PREGLEDNI RAD

Jelena Radić Đozić*

(De) securitisation factors of the EU's gas supply

* Jelena Radić Đozić, M.Sc., PhD student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. E-MAIL: jelenaradicdj@gmail.com

SUMMARY: The EU energy policy has come closer to the security policy due to ever growing EU dependence on the external, non-market-oriented gas suppliers and due to experience of the gas supply disruption crises. The issue of gas supply security represents the basis of the security dimension, one of three EU energy policy's dimensions (besides economic and environmental ones). Putting emphasis on security dimension has provoked the securitization of the EU energy policy. In the aftermath of the first gas supply crisis in the EU, one of the member states took the role of *a securitizing actor.* It has tried to convince *the relevant audience* (other member states as well as the EU institutions) that the gas supply disruption presents an existential threat and has claimed commitment to extraordinary measures. Failed securitization due to divergent member states' interests has revealed the security dimension as the weakest dimension of the EU energy policy. The EU wants to avoid the impression of the militarisation of this non-military sector and leaves the issue within the sphere of regular politics. It retains the discursive dimension of securitization ("energy security" has become a usual collocation), *but* simultaneously has decided to create common crises response capabilities.

The aim of this paper is to show which market and non-market measures are taken to safeguard gas supply as well as the mechanism of gas supply crisis management, based on solidarity, subsidiarity and regionality. The working hypothesis is that the EU has not securitized the issue of gas supply but has moved it from the non-politicized to the politicized sphere as a part of public policy. The comprehensive EU mechanism of gas supply management, strict rules and a system of mutual control prevent the securitization of the issue, namely the emergency mode, going beyond standard political procedures.

KEY WORDS:
gas supply, the EU, security, crisis management, securitisation

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1970s the EU has been aware of the need to prevent potential oil supply crisis and the binding legislation regarding oil supply security has been endorsed. This legislation has been less effective than that of the International Energy Agency (IEA), organisation founded in 1974 to help countries collectively respond to oil supply disruptions. Thereby, in the case of an oil supply crisis the EU Member States (MSs) are acting in line with the Emergency Sharing System of the IEA. The EU imports over 60% of its gas and therefore its MSs are very exposed to external supplier, but it has become aware of the need to prevent potential gas supply crisis just in the mid-2000s. Therefore the rules for responding to shocks have been weaker in the gas sector than in the oil sector, where the EU follows a practice of the IEA (e.g. oil stock storage rules).The issue of the gas supply security in the EU emerged then due to several reasons: growing use of natural gas (the "natural gas golden age") as a cleaner alternative to other fossil fuels (coal, oil), growing gas import dependence, and often repeated gas supply disruptions caused by geopolitical reasons out of reach of the EU influence. The EU MSs were affected by certain kinds of energy crises not being parties to problem itself nor being able to prevent such crisis from arising. There were no EU treaty provisions allowing for deeper cooperation in energy field as well as no support at the political level of the IEA for a collective response on the gas supply security crisis. Thus, the EU has started to develop its own gas supply crisis management mechanism.

This paper will tackle the energy issue from a security perspective. For several years Europe's energy policies have not aimed only at creating internal energy market with ensured competition (economic dimension) and cutting emissions (environmental dimension) but have had a security of supply dimension too. In attempts to enhance the energy supply security the EU created a comprehensive approach which has included all those three dimensions of the EU energy policy for two reasons. The first reason being a rational one – all three dimensions are somehow interconnected (e.g. reduced gas imports as a result of the higher efficiency as well as fuel diversification can contribute to the enhanced gas supply security). The second reason is to avoid emphasising the security dimension, which is connected with the security of Russian gas supply and the relations with Russia in general. The EU attempts to respond to gas supply crisis followed two main patterns, both connected with the security dimension of the energy issue: one more political due to securitization attempts, and one more technical due to implementation of previously prepared crisis plans. Since the political dimension has had the hard foreign security predicament, it was deliberately left more aside the scope.

The EU has concentrated more on the endorsement of the gas supply crisis management mechanism. Since major gas disruption surpasses national level it should be a Community mechanism, which should be compatible with the Union's climate and the internal market objectives. This paper examines the incremental development of the EU gas supply crisis management mechanism, which seeks: 1. to prevent a supply disruption and 2. to limit damages in such an event. This implies that this mechanism includes both, the risk management as well as the crisis management. The question is how the concept of risk and crisis management can prevent securitization of this issue. The paper will bring a brief overview of the development of the gas supply crisis management mechanism, as well as examples of *speech acts* (by Polish and American securitizing actors) labelling gas supply issue a security issue that threatens the EU *as a referent object* in its existence. It examines specifically gas supply crisis management mechanism because the EU oil and fuel crisis management mechanism has been treated solely as an addition to that of the IEA.

Conceptualisation and Definitions

This paper examines the EU's gas supply security; we deem the EU vocabulary appropriate. By the *secure energy (gas) supply* we understand "uninterrupted access to energy sources at an affordable price".[1] The gas supply disruption may be caused by:

- failure of the main transmission infrastructures or storages or LNG terminals due to natural or a disaster provoked by anthropogenic factor, as well as outdated gas infrastructure,
- too big consumption,
- to intensive regulation of energy sector,
- market's failure due to monopoly manipulation or price manipulation,
- trade union's strike or governments'actions (embargo, rising taxes, nationalisation of energy companies),
- political events (regime changes) at the supply side or
- disruption of supplies from the third countries suppliers.

1 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT In-depth study of European Energy Security, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European energy security strategy Brussels, 2.7.2014 SWD(2014) 330 final/3
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD%3A2014%3A330%3AREV2 (12.2.2017.)

This paper will attempt to illustrate that the last cause has been the major trigger for emergence of the EU gas supply crisis management mechanism.

