

Spatial Metaphors

ANCIENT TEXTS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Fabian Horn
Cilliers Breytenbach
(eds.)

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IN PRESENTING PHILOLOGICAL READINGS of spatial metaphors in ancient texts and their reception based on theoretical approaches to metaphor, this is a pioneering study which also bears testimony to the increasing interest in the potential and cognitive functions of metaphor in literary studies. The individual studies offer a representative synopsis of current theories on spatial metaphors and encompass applications to literary texts from a number of genres and languages ranging from wisdom texts and philosophical treatises to tragedy and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean English, thus spanning almost 3000 years of human thought and language.

Based on this framework of theory and practice, this volume collects a series of papers originally delivered at a conference entitled *Raum-Metaphern in antiken Texten und deren Rezeption*, organized by research group C-2 *Space and Metaphor in Cognition, Language and Texts* of the Excellence Cluster 264 *Topoi The Formation and Transformation of Space and Knowledge in Ancient Civilizations* in Berlin in June 2014.

Spatial Metaphors. Ancient Texts and Transformations

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Vorwort

Der vorliegende Sammelband fasst eine Reihe von Vorträgen zusammen, die bei der Tagung *Raum-Metaphern in antiken Texten und deren Rezeption* gehalten wurden, welche von der Forschungsgruppe C-2 *Space and Metaphor in Cognition, Language, and Texts* des Exzellenzclusters 264 Topoi *The Formation and Transformation of Space and Knowledge in Ancient Civilizations* am 6. und 7. Juni 2014 in Berlin veranstaltet wurde.

Der erste Beitrag von Prof. em. Wolfgang Raible fungierte dabei als Keynote-Vortrag und verfolgt einen primär theoretischen Zugang zum vielschichtigen Phänomen der Metapher. Daran schließt sich eine Serie von Fallstudien aus den Arbeiten der Gruppenmitglieder und einiger auswärtiger Sprecher in Form kürzerer, materialbezogener Beiträge zu Raum-Metaphern in unterschiedlichen Textkorpora (ägyptische Texte / biblische Texte / Texte der griechisch-römischen Antike bzw. der mittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Antikerezeption) an. Einige dieser Beiträge sind umfangreichere Ausarbeitungen von Fallstudien, die schon für die C-2-Gruppenpublikation als Beispiele herangezogen wurden. Diese kürzeren, stärker text- und interpretationsbezogenen Beiträge orientieren sich in ihrer Reihenfolge, in der die Vorträge auch auf der Tagung gehalten wurden, an der ungefähren Chronologie des behandelten Textmaterials. Der Beitrag „In Other Words: George Herbert’s Metaphorical Textures“ von Verena Lobsien wurde extra für diesen Band verfasst (anstelle des ursprünglichen Vortrags „Man’s Household: Economic Metaphors and Their Hidden Power in Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus*“, der an anderer Stelle erscheinen wird). Die hierbei versammelten Texte umfassen Quellen aus unterschiedlichen Textgattungen in verschiedenen Sprachen (Ägyptisch, Hebräisch, Altgriechisch, Lateinisch, Mittelhochdeutsch und Englisch) und aus verschiedenen Zeiten vom Neuen Reich Ägyptens (ca. 1550–1070 v. Chr.) bis in die frühe Neuzeit (16./17. Jahrhundert). Die Vielfalt des Materials bietet damit einen kulturübergreifenden Überblick zur räumlichen Metapher sowie zu deren formalen Ausprägungen, literarischem Potential und Funktionalisierungen.

Alle Teilnehmer/innen sind dem Exzellenzcluster Topoi für die Finanzierung der Tagung dankbar, die es ermöglichte, den Kreis weit über Berlin hinaus zu eröffnen. Ferner danken die Autorinnen und Autoren der Beiträge, die in diesem Band versammelt sind, den von der Edition Topoi bestellten anonymen Gutachtern für ihre treffenden Anmerkungen und wertvollen Hinweise. Darüber hinaus ist besonders Herrn Dr. Fabian Horn zu danken, der als Postdoktorand der Gruppe C-2 die Tagungsplanung organisatorisch umsetzte, den Tagungsband einleitete und die Drucklegung der Beiträge begleitete.

Cilliers Breytenbach, Sprecher der Topoi-Forschungsgruppe C-2
Berlin, August 2015

Fabian Horn

Introduction: Space and Metaphor

Summary

The introduction to the volume *Spatial Metaphors: Ancient Texts and Transformations* encompasses two sections: the first part, entitled “Preliminary Remarks on the Theory of Spatial Metaphors”, is aimed at providing a theoretical framework for the study of spatial metaphors by suggesting a classification according to specificity and extent. The approach underlying the typology is indebted to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors (CMT). The second section offers short summaries of the individual contributions collected in this volume (not all of which draw on CMT) with particular regard to how the metaphors studied relate to the proposed framework. What becomes apparent is that even though formal classification of spatial metaphors is possible, philological study and interpretation of metaphors must always consider their respective contexts and work from the texts rather than from abstract theoretical conceptions of metaphor.

Keywords: Theory of metaphors; CMT; spatial metaphors; typology.

Die Einleitung des Tagungsbands *Spatial Metaphors: Ancient Texts and Transformations* umfasst zwei Abschnitte: Der erste Teil enthält vorbereitende Anmerkungen zur Metaphertheorie und versucht, durch die Klassifizierung anhand der Kriterien von Spezifität (*specificity*) und Umfang (*extent*) eine theoretische Struktur für die Untersuchung von Raummetaphern zu erarbeiten. Der Zugang, der dieser Typologie zugrundeliegt, steht in der Tradition der Theorie konzeptueller Metaphern von Lakoff und Johnson. Der zweite Abschnitt bietet eine kurze Übersicht und Zusammenfassung der einzelnen Beiträge des Bands (von denen nicht alle auf die Theorie konzeptueller Metaphern zurückgreifen) mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Fragestellung, wie sich die untersuchten Metaphern zu der eingangs vorgestellten Struktur verhalten. Dabei wird deutlich, dass, obgleich die Möglichkeit einer formalen Klassifikation von Raummetaphern besteht, jede philologische Untersuchung und Interpretation immer die entsprechenden Kontexte miteinbeziehen muss und dabei nicht von abstrakten theoretischen Metaphermodellen, sondern den Texten selbst ihren Ausgang nehmen muss.

Keywords: Metaphertheorie; Theorie konzeptueller Metaphern; Raummetaphern; Typologie.

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1 Preliminary remarks on the theory of spatial metaphors

The studies presented in this volume discuss texts from a number of genres and languages ranging from wisdom texts and philosophical treatises to tragedy and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean English (thus spanning almost 3000 years of human thought and language). Their common ground and the research objective of Topoi group C-2 *Space and Metaphor in Cognition, Language, and Texts* is the focus on the phenomenon of ‘spatial metaphor’.

For this approach, ‘space’ is taken in broad terms as any physical or non-physical place or location. Since further theoretical and philosophical refinement of the concept of ‘space’ would in all likelihood not be conducive to the purpose of linguistic and literary studies, we have rather opted for the concept of metaphor as the theoretical starting point. However, considering the substantial number of theoretical approaches to metaphor (not all of which are applicable to the interpretation and study of literary texts) and the staggering amount of publications concerning metaphor in the last decades,¹ a working definition for what is meant by the term ‘metaphor’ is first called for.

When it comes to metaphor and theories of metaphor, it is unavoidable for all studies from the field of ancient studies, and especially classical philology, to give pride of place to the general and well-known definition of Aristotle (384–322 BCE) who describes metaphor in his *Poetics* as the “transfer of a foreign name”.² Despite considerable advances with respect to the cognitive aspects of metaphor processing, contemporary research has not vastly progressed beyond this basic definition and metaphor is still primarily seen as a transfer of appellations; the only substantial modification or addition to Aristotle’s definition of metaphor as the “transfer of a foreign name” is that in contemporary theory metaphor is often not only viewed as ‘speaking about something in terms of something else’, but also as ‘thinking about something in terms of something else’.³

However, the terminology for describing and analyzing metaphor has been greatly refined: several theoreticians have stressed that a metaphor consists of two components, which in English are commonly referred to as ‘vehicle’ (the term or phrase which is used metaphorically in context) and ‘tenor’ (“the underlying idea of principal subject which

1 Cf. Rolf 2005, who distinguishes a total of 24 distinct theoretical approaches to metaphor.
2 Arist. *Po.* 21 [1457b6–7]: μεταφορά δέ ἐστίν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά (...). Also cf. Weinrich 1976, 311: “Eine Metapher, und das ist im Grunde die einzig mögliche Metapherdefinition, ist ein Wort in einem Kontext, durch den es so determiniert wird, daß es etwas anderes meint, als es bedeutet.”

3 Cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 36 et passim: “Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another.” Similarly Semino 2008, 1: “By ‘metaphor’ I mean the phenomenon whereby we talk and, potentially, think about something in terms of something else.” For metaphor as a natural way of human thinking vide e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Johnson 1987, Gibbs 1994, esp. 120–264, or Gibbs 1996.

the vehicle or figure means⁴), and only these two components together as a ‘double unit’ form a metaphor.⁵ As another descriptive term, the common characteristics shared by the ‘tenor’ and the ‘vehicle’ which constitute the basis of the metaphorical transfer have been termed the ‘ground’ of the metaphor.⁶

A further important refinement of the definition of metaphor as transfer has been the specification that the transfer necessarily must involve two different ‘conceptual domains’⁷ (a transfer within one and the same conceptual domain would more accurately have to be called a metonymy in modern terminology⁸). In this, the conceptual domain of the vehicle is called the ‘source domain,’ the domain of the tenor the ‘target domain,’⁹ and as a result, individual metaphors can also be described as ‘cross-domain mappings.’ For cases where not only individual terms from distinct conceptual domains are transferred, but whole conceptual domains are correlated by means of metaphorical transfer, cognitive science has introduced the term ‘conceptual metaphor,’¹⁰ and the resulting systematic conceptualization in both language and thought is referred to as a conceptual metaphor and expressed as TARGET IS SOURCE.¹¹ Ultimately, metaphor is much more than a mere stylistical or rhetorical device¹² and constitutes a fundamental principle of human thought, language, and cognition.

4 Definition quoted from Richards 1936, 97.

5 The terms ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ were coined by Richards 1936, 96–97, who also deplors the imprecise use of the term ‘metaphor.’ This convenient terminology has largely been accepted by Anglophone researchers.

6 Cf. Richards 1936, 116–117.

7 Cf. the definitions in Evans 2007, 61–62 s. v. ‘domain (2)’ and Kövecses 2010, 323: “A conceptual domain is our conceptual representation, or knowledge, of any coherent segment of experience”.

8 The first two metaphorical transfer types described in Aristot. *Po.* 21 [1457b7–9], “from the genus to the species” (*totum pro parte*) and “from the species to the genus” (*pars pro toto*) are not treated as metaphors any more, but as metonymies or synecdoche (“quantitative metonymy”), also cf. Lausberg 1990, 295–297 §§572–573.

9 The terms ‘source domain’ and ‘target domain’ were introduced by Lakoff and Johnson 1980; the German scholar Harald Weinrich whose theoretical approach shares much common ground with the cognitive theory developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) employed the terms ‘Bildspenderbereich’ and ‘Bildempfängerbereich,’ cf. Weinrich 1976.

10 For the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors in general vide first Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1993, for an overview over the established terminology of cognitive linguistics vide Evans 2007, esp. 33–35. A recent assessment of the theory can be found in Steen 2011. For criticism of this approach also vide the contribution of Schlesier (this volume). To make a clear terminological distinction, the term ‘linguistic,’ or ‘textual,’ metaphor denotes metaphors as they actually appear in spoken or written discourse as opposed to conceptual metaphors, i.e. the abstract metaphorical conceptualizations on which they are based.

11 We here follow the convention in cognitive linguistics to print conceptual metaphors (as opposed to individual linguistic metaphors) in small capitals to indicate that they do not appear as such in texts, but are deduced from individual textual occurrences of metaphorical language.

12 The classification of metaphor as a rhetorical device has a long tradition, e.g. in the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.34.45 where metaphor appears as one of the ten *exornationes verborum*, in Cicero’s *De oratore* 3.41.165–170 in the context of rhetorical *ornatus*, in the *Orator* 27.92–94 as a stylistic device of transposition as well as in Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 8.6.4–8 as a rhetorical trope.

Within this theoretical framework, which is largely derived from cognitive linguistics and to some extent from early twentieth-century literary theory, spatial metaphor must be treated as a subset of metaphor. But as immediately becomes apparent from a glance at the individual studies compiled in this volume and their vastly different textual basis and subject matter, the deceptively simple single term ‘metaphor’ suggests a uniformity which does not do justice to the diverse material and the phenomena which can be treated under the heading of metaphor. Clearly, further differentiation and a typology of metaphors is called for in order to establish a theoretical framework for the classification of spatial metaphors.

The following typology of spatial metaphors, which was first devised by Topoi group C-2 for a joint publication,¹³ is purely technical, and classifies metaphors according to the *specificity* of the spatial concept employed metaphorically (difference between types 1 and 2) and the *extent* of the metaphor (difference between types 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). This schema does not take into consideration all the various possible functions of spatial metaphors, and the functionalization of spatial metaphors will be treated in detail in the individual studies of this volume; like all metaphors, as a matter of course, spatial metaphors may have an explicatory, didactic, persuasive, evaluative, etc. purpose and perhaps even encompass novelty of expression for a particular purpose. They may also, in some cases, serve no function in their respective context, particularly if they are conventional (entrenched, sometimes also called ‘dead’), and in these cases their use might not even be deliberate.¹⁴

1. The first type of spatial metaphor, identified by cognitive metaphor theory, has been called orientational.¹⁵ The defining feature of orientational metaphors is the use of abstract spatial configurations (instead of specific locations or places), such as IN(SIDE) – OUT(SIDE), UP – DOWN, LEFT – RIGHT, or CENTER – PERIPHERY, to give spatial orientation or structure to a non-spatial concept. Often, two opposite spatial conceptualizations are correlated, such as in UP IS MORE and DOWN IS LESS, or RIGHT IS GOOD with the correlate LEFT IS BAD. However, this type of metaphor is often no longer recognized as a metaphor due to the conventionality of the underlying conceptualizations. Thus, orientational metaphors are very often non-deliberate and conventional, but sometimes available as a basis for new metaphorical expressions as well.

13 Horn et al. (in press).

14 For the use of the categories ‘conventional’ and ‘deliberate’ vide Steen 2008 and Steen 2011, esp. 38–43; contrary to earlier theories of metaphor, cognitive

metaphor theory holds that deliberate usage is not a requirement for the identification of metaphor.

15 On the theory of orientational metaphors cf. esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14–21, or Kövecses 2010, 40.

2. In contrast with this first type of orientational metaphors, which rely on abstract spatial relations and configurations, the next class of spatial metaphors utilizes more specific locations or places. Thus, metaphors belonging to this class can be spotted more easily, since they possess a higher degree of metaphoricity.¹⁶ In the following classification, they will be arranged according to the cognitive extent of the metaphor, which may vary according to the text in which a particular metaphor occurs or to the author employing it.
- 2.1 The first, and most basic, type of this class of spatial metaphor is the use of a concrete or specific space or location on the lexical level when spatial characteristics are applied to a single word or phrase.¹⁷ This occurs when a non-spatial term is referred to, or used, as if it were a place or space, or when one spatial term might be metaphorically conceived of in terms of another, different space or place.¹⁸ These metaphors result from a simple transfer of vehicle to tenor without relating the whole conceptual domains from which they are taken through multiple mappings and are therefore isolated, i.e. non-conceptual.¹⁹
- 2.2 A second, and more extensive, type of spatial metaphor is the use of a specific space or location on the conceptual level. While the conceptual metaphor must still be instantiated on the lexical level of individual linguistic metaphors, it is not a single word, but a whole concept which is given spatial properties by means of metaphoric transfer. This happens when a spatial metaphor on the lexical level can be regarded as a mapping of a more extensive underlying conceptualization. In the case of this second type of spatial metaphor, it is insufficient to view tenor and vehicle as isolated lexical entities, but they have to be regarded as parts of their respective domains.²⁰

16 For a theoretical approach to distinguishing varying degrees of ‘metaphoricity’, i.e. the degree to which an individual textual metaphor is regarded as metaphorical by a recipient (as opposed to applying the obsolete ‘dead’ – ‘alive’ distinction, which was already criticized by Richards 1936, 101–102) see Hanks 2006 or Müller 2008, esp. 178–209; Müller defines metaphoricity as a continuum starting with expressions whose original metaphorical character is entirely obscured by semantic opacity and poetic novel metaphors with high metaphoricity forming the other end of the spectrum.

17 For an attempt to define and analyze metaphor on the lexical level through the difference between basic and contextual meaning see Pragglejaz Group, esp. 3, also summarized in Semino 2008, 11–12, further developed in Steen et al. 2010, esp. 1–42.

18 In the third conceivable case of a spatial term being denoted by a non-spatial term we would not call the result of the transfer a spatial metaphor.

19 In cognitive metaphor theory, the terms ‘image metaphor’ or ‘one-shot metaphor’ are occasionally employed to denote this type of isolated mapping, cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989, 89–96, Lakoff 1993, 229–231, and the definition in Kövecses 2010, 327: “One-shot image metaphors involve the superimposition of one rich image onto another rich image. [...] These cases are called ‘one-shot’ metaphors because, in them, we bring into correspondence two rich images for a temporary purpose on a particular occasion.”

20 For the theoretical basis of interpreting metaphors as cross-domain mappings see the fundamental works of the cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphors, esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff 1993. A recent assessment of the theory can be found in Steen 2011.

Thus, this type of metaphor entails multiple transfers, i.e. mappings, which form conceptual metaphors with a spatial source domain being correlated with a target domain.²¹ For such mappings to qualify for the category of spatial conceptual metaphor, the source domain must be spatial while the target domain may, but need not, be a spatial concept.

- 2.3 The most extensive type of spatial metaphor can be found in cases where a specific space or location is used metaphorically on a broader textual level. It is possible for a longer narration or even a whole text to function as a spatial metaphor (something like a macro-metaphor). Assuming the traditional definition of allegory as ‘extended metaphor’,²² this type could also amount to and be described as spatial allegory.

The typology proposed above has been developed with a view to spatial metaphors, but other classifications and distinctions of metaphors are also applicable and may be important for the appropriate interpretation of any individual metaphor. Further categories, which can be applied to any metaphor and ultimately contribute to forming a “three-dimensional model” of metaphor²³ are the distinctions between ‘deliberate’ or ‘non-deliberate’ usage of a particular metaphor and the appraisal of a metaphor’s linguistic form as ‘conventional’ or ‘novel’. The latter distinction is very important for the interpretation and the literary value of metaphors; however, the distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘novel’ suggest a polar contrast which may be misleading: the ‘conventionality’ or ‘novelty’, in other words, the ‘metaphoricity’ of a metaphor is not an absolute category, but rather a matter of degree which always depends on the context.²⁴ Combining these two categories results in the following cognitive linguistic framework for metaphors (cf. Table 1):

With regard to literary studies and interpretations, deliberate metaphors, both conventional and novel, and their functions in context are of particular importance and have been the focus of research.²⁵ From a linguistic and anthropological point of view, the value of the study of non-deliberate metaphors consists in their potential to shed

21 The use of several metaphorical expressions from one target domain referring to the same source domain has been described as ‘extension’ by Semino 2008, 25–26. However, for this type of conceptual metaphor to be present in a text it is not necessary that extension occurs; if a lexical metaphor is isolated, but evokes the metaphorical equation of two domains, it is already possible to speak of a conceptual metaphor.

22 Cf. Quintilian’s *metaphora continua* (*Institutio oratoria* 8.6.44–53). On the possibility of the ‘extension’ of metaphor cf. again Semino 2008, 25–26. Note, however, that a further distinction could be made

between an extended metaphor which occurs only in a passage of text and an allegory encompassing the text as a whole.

23 Cf. Steen 2008 and Steen 2011, esp. 38–43.

24 On the context sensitivity of metaphors see e.g. Stern 2000. Also vide Black 1955 for the distinction between the metaphorical utterance, which he calls the ‘focus’ of the metaphor, and the surrounding non-metaphorical context, the ‘frame’.

25 On theoretical attempts to generalize about the functions of metaphor cf. e.g. Silk 2003, 126–131 or Goatly 2011, 153–177.

	conventional	novel
non-deliberate	traditionally referred to as ‘dead metaphors’ (often not treated as metaphorical, even though this class likely constitutes the bulk of metaphors in spoken and written discourse)	(unlikely)
deliberate	common, with several different functions, such as didactic, mnemonic, informative, persuasive, divertive etc. purposes	poetic, also with specific functions

Tab. 1 Linguistical framework for metaphors.

light on how different cultures at various points in their history think and speak about abstract concepts and thus to contribute to the understanding of the ‘mental infrastructure’²⁶ of a speech community, since all languages have their own conceptualizations and metaphors.²⁷

2 Contributors and contributions to this volume

The initially proposed theoretical framework for classifying spatial metaphors shows that the metaphorical use of spaces and spatiality can occur to a varying extent and on all levels of literary discourse. The studies presented in this volume illustrate the scope and potential of the analysis of spatial metaphors through a number of genres and languages, ranging from wisdom texts and philosophical treatises to tragedy, and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean English (thus spanning almost 3000 years of human thought and language). Most of the contributions are indebted to conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphors, but some explore the boundaries and limitations of CMT, present alternatives, or draw on other theories

26 The term ‘mental infrastructure’ (German ‘mentale Infrastruktur’) was coined by the German ancient historian Christian Meier in several publications and in a broad sense denotes the knowledge which is essential to find one’s way in the world; more precisely, in case of metaphors it denotes the cognitive structures which facilitate the coherent interpreta-

tion of experience and the construction of abstract meaning in language.

27 The question of cross-cultural metaphorical universals is discussed e.g. in Kövecses 2005 and Dan-cygier and Sweetser 2014, 162–182 with the result that there are few, if any, absolute metaphorical conceptualizations.

of metaphor (esp. Schlesier, Utzschneider, Lobsien). In the diversity of its studies, this volume – the first to ever address spatial metaphors comprehensively in literary studies – offers an example of the possibilities and philological potential of applying different theoretical approaches to metaphor to different genres and texts.

In a general sense, the contributions collectively substantiate the initial claim that spatial metaphors are a universal principle of human cognition. Somewhat more specifically, they show that the practice of attributing specific spatial relations to non-spatial or less clearly structured spatial concepts is in tune with the general tendency of the human mind to employ metaphorical thinking and phrasing when coping with abstract and ‘difficult’ concepts.²⁸ The resulting metaphors are complex and frequently influential, developing a momentum and occasionally a history of their own.²⁹ The following overview is an attempt to apply the typology and classifications developed above to the individual studies of spatial metaphors in texts collected in this volume which all investigate into metaphors and their interpretations from a literary point of view.

The first article in this volume, Wolfgang Raible’s (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg) “Metaphors as Models of Thinking”, follows a theoretical semantic approach not based on any particular text or text corpus and shows how our cognitive ability to interpret the world around us is largely based on metaphor and metonymy which let us see relations based on similarity and contiguity between different concepts. By various examples ranging from biblical interpretation to the world of science and technology, the pervasiveness and importance of these models of thinking is demonstrated.

The first of the following series of case studies, “Spatial Metaphors as Rhetorical Figures. Case Studies from Wisdom Texts of the Egyptian New Kingdom” by Camilla Di Biase-Dyson (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen) is dedicated to the study of deliberate spatial metaphors and their didactic and persuasive functions in Egyptian wisdom texts. The focus of her paper lies in the development of the path metaphor in particular, both in and across texts, to show its role in shaping the wisdom genre.

In her article “KRATER. The Mixing-Vessel as Metaphorical Space in Ancient Greek Tradition”, Renate Schlesier (Freie Universität Berlin) confronts Aristotle’s concept of metaphor as a transfer presupposing a comparison or an analogy between two material or mental elements with examples drawn from ancient Greek poetry (Homer, Sappho, the *Anacreontea*). It is demonstrated that concepts such as Aristotle’s and CMT, which also draws on Aristotle’s theory of comparison, are unable to convey the poetic impact of the semantic mixtures between those elements.

28 Cf. esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Johnson 1987, Gibbs 1994, 120–264, and Gibbs 1996.

29 The ‘interaction theory’ developed in Black 1955, 285–291 is an attempt to account for the fact that the combination of two conceptual domains, or

frames of reference, through metaphor can develop a momentum of its own and give rise to associations which reach beyond mere comparison, also cf. function (c) of the schema of functions in Silk 2003, 126.

Fabian Horn's (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) contribution is entitled "Metaphor and Spatial Conceptualization: Observations on Orientational Metaphors in Lycophron's *Alexandra*" and deals with conceptual orientational metaphors in Ancient Greek. This type of metaphor is often neglected in philological studies, since it is usually conventional and often also non-deliberate (and thus likely has no particular literary function in most contexts). However, the article aims to demonstrate that non-deliberate metaphors and their underlying conceptualizations still have the potential to shed light on the cognitive structures which facilitate the coherent interpretation of experience and the construction of abstract meaning in language.

The next two contributions, Markus Egg's (Humboldt-Universität Berlin) "Spatial Metaphor in the Pauline Epistles" and Cilliers Breytenbach's (Humboldt-Universität Berlin) "Taufe als räumliche Metapher?"; are both concerned with the copious orientational and more specific spatial metaphors in the Letters of Paul and their functions as instruments of cognition. Drawing on ideas developed by the Russian formalist Viktor Schklowski, Markus Egg's analysis of Pauline metaphors puts their innovative power down to alienation: rather than facilitating the understanding of complex or novel concepts, Paul's metaphors foreground the limitations of metaphorical expressions. This literary strategy is characteristic for poetic discourse but unusual for didactic and persuasive texts like epistles. Similarly, Cilliers Breytenbach's interpretation of Paul's conception of baptism as a spatial metaphor establishes this particular metaphor as part of Paul's macro-metaphor "being in Christ". Thus, both studies point to the conclusion that Paul's metaphors are deliberate, conceptual, and essential for his theology.

Helmut Utzschneider's (Augustana-Hochschule Neuendettelsau) article "Irisches Himmelreich. Die 'Stiftshütte' (Ex 25–40*) als theologische Metapher" examines the metaphorical character of a narrative from the Hebrew Bible and discusses the theological implications of the deliberately metaphorical conceptualization of the dwelling of God. His analysis draws on the work of Paul Ricoeur and Hans Blumenberg and thus presents an alternative approach to CMT.

In his essay "For to Have Fallen Is Not a Grievous Thing, but to Remain Prostrate after Falling, and Not to Get up Again: The Persuasive Force of Spatial Metaphors in Chrysostom's Exhortation to Theodore", Jan Stenger (University of Glasgow) studies the usage of spatial metaphors as a cognitive mechanism and as instruments of persuasion with epistemic and paraenetic functions in a treatise of the Church Father John Chrysostom. The metaphors treated in this context are adapted to the communicative aims and employ both abstract spatial configurations and specific locations or places. Furthermore, Stenger's contribution also pays attention to the audience's response to Chrysostom's metaphors and discusses the involvement of the readers and how spatial imagery can elicit a response from them.

The contribution “Räume der Erkenntnis. Zur Funktion der Raummetaphorik in Augustins Epistemologie” by Therese Fuhrer (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) studies the use of conceptual spatial metaphors and their importance as a cognitive device in the writings of Augustine. The essay explores how Augustine uses orientational metaphors and more specific spatial metaphors to conceptualize and represent both the human mind and the divine trinity.

Beatrice Trîncă’s (Freie Universität Berlin) article “Brandans Buch der Welt. Eine konkretisierte Metapher” focuses on the literary potential of a religious metaphor, Augustine’s metaphor of the world as a book, which becomes concrete in several episodes of the medieval travelogue *Sankt Brandans Reise*. Even though the metaphor may be conventional, insofar as it can be traced back to a source from Late Antiquity, its deliberate usage as a concrete metaphor in medieval literature puts it to novel use and explores the boundaries and limitations of the concept of metaphor.

Verena Olejniczak Lobsien’s (Humboldt-Universität Berlin) contribution “In Other Words: George Herbert’s Metaphorical Textures” shows how the complex metaphors referred to as *conchetto* or conceit in the poetry of the seventeenth-century metaphysical poet George Herbert explore the boundaries of conceptual metaphor and the possibilities of presenting the unrepresentable through allegorical references.

The focus on spatial metaphors, which are associated with certain formal characteristics, is the common feature of all these individual studies. But beyond formal classifications of their metaphors, a main target of literary analysis of metaphors is their elaboration and function in context. Even a tentative overview of this kind may serve to demonstrate the limits of attempting to generalize about form and usage of spatial metaphors in the light of the almost unfathomable diversity of metaphors. Ultimately, all philological study and interpretation of metaphors must always consider their respective functional and compositional contexts and work from the textual basis rather than from pre-existing conceptions of metaphor.

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Wolfgang Raible

Metaphors as Models of Thinking

Summary

Our cognitive ability to interpret the world around us is largely based on metaphor and metonymy. Both of them let us see relations between unknown and known, remote and near, invisible and visible, based essentially on similarity and contiguity between concepts. The atomists created such a similarity or analogy between visible Greek alphabetic script and the invisible world of atoms. Contemporaneous biologists continue to use this model of thinking in molecular biology. By various examples – from biblical interpretation to the world of science and technology – the pervasiveness of such models of thinking (and partially their time-bound character) is shown. In the past, a big problem was European mainstream thinking, insisting on relations between words instead of concepts in the case of metaphor.

Keywords: Metaphor; metonymy; concepts; cognition.

Unsere kognitive Fähigkeit, die Welt um uns zu interpretieren, beruht weitgehend auf Metapher und Metonymie. Beide erlauben es uns, ausgehend von den Prinzipien von Ähnlichkeit und Kontiguität zwischen Konzepten, Beziehungen zwischen Unbekanntem und Bekanntem, Entlegenem und Naheliegenderem, Unsichtbarem und Sichtbarem zu sehen. Die Atomisten schufen solch eine Ähnlichkeit oder Analogie zwischen der sichtbaren griechischen Schrift und der unsichtbaren Welt der Atome. Zeitgenössische Biologen nutzen dieses Denkmodell weiterhin in Bezug auf molekulare Biologie. Durch vielfältige Beispiele von der Bibelexegese bis zur Welt der Naturwissenschaft und Technik wird die weite Verbreitung solcher Denkmodelle (und teilweise auch ihre Zeitgebundenheit) aufgezeigt. In der Vergangenheit bestand ein großes Problem in der Hauptströmung europäischen Denkens, die auf Beziehungen zwischen Wörtern statt zwischen Konzepten, wie im Fall der Metapher, beharrte.

Keywords: Metapher; Metonymie; Konzepte; Kognition.

Acknowledgment: This contribution is dedicated to the memory of Peter Koch (1951–2014).

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I

Let me start with a citation from one of the Presocratics, Anaxagoras (c. 499 – c. 428 BC): ὄψις ἀδῆλων τὰ φαινόμενα.¹ It can be translated as “the seeing of the invisible is mediated by what is visible [the phenomena]”. A famous article that the supervisor of my doctoral thesis published at age 27 attributes this citation to the activity of Anaxagoras as a physician, ‘the invisible’ being the illness and the ‘phenomena’ the symptoms of the condition to be diagnosed.² That there is another, somewhat different, in my eyes far more interesting interpretation, will become evident after a short detour into the history of linguistic thought.

II

According to Quintilian (*Institutes of Oratory*), there exist a dozen so-called tropes. Petrus Ramus, under his French name Pierre de la Ramée (1515–1572), reduced them to four: metonymy, irony, metaphor and synecdoche.³ Since metonymy and synecdoche can be taken together, synecdoche being a special case of metonymy (use of an element for the class or the class instead of the element); and since irony is somewhat different, given that speech is used in order to mean the contrary of what is being said, two basic tropes will remain: metaphor and metonymy.

These tropes are intimately linked with linguistic thought, the most famous example being perhaps Roman Jakobson with his metonymic and metaphoric poles of language, which have led to two basic types of aphasic disorder – similarity and contiguity disorder.⁴ “Every form of aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment ... of the faculty either for selection and substitution [similarity, paradigmatic aspect] or for combination and contexture [contiguity, syntagmatic aspect]” (p. 254).

This intimate relationship was most clearly spelled out at the beginning of the 1920s, by a French author Jakobson doesn’t seem to be familiar with, Léonce Roudet (1861–1935). In 1921, Roudet published a groundbreaking (if largely unnoticed) article, “Sur la classification psychologique des changements sémantiques”,⁵ showing that metaphor and metonymy underlie linguistic change. – Here are some of his thoroughly phenomenological considerations:

1 Diels and Kranz 1960, fragment 59B 21a.

2 Diller 1932. Reprinted in Diller 1971, 119–143.

3 Quintilianus troporum genera duodecim facit, metaphoram, synekdochen, metonymiam, antonomasiam, onomatopoeiam, catachresin, metalepsin, epitheton, allegoriam, periphrasim, hyperbaton, hyperbolem. At quatuor tantum sunt, metonymia,

ironia, metaphora, synecdoche. (1549: *Rhetoricae distinctiones in Quintilianum*, p. 79.)

4 “Two aspects of language and two types of aphasic disturbances”, first published in Jakobson 1956, 55–82 and reprinted in Jakobson 1971, 239–259.

5 Roudet 1921.

French text	English (my translation)
<p><i>Les idées et les mots forment dans la conscience de chaque individu deux systèmes distincts quoique solidaires. D'un côté les images de choses et les idées générales qui sont à l'état latent dans la conscience sont unies les unes aux autres par les liens multiples de l'association par contiguïté et de l'association par ressemblance. D'un autre côté les images verbales, dont l'ensemble constitue la langue, forment aussi un système bien lié. Il y a entre elles des rapports que Saussure a définis avec précision et qu'il a appelés des rapports syntagmatiques et des rapports associatifs.</i></p>	<p><i>Concepts and words constitute in the conscience of an individual two systems that are distinct, although solidly joint. On the one hand, the images of things and the general ideas that are in a latent state in the conscience are mutually linked by multiple relations of association by contiguity and association by similarity. On the other hand, the sum of verbal images that make up the language form a well-linked system, too. In between these images are relations Saussure has precisely defined, terming them syntagmatic and associative [since 1929, linguists have used paradigmatic in place of this latter term].</i></p>

The distinction between the level of concepts and the level of words, combined with the relations of contiguity and similarity, can be visualised in the following scheme:

	Contiguity	Similarity
Level of concepts	<p>Changements résultant d'une association par contiguïté entre les idées.</p>	<p>Changements résultant d'une association par ressemblance entre les idées.</p>
	metonymy	metaphor
Level of words	<p>Changements résultant des rapports syntagmatiques entre les mots.</p>	<p>Changements résultant des rapports associatifs entre les mots.</p>
	ellipsis, condensation	folk etymologies, etc.

The following citation shows the psychological processes at work:

French text (emphasis added)	English (my translation)
<p>On voit donc comment il faut considérer les changements sémantiques. Ils peuvent avoir des causes initiales extérieures à l'individu et d'ordre social, mais la cause immédiate de chaque changement est toujours un phénomène psychologique qui a son siège dans l'individu, à savoir <i>l'effort du sujet parlant pour exprimer sa pensée au moyen de la langue. Cet effort fait apparaître dans la conscience un système d'idées et un système de mots.</i> Si les deux systèmes sont en accord, l'effort aboutit simplement au rappel d'un mot; <i>mais souvent il y a disharmonie entre eux: l'effort d'expression cherche alors (p. 692) à les adapter l'un à l'autre.</i> Pour cela, <i>il fait glisser le système des mots sur le système des idées, ou au contraire, il fait glisser le système des idées sur le système des mots.</i> Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, il en résulte un changement du sens ou de la valeur d'un mot.</p>	<p>Thus we see how semantic change has to be considered. This change can start with causes that are exterior to the subject and of social order. But the immediate cause of any change is always a psychological phenomenon based in the individual, i.e., <i>the effort of the speaker to express his thoughts through language. This effort creates a system of concepts and a system of words in the conscience.</i> If the two systems are in accordance, the effort simply leads to the recall of a word; <i>but often there is no harmony between them: in this case, the effort of expression seeks (p. 692) to adapt them mutually. In order to do so, it slides the system of expressions over the system of concepts or, conversely, it slides the system of concepts over the system of expressions.</i> In both cases, the result will be a semantic change.</p>

There is one basic distinction behind these considerations: the distinction between words and the concepts they stand for. If we look for a linguistic sign model that meets these requirements, we will remain unsuccessful. Linguistic textbooks offer us a triadic model attributed to Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, basically reflecting ideas of stoicism (Fig. 1).

Here we find an alternative at the apex of the triangle, “thought or reference”, which leaves the relation fundamentally ambiguous. Is it reference? Is it thought? Would ‘concept’ be a more adequate expression?

In order to do justice to the phenomena, we have to introduce a fourth corner, transforming a triangular model into a rectangle or a trapezium. The interesting fact is that, going back some centuries in history, we find an adequate, much more refined model (Fig. 2).⁶

6 I am indebted to Roman Jakobson as regards the discovery of this model. Speaking of the triangle of Ogden and Richards, he used to say that the model

was usable in simple contexts, but that there was, and now I remember his voice becoming grave, a far better model proposed by a group of thirteenth-




Fig. 1 (Stoic) sign model attributed to Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards 1923.

This model can be read as the psychological process involved in perceiving and naming something and, conversely, in uttering something that will be understood by others. First, I am confronted with an object, a matter of fact with certain properties (*modi essendi*). Then I conceive of it, a highly active process for phenomenology: I make a concept of it, classifying it as something I know (*modi intelligendi*). This happens beyond language or beyond a particular language. Only then is the concept I have formed (the *idée* in the wording of Roudet) transposed into a linguistic form, first of all a certain part of speech, thus relating to a certain (prototypical) *modus significandi*. Nouns are in principle endowed with the *modus esse*, verbs with the *modus fieri*, etc.

One of the examples of the schoolmen uses the pain I endure. It may be expressed as an exclamation (*aiaiai!*, *aua!*, *vae mihi misero!*), as a noun (*dolor*), as a verb (*dolet*). I can express it as well with an entire sentence, *Caput dolet vehementer*. Most importantly, since concepts transcend any particular language, I might as well say: *I have a terrible*

century schoolmen dubbed the Modists. In this context he mentioned the names of Boethius and Simon de Dacia (= Denmark), and perhaps also Siger of Brabant. This led me to a thorough study of these authors and my discovery of an evolution bordering on the miraculous in their comments on the Latin grammar of Donatus: a wholly uninspired enumeration of the parts of speech of Latin was transformed,

by their comments (scholasticism means commenting on extant texts), into a Universal Grammar, supplemented by a syntax (diasynthetic) totally lacking in the Latin author. The focus of their grammatical thinking is on exactly this sign model.

In this context, I refer to: Raible 1983 and Raible 1987.

level beyond a particular language

level of a particular language




Fig. 2 The conception of the schoolmen translated into a scheme by the present author.

headache; je souffre d'un mal de tête épouvantable; me duele terriblemente la cabeza, päätäni särkee paljon, etc. All these expressions boil down to a series of *voces* or *dictiones*. In reverse order, from bottom right to bottom left of the model, we by now can understand a well-known scholastic dictum: *voces significant (=significatio) res mediantibus conceptibus*, or “words signify things by mediation through concepts”.

A further advantage of the model is that it can be applied to the entire hierarchy of signs: words, groups of words, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, texts. Where the term *conceptus* actually stands, we could as well find *script*, *scenario*, *macrostructure*, all the more since concepts may be represented in other media such as entire novels, films, and theatre plays.

Thus the model of the mediaeval schoolmen is most efficient: it copes with the distinction between the concept level and the word level crucial for the thinking of Roudet; it is not restricted to words alone, its dynamism allowing the integration of higher lin-

guistic units as well (I didn't insist on this point for the sake of simplicity – it has something to do with the *modi significandi accidentales* in the above scheme). It explains why we can communicate (speak and understand) in more than one language, the main issue or linchpin always being the introduction of a fourth pole, CONCEPTUS, into the above model.

III

Now a first conclusion seems to be appropriate: metonymies and metaphors are not about words, but about concepts (the *idées* of Léonce Roudet). They are about concepts, or relations between concepts, translated into linguistic expressions. In other words, this time with George Lakoff and Mark Johnson: metaphor (and metonymy, as we shall see later) is a matter of concepts, not of words (the first of the four persistent fallacies George Lakoff and Mark Johnson mention in the afterword of the 2003 edition of their most influential book).⁷

With this knowledge we may return to my initial example, profiting from the somewhat enigmatic fragment of Anaxagoras I started with. I shall explain the idea of metaphors as models of thinking, with the help of a doctrine fostered by the atomists, Leucippus of Abdera and his pupil Democritus.

What was it that made these men come up with an atomistic conception of matter? Think of a bucket full of water with a small vessel in it. You move the vessel, and the water displaced at the bow will smoothly be replaced at the stern. How could this be explained? The idea they came up with was that water (and then matter in general) consists of small particles moving relative to each other thanks to the void space in between.

In a nutshell, this is expressed in the following fragment: νόμῳ γάρ φησι γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροίη, ἔτεη δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν – we call something sweet, bitter, warm, cold, we speak of colour – but in reality, all is made of atoms and void.⁸ As reported by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*,⁹ this insight was inspired by Greek script, i.e., the Greek alphabet: a series of letters with different

7 Lakoff and Johnson 1980 (citation from p. 244.) The authors had the privilege not to be burdened by a long European tradition of thinking about metaphors. This is why they start – so to speak – from scratch, conceiving of metaphors from the outset not as a matter of words, but as a matter of the concepts behind the words. Nevertheless, the European tradition would have offered similar ways, as we have seen for instance in the example of the schoolmen or an author like Léonce Roudet. The

problem is that few persons were familiar with such non-mainstream thinking, among them for example Roman Jakobson. Hans Blumenberg, even without the respective linguistic background, uses different wording to advocate a similar position (Blumenberg 1960); the problem is that his followers did not see its far-reaching implications.

8 Diels and Kranz 1960, fragment 68B 125 (Democritus).

9 *Metaphysics* A4. 985 b4 sqq.

shapes, in different combinations and in different spatial position, separated by space, thus leading to an infinite number of combinations. The basic principles holding for atoms (the atomists use special terms not necessarily familiar to laypeople), illustrated by letters, were:

Greek term of the principle	Exemplified by alphabet and script	Translation (explanation)
τάξις	AN vs. NA	order
διαθιγή	Z vs. N	position in space (rotate letter Z 90 degrees clockwise)
ῥυσμός	A vs. N	shape

The example clearly shows that in this case “τὰ φαινόμενα” seen as the elements of Greek script, i.e., the concept of script and its letters, show the invisible inner structure of matter. In other words: the concept of Greek script serves as a model of thinking, showing in this case how matter should be organised.

In their use of the concept of alphabetic script as a model of thinking, the atomists were forerunners of a group of scientists whose thinking to this day is entirely dependent on this model: those in molecular biology.

Since 1953 the nucleotides, abbreviated as A, T, G, and C, are seen as the *letters of the genetic alphabet*. RNA polymerase *reads* DNA sequences within their *reading frame/s*. This process is called *transcription*, which happens because the *transcription of DNA sequences* results in *transcription factors*. The transcripts are subject to *proofreading*. The result is called a *copy*, subject to further *editing*. The resulting string of mRNA will be *translated* into a polypeptide. This is made possible because the triplets of nucleotides *encode* or *are coding for* amino acids. The whole process is called *gene expression*.

Certain recurring sequences of letters are called *motifs*. They can be boxed (whereby a box is drawn around sections of the written sequence), leading to names like *TATA box* or to the transcription factors called *homeoboxes*.¹⁰

The genomes of many species are currently being *deciphered*. The results are stored in large *databases* modelling the sequences of nucleotides as *sequences of the letters A, T, G, and C*. The same is true for *protein databases* that symbolise one amino acid with one letter (the sequence, “mgqtgk...”, for instance, stands for methionine-glycine-glutamine-threonine-glycine-lysine-lysine...). This means that sequences of nucleotides or amino

¹⁰ In the meantime, the genes containing homeoboxes are even abbreviated as *hox* genes.

acids corresponding to triplets of nucleotides ‘materialise’ – in a somewhat hybrid way – *in databases as sequences of letters*.¹¹

Could this concept of alphabetic script serving as a fundamental model of thinking have been avoided? As a rule, biologists are not aware of the central metaphor they use. The present author tried to avoid it at the beginning of the article cited above, using instead the term ‘information’ – but this itself has a metaphoric origin with a strong Aristotelian background.¹² The problem that our thinking, even philosophical thinking, depends on such central, pervasive metaphors (better: concepts) was addressed by the late Hans Blumenberg in his book *Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie*.¹³

An author like Dante (familiar with the doctrines of the thirteenth-century schoolmen, by the way) is fully aware of the problems linked with such models as we gain from the visible world and apply afterwards to the invisible one – witness the idea of a ‘person’ named God:

Divina Commedia III (Paradiso), canto IV,
40–45 (Beatrice speaking to Dante)

English translation

Così parlar conveniesi all vostro ingegno,
però che solo da sensato apprende
ciò che fa poscia d’intelletto degno.

To speak thus is adapted to your mind
Since only through the sense it apprehendeth
What then it worthy makes of intellect.

Per questo la Scrittura condescende
a vostra facultate, e piedi e mano
attribuisce a Dio, e altro intende.

On this account the Scripture condescends
Unto your faculties, and feet and hands
To God attributes, and means something
else.

Having stated in a first conclusion that metaphors (and metonymies) are about concepts, not words, this leads us to a second conclusion: metaphors are models of thinking – in the sense of our interpretation of Anaxagoras’ fragment – insofar as they allow us to grab and master, thanks to a central modelling concept, a domain which as often cannot – or cannot directly – be perceived by our senses.

11 For more information see Raible 2001.

12 Raible 2010.

13 Blumenberg 1960. Among his examples are the ‘naked truth’; Greek *a-lètheta* (what is not hidden); think of the German ‘be-greifen’, ‘An-sicht’, ‘Stand-punkt’, etc.

IV

Let me add some further examples, this time from the Bible, of central metaphors serving as models of thinking. In *Deuteronomy* XXI we read:

<i>Deuteronomy</i> XXI. 10–14	English Standard Version
<p>¹⁰ si egressus fueris ad pugnam contra inimicos tuos et tradiderit eos Dominus Deus tuus in manu tua captivosque duxeris ¹¹ et videris in numero captivorum mulierem pulchram et adamaveris eam voluerisque habere uxorem ¹² introduces in domum intumtuam quae radet caesariem et circumcidet unguis ¹³ et deponet vestem in qua capta est sedensque in domo tua flebit patrem et matrem suam uno mense et postea intrabis ad eam dormiesque cum illa et erit uxor tua ¹⁴ sin autem postea non sederit animo tuo dimittes eam liberam nec vendere poteris pecunia nec opprimere per potentiam quia humiliasti eam.</p>	<p>¹⁰ “When you go out to war against your enemies, and the Lord your God gives them into your hand and you take them into your hand and you take them captive, ¹¹ and you see among the captives a beautiful woman, and you desire to take her to be your wife, ¹² and you bring her home to your house, she shall shave her head and pare her nails. ¹³ And she shall take off the clothes in which she was captured and shall remain in your house and lament her father and her mother a full month. After that you may go in to her and be her husband, and she shall be your wife. ¹⁴ But if you no longer delight in her, you shall let her go where she wants. But you shall not sell her for money, nor shall you treat her as a slave, since you have humiliated her.</p>

In this passage from *Deuteronomy* we would hardly recognize a metaphorical intention. But read Origen. In his *Homiliae in Leviticum* he clearly uses to the above-cited passage as a model of thinking:

Origen, <i>Homiliae in Leviticum</i> VII, PG XII, 227 [col. 490 sq.]	My translation
<p>... et ego frequenter exivi ad bellum contra inimicos meos, et vidi ibi in praeda[m] mulierem decora specie. Quaecunque enim bene et rationabiliter dicta invenimus apud inimicos nostros, si quid apud illos sapienter et scienter dictum legimus, oportet nos</p>	<p>I went out to war against my enemies, too, and I saw among the captives a beautiful woman. Since we find things well and reasonably said by our enemies, when we read something of this kind, we have to purify it from their science and to take off and cut</p>

mundare id et ab scientia quae apud illos est auferre et resecare omne quod emortuum et inane est, hoc enim sunt omnes capilli capitis et ungulae mulieris ex inimicorum spoliis assumptae, et ita demum facere eam nobis uxorem, cum jam nihil ex illis quae per infidelitatem mortua dicuntur, habuerit, nihil in capite habeat mortuum, nihil in manibus, ut neque sensibus, neque actibus, immundum aliquid, aut mortuum gerat.

back what is dead and useless – such are the hair of the head and the nails of the woman we took out of the spoils of our enemies. And we thus may take her to be our wife since she has nothing left anymore we would call dead, given their lack of faith, neither on her head nor on her hands.

In Origen's interpretation, what was said of the purification of a (female) body is now applied to the purification of pagan texts. Together with the simile of bees looking for honey, thus transforming enemy 'prey' into something new and highly welcome, this passage, cited time and again by Christian authors as the text of the beautiful slave, was most important for the preservation of texts dating from antiquity.

The purification example is at the same time a step to the fourfold sense of the Scriptures (literal, allegorical, moral or tropological, and anagogical senses), an exegetic practice developed by the Fathers of the Church: in Origen we find only three of them, with the anagogical one still lacking. The doctrine of the fourfold sense is intimately linked with metaphors as models of thinking, too. In the above case the idea (or concept) of purification (called 'allegorical' in this doctrine) is applied to a case seen as similar, the purification of pagan texts. How the doctrine of the fourfold sense of the Scriptures was developed and how it worked can be seen in a basic four-volume text written by one of the Jesuit polygraphers, Henri de Lubac (1896–1991): *Exégèse médiévale : les quatre sens de l'Écriture*.¹⁴

V

Let me add some more examples for metaphors as models of thinking, first biblical ones, then examples drawn from the lay world. A well-known concept is the concept of Christian life as a journey. According to the *Dictionary of Biblical Imagery* we find it as the Path of Life,¹⁵ Way of Salvation,¹⁶ Walking with God, Virtuous Life, Followers of the Way.¹⁷ Some citations from the *Dictionary*:

14 Lubac 1959–1964.

15 Mt 7:13–14.

16 E.g., Mt 3:3, Mk 1:2–3; Lk 3,4–5; Jn 1:19–25, etc.

17 Ryken, Wilhoit, and Longman 1998.

- “As always, symbolic meanings grow out of the physical phenomenon. Walking on a path involves choosing to enter on the path and to pursue it in a given direction, progress toward a destination, making wise rather than foolish choices along the way, taking care for safety and not getting lost, and arriving at a goal.”
- “The image of the path or way is pervasive in the Bible, with the references numbering approximately eight hundred.”
- “In biblical times walking was the most common way of going somewhere, even over long distances. It is not surprising, then, that references to walking in the Bible number well over two hundred (and in some versions nearly three hundred).”
- “Walking is one of the Bible’s vivid metaphors for how godly people should live, both positively in terms of what to follow, and negatively in warnings about what to avoid.”
- “Death as a metaphoric way” [Josh 23:14, 1 Kings 2:2; Ps. 121:7–8] “The image of the path or way embodies a profound reflection on fundamental ethical themes, the conduct of God and humanity, and the character of God’s salvation.”

The importance of this concept is so great that the technique used by Origen as regards the beautiful slave from *Deuteronomy* can be applied, among other things, to the works of Homer, especially to the *Odyssey* and to Ulysses’ journey home after the fall of Troy. Hugo Rahner published a book in 1966 (first edition: 1957) with the title *Griechische Mythen in christlicher Deutung* (Greek myths in Christian interpretation). It includes a large chapter titled “Holy Homer”.¹⁸ In a book by the same author, published in 1964, we find a large part (of about 300 pages) under the heading ‘Antenna Crucis’. Its chapter titles are self-explanatory: “I Odysseus am Mastbaum” (mast seen as cross, temptation by the sirens); “II Das Meer der Welt”; “III Das Schiff aus Holz”; “IV Das Kreuz als Mastbaum und Antenne” (the cross as mast and yard); “V Das mystische Tau” (means the Greek letter T); “VI Der Schiffbruch und die Planke des Heils” (plank, strake of salvation); “VII Das Schiff des Heils”; “IX Die Ankunft im Hafen. Schifflein des Petrus. Zur Symbolgeschichte des römischen Prinzipats”; “VIII Die Arche Noah als Schiff des Heils”; “IX Die Ankunft im Hafen”.¹⁹

The concept of the journey is not restricted to Christian contexts. You will find it in everyday contexts and everyday thinking – as is shown for instance by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their 1999 book: a purposeful life is a “journey”; a person living a

18 Rahner n.d.

19 Rahner 1964. Some years later, Hans Blumenberg published his book on the importance of the concept of ‘shipwreck’: Blumenberg 1979. By the way,

Hugo Rahner’s brother, Karl Rahner, held a chair from 1967 to 1971 at the University of Münster, where Blumenberg taught from 1970 to 1985.)

life is a “traveller”; life goals are “destinations”; a life plan is an “itinerary”; etc.²⁰ Another quite interesting concept is the idea of love as war. Classical scholars will remember first of all the *Ars amatoria* of Ovid, especially book I, ix: *militat omnis amans*: love is war – females are fortresses to be besieged – lovers should be young and strong (*senilis amor* is ridiculous) – lovers have to endure everything (sleep on the ground in front of the house, etc.) – the rival is an enemy;

*custodum transire manus vigilumque catervas
militis et miseri semper amantis opus.*

Getting past watchman’s hands, and enemy sentinels
is work for soldiers and wretched lovers.

In this context, all of us can remember works from world literature – as for instance Stendhal’s *Le rouge et le noir* or the *Memoirs* of Giacomo Casanova.

It was a pleasant surprise for me to find the same concept of ‘love as war’ in Lakoff/Johnson 1980. What is new in modern times is the two-sidedness of this war: women fight as well – we tend to call it ‘gender equality’. Witness the following statements: *he* is known for his rapid *conquests*; *she fought* for him, but his mistress *won out*; *he fled* from her advances; *she pursued* him relentlessly; *he* is slowly *gaining ground* with her; *he won her hand* in marriage; *he overpowered* her; *she is besieged* by suitors; *he* has to *fend them off*; *he enlisted the aid* of her friends; *he made an ally* of her mother; theirs is a *misalliance* if I’ve ever seen one.²¹

VI

Let me briefly mention two further models of thinking. One of the most important inventions of mankind was the invention of script – we already saw one of its effects in the form of the concept behind the atomistic theory of Leucippus and Democritus, and behind the approach molecular biologists have towards their subject matter. Now script produces texts we can read in books. Thus the book as a model for the world (going back to Augustine) became a most influential concept, the so-called Book of Nature. God is thought of as its author. We try to read this book, and since Galileo it has been written in cipher, with mathematical symbols (reflecting the development of mathematics as the most important ancillary science for natural sciences in the seventeenth century.) The history of this concept and its pervasive effect have been described by Hans Blumenberg in another of his influential texts: *Die Lesbarkeit der Welt*.²²

20 Lakoff and Johnson 1999.

22 Blumenberg 1981.

21 Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 49.

The second concept is the world (or universe) as a clockwork (*horologium*), inspired by the large astronomical clocks constructed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the one hand, the world as a clockwork could be interpreted in a deistic perspective, making of God the “grand [or even supreme] horologer”, the big or universal watchmaker. This remains true of Leibniz (1646–1716). On the other hand there was a ‘physical’, far more progressive interpretation of the concept, fostered, e.g., by Johannes Kepler (1571–1630).²³ Judge for yourself:

Latin original	My translation
<p>Multus sum in causis physicis indagandis. Scopus meus hic est, ut coelestem machinam dicam non esse instar divini animalis, sed instar horologii (qui horologium credit esse animatum, is gloriam artificis tribuit operi), ut in qua pene omnis motuum varietas ab una simplicissima vi magnetica corporali, uti in horologio motus omnes a simplicissimo pondere.</p>	<p>I am very busy looking for the physical causes. Here my goal is to show that the heavenly machinery is not an image of a divine being, but the image of a clockwork (if someone believes the clockwork to be animated, then he attributes the merit of the watchmaker to the clockwork itself), and to show that nearly all variation of the movements comes from one very simple magnetic force of the heavenly bodies; as in a clockwork, all movements come from a very simple weight.</p>

VII

It stands to reason that such central concepts or models of thinking can be subject to change according to the world in which we live. The concept of the world as a clockwork has had its day. It was replaced by the concept of the network, in which no one is forced to look for a moving force, e.g., an unmoved mover. In the case of ‘love as war’, it was more or less an adaptation to the present style of life, the basic state of affairs remaining identical. In other cases, models of thinking become obsolete and need more explanation today.

²³ Kepler in a letter to Herwart von Hohenburg. Cf. *Joannis Kepleri astronomi opera omnia*. Frankfurti

a. M./Erlangae 1859. For the context I refer to the great historian of science, Koyré 1961, 377 sq.

Let me take one further, highly interesting example. Everyone is familiar with the passage from Goethe's *Faust* where Faust prepares a scholar for his studies ("Schüler-szene"). Here the central concept is 'thinking is weaving':

Passage from the 'Schülerszene'	English translation (italics mine)
Gebraucht der Zeit, sie geht so schnell von hinnen,	Use your time well: it slips away so fast, yet
Doch Ordnung lehrt Euch Zeit gewinnen.	Discipline will teach you how to win it.
Mein teurer Freund, ich rat Euch drum	My dear friend, I'd advise, in sum,
Zuerst Collegium Logicum.	First, the Collegium Logicum.
Da wird der Geist Euch wohl dressiert,	There your mind will be trained,
In spanische Stiefeln eingeschnürt,	As if in Spanish boots, constrained,
Daß er bedächtiger so fortan	So that painfully, as it ought,
Hinschleiche die Gedankenbahn,	It creeps along the way of thought,
Und nicht etwa, die Kreuz und Quer,	Not flitting about all over,
Irrlichteliere hin und her.	Wandering here and there.
Dann lehret man Euch manchen Tag,	So you'll learn, in many days,
Daß, was Ihr sonst auf einen Schlag	What you used to do, untaught, as in a haze,
Getrieben, wie Essen und Trinken frei,	Like eating now, and drinking, you'll see
Eins! Zwei! Drei! dazu nötig sei.	The necessity of One! Two! Three!
Zwar ist's mit der Gedankenfabrik	<i>Truly the intricacy of logic</i>
Wie mit einem Weber-Meisterstück,	<i>Is like a master-weaver's fabric,</i>
Wo ein Tritt tausend Fäden regt,	<i>Where the loom holds a thousand threads,</i>
Die Schifflein herüber hinüber schießen,	<i>Here and there the shuttles go</i>
Die Fäden ungesehen fließen,	<i>And the threads, invisibly, flow,</i>
Ein Schlag tausend Verbindungen schlägt.	<i>One pass serves for a thousand instead.</i>
Der Philosoph, der tritt herein	Then the philosopher steps in: he'll show
Und beweist Euch, es müßt so sein:	That it certainly had to be so:
Das Erst wär so, das Zweite so,	The first was – so, the second – so,
Und drum das Dritt und Vierte so;	And so, the third and fourth were – so:
Und wenn das Erst und Zweit nicht wär,	If first and second had never been,
Das Dritt und Viert wär nimmermehr.	Third and fourth would not be seen.
Das preisen die Schüler allerorten,	<i>All praise the scholars, beyond believing,</i>
Sind aber keine Weber geworden.	<i>But few of them ever turn to weaving.</i>

Where does this appreciation for the loom and the activity of weavers come from? Mechanical looms were introduced during the eighteenth century, contributing essentially to the so-called Industrial Revolution. For the previous few centuries, and until the beginning of the nineteenth, men of standing had worn stockings. And one particular loom was invented for the production of such stockings. This “*métier à faire des bas*”, a very sophisticated machine, was then seen as the summit of technical know-how. One of the longest articles of the *Grande Encyclopédie* was dedicated to exactly this machine. It was written by Diderot himself, who had spent about three months learning its function and how to perfectly operate this kind of loom. What made it worth the effort for him and some of his contemporaries was that this loom represented nothing less than the essence of thinking:

Citation from the *Encyclopédie*,
article BAS (stocking)

My translation (italics mine)

Le métier à faire des bas est une des machines les plus compliquées & les plus conséquentes que nous ayons : on peut la regarder comme un seul & unique raisonnement, dont la fabrication de l'ouvrage est la conclusion ; aussi regne-t-il entre ses parties une si grande dépendance, qu'en retrancher une seule, ou altérer la forme de celles qu'on juge les moins importantes, c'est nuire à tout le mécanisme.²⁴

The loom for stockings is one of the most complex and consequent machines we possess: you can see it as *one single reasoning process, leading to the product as its conclusion*. This is why there exists such a degree of mutual dependency among its parts that taking away a single one or changing the form of those we regard as less important is detrimental to the entire mechanism.

The importance in contemporary technology of the use of metaphors, viz. the underlying concepts, has been aptly described by Karlheinz Jakob. The eighteenth century was indeed a century of machines.²⁵

VIII

In order to conclude (and for the sake of a comprehensive view of the matter), let me add some hints as to the influence of concepts on our language itself. The reader will

24 Passage from the beginning of the article BAS (stocking), second volume of the first edition of the *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, dating from 1751. The orthography

is authentic. Jacques Proust, an expert on Diderot, dedicated an extensive paper to this article from the *Encyclopédie*: Proust 1977.
25 Jakob 1991.

remember that this was the problem Roudet wanted to explain. A first point has to do with one of the themes popularised by Lakoff and Johnson:²⁶ body concepts are central in the vocabulary and the grammar of individual languages. This was one of the topics of research of the late Peter Koch, whose projected and partly realised *Dictionnaire Étymologique et Cognitif des Langues Romanes* (DECOLAR) treats exactly the topic of body parts and their semantic evolution. The Latin *caput* (head) has for instance undergone a semantic change to ‘le chef’ in French, ‘the chief’ in English. This corresponds to semantic similarity of the concepts, whereas it would be contiguity in the case of Latin *coxa* (hip) → French *cuisse* (thigh). Koch and his collaborator Paul Gévaudan give many quite sophisticated examples of a refined, linguistic version of Roudet’s findings, this time including even the level of words (which I naturally was not interested in) and not only the level of ideas/concepts.²⁷ The second point is that grammaticalisation processes very often start from body concepts, too. Take the notion of the self (ego) – it may be derived, e.g., from the concepts of ‘head’, ‘belly’, ‘body’. This topic has found greatest interest among linguists. Bernd Heine, a scholar with a broad view not subject to any Eurocentric bias (since he is a specialist in African languages) has been particularly engaged in this discussion.²⁸

An example from my own experience with Romance and Creole languages is perhaps at issue. All of us have a concept of action. Actions have a beginning, a middle phase and an end. Additionally, all of us can imagine a phase before the onset of an action and a phase after its end. Now, what can be conceived can be linguistically expressed, too. In particular, the phase before the onset and the phase after the end of an action are the sources of continuous efforts leading to new forms: the expressions for the pre-initial phase tend to become new future forms (‘I am going to swim’, ‘I will swim’, French ‘je vais nager’, etc.). On a global scale, there exist perhaps only five types of expressions for this phase. The Latin one was deontic (‘I have to sing’, *cantare habeo*, source of nearly all Romance synthetic future forms). The expressions for the post-terminal phase tend to become new perfective and then perfect forms (think of Latin *habeo cantatum*, ‘I have finished singing’, source of the Romance perfect forms like French ‘j’ai chanté’).²⁹

26 Lakoff and Johnson 1999.

27 Gévaudan and Koch 2010.

28 Heine, Claudi, and Hünemeyer 1991; Heine and Kuteva 2002; Heine and Kuteva 2007.

29 Cf. for instance Raible 2003.

IX

Let me terminate these considerations with some conclusions.

