

**Who Are the Jordanians? The Citizen-Subjects of
Abdullah II**

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This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

Paul Esber, March 31, 2018

Abstract

Who are the Jordanians? This dissertation approaches this question from the position of *how*: how is Jordanian citizenship thought of and practiced? As such this is not a study of national identity, but of citizenship. *Al-sh'ab yureed*...Much has been said about this clarion call which echoed in streets and squares across the Arab world in 2011/2012. Jordanians shared with their co-demonstrators in Egypt, the Yemen, and Tunisia among others, a basis on which their claims, regardless of substantive differences, were made: a citizenship of their respective countries. Such is of interest in the context of the Arab world as scholars of twentieth century politics have following Hudson, acknowledged that 'the solution' to the absence or abject weakness of legitimacy from Morocco to Iraq involves the facilitating of a kind of political participation often identified with being a citizen. However actual examinations of citizenship remain limited. Explorations beyond conceiving of it as little more than a status of belonging, remain little more than isolated oases in a scholarly desert saturated with the sands of democratisation and authoritarian persistence. The dissertation that follows is an investigation into the practice and theory of Jordanian citizenship. Divided into three parts and six chapters, the thesis makes several principal arguments.

Part one: *Citizens and Subjects? Theorising on History* consists of the first three chapters. It establishes on the one hand, what I mean when speaking of a citizenship approach, and on the other, assert that such an endeavour is a worthy one to pursue. Second it is advanced that citizenship has a specific historical pedigree in the Anglo-European context that its Arabic counterparts do not, which becomes problematic when these Anglo-European assumptions influence approaches to citizenship in the Arab world. Subsequently, there is a need to elucidate the historical development of *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*. Third, this development is contextualised within Jordanian political history. The historical construction of Jordanian citizenship is situated in its contemporary context since the ascension of Abdullah II in 1999, and the events of 2011/2012 are rendered as direct products of the immediate decade's political and economic trajectory.

Part two: *Citizenship in Contemporary Jordan*, containing chapters four, and five. Chapter four, which makes use of fieldwork conducted in Jordan, uses contemporary reflections on Jordanian citizenship from Jordanians as a lens through which the first decade of Abdullah II's reign is analysed. Both economic and political decisions are analysed in order to highlight a key characteristic of citizenship's theory and practice: the absence of accountability and ownership. The thesis then provides analysis of the 2011/2012 uprisings in Jordan, situating them as a citizen search for ownership and accountability. This search is put into focus comparatively with an analysis of the first five discussion papers of King Abdullah II, which address directly the royal perceptive on the role of citizens in post-2011 Jordan. Part three: *Practices Within and Between Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah*, is composed of chapters six, seven and eight, with a focus on contemporary affairs in the Jordan. Three areas: the gendering of citizenship, the politics of citizen expression and the intersections between tribalism and citizenship, are explored.

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Note on Transliteration and Translation

In the process of acquiring the information for this dissertation I have relied on Arabic sources both written and oral. Accordingly I have applied a standard of transliteration from the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) system of Arabic transliteration, to which I have to the best of my ability remained faithful throughout. Exceptions exist when an individual has a preferred spelling in English or a noun or phrase has a familiar form, Amman instead of ‘Amman for example. Should a careful Arabic reader find fault with my execution I can only hope she or he will forgive my unintended transgression. Unless otherwise stated all translations whatever their faults, belong to the author.

Introduction

The Scope of the Inquiry

"في الاردن نظام الحكم ثابت، والشعب هو المتغير".¹

Al-sh'ab yureed...Much has been said about the clarion call which echoed in streets and squares across the Arab world in 2011/2012. Beginning first in Tunisia following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 10 December 2010, the uprisings against the authoritarian status quo did not remain confined to Tunisia, but spread both West and East. From 7 January 2011 Jordan bore witness to its own vision of what has become known as the Arab Spring.² Unlike their counterparts in Bahrain, Egypt, the Yemen, or Tunisia, Jordanians overwhelmingly demanded reform as opposed to revolution. Yet, at the same time the *sh'ab al-urduni* - the Jordanian people - mobilising in demonstrations unprecedented in the Kingdom's history in terms of their temporal and spatial breath, shared two realities with their contemporaries. Firstly, they occupied public space to make claims, which in Jordan's case involved both political and economic demands for accelerating the kingdom's reform trajectory, serious efforts to combat corruption, and an improvement of transparency in political decision-making. Secondly, Jordanians shared with their co-

¹ 'In Jordan the regime stays the same whereas the people change': Nahed Hattar, 'Min Huwe al-Urduni?' *al-Hadath*, November 01, 1995.

² For an in-depth exploration into the epistemological significance of labelling the uprisings in particular ways see Lucia Sorbera, 'Writing Revolution: New Inspirations, New Questions', *Postcolonial Studies* 17 (2014): 104-108; 'Aādil al-Şafti, 'al-Rabi'a al-'Arabi...Mādtha ya'ani?' *al-'Arabiya*, August 05, 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/05/160884.html>, (accessed April 16, 2014).

demonstrators a basis on which their claims were, regardless of substantive differences, made: citizenship of their respective countries. The events of 2011 and 2012 in Jordan, may be considered then, as an endeavour, on the part of Jordanians, to acquire full citizenship, accountability and ownership within their country.

An immediate series of questions arise concerning epistemically: who is a citizen? Who, on the other, is a non-citizen? What, if any shades of grey exist between these binary categories? And within this, what are the implications for those residing within this in-between space? Each of these are deserving of substantial analysis in their own-right, and are regrettably beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is necessary to preface the subsequent substance of the forthcoming argument with the following elaboration on the nexus between citizen and non-citizen.

To be a citizen according to international law, is to be a person ‘recognized by a State as having an effective link with it’.³ Just what an *effective link* means in practice is the prerogative of each individual state to determine, leaving considerable space for differing interpretations and applications of the principles of *jus soli* (law of place) and *jus sanguinis* (law of blood) that underpin citizenship regimes across the world.⁴ Non-citizens meanwhile encompass a broad spectrum of individuals including: stateless persons, migrants, seekers of asylum, permanent residents, and temporary visitors. Their relationships to the state in which they reside therefore, are dependent on a range of differing legal regimes, some of which providing more or fewer privileges and applied rights than others. What they share regardless, is a common categorisation

³ The United Nations, *the Rights of Non-Citizens* (Geneva & New York: UN Publications, 2006), p. 5.

⁴ The mechanics of this in the Jordanian context will be explored and problematized in the coming chapters.

of not having been ‘recognized’ by the state in which they reside as possessing the ‘effective links’ to the country held by citizens.⁵

Against this backdrop, international law further stipulates that differences assigned by states to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, be restricted to the realm of political rights. And in only such cases where distinctions ‘serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional to the achievement of that objective’.⁶ Thus non-citizens, irrespective of other concomitant legal statuses (tourist, refugee etc.) are decreed to be free from numerous negative actions. For illustration, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the principle of equality before the law without discrimination as valid to all.⁷ The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contributes the right of workers to form unions, and unions federations, without interference of signatory states, of which Jordan is one.⁸ Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Jordan has also ratified, stipulates that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.⁹

However, it is the state which has the determining role in the application, and subsequent individual experience of, these provisions. More specifically, the political considerations of states, are the key determinates in the relationship of alterity between citizens and non-citizens on the one hand, and between citizens themselves and *their* state on the other. Although international law may

⁵ The United Nations, *The Rights of Non-Citizens* (Geneva & New York: UN Publications, 2006), p. 5.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Article 7 of the International Declaration of Human Rights available at: <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>

⁸ The Covenant is available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx>; Jordan ratified the Covenant in 1975.

⁹ Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Cultural Rights available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

require the limiting of citizen/non-citizen differentiation to political rights, there are many instances where employment, cultural and other rights are understood fundamentally in political terms. In Jordan there are numerous illustrations of this, some of which will be elaborated on in this dissertation. One of them concerns the inability of Jordanian mothers married to, or having children with, non-Jordanian men to transfer their citizenship status to these children automatically; an ability that is legally bestowed on their male co-citizens alone.

At the heart of this lies alterity, which as a concept emerges from the asseveration - *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* - the expression of one is the exclusion of another. It is the very social constitution of people into categories (citizen or non-citizen) and sub-categories (refugee, tourist, permanent resident) along with the gendered, religious and ethicized assumptions often associated with them; make the citizenship regime possible.¹⁰ Hence within a polity, citizenship exists an identity ‘within a city or state that certain agents constitute as virtuous, good, righteous, and superior’, which is subsequently differentiated in a number of legal, and socio-normative ways, ‘from strangers, outsiders and aliens who they constitute as their alterity’.¹¹ In this case, gendered between men and women.

Challenges to the established order arise when the alterius subjects *become political* and in so doing, re-constitute their political subjectivities. Becoming a political subject may be comprehended as a two-step process. The first involves a repudiation of the unifying enterprise inherent in the creation and reproduction of citizenship regimes, a ‘questioning’ of the various ‘essential categories’ serving to differentiate between both levels of citizenship, in addition to

¹⁰ Engin Isin *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid*, pp. 35-36.

those excluded outright.¹² The second part concerns what to do next, mobilising to construct new political subjectivities via ‘solidaristic (affiliation, sociation, identification), agonistic (conflict, competition, resistance, tension), or alienating (exclusion, estrangement, oppression, expulsion)’ modes and strategies.¹³ Thus, comprehending whether political acts are citizen oriented, ‘requires the demonstration that these acts produce subjects as citizens’.¹⁴ In the instance of Jordanian mothers this involves challenging an established masculine epistemic construct of citizenship, so as to assert the equal validity of their citizenship with that of their male co-citizens.

The politics of citizenship is situated at a nexus between citizens as a collective, and between citizens and non-citizens. This, as shall be enunciated across the coming chapters, is crucial if we are to understand Jordanian and more broadly the domestic conditions within Arab states especially since the uprisings of 2011. For scholarship, it encourages in-particular a departure from the well-trodden path of “national identity” and instead centre analyses on this interplay between citizen and non-citizen on the one hand, and the attempted movement between them on the part of the state and its prevailing regime.

This raises the question: who is a Jordanian? There are at least two avenues one can take to pursue this and other related questions: national identity and citizenship. As I will enunciate in the literature review, the avenue of national identity has, in the Jordanian context, been meditated on from numerous angles, and I therefore throughout the chapters of this dissertation focus attention on to the practice and theory of citizenship. When approached from this direction, *who*

¹² Ibid, p. 4.

¹³ Ibid, pp. 31-32.

¹⁴ Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux: The figure of the Activist Citizen’, *Subjectivity* 29 (2009): p. 371.

is a Jordanian becomes less a question of what or who, though these remain significant, so much as how - how is being a Jordanian *citizen* thought of and practiced? This is the central question of this dissertation. Subsequent questions emerge including: what are the limitations of citizenship in a semi-authoritarian constitutional monarchy like Jordan? How do Jordanians negotiate and mediate their relationship with the state? In order to answer questions of this nature, an interdisciplinary approach, which gleans from political theory – citizenship theory especially, Area studies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), history of ideas and political history and political science is adopted here.

I argue that it is impossible to adequately comprehend the wave of uprisings in 2011/2012, their foundations, and the various futures that are and will continue to influence, without taking into account the ways in which citizenship is understood and practiced. On the other hand it is difficult to arrive at a meaningful understanding of citizenship in contemporary Jordan without an interdisciplinary approach. The essence of this statement may seem conventional. For some time, political theorists have recognised how much regimes depend on the legitimacy they are able to garner from their populations, in terms of both stability and longevity.¹⁵ Being a citizen, one assumes, grants one strong political influence. In the Arab world, scholars of twentieth century politics have likewise, following Hudson, acknowledged that ‘the solution’ to the absence or abject

¹⁵ Some pillars of the Anglo-European canon include: Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (London: Penguin, 1970); and Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Penguin, 1968). More recent contributions include Larry Diamond (ed.), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Michal Mann, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, vol. 1 of *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, vol. 2 of *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (et al.), *The Logic of Political Survival* (London: The MIT Press, 2005). Bronwyn Winter & Lucia Sorbera (eds.), *Contending Legitimacy in World Politics: The State, Civil Society and the International Sphere in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Routledge, 2017).

weakness of legitimacy from Morocco to Iraq involves the facilitating of a kind of political participation often identified with being a citizen.¹⁶ On the other hand, actual examinations of citizenship remain limited. In Jordan's case, the literature produced in the last thirty or so years coalesces several notable poles: biographies and memoirs of its kings and significant elites,¹⁷ historical narratives of both the overarching and event focused varieties,¹⁸ studies of local politics

¹⁶ Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 404; see also Ghassan Salame (ed.), *The Foundations of the Arab State* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), and *Democracy without Democrats?: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Giacomo Luciani (ed.), *the Arab State* (London: Routledge, 1990); Nazih Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Halim Barakat, *al-Ightirāb fi al-Thiqāfah al-'Arabiyyah: mutāhāt al-Insān bayna al-ḥilm wa al-wāq'a* (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 2006); Adhan Saouli, *the Arab State: Dilemmas of Late Formation* (London: Routledge, 2012); Mehran Kamrava, *Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East* (London: Hurst & Company, 2016).

¹⁷ Abdullah Ibn Hussein, *My Memoirs Complete "Al-Takmilah"* (London: Longman, 1951); Abdullah II Ibn al-Hussein, *Our last Best Chance: a Story of War and Peace* (New York: Penguin, 2012); Marwan Muasher, *The Arab Center: the Promise of Moderation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Asher Susser, *On both banks of the Jordan : a Political Biography of Wasfi al-Tall* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1994); Alexander Bligh, *The Political Legacy of King Hussein* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002); Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

¹⁸ Beverly Milton-Edwards & Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy* (London: Routledge, 2009); Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Samir Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

and history,¹⁹ along with those focused on national identity,²⁰ political economy,²¹ democratisation (and civil society),²² as well as authoritarian resilience.²³

Although citizenship is implicated in each, it is rare to find in-depth analyses of its role in political order and legitimacy beyond conceiving of it as a status of belonging. In political theory

¹⁹ Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan: a Study of a Small Arab Town and its District* (New York: Oxford university Press, 1973); Jordan's tribes and their interplay with the state are prominent objects of analysis in: Paul Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan: the Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* (New York: Praeger, 1984); Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007) and *The shaykh of Shaykhs : Mithqal al-Fayiz and Tribal Leadership in Modern Jordan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

²⁰ Inevitably the unresolved Palestinian Israeli conflict features significantly: Laurie Brand, 'Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24:4 (1995): 46-61; Efraim Karsh & P.R. Kumaraswamy (eds.), *Israel, Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Dona Stewart, *Good Neighbourly Relations: Jordan, Israel and the 1994-2004 Peace Process* (London: Tauris, 2007).

²¹ Laurie Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political economy of Alliance Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Jamie Allinson, *The Struggle for the State in Jordan: The Social Origins of Alliances* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

²² John M. Roberts, 'Prospects for Democracy in Jordan', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 13:3/4 (1991): 119-138; Abla Amawi, 'Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan', *Middle East Report* 174 (1992): 26-29; Rex Brynen, 'Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan', *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25:1(1992): 69-97; Beverly Milton-Edwards, 'Façade Democracy and Jordan', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20:2 (1993): 191-203; Katherine Rath, 'The Process of Democratization in Jordan', *Middle Eastern Studies* 30:3 (1994): 530-557; Leonard Robinson, 'Liberalization, the Islamists and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case Study', *The Muslim World* 85:1 (1996): 1-32; Curtis Ryan, 'Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan', *Democratization* 5:4 (1998): 176-196; 'Ali Maḥāfẓah, *al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Muqayyidah* (Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Center, 1999); Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: the International Politics of Jordan's Identity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan', *Middle East Journal* 53:4 (1999): 606-620, and 'Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan', *Comparative Politics* 33:1 (2000): 43-61; Richard Antoun, 'Civil Society, Tribal Process and Change in Jordan: an Anthropological View', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (2000): 441-463; Sean Yom, 'Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy', *Journal of Democracy* 20:4 (2009): 151-166.

²³ Malik Mufti, 'Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan', *Comparative Political Studies* 32:1 (1999): 100-129; Andrew Shryock, 'Dynastic Modernism and its Contradictions: Testing the Limits of Pluralism, Tribalism and King Hussein's Example in Hashemite Jordan', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 22:3 (2000): 57-79; Scott Greenwood, 'Jordan's "New Bargain": the Political Economy of Regime Security', *Middle East Journal* 57:2 (2003): 248-268; Jillian Schwedler, 'More than a Mob: the Dynamics of Political Demonstrations in Jordan', *Middle East Report*, 226 (2003): 18-23; Michael Herb, 'Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World', *Middle East Journal*, 58:3 (2004): 367-384; Ellen Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition', *Comparative Politics* 36:2 (2004): 159-179; Anne Marie Baylouny, 'Militarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy', *Middle East Journal* 62:2 (2008): 277-303; Sean Yom & Mohammad al-Momani, 'The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 30:1 (2008): 39-60; Janine Clark, 'Threats, Structures and Resources: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Jordan', *Comparative Politics* 43:1 (2010):101-120; Amany Jamal, 'Islamist Momentum in the Arab World: Jordan's Islamic Action Front and Kuwait's Constitutional Movement', in *Of Empire and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at all?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

generally, citizenship studies re-emerged with renewed fervour in tandem with the revitalised discussion of identity politics in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of global bipolarity.²⁴ Prior to this, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, theorists interested in citizenship focused on the institutional environment, framed by constitutions and legislation, and practiced within institutionalised processes. However, during the 1990s and into the first decade of the twenty-first century a shift occurred whereby the discussion increasingly became interested in ‘the qualities and dispositions of the citizens who operate within these institutions and procedures’.²⁵ Accompanying this locus movement were two auxiliary acknowledgments. The first being the need to adapt established models to the emerging realities of pluralistic societies, that is to say, what civic virtues are required to keep the polity functioning fluidly along democratic lines in the absence of a shared national narrative? In light of this, the second acknowledgement was that in order to advance democratic theory the hitherto “vote-centric” focus had to be joined with a deviation towards “talk-centric” approaches.²⁶

This made sense in the context of the Anglo-European polities which make-up the overwhelming majority of case studies used to test and develop citizenship’s typology and theoretical substance. In Middle East studies, the first contribution in English, to the author’s

²⁴ See for example: Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics, and Education* (London: Longman, 1990); Kamal Sadiq, *Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Bart Van Steenberghe (ed.), *The Condition of Citizenship* (London: Sage, 1994); Gerard Delanty, *Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000); Toby Miller, *Cultural Citizenship: Cosmopolitanism, Consumerism, and Television in a Neoliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007); Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werbner (eds.) *Women, Citizenship and Difference* (London: Zed, 1999); Ira M. Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, *Ethics* 99:2 (1989): 250-274; Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, ‘Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, *Ethics* 104:2 (1994): 352-381.

²⁵ Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman (eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 6; Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) was influential in this regard.

²⁶ Kymlicka & Norman (eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* pp. 8-9.

knowledge, providing a nuanced rumination into the complexities of citizenship was published in 1995. Its author, Uri Davis, considering socio-legal distinctions between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Israel, developed a typology of citizenship that used the two most common Arabic terms: *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*.²⁷ The former he defined as ‘passport citizenship’, the purpose of which is to denote who is included and who is excluded from the political community. The latter contrastingly is rendered as ‘democratic citizenship’, the mechanism through which citizens may access equally the political, social, economic, and civil resources of the state.²⁸ Using this typology, he advances the point that at its heart citizenship is neither ‘a fact of consciousness [n]or a question of identity’, but rather is ‘a certificate’ which defines an individual’s relationship to the state.²⁹ Our approach in considering Jordanian citizenship contrastingly, adopts a less normative emphasis.

Following on from this, it took a further five years for the first collaborative inquiry to emerge. *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, (edited by Nils Butenschon) remains to this day a key text for Middle East citizenship studies with its call for ‘a back-to-basics approach’ to focus in on how political communities are constituted and reproduced.³⁰ Of equal significance is Suad Joseph’s (editor) *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East*, which eloquently approaches the problematics of citizenship theory and practice from a gender perspective, emphasising by way of this the significance of intersectionality in both the expressions and experiences of citizens. Her study identifies seven ‘empirical points of departure’:

²⁷ Distinctions made between *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* are subject to analysis in chapter two.

²⁸ Uri Davis, ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana: The Question of Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: the Cases of Israel, Jordan and Palestine’, *Arab Studies Quarterly* 17:1/2 (1995): p. 20.

²⁹ Davis, ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana’, p. 19.

³⁰ Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian, *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000): p. 7.

nations, states, religion, family, family law, self/citizenship, and boundaries as key sites in the constituting of gendered citizenship.³¹ Despite these erudite endeavours, it was not until 2008 that another study took up the issue citizenship. However, unlike its predecessors, John Jandora's *States without Citizens: Understanding the Islamic Crisis*, suggested not so much a typology of citizenship or a definition, filling the blanks with an almost neo-clash of civilisations polemic. The 'crisis' of 'Islamic society' he argues, is a ramification of the 'inability to recast indigenous institutions and values' so as to bring about modernisation, and with it, a modern conception of citizenship, 'from within'.³²

Jandora's study is in some ways symptomatic of a period dominated by the so called War on Terror and the subsequent frenetic interest in securitization of politics and, consequently, security studies. The "War on Terror" brought into prominence once more Islamism and authoritarian resilience at the expense of citizenship, despite that neither authoritarian longevity nor an Islamist capturing of the state could be possible without the action or inaction of the citizenry. Gianluca Parolin's perspicacious *Citizenship in the Arab World* ably reset the agenda from a more socio-legal perspective. Parolin's exegesis asserts its authority in illuminating the history of citizenship as a legal analogy from its roots as a nineteenth century neologism to its present forms. Further, he elucidates the links between so-called subnational ties, such as the social construction of blood and how these have influenced the development of citizenship in its local contexts in the Middle East.³³ Yet, two years after the citizens-led uprisings that were the catalyst

³¹ Suad Joseph & Deniz Kandiyoti, *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000): pp. 5-28.

³² John W. Jandora, *States Without Citizens: Understanding the Islamic Crisis* (Westport: Praeger, 2008): p. ix.

³³ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009).

for the fall of regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and the Yemen, it was lamented that ‘a systematic overview on how to apply the concept of citizenship has so far been lacking’ in the discipline.³⁴ This deficiency has more recently been addressed by Roel Meijer and Nils Butenschon.³⁵ They also reflect on the need to engage in theory building within an Arab context if our understanding of the influence of citizenship practice and theory is to advance. Adopting Jordan as its case study It is to this task that this dissertation offers a contribution.

Why Jordan?

Having once been described as composed of ‘refugees and displaced persons’, and the most artificial state construct imposed on the Eastern Mediterranean following the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom has demonstrated a degree of stability that contradicts its character as a country composed of ‘refugees and displaced persons’.³⁶ Jordan’s heterogeneity rendered both state and nation-building a complex endeavour since the inception of the Hashemite project. This makes the Kingdom an apt case study for an examination of citizenship theory and practice in the Arab world. Two elements of this heterogeneity are especially notable, one territorial, and the other demographic. On the territorial level, Jordan’s boundaries have fluctuated since independence in 1946. The West Bank was, between 1950 and 1967, part of Jordan, yet currently is a disputed territory that was to constitute a substantial part of a Palestinian state in the

³⁴ James Sater, *Citizenship in the Middle East – Exploring a Field of Research* (Odense: Center for Mellemøststudier, 2013): p. 2.

³⁵ Roel Meijer & Nils Butenschon (eds.) *The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World* (Leiden: Brill, 2017); see also Roel Meijer ‘Political Citizenship and Social Movements in the Arab World’ in Hein-Anton van der Heijden (ed.) *Handbook of Political Citizenship and Social Movements* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014): pp. 628-660.

³⁶ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962): p. 181.

1993 Oslo Accords. The ongoing political contest over this territory continues to have decisive ramifications on both the country's national identity and citizenship regime.

On the level of demography, the population of Jordan could at no time in the last two to three hundred years be characterised as homogenous. Following the Russian expansion into the Caucasus since 1803, culminating in the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, what is now Jordan has become the home of a small but politically significant, Chechen and Circassian communities who while Arabised, have maintained their respective identities and modes of cultural expression. Further, the country has been home to Palestinians displaced by the 1948 *Nakba* or catastrophe, and 1967 *Naksa*, or set-back. A majority have been granted citizenship, while others are officially recognised as refugees, and carry different identification. The politicisation of Palestinian identity (both citizens and noncitizens) in the Kingdom from the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 to the immediate aftermath of the 1970 civil war between the PLO and the Jordanian Arab Legion, exacerbated apprehensions and tensions not only about national identity, but equally about the idea of the state, its purpose, and the constituencies it is supposed to serve.

In the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and again after the 2003 American-led invasion, thousands of Iraqis sought refuge in Jordan. Many remain in the Kingdom presently and were responsible for the upsurge in the domestic construction sector and rental prices in Amman.³⁷ Most recently, since the 2011 uprisings in Syria disintegrated into war by mid-2012, Jordan has become one of the largest hosts of Syrian refugees. In addition to migrations, the Kingdom's heterogeneity

³⁷ Raed Omari (Journalist with the Jordan Times), interview with the author, May 2016.

shows itself in social practice. Historically, social organisation has been dominated socially, economically, and politically by a dyadic relationship between steppe and sown that has rendered the establishment of centralised authority difficult.³⁸ These factors make Jordan an appropriate case study, through which some light can be shed on the theory and practice of citizenship. More so, the historical circumstances outlined above have not diminished in significance in the contemporary period, marked by the ascension of Abdullah II in 1999.

Citizenship remains, according to lawyer Sufian Obeidat, ‘one of the complicated issues here in Jordan’.³⁹ In recent years a number of occurrences have buttressed this viewpoint, and serve to question the applicability of Davis’ argument that citizenship has little to do with identities and the interests they facilitate. While each will be discussed in depth in chapters four and five, it serves our purpose here to outline them. One is the continuing stasis surrounding not only negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, but whether the two-state solution is practically workable and capable of realising a just settlement. In this environment some commentators have, it seems, sought to resurrect the *watan al-badil* or alternative homeland proposal, which would see Jordan become Palestine.⁴⁰ Questions emerge regarding the fate and

³⁸ Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Eugene Rogan & Tariq Tell, *Village, Steppe & State: the Social Origins of Modern Jordan* (London: British Academic Press, 1994); Tariq Tell, ‘Guns, Gold and Grain: War and Food Supply in the Making of Transjordan’ in Steven Heydemann (ed.) *War, institutions, and social change in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

³⁹ Sufiyan Obeidat, interview with the author, September 2016.

⁴⁰ Daoud Kuttab, ‘Is Confederation Viable for Jordan?’, *The Jordan Times*, June 01, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/daoud-kuttab/confederation-viable-jordan> (accessed June 01, 2016). The persistence of this discussion despite Jordan’s peace with Israel is underscored by an October 2017 conference held in Israel whose purpose was to discuss the Alternative Homeland option. See: Martin Sherman, ‘The Jordan-is-Palestine Conference: Why I agreed to Participate’, *The Jerusalem Herald*, October 13, 2017, <https://www.jerusalem-herald.com/single-post/2017/10/12/The-Jordan-is-Palestine-Conference-Why-I-Agreed-to-Participate> (accessed October 14, 2017). For a Jordanian perspective see: Jumana Ghunaimat, ‘Owhām al-Watan al-Badil’, *Al-Ghad*, September 28, 2015, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/895179-أوهام-الوطن-البديل>; (accessed November 15, 2017); Anonymous, ‘Statement on Defending State, Identity against Israel’s ‘Alternative Homeland’ - Retired Army’, *Ammon News*, March 05, 2010, http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.Wh_VwUqWbIW

status of Jordan's population of Palestinian origin. Some will relocate to a new state, to be sure, but others will not. What will be the role of Amman in expediting this?

Another manifestation of the importance of citizenship exhibits itself in the campaign, ongoing since 2007: *My Mother is a Jordanian and her Citizenship is my Right*, which seeks to end the exclusively patrilineal transfer of Jordanian citizenship. Current arrangements preclude female citizens from passing citizenship to their children. This results in children who are stateless within their self-identified nation and nationless within the state of their birth and residence, if a Jordanian woman has children with a non-Jordanian man. A final illustration concerns the influence of tribalism on citizenship. In July 2017, a Jordanian soldier was tried and convicted to serve multiple life sentences by the State Security Court for shooting dead three American servicemen. His tribe, the Huwaytāt, one of the biggest confederations in Jordan, called a conference attended by over five thousand of its members. The result was a provocative statement in which the court and its decision were castigated as the pawns of foreign interests at the expense of citizens.⁴¹ Of particular interest was the way that tribal affiliation, routinely labelled as a primordial sub-state social arrangement, was utilised conceptually as a means to project a set of claims about citizenship.

(accessed November 15, 2017); and Jawad Anani, 'Jordan's "West Bank"', *The Jordan Times*, October 23, 2017, <http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/jawad-anani/jordan%E2%80%99s-west-bank%E2%80%99> (accessed October 23, 2017). In addition there is President Donald Trump's so-called 'ultimate deal' to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though what form it takes remains to be seen: Ian Black, 'The 'ultimate deal'? Trump's Middle East peace plan is actually 15 years old', *The Guardian*, May 24, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/24/israel-palestine-trump-arab-peace-initiative> (accessed November 16, 2017).

⁴¹ For an illustration note: Dana Jibril & Shaker Jarrar, 'Rafaq 'Ashā'ri Wās'a li-qarār al-Mahkamah: Tadā'iāt Qādiyah Abu Tāyeh Mustammarah fi al-Jafr', *Tiber*, July 23, 2017, <https://www.7iber.com/politics-economics/tribes-demand-release-of-maarek-abu-tayeh/> (accessed July 23, 2017).

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to provide an answer to the question: how is being a Jordanian *citizen* thought of and practiced? What is its theory and practice? Subsequently, answering this and its associated questions is undertaken with a number of methods that the reader will encounter throughout the thesis. One of these is historical analysis, necessary because understanding the historical development of Jordan's citizenship regime is essential in comprehending its present. Thus I endeavour to situate our argument and analysis within the Kingdom's seventy year history, while paying particular focus to the period since Abdullah II's ascension in 1999. The second one is textual analysis, which is necessary because citizenship as an institution and a status relies on law to provide its essential structure. It is in law that the rights and duties of citizens to each other and towards the state are set out. Our discussion therefore requires textual analysis, and at times a close reading of the Jordanian Constitution (1952), the Nationality Law (1954), and the discussion papers produced by the King between 2012 and 2016. What this analysis reveals are substantial gaps between theory and practice, especially with regards to the legislating of citizens' rights.

Fieldwork conducted in Jordan between February and October 2016 provided substantial data for the analysis below. This undertaking was crucial in contextualising and directing the theory and historical analysis contained across the chapters. It also provided the main resource and inspiration for the empirical chapters in part three. While in Jordan I was a sideline witness to a number of significant events including raids on the Muslim Brotherhood's Amman and al-Zarqa offices, the general elections in September and the tragic assassination of Nahed Hattar. Our analysis of history, interviews and law is contextualised with political theory, in-particular citizenship theory. Although making use of citizenship theory in general, I concentrate on studies

produced about citizenship in Jordan and the wider Arab world. A further point deserves mention. On the basis of my fieldwork, I made the decision not to focus on Islamist politics or parliamentary reform, including elections. Both of these appear across the chapters, but they do not in and of themselves dominate the analysis. I acknowledge the risks this poses in limiting the scope of this thesis. However, I found that the conversations I had about citizenship and political dynamics in Jordan were drawn in other directions; focusing on the practice and theory dyad.

As a body of literature, citizenship theory contains within its ambit three key concepts: extent, content and depth. Of the three, the former concerns the construction of membership boundaries within and between polities. Content, meanwhile, refers to ‘how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated’. Finally, considering the depth of citizenship is to look at how ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ the identities of members (citizens) ought to be on the one hand, and on the other, whether and how differences should be accommodated.⁴² These elements have been of interest to MENA Area Studies and political scientists since King Hussien’s political liberalisation initiative began in 1989, an interest renewed in the wake of the 2011/2012 uprisings. Despite this, MENA Area Studies has been relatively slow to pick-up citizenship as a subject of in-depth analysis. The state of the field is such that by 2017, Morton Valbjörn asserted that there remained ‘a need for a kind of ‘modified citizenship theory’ in order to realise the potential of this approach’ in the context of MENA studies.⁴³

⁴² Engin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: an Introduction’ in Engin Isin & Bryan Turner, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies* (London: Sage, 2002): p. 4.

⁴³ Morten Valbjörn, ‘Like But not the Same as... Arab Citizenship and the Jordanian Experience’ in Meijer & Butenschön (eds.) *The Crisis of Citizenship*, p. 198.

The modification in question involves tailoring the study of citizenship's theory and practice to the specific conditions and historical developments of the MENA generally and the individual states specifically; recognising, by way of this, the distinctions and the commonalities of experiences both inter- and intra-regions. As shall be elucidated in our forthcoming discussion of the state of the art, the scholarly community is exceedingly quick to throw around terms citizen/s, rights and subjects among others, while simultaneously displaying a disconcerting wilfulness to assume what these mean in both theory and practice; thus highlighting the validity of Valbjörn's contention, and this dissertation's contribution.

Further, such a contribution cannot be made without a reliance on the work of political scientists. Studies by luminaries including Larbi Sadiki, Jillian Schwedler, Curtis Ryan and Ellen Lust have contributed significantly to the scope of this thesis. The perspective adopted here, is informed by the precepts of social constructivism.⁴⁴ Constructivists assert that 'people *and* societies construct or constitute each other' in a two-way process.⁴⁵ Institutions, of which citizenship is one, are conceptualized as 'relatively stable' structures comprised of interests and identities that are innately cognitive and internal rather than external to actors. The process of institutionalization involves at its centre a social internalising of identities which encourage

⁴⁴ Social constructivism has numerous manifestations across the natural and social sciences. For the purposes of this dissertation I am concerned with, and applying constructivist concepts as they developed in International Relations Theory (IR). While this may appear puzzling to some as I am focused on domestic politics, the degree of external penetration and influence in the Jordanian state from its inception, similar to its neighbors, see: Bassel F. Salloukh & Rex Brynen (eds.) *Persistent permeability? : Regionalism, Localism, and Globalization in the Middle East* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004); makes the application of a principally IR theory feasible. Some Jordanian analysts additionally speak in similar terms including Sabri Rbaihat, who comments on the principles, practices, "outward and inward" dispositions that go into a cultural citizenship: 'Al-Urduniyyin... wa Hikāyah al-Jinsiyyah al-Thiqāfiyah', *Al-Ghad*, September 22, 2017, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/2056922> (accessed September 22, 2017).

⁴⁵ Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989): p. 36; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46:2 (1992): p. 399.

particular sets of interests associated acutely with them.⁴⁶ Hence perspective is of elemental importance to constructivism, which is significant if we hope to explain how citizens in the plural experience/practice their citizenship in diverse ways. Furthermore, comprehending citizenship as an institution in this manner helps bring to light the nuances between national identity/s and citizenship itself. One such being that whereas in a polity in which citizenship is both strong and stable, we may expect national identity/s to be subservient to it, in Jordan the opposite is the case. Citizenship is subservient to national identity. Resultantly, it is problematic to treat them as interchangeable, although, as shall be observable in chapters one and two, substituting or conflating both often occurs.

Because it is not a substantive theory of politics, constructivism is flexible in allowing those who employ it do so unburdened by pre-packaged claims or hypotheses concerning the motivations behind action and the structure of politics. Thus, in order to make substantive reflections on political activity, constructivists need ‘to delineate who are the principal actors, what are their interests and social capacities, and what is the content of the normative structures.’⁴⁷ At the same time, because reality as conceived by constructivists is socially mediated, constructivist analyses actively invite rumination on the emergence of alternative social worlds because it claims ‘what exists need not have and need not’.⁴⁸ Contestability and the fluidity of social orders are therefore inherent to the way in which an examination of politics is approached. Following Klotz and Lynch, actors are able to, but not at all times, ‘set into motion new normative, cultural,

⁴⁶ Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’, p. 399.

⁴⁷ Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism’ in John Baylis & Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 258-270.

⁴⁸ Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism’, p. 264.

economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional wisdoms and standard operating procedures'.⁴⁹

Despite these apparent advantages, constructivism's application in the MENA (the Middle East & North Africa) remains limited, where much intellectual energy has been and continues to be spent on perspectives centred around either democratization, authoritarian resilience and increasingly, security. Hence when integrated with a citizenship perspective, constructivism offers an important and unique opportunity to in-effect resituate the facts of Jordanian politics, and in so doing offer further insights into the present and future development of the Kingdom while simultaneously stimulating renewed analysis of the region. In sum, this dissertation aims at contributing to the debate about how to theorize citizenship. In this area Andrea Teti and Abdul-Hussein al-Sha'abān have made insightful contributions. Proponents of citizenship theory stress the significance of the constitution of political environments, especially the divisions between who rules and who is ruled. They are therefore acutely concerned with 'the architecture of power-relations' institutionalizing the distribution of power within a polity, which in turn frame the relationship between rulers and ruled.⁵⁰ As the processes that constitute citizenship concern issues of interests, power, contentiousness relations and above all identities (and belonging),⁵¹ examining citizenship in the MENA generally and Jordan specifically is congruent with the thematic focus of constructivism.

⁴⁹ Audie Klotz & Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2007): p. 3.

⁵⁰ Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian, *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, p. 5.

⁵¹ Keith Faulks, *Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 2000): p. 7.

Thesis Outline

The dissertation is divided into three parts and eight chapters, with corresponding arguments explored in each. Part one: *Citizens and Subjects? Theorising on History*, consists of the first three chapters. Chapter one situates the dissertation in the field of political theory and history of ideas. It therefore reviews the literature of Jordanian politics in order to highlight the space in which this thesis' contribution will be made. The literature, which coalesces around Jordan's near thirty year experiment with democratisation and civil society development on the one hand, and national identity on the other, concerns citizens' direct engagement in politics. Scholars rarely, raise questions about the substance of citizenship outside of the Hashemite regime's ability to encourage citizens' electoral involvement. Assumptions of this nature, however, are precarious given that the institutional contexts in which transactions take place are products of 'coagulated social conflicts';⁵² and are by nature therefore subject to change.

A second argument I begin to raise in chapter one, is that citizenship as it has come to be known in an Anglo-European context has a specific historical pedigree that its Arabic counterparts do not possess. I use counterparts in the plural for two reasons. Not only to stress that each Arab country had its own political trajectory, and to avoid Orientalist generalizations on the one hand. But also because in the Arabic political discourse there are two key terms referring to citizenship: *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*. Complicating this, both analogies are employed to denote nationality, and thus they are readily brought into not only dialogue but conflation. One of the purposes of chapter two therefore is to elucidate the development of *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*, tracking their

⁵² Oliver Schlumberger 'Structural reform, economic order, and development: Patrimonial capitalism', *Review of International Political Economy* 15:4 (2008): p. 625.

emergence in the Arabic speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire (geographical Syria paramount amongst them). I explore how this development, tied not only to profound alterations to socio-political life in the late Ottoman Empire, but equally to the root system of the Arabic Language, has given these two faces of citizenship a specific context with implications for its practice and theory. Concerning *muwātanah*, my focus in-particular resides on what is believed to be its prime historical characteristic: representing an attachment to territory or place that is politicised and therein results in claim making whose validity is predicated upon that attachment. Regarding *jinsiyyah*, I highlight its existence as a designation developed in the nineteenth century, to distinguish between subjects that are included and excluded from the political community of the state. Consequently, *jinsiyyah* is seen to possess no consistent day-to-day application on citizens.

Chapter three's role is to historicise citizenship in the Jordanian context from the late Ottoman Sanjaks East of the Jordan River, to the death of King Hussein in 1999. The chapter encourages the reader to consider how being a national and being a citizen while related are nevertheless distinct, as they both call for different responses from the individual within the political realm. Assisting in this effort is the adoption of Tariq Tell's enunciation of the 'Hashemite Compact', a nexus of formal and informal networks of power relationships which constitute, I suggest, the wider domestic context in which Jordanian citizenship operates. Of special significance is the role of the state in employing within the compact, the material (patronage and employment especially) and ideational (loyalty and family unity discourses) resources at its disposal. Doing so is important in highlighting how citizenship may be used as a vehicle for radical alterations to the Kingdom's political architecture as evidenced during the 1950s in the lead up to the 1957/58 crisis, or as a linchpin in the shackling of political subjectivity, reducing its agential

properties. My objective is not to supply the reader a holistic summary of the Kingdom's history, but to highlight those moments and events that are, essential in grasping the development of Jordan's citizenship regime.

Part two: *Citizenship in Contemporary Jordan*, containing chapters four, and five. Chapter four, which makes use of fieldwork conducted in Jordan, uses contemporary reflections on Jordanian citizenship from Jordanians as a lens through which the first decade of Abdullah II's reign is analysed. Both economic and political decisions are analysed in order to highlight a key characteristic of citizenship's theory and practice: the absence of accountability and ownership. I assert that the acceleration of economic liberalisation alongside a deceleration of political liberalisation since Abdullah II's ascension has had a significant impact on the political subjectivity of Jordanian citizenship. The consequences of which, are examined in chapter five's engagement with the Jordanian experience of the 2011/2012 uprisings. It is argued that these events were part of a citizen search for both ownership through a greater role in decision-making, and a subsequent increase in the accountability of decision-makers to them as citizens. This is contrasted with the first five discussion papers of the King. Published between 2012 and 2016, the discussion papers contain the King's thoughts on citizenship and the role of citizens in the post-2011 reform era. Revealed is a consistent theme of absolving present political arrangements in the Kingdom that have produced the existing citizenship regime, while calling on citizens to be more active in the formal political process.

Part three: *Practices Within and Between Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah*, is composed of chapters six, seven and eight, with a focus on contemporary affairs in the Jordan of King Abdullah

II. Chapter six coalesces around the gendering of citizenship in the Kingdom. Through the case of the ‘My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’ campaign, I demonstrate that the patriarchal structuring of citizenship has implicit and explicit ramifications on the practice of citizens. Specifically, the inability of Jordanian mothers married to foreign men to transfer their citizenship to their children automatically. The chapter reveals the complexity of citizenship and its relation with national identity/s inasmuch as the prime sticking point is not gender so much as apprehensions about further increasing the numbers of Jordanian citizens with Palestinian origin. It therefore shows that the unevenness of citizenship affects the ability of citizens to hold decision-makers accountable.

Chapter seven meanwhile adopts a different approach to the problem of ownership and accountability. National unity as an element of citizenship becomes the chief focus with two discussions. The first of these centres on the assassination of Jordanian intellectual and writer Nahed Hattar in September 2016, with the analysis tracing the developments that led to the assassination on the steps of the Amman courthouse. These developments are framed with a parallel examination of the royal response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris in 2015, and Abdullah II’s sixth discussion paper which was released in the immediate aftermath of Hattar’s murder. The key objective is to highlight the duplicity in the Kingdom’s signalling. On the one hand, both the King and Queen marched with world leaders in support of freedom of expression, while on the other it is tightly curtailed at home.

Part three closes with chapter eight, whose focus rests on the interconnections between tribal affiliation and citizenship as one of many identities held by Jordanians. It therein in a very

different way aims to depict how national identity when refract through each of these institutions produces results which may not in the long term be conducive to the establishment of a citizenship regime facilitative of democratisation. While tribalism remains a persistent feature of Jordanian domestic politics, the ability of a citizen to use their tribal identity to advance their interactions with the state, is becoming increasing tied to class, and the extent to which the state takes an economic interest in the citizen's affairs. This is demonstrated by considering university violence on campuses across Jordan and the aftermath of the 2006 elections in the *Badia al-Wasat* (central Bedouin District).

Part I

Citizens and Subjects? Theorising on History

Chapter One: *Citizenship in the Study of Jordanian Politics -the Ubiquitous Absence?*

Chapter Two: *What is Citizenship?*

Chapter Three: *Historicising Jordanian Citizenship*

Chapter One

1. Citizenship in the Study of Jordanian Politics: The Ubiquitous Absence?

Maupassant often lunched at the restaurant in the Tower, though he didn't care much for the food: "it's the only place in Paris", he used to say, "where I don't have to see it". And it's true that you must take endless precautions, in Paris, not to see the Eiffel Tower'.⁵³

1.1. : Introduction

Citizenship is an epistemological blind spot in the literature concerning contemporary Jordanian politics, especially with regards to studies examining the Kingdom's democratic experience from 1989 and the development of its national identity. But blind spot means more than simply unexplored. Illuminated via Barthes' recollection of Maupassant's dining habits, scholarly blindness towards citizenship, is chiefly a product of perspective in the writing about and knowledge production of political history. As an accepted rule, scholars must adopt a position from which to view her or his subject of inquiry, and subsequently, as Barthes shows, certain realities are revealed while simultaneously obscuring others. Following Edward Said, the act of critique is innately 'situated', angled towards illuminating 'what situation, what historical and social configuration, what political interests' are at play within a given subject of inquiry whether literary, disciplinary, scientific, epistemological, political, or otherwise.⁵⁴

What is lacking in these studies is recognition and subsequent action on the reality that citizenship is a contentious institution, and therefore is not one that can be easily assumed to have a particular universal character. Instead, citizenship is overwhelmingly perceived as being little

⁵³ Roland Barthes, *The Eiffel Tower*, in Susan Sontag (ed.) *A Barthes Reader* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 236.

⁵⁴ Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text and the Critic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 26.

more than a status denoting an individual's identification with a nation-state. This is not to be unexpected, given the discussion of the citizen/non-citizen nexus in international law above. Although it is not incorrect to identify citizenship in this way, to proceed no further carries with it at least two dilemmas. First, by not examining the substance of citizenship and its politics, scholars are neglecting an important component of the state-building enterprise. Second, the ability of scholars to more effectively understand the interplay between citizenship *status*, citizen *rights*, and *duties* is curtailed. Both of these points carry implications for the study of democratization and national identity. Regarding the former, the process of becoming democratic involves a transferal of decision-making from a centralized executive to the citizenry, either directly, or as is more common, indirectly through selected representatives. In essence citizen-subjects subjected to arbitrary authority of an individual or body of individuals, become subject to, on the one hand, a body of law that is applied equally to all, and on the other hand, to themselves owing to their collective role in the making of law. The nature of the relationship between state and citizens then is of indubitable importance in this process.

While members of a citizenry might be told, or imagine that they and their fellows are equal, daily practices on the part of individuals may, whether or not intentional, undermine the possibility of citizen equality.⁵⁵ The function of *wasta* in Jordanian society and politics is an example of how an individual's pursuit of personal goals can undermine, by way of kin and class connections, trust in institutions and due processes.⁵⁶ Consequently, citizens and the substance of their citizenship, is of existential significance to the feasibility of democratization. A similar dynamic emerges in work of scholars focused on nationalism and the question of Jordanian national identity. Here however, the issue is how the category of national is conflated with that of citizen, and in so doing, obscures the emergence of a more complete picture of how identities and interests intersect with existing institutional arrangements. It renders more problematic the task of acknowledging, following Kamal Sadiq, that the relative strength of citizenship as an institution

⁵⁵ Jonathan Havencroft, *Captives of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 171.

⁵⁶ Discussed in chapter four. For a broad study on the subject see Aseel al-Ramahi, 'Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (And Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society', *Arab Law Quarterly* 22:1 (2008): 35-62; on a more localised and personal level, Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Farah Maraqa recalls discrimination from university professors because of her Palestinian origins. (Journalist with *Rai al-Youm*) interview with the author, Amman, September 11, 2016.

influences the state's ability to subsume competing identities within a plural political community.⁵⁷ His examination of citizenship regimes in India, Pakistan and Malaysia has also demonstrated the converse, that when an overarching concept of citizenship is 'thin', dominant national narratives subsume citizenship.⁵⁸

1.2. : Citizenship & National Identity

When it comes to citizenship and national identity in the study of Jordanian politics, two key related observations can be made. Firstly, when compared with national identity, citizenship is a peripheral subject of inquiry that is subsumed within national identity itself. More studies have been composed on the questions of national identity in Jordan than citizenship. However, citizenship as an analogy is ubiquitous because it is impossible to speak of state-based political communities without referring to citizens. As such, citizenship is utilized overwhelmingly as a status referring to the association or connection between individuals and the nation-state in which they reside, and are legally tied. Subsequently, it is assumed to possess a universal face, whose features are not dramatically altered according to the various socio-political contexts in which it is developed, understood, and practiced.

Our second observation is the frequency with which scholars and analysts interchange *citizen* with *national* on the basis of their mutual existence within the nation-state. On one level this conflation is natural, but means that in the sphere of academic enterprise, uncritically swapping between the two concepts is problematic if accepting Benedict Anderson's analogy of the nation as an imagined community. To be a national by extension is fundamentally an act of the imaginary. Citizenship however is not an imagined concept, but is rather based at the very least in legal stipulations. To be a citizen (as I claim in detail in chapter two) is not, ergo, above all else, an act of imagination.

⁵⁷ Kamal Sadiq, *Paper Citizens*, p. 17.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 19-21.

To begin with, there are a number of studies which coalesce around national ideologies and their construction by the Hashemite monarchs. In doing so, they in their distinct manner enunciate the top-down production and dissemination of the nation onto the population at large. Alexander Bligh is explicit in asserting that Jordan's 'laboratory approach' to national ideology formulation was 'imposed from above by the king as a necessary tool in creating cohesion and a center of identity among his own citizens'.⁵⁹ Adnan Abu Odeh by contrast, argues it is far more complex than this, because East-Bank or Trans-Jordanian nationalism is not diametrically tied to the interests of the Hashemite project.⁶⁰ Calling into question Bligh's selection of what he calls the 'strategic junctures' of Jordan's history.⁶¹ A triumvirate stand out: the 'mutual alienation' between the regime and so-called 'West Bankers' after 1963; the necessity for the regime to construct 'a coherent national ideology as the basis for the East Bankers to be united for further challenges'; and the changing geopolitics of Palestinian representation; especially concerning the Arab League's sanctioning of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people after the 1974 Rabat summit.⁶²

All of these strategic windows were open from the 1960s onwards, and reflect Bligh's positioning of the 1960s as the critical decade in the evolution of Jordanian nationalism. Essentially, the unionist model of Jordan *including* Palestine came under existential threat from the emerging Palestinian nationalism represented by the PLO.⁶³ Thus attention needed to be pivoted towards a national narrative spatially situated on the East-Bank. 'The main motive' overwhelmingly therefore underpinning the development of Jordanian national identity, 'has been the acute need to define relations between the East Bank and its citizens, and the West Bank lost to Israel in 1967'.⁶⁴ An implication being that had there been no Israeli occupation of the Western side of the Jordan River post-1967, the imperative would not have existed to re-model Jordanian identity. Conspicuous is the absence of non-Hashemite voices and narratives in the construction

⁵⁹ Alexander Bligh, *The Political Legacy of King Hussein*, pp. 5 and 75

⁶⁰ Adnan Abu Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), pp. 13-24.

⁶¹ Alexander Bligh, *The Political Legacy of King Hussein*, p. 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

of national identity, marking an epistemological, not to mention historical blind-spotting, of non-Hashemite local discourses.⁶⁵

Instead, the entire enterprise appears innately Hashemite without any substantial input from East Banker identification with their land and patterns of life. This is not to deny the centrality of Hashemite identity making, but rather is meant to highlight that although it is important, it is not the only significant voice. Some, including Abu Odeh respond with a triangulate focus on the relationships between Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian national narratives.⁶⁶ Marc Lynch provides another, demonstrating that following Hussein's 1988 decision to disengage from the West Bank, the Jordanian public sphere began in-earnest a process of debate over the essence of Jordanian nationality. Although both Bligh and Lynch emphasise the role of Hussein in managing this evolution, the former's nucleus of attention restricts him to the period of martial law, whereas the latter's appraisal considers the post-martial law dynamism of the 1990s. A more dialogic process is revealed. Lynch's study argues against rationalist analogies of Jordanian politics, arguing they do not possess the conceptual depth required to illuminate the multifaceted dynamics of Jordanian politics specifically and Arab politics more generally.⁶⁷ A manifestation of this is the conventional assumption that King Hussein's decision making was impervious to domestic political forces.

By contrast, he challenges this position, or at least contextualises it within the public sphere.⁶⁸ For our present purposes then, what is the role of citizenship as opposed to nationality in this milieu? Neither Lynch nor Abu Odeh expend time ruminating on this question, but conflate terms including citizen, Jordanian, and actor. Conflation is similarly evident in Betty Anderson's *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*. With less of emphasis on regional strategic factors, or national-international distillations via public spheres, and more on the internal production of the narrative of the nation, Anderson does not repudiate the top-down essence of the national project. She argues that 'the lesson to be learned is that Jordan could not exist without the Hashemites'.⁶⁹ Yet the subtle, and perhaps paradoxical, caveat to this is that while the 'Arab street' performs 'no role' in

⁶⁵ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* provides a thorough repudiation of this.

⁶⁶ Adnan Abu Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 271.

⁶⁷ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, p. 4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 21.

⁶⁹ Betty S. Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 2.

the story of Jordan's development, it nevertheless is 'precisely this 'Arab street' that holds a key to understanding' both Jordan and the wider *Mashriq*.⁷⁰

At the heart of this argument is the role of education, with the rationale being twofold. On the one hand, in order to make the concept of the nation-state acceptable to Kings Abdullah I, Talal and Hussein, they needed 'to manufacture institutions and a narrative inextricably connecting Jordanians to a state ruled by them'.⁷¹ As Gramsci notes, education functions to disseminate narratives and the hegemony required to maintain them. He posits that all relationships of 'hegemony' are innately educational in nature.⁷² Thus Anderson refers to how textbooks developed under the reigns of Abdullah I and Hussein instructed students 'to look to Kings 'Abdullah and Husayn as the generators of state largesse; to thank 'Abdullah and Husayn for protecting the rights of Palestinians; and to reward 'Abdullah and Husayn with their loyalty'.⁷³ Hence, similar with Andrew Shryock, Anderson advances the idea that the Jordanian *Hashemite* state is predicated on a 'dynastic modernism' which sees the reigning monarch developing and sustaining particular relations with the various constituencies in the Kingdom;⁷⁴ that is to say, a relationship on a collective rather than individual or legal basis. It does not seem too surprising then that the Constitution should lay stress on the family rather than the individual citizen as the foundation of Jordanian society. A further point needs to be made here on the conflation between the state and the individual of the King, encouraging the idea that the Hashemites, embodied in the form of the monarch, are Jordan, thus when Jordanians give loyalty to the King they give it simultaneously to the state. Conversely one cannot be loyal to the state or the country without giving loyalty to the monarch.

Success in sustaining this arrangement, suggests Anderson, is determinant upon the ability of the Hashemite monarchs to fulfil the needs of 'a population that has demanded that its concerns be addressed. Jordan was not a blank slate in 1921, and the Hashemites succeeded because they

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 8.

⁷¹ Betty S. Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 2.

⁷² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 350.

⁷³ Betty S. Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 2.

⁷⁴ Andrew Shryock, 'Dynastic Modernism and its Contradictions'.

recognized that'.⁷⁵ An interesting question emerges here: what is this population? Anderson is right to subtly connote that it is not the entire population that is 'behind' the monarchy, but little of her analysis actively addresses what sectors are, or are not. Furthermore, has this population of supporters changed in the intervening years, and if so has the regime adapted its tactics and strategy accordingly? These are not insignificant when one considers that the exact nature and method of any transferal of loyalty referred to above, will foreseeably depend on the communities involved and their own specificities with regard to their attachment to Jordanian territory on the one hand, and the Hashemite monarchy on the other. Hence differences emerge not only between generalized categories of the population including tribes, Jordanians of Palestinian origin, Chechens and religious minorities, but equally within them as well. Without defining citizenship, Bligh, Lynch, Abu Odeh, and Anderson use the term to refer vaguely to a population of inhabitants. Subsequently, they appear fixated on the idea that Jordanians are Jordanians because of their identification with an ideological construct that facilitates the establishment of a Jordanian nation. In order to draw out the implications of this it is relevant to think of the nation-state as a two part equation.

The nation constitutes a collective body of people linked by an ideology that is sufficient enough to render the expanded 'imagined community' legitimate in the minds of the majority of members. The state is the institution through which the nation, first, organises itself on the domestic level via institutions and law; second, institutionalises the national into this system, creating the scaffold of citizenship; and third, represents itself and participates with other nations in the international sphere. Therefore, you can have nations without states and states without nations dependent on one's definition. Subsequently, and despite the difficulty, there is a need to epistemologically separate citizenship from nationality. This is no easy task. Massad highlights, Jordanian law positions the two as a dyad 'imbricated in each other so much that a person cannot inhabit one without inhabiting the other'.⁷⁶ His 2001 study *Colonial Effects: the Making of National Identity in Jordan* examines the constitutive role of the law and the military in the structure of the Jordanian state and the ideology of Jordanian nationalism. They are therefore implicated in the construction and persistence of this dyad. His interest in these two pillars is

⁷⁵ Betty S. Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 205.

⁷⁶ Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 44.

influenced by their instrumentality to imperial powers, and later, post-colonial ruling elites, as mechanisms of control and domination.

These two institutions, their evolution and manipulation at the hands of ruling elites have a resonating impact, not only in terms of their structuring effects, which Massad with a fecund turn of phrase refers to as elasticising the nation.⁷⁷ But furthermore, institutions shape the parameters of the collective imaginary in the colonial/imperial state, and therefore contribute to the shape of political organisation of the successor state.⁷⁸ Achille Mbembe's remarks bring us back to citizenship as an institution capable of framing individual and collective imaginary. Yet, enunciating in a direct manner, links or relationships between national identity and citizenship remain rare in the Jordanian context. Stefanie Nanes' provides a much-needed intervention into this scholarly blackspot, illuminating the importance of linkages between competing narratives of national identity and the practice of citizenship. Writing almost ten years after the ascension of Abdullah II, she argues that citizenship resides at the centre of domestic contestation in the Kingdom, claiming 'Jordan struggles to adjudicate between the competing demands of national identity and the universal equality embodied in the modern concept of citizenship'.⁷⁹ Her connection is made possible via her definition of citizenship entailing:

'Passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality [...] Individuals, not groups, bear citizenship. But individuals can only realize their citizenship as a member of a group. Currently, the nation is the primary identity group through which individuals can realize their citizenship'.⁸⁰

Extrapolating from this, the nation appears as the field on which the game of citizenship is played, determining and influencing among other things, the contours of the game, who, and how many can be involved. Correspondingly, 'the 'nation' aspect makes identity, individual and group

⁷⁷ Ibid, pp. 222-278.

⁷⁸ Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (London: University of California Press, 2001), p. 43.

⁷⁹ Stefanie Nanes, 'Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot: Citizenship and National Identity in Jordan', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 14:1 (2008), p. 86.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 94.

level, central to citizenship'.⁸¹ Indeed as Massad reflects, an exclusivist citizenship regime has been an important mechanism in delineating between Jordanian and Palestinian nationalisms on the East Bank in the decades following 1948.⁸² Yet at the same time, citizenship as a legal tool simultaneously served the Hashemite kings in laying the foundation of a nominally level citizen order in which all regardless of origin or socio-economic position had to equally recognise the supremacy of the reigning monarch. This is not the same however, as these same citizens being equal to each other by virtual of a shared subjection to political authority. Therein it becomes possible to manipulate the citizenship order without altering the letter of the law. Developments in electoral dynamics following the 1988 administrative disengagement from the West Bank are demonstrative. Prior to disengagement, parliamentary seats and electoral districts were divided between both banks, as befitting both the constitutionally sanctioned borders of the state and the specifications of who is recognised as a citizen in the Nationality Law of 1954. With administrative disengagement the districts and associated seats were removed from the West Bank and reapportioned on the East Bank. Yet, neither the constitutionally recognised borders (dated from 1950 when Jordan controlled the West Bank), or the Nationality Law were amended.

Thus after disengagement, the West Bank remained part of the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom, and many of the territory's residents would arguably count as members of the Kingdom's citizenry. Subsequent moves to 'denationalize' Jordanians of Palestinian origin residing in the West Bank, including the removal of parliamentary representation are technically illegal.⁸³ Hence, while for ease of comprehension, it is logical to draw distinctions between Palestinian and Jordanian nationalisms when discussing citizenship, the changing character and relationships between them needs to be kept at the forefront. 'The lesson', Abu Odeh reminds us, 'from the eight-decade tragic experience', is that the nationalisms, including the Israeli variant, 'are locked in a symbiotic relationship'.⁸⁴ Nanes meanwhile distils the pre-eminent identities into two main narratives, one, a closed, unitary and cultural Trans-Jordanian nationalist vision, and the other, a pluralist and contractual one. For the first of the two identities, Jordanian and Palestinian

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 94.

⁸² Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects*, p. 222.

⁸³ Ibid, pp. 261-262.

⁸⁴ Adnan Abu Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 272.

categories are taken as 'exclusive of each other'. Leading Nanes to argue that the essential problem is the presence of 'too many (disloyal) Palestinians in Jordan', facilitating a corresponding 'crowding out of the original Jordanian nation'.⁸⁵ Adherents of the plural narrative contrastingly do not conceive of demography in such problematic terms, instead locating the locus of contestation in the existence of a 'discriminatory state' and a subsequent dearth of citizen equality.⁸⁶

The image of contention that emerges from her analysis, builds on the perspective of Hudson, whose own reflection on Jordan's legitimacy deficient more than thirty years prior emphasised the problem in political rather than social terms.⁸⁷ Where Nanes' approach diverges from her predecessors is in her treatment of the issue as one of citizenship, just as much national identity. A point raised perfunctorily by Abu Odeh observing that by granting citizenship to Palestinians in 1950, Jordan had proceeded 'halfway' towards 'absorbing them' into the fabric of the Jordanian political community.⁸⁸ A more thorough illumination of the normative elements is necessary here. Nanes argument contextualises citizen practices within a Jordanian public sphere shaped, by three conceptual mechanisms: choice, the melting pot and loyalty.⁸⁹ For hard nationalists subscribing to an exclusivist Trans-Jordanian vision, there is only one choice for determining loyalty. Citizens in order to be recognised as loyal must adhere to the prevailing national narrative. This naturally contrasts with the view of pluralists, who argue citizens can be loyal to the state while holding numerous identities including national identities.⁹⁰

Both therein have a similar perspective on the role of choice and the importance of loyalty, with differences, revolving around the concept of the melting pot. Rhetoric from Trans-Jordanian nationalists, argues Nanes, conveys a view of history in which 'Jordan was a melting pot until 1948, when Palestinians caused it to overflow'.⁹¹ Prior to this point in time, the melting pot was able to absorb the territory's multi-religious, multi-ethnic (Chechen, Circassian, Muslim, Christian

⁸⁵ Stefanie Nanes, 'Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot', pp. 96-97.

⁸⁶ Ibid, pp. 96-97.

⁸⁷ Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics*, p. 216.

⁸⁸ Adnan Abu Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 274.

⁸⁹ Stefanie Nanes, 'Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot', p. 86.

⁹⁰ Ibid, pp. 86-87.

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 87.

etc.) populations, who for their part acquiesced to becoming “Jordanized”.⁹² The more flexible pluralist position rejects this narrative, advancing instead that the melting pot is still in existence, and has continued to absorb additional populations, most recently at Nanes’ time of publication, Iraqi refugees. Referring to the constitution pluralists including Oraib al-Rantawi and Mohamed Husseiny, argue that citizen status is based in law, and thus is neutral with regard to national narratives providing it is applied in the spirit with which it was written.⁹³ Law then acts as the guarantor of the melting pot irrespective of additional identities.

Her strengths notwithstanding, there are two central limits to Nanes’ analysis. Firstly, at no point in her discussion does she address the *watan al-badil* (the alternative homeland) concept. As a political idea, the analogy’s fundamental premise is that because the East Bank initially formed part of the British Mandate of Palestine; and because of demographic realities east of the Jordan River post-1948, the Kingdom of Jordan is in actually Palestine. Precluding any need for Palestinians to liberate any territory occupied or controlled by Israel.⁹⁴ In the absence of this, and the wider Israeli factor from her argument, Trans-Jordanian nationalism, which is itself a broader train of thought than Nanes gives credit to, appears paranoia at worst or purely material at best. By material I am referring to concerns held by many Jordanians about the evolving nature of the Hashemite Compact in its interaction with neoliberal economic policies and governmentality. On this basis, it becomes possible to argue that comprehensive ‘moves towards equal treatment of all Jordanian citizens threatens the privileged political position of Transjordanians, who feel that as the original Jordanians the state belongs to them’;⁹⁵ without any recognition that there is a concomitant, larger regional game at play. This is brought to light in the Manifesto of the National Committee for Retired Army Personnel. Published in 2010, the document disseminated in the Jordanian media makes six stipulations concerning the threat posed by Israel to the existence of Jordan in the form of the alternative homeland doctrine.⁹⁶

⁹² Ibid, p. 100.

⁹³ Oreib al-Rantawi (Director al-Quds Center for Political Studies) interview with the author, Amman, September 19, 2016; and Mohammed Husseiny (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

⁹⁴ Historically, the Revisionist Zionism of Revisionist Party founder Vladimir Jabotinsky in the 1920s laid the foundation for the *watan al-badil* in Zionist, latter Israeli political circles. See discussion on revisionist Zionism in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 6th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2007), pp. 122-123.

⁹⁵ Stefanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot’, p. 92.

⁹⁶ National Committee for Retired Army Personnel, ‘Statement on Defending State, Identity against Israel’s ‘Alternative Homeland’ - Retired Army’, available at:

Owing to international (especially from the United States) and regional (Israel and increasingly the Gulf States) pressures, the authors argue ‘the Jordanian Kingdom now faces concerted pressure to bestow citizenship on all Palestinians within its borders, which would in effect create an alternative Palestinian homeland on the East Bank’.⁹⁷ In terms of where this intersects with Nanes, the Manifesto conveys ‘the root cause’ of successive government weakness in combating the encroaching threat to reside ‘in the policies of privatization and the liquidation of the public sector that have been pursued in the last decade, and that have led to the growing power of business interests and those who truck in corruption and shady financial dealings’.⁹⁸ In other words they frame governmental support levels for the private and public sectors not in terms of ethnicity but class. Although Nanes invokes class, it nevertheless remains peripheral in the face of identity politics.

The second limitation concerns her understanding and application of citizenship. To reiterate, it is proposed that to be a citizen ‘entails both active and passive membership’ with a corresponding mutual set of demands for both ‘participation and compliance’ in a context of rights and obligations.⁹⁹ Her rendition is thus situated squarely in the canon of modern citizenship developed from the foundation set by T.H. Marshall. Yet as citizenship and its associated politics are established, negotiated and contested in Arabic, it cannot be automatically assumed that it will possess the same history and qualities of citizenship as expressed in English via its European heritage (Greek, Latin and French in-particular).

<http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.WhNenFWWaUm> (accessed November 21, 2017). Owing to its publication date, we are not criticising Nanes for failing to reference the Manifesto, but rather suggest that the situating of her arguments is more precise contextually in light of the *watan al-badil*, which as an idea is several decades old.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Stefanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot’, p. 94.

1.3 : Democratisation Part I The Liberal Window?

King Hussein's decision in 1989 to initiate a dual program of political and economic liberalization has in the years since, resulted a flurry of analytical productions coalescing around democracy, democratization, civil society, the analogy of the nation, and idea of the state. Many of which as I elaborate below are snapshots from the standpoint of power, and therefore at best give a mere peripheral glance towards citizens and citizenship. Accordingly, they share a bias towards monarchical agency. Such is concerning given that in a post-colonial state context, citizenship 'emerges as a key category, a hinge that connects the state and society'.¹⁰⁰ Valerie Yorke provides an early illustration of this approach. Arguing that the socio-economic crises of the mid-1980s constituted the end of an era and the subsequent dawning of a new political order, she writes that the late King Hussein's objective was to 'buttress Hashemite legitimacy and to consolidate the state, through developing Jordan's political structure and thus encouraging popular identification with the state'.¹⁰¹

Significantly, this process did not seem to include a reforming of the relationship between the individual and the state, reflected in the identification of Jordanians as subjects rather than citizens. In articulating Hussein's objective in terms of developing a 'new partnership with his subjects',¹⁰² Yorke elucidated the prevailing perspective, of the nature of Jordan's political order, as one characterised pre-eminently by a seemingly in all but name absolute monarch. Whose control of executive functions enabled an actualised lordship over the lives of his subjects, whose relationship to him, and more critically to each other, is typified by a vertical relation to power. At the same time, she does outline that the new partnership in question 'would be based on a new political balance' that would see a return to the 1952 constitution, that in return, would guarantee the continuation of Hashemite rule.¹⁰³ Two conceptions regarding political order are observable here. One is the personal order shaped by the monarch's possession of his subjects, denoting a vertical hierarchy of relationship and power between the ruler and the ruled. The second is

¹⁰⁰ Subrata Mitra (ed.), *Citizenship as Cultural Flow: Structure, Agency and Power* (New York: Springer, 2013), p. 10.

¹⁰¹ Valerie Yorke, 'A New Era for Jordan?', *The World Today* 46:2 (1990), p. 30.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

altogether more institutional and therefore less personalised in nature, referring to the desire of Jordanians to see their country's political system re-ordered in alignment with the Constitution.

This is important in entailing a shift from the former (personal) to the latter (institutional). The Constitution is deeply respected by political and civil society actors and activists in Jordan, who recognise that it contains of a broad spectrum of rights that are accessible through their status as *citizens* not as *subjects*.¹⁰⁴ Simultaneously there is an acknowledgment that the application of these rights does not meet the stipulations of the Constitution.¹⁰⁵ The practice citizenship by the state, its meeting of obligations to citizens, is therefore incomplete. It may be said that this is the result of a regime determined to maintain Jordanian subject-hood at the expense of citizenship. Such is lost to Yorke because her top-heavy approach does not provide necessary space for citizenship and citizens to be discussed. Consequently the more profound and interesting characteristic of her so-called new political order: the evolution of the citizenry in an era of globalisation – is absent.

Similarly Rex Brynen in an influential 1992 essay provides a limited, although more enlightening, top-heavy examination of citizenship. He begins with a distinction between political development in rentier and non-rentier states. In the latter he argues with reference to so-called Western experience, that the institutions and practices of liberal democracy evolved 'in struggles of citizens and social classes against the extractive power of the state'.¹⁰⁶ He then proceeds to assert how in a rentier context, class emergence capable of such action did not emerge as an outcome of socio-economic development.¹⁰⁷ The chief reason for this concerns the nature of the social contract in each of the dichotomous examples, and the subsequent logic that differences between them will induce different forms of political relationships. The social contract in the rentier context in essence stipulates that 'the state is expected to provide a certain level of economic security, in exchange for which society grants state leaders considerable political autonomy'.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Jumana Ghunaimat, (Editor *al-Ghad* newspaper) interview with author, Amman, April 18, 2016.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Rex Brynen, 'Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World', p. 75.

¹⁰⁷ Haim Gerber goes further to suggest that the prevailing modes of production in the territory of Jordan under the late Ottoman Empire precluded the emergence of antagonistic class identities: *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (London: Mansell, 1987), pp. 99-100.

¹⁰⁸ Rex Brynen, 'Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World', p. 75.

Therefore citizenship in such circumstances has an innate economic significance, constituting ‘the most important economic resource’ of the individual citizen.¹⁰⁹

Changes in the capacity of the state to provide economic benefits will subsequently call into question the social contract. However despite referencing emergence of a post-rentier order in Jordan, Brynen pays little attention to how this could evolve both in terms of citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-state relations. Similar with Yorke, he enunciates an image of a monarchical regime that is determined to maintain the fundamentals of the old rentier-based order in a period of uncertainty and transition. Besides demanding economic assurances, the citizenry appears to have few specifically political objectives. Although Brynen goes further than Yorke in elucidating the character of citizenship, his argumentation suffers from the absence of any in-depth discussion regarding what citizenship means in theory and in practice. It therein emerges as little more than a status, and a passive one at that, through which individuals enter through the door of the state in order to access benefits; with the trade-off being a relative absence from political life and more importantly, decision-making. Ruling elites therefore appear able to exercise autonomy in governing according to their interests, and transparency, accountability and active citizen participation in government not being part of the bargain.

Yorke and Brynen are primarily concerned with capturing the essentials of the emerging new order and the requisites for democracy within states in the MENA generally and Jordan specifically. Beverly Milton-Edwards contrastingly, declares an interest in the typologies of democracy in the region, or more acutely the absence of them.¹¹⁰ This interest leads her to advance S.E. Finer’s conception of ‘façade democracy’,¹¹¹ to Jordan’s political liberalisation post-1989. Through which, it is asserted that the fundamental power balance within the state’s institutions on the one hand, and between state and society on the other ‘remains unchanged’.¹¹² So-called democratic reform accordingly is an elaborate smokescreen designed to impede, rather than expedite a new domestic political order. There is therefore for Milton-Edwards a necessity to

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 74.

¹¹⁰ Beverly Milton-Edwards, ‘Façade Democracy and Jordan’, p. 192.

¹¹¹ Samuel E. Finer, *Comparative Government* (London: Pelican, 1970), p.441.

¹¹² Beverly Milton-Edwards, ‘Façade Democracy and Jordan’, p. 201.

