Rhetorical Questioning: Oracles and Oratory in Fourth Century Athens

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I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, that all sources have been cited correctly and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

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Author's Note

Abbreviations used in the thesis are taken from the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th ed., 2012), apart from Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, which has been shortened to 'Lyc. *Leo*.' in accordance with current scholarship on the speech. Greek text has been cited as it appears in the editions of the *Loeb Classical Library* unless otherwise specified. All dates referred to in the body of the thesis (excluding bibliographic information) are B.C.E. unless otherwise stated.

Introduction

'While other economies around the world tumbled into recession, we in this country…continue to have a Triple-A credit rating and stable outlook'[1]

ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἀγαθὴν ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶ καὶ τὸν Δία τὸν Δωδωναῖον ὑμῖν μαντευόμενον, τὴν μέντοι τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἣ νῦν ἐπέχει, χαλεπὴν καὶ δεινήν

I believe this city has good fortune [Good Fortune], and I notice that so too does the oracle of Dodonian Zeus, but the fortune of all humankind, as it is now, I believe to be harsh and terrible.[2]

Orators, whether in the Athenian assembly during the fourth century BCE or on Australian television in the twenty-first century AD, use sources of authority to engage and persuade their audience. In the modern world, a speaker can employ statistics, polls, commissioned research or, in the case above concerning the Australian economy in 2013, an external evaluation of a country's credit risk to convince their fellow citizens. In the ancient world, a *rhētōr* could refer to witness testimonies, written laws, prayers and, in the case above concerning the tribulations of Athens during the 330s BCE, oracular pronouncements.

The sources of authority that public figures look to in these situations can tell us a great deal about what they and their audience considered most important. Rudd's emphasis on Australia's credit rating implies that his voters have been worried about how their livelihood will be impacted by the economic difficulties of other countries. Demosthenes' use of an oracle asserting that Athens has 'τύχην ἀγαθὴν' suggests that Athenians have been concerned that they will suffer the harsh fortunes experienced by their neighbours.[3]

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[1]Kevin Rudd, Canberra 4 August 2013.
[2] Dem. 18.253; See Bowden 2005, 157-8 and Eidinow 2013, 143 who makes a similar comparison between Demosthenes and Alan Greenspan.
I have used the translations given in the Loeb Classical Library series for all quoted passages in this thesis. Some passages (including this one) have been adapted to reflect a more literal translation. See bibliography for individual translations used.
[3] τύχην ἀγαθὴν is also a stock phrase that would have had some resonance with the audience, although its meaning at this point in time is difficult to ascertain. The Athenian cult of Agatha Tyche emerges in the years after this speech. See Eidinow 2011, 148-152 with 100-1; *IG* II² 333; Parke 1967, 141-2.

The role of oracles in the culture, religion, literature and even cognition of Ancient Greece has been subject to increased scrutiny in recent decades.[4] The oracles used by the orators of ancient Athens, such as the example above, have yet to be included in our understanding of oracles and their place in the ancient world. In the most comprehensive coverage of the oracles that appear in Athenian rhetoric, Bowden concludes that oracles were used as 'a source of authority, parallel with the *nomoi* (laws and customs) of Athens'.[5] While Bowden's conclusion explains two short quotations of oracular pronouncements by Demosthenes, orators also used oracular authority in diverse ways.[6] Speakers included stories from both myth and living memory that hinge on the involvement of the oracular; prosecutors denigrated defendants for not consulting oracles in times of need; and public figures demonstrated their attentiveness to the religious sphere by highlighting their closeness with Delphi and Pythian Apollo. This thesis seeks to determine what the role of these oracles in Athenian oratory was, and what this public function of the oracular can tell us about the people of the *polis*.

Almost all the oracles used in extant Athenian rhetoric were presented in symbouletic oratory, speeches that were presented in the assembly of Athens when it functioned as a democracy.[7] For this reason, the primary focus of scholarship on the oracles used in Athenian rhetoric has been to determine the function of oracles and divination in Athenian democracy. For example, Parker has argued that oracular authority in democratic politics was secondary to the 'autonomy of the assembly'.[8] Parker acknowledges that oracles were part of a repertoire of persuasive devices available to Athenian speakers, but a comprehensive exploration of the argumentative function of each oracle used in rhetoric is yet to be

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[4] Bowden 2005; Johnston 2008; Graf 2009; Flower 2008; Struck 2016.
[5] Only concerning oracles from Delphi. Bowden 2005, 57.
[6] Dem. 21.52 and 43.66.
[7] See methodological discussion below.
[8] Parker 2006, 115.

undertaken.[9]   Bowden has opposed Parker's view, which downplays the prominence of oracles in Athenian democracy, arguing that the *polis* was first and foremost a 'system for establishing and enforcing the will of the gods'.[10] Oracles, then, have a clear role in oratory from Bowden's perspective, as they are 'presented as an arbiter as of correct conduct' by speakers seeking to establish moral norms to an audience preoccupied with pleasing their gods.[11] However, the approaches to Parker and Bowden to the relationship between divination and democracy have yet to fully unpack the range of ways in which oracles were used by orators. Rather than addressing the bigger picture of the place of the oracular in Athenian democracy, this study collects the oracles presented in Athenian speeches and determines the effect they might have had on their audience. This approach largely excludes some very high-profile depictions of Delphi and oracles more generally in Athenian democracy. Herodotus' story of the 'wooden wall' and Aristophanes' lambasting of Athenian oracle-mongers, for example, only enter into my discussion as brief comparisons.[12]

Earlier approaches that have directly dealt with a larger proportion of the oracular material used in oratory have done so attempting to uncover either how the prophetic sanctuaries functioned, both practically and as a socio-political institution, or to determine the 'historicity' of responses presented in the ancient sources. Parke and Wormell, in their extensive collection of 615 oracular responses of the Delphic Oracle, examine 14 oracles

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[9] Parker 2006, 115 and Parker 1985, 320 n. 76 for treatment of Dem. 19.299 and Din. 1.78 and 98. See also: Parker 1985, 323 'As a procedural guarantor of decisions, therefore, an oracle is redundant in a democracy'; Morgan 1990, 153-4 'Oracles… sanction decisions taken on the accumulated wisdom of community leaders'.
[10] Bowden 2005, 159.
[11] Quote from Bowden 2005, 57; see also Bowden 2003, 274 for the increasing use of oracular sources in the Athenian assembly during the fifth century, *contra* Parker 2006, 115 arguing that consulting oracles (especially the state consultations that are less of a focus here) generally became 'less necessary and appropriate' during the same period.
[12] Rather than being covered in detail, as Herodotus is in most monographs on Delphi cited in the thesis: Crahay 1956, 295-304; Parke and Wormell 1956, 169-170; Fontenrose 1978, 124-9; Bowden 2005, 100-8 cf. Kindt 2016, 50-2. On Aristophanes, see: Smith 1988; Muecke 1998; Bowden 2003 and 2005, 55-6.

referred to in Athenian rhetoric.[13] These authors analyse oracles for the information they contain about Athens' interaction with Delphi at various times and whether or not the responses were in prose or verse.[14] While these are valid inquiries to which the authors contribute a great deal, most oracular responses are removed from their textual context in order to assess what a 'normal' response from Delphi might have looked like. With such a broad scope and an aim to generalise, the approach has a limited capacity to explore the role of a single oracle in the speech of which it was originally a part. Although this thesis is attempting to find a generic function of the oracular in Athenian oratory, I also seek to highlight the idiosyncrasies of individual uses of oracles and oracle stories within their original speech.

Studies that followed Parke and Wormell examined oracular source material with the intention of determining the accuracy of individual responses. Fontenrose's comprehensive organisation of the oracles in the Parke and Wormell catalogue two decades later also sought to establish a less subjective method of assessing the historicity, or at least authenticity, of a Delphic prophecy.[15] Fontenrose rejected the reliability of a great deal of oracular evidence provided by the speeches from Classical Athens.[16] Fontenrose's classification system is useful for establishing when an oracular response might have emerged in the sources, but cannot tell us why an orator like Lycurgus can use a 'legendary' oracle in the same breath as

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[13] Parke and Wormell 1956b. Oracles from Athenian logography (with correspondence to Fontenrose 1979): Aeschin. 3.108 = PW 17 = F. Q70; Aeschin. 3.130 = PW 265 = F. Q71; Dem. 19.297 = PW 263; Dem. 21.52 = PW 282 = F. H8; Dem. 43.66 = PW 283 = F. H29; Isoc. 4.31 =PW 162 = F. H9; Isoc. 6.17 = PW 287 = F. L60; Isoc. 6.23, 6.31 = PW 296 = F. Q13; Lyc. *Leo*. 84 = PW 164 = F. L49; Lyc. *Leo*. 93 = PW259 = F. H18; Lyc. *Leo*. 99 = PW 195 = F. L32. For the responses from Dodona: (Din 1.77 and 98 [Dem. 19.297 = PW 263] and Hyp. 4.24-5) see Parke 1967a, 140-2.

[14] i.e. PW 259 (Lyc. *Leo* 93) and PW 17 (Aeschin. 3.108) for Parke and Wormell reconstructing verse responses from prose paraphrases in the original sources. See Parke and Wormell 1956a for a chronological history of Delphi drawn from these sources, esp. 217-243.

[15] Fontenrose 1978, 7. Fontenrose also incorporated the works of Amandry 1950; Delcourt 1955; Crahay 1956 and Nilsson 1958.

[16] Although most of the oracles from the orators are grouped in the 'historical' and 'quasi-historical (Q)' categories, most are deemed 'not genuine'. The H and Q categories indicates that the responses were recorded soon (within a generation) after being produced and occurred in a period for which we have corroborating evidence (*sc.* not from myth), see Fontenrose 1978, 7-8.

a 'historical' oracle for the same persuasive purpose. The oracles used by the orators do not conform to the characteristics prescribed by Fontenrose's survey of the ancient texts, yet the Delphic oracles most frequently examined in present in scholarship on divination and Athenian democracy are two oracles from the 'historical' category.[17] The role of the other oracles in rhetoric, those taken from the Greek storytelling tradition that Fontenrose classes as legendary or not genuine, remains to be explored. This thesis will begin to examine these oracular responses that draw from myth and seek to move beyond any lingering reliance on Fontenrose's classification system. It will be clear that oracular authority in Athenian rhetoric was not dependent on the variables that might lead Fontenrose or other scholars to question the authenticity of an oracle or oracle story.

Rhetorical Retelling

Oracles in oratory, then, must be approached with attention to the oracles of the various literary traditions with which both orators and their audiences were closely familiar. Regardless of how we classify their role in democratic decision-making, oracles permeated Athenian life during the period from which we have rhetorical sources.

Oracles feature in all genres of literary sources that record, interrogate and challenge the actions of humans and the divine. Rather than aiming to determine when, where and why an original oracular consultation in these sources might have taken place, another approach has been to examine the function of these oracles within the texts and genres in which they were recorded. The present study seeks to apply scholarship exploring oracles within their narrative context to a new body of ancient sources: rhetoric.

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[17] Dem. 21.52-1 and 43.66, see Parker 2006, 108-9 and Bowden 2005, 57. Parker 1985, 320 n. 76 and 2006, 108-9 also refer to two oracles from Dodona that Fontenrose does not classify: Dem. 19.297 and Dem. 18.253. It should be noted that both of these oracles from Dodona would certainly be labelled 'historical' according to Fontenrose's methodology, see Fontenrose 1978, 7-9.

Athenian oratory straddles an important divide in modern classification of ancient genres, intended for both public and private consumption, as speech and as text.[18] Further, speeches written for an immediate purpose, i.e. a court case, not only addressed arguments made by others on the day, but also drew from all other Athenian discourse with which the audience and orator were familiar. Orators quote tragedies, Homer, oracles, myths, laws and previous speeches regularly during their arguments. Although rhetoric should not be seen as purely literary genre, this collection of oracles will show that Athenian logographers and speakers used all available methods of engaging and convincing their audience.

Examples of the approach to oracles that examines their function within their literary context have looked at the role of the oracular in Athenian genres such as tragedy and poetry.[19] However, Maurizio has also shown the interconnectedness of the oracle stories that appear in these distinct genres due to the 'oral circulation of oracles'.[20] Maurizio argues that these oracles in written sources are single manifestations of a much broader tradition of telling stories about oracles in oral format.[21] Maurizio's perspective has allowed subsequent inquiries to explore the meanings and functions of these oracular narratives in greater depth. Returning to the notions of oracular authority raised by the excerpt from *On the Crown* at the beginning of this chapter, the role of divine advice in Greek prose has been explored before. Kindt has shown that Herodotus' use of the oracular voice allows his history to convey meaning and authority that could only come from a divine source.[22] Kindt's work has also explored the function of oracles in sources ranging from Herodotus to Athenaeus, but shows

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[18] Fox and Livingstone 2007, 542-3.

[19] Tragedy: Roberts 1984; Bushnell 1988; Vogt 1998 and Bowden 2005, 40-55. Comedy: Smith 1988; Muecke 1998; Bowden 2003 and 2005, 55-6. For all the challenges faced by characters looking to Delphi for answers in tragedy, the sanctuary always supports Athens and general order, see Bowden 2005, 54-5 and 64. While oracles of Bacis and their *chresmologoi* are object of much ridicule in Aristophanic comedy, Delphi is largely spared: Smith 1988, 154; Muecke 1998, 264-6; Bowden 2003; Bowden 2005, 56 with notes.

[20] Maurizio 1997, 312.

[21] Maurizio 1997, 313-5.

[22] Kindt 2006, 45 and 49 n. 78 for Thucydides establishing an authoritative voice in opposition to the oracular. See also Hornblower 1992.

that these sources represent a 'unified body of narratives'.[23] These narratives demonstrate Greeks defining and questioning the place of humanity through its interaction with and opposition to the divine.[24] The oracles used by Athenian orators must also be seen as influenced by and reliant on these representations and functions of oracles from other areas of ancient life.

Either Oracles or Oratory

Scholarship on oratory as a genre, however, tends to look past or downplay the oracular elements of the speeches.[25] This observation is not a criticism, oracles in rhetoric are infrequent and often sit seemingly independent of the general argumentative strategy.[26] Parker has argued that all religious features of oratory are limited by the rules of public speech, such that speakers express ideas about the divine with 'compulsory optimism'.[27] Even within studies that explore the religious attitudes expressed by Athenian orators, oracles have remained peripheral.[28] I look to augment focused analyses of rhetoric by demonstrating the interconnectedness of the oracles of rhetoric with oracular in Athenian myths, rituals, texts and cognition. The argumentative strategies that modern scholarship on oratory has sought to uncover and explain will be shown to have been strengthened and developed by orators' recourse to oracular authority.

Limits and Methodology

This thesis is limited to discussing oracles that were used in the speeches made by the 'Attic orators' of the fourth century BCE. Issues with the texts of these speeches are

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[23] Kindt 2016, 14.
[24] Kindt 2016, 164.
[25] Although commentaries on the speeches have proved invaluable to anylyses that are presented here, esp. MacDowell 1990, 2000; Worthington 1992, 1994; Harris 1995; Carey 2000; Yunis 2001.
[26] Such is the view expressed by MacDowell on Dem. 21.51-2
[27] Parker 1997, 158.
[28] See Martin 2009.

discussed in detail when relevant, but as a body of sources, the surviving material is treated as reliable evidence of how a speechwriter might seek to convince an Athenian audience of this era, even if there is doubt about the identity of the author or whether the speech was ever presented in the form in which we have it. I make reference to the depictions of oracles in Athenian political debate from historiographical and poetic sources, but the oracular pronouncements from Athenian logography are the core of this analysis. Similarly, epigraphic evidence of oracular consultation in Athens is often relevant to issues arising from the discussion of oracles in rhetorical sources.

I will use the term 'oracle' as meaning 'a response or utterance from an oracular source' in this thesis. This includes oblique references to oracles and is not restricted to instances where an entire oracle is read to the audience. The terms 'oracle story' or 'oracular narrative' will be used as they have been in previous scholarship on the tales in Greek storytelling in which the actions of characters are influenced by an oracle.[29]

The thesis collects and analyses the oracles used in Athenian speeches between 347/6 and 323/2 BCE. These year limits have been imposed by the source material, as the first extant quote of an oracle is in *Against Meidias* from 347/6 and the last in *Against Demosthenes* from 323/2.. The oracular references in Isocrates' works before this date are included in my analysis, but the focus is on speeches that were presented in public cases. However, there are no references to oracles in the Lysianic corpus or in speeches made to the Athenian assembly at the turn of the fifth and fourth century.

In this sample from the later fourth centruy, there are 15 oracles and oracle stories from roughly 64 complete speeches surviving from Athens. I include in this sample the potentially spurious speeches from the Demosthenic corpus as they remain reliable as evidence for speechwriting during the period, even if Demosthenes himself did not write

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[29] See Maurizio 1997; Kindt 2006 and 2016.

them. Examination of fragments was beyond the scope of this project, and will be explored more productively once the oracles that survive in their argumentative contexts have been explored. Two oracles from the full sample feature in speeches that could be classed as forensic (Dem. 21.51-2 and Dem. 43.66) and two occur in Isocrates' philosophical logography. The remaining eight, despite appearing to be a disparate collection, were delivered to a relatively constant audience (the Athenian assembly) over a period of twenty-five years. It is possible, or even likely, that a sizeable number of male citizens would have been present at all of these speeches that use oracular authority.[30]

Direction and Delphi

This thesis will explore the uses of oracles in the speeches that survive from Athens during the Classical period. I argue that the role of oracles in oratory is to provide divine authority to mortal arguments. The persuasive function of the oracular voice in rhetoric was drawn from its thematic consistency with the literary and oral traditions of oracle stories in the Athenian imagination. The orators' use of oracles was not contingent on either the authenticity of the response or its relationship with developing consensus in the democratic *polis*. There are clear connections between the oracles of oratory and those of the storytelling tradition and I also aim to show that there was a characteristic mode of oracular authority used in Athenian speech. Rather than employing the 'enigmatic mode' of divine communication that defines the meaning of oracle stories in other ancient sources, Athenian orators stress the clarity of oracular pronouncements.[31]

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[30] Oracles from Athenian logography (with correspondence to Parke and Wormell 1956b and Fontenrose 1979): Aeschin. 3.108 = PW 17 = F. Q70; Aeschin. 3.130 = PW 265 = F. Q71; Dem. 19.297 = PW 263; Dem. 21.52 = PW 282 = F. H8; Dem. 43.66 = PW 283 = F. H29; Isoc. 4.31 =PW 162 = F. H9; Isoc. 6.17 = PW 287 = F. L60; Isoc. 6.23, 6.31 = PW 296 = F. Q13; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 84 = PW 164 = F. L49; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 93 = PW259 = F. H18; Lycurg. *Leoc.* 99 = PW 195 = F. L32. For the responses from Dodona: (Din 1.77 and 98; Dem. 18.253 and Hyp. 4.24-5) see Parke 1967a, 140-2.
[31] 'Enigmatic mode' see Kindt 2016, 159-64.

The nature of rhetorical sources immediately limits this study's contribution to some key questions concerning the role of divination in the lives of the ancient Greeks. Two notable limitations of this body of speeches are the narrow time period during which they were given and the small range of oracular sources that are quoted by the speakers. These features of Athenian oratory limit the scope of the study, but also facilitate conclusions that are specific to a body of similar sources and a historical period. Although assembly speeches remain from the late fifth and early fourth century, no speech attributed to Lysias, Antiphon or Andocides contains an oracle. Further, despite much direct evidence showing a role for *chresmologoi* sharing oracles from collections in Athenian public life throughout the Classical period, only oracles from Delphi and Dodona are referenced by orators.[32]

To address these characteristics of the oracles in oratory, this thesis will approach the argumentative purpose of the oracular responses in their speeches and reconcile them with the scholarship that examines the broader function of Delphi and Dodona as panhellenic sanctuaries. The ongoing archaeological excavation at Delphi has grown into an analysis of the spatial and cultural competition of *poleis* and other groups in the ancient Mediterranean.[33] This multi-disciplinary effort has offered innovative and reliable insights into the function of Delphi as more than its oracle, a site that was a unique political entity.[34] Scott has shown that the crucial relationship between Athens and Delphi was under pressure during the fourth century period from which these speeches come.[35] The interaction of individual orators and Athens as a whole will be demonstrated to have influenced how oracular authority from Delphi and Dodona was used in public speech.

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter seeks to show that oracle stories were a means of addressing a crisis in Athenian identity after the battle of Chaeronea

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[32] On *chresmologoi* see Ar. Eq. 996-1110; Thuc. 2.48.1-54.5 with Bowden 2003; Parker 2006, 111-115.
[33] Scott 2010 and 2014.
[34] Jacquemin 1999; Scott 2010, 2014. See also Arnush 1991 and Malkin 1989.
[35] Scott 2014, 240-60. Athens and Delphi: 'Athenians needed what Delphi had to offer' Bowden 2005, 157.

in 338. Lycurgus' inversion of the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication throughout his speech *Against Leocrates* was part of Athens' wider reengagement with Apollo and his oracle in the face of an uncertain future. For this purpose, Lycurgus conflates tales from the mythical and recent past to highlight not only Leocrates' treasonous behaviour, but also the importance of Athens' continued attention to Apollo and Delphi.

The second chapter will extend this explanation of oracles in rhetoric as providing clear response to crisis. The trial of Ctesiphon, mere months after Lycurgus' prosecution of Leocrates, become a public discussion of the causes of Athens' decreasing autonomy during the expansion of Macedon. Aeschines emphasises the clarity of the warnings the city had received from Delphi, again in both the mythical and recent past, to argue that Athens' misfortune was a result of Demosthenes' neglect of the city's relationship with the gods. In his defence, Demosthenes addresses Aeschines' use of oracles and looks to Dodona for prophetic wisdom as he offers an alternative model of human and divine interaction. Thus, oracular discourse forms a central part of this public negotiation of the balance between human decision-making and the role of the gods.

The final chapter demonstrates the necessity of approaching all uses of oracles in oratory from this perspective. A survey of the oracles given in public speeches in the decade either side of the trials in 330 will address two main questions: whether the two key oracular sanctuaries of Delphi and Dodona were used differently; and whether the enigmatic nature of oracular communication crucial to other literature featured in rhetoric. I conclude that the sanctuaries were used differently by the orators in this period, but that the oracular voices of Apollo and Zeus were only ever presented as an absolute authority. Similarly, I show that the

pattern of 'consultation-interpretation-solution' that has been examined in epiphanic narratives from other Greek sources is not present in oracles presented by the orators.[36]

The conclusion brings together the features and purposes of oracles in Athenian speeches from the late fourth century. I also explore the implications the use of oracles in oratory has for our understanding of oracles in other sources and at other points in Athenian history.

Overall, then, this thesis hopes to make a contribution to an understanding of how ancient people viewed and developed their interaction with the oracular. Further, I seek to show that this interaction existed well beyond an original consultation at a prophetic sanctuary. The uses of oracular authority in oratory relied on a constant engagement with the oracular sphere that was an important part of Athenian politics, storytelling and identity.

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[36] Narrative structure: Maurizio 1997, 311. Epiphanic narratives: Platt 2011; Petridou 2014; Kindt 2016, 163-4.

Chapter One:

Mything the Point? Oracles and Rhetoric in the Lycurgan era

εἰς Δελφοὺς ἰὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεὸν τί ποιῶν ἂν νίκην λάβοι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων. χρήσαντος δ᾿ αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συμβαλεῖν τὼ στρατοπέδω, κρατήσειν τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενος τοῦτ᾿ ἔπραξε, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστρατευομένους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐξέβαλε.

[Erechtheus] went to Delphi and asked the god by what means he could assure a victory over the enemy. The god proclaimed that if he sacrificed his daughter before the two sides engaged he would defeat the enemy and, submitting to the god, he did this and drove the invaders from the country.[37]

Oracles and prophecies are familiar features of stories from ancient Greece just as they are in the modern storytelling tradition.[38] At first glance, the three stories featuring oracles from Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, such as the one above, fit the pattern with which Greek audiences would have been accustomed. The stories contain a problem, a consultation and a resolution.[39] As familiar as they are, these types of stories have been deeply problematic for traditional scholarship on Delphi in the 20th century. The story presented above gives no answers to historians questioning whether this consultation ever happened, or what the mantic session might have looked like. The existence of an Erechtheus, let alone his visit to Delphi, is impossible to know with any certainty and the speaker gives no details about the process of consultation.[40]

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[37] Lyc. *Leo.* 99.

[38] Prophecies in a variety of forms have driven the plots of the highest grossing movie worldwide for five of the past ten years: *Beauty and the Beast* 2017; *Star Wars: The Force Awakens* 2015; *Frozen* 2013; *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2* 2011; *Pirates of the Caribbean: At World's End* 2007. Three of the top five highest grossing movie franchises of all time centre on prophecies and their eventual fulfilment: *Harry Potter* (Warner Bros.); *Star Wars* (Lucasfilm) and J.R.R. Tolkien's *Middle Earth* (New Line).

[39] For this 'almost invariable plot structure' see Maurizio 1997, 311; Kindt 2016, 157-8.

[40] Lyc. *Leo.* 99 is classified by Fontenrose as 'legendary' and the broad range of sources that refer to Erechtheus' sacrifices (see entry L 32 at Fontenrose 1978, 367-8) complicate any further analysis of 'authenticity'.

