

## **WORKING PAPER**

ITLS-WP-13-04

Freeway drivers' willingness to pay for speeding fines.

By Rong-Chang Jou<sup>a</sup>, David Hensher, Ke-Hong Chen<sup>a</sup> and Pei-Lung Wang<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Department of Civil Engineering, National ChiNan International University, Taiwan

February 2013

ISSN 1832-570X

# INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and LOGISTICS STUDIES

The Australian Key Centre in Transport and Logistics Management

The University of Sydney

Established under the Australian Research Council's Key Centre Program.

**NUMBER:** Working Paper ITLS-WP-13-04

TITLE: Freeway drivers' willingness to pay for speeding fines.

**ABSTRACT:** Taiwanese drivers, like most drivers, often exceed the legal

speed limit and expose themselves to the risk of a fine. Given the propensity to exceed the legal speed limit is common in many counties, it is of interest to understand the amount that drivers are willing to pay for driving faster than the law permits. This may provide useful guidance on the extent to which current fines are adequate as a deterrent to speeding. In this paper we use the contingent valuation method to measure drivers' preferences and to estimate econometric models to determine Taiwanese drivers' willingness to pay (WTP) for driving faster than the law allows. Given the high incidence of a zero willingness to pay, we use a spike model to capture this phenomenon. The study identifies some key influences on WTP such as personal income, the presence/absence of past violations, the risk tolerance of the driver, and the proportion of times spent on the roads where the driver was exceeding the speeding limit last year. On average, we find that freeway drivers in various locations in Taiwan were

willing to pay between \$US43 and \$US51 for driving faster than

the law allows.

KEY WORDS: Contingent valuation method, willingness to pay, speeding

behaviour, spike model.

**AUTHORS:** Jou, Hensher, Chen and Wang

CONTACT: INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and LOGISTICS STUDIES (C13)

The Australian Key Centre in Transport and Logistics Management

The University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia

Telephone: +612 9114 1824 Facsimile: +612 9114 1722

E-mail: business.itlsinfo@sydney.edu.au
Internet: http://sydney.edu.au/business/itls

**DATE:** February 2013

## 1. Introduction

In December 1, 2001, the Government Traffic Department of Taiwan increased the speed limit from 90 km/h to 100 km/h for the entire length of Freeway No. 1, and in 2008, increased the limit further of 110 km/h on the section between the Tainan rest area and the Nanzih intersection (detailed in Fig. 1). The speed limit on Freeway No. 5 was also raised from 70 km/h to 80 km/h on March 16, 2008. These higher speed limits were a consequence of freeway upgrading that enabled greater throughput of larger volumes of traffic. One consequence of these relaxed speed limits and greatly improved freeway performance was a noticeable increase is speeding. The Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan (2008) reported that speeding was the most common illegal driving behavior from 2001 to 2007, accounting for 63.8% to 77.3% of all such infringements. Speeding fines in Taiwan range from \$US94 to \$US1881, increasing as the speed increment increases. These figures are the equivalent, on average, of 6.7% to 13.3% of average monthly personal income.

Despite all the warnings, drivers continue to speed in ever increasing numbers, mindful of the increased risks of a crash and injury (including fatality), and the implications on loss of income to the driver and society in general (Carcary et al., 2001). The desire to speed for some drivers is linked to them gaining personal satisfaction through risky behavior, and therefore by implication has an association with a willingness to pay (WTP) speeding fines as well as to cover expenditure caused by accidents.

Becker (1968) in an early pioneering study, focused on the relationship between illegal behavior and the associated penalties, with the results demonstrating that the cost expectations of drivers who deliberately speed are consistent with expected penalties2, and are lower than the expectations of drivers who do not take risks. In that study, illegal behaviors were assumed to be rational choices. In other words, personal illegal behaviors occur when the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs; otherwise, drivers obey the law. If an administration wants to decrease illegal behavior, then there are a number of ways to achieve this. One approach is to have a larger police force which may also be accompanied by increasing speeding fines.

Becker's study, like those by Polinsky and Shavell (1979; 1991) and Chu and Jiang (1993), demonstrated that fines do not need to be raised to include all the risk-averse violator's property. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement, we should consider stipulating speeding fines which are rational and lower than the average overall monthly income level of society. Above all, reducing illegal behavior not only depends upon law enforcement, but also upon the stipulation of rational fines.

However, establishing the appropriate level of WTP speeding fines is a challenge given that it is a non-market good and there is no trading market in which to assess its actual value. In recent years, the contingent valuation method (CVM) has been widely applied to assess the value of non-market goods, with studies finding that CVM is one of the most efficient means of overcoming the difficulty of measuring risk and non-market goods. Several studies applied this method and developed discrete choice models of the logit form to investigate the WTP for goods and services such as improvements in environmental amenity and drink-driving behaviour, etc. (Liu, 1990; Fu and Jou, 1995; Lee, 1999; Bruce and John, 2000; Chen et al., 2003 Liu and Lee, 2007; Liu and Lee, 2007; Yeh and Fu, 2007; Saz-Salazar and Garcia-Menendez, 2001a).

Given the real possibility in a context such as WTP speeding fines that many respondent's in a CV setting may not be prepared to pay any money to obtain the preferred outcome, Kristrom (1997) proposed the 'Spike model' to deal with a large number of zero bids. The appeal of spike

2 Becker (1968) defines the expected penalty as the probability of being caught multiplied by the level of severity (for example, the fine).