‘understand democratization’ as it appears in Jordan, in order to illuminate whether it will shift towards or away from Finer’s façade model.¹¹³

Undisputedly, this is an endeavour deserving of analysis. Yet it is intriguing how little citizenship enters into the subsequent discussion despite the key research question being: ‘is a full liberal democracy on the agenda in Jordan or are the current reforms designed to strengthen and bolster the monarchy as the most important political institution in the kingdom?’¹¹⁴ Any movement towards liberal democracy would by definition entail a strengthening of citizen participation in the political system. To this end, although she spends time discussing the participation of major collectives including Islamists and Leftists; the more interesting observation is that the social facets of democratisation did not seem to be keeping pace with the political equivalents. Citizenship does not factor into the examination of these social facets. Instead emphasis is given to the Islamist movement as something of a cultural impediment to democratisation.¹¹⁵ The political community of citizens is thus divided into clusters of collective actors, and we are left to wonder what if anything exists and operates on the level below the collective actor.

Comparable with *façade democracy*, Glen Robinson developed the analogy of ‘defensive democratization’ to better enunciate how political liberalisation may be used by rentier states as a pre-emptive strategy to maintain the status quo rather than alter it.¹¹⁶ Thus his study analogous to those previously examined is chiefly concerned with democratization as a top down process. Unsurprisingly therefore, he employs citizen as a category or status to refer to Jordanians, with no definition or theorising of the term provided.¹¹⁷ As in the previous cases this is a glaring absence if it is accepted that democracy will change according to context. How it will do so is shaped by the nature of state-society relations that influence, firstly the relationships between individuals associated with the nation-state (that is to say citizens); and second, the subsequent kinds of

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 193.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 200-201.

¹¹⁶ Glen Robinson, ‘Defensive democratization in Jordan’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30:3 (1998) p. 387. This status quo according to Robinson is comprised of four prime groups: the monarchy (including the Palace), the armed and security services, domestic business elites and tribal sheikhs from the East Bank.

¹¹⁷ This is unsurprising, for as Asbjørn Eide notes in relation to International Law, the terms national and citizen are often taken as synonymous and used interchangeably. Asbjørn Eide, ‘Citizenship and International Human Rights Law: Status, Evolution and Challenges’ in Nils Butenshon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian, *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 91.

collective mobilisations or repertoires available to citizens at any given time with which to pursue collective political agendas.

But a focus away from these issues enables Robinson to situate defensive democratisation in the context of fiscal crises within ‘the *state*, not society’.¹¹⁸ That is to say that as a policy response, democratisation has little to do with citizens as political actors, and more to do with holding the winning coalition supporting the political status quo, together. This however I would argue, shares with other top down analyses, insufficient manoeuvrability in accounting for the reality that while democratisation or political liberalisation may be *intended* as a regime oriented solution to state crises, it may act as an *unintended* catalyst for societal changes that will inevitably impact the state. It is a question of perspective, of how analysis positioned in one location will illuminate certain dynamics at the expense of others. Robinson’s conclusion regarding the threat posed by the Wadi ‘Araba peace treaty with Israel to Jordan’s future democratic trajectory is illuminative. He posits that unless peace acts as a panacea to Jordan’s economic deficiencies, it will produce further disgruntlement and therein empower the Islamist movement in the Kingdom.¹¹⁹

Interestingly, he links the rise of Islamism in Jordan not to increased religiosity, but to Palestinian identity and its place in the Kingdom. This identity is pitted against a parallel East-Banker Jordanian identity, with a clear delineation made between the two. The element regarding these two identities that Robinson is at pains to emphasise is the inevitability of how ‘Palestinians in Jordan will be forced to choose in some significant ways between being ‘Jordanian’ and ‘Palestinian’.¹²⁰ The danger to social harmony this will cause is as follows, ‘to choose a fundamentally Palestinian identity will be to lose certain rights in Jordan’, and yet ‘to choose a fundamentally Jordanian identity will be to relinquish both national claims to Palestine and concomitant political activity’.¹²¹ Into this fragile ideational space, the significance of the Islamists

¹¹⁸ Glen Robinson, ‘Defensive democratization in Jordan’, p. 389.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 406-407, it is naturally (?) assumed that the Islamist movement as a whole cannot be trusted with the application of democratic (read liberal) values.

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 407.

¹²¹ Ibid.

is that they, led by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, is the only political entity whose identity can overcome having to choose between attachment to Palestine to Jordan.¹²²

Nowhere in this examination is citizenship itself problematized and ruminated on. There is no discussion of how the construction of citizenship may be able to mitigate between competing elements of national narratives. The idea that national identity and citizenship are separate albeit connected is not considered. Assumptions are thus made about the identities of Jordanians to each other and to the state which do little to reveal the dynamics of the relationship between them. The top down perspective towards political liberalisation and its future trajectory then, obscures the agency of citizens, who appear to be little more than economic agents seeking maximum pay-off advantage from the state. Little reflection is therefore given to the notion that economic expectations might be directly related to expectations as to the role of the state itself, and by extension, to the kind of political subjectivity that is being produced and experienced via Jordanian citizenship.

The importance of caution about relegating citizen political activity to the periphery is illuminated by Katherine Rath, who notes that even before independence, Jordanians took an active interest in shaping their political system, with the objective of establishing a space for representation and institutional accountability. The National Pact (*Mithaq al-Watani*) of 1928 is a case in point, reflecting the penchant for limits on monarchical control of the domestic political order, stating that parliamentary elections ought to be founded on the ‘true representation’ of the public, and enshrining political accountability as a principle of action.¹²³ However it is equally important to recognise that during periods of economic prosperity, demands for the application of democratic possibilities entailed by the constitution, ‘were not widely voiced, and the popular pressure was not as strong as to create a serious problem for the leadership’.¹²⁴

When prosperity began to stagnate, unrest quickly emerged as evidenced by the uprisings in 1989. Though necessary to reflect on the economic demands raised by demonstrators in Karak,

¹²² Osama Sharif, (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, April 29, 2016.

¹²³ Katherine Rath, ‘The Process of Democratization in Jordan’, p. 530.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 541.

Tafileh and Ma'an during 1989,¹²⁵ it is critical to do so without neglecting the political nature of them and their advocates. The Karak Statement exemplifies this. The Statement, procured by the leaders of the Karak protests made a series of demands on the regime. Chiefly: the resignation of the Ziad al-Rifa'i government, the establishment of a national government capable of being 'accountable and responsive to the demands of the people', proceeding with free and fair elections, conducted under a new 'modern and democratic' electoral law; address corruption and be 'accountable' for the 'embezzlement of public funds'; cancel the enacted increases to fuel and commodity prices; and support at an official level the Palestinian Intifada and the 'national rights' of the Palestinian people.¹²⁶

The Karak Statement therefore appears reflective of Rath's contention that Jordanians at the dawn of the 1990s felt they 'had a right to participate' in their country's decision-making processes'.¹²⁷ Importantly, the regime's response plan contained a number of post-elections legislative changes that sought to delimit the influence of the Palace. For example, by 1990 the *Mukhabarat's* (referred to formally as the General Intelligence Directorate or GID), practices of confiscating, withholding and certifying passport renewals, long undertaken during martial law were suspended.¹²⁸ This should not be a surprise when taken in the context of the shifting nature of Jordanian society since independence, and the subsequent changing foundations of political legitimacy. To elaborate further, 'the transformation of traditional society (Bedouin, tribal) to a modern society has entailed an erosion of the traditional base on which legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy was founded';¹²⁹ necessitating the construction of new foundations of legitimacy. A considerable pillar of this legitimacy base was popular expectations regarding the moral economy of the state. Speaking of this, Robinson argues that material factors were more important as catalysts to the 1989 riots than questions of political participation.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, pp. 254-256; Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace* (London: Penguin, 2007), pp. 474-475.

¹²⁶ 'Ali Maḥāfzah, *al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Muqayyidah*, p. 75.

¹²⁷ Katherine Rath, 'The Process of Democratization in Jordan', p. 541.

¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 548. By 1994 and Jordan's peace with Israel, the influence and activity of the Mukhabarat had increased once more. See Curtis Ryan & Jillian Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?', *Middle East Policy* 11:2 (2004), p. 142.

¹²⁹ Katherine Rath, 'The Process of Democratization in Jordan', p. 540.

¹³⁰ Glen Robinson, 'Defensive democratization in Jordan', p. 391.

Axiomatically alterations to the economic outlook would produce political ramifications. Curtis Ryan is elucidative in this manner, noting that while the liberalisation program was enacted to address an economic crisis, it also ‘set off a corresponding political crisis’.¹³¹ That this crisis may have something to do with the substance (or the lack thereof) of citizenship in the Kingdom is not addressed directly. Instead, Ryan highlights the agency of the regime, stressing that from its then current location ‘at a crossroads’, it has ‘as least two paths to choose from’: the first ‘a return’ to the liberal democratic project, the existence of which has been eloquently critiqued by Milton-Edwards and Robinson, and the other, being to persist in undermining the democratic opening.¹³² Although true in-so-far as the regime did and does have agency, little reflection is given to citizen agency, or role at the crossroads.

Yet, between the lines there is evidence of the role of citizenship as a factor of emerging significance. For illustration, Ryan reflects on the regime’s unwillingness to accept dissent from the public sphere in the wake of the 1994 Wadi ‘Araba peace treaty with Israel, labelling it an ‘ominous’ sign for the future of political liberalisation.¹³³ Dissent and public mobilisations attached with it threatened the regime’s control over steering the foreign (and in this instance simultaneously the domestic) policy trajectory of the country. Ryan eloquently makes the connection. It is possible however to proceed a step further, in order to ruminate on what a regime crack-down on a publically pronounced policy alternative signifies. Marc Lynch’s borrowing of Habermas’ public sphere theory is revealing at this juncture. Lynch argues that since the 1988 disengagement with the West Bank, Jordan has experienced an inward turn in its public sphere, as debates, which in the preceding decades coalesced around Arabism and confrontation with Israel, began to revolve around questions of Jordanian national identity.¹³⁴

By public sphere Lynch is referring to ‘the site in which members of a society exchange justifications and arguments oriented toward establishing a political consensus’.¹³⁵ It is therefore distinct from public opinion which ‘implies an external constraint’ that is not the product of public

¹³¹ Curtis Ryan, ‘Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan’, p. 176.

¹³² Ibid, p. 194.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, pp. 3, 100.

¹³⁵ Ibid, p. 52.

deliberation, but rather is more of ‘an objectively existing quantity’.¹³⁶ As an identifiable site of action, Lynch accepts Benhabib’s explication that ‘the public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity’.¹³⁷ Several things about this comprehension of the public sphere are apparent. First it is a space which in order to function requires participants who are able to, through agency, voice political arguments. Second, these arguments should be diverse enough to produce the necessity for deliberation and contestation.

It is in the process of back and forth debate, to borrow from Mansoor Moaddel, which gives the public sphere its validity and capacity to change identities and interests through the establishment of a societal consensus over a given issue.¹³⁸ Third, the notion of societal consensus refers not to a ‘fully hegemonic discourse’, but to a situation in which the participants are accepting of an outcome reached via ‘legitimate procedures’.¹³⁹ It does not mean that debate and disagreement did not occur, but rather, that society at large accepted decisions made in their best interests. Fourth, the participants involved must belong to a society, not necessarily a nation-state.¹⁴⁰ Resultantly citizens and citizenship, which are intimately associated with the construct of the nation-state, are not central analytical frames to Lynch’s study. On the one hand this is understandable given that each level of public sphere (sub-state, state, transnational etc.) ought not to be conceived of as distinct and autonomous, but as interconnected. Yet on the other hand, examining the contested nature of Jordanian national identity without factoring in citizenship as a form of identification tied innately to the Jordanian state risks overlooking the intersections between the two; of how national identities are not synonymous with citizenship in a basic sense of rights and obligations.

The intersections between identity and citizenship are explored by the Jordanian writer Nahed Hattar, whose mid-1990s article ‘Who is a Jordanian?’ (*Min Huwe Urduni?*), is an

¹³⁶ Ibid, p. 21.

¹³⁷ Seyla Benhabib, ‘Models of Public Space’ in Craig Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992) p. 87.

¹³⁸ Mansoor Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Syria* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

¹³⁹ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, p. 42.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 52.

exemplary and controversial illustration. In the article, Hattar observes the fluid nature of Jordanian identity, commenting that who is considered a Jordanian seems to change, whereas the regime remains the same;¹⁴¹ indicative of the manipulation of identities and institutionalised relations by the regime in ways expedient for its survival. The union of the two banks, and its peoples both Palestinian and East Banker, once proclaimed as an indivisible foundation of the kingdom since 1950, was now shown to be dispensable. This policy divergence from prevailing convention has, as Anis Kassim affirms, the question citizenship at its core, equally as much as more abstract notions of national identity.¹⁴² If the now formerly Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin residing on the West Bank could overnight become Palestinians without any citizenship, argues Hattar, could not similar manifest itself on the East Bank?

That king Hussein felt compelled to pen a rebuke of Hattar's argumentation highlights the contentious nature of these discussions generally, and Hattar's article specifically. It is illuminating the realities of the contested natures of Jordanian identities, and their place in wider regional debates regarding pan-Arabism that the value of Lynch's exegesis is readily apparent. Critically, these were, and are not mere abstract occurrences, but taken in the context of Jordan's political and economic liberalisation process are seismic as catalysts for changing perspectives and expectations. To quote Ryan:

'The IMF economic adjustment programme again became a source of tension in August 1996 when the government dropped its long-standing bread subsidy, triggering riots from the south of Jordan to some neighbourhoods of Amman itself. As the smoke cleared, both government and opposition retrenched and if anything the gap between them had become wider. But the 1996 'bread riots' were not just about bread. Rather, they signalled public anger over a host of issues that did not disappear once the overt political unrest had been quelled by the Jordanian army. These issues included disillusionment with the Jordanian economy, with normalized relations with Israel, and with the political liberalization

¹⁴¹ Nahed Hattar, 'Min Huwe al-Urduni?'

¹⁴² Anis Kassim, 'The Palestinians: From hyphenated to Integrated Citizenship' in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassanian (eds.) *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. 211-212.

process itself. Yet four years of political opposition in parliament had not managed to change the regime's stances on any of these large policy issues'.¹⁴³

In other words, Jordanians could see that the decision-making process had not changed despite the opening provided by improved representational politics. As Ryan denotes bread alone was not the sole issue at stake, but the status of Jordanians as citizens was as well. The regime's unwillingness to accept the principle of uncertainty in its democratic experiment indicates an attempt to keep the population disengaged from politics as citizens, and instead encourage participation through other forms of identity, specifically that generated by kinship/tribal affiliation. The 1992 changes to the Electoral Law, rescinding the principle of multiple votes, and instituting the Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV), is one example.

This process is arguably most perspicaciously described by Jordanian historian Ali Maḥāfẓah as 'restrained democracy' (*al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Muqayyidah*). In his treatise of the same name, the first decade of Jordan's democratic opening is examined, and the state of the domestic economy towards the end of the 1980s is positioned as the key driving force behind Hussein's decision to liberalise the political and economic spheres. He constructs a detailed argument regarding the question of why the democratic trajectory of the Kingdom was restricted. To this end, aside from structural economic challenges, Maḥāfẓah identifies five pre-eminent political challenges that impeded the development of democracy in the Kingdom: national unity; the absence of a separation of powers, with the Executive domineering over the Legislature and the Judiciary; corruption and weak institutional accountability; compounded by the weakness of political parties and civil society; and lastly, the challenge of implementing at a respect for Human Rights at a policy level.¹⁴⁴ In so doing Maḥāfẓah does a better job than most in bringing some balance to bear on discussing the agency of the regime, and of various Jordanian communities responding to government policies and the frantic regional environment.

The first of these challenges at once reveals the utility and limit of Maḥāfẓah's analysis. On the one hand he explores the contention between national identities (Jordanian and Palestinian)

¹⁴³ Curtis Ryan, 'Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan', p. 184.

¹⁴⁴ 'Ali Maḥāfẓah, *al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Muqayyidah*, pp. 358-359.

in a manner that is both practical and abstract, linking the battle of ideas to the continual blocking out of Jordanians of Palestinian origin from positions in the army, security apparatus and other state based institutions.¹⁴⁵ On the other hand he does not necessarily see citizenship as being both a concept capable of restoring balance between these identities and a mechanism for the institution of Human Rights in the Kingdom. Among the first studies to suggest as much were Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis Uri and Manuel Hassassian Manuel's volume *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, and Suad Joseph's *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East*. Both published at the dawn of this century. With respect to the first of these, citizenship's value to the twin processes of state and nation building resides in how its structure is implicated in the provision of rights and in the state's very capacity 'to create political loyalties and manage communal conflicts'.¹⁴⁶

This capacity is linked to the forms contractual relations between ruler and ruled take in a given political community, concerning which Butenschon refers to three: singular, plural and universal.¹⁴⁷ A fundamental point, underscored in Bryan Turner's chapter in the volume is 'the triumph of *gesellschaft* over *gemeinschaft*'.¹⁴⁸ By extension establishing a political community grounded on active citizenship 'involves a civic culture within which there is a strong sense of moral obligation and commitment to society'.¹⁴⁹ In light of the above discussion it takes little imagination to see the significance of Turner's extrapolation for Jordan for the citizenship perspective invites us to meditate on *what kind of society* has been and is being fostered. The second study mentioned above, edited by Suad Joseph addresses a glaring deficiency in the state-of-the-art: the gendering of citizenship. She therefore seeks to elucidate the privileging of the masculine citizen construction observable via seven planes: nation, state, religion, family, family law, the self and citizenship dialectic, and boundaries.¹⁵⁰ Which again asks about what kind of society is being produced and reproduced.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 358.

¹⁴⁶ Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassanian (eds.) *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 16.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 17-27.

¹⁴⁸ Bryan Turner, 'Islam, Civil Society and Citizenship', in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian (eds.) *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p. 31.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 43.

¹⁵⁰ Suad Joseph & Deniz Kandiyoti, *Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. 5-28

Through these planes, a key contribution of her analysis is the illumination of consequences and implications. How the particular intersections of the seven produce certain results. For instance if states in the MENA ‘emerged less’ as a form of local class formations, than as an outcome of the collapse of empire,¹⁵¹ then assumptions grounded on models and historical experience from Anglo-European political theory, (including many of the above examined analyses!) should be put under the microscope. This is especially regarding divisions between the state and civil society, religious institutions, and kinship networks on the one hand, along with the corresponding distinction between public and private spheres on the other. The extent to which they are interconnected through laws, customs and norms will encourage particular modes of citizenship and ergo of political subjectivities.¹⁵²

1.4 : Democratisation Part II a Post-Democratic Turn?

In part one, I revealed in a substantive way the manner by which democratisation studies and the theorists who produced them treated citizenship as a concept. Demonstrating how this ‘demo-crazy’ literature conceived of citizenship as a given reality in political life, rarely if ever comprehending it as more than a status synonymous with being a national of a nation-state. With few exceptions they followed the well-trodden trajectory of either orientalist, ethnographic, anthropological, political-economic, or rentier-state theoretic analyses of citizenship that all shared conceptual unity in the passivity of citizens.¹⁵³ In the early part of the century scholars began to meditate more thoughtfully and consistently on the limitations of democratisation efforts in the MENA; the ‘demo-crazy’ tide had begun to recede. However what remained was a bias towards regime arranging of socio-political life.¹⁵⁴ Wiktorowicz for example, investigating Jordanian civil society, argued that the spaces in which civil society organisations were able to legally function limited their opportunities to operate as conduits for opposition. Asserting that organisations once

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 18, resulting in a continuity which sees the citizen (both male and female) belonging ‘to a male-defined kin group to belong to a religious sect, to belong to the nation, to acquire the rights and responsibilities of citizenship’.

¹⁵³ Roel Meijer, ‘Political Citizenship and Social Movements in the Arab World’, p. 629.

¹⁵⁴ Asef Bayat, *Revolution Without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), pp. 138-139.

established were ‘embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes’, allowing the security apparatus led by the *Mukhabarat*, to monitor their operations and where necessary regulate their activity and personnel.¹⁵⁵

Within such an environment it becomes increasingly difficult to see a top-down model of political liberalisation producing a democratic system in which power is recycled at regular intervals, whether liberal in philosophical underpinning or not. The question inevitably turned towards analysis of authoritarian resilience in the face of pressures to democratize.¹⁵⁶ Recognising that the types of authoritarian governance being observed were not synonymous with previously developed typologies, scholars began to advance ideas of hybridized polities, exhibiting features of authoritarianism and democracy. New questions emerged concerning the specificities and commonalities of these systems.¹⁵⁷ For Jordanian studies these trends emerged analogously. In the wake of the 2003 parliamentary elections, Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler for instance labelled Jordan ‘a new kind of hybrid regime’ in which democratic language retains a normative significance even while the democratic window continued to close.¹⁵⁸

A series of studies from Ellen Lust on the opposition management strategies of King Hussein further developed these insights, assiduously illuminating how the adapting nature of the Hashemite regime has informed the formation of institutions, democratic or otherwise.¹⁵⁹ This she ventures is brought about through ‘structures of contestation’ (SoC), which serve to ‘shape relations among different opposition groups, as well as between these groups and the

¹⁵⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control’, p. 43; see also Sean Yom ‘Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy’.

¹⁵⁶ Eva Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective’, *Comparative Politics*, 36(2) (2004): 139-157; Andre Bank, ‘Rents, Cooptation, and Economized Discourse: Three Dimensions of Political Rule in Jordan, Morocco and Syria’, *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 14:1/2 (2004): pp. 155–179.

¹⁵⁷ Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, *Journal of Democracy*, 13:1 (2002): 5-21; Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’, *Journal of Democracy*, 13:2 (2002): 21-35; Larry Diamond, ‘Authoritarian Learning: Lessons from the Coloured Revolutions’, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 12:2 (2006): 215-222; Steven Heydemann, *Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World* (Washington: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, 13: 2007), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arabworld.pdf> (accessed June 12 2016).

¹⁵⁸ Curtis Ryan & Jillian Schwedler, ‘Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?’, *Middle East Policy* 11:2 (2004), p. 149; Jillian Schwedler, ‘More than a Mob’.

¹⁵⁹ Ellen Lust-Okar & Amaney Jamal, ‘Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation’, *Comparative Political Studies* 35:3 (2002), p. 338.

government'.¹⁶⁰ Three models of SoC: 'inclusive-unified', 'exclusive-unified and 'divided' predominate. In the first of these, all currents in society are able to participate in formal processes, notably elections, and their participation is closely monitored. Contrastingly, within an exclusive-unified system, all collectives are barred from participation. Between these two, the divided SoC splits the opposition between those included and those excluded from formal participation.¹⁶¹ On a contextual level resultantly, regimes have the greater ability to construct and sustain because in a hybridized system, the locus of political authority remains fixed in the circles of the few at the expense of the many. In this way a Kingdom like Jordan can host regular elections – eight since 1989 – and therefore make claims to be democratizing, while ensuring as much as possible that the security of the regime is not at stake.

A central advantage of Lust's SoC perspective is that it partially addresses why authoritarian regimes have been able to withstand external and internal pressures to loosen their constriction of politics. While it may be a readily logical assumption economic crises will by their nature increase the probability of instability and therefore precipitate reform; Lust advocates caution, pending examination of opposition – regime dynamics:

'In a divided environment moderates who previously challenged incumbent elites may choose not to continue to do so when radical groups join, even if incumbents have not accommodated their demands. In an undivided political environment opponents remain willing to mobilize as crises continue. Loyalists do not fear the inclusion of radicals in their unrest... Thus, as the probability of success increases in an undivided political environment, a moderate group that has previously challenged the government will continue to do so, regardless of the radicals' strategy'.¹⁶²

A corresponding limitation of the approach vis-a-vie citizenship however is that Jordan's political community is conceptually divided into either: a regime pulling the strings, aggregated

¹⁶⁰ Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 36.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 38-40.

¹⁶² Ellen Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule', p. 161.

organised collectives within the opposition, or disorganised ‘masses’.¹⁶³ Under such notional circumstances, the agency of citizens is not taken into consideration nor the possibility for alternative forms of contestation given much thought. Nor is the connection made between the model of citizenship and the existence of these numerous disaggregated collective actors. Having said that, the search for alternatives is not a stated research agenda for Lust-Okar, and subsequently I am circumspect in offering this critique. Her work does demonstrate though, why the uprisings beginning in 2011 mark an epistemological turning point in the history of scholarly knowledge production on MENA politics. Precisely because insightful analyses of this sort could not at best, predict the events, and at worst, could not foresee a moment in time in which the ordered arrangements of politics in the states of the MENA could be brought asunder in such a profound manner. An under-considered variable it seems was the ability for citizens to mobilise and, no matter how fleetingly, aggregate their identities and interests outside of the formal sphere with the effect that they did.

The shackled nature of democratic processes in Lust’s work gives rise to questions concerning the philosophical substance of democracy itself within an Arab context. In this respect, Larbi Sadiki’s *the Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses*, is nearly unrivalled in its philosophical scope and advocacy for a de-foundationalised understanding of democracy; one whereby ‘Arab understandings of democracy need no longer be grounded in Western foundations’.¹⁶⁴ At stake, argues Sadiki is not only intra- and inter-state stability in the region, but more profoundly, the very capacity for the citizen to emerge and consolidate popularly constituted legitimacy as a form of governance. Overriding therefore, the conventions of *aḥādiyyah* (homogeny) and *sulṭawiyyah* (hegemony), that has pre-dominated since liberation movements ended direct external dominance.¹⁶⁵ Expressed in another way, if democracy is to usher in an epoch of ‘active citizenship’ it must necessarily be detached from assumptions and expressions, whose historicity is particular to Anglo-European sites of political action.¹⁶⁶ His

¹⁶³ Ibid, p. 173.

¹⁶⁴ Larbi Sadiki, *the Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-discourses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 8.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 5.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, pp. 25, 51.

exegesis hence challenges assumptions in the literature either implicitly or explicitly championing the necessity for a liberal model of democracy in the region.

Timothy Mitchell illustrates this perspective in the search for a ‘universal process of change’ capable of governing and guiding ‘the politics and history of non-Western regions, such as the process of development, democratization, globalization, or the introduction of free markets’.¹⁶⁷ All of which have been nourished intellectually by liberalism, propelling the discussion into the territory of the politics of knowledge production. Concerning which Robert Bates has noted how MENA scholars in order to be more widely read are encouraged to fit their analyses within established consensuses and paradigms.¹⁶⁸ Instead, Sadiki calls for a pivot from text to context and, from test to contest, in which, ‘the challenge’ for scholars, Arab democrats of all persuasions, and Islamists is for the two concepts of democracy and Islam to engage ‘each other in conjunction and not in disjunction’.¹⁶⁹ While representing an intellectual peak, Sadiki’s voice is not a lone prophet in the wilderness. Lisa Anderson later argued via her own review of American political science literature on democratisation in the MENA, ‘the parochialism of American theories of democracy went largely unchallenged by “hard cases” while the dynamics of politics in the region went largely unexplained by applicable theory’.¹⁷⁰

Hence, by 2010 the momentum of the scholarly pendulum was already swinging towards post-democratisation and its implications before the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi changed the geopolitical face of the MENA.¹⁷¹ More than that however, Oliver Schlumberger makes a poignant reflection that not since Hudson has an inquiry into the nondemocratic sources of legitimacy in the Arab world been conducted in an ‘encompassing manner’.¹⁷² By this, he specifies four questions: who are the targets of claims to legitimacy, what are the possible and

¹⁶⁷ Tim Mitchell in Lisa Anderson, ‘Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East’, *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006), p. 191.

¹⁶⁸ Robert Bates, ‘Letter from the President: Theory in Comparative Politics?’, *American Political Science Association – Comparative Politics* 8:1 (1997): pp. 1-2.

¹⁶⁹ Larbi Sadiki, *the Search for Arab Democracy*, pp. 382, 374-409.

¹⁷⁰ Lisa Anderson, ‘Searching Where the Light Shines’, pp. 191-192.

¹⁷¹ Morten Valbjørn & André Bank, ‘Examining the “Post” in Post- Democratization: The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past’, *Middle East Critique*, 19:3 (2010): 183-200; see also Steven Heydemann & Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’, in: *Globalizations*, 8:5 (2011): pp. 647–653.

¹⁷² Oliver Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East’, *Middle East Critique* 19:3 (2010): 233.

actual sources of legitimacy in context, by what practices is a legitimate order achieved, and how is legitimacy to be measured?;¹⁷³ therein bringing the discussion closer to citizenship. Questions of this nature suggest a shared opinion amongst scholars that perhaps after more than thirty years (variances between countries taken into account), of liberalization, the so-called fourth wave of post-Cold War democratic evolution was not going to materialize in a region which appeared to be locked in a de-politicised miasma to nowhere.¹⁷⁴

Yet it must be said at this juncture that a substantial portion of the literature under this umbrella, displayed a significant emphasis on regimes and the formal political sphere of institutions including elections, parliaments and, to a lesser extent, the military.¹⁷⁵ It is perhaps for this reason, that scholars subscribing to a post-democratisation view of the region were just as surprised with the events of 2011 as everyone else; highlighting the perspective's limitations. In-particular myopia in overstating the resilience and adaptability of authoritarian regimes, coupled with neglect of political activity underway outside or at the margins of the formally institutionalised domestic political sphere.¹⁷⁶ Into this environment valuable insights are to be garnered from political sociology. In-particular Asef Bayat has provided some much-needed counterbalance, illustrating the advantages of extending the notion of politics and what it means to be political into what he labels the everyday.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Ibid, pp. 233-234.

¹⁷⁴ For a general reflection on this see Morten Valbjørn, 'Upgrading Post-democratization Studies: Examining a Re-politicized Arab World in a Transition to Somewhere', *Middle East Critique* 21:1 (2012): 26-27; for one with specific relation to Jordan see Morten Valbjørn, 'Post-democratization Lessons from the Jordanian Success Story', *Foreign Policy*, June 16, 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/15/post_democratization_lessons_from_the_jordanian_success_story (accessed December 12, 2017).

¹⁷⁵ For reviews of this literature see Gregory Gause, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability", *Foreign Affairs* 90:4 (2011): 81-90; and Morten Valbjørn & Andre Bank, 'The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past: Revisiting the (first) Era of Post-Democratization' [Special Issue], *Middle East Critique* 19:3 (2010): 181-319.

¹⁷⁶ Morten Valbjørn, 'Upgrading Post-democratization Studies', p. 30.

¹⁷⁷ Asef Bayat has developed this theme in a series of penetrating analyses. *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); and *Revolution Without Revolutionaries*.

Chapter Two

2. What is Citizenship?

'Who is a citizen? And, whom should we call one? Here too there is no unanimity, no agreement'.¹⁷⁸

'That which includes must by definition exclude'.¹⁷⁹

2.1 : Introduction

When one encounters the analogies of citizenship and citizen in the literature concerning Jordanian politics specifically, and the region more generally, the encounter is dominated by assumptions as to what these designations mean in practice and theory. From the outset, this is problematic for three cardinal reasons. First, citizenship as it is comprehended in languages such as English and French, among others contains within it a dyad of rights and obligations, including the element that citizens partake in government. Despite the numerous shifts in political organisation from the period of classical Athens to our own time, citizenship traversed this space still clutching onto this attribute. An immediate question therefore is what assumptions underpin analyses of citizenship in the Arab world and Jordan specifically?

Second, although citizenship and its plethora of associations situate themselves conveniently in English under a single rubric, the same cannot be said of its counterpart(s) in Arabic. In contemporary discourse two words are used in reference to citizenship: *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*, both of which are capable of, and regularly are translated into citizenship, producing a conflation of the two. Complicating this further is the question of nationality. As will be enunciated although *jinsiyyah* denotes nationality in legal terms, *muwātanah* carries many of its socially constructed attributes. While they exist in a dialogic relationship, conflating them in the act of translation results in a dual obscuration of their distinct root-based properties on the one

¹⁷⁸ Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 168.

¹⁷⁹ Engin Isin & Bryan Turner, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, p. 5.

hand, and the resulting power-relations that they frame on the other. Third, the failure of political science to adequately take stock of citizenship's unique lingual foundations and expressions risks the fostering of an implicit presumption that it (citizenship) has enjoyed a similar history in the Arab world as it has in the Anglo-European context. Despite the fact that, at the same time, scholarship has in some sectors persisted in reproducing orientalist perspectives, underscoring the seemingly irreconcilable dissimilarities between so-called East and West.

Subsequently the aim of this chapter is innately to compare and contrast. I begin by asking what is citizenship in an Anglo-European scholarly context? It is important to do so, given the ready ease with which non-Arab scholars especially, make assumptions about citizenship in Jordanian politics. Examples of which were provided in chapter one. This is followed by an analysis of how *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* developed out of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Through which, I emphasise and situate the historicity of citizenship and citizens as designations in Arabic discourse. This is necessary because none of the four main theories of citizenship of the Anglo-European canon: liberal, consensual order, participatory Republican or postmodern pluralism,¹⁸⁰ take the potential for Arabic specificity into their accounts. In so doing contemplating the production of an understanding of citizenship that has at its centre the dialogic relationship between *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*, without reducing their distinct characteristics. In the final section, I advance that at the relationship's heart, is a three-way act of claim-making on the part of citizens, non-citizens and the state. Hence, part of the current research agenda is to contribute to the ongoing endeavour to, paraphrasing Isin, de-orientalise the citizen and their practice of citizenship.¹⁸¹

2.2 : What is Citizenship?

Citizenship is above all a social construction, fluid and nebulous as a vessel of rights and obligations alongside the embedded paradox of its simultaneous exclusivity and universality. Its historicity in the Anglo-European sense is Greco-Roman, deriving from the Greek terms *polis* and

¹⁸⁰ Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, 'Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights' in Isin, Engin & Turner (eds.), Bryan. *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, p. 18.

¹⁸¹ Engin Isin, *Citizenship after Orientalism: An Unfinished Project* (London: Routledge, 2015).

polites, and the Latin *civitas* (city-state) and *civis* (an individual member of the *civitas*). In both classical Greece (predominantly Athens) and Rome of both Republic and Empire, citizens, were considered to be complete members of their polis/*civitas* community, with the right to partake in the process of government.¹⁸² Owing to the passage of time between Athens, Rome and the twenty-first century, accepting citizenship as a signifier of the individual's 'full membership' into the society in which they exist,¹⁸³ forces us to recognize its fluidity. It has never existed in a single form. Ergo, a more advantageous stratagem is to take up a critique of citizenship *as membership* within a political community, and the politics that surrounds it.¹⁸⁴

Examining the politics that orbit around citizenship (and citizen practices), referred to by Nils Butenschon as 'any area of social interaction where citizenship comes into the picture as an instrument of power distribution', enables an analysis of politics to occur that is both spatially and temporally sensitive. Spatially, because the field of inquiry becomes sufficiently broad enough to encompass potentially diverse range of actors both citizens and noncitizens, operating within societies. When societies are understood as being '*constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociopatial networks of power*',¹⁸⁵ it is subsequently easier to appreciate how even within a single polity, substantial differences in the practice and theory of citizenship on the part of citizens may emerge.

Temporally, approaching citizenship from the perspective of its politics facilitates a greater respect for, and opportunity to integrate, its conventional and critical streams together. Conventional citizenship studies follow the model established by T.H. Marshall, for whom citizenship 'is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community' whose nature, by implication of his focus on England is inherently national and state bounded.¹⁸⁶ The centrality of *the nation* in the constituting of the citizen is further enunciated in Marshall's contention that although the community of those identified as citizens share equally in rights and obligations,

¹⁸² Richard Dagger, 'Republican Citizenship' in Isin, Engin & Turner (eds.), Bryan. *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, p. 149.

¹⁸³ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class & Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 8; and Eric Gorham, 'Social Citizenship and its Fetters', *Polity* 28:1 (1995): 36.

¹⁸⁴ Nils Butenschon, 'State, Power and Citizenship in the Middle East: A Theoretical Introduction', in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian (eds.) *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, p. 6.

¹⁸⁵ Michael Mann, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, p. 1 (italics in original text).

¹⁸⁶ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class & Other Essays*, p. 28.

‘there is no universal principle’ determining the exact make-up of these dialogic elements.¹⁸⁷ That is to say there is no supra-state consensus on an organising principle. Conventional citizenship studies then, ‘typically begin with citizenship defined as rights, obligations, and belonging to the nation-state’, with three rights ‘civil, political, and social’ and three obligations ‘conscription, taxation and franchise’ awarded particular significance.¹⁸⁸ The state (specifically the nation-state) is the key institution, because it is the nation-state that makes possible citizenship as a status of membership in its internal political community.

Fundamentally, this is due to the reality that at some level all citizen rights are legislated, within the halls of government, whether through deliberation or executive orders.¹⁸⁹ Thus the nation-state is the significant landscape on which citizenship exists because in modern times the legal and the political have been encapsulated within it. Contemporary globalization - notwithstanding Isin and Turner’s request to bear in mind its historical counterparts – is in rather novel ways altering this capacity of the state.¹⁹⁰ Thus critical theories of citizenship do not repudiate the importance of the nation-state, but approach its role in the constitution of citizenship orders from different perspectives. One of the issues this raises is the historical and present conflation between.

While this reality owes much to the concomitant emergence of nationalism with the modern nation-state in the Anglo-European context,¹⁹¹ a similar dynamic is observable in Arabic discourse as well. The significance of the development cannot be understated. Conventional analyses either implicitly or explicitly assert that citizen rights ‘are predicated on a fundamental right of equality before the law regardless of belief, background or origin that governs the relationship between citizens and their states’.¹⁹² Therefore, issues of legitimacy are concerned with tangible reciprocity or its absence, as Michael Hudson has capably illustrated.¹⁹³ Nationalism however orients questions

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, pp. 28-29.

¹⁸⁸ Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship Studies and the Middle East’ in Roel Meijer & Nils Butenschon (eds.) *the Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 512.

¹⁸⁹ Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, ‘Political Citizenship’, p. 13.

¹⁹⁰ Engin Isin & Bryan Turner, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁹¹ Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 104.

¹⁹² Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship Studies and the Middle East’, p. 512.

¹⁹³ Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics*.

of legitimacy towards more abstract notions of the imagined communities and solidarity in which what matters is the individual and the collectives' ability to fit into a pre-existing bounded institutional assemblage of the state.¹⁹⁴

Analyses adopting a critical perspective however problematise the assumptions on which their conventional counterparts rely, by introducing into the discussion two prime interpolations. First, critical theorists take into account the emergence of new rights (sexual, environmental etc.) which are taken as evidence that citizenship is a site of contestation and therefore more unstable than conventional studies allow.¹⁹⁵ Via this evaluation, critical perspectives illuminate how citizenship's embedded paradox of particularity and universality functions not only on the level of inside-outside disparity, but simultaneously on a level of internal differentiation. It is not just a matter of variances between citizens of different states, but profoundly, one of how citizens of the same state experience citizen hierarchies. Ira M. Young argues that this is part of citizenship's historical legacy, especially though not limited to the matter of gender. Explaining that for the early theorists and advocates of republican citizenship in Europe and North America, the duality of liberty for some and exclusion for others was not contradictory 'because the idea that citizenship is the same for all translated in practice to the requirement that all citizens be the same'.¹⁹⁶ As this is ontologically impossible, citizenship's homogenising capacity has created a social architecture that legitimates social inequality, concomitant with its facilitation of equal membership within a state.¹⁹⁷

Second, critical analyses consider how rights whether traditional or new, are increasingly – thanks to globalisation – being negotiated either through or with assistance from transnational and international institutions including the United Nations and the Council of Europe, and regional or devolved bodies within states.¹⁹⁸ A resultant cardinal implication being the critique of citizenship thought to operate solely on the level of the nation-state. This extends to conceiving of citizenship purely in terms of it being a pastiche of rights and obligations. Rather, as critical

¹⁹⁴ Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, p. 104.

¹⁹⁵ Engin Isin, 'Citizenship Studies and the Middle East', p. 512.

¹⁹⁶ Young, Ira M. 'Polity and Group Difference', p. 254; see also Amy Brandzel, *Against Citizenship: The Violence of the Normative* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2016).

¹⁹⁷ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class & Other Essays*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁸ Engin Isin, 'Citizenship Studies and the Middle East', p. 512.

theorists argue, it must be additionally defined ‘as a social process through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights’.¹⁹⁹ Consequently, if one were to speak, however tentatively, of a principle guiding critical analyses of contemporary citizenship regimes it could be that a number of significant social issues in our contemporary epoch (from the status of indigenous communities, sexual minorities, migrants and the environment) ‘have increasingly been expressed through the language of rights and obligations, and hence of citizenship’.²⁰⁰ Ergo, while each of these have materialized across the breadth of human history,²⁰¹ the onset of globalization has brought renewed focus to them as the hegemony of liberal internationalism, Fukuyama’s “end of history”,²⁰² and American unipolarity continue to fragment.

What emerges is less a repudiation of conventionalism, and more a pronouncement that a more profound flexibility of theory is required to take stock of diverse practices. Accordingly, diligence in the balancing act between conventional and critical understandings of citizenship is important for the sensitivity it engenders towards the subjective realities of citizens. Or following Balibar while the citizen is not synonymous with the subject, the citizen is a subject, especially as their capacity to access rights is, in the modern context, predicated on their subjection and obligations to the nation-state.²⁰³ Hence, in contrast to subjects or slaves ‘whose statuses imply hierarchy and domination’,²⁰⁴ citizens enjoy a privileged position of latitude vis-a-vie the networks of power in which they are situated. It cannot be overstated that this relationship between citizenship and the nation-state is only symbiotic insofar as it exists in our modern and contemporary epoch.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, the advent of globalisation has, if not weakened, at the least transformed and is transforming the role and functions of the nation-state in politics.²⁰⁶ Taking both the present moment and a sense of history into account, it is instrumental that citizenship is approached, not from a statist, but a constitutive position.

¹⁹⁹ Engin Isin & Bryan Turner, *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, p. 4.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 1.

²⁰¹ Engin Isin, *Being Political*.

²⁰² Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, *The National Interest* No.16 (1989): 3-18.

²⁰³ Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject: Foundations for Political Anthropology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), p. 114.

²⁰⁴ Keith Faulks, *Citizenship*, p. 4.

²⁰⁵ Asbjørn Eide, ‘Citizenship and International Human Rights Law’, p. 97.

²⁰⁶ Michael Mann, ‘Has Globalization ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?’ *Review of International Political Economy* 4:3 (1997): 472-496.

In this regard Keith Faulks offers a pertinent conceptual toolkit consisting of a triumvirate of *content*, *extent* and *depth*. If citizenship acts as a vessel of obligations and rights, then content is associated with questions concerning what ought to be the balance between the two, and what trade-offs are involved in negotiating and altering citizenship's substance in an identified context.²⁰⁷ Extent then denotes *the who*; who is included and excluded from possessing and/or accessing citizen rights, and according to which criteria is this mediated?²⁰⁸ The function of exclusion in citizenship cuts in at least two directions. The first, readily apparent when being citizen of a nation-state is examined, is associated with the external other. That is to say the non-national who nevertheless is a national of another state. In this manner, the key difference between a Jordanian and a Syrian is, for illustration, their association with two distinct nation-state constructs. Observers of the Arab world and its history will automatically detect an epistemological weakness with this level of differentiation between citizens of two (Arab) states. Because of the presence of supra-nationalism in the region dating from before the imposition and later consolidation of the nation-state system; the very idea of a national community being territorially bounded in as many as twenty-two Arab states has historically struggled for perchance.²⁰⁹ Resultantly, pertinent queries may be raised concerning the utility of citizen-to-citizen distinctions based primarily on the state.

The frame is further complicated when considering the interjection of non-state affiliated actors in the form pre-eminently of refugees and displaced persons across the breadth of the kingdom's history. Among them the Palestinians occupy cardinal significance. Like the Kurds, Palestinians globally constitute a national community without a state, who therefore exist either as citizens or non-citizens of other nation-states. In Jordan both are applicable as there are Jordanian-Palestinian citizens of the kingdom in addition to a population of non-citizen Palestinian refugees. Therefore, when investigating from a citizen perspective, the politics of being Palestinian and practicing Palestinian identity in Jordan – let alone the differences of citizen practice between other members of the Jordanian citizen community - I am not referring to external outsiders, the barbarians to the Greeks of antiquity, but rather to individuals and collectives who are inherently

²⁰⁷ Keith Faulks, *Citizenship*, p. 7.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 7.

²⁰⁹ Michael N. Barnett, 'Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System', *International Organization* 49:3 (1995): 479-510; Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2000); Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (London: Faber & Faber, 1991).

immanent. Conceptualising the function of exclusion within citizenship invariably therefore requires a second approach to take stock of citizen differences within the nation-state.

Engin Isin's study on alterity in the construction of citizenship regimes underscores as much. One of his founding contentions is that conventional comprehensions of citizenship begin from the position of a citizen/non-citizen dichotomy, directed by a 'logic of exclusion' predicated on two assumptions. Firstly that outsiders or non-citizens as a category 'pre-existed citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them'; and additionally, that those who are excluded are endowed with an innate negativity, which consequently renders their exclusion 'irreconcilable' with citizenship.²¹⁰ On the contrary, Isin proposes that profitable insights are to be gained from approaching citizenship from the outside, or from the perspective of its alterity. In this manner, *otherness* emerges 'as a condition of citizenship', therein positing a simultaneous emergence of the two.²¹¹ In evidence here are echoes of Mann's intersecting and overlapping power networks and constructivism's mutual constitution. While the distinction between these standpoints seems perhaps too subtle to warrant elucidation, the dialogic essence of Isin's analysis accentuates in a far more profound manner how citizenship 'requires the constitution of these others to become possible'.²¹²

I now return to Faulks and his third facet of citizenship, depth, which unlike content and extent is more problematic in its qualification as a consequence of its subjectivity. To the point, when asking questions about citizenship's depth or thickness, several key questions emerge: 'how demanding or extensive should our identity as citizens be' on the one hand, and on the other, when, if at all should our identity as citizens take precedence relative to the others with which we identify?²¹³ This question as to the depth of individual as well as collective identifications, and the gravity of obligation they possess, is of the three components, the one where the influence of the nation-state is most profound. Such is a ramification of the nation-state existing as a site bearing witness to the interplay between ideological expressions of nationalism on the one hand and principles of citizenship on the other. Unease embedded within their interactions thus necessitates, at least in theoretical terms, disentanglement. Citizenship by way of its mix of rights and

²¹⁰ Engin F. Isin, *Being Political*, p. 3.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²¹³ Keith Faulks, *Citizenship*, p. 7.

obligations carries with it a promise of reciprocity on the part of the state, or whatever political authority it is associated with. As an institution then, citizenship ‘is grounded in the guarantee of legal and political protections from raw coercive power’.²¹⁴ Nationalism, and its accompanying category the national, do not in any politico-legal fashion convey anywhere near the same theoretical assurances. Instead it makes appeals to individual members (nationals) on the basis of primordial and communal notions of solidarity alongside ‘sentiments of soil and blood’.²¹⁵

2.3 : Situating Citizenship (Jinsiyyah & Muwātanah) Historically

Having considered the fundamentals of citizenship from an Anglo-European perspective I now proceed to the Arab world in order to illuminate differences and similarities. The 19th century and the Ottoman Empire’s endeavours to address the challenges that emerged throughout it (especially from 1860 onwards) had indubitable, albeit unintended, structural influences upon developing comprehensions of citizenship in Arabic discourse. A discourse that had hitherto coalesced around the vertical power configuration of ruler and the ruled.²¹⁶ Ottoman political organisation was in some respects dualistic, with government and territorial divisions providing ‘a framework of order’, while the composition of rights and duties delineating the relationship between Istanbul and its subjects was predicated on the *Shari‘a*.²¹⁷ Within the social architecture facilitated by these two, the mosaic of communities in the Empire were categorised differently. Muslim subjects for illustration served in the military unlike their Christian and Jewish neighbours, but were exempt from some of the taxation regimes these communities were required to pay. There were distinctions between Muslim members of the empire as well.

Perhaps the most important in terms of military organisation, was that between the *‘askar*, historically a military caste from which was derived the governors and ruling administrators of the Empire, and the *ra‘ayah* (subjects).²¹⁸ Such is indicative of the integration between so-called

²¹⁴ Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, ‘Political Citizenship’, p. 13.

²¹⁵ Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werbner (eds.). *Women, Citizenship and Difference*, p. 1.

²¹⁶ Abdel Hussein Sha‘bān, *Al-Huwiyyah wa al-Muwātanah: Al-Badā‘il al-Multabasah wa al-Ḥadāthah al-Muta‘atharah* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥdah al-Arabiyyah, 2017), p. 30.

²¹⁷ Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 29.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 25. As a category this additionally included non-Muslim populations within the Empire.

religious and secular structural elements in the Empire. *Ra'īyah/ra'ayā* Parolin explains collectively denotes the people who exist 'under' an identifiable political authority. Yet even as a referent to people with centuries of utilisation, the analogy is a neologism insofar as it initially applied (and still does) to herds of livestock.²¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, the human rulers of this human flock are described as *ru'āt* or shepherds.

The two imply a relationship of dependency and submission on the part of the *ra'ayā*, and of top-down benevolent guidance from the *ru'āt*. Apart from submission, 'each community was free to live in accordance with its own beliefs and customs' as long as these did not conflict with the *Shari'a's* provisions, or threaten Ottoman dominance.²²⁰ Subject communities therefore evolved, according to Albert Hourani 'regional', 'religious' and 'functional' characteristics.²²¹ The control and unity generated by this institutionalisation of communal differentiation would come under increasing pressure as the century continued. Ergo, Roger Owen reflects how the Empire became increasingly concerned for its territorial integrity on the part of interference from 'a Europe driven on by the influence of the two great revolutions that it had experienced at the end of the eighteenth century: the political revolution in France from 1789 onwards and the Industrial Revolution in Britain'.²²² He does not however consider the implications of these two revolutionary processes on the development of citizenship in the MENA, which is a glaring deficiency in an otherwise landmark exegesis of nation-state emergence in the region post World War One.

Parolin contrastingly argues that decision makers in Istanbul 'felt urgent need of a secular membership bond to do away with capitulatory privileges' and to better strengthen centralised control over the non-Turkish territories.²²³ An important milestone in this regard, despite its ultimate failure, was the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, under whose terms all subjects regardless of religious affiliation were recognised as equal members of the same political

²¹⁹ Butrus al-Bustani, *Moheet al-Moheet Qāmus Muṭawal li-Lughah l-Arabiyyah* (Beirut: Maktabah Lubnan 1987), p. 641; Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: [Arabic-English]* (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, 1994), p. 401.

²²⁰ Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 29.

²²¹ *Ibid*, p. 29.

²²² Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, p. 8. It is perhaps not too coincidental to point out that these two revolutions served as catalysts for further advances to citizenship regimes on the European sub-continent.

²²³ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 71.

community. Inevitably, this in-conjunction with contemporaneous (the printing press) and future developments (the Young Turks movement) facilitated the expansion of nationalism; specifically Arab nationalism and smaller more territorially bounded nationalisms across the MENA. However, what remained underdeveloped was a thoroughly conceived model of citizenship. Historical precedence is significant here. A reading of Egyptian historian al-Jabarti's reflections on Napoleon's invasion/expedition into Egypt in 1798, for example reveals his utilisation of *sīṭwayān*, a transliterated form of citizen in French (*citoyen*) as a prefix when referring to French individuals 'for lack of a better alternative'.²²⁴ Symptomatic that the term now employed to designate citizen (*muwāṭin*) did not yet exist.

The absence of alternative expressions was not so much due to the paucity of terminology so much as their inability to capture the essence of citizenship as it was being observed in the European context. Ami Ayalon observes that Arab travellers to Europe during the nineteenth century found that although *ra'ayah* could be applied appropriately categorising the subjects of monarchs in Austria or Russia, its carrying capacity as a vessel of meaning evaporated in cases of constitutional monarchies. Tahtawi's lingual constructions of *sawṭ al-ra'iyyah* (the subject's vote) and *wukalā' al-ra'iyyah* (the deputies of the subjects) for example appear contextually incongruous at best and self-contradictory at worst.²²⁵ It may be appreciated then the argument that the designations of citizen and citizenship in a legal and political sense, were 'alien to the traditional Arab-Islamic political discourse'.²²⁶ Yet only insofar as these terms and their role in shaping political regimes and behaviours, developed and have subsequently been comprehended in an Anglo-European historical context. Resultantly in the face of challenges to established models of political organisation and mobilisation new conceptions needed to, and were developed. Linguistically Ayalon refers to this as 'interference', a circumstance in which a given language, in this case Arabic, 'finds itself inadequately equipped' for naturalising ideas and analogies 'current in that of another society' and subsequently, language.²²⁷ Because of its morphology and historical richness, Arabic's linguists and advocates rose to the challenge by redeveloping outdated terms, and broadening the application of others.

²²⁴ Ibid, p. 23.

²²⁵ Ami Ayalon, *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East: The Evolution of Modern Political Discourse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 45.

²²⁶ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 23.

²²⁷ Ami Ayalon, *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East*, p. 5.

Aside from *ra'īyah/ra'ayā*, Parolin identifies three other contemporary terms: *tābi'/atbā'* (follower/s), *jinsīyah* (nationality), and *muwātin/muwātinun* (citizen/s) as being particularly significant.²²⁸ Within Ottoman discourse, *tābi'/atbā'* conveys a disproportionate balance of power in the relationship between ruler and ruled, and as such shares characteristics with *ra'īyah/ra'ayā*. It was however more malleable to interference, having acquired over the course of the nineteenth century a legal-diplomatic character in order to be utilised as a translation for the French *sujet* or subject.²²⁹ In contrast to both of these, *jinsīyah* entered the political vocabulary in response to a newly emerging model of political organisation: the nation-state. Accordingly, *jinsīyah* whose derivation *jins*, details the process of categorisation, race, species, and later gender designations, came to be ascribed to nationality.²³⁰ A pivotal detail needs mention here, that *jinsīyah* refers to nationality as a concept not to individual nationals.

There is no active participle for citizen that is extracted from either *jins* or *jinsīyah*, which seems to correlate with how Bryan Turner understands passive citizenship as a status 'cultivated by the state in terms of a limited number of entitlements' without any associated political activism.²³¹ The third of the nomenclature, *muwātin*, as a political categorisation was born out the fissure between the end of empire and the dawn of its nation-state successor.²³² It was during the period bordered roughly by the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) and the nationalistic Turkification policies of the Young Turks post-1902, that it and its associated ideology Arab nationalism (specifically Syrian nationalism) rose at the intersection of the metamorphosing structure of Ottoman politics, and the diffusion of nationalism in the region from Europe. An indication of its usage at least amongst the intellectuals of the Arabic Renaissance or *al-Nahda* is its inclusion in Butrus al-Bustani's encyclopaedic *Moheet al-Moheet*. Al-Bustani's text is significant in how it situates *muwātin* within the lexical web of the root w-t-n, and thus denoting how its meaning comprehended at the time was linked to an individual's attachment to and association with territory.²³³

²²⁸ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 24.

²²⁹ Ibid, p. 24.

²³⁰ Ibid, p. 24.

²³¹ Bryan Turner, 'Islam, Civil Society and Citizenship', p. 44.

²³² Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 24.

²³³ Butrus al-Bustani, *Moheet al-Moheet*, p. 976.

Muwātin in its initial conception appears to convey greater similarities with nationalism and the national, than to citizenship and the citizen, insofar as al-Bustani did not attach to this analogy equilibrium between obligations and rights. A dialogic structure which has been integral to citizenship regimes across time regardless of the circumstances of the polities in which it occurs.²³⁴ Without a new model of political organisation yet in place to supersede the notion of empire, a female or male child of the nation (*ibn, ibna al-watan*) remained part of a collective, and hence their access to rights and freedoms hinged on that collective rather than individual agency.²³⁵ In Craig Calhoun's words, a 'process of individuation' had not yet occurred.²³⁶ Subsequently, it is revealing and not unsurprising that al-Bustani does not record *muwātanah* (citizenship) in his dictionary.

Indeed, it has been argued that the analogy did not enter conventional practice until the twentieth century, and even then, its usage in legal circles has been limited. Nowhere in Egypt's 1971 constitution for example could *Muwātanah* be found until it was introduced by a controversial 2007 amendment.²³⁷ It remains absent in Jordan's constitution, even after its most recent amendment in 2016. Ergo, although by the end of the nineteenth century concepts of a nominally secular nationality and attachment to a cultural political community were in evidence; an '*évolution psychologique*' was required if a notion of 'full citizenship' was to be established in the Arab world.²³⁸

2.4 : Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah - Citizenship as a Dialogic Structure

The preceding exegesis has inferred the following. *Jinsiyyah* is a designation denoting a national community from the perspective of the top down. I suggest the appropriateness of this position in that: firstly, its root which is examined further shortly, has no connection with either similar pre-existing analogies including *ummah*, or with feelings of attachment to place, which were being

²³⁴ Engin F. Isin, *Being Political*.

²³⁵ Ami Ayalon, *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East*, pp. 52-53.

²³⁶ Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, p. 87.

²³⁷ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 125.

²³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 75.

expressed through derivatives of the root w-t-n. And Secondly, its entry into politico-legal convention was a direct response to exposure to Europe's experiments with nationality and the nation-state. *Muwātanah* meanwhile has a more convoluted pedigree, as its active participle, the *muwātaneen*, predate it, as a reference to the *Moheet al-Moheet* confirms. Unlike *jinsiyyah*, it conveys a sense of attachment to, and communally shared feelings for a territorial space. I argue in the following sections that *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* must be considered together if a more substantive comprehension of citizenship in Jordan and the Arab world is to be acquired. In essence they constitute a dialogic structure that cannot from a scholarly perspective be separated.

Jinsiyyah and *muwatanah*, may both be translated as citizenship and each denote something of its substance. Yet, they do so in radically different ways, owing before anything else, to their roots. *Jinsiyyah* is derived from the root j-n-s (ج، ن، س), which in its second verbal form denotes a process of assimilation, naturalisation and or classification.²³⁹ Significant here is the question that if the j-n-s root is concerned fundamentally with issues of categorisation, what power-relations are embedded in the process of interpretation and selection. Who gets to choose the classifications in general terms and citizens versus non-citizens specifically?

The answer is to be found in the nation-state. Every Jordanian citizen has an identity card, on which is written, among other things, their national identity number, name, family and citizenship status under the rubric of *jinsiyyah not muwātanah*. It becomes possible to extrapolate that *jinsiyyah* is the prerogative of the state, and is applied in order to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens (*ajānib*), or more specifically, between nationals and foreigners.²⁴⁰ Therefore it carries a top-down 'legal and political association' that is tied to, yet simultaneously distinct from *muwātanah*.²⁴¹ Into this context, the concept of *tajannus*, or naturalisation is revealed not so much as a process by which an individual recognises their own entrance into a new community of citizens; but rather, the state's recognition and acquiescence to this occurrence. Hattar's observation then that Jordanians as a category change while the regime remains the same seems well founded.

²³⁹ Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, p. 167.

²⁴⁰ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 116.

²⁴¹ Abdel Hussein Sha'bān, *Al-Huwiyyah wa al-Muwātanah: Al-Badā'il al-Multabasah wa al-Ḥadāthah al-Muta'atharah* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥdah al-Arabiyyah, 2017), p. 30; see also Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, p. 59.

Muwātanah meanwhile, comes from a different root altogether, and its lexical archaeology reveals differing aspects of citizenship resultantly. In-particular ones that are indubitably less associated with the process of official categorisation and the in-and-out bordering of individuals. Its root w-t-n extending on our previous consideration of al-Bustani, refers in its verbal forms to reside (I), settle in a place (II & V), and to become acclimatised or naturalised to a locality (X).²⁴² As a noun, *watan* signifies the ‘homeland’ and nation, and unsurprisingly then, *wataniyyah* in political usage is adjunctively equitable with nationalism.²⁴³ This is not to be confused with *Qawmiyyah*, which is based on the awareness of the *Ummah*, a broader community of worshippers, which is significantly, not bound to smaller geographical units.²⁴⁴ Or following the broader spectrum of Adnan Hussein, *wataniyyah* denotes the *muwātin*’s (citizen’s) conveying of ‘feelings of attachment to the nation’.²⁴⁵ There is a point of conceptual overlap, as both root structures are carriers of both nationality and citizenship. However because *jinsiyyah* has no active participles accompanying it, it is the individual *muwātin/muwātineen*, who reside in, and are connected to an identifiable territory that express thorough this connection nationalist feelings.

Jordanian historian Ali Maḥāfẓah elaborates that although ‘the *watan* refers to a place of residence’, its political meaning, is broader than its literal definition, encompassing both ‘the geographical space that individuals feel to be their own’, and a connection of both sentimentality and interest.²⁴⁶ The *watan*, he continues, ‘is a network of different connections between residents in the designated geographical space’.²⁴⁷ These connections and feelings of ownership are mediated through the social construction of the community. An individual *muwātin* participates as part of a collective more than as an atomised individual. Hence, although *muwātin* as a discernible category ‘relies on a relation with a place’ more than a political authority, it ‘does not immediately entail the ideas of a status and rights enjoyed by the subject’.²⁴⁸ This is critical inasmuch as it constitutes a pillar of Ashwāq ‘Abbās’ crisis of the contemporary Arab state, whose ‘weakness of

²⁴² Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, p. 1265.

²⁴³ Ibid, p. 1265.

²⁴⁴ Ali Maḥāfẓah, *al-Tarbiyyah al-Wataniyyah* (Amman: Dar Jarir, 2006), p. 18.

²⁴⁵ Adnan al-Said Hussein, “Al-Muwātanah fi al-Watan al-Arabi” in Humam Ghaṣīb (ed.) *Al-Muwātanah fi al-Watan al-Arabi* (Amman: Dar Ward, 2010), p. 3.

²⁴⁶ ‘Ali Maḥāfẓah, *al-Tarbiyyah al-Wataniyyah*, p. 17.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 17.

²⁴⁸ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 25.

legitimacy is tied fundamentally to the conditions of its genesis'.²⁴⁹ Emergent then, is the central role of nation- and state-building in developing and reproducing what Bosniak refers to as 'the common substantive core' of citizenship as membership of the political community within its borders.²⁵⁰ It becomes clear then, how citizenship regimes across states develop different characteristics contingent on their respective nation and state building trajectories. However, identifying this core is challenging in the context of the Arab world because, citizenship rests on two seminal lingual foundations: *muwātanah* and *jinsiyyah*.

2.5 : Muwātanah, a Democratic Character?

Muwātanah in the 21st century is more nuanced, and a vessel of greater normative carrying capacity than a reference to its lexical foundations suggest, although it remains in an 'embryonic' stage.²⁵¹ A number of Jordanian former politicians and civil society activists interviewed by the author equate *muwātanah* with democratic practices and principles; and more profoundly, frame these in terms of the individual citizen. Former senator, and director of the non-government organisation (NGO) Sisterhood is Global Institute Asma Khudar, argues for illustration that *muwātanah* is both a 'legal and social relation' enacted between the state and the individual' recognised as a citizen.²⁵² Similarly, Mohamed Husseiny, director of the Identity Centre for Human Development, emphasises the individual and legal character of *muwātanah*, articulating it as 'the relationship between the state and the citizens, and between the citizens themselves'.²⁵³ Extrapolating from these perspectives, readily observe citizenship's progression from an individual and collective attachment to territory, to a socio-legal relationship between an institution – the nation-state – and

²⁴⁹ Ashwāq 'Abbās, *Azmah Binā' al-Dawlah al-Arabiyyah al-Mu'āshrah* (Beirut: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 2016), p. 50.

²⁵⁰ Linda Bosniak, *The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 18.

²⁵¹ Abdel Hussein Sha'bān, *Al-Huwiyyah wa al-Muwātanah*, p. 40.

²⁵² Asma Khudar (Former Senator and Director of Sisterhood is Global Institute) interview with the author, Amman, June 13, 2016.

²⁵³ Mohamed Husseiny (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

individual citizens on the one hand. And on the other an analogously socio-legal relationship between citizens themselves as individual members of the state constituted political community.

Both Khudar and Husseinyy allude to the psychological shift through which collective notions of belonging to a political community have been altered to *begin to* accommodate the individual as a base unit of that community. Stress must be placed on the reality that the process is both relatively young in historical terms and ongoing. It is young because whereas as the Anglo-European experiment with the nation-state as a defined entity, and with citizenship, has been ongoing for at least three hundred years, the Arab world has had but one hundred years with which to grapple with this particular model of political organisation. It is ongoing, not only because from a constructivist perspective, all social realities are forever being constructed, reproduced and challenged, but more importantly, because the foundational unity of the Jordanian state is a collective as opposed to individual actor: the family. Article 6 Paragraph 4 of the constitution is unequivocal in establishing that it is the family that is the basis of society.²⁵⁴

The entry of the individual actor into comprehensions of citizenship means that it is possible to speak of mutual rights and obligations that are tied, inextricably, to this actor without communal mediation. Hence, Husseinyy's identification of the state having the responsibility to treat all citizens equally, and to respect their innate freedoms and human rights, is an indication that being a Jordanian is a sufficient basis to be able to expect equal treatment.²⁵⁵ Expressed differently, being recognised as a citizen is the satisfactory condition on which the individual in question may make a claim on the state as an institution that is obligated to respond. Journalist Rana Sweiss advances this a step further, stating that citizenship by principle must endow Jordanians with a sense of ownership in their relationship with the state, including their involvement in the decision-making process.²⁵⁶ Such illuminates *muwātanah*'s aptitude to accept into itself normative considerations from its wider social landscape, in this case democratic notions concerned with rule of the people. That *muwātanah* is being associated by Jordanians with democratic values, demonstrates the need to conceive of citizenship as a dual, Janus-faced entity.

²⁵⁴ The Jordanian Constitution. Article VI. Section 4.

²⁵⁵ Mohamed Husseinyy (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

²⁵⁶ Rana Sweiss (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

When Ali Batran, manager of the Ammon Centre for Human Development laments ‘there is no *muwātanah* in Jordan’,²⁵⁷ he is not suggesting that citizenship does not exist, for the simple reason that *jinsiyyah* indisputably does, and therefore there is a category of people who are Jordanian citizens. That is to say they are recognised to be Jordanians by the state. The implication is that there is a deficiency or imbalance in the current composition of Jordanian citizenship as it is practiced by Jordanians. ‘Abbās enunciates analogously, that the precariousness of state legitimacy is ongoing due to its inability ‘to function as a vehicle for policy reflecting the public and national interest’.²⁵⁸ It is consequently easy to recognise how democracy and citizenship (*muwātanah*) have come together into dialogue. There is certain logic to this, following Balibar’s distinction between the subject and the citizen-subject as being one whereby the former has no ability to shape power relations, whereas the latter does.²⁵⁹

Uri Davis applies an analogous perspective with his differentiation between *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*. With the former rendered as ‘passport citizenship’, and the latter ‘democratic citizenship’.²⁶⁰ By passport, Davis means a ‘document issued by the recognized authorities of a recognized state to citizens (and only to citizens) for the purpose of travel outside the boundaries of the state’.²⁶¹ The right or perhaps more accurately, privilege of travel abroad, is one half of a dyadic structure, with the other being the concomitant ‘right of abode’.²⁶² Thus only those who have the right to abode (*jinsiyyah*) have the subsequent capacity to cross back and forth across state borders. Defining *jinsiyyah* in this manner ties it directly to the institution of the nation-state, which monopolises the capacity to authorise the individual certificate holder’s right of residence. Accordingly, Davis argues that it is *jinsiyyah* which constitutes ‘the guts’ of citizenship.²⁶³ Insofar as it is the institutional mechanism through which populations are brought into the political architecture of the state, and thus become recognised as citizens there is merit to Davis’ position.

²⁵⁷ Ali Batran (Director Ammon Centre) interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2017.

²⁵⁸ Ashwāq ‘Abbās, *Azmah Binā’ al-Dawlah al-Arabiyyah al-Mu’āṣrah*, p. 50.

²⁵⁹ Etienne Balibar, *Equaliberty and Citizen-Subject*.

²⁶⁰ Uri Davis, ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana’, p. 20.

²⁶¹ Ibid, p. 20.

²⁶² Ibid, p. 22.

²⁶³ Uri Davis, ‘Conceptions of Citizenship in the Middle East: State, Nation and People’ in Nils Butenshon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassanian (eds.) *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, p. 53.

His desire to draw distinctions between the two obscures their interconnectedness, one which as shall be elaborated in the next section, a relationship that can be better illuminated through a focus on the functions of claim-making inherent in both. In contrast to *jinsiyyah*, democratic citizenship (*muwātanah*) is positioned as the vehicle through which the individual citizen's right, again perhaps privilege is more precise, to 'equal access to the civil, political, social and economic resources of the state' is made available.²⁶⁴ Utilising his distinction between the two faces of citizenship, enables Davis to irradiate structural divisions between Jewish and non-Jewish (Palestinian) citizens of Israel:

*'In Israel a different refinement has been introduced, namely, the legal distinction between the Jewish citizens of the state who have Muwatana ("democratic citizenship" representing the right of equal access to the civil political, social and economic resources of the state, including Jinsiyya, the right of abode) versus the non-Jewish (Palestinian) citizens of the state who have the same Jinsiyya citizenship rights as the Jewish citizens, but not the same Muwatana citizenship rights'.*²⁶⁵

In effect, Davis employs the two terms as a dual-tiered structure, and in so doing is able to argue that within a single polity, in this case Israel, all citizens can share in *jinsiyyah*, but only those who fulfil a precise criterion are granted the ability to share *muwātanah*. However I have some concerns regarding the general applicability of Davis' definition. Firstly, given our discussion to date about the historical development of citizenship in the Arab world, it is conceptually difficult to swallow a definition of *muwātanah* that is so evidently skewed towards a particular normative outlook on political organisation, particularly one which bears no affiliation to the term's root foundations. Furthermore, what is meant when discussing democracy and democratic as an adjective for citizenship? A derivative of this is if a democratic discourse is going to be employed for analytical purposes, is its application being sufficiently sensitive to the wider socio-political context? Generally, scholarly communities in both area studies and political science and theory have philosophically been found wanting in this regard.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ Uri Davis, 'Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana, p. 20.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 21-22.

²⁶⁶ This is a point laboured by Larbi Sadiki. *The Search for Arab Democracy and Rethinking Arab Democratization; Elections Without Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2009).

In response, Larbi Sadiki calls for explorations, not into the feasibility of democratisation in the region, but more significantly, into ‘the potentiality of democratic knowledge’ and its regional diffusion.²⁶⁷ His is something of a lonely voice in the wilderness, which is all the more surprising given the incontestability of the postulation that democracy as a mode of government cannot hope to exist ‘without a cumulatively attained theoretical and practical “toolkit” of democratic knowledge’.²⁶⁸ A similar call may be heard in Andrea Teti’s critique of the post-9/11 state of the literature in MENA area studies. ‘Rather than aiding inter-field reconciliation’, he reflects, the recent history of ‘interdisciplinarity’ suggests its association ‘with the legitimization of mainstream standpoints, policing those very boundaries they supposedly undermine, and disciplining dissent by delegitimizing epistemological alternatives’.²⁶⁹ Diligence is subsequently required when proverbially sailing into democratic territory. With this in mind, Sadiki denotes democratic knowledge as ‘the intellectual and practical capacities, skills, ethics whose primary cognitive weight lends itself to democratic learning, and civic habituation and socialization via an open-ended, constructivist, interactive, cross-cultural but also reflexive process, across time and space, cumulatively and collaboratively’.²⁷⁰

So where as some observers of Jordan (and the region) lament the lost opportunities of the 2011 uprisings,²⁷¹ claim the arrival of a ‘Winter’,²⁷² or re-articulate the strategic rationale behind authoritarian resilience,²⁷³ Sadiki fashions an alternative. Instead of looking to the presence or absence of systemic changes to government and governance styles post-2011, these same uprisings

²⁶⁷ Larbi Sadiki, ‘Discoursing “Democratic Knowledge” and Knowledge Production in North Africa’, *The Journal of North African Studies* 20:5 (2015A), p. 688.

²⁶⁸ Larbi Sadiki, ‘Discoursing “Democratic Knowledge” and Knowledge Production’, p. 688.

²⁶⁹ Andrea Teti, ‘The Middle East and the Disciplinary (Re)Production of Knowledge’, in Firat, B., de Mul, S. and van Wichelen, S. (eds) *Commitment and Complicity in Cultural Theory and Practice* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), p. 84.

²⁷⁰ Larbi Sadiki, ‘Towards a “Democratic Knowledge” Turn? Knowledge Production in the Age of the Arab Spring’, *The Journal of North African Studies* 20:5 (2015B), p. 706.

²⁷¹ Marina Ottaway & Marwan Muasher, *Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform Yet Unmet* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011); Husain Haqqani, ‘Islamists and Democracy: Cautions from Pakistan’, *Journal of Democracy* 24:2 (2013), pp. 5-14.

²⁷² Michael J. Totten, ‘Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?’ *World Affairs* 174:5 (2012), pp. 23–42; Daniel Byman, ‘After the Hope of the Arab Spring, the Chill of an Arab Winter’, *The Washington Post*, December 1 2011, Opinion. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-the-hope-of-the-arab-spring-the-chill-of-an-arab-winter/2011/11/28/gIQABGqHIO_story.html (accessed September 5 2015).