The oracular narratives of Athenian public speeches present an excellent opportunity to combine two approaches to the history of Delphi and its oracle. Firstly, the function of oracle stories within their speeches can be examined for literary effect and cultural meaning using the same methods as previous scholars exploring the oracles of historiography, myth and other Greek forms. Secondly, this 'genre specific' analysis within a relatively stable performance context can be reconciled with broader trends in Athenian religious life during the same period. This chapter will demonstrate that the emergence of oracular narratives in Athenian oratory in the late fourth century is part of a purposeful reengagement with Delphi by Athens.

The most recent assessment of the role of oracles in oratory is that the pronouncements act as 'a source of authority, parallel with the *nomoi* (laws or customs) of the city of Athens.'[41] These oracle stories, unlike those offered by Demosthenes that complement existing *nomoi*, suit a wide range of argumentative purposes not restricted to Athenian laws. Lycurgus refers to Delphic oracles in three moralistic tales from the Athenian past in his speech, neither parallel with existing laws nor corresponding to the famous enigmatic language of oracles presented in Greek myth and history.[42]

This chapter seeks to expand Bowden's summary of Delphi in public speech to explore the function of the oracle stories in *Against Leocrates*. The three oracle stories presented by Lycurgus are doing far more than reasserting the traditional laws and customs of Athens. Lycurgus deemphasises the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication to highlight the reciprocal relationship between Athens and Delphi in both myth and recent memory. Although investigating whether the Pythia gave ambiguous or unclear prophecies to enquirers is not the focus of this research, the obscure nature of Delphic language remains

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[41] Bowden 2005, 55.
[42] See Kindt 2006, 2016 16-54 and 55-86.

crucial. For oracle stories to have accessible meaning, Apollo's advice must be (somewhat paradoxically) difficult, but possible, for humans to interpret.[43]

In most literary sources, Delphic oracles are inextricable from the narratives in which they feature, as the meaning of an oracle story for the audience is drawn from the interaction between the Apollo's prophecy and human behaviour before and after the consultation.[44] Once the problematic questions of authenticity are sidelined, we can start to examine the way that authors use the oracular storytelling tradition within historical narratives and what this function can tell us about Greek culture more broadly.[45] The following analysis will explore how Lycurgus uses the traditional form of the oracle story to support his arguments against Leocrates.

From this textual basis, we can move to examining how these oracular narratives related to their context. For all the recent scholarship on Delphi and the role of Delphic oracles in storytelling, the relationship between the oracular story tradition and the broader history of Delphi as a sanctuary has yet to be analysed in detail or a specific case study. The mid-fourth century was a period during which Athens' relationship with Delphi and Apollo was actively strengthened by physical dedication, religious legislation and mythological genealogies. The emerging practice of quoting or paraphrasing oracular consultation in political speeches must be understood as part of Athens' emphasis on its closeness with the sanctuary. All thirteen oracles in the extant speeches of the Athenian logographers and orators were given during this time.[46] Assembly audiences in the year 331/0 alone would

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[43] Bowden 2005, 51.
[44] For Delphi in Attic tragedy, see Bowden 46-54; for Athens and Delphi in Herodotus see Kindt 2016 47-54.
[45] Kindt 2016, 160-162 and appendix.
[46] See introduction for full list. Earliest possible date would be Isoc. *Arch.* 31 in the 360s and the latest possible is Din. *Dem.* 98 in the late 320s.

have heard five oracles and oracle narratives from three different speakers: Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Aeschines.[47]

Lycurgus' varied use of oracles in *Against Leocrates* demonstrates that these narratives of oracular knowledge were a way for the orator to use myths and past events within the pursuasive framework of his prosecution. Further, the shared understanding that the orator and his audience have of the traditional discourse of Delphi and its oracles strengthens Lycurgus' argument that Leocrates' cowardice is an offence against Athens and its religious and cultural heritage.[48] Thus, Lycurgus' use of oracular discourse is not 'always in agreement with the *nomoi* of the city'.[49] His emphasis on Delphi is in fact innovation, rather than a return to previous laws and customs.

My argument is divided into three parts. Firstly, a brief exploration of context of the case in post-Chaeronea Athens will show that the city as a whole was attempting to reassert ownership over the socio-political capital of its past during its conflict with Macedon. It will also be shown that Lycurgus' personal affiliation with the sanctuary at Delphi influences the way the audience would have received his oracular argumentation. Finally, a close examination of the oracle stories themselves will reveal that Lycurgus deemphasises the enigmatic mode of oracular communication to support his argument for human susceptibility to deception. His oracle stories explore human fallibility and reliably link it to his prosecution of Leocrates.

Apollo and Lycurgus

Even before his political prominence in the period after Chaeronea, Lycurgus appears to have been noticeable in Athenian public life for his role in religious affairs.[50] Although it is unlikely that he held the priesthood of Poseidon Erechtheus himself, his *genos* supplied

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[47] All dates from here are BCE.
[48] Allen 2000, 26; Steinbock 2011, 282; Hanink 2014, 58-9.
[49] Bowden 2005, 57.
[50] Plut. *Mor*. 841D; Humphreys 2004, 79; Martin 2009, 152-6; Hanink 2014, 5.

both that position and the priestess of Athena Polias. Lycurgus' attention to religious affairs in both speechmaking and legislation has been well covered by other authors.[51] What this section seeks to emphasise is the consistent involvement that Lycurgus had with Delphi. This connection accentuates the impact and authority of the oracles in Against Leocrates and frames the audience's engagement with the past. In a period that is often known for the emergence of 'documentary' proof of the past, Lycurgus' use of oracles combines documentary and oral religious authority.[52]

Lycurgus' tenure as the chief financial administrator of the city is marked by an increase in legislation, much relating to religious practice, by the board of *nomothetai*. While the legislative processes of the *nomothetai* remain matters of debate, some features of the body's activity in the later fourth century clearly demonstrate that the public would have been aware of Lycurgus' closeness with Delphi and its oracle. During the 340s and 330s, laws proposed to the *nomothetai* become associated with the individuals endorsing the motion.[53] Thus, the law proposed by Lycurgus in 335/4 that regulated dedications at temples and the procession of the Panathenaia has greater ramifications for the speech delivered in 330. Not only is Lycurgus' attention to religious legislation conspicuous and individual, but the law also required a *theōria* to Delphi.[54] Regardless of whether Lycurgus himself led the *theōria*, legislation that was identifiably his initiative required the involvement of Delphi.

This is not an isolated action; Lycurgus interacted with Delphi and sanctuaries to Apollo more frequently than any Athenian politician about whom we have comparable evidence. The temple of Apollo Patroos was constructed during Lycurgus' financial administration of the city and he proposed a decree in honour of Neoptolemus of Melite, who

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[51] See especially Humphreys 2004 and Lambert 2010 for legislation; Martin 2009 for speechmaking.
[52] Lambert 2010, 225. Documentary evidence of the past refers to the increase in inscriptions, records of laws and oaths we have from this period.
[53] Humphreys 2004, 82.
[54] θεωρία… κελεύου[σι *IG* ii² 333; Humphreys 2004, 83.

gilded the cult statue.[55] In 326/5, Lycurgus led the first *Pythaïs* to Delphi in thirty years, accompanied by an all-star list of his contemporaries.[56] It is this delegation that might well have dedicated the Acanthus column that, in the time-honoured tradition of dedications at Delphi, purposefully detracted attention from monuments built by rivals. [57]

Athens was, and Athenians were, deeply involved with building and festival developments at Delphi during the late 330s as Macedonian influence over the sanctuary and its Amphictyony subsided.[58] This involvement corresponded with distinctive changes in mythological narratives that introduced Apollo as an ancestor of Athenians and all Ionic peoples. [59] Lycurgus as an individual was involved in both of these trends. His financial and honorific activity placed great importance on the growth of the cult of Apollo Patroos in Athens, and on Athenian prominence within the sanctuary at Delphi. As we will shortly see, his rhetoric actively promoted Apollo's long-standing goodwill towards Athens.

Putting the 'Cur' in Lycurgan Athens

The only speech delivered by Lycurgus that remains, *Against Leocrates*, was delivered in the spring of 330. Lycurgus brought a procedure for treason (*eisangelia*) against a blacksmith and grain merchant named Leocrates, who left Athens in the aftermath of the Battle of Chaeronea in 338. While Lycurgus had been successful prosecuting a prominent member of the Areopagus named Autolycus in similar circumstances, it appears that

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[55] Plut. *Mor.* 843.
[56] Phanodemos, Demades, Epiteles, Nikeratos, Neoptolemus of Melite et al. Three of these men would become *proxenoi* at Delphi. See SIG³ 296; Humphreys 2004, 95; Csapo forthcoming, 13. Fontenrose H 57 for sources.
[57] Vidal Naquet 1981, 314; Rutherford 2013, 31; Scott 2014, 163-4. The column was positioned in front of a statue group dedicated by Daochus of Thessaly, an ally of Philip. See Jacquemin and La Roche 2001.
[58] Scott 2014, 160-65.
[59] See Eur. *Ion*; Pl. *Euthyd.* 302C; Phanodemos *FGrH* 328 F75.

Leocrates had left Athens either before the law restricting movement was passed or at least before it became treasonous to leave the city.[60]

Early explanations of the idiosyncratic rhetoric of this speech have seen Lycurgus as a religious zealot or, more helpfully, as struggling to make a case against a citizen who may not have done anything against the laws of Athens at the time.[61] These are contributing factors, but the ways in which Lycurgus constructs his arguments from poetry and mythology are worthy of investigation in their own right. Recent scholarship engaging with these previously problematic features of Lycurgus' rhetoric has shed light on the function of poetry and myth in *Against Leocrates*.[62] Danielle Allen has examined how poetry and civic imagery help Lycurgus develop a removed 'public prosecutor' persona in forensic oratory that usually relied on a more personal emotive strategy.[63] Bernd Steinbock has taken a similar approach to the stories of Codrus and Erechtheus in the speech, arguing that they personify key Athenian values around which Lycurgus builds his case.[64] Johanna Hanink, however, has seen Lycurgus' use of poetic examples as aimed beyond the case, defending and promoting the value of civic-minded poetry.[65]

The oracle stories that are the focus of this analysis develop from and add to aspects of each of these arguments. Lycurgus' use of the oracular voice strengthens his rhetorical position as the defender of Athenian values in his prosecution of Leocrates. This unprecedented and never emulated prosecution strategy is contingent on Lycurgus' role as at the forefront of a resurgence in Athenian involvement with Delphi. The stories emphasise the goodwill between Athens and Apollo and highlight the rigidity of the relationship between humans and divinity. This strict hierarchy, in Lycurgus' argument, compels the *dikastai* to

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[60] Martin 2009, 50.
[61] Petrie 1922, xxviii; Hansen 1975, 109; Bleicken 1986, 13 n. 16.
[62] Martin 2009, 50.
[63] Allen 2000.
[64] Steinbock 2011.
[65] Hanink 2014, 25-59.

prosecute Leocrates more pressingly than the laws of Athens themselves. Lycurgus, a man with close ties to Delphi, at a time when Athens is self-consciously expanding its relationship with the sanctuary, uses oracle stories that complement the city's identification with Apollo. These oracle stories are therefore promoting a public discourse rethinking, rather than reaffirming, Athenian *nomoi*.

Telling Tales

Lycurgus introduces the stories from myth and Athenian history as educational examples for the jurors:

> βούλομαι δὲ μικρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν ὑμῖν διελθεῖν, οἷς παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων βέλτιον βουλεύσεσθε
>
> I wish to remind you of a few short tales of old, consulting with which you will reach a better verdict concerning this case and others.[66]

This passage has led commentators to see Lycurgus' short tales (μικρά) as part of the orator's adoption of impersonal moral authority.[67] The stories, as we shall see, effectively contrast legendary Athenian bravery with Leocrates' cowardice. As Allen has convincingly shown, Lycurgus replaces the tone of personal outrage common in most Athenian prosecution speeches with an impersonal 'morality of the battlefield'.[68] Steinbock's argument that the audience would have been receptive to this code of morals on account of their participation of in the *ephebate* as youths has persuasively grounded Allen's focus on Lycurgus' rhetorical strategy.[69] While Allen is right to emphasise Lycurgus' unusual impersonal argumentative style, it should be noted that the orator's tone also aligns with his public persona as it is portrayed in other sources. The fact that no other orator appears to have

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[66] Lyc. *Leo*. 83.
[67] Martin 2009, 163-4; Allen 2000, 26-9; Steinbock 2011, 311-2.
[68] Allen 2000, 31.
[69] Steinbock 2011.

adopted a similar rhetorical strategy implies that Lycurgus' style was dependent on his standing in Athenian public life.[70]

Underlying the binary morality of Athenian bravery and 'unAthenian' cowardice are Lycurgus' constant reminders of the presence, omniscience and intervention of the gods.[71] Martin argues that there are two complementary sides to Lycurgus' argumentation: that Leocrates has betrayed you, men of Athens, and must be punished; and that Leocrates has violated the gods and will suffer their vengeance.[72] I put forward that the oracular narratives at the centre of Lycurgus' speech are crucial to the connection between these complementary arguments of human and divine betrayal.

Lycurgus' authority on religious matters has been well established from a wealth of epigraphic evidence and assorted fragments of his own oratory beyond *Against Leocrates*.[73] While the actions of Athenians in the oracle stories in the speech serve to contrast ancestral Athenian courage with Leocrates' cowardice, the role of Delphi in the narratives emphasises a consistent reciprocal relationship between the Athens and Apollo. Moreover, the presence of Delphi in tales from both the audience's lifetime and from their collective myths grounds the narratives from very different storytelling traditions more firmly in the present.

Lycurgus' oracle stories share fundamental structures and themes not only with each other, but also with the robust 'oracular discourse' recently explored by Julia Kindt.[74] The narratives presented in the wide range of sources examined by Kindt all centre on humanity's persistent attempts to understand divine omniscience. Lycurgus' stories in *Against Leocrates* are no different. The orator highlights the limits of mortal knowledge by telling his audience three tales in which humans attempt to comprehend the divine wisdom of Apollo.

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[70] Martin 2009, 164-5.
[71] Lyc. *Leo.*
[72] Martin 2009, 160.
[73] Regulation of various cult activities *IG* ii^2 333; sale of *dermatikon IG* ii^2 1496; regulation of Mysteries *IG* ii^2 1672; see Humphreys 2004, 83-8; Martin 2009, 154 n. 59; Lambert 2010, 230-1.
[74] Kindt 2016, 157-8.

Human Deception and Divine Justice

After Lycurgus establishes the narrative of Leocrates' alleged treason (when he left Athens, by what method, with whom and so on), the orator uses the *refutatio* to introduce another series of accusations.   In anticipation of a very unlikely argument defending Leocrates' flight from Athens by comparison with the flight to Salamis during the Persian invasion, Lycurgus reminds the judges of the ephebic oath.[75] A secondary point put forward by Lycurgus about the ephebic oath also acts as a preface for his oracular narratives:

> καὶ μήν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὑμᾶς δεῖ μαθεῖν, ὅτι τὸ συνέχον τὴν δημοκρατίαν ὅρκος ἐστί. … τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες καὶ διαλαθόντες οὐ μόνον τῶν παρόντων κινδύνων ἀπελύθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἀθῷοι τῶν ἀδικημάτων τούτων εἰσί: τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιορκήσας τις λάθοι οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐκφύγοι τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν.

> There is a further point which you should notice, gentlemen. The power which keeps our democracy together is the oath…For human beings have often been deceived. Many criminals evade them, escaping the dangers of the moment, yes, and even remaining unpunished for these crimes for the remainder of their lives. But the gods no one who broke his oath would deceive. No one would escape their vengeance.[76]

Lycurgus follows these statements with the oath sworn by the allies at Plataea, as part of the explicit contrast between legendary Athenian acts of bravery and those of Leocrates. However, the ruminations above also serve as an introduction to the theme of human knowledge and misunderstanding that underpins the oracular narratives. Lycurgus stresses the ease and frequency of humans being deceived (πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες) and the trust humans must have in divine justice to overcome their limitations. Lycurgus' version of the Codrus myth continues to highlight humanity's imperfect knowledge and susceptibility to deception:

> καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀποστείλαντες τὸν θεὸν ἐπηρώτων εἰ λήψονται τὰς Ἀθήνας: ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὴν πόλιν αἱρήσουσιν ἂν μὴ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίων Κόδρον ἀποκτείνωσιν, ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας… Κλεόμαντις δὲ τῶν Δελφῶν τις πυθόμενος τὸ χρηστήριον δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων ἐξήγγειλε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις…λαβόντα πτωχικὴν

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[75] Lyc. *Leo.* 74-78. See Steinbock 2011 for detailed discussion of the oath.
[76] Lyc. *Leo.* 79.

στολὴν ὅπως ἂν ἀπατήσῃ τοὺς πολεμίους, κατὰ τὰς πύλας ὑποδύντα...παροξυνθέντα τῷ Κόδρῳ καὶ νομίσαντα πτωχὸν εἶναι, σπασάμενον τὸ ξίφος ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Κόδρον.

First, [the invading Peloponnesians] sent to Delphi and asked of the god whether they would capture Athens. When the god replied that they would take the city as long as they did not kill the King of Athens, Codrus, they marched against Athens… A certain Cleomantis of Delphi, having learned of the oracle told the Athenians, although it was a secret… [Codrus] took up a beggar's cloak so that he could deceive the enemy and slipped out of the gates… provoked by Codrus and thinking him to be a beggar, [the scout] drew his sword and killed Codrus.[77]

Perhaps the most notable way in which Lycurgus encourages the judges to reflect on their ability to know is by inverting the tradition of oracular ambiguity. The obscurity of Apollo's wisdom, prominent in oracular tales from elsewhere in the Greek canon, forces reflection on the part of a successful enquirer or highlights the folly of those who confidently misinterpret prophecies.[78]

In contrast, Lycurgus presents consultation at Delphi in a very streamlined way, detracting the audience's attention from the process of enquiry and prophecy. It is the god who is asked and the god who responds, without mention of the Pythia (εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀποστείλαντες τὸν θεόν...ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ). Lycurgus' later oracle stories all place the same emphasis on Apollo, or 'the god', delivering the prophecies directly.[79] While this is one of the conventional ways of describing the process of consulting the oracle from Delphi, Lycurgus' language minimises the surrounding 'noise' of the mantic session.[80] This is a slight deviation from the 'almost invariable plot structure' of oracular narratives perpetuated through oral transmission in the Greek world.[81] Without the characteristic hexameters of the

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[77] Lyc. *Leo*. 84-87 = PW 215 = F. L49. For briefer fifth and fourth century references to Codrus that do not feature oracles see: Pl. *Symp*. 208 D; *FGrH* 3 fr.154 (Pherecydes).
[78] Fontenrose 1978, 236-8; Maurizio 1997, 311; Bowden 2005, 49; Kindt 2016, 157-8.
[79] Lyc. *Leo*. 84-6; Lyc. *Leo*. 93 καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀκούσαντα ὅτι ἂν ἔλθῃ Ἀθήναζε τεύξεται τῶν νόμων; Lyc. *Leo*. 99 εἰς Δελφοὺς ἰὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεὸν τί ποιῶν ἂν νίκην λάβοι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων.
[80] This is consistent with the only earlier account of the Codrus myth, that of Hellanicus of Lesbos (ἐχρήσεν ὁ θεὸς τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν...) *FGrH* 4 fr.125. There are a range of common phrases introducing Delphic prophecies: from the impersonal 'oracle declared/ordained' to the more direct phrases 'the Pythia/ the god replied'. See Fontenrose 1978, 11-57.
[81] Maurizio 1997, 311.

Pythia or the obscurity of Apollo's wisdom, Lycurgus' tale focuses on the interaction between human players, rather than on human interaction with divinity.

The oracle given to the Peloponnesians does not require interpretation or reflection. Although the story plays on the limitations of human knowledge, it does not explore this theme through the obscurity of Delphic language. Rather, the Peloponnesians are actively deceived by Codrus with some help from a Delphian man, Cleomantis.[82] Codrus leaves Athens in order to deceive the enemy (ὅπως ἂν ἀπατήσῃ) after Cleomantis learns of the oracle despite it being secret (πυθόμενος τὸ χρηστήριον δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων). The actions of both of the characters defending Athens in the story rely on deception. Nevertheless, human understanding of the prophecy remains constant between the invading Peloponnesians, the besieged Athenians and the Delphian. In contrast to one of the popular strands of oracular discourse, humans are being deceived by each other, rather than by an ambiguous prophecy.

As we saw above, Lycurgus has already warned the audience that humans have often been deceived (πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες). The role of the oracle in this message is the inverse of its role in most other examples of oracle stories in the Greek tradition. It is Athens' close relationship with Delphi that provides noble Codrus with an opportunity to save the city, rather than a forced appreciation of the nuances of divine language.[83]

Lycurgus offers further support for the mutual respect between Athens and Delphi in the time of Codrus by introducing some very contemporary honorific language to the mythical narrative:

> τῷ δὲ Κλεομάντει τῷ Δελφῷ ἡ πόλις αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἐκγόνοις ἐν πρυτανείῳ ἀίδιον σίτησιν ἔδοσαν.

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[82] Cleomantis, meaning 'seer of glory', is an attested Delphian name outside of this story, but may also have developed in the Codrus myth in a similar way to other narratives featuring similar 'nominative determinism' e.g. Euenius in Hdt. 9.93-105; Aethra in Paus. 10.10.6. On which, see Griffith 1999 and Dougherty 1992, 39-40.
[83] See Kindt 2016, 42-52 for Herodotus' use of the oracular voice to support the structure of his history.

> To Cleomantis of Delphi, the city granted eternal *sitēsis* for himself and his descendants in the prytaneion.[84]

Lycurgus here adopts the standard formula for the granting of dining rights (*sitēsis*) in the fourth century to describe Athens' honouring of Cleomantis in the distant past.[85] Granting *sitēsis* was, however, very uncommon in Athens until the early third century.[86] Lycurgus' use of Athenian myth and history in this speech has been frequently noted, but the reference to *sitēsis* here is quite the opposite. Lycurgus is introducing a contemporary honorific practice, a practice with which he was associated, into the mythical past.[87] While the Codrus tale is a part of Athens' shared past, Lycurgus' retelling places unprecedented emphasis on the relationship between Athens and Delphi. Lycurgus not only highlights the favourable prophecy from Apollo, but also a reciprocal relationship between citizens of Delphi and Athens in the age of heroes. His use of a contemporary honorific formula stresses the continuity of this ancient relationship to the present day.

Sign Language

After summarising the contrast between Leocrates' cowardice and Codrus' bravery, Lycurgus returns to the theme of human ignorance. The prosecutor presents some unidentified poetry and another oracular narrative to refute an argument that Leocrates' defence might put forward: that Leocrates would not have returned to Athens if he were guilty.[88] The orator explains that the reasoning of men who have betrayed their city and their gods is taken away from them:

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[84] Lyc. *Leo.* 87.
[85] See *IG* II² 77 with Osborne 1981; Henry 1983, 275-279; MacDowell 2007.
[86] Osborne 1981, 170; Humphreys 2004, 109-10; MacDowell 2007, 111. Osborne argues for three grants of hereditary *sitēsis* before the honour becomes more common in the third century, MacDowell for four.
[87] For Lycurgus' role in grants of *sitēsis* see Humphreys 2004, 109-110; MacDowell 2007, 111 cf. *IG* I³ 131.
[88] Lyc. *Leo.* 90.

οἱ γὰρ θεοὶ οὐδὲν πρότερον ποιοῦσιν ἢ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν διάνοιαν παράγουσι· καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς ποιητῶν ὥσπερ χρησμοὺς γράψαντες τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις τάδε τὰ ἰαμβεῖα καταλιπεῖν·
"ὅταν γὰρ ὀργὴ δαιμόνων βλάπτῃ τινά,
τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ πρῶτον, ἐξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν
τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν, εἰς δὲ τὴν χείρω τρέπει
γνώμην, ἵν᾽ εἰδῇ μηδὲν ὧν ἁμαρτάνει.

For the first step taken by the gods in the case of wicked men is to unhinge their reason; and personally, I value as the utterance of an oracle these lines, composed by ancient poets and handed down to posterity:
"When gods in anger seek a mortal's harm,
first they deprive him of his sanity,
And fashion of his mind a baser instrument,
That he may have no knowledge when he errs."[89]

Again, Lycurgus highlights the frailty of human comprehension of their world. Reason (τὴν διάνοιαν and τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν) is not a constant of human cognition, but rather an unstable feature of human decision-making subject to divine influence. Lycurgus is encouraging the audience to interpret the misguided actions of Callistratus in the following tale, and by implication those of the defendant, as being a result of a poorly maintained relationship with their homeland (πατρία) and its gods. Had these men been more diligent in their observance of their gods, they might have been presented with less ambiguous signs (σημεῖα).[90] Lycurgus introduces oracular discourse to develop a view of the world in which human comprehension is disconcertingly fallible.

Lycurgus then explores the limitations of human knowledge with a recent example of oracular interpretation:

τίς γὰρ οὐ μέμνηται τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἢ τῶν νεωτέρων οὐκ ἀκήκοε Καλλίστρατον, οὗ θάνατον ἡ πόλις κατέγνω, τοῦτον φυγόντα καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀκούσαντα ὅτι ἂν ἔλθῃ Ἀθήναζε τεύξεται τῶν νόμων, ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν καταφυγόντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποθανόντα; δικαίως· τὸ γὰρ τῶν νόμων τοῖς ἠδικηκόσι τυχεῖν τιμωρία ἐστίν.