<sup>1 \$</sup>US1 is equivalent to \$32 NT (Central Bank of the Republic of Taiwan, 2008).

models was confirmed by Yoo et al. (2002), who suggested that spike models can reduce statistical bias when using data with a high proportion of zero bids (Yoo et al. 2006; Bengochea-Morancho et al., 2005; Saz-Salazar and Garcia-Menendez, 2001b; Hu., 2006; Jou et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012).

This paper develops a framework within which to obtain estimates of the WTP speeding fines. A spike model is estimated using data collected in a CVM survey.

### 2. Model framework

The framework proposed by Hanemann (1984), which introduces random utility theory in studies of contingent valuation, is used to investigate drivers' willingness to pay speeding fines on a freeway. The Hanemann model which assumes that the utility function is linear, with observed and unobserved components, showed that we can obtain the mean and median of the WTP starting from a dichotomous valuation question. Formally, the utility function of a freeway driver can be expressed as equation (1):

$$U(Y, X, Q) = V(Y, X, Q) + \varepsilon \tag{1}$$

where Y is personal monthly income, X is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics, Q is a vector of awareness toward the effects of speeding, and the error component  $\varepsilon$  is randomly distributed with zero mean. Where a driver prefers to accept the cost of speeding ( $^{V_1}$ ) rather than obey the traffic laws and pay nothing ( $^{V_0}$ ), we have equation (2):

$$V_1(Y - A, X, Q_1) + \varepsilon_1 \ge V_0(Y, X, Q_0) + \varepsilon_0$$
 (2)

where A is the monetary cost that the driver is willing to pay for speeding, and  $\epsilon 0$  and  $\epsilon 1$  are random components with an independent and identical (iid) Gumbel distribution. The probability of the driver accepting a WTP amount under a new condition (that is, accepting the cost of speeding) is as follows:

$$\begin{split} &\Pr(Accept) = \Pr(\Delta V(*) \geq \varepsilon) = F_{\varepsilon}(\Delta V(*)) \\ &\Delta V = V_1(Y - A, X, Q_1) - V_0(Y, X, Q_0) \\ &\varepsilon = \varepsilon_0 - \varepsilon_1 \end{split} \tag{3}$$

The argument \* of  $\Delta V$  is Y, A, X, Q. In addition, the driver will accept the payment of driving faster than the law allows when their WTP value is greater than the bid (A) offered in the CV survey. This probability of driver acceptance is given in equation (4).

$$Pr(Accept) = Pr(WTP \ge A)$$

$$= 1 - G_{WTP}(A)$$

$$= F_{\varepsilon}(\Delta V(*))$$
(4)

where GWTP(A) is the complementary cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of WTP. The expected WTP is given as equation (5).

$$E(WTP) = \int_{0}^{\infty} (1 - G_{WTP}(A)) dA = \int_{0}^{\infty} (F_{\varepsilon}(\Delta V(*))) dA$$
(5)

The domain of  $G_{WTP}(A)$  can be defined as equation (6).

$$G_{WTP}(A) = \begin{cases} 0, & A < 0 \\ P, & A = 0 \\ F_{WTP}(A), & A > 0 \end{cases}$$
(6)

where P belongs to the (0,1) interval and  $F_{WTP}(A)$  is a continuous and increasing function such that  $F_{WTP}(A=0)=P$  and  $\lim A \to \infty$   $F_{WTP}(A)=1$ . Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is used to estimate the binary dependent variable model, given its preferred properties over ordinary least squares (Bengochea-Morancho, et al., 2005). The maximum likelihood function is given in equation (7).

$$L = \sum_{i} [M_{i}W_{i} \ln(1 - G_{WTP}(A)) + M_{i}(1 - W_{i}) \ln(G_{WTP}(A) - G_{WTP}(0)) + (1 - M_{i}) \ln(G_{WTP}(0))]$$
(7)

where M and W are defined as equations (8) and (9) respectively.

$$M = \begin{cases} 1, WTP > 0 \\ 0, otherwise \end{cases}$$
 (8)

$$W = \begin{cases} 1, WTP > A \\ 0, otherwise \end{cases}$$
 (9)

Equation (3) can be further rewritten as Equation (10) given the assumption about the form of the functions  $V_1$  and  $V_0$ .

$$\Delta V(*) = \alpha_1 + \beta(Y - A) + \delta Q_1 - (\alpha_0 + \beta Y + \delta Q_0) + \gamma X$$

$$= \alpha_1 - \alpha_0 - \beta A + \gamma X + \delta (Q_1 - Q_0)$$

$$= \alpha - \beta A + \gamma X + \delta Q$$
(10)

In the spike model estimation, assuming that  $G_{WTP}(A)$  is takes a logistical functional form,  $F_{\varepsilon}(\Delta V(*))$  is defined by equation (11):

$$F_{\varepsilon}(\Delta V(*)) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp[-\alpha + \beta A - \gamma X - \delta Q]}$$
(11)

Furthermore, equation (6) can be rewritten as equation (12).

$$G_{WTP}(A) = \begin{cases} 0, & A < 0 \\ [1 + \exp(-\alpha - \gamma X - \delta Q)]^{-1}, & A = 0 \\ [1 + \exp(-\alpha + \beta A - \gamma X - \delta Q)]^{-1}, & A > 0 \end{cases}$$
 (12)

