = 0.454 - 0.623), minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics than use violence by 14-17 percentage points. Therefore, when majorities are minimally and highly fragmented, minority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics than to use either nonviolence or violence.

In sum, whether measured by the cohesiveness of roll call votes or by the proportion of ethnic party seat shares, majority fragmentation appears to have a statistically and substantively significant impact on ethnic minority strategic choices, as predicted by Hypotheses 1-3.

5.3   Part II - Mixed strategies

In addition to exploring how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of minority organizations to take part in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence, I also examine how majority fragmentation affects the choice of minority organizations to use a mix of these strategies. In the analysis below, I first discuss results from Model 3 (3.1 and 3.2), a multinomial logistic regression of minority strategies that uses the EMFI variable. I then review findings from Model 4 (4.1

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[16]A Wald test of the null that the probability of participating in electoral politics is equal to that of using nonviolence was rejected at p=0.0925.

and 4.2), a similar regression but with the EMSI variable.

As noted in the preceding chapter, I used two different versions of the dependent variable in the analysis. The first included all observations (including single strategies and the remaining two cases of mixed strategies), while the second excluded single strategies and two cases of mixed strategies. Specifically, the first version of the dependent variable consisted of three categories - no action, *single strategies, and the remaining two cases of mixed strategies*; elections & nonviolence; and violence & nonviolence.[17] The second version of the dependent variable also consisted of three categories - no action only (excluding single strategies and the two remaining cases of mixed strategies), elections & nonviolence, and violence & nonviolence.

As shown below, the results of the multinomial logistic regressions are similar for both dependent variables. I present findings from both models but discuss the results from the second dependent variable since it is coded similarly to the single strategies variable used in Models 1 and 2 (see Models 3.2 and 4.2 below); for a discussion about why I was unable to run an analysis with a version of the single strategies dependent variable that used the full sample, see Chapter 4.

5.3.1 Model 3 - Mixed Strategies and EMFI

Results for Model 3 are listed in Tables 5.5 and 5.6; Table 5.5 includes the full sample (Model 3.1), while Table 5.6 excludes single strategies and the two re-

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[17]There was one organization that took part in elections and used violence in the same year and one organization that ran in elections, used nonviolence, and engaged in violence in the same year.

maining cases of mixed strategies (Model 3.2). The analysis shows that on average and controlling for minority fragmentation, whether it is an election year, and the past use of mixed strategies, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics and protest than to take no action as majority fragmentation increases. The coefficient on the EMFI variable is positive and statistically significant at the $p<0.10$ level for Model 3.1 and the $p<0.01$ level for Model 3.2. These results lend support to Hypothesis 4, which expects that minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics and use nonviolence in the same year as majority fragmentation increases.

Table 5.5: Model 3.1 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority mixed strategies (base category - all other strategies)

	Elections & nonviolence/ All other strategies	Violence & nonviolence/ All other strategies
Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index	1.195*	0.910**
	(0.670)	(0.434)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	0.0341	0.182***
	(0.0639)	(0.0466)
Election Year	2.114***	0.603**
	(0.415)	(0.272)
Past Use of Elections & Nonviolence	0.446	-13.51***
	(0.554)	(0.704)
Past Use of Violence & Nonviolence	-21.41***	4.885***
	(0.651)	(0.649)
Constant	-4.155***	-5.736***
	(0.674)	(1.054)
Observations	304	304

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 also indicate that majority fragmentation conditions the

Table 5.6: Model 3.2 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority mixed strategies (base category - no strategy)

	Elections & nonviolence/ No strategy	Violence & nonviolence/ No strategy
Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index	2.245***	1.895***
	(0.842)	(0.467)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	0.0506	0.357***
	(0.0949)	(0.124)
Election Year	2.849***	2.045***
	(0.554)	(0.583)
Past Use of Elections & Nonviolence	0.367	-14.38***
	(0.534)	(0.731)
Past Use of Violence & Nonviolence	-18.64***	6.022***
	(1.188)	(1.440)
Constant	-4.567***	-7.658***
	(0.929)	(1.478)
Observations	216	216

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

choice of minority organizations - notably, the LTTE - to engage in violence and protest; the coefficient on the EMFI measure is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.5 level for Model 3.1 and the p<0.01 level for Model 3.2. This finding supports Hypothesis 5b, which states that minority organizations are more likely to use violence and nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases. I expected that minority organizations may be more likely to choose this mixed strategy under high fragmentation for two reasons that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, it is possible that minority organizations use targeted violence to avoid drawing the ire of moderates, which limits the fallout from outbidding and enables them to continue courting support from moderates with nonviolence. Second, it is possible that minority organizations want to provoke outbidding in order to shore up their recruit-

ment and mobilization (and have the resources to withstand potential government reprisals), and employ nonviolence as a show of strength to the government.

In the Sri Lankan case, it is possible that both of these explanations are valid. Nearly all of the observations for this mixed strategy come from the LTTE.[18] Starting in the mid to late 1980s, the LTTE was the predominant militant organization representing the Tamils. It is likely, therefore, that the LTTE had the organizational capacity to withstand any fallout that may have occurred from provoking outbidding in the majority group.

The organization also used violence in a mixture of localities but mostly targeted the government. In some cases, the organization fought with the Sri Lankan military in the Tamil-dominated north and east of the country, where it controlled territory. In other instances, it staged attacks in the Sinhalese-controlled south of the country. Starting in the late 1980s, the vast majority of the organization's attacks were against government targets (about 93%), although they also used violence against civilians (about 6%) and other co-ethnic organizations (about 2%).[19] Subsequently, it appears that the organization was mostly engaged in discriminate attacks against the government that occurred partly in its own territory and partly in the Sinhalese-controlled south.

At the same time, the acts of nonviolence seem to serve two purposes. The acts of political non-cooperation (boycotts) and social non-cooperation (hunger strikes)

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[18]Two other organizations - the Eelam People's Liberation Front and the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam - used this mixed strategy for one year each.

[19]According to the UCDP data on Sri Lanka, the LTTE perpetrated 4,325 attacks from 1989-2009, 4007 of which were against government targets, 244 were against civilians, and 74 were against co-ethnic organizations.

were aimed at protesting the official electoral process and the government's treatment of Tamils, respectively. The acts of economic non-cooperation were strikes that completely shut down entire towns and cities in the LTTE-controlled north and east of the country. In part, since these acts had no discernible effect on the rest of the country, they may have served as a show of force for the LTTE, although it is also likely that the organization was unable to hold strikes elsewhere. The demonstrations also mostly took place in the north and east, and were protests against the government. As such, it is possible that the LTTE was using violence discriminately against the government with nonviolence to leverage majority divisions and indiscriminately against civilians with nonviolence to provoke outbidding and increase its mobilization capacity.

This finding also suggests that resources may play an important role in deciding when minority organizations are more likely to use violence. The results from Models 1 and 2 indicate that minority organizations are more likely to use a single strategy of violence when majorities are less fragmented. However, the analysis from Model 3 (and Model 4, which is discussed in the next section), shows that minority organizations, and notably, the dominant organizations representing the Tamils at the time, the LTTE, are more likely to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence when majorities are more fragmented. These two findings seem to contradict one another. However, it is likely that they reflect the influence of minority resources.

When minorities have limited resources, as was the case with most of the organizations that used a single strategy of violence, including the LTTE before

it became the dominant militant actor, they may be less resilient and less able to withstand outbidding by the majority group, especially if that outbidding results in the government attacking them. On the other hand, when minority organizations acquire enough resources to become the dominant militant organization, as was the case with the LTTE when it used a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, they may be better able to withstand majority outbidding.

As such, it is possible that minority organizations with limited resources are more likely to use violence only when majority is fragmentation is low, but once organizations have more resources at their disposal, they may be more likely to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence as when majority fragmentation is high.

Turning to the control variables, minority fragmentation conditions the choice to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, but not elections and non-violence. Specifically, as minority fragmentation increases, minority organizations, and in particular, the LTTE, were more likely to use violence and nonviolence than to take no action. However, minority fragmentation does not condition the choice between taking part in electoral politics and using nonviolence versus doing nothing; the coefficient on the number of other co-ethnics variable is not statistically significant at the $p<0.10$ level in both Tables 5.5 and 5.6.

This finding may reflect that the dominant organization that used a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, the LTTE, carved out a niche for itself as the premiere militant group, and therefore may have been unwilling or unable to change strategies or sit out on the sidelines and do nothing as the number of co-ethnic com-

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petitors increased. At the same time, the null finding for elections and nonviolence may demonstrate that for most other minority organizations, the decision to use this mixed strategy had less to do with what co-ethnic organizations were doing, and more to do with what was happening in the majority group and other factors.

Minority organizations are more likely to use either mixed strategy in an election year; the coefficients on the Election Year variable are positive and statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level or lower for both outcomes in Models 3.1 and 3.2. It is likely that organizations use these two strategies during an election year for different reasons. The choice to participate in elections and use nonviolence during an election year is not surprising, as we would expect that organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics during an election year. Moreover, it is possible that organizations are staging protests before an election to rally support from their constituents; for example, if voters have grievances against the government, staging a protest may mobilize voters to support an organization during an upcoming election. Organizations may protest after they are elected as well, as a means of pressuring the government into offering a policy concession.

At the same time, minority organizations, and in particular, the LTTE, may use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence during an election year for a different set for reasons. An organization may use violence and nonviolence before an election in order to control who runs and/or votes. For example, a minority organization may use violence against candidates that it disapproves of to dissuade or prevent them from running for office. An organization may attack the government in an attempt to provoke it into postponing or canceling elections out of security con-

cerns, thereby limiting the ability of majority parties and/or rival co-ethnic parties from winning seats. An organization may also use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence after an election is held in order to protest the outcome of the electoral process and punish those who participated.

In terms of the other control variables, using a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence in the past year decreases the likelihood of using violence and nonviolence relative to doing nothing in the subsequent year, although somewhat surprisingly, it has no effect on the choice to participate in elections and protest; the coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant at the $p<0.01$ level for the violence and nonviolence outcome, but it not statistically significant for the elections and nonviolence outcome in Models 3.1 or 3.2. This null finding may stem from how this variable is coded in the SRDP data. The electoral politics variable includes both running for office and registering as a political party. Since an organization is only likely to register as a political party once, this action is not likely to impact what an organization does in the following year.

Finally, minority organizations that used violence and nonviolence in the past year are both less likely to take part in elections and protest and more likely to use violence and nonviolence again in the following year. This indicates that there is indeed a path dependency to using violence in combination with nonviolence.

5.3.1.1   Substantive effects within categories

Table 5.7 examines the substantive effects of the statistically significant variables for Model 3.2, while Figures 5.9 and 5.10 graph the change in predicted probability for each mixed strategy across the range of values for the EMFI variable. Similar to Models 1 and 2, I calculated the average marginal effects for cases when (1) a qualitative independent variable is changed from 0 to 1 or (2) a continuous variable changes from its minimum to its maximum value.[20]

As seen in Table 5.7, as majority fragmentation increases from its lowest to its highest values, minority organizations are more likely to use elections and non-violence by 15 percentage points; this effect is statistically significant at p=0.01. Minority organizations, and in particular, the LTTE, also are more likely to choose a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, although the effect is far smaller; moving from the lowest to the highest value of majority fragmentation increases the probability of using violence and nonviolence by 4 percentage points (p=0.084). Subsequently, while majority fragmentation increases the predicted probability of using both mixed strategies, the effect is larger for the choice to use elections and nonviolence. One thing to note about this finding is that for the most part, non-violence and violence was used by just one organization, the LTTE; as such, this is essentially just one data point, albeit an important one. It is possible that if other organizations had used this mixed strategy, we might have seen that majority

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[20]I compute the average marginal effect by calculating the predictive margins for each observation at its observed value and then taking the average of these effects (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012; Long and Freese 2014).

Table 5.7: Discrete change in the probability of ethnic minority mixed strategies

	No strategy	Elections & nonviolence	Violence & nonviolence
Ethnic Majority Fragmentation Index			
Min (0.028)	0.865	0.059	0.075
Max (0.919)	0.674	0.213	0.113
Change	-0.191	0.153	0.038
p-value	0.004	0.010	0.084
Number other co-ethnic factions			
Min (0)	0.867	0.092	0.041
Max (1)	0.738	0.119	0.143
Change	-0.130	0.027	0.102
p-value	0.152	0.718	0.024
Election year			
Min (0)	0.879	0.041	0.080
Max (1)	0.519	0.351	0.130
Change	-0.361	0.311	0.050
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.076
Past use of elections & nonviolence			
Min (0)	0.798	0.107	0.095
Max (1)	0.856	0.144	0.000
Change	0.058	0.037	-0.095
p-value	0.242	0.467	0.000
Past use of violence & nonviolence			
Min (0)	0.850	0.123	0.027
Max (1)	0.239	0.000	0.761
Change	-0.611	-0.123	0.735
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Average predictions Pr(y | base)	0.796	0.111	0.093

fragmentation has a greater effect on the likelihood that minority organizations use violence and nonviolence.

The relationship between majority fragmentation and minority mixed strategies is illustrated in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. Here, we see that as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are more likely to take part in elections and use nonviolence (Figure 5.9) and more likely to engage in violence and nonviolence

Figure 5.9: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority elections & nonviolence

(Figure 5.10).

Regarding the control variables, minority organizations, and for the most part,

the LTTE, are more likely to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence as

minority fragmentation increases; a change from the lowest to the highest value

of minority fragmentation increases the predicted probability of using violence and

nonviolence by 10 percentage points (p=0.024). During an election year, minority

organizations are more likely to use elections and nonviolence by 31 percentage

points (p=0.000) and violence and nonviolence by 10 percentage points (p=0.076).

Minority organizations that participated in electoral politics and used nonviolence

in the past year are less likely to use violence and nonviolence in the subsequent

year by 10 percentage points (p=0.000). Finally, a mixed strategy of violence and

nonviolence in the preceding year has a large effect on what minority organizations

Figure 5.10: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority violence & nonviolence

do in the following year; it reduces the predicted probability of using elections and nonviolence by 12 percentage points (p=0.000) and increases the probability that minority organizations use violence and nonviolence by 73 percentage points (p=0.000).

In sum, while majority fragmentation has a substantively large impact on whether minority organizations participate in electoral politics and use nonviolence, second only to the effect of the election year variable, it has only a minimal impact on the choice to use violence and nonviolence. Instead, what matters more for minority organizations that use this strategy, like the LTTE, is whether they used it in the preceding year and to a lesser extent, how fragmented the minority group is. Nonetheless, majority fragmentation has a larger impact on participating in electoral politics and nonviolence than minority fragmentation does on the choice

to use violence and nonviolence.[21] Consequently, majority fragmentation remains a substantively important predictor of minority strategies, at least for the choice of minority organizations to use elections and nonviolence.

5.3.1.2 Substantive effects across categories

In addition to examining the substantive effects of the statistically significant variables within each outcome, I also explore whether there is a difference in predicted probabilities between the outcomes for Model 3.2. Comparing the change in predicted probabilities across strategies, I find that there is no statistically significant difference between the likelihood that ethnopolitical minority organizations use a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence versus violence and nonviolence; at all levels of the EMFI variable, a Wald test of the null that the probability of elections and nonviolence is equal to that of violence and nonviolence was not rejected at $p<0.10$. It appears that while minority organizations are significantly more likely to participate in elections and engage in nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases, and somewhat more likely to use violence and nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases, there is no statistically distinguishable difference between the use of these categories across any value of the EMFI measure.

This finding seems to suggest that minority organizations are neither more nor less likely to use one strategy over another as majority fragmentation increases. However, this belies the fact that for the most part, violence and nonviolence was

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[21]A Wald test of the null that the majority fragmentation coefficient in the elections and nonviolence outcome is equal to the minority fragmentation coefficient in the violence and nonviolence outcome was rejected at p=0.0232

Figure 5.11: Difference in predicted probability across ethnic minority mixed strategies

used by just one organization, the LTTE. If other minority organizations had used this strategy, we might have seen a greater difference in how likely they were to choose one mixed strategy over another.

5.3.2 Model 4 - Mixed Strategies and EMSI

I now turn to the results from the final model, Model 4, which is a multinomial logistic regression on minority mixed strategies using the EMSI variable as the measure of majority fragmentation. The results from this model using both versions of the dependent variable are similar to those using the EMFI variable in Model 3. As seen in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics and protest relative to doing

nothing and more likely to use violence and nonviolence relative to doing nothing.

