

1 **Title:**

2 **An analysis of lifejacket wear, environmental factors, and casualty activity on marine**
3 **accident fatality rates**

Author Note:

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4

5 **Abstract:**

6 Drowning and fatalities at sea are a large concern globally. In the UK, many sea rescues are
7 performed by the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, and this study investigates 6 years'
8 worth of their rescue data to better understand causation of drowning and what makes an
9 incident at sea high risk. A Poisson model is applied to numerous factors recorded as part of
10 each rescue, including environmental conditions (visibility, sea state, etc.), lifejacket wear,
11 and response times for rescue. Increased lifejacket wear is shown to be significantly
12 correlated with lower fatality rates across all spectrum of activities. Survivability among
13 those casualties wearing life jackets was 94 %. A seasonal signal is clearly present, with a
14 higher proportion of life at risk incidents occurring during winter months, and a higher than
15 predicted number of fatalities during this time. The analysis identifies high risk groups of
16 beach/sea users, with one of the most at risk being people fishing from shore. Incident
17 survivability is shown to decrease at different rates per activity, as time to rescue increases.
18 This study provides clear evidence that a co-ordinated approach to sea safety is required, and

19 suggests that increased lifejacket wear among coastal and marine users would have a
20 dramatic effect on reducing the number of drowning related deaths each year.

21

22 **Keywords:**

23 Personal flotation device; sea safety; drowning; commercial fishing; RNLI

PRE-PRINT

24 **1. Introduction**

25 The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) is the largest maritime lifesaving
26 organisation in the UK and it currently provides both lifeboat and lifeguard cover, with 238
27 lifeboat stations and in excess of 240 lifeguard units around Great Britain and Ireland. On
28 average, RNLI lifeboats are called to attend in excess of 8,500 incidents per year around the
29 UK. Of these, approximately 350 (4.1 %) represent an incident whereby there was a verified
30 life at risk (LAR) each year. Of all LAR incidents, 140 (40 %) involve a fatality. A LAR
31 incident is defined as an incident where either a life was lost, or would have been lost had it
32 not been for the actions of the RNLI. There is a broad increase in water based-activity across
33 the UK, and it is important for the RNLI to understand what that will mean for the number of
34 incidents they are likely to be tasked to respond to. The sea is used extensively for both
35 recreational and commercial activities, yet it is an environment that is notoriously
36 unpredictable and quick to change. Factors such as inexperience, inappropriate equipment,
37 mechanical failure, and horseplay mean that each year around the UK coastline, thousands of
38 people get into difficulty at sea. Indeed, the combination of these factors has earned
39 commercial fishing the reputation as one of the most dangerous professions in the UK
40 (McGuinness and Utne, 2016). Over the past 11 years in the UK fishing fleet alone, there
41 have been on average 245 accidents, 16 vessels lost, 52 injuries and 8 fatalities each year,
42 with the overall size of the UK fishing fleet estimated to be 6191 vessels (MMO, 2017). Both
43 commercial and leisure users that get into trouble may be able to self-rescue (i.e. get
44 themselves to shore, or be rescued by crew mates), or attract help from passing vessels, but
45 many will require the assistance of the coastguard or emergency services such as the RNLI in
46 order to get out of their predicament. Thus, in the context of this article, a service is defined
47 as a rescue response performed by the RNLI.

48

49 Most research on maritime accidents and fatalities focus on commercial activities (Jin *et al.*,
50 2002; O'Connor and O'Connor, 2006; Marvasti, 2017), as a result of the requirement from
51 bodies such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO, 1999) to report and investigate
52 occupational fatalities (McGuinness and Utne, 2016). One of the most well-established lines
53 of research is that of assessing the impact of weather conditions on the number and severity
54 of fishing vessel incidents. Wind speed is regularly investigated in terms of accident and
55 incident causation, as it is shown to be a primary factor in fishing vessel stability (Niclasen *et*
56 *al.*, 2010). Generally, as might be expected, an overall decline in weather conditions increases
57 the likelihood of an incident per vessel (Wu *et al.*, 2009), however, there are less journeys
58 made in inclement weather and the overall number of incidents is shown to decrease as a
59 result (Marvasti and Dakhli, 2017). More recently, studies have attempted to quantify the
60 impact of the most severe weather conditions that a particular fishing fleet may encounter,
61 such as extratropical cyclones and large-scale sea ice coverage. The study of Rezaee *et al.*
62 (2016) was one of the most comprehensive to address these factors, primarily because results
63 were interpreted by commercial fishing vessel type (e.g. crab fishing, seal fishing, etc.). The
64 results showed that differing fishing types were predominantly affected by different types of
65 weather influence, as a result of differing vessel configurations and the relative locality of
66 fishing grounds per species type. A study of passenger vessels explicitly linked the
67 occurrence of crew injuries during incidents on cruise liners and ferries to that of passenger
68 injuries, with obvious implications for crew training and competence (Yip *et al.*, 2015).