Substituting equation (11) and equation (12) into equation (5), the expected WTP is expressed by equation (13):

$$E(WTP) = \int_{0}^{\infty} (1 - G_{WTP}(A))dA$$

$$= \int_{0}^{\infty} (\frac{\exp(-\alpha + \beta A - \gamma X - \delta Q)}{1 + \exp(-\alpha + \beta A - \gamma X - \delta Q)})dA$$

$$= \frac{1}{\beta} \{\lim_{A \to \infty} (-\ln[1 + \exp(-\alpha + \beta A - \gamma X - \delta Q)] + \ln[1 + \exp(-\alpha - \gamma X - \delta Q)]\}$$
(13)

Kristroöm (1997) defined the spike value when A=0 (equations (14) and (15)) where equation (15) is a special case which does not take exogenous variables into account.

$$Spike = \frac{1}{1 + \exp[-\alpha - \gamma X - \delta Q]}$$
 (14)

$$Spike = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\alpha)} \tag{15}$$

# 3. Survey instrument design and data analysis

The design of the survey instrument, the survey methodology and the analysis of the survey data are presented below in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.

#### 3.1 Survey instrument design

There is no market or trade mechanism in existence to measure the WTP speeding fines for freeway drivers. Given this situation, we use a stated preference (SP) design of the contingent valuation form, to represent a hypothetical market in which to trade speeding fines.

A series of background questions were asked prior to the main CV questions in order to establish a context for the CV exercise. Details were obtained on gender, age, education level, marital status, car ownership and personal monthly income of the each sampled driver, followed by questions to obtain trip details. Trip data included freeway usage frequency, departure city (county), time spent on the freeway, and whether this trip involved speeding on the freeway.

Freeway drivers were questioned about their attitudes towards the law, which are used in identifying the WTP for speeding behavior. These questions are:

- What do you think is the probability of getting a speeding ticket when you are driving on the freeway?
- What do you think is the probability of an accident occurring due to speeding?
- If an accident were to occur due to speeding, what amount of compensation would you expect to have to pay?
- Have you received a speeding ticket in the last year?
- Do you usually speed on the freeway?
- Do you know that the more a driver exceeds the speed limit, the higher the fine he or she needs to pay?
- Have you ever turned right on red (this is not allowed in Taiwan)?
- Have you ever made a phone call while driving?
- Have you ever driven after drinking? and
- Do you use your turn signal every time you change lanes?

To investigate the effects of different speeding fine policies on drivers' WTP for speeding, seven scenarios defining a range of speeding fines were selected, including the current fine for speeding (\$US94). These scenarios were described as follows: "Will you speed³ on the freeway if the fine is X USD?" (yes or no). Fines for the X (in \$US) were 47, 70, 94, 117, 141, 164 and 188, respectively, that is, -50%, -25%, 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the current fine. The respondent's WTPs for speeding are the fines that the respondent answers as a yes. Each respondent has to complete all seven scenarios, yielding for 505 drivers a total of 3,535 observations.

### 3.2 Survey methodology

The field survey was conducted as face-to-face interviews in the Sun Moon Lake national scenic area, an internationally-known sightseeing area, in the central region of Taiwan. This was an appropriate area for our survey since the majority of travelers (over 70%) driving to visit the area use freeways (Sun Moon Lake National Scenic Area Administration, 2007). The survey was conducted from 10 AM to 5 PM over three weekends (from June 21 to July 12) in 2008. The questions presented to respondents relate to freeway trips undertaken during the last 12 months as well as questions to capture attitude towards the law and WTP bidding scenario responses. A total of 505 valid surveys were returned with only five refusals at the point of requesting an interview. The interviewers were trained to be able to explain all related speeding regulations and consequences (including the fines drivers would have to pay) to respondents to ensure that they fully understood the implications of speeding beforehand.

#### 3.3 Descriptive data profiles

#### 1. Socioeconomic characteristics

Socioeconomic characteristics are summarized in Table 1. The majority of respondents were between 26 and 40 years old with 41.5% single. 82.6% of drivers only had one car. The distribution of monthly personal income lies between \$US626 and \$US1,875 (74.5%), with an average monthly personal income for the sample of \$US1,764. Most respondents (86.4%) have held their driver's license for more than six years, indicating that the sample included mostly experienced drivers, that is, drivers with basic safe driving skills and an understanding of traffic laws. The car insurance fee paid per year was mostly below \$US312 (53.9%).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The current fine (\$ US 94) is based on situations in which speeding does not exceed the posted speed limit by more than 20 km/h. More than 20km/h is not within our study scope.

#### 2. Trip characteristics and attitude towards the law

On average, respondents used freeways 10.6 times per month. The proportion of drivers who reported speeding on freeways, 71.7%~76.9% of drivers, had a probability of speeding on freeways lower than 20%. Drivers who had not received a speeding ticket the previous year made up 81.4% of all drivers, 73.1% from the Taipei area, 86.6% from the Taichung area, and 82.1% from other areas in Taiwan.