²⁷³ Gregory Gause III, *Kings for All Seasons: How the Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring* (Doha: Brookings Center, 2013); Samuel Helfont & Tally Helfont, ‘Jordan between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council’, *Orbis* 56:1 (2011), pp. 82-95.

need to be framed as episodes of citizen engagement with, and updating of, the state of local democratic knowledge. Significantly, within this context, democracy must be conceptualised in a de-foundational manner,²⁷⁴ for it can only become knowable ‘within contexts of history, geography, language, culture and power relations, local and global’.²⁷⁵

By accepting Sadiki’s postulation as valid it is imperative to approach Davis’ translation of *muwātanah* and its subsequent dialogue with *jinsiyyah* with respectful caution. Davis himself may be perfectly capable of further defining what he means by democracy and democratic, but it is fair to say that some of his readers and policy makers are not, blinded as they are by a normative conflation between democracy and liberal democracy. The scholarly community itself is not immune to this myopia. To demonstrate, Rainer Bauböck in his preface to Parolin’s 2009 study argues ‘the gap between a liberal democratic concept and present legislation in these countries still remains very wide and difficult to bridge. Yet bridged it must be, because in a globalising world, citizenship is no longer a matter under exclusive control of sovereign states’.²⁷⁶ Within statements such as these the perceived superiority of liberal democracy rings loud and offers a double obfuscation. It first chokes the reality that ‘there are plural knowledge systems’, giving birth to a plurality of power relationships within societies.²⁷⁷

In so doing, the hubris of liberal triumphalism obscures the path towards Sadiki’s aphorism that good government must exist within local knowledge systems, some of which depending on context, have historically had nothing to do with explicitly liberal epistemological communities. I do not mean by this to suggest that commonalities between liberal theory and the various schools of Arabic Islamic social and political theory do not exist. Andrew March’s perspicacious *Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus* is exemplary in elucidating the harmonies of both.²⁷⁸

Furthermore, following Sadiki, a localised knowledge system or *makhzun*, is fluid site where communities across generations ‘transmit’ and crucially ‘supplement’ social knowledge in

²⁷⁴ Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy*.

²⁷⁵ Larbi Sadiki, ‘Discoursing “Democratic Knowledge” and Knowledge Production’, p. 688.

²⁷⁶ Rainer Bauböck cited in Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 11.

²⁷⁷ Larbi Sadiki, ‘Towards a “Democratic Knowledge” Turn? p. 708.

²⁷⁸ Andrew F. March, *Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

order to optimally ‘manage change over time and space’.²⁷⁹ Parallels developed in Arabic attest to this. Returning to *watan*, Sha‘abān illustrates that it refers to ‘a group of specific human, cultural, and material relationships existing within a framework of horizontal and vertical identities’. It is conceivable that overtime these relationships will form oral and literal databases of social knowledge within which the keys to solving past, and hopefully, future problems of social organisation reside. The origin of the information in these databases is not necessarily local however. It could well be that liberal analogies are adopted into a *makhzun*. Indeed the conceptions of citizenship reflected by Khudar, Sweiss, Batran and Husseiny demonstrate as much. The fundamental variable is that the process of adoption be internal, rather than external, to the social networks that are linked into the localised knowledge repository.

This reveals a shortcoming in Davis’ model. While to his credit, he does not speak in terms of liberal democracy, he doesn’t, at the same time, engage in problematizing the multi-faceted and context dependent nature of democracy and what this means for his translation of *muwātanah*.²⁸⁰ It is apposite to emphasise the time frame here. It is easy to criticise Davis for the limitations of linking his definition of *muwātanah* with democracy in a region where there is a dearth of democracy. Yet this needs to be tempered with recognition as to the level of optimism amongst scholarship circles concerning the potentiality for democratisation in the region post 1989.

A third concern and one associated with Sadiki’s call for greater democratic knowledge, involves wider applicability. Despite how problematic it is to place Israel, an ethno-religious state, together with democracy in the same adjective sentence, Israelis do enjoy elements of democratic practice and principles that citizens of neighbouring states including Jordan do not possess. It is possible for Davis to assume the existence of a level of democracy sufficient enough to float his definition of *muwātanah*. In a region where nothing democratic can be taken for granted, relying on an assumption of this nature makes for tenuous analysis. Fourth, his choice of case study has certain specificities that are not present in Jordan, or other regional contexts, and accordingly, questions emerge as to whether his distinctions are applicable. Notably, Israel is a settler-colonial society with one population (Israelis) seeking to usurp another population (Palestinians).

²⁷⁹ Larbi Sadiki, ‘Towards a “Democratic Knowledge” Turn?’ p. 704.

²⁸⁰ Uri Davis, ‘Conceptions of Citizenship in the Middle East’, and ‘Jinsiyya Versus Muwatana’.

Categorising key distinctions between their citizenships, especially considering Israel's existence as an ethno-religious state, is subsequently somewhat straightforward. The same cannot be said for Jordan even if one wanted to reproduce the conventional languid argument that speaks of a chasm between Jordanians of Palestinian and East-Bank origins. It is true that the state treats members of each community according to the needs of the regime. But to generalise this treatment without regard for its fluid nature and specificities is altogether otiose.

The question of whether one can generalise or not brings another concern to the fore: that of gender. In categorising *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* according to a Jewish and non-Jewish binary, Davis sidelines intersectional experiences of citizenship holders. As has been well documented by critical theorists, from an external position it is feasible to establish in some but certainly not all polities, that women enjoy the same citizenship status as their male counterparts.²⁸¹ Nevertheless, as long as a woman has to exercise the rights acknowledged to her via citizenship within the framework of patriarchy, it becomes incredibly dubious to argue substantively that her citizenship is equal to that of her male counterpart.²⁸² Certainly, adopting Davis' case-study, it could not with any seriousness be argued that all female Jewish – therefore holders of *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* – citizens of Israel share equally in both of these among themselves and their male counterparts.

In light of the above, caution is required in order to avoid converting an association between *muwātanah* and democratic norms into an equation. It is necessary to embark on a deeper analysis into the inner workings of their relationship. Central to this is claim-making, which not coincidentally, is fundamental to both democracy and citizenship. Bryan Turner notes 'the first thing to emphasize about citizenship is that it controls access to the scarce resources of society'.²⁸³ Consequently, those who possess it make claims on those in power to access these resources, and do so in a competitive fashion owing to their scarcity. Simultaneously, non-citizens who exist within the sphere of the same political power structures additionally make claims for citizenship that they may be able to subsequently lay claim to society's resource pie.

²⁸¹ Amy Brandzel, *Against Citizenship*; Iris M. Young, 'The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State', in Marilyn Friedman (ed.) *Women and Citizenship*, 15-34, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Afaf Jabiri, *Gendered Politics and Law in Jordan*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

²⁸² Keith Faulks, *Citizenship*, p. 9.

²⁸³ Bryan Turner, 'Islam, Civil Society and Citizenship', in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian (eds). *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, p. 38.

Engin Isin consolidates these dynamics under the rubric of citizenship's alterity, whose logics 'embody differentiation and distinction, not only as strategies of exclusion, but as strategies of elective affiliation, recognition, incorporation, and congregation'.²⁸⁴ At the heart of which are the claims individuals and communities make on each other within the context of fluid yet stratified power networks. Approaching citizenship as a dialogue between *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* through a focus on claim-making enables us to desaturate from our analysis (and subsequent knowledge of citizenship) assumptions concerning democracy, while still recognising its position in the relationship. One immediate benefit will be a disentangling between Anglo-European theoretical expectations regarding the functions of citizenship, on the one hand, and a more sensitive appreciation of citizenship's development "on the ground". On a more profound level, disassociating ourselves from a reliance on the democratic adjective opens the space for further insights into the location of *muwātanah* and *jinsiyyah* at the nexus of power relationships. Most notably but not limited to between individuals (citizens) and the state; at whose heart I propose are the processes and acts of claim-making.

2.6 : Muwātanah & Jinsiyyah - Claim-making and the Citizen-Subject

I contend here that citizenship in Jordan can be (more) optimally ruminated on if conceptually *muwātanah* and *jinsiyyah* are conceived of as being two faces of the one concept. Simultaneously, I accept the immediate difficulty of this request owing to the non-existence in contemporary discourse of a term that could bring the two under its umbrella. However persistence will yield advantages of an improved understanding. Specifically, by considering them as two parts of the single whole I conceptually bring them together, facilitating an appreciation of their dialogic essence. This crux it is asserted here is anchored in claim-making and the contentious politics that consequently arise when these claims clash. It is necessary to begin with a brief note on categorisation, in-particular when categorising something or someone a claim is made to know something about it/them. More than this the process both creates an image of the subject being

²⁸⁴ Engin F. Isin, *Being Political*, p. 25.

described/comprehended, while at the same time destroying alternative visions of what that subject might be.²⁸⁵

Consider *muwātanah* as being indicative of an individual's status as a resident of a territory, recognised socially. Through this residence, a citizen (*muwātin*) makes claims on the existing structures of political organisation via their connection with said territory. When an individual's attachment to, and place within, a territorial space and its accompanying human networks is recognised and reproduced socially; there is an implicit acknowledgment that this social reality exists while others do not. I can claim that I am from city A, and accordingly imply I am not from city B. I then substantiate this claim on the grounds of my socially performed attachment to the space of city A, which in turn demonstrates my familiarity with it. Because the performance is social, it receives either support or derision from the social networks in which I am embedded. Assuming it is the former and not the latter, I can then make claims on the power networks present upon the territorial space in which I exist.

Simultaneously, the state, engages in its own process of claim making via *jinsiyyah*. When a state grants recognition that an individual belongs to its associated political (national) community, a claim is made over that person and their character. Including among other things, criteria of expectations concerning behaviour deemed acceptable and non-acceptable. Coercion is critical here in encouraging acceptable behaviour, in-particular the threat of violence. Historically treason and other such crimes of betrayal have fallen into this set, and their strength, aside from the physical destruction of the individual/s, resides in how as part of the method of citizen recognition the possibility of alternatives is destroyed or weakened to the point of appearing invisible. Borders are produced, demarcating those inside from those outside, constructing and defending a dominant narrative as to who are the citizens.

A key distinction to be made is that although *jinsiyyah* may well denote a state sanctioned *right* of abode, it does not necessarily involve the *act* of abode and the claims that emerge from this practice. This is why it becomes possible for *muwātanah*, and not *jinsiyyah* to act as a vessel for social norms, whether democratic or not. Drawing attention to the distinction between the *right* and *act* of abode facilitates greater appreciation of the multifaceted experience of citizenship in an

²⁸⁵ Reece Jones, 'Categories, Borders and Boundaries', *Progress in Human Geography* 33:2 (2009), p. 176.

intersectional world. This is not a repudiation of Davis so much as an endeavour to elucidate his distinction between the two further by bringing them into a dialogic relationship. The distribution of power within this relationship is instrumental in producing outcomes. Nicolas Onuf sheds light on this arguing human agents author and enforce rules, which being both ‘constitutive and regulative’ inform agents ‘how to play the game’, in order to ‘secure and ensconce advantages over other agents’.²⁸⁶

‘Differential success’ in this endeavour means that although advantage is never permanent in a static sense, the asymmetries that are produced as a consequence of the authoring and deploying resources for the maintenance of rules, induces a disadvantage on agents seeking to reverse or alter the circumstances.²⁸⁷ Via extrapolation it is perceivable that individuals and collectives are a battle ground as the forces and power networks of both *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* promote the construction of differing images of the citizen, who is subject to these forces. The reality of subject status highlights the difficulty in maintaining one of the central assumptions concerning citizens and citizenship in the MENA elucidated in the literature review: the ontological nature of the citizen. There is a tendency, linked generally with the modernist predilection for progress to conceive of the citizen within the modern state as a product of a linear evolutionary process that has resulted in the retreat of the subject. Ayalon illustratively connotes subject with ‘subordination to a monarch’.²⁸⁸

Yet Balibar encourages a reconsidering of this paradigm of progression and ‘teleological transformation’.²⁸⁹ Advancing instead a conceptualising of modernity as being ‘defined by the overlapping and contradictory processes of becoming-citizen of the subject and the becoming-subject of the citizen’.²⁹⁰ All citizens are subjects insofar as they are subject to a locus, or loci of power. It is the nature of this power and subsequently the substance of the associated relationship that is seminal in efforts to distinguish between them. The analogy of representation is worthy of identification. Returning to Balibar:

²⁸⁶ Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making*, pp. 47, 52 and 60.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 60.

²⁸⁸ Ami Ayalon, *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East*, p. 43.

²⁸⁹ Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*, p. 4.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 17.

*'Initially, representation is a representation before the Prince, before Power, and in general, before the instance of decision making' [however] 'representation of the sovereign in its deputies, inasmuch as the sovereign is the people is something entirely different' ... [it] is 'the act of representation par excellence: the choice of those who govern, the corollary of which is monitoring them. To elect representatives is to act and to make possible all political action, which draws its legitimacy from this election'.*²⁹¹

To be a subject in the classical sense then is to be subject *before* a power that is often embodied in a single authoritative being. Citizens however, are not so much separate from the locus of power that governs their lives, as they are collectively the source of this power. They cannot be a subject before power in quite the same manner owing to their agency's role in constituting that power. Having said this, I do not wish to imply any linearity here. To illustrate, in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, each of the subjects has engaged in the submission of their wills for the sake of commonwealth, and are collectively therefore, the author of the regime.²⁹² Their agency therefore reveals them as more than abstract subjects. Simultaneously, they are not citizens insofar as they have no legitimate recourse against decision-making, but must persist in the reproduction of an established power relationship.

On the one hand Hobbes' exposition of the relationship between ruler and ruled 'breaks with the assumption that the ruler and the state are indivisible'; while on the other, the resulting model 'might, at best, be termed subject-citizenship' as the aim is the security of order as opposed to the protection of individual rights or civility.²⁹³ Injecting Hobbes into the discussion at this stage is pertinent insofar as Hobbes was one of the first to identify the role of individuals, rather than collectives in the constitution of state power. Furthermore, his exegesis demonstrates how during the early moments of the development of citizenship in relation to the nation-state, a degree of subjection was intimately present. Ergo, centuries later, Balibar is able to critique the degree of subjection facing the liberal citizen, whose 'freedom is a narrow and uncertain path between the Charybdis of penalization and the Scylla of medicalization'.²⁹⁴

²⁹¹ Ibid, p. 32.

²⁹² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 227.

²⁹³ Keith Faulks, *Citizenship*, pp. 22-23.

²⁹⁴ Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*, p. 8.

It behoves scholarly enterprise interested in citizenship to therefore persist in problematising the location of the citizen-subject that has emanated from the bones of Hobbe's agential subject, via the changing function and location of power in political relationships. Rather than generalise about what power is and is not within a social setting, it is appropriate to dedicate some time to a consideration of what power is. Pamela Pansardi, augmenting Amy Allen's extrapolation of power-to, power-with and power-over,²⁹⁵ is a useful tangent of inquiry in this regard. While Allen's triumvirate is developed to address an aperture within feminist theory specifically, Pansardi argues that they can be taken to constitute faces of a single concept of power.²⁹⁶ The result, for our own immediate study, is that the utility of Allen's initial development becomes available to wider application.

Power-over is 'the ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices available to another actor or set of actors in a nontrivial way'.²⁹⁷ Thus while exercising power-over someone or something does not have to fit within strategic imperatives or goals for Allen, it nevertheless must have a substantial effect. The parameters then are established vis-a-vie the effect of constraint over action. By extension, the removal of explicit intent means that Allen is able to disaggregate power-over from domination, which she considers to be an 'application' of power-over, not power-over in its entirety.²⁹⁸ Such is predicated on her recognition that an individual having power-over another is not in isolation sufficient to construct a negative relationship between them. While all cases of domination require power-over, not all cases of power-over involve domination.²⁹⁹ Conceptually, this dissection of domination from power-over is crucial for the nuanced study citizenship. The two are simply 'incompatible', for where domination 'seeks to deny us recognition as an autonomous individual, capable of self-governance',³⁰⁰ citizenship functions in an opposite fashion.

²⁹⁵ Amy Allen, *The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), p. 129.

²⁹⁶ Pamela Pansardi, 'Power to and Power over: Two Distinct Concepts of Power?', *Journal of Political Power* 5:1, (2012A), 73-89;

²⁹⁷ Amy Allen, *The Power of Feminist Theory*, p. 123.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 125.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 125.

³⁰⁰ Keith Faulks, *Citizenship*, p. 4.

Correspondingly, Pansardi discerns the division between power and domination ‘lies in the level of asymmetry of the social relations that the latter entails’.³⁰¹ She advances that domination is a condition determinate on the modalities of power’s distribution within an identified set of social relations, rather than being a distinct variety of power. In contrast, power-to connotes ‘the ability of an individual actor to attain an end or series of ends’.³⁰² Being defined in this manner, some theorists have proceeded to separate power-to from social realities,³⁰³ a separation rejected by Pansardi due to the risk of seeing power-over as a relational aspect of power, and power-to as a more individually dispositional aspect isolated from social realities.³⁰⁴ Conceived socially, it becomes possible to identify resistance, as a sub-category of power-to, analogous with the conceptual relationship between domination and power-over. In this context, resistance is understood as the capacity ‘of an individual actor to attain an end or series of ends that serve to challenge and/or subvert domination’.³⁰⁵ In other words the status quo power-over relationship between the actor in question and the actor/s in which they are in relationship with.

Illuminated is power-to as an innately individual pursuit. Collective action therefore emerges via power-with. Power-with is ‘a collective ability that results from the receptivity and reciprocity that characterize the relations among individual members of the collectivity’.³⁰⁶ That said, it would be incorrect to equate power-with with solidarity, which is more appropriately understood as but one of the ways in which power-over can be exercised.³⁰⁷ Solidarity, especially in the internet age, if it is to be taken seriously, should be comprehended in a context specific manner. It may be possible to demonstrate so-called keyboard solidarity, but this should not in all cases be understood as part of ‘the ability of a collectivity to act together for the attainment of an agreed-upon end or series of ends’,³⁰⁸ which rests at the centre of power-with.

The key distinction to be made between Allen and Pansardi, is that while Allen conceives of power-to, power-over and power-with as situational features, Pansardi endeavours to fuse them

³⁰¹ Pamela Pansardi, ‘A Non-normative Theory of Power and Domination’, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 16:5 (2013), p. 629.

³⁰² Amy Allen, *The Power of Feminist Theory*, p. 126.

³⁰³ Keith M. Dowding, *Rational choice and political power* (Aldershot: Edwan Elgar, 1991).

³⁰⁴ Pamela Pansardi, ‘Power to and Power over’, pp. 77-78.

³⁰⁵ Amy Allen, *The Power of Feminist Theory*, p. 126.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 126.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 127.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 127.

into a single conception of social power. Her proposition being that both power-to, and power-over, are ‘best understood as two different aspects of a single, unified concept of power, which is intrinsically social’.³⁰⁹ From this perspective then, Allen’s exegesis is torn between ‘the need’ to advance an understanding of power that is concomitantly ‘formal’ as well as ‘politically relevant and, more specifically, feminist’.³¹⁰ In contrast, Pansardi seeks to overcome this embedded tension, reasoning that despite their definitional divergences, they nevertheless ‘denote the same category of social facts’.³¹¹

Power understood in this manner provides potent ammunition in enunciating some of the dynamics on the historical continuum between *subjectus* and *subjectum*.³¹² The subject or *subjectus*, is subjected to an authority, that he/she does not have power-over in any reasonable form, and an at best curtailed power-to pursue objectives with the goal of altering the means of reproducing established stratified power relations. However the citizen is not the *subjectum* insofar as the *subjectum* can be taken to epitomise an equality of power relations. In the process of becoming a citizen, being in possession of rights is crucial, for ‘the idea of the rights of the citizen, at the very moment of his emergence, thus institutes an historical figure that is no longer the *subjectus*, and not yet the *subjectum*’.³¹³ The citizen cannot completely escape being a subject, but rather is endowed with particular capacities vis-a-vie his/her: power-to address authority however it is manifested, and via various models of collective action (power-with), enact power-over this authority.

However one should not at any point conclude that citizens across or within polities possess the same grade of power-to and power-over. Even within polities the intersectionality of experience and the social construction(s) of citizenship must be considered in order for analysis to proceed beyond abstract philosophy into the realm of political reality. American writer James Baldwin in a brilliant commentary on race relations in twentieth century America captures its

³⁰⁹ Pamela Pansardi, ‘Power to and Power over’, p. 87.

³¹⁰ Ibid, p. 85.

³¹¹ Ibid, p. 74.

³¹² Emily Apter, “Foreword” to Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*,: ‘where *subjectum* referred in scholastic manner to an individual substance, a unity of body and soul, and *subjectus* (the “other name of the *subditus*”), was taken to refer to the human person, “subjected to” divine or princely authority’, p. vii.

³¹³ Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*, p. 31.

essence. From his perspective as an African-American growing up in Harlem New York, Baldwin reflects on the transition from childhood by his friends, and in doing so, enunciates the reality of the subject-citizen:

*‘My friends were now “downtown”, busy, as they put it, “fighting the man”. They began to care less about the way they looked, the way they dressed, the things they did; presently one found them in twos and threes and fours, in a hallway, sharing a jug of wine or a bottle of whiskey, talking, cursing, fighting, sometimes weeping: lost and unable to say what it was that oppressed them, except that they knew it was “the man” – the white man. And there seemed to be no way whatever to remove this cloud that stood between them and the sun, between them and love and life and power’.*³¹⁴

Baldwin’s passage enunciates a necessary metaphorical flourish: ‘this cloud that stood between them and the sun’. The “they” he refers to are the millions of American citizens of whom Baldwin’s friends are emblematic; the “cloud” meanwhile, more than signifying the abstract white man, is a regime of power (one that is inherently white), that structures the citizenship regime within the country. Its impact, as experienced by African-American citizens being to shadow them from the direct light of the “sun”, and hence from practicing power-to and power-over the system as citizens of the state. Among other things, Baldwin’s observations challenge Balibar’s contention that ‘what radically distinguishes him (the citizen) from the subject of the Prince is his participation in the formation and application of the decision: the fact that he is legislator and magistrate’.³¹⁵ Consequently, unlike the subject, the citizen participates in the production and reproduction of the political community, rendering for Balibar the analogy of the passive citizen ‘a contradiction in terms’.³¹⁶

Yet it is important not to weigh Balibar’s exposition disproportionately. By way of counterbalance Baldwin is adamant in explicating how ‘it must be remembered that the oppressed and the oppressor are bound together within the same society; they accept the same criteria, they

³¹⁴ James Baldwin, *The Fire Next Time* (New York: Vintage, 1993), p. 19.

³¹⁵ Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*, p. 32.

³¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 32.

share the same beliefs, they both alike depend on the same reality'.³¹⁷ Both the oppressor and the oppressed in this context are citizens of the same nation-state, which echoes Davis' dual-level model of citizenship in which Jewish Israelis possess both *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah*, whereas their non-Jewish citizen counterparts hold *jinsiyyah* but are denied *muwātanah*. The experience of subject-hood is diametrically different as a ramification of the intersections of their experience and practice of citizenship. To what do citizens remain subject to, and by extension when can it be said that the balance between citizen and subject statuses is balanced/imbalanced? According to Balibar, subjects exist in 'a relation of obedience', but crucially, one that is not synonymous with compulsion, although the authority's power-to compel is inevitably present.³¹⁸ To clarify further, a relationship 'is established not only between a chief who has the power to compel and those who must submit to his power, but between a *sublimis*, "chosen" to command, and *subditi*, who turn towards him to hear a law'.³¹⁹

For our purposes, the final part of this sentence is perhaps the most noteworthy in implicitly denoting where the change between the abstract subject and the citizen-subject occurs. In it Balibar contends that the subjects (*subditi*) turn towards the chief, who embodies political authority within the community, in order to hear the law. That is to say the chief acts as an intermediary between subjects and a law which historically was divinely bestowed and thus beyond negotiation and compromise. In this way the chief becomes the embodiment of the law, and subsequently the object of obedience. Brought into focus by Baldwin's imagery of the cloud before the sun, one sees that the cloud (the chief) over time conceives of himself as the sun. Predicably therefore throughout human history emperors have established worship cults of themselves, and have claimed lineage from the demi-gods of Olympus; Pharaohs have stylised themselves as gods upon the earth.

It was established in the introduction that while my focus is on a particular community of citizens and non-citizens tied to Jordan, I simultaneously recognise the fallacy of framing this community and society as a systemic totality. Instead, I am sympathetic to Mann's argument that societies are constructed of overlapping and intersecting networks of power. A problem therefore

³¹⁷ James Baldwin, *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), p. 21.

³¹⁸ Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*, p. 27; Hobbes' insightful dictum 'covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all' is a relevant point of reflection here. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 223.

³¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 27.

arises in Balibar's reduction of *subditi* and their chief, which implies the existence of a single locus of power. Though serving a theoretical purpose it must be expanded to include multiple sometimes competing loci of power, especially in Jordan. In the absence of centralised authority capable of sustaining direct control over a population, other forms of organisation and belonging persisted and at times changed the status quo. This is especially true in Jordan where direct control rarely penetrated the steppe east of the Jordan River until the establishment of the Trans-Jordanian Emirate.³²⁰ Both inside and outside of the main settlements: Karak and Salt, socio-political organisation was structured primarily via kinship networks. By which I mean that the structure of society coalesces around 'distinct, self-ruling groups', with membership to these communities based on descent whether real or imagined, to a common ancestor. Connections between members of these groups were therefore personal more than territorial in nature.³²¹ Hence upon the creation of the nation-state, whose category of membership – citizenship – was eminently territorial rather than personal, the seeds of competition between these loci in-particular were sown.

The constitution of the relationship between ruler and ruled, whether *sublimis - subditi* or otherwise cannot be assumed *a priori*. And the consciousness of Balibar's subject appears restricted to the extent that he/she cannot pronounce, let alone advocate their being, their identities and interests in the web of social relationships within which their subject status has been constructed and sustained.³²² But the subject-(citizen) who emerges from the pages of Baldwin, let alone Hobbes, is of a different calibre. He/she not only knows and is aware of their structurally set limitations as citizens, but furthermore understands that this *sine qua non* is of no benefit to their interests.

There emerges implicitly from Balibar's argument a suggestion that citizenship as a concept has a unitary quality that cannot be subtracted from, and hence there must be equilibrium between the citizen's passivity as expressed through obedience to law, and their activity as manifested in the legislative involvement. I argue into this context that it is important to be flexible in conceiving of citizenship as existing perpetually on a spectrum with a number of markers that can indicate, without completely categorising the kind of citizenship being practiced at a given

³²⁰ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*, pp. 28-30.

³²¹ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 33.

³²² Etienne Balibar, *Citizen-Subject*, p. 26.

moment. Marshall's three stages: civil, political and social, constitute three such markers. Flexibility is important for the following reasons. First, Balibar's exegesis is, dependent upon the European experience of the citizen-subject. Our study conversely is interested in the citizen-subject within a non-European context, and specifically one in which the role of the citizen legislator in the exercise of political power and its distribution remains limited.³²³ Second, because power distribution and the contest over access to it are integral to citizen practices and capacities, it is worthwhile to explore how these dynamics are performed.

This exploration is better served comprehending citizenship as elastic however durable entity demarcating between the citizen and its alterity: the non-citizen. Through which, the lines of inclusion versus exclusion may be tentatively drawn. Such is central to the back to basics approach advocated by Butenschon. Third, citizens are conventionally assumed through their identification with a nation-state. This identification however does not necessarily mean that they are endowed with Pansardi's three faces of power, as Baldwin's exegesis on the condition of African-American citizens clearly illustrates.

2.7 : Conclusion

The chapter has endeavoured to provide a nuanced analysis of citizenship that can be applied in the coming case-study chapters. I advanced an understanding of citizenship that sees *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* historicised in terms of their development from the nineteenth century forward, and their fundamental constitution examined. This examination has involved a consideration of the two analogies and their roots in order to elucidate webs of meaning attached to them. Doing so has enabled sensitivity concerning the role of democracy in understandings of citizenship in the Jordanian context. The significance of which is that assumptions regarding citizenship's meaning are avoided before adequate analysis of its application and practice has been conducted.

Additionally, the analysis included deliberation on how the philosophical matter of citizenship can be better understood. Balibar's rendering of the citizen-subject was especially

³²³ Surprising given: 'the Arab-Islamic world, having not been decimated socially by the Wars of Religion was never compelled to seek alternative sources of political legitimacy divorced from that derived from religion'. Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, p. 21.

pertinent in this, demonstrating how rather than being a linear development, the subject has never truly left the political sphere, rather it has become a hyphenated entity with the citizen. Through which I suggested that citizenship exists on a continuum, and more to the point is innately intersectional. Doing so has highlighted the fluid and contestable nature of citizenship.

Chapter 3

3. Historicising Jordanian Citizenship

*'We have something called Jordanian citizenship but its definition to tell you the truth no one could answer that...you have a diverse society but no specific definition of who is Jordanian'.*³²⁴

3.1 : Introduction

The previous chapter shed light on the distinct character and close relationship between *muwatanah* and *jinsiyyah*, showing the alternating between intersections and different historical developments of the concepts in the Arab World. It addressed the history of *muwātanah* and *jinsiyyah* from the position of the history of ideas and corresponding political thought. Our task now turns to the historical permutations that have produced contemporary citizenship in Jordan, for it is history that, in the words of Ibn Khaldun, 'shows how changing conditions affected (human affairs), how certain dynasties came to occupy an ever wider space in the world'.³²⁵ To do so this chapter covers six key periods, together spanning nearly a century of modern Jordanian history from the Karak protests of 1910 to the close of the century in 1999.

It begins with the pre-Mandate dynamics of social organisation in Ottoman Transjordan and their relation to centralised authority. A centralised authority has historically been a key factor in the evolution of the citizen-subject, and thus it is imperative to examine the influence of Ottoman penetration on this process in the geopolitical locality of Jordan. Through which it becomes possible to elucidate whether any continuities are recognisable as the territorial entity socially and geopolitically advanced from sanjak, to mandate, to emirate, and to state. Attention then proceeds to the Mandate epoch (1920-1946), with a focus on domestic contestation over the emerging new political order on the one hand, and the influence of foreign intervention in the state-making

³²⁴ Bashar al-Khatib, (Freelance economic and politics researcher) interview with the author, August 30, 2016.

³²⁵ 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqadimah* (Cairo: Dar Ibn Jawzy, 2010), p. 9.

process on the other. Both are particularly relevant in the treatment of Jordan's Bedouin. A mediation on the decade succeeding independence in 1946 follows, with attention again allocated to internal and external pressures and relations. The Palestinian Nakba of 1948 which saw both Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and the settlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced Palestinians in the Kingdom (both East and West Bank) are among the most significant factors; owing to their far-reaching effects on both state and nation building in Jordan. On such manifestation of this are the elections of 1956, still referred to by Jordanians as the freest in the Kingdom's history. The elections along with the ensuing political crisis of 1957-1958, whose resolution saw the contraction of the electoral experiment and the imputation of martial law and royal rule, are a central concern.

In association, I examine how post-crisis Jordan took a not insignificant shift towards the country's tribes as political actors critical to the sustainability of the monarchy. During the 1960s tribal support was instrumental in the wake of the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 and its settlement in Jordan with increased ramifications following the Six Day War in 1967. Building on this relationship between PLO and the Jordanian state, consideration turns towards those developments occurring between the 1970 civil war and King Hussein's decision to disengage administratively from the West Bank in 1988. Finally, the chapter courses over the last decade of Hussein's reign in which several pronounced developments occurred on domestic and international fronts. These include the twin processes of political and economic liberalisation in 1989, the pursuit and acquisition of peace with Israel in 1994, and the subsequent tightening of the political window from that moment onward.

In order to frame the subsequent historical analysis in terms of citizenship, I utilise the quadripartite typology of Jordanian citizenship developed by Morten Valbjørn, whose models operate (sometimes simultaneously) across different epochs. The first of these, is an '*Arab-Islamic Hashemite model*' whose parameters were not territorially defined, but required that those within its orbit be loyal to the Hashemite throne regardless of residence or occupation.³²⁶ Arising alongside this first model, the second, '*Transjordanisation*', is innately more territorially bounded,

³²⁶ Morten Valbjørn, 'Like But not the Same as...: Arab Citizenship and the Jordanian Experience' in Roel Meijer & Nils Butenschön (eds.) *The Crisis of Citizenship*, 2017, pp. 194-195.

expressing a ‘resentment’ of the prominent position of foreign actors in the developing polity, with a special focus on non-Jordanian Arabs and the British. This was a symptom of its chief guiding principle that the state’s first priority was to act in the interests of trans-Jordanians.³²⁷ Resultantly, one of its more interesting notions when compared to the first model is the sense of hierarchy embedded within it, whereby although the political community need not be homogenous there ought not to be any doubt over whose interests the state should in policy-making prioritise.³²⁸

Integrating some of the elements of both of these is the third: ‘*United Arab Kingdom*’ (UAK) analogy. Unlike them however, the state’s role is envisaged as a facilitator of compromise between constituent groups. Citizenship ‘becomes an indirect relationship between the citizen and the state’ because it is the group to which a citizen belongs that ‘determines the nature’ of the individual’s relation with the state.³²⁹ In practical terms this model faded into relative insignificance following the loss of the West Bank in 1967, and the subsequent administrative disengagement in 1988. As an organising principle however, the idea that the individual’s ability to interact with the state is predicated on their subnational collective identity remains relevant even until the present.³³⁰ Last in Valbjørn’s typology and the latest chronologically is ‘*Jordanisation*’.³³¹ It is an aggregation of the previous three, combining loyalty to the Hashemite position in Jordan with the territoriality of trans-Jordanisation, but without the citizen divisions - implicit or explicit - that are components of it or the UAK models. Ergo, the political community framed by territorial borders ‘constitutes the universe within which every person is considered equal’.³³²

Unsurprisingly, this mode of citizenship finds its pre-eminent expressions in the narrative slogans (Jordan First and We are All Jordan especially) of Abdullah II. Yet herein resides its

³²⁷ Morten Valbjørn, ‘Like But not the Same as...’, p. 196. Its origins reside in the 1920s and the five meetings of the Transjordan National Congress (TJNC) between 1928 and 1933, see Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*, p. 80.

³²⁸ Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 135; Nahed Hattar, ‘Al-Urdun: Mujtim‘ān fi Balad Wāhad’, *Al-Akhbar*, July 28, 2007; Adnan Abu-Odeh’s recollections of post-1970 Jordan fall into this category, see *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom*, pp. 189-192.

³²⁹ Morten Valbjørn, ‘Like But not the Same as...’, p. 197.

³³⁰ Shāker Jarrar’s analysis of Jordanian elections indicates as much. See: ‘Al-Bedu wa al-Nisā’ wa al-Masihiyun fi Qawānin al-Intikhāb: Min al-Tamayyez ila Tasis al-Huwiyyāt al-Muludah’, *7iber.com*, June 2, 2016, <https://www.7iber.com/politics-economics/jordanian-election-laws-and-the-manufacturing-of-identities/#.Wo-0DK6WaUk> (accessed June 4, 2016).

³³¹ Morten Valbjørn, ‘Like But not the Same as...’, p. 197.

³³² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

weakness, for as an aggregation of various contradictory currents, Jordanisation is open to interpretation and contestation from multiple simultaneous angles. The existence of various models occasionally concomitantly, other times distinctively, suggests that at the heart of each is political expediency.³³³ Greater appreciation of this can be advanced with what Tariq Tell refers to as the ‘Hashemite Compact’.³³⁴

3.2 : The Hashemite Compact - Definition and Considerations

Throughout this chapter and beyond, when referring to the Hashemite compact I am advancing an understanding adopted from Tariq Tell’s 2013 study *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*. In it he defines the compact in terms of a ‘nexus of formal organizations and informal institutions, ranging from a militarized welfare regime to dynastic patronage networks’ exchanging ‘loyalty for economic security’.³³⁵ His choice in opting for *compact* over *contract* is a deliberate one. The former is conceptually and hermeneutically far more flexible and, in political terms, vague in contrast with the latter, which refers to an altogether more explicit set of stipulations. In a contractual setting, any obligations signatories possess towards each other in practical terms, is transparent and categorical. A social compact contrastingly captures ambiguity and subjective application of obligations and benefits more appropriately, precisely because there is no necessity for an explicit detailing of its terms.

Furthermore, a compact may be substantially larger than an agreement between two or more agents, an epistemic element of prime importance in social relations in Jordan. For instance, although Jordan was and is ‘no more artificial than the other entities that emerged from the post-Ottoman carve up of the Fertile Crescent’, Tell posits that, unlike its equivalent successor states Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, the Mandate and then Emirate of Transjordan ‘lacked a center’ of

³³³ Nahed Hattar, ‘Min Huwe al-Urduni?’

³³⁴ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 12.

the variety ‘provided by old imperial capitals, religious centers, or confessional havens’.³³⁶ Arguably then, the Jordanian variant of the social compact functioned as more of a lynchpin to both state as well as nation building. It is necessary to keep in mind the role these centres perform in the crafting of social spaces and centres on which individuals and collectives develop and reproduce their sense of self. This is a key way of how territory and attachment to it is imbued with a meaning that may be subsequently politicised in various ways with corresponding implications.

An absence of a socio-political locus of gravitation is therefore both advantageous and problematic for political elites. For the Hashemites it was advantageous because it enabled the creation of a new socio-political centre, one that bound the idea of first Transjordan, and later the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom to the Hashemite family in a way that made it difficult for any emerging competing alternative to dislodge. A facet their cousins in Iraq never enjoyed. From this then, the security dimension of the compact becomes manifest. Following Kaplan, a state ‘whose citizens share common ideas about who they are and how they should work together are far more likely to enjoy the state legitimacy and good governance necessary to spur and sustain economic and political development’.³³⁷ There are parallels between Kaplan’s assertion and Barry Buzan’s ‘idea of the state’, which chiefly concerns the question/s of purpose, an idea that ‘lies at the heart of the state’s political identity’, including those pertaining to why it exists, and what its relationship to the society within it is.³³⁸

Hence, the compact composed the glue of the state’s ‘infrastructural power’ defined by Michael Mann as ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’.³³⁹ Infrastructural power thus underlines a regime’s social control over the population within its territory. Migdal’s rendering of social control, ‘the successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of social behaviour or

³³⁶ Tariq Tell, On the Nature of the Hashemite Regime and Jordanian Politics: An Interview with Tariq Tell (Part 1), *Jadaliyya.com*, August 22, 2012, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26928/On-the-Nature-of-the-Hashemite-Regime-and-Jordanian-Politics-An-Interview-with-Tariq-Tell-Part-1> (accessed December 07, 2015).

³³⁷ Seth Kaplan, Identity in Fragile States: Social Cohesion and State Building, *Development* 52:4 (2009), p. 466.

³³⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 70.

³³⁹ Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 5.

behaviour sought by other social organizations in favour of the behaviour prescribed by state rules',³⁴⁰ is especially pertinent here for its illumination of compliance, legitimation and participation as key indicators. Compliance concerns the methods by which the state has its population conform to its regime. This can take a number of forms but may be reduced to a combination of carrots and sticks: rewards for complying and coercion for disobedience.

Evidently, in a world of incomplete information, the success of a carrots and sticks combination is a matter of degree. Migdal makes an astute observation that success rests considerably on the state's ability to judiciously distribute available resources and to monopolise this process.³⁴¹ Participation is the second indication of social control, and is acutely concerned with the involvement of the population, or rather members of that population within the state's organisational apparatus. Specifically, 'participation denotes repeated voluntary use of and action in state-run or state-authorized institutions'.³⁴² Thus it concerns not only mass political participation, in the form of elections for example, or select involvement of certain groups in government enterprises, as with the Bedouin tribes being drafted on-mass into the Arab Legion.³⁴³ Rather, it is epistemologically broader, encompassing all forms of interaction from a citizen population within the ambit of the state. The third and final indicator legitimation, advances beyond the previous two in terms of its strength, referring to 'an acceptance, even approbation of the state's rules of the game, its social control as true and right'.³⁴⁴ Conceptually it is constructed on the pillars of compliance and participation as it is conceivable how in the absence of either of these, legitimation is unlikely to be produced and reproduced socially.

Resultantly, the Hashemite compact cannot be solely rendered in terms of material transactions, although these are invariably fundamental to it. Rather greater utility is to be found in excavating deeper, to uncover their inherent value in their social existence. If the world is innately social, material entities are given meaning within the context of social worlds constructed

³⁴⁰ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 22.

³⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 32.

³⁴² *Ibid*, p. 32.

³⁴³ See for thorough illustration Riccardo Bocco & Tariq Tell 'Pax Britannica in the Steppe: British Policy and the Transjordan Bedouin in Eugene Rogan & Tariq Tell (eds.) *Village, Steppe and State : the Social Origins of Modern Jordan* (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 108-127.

³⁴⁴ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, p. 33

by people who inhabit them. In this manner rules convert material substances into resources for agential use.³⁴⁵ Pertaining to Jordan, Tell conveys similarly, that resources available to and distributed by, the state are ‘gauged by the communitarian norms of a moral economy geared to insuring the minimal livelihoods of households that survive in an environment marked by uncertainty and conflict’.³⁴⁶

3.3 : Late Ottoman Jordan – Centralisation and the Foundations of a Citizen Order

Before the imposition of the British Mandate over what is now known as the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom in 1920, the territory in question was part of the Ottoman Empire, and had been since the cessation of the first Ottoman-Mameluke war in 1491. However, this did not imply that anything resembling a nation-state shaded model of sovereignty existed. Michael Mann has argued persuasively that the nature of logistics and centralised political reach in pre-industrial societies meant that formally controlling all aspects of territory beyond key supply or logistical routes was in practice impossible, until technological advances from the telegraph onwards were devised. A tangible consequence was the innate limit placed on ‘authoritative power’.³⁴⁷ There is substance to Haim Gerber’s reflection that Ottoman law based rule was ‘never firmly established’ in the geography between the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers.³⁴⁸ Yet from the 1850s onwards endeavours were made to bring Transjordan into the Ottoman fold more concretely. And in 1867 administrative structures were enlarged by the governor of Damascus to incorporate the districts of ‘Ajlun and the Balqa’, to be joined by Karak and Ma’an in 1893.³⁴⁹ However these administrative units did not extend eastward beyond the historical pilgrimage route to the Hijaz, later delineated by the Hijaz railway; meaning that tribal continuity persisted comparatively unchecked on the frontiers and beyond.

³⁴⁵ Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 8.

³⁴⁶ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*, p. 12.

³⁴⁷ Michael Mann, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, p. 10.

³⁴⁸ Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East*, p. 99.

³⁴⁹ Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, p. 18.

Fluctuation and disparity of Ottoman influence between settled communities, west of the pilgrimage route and the Bedouin pastoral *dirah* to the east is significant for later developments in Jordan for at least three reasons. Firstly, local forms of social and political organisation endured alongside an overarching albeit it loose Ottoman framework. Karak is particularly exemplary in this regard, with its socio-political life dominated by tribal dynamics,³⁵⁰ manifested in the Western (*gharaba*) and Eastern (*sharaqa*) alliances headed by the Tarawneh and Majali families.³⁵¹ Secondly, local familiarity with a loosely applied central authority facilitates foreseeable circumstances, whereby attempts to impose more rigid centralisation were resisted. Compounding this was the reality that the tribes in effect provided systems of justice, taxation and land usage alongside the capability to apply coercive force. Thirdly, the people of Transjordan, and their elites in-particular, had experience with external authorities, and their attempts at enforcing administrative centralisation upon them. This goes some way in helping us recognise that the calls for parliamentary rule which emerged out of the Balqa' Movement in the 1920s were not a thought bubble, and indeed could be interpreted as an effort to maintain pre-existing local autonomy. All of which challenged the centralising tendencies of the Ottoman state during the Tanzimat era of the mid-nineteenth century.³⁵² It is worth postulating in theoretical terms here furthermore that these three provisions continued to constitute a challenge to the centralised authority of the post-Ottoman order in Jordan.

With this at the forefront of our minds I now turn attention to the Karak revolt of 1910, which serves to place the previous discussion in a context preceding the Mandate's establishment. Not an isolated event, the Karak unrest followed on the heels of other provincial uprisings in the Jabal Druze district of the Damascus Vilayet in May 1909.³⁵³ All three were direct consequences of Istanbul's consolidating endeavours. In the Karak case, the revolt developed from three stimuli: taxation, population disarmament and the threat of conscription. Taxation had been both expanded and its rates increased since 1900, and besides being an inconvenience was problematic for some Karakis, who additionally made protection payments to Bedouin tribes.³⁵⁴ By 1910 a plan to curb

³⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 6-7. Where tribe is understood as 'a social group defined in genealogical and territorial terms'.

³⁵¹ Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan*, pp. 56-59.

³⁵² Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 9 & 18.

³⁵³ Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan*, p. 20.

³⁵⁴ Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, p. 185.

the availability of breech-loading rifles had surfaced, and in practical terms involved a prohibiting of firearms possession in the town.³⁵⁵ Local disconcertion, which had already been growing as a consequence of the tax regime, rose again justifiably out of fear of raiding parties from the district's Bedouin neighbours, particularly the Huwaytat to Karak's south.³⁵⁶ Disgruntlement was compounded by the accompanying request by the Damascus-based governor to carry out a census of the male population in preparation for conscription. It is this threat, according to Gubser, that 'was the major concern and real cause of the revolt', because similar to the partial disarming of the population, conscription would weaken the defensive capacity of urban and semi-urban residents against Bedouin raids.³⁵⁷

The uprising itself broke out on December 5, 1910, when armed rebels led by the Majali infiltrated the town and made their way to the local governor's house.³⁵⁸ Manifestations of Ottoman centralisation in Karak were attacked and occupied by the revolting forces, most notably the Ottoman Bank, Municipal building and the main mosque.³⁵⁹ In the municipal building the rebels burnt all registration papers that had been collected as part of the census and land registration processes, therein attacking the administrative and bureaucratic means of Istanbul's penetration of society.³⁶⁰ Ottoman officials and gendarmerie that couldn't seek refuge in the citadel were similarly targeted and held either for ransom or insurance against possible retribution from Damascus (Istanbul) or killed. The revolt spread across southern towns including Tafilah, Ma'an, Aqaba, and Qatrana, where interestingly the Hijaz railway stations in these latter three localities were torched as symbols of Ottoman control and penetration.³⁶¹ The revolt ended some ten days

³⁵⁵ Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan*, p. 106.

³⁵⁶ It is worth mentioning here that Ottoman penetration of Jordan West of the pilgrimage road had made unchecked raiding by Bedouins more difficult but not impossible, indeed Rogan suggests that some of the smaller tribes became more prone to raiding owing to their weak bargaining position vis-a-vie the Ottoman state. Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 187-189.

³⁵⁷ Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan*, pp. 106-107. The Majali, who at the time were the most prominent family in Karak, were additionally vexed at the refusal of the Ottoman authorities to include Shiekh Qadr al-Majali on their regional administration council.

³⁵⁸ The events revealed a basic division between the Majali and Tarawnah families and illuminated the centrality of proto-international relations in local politics. The latter of the two families was on good terms with the Ottoman Governor and hoped to continue to foster this relationship. They therefore were hesitant to enter into the uprising. The Majali meanwhile in-part desired to use the uprising as a means of signalling their continued importance and power to the Ottomans and their competitors in the district.

³⁵⁹ Peter Gubser, *Politics and Change in al-Karak, Jordan*, p. 108.

³⁶⁰ Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, p. 198.

³⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 199.

later when, on 14 December, Ottoman reinforcements entered Karak to restore order and military rule.

Rogan surmises that the presence of Sami Pasha Faruqi's army in the Hawran while the revolt was being planned and enacted made it 'inconceivable' that the rebels thought they could get away with their actions.³⁶² Given the rationale for revolt discussed above, the sentiment lends weight to Tariq Tell's characterising of the revolt 'as the dying spasm of the local order, a doomed attempt of a tribal system to defend itself against an encroaching state'.³⁶³ A key explication here is dying, and it is pertinent to condition the notion of an impending death. Because what is witnessed through Tell's exegesis is a pre-existing network of social organisation (the tribe) and its associated social and political norms, coming into direct contact and competition with, the centralising organisational power of the state, who thanks to contemporary technology (the railway, telegraph communication etc.) can penetrate into the corners of demarcated geography in a manner more holistic than at any other period in history.

But this centralisation had its limits, especially on the Syrian/North Arabian steppe. Large tribal confederations, including but not limited to the Huwaytat, Shammar, 'Adwan, Bani Sakhr and 'Anaza, threatened Ottoman control of trade and logistical routes. Even the annual Hajj caravans from Damascus to Mecca were occasionally pillaged.³⁶⁴ Tell's reading of Jordanian history during World War One further testifies to necessity of flexibility in establishing and maintaining centralised control East of the Hijaz railway. The Ottoman Fourth Army had been based in Jiza south of Amman since at least 1914 in the wake of the 1910 uprising, and their presence in the Western reaches of the Bani Sakhr's traditional *Dirah* or territory meant that the tribe's loyalties could be monitored once the Hashemites in the Hijaz, and the British West of the Jordan River began to show their geopolitical hands. Although, beyond the centralising power of the Ottomans in their lands east of the railway, the seasonal patterns of the nomadic Bani Sakhr meant that in summer they had to return to the Western side, into the sphere of the Fourth Army, who could if necessary threaten a denial of access to their summer pastures.³⁶⁵

³⁶² Ibid, p. 199.

³⁶³ Tariq Tell, 'Guns, Gold and Grain', p. 39.

³⁶⁴ Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. 13, refers to a Bani Sakhr raid in 1757.

³⁶⁵ Tariq Tell, 'Guns, Gold and Grain', p. 47.

In the absence of territorially rigid states, this arrangement ensured a nominal degree of acquiescence to a central authority, this case in Istanbul via Damascus. However, with the establishment of the Trans-Jordanian Mandate in 1920 and later the independent kingdom in 1946, such was no longer tenable. If anything, the so-called modern nation-state, wherever it is to be found, is predicated on a near pathological obsession with borders, sovereignty and control, both on the perimeter and within the body politic itself. Bedouin, whether nomadic or semi-nomadic, whose seasonal movements did not correspond with the state division of *Bilad al-Sham* therein constituted a threat to this matrix. Thus a top-down driven project of sedentarisation was enacted in order to preclude any need of crossing borders.³⁶⁶

But this did not mean that the Bedouin image was dismantled alone. It was rather reassembled ‘in accordance with nation-state criteria’.³⁶⁷ Hence, the spasm of the dying local order evoked by Tell is dying insofar, as its existence as an autonomous network distinct from the influence of the modern technologically endowed state was coming to an end. Distinction is the prime variable here, for Tell along with other astute observers of the MENA are not so quick to declare the end of such modes of social organisation. Nor do they infer by implication that orientalist accounts of regional exceptionalism are binding.³⁶⁸ There is no white dwarf hurtling towards a black hole. Instead, one finds integration. Hourani posits that the introduction of new or imported ideas, institutions or other such entities into a society do not automatically ‘change it into something other than itself’, but may be ‘absorbed into and adapted by a society which still continued to exist and to move in its own way’.³⁶⁹

Even before the drawing up and social infilling of nation-states, this altogether natural process was observable at the very least with the periscope of hindsight. Tell elaborates for instance, on the Bedouin irregulars in the Hashemite army as having ‘stamped the Arab Movement

³⁶⁶ The Ottomans were the first to implement policies of forced Bedouin sedentarization. The 1858 Land Law was a crucial legislative mechanism owing to the fact it did not recognise and therefore legitimise ‘traditional’ claims over land. Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 1, 18 & 188.

³⁶⁷ Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects*, p. 73.

³⁶⁸ See for example Hisham Sharabi’s critique. Hisham Sharabi (ed.), *Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Critical Responses* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

³⁶⁹ Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, p. xvii.

with a tribal character' ensuring 'that whatever the motives of its instigators, the form and content of the Arab Revolt reproduced traditional patterns of political change in the rural hinterlands'.³⁷⁰ It would be a surprise if this had no influence on state, and through this, citizen development in Jordan following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

3.4 : The Mandate & Emirate of Transjordan

So far, it has been seen that in the face of an encroaching power whose coercive capacity could not be matched through open confrontation, local actors (urban and rural) sought to engage in a process of mitigation and negotiation. I argue below that this process of negotiation persisted, albeit within a more claustrophobic geopolitical space, created by external actors and events whose role in the geographical demarcating of Jordan and the wider Mashreq are well known. The April 1920 San Remo conference of the League of Nations laid the international legal foundations for the French and British Mandates over Jordan along with the other former Ottoman territories in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ratification took place in July 1922.³⁷¹ This interval is climactic, because it gave the British and Abdullah bin Hussein (later King Abdullah I) time to evaluate the strategic intersections of their geopolitical interests;³⁷² resulting in Britain's decision in 1921 to divide the unratified Mandate of Palestine in two from the Jordan River. The division was inserted into the Mandate via Article 25 which appeared in the final ratified text:

'In the territories lying between the Jordan [river] and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions'.³⁷³

³⁷⁰ Tariq Tell, 'Guns, Gold and Grain', p. 43.

³⁷¹ Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 109.

³⁷² Jamie Allinson elaborates: 'the British had no particular concern with the area that became Transjordan, but they were fundamentally concerned with what lay around it. To the east, the bountiful oil fields of Iraq had to be secured and exploited. To the west, the Mediterranean pipeline at Haifa would export the product'. Jamie Allinson, *The Struggle for the State in Jordan*, p. 70.

³⁷³ Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate cited in Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 110; questions over the meaning of 'postpone or withhold' have fuelled arguments on the Israeli right about the illegitimacy of Jordan as Jordan and the legitimacy of Jordan as Palestine, therein identifying the Kingdom as a solution to the

Transjordan was born, and placed under the stewardship of Emir Abdullah, whose arrival in Ma'an in November 1920 precipitated the end of a period of experimentation with local government in Karak, 'Ajlun and the Balqa'.³⁷⁴ This experiment of self-government is evidence as to the existence of politically minded local elite who were active rather than passive recipients of external power politics. The Umm Qays conference held on September 2 1920, at least two months before Abdullah's arrival is further demonstrative. The meeting involving local shaykhs, Syrian nationalists (*Istiqlalists*), and Major Somerset (future Lord Raglan), shared a striking similarity with endeavours on the part of local leaders to negotiate with their former Ottoman governors. Encouraged by the presence of the *Istiqlalists* and their agenda, the assembled 'demanded' following Tell's account, that Somerset in his capacity as present representative of the British government accept a series of nationalistic provisions, including the unification the Karak, Ajlun and al-Balqa' governments into a single jurisdiction under a designated ruler, and 'a guarantee that Trans-Jordan would be excluded from Zionist colonization' underway west of the Jordan River.³⁷⁵ At the conclusion of the meeting, Somerset's signature marked what has become known as the Umm Qays Treaty, a symbol of indigenous political nous.

Be that as it may, part of Abdullah's centralising mission was to preclude such local initiatives for at least two interdependent reasons. Firstly, his geopolitical ambitions extended beyond the borders of the emirate, and thus he was not too concerned with the construction of a unitary Jordanian identity, because such would contradict his larger pan-Arab kingdom aspirations. Any doubts concerning Abdullah's wider pan-Arab, or pan-Syrian ambitions should be expelled by a glance at the personnel he brought into his governing arrangements. Of the eight chairmen who chaired the eighteen governments in operation between 1921 and 1946, none were native to the emirate of Transjordan.³⁷⁶ Aside from this more philosophical reasoning, a more tangible

Palestinian question. See for illustration Raphael Israeli "Is Jordan Palestine?" in Efraim Karsh & P.R Kumaraswamy (eds.), *Israel, Hashemites and the Palestinians*, pp. 49-66.

³⁷⁴ Eugene Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the late Ottoman Empire*, p. 241.

³⁷⁵ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*, pp. 57-58.

³⁷⁶ Mohammed Torki Bani Salameh & Khalid Issa El-Edwan, 'The Identity Crisis in Jordan: Historical Pathways and Contemporary Debates', *Nationalities Papers* 44:6 (2016), p. 988; writes that three were Syrian, three Palestinian and one Lebanese.

rationale for the reliance on non-local staffing was necessity brought about through limited resources. Philip Robins makes the evaluation that ‘Abdullah’s instinctive initial course was one of expediency: appease the larger, well-organised tribal groupings in order to harness or at least neutralise the powerful; ignore or tax the weaker, socially inferior, more sedentary communities in order to expand the income base with the purchase of influence in Syria in mind’.³⁷⁷ Utilising foreign expertise therefore theoretically served both to keep Abdullah’s finger on the wider Syrian pulse and to ensure that he did not rupture local dynamics too obtrusively. Thus, there is little reason to suggest as Sharabi seems to imply that East Bank inhabitants whether notables or not would possess some innate feeling of loyalty to the Hashemite regime.³⁷⁸

Tell’s elucidation of the 1922 Balqa’ Movement (*harakat al-Balqa’*) puts to bed any thought as to the existence of uncritical loyalty to the new emir. Experiencing considerable public sympathy beyond the Balqa’ region of North Western Jordan, the revolt of clans associated with the ‘Adwan tribe was at its heart a series of demonstrations against Abdullah I’s method of patrimonial government. This although capable of fostering firm relations with certain elites in the towns and on the steppe, had simultaneously disenfranchised a substantial part of the wider population within the state.³⁷⁹ Given this, an immediate catalyst for the Movement was the King’s granting of lands and access to state resources to the Bani Sakhr, as a reward for their service against the forces of the Saudi Ikwan.³⁸⁰ The ‘Adwan who had historical claims to this land, responded with an armed march on Amman that was halted with British Royal Air Force (RAF) support at al-Suwaylih. Accompanying the ‘Adwan revolt were loud voices calling for the institution of parliamentary (*niyābi*) rule,³⁸¹ which was ostensibly recognised as a way of curbing the arbitrary governing style of the monarch. To be clear, democratic governance according to contemporary standards was not the objective, but rather a renegotiation of the Emir’s balancing of social forces.

³⁷⁷ Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 23.

³⁷⁸ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, pp. 181-184.

³⁷⁹ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*, p. 68.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 67-68.

³⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 68.

Events in the Balqa' highlight a second reason for delimiting local governance initiatives: as a foreign emir with limited financial resources, Abdullah (and his British supporters) were conscious of the need to overcome competing alternatives to the mandate in the most cost-effective manner. Co-opting local social forces involving a working 'through what they perceived as indigenous Arab social practices and institutions such as "the tribe", retrenching or even creating relationships of power and patronage on that basis' was axiomatic.³⁸² In essence then, the old order was not completely destroyed, but was remodelled in order to suit the immediate interests of mandatory governance. One significant consequence concerns Jordan's steady integration into the world economy and its relationship with capitalist modes of production. Pointedly, capitalism 'neither evolved mechanically from the modes of production' existent locally, 'nor did it completely dissolve these modes'. Rather it 'sometimes coexisted with such modes and sometimes buttressed and prolonged certain of their aspects'.³⁸³ One such aspect was the power of prominent individuals and shaykhs within the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, who historically maintained their social positions via the distribution of wealth obtained from the economy of the tribe's *dirah*, raiding and extracting *khuwwa*.

During the mandate however military energies exercised through raiding, and fiscal sustenance acquired from *khuwwa* were replaced with an external subsidy 'from the colonial power administered through the armed forces'.³⁸⁴ There were several developments in this process, funded as part of the 1923 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, which initially allocated 150,000 Pounds annually for the purpose. The first organisation which sought to use the military as vehicle of popular integration with the state was the establishment of the Mobile Reserve Force by Frederick Peake in 1920, joined by Abdullah's Arab Legion in 1921, the Trans-Jordanian Frontier Force (TJFF) in 1926,³⁸⁵ and finally in 1930 John Bagot Glubb's Desert Patrol. It is Glubb's project which proved decisive as the premier mechanism of convincing the Bedouin that centralised authority was not always the enemy.³⁸⁶ The process of integrating the Bedouin into the military

³⁸² Jamie Allinson, *The Struggle for the State in Jordan*, p. 82; Stephanie Nanes, 'Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot', p. 89.

³⁸³ Nazih Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State*, p. 41.

³⁸⁴ Jamie Allinson, *The Struggle for the State in Jordan*, p. 87.

³⁸⁵ The composition of which was overwhelmingly "Palestinian". See Jamie Allinson, *The Struggle for the State in Jordan*, p. 72.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 71.

was made easier by the subsistence crisis facing two of the most significant confederations: the Huwaytat and the Bani Sakhr over the course of the 1930s. And it was these two tribal groupings that Glubb first applied his take on the Sandeman model of ‘humane imperialism’.³⁸⁷ Weak winter rains over successive years combined with the new reality that only fifteen of the sixty permanent wells in the southern steppe region around the Sirhan and Sahib Valleys remained in Mandate Transjordan - the rest now located in inaccessible Saudi Arabia - reduced the Bani Sakhr, Huwaytat and Sirhan confederations to a state of malnourishment.³⁸⁸

An old model of behaviour then was not so much dismantled as its vitality rechannelled and put in the service of the developing state construct. Ergo, during this period ‘the armed forces shaped a channel to reinvigorate the vertical loyalties of such groups as the Huwaytat and the Bani Sakhr’,³⁸⁹ and transferred them to the state embodied in the Emir. This transferral became stable and reliable due to the removal of tribes’ independent earning capacity with the end of raiding and *khuwwa* extraction, resulting in economic dependence. It was the mandate and then the state proper which was positioned advantageously to define the socio-political role of tribes within the wider state network.³⁹⁰ A critical effect was to tie the Bedouin, and later other sectors of society, to a wage economy dominated by the state’.³⁹¹ That this was a profound development is attested to by economy analyst Bashar al-Khatib, who argues this dependency persists well into the twenty-first century and been exacerbated by contemporary economic challenges and resolute unemployment.³⁹²

³⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 90. A model of integration into the colonial apparatus first practiced by Robert Sandeman in North West India, in which tribes are taken as natural entities whose pre-colonial traits are appropriated and redesigned in the service of the new centralising authority.

³⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 87 states this was up to 84% of all three.

³⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 83.

³⁹⁰ Schirin H. Fathi, *Jordan – An Invented Nation? Tribe-State Dynamics and the Formation of National Identity* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994), p. 9.

³⁹¹ Joseph Nevo, ‘Changing Identities in Jordan’ in Efraim Karsh & P.R. Kumaraswamy (eds.), *Israel, Hashemites and the Palestinians*, p. 188.

³⁹² Bashar al-Khatib, (Freelance economic and politics researcher) interview with the author, August 30, 2016.

3.5 : Regime Consolidation & Domestic Contestation 1946-1958

It is in the first decade of Jordanian independence that many of the dynamics regarding the citizenship regime, which are familiar to contemporary observers of Jordan, began to materialise in consolidated form. Notwithstanding obvious differences resulting from differing global and regional conjunctures in the two periods, recurring patterns in the Jordanian political economy between the late 1940s and the early 2000s are observable. For example government policy vis-a-vis employment within the public sector was already becoming an issue for many Jordanians during the 1950s. Although selective allocations provided thousands of opportunities ‘for migrant workers and Bedouin tribesmen...[it] left large proportions of the population, particularly the Palestinians, without employment’.³⁹³ Wealth disparities between not so much classes as those with closer linkages to the state dominated wage economy than others exacerbated discontent with political performance. One may also read parallels with the Kingdom’s contemporary struggle to provide employment for its burgeoning population of displaced Syrians in a not too dissimilar light.

Furthermore, Jordan’s first decade of independence is significant in emphasising the fundamental role of national narratives in organising (and controlling) the social energies of Jordanians. Specifically, the state under first Abdullah, then briefly Talal before the ascension of Hussein, sought in essence to create a hybrid nationality coalescing around four prime facets: ‘first, the monarch as the father of the larger Jordanian family; second, the Hashemite commitment to Arabism as evidenced by their leadership of the Arab Revolt; third, the regime’s stated commitment to Palestine, particularly its defence of Jerusalem in the 1948 war, continued Hashemite support of Islamic holy places and its providing a haven for Palestinian refugees; and finally, the unity of the two banks and the two peoples’.³⁹⁴ This was of course the decade of pan-Arabism, and it was this trans-state nationalism which unified opposition to the regime, embodied in the Jordanian National Movement (JNM), rather than a territorially bounded Jordanian

³⁹³ Betty Anderson, ‘Domestic Influences on Policy-Making: the History of the Jordanian National Movement’, in Tariq Tell (ed.), *The Resilience of the Hashemite Rule: Politics and the State in Jordan 1946-67* (Beirut: Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain [CERMOC], 2001), p. 53. (37-88)

³⁹⁴ Stephanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot’, p. 90.

nationalism.³⁹⁵ Although Arab nationalism so far in the twenty-first century can be said to no longer possess the same political weight and gravitas, the second part of the asseveration remains valid. By this I am chiefly referring to the importance of *getting the mixture right* in a national narrative, so that its probability of reproduction is enhanced.

Reflecting on the composition of 1950s Jordanian nationalism, Betty Anderson argues its core components were acquiescence to Hashemite rule (and its peculiar brand of Arab nationalism), combined with an ‘ideological orientation’ towards Anglo-European states, especially Britain.³⁹⁶ Therefore, and this is the essential point with lessons for Abdullah II’s Jordan, those citizens who disagreed with this model needed to draw on a different understanding of the nation, and therein question the supposed naturalness of the Hashemite project. Connected with this, and in terms of institutionalised politics, the period elucidates the genuine fear and recognition on the part of the Palace that a parliament responsive to the public is more than a potential threat. Hence, this period stands as an illumination of how citizen engagement, the utilisation of *muwātanah*, may, given the right conditions, operate as a threat to authoritarian sensibilities.

The Palestinian *Nakba*, which resulted in the establishment of Israel in that same year, has had a titanic effect on the development of Jordanian citizenship, to the extent that its impacts resonate in contemporary Jordan. At the time two ramifications were of particular note, one geographic, another demographic. Regarding the former, the state witnessed an increase in its territorial size, now encompassing the West Bank including Jerusalem’s Old City. The expansion embodies something of a partial reversion back to the initial British Mandate over Southern Syria, in which Palestine and Transjordan were amalgamated. Its prominence in the subsequent evolution of the Jordanian political community is tied to the ways in which meaning is imputed on territory and then politicised.³⁹⁷ Specifically, state expansion, later consolidated through the unity of the two banks in 1950, facilitated a continuation of Abdullah I’s vision of a pan-Arab kingdom *promised* to his father Sharif Hussein over the course of his correspondence with Henry

³⁹⁵ Betty Anderson, ‘Domestic Influences on Policy-Making’, p. 49.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. pp. 49-50.

³⁹⁷ Chiara Brambilla, ‘Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept’, *Geopolitics* 20:1 (2015), pp. 14-34.

MacMahon.³⁹⁸ This Hashemite vision necessitated the creation of a political subjectivity, which necessarily had to exist and operate beyond the territorial limits of the East Bank. Indicative of Valbjörn's first (United Arab Kingdom) and third (Arab/Islamic/Hashemite) typologies.

With respect to narratives informing citizenship, territorial expansion across the Jordan River made possible the creation of the notion, often repeated by King Hussein, that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan.³⁹⁹ Binding this equation together was the loyalty and dependency of the population on the Hashemite throne, carried via *jinsiyyah*, the mechanism of top-down categorisation and delineation of the political community. Such enabled Abdullah I and Hussein to tap into widely held pan-Arab views, while simultaneously not denying the existence of local attachments. Contrastingly, to have laboured in the construction of a citizenship regime grounded (literally and figuratively) in the *muwātanah* of either East or West Banks of the Jordan River, would have risked the following. First, a collapse of the expansionist Hashemite vision as a ramification of its territorial shackling to the East Bank, second, an explicit alienation of some communities brought under the Hashemite umbrella, and third, accelerated the development of competing narratives as the architecture of the state, especially the place and function of monarchy could be more readily criticised. Accordingly, the 1952 Constitution promulgated in the reign of Talal, in-conjunction with the 1954 Nationality Law (Law No. 6), institutionalised a fluid conception of citizenship indubitably tied to the monarchy as the common denominator.

3.5.1 : The Constitution

As a framing device that structures the politico-legal architecture of the nation-state, constitutions shape the institutions and functions of government. And the form of government invariably, so Aristotle reminds us, alters the nature of both citizenship and the citizen.⁴⁰⁰ Simultaneously, the societal impact of constitutions resides in what Hanna Ziadeh refers to as their capacity to embody

³⁹⁸ Henry McMahon was the British High Commissioner in Cairo between 1915 and 1917. His correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca across 1915/1916 is taken by many Arabs to constitute a betrayal in light of the later Balfour Declaration 1917. See Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 96-105.

³⁹⁹ Raphael Israeli, 'Is Jordan Palestine?' in Efraim Karsh & P.R. Kumaraswamy (eds.), *Israel, Hashemites and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 51.

⁴⁰⁰ Aristotle, *The Politics*, p. 68.

the ‘ideals’ and ‘characteristics’ of the constituents within the state.⁴⁰¹ As such, Ziadeh and Aristotle reveal the framing and regulatory functions of constitutions with regard to citizenship that is of axiomatic relevance to Jordan. With this in mind it is of indispensable significance to state categorically that the Constitution does not define citizenship (*jinsiyyah*). Nor does it articulate with precision the parameters for membership within the Jordanian political community. Chapter 2 Article 5 stipulates this is to be the prerogative of legislation, and it is for this purpose that Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (amended 1987) was promulgated.⁴⁰² At the same time it would be a mistake to claim that the constitution vacates the field of relevancy, leaving it to the dominion of law-making. Rather, it serves as noted, the function of a framing mechanism, outlining in a structural sense, the space in which citizens may operate as part of the political system. Consequently, the following analysis is focused in this direction.

Article 6 in Chapter 2 is especially germane in this regard. Its five clauses scaffold the environment of the citizen, beginning with the statement that all Jordanians are equal before the law, with ‘no discrimination between them as regards to their rights and duties on the grounds of race, language or religion’.⁴⁰³ Thus, in-principle, Jordanians exist in relation to each other on a Euclidian basis, that is to say if things (citizens) are equal to the same thing (the law) they are equal to each other. However there is a combination of overt and altogether more covert determinants. Within the category of overt determinants, the most glaring is an omission from Paragraph 1: gender. I will address this in detail in chapter five, so it suffice to say here that there is no explicit constitutional repudiation of gender-based discrimination, and far from producing mere abstractions, enables the perpetuation of discrimination in law.⁴⁰⁴

Clause 1 of Article 6 is of further interest for its reference to the rights and duties of citizens in the Kingdom, both of which are elaborated upon in the subsequent two items. Four ‘sacred’ defensive duties pertaining to: ‘the homeland, its land and people’s unity and maintaining social peace’ are specified,⁴⁰⁵ revealing the importance of linking national identity to the existing

⁴⁰¹ Hanna Ziadeh, *Sectarianism and intercommunal nation-building in Lebanon* (London: Hurst, 2006), p. 16.

⁴⁰² The Jordanian Constitution, Chapter 2, Art. 5; Law No.6 of 1954 is henceforth referred to as the Nationality Law.

⁴⁰³ Ibid, Art. 6, sec. 1.

⁴⁰⁴ Asma Khudar (Former Senator and Director of Sisterhood is Global Institute) interview with the author, Amman, June 13, 2016.

⁴⁰⁵ The Jordanian Constitution Chapter 2, Art. 6, sec. 2.

hegemonic citizenship regime. Following Mehran Kamrava's observation that 'legitimate political orders are usually built around a cohesive group and use institutions that are reflective of that group's historical evolution';⁴⁰⁶ it is crucial that an established order is able to construct the veneer of being natural so as to de-legitimise possible alternative orders. In the case of the Hashemites, this adopts further significance due to their territorial origins in the Hijaz region of present day Saudi Arabia. Just as the constitution outlines the duties of citizens to the state, so too are the state's duties to citizens, through the vehicle of government, laid out into four key provisions. These are education and employment 'within the limits of its possibilities' on the one hand, and guaranteeing both equal opportunity and 'tranquillity' to all citizens.⁴⁰⁷

The final two clauses of Article 6 meanwhile pertain to the social foundation of citizenship. Whereas in the Anglo-European tradition the individual citizen came to constitute the basis of society, in Jordan citizenship as an analogy remains socially grounded in the family unit as the 'foundation of the society'.⁴⁰⁸ This becomes problematic in light of the inability of Jordanian mothers whose children are born to foreign fathers to transmit their *jinsiyyah* to their children. According to Article 3 of Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (amended 1987), only children born to Jordanian fathers acquire *jinsiyyah* automatically in the eyes of the state.⁴⁰⁹ Female citizens therein have the power-to, power-over and power-with facilities of their *jinsiyyah* restricted in contrast to their male co-citizens. Hence only male citizens can "have" families and act as the prime conduit for the transmission of citizenship. They are therefore central in the reproduction of the state and are located at the foundation of society. Ramifications emerge resultantly in terms of the imaginary, the images of what ideal citizenship looks like both in practice and principle. Lina Ejeilat reflects as much in her observation that if you are Jordanian Muslim man, you have a higher level of citizenship regardless of whether you are of Palestinian or East Bank origin than if you are a non-Muslim man or a woman whether Muslim or not.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁶ Mehran Kamrava, *Fragile Politics*, p. 15.

