

An analysis on institutional preparedness to bus tendering in the context of a fragmented liberalized market: Case Study of Harare, Zimbabwe

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ABSTRACT

In many cities of the developed world, the previously public owned and subsidized bus operators which provided services with minimal exposure to competition have been deregulated. Literature suggests that deregulation especially uncontrolled deregulation has resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of minibus operators, both registered and unregistered. The oversupply of vehicles inevitably leads to a reduction in round trips and reduced profits to operators. In order for operators to remain afloat in business, their drivers have developed dangerous driving behaviors typified by tailgating, picking up and dropping off passengers at undesignated sites, establishing and operating from incidental bus termini (along major roads). This behaviour is both a road capacity and safety concern. In 2012, the Government of Zimbabwe published their first National Transport Policy, which identified route tendering as one option among others, to address some of the operational challenges emanating from a deregulated urban public transport market. The objective of this paper is to interrogate whether the intention to implement bus route tendering augurs well with awareness of what route tendering entails. The following questions will be addressed: What are the views of stakeholders on competitive tendering? What benefits can accrue? What pre-conditions are necessary for the successful implementation of route tendering? Is the prevailing urban public transport institutional framework conducive and prepared for route tendering? These are pertinent questions as the country has no experience of route tendering and there are very few examples in Africa to learn from.

Introduction

While competitive tendering has been widely applied in the developed world, in many developing countries particularly Africa, this has not been the case. During the period that competitive tendering was gaining momentum in the developed countries, there was an intervention by the Bretton Institutes, which changed the configuration of most economies in Africa. Dubbed the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), this intervention

significantly influenced the future developments in the provision of urban public transport. In essence, ESAP was geared towards economic reforms and removal of price and fiscal controls in order to allow the market to direct the performance of the economy. According to Saunders (1996), the areas that were targeted by the reforms included trade and currency devaluation, movement towards high interest rates, reduction of expenditure, removal of consumer subsidies and privatization of public enterprises. In respect of public transport, these economic reforms ushered a new era in many cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. The urban public transport sector was deregulated by facilitating market entry to private transporters. The dominant bus monopolies were replaced by a fragmented informal public transport system comprising of small vehicles; the practice has invariably been '*competition in the market*'. The growth of the informal transport sector has been unprecedented and UITP (2008) conceded that "any attempt to evaluate the number of transport units remains everywhere a great challenge". The dramatic growth has resulted in a chaotic situation characterised by bad driving habits, cut-throat competition, and high levels of accidents and congestion.

The state of public transport in Harare, Zimbabwe is similar to that of most developing countries. Public transport is solely provided by the informal sector which is characterised by small and old vehicles, uncourteous and dangerous driving and excess supply resulting in congestion, slow speeds and an unpalatable urban environment. The Government of Zimbabwe in its first National Transport Policy statement of 2012, stipulated tendering of bus services as one of the strategies to improve the provision of urban transport services. Since the pronouncement of this policy strategy five years ago, the tendering option has not been implemented. The five-year gap of inactivity to introduce bus tendering has prompted the authors of this paper to explore stakeholders' views on a number of issues related to competitive tendering. The following questions will be addressed: What are the views of stakeholders on competitive tendering? What benefits can accrue? What pre-conditions are necessary for the successful implementation of route tendering? Are there ideal routes which can be tendered? Is the prevailing urban public transport institutional framework conducive and prepared for route tendering? These are pertinent questions as the country has no experience of route tendering and there are very few examples in Africa to learn from.

Literature review

According to GTZ (2001), the tendering process entails "the creation of competition for the right to provide bus services". Cox, Love and Newton (Updated) defined competitive tendering as the procurement of public transport services from the competitive market by the public authority "awarding service contracts to the lowest responsible and responsive proposer".

Competitive tendering therefore accords a successful tenderer an exclusive right to deliver a service in accordance with predetermined rubrics. Promotion of competition and delivery of a service that offers value for money to both the tenderer (an operator) and the purchaser (Government or Local Authority) are some of the classical arguments that favoured the competitive tendering practice. In the United Kingdom, the deregulation of local buses was pinned on the argument to drive costs down and improve efficiency.