Table 5.8: Model 4.1 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority mixed strategies (base category - all other strategies)

	Elections & nonviolence/ All other strategies	Violence & nonviolence/ All other strategies
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	3.467**	2.822***
	(1.697)	(0.850)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	0.120	0.272***
	(0.0841)	(0.0660)
Election Year	1.993***	0.540**
	(0.460)	(0.249)
Past Use of Elections & Nonviolence	0.316	-12.97***
	(0.641)	(0.711)
Past Use of Violence & Nonviolence	-20.93***	4.767***
	(0.677)	(0.646)
Constant	-5.519***	-7.043***
	(1.093)	(1.293)
Observations	304	304

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The findings for the control variables are also similar to those from Model 3. The coefficient on the minority fragmentation variable is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level for the violence and nonviolence outcome in Models 4.1 and 4.2, but is not significant for the choice to use elections and nonviolence. Minority organizations are more likely to use either strategy during an election year. They are also less likely to use violence and nonviolence if they participated in electoral politics and used nonviolence in the previous year, although similar to Model 3, the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant for the choice to take part in elections and to protest. Finally, minority organizations that used

Table 5.9: Model 4.2 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority mixed strategies (base category - no strategy)

	Elections & nonviolence/ No strategy	Violence & nonviolence/ No strategy
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	4.066**	2.883**
	(1.792)	(1.209)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	0.142	0.412***
	(0.118)	(0.0995)
Election Year	2.458***	1.669***
	(0.548)	(0.523)
Past Use of Elections & Nonviolence	0.314	-13.42***
	(0.765)	(0.739)
Past Use of Violence & Nonviolence	-17.72***	6.005***
	(1.271)	(1.510)
Constant	-5.656***	-8.159***
	(1.372)	(1.130)
Observations	216	216

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

violence and nonviolence in the preceding year are less likely to engage in electoral politics and protest in the following year and are more likely to use violence and nonviolence again.

5.3.2.1 Substantive effects within categories

As in the other models, to explore substantive effects I calculated the average marginal effects for cases when (1) a qualitative independent variable is changed from 0 to 1 or (2) a continuous variable changes from its minimum to its maximum value for Model 4.2.[22]

As seen in Table 5.10 and Figures 5.12 and 5.13, majority fragmentation has a

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[22]I compute the average marginal effect by calculating the predictive margins for each observation at its observed value and then taking the average of these effects (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012; Long and Freese 2014).

statistically and substantively significant impact on the choice to use elections and nonviolence; as majority fragmentation increases from its lowest to highest values, minority organizations are more likely to participate in elections and protest by 16 percentage points (p=0.014). Majority fragmentation does not, however, have an impact the choice to use violence and nonviolence. Moving from the lowest to the highest values of majority fragmentation increases the predicted probability of using violence and nonviolence by 4 percentage points, but this effect is not statistically significant (p=0.219). These results are substantively similar to those from Model 3, although in this model, majority fragmentation has a statistically significant effect on the choice to participate in elections and use nonviolence only. It may be possible that the null finding for the violence and nonviolence outcomes stems from the truncated range of values in the EMSI variable.

Table 5.10: Discrete change in the probability of ethnic minority mixed strategies

	No strategy	Elections & nonviolence	Violence & nonviolence
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index			
Min (0.077)	0.887	0.038	0.075
Max (0.623)	0.696	0.193	0.111
Change	-0.191	0.155	0.036
p-value	0.010	0.014	0.219
Number other co-ethnic factions			
Min (0)	0.905	0.061	0.034
Max (11)	0.688	0.156	0.156
Change	-0.217	0.095	0.122
p-value	0.039	0.283	0.015
Election year			
Min (0)	0.873	0.044	0.083
Max (1)	0.576	0.301	0.123
Change	-0.297	0.257	0.040
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.092
Past use of elections & nonviolence			
Min (0)	0.798	0.107	0.095
Max (1)	0.861	0.139	0.000
Change	0.063	0.032	-0.095
p-value	0.374	0.659	0.000
Past use of violence & nonviolence			
Min (0)	0.849	0.124	0.027
Max (1)	0.232	0.000	0.768
Change	-0.617	-0.124	0.742
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Average predictions $\Pr(y \mid \text{base})$	0.796	0.111	0.093

Figure 5.12: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority elections & nonviolence

Figure 5.13: Effect of majority fragmentation on minority violence & nonviolence

In terms of the control variables, similar to Model 3, minority fragmentation increases the likelihood that organizations, and in particular, the LTTE, use violence and nonviolence; when minority groups are at their most fragmented, minority organizations are more likely use violence and nonviolence by 12 percentage points (p=0.015). Minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics and use nonviolence by 26 percentage points in an election year (p=0.000); they are also 4 percentage points more likely to use violence and nonviolence in an election year (p=0.092). Minority organizations that took part in elections and protested in the preceding year are less likely to use violence and nonviolence in the following year by 10 percentage points (p=0.000). Finally, using violence and nonviolence in the past year increases the probability that minority organizations use this strategy again in the next year by 74 percentage points (p=0.000), and decreases the likelihood of using elections and nonviolence by 12 percentage points (p=0.000).

Like in Model 3, majority fragmentation has the second largest substantive effect on the outcome of elections and nonviolence; the largest effect stemming from the election year variable. Majority fragmentation does not, however, has a substantively significant impact on using violence and nonviolence. Instead, what matters more for the choice to use violence and nonviolence is whether an organization used this strategy in the preceding year, followed by how fragmented the minority group is and whether it used elections and nonviolence in the prior year.

5.3.2.2 Substantive effects across categories

Finally, I examine whether there is a difference in predicted probabilities between the two outcomes for Model 4.2. In doing so, I find that similar to Model 3, there is no statistically significant difference between the mixed strategies; at all levels of the EMSI variable, a Wald test of the null that the probability of elections and nonviolence is equal to that of violence and nonviolence was not rejected at $p<0.10$. This indicates that although ethnopolitical minority organizations are significantly more likely to participate in elections and engage in nonviolence as majority fragmentation increases, there is no statistically distinguishable difference between this category and that of violence and nonviolence across the range of values in the EMSI variable.

Figure 5.14: Difference in predicted probability across ethnic minority mixed strategies

5.4 Part III - Majority outbidding in response to minority strategies

Having examine how majority fragmentation conditions the single and mixed strategies that minority organizations use, I now explore how minority strategies affect outbidding in the majority group. Specifically, I examine whether majority parties are more likely to outbid after minority organizations use violence than non-violence (H6) and whether majority outbidding is more likely when fragmentation in the majority group is relatively high (H7).

I expect that when majority parties outbid against ethnic minorities, they will vote more cohesively on a roll call measure about an ethnic minority issue than they would otherwise. Subsequently, I examine whether on average, majority parties vote more cohesively on ethnic minority issue votes that follow an act of minority violence than on votes that take place after an act of minority nonviolence. If the mean EMFI measure for votes that take place after an act of minority violence is significantly higher than the mean EMFI score for votes that were held after minorities used nonviolence, the analysis will lend support to Hypothesis 6.

In addition, I examine whether the degree of outbidding varies based on how fragmented the majority group is. As per Hypothesis 7, I expect that outbidding will be more pronounced - i.e., the difference in mean EMFI scores by votes that take place after violence versus nonviolence - will be greater when majorities are highly fragmented.

For this analysis, I conducted two-sample tests of groups means using the EMFI and *Ethnic Votes after Minority Strategies* variables, the latter of which

groups roll call votes into two categories - those that were held after violence and those that were called for after nonviolence. For Parliament 8, this variable is coded 1 for votes on ethnic minority issues that took place within a month of minority organizations using nonviolence and 0 for votes on minority issues that were held within a month of minority acts of violence. Since there were no votes on minority issues after minorities used nonviolence in Parliament 10, this variable is coded 1 for votes on minority issues that were held within a month of a minority organization using violence and 0 for non-ethnic issue votes. For this analysis, I did not transpose the EMFI score so that higher values indicate higher levels of fragmentation, as I did for the multinomial logit analysis.

5.4.0.1 Majority group votes on minority issues when majority fragmentation is low

For Parliament 8, the mean EMFI values for majority party votes on ethnic minority issues after minority nonviolence and violence are both high, which reflects the high level of cohesion that characterized this period of low majority fragmentation. Nonetheless, there is a difference in means between these two types of votes; whereas the average EMFI score for votes after violence is 0.90, the mean EMFI score for votes after nonviolence is 0.86, a difference of 0.04 that is statistically significant at p<0.01.[23] The Cohen's δ for votes after minority violence versus non-

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[23]If the variable that is being compared in the t-test is normally distributed, the confidence intervals that are calculated are appropriate. If this variable is not normally distributed, it is possible to obtain bootstrapped confidence intervals. As a robustness check, I calculated bootstrapped confidence intervals; this analysis shows that reported coefficient is statistically significant (p=0.000).

violence is 1.72, or about 1.7 standard deviations, which is considered to be a large

effect. This indicates that majority parties are more likely to vote cohesively after

minorities use violence than nonviolence. This lends support to Hypothesis 6, which

expects that majorities are more likely to outbid on minority issues after minorities

use violence than nonviolence.

Table 5.11: Difference in mean EMFI for majority group votes on ethnic minority
issues after minorities use nonviolence versus violence - Parliament 8

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf.	Interval
Votes after violence	414	0.9040	0.0017	0.0345	0.9007	0.9073
Votes after nonviolence	414	0.8610	0.0003	0.0069	0.8604	0.8617
Combined	828	0.8825	0.0011	0.0329	0.8803	0.8848
Difference		0.0430	0.0017		0.0396	0.0464
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)	t = 24.8577					
Ho: diff = 0	Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 445.885					
Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0					Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t)	Pr(T > t)					Pr(T > t)
= 1.0000	= 0.0000					= 0.0000

5.4.0.2 Majority group votes on minority issues when majority fragmentation is high

Turning to Parliament 10, I examine how majority parties vote on ethnic

minority issues after minorities used violence during a period of high majority frag-

mentation. For this analysis, I compare the mean EMFI score for majority parties

on minority issue votes after minorities used violence to the EMFI score for majority

party votes on non-ethnic issues in general. While this comparison doesn't allow me

to fully test the hypotheses, since there are no votes on ethnic minority issues after

Table 5.12: Difference in mean EMFI for majority group votes on ethnic minority issues after minorities use violence versus non-ethnic issues - Parliament 10

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf.	Interval
Non-ethnic issue votes	2,769	0.3683	0.0078	0.4079	0.3531	0.3835
Minority issue votes after violence	426	0.1024	0.0013	0.0270	0.1000	0.1050
Combined	3,195	0.3329	0.0069	0.3905	0.193	0.3462
Difference		0.2659	0.0079		0.2505	0.2813
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)	t = 33.8193					
Ho: diff = 0	Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 2912.51					
Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0					Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t)	Pr(T > t)					Pr(T > t)
= 1.0000	= 0.0000					= 0.0000

minorities use nonviolence, I can get a sense of how majorities respond to minority violence during a period of high majority fragmentation.

As seen in Table 5.12, the mean EMFI scores for both types of votes are much lower than in Parliament 8, which is to be expected since this parliament coincided with a period of high majority fragmentation. The t-test shows that there is a large difference in how majorities vote on ethnic minority issues after minority violence versus how they vote on non-ethnic issues overall. The mean EMFI score on an ethnic minority issue vote after minorities used violence is 0.10, whereas the mean EMFI value on non-ethnic votes in general is 0.37. This difference of .27 is both statistically and substantively significant; the p-value is 0.000, and the Cohen's δ is 0.6698 or about 0.67 standard deviations, which is considered to be a large effect.[24]

This analysis indicates that as compared to non-ethnic votes, majority parties are less likely to vote cohesively on minority issues after minorities use violence. In

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[24]As a robustness check, I calculated bootstrapped confidence intervals; this analysis shows that the reported coefficient is statistically significant (p=0.000).

addition, when compared to the mean EMFI score after minority violence in Parliament 8, the mean EMFI score is much lower in Parliament 10; .90 versus .10, respectively. This seems to suggest that during a period of high majority fragmentation, majority parties are less likely to outbid after minorities use violence than during a period of low fragmentation. This would run counter to Hypothesis 7, which expects that majorities are more likely to outbid against minorities during periods of high majority fragmentation.

However, without knowing how majorities voted on ethnic issues after minorities used nonviolence, it is not clear if this hypothesis is refuted or not. It is possible that if there was a vote on an ethnic issue following an act of minority nonviolence, we would see majorities voting less cohesively, which would support Hypothesis 7. It is also possible that the difference in mean EMFI scores after minority violence between the Parliaments could reflect the fact that on average, majorities were far more fragmented and less likely to vote cohesively on all votes in general in Parliament 10 than in Parliament 8.

Alternatively, it is possible that this finding reflects a more nuanced relationship between minority strategies and majority outbidding during high majority fragmentation. Instead of violence provoking outbidding among all members of the majority group, it is possible that the extent to which majorities outbid depends on who is being targeted and where; if minority organizations mostly attack civilians throughout the entire country, we might see all majority parties being pushed by public opinion into supporting a policy of outbidding against minorities. However, if minority organizations mostly attack the government in their own rebel-held terri-

tory or attack civilians in a limited area, the majority of voters within the majority group may not necessarily call for majority parties to adopt hard-lined positions against the minority group. The extent to which majorities outbid against minorities, therefore, may depend on whom minority organizations target and where. This is an interesting question that should be examined in future research.

In sum, these results indicate that during periods of low majority fragmentation, majorities are more likely to vote cohesively on minority issue votes following acts of minority violence than nonviolence, which suggests that majorities are indeed more likely to outbid after minorities use violence than nonviolence. While I cannot make the same comparison for periods of high fragmentation, the analysis indicates that in contrast to expectations, majorities are quite divided on minority issue votes after minorities use violence. The extent to which they are more likely to outbid after violence than nonviolence during high majority fragmentation, however, remains unknown. The results also show that when majority fragmentation is high, majority parties are divided on non-ethnic issues, but they are even more divided on minority issues after minorities use violence.

5.5   Part IV - Addressing the issue of endogeneity

The results from Models 1-4 demonstrate that majority fragmentation conditions minority strategies, as expected by Hypotheses 1-4 and 5b. Further, the t-tests comparing majority group votes on minority issue after minorities use violence or nonviolence show that majorities are more likely to outbid in response to minority

violence than nonviolence, as anticipated by Hypothesis 6. While these results are promising, it is important to examine whether endogeneity may be biasing these findings.

As described in chapter 4, while I theorize that majority fragmentation conditions minority strategies and that minorities strategies affect majority outbidding on minority issues, it may be the case that minority strategies also impact fragmentation within majority groups. This could occur if (1) most roll call votes were on ethnic minority issues, (2) minority strategies affected roll call votes on non-ethnic issues, and/or (3) minority strategies changed the distribution of power among parties in the majority group. I discuss each of these concerns below.

First, the preceding analysis from Parliament 8 showed that majority parties vote differently on ethnic minority issues after minorities use violence and nonviolence. If the majority of roll call votes were on minority issues, there may be reason to suspect that the EMFI variable is endogenous to minority strategies. Second, if minority strategies affect how majorities vote on non-ethnic issues, and if the majority of non-ethnic issue votes were held within a month of a minority organization using nonviolence or violence, it may be possible that the level of cohesion recorded by the EMFI score is endogenous to minority strategies. Third, if minority strategies affect the distribution of power, the EMSI variable, which uses party seat share to calculate majority fragmentation, could also be endogenous to minority strategies.

If one or more of these situations were present, the fragmentation variables would be correlated with the errors in the equation modeling minority strategies, which would bias the coefficient on the majority fragmentation variable, as well as

the other coefficients in the model. I address each of these issues both theoretically and empirically.

First, to assess whether majority fragmentation is endogenous to minority strategies (1) due to the presence of many votes on ethnic minority issues, I examined the proportion of votes that were held on ethnic minority issues following acts of minority violence or nonviolence versus the total number of votes. As seen in Table 5.13, these votes comprise a small proportion (6 percent) of all recorded votes and were only held in two parliamentary sessions.

Table 5.13: Proportion votes held after minority strategies

Parliament	Year	Roll calls	Ethnic votes after minority strategies	Prop.	Non-ethnic votes after minority strategies	Prop.
5	1960 - 1964	29	0	0	0	0
6	1965 - 1970	31	0	0	0	0
7	1970 - 1977	3	0	0	0	0
8	1977 - 1988	20	4	0.20	1	0.05
9	1989 - 1994	3	0	0	3	1.00
10	1994 - 2000	15	2	0.13	13	0.87
11	2000 - 2001	3	1	0.33	2	0.67
12	2001 - 2004	1	0	0	0	0
13	2004 - 2005	2	0	0	1	0.50
Total		107	6	0.06	21	0.20

Second, regarding whether majority fragmentation is endogenous to minority strategies because (2) minority strategies influence majority voting on non-ethnic issues, I identified votes on non-ethnic issues that took place after minorities used nonviolence or violence. As seen in Table 5.13, there are more votes on non-ethnic issues that did not take place within a month of a minority organization using a

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strategy; 80% of non-ethnic votes were held after minorities did not use a strategy within a month prior to the vote, and 20% took place after minorities used nonviolence or violence within a month of a vote. For the 21 votes on non-ethnic issues that did take place after minorities used nonviolence or violence, I examined the coding notes and sources to determine if the acts of minority violence or nonviolence were related to the votes.