Who does not know the fate of Callistratus, which the older among you remember and the younger have heard recounted, the man condemned to death by the city? How he fled and later, hearing from the god at Delphi that if he returned to Athens he would have fair treatment by the laws, came back and taking refuge at the altar of the twelve gods and was

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[89] Lyc. *Leo.* 92
[90] Lyc. *Leo.* 93 cf. Heraclitus fr. 93. On the idea of divinity 'speaking through signs' (σεμαινεῖν) see Tor 2016.

none the less put to death by the state, and rightly so, for "fair treatment by the laws" is, in the case of wrongdoers, punishment.[91]

Lycurgus here explains the death of Callistratus, a few decades before this speech was delivered in 330, in a narrative featuring the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication that would have been very familiar to his audience.[92] Unlike the tale of Codrus above, the Callistratus story hinges upon the interpretation of cryptic advice from the god at Delphi. Kindt has argued that the enigmatic oracle story is one in which the narrative serves to define features of human experience in opposition to the gods.[93] The example Lycurgus presents as part of his *refutatio* works very much within this framework.

Callistratus, in exile for betraying Athens, believes that Apollo's words are confirming his desired return to the city. The oracle is, of course, merely observing that he will meet his punishment (already) laid out in the laws.[94] Thus, Delphi is simultaneously upholding Athens' *nomoi* and expediting their fulfilment by presenting the treacherous Callistratus with abstruse *sēmia*:

> ὁ δέ γε θεὸς ὀρθῶς ἀπέδωκε τοῖς ἠδικημένοις κολάσαι τὸν αἴτιον: δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ταὐτὰ σημεῖα τοῖς εὐσεβέσι καὶ τοῖς κακούργοις φαίνοιτο.

> And thus, the god too acted rightly in allowing those who had been wronged to punish the offender. For it would be an unseemly thing if revelations made to good men were the same as those vouchsafed to malefactors.[95]

Lycurgus' authorial aside on Callistratus' misfortune develops ideas explored in the Codrus story. Athenians benefitted from their relationship with Delphi in both tales of

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[91] Lyc. *Leo*. 93 = Fontenrose H18; PW 259 c. 356 BC.
[92] Kindt 2016, 26-27; 159-164.
[93] Kindt 2008; 2016, 160-2. Kindt argues that these narratives have three levels on which to explore the human condition: the ontological difference between omniscient gods and fallible mortals; the temporal difference between the unchanged divine perspective and the changed mortal perspective on events as the oracle moves from prediction to fulfilment; and the cognitive mode by which humans move from ignorance to knowledge.
[94] It is worth noting that both Parke and Fontenrose argue that this is an 'unambiguous' oracle onto which a double meaning was later projected: Parke and Wormell 1956b, 105; Fontenrose 1978, 250.
[95] Lyc. *Leo*. 93.

oracular knowledge, but only here does Lycurgus explicitly state that this reflects Athens' *eusebia*.

The purpose of these oracular narratives, quite apart from possibly representing Lycurgus' own perspective on human interaction with the divine, is to offer the audience a persuasive interpretation of the actions on which they were deliberating. On the one hand, Lycurgus uses an oracular narrative to understand past events: Callistratus returned to Athens because traitors are deprived of their ability to comprehend divine signals. On the other, explaining the event in this way projects the familiar narrative framework of the oracle story onto the case of Leocrates. The audience's familiarity with the structure and themes of the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication also complements Lycurgus' broader argument for this section of the speech as whole.

Human understanding, in the stories of both Codrus and Callistratus, is dependent on their maintenance of reciprocal goodwill with the gods. Athenian nobility, according to Lycurgus, prompts Cleomantis to help Codrus deceive the Peloponnesians and fulfil one of the prophecy's potential outcomes. In this instance, the relationship between Athens and Delphi resolves an Athenian crisis by helping exploit human susceptibility to deception. In the case of Callistratus, Lycurgus again depicts the enemies of Athens falling victim to Delphic pitfalls. Callistratus, as one of the *kakourgoi*, has misunderstood divine signals from Delphi due to his transgression against Athens and her temples.[96]

These oracle stories, despite key differences in structure, develop the same argument for Athens' trust in the processes of advice from the sanctuary. The consistency of Delphi's alignment with Athenian interests in both early myth and the present day supports the immediate relevance of Lycurgus' framework of human-divine interaction.

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[96] Lyc. *Leo*. 93.

Exemplary Erechtheus

Lycurgus' use of poetry in his prosecution of Leocrates has often been the focus of scholarship on the speech. Foremost amongst the poetic examples is the extended quotation of Euripides' *Erechtheus*.[97] Here I wish to focus on the continuity of Lycurgus' oracular storytelling from earlier in the speech with the excerpt of Euripides he reperfoms. This final oracular narrative builds on the stable relationship between Athens and Delphi established in the previous stories:

> εἰς Δελφοὺς ἰὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεὸν τί ποιῶν ἂν νίκην λάβοι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων. χρήσαντος δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συμβαλεῖν τὼ στρατοπέδω, κρατήσειν τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενος τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξε, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστρατευομέ νους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐξέβαλε.

> [Erechtheus] went to Delphi and asked the god by what means he could assure a victory over the enemy. The god's answer to him was that if he sacrificed his daughter before the two sides engaged he would defeat the enemy and, submitting to the god, he did this and drove the invaders from the country.[98]

The passage above is perhaps the briefest possible oracle story that could be told. Once again, the consultation and response of the god is streamlined. Rather than mentioning the intermediary Pythia, it is the god who responds to Erechtheus' enquiry and the king brings the prophecy to completion without any complicating events. Indeed, Lycurgus' two-word resolution of the play's dilemma (τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξε) entirely avoids the moral conundrum on which Euripides' tragedy certainly focused.[99] Lycurgus thanks Euripides for 'believing that in the conduct of those people [i.e. Erechtheus and Praxithea] citizens would have a fine example … and so implant in their hearts a love for their country'[100]. This quote immediately follows Lycurgus' quick synopsis of the story, in which the only event described in detail is visiting and obeying Delphi. While three clauses are devoted to describing Erechtheus' consultation of Apollo, only two words are given to the king's sacrifice of his own daughter.

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[97] Wilson 1996; Bowden 2005, 55; Hanink 2014; Calame 2011.
[98] Lyc. *Leo*. 99.
[99] Wilson 1996, 314.
[100] Lyc. *Leo*. 100.

In Lycurgus' lengthy reperformance of Praxithea's speech, Erechtheus' unenviable decision is similarly superseded by his wife's patriotic pseudo-*epitaphios*.[101] Moreover, the story (τὸν μῦθον) that Lycurgus praises as an example (τὰ παράδειμα) before presenting Praxithea's speech is based far more on Erechtheus' cognitive response to crisis than on his deeply problematic sacrifice. As Peter Wilson has outlined, part of Lycurgus' emphasis here must be attributed to the tricky process of co-opting a play devoted to a moral dilemma between familial and patriotic responsibility as an unproblematic patriotic text.[102] Highlighting Erechtheus' attentiveness and deference to Apollo in the tale appears to be another way of developing tragedy into what Johanna Hanink has called 'civic poetry' demonstrating Athenian excellence, rather than a genre exploring challenging human situations.[103]

The similarities between Lycurgus' inclusion of Delphi in this short synopsis and the previous two oracle stories demonstrates the role of the oracular voice in Lycurgus' speech and in fourth century Athens. The audience are compelled to acknowledge Erechtheus' and Praxithea's actions protecting Athens as examples of fine civic behaviour, but Lycurgus also makes a point to praise their decision-making process. By framing their actions as deference to divine authority, Lycurgus not only avoids the problematic aspects of the myth, but also continues to develop previous arguments for the frailty of human reasoning in the popular Erechtheus story.[104]

This oracular perspective complements Lycurgus' use of *ta palaia* in his prosecution of Leocrates. The three oracle stories show the tradition and importance of Athens' goodwill with Delphi. Leocrates' betrayal of Athens was not only cowardly, but has also placed him outside of the religious life of the polis. The existential (between human and divine) and

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[101] Wilson 1996, 313; Hanink 2014, 37-38.
[102] Wilson 1996, 312-14
[103] Hanink 2014, 25; 32-4.
[104] For the popularity of retellings of the Erechtheus myth in Athenian public discourse see Loraux 1986, 393; Thomas 1989, 207-218; Calame 2011, 8; Steinbock 2012, 50-8; Hanink 2014, 32-35.

cognitive (between human and crisis) themes of oracular discourse promote the interpretation of Leocrates' alleged treason according to broader community morality rather than specific Athenian laws.

Mythed Opportunity

Lycurgus' use of oracles in Against Leocrates is crucial to the development of one aspect of his prosecution. For twenty sections of the speech, the orator focuses on the frailty of human reasoning in times of crisis. The three oracular narratives that comprise this line of argument have different outcomes and come from disparate story-telling traditions: heroic myths, recent memory and a mix of both in Euripidean tragedy. Nevertheless, the role of Delphi and its oracle in the stories is consistent. The oracle provides divine advice that can assist human decision-making. Lycurgus stresses that benefiting from Apollo's responses requires strict adherence to ritual processes and a recognition of the inherent division between divine and mortal. For the Athenian kings, Codrus and Erechtheus, this involved complete submission to divine suggestion despite harm to them or their family. The treacherous Callistratus demonstrated the fatal consequences of confidently interpreting divine advice in a way favouring the individual over Athens and its *nomoi*. Lycurgus' use of the oracular voice to establish this absolutism conflates tales of Athenian bravery with the everyday observance of collective rituals.

My argument is in accordance with previous assessment of the role of oracles in Athenian oratory. In each example, the orator uses advice from Delphi in the narratives as 'a source of authority, parallel with the nomoi of the city of Athens.'[105] However, Lycurgus constructs this argument from *ta palaia* as part of his challenge for the jurors to become

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[105] Bowden 2005, 55. Italics in original.

nomothetai themselves.[106] While the role of Delphi in the stories might be to offer support to pious kings, the collection of oracle stories as a whole is urging the audience to go beyond Athenian *nomoi* in prosecuting Leocrates. Moreover, the constant role of oracles in the narratives allows Lycurgus to link the moral absolutes of patriotic tales with religious practices and ritual logic of the present day.

It has been argued elsewhere that Lycurgus' frequent citations of poetic examples reflect his ideals and agenda outside the courtroom.[107] I suggest here that there is a similar connection between Lycurgus' series of oracle stories and the increase in Athenian involvement with Delphi in the preceding decades. An increase in the amount of Apollo-Ion genealogies and the construction of the temple to Apollo Patroos in the 330s show greater prominence for Apollo in Athenian religious life. Lycurgus was at the forefront of these religious changes: forming councils for advice on change, honouring those who dedicated to Apollo, introducing legislation and leading *theōria*.[108]

There is strong evidence of this focus on Delphi in the speech *Against Leocrates*. The orator uses the form and themes of oracle stories to link the moral absolutes of myth to contemporary politics. Lycurgus also uses present day honorific language to emphasise the closeness of Athens and Delphi in the era of Codrus. This process works in the opposite direction as well, as Lycurgus uses the increasingly positive sentiment toward Apollo in his time to mitigate the potentially problematic morality of the Callistratus and Erechtheus stories as unequivocally patriotic.

The emergence of oracular narratives in Athenian public speeches during the 330s reflects an increase in the importance of Delphi in Athenian public life.   The oracles

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[106] Lyc. *Leo*. 9 διὸ καὶ μάλιστ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες, δεῖ ὑμᾶς γενέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοῦ νῦν ἀδικήματος δικαστάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομοθέτας. See Hanink 2014, 30 n. 24; Humphreys 2004, 201-4.

[107] A Platonic ideal of how poetry should function in the polis: Allen 2000, 30-31; Lycurgus' appropriation of tragedy as a patriotically Athenian form: Hanink 2014, 40-43.

[108] For Ion genealogy see Phanodemos *FGrH* 328 F75. On the relationship between Phanodemos and Lycurgus see Humphreys 2004 82-100 with notes. Apollo Patroos: *IG* ii² 333; Plut. *Mor*. 843.

presented in the speech *Against Leocrates* work toward Lycurgus' aims in a specific section of argumentation, in the *eisangelia* procedure and in his political objectives for the *polis*. The oracle stories in the speech, as they do in other sources, highlight the risks of being overly confident in human decision making. By presenting two positive examples and one negative, Lycurgus highlights the traditional value of trusting the god at Delphi. The orator's use of the oracular voice also encourages the jurors to view the case from a patriotic and morally absolute perspective, rather than simply following their *nomoi* as they find them. Finally, Lycurgus' personal connection with the Delphi through regulatory and honorific activity heightens the impact of his oracular argumentation.

Chapter Two:

Turn That Crown Upside Down: Oracular Arguments in Aeschines' *Against*

Ctesiphon **and Demosthenes'** *On the Crown***.**

> The failure of local, state, and federal governments to respond more effectively to Katrina — which had been predicted in theory for many years, and forecast with startling accuracy for five days — demonstrates that … we are still not fully prepared.[109]

> ἀλλ᾿ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήμαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, μόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς προσκτησάμενοι;

> But did not the gods forewarn, did they not indicate to us to be on our guard, all but adopting human voice?[110]

Response to crisis always involves an assessment of the processes and preparations that were in place before the event. For both the House of Representatives Select Committee and Aeschines in the excerpts above, assessments determined that the state's response to a crisis was unacceptable given the extent to which events were either 'forecast' or 'forespoken' (προύλεγον). The striking difference between these brief excerpts is the state's method of minimising uncertainty toward the future — meteorological reports and oracles — rather than the conclusions that have been drawn. The conclusions of the House Select Committee match the prevailing attitudes of America in 2006, that the poor response to Hurricane Katrina by the United States Government was a result of inefficient management of response resources rather than inadequate warning about the storm. Aeschines

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[109] "A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina" February 15, 2006, 1.
[110] Aeschin. 3.130. The comparison with the language of contemporary political committees is inspired by Eidinow 2011, 143-4.

concluded that Demosthenes had mismanaged and misled Athens, considering that the people had been warned so clearly about the future by Apollo.

We saw in the previous chapter that Lycurgus used oracular discourse to link and develop different angles of his prosecution. The orator and his audience had a shared understanding of the features, shape and meaning of oracle stories. The persuasive function of these tales involving oracles, then, is separate to the most common question in the modern scholarship, concerning the 'authenticity' of responses from Delphi. Regardless of whether Pythia ever spoke the words that were read to the court, Lycurgus could use the oracular tradition to develop complex arguments. However, Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates* has interested commentators from both modern and ancient times due to its idiosyncratic style of language and argumentation. It is the task of this chapter to determine whether the persuasive function of the oracle stories in *Against Leocrates* can be found in the speeches of other orators.

We do not need to travel far in time to find other uses of oracular argumentation in Athenian oratory. A few months after Lycurgus brought his prosecution against Leocrates, another case came before the Athenian courts in which both parties used oracles, this time from both Delphi and Dodona, in their arguments. This concentration of oracles in Athenian trials is rare, but the significance of these examples lies as much in their opposition as their closeness in time. The expectations and values of the audience of Athenian jurors can be assumed to be constant between the suits against Leocrates and Ctesiphon, yet the three speeches we have offer very distinct uses of the oracular voice. Further, the opposing speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes use different oracular responses from different sanctuaries in competing

interpretations of the same key religious concept: *tuchē*.[111] The orators use this religious discourse to debate responsibility for the failure of Athenian resistance to Macedon. Analysis of this case will show that Lycurgus' depiction of Delphi as a constant ally of Athens was not the only way of using the oracular voice in fourth century rhetoric. Aeschines carefully appropriates and inverts traditions of oracular storytelling to attack Demosthenes. Moreover, Demosthenes could avoid these attacks by turning to another avenue of oracular authority to develop a competing explanation of the relationship between humans and divine insight.

Send in the Crowns

From the Peace of Philocrates in 446 to the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 and beyond, Demosthenes was the most prominent advocate for absolute opposition to the expansion of Philip the Second. One of his colleagues on the peace envoys of 446, Aeschines, became one of the many politicians advocating attempts to curtail Macedonian expansion through diplomatic means.[112] The two orators were frequently and famously in opposition with each other, and the case concerning Ctesiphon's proposal to present a crown to Demosthenes at the Dionysia for his services to the Athens is very much the culmination of their rivalry. Aeschines brought the suit against Ctesiphon for improperly proposing honours for Demosthenes in 336, but the case did not reach trial until the autumn of 330. The speech *Against Ctesiphon* is therefore the final expression of nearly two decades of enmity between not only Aeschines and Demosthenes but also their respective approaches to the expansion of Philip.

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[111] On *tuchē* in these speeches, see Eidinow 2011, 144-150.
[112] Cawkwell 1969.

Aeschines prosecuted Ctesiphon on the grounds that his proposal to crown Demosthenes was *paranomon* (against law and custom). According to Aeschines, Ctesiphon's motion was improper for three reasons: that a city official could not be honoured at the Theatre of Dionysus; that a magistrate could not be presented with a crown without being subject to an audit; and finally, that there was no basis for the honours, because Demosthenes had never been in the practice of 'continually advising and doing the best things for the people'.[113]

Prosecuting Ctesiphon gave Aeschines a chance to present his damning interpretation of Demosthenes' entire public career. The contrast between Aeschines' account and Demosthenes ensuing defence speech, *On the Crown*, makes an accurate reconstruction of the events of the fourth-century difficult.[114] While the speeches offer distinct challenges to the political historian, the contrasting ways in which Aeschines and Demosthenes develop their arguments and interpretations of events for their Athenian peers can be very informative.[115] Steinbock in particular has used an earlier pair of speeches, those concerning the embassy of 446, to question the prevailing view of how modern scholars ought to approach orators' competing versions of historical events.[116] Rather than expecting the jurors to already have a clear and accurate understanding of Athenian history that politicians could manipulate for their own ends, Steinbock argues that there were multiple competing public

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[113]Aeschin. 3.50. δεῖ γὰρ δή που τὸν μὲν κατηγοροῦντα ἐμὲ τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ὡς εἰσὶν οἱ κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔπαινοι ψευδεῖς, καὶ ὡς οὔτ᾽ ἤρξατο 'λέγειν τὰ βέλτιστα,' οὔτε νῦν 'διατελεῖ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ δήμῳ.'

[114] See Cawkwell 1969 for the most comprehensive treatment of the fourth-century sources. See also Carey 2000, 114-5; Rhodes 2010, 348-9.

[115] On insults and oral imagery see Worman 2004; religion: Martin 2009, 85-117 and 168-182; *tuchē* in particular: Eidinow 2011, 144-150; historical allusions: Hobden 2007; social memory: Steinbock 2013.

[116] Steinbock 2013, 72-3 cf. Ober 1989, 44. *contra* Perlman 1961; Nouhaud 1982; Harding 1987; Worthington 1992, 2000 and 1994; Milns 1995; Paulsen 1999.

recollections in the ancient *polis*.[117] Thus, by 330, the Athenian public had a remarkably broad range of possible narratives and explanations of events that occurred sixteen years earlier.[118]

How, then, did speechmakers construct a persuasive sequence of events for their audience? We saw Lycurgus use oracular narratives to develop the themes of his prosecution in *Against Leocrates* and to organise events from both Athenian myth and living memory.[119] Aeschines' use of oracular language similarly links his arguments against Demosthenes with a range of events from Athenian collective memory.

Whatever the reasons for the six-year delay between Ctesiphon's alleged offence and the case coming to trial, Aeschines had a strong position from which to attack Demosthenes.[120] Demosthenes' policies for Athens had failed, both in the lead up to the disaster at Chaeronea in 338 and during the brief resistance to Macedon after the death of Philip in 336.[121] Aeschines covers this crucial period of Demosthenes' public career in the second half of the speech *Against Ctesiphon*. During the first half of the speech, after he has introduced the case and his main arguments, Aeschines seeks to establish that Demosthenes has been consistently impious towards the gods.[122] He continues this theme as his argumentation shifts more openly to religious matters:

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[117] Steinbock 2013, 89-91. Steinbock points to two common misconceptions in Athens: that Xerxes offered peace terms before Salamis rather than after (cit. in Lys. 2.33; Isoc. 4.94-6; Dem. 6.11; 18.202-4; Lyc. *Leo.* 71.) and the dating of Spartan occupation of Dekeleia before the Sicilian expedition (cf. Isoc. 8.84). See also Thomas 1989 and 1992.

[118] See Hobden 2007, 501 for the role of adversarial litigation in this vast pool of potential historical realities.

[119] Lyc. *Leo.* 84-7, 93.

[120] Eidinow 2011, 144-5; Adams 1988, 305; Yunis 2000, 13; *contra* Richardson 1889, 23.

[121] See Cawkwell 1969, 175-7 cf. Aeschin. 3.156, 173, 209, 250-9.

[122] Aeschin. 3.64-135. See Martin 2009, 168-171; Eidinow 2011, 147-8.

ἐνταῦθ᾿ ἤδη τέτακται καὶ ὁ τρίτος τῶν καιρῶν, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ὁ πάντων πικρότατος χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ Δημοσθένης ἀπώλεσε τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῆς πόλεως πράξεις, ἀσεβήσας μὲν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς.

I come now to the third, or rather the most bitter period [of Demosthenes' career], in which Demosthenes ruined the affairs of the Greeks and of our city by being impious toward the sanctuary at Delphi.[123]

Aeschines refers to two oracles from the distant past — the First Sacred War in the sixth century — and then raises a response from Delphi that Demosthenes allegedly ignored.[124] The discrepancies between the accounts of Aeschines and Demosthenes in these speeches complicate any analysis of the historicity or authenticity of these pronouncements from Delphi. For example, Parke and Wormell consider the oracles, although the second has not been transmitted with the text of the speech, as accurate to records Aeschines had available in court.[125] In contrast, Fontenrose concludes that neither of the oracles are genuine, and that the first was 'obviously invented' after the fact.[126] I seek to show that Aeschines is able to use the Delphic oracles and the narratives surrounding them, regardless of their historicity, to highlight his own role in events and to exacerbate the accusations of Demosthenes' impiety and contagious misfortune.

Solon and good luck

Before describing Demosthenes' offences against the gods, Aeschines reminds the jurors of a tale from the First Sacred War.[127] The orator seeks to demonstrate the

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[123] Aeschin. 3.106.
[124] Aeschin. 3.109; 3.112 and 3.130-1.
[125] Parke and Wormell 1956, 8-9.
[126] Fontenrose 1979, 291-2.
[127] The history of the First Sacred War remains very unclear. The existence of the war itself has been questioned in Robertson 1978. See Scott 2014, 71-4 for a detailed summary of the debate.

venerable and pious relationship between Athens, Delphi and the Amphictyony from the time of Solon.[128]

> ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς τοὺς πλημμελημάτων λέγειν… [οἱ Κιρραῖοι καὶ Κραγαλίδαι] εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα ἠσέβουν, ἐξημάρτανον δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας. ἀγανακτήσαντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις μάλιστα μέν, ὡς λέγονται, οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ ὑμέτεροι, ἔπειτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀμφικτύονες, μαντείαν ἐμαντεύσαντο παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, τίνι χρὴ τιμωρίᾳ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους μετελθεῖν.

> I will begin to speak from the offences [of Demosthenes] against the gods… [the Kirraeans and the Kragalidae] repeatedly committed sacrilege against the shrine at Delphi and the votive offerings there, and transgressed against the Amphictyons also. This conduct exasperated all the Amphictyons, and your ancestors most of all, it is said, and they sought at the shrine of the god an oracle to tell them with what penalty they should visit these men.[129]

Moreover, he stresses that the contested plain and harbour are known as consecrated and accursed (ὁ νῦν ἐξάγιστος καὶ ἐπάρατος ὠνομασμένος).[130] Martin has argued that Aeschines' repetition of this phrase foreshadows his later point that money accepted by Demosthenes was also ἐξάγιστον and ἐπάρατον.[131] Phrases such as these form the basis of Aeschines' argument for the Demosthenes, but do not appear to have great authority or impact in their own right.[132] Rather, Aeschines establishes the significance of his charges against Demosthenes during his explanation of early Delphic history. The voice of the Pythia and the actions of Solon in Aeschines' narrative develop the religious significance of Demosthenes' (alleged) actions in the 440s. Aeschines' history of the Sacred War gives prominence to the process of consulting the Pythia and adhering to her responses:

> καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναιρεῖ ἡ Πυθία πολεμεῖν Κιρραίοις καὶ Κραγαλίδαις πάντ᾽ ἤματα καὶ πάσας νύκτας, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐκπορθήσαντας καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισαμένους

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[128] Other sources present very different accounts, especially concerning the leader of the Amphictyonic effort against Kirra: Plut. *Sol.* 9 gives Alcmeon; Paus. 10.37.6 gives Cleisthenes of Sicyon.

[129] Aeschin. 3.107.

[130] Aeschin. 3.107. See Martin 2009, 169.

[131] Martin 2009, 169; Aeschin. 3.114.

[132] Martin 2009, 169 n. 113. Martin argues that this phrase is not a standard feature of inscriptions or religious language. Aeschines elsewhere uses more common and emotive ritual language. See Aeschin. 3.135 quoting Hes. *Op.* 240 'ὅς κεν ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα' with Martin 2009, 168 n. 112.