- (1) As was already shown by phenomenology and Gestalt psychology (decidedly theories of perception), some basic operations exist in our mind: the most important ones utilise recognition on the basis of the relations of contiguity and similarity. In the case of metaphors, these relations are not given per se, but created by ourselves.
- (2) These operations work from concepts, not from their linguistic counterparts (the words or sentences).
- (3) Thus metaphor and metonymy are a matter of concepts, not of words (the first of the four persistent fallacies Lakoff/Johnson 1980 mention in their afterword of 2003).³⁰
- (4) A concept applied to another conceptual space creates either contiguity (and thus metonymy) or similarity (and thus metaphor). This was the second, far more interesting interpretation of Anaxagoras' fragment.
- (5) In order to become fully aware of this fact, one has to change one's sign model. The appropriate one is, e.g., the one fostered by the schoolmen of the thirteenth century, certainly not the misleading one of Ogden and Richards.
- (6) Our reasoning is of necessity metaphoric or metonymic – the number of states of affairs or objects to be designed being unlimited, whereas the vocabulary of historical languages is always restricted. This leads to polysemy as a natural consequence – the meaning of words thus depending on the context in which they are uttered. (Think, as a simple example, of the *Trash* icon on your computer or of a lover *besieging* his lady.) This kind of meaning change was exactly the point made by Léonce Roudet.

In order to show that all this works just as well for the contiguity of concepts, I will end with an extra: a series of metonymies we all are familiar with.

30 “The first fallacy is that metaphor is a matter of words, not concepts. The second is that metaphor is based on similarity. The third is that all concepts are literal and that none can be metaphorical. The

fourth is that rational thought is in no way shaped by the nature of our brains and bodies.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 244).

X

We are familiar with taboo domains and activities in our everyday life. We are not allowed to speak of such matters of fact directly – lots of examples can be found today in the domain of so-called political correctness. Now one of the vices of modern Western societies is alcoholism. When speaking of someone’s relative drunkenness, beware of naming it as such. Never tell someone that s/he is intoxicated. Most expressions relating to taboos resort to contiguous activities or states. In the case of alcoholism, there is a quite large quantity of such solutions. A considerable part of the following expressions comes, by the way, from the *Dogood Papers* of Benjamin Franklin (Paper No 12, 10. IX.1722).³¹

Contiguous concept	Expressions for a taboo activity Contiguity between concepts (→ Metonymy) (Mostly) metonymical expressions
Relaxed mood	Merry, mellow, flying high, high, pretty well-entered (Germ. aufgeräumt), to be in one’s altitudes
Positive effects, preparation for the ‘hard’ life	To tie one on, to take one for the road, nightcap, the cup that cheers; shots, jolts an eye-opener, a pick-me-up
To straighten up oneself	To refresh the inner man, to repair the tissues, to wet the whistle
Reduced perceptive faculty	Fuddled, see two moons, the sun has shown upon him, blind, cockeyed, conked, feeling no pain, jagged, pie-eyed, seeing double
Reduced speaking faculty	To clip the King’s English (Germ. e.g., eine schwere Zunge haben)

31 “And as the Effects of Liquor are various, so are the Characters given to its Devourers. It argues some Shame in the Drunkards themselves, in that they have invented numberless Words and Phrases to cover their Folly, whose proper Significations are harmless, or have no Signification at all. They are seldom known to be *drunk*, tho’ they are very often *boozey*, *cogey*, *tipsey*, *fox’d*, *merry*, *mellow*, *fudd’d*, *groatable*, *Confoundedly cut*, *See two Moons*, *are Among the Philistines*, *In a very good Humour*, *See the Sun*, or, *The*

Sun has shone upon them; they Clip the King’s English, *are Almost froze*, *Feavourish*, *In their Altitudes*, *Pretty well enter’d*, &c. In short, every Day produces some new Word or Phrase which might be added to the Vocabulary of the *Tiplers*: But I have chosen to mention these few, because if at any Time a Man of Sobriety and Temperance happens to *cut himself confoundedly*, or is *almost froze*, or *feavourish*, or accidentally *sees the Sun*, &c. he may escape the Imputation of being *drunk*, when his Misfortune comes to be related.”

Reduced mobility	To be almost frozen, groggy, half shot, paralyzed, palsied, petrified, plastered, shellacked, skunked, smashed, stiff
Reduced equilibrium control	To be listing to the leeward, squiffed, three sheets to the wind
Reduced accessibility	To be corked, tight (Germ. jemand ist völlig zu)
To be full of liquid	To be blotto, floating, greased, juiced, loaded, saturated, tanked, spizzled, having a drop too much,
Concomitant activity of the body	To hoist a few, to bend the elbow with one's cronies, to have some nips, swigs, slugs, to have a slug, to have a snootful, (cf. Germ. sich einen hinter die Binde gießen)
State after the event	To have a katzenjammer, hangover, the horrors, a big head, a bit of a glow on, to be blasted, boiled, fried, gassed, stewed, stoned, under the influence
Belittlement of the quantity	To take a quick one, to need a wee dram before dinner (Germ. ein Bierchen trinken)
Pub crawls	To be on a bender, on a spree, on a toot
Other names of alcohol	Booze, hooch, sauce, snake oil, the grape, redevye, a drop too much

Thus metaphors and metonymies are central notions, reflecting, among other things, the way we perceive, think and speak, be it as commoners or as scientists; in short: how we cope with the world around us.

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Spatial Metaphors as Rhetorical Figures. Case Studies from Wisdom Texts of the Egyptian New Kingdom

Summary

This study analyses a series of wisdom texts dating to the Egyptian New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period (1550–712 BC) in order to outline the rhetorical and communicative usage of spatial metaphors. The findings contribute significantly to our understanding of rhetoric: that the spatial metaphors (particularly *path*-based metaphors) become increasingly numerous and explicit when the rhetorical weight of the text increases – when, in other words, the more enumerative wisdom text genre comes to be influenced by the exhortations of scribal school texts.

Keywords: Metaphor; cognition; linguistics; wisdom literature; corpus analysis.

Diese Studie analysiert einige Weisheitstexte aus dem ägyptischen Neuen Reich und der Dritten Zwischenzeit (1550–712 BC), um die rhetorische sowie kommunikative Anwendungen von räumlichen Metaphern zu skizzieren. Unser Verständnis altägyptischer Rhetorik wird dadurch verstärkt: Wir sehen, zum Beispiel, dass die räumlichen Metaphern (insbesondere die *Weg*metaphern) sich vermehren und expliziter werden wobei die rhetorische Qualität des Textes ebenso zunimmt – oder anders ausgedrückt, dass die enumerative Weisheitsgattung zunehmend von den Aufrufen der Schultexte beeinflusst wird.

Keywords: Metapher; Kognition; Sprachwissenschaft; Weisheitsliteratur; Korpusanalyse.

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I Aims of the study

This study analyses the spatial metaphors, particularly *path*-based metaphors, in the so-called ‘wisdom literature’ corpus of the Egyptian New Kingdom (ca. 1550–712 BC) in order to assess the way in which this metaphor works rhetorically. It is argued here that spatial metaphors, particularly metaphors involving movement along a path, are fundamental elements of this educational genre, since the path metaphor is associated with life choices (LIFE IS A JOURNEY), particularly relating to behaviour. These metaphors appear both explicitly, via the mention of a ‘(life) path’ as well as implicitly, via mention of movement through space. The hypothesis being tested is that the explicitness of spatial metaphors (and here particularly *path*-based metaphors) increases when the argumentative weight of the text likewise increases – when, in other words, the prescriptive but more neutral wisdom text genre comes to be increasingly influenced by the more direct exhortations of scribal school texts.

To avoid conflation of rhetorical language with metaphors naturally and unintentionally used in the language, explicitly ‘deliberate’ metaphors have been taken into consideration (for a definition of which see § 2). These metaphors are then subjected to a multi-level analysis, comprising two approaches from the contemporary study of metaphor. The first is a word-based study based on the *Metaphor Identification Procedure VU University Amsterdam* (MIPVU) method of Gerard Steen and colleagues.¹ Here, the ‘Basic Sense’ and ‘Contextual Sense’ of a metaphorical lexical unit are determined in order to provide an empirical basis for metaphor identification. Secondly, a text-based analysis developed by Elena Semino, which identifies particular patterns of metaphorical language in cross-textual perspective, is applied.² This approach will be implemented across a range of genres in the Ancient Egyptian textual corpus, generating what will be the first simultaneously qualitative and quantitative analysis of metaphors for this language.

The perspective is synchronic, which in this context signifies that metaphorical language from the New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period (ca. 1550–712 BC) are being investigated. The decision to work synchronically reflects a tendency in contemporary metaphor studies,³ where the focus is not on the emergence and development of metaphors but rather on the communicative intentions behind their use. This ties in well with a future research question, namely, whether metaphors in comparative perspective reflect the text type or register in which they appear. To do this, the ‘wisdom corpus’ will in an upcoming study be compared with metaphors used in other genres popular at this time.

1 Steen 2007, also Pragglejaz 2007.

2 Semino 2008.

3 Steen 2007, 79.

The analysis takes into consideration the so-called wisdom texts of the late New Kingdom. Wisdom texts are a popular ancient Egyptian literary genre, in which advice for proper behaviour is dispensed.⁴ The texts under analysis here, *The Teaching of Ani*, *The Teaching of Amenemope*, *The Teaching of Amunnakht* and *The ‘Teaching’ of Menena*, provide convincing support for our hypothesis. All wisdom texts draw on path metaphors for the single aim of highlighting behaviour but in differing amounts and with differing effect. In *The Teaching of Ani*, a text approximately 2925 Tokens long (from the longest text witness, pBoulaq 4),⁵ path metaphors are rare – only two cases of explicit path metaphors and another two less explicit variants are to be found. The path metaphors in *The Teachings of Amenemope* (with 3292 tokens in its longest manuscript, pBM EA 10474)⁶ are more numerous than in *Ani*, but focus on sailing rather than movement over land. The *Teaching of Amunnakht* (whose longest, most complete fragment oKV 18/3.614+627 consists of approximately 261 tokens)⁷ has similar features to *Amenemope* but the metaphors are much more conventional. Lastly, the metaphors in *The ‘Teaching’ of Menena*, (whose sole manuscript, oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAO Inv. 2188, numbers 421 tokens),⁸ present, in contrast to the other texts in the corpus, much more of a play with the idea of wisdom texts being ‘teachings for the path of life,’ explicitly drawing on terrestrial (and other) paths in its discussion of behaviour. In *The ‘Teaching’ of Menena*, which in its format and rhetoric really belongs more to a school text than a wisdom text, creative extensions of path-based metaphors permeate the text. In this way, this article intends to exemplify the extent to which metaphor analysis can contribute to our understanding of rhetoric in this genre. What we see is that paths as metaphors are often relegated in the wisdom corpus to the sphere of the cliché and it takes an enlightened rhetorician to make these metaphors extraordinary.

2 Some definitions

Metaphors are features of language in which a commonly more abstract entity (the *topic* or *tenor*) is represented by a more concrete entity (the *vehicle*),⁹ which seemingly reflects the association at the cognitive level between a more abstract category (the *target domain*)

4 See Junge 2003, 82.

5 Statistics from the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*, <http://aew.bbaw.de/tla/servlet/so?f=o&l=o&ff=7&cex=1&db=o&oc=1135&l1=o>, accessed 07.2015. The prefix p is an abbreviation for ‘papyrus’ and is used as such throughout the text.

6 Statistics from the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*, <http://aew.bbaw.de/tla/servlet/so?f=o&l=o&ff=7&cex=1&db=o&oc=1168&l1=o>, accessed 07.2015.

7 Statistics from the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*, <http://aew.bbaw.de/tla/servlet/so?f=o&l=o&ff=7&cex=1&db=o&oc=1114&l1=o>, accessed 07.2015. The prefix o is an abbreviation for ‘ostrakon’ and is used as such throughout the text.

8 Statistics from the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*, <http://aew.bbaw.de/tla/servlet/so?f=o&l=o&ff=7&cex=1&db=o&oc=1182&l1=o>, accessed 07.2015.

9 Richards 1936.

and a more concrete one (the *source domain*). *Domains* are to be understood as conceptual structures that represent the coherent organisation of experience.¹⁰ Since a metaphor can emerge in thought, in language and in communication,¹¹ there are several aspects to cover as part of an analysis. From the perspective of metaphor in thought, one main question emerges: is the metaphor *conventional* or *new*? If, however, one is investigating metaphor in language, the distinction lies rather in whether a *metaphor* or a *simile* is used. Lastly, if the focus lies on metaphor in communication, one has to consider whether the metaphor is *deliberate* or not.

To be clear, speakers often use metaphor in an unconscious manner. For instance, it is likely that a majority of native speakers of English would not regard the sentence ‘He *defended* his argument’ as being metaphorical. However, according to the classic work of metaphor studies, Lakoff and Johnsons *Metaphors We Live By*, 4), an equation like ARGUMENT IS WAR would most certainly be classified as metaphorical language, albeit conventional and non-deliberate.¹² Although it would indeed be worthwhile to seek out such unintentional comparisons in the Egyptian language, the lack of native speakers would make such an undertaking significantly more difficult than modern empirical studies. For this reason (amongst others), the accent lies in this study on the so-called *deliberate* metaphors, which explicitly draw attention to the source domain and function in this manner as rhetorical figures.¹³ In other words, these metaphors compel the reader to observe what is being represented from another perspective,¹⁴ for which an (admittedly somewhat stilted) English example could be: ‘He defended his argument *with the strategy of a general*’. Such deliberate metaphors can be either *conventional* or *novel* on the conceptual level – in any case, they draw our attention to the source domain, in the case above, WAR. Naturally, it is not an easy task to demonstrate deliberateness (in dead languages even less than in living ones), but I make the case here that the issue is to be answered on a case-by-case basis but also in relation to the context in which the metaphors occur. To this end, a current research project of mine is the establishment of a *typology of deliberateness* that is relevant for ancient languages.

3 Methodology

In this study, metaphor is analysed across three levels. Firstly, metaphors are identified at the word level using the MIPVU Procedure. Secondly, a more *ad-hoc* categorisation is used to describe the conceptual domains that form the basis of the metaphor and thirdly, Semino’s typology of metaphorical patterns in cross-textual perspective helps describe

10 Kövecses 2002, 4.

11 Steen 2008, 213, 221.

12 Lakoff and Johnson 1980.

13 Steen 2008, 224.

14 Krennmayr 2011, 154.

where the metaphors occur and their relationship to each other, if a relationship seems to exist.¹⁵

Firstly, MIPVU (*Metaphor Identification Procedure VU University Amsterdam*) identifies and annotates metaphors on the *lexical* level.¹⁶ The method investigates the *meaning in context* of each lexical unit and focuses on those cases in which the so-called *contextual sense* deviates from the *basic sense*. Fundamentally, the basic sense is the meaning that is often concreter, more precise or more embodied than other possible meanings.¹⁷ In order to specify these meanings, a corpus-based lexicon is used: if a fitting contextual sense appears in the lexicon one is most likely dealing with a *conventional* metaphor and when one such is not to be found one can begin to consider whether the metaphor in question is indeed *novel* or whether it is simply not (yet) attested in the textual record. At this point, further study in the corpus (preferably an annotated digital corpus) is required (see § 4) to test whether the usage is indeed quite individual or rather just a variation of a more well-known rhetorical figure.

The analysis of domains has as its basis the linguistic phenomena of a particular language, although lists of domains established on the basis of other languages like English (for which see, for instance, Kövecses 2002, 281–285 and Panther and Radden 1999, 419–423) can establish a good point of comparison. One cannot assume that these domains are the same across languages, but, nonetheless, several studies have shown the extent to which unrelated languages use very similar metaphors and therefore perhaps have similar conceptual metaphors at their base.¹⁸ It is one of the aims of this project to text whether these categorisations are acceptable for the Egyptian corpus. To make this explicit: the study is bottom-up, extracting categories from the textual record. These categories are then compared to categories already current in cognitive linguistic studies.

Lastly, at the level of the text, the typology of Elena Semino,¹⁹ as seen in Table 1, has been employed, in order to test how metaphors occur in relation to each other:

15 Semino 2008.

16 Steen et al. 2010, 12–13. Cf. Cameron 2003, 10 who analyses whole ‘discourse units’

17 Pragglejaz 2007 but also Krennmayr 2011, 29.

18 Kövecses 2002, 163–177.

19 Semino 2008, 22–30.

Type	Function
Repetition	A literal repetition of metaphorical lexical items.
Recurrence	Where different expressions relating to the same source domain appear far apart from each other in the text.
Clustering	Where there is a high density of (perhaps different) metaphorical lexical items in a particular part of the text.
Extension	Where expressions evoking the same source domain are used in close proximity to one another in relation to elements of the same target domain.
Mixing	Where metaphorical expressions from different source domains are used in close proximity to one another.
Literal-metaphorical opposition	Punning on literal and metaphorical meanings (<i>double entendre</i>).
Signalling	‘Signals’ that draw attention to metaphorical quality (‘like’, ‘as’).
Intertextuality	The metaphorical usage of a direct quote.

Tab. 1 Metaphor typology, following Semino 2008.

4 The data: The use of the *Projet Ramsès* database

In order to carry out a synchronic and corpus-based study in the future, we are currently annotating the metaphorical language in the texts stored within the database of the *Projet Ramsès* (Université de Liège, Belgium). This database is a linguistically annotated corpus of texts of the Late Egyptian language stage (dating from the New Kingdom until the Third Intermediate Period, ca. 1550–712 BC). Additionally, we shall be extensively using the *Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache*²⁰ with its accompanying *Belegstellen*²¹ and the online digital corpus *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*, which presents a variety of Egyptian text types from many language stages. In this way, we have a triple means of checking definitions and usages. The *Wörterbuch* is in itself the perfect companion tool for a metaphorical analysis, since, in comparison with many modern language dictionaries, it is corpus-based.²² This being said, it is still a bilingual ‘translation dictionary’, with a corresponding focus on translation, which differentiates it from monolingual definition-based dictionaries. Unfortunately, the ancient Egyptians of the pharaonic period did not, to the best of our knowledge, attempt lexicographical research.

20 Erman and Grapow 1971 [1926–1931], henceforth Wb.

21 Erman and Grapow 1973 [1935–1953].

22 Verlinde and Selva 2001, 594.

In order to realise the aim of investigating metaphor in corpus perspective, a new annotation layer is being built into the Liège database, by which means metaphors can be tagged on all three levels of analysis outlined in § 3. This is a manual procedure, since context is so necessary to the identification and analysis of metaphors (see § 6.2). This signifies that one must observe metaphor usage across whole texts and not only isolate particular cases from the corpus.²³ Nevertheless, the usefulness of a large corpus will be demonstrated in the future, when, on the basis of the text-based qualitative tests, broader quantitative studies of particular expressions will be able to be carried out across the corpus.

Since the annotation layer was still being built at the time of conducting this research and writing this article, the *Projet Ramsès* database was not extensively used for this study, which comprises the pilot study used to identify and test the annotation levels. The study here is thus based in great part on the definitions of the *Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache* (including the *Belegstellen*) and on the corpus data of the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*, particularly for the testing of word meaning in context. This being said the transliteration, translation and glossing of the texts is the author's own.

5 The case studies

For this pilot study the most significant wisdom texts of the New Kingdom were subjected to analysis. All texts are written in hieratic script on a range of media (particularly papyrus and ostraca – limestone and pottery shards) and almost all derive from Thebes (modern Luxor). The manuscripts containing *The Teaching of Ani* date from the 19th Dynasty (from ca. 1290 BC, e.g. pBM EA 10685) until about the 26th Dynasty (ca. 650 BC, e.g. tBerlin 8934²⁴). *The Teaching of Amenemope* is attested from the 20th Dynasty (from ca. 1180 BC, e.g. oCairo SR 1840) until about 650 BC (e.g. pBM EA 10474²⁵). *The Teaching of Amunnakbt* also has manuscripts dating from the 20th Dynasty (reign of Ramses III, ca. 1150 BC, e.g. oKV 18/3.614+627²⁶), as does *The 'Teaching' of Menena* (reign of Ramses III – Ramses VI, e.g. oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAO Inv. 2188²⁷).

The research questions guiding our investigation of these sources principally concern themselves with spatial metaphors, particularly *path* metaphors, which are allegedly repeatedly used in educational texts.²⁸ One could ask, for instance: Are path metaphors used similarly in all wisdom texts from the period under investigation? With which other domains are paths connected? Do path metaphors develop throughout a text? This study

23 See also Kimmel 2012, 10.

24 See Quack 1994.

25 See Laisney 2007.

26 See Dorn 2004.

27 See Černý and Gardiner 1957 and Guglielmi 1983.

28 Vittmann 1999, 32.

hypothesises that the usage of path metaphors not only plays a role in the rhetorical structure of this genre but may also show a degree of connection not only between the texts within this corpus but also with other genres popular during this period.

6 The findings

What can be seen is that the path metaphors develop and interact with each other in similar ways to what Semino identified on the basis of metaphors in modern newspaper articles.²⁹ Although we do have cases of spatial metaphors in a wisdom text appearing once and never again, it is a more common phenomenon that these metaphors recur and stand in ever more complex relationships with each other. This type of relationship has been described by Andreas Musolff as a ‘Metaphor Scenario’ and is defined by him in the following manner:

[W]e can characterise a ‘scenario’ as a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about ‘typical’ aspects of a source-situation, for example, its participants and their roles, the ‘dramatic’ storylines and outcomes [...]

Scenarios enable the speakers to not only apply source to target concepts but to draw on them to build narrative frames.³⁰

6.1 *The Teaching of Ani*

In comparative perspective, it is clear that the path metaphors appear and develop in the four texts under analysis in very different ways. Concomitantly there are clear similarities between the metaphors of some texts. In particular, there are usually two to three cases of explicit mentions of a path, followed by more implicit and more creative plays on this motif. The kinds of variation include things like different types of path, different types of movement along a path and different kinds of blockages of a path.

In *The Teaching of Ani*, for instance, path metaphors do not play a very significant role. Metaphors of family structures and gardens are dominant instead, which represent growing beings, which one must take responsibility for.³¹ This being said, there are nevertheless two cases³² of explicit path metaphors, in which several ancient Egyptian

29 Semino 2008.


30 Musolff 2006, 28 and 36.

31 Metaphors other than ‘path’ in these texts are being treated in a separate study.

32 The latter part of Example 1 (starting with *dgs=k*) is also repeated in 21.11.

words for ‘path’, such as *mtn*, *mj.t* and *w:t*, are used metaphorically (metaphorical usage of a lexeme is marked in bold throughout):³³

Example 1




<i>j:šm</i>	<i>tw</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>mj.t</i>	<i>n.t-^c{wi}</i>	<i>r^c-nb</i>	<i>dgs=k</i>	<i>s.t</i>	<i>nmt.t</i>
<i>j:šm</i>	<i>tw</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>mj:t</i>	<i>n:t-^c</i>	<i>r^c-nb</i>	<i>dgs-k</i>	<i>s:t</i>	<i>nmt:t</i>
go:IMP	2SG.M	towards	path:F	tradition	daily	tread:SBJV-2SG.M	place:F	step:F

“Go daily towards the traditional path, so that you may traverse the trodden area.”³⁴
 (*Ani*, pBoulaq 4, 19.13)

At the end of the teaching, we also have the appeal to the god:

Example 2



<i>jmm</i>	<i>sn</i>	<i>hr</i>	<i>w:t=k</i>
<i>jmm</i>	<i>sn</i>	<i>hr</i>	<i>w:t-k</i>
place:IMP	3PL	on	path:F-2SG.M


“Place them (the people, CD) on your (the god’s, CD) path!” (*Ani*, pBoulaq 4, 23.11)


Aside from these two examples, path metaphors are not otherwise present in the text. Instead, we are presented with two *anti-path metaphors*, in which the *static* condition of a person or animal represents a nightmarish situation in a metaphor defined at the conceptual level like HUMAN VICTIM IS ANIMAL (Eggertsson and Forceville 2009, 444):

33 There are metaphorical and non-metaphorical usages of *both* words for path *w:t* and *mj.t* throughout the text. The phrases about the student finding his ‘way’ in 17.11–12 and 17.13 are not treated as metaphors, since, from a contextual perspective, they are talking about the student actually trying to get home in an inebriated state.
 34 The phrase *s.t nmt.t* means literally ‘place of steps’. However, *nmt.t* ‘step’ is used in the earlier *Teaching of Ptahhotep* (D220–221, pPrisse 8.2, in Žába 1956, 33) to refer to ‘status’, a meaning applied by many to this passage from *Ani* (Volten 1937, 105). The

sentence *dgs=k s.t nmt.t* could thus read (after the emendation of a preposition and a possessive suffix pronoun – here bracketed, CD): “Stelle dich <auf> den Platz <deines> Ranges” (Volten 1937, 103). With *s.t* perhaps forming a composite abstract term (rather than meaning ‘place’) the reading “<Nach> der Position sollst du auftreten” (Quack 1994, 105) is also possible. As apparent by my translation, I prefer to see the sentence as a recurrence of the path metaphor, made likely not only by the context but also by the absence of the preposition *r*.

Example 3


 [j]nk n^c hr=s n=k r^c-nb jw bn n=s mtr(.w)
 jnk n^c hr-s n-k r^c_nb jw bn n-s mtr:w
 ISG smooth say:PFV-3SG.F to-2SG.M daily CORD NEG for-3SG.F witness:PL


 jw=s 'h^c.tw sht.tw <m> bB:w ʕ <n> m(w)t
 jw-s 'h^c-tw sht-tw m bB:w ʕ n mw
 CORD-3SG.F stand-RES catch_in_net-RES in offence:M.SG great of death

m-ht sdm{.tw}=f
 m_ht sdm-f
 after hear:INF-3SG.M

“I am free’ she says to you daily, when no witnesses are present, but she will get caught up in a capital offence, when it becomes known.” (*Ani*, pBoulaq 4, 16.15)

In this case, we are presented with a metaphor that sits somewhat uncertainly between conventionality and novelty. The word *sht* has a basic sense, found in the *Wörterbuch*, of ‘catching a bird in a net’ (Wb. 4.262.3). A metaphorical usage along the lines of ‘to gain’ is apparent in contemporary texts such as the letter of Djehutymesu to his son Butehamun (pTurin 1971, vs. 2) as well as in the *Teaching of Amenemope* in this same corpus (pBM EA 10474, 7.18 and 12.9).³⁵ The problem is that the meaning here in *Ani* is significantly different – it represents not the action of an agent (in this case, the ‘hunter’), but rather the condition of a patient (the ‘hunted’). This metaphorical usage of *sht* could, in other words, be a quite particular usage. In any case, a contextual sense of ‘to be cornered’ is not to be found in the *Wörterbuch*.











































A further example from *Ani* presents us with another potentially innovative case. A *sr(.t)*, or ‘wild goose’ (to be found in Wb. 4.192.5), is used to refer to a person, in this case, a young scribe. Although people are regularly represented metaphorically as animals (see also the cases of crocodiles in § 6.2–6.4) this particular case of a goose is not represented in the dictionary (the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS is also found in other languages, for which see Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000, 111). The equation in the text here is nonetheless clear – both geese and young students must be restrained by

35 This usage also appears in earlier wisdom texts – and, from the data supplied by the digital corpus of the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae* shows, scarcely in any other genre at this time: *The Teaching of pRamesseum*

II (pBM EA 10755, vs. 2.4), *The Teaching of Ptahhotep* (pPrise = pBN 186–194, 6,7) and *The Teaching for Merikare* (pPetersburg 1116 A, vs. 10.6).

society presenting yet another HUMAN VICTIM IS ANIMAL metaphor via the verb *ddh* ‘to trap’. At the textual level, this provides a *recurrence* (following Semino’s terminology) of the earlier ‘catching’ metaphor in Example 3:

Example 4

																					
<i>t3</i>	<i>sr(.t)</i>	<i>h3y:tw</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>qbh:w</i>																<i>j{3}<w>=tw</i>	
<i>t3</i>	<i>sr:t</i>	<i>h3y:tw</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>qbh:w</i>																<i>ju-tw</i>	
DEF:F.SG	goose:F	descend:RES	from	watery_region:M.SG																SBRD-IMPRS	
																					
<i>m-s3=s</i>	<i><r></i>	<i>{h3dn}<ddh>=s</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>t3</i>																<i>jd:t</i>	
<i>m_s3=s</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>ddh:s</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>t3</i>																	<i>jd:t</i>
behind-3SG.F	to	trap:INF-3SG.F	in	DEF:F.SG																	net:F

“The goose has flown down from the marshland – so one goes after it to trap it in the net.”³⁶ (*Ani*, pBoulaq 4, 23.5)

In sum, the few path metaphors that are to be found in *Ani* are explicit, concerned with following the correct life path. Less explicit cases are limited to ‘trapping’ imagery – the blocking of a bird’s airborne path – based on the bad behaviour of the human agents.

6.2 The Teaching of Amenemope

In the *Teaching of Amenemope* a large range of path metaphors are used, both explicit and non-explicit. At the beginning of the text we have (as in *Amunnakht* below in § 6.3) the clearest case: “Beginning of the instruction for life [...] in order to be led onto the right life path (*mj.t n 3nh*)” (pBM EA 10474, 1.1 and 1.7, also 16.8). The word *mj.t* ‘path’ is conventionally metaphorical: ‘path as life choice’ (Wb. 2.41.15). Following this introduction, on the other hand, the proclaimed aim of the teaching is: *<r> jri hm(w)=f r dw* ‘to steer oneself away from evil’, or literally ‘to use one’s oar against evil’ (pBM EA 10474, 1.10). We thus have the immediate influence of naval metaphors. The word *hm(w)* ‘steering oar’ can be used metaphorically in connection with the actions of a respectable person at least from the Middle Kingdom (see § 6.3). Although this usage is not to be found anywhere in the *Wörterbuch*, it appears throughout texts from a range of genres,

36 For the amendment of *ddh* see pGuimet 16959 = pLouvre E 30144, 5.5.



<i>p³</i>	<i>qrj</i>	<i>hy</i>	<i>n³</i>	<i>msh(.)</i>	<i>bjn</i>
<i>p³</i>	<i>qrj</i>	<i>hy</i>	<i>n³</i>	<i>msh:w</i>	<i>bjn</i>
DEF:M.SG	stormcloud:M.SG	be_high:RES	DEF:PL	crocodile:M.PL	be_evil:RES

“The north wind picks up, and brings his (the bad man’s, CD) time to a close [...] the storm is loud and the crocodiles are evil.” (*Amenemope*, pBM EA 10474, 4.14 and 4.16)

The terms *msh.yt* ‘north wind’ (Wb. 2.125.6) and *qrjw* ‘cloud/storm’ (Wb. 5.58.6–7) are not recorded in the dictionary as having any metaphorical sense – here they have contextual senses of something like ‘turmoil’. In addition, it is interesting to note that the north wind usually appears in offering formulae with a positive meaning: *ḫ.w nḏm n(i) msh.yt* ‘the sweet breath of the north wind.’³⁸ Here, on the other hand, we have a less positive connotation more in line with the *Blind Harpist’s Song D* from the tomb of Inherkhau (TT 359), which connects the wind more unequivocally with death – indeed, even following passage, in which each man has his ‘time’ (to die!) links the two texts.³⁹ On the other hand, the word *msh* ‘crocodile’ (Wb. 2.136.10) is most certainly a conventional metaphor, with a well-attested contextual sense of ‘symbol of speed and greed’ (Wb. 2.136.13). The water, sailing and weather-bound path metaphors, which present good (or bad) life decisions, are occasionally also bound to the teaching of life skills:

Example 7



<i>ḫr-r²-c</i>	<i>wn.w</i>	<i>d^c</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>mdw(.wt)</i>	<i>jr(j).y=w</i>	<i>n^c.y.t</i>	<i>m</i>
<i>ḫr_r²-c</i>	<i>wn:w</i>	<i>d^c</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>mdw:wt</i>	<i>jrj:y-w</i>	<i>n^c:y:t</i>	<i>m</i>
still	exist:SBJV	storm:M.PL	of	word:F.PL	do:SBJV-3PL	anchor:F.SG	in

ns=k
ns-k
 tongue-2SG.M

“And even if there is a storm of words, they (the wise words, CD) will form an anchor on your tongue.” (*Amenemope*, pBM EA 10474, 3.15 and 3.16)

38 See for instance the Stela of Dedtu, Manchester UM 7964, A4 = Abydos 9 (Kubisch 2008, 161–162, Tbl. 2.b).

39 Blind Harpist’s Song, Text D, Tomb of Inherkhau (TT 359), 7 (KRI VI 192.2, in Kitchen 1969–1990): *nw ḫd(j) msh.yw ḫnty z(j) nb r wnw.t=f* “The water of the Nile flows downstream and the north wind blows upstream – to each man his (own) time”.

Although the *Wörterbuch* does indeed define *d*^c ‘storm’ (Wb. 5.533.11) as ‘shouting’ (Wb. 5.534.5), the attestation for this usage seems to be reliant on this particular citation from *Amenemope*.⁴⁰ There is the possibility, therefore, that the author was establishing a quite particular association between shouting and weather, which perhaps is also reflected in *Menena* (Example 9). In sum, *Amenemope*, a long and rich wisdom text (at least 3292 tokens), provides only two explicit path metaphors, but a large number (25) and rich range of plays on the path, particularly from a nautical perspective.

6.3 The Teaching of Amunnakht

In *The Teaching of Amunnakht*, as in *Amenemope*, we are presented with an explicit path metaphor right at the beginning of the text: *tsjs(.w) n w3.t n 3nh* ‘the sayings for the path of life’ (oBM EA 41541, 1). Directly following this, similar to *Amenemope* in § 6.2, are a series of sailing metaphors. The student, responding to his teacher, says: *jnk p3 jmw mntk p3 hmw*, “I am the ship (but) you are the steering oar” (oKV 18/3.614+627, rt. 8). It is possible at this point that there is a certain metaphorical *intertextuality* (as argued by Fischer-Elfert 1984, 338), which draws on a metaphor from the much earlier dialogue known as *The Eloquent Peasant*: *ntk hmw n t3 r-dr=f* “You (Rensi) are the steering oar of the entire land!” (pBerlin 3023, 298). This motif is also present in *Amenemope* and is in this richer text developed even further as an idea: not only can people steer – people can in turn be ‘steered’ by god: “As for a man’s tongue, it is the ship’s steering oar, (but) god is its pilot!” (*Amenemope*, pBM EA 10474, 20.5–6). Though *Amunnakht* shares the metaphorical basis of *Amenemope*, with its metaphors of terrestrial and nautical paths to represent good and bad behaviour (of which it has two explicit and nine non-explicit cases), it relies on conventional, clichéd expressions:

Example 8



<i>j.šm[=j]</i>	<i>ḥr</i>	<i>w3.t</i>	<i>sdm</i>	<i>n=k [...]</i>	<i>tw=j</i>	<i>ḥr</i>	<i>mw</i>	<i>n</i>
<i>j.šm-j</i>	<i>ḥr</i>	<i>w3.t</i>	<i>sdm</i>	<i>n-k</i>	<i>tw-j</i>	<i>ḥr</i>	<i>mw</i>	<i>n</i>
gO:NMLZ[-I.SG]	upon	path:F.SG	hear:INF	for-2SG.M [...]	PRS-1SG	upon	water	of

dmy=k

dmy-k

name:REL-2SG.M

40 The citation in Wb. 5.534.5 and in the *Digital-isiertes Zettelarchiv* of the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae* (DZA-Zettel 31.558.940) are from *Amenemope*; the

Belegstellen of the *Wörterbuch* (Vol. V of Erman and Grapow 1973 [1935–1953], 95) do not cite any further examples for this usage.

“I go along the path of listening to you (= I follow your lead obediently) [...] I go upon the water of what you say (= I am loyal to your instructions).” (*Amunnakbt*, oKV 18/3.614+627, rt. 8–9)

From a lexical perspective, both these metaphors are conventional. The contextual sense of *ḥr w3.t* ‘on the path’ is ‘to fit in with someone’ (Wb. 1.248.8) and that of *ḥr mw* ‘on the water’ is ‘to be loyal to someone’ (Wb. 2.52.17, also Dorn 2004, 54). From a textual perspective, we also see a recurrence of the above-mentioned water metaphor, “I am the ship (but) you are the steering oar” (oKV 18/3.614+627, rt. 8). To this point, all water metaphors have come from the discursive perspective of the student, which perhaps also explains why they follow such a conventional route. The teacher, however, takes up the water metaphor at the end of the text and uses it more creatively to build up a metaphor scenario to recount the story of the disobedient son: “He (the son, CD) is in the ship at the ropes, which are (heading) towards the water over his head, so that he is united with the crocodiles and hippopotami!” (oTurin CGT 57436 = Suppl. 9598, rt. 3–6).

In *Amunnakbt* there is also a path metaphor representing movement in flight: “You should [not] fly about like a little quail, which darts off and flies here and there. The snapping shut of the net, when it is made, is worse than saying (in the first place): ‘I’ll do it’” (oLacau, 12–13). This passage reminds us of the poor goose caught in the net in *Ani* (Example 4). However, this motif of the flighty bird appears ordinarily, not in the classical wisdom literature but rather in school instruction texts and the like, such as pAnastasi IV 2.4: “Someone has told me that you have given up on writing, that you go and fly off [...] Your heart has hopped off – you’re like an *achy-bird*” or the ‘Teaching’ of *Menena* (oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAo Inv. 2188, rt. 5): “You find yourself on the trip of a swallow with its young”.

6.4 The ‘Teaching’ of *Menena*

In the so-called ‘Teaching’ of *Menena* the density of path metaphors is higher than the other texts in the corpus (3 explicit path metaphors and 16 non-explicit ones in a text about 421 tokens long). Moreover, they are treated in a very different manner. Three characteristics are apparent in this text, which strengthen its metaphorical power in comparison to the other texts: a high degree of intertextuality, innovation and self-referentiality. Firstly, the storm metaphor is made more complex thanks to an intertextual inclusion from a much earlier work of Egyptian literature:⁴¹

41 Gardiner 1923, 25 also discusses a citation from *The Eloquent Peasant* in *Menena*.

Example 9



<i>sr(w)</i>	<i>n=k</i>	<i>p'</i>	<i>d^c</i>	<i>bw</i>	<i>jy(j).t=f</i>
<i>sr:w</i>	<i>n-k</i>	<i>p'</i>	<i>d^c</i>	<i>bw</i>	<i>jyj:t-f</i>
predict:PFV.PASS	for-2SG.M	DEF:M.SG	storm	NEG	come:COMPL-3SG.M

“The storm was predicted for you before it arrived.” (*Menena*, oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAO Inv. 2188, rt. 1)

As Simpson discussed (1958: 50–51), this sentence cites but also modernises the following Middle Egyptian sentence:

Example 10



<i>sr=sn</i>	<i>d^c</i>	<i>n(j)</i>	<i>jy(j).t</i>
<i>sr-sn</i>	<i>d^c</i>	<i>nj</i>	<i>jy(j):t</i>
predict:SBJV-3PL	storm	NEG	come:COMPL

“They could predict a storm before (it) arrived.” (*The Shipwrecked Sailor*, pPetersburg 1115, 30–32)

The original quotation from *The Shipwrecked Sailor* is in itself not metaphorical – a factor that differentiates this case of intertextuality from the category outlined by Semino, where metaphors themselves are described as being included in intertextual references (§ 3). Nevertheless, the metaphorical usage of this citation in *Menena* vividly illustrates how Menena’s badly-behaved son Pai-iri (like the brave sailors in *The Shipwrecked Sailor*) currently finds himself in an unpleasant situation. The word *d^c* has the basic sense of ‘storm’ and a contextual sense of ‘bad situation’ not to be found in the *Wörterbuch* (compare, for instance, the meaning of *d^c* in Example 7). The metaphorical meaning of the word and the whole passage is not only to be gained from the co-text but also from the reworked syntax of the citation. We have not only a ‘translation’ (following the terminology of Hagen 2012, 147) of the citation from Middle Egyptian to Late Egyptian syntax but also a completely new framing of the citation. This happens firstly via the passivisation of the verb *sr* ‘to predict’ and secondly through the addition of the prepositional phrase *n=k* ‘for you.’ These new elements allow the son Pai-iri to be linked to – but also compared with – the skilful and courageous sailors from the tale of *The Shipwrecked Sailor* – he is, by comparison, unable to foresee problems or even to react appropriately, when

these problems have been foreseen for him. Such explicit references to much earlier texts emphasise the power and meaning of the metaphor – the foretold storm – and function also in an intra-textual manner as a framing motif: all the ‘travel over water’ metaphors in the text extend from this citation.

Although a series of other metaphors follow which depict travel along a path, particularly over water, we have also particularly innovative developments of the terrestrial path metaphor in this text. For instance, in the following passage, the word *t(b)w* ‘sandal’ (Wb. 5.362.16) gains unprecedented metaphorical weight by being used here in reference to something like ‘preparation.’ It comes together with the word *sr:t* ‘thorn’ (Wb 4.190.24–191.2), which in this case means something like ‘obstacle,’ to build a metaphor scenario along the theme of path metaphors:

Example 11



<i>šm=k{wj}</i>	<i>ju</i>	<i>nn</i>	<i>n=k</i>	<i>t(b)w.w</i>	<i>tm</i>	<i>sr:t</i>	<i>nb{t}</i>
<i>šm-k</i>	<i>ju</i>	<i>nn</i>	<i>n-k</i>	<i>tbw:w</i>	<i>tm</i>	<i>sr:t</i>	<i>nb</i>
go:PFV-2SG.M	SBRD	not_existent	for-2SG.M	sandal:PL	not_do	thorn:F	any

jn(j)=k
jn-j-k
 bring:INF-2SG.M

“You have gone off without sandals because no thorn has ever brought you (back again).” (*Menena*, oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAO Inv. 2188, rt. 3)

What is meant is that until his son actually has a bad experience he will never adequately prepare himself for life. Such novel metaphors are clear developments of conventional path metaphors, but the surprising details more precisely outline Pai-iri’s bad behaviour. The last particular feature in *Menena* to be discussed here is the mixture of self-referentiality (in other words, the *signalling* of a metaphor following Semino’s terminology) with references to the explicit path metaphors in the other texts from this corpus. The *creative* development of these explicit path metaphors, however, is taken on rather by the school text tradition than the wisdom texts themselves, as we see here in one of the scribal miscellanies:

Example 12

<i>d(j)=j</i>	<i>tw</i>	<i>hr</i>	<i>mtn</i>	<i>jwṯi</i>	<i>šnn=f</i>	<i>ḥꜣy.t</i>	<i>mˁk</i>
<i>dj-j</i>	<i>tw</i>	<i>hr</i>	<i>mtn</i>	<i>jwṯi</i>	<i>šnn-f</i>	<i>ḥꜣy:t</i>	<i>mˁk</i>
give::SBJV-1SG	2SG.M	upon	path	NEG.REL	worry-3SG.M	bulwark:F	protect:INF
<>	<i>pꜣ</i>	<i>msh</i>					
<i>r</i>	<i>pꜣ</i>	<i>msh</i>					
against	DEF:M.SG	crocodile:M.SG					

“I want to set you upon a path that is free from worry, a barrier that protects (you) from the crocodile.” (pChester Beatty IV vs. 6.4)

To put the probable reference to this contemporary school text into context, in his remonstrance of his son, Menena begins to demand changes to his behaviour. He does this by using a path metaphor, which certainly has similarities with the above passage of pChester Beatty IV (as discussed in Moers 2001, 236). He then marks his metaphor further using *signalling* (here placed in italics). Moers’ argument notwithstanding, it is significant that the barrier in *Menena* is not the barrier *against* the wicked influence but instead seemingly the fortification *belonging to* it – from which Pai-iri should of course remove himself as quickly as possible!

Example 13

<i>j.rw(j)=k</i>	<i>jnb.t</i>	<i>nhr-hr</i>	<i>j///</i>	<i>mjnꜣ</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>tsjs-md.(w)t</i>
<i>j:rw(j)-k</i>	<i>jnb:t</i>	<i>nhr=hr</i>	<i>///</i>	<i>mjnꜣ</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>tsjs=md:wt</i>
leave:IMP-2SG.M	fortification:F	fierce=face	///	here	with	saying=speech:F.PL

“Get away from the fortification of (the evil being, CD) ‘Fierce of Face’!, to ... *here with a figure of speech*” (*Menena*, oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAO Inv. 2188, rt. 10–12)

The speaker thereby establishes both a link with the earlier conventional metaphor of ‘the path, where ‘Fierce-of-Face’ lurks in the bushes’ (*Menena*, oChicago OIC 12074+oIFAO Inv. 2188, rt. 2–3) as well as the paths, barriers and crocodiles in the school texts and other wisdom texts.

7 Conclusion

To sum up, this contribution has investigated the path metaphors in texts of the Rameside wisdom tradition, in order to assess the connection between mode of expression, meaning and genre on the basis of modern methods of metaphor analysis. We see that in the rhetoric of instructional texts, the idea of a path has an important role to play in the elucidation of good and bad behaviour, correct and incorrect life choices. The path emerges often a few times as an explicit reference and is then built on by the author(s) in a variety of ways to elaborate their point. In *Ani* the motif barely emerges beyond the two explicit cases, but takes the route of describing a truncated airborne path via the metaphor HUMAN VICTIM IS ANIMAL. In *Amenemope*, we have a great richness of metaphors that draw on water-borne paths, as well as the logical derivations of such paths: sailing and weather. We see similar features in *Amunnakht*, but in a more conventional way. *Menena*, by contrast, provides great innovation in the development of metaphors around both terrestrial and water-borne paths to portray the hearer, the badly behaved son, in the worst possible light. The more explicit developments of the path motif are, in fact, rather to be seen in the scribal texts and in texts that straddle the wisdom and scribal genres (like the so-called ‘*Teaching*’ of *Menena*) than the wisdom texts themselves. We have also seen that the metaphors investigated in this study demonstrate a significant degree of interaction both within texts of the wisdom genre but also between different genres, such as wisdom texts, school texts, monumental texts and literary texts. Lastly, the development of metaphors and metaphor scenarios in the span of whole texts (which fit the parameters established by Semino and Musolff) showcases the structural and rhetorical brilliance of these texts.

8 Perspectives

In closing, we can only say that the still preliminary state of this research (with only one genre investigated in detail to date) leaves many important questions open, which are to be addressed in future research. For instance, the question of the extent to which metaphors are bound to particular genres has only begun to be properly answered, although already the results are quite promising. Also, that some metaphors reached idiomatic status in the Ramesside Period has to this point only been shown in reference to path-related metaphors (like in *Amunnakht* § 6.3). Lastly, the investigation of parts of speech in which metaphors occur – in itself an issue in contemporary metaphor research (for which see Steen et al. 2010) – requires a quantitative approach, which will therefore be addressed as the annotated corpus develops further. The pilot study nevertheless gives us an insight into both the creativity and the conventionalism of Egyptian scribes.

9 Glossing abbreviations⁴²

I	first person
2	second person
3	third person
ACT	active
CAUS	causative
COMPL	completive
CORD	coordinating particle
DEF	definite (article)
F	feminine
IMP	imperative
IMPRS	impersonal
INF	infinitive
M	masculine
NEG	negative
NMLZ	nominalizer
PASS	passive
PFV	perfective
PL	plural
PRS	present
PTCP	participle
REL	relative
RES	resultative
SG	single
SBJV	subjunctive
SBRD	subordinating particle
-	connects segmentable morphemes
=	marks clitic boundary
:	marks units that are segmentable without visible formal segmentation
—	shows that two words in one language correspond to one in another
.	separates several meta-language elements rendered by a single object-language element

⁴² Following Di Biase-Dyson, Kammerzell, and Werning 2009.

- () marks inherent, non-overt categories
- [] marks an element in the gloss not corresponding to element in the source language
- { } emends a scribal error (deletion) *or* represents an orthographical convention

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KRATĒR. The Mixing-Vessel as Metaphorical Space in Ancient Greek Tradition

Summary

Aristotle conceptualized the noun *metaphora* (literally ‘transfer’) as the result of a linguistic and cognitive process of transfer presupposing a comparison or an analogy between two material or mental elements. However, such a notion of metaphor is unable to convey the impact of semantic mixtures between those elements. This is demonstrated by the term *kratēr* (literally ‘mixing-object’) in ancient Greek poetry, where it is used as an emblem and not necessarily a metaphor for different forms of transfer, spatial and non-spatial ones, but also of mixtures, taking place in the symposion.

Keywords: Transfer; mixture; symposion; comparison; wine; nectar.

Aristoteles konzipierte das Substantiv *metaphora* (wörtlich „Transfer“) als das Ergebnis eines sprachlichen und kognitiven Übertragungsprozesses, der einen Vergleich oder eine Analogie zwischen zwei materiellen oder geistigen Elementen voraussetzt. Dieser Metapherbegriff erlaubt jedoch nicht, die Auswirkung von semantischen Mischungen solcher Elemente zu erfassen. Dies zeigt der Begriff *kratēr* (wörtlich „Misch-Objekt“) in der griechischen Dichtung, wo er als Emblem und nicht notwendigerweise als Metapher für verschiedene Formen räumlicher und nicht-räumlicher Übertragung gebraucht wird, aber auch für Mischungen, die im Symposion stattfinden.

Keywords: Übertragung; Mischung; Symposion; Vergleich; Wein; Nektar.

I On the predicament of metaphor as transfer

The study of any type of metaphor requires an examination of Aristotle's (384–322 BCE) definition of metaphor.¹ The noun *metaphora* (literally 'transfer') which occurs first in the work of the orator Isocrates (436–338 BCE) as a designation of certain poetic techniques² is conceptualized philosophically by Aristotle some decades later and is conceived as the result of a universal – linguistic and cognitive – process of transfer. Thus, the word 'metaphor' itself is from the beginning defined as a metaphor, that is to say a transfer in the figurative sense: the concrete spatial process of 'transporting' is transmuted into a dynamic mental 'transporting'. Aristotle's theory of metaphor is a theory of comparison which is epistemologically substantiated and thus exceeds by far the limits of rhetoric. According to Aristotle, metaphor presupposes that two elements can be thought of as similar (even identical in some respects) as well as different and that in language, for this reason, one can be used instead of the other. This constitutes for him the reflexive, epistemologically relevant value of metaphor, since metaphor stimulates reflection upon possible common characteristics of two material or mental elements despite their differences. This gives rise to the "problem of the relationship between language, thought, reality", which so far has not been solved even by modern metaphor theories such as those of cognitive linguistics.³ Hence the currently popular theory designating metaphor as a relation between a "source domain" and a "target domain" with associated "mappings" (i.e. projections from the first domain onto the second) remains confined to Aristotle's theory of comparison,⁴ in spite of the harsh critique ventured upon it.

As a matter of fact, Aristotle, unlike many of his successors since the Roman theoreticians of rhetoric, does not perceive metaphor as a mere substitution. Furthermore, he does not assume, as is often claimed, that metaphor is a replacement of something basically 'proper' (or 'appropriate') by something basically 'improper' (or 'inappropriate'). In fact, he emphasizes that metaphorical processes of transfer, which he divides into four categories (from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, and according to analogy), are not unidirectionally fixed.⁵ Rather, such transfers can run in

1 Arist. *Po.* 21, 1457b; cf. *Rhetoric* 3, 1405a–b, 1406b–1407a.

2 Isoc. 9.9; in plural (μεταφοραί).

3 See Eggs 2001, 1102: "das von der Interaktionstheorie, aber auch der strukturalistischen und kognitivistischen Sprachwissenschaft nicht gelöste Problem des Verhältnisses von Sprache, Denken, Wirklichkeit, d. h. von sprachlicher Bedeutung, begrifflicher Aneignung der Wirklichkeit und Struk-

turen der Wirklichkeit [muss] zu Aporien bei der konkreten Analyse von M[etaphern] führen".

4 Lakoff and Johnson 1980 etc. Cf. the critical assessment of Eggs 2001, 1156.

5 On this matter and on the metaphysical and theological implications of Aristotle's notion of metaphor as well as on the problem of its applicability to ancient Greek lyric poetry see Schlesier 1986/1987. Concerning the fallacies connected with the reading of ancient Greek literature in terms of metaphor see also Stanford 1936.

two opposite directions, and it is only the respective starting point that determines the orientation of the perspective from which the comparison issues.

This excludes an absolute valuation or hierarchization of the elements which are implicitly compared by means of a metaphor. Conversely, Aristotle's theoretical focus on relations of comparability between two terms entails his definition of these terms as expressions of fixed and necessarily different – concrete or abstract – qualities which may connote – concrete or abstract – similarities. Therefore Aristotle does not envisage the possibility of an already established semantic or contextual simultaneity or mixture of qualities.

2 The mixing-vessel as emblem of the ancient Greek symposion

The study of the ancient Greek symposion is well-suited to pursuing the problem of such a simultaneity and mixture with regard to the concept of metaphor in general and spatial metaphors in particular. The *symposion* (literally 'drinking together') is an experimental space, an institution, a social rite, and a medium of conviviality whose cultural significance extends well over the archaic and classical periods and at which various modes of space are simultaneously pragmatically linked and operate on a cognitive and metaphorical level as well. This is triggered by the mixture of several qualities⁶ and experiences available in the space of the symposion. It is at once a space of religious rituals (libations for the deities of the symposion, cultic poetry), a space for the use of pottery which often represents the symposion itself and aims at its imaginative construction, a space for aesthetic performances (poetry, music, dance), a space of equally performative and agonistic exchange and interchange involving reciprocity as well as rivalry (poetic, philosophical, erotic, musical), a space of social, sexual, political, and cultural mixture and mobility, a space for the combination of several linguistic forms of communication (discourse, song, mockery, praise, riddle), but also for the overcoming of the constraints of literary and musical genres, a space of ethical education (*paideia*) and playful pleasure (*paidia*), a space in which psycho-physical boundaries can be dissolved (by ecstasy, *enthousiasmos*, inebriation), a space of intertwined sensual perceptions and emotions (shared and potentially conflicting ones), and also a space for the transfer of knowledge and cultural patterns.

6 On these qualities of the symposion cf. Rossi 1983; Vetta 1983; Murray 1983; Lissarrague 1987; Murray 1990; Murray and Tecuşan 1995; Schäfer 1997; Orfanos and Carrière 2003; Lissarrague et al. 2004; Murray 2009; Hobden 2013; Schlesier 2014. On the normative aspects of the symposion see the bal-

anced account of Ford 2002. On the symposion as experimental space, in connection with Dionysos: Fehr 2003. On gender aspects: e.g. Schmitt Pantel 2011. See also earlier scholarship on the symposion, e.g. Von der Mühl 1976; Fehr 1971; Graf 1974.



Fig. 1 Red-figure krater from Southern Italy: Dionysiac procession by night (the satyr on the left carries a black-figure krater). 400–375 BCE.

The question whether the Aristotelian (or a later) notion of metaphor can do justice to the multiple dimensions of the symposion – which are mixed in such a specific manner – shall be demonstrated by the example of the *kratēr* (literally ‘mixing-object’)⁷. Among the many vessels used for the purposes of the ancient Greek drinking-party, the symposion, it is the *kratēr* that is the most particular and emblematic one (see Fig. 1).⁸

It should be emphasized that such a peculiar object was needed since in contrast to the drinking habits of other cultures, as for instance our own, the Greeks typically refrained from drinking pure wine. Therefore, the wine had to be diluted with water, in different proportions, arranged in advance,⁹ and this took place in the space of the *kratēr*. Consequently, numerous visual representations of banquets on ancient Greek symposion pottery include the *kratēr* and give it a conspicuous, and often self-referential, location in the image. As a matter of fact, the mixing-vessel is, in the space of the symposion and for its practices, an indispensable physical object.

Yet in the same way as the mixing-vessel stands for the peculiarity of the ancient symposion of the archaic and classical periods, the symposion stands for mixing in a

7 On the political (aristocratic and democratic) aspects of the *kratēr* see Luke 1994.

8 About this vessel, its different shapes, and its usage see e.g. Boardman 2001, 250–253. Further examples of the visual evidence from the 6th to the 4th cen-

tury BCE are provided in Viernseis and Kaeser 1990 and in Schlesier and Schwarzmaier 2008. On the lower prominence of the *kratēr* in the archaeological record since the Hellenistic period see Rotroff 1996.

9 Cf. Catoni 2010 *passim*.

more general sense. In the realm of the symposion, mixtures of several kinds take place, not only the mixing of wine with water. On the level of the mixture of the participants, different groups of persons share the space of a symposion: adult men and boys or adolescents, males and females, free citizens and slaves. The activities of these persons can be blended as well: someone who acts as a cup-bearer can also be served a drink, someone who performs music can become a listener, someone who is observed by others is also an observer him- or herself. There is a constant mirroring of the participants mixed together, there is role-playing and even role-exchanging, including gender roles and roles of gods and humans. Moreover, in the space of a symposion, the sensual experience of tasting is not only mixed with hearing and seeing, but with touching and smelling as well. All kinds of physical and emotional states are triggered in the realm of this space, not least erotic ones, and it is also propitious for mental communication through performance of poetry and playful discussion. Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that the mixing-vessel could be understood, by the ancient Greeks, as a metaphor for the symposion itself¹⁰ and for all the mixtures available through its space.

In the following, I shall try to show how some Greek poets coped with the metaphorical potential of the *kratēr* as well as of the sympotic space. In order to doing so, one has to start with the fact that the Greek language had two different terms for ‘mixing’ at its disposal. On one hand, there is the verb *kerannymi* from which the nouns *kratēr*, ‘mixing-vessel’; and *krasis*, ‘mixing procedure’, are derived, and on the other, there is the verb *meignymi* with the noun *m(e)ixis*, ‘mixture’, derived from it, the direct linguistic basis of the English word ‘to mix’.

Although both Greek terms point to mingling, their field of application is not the same: *kerannymi* means to mix, to blend or to mingle according to a certain proportion, while *meignymi* is applied to procedures of mixing, blending or mingling that are irrespective of proportion. This explains why *kerannymi* and its derivatives *kratēr* and *krasis* are used for the proportioning practice of the mixing of wine and water at the symposion, for which *meignymi* and *mixis* would be less appropriate terms. And this explains as well, why *meignymi* and *mixis* could be applied to a close fight at a military battle, and also to sexual union, that is to kinds of actions and situations where the use of *kerannymi* and *krasis* would be misplaced.

This leads to the following questions: given the specific, but very general significances of these different terms, is it possible to distinguish their literal and their metaphorical usages? How can the usages of terms related to *kerannymi* or *meignymi* generate analytical knowledge and comparative reflection?¹¹ What types of transfer and what types of

10 Expressed in the formula παρὰ κρατήρα (“next to the mixing-vessel”): e.g. Pi. N. 9.49; cf. παρὰ κρητήρι, Thgn. 493, 643, 981. On the emblematic function of the *kratēr* in visual art see Lissarrague 1990.

11 On Plato’s appropriation of the semantic range of *meignymi* and *kerannymi*, sometimes used as synonyms, for philosophical arguments see Pe-

space are at stake in a particular case? Which of them are metaphorizations? Is it impossible, because of the semantic difference mentioned, that the procedure of *krasis* could become a synonym for *mixis*, or is this possible, under certain conditions? These questions will now be pursued with the help of some examples from ancient Greek poetry related to the symposion. The material is organized according to six types of transfer, to be found in texts composed between the 8th century BCE and the Roman imperial period.

3 Some examples

3.1 Homer

Two verses from Homer already illustrate two types of transfer (first and second type of transfer, *Il.* 1.597–598)¹²:

αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοισι θεοῖς ἐνδέξια πᾶσιν
οἰνοχόει γλυκὺ νέκταρ ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσω·

Yet this one, for the other gods, to the right, for all of them
he poured out as wine sweet nectar, drawing it from a mixing-vessel (*kratēr*).

Surprisingly, at this very early occurrence of the term κρητήρ in ancient literature,¹³ it does actually not denote a vessel in which liquids are mixed. In this Homeric passage the god Hephaistos is described as cup-bearer of the other Olympian gods, drawing the communal drink from a *kratēr* and pouring it out from left to right, as in a regular symposion of humans. The first type of transfer therefore consists in transferring practices, and also a typical vessel, from the human symposion to a symposion of the gods. But in contrast to the analogy expressed in such a transfer, this example simultaneously implies a second type of transfer: Hephaistos does not serve a mixture of wine and water, as in the human symposion, but he “pours as wine” (*oinochoei*), or instead of wine, nectar,

poni 2002, 151. On the philosophical context of Plato’s use of *kratēr* as metaphor for his ideal state in the *Laus*, 773d: Schlesier 2006, 60. Cf. *kratēr* as metaphor for a person: *Ar. Ach.* 936, where a sycophant is metaphorically designated as κρητήρ κακῶν (“mixing-vessel of bad things”). See also already *Hom. Il.* 6.528, where Hektor declares that the hoped-for Trojan victory should be celebrated with a “*kratēr* of freedom” (κρητήρα ἐλευθέρου) in honor of the gods.

12 Here as elsewhere, the Greek text comes from the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* [TLG online source], and the translations are my own.

13 It is not the first, but the second one: the first occurrence of *kratēr* is to be found not much before (*Il.* 1.470), in a formulaic verse several times reused in Homer, and here contextualized by the after-dinner drinking bout following the propitiatory sacrifice to Apollo connected to the restitution of Agamemnon’s slave Chryseis to her father, the god’s priest.

that is the drink of the gods. Yet for this pure drink, the nectar, a mixing-vessel would obviously not be needed. In other words, the function of the *kratēr* does not correspond to its literal meaning, since it is not used as a mixing-vessel, but as a space containing an unmixed drink, nectar. Consequently, the second type of transfer could be described as a transfer from the wine-water-mixture to pure nectar, and, by the same token, a transfer of the *kratēr* from its function as mixing-vessel to the function of a recipient of an unmixed liquid.

Does this make the *kratēr* a metaphor in this context? The Homeric passage highlights that the mixing-vessel which is specific to human banquets has its place at the divine banquet as well. In terms of a modern theory of metaphor, one could perhaps say that a spatial ‘target domain’ (the banquet of the gods) is denoted by means of the term *kratēr* stemming from the spatial ‘source domain’ (the banquet of humans), or else, in Aristotle’s terminology, that this usage constitutes a transfer from the species (mixing-vessel) to the genus (liquid container). But does this entail that the word κρατήρ is a comparison (εἰκῶν)¹⁴, in the sense of Aristotle’s general definition of metaphor? Because of its precise functional determination, it is impossible to equate the *kratēr* with other vessels not designated for the mixing of liquids. Rather, by means of the inclusion of the *kratēr* into this context, divine and human dimensions of experience are specifically mingled: at the divine banquet a particular vessel is used which belongs by definition to the mixture of wine and water at human banquets, but the gods adapt it for their own purposes and alter its function by employing it as container for the pure drink reserved for them, nectar. Thus, a transfer is happening here, however not a metaphorical, but a functional one. What the *kratēr* represents in this context is a mixture different from that of water and wine: it points to the mixture of the human and the divine spheres. It signals that the human dimension is also simultaneously present at the divine banquet and that both kinds of symposion can be compared just like the two kinds of drinks enjoyed at each. Yet the reflective potential of the present semantic context can apparently only be grasped when the framework of the Aristotelian theory of metaphor has been abandoned or at least expanded.

Hence one should ask: could the two types of transfer present in the Homeric passage be conceptualized as metaphorizing processes? I would suggest that this is not directly the case. What we have here is an analogy between a human and a divine symposion, combined with an emphasis on some differences that are, to a certain extent, due to the fundamental contrast between divinities and humans. On one hand, both share their drinking habits, yet on the other, the drink of the immortal gods is not wine, as in the case of the mortals, but nectar, a beverage connected to immortality. Nevertheless, this implies that nectar can be compared with wine, a fact that is alluded to by the use of

14 Arist. *Rh.* 3, 1406b–1407a.

the compound *oinochoein*, ‘to pour out (as) wine.’ Therefore, since here the nectar is said to be poured out as wine (and not just plainly said to be poured out), a metaphorical potential is included in this expression.