A large number of sampled drivers (63.4%~66.7%) had made a phone call while driving; and the proportion of sample drivers who had turned right on red was also high (54.6%~66.2%). However, the experience of drink-driving was only 17.9%~22.2%. A high proportion of sampled drivers (75%~78.3%) perceived that the probability of getting a speeding ticket on the freeway was below 30% (including a high incidence of a zero probability). This suggests that the implementation of traffic laws on the Taiwanese freeways could be stricter. On the other hand, around 57%~94% of drivers perceived that there was only a 50% or lower probability that speeding on the freeway would be a main factor in a traffic accident. The reason for such answers may be the improvement in both the level of service on the freeway and car safety technologies (for example, ABS (Antilock brake system), TCS (traction control system) etc.; such equipment is widely used in cars in Taiwan). When an accident occurs due to speeding, 80%~85% of sampled drivers expect to outlay only 10% or less of their personal income for compensation (the amount of compensation is \$US867.5 on average).

#### 3. Hypothetical market scenarios

To measure a drivers WTP for driving faster than the law allows, seven different scenarios were designed. The statistical results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The results show that the higher the fine for speeding, the less illegal behavior occurs.

Table 3 also reveals the changes in the percentage of drivers who would speed if the fine were changed (from the basic fine of \$US94). The greatest impact is obtained by raising the fine for speeding to \$US188 (associated with the number of speeding drivers decreasing by 49.2%~59.3% in comparison with the basic fine), with around 18.3%~28.7% of sampled drivers persisting in speeding on the freeway. This reaction on the part of drivers to increased speeding fines suggests that increasing speeding fines might be effective in curbing some amount of illegal driving.

Three market segments were analyzed to determine possible differences in WTP for speeding. These are personal income, the presence/absence of past violations, and driver characteristics.

This study investigates two personal monthly income groups: (1) above average and (2) below average (according to the DGBAS<sup>4</sup>, the 2007 average personal GDP in Taiwan was \$1,406 US). Table 4 presents the statistical results, showing that drivers with a higher WTP for driving faster than the law allowed had personal monthly incomes which were above average, although different area segmentations were not statistically significant.

Drivers were questioned about their previous freeway violations in this survey. We defined "past speeding violators" as drivers who had received speeding tickets on one or more previous occasions. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5. The findings verify that past speeding violators have a higher WTP than those reporting no violations. This may indicate that past violators have become less sensitive to fines due to having received them in the past.

We divided driver characteristics into three categories based oin responses to two questions: "What do you think is the probability of getting a speeding ticket when you are driving on the freeway?" and "What do you think is the probability of an accident occurring due to speeding?" These questions showed that a driver belonged to one of the risk attitude categories - the "risk-seeking," "risk-averse," or "other".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS)

Risk-seeking drivers were defined as drivers who perceived a lower probability (below 40%) of receiving a speeding ticket and a lower probability (below 40%) of having an accident due to speeding. Risk-averse drivers were defined as those with conservative driving behaviors who perceived a higher probability of receiving a speeding ticket and a higher probability of an accident occurring due to speeding (both above 60%).

The driver characteristics under the different area segmentations are presented in Table 6. To summarise briefly, risk-averse drivers had the lowest WTP compared to other types of drivers across all scenarios. The average WTPs in the four area segmentations were \$US25, \$US27, \$US35 and \$US19, respectively. This result shows that risk-averse drivers are less willing to pay for their speeding fines. In contrast, risk-seeking drivers had the highest WTPs for all geographical areas (\$US87, \$US104, \$US88 and \$US80, respectively).

#### Model estimation results

The focus of model estimation is on the spike model given the incidence of a spike at the zero value response (i.e., 47% of participants had a zero WTP). The model is summarised in Table 7. Data for three market segments (the Taipei area, the Taichung area, and other areas (excluding the Taipei and Taichung samples)) and the combined sample are presented. All explanatory variables in Table 7 are statistically significant with the correct sign. The results indicate that drivers with higher personal monthly income are willing to pay higher speeding fines. The presence/absence of past violations, as a proxy variable indicating the total number of times the driver was punished for speeding last year, suggests that the greater the number of times someone is caught speeding, the higher the acceptance exhibited toward speeding fines; that is, the driver may not care at all about the amount of the speeding fine while he/she drives on the freeway. Risk-seeking drivers have higher WTP speeding fines. The reason is that these drivers are less sensitive to danger and the cost of speeding; and because they underestimate these factors, they are willing to pay more. Risk-averse drivers have lower WTP speeding fines, and their heightened awareness of cost and danger distinguishes them from risk-seeking drivers. Drivers with a higher percentage of time spent on the road where the driver was exceeding the speed limit last year, tended to accept higher speeding fines, indicating that the habit of speeding decreases a driver's aversion to paying fines.

The driver's average WTP for speeding fines was \$US51 in all samples<sup>5</sup>, \$US43 in Taipei, \$US51 in Taichung, and \$US53 in other areas. The spike value ranges from 66%~75% for all models, indicating that a driver's WTP is not only determined by speeding fines, but also related variables. This study is consistent with evidence reported in Yoo *et al.* (2006).

The only other study we are aware of that has investigated the WTP for speeding fines is by Jou and Chen (2013). They used standard logit and probit models and obtained mean The WTP estimates of \$US119 and \$US116 respectively. The higher values of WTP can be attributed to the fact that zero WTPs were not taken into consideration. What this suggests is that the spike model is a preferred method to ensure that proper account is taken on the high incidence of zero values.

# 4. Conclusions and suggestions

In this paper we created a hypothetical market and used contingent valuation to investigate drivers' real WTP through a field survey. A spike model was estimated as a way of dealing with a high incidence of zero bids.