⁴⁰⁷ The Jordanian Constitution Chapter 2, Art. 6, sec. 3.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid, Chapter 2, Art. 6.

⁴⁰⁹ Law No. 6 of 1954 (amended 1987) on Nationality, Art. 3.

⁴¹⁰ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com) interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

Hence, the case elucidates what Hisham Sharabi refers to the ‘schizophrenic’ nature of neopatriarchy, being neither traditional nor modern, but claiming its essential essence from both.⁴¹¹ No one should not be deluded into thinking that this institutionalised differentiation is a consequence of mere oversight. As a gear in the machinery of Jordan’s citizenship regime, it speaks of latent power relationships that influence the wider structure of Jordanian politics and the relations between citizens and between citizens and the state. Elaborating on this foundation, Jordanian society is established on three pillars: religion, morals and patriotism. With a chief function of law being to strengthen societal ‘ties and values’ while preserving its legal status.⁴¹² The fifth clause continues this protectionist theme, establishing motherhood, childhood and the elderly are sectors of the community to be protected by law. Young and disabled Jordanians are similarly to be cared for and protected from abuse and exploitation.⁴¹³

Expounding on the stipulations of Chapter 2 Article 6 reveals the linkage between citizen and national, citizenship and national identity. If the Hashemites are successful in positioning themselves within the hegemonic narrative of Jordanian national identity, then they are simultaneously situated within the realm of popular patriotism expressed towards the Jordanian national community. If patriotism is an accepted and socially reproduced pillar of society, and bounded by the constitution, it therein becomes integral to citizenship within that society. By extension then, the Hashemites have strategically located themselves within the sphere of citizenship, giving the impression as a result that they are indispensable to it. Success in this enterprise is crucial for regime longevity because it is ‘through citizenship’ and not amorphous national identity, that states ‘provide a status packaged with common legal standing, rights and responsibilities designed to insure one’s security and to maintain the state’s ability to continue providing a secure environment’.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 23.

⁴¹² The Jordanian Constitution Chapter 2, Art. 6, sec. 4.

⁴¹³ Ibid, Chapter 2, Art. 6, sec. 5. In reality, similar with most parts of the world, applying the spirit of this stipulation has some way to go before people with disabilities reach parity with their fellow citizens.

⁴¹⁴ Joel Migdal (ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.16. Furthermore, he argues additionally that the ‘strengthening of subjects’ loyalty to the state comes through efforts by state leaders to merge status (citizen) and identity (national)’. Joel Migdal, *Boundaries and Belonging*, p. 19.

3.5.2 : Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (amended 1987)

Laws are indispensable mechanisms in the institutional construction of subjects both within and without states. Their operation, illuminates Migdal, is one of constituting ‘the rules of conduct that prescribe proper behaviour of its members and the control implied by the enforcement of the codes’.⁴¹⁵ With this in mind, Jordan’s Nationality Law of 1954, along with its 1987 amendments, provides not only an image as to who is a Jordanian, but at the same time produces a portrait of the nation-state. The significance of this is not to be underestimated in lieu of the often contested relationship between Arab nationalism and smaller state-bounded nationalisms. One denies legitimacy to a state system which falls short of complete unity, and the other whose resilience cannot be denied.⁴¹⁶ On top of this, Arabism as an ‘umbrella’ of political and cultural identity has and continues to be a key element in the reproduction of bordered state nationalisms across the region, let alone in Jordan.⁴¹⁷

The Nationality Law identifies four categories of person: Jordanian, foreigner, emigrant and Arab.⁴¹⁸ A foreigner denotes any person who is not a Jordanian, while an emigrant refers to an individual born in either Jordan or the ‘usurped’ territory of Palestine who has since left these locations. The children of these persons are analogously categorised.⁴¹⁹ As a category, an Arab is

⁴¹⁵ Ibid, p. 13.

⁴¹⁶ Michael Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

⁴¹⁷ Christopher Phillips, *Everyday Arab Identity: The daily Reproduction of the Arab World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 9-11; recent Israeli incursions on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound in Jerusalem saw Jordan involved directly as the Hashemite king is the official custodian of the site, see: Anonymous ‘Jerusalem leaders hail Jordan’s role in ending Al Aqsa crisis’, *Jordan Times*, August 16, 2017. <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jerusalem-leaders-hail-jordan%E2%80%99s-role-ending-al-aqsa-crisis> (accessed August 17, 2017). Hashemite custodianship is an integral pillar to the regime’s Arab nationalist and domestic credentials and legitimacy: See King Abdullah II of Jordan, ‘Ra ‘āiyah al-Muqadasāt’, <https://kingabdullah.jo/ar/page/the-hashemites/%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA>, (accessed November 03, 2017). In February 2018 an art exhibition commemorating the birth of King Abdullah II was organised in the Abdali Boulevard. Titled “Jerusalem in the Heart of the Custodian”, the exhibition in a very explicit way seeks to convey the continuing links between the Hashemite Jordanian monarch and the capital of the Palestinian people. See Muath Freij, ‘King’s Custodianship of Jerusalem Holy Shrines to be Celebrated in Art Exhibition’, *Jordan Times*, February 3, 2018, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/king%E2%80%99s-custodianship-jerusalem-holy-shrines-be-celebrated-art-exhibition> (accessed February 5, 2018).

⁴¹⁸ Law No. 6 of 1954 (amended 1987) on Nationality, Art. 2.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

defined in patrilineal terms, an individual whose father is of Arab origin and holds citizenship (*jinsiyyah*) of another Arab state.⁴²⁰ Defining who is a Jordanian citizen meanwhile is predicated on one or a combination of the following six explications. First, a Jordanian is anyone who possesses citizenship or a passport according to the stipulations of the 1928 Citizenship Law (*Qanun al-Jinsiyyah al-Urduniyyah*) and its 1954 replacement. Second, any non-Jewish holder of Palestinian citizenship before 15 May 1948, who resided in the Kingdom between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954, is recognised as a citizen.⁴²¹

This clause is particularly noteworthy in light of the widespread allegations and proven cases of Jordanians having their citizenship rescinded following the 1988 Disengagement from the West Bank. Chapter five addresses the conditions under which citizenship may be removed. Article 18 stipulates that entry into a foreign civil or military service is one such set of conditions, and Article 19 accompanying this states that if a citizen engages or attempts to engage in an act considered harmful to the state's security, they too may lawfully be stripped of their status.⁴²² In a number of cases documented by Human Rights Watch however Jordanians of Palestinian origin have had their citizenship rescinded arbitrarily in violation of the protections offered the Law and its statutes.⁴²³ It serves to illuminate the flexibility of law as an instituting mechanism, and in so doing highlights the presence of intervening forces in the actual application of it in day-to-day contexts. Thirdly, any individual whose father holds Jordanian citizenship is automatically regarded to be Jordanian, while children born to Jordanian mothers and whose fathers are either stateless or of unknown nationality are recognised as citizens. Fifth, children born in, or assumed to have been born in Jordan to parents whose citizenship status is unknown (*wālideen mujahaleen*) are taken to be citizens. In these previous two cases, the status of the citizenship holder is precarious, as any later information about their parents being non-Jordanians may result in a disqualification of their citizen status. Finally, citizenship is extended to all individual members of

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Law No. 6 of 1954 (amended 1987) on Nationality, Art. 3. By implication post-1988 rescinding of citizenship is illegal, and demonstrates the arbitrary capacity of the monarch to override legal stipulations.

⁴²² Law No. 6 of 1954 (amended 1987) on Nationality, Chap, 5 Art. 18 & 19.

⁴²³ Human Rights Watch, *Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality* (Amman: HRW, 2010), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/01/stateless-again/palestinian-origin-jordanians-deprived-their-nationality> (accessed July 18, 2017).

the northern Bedouin tribes mentioned in Article 25 of the Provisional Election Law, No. 24 of 1960, who reside in territory annexed since 1930.⁴²⁴

Attention is brought back then to the second emphatic consequence of the Nakba, that of demography, chiefly the rapid increase in Jordan's population and the struggle by successive monarchs to address its consequences. Specifically, that Abdullah I had 'acquired' and needed to, Hisham Sharabi argues, integrate 'new subjects who did not share the Transjordanians' loyalty to their king' into the polity.⁴²⁵ Hence, analogous with the geographic facet discussed above, the importance of demography is best appreciated via recognising the meanings that are given to it and subsequent modes of behaviour. By extension, identifying and critiquing the implicit assumption of loyalty on the part of the Trans-Jordanian or East Banker populations in Sharabi's argument becomes elemental. In essence his study suffers from what Tell labels as a reductionist reading of socio-political conditions in Jordan from Ottoman times forward, in which the idiosyncrasies of the East Bank are neglected.⁴²⁶ Such analyses tend to assume the loyalty of the East Bank to the Hashemite family and its monarchical head without contextualising it adequately. Subsequently, certain degree of naturalism is bestowed upon a regime, whose origins do not reside in the territory of the Kingdom. Yet, if it is true that 'a social structure is not institutions but what animates them - a set of allegiances, stresses and tensions',⁴²⁷ then the 1950s indicated acutely to the young King Hussein and those around him, that the established order required vigilance for its security.

3.5.3 : From Elections to Martial Law 1956-1958

With the maturing of political life and civil society after the union, away from the 'ceremonial and artificial' disposition of parliamentary life, the necessity for monarchical vigilance only

⁴²⁴ Law No. 6 of 1954 (amended 1987) on Nationality, Art. 3.

⁴²⁵ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, p. 183; the scale of this integration should not be forgotten. The population of the West Bank at the time of union in 1950 was almost double its East Bank counterpart, Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 73.

⁴²⁶ Tariq Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan*, p. 3.

⁴²⁷ Tom Nairn, *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy* (London: Vintage, 1994), p. x.

increased.⁴²⁸ The regional environment, at that time shaped by Nasser's vision on Arab socialism, also contributed to this trend. Domestic maturation and regional ideological fervour improved the organisational capacity of opposition movements, including the Jordanian Communist Party, which culminated in the 1956 elections, considered to this day the freest in the Kingdom's history.⁴²⁹ And while Hussein's pre-1956 governments were led by prime ministers prominent during the reigns of Abdullah I and Talal, such as Abu al-Huda and Sa'id al-Mufti, the latest Prime Minister, Suleiman Nablusi, was appointed from the largest elected bloc in the Chamber of Deputies. Composed of forty seats, the Chamber post-elections was filled with members of the National Socialist Party 11 seats, Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidates 4 seats, the Communist Party 3 seats, the Ba'ath Party 2 seats and the Liberation Party with a single seat. The remaining seats were filled with so-called independent candidates.⁴³⁰

It is noteworthy that Hussein's first 8 governments from May 1953 to October 1956 lasted little more than a handful of months. Phillip Robbins has posited that an expectation versus reality scenario was at the heart of this rapid recycling of Prime Ministers and Cabinets. By way of which he asserts that one of the ramifications of government 'short-sightedness' was in effect 'to drive their more liberal opponents into the camp of the radicals, who became increasingly strident in their calls for systemic change'.⁴³¹ Over time, such would contribute to the development of a general perception that holistic change to the political architecture of the state was necessary in order for domestic politics to be more accountable to citizens, particularly given the growing inequalities observable in urban centres.⁴³² Hence, appointing Nablusi was important for Hussein in terms of demonstrating his responsiveness to citizens. Within a few short years after "unity", up to two-thirds of the citizen population were of Palestinian origin, and for a majority of them redressing the occupation of Palestine was the issue above all others. Thus, argues Sharabi, the liberation of Palestine, rather than freedom or justice, became the central point of coalescence for the political opposition.⁴³³

⁴²⁸ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, p. 184.

⁴²⁹ Abla Abu Elbeh (Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party) interview with author, April 24, 2016.

⁴³⁰ Schirin H. Fathi, *Jordan – An Invented Nation? P.* 144.

⁴³¹ Philip Robbins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 91.

⁴³² Betty Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 125.

⁴³³ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, p. 185.

In-part because of Nasser's mellifluous employment of Palestine in his Pan-Arabist discourse, the centrality of Palestine brought Jordan and its citizenship regime into the gambit of regional power struggles and the Cold War. The 1955 Baghdad Pact was especially relevant, as it brought into sharp relief questions concerning Jordan's place in the region and within or without the Arab consensus, artfully wielded by Nasser.⁴³⁴ Citizens voted accordingly, with a Leftist coalition winning the most seats in the 1956 elections.⁴³⁵ It is at this point that domestic considerations converged with regional outlook in the policy platform of Suleiman al-Nablusi, the newly appointed socialist Prime Minister. In the little over five months that he headed government, Jordan pursued a more pro-Egyptian and anti-British agenda with the rescinding of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the signing of a tripartite agreement with Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, facilitating a replacement of Britain's annual subsidy with a thirty six million (\$US) per annum payment; combined with efforts to reach out to the USSR and China,⁴³⁶ to the chagrin of the United States, who were keen to see Jordan part of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Some scholars, including Robbins, frame these policy initiatives as emanating primarily from the throne, an exercise of a king 'keen to show his Arab nationalist colours'.⁴³⁷ Yet, digging deeper brings two facets to light. Firstly, even if these were throne-driven, and there is every indication given the Parliament's make-up to suggest otherwise, all legislation requires parliamentary approval. Thus, the role of al-Nablusi as Prime Minister should not be immediately cast aside. Secondly, there is still the matter of locating citizens' collective power-over the established status quo. Hussein's need to demonstrate his pan-Arab colours was predicated on the domestic momentum behind Arab nationalism. Thus, Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe argue that the young king was forced via the critical mass of public opinion to attempt 'a policy of appeasement'.⁴³⁸ Had Jordanians expressed little or no interest in it, or Nasser's discursive constructions in-particular, then it is probable that Hussein and those around him would not have had their choice repertoire constrained. As the situation between al-Nablusi's government

⁴³⁴ For detail see Malcolm Kerr's influential *The Arab Cold War 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics* (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1967).

⁴³⁵ Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 95.

⁴³⁶ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, p. 187.

⁴³⁷ Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 97.

⁴³⁸ Beverly Milton-Edwards & Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, p. 35.

and Hussein became increasingly tenuous from April 1957, the central question, writes Betty Anderson, was ‘which national identity, and its concomitant social and political structure, would “win” and come to dominate the country’.⁴³⁹ For our purposes, the issue is not whether this is true or not, rather it is identifying the point at which nationalist perspectives lose their capacity to (without a citizenship viewpoint), adequately elucidate and critique the logic and structure of power relations between ruler and ruled.

An allusion to this appears when she highlights al-Nabulsi’s agenda to see the monarchy retreat from rule, and therein allow the parliament as an elected assembly take over the rump tasks of government.⁴⁴⁰ That Hussein refused, initiating the dissolution of both government and parliament, speaks, I contend, more to the substance of citizenship than to narratives of national identity. Precisely because it concerns, as Butenschon iterates, the architecture of Jordanian power relations within the state. More of the same emerges in the post-1958 settlement, which in many ways constituted the foundation of Jordan’s citizenship regime for the next twenty years. Anderson refers to ‘a bargain’,⁴⁴¹ a classic authoritarian bargain,⁴⁴² through which the loyalty of the citizen-subject population was traded in exchange for resource distribution. Implicitly then, Anderson’s investigation lends credence to the function citizenship performs in providing for ‘a stronger sense of belonging, conveying loyalty to the social group’ whom the state through its national borders makes a claim to represent.⁴⁴³

The politics of this representation underline why it took time before Hussein responded with coercion, specifically, utilising his constitutional ability to dismiss the Prime Minister, the government, dissolve parliament and declare the rule of emergency law, including a prohibition on public demonstrations and political parties.⁴⁴⁴ Each of these initiatives unsurprisingly targeted explicit aspects of citizen practice that had come to be associated with *muwātanah*, and impeded the ability of the citizenry to act. The corollary being that they could no longer participate in government processes. Coercion performed a central function in compelling citizens to accept the

⁴³⁹ Betty Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 177.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 180.

⁴⁴¹ Betty Anderson, *Nationalist Voices in Jordan*, p. 188.

⁴⁴² Morten Valbjørn, ‘Like But not the Same as’, pp. 182-184.

⁴⁴³ Joel Migdal (ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging*, p. 16.

⁴⁴⁴ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, p. 187.

new state of affairs. It is of no surprise that it is from this point that the internal security service (*Mukhabarat*) was expanded and its funding increased, media outlets were pressured and contained, political opponents were arrested, and the army was purged.⁴⁴⁵ In a rather blunt assessment Kamal Salibi reflected on how the reassertions of monarchical power-over the institutional avenues of the citizenry ultimately meant democracy was ‘sacrificed for stability’ pending royal favour.⁴⁴⁶ Yet more than this, the episode demonstrated that when parliament was buttressed by a supportive cabinet ‘the de facto authority of the king was seriously challenged’,⁴⁴⁷ a lesson Hussein would hold close for the rest of his reign.

3.6 : The Swinging 1960s and 1970s towards Trans-Jordanian Nationalism

*‘The loss of the West Bank in 1967 set in motion a process that prompted Jordanians to contemplate the question of national identity in a new way’.*⁴⁴⁸

With the establishment of the Palestinian liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 and the subsequent politicisation of Palestinian activism, discussions of Jordanian national identity and questions concerning who belongs to the political community entered a new phase. While a major variable in the evolution of Jordanian politics, it is not the only one of relevance in this period. Following the resignation of Wasfi al-Tell from the Prime Ministership in 1963, his replacement Ziad al-Rifai found his mandate cut short by the parliament, which refused to vote in his confidence. This was the first time a parliament had used its constitutional right to deny the Prime Minister their commission. Demonstrating how even after the 1958 events, the parliament maintained its capacity to act against the royal agenda. ‘An angered monarch’ reintroduced emergency law and dissolved the parliament in response.⁴⁴⁹ The twin decades of the 1960s and 1970s were transformative in the development of the Hashemite compact and subsequently

⁴⁴⁵ Beverly Milton-Edwards & Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, p. 35.

⁴⁴⁶ Kamal Salibi, *the Modern History of Jordan*, p. 203.

⁴⁴⁷ Hisham Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East*, p.184.

⁴⁴⁸ Schirin H. Fathi, *Jordan – An Invented Nation?* p. 212.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 145.

Jordanian citizenship. Economically, the country witnessed an unprecedented degree of development, which, aside from the predictable social shifts, produced a certain set of expectations amongst the population of citizens, as to the proper role of the state. Socially, the state increased its infrastructural and penetrative capacities through the expansion of roads, and public education being but two.⁴⁵⁰

Geopolitically, by the end of the 1967 Six Day War, the Kingdom would be smaller, as Israel came to occupy the West Bank. Concerning narratives of national identity, the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1964 and the wider politicisation of the Palestinian struggle would see Jordan compete for the representation of Palestinians and Palestine.⁴⁵¹ This competition would lead to a dramatic recalibration of Jordanian national identity, leading to a contraction of a plural *Arab-Islamic Hashemite* model of Jordanian identity, and a concomitant expansion of an East-Bank specific Trans-Jordanian national narrative of identity. Newly established, the PLO used Jordan's defeat in the Six Day War to pursue their claim to being the legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause. With the migration of 300, 000 displaced Palestinians on the East Bank and settled in what would become eleven permanent camps,⁴⁵² the PLO and forces under its umbrella, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front (PDF) had a healthy spring from which to draw water. The militarization of these camps quickly led to friction between the Palestinian militias (Fedayeen) and the Jordanian military, and clashes between them became recurrent from 1968 onwards.⁴⁵³ More than sporadic and random acts of violence, the clashes underscore how the Six Day War 'arrested' in Asher Susser's words, 'the process of "Jordanization" of the Palestinians and "re-Palestinized" the Arab-Israeli conflict'.⁴⁵⁴ Such produced what some have identified as a Palestinian 'dilemma', in which the emergence of the PLO in combination with Jordanian performance in the 1967 war shed light on a new reality: the existence of at least two forms of

⁴⁵⁰ Ali S. Zaghal, 'Social Change in Jordan', *Middle Eastern Studies* 20:4 (1984), pp. 53-75.

⁴⁵¹ Joseph Nevo, 'The Political Context of the Triangle' in Joseph Ginat & Onn Winckler, *The Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle: Smoothing the Path to Peace* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), p. 14.

⁴⁵² Samir A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 171.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 171.

⁴⁵⁴ Asher Susser, 'The Cultural and Social Context of the Triangle' in *The Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle*, p. 108.

Palestinian identity: one focused on liberation and national exclusivity, and the other on a dual ‘Jordanian-Palestinian’ identity under the Hashemite crown.⁴⁵⁵

The complications that this represented in the Jordanian – Palestinian relationship and Hussein’s calculations are reflected in the changes to his policy towards the West Bank as part of the kingdom. In the wake of Israel’s occupation, Jordan endeavoured by whatever means to reclaim it under its sovereignty. Indicating as much was Amman’s policy of continuing to ‘issue licenses, permits, loans, and grants in order to aid private and public organizations’ there.⁴⁵⁶ However, Jordan’s weakened position post-1967 in-conjunction with the presence of the PLO meant that a return to the old order was impossible. By 1972 Hussein had formally recognised this situation with the release of the United Arab Kingdom (UAK) plan. Under which, the West Bank would go from being a governorate to an autonomous region within a federal constitutional monarchy. In the end however, the decision of the Arab states at the 1974 Rabat Summit to recognise the PLO as the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians’,⁴⁵⁷ proved its undoing.

That this was the case is intriguing, given the earlier 1970/71 civil war, sometimes referred to as Black September, between the Jordanian army and Fedayeen units of the PLO, demonstrating the normative power and value attached to the union of the two banks, and Hussein’s commitment to it. This civil war was to have other ‘far-reaching implications for Jordan’s domestic politics over the next two decades’.⁴⁵⁸ For one, any sense of Jordanian guilt towards the Palestinians following 1967 was ‘eradicated’, assisting considerably in what Abu Odeh refers to as the ‘mopping-up process’, which witnessed substantial purges of Jordanians with Palestinian origin, and some Trans-Jordanians with Palestinian sympathies from the security services and wider public sector.⁴⁵⁹ Beginning in a limited and targeted fashion, the process over time once taken over by the mukhabarat acquired a broader brush, becoming a means of ‘de-Palestinianization’. For another, this contributed to the developing of closer bonds between some Trans-Jordanian

⁴⁵⁵ Joseph Nevo, ‘The Political Context of the Triangle’, p. 16.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 15.

⁴⁵⁷ King Hussein ibn Talal, ‘Address to the Nation’ (Speech, Amman July 31, 1988), http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html (accessed October 05, 2017).

⁴⁵⁸ Adnan Abu Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 189.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 190.

nationalists and the intelligence service, which became an ‘embodiment of Trans-Jordanian nationalism’.⁴⁶⁰ Resulting in a change in atmosphere in the way in which Jordanian citizens from the East Bank conceived of their relationship to domestic (the monarchy, fellow citizens of Palestinian origin) and external (Palestinians on the West Bank and the PLO) actors.

Nevertheless, the King did not give up on his historical role as a representative of the Palestinians, which naturally included those numbered as citizens of the Kingdom. This desire on the part of Hussein not to relinquish the legacy of his grandfather Abdullah I persisted through the 1974 Rabat Summit of the Arab League. The Summit is significant for Jordan’s citizenship regime for at least two reasons. First, it acted as a catalyst for a deepening of Jordanisation, which had begun in a targeted manner following the end of the 1970-71 hostilities. Second, the Summit and its resolution revealed the extent to which citizenship in Jordan is shaped by external phenomena, and as such serves to question the applicability of Westphalian sovereignty in the MENA more broadly, and in the absence of a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict particularly. The wording of the Summit’s resolution appears to challenge the ability of the Jordanian monarch to legitimately act as a representative of those citizens of Palestinian origin residing on the East Bank, to say nothing of those on the West Bank, who had previously, and indeed presently -if one adopts a strict reading of the constitution and nationality law-, were and are Jordanian citizens subject to Jordanian law. In light of external pressure, Hussein convened a special meeting of parliament, so as to amend the constitution and relevant laws so as to remove West Bank Palestinian representatives from the parliament. I reiterate however that this in no way altered the citizenship status of these now former representatives and their constituents.

3.7 : The 1980s and the Road to “Liberalisation”

The 1980s was a pivotal decade in Jordanian political decision-making, and subsequently on the development of citizen expectations of the state, and their role in it. During this period, the old economic conventions sustained by the boom between 1974 and 1982, that had underpinned the expansion of the state since independence, and with it, the Hashemite Compact, fell away,

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 190.

necessitating a change in the international relations of the Kingdom. In-particular, Jordanian remittances from the Gulf states, which accounted for over 35% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1977, were cut in half by 1984.⁴⁶¹ Jordan's rent-based economic and socio-political architecture was under unsustainable pressure. A rentier state according to Beblawi and Luciani is a 'sub-system associated with a rentier economy', which they define in two ways. Either an economy 'substantially supported by expenditure from the state, while the state itself is supported from rent accruing from abroad'; or, in more general terms 'an economy in which rent plays a major role'.⁴⁶²

In both instances rent income must predominate over other income streams, it must be external in origin, and while a minority of the population is involved in the generation of rent income, the majority is involved 'only in the distribution and utilisation of it'.⁴⁶³ There are further typologies used to understand rentier dynamics in state economies, which is especially important for Jordan, given that its pivot towards a liberalised economy did not reduce its dependency on rent income. According to Warwick Knowles, Jordan pre-1989 was an 'induced rentier state economy', before changes after this time led to a gradual shift towards what he characterises as a 'private sector rentier economy'.⁴⁶⁴ Unlike 'pure' rentier state economies, whose rent income is derived from sources not aligned with a third party (oil or resources rent), economies of the induced variety obtain rent income from a third party, who may choose to place conditions on their largesse.⁴⁶⁵ Consequently, if the state, in this case Jordan, wants to continue to receive aid-based rentier income, then it must enact policies that meet the interests of the donor/s, which may diverge from the interests of local constituents, especially the wider citizenry.

Wherever they are found, induced rentier state economies share at least six features. They are all aid dependent, experience chronic trade deficits, both of which contribute to high levels of state expenditure 'resulting in continual budget deficits' when rent income is excluded. Further, the sectors of the domestic economy are grossly imbalanced with generally weak productive

⁴⁶¹ Hesham Garaibeh, 'Government Income Sources and the Development of the Taxation System – the Case of Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait', in Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.) *The Rentier State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 201.

⁴⁶² Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.) *The Rentier State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 11.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 12.

⁴⁶⁴ Warwick Knowles, *Jordan Since 1989: a Study in Political Economy* (London: Tauris, 2005).

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 14.

sectors and a privileging of the service industry. Consumption when compared to GDP is high, and ‘the state follows a two-dimensional policy of maintaining control of and access to rent and pursuing a politically motivated expenditure policy’.⁴⁶⁶ Pure rentier state economies are able to largely ignore broad-based citizen discontent by distributing largesse as the need arises. This capacity is facilitated by the state’s existence as ‘the prime economic power’ and hence, as is observable in the Gulf states, broad approaches to distribution can be adopted.⁴⁶⁷ Regimes in induced rentier economies, such as Jordan, are unable owing to financial constraints and population heterogeneity to do so in the same way. Thus, they construct ‘a series of distributive institutions—usually at the expense of economic development—in order to maintain a highly disparate regime coalition’.⁴⁶⁸

Jordan’s high tide, insomuch as its acquisition of external rents is concerned, was between 1973 and 1980, following the spike in oil prices in the wake of the OPEC embargo. During this period this ‘petromonarchy assistance’ to the Kingdom was on average approximately 30% of gross domestic product (GDP), going as 86% in 1979. As a consequence of that, the observation has been made that this ‘budget support in the purest sense of the word’ allowed Hussein and his governments ‘to expand state economic intervention through employment, state-owned enterprises, and subsidies’.⁴⁶⁹ However, it was to be short lived. By 1983 Jordan experienced a series of acute reductions of international capital transfers, to which the government responded with external and domestic borrowing, rather than contract spending.⁴⁷⁰ The failure of this measure to curb the accelerating “debt trap” is indicated in the Kingdom’s per capita debt increasing to more than 1,900 (\$US) by 1988. In light of this chapter’s analysis up until this point it is interesting to note how all available measures to improve the fiscal balance were taken that did not rupture the internal fabric of citizen expectations.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 15.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 11.

⁴⁶⁸ Anne Mariel Peters & Pete W. Moore, ‘Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’, *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (2009), p. 257.

⁴⁶⁹ Anne Mariel Peters & Pete W. Moore, ‘Beyond Boom and Bust’, p. 270.

⁴⁷⁰ Oliver Schlumberger, “Transition to Development?” in George Joffé (ed.), *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), p. 226.

Yet, with external debt double Jordan's GDP by 1989, decision makers had little choice but to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for a stabilisation loan. Unlike the assistance the Kingdom had received from the Gulf States in the previous decade, this support was conditional on reforms being made to the domestic economic system according to precepts set out by the donors.⁴⁷¹ Acceptance of which seems evidential of a regime that could neither use coercion to sustain supremacy while altering the established politico-economic order, nor maintain the status quo itself. Necessitating therefore, the concomitant program of political liberalisation to provide a semblance of citizen involvement in decision making; and through this involvement enhance the legitimacy of the regime. What is especially interesting about Jordan however is how, despite acquiescing to a series of demands in the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) administered by the IMF, the Kingdom 'explicitly contradicts the rentier proposition that a decline in foreign aid should lead to political liberalization or democracy'.⁴⁷²

This was achieved by controlling both processes of economic and political liberalisation, so that neither risked the privileged position of key members of the Hashemite winning coalition. Simultaneously however, the political opening in-conjunction with the worsening socio-economic conditions emboldened sectors of the citizenry – the so called East Bank bedrock of the regime especially – who had learnt to expect more from ruling elites, the King chief among them. This would go on to have repercussions on liberalisation both in the 1990s and beyond: a testament to Ashton's reflection that 'liberalisation during this period probably went further than Hussein himself wished', given his own 'paternalistic' view of domestic politics.⁴⁷³

If there was one unexpected shock Hussein did not need during the 1980s it is arguably the 1987-1988 Intifada of Palestinians against the Israeli occupation. Not only did it come at a difficult time financially, it additionally rendered more problematic the "Jordan option" to the conflict with Israel withdrawing and the Kingdom resuming partial control of the West Bank.⁴⁷⁴ Instead, writes

⁴⁷¹ Ibid, p. 226. For reflections on Jordan's past relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait see Laurie Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: the Political Economy of Alliance Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

⁴⁷² Anne Mariel Peters & Pete W. Moore, 'Beyond Boom and Bust', p. 258.

⁴⁷³ Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 256.

⁴⁷⁴ Sami al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy-Making* (Reading: Ithaca, 1997), p. 80. This is based on the 1985 Jordanian-PLO Agreement, Article 2 of which opens the way for a confederation.

Joseph Nevo ‘fear of the impact of the Intifada on the Palestinians in the East Bank and apprehension that their loyalty might be put to the test, was the ultimate incentive for his (Hussein’s) decision to give up Jordan’s claim to the West Bank’ on 31 July 1988.⁴⁷⁵ Furthermore, Hussein was equally concerned about the possibility of Israel moving to force further dispossession and migration of Palestinians from the West Bank to the East Bank.⁴⁷⁶ A number of scholars have asserted that the royal decision ‘signalled’ the abandonment of Jordan’s ‘quest to reunify the banks’, therein ‘reflecting a deep reorientation in its identity’.⁴⁷⁷ Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe go a step further, stating it amounted to ‘relinquishing all Hashemite claim to the territory’;⁴⁷⁸ while Lynch focuses on it symbolising an end to Jordanian claims to sovereignty over the territory and efforts to compete with the PLO for influence.⁴⁷⁹

In order for *Hussein’s* decision to be appreciated more comprehensively, a citizenship-focused perspective is enlightening, for it reveals that the disengagement cannot be registered either holistic or complete. Jordan to this day constitutionally and legally in terms of its nationality law still possesses a technical claim over the West Bank. By extension therefore, residents of the West Bank, who prior to 1988 were recognised as citizens, remain citizens if only on paper. In the absence of constitutional amendments being drafted and bills put before the parliament, the decision is little more than a glorified thought bubble. It is hence in this context that the National Committee of Retired Army Personnel declares in their 2010 statement to the Jordanian people that ‘it is now time to bestow constitutional status on this decision by issuing the necessary legislation to put it into law, and to end all overlap of citizenship rights with the Palestinian areas’.⁴⁸⁰ Enabling therefore the emergence of distinct political communities – legally recognised in Jordanian law- on both banks of the Jordan River. Be that as it may, disengagement, in concert with the need to make more palatable the austerity measures designed by the Kingdom’s donors, gave the King a unique opportunity to reset parliamentary politics and citizen engagement. The

⁴⁷⁵ Joseph Nevo, ‘The Political Context of the Triangle’, p. 21.

⁴⁷⁶ Sami al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question*, p. 89.

⁴⁷⁷ Stefanie Nanes, ‘Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot’, p. 91.

⁴⁷⁸ Beverly Milton-Edwards & Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, p. 47.

⁴⁷⁹ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, p. 81.

⁴⁸⁰ Anonymous, ‘Statement on Defending State, Identity Against Israel’s ‘Alternative Homeland’ - Retired Army’, *Ammon News*, March 05, 2010 <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.WhNenFWWaUm> (accessed April 23, 2016).

result being the twin processes of political and economic liberalisation which would shape Jordanian politics beyond the subsequent decade.

3.8 : The “Liberal” 1990s? [Or Shackled Citizenship]

Socially, the decade following disengagement was punctuated by increased contestation over the substance of Jordan’s national identity and, through that, the fabric of its citizenship, now that the Kingdom had contracted to the East Bank of the Jordan River. In-conjunction with debates around national identity, the decade witnessed several pivotal events that continue to leave an indubitable mark on the practice of citizenship. In the following analysis I consider three such events: the creation and acceptance of the National Charter in 1991, the introduction of the single non-transferrable vote (SNTV) in the lead up to the 1993 elections, and the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Each of these windows reveals important insights into the practice of citizenship, namely, that the entire experience of political liberalisation and associated democratisation was ordered so as to be inherently limited, and ergo, maintain the privileged position of the monarchy and the key members of its winning coalition. Yet this is but one perspective from which to view Jordan’s political trajectory during the 1990s. Another which is equally valid requires further excavation. Taking Mahafzah’s notion of “shackled” democracy,⁴⁸¹ our starting point is to ask who, rather than what (democracy in this case) is being shackled? If it is supposed that all forms of democracy (demos – kratos: rule of the people) involves a degree of popular involvement in decision-making, then a shackling of this is at its heart a shackling of the demos, of citizens.

Jinsiyyah, as the diviner determining between national and foreigner, is a device that establishes, as articulated in chapter 2, between those recognised as members of the nation-state by the state, and those who are excluded. It is thus the pre-eminent mechanism through which this shackling occurs, and therein illuminates the importance of national identity debates. Their significance or insignificance is tied to the extent to which their implications are able to make themselves felt on the practice of citizenship, and hence of power. In this light then, successfully

⁴⁸¹ ‘Ali Maḥāfzah, *al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Muqayyidah*.

utilising *jinsiyyah* endowed with particular normative characteristics may have the impact of restricting the possibilities of the democratic window and thus shape/control the expectations associated with citizenship. With regards to *jinsiyyah* this is relatively straightforward, as the state has the arbitrary power to determine the rules of the game vis-à-vis who is included/excluded at any given time. Nahed Hattar alludes to this capacity in reflecting on the unchanging nature of the governing regime in contrast to the Jordanian citizenry.⁴⁸² *Muwātanah* however is more problematic and difficult for ruling elites to contain, because the citizen acts that are derived from it do not necessarily fit so easily into categorisation and control by the state. Opposition to the naturalisation of the Wadi Araba treaty with Israel is exemplary in this regard. Citizens do not challenge the existence of the peace treaty so much as its ability to influence their lives and the society in which they live.

In the previous sections of this chapter I illuminated a fundamental facet of the Hashemite compact being the trading of material benefits for political loyalty. The National Charter is interesting in how it seeks to institutionalise this loyalty, establishing it as the condition for legitimate participation in the emerging political system. It does so through its contractual function establishing the acceptable limits of action within the new democratic window. Drafted by a sixty member Royal Commission in 1990 and approved at a national conference held in June 1991, attended by two-thousand Jordanians from across the political spectrum; the Charter above all else reaffirms the centrality of the Constitution as organisational basis of the Kingdom's governing system, stipulating that it is both a parliamentary and hereditary monarchy in essence.⁴⁸³ As if to remove any doubt, Article 1 of Chapter One, adduces the way for unity 'between the people and the rulership' is via shared respect for the constitution and the law emanating from it.⁴⁸⁴

Parolin's study on what he labels the 'Big Bangs of constitution making' in the wake of the 2011 uprisings in North Africa contains a pertinent lesson here. The 'radical change sought by revolutions' he argues persuasively via examples in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt 'has very little chance of being attained in constitutional processes imbued with liberal legality, especially when

⁴⁸² Nahed Hattar, 'Min Huwe al-Urduni?'

⁴⁸³ Jordan: *Jordanian National Charter of 1991*, 1 June 1991, English translation <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53b4.html> (accessed February 15 2017).

⁴⁸⁴ Jordan: *Jordanian National Charter of 1991*, Chap 1, Art. 1.

these come to be controlled by forces pursuing continuity rather than change'.⁴⁸⁵ In the present instance I am not referring to constitutional change so much as a potentially profound change in Jordan's political life - keeping in mind that Jordan had been governed under martial law since 1967 - a framework is produced to divine a trajectory forward. That this framework was both orchestrated by the King, while simultaneously securing his institutional position and effective powers as head of the state links it in substance to Parolin's constitutional discussion.

The Charter's eighth, tenth and eleventh articles further emphasise the importance of stability, national security and domestic unity in the Jordanian polity. Article 8 for instance enunciates while Jordanians have no distinctions regarding the exercise of their rights and obligations, any practice of these rights shall adhere to the higher interests of the nation (*al-watan*). Peculiarly it also states that all Jordanians whether male or female are equal before the law without distinction; a proclamation the constitution categorically does not make.⁴⁸⁶ Article 10 builds on Article 8 notably in underlining that 'political, party and intellectual pluralism' as the avenue of democracy serves 'to guarantee national unity and the construction of a balanced civil society'.⁴⁸⁷ In both pre-eminence is clearly given in favour of the nation's security, which is unsurprising considering the four duties to 'the homeland, its land and people's unity and maintaining social peace' outlined in Article 6 of the Constitution. In this manner, the Charter served as the foundation for citizen engagement in parties, demonstrations, elections and other forms of political activity. Correspondingly, if culture may be understood as being 'composed of potentially contested codes and representations, as designating a field on which are fought battles over meaning',⁴⁸⁸ then the National Charter is a bold effort in restricting such contention within the overlapping networks of Jordan's political culture. As such it served, much like the constitutions in Parolin's study, an additional purpose: control and within that, predictability.

Attempts to ascertain this objective coalesce around constructing a particular subject to the state; in a word a certain kind of citizen. An identity of any variety 'can only be established'

⁴⁸⁵ Gianluca Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World*, pp. 31-32.

⁴⁸⁶ Jordan: *Jordanian National Charter of 1991*, Chap 1, Art. 8.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 10.

⁴⁸⁸ Jutta Weldes (et al.), 'Introduction: Constructing Insecurity' in Jutta Weldes (et al.) *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 2.

proposes Jutta Weldes, ‘in relation to what it is not – to difference’ and subsequently this difference however constituted, ‘in turn, is constituted in relation to identity’.⁴⁸⁹ *Jinsiyyah* then is not merely a demarcation between national and foreigner, but more profoundly is a category indicative of a certain identity and through that identity a relationship to and with power. In establishing who is within and who is without the political community, *jinsiyyah* is a powerful device, and one that is intrinsically relational because it cannot exist without a corresponding other. Power is never static, and resultantly the construction of boundaries between members both internal and external to the political community in question is similarly fluid rather than fixed. They are malleable to intervention ‘in ways that privilege certain conceptions of a community over others’.⁴⁹⁰ The clout of Hattar posing the question “who is the Jordanian?” then resides precisely in his recognition of the fluidity of the official endeavour, of which the National Charter performs its role, to produce a certain kind of citizen-subject.

This citizen-subject according to the Charter, is concerned with, and acts in the interests of national unity. Unity’s pervasive presence alludes to its counterpoint, disunity, and its emergent insecurity. How this relates to *jinsiyyah* is as follows: if it is accepted that ‘the cultural production of insecurities implicates and is implicated in the cultural production of the identities of actors’,⁴⁹¹ then the construction of *jinsiyyah* and those under its umbrella are similarly constituted by a positive and negative identification dialectic. In this instance, the underlining insecurity behind the positive image of a unified body politic is that which concerns the disunity of the nation and by extension, disloyalty to the nation as already constructed, conveniently, by the regime. With this in mind, the timing of the Charter is significant considering the recent history of political upheaval in the Kingdom in 1986 and 1989. Many volumes of ink have been expended on referring to particular East Bank communities and tribes as the so-called ‘bedrock’ of the regime.⁴⁹² Yet, the events of the two aforementioned years highlight the innate peril of assuming its permanence.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁹ Jutta Weldes (et al.), ‘Introduction: Constructing Insecurity’, p. 11.

⁴⁹⁰ Steve Niva, ‘Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East’, in Jutta Weldes (et al.) *Cultures of Insecurity*, p. 152.

⁴⁹¹ Jutta Weldes (et al.), ‘Introduction’, p. 10.

⁴⁹² For a list of prominent families see Susser (On both Banks of the Jordan) 1994: 2 and 177; al-Khazendar 1997: 36-37; Françoise Bel-Air, ‘Household politics to Domestic Politics: The Effect of Demographic Transition on Socio-political Patterns of Domination’ in George Joffé (ed.), *Jordan in Transition*, p. 159.

⁴⁹³ This is to say nothing of subsequent episodes of protest in 1996 and 1998 on the one hand, and the spate of labour demonstrations throughout the 2000s.

Permanence, or rather the next best thing, predictability is important in the cost-effective maintenance of political orders, and especially so when authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes undertake political openings. Into this context, elections are a particularly important battleground. Voting processes for parliamentary elections in 1989, working off an amended 1986 elections law, allowed voters to cast as many votes as there were parliamentary seats in their particular electoral district. The parliament that subsequently convened was diverse with representatives from across the political spectrum present, despite the reality that political parties remained banned. Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidates won 22/80 seats, with a further 12/80 going to independent Islamists. Leftists and Liberals acquired 11/80 and so-called regime loyalists won the remaining 35/80 seats.⁴⁹⁴ When elections were next held in 1993 political parties were able to contest, however citizens could cast only one vote (SNTV) though multiple seats per district remained. The results are striking in what they reveal about the make-up of the Lower House. Brotherhood candidates, competing now under banner of the Islamic Action Front/IAF (*Jubhat al-'Amal al-Islami*), the most organised of the country's political parties gained 16/80 seats a reduction on the 22 previously held. Independent Islamists meanwhile lost half their seats, with Pan-Arabists 5/80 and Leftists 7/80 stable. Finally, Jordanian Nationalists acquired 10/80 and 36 seats went to independent tribal candidates.⁴⁹⁵ The opposition therefore lost its working majority.

I do not wish to imply that the SNTV alone is to blame for the reversal in the opposition's fortunes. Rather if it is true that 'the social fabric' of the kingdom 'relies heavily on family bonds and informal *wasta* networks',⁴⁹⁶ then the SNTV may be understood as a means of institutionally accentuating this character. An implication of which is the rendering of 'political opposition a difficult task'.⁴⁹⁷ Such was essential to King Hussein for domestic and international relations. On the domestic front, the 1989 parliament had proven itself capable of action independent from, and at times in opposition to the royal agenda. For example in 1992, Laith al-Shubeilat, President of the Engineer's Syndicate, who had been elected as an Amman deputy in 1989, was heading a

⁴⁹⁴ Leonard Robinson, 'Liberalization, the Islamists and the Stability of the Arab State', p. 10.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 32.

⁴⁹⁶ Renate Dieterich, 'The Weakness of the Ruled is the Strength of the Ruler: The Role of the Opposition in Contemporary Jordan' in George Joffé (ed.), *Jordan in Transition*, p. 141.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 141.

parliamentary investigations committee into ministerial corruption. During the course of the investigation, then Prime Minister Zaid bin Shaker came under scrutiny for alleged corrupt practices. The allegations were especially serious as bin Shaker was a cousin and confidante of King Hussein, thus any negative findings would potentially reverberate considerably. The Committee was about to indict the Prime Minister when, as Shubeilat explains ‘one month later, I was in prison for a “plotting a coup d’etat”. Four months later, I was condemned to death. Two days after that, the king gave a general amnesty’.⁴⁹⁸ The amnesty was a sign of power from the King not only to Shubeilat but to other would-be independent reformists including contemporary Toujan Faisal that there were lines that they as citizens and the parliament as the law-making chamber could not cross. Commenting on both Faisal and Shubeilat, Tariq Tell states ‘they were very careful not to create movements because the game is you create a lot of noise and then you then get benefits in other ways but don’t create a movement’.⁴⁹⁹

Regarding international relations, the electoral law needed to be changed to pave the way for the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel. The treaty would need to be approved by the parliament in order for it to take effect, and thus in order to prevent an untenable embarrassment, the SNTV was implemented under the calculations that it would reduce the Islamist presence in parliament, and thus not only remove the opposition’s majority, but quieten vocal opposition. In other words, the institutional mechanism of citizen practice – elections and voting – derived from *jinsiyyah*, was manipulated so as to increase the probability that the elected parliament would when the time, demonstrate loyalty to the throne and state through support for peace. But this came with an unforeseen cost of generating alienation between the population at large and ruling elites precisely because citizenship crystallised through *muwātanah* produces a different set of identities, therefore interests and subsequently actions.

Peace with Israel, one of the two historic *others*, in relationship with whom Jordanian identity had developed and understood itself in its regional context, brought this debate further into

⁴⁹⁸ Laith al-Shubeilat interviewed by David Hearst, ‘Abdullah, the King Who Rules Jordan “By Remote Control”, Says Dissident’, *Middle East Eye*, March 13, 2016 <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/mee-interviews-laith-shubeilat-711229830> (accessed May 23, 2016).

⁴⁹⁹ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut) interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

the public sphere where it has remained since. On 26 October 1994, King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Wadi Araba treaty, bringing hostilities between the two states to a conclusion. Owing to the ‘perennial tumult’ of the region, Hassan Barari argues that Hussein endeavoured to nourish peace as a ‘strategic choice’.⁵⁰⁰ Simultaneously, the wider objective was to institute a “warm” peace, understood as ‘full normalization of relations at the political, economic and social levels enabling easy transfer and flow of people, goods and ideas’.⁵⁰¹ Writing twenty years after the historic signing however, Barari affirms that a relationship capable of being characterised in this way remained ‘far from reality’.⁵⁰²

To contextualise this is it appropriate to outline some of the key Jordanian rationales for peace, aside from it being a strategic geopolitical manoeuvre. Two stand out: expectations for a so-called ‘peace dividend’ on the one hand,⁵⁰³ coupled with a belief that the Oslo Accords would result in the materialisation of a Palestinian state that would preclude the possibility of a de-facto Palestinian takeover of Jordan.⁵⁰⁴ Allow me to note here that this fear of a Palestinian takeover is an umbrella under which at least two distinct arguments reside. The first is the argument, propagated with increased fervour during the 1980s in Israel, that ‘Jordan is Palestine’.⁵⁰⁵ In essence this argument takes demographic dynamics within the Kingdom and suggests that on the basis of them, there is no need to settle the Palestinian question west of the Jordan River. A second argument, which exists irrespective of the Israeli contention, is also grounded in a reading of demography. Its wellspring is Trans-Jordanian apprehension about being a minority in their own state, a sensation currently magnified by the presence of over one million Syrian refugees in the Kingdom.⁵⁰⁶ As a concept Trans-Jordanian nationalism may be unique in the region for its manner of coming into being had little to do with the leadership of the nation-state.

⁵⁰⁰ Hassan A. Barari, *Jordan and Israel: A Troubled Relationship in a Volatile Region* (Amman: Friederich Ebert Stiftung, 2014), p. 15.

⁵⁰¹ Mutayyam al-O’ran, *Jordanian – Israeli Relations: The Peacebuilding Experience* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 1.

⁵⁰² Hassan A. Barari, *Jordan and Israel*, p. 15.

⁵⁰³ Allison Astorino-Courtois, ‘Transforming International Agreements into National Realities: Marketing Arab-Israeli Peace in Jordan’, *the Journal of Politics* 58:4 (1996), pp. 1035-54; Karla J. Cunningham, ‘The Causes and Effects of Foreign Policy Decision Making’, *World Affairs* 160:4 (1998), pp. 192-201.

⁵⁰⁴ Hassan A. Barari, *Jordan and Israel*, p. 17.

⁵⁰⁵ Ariel Sharon being its most vocal advocate at the time. Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan*, p. 261.

⁵⁰⁶ Riad Omari (Journalist with the Jordan Times) interview with the author, Amman, May 16, 2016.

Adnan Abu-Odeh, a former Royal Court chief and Jordanian of Palestinian origin notes for instance that there is ‘no serious evidence’ that the propagation of a distinctly East Bank national identity was of any real concern to Abdullah I.⁵⁰⁷ In some respects it was not until the 1970 civil war that the regime, then led by Hussein became more interested in propagating a trans-Jordanian nationalism. Although following Valbjörn, this was not premised on an exclusion of the broader Hashemite narrative of unity across the River. Yet, as illustrated in the first half of this chapter, it was a consistent concern for local elites.

3.9 : Conclusion

Citizenship in Jordan as it evolved over the course of the 20th Century is grounded in what Tariq Tell refers to as the Hashemite Compact. This is more than an unwritten and informal code framing the bargain of loyalty for social and economic security, but is furthermore, implicated in the very political subjectivity of Jordanians. Over the course of this chapter I charted the development of the relationship between Jordanians and political authority, first of the Ottoman Empire, then the Mandate, and finally the Hashemite monarchy. Through each period Jordanians demonstrated a willingness to challenge decisions and test the boundaries of the extant political authority.

⁵⁰⁷ Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 19.

Part II

Citizenship in Contemporary Jordan

Chapter Four: *An Absence of Ownership and Accountability?*

Chapter Five: *In Search of Ownership and Accountability*

Chapter Four

4. An Absence of Ownership and Accountability

'Citizenship (muwātanah) means equal rights for all and equality before the law in accordance with the constitution in which rights are political, economic and social and'.⁵⁰⁸

'Citizenship in Jordan is a very vague term, perhaps not on paper but in reality it is'.⁵⁰⁹

'Here in Jordan citizenship means almost nothing'.⁵¹⁰

'I'm talking about garbage but it's very important because it's political and it's also cultural. And when I talk about citizenship this is part of citizenship'.⁵¹¹

4.1 : Garbage in the Streets

It is 2016, and across Amman and Jordan as a whole, whether it be a popular picnic spot in the *Ghor* (Jordan Valley), the roadside of the King's Highway or popular locales in Amman and Irbid it is difficult to not notice the waste. Empty cigarette packets, ethereal plastic bags, and vacant bottles converse with the dust of a dry summer. This is not uniquely Jordanian. In the same year, logistical and political failures would see mountains of uncollected garbage lie rotting in streets across Lebanon. Nor is this exceptionally Arab or regional, with residents of and visitors to places as varied as New York, Paris, New Delhi and Beijing confronting pollutants in their

⁵⁰⁸ Abla Abu-Elbeh, (Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party), interview with the author, Amman, April 24, 2016.

⁵⁰⁹ Wael Abu Anzeh, (Economic researcher), interview with the author, Amman September 03, 2016.

⁵¹⁰ Farah Maraqa, (Journalist with Rai al-Youm), interview with the author, Amman September 11, 2016.,

⁵¹¹ Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist), interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

neighbourhoods and wider environment. But in this case, garbage in the streets of Jordan suggests something specific; that the prevailing status and practice of citizenship is absent from ownership and accountability.

As a lived experience, the question of what is done with our domestic waste is a universally human one, and has much to do with our individual and collective interpreting of the meaning and through it, acceptable use of space. This specifically concerns the uses of shared public space outside of the confines of a private residence. Central to which is a shared perception of accountability borne out as an expression of feeling individual and collective ownership. Each of these is critical to citizenship, and it is through their absence, manifested in the act of littering that particular complexities of Jordanian citizenship can be observed. ‘For me’, observes local journalist Rana Sweiss, ‘it is one of the signs, the profound signs of people not feeling that they are part of a community that this is theirs and you need to take care of it. You cannot throw garbage in your neighbour’s house you cannot steal your neighbour’s water’.⁵¹²

She continues that, for her, citizenship (*muwātanah*) in Jordan ‘means Jordanians feeling that they have ownership, that they have responsibilities towards their country and they feel that they are part of the decision making process as well’.⁵¹³ They as individuals, and as members of the national community, have a deciding stake in the political process, sufficient enough to make decision-makers accountable to the citizenry. As was enunciated in chapter two, this is critical in the evolution of the subject into the citizen-subject who becomes subject to law as opposed to an individual. The first of the epigraphs listed above from Abla Abu-Elbeh confirms this, recognising *muwātanah*’s unique carrying capacity (in contrast with *jinsiyyah*) as the vessel for individual rights. A concomitant recognition of obligations is implicit here, and is expressed in greater deal by economic researcher Wael Abu Anzeh who argues citizenship fundamentally ‘means you as a person having the nationality of a certain country and from there you are subject to that country’s rules, cultural norms and heritage’.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Wael Abu Anzeh, (Economic researcher), interview with the author, Amman September 03, 2016.

In referencing the connections between rules, norms and heritage, Abu Anzeh conveys the subjective nature of citizenship, which may generate, according to Sweiss, a ‘feeling like you can make an impact on the decision making process’.⁵¹⁵ This is undertaken via the political rights citizenship theoretically guarantees as a matter of principle. However, there is a disparity between the theoretical promises of citizenship and the lived experience of its application in Jordan. At its centre are ownership and accountability. One political analyst who wished to remain anonymous links the present state of these, or rather their precariousness to two factors mirroring Abu Anzeh’s observations: conventional ways of individual and collective identification on the one hand, and the role of the state in promulgating and enforcing rules on the other.⁵¹⁶

She suggests that because ‘when Arab people identify with something we identify with a group of people not with a territory’ the very idea of a territorial identity embodied in the nation-state becomes a challenge in the Jordanian context.⁵¹⁷ This relates to not only its establishment, which was detailed in chapter three, but equally, to the depth of citizenship as an institution of identity within it. Remembering that depth refers to how demanding citizenship is, comparative to the other identities that individuals simultaneously possess, and act in accordance with. If citizenship, especially *jinsiyyah*, in the context of the nation-state is predicated on territory, than it may struggle to integrate itself into a normative milieu which favours identity construction within groups rather than space. Using herself as an example she elaborates:

*‘I was born in Amman and have lived all my life in Amman but if asked I never say that I am from Amman; I say I am from Irbid the town where my father was born. My mother wasn’t born there, I have never lived there as a matter of fact I hate going there and when I do go I am a stranger: I don’t know the people and I don’t know the area’.*⁵¹⁸

Demonstrably, identity is conveyed through ties to networks, and therefore space becomes relevant when it is directly associated with personal (especially familial) networks. There is a stark contrast between the family home, which is spotlessly clean, and the garbage filled neighbourhood:

⁵¹⁵ Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist), interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

⁵¹⁶ Anonymous, (Political analyst and researcher), interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

to one accountability and ownership, the other comparatively neither. From this extrapolation *muwātanah* appears conceptually as a function/product of human interaction. Perhaps, answering why early exponents of Arab nationalism focused on language as the unifying variable *par excellence*.⁵¹⁹ When taken in this way, the territorial element of *muwātanah* appears to be secondary yet, not insignificant. Indeed, given that all Jordanians interviewed between 2016 and 2017 identified *muwātanah* as the vessel of rights and obligations, it is important to recognise its inherent territoriality in contemporary political discourse. Especially given the uprisings of 2011 and 2012, which analogous with their counterparts in other parts of the Arab world owed much of their existence to ‘the emergence of a discourse of rights which united the different groups, tendencies and classes against the factors that hindered change’ in the previous decades.⁵²⁰

This connects with the second facet referred to by our Jordanian analyst: ‘the way people react to the idea of the public good’.⁵²¹ Because notions of the public are bounded territorially by the nation-state, it performs a seminal role in shaping reactions. In this regard, the interviewee reflects on the necessity for further civic education in Jordan to improve the perception of ownership and accountability in the public sphere. Stating, if citizens feel ‘I pay my taxes at least that will go to cleaning my town, my street, my neighbourhood, ok I can see where the money is going and I am in charge of it’ (albeit indirectly).⁵²² Once more ownership and accountability come into play, and involves the institutions of the state being responsive and accountable to the expectations and needs of citizens. However she is concomitantly aware that ‘this is not the way the relationship [between citizens/residents and state authority] has been constructed where you have a state which claims that they are cleaning *their* streets not *my* streets’.⁵²³

Privilege and dispensation have by this logic been important components of Jordanian state-building, an argument enunciated in chapter three. Its continuing relevance in the twenty-first century is attested to in Tariq Tell’s observation that citizenship in the Kingdom is more ‘an

⁵¹⁹ See for illustration Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p. 260; A.A. Duri, *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation: A Study in Identity and Consciousness* (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 221.

⁵²⁰ Roel Meijer, *Citizenship Rights and the Arab Uprisings: Towards a New Political Order* (Amsterdam: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015), p. 20.

⁵²¹ Anonymous, (Political analyst and researcher), interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Ibid.

idea of being a beneficiary rather than having rights. So it's about your right to a job and the trouble is that the state runs into crises when it has been unable to deliver these [benefits]'.⁵²⁴ In his account citizens vie with each other over access to resources distributed by the state. As these resources, in his example employment opportunities, are finite, this automatically presupposes the existence of hierarchies whether officially institutionalised or not. Furthermore, because access is facilitated by individuals in relative positions of power, familial and extra-familial social networks become especially important vehicles through which the individual's relationship with the state is negotiated, performed and navigated.

Over time, this has produced in Jordan, a scenario in which 'familial ties have provided a substitute for properly functioning institutions' in the relations between citizens and the state.⁵²⁵ Their ongoing contemporary relevance is affirmed by journalist Farah Maraqa, who poignantly notes, 'if you are a citizen (of Jordan) you will have a passport and be able to represent the country in the world, but you will do so without any other services unless you have someone who, you know, here called *wasta*'.⁵²⁶ Instrumental in Jordanian politics since its establishment,⁵²⁷ *wasta*'s origins reside in modes of tribal social organisation as means of conflict resolution, reflected etymologically in its root structure. Derived from the root *wa-sa-ta*, form II meaning to place an entity in the middle of, or between two things, whereas form V refers to something or someone being positioned between two extremes on the one hand, or the act of mediating between these dual extremes;⁵²⁸ *wasta*, context dependent, may refer to a noun (an individual) or a verb (the action of mediation undertaken).

⁵²⁴ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

⁵²⁵ Yusuf, M. Sidani & Jon, Thornberry, 'Nepotism in the Arab World: An Institutional Theory Perspective', *Business Ethics Quarterly* 23:1 (2013), p. 69; Ahmed Mohamed & Hadia Hamdy, *The Stigma of Wasta: The Effect of Wasta on Perceived Competence and Morality* (Cairo: German University in Cairo, 2008), p.3: argue three factors in-particular have brought this about. Firstly, they posit that the example set by political regimes to maintain power by filling available positions in administration with 'close confidants' irrespective of their qualifications and suitability has permeated into the fabric of wider society. Second, it is argued that the historically high and persistent levels of unemployment have contributed to citizens using whatever means necessary to access employment including the leveraging of kin and social networks. Their third factor concerns the reliance of local human resources (HR) departments using informal or subjective assessment tools when evaluating prospective candidates for positions.

⁵²⁶ Farah Maraqa, (Journalist with Rai al-Youm), interview with the author, Amman September 11, 2016.

⁵²⁷ Aseel al-Ramahi, 'Wasta in Jordan', p. 37.

⁵²⁸ Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, p. 1250.

In its historical context of inter-tribal relations, it served an ‘intermediary’ function, being employed to de-escalate conflict whether inter-personal or inter-collective in nature.⁵²⁹ The arrival of centralised government with the nation-state did not result in *wasta*’s social eradication so much as its evolution from a vehicle of intermediation to one of intercession. An individual seeking anything in the modern marketplace from employment, legal assistance, entry into an education institution such as a university, a contract or negotiating a bureaucratic procedure such as obtaining a driving license may call upon *wasta* to intercede on their behalf to streamline the process.⁵³⁰ Because *wasta* as both a noun and a verb, is utilised by citizens in this manner, it can be said that the state is implicated in the persistence of such practices. Consequently, the contemporary as well as the historical state is implicated (in more ways than one) in the construction of the present citizenship regime. Furthermore, where the state has been involved it has seemingly more often than not either been unwilling to foster the civic identity of citizens, or has been detrimental to it. Affirmed by Hamid Qahwi’s observation that whether ‘in the school, university, administrative apparatus [of the state] or workplace, real citizenship is not practiced’.⁵³¹

Tell’s outlining of Jordanian citizen-state relations in-conjunction with the other views provided here falls under the umbrella of Cynthia Weber’s understanding of legitimation. Namely, the citizenry ‘submits itself to the authority of the state so long as the state performs as the reflection of the will of its citizens’.⁵³² Recalling his associated claim that the Jordanian state becomes marred in crises when this performative equation is ruptured, it is useful to frame the 2011 and 2012 demonstrations as evidence of this rupture similar with their predecessors in 1989. A moment in which the distribution mechanisms of the Jordanian state failed to operate in accordance with either the expectations of citizens, or their networked ability (via *wasta* for example) to overcome the negative repercussions. Regime precariousness emerges from the contraction of citizen participation in the economic, political and social life of the state. Resulting in a concomitant withdrawal of support for the status quo, through which, the state is experienced by citizens. This is precisely what made the events of 2011 and 2012 a watershed in Jordan and

⁵²⁹ Aseel al-Ramahi, ‘Wasta in Jordan’, p. 37.

⁵³⁰ Samih Farouson, ‘Family Structure and Society in Modern Lebanon’, in L. Sweet (ed), *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East* (New York: Natural History Press, 1970), p. 270.

⁵³¹ Hamid Qahwi, *Al-Muwāṭin al-‘Arabi wa al-wa‘I al-Qawmi* (Beirut: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 2004), p. 21.

⁵³² Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 8.

beyond, because ‘people really did have moments where they felt they can make an impact on decisions in Jordan. Political decisions, social decisions and labour decisions’.⁵³³

Given this, how may the uprisings, and the political developments that followed be situated? Chapter three provided an historical consideration of the evolution of citizenship as an institutional category associated with the Jordanian nation-state spanning the twentieth century. With this and the above information in hand it is now appropriate to pivot focus onto this century. Doing so highlights the absence of ownership and accountability in the political and economic decision-making of the period which has contributed to increased apathy amongst Jordanians. Apathy towards both the political class composed of individuals and families close to the regime, and the institutions of the state including but limited to the parliament and the monarchy; resulting in the unprecedented uprisings from 2011 onwards. From the perspective of 2016 Rana Sweiss reflects that this situation, along with the garbage ‘has gotten much worse maybe since the 2000s... In the 80s it was unheard of’.⁵³⁴ Ergo, the first decade of Abdullah II’s reign is pivotal in illuminating practices of contemporary citizenship.

This chapter illustrates how existing avenues of citizen participation in decision-making between 1999 and 2010 provided an insufficient degree of citizen ownership, and hence, power-over the process. By consequence, those involved in economic and political decision-making were not made accountable to the citizenry. In the subsequent divisions of this chapter I consider each in turn, mindful of their interconnections.

4.2 : Competition and its Discontents

On the economic front, two initial and distinct but related points are made. First is that there has been a contraction of state resources over the course of the decade or so in question. This has meant that established tools used by citizens when interacting with the state such as *wasta* have become less effective for the majority of citizens in the middle and working classes; rendering their

⁵³³ Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist), interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

deteriorating socio-economic situation increasingly untenable. Secondly, because decision-makers are by-and-large unaccountable to citizens, these same citizens have little recourse when it comes to desiring changes to the Kingdom's economic trajectory. A reality made harder by the nature of transnational capital flows and the need by states to compete with each other in order to attract foreign investment and capital inflows. Within a year of ascending to the throne it was clear that Abdullah II's 'primary concern' was to prepare Jordan for post-Cold War globalisation and 'presumably' a post-peace era of regional relations.⁵³⁵ This included a further distancing of Jordan from the West Bank and the Palestinian question politically, and an accelerating of market oriented reforms to boost Jordan's competitiveness, the two constituted an advancement of an existing trajectory initiated by King Hussein in 1989.⁵³⁶ While it may be true that already by 2000 these twin policies could be recognised as fuelling 'a power struggle between the "old guard traditionalists" and "the new guard reformists"';⁵³⁷ worthy of attention is how they may have influenced the theory and practice of citizenship at the level of citizens.

To begin, it is worthwhile outlining that the global order is socially constructed, producing hierarchies. This is significant in relation to the MENA, which as Raymond Hinnebusch has argued, was converted 'under imperialism into a periphery of the Western dominated world system'.⁵³⁸ Hierarchical status and cross-border flows do not just exist in the terms of movement from periphery to metropole,⁵³⁹ but in an era of globalisation have been tied to the production, consumption and accumulation of capital. Engendering what Cerny calls the emergence of the 'competition state' whose rationale, is to attract an increasing market share of available global capital flows.⁵⁴⁰ In light of the historical development of Jordan's citizenship regime, the shift in state behaviour from resource distribution to capital attraction and accumulation would have a profound impact on established citizen expectations; and therefore citizen – state relations. Tariq

⁵³⁵ Lamis Andoni, 'King Abdallah: In His Father's Footsteps?', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29:3 (2000), p. 77.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ Raymond Hinnebusch, *The international politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), p. 3; Bassel Salloukh & Rex Brynen (eds.), *Persistent Permeability?*

⁵³⁹ Michael B. Brown, *After Imperialism* (London: Heinemann, 1970).

⁵⁴⁰ Philip G. Cerny, 'Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization', *Government and Opposition* 32:2 (1997), pp. 251-274; 'The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the Global Era', *Review of International Studies* 26:4 (2000), pp. 623-646; Philip G. Cerny & Mark Evans, *New Labour, Globalization, and the Competition State* (Cambridge: Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series #70, 2000).

Tell elaborates, the trouble for Abdullah II's endeavour to prepare Jordan for an era of embedded globalisation is that the logic by which the state operates 'has to be a logic of distribution rather than accumulation, and the problem of Abdullah II is that he is interested in accumulation. So this is why he has ended up in a lot of trouble, and ended up with such a legitimacy problem'.⁵⁴¹

There are substantial indicators that the Kingdom's economic developments since Abdullah II's ascension are leaning in the direction towards those of a competition state. The first of these concerns the King's early travel itinerary declaring Jordan open for business, and resituating the Kingdom within the ambit of states and international financial organisations (IFOs) recognised as critical for budget and regime security. Chief among them the World Bank and IMF, whose intervention in the Kingdom had been ongoing since 1989, and a number of regional and more distant states including Egypt, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members Saudi Arabia chief among them, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Spain and the United States (US).

Relations between Jordan and the GCC had soured demonstrably during the last decade of Hussein's reign, and tensions had arisen in Jordan's other inter-Arab relations via the Kingdom's support for Iraq in the first Gulf War, and Hussein's pursuit and eventual acquisition of peace with Israel. Beyond these geo-strategic manoeuvres, a number of Arab leaders were critical of Hussein's ambition.⁵⁴² Having not come of age politically in the midst of the Cold War and episodes of inter-Arab rivalry, Abdullah II was well placed to turn the page on these relations.⁵⁴³ Resetting Jordan's external relations was a fundamental component of improving budget security and not merely so as to acquire further loans and financial aid. Abdullah II was a strong believer in deepening his country's linkages with the prevailing currents of global capital flows. It was with equal enthusiasm that he approached Jordan's relations with non-Arab states.

At a May 1999 banquet hosted by the Mayor of London, the King opened with a statement of intent: 'my government asked me to convince all of you, in five minutes or less, that Jordan is

⁵⁴¹ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

⁵⁴² Curtis Ryan, *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

⁵⁴³ *Ibid*, pp. 95-96.

the ideal place for your investments'.⁵⁴⁴ Putting the humour aside, it is clear that Abdullah II was serious about attracting foreign investment as a way of stimulating domestic employment growth. But in order to do so, Jordan's economic environment needs to be attractive to foreign investors. Globally then, Jordan must compete with other states for investment contracts and foreign capital. This process of competition is at the heart of what Philip Cerny identifies as the 'transformation of the nation-state into a "competition state"' in the face of accelerating globalisation.⁵⁴⁵ Cerny is chiefly concerned with what he calls 'political globalisation', a form of structuration directly influencing 'the shaping of the playing field of politics itself'.⁵⁴⁶ This means that 'complex congeries of multilevel games played on multilayered institutional playing fields, above and across, as well as within, states boundaries' are having a greater effect on state behaviour than outdated models of unitary state action.

Citizenship within the state is affected insofar as globalisation 'involves reshaping political practices and institutional structures in order to adjust and adapt to the growing deficiencies of nation-states as perceived and *experienced* by such actors'.⁵⁴⁷ This includes the economic activity of states whose trade relations become less about exporting domestic surplus, than situating them within the context of global political contestation over access to capital. For Jordanians this has meant a contraction of the state as a distributor of largesse and resources, which was at the heart of the Hashemite compact. Hence, 'rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market, to "decommodify" them as the welfare state was organized to do, the competition state has pursued increased marketization in order to make economic activities located within the national territory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms'.⁵⁴⁸

While in London, Abdullah II made certain to inform his audience of potential investors that Jordan had already, and was continuing to, accelerate its pursuit of marketization, listing the

⁵⁴⁴ Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, 'Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II At the lunch banquet hosted by the Mayor of London' (Speech, London UK, May 11, 1999), <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/lunch-banquet-hosted-mayor-london> (accessed April 28, 2016).

⁵⁴⁵ Philip G. Cerny, 'Paradoxes of the Competition State', p. 251.

⁵⁴⁶ Philip G. Cerny, 'Paradoxes of the Competition State', p. 253.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 259.

privatisation of the railway system and Jordan Telecom Group as evidential, with Royal Jordanian Airlines on the way.⁵⁴⁹ Further, he nominated that his and his government's 'job' would be 'to do what we can within our capabilities to make these offers for foreign investors as smooth as possible', a point reiterated later that month during an official visit to Canada.⁵⁵⁰ In both instances the government is referred to as the King's rather than belonging to the country itself. Instead of being taken as isolated policies, these and others like them ought to be comprehended as part of a program enacted by state, non-state and market actors who 'in seeking to adapt to a range of complex changes in cultural, institutional and market structures...are attempting to reinvent the state as a quasi-"enterprise association"'.⁵⁵¹ And do so in a context in which the wider citizenry has increasingly little input.

It is this process of pseudo-reinvention which has produced an increasing disconnection between Jordanians and the nation-state under the Hashemite umbrella. 'We are running into trouble' argues Rana Sweiss, inasmuch as the central 'trade-off' of the Hashemite Compact, 'you (the regime) provide us (citizens) with jobs in the state and we will cooperate with you' has since 1999 become increasingly unsustainable.⁵⁵² This is true not only in terms of the state's ability to afford it, but also for citizens themselves to earn a living from it.⁵⁵³ She continues outlining how in the past you could provide employment in the military, the *Mukhabarat*, the Royal Court, government ministries and institutions and within the local municipalities. Each of these would have a budget and assign salaries accordingly, often reliant on foreign aid and financial assistance. 'The problem' Sweiss identifies:

'Is that in the last thirty years without exaggeration, even 1000 dinars is not enough to live in Jordan. These people are still taking 200 dinars for five, six, seven people in a family.'

⁵⁴⁹ Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, 'Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at the lunch banquet hosted by the Mayor of London'.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid; In another address the King highlights the water and energy sectors: 'Speech of His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Dinner Banquet Hosted by Governor- General of Canada Romeo Adrien LeBlanc' (Speech, Ottawa Canada, May 14, 1999) <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/dinner-banquet-hosted-governor-general-canada-romeo-adrien-leblanc> (accessed April 28, 2016).

