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Thomas Otto

**How Eagles Became Pigeons:
How the application of
development aid became a
norm in COIN campaigns**

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Dr. Rainer Hülse
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1 Introduction

Dollars are bullets in this fight.

(Lt. Col. John A. Nagl about the efficiency of development aid in counter-insurgency. Nagl (2005): p. xii)

For centuries, the military had a clear perception of its task – fight and defeat the enemy. The tools used for this task were undisputed: Coercion through the threat or application of physical violence. These principles were valid regardless of the type of enemy fought. Rebels in intra-state conflicts were fought with the same means as conventional armies in major inter-state ones. On the contrary, the violence in intra-state conflicts very often exceeded the violence in inter-state ones. A common form of intra-state war was the war of some sort of government against insurgencies. As there are as many definitions of insurgency as there have been insurgency-like conflicts this thesis will build upon the most commonly used one by *David Galula*, a french scholar who set the standard definition of an insurgency for modern day counter-insurgency doctrines. Following Galula, an ‘insurgency’ describes

“an internal conflict, [...] challenging a local ruling power controlling the existing administration, police, and armed forces. [...] The conflict results from the action of the insurgent aiming to seize power [...] and from the reaction of the counterinsurgent aiming to keep his power. An insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order [...].” (Galula 1965: pp. 3–4).

In the following, this definition will be used as a base for an analysis in the field of counter-insurgency (COIN), a type of intra-state warfare with the aim to thwart an ongoing insurgency.

Emerging in the colonial period with its various engagements of Western forces against rebellious native populations, the methods of COIN stayed mostly the same until the middle of the 20th century. These methods focused almost exclusively on means of violent suppression, representing an enemy-centric form of warfare. Nobody applied or even thought about development aid as a major tool in COIN. But since the end of the Second

World War, the instruments employed in COIN campaigns have changed fundamentally. The U.S. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2008), the current state of the art COIN doctrine, is much less focused on coercive means. Rather, population-centric instruments like development aid now constitute major, if not the main tools for successfully conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. In COIN military means and instruments of development aid have merged so closely together that some scholars describe this development as the merging of a “security-development nexus” (Duffield 2005: pp. 22-42; Bell 2011: pp. 310-311).

This constitutes a huge change of spirit in the mindset of the military which used to employ sheer means of coercion for centuries. This variation within a relatively short period of time of about five decades is not explained easily and hence worth a closer examination.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the process that led to the taken for granted application of development aid in modern counter-insurgency campaigns. Using the theory of norm emergence in the field of social constructivism I will trace the norm that *development aid constitutes a major tool in COIN campaigns* from its emergence after the Second World War onwards. The aim of this analytical description is twofold: On the one side, it should examine and display what the necessary steps were in order for the norm to emerge. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are important to understand the past process and predict and eventually influence further developments in the field of counter-insurgency. On the other hand, it may provide a further empirical confirmation of the norm theory, which is, as will be shown later, in structural lack of supporting empirical evidence.

As the timeframe for the process tracing is vast in this case, empirical evidence will be gathered by using a variety of historical case studies which will all be examined with regard to two theses, which are forming the underlying structure of the subsequent analysis:

- The norm evolved *within* every single case, leading to an evolution of the norm from the beginning to the end of every COIN campaign.
- The norm evolved *beyond* the single case studies, as every case had its impact on subsequent cases, thereby influencing the long-term development of the norm.

In the following analysis, I will refer to the former as the *micro-evolution* and to the latter as the *macro-evolution* of the norm. In a first part, I will work out the theoretical foundations of the analysis. Drawing from previous theoretical work mainly from *Martha Finnemore* and *Alexander Wendt*, I will combine the respective approaches in order to construct a more inclusive approach to explain norm evolutions. Furthermore, I will add the perspective of the macro-evolution of a norm to the social constructivistic norm model. After outlining the methodology, the main part will examine the case studies in respect to the theses mentioned above. Whereas the analysis of the micro-evolutions will be concluded within each case study, the last part will outline the results for the macro-evolution and hence provide an answer to the question how the norm to apply development aid in COIN campaigns has become internalized in the past half a century.

2 Norms and policy

In the following, I will outline how norms can help to explain policy change, and hence why analysing a norm change process is a suitable method to explain the emergence of development aid as a part of COIN campaigns. I will hereby mostly stick to the work of *Martha Finnemore* and *Kathryn Sikkink* (1998), but not without critiquing and complementing their approach in respect to the *norm life cycle*.

2.1 Constructivism and norms

Especially since the end of the Cold War, social constructivism gained acceptance compared to the more traditional concepts such as (neo-)realism and liberalism. The strongest argument in favour for social constructivism was the failure of the ‘static’ theories to predict and explain the changes that brought an end to the Cold War. Constructivists blamed them to “marginalize or ignore altogether the social process that spawned the core ideas of mature New Thinking [the policy change in the USSR] and helped bringing them to policy fruition” (Herman 1996: pp. 272–273).

In contrast to the focus of realists on static interest which are dependent on irrevocable rational choice assumptions emerging from a given structure as the main cause for policy decisions, constructivists assume a more flexible model. They deny fixed *a priori*

meanings of social objects, instead they argue that meanings are attached to objects due to a social process which results in a shared common understatement of those meanings attached (Adler 1997: p. 322). Contrary to the traditional approaches, where the structure is regarded as the constituting element, constructivists assume a mutual constitutive relationship between actors and structure (Wendt 1987: p. 339; 1999: pp. 139–140).

Nevertheless, the questions how these two interact and who is to be treated as point for departure in the epistemology are still debated between constructivists. One possible answer was shaped by *Nicholas Onuf* (1989) and *Friedrich Kratochwil* (1989), who further examined the vehicles of the co-determination between actors and structure. They argued that in researching these vehicles one might be able to better understand what constitutes this relationship to finally better understand variations in the social reality and, even further, policy outcomes.

A vehicle for the change of the social reality is the variation of ‘norms’ or ‘ideas’ which are shaping behavior (Finnemore 1996: p. 312). The widely accepted definition of norms by *Peter Katzenstein*, that norms constitute “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” (1996: p. 5), accounts to the potential flexibility of the social allocation of meaning to objects in social constructivism. According to the mutual constitutive character between agents and structure, norms have effects on the agents, in shaping their interests and identity (Katzenstein 1996: p. 5), as well as agents have an effect on norms in creating (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: p. 896) and using (*ibid.*: p. 910) them.

Norms constitute the borders of social acceptable behavior by their regulative function of judging the “oughtness” of actions (*ibid.*: p. 892). They “define the universe of possibilities for action” (Goldstein/Keohane 1993: p. 8), consequently working like a “switchmen determining the tracks” (*ibid.*: p. 12). Beside this regulative character, they also have a constitutive function (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: p. 891). Due to their unchallenged, naturalized existence and borders of action, over time norms shape the actors who, in return, reinforce the norms by replicating them repeatedly (Wendt 1992: p. 399). Therefore, in determining the possible pool of actions norms have a direct influence on policy outcomes as they allow some to happen and prevent others. As long as these determining norms do not change, policy will neither (Goldstein/Keohane 1993: p. 12).