69

70 Comparatively few studies have addressed boating more generally, or recreational boating
71 specifically, although a few have attempted to quantify the impact of lifejacket use on the
72 outcome of leisure boating incidents (Cummings *et al.*, 2011; Wright *et al.*, 2013; Bugeja *et*
73 *al.*, 2014; Viauroux and Gungor, 2016). However, published studies on the trends in the UK

74 are either generally either dated or entirely focused on commercial activities rather than
75 recreational boating (Reilly, 1980; Matheson, 2001; Roberts, 2004). There is a much larger
76 focus on understanding and preventing incidents that might be termed lifeguard incidents in
77 the leisure sector, such as rip current rescues (Gallop *et al.*, 2016, Pitman *et al.*, 2016), but not
78 incidents further offshore.

79

80 In order to reduce drowning in the UK, it is first important to fully understand the chain of
81 causation influencing accidents and incidents in UK waters, and to appreciate the factors that
82 influence the fatality rate of incidents. To date, no published studies have addressed the
83 deficit of information regarding causation of UK maritime accidents, and no studies have
84 taken a holistic approach incorporating both commercial and leisure craft, as well as small
85 manual craft such as surfboards and bodyboards. Therefore, this study makes use of
86 operational RNLI data spanning the period 2011-2016 in order to better understand the
87 causes of maritime incidents in UK waters. For ease of reference, the non-standard
88 abbreviations used throughout this article are summarized in Table 1.

89

90 Table 1. Royal National Lifeboat Institution abbreviations used throughout this article.

Abbreviation	Text in full	Brief description
RNLI	Royal National Lifeboat Institution	The name of the UK's largest maritime rescue charity
AIC	Abbreviated Incident Category	The broad categories used by the RNLI to group incidents into types based on activity (such as fishing)
LAR	Life at Risk	An incident where either a life was lost, or one would have been lost had it not been for the RNLI's intervention
RoS	Return of Service	The log pertaining to an individual incident that was attended by the RNLI
SST	Sea Surface Temperature	A measure of water temperature

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94

95 **2. Data and Methods**

96 Here we outline the way in which RNLI data is collected and how it has been supplemented
97 with external data sets, and the processing steps taken for analysis.

98

99 **2.1 Data**

100 The RNLI collects data every time a lifeboat is launched, with each individual entry being
101 termed a Return of Service (RoS). Each RoS contains information on casualty location,
102 number of people involved, casualty activity, casualty behaviour (lifejacket use, influence of
103 drugs/alcohol, etc.), and meteorological conditions (wind speed, wave height, visibility, sea
104 state etc. at incident location). This study makes use of 6 years' worth of RoS data (2011-
105 2016) supplied by the RNLI. Although more is available, the RNLI has only recorded
106 information about lifejacket utilisation since 2011, and therefore in order to fully incorporate
107 this parameter into the analysis, only data since 2011 will be used. The data also contains
108 information about whether a life was saved or lost as a result of this rescue effort. Initially,
109 the entry for life saved/lost is made by the crew, but it is subsequently verified by the RNLI
110 HQ based on the narrative and conditions in order to ensure parity in reporting across the
111 organisation.

112

113 Much of the meteorological information recorded is qualitative and based on the experienced
114 coxswain's estimates of conditions. When entering the data for the RoS, they are prompted to
115 select the appropriate conditions from a drop-down, which lists all the appropriate terms.

116 Wind speed and sea state are all recorded as per the terminology on the Beaufort scale, and
117 this allows conversion from qualitative terms to a quantitative value for the mean wind
118 speeds and wave heights associated with the relevant level of the Beaufort scale. The
119 conversion applied is listed at Table 2. As a result of this qualitative approach to

120 meteorological data uncertainties do exist as to the reliability of the data. However, a study
 121 by Wheeler (2005), comparing qualitative recording of wind speed in ships logs to measured
 122 data, showed estimates to be consistent and reliable with 43 % of all observations correct, and
 123 a further 33 % only ± 1 Beaufort Scale category from the true value. Therefore, in the scope
 124 of this research, wind observations are deemed suitably robust to be included for further
 125 analysis.

126

Table 2. Conversion matrix for reported terminology in RoS data. All conversions based on Met Office Beaufort Scale.

