

# Public Financing and the Underrepresentation of Women in United States Elected Political Offices 

Libby Moyer<br>Butler University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/ugtheses
Part of the American Politics Commons

## Recommended Citation

Moyer, Libby, "Public Financing and the Underrepresentation of Women in United States Elected Political Offices" (2017). Undergraduate Honors Thesis Collection. 401.
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/ugtheses/401

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@butler.edu.

# BUTLER UNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM 

Honors Thesis Certification

Please type all information in this section:
Applicant

Thesis title

## Libby Moyer

(Name as it is to appear on diploma)
Public Financing and the Underrepresentation of Women in
United States' Elected Political Offices

Intended date of commencement 5/6/2017


For Honors Program use:
Level of Honors conferred: University
Departmental
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

Butler University

# Public Financing and the Underrepresentation of Women in United States Elected Political Offices 

Libby Moyer<br>University Honors Thesis<br>Thesis Advisors: Dr. Shufeldt and Dr. Brabant<br>Second Reader: Dr. Jett

April 21, 2017


#### Abstract

Approaching the 100-year anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment, women comprise approximately 51 percent of the American population but hold only 24.8 percent of state legislative seats and 19.4 percent of United States Congressional seats. The scholarly literature suggests that one contributing factor to this inequality is a real or perceived gender difference in fundraising success. My hypothesis is that state public financing programs will decrease gender inequality in state legislative offices. I examined the role campaign finance plays in gender inequality in elected office by conducting a comparative case study of the state legislatures of Minnesota and Iowa from 1975 to 2017. Since Minnesota and Iowa are similar in many of the other theoretical factors attributed to gender equality, I am able to isolate the effect of public financing. Minnesota implemented a public financing program for state legislative office in 1974. Iowa does not have a public financing program and allows unlimited campaign donations by various types of donors. In 1975, women comprised 4\% of state legislative seats in Minnesota and $9 \%$ of state legislative seats in Iowa. Currently, Minnesota's state legislature is $32 \%$ women, and Iowa's state legislature is $22 \%$ women. According to the Center for American Women and Politics, Minnesota ranks ninth and Iowa ranks thirty-first in terms of gender equality in state legislative chambers. I hope my research can provide a preliminary understanding of how public campaign financing can increase gender equality in elected office.


Women have historically been underrepresented in elected offices throughout the United States. Although many women are active in political organizations and exercise their right to vote, this underrepresentation remains constant across all levels of government. The lack of female representation in elected offices of the United States is detrimental to the future of our country as we work toward building a more inclusive environment for all citizens. Women are often successful when they choose to seek office. However, women are not choosing to run for political office. Several factors contribute to this decision not to run for elected political office including the political ambition gap, a state's political culture, and perceived difficulty in campaign fundraising for women. This paper focuses on the role that campaign finance plays in a woman's decision to seek elected political office. Through analysis of existing research and a comparative case study of Minnesota and Iowa, my thesis will prove that public funding of campaigns can reduce gender equality in state legislative offices.

## Women Aren't in Office Because Women Don't Run for Office

The existing literature on the topic of female inequality in politics and specifically serving in state legislatures is extensive but not yet conclusive. Undoubtedly, women as a gender are proportionally underrepresented in American politics. However, research on the cause of this inequality is conflicting. A variety of sources credit partisanship, race, state district structure, lack of ambition, political culture and ideology, fundraising difficulties, and gender stereotypes for the lack of female representation (Lawless and Fox 2013; Arceneaux 2001; Dolan 2013; Rule 1990; Pyeatt and Yanus 2014; Sanbonmatsu 2002; King 2002). One common focus of the literature is that women might be less likely to run for office due to difficulty raising money (Lawless and Fox 2013; Mann 2003; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Burrell 2014). However, sources disagree on whether female candidates are truly at a disadvantage in fundraising. Some
researchers claim that fundraising difficulties for women are simply perceived and not actual obstacles to being elected to office (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Lawless and Fox 2013). My thesis attempts to connect existing research and prove that public financing can increase gender representation in state legislatures by helping women seek political office.

In general, women win political seats at a similar rate as men, but as a gender, women still are consistently underrepresented in elected office (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 432). Women have experienced recent success at the ballot box. For example, 1992 was considered the "Year of the Woman," which symbolized a shift toward a view of women in elected political office as acceptable. The 1992 federal election resulted in the number of female senators doubling and women in the House increased from 28 to 47 (Tumulty 2012).