Norms constitute a vehicle which work as the connection for the relation between actors and the structure. Due to their regulative and replicating character, they have a significant influence on policy outcomes in determining the possibilities of actions. In order to understand the process which forms policy outcomes, one therefore has to understand the process of norm evolution as well. In analysing the norms as a vehicle for the process of policy change, this thesis aims to add a further piece to this complex puzzle.

2.2 How norms change

Above I argued that norms constitute a relatively stable entity influencing actors, structures and hence policy outcomes. Nonetheless, sometimes norms these stable norms might change over time. In the following, I will outline how this process of norm change works.

Due to the concurrency of the regulative and replicating character of norms, they form a relatively stable social reality. They regulate action and thereby constitute the actors, what leads to a constant reproduction of the social system (Luhman 1984: pp. 30–45; Wendt 1992: p. 411. Therefore, the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) falls short by describing the norm change process from the emergence of the new norm onwards. As it has been shown above, norms constitute an extremely stable set of acceptable behaviour. To change a norm it is not sufficient enough to just replace it with a new one. In order to allow a new norm to challenge the old one, the old one has to become destabilized in a first step. Therefore, in order to fully understand the process of norm change, one has to take the *denaturalization* of the old norms into account as well.

Wendt argues that norms and ideas over time may become “institutionalized” and form stable structures and path-dependencies, which are difficult to change (1992: pp. 399, 411). Thus, a precondition for norm change is the “breakdown of consensus” about the old norms, in order to enable a debate which finally leads to their “denaturalization” (ibid.: p. 420). An indication for such a process might be a debate about a topic that has not been an object of discussion before.

Thus, the denaturalization of the old norms is a necessary precondition for the emergence of new ones. From this point onwards, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) deliver a well

elaborated model of norm emergence, summarized in figure 1.




Figure 1: Norm life cycle. Source: Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: p. 896.

Even if the label *norm life cycle* is misleading, as they omitted the denaturalization part, their model helps to strucuralize this complex stage of norm change. Norms are “actively built by agents” (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: p. 896), who form the early avantgarde. These agents are described as “norm entrepreneurs” (ibid.: p. 896) and will be referred to as such in the subsequent analysis. These entrepreneurs promote their norm until they reach a “tipping point” of supporters for their course (ibid.: p. 901). Where exactly this tipping point is is difficult to specify and dependent on the type of the norm and the influence of the supporters. However, some kind of critical mass is needed to provide the new norm with the necessary momentum to enter the “norm cascade”, where it finds further distribution and support mainly through peer pressure and socialization (ibid.: pp. 901–904). Finally, after having reached broad acceptance, it internalizes through repeated compliance, reaching the naturalized status described above.

Thus, a complete norm change model includes the denaturalization of the old norm, entrepreneurs who actively promote the new one until they reach a not exactly specifiable critical mass of supporters. From this point onwards, the norm spreads until it naturalizes. The subsequent analysis will build upon this model in order to examine the life cycle of the norm to employ development aid in COIN campaigns.

2.3 Why norms change

Section 2.2 described the process of *how* norms change. But *why* do norms change in the first place? This question is indeed difficult to answer and contested in the literature. Clearly, norms “do not appear out of thin air” (ibid.: p. 896). Agents are actively promoting them. But what are their motifs? Finnemore and Sikkink fall short in solely

attributing the motivations to “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior” (1998: p. 896). They see factors such as altruism, empathy or ideational commitment as the main incentives (view figure 2).

	<i>Stage 1</i> <i>Norm emergence</i>	<i>Stage 2</i> <i>Norm cascade</i>	<i>Stage 3</i> <i>Internalization</i>
<i>Actors</i>	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
<i>Motives</i>	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
<i>Dominant mechanisms</i>	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

Figure 2: Stages of the norm life cycle. Source: Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: p. 898.

This constraint is highly contested. One of the main points of critique by the rationalistic scholars is that norms are just another vehicle for the expression of self-interests (Shannon 2000: p. 295) and have therefore no explanatory power on their own (Mearsheimer 1995: pp. 340–343). The main argument is that actors only “comply with norms when it suits their interests and violate norms when they conflict with defined interests” (Shannon 2000: p. 296).

This brief overview displays the complexity of the ongoing debate about the motifs influencing norm changes, hence about the independent variables behind norms. The sheer existence of them as well as their level of influence is highly contested in the literature (Björkdahl 2002: p. 27) and clear causal paths are difficult to substantiate (Goldstein/Keohane 1993: p. 11). Furthermore, the mutual constitutive character of norms and the environment in which they function weakens the causal direction of the argumentation (March/Olsen 1998: p. 958). Therefore, the subsequent analysis will not dive into the level of independent variables behind norm changes. I will rather treat the norm change itself as independent variable. In doing so I will be able to fully focus on analysing the dynamics of the norm change process and its consequences on policies. I acknowledge that in doing so, the analysis’ explanatory power might be challenged, but with the

subsequent analysis I rather prepare the ground for following examinations of the deeper levels of independent variables behind norm changes. Nonetheless, one has to be aware that the results of this analysis has to be handled carefully in regards to causality.

3 Methodology

In this thesis I will analyse how development aid became an essential feature of COIN, using the norm change approach outlined in section 2. For this purpose the findings will be split in two areas, following the two theses formulated in section 1: The cases presented below will be analysed on the one hand in regards to the norm evolution taking place within every single one and on the other side in regards to their influence on the broader, international norm evolution leading to modern days COIN doctrine. In the following, the former analysis will be referred to as ‘micro-level’ and the latter as ‘macro-level’.

As shown in section 2, the theoretical work done on norm theory is rich and norm change a widely accepted process in the realm of international relations. Nonetheless, the still small amount of empirical evidence to underline the theory stays a major point of critique (Björkdahl 2002: pp. 25; 32). This thesis is a contribution to counter this critique and to further contribute to the growing activities trying to underpin the theory with empirical evidence. In the recent years, constructivistic scholars have been busy trying to fill this gap. For example, the normative change in the Soviet Union has been examined (Herman 1996) as well as the normative change leading to the establishment of humanitarian interventions (Björkdahl 2002). However, the amount of work done in this field is still too small to convince scholars outside of social constructivism that norm changes posses explanatory power for policy changes.

A reason for the small number of articles in this field are the difficulties every scholar face when analysing norm changes. Norm changes take place over long timeframes, what makes them difficult to observe. As Finnemore points out, norms are almost exclusively perceptible by analysing the lines of communication (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: p. 892). But as it is a basic attribute of norms that they constitute the commonly accepted proper behavior (view section 2.1), they are rarely part of discourses. Furthermore, norm changes

are rarely sudden, but rather slow and unobtrusive. Hence, their evolution is hard to trace.

However, the evolution of development aid in COIN is an ideal field to add empirical evidence to the norms theory. COIN has been a common tool of warfare since the beginnings of modern statehood and has stayed one ever since. Therefore, the quantity of case studies is rich and written doctrines and a vibrant scholarship make it possible to comprehend past policy changes and analyse them in regards to the underlying norms.

In the following part empirical evidence will be gathered to examine if the change in the COIN doctrine can be explained partly by a norm change. The subsequent analysis will not be able to fully explain the policy change in COIN. However, it will elaborate how norms influenced the process leading to the role of development aid in current COIN doctrines and thereby adding another piece to the complex puzzle of the influence of norms on policy changes.