Aristotle himself had confronted the problem involved in the use of the verb *oinochoein* for the pouring of nectar. In his *Poetics*,¹⁵ he alludes to its Homeric usage, although pointing to Ganymedes as cup-bearer of Zeus,¹⁶ not to Hephaistos as cup-bearer of the Olympian gods. As for the classification of such a phrasing, however, Aristotle is not quite resolute: on one hand, he seems to suggest that it has to do with “habitual use of diction” (κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως), on the other he suggests that “this might also be metaphorical” (εἴη δ’ ἄν τοῦτό γε καὶ κατὰ μεταφωράν). One wonders whether Aristotle thought that this would be a satisfactory solution of the problem,¹⁷ though he took customary speech for granted and evaded the evident complications which are at stake. At any event, it seems as if he was well aware of the fact that nectar – although not explicitly mentioned by him – was set up by Homer as an *analogon* to wine.

However, it requires a further step, which is only taken by later authors, and in later speech habits, to use nectar as a metaphor for wine.¹⁸ In Homer, this is not the case. Yet as a matter of fact, the combination, in the passage quoted from the Homeric *Iliad*, between elements which are analogous to the symposium of humans and those which differ from it¹⁹ prepares such a metaphoric usage.

3.2 Sappho

The next example, three verses from a song of Sappho (composed at least one hundred years after the Homeric epic), include three further types of transfer, and it should be asked whether these verses point to the two types of transfer found in the Homeric lines as well (third, fourth, and fifth type of transfer, Sappho, fr. 2, 14–16)²⁰:

15 Arist. *Po.* 25, 1461a: τὸν κεκραμένον οἶνον φασιν εἶναι, [...] ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεῦειν, οὐ μινόντων οἶνον (“as the mixture is called wine, [...] so Ganymedes is said to pour wine for Zeus, though they [i.e. the gods] do not drink wine”).

16 Hom., *Il.* 20.234.

17 Pace Latacz 2002, 8: according to him, the “Sprachgebrauch [...] (der nämlich ein anderes Verb für ‘als Mundschenk fungieren’ nun einmal nicht zur Verfügung stellt)”, conveys a “Lösung” of the problem.

18 The first testimony is Archilochus, fr. 290 West (Naxian wine compared with nectar). Cf. Pi. *I.* 6.37 (Herakles’ wine libations: *nektareai spondai*); Ar. *Acb.* 196 (libations of wine that smells like ambrosia

and nectar); Aristophanes, fr. 688 Kassel-Austin (wine with a taste of nectar); *Anth. Pal.* [= Marcus Argentarius] 6.248.2. One could argue, however, that Homer’s use of the adjective *nektareos* for a garment’s smell (Helen’s: *Il.* 3.385; Achilles’ *Il.* 18.25), or his designation of the wine Odysseus offers the cyclops as “a drop of ambrosia and nectar” (*Od.* 9.359) come close to those comparisons.

19 On the much debated issue of a possible connection of Homer with the institution of the symposium see Węcowski 2002 and Węcowski 2014. Cf. also Ford 1999.

20 The *TLG* text of the Sappho verses I quote reproduces the edition of Lobel and Page 1955. Note that these verses are cited, in a slightly different version,

χρυσίαισι ἐν κυλίκεσσι ἄβρω
 ὀμ<με>μείχμενον θαλίαισι νέκταρ
 οἶνοχόαισον.

in golden cups, delicately,
 nectar admixed to festive pleasures
 pour out as wine.

In this poem of Sappho, it is not the god Hephaistos, but the goddess Aphrodite (considered, in some parts of ancient tradition since the Homeric *Odyssey*, as his wife) who is presented as cup-bearer. She, too, as in the *Iliad* passage, “pours nectar as wine”, although not, as in Homer, drawn from a *kratēr*. In further contrast to Homer, the nectar poured out, in Sappho, is not a pure drink, but something mixed. The third type of transfer, therefore, consists in a transfer from the Homeric pure nectar to something that could be mixed with something else, but has no need, in this regard, of the *kratēr*, an object not mentioned in Sappho’s song.

This type of transfer is connected with a fourth one: while in a human symposion, wine is mixed with water, Sappho transfers this mixture to another one: on the one hand, as in Homer, the nectar in Sappho stands for the wine of the human symposion, but on the other, it is mixed with “festive pleasures” (*thaliai*) which here take the place of the water in the sympotic wine-water-mixture.²¹ Yet these festive pleasures are not just a metaphorical representation of the water. It would not make sense to say, in analogy to the metaphor of nectar as wine of the gods, that festive pleasures (of whoever receives the mixture appearing in Sappho’s poem) are in any way comparable with water. One could only say that in analogy to the sympotic mixing of liquids, a physical substance, water, is replaced by a psycho-physical phenomenon, festive pleasures.

Looking back to the first two types of transfer, one discovers that Aphrodite’s pouring of nectar, in Sappho, is compatible with the second type. This compatibility is stressed by the use of the same verb as in Homer, *oinochoein*, ‘to pour out as wine’. Yet is the scene evoked in Sappho also compatible with the first type detected in Homer, the transfer from the human symposion to a divine one? Or do the third and fourth types of transfer, particular to Sappho’s poem, exclude a compatibility with the first type? Before answering these questions, let us consider a fifth type of transfer to be detected in Sappho’s song: this is a transfer from the action of *kerannymi*, the mixing according to a

by Athenaeus (II, 463e); on this citation, and on Sappho as sympotic poet in the *Deipnosophists* in general, see Schlesier (in press).

21 Cf. Xenoph. fr. B 1.4 Diels-Kranz: κρατήρ μεστός εὐφροσύνης (“a *kratēr*, filled with well-being”). See also Anacr. fr. eleg. 2 West, with a praise of the exemplary symposiast who “mixes together” (συμμί-σγων) the gifts of the Muses and of Aphrodite.

determined proportion, to the action of *meignymi*, a mixing irrespective of proportion.²² The mingling of nectar and festive pleasures is actually in Sappho not presented as *krasis*, but as *mixis*. And the priority in this mixture is not attributed to the nectar, but to the festive pleasures to which the nectar is just admixed (*anameignymi*), in a procedure in which the proportions of both parts do not count.

As a matter of fact, the mentioning of the festive pleasures does not allow one to attach the sympotic situation at stake in this Sappho poem either to a divine or to a human ambience, since festive pleasures are, for the ancient Greeks, neither reserved to humans nor to gods, but are, on the contrary, something that is common to both kinds of beings. The conditions defining the first type of transfer, that is clear-cut differences between a symposion of humans and a symposion of divinities, are therefore blurred – all the more so since the inclusion of a certain kind of mixture (the third type of transfer, from the pure liquid to something mixed) as well as the nature of the ingredient to which it is admixed (the fourth type of transfer, from water to a psycho-physical phenomenon, festive pleasures) would actually be compatible with both human and divine banquets.

This attracts the attention to the fact that, in further contrast to Homer, little is said, in the context of Sappho's fragment, about the receiver(s) of the mixture. However, Aphrodite's serving of it, in Sappho, does certainly not, like that of nectar by Hephaistos in Homer, imply other gods as receivers of this drink. The only potential receiver available in this poem would be the lyric persona herself who explicitly summons Aphrodite, directly addressed by her, to perform this service. And it should be noted that no other receivers, be they mortals or divinities, are mentioned. In other words: Sappho is neither describing a purely divine symposion nor a purely human symposion, but she is blending both kinds of drinking venues, identifying as exclusive participants a goddess (Aphrodite) and a human (the lyric persona). The sympotic space created in this poem opens up a third dimension, beyond a definite division between the human and the divine sphere, a dimension in which a direct symposiastic meeting of a particular human being and a particular goddess could be possible. The human in this case, however, is provided with a divine privilege: the lyric persona claims to take part of the divine drink, the nectar, as if she were an immortal, and this pure drink is not diluted but rather reinforced by the festive pleasures to which it is admixed.

In this way, Sappho's poem could be said to be metaphorically functioning as a *kratēr* – a metaphorical mixing-vessel, in which the sympotic mixture of Aphrodite and the lyric persona spatially replaces, by implicit comparison, the mixture of wine and water in a *kratēr*. But this *krasis* is compatible with a *mixis* – since the mixture of nectar and

22 Note, however, that Homer sometimes uses *meignymi* for the mixing of wine in the *kratēr*: *Il.* 3.270; *Od.* 1.110 (here explicitly of wine and water), although he mostly uses *kerannymi* in this respect. Generally, when mixing in a *kratēr* occurs in Homer, only the wine is mentioned, not the water.

festive pleasures, which in this song is shared by the goddess and the human persona, does not take care of proportion and unites both under the auspices of immortality. When Pindar one century later speaks of the “sweet *kratēr*” of his “loudly ringing songs” (γλυκὺς κρατῆρ ἀγαφθέγκτων ἀοιδᾶν),²³ he apparently does not suggest such sweeping implications as evoked in Sappho’s sympotic poem.²⁴ By metaphorically conferring the quality of a drink mixed from wine and water to his poetry, he implies that his songs, too, could be distributed in equal shares to a community. And insinuatingly, he attributes to them the sympotic effect of drunkenness. But for the ancient Greeks, this is a state of divine obsession, especially by Dionysos the wine-god, and by the divinities who rule over love.²⁵

3.3 An Anacreontic poem

Much later, sometime between the 1st and the 4th century CE, an anonymous poet composed a sympotic poem in which the metaphor of a “*kratēr* of songs” is further elaborated. This represents a sixth type of transfer (*Anacreontea*, no. 20):

Ἡδυμελῆς Ἀνακρέων,
 ἡδυμελῆς δὲ Σαπφώ·
 Πινδαρικὸν δ’ ἔτι μοι μέλος
 συγκεράσας τις ἐγγέοι.
 τὰ τρία ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
 καὶ Διόνυσος ἐλθῶν
 καὶ Παφίη λιπαρόχροος
 καὶ τὸς Ἔρωσ ἄν ἐκπιεῖν.²⁶

Sweet-singing is Anacreon,
 and sweet-singing is Sappho;
 and of Pindar, in addition, a song
 after having them mixed together should someone pour out to me.

23 Pi. O. 6.91; cf. *Isthm.* 6.1–9. On Pindar’s “sympotic *Epiticia*” see Clay 1999.

24 But see also O. 7.7, where Pindar boldly designates his song, in explicit association with the drink poured at the symposium, as “poured nectar, gift of the Muses, [...] sweet fruit of the mind” (νέκταρ χυτὸν, Μοισᾶν δόσιον, [...] γλυκὺν καρπὸν φρενός), i.e. something that is much more valuable than the wine-water-mixture.

25 On Dionysos and drunkenness see Schlesier and Schwarzmaier 2008 *passim* (esp. with regard to visual art); Dionysos as god of ecstasy (also connected with erotics): Schlesier 2011. On the gods of the symposium: Nilsson 1951.

26 This ‘drinking out’ of poetry can be compared with another Anacreontic poem (*Anacreont.* no. 60b, 9–10), which invites to drain in honor of boys (πρόμυε πασῶν) the “lovely cup (*phiale*) of words” (φιᾶλην λόγων ἐραυνήν), following the example of Anacreon himself.

The three of them seem to me such that
 Dionysos as well in his coming
 as well as she from Paphos with gleaming skin
 as well as Eros himself would drink them out.

The ingredients of the mixture to be drunk are here identified, first of all, with two of the traditionally most important sympotic poets, Anacreon and Sappho who, in the verses of this poem, metonymically represent their own poetry, and then with a Pindaric song as well. The songs of these three poets are mixed as if they enter the space of a *kratēr*, from which, like the sympotic wine-water-mixture, this mixture of poetry should be drawn and poured out to the human lyric persona. The use of the verb (*syn-*)*kerannymi*, ‘mixing (together)’, makes clear that this mixture is meant to correspond to a certain proportion. And since just one song of Pindar shall be part of the mixture, this should clearly be the smallest part of the proportion, in which the songs of the two other poets unmistakably form the main part. But who metaphorically represents here the wine and the water?²⁷ According to the typical drinking habits of ancient Greek symposia, the precise proportion depends on the regulations fixed at the beginning of a party: more water is needed, if sobriety should be kept as long as possible, more wine, if the state of drunkenness should not much be delayed. The elusiveness of this poem does not allow us to decide what regulations are presupposed. If a quicker inebriation would be desired, then water should be represented by the Pindaric song, and wine by Anacreon’s and Sappho’s songs together.²⁸ If a longer sobriety is aspired to, the Pindaric song would stand for the wine and Anacreon’s and Sappho’s poetry for the water.

But it is perhaps not an exact physical condition that this mixture suggests. The point seems to be rather the pleasure that is conferred. And this does not appear to be metaphorical. At any event, the metaphorical drink mixed from Anacreon, Sappho and Pindar would not only please the lyric persona, but also the three most important divine sympotic companions, Dionysos, Aphrodite and Eros.²⁹ And since these gods

27 For the use of wine (or of the mixture of wine and water) as metaphor or as implicit analogon, see e.g. Anacr. fr. 376 and 450 PMG (love: to be drunken, in analogy to wine); Cratinus, fr. 195 Kassel-Austin (wine analogous to a beloved boy). On Οἶνος (= Wine) as name of satyrs see Heinemann 2000, 339.

28 This seems more probable, since the largest quantity is obviously represented by Anacreon and Sappho, the smallest by Pindar (just one song). Arguably, this *Anacreonteion* alludes to Pindar’s famous praise of water (O. 1.1: ἀριστον ὕδωρ, “the best is water”). Moreover, it seems to point to Pindar’s frequent use

of metaphors taken from the symposion in order to highlight his own poetry (see above).

29 The three deities and their sequence, in the arrangement of this poem, clearly enough correspond to the three poets: Dionysos to Anacreon, Aphrodite to Sappho, and Eros to Pindar (perhaps rather surprisingly, but Pindar’s erotic poetry survives only in some scattered fragments). Furthermore, this Anacreontic poem itself could be taken as a *kratēr* of songs; in which the deities themselves are, implicitly, no less mixed than, explicitly, the three poets. In other words: those who ‘drink’ this poem by the same token ‘drain’ a mixture of the emblematic divinities of the symposion.

as well as the human would not hesitate to drink this mixture, a potential blurring of the difference between a divine and a human symposion is emphasized. This links up with the poetical and analytical reflections expressed already, as we saw, in the poetry of Homer and Sappho. The Anacreontic poem, the example for a sixth type of transfer, thus also alludes to the other five types considered in my paper. This sixth type of transfer consists in the transfer from drinking a mixture of wine and water to the metaphorical 'drinking' of a mixture of poetry – an experience no less central to the symposion than the factual drinking. But only 'drinking' functions here as a metaphor, not mixing. This further underlines that not all types of transfer are metaphors, and that the symposion is a space in which several transfers and mixtures, not necessarily metaphorical ones, are available, including even those of divine and human spheres. And this explains why the *kratēr* could serve as an appropriate metaphor for many other specificities of the symposion, and even for this venue itself that is most favourable for all these mixtures and transfers.

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Fabian Horn

Metaphor and Spatial Conceptualization. Observations on Orientational Metaphors in Lycophron's *Alexandra*

Summary

Drawing on the theoretical and methodological framework of the cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphors and working from the textual basis of Lycophron's *Alexandra*, this paper argues for the existence of a conceptual orientational metaphor ACTIVE IS UP (with a corresponding opposite conceptualization PASSIVE/DESTROYED/DEAD IS DOWN). Numerous individual linguistic instantiations of this conceptualization occur in the *Alexandra*, most often in the form of prepositions or prefixes (ἀνά/ἀνα-, ἐπί/ἐπι-, κατά/κατα-), but also in case of words with basic meanings containing the direction up or down, such as αἶρω, whose metaphorical usages in the *Alexandra* (Lyc. 1228, 1295) are discussed in detail.

Keywords: Lycophron; *Alexandra*; cognitive metaphor theory; orientational metaphors; conceptual metaphors.

In Bezugnahme auf die theoretischen und methodischen Ansätze der kognitionswissenschaftlichen Theorie konzeptueller Metaphern und auf der Grundlage des Texts von Lykophrons *Alexandra* zeigt dieser Beitrag die Existenz der konzeptuellen Orientierungsmetaphern AKTIV IST OBEN (zusammen mit der korrespondierenden entgegengesetzten Vorstellung PASSIV/ZERSTÖRT/TOT IST UNTEN) auf. Zahlreiche einzelne textuelle Belege diese Vorstellung erscheinen in der *Alexandra*, oftmals in der Form von Präpositionen und Präfixen (ἀνά/ἀνα-, ἐπί/ἐπι-, κατά/κατα-), aber auch im Falle von Vokabeln, deren Grundbedeutung die Richtungsbestimmung oben oder unten enthält, wie αἶρω, dessen metaphorische Verwendung in der *Alexandra* (Lyc. 1228, 1295) ausführlich diskutiert wird.

Keywords: Lykophron; *Alexandra*; kognitive Metapherntheorie; Orientierungsmetaphern; konzeptuelle Metaphern.

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I Introduction

The *Alexandra* commonly ascribed to the Hellenistic tragic poet Lycophron of Chalcis (3rd century BCE) is probably the most peculiar literary work to survive from antiquity. Its form corresponds to a tragic messenger speech in iambic trimeters in which a Trojan watchman reports to king Priam of Troy the cryptic prophecies of his daughter Cassandra, who is here called Alexandra in allusion to her brother Alexandros, better known to us as Paris. Thus, the title is already indicative of the poet's penchant to hardly ever call anything by its proper name, but rather employ obscure and erudite periphrases and mythological allusions. Furthermore, the diction of the poem is riddled with a plethora of rare words which appear only in Lycophron or are attested in his poem for the first time.¹ It was the curse of Cassandra to always foresee the truth, but never be believed,² which gains a further dimension in Lycophron's *Alexandra*: Form and content of the poem are closely intertwined, for Cassandra's prophecies could not be believed, because they were not even understood:

Every line of the poem is an enigma. Persons, gods, places are almost never called by their names but referred to by the most remote and abstruse allusions; if the allusion strikes the reader as recognizable he is surely wrong, for some more remote and more paradoxical reference is intended. (...) To modern readers the work, happily unique in its kind, appears to be the chef d'œuvre of an erudite madman.³

1 Cf. e.g. Hopkinson 1988, 230: "It has been calculated that 518 of the 3000 different words in the poem are found nowhere else, and that a further 117 occur in the *Alexandra* for the first time." This clearly indicates how conscious the poet of the *Alexandra* was of his diction and the expressions he chose to employ.

2 Cf. Lyc. 1454–1456.

3 Quotation from Hadas 1950, 192–193. Also cf. Hopkinson 1988, 230: "It was Cassandra's fate never to be believed. Lycophron provides a new reason for this traditional feature of the myth: she was not only not believed, but not even understood. (...) The poem thus constitutes a novel combination of form and subject matter." Similarly also West 2003, 85.

The excessive use of metaphors and metonymies, intensified by Lycophron's propensity for obscure vocabulary, largely accounts for the oracular character of the poem's diction and the overall effect of being one huge and elaborate riddle.⁴ However, metaphor does not occur exclusively in instances where the poet consciously chose to employ figurative language as a rhetorical device and a means of encryption. Rather, since metaphor has been recognized to be a ubiquitous and common mode of thought and expression according to recent studies from the field of cognitive linguistics,⁵ metaphors need not also appear in low-key contexts where they might even have been used unconsciously and are often understood instinctively without additional cognitive effort. Compared to the obvious poetic metaphors consciously employed by the poet for stylistic and aesthetic reasons, the mechanical usage of unobtrusive and inconspicuous metaphorical language stems from the cognitive function of metaphors as a means of the human mind of imagining and conceptualizing certain ideas. It is particularly this type of unconscious and automatic metaphors which allows a glimpse into the conceptual system of language users. According to the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphors, individual linguistic metaphors found in actual texts are commonly (but not always) instantiations of underlying conceptions referred to as conceptual metaphors.⁶ A conceptual metaphor consists of a source domain being mapped onto a target domain through several correspondences which are called mappings and which form the basis of individual metaphors. Despite the reasonable claim of cognitive scholars that most conceptual metaphors are grounded in basic human bodily experience,⁷ the implicit hypothesis that the interpretation of human bodily experience and thus the human conceptual system have remained constant across cultures and have not undergone significant changes in more than two millennia is yet untested and in my opinion unlikely to be true.⁸ Every

4 Aristotle already noted that an overuse of metaphor results in an αἰνυμῶν 'riddle' (Aristot. *Po.* 22, 1458a18-25; *Rh.* 3.2.12, 1405a34-b5). On the seamless transition from metaphor/extended metaphor (allegory) to riddle vide now also Calboli 2012, esp. at 25-32.

5 For metaphor as a natural and fundamental way of human thought, cognition, and expression vide e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, or Gibbs 1994, esp. 120-264 and Gibbs 1996.

6 For the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors in general vide first Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Lakoff 1993, 202-251 as well as the summaries in Evans 2007, esp. 33-35 and Kövecses 2010, 3-14. A recent assessment of the theory can be found in Steen 2011 and Dancygier and Sweetser 2014.

7 Cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, esp. 56-68, and Johnson 1987.

8 E.g. the textual sources used in the first chapter of Lakoff and Turner 1989, 1-56 include, besides modern English poetry, Homer's *Iliad*, the Bible, the poems of Catullus, and Shakespeare's works. Even though the examples are, of course, chosen to support the argument, the unspoken assumption that the conceptual metaphors used in different times, societies, and languages are identical and not subject to change, is improbable and methodologically disputable. This question of crosscultural metaphorical universals is discussed e.g. in Kövecses 2005 and Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 162-182 with the result that there are few, if any, absolute metaphorical conceptualizations. Note, however, that research in cognitive linguistics usually focuses on the synchronic study of different languages without taking the diachronic perspective on cultures and languages removed in time into account.

society and language community possesses a dynamic system of culturally dependent notions and conceptualizations which is subject to change over time.⁹ Thus, when we attempt to apply the cognitive theory of metaphors to ancient languages and texts, we must refrain from automatically transferring our own conceptual system and first try to develop and identify the conceptualizations underlying the text and language on the basis of the linguistic evidence of their metaphors.

The following study is an attempt to illustrate the difficulties of explaining individual linguistic metaphors in ancient languages and of fully accounting for their underlying cultural conceptualizations. It takes as its starting point a close reading of a seemingly non-descript passage from Lycophron's *Alexandra* which will then give rise to a discussion of the wider issue of conceptual metaphors and spatial conceptualizations in Ancient Greek.

2 Orientational metaphors in Lycophron's *Alexandra*

At the beginning of his account of the fights between Greeks and barbarians,¹⁰ drawing on the beginning of Herodotus' *Histories*,¹¹ the poet of the *Alexandra* also traces the origin of the hostilities between Europe and Asia back to the abduction of Io from Argos to Egypt by Phoenician sailors. The passage in question contains several instances of obscure geographical references and animal imagery, both of which are very common in Lycophronean oracular diction, and concludes with a poetic metaphor:

(1) Lyc. 1291–1295: ὄλοιντο ναῦται πρῶτα Καρνῆται κύνες,
οἱ τὴν βοῶπιον ταυροπάρθενον κόρην
Λέρνης ἀνηρείψαντο, φορτηγοὶ λύκοι,
πλάτιν πορευῆσαι κῆρα Μεμφίτη πρόμῳ,
ἔχθρας δὲ πυρσὸν ἦραν ἠπείρους διπλαῖς.

First shall perish the seafaring dogs from Karne (i.e. Phoenicia),
who took the cow-eyed bull-virgin girl
from Lerne (i.e. Argos), the mercantile wolves,

9 In this regard, I draw on the definition of culture proposed by Geertz 1973, 89, who defines culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”

Geertz is not referring to metaphors in particular in the original context, but his definition naturally encompasses them as just another cultural set of conceptualizations as a means of communication and the development of knowledge.

10 Cf. Lyc. 1283–1450.

11 Hdt. *Hist.* 1.1–4.

in order to obtain a fateful wife for the lord of Memphis (i.e. the king of Egypt); they raised the beacon of hostility for the two continents.¹²

The final verse of the passage is obviously metaphorical with the phrase “they raised the beacon of hostility” denoting that the Phoenician sailors, by abducting Io from Argos, initiated the series of battles between the two continents, Europe and Asia, which culminated in the Persian Wars between Greece and Persia and Alexander the Great’s victory over Persia.¹³ The phrase is certainly a metaphor, for the “beacon of hostility” is obviously not meant literally as an actual object. However, since the meaning of the metaphor is unambiguous among the countless obscure passages in Lycophron, neither the ancient scholiasts nor modern commentators¹⁴ offer any additional lexical explanations of the verse. On the contrary, an ancient periphrasis of the verse suggests that the scholiast either did not recognize the metaphoricality of the passage, or deemed it so self-evident and self-explanatory that he only changed the word order and even preserved the metaphor:

(2) Σ ad Lyc. 1295: τὸν δὲ πυρσὸν τῆς ἔχθρας ἐπήραυ Εὐρώπης καὶ Ἀσίας.¹⁵

The beacon of hostility of Europe and Asia they raised up.

That in itself is corroboration of recent claims in cognitive science that metaphors are an integral part of human cognition and the human conceptual system, and that therefore they are often understood instinctively. This metaphor has only a low degree of metaphoricality,¹⁶ meaning that it is not particularly active in the minds of the poet and the audience. Nevertheless, upon closer examination, even metaphors with low metaphoricality are often very difficult to explain and often reveal complex and intricate structures which require individual analysis for every single metaphor in its context. In the case of the πυρσὸς ἔχθρας “the beacon of hostility”, there seems to be a combination

12 Greek text quotations are taken from the recent Budé edition of Hurst 2008, all translations are my own tentative attempt to reproduce the original syntax of the cryptic lines of Lycophron in English as precisely as possible, in some places in dependence on phrases borrowed from the Loeb translation of A. W. Mair and G. R. Mair 1955.

13 Cf. Lyc. 1412–1434 and Lyc. 1435–1444 respectively.

14 Cf. the major commentaries on the *Alexandra*, von Holzinger 1895, Fusillo, Hurst, and Paduano 1991, Gigante Lanzara 2000, Hurst 2008 and Hornblower 2015.

15 Quoted from the recent edition of the extensive scholia by Leone 2002.

16 For a theoretical approach to distinguish varying degrees of metaphoricality (as opposed to applying the obsolete ‘dead’ – ‘alive’ distinction) vide Hanks 2006 or Müller 2008, esp. 178–209; Müller defines metaphoricality as a continuum starting with expressions whose original metaphorical character is entirely obscured by semantic opacity and poetic novel metaphors with high metaphoricality forming the other end of the spectrum.

of two distinct conceptual metaphors,¹⁷ both of which are appropriate for the function of the metaphor in context.

Firstly, light, and in this instance light originating from a fire, serves as a rather conventional metaphor for rendering something visible and conspicuous. The noun πυρσός, derived from πῦρ ‘fire’, is particularly suitable to convey this notion, since it does not merely refer to any fire or torch, but usually denotes a bright fire signal or a watch fire in the night, which may also be used as a means to transmit messages over large distances.¹⁸ This is also the basis for the metaphorical use of πυρσός in Pindar’s Fourth *Isthmian Ode* where he employs the metaphor of “lighting the fire-brand of song”¹⁹ with the beacon’s light being a signal of the glory his praise poem will spread.

Secondly, the image of a “fire of hostility” is especially apt, since it also draws on the conceptualization of war and conflict as fire. The image already occurs in the Homeric poems, and other linguistic instantiations of this conceptual metaphor WAR IS FIRE²⁰ in Ancient Greek include such poetic expressions as Homer’s formulaic phrases “burning battle”;²¹ “blazing war”;²² or “fighting in the likeness of blazing fire”.²³ Lycophron himself possibly uses similar fire-imagery metaphorically in one other passage in reference to hatred and enmity when he relates the story of Nauplios, the father of Palamedes, who took revenge on the Greeks for the death of his son by making their wives commit adultery:

(3) Lyc. 1219: ψυδραῖσι τ’ ἔχθραν μηχαναῖς ἀναφλέγων.

- 17 To repeat, the term conceptual metaphor is employed in cognitive metaphor theory to denote an abstract cross-domain mapping conceptualizing one thing in terms of another which underlies the production of individual linguistic metaphors.
- 18 Cf. e.g. *Il.* 18.211; *Gorg. Palam.* 30; *Hdt. Hist.* 7.183, 9.3; *Eur. Pho.* 1377; [*Eur.*] *Rh.* 97.
- 19 *Pind. I.* 4.43: ἄψαι πυρσὸν ὕμνων. Cf. Thummer 1969, 74 on *Pind. I.* 3/4.61: “In dem Ausdruck ἄψαι πυρσόν wird von den in den vorhergehenden Versen verwendeten Bildern des Klanges (φωνάεν) und des Lichtes (ἀκτίς) das zweite weitergeführt. Man wird dabei an das Feuerzeichen erinnert, das am Beginn des *Agamemnon* die Siegesbotschaft über Meer und Land trägt” (reference to *Aes. Ag.* 281–316). For light imagery in Pindar also cf. Steiner 1986, 46–48 who lists, but does not explain individual metaphors.
- 20 Note the convention in cognitive linguistics to print conceptual metaphors (as opposed to individual linguistic metaphors) in small capitals in the form of SOURCE IS TARGET. This is done to indicate that they do not appear as such in texts, but are deduced from individual textual metaphors.
- 21 *Il.* 4.342; 12.316: μάχης καυστήρης. Also cf. the explanation in Hainsworth 1993, 353 ad *Il.* 12.316: “Note the metaphorical epithet. Fires (conflagrations, not domestic hearths), being destructive and well-nigh irresistible, make effective similes for advancing heroes and armies (19x). See also 17.736–41 and n., where bT observe that the extended simile at that point is here compressed into a single metaphorical word”
- 22 *Il.* 4.281: δῆϊον ἐς πόλεμον; 5.117; δηῖω ἐν πολέμῳ. I propose to interpret the common epic adjective δῆϊος (which is also applied to πῦρ, cf. *Il.* 6.331; 8.181; 11.666; 16.127) in these instances as derived from δαῖω ‘burn’ rather than from δαίς ‘battle’, cf. esp. other metaphorical expressions using the verb directly: *Il.* 12.35: ἀμφὶ μάχη τ’ ἐνοπή τε δεδήει; 13.736: πέρι στέφανος πολέμοιο δέδηε; 17.253: τόσση γὰρ ἔρις πολέμοιο δέδηεν; 20.18: μάχη πόλεμος τε δέδηε.
- 23 *Il.* 11.596: οἱ μὲν μάργαντο δέμας πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο.

with lying schemes lighting up enmity.²⁴

Note however that so far this analysis has not produced anything to indicate the notion of beginning in the metaphor of the “beacon of hostility”, and the fire/light metaphor is not elaborated.²⁵ The verb of the phrase is not taken from the same source domain, since the Phoenician pirates are not said to have lit the fire of hostility, as we would probably have expected from the image;²⁶ instead, the Phoenicians are said to have raised the metaphorical beacon of hostility, ἔχθρα δὲ πυρσὸν ἦραν. The verb ἦραν²⁷ must be an aorist of ἀείρω/αἶρω, literally ‘(to) raise’, ‘(to) lift up’, and is clearly metaphorical in this context: the etymology of the verb ἀείρω/αἶρω is uncertain, but an association with ἀήρ ‘air’ has been suggested²⁸ and it seems that the notion UP/UPWARDS is inherent in its basic meaning ‘(to) raise (up in the air)’.²⁹ Since the contextual meaning differs from the basic meaning, it is a clear case of metaphor on a lexical level.³⁰ It is surprising that the poet uses the 3rd pers. pl. aor. ind. of ἀείρω/αἶρω, ἦραν, rather than ἦσαν, the corresponding and prosodically equal form of ἄπτω ‘(to) ignite’, as the poet could have easily substituted (cf. the phrase ἄψαι πυρσὸν ὕμνων in Pind. *I.* 4.43). However, the use of a verb from a

24 The line might be a clear instantiation of the conceptualization WAR IS FIRE. However, the verb ἀναφλέγων is only a conjecture by Scheer (accepted by Mooney 1921, Mascialino 1956, Gigante Lanzara 2000, Chauvin and Cusset 2008, Hornblower 2015) on the basis of the scholia which preserve the fire-imagery by periphrasis (Σ ad Lyc. 1219: ψευδέσι μηχαναῖς καὶ τρόποις τὴν ἔχθραν ἐκκαίων καὶ ἀναζωπυρῶν); the reading of the manuscripts is ἀναπλέων (retained by Holzinger 1895, A. W. Mair and G. R. Mair 1955, Fusillo, Hurst, and Paduano 1991, Hurst 2008), which is in tune with the fishing-imagery of the passage (and thus a possible explanation for a clerical error).

25 Cf. Semino 2008, 25 for the use of the term ‘elaboration of a metaphor’ as “a particular type of cluster, where several metaphorical expressions belonging to the same semantic field or evoking the same source domain are used in close proximity to one another in relation to the same topic, or to elements of the same target domain.”

26 The form ἦσαν is not attested, but has been conjectured by Liberman 2009 as an “easy correction”; the conjecture is rightly rejected by Hornblower 2015, 456 ad loc.

27 The form was corrected from the ungrammatical ἦραν by von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1924, 155. The emendation has been accepted in the most recent editions of the *Alexandra* (Hurst 2008, Horn-

blower 2015); other editors and translators retain ἦραν, but there is general agreement in all translations that it is the 3rd pers. pl. aor. ind. of ἀείρω/αἶρω: “they raised a war-torch for two continents” (Mooney 1921), “they raised the beacon of hatred for the two continents” (A. W. Mair and G. R. Mair 1955), “levantaron la tea del odio entre los dos continentes” (Mascialino 1956), “sollevarono l’inimicizia tra i due continenti” (Fusillo, Hurst, and Paduano 1991), “levèrent la torche de la haine pour les deux continents” (Lambin 2005), “ils levèrent le flambeau de la haine entre les deux continents” (Chauvin and Cusset 2008), “c’est ainsi qu’ils ont levé le flambeau guerrier entre deux continents” (Hurst 2008), “they lifted up a torch of enmity for the two continents” (Hornblower 2015).

28 Cf. Frisk 1960, 23 s. v. ἀείρω. However, this explanation is rejected by Beekes 2010, 24.

29 The attribution to an old Proto-Indo-European verbal root *h₂er- meaning ‘hängen (intr.)’ in Rix 2001, 290 and Beekes 2010, 23 also indicates that the notion UP/UPWARDS is an intrinsic component of the basic meaning of ἀείρω.

30 For a procedure and criteria to determine metaphor through the difference between basic and contextual meaning vide Pragglejaz Group 2007, esp. at 3, also summarized in Semino 2008, 11–12, further developed in Steen et al. 2010, esp. 1–42.

different source domain is in tune with Lycophron's usual practice to forego the obvious in favor of something more nebulous or unexpected. This habit informs the whole poem and offers many difficulties to any interpreter, since the poet regularly makes use of rare vocabulary, remote versions of myths, obscure cult epithets, etc. Considering Lycophron's awareness regarding his diction, this choice of verb can hardly be accidental. It is conceivable that the image of 'raising the flame' as a whole is an idiom referring to a certain cultural setting where the lifting of a torch was used as a symbol to indicate a beginning, such as a wedding,³¹ a symposium,³² or an athletic event;³³ however, there is no evidence to support the assumption that 'raising the flame' was a fixed expression. Even if we could attribute the Lycophronean metaphor to a specific instance where the symbolic raising of a torch denoted the beginning of something, this act would be based on the same conceptualization which I will propose for the metaphor in Lycophron. On the contrary, drawing on other instances of πυρσός in Greek literature, it is likely that the noun does not only denote a mere torch used for some signalling purpose, but a larger stationary fire to convey messages over larger distances;³⁴ thus, it is unlikely that an actual πυρσός could be raised in a physical sense, and if indeed the combination of the verb αἶρω with the object πυρσός cannot be used literally, the metaphor becomes even more pronounced.

In any case, the use of the verb αἶρω adds a directional component to the metaphor, and I would argue that this spatial component of the basic meaning of the verb is the reason why the poet chose to employ it metaphorically in this context. In cognitive metaphor theory, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have opted to call the metaphorical use of spatialization "orientational metaphor"; since it provides an abstract concept with

- 31 Cf. e.g. Eur. *Cycl.* 514–515; *Med.* 1026–1027; *Pho.* 344–345; *IA.* 732–733; A. R. *Arg.* 4.808–809. However, in none of these instances is πυρσός used to refer to a wedding torch, and when the wedding torches are not merely lit (Eur. *Pho.* 344–345), but explicitly said to be raised, the verb employed is ἀνέχω rather than αἶρω (Eur. *IA.* 732; *Med.* 1027; A. R. *Arg.* 4.808). Thus, even if the image of raising the torch is familiar, the phrasing of the Lycophronean passage is probably unconventional. However, the wedding ritual is particularly suggestive as the source of the Lycophronean metaphor of 'raising the flame' because it would present the war between Europe and Asia as an inauspicious wedding.
- 32 Cf. Alc. frg. 346.1 Lobel-Page. In this case, the poet asks his fellow revellers not to wait for the lamps to start the drinking party; however, it is to be assumed that torches and lamps were always lit for symposia, which were usually held in the evening,

but there appears to be no further evidence that the beginning of the event was actually marked by the kindling of lights.

- 33 There is not much evidence of this practice, but it seems that the start signal of races at athletic competitions was not given visually, but by means of a βαλβίς, a rope stretched between two posts which indicated the start and finish of a race, also the metaphorical use in Lyc. 13–15: ἄκραν βαλβίδα μηρίθου σχάσας (...), ὡς πτηνός δρομεύς 'cutting the utter bounding thread (...) like a winged runner' with the commentary of Holzinger 1895, 166–167 ad Lyc. 13.
- 34 Cf. esp. *Il.* 18.211; *Hdt. Hist.* 7.183, 9.3. There is one other occurrence of πυρσός in the *Alexandra*, at Lyc. 340, where it also refers to a signal fire which is used to convey a message over a distance; however, some interpreters have understood the fire sign to be a mere torch, cf. Holzinger 1895, 221 ad loc.

structure by means of a spatial orientation.³⁵ Scholars of the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphors have compiled a list of common conceptual orientational metaphors in modern English, such as GOOD IS UP, CONSCIOUS IS UP, CONTROL IS UP, HAPPY IS UP, HEALTHY IS UP, MORE IS UP, RATIONAL IS UP, VIRTUE IS UP, HIGH STATUS IS UP (all with coordinate conceptualizations with opposite directionality).³⁶ However, to the best of my knowledge, no systematic research has been conducted on orientational metaphors, i.e. on metaphors based on spatial relations, but Lakoff and Johnson's observation of the existence of orientational metaphors provides a starting point and a theoretical frame for the interpretation I am about to offer.

Since we have ascertained that the *πυρσὸς ἔχθρας* is merely a poetic way of referring to war and open hostility, the image leaves us with the questions why the 'torch of hostility' is being lifted up at the beginning of the series of battles between Europe and Asia, and what the connotations of the concept UP in this context might be.

None of the examples of conceptual orientational metaphors listed above can account for the Lycophronean passage, but in order to posit a conceptual metaphor for an ancient language it is indispensable to adduce similar instantiations of the same spatial conceptualization in the *Alexandra*. Indeed it turns out that Lycophron uses αἶρω once more metaphorically. The first possible parallel occurs a little earlier in the poem where the Romans, in their capacity as descendants of Troy, are predicted to "raise the foremost crown of glory with their spears" when establishing their empire and seizing control over land and sea:

- (4) Lyc. 1226–1230: γένους δὲ πάππων τῶν ἐμῶν αὐθις κλέος
 μέγιστον αὐξήσουσιν ἄμμαοί ποτε
 αἰχμαῖς τὸ πρωτόλειον ἄραντες στέφος,
 γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης σκῆπτρα καὶ μοναρχίαν
 λαβόντες. (...)

But the fame of the race of my ancestors
 shall hereafter be increased by their descendants
 who shall with their spears raise the foremost crown of glory,
 obtaining the sceptre and dominion of earth and sea.

As with the original passage, the degree of metaphoricity of the metaphors in Lyc. 1228 is also comparatively low. The periphrasis in the scholia seems to be more concerned

35 Note that most theoretical approaches to metaphors would either dismiss this phrase as conventional, or pass it over on account of its low metaphoricity, or face difficulties accounting for this choice and usage

of αἶρω. On orientational metaphors cf. esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14–21 or Kövecses 2010, 40.

36 Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 15–17, as well as the extensive list of common conceptual metaphors and metonymies compiled in Kövecses 2010, 369–375.

with the intelligibility of ἀχιμή ‘spear’ which the scholiast replaced with the synonym δόρυ, but otherwise he preserved the metaphorical verb:

(5) Σ ad Lyc. 1228: δόρασι τὸ πρωτεῖον ἄραντες στέφος, ἐπάραντες.

With spears raising the foremost crown, raising up.

In fact, the apparently explanatory addition of the compound verb ἐπ-αἶρω ‘(to) lift up’ rather than the simplex αἶρω ‘(to) lift’ makes the metaphorical usage even more pronounced. As with text (1), modern commentators offer information only as regards the content of the passage, but see no need to explain the metaphorical uses of αἶρω. In her *Lexikon zu Lykophron*, Maria Grazia Ciani gives the literal Latin translations “*erigo, extollo*” for both instances, but, contrary to her usual practice, fails to note the metaphorical character of the usages.³⁷ However, the imagery of the reference passage raises similar questions: it seems obvious that the Romans do not literally raise the winner’s crown with their spears; rather, by means of their strength, which is metonymically denoted by the reference to their weapons, they win a victory. The military context becomes apparent in πρωτόλειον which is used as an adjective and literally refers to the first spoils of war (cf. λεία ‘plunder’), but is further expressed by the metaphor of ‘the victor’s crown’ taken from the domain of athletic competition.³⁸ Again, the question arises as to why the poet has the Romans “raise the victor’s crown” rather than elaborate the original metaphor with a verb from the same source domain of athletic or martial competition and use the more obvious verb of ‘winning’ or ‘gaining’.³⁹

The motivation for employing the verb αἶρω in all three instances is obviously its spatial and directional component. The phrases exhibit a consistent metaphorical conceptualization of the direction UP, in these instantiations embodied in the verb αἶρω, ‘(to) raise’ or ‘(to) lift’. It seems that in this case, the orientation UP is associated with activation and coming into effect, and thus the cognitive linguistic formulation of the conceptual orientational metaphor would be ACTIVE IS UP. This orientational metaphor is admittedly rather vague, but this is due to the metaphor’s status as a primary metaphor directly based on human bodily experience.⁴⁰ The physical experiential basis of this conceptualization is obvious, since humans get up and stand upright in order to move and become

37 Cf. Ciani 1975, 11 s.v. αἶρω.

38 Note that the military and the athletic domains are often used to conceptualize one another, which they can easily do because they belong to the same metaphor family through the shared frame of competition, cf. Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 67–69.

39 Hornblower 2015, 437 ad loc. treats ἄραντες στέφος together as a metaphor from the domain of athletics and adduces the parallel of Bacchyl. 2.5:

[ἄ]ρατο νίκην. It is likely that victors actually raised up the crowns or wreaths they won in competition in order to affirm and make their success visible, with the symbolism of the gesture also drawing on the orientation UP, VICTORY/SUPERIORITY IS UP (note the etymology of ‘superiority’).

40 For the idea of primary metaphors cf. Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 25–30.

active, and there is also a cultural basis, since tools and instruments require picking up before they can be wielded efficiently.⁴¹

This particular orientational metaphor ACTIVE IS UP also occurs in modern languages, in particular with verbs meaning ‘(to) raise,’ ‘(to) lift,’ or ‘(to) rise,’⁴² and is consistent with numerous examples of conceptual orientational metaphors in modern languages in which UP denotes the good half of a polar pair.

In accordance with the underlying bipolar VERTICALITY schema,⁴³ we can expect to find a corresponding opposite orientational metaphor PASSIVE IS DOWN, passive in these cases meaning not only inactive, but broken, destroyed, or dead. The experiential basis complements the conceptualization ACTIVE IS UP, since objects that are not in use, inoperative, or discarded are set down and dead bodies devoid of life fall down due to the effect of gravity. Lycophron’s poem shows copious instances of the direction DOWN, as expressed e.g. in the prefix *κατα-*, being associated with, or strengthening the notion of, suffering, destruction, and death. If some of the translations of the following passages seem awkward or unidiomatic, it is because English allows the realisation of this particular conceptual orientational metaphor in some cases but not in others:

- (6) Lyc. 48: *σάρκα καταίθων λοφνίσιν (...)*
burning down flesh with fire-brands.
- (7) Lyc. 55: *παιδὸς καταβροχθέντος αἰθάλω δέμας*
the body of the boy gorged down by flame.
- (8) Lyc. 90–91: (...) *ἡ ἕχερουσία τρίβος / καταιβάτις (...)*
the path of Acheron, leading downward.
- (9) Lyc. 169: *κίρκου καταρρακτῆρος (...)*
of the hawk which shoots down from above.

41 On the experiential physical basis of orientational metaphors vide esp. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 15–21. More extensively on the bodily basis of metaphor and meaning vide Johnson 1987, esp. 18–138.

42 Cf. a random selection of examples from modern European languages, such as English: “The conflict arose because of a misunderstanding.”; “The suppressed people rose in protest.”; German “Es erhob sich ein Getöse.”; “Es werden neue Steuern erhoben.”; Italian “Il vento si è alzato.”; “L’ avvocato solleva un’ obiezione.”; Spanish “Se levantaron pocas

voces críticas.”; “La nación se alzo en armas contra el opresor.”; French “Un peuple se lève contre un dictateur.”; “Cette réponse a soulevé des protestations.”; “Le vent s’ est levé.” Of course, this selection of European languages is not nearly sufficient to claim that this particular metaphor is universal (on these matters cf. Kövecses 2005), but it suggests that the conceptualization underlying the Lycophrean passages is not an isolated instance, but has parallels in other Indo-European languages.

43 On the VERTICALITY schema (also UP-DOWN schema) cf. Johnson 1987, esp. xiv.

- (10) Lyc. 249: (...) καταίθει γαῖαν ὀρχηστῆς Ἄρης
 Ares the dancer burns down the land.
- (11) Lyc 256: γόω γυναικῶν καὶ καταρραγαῖς πέπλων
 with groaning of women and down-tearing of robes.
- (12) Lyc. 298–300: πολλοὺς δ' ἄριστεῖς (...)
 αἰ σαὶ καταξανοῦσιν ὄβριμοι χέρες
 many heroes / (...) / shall thy mighty hands tear down.
- (13) Lyc. 396–397: ψυχρὸν δ' ἐπ' ἀκταῖς ἐκβεβρασμένον νέκυν
 (...) ἀκτις Σειρία καθουανεῖ
 the ray of Sirius shall wither down the cold corpse washed up on the shore.
- (14) Lyc. 382–383: (...) ὤν καταιβάτης
 σκηπτὸς κατ' ὄρφνην γεύσεται δηομένων
 whom the descending thunderbolt will taste in the darkness as they perish.
- (15) Lyc. 459: (...) καταίθων θύσθλα Κωμύρω λέων
 the lion (i.e. Heracles) burning down sacrifices for Komyros (i.e. Zeus).
- (16) Lyc. 560–561: (...) χαλκὸς καὶ κεραῦνιοι βολαὶ
 ταύρους καταξανοῦσιν (...)
 bronze and thunderbolts shall tear down the bulls.
- (17) Lyc. 971: (...) πύργων δυστυχεῖς κατασκαφὰς
 unhappy downfalls of towers.
- (18) Lyc. 1376: καταιθαλώσει γαῖαν ὀθνεῖαν (...)
 he shall burn down the alien soil.

It is obvious that not all of these examples are necessarily metaphorical, but there are several where the notion of the direction DOWNWARDS does not make any immediate sense in their respective contexts, and thus cannot be meant literally. Examples are provided by passages (11), (13), and (18), where the rending of robes in grief, the drying of a corpse, or the burning of a country respectively do not literally entail any downward

direction. In these cases, the use of verbs prefixed by *κατα-* is due to the notion of destruction conveyed by this prefix on the basis of the conceptual orientational metaphor *PASSIVE IS DOWN*.

This emphasis on destruction, along with the notion of control and subjugation, may also be expressed by the directionality *DOWN FROM ABOVE*, often in the form of the preposition *ἐπί* or the prefix *ἐπι-* respectively:

- (19) Lyc. 228: τοςῶνδε κῦμ' ἐπέκλυσεν κακῶν
a wave of such evils washing over (sc. Troy).
- (20) Lyc. 333: κρύψει κύπασσις χερμάδων ἐπομβρία
a cloak of stones will hide her (i.e. Hecuba) in a downpour (= she will be stoned to death).
- (21) Lyc. 557–558: (...) τῷ δὲ δευτέραν ἔπι
πληγὴν ἄθαμβῆς κριὸς ἐγκορύφεται
a second blow the fearless ram (i.e. Idas) will strike down on him (i.e. Polydeukes) with his horns.
- (22) Lyc. 1114–1115: δράκαινα διψὰς κάπιβᾶσ' ἐπ' ἀχένοσ
πλήσει γέμοντα θυμὸν ἀγρίας χολῆς
the dragoness, the serpent (i.e. Clytaemnestra), stepping down on my neck will fill her groaning soul full of wild bile.

The passages show again that *ἐπί* does not merely express the direction *DOWN FROM ABOVE*, but also emphasizes the notion of destruction in contexts where the directionality cannot be intended literally. In (19), a metaphorical wave of evils washes over Troy, submerging and putting down the city, in (20) the stones from the stoning of Hecuba fall down on her, rather than being thrown at her, and in (21) the blow falling on Polydeukes is at odds with the image of his opponent as a ram striking him with his horn. In (22), Cassandra's prediction of Clytaemnestra stepping down on her neck might at first be taken literally or appear as an instantiation of the orientational metaphor *CONTROL IS UP*,⁴⁴ however, Cassandra's slaughter (Lyc. 1108–1115) is described in several metaphors as the splitting of a tree trunk (Lyc. 1110–1111), with Clytaemnestra the viper (Lyc. 1114) filling her soul with bile (Lyc. 1115), and the phrase *κάπιβᾶσ' ἐπ' ἀχένοσ* seems to refer to Cassandra's death rather to her subjugation. Therefore, it would be well in

44 Hornblower 2015, 395 ad loc. takes the phrasing literally and as a detail possibly going back to a version narrated in the Epic Cycle.

tune with the tone of the passage and the style of Lycophron to interpret the participle construction as another metaphorical instantiation of the same conception with the directionality of DOWN FROM ABOVE emphasizing the notion of destruction.

3 Conclusions and perspectives

To conclude, I hope to have shown the challenges and difficulties of explaining even a seemingly simple metaphor in an ancient language: since every metaphor arises from the culture of its language users, knowledge of many aspects of the respective culture is a requirement for the interpretation of its metaphors. Drawing on the methodology and terminology developed in the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphors, I suggested that the use of αἴρω in the two passages discussed above can be explained by and attributed to a conceptual orientational metaphor ACTIVE IS UP (with a corresponding opposite PASSIVE IS DOWN). This orientational metaphor is admittedly rather vague, but the concept turns out to be pervasive and very productive and numerous instantiations occur in the *Alexandra*. The two examples discussed in detail, passages (1) and (4), show the conceptual orientational metaphor ACTIVE IS UP being used creatively as a basis for individual linguistic metaphors in conjunction with other metaphorical and metonymical conceptualizations.

As such, the in-depth analysis of metaphors with low metaphoricality can highlight the mastery of figurative language of a poet, if even non-descript metaphors prove themselves to be particular apt images. Besides, an examination of these metaphors with regard to their underlying conceptualizations reveals a wealth of additional information, not only about the individual poet, but also about his language community and culture.

In a next step it would be necessary to ascertain that the metaphor does not only occur in Lycophron's *Alexandra*, but was also used by other writers and members of the Ancient Greek language community. A first lexical search on the basis of LSJ yields several instances of the phrase πόλεμον αἴρεσθαι '(to) raise war',⁴⁵ two passages containing φυγήν αἴρεσθαι '(to) raise flight',⁴⁶ as well as one instance each of κίνδυνον αἴρεσθαι '(to) raise danger'⁴⁷ and νίκας αἴρεσθαι '(to) raise victories'.⁴⁸ Similarly, further lexical search shows that the compound form ἐπ-αίρω, lit. (to) 'lift; (to) 'raise', is also used metaphorically with the same underlying conceptualization in the sense of (to) 'make active' → (to) 'stir up; (to) 'excite'.⁴⁹

45 Aes. *Suppl.* 342; Hdt. *Hist.* 7.132; Thuc. 4.60; Demosth. *or.* 5.5; Aristoph. *Av.* 1188 (pass.).

46 Aes. *Pers.* 481; [Eur.] *Rhes.* 54.

47 Antipho. *or.* 5.63.

48 Pind. *I.* 6.60; to this add Bacchyl. 2.5, cf. note 39 above.

49 Cf. e.g. Hdt. *Hist.* 1.204; Soph. *OT* 1328; Eur. *IA* 125; Demosth. *or.* 16.23; Aristoph. *Ra.* 1041; etc. The same development must be assumed for the verbs

The evidence suggests that the metaphorical usage of (ἐπι-)αἴρω/αἴρομαι in Ancient Greek was common and conventional, and even though none of the examples are explicitly marked as metaphorical, it is obvious that they cannot be understood literally.⁵⁰ However, the contextual meaning of αἴρεσθαι in these passages can easily be understood from the basic meaning, and the metaphorical usage can be attributed to the same general conceptualization of directionality and space which we have encountered in Lycophrón's *Alexandra* and described as ACTIVE IS UP.⁵¹

ὀρίνω/ὀρυσσάμαι '(to) rise,' '(to) stir,' '(to) rush'; cf. note 50 below.

50 This also affords some insights into the working of a language and the difficulties of lexicography: in case of αἴρω/αἴρομαι which is used both literally and figuratively, it is possible to make out the metaphorical usage. However, there is a related verb ἄρυσσάμαι (only attested in pres. and impf.), which is commonly associated with αἴρω and appears to be formed from the same verbal root ἄρ- (< Proto-Indo-European *h₂er- 'hang') with nasal infix -υσ-. Thus, despite literally meaning '(to) raise for oneself,' this verb seems to have been used exclusively metaphorically and consequently has taken on the lexicalized meaning '(to) receive,' '(to) win,' '(to) gain.' Clearly,

the metaphoricity of ἄρυσσάμαι, which is also based on the orientational conceptual metaphor UP IS ACTIVE, is so low as to be likely semantically opaque even to a native Ancient Greek language user.

51 In the Homeric *Iliad*, our oldest extant source of Ancient Greek literature, (ἐπι-)αἴρω/αἴρομαι is not used metaphorically, however, the orientational metaphor ACTIVE IS UP already occurs in formulae employing the verbs ὀρίνω/ὀρυσσάμαι, which is attributed to a root *h₃er- '(a)rise' by Beekes 2010, 1107 s. v. ὀρυσσάμαι: thus war (*Il.* 2.797; 12.361), strife (*Il.* 3.87; 12.348, 361; 13.122, 15.400; 24.107), clamor (*Il.* 11.530), noise (*Il.* 2.810; 4.449; 8.59, 63; 16.633; 21.313), lamentation (*Il.* 24.760) are said to arise or be raised.

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Spatial Metaphor in the Pauline Epistles

Summary

The paper analyses spatial metaphor in the Pauline epistles, using the Cognitive Metaphor Theory of Lakoff and Johnson, which models metaphor as accessing a more complex target domain by mapping the structure of a simpler source domain onto it. Paul's metaphors are innovative, but their key feature is *alienation*, which offers a fresh perspective on familiar phenomena. For metaphor, this means foregrounding their limitations. But if metaphors make a complex domain more accessible, alienation seems inappropriate for didactic and exhortative epistles. Also, Paul's topics are novel, and need no alienation to overcome familiarity. I put down Paul's motivation for alienated metaphors to the novelty of his thoughts. To express these, he had to use metaphors, which are not fully precise. Thus, he alienated them to show their limitations, and to warn against taking them too far. I.e., alienation cannot only be used for de-familiarization.

Keywords: Spatial metaphor; poetic metaphor; alienation; cognitive metaphor theory.

Dieser Beitrag analysiert räumliche Metaphern in den Paulusbriefen im Rahmen der kognitiven Metapherntheorie Lakoffs und Johnsons. Diese Theorie modelliert Metaphern als Zugriff auf einen komplexeren Sinnbereich („Zieldomäne“), indem man die Struktur eines einfacheren Sinnbereichs („Quelldomäne“) auf die Zieldomäne abbildet. Paulus' Metaphern sind innovativ, doch ihr Hauptmerkmal ist *Verfremdung*, die eine neue Perspektive auf vertraute Phänomene eröffnet. Für Metaphern bedeutet dies, dass ihre Grenzen hervorgehoben werden. Aber wenn Metaphern ein komplexes Konzept zugänglicher machen, erscheint Verfremdung für die didaktischen und ermahnenden Briefe unpassend. Zudem sind die Themen des Paulus neuartig und bedürfen keiner Verfremdung, um Vertrautheit zu überwinden. Ich führe Paulus' Motivation für die Verwendung verfremdender Metaphern auf die Neuartigkeit seiner Gedanken zurück. Um diese ausdrücken zu können, musste er Metaphern verwenden, die nicht vollkommen präzise sind. Daher verfremdete er diese, um ihre Beschränkungen aufzuzeigen und davor zu warnen, sie zu weit zu treiben. Folglich kann Verfremdung nicht nur zur Aufhebung von Vertrautheit eingesetzt werden.

Keywords: Raummetapher; poetische Metapher; Verfremdung; kognitive Metapherntheorie.

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1 Introduction

Paul's epistles are well known for their rich imagery, which draws on all aspects of life, from everyday objects and activities to philosophical and theological debates and topics. Many of these images are cast in the form of metaphor, e.g., in the epistle to the Ephesians alone, there are metaphors based on light and darkness, kinship, body, buildings, citizenship, wealth, weapons, garments, and dice.¹ Such metaphors are the topic of this paper. In line with the other papers in the present volume (and because one cannot analyse all of Paul's metaphors in a single paper), the analysis will focus on spatial metaphors.

The paper is structured as follows. First I will discuss the concept of metaphor in general and introduce the Pauline epistles, then I will focus on one of the key spatial metaphors, viz., container-based metaphor, and show the creative and innovative way in which Paul uses this metaphor. In a second step, I will advocate alienation as the key feature in the innovative Pauline metaphors and discuss the function of this feature in the context of the epistles.

2 Background

This section will introduce the background of the analysis, the theory of metaphor that is assumed for the present study, its application to poetic discourse, and an attempt to characterise epistles as a genre and a corpus.

2.1 Conceptual metaphor theory

In the Aristotelian tradition, metaphor is based on similarity between the literal and the intended interpretation, i.e., they share a (salient) property. The property need not be

1 Gerber 2013.

specified explicitly, according to interactional theories of metaphor,² it is identified during the processing of the metaphor by trying to relate the literal and the intended interpretation. For instance, in (1), the connection between the two interpretations ‘flower’ and ‘woman’ is the property of being beautiful:

(1) *There is a rose in Spanish Harlem.*

However, Searle points out (among other problems) that this assumption cannot work for metaphors like (2):³

(2) *Sally is a block of ice.*

The problem is that an attempt to identify coldness as the property that establishes the similarity between Sally and the block of ice will only explain one metaphor in terms of another, because ‘coldness’ in the case of Sally is used in a metaphorical sense, too. Consequently, the notion of similarity must be modelled in a different fashion.

Cognitive metaphor theory (CMT)⁴ avoids this problem by reformulating the notion of similarity between literal and metaphorical interpretation in terms of a structural mapping across domains. The structure of a cognitively more accessible domain (‘source domain’) is mapped onto a less accessible domain (‘target domain’)⁵. Two well-worked examples are the mapping from the domain of JOURNEY to the one of LIFE, and the one from WAR to LOVE, which show up in numerous metaphorical expressions.⁶

(3) (a) *to be at a crossroads after school*

(b) *moving on after the loss of one’s parents*

(4) (a) *to resist someone’s advances*

(b) *to conquer someone*

In many cases, entities of the SD are merely mapped onto TD entities, e.g., the metaphor ‘LIFE as JOURNEY’ maps a traveller onto someone leading a specific kind of life. In CMT theory, this is called ‘filling of slots.’ Sometimes, however, metaphor introduces specific aspects or entities from the source domain into the target domain. E.g., *crossroads* is used as a means to refer to a potentially far-reaching and difficult choice point in the course

2 Black 1962.

3 Searle 1979.

4 Lakoff and Johnson 1981, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Lakoff 1993.

5 Following Schklowski 1971, these ideas surface already in the thoughts of Potebnja 1905, when he says that ‘the image must be better known than what is to be explained in terms of the image.’

6 The two domains are written in small capitals, following the convention in the field.

of one's life, even though life is not necessarily a goal-oriented process. This notion of orientation or directedness is only introduced through the metaphor 'LIFE as JOURNEY' as the result of mapping the journey's path into the TD, in this way, 'metaphor creates structure'.⁷

Many researchers have pointed out that metaphors seem to violate two of Searle's conversation maxims.⁸ The first is the maxim of quality, because metaphors usually are false in a literal interpretation. Assuming cooperativity of the interlocutors, this will trigger an appropriate reinterpretation process on the part of the hearer, but this raises the question of why metaphors do not violate the maxim of manner. Therefore, there must be an additional motivation for them. According to CMT, the motivation lies in the fact that metaphors make domains that are difficult to grasp more accessible.

CMT regards metaphors not just as a rhetorical device to adorn speech, rather, they are a fundamental way of conceptualising the world around us, or of making sense of our environment. Thus, metaphor is deeply embedded into our conceptual system; linguistic metaphor is just a way in which this conceptualisation surfaces.

Since metaphors try to account for less accessible domains in terms of more accessible ones, domains accessible by immediate sensory experience are very good source domains. Space figures prominently among these domains, as it is directly (non-metaphorically) accessible by sense of gravity and stereoscopic vision.

It is thus to be expected that there should be spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles, too, among them very conventional ones (e.g., TIME is SPACE and LIFE is LOCOMOTION):

- (5) ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς κλέπτῃς ἐν νυκτὶ οὕτως ἔρχεται
'the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night' (1 Thess. 5:2)⁹
- (6) καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν
'we too walk in the newness of life' (Rom. 6:4)

All theories of metaphor must take into account the observation that the similarity between the literal and the intended interpretation of a metaphorical expression is only partial. CMT resolves potential tensions between source domain and target domain by the so-called 'invariance principle'. This principle limits the mapping of the SD structure onto the TD to those parts that are compatible with the TD. For instance, in spatial

7 Lakoff and Turner 1989.

8 Searle 1969.

9 The quoted text follows the *Novum Testamentum Graece* (Nestlé/Aland, 28th edition) as published on the website of the Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft

(German Bible Society; <https://www.bibelwissenschaft.de>). Much of the English translation follows the English Standard Version, which is quoted from the same source.

metaphors of time the multi-dimensionality of space cannot be mapped onto the domain of time, which has one single dimension only.

It is also possible to cast different perspectives onto one single target domain, e.g., there are many different metaphors for love, among them LOVE is a FINANCIAL TRANSACTION and LOVE IS MADNESS:

(7) *steal someone's boyfriend*

(8) *crazy for you*

Political discourse uses this phenomenon for its own ends, as in the well-known quote from the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, which implicitly transfers properties of the SD like being catastrophic and irresistible onto the TD:

(9) *a tsunami of islamisation*

The incomplete match between the SD and TD structure and the influence of the SD onto the way the TD is perceived allows for a quite considerable tension between SD and TD, which will play an important role in the analysis of Pauline metaphors in the next sections.