Wind speed		Sea state		Visibility	
Reported Term	Converted value [knots]	Reported Term	Converted value (wave height [m])	Reported term	Converted value Visibility [miles]
Calm	0	Glass Calm	0	Nil	0
Light Airs	2	Calm	0.1	Poor	2
Light Breeze	5	Smooth	0.2	Fair	3.5
Gentle Breeze	9	Slight	0.6	Good	5
Moderate Breeze	13	Choppy	2	Very Good	7.5
Fresh Breeze	19	Rough	3	Excellent	10
Strong Breeze	24	Very Rough	4.75		
Near Gale	30	High	7		
Gale	37	Very High	10.75		
Severe Gale	44	Phenomenal	14		
Storm	52				
Violent Storm	60				
Hurricane	64				

127

128 One crucial parameter not recorded in RoS data is sea surface temperature (SST). In order to
 129 incorporate this into the dataset, average monthly SSTs were obtained for 10 representative
 130 stations around the UK coastline, and each RoS incident was mapped to the nearest SST
 131 station. The appropriate representative SST for the incident month was then assigned to the
 132 RoS entry, in order to provide some indication of likely SST at the incident. As a result of

133 this averaging approach, the SST is the parameter used for further analysis with the poorest
134 data quality overall.

135

136 **2.2 Methods**

137 In this paper, a simple stepwise log-linear (Poisson) regression model is described and
138 applied to just the LAR incidents within the RoS data. The way RoS data is collected means
139 that you get one entry per lifeboat incident, which may have multiple fatalities or lives saved.
140 The data was therefore separated out into individual entries for individual people. This was
141 achieved by splitting the RoS entry into multiple entries, based on the sum of lives saved and
142 lost as a result of that service. The narrative for each entry was used to attribute the correct
143 lifejacket characteristics to each individual in the incident. The result is that of 2094 RoS
144 entries for services where a life was at risk, the dataset is expanded to reflect the 3119
145 individuals who were either saved or lost their lives in the 2094 services.

146

147 The dependent variable for the model will be the occurrence of a fatality (Y_i), binary coded
148 with 1 equal to a loss of life. The model estimates the likelihood of a fatality based on the
149 balance of independent variables, as follows;

$$\exp(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_1 + \beta_2\chi_2 + \dots + \beta_k\chi_k \quad (1)$$

150 where α is a constant, β is a partial regression coefficient and χ is an explanatory independent
151 variable. The model starts empty and is able to add any variables inside the significance
152 threshold (set at 0.05), and remove any variables outside this threshold through forward
153 selection and backward elimination. Goodness of fit was evaluated at each step using the R-
154 squared value. The variables offered to the model were SST, four dummy binary variables for
155 the four types of activity each RoS entry is classified into (Leisure, Commercial, Person,
156 Other), whether there was physically a person in the water, the swell height, whether service

157 was conducted at night, wind speed at incident, time taken to reach casualty from the RNLI
 158 receiving the information, visibility at incident, sea state, and whether the casualty was
 159 wearing a lifejacket. The variables were checked for collinearity, and this was found in the
 160 casualty category variables (as the sum of the four dummy variables by default has to be
 161 equal to 1). Therefore, the commercial category was removed as it was not statistically
 162 significant.

Table 3. Poisson regression coefficients and associated P-Values for the likelihood of fatality in life at risk incidents.

Label	Factor	Measurement	Coef	P-Value
	Constant		-0.100	
β_1	Lifejacket Use	1 if lifejacket used, 0 otherwise	-1.277	0.000
β_2	Leisure Activity	1 if a leisure incident, 0 otherwise	-1.234	0.000
β_3	'Other' Activity	1 if an 'other' incident (not leisure, commercial, or people), 0 otherwise. Typical 'other' incidents might include flying or motor vehicles.	0.673	0.000
β_4	Person In Water	1 if the casualty had entered the water, 0 otherwise	0.3368	0.000
β_5	'Person' Activity	1 if a 'person' activity where no craft involved (such as walking), 0 otherwise	-0.233	0.039
β_6	Sea Surface Temperature	Temperature in °C (range from 6.65 to 17.75)	-0.0526	0.000
β_7	Visibility	Distance in miles (range from 0 to 10)	-0.0299	0.030
β_8	Time to Reach Casualty	Time taken (minutes) to reach casualty from moment RNLI informed of incident	0.001688	0.000

163

164 3. Results

165 Table 3 reports the results of the log-linear regression, and shows the variables deemed to be
 166 statistically significant ($P < 0.05$) in influencing the likelihood of a fatality. Lifejacket use had
 167 the greatest impact on likelihood of fatality, with a coefficient in excess of -1, significant at
 168 99.9 %. Similarly, leisure activity was associated with a large magnitude (-1.2) reduction in
 169 fatalities ($P < 0.001$). The category of activity associated with the greatest increase in fatalities
 170 is the 'Other' category ($P < 0.001$). Most (>90 %) of the entries in this category are for other
 171 vehicles, either aircraft or motor vehicles, entering the water, and are associated with a high

172 fatality rate. A service involving a person physically in the water, as opposed to in trouble on
173 a boat, also increased the likelihood of a fatal incident ($P<0.05$). Increases in SST are
174 associated with increased survivability ($P<0.001$), as is an increase in visibility ($P<0.05$).
175 Increases in the time taken for the RNLI to reach a casualty are also associated with increased
176 fatality rates among victims ($P<0.001$).