For Parliament 8, there was one vote on a non-ethnic issue after minorities used nonviolence (there were no votes on non-ethnic issues after minorities used violence). This vote was on the Control of Publications on Horse-Racing (Repeal) Bill. Upon examining the coding notes, it does not appear that the vote was related to the act of nonviolence. Prior to the vote on June 9, the Ceylon Workers' Congress organized a strike on May 19 of about 100,000 Tamil estate workers to protest against a police shooting incident during which a plantation worker was killed.[25]

In Parliament 9, all three votes, which were on non-ethnic issues, took place after minority organizations used violence (there were no votes on non-ethnic issues after minorities used nonviolence). The roll calls were votes of no confidence against either the speaker of the parliament (1 vote) or the government (2 votes). The first no confidence vote against the government was called for when the speaker of the parliament rejected an impeachment resolution against the president, which was initiated by the UNP's rival, the SLFP. The vote against the speaker was called for because the speaker violated a parliamentary procedural rule. The other vote

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[25]I do not perform a t-test for this case because there is just one vote that meets the criteria of a minority organization using a strategy within one month of a non-ethnic issue vote.

no confidence vote against the government was also called for the UNP's rival, the SLFP. It does not appear that the acts of minority violence were related to these votes.[26]

For Parliament 10, there were 13 votes on non-ethnic issues that took place within a month of minority organizations using a strategy; 11 of these were held after minorities used violence, one was held after an act of minority nonviolence, and one took place after the same minority organization (the LTTE) used nonviolence and violence within the same week. All of the non-ethnic votes after minority violence do not appear to be related to the acts of violence; the votes took place after clashes between Tamil organizations and the government in the Tamil-controlled north and east of the country, and do not seem to be related to the bills under review.

For the non-ethnic vote after minorities used nonviolence, the vote was a no confidence measure against the Minister of Telecommunications and Media, which occurred after a protest rally in the east over the government cutting rehabilitation assistance and continuing sanctions on food and medicine; the two do not seem to be connected. Finally, for the non-ethnic vote after a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, the vote was on a Vocational Training Authority of Sri Lanka bill, which followed clashes between the LTTE and the military and a LTTE-organized demonstration in the north against the war. This vote also does not appear to be related to the act of minority violence and nonviolence that preceded it.

In Parliament 11, there were two non-ethnic issues votes after minorities used

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[26]The Sunday Leader, 2010, "The Speaker" http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2010/03/14/the-speaker/

nonviolence or violence. The non-ethnic vote after nonviolence was on an appropri-ation bill; the act of nonviolence that preceded it organized by the Ceylon Workers' Congress, who wanted to win an increase in wages for tea worker union members during negotiations with representatives of the tea industry. The other non-ethnic issue vote was also on an appropriation bill; the act of violence that came before it was an attack on a Sri Lankan ship. In neither of these cases do the acts of nonviolence or violence seem to be intended to influence votes on these bills.[27]

For Parliament 13, the non-ethnic vote was on an appropriation bill, while the act of violence was part of ongoing hostilities between the LTTE and the government. The two matters do not appear to be related.

As members of the dominant ethnic group, majority parties are not only con-cerned about ethnic minority issues, but they also care about a host of other non-ethnic minority issues, like the economy, national security, foreign relations, trade, business, the environment, education, etc. Although it is clear that the actions of minorities matter for how majorities respond to issues that pertain to the minority group, it is less clear why the actions of minorities would affect the policies and positions that majorities hold on other, non-ethnic minority issues. Moreover, while what happens to the ethnic minority group is of utmost importance to minority organizations, it is unlikely to be the most important factor affecting the majority group.[28] As such, while minority strategies are likely to affect majority outbid-

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[27]The ethnic issue vote after violence was a vote on the 17th amendment to the Constitution, which made provisions for a Constitutional Council and Independent Commissions that included representatives from minority communities. I did not perform a t-test comparing ethnic and non-ethnic votes in this parliament since there was just one ethnic vote. (Sunday Island Online, http://www.island.lk/2010/01/10/features10.html)

[28]The exception may be during times of a civil war, when the government is fighting against a

ding against minorities, they are less likely to impact majority party positions on non-ethnic issues.

Third, if majority fragmentation was endogenous to minority strategies because (3) minority strategies influence the distribution of power, we might see minority strategies affecting the number of seats in the parliament. However, the number of seats in the parliament is fixed and does not change with each parliamentary session. Although a minority organization may affect who holds a seat, for example, by assassinating a representative, the vacant seat will be filled. This suggests that minority violence is unlikely to change the total number of seats in the parliament.

Minority organizations may influence what happens during an election cycle to determine the distribution of power - for example, if an organization attacks majority party candidates. But once elections are over, it is less likely that what a minority organization does will change the distribution of power in the parliament itself. It may be possible that a minority organization could cause a change in the distribution of power if many representatives switched parties, which would affect the proportion of seats held by each party and subsequently, the EMSI variable. However, party switches happened irregularly in Sri Lanka; it was more common for a representative to switch parties before an election than otherwise. When they did happen during a parliamentary session, it was due to disagreements within the party itself about non-ethnic minority issues.

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minority organization or organizations. However, unless the minority organization controls a vast swath of territory and is close to taking over the capital, the government still needs to concern itself with non-ethnic minority issues, like ruling over the territory that it holds.

Finally, it is worth re-iterating that the roll call and party seat share measures closely match each other. As noted in Chapter 4, the two variables are strongly correlated (0.7411). Excluding the two years when the EMFI and EMSI scores differ, the correlation is even stronger at 0.8694. Since the party seat share measure is less likely to be endogenous to minority strategies, and because it is strongly correlated to the EMFI variable, it does not appear that either measure is endogenous to minority strategies and that both are accurately capturing the level of majority fragmentation.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented results from the statistical analysis of the hypotheses that were developed in Chapter 3. The findings provide strong support for the theory, as well as more nuance about the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than expected.

First, as seen in Table 5.14, I find that as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are (1) more likely to engage in electoral politics by 14 and 4 percentage points, although the latter effect is not statistically significant, (2) more likely to use nonviolence by 13 and 9 percentage points, and (3) less likely to use violence by 12 and 13 percentage points.[29]

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[29]In Model 2, the change in predicted probability for the choice to take part in electoral politics is not large (4.0), and therefore is not statistically significant. However, the probabilities at the lowest and highest levels of majority competition are rather high (15.5 and 19.5) and similar to Model 1.

Table 5.14: Single Strategies (Models 1 and 2) - Within category comparisons

Single Strategies	Low Majority Fragmentation		High Majority Fragmentation		Difference	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Elections	.12	.155	.26	.195	14.0 percentage points	4.0 percentage points (NS)
Nonviolence	.038	.046	.165	.136	12.7 percentage points	9.0 percentage points
Violence	.141	.146	.02	.021	-12.1 percentage points	-12.5 percentage points

Across strategies, there is also a statistically significant difference in the effect of majority fragmentation on minority strategies. As summarized in Table 5.15, when majority fragmentation is relatively *low*, minority organizations are (4) more likely to use violence than nonviolence and (5) more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use nonviolence. At the *highest* levels of majority fragmentation, minority organizations are (6) more likely to use nonviolence than violence and (7) more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use nonviolence or violence, although at the highest level of majority fragmentation, the difference between electoral politics and nonviolence is not statistically significant. Finally, starting at relatively *medium* levels of majority fragmentation, minority organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use violence.

These results support Hypotheses 1-3, but also suggest that there is more to the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than anticipated. While Table 5.14 (as well as Figures 5.1-5.3 and 5.5-5.7) indicates that there is a linear relationship between majority fragmentation and the predicted probabil-

Table 5.15: Summary of single strategies (Models 1 and 2) - Across category comparisons

Comparing single strategies	Low Majority Fragmentation		Medium Majority Fragmentation		High Majority Fragmentation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Nonviolence vs. violence	V >NV (10 pp)	V >NV (9-14 pp)			NV >V (9-14 pp)	NV >V (7-11 pp)
Elections vs. violence			E >V (14 pp)		E >V (20-24 pp)	E >V (14-17 pp)
Elections vs. nonviolence	E >NV (10 pp)	E >NV (11 pp)			E >NV (10 pp)	E >NV (6-8 pp)

ity of using each strategy, Table 5.15 suggests that the greatest differences *across* these strategies are at the extremes of majority fragmentation. When majority fragmentation is at its lowest and highest, there is a statistically significant difference across the three categories. As expected, violence is more likely than nonviolence when majority fragmentation is low, and electoral politics and nonviolence are both more likely than violence when majority fragmentation is high.

However, I also expected that violence will be more likely than electoral politics when majority fragmentation is low. Table 5.15 indicates that this is not the case; it is only at relatively medium levels of majority fragmentation that we start to see a difference in the predicted probabilities between these categories. Subsequently, when majority fragmentation is at its lowest, minority organizations are no more or less likely to take part in elections than to use violence. This may reflect the fact that some organizations always choose electoral politics over violence, even when the political opportunity structure favors violence for ideological or moral reasons.

At the same time, while I expected that minorities will be more likely to take part in electoral politics or to use nonviolence as majority fragmentation increased, I did not have any predictions about how these strategies would differ from each other at varying levels of majority fragmentation. And yet the results indicate that they do differ; both at the highest and lowest levels of majority fragmentation, minority organizations are more likely to participate in electoral politics than to use nonviolence. This may reflect the democratic nature of the electoral system in Sri Lanka; since electoral politics was an option for minority organizations, it may be the case that on average, minority organizations preferred to pursue their political goals through conventional channels.

Second, turning to the results from the mixed strategies models, Table 5.16 shows that as majority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are (7) more likely to participate in electoral politics and use nonviolence by 15 and 16 percentage points and (8) more likely to use violence and nonviolence by 4 percentage points, although this effect is not statistically significant for Model 4.2. These findings lend support to Hypotheses 4 and 5b, which expect that minority organizations will be more likely to use both mixed strategies as majority fragmentation increases.

These findings also suggest two somewhat unexpected implications about how minority organizations select mixed strategies. First, the between category analysis showed that there is no statistically significant difference in the probability that minority organizations use one mixed strategy over another; as such, minority organizations were neither more nor less likely to choose electoral politics and nonviolence or violence and nonviolence as majority fragmentation increased. While

Table 5.16: Summary of mixed strategies (Models 3.2 and 4.2) - Within category comparisons

	Low Majority Fragmentation		High Majority Fragmentation		Difference	
Minority Mixed Strategies	Model 3.2	Model 4.2	Model 3.2	Model 4.2	Model 3.2	Model 4.2
Elections & Nonviolence	5.9	3.8	21.3	19.3	15.3	15.5
Violence & Nonviolence	7.5	7.5	11.3	11.1	3.8	3.6 (NS)

this seems to suggest that organizations were equally likely to choose both, this is somewhat misleading, since for the most part, just one organization - the LTTE - used a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence. It may be the case that other minority organizations did not use this mixed strategies because they lacked the resources to use both at the same time.

While participating in elections and using nonviolence in the same year is costly, using violence and nonviolence in the same year is likely to be costlier; having to train and mobilize soldiers to launch attacks on government forces is likely to require more resources than sending out candidates to knock on doors or holding campaign rallies. Since the LTTE was the dominant militant organization representing the Tamils from the mid to late 1980s onward, it may have been the only organization with the resources to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence. It is possible that if other organizations had the resources to use both, we would see a greater difference in the probability that they choose one mixed strategy over another.

This result also indicates that in contrast to what we might expect about the

dynamics of civil wars, minority organizations use more than just violence to press their demands. Throughout the course of the violent conflict between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan government, minority organizations engaged in conventional politics and used nonviolence. Even the dominant militant Tamil organization, the LTTE, employed violence in combination with nonviolence. Starting in 1986 and continuing through 2005, with a few exceptions in between, the LTTE used both violence and nonviolence in the same year. In fact, Table 5.17 shows that in all but three years during this time period, the LTTE used two or more nonviolent tactics alongside violence in the same year.

Table 5.17: Disaggregating LTTE mixed strategies

Year	Violence	Political non-cooperation	Social non-cooperation	Nonviolent intervention	Economic non-cooperation	Protest	Total nonviolence
1986	+	+	+		+	+	3
1987	+	+	+	+	+	+	5
1988	+	+			+		2
1989	+	+			+		2
1990	+	+			+		2
1992	+				+	+	2
1993	+	+	+			+	3
1994	+	+					1
1995	+					+	1
1996	+	+				+	3
1997	+	+				+	3
1998	+	+				+	3
1999	+	+					1
2001	+	+	+				2
2002	+	+	+			+	3
2003	+				+	+	2
2004	+	+	+		+	+	4
2005	+	+			+	+	3

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Table 5.18: Summary of majority outbidding analysis

Type of vote	Low Majority Fragmentation	High Majority Fragmentation	Difference
Ethnic vote after minority violence	.90	.10	.04
Ethnic vote after minority nonviolence	.86	NA	NA
Non-ethnic vote	NA	.37	NA

Third, in terms of how minorities strategies affect majority outbidding against minorities, the results support Hypothesis 6. For Parliament 8, there is a statistically significant difference in the mean EMFI scores after minorities use violence versus nonviolence. As summarized in Table 5.18, whereas the average EMFI score for minority issue votes after violence is 0.90, the mean EMFI score for these votes after nonviolence is 0.86, a difference of 0.04 that is statistically significant at $p<0.01$. The Cohen's δ for votes after minority violence versus nonviolence is 1.72, or about 1.7 standard deviations, which is considered to be a large effect. This suggests that majority parties are more likely to vote cohesively after minorities use violence than nonviolence, which lends support to Hypothesis 6.

I cannot test Hypothesis 7 fully, since there are no ethnic issue votes that take place after minorities use nonviolence during a period of high majority fragmentation. However, the results show that majority parties seem to vote less cohesively after minorities use violence under high fragmentation than during low fragmentation. This seems to run counter to Hypothesis 7, which expects that majority outbidding is more likely when majority fragmentation is high than low. However, without comparing how majorities vote after minorities use nonviolence under high fragmentation, it is not possible to conclude that Hypothesis 7 is not supported.

In addition, I find that majority parties vote less cohesively on ethnic issues after minorities use violence than on non-ethnic votes in general. The mean EMFI score on an ethnic minority issue vote after minorities used violence is 0.10, whereas the mean EMFI value on non-ethnic votes in general is 0.37. This difference of .27 is both statistically and substantively significant; the p-value is 0.000, and the Cohen's δ is 0.6698 or about 0.67 standard deviations, which is considered to be a large effect. This finding shows that when majority fragmentation is high, majority parties are quite divided on non-ethnic issues, but they are even more divided on minority issues after minorities use violence.

Having reviewed the results from the quantitative analysis, in the following chapter I probe the mechanisms and hypotheses in greater detail with a qualitative analysis of majority-minority relations in Sri Lanka.

Chapter 6:   Qualitative Results - Sri Lanka

6.1   Overview

This chapter provides historical information about Sri Lanka and presents results from the process-tracing analysis. First, it describes in detail the constellation of ethnic groups and ethnic parties in Sri Lanka, the country's political and party systems, and the history and trajectory of the conflict between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese. Thereafter, I undertake a process-tracing analysis to test the causal mechanisms through which majority fragmentation conditioned minority strategies, focusing on how minority organizations selected their strategies during two periods of time in the history of the country - when majority fragmentation was relatively low and relatively high.

In doing so, I also examine alternative explanations, including whether minority strategies were influenced by *minority* fragmentation or inherent preferences toward nonviolence or violence and whether majority policies toward minorities were a function of their fixed preferences, which would suggest that minorities were responding to the parties themselves, rather than the political opportunity structures that were created by varying levels of majority fragmentation.

As defined by George and Bennett (2005: 6), process tracing is the use of "his-

tories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case." Moreover, "the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005: 206).

To undertake this analysis, I rely on various types of information, including the vast comparative politics literature on Sri Lanka written by Sri Lankan scholars and other experts worldwide, as well as interviews that I conducted with local experts and representatives of political parties during field work in Sri Lanka. The secondary sources include biographies about leaders of Sinhalese and Tamil parties that were written by Sri Lankan scholars and historians.

Regarding the interviews, in the Sri Lankan cities of Colombo and Kandy, I met with five local experts and five representatives from political parties, including the United National Party, the Ceylon Worker's Party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, and the Lanka Sama Samanja Party. After my return, I met with a Sri Lankan expert living in the U.S. and held a Skype interview with a local expert in Sri Lanka. I was limited in the number of party representatives that I could meet with because parliamentary elections were taking place while I was in Sri Lanka, and many politicians expressed that they were out on the campaign trail and/or too busy to meet. The interviews were based on open-ended questions about the political system, political competition and fragmentation within the ethnic majority Sinhalese and ethnic minority Tamils and Muslims, and the conflict between the

Sinhalese and Tamils (see Chapter 4 for a list of questions).

In short, I find support for the theory, as well as evidence indicating more nuance about the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than initially expected. First, as expected by the theory, there were far greater opportunities for minority organizations to use nonviolence and electoral politics during periods of majority fragmentation. The analysis indicates that relatively high levels of majority fragmentation created the political opportunity structures that are expected by the theory - more divisions to leverage, more opportunities to serve as a coalition member or exact legislative concessions, and more of a chance that minority violence triggers majority outbidding.