The deep roots of metaphor in our conceptual system raises questions about the role of metaphors in natural language production and processing. In particular, is the use of a linguistic metaphor inextricably linked to a corresponding cognitive process that brings together the two domains involved? Here, following Steen et al., I do not want to rush to conclusions regarding the actual processing of metaphors.¹⁰ This is in line with the observations of Lakoff and Turner, who point out that the conventionalisation of much of (non-poetic) metaphor leads to its automatic and unconscious use.¹¹

Finally, it seems advisable to introduce the way in which similes are addressed in the present paper, since they are very similar to metaphors, but differ in that they explicate the comparison, e.g., in terms of *like*. Steen et al. argue for a separation of the two phenomena, as they introduce the mapping between domains in different ways, however, for the purpose of this paper, the distinction is not important and is therefore neglected. I.e., the metaphorical mappings that are discussed in the following may be introduced either in the form of a metaphor or a simile.

10 Steen et al. 2010.

11 Lakoff and Turner 1989.

2.2 Poetic metaphor

CMT has considerably advanced research and theorising on metaphor by focusing on everyday language and thought instead of poetical language. But much of Paul's epistles¹² is highly poetical in character, consider for instance the encomium of Christian love (*agápē*) in 1 Cor 13, of which only verses 1–3 are quoted here:

(10) Ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, γέγονα χαλκὸς ἤχων ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον. καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω προφητεῖαν καὶ εἰδῶ τὰ μυστήρια πάντα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω πᾶσαν τὴν πίστιν ὥστε ὄρη μεθιστάναι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐθέν εἰμι. κἄν ψωμίσω πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντά μου καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου ἵνα καυχῆσωμαι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι.

‘If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. And if I have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing. If I give away all I have, and if I deliver up my body to be burned, but have not love, I gain nothing.’

This poetical style of writing is accompanied by a high amount and rich variety of metaphors, consequently, these metaphors fall outside the the main focus of CMT on everyday language and thought. Nevertheless, there is much work that links non-poetic and poetic metaphor. Lakoff and Turner offer an account of poetic metaphor in the CMT framework,¹³ while Steen shows that practical work on the detection (and annotation) of metaphors in non-poetic discourse extends straightforwardly to poetic discourse as well.¹⁴

In the following, Lakoff and Turner's classification of poetic metaphors will be taken as a guide for a first analysis of Pauline metaphors.¹⁵ They try to define aspects of ‘poeticity’ of metaphor in terms of CMT, by analysing the differences between poetic and non-poetic metaphor. ‘What makes poetic metaphor noticeable and memorable’ they say, is ‘the special, nonautomatic use to which ordinary, automatic modes of thought are put.’¹⁶ Due to the poetic character of much in the Pauline epistles, it is advisable to subject our corpus to these analytic tools.

This conscious identification and processing of poetic metaphors can be effected in a number of ways, first by *elaboration*, by which Lakoff and Turner refer to unusual

12 See e.g. Lehnert 2013.

13 Lakoff and Turner 1989.

14 Steen 2009.

15 This is not meant to rule out the possibility that there could be poetic metaphors not covered by this account, as argued for e.g. by Semino and Steen 2008.

16 Lakoff and Turner 1989.

variation in the mapping of SD elements onto corresponding elements in the TD ('filling in slots'). As an example, consider the metaphorical mapping CAUSATION IS COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION in (11):

- (11) τὰ γὰρ ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος
 'the wages of sin is death indeed' (Rom 6:23)

The unusual mapping is encoded in the word ὀψώνια 'wages': Death is not only the consequence of sinning, Sin is represented (and personified) as employer who contracts sinners.

In a similar way, the highly familiar metaphor 'SPACE IS TIME' is elaborated in example (5): The day of the Lord is not just presented as an object that is coming closer, its approach is unexpected and surprising (and perhaps even unwelcome), like the break-in of a burglar.

The second property that can identify poetic metaphors is *questioning*, i.e., putting into doubt the usefulness of metaphors for understanding target domains.

The metaphor can be explicitly challenged, or in an indirect way, by highlighting its boundaries. These boundaries are set by the Invariance Principle and referring to them explicitly considerably highlights the differences between SD and TD. As an example for an indirect challenge, consider Paul's questioning of the metaphor that maps a race onto the strive for a Christian life:

- (12) Οὐκ οἶδατε ὅτι οἱ ἐν σταδίῳ τρέχοντες πάντες μὲν τρέχουσιν, εἷς δὲ λαμβάνει τὸ βραβεῖον; οὕτως τρέχετε ἵνα καταλάβητε.
 'Don't you know that in a race all the runners run, but only one gets the prize? So run that you may get it.' (1 Cor. 9:24)

This metaphor draws attention to the SD phenomenon that there can only be one winner, even though this observation cannot be mapped onto the TD. Rather, the TD should comprise a multitude of people who eventually are rewarded for a truly Christian life (which corresponds to the race in the SD). The effect in this case is that Christians are admonished to strive for a Christian life as if they were competing for a single place in heaven.

Third, metaphors can be *composed* in that several metaphors can be combined in one single expression. As a Pauline example of this technique, consider (13):

- (13) ἔπινον γὰρ ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀκολουθούσης πέτρας, ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός.
 ‘and indeed they drank from the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock
 was Christ’ (Rom 2:29)

The first clause comprises no less than three metaphorical expressions, starting with πέτρα ‘rock’ for Christ, whose metaphorical character is first highlighted by the modifying adjective πνευματικός ‘spiritual’ (and then expounded in the second clause). The verbs ἀκολουθέω ‘follow’ and πίνω ‘drink’ are metaphorical, too (for ‘watch over’ and ‘profit’), too.

These metaphors are furthermore closely tied together by the deliberately contradictory properties of the respective source domains of the metaphors πέτρα vs. πίνω (arid - wet) and πέτρα vs. ἀκολουθέω (mobile - immobile).¹⁷

This technique of composition is a cover term for a number of processes, which exhibit different degrees of integration during composition: The metaphors can merely be juxtaposed, or linked together like in (13), or be truly blended in that there is identity or a sense relation between the source and target domains involved.

Such a blended composition emerges in Sassoon’s poem *The next war*, in the form of a twofold metaphor for battle noises as singing:

- (14) *He’s spat at us with bullets and he’s coughed*
Shrapnel. We chorussed when he sang aloft

Noises of projectiles are first presented metaphorically as human noises and sounds (spitting, coughing, and eventually to singing; emitted by the personification of death). These noises are then accompanied by the soldiers’ screams, which are also likened to singing. The second metaphor then depicts the battle noises (in the form of the soldiers’ reaction to projectiles) as singing, too, but this time as the interaction between preceptor and chorus.

Finally, *extension* refers to the technique of deliberately introducing entities into the TD that do not really fit there. This deliberately goes against the grain of the Invariance Principle and is more than just an addition of material (introducing ‘additional slots’) to the TD like in the case of the directedness of life in (3).

17 The image of the rock yielding water to drink alludes to the events in Num 20, but there both reference to the rock and to the drinking are used in a non-metaphorical way. This allusion instantiates what Di Biase-Dyson 2015 calls the “metaphorical

‘charging’ of the citations” in her analyses of intertextuality in Ancient Egyptian wisdom texts. Example (46) below works in a similar way but explicates the metaphor in the citation.

Lakoff and Turner quote Hamlet's lines as an example, in which death is introduced metaphorically as sleep,¹⁸ which brings the idea of dreaming into death, even though dreaming is not compatible with death:

- (15) *To sleep? Perchance to dream! Ay, there's the rub;
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come?*

In the Pauline epistles we even find the reverse pattern, in which - in principle obligatory - TD material is deliberately removed, e.g., if life as a sinner is introduced metaphorically as death. Since death is just an inert state, this metaphor suggests that all activities of sinners are not for real, they are a mere sham:

- (16) Καὶ ὑμᾶς ὄντας νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἀμαρτίαις ὑμῶν, ἐν αἷς ποτε περιεπατήσατε κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου
'And you were dead in your trespasses and sins, in which you once walked, following the course of this world...' (Eph 2:1-2)

CMT points out an additional way in which poetry introduces innovation in the domain of metaphors, viz., *image metaphors*, which are not part of the way in which we usually conceptualise the world.¹⁹

While image metaphors involve just another mapping from a SD into a TD, here the domains are conventional mental images. In Robert Herrick's *On Julia's clothes*, for instance, there is such a mapping from the visual impression of changing light reflections on silk that is moving to the light reflections on rushing water:

- (17) *Whenas in silks my Julia goes,
Then, then (methinks) how sweetly flows
That liquefaction of her clothes.*

Another well-known example is Rilke's description of the tumbling of falling leaves as a 'negating gesture' in the poem *Herbst* ('autumn'). This kind of poetic mapping will not play a role in the investigation of Pauline epistles pursued in this paper, however.

In the next section, these categories of poetic metaphors will be retraced in the domain of spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles. I will argue that while these categories are valuable in analysing metaphor, they cannot be used as a kind of metric for poeticity or fully explain the poetic effect of many Pauline metaphors. Rather, the poeticity of

18 Lakoff and Turner 1989.

19 Lakoff and Turner 1989.

these metaphors emerges through *alienation* in the sense of Schklowski,²⁰ which does not facilitate the approach to a specific target domain but enforces a novel and perhaps even deliberately obfuscated perspective on otherwise familiar domains.

2.3 Epistles as a genre and as a corpus

Before embarking on the analysis of the metaphors, I want to finish off this section with some (philological) remarks on epistles, both from the viewpoint of genre, and from the perspective of using them as a corpus for metaphor research.

The corpus of the present analysis comprises the 13 epistles traditionally ascribed to Paul. This *Corpus Paulinum* thus excludes the epistle to the Hebrews. Paul's authorship of these 13 epistles has been the matter of a long debate in theology. In the meantime, there is agreement on his authorship for Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon, the so-called *homologoumena*, while his authorship is doubted for the other epistles.²¹ However, for ease of presentation, I will keep talking of 'Pauline' epistles in the following.

These epistles have a characteristic structure, they exhibit features of letters like naming sender and addressee, salutation, personal messages, and greetings, often there is a section of thanksgiving, too.

However, from the viewpoint of content, the epistles are no prototypical letters. Their main parts develop and elaborate Christian theology, often in response to concrete issues in the respective Christian communities. (Paul is the founder of Christian theology.) The epistles are a mixed genre in that they also comprise exhortations and other persuasive elements. There are almost no narrative elements in the epistles, as opposed to e.g. the Gospels.

This characterisation of epistles as both didactic and persuasive suggests a high number of metaphors, because metaphors occur frequently in didactic as well as in persuasive genres. Previous work puts down the use of metaphor in didactic discourse to an attempt to bridge the gap between experts and non-experts (e.g., in medical discourse).²² In persuasive discourse, metaphor is analysed as a device to support the cause of the text by presenting it under specific perspectives.²³

However, the frequency of spatial and other metaphors in the Pauline epistles surpasses even high expectations: 577 sentences with spatial metaphors alone were found in the Pauline corpus. This is but a small subset of all the metaphors found in the corpus;

20 Schklowski 1971.

21 Colossians, Ephesians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus; Niebuhr 2011.

22 Gwyn 1999.

23 Lakoff 1996.

it abounds with a plethora of metaphors.²⁴ Some kinds of metaphors are characteristic of specific epistles (e.g., legal metaphors in the epistle to the Romans).²⁵

Previous work on Paul's metaphors typically focuses on specific metaphors. Examples are metaphors with the SDs family, body, competition, household, or plants.²⁶

Primarily spatial metaphors have received less attention; the first study emerged within Topoi was Gerber, who investigated the horizontal vs. vertical dimension in the epistle to the Ephesians from a theological point of view. Linguists, to my knowledge, have not investigated Pauline metaphors intensively so far.²⁷

3 Metaphors in Pauline epistles

In this section, metaphors in the Pauline epistles will be investigated according to the fourfold classification of poetic metaphors as expounded in section 2.2. This classification will mostly be applied to a specific kind of spatial metaphor, viz., container metaphors, i.e., metaphors that use the domain of containers as their source domain.

3.1 Elaborating metaphors

Elaboration of metaphors refers to unusual ways of mapping SD elements onto already existing elements in the TD. This phenomenon is implemented in the realm of container metaphors in that there is a very wide range of variation of containers in the source domain, and of container and content equivalent in the target domain. In addition, the SD relation between container and content (and with it, the corresponding TD relation) varies considerably.

Note that not all of the metaphors quoted in this subsection are themselves poetic, in fact, there is a cline from quite conventional metaphors, e.g., (22) or (30), to elaborated ones. But the conventional metaphors are important, too, they serve as the backdrop against which the elaboration of other metaphors of the same kind sticks out even more.

First, the SD containers range from highly prototypical containers like vessels to less prototypical ones such as clothes or temples. (The latter introduce a special case of container metaphor, viz., BODY is HOUSE.)

(18) ἔχομεν δὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ὄστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν
 'but we have this treasure in vessels of clay' (2 Cor 4:7)

24 See Williams 1999 for a classification of these metaphors from a culture-studies point of view.

26 See Williams 1999 for references.

25 See Gemünden and Theißen 1999.

27 Gerber 2013.

- (19) ἐνδύσασθε τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν
 ‘put on the Lord Jesus Christ’ (Rom 13:14)
- (20) τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐστίν
 ‘your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you’ (1 Cor 6:19)
- (21) ἡμεῖς γὰρ ναὸς θεοῦ ἐσμεν ζῶντος
 ‘we are the temple of the living God’ (2 Cor. 6:16)

Abstract states show up in the role of containers, too. The content can be inside them, but also move in and out of these containers. Consequently, such metaphors can be subsumed under the global event structure metaphor, in particular, the subcases STATE IS LOCATION, CHANGE IS MOTION, and CAUSATION IS CONTROL OVER AN ENTITY RELATIVE TO A LOCATION, as illustrated in (22)–(24):

- (22) ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ φθόνῳ διάγοντες
 ‘living in malice and envy’ (Tit 3:3)
- (23) μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐνότητα τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ (Eph 4:13)
 ‘until we all reach the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God’
- (24) πρὸς τὰ εἰδωλα τὰ ἄφωνα ὡς ἂν ἤγεσθε ἀπαγόμενοι
 ‘you were led astray to mute idols, however you were led’ (1 Cor 12:2)

To these three subcases, we can add as a fourth one the metaphorical use of the *continuation* of a location, which is expressed in the adverb ἔτι ‘still’. The metaphor is then ‘PERSISTENCE OF LOCATION IS PERSISTENCE OF STATE.

- (25) οὔτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ
 ‘How can we who died to sin still live in it?’ (Rom 6:2)

Next, the TD equivalent of containers is highly variable too, Man and God figure prominently here, but also the Cross and abstract entities.

- (26) ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ
 ‘lest the cross of Christ be emptied’ (1 Cor 1:17)
- (27) βλέπε τὴν διακονίαν ἣν παρέλαβες ἐν κυρίῳ, ἵνα αὐτὴν πληροῖς
 ‘take heed to the ministry that you received in the Lord, that you might fill it’ (Col 4:17)

This variation reappears for the TD equivalent of the content of a container. Again, we find Man and God, but also actions or states, and even a ‘yes’.

- (28) χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ
 ‘rejoice in the Lord’ (Phil 3:1)
- (29) ἀλλὰ ναὶ ἐν αὐτῷ γέγονεν
 ‘but in him is always a yes’ (2 Cor 1:19)

Finally, the relation between container and content varies considerably, too. The content may be just inside, in a specific position, inert but fastened, animate, or active:

- (30) πεπληρωμένους πάση ἀδικίᾳ πονηρίᾳ πλεονεξίᾳ κακίᾳ, μεστοὺς φθόνου φόβου ἔριδος δόλου κακοηθείας
 ‘filled with all unrighteousness, evil, covetousness, malice; full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, maliciousness.’ (Rom 1:29)
- (31) ὑμεῖς στήκετε ἐν κυρίῳ
 ‘you are standing fast in the Lord’ (1 Thess 3:8)
- (32) ἐρριζωμένοι καὶ ἐποικοδομούμενοι ἐν αὐτῷ
 ‘firmly rooted and built up in him’ (Col 2:7)
- (33) ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία
 ‘the sin that dwells in me’ (Rom 7:20)
- (34) ὁ ἐναρξάμενος ἐν ὑμῖν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιτελέσει
 ‘he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion’ (Phil 1:6)

This unusual variation heightens the awareness of the metaphorical character of the expressions, which is in marked contrast to the non-poetical metaphors that are not specifically announced and often go unnoticed in conversation.

3.2 Questioning metaphors

Readers or hearers can also be made aware of the metaphorical character of an expression by challenging the aptness of a metaphor directly or in terms of showing the limits of the structural mapping from SD to TD.

This technique is employed in the Pauline corpus, too, a very ingenious example is the vessel metaphor of 2 Timothy 2. It starts off quite conventionally by distinguishing different kinds of vessels, according to their material and their function:

- (35) Ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ οἰκίᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν μόνου σκεύη χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργυροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύλινα καὶ ὀστράκινα, καὶ ἃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν ἃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν
 ‘Now in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver but also of wood and clay, some for honourable use, some for dishonourable.’ (2 Tim 2:20)

But the function of vessels is closely tied to the content they are supposed to carry. This distinction is reflected in the material of the vessels, in that there is an interdependence between their value (or the value of their material) and the agreeableness of their content (mediated by the degree of honourableness of their function). This interdependence is stable, it is fixed for the vessel once and for all by language-external culture-based conventions and rules. The metaphorical interpretation of this description is based on the metaphor ‘PERSONS ARE CONTAINERS’, here, for ideas. Following the structure of the source domain, we can deduce for the target domain that there are more and less valuable human beings, and that their value depends on the ideas and beliefs that they carry. According to their function, these human beings (still addressed by the vessel metaphor) may then be the object of God’s wrath or of His glory:

- (36) εἰ δὲ θέλω ὁ θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατόν αὐτοῦ ἥνεγκεν ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ σκεύη ὀργῆς κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν, καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ σκεύη ἐλέους ἃ προητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν
 ‘What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory?’ (Rom 9:22–23)

This SD-based reasoning on the TD, however, is then contested by the next verse. The challenge for the metaphor is the observation that Man is not inert like a vessel, he is capable of determining the ideas and beliefs that he holds. In this way, he can manipulate his function:

- (37) ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐκκαθάρῃ ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τούτων, ἔσται σκεῦος εἰς τιμὴν
 ‘Therefore, if anyone cleanses himself from this, he will be a vessel for honourable use’ (2 Tim 2:21)

In this way, the content turns out to be the decisive factor that overrules substance, by changing one’s ideas and beliefs one can also change one’s value.

The function of questioning the metaphor is an attempt to highlight one important difference between vessels and human beings: Man is more than just an inert vessel, he has a free will and can take fate into his own hands to improve his worthiness. So the questioning of the vessel metaphor serves as an exhortation to overcome one's inertia and become a better person by actively working on one's beliefs and ideas.

3.3 Combining metaphors

The combination of metaphors shows up in vessel metaphors in the Pauline corpus, too. As a first instance, consider metaphors that combine the global event structure metaphor with the GOOD IS UP metaphor, in particular, CHANGE IS MOTION. In such a combination, a container functions as the beginning or end of a downward trajectory. These combinations show an extremely high degree of integration in that the two metaphors are blended by unifying their source and target domains (spatial and abstract change), respectively. This is a much closer interaction than just juxtaposing them.

(38) τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε

'you have fallen from grace' (Gal 5:4)

(39) οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι πλουτεῖν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς πειρασμὸν καὶ παγίδα καὶ ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς, αἵτινες βυθίζουσιν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν.

'But those who want to be rich fall into temptation, into a snare, into many senseless and harmful desires that plunge people into ruin and destruction.' (1 Tim 6:9)

Consequently, the direction of the movement and with it, the change of state w.r.t. location in the container is evaluated, it is a change to the worse. The container is evaluated, too, depending on its position in the path of the movement. If it situated at the beginning of the path, it is depicted as a positive state that is terminated, like grace in (38). However, if its place is at the end of the path, it is a negative state that comes to pass, such as a depraved state of mind in (39).

As a second example, consider Col 2:3, which contains another vessel metaphor. Vessels are in many cases not transparent, thus, they might hide their content from view. This observation is employed in the following metaphor, which combines the vessel metaphor with the metaphor IDEAS ARE PERCEPTIONS (the subcase UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING).

(40) ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως ἀπόκρυφοί

'in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge' (Col 2:3)

In this metaphor, Christ is depicted as possessing the whole range of wisdom and knowledge, which is hidden to Man, until the time Christ shares his knowledge with him.

Finally, another combination blends the vessel metaphor and a subcase of the event structure metaphor, viz., OPPORTUNITIES ARE OPEN PATHS. In the following example, the metaphor is used to introduce a lack of opportunities in terms of confinement. The state of disobedience is thus simultaneously described as a vessel and as a prison:

- (41) συνέκλεισεν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἀπειθείαν
 ‘for God has imprisoned all in disobedience’ (Rom. 11:32)

3.4 Extending metaphors

Extension of metaphors introduces additional structure from the SD into the TD, which does not really fit in easily with the TD. As an example, consider the metaphorical description of love as space in Ephesians 3. This is an instance of the metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, but in this metaphor, the three dimensions of space are introduced into the target domain, as if it was possible to distinguish dimensions in love, too:

- (42) ἵνα ἐξισχύσητε καταλαβέσθαι σὺν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἁγίοις τί τὸ πλάτος καὶ μήκος καὶ ὕψος καὶ βάθος, γινῶναί τε τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῆς γνώσεως ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ
 ‘you may have strength to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge’ (Eph 3:18-19)

Other examples of extending spatial metaphors present faith as a kind of path. This gives it a sense of direction that does not really blend in intuitively with the concept of faith:

- (43) τοῖς στοιχοῦσιν τοῖς ἵχνεσιν τῆς πίστεως
 ‘to those walking in the footsteps of the faith’ (Rom 4:12)
 (44) περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἠστόχησαν
 ‘they have swerved from the faith’ (1 Tim 6:21)

There are at least two ways in which this extension might be interpreted. Either faith is not stative but a development passing through several stages of completion, or it is a kind of guidance on how to lead one’s life. Note that either interpretation is compatible with the additional complication in the first example, which introduces the path in terms of

footsteps: This indicates that others have trod this path before, there are exemplars of faith.

In sum, the classification of poetical metaphor has proven to be applicable to the spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles. There are numerous instances of elaborating, questioning, or combining metaphors, which were illustrated with vessel metaphors, and also instances of extending metaphors.

However, even though the classification proved fruitful for the analysis of Pauline metaphors, shedding much light on the nature of these metaphors, it cannot (nor is it intended to) answer the question of what the peculiarity or common denominator of these metaphors is, and why they are used in the epistles.

In the following section, I will propose that much of these metaphors follows a very general principle, viz., the deliberate *alienation* of metaphors that does not focus on the similarities between SD and TD but rather emphasises their differences.

4 Metaphor and alienation

CMT suggests that metaphors in non-poetic discourse have a clear function, viz., to facilitate the understanding of and reasoning with conceptual domains by structuring parts of them in terms of structures borrowed from another. This borrowing takes the form of a structural mapping between domains. In this way, metaphors constitute a very fundamental process of conceptualisation, they function so effortlessly and unconsciously as to be highly conventionalised in many cases. I.e., metaphor itself is a very unobtrusive phenomenon that goes unnoticed in most cases.

There is an obvious causal link between the straightforward mechanics and the inconspicuity of the metaphorical mapping. There is no complicated interaction between two domains, just a transfer in one direction. Any potential mismatch between the structures of source and target domain is resolved in favour of the latter by the Invariance Principle.

The ensuing unobtrusiveness of metaphors makes them a very efficient tool for understanding and reasoning with complex domains in non-poetical language.

4.1 The foundation of poetic metaphors in the Pauline epistles

But even for non-poetic discourse, this account of metaphor is an idealisation. Modelling it in terms of a structural mapping between domains suggests a mathematically strict and complete transfer of entities and the relations between them, which is in dan-

ger of obfuscating the fact that the mapping between SD and TD need not be perfect at all.

While this is neglected – or, at least, backgrounded – in non-poetic discourse (though sometimes exploited in politics), in order not to hamper understanding, it lies at the heart of metaphorical innovation in poetic discourse: The tension between SD and TD, which arises from the limitations of the structural mapping between them, is foregrounded by unusual mappings, by the introduction of potentially alien elements into the TD through the mapping, or by explicitly pointing out the limits of the mapping (a.k.a. questioning the metaphor). Combining metaphors, too, can emphasise the tension between SD and TD, because it highlights the fact that a specific metaphor can only capture a part of a specific target domain, thus, several SDs are needed in combination to yield a reasonably comprehensive account of the TD.

Metaphorical innovation thus enforces a fresh and unconventional perspective on the TD, which is in line with the general process of poetic *alienation*.²⁸ Alienation is a process that deliberately lengthens and aggravates the process of perceiving an in principle familiar object because it aims at providing the reader with a sensation of the object that is based on very conscious and intensive perception instead of just recognising the object without focussing on it.

I.e., alienation presents familiar objects deliberately in an unexpected and novel way in order to force the reader not just to take things for granted but to have a really close look at them that reveals their essence.

For metaphorical expressions, alienation works by going against the grain by emphasising the *dissimilitude* of source and target domain rather than their similitude. This emphasis is exactly the overarching foundation of the techniques of poetic metaphor as discussed so far. They all hamper the well-oiled machinery of understanding through metaphor by exposing its limits and the way it functions.

The impact of this dissimilitude on the source domain often is one that can be described in terms of the notions of *schema refreshment* or *schema disruption*.²⁹ Schemas encode culturally entrenched practices and are typically triggered by reference to their central participants. Such a reference creates the expectation that the schema is executed faithfully and completely. For instance, words like *regulars*, *draft*, or *pub* invoke a schema for visiting pubs that includes getting one's beer at the bar, paying for it immediately, etc. (at least in the UK).

Refreshed schemas are executed in a deviant or novel way, but when they are not executed fully, we talk about schema disruption. One possible way of achieving these effects is by metaphor, by invoking schemas in the source domain, because due to the

28 As described in Schklowski 1971 and introduced into and made fruitful for biblical hermeneutics by researchers like Ricœur 1975 and Harnisch 1990.

29 Stockwell 2002.

Invariance Principle any discrepancies between source and target domain are resolved in favour of the latter.

For instance, the vessel metaphor in 2 Tim as expounded in section 3.2 involves a schema disruption in that the expectations triggered by the vessel schema are thwarted: The interrelation between the value or material of a vessel and its function and content is first explicitly introduced only to be denied later when the possibility of overcoming this interrelation is introduced. Another example is the runner metaphor of (12) from 1 Cor. 9:24, where metaphoricity disrupts expectations introduced by previous knowledge of the source domain.

In the following, I will show that there are additional techniques of alienation that figure prominently in the metaphors of the Pauline corpus. The focus will be on two techniques, first, juxtaposing literal and metaphorical readings of expressions, which introduces a zeugmatic effect, and second, the deliberate construction of apparent contradictions through metaphorical mappings.

4.2 Kinds of alienation

The juxtaposition of literal and metaphorical readings of expressions shows up in the domain of spatial metaphor in many cases. Often the readings pertain to the same expression, but it is also possible to find them for expressions linked by a sense relation like antonymy (ἄπειμι ‘I am absent’ vs. σὺν ὑμῖν εἶμι ‘I am with you’):

- (45) εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ ἄπειμι, ἀλλὰ τῷ πνεύματι σὺν ὑμῖν εἶμι
 ‘though I am absent in body, yet I am with you in spirit’ (Col. 2:5)

The zeugmatic effect shows up especially for more extended metaphors like the veil metaphor in the second epistle to the Corinthians. It starts off with a literal use of the word κάλυμμα ‘veil’, referring to an event after Moses’ return from Mount Sinai with the tablets of the Ten Commandments (Exodus 34:33):

- (46) ...Μωϋσῆς ἐτίθει κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου.
 ‘...Moses would put a veil over his face so that the Israelites might not gaze at the end of what was fading away.’³⁰ (2 Cor. 3:13)

30 The relative clause *what was fading away* refers to the shine on Moses’ face brought about by being in God’s presence on Mount Sinai.

But then the veil emerges as a metaphor for ignorance, which once again instantiates the metaphor IDEAS ARE PERCEPTIONS (the subcase UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING). This metaphor is carried on through a number of verses, of which only the first one is quoted here:

(47) ἀλλ' ἐπωρώθη τὰ νοήματα αὐτῶν. ἄχρι γὰρ τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας τὸ αὐτὸ κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τῆ ἀναγνώσει τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης μένει, μὴ ἀνακαλυπτόμενον ὅτι ἐν Χριστῷ καταργεῖται.

'But their minds were hardened. For to this day, when they read the old covenant, that same veil remains unlifted, because only through Christ is it taken away.' (2 Cor. 3:14)

This zeugmatic effect shows up for other kinds of metaphors, too, e.g., in 2 Cor 3:3, where the audience is called a letter of Christ, written not with ink (as in a real letter), but with the spirit of the living God.

The second technique is to bring together at least potentially contradictory traits through metaphor. This can be effected within a single metaphor, here the SD and TD give rise to this potential contradiction. As an example, consider Paul's depiction of the process of bringing people to the faith as giving birth to children, even though he is a man, and the children have already fully grown up:

(48) τέκνα μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῆ Χριστός ἐν ὑμῖν

'My children, with whom I am again in labour until Christ is formed in you' (Gal. 4:19)

This deliberate combination of contradictory traits can also emerge through the formulation of several metaphors. For instance, in the epistle to the Romans we find Man dwelling in sin as well as sin dwelling in Man:

(49) οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ

'How can we who died to sin still live in it?' (Rom 6:2)

(50) [= (33)] ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία

'the sin that dwells in me' (Rom 7:20)

From a mathematical point of view, this does not make sense at all: if *A* (properly) contains *B*, then the reverse relation cannot hold (the relation of containment is 'asymmetric' in this respect). But even for the less mathematically inclined these two metaphors are strange from the viewpoint of the source domain, because everyday experience tells

us that there is a sharp contrast between prototypical containers and prototypical content, and that these roles cannot be switched easily.

The deliberate composition of this apparent contradiction could be explained and resolved in that we could interpret the relation of containment as improper containment, which includes spatial coextension as a boundary case. This makes the relation ‘antisymmetric’ in that simultaneous improper containment of *A* in *B* and vice versa entails spatial coextension of *A* and *B*, i.e., the suggestion seems to that Man and sin permeate each other completely.³¹

In sum, the innovation in Pauline metaphor lies in alienation. Rather than emphasising the common ground between source and target domain, and in this way making the target domain more accessible, the limitations of the metaphorical mapping are foregrounded, which is an obstacle for the easy processing of the metaphor.

5 The purpose of poetic metaphors in the Pauline epistles

In the last section I have presented alienation as the overarching feature of Pauline metaphors on the example of spatial metaphors. In this respect, Gerber diagnosis that Pauline epistles are brimful of ‘extravagant metaphors,’ is borne out for spatial metaphors too.³²

But while this analysis might account for the highly poetic character of many passages in the Pauline corpus, it saddles us with an even more pressing question: If alienation and subversion of conventions of conceptualising our environment through metaphors are the hallmark of (at least some) poetry, and if poetry serves no purpose but itself,³³ then why use them in a genre that clearly has a purpose outside itself? Recall that epistles serve a didactic and persuasive purpose. In Stockwell’s terms, Paul should have used ‘explanatory’ instead of ‘expressive’ metaphors, which are distinguished by the range of interpretation possibilities that they allow.³⁴

31 At a first glance it looks as if one could make the same point for the notions ‘Man in God’ and ‘God in Man’ too. Examples are numerous, e.g.:

(i) Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν ‘Christ in you’ (Col. 1:27)

(ii) ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ‘you are in Jesus Christ’ (1 Cor. 1:30)

However, the notion of ‘Man filled with God’ (as expressed in the word ‘enthusiastic’) has a long-standing history in antiquity, which would allow a literal interpretation Schlesier 2006. Considering Paul’s exposure to Greek literature and philosophy, it is thus a matter of further debate whether he in-

roduced this notion in a literal, or a metaphorical way.

For the converse notion of ‘Man in God’ it has been claimed, too, that it had existed in antiquity, too, as part of the myths on which the beliefs and rites of ‘Orphic’ circles were based Graf and Johnston 2007. However, the dating of these myths is controversial Edmonds 2013, so it is not probable that for Paul this notion was a non-metaphorical one.

I thank Renate Schlesier for in-depth discussion of the the notions ‘Man in God’ and ‘God in Man’.

32 Gerber 2005.

33 the poetic function of Jakobson 1960.

34 Stockwell 2002.

What is more, alienation is defined as a technique to enforce a fresh perspective on phenomena that are only too familiar. But the topics of Paul's epistles are entirely novel, so no familiarity or conventionalisation of perspective can be assumed for them.

As a reaction to this question, I can only offer a first tentative hypothesis, which is based on the fact that Paul was the founder of Christian theology, and the basis of much theological reasoning up to the present day. For instance, the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith and grace alone is based mostly on the epistle to the Romans, consider e.g. the references in the joint declaration on the doctrine of justification by the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church in the year 1999.³⁵

When Paul tried to express his ideas, he was continuously breaking new ground, hence, it is not surprising that he used metaphors to express thoughts and concepts hitherto unheard of (or even formerly ineffable). In Crossan's words, "metaphor can also articulate a referent so new or so alien to consciousness that this referent can only be grasped within the metaphor itself".³⁶

However, he shows a very high awareness of the fact that metaphors are an insufficient tool to express very precise thoughts. In CMT terms, he was painfully aware of the potential mismatch between the SD and TD structures as expressed in the Invariance Principle.

My hypothesis is thus that Paul used the alienation of metaphors in order to be more precise. By pointing out the differences between SD and TD to his audience, he warned his readers against taking his metaphors too far. In this way, one could still stick to the claim that Paul's spatial metaphors show a high degree of alienation, what would have to be modified, though, is the claim that alienation solely is used for purposes of de-familiarisation (and, perhaps also the tacit implication that it only occurs in poetic discourse).

In sum, the present paper offered a detailed analysis of spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles, but also paved the way to addressing a more fundamental question, viz., the question of the purpose of alienating metaphors in non-poetic discourse. Future work is called for to check the validity of the hypothesis advocated at this point, viz., that Paul used the alienation of metaphors to heighten the precision of the metaphorical description of his novel concepts and ideas. If this hypothesis is on the right track, it should prove of explanatory value for other kinds of metaphors, too, and also for other Pauline strategies of introducing and outlining his theology.

35 Downloadable from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_31101999_-

[cath-luth-joint-declaration_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_31101999_-cath-luth-joint-declaration_en.html) (visited on 08.06.2016).
36 Crossan 1992.

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Cilliers Breytenbach

Taufe als räumliche Metapher in den Briefen des Paulus

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht das paulinische Verständnis der Taufe als räumliche Metapher. Vor dem Hintergrund des Gebrauchs von βάπτειν/βαπτίζειν im Altgriechischen wird offensichtlich, dass Paulus den Begriff auf spezifische metaphorische Weise verwendet. Paulinische Formulierungen, wie „in den Leib Christi eingetaucht werden“ (1 Kor 12,13), „in Christus eingetaucht werden“ (Gal 3,28) und „in den Tod Christi eingetaucht werden“ (Rom 6,3–5) werden untersucht und deren Implikationen im Rückgriff auf aktuelle metaphortheoretische Ansätze diskutiert.

Keywords: Taufe; Leib Christi; Eintauchen; Paulus-Briefe; Raum-Metaphorik.

This article investigates Paul's use of baptism as a spatial metaphor. Against the background of the usage of βάπτειν/βαπτίζειν in Ancient Greek it is suggested that Paul uses the word in a unique metaphorical way. Instances of Paul metaphorically employing the term in phrases such as “being emerged *in* to the body of Christ” (1 Kor 12:13), “being emerged *in* Christ” (Gal 3:28) and “being emerged *in* the death of Christ” (Rom 6:3–5) are investigated and their implications are discussed in light of current metaphor theories.

Keywords: Baptism; body of Christ; immersion; Pauline epistles; spatial metaphor.

1 Einleitung¹

Die Ursprünge christlicher Taufe sind bei Johannes dem Täufer zu vermuten.² Wir wissen leider nicht, wie das aramäisch sprechende Urchristentum das Untertauchen in Wasser praktizierte, und auch nicht, wie darüber gesprochen wurde, da die Quellen dazu fehlen. Unsere frühesten Quellen sind Griechisch und finden sich in den Briefen des Paulus. Bevor wir mit Paulus fortfahren, der der früheste Zeuge der Verwendung von βαπτίζειν im Zusammenhang mit der christlichen Taufe ist, ist es notwendig, sich über die Bedeutung der griechischen Terminologie hinter unseren Begriffen ‚Taufe‘, ‚taufen‘ und ‚getauft werden‘ klar zu werden,³ denn das deutsche Wort ‚taufen‘ besitzt nicht mehr die Bedeutungsnuance ‚eintauchen‘, die für βαπτίζειν als Intensivform von βάπτειν kennzeichnend ist.

2 Βαπτίζειν/-εσθαι mit εἰς τι/τινα im Griechischen

Als transitiv verwendetes Verb bedeutet βάπτειν, etwas in eine Flüssigkeit einzutauchen, z. B. wenn man Stoff färbt oder der Schmied eine geschmiedete Axt in kaltes Wasser taucht, um sie zu härten. Manchmal geht es nicht um das ‚Eintauchen‘ in Flüssigkeit. So sagt Euripides’ Antigone in den *Phoinikierinnen* über ihre Mutter Iokaste, „von den Toten ein Bronzeschwert aufraffend, taucht (ἔβαψεν) sie es tief in den Körper“.⁴ Der Prometheus des Aischylos ruft, „taucht (ἔβαψεν) zwiesgeschärft der Kehle ein das Schwert“.⁵

Das Verb βαπτίζειν ersetzte mit der Zeit βάπτειν weitgehend. Letzteres drückt in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit häufig aus, dass etwas in Farbstoff eingetaucht wird. Trotz kausativer Form mit -ίζειν bezeichnet βαπτίζειν die Handlung, dass etwas oder jemand eintaucht und von Flüssigkeit umgeben wird. Polybios beispielsweise verwendet das Verb, um auszudrücken, dass Schiffe sinken,⁶ und Strabon schreibt u. a., dass jemand, der in das Tote Meer hineingeht, „nicht versinkt (βαπτίζεσθαι), sondern treibt.“⁷ Aber auch die kausative Bedeutung, etwas oder jemanden in etwas einzutauchen, bleibt erhalten. Der Evangelist Markus erzählt, dass das ganze jüdische Land und

1 Dieser Aufsatz entstand im Rahmen der Forschung der Arbeitsgruppe C-2 *Space and Metaphor in Cognition, Language, and Texts* des DFG-Exzellenzclusters 264 Topoi. Für eine ausführlichere Darstellung, vgl. Breytenbach 2016.

2 Vgl. Mk 6,14,24; 8,28 par.; Mt 3,1; J. Aj 18,116. Viele Forscher meinen, dass die Jesusbewegung die Taufe des Johannes übernahm; vgl. Hartman 1997, 31–32. Für eine Diskussion dieser und anderer Optionen, vgl. Ferguson 2009, 25–37, 60–82, 83–96.

3 Diesem methodischen Grundsatz von Heitmüller 1903, 115–116, ist nach wie vor zu folgen. Abgesehen von der hier gebotenen repräsentativen Auswahl an Belegen vgl. auch die gründliche Untersuchung von Ferguson 2009, 38–59.

4 E. Ph. 1577–1578: χαλκόκοροτον δὲ λαβοῦσα νεκρῶν πάρα φάσγανον εἰσω | σαρκὸς ἔβαψεν.

5 A. Pr. 863: δίθηκτον ἐν σφαγαῖσι βάψασα ξίφος.

6 Plb. 1,15,6f.; 16,6,2.

7 Str. 16,2,42: μηδὲ βαπτίζεσθαι τὸν ἐμβάντα ἀλλ’ ἐξαίρεσθαι.

alle Einwohner Jerusalems im Jordanfluss von Johannes dem Täufer untergetaucht wurden (ἐβαπτίζοντο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ποταμῷ, 1,5) und nach der Formulierung in Mk 1,8 geht es ebenfalls um das Eintauchen in Wasser (ἐγὼ ἐβάπτισα ὑμᾶς ὕδατι), wie die parallele ἐν-Wendung in der Schlusszeile anzeigt (αὐτὸς δὲ βαπτίσει ὑμᾶς ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ).⁸ Die Überlieferung der Redenquelle lautet entsprechend: ἐγὼ μὲν ὕδατι βαπτίζω ὑμᾶς ... αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ („ich tauche euch in Wasser, ... er wird euch in heiligen Geist und in Feuer tauchen“; Lk^Q 3,16//Mt^Q 3,11). Lukians Misanthrop rät, im Winter „dem im Fluss Treibenden nicht die Hand zu reichen, sondern seinen Kopf herunterzudrücken, ihn ‚unterzutauchen‘ (βαπτίζοντα), so dass er nicht wieder empor kommen kann“;⁹ und Plutarch umschreibt die Verdünnung von Wein mit Wasser mit der Wendung „Dionys in das Meer ‚eintauchen‘ (βαπτίζειν).“¹⁰ Absolut gebraucht, kann das Verbum im Medium ausdrücken, sich (die Hände) durch Eintauchen in Wasser zu waschen (vgl. Mk 7,4; Lk 11,38).

Wichtig in unserem Zusammenhang sind die Fälle, in denen βαπτίζειν mit εἰς τι/τινα verwendet wird. In diesem Syntagma bedeutet die Wendung, etwas in etwas anderes einzutauchen.¹¹ Achilles Tatius schreibt von einem Fluss in Libyen, in dessen Schlamm in der Tiefe Schätze liegen. Um an sie heranzukommen, „taucht (βαπτίζουσι) man einen mit Pech bestrichenen Pfahl in das Wasser (εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ) und öffnet die Versperrungen des Flusses.“¹² Es muss nicht immer Wasser sein. Plutarch erzählt, wie der schwer verwundete Postumius Albinus „seine Hand in das Blut (εἰς τὸ αἷμα) tauchend (βαπτίσας) eine Trophäe [aus den Schilden der getöteten Soldaten] aufsetzte, indem er [auf sie etwas] schrieb.“¹³ Bei βαπτίζεσθαι bleibt der lexikalische Sinn gleich.¹⁴ In Mk 1,9 wird, dem allgemeinem Sprachgebrauch folgend, im Passiv formuliert, dass Jesus „durch Johannes in den Jordan eingetaucht wurde“ (ἐβαπτίσθη εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην ὑπὸ Ἰωάννου). Strabon schreibt über den Tatta-See in Lykaonien, er sei „eine natürliche

8 Vgl. auch Apg 8,38.

9 Luc. *Tim.* 44: ὁ δὲ τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγων ἀντιλαβέσθαι δέηται, ὡθεὶν καὶ τούτου ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν βαπτίζοντα, ὡς μὴδὲ ἀνακόψαι δυναθῆι.

10 Plu. *Quaestiones Naturales* (= *Moralia* 914D): βαπτίζουσι τὸν Διόνυσον πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν.

11 Vgl. J. *AJ* 4,81; Hero *Mechanicus Spir.* 1,2,30; Plu. *Bruta animalia ratione uti* (= *Moralia* 985E); *De superstitione* (= *Moralia* 166A); Sor. *Gynaeciorum* 4,11,5 (= CMG IV 142,22): καὶ εἰς τὰς σφαγὰς βαπτίζουσι τὸ σπαθίον μέχρι κενεμβατήσεως εἰς τὸ ἔμβρουον; *Anachreont.* 6.

12 Ach. Tat. *Leuc. et Clit.* 2,14,9: Κουτὸν οὖν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ βαπτίζουσι πίσση πεφαρμαγμένον, ἀνοίγουσι τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ τὰ κλειθρα.

13 Plu. *Parallela minora* (= *Moralia* 305C): καὶ εἰς τὸ αἷμα τὴν χεῖρα βαπτίσας ἔστησε τρόποιον ἐπιγράψας.

14 Dabei ist es bemerkenswert, dass βαπτίζεσθαι mit ἐν τινι oder ἐπὶ τινος vorchristlich nur in der Septuaginta und bei Josephus belegt ist und es dabei darum geht, sich in Wasser einzutauchen bzw. darin untergetaucht zu werden. Vgl. 4 Bas 5,14 (κατέβη Ναϊμαν καὶ ἐβαπτίσαστο ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ἐπτάκι κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμα Ἐλισαιε), sonst J. *BJ* 1,437 (πέμπεται μὲν οὖν ὁ παῖς διὰ νυκτός εἰς Ἱερικουόνα ἐκεῖ δὲ κατ' ἐντολὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν βαπτιζόμενος ἐν κολυμβήθρα τελευτᾷ); Judith 12,7 (καὶ ἐβαπτίζετο [sc. Ιουδιθ] ἐπὶ τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ ὕδατος); Sir 34,25; J. *AJ* 15,55. Etwa zeitgleich mit Paulus zeigen Strabon (*Geographica* 14,3,9) und Plutarch (*Marcellus* 15,3,6), dass Wasser das Element ist, in das etwas eintaucht bzw. untergetaucht wird.

Saline; sein Wasser gerinnt so leicht um alles herum, was in es eingetaucht wird (βαπτισθέντι εἰς αὐτό) ...¹⁵ Es muss auch hier nicht zwingend um eine Flüssigkeit gehen. Aischylos aufnehmend erzählt Flavius Josephus, dass während des Kampfes um Skythopolis Simon, der Sohn eines Sauls, nach der Ermordung seiner Verwandten, „das ganze Schwert in seine eigene Kehle versenkte (εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σφαγὴν ἐβάπτισεν).“¹⁶

In der Kombination mit εἰς τι/τινα ist die Bedeutung des Verbs somit klar. Es drückt die Aktion aus, mit der jemand etwas oder jemanden in etwas anderes, überwiegend Flüssigkeit, aber auch in einen Körper hinein bewegt (aktiv) oder etwas bzw. jemand in etwas hinein bewegt wird (passiv), sodass die Person oder der Gegenstand von der Flüssigkeit oder dem Körper umgeben ist. Der lexikalische Sinn kann am besten mit ‚eintauchen in‘ bzw. ‚eingetaucht werden in‘ wiedergegeben werden.

3 „Eingetaucht werden in Christi Leib bzw. Tod“ bei Paulus

Dieser lexikalische Sinn des Verbes ist auch bei Paulus zu beachten. Die Zuhörer seiner Briefe werden auf jeden Fall das Vorgelesene vor dem Hintergrund des üblichen griechischen Sprachgebrauches ihrer Zeit zu verstehen versucht haben.¹⁷ Paulus verwendet bis auf wenige Ausnahmen¹⁸ das Verb in Verbindung mit εἰς τι/τινα und dann nur im Aorist Passiv – also βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τι/τινα. Da sich der Sprachgebrauch von βαπτισθῆναι bei Paulus, mit oder ohne εἰς τι/τινα, wie bei fast allen Stellen im Neuen Testament¹⁹ ohne die Annahme einer besonderen Bedeutung aus dem normalen Gebrauch im Griechischen befriedigend erklären lässt, soll man es dabei belassen.²⁰

15 Str. 12,5,4: ἡ μὲν οὖν Τάττα ἀλοπήγιόν ἐστιν αὐτοφυές, οὗτω δὲ περιπῆττεται ῥαδίως τὸ ὕδωρ παντὶ τῷ βαπτισθέντι εἰς αὐτό ...

16 J. Bf 2,476: ὄλον εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σφαγὴν ἐβάπτισεν τὸ ζῆφος.

17 Zu Recht formuliert Lietzmann 1971, 65: „βαπτίζεω bedeutet für griechische Ohren nicht ‚taufen‘ sondern ‚eintauchen‘; also ‚wir sind in seinen Tod eingetaucht worden“.

18 Vgl. die aktive Form ἐβάπτισα mit direktem Objekt in 1 Kor 1,14.16, den Infinitiv βαπτίζεω in 1 Kor 1,17 und die passive Form mit ὑπὲρ in 1 Kor 15,29.

19 Das Verb behält den Sinn ‚eintauchen‘ (Mk 1,8; Mt 3,11; Lk 3,16; Joh 1,25f.28.31.33; 3,22f.26; 4,1f.; 10,40; Apg 1,5; 19,4) oder passiv ‚eingetaucht werden‘ (Mk 1,5.9; Mt 3,6.13f.16; Lk 3,7.12.21; 7,29f.; Joh 3,23) auch wenn es auf das christliche Ritual zu taufen (Apg 8,38; 11,16) oder getauft zu wer-

den (Apg 2,41; 8,12f.36; 9,18; 10,47; 11,16; 16,15.33; 18,8) Bezug nimmt. Zu Mt 28,19 s. u.

20 Es geht methodisch nicht an (wie Bietenhard 1966, 274–275; Hartman 1997, 37–50), den Sprachgebrauch des Paulus im Ganzen vor dem Hintergrund des Hebräischen und einer späteren christlichen Sonderbedeutung der Wendungen βαπτίζεω τινα εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τίνος oder βαπτισθῆναι ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι bzw. εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τίνος zu erklären, wie sie sich im Neuen Testament außerhalb der paulinischen Briefe in sechs Fällen (Mt 28,19 oder Apg 2,38; 8,16; 10,48; 19,3.5) abzeichnet. Um eine Entwicklungsgeschichte christlicher Taufterminologie nicht chronologisch vom Ende her zu konstruieren, ist die paulinische Verwendung der Terminologie zunächst vor dem Hintergrund des zeitgenössischen Sprachgebrauchs in der Koinē zu erklären und nicht von einigen Ausnahmen in der Apostelgeschichte her. Zu 1 Kor 1,13.15 und 8,2, vgl. Breytenbach 2016; zu der Apg, Avemarie 2002.

3.1 „Eingetaucht werden in den einen Leib“ (1 Kor 12,13)

Setzen wir für die Deutung der Wendung βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τι bei dem Fall im 1. Korintherbrief ein, der vom Sprachgebrauch im Griechischen her eigentlich eindeutig sein sollte. Paulus schreibt in 1 Kor 12,13: καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν. Friedrich Lang übersetzte die Formulierung in der Tradition Luthers²¹ mit: „Denn wir wurden ja auch durch einen Geist alle zu einem Leib getauft.“²² Die Frage ist, ob dies der Bedeutung des griechischen Wortes und der im Hintergrund stehenden Vorstellung entspricht.

‚Taufen‘ kommt, vom gotischen *daupjan*, ‚eintauchen‘²³ Auch die althochdeutsche Zwischenform *toufan*, ‚tiefmachen‘, besaß noch die Assoziation ‚tief ein-, untertauchen‘. Im heutigen Deutsch ist die Bedeutungsnuance ‚eintauchen‘ aus ‚taufen‘ allerdings verschwunden. Nach den einschlägigen Lexika bedeutet ‚taufen‘ heute schlicht, ‚jmdn., bes. ein Kind, durch die Taufe in die Gemeinschaft der Christen aufnehmen‘; oder ‚jmdm., einer Sache einen Namen geben‘.²⁴ Die gegenüber ihren Anfängen veränderte christliche Taufpraxis, bei der das Eintauchen nicht mehr notwendigerweise zum Ablauf der Taufe gehört, ermöglicht einen Sprachgebrauch, der das Verständnis des griechischen Ausdrucks verstellt. Erst die Bedeutungsverschiebung im Deutschen und die anders geartete Vorstellung hinter dem Ausdruck ermöglichen deutschen Exegeten ihre Übersetzungen mit ‚taufen zu einem Leib‘ o. ä.

Die skizzierte Bedeutung von βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τι/τινα passt offenkundig nicht zu dieser deutschen Übersetzung. Es lässt sich nicht sinnvoll davon sprechen, dass „wir alle durch einen Geist zu einem Leib *eingetaucht* sind“. Wortgemäß, d. h. in einem lokalen Sinne, übersetzt Hans Conzelmann: „Denn wir alle sind ja auch in einem Geist *in* einen Leib getauft“.²⁵ Dieser Linie folgen auch Lars Hartman,²⁶ Wolfgang Schrage²⁷ und Everett Ferguson.²⁸

21 Vgl. die Übersetzung der Lutherbibel: „Denn wir sind durch einen Geist alle zu einem Leibe getauft ...“

22 Lang 1994, 170–171 (Kursivierung von mir geändert). Lang schwankt etwas bei der Auslegung. Schon Johannes Weiss, dem neben Lang auch Wolff (Wolff 2000, 296: „Denn durch einen Geist wurden wir alle zu einem Leib hin getauft ...“) und Lindemann (Lindemann 2000, 268) folgen, bestritt, dass das εἰς lokal als „in ... hinein“ zu fassen sei, und meinte, es beschreibe die Wirkung der Taufe: „... wir sind alle zu einem Leib getauft worden.“ Vgl. Weiss 1910, 303.

23 Vgl. Kluge 2011, 723.

24 Vgl. Klappenbach und Steinitz 1980, 3701–3702.

25 Conzelmann 1981, 256 (Kursivierung von mir). Gegen die konsekutive Deutung mit „... zu einem Leib“, die den Leib (Christi) als Folge der Taufe versteht, hält Conzelmann zu Recht fest: „die Kirche entsteht nicht durch den Entschluß und Zusammenschluß von Menschen, sondern macht diesen erst möglich“ (ebd., 258 Anm. 16).

26 Vgl. Hartman 1997, 67: „[Paul] stresses that the Corinthians were baptised into the new Christ sphere.“

27 Vgl. Schrage 1991–2001 Bd. 3, 215–216: „Denn durch einen Geist sind wir alle in einen Leib hineingetauft“; d. h. „εἰς ἓν σῶμα ist lokal zu interpretieren.“

28 Vgl. Ferguson 2009, 152: „Baptism is the act that introduces a person into the one body.“

Die Frage, die sich in diesem Zusammenhang stellt, ist, worauf sich ἐν σῶμα bezieht. Für Dieter Zeller referiert ἐν σῶμα metaphorisch auf die Kirche. Er weist die lokale Deutung ab und entscheidet sich mit Hinweis auf 1 Kor 1,13 und 10,2 für die Übersetzung „auf einen Leib hin“, also für ein konsekutives Verständnis, nach dem es um die Herstellung einer der Taufe folgenden Beziehung zum Leib (Christi) geht.²⁹ Auch Schrage, der die lokale Deutung vertritt, bezieht ἐν σῶμα angesichts des vorangehenden ὁ Χριστός (12,12) auf den „zur neuen Welt gehörenden Christusleib“.³⁰ Ähnlich beschreibt Andreas Lindemann den Sachverhalt: „Taufe bedeutet die Eingliederung in das σῶμα, aber zugleich auch das Entstehen jenes dann im folgenden beschriebenen Leibes.“³¹

Das mit Artikel versehene ὁ Χριστός setzt den Interpretationsrahmen für ἐν σῶμα, dabei spielt „der in den Tod gegebene physische Leib Christi eine wesentliche Rolle.“³² Die Deutungsversuche zeigen, dass ein wörtliches Verständnis nicht gelingt. Daher ist es besser, den Bezug auf die Taufferfahrung als metaphorisch zu verstehen und dabei auszugehen von der eben erwiesenen Bedeutung des Verbs ‚eintauchen‘. Bei metaphorischem Sprachgebrauch werden Aspekte eines Spendebereichs auf einen Zielbereich übertragen. Hier nimmt Paulus Bezug auf die Taufferfahrung, die er und die Adressaten trotz der Unterschiede in Herkunft und Status gemeinsam haben.³³ Das wichtigste Kriterium für die Identifikation einer Metapher ist in der paulinischen Redeweise eindeutig erfüllt,³⁴ denn es handelt es sich in 1 Kor 12,13 um eine ‚non-basic‘-Verwendung von ἐβαπτίσθημεν.³⁵ Βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς τι/τινα bezeichnet die Aktion, ‚in etwas eingetaucht zu werden‘, wobei es sich nicht zwingend um eine Flüssigkeit handeln muss. Es ist klar, dass „wir alle“, wie Paulus sagt, nicht realiter in den „einen Leib“ eingetaucht wurden. Es ist also metaphorisch vom Eingetaucht-Werden die Rede. Das Eingetaucht-Werden in das Wasser beim Taufritual wird auf die Eingliederung in den einen Leib (εἰς ἐν σῶμα) des gekreuzigten Christus übertragen, das Eingetaucht-Werden in das Wasser gibt also das Bild für die Aufnahme in den einen Leib Christi, durch das „wir alle“ mit Christus verbunden werden. Wie ἐν σῶμα auf den Leib Christi Bezug nimmt, verweist ἐν πνεῦμα auf den einen Geist des einen Herrn (vgl. 1 Kor 12,3–5), der durch die Auferweckung ein πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν geworden ist (vgl. 1 Kor 15,45). Das Bild des Eintauchens verdeutlicht auch, weswegen die Untergetauchten alle, trotz aller Differenzen, mit dem Geist „getränkt“ wurden (ἐποτίσθημεν, 12,13), denn sie sind durch das zurückliegende

29 Vgl. Zeller 2010, 397.

30 Vgl. Schrage 1991–2001 Bd. 3, 216–217.

31 Vgl. Lindemann 2000, 271.

32 Zeller 2010, 397.

33 Im Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes kann nicht auf 1 Kor 12,13ab eingegangen werden.

34 Vgl. die Beschreibung der „Metaphor Identification Procedure“ (MIP) der Pragglejaz-Gruppe bei Semino 2008, 11–12.

35 Für den Begriff ‚non-basic meaning‘ vgl. Semino 2008, 11.

Eintauchen – Paulus redet metaphorisch – *im* Leib Christi.³⁶ Die Immersion in den Leib Christi hat zur Folge, dass die Getauften auch Teil an der Auferweckung Christi haben. Wie für Gal 3,26, Röm 6,3–5 und 1 Kor 1,13 noch zu zeigen ist, versteht Paulus die Taufe vom Tod und der Auferweckung Christi her.

3.2 „Eingetaucht werden in Christus“ (Gal 3,28)

Ein Bild vom Einschluss in Christus durch das Eintauchen bei der Taufe entwirft die Wendung βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τινα auch in Gal 3,26–29: (26) „Ihr seid alle Söhne Gottes durch den Glauben an Christus Jesus, (27) insoweit ihr in Christus eingetaucht seid. Ihr habt Christus angezogen (ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε). (28) Hier gibt es weder Jude noch Grieche, weder Sklave noch Freigelassenen, nicht Männliches und Weibliches, denn ihr alle seid einer in Christus Jesus. (29) Wenn ihr des Christus seid, dann seid ihr Nachkommen Abrahams, der Verheißung entsprechend Erben.“ Wie in 1 Kor 12,13f. ist die Einheit „in Christus Jesus“ (πάντες ὑμεῖς εἰς ἓστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, Gal 3,28). Die Galater, die in Christus hinein getaucht wurden, sind „Christi“ bzw. „von Christus“ (ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ, 3,29). Wie Paulus dazu kommt, ist im Folgenden zu erklären.

Den Ausgangspunkt der Argumentation bilden zwei Feststellungen: (1.) Abraham ist aufgrund des Glauben gerechtfertigt (3,6). Gott schenkte ihm Gnade durch die Verheißung (3,18). Dieser Ausgangspunkt ist der Schrift entnommen (Gen^{LXX} 15,6 in Gal 3,6; Hab^{LXX} 2,4 bestätigt dies; vgl. Gal 3,11). (2.) Die Verheißung gilt auch für die Nachkommenschaft Abrahams. Nach Paulus wurde dem Abraham aber nur ein Nachkomme, nämlich Christus (Gal 3,16) versprochen. Auch diesen Ausgangspunkt meint Paulus, aus der Schrift entnehmen zu können (Gen^{LXX} 12,3; 13,15). Aus diesen beiden Ansatzpunkten zieht er zwei Folgerungen. Die erste Folgerung ergibt sich für ihn ebenfalls aus der Schrift: Die, die aus dem Glauben sind, sind Kinder Abrahams und werden die Verheißung, also die Rechtfertigung, auf der gleichen Basis wie Abraham empfangen, nämlich aus dem Glauben (Gal 3,7.11.18a). Dazu gehören auch diejenigen aus den Völkern, die „aus dem Glauben sind“. Auch sie sind υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ (3,7) und werden mit Abraham gesegnet werden (3,8f.).³⁷ Die zweite Folgerung beruht auf einer Interpretation des To-

36 Man kann in der Tat fragen, ob in Analogie zum Teilhaben an einem Brot in 1 Kor 10,16f. die Getauften nach 1 Kor 12,13 nicht nach der Taufe alle aus einem Kelch beim Herrnmahl ‚getränkt‘ wurden; vgl. Heinrici 1880, 400–401; Conzelmann 1981, 250 Anm. 70. Andere sehen die Ausgießung des Geistes bei der Taufe als Bildspender; vgl. dafür Wolff 2000, 299; Zeller 2010, 398–399. Gegen diese Herleitung Schrage 1991–2001 Bd. 3, 218, der die

Entscheidung zwischen Taufe und Herrnmahl offen lässt.

37 Die Kehrseite ist, dass die, die nicht aus dem Glauben, sondern aus dem Gesetz sind, unter dem Fluch (3,10–12), d. h. von der Verheißung ausgeschlossen sind, denn die Rechtfertigung ist aus dem Glauben (3,11), die Verheißung aus der Gnade (3,18). Das Thema ‚verfluchen‘ und ‚Fluch‘ (καταράσθαι und

des Christi und der Taufe. Sie ist in 3,13f. und 3,26–29 ausgeführt. Zunächst behauptet Paulus, dass „wir“, die nicht alles, was im Gesetz geschrieben steht, taten, und demnach verflucht waren, durch Christi Tod von dem Fluch freigekauft wurden (3,13). In Vers 14 wird das Ziel des Todes Jesu in einer doppelten Formulierung angegeben. Der Segen Abrahams wird ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ein Segen für die Völker, damit Paulus und die Galater den versprochenen Geist³⁸ durch den Glauben empfangen. Wie ist dies möglich? Wie kann es sein, dass die Verheißung, die ursprünglich dem „einen Samen“ Abrahams gilt (3,16.19), für die Glaubenden, auch für die nicht-jüdischen gilt?

Gal 3,26–29 beantwortet diese Frage mit zwei metaphorischen Aussagen in Vers 27.³⁹ Dass es sich hier um Metaphern handelt, liegt wiederum auf der Hand: niemand kann realiter in eine Person, hier Christus „eingetaucht werden“ und selbstverständlich „zieht“ niemand eine Person „an“.⁴⁰ Wenn gesagt wird, dass „ihr, die ihr in Christus eingetaucht wurdet, Christus angezogen habt“ (3,27b), bildet dies aber eine lokale Vorstellung ab. Die Wendung εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε ist also nicht mit „ihr seid auf Christus getauft worden“ zu übersetzen⁴¹ und nicht lediglich im Sinne der Herstellung einer Beziehung zu verstehen.⁴² Vielmehr bietet sich auch hier die Wiedergabe mit „ihr wurdet in Christus eingetaucht“⁴³ an. Wieder findet eine metaphorische Übertragung des Taufrituals statt. Wie die Glaubenden in das Wasser eingetaucht wurden, wurden auch die Galater metaphorisch ‚in Christus eingetaucht‘; sind damit von ihm umkleidet und haben ihn insofern ‚angezogen‘. Die Metaphorik wird weitergeführt, sie sind jetzt Juden und Griechen, Sklaven und Freigeborene, männlich und weiblich gleich gekleidet.⁴⁴

Auf dieser Basis kann Paulus das Argument, dass auch die Galater, obwohl aus den Völkern, zu den Kinder Abrahams gehören, in 3,29 zu Ende führen.⁴⁵ Durch den metaphorischen Rückgriff auf das Ritual verortet Paulus die nicht-jüdischen Galater, insofern sie in Christus eingetaucht wurden, „in Christus“, sie haben Teil an Christus (ὅμοις Χριστοῦ, 3,29),⁴⁶ dem einen Nachkommens Abrahams.⁴⁷ Diese Lokalisierung in Chris-

ἐπικατάρατος) wurde über Gen 12,3 (vgl. 27,29) und Dtn 21,23; 27,26 in Gal 3,10.13 aufgenommen.