The success of women at the polls could be related to the fact that gender does not seem to directly affect choices at the ballot boxes. Negative gender stereotypes do not directly affect women's chances of winning elected office according to Kathleen Dolan. Negative gender stereotypes in this context include views that consider women unfit or unqualified for political office. Gender stereotypes do play a role in conducting a campaign and voter evaluations of a female candidate's qualifications. However, Dolan's research suggests that these stereotypes do not affect voter behavior at the polls. Through surveys on voter behavior in the 2010 U.S. House of Representatives election, she found no empirical evidence that abstract gender stereotypes impact voter behavior for real-world candidates (Dolan 2013, 104; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Dolan finds that gender stereotypes do not play a large role in voter behavior at the polls because of party loyalty. Most Democrats will vote for Democrats, and most Republicans will vote for Republicans regardless of the gender of the candidates. In practice, while voters may perceive candidates differently based on gender in campaign season, candidate gender does not play a
major role in the choice voters make at the polls. This inequality exists not because women cannot win when they seek office but because women do not run for political seats.

When women choose to seek office, women realistically can fundraise as well as men although they fundraise in different ways. Female candidates also are raising as much or more in campaign funds as male candidates. Despite perceptions that women lack the skills and network needed to fundraise successfully, many women are matching their male opponents' dollar for dollar or raising substantially more than them (Burrell 2014, 119). For example, in the 2016 general election, Hillary Clinton raised more than $\$ 2.35$ million more than Donald Trump. ${ }^{1}$ Burrell's research did not find any inequalities among genders within party spending on behalf of congressional candidates or the ability for men and women to raise early money for campaigns. She even goes as far as to say that women are advantaged in terms of financing congressional campaigns (120). As with both genders, the ability to fundraise effectively can depend on a candidate's personal connections and personal wealth as is obvious with the examples of Clinton and Trump.

Gender representation in elected office has increased over the past century, and "The Year of the Woman" illustrated the rate at which women can win political seats. Women win elected office and fundraise as well as men, and negative stereotypes do not seem to influence voters at the polls. If the gender difference is not a product of women not winning, the question still remains: why are women underrepresented in elected political offices? Further research suggests that gender inequality in elected office exists simply because women are not seeking political office. The lack of desire to run for office is caused by a lack of political ambition,

[^0]political culture and ideology, negative gender stereotypes, and perceived fundraising difficulties for female candidates. (Lawless and Fox 2013; Arceneaux 2001; Sanbonmatsu, et al. 2009; "Money and Women Candidates").

The gender gap in political ambition or the "ambition gap" causes young women to be less likely to consider running for public office than young men (Lawless and Fox 2013, 2). A 2013 study conducted by Lawless and Fox shows female underrepresentation in politics exists because women are not running for office, and the underrepresentation is not a result of voters choosing male candidates over female candidates at the polls. Through online surveys of college students, Lawless and Fox attribute the gender gap to socialization of young women, little exposure to political information and discourse, little participation in organized and competitive sports, lack of encouragement to run for office, and lack of confidence in qualification to run for office in comparison to men. Women are less likely to believe they are qualified to run for office perhaps due to the lack of encouragement provided to women to seek office or the explicit fact that most politicians are not women. Inherently, due to a lack of political female representation, women are less likely to be included in political discourse.

A state's attitudinal characteristics, estimated based on measures of ideology and political culture, can have negative consequences on a woman's desire to seek political office and, as a result, the representation of women in state legislature (Arceneaux 2001). Arceneaux defines state political culture as "an orientation toward political action" (144). One attitudinal characteristic refers to a state's view of appropriate gender roles for women. If a majority of a state's voters do not believe political office is an appropriate position for a woman, less women are likely to seek the position than if a state viewed female political representatives positively. This negative gender role attitude may also deter party leaders and political elites from recruiting
women for office (Arceneaux 2001, 145). If party leaders assume voters will not support a female candidate, they are not likely to recruit a woman to run for office and provide resources for her campaign. According to Sanbonmatsu, "party leaders are misperceiving women's electability" ("Party Leader Beliefs about Women's Electoral Chances" 2006, 434). The misperception is not consistently overly pessimistic or overly optimistic. Some party leaders overestimate voter support of female candidates while other party leaders underestimate voter support of female candidates. This misconception of women's political electability can lead to party leaders recruiting female candidates at a lower rate than male candidates and allocating less resources to the recruitment of female candidates.