To empirically examine the process of norm change, I will use case studies of COIN campaigns from the end of the Second World War onwards. As I will show in the subsequent sections, development aid was first used after this date in COIN on a significant scale, which makes COIN missions prior to that border in history less informative for the analysis. The instrument of COIN is used by various nations on various continents, which makes it difficult to transfer analyses from the micro to the macro level. I will address this problem in focusing on the Western ‘mainstream’ of COIN thinking and application. In the prominent literature about COIN (Nagl 2005; Galula 1965; Tomes 2004; Petraeus et al. 2008; Corum 2008; Merom 2003; Porch 2013; Kitson 1971), three COIN campaigns were used mostly as points of reference: The Malayan Emergency (1948–60), the Algerian War (1954–62) and the Vietnam War (1955–75). All of these will be analysed subsequently in regards to the role norms played in the evolution of development aid in COIN. To demonstrate how the application of development aid has been internalized, I will further examine the intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards in regards to applications of development aid.

I acknowledge the fact that all these cases were conducted by Western forces on foreign shores. Therefore, the conclusions may be limited to these type of cases and do not necessarily have any explanatory power for other cases, like states in the ‘Global South’

performing COIN within their own borders.

Before starting with the analysis, the term ‘development aid’ needs further clarification. It is important to differentiate the concept of ‘development’ aid from that of ‘humanitarian’ aid. Humanitarian aid is mostly short term relief, “intended to prevent and alleviate human suffering” (Beswick/P. Jackson 2014: p. 75). That does not automatically foreclose long term consequences of humanitarian help. On the contrary, after e.g. natural disasters, sometimes “windows of opportunity”¹ (Miller 2012: p. 47) are created. This effect is often described as “disaster diplomacy” (Kelman 2006; Waizenegger/Hyndman 2010; Gaillard/Clavé/Kelman 2008), catalyzing long term political changes through the need for cooperation.

But as humanitarian help is intended to be short term help and long term consequences are rather a by-product, I will exclude all means of humanitarian aid from my analysis. Instead, I will focus on development aid in its ‘pure’ form. Development aid is rather intended as long-term measures from the very beginning onwards. As *Danielle Beswick* and *Paul Jackson* define it, “development aid more commonly refers to assistance, financial or technical, that is given to encourage longer-term development” (Beswick/P. Jackson 2014: p. 75). The exact approach itself depends very much on the definition of what development means for a particular donor or institution. The *World Bank*, for instance, works based on an understanding of development closely attached to financial, quantifiable measures. In the report *World Development Indicators 2015* (World Bank Group 2015: p. 18), the World Bank demands “increased aid flows and debt relief for the poorest, highly indebted countries” as one of the most urgent measures to increase the global development level, indicating a more financial approach to development aid. The *United Nations Development Program (UNDP)*, on the other hand, emphasizes that state structures and institutions may sometimes not be the solution, but rather part of the problem. That makes it necessary for the global community to take “collective action” (Malik 2014: p. 8), what comes closer to an ‘active’ form of developmental engagement.

I will stick to Beswick’s and Jackson’s definition of development aid, being aware that

¹which “tend to appear during times of national crisis, when key political actors recognize that some critical aspect of the existing system has failed and decide to work towards instituting positive change” (Miller 2012: p. 47).

this comprehends a whole range of approaches and that the borders dividing humanitarian and development aid are vague, especially in the realm of military operations. I therefore exclude all measures concerning military assistance, security sector reform and governance support, as these are mostly not intended for long term development but rather for short term stability and, as mentioned above, humanitarian aid from the subsequent analysis. Within these borders I will not make a difference between purely financial and more active forms of development aid.

4 The developmentization of COIN

In the following analysis I will examine the process of how the norm to employ development aid became a naturalized part of modern COIN operations. As outlined in the sections 2 and 3, I will apply the constructivist theory of norm change on a variety of case studies from the Second World War onwards and draw conclusions on the cases' micro-evolutions and further on the resulting consequences for the macro-evolution of the norm to employ means of development aid in COIN campaigns. Before that, I will shortly outline what COIN used to be earlier to better underline the difference to modern days COIN doctrines.

4.1 The traditional approach to counter an insurgency

The attempts to counter insurgencies are as old as some form of statehood itself. Thukydides described several clashes of revolting insurgents against the statehood of the city-states, the Romans thwarted hundreds of them in their colonies. Until the mid of the last century, states used almost exclusively one instrument to deal with insurgencies: Military might with a clear task, to fight and defeat the insurgents, the enemy. The tools used for this task were undisputed – coercion through the threat or application of physical violence. These principles were valid regardless the type of enemy fought. Rebels in intra-state conflicts were fought with the same means as conventional armies in major inter-state ones and very often the means were even more violent. As *Sibylle Scheipers* describes,

“standard practices included executions, arrest and banishment, hostage taking, and collective punishment such as the destruction of property and liveli-

hoods and the levying of fines” (Scheipers 2014: p. 884).

The fighting parties took “surprisingly little interest in the majority of the population” (Nagl 2005: p. 15). The results were often devastating. For example, in their effort to thwart the Jewish insurrection, the Romans decimated the Jewish population by around 50 percent (Merom 2003: p. 36).

Western powers were engaged in COIN-like operations at least since their various colonial engagements (Porch 2013: p. 1). Some scholars go back even further and see the origins in the “small wars” of European continental warfare from the Thirty Years’ War onwards (Scheipers 2014: 883f.). However, in the period of colonialism the efforts to counter insurgencies intensified and hence COIN became a common tool for the expression of military might. The vast colonial empires required the Western nation states to occupy and violently engage with indigenous populations, often leading to their violent suppression. The increasing advantage in weapon technology of the Europeans allowed them in the colonial period to install minority elites to rule over huge indigenous populations. This technological advantage provided the Europeans with the means to defend their rule over centuries, mostly through the means of coercion, installing a common perception that the state has the ability to suppress insurgencies solely through the use of force. The “deployment of indiscriminate violence against noncombatants” was a common norm throughout all these campaigns (Porch 2013: p. 21).

The focus on coercive means did by no means end with the emergence of humanism and the era of enlightenment. Western powers continued to rely on sheer coercion to suppress insurgencies. In their effort to counter the insurrections of African tribes, the Germans decimated some of them by 80 percent at the beginning of the 20th century (Merom 2003: pp. 36–37). The record of democratic systems were hardly better. The French in Africa relied heavily on so called “razzias” – the systematic extinction of villages – to devastate the economic base of the insurgents (Porch 2013: pp. 22–23), whereas the British in Iraq employed mustard gas indiscriminately (ibid.: p. 107). The British also replied with a heavy hand to the Jewish and Arabic insurrections in Palestine (cf. Barr 2011: pp. 95–286; Mockaitis 1990: pp. 100–110).

The Second World War did not much to improve this situation. Especially the Germans intensified their coercive approach as they found themselves suddenly in the situation to

occupy huge landmasses. The Allies, in their need for manpower for the main battlefields, reduced their colonial forces significantly, relying increasingly on air power and violent indigenous organizations, both contributing to an even more coercive and indiscriminate approach (Porch 2013: p. 133).