- 38 Bei τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος handelt es sich angesichts von Gal 3,2.5 um einen Genitivus obiectivus. So auch Betz 1979, 152–153.
- 39 Betz 1979, 186, nennt Gal 3,28 „an explanatory insertion of great significance“.
- 40 Vgl. Semino 2008, 26–27, für die Kriterien zur Identifizierung der beiden Wendungen als Metaphern, die hier kombiniert auftreten. Für die paulinische Verwendung von ἐνδύειν und die Hintergründe der Vorstellung, vgl. Betz 1979, 188–189; zu ἐπενδύεσθαι, vgl. Schmeller 2010, 291–292.
- 41 So z. B. Schlier 1965, 172–173.
- 42 So z. B. Rohde 1989, 164. Hartman 1997, 56, meint, dass das ‚in Christus hinein‘ sich aus der Formel

‚in den Namen hinein‘ entwickelte. Der Vorgang ist m. E. umzukehren (vgl. auch Breytenbach 2016 Abschnitt 3.4).

- 43 Ähnlich, Betz 1979, 187 („into Christ“); Ferguson 2009, 147–148.
- 44 Den Hinweis verdanke ich Christine Gerber, der ich für die aufmerksame Lektüre danke.
- 45 Aus Raumgründen wird nicht auf die anderen Aspekte von 3,28 eingegangen.
- 46 Rohde 1989, 166, nimmt ὅμοις Χριστοῦ als Genitivus possessivus an; so auch Hartman 1997, 57. Ein partitivus ist aber angesichts von Gal 3,16.19 nicht auszuschließen; vgl. Ferguson 2009, 148.
- 47 Es erübrigt sich, hier nach einem eschatologischen Einheitsmenschen zu suchen; gegen Mußner 1988, 264–265.

tus ermöglicht es Paulus, die nicht-jüdischen Galater zusammen mit allen anderen „in Christus“ als „ein einziger“ (εἷς) zu bezeichnen (3,28) – männlich, weil sie in den einen Samen Abrahams, in Christus (3,16), eingetaucht sind.⁴⁸ Wenn sie Teil von Christus sind, folgt daraus (ἄρα⁴⁹), dass sie als Nachkommen Abrahams Erben seiner Verheißungen sind (3,29).⁵⁰ Die Taufmetaphorik ist somit entscheidend für das auf die Teilhabe der Galater zielende Argument des Paulus. Sie brauchen die Beschneidung nicht. Auch in Röm 6, wo der Zusammenhang zwischen Tod und Auferweckung Christi einerseits und dem Taufritual andererseits explizit formuliert wird, ist die Taufmetaphorik wesentlicher Bestandteil des Gedankengangs.

3.3 „Eingetaucht werden in den Tod Christi“ (Röm 6,3–5)

Bei einer lokalen Deutung der Wendung βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τὸν θάνατον wird auch Röm 6,3–5 verständlicher:⁵¹ „Oder wisst ihr nicht, dass wir alle, die wir in Christus Jesus eingetaucht wurden, in seinen Tod eingetaucht wurden? Durch das Eintauchen (διὰ τοῦ βάπτισματος) wurden wir mit ihm begraben in den Tod ...“ Hierfür prägte Paulus als spezifisch christlichen Begriff das Wort βάπτισμα neu.⁵² Stellen wir knapp den Kontext dieses schwierigen Abschnittes vor.

Paulus entfaltet im zweiten Hauptteil seines Briefes an die Römer seine Auffassung von der Realität der Rechtfertigung der Gottlosen (Röm 5,1–8,39). Er geht dort unter anderem auf zwei Einwände gegen sein Evangelium ein. Beide Probleme dürften in Rom für die nicht-jüdischen, aber vor allem auch für die jüdischen Zuhörer seines Briefes relevant gewesen sein. Der zweite Einwand, der uns hier nicht zu beschäftigen braucht, besteht in dem Vorwurf, Paulus setze durch das Evangelium das Gesetz außer Kraft (3,31). Der erste Einwand war schon zuvor in Röm 3,8 ausgesprochen worden. Einige verleumdete Paulus, indem sie ihm unterstellten, dass er angesichts der unverbrüchlichen Treue Gottes sage, „lasst uns das Böse tun, damit das Gute komme.“ In seiner Entgegnung stellt Paulus eine These auf. Er argumentiert, dass Gottes Gunst (χάρις)⁵³ sich immer mehr vermehrt als die menschlichen Übertretungen (5,20). In dem Abschnitt, dem wir uns widmen, problematisiert Paulus diese These. Wenn die Gunst

48 Mit Dunn 1993, 203.

49 Vgl. BDR § 4518.

50 Nach Wolters weitergehender Deutung sind die Galater „Jesus Christus selbst“ (Wolter 2011, 138).

51 Wolter 2011, 133, meint dagegen, dass „eine räumliche Interpretation ... hier nicht einmal im Ansatz durchführbar“ sei.

52 Nach BAA, *s.v.*, und LSJ, *s.v.*, ist βάπτισμα eine christliche Wortschöpfung, zuerst bei Paulus (nur Röm 6,4) belegt. Eine Durchmusterung des Materials im *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* bestätigt dies. Wie

Mk, Kol und Hebr, verwenden Josephus (*AJ* 17,117) und Plutarch (*De superstitione* [*Moralia* 166A]) das Maskulinum βαπτισμός; Josephus (ebd.) auch βάπτισσις. Beide Wörter sind vorher nicht belegt. Die von Delling 1970, 241, erwähnten Belege (Pseudo-Iamblich, *Theologoumena arithmeticae*, de Valco IX p. 39,4; Oribas. *Coll. Med.* 10,3,10 [= CMG VI 1,2 p. 46,18] sind um Jahrhunderte später.

53 Für diese Bedeutung von χάρις vgl. Breytenbach 2010, 207–238.

Gottes immer das Maß der Sünde übersteigt, drängt sich die Frage der Verleumder auf, ob man etwa in der Sünde weiter leben solle, damit die Gnade sich vermehre (6,1).

Paulus lehnt diese als rhetorische Frage formulierte Ansicht entschieden ab: „Gewiss nicht!“ (μη γένοιτο, 6,2a). Die Begründung verläuft in zwei Sequenzen, die die Abschnitte 6,2b–5.6f. und 6,8–11 umfassen. Wir konzentrieren uns auf den Anfang des ersten Abschnitts (6,2b–5), die Problematisierung des „Bleibens in der Sünde“ von der gemeinsamen Taufferfahrung her. Paulus geht dort in vier Argumentationsschritten vor:

(1.) Er definiert zunächst „uns“ als diejenigen, die „der Sünde gestorben sind“ (6,2bα), d.h. die vom Anspruch der Sünde freigesprochen sind (ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 6,7; vgl. 7,1–6).⁵⁴

(2.) Aufgrund der Annahme, dass „wir“ der Sünde gestorben sind, fragt er folgerichtig, wie es dann möglich sei, dass „wir“ das Leben weiterhin in der Sünde führen (6,2bβ).⁵⁵ Damit ist bereits das Wesentliche zur Entkräftung des Einwands gesagt, aber Paulus weiß, dass er die Prämisse seines Argumentes, er und die Adressaten seien der Sünde gestorben, noch begründen muss.

(3.) Dies tut er durch seine eigene Interpretation der Taufe (6,3–5).⁵⁶ Paulus setzt beim Konsens ein. Er erinnert die Adressaten an ihre eigene Taufe und formuliert die eingangs bereits zitierte Phrase ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν. Βαπτισθῆναι εἰς τι/τινα bezeichnet auch hier ein Eingetaucht-Werden in Christus hinein,⁵⁷ und zwar in ihn als den Gestorbenen.⁵⁸ Paulus stellt eine Verbindung zwischen der Taufe der Gläubigen und dem Schicksal Christi her.⁵⁹ Er greift dabei den grundlegenden christlichen Glaubenssatz von 1 Kor 15,3f. auf, der schon in Röm 5,6–8 eine Rolle spielte, „dass Christus für unsere Sünden gestorben ist“ (ὅτι Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν),⁶⁰ und baut ihn im Blick auf das Taufritual aus: Die, die eingetaucht wurden, wurden in den Tod Christi eingetaucht (εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν), sie sind „mit Christus gestorben“ (ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ, 6,8). Die gemeinsame Glaubensstradition zeigt sich auch in der Fortsetzung des Gedankens. Christus wurde begraben (vgl. 1 Kor 15,4a: καὶ ὅτι ἐτάφη [sc. Χριστός]) und durch die Taufe als Eingetaucht-Werden in seinen Tod hinein auch „wir“ mit ihm (συνετάφημεν, Röm 6,4).⁶¹ Mit jemandem begraben zu werden, bedeutet, dass man das

54 Vgl. BDAG, s.v. 3 mit Hinweis auf Sir 26,29 und TestSim 6,1 für diese Bedeutung von χάρις.

55 Neben ‚lebendig sein‘ hat ζῆν auch die Bedeutung ‚to conduct oneself in a pattern of behavior, live‘ (BDAG, s.v.).

56 So auch Wolter 2011, 143.

57 S. oben. So auch Wilckens 2003, 11–12; Dunn 1988, 311, und Ferguson 2009, 156.

58 Man kann hier nicht mit ‚auf den Namen Jesu Christi‘ übersetzen. Gegen Zeller 1985, 124

59 Vgl. auch Delling 1961, 74–75; Dunn 1988, 311; Ferguson 2009, 156. Dies ist auch für Gal 3,27–28 vorzusetzen (vgl. Gal 2,19f.; 3,13) und in 1 Kor 1,13 explizit (s.u.).

60 Vgl. auch Michel 1978, 205; Zeller 1985, 124; Lohse 2003, 187.

61 Dieser Bezug klärt Zahns Frage (von Zahn 1925, 296), warum der Gedanke mit συνετάφημεν und nicht mit συναπεθάνομεν weitergeführt wurde.

Todesschicksal der Person teilt.⁶² Christus wurde begraben, die, die in der Taufe untergetaucht wurden, sind mit ihm begraben worden. Das Schicksal Christi wird also auf dem Weg der Taufe auf „uns“ übertragen, und damit die positive Wirkung des Todes als Befreiung von der Sünde: Der Sünde gestorben zu sein und deswegen nicht weiterhin ein Leben in ihr führen zu können (6,2), ist möglich dadurch, dass „wir“ in Christi Todesleib hineingetaucht wurden (6,3f.), also in der Taufe mit Christus gestorben sind (vgl. 6,8).

(4.) Nachdem Paulus die Taufe in diesem Sinne interpretiert hat, kann er das Ziel des Mit-Christus-Begraben-Werdens in der Taufe ins Auge fassen (ἴνα, 6,4). Wiederum greift Paulus auf das Bekenntnis aus 1 Kor 15,3f. zurück, wenn er nun auf die Auferweckung Christi zu sprechen kommt (vgl. 1 Kor 15,4a: καὶ ὅτι ἐγήγερται [sc. Χριστός]). Die Neuformulierung ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν in Röm 6,4b steht zwischen zwei Vergleichspartikeln (vgl. ὡσπερ ... οὕτως). Anders als für das Eingetaucht-Werden in den Tod und das Mitgestorben- und Begraben-Sein stellt Paulus für die Auferweckung ein analoges Verhältnis zwischen dem Schicksal Christi und dem künftigen Ergehen der Getauften her.⁶³ Die Anteilnahme an der Auferweckung Christi durch den „Vater“, also durch Gott, soll sich analog in einer „Neuheit des Lebens“ abbilden, in der „wir“ wandeln sollen, d.h. die Getauften sollen ihr Leben analog der Auferweckung Christi auf eine neue Weise führen.⁶⁴ Nicht das Bleiben in der Sünde soll auf die Taufe folgen – tatsächlich ist es durch den Einschluss in den Tod Christi unmöglich –, sondern eine neue Lebensweise, die sich durch den Anteil an der Auferweckung Christi bestimmt.

Es lohnt sich, hier etwas genauer auf die Begründung dieser Aussage einzugehen: εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσομέθα (6,5). Paulus drückt in der Protasis mit εἰ und dem Perfekt γεγόναμεν eine realisierte Bedingung aus. Die Apodosis ist elliptisch⁶⁵ und wird stark eingeführt mit ἀλλὰ καί.⁶⁶ Was bedeutet allerdings σύμφυτος γίνεσθαι? Nach Wolter ist σύμφυτος „ein Verbaladjektiv mit passivischer Bedeutung, das von συμφύειν (‚zusammenwachsen‘) abgeleitet ist.“⁶⁷ Auch wenn diese Deutung seit Zahn die Runde macht,⁶⁸ muss das Element des Wachsens nicht unbedingt Teil des Bedeutungsgehalts sein.⁶⁹ Das zu Grunde liegende Verb συμφύειν kann auch bedeuten, etwas ‚zu vereinen‘ oder ‚zu vereinigen‘. LSJ glossiert zwar einen zweiten Gebrauch von σύμφυτος mit „grown together“;

62 Vgl. Hdt. 5,5,7; D.S. 18,22,8; Chariton, *De Callirhoe narrationes amatoriae* 6,2,9; Claudius Aelianus, *De natura animalium* 7,40,10; Flavius Philostratus, *Vitae sophistarum* 2 (p. 558,5). Vgl. zusätzliches Material bei Jewett 2007, 398 Anm. 65.

63 Vgl. auch Wolter 2011, 146.

64 Für diese Bedeutung von περιπατεῖν, vgl. LSJ und BDAG, s.v.

65 Ohne Ellipse würde die Apodosis lauten: ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμφυτοι γενησόμεθα τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

66 Vgl. BDR § 488.6

67 Wolter 2014, z.St.

68 Vgl. von Zahn 1925, 298–299; Lietzmann 1971, 68; Michel 1978, 205–206.

69 So auch Wilckens 2003, 13.

gibt aber viele Belege für die erste Bedeutung an, die mit „born with one, congenital, innate“ und „natural“ angegeben wird.⁷⁰

Paulus drückt mit *σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν* also augenscheinlich eine Verwandtschaft⁷¹ mit der Gleichheit (*ὁμοίωμα*) des Todes Christi aus. Michael Wolter meint, dass Paulus mit *ὁμοίωμα* „die semantische Differenz zwischen dem alltagssprachlichen Verständnis von Sterben und Tod und der metaphorischen Charakterisierung der Taufe“ markiert, wie er auch sonst mit dem Gebrauch von *ὁμοίωμα* mit Genitiv das „Ineinander von Gemeinsamkeit und Differenz kennzeichnet“.⁷² Als Ritual stellt die Taufe für Paulus einen inhärenten Zusammenhang mit der ‚Gleichheit‘ des Todes und der Auferweckung Christi her. Aufgrund des überlieferten Glaubens an die Auferweckung Christi (vgl. 1 Kor 15,4a) erwartet Paulus, dass diejenigen, die eingetaucht wurden in den Tod Christi, gewiss auch mit der Gleichheit von Christi Auferstehung verwandt sein werden. In Röm 8,29 greift er diesen Gedanken wieder auf, formuliert ihn aber um. Gott hat entschieden, dass seine Kinder, die den Geist (bei der Taufe) bekamen, eine Form (*σύμμορφος*) haben werden, die der Erscheinung (*εἰκῶν*) seines Sohnes, des Erstgeborenen (*πρωτότοκος*) unter vielen Geschwistern, entsprechen wird.⁷³ Die Wahl des von *τίκτειν* abgeleiteten genealogischen Terminus *πρωτότοκος* zeigt, dass es Paulus wie bei *σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν* in 6,5 um eine verwandtschaftliche Gleichheit geht.

Die Interpretation der Taufe dient Paulus als Begründung für die Ausgangsthese, dass „wir“ nicht weiter in der Sünde leben können.⁷⁴ Wir sahen, wie in Röm 6,3–5 das zum Glaubensbekenntnis verdichtete Sterben, Bestattet-Werden und Erweckt-Worden-Sein Christi (1 Kor 15,3f.) auf den Vorgang der Taufe übertragen wird, um die Wirkung der Taufe zu verdeutlichen. Anders als in 1 Kor 12,13 und Gal 3,27, wo Paulus im Rückgriff auf das Taufritual metaphorisch die Einheit der Getauften untereinander oder ihre Einheit mit Christus beschreibt, haben wir es in Röm 6,3–5 mit einer metaphorischen Ausdeutung der Taufe selbst zu tun.

Tatsächlich liegt es gerade angesichts der Verwendung von *ὥσπερ ... οὕτως* (6,4) und *ὁμοίωμα* (6,5) nahe, einen metaphorischen Gebrauch der Sprache anzunehmen.⁷⁵

70 Vgl. LSJ, *s.v.*; Cranfield 1979, 306–307.

71 Mit Cranfield 1979, 307; Zeller 1985, 122 und 124; Jewett 2007, 400.

72 Wolter 2014, z.St.; vgl. Röm 1,23; 8,3; Phil 2,7.

73 Paulus schließt auch anderswo von der Auferweckung Christi auf die zukünftige Auferweckung derer in Christus (mit Zeller 1985, 124): vgl. 1 Thess 4,14; 1 Kor 6,14; 15,20ff.; 2 Kor 4,14.

74 Röm 6,6 als weitere Begründung der Prämisse aus 6,2b (das Gestorben-Sein für die Sünde) führt das Argument von 6,5 weiter. Die Gleichheit ergibt sich

in dem Wissen, dass in der Taufe der alte Mensch mit gekreuzigt wurde mit dem Ziel/der Folge, dass der von der Sünde qualifizierte Leib vernichtet wurde, sodass „wir“ nicht länger der Sünde dienen.

Röm 6,7 ist ein allgemeiner Grundsatz, der aber auf der Prämisse aufbaut, dass „wir“ in der Taufe mit gestorben sind. Wer gestorben ist, ist freigesprochen von der Sünde, wie 7,1–6 mit einem Beispiel verdeutlicht.

75 Vgl. auch Dunn 1977/1978, 173–175; Dunn 1988, 1.311f.; Dunn 2003, 452.

Die Kriterien für Metaphern sind auch sonst eindeutig erfüllt.⁷⁶ Es gibt nicht nur eine, sondern mehrere Metaphern – ein weiteres Anzeichen. So ist in 6,2 eine ‚non-basic‘-Verwendung von ἀπεθάνομεν festzustellen. Abgesehen davon, dass es klar ist, dass „wir“ nicht wirklich tot sind, zeigt τῆ ἁμαρτίᾳ die besondere Art des „Sterbens“ auf. Es wird also metaphorisch vom Sterben gesprochen. Ebenso wird ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς in Röm 6,3 metaphorisch verwendet. Dass Personen in etwas eingetaucht werden, gehorcht dem üblichen Sprachgebrauch, die Gegenstände in die sie nach Röm 6,3f. eingetaucht werden, in eine andere Person (εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν) bzw. deren Tod (εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ), weichen aber wie in Gal 3,27 und 1 Kor 12,13 von diesem Sprachgebrauch ab, was ein metaphorisches Verständnis befördert.⁷⁷ Das Wort ἐβαπτίσθημεν wird zweimal verwendet – also gibt es, wie oft bei Metaphern, „repetition“.⁷⁸ Zudem ist der Begriff βάπτισμα Rekurrenz von ἐβαπτίσθημεν. Auch συνετάφημεν in Röm 6,4 wird auf besondere Weise verwendet, denn üblicherweise bezeichnet συσθάπτειν im Passiv im Griechischen eine wirkliche Bestattung in einem Grab oder Sarkophag. „Wir“ sind als Getaufte natürlich nicht im eigentlichen Sinne mit Christus bestattet worden, „wir“ sind vielmehr verwandt geworden „mit der Gleichheit seines Todes“.

Paulus interpretiert die Taufe vom Bekenntnis her, das Christi Sterben, Begräbnis und Auferweckung zum Inhalt hat. Dieses Bekenntnis ist hier der Spendebereich, der metaphorisch auf die Taufferfahrung der Adressaten übertragen wird. Paulus erklärt, was es bedeutet, dass er und die Adressaten in der Vergangenheit einmal in das Wasser eingetaucht wurden, nämlich dass dies eine Verwandtschaft mit der Gleichheit mit dem Tod und der Auferweckung Christi hergestellt hat.

Die Neubeschreibung des Taufrituals als Eingetaucht-Werden in Christi Sterben und Auferweckung ermöglicht es Paulus, die Taufe als Verbindung der Adressaten mit dem Tod und der Auferstehung Christi zu beschreiben und so als Grundlage für sein Argument gegen das Verweilen in der Sünde zu verwenden. Auch wenn Hans Lietzmann von einer „symbolischen“ Übertragung des Todes Christi auf die Taufe redet, Paulus aber seines Erachtens das Sterben im Taufvorgang „als etwas Reales denkt“, hat er doch die Vorstellung, die zur Übertragung des Sterbens, Begraben-Werdens und der Auferweckung Christi auf die Taufe führte, gut geschildert: „Als wir mit unserer ganzen Liebe (wie noch lange altkirchliche Sitte) im Wasser verschwanden, sind wir symbolisch (durch Ertränken) getötet und (im Wasser) begraben.“⁷⁹

76 Vgl. wieder die Beschreibung der „Metaphor Identification Procedure“ (MIP) der Pragglejaz-Gruppe bei Semino 2008, 11–12.

77 Siehe oben.

78 Vgl. Semino 2008, 22.

79 Lietzmann 1971, 65.

4 Zusammenfassung

Geht man von der üblichen Bedeutung der Wendung βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς τι/τινα im Griechischen aus, dann lassen sich die Aussagen des Paulus in 1 Kor 12,13 und Gal 3,27 befriedigend erklären, wenn man sieht, dass Paulus das ihm und seinen Adressaten bekannte Taufritual aufgreift und die Beziehung der Getauften zu Christus und untereinander metaphorisch vom „Eingetaucht-Werden-in“ her beschreibt.⁸⁰ Er spricht vom Taufritual her räumlich vom Leib Christi. „In Christus“ wird die Einheit derer, die in dem Raum sind, gewährt. Etwas anders stellt sich die Sache in Röm 6,3–5 dar. Hier redet Paulus in der Sprache des Bekenntnisses metaphorisch vom „Eingetaucht-Werden“ in Tod, Bestattung und Auferstehung Christi, um dann, auf Basis der so verstandenen Taufe, die die Getauften in den Christusraum eingliedern, in einem zweiten Schritt zu einem neuen Lebenswandel aufzurufen. Dass es sich bei dem Eingetaucht-Werden in Christus bzw. in seinen Leib und in seinen Tod um eine räumliche Metapher handelt, ist offensichtlich. Es öffnet die Tür zur Makro-Metapher des „In-Christus-Sein“, die zu erklären hier nicht die Aufgabe sein kann.⁸¹

80 Dies gilt auch für 1 Kor 10,2 (s. o.).

81 Vgl. Horn u. a. (im Druck).

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Helmut Utzschneider

Irdisches Himmelreich. Die ‚Stiftshütte‘ (Ex 25–40*) als theologische Metapher

Zusammenfassung

Die biblische Erzählung von der Errichtung des Sinaiheiligtums, der sogenannten Stiftshütte, im Buch Exodus Kap 25–40 wird als „ausgeführte Metapher“ im Sinne Paul Ricoeurs sowie als „absolute Metapher“ im Sinne Hans Blumenbergs gedeutet. Das heilige Zelt und seine sakrale Ausstattung, das die Israeliten auf Anweisung Gottes an Mose herzustellen haben, soll Gott als ‚Wohnung‘ bei den Israeliten dienen. Der Raum und die Räume des Heiligtums werden aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven entwickelt. Der metaphorische Charakter der Erzählung erweist sich dadurch, dass das ‚Wohnen Gottes‘ nur in Spannung zwischen göttlichem und menschlichem Bereich dargestellt werden kann. Der Raum des Heiligtums vereinigt gegensätzliche und zugleich komplementäre Weisen der Präsenz Gottes unter den Menschen.

Keywords: Exodus; Heiligtum; Wohnung (Gottes); Lebendige Metapher; Absolute Metapher.

The biblical narrative of the creation of the Sinai sanctuary, called the tabernacle, in the book of Exodus chapters 25–40 is interpreted as “living metaphor” in the sense of Paul Ricoeur as well as “absolute metaphor” in the sense of Hans Blumenberg. The tabernacle and its sacred furniture have to be built by the Israelites on God’s instruction. It serves God as ‘dwelling’ among the Israelites. The space and the rooms of the sanctuary are developed from different perspectives. The metaphorical character of the narrative is proved by the fact that the ‘dwelling of God’ can only be represented in the tension between divine and human realms. The space of the sanctuary unites opposing yet complementary ways of God’s presence among mankind.

Keywords: Exodus; sanctuary; dwelling of God; living metaphor; absolute metaphor.

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Der Begriff ‚Stiftshütte‘ – er stammt aus der Bibelübersetzung Martin Luthers – bezeichnet das Heiligtum, das die Hebräische Bibel „Zelt der Begegnung“ (אהל מועד), engl. „tent of meeting“; und die LXX, σκηνη „Zelt“, nennt.¹ Von der Planung und dem Bau dieses Heiligtums erzählt das Buch Exodus in den Kapiteln 25–40. Sie enthalten eine detailreiche Beschreibung sakraler ‚Topoi‘; also des Heiligtums, seiner Räume und ihrer Einrichtungen. Der literarischen Form nach handelt es sich um eine vorzeitlich-fiktive, theologische Erzählung, deren Thema und Plot Gott als handelnde Figur so bestimmt: „Sie (scil. die Israeliten) sollen mir ein Heiligtum herstellen, damit ich (Gott) unter ihnen (den Israeliten) wohne.“

וע שׁו לי מקד שׁו שכנתי בתוכם

Die Erzählung handelt somit offensichtlich von Raum bzw. Räumen (*space*). Meine These ist, dass diese Erzählung als theologische Metapher zu verstehen ist. Es geht dabei, wohlgemerkt, nicht um Metaphern *im* Text, sondern um den Text *als* Metapher.

Zur Entfaltung und Begründung dieser These werde ich in aller Kürze in die Stiftshüttenerzählung und ihre literarischen und historischen Kontexte einführen, die mit dem Heiligtum verbundenen Raumvorstellungen erheben sowie ihre theologischen Implikationen herausarbeiten und die Stiftshütte als theologische Metapher interpretieren.

I „Sie sollen mir ein Heiligtum herstellen, damit ich unter ihnen wohne.“ – Die ‚Stiftshüttentexte‘ und ihre Kontexte

Die Stiftshüttenerzählung ist in zwei große Abschnitte, Ex 25–31 und Ex 35–40, gegliedert. Der erste Abschnitt (Ex 25–31) ist am oder auf dem Gipfel des Sinai genannten Gottesberges situiert, an dessen Fuß die Israeliten auf ihrem Weg von Ägypten ins verheißene Land Station gemacht haben. Erzählt wird in diesem Abschnitt, was Gott dem Mose zu sagen hat. Dies geschieht – abgesehen von erzählenden Redeeinleitungen – ausschließlich in Reden, mit denen Gott dem Mose Anweisungen erteilt, die dieser an die Israeliten übermitteln soll: Die Israeliten haben zum Bau des Heiligtums die Baumaterialien bereit zu stellen: Gold, Silber, Kupfer, erlesene Farbstoffe und Webarbeiten sowie edle Hölzer und Pretiosen, und daraus die Bauteile anzufertigen. Nur von einer einzigen Handlung erfahren wir (und dies auch nur indirekt): Gott zeigt Mose einen Plan des Heiligtums (Ex 25,9).

Der Schauplatz des zweiten Teils der Erzählung (Ex 35–40) ist das Lager der wandernden Israeliten am Fuß des Gottesberges. Nun dominiert nicht die Rede, sondern

1 Die Terminologie in Ex 25–40^o ist nicht völlig konsistent. ‚Zelt der Begegnung‘ scheint uns jedenfalls der Terminus, der das Heiligtum in seiner Anla-

ge und seinen Funktionen am umfassendsten umschreibt. Vgl. Utzschneider 1988, 124–133.

die Aktion: Die Israeliten stellen – wie von Gott geheißen – die Baumaterialien bereit und fertigen das Heiligtum, genauer gesagt: dessen Teile (Ex 35–39). Diese fügt Mose schließlich so zu der Stiftshütte zusammen, wie Gott es ihm zu Beginn in dem erwähnten Plan gezeigt hat (Ex 40).

Dann, so heißt es am Schluss der Erzählung,
 ... bedeckte die Wolke die Stiftshütte,
 während die Herrlichkeit JHWHs die Wohnung erfüllte,
 Mose aber konnte an die Stiftshütte nicht herankommen,
 denn die Wolke hatte auf ihr Wohnung genommen
 und die Herrlichkeit JHWHs hatte die Wohnung erfüllt. (Ex 40,34)

Gott hat also in Gestalt seiner himmlisch-kosmischen Manifestationen, als Feuer- und Lichterscheinung (hebr. *kābôd* – griech. *δόξα* – dt. Herrlichkeit) sowie als Wolke, eine irdische Wohnung bezogen. Mit und in diesen Manifestationen wird er die Israeliten auf ihrem Weg durch die Wüste bis ins verheißene Land begleiten. Auf jeder ihrer Stationen werden die Israeliten bei ihrer Ankunft das Heiligtum inmitten ihres Lagers aufbauen, beim Aufbruch wieder abbauen, verpacken und zur nächsten Station transportieren. In selben Rhythmus wird Gott ihnen jeweils erscheinen, sei es in der Licht- und Feuer-Gestalt des *kābôd*, sei es als wegweisende Wolke über dem Zelt. Nach der Ankunft der Israeliten im verheißenen Land verliert sich die Spur der Stiftshütte.

Es lässt sich darüber streiten, ob es jemals die Stiftshütte oder ein ihr vergleichbares Zeltheiligtum gegeben hat. Für das Verständnis der Stiftshüttentexte ist dies letztlich nicht wichtig. Entscheidend dafür ist der historische und literarische *Kontext*, in dem die Texte entstanden sind.

Die Stiftshüttenerzählung gehört zu der ‚priesterschriftlich‘ genannten Schicht des Pentateuchs,² d. h. sie ist etwa ab der Mitte des 6. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. entstanden und steht unter dem Eindruck der Zerstörung des ersten, des salomonischen Tempels in Jerusalem durch die Babylonier sowie der Exilierung der führenden Schichten, insbesondere des Königshofs und der Priesterschaft. Unter den Persern, die die Oberherrschaft von den Babyloniern übernommen haben, regen sich Bestrebungen, das Jerusalemer Heiligtum auf dem heiligen Berg Zion wieder aufzubauen. Die Stiftshüttentexte gehören in das Spektrum dieser Bestrebungen hinein. Die Absicht, JHWH (wieder) eine Wohnung inmitten seines Volkes zu geben, erscheint in mancherlei Variationen in der zeitgenössischen biblischen Literatur des 6. Jahrhunderts.³ Der Prophet Sacharja (Sach 2,14.15; 8,3) etwa verbindet damit die Absicht, nicht nur den Tempel in Jerusalem wieder aufzubauen, sondern auch eine Restauration der Davidsdynastie herbeizuführen. Beim Pro-

2 Vgl. dazu Utzschneider 1988, 55–70; Cortese 1998; Utzschneider 2014, 294–299.

3 Vgl. dazu Janowski 1993, passim; Görg 1993, insbesondere Sp. 1347.




Abb. 1 Das Sinaiheiligum nach Ex 25–31; 35–40.

pheten Ezechiel erscheint ein ganz ähnlicher Programmsatz („... und ich will für immer unter ihnen wohnen“, Ez 43,9). Er steht im Rahmen einer Vision, die einen Neubau des Tempels in Jerusalem und eine Neuordnung des Landes erwartet, dem künftigen König dabei aber eine nur sehr begrenzte Rolle zubilligt. Tatsächlich gelungen ist ein bescheidener Neubau des Tempels, der von der neuen persischen Hegemonialmacht nicht nur sanktioniert, sondern vermutlich auch unterstützt wurde.

Die Stiftshüttentexte halten zu diesen Konzepten räumlich und zeitlich deutlich Abstand, so sehr sie das Grundanliegen einer Gotteswohnung teilen. Sie spielen in der Vorzeit, ihr Schauplatz liegt weit von Jerusalem weg am Sinai; keiner der Akteure der persischen Zeit wird auch nur andeutend erwähnt. Nicht ein König, gleichviel ob ein Davidide oder ein Perser, soll der menschliche Bauherr des Heiligtums sein, sondern das Volk. Die wandernde Stiftshütte hat – anders als das untrennbar mit Jerusalem verbundene Zionsheiligum – weder eine feste Stätte, noch erhebt sie Anspruch auf Ewigkeit wie dieses. Kurz: Die Stiftshüttentexte reflektieren grundsätzlich theologisch, was es mit der ‚Wohnung Gottes‘ bei den Menschen auf sich hat. Diese Reflexion drückt sich im Raumprogramm und im Raumkonzept der Stiftshüttentexte aus.

2 Die Raumkonzepte der Stiftshütte

Zunächst einige Bemerkungen zur Kategorie des Raumes wie wir sie hier verstehen: ‚Raum‘ ist keine nur physische Kategorie,⁴ sondern hat auch soziale und symbolische, d. h. religiös-theologische Dimensionen.⁵ Die Materialien, die Farben und Formen der Bauteile fügen sich zu Räumen, in denen sich Gott und Mensch begegnen, sie bilden Schauplätze für soziale und kultische Rollen und last but not least konstituieren sie eine religiöse Symbolwelt. Freilich sind die Räume der Stiftshütten keine realen, sondern literarisch-narrative Räume. Gestalt gewinnen sie allererst in der Vorstellung der

Leserinnen und Leser, deren unterschiedliche Voraussetzungen und Perspektiven eine Vielzahl von Gestalten erstehen ließ und lässt.

Neuere wissenschaftliche Kommentare oder Handbücher zeigen meist nüchterne Architekturzeichnungen, übertragen Bildermaterial aus antiken Kontexten auf die ‚Stiftshütte‘ und bemühen sich um textliche wie historische Authentizität (Abb. 1).⁶

Illustrationen in Bibeln oder Schriften, die auch für ‚Laien‘ gedacht sind, lokalisieren das Heiligtum aber in ihren jeweiligen zeitgenössischen Kontexten und konkretisieren die Angaben aus ihrer jeweiligen Vorstellungswelt.⁷

Auch die biblischen Raumvorstellungen sind nicht einheitlich, was teils dem Umstand zuzuschreiben ist, dass die Texte nicht aus einer Hand stammen, sondern (vermutlich mehrfach) redaktionell bearbeitet wurden, teils aber auch durch die unterschiedlichen Perspektiven bedingt ist, aus denen die Texte die Räume darstellen. Wir werden im Folgenden drei Perspektiven nachzeichnen: die Perspektive Gottes, wie sie in dessen Rede an Mose in Exodus 25,10–27,19 erscheint, die Perspektive der Priesterschaft aufgrund der Anweisung zur Herstellung des priesterlichen Ornats (Ex 28) und das Raumkonzept aus der Perspektive der Israeliten aufgrund der Bauerzählung (Ex 35–39).⁸

2.1 Das Raumkonzept aus der Perspektive Gottes (Ex 25,10–27,19)

Die Perspektive Gottes ist in der Gottesrede, insbesondere in ihrem Kernbereich von Ex 25,10–27,19, enthalten. Die Beschreibung setzt mit den sakralen Gegenständen ein, an vorderster Stelle steht die Lade, hebräisch ארון, sowie ein *kapporet* (hebr. כפרת) genannter Gegenstand (Ex 25,10–22).⁹ Darauf folgen die Menorah und ein Tisch mit Broten, dann erst ist von der Wohnung (מִשְׁכָּן), also dem ‚Gebäude‘ die Rede, in der diese Gegenstände einmal Aufnahme finden sollen (Ex 26). Die weiteren Bauelemente befinden sich schon außerhalb des Gebäudes: ein kupferner (Brandopfer-)Altar (Ex 27,1–8), schließlich der Hof und seine Umfriedung (Ex 27,9–19). Diese Anordnung erweckt den Eindruck, als würde – aus der Perspektive Gottes – das Gebäude um die Sakralgegenstände herum gebaut und als sei die ganze Anlage von innen nach außen konzipiert. Als zentral werden

4 Als primär architektonische Größe erscheint die Stiftshütte in den Plänen und Rekonstruktionszeichnungen der Bibellexika und Kommentare. Cf. Kennedy 1909, 657, 661.

5 Cf. etwa George 2009. Mark K. George folgt in seiner Monographie der Raumtheorie des französischen Philosophen Henri Lefebvre.

6 Exemplarisch deutlich werden wird dies an den Illustrationen im Exodus-Kommentar der renommierten Anchor-Bible, aus der auch die Abbildungen dieses Aufsatzes entnommen sind (Propp 2006).

Cf. auch die Darstellungen bei Kennedy 1909, 657; Reicke 1966, 1875–1876; Homann 2002, 127–187.

7 Cf. etwa die Kupferstiche in der ersten vollständigen Lutherbibel von 1534. Die Illustrationen sind in der Werkstatt Lucas Cranachs entstanden. Luther 1534, Seiten LIII–LIIII.

8 Cf. dazu auch Utzschneider 2014, 279–294.

9 Für den vorgelagerten Raum der Wohnung sind ein Tisch und der Leuchter vorgesehen, nach Ex 30,1–10 wird den Letzteren noch ein goldener (Räucher-)Altar hinzugefügt.




Abb. 2 Lade und Kapporet.

sich gleich Lade und *kapporet* erweisen. Deshalb gehen wir ausführlicher auf sie ein (Abb. 2).

Die Lade wird als ein Kasten aus goldüberzogenem Akazienholz beschrieben, in dem die sog. ‚*edut*‘ (עדות) Aufnahme finden sollen (Ex 25,16); dieser Begriff kann mit ‚Zeugnisse‘ oder auch – u. E. sachgemäßer – mit ‚Gesetze‘ wiedergegeben werden. Es handelt sich jedenfalls um Schriftstücke. Meist denkt man an die von Gott am Sinai verkündeten und auf Tafeln geschriebenen Zehn Gebote; ich meine freilich, dass damit *alle* am Sinai verkündeten Gesetze und Ordnungen gemeint sind.¹⁰

Die *kapporet* wird oft als eine Art Deckel auf der Lade verstanden,¹¹ es kann sich aber auch um ein separates Stück über ihr handeln. Jedenfalls soll sie – wie die Lade – aus reinem Gold sein. In getriebener Technik sollen zwei Keruben (כרובים) aus ihr herausgearbeitet sein. Darunter sind Mischwesen vorzustellen, die meist mit menschlichen Köpfen, Tierleibern und Flügeln dargestellt werden. Nicht selten dienten sie paarweise in paralleler Schreitstellung als Lehnen für Thronsitze von Königen oder Göttern und signalisierten die königliche bzw. göttliche Machtsphäre (Abb. 3).

Diese Assoziation ist für die *kapporet* m. E. bewusst ausgeschaltet, denn ihre Keruben stehen nicht parallel wie die Lehnen eines Throns, sondern *face to face* gegeneinander. Ungeachtet dessen verweisen die Keruben auf die Präsenz Gottes, wenn auch nicht als thronender König.¹²

10 Utzschneider 1988, 110–117; nach dem Vorbild altorientalischer Tempel könnte es sich auch um eine Bauinschrift handeln, vgl. George 2009, 169.

11 Janowski 2000, 274.

12 Cf. Propp 2006, Exodus 19–40, 519. 521.



Abb. 3 Kerubenthron (nach einer Elfenbeinarbeit). Megiddo, letztes Drittel 2. Jt. BCE.

Eine weitere Funktion der *kapporaet* ist die kultische Sühne.¹³ Die Präsenz Gottes erfordert von Menschen, die ihr nahe kommen, einen makellosen, „reinen“ Zustand. Die *kapporaet* bewirkt diesen Zustand – anders als etwa Riten des Versöhnungstages (*yom kippur*, Lev 16,14f.17) – durch ihr bloßes Vorhandensein. Man versteht deshalb am besten als ‚Sühneort‘ oder ‚Sühnemat‘.¹⁴

Eine dritte Funktion dieser beiden Gegenstände erschließt sich, wenn *‘edut* und *kapporaet* räumlich und funktional zusammengedacht werden. Dies geschieht in der Gottesrede in Ex 25,22: „Dort“ werde ich dir begegnen und mit dir sprechen (דברתי אתך) von der *kapporaet* herab zwischen den Keruben auf der Lade des Gesetzes (*‘edut*):“ Dieses Raumbild ist am besten so zu entschlüsseln: Die Lade repräsentiert die in den *‘edut* / Gesetzen niedergelegte göttliche Weltordnung, von der ihr verbundenen *kapporaet* gehen je und je Gottesworte (דברים) zur Interpretation dieser Gesetze aus. Zusammengenommen ist eine Funktionsbeschreibung des Heiligtums ganz ähnlich der der Zionsweissagung

13 Janowski 2000, 189–276.

14 Janowski 2000, 347–50




Abb. 4 Die ‚Wohnung‘ und ihre Konstruktion.

in Jes 2,3 bzw. Mi 4,2: Von Zion / Jerusalem werde Tora (תורה) und Gotteswort (דבר יהוה) zu den Völkern ausgehen.

Die beschreibenden Anweisungen zur ‚Wohnung‘ (מִשְׁכָּן), also dem zentralen Bau des Heiligtums (Ex 26), beginnen mit einer Zeltdecke oder Plane. Sie bildet die inneren Wände sowie die Decke des Baues, sie ist aus Leinen sowie violett, purpurn und karmesinrot gefärbten Wollfäden gewebt. Zusätzlich sind in das kostbare Mischgewebe Keruben eingearbeitet, die mit den beiden Figuren auf der *kapporæt* korrespondieren und wie diese als Zeichen der göttlichen Sphäre zu verstehen sind. Über dieser Plane sollen einfachere Decken aus dunkler Ziegenwolle sowie zwei weitere Abdeckungen aus Widder- bzw. sogenanntem Tachaschleder liegen. Zu einem lichten Raum wird die Wohnung durch eine zum Ausgang hin offene Konstruktion aus vergoldeten Brettern aus Akazienholz, über die die Decken geworfen oder gespannt zu denken sind (Abb. 4).

Mittels zweier Vorhänge wird die Wohnung in einen innersten und einen äußeren Raum geteilt bzw. nach außen abgeschlossen. Der innere Vorhang (פְּרֻכָּה) soll in der gleichen Kunstweberarbeit ausgeführt werden wie die innere Decke. So bildet der innerste Raum der Wohnung einen Kubus von etwa 10x10x10 Ellen¹⁵, der Lade und *kapporæt*

15 Dies lässt sich aus der Angabe erschließen, dass die innere Decke an der Rückseite der Wohnung über die ganze Höhe der Bretterkonstruktion, also 10 Ellen, überhängt. Die Verbindungsstelle der beiden Gebinde, an der der Trennvorhang anzubringen ist

(Ex 26,33), liegt dann 10 Ellen von der Rückwand entfernt. Cf. Homann 2002, 181–84. Exakte Maße sind nicht möglich, da es in der Anordnung der ‚Bretter‘ und ihrer Tiefe Unklarheiten gibt. Als Ku-

mit dem kostbaren, farbigen Gewebe samt den darin eingearbeiteten Kerubenfiguren umschließt. Die ebene, kubische Dimension, seine hochwertige Ausstattung sowie die Keruben-Ikonographie zeichnen diesen Raum als „Allerheiligstes“ (Ex 26,34) aus.

Der äußere Raum¹⁶, der Leuchter, Tisch und einen Räucheraltar (der in Ex 30,1–7 nachgetragen wird) beherbergt, wird am östlich gelegenen Eingang durch einen weiteren Vorhang (מסך) geschlossen, der zwar auch aus dem farbigen Mischgewebe, aber ohne die eingearbeiteten Keruben gefertigt ist.

Im Hof und seiner Umfriedung dominieren die Materialien Kupfer und einfaches Leinen. Der Brandopferaltar im dem Hof ist ganz aus von Kupfer überzogenem Holz. Auch das später hinzukommende Becken ist aus Kupfer. Die Umfriedung des Hofes besteht aus rein leinenen Behängen.

Materialien, Machart und Dimensionen des Baus weisen ein Gefälle vom Wertvollen und Raffinierten zum Alltäglichen und Einfachen auf. Der innere Raum der Wohnung ist ganz von wertvollstem Mischgewebe umgeben, die heiligen Geräte selbst sind rein golden; nach außen und zu den oberen Decken hin nimmt die Werthaltigkeit ab. Im inneren Zentrum, dem Kubus mit Lade und *kapporæt*, hat die göttliche Sphäre gleichsam die höchste Dichte und ‚Heiligkeit‘.

2.2 Das Raumkonzept aus der Perspektive der Priesterschaft aufgrund der Anweisung zur Herstellung des priesterlichen Ornaments (Ex 28)

Die Perspektive der Priesterschaft erschließt sich aus der Anweisung zur Herstellung der Priesterkleider (Ex 28), insbesondere des Ornaments des Hohepriesters.¹⁷ Wir konzentrieren uns auf drei Stücke dieses Ornaments, den sog. Efod (אפוד), eine Art Schurz, den Choschän (חשן), eine Brusttasche oder Pektoriale, und das Diadem (צִיץ, wörtl. ‚Blüte‘) am Kopfbund (מצנפת). Ein kurzer Blick wird auf die Kleidung der einfachen Priester zu werfen sein.

Der Efod ist aus den gleichen farbigen Mischgeweben herzustellen (Ex 28,6) wie die innere Decke bzw. der innere Vorhang der Wohnung. An seinen Trägern sind in Schul-

bus wird auch der *d^e bir*, der hölzerne Schrein des Salomonischen Tempels, beschrieben (1Kön 6,20), der dem Allerheiligsten der Wohnung entspricht.

16 Er ist etwa doppelt so lang wie der innere; Länge und Breite des Gebäudes stehen somit im Verhältnis 3:1, d. h. in ihrer Grundstruktur entspricht die Wohnung einem Langhaus-Tempel, mit einem Hauptraum im vorderen und einer abgeteilten inneren ‚Cella‘, in der in ikonischen Kulturen die bildliche Repräsentanz des Gottes ihre Wohnung hat. Auch für die spezifische Machart als Zelt im Umfeld eines

rechteckigen Hofes können historische Vorbilder namhaft gemacht werden, vor allem das Zelt Rameses' II. inmitten des Kriegslagers von Qadesch. Cf. die Untersuchung von Homann 2002, 89–128, und besonders 111–116 („Rameses's Military Camp and the Tabernacle“) und Taf. 47–49.

17 Zum Efod in anderen Kontexten und anderen Bedeutungen bzw. Gestalten cf. Utschneider 1999; mit ausführlicher Diskussion: Bender 2008, 211–220.



Abb. 5 Der Hohepriester nach
Ex 28.

terhöhe zwei Edelsteine mit den Namen der zwölf Stämme der Israeliten anzubringen. Der Text bezeichnet sie als „Steine des Gedenkens an die Israeliten“, die der Hohepriester „vor YHWH tragen soll zum Gedenken“ bzw. „zur Erinnerung“ (זכרון) vgl. dazu unten)

Auch die Brusttasche ist aus Mischgewebe herzustellen. Sie soll an ihrer Vorderseite mit zwölf Edelsteinen besetzt sein, in die jeweils der Name eines der zwölf Stämme eingraviert ist (Ex 28,21). Somit dient auch dieses Stück des Ornaments dem Gedenken. Außerdem soll die Tasche zwei *'urim* und *tumim* genannte Gegenstände aufnehmen, auf deren Funktion wir gleich zu sprechen kommen. Aus Wolle in violett-purpurner Färbung ist schließlich auch das Grundmaterial des Kopfbundes (Ex 28,37) gefertigt, an dem sich das goldene Diadem, die ‚Blüte‘, befindet.

So sind die Materialien des hohepriesterlichen Ornaments eng, ja exakt auf das Raumkonzept der Wohnung abgestimmt und lassen ihren Träger in gewisser Weise als einen Teil der göttlichen Sphäre erscheinen, wenn er in ihr erscheint, was im Allerheiligsten nach Lev 16 nur einmal jährlich der Fall ist. Die Funktionen, die er dort wahrnimmt, sind in den wertvollsten Stücken des Ornaments materialisiert, den Edelsteinen an Schurz und Brusttasche des Hohepriesters und an den beiden *'urim* und *tumim* genannten Gegenständen.

Die Edelsteine, die der Priester vor sich herträgt, wenn er die Wohnung betritt, haben die Funktion des „Gedenkens“ oder „Erinnerns“ (Ex 28,12.29). Dies bezieht sich

keineswegs auf Menschen, sondern auf Gott. Jedes Mal, wenn der Priester die Wohnung betritt, erinnern die Gedenksteine Gott an die Israeliten und daran, dass sie das Heiligtum hergestellt haben. Zu Recht hat man die Steine deshalb mit Stifterinschriften verglichen.¹⁸

'urim und *tumim* sind außerhalb der Stiftshüttexten als Orakelinstrumente belegt, mit denen man Rhabdomantie betrieb.¹⁹ Im Ornat des Hohepriesters haben sie eine andere Bedeutung. Mehrfach wird das priesterliche Pektore, in dem sie sich befinden, auch „Brusttasche des Rechts“ (Ex 28.15.29f.) genannt, mit *'urim* und *tumim* in der Brusttasche trägt der Priester das „Recht auf seinem Herzen“ (Ex 28,30) und bringt es vor Gott. Othmar Keel hat dazu auf den ägyptischen Ritus der „Darbringens der Ma'at“ durch den König aufmerksam gemacht. Die Göttin Ma'at stellt „im ägyptischen Kult das der Weltordnung Gemäße“ dar.²⁰ Auch die hebräischen Begriffe für Recht und Gerechtigkeit (שפט und צדקה) können das „Richtige, Angemessene“ (Ex 26,30; 1Kön 18,28; Jes 28,25f.), die ‚Ordnung‘ schlechthin (Gen 40,13; 1Kön 5,8)²¹ bedeuten. Somit repräsentiert der Hohepriester durch sein Pektore das gerechte, der göttlichen Weltordnung gemäße Verhalten der Israeliten. Im Symbolraum der Stiftshütte ist das Pektore das Gegenstück zu den *'edut*, den göttlichen Gesetzen in der Lade.²² In diesen kommt der Rechts- und Ordnungswille JHWHs zum Ausdruck; *'urim* und *tumim* im Brustschild des Hohepriesters bringen den Willen und den Anspruch des Volkes zum Ausdruck, diesen göttlichen Ordnungen zu entsprechen.

Die goldene ‚Blüte‘ am Kopfbund schließlich soll nach Ex 28,36–38 die „Verfehlungen ihrer heiligen Opfertgaben wegnehmen“ und, wenn es „ständig auf der Stirn Aarons ist“, für sie (jederzeit) „Gefallen bei YHWH“ erwirken. Das Diadem wendet also das Missfallen der Gottheit ab. Wie schon die *'urim* und *tumim* hat es ein Gegenstück in der Wohnung: die *kapporet*, also das Sühnemaß, in dem Gottes Gnadenbereitschaft im Heiligtum institutionalisiert, ja materialisiert ist.

Durch den Ornat ist der Priester Repräsentant der Israeliten vor Gott. Betritt er die Wohnung so ereignet sich, allein in seiner Bewegung im Raum, eine Begegnung zwischen Gott und dem Volk (Ex 25,22, vgl. dazu oben), in der die Verpflichtung des Volkes auf die göttliche Weltordnung, aber auch der Anspruch des Volkes als Stifter des Heiligtums vergegenwärtigt werden.

Die liturgische Kleidung der gewöhnlichen Priester umfasst den Leibrock (כתנת), den Kopfbund (מצנפת) und die Priesterschärpe (אבנט). Sie sind aus einfachem Leinen (שׁוּׁן) wie die Behänge der Umfriedung des Hofes und einfache Weberarbeit wie die Eingangsvorhänge zur Wohnung (Ex 26,36) bzw. zum Hof (Ex 27,16). Damit sind auch

18 Cf. dazu Utschneider 1988, 168–71 mit weiterem Material; Keel 2004, 386; Dohmen 2004, 268.

19 Num 27,21; 1Sam 28,6. Hos 4,12. Cf. auch Houtman 2000, 496; Keel 2004, 382.

20 Keel 2004, 383.

21 Liedke 1976, 1005.

22 Jacob und Mayer 1997, 909.

Grenzen des einfachen priesterlichen Dienstes abgesteckt: Er spielt sich im wesentlichen im Hof vor dem Brandopferaltar in dem Bereich ab, den die Texte „פתח אהל מועד“, „Eingang des Begegnungszeltes“ nennen, während der Hohepriester Zugang zu Wohnung und – einmal im Jahr (Lev 16,2) – zum ‚Allerheiligsten‘ hat.

2.3 Das Raumkonzept aus der Perspektive der Israeliten (Ex 35–39)

In der Ausführungserzählung von Ex 35–39 sind die Israeliten, genauer: die „ganze Gemeinde der Israeliten“ (כל עדת יִשְׂרָאֵל, Ex 35,1.4), das eigentlich handelnde Subjekt.²³

Die ganze Gemeinde ist auf den Beinen, „weil ihr Herz sie antrieb“ (אֵי שֶׁר נָדַב לְבָבָם אֹתָם) (V. 29), also ungezwungen und freiwillig. Die Israeliten, Männer *und* Frauen, kommen und bringen ihren goldenen Schmuck, die gefärbten Garne, das feine Leinen, Silber, Kupfer und Holz (Ex 35,20–29), die „Fürsten“ (*nesi'im*, Ex 35,37) steuern die Edelsteine bei. Indem die Rolle des Volkes als Stifterin des Heiligtums erzählt wird, wird vorbereitet und begründet, was sich in der Bewegung des Hohepriesters in der Wohnung ereignen wird: die Repräsentanz der Israeliten vor Gott, die sich so als Stifter in Erinnerung bringen. Hier zeigt sich, wie treffend Luthers Begriff ‚Stiftshütte‘ für die soziale und theologische Funktion dieses Raumes ist.

In ihrer Arbeit an der Herstellung des Heiligtums zeigt sich die Gemeinde unbedingt gebunden an die göttliche Ordnung (מִשְׁפַּט, Ex 26,30), die ihnen Mose aufgrund des himmlischen Vorbildes (תְּבִינֹתָי, 25,9.40) vermittelt hat. So kann Mose, während er die Stiftshütte errichtet, jedes Teil mit der Formel „wie JHWH geboten hatte“ (כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה) (Ex 40,19.21.23.25.27.29.32) gleichsam quittieren.²⁴ Im Bau des Heiligtums ereignet sich erstmals, was die Korrespondenz zwischen Lade mit den *'edut* und dem hohepriesterlichen Pektore mit *'urim* und *tumim* zum Ausdruck bringt. Die ‚Gemeinde der Israeliten‘ handelt gemäß der göttlichen Ordnung, die im Heiligtum durch Lade und *kapporæt*, durch Gesetz und Gotteswort präsent ist und die durch den Hohepriester vor Gott repräsentiert wird.

Die Raumperspektive der Gemeinde kommt in der Ausführungserzählung nicht zuletzt dadurch zum Ausdruck, dass die Reihenfolge der Bauteile gegenüber der Gottesrede verändert ist: Zuerst werden Decken und Bretter für die ‚Wohnung‘ fertiggestellt, dann erst folgen die Sakralgegenstände für das Innere, also vor allem Lade und *kapporæt*. Diese Reihenfolge entspricht der Perspektive der Menschen, die sich der Wohnung nähern. Mit seinen 10 Ellen, also etwa 4,5 m Höhe, überragt sie den ganzen Bereich des Heiligtums. Sie wird als erstes sichtbar, wenn sich die Israeliten von ihrem Lager her nähern, während ihnen die sakrale Einrichtung dauernd verborgen bleibt.

23 Cf. Utzschneider 1988, 160–67.

24 Cf. Utzschneider 1988, 215.

Anders als die Gottesrede, die von innen nach außen, vom göttlichen zum menschlichen Bereich orientiert ist, blickt die Ausführungserzählung (Ex 35–40) von außen nach innen, von der menschlichen auf (aber nicht in) die göttliche Sphäre. Dem entspricht, dass der Bereich vor der Wohnung, der ‚Eingang des Begegnungszeltes‘, der Ort des Kultes, der gottesdienstlichen Begegnung mit Gott ist, in dem sich Priester und Laien zum Opfer versammeln.

Soweit das Raumkonzept der ‚Stiftshüttenerzählung‘, die nun abschließend als ‚theologische Metapher‘ interpretiert werden soll.

3 Metaphorik und sakraler Raum

3.1 Bemerkungen zur Metaphorik und ihre Bedeutung für die Theologie

Unseren Überlegungen liegt ein Verständnis von Metaphorik zugrunde, das in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten in der Philosophie, vor allem durch Paul Ricœur und Hans Blumenberg, entwickelt und in der Theologie, etwa durch Eberhard Jüngel, rezipiert wurde. Es unterscheidet sich beträchtlich sowohl vom neueren kognitiv-linguistischen Konzept der Metapher²⁵ wie auch vom herkömmlichen rhetorischen Verständnis, wiewohl es an das Letztere anknüpft. Auf dreierlei kommt es besonders an:

(1) ‚Metaphorisch‘ ist nicht nur die Übertragung eines ‚uneigentlichen‘ Bildwortes auf ein ‚eigentliches‘ Bezugswort, wie es in dem klassischen aristotelischen Beispielsatz „Achill ist ein Löwe“ zum Ausdruck kommt. Metaphern sind auch nicht auf Worte oder Wortverbindungen beschränkt. ‚Ausgeführte Metaphern‘²⁶ können vielmehr ganze Sätze umfassen, ja die Gestalt von Erzählungen oder Mythen annehmen. In diesem Sinne verstehen wir die Stiftshüttenerzählung als eine narrative Großmetapher.²⁷

(2) Hans Blumenberg hat den Begriff der „absolute[n] Metaphern“ geprägt. Anders als rhetorische Metaphern sind sie nicht durch eigentliche Begriffe ersetzbar, so wie man Achill statt metaphorisch als ‚Löwe‘ auch einfach als ‚tapferen Krieger‘ bezeichnen könnte. Absolute Metaphern beziehen sich auf Sachverhalte, die überhaupt *nur* durch Metaphern aussagbar sind.²⁸ Sie zeigen „die fundamentale[n], tragende[n] Gewißheiten, Vermutungen, Wertungen ... einer Epoche“ an. Dabei haben sie – wiewohl es zunächst so klingen mag – keine absolute, überzeitliche Geltung, sie können sehr wohl „durch eine andere ersetzt bzw. vertreten oder durch eine genauere korrigiert werden.“²⁹

25 Lakoff und Johnson 2004.

26 Ricœur 1986, 233; vgl. Buntfuß 1997, 50.

27 Die erste biblische Textsorte, auf die dieses erweiterte Verständnis von Metapher angewendet wurde,

sind die Gottes- bzw. Himmelreichsgleichnisse Jesu in den synoptischen Evangelien. Vgl. Weder 1978.

28 Vgl. Blumenberg 1998, 12; Buntfuß 1997, 102.

29 Blumenberg 1998, 12–13.

(3) Im klassischen Verständnis sind Metaphern durch eine Spannung von ‚ist (wie)‘ und ‚ist nicht (wie)‘ geprägt.³⁰ *Eigentlich* ist Achill kein Löwe, sondern ein Mensch; (wie) ein Löwe ist er in Hinsicht auf seinen Mut und seine Kraft. In den ausgeführten Metaphern ist die metaphorische Spannung nicht auf ein eigentliches Subjekt (‚Achill‘) und einen uneigentlichen Tropos (‚Löwe‘), eine Sach- und eine Bildhälfte aufteilbar. Sie durchzieht vielmehr den metaphorischen Text in allen seinen inner- und außertextlichen Bezügen und ist damit offen, vielfältig, spielerisch.³¹ In diesem Sinne kann mit Paul Ricœur von „lebendigen Metaphern“ die Rede sein.³²

Für die Theologie, insbesondere die biblische, ist dieses Verständnis von Metaphorik hilfreich und erhellend,³³ denn die biblische Sprache ist einerseits voller Bilder und andererseits voll unreduzierbarer Spannung. Als Sprache des Glaubens gelesen ist sie „durch und durch metaphorisch“:³⁴Die „Möglichkeit metaphorischer Rede von Gott im Horizont des christlichen Glaubens“ hat, so Eberhard Jüngel, die „fundamentale Differenz von Gott und Welt“³⁵ zur Voraussetzung. Aufgrund dieser Differenz gibt es über Gott nur „übertragene“ Aussagen, wenn einerseits Gott nicht in menschlichen, welthaften Begriffen verweltlicht werden soll und andererseits doch für den Menschen und seiner Sprache, besser gesagt: seinen Sprachen, zugänglich sei soll.³⁶

3.2 Die Stiftshütte als theologische Metapher

Meine These ist nun, dass die Stiftshüttenerzählung in der Vorstellung des sakralen Raums der Gotteswohnung diese Spannung des gott-menschlichen Verhältnisses zum Ausdruck bringt und eben darin eine theologische Metapher darstellt. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt des ‚ist wie‘ und ‚ist nicht‘ ist dies an drei Beobachtungen abzulesen.

(1) Das Verhältnis von Gott und Mensch ist *wie* es sich in der Stiftshütte darstellt: Gott wohnt inmitten des Lagers der Israeliten. Durch *Lade* und *kapporet* ist er unter ihnen präsent. In seinen himmlischen Erscheinungen, dem *kābôd* und der Wolke, lässt er sich auf der Wohnung nieder. Und es ist nicht so: Er kann seine Wohnung auch verlassen; ja sie kann ganz aufgegeben werden und aus der Geschichte Gottes mit seinem Volk spurlos verschwinden.

30 Vgl. dazu Ricœur 1974, 54.

31 Vgl. Buntfuß 1997, 26.

32 Vgl. Ricœur 1986, VI; Buntfuß 1997, 51.

33 Jüngel 1974, 110.

34 Jüngel 1974, 110.

35 Jüngel 1974, 110–111.

36 Markus Buntfuß erläutert die Funktionsweise der absoluten Metapher an den christologischen Aussagen des Bekenntnisses von Calcedon: Die „termino-

logischen Bestimmungen“ des Calcedonense [scil. „vere Homo et vere deus deus“] „... stellen zwei unvereinbare Kontexte bzw. Konzepte zueinander und bewirken somit eine Interaktion der dadurch entstandenen Spannungsmetapher. Demzufolge wird eine Aussagehälfte durch die andere ausgelegt, ohne dabei in einem dritten Schritt einen Vereinigungs- oder Vermittlungspunkt anzustreben.“ Buntfuß 1997, 184.

(2) Die Stiftshütte ist streng nach göttlichem Plan konzipiert und errichtet. Insofern ist sie *wie* Gottes eigene Wohnung. Sie ist es aber wiederum *nicht*, weil Gott zu ihrer Realisierung auf irdische Stoffe und vor allem auf menschliche Gebefreude und Kooperation zurückgreift. Ohne die Gemeinde der Israeliten als Stifter und Erbauer gibt es keine Gotteswohnung.

(3) Die Stiftshütte vereinigt – in ihrem räumlichen Dimensionen sowie durch die Farb- und Formensprache ihrer Ausstattung – zwei gegensätzliche und zugleich komplementäre Weisen der Präsenz Gottes unter den Menschen. Im Allerheiligsten wird nicht gebetet oder gesungen, niemand predigt oder versammelt sich in ihr. In der Wohnung selbst herrscht majestätische Stille.³⁷ Umso lebendiger ist der kultische Betrieb außerhalb dieses Bezirks „vor dem Begegnungszelt“ (פתח אהל מועד). Bis zum Altar im Vorhof steht die Gotteswohnung nicht nur Priestern, sondern allen Israeliten zu Opfer und Gottesdienst offen.