Lawless and Fox's discussion of the ambition gap applies to gender role attitudes as well. If women serving in politics are viewed negatively, less women will have the desire to run for political office, and gender inequality in political elected office is maintained. Consequently, the lack of women in elected office will reinforce the perception that women are not fit for politics and lack the skills necessary for winning campaigns. These negative gender role attitudes stem from the stereotypes of women as too weak or nurturing to be political leaders. States that have a political culture that reinforces these negative stereotypes toward women as leaders are less likely to have equal female representation in the state legislature than state's that view female political leaders more positively (Arceneaux 2001, 147). Although negative gender stereotypes do not directly affect female candidates' chances of winning, these negative stereotypes may deter women from seeking elected office (Dolan). Ridicule of female candidates as mothers, criticism of their appearance, and a lack of support from other women during the campaign season often keeps women from pursuing a career in politics (Tumulty 2012). These critiques that do not similarly effect male candidates.

Once women make the decision to run for office, they may raise campaign funds at similar rates as their male counterparts, there may still be a salient difference in how campaign fundraising affects potential female candidates. The 2008 Center for American Women and Politics recruitment study found that many women still perceive fundraising to be harder for women than men (Sanbonmatsu, et al. 2009, 38). Women are less likely to be able to self-fund their campaigns and are less reliant on receiving gifts from established donors. Women, if they decide to run for office, also are most likely to campaign against a male incumbent based on the existing gender gap. Incumbents have a built-in fundraising advantage compared to challengers ("Money and Women Candidates"). In order for a woman to be competitive, she needs to cultivate a larger base of individual donors which requires more time and may prove to be too burdensome (Lawless and Fox 2013; Sanbonmatsu 2006, 447; Ruel and Hauser 2013).

Because the perception of a gendered difficulty in raising campaign funds deters women from seeking political office, some have questioned whether implementing a state-level public financing program can encourage more women to run for elected office. Public funding involves the campaigns that are financed by the government rather than private individual donors or organizations. Thirteen states currently utilize some system of public financing for campaigns (Cruikshank 2016). This method of funding political campaigns has been cited as a possible way to encourage more women to seek elected office because women are more likely to believe that political office is more attractive if campaigns are publicly financed (Lawless and Fox 2013; Werner and Mayer 2007). Public financing programs can entice more women to seek elected offices and, as a result, reduce the gender inequality in political elected office. Removing the hurdle of asking for substantial donations, reducing the time commitment of raising substantive funds to run, often against a male incumbent, and seeing more female elected officials should
result in more women seeking office and a reduction in gender inequality in elected office. My study of Minnesota and Iowa focuses specifically on state legislature gender representation over a period of time following the implementation of a public financing program.

## Research Design

My hypothesis is that public campaign financing programs can increase the opportunity for women to run for and win state legislative seats. For the purpose of my study, I am assuming that this hypothesis is true across all states. In order to test this hypothesis, I would need to collect data on all 50 state campaign finance systems and all 50 state legislatures which involves 99 legislative chambers. ${ }^{2}$ This type of analysis would need to be conducted over time. Due to time and resource limits, I cannot examine every state legislative election outcome and every state campaign finance system. Instead, I used a sample to test my hypothesis. I conducted a comparative case study utilizing John Stuart Mill's method of difference. Mill's method of difference is a research design in which the cases that are selected differ on the key explanatory variable - in this case, two states must vary on whether or not they have public financing of campaigns. Those same cases must be similar in all but one independent variable (Malici and Smith 2013, 27-28). This method allows me to select two cases, or states, that are similar in important aspects that affect gender equality in political office.

Because states are tasked with running and regulating elections, evaluating the success of public financing policies in states in relation to political gender equity can shed light on policies that could be applied in more states or nationally. To test my hypothesis, I selected Minnesota and Iowa as my two cases for my comparative case study using Mill's method of difference. This method allowed me to evaluate the large scale issue of gender inequality in political

[^1]representation at a smaller level in order to draw broader conclusions and make policy recommendations for the future. The use of Mill's method of difference allows me to draw inferences about the relationship between public financing and gender inequality by using a sample of two cases to examine gender inequality on a small, more manageable scale.

As stated previously, the primary independent variable in my case study is the presence or absence of public financing for state legislatures. Essentially, public financing of campaigns is a system in which political candidates can use public money to fund their campaigns. These systems usually require candidates to follow certain rules or raise a certain amount of money independently in order to establish creditability. Thirteen U.S. states currently provide a public financing option for candidates of certain state offices. ${ }^{3}$ By accepting public money in each of these options, the candidate is promising to limit how much they spend on their campaign and how much they accept in donations from a group or individual (Cruikshank 2016).