177

178

179 **3.1 Lifejackets**

180 The wear of lifejackets was seen to have the highest magnitude impact on survivability in life
181 at risk incidents (Table 3). Therefore, more investigation into lifejacket wear was undertaken.
182 Plotting the percentage of survivors wearing lifejackets against the time to rescue shows the
183 impact that a lifejacket has on survivability over time. There is an increase in percentage of
184 survivors rescued wearing lifejackets from 35 % rescued after 10 minutes, compared to 55 %
185 at 60 minutes and ~80 % of survivors rescued after 120 minutes are shown to be wearing
186 lifejackets (Figure 1a). This figure provides a basic predictive capacity for survivability, for
187 example, if 10 people were to get into a LAR situation at sea, on average only two of the
188 individuals would have the ability to survive without the aid of a lifejacket. Therefore, if a
189 rescue asset will take two hours to reach or find a casualty, in order to survive two hours in
190 the water, 80 % of people would require the assistance of a lifejacket. This of course does not
191 account for other factors such as the onset of hypothermia. The overall percentage of
192 incidents involving individuals wearing a lifejacket is 42.4 %, however, among those wearing
193 a lifejacket, 94.1 % survived their incident (Figure 1b), versus 73.1 % survival of people not
194 wearing a lifejacket.

195




Figure 1. The impact of lifejacket wear on survivability during life at risk incidents, including: (a) the percentage of survivors found wearing lifejackets over time to casualty, showing that a greater number of people need to wear lifejackets in order to survive longer during life at risk incidents; and (b) the total split of lifejacket wear among survivors and fatalities.

196

197 3.2 Seasonality / SST

198 SST was shown to be a high magnitude factor from the multivariate regression, and further
 199 analysis showed there to be statistically significant difference in the mean SST for fatalities
 200 and survivors. SST in fatalities was shown to be 1.03 °C cooler ($P < 0.000$), with 95 %
 201 confidence intervals at 0.78 °C and 1.28 °C. The actual difference is small, and the standard
 202 deviations are large (3.21 for survivors and 3.25 for fatalities). Instead of looking at
 203 individual SST trends on an individual case-by-case basis, we have subsequently looked at
 204 the occurrence of fatalities by month. The eight months between October and May see an
 205 above average proportion of LAR incidents when compared to the distribution of all RNLI
 206 incidents (Figure 2a), with the largest proportion occurring in the 3 months centered on
 207 February. In terms of actual fatalities within those LAR incidents, the five months between
 208 November and March see the greatest proportion of fatalities, with proportions in January
 209 double that of any other month (Figure 2b). These months incorporate British winter, and
 210 therefore reflect lower average SSTs. In terms of fatalities, the casualty type also changes
 211 with the seasons (Figure 3). In summer months, the proportion of fatalities in leisure users is

212 seen to increase from 20 % in winter to around 45 %. Conversely, the percentage of
 213 commercial fatalities increases from 5% in summer months, to 25 % in winter months.
 214




Figure 2. Seasonality in incident profile. (a) The spread of all (non-life at risk) incidents throughout the year (grey shaded area) compared against the spread of LAR incidents (bars), with positive bars indicative of greater than average occurrence and negative values indicative of lower than average occurrence. (b) Spread of all life at risk incidents throughout the year (grey area), against the occurrence of fatalities throughout the year (blue bars).

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


Figure 3. Percentage of fatalities per month broken down by casualty category (excluding 'Other' fatalities).

216

217 3.3 Activity

218 When considering fatalities during all incidents (not just those deemed life at risk), analysis
 219 of activity type can show strong trends in the percentage of fatalities. Multivariate analysis

220 highlighted how of the four broad categories of incident, the ‘Other’ category (typically
221 motor vehicles and aircraft) showed a strong positive correlation with fatality. That is echoed
222 in Table 4, where incidents are further broken down by activity. Motor vehicle incidents
223 typically result in the most fatalities, with 80 fatalities per 1,000 incidents. Flying also
224 features highly with 60 fatalities per 1,000 incidents. These two activities are atypical of the
225 remainder in the chart, as it is highly unlikely (other than in cases of self-harm or suicide) that
226 the people undertaking these activities ever anticipated coming into contact with the sea or
227 beach. Although these activities have a high fatality rate, their overall occurrence is low, with
228 only 225 motor vehicle and 183 flying incidents over the study period (Table 4). Of the
229 typical coastal activities, scuba diving results in a high level of fatalities (68 per 1,000), as
230 does angling from the shore (63 per 1,000), but again the relative number of incidents is low
231 overall (545 and 384, respectively). These activities both incur more fatalities than incidents
232 involving suicide or self-harm (60 per 1,000), where often the intention is for a fatal event to
233 occur. However, there are many more incidents of this nature. Over the reporting period,
234 there were 4558 suicide or self-harm attempts, of which 275 resulted in a fatality. The suicide
235 and self-harm is actually an under prediction of the true rate, as the RNLi only attributes this
236 category to incidents where the casualty is thought to be alive at the moment the lifeboat is
237 called to assist, else the services are recorded as body recovery operations. Waterside activity
238 is the only other activity that results in fatalities in excess of 50 times per 1,000 incidents,
239 with significant numbers of incidents overall (2050). When the fatality rate is plotted against
240 the percentage of fatalities wearing lifejackets, taken from Table 4, there is a clear trend of
241 lower lifejacket wear in activities that have higher fatality rates (Figure 4). Flying and motor
242 vehicle accidents are omitted, as these are both activities where there was never any intended
243 interaction with the coast and therefore there is no scope for education or prevention. Of the
244 two, the main anomaly is that of flying, which has high fatality rate and high lifejacket wear.