ἀναθεῖναι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Πυθίῳ καὶ τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι καὶ τῇ Λητοῖ καὶ Ἀθηνᾷ Προναίᾳ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ἀεργίᾳ, καὶ ταύτην τὴν χώραν μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μήτ' ἄλλον ἐᾶν.

λαβόντες δὲ τὸν χρησμὸν τοῦτον οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες ἐψηφίσαντο Σόλωνος εἰπόντος Ἀθηναίου τὴν γνώμην, ἀνδρὸς καὶ νομοθετῆσαι δυνατοῦ καὶ περὶ ποίησιν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν διατετριφότος, ἐπιστρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναγεῖς κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν τοῦ θεοῦ.

The Pythia replied that they must fight against the Kirraeans and the Kragalidae day and night, bitterly ravage their country, enslave the inhabitants, and dedicate the land to the Pythian Apollo and Artemis and Leto and Athena Pronaea, that for the future it lie entirely uncultivated; that they must not till this land themselves nor permit another.

Now when they had received this oracle, the Amphictyons voted, on motion of Solon of Athens, a man able as a law-giver and versed in poetry and philosophy, to march against the accursed men according to the oracle of the god.[133]

In contrast to the oracular narratives presented by Lycurgus in *Against Leocrates*, Aeschines here draws out the process of consulting Apollo at Delphi.[134] The crisis leading to the involvement of the oracle is described in detail and Aeschines gives a lengthy paraphrase of the Pythia's response.[135] While the role of Solon in any sixth century conflict over Delphi has been rightly questioned due to a lack of direct evidence, his role in Aeschines' narrative shows the orator emphasising the connection between Athenian and Delphic interests.[136] The orator establishes not only the dedication of the land to the gods of Delphi, but also that the sanctuary's early survival was dependant on a key figure in the development of Athens. Aeschines highlights Solon's varied abilities (ἀνδρὸς καὶ νομοθετῆσαι δυνατοῦ καὶ περὶ ποίησιν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν διατετριφότος), a description that reflects Solon's ever-growing reputation in the fourth century.[137] Without taking up the 'fool's task' of determining the authenticity of Solonian laws, it can still be seen that Solon was

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[133] Aeschin. 3.108 = PW 17 = F. Q70.
[134] See esp. Lyc. *Leo.* 99 with chapter one above.
[135] See Parke and Wormell 1956b, 8 for a potential reconstruction of an original hexameter response.
[136] For source issues of the Solonian era see Osborne 2009, 203-11. Solon is a clear leader in the conflict in the account of Aeschines but features as part of a coalition in later accounts: Paus. 10.37.5; Plut. *Sol.* 11. On the Sacred War as a whole see Forrest 1956; Davies 1994.
[137] Osborne 2009, 204.

viewed in this period as the figure that aligned Athens with Delphi.[138] Aeschines'

narration of this oracle story, as familiar as it might have been to his audience,

accentuates the authority and ongoing relevance of the Pythia's command to dedicate

the land.

The oracle also allows Aeschines to introduce a previously cultivated personal

affiliation with Solon.[139] During the trial of Timarchus in 345, Aeschines contrasted

the defendant's indecorous style of wearing his cloak while speaking to the assembly

with the far more respectable self-presentation of Solon.[140] Two years later,

Demosthenes ridiculed Aeschines for adopting this Solonian posture without any of

its corresponding virtues.[141] Demosthenes also contests Aeschines' portrayal of Solon

by reading an extensive quotation of the lawgiver's poetry.[142] As Carey argues, the

two year delay between Aeschines' self-association with Solon and Demosthenes'

mockery of it suggests that the connection was well-known.[143] While it is difficult to

know whether Aeschines' adoption of Solonian style impacted the audience's

reception of the narrative of the Sacred War in *Against Ctesiphon*, it is clear that

Aeschines' co-opted Solon and the oracular narrative to underline the ancient

friendship between Athens and Delphi.

The oracle thus serves two functions in establishing this section of Aeschines'

argument. Firstly, Aeschines describes the Pythia's response in detailed and powerful

language to highlight that Demosthenes' acceptance of cursed money was a crime

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[138] Solon is associated with a number of oracular consultations from this era as well as the foundation of the board of *exegetai pythochrestoi*. See Scott 2014, 75; Parke and Wormell no. 14-18; Fontenrose Q 67-69; Hdt. 1.29-86 for Solon's accord with Delphi in the Croesus *logos*. Quote from Osborne 2009, 207.

[139] Carey 2015, 118. See also Westwood 2013 for more detailed analysis of the use of Solon by the orators.

[140] Aeschin. 1.25-6.

[141] Dem. 19.251.

[142] Dem. 19.255-6.

[143] Carey 2015, 121.

against Apollo, Leto and Athena. At the same time, the tale of the Sacred War acts as counter-example of Athenian conduct at Delphi. Aeschines' description of Solon's humble acquiescence to divine advice strengthens the seriousness of the legendary oracular response for present day Athens. Further, Aeschines uses Solon's conduct to foreshadow his own pious actions at Delphi in the following sections.

Before Aeschines moves on to the present day, however, he reinforces the seriousness of the oracle by describing the resulting oath and its associated curse:

> καὶ οὐκ ἀπέχρησεν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν ὅρκον ὀμόσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστροπὴν καὶ ἀρὰν ἰσχυρὰν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐποιήσαντο. γέγραπται γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῇ ἀρᾷ … ʽεἴ τις τάδε,' φησί ʽπαραβαίνοι ἐναγής … ἔστω τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τῆς Λητοῦς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς Προναίας…. καὶ μήποτε,' φησίν, ʽὁσίως θύσειαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι μηδὲ τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι μηδὲ τῇ Λητοῖ μηδ' Ἀθηνᾷ Προναίᾳ, μηδὲ δέξαιντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ἱερά.'

> [Solon and the Amphictyons] were not content with taking this oath, but they added an imprecation and a mighty curse concerning this; for it stands thus written in the curse: "If any one should violate this," it says… "let them be under the curse of Apollo and Artemis and Leto and Athena Pronaea… and may they never offer pure sacrifice unto Apollo or Artemis or Leto or Athena Pronaia, and may the gods refuse to accept their offerings."[144]

Throughout this section of the speech, Aeschines argues that Demosthenes' actions have amounted to impiety (ἀσέβεια) and that he has brought this impiety (ασεβήσας) on both Athens and Greece.[145] Orators elsewhere establish broad accusations of ἀσέβεια using oracles and the stories around them, but here Aeschines combines the implications of the oracle, the oath and the curse at once to present a clear image of Demosthenes' ἀσέβεια and contagiousness.[146] Moreover, Aeschines juxtaposes Demosthenes' disregard of the gods with the upstanding behaviour of Solon above and his own conduct at Delphi.

The final prohibition of the curse attached to the oracle is the key link between Solon and Aeschines. Solon and the Amphictyony act κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν before

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[144] Aeschin. 3.110-1.
[145] Aeschin. 3.118-121; 106; cf. 3.157 with Martin 2009, 168-170.
[146] See Martin 2009, 169 for contagiousness; other oracles see Dem. 21.51-2.

making the curse on those who would act against the wishes of the oracle.[147] Aeschines then recounts his own speech to the Amphictyony in the same language, repeating the curse in both the positive and the negative.[148] The 'may they never offer pure sacrifice (ὁσίως θύσειαν) prohibition is repeated as he reminds the Amphictyony (and the present Athenian audience) of the curse.[149]

The phrasing of the curse is also informative. As Versnel has noted, the prohibitive 'may they not sacrifice' curse is amongst the most serious common formulae.[150] The victim of the curse is not only suffering the wrath of the gods (famine, monstrous offspring and eventual destruction in this case) but is also removed from any means of placating or even contacting the divine.[151] Moreover, the 'may they not sacrifice' formula, perhaps because of its profound effect, is common in a wide range of evidence for curses from the sixth century BCE through to the Roman Period.[152] Thus, it seems likely that Aeschines' repetition of this phrase would have resonated with his Athenian audience. Martin has argued that Aeschines uses religious language to construct his characterisation of Demosthenes as contagious.[153] Framing Demosthenes as a source of risk to Athens certainly is the argumentative goal of this section of the speech, but the interplay of religious discourses leading to this goal is also revealing.

Aeschines combines oracular language that would be familiar from oral narratives with the language of curses that survive to us in a very different religious

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[147] Aeschin. 3.108 and 109.
[148] Aeschin. 3.121 and 3.127.
[149] Aeschin. 3.108 and 3.121.
[150] Versnel 1985, 263.
[151] Aeschin. 3.111 for the details of the curse.
[152] Eidinow 2007, 214 n. 45; Versnel 1985, 68.
[153] Martin 2009, 169.

discourse.[154] Elements of each tradition are used in Aeschines' narratives of both the distant and recent past. The oracle allows Aeschines to link the mythic past with the religious practices of the present. Thus, the orator collapses the temporal distance between the impiety against Delphi in the time of Solon and the impiety committed by Demosthenes. Aeschines' storytelling also frames him as somewhat of an authority on matters concerning the Amphictyony and ἀσέβεια.

The legendary oath called for Solon and the allies 'to help the god and the sacred land by hand, foot and voice'; Aeschines then says that he declared to the Amphictyonic council "I myself…come to help the god and the sacred land with hand and foot and voice…".[155] As noted above, Aeschines is also repeats the phrase 'ἐξάγιστος καὶ ἐπάρατος' (dedicate and accursed) to highlight that any profit from the harbour and the plain around Delphi is also tainted.[156] Regardless of its potential significance in other contexts, the phrase is yet another way in which Aeschines can link past religious offences to Demosthenes in the present.

Enigmatic or Automatic?

Aeschines' complementary tales of oracles being fulfilled in the first and third Sacred Wars incorporate familiar elements of religious ritual and storytelling to amplify the significance of his accusations against Demosthenes. There are also, however, elements of Greek storytelling tradition that the orator clearly inverts or ignores. At no point in Aeschines' oracle story is there any suggestion that the

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[154] On oracular narratives as oral storytelling, see Maurizio 1997; Kindt 2016. On physical evidence for curse tablets and formulae, see Eidinow 2007.

[155] Aeschin. 3.108-9: …ἀλλὰ βοηθήσειν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῇ γῇ τῇ ἱερᾷ καὶ χειρὶ καὶ ποδὶ καὶ φωνῇ καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει and Aeschin. 3.120: ἐγὼ μὲν … βοηθῶ κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον καὶ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῇ γῇ τῇ ἱερᾷ καὶ χειρὶ καὶ ποδὶ καὶ φωνῇ καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς δύναμαι.

[156] Harbour and land: Aeschin. 3.107, 113, 119; money: Aeschin. 3.114. See also Martin 2009, 169 with notes.

oracular pronouncement from the Pythia required interpretation or reflection on the problem it was sought to resolve. The orator's narrative, then, goes against the 'almost invariable' plot structure associated with oracle stories from the ancient world.[157] Aeschines' story is not one that should be read as a 'human quest for meaning', but more in the way we approached the oracles from *Against Leocrates*.[158] Solon and Aeschines do not arrive at the appropriate course of action directed by the oracle through a process of interpretation or deliberation, but rather seek out and fulfil Apollo's clear command:

> λαβόντες δὲ τὸν χρησμὸν τοῦτον οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες ἐψηφίσαντο Σόλωνος εἰπόντος Ἀθηναίου τὴν γνώμην … ἐπιστρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναγεῖς κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν τοῦ θεοῦ…, ἐξηνδραποδίσαντο τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὸν λιμένα καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν κατέσκαψαν καὶ τὴν χώραν καθιέρωσαν κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν.

> When they received this oracle, the Amphictyons voted, on the motion of Solon the Athenian … to march against the accursed men in accordance with the oracle of the god…. They enslaved the men, destroyed the harbour and the city and dedicated the land, in accordance with the oracle.[159]

As Aeschines begins to develop the other implications of not following the oracle's advice in the present day, he continues to underscore the clarity of Apollo's will. In the orator's summary of his speech to the Amphictyony, he illustrates the consequences of their inaction:

> οὐ γὰρ δι' αἰνιγμῶν, ἀλλ' ἐναργῶς γέγραπται κατά τε τῶν ἀσεβησάντων, ἃ χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρεψάντων, καὶ τελευταῖον ἐν τῇ ἀρᾷ γέγραπται…

> For not in riddles, but plainly written is the penalty for those convicted of impiety, and for those who allowed it, as the curse ends with the words…[160]

The cryptic reference to enigmatic divine communication (δι' αἰνιγμῶν) in this phrase shows Aeschines' attention to Delphic storytelling traditions. Delphi had a

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[157] Maurizio 1997, 311.
[158] Quote from Kindt 2016, 157. See Lyc. *Leo* 84-87 and 99.
[159] Aeschin. 3.108-9.
[160] Aeschin. 3.120 cf. Aeschyl. *Ag.* 1112, 1183.

reputation in antiquity for giving responses that were not immediately comprehensible to enquirers, but there are very few direct examples of these oracles.[161] Aeschines does, however, exploit the enigmatic mode of oracular communication associated with Delphi to further develop his prosecution and his prosecutorial persona. Throughout the speech, although never more obviously than in this sequence, Aeschines seeks to establish himself as an authority on ἀσέβεια.[162] His accusation that Demosthenes committed an ἀσεβῆμα against Apollo by taking cursed money from the town of Amphissa is supported by his own claims to be part of Athens' collective εὐσεβεία.[163]

Aeschines' use of the oracular voice establishes this crucial dichotomy. Both Solon and Aeschines have consulted and obeyed the oracle of Apollo that the orator reads to the court, without any reference to any potentially divergent interpretations of the words. Both Athenian statesmen have recognised the severe consequences outlined by the curse that is now very familiar to the audience.[164] Demosthenes, on the other hand, has either ignored or actively jeopardised Athens' relationship with Delphi. Aeschines again returns to the concept of divine communication to emphasise Demosthenes' recklessness:

> ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήμαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, μόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς προσκτησάμενοι; οὐδεμίαν τοι πώποτε ἔγωγε μᾶλλον πόλιν ἑώρακα ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν θεῶν σῳζομένην, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐνίων ἀπολλυμένην.

> But did not the gods forewarn, did they not indicate to us to be on our guard, all but having adopted human sounds? Never have I seen a city offered more protection by the gods, but invariably destroyed by certain of its politicians.[165]

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[161] See Fontenrose 1979, 79-83; Bowden 2005, 49-51; Kindt 2016, 8-15. All make the point that most oracles in this tradition come from detailed storytelling with aims beyond merely recording the oracular response. On Apollo's reputation for cryptic advice: Tor 2016 on Heraclitus Fr. 93.
[162] See also Aeschin. 3.106, 120, 121, 224.
[163] Aeschin. 3.125 and esp. 129.
[164] From repetition in the speech at the very least, without excluding the possibility of the curse being part of the oral history of the Sacred War and the curse formula being common during this period.
[165] Aeschin. 3.130.

Aeschines stresses that Demosthenes has not only committed ἀσέβεια, but has also surrendered the εὐσέβεια developed by Solon and Aeschines himself at Delphi.[166] The rhetorical question again returns to oracular language, this time to link Demosthenes' impious actions at Delphi back to the main argument of the *paranomon* charge. Aeschines carefully appropriates existing speculation on the nature of oracles and prophecy to strengthen his case against Demosthenes. The orator uses polysyndeton to link three negative rhetorical questions (ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήμαινον … [οὐκ] προσκτησάμενοι) in an ascending tricolon.[167] Within this emphatic structure, Aeschines uses three compound verbs with a πρός-prefix not only for alliteration but also to stress the directness of the god's communication. προλέγω was frequently used in fourth century prose for the action of announcing the content of an oracle or of a law.[168] The second (προσημαίνω) has a much narrower semantic field concerning the prediction of gods and their oracles.[169] Aeschines juxtaposes these two terms to not only stress the warnings ignored by Demosthenes, but also to evoke a key dichotomy in Greek discourse concerning divine communication.

By implying that Apollo had both forewarned (προύλεγον) and given signs in advance (προεσήμαινον), Aeschines contradicts the 'enigmatic mode' of oracles in other literary sources. The oracles presented by Lycurgus in *Against Leocrates*, mere months prior to this trial, also stress the clarity of Apollo's directions to Athens. Like Aeschines, Lycurgus argues that benefiting from divine signals is more contingent on collective Athenian εὐσέβεια than on individual reflection on the signs and their

[166] Aeschin. 3.129: τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεδωκότων, τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας ἐμποδὼν γεγενημένης.
[167] Aeschin. 3.130.
[168] Oracle: Dem. 19.298; laws: Lyc. *Leo.* 4.
[169] Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.4 (…ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος). Earlier examples: Hdt. 1.45, 6.123; Eur. *Supp.* 213.

meaning.[170] By declaring that the gods offer better signs (σημεῖα) to the pious (τοῖς εὐσεβέσι), or that there is little differentiation between speaking (προύλεγον) and signalling (προεσήμαινον); these two orators present oracular communication in a very different way to previous traditions. Aeschines, for example, is consciously collapsing the key difference between divine voice and sign (οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήμαινον…) famously put forward by Heraclitus (οὔτε λέγει… ἀλλὰ σημαίνει).[171] For Heraclitus, Apollo at Delphi does not speak or hide (with his prophecies) but gives a sign.[172] Heraclitus' use of σημαίνω clearly indicates that Apollo's prophecies are defined by at least some opposition to any meaning that could be conveyed by speaking them (λέγει).[173] As Tor and Kindt argue, the literary tradition with which Heraclitus' concept of oracles corresponds is one that promotes a flexible and receptive process of interpreting signs (σημεῖα) that can offer more insight than mortal speech (λόγος).[174] In contrast, Aeschines conscientiously avoids associating his oracular narratives with this existing body of 'epiphanic' narratives.[175] Apollo's signs were clear, to pious Athenians such as himself, and should have been heeded:

> ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήμαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, μόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς προσκτησάμενοι;…οὐχ ἱκανὸν ἦν τὸ τοῖς μυστηρίοις φανὲν σημεῖον, ἡ τῶν μυστῶν τελευτή; οὐ περὶ τούτων Ἀμεινιάδης μὲν προύλεγεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι καὶ πέμπειν εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐπερησομένους τὸν θεὸν ὅ τι χρὴ πράττειν, Δημοσθένης δὲ ἀντέλεγε, φιλιππίζειν τὴν Πυθίαν φάσκων;

> But did not the gods forewarn, did they not indicate to us to be on our guard, all but adopting human voice? ...Was not that portent sufficient which appeared at the Mysteries—the death of the celebrants? In view of this did not Ameiniades warn you

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[170] Lyc. *Leo*. 93 δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ταὐτὰ σημεῖα τοῖς εὐσεβέσι καὶ τοῖς κακούργοις φαίνοιτο.
[171] Heraclitus fr. 93: ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει
οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει. I follow the reading of this fragment offered by Tor 2016.
[172] Tor 2016, 89.
[173] Tor 2016, 110. See also a more literal interpretation of σημαίνω as Apollo using the Pythia to 'indicate' in his stead: Fontenrose 1978, 238.
[174] Tor 2016, 111; Kindt 2016, 162-4.
[175] Kindt 2016, 163.

to take precautions and send to Delphi to ask the god what to do? Did Demosthenes not speak against this, saying that the Pythia had Philippised?[176]

For Aeschines, divine communication has been so clear as to nearly sound human (μόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς). Indeed, Aeschines can refer an event from recent memory as a sign (σημεῖον) that should have indicated Athens' dangerous position.[177] The orator again juxtaposes ways of addressing and communicating divine signals. Ameiniades warned the people (μὲν προύλεγεν) having recognised the σημεῖον, whereas Demosthenes spoke in opposition (δὲ ἀντέλεγε) having overlooked them. Aeschines seeks to convince the audience that there was a causal link between Demosthenes' use and misuse of the divine decision-making process and the eventual catastrophe at Chaeronea.[178] Aeschines re-iterates this idea with a detailed discussion of Demosthenes' ritual practices:

> οὐ τὸ τελευταῖον ἀθύτων καὶ ἀκαλλιερήτων ὄντων τῶν ἱερῶν ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπὶ τὸν πρόδηλον κίνδυνον; καίτοι πρώην γέ ποτε ἀπετόλμα λέγειν ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο Φίλιππος οὐκ ἦλθεν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ καλὰ τὰ ἱερά. τίνος οὖν σὺ ζημίας ἄξιος εἶ τυχεῖν, ὦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριε; εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κρατῶν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν τῶν κρατουμένων χώραν, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ καλὰ τὰ ἱερά, σὺ δ᾽ οὐδὲν προειδὼς τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, πρὶν καλλιερῆσαι τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐξέπεμψας, πότερα στεφανοῦσθαι σε δεῖ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀτυχίαις, ἢ ὑπερωρίσθαι;

> And did he not at last from smouldering and ill-omened sacrifices send forth our troops into manifest danger? And yet it was but yesterday that he dared to assert that the reason why Philip did not advance against our country was that the omens were not favourable to him. What punishment, then, do you deserve, you curse of Hellas! For if the conqueror refrained from entering the land of the conquered because the omens were not favourable to him, whereas you, ignorant of the future, sent out our troops before the omens were propitious, ought you to be receiving a crown for the misfortunes of the city, or to have been thrust already beyond her borders?[179]

Aeschines invective continues to highlight Demosthenes' negligence of divine signals that were apparent to others. The danger of Chaeronea was foreseen (τὸν

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[176] Aeschin. 3.130.
[177] The MSS gives σημεῖον φυλάξασθαι, removed by most editors but could strengthening the link to the opening sentence of the passage if the repetition was intended.
[178] Aeschin. 3.106.
[179] Aeschin. 3.131.

πρόδηλον κίνδυνον) and Demosthenes has no awareness of things to come (σὺ δ᾽ οὐδὲν προειδὼς τῶν μελλόντων). Aeschines repeats, juxtaposes and may even invent religious terms throughout the passage to highlight Demosthenes' careless leadership of Athens (ἀκαλλιερήτων ὄντων τῶν ἱερῶν… πρὶν καλλιερῆσαι).[180] The repetition of τὰ ἱερά also recalls Aeschines' initial accusations of impiety (ἀσεβήσας μὲν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς). These terms all bracket a direct address with similarly significant religious implications, as Aeschines calls Demosthenes the cursed man of Greece (ὦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλειτήριε).[181] ἀλιτήριος is not an uncommon accusation in oratory of this period, being especially prominent in earlier speech *Against Andocides*, and is certainly associated with the contagious pollution of ἀσεβεία.[182] The word is used in a range of sources to describe the Alcmeonidae, the mutilators of the Herms and Protagoras, all of whom were accused of ἀσεβεία in Athens.[183] The term also effectively picks up on the curse language of the oracle narrative (ἐξάγιστος καὶ ἐπάρατος; ἐναγὴς ἔσται καὶ τῇ ἀρᾷ ἔνοχος) in order to highlight the incongruity of Ctesiphon's motion to crown Demosthenes (πότερα στεφανοῦσθαι…, ἢ ὑπερωρίσθαι).

The final reference to oracular knowledge in the speech comes as Aeschines introduces a passage of Hesiod to justify his proposed condemnation of Demosthenes:

> ἐὰν περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον τὰς γνώμας ἐξετάζητε, οἶμαι ὑμῖν δόξειν οὐ ποιήματα Ἡσιόδου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χρησμὸν εἰς τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν:

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[180] ἀθύτων καὶ ἀκαλλιερήτων. ἄθυτος is very rare in relation to sacrifices and ἀκαλλιέρητος is only found in this speech (again at 152).

[181] Aeschines repeats the phrase later (3.157) and Demosthenes responds in kind (Dem. 18.159). See Eidinow 2011, 147. The nickname might have become commonly associated with Demosthenes, see also Din. 1.77.

[182] Examples are collected in Paine 1908. See Martin 2009, 86-9 and 144. Alcmeonidae: Thuc. 1.126 and Eupolis fr.103 K-A vol. V; Hermai: Andoc. *De Myst.* 51; Lys. 6.52-3; Protagoras: Eupolis fr.157 K-A vol. V.

[183] Protagoras: Diog. Laert. 9.8.54; on these trials more generally see Rubel 2014.

> If you disregard the poet's meter and examine only his thought, I think this will seem to you to be, not a poem of Hesiod, but an oracle directed against the politics of Demosthenes.[184]

Aeschines cites Hesiod as an authority on the appropriate treatment for those who dishonour the gods. The orator had already quoted the same passage of *Works and Days* in his defence speech *On the Embassy* in 343 for the same purpose.[185] Although the exact accusations of impiety differ between the speeches, both are directed at Demosthenes as the evil man (κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς) who commits evil and plans wicked deeds (ἀλιτραίνῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μητιάαται). Aeschines uses the excerpt to continue his emphasis on Demosthenes' contagiousness (ἀλειτήριε and ἀλιτραίνῃ) and encourages his audience to view the poetry as an oracle (χρησμὸν). Lycurgus uses a similar expression in *Against Leocrates* to introduce poetry that supports his argument for the frailty of human knowledge.[186] When viewed with his previous uses of oracles by both orators, Aeschines clearly also intends for the phrase to underscore the authority and relevance of the lines.[187] Unlike Lycurgus, however, Aeschines' oracles and poetry share similar themes and language. Lycurgus presented his oracles from Athenian legend as 'positive', he reports the prophecies indirectly and focuses on the positive instructions.[188] In contrast, Aeschines repeatedly quotes the negative imprecations of the oracle and the curse throughout his narrative, then gives a passage from Hesiod's epic that also describes the consequences of allowing hubristic individuals to go unpunished.