Crisis can occur as a result of an unpredictable event or as a consequence of some event that has been considered a potential risk (e.g. gas supplies cuts). The word *crisis* has an ambivalent meaning: it could be a negative one, as "a condition of instability or danger, as in social, economic, political, or international affairs"; however, it can lead "to a decisive change" and be defined as "a stage in a sequence of events at which the trend of all future events, especially for better or for worse, is determined."[2] So, the *crisis* could also have a positive connotation and represent something like "a turning point" that can lead to redistribution of power, to a new constellation of forces and relations in the most sensitive energy issues. According to Venette (2003: 43) a "crisis is a process of transformation where the old system can no longer be maintained". Under the term *gas crisis* in this paper we understand the abruption of gas flow to the EU MSs from an outsider supplier. Since gas supplies from third countries are quintessential to the security of gas supply of the EU, geopolitical risks may directly or indirectly affect the MSs. The biggest risk are actions under Russian government auspices aimed at putting pressure on consumers, such is a threat of supply cut (from Russia[3] generally or through the biggest Ukrainian route).

The first gas supply crisis in Europe in 2006, triggered seemingly by the gas price dispute, was in fact caused by semi-political reasons.[4] This gas crisis resulted in substantial gas supply restrictions and had major consequences for the EU countries: economic, social, and political. It resulted from disagreements between third-party countries (Russia as the main gas exporter, and Ukraine as a main gas transit country), and not from causes within the EU control. EU became aware of practical application of the new Russian[5] strategy of use of energy tools in foreign affairs.[6] It therefore became obvious that

2 http://www.dictionary.com/browse/crisis (15.1.2017.)

3 Russia's share of EU-28 imports of natural gas declined from 43.6 % to 32.1 % from 2004 to 2010, but this development was reversed with increases thereafter leading to a share of 37.5 % in 2014. Source: Eurostat, Energy production and imports. Data extracted in July 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports (16.1.2017.)

4 After collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was an independent state that paid for Russian gas well below European levels, but anyway it failed to pay its debts and came under Russian pressure to disown its infrastructure in return for debt relief.

5 See, for example, Energy Strategy of Russia for Period up to 2030 (approved 2009).

6 Therefore, Lucas (2008:214) labels the biggest Russian gas company Gazprom as "the gas division of Kremlin Inc.".

the gas crisis break out was a consequence of a strategic choice. The involvement of this strategic element raised an issue that the EU "will not be free to deal with it in (its) own way" (Buzan et al. 1998: 24), thus threatening the EU foreign and security policy, the freedom of the foreign policy decisions. Hence, for the EU countries the macroeconomic implications, and even more importantly, strategic ones, were huge. This crisis was a turning point that led to the new constellation of forces in the EU.

Thus the EU energy policy has begun to be intertwined with the foreign and security policy, and, at the EU level, the process of securitization of energy policy has started. This process, not successful yet, could be explained by two concepts of the Copenhagen School. The first one is the multi-sectoral, broader, holistic understanding of the concept of security, which involves different, non-military and traditionally non-security issues. The term *energy security* had come to usage more frequently after the Cold War as one of types of security in this broadened concept of the security. The second one is the concept of securitization, which is rooted in the social constructivism, since security has no pre-existing meaning, but being socially constructed it may adopt any meaning given by a *securitizing actor*.

The starting point of securitization is a *speech act* by a *securitization actor*. The second stage is convincing an *audience* of the narrative. During *the speech act* an issue must be presented as an existential threat – if it is not tackled, nothing else will be relevant, and not only because "we will not be here", but also because "we will not be free to deal with it in our own way" (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). According to A. Does (2013) the issues could be classified as non-politicized (not included in the public debate and the state, in this case the EU, does not cope with it), politicized (a part of public policy, requiring government, in this case MSs or the EC, decision and resource allocations), or securitized (the framing of an already politicized issue as a security issue, as an existential threat to a referent object through an act of securitization). Securitization can be considered a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan *at al*., 1998:23), but the main difference is that securitized issues need to be dealt with urgency and legitimized bypassing of public debate and democratic procedures, whereas the politicized issues can be dealt with in accordance with the rules of the (democratic) political system.

The 2006 gas crisis brought the security of gas supply undoubtedly into sharp focus. It resulted in a number of EU legislative acts concentrating on the protection of supply: they have given a frame for a mechanism which has included different supply protection and demand restraint measures as well as measures which should mitigate the implication in case of gas crisis. This mechanism comprises a risk management (assessing potential threats and finding the

best ways to avoid them), and a crisis management (dealing with a disruptive and unexpected event not only before, but also after it has occurred in order to minimize the consequences).[7] Its aims are reducing risks, improving resilience, and creating "a 'security margin' in the energy supply system that provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates recovery after disruption" (Yergin, 2006: 76). To this end the EU is continually trying to improve the mechanism. One of the approaches is to introduce the concept of regionality. The regions are being defined from the aspect of security of supply. By designing these transnational regions, the EC has taken into consideration who has necessarily to cooperate with whom in case of major crisis.

Risk Management to avoid Threats and Emerging Crisis Mechanism

A real debate on "an energy policy regarding security of supply" in the EU actually started in 2000 with *The Green Paper – Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply.*[8] Since then the EU has become aware of its constantly increasing external dependence on energy ("in geopolitical terms, 45% of oil imports come from the Middle East and 40% of natural gas from Russia"), and of the need for "an active energy policy" as well as a " long-term strategy for energy supply security" (Green Paper: 2000). The main concerns of the EU energy policy at that time were the functioning of the internal market and respecting of environmental concerns; thus, the actions which were undertaken[9] were more concentrated on market-opening than on energy security ideas. The primary cause of concern was still oil and its dramatically price rising, but gas was also seen as a source of "new dependence", and from then on the MSs eventually understood their increased interdependence regarding gas supply, and thus the need to conceive an EU energy policy from a security angle. However, the "energy policy has assumed a new Community dimension without fact being reflected in new Community powers" (Green Paper: 2000).