Second, during periods of low majority fragmentation, there were limited openings for minority organizations to press their demands with nonviolence or electoral politics. During these periods, Sinhalese parties won in landslide victories. With a legislative majority, neither party needed minority support to govern or pass legislation. Instead, they were able to pursue policies relatively unchecked by either minority parties or the Sinhalese opposition.

Third, the analysis also demonstrates that although majority fragmentation created political opportunity structures that favored the use of violence during low fragmentation and nonviolence and electoral politics during high fragmentation, not all parties took advantage of these conditions, nor were their efforts always met with success. In one case, these efforts resulted in the Indian Tamils being able to address a major grievance - their lack of citizenship status. In other instances, however, attempts to ameliorate Tamil grievances were not successful despite cooperation

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between the Sinhalese government and Tamil parties. Taken together, these findings confirm the value in incorporating majority fragmentation into models of ethnic conflict processes.

6.2 Part I: History and Context

In the section below, I provide a historical overview of Sri Lanka in terms of its ethnic groups, ethnic parties, government type, and party structure. I also briefly trace the history of the conflict between the political majority group, the Sinhalese, and the Tamils, an ethnic minority group that has been advocating for self-determination since the country became independent.

6.2.1 Ethnic groups in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an ethnically diverse country that is comprised of the Sinhalese, Tamils (Indian and Sri Lankan), and Moors/Muslims. In terms of size, the Sinhalese are the largest ethnic group, with about 70% of the total country population throughout 1960-2006. The Tamils are the largest minority group (the Sri Lankan Tamils comprise about 11% of the total country population, while the Indian Tamils constitute about 12% of the population), followed by the Moors/Muslims, at about 6% of the population. The Sri Lankan Tamils are geographically concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces; in the former, they comprise the majority. The Indian Tamils are located primarily in the hill country, in the Central Province. The Muslims are concentrated in the Central and Eastern Provinces, as well as in the

urban areas in the south. The Sinhalese make up the majority in the south-west and central parts of Sri Lanka (Birnir et al. 2015; Vogt et al. 2015).

6.2.2 Ethnic parties in Sri Lanka

Since Sri Lanka gained its independence from the British in 1948, political power has been concentrated in the hands of the Sinhalese. Both the executive and legislative branches of government have been controlled exclusively by the Sinhalese, who have been represented by many political parties over time. Since the late 1950s, when ethnicity first became a rallying cry for political mobilization, many Sinhalese political parties incorporated ethnic appeals in their party positions or policies, either explicitly or indirectly. From 1960-2006, these ethnic parties included the United National Party (UNP), Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Communist Party (CP), Lanka Sama Samanja Part (LSSP), Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party (SLFSP), Viplawakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP), Sinhala Basha Peramuna (SBP), Nationalities Unity Organization (NUO), Ceylon Democratic Party (CDP), Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), National Liberal Front (NLF), National Liberation Front (NLF), Democratic Left Front (DLF), Democratic United National Front (DUNF), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Among these parties, the UNP, SLFP, and LSSP have been active consistently from 1960-2006.

At the same time, minority parties have been equally strong in voicing their own ethnic appeals and positions. Throughout 1960-2006, the Tamils have been

represented by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC), Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC), Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Eelavar Democratic Front (EDF), Federal Party (FP), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Karuna faction (LTTE-Karuna), People's Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT), People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Tamil National Alliance (TNA), Tamil United Front (TUF), Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA). During this same time period, the Muslims were represented by the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC).

6.2.3   The political system in Sri Lanka

As a unitary democratic republic, Sri Lanka has a unicameral parliament and an executive presidency. Following independence, Sri Lanka adopted a Westminster-style of government, with a directed elected lower chamber, the House of Representatives, and an upper chamber, the Senate, whose members were appointed. The Senate was abolished in 1971 and after the republican constitution of 1972 was enacted, the House of Representatives was replaced by the unicameral National State Assembly. In 1977, following the implementation of the second constitution, the National Assembly became the Parliament of Sri Lanka. The second constitution also established an executive president, who as the head of the state and the gov-

ernment, can dissolve parliament. The president also appoints the prime minister and the cabinet. Proportional elections to the parliament and presidential elections are held every six years.

6.2.4   The party system in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is often characterized as a two-party system, as control of the government has alternated between two Sinhalese parties - the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) (Bush 2003; Seneviratne 1997). Nonetheless, at different points in time, the two main Sinhalese parties have ruled through a single party government, a co-ethnic coalition, or a multi-ethnic coalition.

During the 4th parliament (March - April 1960), the UNP ruled on its own. Shortly thereafter, co-ethnic coalition governments became the norm from 1960-1977. For the 5th parliament (August 1960 - December 1964), the SLFP formed a co-ethnic coalition government with the LSSP and the CP. Throughout the 6th parliament (April 1965 - March 1970), the UNP led a co-ethnic coalition with the SLFSP, MEP, and NLF. The 7th parliament (June 1970 - February 1977) was governed by another co-ethnic coalition, this time led by the SLFP and with the LSSP and CP as members.

From the late 1970s onward, governments were comprised of multi-ethnic coalitions. For the 8th parliament (August 1977 - December 1988), the UNP formed a multi-ethnic coalition government with the Tamil CWC. This same multi-ethnic coalition governed during the 9th parliament (March 1989 - June 1994). For the

10th parliament (August 1994 - August 2000), the SLFP led a multi-ethnic coalition with three co-ethnic parties, the LSSP, CP, DUNF, and one Muslim party, the SLMC. The 11th parliament (October 2000 - October 2001) was also led by the SLFP in a multi-ethnic coalition, with the Sinhalese LSSP, CP, and DUNF, the Tamil EPDP, and the Muslim SLMC. In the 12th parliament, the SLFP led a multi-ethnic coalition with Sinhalese parties, the Tamil EPDP, and the Muslim SLMC. Finally, in the 13th parliament (April 2004 - February 2010), the SLFP led a multi-ethnic coalition with a number of co-ethnic Sinhalese parties and the Tamil EPDP.

6.2.5 Conflict in Sri Lanka

The history of Sinhalese and Tamil relations in Sri Lankan has been punctuated by periods of both conflict and cooperation. During colonial times, the Tamils, who learned English in greater numbers than the Sinhalese, were able to obtain a disproportionate share of public employment in the British-run administration, as well as in legal, engineering, and medical jobs. Tamils who held positions in the colonial administration on average earned more than the rest of the population, including the Sinhalese and Tamils who were not employed by the British. Nonetheless, the Sinhalese viewed all Tamils as the privileged ethnic group in the country (Manogaran 1987, 2-8).

After the country became independent in 1948, the Sinhalese used their majority in the newly elected parliament to address their ethnic group's economic and

political situation. Under the government of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, in 1956 the Indian Tamils were stripped of their citizenship and Sinhalese was made the official language of the country, replacing English. At the time, Tamil opposition to these measures took the form of nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns. Some of these protests led to counter-protests and anti-Tamil riots, such as in 1956 and 1958. In 1957, the leader of the main Tamil organization, the Federal Party, negotiated a pact with the Sinhalese government - the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact - that made some concessions to the Tamils, but the agreement was not implemented due to push back from part of the Sinhalese Buddhist clergy and some Sinhalese extremists (de Silva 1997; Manogaran 1987, 12-13).

Despite appeals from Tamil political party leaders, the government continued to discriminate against Tamils with respect to recruitment for government jobs and university admissions; the government also engaged in a widespread policy of settling Sinhalese families in Tamil areas. In 1972, the new constitution reaffirmed Sinhalese as the only official language of the country and gave Buddhism a special status as the religion of the state, but did not mention Tamil as the language of the national minority or allow for any devolution of powers to Tamil provinces; as such, it eliminated a clause of the former constitution that had given at least some protection against discrimination to other ethnic groups while at the same time elevating the status of the Sinhalese. Tamil demonstrations against the Constitution were met with heavy-handed repression by the government, and many young Tamil activists were arrested (Manogaran 1987, 12-13; Senaratne 1997, 58-61)).

Led by Tamil youths, who were dissatisfied with the inability of the Tamil

parties to procure any guarantee of rights for the Tamil population, there was a push to unite all the major Tamil parties in a combined front to advocate against Sinhalese domination. Subsequently, in 1972 the Tamil United Front, comprised of the FP, ACTC, and CWC, was created. The TUF continued to work within the realm of nonviolent politics, but among the Tamil youth, budding Tamil nationalist paramilitaries started to emerge. Broadly referred to as "the boys," a low-key but coordinated armed struggle began to surface around 1972, as two militant organizations, the Tamil Liberation Organization and the Tamil New Tigers, were formed. From these two factions, several other organizations, including TELO, the LTTE, and PLOTE, were founded. These organizations started to engage in relatively low-scale acts of intimidation and violence (de Silva 1997, 103).

In 1976, some members of the TUF adopted the "Vaddukoddai Resolution," which called for the creation of an independent "Tamil Eelam" state and reformulated themselves as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). During the 1977 elections, the TULF, which had campaigned on a platform of secession, won the second largest number of seats in the parliament and became the official opposition. In part due to heightened tensions between Sinhalese and Tamil parties during the run-up to the election, anti-Tamil riots broke out less in several major cities and throughout provincial towns than a month after the UNP came to power. Within a few days, an estimated more than 100 Tamils had been killed, thousands were displaced, and property was substantially damaged. The government responded with a state of emergency, curfews, and deployed the police and military to stop the violence.

These riots were the most serious form of inter-communal violence between the Sinhalese and Tamils since the anti-Tamil riots of 1958. They were under control in about a week, but they stoked secessionist demands within the Tamil community and increased tensions between the Tamils and Sinhalese. At the same time, the UNP government moved toward introducing a new constitution that would further enshrine the pro-Sinhalese and anti-minority orientation of the 1972 constitution (Senaratne 62-63).

Starting in 1978, there was a marked increase in violent activities perpetrated by Tamil militant organizations. In April 1978, the LTTE ambushed and killed four policemen in the main city of the predominantly Tamil Northern Province, Jaffna. In September, the LTTE exploded a bomb in an Air Ceylon plane at the Ratmalana Airport, just a few miles south of the capital, Colombo; the organization stated that the act was in opposition to the new constitution. By July of the following year, Tamil militants had killed 14 policemen, and the government declared a state of emergency and installed military rule over Jaffna. During this time, many Tamil youth were arrested or "disappeared," and Tamil militants crossed over to Tamil Nadu in India, leading to a lull in violence (Senaratne 1997, 63-64).

After the army left Jaffna in 1980, however, Tamil militants started to return; with them, there was a return to violence. Militant activity increased sharply from 1981 onwards, as Tamil organizations targeted the police, Sinhalese politicians, and suspected Tamil informants alike. Under the government's Emergency Regulation and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was adopted in 1979, the military was able to detain, arrest, and interrogate civilians suspected of violence; what resulted

was many acts of violence against the Tamil population. In July 1983, soldiers killed 51 people in Jaffa; in retaliation, just a few days later the LTTE killed 13 soldiers in Jaffna. In response, anti-Tamil riots started in Colombo and spread throughout areas of the country with substantial concentrations of Tamils. According to official estimates, 387 people were killed and over 100,000 people were displaced during the week-long riots. Non-governmental estimates, however, place the number of deaths at close to 2,000, the number of displaced close to 275,000, and the number of Tamil homes destroyed at 18,000 (Bush 2003, 124-125; Senaratne 1997, 68).

Thereafter, violence escalated even further, and the five main militant Tamil groups - LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, EROS, and EPRLF - increased their attacks on police and armed forces. This marked the start of the Sri Lankan civil war, which continued until the main militant organization at the time, the LTTE, was defeated by Sinhalese armed forces in 2009 (Ratner 2012).

6.3   Part II: Tracing the theory

Having described the historical background of Sri Lanka, in the following section I use process-tracing to examine whether there is support for the causal mechanisms of the theory. To do so, I focus on "critical junctures" of majority fragmentation, or episodes that mark turning points in the degree to which the Sinhalese were fragmented. Since my theory expects that minority organizations select distinct strategies based on the level of fragmentation within the majority group, I center the analysis on periods that are marked by relatively low and relatively high levels

of majority fragmentation.

The Sinhalese have varied considerably in their level of fragmentation over time. In particular, parliaments 6 (1965 - 1970) and 10 (1994-2000) are marked by relatively high levels of majority fragmentation, while parliaments 7 (1970 - 1977) and 8 (1977 - 1988) experienced relatively low levels of majority fragmentation. Although there are other periods of low and high fragmentation, I selected these time frames since 1) minority organizations varied in the strategies that they used, 2) both of the variables that measure majority fragmentation - the roll call- based EMFI and the seat share-based EMSI - show similar levels of fragmentation, and 3) neither period was controlled by the same government, which allows me to examine whether the structure of fragmentation, rather than the parties themselves, impacted minority strategies.

Before analyzing whether and how majority fragmentation affected minority strategies during these periods, I first revisit the causal mechanisms that link my theoretical explanation to the outcomes of interest - minority use of electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence.

6.3.1   Revisiting the causal mechanisms

As noted in Chapter 3, I conceptualize that fragmentation within political majorities varies along three dimensions - the preferences of parties and the distribution of power among them, the institutional power of the governing party, and the institutional power of opposition parties. These characteristics, which are summarized

in Table 6.1, define the political opportunity structures and cost-benefit calculations of ethnopolitical minority organizations as they realize their political goals.

Table 6.1: Characteristics of majority fragmentation

	Party preferences, power distribution	Governing party	Opposition parties
Low Majority Fragmentation (LMF)	Fewer divisions, unipolar	More power	Less power
High Majority Fragmentation (HMF)	More divisions, bipolar, multi-polar	Less power, coalition	More power

When majorities are minimally fragmented, there are fewer divisions in the preferences and policy positions of majority parties and the distribution of power is unipolar. Under relatively high majority fragmentation, majority parties are more divided in their preferences and policy positions and the distribution of power is bipolar or multi-polar

In terms of the governing party, under low majority fragmentation the governing party has more institutional and political power, while its power is likely to be limited by co-ethnic competition when fragmentation is relatively high. Indeed, under the latter condition, the governing party (at least in a parliamentary or semi-presidential system) may need to form a coalition in order to govern.

Since many ethnic majority parties may hold seats in the legislature, but only one ethnic majority party may control the executive, I expect that fragmentation is likely to impact the governing party's resources for legislating. When the governing party does not have a majority in the legislature, it is likely to have less power to

legislate than when it controls a majority of seats. Subsequently, I expect that the more fragmented the ethnic majority group, the more likely it is that the government faces resource constraints on its power to legislate.

For opposition parties, institutional and political power is relatively restricted under low majority fragmentation, since the governing party holds a preponderance of power; opposition parties, therefore, are relatively weak. On the contrary, when fragmentation is relatively high, opposition parties have more institutional and political power and serve as a more powerful check on the governing party.

As summarized in Table 6.2, each strategy that minority organizations can use requires distinct political opportunity structures and resources. For violence, an ethnopolitical minority organization must have enough resources to defeat the governing party outright or to coerce it into offering concessions. Likewise, if an ethnopolitical minority organization pays the costs of using violence to bring the governing party to the negotiating table, it needs assurance that the government will not renege on concessions.

For nonviolence to be effective, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have enough organizational capacity to mobilize the masses and impose costs on the government through non-cooperation. Just as importantly, there need to be divisions among elites for minorities to leverage so that they can peel support away from the governing party. Finally, to advance its claims through elections, an ethnopolitical minority organization needs to have legislative access and the ability to obtain its preferred policies.

I contend that variation in majority fragmentation changes the costs, benefits,

and opportunities for using each strategy in distinct ways. When majority fragmentation is relatively low, I expect that minority organizations will be more likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics because 1) violence is less likely to trigger a costly cycle of outbidding that can lead the government to increase its resolve, thereby further tipping the balance of power in the government's favor and making it harder to defeat with force, 2) there are fewer divisions for minority organizations to leverage with nonviolence, and 3) there are limited opportunities for minority organizations to engage in policymaking or to serve as coalition members.

On the contrary, during periods of relatively high majority fragmentation, minority organizations will be more likely to participate in electoral politics or to use nonviolence than violence because 1) violence is more likely to spur a costly cycle of outbidding that will lead the government to increase its resolve, making it harder to defeat or coerce with force, 2) there are more divisions for minority organizations to leverage with nonviolence, and 3) there are more opportunities for minority organizations to engage in policymaking or to serve as coalition members.

In the following section, I use secondary sources and interviews that I conducted during fieldwork in Sri Lanka to examine whether the strategies that minority organizations used where indeed influenced by the degree of fragmentation within the majority Sinhalese group, as expected by the theory.