Fundamentally, there are two forms of competitive tendering; the gross cost contract and net cost contract. The gross cost contract, also known as a comprehensive contract defines a service to be provided by an operator with pre-specified conditions (such as subsidies and quality of service) with all the revenue collected being retained by the authority. While the gross cost contract is advantageous in avoiding on-street competition for passengers, it also has disadvantages in that the operator has no direct incentive to ensure revenue collection and not concerned with the efficient operation of the route (World Bank Group & PPIAF, 2006). The net cost contract places both the production and revenue risks on the operator. The regulatory authority grants monopoly rights to an operator for a given price (or subsidy) for a specific period. The operator retains all the revenue. The operator is therefore compelled to forecast his future costs and revenues. According to World Bank Group & PPIAF, (2006), the net cost contract restricts the authority's capacity to make desirable changes to the network if such changes adversely affect revenue. The operator is also likely to make conservative estimates of revenue in order reduce his financial risk and consequently, the authority may end up paying more for a net-cost (Ibid).

In addition to the two types of contracts discussed above, there are other contract variations that are used to execute contract awards. Negotiated and Performance Based Contracts (PBC) are two such examples. The former contract (which implies a non-competitive bid) involves a regulatory authority negotiating with an operator for the provision of a service. Continuity of service, reputation of operator and past experience are some of the criteria upon which a negotiated contract can be preferred. A negotiated contract can also be used to pacify the displaced operator as in the case of the implementation of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Johannesburg (Seftel and Rikhotso, 2014). PBC is result-oriented and aligns payment to outputs, that is, performance, The World Bank (2006) defines PBC as a contract in which "payments are explicitly linked to the contractor successfully meeting or exceeding certain clearly defined minimum performance indicators". Referring to the experiences of Melbourne, Hensher and Stanley (2003), concluded that contractual agreements based on achieving designated performance objectives and not necessarily reliant on competitive rendering, hold the prospect of delivering better value for money in terms of meeting multiple objectives".

The drive towards competitive tendering in earnest has its roots in the United Kingdom. Following the liberalisation of local buses in the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteen eighties, competitive tendering (*competition for the market*) has become a trend and crucial tool in ensuring control of urban and inter-city transport passenger markets in many countries. Gulibon (2006) observed the spread of competitive tendering for public transport services to countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, France, Belgium, Poland, Germany, Italy, Australia and New Zealand among others. By and large, competitive tendering has yielded positive outcomes as evidenced by a decrease in vehicle operating costs, an improvement in a more customer oriented attitude leading to customer satisfaction, an improvement of vehicles, service expansion, increased bus productivity and ridership (Van de Velde and Savelberg, 2016, White 2009, Gulibon 2006 and Valkama Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko and Jari Kankaanpää 2015).

In Africa, public transport competitive tendering is a grey area. The only country that is known to practice competitive tendering is South Africa. According to Walters and Heyns (2012), South Africa's policy of competitive tendering has been in existence since the mid-1980s and the actual tendering process started in 1997. Trade unions were not in favour of the competitive tendering system as in some cases employees had their wages eroded when changing from one operator to the other (Ibid).

Overview of public transport in Harare

According to Gwilliam (2000) there is much in common in the story of passenger transport in many postcolonial African countries. With the exception of South Africa all are dependent on road based modes. In Zimbabwe, before the country's political independence, urban public transport was provided under a franchised agreement that guaranteed a 20% return on capital to the operator. Other operators were prohibited from competing with the operator (United Transport Overseas Services) within the franchise area.

However, upon attaining independence in 1980 the monopolistic franchised arrangement was abandoned in favour of a more competitive open market approach. The major hiccup to adopt the free market approach was due to a standing contractual agreement between the United Transport Group (UTG) and the Government of Zimbabwe signed in 1977 and was to expire in 1987. Thus when the contract finally expired in December 1987, the government bought 51% of the shares into the now Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) in 1988.

The direct participation of the national government in the urban public transport sector was observed soon after independence. This usually involved direct political control of fares and a

further introduction of other parallel forms of transport. For example, the Government of Zimbabwe in December 1983, made a decision to license “Emergency Taxis” (ETs) as a temporary mode of transport to supplement public transport demand in Harare and other urban areas in the country. They were going to fill the public transport services gap between buses and conventional metered taxis. As such emergency taxis were established as a new public transport mode and were required to obtain permits from the Ministry of Transport which specified routes, passenger capacity of the vehicle and fares. However, fares were recommended to government by the local authorities (LAs). The LAs were also mandated to provide emergency taxi ranks and monitor and enforce their proper use.