At first, the EU attempted to find viable mitigation options on the demand side to ensure a stable gas flow and to impact the supply-

7 The field of crisis management originated in fact with the large-scale industrial and environmental disasters in the 1980s. It is generally considered to have originated with Johnson & Johnson's handling of a situation in 1982, when cyanide-laced Tylenol killed seven people in the Chicago area.

8 Green Paper – Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply /COM/2000/0769 final/ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52000DC0769 (13.5.2017.)

9 These actions are based on common rules like transparency and equality of access, regulations providing clarity and predictability, promoting liberalized energy trade.

demand balance. The problem is that such demand-side mitigation measures[10] cannot mostly be applied quickly and must be initiated more than a decade in advance. Many of them are not required by the market and may require a transitional period to find the necessary investments. The EU has even undertaken some measures on the supply side trying to influence the third-countries supply conditions, to bring them in accord with the internal market rules and to prevent distortion of competition. Namely, external companies, such as Gazprom, do not respect principles of the EU law such as ownership unbundling and third-party access. Equally, the existing pipelines for transport of gas from Russia through Ukraine or Belarus are not operated in line with EU legislation, undermining security of supply instead of being an interconnection that can be flexibly used to transport gas between vulnerable markets (SWD (2014) 330 final/3:50). Another problem is that most of the MSs are bound with long-term supply contracts with Russia, compromising take-or-pay clause, re-export prohibition clause, politically based prices, and are backed-up by bilateral intergovernmental agreements. Besides, the EC has been trying to use appropriate external policy tools to prevent the deterioration of the situation in gas supply and increase transparency and reliability through the exchange of information.

Although all these measures are improving the gas supply system resilience, a short-term winter gas supply disruption through Ukraine transit route still poses significant challenges requiring immediate short-term responses. There are complementary measures necessary to attain all three underlying objectives of the EU energy policy: sustainability, competitiveness and, above all, security of supply. Hence, the EU at that time did not want to come under this kind of pressure, so it decided to take control over the described problems. Therefore, since markets alone are no longer able to deal with the gas supply crisis, the non-market measures are to be used, in form of a crisis mechanism. The first step for effective action during any kind of crisis situation is establishing a legal framework. In fact, each gas crisis outside of the EU control has been followed by establishment of the new set of collective or common responses within the EU framework.

10 They include: further developing of a fully integrated, reliable, transparent, liquid and competitive internal energy market with non-discriminatory policies, equality of access, harmonisation of standard, in order to provide security by absorbing shocks and allowing supply and demand to respond more quickly; demand reduction due to increased energy-efficiency; import reduction due to maximising of the rate of extraction at home; fuel switching aiming at decreasing of fossil fuel dependence due to large-scale integration of unconventional energy like renewables, what will increase indigenous energy sources and at the same time will meet the environmental requirements; supplier switching (balancing between and diversifying of the various sources of supply by product and by geographical region).

In January 2004 there was an escalation of the Russia-Belarus gas dispute over gas price as well as over the imposing of Russian control over the Belarusian gas transit network for transiting Russian gas to Europe. The dispute resulted in the 6-month supply cut off of Russian gas to Belarus. In the meantime, with the *2004 Council Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply*[11] the first legal framework at Community level to safeguard security of gas supply came into force. This time, the focus of the Directive was on gas, whereas oil was not even mentioned. The MSs expressed their concern that "the European Union is expected in the longer term to become increasingly dependent on gas imported from non--EU sources of supply".[12] However, Russia then was not perceived as the problem on the supply side. The security dimension of the energy policy was not in the scope of the EU attention yet, and the security of gas supply according to that document was important only from the point of view of the "serious disturbances in the economic activity".

Although the primary goal of the Directive was well-functioning of the internal market, it also provided a mechanism of rules applicable in the event of major gas supply crisis. The prime actors of the proposed three-step mechanism were: market players, the MSs, and the European Commission (EC). The EC's responsibilities, however, remained limited. It could, in consultation with the then established *Gas Coordination Group* for facilitating exchange of information and coordination among MSs (with no EC's representatives), provide guidance, monitor implementation or just recommend or present proposals regarding further measures. The Community level should have been involved (upon the request of the MSs or on EC's own initiative) only in the case of a major disruption and if the measures of the MSs have failed.

The First Gas Crises: Securitization Attempts and Early Warning Mechanism

On 1 January 2006, the first Russia-Ukraine gas dispute concerning gas supplies, prices and debts, reached a high point. Russia cut off all gas supplies passing through Ukrainian territory. The impact on European countries was immediate since numerous European countries were dependent on imports from Russia through Ukraine (by 80%).[13]

11 Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/67/oj (18.1.2017.)

12 Ibid.

13 More detailed insight in this crises can be find, for example, in Jonathan Stern article "The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006".

Only three months later, the then Polish Prime Minister, acting as *a securitizing actor*, presented in form of a non-paper an idea (at the EU Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council meeting[14]) for a new intergovernmental energy security agreement called the European Energy Security Treaty (EEST)[15]. The main aim of that political proposal was supposed to be a guarantee of energy supply support in the case of a crisis situation based on members' solidarity approach. The proposal was meant to achieve mutual security guarantees in energy field, modelled on the guarantees at the root of the Western European Union as well as NATO (excluding a situation of armed attack covered by the Washington Treaty). "It was a deliberate intention of the EEST proposal to induce a space of political thinking into energy deliberations in Europe, in the European Union in particular."[16] It was conceived as a mechanism for mutual help in the case of gas crisis, not as an energy crisis risk or crisis mechanism.