I chose Minnesota as my case with public campaign finance programming because I am interested in politics in the Midwest on a state level. Minnesota created its public financing program in 1974 following the Watergate Scandal (Novak and Ammons 2007, 14). Minnesota offers a matching funds program for qualifying candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, and state legislative offices. With this program, candidates must raise a certain amount in contributions from private individuals in order to qualify for the program. For example, candidates for State Senate must raise $\$ 3,000$ and candidates for the State House of Representatives must raise $\$ 1,500$ in order to qualify for the program. After meeting that

[^2]requirement, candidates may receive up to 50 percent of their campaign spending limits in public funds ("Public Financing of Campaigns").

After choosing Minnesota, I needed to choose a state that does not have public financing programs but is substantively similar to Minnesota in all other competing explanations. I chose Iowa because of its similarities and proximity to Minnesota as well as its one vital difference. Iowa does not have a public financing program for state legislature candidates. Private individuals, Political Action Committees (PACs), unions, and political parties can make unlimited contributions to candidates for State Congress. Single candidate committees, Super PACs, and corporations are prohibited from making campaign contributions to State Senate and State House of Representative candidates ("Campaign Finance Requirements in Iowa").

My cases must be similar in other plausible explanation for political gender equity. For example, women are slightly more likely than men to vote for female candidates (Newman 1996, 12). Therefore, it is important for my case study to include states that are relatively balanced in terms of their population gender make-up. According to the 2010 United States Census, Minnesota's population is 50.4 percent female, and Iowa has a population that is 50.5 percent female ("QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau").

Party identification also affects the gender make-up of legislative bodies. Federally, women comprise nearly one-third of the Democratic Party in the House and the Senate. On the other hand, the Republican party is made of only 10 percent women in Congress. On a state level, 16.9 percent of Republican legislators are women, and 33 percent of Democratic legislators are women ("Women's Election to Congress," 3). For these reasons, my case study must include states that are relatively balanced in terms of their partisan make-up. A 2015 Gallup poll classifies both Iowa and Minnesota as "competitive" states. This classification means that the

Democratic and Republican Parties are within five points of each other in terms of adult population party affiliation. In Minnesota, 42.9 percent of adults polled identified as Democratic or Lean Democratic while 39.6 percent of adults polled in Iowa identified as Democratic or Lean Democratic ("Red States Outnumber Blue for First Time in Gallup Tracking" 2016).

The dependent variable in my case study is gender representation in state legislative offices in Iowa and Minnesota. Specifically, I observed the percentage of women serving in the State Senate and State House of Representative in both the Iowa and Minnesota Congress. The Minnesota Senate has 67 seats, and the Minnesota House of Representatives has 134 seats. The Iowa Senate consists of 50 members, and 100 seats fill the Iowa House of Representatives. In total, Minnesota has 201 state legislative seats and Iowa has 150. Because of the variance in the number of seats in each of the legislatures, I chose to use the percentage of women serving as my measurement as opposed to the raw number of women serving in each legislature.

To test my hypothesis, I compared the percentage of women serving in the Minnesota state legislature from the creation of the public financing program in 1974 through the most current election in 2016 to the percentage of women serving in the Iowa state legislature in that same time period. This time period includes 24 election cycles per state because state legislative elections occur every two years in my states. I collected data for 48 data points. For my hypothesis to be correct, the percentage of women in legislature seats in Minnesota should increase following the implementation of the public financing program. The percentage should also be consistently higher than the percentage of women serving in Iowa legislature seats after 1974. If the percentage of women serving in Minnesota and Iowa both increase but the percentage in Minnesota increases more rapidly, my hypothesis suggests that public campaign financing is the primary cause of this growing gap in gender representation.

I utilized resources from Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics to collect my data. The site has a downloadable document containing the raw numbers of women serving in state legislatures in all 50 states from 1975 to 2014. The sheet has percentages for women in all 50 state legislatures for 1979 and beyond. I figured the percentages for Iowa and Minnesota in 1975 and 1979 using the raw numbers provided by the document. The site contains a separate factsheet with raw numbers and the percentages for women in all 50 state legislatures in 2017.

The independent variable in my experiment is the existence of public financing. Minnesota has public financing program and is coded as 1. Iowa does not have public financing and is coded as 0 . To test my hypothesis, I used a T-test, or a difference in means test, to compare women's representation in state legislatures in Iowa against women's representation in Minnesota. The T-test allows me to test whether the dependent variables are different and whether Minnesota or Iowa has more women's representation. By analyzing the results of the Ttest, I can make inferences regarding the influence of public financing programs on gender representation in state legislatures.