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[184] Aeschin. 3.136.
[185] Aeschin. 2.158-9. See Martin 2009, 168; Hes. *Op.* 240-1.
[186] ὥσπερ χρησμοὺς Lyc. *Leo.* 92.
[187] See Aeschin. 3.108-9: λαβόντες δὲ τὸν χρησμὸν… κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν… κατὰ τὴν μαντείαν.
[188] Lyc. *Leo.* 84: ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοῖς ὅτι τὴν πόλιν αἱρήσουσιν ἂν μὴ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίων Κόδρον ἀποκτείνωσιν, ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας; Lyc. *Leo.* 99: χρήσαντος δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συμβαλεῖν τὼ στρατοπέδω,1 κρατήσειν τῶν πολεμίων.

Crowning Glory

ὁ δὲ ‘οὐκ ἂν’ ἔφη ‘ἐθαυμάζετε, εἰ Δημοσθένους λέγοντος πρὸς ταῦτα ἠκούσατε

You would not marvel so [at the outcome] if you heard Demosthenes replying to these arguments.[189]

So overwhelming was Demosthenes' response to Aeschines' speech, the story goes, that the prosecutor was run out of Athens for having convinced less than a fifth of the jurors.[190] A key part of the speech's success, it appears, was Demosthenes' reinterpretation of Aeschines' explanation of Athens' misfortune.[191] Both Martin and Eidinow show that Demosthenes' strategy relies on the lack of a single concept of τύχη in Athens during this period.[192] Martin in particular argues that Demosthenes deemphasises the religious significance of the allegations concerning his own personal misfortune.[193] While Demosthenes avoids addressing many of these serious accusations directly, he does respond to the oracular argumentation of Aeschines that we saw above. Oracles serve two important functions for Demosthenes. Firstly, appealing to Delphi helps him challenge Aeschines' narrative of the Sacred War. Secondly, Demosthenes can later introduce an alternative source of oracular authority, Dodona, to support his interpretation of τύχη.

The events and causes of the Sacred War of the 350s remain very obscure, partly due to this exchange between Aeschines and Demosthenes.[194] Where Aeschines argued that he was preventing impiety and presenting Athens with the leadership of the Amphictyony, Demosthenes argues that Aeschines incited the

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[189] Quote attributed to Aeschines in exile: Philostr. *V S* 510.
[190] Philostr. *V S* 509 cf. Yunis 2001, 11-12.
[191] Martin 2009, 96-7; Eidinow 2011, 146-8.
[192] Martin 2009, 96; Eidonow 2011, 148.
[193] Martin 2008, 115-17.
[194] Cawkell 1969, 165-6.

conflict to give Philip reason to march into Central Greece.[195] Demosthenes invokes

Pythian Apollo midway through his version of these events:

> καλῶ δ᾽ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς θεοὺς πάντας καὶ πάσας ὅσοι τὴν χώραν ἔχουσι τὴν Ἀττικήν, καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω τὸν Πύθιον, ὃς πατρῷός ἐστι τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπεύχομαι πᾶσι τούτοις, εἰ μὲν ἀληθῆ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἴποιμι καὶ εἶπον καὶ τότ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτε πρῶτον εἶδον τουτονὶ τὸν μιαρὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἁπτόμενον (ἔγνων γάρ, εὐθέως ἔγνων), εὐτυχίαν μοι δοῦναι καὶ σωτηρίαν, εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἔχθραν ἢ φιλονικίας ἰδίας ἕνεκ᾽ αἰτίαν ἐπάγω τούτῳ ψευδῆ, πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνόνητόν με ποιῆσαι.

> In your presence, men of Athens, I now invoke all the gods and goddesses whose domain is the land of Attica. I invoke also Pythian Apollo, the ancestral divinity of this city, and I solemnly beseech them all that, if I shall speak the truth now, and if I spoke truth to my countrymen when I first saw this defiled man putting his hand to that deed (for I knew it, I instantly knew it) they grant me good fortune and safety. But if with personal enmity or rivalry I lead a false charge, that they deprive me of everything good.[196]

To complicate Martin's generally sound argument that Demosthenes downplays the religious aspects of Aeschines' accusations, the above passage is one of three direct prayers in the speech.[197] This uncommon direct invocation of the gods suggests that while the total weight of divine terms and arguments may be less in *On the Crown* than *Against Ctesiphon*, Demosthenes does purposefully address Aeschines' religious argumentation.[198]

Demosthenes counters the intricate narrative of the Sacred Wars presented by Aeschines with an alternative, or perhaps competing, supernatural authority. Demosthenes consistently uses broad and optimistic language to discredit Aeschines' fearmongering. Where Aeschines has cited Delphic authority to warn the audience that their wives would beget monsters rather than children if they disobeyed the oracle, Demosthenes uses formalised prayer language to ask the god to 'grant [him]

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[195] Dem. 18.141-56.
[196] Dem. 18.141.
[197] Martin 2009, 96-7; Yunis 2001, 193; This the only direct prayer in the middle of speech in extant oratory: Wankel 1976, 768-9.
[198] Eidinow 2011, 149.

good fortune (εὐτυχίαν) and safety'.[199] Aeschines' direct quotation of the curse sworn at Delphi presents a specific and singular example of the negative outcomes associated with oracles.   In response, Demosthenes looks to the unspecific and positive aspect of Athens' relationship with Delphi to stress their shared good fortune and history.   Despite this clear contrast in the medium and tone of divine communication, Pythian Apollo remains the only god individually invoked by Demosthenes in this passage.

This brief comparison demonstrates that adopting oracular authority in public speech could have opposite form and purpose.   Aeschines threatens Athens with Apollo's wrath and Demosthenes calls on Pythian Apollo to ensure he speaks truly. Juxtaposing these examples gives the clearest evidence that oracles in oratory were not restricted to being 'always in agreement with the *nomoi* of the city'.[200] Bowden has argued that Demosthenes uses oracles to indicate ancestral Athenian values that ought to be upheld by following his advice to the city.[201] The way Demosthenes' unusual prayer directly opposes Aeschines' claims to divine authority indicates that the usage of oracles was far more flexible and varied than this summary implies.

The second crucial aspect of Demosthenes' use of oracles in this speech is the introduction of the oracular sanctuary of Dodona.[202] Athens consulted the oracle at Dodona frequently during the fourth century, most likely due to intermittent political upheaval at Delphi.[203] While there are numerous other references to this particular oracular response from Zeus in fourth century oratory, it is intriguing to see

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[199] Aeschin. 3.111: μήτε γυναῖκας τέκνα τίκτειν γονεῦσιν ἐοικότα, ἀλλὰ τέρατα;
[200] Bowden 2005, 57.
[201] Bowden 2005, 56-7 referring to Dem. 21.51-2 and 43.66, passages that will be dealt with in detail elsewhere.
[202] See also Dem. 21.51-2. Similar oracles are given by Dinarchus and Hyperides (Din. 1.78 and 98; Hyp. 1.24).
[203] Although there is evidence of contact between Athens and Dodona before this period, see Eidinow 2007, 61; Parke 1967, 141-2.

Demosthenes using Athens' most frequently consulted oracular sanctuaries for different purposes.[204] In the passage above, Demosthenes contradicts not only the events of Aeschines' narrative in *Against Ctesiphon* but also his model of divine intervention.[205] To support his explanation, Demosthenes prays to Pythian Apollo for good fortune (εὐτυχίαν). While Martin rightly points out that this simple prayer does function to alleviate Aeschines' harsh allegations of pollution, it should also be seen as forshadowing the crucial motif of Demosthenes' defence, an impersonal model of τύχη.[206]

Demosthenes carefully addresses Aeschines' negative and personal notion of misfortune with his own broad and impersonal model of fortune and divine action.[207] Eidinow has convincingly argued that Aeschines' invective of personal misfortune is drawn from an older discourse on the subject and Demosthenes' defence skilfully appropriates more recent speculation.[208] We have already seen that Aeschines builds his argument for Demosthenes' personal misfortune during a detailed narrative following the Athenian interaction with the Delphic oracle. While Demosthenes' alternative relies on very different argumentation, it also develops from the authority given by Pythian Apollo and the oracular advice of Zeus at Dodona:

> …σκέψασθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρήσατε ὅσῳ καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ ἀνθρωπινώτερον ἐγὼ περὶ τῆς τύχης τούτου διαλεχθήσομαι. ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἀγαθὴν ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶ καὶ τὸν Δία τὸν Δωδωναῖον ὑμῖν μαντευόμενον, τὴν μέντοι τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἣ νῦν ἐπέχει, χαλεπὴν καὶ δεινήν: τίς γὰρ Ἑλλήνων ἢ τίς βαρβάρων οὐ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πεπείραται;

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[204] There are four references to oracles from Dodona in total (Dem. 21.52; Dem. 18.253; Hyp. 4.24-5; then the same oracle is cited at Dem. 19.297-9 and Din. 1.77, 98) cf. ten from Delphi (Aeschin. 3.108, 130; Dem. 21.52, 42.66; Isoc. 4.31, 6.17, 23-31; Lyc. *Leo.* 84, 93, 99.
[205] Eidinow 2011, 148.
[206] Martin 2009, 92-3.
[207] Eidinow 2011, 148-9.
[208] Aeschines' personal model echoes that present in Solon's musings in Hdt. 1.32 or Oedipus' soliloquies. Demosthenes' impersonal τύχη resembles the nascent Hellenistic conception of τύχη as an impartial or blind goddess. Eidinow 2011, 148 with 100-1 and 151-2. See also Parke 1967, 141-2.

> Observe and consider, men of Athens, that the discourse on fortune that I will present is more truthful and more fitting for humans than his. I attribute good fortune to our city, and this I observe the oracle of Zeus at Dodona does too, but the current fortune befalling all humankind is harsh and terrible. For is there anyone living, Greek or Barbarian, who has not experienced many evils in these times?[209]

This oracle given to Athens, one in which the city was recognised as having good fortune (τύχην ἀγαθὴν), corresponds with the prayer to Apollo earlier in the speech seeking to be well-fortuned (εὐτυχίαν…σωτηρίαν).[210] On the other hand, Demosthenes expresses a desire for immediate personal fortune in the prayer and a seeks to demonstrate that the *polis* has experienced collective good fortune. While this oracle does not form part of an extended narrative, it does share two key features with the oracles used by other orators in this period: there is no suggestion that the god's advice is cryptic and the oracle itself is optimistic.[211] Rather than acting as the foundation for a line of argument, as the legendary oracle given to Solon does for Aeschines, Demosthenes' oracle from Dodona supports the impersonal model of fate that he has developed during most of the speech. As Martin shows, this line of argument only implicitly refutes Aeschines' image of Demosthenes as a cursed man (ἀλιτήριος) by suggesting that Athens could not enjoy such divinely endorsed good fortune if it were harbouring such an evil man.[212]

Demosthenes not only presents an alternative discourse of fortune, but also uses the oracular voice to support his discourse in a very different way. Demosthenes openly mocks the seriousness of Aeschines' narrative of the legendary Sacred War

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[209] Dem. 18.253.
[210] Dem. 18.253 and 19.141.
[211] Although little is known about the oracular methods at Dodona, it does also have a reputation for double meanings and obscurity similar to that of the Delphic oracle, see Parke 1967, 129-40; Eidinow 2007, 67-71; Parker 2016, 69-70. Straightforward and (mostly) positive oracles in oratory: Aeschin. 3.108; Lyc. *Leo.* 84-7, 99; Dem. 19.300; Dem. 21.51-2; Dem. 43.66; Din. 1.78 and 98; Hyp. 1.24. On the theological optimism of oratory in general, see Parker 1997.
[212] Martin 2009, 97; Aeschin. 3.131.

and the rhetorical inexperience of the Amphictyons (ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων).[213]

As he finishes his description of events leading to Chaeronea, while highlighting the general uselessness of Aeschines, Demosthenes emphasises the limitations of human understanding of events (ὅσ᾽ ἐνῆν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον λογισμὸν εἱλόμην). [214] He explains that a statesman deduces a plan that is then subject to the will of a superhuman force (δαίμων) or in the hands of a god (ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ τὸ τούτου τέλος ἦν, οὐκ ἐμοί).[215] This line of reasoning is explicitly recalled when the oracle is introduced later in the speech, as Demosthenes questions whether any human, let alone Aeschines, can be privy to the divine workings of fate:

> πανταχόθεν μὲν τοίνυν ἄν τις ἴδοι τὴν ἀγνωμοσύνην αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν βασκανίαν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν περὶ τῆς τύχης διελέχθη. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὅλως μέν, ὅστις ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπῳ τύχην προφέρει… σκέψασθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρήσατε ὅσῳ καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ ἀνθρωπινώτερον ἐγὼ περὶ τῆς τύχης τούτου διαλεχθήσομαι.

> At every point his morose and spiteful temper is conspicuous, and especially in what he said about fortune. As a general remark, I must say that it is a stupid thing for any human being to reproach his brother man on the score of fortune… Observe and consider, men of Athens, that the discourse on fortune that I will present is more truthful and more fitting for humans than his.

While Demosthenes does not imply that oracular knowledge cannot be useful to humans, he does stress the distance between human conception (ἀνθρώπινον λογισμὸν) and divine will. He stresses throughout that human interactions that are contained within a mortal sphere subject to higher influence. Demosthenes supports this theology with examples: the impossibility of a human knowing the divine lot of another (ὅστις ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπῳ); a well-prepared ship-owner not being responsible for a shipwreck in a hurricane (εἴ τις ναύκληρον πάντ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ

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[213] καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους καὶ μύθους, ὅθεν ἡ Κιρραία χώρα καθιερώθη, συνθεὶς. καὶ διεξελθὼν ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, Dem. 18.149.

[214] Dem. 18.149-194. Aeschines' uselessness: Dem. 18.193 σὺ μέν γ᾽ οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ χρήσιμος ἦσθα: ἐγὼ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα προσῆκε τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην ἔπραττον.

[215] Dem. 18.192-3.

πράξαντα καὶ κατασκευάσαντα τὸ πλοῖον …τῆς ναυαγίας αἰτιῷτο).[216] It is within this considered argument that Demosthenes singles out Aeschines' claims to oracular wisdom for further criticism:

> ἐπεὶ πρός γε τοῦτον τὸν κατάπτυστον βραχὺς καὶ σαφὴς ἐξήρκει λόγος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν σοὶ πρόδηλα τὰ μέλλοντ᾽, Αἰσχίνη, μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτ᾽ ἐβουλεύεθ᾽ ἡ πόλις περὶ τούτων, τότ᾽ ἔδει προλέγειν: εἰ δὲ μὴ προῄδεις, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεύθυνος εἶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

> For this contemptible fellow, I have a short, plain, and sufficient answer. Aeschines, if the future was revealed to you and to nobody else, you should have given us the benefit of your predictions when we were deliberating; if you had no foreknowledge, you are open to the charge of ignorance just like the rest of us.[217]

Without entering the debate surrounding the closeness of the text that survives to the speeches presented during the trial itself, this passage shows Demosthenes' careful inversion of Aeschines' equally elaborate ritual invective.[218] Demosthenes co-opts the niche language of oracular communication used by Aeschines to paint him as either a traitor or a charlatan. He emphasises his own brevity (βραχὺς καὶ σαφὴς ἐξήρκει λόγος) and twists the same verbs and prefix (πρό-) to challenge Aeschines' claims to the clarity of divine advice. The future was apparently revealed to Aeschines (πρόδηλα τὰ μέλλοντ᾽) just as he claimed the city had been forewarned (προσκτησάμενοι).[219] Moreover, Aeschines himself should have said beforehand (ἔδει προλέγειν…) if the gods had told him beforehand.[220] Demosthenes concludes that all of Aeschines' divine talk was just that: talk.[221]

Demosthenes' inversion of προλέγειν in this prophetic context may also have had a greater impact considering the continuous juxtaposition of his own efforts to

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[216] Dem. 18.252, 194.
[217] Dem. 18.196.
[218] See Yunis 2001 for MSS information and MacDowell 2000, 22-4 for a good discussion of the issues of reading these texts records.
[219] Dem. 18.196 cf. Aeschin. 3.130.
[220] Dem. 18.16 cf. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον… Aeschin. 3.130.
[221] εἰ δὲ μὴ προῄδεις…Dem. 1.196.

warn Athens with Aeschines' inactivity.[222] The repetition of these πρό- compounds in direct response to the way that Aeschines used them suggests that they did have a clear association with oracular wisdom. It should also be noted that Aeschines had also accused Demosthenes of a similar deception relating to divine communication early in his prosecution:

> τῶν μὲν θεῶν συμπλάσας ἑαυτῷ ἐνύπνιον κατεψεύσατο, ὡς οὐ παρὰ Χαριδήμου τὸ πρᾶγμα πεπυσμένος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, οὓς μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιορκῶν νύκτωρ φησὶν ἑαυτῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι προλέγειν…

> [Demosthenes] made up a vision for himself and lied about the gods, pretending that he had received the news, not from Charidemus, but from Zeus and Athena, the gods by whose name he perjures himself by day, and who then converse with him in the night, as he says, and tell him of things to come.[223]

It would be easy to see these contrasting uses of προλέγειν and similar compounds as merely another attestation of personal enmity between the two orators, challenging each other's interpretation of whatever subject was up for debate. While adversarial litigation and the rivalry of the two men clearly motivates this discourse, it is important to recognise that oracles, prophecies and epiphanies were one of the many areas in which public trials were decided. The manipulation of these tropes by both orators confirms the existence of a robust and varied 'oracular discourse' in fourth century Athens.

Conclusion

> ἐπειδὰν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθίστανται μαντικήν τε καὶ χρησμοὺς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μετ᾽ ἐλπίδων λυμαίνεται.

> When [people] are under pressure and visible hopes have abandoned them, they turn to the invisible, prophecy and oracles, and other such things that cause ruin with their hope.[224]

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[222] προλέγων καὶ διδάσκων Dem. 18.72; πολλάκις προλεγόντων ἡμῶν καὶ παρακαλούντων καὶ διδασκόντων Dem. 18.296; same criticism of Aeschines' lack of action: οὐ προλέγων ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασιν Dem. 18.235.
[223] Aeschin. 3.78.
[224] Thuc. 5.103.2.

It is not surprising to see such diverse use of oracular argumentation by Demosthenes and Aeschines during a case at an uncertain point in Athenian history. Their varied use of oracles represents one of the ways in which Athenians perceived, comprehended and reacted to crisis in public discourse. The two orators adopted oracular authority in very different ways to formulate a convincing model of both human and divine responsibility for Athens' precarious position in 330. While this conclusion might seem to align with the uncommonly sceptical comments of Thucydides' Athenian delegate above, it is just as important to stress that the intricate religious argumentation of Aeschines and Demosthenes was contingent on its connection with the daily religious life and perspectives of their Athenians audience.[225]

Aeschines' speech shows orators using narratological functions of oracles from traditional Greek storytelling in a distinctive new manner.[226] The oracle structures his narrative by providing an external and authoritative 'resolution' to a dilemma.[227] However, Aeschines' emphasis on the clarity of divine wisdom is at odds with the larger body of 'epiphanic' narratives from ancient Greek storytelling.[228] While the tale differs from those of tragedy or historiography, his repeated invocation of a legendary oracle given to Solon does fit the pattern present in *Against Leocrates*, where Delphi and Pythian Apollo are presented as unwavering allies of Athens that provide clear and productive oracular advice to the *polis*.[229] While the general shape of the narrative was similar to those given by Lycurgus, Aeschines also placed far greater emphasis on the process of visiting and consulting the god at the sanctuary at

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[225] For the overexposure of skeptical attitudes such as the one presented by Thucydides' Athenian ambassadors in this excerpt, see Struck 2016, 9-10.
[226] Cf. Lyc. *Leo* 84, 93 and 99.
[227] See Maurizio 1997, 311.
[228] For the larger body see: Kindt 2016, 163-4 cf. Platt 2011 and Petridou 2016.
[229] Aeschin. 3.108; Lyc. *Leo.* 84-7 and 99.

Delphi. These choices show the depth and flexibility of this public oracular discourse. There is not a single type of oracle story that orators could use in their persuasive descriptions of the past. Rather, Aeschines could pick up features of a wider tradition to suit his argumentative goals. In this example, Aeschines takes care to situate the legendary story at the sanctuary of Delphi to support his own construction of traditional piety in the present.

Aeschines' use of the oracle to conflate past and present also demonstrates the interconnectedness of oracular discourse with the other aspects of the audience's religious life. He quotes a curse that uses the same formulae as epigraphic evidence from the same period and beyond.[230] The orator combines curse language with a wide range of supporting terms for polluted and impious individuals that are well attested in other public speeches. Most strikingly, Aeschines inverts the most prevalent conception of oracular communication our sources. To emphasise Demosthenes' impiety, Aeschines argues that the gods had warned Athens in a voice nearly human. Aeschines' careful argumentation shows not only keen attention to previous authors' speculation on divine signals but also that oratory could appropriate this dialogue for immediate persuasive purpose.

The adversarial nature of Athenian law presents a rare opportunity to see an immediate response to the perspective on divine causation and communication presented by Aeschines. Demosthenes' complete reinterpretation of τύχη and human comprehension of it reflects the scope of oracular argumentation during this period.[231] The direct prayer to Pythian Apollo suggests that Demosthenes deemed it necessary to respond to the accusations made by Aeschines through his narrative of Delphic

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[230] Versnel 1985, 68; Eidinow 2007, 214 with notes.
[231] On τύχη again see Eidinow 2011, 146-9.

oracles past and present. The prominence given to Apollo Pythios further demonstrates the growing importance of Apollo's various forms to Athens during this period.[232] Demosthenes' use of the oracle from Dodona may also suggest that he fostered a personal association with this sanctuary, a possibility that will be explored in the next chapter. His conscious appropriation of Aeschines' language of oracular knowledge and divine forewarning shows the centrality of oracular discourse to explaining the divine. Aeschines used legendary oracles and figures to stress the closeness of divinity to the human sphere, a world where gods tried to help humans and would actively punish them if their help was not wanted. Conversely, Demosthenes' world of limited human agency and generic prophecy exculpates his own decision making and mocks people like Aeschines who claim to comprehend the plans of the superhuman. Despite their opposed theological arguments, both orators rely on oracular authority, often in very different forms, to convince their audience.

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[232] See chapter one.

Chapter Three: Oracles from Apollo to Zeus: Doubting Delphi or the Dawn of Dodona?

Ἀλλαντοπώλης: Αἰγεΐδη φράσσαι κυναλώπεκα, μή σε δολώσῃ, λαίθαργον ταχύπουν, δολίαν κερδὼ πολύιδριν. οἶσθ᾽ ὅ τι ἐστὶν τοῦτο;

Δῆμος: Φιλόστρατος ἡ κυναλώπηξ.

Ἀλλαντοπώλης: οὐ τοῦτό φησιν, ἀλλὰ ναῦς ἑκάστοτε αἰτεῖ ταχείας ἀργυρολόγους οὑτοσί· ταύτας ἀπαυδᾷ μὴ διδόναι σ᾽ ὁ Λοξίας.

Δῆμος: πῶς δὴ τριήρης ἐστὶ κυναλώπηξ;

Ἀλλαντοπώλης: ὅπως; ὅτι ἡ τριήρης ἐστὶ χὠ κύων ταχύ.

Δῆμος: πῶς οὖν ἀλώπηξ προσετέθη πρὸς τῷ κυνί;

Ἀλλαντοπώλης: ἀλωπεκίοισι τοὺς στρατιώτας ἤκασεν, ὁτιὴ βότρυς τρώγουσιν ἐν τοῖς χωρίοις.

Δῆμος: εἶεν·

Sausage Seller: "Scion of Aegeus, ponder the fox-dog lest he beguile you; he's treacherous, swift of foot, a wily trickster and very crafty." Did you get that one [that oracle]?

Demos: The fox-dog is Philostratus

Sausage Seller: That's not it, no this one keeps demanding swift ships for collecting tribute. Loxias is warning you not to give them to him.

Demos: How can a trireme be a fox-dog?

Sausage Seller: How? Because both triremes and dogs are fleet.

Demos: And how come 'fox' is added to the 'dog'?

Sausage Seller: Soldiers are like fox cubs because they eat grapes in the farmlands.

Demos: Aha!

While directly applying the practices of Aristophanes' farcical depiction of Athenian political debate to the texts of the Attic orators is clearly problematic, the antics of the Sausage Seller and the Paphlagonian above illustrate one of the difficulties the oracles from the fourth century speeches present. Aristophanes' *rhētores* prepare for their *agōn* by grabbing as many oracles as their arms can carry to try and impress the personification of the *dēmos*.[233] As ludicrous as the scene is intended to be, it does bear some resemblance to the oracles used by Lycurgus,

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[233] Ar. *Eq.* 996-1110 trans. Henderson. See also Muecke 1998.

Aeschines and Demosthenes that we have examined so far. These orators sought out oracles from both distant Athenian myth and their present day to develop their various theological arguments.