However, the EU MSs as target *audience* did not accept the Polish Prime Minister's narrative. The main reasons were disagreements concerning supplies of natural gas among the EU MSs. A certain interest for Poland's "Energy NATO" was expressed in the Baltic States, while Germany, Italy, and France countered the call for an "Energy NATO" due to their confrontational approaches to energy security.[17] Namely, the EU MSs suffer from the same problem (increased gas import dependence), but not to the same extent. This resulted in differing opinions and no formal conclusion or further steps. Especially the Eastern European countries were left with their problems: they are more dependent on single supplier and are exposed to greater disruption than those in the West due to the state of infrastructure, levels of interconnections, market development,[18] long term commitments and geography of pipelines in the EU (lack of North-South connections).[19] This has also proved that the third, security dimensi-

14 7160/06 ENER 89 RELEX 136; http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/06/67 (3.2.2017.)

15 The idea was first published by then Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in both "Financial Times" and the Warsaw daily "Rzeczpospolita" on 10 February 2006. Poland's Non-Paper: Outline of the European Energy Security Treaty (7160/06 ENER) http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/06/st07/st07160.en06.pdf (18.1.2017.)

16 Jesien, Leszek, "Poland's Proposal for the European Energy Security Treaty", https://www.academia.edu/5657638/Polands_Proposal_for_the_European_Energy_Security_Treaty (27.2.2017.)

17 For more information see: Roth, Mathias, "Poland as a Policy Entrepreneur in European External Energy Policy: Towards Greater Energy Solidarity vis-à-vis Russia?", Geopolitics, 16:600–625, 2011.

18 More liquid markets, with more supply options, are more able to respond to disruptions because they are more attractive to the potential alternative gas suppliers.

19 According to various analysis, in the case of disruption of transit through Ukra-

on of the EU energy policy remained the weakest one, being closely connected with foreign policy issues, especially bilateral relations of the MSs with the export countries. Ever since, particularly the bigger and more influential MSs have been trying to strengthen bilateral relations with third-party producing countries, expecting special treatment, special conditions and other economic benefits. The best example is the continuation of the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline despite of the 2006 gas crisis, which for the first time in history directly connected Germany and Russia, bypassing transit countries Belarus and Ukraine.

This failed energy securitisation attempt was followed at the end of the same year by a new one, during the NATO Riga Summit. At that time an US official, the US senator and then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Richard Lugar, acting as *a securitizing actor*, called on the alliance to assist any MSs whose energy sources are cut off by force. He even advocated the usage of the Washington Treaty mutual defence clause (Article 5). Senator Lugar underlined that Article 5 considered not only the situation of on attack, but also the situation of coercion (due to an energy cut-off) and emphasized that " the Alliance must commit itself to preparing for and responding to attempts to use the energy weapon against its fellow members…NATO must become a reliable refuge for members against threats stemming from their energy insecurity".[20] Although Lugar's call was welcomed mostly by the "new" EU MSs, there were no consequences: many MSs were sceptical regarding the NATO's ability to provide assistance in energy issues, and very concerned on opening up the legal meaning of Article 5 by linking energy security directly to it. Their concern was that use of the Article 5 for energy issues could open a way to a growing military involvement in a broad array of policies beyond the traditional security domains and they considered the EU a more appropriate institution to deal with the issue of energy security.

Nevertheless, the January 2006 gas crisis acted as a catalyst for the awareness of importance of the energy security for Europe. After the crisis, the Community level became more important and the security dimension of the EU energy policy more visible. In December 2006 the European Council endorsed *the Network of Energy Security Correspondents* (NESCO), consisted of representatives not only of the

ine, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Greece, as well as Energy Community Members FYROM, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are exposed to disruption of deliveries, and in the case of disruption of all supplies from Russia over winter Finland, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States are also exposed to disruption.

20 The German Marshall Fund, "Lugar: Attack on Allies' Energy Supplies is Attack on NATO Alliance", June 18, 2010.http://www.gmfus.org/commentary/lugar-attack-allies-energy-supplies-attack-nato-alliance (2.1.2017.)

MSs, but also of the EC and the Council Secretariat, aiming at improving the capacity to collect information and to provide early warning of potential threats to security of energy supply (such as *an early warning mechanism*). From then on, the focus has been moved from the internal energy market and environmental concerns to the external dimension of the EU energy policy. The focus on external factors affecting the EU security of energy supply has moved the EU energy policy closer to the EU foreign policy. For that reason, the Commissioner for Energy participated in the launching of NESCO in May 2007, which was hosted by the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy.[21]

At the same time the EU recognised the fact that the internal energy market increases the interdependence of MSs in gas supply as well as in electricity (not the issue of this paper). *The European Council Presidency Conclusions on Integrated Climate and Energy Policy* from March 2007 integrated all three dimensions of the EU energy policy under the *Energy Policy for Europe*/EPE[22]: 1. economic, by claiming to ensure competitiveness of European economies, 2. environmental, by demanding promotion of environmental sustainability and combating climate change, and 3. security, by requesting increase of security of supply. Regarding the security of supply it recommended effective diversification of energy sources and transport routes, but also developing of more effective *crisis management mechanism*, still remaining the primary responsibility of the MSs. The main novelties were the establishment of *an Energy Observatory Office*, within the Commission's Directorate General for Energy and Transport, and the developing the common voice of the EU in implementation of the EU energy policy objectives (e.g. diversification). In the Lisbon Treaty[23] some specific provisions regarding energy policy were included in the so called Energy Article (security of supply, energy networks, etc.). This Treaty inserted the principle of solidarity into the energy market and made some areas of energy policy a shared competence, signalling a move towards a common energy policy.

The EU dependence on Russian gas became a major issue after the politically motivated second gas supply crisis in 2009[24]. Until then

21 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-629_en.htm?locale=en (3.2.2017.)

22 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament of 10 January 2007, "An energy policy for Europe" [COM(2007) 1 final – Not published in the Official Journal]. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al27067 (6.2.2017.)

23 TREATY OF LISBON AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (2007/C306/01). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT (24.2.2017.)