Insgesamt heißt das: Die Stiftshütte ist das von Menschen erbaute, irdische Haus Gottes, gewissermaßen sein ‚irdisches Himmelreich‘. Rhetorisch ist dies ein ‚Oxymoron‘, eine auf die Spitze getriebene Metapher. Und es ist eine ‚absolute Metapher‘ im Sinne Blumenbergs. Sie lässt sich nicht in eigentliche und eindeutige Begriffe übersetzen, sondern allenfalls in andere, ebenso absolute Metaphern abwandeln. Dies zeigt sich an der wirkmächtigen Nachgeschichte der Stiftshütte als Wohnmetapher; sie war (und ist?) an vielerlei Diskurse anschlussfähig. Leider kann ich dies hier nicht mehr ausführen, sondern nur noch andeuten.

4 Zur biblischen Nachgeschichte der Wohnmetapher

In der jüdischen Tradition, vor allem der Kabbalah, ist aus der ‚Wohnung‘ der Stiftshütte die personifizierte göttliche ‚Schechinah‘ wörtlich: ‚die Einwohnung‘ geworden. Sie hat sich von Gott abgetrennt, um mit Israel das Leiden des Exils zu teilen.³⁸ Das Ende des Exils, die Erlösung, bedeutet nichts anderes als die Wiedervereinigung Gottes mit seiner Schechinah.

Das Johannesevangelium bezieht die Wohnmetapher auf den Gottessohn: „... das Wort (λόγος) ward Fleisch und *wohnte* (ἐσκήνωσεν, wörtlich: ‚zeltete‘) unter uns, und wir sahen seine Herrlichkeit (δόξα), eine Herrlichkeit als des eingeborenen Sohnes vom Vater, voller Gnade und Wahrheit.“ (Joh 1,14). Die Formel knüpft in den drei Schlüsselbegriffen λόγος (Wort), σκηνή (Zelt) und δόξα (Herrlichkeit) an die Stiftshüttexte an. In der Apokalypse des Johannes schließlich stiften nicht die Menschen Gott eine

37 Das hat Israel Knohl in seinem Buch „The Sanctuary of Silence“ (Knohl 1995) sehr richtig gesehen.

38 „Etwas von Gott ist von Gott selber exiliert.“ Scholem 2004, 144.

irdische Hütte, sondern umgekehrt: die Hütte Gottes (ἡ σκηπή τοῦ θεοῦ) kommt vom Himmel auf die Erde (Apk 21,3).

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University Press. 4 Propp 2006, 409, Courtesy of Yale University Press. 5 Propp 2006, 434, Courtesy of Yale University Press.

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“For to Have Fallen Is Not a Grievous Thing, but to Remain Prostrate after Falling, and Not to Get up Again.” The Persuasive Force of Spatial Metaphors in Chrysostom’s Exhortation to Theodore

Summary

Metaphors, in particular those with spatial source domains, are a frequent feature of the oratory of the Greek Church Father John Chrysostom (c. 349–407). Given that he was an accomplished religious orator with an eye for imagistic language, this article explores how spatial metaphors contribute to Chrysostom’s achieving his persuasive goals. Adopting the approach of cognitive metaphor theory, it examines the treatise *To Theodore* with a focus on the epistemic and paraenetic functions fulfilled by conceptual metaphors. What is peculiar to Chrysostom’s metaphor use is that he involves his audience in metaphorical scenarios created by his visual rhetoric, in order to make his readers reappraise their attitudes and behaviour and, at once, elicit from them a specific response to the present situation.

Keywords: Early Christianity; John Chrysostom; spatial metaphors; rhetoric; mental spaces.

Metaphern, insbesondere solche, die auf den Raum als Bildspender zurückgreifen, sind ein Hauptcharakteristikum der Redekunst des Kirchenvaters Johannes Chrysostomos (ca. 349–407). Da er ein versierter Redner mit einer Vorliebe für bildliche Sprache war, untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag, wie räumliche Metaphern zum Erreichen der persuasiven Ziele des Chrysostomos beitragen. Im Rückgriff auf die kognitive Metaphertheorie wird der Traktat *An Theodor* analysiert, wobei die erkenntnistheoretischen und paränetischen Funktionen, die konzeptuelle Metaphern erfüllen, in den Blick genommen werden. Die Besonderheit des Metaphergebrauchs des Chrysostomos besteht darin, dass er sein Publikum in metaphorische Szenarien, die er in seiner visuellen Rhetorik entwirft, einbezieht, um seine Leser dazu zu bringen, ihre Einstellungen und Verhalten zu überprüfen. Damit versucht er, eine praktische Reaktion auf die gegenwärtige Situation hervorzurufen.

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Keywords: Frühes Christentum; Johannes Chrysostomos; Raum-Metaphern; Rhetorik; *mental spaces*.

The opposition of wealth and poverty was a constant concern for the Greek preacher John Chrysostom (c. 349–407), as he sought to mitigate the material and social divide in his urban congregation.¹ Vivid descriptions of riches and the rich as well as of the poor and their behaviour abound in his homilies and treatises, drawing on a reservoir of stock-motifs and recurring images. In one homily preached in Constantinople, *Cum Saturninus et Aurelianus acti essent in exsilium*, the Church Father assembles a veritable catalogue of images and metaphors to throw the contrast between wealth and poverty into sharp relief.² First, he fashions material wealth into a runaway who never maintains his loyalty to one person but constantly switches from one to another. However, not content with merely employing a single metaphor, Chrysostom elaborates on this point, adding that wealth is likewise a traitor who hurls his victims into an abyss,³ a murderer, a beast, a steep cliff, a rock amid unceasing waves, a whole sea battered by constant storms, further a relentless tyrant, a master worse than any barbarian and an enemy that will never give up his hatred. Should the parishioners still not have grasped the message, Chrysostom proceeds to characterise poverty in similar fashion, albeit as the direct opposite. Poverty now figures as a place of asylum, a peaceful harbour, perpetual security, luxury free of risk, life without waves or disturbance, mother of wisdom and root of humility. It is interesting to note how Chrysostom carefully crafts this contrasting pair of metaphorical catalogues so that his flock cannot but be overwhelmed by the sheer mass of images. As elsewhere, he clusters a whole range of graphic expressions, some of them metaphorical, making it compelling through antithesis, parallelism, parison and verbal resonances.⁴

At first glance, this firework of metaphors may result in overkill, as the audience is not allowed sufficient time to dwell on one individual metaphor and reflect on its full import. The sudden switches point to the fact that what this and similar passages deal with is rather metaphors on the linguistic level than a fully fleshed out concept that is mapped onto an abstract domain. Moreover, the metaphors seem to be unconnected or even unsuitable, as Chrysostom juxtaposes human characters in action with rather

1 See Mayer 2009.

2 Chrys. *Saturn.* 2–3 (PG 52.416). Cf. Mayer 2009, 104–105. For the situational context of the homily see Cameron and Long 1993, 173–175 and Tiersch 2002, 297–308.

3 The metaphor of the abyss of vice is further used with regard to the metaphorical theatre. Cf. Retzleff 2003. For further images in Chrysostom relating to wealth and poverty see Kertsch 1995, 56–69.

4 Some of the rhetorical devices typically used by Chrysostom are compiled by Ameringer 1921, 29–55 and Wilken 1983, 106–112.

static features of nature. Strikingly, the single linguistic metaphor does not contribute much to the meaning of the passage as a whole, as some of them make the same point with only slight variation in detail. What the preacher is aiming at here is rather to overwhelm his audience, to force them to adopt his view by the irresistible fusillade of images. The impressive range of metaphors is integrated by the view that wealth, despite the love of its devotees, is an unstable and difficult possession, which will ultimately ruin its possessor, whereas poverty is a state of tranquil mind, which creates an atmosphere conducive to Christian virtue. The variety of metaphors on the linguistic level does not encompass a single and coherent concept but rather evokes a general impression that is illuminated from different angles.

It has been noted that Chrysostom’s use of metaphors, in keeping with his preaching style in general, bears the stamp of the rhetorical schools of late antiquity.⁵ As a boy, born into an upper-class family, he attended the lessons of a rhetorician and acquired the skills and techniques that dominated classical oratory since long.⁶ There he would have developed a taste for the exuberant and exalted style that later became a hallmark of his sermons, an eloquence that bristles with images, drastic scenes, stark oppositions and rhetorical devices of any kind. It is evident that a kaleidoscope of metaphors such as in *Cum Saturninus* is heavily indebted to the rhetorical schooling, where students through the repetition of preliminary exercises learned to build up a good stock of ready-made expressions to be applied in oratorical improvisation.

Given that the fingerprint of the rhetorical tradition is palpable in Chrysostom’s metaphors, this article considers whether metaphorical expressions, in particular of spatial origin, make a meaningful contribution to the communicative aims, beyond mere embellishment and emotional manipulation. Further, it will be addressed to what extent the effects of the metaphors were underpinned by their spatiality. Since an investigation of this type can only be carried out into metaphors within a specific discourse context, I will concentrate on one text as an example, to examine the functions that spatial metaphors fulfil in an argument.⁷ As will become clear, Chrysostom’s treatise *To Theodore after His Fall* is particularly suitable for our research questions as it contains a vast number of metaphors, most of which are representative of the Church Father’s metaphor use in general. It needs to be pointed out that the study is from a literary or rhetorical perspective, not a theological, i.e. the focus is on Chrysostom’s achievements in persuasion.⁸

5 Wilken 1983, 95–127. Ameringer’s collection of passages (Ameringer 1921) is still useful in some places.

6 Mayer and Allen 2000, 3–5 give a brief account of Chrysostom’s upbringing and training. His rhetorical teacher may have been the famous sophist Libanius of Antioch.

7 My investigation follows the cognitive theory of metaphor in broad terms. However, research on metaphors in literary discourse is still a blind spot in cognitive metaphor studies. Cf. the contributions in Fludernik 2011.

8 Chrysostom’s rhetorical style still is an under-researched topic; this holds even more so for his

1 Chrysostom's theory of metaphor

One major advantage to a study in Chrysostom's use of metaphorical language is that, as an exegetical preacher, he himself in numerous homilies on the Biblical books provided a hermeneutic framework, which can serve as a gateway to an examination of his own rhetoric.⁹ Of particular use is the body of exegetical homilies on the Pauline letters because Paul, the unrivalled beacon of Chrysostom's theology and preaching,¹⁰ was an accomplished metaphor user himself.¹¹ This fact did not go unnoticed by his late-antique admirer, and so we encounter many passages where Chrysostom tried to expound Paul's metaphors to his flock and clarify their literal meaning.¹² Interestingly, in explaining them he often took advantage of further metaphors, which suggests that he attributed to metaphors the potential for clarifying complicated matters.

To give just one example, Chrysostom attempts to illuminate in detail the famous Pauline metaphor of the human body in one of his homilies on 1 Corinthians.¹³ There he not only makes explicit what the individual body parts stand for, but also highlights that the head, eyes, feet and genitals convey notions, such as nobility and cheapness, that carry specific evaluations. In other words, metaphors do not simply substitute one linguistic expression for another, a transferred for a literal; rather, they operate as a communicative and, more fundamentally, cognitive instrument that represents an entire concept, without making explicit all of its aspects.¹⁴ Their asset, it seems, is that they evoke notions in the audience's mind that are usually attached to their source domain, as for instance the cultural evaluations attached to body parts in Greco-Roman civilisation. That metaphors have implications and connotations which the audience is asked to associate Chrysostom clearly indicates when he explains that the metaphor of the rock in the Gospel of Matthew is used for the security of Jesus' lessons because a rock denotes a position remotely above the waves of human affairs.¹⁵ Chrysostom here brings out the

metaphor use. Previous scholarship on his imagery and metaphors has focused on the realities reflected by them rather than on their functions. See Kertsch 1995 and Koch 2007 (on athletic imagery), further Ameringer 1921, 56–67. A notable exception is the brief analysis in Wilken 1983, 107–110 and 117–120.

- 9 On Chrysostom's exegetical method see Kanngiesser 2004.
- 10 The magisterial study on Chrysostom's image of Paul is Mitchell 2000. See also Heiser 2012.
- 11 See Williams 1999; Gerber 2005.
- 12 E.g., Chrys. *hom. in Rom.* 22.2 (PG 60.496); *hom. in Heb.* 33.2 (PG 63.162); *hom. in 2 Cor.* 10.6 (PG 61.414). As a matter of fact, a great deal of Chrysostom's exegesis is devoted to the explanation of Biblical metaphors. The reason why metaphors require clarification is their similarity to enigmatic utterances. See, for instance, Chrysostom's comments on the relationship between a metaphor in the Psalms and an enigmatic expression in Paul in *exp. in Ps.* 7.12 (PG 55.98).
- 13 Chrys. *hom. in 1 Cor.* 30.2 (PG 61.251.8–43) on 1 Corinthians 12.
- 14 In the same passage, Chrysostom states that Paul by reference to the body parts wants to make his audience aware of the hierarchy of mean and honourable (PG 61.251.31–34).
- 15 Chrys. *hom. in Mt.* 24.2 (PG 57.323–324) on Matthew 7:24–25.

literal meaning communicated by the orientational metaphor of up and down, which is actually already evident from the Gospel itself.¹⁶

The reason why metaphors are able to shed light on specific qualities and features of rather abstract entities such as the Church seems to be their visual dimension. According to Chrysostom, metaphors function in a similar way as images as they paint the thing they signify in almost picture-like manner.¹⁷ From this comment we can infer that the Church Father considers the graphic and concrete qualities of metaphorical expressions as suitable for visualising abstract notions that are difficult to grasp. When the Psalms speak of missiles and fire they mean in fact punishment so that the audience becomes aware of God’s relentlessness.¹⁸ Not only that, the graphic metaphor also increases the emotional impact of the argument, as the audience will experience greater fear because of the threat posed by weapons and fire. This observation made by Chrysostom ties in closely with the claim of Greco-Roman rhetoric that vividness generates images before the audience’s mind so as to enhance the persuasive pathos of the speech.¹⁹ Metaphors fulfil, in essence, the same functions as textual images, illuminating an abstract domain by their visual potential. We may add here that elsewhere Chrysostom reflects on the power of images created by words to represent imperceptible and even ineffable things such as the turmoil of the human soul.²⁰ In the following analysis, we shall explore whether Chrysostom’s own metaphors serve the same communicative aims.

2 A spatial conceptualisation of life

The work which will be analysed in this article is commonly referred to by the title *To Theodore after His Fall*, although the name Theodore occurs nowhere in the tract.²¹ The precise circumstances of its origin and publication are not indicated, either. However, its whole argument suggests that it belongs to the period when Chrysostom still entertained the ideal of monasticism as the pinnacle of the Christian life before he adjusted his aspirations to the realities of the late-antique polis. It is, therefore, safe to say that the treatise originated from his agenda of defending asceticism in the face of its urban critics in Antioch.²² Its transmitted title is down to the fact that the work, because of the similarity in subject matter and standpoint, has been attached in the manuscript tradition to the letter addressed to Theodore, who was for some time Chrysostom’s brother

16 Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14–19; further Kövecses 2002, 35–36.

17 Chrys. *exp. in Ps.* 44.10 (PG 55.199.3–5).

18 Chrys. *exp. in Ps.* 7.12 (PG 55.98.36–53).

19 On this effect of *enargeia* see Rhet. Her. 4.39.51; Cic. *inv.* 1.54.104 and 107; Quint. *inst.* 8.3.67; Nic. *prog.* p. 70–1. Cf. Webb 2009, 99–100.

20 Chrys. *Thdr.* 1.11 and 14.

21 Greek text and French translation in Dumortier 1966.

22 Dumortier 1966, 10–20 on the relationship between the letter (usually referred to as *Thdr.* 2) and the treatise (*Thdr.* 1) to Theodore.

in an ascetic community. Despite this close relationship, it is evident that the much longer treatise has a general relevance, targeting not an individual but any monk, and is more markedly informed by the techniques of classical rhetoric. Developing the letter's subject matter further, the work owes its existence to the fact that the addressee has defected from the spiritual life for the sake of a beautiful woman called Hermione.²³ Chrysostom now seeks to persuade his brother to stay clear from physical pleasures and the lures of city life in general and return to the monastic community. The entire argument is based on the opposition between worldly concerns and spiritual treasures, without a real progression in thought; instead it circles around one single point, discussing it under varying key themes, including repentance, return, the relation of body and soul and the cutting off of desires. Packed with powerful images of graphic qualities (the depiction of luxury and its physical decay is particularly vivid²⁴), the tract makes also frequent use of metaphors, many of which are moulded in spatial terms.

After introducing his paraenetic address with a lament in the footsteps of Jeremiah,²⁵ Chrysostom starts his argument with extended imagery. The comparison of mourning over cities and over human souls brings him to the metaphor of the soul as a Christ-bearing temple. At first, he seems to merely compare the desolation of the soul and the destruction and effacement of a temple, but then he uses the temple as a metaphor, proceeding to a detailed description of its utter devastation.

This temple is holier than that; for it glistened not with gold and silver, but with the grace of the Spirit, and in place of the cherubim and the ark, it had Christ and His Father and the Paraclete seated within. But now all is changed, and the temple is desolate, bare of its former beauty and comeliness, unadorned with its divine and unspeakable adornments, bare of all security and protection. It has neither door nor bolt, but is laid open to all soul-destroying and shameful thoughts; and if the thought of arrogance or fornication or avarice or any more accursed than these wish to enter in there is no one to hinder them, whereas formerly, even as the Heaven is inaccessible to all these, so also was the purity of your mind. Perhaps I shall seem to say what is incredible to some who now witness your desolation and defeat; for because of this I wail and mourn, and shall not cease doing so until I see you again in your former brightness. For although this seems to be impossible to men, yet to God all things are possible.²⁶

23 She is mentioned once in *Thdr.* 1.14.54, yet as an elusive figure without any individual characteristics.

24 Chrys. *Thdr.* 1.9.

25 See Jeremiah 8:23 LXX.

26 Chrys. *Thdr.* 1.1.22–40: οὗτος ἀγιώτερος ἐκείνου ὁ ναός· οὐδὲ γὰρ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου ἀλλὰ τῆ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀπέστιλβε χάριτι καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν Χερου-

βιμ καὶ τῆς κιβωτοῦ τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ τὸν τοῦτου Πατέρα καὶ τὸν Παράκλητον εἶχεν ἰδρυμένον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος μὲν καὶ γυμνὸς τοῦ κάλλους ἐκείνου καὶ τῆς εὐπρεπείας ἐστίν, τὸν θεῖον καὶ ἄρρητον ἀποκοσμηθεὶς κόσμον, ἔρημος δὲ ἀσφαλείας ἀπάσης καὶ φυλακῆς. Καὶ οὔτε θύρα, οὔτε μοχλός, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀνέωκται

Drawing on a Pauline model,²⁷ Chrysostom sees the soul as a sacred building, adorned by the Trinity, which, since the addressee has surrendered to sinful lusts, is bereft of all its protection and exposed to the attacks of any enemy to come. Unlike in the homily discussed above, this passage maps an entire concept, that of the temple under attack, onto another domain, furnishing it with figures, objects, actions and events so that the reader can imagine the seizure and destruction of the sanctuary by an enemy. With its references to ‘now’ and ‘then,’ the metaphor even adumbrates a chronological sequence, a story, as it were. Although the spatial metaphor is far from containing every possible detail belonging to the capture of a temple it goes a long way towards conjuring a vivid image in the reader’s mind. Its graphic features and powerful language set up a whole tableau. Interestingly enough, not every detail of the source domain matches one of the target domain, as, for instance, it is left unsaid what the counterparts of the door and bolts are in the human soul. So there is an excess of detail in the source domain that is not directly used for the metaphorical mapping but nonetheless contributes to our understanding of the target.

This lack in a precise one-to-one relationship suggests that the spatial metaphor is not designed primarily for analytical explanation. For the effectiveness of the image the audience need not wonder whether any feature of the source domain is actually fit for purpose. Instead, the intended effect is furthered by the technique of blending source and target together. Almost unnoticeably, components of the concept of the soul enter the concept of the temple, to the effect that both input concepts merge into one blended entity.²⁸ Chrysostom skilfully mixes the material elements of the building with immaterial components of the soul, such as thoughts and vices, until aspects of both domains begin to coalesce into a new whole, the soul-cum-temple.

Assuming this strategy is not exclusively for the sake of didactic, we may wonder what the effects of the spatial metaphor are in this context. It is important to note here that in the quoted passage the author explicitly refers to someone witnessing the destruction of the temple. Further, we should remember that Chrysostom set out with a lamentation borrowed from Jeremiah. Therefore, I want to argue that with the vivid and detailed description of the temple he primarily aims at an emotional appeal to his

τοῖς ψυχοφθόροις καὶ αἰσχροῖς λογισμοῖς· κἄν ὁ τῆς ἀλαζονείας, κἄν ὁ τῆς πορνείας, κἄν ὁ τῆς φιλαργυρίας, κἄν οἱ τούτων μιαιώτεροι βουληθῶσιν ἐπεισελθεῖν ὁ κολύσων οὐδεὶς· πρότερον δέ, καθάπερ ὁ οὐρανὸς τούτοις ἐστὶν ἄβατος ἅπανιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ καθαρότης τῆς διανοίας τῆς σῆς. Καὶ τάχα ἄπιστα δόξω τισὶν λέγειν τοῖς νῦν τὴν ἐρήμωσιν καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν ὁρῶσιν τὴν σὴν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο κόπτομαι καὶ πενθῶ, καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶν οὐ παύσομαι, ἕως ἂν σε πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας

ἴδω φαιδρότητος. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ πάντα δυνατά. The translations are based on Stephens 1886.

27 The metaphor is introduced in 1 Corinthians 3:16–17.

28 See Fauconnier and Turner 2002, esp. 17–57 on the mental operation of conceptual blending. According to this theory, distinct conceptual domains can be simultaneously activated, and connections across domains can be formed, leading to new inferences.

addressee. What he tries to elicit from the monk as an ‘eye-witness’ is that he imagines the desolation of his own soul in the most deplorable terms. The imagery carries the undertones of defilement, ruin, profanation and sacrilege, that is, of outrageous misdeeds. If the addressee should have retained any sense of shame and reverence he must feel deep regret for not caring about his own Christ-bearing soul. To be sure, there is a didactic element in the metaphor use, as the source domain of the temple makes something invisible and abstract, the soul, almost tangible and hence accessible to cognition. However, Chrysostom aims primarily at impressing and overwhelming his addressee with a poignant imagination.

Moreover, as some of the metaphorical elements do not have a specific literal counterpart, the whole metaphor becomes autonomous as if it were designed for the connoisseur of an excellent painting. The emotional appeal, though, indicates that the vivid imagination is not art for art’s sake. Quite the contrary, it has a considerable relevance for the monk’s life. Since the metaphor operates on the reader equally through implications and connotations, it is time to mention one implication that reaches beyond the present state of the soul. While the notions of ruin and sacrilege apply to the present condition, after the monk’s fall, the whole concept of the spoilt sanctuary implies that any adherent of the cult is summoned to restore it to its former beauty and purity.²⁹ Strikingly, Chrysostom even makes the point that he wants to see his brother’s soul in its former lustre, thereby revealing the application of the metaphor to reality. In other words, what he seeks from the addressee is not only contrition but, as the next step, return, irresistibly couched in metaphorical terms. All of which stresses that a spatial metaphor, far from being a mere substitute, fulfils several functions in a discourse context, from didactic, to epistemic, to appeal and command.

After the imagery of the temple Chrysostom goes on to explain further the significance of the desertion from the spiritual life to the world. Unsurprisingly, he assumes that it was the devil that lured the brother away from the monastic community to sin. However, he is convinced that with God’s help the addressee still can return from vice to virtue provided that he does not relinquish all hope.

Do not then despair of the most excellent change. For if the devil had such great power as to cast you down from that pinnacle and height of virtue into the extremity of vice, much more will God have the power to draw you up again to your former confidence³⁰; and not only indeed to make you what you were

29 This shows that a metaphor is not confined to a static concept but can refer to an elaborated script with a considerable extension in time. For metaphorical scripts and scenarios see below, p. 175.

30 This is but an approximate rendering of the Greek term *parrhesia* (παρρησία), which literally denotes frankness of speech. It is a central concept in Chrysostom’s view of relationships among humans and between man and God. Cf. Chrys. *scand.* 3.5 (SC 79, 76.3–11); *sac.* 6.2; *stat.* 17.2 (PG 49.175).

before, but even much happier. Only be not downcast nor cut off your good hopes, nor be in the state of the ungodly. For it is not the multitude of sins which is wont to plunge men into despair, but impiety of soul.³¹

With a quotation taken from the Book of Proverbs, Chrysostom dwells on this point, adding that ‘the accursed thought,’ pressing down like a yoke on the neck of the soul, forces it to bend and hinders it from looking up to the Lord.³² Unlike immediately before, it is not a developed metaphorical scene, since the devil’s assault on the addressee is, according to the Church Father’s view, a reality of life. And yet, also this passage derives its force from metaphors. Its suggestiveness rests primarily on the recurring motif that the addressee when he left for physical pleasures fell from the height of virtue down into deep despair. Within a couple of lines the text strings together several expressions that denote vertical localisation in a space. While the pinnacle of virtue figuratively suggests a high mountain, the verbs represent movements of falling and rising, until Chrysostom refers to the present state of the addressee’s mind with the double metaphor of the heavy yoke on the neck of the soul, which captures the concept of the soul as a draught horse.³³

All of these metaphors are consistent in that they illustrate the abandonment of the spiritual ideal as a sudden movement from height to ground. Dressing his analysis in the metaphor of up and down, Chrysostom on the one hand merely follows two Biblical quotations which he weaves into his argument, as already Proverbs and Psalms employ spatial terms to make their point.³⁴ On the other hand, he adopts the orientational metaphor shared across cultures, according to which things situated above are positive and things down negative. It is interesting to note that this metaphorical concept, apart from its key role in the whole work, dominates the entire passage, appearing in varying fashion and so hammering the intended lesson into the audience. The evaluative hierarchy of up and down structures a spectrum of activities and events – despair and hope, looks, companionship and confidence – while cooperating with other images such as the yoke and the maidservants. Again, the text blends several metaphors together and

See Bartelink 1997, especially 269 on the connection between repentance and *parrhesia*.

31 Chrys. *Thdr.* 1.1.44–53: Μὴ τοῖνυν ἀπογνώσ τῆς ἀρίστης μεταβολῆς. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ διάβολος τοσοῦτον ἴσχυσεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς κορυφῆς ἐκείνης καὶ τοῦ ὕψους τῆς ἀρετῆς εἰς ἔσχατόν σε κακίας κατενεγκεῖν, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ὁ θεὸς ἰσχύσει πρὸς ἐκείνην σε πάλιν ἀνελεγκάσαι τὴν παρρησίαν· καὶ οὐ τοιοῦτον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλῶ μακαριώτερον ἐργάσασθαι τοῦ πρότερον. Μόνον μὴ καταπέσης, μηδὲ τὰς χρηστὰς ἐκκόψης ἐλπίδας, μηδὲ πάθης τὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων πλήθος

εἰς ἀπόγνωσιν ἐμβάλλειν εἴωθεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν ἀσεβῆ.

32 Cf. Proverbs 18:3.

33 The metaphor of the neck of the soul appears also in Chrys. *catech.* 1 (PG 49.224.8) and *pan. Ign.* (PG 50.590.30). Chrysostom might have modelled it on Sirach 51:26.

34 Psalms 122:2–3 LXX and Proverbs 18:3 with the container metaphor for the evils (ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἀσεβῆς εἰς βάθος κακῶν, καταφρονεῖ, ἐπέρχεται δὲ αὐτῷ ἀτιμία καὶ ὄνειδος).

subsumes them under a shared master concept that conveys a basic oppositional evaluation.³⁵

And again, Chrysostom aims for something more substantial than just lending concreteness to an abstract notion. Since the underlying conceptual metaphor, not only in ancient civilisation, is outspokenly evaluative, it suggests that every effort needs to be made in order to maintain or restore the relationship between top and bottom. Applied to the specific occasion, the addressee, notably a generic persona, ought to realise that he has cast himself from the height to the extreme abyss, where he must not stay for good. What enhances this appeal for change is that the orientational metaphor here is not exclusively spatial in nature but simultaneously temporal because it is phrased in terms of now and then. Thus, it propounds a storyline, a progression in action, with the implied assumption that the present state of lying on the ground will not be the definite terminus. What is more, Chrysostom conceptualises the addressee's whole life in spatial categories. Human existence appears to be bound tightly to spaces and every event, every action has consequences for one's position within this 'space of life' which is structured by regions, places, trajectories and movements. If the audience adopts the mental map of their lives as outlined by the author they simultaneously acquire a novel way of perceiving or assessing their own selves as well as their conditions.

This brings us one step further because, as we go through the treatise, we cannot fail to notice that the orientational up-down metaphor forms the backbone of the text right from the start until the final exhortation. Throughout, it crops up as the leitmotif, assuming different shapes and not always coming to the fore, but every time noticeable. In contrast to a detailed scenario as discussed above, a skeletal image-schema such as 'up-down' is a very general source domain, from which relatively little is mapped onto the target.³⁶ Because of its being situated on the most general level, the orientational metaphor is particularly useful for integrating various specific items into a coherent whole. In one conspicuous place, when Chrysostom has proceeded to talk about our lives in very broad terms, the figurative vertical hierarchy, combined with the notion of movement, is presented in almost aphoristic manner. To have fallen, the Church Father authoritatively claims, is not a grievous thing, but to remain prostrate after falling, and not to get up again.³⁷ The metaphor of falling and rising again to one's feet continues what Chrysostom has introduced in the opening of the tract and binds together numerous passages of the work. Interestingly, it even lends shape to the exemplars which the

35 Overlap in emotion metaphors has scholars led to discuss whether there is even a master metaphor in the emotion domain. Kövecses 2000, 61 and 192.

36 For metaphors of this kind, which are motivated by image schemas, i.e. embodied patterns of experi-

ence, such as 'in-out' see Turner 1996, 16–18, Kövecses 2002, 36–38 and Semino 2008, 7.

37 *Thdr.* 1.7.7–8, a maxim that succinctly phrases the core lesson of the treatise: Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πεσεῖν χαλεπὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πεσόντα κεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀνίστασθαι...

author inserts in his argument, King David from the Bible and a certain Phoenix, in a tale seemingly made up by Chrysostom himself.³⁸

Phoenix, an affluent young man who is won over for the spiritual vocation, after his intermediary fall back into his former, vainglorious life in the midst of the city, finally returns to contemplation and Christian virtue. As the story perfectly encapsulates, the orientational metaphor lends itself easily to a combination with the likewise entrenched image of the path. Ultimately, the lad is treading again the path which leads to Heaven and has already arrived at the goal of virtue.³⁹ It comes as no surprise then that Chrysostom often mixes both metaphors when, for instance, he talks about the path to virtue, the road to Heaven, leaving the furnace of pleasures, death as departure and, with regard to the overall goal, running to the city of Heaven and the eternal life.⁴⁰ He relies on the concept of LIFE AS A JOURNEY and accentuates it for his purposes by giving it a specific, vertical direction.

Tellingly, the letter to Theodore, which accompanies the treatise in the manuscripts, opens with the same conceptual metaphor of fall and rise, only in a more developed fashion. There the text evokes the images of an athlete, a soldier and a merchant to urge Theodore not to remain prostrate after a serious blow but rise to his former spiritual strength.⁴¹ From the repeated employment of the metaphorical concept of FAILURE AS FALL and SUCCESS AS RISE we can infer that for Chrysostom spatiality is not only a versatile tool for visualising numerous actions and events, a didactic instrument that is capable of making abstract concepts accessible. More essentially, spatial metaphors reflect his understanding of the world and the Christian's place therein. We will not press the evidence too far if we state that his worldview is informed by spatial thinking; for, in an emblematic passage, he reveals the hope towards God, that is, the foundation of human life, as something stretching through three-dimensional spaces.

For this, this [hope] it is which, like some golden cord suspended from the Heavens, keeps our souls steady, gradually drawing towards that height those who cling firmly to it, and lifting us above the sea of the troubles of this life. If

38 *Thdr.* 1.15 (David); 1.18 (Phoenix).

39 *Thdr.* 1.18.69–71 (καὶ νῦν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν βαδίζων ὁδόν, πρὸς αὐτὸ λοιπὸν τὸ τέλος ἔφθασεν τῆς ἀρετῆς).

40 *Thdr.* 1.3.30–3; 40–6; 9.41–2; 17.47–53; 73–5. Needless to say, none of these metaphors is completely unique to Chrysostom. The furnace of pleasures, for instance, seems to be suggested by Daniel 3, a Biblical story that is referenced by Chrysostom in 1.5. Further, he is likely to have been inspired by the furnace of fire in Matthew 13:42 and 50. Cf. also *Thdr.* 1.9.43–5. In *Thdr.* 2.3.68–9 he speaks of the ‘flame

of pleasures.’ For the image of the iron furnace see further Deuteronomy 4:20 and Jeremiah 9:4. It is applied in Chrysostom's works very frequently and can denote both purifying fire and, more often than not, vexing and dangerous fire.

41 *Thdr.* 2.1.9–27. Such series of examples are typical of the colloquial style of the so-called diatribe, which Chrysostom's preaching is heavily indebted to. We should mention in passing that most of the metaphors and images in the treatise, e.g. fall and rise, athletics and the dangers of seafaring, are already present in the *Letter to Theodore*.

anyone then becomes enervated and lets this sacred anchor loose, straightaway he falls down and is suffocated, having entered into the abyss of vice.⁴²

This image, building on the Homeric metaphor of the golden chain linking men to the divine,⁴³ mirrors lucidly the spatial aspect which Chrysostom's picture of the human world displays. Interweaving the metaphors of the chain, rough sea and firm anchor, and height and abyss, it situates man in a multi-layered spatial framework. Further, it demonstrates that the application of spatial metaphors is not based on arbitrary choice. Quite the contrary, as in the belief system of Christianity Heaven is an undeniable fact, spatial thinking suggests itself as an appropriate method of cognition. The ubiquitous conceptual metaphors like the heavenly city, the abyss of vice and the spiritual theatre are evidence that Chrysostom construes the religious 'landscape' of late antiquity as a multi-tiered network of spaces, whose components are interconnected and arranged in such a way vertically and horizontally that they receive their meaning from their place in the spatial matrix. Tentatively we may visualise this matrix in a 3-D diagram like fig. 1, with the qualification that the items, of course, cannot be located with exactness. Since many of the spatial categories are bipolar, apart from the aforementioned up-down e.g. the deictic here and there, Heaven and earth, city and desert, each of them assumes a specific role and function by the opposition of its direct counterpart. Furthermore, non-spatial contrasts, for instance, present and future, unstable and firm, temporal and eternal, seen and unseen,⁴⁴ enhance the effect of the spatial distribution of meaning, in order to make the audience aware of the inherently black-and-white order of the world.

To carry this a step further, to a more theoretical level, we can say that metaphors, although appearing as linguistic features on the level of texture, essentially operate on the conceptual level.⁴⁵ This is why they point to a specific way of world construal even if they, according to the affordances of language, cannot mirror cognition in all details and all respects. Chrysostom's method of mapping the religious landscape and communicating this mental model to his audience indicates that what matters to human life is a sense of place. His constant reminders of where in fact you are, how you have come there and

42 *Thdr.* 1.2.6–10: Αὐτὴ γάρ, αὐτὴ, καθάπερ τις χρυσοῦν σειρὰ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐξαρτηθεῖσα, τὰς ἡμετέρας διαβαστάζει ψυχάς, κατὰ μικρὸν πρὸς τὸ ὕψος ἐκεῖνο ἀνέλκουσα τοὺς σφοδρὰ ἐχομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ τοῦ κλύδωνος ἡμᾶς τῶν βιωτικῶν ὑπεραίρουσα κακῶν. Ἄν οὖν τις μεταξὺ μαλακισθεὶς ἀφῆ τὴν ἀγκυραν ταύτην τὴν ἱερὰν, κατέπεσέ τε εὐθέως καὶ ἀπεπνίγη, εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον τῆς κακίας ἐλθὼν.

43 Cf. *Hom. Il.* 8.19–20. See further the allegorical interpretation in *Pl. Tht.* 153c–d. The metaphor occurs also elsewhere in Chrysostom's writings: *hom. in Ac.*

9:1 (*De mutatione nominum*) 4.3 (PG 51.159.56); *hom. in Eph.* 8 (PG 62.66.11 and 14); *hom. in Heb.* 9.4 (PG 63.80.62); *educ. lib.* 88 (line 1053); *hom. in Gen.* 36.1 (PG 53.332.58); *hom. in Mt.* 15.6 (PG 57.230.56); *hom. in 1 Cor.* 7.9 (PG 61.66.41–42); *hom. in 1 Cor.* 33.4 (PG 61.281.6); *Homilia dicta postquam reliquiae martyrum* 2 (PG 63.470.45–46). In late-antique Neoplatonism, it was applied to the unbroken succession from Plato downwards.

44 Cf., among other passages, *Thdr.* 1.13–4.

45 Cf. *Thdr.* 1.7 on the human condition, referred to above.




Fig. 1 Chrysostom's matrix of spaces.

where you ought to be force the audience to realise, and rethink, their position in the ethico-religious environment. It can be argued that one major factor why Chrysostom in his instruction of the flock relies so heavily on spatial categories is that space is immediately accessible and comprehensible to everyone. As cognitive science has emphasised, human cognition is deeply grounded in the constant bodily experience of the spatial dimension; our conceptual system, hence, is fundamentally shaped by our perceptual and motor systems, which is why the bulk of conceptual metaphors is based on spatial relationships and why many primary metaphors occur across cultures.⁴⁶ Considering the fact that cognition is in essence embodied, i.e. having recourse on knowledge stored in the human body, we grasp why the perception of spaces is of paramount importance to Chrysostom's understanding of the human condition. Since he wants to impose his mental model on the audience, appealing to the sense of one's place is arguably the most promising path to successful persuasion. The persuasive force of his homilies and treatises lies in the pervasive references to bodily experiences of spaces that are familiar to everyone, including the cityscape, the theatre and the surroundings of the city.⁴⁷ It is

46 The view that abstract concepts are grounded metaphorically in embodied and situated knowledge has been put forward most vocally by Lakoff and Johnson 1999. See further Lakoff and Johnson

1980, 19–21, 56–60 and Kövecses 2002, 69–76 on the experiential basis of metaphors.

47 The relevance of the cityscape and the surrounding mountains emerges with clarity in particular from

therefore indispensable to take into consideration the relevance of the local setting to Chrysostom's oratory.

3 Metaphorical scenarios and embodied reasoning

The combination of the orientational up-down metaphor and the conventional LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor features prominently also in the final exhortation of the treatise. After a quotation of the Biblical metaphor of the yoke of God,⁴⁸ Chrysostom first applies the metaphor of agriculture to his brother's life. He asks him to dam up the streams of destruction, lest he suffer severe damage and the cultivated field be completely flooded. Only then will he make up for the present loss and even add profit. At first glance, the image of a farmer does not seem well-chosen for someone having defected from virtue to bodily pleasures. In all likelihood, the choice is determined by the image of the yoke and burden, which associate labour in farming. Between the lines, though, there is a connection that has been established by a great number of economic metaphors during the course of argument. For the concepts of reward and recompense, characteristic of economic exchange, have made a regular appearance in Chrysostom's admonitions.⁴⁹ To highlight what his addressee is in danger of losing he has repeatedly referred to gold, wealth and profit, thereby directing our attention to the invaluable benefits waiting for the godly man. Now the scene of the farmer protecting the crops with suitable preventive measures against devastation again underlines the need to take action in order not to risk losing the harvest. Considering this metaphor, we can develop further what we noted with regard to the other passages: while these consist, for the greatest part, in single linguistic metaphors or general metaphorical concepts, the image of the farmer brings an entire scenario to life, comprising a protagonist, a scene with objects, events and actions. Although brief metaphorical references, as we have seen, sometimes imply sketchy storylines, in this case the author himself furnishes sufficient detail to suggest to his readers a veritable scenario through an extended metaphor on the level of language.

After the farmer struggling against a natural catastrophe, Chrysostom quickly switches to another scene and imagines the addressee as wrestling with a dangerous opponent.

his ascetic writings *Ad Theodorum lapsum* 1 and 2, and *Adversus oppugnatores*. Some aspects of his image of urban space are discussed in Hartney 2004 (with a gender focus) and Lavan 2007 (on the marketplace).

48 Cf. Matthew 11:30. The metaphor of the easy yoke is already referred to in *Tbdr.* 1.2.

49 E.g., *Tbdr.* 1.13 (profit, gain, wealth); 14 (possession, damage and loss); 20-2 (storing good deeds, the balance of good and evil deeds, gold, precious stone, material wealth).

Having considered all these things, shake off the dust, get up from the ground and you will be formidable to the adversary. For he himself indeed has overthrown you, as if you would never rise again; but if he sees you again lifting up your hands against him, he will receive such an unexpected blow that he will be too timid to upset you again. And, I mean to say, you yourself will be more secure against receiving any wound of that kind in future.⁵⁰

In an elaborated image he draws on the familiar metaphor of athletics⁵¹ and envisages the addressee as a wrestler who has been beaten by his competitor but can recover his firm stance and ward off the other’s blows, until, with the help of God, he succeeds and even rescues other people with his virtue. This extract is another fine example of an extended and detailed metaphor that is fully fleshed out to elicit in the reader’s mind a vivid imagination. It is important to note that both scenarios are completely generic in their make-up. Neither the farmer nor the wrestler are identifiable characters, singled out by any individual feature. Instead, they belong to the stock-in-trade of writers, orators and philosophers seeking to clarify a point by reference to an analogy. To put it another way, Chrysostom makes a reference to a prototypical image or scene stored in the minds of his audience.⁵² Every member of Greco-Roman civilisation has a basic knowledge of farming and sports and knows what props and activities are typically involved in these professions. Thus, everyone is thoroughly familiar with the ‘script’ of a prototypical wrestling fight, which contains two competitors, a fighting ground, spectators, certain regulations, specific wrestling grips and, eventually, defeat and victory, marked by a prize.⁵³ The author, therefore, need not provide every component in order to evoke the whole scenario; he can rely on the cultural background knowledge of his audience, to the benefit of narrative economy. What we can learn from passages like this is that conceptual metaphors often consist of such schemas or frames which need not to

50 *Thdr.* 1.22.31–7: ἄλλ’ ἄπερ ἅπαντα λογισάμενος ἀποτινάξαί τὸν χοῦν, ἀναστῆθι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ φοβερὸς ἔσῃ τῷ ἀνταγωνιστῇ. Αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ σε κατέβαλεν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναστησόμενον λουπόν· ἂν δὲ ἴδῃ πάλιν τὰς χεῖρας ἀνταίρουτά σε, ἀπροσδοκῆτως πληγεῖς, ὀκνηρότερος ἔσται πρὸς τὸ ὑποσκελίσαι πάλιν. Τί λέγω; Καὶ αὐτὸς ἀσφαλέστερος ἔσῃ πρὸς τὸ μηκέτι τραῦμα τοιοῦτο λαβεῖν.

51 For Chrysostom’s use of images and analogies from athletics see Koch 2007, who is, however, rather interested in Chrysostom’s familiarity with sports. Sawhill 1928 and Kertsch 1995, 114–133 have also collections of passages where Chrysostom refers to the Christian *agon*. Athletic metaphors had been applied to the struggle for virtue or the human con-

dition in general by ancient philosophy and by Paul as well. The components Chrysostom uses, such as *agon*, boxing, running and the victory garland, are already present in Paul’s metaphors. Cf. 1 Corinthians 9:24–7. See Gerber 2005, 192–197.

52 Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 69–86 highlight that metaphors often have a prototypical core and rest on the mapping of structural units, *gestalts*, that involve typical elements.

53 The concept of the ‘script’ in semantics refers to knowledge structures whose elements are sequenced types of events. On metaphorical scripts and scenarios see Semino 2008, 10 and 219–220. See also the following footnote on the related notion of ‘frame.’

be spelled out but nevertheless are tacitly understood as they are part of the shared cultural knowledge.⁵⁴ It is particularly striking how frequently Chrysostom draws on these frames when he employs topical metaphors of soldiers, athletes, merchants, sailors and other stock characters.

Prima facie, the two frames, agriculture and athletics, do not easily match as they represent widely different businesses. Yet, both are united by the general notion that a strenuous effort amid adverse conditions will result in success and profit, as long as you fix your eyes on a chosen goal.⁵⁵ This lesson, which is also referred to at the beginning of the passage with the mention of the noble yoke and the goal (*telos*), is formulated, not by single linguistic metaphors, but by whole scenarios that set off, as it were, comic strips in the audience's minds. These vivid imaginations can be seen as mental models, that is to say, mental representations of cognitive domains, which are elicited from the reader by metaphorical clues in the text. As a result of this technique, three mental models in the extract under consideration come into play: the first is the mental representation of the addressee's flight from the spiritual profession to the secular life; second comes the farmer on the brink of losing his crops to the flood; and third follows the wrestler getting up again after a serious blow. As has been mentioned above, the two metaphorical concepts build on shared background knowledge and represent prototypical scenes, where attention is focused on a few salient elements. Although these input spaces share a general meaning, that of resistance in the prospect of defeat, the conceptual blending does not result in tedious duplication. Other than that, what emerges from the blend is a mental space where the input spaces generate something new by each contributing its own properties.⁵⁶ While the metaphor of the farmer foregrounds, among others, the aspects of cultivation, labour, strategic planning and material profit, the concept of the wrestler puts training, steadfastness, being on your guard, triumph and reputation centre stage, with the additional notion that you can learn from your own previous calamities to do better next time.⁵⁷ The emergent sum of the input spaces is considerably more than each of its parts.

What is striking in passages like this is the role of the audience within the metaphorical scenarios. Instead of merely providing descriptions of spaces, Chrysostom inserts his addressee into the imagined scenes so that the latter himself becomes an agent in the

54 Frames are part of cognitive semantics, going back to Gestalt theory. A frame is based on recurring experiences and is defined as a coherent structure of related concepts that comprises a stereotypical situation, figures, objects, relationships, activities and events. We employ such cognitive frames to produce and understand language. Cf. Fillmore 1985.

55 Of similar meaning and function is the analogy of seafaring merchants and shipwreck, which it-

self is followed by the analogy of a boxer (*Thdr.* 1.15.43–51).

56 On the emergent nature of the blended space see Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 42–44, 48 and Kövecses 2002, 228–230.

57 This additional significance is discussed by Chrysostom immediately afterwards and applied to the addressee.

mental spaces. Addressed by verbs in the second person singular, he, and through him any reader, is invited to see himself as a farmer and an athlete. Since the experience of the spatial dimension is deeply embedded in the human body, the Church Father wants his audience to act out a role in the metaphorical spaces, engage there, even if in imagination, and develop a feeling for these environments. Considering the effect of this technique, it is significant that the audience is turned by the text into an active player, not just a detached onlooker. Current cognitive science argues that the audience’s implication in metaphorical scenarios generates an embodied simulation because the metaphor interpreter replicates the physical experience of the imagined space.⁵⁸ In the interpretation of embodied metaphors, people recreate imaginatively what it must be like to engage in bodily actions represented by verbal metaphors. The key mechanism in this process of imagination is simulation, i.e. the mental enactment of the action referred to in the metaphor. Although we cannot access the cognitive responses of ancient readers to textual spaces, it can reasonably be surmised that Chrysostom’s readers are stimulated to envisage themselves as actors within them, which would facilitate the metaphor processing. What is more, they are engaged in simulation of bodily actions that in many cases are impossible to do in the real world; this is particularly relevant in the successful communication of spiritual things, which by nature defy any attempt to perceive them through the bodily senses.

The intended result of this implication of the audience in the mental models is that they adopt the perspective of the characters and re-enact their experiences. For the time of reading, they take the position of a farmer defending against flood or of an athlete overcoming his strong opponent. Consequently, they will develop an understanding of what needs to be done or avoided if you want to achieve your aims in these domains. The close link that Chrysostom establishes between the physical experience of imaginary spaces and human reasoning suggests that in his view the process of understanding can be enhanced by drawing on the human body and embodied memory.⁵⁹ Chrysostom uses conceptual metaphors which are based on familiar domains such as agriculture and athletics and maps them onto the spiritual life so that the audience views it in a different light. Since the spiritual life is an abstract concept and to a great extent inaccessible to human cognition, the spatial scenarios with their vividness serve an epistemic function, increasing the believer’s awareness of the duties and tasks required from a clergyman on the verge of squandering his heavenly reward. To corroborate the embodiment hypothesis we can draw in here two further episodes which, though not metaphorical, make use

58 Gibbs 2006 and Ritchie 2008 argue for the simulation of listeners imagining the performance of bodily action described by language. In particular, metaphorical language stimulates partial simulation of perceptual experience associated with the source

domain of the metaphor. The hypothesis is based on the model of embodied cognition. See Barsalou 2008, esp. 623 and 628–629.

59 Cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999 and Barsalou 2008 on embodied cognition.

of the same strategy. In one chapter of *To Theodore*, Chrysostom takes his brother along on a journey first to Heaven and then to the Mount of Transfiguration so that he, at least in imagination, may gain approximate insight into spiritual things.⁶⁰ Painting what they will see there in bright colours, the author seeks to generate the bodily simulation of spatial experience in the audience, in order to make them aware of the awe-inspiring superiority of heavenly beauty. There we see the same cognitive mechanism in operation, with an imagination of embodied cognition serving epistemic purposes.

That spatial scenarios are intended as a didactic or epistemic tool is clearly indicated by another passage in the same work when Chrysostom summons his addressee, after watching the shipwreck of sailors, to shun the sea and the waves, ascending instead to the height that is a safe place.⁶¹ Here, the author combines the orientational metaphor GOOD IS UP with the concept of maritime catastrophe so that we form a graphic image in our minds and draw from it the right conclusions. Metaphorical as well as non-metaphorical imaginations urge the readers to abandon their familiar position in real life, if only for a glimpse, and switch to a new and unfamiliar place, sometimes in the guise of a different role. Consequently, the use of spatial metaphors in this context is not a substitution of one linguistic expression with another; rather, the mapping of one cognitive schema onto another results in a shift of viewpoint that is instrumental in achieving the communicative aims.⁶² A slight tension or dissimilarity between the source domain and the target domain contributes considerably to the epistemic function. Since wealth and a cliff or the sea are not connected by a necessary link or any inherent similarity, the audience experiences alienation or de-familiarisation during text processing. This tension, as an element of surprise, then operates as a cognitive stimulus.⁶³ Receiving this stimulus, the readers are forced to reassess their attitudes towards the subject matter and adapt their views accordingly. Chrysostom invites them to adopt a new perspective, to view a familiar matter in fresh light so that they re-evaluate their opinions and attitudes.⁶⁴ Thus, he exploits the full potential contained in conceptual metaphors, that is, the opportunity

60 *Thdr.* 1.11.25–50 and 51–93, with reference to Romans 8:21 and Matthew 17 respectively.

61 *Thdr.* 1.15.43–51. Brottier 1994 discusses Chrysostom's metaphors of shipwreck and harbour, in particular their paradoxical juxtaposition.

62 Semino 2009, 65 calls this cognitive mechanism of accommodating disturbing metaphors schema-refreshment.

63 Interestingly, Chrysostom frequently labels the insights that his audience is supposed to gain through his homilies and writings as 'wonder' (*thauma*) or 'paradox', e.g. *Chrys. pan. mart.* 2 (PG 50.665–666); *stat.* 17.1 (PG 49.171–173, three times); *stat.* 18.2 (PG 49.184); *stat.* 19.1 (PG 49.190). Especially the

passage in *stat.* 17 underlines the function of wonder as a stimulus to pose questions. Brottier 1994 shows how the paradoxical use of the metaphors of shipwreck and harbour supports Chrysostom's core teaching that the objective conditions of life do not matter, but our disposition towards them.

64 Similar observations apply to the metaphor of life as theatre, which is prominent in Chrysostom's homilies, e.g. *Laz.* 2.3 (PG 48.986). Occasionally, this conceptual metaphor is combined with that of the *agon*, for instance in *hom. in Gen.* 64.2 (PG 54.567), *hom. in Rom.* 18.6 (PG 60.580–581). Cf. Bergjan 2004, 585–592; Jacob 2010, 71–73.

to gain insight by blending two concepts which seemingly have little in common. Once the readers have followed the Church Father into unfamiliar territory they will realise that the seeming pleasures of the world are in fact dangers and need to be fought with determination. Metaphor interpretation is intended as a response that ideally leads to a revision of cognitive schemas on the part of the audience.

So what can spatial metaphors reveal about Chrysostom’s art of persuasion? First, by tailoring spatial metaphors neatly to his audience, as visible in the second person addresses, he transports them to spatial scenarios evoked by metaphorical expressions. The specific usefulness of this technique is that the readers’ self-implication into textual spaces draws on embodied memories, something that is immediately available to everyone. Second, the simulated engagement in the text worlds results in a dramatic shift of viewpoint, often enhanced by alienating features. The audience enters, as it were, possible worlds such as a peaceful harbour or the wrestling arena, and in doing so, they adopt a fresh perspective on their activities and experiences. To put it differently, spatial metaphors function as thought experiments or models of thinking, where you can enact different dramas without having to face the real consequences.⁶⁵ Third, the main effect of metaphorical spaces is twofold: on the one hand, they enable the audience to gain new insights and view things in a different light. That is the epistemic function, which is buttressed by the physical concreteness characteristic of actual spaces. On the other hand, the spatial scenarios outlined by linguistic metaphors frequently imply a change in values, attitudes and behaviour. It is first and foremost this paraenetic function of metaphorical frames, their communicative pragmatics, why Chrysostom relies so heavily on embodied cognition based on previous experiences of spaces.

65 As *Thdr.* 1.11 unequivocally states, Chrysostom deliberately uses textual thought experiments when it comes to an approximate knowledge of imperceptible things. There he makes explicit that it is beyond the faculties of words to describe the other life but that it can be grasped by analogies taken from the material world. He then goes on to a detailed ekphrasis of the eternal life based on the experiences of the earthly life. See further his remarks in 1.13.26–34 (“For when the soul has returned to

the proper condition of nobility, and is able henceforth with much boldness to behold its Master it is impossible to say what great pleasure it derives therefrom, what great gain, rejoicing not only in the good things actually in hand, but in the persuasion that these things will never come to an end. All that gladness then cannot be described in words, nor grasped by the understanding; but in a dim kind of way, as one indicates great things by means of small ones, I will endeavour to make it manifest.”).

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Therese Fuhrer

Räume der Erkenntnis. Zur Raummetaphorik in der augustinischen Erkenntnistheorie

Zusammenfassung

Bei der Beschreibung kognitiver Prozesse, in denen die Erkenntnis einer ‚höchsten‘ oder ‚göttlichen‘ Wahrheit vermittelt werden soll, greifen antike philosophische Texte oft auf räumliche Metaphern zurück, mit denen sie diesen Vorgang im ‚Innern‘ des Menschen lokalisieren. Hier interessiert die Frage, mit welchen Raummetaphern Augustin die Erkenntnisprozesse in *De trinitate* beschreibt. Augustin geht davon aus, dass der Mensch nach Genesis 1,27 „nach Gottes Ebenbild“ geschaffen und daher die *imago dei* als eine Art Struktur im ‚inneren Menschen‘ präsent seien. Aus der ‚Vermischung‘ (*blending*) des nicht-metaphorischen Konzepts des Gottesbildes mit dem durch Raummetaphern beschriebenen Menschenbild entwickelt Augustin seine – in der antiken Erkenntnistheorie neue und einzigartige, auch wirkungsmächtige – ‚theologische Epistemologie‘ und eine ‚Onto-Theologie des Bildes‘.

Keywords: Denkraum; Raum der Memoria; Gefäß-Metapher; *imago dei*; Kippfigur.

When describing cognitive processes by which knowledge of a ‘highest’ or ‘divine’ truth is supposed to be conveyed, ancient philosophical texts often draw on spatial metaphors, in which they locate this process ‘inside’ the human person. Here the question will be pursued of which spatial metaphors are used by Augustine to describe the process of discovering knowledge in *De trinitate*. Augustine works on the assumption that man is created, after Genesis 1:27, “in the image of God” and hence the *imago dei* is present as a kind of structure in the ‘inner man.’ Through the ‘blending’ of the non-metaphorical concept of the image of God with the image of man that had been developed through spatial metaphors, Augustine developed his – for ancient theory of knowledge, new, distinctive and highly influential – ‘theological epistemology’ and an ‘onto-theology of the image.’

Keywords: Thinking space; space of memory; vessel metaphor; *imago dei*; tilting figure.

Vorbemerkung I: Zur Metapher des ‚Erkenntnisraums‘ in der antiken Philosophie

Bei der Beschreibung kognitiver Prozesse, in denen eine Form von Erkenntnis vermittelt wird, die als Wissen von der ‚höchsten‘, ‚reinen‘ oder auch ‚göttlichen‘ Wahrheit gelten soll, greifen antike philosophische und religiöse Texte häufig auf Raummetaphern und räumliche Vorstellungen zurück.¹ Damit lokalisieren sie diesen Erkenntnisvorgang ‚über‘ der sinnlich erfassbaren Welt, meist in einem ‚inneren‘ Bereich des Menschen bzw. seiner Seele: im Zentralorgan der Seele, in der Geistseele, im Geist,² der allerdings gerade nicht als realer Raum zu denken ist. Insbesondere die Platoniker und in der Folge auch die platonisierenden Christen wie Origenes, die Kappadokier, Augustin oder Ambrosius sprechen, wenn sie den Prozess und den Moment der ‚höchsten‘ Wahrheits-erkenntnis beschreiben, vom ‚Aufstieg‘ in den ‚Bereich‘ des Intelligiblen, von einem ‚Schritt‘ oder ‚Sprung‘ in die ‚Sphäre‘ des Göttlichen, von einem ‚Heraustreten‘ aus dem Körper, einer ‚Ekstase‘, auch vom ‚Eintreten‘ in das ‚Innerste‘, von dem aus nochmals ein ‚Übersteigen‘ des ‚obersten‘ Seelenteils, des *noûs*, angenommen wird.³ Die christlichen Autoren betonen zudem, dass Gott sich in einem Gnadenakt zum Menschen ‚herabneigt‘, um diesem die Wahrheit zu offenbaren, oder Christus wird als der ‚innere‘ Lehrer vorgestellt, der den Menschen jegliches oder das ‚höchste‘ Wissen vermittelt.⁴ Zum selben Metaphernstand gehören architektonische Vorstellungen: Der menschliche Leib wird als ‚Haus‘ der Seele verstanden, das Herz als ‚Burg‘, ‚Stadt‘, ‚Tempel‘ oder allgemein als ein Innenraum, in dem Gott ‚wohnt‘.⁵ In der antiken Ethik und in der mittelalterlichen Geist-Metaphysik wird die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes gerne als ‚innere Kathedrale‘ verstanden, und auch noch die moderne Philosophie des Geistes benutzt die Vorstellung einer ‚inneren Architektur‘, um zu beschreiben, wie das Zusammenwirken mentaler Prozesse organisiert ist.⁶

Angesichts des Umstands, dass die Vorstellung von der menschlichen Seele, dem Geist oder dem ganzen Menschen als einem ‚Innenraum‘ sowohl in der Literatur als

- 1 Im Folgenden werden metaphorische Begriffe – wie andere uneigentliche Ausdrücke – konsequent mit gnomischen Häkchen markiert, nicht zuletzt um gleichlautende nicht-metaphorisch verwendete Begriffe davon abzusetzen. Sind dieselben Begriffe mit doppelten Anführungszeichen versehen, handelt es sich um Zitate, wobei die Metaphorizität nicht eigens markiert wird.
- 2 Die Bezeichnungen variieren, im Folgenden wird von *noûs* bzw. *mens* oder *animus* gesprochen. Die Terminologie diskutiert ausführlich Lagouanère 2012, 47–293.
- 3 Zur platonischen Metaphorik vgl. den Überblick bei Markschie 1997, 266–275; Fischer 2004–2010,

38–39; zuletzt Lagouanère 2012, 295–299; zur biblischen und jüdisch-christlichen Tradition sowie zur Rezeption des platonischen Menschenbildes im christlichen Platonismus vgl. Markschie 1995; Markschie 1997, 276–312; Cillera 2008, 101–112; Lagouanère 2012, 299–308.

- 4 Dazu Fischer 2004–2010, 42–44; Fuhrer 2004–2010, 1092–1093.

5 Einen Überblick über die Architekturmetaphern in der antiken Anthropologie gibt Ohly 1986, 906–1007.

- 6 Zur scholastischen Tradition und den Parallelen in der modernen Philosophy of Mind vgl. King 2008.

auch in Fachtexten wie auch in der Umgangssprache verbreitet ist, könnte man meinen, dass der Grad der Metaphorizität nicht mehr hoch und die Metapher als solche als Ausgangspunkt für die Analyse philosophisch relevanter Argumente nicht mehr interessant sei. Denn auch in der Fachliteratur wird in der Diskussion zu antiken Texten auf die dort verwendete Metaphorik zurückgegriffen, etwa wenn vom platonischen ‚Aufstieg zur Schau‘ oder ‚zum Einen‘ gesprochen wird oder wenn das stoische Modell der ‚Introspektion‘ oder Augustins Konzept der ‚Innerlichkeit‘ Thema sind.⁷ Es stellt sich also die Frage, ob eine Analyse der Raum-Metaphern und des entsprechenden Metaphernfelds für die in den Texten damit vorgestellte oder erläuterte Sache – die menschlichen Wahrnehmungs-, Denk- und Erkenntnisprozesse – überhaupt noch zielführend sein kann, d. h. ob wir die in den antiken philosophischen Texten diskutierten anthropologischen und epistemologischen Theorien und Konzepte besser verstehen, wenn wir die dafür verwendeten Metaphern beschreiben und die dahinter stehende Metaphorologie erklären können.

Vorbemerkung II: Die moderne Debatte zur Epistemologie in Augustins *De trinitate*

Genau dies dürfte zumindest für einen bestimmten Text zutreffen, nämlich für Augustins Schrift *De trinitate*, an der er zwanzig Jahre gearbeitet hat, um das theologische Problem des trinitarischen Gottes und der Gottesebenbildlichkeit des Menschen mit dem begrifflichen und konzeptuellen Instrumentarium der pagan-philosophischen Epistemologie und Anthropologie zu erklären. Die Schrift ist in jüngerer Zeit zu einem zentralen Gegenstand der Forschung im Bereich der Philosophy of Mind geworden.⁸ Allerdings werden in der Diskussion zu der in *De trinitate* vorgestellten Erkenntnistheorie unterschiedliche, teils auch konträre Positionen vertreten. In Christoph Horns Lektüre von *De trinitate* ist Augustins ‚Geistmetaphysik‘ konsequent plotinisch, d. h. der menschliche Geist kann im Prozess des ‚Aufstiegs‘ eine Verbindung zur Ideenwelt herstellen und sich, zumindest zeitweise, in ekstatischer Erfahrung über sich selbst erheben und – in einer Art *unio mystica* – am göttlichen *noûs* teilnehmen (so explizit in *trin.* 14,20: *unus erit spiritus*).⁹ Gemäß der Interpretation von Johannes Brachtendorf vermag der Mensch in seinem als Erkenntnisraum vorgestellten Geist hingegen nur bis zur Schau des Bildes

7 Die Raum-Metaphorik steht bereits im Titel der Monographien von Hadot 2009, Taylor 1999, Cary 2000 und Lagouanère 2012; vgl. King 2008.