The “pirate taxis” that naturally grew in response to demand in the pre independence era are the same that were denoted “Emergency Taxis” post the independence era. As the name “emergency” suggests: it was a reaction to a public transport crisis. A point of analysis here is that the temporality of Emergency Taxis persisted for 14 years i.e. from 1983 to 1996. This is despite the observable nature of traffic congestion caused but ETs in the Central Business Districts of major urban centres. This indecisiveness of government caused numerous traffic flow problems as well as posing unhealthy competition to the formal public transport system. Despite all this, the Government of Zimbabwe still could not adopt a definite policy stance on ETs, hence they thrived under the ‘blind eye’ of the government. The advent of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in 1993, deregulated urban passenger transport paving way for privately operated public transport to operate in urban areas. The privately operated vehicles have grown at an unprecedented rate ultimately forcing the conventional bus operator out of the market. Currently, public transport in Harare is wholly provided by the informal sector. The vehicles operated, which are invariably small (minibuses and sedans) are causing severe congestion onto the streets, creating an unpalatable environment.

Survey Design

This study is based on an interrogation of key stakeholders’ preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The authors adopted a mixed-methods research paradigm to ensure the robustness, validity and reliability of study findings. The study relied on a balance of literature, in-depth interviews and questionnaire survey of key stakeholders in examining the institutional preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare. A questionnaire survey was designed to obtain baseline information on institutional preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare, Zimbabwe. This method was used, as it is ideal in surveys where many questions from multiple stakeholders are required. The authors administered a total of 75 closed ended questionnaires (obtained 70 valid responses) and 8

open-ended questionnaires to the following four critical stakeholders (Table 1). The open ended questionnaire (qualitative data) was administered to the heads of Departments within the clusters.

Table 1: Clusters surveyed

Stakeholder	Tools Applied
A. Regulatory Cluster	
i. The Central Government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure Development b. The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (Department of Physical Planning) c. The Ministry of Home Affairs (Zimbabwe Republic Police National Traffic) ii. The Local Government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Harare City Council (H.C.C) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-depth interviews • Questionnaire
B. Operators Cluster	
i. Urban Public Transport Operators' Associations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Zimbabwe National Commuter Omnibus Operators Organisation, (ZNCOOO) and b. The Greater Harare Commuter Omnibus Operators Association, (GHACO). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus Group Discussions • Questionnaire
C. Passengers Cluster	
i. Users of public transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oral interviews
D. Academia Cluster	
i. Universities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. University of Zimbabwe b. Chinhoyi of University of Technology c. Great Zimbabwe University ii. Polytechnics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Harare Polytechnic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire

STUDY FINDINGS

Introduction

The findings reported in this section are based on 65 respondents (qualitative survey) and 8 participants (qualitative survey). The 65 respondents comprised of 53 male and 13 female from the four (4) clusters described in the research design section. The 8 interviewees who participated in the qualitative survey comprised of 7 male and one female. Invariably, these are all senior people in their respective organisations.

Desirability of a tendered system


Zimbabwe's urban public transport is provided by two main modes; minibuses (locally dubbed as kombis) with a carrying capacity of 18, although legally they must carry a maximum of 14 passengers and private motor vehicles used as public transport mainly for shuttling the intra CBD routes. These forms of public transport violate traffic rules with impunity, they engage in dangerous driving behaviour as they compete for passengers. This partly explains the consensus across the sectors interviewed that the Harare City Council should adopt a bus tendering system with the hope that poor driver behaviour and other negative environmental externalities would be better managed. In response to the question whether competitive bus tendering should be introduced in the City of Harare, sixty four respondents (91%) answered in the affirmative. All the eight contributors who participated in the qualitative survey supported competitive tendering.