Thus, development aid was not at all associated with counter-insurgency campaigns before the Second World War. Using the definition of norms from section 2.1, the expectation for the proper behavior of counterinsurgents was the application of coercive, enemy-centric measures to suppress insurrections violently. This norm was in place for millennia and thus highly naturalized as a norm and institutionalized in the military.

In the following parts I will analyse how this norm changed and was slowly replaced by a proper behavior which includes the application of population-centric measures, of which development aid is an important one.

4.2 The Malayan Emergency

The Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1957 was the first major scale example for the systematic application of development aid in a COIN campaign. Nonetheless, the British did not change their behavior in the beginning. Rather, the old norm needed to vanish before norm entrepreneurs could establish a new standard of conduct. In the following, I will analyse the process of norm evolution in the Malayan Emergency, hence the micro-evolution of the norm within the case. Further, I will conclude the consequences of the Malayan emergency for the macro evolution of development aid in COIN.²

After the withdrawal of the Japanese, Malaya was left as an economic cripple. The British were not able to fill the vacuum of power fast enough and were thus soon confronted with a major rural, communistic insurgency, mostly driven by the ethnic Chinese, forming the guerilla organisation MNLA. After numerous strikes and demonstrations, the MNLA was able to use the momentum and turned a minor insurrection into a full scale insurgency supported by major parts of the ethnic Chinese minority.

²For background information about the Malayan Emergency view Nagl 2005, R. Jackson 1991 or Mockaitis 1990: pp. 115–130.

The British officer corps was, at this time, still very much rooted in conventional war thinking with their experiences from the Western European campaign (Nagl 2005: pp. 66–67), being used to violently fight their enemy. Additionally, the general in command of the British, *Sir Gerald Templer*, was a veteran of the Palestinian COIN campaign, a campaign that was conducted in the way described in 4.1. This dominating thinking led to a reproduction of the well known old behavior in the first place, an employment of almost pure military power with coercive means to tackle the insurgents (ibid.: p. 59; Mockaitis 1990: p. 113). These measures were a “Boer War redux”: Detentions, settlement burnings and executions were common tools (Porch 2013: pp. 253–254). However, all these instruments failed to swiftly defeat the insurgents. Driven both by domestic pressure condemning the brute violence (ibid.: p. 255) and the inefficiency of the approach, the old COIN doctrine came under debate. As outlined in section 2, the sheer existence of this debate about a previously largely unchallenged behavior is an indication of the denaturalization of the old norm how counter-insurgency should be conducted.

The decision makers were split in two camps, one side supporting an intensification of the enemy-centric approach, the other one favouring an approach focused on “the economic and political factors that created and sustained the will of the insurgents” (Nagl 2005: p. 66). The supporters of the latter approach functioned thereby as norm entrepreneurs bringing forward a new idea about what COIN should constitute.

The norm entrepreneurs prevailed and a norm cascade followed, mostly initiated by mid-level officers who were conducting trial and error experiments in order to win over the Chinese population. It was “slow getting common knowledge that the war was rather about the support of the populace” to deny the insurgents popular support (ibid.: p. 71), in order to separate the fish from the water (cf. Mao 1961: p. 34).

This rethinking soon translated into policy outcomes. A first step was done with the establishment of rehabilitation programs in the detention centers. In these centers, the detainees, mostly Chinese peasants, received elementary education and agricultural training in order to improve their economic situation after their relief in order to make them less susceptible for the insurgents (Mockaitis 1990: pp. 113–115). Although this effort was extremely successful, the numbers of participants were too small to have a decisive impact (ibid.: p. 114).

The small scale character of development aid measures changed when the *Briggs' Plan*, named after the Director of operations, General *Sir Harold Briggs*, went into force in 1950. At its core, the Briggs' Plan was a huge resettlement program, aimed at physically separating the population from the insurgents (Tilman 1966: pp. 410–411). By the end of 1951, 400.000 people were resettled in so called “New Villages” (Nagl 2005: p. 75). The resettlement was conducted with two measures. One was the ‘stick’ of food denials and forced dislocations (Tilman 1966: p. 411), the other one was the ‘carrot’, encompassing developmental support within these New Villages. The British built schools, sanitary facilities, medical stations and supported the economic development of the settlers in a so far unseen extent (Nagl 2005: p. 75; Mockaitis 1990: p. 115). Hereby so called “District Officers”, whose responsibilities included “improvements to Malay kampong life, e.g. in water supplies, bridle paths, the provision of electric lights; and land administration generally” (Nagl 2005: pp. 100–101), played a central role. This ‘carrot’ part of the Briggs’ plan constituted the first, systematic approach on a considerable scale to employ development aid in COIN campaigns. Even if some scholars argue that the coercive measures still predominated (Porch 2013: p. 255), the sheer existence of development aid in such a campaign is a considerable change in regards to prior policies. As a result of the Briggs’ Plan, the insurgents were deprived from their support and finally marginalized. This was not quickly accomplished as especially the development aid part needed time to unfold its effects but in exchange, the results were long-term in character. When the British declared an end to the Emergency, only six of the 480 ‘New Villages’ were abandoned (Mockaitis 1990: p. 116).

It became obvious that the micro-evolution of the norm to apply development aid in Malaya underwent a process similar to the norm change model described in section 2.2: The old behavior was challenged after it was proofed inefficient, leading to its denaturalization. Norm entrepreneurs, especially mid-level officers, brought forward new approaches, including development aid. After some small scale trial and errors, the norm cascaded bottom-up to the strategic decision level where it was implemented in the Brigg’s Plan. Its success lead to the naturalization of development aid in British COIN doctrine.

For the macro-evolution of the norm on a broader, international level, the Malayan

Emergency was crucial. It set an example that ‘soft’ measures such as development aid might be working tools in ‘hard’ conflicts. Further, some of the most influential COIN scholars earned their stripes in Malaya. *Sir Frank Kitson*, who highly influenced subsequent COIN doctrines especially with his book *Low intensity operations* (1971), served in Malaya in 1957, participating in the British hearts and minds campaign, which significantly shaped his later writings (Bennett/Cormac 2014: pp. 110–111). Another relevant person for the macro-evolution was *Sir Robert Thompson*, who served in the Malayan Civil service during the emergency. He later advised the South Vietnamese government and the U.S. in Vietnam, significantly shaping the ‘Strategic Hamlet’ program (view section 4.4). Thompson learned in Malaya to emphasize the need of political reforms and economic development (Mockaitis 1990: p. 186), what he then adapted to Vietnam and into his famous book *Defeating communist insurgency* (1966), what heavily influenced the British counter-insurgency doctrine (ibid.: p. 185).

With its influence on COIN thinking and the direct involvement of personnel in subsequent campaigns, the Malayan Emergency had an important impact on the macro-evolution of the norm to apply development aid in COIN campaigns and therefore marks the beginning of the norm emergence on a macro level.