The main empirical results can be summarized as follows, together with some policy-related implications on how the evidence might be of value in revising current fine practices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Compared with another study by Jou and Wang (2012), the average WTP for speeding fines was \$US23 for motorcyclists. Currently the actual fine for exceeding the speed limit by 20 k/h is \$US40,

Drivers' reactions to increases in freeway speeding fines are systematically related to personal income. A driver who has a higher income also has a higher WTP. This indicates that not only enforcement of the law, but also the stipulation of rational fines is required to effectively reduce illegal speeding behavior. For example, Finland sets fines for moving violations according to two variables: "severity of the violation" and "progressive income." In the same way, income and past violation ratio variables can be further considered in policy making. Consistent with principles of social justice, fines for violating the laws increase as driver income increases.

We find that risk-seeking drivers have a higher WTP than drivers with risk-averse characteristics, showing that the relationship between drivers' characteristics and the amount of speeding fines is worth considering when drafting traffic legislation in the future.

The results of the study indicate that adopting the spike model to determine the real WTP that drivers have in mind is one way to determine the value of non-market goods in transportation related research.

The WTP values for speeding fines calculated by the spike model will be helpful in setting rational fines in the future.

Instead of defining Q as a vector of awareness, one might use another variable "the difference between the chosen and stipulated speeds" to derive the indirect utility such that the optimal speed chosen and optimal fine paid by the individual can be determined.

The spike model should be considered in future studies where there is high incidence of a specific value, which in our study is the zero response.

# **References**

Becker, G. S. (1968): 'Crime and punishment: An economic approach', Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.

Bengochea-Morancho, A., Fuertes-Eugenio, A.M, Saz-Salazar, S.D. (2005): 'A comparison of empirical models used to infer the willingness to pay in contingent valuation', Empirical Economics, 30, 235–244.

Bruce, K. J., and John, C. W. (2000): 'Value of public goods from sports stadiums: the CVM approach', Contemporary Economic Policy, 18(1), 48-58.

Carcary, W. B., Power, K. G. and Murry, F. A. (2001): 'the new driver project - changing driving beliefs, attitudes and self-reported driving behavior amongst young drivers through classroom-based pre and post driving test interventions', Scottish executive central research unit, 2001.

Central Bank of the Republic of Taiwan, 2008

Chen, M. C., Chuang, C. T., Chen, K. L., Jeng, H. Y., Hsiao, C. K., Wu., P. I. (2003): Natural resources and environmental economics: theoretical basis and the local case studies, ISBN 957-8555-77-6.

Chu, C. Y., and Jiang, N. (1993): 'Are fines more efficient than imprisonment?' Journal of Public Economics, 51, 115-124.

Del Saz-Salazar, S., and Garcia-Menendez, L. (2001a): 'Restoring port areas for recreation purposes: A contingent valuation study', 8th European Real Estate Society Conference (26-29 June 2001), Alicante, Spain.

Del Saz-Salazar, S., and Garcia-Menendez, L. (2001b): 'Willingness to pay for environmental improvements in a large city', Environmental and Resource Economics, 20, 103–112.

Fu, T. T., and Jou, Z. (1995): 'The willingness to pay and value of time for riding HSR – application of contingent valuation method', Taiwan Economic Review, 23(3), 259-298.

Hanemann, W. H. (1984): 'Welfare evaluations in contingent valuation experiments with discrete responses', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(3), 332-341.

Hu., W. (2006): 'Use of spike models in measuring consumers' willingness to pay for Non-GM oil', Journal of Agricultural Economics, 38(3), 525-538.

Institute of Transportation, Ministry of Transportation and Communication (2008): Number of Driving Licenses in Taiwan Area.

Jou, R.C. and Chen, K.H. (2013): 'Highway drivers' willingness-to-pay for speeding behavior in Taiwan', Journal of Advanced Transportation, Article first published online: 13 JUN 2012 | DOI: 10.1002/atr.219.

Jou, R.C., Chiou, Y.C., Chen, K.H., Tan, H.I. (2012): 'Freeway drivers' willingness-to-pay for a distance-based toll rate', Transportation Research Part A, 46, 549-559.

Jou, R.C. and Wang, P.L. (2012): 'The intention and willingness to pay moving violation citations among Taiwan motorcyclists', Accident Analysis and Prevention, 49, 177-185.

Jou, R.C., Wu, Y.C., and Chen, K.H. (2011a): 'Analysis of environmental benefits of a motorcycle idling stop policy at urban intersections', Transportation, 38, 1017-1033.

Jou, R.C., Wu, Y.C., Jian, R.Y. (2011b): 'A study of passengers' willingness to pay for business class seats of high speed rail in Taiwan', Transportmetrica (In press).

Kriström, B. (1997): 'Spike models in contingent valuation', American Journal Agricultural Economics, 79, 1013-36.

Lee, H. C., and Chun, H. S. (1999): 'Valuing environmental quality change on recreational hunting in Korea: A contingent valuation analysis', Journal of Environmental Management, 57, 11-20.

Liu, J. H., and Lee, T. M. (2007): 'Travelers' willingness to pay for green accommodation building in Jiufen & Jinguashi', Recreation association conference, Aletheia University, Taipei.

Liu, J. T. (1990): 'The economic benefit of Dan-shui River in terms of water quality improvemen –Applications of Auction Experiment and the Contingent Valuation Method', Academia Economics Papers, 18(2), 99-128.

National Freeway Police Bureau (2008, updated to May 7): http://www.hpb.gov.tw/.

Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S. (1979): 'The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines', American Economic Review, 69, 880-891.

Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S. (1991): 'A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals', American Economic Review, 81, 618-621.

Sun Moon Lake National Scenic Area Administration (2007): The Sun Moon Lake's traffic impact assessment after high speed rail and freeway No. 6 both in operation.

Yeh, P., and Fu, T. T. (2007): 'The study of the willingness to pay for drink-driving and risk a ban', Transportation Planning Journal, 36(4), 509-534.

Yoo, S. H., and Kwak, S. J. (2002): 'Using a spike model to deal with zero response data from double bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys', Applied Economics Letters, 9, 929-932.

Yoo, S. H., Shin, C. O., and Kwak, S. J. (2006): 'Inconvenience cost of spam mail: a contingent valuation study', Applied Economics Letters, 13, 933–936.

# **Tables**

Table 1: Description of respondent socioeconomic characteristics (percentages in parentheses)

| Variable                     | Item       | All       | Taipei   | Taichung  | Other     |
|------------------------------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Age                          | Below 25   | 44(8.7)   | 12(11.2) | 14(10.4)  | 18(6.8)   |
|                              | 26~40      | 314(41.5) | 60(55.5) | 85(63.5)  | 169(64.3) |
|                              | Above 41   | 147(29.2) | 36(33.3) | 35(26.1)  | 76(28.9)  |
| Marital status               | Single     | 332(65.7) | 38(35.1) | 45(33.6)  | 90(34.2)  |
| Car ownership                | 0          | 17(3.4)   | 4(3.7)   | 5(3.7)    | 8(3)      |
|                              | 1          | 417(82.6) | 92(85)   | 114(85.1) | 211(80.2) |
|                              | 2 or above | 71(14.1)  | 12(11.3) | 15(11.2)  | 12(4.6)   |
| Personal monthly             | Below 625  | 21(4.2)   | 3(2.8)   | 6(4.5)    | 12(4.6)   |
| income (USD)*                | 626~1875   | 376(74.5) | 74(68.5) | 108(80.6) | 194(73.8) |
|                              | 1876~3125  | 76(15)    | 21(19.4) | 11(8.2)   | 44(16.7)  |
|                              | Above 3126 | 32(6.3)   | 10(9.3)  | 9(6.7)    | 13(4.9)   |
| Driving license (years held) | Below 2    | 15(3)     | 2(1.9)   | 3(2.2)    | 10(3.8)   |
|                              | 3~5        | 53(10.5)  | 10(9.3)  | 17(12.7)  | 26(9.9)   |
|                              | Above 6    | 437(86.4) | 96(88.9) | 114(85.1) | 227(86.3) |
| Insurance Fee per year       | Below 156  | 104(33.8) | 66(66.1) | 75(56.0)  | 160(60.8) |
| (USD)*                       | 157~313    | 62(20.1)  | 12(11.1) | 21(15.7)  | 29(11.0)  |
|                              | 314~469    | 25(8.1)   | 5(4.6)   | 7(5.2)    | 13(4.9)   |
|                              | 470~625    | 45(14.6)  | 10(9.3)  | 11(8.2)   | 24(9.1)   |
|                              | Above 626  | 72(23.4)  | 15(13.9) | 20(14.9)  | 37(14.1)  |

<sup>\*1</sup> US\$ = 32 NT\$, Central Bank of the Republic of Taiwan, 2008

Table 2: Sample distribution under different speeding fine scenarios

| Scenarios (USD) | 47  | 70 | 94 | 117 | 141 | 164 | 188 |
|-----------------|-----|----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| All areas       | 233 | 31 | 46 | 41  | 34  | 19  | 101 |
| Taipei          | 44  | 3  | 10 | 5   | 9   | 6   | 31  |
| Taichung        | 59  | 13 | 9  | 13  | 10  | 8   | 22  |
| Other areas     | 130 | 15 | 27 | 23  | 15  | 5   | 48  |

<sup>\*</sup>Total samples are 505, Taipei samples are 108, Taichung samples are 134 and other area samples are 263.

Table 3: Drivers' speeding behaviour under various fines (percentages in parentheses)

| Fine | All areas (%) | Percentage | Taipei   | Percentage | Taichung | Percentage | Other areas | Percentage |
|------|---------------|------------|----------|------------|----------|------------|-------------|------------|
| 47   | 272(53.9)     | -12.9      | 64(59.3) | -5.0       | 75(56.0) | -21.0      | 133(50.6)   | -12.7      |
| 70   | 272(53.9)     | -12.9      | 64(59.3) | -5.0       | 75(56.0) | -21.0      | 133(50.6)   | -12.7      |
| 94   | 241(47.7)     | 0          | 61(56.5) | 0          | 62(46.3) | 0          | 118(44.9)   | 0          |
| 117  | 195(38.6)     | 19.1       | 51(47.2) | 16.4       | 53(39.6) | 14.5       | 90(34.2)    | 23.7       |
| 141  | 154(30.5)     | 36.1       | 46(42.6) | 24.6       | 40(29.9) | 35.5       | 68(25.9)    | 42.4       |
| 164  | 120(23.8)     | 50.2       | 37(34.3) | 39.3       | 30(22.4) | 51.6       | 53(20.2)    | 55.1       |
| 188  | 101(20.0)     | 58.1       | 31(28.7) | 49.2       | 22(16.4) | 64.5       | 48(18.3)    | 59.3       |

Table 4: Two-sample t-test of WTP with respect to income

| 0.200       | Above ave | Above average income |         | age income | Two-sample |  |
|-------------|-----------|----------------------|---------|------------|------------|--|
| area        | Samples   | WTP                  | Samples | WTP        | t-test     |  |
| All areas   | 164       | 84                   | 341     | 71         | 1.76**     |  |
| Taipei      | 49        | 101                  | 59      | 82         | 1.19       |  |
| Taichung    | 34        | 72                   | 100     | 77         | -0.34      |  |
| Other areas | 81        | 80                   | 182     | 65         | 1.46       |  |

<sup>\*\*</sup> Significant at 90% confidence level.