24 The motive was unpaid bills for Russian gas, but the real causes were different: in 2008 Ukraine applied to join the NATO Membership Action Plan and then

the priority was, as was previously mentioned in this paper (EPE, 2007), the enhancing relations with Russia through the negotiations of a new comprehensive framework gas agreement. This resulted in the linking energy (gas) with security. Therefore, in the 2008 *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*[25] the energy security was emphasized as one of the new challenges for the EU security policy and energy as "a major factor in EU-Russia relations" (the "Russification" of the energy issues was carried out). Whilst in the first *European Security Strategy*[26] from 2003 the energy security was not even mentioned, the 2008 Report suggested that "concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years"; the energy security, as one of the key threats, as defined in the Report, is to become an integral part of any future European Security Strategy.[27]

The Second Gas Crisis and Ukraine Crisis as Catalysts for a Common Gas Supply Crisis Management Mechanism

From Early Warning Mechanism to Risk Mechanism

The second gas crisis in 2009 led to severe, week-long energy shortages in many EU countries, provoking the new EU legislation concerning the gas supply security. In the new *"Gas Directive"*[28] the completion of the internal gas market remained a central element to increase the gas supply security and to reduce the exposure of individual MSs to the harmful effects of supply disruptions. *The early warning mecha-*

pro-Western Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko announced that Ukraine would not extend the lease on the Sevastopol base to Russia's Black Sea Fleet beyond 2017.

25 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008 S407/08 , p.5 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf (20.2.2017.)

26 European Security Strategy "A secure Europe in the better World", Brussels, December 2003. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (21.2.2017.)

27 At the same time NATO prepared a report "NATO's Role in Energy Security" for the Bucharest summit in April 2008. It was recognized that in the new security context the disruption of energy supply could affect not only NATO's military operations, but also the security of NATO MSs' societies. Anyway this issue remained primarily responsibility of national governments, and NATO has been concentrating on areas where it can add value, especially on enhancing its strategic awareness of energy developments with security implications. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm (5.2.2016.)

28 Directive 2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and Gas, The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 13 July. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0094:0136:en:PDF (23.2.2017.)

nism also began to develop into *a risk mechanism*, assessing potential threats (failure of the balance of supply and demand on the national market, the level of expected future demand and available supplies, the quality and level of maintenance of the networks). However, the means to avoid those threats remained weak. In spite of that, the Community level strengthened – the EC continued to exercise its role of observing and monitoring the internal gas market (e.g. non-discriminatory access to the gas system) but got an additional role in monitoring aspects such as supply and demand, transmission and distribution infrastructure. The MSs became obliged to publish a report each year and to forward it to the EC "sufficiently early to enable appropriate measures" (2009/73/EC:L211/105, Art.5). *The Gas Directive* also introduced two new concepts in the EU gas supply security strategy: *regional cooperation* and *solidarity*[29] (2009/73/EC: L211/105, Art. 6-7). These concepts have become prerequisites for farther development of the gas supply crisis management mechanism at the Community level.

Bearing in mind possible new supply disruptions similar to the one in 2009, the EU was prompted to address specifically security of gas supply. This resulted in a regulation dedicated to strengthen prevention and crisis response mechanisms. *The 2010 Regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply*[30] created two types of measures for better preparedness: one for the gas supply crisis prevention and the other for the mitigating of the exceptional gas crisis situations (measures to be implemented when the market can no longer deliver the required gas supplies). Instead of a "directive", the EU imposed a "regulation", immediately binding for the MSs.

In order to ensure the highest level of preparedness in the event of supply disruption t**hree crisis levels were introduced**: early warning (when there is reliable information that an event may occur to result in significant deterioration); alert (deterioration already occurred, but the market is still able to manage disruption or demand without the need to resort to non-market measure); emergency (all relevant market measures have been implemented but the supply of gas is insufficient to meet the remaining gas demand so that non--market measures have to be additionally introduced). Besides that, the MSs are obliged to **create *National Risk Assessment* (national**

29 The Article 6 of the Gas Directive" (2009/73/EC) "Regional solidarity" emphasizes solidarity in different ways: "In order to safeguard a secure supply.. MSs shall cooperate in order to promote regional and bilateral solidarity..; conditions and practical modalities for mutual assistance; the EC may adopt Guidelines for regional cooperation in a spirit of solidarity..".

30 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC Text with EEA relevance http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32010R0994 (16.3.2017.)

or joint, assessing the likely consequences of an event), ***Preventive Action*** **(**measures needed to remove or mitigate risks identified**) and *Emergency Plans*** **(**containing measures to be taken to remove or mitigate the impact of a gas supply disruption).

The EC was entitled more responsibilities: to ensure consistency with plans of another MSs, **to recommend the establishment of** joint Preventive Action or Emergency Plans at regional level, to deploy a task force to monitor gas flows into the EU in crisis situations, and, should a crisis arise, to assume a mediation and facilitation role (994/2010:295/5). The Regulation revoked three-level approach and the principle of subsidiarity from the **Council Directive 2004/67/EC, but more emphasized regional approach regional solutions (Annex IV Regional cooperation,** 994/2010:**L 295/22) with** potential for more efficient and less costly measures. **To that end** existing areas of cooperation were to be adapted and new cooperation frameworks fostered. On the demand side, further measures were introduced in order to enhance security of supply: in 2013 the EU (following the EC proposal) adopted the first list of Projects of Common Interest (PCI), which should with help of accelerated permit granting and EU funding facilitate the construction of sufficient and diversified gas infrastructure with the cross-border access[31]. Despite many measures were undertaken at the Community level, MSs kept the right to exercise discretion as to which measures were going to: in the event of a sudden crisis they could take unilateral safeguard measures in the gas market with potential to disturb the internal market functioning.

The EU Energy Policy Turned into EU Energy Security Policy

The EU legal acts to follow emphasized the awareness of the EU vulnerability to supply disruptions as a consequence of heavy relying of many countries on Russia as a single gas supplier[32]. The deterioration of relations between the EU and its problematic supplier Russia, in response to the Ukrainian crisis, additionally raised concerns in the EU regarding the continuity of energy supplies and the price of energy. The gas supply security of the EU became "a highly topical issue" linked with "the tensions prevailing between Ukraine and Russia", as was

31 The easiest and fastest way of making large volumes of additional gas is building more strategic gas stocks (although there is no storage obligation in natural gas in the EU).