4.3 The Algerian War

Similar to the British, the French faced several difficulties to control their vast colonial empire after the Allies’ victory in 1945. After their blunt defeat in Indochina, they focused all their energy to keep their “peril of the empire”, Algeria, controlled. The mood in the Algerian population had been nervous since 1945, but in 1954, after some sparking incidents between the *pied-noir*, French settlers, and Algerians, a major insurgency started, represented mostly by the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN). The conflict lasted until 1962 when Algeria was granted independence.³

The French, anxious after their defeat in Indochina and pressured by the pied-noirs lobby, reacted in well known reflexes (view section 4.1). As Francois Mitterand, then Minister of

³For background information about the Algerian War view Galula 2006 or Corum 2008.

the Interior⁴, put it, the only perceived possible negotiation was war (Corum 2008: p. 46). Hence, the methods firstly employed were purely coercive. A campaign followed which looked “uncomfortably similar to those applied in France during the four-year Vichy/Nazi condominium in World War II” (Porch 2013: 162f.). Torture was employed frequently (ibid.: p. 186; Merom 2003: p. 110; Corum 2008: p. 55), curfews combined with raids were the standard response to even minor mutinies (Porch 2013: p. 186).

These harsh measures did little to calm the situation. On the contrary, the more aggressive the French replied and the more troops they brought in, the more intense grew the insurgency. Additionally, due to returning conscripts and veterans, the French public learned more and more about the inhumane war they were fighting. As a consequence, the domestic support for the war was crumbling (Corum 2008: pp. 63–64). These pressures led to the denaturalization of the previous approach, thereby presenting a window of opportunity for a norm change in the French policy.

It was in this climate of looming failure when development aid appeared on the scene for the first time in French COIN history. Learning from the British in Malaya and their own experiences in Indochina, which provided the French with a mid-level officer corps open for reform (Merom 2003: p. 92), they re-shifted their center of gravity to population-centric measures. Several *Section Administrative Spécialisée* (SAS) were founded in 1957 whose task were to go into secured areas and provide the population with civic support such as the building of schools and clinics, government relief and job programs (Fremaux 2002). Also, for the first time in COIN, Arabic speaking women were employed to specifically address the female part of the population (Corum 2008: p. 51). As shown in figure 3, the proportion of non-military expenses rose constantly until the end of the war.

Nonetheless, these measures were never sufficient in scale and often sabotaged by the strong lobby of the pied-noirs. For example, the *Constantine Plan*, a program designed to create 400.000 jobs, was sabotaged before its launch (Porch 2013: p. 197). Hence, development aid failed to influence the conflict decisively, leaving the French with their second colonial defeat in a row despite their ability to adapt their doctrine and employ new measures such as development aid.

⁴Algeria was legally part of continental France, which made the Minister of the Interior responsible for all operations.

Year	All state expenses in Algeria ^a (% of GDP)	Military expenses (% of state expenses)	All military expenses (% of GDP)	All state expenses (% of GDP)
1953		36.3	12.6	
1954		32.7	11.4	
1955	1.0	27.5	9.6	
1956	1.4	28.3	10.1	
1957	1.6	29.7	10.3	34.6
1958	1.7	25.8	8.6	33.3
1959	2.8	26.8	8.6	32.0
1960	2.7	27.9	8.1	29.1
1961	2.5	26.9	8.1	30.0
1962	2.0	24.7	7.5	30.3
1963		21.7	6.9	

^a Civil and military expenses in Algeria computed from the combined overseas expenses of the different administrations.

Figure 3: French expenditure during the Algerian War. Source: Asselain 1990: p. 292.

Similar to the British experience in Malaya, the denaturalization of the old norms on how to fight an insurgency took place after demonstrated inefficiency and public pressure. That this happened already two years after the beginning of the conflict was largely caused by the Malayan example and the previous experiences in Indochina. Especially the mid-level officers acted as norm entrepreneurs for the new population-centric approach including development aid. Nevertheless, due to lobbying from both the old military elite and the *pié noirs*, these norms failed to internalize and institutionalize on a strategic level as they did in Malaya with the Briggs' Plan. Hence, the micro-evolution of the norm in Algeria failed to reach a stage of naturalization, falling short compared to the micro-evolution in the Malayan Emergency.

Nonetheless, the Algerian case influenced the macro-evolution of the norm to employ development aid in COIN campaigns significantly by setting the stage for a scholar whose writings influenced modern COIN considerably, *David Galula*. Serving as a captain and major in Algeria (Reis 2014: pp. 38–39), Galula belonged to the reform minded, mid-level norm entrepreneurs. He experimented with several forms of population-centric measures in his area of responsibility, which he describes in his much-cited book *Counterinsurgency*

Warfare: Theory and Practice (1965). The cornerstones of his proposed doctrine include the point that “[the aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory”, which makes the application of development aid a logical, if not necessary, consequence (Galula 1965: pp. 74–75). This emphasis on population-centric means should influence the COIN thinking significantly. Indeed, Galula is, together with Thompson, one of the two scholars explicitly mentioned in the foreword of the U.S. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, indicating his still enormous influence on modern COIN doctrines.

Although the micro norm evolution within the Algerian case did not lead to the internalization of development aid, it therefore contributed significantly to the further norm-cascade on the macro-level, making the Algerian case a milestone in the norm’s evolution.

4.4 The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War is an ambiguous example for the application of development aid in COIN. On the one hand, the U.S. failed to employ development aid in time and on a sufficient level to fundamentally influence the denouement of the conflict. On the other hand, with *Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS)* they developed an highly sophisticated and well funded instrument of development aid which showed respectable results. With the concept of CORDS, the U.S. set an example which would influence the macro-evolution of COIN on a significant level. The following part will analyse the micro-evolution of the application of development aid in Vietnam and deduce its importance for the macro-evolution.⁵

At the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. failed to classify the prolonged insurrections, backed by North Vietnam, as an insurgency. Instead, they focused on conventional instruments of warfare. With a senior officer corps cultivated in the Second World War, Korea and the ongoing Cold War with its focus on strategic bombing and nuclear weapons, the U.S. were neither trained nor flexible enough to employ the COIN doctrine already elaborated by the British and the French (Corum 2008: p. 147). The leading general *William Westmoreland* insisted on fighting a conventional war in the first period of the

⁵For background information about the Vietnam War view Nagl 2005 or Corum 2008.

U.S. intervention (Sorley 2011: pp. 78–81). In the literature it is doubted to which extent he actually believed in the conventional approach or whether he was forced into it by circumstances or politics (Porch 2013: p. 207; Andrade/Willbanks 2008: p. 11). In 1966 he admitted that development aid is a necessary condition for success (ibid.: p. 10). Nonetheless, he failed to realise the necessary order, that development aid should not be subordinated to military security. Hence, as seen in the preceding cases, there was an established norm of how an insurgency should be countered, namely with conventional military tactics.

After a worsening situation and a de facto stalemate, the U.S. started reconsidering their conventional approach from 1965 onwards, also pressured by an increasingly opposing domestic opinion. Instead of undergoing the same time-intensive learning process as other nations before, the U.S. benefited from the preceding macro-evolution of COIN. Not just the ideas, but even the personnel was shared. For example, General *Edward Lansdale*, who has been an important adviser for the Phillipine COIN campaign ⁶, or, more importantly, *Sir Robert Thompson*, who has been an important part of the British success in Malaya (view section 4.2), were employed by the U.S. (Corum 2008: pp. 136–137). The thoughts seeded by these norm entrepreneurs fell on fertile ground. The officer corps, especially the young ones, frustrated by the stalemate, were willing to adapt to new ways of COIN (Porch 2013: p. 209). With this influence, the U.S. increasingly employed population-centric measures, including means of development aid.