Table 6.2: Theoretical mechanisms

Minority strategy	Political opportunity structure	LMF	HMF
Violence	No increase in govt. resolve from outbidding	Available	Limited
Nonviolence	Elite divisions to leverage	Limited	Available
Elections	Policymaking, coalition	Limited	Available

6.3.2 Tracing minority strategies under low majority fragmentation

Majority fragmentation was relatively low during the 7th (1970 - 1977) and 8th (1977 - 1988) parliaments. During this period of time, I expect that the Sinhalese were characterized by fewer divisions in preferences among Sinhalese parties, political power was concentrated in the hands of the Sinhalese governing party, and Sinhalese opposition parties were relatively weak.

At the same time, my theory anticipates that when faced with a majority group that is minimally fragmented, minority organizations will be more likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics because 1) violence is less likely to trigger outbidding in the majority group that can increase the government's resolve and make it harder to defeat or coerce with force, 2) there are minimal divisions among the majority group for minority organizations to leverage and majority opposition parties are relatively weak, and 3) there are limited opportunities for minority organizations to achieve their policy goals or partner with the governing party.

In 1970, the UNP lost in the parliamentary election to the United Front (UF), which was led by the SLFP and included the LSSP and CP. With a resounding electoral victory - combined, the SLFP, CP, and LSSP won 125 out of 151 seats -

the SLFP set forth on implementing its electoral mandate to create a new unitary-state constitution that privileged the Sinhalese. They met limited resistance from Sinhalese opposition parties, who had minimal power in voicing their positions on the design of the constitution. This is not necessarily because there was no divergence in preferences among the Sinhalese; as noted by one of the interviewees, the UNP originally was more supportive of ethnic minority groups, whereas the SLFP was more nationalistic.

The government coalition, however, was united in its stance toward the minority issue. While some expected that the SLFP's coalition partners, the LSSP and CP, would act as a moderating influence on the Tamil question, this was not the case. In the 1950s, the LSSP and CP had supported granting equal status to the Sinhalese and Tamil languages. As coalition members, however, they changed course and supported the SLFP's positions to declare Sinhalese the only official language and to award special status to the Buddhist religion, despite the sizeable minorities of Hindus, Muslims, and Christians in the country (Wilson 1988, 130). Indeed, as noted by Wilson (1988, 127), "the Marxists had tired of opposition, and the prospect of power led them to change their strategy. They also had an opportunity to reward their faithful through patronage."

Although the SLFP attempted to gain some support from the Tamil community by appointing two pro-SLFP Tamil politicians to the positions of District Political Authorities, through which they could channel patronage to Tamils, the SLFP also continued to adopt policies that privileged the Sinhalese over the Tamils. Unchecked by Sinhalese opposition parties, in 1971 the government changed the

university admissions system, requiring Tamil students to obtain higher scores than Sinhalese students to qualify for admission to medical school and other universities. The same pattern continued in the public employment sector, as Sinhalese applicants for civil service and other jobs were given preferences over Tamils (Wilson 1988, 131-132).

These efforts were met with some Tamil protests in Jaffna,, the main city in the Tamil-dominated north. The SLFP and its coalition members, however, were generally indifferent to Tamil resistance to the pro-Sinhalese language and education policies. At the time, the FP's position was that the Tamils were justified in realizing their right of self-determination. To this end, the FP drafted a memorandum of demands that focused on implementing a federal system of government, protecting the Tamil language, and granting citizenship to Indian Tamils. The SLFP-led government, however, rejected the FP's memo and did not invite the party to present its evidence in favor of it. In response, in October 1972 the leader of the FP, Chelvanayakam, proclaimed that he would resign his seat in protest, and if the seat was won back by the government, only then would the FP give up the Tamils' demand for the right to self-determination (Wilson 1994, 116).

The response of the SLFP-led government was tepid; they expected that Chelvanayakam, who was in his seventies, would not live long and that the Tamil movement would fade out after his death. For nearly two years, the government failed to hold elections for the vacant seat on the pretext that it would lead to violence. One year into the seat being vacated, Chelvanayakam sent a letter to the Prime Minister confirming that the by-election for his seat would be free of violence and

that "the government and its supporters will be completely free to support their candidate;" the government, however, failed to respond (Wilson 1994, 123). While the FP continued to advance the rights of the Tamils through nonviolent means and Chelvanayakam "urged young people to renounce violence and continue their education," Tamil youth began turning to violence as a means of resistance (Wilson 1994, 115). Indeed, the Tamil armed struggle started in earnest just a year later, in 1973.

The 8th parliament was also minimally fragmented. In a landslide victory, power shifted from the SLFP to the UNP. Out of a total of 168 seats, the UNP won 140, while the SLFP won only 8. The second largest group in parliament was the main Tamil party, the TULF, who with 18 seats became the official opposition; as a result, its leader, A. Amirthalingam, became the Leader of the Opposition.

Just a few weeks after the elections, violence broke out across the country. While it began with a series of skirmishes between UNP and SLFP supporters, it quickly changed course and was directed toward Sri Lankan Tamils living in the Sinhalese-dominated south and Indian Tamils in the Central Province. The attacks, which lasted for a period of two weeks, resulted in about 300 deaths and 35,000 displaced people, most of whom were from the Tamil population. As noted by Bush (2003, 118), "the violence contributed to Tamil distrust of UNP promises to redress Tamil grievances as promised in the UNP election manifesto."

By the mid-1970s, under the guidance of the FP's Chelvanayakam, the parliamentary parties began to move toward publicly supporting the secessionist option. These parties united under the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), and on May

14, 1976 formally adopted the "Vaddukoddai Resolution," which called for creating a separate state of "Tamil Eelam" and supported armed conflict to achieve that goal (Senaratne 1997, 60).

In 1978, violence continued to escalate in the north of the country as well, as the TNT, PLOTE, and TELO staged attacks on pro-government officials. As described by Hoole et al. (1992, 23), "as a purely security problem, the Tamil militancy had gone beyond routine policing, but as a political problem, it was well within control. The TULF was willing to settle for a fairly modest grant of autonomy for the Tamil areas which included some compromise on land settlements. The militants at this point in time respected TULF and were not challenging it. But the government decided to play tough, and given some of the racist attitudes of some of its leading members, every action of the government's began to be seen as punitive."

In 1979, the government declared a state of emergency and passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which granted the police broad powers to search, arrest, and detain any persons suspected of engaging in unlawful activities, including hanging posters in public spaces, and stipulated that these crimes were punishable by death. This act, which contravened Sri Lanka's commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, resulted in widespread human rights abuses by state agents in Tamil areas. Thousands of Tamils were detained and severely interrogated. The government also continued to implement the system of weighted application for university admission that originated under the previous administration, leading Tamil political parties to withdraw from parliament in protest in 1979 (Chadda 2004, 105).

While the UNP-led government attempted to address Tamil grievances with the District Development Councils (DDC), which would have increased regional autonomy by decentralizing government power, these efforts never reached fruition. The government held elections for the DDC in June 1981, but never followed through on devolving power or providing financial resources to the councils, which served to further weaken trust among Tamils that the UNP was willing to make meaningful progress on devolution and accommodation (Bush 2003, 120-121). Shortly thereafter, in July the UNP government further exacerbated this trust issue by leading a no confidence vote against the Tamil Leader of the Opposition, TULF leader A. Amirthalingam. In protest, the TULF and Sinhalese opposition parties, including the SLFP, walked out of parliament.

The situation in the Tamil-dominated north again worsened. In May of 1981, two policemen were killed and two others wounded at a TULF DDC election rally. In response, about 100-200 Sinhalese policemen burned down the central market, Tamil newspaper offices, TULF headquarters, the home of a TULF member of parliament, and the library in Jaffna. Not a single suspect was charged after the attack, however, and conditions further deteriorated in a tit-for-tat escalation of violence as Tamil militants attacked Sinhalese security forces, who responded in turn by repressing the local Tamil population.

At the same time, the leadership of the TULF started to pursue a separatist agenda in greater earnest. Under the guidance of its leader, A. Amirthalingam, "Tamil nationalist parliamentarians supportive of more militant views attempted to provide a buffer or protective umbrella of sorts to the activities on the ground,

through their parliamentary presence. Primarily this support was extended to members of the FP's militant youth front and thereafter to "the boys" at large" (de Silva 1997, 104).

After the 1983 riots, the LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, EROS, and EPRLF increased their attacks on policemen, police stations, and armed forces (Senaratne 1997, 73). In response, the government made overtures to the Tamils by holding a series of talks. From January to December 1984, an All-Party Congress took place in Colombo. While many groups participated in these talks, including Tamil secessionist groups and representatives from the Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Christian faiths, the talks ended in December 1984 without any real progress.

In July 1985, under pressure from the Indian government, the UNP held talks with the main Tamil militant parties, the LTTE, TELO, EPRLF, EROS, and PLOTE, as well as the TULF and Indian officials. The "Thimpu Talks," as they were referred to, took place over two rounds but ended without any headway on the Tamil issue. One year later, the government organized the Political Parties Conference (PPC). Through the PPC, the UNP hoped to create a consensus among Sinhalese parties to unilaterally impose a devolution proposal on the Tamils; this effort failed as well, since no Tamil representatives were in attendance (Senaratne 1997, 72-73).

6.3.2.1 Analysis

Both periods of low majority fragmentation saw few opportunities for minority organizations to leverage divisions among the Sinhalese with nonviolence or electoral politics; instead, these periods saw a rise in militancy among the Tamils. Indeed, in describing the SLFP-led government in 1970-1977, Wilson (1988, 130) notes that the SLFP's "premiership set in motion the rise of the Tamil Resistance in which the civilian population sympathized broadly with the objectives of the young [Tamil] militants now committed to violence to achieve secession."

During the first period of low majority fragmentation, the SLFP government adopted policies that further aggrieved the Tamil population and engaged in limited attempts to resolve the conflict through nonviolent means. While the dominant Tamil party at the time, the FP, continued to advance its political goals through nonviolence, it had limited success in using parliamentary politics. Since the SLFP controlled the government and faced little resistance from other parties, the Tamils had minimal electoral or political political with which to exact concessions from the SLFP. Instead, this period saw a shift in support for violence among Tamil parliamentarians and the Tamil population, as well as a marked increase in the use of violence by the nascent Tamil militant organizations.

In 1976, the TULF started to openly endorsed violent struggle as a legitimate means for realizing the goal of a separate Tamil homeland, "Tamil Eelam." This was a pronounced change in strategy, especially because it was implemented under the leadership of the FP's Chelvanayakam, who had previously expressed that

nonviolence was the only acceptable solution to the conflict. The language of the Vaddukoddai Resolution illustrates the tenor of this approach, "...This convention resolves that the restoration and reconstitution of the free, sovereign, secular socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this country [...] This Convention directs the Action committee of the TAMIL UNITED LIBERATION FRONT to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation [...] And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist State of EELAM is reached" (de Silva 1986, 403-406).

During the 1977 elections, Tamil politicians incorporated this resolution in their campaign platforms and other publications. As noted by Senaratne (1997, 60), "This rhetoric had a high impact on the Tamil mass electorate, and especially the youth amongst them, and served to further politically mobilize Tamil youth and raise their expectations even higher...The Tamil secessionist insurrection was underway in 1972 onwards and the resolution was a manifestation of the ascendancy of radical Tamil secessionism *within* mainstream Tamil politics. The resolution was merely a moment - an important one, undoubtedly - on the path of the secessionist mobilization."

These patterns continued during the second period of majority fragmentation. The UNP government showed minimal interest in resolving the conflict through

negotiations or to heeding to Sinhalese opposition parties. As noted by Senaratne (1997, 34), "because of its electoral dominance, the UNP was in a position to disregard the political views of the opposition expressed within parliament and its overwhelming majority enabled it to change the Constitution at will. The dominance also bred an arrogance in the UNP which paved the way for dealing with the opposition outside of parliament in an extremely harsh and authoritarian manner. After seven years in the opposition, the UNP was over keen to affirm its hold on governmental power and was not averse to taking a range of authoritarian measures...[including] against the SLFP, the left parties, trade unions, and other groups."

As indicated by one of the people whom I interviewed in Sri Lanka, the government was simply not interested in any give and take. They did not want to entertain the idea of addressing Tamil grievances through federalism. Instead, they only offered the District Development Councils, which provided far less than what the Tamils wanted at the time. The government also didn't see the need to negotiate with Tamil militant groups, since the TULF was in the parliament. The Tamils responded accordingly, as Tamil parties walked out of parliament in protest of the government's actions and Tamil militant stepped up their violent campaigns. Subsequently, it appears that in both the 7th and 8th parliaments, majority fragmentation created limited opportunities for minority organizations to pursue their goals via nonviolence or electoral politics, as expected by the theory.

In terms of alternative explanations, the Tamils were not highly fragmented when violence started in 1972. According to the SRDP, only two Tamil parties

were active at the beginning of the 7th parliament in 1970 - the CWC and the FP. This increased to four parties in 1972, as the ACTC and TUF emerged on the scene. Toward the end of the 7th parliament (in 1976), the number of Tamil parties increased to 5, with the addition of the LTTE. Since there were relatively few parties when "the boys" started using violence, it does not appear that minority fragmentation played a critical role in the onset of the armed struggle. However, the Tamils did become more fragmented throughout the 7th parliament; the number of Tamil parties increased from 5 in 1977 to 12 in 1988.[1] This increase in fragmentation coincides with an escalation of violence, as the frequency and intensity of attacks shifted markedly during this time. As such, although minority fragmentation does not appear to have played a role in the onset of violence in the 7th parliament, it more than likely contributed to its escalation during the 8th parliament.

In addition, the policies that the SLFP and UNP governments adopted during this period do not appear to have been driven by inherent or fixed preferences toward minority groups, suggesting that minority organizations were responding to the political opportunity structures associated with low majority fragmentation, rather than the underlying preferences of the parties themselves. Although the SLFP and UNP are different in their ideological orientations, with the SLFP being more leftist in its policies and the UNP being more center-right, they adopted similar approaches to dealing with Tamil demands. In both cases, the SLFP and the UNP pursued hard-lined policies and made limited efforts to resolve the underlying source

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[1]According to the SRDP, in 1982 the number jumped from 5 to 8 organizations. In 1983, the number of Tamil organizations increased to 10. In 1985, there were 11 Tamil organizations, and from 1986 onward, there were 12 organizations.

of conflict with the Tamil community. Indeed, as noted by an interviewee, the parties tended to flip-flop a lot on the minority question; regardless of which party was in power, there was an incentive for the party that was in the opposition to stake out a different position. For instance, while the SLFP pursued several anti-Tamil policies while it controlled the government in the 7th parliament, it voted against and walked out with TULF members in protest of the UNP's vote of no confidence against the TULF Leader of the Opposition during the 8th parliament, when it was in the opposition. Since the parties changed their positions throughout these periods, it is unlikely that minority organizations were responding solely to the fixed preferences of parties themselves; therefore, majority fragmentation does not appear to be epiphenomenal to party preferences.

6.3.3   Tracing minority strategies under high majority fragmentation

Based on my data, the Sinhalese were highly fragmented from 1965 - 1970 (6th parliament) and 1994 - 2000 (10th parliament). Throughout these periods, I anticipate that there were more divisions in preferences among Sinhalese parties, the Sinhalese governing party had less political power, and Sinhalese opposition parties were relatively strong.

My theory also expects that when the majority group that is highly fragmented, minority organizations will be less likely to use violence than nonviolence or electoral politics because 1) violence is more likely to trigger outbidding in the majority group that can increase the government's resolve and make it harder to

defeat or coerce with force, 2) there are more divisions among the majority group for minority organizations to leverage, and majority opposition parties are relatively weak, and 3) there are more opportunities for minority organizations to achieve their policy goals or partner with the governing party.

The first period of relatively high majority fragmentation was during the 6th parliament, from 1965-1970. During this time, there was increased cooperation between the UNP-controlled government and Tamil parties. In particular, there were negotiated efforts to resolve the grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils; the first one failed, but the second was a success.

In the 1965 election, the UNP and its allies won 75 seats, while the SLFP and its supporters won 55. The UNP courted support from the Tamil parties to form a government. As noted by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the leader of FP at the time, "we were there [at the Prime Minister's residence] to give our support to the formation of a Government by Dudley Senanayake [the leader of the UNP] on condition that he gave us the assurances on certain subjects that affect the Tamil-speaking people and which subject we had discussed with him last year, at Mr J.R. Jayewardene's suggestion, we put down in writing the terms of our agreement, which was signed by both of us" (Wilson 1988, 123).

The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, which emerged from this meeting, was designed to ameliorate Tamil demands. The pact created District Councils that devolved some power to the provinces; while they remained under the control of the central government, there was an expectation that this would change over time. The Northern and Eastern Provinces, which were the home of the vast majority of

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the Tamil population, would be recognized as Tamil speaking, and Tamils would be given preference in government land allocations in these areas (Wilson 1994, 105).

The pact was never implemented, however, in part due to resistance within the ranks of the UNP itself, but also because Senanayake was unaware of the shift among Tamils in support for practicing their language and culture in their own territory. Indeed, during one of their meetings, Senanayake turned to Chelvanayakam and said, "I thought, Mr. Chelvanayakam, that after some months of working with our government, you will not insist on your demands" (Wilson 1988, 126).