Table 5: Two-sample t-test of WTP with respect to past speeding violators

| area        | Past violator |     | Driver with | no violations | t-value |
|-------------|---------------|-----|-------------|---------------|---------|
| arca        | Samples       | WTP | Samples     | WTP           | t-varue |
| All areas   | 94            | 115 | 411         | 66            | 5.60*   |
| Taipei      | 29            | 154 | 79          | 67            | 6.58*   |
| Taichung    | 18            | 109 | 116         | 70            | 2.19*   |
| Other areas | 47            | 93  | 216         | 64            | 2.24*   |

<sup>\*</sup> Significant at 95% confidence level; \*\*Significant at 90% confidence level.

Table 6: WTP according to driver characteristics under different areas (percentages in parentheses)

| area        | Risk-averse | Risk-averse |            | Risk-seeking |          | Others |  |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|----------|--------|--|
|             | Samples     | WTP         | Samples    | WTP          | Samples  | WTP    |  |
| All areas   | 20(3.96)    | 25          | 333(65.94) | 87           | 25(4.95) | 57     |  |
| Taipei      | 6(1.188)    | 27          | 76(15.049) | 104          | 5(0.99)  | 33     |  |
| Taichung    | 4(0.79)     | 35          | 87(17.22)  | 88           | 6(1.188) | 63     |  |
| Other areas | 10(1.98)    | 19          | 170(33.66) | 80           | 14(2.77) | 64     |  |

Table 7: Spike model estimation results (t-value in parentheses)

| Variables   | All areas        | Taipei           | Taichung        | Other<br>areas   |
|---|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Constant  | -0.841           | -1.109           | -0.686          | -0.832           |
|   | (-10.41)         | (-5.07)          | (-4.27)         | (-7.49)          |
| Bid (USD)   | 0.218            | 0.205            | 0.247           | 0.213            |
|   | (24.08)          | (10.09)          | (13.92)         | (17.64)          |
| Personal monthly income (USD)   | 0.036            | 0.066            | 0.006           | 0.046            |
|   | (4.84)           | (3.65)           | (1.45)          | (3.35)           |
| Past violations   | 0.347            | 0.678            | 0.223           | 0.236            |
|   | (5.75)           | (5.635)          | (1.45)          | (3.11)           |
| Risk-seeking driver   | 0.469            | 0.394            | 0.730           | 0.340            |
|   | (6.23)           | (2.00)           | (5.12)          | (3.31)           |
| Risk-averse driver  | -0.961           | -0.693           | -0.662          | -1.333           |
|   | (-4.46)          | (-1.82)          | (-1.57)         | (-3.82)          |
| The proportion of<br>times spent on the<br>roads where the<br>driver was exceeding<br>the speeding limit<br>(%) | 0.023<br>(18.02) | 0.034<br>(11.38) | 0.024<br>(8.55) | 0.019<br>(11.08) |
| Samples   | 3535             | 756              | 938             | 1841             |
| Average WTP<br>(USD)  | 51               | 43               | 51              | 53               |
| Log-likelihood  | -3034.944        | -562.224         | -829.143        | -1608.715        |
| Spike   | 0.698            | 0.751            | 0.665           | 0.696            |