By looking at the norm cascade, starting with young, mid level officers, it is not surprising that the first measures of development aid were implemented rather bottom-up than top-down. *Combined Action Platoons (CAP)*, led by reform-minded officers, were installed in some villages in an effort to both defend and support the communities (Nagl 2005: pp. 156–158). As the success of this limited approach was observed, a more systematic, top-down program was designed. A study labeled *Program for the pacification and long-term development of South-Vietnam* was conducted in Washington, arguing for a raise of non-military assistance and broad social-economic programs (U.S. Government 1966). These proposals were not implemented as they contained a civil leadership and were therefore blocked by Westmoreland (Nagl 2005: p. 159). Instead, a resettlement

⁶The Phillipines were fighting a successful COIN campaign against communistic rebels in the 60s.

program, “Strategic Hamlet”, was initiated, similar to the Brigg’s plan (view section 4.2), which again highlights the importance of the norm’s macro-evolution. But in the Vietnam context this designed failed, both due to a different cultural bondage to the original villages and an insufficient ‘carrot’ part of the scheme (Hunt 1998: p. 21; Corum 2008: pp. 134–135).

Were the civil efforts treated shabby so far and referred to as the “other war” (Nagl 2005: p. 165), under *Robert Komer’s* leadership, a CIA official, they were put into the spotlight. His ideas were implemented as the program *Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS)* was put into action in 1967 (U.S. Government 1967). CORDS merged the so far uncoordinated attempts under one leadership, employing socio-economic and infrastructure programs, the building of schools and hospitals and large-scale job programs (Komer 1970). As a result, the living standards and economic situations for the rural population increased significantly, easing the grip of the insurgents on this target group (Corum 2008: pp. 156–157). Until the end of the U.S. intervention, CORDS was constantly upgraded. The number of personnel rose from about 1000 to 7600, the budget from \$582 million to about \$1.5 billion (Andrade/Willbanks 2008: p. 16). Also, the command structure now included a civilian deputy to the commander in Vietnam, staffed at the beginning with Komer, an genuine entrepreneur of the development aid norm, giving the program the necessary weight (view figure 4).

Nonetheless, the efforts never reached a sufficient scale to fundamentally alter the process of the war. It remained too little too late, and, as Komer concluded, always stayed “a small tail to the very large conventional military dog” (Coffey 2006: p. 100).

The Vietnam conflict is an excellent case study to demonstrate both, the micro-evolution within it as well as the impact of the macro-evolution of norms. Without the preceding norm evolutions especially in Malaya, development aid would have never been employed so fast and systematically as it has been from 1967 onwards. The links to other COIN campaigns were not merely ideational, but also factual, as with Thompson a major British norm entrepreneur influenced the American norm change, after the old approach proofed to lead to a deadlock. The seeded norms fell on fertile ground especially amongst the mid-level officer corps and civilians who felt to have been overruled by the old mili-




Figure 4: The organigram in Vietnam after 1967. The “Deputy CORDS” was staffed initially by Robert Komer. Source: Scoville 1982: p. 61.

tary establishment. With Komer, the norm cascade attained an entrepreneur who was extremely valuable for achieving the necessary tipping point, especially in the political realm, to enable development aid to be applied systematically. At the end of the campaign, development aid was a naturalized part of the COIN campaign in Vietnam.

However, the consequences for the further macro-evolution was two-sided. On the one hand, the success of the developmentization of COIN in Vietnam was certainly a strong argument in favour for its further internalization. Especially CORDS is an exemplary program often referred to by modern doctrines like the most recent *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Petraeus et al. 2008: pp. 73–75). On the other hand, Vietnam was a defeat for the U.S. and hence, everything connected with the conduct of the Vietnam War was contaminated, including the concept of counter-insurgency and development aid in conflicts in general. This proved to be a huge setback in the macro-evolution, prevented an early internalization of the norm on the macro-level and led to the ‘re-conventionalization’ of the military, what will be described in section 4.5.1.

4.5 The road to Afghanistan

This section will further analyse the macro-evolution of the norm to employ development aid in COIN campaigns. Starting in the late 70s, it will analyse what influences intervened in this process. Hereby I will not underlie any specific case studies as there simply has not been any COIN campaigns of considerable size conducted by Western forces during this timeframe. Thus, I will focus on mainly two opposing aspects, the ‘re-conventionalization’ of the military on the one hand (section 4.5.1) and the rise of liberal peacekeeping on the other one (section 4.5.2). Together with the path-dependencies demonstrated above, these two aspects will fill the lacking gap to sufficiently explain the norm evolution leading to the most recent case, Afghanistan. Subsequently, the case of the intervention in Afghanistan will be analysed in regards to aspects of development aid to examine the respective standpoint of modern days COIN (view 4.6). As the military budgets of all Western countries except the U.S. decreased significantly, the British and the French ended their decolonization efforts and doctrinal alignment became more common within an U.S. dominated NATO, I will focus from this point onwards on the development within the U.S. military as representative for the Western approach.

4.5.1 The re-conventionalization of the military

The defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam was a harsh strike for the self-confidence of its military. As a reaction, the conduct of COIN was simply banned with a “never again” mentality (Porch 2013: p. 222). The career-officers increasingly regarded COIN as a “fool’s errand” and devoted themselves to the “reconstruction” of conventional war (ibid.: p. 289). This development is often referred to as “revolution of military affairs (RMA)” (ibid.: p. 289). It saw the technization of the military, leading finally to the *Air-Land Battle* doctrine that was so successful applied in operation *Desert Storm* (ibid.: pp. 289–299; Bousquet 2009: pp. 1–9; Romjue et al. 1991: p. 83). As a result, the military became pretty much a “onetrick circus pony” which was really good in conventional war, but could do little else (Corum 2008: p. 176). COIN as a concept was excluded from the military discourse, disappearing from the syllabus and the relevant journals (Tomes 2004: p. 16).

This development could seem to be a huge setback for the norm discussed in this thesis.




Figure 5: Number of ongoing peacekeeping missions. Source: SIPRI 2015, own editing.

Actually, this is not the case. All the trends described affected the concept of COIN in general but no specific parts of it. It can be said that the whole doctrine was frozen for some time, not changed, at least not from within COIN thinking. What did indeed change COIN was the development outside COIN described below.

4.5.2 The influence of liberal peacekeeping

When the Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, policy makers in the Western World turned their attention away from keeping up the unstable stalemate and began to figure out ways how to change the world proactively. New forms of engagements such as ‘humanitarian interventions’ or ‘peacekeeping’ missions emerged. Indeed, as shown in figure 5, the number of such engagements exploded from the late 90s onwards.