245 This may be a function of the fact that although lifejackets are generally readily available on
246 aircraft, the impact can be catastrophic and regardless of the preparation taken by casualties
247 prior to impact (such as donning the lifejacket), the impact itself proves fatal. Clearly
248 lifejacket wear is inappropriate for some activities, such as scuba diving or walking, both of
249 which feature low lifejacket wear rates.

250

251 The presentation of data in these broad groups of activity still somewhat obscures the trends.
252 It is possible to investigate the type of accident on board vessels (Figure 5), and also for
253 activities involving people on the shore (Figure 6). When the type of incident onboard vessels
254 is investigated, the most severe outcome appears to be a man overboard (Figure 5a). On
255 average, across all vessel incidents, a man overboard typically results in 53 fatalities per
256 1,000 incidents, however, there is great variation within the class. The highest fatality rate is
257 for a man overboard a commercial fishing vessel, where fatality rates reach 108 per 1,000.
258 Also experiencing a high man overboard fatality rate is Other Marine traffic (78 per 1,000)
259 and Angling from a Boat (70 per 1,000). Motorboating and Sailing fatalities resulting from
260 man overboard incidents are comparatively low (both at 31 per 1,000). Second to Man
261 Overboard events, are those incidents involving fire, explosion, capsized or collision (Figure
262 5b). On average, these result in fatalities in 28 per 1,000 incidents, however, the Commercial
263 Fishing category is again far higher (73 per 1,000). Second within this category is Angling
264 from a Boat (43 per 1,000), and the remaining categories all register less than 40 fatalities per
265 1,000 incidents involving fire, explosion, capsized or collision. The third most severe vessel
266 incident category is that of person ill (e.g. heart attack, stroke, etc.) on board (Figure 5c),
267 resulting in 25 fatalities per 1,000 on average. However, within this category there is very
268 little variation between activity types.

269

270 For incidents involving non-craft activities (swimming, walking, etc.), falls from cliff are the
 271 most severe cause of accidents (Figure 6a), resulting in 93 fatalities per 1,000 incidents.
 272 Within this, there is a much higher fatality rate among people that get into trouble angling
 273 from shore, where the fatality rate is 190 fatalities per 1,000 incidents. Second is walkers
 274 (99), followed by Waterside Activity, Others, and Climbers (83, 73, and 63 per 1,000
 275 respectively). The second most serious type of incident is people ending up in the water, with
 276 an average of 75 fatalities per 1,000 incidents. The trend is as per falls from a cliff, whereby
 277 Anglers from Rocks are most at risk (126), followed by Walkers (92), Waterside Activity
 278 (68), Others (48), and Climbers (37).
 279

Table 4. Fatality rate per 1,000 incidents broken down by RNLI Abbreviated Incident Category, including the percentage of fatalities wearing a lifejacket, and the average number of fatalities per year.

Abbreviated Incident Category	Total number of incidents	Fatalities per 1,000 incidents	Percentage of fatalities wearing a lifejacket	Average number of fatalities per year
Motor Vehicles	225	80	5.6	3
Scuba Diving	545	68	5.4	6
Angling from Shore	384	63	4.2	4
Suicide and Self Harm	4558	60	0.4	46
Flying	183	60	72.7	2
Waterside Activity	2050	51	4.8	17
Swimming	1210	36	2.3	7
Climbing	271	30	12.5	1
Walking	2914	22	1.6	11
Other Marine Vessels	1259	21	15.4	4
Commercial Vessels	3043	16	30.6	8
Small Craft (e.g. kayaking, canoeing)	5724	6	16.2	6
Angling from a Boat	3644	5	50.0	3
Motorboating	5708	3	26.3	3
Sailing	7451	3	28.6	4
Jumping in to Water	31	0	0	0




Figure 4. The percentage of fatalities wearing lifejackets plotted against the number of fatalities per 1,000 incidents for each activity type (outlined in Table 4). The identified anomalous activities (motor vehicles and aircraft) are omitted.

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


Figure 5. Fatality rates among vessel incidents, broken down by incident type: (a) Man overboard; (b) Fire/explosion/capsize/collision; (c) Person ill on board; and (d) other incidents. Type of vessel is also recorded, including Angling from a boat (AFB), Commercial Fishing (CF), Motorboating (M), Other Marine (OM), and Sailing (S).