⁵⁵¹ Philip G. Cerny, 'Paradoxes of the Competition State', p. 251. See also E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997); Mathias Albert, David Jacobson & Yosef lapid (eds.) *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

⁵⁵² Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist), interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

*The government cannot keep up nor increase the salaries. So you end up with a bloated bureaucracy, you cannot fire them, you have low pay, and for example in the Amman Municipality, so many mayors – who are appointed by the way – have wanted to fire people and they were literally threatened. Every time you ask “why do you have so many people?” they respond “we can’t fire anyone”. They are afraid of riots from the tribes. And if you listen, the Prime Minister is always trying to reassure people that the price of bread is not going to go up. You know these are the red lines’.*⁵⁵⁴

Situations like these are not isolated phenomena in Jordan. ‘So much of the population is dependent upon the state’, with some forty-two percent of the population employed in the military, security apparatus and other public sector agencies.⁵⁵⁵ Although the public sector remains bloated, the depreciation in its service provision to citizens, and the apparent embrace of private sector investment seeking rhetoric by decision-makers, is evidence of the state repositioning itself. In a move away from ‘the development and maintenance of a range of “strategic” or “basic” economic activities’ promoting self-sufficiency, towards a focus on ‘competitive conditions’ within a growing international (and increasingly transnational) marketplace. A shift that is occurring without citizen involvement in its agenda, and one often framed in terms of ‘competitive advantage’ superseding the pursuit of ‘comparative advantage’ in the minds of policymakers.⁵⁵⁶ In an address to the Confederation of Spanish Industry, for example, Abdullah II alludes to this very modification in explicating how Jordanian decision-makers ‘have identified the competitive advantages in our economy: in mining, tourism and services’ in addition to adopting information technology (IT) ‘as our new national sector’.⁵⁵⁷

To this end governments had initiated a multi-pronged policy with an eye to increasing FDI through improving the Kingdom’s competitive advantage via: protecting intellectual property, sector regulation, ‘taking a “liberal” stance on controlling information flows and content in

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ Oreib al-Rantawi, (Director, Al-Quds Center for Political Studies), interview with the author, Amman, September 19, 2016.

⁵⁵⁶ Philip G. Cerny, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State’, p. 260.

⁵⁵⁷ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Confederation of Spanish Industry’ (Speech, Madrid, Spain October 21, 1999) <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/confederation-spanish-industry> (accessed April 29, 2016).

cyberspace’, and harnessing human capital within the workforce among others.⁵⁵⁸ Despite some forward advances, by 2002 the Kingdom still lagged behind competitors Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Bahrain. Cunningham puts part of the reason at the feet of the leadership who appeared to be ‘pursuing a "managed" IT strategy that may prompt the regime to limit, in whole or in part, elements of the IT program’.⁵⁵⁹ Furthermore, on the question of freedom online, by the middle of the decade bloggers had begun to feel the pressure of censorship and monitoring by the *mukhabarat*,⁵⁶⁰ suggestive that the “liberal” stance on internet activity had its limits.

Two things about economic agenda-setting and policy application when it comes to citizens become discernible. First, the citizenry has little if any active input over economic agenda-setting. Jordan is not alone in this globally however, its particular combination of historical development and geographical characteristics, in-concert with current patterns of globalisation means that its citizens feel the limitations of their place in the political decision-making hierarchy acutely. It is with little irony that Nahed Hattar argues that of the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in Jordan, it is the general population who comprise the latter, with decisions made in the interests of cabals and business at the expense of the individual citizen.⁵⁶¹ A second observation to be made about citizenship here is the fear with which its free practice is meant by the regime as a whole. IT development could contribute substantially to Jordan’s economic sustainability over time. However advancing the Kingdom to that stage would foreseeably require a loosening of internet censorship, and a facilitation of greater Intra-Jordan networking and entrepreneurship. An unintended consequence of which would be allowing greater citizen expression and possibly critique of the governing status-quo. Hence Oreib al-Rantawi’s reflection ‘there is no interest for the regime to weaken its vertical [social] structures and strengthen the horizontal counterpart in general because there is a belief, especially in the security apparatus, that they can serve better as a tool to strengthen and consolidate the regime’.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁸ Karla, J. Cunningham, ‘Factors Influencing Jordan's Information Revolution: Implications for Democracy’, *Middle East Journal* 56:2 (2002), p. 241.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 241.

⁵⁶⁰ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

⁵⁶¹ Nahed Hattar, *al-Khāsiroun: Hal Yumkin Taghayyr Sharouf lil-Labah?* (Amman: Ward, 2006), pp. 44-45.

⁵⁶² Oreib al-Rantawi, (Director, Al-Quds Center for Political Studies), interview with the author, Amman, September 19, 2016.

An irony emerges here in which the ability of citizens to practice their citizenship in the public sphere is tightly monitored and regulated, whereas the Kingdom's industrial and deregulation policies are, according to successive reports from the Bertelsmann Institute's Transformation Index (BTI), among the least protected in the MENA region.⁵⁶³ Such is part of a wider process of relocating 'the focal point' of domestic government and political activity on the part of citizens including parties 'away from the general maximization of welfare within a nation (full employment, redistributive transfer payments and social service provision) to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors'.⁵⁶⁴ While incomplete as of 2018, the abject absence of any meaningful alternative has meant that opposition has focused on isolated policies rather than the framework itself.

Demonstrations over plans to remove subsidies on commodities since before the ascension of Abdullah II are illustrative. The Islamists led by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and their associated party the Islamic Action Front (*Jubhat al-'Amal al-Islami*) have frequently called bread subsidisation a red line, part of the government's moral responsibility to ensure a basic level of subsistence for citizens for decades.⁵⁶⁵ However, to this day come election time, their electoral fliers, pamphlets and public addresses suggest no indication of developing an alternative vision for the Kingdom's economy in a systemic sense.⁵⁶⁶ Evidence of an implicit acceptance of Abdullah II's stance, that in the face of 'the globalisation of international economic affairs', there is 'no room for narrow differences among nations to obstruct the process of establishing a new mode of regional economic cooperation and development'.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶³ Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010: Jordan Country Report* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009); *BTI 2012 — Jordan Country Report* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012); *BTI 2016 — Jordan Country Report* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016).

⁵⁶⁴ Philip G. Cerny, 'Paradoxes of the Competition State', p. 260.

⁵⁶⁵ Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy and Rethinking Arab Democratization*, pp. 217-220.

⁵⁶⁶ During the 2016 election campaign, the IAF ran as part of the National Reform Alliance. Their campaign material: *Tahawwal: al-Barnāmej al-Intikhābi al-Intikhābāt al-Niyābiyyah lil-Majlis al-Thāmin 'Ashr* (Amman, 2016) contains information about individual policy initiatives such as changing the taxation rate, but nothing about how to better address systemic issues in relation to the country's international relations. The Islamists were not alone in this, as demonstrated by the campaign material of 'Ma'an' (Together) List in Amman's Third District: *Ma'an: Qā'imat al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah: al-Barnāmej al-Intikhābi* (Amman, 2016).

⁵⁶⁷ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Speech of His Majesty King Abdullah II at Harvard University US Boston, Massachusetts' (Speech, Boston, US October 15, 1999) <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/harvard-university> (accessed April 28, 2016).

In practical terms this means the nation-state, the vessel of modern citizenship, is becoming increasingly dependent on external dynamics beyond its direct control.⁵⁶⁸ Citizen ownership over decision-making and the subsequent accountability of decision-makers to the citizenry becomes a difficult proposition for a so-called democratising nation to enact. Instead answers to questions of economic, social, technological and political development are sought abroad irrespective of the public perspective. The King enunciates as much in advancing the prevailing (neo)-liberal opinion that ‘political and social dimensions of the internal stability required to face the future challenges are mere extensions of the economic factor’.⁵⁶⁹ While all states are interdependent inasmuch as none, including North Korea are successfully self-sufficient, globalisation is changing not only the goalposts but the entire field of international/transnational/global politics. Via increasing tensions between the principles of economic globalisation on the one hand, and ‘embedded state/society practices’ on the other. The ‘terrain of political conflict’ is increasingly a three-level rather than two-level game.⁵⁷⁰

Royal rhetoric at the international level has been supported by alterations at the domestic level. Andre Bank and Oliver Schlumberger have conducted some important research in this area, examining changes in what Volker Perthes calls the ‘politically relevant elite’ (PRE).⁵⁷¹ PRE in any polity, consists of those are capable of wielding influence and power politically through their role in decision-making and norm setting.⁵⁷² It is represented in a model of three concentric circles, with power in the central circle emanating outwards. Those in the inner circle constitute the state’s ‘core elite’;⁵⁷³ the next circle contains an ‘intermediate elite’ who do possess the institutional capacity to make strategic decisions for the polity on the whole unless such capacity is first delegated to them.⁵⁷⁴ Their ability to influence decision-making occurs therefore on a floating basis dependent upon the interests and needs of the core elites. The final circle in the model consists of

⁵⁶⁸ Philip G. Cerny, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State’, p. 251.

⁵⁶⁹ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Speech of His Majesty King Abdullah II at Harvard University’.

⁵⁷⁰ Philip G. Cerny, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State’, p. 251.

⁵⁷¹ Volker Perthes, *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 5.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 6; Andre Bank & Oliver Schlumberger, ‘Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform’ in Volker Perthes (ed.) *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 46.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

the ‘sub-elite’ who role in the exercise of power extends to contributing to an agenda through newspaper editorials for instance, or influencing decision-making albeit in an indirect manner.⁵⁷⁵

According to Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan’s neo-patrimonial character is significant when it comes to alterations to the PRE’s membership. Although leaders of neo-patrimonial political networks, in this case the king, possess considerable unilateral decision-making capability, loyalists are required so that the king is able to sustain his position above the fray of day-to-day contestation.⁵⁷⁶ There is an important implication here regarding the role of every-day citizens in economic decision-making. Practically no space given for citizen participation in agenda-setting, nor is there space for them to, in an influential way, consent to draft agendas, outside of a parliament whose operations are tightly monitored. If the parliament could serve as such an institutional mechanism its deputies are effectively removed from the process by the establishment of the extra-parliamentary Economic Consultative Council (ECC). Tasked with developing frameworks for ‘activating the role of the private sector in decision-making processes’, the ECC in-effect further isolates citizens from decisions which dramatically affect their standard of living.

The first ECC’s members included Ghassan Nuqul of the Nuqul Group, Fadi Ghandour cofounder of Aramex, Suhayr al-Ali Dabbas General Manager of Citibank Jordan and Bassem Awadallah,⁵⁷⁷ a former head of the economic bureau of the Royal Court who in 2016 would go on to seal the heralded Cooperation (*tansiq*) agreement between Jordan and Saudi Arabia.⁵⁷⁸ Their chief commonality of coalescence was their embodying of Jordan’s ‘economic “success stories”, symbolizing young, self-confident “winners” in globalization and have internalized the currently fashionable neoliberal jargon’.⁵⁷⁹ They are thus the avant-garde of Jordan’s linkage into the world economy, and as business leaders and policy advisors and makers, engage in what Cerny calls ‘internalizing globalization’. The processes via which individuals ‘accelerate’ and further ‘embed’

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 36

⁵⁷⁷ Andre Bank & Oliver Schlumberger, ‘Jordan’, p.41.

⁵⁷⁸ Anonymous, ‘Bayān Urduni – Sa‘udi Mushtarak fi Khitām Mubāḥthāt Jalāh al-Malik wa Khādam al-Ḥaramin al-Sharifin fi al-Riyād’, *Petra News*, April 27, 2016.

⁵⁷⁹ Andre Bank & Oliver Schlumberger, ‘Jordan’, p. 41.

the norms and practices of globalisation ‘in their own institutions and practices’.⁵⁸⁰ The king himself is among this group and seminal in Jordan’s internalising of globalisation. Bassem Awadallah in a 2003 report for the Washington Institute echoes the role of Abdullah II in accelerating the pace of reform by becoming directly involved in it as a matter of national priority.⁵⁸¹

Yet, some of the central methods to address this national priority were undertaken without citizen involvement. Accelerating privatisation and expanding the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) rank among these. As a concept and geo-economic reality on the ground, Jordan’s experience with QIZs sees the 1994 Wadi ‘Araba peace treaty with Israel as their catalyst. Their political essence ‘against the backdrop of the “peace process” as an incentive scheme to promote exchanges between Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli businesspersons’ is hence readily discernible.⁵⁸² Rules governing the production to export process within the QIZs establish that in order to qualify for tariff-free export to the US market, a product’s material input must be composed of a minimum of 35% of local content. Of this, 11.7% must be Jordanian and 8% Israeli. The remaining 15.3% could come from Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, Israel or the United States.⁵⁸³ Unsurprisingly, Imad al-Anis refers to the QIZ concept as a ‘cornerstone’ of bilateral trade between Jordan and the US post-1994 with three key objectives: assisting in the normalisation of the Jordanian-Israeli peace by encouraging economic cooperation, increasing employment creation and FDI attractiveness, and finally, providing sectors including textiles ‘unfettered access to the US market’.⁵⁸⁴

Though covering a range of industries, it is the textiles and clothing (T&C) sector which dominates the Jordanian QIZs in value terms, encompassing almost 90% of all QIZ-based exports

⁵⁸⁰ Susanne Soederberg, Georg Munz & Philip G. Cerny, *Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 2.

⁵⁸¹ Bassem Awadallah, ‘Jordan’s Economic Up-Turn’, *the Washington Institute*, February 12, 2003 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jordans-economic-upturn> (accessed December 05, 2016).

⁵⁸² Mary Nazzal, ‘Economic Reform in Jordan: An Analysis of Structural Adjustment and Qualified Industrial Zones’, 2005, p. 12. Available at <http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/articles/jordan.html> (accessed June 07, 2016).

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Imad el-Anis, *Jordan and the United States: the Political Economy of Trade and Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011), pp. 138-139 reflects that the QIZs were indisputable in altering the fortunes of the textile industry in Jordan from a state of irrelevance before 1997 (1% of GDP) to a productive sector worth 9.4% GDP in 2006.

to the US.⁵⁸⁵ The wider export field is impressive. In 2003 alone, exports from the QIZs amounted to 587 million (\$US) out of Jordan's total 2.4 billion (\$US) worth of exports.⁵⁸⁶ At the same time, Al-Anis provides an intriguing and significant reflection on the Jordanian Government's view of QIZs, stating how initially they received little attention at the level of decision-makers.⁵⁸⁷ What changed minds in Amman was the steady increase in exports, coupled with a realisation that they could be utilised as a way of FDI accrual. Subsequently, the exponential increase in exports in dollar value, from 6.9 million (\$US) in 1997, to in-excess of 1 billion (\$US) by 2007, makes for interesting reading in this light.⁵⁸⁸

Apart from their value as export generators, part of official interest around economic processing zones (EPZs) is their employment creation capacities. Yet it is here where their value to unemployed citizens is questionable. Writing in 2003, Aaron Glantz stated, that more than forty thousand employees were operating in over sixty factories within the zones.⁵⁸⁹ However, less than half of these employees by his figures are Jordanian nationals.⁵⁹⁰ Ergo, although export oriented industries have enjoyed substantial growth since the mid-1990s, Jordan's stubbornly high rates of unemployment remain intact, suggesting that while some economic policies are improving some key indicators, some which directly impact the day-to-day lives of citizens, are not being addressed. Concerning this non-Jordanian workforce, there is a compounding factor, a number of the QIZ-based factories house their employees on site,⁵⁹¹ limiting of the circulation of currency earned by employees in the wider domestic economy.

Furthermore, availability of capital has been curtailed since 2004 when the al-Fayez Government, in an effort to improve competitiveness, decreased by half the fees businesses are

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 147.

⁵⁸⁶ Mary Nazzal, 'Economic Reform in Jordan', p. 13.

⁵⁸⁷ Imad el-Anis, *Jordan and the United States*, p. 145.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 145-146.

⁵⁸⁹ Aaron Glantz, 'Jordan's Sweatshops: The Carrot or the Stick of US Policy?', *CorpWatch*, February 26, 2003 <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=5688> (accessed June 07, 2015); Mary Nazzal, 'Economic Reform in Jordan', p. 13 puts the figure at 30,000 employed within 785 companies within the QIZs; World Bank statistics meanwhile state that 54,000 positions have been generated between 2000 and 2008. See: the World Bank, *Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Resolving Jordan's Labor Market Paradox of Concurrent Economic Growth and High Unemployment*, Report No.39201 (New York: the World Bank, 2008)

⁵⁹⁰ Aaron Glantz, 'Jordan's Sweatshops'.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

required to pay in order to hire foreign staff in the QIZs from 300 to 150 Jordanian Dinars (JD).⁵⁹² Decreasing the incentives for businesses to hire local employees, elucidates an important paradox of economic growth in Jordan and the region. While employment opportunities and export statistics make QIZs attractive elements of economic strategy, ‘the actual impact on Jordan’s economy’, reminds Mary Nazzal, is primarily to be ‘determined by the effect on wages paid to Jordanian workers and on domestic investment through profits re-invested’ in the wider economy.⁵⁹³ According to these indicators, QIZs are in and of themselves, no panacea to Jordan’s structural weaknesses or to consistently high unemployment which in the final quarter of 2017 reached 18.2% according to the Jordanian Department of Statistics; the highest in twenty-five years.⁵⁹⁴

Like the QIZs, privatisation emerged as one of the key policy mechanisms in Jordan’s economic liberalisation following the fiscal crisis of 1988-1989. However, it only began ‘in earnest’ a decade later in 1998,⁵⁹⁵ and the Kingdom’s first Privatisation Law was drafted in 1999 and ratified in 2000. According to the Law, privatisation is understood as ‘the adoption of an economic methodology which enhances the role of the private sector in the economy to include public sector enterprises the nature of which requires that they be managed on commercial bases’.⁵⁹⁶ It is thus registered as a mechanism for the introducing of market relationships into ‘the bureaucratic production of public services’.⁵⁹⁷ In-conjunction with the National Privatization Strategy (NPS), the Law provides the necessary legal architecture for privatisation to take place, establishing six avenues for the privatising of public enterprises.⁵⁹⁸

Privatisation entails a sort of ‘rebalancing the role and scale of the public sector in the economy by reducing the government’s stake in industrial sectors’ which hitherto it had

⁵⁹² The World Bank, *Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, p. 33.

⁵⁹³ Mary Nazzal, ‘Economic Reform in Jordan’, p. 13.

⁵⁹⁴ Department of Statistics, ‘Unemployment Rate during the fourth Quarter of 2017’, dosweb.dos.gov.jo, March 01, 2018, <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/18-5-unemployment-rate-during-the-fourth-quarter-of-2017/> (accessed March 05, 2018).

⁵⁹⁵ Imad el-Anis, *Jordan and the United States*, p. 79.

⁵⁹⁶ Jordanian Government, Privatization Law No. (25) of 2000.

⁵⁹⁷ Elliot D. Sclar, *You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 3.

⁵⁹⁸ Jordanian Government, Privatization Law No. (25) of 2000.

dominated.⁵⁹⁹ The results have been impressive, with more than 70 transactions completed by the end of 2009. Successive governments have sold shares in 54 public sector firms with total proceeds equating to approximately 2.6 billion (\$US) with associated foreign direct investment (FDI) exceeding 850 million (\$US).⁶⁰⁰ There has been a not inconsequential dividend, although, at the same time, from the perspective of citizenship in the kingdom, it is important to consider this information from different perspectives other than accounting balance sheets. A rebalancing of the public sector is not only an economic manoeuvre, but rather is accompanied by a simultaneous reshaping of the country's citizenship regime because of the alienation these policies have generated. It is worth recalling here from chapter three, how the state developed and garnered legitimacy through the distribution of goods and services. In this way it penetrated the societies of steppe and sown, transferring to a considerable yet not total extent, the dependency of the population to itself away from pre-state sources of authority and distribution. But, the economic model on which this was founded became increasingly unsustainable from the 1980s onwards, and its remnants producing what Schlumberger referred to as 'patrimonial capitalism',⁶⁰¹ are sustained to this day through externally sourced rents and aid agreements.

4.3 : Spectators in the Stands? Citizens in the Political Game

The absence of citizens in economic decision-making has developed as the prerogative of closed groups of individuals, whose decisions receive little parliamentary oversight. Citizen ownership of decisions, and subsequently the accountability of decision-makers to the citizenry remain minimal. This deserves further analysis in the political system itself, which has experienced a decade or more of de-accelerated political liberalisation, in contrast with accelerated economic liberalisation.

⁵⁹⁹ Imad el-Anis, *Jordan and the United States*, p. 79.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 82-83.

⁶⁰¹ Oliver Schlumberger, "Transition to Development?" in George Joffé (ed.) *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), p. 244.

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with a powerful monarch at the head of the executive, who is also directly influential in the legislative and judicial spheres. Being a hereditary monarchy means that political leadership in Jordan is not open to competition, and hence, there is no recycling of decision-making power, only of personnel who are charged with executing the predetermined agenda.⁶⁰² This is undertaken in a tightly controlled model of shackled delegation, in which the Royal Court and *Mukhabarat* wield considerable influence. So much so that one former MP argued that the government citizens see is little more than a cover for a ‘shadow government’ in the Royal Court.⁶⁰³ Whether the truth of the matter is as profound as this is not the point. Rather, it is to assert that what emerges, in any event, is the following: first, decision-making is tightly controlled and wielded only by individuals loyal to the regime, and subsequently, all positions of any significance are royal appointees rather than citizen selections. The ECC discussed in the previous section, is one illustration of this. Second, political power is exercised within institutions characterised by a high degree of opacity, and subsequently little if any civilian oversight. Finally, this opacity extends to elections whose only transparent facet is that they are designed to preclude any meaningful challenge to the status quo.

Illuminating the institutions involved in the legislature is a useful way of considering all three contextually. Legislative power is, according to the constitution vested in the parliament (both houses together referred to as the National Assembly) and the King.⁶⁰⁴ There is no set number of deputies or senators that are required to sit in the National Assembly, yet the number of senators must be half the number of elected deputies.⁶⁰⁵ This dynamic has remained consistent in Jordanian parliamentary life since then, although there has been considerable variation across time in other aspects, which serve to highlight the changing nature of royal power-over the parliament and its members. Until the promulgation of the 1952 Constitution, parliament was not able to question

⁶⁰² Hisham Bustani, ‘The Alternative Opposition in Jordan and the Failure to Understand Lessons of Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions’, *jadaliyya.com*, March 22, 2011 <http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23816/The-Alternative-Opposition-in-Jordan-and-the-Failure-to-Understand-Lessons-of-Tunisian-and-Egyptian-Revolutions> (accessed May 12 2016); Dr Khalid al-Qudah (Former lecturer at the University of Jordan) interview with the author, September 26, 2016.

⁶⁰³ Al-Hayat News, ‘Al-Fayez li-“al-Hayāt” Hikumah al-Dil fi al-Diwān al-Maliki wa A‘awānha Tasayyir ‘Aly’, *al-Hayat News*, May 06, 2016.

⁶⁰⁴ The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni wa Ta‘adilāt li-Sinah 1952*), No.1093, Chapter 3, Art. 25 see also Art. 62.

⁶⁰⁵ The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni wa Ta‘adilāt li-Sinah 1952*), Art. 63 stipulates that the Senate shall never exceed more than half the number of Lower House MPs.

executive decision makers as neither the King nor the Cabinet were constitutionally accountable to it.

This extended to budget scrutiny as cabinets did not require a parliamentary vote of confidence. Thus, the King (officially through his government of appointees) could pursue his agenda irrespective of Lower House support or opposition.⁶⁰⁶ Therein it was the 1952 successor that improved parliamentary efficacy and the extent to which the Executive became accountable to it.⁶⁰⁷ First, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet had to now acquire the approval of the Chamber of Deputies in the form of a confidence motion before they could assume their roles.⁶⁰⁸ Second, in accordance with Articles 53 and 54, confidence could be rescinded at any time with a two-thirds majority vote of the parliament's members.⁶⁰⁹ Third, ministers could now be impeached following Articles 55 and 56. Fourth, the Executive could no longer engage in law-making without parliamentary approval. All draft legislation had to be submitted to the Lower House for debate, amendment, approval or rejection.⁶¹⁰ This procedure must be followed for all legislation in order for bills to become laws. So-called temporary laws, produced by cabinets during periods of parliamentary suspension, are not exempt; they must receive majority approval at the nearest opportunity.

Amendments made to the constitution in 2011, after civilian pressure in streets across Jordan, closed this loophole whereby cabinets could operate after the King, for whatever reason, dissolved the parliament and/or suspended parliamentary life. This had previously been an allowance utilised by Abdullah II between 2001 and 2003. Under present conditions the dissolution of parliament must be paired with the dissolution of the sitting government.⁶¹¹ Thus the 1952 constitution established the current procedure for the passage of bills. All drafts must be approved by the Chamber of Deputies before proceeding to the Senate where they are reviewed

⁶⁰⁶ Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux & Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab world: the Resurgence of Democratic Institutions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 138: treaties and foreign relations as a policy area were established as the prerogative of the King, denying the legislature input into this area of government. In essence this remains established practice contemporaneously.

⁶⁰⁷ Since then the constitution has been amended four times in 1974, 1976, 1984 and 2011.

⁶⁰⁸ Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux & Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab world*, p. 139.

⁶⁰⁹ The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni wa Ta'adilat li-Sinah 1952*), Art. 53 & 54.

⁶¹⁰ Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux & Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab world*, p. 139.

⁶¹¹ The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni wa Ta'adilat li-Sinah 1952*), Art. 74.

and if accepted, passed on to the king for ratification. In addition, if the king does not ratify a bill, a two-thirds majority vote in the parliament can be applied to veto the decision.⁶¹² Finally, although treaties and foreign relations remained in the Executive – that is to say the Monarch’s hand – if any of these entailed a financial commitment on the part of the Treasury, then parliamentary approval was now required.⁶¹³

Ergo, while Jordan is officially a constitutional monarchy, the actual divisions and subsequent independence of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary from each other is nebulous. Therein resides the contention between principles of constitutional monarchy and semi-authoritarian practices observable in the Kingdom. In terms of the Legislature, Jordan possesses a bicameral parliament composed of a directly elected *Majlis al-Nuwāb* via universal suffrage, and a Senate (*Majlis al-‘Ayan*), whose members are appointed unilaterally by the King. Royal prerogative extends to government formation in that the Prime Minister who shares executive authority with the King in accordance with the constitution is an appointee of the monarch. Further the king may, and indeed does, appoint prime ministers irrespective of the parliament’s composition. Once appointed, the prime minister nominates a Cabinet of ministers, none of whom need to be sitting parliamentary representatives. Citizen power-to elect decision-makers who will debate and govern on their behalf is subsequently delimited by the very structure of the system.

The exact method of voting, turning candidates into MPs is subject to legislation rather than constitutional dictate. As a consequence, debates both within and external to the parliament about the substance of election laws are often hotly contested, and the Opposition has regularly employed the threat of boycotts as a leverage device.⁶¹⁴ Senators contrastingly are appointed unilaterally by the reigning monarch. Outlined within Article 36, the King appoints both the senators and the Senate Speaker, granting him considerable clout over that Chamber’s agenda. In this manner it functions as the *King’s Chamber* with no popular participation in the senatorial

⁶¹² Ibid. Art. 91 & 93.

⁶¹³ Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux & Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab world*, p. 139.

⁶¹⁴ See Paul M. Esber, ‘The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Democratisation and the Dilemmas of Internal Organisational Reform; Seeking Unity, Finding Division?’ in John L. Esposito, Lily Zubaidah Rahim & Naser Ghobadzadeh (eds.) *The Politics of Islamism: Diverging Visions and Trajectories* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 217-241.

selection process. In addition, it is worth highlighting here the Constitution's poignant desideratum pertaining to candidate qualities:

'In addition to the requirements prescribed in Article 75 of the present Constitution, a Senator must have completed forty calendar years of age and must belong to one of the following classes: Present and former Prime Ministers and Ministers, persons who had previously held the office of Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, President and judges of the Court of Cassation and of the Civil and Sharia Courts of Appeal, retired military officers of the rank of Lt. General and above, former Deputies who were elected at least twice as deputies, and other similar personalities who enjoy the confidence of the people in view of the services rendered by them to the Nation and the Country'.⁶¹⁵

All prospective senators are to have had a long and consistent relationship with the regime. A corollary hypothesis is that the Senate cannot be expected to behave in a manner considerably divergent from the interests of the regime itself. Implications arise therefore on the question of their accountability to the wider citizenry. Further, the Senate Speaker, unlike his/her Lower House equivalent is royally appointed rather than elected.⁶¹⁶ Such lends credence to the image of this institution as a modern-day King's council, underscoring the reality that while all senators are citizens they owe their position to the monarch not to the citizenry. The Lower House and its MPs are comparatively more connected to the citizenry in terms of being accountable. However the King's influence here too can be felt. All candidates for the Chamber of Deputies must: be a Jordanian as defined by Law No.6 of 1954 on Nationality (the Nationality Law); have been 'rehabilitated' if bankrupt in the past; have any past interdictions removed from their record; be pardoned if they have spent a term in jail exceeding a year 'for a non-political offence'; be of sound mind, and not be related to the King according to the directives of the relevant special law.⁶¹⁷ This means however that activists from Tujan Faisal and leith al-Sheibailat to scores of youth arrested in the wake of the 2011 and 2012 demonstrations, are precluded from taking their activism

⁶¹⁵ The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni wa Ta'adilat li-Sinah 1952*), Art. 64.

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.* Art. 36.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.* Art. 75.

into the halls of parliament. Consequently, these citizens are denied the available institutional avenues for political expression.

Parliamentary terms in Jordan run for four calendar years.⁶¹⁸ Yet in the reality their duration is often (especially in recent history) determined by the King who has the ability to dissolve the institution. Be that as it may, when elections are called, candidates run via an open-list system, that has been in place with a few alterations since 1989.⁶¹⁹ This list system incorporates quotas for Christians, Chechen/Circassian minorities and women. The former two groups have had quota-based representation available since the 1986 elections Law was implemented, whereas women have had a parliamentary quota since 2003.⁶²⁰ The exact number of quota seats has changed over time, and at present women, Christians, and Chechen/Circassians are allocated 10, 9 and 3 seats respectively. Both Christian and Chechen/Circassian minorities are demonstrably over-represented in the quota system, and arguments have subsequently been made that the existence of quota allocations does more to serve the political ends of the regime than the interests of the communities in question.⁶²¹ But more than this, the quotas influence the development of citizenship and an associated civilian identity that is separate from ethnic or religious identity.

In actuality, while they provide a degree of guaranteed representation, they simultaneously serve ‘as a ceiling’ of the ‘maximum allowed representation’ for the groups involved.⁶²² The quotas funnel the participation of Christian, Chechen and Circassian minorities into specific limited seats. If two Chechens wanted to run on the same list in a district, they could only do so if there were two quota seats available in that district. The same applies for Christians, irrespective of the actual number of votes a candidate is able to attract. ‘Suppose’, argues Lina Ejeilat, that

⁶¹⁸ Ibid. Art. 68.

⁶¹⁹ Jamil al-Nimri, *al-Iṣlāḥ al-Siyāsī wa al-Intikhābāt* (Amman: Ward, 2010). To begin with, in 1989 candidates could not organise their own lists, but once candidacy was approved were arranged onto lists in their districts. Subsequently however this centralisation was rescinded thus enabling candidates to negotiate their own list composition.

⁶²⁰ Shāker Jarrār, ‘al-Bedu wa al-Nisā’ wa al-Masiḥiyoun fi Qawānin al-Intikhāb: Min al-Tamayyiz ila Tasyys al-Huwiyyāt al-Mulodah’, *7iber.com*, June 02, 2016 <https://www.7iber.com/politics-economics/jordanian-election-laws-and-the-manufacturing-of-identities/> (accessed June 12, 2016).

⁶²¹ Shāker Jarrār, ‘al-Bedu wa al-Nisā’ wa al-Masiḥiyoun fi Qawānin al-Intikhāb’.

⁶²² Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

‘three Christian men on a list received the highest number of votes in the Amman Third District only one of them would win a seat’.⁶²³

Concerning citizen involvement in the 2003, 2007 and 2010 elections it is noteworthy to consider both the method of voting and the distribution of parliamentary seats per district across the country. In all three cases voting was undertaken according to the SNTV outlined in chapter three. Despite opposition arguments in parliament and the public sphere, including a wide-ranging boycott of the 2010 elections led by the IAF, successive governments maintained the *sawt wahad*. A single exception to this occurred in the 2013 elections, which introduced a floating national list to voters. Instead of casting the single vote tied to their district of registration – not necessarily residence – citizens could cast an additional vote for candidates on the national list. While not the rescinding of the SNTV the opposition had demanded, the national list’s inclusion was seen as a positive step forward inasmuch as it allowed citizens to vote for a kinship relation in their district, and for a party or ideological platform on the national list.

International obligations concerning equal suffrage for citizens delimit in theory the ways in which electoral districts are designed and available parliamentary seats allocated to them. Ergo, although ‘fair electoral district or constituency-delimitation procedures will take into account a range of information, including available census data, territorial contiguity, geographic and topographic accessibility, and communities of interest’,⁶²⁴ the principle of equality between votes, that is to say their weight, must be maintained. In Jordan the relative weight of a citizen’s vote and the method by which the variables listed above are evaluated in to create districts and assign seats is devoid of transparency and independence. Until the creation of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) in 2012, organising elections including seat allocation was handled by the Ministry of Interior, who gave recommendations to the Cabinet who in turn decreed the substance of the electoral map for a given election in a by-law.⁶²⁵

⁶²³ Ibid.

⁶²⁴ Domenico Tuccinardi, *International Obligations for Elections: Guidelines for Legal Frameworks* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014), p. 77. Available at: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/international-obligations-for-elections.pdf>.

⁶²⁵ The Carter Center, *Mission Report on Jordan’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections* (Atlanta: the Carter Center, 2013), p. 11. Available at: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/jordan-2013-study-mission-eng.pdf.

To date no elections law approved by parliament during the reign of Abdullah II has specified the terms by which districting takes place. And as the 2016 case indicates,⁶²⁶ the Cabinet to this day sustains this function. Suggesting that, even with the IEC in place, the procedure is not managed from start to finish by an independent auditor who could balance the sometimes-competing demands of demography with development in under-privileged areas. For example, in 2001 the number of districts for general elections was increased from 22 to 45, and was maintained until the 2016 elections when it was reduced to 23.⁶²⁷ Similarly, the number of deputies has fluctuated, from 110 between the 2003 and 2007 polls, 120 between 2010 and 2013, and 150 between 2013 and 2016. It has since been reduced to 130. Changes to districts were based on the Ministry of Interior's evaluation of geographical and demographical variables.⁶²⁸ To this day the exact formula or equation utilised for this evaluation remains unknown publicly. Expanding the quota system accounts for some but not all of the alterations to the number of elected deputies.

The opacity surrounding the electoral system is not the result of chance. Elections are not so much a vehicle of genuine competition for decision-making power, as they are one of increasing a citizen's stake in the game of patronage acquisition. In this way elections serve to 'reinforce rather than undermine authoritarian regimes', through a process Ellen Lust refers to as 'competitive clientelism'.⁶²⁹ From the position of MPs, they can use the influence of their position 'to pressure ministers and bureaucrats into dispensing jobs, licenses, and other state resources to their constituents'.⁶³⁰ Pressure may be supported with threats to make public accusations against particular bureaucrats or ministers if requests are denied. In 2016 a case of this was made public involving then Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour and Lower House Speaker Atef al-Tarawneh. It came to light that of 109 recent appointments to positions servicing the parliament 15 were given

⁶²⁶ Mohamed Ghazal, 'Government Ready with By-law on Distribution of Constituencies', *Jordan Times*, March 29, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gov%E2%80%99t-ready-law-distribution-constituencies> (accessed March 30, 2016).

⁶²⁷ Mohamed Hussein & Paul M. Esber, *Position Paper – 2016 Election Law* (Amman: Identity Center, 2016). Available at: http://haqqi.info/check_1.php?t=research_paper&f=IdentityCenterElectionLawPositionPaperfinal

⁶²⁸ The Carter Center, *Mission Report on Jordan's 2013 Parliamentary Elections*, p. 11.

⁶²⁹ Ellen Lust, 'Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East', *Journal of Democracy* 20:3, (2009), p. 122.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 124.

to sons of sitting MPs and the majority of the remainder were relatives.⁶³¹ MP Tarek Khoury who was critical of the appointments stated when interviewed that a number of MPs had been pressuring the Speaker to approve the appointments, concluding ‘MPs cannot risk rejecting “wasta” requests from people in their constituencies, because they fear losing them as voters’.⁶³²

Besides being evidence that some MPs are more concerned with constituent expectations than with the state of the national budget, the episode supports earlier research on the prevalence of clientelism. Based on surveys conducted between 2000 and 2005, one study reported a majority of participants ‘believed that they would need *wasta* in order to succeed in conducting business with government agencies or to obtain public-sector employment’.⁶³³ Consequently, that citizens would vote in ways they feel may increase the probability of accessing benefits is unsurprising, given the difficult economic climate. This includes voting for candidates with whom they have an established relationship through kinship. Therein the existence of the SNTV in concert with the absence of competition for power encourages what some in Jordan call ‘service MPs’ - ‘helping constituents to gain access to health, education, and other services, to get jobs, or to navigate (and if need be, to bypass) the sprawling state bureaucracy is what being an MP is really all about’.⁶³⁴

4.4 : Conclusion

When asked about citizenship (*muwātanah*) Bassām al-Badreen replies it is about the rights and obligations of citizens to each other and the state, grounded in a fundamental equality between them as individuals, in addition to the necessity of the state to respect the rights of citizens. Contrastingly, when it comes to Jordan, he asserts there is ‘no possibility’ of equating the present

⁶³¹ Omar Obeidat, ‘Jordanians Angry at House, Government over Spread of Wasta’, *Jordan Times*, April 14, 2016. <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordanians-angry-house-gov%E2%80%99t-over-spread-wasta> (accessed April 20, 2016).

⁶³² Omar Obeidat & Raed Omari, ‘Hundreds of MPs’ Relatives Appointed as Administrators at Chamber’, *Jordan Times*, April 11, 2016. <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/hundreds-mps%E2%80%99-relatives-appointed-administrators-chamber> (accessed April 11, 2016).

⁶³³ Sa’eda Kilani & Basem Sakijha, *Wasta: The Declared Secret—A Study on Nepotism and Favouritism in Jordan* (Amman: Press Foundation, 2002), p. 126.

⁶³⁴ Ellen Lust, Sami Hourani & Mohammad El-Momani, Jordan Votes: Election or Selection? *Journal of Democracy* 22:2 (2011), p. 120.

circumstances of citizenship with this definition.⁶³⁵ This chapter has endeavoured to elucidate this contrast in terms of the absence of ownership and accountability in Jordanian citizenship. I began by contemplating the act of littering in public as an indication of citizens recognising whether consciously or unconsciously that the physical spaces of the public sphere did not belong to them. They thus felt unencumbered about discarding their wrappers, cigarette packets and other such unwanted material in the streets of their residences and their cities.

This was subsequently linked with the policy framework fostered and enacted since the ascension of King Abdullah II in 1999, with particular reference to the acceleration of *economic* liberalization and the de-acceleration of *political* liberalization.⁶³⁶ In both spheres I highlighted the threadbare (if existent) role citizens performed in designing, drafting and consenting to economic policies and reform of the political system. The two spheres must be considered in-tandem, in order to show that demonstrations in streets and the occupation of public spaces in urban centres that would be so indispensable during 2011 and 2012 were, in essence, the only viable option for citizens because of the working nature of formal institutionalized political participation in the Kingdom. These uprisings were not the only expressions of this. Between 2010 and 2015 there were over three thousand instances of labor strikes according to the Amman based Phenix Center.⁶³⁷ These built on previous labor action undertaken between 2006 and 2009 as the impact of privatization deals began to negatively impact Jordanian workers and families,⁶³⁸ suggesting the actions to be in response to the Palace's decade long program of neoliberal economic development.

Underpinning which was the 'unspoken assumption' that annual increases in GDP would in aggregate terms beneficial to 'the population as a whole'.⁶³⁹ Closer examination of other variables, reveals Adam Hanieh, illuminates a decidedly different reality. The food consumer price

⁶³⁵ Bassām al-Badreen (Editor, Rai al-Youm), interview with the author, Amman, September 11, 2016.

⁶³⁶ See for instance, Curtis Ryan & Jillian Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?'

⁶³⁷ The Phenix Center, *Report: Labor Strikes in Jordan 2015* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016), p. 7.

<http://www.labor-watch.net/en/paper/20350> (accessed August 14, 2016). Established in 2003, the Phenix Center for Economics and Informatics Studies is a non-governmental and independent research centre in Amman. Focused on policy analysis, its reports and publications seek to contextualise economic, social and political drivers in Jordan.

⁶³⁸ Fida Adely, 'The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Jordan', *MERIP* 42 (2012),

<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/emergence-new-labor-movement-jordan> (accessed August 14, 2016); see also

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *Report: Labour Protests in Jordan* (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010),

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10104.pdf> (accessed August 14, 2016).

⁶³⁹ Adam Hanieh, *Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013), p. 145.

index for example between July 2007 and July 2009 rose by twenty percent in Jordan, not only applying fiscal pressure on the budget to continue to fund subsidization schemes, but also contributed to an increase in the number of families living below the poverty line.⁶⁴⁰ For many citizens therefore, the policies that were supposed to lead to greater economic opportunity and sustainability have had the opposite effect. Additionally, these citizens were asked to participate in, and therefore bestow their consent on continuing such frameworks through formal institutions whose members were unaccountable and unresponsive to them and their needs. That this had an indubitable influence on the outbreak of demonstrations from January 7 2011 is asserted by Nahed Hattar, who links the uprisings in the South with the plight of Jordanian labor in the face of rampant privatization undertaken for the benefit of what he refers to as the ‘comprador class’.⁶⁴¹ The distance between the way citizenship is framed by institutional discourse and the lived experience of the citizens themselves, is a product of immediate and less recent history. In the absence of accountability and ownership, Jordanians have the need to search for these two principles of citizenship beyond the confines of formalized politics.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 146: notes that a in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Yemen and Syria, 1.1 million additional people were living below the poverty line before the onset of the global financial crisis.

⁶⁴¹ Nahed Hattar, ‘Khitwat Tanzim Min Ajal Fahm al-Hirak al-Urduni’, *Ammonnews*, June 11, 2011, www.ammonnews.net/article/89725 (accessed October 23, 2017).

Chapter Five

5. In Search of Ownership and Accountability

'On the idea of citizenship and rights, they (Jordanians) are subjects'.⁶⁴²

'It is not a balanced relationship. The Executive is the hegemon that encroaches on everyone else. The problem of course is that the constitution provides for a parliamentary system, which means that the government should come from the people and the parliament. This is not the case however'.⁶⁴³

5.1 : Introduction

In the previous chapter I sought to shed light on the absence of ownership and accountability in the Jordanian citizenship regime, illustrated via the economics and politics of Jordan during King Abdullah II's first decade on the throne. This chapter provides an analysis of Jordan's experience of the 2011 and 2012 uprisings, as a search on the part of citizens, for ownership and accountability, and therein re-adjust the balance of power between rulers and the ruled in the Kingdom. The chapter aims to elucidate the contrast between the citizen search for accountability and ownership, with the regime's simultaneous attempt to sustain a political subjectivity of passivity for citizens.

By this however, I do not mean to imply that all participants in the uprisings shared the same interests, agendas or identities. Indeed, it is hoped the opposite will emerge, underscoring the differing visions of citizenship on display in the Kingdom. Which in turn emphasises some of the challenges citizenship faces as one of many socio-political identities in Jordan. In this manner,

⁶⁴² Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

⁶⁴³ Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer), interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016.

although the so-called Arab Spring was in many regards about citizenship and the newly visible citizen,⁶⁴⁴ this is not to say that its *depth* was and is equally shared and understood. Remembering that citizenship depth refers to *how* demanding it should be as an identity influencing and mobilising individual and collective behaviour on the one hand and *when*, on the other, should it be prioritised above other identities.

Succeeding the examination of the uprisings, I present an analysis of the first five of the King's Discussion Papers, released progressively between 2012 and 2016. Their content coalesces around the themes of political reform, citizenship, democratisation and national unity, and they hence function as an excellent window into the King's thinking on these subjects. These subjects were also central to the protest movements of 2011 and 2012, making our analysis germane. The prime importance of the papers therefore, is as a comparative foil, demonstrating a stark contrast to the citizen search for ownership and accountability powerfully manifested in the unprecedented protests and demonstrations of 2011/2012. The acts of citizens in mobilising, occupying and reclaiming public space speak profoundly of substantial inadequacies in the institutional framework linking citizens to decision-makers. However, the Discussion Papers at times imply and at other moments state outright that citizen ownership and decision-maker accountability already exist within the architectural framework of Jordan's political system. By extension the message conveyed is that any deficiencies are the result of citizen in-action and apathy, rather than characteristic of the institutional avenues themselves, or the individuals who occupy positions of authority. This particular discussion is buttressed by examining the series of constitutional amendments passed by the parliament with record speed in 2014 and 2016. These are relevant here insofar as they further concentrate political authority in the hands of the King.

⁶⁴⁴ Marwan Bishara, *The invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolutions* (New York: Nation Books, 2012); Nils A. Butenschøn, 'Arab Citizen and the Arab State: The "Arab Spring" as a Critical Juncture in Contemporary Arab Politics', *Democracy and Security* 11:2 (2015), pp. 111-128, engages with this in the Egyptian context.

5.2 : Jordan 2011-2012 - Scouring the Streets (for Ownership and Accountability)

Meditating on political liberalisation as an instrument of socio-political control impressed on Jillian Schwedler four key provisions, which in light of chapter four's discussion, are perspicuous in our an inquiry into Jordan's recent wave of demonstrations in 2011 and 2012. The prime objective of political liberalisation, she notes, 'is to *seem* to move toward democratization', while simultaneously preventing these novel openings of either new or existing institutions from allowing citizens to perform influential roles in decision-making. Such a process of delimiting the citizen combines with the third and fourth facets, involving a channelling of opposition, whether inside or outside formal institutions, into acceptable conduits. These are necessarily 'controlled by the state', so as to function as a mechanism for either 'managing or deflating threats'.⁶⁴⁵ Political liberalisation thus, operates as a strategy to sustain status quo hierarchies of authority and power.

The emergence of uprisings across the Arab world from December 2010 is, considering Schwedler's reflection, evidence of both the successes and failures of Arab ruling elites in collectively applying political liberalisation over the past thirty or so years. Success inasmuch as these rulers whether in Tunisia, the Yemen, Jordan or Egypt had implemented these policies for over three decades before oppositional critical mass emerged. Yet concomitantly failure in so far as ruling elite strategies, and here I am referring specifically to Jordan,⁶⁴⁶ were able to manage but not deflate threats to established vertical political and economic hierarchies. Ergo, the Jordanian demonstrations owe more to domestic factors than to the example set by Tunisians and Egyptians. In-particular the emergence of *al-Hirāk al-Shabābi al-Urduni (the Hirāk)* can be traced at least to 2009, with the movement of Aqaba Port workers demonstrating against the effects of privatisation on their employment conditions and security.⁶⁴⁷ Some younger activists however push these beginnings back further to 2006, corresponding with Muhammad Sneid's labour activism with the

⁶⁴⁵ Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 34.

⁶⁴⁶ It is difficult to make generalised comparative statements about the various trajectories that culminated in the 2011 uprisings. In order to do justice one must recognise the specificities not only of each country, but equally of the currents within each country in question. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake as much here. Hence while we may make reflections on cases outside of Jordan, we naturally focus attention there.

⁶⁴⁷ Nahed Hattar, 'Khitwa Ṭanzim min Ajal Fahim al-Hirāk al-Urduni', *ammonnews.net*, June 11, 2011, www.ammonnews.net/article/89725 (accessed November 03, 2016); Muhammad Sneid began organising labour demonstrations from 2006. Muhammad Sneid, (Seminar address: closed seminar, Amman 2016).

Day Wage Labour Movement which ‘gave hope’ to many employees in sectors targeted by privatisation schemes.⁶⁴⁸

The beginning of the Jordanian 2011 uprisings preceded both the resignation of Tunisian President Zine Abidine Ben Ali (January 14) and the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution (January 25). On January 7 demonstrations were held in Dhiban, a small-town in the Madaba Governorate. Organised with the assistance of Muhammad Sneid, the participants, who were mainly students, workers and farmers held banners aloft calling for the fall of the government while congregating with up to one thousand others.⁶⁴⁹ Hence, similar to the Tunisian revolution, demonstrations in the Kingdom began away from the geopolitical centre of the country, before promptly proceeding in that direction. Additionally, they were youth led, conveying not only the volatility in inter-generational politics, but moreover expressing the specific concerns of younger Jordanians. Specifically, their belief as to the inability of ruling elites to create an environment that would allow them to pursue their individual and collective goals.

Consider for illustration a key catalyst for the uprisings was the government’s decision to raise fuel prices without a corresponding increase in salaries for public sector workers. After a second week of protests in Dhiban, government representatives approached the protestors offering to increase salaries by twenty dinars per month. The movement’s representatives rejected this proposal in the absence of the Cabinet’s resignation, desired due to the prevailing perception that it was a cabinet representing elite interests. One activist expressed it in historical terms, arguing that in the past regime legitimacy derived from social distributive policies attached to state expansion. Once this became financially unsustainable however, the pillars of legitimacy began to change as a coalition of economic elites and security personnel materialized, resulting in a contraction of the constituencies the state seeks to serve in order to sustain itself.⁶⁵⁰ It is little surprise then that those sectors of the Jordanian polity who are neither economically privileged, nor high ranking security personnel, feel abandoned and isolated from decision-making; with a corresponding sense of the devaluation of their citizenship. Consequently, clarity is given to the

⁶⁴⁸ Anonymous Youth activist, (Seminar address: closed seminar), Amman June 07, 2016.

⁶⁴⁹ Muhammad Sneid, (Seminar address: closed seminar), Amman June 07, 2016.

⁶⁵⁰ Anonymous Youth activist, (Seminar address: closed seminar), Amman June 07, 2016.

importance of mobilising in, and occupying public space from busy intersections to ministerial buildings. When formal channels of expression such as elections and parliamentary debates are closed, constrained or, through personal and collective experience found to be inadequate; public spaces become crucial in attracting attention towards citizen plight.

By mid-January the reform movement had materialized in Amman with over three thousand participants congregating in the capital's downtown calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai.⁶⁵¹ The Amman protests are significant not only because they are a symbol of the uprisings' diffusion from periphery to centre, but equally because it is in Amman that the established opposition movements and parties intersected with newer collectives, namely local cells of the *Hirāk*. It is important to note here that the *Hirāk* is not a unified movement, but is rather better recognised as a broad umbrella under which various collectives, often regionally based, are gathered.⁶⁵² The Dhiban Youth Committee from the central Governorate of Madaba for example has at the top of its agenda both local and national objectives. On the local level these include overturning the dearth of economic development projects in the district, bringing corrupt officials to trial, and repatriating the resources they usurped. On the national level this branch of the *Hirāk* has sought a codification of Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank.⁶⁵³ This agenda is distinct from the Free People of Kharja Movement from the northern Irbid Governorate. This Movement's demands are less regional and economic, and more procedural and political. Amongst their demands were an elected, rather than one royally appointed senate, and a constitutional amendment specifying that the government is responsible for the day-to-day running of the state; therein making it subject to the citizenry.⁶⁵⁴

While this intersecting increased the momentum of the initial protest movement, it opened a wider space in which distrust and antagonism developed between what Hisham al-Bustani refers to as the 'official' and 'alternative' opposition on at least two critical fronts: domestic priorities,

⁶⁵¹ Al-Jazeera, 'Thousands Protest in Jordan', *Aljazeera.com*, January 29, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011128125157509196.html> (accessed December 06, 2017).

⁶⁵² Muhammad Bani Salamah, *al-Ḥirāk al-Shabābi al-Urduni fī Zal al-Rabi'a al-'Arabi* (Amman: Markaz al-Badil, 2013), pp. 155-157, argues the movement lacks a unifying identity.

⁶⁵³ Identity Center, *Map of Political Parties and Movements in Jordan 2013/2014* (Amman: Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, 2014), p. 65.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 67.

and regional identities.⁶⁵⁵ The official opposition ‘comprised of the legalized opposition parties and professional associations’ consisting of three main currents: the Islamists (chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood, its affiliated party the Islamic Action Front, al-Fursan and smaller groups of politically active Salafists), Leftists (such as the Jordanian Communist Party, the Popular Unity Party and the People’s Democratic Party), and Nationalists (including two Baath parties – each connected to the Syrian and Iraqi factions respectively). Meanwhile, the alternative opposition, consisted of a similarly broad assortment of associations, some new others established, from across the social and ideological spectrum.⁶⁵⁶ Pre-eminent amongst them are the National Committee of Military Veterans, the National Progressive Current, the Jordanian Writers Association, the Jordanian Social Left Movement and the Jordanian National Initiative.⁶⁵⁷ Cumulatively these organisations formed the Jordanian Campaign for Change, or the *Jayeen* (we are coming) coalition.

For simplification, two divisions can be made here: one broad and general between official and alternative umbrellas, and another more specific, between the currents, parties and factions under each banner. Underpinning each division are the unique sets of interests, priorities and identities held by the members of each collective based on their experience with the state. The Islamists prioritised reforms of a political as opposed to economic nature in their participation in the demonstrations. In-particular, seeking the rescinding of the SNTV and the reintroduction of multiple votes per voter at elections in order to better reflect their organizational strength in Jordan’s main urban centres: Amman, Irbid and al-Zarqa. Members of the alternative opposition contrastingly, generally advanced an agenda prioritising economic reform, revolving around ‘a more *dirigiste* alternative to neoliberal reform and a development policy that preserves the public sector and diverts wealth and resources from Amman’.⁶⁵⁸ This is true of groups as diverse as the Military Veterans and labour-oriented *Hirāk* activists, for whom political reform was viewed chiefly as means to an economic end. Principally, addressing perceptions of systemic corruption,

⁶⁵⁵ Hisham Bustani, ‘The Alternative Opposition in Jordan’.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Tariq Tell cited in: Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘Jordan’s Current Political Opposition Movements and the Need for Further Research: An Interview with Tariq Tell (Part 2)’, *Jadaliyya*, August 24, 2012, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26936/Jordan%60s-Current-Political-Opposition-Movements-and-the-Need-for-Further-Research-An-Interview-with-Tariq-Tell-Part-2> (accessed April 19, 2016).

undermining a model of economic development which had neglected the hinterlands,⁶⁵⁹ and reducing ‘the perceived influence’ of Queen Rania and her extended family in economic decision-making.⁶⁶⁰

Alongside the division between economic and political priorities, the currents and factions involved in the demonstrations were also divided over Jordan’s role in the region. In 2010 the Veterans, concerned about possible Israeli plans to resurrect the *watan al-badil* (the alternative homeland) solution to the Palestinian question; released a manifesto calling on the regime to complete the process of disengaging from the West Bank, and settling from Jordan’s end, the status of Palestinian non-citizens in the Kingdom.⁶⁶¹ The Muslim Brotherhood, who because of their ties with Hamas in the Occupied Territories, has not been as supportive of final disengagement, joined Ahmad ‘Ubaydat’s 2010 pan-Jordanian coalition, asserting the constitutionally sanctioned unity of East and West Banks.⁶⁶² This coalition included Baathists, a handful of former ministers and members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) among others, and under normal conditions, would not interest the Brotherhood as potential political allies. This wider point is affirmed by Sami Hourani, founder and director of the civil society organisation *Leaders of Tomorrow*. Commenting on the state of the ideological spectrum in the domestic political system, he educates:

‘You have to remember that the Islamists were able to develop their own platform based on service provision so by the time the system was opened up, the rise of the secular liberal became impossible. If this was intentional I think this is the smartest regime ever because you created an environment a status quo that can never be challenged, and you have Islamist parties that are too weak to move too close to the centre of power, and yet it cannot accept any ideological competition.’⁶⁶³

⁶⁵⁹ Jillian Schwedler, ‘Amman Cosmopolitan: Spaces and Practices of Aspiration and Consumption’, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 30:3 (2010), p. 548.

⁶⁶⁰ Tariq Tell cited in: Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘Jordan’s Current Political Opposition Movements... (Part 2)’.

⁶⁶¹ National Committee for Retired Army Personnel, ‘Statement on Defending State, identity against Israel’s ‘Alternative Homeland’, *ammonnews.net*, March 5, 2010, <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=7683#.WhNenFWWaUm> (accessed November 21, 2017).

⁶⁶² Tariq Tell cited in: Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘Jordan’s Current Political Opposition Movements’.

⁶⁶³ Sami Hourani, (Founder & Director Leaders of Tomorrow), interview with the author, Amman, May 18, 2016.

Initially though, there was a considerable degree of consensus amongst protestors about objectives and red lines. Mohammed Hussainy who took part in demonstrations and marches in Amman educated ‘we were rational enough not to call for the fall of the regime and not to use violence. These two things were agreed upon by all participants’.⁶⁶⁴ Given the regional climate, King Abdullah II moved quickly to address the publicly declared objectives of the demonstrators, accepting al-Rifai’s resignation on February 1 and replacing him with Marouf al-Bakhit. The move was a clever one. Al-Bakhit of the influential ‘Abbadi tribe is a well-known regime loyalist, and a member of the so-called ‘old guard’ of politicians whose influence had been partially offset by the new generation of business elites close to Abdullah II.⁶⁶⁵ Some of this old guard were close to the members and factions of the *Hirāk*, and hence a division emerged both within the *Hirāk* and between the *Hirāk* and the official opposition, as some *Hirākis* supported the change in leadership and were prepared to give the new Prime Minister time to implement policies addressing their concerns.⁶⁶⁶ The official opposition did not share this perspective and did not want to see the poignancy of the moment lost.⁶⁶⁷

Compounding these divergences over domestic priorities were similar fractures over Jordan’s role in the region and the regional affiliations of domestic actors. In this context argues Lina Ejeilat, Syria became ‘very divisive in the *Hirāk* because it was a fault line’, as a number of prominent Leftists and Ba’athists declared support for President Bashar al-Assad, some having travelled to Syria to do so.⁶⁶⁸ The Brotherhood and other *Hirāk* activists contrastingly supported the Syrian peoples’ uprising. This made it increasingly difficult over time to build and sustain strong coalitions capable of focusing on an agreed set of objectives. As Ejeilat recalls: ‘you suddenly realised that these Leftists in Jordan, these ancient Leftists, the Ba’athists and whatever these anti-imperialists what political reform are you after [in Jordan] when you went to pay allegiance to Assad? Who is going to go into the streets together to demand political reform when you see there is this huge divergence?’⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁴ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

⁶⁶⁵ Referenced in the discussion of the ECC in chapter four.

⁶⁶⁶ Nahed Hattar, ‘Khitwa Tanzim’.

⁶⁶⁷ Ali Mahafzah, ‘Jordan: The Difficult Path towards Reform’, *Aljazeera.net*, December 19, 2012, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/12/2012121995612798705.htm> (accessed April 19, 2016).

⁶⁶⁸ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

Analogous with Hourani, Ejeilat refers to the problem of pre-existing ideological commitments in building and sustaining the critical mass necessary to challenge established political and economic hierarchies in Jordan. This speaks to a broader issue of civic and citizen identity in the Kingdom. In other words, the *depth* of citizenship comparative to other social and political identities is weak. This in turn influences the power-to (act) and power-over (decision-makers) capacities of citizens because it reduces their ability to act in-concert, or in Pansardi's terms to have *power-with* each other.⁶⁷⁰ Collective power is at the heart of citizen action because it is through citizen identity that different, sometimes conflicting interests and ideas about the common good may be aggregated into an agenda capable of acquiring and sustaining consensus. In-turn, consensus is significant as the vessel of collective ownership. Much of this underpins what Asma Khudar argues concerning democratic values in Jordan. They are she states:

'Not embedded in life, in family, in schools, in any structures. So, it is so difficult to build democratic political parties who are committed to laws and by-laws, to the rules (of the game) and accept diversity and rotation of leadership all of this. The whole (totality of) democratic values are not embedded in our lives. Civil or political in fact - it's the culture. It needs time, and you need to build it'.⁶⁷¹

Her observation, made in 2016, highlights the continuing problem of collective action in Jordan, and provides some clues as to why the largest demonstrations in 2011 attracted 10,000 participants and not more given the hardships confronting citizens. February 25 was especially significant, and it lent momentum into March, which saw the creation of the "Youth of March 24" movement, named in reference to the day of a sit-in at Amman's Gamal Abd al-Nasser Square, known locally as *Duwar al-Dhakliyyah* (the interior circle). Following the effective model of Cairo's Tahrir Square, the up to two thousand participants hoped to use their occupation of both a visible (the circle is one of the city's busiest), and strategic (the official news agency Petra and the office of the Amman Governor overlook the circle) location to sustain impetus for reform through their presence. In this way, the gathering can be interpreted through the lens of what Andrea Khalil

⁶⁷⁰ Amy Allen, *The Power of Feminist Theory*, p. 126.

⁶⁷¹ Asma Khudar, (Former Senator & Director of Sisterhood is Global Institute), interview with the author, Amman, June 13, 2016.

calls ‘subversive political crowds’ as the objective was to ‘dismantle existing hierarchies of power’ through disruption.⁶⁷²

In composition, the sit-in was heterogeneous, comprising of Jordanians from different origins, social classes, places of residence, religion and gender.⁶⁷³ If it is true that ‘being in a crowd is *becoming* human, *becoming* oneself’,⁶⁷⁴ and more importantly that this becoming is innately social; then the significance of the sit-in becomes transparent. In that it carries the capacity to imagine and embody new social, that is to say a new collective self, in contrast to prevailing narratives of national identity and citizen behaviours. What began as a peaceful demonstration became violent on March 25. Groups of youths and thugs (*baltijah*), believed to be associated with the regime, or at the very least in possession of pro-government sympathies moved against the demonstrators using blunted instruments to break-up the sit-in.⁶⁷⁵ A number of these were associated with *Shabāb kulna al-Urdun* (The Youth arm of “We are All Jordan”) and *Nidā’ al-Watan* (Call of the Nation) who had organised counter demonstrations in al-Hussein Park before moving on to *Duwar al-Dhakhliyyah*. In response, the police and security forces, which were on hand did not prevent the violence from occurring, but were themselves engaging in the beating participants.⁶⁷⁶

The afternoon and evening reports had framed this as a clash between demonstrators and police, when in reality to those on the ground ‘it was one group attacking the other’. Of particular interest here was the role of identity politics. The members of *Shabāb kulna al-Urdun* and *Nidā’ al-Watan*, having ‘liberated’ the circle, went off into the evening to celebrate, ‘attacking all of these traitors who thought they could turn Jordan into Egypt or whatever’.⁶⁷⁷ The regime had been

⁶⁷² Andrea Khalil, *Crowds and Politics in North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria and Libya* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 8.

⁶⁷³ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016; Curtis Ryan, ‘Identity Politics, Reform and Protest in Jordan’, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11:3 (2011), p. 570.

⁶⁷⁴ Andrea Khalil, *Crowds and Politics in North Africa*, p. 26.

⁶⁷⁵ Allofjo, ‘Khafāyā wa Isrār Shabāb Adhār 24 wa ‘Itiṣām al-Dākhiliyyah’, *allofjo.net*, March 24, 2011, <http://www.allofjo.net/index.php?page=article&id=10108> (accessed October 18, 2016); video recordings may still be found on YouTube: YouTube, ‘Nashāma al-Urdun D’asou ‘ala Rous Ḥarakah 24 Adhār’, *Youtube.com*, July 22, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ-fzhcSvyQ> (accessed October 19, 2016). A glance at the comments is quite revealing.

⁶⁷⁶ YouTube, ‘Al-Darak Kisar Rous Shabāb Adhār 24’, *Youtube.com*, March 26, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1mE_4puvV4 (accessed October 19, 2016).

⁶⁷⁷ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

successful in rehabilitating the old cleavage between Jordanians of East Bank and Palestinian origins. 'I think' meditates Lina Ejeilat, who was present at the Circle, 'that was a serious blow to the protestors' insofar as 'the regime played it as Jordanian-Jordanians versus Palestinian-Jordanians which was not true at all. Anyone who was there knows it was not true. But that was the narrative'.⁶⁷⁸ The essence of this situation, in which a collective action is imbued with a meaning associated with debates about Jordanian identity, is not novel.

Jillian Schwedler observed a similar dynamic at play in the 1997 protests against the first Israeli trade fair. The riot police who were tasked with guarding the fair went from performing a role dictated to them by their superiors, to having their loyalty to the nation questioned by protestors. The riot police responded unorthodoxly by engaging in spontaneous traditional dances in front of the demonstration which enabled them to perform their loyalty and job simultaneously.⁶⁷⁹ Although the demonstrators assembled at *Duwar al-Dhakhliyyah* carried Jordanian flags, *shamags* and chanted loyalist slogans, there was no such reprieve for their display of national identity. In the aftermath spokespeople for the March 24 Movement blamed *mukhabarat* chief Muhammad Riqad for the clashes and the forcible dislodging of the sit-in.⁶⁸⁰ Then Interior Minister Yahya Surour declared in the aftermath that he 'will not tolerate sit-ins at Jamal Abd al-Nasser Square'.⁶⁸¹ Amid tensions Abdullah II stepped in with a letter published in the Jordanian newspapers the following week, calling on Prime Minister al-Bakhit to push on with the reform program. Despite royal intervention however marches persisted into April, though this time the police intervened to prevent violence between rival demonstrations in Amman,⁶⁸² and al-Zarqa. The atmosphere was different after March 24/25 however, as citizens who continued to demonstrate were looked on by some in society as disloyal.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁹ Jillian Schwedler, 'Cop Rock: Protest, Identity, and Dancing Riot Police in Jordan', *Social Movement Studies* 4:2 (2005), p. 166.

⁶⁸⁰ Muhammad al-Najār 'Itiṣām li-Ḥarakat Adhār 24 bil-Urdun', *aljazeera.net*, April 1, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/4/1/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-24-%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86> (accessed October 19, 2016); Allofjo, 'Khafāyā wa Isrār Shabāb Adhār 24'.

⁶⁸¹ Iyād al-Jaghbeer, 'Al-Sarour: Lan Asmaḥ Lil-'Itiṣām bil-Dakhliyyah..wa al-Majāli: La A'alim Idha Iḥtīfāl Afrād al-Amn ma' Masirah Nadā' Watan', *ammonnews.net*, March 26, 2011 <http://www.ammonnews.net/article/83610> (accessed October 20, 2016).

⁶⁸² Al-Jazeera, 'Jordanian Police Separate Rival Rallies', *Aljazeera.com*, April 2, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011411707284653.html> (accessed October 19, 2016).

Ejeilat notes that these protestors were verbally abused on morning radio talk shows for months afterward, and street sellers across the Kingdom almost like magic began selling (successfully too!) flags *en masse*. It was ‘as if the country had been under attack’ she says. ‘It was like after the Irbid raids or when the *Mukhabarat* headquarters in *al-Baq’a* was attacked and there was this over-expression of nationalistic feeling with flags and what-have-you’.⁶⁸³ The events are indicative of how domestic priorities and regional affiliations were weakening the ability of the reform movement to sustain a united front. In al-Zarqa skirmishes erupted between police officers and Salafi participants armed with sticks, knives and clubs. They had congregated in front of the main mosque, denouncing Jordan’s ties to the US, while calling for the implementation of the Shari’a.⁶⁸⁴ The ensuing events resulted in injuries to 83 police, and the arrest of 17 individuals, later expanding to 120.

By April 20 the *Mukhabarat*’s military prosecutor had filed charges of ‘terrorism, disturbance, assault, and unlawful gathering’ against a total of 230 citizens.⁶⁸⁵ Commenting in the aftermath of the clashes, Prime Minister al-Bakhit argued that the available evidence indicated that the individuals arrested were part of an ‘experienced armed organisation whose goal is to blow up the democratic process’.⁶⁸⁶ By the end of the year this would evolve into the largest terrorism trial hitherto in Jordan’s history. One hundred and fifty citizens (all of them members of the opposition with Islamists especially targeted) were charged under anti-terror legislation for their involvement.⁶⁸⁷ Christoph Wilcke, of Human Rights Watch (HRW) articulated concern not only with the sheer scale of the trial and its happening within the State Security Court to which there is no appeal, but with the imprudent use of evidence. Evaluating the prosecution, he states:

⁶⁸³ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

⁶⁸⁴ Al-Jazeera, ‘Clashes Erupt in Jordanian Town’, *Aljazeera.com*, April 16, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011415153839185473.html> (accessed October 19, 2016).

⁶⁸⁵ Christoph Wilcke, ‘The Flaws of Jordan’s Largest Terrorism Trial’, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, November 21, 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/21/flaws-of-jordan-s-largest-terrorist-trial/7ntc> (accessed October 21, 2016).

⁶⁸⁶ Imād Ghānim, ‘Itiqāl ‘Ashrāt al-Salafin al-Urdunin ‘ala Khalafīyyah Aḥdath al-Juma’ah’, *dw.com*, April 16, 2011, <http://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A9/a-14994600> (accessed October 20, 2016).

⁶⁸⁷ Christoph Wilcke, ‘The Flaws of Jordan’s Largest Terrorism Trial’.

'Could not substantiate charges of terrorism, let alone identify individual Salafi defendants as aggressors. Nonetheless, the prosecution contended that participation in a demonstration linked to violence—even if some time and distance away from the scene of the fight—was a terrorist offense, and it highlighted prior arrests or particular defendants' admissions that they indeed belonged to a "jihadi-Salafi" strand of Islam'.⁶⁸⁸

An almost casual application of what constitutes terrorist activity, he argued 'casts doubts' on Jordan's publicly declared commitment to the protection of citizen rights and freedoms, particularly of assembly, association and expression.⁶⁸⁹ In this light the flexibility with which accusations of terrorist activity could be employed is an early indication of the regime positioning itself so as to control the ongoing demonstrations more effectively; and by extension expressions of citizenship. Be that as it may, with protests continuing, the King was forced to address the nation, offering concessions including an acknowledgment that elected cabinets would be part of Jordan's reform agenda.⁶⁹⁰ Public frustration however was not so easily supplicated, as evidenced by an incident in the southern city of Tafileh in which the King's motorcade was hit by stones.⁶⁹¹

It was during this period that the al-Bakhit government established the National Dialogue Committee (NDC), which, under the direction of former Prime Minister Taher al-Masri, met between March and June 2011. Composed of 52 members from across Jordan's political spectrum, the NDC was charged with developing a program of political reform.⁶⁹² Phase one involved internal debate over potential reforms to three key laws: the electoral, municipal and political parties; that frame much of citizen involvement in the political process. Following this, NDC members were dispatched to local communities across all the governorates to acquire public

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ YouTube, 'King Abdullah II speech to nation (12 June 2011) - Part 1', *Youtube.com*, June 21, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S4IT_ZENT08 (accessed October 19, 2016; *see also* Jamal Halaby, 'Jordan's King Bows to Demand for Elected Cabinets', *Associated Press*, June 12, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43371651/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/jordans-king-bows-demand-elected-cabinets/ (accessed May 10, 2015).

⁶⁹¹ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016. Official accounts deny the attack, claiming contrastingly that it was an accident brought about by the frustration of crowds who thronged to see the King.

⁶⁹² Rana Sweiss, 'Jordan Tries to Remake its Political Machinery', *nytimes.com*, June 8, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09iht-M09-JORDAN.html> (accessed May 11, 2015).

suggestion, with the ultimate declared aim of reaching a consensual trajectory forward. One of its innate limitations however was that the NDC existed strictly on an advisory only basis, and thus its final recommendations remained in essence proposals that could be rejected.

This was fundamental to the design of the process, to make it one of dialogue rather than action. Taher al-Masri was overheard saying at a latter event that the regime never wanted to take the process too far, and hence the committee was established in order to discuss solutions without having the necessity to at the end enact them.⁶⁹³ Perhaps this is why another limitation of the dialogue process concerned the division of labour following the King's inauguration of a Royal Committee to reform the constitution in April 2011.⁶⁹⁴ All ten members of this Committee were royal appointees, and were answerable to the King rather than to citizens. As such, there was no citizen involvement in the process of selecting which articles ought to be amended. Ergo, the citizenry was excluded from the process.

The Committee announced its findings on 14 August, which were subsequently sent to the parliament for approval.⁶⁹⁵ All were passed via majority except for a handful, including the suggestion to lower candidacy age for general elections from 30 to 25. If the government was serious about engaging young Jordanians in formal institutions this was a lost opportunity. Former minister and reform advocate Marwan Muasher, in analysing the subsequent recommendations highlighted six of particular significance: the creation of a constitutional court; establishing an Independent Election Commission (IEC) to take over the running of the electoral process from the Ministry of Interior; placing restrictions on the jurisdiction of the State Security Court (SSC) to espionage, terrorism and high treason cases; general strengthening of civil liberties, including prohibition on torture; tying the dissolution of the government with the dissolution of parliament;

⁶⁹³ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

⁶⁹⁴ Abdullah ibn al-Hussein, 'Risālat Jalālah al-Malik Abdullah al-Thāni ila Ahmad al-Lauzi Yu'ahid ilayho fiha bi-Ri'āsh Lajnah Malikiyah Mukallifah bi-Murāj'ah Naşuş al-Dustour', 26 April 2011, accessible at:

<https://kingabdullah.jo/ar/letters/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%83%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A9> (accessed May 11, 2015).