Within these missions, which had a huge civilian part by character from the first moment onwards, the need emerged for the military to cooperate with the civilian parts, such as NGOs (Duffield 2005: pp. 57–58). Had the NGOs been mostly impartial actors in conflict zones so far (Duffield 1997: pp. 530–533), they now became increasingly incorporated by the military for their purposes. A “security-development nexus” emerged (cf. Duffield

2005: pp. 22–42). This nexus implicated a blurring of lines between martial and peace efforts, a policy shift from enemy-centric to population-centric warfare as well as a general deepening of interagency cooperation (Bell 2011: pp. 325–326). The formation of this security-development nexus within liberal peacekeeping interventions should later heavily influence the reformulation of COIN doctrine, as the lessons learned were transferred from peacekeeping to COIN campaigns (ibid.: p. 326).

Further, the concept of security was altered. Had the main reference object of security so far been the state, it now shifted to address the needs of the people directly affected by military interventions. The concept of the so called “human security”-paradigm (Paris 2001; McDonald 2002) matured more and more, having consequences not just in the theoretical debate, but also in policies on the ground. At least from the Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP 1994) onwards, which linked security closely with economic development, the connectedness of security and development reached the political mainstream. An intervention without a civilian, development aid part became almost unthinkable, for both practical and moral reasons.⁷

Hence, since the end of the Cold War, the “rationale that security requires development, and visa versa, has spread exponentially” (Bell 2011: p. 323). However, this did not affect the COIN doctrine directly. None of the conflicts in the 1990s contained a violent, determined insurgency, but rather conventional civil-war situations (Tomes 2004: p. 16)⁸. Nonetheless, this evolution of thought, leading to a “liberal internationalism” promoting interventions (Bell 2011: p. 322), had a huge indirect influence on the norms within COIN. Because when the COIN doctrine was re-activated in Afghanistan, the norm to employ development aid in violent conflicts had naturalized outside COIN and therefore pushed the same evolution within COIN even further.

It could be shown that two major evolutions relevant for the norm discussed in this thesis happened after Vietnam, on the one hand the freezing of the COIN doctrine, on the other

⁷This does by no means exclude self-interests from such interventions. As both Duffield (2005) and Münkler (2009) showed, humanitarian interventions may use such altruistic motives as sheer alibi to promote their self-interests. However, as outlined in section 2.3, the motifs behind norms will not be a part of this thesis.

⁸The exception might be the Somalian intervention, but in this case the UN and the U.S. withdrew when they realised the strength of the insurgency, not employing COIN instruments.

one the naturalization of the norm to deploy development aid in violent conflicts outside the COIN concept. Hence, when the Western forces reached out for the COIN toolbox in the 21st century again, one aspect of it, development aid, was weighted more than it would have been expected by solely focusing on the COIN evolution.

4.6 The naturalization: COIN in Afghanistan

This section will elaborate how the norm to employ development aid in COIN finally became naturalized. It will use three major points to elaborate this argument, the Afghan case study, the new U.S. COIN doctrine and the concept of the *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)*.

As a response to 9/11, the U.S. launched a massive counter terrorism operation against al-Qaueda and the supporting Taliban in Afghanistan. When this highly violent conflict was almost over, Afghanistan was left without government, criminality and violence soon emerged, finally leading to a major insurgency.

The U.S. were by no means prepared to fight such an irregular war. As shown above in section 4.5.1, COIN had not been on the syllabus since Vietnam. When the West reached out for a tool to counter the insurgency, they only found the peacekeeping approach. This led to the installation of the *International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)*, which was, especially at the beginning, almost a purely reconstructive mission (Kilcullen 2009: p. 66) in the spirit of the liberal peacekeeping missions described in section 4.5.2. For the U.S., this lack of an applicable doctrine led to a shock causing an intellectual earthquake. A ‘whole of government’ approach was taken, involving civilian agencies in the conflict, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA) or the Department of Treasury (USAID 2015). This step can be seen as a direct derivative from the whole of government approach developed and tried by Galula in Algeria, showing once more the dense interconnectedness of the norm evolution.

Parallel to this, the COIN concept was reactivated. Driven by a cultural shift in the military, high-level officers assembled and wrote the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Petraeus et al. 2008). Since the beginning, this process also involved numerous civilian

experts, among those *Sarah Sewall*, a professor for human rights studies in Harvard. The leading figure, General *David Petraeus*, both a successful officer and civilian scholar, was finally a norm entrepreneur with enough influence in the military and in politics to manifest this new way of modern COIN (Kleinfeld 2009: p. 110; Russel 2014: pp. 154–155). The counter-insurgency doctrine, developed over the last century in numerous conflicts, merged with the liberal interventionism from the 1990s and finally led to a COIN doctrine in which development aid was finally internalized as one of the cornerstones.

From the beginning, the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* makes clear that it perceives itself as an advancement from previous COIN doctrines. Especially the work of Galula in Algeria and of Thompson in Malaya and Vietnam are mentioned repeatedly and on prominent positions (Petraeus et al. 2008: p. xlix). Historical lessons learned are mentioned all over the book, and case studies such as CORDS (ibid.: pp. 73–75) are examined in regards on their strengths and weaknesses. Thus, the Field Manual is a product of an examination of the past macro-evolution of the COIN doctrine and its development aid part.

Development aid is an important cornerstone in the doctrine, more prominent than ever before. Two of the five main lines of operation, “provision of essential services” and “economic development” now include means of development aid in a way such as defined in section 3, for example reconstruction of infrastructure, including energy and sanitary facilities, the building of schools, improvement of medical treatment and job programs (ibid.: p. 156). Further, the Field Manual acknowledges that the military is by no means the only actor needed to be successful. On the contrary, a wide variety of other actors, such as civil state departments and NGOs, are needed to successfully conduct all lines of operation (ibid.: pp. 53–66). It can be said with no doubt that with the Field Manual, development aid has become a *sine qua non* of COIN campaigns and therefore constitutes a naturalized and internalized norm.

The results of this theoretical process directly transferred into policy reality, facilitated by the fact that Petraeus and his ideational colleague, General *Stanley McChrystal*, were both commanding officers in Afghanistan and Iraq before and after the elaboration of the Field Manual. As shown in figure 6a, the funds invested in aid for Afghanistan rose

almost constantly until 2011, reaching their peak from 2009 to 2011. It has to be said that




Figure 6: USAID data for Afghanistan

not all of this aid was development aid in the sense of the definition elaborated in section 3. When such factors as security sector reforms or humanitarian aid are eliminated, the expenses are considerably smaller, as shown in figure 6b, accounting for only 18% of the aid fund on average. What indeed is a good indication for the established importance of foreign aid is the graph displayed in figure 7. With a raising intensity of the conflict and hence more killed soldiers, the military did not react with the old reflexes of cutting aid and relying solely on violent means. Instead, they had internalized the application of development aid as a key in order to improve the security environment, leading to a correlation of killed soldiers as an indication for the intensity and the funds invested for




Figure 7: Number of U.S. soldiers KIA (killed in action) in relation to the spendings of development aid. Source: USAID (2015), own editing.

development aid.

A practical example of the increased role of development aid were the *Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)* operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. The tasks of these PRTs were twofold, securing the area and contributing to its reconstructing (NATO 2009; Department of the Army 2010). The involvement of civilians was high as their proportion in the staff ranged from 5% to 30% (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008: p. 5). Some, for example the UK and the German PRTs, were even lead by a civilian, as displayed in figure (ibid.: p. 28).