## Results

To examine whether public financing of campaigns can reduce gender inequality, I examined the percentage of women elected to state office in Minnesota and Iowa between 1975 and 2017. I analyzed the raw numbers of women in the two state legislatures from 1975 to 2017 obtained from the Center for American Women and Politics. My comparison of the two cases used the percentages of women in each chamber and in total. By conducting a T-test on the data, I determined that the difference in gender representation between Minnesota and Iowa is statistically significant. Over time, gender representation in Minnesota increased more rapidly than in Iowa. Following the 2016 general election, Minnesota ranks ninth and Iowa ranks thirty-
first in terms of gender equality in state legislative chambers in the United States. The data suggests that public finance can increase gender representation in state legislatures.

In order to test the statistical significance of the difference in the cases' gender representation, I conducted a two-sample t-test assuming equal variances using each state's average percentage of women's representation from 1975 to 2017. On average, the Minnesota state legislature is 23 percent female, and Iowa's is 18 percent. This is a 5 percent difference which is statistically significant at the 99 percent level. The T-test showed that my data findings are significantly and substantively different.

As seen in Figure 1, in the first years after Minnesota instituted its public financing program, Iowa had a higher proportion of women in state legislative office. Iowa's state legislature was 9 percent women, more than double Minnesota's state legislature of 4 percent women in 1975. However, after Minnesota's public financing program was in place for a decade, the state's gender representation reached higher levels than in Iowa and has remained above Iowa since 1989. This trend proves my hypothesis is correct. Gender representation increased in Minnesota under a public financing program at a higher rate than in Iowa without public financing.

After the most recent election in 2016, Minnesota leads Iowa in percentage female representation by ten percentage points. Minnesota's state legislature is 32 percent women compared to Iowa's 22 percent. Overall, the percentage of women in state legislative office is increasing in both states. In 2017, state legislatures in Iowa and Minnesota are 27 percent female compared to 6.5 percent in 1975 . This is a 20.5 percent increase over the last forty-two years. Individually, Minnesota increased by 28 percentage points while Iowa increased by only 13 percentage points over the 42-year period. This data follows my theory because Minnesota's
gender representation increased following the state's implementation of a public financing program. As women had easier access to public financing, more women chose to run for office and were successful. Other women saw these successes and chose to run for office themselves which in turn decreased gender representation in Minnesota legislative office. Iowa did not experience an increase in gender equality at the same rate of Minnesota because women in that state did not have the opportunity to take advantage of a public financing program.

In 1981, Minnesota reached the same percentage as Iowa of women in state legislative office. From 1989 to 2017, Minnesota remained above Iowa in terms of percentage of female state legislators. Following the 1992 election, gender representation increased by 6 percentage points. 1992 became known as "The Year of the Woman" after a record four women had been elected to the U.S. Senate. The highest percentage between the two states was 35 percent in Minnesota in 2007 and 2009. The Democratic Party and liberals did well in the elections of 2006 and 2008, and the Republican Party did not fare well in those years due to the unpopular Iraq war.

Gender representation has grown much slower in Iowa. The state did not reap the benefits of "The Year of the Woman" as Minnesota did. In 1993, Iowa did not see an increase in gender representation in the state legislature. Iowa saw the greatest increase in gender representation in the 1984 election, an increase of 6 percentage points. In this election, Ronald Reagan swept the presidential election with every state except Minnesota and Washington, D.C. Iowa reached the height of its gender representation in 2007, 2009, 2013, and 2015 at 23 percent.

The trend of Minnesota overtaking Iowa in gender representation following the implementation of public financing is true regardless of legislative chamber. In 2017, the state House of Representatives in both Minnesota and Iowa has a higher percentage of female leaders than the state Senate in each state. Minnesota House of Representatives is 36 percent women
while the Minnesota Senate trails at 24 percent. In Iowa, women make up 27 percent of the state House of Representatives and 12 percent of the state Senate. This trend has varied over the past 42 years.

As women gained more power in the workforce and the public sphere, their numbers grew steadily in American politics. Gender representation grew in Iowa and Minnesota from 1975 to 2017. Iowa began with a higher percentage of women in the state legislature than Minnesota at the start of Minnesota's public financing program. However, Minnesota quickly overtook Iowa in terms of gender representation. On average since 1981, Minnesota has led Iowa in state gender representation by 7 percentage points. My hypothesis that public financing increases gender representation is proven correct as gender representation did increase in Minnesota following the implementation of public financing, and it increased at a faster rate in Minnesota than in Iowa, a state without gender representation. The public financing program in Minnesota allows women to take advantage of a program that eases the perception that women cannot raise funds as well as men. As women began to win public office at increased rate, other women chose to seek elected office which resulted in the increase in female representation in the Minnesota state legislature.