Respondents preferred the route based tendering system (64% in favour) instituted on high density routes to the area based system. Six qualitative survey participants were in favour of route based tendering, one preferring area based tendering the eighth preferred a combination of both. The high density routes were those that serve the high density suburbs of Harare where there are higher population densities per square metre. This high population density provides a proxy indicator of high ridership which enables profitable and sustainable operations *ceteris paribus*. The route based system was preferred because of its perceived ease of service levels monitoring and management. Respondents felt that it would be difficult to monitor service levels if an operator is given the whole area to operate as an area may constitute a complex network of routes some which may be served well and some may not. Other respondents noted that a route based system helps in improved network planning for public transport and cancelation can be done 'overnight' if need be. Interestingly there were no respondents who cited low demand loss making routes as ideal for tendering. The desire for a more regulated and monitored bus tendering system was further reinforced by the opinion

that the given route must have service conditions based contract upon which service performance would be evaluated.

Desired type of contract

The monopolistic type of contract was unpopular (Figure 1) in comparison with one where the regulatory agency retains planning responsibility. Reasons proffered were varied and included: the need to tie the operator to perform, avoiding a situation where the operator becomes ‘a judge and jury’, and need to strike a balance between the requirements of the commuter (affordability) and those of the operator (profits).



Furthermore, it was found out that respondents were more comfortable with an open / formal tender process (58.6%) when selecting potential service providers as compared to negotiated contracts (41.4%). An open tender was thought to provide the following advantages: An open tender was thought to allow various operators to participate and there is transparency and fairness in the tender adjudication process. The ‘best’ operator would come out a winner, this would lower chances of corrupt activities. Corruption was cited as one strong reason against a negotiated contract and two respondents from the qualitative survey remarked: *“The political system in Harare is highly vulnerable to corruption and inconsistencies. Therefore, an open and formal tender creates room for accountability on all parties involved”* [Respondent 1] and *“The negotiated tender is not transparent and in a politically charged environment like Zimbabwe can open opportunities for the contract to be awarded to a provider who does not necessarily have sufficient capacity to provide the service standards envisaged”* [Respondent 2]. Respondents favouring negotiated contracts viewed them as the best way to go as this

model provides an opportunity to the operator to suggest some innovative ways of offering service which when debated will mutually benefit the public and the operator. One respondent commented *“With an open tender, you may not get a serious service provider whereas parameters can be set for a negotiated one. Some open tenders can be disguised”*. [Respondent 3]

Contract duration

An aggregated 77% of respondents were of the view that contracts for a tendered bus service must have a maximum of six years. Generally, a relatively short contract was envisaged not to create a high level of commitment while a long contract often creates loopholes for corruption in the service performance evaluation and subsequent renewal of contract. Another advantage of short contracts that emerged was that operators had no room for relaxation or compromise in passenger satisfaction because of the fear of non-contract renewal, if performance is below set standards. Longer contractual arrangements were envisaged to be problematic in extreme cases of poor performance by operators. It would be very difficult to terminate the contract before the stipulated number of years. Thus passenger would endure the poor service levels for a longer period of time. Despite the greater weight placed on short term contracts, some respondents were of the view that operating a fleet of buses is a capital intensive venture with slow returns. This may entail longer periods of time before the operator realises profits.

Benefits of competitive tendering system

In summary, respondents were of the view that a route based contract advertised via an open tender preferably for high density routes with a maximum contract period of six years was an ideal bus tendering system for Harare. This model is envisaged to achieve a reliable and affordable service among other benefits as shown in Fig 3.




Fig 3: Opinion on benefits of bus tendering system

Respondents who participated in the qualitative interview also acknowledged the following benefits from an open competitive tendering system; getting for money, transparency, creating order on the road as operators won't rush for passengers and promotion of competition for the market and thus reducing competition in the market.

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the relevant stakeholders envisage route competitive tendering as a viable alternative to the current system. The next section analyses and interrogates why it is taking too long to introduce the competitive tendering system.