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


Figure 6. Fatality rates among incidents involving people not using vessels or crafts, broken down by incident type: (a) Fall from cliff; (b) Person in water; and (c) Person on shore. Casualty activity is also recorded, including Angling from Shore (AFS), Climbing (C), Other (O), Walking (W), or Waterside Activity (WA).

282

283 **3.4 Time to casualty**

284 The multivariate regression showed that as time to casualty increased, survivability
285 decreases. This again varies by incident, and has been presented in Figure 7. Time to casualty
286 is the time taken from the point at which the RNLI is informed of an incident to the moment
287 they reach the casualty. The RNLI is normally informed of an incident at sea immediately in
288 order to give the crew time to assemble prior to making a decision to launch. Therefore any
289 delay in launching is taken into account by this metric, as it focusses on the point in time at
290 which information was first received. In the highest risk activities, the survivability drops
291 rapidly with time, such as is observed in suicide/self-harm incidents and those involving
292 scuba diving. There are some incidents where survivability stays relatively high for a period,
293 before dropping away, such as incidents where the casualty may conceivably still have some
294 form of craft for flotation (Small Craft, and Fire/Explosion/Capsize/Collision). The lowest
295 initial survivability is for a casualty that has fallen from a cliff, with only 45 % surviving after
296 the first 5 minutes. Conversely, swimmers and small craft users have a near 100 %
297 survivability chance within the initial 5 minutes. Small craft incidents are anomalous among
298 the data, as survivability remains at near 100 % for up to 25 minutes, before dropping off
299 rapidly to around 20 % after 55 minutes.

300

301 **4. Discussion**

302 Maritime activity is notoriously dangerous, with commercial fishing widely regarded as one
303 of the most dangerous professions. Hitherto, there has been no holistic investigation of UK
304 maritime incidents that encompasses recreational boating, commercial activities, and people
305 on the shore that get into trouble in the water or on the coast. In order to provide insight into
306 the causes and factors influencing UK incidents, a log-linear regression was applied to 6
307 years' worth of RNLI incident data, for incidents where a life was deemed to be at risk.




Figure 7. Predicted survivability of a Life at Risk incident as a function of the time taken to reach the casualty, calculated as the percentage of lives saved per 5 minute time interval.

309

310 4.1 Key findings

311 The wear of lifejackets had the most bearing on the multivariate analysis. The recording of
 312 this information has only been undertaken by the RNLI since 2011, and this is what limited
 313 the data analysis to just the 2011 – 2016 returns. The overall number of casualties in life at
 314 risk incidents wearing lifejackets was found to be 42.2 %. This was slightly higher than other
 315 studies: 19.8 % (Viauoux and Gungor, 2016) in recreational boating; and 19.5 % (O'Connor
 316 and O'Connor, 2005) in all Australian boating rescues. It is interesting that the rate of wear is
 317 slightly higher than other studies as this dataset includes all RNLI incidents, including
 318 activities such as walkers falling from cliffs, whom would naturally not be expected to be
 319 wearing lifejackets. Lifejacket wear among fatalities was 13.9 %, comparable with other
 320 studies citing 15.5 % (MAIB, 2016), but significantly higher than the 5 % quoted for
 321 commercial fishing fatalities (O'Connor and O'Connor, 2006). The most significant finding
 322 is that in life at risk incidents, 94 % of people who were wearing a lifejacket at the time of the
 323 incident survived their experience.

324

325 The distribution of life at risk incidents showed a clear signal of seasonality, broadly linked to
326 sea surface temperature. Despite a comparatively low overall number of incidents during the
327 winter, there was a higher than expected rate of life at risk incidents during winter months,
328 and within the distribution of life at risk incidents, there was again a higher proportion of
329 fatalities than expected during winter months. Sea surface temperature and visibility were
330 returned as significant by the regression analysis, whereas wave height and wind speed at
331 incident were not. These are not insignificant as a result of their omissions, it may just be that
332 visibility and sea surface temperature were adequate descriptors for the seasonality trend.
333 Much research has been done on the effects of cold water shock, and the link to death and
334 rapid incapacitation is well documented (Harnett and Bulani, 1982; Tipton, 1989). The
335 reduction in overall incidents reflects a shift in demographic, with less pleasure craft out in
336 cold conditions. More winter incidents are attributable to commercial traffic as the industry
337 doesn't have a seasonal peak in the same way that leisure uses do. The over-representation of
338 life at risk incidents and fatalities in winter demonstrate that when incidents do occur they are
339 typically more serious. Cold water shock will be one mechanism by which the severity of an
340 incident is increased (Golden *et al.*, 1997). Storminess is also increased through the winter
341 months, with large waves more likely to incapacitate someone in the water both through
342 overtopping but also increased skin heat flux and faster onset of hypothermia (Ducharme and
343 Brooks, 1998). Increased wave height also likely to make searching for a casualty harder
344 among the waves. The adverse weather conditions also impact the speed with which a rescue
345 asset such as a lifeboat or search and rescue helicopter can be deployed and make it onto
346 scene to affect a rescue. A study by Siljander *et al.* (2015) demonstrated that in extreme
347 waves, a 33 knot rescue asset was reduced to a maximum speed of just 16 knots, hugely
348 impacted response time over longer distances.