## Discussion

The United States representative democracy ought to be representative of the genders that are governed by it, and women are consistently underrepresented in legislative and executive offices. Women are better political representatives of women than male representatives. Studies have shown that correlation exists between women legislators and progressive policy on issues such as the environment and incarceration, and female legislators of both major parties introduce more bills related to civil rights, labor, and education than male legislators (Arceneaux 2001; Hill
2014). By implementing a public financing program, states can increase gender representation in elected office. Women perceive campaign fundraising to be more difficult for them as a gender, and public financing programs can give women the opportunity to overcome this obstacle. As more women are elected to political office, more women will be empowered to seek political office. I hope that my research will help shape policy concerning women and campaign finance. America cannot foster a truly inclusive environment for all citizens until women are on the same political playing field as men.

## Appendix

Table 1: Average Levels of Female Representation

| Minnesota lowa |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Mean | $23 \%$ | $18 \%$ | $5 \%^{* * *}$ |
| Variance | 0.0085 | 0.0021 |  |
| $p<0.01$ |  |  |  |

Table 2: Minnesota Gender Representation 1975 to 2017

| Minnesota |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | \# in House | Total House Seats | \% Women in House | \# in Senate | Total Senate Seats | \% Women in Senate | Total \# of Women | Total Seats | Total \% in Legislature |
| 1975 | 7 | 134 | 5.22\% | 1 | 67 | 1.49\% | 8 | 201 | 4.0\% |
| 1977 | 10 | 134 | 7.46\% | 2 | 67 | 2.99\% | 12 | 201 | 6.0\% |
| 1979 | 15 | 134 | 11.19\% | 3 | 67 | 4.48\% | 18 | 201 | 9.0\% |
| 1981 | 19 | 134 | 14.18\% | 5 | 67 | 7.46\% | 24 | 201 | 11.9\% |
| 1984 | 19 | 134 | 14.18\% | 9 | 67 | 13.43\% | 28 | 201 | 13.9\% |
| 1985 | 20 | 134 | 14.93\% | 9 | 67 | 13.43\% | 29 | 201 | 14.4\% |
| 1987 | 22 | 134 | 16.42\% | 9 | 67 | 13.43\% | 31 | 201 | 15.4\% |
| 1989 | 27 | 134 | 20.15\% | 10 | 67 | 14.93\% | 37 | 201 | 18.4\% |
| 1991 | 29 | 134 | 21.64\% | 14 | 67 | 20.90\% | 43 | 201 | 21.4\% |
| 1993 | 35 | 134 | 26.12\% | 20 | 67 | 29.85\% | 55 | 201 | 27.4\% |
| 1995 | 32 | 134 | 23.88\% | 18 | 67 | 26.87\% | 50 | 201 | 24.9\% |
| 1997 | 40 | 134 | 29.85\% | 22 | 67 | 32.84\% | 62 | 201 | 30.8\% |
| 1999 | 35 | 134 | 26.12\% | 22 | 67 | 32.84\% | 57 | 201 | 28.4\% |
| 2001 | 35 | 134 | 26.12\% | 23 | 67 | 34.33\% | 58 | 201 | 28.9\% |
| 2003 | 32 | 134 | 23.88\% | 23 | 67 | 34.33\% | 55 | 201 | 27.4\% |
| 2005 | 37 | 134 | 27.61\% | 25 | 67 | 37.31\% | 62 | 201 | 30.8\% |
| 2007 | 43 | 134 | 32.09\% | 27 | 67 | 40.30\% | 70 | 201 | 34.8\% |
| 2009 | 43 | 134 | 32.09\% | 27 | 67 | 40.30\% | 70 | 201 | 34.8\% |
| 2011 | 44 | 134 | 32.84\% | 19 | 67 | 28.36\% | 63 | 201 | 31.3\% |
| 2013 | 45 | 134 | 33.58\% | 23 | 67 | 34.33\% | 68 | 201 | 33.8\% |
| 2015 | 45 | 134 | 33.58\% | 23 | 67 | 34.33\% | 68 | 201 | 33.8\% |
| 2017 | 48 | 134 | 35.82\% | 16 | 67 | 23.88\% | 64 | 201 | 31.8\% |