DISCUSSION

An opinion survey on bus tendering in Harare across the public, regulators and operators revealed that there is greater desire for a tendered bus system to be introduced in Harare. This desire is mainly derived from the present dissatisfaction and disgruntlement with operational behaviour of kombis and other private vehicles operating as public transport (*mushikashika*). Competitive tendering system is perceived to 'solve' or at least 'ease' some of the problems posed by the kombis and *mushikashikas*. However, the following factors were found to militate against the effective adoption and implementation of bus tendering system in Harare.

i. Lack of requisite infrastructure and support systems

A cross examination on competitive bus tendering shows that whilst, the desire is there, the Harare City Council (Local Planning Authority) and Central Government are not prepared and ready to implement competitive bus tendering in the near future. This is supported by a composite analysis on selected preconditions necessary for competitive tendering (fig 4), these range from supporting infrastructure to skilled manpower to design and implement a tendered bus system.




Fig 4: The readiness and preparedness for City of Harare to bus tendering

The situation obtaining on the ground corroborates the picture depicted in the graph above. Road infrastructure and termini in Harare are in a bad state. Currently, the Department of Transport at the City is operating with people who do not have the requisite qualifications in transport. Lack of a well-managed planning regime was a dominant view expressed by respondents who participated in the qualitative interview. One respondent argued on the need for managerial discipline: *“It’s not just a matter of know-how, it’s the discipline and consistency in management required that is lacking in the planning regime”*.

ii. Revenue generation vs negative environmental externalities dilemma

The desire for a formal public transport system in Zimbabwe’s major urban areas has been on the country’s policy agenda for a long time. The first transport policy document, after the country’s independence in 1980, enunciating the issue of a formalised transport, including mass transit and bus tendering was the National Transport Study of 1985. Specifically, for Harare, the Local Traffic Subject Plan of 1997, proposal number 30 highlighted the need for a more organised formal public transport system. One such organisation was to be achieved through competitive tendering. The prevailing National Transport Policy instituted in 2012 again emphasises on competitive tendering as a strategic move to ensure sanity in the urban public transport market.

Despite all these policy pronouncements, competitive tendering has not been implemented and is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. One such hurdle is that the public transport industry in Zimbabwe has become a cash cow for the economy. The current poorly regulated or unregulated urban public transport market has witnessed unrestricted free entry of operators to such an extent that there is an oversupply of minibuses. An oversupply of vehicles means increased revenue generation to the fiscus through both legal (vehicle taxes)

and illegal (corrupt) means. Table 2 shows a comprehensive financial contribution by the minibus industry in Harare assuming there are 8000 (the figure that is often quoted) vehicles in Harare. These were submitted to the Minister of Finance and Economic Development last year during the 2017 national budget consultations done in 2016 by the Ministry of Transport

Table 1: Showing estimated financial contribution to the national budget

Cost Description	Supplier	Annual Unit Price	No. of units	Total Annual Economic Contribution
Fuel (30L*312*\$1.23)	Fuel Co.	\$11,513	8,000	92 104 000
Presumptive Tax	Min of Finance	\$700	8000	5 600 000
Paye	Min of Finance	\$480	8000	3 840 000
Vehicle insurance	ICZ / TSCZ	\$264	8000	2 112 000
Passenger insurance	ICZ	\$236	8000	1 888 000
Route Authority	RMT	\$75	8000	600 000
Vehicle licence	ZINARA	\$60	8000	480 000
Rank disc (*3)	City of Harare	\$300	8,000	2 400 000
VID fitness	VID	\$40	8 000	320 000
Vehicle radio license	ZBC	\$30	8 000	240 000
Re-test – medical	Doctors	\$20	8000	160 000
Route Authority Form	City of Harare	\$100	8,000	800 000
Re-test – defensive	TSCZ	\$13	8000	104 000
Re-test - vehicle hire	Driving School	\$10	8000	80 000
Operators' license	RMT	\$42	8000	336 000
VID garage report	VID	\$20	8000	160 000
TOTAL DIRECT CONTRIBUTION				111 224 000

Source: Commuter Operators 2017 National Budget Consultations.

From the figures above it is very unlikely that the government may want to introduce competitive tendering which essentially means that the number of vehicles would be reduced. Further, informants from both Zimbabwe National Commuter Omnibus Operators Organisation (ZNCOOO) and Greater Harare Association of Commuter Omnibus Operators (GHACO) raised complaints about the multiplicity of regulatory institutions from both central and local government who have a host of conflicting instruments for generating revenue thus creating a harsh operational environment. Operators are dealing with at least 3 separate ministries (Ministries of Transport, Home Affairs and Local Government) for them to do their business thereby creating unnecessary red tape that also results in high cost of doing business. In addition to the costs in figure 4, other internal operational costs incurred by operators per year are estimated and shown in in figure 5.

