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Generating Adversarial Attacks for Sparse Neural Networks

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Generating Adversarial Attacks for Sparse Neural Networks

Problem

Image Recognition:

- Relies on **Neural Networks**
- Classifies images with state-of-the-art accuracy

Adversarial Attacks:

- Neural Networks are highly susceptible to **imperceivable** changes to its input that **changes prediction** called adversarial attacks.
- Has huge security implications, therefore it is beneficial to make attacks more perceivable.
- Attack perceivability measured with **Mean Square Error (MSE)**.
- Attack effectiveness to change classification is measured with **loss**.




Figure 1: Adversarial Attack changing image classification from Sports Car to Fur Coat

<u>Mean Square Error (MSE):</u>


• In an attack, MSE is the mean of the magnitude of changed pixels

Loss:

- Inversely related to accuracy. As loss of Low MSE a class increases, accuracy of that class decreases.
- Generating adversarial attacks must minimize both loss and MSE.







Hypothesis

<u>Sparsity:</u>

Sparsity can provide benefits, such as less power usage, with little difference in accuracy [Woods & Teuscher, 2017]. We predict that there exists a sparse architecture that takes only the **relevant parts of an image** as inputs to a neural network. Taking only relevant parts of an image reduces the space an adversarial attack can affect and therefore we predict the MSE of that attack will increase.

Jack Chen, Walt Woods **Advisor: Christof Teuscher**



To test our hypothesis, we need to generate adversarial attacks that are both effective and computed in reasonable amount of time. We began by creating white box and black box attack generators.

Figure 2: Example of relatively high (top) and low MSE (bottom)




Figure 2: Representation of a white box attack. Internal gradients of a neural network is known to a generator.





Figure 4: Number of iterations before successful classification change on white box attack generator.



MSE: 2.95e0

Figure 5: White box attacks on CIFAR-10 dataset with class accuracies before (leftmost) and after (rightmost) an attack.



MSE: 1.14e-3

Figure 6: CIFAR-10 images of before and after black box attack and resulting MSE of the attack

Attack Generation






Figure 3: Representation of a black box attack. Only the inputs and outputs of network are known to the generator.

MSE: 2.21e-1

MSE: 2.44e-4




Figure 7: Cumulative Sum Distribution (CDF) of fitness over time on black box attack generator. Blue is when generator optimizes loss. **Red is when generator optimizes MSE.**

Black Box Generation:




Next Steps:





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• Generally the internals of a neural network are unknown. • We used a genetic algorithm where attacks were evaluated as a logarithmic function of loss, max loss being 0.5, plus MSE.


Results and Next Steps

• In Figure 4 we observe that around timestep 470 the success rate starts to stagnate, **signifying loss is fully maximized**. • We observe similar results in Figure 7. At timestep 470, fitness is about -1.64 and we can confirm that the log of 1.64 is about 0.5; the maximum allowed loss.

• After timestep 470, the black box generator minimizes MSE which produces the imperceivable attacks seen in Figure 6.

• We must find sparse architectures that models the relevant parts of images for neural network input and test these architectures with our black box generator.

• We will also examine our generator with state-of-the-art classifiers and examine the attack's MSE.



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