Table 3: Iowa Gender Representation 1975 to 2017

| lowa |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | \# in House | Total House Seats | \% Women in House | \# in Senate | Total Senate Seats | \% Women in Senate | Total \# of women | Total Seats | Total \% in Legislature |
| 1975 | 10 | 100 | 10\% | 4 | 50 | 8\% | 14 | 150 | 9.3\% |
| 1977 | 13 | 100 | 13\% | 4 | 50 | 8\% | 17 | 150 | 11.3\% |
| 1979 | 11 | 100 | 11\% | 4 | 50 | 8\% | 15 | 150 | 10.0\% |
| 1981 | 16 | 100 | 16\% | 2 | 50 | 4\% | 18 | 150 | 12.0\% |
| 1984 | 16 | 100 | 16\% | 1 | 50 | 2\% | 17 | 150 | 11.3\% |
| 1985 | 19 | 100 | 19\% | 3 | 50 | 6\% | 22 | 150 | 14.7\% |
| 1987 | 18 | 100 | 18\% | 4 | 50 | 8\% | 22 | 150 | 14.7\% |
| 1989 | 19 | 100 | 19\% | 6 | 50 | 12\% | 25 | 150 | 16.7\% |
| 1991 | 16 | 100 | 16\% | 6 | 50 | 12\% | 22 | 150 | 14.7\% |
| 1993 | 16 | 100 | 16\% | 6 | 50 | 12\% | 22 | 150 | 14.7\% |
| 1995 | 17 | 100 | 17\% | 10 | 50 | 20\% | 27 | 150 | 18.0\% |
| 1997 | 20 | 100 | 20\% | 12 | 50 | 24\% | 32 | 150 | 21.3\% |
| 1999 | 21 | 100 | 21\% | 11 | 50 | 22\% | 32 | 150 | 21.3\% |
| 2001 | 22 | 100 | 22\% | 11 | 50 | 22\% | 33 | 150 | 22.0\% |
| 2003 | 25 | 100 | 25\% | 7 | 50 | 14\% | 32 | 150 | 21.3\% |
| 2005 | 25 | 100 | 25\% | 5 | 50 | 10\% | 30 | 150 | 20.0\% |
| 2007 | 28 | 100 | 28\% | 6 | 50 | 12\% | 34 | 150 | 22.7\% |
| 2009 | 26 | 100 | 26\% | 9 | 50 | 18\% | 35 | 150 | 23.3\% |
| 2011 | 24 | 100 | 24\% | 8 | 50 | 16\% | 32 | 150 | 21.3\% |
| 2013 | 25 | 100 | 25\% | 10 | 50 | 20\% | 35 | 150 | 23.3\% |
| 2015 | 27 | 100 | 27\% | 7 | 50 | 14\% | 34 | 150 | 22.7\% |
| 2017 | 27 | 100 | 27\% | 6 | 50 | 12\% | 33 | 150 | 22.0\% |

Figure 1: Overall Female Representation


Figure 2: Female Representation by Legislative Chamber


## Works Cited

Arceneaux, K. "The "Gender Gap" in State Legislative Representation: New Data to Tackle an Old Question." Political Research Quarterly 54.1 (2001): 143-60. Web. 12 Nov. 2016. http://prq.sagepub.com/content/54/1/143.full.pdf+html

Burrell, Barbara C. Gender in Campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives. N.p.: University of Michigan Press, 2014. Print.

Cammisa, Anne Marie, and Beth Reingold. "Women in State Legislatures and State Legislative Research: Beyond Sameness and Difference." State Politics \& Policy Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 181-210., www.jstor.org/stable/40421515.
"Campaign Finance Requirements in Iowa." Ballotpedia, ballotpedia.org/Campaign_finance_requirements_in_Iowa.).

Cruikshank, Brian. "Overview of State Laws on Public Financing." National Conference of State Legislatures. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 Sept. 2016.
"Current Numbers." CAWP. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Aug. 2016.
Deen, Rebecca E., and Thomas H. Little. "Getting to the Top: Factors Influencing the Selection of Women to Positions of Leadership in State Legislatures." State \& Local Government Review, vol. 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 123-134., www.jstor.org/stable/4355231.

Dolan, K. "Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters?" Political Research Quarterly 67.1 (2013): 96-107. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. http://prq.sagepub.com/content/67/1/96.full.pdf+html

Gender Differences in Voter Turnout. Rep. Rutgers University. N.p.: n.p., 2015. Web.
"Gender Disparity." Representation 2020. Web. 2 Feb. 2016.
Hill, Steven. "Why Does the US Still Have So Few Women in Office?" The Nation. 07 Mar. 2014. Web. 25 Jan. 2016.

History, Art \& Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, "Assembling, Amplifying, and Ascending: Recent Trends Among Women in Congress, 19772006," http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Essays/Assembling-Amplifying-Ascending/Introduction/ (July 06, 2016)

King, James D. "Single-Member Districts and the Representation of Women in American State Legislatures: The Effects of Electoral System Change." State Politics \& Policy Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 161. EBSCOhost, ezproxy.butler.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&AuthT ype $=\mathrm{ip} \& \mathrm{db}=$ aph $\& A N=6803124 \&$ site $=$ ehost-live $\& s c o p e=$ site.