Table 5: Internal annual costs of operating a minibus business in Zimbabwe

COST ITEM	AMOUNT \$US
Driver's schedule	5
Replacement of smashed windscreens by the police	120
VID preparations	1 000
Replacement of tyres(5x2x \$130)	1 300
Vehicle number plates	160
Zinara licence	75
Radio licence	30
Crew wages	4 200
Service	1 800
Driver Retest	100
TOTAL	21 128

Source GHACO (2017)

Poor or partial policy implementation

Another delay in the implementation of bus tendering system in Harare is poor or partial policy implementation. Study findings have shown that there is a general lack of commitment to policy implementation. Policy pronouncements rarely are they accompanied by Action Plans detailing the implementation matrix, as such most policy statements suffer a natural death. In Zimbabwe, non-policy implementation has become an institutional culture without accountability. Further compounding the non-policy implementation problem is that strategy execution/implementation requires a level of managerial capability that is lacking among the policy implementers.

Lessons learnt

From the foregoing discussions, it is quite evident that the urban public transport system is neither simple to comprehend nor easy to deal with. Policy advocacy for a tendered bus system in Zimbabwe and perhaps in other typical developing countries have to grapple with the rather complex nature of public transport. This is largely because urban public transport is such a key economic sector that attracts diversified and often contradictory interests. The obtaining evidence shows that the Government of Zimbabwe has adopted a laissez fair approach towards implementing bus tendering as a way of dealing with the challenges posed by the unregulated informal public transport system. The government is playing a delicate balance between the economic gains and the negative environmental externalities generated by the informal public transport sector. Urban transport in Zimbabwe represents

a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize.

The complexity in dealing and altering the prevailing urban public transport system in Harare, Zimbabwe and other developing cities has significant implications for the practice of public transport planning. In particular, the difficulty with predicting the effects of interventions in detail raises questions about the purpose of planning at large, and what approaches would best achieve that purpose. Some factors supporting the status quo and the restraining forces towards a desired change (bus tendering) are illustrated in Figure 5




Figure 5: The IPT driver behaviour and regulatory policy reinforcing loop in Harare
 Source: Authors.

From the foregoing it can be seen that urban public transport in Zimbabwe is immersed in a complex web of mainly regulatory factors generating, exacerbating and sustaining the current system. Further the restraining forces against the introduction of a more sustainable public transport system (tendered bus system) are shown. The major lesson derived from this paper is that there is need for a detailed diagnostic studies to systematically analyse the deep rooted political and economic factors or pressures that support the status quo (restraining forces) and those pressures that support change in the desired direction (driving forces) towards a tendered bus system. An injudicious and rushed approach to introduce a tendered bus system or any other alternative form of public transport that may 'do away' with the prevailing informal public transport system is likely to be futile.

Conclusion

The study has clearly shown that the concept of bus competitive tendering is known and well appreciated. The consensus view favoured an open tender route based contract for high density routes with a maximum contract period of six years. Competitive tendering is envisaged to bring benefits such as transparency, a reliable urban public transport service, an affordable public transport system, and creating order on the road network among others.

Notwithstanding the desire for a formal public transport system in the major urban areas of Zimbabwe, competitive bus tendering system in Harare is far from being realised. The factors that stand against competitive bus tendering include inter alia, poor infrastructure, corruption, and paucity of technical and managerial skills. The present public transport system, albeit in its chaotic state, has become a cash cow for the economy. It is a source of revenue for the economy. Revenue is generated both through legal and illegal means.

This study has also revealed the general lack of commitment to policy implementation. Five years after enunciating a policy position, no action has been taken. Non policy implementation has become an institutional culture. Policy makers are good at crafting policy documents and implementation is weak.

The study provides valuable lessons to other developing countries. As stated earlier in this paper, public transport in many cities of Africa is in a bad state. Notwithstanding the unpalatable state of public transport, competitive tendering is not widely practiced. There is therefore need for a detailed diagnostic study to analyse the deep rooted political and economic factors or pressures that impede a movement from the status quo.

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