⁶⁹⁵ CNN, 'Jordan Mulls Constitutional Reform to Weaken King, Boost Protections', *cnn.com*, August 19, 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/08/14/jordan.constitutional.reform/> (accessed May 12, 2015).

and lastly, reducing the scope for governments to enact *temporary legislation* following the dissolution of parliament.⁶⁹⁶

Establishing a constitutional court is significant in institutionalising distinction between the legislative and judicial branches of government. Prior to its creation, matters pertaining to the interpretation of law were handled by a high tribunal headed by the sitting Senate Speaker. This situation, Muasher notes, was ‘widely considered less than totally independent’.⁶⁹⁷ The Senate Speaker, like his co-senators, is royally appointed and accountable to the monarch, not to the government or the wider citizenry. Analogously, a key function of the IEC was to take electoral disputes out of parliament, and into the realm of the judiciary to act as the sole arbitrator. Over time this will improve confidence in the electoral system because the Interior Ministry, which historically has been involved in vote fraud,⁶⁹⁸ will no longer have an organisational role in elections. Yet at the same time, the reforms were indicative of some profound limitations. With regards to gender discrimination, the Royal committee’s recommendations stopped short of nominating gender as a category to be added to Article 6 of the constitution which forbids discrimination based on religion, language and ethnic origin, ‘for religious and political reasons’.⁶⁹⁹

In terms of the locus of power within the political architecture, the recommendations stopped short of limiting the King’s hold over the executive, as he may still appoint and dismiss prime ministers along with the entirety of the Senate at will. Although he has spoken of consulting parliament and in time appointing prime ministers from among the largest party or bloc represented in the parliament, there remains no detailed time-line of when this will be implemented, and what milestones need to be acquired in order for this to become standard practice. It would come to light in time that ‘the amendments failed to protect government and parliament from interference from

⁶⁹⁶ Marwan Muasher, ‘Jordan’s Proposed Constitutional Amendments—A First Step in the Right Direction’, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, August 17, 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/17/jordan-s-proposed-constitutional-amendments-first-step-in-right-direction-pub-45366> (accessed May 06, 2015).

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer), interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid. In a subsequent chapter we consider the inability for Jordanian mothers married to non-Jordanian men to transfer their citizenship to their children, in detail.

unelected institutions such as the intelligence apparatus or the Royal Court'.⁷⁰⁰ While consisting of a substantial revision of the constitution, the changes did little to address the socio-economic demands of demonstrators, underscoring the complexity of the Jordanian uprisings and the struggle to aggregate disparate opposition groups and their agendas.

For Larbi Sadiki, the situation resembled a King's dilemma, giving Abdullah II two options. He could either lead an agenda of deep systemic reform, or risk being overtaken by the march of popular demands for genuine reform. Predicated on two assumptions, Sadiki elaborates that unilateral top-down reform is no longer a possibility for regimes, owing to the internal 'rot' within them, which has reduced their capacity to respond with any real adequacy to their people.⁷⁰¹ A ramification is that honesty and subsequently trust remain enduring obstacles, because of the absence of citizenship ownership and accountability, which are supplanted by regime expediency. For example, Sadiki refers to the passing into law of Law No.23 of 2012, which was drafted as a sign of the government's addressing widespread concerns about rampant corruption. Although the law demonstrates some promise, it simultaneously comes with a sting. If a defamation case can be sustained by one accused of corruption, the journalist or the individual who brought the allegation to life can find themselves facing a thirty to forty thousand Jordanian Dinars fine.⁷⁰² This is a substantial impediment to investigative journalism, and therefore, of the media's ability to inform and empower the citizenry.

This utilising of existing legal and bureaucratic channels reflects continuity with the 'web of disincentives' identified by Wiktorowicz at the beginning of the century.⁷⁰³ Vogt, although not referencing king's dilemma in his analysis, reveals a sympathetic perspective. According to which, Abdullah II retains the ability to shape political outcomes through managing the reform process, that at this stage of 2011 appears credibly to be inevitable. A key part of the dilemma is, as highlighted above, that the opposition is a kaleidoscope of organisations and currents 'whose

⁷⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan* (International Crisis Group, 2012), p. 22.

⁷⁰¹ Larbi Sadiki, 'En Passant in Jordan: The king's Dilemma', *Aljazeera.com*, February 29, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/2012225104354937565.html> (accessed January 15, 2015); Achim Vogt, 'Jordan's Eternal Promise of Reform', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 4 (2011), p. 64.

⁷⁰² Larbi Sadiki, 'En Passant in Jordan'. Approximately sixty to eighty thousand (\$AUS).

⁷⁰³ Quintain Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 14.

extremely divergent positions, demands and expectations are hard to merge' into a coherent national agenda.⁷⁰⁴ It is unsurprising that protests continued across the country, resulting in the King intervening for the second time in 2011 to remove a sitting Prime Minister.

Al-Bakhit's exit ushered the entrance of Awn al-Khasawneh, who had previously served as an elected member of the International Court of Justice. Ideologically, while al-Bakhit was a known regime loyalist and conservative, al-Khasawneh was considered more progressive, and his legal background gave reformers hope of further advancements in that area. Despite this, the year ended much like it began with marches and rallying calls including in the northern towns of Ramtha and Mafraq.⁷⁰⁵ By comparison, the first half of 2012 was if not quieter than its predecessor, at the least more predictable. Protests persisted in localities across the Kingdom. And yet what became clear as the year advanced was how in the face of the worsening situation in Syria and the increasing number of displaced Syrians crossing into Jordan, a discourse of stability and security began to overwhelm the voices of reform.⁷⁰⁶

Within the government there emerged a factional interplay, which resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister al-Khasawneh on April 26 after only six months in the role. Of particular interest was that he tendered his resignation while abroad, believing his authority to have been undercut by more conservative forces (believed to be) aligned with the Palace. At the centre of the circumstances were differences concerning Jordan's reform trajectory, its speed, and the extent to which citizens should be allowed to participate in elections.⁷⁰⁷ Since becoming Prime Minister, al-Khasawneh had been in negotiations with the opposition, especially with the Muslim Brotherhood, over proposed changes to the electoral law. The Brotherhood would not contend with anything less than the total rescindment of the SNTV, which was unacceptable to the government (and by this I also include the broader regime). Al-Khasawneh's compromise was to replace the SNTV with a new model of three votes per voter, and he sought to utilize the full extent of his prime ministerial mandate to negotiate consensus.

⁷⁰⁴ Achim Vogt, 'Jordan's Eternal Promise of Reform', p. 61.

⁷⁰⁵ The latter case another manifestation of pro-regime loyalists clashing with demonstrators, this time associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Anonymous, 'Riots break out in Northern Jordan over Detainee Death', *Azer News*, November 20, 2011, <http://en.trend.az/world/arab/1959399.html> (accessed January 16, 2015).

⁷⁰⁶ Emblematic of this was the establishment of the Zaatari refugee camp in the Mafraq Governorate in July 2012.

⁷⁰⁷ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

The King however, who later criticized al-Khasawneh for the sluggish pace of reform during his tenure, desired an expeditious solution. The Palace summoned the deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior, calling on them to sign a royal decree extending the parliamentary session so that the draft election law (sustaining the SNTV) could be approved. Their signature was required, given the presence of the Prime Minister abroad, and it was reported in the Press that the two ‘were given a dire choice of either sign the document or choose their boss (al-Khasawneh) over the King’.⁷⁰⁸ They chose the former. In the vacant role, Abdullah II appointed Fayez al-Tarawneh, a known conservative and anti-reformist, to his second tenure as Prime Minister. The appointment was indicative of the regime’s growing confidence in being able to control the reformist movements in the Kingdom.

Analogous with the role of price increases in January 2011 as a catalyst for the uprisings’ beginning, so too did proposed increases to fuel prices result in calls for al-Tarawneh’s resignation. On September 1 activists in Amman and Ma’an demonstrated, calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister following the introduction of a 10% increase on prices. Although not targeting the monarch directly, participants aimed their frustration at the Palace, chanting ‘the Royal Palace is standing between the people and their rights’.⁷⁰⁹ Facing the opposition, and the increasing frequency at which the Palace and individuals close to the monarchy were becoming targets of resentment, Abdullah II moved to suspend the full implementation of the increase. But in a move highlighting the connections between socio-economic conditions and political mobilization in Jordan, sit-ins and marches persisted into the following week. One such occurrence in Tafileh was stormed by riot police after it was reported that participants were chanting slogans against the king.⁷¹⁰

Nevertheless, the decision by the King to hold elections in January 2013 without any significant changes to the election law demonstrated the persistence of confidence on the part of

⁷⁰⁸ Ali Younes, ‘The struggle for power in Jordan’, *Al-Arabiya*, May 01, 2012, <https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/05/01/211469.html> (October 07, 2014).

⁷⁰⁹ Anonymous, ‘Jordanians Protest Fuel Price Hike’, *Azer News*, September 02, 2012, <https://en.trend.az/world/arab/2060982.html> (accessed January 15, 2015).

⁷¹⁰ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

decision-makers that popular disgruntlement could be managed. What was concerning for decision-makers however was the state of the budget, with an estimated 3.5 billion (\$US) being added to the total deficit for 2012.⁷¹¹ In the face of pressure from the IMF, and indirectly from domestic constituents whose pieces of the budgetary pie could not be touched, the government began to propose ways of tackling the debt crisis by either devaluing the dinar, therein removing its “pegged” status with the US dollar, or cancelling the program of gas and commodity subsidies.⁷¹² Annually, Jordan had been allocating almost a quarter of its budget to subsidisation schemes,⁷¹³ and the IMF for its part was refusing to release the next stage of a loan agreement worth 2 billion (\$US) until the government had demonstrated a commitment to subsidy removal. Turbulence in the Sinai, resulting in the bombing of a crucial gas supply line to Jordan, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia’s declination to gift the country a further capital boost of 1.4 billion (\$US), meant that wholesale fuel subsidisation was proceeding to beyond untenable. Therefore, on November 13, Prime Minister Ensour, who had replaced al-Tarawneh in October, announced a lifting of commodity subsidisation, securing the IMF funds. In percent terms the consequent increases were substantial, with bottled gas increasing 50%, diesel and kerosene 33%, and lower quality petrol 14%.⁷¹⁴

As early as that evening, demonstrations against the price increases materialised across the country in Ajloun, Amman, Aqaba, Dhiban, Irbid, Karak, Mafraq, Shobak and Tafileh. In each locality demonstrators in the spontaneity exhibited several commonalities in terms of the locations within the cities/towns where they congregated, and the targets of their frustrations. In Salt and Tafileh for example, police vehicles were torched, In Karak and Ma’an roads were blockaded, including the desert highway, and a petrol station was set ablaze in Irbid.⁷¹⁵ Where government buildings were present, marches moved towards them, and in Salt’s cases these included the house of Prime Minister Ensour. The Gendarmerie forces for their part sought to set-up positions in front of or around key buildings in order to prevent the demonstrators from reaching them, and used

⁷¹¹ Reuters Agency, ‘Update 2 - Jordan Lifts Fuel Subsidies, Sparks Protests’, *Reuters*, November 14, 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/jordan-gasoline-prices-idUSL5E8MDCKK20121113> (accessed October 06, 2015).

⁷¹² Al-Monitor, ‘Jordan Budget Choices’, *al-monitor.com*, October, 2012, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/jordan-budget-choices.html> (accessed October 12, 2015).

⁷¹³ Reuters Agency, ‘Update 2’. Equating to some 2.3 billion (\$US) per annum.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁵ Ammonnews, ‘Violent Riots, Protests, Looting Erupt in Protest of Price Hikes’, *ammonnews.net*, <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=19016> (accessed October 10, 2015).

rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse them.⁷¹⁶ Actions of this variety were not novel in the Jordanian experience of 2011/2012. What was novel however was articulation of frustration targeting the King as much as the sitting government. One demonstration in front of the Interior Ministry remembered by an activist for illustration demonstrates the speed with which the security services, followed by the law act in the face of royal criticism:

'I can't remember exactly but it was in 2012 in front of the Ministry of Interior to protest against the arrest of these activists. And there is this one guy, who was you know I would say he was stupid because that protest barely had 30 or 40 people, and if you were unable to gather more than 40 people to protest the arrest of activists you don't stand up there and say yasqut isqut hukm 'ada'iy you're going straight to the king when you have nobody to take your back. He said that and there were police and gendarmerie surrounding the protest and all of a sudden there was this tension, the police closed and said in effect "ok everybody time to go home" ...and as the protest was winding down – this is amazing – you had this big gendarmerie van park close by and just as people were starting to leave – it was very surreal - they grabbed the guy super quickly and that was it he was arrested. This was the guy who was charged with attempting to change the constitution'.⁷¹⁷

Of interest here is the affirmation made in public about the centrality of the monarch not only in decision-making, but equally by implication in corrupt practices. This is significant inasmuch as it illuminates a key problem facing political parties and other associations within the opposition, whether official or alternative, in discussing 'the *legitimacy* of political authority in Jordan'.⁷¹⁸ Both have generally operated on the assumption that 'the head of the political system to be some sort of moderating sage. This is despite the fact that constitutionally he is indeed the

⁷¹⁶ Ibid.

⁷¹⁷ Lina Ejeilat (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com), interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016; Max Fischer, 'Protests Break out in Jordan, Mention King by Name', *The Washington Post*, November 13, 2012, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2012/11/13/protests-break-out-in-jordan-mention-king-by-name/> (accessed October 10, 2015) reported a similar claim: 'Oh Abdallah, Listen up, Change and Reform, it's going to happen, it's going to happen. Oh, Abdallah son of Hussien, where did the people's money go? There's those stealing millions, and the rest eating plain bread. If prices go up, we'll sleep in the circle, and the country will light on fire. Freedom is from God, in spite of you Abdallah'.

⁷¹⁸ Hisham Bustani, 'The Alternative Opposition in Jordan'.

head of three centers of power'.⁷¹⁹ Protests persisted over the following two days in Irbid, Salt, Amman, Karak and Ma'an with a range in the number of participants from several hundred to an estimated 2000 participants in Amman.⁷²⁰ Similar with the previous day, police stations and other symbols of government control were targeted. This was not without consequences, as the death of Qais Omari in Irbid attests. Local police argued he was a gunman who had used the demonstrations at a police station to cause trouble, an accusation vehemently denied by his family.⁷²¹ Once more, the King became a target of derision for his role in the trajectory of the Kingdom over the past decade, underscoring that although only articulated by a minority of demonstrators, was nonetheless not isolated to a single locality.⁷²²

A week later a congregation formed in front of the Royal Court in Amman, and slogans including 'we are no longer slaves' and 'overthrow the regime' were chanted.⁷²³ Alongside this, a new youth led movement, called "The November Uprising" emerged, calling for the wider public to join the demonstrations in order to end the 'era of absolute monarchy'.⁷²⁴ Similar with the previously quoted passage, it is important to note the content of the utterance in-conjunction with the location. Illuminating the links between public recognition of what goes on in their country, and the relative absence of accountability with the citizen-subject dialectic along the spectrum. Late in the month, the Brotherhood had attempted to establish a semi-permanent sit-in at the *Dakhliyyah Circle*, similar to the one attempted by the March 24 Youth. The regime responded by installing military personnel, barriers and vehicles on location, while the Interior Ministry announced that all protest action there would be banned.⁷²⁵ Demonstrations planned for November

⁷¹⁹ Ibid.

⁷²⁰ BBC, 'Jordan Protesters Take to Streets Over Fuel Price Rises', *BBC*, November 14, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20321086> (accessed October 12, 2015) and 'Jordan Police Kill 'Gunman' Amid Fuel Price Unrest', *BBC*, November 15, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20335287> (accessed October 12, 2015).

⁷²¹ Dale Gavlak, 'Political and Economic Problems Fuel Jordan Protests', *BBC*, November 16, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20357743> (accessed October 12, 2015).

⁷²² Ibid.

⁷²³ Al-monitor, 'Jordanian Protesters Shift call for Regime's Downfall', *al-monitor.com*, November, 2012, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/11/jordanian-protesters-shift-call-for-regimes-downfall.html> (accessed October 14, 2015). Marches also materialised for the first time in a number of Palestinian refugee camps: Balqa', al-Hussein (central Amman) and Azmi Mufti (Irbid)

⁷²⁴ Al-monitor, 'Jordan in Lockdown as Protests Set to Rock Capital', *al-monitor.com*, November, 2012 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/11/jordan-in-lockdown-protests-set-to-rock-capital.html> (accessed October 14, 2015).

⁷²⁵ Al-monitor, 'Jordanian Protesters Shift call for Regime's Downfall'.

30, to which momentum appeared to be indicating would prove decisive for the leverage of the opposition specifically, and citizens more generally, proved a disappointment. Insofar as the critical mass which many opposition advocates including the Brotherhood had been endeavouring to draw onto the streets failed to materialise.

5.3 : Constitutional Amendments & Royal Discussion Papers – Reapplying the Shackles?

*‘Citizenship can be both domination and empowerment separately or simultaneously’.*⁷²⁶

‘Selective inclusion and exclusion’ argues Schwedler, ‘are tried and true mechanisms for regime preservation’ regardless of regime type. Subsequently, she continues ‘one of the most powerful mechanisms for structuring public political space is drawing the boundary between inclusion and exclusion, a practice dominated by state elites’.⁷²⁷ In light of the previous discussion I now wish to consider some of the ways in which the dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion has been utilised for the purposes of regime consolidation, rather than addressing the legitimate demands for greater ownership and accountability by citizens. The two nominated here: the royal discussion papers of Abdullah II, and a series of constitutional amendments enacted in 2014 and 2016, aside from being unequivocally part of the regime response to the uprisings, both involved citizenship and the search by citizens for ownership and accountability directly.

The discussion papers, the first five of which are the focus here due to their reform-focused content, were published between 2012 and 2016. Although receiving a generally muted response from a public that has become increasingly apathetic to royal public relations campaigns,⁷²⁸ the papers are nevertheless worthy of analysis as a foil of comparison with the acts of citizenship

⁷²⁶ Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux’, p. 369.

⁷²⁷ Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, p. 78.

⁷²⁸ Jumana Ghunaimat (Editor *al-Ghad* newspaper), interview with author, Amman, April 18, 2016, and Faraj Tomayaz (Secretary, The Jordanian Communist Party) interview with the author, Amman, April 26, 2016. Both had little to say concerning two previous royal campaigns: Jordan First and We are all Jordan. The exception being the sixth discussion paper, which published in the wake of Nahed Hattar’s assassination, received considerable attention.

detailed above. Published in Arabic before being translated into English, the papers were designed for domestic consumption. And I argue, are optimally read as an attempt at (re)framing the post-uprisings discussion about political reform, for they ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text...through repetition or by associating them culturally familiar symbols’.⁷²⁹

In light of the muted response some of the papers received in the public sphere, questions may be raised concerning the success of these papers in this enterprise. However, they remain useful subjects of analysis in the way they frame and advance the analogy of citizenship. In so doing, the papers convey the impression that it is citizen inaction and use of subnational identities that is the chief impediment to Jordan’s democratic trajectory, a suggestion seemingly contradicted by the events of 2011/2012. Subsequently, although neither policies nor laws, but rather calls to action, the papers indicate something of a continuation of the very policies of political liberalisation described by Schwedler.

Abdullah II’s first discussion paper ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy’,⁷³⁰ published 29 December 2012, came in the wake of three important developments: Abdullah Ensour’s appointment as Prime Minister in October, replacing Fayez al-Tarawneh in the process; the November demonstrations against the Ensour Government’s decision to remove subsidies on commodities; and the decision to hold elections in January 2013, concerning which the Muslim Brotherhood had already signalled its decision to boycott. Befitting this immediate context against the wider background of the uprisings initiated the year before, the King focuses his attention on the upcoming election campaign. Specifically, elaborating on four ‘essential’ principles and practices that are necessary in order to develop a democratic order in the Kingdom: respect of difference in opinions, the exercise of accountability, understanding that dialogue and consensus constitute ‘a persistent national duty’, and recognition that all citizens are ‘partners in sacrifice and gain’.⁷³¹

⁷²⁹ Robert Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, *Journal of Communication* 43:4 (1993), pp. 52-53.

⁷³⁰ Accessible on the King’s Website. Note the title referenced here is that of the official English translation, all other citations unless otherwise specified are the author’s own translations.

⁷³¹ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy’, December 29, 2012, available at www.kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers/ (accessed June 22, 2016).

In articulating the necessity for respect of different opinions within the public sphere, the King employs a combination of familial and civic discursive analogies. For instance, he asserts all Jordanians (*jinsiyyah* holders) are ‘equal brothers and sisters’ within the one family, using a trope with substantial historical pedigree in Hashemite discourse.⁷³² Abdullah II has over the course of his reign regularly spoken of the Jordanian family with himself positioned as the metaphorical father. This has importantly -when necessary- adopted a tribal flavouring, with the Jordanian nation likened to a tribe, with the King its paramour sheikh.⁷³³ Simultaneously, the familial is contextualised by the nation-state, for the brothers and sisters of the family ‘are all Jordanians and all of us are Jordan’.⁷³⁴ Although as in a family each member performs different functions to varying degrees of proficiency, all are united in their kin-based partnership; so too are citizens in Abdullah II’s Jordan. Hence, ensuring the unity of the political community (the state) is more important than the differences that exist between citizen members.⁷³⁵

As such the use of familial symbols and language underscores, or at least indicates, why consensus and dialogue are conceived of as incessant national duties. In so-called transitioning societies from one form or another of overtly centralised or authoritarian rule to democracy, the transition can be problematic. Fissures and disagreements over decision-making that can be contained within democratic institutions may not be so easily balanced and accommodated in situations where established patterns of behaviour within and between institutions and actors are being altered.⁷³⁶ And the Kings alludes to this by recognising that ‘the circle of respect and mutual trust’ between citizens must be expanded.⁷³⁷

This is not disputed by political and civil society activists. Muhammad Hussainy instructively notes ‘there is a mutual fear in Jordanian society, different groups are afraid of each

⁷³² Ibid; Schirin H. Fathi, *Jordan – An Invented Nation?*, pp. 128, 175.

⁷³³ Jordan Times, ‘Jordan is One Tribe, My Tribe – the King’, *Jordan Times*, August 06, 2017, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-one-tribe-my-tribe-%E2%80%94-king>, (accessed August 06, 2017).

⁷³⁴ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy’.

⁷³⁵ Ibid.

⁷³⁶ Larry Diamond (ed.) *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

⁷³⁷ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy’.

other...that is why we didn't go too far with our demands'.⁷³⁸ He explains that the existence of mutual suspicions underpins domestic support for the monarchy which is seen 'as the safety key or network'.⁷³⁹ Outside of institutional politics, these fears and suspicions operate additionally on a more societal level. In mid-2016 a car accident on Amman's airport road tragically cut short the life of a young Jordanian boy. This boy had recently been starring on the latest season of a popular television talent show in which he had been performing guitar to the live audience. Ru'ya TV which owned the license to the show ran a news story on the tragedy. When it soon came to light that the boy was Christian, 'it started this argument' said Rana Sweiss: 'do we [as Muslims] send condolences or not?' it soon developed into 'a whole discussion all over social media: no, we don't send condolences, no we do send condolences; is it allowed is it not allowed? This was something that had not been discussed before'.⁷⁴⁰

The state, and by extension the regime is implicated in this development argues Sweiss through 'decades of a deteriorating education system and an increasing lack of tolerance', creating 'a belief that diversity is a bad thing'. This, intersecting with the widespread availability of anonymity facilitated by social media made it easier for thoughts and ideas harmful to the body politic to be disseminated, to the extent that Jordan's Mufti was forced to publicly declare that sending condolences was permitted.⁷⁴¹ Thus the King is correct in arguing that the citizenry has some ground to cover internalising the respect/dialogue dyad and reproducing it socially producing compromise in turn resulting in 'agreeable solutions' (*ḥaloul al-tawāfiqiyyah*) to collective concerns.⁷⁴² However completely absent is any suggestion that the architecture of the state directly influences the kind of political and social subjectivities that have encouraged the production and reproduction of mutual suspicions and fears.

Marwan Muasher recognises this point, expounding how in both Arab republics and monarchies including Jordan, 'a culture of allegiance' rendered diversity and disagreement in negative terms, resulting in the creation of a generation 'raised on the notion that allegiance to the

⁷³⁸ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

⁷³⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁰ Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist), interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

⁷⁴² Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy'.

country meant allegiance to the party, system, or leader; and suggesting that diversity, critical thinking, and individual differences were treasonous'.⁷⁴³ In contemporary Jordan, Rana Sweiss affirms 'people here in Jordan...created a citizenship with loyalty today which means that security trumps everything, it's the most important thing and that's it. Loyalty means you keep your thoughts to yourself, you keep anything that is critical to yourself because now is not the time'.⁷⁴⁴ Our discussions however argue this conception of loyalty has run its course, especially as to an increasing number of Jordanians the state to which they are citizens has ceased being responsive and attentive to their needs and expectations. Becoming unaccountable to them in the process and inducing a corresponding reciprocity of apathy on their part, towards the state.

Given the exegesis on citizenship in chapter two, accountability, while appearing self-evident at first glance, cannot in reality, be assumed owing to the existence of Citizens as hyphenated subjects. Accountability manifests itself in various ways in Abdullah II's argument. Requiring on the one hand, a 'questioning of those who occupy positions of responsibility', combined with civic engagement and partnership on the other. So that via 'purposeful discussions and dialogue' issues faced by families, communities and the nation itself may be resolved.⁷⁴⁵ Each of these however means little in the absence of reciprocity from state institutions. When Farah Maraqa states 'citizenship in Jordan means almost nothing' it is largely because the capacities of citizens to perform their citizenship, without resorting to subnational identities, is profoundly restricted by the nature of state institutions.⁷⁴⁶

At the heart of the matter is how to define citizenship and the acceptable behaviours associated with it. The King developed a model of 'attentive/conscious and responsible citizens' (*al-muwātanun al-wā'aun wa al-mas'ulun*) to describe those Jordanians who engage in the following practices. They 'follow (*yatāba'aun*) the media bearing in mind truth and objectivity' when evaluating the content of news messages regardless of media platform. In association, they 'interact' (*yatafā'ilun*) with their fellow citizens in expressing different opinions, maintaining the familial cordiality already outlined as requisite for respecting diversity of opinion. More than intra-

⁷⁴³ Marwan Muasher, *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 256.

⁷⁴⁴ Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist), interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

⁷⁴⁵ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy'.

⁷⁴⁶ Farah Maraqa, (Journalist with *Rai al-Youm*), interview with the author, Amman September 11, 2016.

citizenry debate, responsible citizens ‘communicate’ (*yatawāsilun*) actively with their parliamentary representatives, ‘following’ and evaluating answers to given questions. Armed with these, citizens are called to take the initiative ‘to organise themselves on the local level’, adopting ‘unified’ or consensual positions in their efforts ‘towards solutions to local problems’.⁷⁴⁷

This is what Abdullah II refers to when he speaks of citizens exercising accountability, without which their citizenship is incomplete. Within this articulation, consent is implicitly projected as a precondition for the exercise of accountability. In order to interact respectfully with fellow citizens irrespective of origin, class or religion, requires a consenting to the principle that you and they share a fundamental status and identity within the political community. Communicating with members of parliament similarly requires not only consent to the existence of a parliament, but also to the processes, such as elections, through which individuals become members of that institution. Respect for these processes will in turn engender confidence in the practice of asking and critiquing MPs on their performance. Inextricably, this is conditional on the realities of institutional performance and the perceptions they generate on the ground.

Each of these is significant in facilitating inter-citizen trust and on a wider scale a civic national culture. However, when considered as they are by Abdullah II in isolation from existing institutional arrangements, which over decades have produced and continue to reproduce behaviours and mutual suspicion antithetical to civility, they remain hollow. Lending further support to Maraqa and Sweiss’ contention about the absence of reciprocity, which is a clear signal that citizens do possess a sufficient degree of power-over their representatives in order for these actions (following, communicating etc.) to lead to tangible changes in their livelihoods in the absence of contentious politics.

The King’s second discussion paper ‘Making Our Democratic System Work for all Jordanians’ was released a week prior to the January 23rd poll, and understandably continues the thematic focus of its predecessor, but with an acute focusing in on the transition to parliamentary government. However, it does so in context of voter disillusionment with electoral politics,⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴⁷ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy’.

⁷⁴⁸ Dale Gavlak, ‘Jordan Election: Risks of Not Changing’, *BBC*, January 22, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21147461> (accessed April 18, 2016).

justifiable in light of the details of the 2012 Elections Law, which was viewed as a step-backward from the rhetoric of reform espoused in August 2011. The August recommendations suggested reducing the candidacy age from thirty to twenty-five, in order to allow younger Jordanians to better access the political system. However, Article 10 of the 2012 Law preserved the minimum candidacy age of thirty, and whenever reducing the age has been put before parliament since, it has been rejected.⁷⁴⁹ More demonstrably is the maintenance (in essence) of the SNTV, which was an instrumental reason behind the Muslim Brotherhood's boycotting of the elections.⁷⁵⁰ The government did however allow voters a second vote in a general national list, alongside their district-bounded vote.⁷⁵¹

The King dedicated time to the role of political parties in the transition to democracy and specifically to a model of parliamentary government. He begins by emphasising the centrality of the Constitution to the process of democratisation as 'the foundation of political and democratic life' in the Kingdom, maintaining that it guarantees the separation of powers and 'safeguards' the rights of citizens.⁷⁵² Jordanian analysts however, have commented that this so-called guaranteed separation has been rendered precarious by the 2014 and 2016 constitutional amendments. Recent history of policy-making pours water over any suggestion of a rigid separation between powers and institutions. Explicitly, 'policy is decided by the Royal Palace, but in the past policy making used to be in the hands of the Prime Minister and ministers with communication and understanding with the King. Now no, I don't think so'.⁷⁵³

Such has repercussions on the short and mid-term opportunities to develop political parties capable of performing a meaningful role in government decision-making, operating as a conduit between decision-makers and the voting citizenry to whom they would be accountable. Since 1993 when they were legalized once more in Jordan, political parties have been organised more around

⁷⁴⁹ Jordanian Government, Election Law (No.25) of 2012, Art. 10; Art. 12 furthermore stipulates that all candidates are required to pay a non-refundable fee of 500 dinars, a cost which is beyond many to bear.

⁷⁵⁰ Paul M. Esber, 'The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Democratisation and the Dilemmas of Internal Organisational Reform: Seeking Unity, Finding Division?' In John L. Esposito, Lily Z. Rahim and Naser Ghobadzadeh (eds.) *The Politics of Islamism: Diverging Visions and Trajectories* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018): 217-242.

⁷⁵¹ Jordanian Government, Election Law (No.25) of 2012, Art. 8.

⁷⁵² Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Making Our Democratic System Work for all Jordanians', November 16, 2013, available at www.kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers (accessed June 22, 2016).

⁷⁵³ Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer), interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016.

individuals than ideologies or policy programs, with a possible exception being the Islamic Action Front.⁷⁵⁴ A shift in the way parties are established, organised and are mobilised, is essential to Jordan's reform trajectory, because 'the essential principle of modern democracies' is the practice of citizens choosing their representatives who partake in decision making on their behalf.⁷⁵⁵ Parties perform a significant function in aggregating interests into a policy program, the merits of which can be debated internally through party structures and forums, and externally via elections.

In order for this to happen, the environment needs to be receptive, requiring action not only at the citizen, but additionally the government and regime levels. It is here where once more the citizen search for ownership and accountability is impeded. A particularly bright light is shone on this via a brief comparison between civil society organisations and political parties in Jordan. When asked about the reasons for choosing to pursue youth activism via a civil society organisation instead of existing channels of institutional politics, Sami Hourani presents a forthright rationale: flexibility. In order to develop *Leaders of Tomorrow* into 'an entity for young educated Jordanians to have the freedom to express themselves and serve their communities',⁷⁵⁶ civil society despite its limitations offered more options than the route of a political party:

'Once you are registered as a political party it goes straight to the Mukhabarat and you will be obstructed at every turn. Agents will be with you from the beginning. As a civil society organisation, you do not receive the same attention. At least you can move. For instance, what we do with Diwaniyyah it is a purely political party thing, and would be great for political parties to hold such public debates. If you look at Forsa it is a great platform that political parties could adapt. All of our main platforms are like that. But then the Mukhabarat would get involved'.⁷⁵⁷

This is not to say that interference from the intelligence services does not occur. In recent years *Diwaniyyah* has proven to be increasingly difficult to host and a number of planned events in 2016 were cancelled with permission revoked in the hours beforehand. *Diwaniyyah* is a forum-

⁷⁵⁴ Wael Abu Anzeh, (Economic researcher), interview with the author, Amman September 03, 2016.

⁷⁵⁵ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Making Our Democratic System Work for all Jordanians'.

⁷⁵⁶ Sami Hourani (Founder & Director Leaders of Tomorrow), interview with the author, Amman, May 18, 2016.

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid.

style event in which speakers are invited to address crowd of young Jordanians (some up to three hundred strong), and field questions from them about a range of topics on which they are versed. It aims ‘to develop citizenship through social engagement at the grassroots and advocates for the rights of the citizen to hold decision-makers to account’. Subsequently it is designed to be ‘very confronting’ for the speaker because ‘we want an MP, a minister or university head to be accountable to the grass roots in that space’.⁷⁵⁸ Unsurprisingly then, the platform and its organisers have been banned, faced interrogation and had permission (required to hold such a gathering a public place) revoked.⁷⁵⁹

This stands in stark contrast to the implication that underpins the King’s argument concerning the reasons behind party weakness. In it, the wider institutional environments in which political parties operate is currently sufficient in facilitating the aforementioned movement away from character-centric organisation, towards policy platforms and ideas on a national level. By extension, fault for the poor health of party politics in Jordan is levelled at the citizenry. Accordingly, this carries airs of a pseudo-Tocquevillian position in that it appears as though it is the calibre ‘of the people as citizens which ultimately determined the quality of public and political life’.⁷⁶⁰

Principles established as necessary for democratisation in the first discussion paper return in the third paper ‘Each Playing Our Part in a New Democracy’, published a few months after the January poll. In it the King outlines in some detail the roles he envisages political parties, the parliament, Ministers and Cabinet, the Monarchy, and citizens having in Jordan’s democratic transition. The role of the monarch is to guarantee that nothing either internally or externally undermines national unity (*al-wiḥdah al-wataniyyah*), pluralism (*al-ta’dudiyyah*), openness (*al-infithah*), moderation (*al-’itidal*), and tolerance (*al-tasameh*), which for the King ‘fundamentally’ shape the Jordanian political community.⁷⁶¹ Parliament meanwhile functions to hold the governments to account, denoting in theory that governments are accountable to the parliament,

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Axel Hadenius, *Institutions and Democratic Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 4.

⁷⁶¹ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Each Playing Our Part in a New Democracy’, March 02, 2013, available at www.kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers (accessed June 22, 2016).

which for its part is accountable to the citizens who elected its members.⁷⁶² Within this context, the sitting government has a ‘constitutional authority’ and responsibility to implement its agenda, thus requiring MPs to operate in a such a way so as to ‘balance’ the requirement of supporting a government’s mandate on the one hand, and opposing particular elements and bills of the agenda if it is in the national interest.⁷⁶³

The elephant in the room is that if this were so, and, if it met the expectations of citizens, then the 2011 uprisings would not foreseeably have occurred. Although the citizenry is accorded the character of ‘the essential brick in constructing our democratic system’, whose ‘engagement’ (*inkhirāt*) in political life ‘is necessary in order to develop ‘an active party system’;⁷⁶⁴ the practice of their citizenship is framed more passively than what appears in Balibar’s citizen-subjectivity. Three such practices constituting ‘active citizenship’ (*al-muwātanah al-fā‘ilah*) are outlined. One is ‘their awareness’ in ‘persistently searching for the truth’, through which they become informed of local and national events and act accordingly ‘based on facts not rumours’.⁷⁶⁵ The second and third practices concern what to do with this acquired knowledge and when. One outlined by the king is voting in elections. Here citizens have a responsibility to cast votes for representatives with an eye to the national interest alongside the perhaps more immediate local interest. Again this is predicated on the assumption that the political environment encourages nationally oriented campaigns and voting patterns, a point refuted by those in civil society who point out that ‘in day-to-day life you will find immediately that people are suffering because of exclusion from certain sectors of the government and the state’.⁷⁶⁶ It thus becomes exceedingly difficult to engage in the third mode of participation outlined by Abdullah II: suggesting ‘alternative ideas and solutions’ to those proposed by governments.

Active citizenship constitutes the locus of coalescence for the fourth paper, ‘Towards Democratic Empowerment and Active Citizenship’, released on June 2 2013. A response in part to increasing scepticism from Anglo-European observers of the MENA regarding post-2011

⁷⁶² Ibid.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁶ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

democratisation probabilities on the one hand, and as part of the launch of a new Royal initiative for democracy empowerment '*Demokrati*', funded by the influential King Abdullah II Fund for Development on the other. The paper confirms again the centrality of citizen action in Jordan's transition. At its heart, active citizenship is proposed to have three principle foundations: 'the right to participate, the duty to participate and the responsibility to participate', where participation is understood as being 'committed to peaceful means and mutual respect'.⁷⁶⁷ These pillars are significant in light of the reform objective of 'strengthening popular participation in decision-making through a deepening model of parliamentary governments'.⁷⁶⁸ Emphasis is placed on the duty and responsibility to participate in specific ways is of primary significance in the construction of political subjectivity. A point repeated in the fifth in the series 'Goals, Achievements and Conventions: Pillars for Deepening Our Democratic Transition', circulated in late 2014. In which the King addresses the progress of *Demokrati*, reflecting on milestones reminding Jordanians that progress had been made, including a doubling of civil society organisations to more than six thousand countrywide.⁷⁶⁹

He once again reaffirms the values required for a flourishing democracy outlined in the third paper in the series, calling on citizens to acknowledge and respect the reciprocity of rights and obligations to each other and the state. Abdullah II is silent however on the progress towards parliamentary governance in addition to the obligations of the state and its architecture to citizens. This would have to assume the existence of a model of parliamentary government. Yet, because 'parliaments simply can't make policy'⁷⁷⁰ there is instead something of a kleptocratic system of Amman based networks with no public accountability that attracts the services of parliamentarians. 'Many of the people' reflects Tariq Tell, 'who are most successful in parliament have joined them rather than thinking about their constituents'.⁷⁷¹ According to some, this situation has become worse since Abdullah II ascended the throne. While his predecessor Hussein indisputably ruled and reigned, he had a tendency to 'give a huge margin' of manoeuvrability to prime ministers who

⁷⁶⁷ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Towards Democratic Empowerment and Active Citizenship' June 2, 2013, available at www.kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers (accessed June 22, 2013).

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁹ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'Goals, Achievements and Conventions: Pillars for Deepening Our Democratic Transition', October 13, 2014, available at www.kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers (accessed June 22, 2016).

⁷⁷⁰ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut), interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

although never elected ‘were real prime ministers’.⁷⁷² To the extent, states Sufian Obeidat that they had the latitude to decide on the Cabinet members, policy agendas and their implementation. The current monarch in comparison ‘likes to see himself as a president’.⁷⁷³

5.3.2 : Constitutional Amendments & Royal Discussion Papers – Reapplying the Shackles?

The central thread running through each of the five discussion papers was not only that it was up to Jordanians to activate their citizenship, but equally that the institutions of state, pre-eminently the parliament, were ready for such activation, needing only their participation to reach their democratic potential. In other words, Jordanians already possess power-to and power-over via power-with. They have power-to engage and for this engagement to wield tangible results; power-over the parliament so long as their engagement functions to keep MPs accountable for their decisions; power-with inasmuch as their collective participation in elections and civil society is critical in building the desired society.

When regarded from this perspective, the power-with advanced by the King stands in contrast to the power-with enacted and embodied by Jordanians in marches and sit-ins across the country. A contradistinction confirmed in his first discussion paper where he argues that, although demonstrations and strikes are ‘constitutionally protected’ they should not be quickly adopted as it results in a stalling of dialogue and a closing of communication.⁷⁷⁴ The logic embedded here applies only if dialogue and communication are understood from a particular and rather limited position conceiving of such terms as operational and legitimate only within certain identified contexts such as elections, forums and parliament. Engin Isin comments that this ‘active citizenship...has become a script for already existing citizens to follow already existing paths’, which are by definition associated with government practices and hence existing hierarchies of power and authority.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷² Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer), interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Our Journey to Forge Our Path Towards Democracy’.

⁷⁷⁵ Engin Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux’, p. 383.

However, what if protests are a form of communication or even citizenship? If so then they constitute a dialogic structure between those participating and the object of their frustration, in this instance readily understood as the regime as the prevailing hegemon. When social analogies like dialogue are broadened in this way, exposed is the reality that all the decisions made within its ambit are responses to the decisions of the other actors involved. It is not the closing of the door mentioned by the King, rather than being interpreted as pseudo-natural in occurrence, in actuality is a choice made by the regime?

It is into this argument that the uprisings reveal illuminating insights on the status of citizenship in the Kingdom. The very existence of the demonstrations with their spatial and temporal scope denotes forcefully that the hitherto conventional modes of citizen participation in domestic politics were not yielding sufficient results to the citizenry; necessitating a new, less institutionalized and more unpredictable form of citizen activism and political participation. At the same time, the very fact that Jordanian protesters demanded reform rather than revolution suggests equally that the institutions of the country maintain a degree of legitimacy sufficient enough to preclude the active consideration of radical alternative models. Having established this, the argument of the chapter now turns away from textual analysis, towards realities on the ground in order to evaluate Abdullah II's propositions. While the discussion papers have much to recommend them thematically, whatever role they accord the citizen is placed into sharp relief when compared with the constitution and its amendments from 2011 to 2016.

Across the discussion papers, the King reiterates frequently that the constitution guarantees the rights of all Jordanians, and this assumption serves as the basis on which the subsequently ruminated democratic reform agenda is predicated. But is this true? It ought to be borne in mind that the present constitution was promulgated in 1951/1952, almost forty years before democratisation became first a concern, and then a policy umbrella of the Hashemite regime in a post-Cold War world. For the majority of this time, Hussein ruled and reigned in tandem with unelected governments, and between 1967 and 1989 did so under martial law in the absence of any meaningful parliamentary life. In Chapter three I noted that the constitution itself does not define citizenship (*jinsiyyah*), but rather leaves that task to legislation. Analogously the

constitution does not define the rights possessed by citizens, but frames them as principles whose explicit details are formally designated, as is the extent of their application, in legislation. Two examples serve to demonstrate. Article 15 section 1, which addresses freedom of opinion, including expression, publication etc. stipulates that ‘the state guarantees/secures (*kafala*) freedom of opinion, and all Jordanians may express their opinions freely in speech, writing, photography/portrayal, and other means of expression’.⁷⁷⁶

So far, the stipulation is unconditional, and would therefore be able to constellate a blanket guarantee of this particular freedom. It finishes however with the declaration – ‘*bishrt inna la yatajāwaz hadud al-qānun*’ – ‘on the condition that it does not exceed the limits of the law’.⁷⁷⁷ Therefore the applicability of the first half of the sentence is contingent on the interpretation of the second in legislation. Section 3 of the same article similarly asserts that ‘the state guarantees/secures (*kafala*) freedom of the press, printing, publication and information media’ provided that such activity is properly situated ‘within the limits of the law’ – ‘*damina hadud al-qānun*’.⁷⁷⁸ Article 16’s three paragraphs are similarly reinforcing. Section 1 states ‘Jordanians have the right of association within the limits of the law’, ergo repeating the pattern observable in previous and subsequent, articles. This is elaborated on in paragraph 2 with regards to forming (*tālif*) unions and political parties, provided they are lawful and peaceful. Further conditionality is provided in paragraph 3 explicating that ‘the law structures the way by which the establishment of groups, unions and political parties’.⁷⁷⁹

Resultantly, although the constitution enables the creation of citizen organisations, the actual composition of these rely on laws to regulate their day-to-day operations. Citizens therefore according to Mohamed Husseiny deal with regulation rather than laws specifically in many of their regular interactions with the state, arguing:

‘When I want to do something related to my rights for example, issuing me a passport or something like that, I don’t deal with the law, I deal with the relevant regulations: bring a

⁷⁷⁶ Jordanian Government, The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni*) 3: 1093, 1952 Art.15,1.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid. Art. 15,3.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid. 16, 1-3.

*copy of this paper, bring a certain number of photos; and here the government is playing with it because regulations are not approved by the parliament. The laws are but the associated regulation is totally under the mandate of the government’.*⁷⁸⁰

These articles suggest that the constitution itself, unlike a bill of rights, in isolation does little if anything to safeguard the practice of citizen-based rights. Instead it must operate in conjunction with parliament, which as the site of legislative activity has the power to apply constitutional principles in law and regulation. Recent Legislation concerning press freedoms in the Kingdom is indicative of this dynamic, and further reveals that while the King implores citizens to become socially and politically engaged, laws have been passed curtailing the freedoms necessary to facilitate this. The significant role of parliament in the sustaining of authoritarian governmental practices emerges here, and hence, illuminates the need of the regime to control it.

The constitutional amendments which were passed by the 17th Parliament in 2014 and 2016 in record time lend further weight to the continuity of political liberalisation as a means of regime consolidation rather than change. Principally, by centralising executive authority in the figure of the monarch, and thereby reducing the scope for the Legislature to hold the Executive accountable. In August 2014, the King wrote to then-Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, directing his government to address two areas of concern. The first concerned a division of labour between the executive, the legislative and the military in which the Prime Minister was charged with ‘beginning a process of activating the Ministry of Defence’. Secondly, the King stipulated the need to bolster the institutional scope and reach of the IEC.⁷⁸¹ Abdullah Ensour responded with an official missive, articulating the relevant steps the government would take involving the passage of two constitutional amendments through parliament. The first entailed giving the Head of State (the

⁷⁸⁰ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

⁷⁸¹ Risālat Jalālah al-Malik Abdullah al-Thāni ila Ra’is al-Wuzarā’ Abdullah al-Nsour Yuwajhi fiha al-Ḥukuma li-taf’ il Wazāra al-Difā’a wa Tawsi’a Dour al-Hay’a al-Mustaqilah lil-Intikhāb, Amman, August 13, 2014, <https://kingabdullah.jo/ar/letters/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%84> (accessed June 24, 2016).

King) unilateral right of appointment for the head of General Intelligence Department and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prior to parliament's acceptance of the amendment on 28 August, the King appointed individuals to both of these positions on recommendations from Cabinet, and the decision was counter-signed.⁷⁸² Cabinet involvement in the process however is now no longer required. Justifying this, the Prime Minister acknowledged the challenging environment facing Jordan, and the necessity of ensuring the 'professional and apolitical' nature of the Armed Forces and the GID.⁷⁸³ Ensour proceeded to articulate that isolating such sensitive appointments in the hand of the King was a measure essential 'in preparation for democratic reforms'. Categorically, 'if a leftist or an Islamic party formed the government in the future, this amendment would prevent them from causing instability in the army'.⁷⁸⁴

The second amendment referenced in Ensour's response concerned Article 67 and the expansion of the IEC's organisational prerogatives from its then present jurisdiction over general elections, to all elections at the governorate, municipal and local levels.⁷⁸⁵ There was nothing innately surprising or controversial about this aspect of the directive. The same could not be said however of the first area highlighted by the King. Critics claimed that the amendments served to alter the very nature of Jordan's political system. Amman based lawyer Omar Aṭouṭ argued that the King, instead of occupying the role of 'referee' in the system, had now become 'a player' in the political game.⁷⁸⁶ The risk explicit in this change of position is that it calls into question Article 30 of the Constitution, which is unequivocal in its assertion that the King is 'immune from liability'.⁷⁸⁷ More forthrightly, Muhammad Hammouri argued that the changes amount to a tacit approval of converting Jordan's political architecture 'from constitutional to presidential

⁷⁸² Omar Obeidat, 'Constitutional Changes Aimed to Enhance Political Reforms — PM', *Jordan Times*, August 15, 2014, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/constitutional-changes-aimed-enhance-political-reforms-%E2%80%94-94-pm> (accessed September 14, 2016).

⁷⁸³ Jordan Times, 'His Majesty Directs Gov't to Activate Defence Ministry, Expand IEC's Role', *Jordan Times*, August 14, 2014, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/his-majesty-directs-gov%E2%80%99t-activate-defence-ministry-expand-iec%E2%80%99s-role> (accessed September 14, 2016).

⁷⁸⁴ Omar Obeidat, 'Constitutional Changes Aimed to Enhance Political Reforms'.

⁷⁸⁵ Jordan Times, 'His Majesty Directs Gov't to Activate Defence Ministry'.

⁷⁸⁶ Omar Aṭouṭ, al-Ḥukmah Taqawwid Nizām al-Ḥukm, *7iber.com*, August 14, 2014, <http://7iber.com/2014/08/jordan-violating-constitution/> (accessed September 14, 2016).

⁷⁸⁷ Jordanian Government, *The Constitution (al-Dustour al-Urduni)* 3: 1093, 1952 Art. 30.

monarchy' (*malikiyah dustouriyah ila malikiyah rai'siyah*).⁷⁸⁸ Mohammed Hussainy for example is less concerned insofar as the constitution irrespective of the amendments precludes the King from legal responsibility.⁷⁸⁹

Yet, disconcertion persisted in the wake of a second round of amendments in 2016. Local analysts were concerned with, on the one hand, the behaviour of the parliament in approving the alterations and, on the other, with the implications of the amendments on future parliamentary activity.⁷⁹⁰ Obeidat explains the process as follows: 'the council of ministers were summoned in the morning and these substantial amendments were put on the table for them to sign. They just signed it and immediately within the hour sent it to the parliament. No objections'.⁷⁹¹ Such accentuates the accountability of the Cabinet to the Monarch rather than the citizenry. The process was similarly opaque and unaccountable, given that the Ministers were unaware of the amendments before they were summoned to sign their approval.⁷⁹²

Analogous with their 2014 predecessors, the 2016 amendments were acutely focused on the state's judiciary and the security apparatus. The reigning monarch now has the unilateral prerogative to appoint and remove the Kingdom's Chief Justice and all sitting judges on the bench of the Constitutional Court. Similarly, in the sphere of security, the head of the Gendarmerie is now appointed without consultation and ministerial counter-signing; both of which were previous necessities. Ministers are no longer engaged directly in the process of appointing key roles in the Kingdom's Judicial-political architecture. Further, if this individual was an elected member of parliament, it means that the electorate (through its elected representatives) has no role in the process. A careful reading of Abdullah Ensour's rationale justifying the amendments reveals something of the profound nature of the reforms. When taken together, both stages appear to be part of a process disaggregating parliament from sensitive spheres of government, and locating

⁷⁸⁸ Al-Maqar, 'Min Ḥaqi Ana Aqoul Awqafou Hadtha al-‘Abath wa al-Inqilāb ‘ala al-Dustour', *maqar.com*, August 19, 2014, <http://www.maqar.com/?id=63491&&headline=> (accessed September 15, 2016).

⁷⁸⁹ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

⁷⁹⁰ Sufian Obeidat, 'Jordan's 2016 constitutional amendments: A return to absolute monarchy?' *constitutionnet.org*, May 27, 2016, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/jordans-2016-constitutional-amendments-return-absolute-monarchy> (accessed May 28, 2016).

⁷⁹¹ Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer), interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016.

⁷⁹² Ibid.

these spheres in the monarchy. A ‘Nice justification’, sighs Hussainy, if on the assumption that facilitating parliamentary government is the objective. However, he continues, ‘we still have not seen any parliamentary government! I mean Hani al-Mulki (the current Prime Minister) was appointed without consultation nothing!’⁷⁹³

5.4 : Conclusion

‘One of the worst things’, writes Rashid Khalidi in a general commentary on the nature of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, ‘was the contempt the rulers showed for their peoples...immature, dangerous and unready for democracy’.⁷⁹⁴ In this chapter I began by examining the trajectory of the Jordanian experience over the course of the 2011/2012 uprisings, emphasising it as a search for ownership and accountability on the part of citizens. It was necessary to advance this search into the streets, because the formal avenues of citizenship practice had been for too long constrained, excoriated of value, and proven inadequate in meeting the needs and expectations of Jordanians. I suggested that the present ordering of Jordan’s political architecture reveals much about the nature and limitations of Jordanian citizenship.

Following the uprisings, I endeavoured to contrast the citizen search for ownership and accountability with the efforts of the regime to re-establish a political subjectivity of passivity. This was undertaken via a delimiting of the rights, sites, scales and acts in which citizen subjectivity is produced and reproduced, both through ideas and discourses as suggested by the discussion papers, and through constitutional amendments, structuring the capacities of citizens and decision-makers within the Jordanian polity. The assumption, that the only variable in question is the desire for all Jordanians to put the national interest first, completely blindsides the

⁷⁹³ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development), interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

⁷⁹⁴ Rashid Khalidi, ‘Preliminary Historical Observations on the Arab Revolutions of 2011’ in Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer & Ziad Abu-Rish, *The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), p. 13.

architectural arrangements (political, social and economic) that preclude alternative and potentially disruptive action capable of changing the nature of citizen within the domestic political scene.

Part III

Practices Within Jinsiyyah and Muwātanah

Chapter Six: *Between Nationalities & Expediency - 'My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right'*

Chapter Seven: *Nahed Hattar, Freedom of Expression as an Act of Citizenship*

Chapter Eight: *Tribalism (al-'Asha'iriyyah) and Contemporary Citizenship*

Chapter Six

6. Between Nationalities & Expediency: ‘My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’

*‘For me citizenship is a legal relationship in which your obligations and your privileges are determined. It is the basis by which you become part of the political community that the state is meant to encompass. In Jordan it is a tricky subject. Citizenship and nationality are not aligned neither legally nor in people’s perceptions. I think the reasons for this are quite complex – some relate to the politics of the region and of Jordan. But also a lot of it is cultural and the way people identify’.*⁷⁹⁵

*‘If you are a Jordanian man of Palestinian origin and a Jordanian man of East Bank origin if you are Muslim Jordanian man regardless of your origin, let’s say you have the higher reference point in terms of citizenship. Everybody else suffers a particular kind of discrimination. So obviously if you are a woman it’s not equal citizenship, if you are a Christian it’s not equal citizenship, particularly if you are a Christian woman, and also a Christian man. Obviously there are all these intersections...there is this very disturbing notion that there is a certain Jordanian-ness that merely having a passport or citizenship or a national ID number does not grant you’.*⁷⁹⁶

6.1 : Introduction

In part two (chapters 4 and 5) I argued that one of the profound characteristics of citizenship in contemporary Jordan was the absence of ownership and accountability. Now, our attention turns to some of the ways in which this reality is negotiated and at times contested by Jordanians. This is the preeminent occupation of part three. The present chapter considers the gendered hierarchies of Jordan’s citizenship regime. Specifically focusing on the campaign *My Mother is Jordanian*

⁷⁹⁵ Anonymous, (Political analyst and researcher) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁷⁹⁶ Lina Ejeilat, (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com) interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

and Her Citizenship is My Right, which has been ongoing over the past decade. The campaign addresses the plight of Jordanian mothers bearing children with non-Jordanian fathers irrespective of marriage status, who are categorically unable to automatically transfer their citizenship to their children like their male counterparts. The state simply does not recognise them, and consequently, a key aspect of Jordanian mothers' agency as citizens is in this situation non-existent.

Not only does the campaign bring to light the conjunct roles of constitutions, law-making and social norms in gendering citizenship, but furthermore links with our discussion of *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* from chapter two. I advanced an enunciation of *muwātanah* claims founded on individual ties to territory, and the struggle that exists between the bottom-up potential of *muwātanah* on the one hand and the top-down structuration of *jinsiyyah* on the other. Furthermore there is another facet involved here concerning the definition and practice of *jinsiyyah*. The campaigners involved in the coalition are using their statuses as both *muwātanah* and *jinsiyyah* holders in an endeavour to influence the way the state defines the latter; therein seeking a degree of ownership over a process that has historically been the preserve of the state alone. In so doing, this illustration illuminates the power relations implicit in the politics of gender and citizenship regimes, and highlights the import of altering the ways in which citizenship practice is structured to encourage or produce particular results. Hence regime is the optimal word here, in referring to efforts to change rules (laws and constitutional articles), which for their part, “give” any regime its scope and coherence by demarcating roles’.⁷⁹⁷ Onuf’s identification of the relationship between rules and roles here is important in the case of the social production and re-production of gender roles, not merely in Jordan but across the region and the world.

Although the constitution might theoretically guarantee Jordanians a range of rights, the practicalities of accessing and applying these are determined through legislation and regulation, undergirded by socially constructed and reproduced normative arrangements. Social norms cannot therefore be ignored. Laws and legislative alterations are no panacea to the ills of gender and citizenship imbalances. As poignantly explained by Valentine Moghadam, ‘the nature of the political system, objectives of state managers, elites constitute crucial factors in the equation that

⁷⁹⁷ Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making*, p. 145.

determines positions of women'.⁷⁹⁸ All of which, constitute, and are constituted by, normative arrangements. Extrapolating from Onuf, it becomes apparent that a substantive power of law and law-making reside in the ways in which it shapes and frames the political community/s within the state. Through this process, laws create borders between: the permissible and impermissible, inside versus outside, and included as opposed to excluded.

This is of particular significance in the Jordanian context for the reason Amira El-Azhary Sonbol enunciates, whereby change, even of laws, 'has been gendered by holding on to traditional patriarchal relations and a state-controlled legal system that continues to reflect tribal patriarchy'.⁷⁹⁹ Social realities are predicated on these constructions, an assertion conveyed in Lapid's postulate that 'borders (and bordering) are absolutely indispensable to any notion of linguistic or social order'.⁸⁰⁰ In this way, a better contextualisation of Moghadam's assertion that 'Variations in the application of Muslim family content depend principally on the type of political regime and the strength of modern social classes' may be appreciated.⁸⁰¹ Reform is consequently a necessary part of structuring more equal citizenship and gender relations, regardless of its difficulty as an undertaking. This directs our present focus to what specific elements of the constitution and legislative canon that needs to be addressed. A key factor here is the absence of a definition of Jordanian citizenship in the constitution, for it is in the nationality law that the normative acceptance of patrilineal citizenship truly emerges.

6.2 : Gendered Readings of the Constitution

Here it is pertinent to begin with Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the constitution stating 'Jordanians are equal before the law without distinction in terms of their rights and obligations whether they differ

⁷⁹⁸ Valentine M. Moghadam, 'Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing Family in the Middle East', *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 35:2 (2004), p. 147.

⁷⁹⁹ Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, *Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor & the Law* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 7.

⁸⁰⁰ Yosef Lapid, 'Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New Direction' in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson & Yosef lapid (eds.) *Identities, Borders, Orders*, p. 13.

⁸⁰¹ Valentine M. Moghadam, 'Patriarchy in Transition', p. 147.

in race, language or religion'.⁸⁰² The absence of gender assists in the perpetuation of inequality in law.⁸⁰³ I do not mean to suggest that all Jordanian women experience inequality of the same variety in their everyday life. Intersectionality is central to understand the lived experience of masculine and feminine citizenship constructions. Even in Jordanian law, there are different levels of equality. If the constitution ignores gender/ is gender blind, in the civil code 'all women are considered ostensibly equal to all men', and in the personal status law women and men 'are unequal (in terms of rights and duties)'.⁸⁰⁴ Additionally, within this duality, the status of Bedouin women is complicated by a third element, namely the historically constituted legal distinction between them and their urban dwelling counterparts.⁸⁰⁵

A further intersection is religious affiliation, which despite Article 6 does have an influence over the practice of citizenship. Although Jordanians are able to practice their religious traditions freely, this is not synonymous with a state and socially recognised equality of faiths. Constitutional Article 2 of Chapter 1 for example establishes Islam as the religion of State⁸⁰⁶ and this, in conjunction with the necessity of the King being an adherent of Islam, and a *Sharif* – a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad,⁸⁰⁷ creates an image of an ideal citizen as one who shares in that faith.⁸⁰⁸ None should be surprised therefore, if the categories of citizen and believer become at times intertwined. Rania Maktabi has found that in a number of instances 'family law embodies the clerical imprint of religious law which principles male guardianship over females'.⁸⁰⁹ Having said that, it is the normatively constructed understandings of religious stipulations that are, arguably, of greater weight than the stipulations themselves. Consider for example, the Islamic justification for children belonging to the father. El-Azhary Sonbol's statement in Islamic *fiqh* that "the child belongs to the marital bed" (*al-wild lil-firash*), meaning that he belongs to those who conceived

⁸⁰² Jordanian Government, The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni*), Art. 6, 1.

⁸⁰³ Asma Khudar, (Former Senator and Director of Sisterhood is Global Institute) interview with the author, Amman, June 13, 2016.

⁸⁰⁴ Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects*, p. 50.

⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 50.

⁸⁰⁶ Jordanian Government, The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni*), Chap. 1, Art. 2.

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid*. Chap. 4, Art. 28.

⁸⁰⁸ Lina Ejeilat, (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com) interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

⁸⁰⁹ Rania Maktabi, 'Female Citizenship in the Middle East: Comparing family law reform in Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon', *Middle East Law and Governance* 5 (2013), p. 281.

him’, has no gender attribute, and ‘yet it is taken to mean the child belongs to the father without dispute’.⁸¹⁰

The push-and-pull factors of one institution are in a dialogic relationship with their counterparts from a second institution (the nation-state). Article 3 of the Nationality Law for example enunciates that a child is automatically conferred Jordanian citizenship if their father is recognised as a citizen,⁸¹¹ echoing traditional norms regarding the masculine construction of the family. This is indicative of the seminal significance of legislation, in performing a deciding role in the status and agency of female citizens. Where a marriage is recognised, the state assumes that children born in the context of it will become members of a national community through patrilineal association. In circumstances where a marriage union is either non-existent or not recognised by the state, the situation Samar Muhareb, General Director of the Jordanian based organisation Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD) elucidates is more problematic:

*‘By law, a child born out of wedlock cannot be registered, is not recognised by the state and the government can forcibly remove the child from the mother. This may create a situation where women who were raped, or had a child out of wedlock, will marry the man simply to ensure that the child can be registered, gain nationality and other associated rights’.*⁸¹²

Without any doubt, women find themselves doubly discriminated in such situations. Mothers lack the institutional (state-sanctioned) capacity, as individual citizens, to properly care for their children in a context not attached to marriage in either the union itself or divorce. This is on top of their existence in marriage as an unequal partner to the husband as far as the state is concerned. From the state’s perspective marriage is deemed necessary for at least two reasons. First, the family as an institution is constitutionally designated as ‘the foundation of the (Jordanian) community (*al-Usrat asās al-Mujtima*)’.⁸¹³ Subsequently being part of a family is a prerequisite

⁸¹⁰ Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, *Women of Jordan*, pp. 39-40.

⁸¹¹ Jordanian Government, Law of Nationality (*Qānun al-Jinsiyyah al-Urduniyyah*) No. (6) of 1954, Art. 3.

⁸¹² Samar Muhareb, ‘Not Legislative Change Alone’, *Jordan Times*, April 27, 2017, <http://jordantimes.com/opinion/samar-muhareb/not-legislative-change-alone> (accessed April 28, 2017).

⁸¹³ Jordanian Government, The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni*), Art. 5, 4.

for participation in the Jordanian community as a citizen. If, following Suad Joseph, the constitution ‘assumes that the family is the basic unit of society, as opposed to the citizen subject’ then this reality is problematic for female citizens as a result of the patriarchal construction of the family. By way of this construction, women ‘can never aspire be the conduits into family units and therefore to citizenship’.⁸¹⁴

Second, through a marriage union the father’s citizenship is transferred to the children via the patrilineal connection, and the children will be bestowed the institutional necessities for membership in Jordanian society. Simultaneously, the mother is given rights via her partnership in the marital union. One could say that marriage functions as a guard against the state’s capacity to coercively remove the child from the custody of the mother. Pivotaly, marriage is not required on an institutional basis, for men in the same manner. If a Jordanian man recognises a child born out of wedlock as his, (and has the financial capacity to make transition comparatively seamless) the right of blood provides an opportunity for the child to be absorbed into his family. The right of blood however has not always been privileged legally. Suad Joseph highlights that in Ottoman law there existed the ability for citizenship to be transferred on the basis of relationship to land. If an individual was born on land falling under the jurisdiction of the Sultan, then in practical terms the child in question could inherit their mother’s Ottoman citizenship.⁸¹⁵

However, whether through the influence of Anglo and European legal codes or other local customs privileging blood, automatic transmission through relationship to land retreated as a principle following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. A further indication of this manifested itself in the now rescinded Article 308 of the Penal Code, which in paragraph 1 explicated: ‘If a correct marriage contract is concluded between the perpetrator of one of the crimes stipulated in this section and the victim, any pursuit shall be stopped; if a judgment was issued in the case, execution of penalty shall be suspended’.⁸¹⁶ By *this section* it is referred to articles 304-307, which include crimes of rape and sexual harassment. Thus, if a woman is raped and becomes pregnant there was an option available to the perpetrator to offer a marital contract to avoid prosecution.

⁸¹⁴ Suad Joseph, *Gender, Citizenship, and Human Rights in the Middle East: Agendas for Research and Reflections on Lebanon* (Davis: GAIA Books, 2002), p. 8.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 7.

⁸¹⁶ Jordanian Government, Penal Code (*Qānun al-‘Aqubāt*), No. (29) 1960. Art. 308, 1. Rescinded in April 2017.

The idea was that, from the perspective of the victim's survival, an offer of marriage however insincere it may be, could have reduced the social backlash against her on the one hand, and provide the unborn child a direct pathway to citizenship.

The notion that a reparatory marriage was nothing but a perpetuation of the violence was not contemplated, confirming that gender imbalances are embedded within Jordan's citizenship regime, as indeed many such regimes globally. Enunciated eruditely by Laurie Brand, the very 'evolution of the Jordanian state has played a central role in shaping the political, economic and social opportunities and constraints Jordanian women face'.⁸¹⁷ The second Camp David negotiations had an indubitable influence on this evolution. Surrounding the momentum towards a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, questions were being raised in Jordan regarding the fate and status of children born to Jordanian mothers and non-Jordanian fathers. The rationale being that the majority of unions of this nature are between Jordanian women and Palestinian men.⁸¹⁸ In the midst of the discussion, the government of Prime Minister Ali Abu-Ragheb announced in November 2002 plans to review a number of relevant articles within the Nationality Law. However, as journalist Rana Husseini reported, no more than five months after the announcement was made, Samir Habashneh, then Minister of Interior, signalled a change of direction, asserting that amending the Law was 'no longer possible'.⁸¹⁹

Given that the announcement was made in the wake of failed peace negotiations, and the continuing Second Intifada, its substantive essence is unsurprising. The issue is intertwined, as is Jordan itself within the regional conflict and its search for resolution.⁸²⁰ Recognising this reality, Husseini commented that the change of heart on the matter indicated that 'the government had no intention of granting citizenship to children of Jordanian women married to Palestinians until a settlement is reached in the Palestinian conflict'.⁸²¹ This cuts to the heart of the matter. As the

⁸¹⁷ Laurie Brand 1998, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 100.

⁸¹⁸ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁸¹⁹ Samir Habashneh cited in Naseem Tarawneh, 'Foreigners in Their Own Land: Jordanian Women & Hereditary Citizenship', *black-iris.com*, December 28, 2007, <http://black-iris.com/2007/12/28/foreigners-in-their-own-land-jordanian-women-hereditary-citizenship/> (accessed November 12, 2016).

⁸²⁰ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁸²¹ Rana Husseini cited in Naseem Tarawneh, 'Foreigners In Their Own Land'.

majority of children born into citizen limbo have Palestinian fathers,⁸²² the state either implicitly or explicitly recognises them to be Palestinians. Absorbing them into the Jordanian citizen-body would therefore amount to increasing the number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the Kingdom. A central corollary of this is that the struggle for equal citizenship rights is a thread in the Gordian knot of identity and demographic politics in the Kingdom, and the fear held by some of the *watan al-badil*, the alternative homeland proposal to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Dr. Aida Essaid, one of the leading advocates of the civil society coalition ‘My Nationality is the Right of My Family’, and director of the Research and Information Center of the King Hussein Foundation, affirms this notion.⁸²³

The precise number of women affected by their inability to transmit citizenship to their children has grown over the past decade from at least sixty thousand in 2002 to almost ninety thousand in 2016.⁸²⁴ Statistics of this nature are but one illustration of the integration that exists socially within the Kingdom. Yet, during the first decade of this century the status of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin became increasingly tenuous in the face of arbitrary withdrawals of citizenship by the government. Human Rights Watch reported that between 2004 and 2008 nearly three thousand citizens of Palestinian origin had their citizenship rescinded.⁸²⁵ Besides being in violation of the law, rescinding citizenship has tangible social ramifications as all rights associated with citizenship, including to work, were no longer accessible. Jordanian women married to spouses who hitherto had been recognised as Jordanians felt the impacts of these measures doubly, because they were unable to protect their children from having citizenship withdrawn. The following testimony recounted by ‘Abbas’ from the West Bank in the 2010 Human Rights Watch

⁸²² Musa al-‘Adwān, ‘Ummi Urduniyah wa Jinsiyyatha haq li...Hal Huwe Sha‘aār Amin?’, *sawaleif.com*, July 30, 2016,

<http://sawaleif.com/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D9%85-158199/> (accessed November 12, 2016).

⁸²³ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁸²⁴ Naseem Tarawneh, ‘Foreigners In Their Own Land’; and Musa al-‘Adwān, ‘Ummi Urduniyah wa Jinsiyyatha haq li...Hal Huwe Sha‘aār Amin?’

⁸²⁵ Human Rights Watch, ‘Jordan: Stop Withdrawing Nationality from Palestinian-Origin Citizens’, www.hrw.org, February 1, 2010, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/01/jordan-stop-withdrawing-nationality-palestinian-origin-citizens> (accessed November 14, 2016).

report: *Stateless Again Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality*, elucidates as such:

'In 2005 my wife renewed her passport, and was sent to the Follow-up and Inspection Department, which sent her to the Ministry of Interior's Legal Department. There, they told her that she had to add our six children to my Israeli permit and that we had to renew it. This is despite her being fully Jordanian'.⁸²⁶

The Ministry of Interior required that the children of Abbas and his wife be legally recognised as non-Jordanians despite the mother's unquestioned citizenship status. Had the roles been reversed, and Abbas been the Jordanian with origins on the East-Bank, this situation in all likelihood would not have eventuated.

6.3 : Campaigning for Citizenship

It is in this environment that Nima Habashnah, a Jordanian woman with six children born to a non-Jordanian (Moroccan) father, began an individual campaign in 2007 to raise awareness of the citizenship imbalance, with the ultimate objective of aligning Jordan's legislative environment with the rights promised by the Constitution. Habashnah's campaign coalesced around local personal networks of women who shared her predicament, although initially she had difficulty encouraging these women to attend organised demonstrations.⁸²⁷ In a sign of the sensitive nature of the issue, Habashnah received threatening messages, and her first Facebook page 'My Mother is a Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right' was hacked. Experiencing this opposition did not prevent her from persevering in both online and offline advocacy. The Second Facebook page

⁸²⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Report – Stateless Again: Palestinian-origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality* (Amman: Human Rights Watch, 2010). Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/01/stateless-again/palestinian-origin-jordanians-deprived-their-nationality> (accessed November 10, 2016).

⁸²⁷ Rana Sweiss, 'Nima Habashneh: A Woman Who Fought for Equal Rights in Jordan', *Huffington Post*, February 2, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rana-f-sweis/nima-habashneh-a-women-who-jordan_b_6650746.html (accessed November 15, 2016).

‘MomJordanian’ replaced its compromised predecessor,⁸²⁸ and the public demonstrations continued.

The utilisation of social media in the advocacy of this issue is illustrative of the potential of social media to operate as a vehicle of information, dissemination, and network building within a public sphere that is increasingly virtual, as it is offline. The pertinence of this to citizenship is observed by Linda Herrera and Rehab Sakr, noting in the midst of the 2011 uprisings that the region’s younger generations ‘had been experiencing novel forms of “wired citizenship” through their engagement with and connectivity across online platforms.’⁸²⁹ The allusion to practicing citizenship activity virtually has a number of implications, of which two are especially relevant for our present discussion. Firstly, because practicing citizenship requires the production and reproduction of associated norms in an online space, an inevitable development is that this space becomes educative in nature. Habashnah’s Facebook page is no different, serving as a space in which information can be exchanged, and a sense of community constructed around a shared experience or response to the plight of Jordanian mothers. It is illustrative of Christou & Ioannidou’s contention that ‘citizenship education today is not limited to being within classroom walls: it is conducted on the Internet, debated in blogs, and exchanged on social networking sites’.⁸³⁰ By virtue of the educative foundation on which understandings of citizenship are based, new models of performing citizen functions may develop.

Therefore, while citizen activism has, according to Boutieri, been ‘impoverished’ by its conventional situation within ‘the sphere of oppositional politics’, the very politics the King appears intent on advancing: one cannot ignore the profound ways in which a ‘broader everyday reconfiguration of the actual social fabric in virtual environments’ is occurring.⁸³¹ Because a rigid

⁸²⁸ My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right,

https://www.facebook.com/pg/MomJordanian/about/?ref=page_internal (accessed November 26, 2016).

⁸²⁹ Linda Herrera & Rehab Sakr, ‘Wired and Revolutionary in the Middle East and North Africa’, in Linda Herrera & Rehab Sakr (eds.) *Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 1.

⁸³⁰ Miranda Christou & Elena Ioannidou, ‘Opening Networks, Sealing Borders: Youth and Racist Discourse on the Internet’, in Linda Herrera & Rehab Sakr (eds.) *Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 121.