Lawless, Jennifer L., and Richard L. Fox. "Girls Just Wanna Not Run." (2013): N.p. Women \& Politics Institute. Washington, DC: Women \& Politics Institute. Web. May 2016.

Malici, Akan, and Elizabeth S. Smith. Political Science Research in Practice. New York: Routledge, 2013. Print.

Mann, Thomas E. "Linking Knowledge and Action: Political Science and Campaign Finance Reform." Perspectives on Politics 1.1 (2003): 69-83. Web.
"Money and Women Candidates." Political Parity. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 Aug. 2016.
Newman, Jody. "Do Women Vote for Women? ." The Public Perspective (1996): 10-12. Web. 2016.

Novak, Suzanne, and Paige Ammons. Campaign Finance in Minnesota. (2007): N.p. Rep. New York City: Brennan Center for Justice, New York. Print.

Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox. 1998. "The Geography of Gender Power: Women in State Legislatures." In Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Politics is Personal: Keys to Likeability and Electability for Women. Barbara Lee Family Foundation, April 2016.
"Public Financing of Campaigns." Ballotpedia. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Jan. 2017.
Pyeatt, N., and A. Yanus. "Breaking the Statehouse Glass Ceiling: Examining Women-Friendly Districts in the State Legislatures." (2014).
"QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau." US Census Bureau. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Jan. 2017.
"Red States Outnumber Blue for First Time in Gallup Tracking." Gallup.com. N.p., 03 Feb. 2016. Web. 15 Jan. 2017.

Ruel, Erin, and Robert M. Hauser. "Explaining the Gender Wealth Gap." Demography 50.4 (2013): 1155-1176. PMC. Web. 27 Feb. 2017.

Rule, W. "Why More Women Are State Legislators: A Research Note." Political Research Quarterly 43.2 (1990): 437-48. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/448378.pdf

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. "Do Parties Know That "Women Win"? Party Leader Beliefs about Women's Electoral Chances." Politics \& Gender 2.04 (2006): n. pag. Web.

Sanbonmatsu, K. "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Women to State Legislatures." Journal of Politics, vol. 64, no. 3, Aug. 2002, pp. 791-809. EBSCOhost, ezproxy.butler.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true\&AuthT ype $=\mathrm{ip} \& \mathrm{db}=$ aph\&AN $=7196834 \&$ site $=$ ehost-live\&scope $=$ site.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira, Susan J. Carroll, and Debbie Walsh, "Poised to Run: Women's Pathways to the State Legislatures," http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/research/reports/ PoisedtoRun.pdf (Center for American Women and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, 2009).

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie, and Peverill Squire. "Legislative Power and Women's Representation." Politics \& Gender 10.4 (2014): 622-58. ProQuest. Web. 25 Feb. 2017.

Sultan, Niv. "Self-funded candidates lose big (except when they don't)." OpenSecrets Blog. N.p., 15 Mar. 2017. Web. 15 Apr. 2017.

Shames, Shauna. "Twin States: A Multiplier Effect." Political Parity. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Nov. 2016. http://www.politicalparity.org/research/twinstates/

Thomas, Sue. "The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies." The Journal of Politics 53.4 (1991): 958-76. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2131862.pdf

Tumulty, Karen. "Twenty Years On, 'Year of the Woman' Fades." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 24 Mar. 2012. Web. 06 July 2016.

Vote with Your Purse, Lesson Learned: Women, Money, and Politics in the 2010 Election Cycle. Rep. She Should Run. Washington, D.C.: n.p., 2011. 1-11. Print

Werner, Timothy and Kenneth R. Mayer, "Public Election Funding, Competition, and Candidate Gender." PS: Political Science and Politics 40.4 (2007): 661-667.
"Women's Election to Congress." Political Parity. Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics, n.d. Web. 2 Mar. 2016.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ In the example of the most recent presidential election, Donald Trump self-funded almost 20 percent of his own campaign with over $\$ 66$ million in campaign funding. In comparasion, Hillary Clinton self-funded less than 1 percent of her campaign with almost $\$ 1.5$ million in campaign funding (Sultan 2017).

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Nebraska employs a unicameral system which accounts for the odd number of legislative chambers.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont have some form of public financing for the election of governor and lieutenant governor. Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, and Minnesota also have public financing options for candidates for state legislative offices. New Mexico and West Virginia offer public financing for candidates for state supreme court and other state offices (Cruikshank 2016).