32 See, for example, Commission Decision of August 11, 2011 establishing the composition and the operation provisions of the Gas Coordination Group https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/rop_of_the_gcg.pdf (22.2.2017.)

stressed in the EU documents[33]. Also, the questions arose regarding adequacy of the measures taken, preventive ones, especially for the medium term. In the 2104 gas supply security was given its own strategy at the Union level in the document named the *European Energy Security Strategy*[34]. The first short-term energy security measures under the terms of the Strategy were energy security stress tests, carried out in the MSs of the whole Energy Community[35]. The results showed that a prolonged supply disruption would have a substantial impact on the EU, but that in the case of mutual cooperation consumers would have remained supplied even in the event of a six-month gas disruption. To that end the EU has proposed stronger regional coordination of energy *acquis* which still did not imply creation of any new institutional structures.

Soon afterwards, at the beginning of 2015, the EC proposed an Energy Union Strategy[36] and on the 2015 March meeting[37] the European Council decided to create an "Energy Union". The idea had initially come from then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk[38], who had suggested MSs not only to coordinate their purchasing of natural gas, largely supplied by Russia, but to establish a single European body in charge of it. He had actually proposed an Energy Union based on solidarity and common economic interests. Consequently, the European Energy Union (EEU) was launched 2015 aiming to provide all Euro-

33 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, (Text with EEA relevance), Brussels, 16.2.2016 COM(2016) 52 final 2016/0030 (COD) https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-52-EN-F1-1.PDF (1.3.2017.)

34 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL European Energy Security Strategy /* COM/2014/0330 final */ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330 (15.3.2017.)

35 The Energy Community brought together the EU states and the EU candidate states from the Black Sea region and Southeast Europe, including those of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Kosovo, Ukraine).

36 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy /* COM/2015/080 final */ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2015:80:FIN (24.2.2017.)

37 European Council meeting – Conclusions (19 and 20 March 2015) , EUCO 11/15, I. ENERGY UNION http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/20-conclusions-european-council/http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52000DC0769 (13.5.2017.)

38 Tusk, Donald, "A united Europe can end Russia's energy stranglehold – a European energy union could break Moscow's monopoly and restore competition", Financial Times, April 21, 2014; https://next.ft.com/content/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0 (24.2.2017.)

peans with secure, sustainable, and competitive energy. The security dimension of the EU energy policy has remained the cornerstone of the EEU, although the security of supply is only among other four, interlinked and mutually dependant dimensions. The energy security drivers remain the completion of the internal market, more efficient energy consumption, as well as diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes.

Furthermore, the EEU sets out a wide range of measures to strengthen the EU's resilience to gas supply disruptions based on enhanced solidarity among the MSs shifting from national to a regional approach. Defining the regions from the aspect of security of supply, the EC considers criteria such as levels of interconnections and maturity of the market development. These regions have to prepare Risk Assessments and Plans at their regional level.

Similar Obstacles Prevent Securitization and Reduce Efficiency of Crisis Mechanism

The Ukraine crisis was a clear signal that Russia integrates gas supply issue into its hybrid strategy[39], enhancing the strategic impacts of the dependence on the Russian gas. As the risks of a major disruption of gas supplies to the EU, as previously mentioned, are not restricted by national borders and could directly or indirectly affect several MSs, "any energy policy decision taken by one MS will inevitably have an impact on the functioning of the market in the other MSs" (Green Paper:2000). Europe's speaking *with one voice* understands common objectives and tools (agreed upon the Community or at least intergovernmental), particularly in the case of securitization, where centralized command and control is required. However, there are various obstacles to successful securitization of the gas supply issue at the Community level:

— Reluctance of the national governments to transfer or even share sovereignty over the energy issues (such is the case in a foreign and security policy): When it comes to the security of gas supply, the transfer from the intergovernmental method

39 According to the NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Jamie Shea, hybrid warfare is a new form of warfare based on hybrid operations that combine aggressive information and propaganda campaigns, social media exploitation, cyber-attacks, creeping infiltration of special forces, militias and weapons, economic embargoes and sabotage, political and business networks of influence and the exploitation of minority grievances… Hybrid warfare is not exactly new, but a Russia which is integrated into our financial, business and energy transactions, in a way that the Soviet Union never was, has far greater leverage to intimidate and divide." http://www.atlcom.nl/ap_archive/pdf/AP%202014%20nr.%207/Shea.pdf (14.2.2016.)

(assumes coordination as the highest level of consensus) to the Community method (qualified majority voting in Council) has not been agreed upon. On the energy issues shared competences are applied, and the EU MSs still exercise some of their own competencies.

— "The vulnerability dilemma" of the EU MSs: The energy security challenges "can be securitised, but if securitised they also must be handled" (Buzan, Weaver, 2003: 291). This would mean adoption of some extraordinary measures against Russia, which in turn could destabilize the EU itself. Namely, the interdependence between Russia and the EU regarding gas trade is asymmetric "as long as the producer can go longer without revenue than the consumer can go without gas" (Ruhle, Grubliauskas, 2015: 1). This of course implies that the EU MSs are too vulnerable on Russian gas.

— Strong asymmetric dependence on Russian gas among the EU MSs creates chronicle incapability of reaching a common position on energy security; the MSs rather protect national interests than face up energy challenges at the Community level. "The discussion of energy security (in the EU) is marked by an untidy patchwork of different concerns and conflicting interests" (Buchan, 2015:357) and "the desecuritising logic of economic rationalism (is) stronger force than the securitisation logic of power politics" (Buzan, Weaver, 2003:176).