Another issue that led to the pact's demise was opposition from the Sinhalese themselves. There was a well-established conviction among some of the Sinhalese that devolution was a pathway toward a federal structure, which would then inevitably lead to the secession of a Tamil federal unit from Sri Lanka. This sentiment was deeply entrenched in the Sinhalese psyche, to the point that devolution was seen as a threat to national integrity (de Silva 1986, 192-193). As noted by one of my interviewees, the terms federalism and devolution became highly politicized to the point that they almost became "swear words."

In spite of this failure, however, this period is generally considered to be one of relative cooperation between the Sinhalese and Tamils, and the UNP-led government was able to implement a pact that addressed another set of Tamil demands - the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1964 (the Sirima-Shastri Pact). The Indo-Ceylon Agreement focused on the citizenship legislation of 1948-1949, which instituted a definition of citizenship that excluded most Indian Tamils and rendered them stateless (de Silva 1986, 222). The status of Indian Tamils remained unresolved until

1964, when the SLFP government negotiated a pact with the Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri. The agreement called for repatriating 525,000 Indian residents from Sri Lanka to India over the course of 15 years and granted citizenship to about 300,000 Indian Tamils living in Sri Lanka. The pact also instituted provisions to create a separate electoral register for Indian Tamils, which would have diluted their votes in Sinhalese constituencies and helped ensure Sinhalese electoral victories in these areas. Indian Tamil parties, like the CWC, denounced the provision for separate registries, as it would have disenfranchised them. Although the pact was signed, during the SLFP's tenure is was not implemented (de Silva 1986, 224-225).

When the UNP-led coalition came to power in a highly fragmented polity, however, it adopted a different strategy. The UNP negotiated with the CWC to remove the separate electoral registry provision and to re-examine the immediate repatriation requirement in exchange for their support in the governing coalition. After coming into office, the UNP honored these commitments; Indians who had obtained Sri Lankan citizenship remained on the general electoral roll along with all others, and those who were awarded citizenship were permitted to stay in Sri Lanka until they finished their employment or until a later time, which would be determined by the government (Wilson 1994, 106-107; de Silva 1986, 224-225).

The second period of relatively high fragmentation was during the 10th (1994-2000) parliament. In the run-up to the 1994 election, Chandrika Kumaratunga, the leader of the SLFP, campaigned on a platform of peace and promised to take steps to end the war. Indeed, as one of my interviewees noted, Kumaratunga was very much

for devolution and it was very clear that she wanted to pursue the peace process. When the SLFP, along with its coalition of leftist and minority-based parties won the election, Kumaratunga took this victory a mandate to implement major reforms and work toward peace.

By this point in time, the LTTE had become the dominant militant organization representing the Tamil population, a process that had started in the mid-1980s. After the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, thousands of Tamil youths were radicalized and many new militant Tamil organizations were formed; shortly thereafter, in late 1984, the Sri Lankan government lost control of several large parts of the Jaffna peninsula. In the chaos that ensued, the main Tamil militant organizations - the LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, EROS, and EPRLF - started to vie for territory and control.

Throughout 1984-1986, tensions among these groups came to the forefront and there was fierce competition among them for public support and resources. While these groups did form an alliance in 1985 to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government during the "Thimpu Talks," this alliance broke down and in 1986, the LTTE started to attack two of the other groups in the alliance, the TELO and EPRLF (Senaratne 1997, 83-86). In early 1987, all the major non-LTTE organizations (with the possible exception of EROS) started to view the government as less of a threat than the LTTE, and participated in joint operations against the organization. Nonetheless, by 1987 the LTTE had succeeded in establishing its hegemony over the Tamil population not only by eliminating its rivals, but also by providing state-like social services in the north, including mail, vehicle registration, security, taxation, and health and social services (Bush 2003, 154; Senaratne 1997, 83-86).

During this period, the country was operating under the realms of the 13th Amendment (to the 1977 Constitution), which was introduced under the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987.[2] The 13th Amendment devolved power to elected provincial councils throughout the country and created three lists - the first was the reserved list, which identified powers that were kept by the central government; the second list devolved power to the provinces; and the third list, known as the concurrent list, shared power between the government and the provinces.

In spite of these provisions, Sri Lanka remained a unitary country; the president had the authority to dissolve the provincial councils and the government could restrict the powers of the councils as it saw fit (the provinces had no means to address a dispute with the central government). The 13th Amendment did, however, address some Tamil grievances by giving the Tamil language co-equal status with Sinhalese and by merging the Northern and Northwestern Provinces, where Tamils resided, conditional on a referendum. Elections were held for the provincial councils in 1988, but the referendum was never held and the 13th Amendment was never fully implemented (Chadda 2004, 97).

By the late 1980s, the conflict between the LTTE and the government had resumed, and toward the mid-1990s, it reached a stalemate. When Karatunaga's government came to power in 1994 on a mandate the restart the peace process, the

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[2]After violence escalated substantially in the mid-1980s, the UNP government was unable to control or defeat Tamil militant organizations. It turned to India for help; this help came with stipulations - the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) would disarm the militants and restore control of Jaffna and the Eastern Province to the government, and in return, the government would award Tamils coequal status, make Tamil a national language, and create Provincial Councils that would have power over local and regional affairs, pending a public referendum. The 13th Amendment was passed in order to secure these provisions (Chadda 2004, 105.)

LTTE was in complete control of the Jaffna peninsula (Bush 2003, 141; Senaratne 1997, 83-86). Beginning in October 1994, the government held four rounds of talks in Jaffna with a four-member LTTE delegation. At these talks, it became clear that the two parties had different agendas; the government wanted to negotiate a formal ceasefire while simultaneously working on proposals to resolve the underlying source of the conflict and to reconstruct and rehabilitate the war-stricken northern and easter parts of the country. In contrast, the LTTE wanted to pursue a more gradual approach by first negotiating a ceasefire and implementing measures to normalize civilian life before starting on a proposal for political reform.

The LTTE agreed to a ceasefire for two rounds of the talks, but then resumed violence on the grounds that the government's concessions were too vague. In the hopes of forcing the LTTE to the negotiating table, the SLFP government launched a major military operation to retake the Jaffna peninsula. While the government was successful in this operation by December 1995, restoring control to an area that had been under LTTE power for more than a decade, this did not deter the LTTE. The organization struck back with three major attacks in July 1996. At that point, the Eelam III war, is it has been commonly called, had begun (Chadda 2004, 98).

Undeterred, President Kumaratunga went ahead with the devolution and reform package "in the hope of dividing her enemies and rallying support from loyalists" (Chadda 2004, 98). In August 1995, the government published the first of three versions of its proposal. The proposal called for changing the system of government that had been created in the 13th Amendment. It struck down the provision that identified Sri Lanka as a unitary state, and instead, described the country as an in-

dissoluble region of unions. It also defined the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces and delineated the regions that would elect the Regional Councils. Each of these regions would have a Governor and a Board of Ministers, and legislative power was to be split among the parliament, regional councils, and the people in a popular vote; the latter of which could decide whether to form an autonomous unit or to merge with another region. In essence, powers and responsibilities, including taxation, funding, law and order, and land rights, were shared among the local and central governments, and the final federal map of Sri Lanka was to be decided by popular referendums. These were the most sweeping constitutional changes since the country's independence.

The SLFP's constitutional proposals, however, did not materialize. The SLFP entered parliament with only a slim majority, which prevented the government from being able to implement its reforms. Bouffard and Carment (2006, 165) note that "Although she sent reform proposals to Parliament about new constitutional schemes and new electoral laws, Kumaratunga could not get the response she wanted. The idea behind the proposals was that such change would eventually provide the two-thirds majority needed to enact constitutional changes and pass devolutionary measures. However, due to opposition from both sides, she failed to put together the needed two-thirds majority in Parliament. Instead, the president abandoned constitutional reform proposals and called for new elections."

At the time, there was support for peace among both the general Sinhalese population and the other Tamil parties, who by the late 1980s had dropped their strategies of violence in exchange for participation in electoral politics. As noted

by Chadda (2004, 107), "[the SLFP's] victory underscored an intense and deeply felt popular desire for peace and effective governance." At the same time, however, "the Kumaratunga government wanted to end the conflict but was unwilling to pay the likely political price (i.e., loss of government) that a compromise might have entailed as it would most certainly alienate the Buddhist Maha Sangha and a significant portion of the Sinhala majority should it forge ahead with the proposals" (Chadda 2004, 107).

6.3.3.1   Analysis

During both periods of high majority fragmentation, there were opportunities for minority organizations to leverage divisions among the Sinhalese with nonviolence and electoral politics. In the 6th parliament, Tamil parties recognized that they could exact concessions from the UNP government, since its limited hold on power meant that they could negotiate their demands in exchange for providing the UNP with legislative support.

In addition, there is further evidence that Tamil parties recognized the opportunity that majority fragmentation provided to them for securing progress on their demands. For instance, when the general election in March 1960 resulted in a hung parliament, the balance of power rested with the main Tamil party, the FP. The leader of the FP, Chelvanayakam, was "urged by his immediate supporters and by influential Colombo Tamils to press his advantage to the full and obtain for the Tamil people as many of their demands as was possible (Wilson 1994, 90).[3]

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[3]This parliament is not included in the analysis since it lasted for only a few months.

In the 6th parliament, the Indian Tamil parties were able to use electoral politics to negotiate concessions from the UNP government. At the same time, however, the Sri Lankan Tamils were not successful in their efforts to increase their autonomy via the electoral process. This variation in success is likely due the nature of their demands.

In the case of the Indian Tamils, the UNP government may have been more willing to offer concessions because the Indian Tamils' request for citizenship was not as controversial as the Sri Lankan Tamils' demands for increased autonomy under federalism or independence. As noted by the people whom I interviewed and several secondary sources, the words "devolution" and "federalism" had become politically charged, as the Sinhalese viewed these types of solutions as the first step down a road that would lead toward the territorial dissolution of the country. Subsequently, while majority fragmentation created an opportunity structure for minority organizations to use electoral politics and nonviolence in the 6th parliament, which they did, these strategies were equally successful in both cases.

In the second period of high majority fragmentation, the SLFP government attempted to resolve the conflict with a constitutional solution that would have improved the status of the Tamils and addressed their demands for greater autonomy. At the time, there appeared to be public support for this approach. Chandrika Kumaratunga's party ran and won on a platform that emphasized a negotiated end to the conflict; although she did not win an outright majority of seats, the fact that her coalition prevailed over the UNP indicates that a sizable portion of Sinhalese voters supported her position. Likewise, there was support among Tamils for realizing the

conflict through nonviolence. Indeed, every singe Tamil organizations except for the LTTE was participating in electoral politics at this time.

The LTTE, however, rejected these overtures and returned to violence. Had this not occurred, the SLFP may have had the political capital to follow through on its constitutional reforms. After the LTTE resumed violence, the government's ability to follow through on its reforms unilaterally was much more limited, especially because the LTTE's use of violence triggered outbidding within the Sinhalese community. For instance, shortly after pulling out of the peace talks, the LTTE bombed a commuter train in Colombo, killing seventy people. In January 1998, the organization bombed the sacred Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. As noted by Chadda (2004, 109), this act especially "outraged the Sinhala majority and hardened the government's military resolve." As expected by the theory, the LTTE's use of violence against the fragmented Sinhalese led to outbidding that increased the government's efforts to resolve the conflict through military force.

Although the political opportunity structure was ripe for the LTTE to negotiate a solution to the conflict, what explains its decision to pull out of the peace talks and resume armed violence? There are a number of reasons why this may have occurred. First, it is possible that a lack of trust between the LTTE and the government undermined the talks. As mentioned during one of my interviews in Sri Lanka, there was mistrust and suspicion on the part of both the government and the LTTE. After the talks failed, both sides accused the other of using the ceasefire to re-build their forces and prepare for another round of battle. Second, the LTTE's demands for secession were incompatible with the SLFP's proposal to devolve power

under a federal framework, which may have crippled the talks from the start.

It is also possible that the LTTE's decision was influenced by its inability to adapt to the confines of electoral competition. As one of my interviewees mentioned, while the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was seen as an exceptional military strategist (to the point that people in the government and military were afraid to engage him), he was not particularly good at politics. The LTTE could not compete politically with the other Tamil parties, especially since most of them had been engaged in electoral politics for several years by that point. It is possible that the LTTE may have laid down its arms and entered into electoral politics if the other Tamil parties had not been around at the time. Consequently, while the political opportunity structure appeared to be opportune for using nonviolence and electoral politics, all but the main militant organization, the LTTE, took advantage of these conditions and pressed their demands through nonviolent means.

Regarding alternative explanations, the Tamils were represented by only two organizations during the 6th parliament. In the 10th parliament, the Tamils were highly fragmented, but only one organization, the LTTE, used violence; all other Tamil parties used electoral politics or nonviolence. According to the literature, fragmentation within the minority group increases the likelihood that minority organizations use violence. In the case of the 10th parliament, this expectation holds for the LTTE, but not for the other Tamil parties.

Likewise, it seems unlikely that the UNP and SLFP's efforts to address minority demands were driven by their party's long-standing positions on the minority issue. As was the case under low majority fragmentation, the government was con-

trolled by different parties during the two periods of high majority fragmentation. In both instances, the party that was in power attempted conciliatory policies toward the Tamils, while the party that was in the opposition struck a hard-lined stance.

For instance, when the UNP led the government during the 6th parliament, the SLFP opposed any measures that it took to devolve power to the Tamils. In contrast, during the 10th parliament, the SLFP attempted to devolve power to the Tamils, while the UNP vehemently opposed these efforts. In fact, as mentioned by one of my interviewees, when the SLFP introduced the constitutional bill on the floor of the parliament, the leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickramasinghe, took a lighter to the document and set it on fire. Just a few years later, the UNP became the government and re-initiated high profile peace talks with the LTTE, which the SLFP then opposed. Consequently, majority fragmentation does not seem to be epiphenomenal to fixed party preferences.

6.4   Conclusion

The qualitative analysis shows support for the theory, but also illustrates that there is more nuance to the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies. First, as expected by the theory, there were far greater opportunities for minority organizations to use nonviolence and electoral politics during periods of majority fragmentation. During the 6th and 10th parliaments, the UNP and SLFP governments made efforts to resolve minority grievances through negotiations, legislative solutions, or constitutional changes. In these cases, Tamil parties responded

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by taking advantage of these conditions to press their demands through nonviolence or electoral politics, at least to some extent.

During the 6th parliament, the Tamils used electoral politics to negotiate concessions from the UNP government, although only one of the efforts were a success. In the 10th parliament, the LTTE entered into peace talks with the SLFP government, which also pursued constitutional changes as a solution to the conflict. In this case, however, the organization did not lay down its weapons. Subsequently, while relatively high levels of majority fragmentation seem to produce the political opportunity structures that are expected by the theory - more divisions to leverage, more opportunities to serve as a coalition member or exact legislative concessions, and more of a chance that minority violence triggers majority outbidding - not all organizations took advantage of these conditions, and not all attempts to resolve issues through nonviolence were successful.

Second, during periods of low majority fragmentation, there were limited openings for minority organizations to press their demands with nonviolence or electoral politics. During the 7th and 8th parliaments, both the SLFP and the UNP won in resounding electoral victories. With a legislative majority, neither party needed minority support to govern or pass legislation. Instead, they were able to pursue policies relatively unchecked by either minority parties or the Sinhalese opposition. Indeed, as noted in my interviews and in secondary sources, the SLFP's actions during the 7th parliament set the stage for a shift in support among Tamils for a secessionist resolution to the conflict and created incentives for Tamil militant organizations to emerge. While the SLFP made some attempts at winning Tamil

support, it certainly did not need to negotiate with Tamils in exchange for their political or legislative support. Likewise, the UNP's policies during the 8th parliament continued this trend, as the government moved ahead with repressive policies toward the Tamils. While it also held several talks and engaged in efforts to discuss political solutions to the conflict, these efforts were not successful. Subsequently, as my theory expects, during periods of low majority fragmentation, there were few divisions for Tamil organizations to leverage and minimal opportunities to serve a coalition members or trade legislative support for political concessions.

Third, the analysis also demonstrates that although majority fragmentation created political opportunity structures that favored the use of violence during low fragmentation and nonviolence and electoral politics during high fragmentation, not all parties took advantage of these conditions, nor were their efforts always met with success. In one case - the status of Indian Tamils citizenship - the CWC was able to use electoral politics to exact concessions that addressed a main grievance of the minority group. At the same time, although the FP tried to use electoral politics to negotiate concessions with the UNP, these efforts were not effective. Likewise, although the SLFP was willing to make extensive constitutional reforms that would have addressed some, though certainly not all, Tamil grievances, the LTTE was unwilling to pursue a nonviolent approach.

Consequently, while other factors certainly affected these outcomes, the analysis demonstrates that variation in majority fragmentation created distinct opportunities that shaped minority incentives for electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence, as expected by the theory. Having discussed the results from the qualitative

analysis, the next chapter summarizes the main findings of the project, discusses policy implications, and outlines directions for future research.