The comic oratory above, however, in which the characters squabble over the meaning of a hyperbolically abstruse oracle, is the type of exchange that we have not seen in the present survey of Athenian rhetoric. Aristophanes' politicians directly contest the meaning of a single divine pronouncement presented by their opponent. In fourth century Athens, speechmakers almost exclusively turned to other oracular responses or even oracular sanctuaries, rather than challenging their opponent's interpretation of divine communications.[234] Public trials involved conjecture on all facets of the public and private life of litigants and defendants, and accusations of religious misconduct and pollution abound. There are not, however, any accusations that an opponent had misinterpreted or misled the public in their use of an oracle.[235]

The difference between the uses of oracles in oratory and its direct satire suggest that the conclusions about the latter are good to think with for the former. Aristophanes' satirical use of oracles has often been treated as aligning with the scepticism of Athenians towards divination and superstition at the close of the fifth century.[236] More recently, Smith and Muecke have re-examined these oracles to conclude, amongst other things, that Aristophanes' abuse of *chresmologoi* indicates that divination formed a central part of Athenian political language.[237] Smith also argues that Delphi has a privileged place in Aristophanic comedy, as the sanctuary is

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[234] See esp. Dem. 18.253.

[235] Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of misleading Athens by deliberately not consulting Delphi rather than by misinterpreting divine signals (Aeschin. 3.130-1).

[236] Smith 1989, 1 n. 2 collects a good range of these mid-twentieth century views, e.g. Ehrenburg 1962; Strauss 1966.

[237] See also Parker 1985, 302: 'The society that abuses diviners is the society that consults them'. Smith 1989, 155-6 argues that Aristophanes is against cynical exploitation of divination; Muecke 1998, 270-3 sees the oracles from *Knights* as finding humour through exploring the limits of a linguistic system (inspired poetry).

spared the insults given to the oracles of Bacis, for example.[238] In contrast, Bowden has advocated resisting distinguishing 'reputable' oracular sources from the rest, and stressed that recourse to any manifestation of the oracular was not an extraordinary occurrence in Athenian life.[239]

This chapter will explore these trends in Athenian oracular consultation in the present sample of fourth century rhetoric.[240] Bowden's view that the oracles of Aristophanes reflect the uses of oracles in the assembly will be augmented by the role that Delphi and Dodona have been shown to have in oratory.[241]

Beyond the citation of oracular responses, orators also adopted and contested for oracular authority using the wider storytelling tradition of featuring oracular communication. While Smith's case for the relative respect given to Delphi in Aristophanes is certainly supported by a similar position in fourth century oratory, references to Dodona also demonstrate that the oracular voice was unlikely to be challenged in Athenian public speech. The absence of Bacis and other 'collected' oracles from our body of speeches is difficult to resolve through this comparison, but may be related to the increased prominence of Delphi in Athenian public life during the Lycurgan era.[242]

A Matter of Interpretation

As might be expected after reading this passage of Aristophanes, the majority of stories involving human interaction with oracles in the Greek tradition focus on the

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[238] Smith 1989, 156.
[239] Bowden 2003, 270-2.
[240] Bowden 2003, 272 n. 78 does in fact seek to do the same.
[241] Bowden 2003, 272; 2005, 56.
[242] The lack of oracles from *chresmologoi* in this small sample does seem to run against the explanation of Parker 2005, 115: '…the Athenians seldom, after 479, sent delegations to the fixed shrines except with questions about cult, but even in the fourth century allowed *chresmologoi* a voice in public debates.'

process of interpreting or translating divine signs into action.[243] However, the uses of the oracular voice in fourth century rhetoric, have tended to minimise the role of human reflection of divine meaning in favour of clear prophecies and decisive action. This chapter seeks to collect the remaining oracles used by the Athenian orators of this period and determine whether the meaning of oracular pronouncements was ever contested or reinterpreted in the public discourse that these speeches represent. I argue that the examples that have survived show a distinct tendency to avoid not only oracles with contestable interpretations but also stories in which characters reflect on the meaning of oracular responses.

While exploring the seven remaining case studies of oracles in oratory, another question emerges: whether orators used oracles from different sanctuaries in different ways. In the case concerning the crowning of Demosthenes examined in the previous chapter, the defendant used a pronouncement from the sanctuary of Zeus and Dione at Dodona to counter accusations built around an oracle from Delphi. The litigant in that case, Aeschines, had also sought to highlight the good relationship he had developed with Delphi and its Amphictyony.[244] Aeschines then claimed that Demosthenes had advised Athens against consulting Delphi, believing that the Pythia had 'Philippised'.[245] Thus, Demosthenes' use of Dodona may have been motivated by concerns beyond the subject matter of the oracle in question. Before discussion begins to look at how different orators could interpret the same oracular pronouncement, it will determine whether the differences between Athens' relationship with the sanctuaries at Delphi and Dodona are reflected in the use of their oracles in Athenian public speech.

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[243] Kindt 2016, 159-64.
[244] Aeschin. 3.106-30.
[245] Aeschin. 3.130 Δημοσθένης δὲ ἀντέλεγε, φιλιππίζειν τὴν Πυθίαν φάσκων;.

Oaken Word

The use of oracles from Delphi by Lycurgus and Aeschines in 330 was closely tied to the relationships each orator had cultivated with the sanctuary at Delphi. In the first chapter of this study, it was suggested that the prominence given to Delphi by Lycurgus was both part of and a contribution to a broader cultural trend. The impact and meaning of the oracles in the speech were thus influenced by the increased popularity of Apollo in his related roles as Pythios and Patroos in Athens during the mid-fourth century. In this context, Apollo is presented as a constant ally of the *polis* in myth and recent memory, giving clear and productive advice to pious citizens. Any difficulties or consequences caused by these divinely sanctioned actions were actively minimised.[246] Aeschines' oracular narratives and argumentation are stylistically and structurally different to those presented by Lycurgus, but the position of Pythian Apollo remains constant. This consistency in the usage of oracles and oracle stories from Delphi shows the necessity of addressing whether other oracular sanctuaries were used differently.[247]

Bowden's analysis of Athens' relationship with Delphi contains a chapter entitled 'What did the Athenians think of the Delphic oracle?'.[248] Unfortunately, asking the same question of Dodona, or any other popular sanctuary, does not yield such fruitful results. As Parke's survey of the contact between Athens and Dodona showed over fifty years ago, the evidence for Athenian interaction with the sanctuary, let alone more qualitative investigation, is limited.[249] A traditional starting point for discussing Athens' relationship with Dodona during the fourth century has been

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[246] Difficulties such as the sacrifice of Erechtheus' daughter, Lyc. *Leo.* 99-100.
[247] There are five references to oracles from Dodona in total (Dem 21.52; Dem 18.253; Hyperides 4.24-5 then the same oracle is cited at Dem 19.297-9 and Dinarchus 1.98) cf. ten from Delphi (Aeschin. 3.108, 130; Dem. 21.52, 42.66; Isoc. 4.31, 6.17, 23-31; Lyc. *Leo.* 84, 93, 99.
[248] Bowden 2005.
[249] Parke 1967, 135-143.

Demosthenes' alleged claim that the Pythia had 'Philippised' (φιλιππίζειν).[250] It has been suggested that Athens turned to the sanctuary of Zeus in Epirus as a result.[251] While Athens certainly interacted with the Dodona in the centuries before this point, the sanctuary offers less clear epigraphic or archaeological evidence of *polis* level inquiries than has been available at Delphi.[252] There is record that Zeus' oracle sanctioned the emergence of the cult of Bendis in the late fifth century and there may have been an Athenian dedication at the sanctuary around this time to commemorate a naval victory by Phormio.[253]

The literary evidence for Athens' relationship with Dodona, although more abundant, is not without its problems, especially in tales that conflate the role of Dodona with that of Delphi.[254] Both oracles feature in two of Herodotus' tales of oracular knowledge: Croesus' oracle test and the *aition* of the seer Euenius.[255] Various accounts of the Sicilian expedition involve an Athenian consultation of Dodona that was understood as having a double meaning.[256] Pausanias includes an oracle from Dodona in the aftermath of the Codrus myth Lycurgus told in *Against Leocrates*.[257] The complementary roles of oracles in all these examples suggest that some elements are shared between the oracular tradition of Dodona and Delphi.

The role of Dodona in Attic tragedy shows that tragedians expected their audiences to be familiar with the oracle, but this reveals little about the direct

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[250] Alleged by Aeschines, see Aeschin. 3.130. See Parke 1967b, 116-7 and Eidinow 2007, 62 who note an increase in Athenian consultations at Delphi during the relevant period.
[251] Parke 1967b, 116-7 and Eidinow 2007, 62.
[252] Meyer 2013, 18; Eidinow 2007, 60-1. This statement refers to Athenian involvement at Dodona, there is much compelling evidence discovered at the site pertaining to other areas of inquiry.
[253] Bendis: *IG* II² 1283; Parker 1996, 170; Eidinow 2007, 61 n. 37. Phormio: Parke 1967a, 136.
[254] Parke 1967a, 132-5.
[255] Hdt. 1.47 (Fontenrose Q99; PW 52) and 9.93 (Fontenrose Q161; PW 108).
[256] The oracle referred to a hill called Sicily (Σικελία) near Athens, rather than the island. Paus. 8.11.12; Dio. Chr. 17.17; *contra* Plut. *Nic.* 13. who attributes the prophecy to Ammon and 'various oracles' (ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρους … μάντεις).
[257] Pausanias 7.25.2.

interaction of Athenians with the sanctuary. While an oracle from Dodona concerning Heracles features prominently in Sophocles' *Trachinae*, determining what the Athenian public thought of Dodona from this performance, which is one of Bowden's methods for Delphi, is difficult.[258] Heracles laments misunderstanding the words of his father from the sanctuary without any suggestion that he has been deliberately deceived like Deianeira had been.[259] Athens itself is not connected to either the oracle or the story, as it is in the *Eumenides* or *Ion*, limiting any insights into the relationship between Athens and Dodona outside the drama. Dodona also appears in *Prometheus Bound*, accused by Io of giving oracles of 'shifting speech' (αἰολοστόμους) in response to her father's inquiries.[260] Her complaints are indirectly redressed by Prometheus as he describes the prophecy as 'clear and at not at all riddling' (λαμπρῶς κοὐδὲν αἰνικτηρίως).[261] The divine and mortal interpretations of the oracle are key feature of the play, but this is difficult to apply to the world outside the theatre. Nevertheless, it can be said that Dodona was clearly one of the spaces in which Athenian tragedians could explore the friction between divine prophecy and mortal understanding. While there is a discernible trend in tragedy for Delphi to act favourably toward Athens, the sample of oracles from Dodona is too small for a similar conclusion to be drawn.[262]

Expanding beyond the texts, Bowden stresses the constant interaction of Athenian gods and heroes with Delphi and its oracle in art, tragedy and public speech.[263] There is little evidence for a similar position for Dodona during the classical period. While there may not be as detailed a picture of 'what Athenians

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[258] Soph. *Trach*. 170-4, 821-5 and esp. 1165-75. See Bowden 2005, 40-55.
[259] Soph. *Trach*. 1165-75. Deianeira had been tricked into poisoning Heracles by the centaur Nessos.
[260] Aesch. *PV* 661.
[261] Aesch. *PV* 833.
[262] Bowden 2005, 54-5.
[263] Bowden 2005, 64.

thought of' Dodona from these sources, Athenians were certainly interacting with the sanctuary at both a state and individual level throughout the fourth century. The audience of an assembly speech of this period, then, was familiar with Dodona as an oracular sanctuary in their world and from its role in tragedy and other forms of storytelling. In this tradition, both Dodona and Delphi could offer both clear and cryptic prophecies to human characters at the same time. The following examples of oracles in Athenian rhetoric will show far less emphasis on the difficulty of comprehending divine wisdom.

False Embassies and True Oracles

An early instance of how orators could use oracles from Dodona is also the only oracle to be reinterpreted, or redirected, by another speaker. This lone example of reinterpretation reflects the separation of oracular discourse in oratory from the larger body of literary sources on which existing scholarship has focused. Lisa Maurizio's model of oracular storytelling in the Greek world placed emphasis on the 'interpretation' phase of the oracle story.[264] The prophecy from the *Trachinae* above shows that Dodona could fit Maurizio's framework. As Heracles so openly explains, both he and Deianeira thought that they had correctly interpreted the oracle only to realise its true meaning after being forced to reconsider.[265] Oracles rarely have this revelatory role in surviving speeches from Athenian public discourse.

Demosthenes prosecuted Aeschines in 343, preserved in a speech usually referred to as *On the False Embassy*, on the grounds that Aeschines had taken bribes from Philip during negotiations for the unpopular Peace of Philocrates in 346.[266]

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[264] Maurizio 1997, 311.
[265] Soph. *Trach*. 1160-75.
[266] MacDowell 2000, 20-22.

While Demosthenes raises a similar number of religious issues and arguments as we saw in the case concerning the crown in 330, stories and accusations featuring oracles are far less prominent.[267]   Apart from the often vague details of the bribery, Martin argues that Demosthenes uses religious themes to argue that Aeschines is at the margins of Athenian politics and society.[268] I suggest here that the references to Delphi contribute to Demosthenes' characterisation of Aeschines as an outsider susceptible to Philip's bribery.[269] The oracle from Dodona that Demosthenes reads to the audience, however, is not an example of this broad strategy. Thus, Demosthenes' use of the two oracular sanctuaries is different, so far as can be deduced from a single speech.

Before the oracle from Dodona is given, Demosthenes uses Athenian sentiment toward the Delphi to frame Aeschines as traitorously amicable with Philip. As Scott has shown, Athens' relationship with Delphi during late 340s was in no way simple.[270] This dynamic is evident in this speech from 343, as Demosthenes depicts Aeschines' singing of a paean at a feast with Philip as high treason:

> ἁπάντων γὰρ ὑμῶν τουτωνὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλι᾽ ἡγουμένων τοὺς ταλαιπώρους πάσχειν Φωκέας ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας, οὗτος εἰς τἀπινίκια τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ Θηβαῖοι καὶ Φίλιππος ἔθυον, εἱστιᾶτ᾽ ἐλθὼν καὶ σπονδῶν μετεῖχε καὶ εὐχῶν, ἃς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων τῶν ὑμετέρων τείχεσι καὶ χώρᾳ καὶ ὅπλοις ἀπολωλόσιν ηὔχετ᾽ ἐκεῖνος, καὶ συνεστεφανοῦτο καὶ συνεπαιώνιζεν Φιλίππῳ καὶ φιλοτησίας προὔπινεν.

> While you who are here and all other Athenians regarded the treatment of the Phocians as terrible and outrageous, such that you would not send any member of council or any judge to the Pythian games, but relinquished that traditional delegation, Aeschines attended the service of thanksgiving which the Thebans and Philip held to celebrate their victory and their political success, was a guest at the banquet, and took part in the libations and prayers with which Philip prayed for the destruction of the fortresses, the territory, and the armies of your allies. He even

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[267] See Martin 2009, 49-84.
[268] Dem. 19.30, 182-7, Martin 2009, 50-1.
[269] Dem. 19.128.
[270] Scott 2014, 245-56.

joined Philip in wearing garlands and singing paeans, and lovingly drank in his honour.[271]

While Delphi is not the focal point for this episode, which took place in Thebes, it is remarkable that Demosthenes used the sanctuary to provoke anti-Macedonian sentiment in this way. References to Delphi in the 330s, as has been established in previous chapters, have a strong tendency to support Athenian kings, heroes, politicians and festivals. In the passage above, while Demosthenes laments the loss of the traditional *theōria* to the Pythian games (τῆς πατρίου θεωρίας), he also portrays the liberation of the sanctuary from the Phocians as a negative outcome for Athens.[272] While a Macedonian army in mainland Greece and Philip's subsequent pre-eminence at Delphi were distressing developments for Athens, the Assembly had also voted at that time to send troops to aid in the removal of Phalaecus and the remaining the Phocians.[273] In this way, Demosthenes attempts to create a false polarity in past Athenian policy toward Delphi as anti-Phocian or anti-Macedonian.

Demosthenes resurrects his image of the corruption of Delphi as he concludes his prosecution:

> ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰ πάτρι᾽ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ κατασταθῆναι καὶ τὰ χρήματ᾽ εἰσπραχθῆναι τῷ θεῷ, οἱ μὲν ὄντες Ἀμφικτύονες φεύγουσι καὶ ἐξελήλανται, … ἡ πόλις δὲ τὴν προμαντείαν ἀφῄρηται. καὶ γέγονεν τὰ πράγματα πάνθ᾽ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα τῇ πόλει. ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἔψευσται καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἐβουλήθη διαπέπρακται, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἅπερ εὔξαισθ᾽ ἂν ἐλπίσαντες, τἀναντία τούτων ἑοράκατε γιγνόμενα, καὶ δοκεῖτε μὲν εἰρήνην ἄγειν, πεπόνθατε δὲ δεινότερ᾽ ἢ πολεμοῦντες· οὗτοι δὲ χρήματ᾽ ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας δίκην οὐ δεδώκασιν.

> Instead of the re-establishment of ancient rites in the Temple of Apollo, and the restitution of treasure to the god, men who were once Amphictyons are fugitives and exiles… and Athens is robbed of her precedence in the consultation of the Oracle. To Athens the whole business is an insoluble puzzle. Philip has never been deceived, and has accomplished all his purposes, while you, after expecting the complete fulfilment,

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[271] Dem. 19.128.

[272] See Cawkwell 1978, 103-4 for the complexity of Phocian, Athenian and Macedonian goals in the Peace of Philocrates.

[273] Philip at Delphi: Scott 2014, 245-6. Assembly activity on 16 Skirophorion 346: Cawkwell 1978, 104 and Harris 1995, 99.

have witnessed the entire disappointment, of your desires. You are nominally at
peace; yet peace has brought you greater calamities than war. Meantime these men
have made money by your misfortunes, and until today have never been brought to
justice.[274]

Here Demosthenes uses the audience's expectations of Delphic imagery to
highlight Aeschines' successful treason.[275] Athens losing *promanteia* is reflective of
an upheaval of the city's traditional relationship with Apollo so great that collusion
with the enemy must be the only explanation. As Parker has so clearly shown, the
concept of Athens being abandoned by Apollo (or any key divinity) was not one that
could be directly addressed in oratory.[276] Rather, blame is assigned to the folly or, in
this case, a conspiracy of individuals.[277] Athens' declining relationship with Delphi is
used by Demosthenes to show the consequences of Aeschines' treason. As with the
speeches from 330, insult to the god is described as insult to the sanctuary or temple
as a whole (ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ… τῷ θεῷ).[278] Demosthenes then contrasts practical language
of Delphic consultation (…τὴν προμαντείαν ἀφῄρηται) with the language of
epiphanic oracle stories (ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα τῇ πόλει).[279] The emphasis on the *polis* in
this sequence (ἡ πόλις… τῇ πόλει) suggests that Demosthenes could speak to a
concern that Athens might lose a relationship with Delphi that comforted its
citizens.[280] Demosthenes juxtaposes Athens' now limited ways of addressing external
uncertainty with Philip's apparent advantage (ὁ [Φίλιππος] μὲν οὐδὲν ἔψευσται…
ὑμεῖς [δέ]). Delphi is not the main focus of Demosthenes' accusations against

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[274] Dem. 19.327-8.
[275] This speech is far too long to have been given in full within the customary time constraints of
Athenian courtroom speeches. MacDowell argues that internal evidence suggests the speech that
remains was an expanded but not significantly amended version: MacDowell 2000, 23-4.
[276] Parker 1997, 1-2.
[277] Folly: Solon fr. 4 West; conspiracy: Aeschin. 3.130 *et al*.
[278] cf. Aeschin. 3.106.
[279] Epiphanic narratives: Kindt 2016, 163-4; αἴνιγμα as descriptive of oracular language in oratory:
Aeschin. 3.121.
[280] On Delphi as reassurance see Bowden 2005, 158-9.

Aeschines, but the orator still can use Athens' trust toward Delphi to develop a hostile image of the future without customary access to the sanctuary. While Demosthenes never claims Apollo has abandoned or deceived Athens, this is perhaps the most disquieting presentation of Delphi in Athenian public oratory. One of Lycurgus' oracular narratives shows oracular ambiguity punishing an Athenian traitor and Aeschines later accused Demosthenes of committing impiety towards Delphi, but the prospect of Apollo not resolving Athenian inquiries and leaving the future an αἴνιγμα would have been disconcerting to the *dēmos*.[281]

The differences between Demosthenes' use of Delphi in the passage above and the speeches from 330 reflect the ongoing effects of Athenian activity during Lycurgus' period of political ascendancy after Chaeronea. Delphi could be presented as ambivalent toward Athens in 343, but by the late 330s it was exclusively presented as actively interceding on Athens' behalf. Athens' apprehensive policy towards Delphi came to an abrupt halt in 340 when they announced their return to regular civic dedications by reinstalling the shields from Marathon inscribed with accusations of Theban treachery.[282] Does Demosthenes' use of Dodona before that very public gesture suggest that Athens had turned to the sanctuary in Epirus while access to the Pythia became practically and politically difficult?[283]

> ὅτι γὰρ ταῦτα φυλάττοισθ᾽ ἂν εἰκότως μᾶλλον ἢ πιστεύοιτε, τῶν θεῶν ὑμῖν μαντείαν ἀναγνώσομαι, οἵπερ ἀεὶ σῴζουσι τὴν πόλιν πολλῷ τῶν προεστηκότων μᾶλλον. λέγε τὰς μαντείας. "Μαντεῖαι"

> ἀκούετ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν θεῶν οἵ᾽ ὑμῖν προλέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν πολεμούντων ὑμῶν ταῦτ᾽ ἀνῃρήκασι, τοὺς στρατηγοὺς λέγουσι φυλάττεσθαι: πολέμου γάρ εἰσιν ἡγεμόνες οἱ στρατηγοί: εἰ δὲ πεποιημένων εἰρήνην, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας: οὗτοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται, τούτοις πείθεσθ᾽ ὑμεῖς, ὑπὸ τούτων δέος ἐστὶ μὴ παρακρουσθῆτε.

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[281] Lyc. *Leo.* 93; Aeschin. 3.108; see Bowden 158-9.
[282] Scott 2014, 253 with notes; Aeschin. 3.108-26.
[283] Eidinow suggests that Athens' consultations at Dodona increased in this period, although without speculating on the potential causes. Eidinow 2007, 61 n. 37.

> To enforce the warning that it is better to take those precautions than to be credulous, I will read to you an oracle of the gods — to whom Athens owes her salvation far more than to her most prominent politicians. Read the oracles. "Oracles"
>
> Men of Athens, hear the gods who are warning you. If they are addressed to you in time of war, they bid you beware of your commanders, for commanders are the leaders of warfare; if after conclusion of peace, of your statesmen, for they are your leaders, they have your obedience, by them you may haply be deceived.

While this passage does not suggest that Demosthenes was attempting to hide the provenance of the oracle he presents, he certainly does not place any emphasis on the process of consulting the oracular sanctuary or even the circumstances surrounding the pronouncement. Parke argues that the internal option of wartime or peacetime interpretations (εἰ μὲν τοίνυν πολεμούντων ὑμῶν… εἰ δὲ πεποιημένων εἰρήνην) suggests that the oracle was contemporaneous with the Peace of Philocrates.[284] This would place the consultation during a period in which Athens had limited access to Delphi, a situation for which Demosthenes paints Aeschines responsible. However, the motivation for their enquiry, while 'interesting to try and conjecture' as Parke terms it, cannot be reconstructed with any degree of confidence.[285] Thus, Demosthenes' use of the oracle does not correspond with the common 'crisis' phase of the oracle stories presented by other orators.[286] Without a clear dilemma to solve, the oracle shares few storytelling characteristics with the wider body of 'epiphanic' oracular narratives.[287]

Nevertheless, Demosthenes presents the divine pronouncement using vocabulary similar to that of Aeschines' far more involved story about Delphi.[288] Athens has been 'forewarned' by the gods (τῶν θεῶν οἳ᾽ ὑμῖν προλέγουσιν) to be on

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[284] Parke 1967a, 141.
[285] Quote from Parke 1967a, 141. Parke rightly avoids placing too much weight on his speculation.
[286] Lyc. *Leo*. 84, 93, 100; Aeschin. 3.108. 'Crisis' terminology, see Maurizio 1997.
[287] On epiphany see Platt 2011; Kindt 2016, 163-4; Petridou 2016.
[288] Aeschin. 3.108, 21-34.

its guard (φυλάττεσθαι).[289] While it is likely that the orators' language reflects common oracular phrasing, Demosthenes also expected these words to have persuasive impact without being part of a detailed narrative.

In this section, Demosthenes is attempting to persuade the audience not to be swayed by the endorsement that Eubulus, a prominent politician, will give to Aeschines in his defence.[290] Martin argues that Demosthenes uses the oracle to prompt the audience to decide between the authority of Eubulus and the authority of Zeus.[291] While Martin's interpretation that the oracle is not used in an overly pejorative way is sound, it should be noted that Demosthenes' argumentation highlights themes similar to the more emphatic oracular narratives of Aeschines or Lycurgus:

> … ἡ μαντεία δεῖν ὅπως ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιεῖν. ἅπασι τοίνυν μιᾷ γνώμῃ παρακελεύεται κολάζειν τοὺς ὑπηρετηκότας τι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὁ Ζεύς, ἡ Διώνη, πάντες οἱ θεοί. ἔξωθεν οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες, ἔνδοθεν οἱ συμπράττοντες… ἔτι τοίνυν κἂν ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνου λογισμοῦ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδοι τις, ὅτι πάντων ἐχθρότατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τὸ τὸν προεστηκότ᾽ ἐᾶν οἰκεῖον γίγνεσθαι τοῖς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῷ δήμῳ.