349

350 In terms of casualty activity, scuba diving, angling from shore, and suicide/self-harm had the
351 highest fatality rates (aside from motor vehicles entering the water). Investigation of scuba
352 diving accidents has shown that many were avoidable had there been better preparation for
353 the dive, monitoring throughout and improved personal skills, although 27 % of diving
354 fatalities were attributed to non-diving related medical problems (Cumming *et al.*, 2010). One
355 of the most surprising statistics was that of high fatality rates among people fishing from the
356 shore. The high fatality rate among this group is likely a function of the fact that at the onset
357 of the activity, the individuals had no intention of ever entering the water, and were therefore
358 totally unprepared to deal with the situation they found themselves in. This means they are
359 highly unlikely to be wearing a lifejacket, indeed in this study none of the 25 fatalities from
360 angling on shore were wearing a lifejacket. There is an increasing bank of evidence
361 supporting the concept of rogue waves, and this may be one mechanism by which fishermen
362 are swept from the shoreline (Nikolkina and Didenkulova, 2011). Here we postulate that the
363 nature of the sport means fishermen are often looking for the best spot, which can be
364 characterized at times by isolation from others and remote in terms of access. This may
365 subsequently reduce the chances of alarm being raised, and therefore reduces the chance of
366 rescue. Often, these fishermen are operating from rocks, and the nature of the nearshore
367 means that energetic wave action after they fall in may be forcefully pushing them into rocks.
368 It is conceivable that this energetic motion increases the chance of injury and
369 unconsciousness, which could ultimately contribute to drowning and high fatality rates.

370

371 Time to casualty is an important factor in survival for some activities. In activities where the
372 casualty likely has a means of buoyancy (e.g. a craft to hold on to), survivability is increased
373 for longer, such as in the small craft and capsize/collision cases. In other activities,

374 prevention is more important, because as soon as the incident takes place the mortality rate is
375 high, such as in people falling from cliffs. Survivability is highest in people that intended to
376 be in the water as part of their activity, such as swimmers. This is likely linked to
377 preparedness for the conditions they encounter (i.e. good swimming ability, appropriate
378 swimwear). Survivability in some cases is inextricably linked to lifejacket wear, such as man
379 overboard. In these cases, survivability remains higher for longer among those people
380 wearing lifejackets.

381

382 **4.2 Data reliability**

383 It is important to acknowledge that the SST parameter used in this study was a monthly
384 average value, taken from the nearest of the 10 representative stations around the UK
385 coastline, and is therefore the least reliable of data sources used. The location of
386 representative stations were chosen in such a way that on average the difference in
387 temperature between neighbouring stations was less than 1 °C (mean difference = 0.79), to
388 ensure good spatial coverage of SST gradients around the coast. Despite the lower accuracy
389 of the SST dataset to other recorded parameters, it is useful in highlighting the difference in
390 conditions between winter and summer, with the overall average temperature at all stations
391 4.6 °C warmer during the months of May – Oct, compared to Nov – Apr. Although high
392 resolution accurate measurements are required to draw solid conclusions on the effect of SST
393 on fatality, the way SST has been employed here is a useful means of explaining the increase
394 in fatalities during winter months (Figure 2).

395

396 Wind speed values used here were also qualitative estimations made by lifeboat coxswains.
397 Although previous studies have shown the qualitative estimation of wind speed by crews to
398 be reliable (Wheeler, 2005), it would be of interest for a future study to evaluate the

399 effectiveness of estimations in a blue light environment such as this. Wind speed values were
400 not deemed significant by the regression model in this study and therefore the effect of any
401 errors in the wind dataset has limited consequence on the findings of the study.