⁸³¹ Charis Boutieri, ‘Morocco On-trial: De-Colonial Logic and Transformative Practice in Cyberspace’, in Linda Herrera & Rehab Sakr (eds.) *Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 42.

demarcation between online and offline social worlds cannot realistically be made, the two will naturally inform each other. Hence, in the context of Habashnah's efforts to increase awareness, a sense of community and subsequently momentum, the utilisation of social media as a virtual citizen space, buttressed the movement's grassroots foundation. Her campaign subsequently was able to carry the issue at its heart with a high degree of.

By September 2010 the issue had begun to generate local and regional attention. Adnan Badran's intervention as President of the General Council of the National Centre for Human Rights was the first time a figure of his stature had publicly addressed the issue and the campaign. He declared the discrimination against women in this matter 'inconsistent with the Constitution',⁸³² a position not universally welcome though not without support either. One commentator reflected 'yes the issue is a complex one', and the costs associated with extending citizenship to the children at the centre of this issue are 'exorbitant'; however Jordanian women should not be the ones carrying the burden when their rights are theirs to have irrespective of socio-political cost.⁸³³ Owing to momentum generated in the public sphere, it was around this time that a coalition of civil society organisations began to crystallise around Habashnah's campaigning. One of them was the Information and Research Center of the King Hussein Foundation, which despite its name is an NGO that does not receive government funding. One of the key ways in which the Center contributed to the campaign was by conducting research whose outcomes challenged and discredited a number of myths surrounding the issue.

A cost-benefit analysis study conducted between 2010 and 2012 in collaboration with Jordanian economist Dr Yousef Mansour was particularly influential. Its results were significant given the at-the-time 'main argument' of those opposing the extension of citizenship rights, which as Essaid elaborates, 'used to be in the past that Jordan can't afford to give everyone nationality, that there are too many of them'.⁸³⁴ Countering this position, the study calculated that 'the costs the government would bear (residency permit fees, work permits, subsidies to education in schools

⁸³² Ammonnews, 'Dr. Badrān: 'Adam Manḥ Abnā' al-Urduniyāt al-Jinsiyyah Mukhālif lil-Dustour', *ammonnews.net*, December 13, 2010, <http://www.ammonnews.net/article/75624> (accessed November 20, 2016).

⁸³³ Jamāl Abdullah, "'Adam Manḥ Abnā' al-Urduniyāt al-Jinsiyyah Mukhālif lil-Dustour', *7iber.com*, December 26, 2010, <https://www.7iber.com/2010/12/right-to-pass-citizenship/> (accessed November 20, 2016).

⁸³⁴ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

and universities and public health care) were slightly higher than 49 million JD'. The payoff however in direct benefits was calculated at approximately 59 million Jordanian dinars, a net advantage of 10 million dinars.⁸³⁵ Resultantly, the assumptions on which cost/benefit justifications for not granting full citizenship were made were eliminated. However, in its place another rationale became increasingly expressed: demography.

Described by Essaid as 'the unofficially said but the officially unsaid argument',⁸³⁶ demographic fears at once encompass both apprehensions from some Trans-Jordanians regarding a default Palestinian take-over of the state, and a belief in Israel's covert plan to establish the *watan al-badil* on the East Bank. Both trepidations are necessary in order to understand the fluid nature of the demographic argument. At its heart, the alternative homeland concept revolves around Jordan being forced through Israeli and eventually international pressure to become the repository of the global Palestinian refugee population. Accordingly, this pressure, would materialise if it became apparent that the overwhelming majority of Jordan's population was of Palestinian origin. Whether through direct or indirect labelling, the state would then become Palestinian by default. By implication such would facilitate an abrogation of the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. Under such circumstances, Jordan because of its embedded economic ties with, and debt dependency on the United States could be forced into accepting a transfer of Palestinians from territory currently occupied by Israel. However, the Center's report argues because of the special status of The United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) 'the Palestinian refugee enjoys a special legal status that is different from any other refugee. This status cannot be ceded'.⁸³⁷

Confidence in this status appears to be held by Jordan's judiciary, demonstrated in the Kingdom's signing and ratification of a number of international covenants of relevance to the citizenship powers of Jordanian women. In one illustration, the government decided in 2009 to drop its opposition to Article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

⁸³⁵ My Nationality is the Right of My Family Coalition, *Policy Brief: Jordanian Women Married to Non-Jordanians Have the Right to Pass on Their Nationality to Their Families* (Amman: King Hussein Foundation Information & Research Center, 2013), p. 4.

⁸³⁶ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁸³⁷ My Nationality is the Right of My Family Coalition, *Policy Brief*, p. 5.

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Paragraph 4 of the Article stipulates all signatories ‘shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile’.⁸³⁸ Although a positive step forward, Jordan maintained its reservations regarding Article 9 Paragraph 2, which asserts ‘parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children’.⁸³⁹ This opposition seems to convey something of the prevailing apprehension about demographic dynamics. Or more specifically, the issue of transferring citizenship to children of non-Jordanian fathers is ‘always whispering and disappearing under the scarecrow of the Alternative Homeland’.⁸⁴⁰ Suggestive here is Joseph’s erudite observation that despite questions of state efficacy as a site of identity production produced by globalisation discourses, ‘citizenship is an increasingly active site of negotiations’ over the demarcation and practice of personhood in its legal and social dimensions.⁸⁴¹

The Kingdom has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which calls on Arab legislators to empower children, and to guarantee as much as is possible that the interests of children be paramount in legislation, including the capacity to acquire their mothers’ citizenship.⁸⁴² Thus the coalition campaigning for Jordanian mothers while claiming ownership of citizen rights irrespective of gender, is equally demanding that the State be accountable for its own agreed to commitments. Since 2006 Jordan has been a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified by Law No. 50 of 2006), which makes further claims on states to support children.⁸⁴³ Consequently, the Center’s report notes ‘we can safely assume that the Jordanian judiciary gave the international conventions, ratified by Jordan through legal channels,

⁸³⁸ The United Nations General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women resolution’ 34/180 (New York, 1979), available at:

<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf> (accessed November 21, 2016).

⁸³⁹ The United Nations General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women resolution’.

⁸⁴⁰ Jamāl Abdullah, ‘‘Adam Manḥ Abnā’ al-Urduniyāt al-Jinsiyyah Mukhālif lil-Dustour’.

⁸⁴¹ Suad Joseph, *Gender, Citizenship, and Human Rights in the Middle East*, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁴² League of Arab States, ‘Arab Charter on Human Rights’ (Cairo, 1994), available at:

<http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Arab-Charter-on-Human-Rights.pdf> (accessed November 21, 2016).

⁸⁴³ United Nations General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’, (New York, 1989) available at:

http://www.unicef.org.au/Upload/UNICEF/Media/Our%20work/childfriendlycrc.pdf?utm_source=multiple&utm_medium=short_url&utm_term=&utm_name=crc (accessed December 30, 2017).

a greater value than domestic legislations'.⁸⁴⁴ Therefore, despite the position articulated by former Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour that '[changing nationality laws] could change the demographic balance and might lead to depopulating Palestine',⁸⁴⁵ it has to be recalled that a hypothetical does not abrogate the responsibility of the state to citizens. What is revealed by extrapolation is the gendered component of the present citizenship regime that reduces the state's accountability towards female citizens. Dr Essaid's observations are incisive:

*'At the end of the day "yes" the Palestinian issue is used as an excuse but let's say there was no Palestinian issue, and let's say that most Jordanian women weren't married to Palestinian men; are we saying that then we would be giving Jordanian (citizenship)? That is the real question. Would we then be giving Jordanian nationality to the children of spouses the same way it's given to men? And I know that's a theoretical question but in my opinion, I still don't think we would be. Because I think the root of the problem is gender discrimination; we don't see Jordanian women as equal citizens to Jordanian men'.*⁸⁴⁶

2011 proved something of a turning point for the campaign as its advocates were involved in the wider Kingdom-wide demonstrations led by the *Hirāk*, and in August the campaign under the banner 'My Mother is Jordanian and her Citizenship is My Right' was officially launched.⁸⁴⁷ But unlike instances of public protest involving marches and speeches, characteristic of those in down-town Amman, Habashnah and her supporters used almost exclusively sit-ins in highly visible areas such as the Fourth Circle (*Duwār al-Rāba'a*). After taking up a position, the participants use slogans and banners for instance 'we are citizens (fem) and we will not accept that we are half citizens' to attract attention and convey messages to passers-by.⁸⁴⁸ In light of the Kings' discussion papers it is interesting to note that the advocates and participants in the campaign were

⁸⁴⁴ My Nationality is the Right of My Family Coalition, *Policy Brief*, p. 6.

⁸⁴⁵ Mohammed al-Fadilat, 'Civil Rights Granted to Children of Jordanians and Foreigners', *alaraby.co.uk*, November 9, 2014, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2014/11/11/civil-rights-granted-to-children-of-jordanians-and-foreigners> (accessed December 30, 2017).

⁸⁴⁶ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁸⁴⁷ Gerasa News, 'Itlāq Ḥamlah Umi Urduniyah wa Jinsiyyatha Ḥaq li li-Tajnees Abnā' al-Urduniyyāt', *gerasnews.com*, August 4, 2011, <http://www.gerasnews.com/article/53229> (accessed December 30, 2017).

⁸⁴⁸ Gerasa News, 'al-Duwār al-Rāba'a: I'tiṣām "Umi Urduniyyah wa Jinsiyyatha Ḥaq li" Ṣabāḥ Youm Ghad', *gerasnews.com*, June 1, 2011, <http://www.gerasnews.com/index.php?page=article&id=48969> (accessed December 30, 2017).

engaged in the very kind of local action advocated for in the analogy of active citizenship. Subsequently the involvement of civil society and members of parliament in the campaign highlights the existing possibilities and limitations of Jordan's institutions in responding and being accountable to citizen action.

In her capacity as director of the King Hussein Foundation Research and Information Center, and member of the coalition supporting full citizen rights, Dr Essaid approached nine to ten MPs, seeking meetings to acquire their support. Six of them acquiesced, and her reflection was that 'they were responsive, they took the time to meet with me, and not just me but with other members of the coalition, some working in their offices, others outside; they accommodated us'.⁸⁴⁹ Parliamentarians then do at times, adopt advocacy roles. In the context of the coalition's aims, receiving parliamentary support is crucial for at least two reasons. One, the process of legislative change requires action from the members of the legislature. And two, because parliamentarians and the government itself possess agendas with a hierarchy of objectives, effort needs to be exerted to bring an issue that might not exist on either agenda into the parliament as an item of business.

One of the MPs who met with and advised the coalition was Mustapha al-Hamarneh, the leader of the Initiative Bloc (*al-Mubadara*) in the 17th parliament. His advice centred on the need for the coalition to divide the end goal – full citizenship rights – into a series of outcomes that could, given the environment, be achieved within parliamentary sitting periods.⁸⁵⁰ To this end, his advocacy in the parliament on behalf of the coalition was focused on prosecuting the case for civil rights to be awarded to the children in question. Despite the best efforts of *al-Mubadara* however, the goalposts on the issue and the intra-parliamentary debate kept shifting. 'In the end' Dr Essaid recalls, 'what they (the parliament) delivered was what they were called privileges; however, if you look at them they are more services as opposed to privileges'.⁸⁵¹ At the very least, this demonstrates that sustained activity on the part of citizens can influence debates and decisions in the parliament. The accumulated impact of informal and formal political engagement yielded some constructive outcomes: after more than a year of sit-ins, and some parliamentary negotiating, the

⁸⁴⁹ Aida Essaid, (Director Information and Research Centre King Hussein Foundation) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid.

government announced in November 2013 the establishment of a ministerial committee to examine the possibility of extending civil rights. Khaled Khaladeh, then Minister of Political and Parliamentary Affairs and member of the committee reported in August 2014 the committee's recommendation that regulation, rather than laws be used to address the issue, saying that improvements were 'only a matter of time'.⁸⁵² In practical terms this meant that the children of Jordan mothers and non-Jordanian fathers would receive privileges (*mazāyāt*) including free access to public health and education providers. When asked about the possibility of acquiring citizenship, Khaladeh was upfront asserting that it 'will not be granted to children of these families because of its political implication'.⁸⁵³

This is despite an earlier constitutional review committee in 2011 suggesting that Article 6 of the Constitution should be amended so as to preclude gender discrimination.⁸⁵⁴ It took a further three months for details of the regulation to be released and their benefits distributed to families. Then Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour and Interior Minister Hussein al-Majali announced that the package, estimated to cost sixty-two million Jordanian dinars would assist 355, 923 children and 88,983 mothers.⁸⁵⁵ Soon afterward, Nima Habashnah lost her battle with cancer,⁸⁵⁶ but this did not prevent others from the coalition continuing the work of the campaign she initiated a decade before. What was changing however was the object of demonstration. In addition to the wider absence of equal citizenship, advocates and participants found themselves demonstrating (often in front of the Prime Minister's departmental offices), in opposition to the execution of government policy. Part of the government's response involved the issuance of identification documents to the children and parents who for the reasons outlined above could not claim (and receive) citizenship. By December 2015 the Civil Status and Passports Department (CSPD) had issued 56,000

⁸⁵² Khalid Khaladeh cited in Rana Husseini, 'Granting Service-related Privileges to Children with non-Jordanian Fathers 'a matter of time' — Kalaladeh', *Jordan Times*, August 11, 2014, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/granting-service-related-privileges-children-non-jordanian-fathers-matter-time%E2%80%99-%E2%80%94> (accessed December 31 2017).

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ HRW Report 2012 – situation remains as of 2017 despite pressure from civil society and some changes to the penal code.

⁸⁵⁵ Mohammed al-Fadilat, 'al-Urdun Yuqarr Tashilāt li-Abnā' al-Urduniyāt, *alaraby.co.uk*, November 9, 2014, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/2014/11/9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA> (accessed December 30, 2017).

⁸⁵⁶ Rana Sweiss, 'Nima Habashneh'.

certificates, needed for adolescents to acquire drivers' licenses, access health and education services, and for their parents to enter the property market and obtain work permits. The problem for many who had received these was that they were not being accepted by civil employees. Illuminated is the reality that for citizens, accountability is not just about parliamentarians or government promises, but equally concerns the performance and response of the civil service.

Carriers of identity papers were being told at police stations, clinics and other such government sites across the country that their identification could not be accepted. Many felt they had returned to square one.⁸⁵⁷ Despite government assurances that their grievances would be addressed, many continued to struggle to access the promised privileges. Of seminal concern here is the extent to which accountability of government to citizens exists in practice. Mayada Barghouti, a participant in the movement, married to an Egyptian citizen, alludes to as much, recognising the differing pace with which governments respond to various policy areas. Arguing: 'the government is quick in applying Mulki's (the Prime Minister as of May 2016) instructions when it comes to raising the prices of commodities. But when it comes to our rights, it is totally ignored. We do not want privileges. We want citizenships for our children'.⁸⁵⁸ Having said that, the power of citizens to extract concessions from government and to force an issue onto the government's agenda is equally represented in the tireless advocacy and utilisation of both formal (MPs and civil society) and informal (sit-ins) channels of participation.

In March 2017 in a joint-session of parliament, a majority of MPs voted to centralise the authority of the Interior Minister so that he/she alone now possessed the sole authority to issue and residency permits to the children in question. A practical outcome for parents and their children was that from now on they need only visit the single government agency, instead of proceeding through a bureaucratic quagmire of multiple agencies in order to obtain and renew their residency.⁸⁵⁹ Simultaneously, although privileges are beneficial in alleviating day-today living

⁸⁵⁷ Rana Hussein, 'Protesters Want Full Rights for Children of Jordanian Women Married to Foreigners; Picket Prime Ministry', *Jordan Times*, March 29, 2016, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/protesters-want-full-rights-children-jordanian-women-married-foreigners-picket-prime> (accessed March 29, 2016).

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁹ Rana Hussein, 'Activists welcome decision on children of Jordanian women married to foreigners', *Jordan Times*, March 27, 2017, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/activists-welcome-decision-children-jordanian-women-married-foreigners> (accessed March 28, 2017).

pressures on families, they constitute a bandaid solution. For the children at the centre of the maelstrom, their ability to participate in the social, economic and political life of their society structured by the state is curtailed in the absence of citizenship. They retain their status as *persona non-grata* and, consequently, are barred from active participation in Jordanian society regardless of whether Jordan is the only home they have ever known.

More than this, they may be prevented from re-entering the country. A case reported in the Jordanian Press involved Zamam Ahmad, whose husband is a Syrian national. After visiting his family her twenty-year-old son was barred from entering the Kingdom and was forced to return to Idlib in Syria to await approval of entry by Jordanian officials. He was killed in a rocket attack; his mother erudite in reflecting ‘my son was killed because his father is not Jordanian’.⁸⁶⁰ Ergo, this is not an issue of abstract privilege or rights, but one of life and death for the individuals and families involved. Jordan’s reform trajectory suffers additionally from this state of affairs. Accepting Adnan Hussein’s contention that democratic practice is only possible through the individual citizen,⁸⁶¹ what kind of democratic practices and principles are being developed in Jordan where constitutionally sanctioned (through its silence) discrimination occurs?

6.4 : Conclusion

In this chapter I endeavoured to illustrate and analyse one of the ways in which the realities of Jordanian citizenship is contested and negotiated. The women at the centre of the campaign: ‘My Mother is Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’, in attempting to acquire the same citizenship-based capacity to transfer citizenship as their male counterparts, are challenging the gendered hierarchies of Jordan’s contemporary citizenship regime. Their actions are, I argued, illustrative of a search for both ownership and accountability. Regarding the former, the example of Nima Habashnah and her co-campaigners is one of an endeavour seeking ownership of rights provisioned by citizenship, but denied to them because of their gender. This concerns accountability in two important ways. Firstly, of citizens demanding the state to which they are

⁸⁶⁰ Rana Hussein, ‘Protesters Want Full Rights for Children of Jordanian Women Married to Foreigners’.

⁸⁶¹ Adnan el-Said Hussein, ‘Al-Muwātanah fī al-Watan al-Arabi’, p. 18.

associated is accountable to them, therein requesting a degree of ownership of, and in, the state. Secondly, the appeal of these citizens is for the state to be accountable to its own agreed to commitment to domestic and international conventions.

Within this there is perhaps a more profound element at play. In seeking ownership of their right as citizens to transmit their citizenship like their male counterparts, the women of the coalition are requesting that the state adopts, and enforces, equality of citizens irrespective of gender. They are demanding that the central mechanism, through which the state distinguishes those within its borders, be one of citizenship (*jinsiyyah*) holders and non-citizenship holders. By virtue, the issue strikes at the core of the theory and practice of citizenship, and of national identity. If the two are not aligned, as in this case, ‘you will be excluding people who should not be excluded’.⁸⁶² Therefore, the expectation that citizenship override other considerations and identities such as gender, religion and national identity, reveals that the issue is ultimately about citizenship.

⁸⁶² Anonymous, (Political analyst and researcher) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

Chapter Seven

7. Nahed Hattar, Freedom of Expression as an Act of Citizenship

7.1 : Introduction

In preceding chapter, our focus coalesced around the negotiated and contested gendered realities of citizenship in Jordan through the example of the ‘My Mother is a Jordanian and Her Citizenship is My Right’ Coalition. Within which I elucidated different elements of ownership, accountability and their absence. Our present chapter retains this interest in the contested and negotiated facets of citizenship, but approaches the notions of accountability and ownership in a more indirect and conceptual manner. Taking contestations surrounding freedom of expression in Jordan as its key point of coalescence, this chapter focuses on the events leading up to and the aftermath of the assassination of Jordanian intellectual Nahed Hattar in September 2016. In the wake of Hattar’s assassination, debate raged anew about the present and future nature of the Jordanian state.⁸⁶³

Thus his murder re-energised a long standing discussion, whose latest manifestation had emerged un-expectantly during the recent election campaign leading up to the 20 September 2016 poll. The *Ma’an* (Together) Electoral List from Amman’s Third District initiated their campaign with orange banners positioned around the city emblazoned with the words ‘Together for a Civil State’ (*Ma’an lil-dawlah al-Madaniyah*).⁸⁶⁴ Thus, I argue, when analysed in light of its contemporary and historical context, the murder of Nahed Hattar illuminates some intriguing facets of Jordan’s citizenship regime. This is especially so given that the King responded to it directly. He personally visited the family to pay his condolences, and released his sixth discussion

⁸⁶³ Jumana Ghunaimat, ‘Huwiyah al-Dawlah min al-Jadid’, *al-Ghad*, October 17, 2016, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/1194532-%D9%87%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF> (accessed October 17, 2016).

⁸⁶⁴ ‘Ma’an’ (Together): *Ma’an: Qā’imat al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah: al-Barnāmej al-Intikhābi* (Amman, 2016).

paper: ‘The Rule of Law - the Foundation of the Civil State’ (*al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah*) in the immediate aftermath. Its contents, which shall be discussed in this chapter, is distinct from the previous five in that it does not focus on reform so much as citizenship in the context of the civil state.

Demonstrably, the assassination of Hattar opens a window into some vitally significant discussions about contemporary citizenship in Jordan. That Hattar was a member of Jordan’s Christian minority complicated the scenario, by bringing sectarian discourse to the fore, especially on social media platforms.⁸⁶⁵ One of the aspects raised concerns the dualism implicit in the Hashemite regime’s image construction of Jordan: one abroad to an external audience, the other internal to domestic constituencies. The case examined below compares the different responses from the regime led by the Monarch, to the Charlie Hebdo shootings of 2015, with those of the Hattar affair. Through this I assert that the production and strategic employment of both of these images limits the ability for Jordanians to relate with the state as citizens. Precisely because the images engender a hierarchical structure of constituencies in vertical relation to the state, its institutions and political authority, while simultaneously weakening the capacity for horizontal relations grounded in citizenship to emerge.

To be clear, this manifests itself in numerous ways. Regarding political parties for example, although the King declares publically his support for the development of parliamentary government with active parties, these same parties remain shackled by the legal parameters of the electoral system; with the method of voting and district allocations chief among them. This has led observers including Oreib al-Rantawi to disclose ‘there is no interest for the regime to weaken its vertical [social] structures and strengthen the horizontal counterpart in general because there is a

⁸⁶⁵ Rana Sweiss & Peter Baker, ‘Writer Charged with Insulting Islam is Killed as Extremism Boils Over in Jordan’, *New York Times*, September 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/world/middleeast/nahed-hattar-jordanian-writer-killed.html?_r=0 (accessed September 26, 2016); Anonymous, ‘Watch What You Say: 10 Jordanians to be Sued for Hate Speech on Social Media Following Hattar Assassination’, *al-bawaba.com*, September 26, 2016, <http://www.albawaba.com/news/watch-what-you-say-10-jordanians-be-sued-hate-speech-social-media-following-hattar-assassinatio> (accessed September 27, 2016); Suha Maayeh, ‘Jordan Police Make Arrests Over ‘Social Media Hate’’, *The National*, September 27, 2016, <http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/jordan-police-make-arrests-over-social-media-hate> (accessed September 27, 2016).

belief, especially in the security apparatus, that they can serve better as a tool to strengthen and consolidate the regime’.⁸⁶⁶

Similar arrangements, as I shall explore, constrain freedom of expression in the Kingdom. A consequence being a withdrawal of trust in state processes and institutions (including in this instance, the rule of law), without which a citizen, as opposed to subject based political order, necessary for any transition away from authoritarian governance cannot emerge. More than this however, the withdrawal of trust, negatively affects the *depth* of citizenship as an identity competing with others individual and collective actors possess concomitantly. The inability of citizenship to aggregate the naturally disparate identities and interests of those living within the boundaries of its theoretical influence, reduces the capacity for citizen-subjects to live cohesively as a community of citizens irrespective of the natures of their other identities.

7.2 : The Assassination of Nahed Hattar

On Thursday 22 September 2016 I made a call to request an interview. I had planned to do this a month earlier, but events that had transpired precluded me from doing so. Through a mutual friend I suspected the individual I was calling would be busy, and so it was. A pending court case scheduled to begin in three days’ time meant I would have to wait for my interview. This did not bother me, I understood, and felt I had sufficient time in reserve before leaving Jordan. I was wrong. On Sunday morning 25 September as was my daily routine, I opened the webpages of Jordan’s daily newspapers. Emblazoned on the homepage of *al-Ghad*, I read ‘*Aājil – Urgent*. Nahed Hattar it read had been shot on the steps of the Palace of Justice (courthouse) in Amman while entering to commence his trial for blasphemy and disrupting social cohesion. He was dead. Hattar, a noted Trans-Jordanian nationalist and leftist intellectual was no stranger to controversy in Jordan. He had been jailed for “offences” in the past, and amongst other things, gained some notoriety after having engaged with the late King Hussein in a war of words during the mid-nineties over his article *Min Huwe al-Urduni?*

⁸⁶⁶ Oreib al-Rantawi, (Director al-Quds Center for Political Studies) interview with the author, Amman, September 19, 2016.

Tariq Tell remembers the exchange, emphasising its location within a post-Oslo and Jordan-Israel peace context, in which there was ‘a lot of critical conjuncture and the King was a bit shocked I think by some of the opposition’. Recalling an address Hussein gave to a group of military generals, Tell explains ‘he was trying to batten down. So what he said is you say who is a Jordanian? What is Jordan without us [the Hashemites]? We built it...of course with your help. So the idea is that we built Jordan and we tell you what its boundaries will be, and we will give you certain dispensations, but in return you give us loyalty. That is the equation’.⁸⁶⁷ More than two decades later, it seems appropriate, albeit in a macabre way, that in death Hattar would continue the debate around the questions of who is a Jordanian and what is her/his relationship to the regime and the state.

But before approaching that aspect in detail it is necessary to ask how this situation, which led Hattar to the Courthouse that Sunday morning, materialised. On August 12 Nahed Hattar reposted a cartoon titled “the Lord of ISIS” on his personal Facebook page. He was neither the first nor the last Jordanian to share this caricature on social media. According to his family this act generated a near immediate campaign against him, orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, their public mouthpiece the *Assabeel* newspaper, and several prominent former parliamentarians.⁸⁶⁸ Central to the campaign was the claim that Hattar had insulted the divine, a punishable crime under the Jordanian Penal Code. In response to this, Hattar released a detailed clarification to *Ammon News* regarding his reasoning:

‘I have shared a post that contained a cartoon entitled ‘the lord of ISIS,’ to which I have no connection whatsoever, as claimed by the Brotherhood. The cartoon mocks terrorists and their image of God and heaven, and does not offend the divine being in any way, shape or form. In fact, it rids the concept of divinity of what the terrorists promote. There are two types of people who were angered by this image: good people who did not understand the

⁸⁶⁷ Tariq Tell, (Associate Professor American University Beirut) interview with the author, Amman, March 25, 2016.

⁸⁶⁸ ‘Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar’, available at: <https://eng.nahedhattar.net/statement-from-the-family-nahed-hattar/> (accessed March 17, 2018).

*meaning, which is to mock the terrorists and see divinity as devoid of what is attributed to it in the terrorist mind; and these people I respect and appreciate. And ISIS-supporting Muslim Brothers, who themselves possess this sick imagination concerning the relationship between humans and the divine. The latter have exploited the caricature to settle political feuds which have nothing to do with their claims’.*⁸⁶⁹

The debate and with it the dissemination of misinformation continued. Hani al-Mulki, then care-taker Prime Minister, who had been the target of Hattar’s particularly sharp pen in June,⁸⁷⁰ sanctioned Hattar’s arrest in the wake of increasingly heated online discussions.⁸⁷¹ The police, under the directive of then Interior Minister Salamah Hamad, went to Hattar’s Amman residence to take him into custody. Finding him absent, the Governor of Amman publically labelled the writer ‘a fugitive from justice’.⁸⁷² Upon hearing of this, Hattar turned himself in to police and was arrested the following day 13 August. The Government responded further by imposing a media gag on the events while Hattar was held in Marka Jail, located in Amman’s Eastern suburbs. No further action was taken by the government to counter the misinformation circulating in the public sphere. The family reported that the defamatory campaign pursued against Hattar continued after his arrest. Several complaints were directed at the writer from different sources ‘from the Attorney General of Karak, to South Amman, to the Palace of Justice’.⁸⁷³ But, they argue, each of the complaints was ‘filed by lawyers with known affiliations to the Brotherhood movement’, which only increased their suspicion at the direct involvement of the Brotherhood in the campaign.⁸⁷⁴

While in custody there were concerns for Hattar’s safety from both the campaign outside the jail, and the actions of state officials inside. Regarding the former, it continued unabated on

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁰ Nahed Hattar, ‘Hal Tajāwaz al-Mulki Ḥadudo?’, *Ammon News*, June 20, 2016 <https://www.ammonnews.net/article/272765> (accessed March 17, 2018).

⁸⁷¹ Al-Ghad, ‘Istoda‘ā’ Hattar Lil-Taḥqīq Ḥawwal Manshour al-Dhāt al-Ilāhiyah’, *al-Ghad*, August 12, 2016 <http://alghad.com/articles/1066992> (accessed August 13, 2016). Al-Mulki according to Hattar’s family acted unlawfully in this action by wilfully usurping the role of the Attorney General.

⁸⁷² Arab Times, ‘al-Muḥariḍ ‘ala Qatil Nahed Hattar... Yunāqish waraqah al-Malik Ba‘ad Qalil’, *Arab Times*, October 23, 2016, http://www.arabtimes.com/portal/news_display.cfm?Action=&Preview=No&nid=22599&a=1 (accessed March 18, 2018). The Hattar family added: ‘The Ministry of the Interior has also usurped the role of the General Prosecution Office, the only institution with the legal right to decide whether an individual is a fugitive or not, as stated in Article 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure’. See ‘Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar’.

⁸⁷³ ‘Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar’.

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid.

social media, which was not bound to the media gag in the same way as news producers whether news-based websites or print media institutions were. Some more odious commentary from the online public sphere included calls for his execution or for torturous methods to be used in punishment; all of which expressed in the absence of any court verdict, and in an environment devoid of factual information as a consequence of the media gag. In jail, Hattar was branded a dangerous criminal and had his hands and feet shackled. When taken to the al-Bashir hospital for treatment he was fettered to his bed, and was not released from this state despite a doctor's request.⁸⁷⁵ His family additionally documented instances of wilful neglect, and what they considered 'torture'.⁸⁷⁶ After almost a month, on September 8, he was released pending trial for 'insulting the Divine' (*Isā't lil-dhāt al-Ilahiyah*); a Charge derived from two articles in the Jordanian Penal Code 1960 (amended 2011).⁸⁷⁷ Article 150, in chapter two, addresses crimes against 'national unity', and thus enables the criminalisation of 'any writing or discourse' that incites sectarian or racial tensions. Article 278 meanwhile, criminalises actions which 'insults' (*Ihānah*) 'religious sentiments' and/or the 'religious beliefs of others'.⁸⁷⁸

Given the social climate surrounding Hattar, his family asked for police protection, similar to that given to Toujan Faisal and Laith al-Shubailat decades earlier.⁸⁷⁹ These were denied. In the morning of Sunday August 25, Nahed, accompanied by two of his sons and his solicitor arrived at the Palace of Justice in Amman to initiate the trial proceedings. As they approached the entrance to the courthouse, the gunman, who would be later identified as Riad Ismail Ahmed Abdullah intercepted the group and shot Hattar three times. One of the sons, Mutaz, recalled that the cadre of attendant police officers did not appear to show any urgency while his older brother chased the assassin, who was later remanded in custody.⁸⁸⁰ A 49-year old citizen of Jordan, residing in the *al-Hāshami al-Shamāli* neighbourhood of Amman, Ismail had been employed by the Ministry of

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁷ Mawfaq Kamāl, 'al-Mada' ai al-'ām Yuwaqaf Nahed Hattar', *al-Ghad*, August 14, 2016, <http://alghad.com/articles/1069542> (accessed March 18, 2018).

⁸⁷⁸ Jordanian Government, Penal Code (*Qānun al-'Aqubāt*), No. (29) 1960. Art 150 & 278.

⁸⁷⁹ 'Statement from the Family of Nahed Hattar'.

⁸⁸⁰ Robert Fisk, 'The Anguish of a Family Seeking Justice for Writer Shot Outside Jordanian Court', *The Independent*, December 8, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-anguish-of-a-family-seeking-justice-for-writer-shot-outside-jordanian-court-a7463611.html> (accessed December 9, 2016).

Education as a computer engineer, in addition to being an Imam in two local mosques.⁸⁸¹ He was known to have been abroad prior to the trial, returning to Jordan after having participated in Haj.⁸⁸² Information gathered by Hattar's family suggests he had spent some of his time abroad fighting in Syria against the forces of President Bashar al-Assad, potentially indicative of his sectarian radicalisation.⁸⁸³

Questions emerged from those close to Hattar about how Ismail knew about the time and date of the trial, the details of which had not been publically listed. It was later learned that the newspaper *Assabeel* had leaked the details. Khaled Hattar, Nahed's brother is adamant that the Government was responsible for leaking the details to the paper.⁸⁸⁴ The manner of his death, gunned down in front of the courthouse before his trial could commence shocked Jordanians, and representatives of political currents across the political spectrum including the Democratic People's Party (HASD) and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) condemned the assassination.⁸⁸⁵ Hamza Mansour, former Secretary General of the IAF, for example condemned it as 'criminal offence', adding that 'no one has the right to injure the spirit of a man save the Judiciary'.⁸⁸⁶ The

⁸⁸¹ Farah Maraqa, 'Tadā'ayāt Ightiyāl al-Kātib Hattar', *Rai al-Youm*, September 25, 2016, <https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1/> (accessed September 27, 2016).

⁸⁸² Anonymous, 'Min Huwe Riyād Ismā'il Ahmad Abdullah Qātil al-Kātib Nahed Hattar?', *MCD*, September 25, 2016, <https://www.mcdoualiya.com/articles/20160925-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B6-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84> (accessed September 26, 2016).

⁸⁸³ Robert Fisk, 'The Anguish of a Family Seeking Justice for Writer Shot Outside Jordanian Court'.

⁸⁸⁴ Khaled Hattar cited in *ibid*.

⁸⁸⁵ The Jordan Times, 'Government, Unions Condemn Hattar Murder', *Jordan Times*, September 25, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gov%E2%80%99t-unions-condemn-hattar-murder> (Accessed September 25, 2016).

⁸⁸⁶ Assabeel, 'Hamzah Mansour: La Yuḥaq Li-Aḥad Izhāq Rouḥ Insān Ghair al-Qaḍā'', *Assabeel*, September 25, 2016, <http://assabeel.net/news/2016/09/25/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1> (accessed September 25, 2016).

Government for its part labelled it a ‘reprehensible crime’ (*al-Jarimat al-Nakrā*),⁸⁸⁷ and vowed to use ‘an iron fist’ against anyone who threatens Jordanian unity.⁸⁸⁸

Similar themes were publically affirmed by King Abdullah II during his visit to Hattar’s family five days later. Over the course of this visitation, the King condemned the assassination, referring to it as both heinous and foreign to ‘our authentic Jordanian people and our culture’.⁸⁸⁹ He additionally promised the establishment of an independent inquiry to investigate the murder. To this day the government has not followed through on this promise, contributing further to Hattar’s family’s belief that the government was involved in the murder. The assassination ruptured the long-held image of Jordan by Jordanians and the state itself as an oasis of stability and relative predictability in a neighbourhood often characterised by the opposite. This was not because the assassination ushered in a period of lynching and inter-communal violence. Rather, it elucidated the extent to which sectarianism and the bigotry of tightly held opinions had permeated into Jordanian society, challenging the “unity” narrative of the nation fostered discursively but perhaps neglected in practice by the regime. In this way the Hattar affair is demonstrative of the same intercommunal disassociation that made it possible to question whether it was permissible to give condolences to the young boy whose tragic death was raised in chapter four. In other words the depth of citizenship was revealed to be comparatively shallow next to other identities such as religion, sect and tribe extant in the community.

7.3 : Citizenship in the Crucible – Nahed Hattar & Charlie Hebdo

At first glance, there may not appear to be sufficient similarities between the murder of Nahed Hattar and the January 07 2015 shootings at the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris to warrant beneficial comparison. One is domestic to Jordan, the other external involving no Jordanians directly.

⁸⁸⁷ Ammon News, ‘al-Hukumah: Jarimah Nakrā’, *Ammon News*, September 25, 2016, <http://www.ammonnews.net/article/283423> (accessed September 26, 2016).

⁸⁸⁸ Al-Quds al-Arabi, ‘al-Hukumah al-Urduniyyah Tastankar Jarimah Ightiyāl al-Kātib Nahed Hattar’, *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, September 25, 2016, <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=603156> (accessed September 26, 2016).

⁸⁸⁹ Al-Ghad, ‘Al-Malik fi ‘azā’ Hattar: Nadayyen Hadhi al-Jarimah al-Bash‘ah wa al-Gharibah ‘ala al-Urdunien’, *al-Ghad*, September 29, 2016, <http://alghad.com/articles/1156992> (accessed September 30, 2016).

However, an inspection of the official regime response to both provides an advantageous point of comparison insofar as it stands as an intriguing window into the relationship between Jordanians as citizen-subjects and political authority. Specifically, it suggests that the regime is more willing to meet and perform to the expectations of external partners than to citizens. A key component of this is a willingness to support freedom of expression as a right given to citizens of other countries, but in practice, not accord the same to Jordanians in the face of political expediency. Together the two make a question of consistency, or rather the inconsistency and arbitrary nature of the application of law when it concerns citizen rights instead of national security.

In the wake of the shooting murder of twelve people, including employees, at the offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, King Abdullah II and Queen Rania marched with other world leaders through Paris in solidarity with France and in support of freedom of expression.⁸⁹⁰ In an interview, the Queen commented that their participation ‘sent a very important message of world unity against ideological extremism’. Elaborating that the message of global unity is ‘exactly what they do not want’ to emerge out of so public an attack.⁸⁹¹ Royal participation therefore appeared justified on the basis of combating ideological extremism on the global, regional, and one would anticipate domestic levels. The Queen constructs a clear link between support for freedom of expression and the struggle against the dogma of fanaticism. More than this her statement is lucid in declaring that fanaticism anywhere is a threat to freedom everywhere.

The struggle against fanaticism, especially of the Islamic variety has been one in which Jordan has been active ‘way before September 11th’,⁸⁹² and more than that has been integral to Jordan’s foreign policy. In the case of the solidarity march, the Doha Institute reflected that the royal couple’s involvement ‘served to highlight the security-enhancing role of the Kingdom in the

⁸⁹⁰ Al-Jazeera, ‘Millions Attend Unity Rallies in France’, *aljazeera.com*, January 12, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2015/01/huge-crowds-attend-paris-solidarity-march-20151114145225392.html> (accessed March 17, 2018).

⁸⁹¹ Annahar, ‘Mādthā Qālat al-Malikah Rania ‘an Qaḍiyah Charlie Hebdo?’, *annahar.com*, January 21, 2015, <http://www.annahar.com/article/207452-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%88> (accessed March 17, 2018).

⁸⁹² Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II During the “Supporting Syria and the Region Conference”’, (Speech: London, United Kingdom, February 04, 2016), <https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/during-%E2%80%9Csupporting-syria-and-region-conference%E2%80%9D> (accessed February 23, 2016).

international war on terrorism'. The presence of the Jordanian King and Queen served to consolidate 'the image Jordan has long sought to promote of itself in the West, of a "moderate" Sunni Islam, rooted in historical and symbolic legitimacy, through its Hashemite lineage'.⁸⁹³ Projecting this image abroad has been historically advantageous to Jordan. However, comparatively less cogitation has been spent on how, in an era of globalisation, the twenty-four hour media cycle and social media, this projected image of Jordan has been received at home, and, how this representation might differ from the one projected to the domestic audience. In addition, if there are differences and inconsistencies between the representations, what impact does this have over time on state-society relations and the practice of citizenship?

Criticism of the royal presence in Paris expressed by Jordanians via social media was audible. One, associated with the *Hirak*, was excoriating of the King in a post on Facebook exclaiming, 'as a Jordanian your solidarity with Charlie (Hebdo) does not honour or represent me'.⁸⁹⁴ Another, close to the Islamic Reform Movement (*al-Hirāk al-Iṣṭiḥāḥ al-Islami*) mocked the King's attendance in Paris by contrasting it with his absence from a demonstration in support of al-Aqsa and the Palestinian resistance ten days previous.⁸⁹⁵ Both cases illustrate at best a degree of disappointment with the royal response, compounded no doubt by their own experience of the regime at home during the 2011/2012 uprisings. The *Hirak* in-particular as noted in chapter five, was subject to crack-downs and instances of police and gendarmerie brutality.

Extrapolating from these responses, two observations then may be made about the King and Queens' participation in the Charlie Hebdo march. First, the demonstration was in support of a magazine that had made a habit of inflaming (whether intended by the editors or not) the dispositions of Muslims globally, and therefore the royal action was unlikely to win open support

⁸⁹³ Arab Center for research and Policy Studies - Policy Unit Analysis, *Arab Regimes Rush to Gain Mileage from the Charlie Hebdo Attack* (Doha: the Doha Institute, 2015), p. 5.

⁸⁹⁴ Mohammed al-Fadilat, 'al-Urdun: Nāshitoun Ghāḍiboun min Mushārikat al-Malik fi Masirah Faransā', *alaraby.co.uk*, January 11, 2015, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/medianews/2015/1/11/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7> (accessed, March 17, 2018).

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

at home.⁸⁹⁶ Second, by marching with world leaders in Paris a degree of support was lent to a variety of freedom of expression that was not – and is not - available in Jordan.⁸⁹⁷ Furthermore, based on the commentary from the second critic, while the King is quick to attend a solidarity march in Paris, such initiative does not extend to supporting an issue close to many Jordanians regardless of whether they are of East Bank or Palestinian origins. A double standard then emerges between behaviour at home and abroad, which indubitably weakens the relationship between citizens feeling increasingly powerless, and the state as represented by its leadership.

Another example of this at home and abroad dichotomy was the arrest of citizens Bassem al-Rawabedah and Thabet Assaf for their part in a peaceful demonstration against the first Charlie Hebdo magazine printed in the attacks' aftermath.⁸⁹⁸ Both men, who were associated with the Islamic Reform Movement, were held *incommunicado* for two weeks in the headquarters of the GID before being tried by the State Security Court for crimes of incitement against the regime, derived from Article 149 of the Penal Code. In May 2015 this charge was changed to one of 'insulting the King' under Penal Code Article 195. Al-Rawabedah and Assaf were later that month sentenced to five and three months in jail respectively.⁸⁹⁹ Abdullah II meanwhile responded to the magazine's front page cartoon, by labelling it 'irresponsible, reckless and thoughtless'. At the same time, he asserted that a key element of freedom of speech was respect for religions, whereas the latest magazine edition was little more than a deliberate effort at insulting religion and people of faith.⁹⁰⁰

⁸⁹⁶ Middle East Eye, 'New Charlie Hebdo Cover insults Mohammed: Jordan King', *Middle East Eye*, January 15, 2015, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/new-charlie-hebdo-cover-insults-mohammed-jordan-king-592886994#block-disqus-disqus-comments> (accessed March 17, 2018).

⁸⁹⁷ In November 2014, the Deputy of the MB was arrested after criticising the UAE for branding the MB a terrorist organisation: Middle East Eye, 'Jordan Arrests Top Brotherhood Leader for Calling UAE a 'Sponsor of Terrorism'', *Middle East Eye*, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-arrest-top-brotherhood-leader-accusing-uae-rulers-sponsoring-terrorism-430864585> (accessed March 18, 2018).

⁸⁹⁸ Al-Karama, 'Two Activists Arrested for Involvement in Peaceful Demonstration Against Charlie Hebdo Cartoons Less Than Five Days After the King Abdullah Participation to Paris Rally', *alkarama.org*, January 22, 2015, <https://www.alkarama.org/en/articles/jordan-two-activists-arrested-involvement-peaceful-demonstration-against-charlie-hebdos> (accessed March 17, 2018).

⁸⁹⁹ Al-Karama, 'Release of Two Activists Charged with "Insulting the King" For Participating in Peaceful Demonstration Against Charlie Hebdo Cartoon', *alkarama.org*, <https://www.alkarama.org/en/articles/jordan-release-2-activists-charged-insulting-king-participating-peaceful-demonstration> (accessed March 17, 2018).

⁹⁰⁰ Middle East Eye, 'New Charlie Hebdo Cover insults Mohammed'.

Let us recount this episode. Jordan's monarch responds to the tragedy of the Charlie Hebdo shootings by joining world leaders in a march defending free speech, while simultaneously sanctioning the tightening of freedom of expression laws domestically.⁹⁰¹ When the satirical magazine released its first post-attack edition, the King criticised it as an exercise of freedom of expression, labelling it irresponsible, while at the same time, the state acted to detain, charge and sentence through a security tribunal, protesters who to an extent held congruent opinions with the King's condemnation. Their error in this instance was to highlight the hypocrisy of the state's (the King's) position. In the wake of Hattar's arrest and death, this dynamic manifested itself once more, with state described as engaging in an attempt at pleasing everyone, with the end result of pleasing no one.⁹⁰²

A concerning development that this dynamic vitalises is 'political alienation' (*al-Ightirāb al-Siyāsi*), whereby citizens feel powerless with no sense of control over the state.⁹⁰³ At the root of this alienation, argues Halim Barakat, is a situation in which 'the people' have become – either through perception or material reality – 'servants to the state', rather than the state serving the people. The extent to which this manifests itself is evident in the requirement for citizens to 'protect themselves from the ruling regime', when the opposite should be the convention.⁹⁰⁴ More explicitly, the citizen in the Arab world 'sees a sword hanging above his neck', and collectively, 'lives under the boot of the ruler'.⁹⁰⁵ Barakat's exegesis provides a general overview of the pervasive existence of alienation through multiple levels (family, societal, religious as well as political) of Arab society. Where he and the above discussion intersect is on the point of recognition: Arab citizens, whether intellectuals like Barakat or activists including Assaf and al-

⁹⁰¹ See for example: Human Rights Watch, 'Jordan: End Protester Trials in State Security Courts', *HRW*, November 30, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/30/jordan-end-protester-trials-state-security-courts> (accessed January 12, 2018); al-Jazeera, '“Ouwdah al-I'tiqālāt al-Siyāsiyyah Lil-Urdun Mujaddān', *aljazeera.net*, January 21, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2015/1/21/%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7> (accessed January 12, 2018).

⁹⁰² 7iber, 'Incitement, Negligence, and Complicity: How We Arrived at Hattar's Assassination', 7iber.com, September 26, 2016, <https://www.7iber.com/2016/09/incitement-negligence-and-complicity-how-we-arrived-at-hattars-assassination/> (accessed September 27, 2016).

⁹⁰³ Halim Barakāt, *al-Ightirāb fi al-Thiqāfah al-'Arabiyyah: Mutāhāt al-Insān beina al-Ḥulm wa al-Wāqa'a* (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2006) p. 91.

⁹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 92.

⁹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 92.

Rawabdeh recognise – and have done so for some time – both the hypocrisy of ruling elites, and the undesirability of their domestic political circumstances.

This contributes to the reason why press laws have been utilised as a means for consolidating regime security in the face of potentially vocal opposition, a point emphasised by Russel Lucas and Joel Campagna have demonstrated.⁹⁰⁶ During the first decade of this century it has however become increasingly important as internet-based connectivity improved in terms of speed and geographical dissemination.⁹⁰⁷ Further, a number of studies have correlated links between Internet access and mobilization during the 2011 uprisings.⁹⁰⁸ Amendments to the 1998 Press and Publications Law (PPL) approved by parliament in August 2012 are emblematic in this regard. These amendments, rumours of which had been circulating in the public sphere for almost a year, ought not to be understood as an isolated occurrence, but as the continuation (even an acceleration) of successive government (and therein regime) endeavours to restrict the practical application of citizen freedoms and rights.

In 2010 for example, the parliament passed an amendment to the 1998 law allowing charges against journalists, bloggers and other such individuals to be heard by the State Security Court (SSC).⁹⁰⁹ Enabling what hitherto was a matter for civil courts to be judged by the SSC is indicative of the kind of environment which the regime felt itself to be in even before the uprisings of 2010, and underscores the challenges before Jordanian journalists especially in publishing news stories that may appear critical in certain circles. Thanks to the revisions, the law defines an

⁹⁰⁶ Russell Lucas, 'Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99', *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 39:4 (2003), pp. 81-98; Joel Campagna, 'Press Freedom in Jordan', *Middle East Report* 206 (1998), pp. 44-48.

⁹⁰⁷ A 2012 IPSOS report stated that by March 2012 around 70% of internet users obtained their news from online rather than print sources. See: Freedom House [B]. 'Freedom on the Net 2012', available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/jordan> (accessed March 13, 2016), p. 6.

⁹⁰⁸ Axel Bruns, Tim Highfield & Jean Burgess, 'The Arab Spring and Social Media Audiences: English and Arabic Twitter Users and Their Networks', *American Behavioral Scientist* 57:7 (2013), pp. 871–898; Marc Lynch (ed.), *The Arab uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

⁹⁰⁹ Freedom House [A]. 'Jordan: Freedom of the Press 2012', available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/jordan> (accessed March 14, 2016). As part of the 2011 constitutional amendments, the jurisdiction of the SSC was limited to treason, terrorism and espionage. Whatever safety-net this provided to journalists, bloggers and other online content builders, it has not stopped charges being laid. See for example: Human Rights Watch, 'Jordan: Drop Charges for "Undermining Royal Dignity"', *HRW*, January 19, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/19/jordan-drop-charges-undermining-royal-dignity> (accessed December 13, 2017). Perhaps understandably anti-terrorism legislation was amended in 2014, expanding the definition of terrorism.

electronic publication as ‘a website with an electronic address on the worldwide web that offers publication services including news, reports, investigations, articles, and comments’.⁹¹⁰ In so doing, it considers Internet publications equivalent to print publications. Therefore, domestic online news providers are rendered subject to the same regulative environment as their print media counterparts, including the necessity of registering with the Press and Publication Department of the Ministry of Culture.⁹¹¹ To be clear this is not merely a procedure of appearing on a government list, therein obtaining official recognition and through that legitimacy. However much this is true, registration also came with material costs in licensing fees of up to one thousand Jordanian dinars - at the time a little more than 1,400 \$US – which imposed substantial obstacles on individual and independent webpage creators.⁹¹²

Moreover, amendments made to Articles 48 and 49 bestow upon the Press and Publications Department authority to close offices and block website addresses of those online platforms who are either unlicensed irrespective of the reason, or who have been perceived to have published material interpreted as ‘defamatory’.⁹¹³ By June 2013 more than three hundred websites had been blocked.⁹¹⁴ That this authority exists without needing to acquire a court’s permission, accentuates the capacity for the state security apparatus to operate unilaterally and without transparency. Demonstrating how legislation and regulation can be applied seemingly antithetically to the constitution itself.

In a more bureaucratic manner, registered publications are required to have editors-in-chief who are members of the Jordanian Press Association (JPA), and have been so for at least four years.⁹¹⁵ Though sounding innocuous, the JPA has a history of excluding working journalists,⁹¹⁶

⁹¹⁰ Basma Guthrie & Fida Adely, ‘Is the Sky Falling? Press and Internet Censorship Rises in Jordan’, *Jadaliyya*, October 31, 2012. <http://www.middleeastdigest.com/pages/index/8102/is-the-sky-falling-press-and-internet-censorship-r> (accessed July 07, 2015).

⁹¹¹ Freedom House [B]. ‘Freedom on the Net 2012’, p.5.

⁹¹² Basma Guthrie & Fida Adely, ‘Is the Sky Falling?’

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ Rayna Stamboliyska, ‘Jordan Starts Blocking "Unlicensed Websites"', *Jadaliyya*, June 06, 2013, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12069/jordan-starts-blocking-unlicensed-websites> (accessed July 08, 2015).

⁹¹⁵ Ziad Abu-Rish, ‘The Facade of Jordanian Reform: A Brief History of the Constitution’, *Jadaliyya*, May 31, 2016 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/24563/the%ADfacade%ADof%ADjordanian%ADreform_a%ADbrief%ADhistory%ADof%AD1/5 (accessed June 01, 2016).

⁹¹⁶ Magda Abu Fadel, ‘7iber, Jordan’s Gutsy Media Platform’, *the Huffington Post*, February 10, 2014,

thus membership to it is not guaranteed, and is not without potential costs to independence. To be clear however, in general terms successive governments have been more interested in targeted application of the more restrictive facets of laws. Such encourages a culture of self-censorship on the one hand, while additionally ensuring that the international reputation of the Kingdom is not sacrificed to ham-fisted securitisation.⁹¹⁷ At the same time, the influence of the amendments is one of ‘a chilling effect on expression online’,⁹¹⁸ as online news owners, content writers and bloggers frequently complain of direct or indirect interference in their work, especially with concern to so-called red line issues outlined in detail in Article 37.⁹¹⁹

The chilling effect is especially true when the PPL amendments are considered alongside the existing Penal Code. In 2013 for example, the Chief Editor and Publisher of Jafra News, an online news website, were arrested and charged on September 17 under Article 118 of the Penal Code, under which it is illegal for anyone to engage “in acts, writings, or speeches not approved by the government that would subject Jordan to the danger of violent acts or disturb its relations with a foreign state”. The pair was arrested for their role in publishing a video on a YouTube page connected with Jafra News, which reportedly showed the brother of Qatar’s Emir dancing and showering with a number of women. The video which had been posted more than a year earlier during July 2012 and according to staff was produced by a third party with no connection to the website. An alarming development in the case was its referral by the prosecution to the SSC, whose jurisdiction, as stated previously, had apparently been reduced to instances of alleged treason, terrorism and espionage. They were held for one hundred days before being released on bail.⁹²⁰

Subsequently, the al-Fara’nah and Mu’alas’ case highlights the following: firstly, the capacity for cases seemingly unrelated to terrorism, espionage or treason to be referred to the SSC,

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/magda-abufadil/7iber-jordans-gutsy-media_b_5919928.html (accessed July 08, 2015).

⁹¹⁷ The case of ‘Alaa al-Fazaa illuminates this. See: James Dorsey, ‘Assad Criticism Isolates Iran, Fails to Tackle Key Issues’, *MidEastPosts*, August 9, 2011 <http://mideastposts.com/middle-east-politics-analysis/assad-criticism-isolates-iran-fails-to-address-key-issues/> (accessed November 12, 2017).

⁹¹⁸ Freedom House [B]. ‘Freedom on the Net 2012’, p.5.

⁹¹⁹ Jordanian Government, Press and Publications Law No. (32) of 2012. Available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ar/text.jsp?file_id=338979 (accessed November 12, 2017).

⁹²⁰ Al-Maqar, ‘al-Ifraj ‘an Malān wa al-Frā’anah’, *maqar.com*, December 31, 2013, <http://maqar.com/2013/12/31/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A9/> (accessed November 13, 2017).

to which there is no appeal. Secondly, the extent to which the 2012 amendments to the PPL can be used to hold online publishers and chief editors responsible for all content and commentary posted on their webpages irrespective of who produced it. A related case involves *7iber.com* (*7iber*) an Amman based online magazine. The website began its life in 2007 as a blog whose content came from volunteer contributions. Receiving an honorary award at the third annual Jordan Web Awards in 2008,⁹²¹ the organisation came of age similar with much of the Jordanian blogosphere during the uprisings of 2011, becoming a professional internet-based magazine in 2012. The PPL amendments of that year have been influential on *7iber's* development, with one of the more observable being the requirement for all websites identifiable as news providers to be registered, a requisite *7iber* founder and current editor Lina Ejeilat likens to a state-sanctioned baptism.⁹²²

Rather than succumb to the curtailing of its independence that the registration process would entail, *7iber* engaged in a form of online nomadism, relocating from a dot.com address to dot.org, dot.net, and dot.me before returning to dot.com, with three of these domain relocations occurring between June and August 2014 as each was successively blocked by the Jordanian Media Commission. After being taken to court by the Commission and required to pay a fine for the charge of ‘managing an unlicensed media organization’, *7iber* obtained its operating license from the Commission at the end of 2014.⁹²³

As a threat to regime stability, this situation can be illuminated via constructivist understandings of the security/insecurity dyad. Diana Saco for example posits that ‘the process of describing “the threats we face” not only helps to construct those threats; it also brings a particular identity (a “we”) into existence, creates interests for that identity, and provides rationales for particular actions’.⁹²⁴ In accepting this, it is plain to see that recognition, knowledge is a potential

⁹²¹ *7iber*, ‘*7iber* Wins A Jordan Web Award’, *7iber.com*, January 31, 2009, <https://www.7iber.com/2009/01/7iber-wins-a-jordan-web-award/> (accessed November 12, 2017).

⁹²² This stipulation comes from Article 49 of the amended PPL. For Lina Ejeilat’s reflections see: Magda Abu Fadil, ‘*7iber*, Jordan’s Gutsy Media Platform’.

⁹²³ *7iber*, ‘*7iber* Marks Its 10th Anniversary’, *7iber.com*, May 29, 2017 <https://www.7iber.com/2017/05/7iber-turns-10-en/> (accessed November 10, 2017).

⁹²⁴ Diana Saco, ‘Colonizing Cyberspace: “National Security” and the Internet in Jutta Weldes (et.al) *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 264. (261-292)

threat to the status quo. I concur with Bueno de Mesquita that all regimes are founded on a web of relations involving an at time intricate balancing of forces of inclusion and exclusion, advantage and disadvantage (Bueno de Mesquita). This inclusion/exclusion doublet itself produces an accompanying we/us and them/others deuce. On this basis, the threat of knowledge/recognition to the status quo is that the regime finds itself disaggregated from the population at large. In other words, excluded from Saco's 'we'. In such a situation, a regime becomes a threat, a source of insecurity to wider political community within the state.

To use Bueno de Mesquita's terminology, the selectorate and the disenfranchised recognise their role in propping up the winning coalition, and by extension the regime, while simultaneously being excluded from the winning coalition. Adopting Partha Chatterjee's insights can assist us in illuminating this further by bringing citizenship back in. Specifically, his contention that the 'functions and activities' of modern governments generate expectations that in turn facilitate the establishment and reproduction of 'certain relations between governments and populations'.⁹²⁵ Citizenship evidently enough is one such product of these evolving relationships. And which, following Peter Nyers has developed as a central institution in shaping how populations (now organised as citizens) collectively imagine the boundaries of an acceptable model of political subjectivity.⁹²⁶ Political subjectivity is essential because it is what imbues citizenship with its content; the material poured into Laclau's empty signifier. To reference our previous examination of citizenship, it is unsurprising therefore that as an analogy or status, citizenship will demonstrate substantial variability.

Of this variability Chatterjee mentions there being at least 'two different shapes...the formal and the real'.⁹²⁷ Considering all that has been advanced thus far in relation to citizenship in Jordan, I assert the applicability of this dichotomy – despite its natural limitations. As witnessed in chapter three, Tariq al-Tell has persuasively situated the establishment and reproduction of Jordanian political subjectivity within the Hashemite compact. This order has been under pressure

⁹²⁵ Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in most of the world* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 3.

⁹²⁶ Peter Nyers (ed.) *Securitizations of Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 1.

⁹²⁷ Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed*, p. 4.

since before the events of 2011/2012, which have only underscored the extent to which old political subjectivities old models of citizenship are in need of revision.

7.4 : Discussion Paper VI – Advocating Citizen Passivity?

Three weeks after the assassination of Nahed Hattar, Abdullah II released his sixth discussion paper. While not mentioning Hattar by name, by virtue of the paper's main subject being the rule of law, it is linked directly to the murder, insofar as his murderer very publically took the law into his own hands; denying the state both its claim to the monopolisation of violence, and its capacity to act as the overarching arbitrator through the legal system. The paper is interesting therefore for its location at the crossroads of events (the assassination), and ongoing societal debates, with that revolving around citizen freedom of expression especially germane. Regarding the former, the paper is worthy of discussion for two interconnected reasons. Firstly it is part of the royal response to the murder, and is thus potentially revealing in how it situates the assassination and the events that led to it in its societal context. Relatedly, because of the nature of the cartoon at the centre of the affair, in-conjunction with Hattar being a member of Jordan's Christian minority, the paper is also a royal contribution to a wider debate about the nature of the state in Jordan.

Concerning societal debates, the paper is similarly a contribution to the question of the extent to which citizens are able to engage in freedom of expression as an accorded right. That is to say the *content* of Jordanian citizenship. In this matter, the paper shares much with its five predecessors in advancing a preference for loyalty and consensus over debate and contestation. The latter two, as the references to the immediate neighbourhood seek to confirm, readily result in disunity and instability. Whether intentional or not the King once more places citizens in the driver's seat of ownership and accountability, it is their decisions which will make the rule of law stable in Jordan. Yet this is another expression of continuity in the midst of the maelstrom, a circular way forward which, I shall argue, risks a repetition of events that led to the maelstrom to begin with.

A key factor distinguishing the sixth discussion paper from its predecessors is its content owes less to reform hungry demonstrators, and more to the need for social stability than its five predecessors. Hattar's murder was part of a chain of events that occurred over the course of 2016 both within and outside the Kingdom, which rendered the content of the King's paper pertinent. These included the March raids on an alleged ISIS affiliated cell in the northern city of Irbid;⁹²⁸ the June lone-wolf attack on a *mukhabarat* office in the *Baq'a* Palestinian refugee camp resulting in the deaths of five employees;⁹²⁹ and a number of attacks against Jordanian military instalments along its northern border with Syria.⁹³⁰ Thus the King categorises the context for action in terms of 'external shocks', a regional climate of 'conflicts and wars' encircling Jordan.⁹³¹ A governmentality characterised by security and securitisation is subsequently of prime significance. Such is reflected in the explication of citizen and state duties. For the former, it is 'necessary for every citizen to bear responsibility for defending and strengthening the rule of law' in daily life. The latter's responsibility meanwhile resides in the 'applying (*tatbeeq*) and executing (*infādth*) of the rule of law with equality, justice and integrity'.⁹³² It again falls on citizens to do the heavy lifting in actualising the rule of law. And yet this conceals the role of the regime/state in encouraging behaviours that are antithetical to the rule of law and the unity adherence to it is supposed to facilitate.

This theme is encountered throughout the paper, which is divided into four sections, each addressing a concept or issue relevant to the consolidation of the rule of law, and familiar to Jordanians: 'the Rule of Law is the Foundation of Prudent Administration', 'Wasta and Nepotism', 'Developing the Judiciary and Strengthening the Rule of Law', and 'the Rule of Law is the Buttress

⁹²⁸ Muwafaq Kamāl, 'Amn al-Dawlah Tubāshar al-Taḥqiq m'a Muqufi Khaliyah Irbid al-Irhābiyah al-Aḥad', *al-Ghad*, March 04, 2016,

<http://www.alghad.com/articles/924208-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF> (accessed March 04, 2016).

⁹²⁹ BBC, 'Jordan Officers Killed in Attack at Baqaa Camp near Amman', *BBC News*, June 06, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36459495> (accessed June 06, 2016).

⁹³⁰ Jordan Times, 'World Condemns Terror Attack on Jordan's Border', *Jordan Times*, June 22, 2016, <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/world-condemns-terror-attack-jordan%E2%80%99s-border> (accessed June 23, 2016).

⁹³¹ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State'.

⁹³² *Ibid.*

of the Civil State'.⁹³³ The first two contain three arguments/counter arguments. The first, involves taking state administration grounded on the principles of 'justice, transparency and equality' as a prerequisite condition for the achievement of sustainable socio-political development.⁹³⁴ Only by doing so it is argued, can the 'fruits' of Jordan's almost thirty years of political reform endeavours come into fruition. Taking this into account, the counter-claim is that a system in which *wasta* and nepotism are allowed to function and flourish 'erodes achievements' by undermining these very values, which when taken together with citizenship 'are the enablers of development in any society'.⁹³⁵

The second argument that King Abdullah II raises in relation to the consequences of action/inaction is that democratic transition is predicated on the existence of a state administration that takes the rule of law to its heart.⁹³⁶ By establishing this as 'an essential requirement for a successful democratic transformation', he is favourably positioned to juxtapose such a state of affairs with one developed on *wasta* and nepotism. Any social structure will encourage particular forms of behaviour, a postulation that is situated at the heart of the constructivist contention of the mutual constitution of structures to agents and agents to structures. Nicholas Onuf clarifies this ontology asserting that 'people make society and society makes people' in a continual 'two-way process' bound by rules which are the foundation of structure.⁹³⁷ By rules, Onuf denotes the 'statements' that inform people '*what we should do*', and how we respond and interact with them constitute our '*practices*'.⁹³⁸ Together, rules and practices are instrumental in the construction and occasional correction of inequalities, especially with regard to agency.

Issues of equality contribute to the third argument, namely that 'hesitation' or unwillingness to see the law applied 'in a just, transparent and competent manner leads to the loss of rights and weakens people's trust in state institutions'.⁹³⁹ The alternative argument to this claim is reflected in recent 'transgressions' on the running of state institutions by individuals, who in

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Ibid.

⁹³⁵ Ibid.

⁹³⁶ Ibid.

⁹³⁷ Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf & Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1998), pp. 59-63.

⁹³⁸ Ibid, p. 59.

⁹³⁹ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State'.

practicing *wasta* and nepotism, ‘have deprived institutions from qualified personnel and leadership’. Both of which are integral in improving the output of these institutions and their subsequent ability to serve both citizen and country.

The last two sub-sections of the discussion paper are titled: *Advancing the Judiciary and Enhancing the Rule of Law* and *The Rule of Law: Sine Qua Non-of Civil State*. Analogous with the first two, the arguments made in these segments feed into each other, and hence the appropriateness of analysing them together. Indeed, this interconnectedness emerges as a central principle. To illustrate, the King states that citizens ‘resort to the judiciary because they have confidence in its ability to deliver them justice and safeguard their rights’. Later, this initial reflection on citizens and the judiciary is consolidated by a model of the civil state (*al-Dawlah al-Madaniyah*) as one ‘that protects rights and guarantees freedoms, where all are equal in their rights and obligations’. Elaborating further, it is asserted that ‘a civil state is one that is governed by a constitution and laws that apply to all citizens without exception’, and therefore, all citizens regardless of other identifiers (religion, class etc.) have a horizontal as opposed to hierarchical relationship with the law. The following argument is made, that all civil states are governed by the rule of law, and all states governed by the rule of law are civil in nature.

The paper seeks to link the abiding by the rule of law on the part of citizens with patriotic feeling, arguing that respecting the law is ‘the true expression of our love for our country’.⁹⁴⁰ In this way the dictates of *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* are brought together. Hence, emphasis placed by the King on the rule of law can be readily interpreted as a counter-response to Hattar’s assassin – Riyadh Ismail - taking the law into his own hands. Abdullah II brings together circumstantial premises both regional and domestic across the social, political and economic spectrum, along with the goals of democracy, stability and prosperity in order to justify his claim for action in the direction of the rule of law. Argumentatively this is underpinned by how the rule of law is characterised: ‘the guarantor’ of rights’ and the ‘architecture’ for the desirable safe and balanced society.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Following on from the above summary of its content and context, the paper is part of a royal response to Hattar's assassination, especially with regards to the timing of its publication. A key way in which it contributes to the debate which became increasingly frantic following the Hattar's reposting of the cartoon was to clarify and advance a definition of the civil state (*al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah*). Exactly what constitutes a civil state had been a key discussion point in Amman's Third District and beyond during the election thanks to the Ma'an List and its calls for a civil state. The List received heavy criticism from parts of the wider electorate, including accusations of being atheistic. At their official campaign launch each member of the List addressed this criticism directly and stood behind their contentious campaign. This contention stemmed from confusion in Jordanian society about the differences between *al-dawlah al-Madaniyah* (the civil state) and *al-dawlah al-'Ilmāniyah* (the secular state), with the former equated with the latter.⁹⁴¹ Naturally this generated disconcertion amongst citizens for whom religion, and its principles, as recent public opinion surveys show, remains significant. The Arab Transformations Project, *Political and Social Transformations in the Arab World*, consisting of a phenomenal analysis of public opinion undertaken between 2011 and 2014 found for example that in 2014 98% of Jordanians identified as being 'at least somewhat religious' (73- more than Egypt at 97%), and across both 2011 and 2014 more than 75% of the population surveyed agreed that all legislation and judicial law-making should be based on Shari'a (75).⁹⁴² Of particular significance for the civil state concept, are the findings of 2014 regarding political parties, with the data suggesting a Jordanian preference for religious political parties of a little over 50% (74).⁹⁴³

Evidently the King's intervention generated public discussion. Responding to the discussion paper, Muhammad Abu Ruman agreed with the King that there is a distinct difference between a civil and a secular state.⁹⁴⁴ He argued that the Kingdom is neither a religious state (*dawla*

⁹⁴¹ See for example Fāyez al-Rabi'a, *al-Dawla al-Madaniyah wa al-Dawla al-Diniyah*, *al-Sabeel*, November 02, 2016, <http://assabeel.net/studies/item/200508-1-3> (accessed November 02, 2016). In it he argues that the civil state is the product of secular thinking.

⁹⁴² Andrea Teti, Pamela Abbott & Francesco Cavatorta, *The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, Political and Economic Transformations* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 73-75.

⁹⁴³ Ibid. p. 74. It is important to note, that only the IAF possesses a sizeable public profile in Jordan. This owes much to its social work and outreach it conducts through association with the Muslim Brotherhood. One must necessarily therefore be careful about associating this with religious belief alone.

⁹⁴⁴ Muhammad Abu Ruman, *al-Urdun... Islamiyah Ama 'ilmāniyah?*, *al-Ghad*, October 17, 2016, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/1194542-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%9F>! (accessed October 17, 2016).

diniyah) nor is it a ‘revolutionary secular state’ (*dawlah ‘ilmāniyah thuriyah*). The former connotes the existence of a theocratic state, whereas the latter refers to a state that is fundamentally against religion, its symbols and existence in the public sphere. Jordan, he positions contrastingly, is a country which bestows on religion a ‘spiritual, valuable and legislative role’ in society.⁹⁴⁵ In a more exacerbated meditation, Jumana Ghunaimat’s article ‘The Identity of the State Again’ criticises the seemingly endless ability of various ideological factions in Jordanian society to ‘redefine water with water’.⁹⁴⁶ Each clique, she writes, whether leaning towards the Islamists or more secular attitudes, extracts quotations from the King’s paper in order to declare it supports their vision for, and of, Jordan. While there is nothing wrong in principle in selective interpretation, Ghunaimat perspicaciously observes that it becomes a problem in Jordan when, as is now, this process does not advance the wider public discussion of state’s identity (and therefore of its citizens), but instead brings it ‘back to square one’.⁹⁴⁷

Ghunaimat’s image of square one is a useful entry point into revealing how freedom of expression is addressed in the discussion paper. Nahed Hattar’s travails began with his exercising, rather innocuously, his right to express an opinion. This opinion, helped by flagrant misinterpretations and misassumption, became so problematic that it risked the stability of the social fabric, therein - assuming the family is correct in their assessment of Prime Minister Mulki - providing the government a useful vehicle through which to prosecute Hattar in the court of public opinion. In light of this, Abdullah II’s discussion paper, frames the exercising of rights within the bounds of citizens’ duty to maintain national unity. Unity as a value premise is maximised rhetorically through appeals to *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*. The first of these, coalesces around the character of the individual (the King) seeking to persuade the audience. Empathy, competence and intention are important here and are demonstrated in the paper’s opening sentences, where Abdullah II links himself to Jordan’s political reform agenda and recognises the regional challenges bearing down on the Kingdom.⁹⁴⁸

⁹⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁶ Jumana Ghunaimat, ‘Huwiyah al-Dawlah min al-Jadid’.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁸ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, ‘The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State’.

The second element *pathos* concerns persuasion via emotion. Throughout the paper, love of country and pride in Jordan underpins the emotive side of the argument, specifically, with the King reflecting on ‘the tremendous respect and admiration the world has for our country’.⁹⁴⁹ In which the value of unity is underscored by the inclusive pronoun ‘our’. References are also made to the people themselves with Abdullah II conveying that ‘I find myself deeply touched by the kindness of Jordanians and so proud of your determination and patriotism’.⁹⁵⁰ He emphasises this further by way of a comparison between Jordan and its neighbours, whose ‘disintegration’ is, among other things, a result of the absence of unity.⁹⁵¹ This comparison tie into the final persuasive component, *logos*, sees the King use appeals to reason and logic to buttress the value premise of unity. When considering the poor state of the region the King laments ‘I see clearly that the absence of rule of law and its fair application was a major factor that contributed to the situation today’.⁹⁵² The appeal to reason here is predicated on a causal link between the presence of established rules and adherence to them on the part of citizens with stability, security and democratic transformation.

But what about the role of the state and its representatives in adhering to and defending established rules and civil norms? Although it is axiomatic that individuals rather than institutions make decisions, the role of institutions in directly influencing decision-making through roles cannot be so easily neglected. Roles, argues Michael Barnett, are the mechanism through which a given actor (which could be a state or individual for example), is able to participate in society and ‘comes to modify’ their behaviour overtime accordingly.⁹⁵³ In other words an actor who occupies and identifies with a given role, will seek to organise his or her behaviour in a way that simultaneously meets the requirements of that role, therefore the expectations that others within society have for that particular role. In the present case regarding citizenship, the rule of law and citizen decision-making, citizenship is the institution and to be a citizen is to occupy a role within this institution. This is because, the requirements of a role are to a great extent directed by the institutional context in which the role is established, and hence an institution only comes to regulate

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁵¹ Ibid.

⁹⁵² Ibid.

⁹⁵³ Michael Barnett, ‘Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System’, *International Studies Quarterly* 37:3 (1993), p. 274. (271-296)

and inject predictability into political life when actors adopt a consistent set of behaviour applicable to a given role.⁹⁵⁴

Institutions must therefore promote behaviours applicable to the consolidation of the rule of law, and it is in this area that the discussion circles back to square one. I suggested via my analysis of the royal response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings earlier, that while freedom of expression is defensible outside of Jordan, within the Kingdom it becomes contingent upon security considerations. On the assumption that insecurity and security are mutually buttressing, this becomes ironic. Peter Nyers vividly captures this through his analysis of risk society, that is to say one that bears witness to a paradoxical form of governance whereby rulers predicate their legitimacy on the alleviating of ‘public fears’ while concomitantly cultivating these fears because their rule is dependent upon them.⁹⁵⁵ As touched upon in the previous chapters, the state has whether willingly or not constructed and reproduced a citizenship regime that encourages certain behaviours on the part of citizens. A regime that interprets difference as an inherent danger to the sanctity of the political community, and has therefore positioned loyalty and unity as opposites, rather than as being able to coexist with difference.

Jutta Weldes expresses a similar argument. By defining crises as socially constructed entities ‘fundamentally the outcome of particular social practices, including, centrally, practices of representation’, she identifies the centrality of representations as a mechanism for framing and situational understanding.⁹⁵⁶ In order for an action to be undertaken, *the situation* needs to be understood, and understanding, especially in light of complex circumstances requires prioritising and simplifying of identified variables in the form of categories. As she elaborates, ‘representations fix in place one particular set of features’ out of a litany of features, and it is this set that comes to constitute what is understood as the reality of the situation in question.⁹⁵⁷ All action in response to reality thus understood is predicated on the interpretation and knowledge derived from this set of

⁹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 275.

⁹⁵⁵ Peter Nyers (ed.) *Securitizations of Citizenship*, p. 4.

⁹⁵⁶ Jutta Weldes, ‘The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba’, in Jutta Weldes (et.al) *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 57. (35-62)

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 57.

features. More than being an informal arrangement, this notion is manifested formally. This had profound implications for the fate of Hattar:

*'Putting Hattar on trial for inciting sectarian and racial bigotry under the penal code (a charge whose penalty could lead to three years in prison) was not at all the appropriate alternative to this heinous crime [the assassination]. In effect, his trial contributed to the promotion of hate speech by circulating the message that there is no space for differences in opinion without punishment. And the victim-blaming rhetoric of "execute him by law, do not kill him on the street" consolidates the same foundations from which the crime emerges'.*⁹⁵⁸

Similar with Hattar's family, the writer here refers to the prominent role of the state in fostering an environment in which the assassination became possible. This is something that the discussion paper does not address in more than a cursory fashion. It again falls on citizens to do the heavy lifting in actualising the rule of law, and to practice their rights.

7.5 : Conclusion

This chapter has tried to take the events leading up to and after the assassination of Nahed Hattar as a microcosm of a number of facets of Jordan's citizenship regime. Working in reverse, Abdullah II's sixth discussion paper is exceptional for a number of reasons. First, it is a public declaration of royal support (at least discursively) of the civil state as a desirable objective of the Kingdom's reform trajectory. Given the confusion that has existed surrounding the secular or atheistic tendencies of such a state, the royal intervention is a much needed one. Second, as a product of its immediate context culminating in Hattar's murder, the paper is a passionate call for faith in the state project as a guarantor of security in a tempestuous neighbourhood. Yet at the same time, the paper seems equivalent to locking the gate once the horse has bolted, knowing full well the gate

⁹⁵⁸ 7iber, 'Incitement, negligence and Complicity: How We Arrived at Hattar's Assassination, *7iber.com*, September 26, 2016, <https://www.7iber.com/2016/09/incitement-negligence-and-complicity-how-we-arrived-at-hattars-assassination/> (accessed September 27, 2016).

had been left open in the first place. The King, who given the expansion of his executive powers by the 2014 and 2016 constitutional amendments, has at least on paper, the power to take a more active role in making a citizen-based political order emerge.

That opposite developments seems to have occurred over the course of his reign highlights the problem of a state talking about the rule of law while it actively [for expediency] pursues decisions that induce an environment where adherence to this is made difficult. At its heart, the Hashemite compact which characterised the citizenship regime for much of Jordan's history from the Mandate onwards coalesced around a trade-off of economic benefits and security for loyalty to the state and its Hashemite rulers. The central importance of loyalty (to the state embodied in the individual of the monarch) as a feature of the citizenship has meant that in the contemporary period, it has proven difficult to manage a transition in loyalty to the state and its institutions.

Transitioning in this way requires citizens who feel a sufficient degree of ownership over decision-making processes, through which the individual decision-makers become accountable to the citizenry. By considering the royal response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings I endeavoured to shed light on the alienation between some very public decision-making on the part of the King, and domestic expectations. Overtime the affect has been to fragment the political community rather than unify it. This makes the practice of expression, the freedom of which is right possessed by all Jordanians, in the public sphere a potentially precarious enterprise.

Chapter Eight

8. Tribalism (*al-‘Asha’iriyyah*) and Contemporary Citizenship

*‘Jordan is still a very tribal country... as long as I cannot vote outside of my district the system will stay tribal’.*⁹⁵⁹

*‘The system favours the elite amongst the tribe, not the whole tribe’.*⁹⁶⁰

8.1 : Introduction

Extant sub-national (sub-citizen) identities, imputed deeply into the social fabric during the ongoing processes of state and nation building, reduce the ability of citizenship to act as an aggregator of interests and a common denominator of identity. This theme persists in this chapter, but it is directed towards tribalism and its intersections with citizenship in the Jordan. I am interested in enunciating how the intertwining of citizenship with tribal identities has produced something of a hybrid citizenship. Tribes, tribalism and their affiliated identities are readily employed interchangeably, and therefore I begin with meditation on what both of these mean in twenty-first century Jordan. It is important so as to illuminate the significance of state development (see chapter three) on the contemporary ways in which tribal identities intertwine with citizenship. Having explicated tribalism from tribes, the second section of the chapter considers how these interlace with a conventional practice of citizenship: elections.

⁹⁵⁹ Raed Omari, (Journalist with the Jordan Times) interview with the author, Amman, May 16, 2016.

⁹⁶⁰ Oreib al-Rantawi, (Director al-Quds Center for Political Studies) interview with the author, Amman, September 19, 2016.

This section focuses on two main areas: the way several tribes sought to mediate the district list system following the rescinding of the SNTV, and counting irregularities in the Central Bedouin district (*Badia al-Wasat*). Finally, the chapter reflects on the place of tribal customs including *jalwa* in the civil law of the state. The aim is to highlight some of the ways that Jordanians navigate, accept, and at time contest, the lived reality of their citizenship. I hope to illustrate how the ability to successfully navigate the hierarchical arrangement of Jordanian citizenship is limited to a minority of citizens who are not only affiliated with influential families within tribes, but are influential with the state especially via the security, military or economic capital they possess. Following on from this, and in a similar manner, the analysis engages with the interaction that continually takes place between civil law and tribal legal norms.

8.2 : Tribes & Tribalism in 21st Century Jordan

When *jinsiyyah* began being used as the mechanism through which the political subjectivities of residents could be distinguished from those who, from a top-down perspective, did not belong within the borders of the Emirate/state structure, it was not applied on a blank slate. In chapter three, considerable energy was exerted in following the development of citizenship and how citizenship as an institution interacted with and was influenced by internal and external events and occurrences. The absence of the proverbial blank slate is crucial in reflecting on tribalism as an idea, which unlike the tribes themselves is relatively new to the Kingdom.⁹⁶¹ It is necessary therefore to extricate tribes from tribalism. According to Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, a tribe is a ‘pyramidal and segmentary relationship aggregating extended families into higher orders of organization’ that is based on a shared understanding – real or imagined – that all are related to a common ancestor.⁹⁶²

Regarding the social organisation of these ties, Layne refers to two models, one ‘segmentary’, the other ‘concentric’. The former involves a series of political relations in which

⁹⁶¹ Linda L. Layne, ‘Tribalism: National Representations of Tribal Life in Jordan’, *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 16:2 (1987), p. 186.

⁹⁶² Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan*, p. 41.

local dynamics of alliance making and enmity, will, in theory become subordinated in the face of larger concerns or threats. Subsequently, local relations should be subordinate to the 'greater loyalty commanded' by the nation-state.⁹⁶³ A concentric model of organisation meanwhile situates the individual in a central position from which circles of kinship relations radiate outwards in a horizontal rather than vertical fashion. For Ahmad Oweidi, the inhabitants of these circles are people 'to whom' the man in the centre (and it is overwhelmingly a "he") 'owes, one way or another, legal obligations regarding the maintenance of justice'.⁹⁶⁴

Resultantly, tribal identification is as much about perception as agnation. Whereas all familial networks world over possess a genetic connection, tribal members at least in theory 'believe in the same principles; assimilate the same values and ethos; act according to the same unique rules and laws; respect the same hereditary *shaykh* (Tribal Lord); live together; migrate together; defend each other; fight together, and die together'.⁹⁶⁵ Therefore, despite the speed at which one might wish to accentuate biology's role in the constitution of tribes, it is critical to see beyond agnation to cognition, and through it, the social construction of blood and kin. As Edouard Conte reflects, while generations of families are recorded through 'ascending 'chains' (*salasil*) or 'trees' (*shajarat al-nasab*)' this does not mean that identity is a blood born entity.⁹⁶⁶ Ibn Khaldun asserted more than six centuries ago that 'humanity is the child of custom, not the child of nature',⁹⁶⁷ stressing the significance of shared experience and communal perception in the constitution of community belonging whether tribal or otherwise. Simultaneously, the function of geography and environment are essential here. Surviving in an arid environment requires the assimilation of individual interests, a respect for the guidance of leadership, and an adherence to shared principles. Failure in these would result in the death of the community.

What occurs when tribes enter, settle and operate in a different environment or more the point, within the ambit of a nation-state's supposedly centralised authority? Here tribalism as a

⁹⁶³ Linda L. Layne, 'Tribalism', p. 196.

⁹⁶⁴ Ahmad Oweidi cited in Linda L. Layne, 'Tribalism', p. 197.

⁹⁶⁵ Ghazi Bin Muhammad, *The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century* (Amman: Rutab, 1999), p. 13.

⁹⁶⁶ Edouard Conte, 'Agnatic Illusions: The Element of Choice in Arab Kinship' in Faleh Abdul-Jabar & Hosham Dawod (eds.), *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East* (London: Saqi, 2003), p. 16.

⁹⁶⁷ 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqadimah* (Cairo: Dar Ibn Jawzy, 2010), p. 104.

concept becomes significant. Tribalism evolves out of agnation, social cognition, and the models of social organisation they encourage. It is then, a relative analogy whose practice is better understood intrinsically, that is to say through deeds and narratives enacted or spoken in its name.⁹⁶⁸ And as the Jordanian case demonstrates, in an environment which is in many ways divorced from the original one in which tribes developed. Contextual divorce is at the heart of Jordanian political analyst Ibrahim Gharaibeh's assertion, that tribalism understood as anything 'other than abstract and sentimental relational ties', no longer exists in Jordan.⁹⁶⁹

As a social actor, the tribe can no longer be said to control resources independently from the state. Nor is it considered a legal entity in the eyes of the state which is now the supreme actor on the domestic stage. Resultantly, tribes cannot in the contemporary period advance the 'social and legal protection which they used to extend to members other than a nonbinding moral solidarity'.⁹⁷⁰ This was on display in July 2017, when the Ḥuwayṭāt, one of Southern Jordan's largest tribes held a conference attended by five thousand members to respond to the jailing of one of their own, Ma'ārek Abu Tāyeh. Abu Tāyeh had been convicted for murdering three American soldiers at a military base in *al-Jafr* in 2016.⁹⁷¹ In a statement released by Ḥuwayṭāt representatives after the conference, it declared the tribe rejected the verdict, which they charged was politically motivated, and dictated to Jordan by the Americans.⁹⁷² However despite the large display of force, at the time of writing, Abu Tāyeh remains in jail.

In this instance, the rule of the state is an 'institutional alternative' to the tribe in which citizens (*muwātaneen*) 'are no longer bound to their tribe for purposes of work, subsistence or protection'.⁹⁷³ Private property as the exclusive domain of the state has performed a considerable role here in the retreat of the tribe via the acquisition and subdivision of historical *diyeh* (tribal land). Bedouin and peasants are not to be found in Jordan today as they were historically because

⁹⁶⁸ Eveline J. van der Steen, 'Tribes and Power Structures in Palestine and the Transjordan', *Near Eastern Archaeology* 69:1 (2006), p. 29.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibrahim Gharaibeh, 'Mādthā Baqy min al-‘Ashā’riyyah?' *al-Ghad*, August 9, 2016, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/1061342-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%9F> (accessed August 9, 2016).

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁷¹ Dānah Jibril wa Shākar Jarār, 'Rafaḍ ‘Ashā’iri Wāsa‘a li-Qarār al-Maḥkamah’.

⁹⁷² Unknown, 'Al-Bayān al-Ḥaqāmi' (The Verbal Statement), July 21, 2017.

⁹⁷³ Ibrahim Gharaibeh, 'Mādthā Baqy min al-‘Ashā’riyyah?'

the available ways of making a living have been altered, but not yet replaced. He elaborates articulating ‘the Jordanians in departing from tribalism, Bedouinism and peasantry did not turn themselves into civil (that is to say city-oriented) societies’.⁹⁷⁴ This statement provides a sense as to the half-way space, one both civil in the sense of a cityscape, but normatively rural in its outlook, in which tribalism may continue to function.

It is an argument mediated on in an insightful essay: ‘Amman – Civic Conduct in a City not Truly Civil’, by Hisham al-Bustāni. In which he depicts an urban geography which, through intra-state migration from the hinterland to Amman, has produced something of a hybrid human cityscape. In which the city emerges as one populated not by civilians in the traditional sense of the word, but by villagers, who are no longer villagers but have not yet been shaped into new civilian-subjects of the city. One illustration concerns the ‘massive’ sexual harassment of women in the streets. This ‘civil behaviour’ insofar as it occurs in the cityscape can be followed he argues to its roots, beginning with government and private schools which are largely segregated and offer little in the way of education in ‘gender culture’.⁹⁷⁵ This in turn facilitates the development of normative behaviours, and expectations, that are consolidated within the family sphere via prevailing patriarchal norms. According to which ‘every woman in the public realm not attached to a man is a common body’ (*jasadān mushā‘iān*).⁹⁷⁶

In principle this is shared amongst societies and communities organised along patriarchal lines. Al-Bustāni contends however that in cities like New York or London, there is a civic culture capable of mediating or delimiting if not changing particular modes of patriarchal behaviour. In Amman contrastingly he argues the individuality of the city’s residents is not recognised because the city is ‘composed of collectives who adopt the vices of their place of origin (the countryside) while renouncing its virtues’.⁹⁷⁷ Hence although the city is unable to faithfully reproduce the modes of behaviour and conduct of the original locality, neither is it able to change them completely. The city then is at a disadvantage in educating residents to become civilians subject

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁵ Hisham al-Bustāni, ‘Amman: al-Salouk “al-Madani” fi Medina Laysat Medina Ḥaqqān’, *7iber.com*, January 05, 2015, <http://www.7iber.com/2015/01/amman-civil-behavior/> (accessed September 12, 2017).

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid.

to a new set of normative standards. Although the production and reproduction of civil behavioural norms is a community oriented enterprise, al-Bustāni is discerning in recognising that ‘when the state monopolizes the organization of the community and intervenes in a holistic manner, possesses a much deeper responsibility than does the individual’.⁹⁷⁸ Journalist Raed Omari makes an analogous point in relation to the persistence of tribal dynamics in Amman and elections in the city. The outcomes of which he notes are dominated by member of the five most influential collectives: ‘Abbadi, ‘Adwān, ‘Assāf, Bani Sakhr and Naimat.’⁹⁷⁹ Because general elections are organised by and for the benefit of the state, they illustrate al-Bustāni’s position perspicaciously, inasmuch as tribes have adapted to new(er) political institutions and associated practices, while maintaining some of their pre-state coherency. Thus, in Jordan, there may be ‘cities without civilisation’ a rural landscape ‘without agriculture or agricultural societies and Bedouinism without Bedouins’.⁹⁸⁰

Private property in concert with an increase in modes of production and ways of earning a living facilitated by the state has meant that those tribal leaders who are influential socially and politically are so not so much because of their tribe but because of their access to capital and employment. And because of this they may become useful to the state and its ruling elites in a way that is ‘independent’ from the tribe to which they belong. According to Gharaibeh, ‘the only organised tribe in Jordan’ which enjoys a degree of independence from the state is ‘oligarchical’ in nature, consisting of professional, economic and political elites.⁹⁸¹ Some of these come from prominent East Bank families and tribes, whereas others are Palestinian in origin. Therefore, tribalism for Gharaibeh has evolved into a pseudo-class category irrespective of blood. One may therefore speak of divisions within tribes based on individuals and individual families who enjoy privileged relations with the Hashemite regime, as the examples below attest.

However, complicating this image further is the way in which tribal norms and values have been integrated into the fabric of national identity and the citizenship regime. From the position of modernism, tribalism as an idea is often registered as threatening to solidarities anchored in the

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁹ Raed Omari, (Journalist with the Jordan Times) interview with the author, Amman, May 16, 2016.

⁹⁸⁰ Ibrahim Gharaibeh, ‘Mādthā Baqy min al-‘Ashā’riyyah?’

⁹⁸¹ Ibid.

nation-state (citizenship chief among them) insofar as it appears to denote ‘the placing of family ties before all other political allegiances’.⁹⁸² Nuance is necessary given ‘the problem is not primordial ties versus civil attachments’, but rather the nation-state is itself ‘imagined in more than one style’.⁹⁸³ One of these styles appropriates the imagery and norms of Jordan’s Bedouin past, fusing the individual citizen’s identification with tribe (where applicable) and state together, under the umbrella of the Hashemite family. Testimony to this is the Ma’an Museum, located in the town of its namesake and the ground zero of the Jordanian nation. It was here that Abdullah I first arrived from the Hijaz and met with local dignitaries, chief among them members of the Ḥuwayṭāt tribe.

It is unsurprising then that the museum, in which ‘the bonds between the monarchy and the state, on the one hand, and the southern tribes, on the other, find a perfect fusion’,⁹⁸⁴ emphasises the role of Abdullah I and the foundation of the Kingdom. Layne argues similarly in relation to the Martyrs memorial and museum in Amman that tribes and the values they embody are placed at the centre of the Jordanian state’s foundation. Through the exhibitions on display ‘the Great Arab Revolt, the noble deeds of tribesmen under the leadership of the Hashemites in defending Arab honour are portrayed’.⁹⁸⁵ The effect of which is to embed the concept of tribe within the legitimacy discourse that the Hashemites have self-constructed in Jordan. From here it is a brief step to reinterpret and reapply this unit of belonging in its post-revolt state context, resulting in the production of tribalism.

Through a centralising ideology of nation and state building, tribes as a source of identity, mobilisation, and history have been given no space in which to operate unless it is within the framework of the particular typology of national identity being advanced from the throne at any moment in time. Underscored here is the significance of the 1970-71 civil war and its aftermath discussed in chapter three. This along with the Israeli argument “Jordan is Palestine” encouraged the cultivation of tribalism as a narrative with national identity. In this manner, Jordanian pride in Bedouin and more broadly tribal heritage ‘is not simply a nostalgic longing for a vanishing culture,

⁹⁸² Linda L. Layne, ‘Tribalism’, pp. 186-187.

⁹⁸³ Ibid. 196.

⁹⁸⁴ Irene Maffi, ‘New Museographic Trends in Jordan: the Strengthening of the Nation’ in George Joffé (ed.), *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), p. 215. (208-224)

⁹⁸⁵ Linda L. Layne, ‘Tribalism’, p. 189.

but also... a demonstration of national identity by which Jordan can distinguish itself from the Palestinian nation'.⁹⁸⁶ Illuminated by extension is the innate modernity of tribalism as a product of interactions with the nation-state construct. Furthermore, it complicates the binary that King Abdullah II seeks to convey in his sixth discussion paper between old models of interaction coalescing around *wasta* and *maḥsoubiyyah*, and new models organised around citizenship and the rule of law. He argues that the former are an impediment to the country's transition towards the latter, specifying that they 'undermine the foundation of public work in the service of our citizens'.⁹⁸⁷

Of particular interest is the target of criticism: the practice of *wasta* and *maḥsoubiyyah* in the context of the public good. When this is undertaken the public good is sacrificed for the sake of a more limited set of interests. Complicating the King's crusade is the reality that the public good has been sacrificed in this manner frequently in Jordan's history and has been encouraged by the palace for the sake of rewarding loyalty rather than competence. Hamid el-Said for example writes of how officials 'following the footsteps of their Master' (King Hussein in this context) 'practiced patronage politics in filling positions in institutions of state with relatives, members of their extended family and region... on the basis of loyalty'.⁹⁸⁸ Rules whether formal or informal, along with the various ways in which actors respond to them (practices) when repeated often enough often form patterns or institutions 'suiting agents' intentions'.⁹⁸⁹ Ergo *wasta* and *maḥsoubiyyah* overtime become naturalised, and when practiced within the formal institutions of government, impede the development of a civilly oriented public service. Abdullah II is right then to rhetorically ask 'how is it possible for any generation to safeguard the rule of law or manage our institutions when sub-loyalties have been established at the expense of the nation?'.⁹⁹⁰

⁹⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 195.

⁹⁸⁷ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State', October 16, 2016, available at <https://kingabdullah.jo/ar/discussion-papers/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9> (accessed October 18, 2016).

⁹⁸⁸ Hamid el-Said, 'The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan: Breaking Resistance to Reform?' in George Joffé (ed.), *Jordan in Transition 1990-2000* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), p. 258. (254-277)

⁹⁸⁹ Nicholas Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 5.

⁹⁹⁰ Abdullah II ibn al-Hussein, 'The Rule of Law: The Foundation of the Civil State'. In the official English translation, the King refers to 'a generation brainwashed with sub-loyalties'. That this colourful description would not appear in the Arabic original suggests that the two texts speak to different audiences, one domestic the other

Instead of competition between proverbial “old” and “new” modes of societal identification and organisation, it is more accurate to recognise the existence multiple hybrid models. To think otherwise, for example, of national identity being ‘among the loyalties replacing that of the tribe’,⁹⁹¹ assumes both to have a closed and distinct identity. In reality the two leverage their coherency off each other and thus cannot be practically disaggregated. At a public event at the Columbia Global Centers Amman in September 2016, a university professor in the audience spoke of her apprehension that students were at the present time identifying more with their sub-state identities (including sect and tribe) than with their national identity than at any time she could remember in her career.⁹⁹² The professor in question did not deny the existence and practice of national sentiments on the part of students, but questioned their movement on the spectrum of identities possessed by these young citizens. Although anecdotal, it reflects a concern regarding the how Jordanians balance their various identities in the public sphere. This is more than a student issue, as revealed in celebrations commemorating the Kingdom’s 70th year of independence, also in 2016.

In the led up to the anniversary, advertisements on television, social and print media invited Jordanians to purchase commemorative polo shirts with the nation’s emblems emblazoned upon it. Purchasers could additionally ask that their family name or that of their tribe be stitched into the fabric as part of the national assemblage. On Independence Day, participants in the celebrations could be seen proudly wearing these shirts, many with the names of the noble tribes stitched in gold coloured thread upon them; emblematic of the intertwining of national and sub-national identities in their existence as citizens. All of this serves to underline how discussions concerning the role of tribes and tribalism in civil and political society have circulated persistently within the domestic public sphere, and have done so with varying degrees of intensity over the past thirty years. Recently, in 2014, Mustapha Hamārnah an MP from Madaba was drawn into a heated argument in parliament with fellow MP Abdul Kareem Dughmi after the former made comments

external. Subsequently, it implies that it would not be appropriate for the King to use such language regarding these practices when speaking directly to the internal audience.

⁹⁹¹ Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan*, p. 44.

⁹⁹² Comments by unidentified university professor during the ‘Book Debate: Religious Pluralism in the Middle East - The Relic of a Bygone Era or a Foundation for the Region’s Recovery?’ – Nicholas Pelham and Marwan Muasher in Conversation’ (Book Launch, Columbia Global Centers, Amman, September 27, 2016).

criticising what he labelled militia-like behaviour on the part of some tribes. This Hamārnah argued was corroding the emergence and consolidation of a civil state built on citizenship.⁹⁹³

One of the catalysts for MP Hamārnah's commentary was a spate of episodic violence on university campuses between 2007 and 2013 attributed to tribalism.⁹⁹⁴ It is difficult to qualify the significance of tribalism in cases of student violence as it is inevitably not the only factor involved. It has been argued for example that the socio-economic conditions of students is a more important contributing factor, and analysts refer for example to the fact that tuition costs have risen consistently throughout this period.⁹⁹⁵ Others meanwhile seek answers in direct catalysts, of which student elections is one of the prime ones. Lawyer Sāmīr 'Ariqāt who in 2011 was a member of the Jordanian University's Student Council noted that a majority of incidents involving tribal, regional and religious fanaticism *ta'asoub* occurred during electoral periods.⁹⁹⁶ However such an approach risks neglecting underlying ideational factors that may make such acts of political engagement even at a student level subject to violent outbursts.

Central to this is the formation and reproduction of identities through social interactions. Alexandre Wendt's model of alter and ego (self and other) interaction, although elementary demonstrates succinctly how the behaviours between two actors is shaped by their self-held identities, which are in turn developed through interaction in the process of 'mutual constitution'.⁹⁹⁷ Emerging from identities then, is both a repertoire of actions, and a mechanism

⁹⁹³ Ammon News, 'Al-Daghmi wa al-Ḥamārneh Yatabādalān al-Intihāmāt', *YouTube.com*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82Q_YI8QWrI (accessed January 02, 2018).

⁹⁹⁴ See for example: Alā' Maẓhar, 'Al-Ḥamlah Tuwa'ked anna Jāmi'āt Intaqalat min al-mustaqbal lil-'Ounf al-Mujtima'i ila Maṣdar lihu', *al-Ghad*, April 26, 2014, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/519104>--العنف-عام-2013-ذبحتونا-الطفيلة-القضاة-2013-عام-العنف (accessed January 03, 2018); in 2013 an initiative 'your blood is precious' was launched in Tafīleh by the local governorate authority in partnership with Tafīleh Technical University to address student violence, see: Faiṣal al-Qiṭāmin, 'al-Ṭafilah: al-Qaḍāh Yuṭaliq mubādarah "Damak Ghāli" Li-nabadh al-Ounf al-Jāmi'i', *al-Ghad*, May 15, 2013, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/587542>--الطفيلة-القضاة-2013-عام-العنف (accessed January 03, 2018). This contrasts with Jureidini's reflection decades earlier that 'for the younger generation the tribe is strikingly less important as a symbol of identity', Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan*, p. 41.

⁹⁹⁵ Kokab Ḥanāḥanah, 'Awāmil Ijtimā'iyah wa Iqtisādīyah wa Tarbūiyyah Taghadhi al-'Ounf beina Ṭalabat al-Jāmi'āt', *al-Ghad*, May 20, 2007, <http://www.alghad.com/articles/741129>--عوامل-اجتماعية-واقتصادية-وتربوية-تغذي-العنف (accessed January 03, 2018).

⁹⁹⁶ Ṣālah Qashtah, 'Al-Ounf fi al-Jāmi'āt al-Urduniyyah: Shaḥan 'āṭifi wa ta'aṣub 'ashā'iri', *irfaasawtak.com*, <http://www.irfaasawtak.com/archives/32043> (accessed January 03, 2018).

⁹⁹⁷ Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *the American Political Science Review* 88:2 (1994), pp. 384-396, and 'Constructing International Polities', *International Security* 20:1 (1995), pp. 71-81; John G. Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist

through which individual and collective actors judge the acceptability of these available actions in the context of a given situation. Reflecting as much, a student interviewed by the daily newspaper *al-Ghad*, noted that most instances of student violence he witnessed began over ‘small and shallow’ issues, that only later adopted a tribal and or regionalist veneer.⁹⁹⁸ The idea that these small and shallow issues become immersed in tribal identities and discourse is itself revealing even if one accepts the claim that these same identities are not directly responsible for the outbreak of violence.

The former Minister of Awqaf Dr Muhammad al-Quda’ for illustration, refused to link tribalism to the violence, arguing that ‘tribalism is an integral part of the fabric of Jordanian society’ and therefore should not be seen as causing these evident tears in the social fabric. Instead he focused on the role of ‘odious *‘asabiyya*’ (*al-‘asabiyya al-baghida*).⁹⁹⁹ Taken in light of the student’s observation, it is apparent that for some students using tribal discourse and their own tribal identities is a useful way of prosecuting their claims against others regardless of whether they have anything to do with tribes *per se*. Elucidated below, this principle of action is similar to that enacted in Hind al-Fayez’s response to electoral abnormalities in the Bedouin Central District after the 2016 elections, where an attempt was made to dress a personal grievance in the garb of tribe.

8.3 : Counting Irregularities in Badia al-Wasat 2016 - From Democratic Citizenship to the Solidarity of Tribalism?

From the above it has been argued that Jordanian citizenship is necessarily a hybrid construct, whose identity facets are employed contextually, rather than at all times. To be clear, this does not mean that all Jordan *jinsiyyah* holders possess the same model of this hybrid construct. The reality is exceeding more complex, nuanced, and is dependent on the conditions of residence that have,

Challenge’, *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), p. 875 (855-885); Andrea Teti, ‘A Role in Search of a Hero: Construction and the Evolution of Egyptian Foreign Policy 1952-76’, *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 14:1 (2004), p. 101. (77-105).

⁹⁹⁸ Alā’ Mazhar, ‘Al-Ḥamlah Tuwa’ked anna Jāmi‘āt Intaqalat min al-mustaqbal lil-‘Ounf al-Mujtima‘i ila Maṣdar lihu’.

⁹⁹⁹ Faiṣal al-Qiṭāmin, ‘al-Ṭafilah: al-Qaḍāh Yuṭaliq Mubādarah “Damak Ghāli” Li-nabadh al-Ounf al-Jāmi‘i’.

like a crucible, formed the developmental environment of the individual citizen. Here matters of gender, class, family social capital, and the way the state recognises and responds to these, to name but a few; intersect to produce a vertically stratified citizenship regime. A recent case revealing this the multifaceted nature regards the controversy over the electoral outcomes in the Central Bedouin District (*Badia al-Wasat*) following the 20 September 2016 elections. Before addressing this situation however it is beneficial to acquaint ourselves with the precepts of the Jordanian electoral process.

Firstly, electoral laws and regulations have been designed to ‘minimize the power of the opposition and to maximise the power of regime supporters’ through a number of mechanisms.¹⁰⁰⁰ These include an over-representing of minorities via generous quota allocations in comparison to demographic leverage, and basing electoral districts on physical geography without ensuring it corresponds with the demographic geographies of the Kingdom. The population of Jordanians of Palestinian origin is the particular target of election structuration as a consequence of apprehensions regarding the *watan al-Badil*.¹⁰⁰¹ Hence the second, principle is that electoral contestation is less about the potential to shape decision-making, and more about being in an advantageous position to benefit from decision-making. In this way elections offer an opportunity for a strategic employment of tribe-oriented identities within the individual’s citizenship matrix.

The state can use the privilege of its hegemony to shape the electoral terrain so as to encourage particular behaviours. For instance, in chapter three I noted how the introduction of the Single Non-transferrable Vote (SNTV) resulted in the creation of a parliament whose composition was radically different from its predecessor. To reiterate briefly, the outcome of the 1989 elections was as follows: 22/80 seats to Muslim Brotherhood affiliated candidates, a further 12/80 to independent Islamists, Leftists and Liberals acquired 11/80, and so-called regime loyalists won the remaining 35/80 seats.¹⁰⁰² By contrast, the 1993 results evidenced a decline in support for parties. Muslim brotherhood candidates, competing under banner of the IAF, the most organised of the parties gained 16/80 seats, their independent Islamist counterparts 6/80, Pan-Arabists 5/80, Leftists

¹⁰⁰⁰ Russell Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges 1988-2001* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 27.

¹⁰⁰¹ Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, p. 50.

¹⁰⁰² Leonard Robinson, ‘Liberalization, the Islamists and the Stability of the Arab State’, p. 10.

7/80, Jordanian Nationalists acquired 10/80 and the final 36 seats went to independent tribal candidates.¹⁰⁰³ My point is not that the SNTV is alone responsible for the sharp distinction between the composition of the parliaments following the 1989 and 1993 elections. Rather it is to illuminate the absence of alternatives and the subsequent predictability of parliamentary composition since its introduction. This continued after the ascension of King Abdullah II.

Political analyst Amal Abu-Jeries notes that the ‘service’ rather than representative nature parliaments in Jordan owes a lot to ‘the lack’ of political parties, and the immaturity of citizen participation, a condition she apportions substantial blame for on the education system. It ‘does not’ she elaborates, ‘help Jordanians to engage in the political scene...We don’t learn how to participate or how to assess the situation critically; the basics of the education system in Jordan is on memorising, not thinking critically or out of the box’.¹⁰⁰⁴ Another issue she raises is that of fear, especially felt by younger Jordanians if they engage openly with political parties:

*‘They fear they will be excluded from positions (employment), and I have heard from many youths that they have been threatened by the GID (Mukhabarat). So, it is very difficult especially at the universities to participate in political parties, because you might lose being a student or lose something else. It is very difficult. It is not obvious but it is happening’.*¹⁰⁰⁵

In the 2003 and 2007 elections, the first that many millennial Jordanians would have been able to vote in, non-party affiliated candidates unsurprisingly gained the majority of seats in the 110 seats parliament, 87 and 98 respectfully.¹⁰⁰⁶ The outcome of the next elections in 2010 did not diverge substantially. Once more candidates not affiliated with parties had a higher winning percentage than their party counterparts, winning 103/120 seats. While it is necessary to caveat

¹⁰⁰³ Leonard Robinson, ‘Liberalization, the Islamists and the Stability of the Arab State’, p. 32.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Amal Abu-Jeries (Program Director and analyst at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman) interview with the author, Amman, June 19, 2016.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁶ For analysis of the 2003 poll see Russell Lucas, ‘Parliamentary Elections in Jordan: Lite and Not Much Heat’, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, August 26, 2003, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/21589> (accessed January 05, 2018); for the 2007 elections see: Anonymous, ‘Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Election Guide 2007’, *International Foundation for Electoral Systems*, <http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/923/> (accessed January 05, 2018).

this by noting the boycott of the elections by the IAF, a report compiled by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) did reflect that ‘strong tribal allegiances induce many voters to support candidates selected from their own tribe or region based on promises of patronage, rather than the candidate’s ideology or platform’.¹⁰⁰⁷

One of the more colossal consequences of this has been the absence of the ‘classical politician’ from Jordan’s political evolution. ‘In the sense’ explains long time journalist Osama Sharif ‘that he/she is in a party and that party has a platform and that platform represents working people or middle class or the upper class or the establishment etc. We do not have that experience for instance that they have in Morocco which is also a monarchical polity but they do have a classical definition of politicians, [in that] they do have political parties’.¹⁰⁰⁸ The rise of the classical politician was not assisted by the introduction of sub-districts within electoral districts in the lead-up to the 2010 elections. Candidates had to stand within one sub-district, whereas voters could cast their vote in any of the sub-districts located within their home district. The effect was to engender ‘even more localized politics than usual’.¹⁰⁰⁹

The government seemed to take the nationalisation of elections more seriously with the employment of a national list constituting 27 seats, that was designed to run alongside the district-based single vote of citizens during the 2013 elections. In addition increases were made to the women’s quota from 12 to 15 seats and the parliament itself was expanded to include 150 deputies.¹⁰¹⁰ Voters, who now had two votes, could cast one in their district analogous to 2010, and another on a national list whose candidates were not tied to their district. There was some hope that this novel addition to the electoral landscape would provide a much needed space for political parties to campaign and win. Yet, over 75% of those elected were considered pro-regime loyalists tied to tribes or influential families.¹⁰¹¹ Sharif reflects that ‘the political environment was never designed for the emergence of political parties’, largely, but exclusively due to the Single Non-

¹⁰⁰⁷ National Democratic Institute, *Final International Election Observation Report on the Jordanian parliamentary Elections* (Washington D.C: NDI, 2010) p. 11.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Osama Sharif (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, April 29, 2016.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Curtis Ryan, ‘Déjà vu all over again?: Jordan’s 2010 Elections’, *Foreign Policy*, November 15, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/15/deja-vu-all-over-again-jordans-2010-elections/> (accessed January 04, 2018).

¹⁰¹⁰ Morten Valbjørn, ‘the 2013 Parliamentary Elections in Jordan: Three Stories and Some General Lessons’, *Mediterranean Politics* 18:2 (2013), p. 312.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 314.

transferable Vote (SNTV). This he is adamant ‘destroyed their chances because it favoured the individual and tribal candidate, it favoured political money. And so they (parties) were denied the weaponry of actually engaging with the popular vote and to form coalitions and consensus [in the political process]’.¹⁰¹²

There was hope when in August 2015 the government of Abdullah Ensour announced it would be rescinding the SNTV, meaning that voters would be able to cast multiple votes when participating in the 2016 elections. ‘But the issue’, cautions Bashar al-Khatib ‘is with the distribution of districts. They are not well balanced [as] demographic considerations are still neglected’, irrespective of the new law improving the voting process itself.¹⁰¹³ From other quarters too there was similarly poignant criticism. Sufian Obeidat for instance declared: ‘they (the government and political activists alike) celebrated this law because they got rid of the one man one vote. But actually they instituted a worse law in its place. This law allows people to run only in lists, not individually, and it is designed so that only one person per list can win. So, what do the other people do? They run individually which means they tell their voters vote for me not for anyone else’.¹⁰¹⁴ In other words, the list system does not allow parties to construct viable lists on an ideological or program basis. Electoral politics are effectively confined to individual districts, favouring kinship networks and voting habits, rather than facilitating national discussions and campaigns on issues beyond district borders.

This background is essential in contextualising the different practices of citizenship on display following news of missing and tampered ballot boxes in the *Badia al-Wasat* District. After the close of polling stations rumours – later proven - began to spread of up to eleven boxes of completed ballot papers had gone missing or showed signs of having been tampered with.¹⁰¹⁵ This became a larger media story once it was clear that Hind al-Fayez, an outspoken member of the 17th Parliament, elected in 2013 on the District’s women’s quota seat, had failed to reclaim her seat.

¹⁰¹² Osama Sharif, (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, April 29, 2016.

¹⁰¹³ Bashar al-Khatib, (Freelance economic and politics researcher) interview with the author, August 30, 2016.

¹⁰¹⁴ Sufian Obeidat, (Constitutional lawyer) interview with the author, Amman, September 07, 2016.

¹⁰¹⁵ Khaberni, ‘‘Itiṣām Maftuḥ ‘ala Ṭariq al-Maṭār’, *khaberni.com*, September 24, 2016, <https://www.khaberni.com/news/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-174931-174931> (accessed November 18, 2017).

Al-Fayez responded that evening with a flurry of criticisms, targeting particularly Khalid al-Khalaldeh, the Chief Commissioner of the Independent Electoral Commission,¹⁰¹⁶ and Salamah Hamad the Minister of Interior for their role in what she believed was a targeted attack against her and democracy in the Kingdom. She passionately argued that her role in the ‘war against corruption’, and defence of democracy in Jordan made her a target of such an attack.¹⁰¹⁷

In particular, she declared passionately, ‘I want a true parliament, a constitutional parliament not a parliament that is for sale’ (*majlis al-nuwab al-dunaneer*), not a parliament of the Interior Minister, not a corrupt parliament’.¹⁰¹⁸ Here al-Fayez is referring to the Interior Minister’s position on the board of directors of the Jordan Company for Energy Resources, in violation of Article 47 of Constitution forbidding ministers from sitting on company boards or being partners in firms during their tenure as public servants.¹⁰¹⁹ This company allegedly convinced Dr Khalid Touqan, Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission to transfer the proposed site of a nuclear reactor to land within the Central Bedouin district without first acquiring community approval.¹⁰²⁰ Hamad’s involvement in this which has been reported since at least may 2015,¹⁰²¹ was later elaborated on by al-Fayez in an interview. In it, she stated that she received word from a trusted source in the Interior Ministry that Hamad had spoken of the impossibility of her return to

¹⁰¹⁶ In the wider scheme, signalling out al-Khalaldeh appears ironic as some analysts believe that the episode of missing ballot boxes was concocted in order to blemish what otherwise was a smooth operation by the Chief Commissioner, suggesting it could be that both were smaller players in a larger game. Mohammed Hussein, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

¹⁰¹⁷ Jafra News, ‘Ghaḍab Hind al-Fāyez Ba‘ad Saraqat al-Ṣanādiq wa Tatahum Wazir al-Dhākhaliyah Salāmah Ḥamād’, *Youtube.com*, September 20, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3ROxjeQftw> (accessed November 18, 2017).

¹⁰¹⁸ Mohamed al-Shalabi, ‘Hind al-Fāyez Taftaḥa al-Nār ‘Ala Salāmah Ḥamād’, *Youtube.com*, September 20, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEu0-Pt1Mng> (accessed November 18, 2017).

¹⁰¹⁹ Jordanian Government, The Constitution (*al-Dustour al-Urduni*), Art. 47.

¹⁰²⁰ As‘ad al-‘Azouni, ‘Hind al-Fāyez: Li-Hadha al-Asbāb Lam Yusamiḥou li bil-‘awdah lil-barlimān’, *Raya News*, November 8, 2016, <http://www.raya.com/Mob/GetPage/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/e60c63fa-7c74-4711-a21d-213b3be8afc9> (accessed November 17, 2017).

¹⁰²¹ Anonymous, ‘Salāmah Ḥamād wa Khālid Ṭouqān wa al-Shirkah aliti Tajamma‘ahumā?’, *Saraha News*, May 22, 2015, <http://www.sarahanews.net/archive/%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AC.html> (accessed November 18, 2017).

the parliament while he was minister.¹⁰²² Her defence therefore coalesced around a discourse of civil citizenship, support for the Kingdom's democracy and her own record as an MP.¹⁰²³

However, following the elections the discourse utilised by al-Fayez and other disgruntled candidates, chiefly Saleh al-Jabour, Salam al-Khadier, Muhammad al-Fayez, and Talal al-Khareisha became increasingly tribal in an endeavour to generate momentum behind a call for a re-count of votes in the District. This was notable during a sit-in demonstration on the airport road south of Amman in the region of al-Qastal, where supporters of these candidates gathered to protest government inaction.¹⁰²⁴ During the protests, Hind al-Fayez addressed the assembled participants, extolling the virtues and history of the Bani Sakhr, especially with regard to their role in the shaping and guardianship of the Kingdom.¹⁰²⁵ Her objective therefore appeared to convert what was in essence personal grievance into a communally shared one, requiring a collective response. Mohammed Hussainy, who was the Head of the elections Integrity Commission agreed, commenting 'when she (al-Fayez) found there was not public support for her statement she tried to go [the other way]'.¹⁰²⁶ In any event, gone was the democratic, citizen-oriented discourse of a few days prior, replaced by a much narrower set of claims and justifications, tied directly to the history of the Bani Sakhr. The strategic shift is illustrative not so much of the fickle nature of civil citizenship on the part of al-Fayez and her co-candidates, but more accurately speaks to the fluid and innately contextual nature of Jordanian citizenship.

While addressing the national audience on Election Day it was appropriate for al-Fayez to construct an argument along the lines of citizenship and democracy. When this was shown to not

¹⁰²² As'ad al-'Azouni, 'Hind al-Fāyez: Li-Hadha al-Asbāb Lam Yusamiḥou li bil-'awdah lil-barlimān'.

¹⁰²³ Al-Hayat, 'al-Fāyez lil-Hayat: Ḥukumah al-Zal fi al-Diwān al-Malaki wa A'awānha Tasiyṭar 'Ala', *al-Hayat*, May 06, 2016.

¹⁰²⁴ Zāid al-Dakhil, 'I'tiṣām Iḥtijāji fi al-Qastal 'ala I'timād Natā'ij Intikhābāt Badu al-Wasaṭ', *al-Ghad*, September 24, 2016,

<http://www.alghad.com/articles/1148302-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7> (accessed November 20, 2017).

¹⁰²⁵ Thamer al-Zaben, 'Kalimat Hind al-Fāyez fi Ijtimā'a Bani Šakhr', *Youtube.com*, September 23, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XoNhwopnR9I> (accessed November 20, 2017).

¹⁰²⁶ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

have had the desired effect, a new tactic was called upon. By reframing the incident as a communal insult against one of the Kingdom's most significant tribes, effort was made to signal to the regime that there would be repercussions if it failed to authorise the re-count. Although the missing/tampered boxes affected directly individuals and their immediate family networks, an attempt was made to involve the overarching construct of the tribe as a point of coalescence and mobilisation. Therefore it elucidates the prevailing belief that in times of trouble, drawing on the support of one's tribe is an expedient stratagem. Simultaneously however, the inability of the candidates, al-Fayez chief among them, to successfully orient the resources of the Bani Sakhr behind their campaign suggests limitation on the individual's ability to organise tribal solidarity and action. This is particularly the case when larger strategic goals and interests are in play. Hussainy explains it this way with two interpolations:

'All of the candidates vying for seats in that district (Badia al-Wasat) are from the Bani Sakhr tribe, so in the end the Bani Sakhr was represented as they were supposed to be in the parliament. I mean they were given four seats and they got four seats. Second, she (al-Fayez) was accusing the Minister of Interior who is Bani Sakhr too. So there is a problem within the Bani Sakhr tribe if you want to put it like that. There is nothing in the suggestion that the state is against the Bani Sakhr'.¹⁰²⁷

Reminiscent here is Jureidini and McLaurin's hypothesis made more than three decades ago that the aggregate significance of the tribe 'will give way to more restrictive familial loyalties long before it disappears totally in favour of Western-style identities'.¹⁰²⁸ Assuming this to be true, the al-Fayez case indicates that the politics of tribe and state has more to do with individual families and personalities within the tribal structure, rather than the relationship between the tribe as a unitary actor and the State. Two realities emerging from the *Badia al-Wasat* controversy are pertinent in this regard. First, all the successful candidates from the September 20 poll are members of the Bani Sakhr. Therefore an argument claiming that the State has done the tribe an electoral disservice does not make sense. It does make sense though on the level of individuals and their direct families. This point is denoted in the second reality, namely, the Speaker of the Senate,

¹⁰²⁷ Mohammed Hussainy, (Director, The Identity Center for Human Development) interview with the author, Amman, September 29, 2016.

¹⁰²⁸ Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan*, p. 41.

Faisal al-Fayez is also a member of the Bani Sakhr, and a relative of Hind al-Fayez. He was neither vocal in criticising Khalid al-Kalaldeh or Salamah Hamad, nor did he make his presence felt at the al-Qastal demonstrations.

It cannot be said that this is limited to the Kingdom's formal political realm. On day-to-day basis citizens utilise whatever tools are available within their citizen repertoire in an effort to navigate Jordan's social worlds. While undertaking fieldwork in 2016 I often journeyed to the library of the Council of British Research in the Levant (CBRL). It was during one of these trips that the following interaction took place. Walking along the street in a largely residential part of Amman, a car having come originally from the opposite direction, pulled up next to me, and the driver inquired if I knew where the British Institute was. Believing at the time that he was referring to the one to which I was proceeding – the other larger and more well-known British Institute being located on the other side of the city – I gave the directions. The driver offered me a lift and I accepted. Once sitting down on the back seat and closing the door I realised the poor state of the vehicle, the passenger door had no interior handle, and once closed, the interior plastic lining of the door fell from position. On the way the driver introduced himself and his son to me, and I to them and we engaged in small talk.

After arriving and entering the CBRL, I introduced the men to the receptionist and the father added at this time that he was a member of the 'Adwan. This had not been mentioned in the car. With this information established, he then continued the conversation inquiring after the availability of English classes for his son. The receptionist responded that there were classes located at the British Institute in Jabal Amman but not here, and they would require payment. In response the father outlined his situation, including his scepticism about paying for classes that may not be effective and reaffirmed his kinship connections. What was interesting about observing this dialogue was how the father had seemingly used his tribal affiliation in an attempt to gain more from the conversation than he felt he could acquire without it being mentioned. That is to say, he hoped that giving the receptionist knowledge of his kinship would enable him to circumvent his present material limitations. To be clear I suggest as much given the state of the man's car with the assumption that given the financial resources he would have fixed it.

One could conclude that whatever *wasta* his kinship network bestowed, it was insufficient for him to repair the vehicle at a discounted rate he could afford. Let alone receive preferential treatment from a non-Jordanian formal institution. But this did not stop the strategic employment of identity being attempted. With the stated assumptions in mind, the episode reveals albeit in a very small way the complexities inherent in the practice of tribal identities and the citizenship in which they are implanted. And furthermore, emphasises the importance of context in how identities within citizenship, including those associated with tribalism, are utilised. In the three illustrations analysed above different revealed facets of the friction that has emerged between *jinsiyyah* and *muwatanah* in Jordan. The former entails subjection to the state and its centralised authority, whereas the latter entails an ability to make claims on this authority to behave a particular way justified on the attachment the individual and the collective actor has to the territory claimed by the state. All three highlighted that the state does not necessarily need to listen and respond favourably to the claim making of citizens, but rather can and does do so according to expediency

8.4 : Back inside the Tent of State? Tribalism and Civil Law

On the subject of perpetuation, the persistence of tribalism further manifests itself in the manoeuvres to integrate facets of tribal law into the country's civil law code. Officially tribal customary law operated in Jordan alongside the civil code between 1929, when the Bedouin Control Law was enacted, followed by the Law of Tribal Courts in 1936, until 1976 when this lattice of laws was abolished. As part of the state-building enterprise, laws such as these were designed to govern the Bedouins as a 'separate category of nationals and citizens'.¹⁰²⁹ However, as Massad explains, this arranged division within the citizenship order was only meant as a temporary, transitional arrangement until such a time as the Bedouin were sufficiently territorialised. So as to be fully integrated into the architecture of the nation-state 'equal to and no longer a distinct species of citizen-nationals'.¹⁰³⁰

¹⁰²⁹ Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects*, p. 52.

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid.*

However, and perhaps as a consequence of the prominence of tribal identities in the construction and reproduction of Jordanian national identity, so-called tribal customs, the norms governing pre-state procedures of crime and punishment have, since 1976, permeated into the civil code. Citizenship as an institution is impacted. This continues into this century, which has seen a partial integration of tribal customs into the civil law code. One case concerns *jalwa*, or the forced relocation of a family, clan or tribe of an individual convicted of murdering a member of another neighbouring tribe residing in the same region. Historically, it evolved in the absence of centralised law and order authority as a means of conflict resolution and prevention. Placing physical space between the implicated families was seen as a practical means of limiting the probability of vendettas and future feuds. Interior Minister Salamah Hammad announced in January 2016 that, after a period of debate the previous year, the new Crime Prevention Law would come into effect. It was an important development in the practice of *jalwa*, because its scope was now delimited to the father and any children of the killer on the one hand, and authorised the chief Islamic justice of the Kingdom as the stipulator of *diyeh* (blood money) payments.¹⁰³¹

Commenting on its drafting in late December 2015, Taylor Luck stated that the law would amount to a ‘streamlining’ of tribal and civil law whose practical implication was ‘the word of the tribes and the rule of law now both must be respected’.¹⁰³² Utopian flourishes aside like so many other laws in Jordan the application is the true test. An early trial of this state sanctioning of non-state judicial procedures manifested itself in late January 2016 in the Karak Governorate. As part of a government sponsored *atwa*, or reconciliation, *jalwa* was enforced on the family of a man suspected of murdering Mutah town resident Turki Sarairah. Signifying the degree of importance to which the government treated this reconciliation, the delegation was led by former Deputy Prime Minister Mohammed Thneibat.¹⁰³³ In this case the suspect’s tribe going back five generations on the paternal side were required to evacuate, in an apparent violation of the new law supposedly regulating the process. Furthermore, the agreement following the *atwa* stated that the victim’s

¹⁰³¹ Laila Azzeh, ‘Eviction of Entire Clan of a Murder Suspect ‘Outrageous Violation of Human Rights’’, *Jordan Times*, January 19, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/eviction-entire-klan-murder-suspect-outrageous-violation-human-rights%E2%80%99> (accessed November 25, 2017).

¹⁰³² Taylor Luck, ‘New Tribal Law Could Bring Great Change to Jordan’, *The National*, December 21, 2015, <https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/new-tribal-law-could-bring-great-change-to-jordan-1.110249> (accessed November 25, 2017).

¹⁰³³ Laila Azzeh, ‘Eviction of Entire Clan of a Murder Suspect ‘Outrageous Violation of Human Rights’.

family had the legal right (under both tribal and state law) to kill the murderer's father, uncles, children and grandchildren if they returned at any stage to Mutah town.¹⁰³⁴

The decision outraged some reformists who interpreted the state's involvement as symbolic of its institutional weakness and unconstitutional behaviour. Analyst Daoud Kuttab argued correspondingly that the *atwa* agreement declared 'without trial' the suspect's guilt, decided on the suitability of capital punishment, and secured a vow from the state 'not to pursue any effort for clemency'.¹⁰³⁵ Resultantly, the very capacity for the state to arbitrate justice and security for citizens was outsourced. Such is particularly intriguing given Jordan's history, and its abolishment of tribal law courts as mentioned in 1976. It was necessary, Massad argued, because of the homogenising tendencies of the state and modern governance. He argued that the dictates of justice's standardisation across the community of citizens 'could not allow a Bedouin murderer to get off with only one year imprisonment... when a *Hadari* murderer could receive up to fifteen years of jail if not capital punishment for a similar crime'.¹⁰³⁶

Even advocates of *jalwa* raised objections to the extent of its application in this instance. Tribal elder Barjas al-Hadid for example argued it should be applied very strictly, in cases where for example both families involved live on the same street, and the forced removal should only include the direct members of a perpetrator's family.¹⁰³⁷ Unsurprisingly, the law came under review and amendments were tabled in parliament the following month, reaffirming *jalwa*'s limitations to the perpetrator, his male offspring and his father, and adding that it should be for a period no longer than one year, with an option of extending further if appropriate. Additionally, the relocation should occur within the same governorate to reduce the impact on the wider family.¹⁰³⁸ However the slow pace of the legislative process meant that until the parliament

¹⁰³⁴ [Ibid. A year later in 2017 another case of *jalwa* included family members to the third paternal ancestor. See Rana Hussein, 'Clan of Alleged Police Killer to be Evicted Under "Jalwa" Agreement', *Jordan Times*, January 28, 2017, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/clan-alleged-police-killer-be-evicted-under-jalwa%E2%80%99-agreement> \(accessed November 24, 2017\).](#)

¹⁰³⁵ Daoud Kuttab, 'When Tribal Law Supersedes Civil Law', *Jordan Times*, January 21, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/daoud-kuttab/when-tribal-law-supersedes-civil-law> (accessed November 24, 2017).

¹⁰³⁶ Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁰³⁷ Laila Azzeh, 'Eviction of Entire Clan of a Murder Suspect 'Outrageous Violation of Human Rights''.

¹⁰³⁸ Jordan Times, 'Cabinet Amends Law to Limit Scope of 'Tribal Justice System'', *Jordan Times*, September 01, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/cabinet-amends-law-limit-scope-tribal-justice-system%E2%80%99> (accessed November 24, 2017).

approves the amendments, and the King ratifies them with his signature, *jalwa* could proceed in an unregulated manner.

A case that circulated widely concerned the relocation of the Dawaghreh family to Irbid. Their situation demonstrated again the risk of integrating a practice designed in the absence of centralised authority into the civil law code. This is especially with regard to its bestowing collective punishment on citizens who were not directly involved in the crime itself; impacting their citizenship of the nation-state. In 2013 Asma Dawaghreh along with her cancer suffering husband, their six children and twenty-eight others fled their village in northern Jordan after a family member informed them that a paternal nephew had stabbed a cousin to death. Three years later and after having changed residences six times, the family remained in exile.¹⁰³⁹ Their plight illuminates some significant impacts that *jalwa* specifically, and the attempt at integrating state and non-state legal practices more generally has on citizenship as membership of a political community. Highlighting by extension, the tensions within the relationship between *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* on the one hand, while revealing the monotonous stupidity of defining *muwātanah* in blank terms as “democratic citizenship” on the other.

As of August 2016 the Dawaghreh family’s plight is ongoing despite a *diyeh* of 50,000 dinars (70,000 \$US) being paid to the deceased’s family in 2014. In theory that should be the end of the matter meaning the family could return to their village. Yet they remain in exile, and have been pressured by the victim’s family to sell their supermarket – their source of income – to them.¹⁰⁴⁰ The collective punishment that *jalwa* enshrines however limited it may be, reveals the impotence of citizenship on which membership of the political community embodied in the nation-state is theoretically constituted. Through which the individual citizen is supposed to be subject to the rule of law as determined by the state to the exclusion of others. The principle of collective punishment repudiates this, and continues to do so after the crime has been punished. As manifested in Mrs. Dawaghreh exclaiming ‘what is my crime? What is my son's crime ... my husband's crime?’¹⁰⁴¹ Apart from the social and economic dislocation that is forced upon innocent

¹⁰³⁹ Jordan Times, ‘Forced Relocations Raise Doubts over Jordan’s Tribal Customs’, *Jordan Times*, August 24, 2016, <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/forced-relocations-raise-doubts-over-jordan%E2%80%99s-tribal-customs> (accessed November 24, 2017).

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴¹ Asma Dawaghreh cited in *ibid*.

family members, relocation is an impediment to, if not a violation of constitutional rights. Considering elections at local, governorate and national levels, *jalwa* complicates the right of citizens to vote as they cannot return to the voting district to which they are registered under fear of death.

Thus the prescriptions of state sanctioned citizenship (*jinsiyyah*) conflict with a tradition of conflict mediation developed, and in the context of contemporary Jordan, advocated for, on the basis of a connection to territory (*muwātanah*). Remember as argued in chapter two, the former entails subjection to the state and its centralised authority. While the latter entails an ability to make claims on this authority to behave a particular way justified on the attachment the individual and importantly the collective has to the territory claimed by the state. It is in this context that Omar Jazi, a constitutional law expert, comments that '*jalwa* does not make sense within a civic society, within the rule of law and within the type of society we are living in'.¹⁰⁴² Having said this, there may be an argument to be made in suggesting that longer term assimilating tribal codes into civil law may enhance the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of some of its citizens. And do so in a way that is not tied to the distribution of material resources similar with the integration of the tribes into the military during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.

8.5 : Conclusion

Citizenship is a thoroughly contextual and contestable entity wherever it is found and practiced. In this chapter I have endeavoured to shed light on some of the ways Jordanian citizenship intersects with tribal identities and norms which exist and are themselves practiced alongside citizenship in the country. Presented first was an explication by way of distinguishing between tribes and tribalism, which is important in order to come to terms with how tribal identities may be sustained in contemporary Jordan despite the changes in living conditions described by Gharaibeh and al-Bustāni. Following on from this I proceeded to examine tangible illustrations

¹⁰⁴² Ibid.

first in the form of violence on university campuses and then in elections, focusing in-particular on the aftermath of the 2016 general elections in the *Badia al-Wasat* district.

Lastly, the chapter considered the active interconnections between tribal customs and civil law, demonstrating they have persisted well into the 21st century despite their supposed removal from the Jordanian legal code in the late 20th century. In so doing the aim was to suggest that tribalism in contemporary Jordan is less about tribes as confederations capable of mass collective action, so much as it is about how class and resources held by families within tribes are of importance when understanding political and social dynamics. These are the keys to comprehending the enduring nature of the tribes themselves in Jordanian society.

Conclusion

'(Jordan) seems like a very open society when you consider the speeches of the King, he talks about reform, he encourages the youth to participate in political life as well as to form political parties in order to move the country forward as well as to have in the future parliamentary government. But the issue is, and you can't hear it in the speeches, but on the ground, it is totally different'.¹⁰⁴³

'What is the definition of being a Jordanian? You know it has nothing to do with citizenship unfortunately'.¹⁰⁴⁴

This dissertation has endeavoured to respond to and reflect on the question 'who is a Jordanian?' Rather than adopt an approach coalescing around national identity, the previous eight chapters have together pursued this question via an epistemological investigation into the practice and theory of citizenship in contemporary Jordan. Scholars have consistently assumed citizenship to function in Jordan in a similar manner to other polities. As the modern understanding of citizenship is contained within the nation-state, the implication seems to be that nation-states, wherever they are found, will possess a form of citizenship, and therefore citizens, whose typology can be generalised and taken for granted.

In the place of this, I provided a more nuanced historically grounded understanding of citizenship, taking into account its *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* based characteristics. This was taken up in part one, consisting of chapters one to three, which together were designed to determine and project the parameters of the field, emphasising that assumptions about the nature and typology of citizenship abound, especially when discussions arise over the Jordan's democratic transition, and the landscape of national identity in the Kingdom. I then illuminated a point of contrast between understandings of citizenship in an Anglo-European context, and the historical development of *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* in both abstract and specifically Jordanian contexts. *Jinsiyyah*, I highlighted in chapter two, became associated with citizenship as a state bestowed status in the

¹⁰⁴³ Amal Abu-Jeries, (Program Director and analyst at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman) interview with the author, Amman, June 19, 2016.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Lina Ejeilat, (Founder & Editor, 7iber.com) interview with the author, Amman, June 23, 2016.

19th Century, as a mechanism through which centralised authorities, first in the Ottoman Empire, and secondly in its successor nation-states, were able to distinguish between individuals within and without its ambit. *Muwātanah* meanwhile was comparatively more recent in its development and practice.

While its active participle, the *muwātin*, began to emerge in the late 19th Century, it was not until the 20th Century that *muwātanah* became more pervasive in political discourse. Unlike *jinsiyyah*, which is directly associated with a political authority, *muwātanah* by virtue of its root is tied to both individuals and territory, namely, feelings of connection, common identity and subsequent ownership of territory. That this is necessarily social cannot be neglected, given that, historically, identities in the Jordanian context owe more to relations between people constituting a community, than to land as a sacred space.¹⁰⁴⁵ This means that land is given meaning through its inhabitants. *Muwātanah*'s epistemic development is therefore considerably distinct from *jinsiyyah*. It is through *muwātanah* that citizens, *muwātineen*, are able to make claims on the behaviour of the political authority which claims dominion over the same geographical space. Simultaneously, this highlights one of the cardinal challenges facing *muwātanah* in Jordan. It must compete with other identities, which place similar significance in networks shared by inhabitants of a territory.

Finally, in chapter three, I presented an appraisal of Jordanian political history from the late Ottoman Empire to the dawn of the 21st Century from the position of citizenship. This brought the theoretical aspects of chapters one and two into relief. On the one hand, the evolution of citizenship in Jordan over the course of the 20th Century highlighted the problem of assuming that it refers to the relationship between rulers and ruled with rights and corresponding duties explicitly elucidated. The Jordanian experience illustrates a more nuanced development of subject-citizens rather than citizen-subjects. By this, I refer not only to the subjection of citizens to a ruling authority to which they have only a partial institutional relationship with, but also the subjection of citizenship to other identities, including national identity, to which, following Jordan's twin processes of state and nation-building, citizenship has not developed parity in terms of its depth, and subsequently of its mobilising capacity. Consequently being a Jordanian has less to do with

¹⁰⁴⁵ Anonymous. (Political analyst and researcher) interview with the author, Amman, September 04, 2016.

citizenship than it does the relation of the subject to a subnational community, that community's relationship with others, and with political authority under the Hashemite Crown.

In practice, because *jinsiyyah* has little to do with shared human experience and identities, it cannot operate as a mobilising force. Resultantly, political regimes such as the Hashemite regimes of Hussein and Abdullah II must frame their claims on the *muwātanah* of Jordanians, particularly with regards to national identity. When considering the analogy of loyalty for example, appeals from the regime to citizens for it more often than not involve refracting loyalty to space, subnational identities and communities through the physical being of the monarch. In part two, composed of chapters four and five, the argument proceeded from 20th century historical analysis and theoretical mediation, to contemporary Jordan. In chapter four it was argued that a key feature of Jordanian citizenship in recent history has been the absence of ownership and accountability, which manifests itself metaphorically in public littering. Based primarily on fieldwork data, I advanced that this was symptomatic of a public sphere in which a *muwātanah*/civilian identity, necessary for generating mutually felt, and shared accountability between citizens, is still being developed.

Instead, civilian identity (inasmuch as it exists) is based on a relationship between the citizen and the monarch, rather than between citizens themselves. This has proven to be a substantial impediment to sustained citizen oriented collective action. In practical terms, the persistence of Hashemite rule is not just a matter of authoritarian resilience, but also the resilience of a now outdated model of citizenship which has been unable to provide a level of civilly-oriented organisational capacity to not only articulate and sustain a challenge to the existing political order, but furthermore to provide an alternative to it. From the position of citizenship theory, this is precisely what made the uprisings from 2011 both tangibly and philosophically profound moments in the contemporary Arab political (specifically Jordanian) history. It may be true, following the first of the epigraphs above, that the definition of who is a Jordanian owes exceedingly little to the institution of citizenship.

The weakness of citizenship's depth, in comparison to other extant identities in the Jordanian political community, exists by virtue of the history of state and nation-building in Jordan

on the one hand, and the historical evolution of both *jinsiyyah* and *muwātanah* socio-linguistically on the other. This was central in part three, whose chapters six, seven and eight, each in their own distinct ways, explored some of the ways in which the current citizenship regime is experienced, negotiated and contested by Jordanians. In chapter six, the pre-eminent focus resided on the campaign of Jordanian mothers to have the constitution and nationality law changed so that they are able to transfer their citizenship to their children. It elucidated how the way citizenship is gendered routinely affects the ability of female Jordanians to practice a citizenship, which in neither theoretical or practical terms is considered equal to that possessed by their male counterparts in the eyes of the state.

The chapter thus demonstrated how struggles on the part of citizens to demand accountability and an ability to practice ownership of their citizen status by transferring it to their children as freely as their male co-citizens, intersected with the politics of demography concerning the numerical supremacy of Jordanians of Palestinian origin over those of East Bank origin. In this fashion the case study highlighted the prevailing depth of national identity as a constitutive variable in the practice of Jordanian citizenship. Meaning, that citizenship in Jordan is by extension not merely a legal status denoting the relationship between those in power and those subject to it. Rather citizenship in this context is held hostage within debates about national belonging. The fears that exist amongst some members (including influential ones) of the Jordanian body politic, in some respects derive from the weakness of citizenship. It is, to borrow Faulk's terminology, not deep enough to supplant other identities that exist alongside it.

Moreover, this not the result of Arab or Jordanian exceptionalism, but rather is the product of history, acknowledging both its international and domestic components. It is therefore, the product of deliberate actions and inactions over the Kingdom's more than seventy year history. A ramification of which concerns the unresolved conflict over the final status of Palestine. So long as the practice and theory of Jordanian citizenship remains shackled by apprehensions in the realm of national identity, and so long as the conflict remains unresolved, there is hope but little optimism of a sufficient deepening of citizenship to the extent that it becomes flexible enough to contain the possibility of its holders possessing additional national identities.

Chapter seven explored a less obvious facet of the accountability/ownership dyad through an analysis of the assassination of Jordanian writer and leftist intellectual Nahed Hattar in September 2016. It enunciated that the practice of freedom of expression is governed not so much by legal dictates, but by political expediency framed by a discourse of securitisation. The effect of which is to severely delimit the accountability of the state to citizens. Comparison with Abdullah II and Queen Rania's support for freedom of expression in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris 2015 highlighted the very different image of Jordan that citizens have to contend with. While the international/global community witnesses the tolerant and open face of the Kingdom, its citizens must mediate their own expression regardless of medium with care.

Individual negotiating of Jordan's citizenship regime was a key component of chapter eight, specifically, the ways in which behaviour in the civil space is influenced by tribal identities. One's citizen identity is one of many held concomitantly that may be deployed strategically in order to maximise gains from a given situation. This includes circumstances in which the citizen identity, if the substance of citizenship was taken as a given, may be expected to be deployed above all others. The central instance analysed was the response of former MP Hind al-Fayez to the missing and tampered ballot boxes in the Central Bedouin District following the closing of polling booths during the 2016 general elections. In the immediate aftermath al-Fayez employed a discourse one would often associate with the civility of citizenship. She spoke of government corruption against the citizenry, threatening the democratic trajectory of the Kingdom amongst other things.

Interestingly however, when the strategic use of this identity failed to generate the desired outcome, al-Fayez employed a different identity from her tool-kit. A few days after the elections, al-Fayez, along with other disgruntled candidates, organised a sit-in on the airport road. During the sit-in talk of democracy and citizen ownership of decision-making were replaced with a more exclusive tribal narrative. Al-Fayez, along with the other candidates, was a member of the Bani Sakhr, one of the most influential of the Kingdom's tribes. At the sit-in, she spoke of the tampering of ballot boxes not as an insult to citizens and electoral integrity but as a sign of the state disrespecting the Bani Sakhr. That al-Fayez ultimately failed in the end to have a re-run in the District is not overly significant here. More important is the situation demonstrating the fluid

nature of citizenship in the Kingdom. Relatedly, the events also underscored the increasing class element in tribalism in contemporary Jordan.

There are a number of future avenues of research that this dissertation's theoretical substance could contribute towards. The reader is no doubt aware that the previous chapters did not include thorough stand-alone analyses of the Jordanian Islamist Movement or of elections and parliamentary reform from the perspective of citizenship. As noted in the introduction, the decision not to dedicate chapters to either should not be considered as a blind-spot, but as a conscious decision, firstly, both have been widely discussed in the literature, and secondly, on the basis of observations I made and discussions I had during fieldwork. When asked to comment about citizenship in general, and specifically in the context of Jordan, the twenty-nine interviewees who were interviewed in-depth all elaborated on the gap between theory and practice. The immediate task upon analysing my qualitative data therefore appeared to be one of coming to terms with this dyad. Having reflected on this, a direction of future research regarding the Islamist Movement will be to examine them using the approach applied in this dissertation. A benefit of which would be to consider Islamists without resorting to a liberal point, or other normative point of comparison. In doing so, comparative queries of whether Islamism is or is not compatible with either democracy or *liberal* citizenship could be better avoided. But rather, take an alternate avenue focused on appreciating the Movement within its own citizenship context. A potentially intriguing line of inquiry concerns those who Rana Sweiss refers to as 'retired jihadis' who rely on the stability of the state and its institutions to provide an acceptable standard of living for their families.¹⁰⁴⁶ It may become necessary to widen the analysis of citizenship knowledge to include *Ummah* and *Qawmiyyah*, both of which were peripheral in this dissertation. Yet due to the transnational nature of Islam and Islamism, it will be important to include these in such an undertaking.

Another area for further research concerns parliamentary reform and elections in Jordan. Outside of general statements of parliaments in Jordan functioning as rubber stamps for pre-established government agendas, little in-depth research has comparatively been conducted on parliamentary reform from the citizen perspective. For example, to what extent does the current quota system for women and minorities consolidate sub-national/citizen identities, and affiliated

¹⁰⁴⁶ Rana Sweiss, (Freelance journalist) interview with the author, Amman, June 15, 2016.

voting practices versus encourage cross-sectional nationally oriented voting behaviours? Analogously, it is well known that elections in Jordan produce neither parliamentary governments, nor parliaments independent from the executive. However what kind of citizenship is being produced and reproduced through the electoral process? To what extents are citizens able to wield ownership of the outcomes? And what are the costs, both on them as a citizen-body, and on the state itself which has a history of putting short-term survival ahead of long term goals.

Overall, this dissertation has sustained an epistemological inquiry into the practice and theory of citizenship in Jordan. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach and making use of theoretical and empirical analysis it was suggested that it should not be assumed that Jordanian citizenship is symptomatic of a classical citizen-subjectivity. Rather it is a more nuanced and even hybrid institution whose production and reproduction is intimately partnered with the historical development of the Jordanian state. Further, while the state is semi-authoritarian in nature, citizens across Jordan's history have challenged the loci of political authority in an effort to force its redistribution. At times, they have been successful in acquiring concessions, with the uprisings of 2011, and the tireless campaigning of women like Nima Habashnah representing some of the latest illustrations. The arguments presented in the previous chapters points to the existence of a substantial roadblock that has prevented the shift from concession acquisition, to a greater role of citizens at the heart of the exercise of political authority. It is the absence of a citizen-based organisational capacity, capable of sustaining pressure and demands for ownership and accountability over time without fragmenting into smaller voices of collective actors, that may be co-opted by the regime, as has been historical practice.

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