8 Hervorzuheben sind Brachtendorf 2000b, Brachtendorf 2000a, Horn 2001, Gioia 2008, Lagouanère 2012, Kany 2014 (mit einem aktualisierten For-

schungsbericht) sowie die Beiträge im Sammelband von Berman und O'Daly 2012.

9 Horn 2001, 112–115, bes. 112, der mit Verweis auf *trin.* 14,20 von einer „expliziten Einheitsmetaphorik“ spricht, wobei er unbeachtet lässt, dass der Satz *unus erit spiritus* ein Zitat aus *1 Cor* 6:17 ist.

Gottes (der *imago dei*) zu gelangen, womit sich Augustins Aufstiegskonzeption wesentlich von der plotinischen unterscheidet.¹⁰ Nach Brachtendorfs Deutungsvariante von *De trinitate* kann der Mensch nicht zum göttlichen *noûs* aufsteigen, ist also von diesem gleichsam ‚abgekoppelt‘; wie Christoph Horn kritisch anmerkt.¹¹

Vorbemerkung III: Zur Theorie der Raummetaphorik

Dieser weiterhin kontrovers geführten Debatte¹² kann, wie ich denke, eine metapherntheoretisch geleitete Analyse neue Impulse geben. Ich werde im Folgenden zunächst versuchen, die Vorstellung des Erkenntnisprozesses als Geschehen, das sich in einem ‚Raum‘ im ‚Innern‘ des menschlichen Körpers abspielt, auf der Grundlage der Theorie der kognitiven Metapher zu verstehen. Nach George Lakoff und Mark Johnson sind Sprache und menschliche Kommunikation und in der Folge das menschliche Denken und Sozialverhalten wesentlich von konzeptuellen Metaphern geprägt, die ihrerseits auf sinnliche Wahrnehmung und Körpererfahrungen zurückgehen.¹³ Raummetaphern gelten als ontologische Metaphern, d. h. Metaphern, die auf Erfahrungen beruhen, die an einem konkreten Objekt gemacht worden sind.¹⁴ Sie bilden sich aus der eigenen Körpererfahrung heraus und werden bereits im vorsprachlichen Stadium zu „Schablonen der Wahrnehmung“ (*image schemas*):¹⁵ Der Körper wird als begrenzter, geschlossener Raum erfahren, der durch die Unterscheidung von ‚innen‘ und ‚außen‘ strukturiert ist.¹⁶ Der mit einer solchen Gefäß- oder Behältermetapher erfasste oder vielmehr ausgegrenzte Bereich des ‚Außen‘ wird mit der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung in der ‚Außenwelt‘; in der sich materielle und leibliche Körper – auch der Körper des Wahrnehmenden – bewegen, in Verbindung gebracht; in den ‚äußeren‘ Bereich gehören die in Körperorganen angesiedelten sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Phänomene wie Schmerz (Kopf-, Bauchschmerzen usw.), Hunger (der ‚knurrende‘ Magen) oder sexuelles Verlangen. Der metaphorische Bereich des ‚Innern‘ umfasst im Gegensatz und komplementär dazu all das, was nicht materiell und nicht mit den Körpersinnen wahrnehmbar ist.

Nicht materiell und nicht sinnlich wahrnehmbar ist gemäß platonisch-dualistischer Vorstellung der Geist oder die Geistseele, metaphorisch gesprochen: der ‚Ort‘, an dem

10 Brachtendorf 2000b, bes. 213–250; vgl. auch bes. Brachtendorf 2000a.

11 Horn 2001, 110–111 und 112 bezeichnet Brachtendorfs Interpretation als „Abkopplungsthese“.

12 Die Diskussion fasst Fuchs 2010 zusammen.

13 Lakoff und Johnson 2014, bes. 11–14 und 28–30. Ebenfalls grundlegend für das Folgende ist Johnson 1987.

14 Lakoff und Johnson 2014, 35–43.

15 Johnson 1987, 2.

16 Lakoff/Johnson sprechen in ihrer frühen Publikation von „containment metaphors“; was in der deutschen Ausgabe mit „Gefäß-Metapher“ übersetzt wird (Lakoff und Johnson 2014, 39–43).

Prozesse des Denkens und Erkennens stattfinden, in dem sich Bewusstsein, Wissensgegenstände, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung und auch Emotionen ‚verorten‘ lassen, aber auch die Wahrheit schlechthin, die oft mit einer weiteren Raummetapher – nach Lakoff/Johnson einer Orientierungsmetapher¹⁷ – als ‚höchste‘ bezeichnet wird.¹⁸

In den Texten, die im Folgenden im Zentrum stehen sollen, ist die Vorstellung eines ‚inneren Menschen‘ zentral. Diese stützt sich implizit auf platonische Seelen-Metaphorik und explizit auf Paulus, der von seinen christlichen Adressaten eine Änderung der Lebensweise und damit eine Wandlung vom ‚alten‘ oder auf ‚äußere‘ Güter gerichteten ‚äußeren Menschen‘ zum ‚neuen‘, an christlichen und inneren Werten orientierten Menschen einfordert.¹⁹ Verbunden wird diese Aufforderung mit der ebenfalls räumlich-metaphorisch umschriebenen Forderung der ‚Umkehr‘ (*metastrophé, conversio*) oder der ‚Einkehr in sich selbst‘, die in der kaiserzeitlichen Stoa zu einem zentralen Konzept wird.²⁰

Im Gegensatz zu den Theorien des „verkörperten Bewusstseins“ (*embodiment*), wie sie in der modernen Biologie oder der Leibphänomenologie entwickelt wurden,²¹ steht in den hier untersuchten Texten nicht ein rein physiologisches Menschenbild zur Diskussion; diese gehen vielmehr von einem dualistischen Menschenbild aus, in dem sinnlich erfahrbare und intelligibler Bereich getrennt zu denken sind. Zur Diskussion steht also nicht eine Hirntopologie oder -graphie, in der Denkprozesse und -funktionen in bestimmten Teilen des Gehirns oder Kammern im Schädel lokalisiert werden. Damit wird nochmals deutlich, dass in der Rede von ‚Innenräumen‘ des Denkens, Erkennens, Erinnerns, Fühlens und der Vorstellung von einem ‚inneren Menschen‘ mit Metaphern gearbeitet wird, die bestimmte epistemische Konzepte erklären sollen. Die Gefäß-Metaphern und die mit ihnen verbundene Körpererfahrung strukturieren den abstrakten Gegenstandsbereich Geist/Seele/Erkenntnis und geben dem Denken und Reden über diesen Bereich eine Orientierung. Anders gesagt: Die Wahrnehmungen und Erfahrungen im Körper, die in der materiellen ‚Außenwelt‘ gemacht werden, werden nach ‚innen‘ projiziert, sie leiten die Vorstellungen und modellieren die Begrifflichkeit. Der heuristische Wert der räumlichen Metaphorik besteht für die im Folgenden diskutierten Texte darin, dass auf diese Weise kognitive Prozesse sowie wahrnehmungs- und erkenntnistheo-

17 Lakoff und Johnson 2014, 22–30. Die Zuordnung von Geist/Erkenntnis zum Innenbereich und der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung zum Außenbereich ist in der antiken Philosophie ubiquitär; vgl. dazu Fischer 2004–2010.

18 Der in den hier diskutierten Texten zugrundegelegte Wahrheitsbegriff entspricht jedoch gerade nicht der von Lakoff/Johnson vorgeschlagenen „erfahrungsba-sierten Wahrheits-theorie“ (mit Elementen der Korrespondenztheorie und pragmatischer Theorien). Dazu Lakoff und Johnson 2014, 206–211.

19 Eph. 4,23f. Dazu Markschieß 1995 und umfassend Markschieß 1997.

20 So bei Seneca, Mark Aurel und Epiktet; dazu Hadot 2009, der seine Studie mit Mark Aurels Metapher der ‚inneren Burg‘ betitelt (*La citadelle intérieure*).

21 Für die biologischen Theorien sei hier auf Jakob Johann von Uexküll (1864–1944), für die Leibphänomenologie auf Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) verwiesen. Vgl. dazu den kritischen Überblick von Gallagher 2012.

retische Konzepte, die – der Natur des Gegenstands bzw. dem dualistischen Weltbild entsprechend – abstrakt sein müssen, plausibilisiert und ‚illustriert‘ werden und damit auch verstehbar gemacht werden sollen.

Vorbemerkung IV: Der Raum als konzeptuelle Metapher in Augustins Erkenntnistheorie

Augustin war als Rhetorik-Lehrer und damit als Philologe mit den Möglichkeiten bildhafter sprachlicher Ausdrucksformen vertraut, die in der antiken Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Philosophie definiert werden. Den metaphorischen Ausdruck bezeichnet er gemäß antiker Theorie mit dem griechischen Begriff *tropus* oder lateinisch als *locutionum modus*, der die Funktion hat, einen Gegenstand oder Sachverhalt mit einem Wort oder Satz in einem uneigentlichen Sinn zu umschreiben,²² womit gleichsam Zielbereich (*target domain*) und Gegenstandsbereich (*source domain*) in Analogie zueinander gesetzt werden. So benutzt Augustin das Bildfeldsystem ‚Raum‘ bzw. die Orientierungsmetaphern ‚innen‘, ‚außen‘, ‚aufwärts‘, ‚abwärts‘ usw. meist ganz traditionell, um das Verhältnis von menschlichem Körper und Geist, deren unterschiedliche Funktionen sowie die Wahrnehmungs- und Erkenntnisprozesse zu beschreiben.²³

Nun wurde in der neueren Forschung zu Augustins Trinitätstheologie immer wieder festgestellt, dass Augustin auch mit Bildern arbeitet, die er mit den durch sie beschriebenen Wirklichkeiten interagieren lässt oder die er in eine direkte Beziehung zueinander stellt: Der menschliche Geist *ist* der ‚Ort‘ im von ‚außen‘ nicht wahrnehmbaren und sinnlich nicht fassbaren ‚Innern‘ des Menschen, an dem sich Erkenntnisprozesse vollziehen. Das Bildfeld ‚Raum‘ ist dabei nicht als Analogie zum menschlichen Geist zu verstehen, sondern steht vielmehr in einem Referenz- oder Abbildverhältnis zu diesem: Der Geist *ist* der Raum der Erkenntnis.²⁴ Die Raummetaphorik erhält damit eine konzeptuelle Funktion: Sie dient nicht allein der Veranschaulichung des nicht Sichtbaren,

22 Vgl. die Definition in Quint. *inst.* 9,1,4: *est igitur tropus sermo a naturali et principali significatione tralatus ad aliam ornandae orationis gratia, vel, ut plerique grammatici finiunt, dictio ab eo loco in quo propria est tralata in eum in quo propria non est.* Die unterschiedlichen Tropen behandelt Augustin systematisch in *doctr. chr.* 3,40–56; dazu Tornau 2004–2010. In *trin.* 15,15 scheint Augustin eine weitere Schul-Definition zu zitieren: *quid est ergo allegoria nisi tropus ubi ex alio aliud intellegitur*; vgl. Ambrosiast. in *Gal.* 4,24,1.

23 S. dazu Fischer 2004–2010 mit weiterführender Literatur; zuletzt Lagouanère 2012, 296–376.

24 So Gioia 2008, 236–239 und 277–297; Lagouanère 2012, 437–506; Kany 2014, 237–240. Wie Drever 2007, bes. 239 und 242, betont, unterscheidet sich Augustins Konzept des Selbst damit sowohl von dem physikalischen (geometrischen und nomologischen) Newtons als auch von dem rational-selbstreflexiven Descartes'. Explizit von einer Analogie zwischen menschlichem und göttlichem Intellekt geht Brachtendorf 2000b aus (vgl. dazu Horn 2001, 110–111).

sondern der Erschließung einer theologisch begründeten Epistemologie, die Augustin zuerst in Buch 10 der *Confessiones* und danach in *De trinitate* ausführlich vorstellt.

1 Der Raum der Erkenntnis in Augustins *Confessiones* 10

In der sogenannten Memoria-Lehre in *Confessiones* 10, die auch für das Verständnis von *De trinitate* wichtig ist und offenbar vorausgesetzt wird,²⁵ beschreibt Augustin den Prozess der Wahrnehmung und Erinnerung von Gegenständen, Sachverhalten und Emotionen gemäß der pagan-rhetorischen Tradition konsequent mit Raummetaphern.²⁶ Demnach sei das Gedächtnis ein riesiger Innenraum mit Nischen, Höhlen, Gängen usw., also eine ‚Raumflucht‘, in der die von außen hineingelangten Objekte gelagert und gespeichert werden, teilweise – so im Fall der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung – als „Bilder“ (*imagines*), teilweise – so im Fall von abstrakten Wissensgegenständen – als „sie selbst“ (*res ipsae*), teilweise – so im Fall der Emotionen – als „Begriffe“ (*notiones*). Im Gegensatz zur Beschreibung des ‚Lagerraums‘ werden die dort ‚gelagerten‘ Objekte nicht mittels Metaphern beschrieben: dasselbe gilt auch für die „Bilder“, da der Bildbegriff zur Bezeichnung der materiell oder abstrakt gedachten Sinnesdaten in der antiken Philosophie längst terminologisch festgelegt ist.²⁷ In Augustins Memoria-Lehre bleibt somit die Metaphorik auf die Vorstellung des ‚Behälters‘ beschränkt.²⁸

Das Ich tritt in diese ‚Räume‘ ein, bewegt sich ‚darin‘ und „läuft umher“ (*conf.* 10,26: *discurso et volito*), sucht Gott, der in ihnen ‚wohnend‘ gedacht wird, den es aber nicht findet, solange es ihn unter den aus der Sinneswahrnehmung hervorgegangenen Bildern sucht.²⁹ In den ‚Raumfluchten‘ gibt es zwar eine Stelle, die „der Geist selbst“ einnimmt (10,36: *intravi ad ipsius animi mei sedem*), aber auch da ‚wohnt‘ Gott nicht (*nec ibi tu eras*): Er steht nämlich „über Allem“ (*supra omnia*), da er unveränderlich ist, also nicht räumlich zu denken ist; er ist aber dennoch in der Memoria, da er sich in sie ‚herabgelassen‘ hat.³⁰ Die Frage nach dem ‚Ort‘ ist also verfehlt;³¹ vielmehr ist dieser ‚Nicht-Ort‘ „in dir über mir“ (10,37: *in te supra me*), zu dem man zwar ‚hingehen‘ und von dem man

25 Vgl. dazu Lagouanère 2012, 212–214.

26 *Conf.* 10,9–37. Dazu Schönberger 1998; Cillerai 2008, 94–214; Kann 2009. Zur pagan-rhetorischen Tradition vgl. Cary 2000, 125–139; Cillerai 2008, 113–120. Die Stationen der ‚Bewegungen‘ in den ‚Räumen‘ der Memoria beschreibt Lagouanère 2012, 196–203 („voyage au palais de Mémoire“).

27 Gebräuchlich sind *eikón*, *eidolon*, *imago*, *effigies*, *phantasia* oder, wenn dem Bild kein real existierender Gegenstand zugrunde liegt, *phantasma*. Dazu O’Daly 1987, 106–130; Solère 2003; Bochet 2004–2010,

508–509. Vgl. Kann 2009, 14: „[D]iese inneren Bilder sind in eigener Weise Medien der Erinnerung“.

28 Augustin folgt hiermit Plotins Vorstellung, dass die Wissensgegenstände selbst und nicht deren (Ab-)Bilder, die selbst nicht ‚Wissen‘ sein, sondern nur repräsentieren können, in der Seele präsent sind. Dazu Menn 2001 und Menn 2014, 87.

29 *Conf.* 10,26: *ubi te inveniam?*; 10,36: *ubi manes in memoria mea, domine ...? ... non ibi te inveniebam inter imagines rerum corporalium.*

30 10,36: *dignatus es habitare in memoria mea.*

31 10,36: *quid quaero quo loco eius habites?*

‚zurückkehren‘ kann (*recedimus et accedimus*), der aber eben kein ‚Ort‘ ist (*nusquam locus*). Gottes Immanenz ist in den Kategorien des Raums also nur indirekt fassbar. Mit der Aussage, dass Gott ‚in‘ sich selbst und gleichzeitig ‚über‘ dem Menschen ‚ist‘ (*in te supra me*), macht Augustin Gott selbst zum ‚Raum‘; der den ‚Raum‘ der Memoria nicht nur transzendiert, sondern gleichzeitig auch umfasst.³²

Um Gottes ‚Wohnsitz‘ in der Memoria zu beschreiben, greift Augustin zu einem logischen Trick: Die an einem konkreten Objekt gemachten Erfahrungen, die der Raummetapher zugrunde liegen, werden weiterhin aufgerufen, dann aber negiert, d. h. die Metaphorik wird *e negativo* weitergeführt. Die Erklärungsmodi der negativen Theologie werden in eine ‚negative‘ Raum-Metaphorik überführt.³³ Die Metaphorik ist also auch da, wo kein ‚Ort‘ mehr denkbar ist, immer noch konsequent räumlich.

2 Der ‚Raum‘ der Erkenntnis in *De trinitate*

In *De trinitate* 8–15 erklärt Augustin die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes mit Trinitätsrelationen, die sich aus der Geschaffenheit des Menschen „nach dem Bild Gottes“ (*ad imaginem dei*, nach *Gn* 1,27) ergeben: Gott sei seit der Erschaffung des Menschen im menschlichen Geist als *imago* – als reales, nicht als metaphorisches Bild³⁴ – präsent und manifestiere sich in Form von trinitarischen Strukturen in Form von Ternaren, deren Glieder je einer Person der Trinität zugeordnet werden. Die Ternare bezeichnen Teilvermögen des menschlichen Geistes, die ihn zur Selbst(er)kenntnis und zur Erkenntnis der *imago dei* führen.³⁵ Das menschliche Streben nach der Gotteserkenntnis ist also der Versuch, das Bild Gottes ‚in‘ sich zu betrachten.³⁶ Mit seinen trinitarischen Strukturen ist auch der menschliche Geist – genauer: dessen „Hauptteil“ (*trin.* 14,11: *principale mentis*) – Bild Gottes; wenn er auch diesem „ungleich“ ist, so ist er doch dessen „Bild“ (10,19: *cuius impar imago est humana mens sed tamen imago*).

Da aber der ‚äußere Mensch‘ mit seiner sinnlichen Wahrnehmung nach ‚außen‘ gerichtet ist und dadurch seine Erkenntnisprozesse entsprechend konditioniert sind,³⁷

32 Dazu Cillera 2008, 102. Die Vorstellung, dass Gott sowohl ‚Raum‘ ist als auch ‚über dem Raum‘ zu denken ist, erinnert an die Konzeption der *chóra* im platonischen *Timaios* (48e–52d). Eine Doppelfunktion von ‚innen‘ und ‚außen‘ findet sich auch in der Metaphorik der Paulus-Briefe, so in *1 Cor* 1:30, wo „wir in Christus“, und *Col* 1:27, wo „Christus in uns“ vorgestellt wird. Vgl. dazu den Beitrag von Markus Egg im vorliegenden Band.

33 Die mittelalterliche Philosophie prägt dafür die Metapher der *via negativa*. Vgl. dazu Westerkamp 2006.

34 Daher ist der Begriff im Folgenden nicht mit gnomischen Häkchen ausgezeichnet, oder es wird die lateinische Junktur *imago dei* verwendet.

35 *Trin.* 9–10: *memoria – intelligentia – voluntas; mens – notitia – amor* usw. Vgl. dazu O’Daly 1987, 133–138; Brachtendorf 2000b, 118–148.

36 Den Prozess der Erkenntnis beschreibt Augustin mit einem Rekurs auf die Raummetaphorik: als *in-venire* (‚finden‘ als ‚hinein gehen‘, *trin.* 10,10f.). Vergleichbar ist die Etymologie in *conf.* 10,18: *cogitare* (denken) < *cogere* (zusammentreiben).

37 Augustin spricht von der *consuetudo*, *trin.* 11,1.

sei es sinnvoll, sagt Augustin, den Nachweis der Präsenz der trinitarischen *imago dei* mit „Beispielen der Ähnlichkeit/ähnlicher Dinge“ (*similitudinum documenta*) aus dem Bereich der „äußeren Körper“ (*de corporalibus exterioribus*) zu erbringen (*trin.* 11,1). Auf das Objekt der Suche lenkt die „Spur der Dreieinheit“ hin, die „auch im äußeren Menschen“ wahrnehmbar ist (11,1: *nitamur igitur si possumus in hoc quoque exteriore indagare qualecumque vestigium trinitatis*).³⁸ Auch der weitere Prozess der Gottessuche und -erkenntnis wird mit der paulinischen Metapher des ‚äußeren‘ und ‚inneren Menschen‘ erklärt: Der ‚innere Mensch‘ soll ‚erneuert werden‘ „nach dem Bild dessen, der den Menschen geschaffen hat“; und so kann der Mensch „zur Erkenntnis Gottes“ gelangen.³⁹ Dies geschieht jedoch immer ‚nur‘ *secundum imaginem* (11,1); wenn der Mensch das Bild Gottes in sich betrachtet, ist das die Form der Gotteserkenntnis, die ihm im Diesseits möglich ist. Da dieses immer Gottes Bild ist, ist der Geist immer auch „Gottes aufnahmefähig“ (*capax dei*) und kann „seiner teilhaftig“ werden.⁴⁰ Er ist dadurch, dass er die *imago dei* enthält, fähig Gott zu ‚erfassen‘; durch dieses „Bild in sich“ vermag er „Gott anzuhängen“ (14,20: *qua in se imagine dei tam potens est, ut ei cuius imago est, valeat inhaerere*).

Obwohl Augustin also postuliert, dass die *imago dei* nicht metaphorisch zu verstehen sei, beschreibt er ihren Zustand doch konsequent mit Metaphern (*trin.* 14,6 und 11): Das Bild Gottes kann, durch Verschulden des ‚sündigen‘ Menschen, der es in sich trägt, ‚verbraucht‘ (*obsoleta*), ‚dunkel‘ (*obscura*) oder ‚verformt‘ (*deformis*) sein, jedoch auch ‚klar und schön‘ (*clara et pulchra*) werden. Mit der ‚Erneuerung‘ des ‚inneren Menschen‘ lässt sich die ‚Entstellung‘ des Bildes rückgängig machen.⁴¹ Nicht nur der ‚innere Mensch‘ wird somit ‚erneuert‘; sondern auch das Bild wird ‚renoviert‘ und gleichsam ‚restauriert‘ (14,25: *imago ... renovatur*).⁴² Der menschliche Geist enthält mit dem Bild Gottes auch die es ‚reinigende‘ Kraft in sich.

Augustin operiert also einerseits mit der paulinischen Rede vom ‚inneren Menschen‘ und der Metapher der ‚Reinigung‘ der *imago dei* von ‚Schmutz‘ und ‚Verdunke-

38 Die Metapher der ‚Spur‘ gehört in den Bereich der Weg- und Reisemetaphorik, die auch paulinisch ist, so z. B. das Bild des *homo viator* (2 Cor 5:7), auf das Augustin öfter rekurriert. Bonaventura nimmt die Metaphorik auf und nennt sein mystisches Hauptwerk *Itinerarium mentis ad deum*. Dazu Cillerai 2008, 277–284.

39 *Trin.* 11,1: *renovari in dei agnitionem secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum*, nach Col 3:1 und 2 Cor 4:16. Vgl. auch bes. *trin.* 14,22f. und 25.

40 14,11: *diximus ... dei tamen imaginem permanere. eo quippe ipse imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest*; vgl. 14,6. Das Konzept der *capacitas dei* erörtert umfassend Cillerai 2008, bes. 321–324.

41 ‚Verformung‘ und ‚Verschmutzung‘ des ‚inneren Raumes‘ sind Folge sowohl der *creatio ex nihilo* als auch der ‚Sünde‘; und da die ‚Reinigung‘ durch die Hinwendung zu Gott möglich ist, erhält dieser Raum auch eine soteriologische Funktion; dazu Drever 2007, 238–240.

42 In *trin.* 14,22 ist überliefert: *quasi alia sit imago secundum quam renovatur* [scil. *mens humana*], *non ipsa qua renovatur*; gemäß 14,25 ist es allerdings das Bild selbst, das ‚erneuert‘ wird, weshalb m. E. der Text in 14,22 geändert werden sollte in: *non ipsa quae renovatur*. Kreuzer 2001, 237 übersetzt denn auch, als ob *quae* im Text stünde: ‚als ob es ein anderes Bild sei, nach dem er erneuert wird, und nicht das Bild selbst, das erneuert wird‘. Im Eschaton ist es eine *imago renovata* (15,21).

lung‘ und andererseits der nicht metaphorischen *imago dei*, die ‚im‘ Menschen ‚drin‘ zu denken ist. Dies wirkt zunächst tautologisch oder zirkulär oder zumindest inkonsistent; doch zeigt sich hier ein wesentliches Element der augustinischen Erkenntnistheorie: Das Bild Gottes manifestiert sich als Struktur des trinitarischen Gottes und ist damit eine Art Signatur im Menschen, die auf das abgebildete Objekt (Gott) verweist; das Bild ist dann, wenn es ‚gereinigt‘ ist, ein nicht arbiträres, irrtumsfreies Zeichen.⁴³ Die ‚Arbeit‘ des Menschen ‚am Bild‘ ist der Versuch, diese Signatur seines Schöpfers in sich ‚freizulegen‘ und zu erkennen. Der ‚innere Mensch‘ ist gewissermaßen das ‚Atelier‘, in dem er selbst arbeitet. Der Gegenstand der Arbeit ist dabei so beschaffen, dass er, da er selbst nicht metaphorisch, sondern als Realität zu denken und mithin kategorial anders ist, nicht nur diesen ‚inneren Raum‘ transzendiert und am ‚äußeren‘ Menschen seine ‚Spur‘ zeigt, sondern auch alles, auch das nicht mehr räumlich Denkbare – nach *conf.* 10,37 den *nusquam locus* – ‚umfasst‘.

Die Problematik dieser eigentlich miteinander nicht kompatiblen Vorstellungen – einerseits des menschlichen Geistes als ‚Raum‘ und andererseits des Gottes, der, jeder Raumvorstellung enthoben, ‚darin‘ als Bild präsent ist – erklärt Augustin mit einer weiteren paulinischen Metapher: Im Jenseits wird die Schau Gottes ‚von Angesicht zu Angesicht‘ möglich sein, jetzt jedoch erst „durch einen Spiegel im Rätsel“ (*trin.* 14,25, nach *1Cor* 13,12: *per speculum in aenigmate*).⁴⁴ Den „Spiegel“ deutet Augustin als „Bild“, das „Rätsel“ als Tropus, der für eine „Ähnlichkeit“ (*similitudo*) stehe, welche allerdings „dunkel und schwer erkennbar“ sei (15,16: *nomine speculi imaginem voluit intellegi, ita nomine aenigmati quamvis similitudinem tamen obscuram et ad perspicendam difficilem*).⁴⁵ Damit ist die Mittelbarkeit der Wahrnehmung des Gottesbildes ‚im‘ menschlichen Geist in doppelter Weise ausgedrückt; Gleichheit und Identität des Wahrgenommenen mit dem ‚eigentlichen‘ Ziel des Sehens und Erkennens – Gott – werden ausgeschlossen.⁴⁶ Gott ist also selbst in einem ‚gereinigten‘ und somit ‚klaren‘ Bild ‚nur‘ als Bild (*imago*) und dabei auch ‚nur‘ indirekt „im Spiegelbild“ (*per speculum*) und ‚nur‘ im Modus der ‚Verrätselung‘ (*in aenigmate*) erkennbar. ‚Spiegel‘ und ‚Rätsel‘ bilden also gleichsam Hindernisse zur direkten Schau, die nur soweit abgebaut werden können, als durch die ‚Reinigung‘ des Bildes der Blick in den ‚Spiegel‘ unverstellt und weniger ‚verrätselt‘

43 Vgl. dazu auch Lagouanère 2012, 582–595, der einen Bezug zwischen Augustins Bild- und Zeichentheorie sieht.

44 Auf das Paulus-Zitat rekurriert Augustin häufig in *trin.* 14 und 15; die Stellen sind aufgeführt bei Cillerai 2008, 333 Anm. 230. Vgl. auch die Zusammenstellung und Diskussion aller Zitate bei Lagouanère 2012, 525–571 (551–569 zu *trin.*).

45 Augustin versteht das *aenigma* als Subtypus des Tropus der *allegoria*; dazu Mayer 1986–1994; Lagouanère 2012, 511–512.

46 *Trin.* 15,21: *in hac qualicumque similitudine quanta sit etiam dissimilitudo quis potest explicare?* Zur Funktion der Spiegel-Metaphorik, mit der „Ähnlichkeit“ und damit Differenz, also nicht Identität ausgedrückt werden soll, vgl. Fuchs 2010, 90–92.

erscheint.⁴⁷ Diese erfolgt erst im Jenseits im auferstandenen Leib „von Angesicht zu Angesicht“, „wenn das Bild bis zur Vollkommenheit erneuert sein wird“ (15,21: *cum ... ad perfectum fuerit haec imago renovata*); dann ist die „Ähnlichkeit mit Gott vollkommen“, allerdings auch dann ‚nur‘ „in diesem Bild“ (14,23: *in hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit dei similitudo*). Das Bild Gottes im Menschen fungiert somit allein im diesseitigen Leben als ‚Spiegel‘; im Auferstehungsleib verliert es diese Funktion, zum einen weil es ‚klar‘ und daher nicht mehr ‚verrätselt‘ sein wird, zum anderen weil dem auferstandenen Menschen die direkte und unmittelbare Schau Gottes möglich sein wird.⁴⁸ Die *imago dei*, die sowohl den Menschen als Geschöpf Gottes und damit sowohl die Ähnlichkeit als auch die Differenz zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf ausweist, bleibt auch im Auferstehungsleib als Signatur bestehen.

Doch bleiben wir bei Augustins Vorstellung des Menschen im diesseitigen Leib, in dem die *imago dei* die Funktion des ‚Spiegels‘ übernimmt. Die Spiegel-Metapher wird in der philosophischen Literatur öfter aufgegriffen, um die Mittelbarkeit der Selbst- und/oder Gotteserkenntnis zum Ausdruck zu bringen.⁴⁹ Der menschliche Geist ist ‚hienieden‘ zur unverstellten Gottesschau nicht in der Lage, und auch dann, wenn das Bild gemäß den gegebenen Möglichkeiten ‚erneuert‘ wird, bleibt es hier ein ‚Spiegelbild‘. Damit wird allerdings auch klar, dass in Augustins Darstellung der menschliche Erkenntnisraum nicht von Gott ‚abgekoppelt‘ ist, wie Christoph Horn die Deutung Johannes Brachtendorfs kommentiert,⁵⁰ und dies nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil die Metaphorik eine andere ist. Ich möchte im Folgenden zeigen, dass eben dadurch, dass Augustin das Bild Gottes selbst nicht als Metapher, sondern als reale Entität im Menschen versteht, nicht von einer ‚Abkopplung‘ gesprochen werden kann. Augustins epistemologisches Konzept, das er in *De trinitate* vorstellt, soll daher nochmals mit Rekurs auf metaphortheoretische Überlegungen analysiert werden.

3 Augustins theologische Epistemologie als *Conceptual Blending*

Gemäß Augustins Ausführungen in *De trinitate* existiert ‚im Raum‘ des menschlichen Geistes und Gedächtnisses ein Bild von Gott, das nicht von ‚außen‘ dort hineingelangt ist, sondern dem Menschen als Geschöpf Gottes gleichsam als dessen Signatur immer

47 Vgl. auch *trin.* 7,7: *intelligere saltem in aenigmate*. Zum in *trin.* 14,25 beschriebenen Erkenntnisvorgang des *proficere per speculum in aenigmate* vgl. auch *ep.* 187,29.

48 Zur Vorstellung der Möglichkeit des ‚Sehens‘ im Auferstehungsleib vgl. Fuhrer 2009.

49 So in Plat. *Alc. mai.* 133b; Plot. *enn.* 1,6,8f.; Porph. *Marc.* 13; Sen. *quaest. nat.* 1,17; u.ö. Dazu Koners-

mann 1995, 1379–1380: „Das S.-Bild vermag zu zeigen, was selbst nicht in Erscheinung tritt“; Lagouanère 2012, 511–515; zur biblischen Tradition und zur Rezeption in der frühen christlichen Literatur sowie bei Augustin insgesamt vgl. *ibid.*, 515–608.

50 S. o. Anm. 17.

eigen ist und bleibt. Das Bild wird ‚lokalisiert‘ im Menschen, der als begrenzter ‚Raum‘ gedacht wird, ‚in‘ einem Bereich, der sich gemäß der Beschreibung in *Confessiones* 10 in ‚unzugängliche‘, ‚entgrenzte‘ ‚Gefilde‘ öffnet. Dieser Bereich ist, da er metaphorisch gedacht ist, zwar nicht ‚zugänglich‘ und weder sichtbar noch ‚sagbar‘,⁵¹ er wird jedoch dadurch, dass die Gefäß-Metapher auch bei seiner Beschreibung beibehalten wird, dass also die *imago dei* doch auch in den metaphorischen Bereich eingeschlossen wird,⁵² als der ‚Ort‘ ‚im Raum‘ des ‚inneren Menschen‘, wo sich das Bild befindet, vorstellbar und letztlich – wenn auch im unzulänglichen Medium der Sprache – wieder beschreibbar gemacht.

Das Vorgehen, dass unterschiedliche Dinge und Konzepte gedanklich so miteinander verbunden werden, dass sich in ihrer Vermischung neue Vorstellungen und Denkmöglichkeiten ergeben, lässt sich mit dem Verfahren vergleichen, das Gilles Fauconnier und Mark Turner in ihrer *Blending Theory* und dem Prozess der „konzeptuellen Vermischung“ (*conceptual blending*) oder der „konzeptuellen Integration“ (*conceptual integration*) beschreiben:⁵³ Demnach werden in menschlichen Denkprozessen Gegenstände, Begriffe oder Konzepte aus zwei unterschiedlichen Bereichen (*input spaces*) miteinander ‚vermischt‘ und daraus ergibt sich ein „vermischter Bereich“ (*blended space*), der die Emergenz von neuen oder neuartigen Vorstellungen ermöglicht. Dabei dürfen die beiden Input-Bereiche nicht gänzlich verschieden sein, sondern müssen einem für beide Bereiche relevanten „generischen Bereich“ (*generic space*) entstammen, so dass im „Blending-Bereich“ (*blend*) eine Integration der Konzepte aus beiden Bereichen möglich wird und sinnvoll erscheint.⁵⁴

Augustin verbindet das platonisch-dualistische Menschenbild bzw. – paulinisch gesprochen – das Konzept des ‚inneren Menschen‘ (Input-Bereich 1) mit der alttestamentlichen Lehre, dass der Mensch „nach dem Bilde Gottes geschaffen“ sei (Input-Bereich 2), und kombiniert die beiden Vorstellungen, indem er das „Bild Gottes“ als Wirklichkeit interpretiert, die ‚im‘ Menschen ‚verortet‘ ist und der er somit einen imaginären ‚Raum‘ zuweist. Der Zielbereich der Raum-Metaphorik, das Denken, und der Quellenbereich, die Raumvorstellung, sind gleichberechtigte Zulieferer für eine neue Struktur, die als

51 Auf den Aspekt der ‚Unsagbarkeit‘ weist Augustin in *trin.* 15 mehrmals hin, so in *trin.* 15,13: *quomodo autem fiant quanto attentius voluerimus advertere tanto magis noster et sermo succumbit et ipsa non perdurat intentio ut ad liquidum aliquid nostra intelligentia etsi non lingua perveniat.* Vgl. 15,21: *quanta sit etiam dissimilitudo quis potest explicare?* Zu diesen „apophatic caveats“ in *trin.* 15, mit denen Augustin die Unmöglichkeit der Gotteserkenntnis artikuliert, vgl. Drever 2007, 239. Vgl. auch die Frage „drei was?“ (*quid tria vel quid tres?*), mit der Augustin die Trinität selbst als etwas

Unsagbares und Unfassbares bezeichnet (*trin.* 7,7–9 u.ö.).

52 Die Andersheit betont Augustin in den *Confessiones* mit Ausdrücken wie *locus non locus* (10,16; vgl. 10,8: *quod non capit locus*; 10, 36: *quasi vero loca ibi sint*; 10,37: *nusquam locus*) oder *regio dissimilitudinis* (7,16; vgl. 13,2).

53 Fauconnier und Turner 2002.

54 Vgl. die Darstellung von Schneider 2012, der die Relevanz der *Blending Theory* für die Analyse narrativer Texte in der Erzählforschung vorstellt.

‚Denkraum‘ Realität wird. Durch die ‚Vermischung‘ (*blending*) des nicht-metaphorischen Konzepts des Gottesbildes (der *imago dei*) mit dem durch Raummetaphern beschriebenen Menschenbild emergiert die Vorstellung des menschlichen Geistes als einer Struktur, in der sich die göttliche Trinität abbildhaft erkennen lässt. Aus der konzeptuellen Vermischung entwickelt Augustin seine – in der antiken Erkenntnistheorie neue und einzigartige, auch wirkungsmächtige – „theologische Epistemologie“ und eine „Onto-Theologie des Bildes“.⁵⁵

Während gemäß platonischer Vorstellung der Prozess des Strebens nach der Ideenschau die „Anähnlichung an Gott“ (*homoiosis tô theô*) zur Folge hat, führt die augustinische ‚Wendung nach innen‘ zur Erkenntnis, dass im ‚Innern‘ zwar ‚nur‘ ein Bild, das Ähnlichkeit mit Gott aufweist, erkennbar ist und durch die Ähnlichkeit auf ihn verweist. Der augustinische Mensch kann sich nicht Gott ‚anähnlichen‘, doch kann er versuchen, in dem Bild Gottes, das er in sich trägt, die Ähnlichkeit mit Gott selbst zu erkennen, die zwar gleichzeitig eine kategoriale Andersheit oder „Unähnlichkeit“ (*dissimilitudo*) ist, die er aber in Gestalt des Bildes dennoch in sich trägt.⁵⁶ Auch wenn diese Erkenntnis nur *secundum imaginem*, also nur eine mittelbare sein kann, spricht Augustin doch von „Gotteserkenntnis“ (*trin. 11,1: agnitio dei*). Der Mensch ist nicht von Gott ‚abgekoppelt‘, sondern hat (‚trägt‘) ihn im Medium des Bildes in sich und kann ihn daher mittelbar erkennen.

4 Fazit

Augustin ‚lokalisiert‘ das sinnlich nicht fassbare, aber reale, d. h. im Sinn einer theologischen Realität für real zu denkende Bild Gottes im metaphorischen ‚Innenraum‘ des menschlichen Geistes. Der Gegenstand des Bildes, Gott, ist als Schöpfer gleichzeitig derjenige, der alles geschaffen hat und der alles gleichsam ‚von außen‘ umfasst; er ist also selbst jeder räumlichen Kategorie so enthoben, dass sowohl er ‚im Raum‘ als auch der ‚Raum‘ ‚in ihm‘ vorgestellt werden kann. Das Verhältnis, in dem Schöpfer und Geschöpf zueinander stehen, lässt sich mit einem Vergleich verdeutlichen, der die

55 Der Begriff der „theologischen Epistemologie“ nach dem Titel der Monographie von Gioia 2008, derjenige der „Onto-Theologie des Bildes“ nach Lagouanère 2012, 434–435. Mit Fauconnier und Turner 2002, 48 kann man von „completion“ und „elaboration“ sprechen, d. h. den sich aus den neuen Emergenzen heraus weiterentwickelten Konzepten.

56 Lagouanère 2012, 385–435 sieht in Augustins Verbindung von der platonischen Vorstellung der *ho-*

moiosis und dem rhetorischen Begriff der *similitudo* als Eigenschaft des *tropus* eine „analogie entre rhétorique et mystique“, mithin einen Blend im Sinn von Fauconnier und Turner 2002; allerdings stützt sich Lagouanère nicht auf die Theorie des Conceptual Blending, sondern auf die metapherntheoretischen Konzepte von Jakobson, Eliade und Durand (Lagouanère 2012, 291–293).

Raum-Metapher aufnimmt. Zum einen gleicht nämlich das Verhältnis einer ‚Chinesen-Box‘-Konstruktion: Gott ‚umfasst‘ den Menschen, der in sich, gleichsam in der ‚innersten Box‘, dem *principale mentis*, das Bild Gottes ‚enthält‘; das Bild Gottes transzendiert und strukturiert die jeweils ‚äußeren Boxes‘ so, dass seine Struktur auch noch in der ‚äußersten Box‘ sichtbar ist.⁵⁷ Andererseits ist gerade dieser Vergleich tautologisch und zirkulär, da es sich wiederum um eine Rede im übertragenen Sinn – nach Augustin: einen *tropus* – handelt.

Durch die ‚Vermischung‘ (*blending*) von metaphorisch vorstellbaren und gänzlich unvorstellbaren Bereichen und Dingen ergibt sich eine Spannung zwischen Erklärungswert und Erklärungsziel der Metaphern; denn nicht nur ist der Bereich, in dem der Vorgang der Gotteserkenntnis ‚verortet‘ wird, so zu denken, dass er den Sinnen nicht zugänglich ist: Er enthält auch – metaphorisch gesprochen – eine Schnitt-‚Stelle‘, an der mit der Konkretheit der Metaphorik etwas beschrieben wird, was allem Vorstellbaren als gänzlich entzogen zu denken ist. Der Erklärungswert der spatialen Metaphorik wird aber offenbar darin gesehen, dass der Raum bei aller Konkretheit am ehesten die Möglichkeit der Öffnung ins Unendliche und damit Aufhebung der Dreidimensionalität des Raums in der Unendlichkeit vorstellbar macht. Die Raummetaphern dienen somit als eine Art Kippfiguren zwischen räumlich-konkretem Denken und dem Denken des sinnlich nicht Fassbaren. Mit der konzeptuellen Vermischung der Vorstellungen eines sinnlich und damit räumlich nicht wahrnehmbaren Gottes und der konkreten Räumlichkeit in der biblischen *imago dei* schafft Augustin ein Erkenntnisinstrument, das theologisch ausgesprochen wirksam geworden ist: Die ‚konzeptuelle Integration‘ von konkretem Raum und intelligiblem Gott in dem im Menschen immanenten Bild Gottes bietet eine epistemologische Begründung nicht allein für das Denken von Gott in konkret-räumlicher Begrifflichkeit, sondern auch für die Vorstellung der Menschwerdung Gottes und des Gottmenschentums.

57 Der Vergleich mit ineinander geschachtelten russischen Matroschka-Puppen drängt sich auf, wäre jedoch irreführend, da in Augustins Vorstellung

das Bild Gottes gerade nicht eine anthropomorphe Struktur repräsentiert.

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Beatrice Trínca

Brandans Buch der Welt – eine konkretisierte Metapher

Zusammenfassung

In der Analyse von *Sankt Brandans Reise* wird das literarische Potential einer religiösen Metapher untersucht, der augustinischen Metapher der Welt als Buch. Auch wenn ein signifikanter Größenunterschied zwischen Welt und Codex besteht, wird die Metapher in einigen Episoden konkret. Die Vorstellung einer Identität zwischen Welt und Buch auf der Handlungsebene und ein paradiesisches Artefakt, auf dem fast die ganze Welt täuschend echt repräsentiert ist, stehen der Erkenntnis entgegen, dass Brandans Reisetagebuch nicht die ganze Welt erfassen kann.

Keywords: Welt als Buch; Augustin; Brandan; Konkretisierte Metapher; Mittelalter.

This analysis of *Sankt Brandans Reise* focuses on the literary potential of a religious metaphor, on Augustine's metaphor of the world as a book. This metaphor becomes concrete in several episodes. Despite the substantial difference in scale between the world and a book, they are identified in the narrative, as well as in a paradisiac artefact that presents a deceptively realistic representation of almost the whole world. At the same time, however, this stands in contrast with an awareness that it is not possible for Brendan's travel journal to contain a record of the whole world.

Keywords: World as a book; Augustin; Brandan; Concrete metaphor; Middle Ages.

Kaum eine andere Metapher der Antike, die eine räumliche Vorstellung von Wissen zum Ausdruck bringt, erwies sich für das Mittelalter so wirkmächtig wie die augustinische Metapher der Welt als Buch.¹ Dieses Buch der Schöpfung wurde häufig als Quelle des Wissens über Gott und über das Heil verstanden,² ein Wissen, das nicht unabhängig von dem anderen zentralen Buch der Christenheit, der Heiligen Schrift, zu denken war. Hans Blumenberg hält mit Bezug auf Augustin fest:

Dennoch ist die Formel vom Buch der Natur noch keine Ermunterung zur Erforschung der physischen Welt auf anderem Wege als eben im Licht des Sechstageswerks. Statt die Selbständigkeit der beiden Bücher auszuwerten, werden ständig die Fragen abgewehrt, die sich nicht im Lichte der biblischen Offenbarung beantworten lassen.³

Um das Buch der Welt zu verstehen, benötigt man die Unterstützung eines im konkreten Sinne Lesekundigen.⁴ Die Natur wird metaphorisch zur Schrift,⁵ aber nur durch die Entzifferung einer anderen konkreten Schrift im christlichen Sinne verständlich.

Die Metapher der Welt als Buch gehört zu den grundlegenden Imaginationen der mittelalterlichen Kultur. Im Folgenden soll die Frage nach dem literarischen Potential dieser Metapher gestellt werden. Sie ist auch in der Auseinandersetzung mit Texten zu berücksichtigen, in denen sie nicht explizit erwähnt wird. In der mittelalterlichen Literatur bilden Metaphern – ob sie im Text genannt werden oder nicht – häufig die Vorlage für Handlungen oder für Requisiten im Text, sie werden konkret.⁶ In Wolframs *Parzival* finden sich beispielsweise zahlreiche erotische Metaphern und Vergleiche aus dem Bedeutungsfeld der Jagd. Darüber hinaus erhält Parzival, kurz bevor er seine zukünftige Ehefrau kennen lernt, einen Mantel als Geschenk, dessen Zobelbesatz nach Neu und Wild riecht. Der Held wird mit einer frischen Jagdtrophäe geschmückt und dadurch implizit identifiziert.⁷ Bildspender (Wild) und Bildempfänger (Mensch) einer

1 Vgl. *Enarratio in Psalmum XLV*,7 (ed. Dekkers und Fraipont 1956), *Confessiones* XIII,18,23 (ed. Bernhart 1987). Vgl. auch Maierù 1981, 57.

2 Vgl. Herkommer 1986, 168.

3 Blumenberg 1983, 49–50.

4 Augustin postuliert das Gegenteil und widerspricht sich zugleich.

5 „[J]ene Vorstellung, im 12. Jahrhundert von Hugo von Sankt Viktor auf die griffige Formel gebracht, in der Rede Gottes hätten nicht nur die Wörter, sondern auch die Dinge Bedeutung, [stand] immer (wieder) in Spannung zu der anderen Vorstellung, die Schöpfung sei durch die menschliche Verworfenheit gestört und allenfalls durch Transzendierung oder durch Transformierung vor dem Auge des Geistes als Medium des Göttlichen lesbar.“ Kie-

ning 2007, 333. Ob transformationsbedürftig oder nicht, die Schöpfung galt für Gläubige als Medium göttlicher Präsenz sowie von Wissen über Gott.

6 Dieser poetischen Strategie wurde in den letzten Jahren vermehrt Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Vgl. Kiening und Köbele 1998, Köbele 2002, insbes. S. 103, Müller 2007, insbes. S. 342, Quast und Schauten 2008, Friedrich 2014.

7 „man bôt im einen mantel sân, / gelich alsô der roc getân, / der è des an dem helde lac: / des zobel gap wilden niwen smac. / si sprâchen »welt ir schouwen / die künigin, unser frouwen?« „Sodann bot man ihm einen Mantel an, der genauso gemacht war wie der Rock, den er schon vorher anhatte. Dessen Zobel roch nach Neu und Wild. Sie sagten: »Wollt Ihr

Metapher gehören nun der Handlungsebene an, zwischen ihnen besteht eine metonymische, eine Kontiguitätsrelation. Das Buch der Welt stellt hingegen eine Metapher dar, die nicht so leicht in Handlung übertragen werden kann. Ein Buch, das mit der Welt identisch ist, lässt sich nur mit höherem imaginativem Aufwand realisieren. Auch wenn man ein Buch imaginiert, das die ganze Welt – ob verschriftlicht oder abgebildet – enthält, stößt man auf Schwierigkeiten in der Handlungskonzeption. Der Größenunterschied zwischen Bildspender und Bildempfänger, Buch und Welt steht einer metonymischen Relation bzw. einer Rede im unübertragenen Sinne im Wege. Im Folgenden möchte ich zeigen, wie sich die Erzählung von *Sankt Brandans Reise* mit diesem Problem auseinandersetzt, ohne die Welt als Buch explizit zu erwähnen. Dies geschieht vor dem Hintergrund der augustinischen Metapher, die sich nicht ohne ein zweites konkretes, ein Begleitbuch denken lässt. In der Erzählung geht es nicht um die Frage, was das Buch der Welt über Gott aussagt, sondern welche Möglichkeiten es gibt, ein solches Buch überhaupt als Teil der Handlung zu konzipieren.

Zur Tradition, in der Brandan hauptsächlich als Seefahrer in Erscheinung tritt, gehören die *Navigatio*-Fassung und die deutsch-niederländische *Reise*-Fassung.⁸ Die Texte sind anonym. Die *Reise*-Fassung unterscheidet sich von der *Navigatio* unter anderem darin, dass ein Buch die Motivation für Brandans Reisen darstellt, und die Reise wird mit einem Buch abgeschlossen.⁹ Ich untersuche zwei Textzeugen: M (mitteldeutsch) und C (niederländisch), die zwei verschiedenen Redaktionssträngen der *Reise*-Fassung angehören und zu den ältesten überlieferten Textzeugen dieser Fassung zählen.¹⁰ M wurde um 1350 zu Pergament gebracht, C um 1400. Sie gehen auf eine verlorene mittelfränkische Erzählung zurück, die im 12. Jahrhundert entstand. M und C enthalten die differenzierteste Zusammenstellung von Schrift- und Buch-Motiven, die auf eine komplexe Auseinandersetzung mit der Welt als Buch schließen lassen, weswegen sie im Zentrum der folgenden Analyse stehen.¹¹ Die Zusammenfassung der *Reise*-Handlung trifft (falls nicht anders angemerkt) auf beide Textzeugen zu.

Der irische Abt Brandan wird zu Beginn des Textes als Heiliger vorgestellt. Wie er in der ersten Episode handelt, entspricht jedoch kaum diesem Attribut. Der Gottesdiener sucht und findet in Büchern zahlreiche Wunder Gottes. Dazu zählen ungewöhnliche

die Königin sehen, unsere Herrin?“ (186,7–12) Vgl. dazu Trınca 2008, 115–116, zitiert nach Lachmann und Knecht 1998. Die Übersetzungen stammen, falls nicht anders angemerkt, von der Verfasserin.

8 Ausführlich zu den Fassungen und Redaktionen vgl. Strijbosch 2000, Haug 2006, Guglielmetti 2014.

9 „Der Unterschied der *Navigatio* zur *Reisefassung* liegt [...] nicht lediglich in der Motivation zur Reise oder auf struktureller Ebene. Die *Reisefassung* erscheint im Vergleich zur *Navigatio* insgesamt kontingenter,

da sich ein Zusammenhang zwischen den Episoden kaum findet und die Seefahrer von einem Abenteuer ins nächste katapultiert werden.“ Weitbrecht 2011, 204.

10 Ich zitiere die Textzeugen nach: Schmid und Strijbosch 2009 (C) und Hahn und Fasbender 2002 (M).

11 Zu den Buch-Motiven in Illustrationen (anderer Textzeugen) vgl. zuletzt Strijbosch 2015.

Naturgeschehen, Wesen, Orte, Grenzgebiete und -gestalten zwischen Diesseits und Jenseits. Er erfährt von den zwei irdischen Paradiesen, von der Welt unter der Erde mit einem umgekehrten Tag und Nacht-Rhythmus, von drei Himmeln, einem Fisch mit bewaldetem Land auf der Haut, von Judas' wöchentlichen Pausen von der Hölle, von erstaunlichen Dingen und Inseln (in C) bzw. von fremden Ländern (in M). Das alles will und kann der Heilige nicht glauben. Es handelt sich nicht um biblisch abgesichertes Wissen. Das schriftlich Festgehaltene, dem üblicherweise große Glaubwürdigkeit zugesprochen wird, verliert als Unerhörtes seine Autorität. Brandan verbrennt das Buch (von dem nunmehr im Singular die Rede ist), und er verflucht den Verfasser. Daraufhin wirft ihm in C ein Engel Gottes vor, sein Zorn habe dazu geführt, dass auf diese Weise die Wahrheit verloren gegangen ist, „die waerheit dus es verloren“ (v. 64). In M (v. 56–59) spricht Gott selbst zu Brandan, und es heißt: „du hast vil ubele getan, / daz ich von dime zorne / min wunder sehe verlorne / unde der warheit sinne.“ „Du hast viel Übel angerichtet, so dass ich wegen deines Zorns meine Wunder verloren sehe und den Sinn der Wahrheit.“ Der „warheit sinne“ ist vieldeutig. Es kann die Bedeutung, der Inhalt, die Richtung der Wahrheit gemeint sein. Zudem ist es ungewöhnlich, dass die Wunder verloren gingen, das heißt vernichtet wurden, als das Buch ins Feuer geriet.¹² Es ist, als würde ein Stück Welt mitverbrennen, als hätte die Schöpfung, das Medium der göttlichen Offenbarung, Feuer gefangen, als würde der göttliche Sprecher die Welt als Buch nicht metaphorisch, sondern konkret verstehen, als gäbe es nur ein einziges Buch: einen Codex der Schöpfung, den Brandan in den Händen hielt. Das gilt jedoch nur für einen Moment und nur für eine Möglichkeit, den Vers zu verstehen. Die Wunder könnten einfach aus dem Blick geraten sein, für die Leser als Sammler von Buchstaben, Wahrheit und Sinn verloren gegangen sein.

Brandan soll mit einigen Begleitern die Welt neun Jahre lang mit dem Schiff bereisen, um sich zu überzeugen, was wahr und was falsch sei. Die Wunder existieren also doch noch. Ihnen entsprachen, nach augustinischem Muster, auch wenn es sich nicht um die Heilige Schrift handelte, die Bucheinträge im nunmehr verbrannten Buch. Es deutet sich aber an, dass die Wunder gerettet werden müssen: Als er sich für die Fahrt vorbereitet, lässt Brandan sein Schiff wie die Arche Noah bauen, wenngleich der Abt nicht seine Umgebung, sondern die Fremde in sein Schiff aufnehmen muss. Er bewahrt das in der Ferne Vorgefundene nur in Form von Bucheinträgen auf, er führt ein Reisetagebuch. „Arca“ bedeutet neben Arche auch Kasten oder Truhe, Buchbehälter oder Bücherschrank.¹³ Diese Funktion kommt nun Brandans Schiff zu. Die Analogie zu Noah suggeriert zudem, dass das Schiff – nunmehr indem es die Buchführung beherbergt – die Wunder in und mit Hilfe der Schrift am Leben erhält. Ihre Existenz hängt mit der Existenz des Buches zusammen; es müssen immer zwei Bücher sein: ein metaphorisches

12 Vgl. dazu Strijbosch 2002, 282–283.

13 Vgl. Carruthers 2008 [1990], 51.

und ein konkretes. Im niederländischen Text heißt außerdem der Schreiber, der neben Brandan¹⁴ am Verfassen des Reisetagebuchs beteiligt ist, Noah. Seine Namensnennung kurz vor dem Ende des Textes unterstreicht erneut die Analogie zwischen Reisetagebuch und Arche, zwischen Schreiben und die Wunder Retten.

Die Reise gilt als Buße. In ihrem Verlauf werden Brandans Mut, sein Glaube und sein Gottvertrauen einer Prüfung unterzogen.¹⁵ Autopsie garantierte außerdem in der Zeit die Wahrheit und Realitätstreue eines Textes.¹⁶ Erfahrungswissen soll das von Brandan verworfene Bücherwissen validieren,¹⁷ die Autorität des Buches soll wiederhergestellt werden. In einem Text, dessen Inhalte auch im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter als unglaubwürdig galten,¹⁸ kann die Überzeugungs- und Beglaubigungsunternehmung Brandans ironisch gemeint sein oder innerfiktional eine Wahrheit legitimieren, die als Fiktion durchschaut werden will und zugleich teilweise in eine religiöse übergeht.¹⁹ Ob Brandans Vorhaben gelingt, bleibt außerdem offen, denn das, was Brandan auf seiner Reise erlebt, stimmt nicht immer eindeutig mit dem überein, was am Anfang des Textes als Inhalt der gelesenen Bücher bzw. des verbrannten Buches präsentiert wurde. Das Verfassen des Reisetagebuchs wird während der Narration der Schifffahrt mehrmals erwähnt, jedoch nur einmal, als Brandan das wiederfindet, was er schon aus den gelesenen Büchern kennt.²⁰ Die innerfiktionale Beglaubigung erweist sich als prekär.²¹ Und es bleibt ungesagt, ob Brandan das verbrannte Buch durch ein anderes mit dem gleichen Inhalt ersetzt.²²

Die Reise hat mit dem Vorspann der Erzählung eine Konzeption von Welt gemeinsam, in der diesseitige und jenseitige Räume fließend ineinander übergehen.²³ Brandan und seine Mönche treffen beispielsweise auf Judas und erreichen irdische Paradiесе, durchreisen aber nicht alle Paradiесе und Höllen, die erwähnt werden, auch wenn sie Einblicke darin gewinnen. Während der Reise nimmt Brandan außerdem etwas zur Kenntnis, was ihn zu Beginn des Textes nicht beschäftigt (und worüber auch Augustin nicht nachdenkt): Die ganze Schöpfung passt nicht in ein einziges Buch. Die Wunder

14 Vgl. v. M 841–849, C 1134–1136.

15 Vgl. Haug 2006, 50.

16 Vgl. Kästner 1992, 402. Zu weiteren Autorisierungsstrategien vgl. Kästner 1992 und Demmelhuber 1997.

17 Vgl. ausführlich dazu Strohschneider 1997.

18 Zu den Autoren, die der Geschichte von Brandan keinen Glauben schenkten, vgl. Kästner 1992, 403–404, Kasten 1998, 55.

19 Vgl. Kasten 1998, vor allem S. 56. Man kann m. E. mit Bezug auf *Sankt Brandans Reise* nicht zwischen Fiktionalität (fiktionalen Wundern) und Religion (möglichen Wundern des christlichen Gottes) klar trennen. Dass es sich ausschließlich um nicht-

fiktionale, glaubwürdige Wunder handelt, erschien sicherlich immer als unglaubwürdig – trotz solcher Aussagen wie derjenigen des niederländischen Anonymus, der die Geschichte unter der Voraussetzung erzählt, dass man ihm glaubt (v. 4f.). Zur Fiktionalität vgl. zuletzt Müller 2010, 83–108.

20 Vgl. Strijbosch 1999, 280–281.

21 Komplementär dazu widersprechen sich Brandan und die neutralen Engel (dazu siehe unten) im Hinblick auf die Glaubwürdigkeit von Büchern. Vgl. dazu Strohschneider 1997, 27–29.

22 Vgl. Strijbosch 2002, 281 und Haug 2006, 47.

23 Vgl. Weitbrecht 2011, 197, 203.

Gottes kennen zu lernen heißt auch zu erfahren, dass diese die menschlichen Aufnahmekapazitäten übersteigen.²⁴ Die ganze Welt lässt sich durch Menschen nicht in Schrift und Bild transponieren.

Dieses Problem wird thematisch, als gegen Ende des Textes mehrfach von Büchern und von Schrift die Rede ist. Auf seiner Reise erreicht Brandan eine ferne Gegend, die den Namen „Multum Bona Terra“ trägt. Er und seine Begleiter besteigen einen Berg (in C „Mons Syone“, v. 1640), auf dem sich eine von Drachen und Schlangen bewachte Burg (in M „munda Syon“, v. 1152) befindet. Der Berg sei für die Augen der Reisenden unermesslich, heißt es im Niederländischen (v. 1630). Brandan kommt es vor, „dat die wolken daer up zweveden“ (C, v. 1633), „dass die Wolken darauf schwebten“.²⁵ Im Deutschen ist die Burg „den wolken also nahen, / als si in den luften swebete“, „den Wolken so nah, als würde sie in den Lüften schweben“ (v. 1148f.). Die Reisenden verschaffen sich Zugang zur Burg mit Hilfe von Gottes Worten. Im Text folgt darauf eine Ekphrasis, die Beschreibung der Burg. Die narrative Instanz erwähnt zunächst ein Buch (in C) bzw. Bücher (in M), denen diese Beschreibung entstammt. Ob Brandans Reisetagebuch zu diesen Vorlagen zählt, steht zunächst nicht fest. In einem Text, in dem die Autorität des Geschriebenen in Frage gestellt wird und die Antwort darauf offen bleibt, fungiert die Bezugnahme auf Quellen in erster Linie als Hinführung zur impliziten Reflexion über Schrift und Bücher und erst sekundär als Wahrheitsbeteuerung – zumal die Quellen unbestimmt bleiben. Nur im Niederländischen heißt es dann im Laufe der Ekphrasis, dass die Vorlage von Brandan stamme (v. 1792).

Von der Burg wird erzählt, dass die Mauer kristallen sei. Im niederländischen Text befinden sich darauf (es handelt sich um eine Ringmauer) unzählige Steinbuchstaben: „Daer waren letteren steenijn / so vele daer up ghenomen, / sine consten ten hende comen“ (v. 1658–1660). „Darauf standen Inschriften aus Stein, so viele, dass sie nicht sehen konnten, wo sie aufhörten.“²⁶ „Si“ (v. 1660) bezieht sich entweder auf die Reisenden, die (wie in der zitierten Übersetzung) nicht zu Ende schauen oder aber unbegrenzt an den Buchstaben entlang gehen können. Oder es bezieht sich auf die Buchstaben, die kein Ende nehmen. Die Ringmauer, die die Wolken erreicht, suggeriert Übersichtlichkeit und Unendlichkeit²⁷ zugleich. Sie könnte der Grund dafür sein, dass die Schrift unendlich wirkt. Die Schrift überfordert die menschliche Aufnahmefähigkeit. Sie wird im Laufe der Narration auch nicht entziffert. Dieser Imagination liegt wohl die aus der Antike tradierte und im Mittelalter häufig verwendete Metapher des Textes als Gebäu-

24 Dass der Verfasser nicht explizit auf die seelische Transformation und intellektuelle Entwicklung Brandans eingeht und dass Brandan die Reise nicht sofort abbricht, nachdem er auf seine Begrenztheit

hingewiesen wird, ändert nichts daran. Vgl. dazu Haug 2006, 52.

25 Übersetzung von Schmid und Strijbosch 2009.

26 Übersetzung von Schmid und Strijbosch 2009.