402

403 **4.3 Applications**

404 In the UK, the wear of lifejackets is not legally mandated aboard any vessel (although there is
405 a legal requirement for employers and commercial operators to supply enough lifejackets for
406 crew, employees and passengers). The evidence presented here for the efficacy of lifejacket
407 wear is compelling, and indicates that a behavioral shift towards increased lifejacket wear
408 (whether through legislation or education) would dramatically influence the number of
409 fatalities at sea each year. There is qualitative evidence of this throughout the dataset, for
410 example, of the 23 fatalities involving fishing from shore, 6 narratives describe a casualty
411 being found face down in the water. The wear of a lifejacket would ensure the casualty's
412 head remains out of the water, potentially enhancing the chance of survival. It is important to
413 note here the difference between buoyancy aids and lifejackets, as a buoyancy aid alone
414 would not ensure the casualty's head remains out of the water. Additionally, one narrative
415 reports the lifeboat crew observing the casualty disappear under the water as they
416 approached. A further 7 searches resulted in the lifeboat being unable to locate the casualty.
417 Perhaps, equipped with a lifejacket, this chance of being found may increase as a result of the
418 casualty's ability to stay buoyant, and attract attention using the incorporated light and/or
419 whistle, and in some cases, flares. Unfortunately, the RNLI data does not currently record
420 which device was being worn by the casualty. A number of barriers to lifejacket use have
421 been identified, including the perceived lack of comfort, an overestimation of swimming
422 ability, and a lack of confidence that a lifejacket would be effective in saving life (Quistberg
423 *et al.*, 2014). Statistics such as those presented in this study are an effective means of

424 combatting the perception that a lifejacket is unlikely to preserve life. However, much work
425 is required to overcome some other barriers to use, such as the perceived discomfort
426 associated with wear. One such initiative undertaken by Seafish and the RNLI is to work with
427 fishermen to develop a lifejacket that they felt was fit for purpose. Seafish are a Non-
428 Departmental Public Body set up to raise standards across the seafood industry, and they
429 therefore have a vested interest in promoting and monitoring safety at sea. In their study of a
430 commercial setting (fishing boats), wearers of lifejackets consistently reported that the issue
431 they face with regard to wearing a lifejacket was its suitability for wear during normal
432 working conditions, with some interfering with the job, or being fouled by fish guts (Seafish,
433 2006).

434

435 With regard to temporal risk for different activity types, there is therefore a clear need to
436 focus winter management efforts on commercial traffic, and summer efforts towards leisure
437 users. Professional fishermen are a prime target audience in efforts to reduce the occurrence
438 of fatal incidents during winter (stormier) months. In an interactive study involving fishing
439 skippers taking part in a fishing campaign, despite the occurrence of extreme conditions, at
440 no point did any participant elect to return to the safety of port or cease operations (Morel *et*
441 *al.*, 2008). Instead, they tried to mitigate risk through a number of strategies, including sailing
442 to another local fishing ground. It is clear that classic safety interventions are not appropriate
443 with this group, and further work is required to ascertain how best to change the culture
444 surround fishing.

445

446 People angling from rocks has been demonstrated to be a high risk group. This activity group
447 is a high priority for education and intervention, as the mitigation (wearing a lifejacket) is a
448 comparatively simple fix. One of the issues the RNLI has encountered is a reluctance to

449 engage with safety advice from outsiders. In response, one approach might be to get fishing
450 tackle shop owners on board, as these are often trusted and revered sources of advice for
451 anglers. More complex will be understanding how to intervene or manage scuba diving
452 incidents better, or to reduce the number of coastal suicide and self-harm attempts.

453

454 **5. Conclusions**

455 The findings of this study represent the first comprehensive overview of maritime accidents
456 in the UK, incorporating both commercial and leisure vessels, as well as beach users
457 requiring rescue by lifeboat. Multivariate analysis was used to quantify the influence of
458 various factors on fatality rate during life at risk incidents at sea, based on a record of 2094
459 RNLI incidents and the outcomes for the 3119 people involved.

460

461 The wear of lifejackets was shown to have a significant impact on survivability of incidents,
462 with only 22.7 % of casualties shown to have been wearing lifejackets, but of those, 94.1 %
463 survived their incident. The analysis identified individuals angling from shore to be a
464 particularly high risk group of individuals, with one of the highest rates of fatality. These
465 people are certainly a group that would benefit from lifejacket education, although they will
466 often think there is no risk of entering the water and it is therefore likely going to be
467 challenging to engage them in lifejacket education. There is a clear seasonal signal in the
468 data, which shows there are less incidents overall during winter months, however, there is an
469 over-representation of life at risk incidents during these months. This is likely a combination
470 of lower water temperatures which increases the likelihood of cold water shock, and also
471 higher wave heights and increased storminess, which will accelerate heat loss from the body
472 and reduce the likelihood the casualty can be located for rescue among the waves. A larger

473 proportion of winter incidents were attributable to commercial activities, whereas the summer
474 months were associated with increased leisure incidents.

475

476 In terms of management, intervention, and prevention, this research has successfully
477 highlighted target groups and areas for intervention. The most obvious is that of lifejacket
478 intervention for appropriate groups (such as small craft users and boaters). Moving forwards,
479 the increased survivability associated with lifejacket wear is clearly demonstrable, and this
480 finding should be used to underpin drives to make the wear of lifejackets compulsory for
481 activities at sea whereby the intention is not to enter the water. Ultimately, the best approach
482 is to ensure all water-users are prepared for any eventuality, which involves not just the
483 availability of appropriate emergency equipment, but also the mandated wear and use of such
484 equipment.

485

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493

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