# **Figures**




Figure 1: The Taiwan National Freeway system

# **Appendix**

## Attitudes toward the law (percentages in parentheses)

| Variable  | Item             | All samples | Taipei   | Taichung  | Other areas |
|---|------------------|-------------|----------|-----------|-------------|
|   | 0                | 411(81.4)   | 79(73.1) | 116(86.6) | 216(82.1)   |
|   | 1                | 60(11.9)    | 18(16.7) | 13(9.7)   | 29(11.0)    |
| Have you received a speeding ticket in the last year?   | 2                | 24(4.8)     | 8(7.4)   | 3(2.2)    | 13(4.9)     |
| •   | 3                | 6(1.2)      | 2(1.9)   | 2(1.5)    | 2(0.8)      |
|   | Above 4          | 4(0.8)      | 1(0.9)   | 0         | 3(1.1)      |
|   | Understand       | 219(43.4)   | 43(39.8) | 64(47.8)  | 112(42.6)   |
| Do you know that the more a driver exceeds the speed limit, the higher the fine he or she needs to pay? | Normal           | 23(4.6)     | 4(3.7)   | 6(4.5)    | 13(4.9)     |
|   | Heard about that | 22(4.4)     | 4(3.7)   | 4(3.0)    | 14(5.3)     |
|   | Never knew that  | 31(6.1)     | 13(12)   | 5(3.7)    | 13(4.9)     |
|   | 100              | 41(8.1)     | 16(14.8) | 8(6.0)    | 17(6.5)     |
|   | 90               | 7(1.4)      | 0        | 3(2.2)    | 4(1.5)      |
|   | 80               | 7(1.4)      | 1(0.9)   | 3(2.2)    | 3(1.1)      |
|   | 70               | 5(1)        | 0        | 1(0.7)    | 4(1.5)      |
|   | 60               | 4(0.8)      | 1(0.9)   | 1(0.7)    | 2(0.8)      |
| Do you usually speed on the freeway? (%)  | 50               | 33(6.5)     | 5(4.6)   | 5(3.7)    | 23(8.8)     |
| 1100 (114)  | 40               | 11(2.2)     | 4(3.7)   | 2(1.5)    | 5(1.9)      |
|   | 30               | 30(5.9)     | 4(3.7)   | 8(6.0)    | 18(6.8)     |
|   | 20               | 62(12.3)    | 14(13.0) | 19(14.2)  | 29(11.0)    |
|   | 10               | 112(22.2)   | 25(23.5) | 25(18.7)  | 62(23.6)    |
|   | 0                | 193(38.2)   | 38(35.2) | 59(44.0)  | 96(36.5)    |
|   | 100              | 7(1.4)      | 2(1.9)   | 1(0.7)    | 4(1.5)      |
|   | 90               | 7(1.4)      | 3(2.8)   | 0         | 4(1.5)      |
|   | 80               | 12(2.4)     | 2(1.9)   | 3(2.2)    | 7(2.7)      |
|   | 70               | 9(1.8)      | 3(2.8)   | 4(3.0)    | 2(0.8)      |
| What do you fact is the much chility  | 60               | 8(1.6)      | 3(2.8)   | 0         | 5(1.9)      |
| What do you feel is the probability of getting a speeding ticket when                                   | 50               | 60(11.9)    | 10(9.3)  | 18(13.4)  | 32(12.2)    |
| you are driving on the freeway?   | 40               | 11(2.2)     | 4(3.7)   | 3(2.2)    | 4(1.5)      |
|   | 30               | 71(14.1)    | 14(13.0) | 24(17.9)  | 33(12.6)    |
|   | 20               | 84(16.6)    | 19(17.6) | 20(14.9)  | 45(17.1)    |
|   | 10               | 179(35.4)   | 40(37.0) | 47(35.1)  | 92(35.0)    |
|   | 0                | 57(11.3)    | 8(7.41)  | 14(10.4)  | 35(13.3)    |

## Attitudes toward the law (continued) (percentages in parentheses)

| Variable  | Item | All sample | Taipei   | Taichung | Other areas |
|---|------|------------|----------|----------|-------------|
|   | 100  | 8(1.6)     | 2(1.9)   | 2(1.5)   | 4(1.5)      |
|   | 90   | 16(3.2)    | 4(3.7)   | 3(2.2)   | 9(3.4)      |
|   | 80   | 21(4.2)    | 4(3.7)   | 7(5.2)   | 10(3.8)     |
|   | 70   | 22(4.4)    | 4(3.7)   | 9(6.7)   | 9(3.4)      |
|   | 60   | 15(3)      | 2(1.9)   | 5(3.7)   | 8(3.0)      |
| What do you feel is the probability of an accident occurring due to speeding? | 50   | 61(12.1)   | 9(8.3)   | 15(11.)  | 37(14.1)    |
|   | 40   | 19(3.8)    | 2(1.9)   | 3(2.2)   | 14(5.3)     |
|   | 30   | 39(7.7)    | 13(12.0) | 7(5.2)   | 19(7.2)     |
|   | 20   | 57(11.3)   | 17(15.7) | 15(11.2) | 25(9.5)     |
|   | 10   | 134(26.5)  | 30(27.8) | 39(29.1) | 65(24.7)    |
|   | 0    | 113(22.4)  | 21(19.4) | 29(21.6) | 63(24.0)    |
|   | 300  | 18(3.6)    | 4(3.7)   | 4(3.0)   | 10(3.8)     |
|   | 250  | 2(0.4)     | 1(0.9)   | 0(0.0)   | 1(0.4)      |
|   | 200  | 15(3)      | 3(2.8)   | 4(3.0)   | 8(3.0)      |
|   | 150  | 10(2)      | 1(0.9)   | 0(0.0)   | 9(3.4)      |
|   | 100  | 22(4.4)    | 5(4.6)   | 6(4.5)   | 11(4.2)     |
|   | 90   | 1(0.2)     | 0(0.0)   | 1(0.7)   | 0(0.0)      |
| If an accident were to occur due to   | 80   | 7(1.4)     | 2(1.9)   | 3(2.2)   | 2(0.8)      |
| speeding, what amount of compensation do you think is fair?                   | 70   | 6(1.2)     | 1(0.9)   | 3(2.2)   | 2(0.8)      |
|   | 60   | 12(2.4)    | 4(3.7)   | 3(2.2)   | 5(1.9)      |
|   | 50   | 72(14.3)   | 15(13.9) | 21(15.7) | 36(13.7)    |
|   | 40   | 29(5.7)    | 3(2.8)   | 6(4.5)   | 20(7.6)     |
|   | 30   | 81(16)     | 18(16.7) | 19(14.2) | 44(16.7)    |
|   | 20   | 80(15.8)   | 22(20.4) | 18(13.4) | 40(12.5)    |
|   | 10   | 150(29.7)  | 29(26.9) | 46(34.3) | 75(28.5)    |