The gas supply security issue thus remains in the sphere of public policy, non-securitised. The endorsement of the appropriate risk and crisis mechanism on this issue has prevented counteractions out of ordinary bounds of political procedures. Similar obstacles impede efficiency of the crisis mechanism, which could be "a success (only) in terms of the idea of the European solidarity and collective response" (Jakubowski, 2011: 21). The asymmetric dependence on Russian gas among the EU MSs, for example, undermines solidarity and causes bilateral tensions (during the 2009 gas crisis the Council had to repeatedly remind MSs of solidarity). It may be concluded that there exists a variety of problems (COM(2016) 52 final 2016/0030 (COD): external factors (the behaviour of non-EU suppliers), technical issues (a shortage of appropriate infrastructure, or inadequate protection for infrastructure) and, last but not least, behavioural biases (a purely national approach to security of supply). Apart from behavioural biases there are other limitations to solidarity, the MSs retaining the sovereign right of choice of energy mix as well as retaining their sovereignty over domestic energy sources.

Nevertheless, the main prerequisites of successful gas supply crisis mechanism remain:

— The concept of *a collective action* meaning an "action taken by fully independent countries represented by their governments, which take some steps on a voluntary basis and with full national control, motivated by an idea or on the basis of an international treaty". (Jakubowski, Miland, Wozniak: 2011)
— European *solidarity* should enhance the internal cohesion between MSs: those which are exposed to less favourable geographical or geological conditions should be supported "standing together to protect the most vulnerable"[40]. It should be revised that the concept of fully integrated gas market simultaneously provoked the progressing of interdependence of the gas systems of EU MSs, which in effect asks for more political solidarity in this field.
— *Market-based instruments* (at alert level mostly) should be given priority for as long as possible. "An ideal energy security management system should be based on a well-functioning liberalized market where demand and supply are basic tools for balancing. To reach these ideal conditions there needs to be competition among external suppliers to the EU and regulations which are binding on the internal market must be also applied to external energy companies." (Jakubowski, Miland, Wozniak: 2011)
— A *shared responsibility* at national level between natural gas undertakings (while market players should be given sufficient opportunity to respond to the situation with market-based measures), MSs (notably through their Competent Authorities, and the EC (within their respective areas of activities and competence).
— The principle of *subsidiarity* comes into play when (in common action or in coordinated one) the gas supply security cannot be achieved sufficiently by the MSs alone. In that case the Community level is needed by reason of the scale of the crisis effects or when national approaches result in sub-optimal measures and aggravate the impact of a crisis. It is connected with the principle of *proportionality*, which means that the Union's action does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve some objective.

40 The EC Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete, quoted in European Commission – Press release "Towards Energy Union: The Commission presents sustainable energy security package", Brussels, 16 February 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-307_en.htm

Effective crisis management mechanism for gas supply remains a tool of dual effectiveness. It is a political tool, a tool of deterrence against those who could cause a gas crisis. First of all it is a technical tool aimed at resolving crisis situations due to a range of crisis procedures and investments, such as the construction of bidirectional interconnectors (so called "sleeping pipelines"). Objectives should be achieved by the most cost-efficient measures, and investments should as a matter of principle be made by undertakings and be based, as well as crisis management procedures, on market principles. Some of objectives include solutions used solely in a crisis situation, Therefore, a lot of necessary infrastructure is not required by the market and is too expensive (e.g. "sleeping pipeline" should enable physical ability to supply neighbours in the case of a crisis). For that reason, proportion of the benefits of the infrastructure investments for increased security of supply should be taken into account. If the investment costs would significantly outweigh the prospective economic benefits, there is a big need for creating significant incentives to build and for these purposes different sources of EU funding are available.

In order to ensure the principles of the internal energy market and also to allow for a better risk assessment and more efficient crisis management common approach is needed. Stronger EU level approach is ensured by the newest decision on intergovernmental agreements (IGA) in energy. The first EU decision on energy IGA has been in force since 2012, and has required MSs to notify the EC of their energy IGA with non-EU countries only after they have been concluded. Many of IGAs contain provisions not compliant with EU law, therefore the EC may launch infringement proceedings, but agreements are very difficult to be renegotiated. In March 2017 the European Parliament and the Council adopted revised rules on IGA in energy, closely following a proposal made by the EC in February 2016[41], fully harmonized with the Energy Union strategy. According to the new rules, the Ms will have to notify the EC about their IGA in energy ex-ante, not ex-post.

41 Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States and third countries in the field of energy and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU, Brussels, 16.2.2016 COM(2016) 53 final http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0053 (3.3.2017.)

Conclusion

The security of gas supplies is the overarching goal of the EU energy policy and the backbone of the Energy Union Strategy. The supply vulnerability of certain countries depends on the size of their domestic production, the possibilities to diversify their energy sources, suppliers and routes, as well as the preventive and crisis measures in effect. Since the energy sources abundance is geographically predetermined, the EU has made significant progress in:

— Mitigating the risk of possible future gas supply crisis,
— Preparing for supply disruptions, and
— Limiting the impacts of supply disruptions.

Gas supply security turned into "the capability to manage – for a given period of time – external market influences which cannot be reduced or balanced by the market itself".[42] Crisis management mechanism is an instrument, which helps the governments to enhance the gas security. Large choice of measures is available to address situations in which markets can no longer deliver required gas supplies. In the event of gas supply crisis, all actors, be it at intra-national, national, regional, or at Union level, should abide by crisis management mechanism; there is no need to take exceptional actions other than listed in the risk and crisis plans. The mechanism should take into account different risk stages the involved countries might face.