> … the oracle bids you strive that the enemy shall not rejoice. Therefore, you are all exhorted by Zeus, by Dione, by all the gods, to punish with one mind those who have made themselves the servants of your enemies. There are foes without; there are traitors within…. Moreover, it can be shown by mere human reasoning that it is extremely injurious and dangerous to permit the intimacy of a prominent statesman with men whose purposes are at variance with those of the people.[292]

Just as he would in *On the Crown*, Demosthenes contrasts divine knowledge with limited human reasoning.[293] Although human *logos* (κἂν ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνου λογισμοῦ) can recognise that Athens is in a precarious situation, only the gods reveal that Athenians ought to punish the traitors in their city. Thus, the oracle is given as a

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[289] cf. Aeschin. 3.130 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προύλεγον, οὐ προεσήμαινον οἱ θεοὶ φυλάξασθαι, μόνον γε οὐκ ἀνθρώπων φωνὰς προσκτησάμενοι;
[290] Martin 2009, 74.
[291] Martin 2009, 74.
[292] Dem. 19.300.
[293] Dem. 19.300 ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνου λογισμοῦ τοῦτ᾽ ἴδοι τις; Dem. 18.193 ὅσ᾽ ἐνῆν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον λογισμὸν εἱλόμην.

method of counteracting human propensity to be deceived (…ὑπὸ τούτων δέος ἐστὶ μὴ παρακρουσθῆτε).[294] Lycurgus also frames oracles a way of mitigating human limitations (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πολλοὶ ἤδη ἐξαπατήσαντες) as part of his prosecution of Leocrates.[295] Lycurgus emphasises the closeness of Athens and Delphi as crucial to obtaining divine advice, whereas Demosthenes gives the oracle from Dodona without the same attention to the details of Athens' relationship with the sanctuary. Nevertheless, the oracle from Dodona is fulfilling a very similar argumentative purpose in *On the False Embassy*. Despite the differences between Athens' history with the oracular sanctuaries of Dodona and Delphi, they are presented as helping Athens overcome uncertainty. Neither Apollo nor Delphi are depicted as offering unclear or potentially problematic advice. The consistency in these features shows a common oracular discourse that orators in the fourth century could draw from that was not entirely dependent on the sanctuary from which the oracle came.

Denigrating Demosthenes

This analysis has shown a consistency in vocabulary, themes and purpose of oracular discourse concerning both Dodona and Delphi in Athenian public oratory from the late fourth century. Existing scholarship has demonstrated these types of similarities shared between other genres and authors from the Ancient Greek world. For Kindt, the uniting question of this oracular discourse concerns the availability of divine knowledge to human inquirers.[296] As a result, there is usually a crucial phase of interpretation and reinterpretation of oracles that leads to a revelation or

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[294] Dem. 19.299.
[295] Lyc. *Leo.* 79.
[296] Kindt 2016, 157-8.

resolution.[297]   While the limited nature of human comprehension is a theme shared between these literary sources and speeches from the courts and assembly in Athens, these public speeches have rarely focused on interpreting the meaning of oracular advice. The oracles presented by Lycurgus, Aeschines and Demosthenes have, for the most part, stressed the clarity or at least directness of divine communication in oracles. While these orators have debated the theological ramifications of oracles, there has not been any discussion concerning the meaning of individual oracles.[298] For an example of an orator returning to a previously cited oracle to question its meaning we must wait until the very end of the classical period.

In 324/3, Athens was in the midst of the Harpalus affair.   Harpalus, Alexander's imperial treasurer, had fled Babylon for mainland Greece with a considerable grudge against Alexander and considerable resources at his disposal.[299] Athens eventually accepted Harpalus as a suppliant in 343, after much debate in the assembly, then detained the man and his reported 700 talents while the *polis* negotiated with Macedon at Olympia.[300] During the embassy, Harpalus escaped from Athens and the city found only 350 of the 700 talents left on the Acropolis. Demosthenes' intimate involvement at all stages of the affair made him a prime suspect to have appropriated funds. Rather than wait for a drawn out *eisangelia* procedure, Demosthenes pre-emptively launched an enquiry through an Areopagus that had often acted in his favour.[301]

While there is doubt about who delivered the speech *Against Demosthenes*, it was certainly written by Dinarchus. For our exploration of the way oracles are used

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[297] Kindt 2016, 157; Maurizio 1997, 311-2.
[298] Theological ramifications: Aeschin. 3.108-30 cf. Dem. 18.192-99, 252-6.
[299] Worthington 1992, 41-3; Diod. 17.108.4-6.
[300] Worthington 1992, 50; Din. 1.70, 89; Hyp. 5.9-10.
[301] Worthington 1992, 51 n. 35.

in the speech, this presents an interesting challenge. Lycurgus, Aeschines and Demosthenes all used oracles and oracle stories in a way dependent on their engagement, on behalf of Athens, with Delphi or Dodona. Dinarchus, however, was born in Corinth and does not appear to have ever gained Athenian citizenship.[302] The combination of Dinarchus' position as a metic and non-speaking logographer may contribute to the reserved rhetoric surrounding the oracle from Dodona:

> ἀκούσατε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι…καὶ τῆς μαντείας τῆς ἐλθούσης ἐκ Δωδώνης παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου· σαφῶς γὰρ ὑμῖν πάλαι προείρηκε φυλάττεσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ τοὺς συμβούλους. λέγε τὴν μαντείαν πρῶτον. "Μαντεία"

> I want you also, Athenians, to hear…the oracle sent from Dodona from Dodonian Zeus; for it has long been warning you clearly to beware of your leaders and advisers. Read the oracle first. "Oracle"[303]

The first time Dinarchus employs an oracle, it forms a very minor part of an argument compelling the jurors to hand down their most severe penalty on Demosthenes. The logographer does, however, adopt religious themes and language similar to Aeschines' condemnation of Demosthenes ten years before.[304] Demosthenes is again called the 'cursed man' of Greece in the strongest terms (τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον).[305] Further, Dinarchus attributes the present misfortunes of Athens to Demosthenes and urges the citizens not to continue sharing them (μὴ μὰ Δία…τῆς Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας καὶ ἀτυχίας κοινωνεῖν).[306] However, these arguments are not combined with the detailed oracular narrative of curses, oaths and impiety that Aeschines employed in *Against Ctesiphon*.[307]

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[302] Worthington 1992, 8; Dion. Hal. *Dinarchus*, 2.
[303] Din.1.78.
[304] See Worthington 1992.
[305] Din. 1.77, cf. Aeschin. 3.157.
[306] Din 1.77, cf. Aeschin. 3.130-1.
[307] Although many of the same terms are used e.g. ὁ μιαρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ αἰσχροκερδὴς, Din. 1.21.

Dinarchus does appear to carefully incorporate these existing criticisms into a prosecution that picks apart Demosthenes' defence speech from 330. Demosthenes' focus on the lack of control humans have over their fate (τύχη) in *On the Crown* is actively turned against him as Dinarchus argues that the leader of Athens has not allowed the city to recover its fortunes (…καὶ μεταβαλέσθαι τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἐᾶσαι).[308] The idea that Demosthenes has thrown the city into misfortune (τὸν εἰς τὰς δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ἐμβεβληκότα τὴν πόλιν) reverses Demosthenes' claim that the city always enjoyed good fortune (ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἀγαθὴν ἡγοῦμαι).[309] Demosthenes constructed this argument for the immutability of τύχη using an oracle from Dodona that asserted Athens' good fortune.[310] Dinarchus' inversion of Demosthenes' famous defence, although less intricate, also relies on an oracular pronouncement.

> οὐκ ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε καὶ καλῶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως βουλεύησθε: ἀλλὰ δέξεσθε τὴν ἀγαθὴν τύχην, ἢ τιμωρήσασθαι παρέδωκε τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δωροδοκίαν ταπεινὴν πεποιηκότας, καὶ φυλάξεσθε, καθάπερ οἱ θεοὶ προειρήκασιν ὑμῖν ἐν ταῖς μαντείαις πολλάκις, τοὺς τοιούτους ἡγεμόνας καὶ συμβούλους. ἀκούσατε δ᾿ αὐτῆς τῆς μαντείας. λέγε τὴν μαντείαν. "Μαντεία"

> Not if you [men of Athens] are prudent and make the right decision for yourselves and Athens. No, you will welcome good fortune, who presented to you for punishment those politicians who through their own bribery have humiliated the city. [sc. if you are prudent…] You will also be on your guard, as the gods have often cautioned you in oracles, against the leaders and counsellors of this type. Listen to the oracle itself. Read the oracle. "Oracle "[311]

Despite Dinarchus' focus on reversing Demosthenes' arguments concerning fate in *On the Crown*, the second citation confirms that this oracle from Dodona is different to the one cited by Demosthenes in 330. In fact, Dinarchus uses the same

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[308] Din. 1.77.
[309] Din. 1.77 and Dem. 18.253. See also Demosthenes' prayer (εὐτυχίαν μοι δοῦναι καὶ σωτηρίαν, Dem. 18.141).
[310] Dem 18.253.
[311] Din. 1.98.

oracle Demosthenes presented in 343 in the case on the embassy.[312] The choice to present the 'beware of your leaders' oracle rather than the 'good fortune' oracle suggests that the latter would not add nuance or authority to the argument Dinarchus was constructing. The speaker argues insistently that an impersonal conception of τύχη should not absolve Demosthenes of responsibility and that his personal misfortune (ἀτυχίας) has exacerbated the city's bad circumstances.[313] Even though the 'good fortune' oracle from *On the Crown* was an important part of Demosthenes' argumentation, it appears that the oracle cannot be reinterpreted to suit Dinarchus' counter-argument. Thus, the adversarial format of these speeches drastically alters the process of interpreting oracular pronouncements. The wording of the 'good fortune' oracle was such that Dinarchus could not reinterpret its meaning to persuade a new audience.

The oracle that was read to the audience of *Against Demosthenes* in 323, the 'beware your leaders' oracle, concludes Dinarchus' treatment of Demosthenes' allegedly nefarious political history.[314] Although Demosthenes used the same oracle in 343, there is no attempt by the speaker in 323 to highlight this fact or to offer any different interpretation of the pronouncement.[315] Both Dinarchus and Demosthenes draw the same phrase (μίαν γνώμην; μιᾷ γνώμῃ) from the oracle in an attempt to unite the juries to prosecute their respective defendants with 'one mind'.[316] Both orators also emphasise the susceptibility of the people to deception by their leaders. Dinarchus conflates the deceptive deeds of politicians with their specious words

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[312] Dem. 19.299 see Parke 1967a, 140-2.
[313] Din. 1.77 above; Din. 1.91: τῆς Δημοσθένους πονηρίας καὶ ἀτυχίας ἀπολαύειν, 92: καὶ μετοιωνίσασθαι τὴν τύχην καὶ μεταλλάξασθαι βουλόμεθα; 92: ἱκανὴν γὰρ εἰλήφατε πεῖραν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῆς τύχης.
[314] Worthington 1992, 256.
[315] At either point: Din. 1.77 and 98.
[316] Din. 1.99; Dem. 19.299.

(πράττωσιν ἐξαπατῶντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥᾷστα πειθομένους τοῖς τούτων λόγοις).[317] Demosthenes similarly highlights the ability of those in authority (τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας) to mislead (ὑπὸ τούτων δέος ἐστὶ μὴ παρακρουσθῆτε).[318] In both cases, the correspondence of the two orators' argumentation around the oracle of Dodona clearly shows that the same response was used in both cases.[319] While Parke was right to diplomatically suggest that this original response from Dodona was of 'a general kind', the bland generality of the 'beware your leaders' oracle can also be approached from another perspective. The consistent reuse of this oracle demonstrates a desire for clarity from the divine in both arguments. Dinarchus and Demosthenes have used this pronouncement to denounce different politicians (Demosthenes and Eubulus respectively), but they both present divine communication as a means to counter being misled by their leaders (ἐξαπατάω /παρακρούω).

Dinarchus' recycling of a response from Dodona used by Demosthenes twenty years prior further demonstrates consistency in the use of oracles during this period of Athenian politics. Human susceptibility to deception and misinterpretation is juxtaposed with the clarity and benevolence of divine advice. Although Dinarchus' prosecution inverts much of Demosthenes' theological defence in *On the Crown*, the oracle that formed a part of Demosthenes' argument was not challenged. Moreover, the oracle that contributes to Dinarchus' model of political responsibility shares the same function in *On the False Embassy*. Rather than being used to 'rouse the superstitious feelings of the jury', or amounting to 'another form of *topos* in the

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[317] Din. 1.99.
[318] Dem. 19.299.
[319] Parke 1967a, 141.

rhetorical repertoire', the oracles used by the orators reflect a coherent discourse on the form and function of oracular communication.[320]

In Meidias Res

The speeches examined so far in this chapter have shown that oracles from Dodona and Delphi, while not entirely interchangeable, were used for very similar purposes. I have also argued that orators, unlike tragedians or historians, avoided or actively reinterpreted the oracular tradition that highlighted the obscurity of divine language. The earliest extant citation of an oracle in Attic oratory, from the prosecution of Meidias in 347/6, conforms with these preliminary conclusions. Demosthenes presents two oracles, one each from Dodona and Delphi, to amplify the religious implications of Meidias' assault.[321] The oracles from *Against Meidias* are, however, among the only direct quotations of oracular responses from this corpus that have been preserved with the text of the speech.[322] Demosthenes uses these oracles to encourage the audience to view an offence against a *chorēgos* at a festival as both *asebeia* and *hubris*. Although there are many corruptions in the oracles, the consensus is that their content is genuine.[323] While the main focus of this analysis is on the function of oracular argumentation in these speeches, the text of the oracles provides further support for a consistent group of themes and vocabulary used by the orators to influence their audience.

Demosthenes prosecuted his long-time rival Meidias in 347/6 using an uncommon procedure called a *proboulē* that involved a preliminary hearing before the

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[320] Quotes: Parke 1967a, 140 and Worthington 1992, 249.
[321] Martin 2009, 22-7; MacDowell 1990, 270-77. cf Bowden 2005, 57 for more general treatment.
[322] See also Dem. 43.66.
[323] Parke and Wormell 1956, 337 (PW 282); Fontenrose 1978, 187-8 (F H28); MacDowell 1990, 270; Martin 2009, 22. Speculation that the oracles we have were inserted into the MS at some point seems unlikely considering Demosthenes' frequent reference to certain phrases. See Martin 2009, 22 n. 22.

assembly.[324] This hearing, although it was decided by a jury, did not carry any immediate penalties for either a guilty defendant or a frivolous prosecutor. Although Meidias had allegedly assaulted Demosthenes at the Dionysia of 348, the cited charge was less specific, given as 'wrongdoing concerning the festival'.[325] Demosthenes introduces the oracles as he argues that Meidias' assault on him amounted to impiety due to his position as *chorēgos*:

> ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι τοὺς χοροὺς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντας τούτους καὶ τοὺς ὕμνους τῷ θεῷ ποιεῖτε, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς περὶ τῶν Διονυσίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς μαντείας, ἐν αἷς ἀπάσαις ἀνηρημένον εὑρήσετε τῇ πόλει, ὁμοίως ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ ἐκ Δωδώνης, χοροὺς ἱστάναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ κνισᾶν ἀγυιὰς καὶ στεφανηφορεῖν. ἀνάγνωθι δέ μοι λαβὼν αὐτὰς τὰς μαντείας.

> You surely realise that all your choruses and hymns to the god are sanctioned, not only by the regulations of the Dionysia, but also by the oracles, in all of which, whether given at Delphi or at Dodona, you will find it ordained to the city to set up dances after the ancestral custom, to fill the streets with the savour of sacrifice, and to wear garlands.[326]

As noted above, this passage is the only that survives in which oracles from Dodona and Delphi are presented together. Demosthenes draws no distinction between the two (ὁμοίως ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ ἐκ Δωδώνης). As with many of the other citations of oracles we have seen, the context for the original inquiries is not given to the audience. As a result, there is no emphasis on the process of consulting the oracle or on the relationship of Athens (or Demosthenes) with the oracular sanctuaries.[327] The oracle from Dodona that Demosthenes gives in *On the False Embassy* is similarly devoid of surrounding information, perhaps suggesting that the abbreviated introductions to oracles in the 340s were influenced by the Athens' restricted access

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[324] See MacDowell 1990, 13-4.
[325] Dem. 18.193 ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν. Cf. MacDowell 1990, 14-15.
[326] Dem. 21.51.
[327] Fontenrose 1978, 187, 193-4.

to Delphi during its occupation by the Phocians.[328]   In contrast to the minimal introduction to the oracles, Demosthenes has two substantial oracular responses read to the assembly.[329] Even so, the orator unpacks the words from Delphi and Dodona for the audience:

> εἰσίν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ αὗται καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ μαντεῖαι τῇ πόλει κἀγαθαί. τί οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὑμᾶς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ; ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἄλλας θυσίας τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης μαντείας προφαινομένοις θεοῖς προστάττουσι θύειν, ἱστάναι δὲ χοροὺς καὶ στεφανηφορεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια πρὸς ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀφικνουμέναις μαντείαις προσαναιροῦσιν ὑμῖν. οἱ τοίνυν χοροὶ πάντες οἱ γιγνόμενοι καὶ οἱ χορηγοὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐκείνας ἃς συνερχόμεθ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα, κατὰ τὰς μαντείας ταύτας ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐστεφανώμεθα...

> Besides these oracles, men of Athens, there are many others addressed to our city, and excellent oracles they are. Now what conclusion ought you to draw from them? That while they prescribe the sacrifices to the gods indicated in each oracle, to every oracle that is published they add the injunction to set up dances and to wear garlands after the manner of our ancestors. Therefore, in the case of all the choruses that are constituted, together with their chorus-masters, during the days on which we meet in competition, these oracles make it clear that we wear our crowns as your representatives…[330]

While Demosthenes does not give contextual details for the responses, he does use similar language to the other orators communicating oracular meaning to their audience. The clarity of the gods' will is again stressed by the repetition of verbs with the prefix πρό-.[331] Perhaps due to the abbreviated details of consultation, the oracles themselves, rather than the gods responsible for them, have 'foreshown' (ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης μαντείας προφαινομένοις), 'prescribed sacrifice' (προστάττουσι θύειν) and 'further

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[328] Dem. 19.299. Most commentators have seen the oracle from *Against Meidias* as drawn from a state record of responses: see Fontenrose 1978, 187-194; Martin 2009, 209.   Martin would argue that Demosthenes' minimalistic framing of oracles was in alignment with his tendency to avoid explicitly religious argumentation. See Martin 2009, 209. On Phocian ascendency in the 350s see Scott 2014, 237-45.

[329] There is debate over the number of independent responses that make up this block of text. There appear to be two from each sanctuary, but the differences in dialect and verse may not signify that the two Delphic oracles are from distinct responses. See Fontenrose 1978, 253; MacDowell 1990, 270-1 and 274; Martin 2009, 22 n. 22.

[330] Dem. 21.54-5.

[331] Given lack of temporal specificity in this particular instance, it is difficult to decide on the force of the prefix here. Unlike Aeschin. 3.130, there is no emphasis on knowledge in advance (LSJ vol. IX πρός C. III 3 b.), suggesting that the more common implication of direction (LSJ vol. IX πρός C. I 2, 3). Nevertheless, these are intensified compound forms of the base verbs.

ordained' (προσαναιροῦσιν).[332] Unlike the majority of oracles in public discourse,

these oracles do not form part of an argument alluding to the weakness of human

reasoning. Nevertheless, the use of προφαίνω and προσαναιρέω shows the orator

using language that both he and his audience associated with clarity and the

expression of divine wisdom. As Demosthenes begins to relate the oracles to

Meidias' offenses, he stresses the connection between crowns and divinely ordained

festivals as similarly clear (δῆλον ὅτι…κατὰ τὰς μαντείας ταύτας). Thus, even when

orators do not actively present oracles as a remedy to human fallibility, the

vocabulary of divine communication remains positive and straightforward:

> εἰ μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ χορηγὸς ὢν ταῦτ᾽ ἐπεπόνθειν ὑπὸ Μειδίου,
> ὕβριν ἄν τις μόνον κατέγνω τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτῷ: νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ, κἂν ἀσέβειαν
> εἰ καταγιγνώσκοι, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν…τὸν οὖν εἴς τινα τούτων τῶν χορευτῶν ἢ
> τῶν χορηγῶν ὑβρίζοντ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἔχθρᾳ, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγῶνι καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ
> ἱερῷ, τοῦτον ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἀσεβεῖν φήσομεν;

> Now if I had not been chorus-master, men of Athens, when I was thus maltreated by
> Meidias, it is only the personal insult that one would have condemned; but under the
> circumstances I think one would be justified in condemning also the impiety of the
> act…If, then, a man commits a malicious assault on any member or master of these
> choruses, especially during the actual contest in the sacred precinct of the god, can we
> deny that he is guilty of impiety?[333]

These two passages bookend Demosthenes' quotation and very neatly

illustrate the purpose of this section of the speech. Demosthenes argues that Meidias'

punch represents an offence (ἀσεβῆμα) to the gods who established the choruses.[334]

Both MacDowell and Martin argue that the oracles do not directly (or even indirectly)

support Demosthenes' interpretation of Meidias' actions as impiety.[335] Although the

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[332] Προφαίνω is used in other contexts to refer to oracular pronouncements; προστάσσω usually used in
human (esp. military) contexts; προσαναιρέω is rare (concerning oracles cf. Pl. *Rep.* 461E), although
ἀναιρέω is one of the more common ways of describing oracular speech.
[333] Dem. 21.51-5.
[334] See MacDowell 1990, 18; Martin 2009, 22-4.
[335] The oracles show divine sanctioning of the choruses and wearing crowns, but offer no inviolability
to chorus leaders. The law presented concerning interference with choruses (Dem. 21.56-7) refers to
chorus members (performers) not their chorēgos. MacDowell 1990, 18; Martin 2009, 23-4.

oracles do not specifically define the action of assaulting a *chorēgos* as *asebeia*, it is clear that Demosthenes believed that they would help establish the religious significance of both Meidias' punch and his general anti-democratic character.[336] Thus, the oracles from *Against Meidias* demonstrate that orators expected the oracular voice to have a persuasive function without the characteristic hallmarks of oracle stories.

Believe the Hype

The interplay of oracles from Dodona and Delphi also occurs in the Hyperides' defence of Euxenippus from the late 330s.[337] Euxenippus was facing *eisangelia* proceedings for allegedly misreporting a dream he had during an official envoy.[338] Hyperides' brief defence speech argues that a private citizen could not be impeached by this procedure and that the defendant could not have been bribed to misreport his dream because he had no ties to Macedon.[339] In Hyperides' dismissive speech, he appeals to the authority that Pythian Apollo has over dreams.[340]

> εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ νυνὶ λέγεις, ἡγοῦ αὐτὸν καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ χαριζόμενόν τισι μὴ τἀληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ ψήφισμα ἐχρῆν σε πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον γράφειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ὁ πρότερος ἐμοῦ λέγων εἶπεν, εἰς Δελφοὺς πέμψαντα πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

> If, as you now maintain, you thought that he misrepresented the god and, out of partiality for certain persons, had made a false report to the people, rather than propose a decree disputing the dream you ought to have sent to Delphi, as the previous speaker said, and inquired the truth from the god[341]

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[336] Martin argues that the audience would not have been expecting an argument that focused so heavily on religious issues, Martin 2009, 22. For Demosthenes' characterisation of Meidias as anti-democratic see: Wilson 1991; Ober 1994.

[337] No earlier than 330 and no later than 324, Worthington, Cooper and Harris 2001, 103.

[338] Athens had sent three citizens to a sanctuary of Amphiaraus in Oropus to determine, through their dreams, whether all the land in the area was the property of the god. On this dream see Harris 2009, 157.

[339] Hyp. 4.7, 21-2; Worthington, Cooper and Harris 2001, 104.

[340] For a comprehensive review of dreaming and incubatory sanctuaries in the Greek world, see Renberg 2016.

[341] Hyp. 4.15.

Athenian decision-making concerning the sanctuary at Oropus deserves more attention than can be given here, but the way that Hyperides talks about the process is revealing. Even though the subject matter is a dream, Delphi is portrayed as a definitive method for determining the truth. Suspicion that Euxenippus might have given a false account (καταψεύσασθαι) or not testified the truth to the people (μὴ τἀληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήμῳ) should have been addressed by asking for the truth from Apollo (πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Hyperides succinctly attempts to show that *eisangelia* is an inappropriate procedure for this affair not only because Euxenippus is a private citizen, but also because this is an area in which humans should seek divine assistance. As with more detailed oracular narratives, Hyperides frames Delphi as method of overcoming (alleged) human deception and barriers to accessing knowledge.

The orator introduces the oracular authority of Dodona later in the defence as he seeks to show that Euxenippus' alleged misconduct concerning the cult of Health (Ὑγιεία) was in fact divinely sanctioned:

> ὑμῖν Ὀλυμπιὰς ἐγκλήματα πεποίηται περὶ τὰ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οὐ δίκαια … οὐ προσήκοντα αὐτὴν ἐγκλήματα τῇ πόλει ἐγκαλοῦσαν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Δωδωναῖος προσέταξεν ἐν τῇ μαντείᾳ τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς Διώνης ἐπικοσμῆσαι:

> Olympias has made complaints against you about the incident at Dodona…I explained to her envoys that the charges she brings against the city are not justified. For Zeus of Dodona directed you through the oracle to adorn the statue of Dione.[342]

Hyperides gives Athens' furnishing of a cult statue at Dodona as an example to show that dedications by *poleis* in other territories were customary. The directions from Dodona closely follow Bowden's summary of the presentation of Delphi in oratory, as the 'arbiter of correct conduct.'[343] The god directs Athens to take actions

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[342] Hyp. 4.24-5.
[343] Bowden 2005, 57.

(ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Δωδωναῖος προσέταξεν… ταῦτα τοῦ θεοῦ προστάξαντος.) that are presented as unproblematic, despite the objections of the regent of Molossia, Olympias.[344] Thus, Hyperides' attempt to defuse potential arguments from the prosecution suggests that oracles from Dodona and Delphi were used in very similar ways in the 320s, even after Athens' reengagement with Delphi in the Lycurgan era.

Isocrates in Isolation

> ταύτην τε γὰρ οἰκοῦμεν δόντων μὲν Ἡρακλειδῶν, ἀνελόντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ…ἐκείνην τ᾽ ἐλάβομεν παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ταῖς μαντείαις χρησάμενοι ταῖς αὐταῖς.

> For we inhabit Lacedaemon because the sons of Heracles gave it to us, because Apollo directed us to do so … and Messene we received from the same people, in the same way, and by taking the advice of the same oracle.[345]

The philosophical rhetoric of Isocrates offers a valuable counterpoint to the symbouletic oratory on which this thesis has focused.[346] While the uses of oracles in Isocrates were not presented directly to the Athenian *dēmos*, most of his speeches were composed in the style of public speech and certainly had an impact on the generation of logographers and *rhētores* explored here.[347] The comparison also has value because the most detailed oracle story that Isocrates presents is in the *Archidamus*, written in 366 from the perspective of the eponymous Spartan prince.[348] The Spartan perspective of the hypothetical speech demonstrates how Athenians might have conceived of the function of oracular authority in the assembly of another *poleis*. Isocrates' Archidamus urges the Spartan assembly not to accept the terms of

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[344] Olympias, Alexander's mother, held the regency over the region, Molossia, that controlled the sanctuary at Dodona.
[345] Isoc. 6.24.
[346] The bibliography examining Isocrates' works between philosophy and oratory is large. See esp. Halliwell 1997; Balla 2004; Livingston 2007.
[347] Papillon 2004, 15-6.
[348] Date: Papillion 2004, 12.

surrender that have been offered to them by Thebes in the aftermath of the Battle of

Leuctra in 371. The speaker recounts the Dorian settlement of Laconia in the time of

Heracles:

> πὶ δὲ τρίτης γενεᾶς ἀφίκοντο εἰς Δελφούς, χρήσασθαι τῷ μαντείῳ περί τινων βουληθέντες. ὁ δὲ θεὸς περὶ μὲν ὧν ἐπηρώτησαν οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν, ἐκέλευσε δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν πατρῴαν ἰέναι χώραν… σκοπούμενοι δὲ τὴν μαντείαν, εὕρισκον Ἄργος μὲν κατ᾽ ἀγχιστείαν αὐτῶν γιγνόμενον … Λακεδαίμονα δὲ κατὰ δόσιν… Μεσσήνην δὲ δοριάλωτον ληφθεῖσαν.

> In the third generation thereafter, they came to Delphi, desiring to consult the oracle about certain matters. Apollo, however, made them no answer to the questions which they asked, but merely bade them seek the country of their fathers. Pondering the meaning of the oracle, they discovered that Argos was theirs because of kinship… and Lacedaemon was theirs from a gift... and that they had taken Messenia as a spoil of war.[349]

Isocrates' story of the Dorian consultation of Delphi is, despite some

similarities, unlike the oracle stories presented by Athenian speakers in the assembly.

The Pythia does not offer a direct answer (οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν) to the initial inquiry, but

rather offers a vague response that forces the Dorians to re-examine their own

preconceptions and discover three connections their ancestors had to the land.

Epiphanic interactions with Delphi are commonplace in Greek literature, with both

positive and negative outcomes, but are almost entirely absent from Athenian public

speech.[350] The story of Callistratus being executed in Athens after consulting Delphi

is one of the few that could have prompted reflection on the process of

comprehending oracular wisdom. The focus of Lycurgus' narration of that story,

however, is on the fair and harsh punishment of traitors by the *polis*, not on any

moment of clarity in the subject of the oracle.[351] In contrast, the oracle presented in

the *Archidamus* follows the 'emplotment' of prophecies in Greek colonisation

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[349] Isoc. 6.18-9.
[350] See Kindt 2016, 163-4; Platt 2011; Petridou 2016.
[351] Lyc. *Leo.* 93 above.

stories.[352] Isocrates' hypothetical speaker tells the foundation story of Sparta using the symbolic language of Greek colonisation — crisis, Delphic consultation and resolution.

Isocrates then expands on the foundation narrative, using oracular authority to justify Sparta continuing to occupy Messenia despite the Theban demands to surrender:

> ἐπερόμενοι δὲ τὸν θεόν, κἀκείνου προστάξαντος δέχεσθαι ταῦτα καὶ τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἠδικημένοις, ἐκπολιορκήσαντες Μεσσηνίους οὕτως ἐκτήσασθε τὴν χώραν.
>
> And you, after inquiring of Apollo, and being directed by him to accept this gift and avenge the wronged, you then besieged the Messenians, forced them to surrender, and thus gained possession of their territory.[353]

Archidamus is here exhorting the Spartan assembly to view Messenia rightfully theirs, bequeathed to them by their forefathers as directed (προστάξαντος) by Pythian Apollo. The language of divine communication employed by Isocrates is here almost identical to that used fifty years later by Hyperides.[354] Although Isocrates refers to the god at Delphi and Hyperdides to the god at Dodona, the oracles 'order' (προστάξαντος) the enquirers to carry out actions that the speakers wish to portray as upstanding. Similarly, the clear differences between the modern 'authenticity' of the oracles used by Isocrates and Hyperides has no discernible impact on how the logographers have used them.[355] For the logographer, oracular authority could justify or encourage actions regardless of the recency of the consultation.

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[352] Dougherty 1993, 6.
[353] Isoc. 6.23 = PW 296 = F. Q13.
[354] Hyp. 4.24-5 αὗτα τοῦ θεοῦ προστάξαντος. Cf. Isoc. 6.23 ἐπερόμενοι δὲ τὸν θεόν, κἀκείνου προστάξαντος δέχεσθαι ταῦτα.
[355] Fontenrose 1978, 273 classes the oracle given to the Spartans as 'not genuine'. The oracle instructing Athens to furnish a cult image of Dione at Dodona is viewed as historical by Parke: Parke 1967a, 142. Given that Hyperides recorded the oracle within ten or so years of the initial consulation, Fontenrose would likely also consider it genuine.

Isocrates capitalises on the famous interactions between the mythical early founders of Sparta and the oracle of Delphi to develop an argument that he thought might have been approporiate for Archidamus to have given. The speaker goes on to highlight that the Messenians also consulted Delphi, only to be ignored:

> …πεμψάντων ἀμφοτέρων εἰς Δελφούς, κἀκείνων μὲν σωτηρίαν αἰτούντων, ἡμῶν δ᾽ ἐπερωτώντων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστ᾽ ἂν κρατήσαιμεν τῆς πόλεως, τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲν ἀνεῖλεν ὡς οὐ δικαίαν ποιουμένοις τὴν αἴτησιν… καίτοι πῶς ἄν τις μαρτυρίαν μείζω καὶ σαφεστέραν τούτων παράσχοιτο;

> …both sides sent delegations to Delphi, the Messenians appealing for deliverance and we inquiring how we could most speedily make ourselves masters of their city, the god gave them no answer, thus showing that their appeal was unjust… How could anyone furnish testimony more significant or clearer than this?[356]

There are no other examples in Athenian speechwriting of this period that infer a just result from a lack of oracular response, perhaps further highlighting that the oracles in the *Archidamus* serve a different purpose to those of later speeches. Nevertheless, these examples show Isocrates' attempt to incorporate the oracular features of colonisation stories into rhetoric. While the content of the oracle itself is unlike those of later oratory, there are similarities in the language used to describe oracular consultation. Delphi is portrayed as being a constant ally of the audience for whom the speech was intended. Archidamus uses communication from Apollo, again referred to as 'the god' (ὁ δὲ θεὸς…οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν…ἐπερόμενοι δὲ τὸν θεόν), to justify actions that were contested by other *poleis*.[357] In contrast, the *Archidamus* offers the only example of a Delphic response in rhetoric that required internal reflection on behalf of the enquirers to lead to a positive resolution. Archidamus uses the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication to stress the tripartite connection that the Dorians discovered and developed with the lands of Sparta and Messene.

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[356] Isoc. 6.31-2.
[357] Isoc. 6.18-23 cf. Lyc. *Leo.* 87, 93, 99; Hyp. 4.15.

Conclusion

ἀκούετε, ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅτι ταὐτὰ λέγει ὅ τε Σόλων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ μαντείᾳ, κελεύων τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ποιεῖν τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐν ταῖς καθηκούσαις ἡμέραις. ἀλλὰ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔμελεν Θεοπόμπῳ οὐδὲ Μακαρτάτῳ τουτῳί...

You hear, men of the jury, that Solon in the laws and the god in the oracle use the same language, bidding the relatives to perform rites for the departed on the proper days. But neither Theopompus nor the defendant Macartatus cared at all for these things...[358]

To conclude this chapter, it is worth looking at the most 'dull' citation of an oracle in the speeches that we have covered.[359] The speaker of *Against Macartatus* cites an oracle from Delphi that endorses a wide variety of cult practices, only a few of which relate to the funeral customs that are the focus of the argument.[360] Bowden has put forward that this type of oracle represents one end of a spectrum, at the other end of which are the farcical oracle exchanges such as the passage of the *Knights* in which Athenian politicians trade hyperbolically obscure oracles.[361] In oratory, the oracle above establishes some sort of normative practice, one that the speaker says the accused has transgressed. In contrast, the humour of the passage from Aristophanes derives from a wilful and sizeable exaggeration of the expected use of oracles by Athenian public figures.

This chapter has shown that there are more influences on this spectrum of oracles than have previously been examined. Demosthenes' use of Delphi in *On the False Embassy* illustrated that contact with the oracular sanctuary was so crucial for the Athenian public that the prospect of losing access to Delphi could be framed as a profound existential threat. The oracle from Dodona in the same speech showed that

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[358] Dem. 43.66.
[359] Fontenrose refers to the 'dull' instructions that this oracle and others similar give for cult activity, Fontenrose 1978, 32-3.
[360] Dem. 43.66 = PW 283 = Fontenrose H29.
[361] Bowden 2005, 56.

the oracular voice was cited as a method of overcoming uncertainty in the *polis*, even if the prophecy came from a place other that Delphi. The contrast between how Delphi was portrayed in 343 and 330 also suggests that the orators' use of oracles in their speeches both reflects the relationship of Athens with its oracular sanctuaries at different points in time.

Dinarchus' recycling of the 'beware of your leaders' oracle demonstrated the tendency to avoid reinterpreting or challenging the core meaning of oracles in the public sphere. Although the speaker contests many theological ideas and arguments in prosecuting Demosthenes, the oracle itself has the same meaning and is used for the same argumentative purpose. The oracle from Dodona encouraging Athenian activity at that sanctuary, cited by both Demosthenes and Hyperides, further demonstrated the emphasis on the clarity of the oracular voice in speeches from this period. Both speakers use the oracles as a way of authorising behaviour that they want their audience to view favourably.

This example sat in opposition to the final oracle from Isocrates' earlier logographic exercise, the *Archidamus*. Isocrates' unperformed rhetoric highlighted the idiosyncratic way of using the oracular voice in speeches presented to the Athenian public. Although Isocrates' narration of the foundation of Sparta frequently mentioned the approval of Pythian Apollo for the Dorian cause, the meaning of the oracular response itself was elusive. In a manner consistent with the wider body of Greek *aitia*, the founders only uncovered the meaning of the oracle through reflection and a series of difficulties. Rather than complicating the patterns that have emerged in the usage of oracles by orators of the later fourth century, the oracular narrative in the *Archidamus* throws the other oracles of Athenian rhetoric into sharper relief. Isocrates' speech shows that the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication that

features in foundation stories, while being suited to hypothetical defence of Spartan control over Messenia, was not a persuasive way of introducing oracular authority in Athenian oratory.

Conclusions

ὡς δὲ ἀπελθόντες οἱ θεοπρόποι ἀπήγγελλον ἐς τὸν δῆμον, γνῶμαι καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ γίνονται διζημένων τὸ μαντήιον καὶ αἵδε συνεστηκυῖαι μάλιστα…. κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπεα συνεχέοντο αἱ γνῶμαι… οὗτος ὡνὴρ [Θεμιστοκλέης] οὐκ ἔφη πᾶν ὀρθῶς τοὺς χρησμολόγους συμβάλλεσθαι… ὡς τούτου ἐόντος τοῦ ξυλίνου τείχεος.

When the messengers had left Delphi and laid the oracle before the people, there was much inquiry concerning its meaning…The opinions [of the Athenians and the *chresmologoi*] were confounded by these lines…[Themistocles] claimed that the readers of oracles had incorrectly interpreted the whole of the oracle…. [and that] they should believe their ships to be the wooden wall and so make ready to fight by sea. [362]

The most famous interaction between Athenian politians and the oracular is one that this thesis has so far avoided. Herodotus' story of Themistocles and the 'wooden wall' oracle can, however, help to highlight some of the results of this study. The oracles used in the Athenian assembly during the fourth century bear little resemblance to Herodotus' account of a very important oracle debated in the Athenian assembly at the start of the fifth century.[363] In the brief passage above and throughout his narrative of Athens' response to the Persian invasion before battle at Salamis, Herodotus emphasises the uncertainty of the city's future.[364] The forboding and enigmatic oracle is exacerbated by the conflicting interpretations of the divine advice put forward by Athens' public figures.

The oracles presented in the assembly during the late fourth century have significantly differed from those in Herodotus' account at almost every level. There

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[362] Hdt.7.142-3.

[363] This passage of Herodotus is covered in detail in almost all of the monographs on Delphi cited in the thesis so far: Crahay 1956, 295-304; Parke and Wormell 1956, 169-170; Fontenrose 1978, 124-9; Bowden 2005, 100-8 cf. Kindt 2016, 50-2.

[364] See esp. Hdt. 140-2 for the unique 'double consultation'. I agree with Bowden's reconstruction of the orginial oracle being a single response to an inquiry into cult maintenance if Athens were evacuated, see Bowden 2005, 106-7. On the consistency of the verses given as separate responses by Herodotus, see Crahay 1956, 295-302; Harrison 2000, 151-2.

is no evidence in that orators contested or even ruminated on the meaning of oracular pronouncements in the assembly. On an authorial level, Herodotus accentuates the enigmatic mode of oracular communication, whereas Athenian orators stress the clarity of divine communication to the *polis*.[365]

Chresmoi and Characteristics

This thesis has collected and analysed the oracles used in Athenian speeches between 347/6 and 324. It should be noted in conclusion that these year limits are imposed by the source material, as no speech presented to the assembly before *Against Meidias* uses oracles as part of its argumentation.[366] During the ensuing period, roughly 18% of the speeches that survive feature oracles.[367] Although it has not been the main focus of this analysis, the disparity between the late fourth century and the earlier 'wave' of Attic orators (Antiphon, Andocides and Lysias), from whom a comparable number of speeches but no oracles remain, deserves some consideration. A possible explanation for the quantum of difference is the relative percentage of forensic and assembly speeches. Almost all of Lysias' speeches are from private cases, in which recourse to the oracular seems to have been less common.[368]

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[365] The possible exception is Lycurgus' story of Callistratus misinterpreting an oracle, Lyc. *Leo*. 93. The demise of a man exiled from Athens for treason could well be understood as an example of the oracle supporting Athens. As noted throughout, examples that deviate from these general rules are used to convey specific meaning that reinforces norms: Callistratus misinterpreted a Delphic oracle because he was impious (Lyc. *Leo.* 93); Demosthenes avoided consulting Delphi to mislead the *demos* (Aeschin. 3.130).

[366] The exclusion here is Isocrates, whose works include oracle stories (Isoc. 6.23-31). An interesting aside is Lysias' *On the Sacred Orgas*, which manages to avoid the oracular realm as it has been treated here, despite Delphi's central role in the dispute. On which see Bowden 2005, 90.

[367] 12 oracles and oracle stories from roughly 64 complete speeches from the Attic orators. I include in this number most potentially spurious speeches from the Demosthenic corpus as they remain reliable as evidence for speechwriting during the period, even if Demosthenes himself did not write them. Fragments have been excluded.

[368] Todd 2007, 1 n. 2 surmises that there are six symbouletic and epideictic speeches from of the 31 speeches in the *Corpus Lysianicum*. Dem. 21.51 and Dem. 43.66 are the only forensic speeches to

Any conclusions drawn from the comparison between the first and second 'waves' of Athenian oratory alone are, however, speculative. While this analysis has primarily focused on the texts of Athenian speeches, I have also sought to incorporate the growing body of scholarship holistically examining the relationship between Athens and Delphi.[369] The increase in Athenian dedications, *theōriai*, artisanry and theatrical involvement at Delphi is related to the emergence of oracles as persuasive features of public speeches. The contrast between the first and second halves of the fourth century is in this way telling. Athens' restricted access to Delphi during the Peloponnesian War and its lingering aftermath may contribute to the discrepancy between these two periods of oratory.[370] In contrast, Athens actively expanded its relationship with the sanctuary and its oracle from the middle of the fourth century onwards.

The oracles used by Lycurgus and Aeschines are complemented by the orators' interaction with Delphi outside of the assembly. Lycurgus in particular was a key leader of a wider Athenian movement that emphasised the worship of Apollo as an ancestor of the Ionic people. The cult of Apollo Patroos, increased Athenian building activity at Delphi and growth in genealogies that link Apollo to Athens all contributed to a climate in which oracles from Delphi 'meant something special' to Athens.[371] I have argued that the oracles quoted in these speeches should also be included in our understanding of Athens' self-association with Delphi. Orators invariably cite Delphi as an ally of the Athenian *polis* in its mythological past and

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feature oracles (although *Against Meidias* may not fit any of these speech classifications particularly well).

[369] E.g. Humpreys 2004; Bowden 2005; Scott 2008; Csapo and Wilson 2014; Csapo forthcoming.

[370] The impact of the war on how Delphi appears in Athenian sources is well covered by Bowden 2005, 57-64, 75-9 and Scott 2008, 211-21.

[371] Quote from Bowden 2005, 57 in reference to Demosthenes' prayer to Pythian Apollo at Dem. 18.141.

recent history. The increase (or introduction) of oracles in public oratory during the fourth century, then, both reflected and progressed this religious and cultural change in Athens.

End Quote

The focus of this thesis has been to explore the ways in which oracles were used in Athenian oratory. I have shown that orators not only read verbatim quotes of the Pythia to the audience but also appropriated various features of a broader tradition of oracular storytelling tradition in their attempts to influence the votes held by their audience. Any distinction between directly quoted oracles and oracle stories has, for the most part, proven to be a false dichotomy. Orators relied on the impact of both methods of invoking oracular authority, regardless of whether the oracle could be read back from a recent consultation or whether it was passed down through an oral storytelling tradition.[372] Moreover, there are also key points of argumentation that relied on the audience's experiences and emotions toward oracles and oracular sanctuaries rather than the words of any oracle itself. This body of oracles and oracular argumentation reaffirms that oracles must be understood as 'inseparable from the stories told about them'.[373]

What, then, should we make of the oracles of oratory and the 'stories told about them'? For Kindt, one of the clearest responses to this question for other texts has been that oracle stories were a way of making sense of the external world. The process of narrative structuring and the forced reflection of the 'enigmatic mode' of oracular communication shows how humans of ancient Greece perceived their relationship with their divinities.[374] The function of oracles in oratory relied on and

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[372] Even the oracles at Dem. 21.51-2 and Dem. 43.66 are referred to during the body of the speech.
[373] Kindt 2016, 14.
[374] Kindt 2016, 162-5.

developed this tradition of exploring meaning through the oracular voice. Orators introduced this oracular authority, however, to strengthen a particular way in which they are encouraging the assembly to view human and divine interaction. I suggest that the consistent clarity of divine wisdom in rhetorical oracle stories was a purposeful appropriation of existing oracular narrative tradition to suit a persuasive form of puplic speech that flourished and diversified during this period.

Normative narratives?

The narrative elements of the oracles of oratory are often similar to those in other literary sources. Most tales, even the very succinct, presented a 'crisis' and lead to a 'confirmation'.[375] However, we have consistently seen orators tell stories about oracles that minimise the difficulty of comprehending divine communication. Oracles that do not require interpretation, by either the characters in the tales or their audience, offer a different perspective on the 'human quest for meaning' present in oracle stories from foundation myths or the history of Herodotus.[376] Nevertheless, this study has demonstrated that the oracles in oratory speak to the same theological issues as other sources using oracular discourse by addressing human susceptibility to deception and misinterpretation. Orators tell us that humans struggle to see the real motives for the actions of others and that the solution to this is invariably through recourse to the oracular.

Lycurgus' stories showed two Athenian kings saving their city from foreign invasion by following the instructions of Pythian Apollo. Most strikingly, the kings acted without considering the consequences of the oracle, or even whether they had

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[375] Terms from Maurizio 1997. The missing option would be an example of 'refutation', explaining the recognition of one's misinterpretation of an oracle. The only tale that would (potentially) feature this phase is that of Callistratus: Lyc. *Leo*. 93.
[376] Quote from Kindt 2016, 157.

interpreted divine speech correctly. It has been suggested elsewhere that Lycurgus' retelling of the Erechtheus myth heavily redacts the problematic concepts that were the likely focus of Euripides' version.[377] The contrast between the roles of the oracle in each of these retellings of the same story is informative. While the oracular instruction remains the same, Euripides' story explored the limits of patriotism while Lycurgus' reinterpretation sought to demonstrate the necessity of unwavering patriotism in the face of an uncertain future.

Between the two narratives of kingly sacrifice endorsed by Delphi is the only tale from oratory in which a person misunderstands an oracular pronouncement. Lycurgus uses the story of the treacherous Callistratus' optimistic interpretation of 'τεύξεται' as a contrasting example to the pious acquiescence to Delphi of the Athenian kings.[378] Although the 'enigmatic mode' is not a key feature of Lycurgus' oracular narratives, the orator does define the human by its opposition to the divine. In this way, the oracles of oratory are in conversation with the oracular themes of wider Greek thought.

Aeschines develops his accusations of Demosthenes' impiety through a long and detailed narrative of Athenian interaction with Delphi. Unlike the condensed and simple storytelling of Lycurgus, Aeschines places emphasis on the process of consulting the Pythia and the associated features of the oracular world, such as a curse and an oath. Aeschines' story seeks to highlight Demosthenes' irresponsible relationship with Delphi and all things divine by emphasising the clarity of Apollo's communication to the *polis*. The oracular narratives of *Against Ctesiphon* illustrate the interaction between oratory and religious storytelling. Aeschines' conscious

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[377] Wilson 1996, 313-4.
[378] Lyc. *Leo*. 93.

inversion of the riddling divine language of other oracle stories demonstrates that orators drew from the same tradition to develop new and persuasive interpretations of human and divine actions.

Demosthenes' response to Aeschines' storytelling showed alternate methods of invoking oracular authority. Demosthenes could employ a prayer to Pythian Apollo and an oracle from Dodona to support the validity of his competing interpretation of divine involvement in Athens' affairs. Demosthenes prayed to ensure the truthfulness of his words and the oracle endorsed a theological challenge to the negative model of personal responsibility presented by Aeschines.[379] These two speeches show orators using oracles to coordinate and authorise their narratives of the human relationship with the divine. These oracles do not involve highlighting the separation between human and divine language, but rather frame the oracular as a reliable means of overcoming human limitations within the traditional structures of the *polis*.

The oracles that featured less prominently in the speeches collected in the final chapter conform to these patterns. The oracular is presented in oratory as a counterweight to the deception present in both Athenian politics and more general human nature. The image of Delphi in *On the False Embassy* showed that Apollo's favour for Athens was so important to the audience that orators could use a lack of oracles to symbolise a menacing future. The consistency of oracular favour and directness in the various examples from Dodona demonstrate that divine communication was portrayed as clear and beneficial regardless of the sanctuary from which it came.[380]

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[379] Eidinow 2007, 149-50.
[380] See below for consideration of the oracles and *chresmologoi* not cited by these orators.

The Oracular and the Spectacular

In fourth century rhetoric, then, orators turned to the oracular to establish moral and religious certainty in their audience. For the most part, orators involved oracular authority without quoting long verses of hexameters from the Pythia or recounting long stories of interpretation and epiphany spurred by an enigmatic prophecy. Oracular authority in rhetoric did, however, rely on the textual and oral traditions in which these storytelling and ritual features played an important role.

The oracles of oratory offer further insight into the role of the divine in the everyday lives of people in the ancient world. The importance of the oracular in these people's lives certainly did not depend on the 'historicity' of an individual oracular response. The way in which orators adapt and appropriate oracular authority in their speeches demonstrates that the oracular realm remained a crucial way of addressing future uncertainty in the shifting times of the late fourth century.

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