Chapter 7:   Conclusion

In describing the influence of domestic politics on international bargaining, Putnam (1988) argues that no leader is immune from domestic pressures. I suggest that the same expectation applies to ethnic minorities and the ethnic majorities that govern them; when ethnicity is politicized, no majority group is immune from ethnic competition pressures, and importantly, these pressures are not likely to go unnoticed by members of the ethnic minority.

As they press their claims against the state, ethnopolitical minority organizations choose from a menu of strategies, including electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence. Although these choices can be influenced by a variety of factors, including the degree of fragmentation within the ethnic minority group, regime type, and the past use of strategies, I posit that they are also conditioned by fragmentation dynamics within *ethnically mobilized groups that control the state.*

Like ethnic minority groups that seek self-determination, ethnic groups that control the government may be fragmented and competitive, with multiple parties competing for the same base of support. When ethnicity is politicized, the fragmentation dynamics that impact ethnic minorities are likely to affect ethnic majorities as well, changing how minority organizations bargain with the government. To date,

the literature has not explored how majority fragmentation conditions the strategic choices of ethnopolitical minority organizations. I address this gap by developing and testing a theory about how ethnic minority organizations choose strategies under the shadow of ethnic majority fragmentation.

I argue that majority fragmentation affects the cost-benefit calculations of ethnopolitical minority organizations to take part in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence. When majority fragmentation is relatively low, ethnopolitical minority organizations are likely to have more strategic success by using violence than electoral politics or nonviolence. On the other hand, when majority fragmentation is relatively high, ethnopolitical minority organizations are likely to find that electoral politics or nonviolence are better options for realizing their objectives than violence.

I test this argument with a mixed method approach. I conduct a longitudinal analysis of ethnopolitical minority organization strategies from 1960-2005 in Sri Lanka using an original measure of majority fragmentation based on roll call voting data collected during field work in Sri Lanka, a secondary original measure of majority fragmentation based on party seat share, and existing data on minority strategies. I also use the roll call data from Sri Lanka to explore whether majority parties are more likely to outbid when minority organizations use violence than nonviolence and whether majorities are more likely to outbid when they are highly fragmented.

For the qualitative portion, I conduct a process-tracing analysis of two periods of relatively low and high majority fragmentation in Sri Lanka using secondary

sources and interviews with local experts and political elites that I conducted during fieldwork in Sri Lanka. Taken together, the findings provide strong support for the theory and suggest more nuance about the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than expected.

7.1 Overall findings

In this section, I summarize the results from the quantitative tests of Hypotheses 1-7 and the process-tracing analysis of the causal mechanisms of the theory.

In terms of the quantitative analysis of single strategies, Hypothesis 1 expected that ethnopolitical minority organizations would be more likely to engage in violence than to take part in electoral politics or use nonviolence when majority fragmentation is relatively low. Controlling for the number of other co-ethnic organizations, whether it was an election year, and the past use of electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence, the results support the hypothesis. In terms of substantive effects, I found that on average, a change from the lowest to the highest levels of majority fragmentation significantly decreased the predicted probability of using violence by 12 and 13 percentage points (EMFI and EMSI variables, respectively).

For Hypothesis 2, I predicted that ethnopolitical minority organizations would be more likely to use nonviolence than violence when majority fragmentation is relatively high. In the quantitative analysis, I found support for this hypothesis as well. Regarding substantive effects, a change from the lowest to the highest level of majority fragmentation increased the predicted probability that ethnopolitical

minority organizations engaged in nonviolence by 13 and 9 percentage points (EMFI and EMSI variables, respectively).

In Hypothesis 3, I anticipated that ethnopolitical minority organizations would be more likely to take part in electoral politics than to use violence when majority fragmentation is relatively high. In the regression analysis, I found support for this hypothesis. Substantively, a change from the lowest to the highest level of majority fragmentation increased the predicted probability of elections by 14 and 4 percentage points (EMFI and EMSI variables, respectively), although the latter effect is not statistically significant.

Turning to mixed strategies, Hypothesis 4 argued that ethnopolitical minority organizations would be more likely to take part in electoral politics and use nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation is relatively high. Controlling for minority fragmentation, whether it is an election year, and the past use of mixed strategies, the analysis shows that this is indeed the case. Substantively, a change from the lowest to the highest value of majority fragmentation increased the predicted probability of using this mixed strategy by 15 and 16 percentage points (EMFI and EMSI variables, respectively).

In Hypotheses 5a and 5b, I predicted divergent expectations about the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies. Specifically, H5a expected that ethnopolitical minority organizations would be more likely to use violence and nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation is relatively *low*, while H5b predicted that ethnopolitical minority organizations would be more likely to use violence and nonviolence in the same year when majority fragmentation

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is relatively *high.*

In the analysis, I found support for H5b. It is important to note, however, that nearly all cases of this mixed strategy came from one organization - the LTTE.[1] In chapter 5, I discussed the implication of this finding for other organizations. In terms of substantive effects, moving from the lowest to the highest value of majority fragmentation increased the predicted probability of using violence and nonviolence by 4 percentage points for both measures of majority fragmentation, although only the former is statistically significant (p=0.084).

Finally, regarding majority outbidding against minorities, in Hypothesis 6 I expected that majority parties are more likely to outbid against the minority group after ethnopolitical minority organizations use violence than nonviolence. I find support for this hypothesis. For Parliament 8, the mean EMFI values for majority party votes on ethnic minority issues after minority nonviolence and violence are both high, which reflects the high level of cohesion that characterized this period of low majority fragmentation. Nonetheless, there is a difference in means between these two types of votes; whereas the average EMFI score for votes after violence is 0.90, the mean EMFI score for votes after nonviolence is 0.86, a difference of 0.04 that is statistically significant at p<0.01.

Hypothesis 7 anticipated that majority parties are more likely to outbid against the minority group when majority fragmentation is relatively high. This analysis indicates that as compared to non-ethnic votes, majority parties in a fragmented

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[1]Two other organizations - the Eelam People's Liberation Front and the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam - used this mixed strategy for one year each.

polity are less likely to vote cohesively on minority issues after minorities use violence. In addition, when compared to the mean EMFI score after minority violence in Parliament 8, the mean EMFI score is much lower in Parliament 10; .90 versus .10, respectively. This seems to suggest that during a period of high majority fragmentation, majority parties are less likely to outbid after minorities use violence than during a period of low fragmentation. These results seem to run counter to Hypothesis 7.

However, without knowing how majorities voted on ethnic issues after minorities used nonviolence, it is not clear if this hypothesis is refuted or not. It is possible that if there was a vote on an ethnic issue following an act of minority nonviolence, we would see majorities voting less cohesively, which would support Hypothesis 7. It is also possible that the difference in mean EMFI scores after minority violence between the Parliaments could reflect the fact that on average, majorities were far more fragmented and less likely to vote cohesively on all votes in general in Parliament 10 than in Parliament 8.

Alternatively, it is possible that this finding reflects a more nuanced relationship between minority strategies and majority outbidding during high majority fragmentation. Instead of violence provoking outbidding among all members of the majority group, it is possible that the extent to which majorities outbid depends on who is being targeted and where; if minority organizations mostly attack civilians throughout the entire country, we might see all majority parties being pushed by public opinion into supporting a policy of outbidding against minorities. However, if minority organizations mostly attack the government in their own rebel-held terri-

tory or attack civilians in a limited area, the majority of voters within the majority group may not necessarily call for majority parties to adopt hard-lined positions against the minority group. The extent to which majorities outbid against minorities, therefore, may depend on whom minority organizations target and where. This is an interesting question that should be examined in future research.

Regarding the qualitative analysis, I find support for the theory, as well as evidence indicating that there is more nuance to the relationship between majority fragmentation and minority strategies than expected. First, as anticipated by the theory, there were far greater opportunities for minority organizations to use nonviolence and electoral politics during periods of majority fragmentation. The analysis demonstrated that relatively high levels of majority fragmentation created the political opportunity structures that were expected by the theory - more divisions to leverage, more opportunities to serve as a coalition member or exact legislative concessions, and more of a chance that minority violence triggers majority outbidding.

Second, during periods of low majority fragmentation, there were few openings for minority organizations to press their demands with nonviolence or electoral politics. During these periods, Sinhalese parties won in landslide victories. With a legislative majority, neither party needed minority support to govern or pass legislation. Instead, they were able to enact policies relatively unchecked by either minority parties or the Sinhalese opposition.

Third, the analysis also indicated that although majority fragmentation created political opportunity structures that favored the use of violence during low fragmentation and nonviolence and electoral politics during high fragmentation, not

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all parties took advantage of these conditions, nor were their efforts always met with success. In one case, these efforts resulted in the Indian Tamils being able to address a major grievance - their lack of citizenship status. In other instances, however, attempts to ameliorate Tamil grievances were not successful despite cooperation between the Sinhalese government and Tamil parties.

In sum, whether measured by the cohesiveness of roll call votes or by the proportion of ethnic party seat shares, majority fragmentation appears to have a statistically and substantively significant impact on ethnic minority single and mixed strategies, as predicted by Hypotheses 1-4 and H5b. While I find that majorities are less likely to outbid when minorities use nonviolence than violence (H6), I do not have enough data to adequately test whether this relationship is more pronounced during periods of high majority fragmentation (H7). The qualitative analysis both supports and adds further nuance to these findings. Taken together, the results confirm the value of bringing ethnic majorities into the analysis of ethnic conflict processes.

7.2   Policy Implications

Although studies have found that fragmentation within *ethnic minority groups* increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict (Cunningham 2014), my research demonstrates that fragmentation within *ethnic mobilized political majority groups* does not have the same effect. Instead, majority fragmentation creates a political structure that provides opportunities for minority organizations to more successfully realize

their political goals through electoral politics and nonviolence. In contrast, minority violence becomes more likely when majority groups are minimally fragmented. This suggests that while minority fragmentation may be detrimental to peaceful relations among minority and majority groups, majority fragmentation is not.

This finding has implications that are especially pertinent today. While previous studies found that majority groups, at least in Eastern Europe (Stroschein 2012), have not mobilized along ethnic lines, recent events throughout Europe and the Middle East suggest that this trend may be reversing to some extent. For instance, within the past few years, Europe has seen a rise in nationalist and far-right parties in several countries, including Italy, Germany, Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland (BBC 2018, Brookings 2018, NYT 2016). In Israel, the parliament recently voted that the right of national self-determination is "unique to the Jewish people," effectively declaring that Israel is privileging its identity as a Jewish state over that of a democratic state for Jews and minorities (Fisher 2018).

While nationalist parties in Europe have made electoral gains, they have not reached the same level of political dominance as mainstream and conventional parties. If they do, however, and are the only parties that represent a newly ethnically mobilized majority group, my theory portends that this may have deleterious effects on minority-majority interactions.

7.3   Future Directions

My findings suggest several avenues for future research. First, in order to test the generalizability of the theory, it is important to expand the analysis beyond the Sri Lankan case. To this end, I have collected longitudinal data on majority fragmentation for six countries in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. I will expand on this data by collecting additional information on majority fragmentation across countries in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. In the next section, I present results from this preliminary cross-national database.

Second, I will explore how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of *governments* to repress, accommodate, or co-opt minority organizations. In the dissertation, I focused exclusively on how majority fragmentation affects the strategic choices of minority organizations with respect to the government. However, it is likely that majority fragmentation also impacts the strategies that governments adopt toward minorities. I intend to examine this question by combining my data on majority fragmentation with existing data on government repression and concessions toward ethnopolitical minority organizations.

Third, it is worthwhile to examine what causes majority parties to reach across ethnic divides and invite minority organizations into their coalitions, especially in the context of ongoing ethnic conflicts. For example, as my data collection on Sri Lanka shows, Sinhalese parties varied in whether they formed co-ethnic or multi-ethnic governing coalitions. In this project, I do not examine what causes governments to partner with parties from other ethnic groups, rather than their own group, or the

implications that multi-ethnic coalitions have on majority-minority relations. Answering these questions could shed additional light on how fragmentation dynamics within majorities affects their strategic interactions with minority groups.

Fourth, I plan to examine an understudied question in the conflict literature - why do some ethnopolitical minority organizations use the same strategy always, whereas others switch their strategies or use more than one strategy at a time? For example, in Sri Lanka, some Tamil organizations only ever used violence, nonviolence, or electoral politics, others alternated strategies from year to year, and yet others used a mix of strategies in the same year. The same variation in strategies can be found in other ethnic minority groups. Since majority fragmentation conditions the choice of minority organizations to run in elections, protest, or use violence, it is reasonable to expect, and I argue, worthwhile to explore, whether it also affects the choice of minority organizations to use the same strategy always or to switch strategies over time.

7.3.1 Beyond Sri Lanka - Cross-National Data

To test the theory beyond Sri Lanka, I collected data on majority fragmentation for countries in which: 1) the ethnic group that controls the government is mobilized along ethnic lines; and 2) ethnopolitical organizations vary in using electoral politics, nonviolence, and violence to achieve their political goals.

To identify the countries that meet this criteria, I created a sample frame using two existing data collection projects - the Strategies of Resistance Data Project

(SRDP) and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. The SRDP data provides the dependent variable for the analysis, while the EPR data provides information about which ethnic group is politically dominant.

Using these two datasets, I collected original data on whether politically dominant ethnic groups for the countries coded in the SRDP were mobilized along ethnic lines; specifically, I examined whether groups that were coded as politically dominant by EPR were represented by ethnic parties. Using Kanchan Chandra's (2011) framework for classifying ethnic parties, I coded parties as ethnic if they 1) made an *ethnic claim* (i.e., an ethnic group was named or explicitly identified in a speech or campaign platform to the exclusion of other ethnic groups), 2) engaged in *ethnic recruitment* (i.e., the majority of the party's members are from one ethnic group), and/or 3) received *ethnic support* (i.e., the majority of the ethnic group voted for the party; the majority of the party's votes came from one ethnic group; and/or the party receives support primarily from one ethnic group (irrespective of vote share)).

To create this list of ethnic parties, I examined all political organizations that held seats in the legislature; I focused on these parties, rather than parties that run for office but don't win seats or parties that don't run for office at all, because I expect that political competition, and subsequently, ethnic fragmentation, is strongest among parties that are able to secure seats in elections. Therefore, for each party that won at least one seat in a legislative election, I collected data on whether the party was ethnic, non-ethnic (did not make any ethnic appeals, engage in ethnic recruitment, or receive ethnic support), or multi-ethnic (it made appeals, recruited from, or received support from more than one ethnic group). If a party that held

at least one seat in the legislature made an ethnic appeal, recruited from an ethnic group, or received ethnic support, I coded the party as being ethnic.

I focused on two regions initially, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, because they tend to have more ethnic majority parties than other areas of the world (Szocsik and Zuber 2012; Elischer 2014). For instance, there are no parties that meet the selection criteria in North America, and few parties can be characterized as ethnic majority parties in Latin America. However, I intend to expand the dataset by coding countries in Asia and the Middle East.

For Europe, the list of countries that are included in the SRDP data consist of Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, Georgia, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom; all but three of these countries - Cyprus, Sweden, and Norway - are also coded in EPR. From this list of countries, I conducted research to determine whether any parties that held seats in the legislature could be considered ethnic parties. If no parties met the selection criteria, I did not include the country in the cross-national dataset; countries that did not meet this criteria include Finland, France, Georgia, Italy, Moldova,[2] Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

The remaining countries - Belgium, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia - were identified as having ethnic parties. Belgium, however, has little variation in

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[2]Moldova experienced a brief period of time at the beginning of the country's independence during which a major party could be classified at ethnic; however, shortly thereafter, Moldovan parties moved away from making ethnic appeals and the party that continued to hold an ethnic Moldovan line received little support from the ethnic group. Subsequently, I did not include Moldova in the dataset.

terms of the strategies that minority organizations use (organizations nearly exclusively used electoral politics; nonviolence was used in less than 2% percent of cases, and there were no cases of violence).

For Bosnia, the SRDP data codes the country starting in 1992, when the country declared its independence from Yugoslavia. However, violence broke out shortly after this declaration of independence, and the country experienced a civil war that lasted until a peace agreement was negotiated in 1995. This agreement, the Dayton Accords, created a legislative structure in which the country's bicameral parliament - the upper House of Peoples and the lower House of Representatives - is evenly divided among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Based on this power-sharing framework, EPR does not identify a single politically dominant ethnic group from 1996 onward; instead, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are all considered politically dominant (e.g., they are all "senior partners" in the government). Since there were no elections prior to 1996 and the Dayton Accords created a power-sharing framework that makes all ethnic groups "political majorities," I excluded Bosnia from the dataset. Consequently, for Europe, the dataset consists of Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia.

For Sub-Saharan Africa, the following countries are coded in the SRDP data: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Of these countries, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, and Somalia are not coded in the EPR data. Further, in five countries - Congo-Kinshana, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - ethnopolitical minority organizations either did not use any strategy at all (Ethiopia, Uganda,

and Zimbabwe) or used just one strategy (there was just one act of economic non-cooperation in Congo-Kinshana and four acts of participation in electoral politics only in Zambia); subsequently, I did not include these countries in the dataset. I did not find evidence of any ethnic parties in Mali, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia.