27 Vgl. auch die Beschreibung der Mauern eines der Paradiese: C, v. 855–857.

de zu Grunde,²⁸ die nun konkret wird: Brandan findet eine beschriftete Burg vor. Die Schrift ist auf den Bau übertragen bzw. aufgetragen worden. Bildspender und Bildempfänger einer früheren Metapher stellen nun Requisiten der Handlung dar, zwischen ihnen besteht eine Kontiguitätsrelation. Außerdem sind auf der Mauer im deutschen wie im niederländischen Text unzählige Tiere aus Kupfer und Erz zu sehen. In M kommt es einem vor, als würden sie leben, in C – und darin besteht die besondere Kunstfertigkeit – bewegen sie sich um die Mauer herum. Es handelt sich um mit Wasser angetriebene Automaten. Sie jagen und werden von Tieren und Menschen gejagt, und sie rufen und singen. Sie repräsentieren alle Tiere, die der Verfasser hat jemals nennen hören (im Niederländischen) oder die existieren (im Deutschen). Es bleibt offen, ob jeweils – wie in der Arche Noah – ein Vertreter aller dieser Arten abgebildet ist, oder aber alle Exemplare. Auch Menschen und die zum höfischen Leben dazugehörige Pracht sind auf der Mauer dargestellt. Die Mauer bildet also das ganze Tierreich und die höfische Welt ab. Die Besonderheit dieses Artefakts besteht vor allem darin, dass es in räumlicher Hinsicht überhaupt als möglich postuliert wird. Man gewinnt zudem den Eindruck, als würden die Lebewesen aus der Mauer springen wollen, heißt es in beiden Texten. Das suggeriert, dass die Platzkapazitäten der steinernen Unterlage erschöpft sind, es bekräftigt aber vor allem die Illusion der Lebendigkeit. Das Hoch- und Spätmittelalter war fasziniert von imaginären Artefakten, die Kunstfertigkeit zur Schau stellten und zugleich, weil es sich um realistische Repräsentationen handelte, als Artefakte in Vergessenheit gerieten,²⁹ die Wahrnehmung täuschten. Im niederländischen Text, in dem die Schrift erwähnt wird, deren Ausmaß die Wahrnehmung übersteigt, wird nicht darauf eingegangen, ob die Lebewesen die steinerne Schrift überlagern, oder ob sie nebeneinander angebracht sind, ob sich die Schrift auf das in Kupfer und Erz Dargestellte bezieht (wodurch ein Abbild der zwei Bücher Augustins entstehen würde: Welt und Schrift). Die Schrift und die künstlichen Lebewesen vermitteln den Eindruck größter Fülle, und sie stellen zwei Medien der Repräsentation dar, die sich auch in Büchern, wenngleich in kleineren Dimensionen, realisieren lässt. Nicht ein Buch, sondern eine Konstruktion aus Stein – der eine Text-Metapher zu Grunde liegt – enthält fast die ganze Welt. Die Gestalten aus dem liminalen Diesseits-Jenseits-Bereich, auf die Brandan im Laufe seiner Reise trifft, oder sein Kloster haben allerdings nicht ihren Platz auf der Mauer. Gäbe es ein Buch, das sich auf die ganze Welt bezieht, müsste es wohl zumindest im Hinblick auf die Größe, auf die inhaltliche Fülle und auf die Medien der Repräsentation der Mauer aus dem niederländischen Text ähneln. Oder man hätte ein reines Bilderbuch wie im Deutschen. Vielleicht würde dieses Buch auf Grund seiner Dimensionen zusammenbrechen, wenn es nicht aus Stein wäre. Im steinernen Buch über (fast) die ganze Welt, das Brandan in

28 Vgl. Cowling 1998, 139–141. Zu dieser Metapher in der mittelalterlichen exegetischen Tradition vgl. ebenda, S. 143–144.

29 Vgl. Haferland und Mecklenburg 1996, 11.

„Multum Bona Terra“ vorfindet, wird also die Metapher der Welt als Buch konkret. Mit seinen naturgetreuen Darstellungen in beiden Texten täuscht die Mauer außerdem über das Künstliche hinweg, als gäbe es nur dieses einzige Buch: eine Mauer der Schöpfung, die die Welt ausmacht, die auch in dieser Hinsicht konkret gewordene Metapher der Welt als Buch.

Es folgen weitere Beschreibungen der kostbar gebauten Burg. Ihr werden paradisi-sche Züge verliehen (Nahrung in Überfülle, Betten, ein schöner Garten stehen zur Ver-fügung, die Mönche verlieren ihre Müdigkeit). Die Burg erinnert zudem an das Himm-lische Jerusalem.³⁰ Die Reisenden lassen sich nicht auf das Neue ein und beschließen, sofort zum Schiff zurückzukehren. Als dies geschieht, stellen sie fest, dass sie verfolgt werden, nämlich von einem in Seide gekleideten Volk mit Menschenleibern, Schweins-köpfen, Kranichhälsen, Menschen- (C) bzw. Bärenhänden (M) und Hundebeinen. Bran-dan fragt seine Verfolger, ob sie Gott kennen, und der Heilige erfährt daraufhin, dass er es mit den neutralen Engeln zu tun hat, die damals, als Luzifer rebellierte, nieman-des Partei ergriffen und gerade deshalb aus dem Himmel fielen.³¹ Sie müssen nun die „Multum Bona Terra“ bewohnen. Dabei handelt es sich vielleicht um eines der zu Be-ginn des Textes erwähnten zwei irdischen Paradiese.³² Das steinerne Artefakt, dem es gelingt, fast die ganze Welt in ihrer Fülle zu repräsentieren, steht im Zusammenhang mit oder stammt sogar von Engeln,³³ also von Wesen, deren Fähigkeiten die menschli-chen übersteigen. Es befindet sich an einem irdischen Ort, das aber auf Grund seiner paradisi-schen Qualitäten und auf Grund seiner Lage direkt unter den Wolken einige Gemeinsamkeiten mit einem von räumlichen Zwängen befreiten Jenseits besitzt. Un-ter diesen Voraussetzungen erweist sich die Repräsentation der Welt als in räumlicher Hinsicht möglich. Ob sie das Ergebnis dämonischer Ambitionen darstellt, die Schöp-fung in Bild und Schrift zu wiederholen, wird nicht explizit thematisiert. Die neutralen Engel stehen jedenfalls nicht nur für das Gute und für den Gehorsam. Ihnen könnte ein Artefakt gelungen sein, das sich der göttlichen Schöpfung annähert, wenngleich es nicht mit ihr identisch ist.

Brandan und seine Mitreisenden erstatten den Engeln trotz Einladung keinen Be-such, sondern sie setzen ihre Reise fort. Kurz daraufhin begegnen sie in beiden Text-zeugen einem Männchen in der Größe eines Daumens, das auf einem Blatt segelt. Die Episode wirkt humoristisch und enthält ernste Überlegungen. Auch für diese Episode bemüht der Verfasser im niederländischen Text die Vorlage (v. 2071) und signalisiert da-durch, neben Glaubwürdigkeit, dass sich die Themen ‚Buch‘ und ‚Schrift‘ fortsetzen. In der linken Hand trägt „der wenige“ (M, v. 1731), das Männchen, ein Näpfchen, in der

30 Vgl. Strijbosch 1999, 58.

31 Vgl. Schmid und Strijbosch 2009, 130 und Strijbosch 1999, 58–60, 62.

32 Vgl. Strijbosch 1999, 60.

33 Letzteres deutet sich in C in den Versen 1804–1806 an.

rechten einen kleinen Griffel. Der kleine Mann sticht mit dem Griffel (im Niederländischen) bzw. mit dem Näpfchen (im Deutschen) ins Meer. Im niederländischen Text lässt er das Wasser vom Griffel ins Näpfchen tropfen. Als das Näpfchen voll ist, gießt er in beiden Texten das Wasser aus. Auf die Frage Brandans, was es tue, antwortet das Männchen, dass es das Meer ausmesse. Brandan versichert ihm, dass dies unmöglich sei. Das Männchen antwortet, dass Brandan ebenso wenig alle Wunder Gottes zu sehen vermag. Sein Reisetagebuch wird – das impliziert diese Bemerkung – nicht alle enthalten können. Die Szene erinnert an eine mehrmals überlieferte Erzählung der Zeit, in der gelehrte Protagonisten darauf hingewiesen werden, dass sie die Dreifaltigkeit nicht beschreiben und verstehen können. Die verschiedenen Fassungen schreiben diese Erfahrung der Unmöglichkeit unter anderem Augustin und Alanus ab Insulis zu.³⁴ In *Sankt Brandans Reise* übersteigt die Schöpfung, nicht Gott, die menschlichen Aufnahmekapazitäten. Die Aussage des Männchens verfügt dabei über theologische Implikationen. Die Metapher der Welt als Buch transformiert die Welt in ein Medium der Offenbarung eines als unergründlich gedachten Gottes. Nun erweist sich auch das Medium als unergründlich, was die Distanz zu Gott steigert. Eine (größtenteils) getreue Wiedergabe dieses Mediums, die der Mauer aus „Multum Bona Terra“ ähneln müsste, würde, wie die Mauer selbst, die Menschen überfordern.

In der Episode mit dem Männchen werden die Schrift oder das Verfassen von Büchern (bis auf die Vorlage) nicht explizit thematisiert, doch die Erscheinung des Männchens vereint alles in sich, was mit dem Schreiben zusammenhängt. Das Näpfchen erinnert an ein Tintenfass. Der Daumen, mit dem das Männchen verglichen wird, spielt beim Schreiben eine wichtige Rolle, und das Meereswasser aus dem Näpfchen steht für Tinte, wenngleich die Farbe des Wassers einen vergeblichen Schreibprozess suggeriert. Das Meereswasser wird auch ständig weggeschüttet. Im niederländischen Text füllt zudem der Griffel das Näpfchen, also das Tintenfass, als würde die Handlung des Tintenschöpfens, die die Schrift ermöglicht, rückgängig gemacht werden. Die Unterlage, auf der sich der Däumling aufhält, ist das Meer, die Welt, Gottes Buch, auf dem sich der Finger bewegt. Das Blatt, auf dem er segelt, erinnert zudem an ein Blatt Pergament oder Papier. Zum einen bekräftigt diese Phantasie die Identität zwischen Welt und Codex. Zum anderen zeigt sich hier in verschärfter Weise der Größenunterschied zwischen einem menschlichen Schreiber bzw. einer Schreiberhand mit den Blättern, die sie bearbeitet, und der Welt (dem Meer). Im deutschen Text möchte Brandan das Männchen mitnehmen, sein Kaplan rät ihm aber davon ab, weil dann das Schiff zu schwer werde, es könnte versinken. Die Weisheit macht den kleinen Mann wohl zu einem intellektuellen Schwergewicht. Die Sorge des Kaplans relativiert außerdem die Größenverhältnisse. Brandans Schiff, das früher mit der Arche Noah verglichen wurde, kann noch weniger

34 Vgl. Strijbosch 2000, 228–229, Haug 2006, 50–51.

aufnehmen als ein Männchen auf einem Blatt. Das Schiff erscheint dadurch als nicht viel größer als „der wenige“. Der Unterschied zwischen der segelnden Schreibstube mit dem Reisetagebuch und den Ausmaßen der Welt vergrößert sich. Die Reisenden können allerdings den kleinen Mann als Bucheintrag mitnehmen, seine Existenz geht in die Überlieferung ein.

Nicht lange nach der Begegnung mit dem Männchen beschließt Brandan, in Richtung Heimat zu segeln. Im niederländischen Text wird der Kaplan Noah gefragt, ob er von den gesehenen Wundern noch welche aufzuschreiben habe. Noah erwidert, er hätte dies schon lange aufgegeben, das Buch sei „vulscreven“, „vollständig zu Ende geschrieben“³⁵ (v. 2210), vollgeschrieben. Diese Aussage verschärft den Hinweis des Daumen-Männchens. Menschen können nicht alle Wunder sehen und noch weniger aufschreiben. Ob dies die Rettung der Wunder affiziert, steht nicht zur Debatte. Codizes haben ihre Grenzen. Ein Buch, das die ganze Welt, ihre Beschreibung enthält, lässt sich insbesondere von Menschenhand nicht realisieren. Man kann aber ein Buch schreiben, dessen Handlung genau das vorführt, wie die anonyme *Sankt Brandans Reise*.³⁶ Keines der Bücher, auf die dort Bezug genommen wird – weder das verbrannte, noch das Reisetagebuch und erst recht nicht die auf unbestimmte Quellen zurückgehende deutsche und niederländische Erzählung –, vermag Wissen über die ganze Welt zu enthalten. Nur die Mauer der neutralen Engel nähert sich dieser Utopie an.

In *Sankt Brandans Reise* werden weder die Metapher der Welt als Buch, noch ein Buch über die ganze Welt oder ein Buch, das mit der Welt auf der Handlungsebene identisch wäre, explizit erwähnt, doch diese Vorstellungen deuten sich an, und sie bilden die Grundlage für die Reflexion über Wahrnehmung und über das Schreiben. Zu Beginn des deutschen Textes wird eine Identität zwischen den Wundern und ihrer Beschreibung suggeriert, dann behaupten beide Texte die Abhängigkeit der Wunder vom Reisetagebuch: Nur als niedergeschriebene sind sie zu retten, das Buch der Welt und das menschliche Buch bedingen sich einander. Später in der Narration wird ein Artefakt vorgestellt, das fast die ganze Welt zu enthalten bzw. zu repräsentieren scheint: die (beschriftete) Mauer, auf der die Lebewesen lebensgetreu dargestellt sind. In dieser wohl nicht-menschlichen Schöpfung an einem paradiesischen Ort wird die Metapher der Welt als Buch konkret: die Welt erscheint als steinernes Buch (die Künstlichkeit der Darstellungen gerät dabei aus dem Blick), und die Mauer stellt ein Artefakt dar, das die Welt wiedergibt. Diese Imagination geht zudem auf eine Raum-Metapher für den Text, auf den Text als Gebäude, zurück. Die Mauer überfordert (zumindest im Niederländischen) die Reisenden. Kurz daraufhin machen Brandan und seine Mitreisenden

35 Übersetzung von Schmid und Strijbosch 2009.

36 Das Meer und die Reise können auch als konkretisierte Metaphern für Kontingenz bzw. für den Lebensweg verstanden werden. Das Schiff erinnert an

das Schiff der Kirche. Vgl. Friedrich 2014, 275–279. Das auszuführen, würde in diesem Kontext zu weit führen.

die Erfahrung, dass sie alle Wunder Gottes, implizit die ganze Welt, nicht sehen und nicht in ein Buch übertragen können: Die Größenunterschiede zwischen ihrem Buch bzw. einem menschlichen Schreiber und Welt werden in der Begegnung mit dem kleinen Mann deutlich und verschärfen sich. Brandan erfährt zudem, dass ins Reisetagebuch nicht einmal das Gesehene vollständig eingetragen werden kann. Welt und Buch werden in den zwei besprochenen Texten in imaginativen Experimenten immer wieder gegenübergestellt, das identifikatorische und differenzstiftende Potential der Metapher wird im Verlauf der Handlung ausgeschöpft. Welt und Buch überschneiden sich oder bilden vor allem im Hinblick auf die unterschiedlichen Ausmaße einen Gegensatz.

Sankt Brandans Reise versteht sich nicht als Plädoyer für weitere Reisen, sondern dafür, dass man dem Gelesenen Glauben schenkt bzw. dass man sich auf die Fiktion einlässt – sonst wird man bestraft. Konzentriert man sich auf Bücher, bearbeitet man, wie die Autoren von *Sankt Brandans Reise*, Vorlagen, so entstehen zahlreiche neue Bücher. Die Metapher der Welt als Buch droht dann auf Grund der Bücherflut konkret zu werden: eine Welt, die nur noch aus Büchern besteht. Ab der Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts werden Stimmen laut, die dies befürchten.³⁷ Das Schrifttum – genannt seien ausufernde theologisch-philosophische Abhandlungen, Prosaromane und Enzyklopädien – nimmt dermaßen zu, dass es alles andere verdrängen könnte. Dieses Problem scheint mir in einer Illustration des 34 000 Verse langen *Breviari d'Amor* des Juristen Matfre Ermengaud reflektiert zu sein.³⁸ Der Text stellt ein ambitioniertes enzyklopädisches Projekt dar, das versucht, religiöse und weltliche Literatur zusammenzuführen.³⁹ Die Handschrift Royal 19 C I, British Library wird auf das erste Viertel des 14. Jahrhunderts datiert.⁴⁰ Die erste Illustration des Textes (Abb. 1) zeigt den Verfasser, der vier gekrönte weibliche und männliche Liebende und Troubadoure belehrt.⁴¹ Die Körper weichen zurück, die Schrift breitet sich aus. Gälte das auch für Brandan, würden die Reise und die Lektüre in eins fallen.⁴²

37 Vgl. Jaeger 1997, 137.

38 Zum Text vgl. Zink 1997, 66–69.

39 Vgl. Laske-Fix 1973, 3–8.

40 Vgl. <http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/record.asp?MSID=8564&CollID=16&NStart=190301>, Datum des Zugriffs: 26.09.2014. Die Illustrationen der Handschrift und kurze Erklärungen dazu finden sich ebenda. Zu den Illustrationen aller Handschriften vgl. Laske-Fix 1973.

41 Das Bild findet sich unter: <http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Si->

[ze=mid&IllID=43200](http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Si-ze=mid&IllID=43200) (besucht am 14.06.2016).

Zum Bild vgl. Laske-Fix 1973, 21–22 (mit Transkription und Übersetzung des Textes im Bild). Die Handschrift wird von Laske-Fix als Handschrift L aufgeführt.

42 Für eine anregende Diskussion bedanke ich mich bei den Teilnehmer*innen des Workshops „Raum-Metaphern in antiken Texten und deren Rezeption“ in Berlin sowie des XLII. Internationalen Mediävistischen Colloquiums in Sovana (Italien), bei Clara Stribosch für die Klärung von Übersetzungsfragen.



Abb. 1 Handschrift Royal 19 C I, The British Library, fol. 7r.

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Abbildungsnachweis

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Verena Olejniczak Lobsien

In Other Words: George Herbert's Metaphorical Textures

Summary

The essay shows how seventeenth-century English poetry faces the ultimate challenge to conceptual metaphor. In a close reading of “Love (3)” and “Easter-wings” it explores metaphorical conceits that appear capable of presenting the unrepresentable by referring allegorically – that is to say, literally ‘in other words’ – to what must by definition remain beyond language: God’s redemptive action in the resurrection.

Keywords: Conceptual metaphor; metaphysical ‘conceit’; English Renaissance poetry; neoplatonism; negative theology; allegories of resurrection.

Der Aufsatz untersucht Struktur und Funktion der konzeptuellen Metapher (*conceit*) in der metaphysischen Dichtung des 17. Jahrhunderts. Am Beispiel zweier Gedichte von George Herbert, „Love (3)“ und „Easter Wings“, wird gezeigt, wie poetische Texte mit ihrer äußersten, paradoxen Herausforderung umgehen: „mit anderen Worten“ das zu sagen, was sich als Verborgenes und Transzendentes der sprachlichen Verfügung, zugleich jeder räumlichen Repräsentation entzieht.

Keywords: Konzeptuelle Metapher; metaphysisches *conceit*; Dichtung der Englischen Renaissance; Neuplatonismus; negative Theologie; Auferstehungs Allegorien.

I Metaphor and metaphysics

Everybody knows that poets use metaphors and that they do so for a purpose. It is only to repeat yet another commonplace to recall that the so-called metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century used and introduced into English poetry a type of complex metaphor referred to as *conchetto* or conceit. However, what to the historian of early modern English literature may seem trite acquires new – and different – relevance in the present context. The term *conceit* itself draws attention to what these metaphors were held to achieve. It emphasises their wit and imaginative dimension, but points beyond that: Conceits were not only ornamental devices, fulfilling the rhetorical ‘office’ of *delectare*, but they functioned equally as instruments to think with, as verbal ideas equivalent, indeed superior to, discursive arguments, pursuing didactic or moral intentions (*docere* and *movere*) and guiding the reader through a line of reasoning. It is their complexity and texture that enable them to do this. In a period that admired both concentration of ‘matter’ and rhetorical finesse, they served as vehicles for surprising, often difficult insight. Charged with intellectual as well as affective power, they tend to explore the edges of familiar systems of thought or move beyond the boundaries of well-trodden philosophical ground. In Helen Gardner’s concise definition, a conceit “is a comparison whose ingenuity is more striking than its justness, or, at least, is more immediately striking. [...] we are made to concede likeness while being strongly conscious of unlikeness.”¹

1 “Introduction” to Gardner 1957, 15–28, here: 19. She adds: “In a metaphysical poem the conceits are instruments of definition in an argument or instruments to persuade. The poem has something to say which the conceit explicates or something to urge which the conceit helps to forward. [...] the metaphysical conceit aims at making us concede justness while admiring ingenuity” (21). Compare the definition offered by Preminger 1965: “An intricate or far-fetched metaphor, which functions through arousing feelings of surprise, shock, or amusement [...] The poet compares elements which seem to have little or nothing in common, or juxtaposes images which establish a marked discord in mood. [...] the emotion evoked by a good c. is [...] a surprised recognition of the ultimate validity of the relationship presented in the c., which thus serves not as an ornament but as an instrument of vision” (147–149). The discussion surrounding metaphysical poetry in general and its imagery in particular caused something of a stir around the middle of the twentieth century; it does not seem to agitate literary scholars very much any longer. Its history is,

however, still instructive, as it hinges on precisely the questions of what metaphor can and should do. It started with Dryden’s and Samuel Johnson’s castigation of the Metaphysicals; with Dryden’s indictment in 1692 of Donne’s love poetry as basically indecorous in his *Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire* (“He affects the Metaphysics, not only in his Satires, but in his Amorous Verses, where Nature only should reign; and perplexes the Minds of the Fair Sex with nice Speculations of Philosophy [...]”; Dryden 1974, 7), culminating, a century later, in Johnson’s criticism of the Metaphysicals’ imagery as “analytick”, far-fetched, and artificial in the worst sense, producing “[...] a kind of *discordia concors*; a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike. [...] The most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together; nature and art are ransacked for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions [...]” (Johnson 1968, 20). The rehabilitation of the Metaphysicals, indeed their allocation of a place of honour in the prehistory of classical modern poetry began in 1921 with T. S. Eliot’s review of Herbert Grier-

From the point of view of this volume's inquiry into the nature and history of metaphor it seems worth while to examine the structure and function of some of the conceits employed by the metaphysical poet George Herbert. These are remarkable in a number of respects. To begin with, they are comparatively understated. Eschewing the exhibition of paradoxical brilliance, they lack ostentation to such an extent that an eminent literary historian like Peter Conrad was led to the hyperbolic claim that, if we take John Donne to set the standard, Herbert does not seem to write conceits at all.² The apparent plainness of Herbert's style as well as his conceits is, however, deceptive.³ In my reading of his poetry I shall look not only at the modes in which he builds, organises, combines and presents his metaphors, but also at the cognitive (and affective) functions they serve. For here, conceptual metaphor faces its greatest challenge, as Herbert's poems are metaphysical also in another, literal sense: They thematise questions of metaphysics, taking part in philosophically as well as theologically virulent debates about divine providence, the senses and the spirit, the immortality of the soul, the relation of material to immaterial causes, or the resurrection of the body. In other words: here, one of the conceptual domains involved in the formation of metaphor remains, by definition, not only abstract but unknowable. Furthermore, Herbert's conceits are relevant to the present inquiry in that many of them process, in best Renaissance manner, classical materials, topoi, and motifs.⁴ Last not least, they tend to be spatial. This poet's

son's anthology *Metaphysical Lyrics and Poems of the Seventeenth Century* in his essay on "The Metaphysical Poets" (Eliot 1969 [1932], 281–291). Eliot argues, famously, that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century poets were victims of a catastrophic alteration of the English mind, a "dissociation of sensibility" that took place towards the end of the 17th century, beginning with Milton. While, in consequence, these latter poets "thought and felt by fits, unbalanced" ("The Metaphysical Poets", 288, cf. *ibid.*, "Andrew Marvell", 297), the Metaphysicals were still masters of a "direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation of thought into feeling" (286). Donne, Eliot claims, experienced an abstract idea holistically, as immediately as the scent of a rose, and he was capable of rendering it in the shape of a conceit. In that, he resembles the modern poet, whose sensibility (by implication, like Eliot's own) is able to synthesise the disorderly elements again, forging new unities: "A thought to Donne was an experience; it modified his sensibility. When a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary" (287). While the Metaphysicals are thus elevated

to the status of precursors to the modernists, conversely, the metaphorical practice of modernist poetry appears justified. In this view, modernism takes things up where the seventeenth century left them before enlightenment and romanticist extremism took over with their respective (rational or emotional) distortions.

- 2 Conrad 1985, 233.
- 3 C. A. Patrides has argued that Herbert's "self-conscious plainness" is in fact a kind of over-compensation, masking its opposite, in particular the pride of the artist: "The artlessness [...] will be observed to comprehend an all-pervasive consciousness of self that negates even the nominal 'plainness'" (*A Crown of Praise: The Poetry of Herbert*, in: Patrides 1974, 6–25, here: 6). He asserts: "*The Temple* is the work of a humble man devoid of humility only because a great poet must set a 'just price' on his qualities" (8).
- 4 Herbert is, of course, an major classicist in yet another sense, as John Drury and Victoria Moul make clear, who for the first time translate and comment on, Herbert's considerable body of Latin and Greek poetry in their new edition; cf. Drury and Moul 2015.

spatial metaphors pervade and shape his oeuvre in a way that sets it apart from the works of his contemporaries and fellow-Metaphysicals.

2 Herbert and the uses of metaphor

The very fact that George Herbert's poems were first published (after his death in 1633) under the title *The Temple* already indicates their preoccupation with constructing, building and dwelling, with inhabiting material and physical as well as immaterial and spiritual space. Their title, together with the motto taken from Ps 29.8 ("In his Temple doth every man | speake of his honour"), may be that of Herbert's friend and first editor, Nicholas Ferrar. What Herbert's own title would have been, we cannot know for certain. His headlines, written at the top of each manuscript page, were "The Church-Porch", "The Church", and "The Church Militant". Both temple and church allude to ecclesiastic architecture and to the theological as well as domestic ratio these poems obey.⁵ They also delineate as well as enclose an imaginative domain, adapted to human needs but dedicated to the divine. They aim at creating a sacred space in which reader and writer move, sometimes in unison, sometimes in dialogic and conflicted interaction, often in a triangular relation, in which one participant is allocated the role of (almost) silent observer, always in a conversation that is oriented towards God, the real owner and master of the house.

George Herbert is Shakespeare's junior by 31 years, born in 1593. It is tempting to think that we can find an awareness of the great playwright's performative mastery in Herbert's own poetry, for instance in the way some of his texts construct their relationship to secular love poetry.⁶ There is certainly a strong sense of drama here, but although there is experiential immediacy as well as an awareness of subjectivity as inherently problematic, there is no histrionic self-exhibition. In this respect, Herbert's theatricality is certainly less pronounced than John Donne's, whose speakers so obviously enjoy the display of their exceptional affective states and revel in their sensual involvement. Besides, Herbert's texts are not meant to be performed on stage but read – presumably – in silence, although their remarkable musicality seems to hint at yet another performative quality. Some of them even seem to be written as songs.⁷ Herbert's poems are medi-

5 On the variations both old and new testament texts ring on the trope of the temple see also Patrides 1974, 15–17. The number of poems differs between the MS Tanner, which forms the basis for most modern editions, and the Williams MS; it seems that Herbert thought of "Love (3)" as the final poem of

"The Church"; see, however, the editorial remarks in Drury and Moul 2015, 485–486 and 490.

6 See, for instance, John Drury's commentary on "Dullness" (Drury and Moul 2015, 438–439).

7 This is a dimension also recognised in John Drury's recent biography of Herbert (Drury 2013).

tations, containing in themselves guidelines for further meditation.⁸ They thematise – openly and exclusively – religious matters. Still, this poet does not deal in theological certainties. It is true that, in the latter stages of his career that began in the limelight of the public oratorship at the university of Cambridge and ended in relative obscurity, he was a parish priest and part of the community of Little Gidding in Huntingdonshire. But in his poems he seldom speaks in a pastoral or public voice. Rather than preach, he questions and problematises. While his tone, rather than being determined by the stage or the pulpit, is characterised by intimacy and inwardness, he frequently and fruitfully reflects on his own art, its potential as well as its pitfalls, hence on the consequences of articulating and speaking his mind in its conversation with God.

Domestic and household metaphors abound in these poems, as Herbert's readers have noticed from the first. He is a poet concerned with issues of place, space, and governance, conceived spatially – of the outside world as well as of his own interiority. The all-embracing question is who is to be in charge – man or God. Or, more precisely: how can we imagine God's perfect dominion, His taking up abode and dwelling in the human soul, not as hostile occupant or oppressor but as its true owner, as generous host, or welcome guest? Inevitably, the attempt to give a first idea of the subject matter of Herbert's poetry gravitates towards metaphoric language, in fact to metaphors preferred by the poet himself. But in view of the conceptual challenge he is facing, this appears in itself symptomatic. As Herbert is wrestling with complex problems and issues that reach, by definition, beyond sensual apprehension, such as the relationship between the self and God, or questions of identity and individuality, it is not surprising that he should resort to the devices of figurative language traditionally best suited to the purpose of dealing with matters that are hidden and invisible. It is metaphor and allegory which help to articulate what cannot (yet) be spoken as it resists discursive language or transcends everyday speech.⁹

It should be added immediately that Herbert uses fully-blown allegories not as often as might be expected. Rarely do they come complete with the personifications familiar from medieval literature or morality plays, and repristinated by his famous older contemporary, Edmund Spenser. When they do – for instance in “The Pilgrimage”, a poem that charts a proto-Bunyanesque spiritual autobiography –, the ending is bitter, or – as in “Hope” – frustrating. In what is arguably his most famous, to some his best, poem, “Love (3)”, only one of the parties concerned, the divine host, personifies the abstract term, and it is remarkable that the text does nothing to render the personification more

8 Cf. Martz 1962. Martz discerns the structures of meditation also in the work of Donne and others, governed, however, by formal conventions ruled by a different spirituality.

9 The justification for this is ultimately biblical. For history and functions of allegory and metaphorical language in general from a theological perspective see, above all, the work of Henri de Lubac, e.g. Lubac 2007.

how more palpable or the mystery more amenable to the senses and the rational understanding, allegory here seems to remove it even further from our grasp.¹² Indeed, this seems to be exactly the point of Herbert's figurative strategy: It is Love's unexpected, inexplicable, 'prevenient'¹³ grace that breaks the pattern of continued (and well-founded) self-denigration by absolute self-expenditure, to the speaker's and reader's amazement. In describing this truly excessive kindness in a language that could not be plainer, thus suggesting utmost accessibility and naturalness, the poem itself holds to an interactive style that paradoxically renders the invisible even less available than before: an effect of ultimate, negative-theological adequacy.

If the allegorical meaning of Love could hardly be further removed or more enigmatic, the literal meaning of this giving and receiving is wholly self-evident. The paradox it addresses and imitates in its miniature action, the conceptual difficulty it faces and solves without removing it, do not, as in Donne's poetry, lie on the dazzling surface, but are hidden in the textual implications. Facing the greatest challenge to metaphor, "Love (3)" demonstrates that it is possible to achieve a cognitive surplus, not by discursive elaboration, but by a partial metaphorisation: by allegorically explicating, in a micro-narrative, what it is that resists final explanation. The unimaginable and inexplicable is not rendered graspable, but moved closer. It is elucidated by a conceit that clarifies the grounds for its inexplicability 'in other words'. As a conceptual gain this may seem paradoxical, but at the limits of rational comprehension it succeeds in not only marking those limits but in pointing beyond them. It is also an effect we shall encounter again with the poem I am going to offer as a paradigmatic example of Herbert's combination of allegorical and metaphorical modes, "Easter-wings".

3 Imagining redemption

The topic of "Easter-wings" is yet another aspect of a theological 'scandal' not wholly graspable by (philosophical) rationality: the Easterly return to life in the resurrection. Like "Love (3)", the poem addresses also the concept of redemption. It does so in a metaphorical as well as a literal sense, thematising directly its central metaphysical idea – the rising of the believer with Christ in his victory over sin and death –, while at the same time approaching it by way of a layering of metaphorical levels, from the visual or iconic

have it ends yet again: The word "*FINIS*" (possibly added by the scribe) appears twice – first after "Love (3)" and next after "L'Envoy", which concludes a text less easily accommodated: the anticlimactic and polemic epyllion "The Church Militant". Herbert's

temple remains an open space in more than one sense.

- 12 A point made also, with reference to medieval texts, in Lewis 1973 [1936].
- 13 On Herbert's sense of Grace as "anticipatory of man's behaviour by virtue of Christ's presence in history", see Patrides 1974, 18–19.

through the narrative and allegoric to a ‘punctual’ focusing of the conceit in a striking turn of phrase. Similar to “Love (3)”, it also engages the feelings – both the speaker’s, who tries to marshall his own so that they match his redeemer’s, and the reader’s, who cannot but follow the affective up-and-down curve of elation and depression, flight and humiliation that results from the attempt. Thus resurrection is figured as a spatial event involving a specific logic of ascent and descent, and as a statement involving the body and its extension. In consequence, redemption will emerge as a product of Herbert’s art and the way it depicts and regulates sympathy in a modulation from parallel, but distant, co-affection to true compassion based on imaginative knowledge. Herbert’s use of metaphor, in turn, will be seen as a multi-levelled process, resulting in a ‘texture’ that involves visual, iconic, emblematic, as well as allegoric, comparative, and allusive strands.

In order to see how Herbert achieves all this; how he builds and develops his conceit with reference to this most demanding of metaphysical topics, we need to look more closely at the way he organises not only his sacred meditation, but also his reflection on poetry in “Easter-wings”. It will emerge that both involve processes that are much more dramatic than might be expected.

Easter-wings.

Lord, who createdst man in wealth and store,
 Though foolishly he lost the same,
 Decaying more and more,
 Till he became
 Most poor:
 With thee
 O let me rise
 As larks, harmoniously,
 And sing this day thy victories:
 Then shall the fall further the flight in me.

My tender age in sorrow did beginn:
 And still with sicknesses and shame
 Thou didst so punish sin,
 That I became
 Most thin.
 With thee
 Let me combine
 And feel this day thy victory:
 For, if I imp my wing on thine,
 Affliction shall advance the flight in me.

We do not know the exact date of composition of this poem; like the other poems in *The Temple*, it was published posthumously in 1633. Its most striking feature is its iconicity: its shape and the figure it makes on the page.¹⁴ Generically, this is pattern (or figure) poetry: the text's contours visually present its object or its topic.¹⁵ But what precisely is it that is pictured here? There is some uncertainty as to how Herbert wanted the text printed. Differing from the version quoted above, the 1633 edition appears to have centred the lines so that a symmetrical shape is perceived, and this is also how some modern editions reprint it.¹⁶ It is not, however, necessary to enter into a discussion of authorial intention or to decide between the versions. For those who opt for a symmetrical printing also draw attention to a semantic ambiguity in the text, i.e. to its potential. They transfer an implied possibility of reading to the visual outside of the text, thus exteriorising and stressing what would otherwise have remained implicit. In this version, the iconic image appears to be both that of a pair of wings, as suggested also by the title, and that of an hourglass (actually, two hourglasses).¹⁷

We are thus invited to perceive two different, seemingly incompatible, images: one that evokes life, ascent to the heavens, salvation, eternity, and another that reminds us of death, guiding us towards a contemplation of temporality, the finiteness of human life, and mortality; one that suggests redemption and another that suggests loss. If we are prepared to take into consideration this richer version of the textual shape, we gain an additional and alternative insight. In any case, we cannot from the first be sure where this poem is going to lead us. If its iconic outline strikes us as ambivalent, it does so by offering, metaphorically, two ideas that appear mutually exclusive.

It remains to be seen if and how the text will reconcile the clash of meanings and resolve the seeming contradiction. For, evidently, this ambivalence corresponds precisely

14 The printing is a matter of dispute. The reproduction given here follows that of John Drury (Drury and Moul 2015, 41), who prints a combination of two manuscript versions, which avoids the symmetrical triangles into which the printer of the 1633 edition shaped the text in favour of an asymmetrical, but more wing-like outline (cf. Drury's commentary, Drury and Moul 2015, 384).

15 "Easter-wings" thus places itself squarely in the tradition founded by Simmias of Rhodes, by whom a *technopaignon* on the wings of Eros survives in Book XV of the *Greek Anthology* (no. 24). Contemporary poetics, such as George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie*, was aware of the possibilities offered by "Proportion in figure" (Puttenham 1970 [1936], 91–101), listing among the available suggestive shapes even the double triangles ("the tricquet dis-

played"; 93), but tended to denigrate them as "wanton amorous deuises" (101) and idle embellishment.

16 E.g. Patrides 1974, 63, and Hutchinson 1978 [1941], 43.

17 If we look at the text through the eyes of Christian iconography, it could be seen to figure a number of other 'objects' as well, such as (in the symmetrical printings) the Greek letter χ (*chi*) in each stanza, signifying the crucifixion and Christ's passion, or, in both versions, the topical 'straight and narrow' path the believer ought to walk on his way to heaven. There is, also, an intriguing affirmation of the associations with mortality in the similarity to the small winged hourglass carried by the personification of Time in the Garden of Eden in Thomas Peyton's *The Glasse of Time, in the Second Age* (London 1620). The title of Herbert's poem, of course, guides the imagination towards the idea of wings, thereby to some extent curtailing the iconic potential.

to the criticism levelled at metaphysical conceits by Dr. Johnson: It springs from a combination of “heterogeneous ideas” of the most extreme kind – only that these are not “yoked by violence together”;¹⁸ but, as will appear, indeed form a *discordia concors*, or perhaps, as Nicholas of Cusa might have put it more aptly: a *coincidentia oppositorum*, at a theological juncture where this ultimately appears to be wholly adequate.

But even if we insist on the presumably more authorial and less ambiguous, solely wing-like contours of the version reproduced here, the iconic shape of the poem still remains provocative in other respects. It draws attention to itself, to the black-on-white materiality of any poetic text. Besides, it demands that we consider, indeed admire it as a work of art. It pushes itself into the foreground as a literary sign. This is an object skillfully crafted by the poet. It alerts us to the virtuoso performance that has produced a text capable of communicating its subject not only symbolically but also iconically.

There is, however, a serious problem here. The poem ought not to do this, if it truly wants to be a religious poem. If it really intends to speak of the highest truth, if it means to inculcate sacred insight, it ought not to draw too much attention to its own artificiality or to its author’s virtuosity. According to this view, it had better step back modestly, hide its beautiful form, its distracting outside behind its all-important didactic purpose. Or is the poem’s art perhaps an essential part of the poem’s message? Does it, as in “Love (3)” clarify what cannot – philosophical or theologically – be explained? I would like to claim that it does, by proposing a reading that looks even closer at the poem’s ‘conceited’ metaphorical structure.

In order to test our hypothesis we have to ask how textual figure and structure, image and imagination interact. A first paraphrase might run as follows: The speaker begins by considering – liturgically quite suitable for an Easter poem – God’s history with mankind, starting with the creation. He goes on to lament the Fall that led to the first humans’ loss of grace and stature and their growing alienation from their Creator, a self-impoorishment that, at its very deepest point (“Most poor”), takes a turn for the better with Christ’s incarnation and resurrection. It is these “victories” that the speaker, posing as bard or poet-singer, is going to praise, ‘rising’ as high as possible like the larks that jubilate in the fields at this time of the year. Thus, Adam’s and Eve’s “foolish[]” Fall will further the poet’s “flight”. It will have turned into a *felix culpa* that furnishes inspiration and beautiful material for his song.

The second stanza seems to perform a similar trajectory: Here, the speaker turns towards his own history with God. And here, too, we move from loss towards gain, from sin back to redemption. The speaker’s own guilt and disgrace are imagined in physical terms, with correlates like illness and a lethal loss of weight that almost causes him to dwindle to nothingness (“Most thin”). Again, at the point of greatest despair, there is a

18 Johnson 1968, 20 (as in footnote 1).

reversal, marked by the very same words as in the first stanza ("With thee"). His prayer for grace seems to have been answered. The speaker's "Affliction" and repentance are turned into Easterly enthusiasm, as he is permitted to participate in Christ's resurrection.

In terms of theological doctrine, everything seems to be in perfect, orthodox order. We end where we had begun, in untroubled certainty of salvation. Both stanzas ostensibly and perfectly mirror each other. Fall and Redemption guarantee the salvation of mankind as well as inspire its poetic praise, just as individual sinfulness and the experience of renewed grace are discovered to be the foundation of Easter joy. At the end of both stanzas the poet is (re-)enabled to spread his wings, much like the lark he wants to imitate in his song. Truly, an admirable poem with didactic applicability.

A nagging irritation remains. Where at first we felt semantic tension in the poem's ambivalent iconicity, its opposition between life and death (or: flight and fall, ascent and descent), there now appears to be rather a lot of similarity. Indeed, both stanzas seem to be structured identically, thematising the same rhythm of spiritual wholeness possessed, lost, and regained, with a double conversion in the middle. Maybe we should rest content with this. But in fact, it is too good to be true.

For, of course, there is more to it than meets the eye. In order to understand this, we have to move yet a little closer to the text. A second reading will reveal that the theological parallelism between the poem's parts, their formal equivalence which causes the two stanzas to be read as elements of one extended, complex metaphor, hides important differences. In reality, this poem does not repeat itself. It does not move in a circle, and it does not cover the same ground twice with slight variations on the same theme. In fact it performs a fairly abrupt turn between its two stanzas. There is a *volte-face*, a conversion *between* them that differs from the more conventional ones within the stanzas and that demands explanation. It leads us through a turbulent process towards an insight that was not present at first.¹⁹ The poem's symmetrical shape is, in other words, a façade or dissimulation, a kind of deception, decorative but misleading – however, as we shall see, in a productive manner.

First, it is important to observe that the first stanza, happy as it may sound, hides an aesthetic as well as moral problem. The poem begins with a grand gesture – much too grand. The authorial voice intends no less than an *imitatio Dei*. The poet presents

19 In that respect, the poem's structure resembles that of the last two stanzas of "Misery": Here, the speaker charts a similar process of conversion: "Indeed at first Man was a treasure, | A box of jewels, shop of rarities, | A ring, whose posy was, *My pleasure*: | He was a garden in a Paradise: | Glory and grace | Did crown his heart and face. | But sin hath fool'd him. Now he is | A lump of flesh, without a foot or wing | To raise him to the glimpse of bliss: | A sick toss'd

vessel, dashing on each thing; | Nay, his own shelf: | My God, I mean myself?" (lines 67–78; Drury and Moul 2015, 97). In describing the movement from Paradise to shipwreck, from wealth and heavenly abundance to loss and a reduction to mere, earthly physicality; from divine grace to human, 'wingless' self, Herbert even uses some of the same metaphors he employs in "Easter-wings".

himself in best Renaissance manner as *alter Deus*, as re-creator for whom the Fall is mere subject matter. To him, mankind's guilt is nothing but a theme on which to play his own variations and show his own artfulness to best advantage. Sin appears as mere foolishness, easily distanced. It is a means to the end of advertising and displaying poetic expertise. It is by his art that the poet legitimises his stance: He places himself side by side with the resurrected Christ – “With thee | O let me rise | As larks, harmoniously”. He imagines himself in perfect consonance with the Highest. In other words: he wants to be like God. Or he poses as Daedalus, another highly-renowned artist. This is, then, in itself a multiple conceit, with the poet imitating the Creator as well as casting both himself and Christ visually as larks spreading their wings, soaring to highest heaven, and singing.²⁰ Simultaneously, by way of the mythological comparison, he aligns himself with the epitome of the superior craftsman, capable of constructing an apparatus that will allow him to rise towards the light.

However, Daedalus' tandem flight with his son Icarus, as we know, ended in disaster. The second stanza unfolds some of the myth's ominous implications associated with Icarus' hubris.²¹ Here, the poet's stance in love with his own art that pretended to a delightful combination of theological and classical learning stands revealed as vanity. It now appears as a strategy of self-immunisation. In retrospect, the speaker had only tried to evade a confrontation with himself, and we are asked to realise this at the nodal point

20 Wings, larks, and soaring flight figure in a similar context also in “Sion”, interestingly contrasted with the stone building of Solomon's temple: “All Solomon's sea of brass and world of stone | Is not so dear to thee as one good groan. | And truly brass and stones are heavy things, | Tombs for the dead, not temples fit for thee: | But groans are quick, and full of wings, | And all their motion upward be; | And ever as they mount, like larks they sing: | The note is sad, yet music for a king.” (lines 17–24, Drury and Moul 2015, 101). With emphasis not on the success, but on the failure of this soaring “like larks”, “Easter-wings” associates the “groan” of contrition with a downward “motion”. As this humiliation is the condition for a true “mount[ing]” in the rising that figures resurrection, the spatial semantic here provides the structure for a theologically more demanding arrangement.

21 The allusion to Icarus and the comparison of poetic (and amorous) daring with the ambition of one who flies too near the sun was not uncommon in Renaissance poetry, especially in Petrarchan and Platonic contexts. Thus, Pierre de Ronsard employs the topos in two of his sonnets, CLXXII and

CLXXIII in the 1594 edition of *Le Premier Livres des Amours* (Amours de Cassandre), “Je veux brusler pour m'en-voler aux cieus” and “Mon fol penser pour s'en-voler plus haut” (Ronsard 1950, 75). In both he attempts to direct the speaker's love, enthusiasm, and soaring (“hautain”) desire towards its proper, heavenly goal. The divine (“L'autre beauté”) from which all earthly beauty takes its origin and to which it strives to return is presented in terms of light and fire, attraction and terror; it appears as ambivalent cause of a hoped-for immolation that will burn away all hindrance to ascent as well a source of heat that may effect a melting and loss of the foolish soul's wings (“Cesse, Penser, de hazarder ton aile, | Qu'on ne te voye en bruslant desplumer”). While Herbert seems to imitate Ronsard's linkage of poetic fury with bird-like flight and its hazards, he also transforms the conceit, in effect strengthening its ornithological literalness while critically turning its mythological associations against itself and casting the notion of a potentially dangerous transcendence in Christian, indeed Christological terms. – I am grateful to Steffen Schneider for drawing my attention to this ‘Icarean’ strain in Ronsard's poems.

of silence between the stanzas. Now the speaker opens his eyes that before had been blind to his own “sin”. We are not told what this consists in, only that the consequences make themselves felt in “sorrow” and “sicknesses”.²²

From the first, something is fundamentally wrong; the speaker finds himself steeped in unhappiness. It is no longer Adam and Eve who are the theme of his song, but himself. He now speaks as the one concerned; it is his own life that is at stake. More: it is not only the life of the soul whose fate is affected, but his embodied life. He experiences himself – however, no longer as easily triumphant, but as guilty. The poem figures, quite literally, the radical self-diminishing of human stature that is effected by sin by transforming it, metaphorically, into a wasting away of the body. This loss of girth and spatial extension is made palpable in the first of the two shortest lines of the stanza.

At this point, the poem also figuratively imitates a return to earth: It makes evident humiliation and contrition, as it descends from the dizzy heights of theological and aesthetic generalisation so flattering to the poetic self of the first stanza. Here, the speaker recognises himself not as Second Creator, but as creature. He does not possess grace, but needs it desperately. He is no longer the poet-theologian²³ who knows everything there is to know about the Resurrection and the forgiveness of sin. Instead, he devoutly wishes for it, longing to experience and truly “feel” it by *feeling with* Christ, here and now, *His* “victorie”. The perspective has changed completely, as has the deixis. Redemption now appears as conditional (“if”). It is made dependent on the believer’s capacity for sympathy not in the sense of a superficial echoing of the triumph of the risen Christ, but in the sense of com-*passion* ready to share the saviour’s pain and misery: not a facile evocation of the right doctrinal commonplaces, but genuine “affliction”²⁴ in a suffering that is no longer a fanciful pose seeking to imitate Christ, but a painful affect in consequence of the speaker’s own entanglement in sin and his awareness of it. As ‘passion’ becomes personal experience, redemption is presented as the object of hope and faith – as well as of the poetic imagination.

22 Indicating, according to Richard Strier, a Lutheran streak in Herbert (see Strier 1983). Strict Calvinist as well as Lutheran observance would insist on the natural sinfulness of man, to be relieved only by grace, and, of course, faith.

23 Producing what Sir Philip Sidney in his *Defence of Poetry* would have termed ‘divine’ poetry – “chief, both in antiquity and excellency”, because its makers “did imitate the unconceivable excellencies of God” (in: Duncan-Jones and van Dorsten 1973, 59–121, here: 80).

24 “Affliction” is, as John Drury has pointed out, a strongly resonant word in Herbert’s poetry. Not only did he write five poems that bear this title,

but affliction amounts to nothing less than a signature of Herbert’s later life after his career break, his struggle with what he felt to be his vocation, and the painful process of adjusting to the situation of a priesthood in the country after the political and academic glamour of being Public Orator to the university (cf. “General Introduction” to Drury and Moul 2015, xxi). Compare also the episode in the allegorical “Love unknown”, where the narrator’s heart, after already having been painfully wrung and cleansed, is thrown into “A boiling caldron, round about whose verge | Was in great letters set AFFLICTION” (lines 27–28, Drury and Moul 2015, 123).

In the end, the image of the spiritual flight to the heights, too, changes. The speaker no longer envisages himself twinned with Christ, paired like a couple of soaring larks, but presents himself metaphorically as a creature incapable of flight unless aided by his creator. No traces of prideful self-glorification seem to be left. A rather surprising, rare, both homely and technical term helps to foreground the transformation: The last-but-one line (“if I *imp* my wing on thine”) employs a word taken from falconry, still a popular pastime with aristocratic connotations in seventeenth-century England. *Imp* refers to the practice of engrafting feathers in the wing of a falcon so as to restore or improve its powers of flight (for instance, when the bird is moulting or has damaged its wing). However, although the term itself is clear, its implications are not. They oscillate between notions of activity and passivity, between domesticity and outdoors activity, nobility and poverty, competence and disability, enforced stasis and dynamic motion. Are we to imagine that the speaker sees his powers of flight restored by having Christ’s feathers added to his own wing, or are we to imagine him borne on the wings of Christ, powerless to fly by himself? Is it himself who does the repairing, perhaps even playing on the phonetic similarity between *imp* and *imitate*? All in all, the speaking subject does not appear to be as much master of himself as the metaphor is capable of suggesting. However, the possibility of discerning rather more autonomy here than is perhaps compatible with an orthodox Protestant theology of grace, even a sense of the believer’s own cooperation and achievement, is not totally ruled out.²⁵ The opening of this possibility is, again, an effect of the poem’s non-discursive, metaphorical texture.

4 Elements of a neoplatonic poetics?

Finally, the ornithological conceit remains theologically ambivalent. The unruly suggestive power of the image of heteronomous flight is due partly to its affective and imaginative charge, partly to its cognitive content. In fact, it conjures up even more associations than those we have charted, and they lead into literary as well as metaphysical realms of another sort. Potential meanings and resonances fairly explode if we remember that not only the story of Daedalus and Icarus may be relevant here. Besides, and as a further iconographical background to this poem, classical mythology also holds the narrative of the abduction of Ganymede by Jupiter’s eagle. This episode (frequently and famously

25 Providing, incidentally, an argument against Richard Strier’s contention that Herbert is to be

seen as a protagonist of a strict Lutheran doctrine of salvation by grace alone.

pictured in Renaissance painting)²⁶ provides another, erotically charged image of a tandem flight in which the 'rapt' human is carried to heavenly regions by divine force.

Still, as if this were not enough, yet another, philosophical dimension is brought into play. These lines also evoke the ancient philosophy that is in many respects closest both to Renaissance art²⁷ and Christian theology: Platonism, not last in its early modern, neoplatonic version. Surprisingly, its relevance to Herbert's poetry has hitherto gone virtually unnoticed.²⁸ Particularly dear to the Platonic imagination is the idea of the soul as a winged and feathered being of dubious self-governance. In the *Phaedrus*, the soul appears in constant need of growing, grooming and repairing its wings in order to remain capable of ascending, maintaining and returning to its place of origin (cf. 246c–249e). The passage is part of the extended allegory of the charioteer, the so-called mythical hymn of the *Phaedrus* (243e–256a) providing a discursive language which a poet as learned as Herbert or his readers would have recognised easily. The argument on the four divine *furores* in the *Phaedrus* – the *mania* of the poet, the prophet, the priest, and the lover –, the discussion of poetic inspiration in the *Ion*, and last not least the exploration of earthly and heavenly love in the *Symposium* are central to this discourse as well as to Renaissance neoplatonism. Transformed and mediated through the translations and

- 26 E.g. erotically charged in sixteenth-century drawings of the Rape of Ganymede after a lost original by Michelangelo, with Ganymede's arms virtually merging with the eagle's wings, or in an early seventeenth-century painting by Rubens. The image of Ganymede carried by Jupiter's eagle occurs repeatedly in the emblem books of the time, for instance in the *Emblematum liber* of Andreas Alciatus, where, under the motto "IN DEO LAETANDVM" a determined-looking Ganymede is seen astride a comparatively meek eagle (see Henkel and Schöne 1978, 1726–1727). The motif may have an Akkadian prehistory, as noted by Walter Burkert (Burkert 1995, 122).
- 27 Cf., in particular, the studies of the Warburg School, e.g. Wind 1968 [1958], Panofsky 1972 [1939].
- 28 The more so, since it could be argued that it runs in the family. True, Cambridge Platonism only flourished a few decades after Herbert's university career, but it has its prehistory, and the Florentine neoplatonists, not last Marsilio Ficino's translations and commentaries of the Platonic dialogues were not unknown in England (cf., e.g., Patrides 1980). Not only could Herbert have come in touch with Re-

naissance neoplatonist thinking during his time in Cambridge, but his brother Edward, Lord of Cherbury, also has frequent recourse to neoplatonic figures of thought, both in his autobiography, his poetry, and in his philosophical writings (see Lobsien 2010, 16–29; cf. also Klaudius (in press)). This is not to dispute the importance of the biblical pretexts also present in this poem, such as possible allusions to Ps 63.7, 91.4, 103.5, Isaiah 40.31, Deuteronomy 32.9–13 or Malachi 4.2. The cherubims ornamenting the Temple of Solomon (1 Kings 6.23–27) are, of course, also winged. The *Physiologus*-tradition might also, at first glance, seem to offer itself; however, the birds that figure in Herbert's poem are neither eagle nor phoenix, let alone owl presented as allegories for Christ (or, in the case of the eagle, the believer), but, precisely and suitably, lark and falcon. Herbert's metaphysics are different, both richer and more varied than those suggested by his possible pretexts, and the inattention among scholars to neoplatonic elements in his poetry may be partly due to the tenacity of the traditional image of Herbert as the pious country parson.

commentaries by Marsilio Ficino it offers a mind-set,²⁹ a way of thinking and feeling that harmonises well with a number of Christian concerns.

Above all it appears congenial to poetry. From the first, and repeatedly, Plato resorts to metaphor to render plausible the soul's self-motion and underscore the necessity of right guidance. Thus, as he unfolds the metaphysical field of the mythical hymn at the heart of the *Phaedrus*, he relies on categories of spatiality and significant movement between value-related coordinates of up and down. And it is clearly upward mobility which is better than downward, flight better than fall; so much so that even the upward gaze is valued highly as the mark of the lover of beauty who in his *mania* has fixed the eyes of his mind on the highest truth in "the best of all forms of divine possession": "Such a one, as soon as he beholds the beauty of this world, is reminded of true beauty, and his wings begin to grow; then is he fain to lift his wings and fly upward; yet he has not the power, but inasmuch as he gazes upward like a bird, and cares nothing for the world beneath, men charge it upon him that he is demented" (249e).³⁰ Ficino's Latin rendering of this and related passages similarly stresses the soul's orientation towards divine beauty conceived of as situated 'on high': "When it [i.e. the soul, V. O. L.] is perfect and winged it soars up to the heights and rules over the whole world. [...] The natural power of wings is to lift something heavy up to the heights where the race of gods dwells. But of all that exists with regard to the body, what most participates in the divine is the rational soul. But the divine is beautiful, wise, and good and whatever can be said to be such. By these the plumage of the rational soul is nourished and strengthened most, but it droops and perishes because of the ugly and wicked and such contraries."³¹

The *Phaedrus* quotations also hint at a number of other features of the neoplatonic aesthetic implicit in Herbert's "Easter-wings":³² for instance, an "emphasis on the poet

29 Cf. Allen 1999: "Renaissance Neoplatonism [...] contributed a *forma mentis* that transcended disciplinary and national boundaries without necessarily coming into direct conflict with other contemporary mind-sets, those we associate with Aristotelianism, Protestantism, Ramism, neo-scholasticism, Hermeticism, Copernicanism, Tridentism, and so forth" (435).

30 Hamilton and Cairns 1973, 496. Herbert incidentally favours the notion of the upward gaze in other poems as well, such as, again in comparison with the habit of birds, in "Mans medley" where man is placed, in good Renaissance fashion, ontologically between material and immaterial beings and challenged with joining the sensual, earthly world with the heavenly and angelic: "In soul he mounts and flies, | In flesh he dies. [...] Not, that he may not here | Taste of the cheer, | But as birds drink,

and straight lift up their head" (lines 13–14, 19–21, Drury and Moul 2015, 125).

31 Ficino 2008, 9–11 (sections 5–6). Cf. also the following passage, with reference to the "divine alienation" experienced by the lover: "[...] he who has seen something of beauty here, in recalling the true Beauty, receives his wings, and having received them, attempts to fly. But since he cannot do this, gazing upwards like a bird at the supernals and despising lower things, he receives the [crowd's] verdict that he has been seized as it were by a frenzy. [...] and the person who is seized by this frenzy, since he loves beautiful things, is called a lover" (19, section 14).

32 Allen 1999 presents some basic elements of a neoplatonic aesthetic along these lines; cf. also Lobsien 2007 and, for a more detailed discussion with reference to English Renaissance constellations, Lobsien 2010.

as god-possessed subject;³³ ecstatic, inspired, besides himself in his enthusiasm; a striving for oneness or union with the divine (*henosis*); a fascination with dynamic, upward movement presented as 'epistrophic,' i.e. self-referential and guided by a sense of return to the origin; the preference for an art that is on the one hand non-mimetic in that it aims at the ideal forms themselves, their intelligible and immutable, metaphysical reality (rather than their 'demiurgic' representations), on the other conscious of the necessity of mediation in its approach to the highest. For Herbert's metaphoricality, a sense of the impossibility of attaining this immediacy together with an undiminished longing for it seems to be the most important item in the neoplatonic nexus. As the divine is neither available to the senses, nor to imagination or direct cognition, the only means of referring to it is by way of symbolic – linguistic or artistic – indirection, that is to say metaphorically and allegorically: 'in other words.'

5 The metaphorical art of "Easter-wings"

The speaker of "Easter-wings"; it might be argued, undergoes a metamorphosis whose contours are delineated by the poem's central metaphors: After posing, first, as glorious poet-prophet, not affected by the moral failures of others and hardly touched with earthly materiality, he finds himself, in the second half of the poem, personally subjected to an experience of fall and – ultimately heteronomous – resurrection. Soaring lark-like in harmony with his saviour, we next see him reduced to a feather in the wing of a falcon, or at least faced with his own deficient powers of flight and dependent on the strength of another. From an initial, *Phaedrus*-like emphasis on beauty, the text seems to move to one of love, suggestive (if only in part) of the *Symposium*. But although the neoplatonic imagination may have provided some of the most potent metaphors for the process of *epistrophé* or conversion in Herbert's evocation and interrogation of Renaissance notions of the soul's autonomy, it is the point of intersection with Christian theological thinking about the resurrection of the body which renders his poem not only most poignant but also most interesting in terms of its metaphysical imagery. For it is here that the conceptual surplus emerges that causes poetic metaphors to vie with the arguments of philosophical (or theological) discourse for truth. Still, Herbert's metaphorical probing of philosophical ideas brings into play possibilities of thought without deciding between them. It thus leaves suspended the question – a major bone of contemporary confessional contention – as to the extent of human dependance on the divine and of

33 Allen 1999, 441.

the need to surrender autonomy to the agency of a divine other: the question of grace, together with the question of what the resurrection of the body entails.³⁴

But this is what a poem does. It tends to remain irritating. Also, it does not preach. It wants to communicate essential truth, and it does. But it persuades in a manner that does not render its medium wholly transparent in favour of an extractable ‘message’. On the contrary, it draws attention to the way it is made, and it convinces through it. It is in a very real sense ‘about’ its own intransparency. Literature therefore resists didacticism, and it needs to resist the reduction to *docere*. If it did not, it would render itself superfluous. Poetry, as we could see in reading Herbert’s “Easter-wings”, leads us not only to reflect, but above all to imagine and to feel. It thus taps into cognitive resources not available to mere rationality. As we experience, virtually, the speaker’s experience, we are enabled to sympathise with it. The poem’s metaphorical texture moves us – by creating productive uncertainty rather than dwelling on familiar certainties, by presenting its subject from different perspectives, by forcing us continually to revise the positions we thought we had gained. It can therefore never be wholly commensurate with theology, but will keep reminding us that there is always something else apart from dogmatic insight – the unavailable sensed in a surplus of aesthetic delight, given gratis.

In sum: Herbert’s poetry, exemplified by “Easter-wings”, faces the ultimate challenge – that of presenting the unrepresentable, of spelling out a divine truth incomprehensible to the unaided intellect. It does so by creating a metaphorical texture whose densely interwoven strands function on different levels, on that of visual (iconic, pictorial) form; on that of a short allegorical narrative, told twice and the second time with a difference; on that of metaphysical conceit, linking the Christian idea of resurrection with different notions of upwards flight (and human art) in a paradoxical complex that also brackets mortality with eternal life, sin with grace, agency with surrender.³⁵ Finally, on the micro-level of individual metaphor, it focuses all these in one select term (“imp”).

The overall achievement is conceptual, albeit capable of embracing paradox. For although Max Black’s distinction between the “focus” and “frame” of metaphor³⁶ seems to facilitate the description of effects created by “imp”, it would on the other hand be inadequate to reduce the rest of the poem to context, or a mere framing device. The “system[s] of implication”³⁷ brought into play by the text as a metaphorical whole create an abundance of meaning that goes beyond the rich significance sparked by the embedded falconry metaphor in isolation. Rather, the two parallel stanzas with their title that already names the central conceit lead us through a process of poetical persuasion, past a silent point of conversion in the centre of the poem as the fulcrum on

34 For the history of this discussion from antiquity to early modern times see the milestone study by Bynum 1995.

35 In what Stanley E. Fish has described as an act of “letting go”, cf. Fish 1972.

36 Suggested in Black 1962.

37 Black 1962, 41.

which it turns. Taken together, these two stanzas constitute a metaphorical complex in a persuasive mechanism working to convince us of a paradoxical truth. By thematising two types of attitude – towards the history of mankind and towards one's own life –, and implying, in the flight images, two perspectives on the divine in relation to the human – the soaring flight of the lark, accompanied by ceaseless song, and the artificially aided flight of the falcon, hampered by its deficient plumage –, the stanzas correspond in their rhythms of extension and contraction, their symmetrical sequence of elation, depression and resilience, inviting both comparison and distinction in their modes of figuring the return to life. In doing so, they refer to a Christian-neoplatonic system of ideas that seeks to adumbrate a reconciliation of the seemingly incompatible in the concepts of resurrection and redemption. What remains unavailable to the grasp of reason is nonetheless rendered credible – through the trope of wings in a metaphorical enactment of transcendence. In “Easter-wings” salvation by grace in unison with faith and humble effort becomes a possibility, at least a matter of well-founded hope. Thus, new life may after all spring from the experience of mortality.

What Herbert's intricately textured conceit makes clear is that resurrection does involve the spatial notion of a turning towards a 'higher' source of light, of an upward movement that is more than a rising from the horizontal, deathbed position and that is reminiscent of Christ's *anástasis* after the ransacking of the depth of hell – an ascent which chimes only too well with neoplatonic elements of thought. At the same time, Herbert's conversion of one kind of flight into another guides us towards an experience of the central truth of negative theology: that God is, in the last resort, not accessible by images. The poem places Him, once again, beyond metaphor. He is neither a lark nor a falcon, though the human soul may, in some respects, resemble both. Except that of flight as metaphor of dynamic motion, all possible attributes of the divine are transcended in “Easter-wings”. The complications of its metaphorical texture also permit us to realise anew that, rhetorically speaking, metaphor is indeed a major trope. For trope, as we may remember, is after all just another term for conversion or *epistrophé*: in other words, a turning towards the One who has already turned towards us.

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
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