The mechanism of gas supply crisis management, based on solidarity, subsidiarity and regionality, has been developed. However, within the EU is a full awareness of the measures' shortcomings, presented in the February 2016 Memorandum of the EC[43], at the same time proposing a new security of supply regulation, encouraging more solidarity, more transparency in gas supply contracts, as well as a more decisive shift from national to regional approach when designing security of gas supply measures (better coordination, more exact assessment of common risks, joint decision to build bidirectional capacities etc.). In the gas supply crisis management mechanism, a three crisis level approach (gas undertakings, MSs, the EC) will continue to be applied in order to enable relaying on market mechanisms for as long as possible**.**

The energy security issue in the EU undoubtedly has been transferred from a non-politicized to a politicized issue, which is part of

42 According to a deeper analysis made by the IEA bodies about the emergency policy for natural gas from 2008 (cited by Jakubowski, P., Miland, R., Woźniak, M., 2011:18).

43 European Commission – Fact Sheet, Security of gas supply regulation, Brussels, 16 February 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-308_en.htm (17.2.2017.)

public policy calling for government action. The implementation of risk and crisis management plans, which have already been prepared, has been given the EU priority over attempts of securitization in this issue. For the time being the securitization attempts of the gas supply issue have not been successful since the EU MSs as *the target audience* have not acknowledged that the EU or the EU MSs as *referent object*s are in real danger and have not tolerate measures beyond the already established rules. The main reason for unsuccessful securitization acts is the "Russification" of the issue. For that reason this issue so far has not "move(d) out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making" (Taurek 2006:3).

Avoiding securitization of the Russia's gas supply issue, the EU has acted positively lessening tensions and dangers. The EU has moved the issue "into the ordinary public sphere where (it) can be dealt with in accordance with the rules of the (democratic) political system" (Taurek, 2006:3). This move is fully in accordance with the suggestions of the securitization theory creator Ole Wæver, who underlined that the securitization is "a failure to deal with issues of normal politics" (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). However, it should be emphasized that this view is not unanimously shared. Theorists such as R. Emmers (cited by Doe) recognised "the difficulty of drawing a clear line between politicization and securitization", because "a successful securitization ... does not depend on the adoption of such extraordinary means, however, but simply on the acknowledgment of the security threat by the audience". It is not likely that such differing theorist's views will become closer in the future, or the views of the EU MSs.

Jelena Radić Đozić*

Čimbenici (de) sekuritizacije opskrbe EU plinom

SAŽETAK: Sve veća ovisnost EU o vanjskim, netržišno orijentiranim opskrbljivačima plinom i iskustvo kriza zbog prekida opskrbe energetsku su politiku EU približili sigurnosnoj politici. Pitanje sigurne opskrbe plinom temelj je sigurnosne, kao jedne od tri (uz ekonomsku i ekološku) dimenzije energetske politike EU.

Isticanje sigurnosne dimenzije potaknulo je sekuritizaciju energetske politike EU. Nakon prve krize vezane uz opskrbu plinom EU, jedna država članica preuzela je ulogu provoditelja sekuritizacije te pokušala uvjeriti relevantnu javnost (ostale države članice i tijela EU) da je prekid opskrbe plinom egzistencijalna prijetnja, koja traži obvezivanje na izvanredne mjere. Sekuritizacija nije uspjela zbog različitih interesa država članica, što je potvrdilo da je sigurnosna dimenzija najslabija u energetskoj politici EU. EU nije željela vezivanjem energetske politike sa "sigurnošću" implicirati militarizaciju tog nevojnog sektora, pa je pitanje zadržala u procesu uobičajenog političkog pregovaranja. Doduše, diskurzivna dimenzija procesa sekuritizacije je zadržana (uvriježila se sintagma "energetska sigurnost"), ali je EU odlučio unaprijed razviti zajedničke kapacitete za odgovor na krizu.

Cilj ovog rada je prikazati tržišne i netržišne mjere za osiguranje opskrbe plinom te mehanizam kriznog upravljanja opskrbom plinom, temeljen na principima solidarnosti, supsidijarnosti kao i regionalnom pristupu. Osnovna je hipoteza da pitanje opskrbe EU plinom nije sekuritizirano, ali je iz nepolitizirane prešlo u politiziranu sferu kao dio javne politike. Upravo sveobuhvatan EU pristup u upravljanju opskrbe plinom, čvrsta pravila i uzajamne kontrole onemogućuju sekuritizaciju tog pitanja, odnosno hitnu akciju, izvan standardnih političkih procedura i dogovorenih pravila.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: **opskrba plinom, EU, sigurnost, krizno upravljanje, sekuritizacija**

* Jelena Đozić Radić, doktorska studentica na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. E-MAIL: jelenaradicdj@gmail.com

References

Buchan, David. 2015. Energy Policy – Sharp Challenges and Rising Ambitions, in: Wallace, H., Pollack, Mark. A., Young, Alasdair R. (eds.) *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Seventh Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 344 – 366.

Buzan, Barry, Weaver, Ole. 2003. *Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, B., et.al. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publications.

Does, Antonia, 2013. *The Construction of the Maras: Between Politicization and Securitization*. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Accessible at: http://books.openedition.org/iheid/716 (01.02.2017.)

Jakubowski, Pawel, Miland, Rafal, Woźniak, Maciej. 2011. *Energy Supply Crisis Management Mechanisms*, New Direction, The Foundation for European Reform.

Lucas, Edward. 2008. The new Cold War – How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West. London: Bloomsbury.

Roth, Mathias. 2011. Poland as a Policy Entrepreneur in European External Energy Policy: Towards Greater Energy Solidarity vis-à-vis Russia?. *Geopolitics* (16), 3: 600–625.

Rühle, Michael, Grubliauskas, Julijus. 2015. Energy as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare", Research Paper. Rome: Research Division – NATO Defense College. No. 113 – April 2015.

Stern, Jonathan. 2005. The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and Oxford University Press.

Taurek, Rita. 2006. Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies. *Journal of International Relations and Development* (9), 1: 53-61

Venette, Steven James. 2003. Risk communication in a High Reliability Organization: APHIS PPQ's inclusion of risk in decision making" (A Dissertation), North Dakota State University of Agriculture and Applied Science.

Yergin, Daniel. 2006. Ensuring Energy Security. *Foreign Affairs* (85), 2: 69-82.