The remaining countries - Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan - have ethnic parties. However, in Cameroon, there was just one dominant party that represented the ethnic majority group and controlled the state; since there were no other ethnic majority parties, the level of fragmentation in Cameroon did not change at all over time. Consequently, I did not include Cameroon in the dataset.

For Nigeria, the SRDP data codes the country from 1960-1970 and then 1990-2006. From 1966-1999, the country was controlled by the military, except for a four year period from 1979-1983. Although many ethnic parties participated in elections after democracy was restored and multi-party elections were introduced in 1999, the governing party - the People's Democratic Party - did not make ethnic appeals and received a broad-base of support from various ethnic groups. Since it is considered to be an multi-ethnic party, and not an ethnic party (Ebegbulem 2011), I did not include Nigeria in the dataset.

For Sudan, there were only two brief periods during which multi-party elections were held - 1965-1968 and 1986-1987.[3] Otherwise, the country was ruled by a military government (1958-1964, 1969-1985) or a one-party government (1989-

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[3]There are 14 observations for the period of 1965-1968 and 22 for 1986-1987.

present); as such, I did not include it in the dataset (Willis et al. 2009). Based on these coding decisions, Angola, Chad, and South Africa are the countries that were included for Sub-Saharan Africa.

7.3.2 Part I - Single strategies with cross-national data

In this section, I present results from the models that I use to test Hypotheses 1-3, which expect that majority fragmentation conditions the choice of ethnopolitical minority organizations to use a single strategy of electoral politics, nonviolence, or violence, beyond the Sri Lankan case. Unlike the analysis for Sri Lanka, which includes two original measures of majority fragmentation (one based on roll call votes and the other based on ethnic party seat share), here, I only use an original measure of ethnic party seat share.

For this analysis, I use a similar set of controls variables - the Number of Other Co-ethnic Factions, Election year, Past use of nonviolence, and Past use of violence. I also control for regime type. I coded a variable that identified whether organizations held office in the year before an election, but could not use it in the analysis because it perfectly predicts the outcome (i.e., complete separation). Since the data does not include the full universe of cases and are somewhat preliminary, as I discuss below, I do not calculate predicted probabilities or graph results for the regressions. Nonetheless, using the cross-national data I find partial support for the theory across both single and mixed strategies.

7.3.2.1 Model 5 - Single strategies with cross-national data

Findings from Model 5 - a multinomial logistic regression for single strategies using the EMSI variable - are shown in Table 7.1. As seen below, the coefficient on the EMSI variable is statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level and in the expected direction for one of the two main categories of interest - nonviolence relative to violence. Subsequently, controlling for the number of other co-ethnic organizations, whether it was an election year, regime type, and the past use of nonviolence or violence, the results suggest that as the level of majority ethnic group fragmentation increases, ethnopolitical political minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence than to engage in violence. This lends support to Hypothesis 2, which expects that minority organizations will be more likely to engage in nonviolence than violence as majority fragmentation increases.

Although the sign of the other main outcome of interest - elections versus violence - is in the right direction, the coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels; therefore, Hypothesis 3, which expects that minority organizations are more likely to participate in elections than use violence as majority fragmentation increases, is not supported. There are several possible reasons why this relationship is not statistically significant.

First, it is possible that this null finding stems from the fact that electoral politics is used less frequently by minority organizations in the cross-national sample. In Sri Lanka, minority organizations participated in electoral politics about 18% of the time, while in the cross-national sample, minority organizations used electoral

politics only 11% of the time. It may be the case that this null relationship is affected by the more limited use of electoral politics in the cross-national data.

Second, this outcome may be impacted by the system of government - i.e., whether a country has a presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential system. As described in the theory chapter, I expect that when majority fragmentation is relatively high, majority parties have incentives to reach across ethnic lines and co-operate with minority organizations. In the case of Sri Lanka, this cooperation often resulted in a minority organization joining a governing coalition (this occurred both when the country had a parliamentary system before 1972 and a semi-presidential system from 1972 onward).

While I anticipate that cooperation can occur in a presidential system as well, it is possible that the theory only holds when the system of government includes the possibility for minority organizations to join a governing coalition. I examine this possibility by running the same analysis on a subsample of countries that have parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. These results are presented in Section 7.3.4, below.

Table 7.1 also shows that as majority fragmentation increases, ethnopolitical minority organizations are more likely to do nothing than to use violence, which suggests that not taking any action is preferable to incurring the costs of employing violence against a fragmented majority group.

Turning to the control variables, the results show that in contrast to expectations, minority fragmentation does not impact the use of minority strategies. This

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Table 7.1: Model 5 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority single strategies - cross-national data

	No strategy/ Violence only	Elections only/ Violence only	Nonviolence only/ Violence only
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	2.606*	2.028	3.267**
	(1.506)	(1.836)	(1.623)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	0.133	0.0493	-0.00897
	(0.0913)	(0.110)	(0.107)
Election year	-0.118	2.210***	-0.344
	(0.716)	(0.840)	(0.962)
Regime type	0.0456	0.0202	0.101
	(0.0523)	(0.0654)	(0.0657)
Past use of nonviolence	12.90***	12.38***	14.44***
	(0.501)	(0.843)	(0.479)
Past use of violence	-3.215***	-3.067***	-2.216**
	(0.919)	(1.127)	(1.090)
Constant	1.862***	-0.749	-0.163
	(0.607)	(0.756)	(0.712)
Observations	548	548	548

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

result runs counter to the analysis using the data from Sri Lanka, as well as existing studies on minority fragmentation (Cunningham 2014). It is possible that this null finding stems from the limited number of countries in the sample. Three countries in the sample (Angola, Chad, Croatia, and Macedonia), comprising 44% of observations, have at most four organizations representing the minority ethnic group, whereas the remaining countries (South Africa and Serbia), have 9 organizations and 14 organizations, respectively. In Serbia, less than 10% of observations consist of cases when there are more than 10 organizations. Subsequently, it is possible that this variable would be statistically significant if there were more cases of highly fragmented ethnic groups in the data.

In terms of the other control variables, minority organizations are more likely to take part in elections during an election year, as expected. Further, using a strategy in the previous year affects its use in the current year. The coefficients on the past use of nonviolence and past use of violence variables are statistically significant at $p<0.01$ or $p<0.05$ across all the outcomes; as is the case with lagged dependent variables, the coefficients are large (Achen 2000; Beck and Katz 2011). On average, ethnopolitical minority organizations that used nonviolence in the previous year are more likely to choose elections, nonviolence, or doing nothing over a strategy of violence in the following year. At the same time, using violence in the past year decreases the likelihood of participating in electoral politics, using nonviolence, or doing nothing in the following year. In both cases, the strategies that organizations pursue tend to be rather sticky from year to year.

7.3.3 Part II - Mixed strategies with cross-national data

In addition to examining how majority fragmentation conditions the choice of minority organizations to take part in electoral politics, use nonviolence, or engage in violence, I also explore how majority fragmentation affects the choice of minority organizations to use a mix of these strategies. In the analysis below, I discuss results from Model 6, a multinomial logistic regression of minority strategies that uses the EMSI variable in a cross-national analysis.

7.3.3.1 Model 6 - Mixed strategies with cross-national data

Results for Model 6 are listed in Table 7.3. The analysis shows that while the coefficient on the EMSI variable is in the expected direction, the relationship between majority fragmentation and the use of a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence is not statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not supported, at least for the countries in the cross-national sample.

In contrast, table 7.3 indicates that majority fragmentation does condition the choice of minority organizations to engage in a mixed strategy of violence and protest; the coefficient on the EMSI variable is negative and statistically significant at the $p<0.1$ level. This finding supports Hypothesis 5a, which expects that minority organizations will be less likely to use both violence and nonviolence as majorities become more fragmented.

This finding suggests that minorities in countries other than Sri Lanka may be concerned about outbidding dynamics; since violence is less likely to trigger outbidding that can increase the government's resolve under low majority fragmentation, a minority organization can avoid expending more resources to defeat or coerce the government into making concessions. While there are few divisions to leverage with nonviolence under low majority fragmentation, a minority organization may use nonviolence for another purpose - to signal its strength to the government. If an organization holds a massive rally that is attended by thousands of supporters, the government may update its beliefs about the mobilization capabilities and power of

Table 7.2: Model 6 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority multiple strategies - cross-national data

	Elections & nonviolence/ No strategy	Violence & nonviolence/ No strategy
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	0.769	-3.968*
	(1.206)	(2.395)
Number Co-ethnic Factions	-0.256***	0.0314
	(0.0635)	(0.235)
Election year	1.707***	0.872
	(0.439)	(1.012)
Regime type	0.110**	-0.0660
	(0.0453)	(0.0805)
Past use of Elections & Nonviolence	2.934***	2.007**
	(0.698)	(1.024)
Constant	-2.931***	-2.795***
	(0.488)	(0.802)
Observations	555	555

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

the organization. This signal can increase the ability of the minority organization to coerce the government into making a concession.

Taken together, these findings suggest that resources may indeed play an important role in deciding when minority organizations use violence, either on its own or in combination with nonviolence. The results from Model 5 indicate that minority organizations are more likely to use a single strategy of violence when majorities are less fragmented. Similarly, the finding from Model 6 shows that minority organizations are also less likely to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence when majorities are less fragmented. Unlike the Sri Lankan case, in which the politically and military dominant organization - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - was *more* likely to employ this strategy when majority fragmentation was *high*,

this analysis suggests that when organizations have limited resources, as is likely to be the case the more fragmented the minority group is, organizations may prefer to refrain from using violence and nonviolence.

When minorities have limited resources, they may be less resilient and able to withstand outbidding by the majority group, especially if outbidding results in government attacks. On the other hand, when minority organizations acquire enough resources to become the dominant militant organization, as was the case with the LTTE when it used a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence, they may be better able to withstand majority outbidding. As such, it is possible that minority organizations with limited resources are more likely to use violence only or violence in combination with nonviolence when majority is fragmentation is low, but once they possess more resources, organizations may be more likely to use a mixed strategy of violence and nonviolence when majority fragmentation is high.

Turning to the control variables, minority fragmentation conditions the choice to use a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence, but not violence and nonviolence. In particular, as minority fragmentation increases, minority organizations are less likely to use elections and nonviolence than to take no action; the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the $p<.10$ level. In contrast, minority fragmentation does not condition the choice between engaging in violence and nonviolence versus doing nothing; the coefficient on the number of other co-ethnics variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

This finding may indicate that organizations operating within a fragmented minority group face resource constraints. Unless a minority organization is able to

procure outside support, it is likely to primarily rely on support from its co-ethnic kin. Since the amount of support that the ethnic group can provide is finite, as more organizations become active, each organization has to compete for an increasingly smaller share of the pie. Consequently, as minority fragmentation increases, each organization may have fewer resources to run in elections or to stage nonviolent events. Since using two different strategies in the same year is likely to be costly, resource constraints may decrease the ability of minority organizations to choose a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence over doing nothing.

In terms of the other control variables, as anticipated, minority organizations are more likely to use a mixed strategy of electoral politics and nonviolence in an election year; the coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. The choice to participate in elections and use nonviolence during an election year is not surprising, as we would expect that organizations are more likely to take part in electoral politics during an election year. Moreover, it is possible that organizations are staging protests before an election to rally support from their constituents; for example, if voters have grievances against the government, staging a protest may mobilize voters to support an organization during an upcoming election. Organizations may protest after they are elected as well to pressure the government into offering a policy concession. Also as expected, minority organizations are more likely to use a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence as the level of democracy in the country increases; the coefficient on the regime type variable is positive and statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Regarding the past use of a strategy, organizations that used a mixed strategy

of elections and nonviolence in the past year were more likely to pursue a similar approach than to do nothing in the subsequent year; the coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Somewhat surprisingly, using a mixed strategy of elections and nonviolence in the preceding year also increased the probability of using violence and nonviolence relative to taking no action in the following year; the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the p<.05 level. It is possible that this finding reflects that fact that organizations prefer to remain relevant among their current and potential supporters by engaging in either mixed strategy, rather than hanging out at the sidelines and doing nothing.

7.3.4 Part III: Single strategies with subsample of countries

The results from the cross-national analysis only partially support the theory - while minority organizations are more likely to use nonviolence than violence as majority fragmentation increases, the relationship between majority fragmentation and the choice to participate in electoral politics is not statistically significant (although the sign of the coefficient is in the anticipated direction). As noted earlier, it is possible that this hypothesis is limited to countries with parliamentary or semi-presidential systems, in which a governing party that is hamstrung by co-ethnic competition must reach across the ethnic divide and form a governing coalition with minority organizations.

I examine this possibility by running the same analysis on a subsample of countries that have parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. The results, which

are presented below, suggest that the null findings may not stem from the type of government; instead, they may be driven by an outlier - Serbia. Since the results do not seem to be generalizable beyond the Serbian case, I only present findings from a regression of minority single strategies.

7.3.4.1 Model 7: Single strategies for subsample with cross-national data

Results from the multinomial logistic regression for the subsample of countries with parliamentary or semi-presidential systems are presented below. Unlike in Model 5, the EMSI variable is statistically significant (p<.001) across both of the main outcomes of interest. Also unlike the findings from Model 5, however, the sign is in the opposite direction of what is expected by the theory; as shown in Table 7.3, minority organizations are less likely to participate in elections or to use nonviolence relative to violence as majority fragmentation increases. These results, however, seem to be driven by one country - Serbia. Among the 472 observations that are included in the regression, 346 (73%) are from Serbia. Since most of the observations come from Serbia, is it likely that these contradictory findings are heavily influenced by the Serbian case.

Table 7.3: Model 7 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority single strategies - subsample of cross-national data (parliamentary and semi-presidential systems)

	No strategy/ Violence only	Elections only/ Violence only	Nonviolence only/ Violence only
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	-6.471***	-6.856***	-5.962***
	(1.959)	(2.071)	(2.005)
Number Other Co-Ethnic Factions	0.331**	0.253	0.179
	(0.168)	(0.179)	(0.139)
Election year	-1.011	0.835	-1.477*
	(0.620)	(0.724)	(0.831)
Regime type	0.0851	0.0649	0.134
	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.102)
Past use of nonviolence	11.64***	11.17***	13.11***
	(0.678)	(0.968)	(0.637)
Past use of violence	-3.408**	-2.635**	-2.420*
	(1.545)	(1.243)	(1.449)
Constant	6.788***	4.361***	5.037***
	(1.146)	(1.252)	(1.024)
Observations	472	472	472

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7.3.4.2 Model 8: Single strategies for subsample without Serbia

To assess whether this is indeed the case, I ran another regression using the full cross-national database, but without Serbia.[4] I find that the results are similar to those in Model 5. As seen in Table 7.4 below, the EMSI variable is again positive for both the elections and nonviolence outcomes, but it also statistically significant for the nonviolence outcome only. While these results suggest that Serbia is indeed driving the contradictory findings in Model 7, the results should be taken as

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[4]For this analysis, I excluded regime type because it is strongly correlated with the EMSI variable for this set of countries (.64).

somewhat preliminary, given the small sample size (n = 186). Nonetheless, these findings indicate that there is value in continuing to explore how majority fragmentation conditions minority strategies, a task that I intend to pursue with additional data on Asia and the Middle East.

Table 7.4: Model 8 - Multinomial logistic regression on ethnic minority single strategies - subsample of cross-national data (without Serbia)

	No strategy/ Violence only	Elections only/ Violence only	Nonviolence only/ Violence only
Ethnic Majority Seat Share Index	6.294	8.457	10.78*
	(6.487)	(8.062)	(6.460)
Number Other Co-ethnic Factions	0.126	0.0375	-0.0667
	(0.259)	(0.289)	(0.217)
Election year	0.741	3.436***	1.003
	(1.117)	(1.264)	(1.783)
Regime type	13.62***	-0.651	14.81***
	(0.712)	(0.836)	(0.774)
Past use of violence	-2.786**	-1.576	-1.387
	(1.199)	(1.044)	(1.319)
Constant	1.271*	-2.331***	-1.043
	(0.685)	(0.792)	(0.815)
Observations	186	186	186

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In conclusion, my research on majority fragmentation generates novel insights about how ethnic identity politics *within* the majority groups that govern over and negotiate with minorities conditions the strategic choices of minority organizations. It also complements and expands on existing work on fragmentation within minority groups, thereby giving us a more complete understanding of how ethnicity affects minority-majority interactions. Finally, the rise of nationalist parties in Eu-

rope and nationalist sentiment in the U.S. suggests that an increasing number of countries could find themselves governed by ethnic majority parties; how minority organizations respond to these ethnically politicized and fragmented majority groups, therefore, remains an important question for future study. By unpacking the unitary actor assumption for ethnic political majorities, this dissertation generates a new avenue for research on how ethnicity in both political minorities *and* the political majorities that govern them affects conflict processes.

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