This cooperation led to a significant shift from short-term security objects to long-term development (ibid.: p. 9). In this respect, the PRTs are the direct derivative from CORDS, what is explicitly mentioned in the Field Manual (Petraeus et al. 2008: pp. 72–75). This is again an indication for the close interconnectedness of the COIN doctrines and another indicator for the ongoing macro-evolution of the norm.

It could be shown that development aid was applied quickly and systematically, both in monetary as well as operational terms, to counter the insurgency in Afghanistan. This was only possible due to the advanced status of the norm to apply development aid in COIN which evolved over decades and finally manifested in the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Additionally, the liberal interventionism described in section 4.5.2 contributed

to this process in influencing the COIN doctrine from the outside. Indeed, COIN in Afghanistan showed the impact of the macro-evolution of the norm to apply development aid in COIN, thus enabling a fast micro-evolution of the norm within the Afghan case. Due to this evolution, the norm reached a tipping point of consent in the early phase of the Afghanistan intervention. Hence, norm entrepreneurs such as Petraeus were able to manifest the norm in documents like the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. This manifestation contributes to the further naturalization of the norm in making it a standard tool of fighting insurgencies. Following the doctrine, it would be against the “collective expectations for the proper behavior” (view section 2.1) to not apply any means of development aid, even against a severe and violent insurgency. Thus, the norm reached a status of naturalization and internalization in the first decade of the 21st century.

5 Conclusion

In the previous sections, this thesis analysed the process how the norm to employ development aid in COIN campaigns became naturalized. It did so in using the norm change approach of social constructivism, most notably shaped by Finnemore and Wendt. In merging their approaches, the norm life cycle by Finnemore could be complemented to better explain the first phase of norm change. Thus, the full norm life cycle includes the denaturalization of the old norm, the emergence of a new one supported by norm entrepreneurs, the norm cascade and finally the naturalization of the new norm.

The empirical examination of the norm process was oriented alongside the two theses, that

- the norm evolved *within* every single case, leading to an evolution of the norm from the beginning to the end of every COIN campaign.
- the norm evolved *beyond* the single case studies, as every case had its impact on subsequent cases, thereby influencing the long-term development of the norm.

Regarding the first thesis, the micro-evolution, the results revealed in the analysis were quite homogenous until Afghanistan. In every examined case, the first step was the denaturalization of the old norm, the so far usual way to do it. In Malaya as well as

in Algeria and Vietnam, the military always tried to solve the problem by conventional, coercive means in the first place. The failing of these approaches led to a debate and thereby to a denaturalization, a necessary requirement for the emergence of the new norm. The new norm was brought forward in most cases by norm entrepreneurs originating in the mid-level officer corps. They experimented with new methods on the ground and subsequently led to a bottom-up cascade of their elaborated methods. Whereas in Malaya a tipping point was reached early enough to fundamentally influence the outcome of the conflict, the implementation of the norm came too late in Vietnam and not at all in Algeria.

The most prominent approach to explain the policy changes in COIN campaigns so far was provided by Nagl (2005), who claimed that the ability to perform policy changes depends on the ability of institutions to learn and adapt (Nagl 2005: pp. 213–226). On the basis of the findings elaborated above, I argue that being a learning institution is depended upon the ability to let norm changes happen. A constant, critical engagement with the common behaviors to enable denaturalizations, an inclusive debate and bottom-up channels to enable entrepreneurship and constant doctrinal reviews to provide the space for new norms to naturalize and institutionalize are factors constituting a learning institution in Nagl’s sense.

Hence, the analysis of the micro-evolution of the norms produced several conclusions. First, it provided empirical evidence that the social constructivistic norm theory is a valid tool to explain policy changes. Malaya, Algeria and Vietnam all fit in the pattern of the norm life cycle model elaborated in section 2.2. Second, the analysis of the process delivered a better understanding of the ways in which policies change. This knowledge may enable scholars to predict and improve the adaptability of institutions to adapt in order to bring them closer to the ideal of being a ‘learning institution’ in Nagl’s sense.

Regarding the second thesis, the macro-evolution, the analysis showed that the various micro-evolutions accumulate to a larger macro-evolution. From Malaya onwards, the norm to employ development aid in COIN campaigns cascaded through the different militaries and states until it has nowadays reached a state of naturalization with its prominent role in the Western COIN doctrines. The tracing of the norm over decades showed the dense

ideational and sometimes even personnel connectedness of the cases what enabled the norm to survive and develop over time.

The analysis of the macro-evolution also shows that processes of norm change happen over long time horizons. This makes their detection difficult and demands an extensive empirical approach including historical case studies. Moreover, the outcomes might not be as clear as the ones of the micro-evolution. The macro-evolution examined in this thesis is by no means a straight, constantly progressing development. Instead, it is a slow and curvy evolution, including setbacks and periods of stalemate. In Vietnam, the policy makers did not immediately incorporate the norms emerged in Malaya or Algeria. Instead, they fell back to nearly the same patterns as their predecessors. Nevertheless, in a manner of ‘constant dripping wears the stone’, the norm transformations within every single case translated into the thinking of following generations. This process was enabled by the theoretical work of norm entrepreneurs such as Galula and Thompson, who conserved the status of the norm life cycle from their respective micro-evolutions. This conservation allowed the following generations, after going through their very own denaturalization, to make use of the conserved norms and imply them in their further norm evolution. Hence, all these micro-evolutions were able to accumulate and finally lead to the naturalization of the norm to employ development aid in COIN campaigns nowadays. The existence of the macro-evolution is displayed in an obvious manner in the foreword to the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*:

“The new U.S. doctrine heartily embraces a traditional – some would argue atavistic – British method of fighting insurgency. It is based on principles learned during Britain’s early period of imperial policing and relearned during responses to twentieth-century independence struggles in Malaya and Kenya. It incorporates insights from French counterinsurgency guru David Galula. Accordingly, it adopts a population-centered approach instead of one focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the insurgents (Sewall 2008: p. xxiv)”.

In figure 8, I elaborated an exemplary course of a norm’s macro-evolution. Several micro-evolutions contribute to an increasing internalization of the norm. Even if this process might be obstructed by several setbacks, the accumulation of the effects of the micro-evolutions on internalization leads, in the long run, to an overall increase. This overall increase is the macro-evolution worked out in this thesis.




Figure 8: An exemplary model of a norm's macro-evolution.

This analytical description has been focused on the process of norm evolution, answering the question *how* this process took place, thereby providing empirical evidence for the social constructivistic norm theory, elaborating a model for the macro-evolutions of norms and adding valuable insights into norm transformations in COIN doctrines. What it did not provide was an answer to the question *why* this transformation took place. As outlined in section 2.3, the lack of causality behind the norm change process is a major point of critique held against the norm theory. However, what this thesis does provide is a basis for a further examination of the causalities behind the norm transformation process. For example, the influence of the changing media environment and its influence on domestic dynamics was mentioned repeatedly, pointing to a potential causality best explained by domestic influences and theories involving the role of the media. Another line of thought may follow Duffield's reasoning and argue that the changed role of development aid in COIN is only a disguise for post-colonial self-interest by the Western States.

Hence, the process analysis conducted in this thesis laid a foundation for further exami-

nations in order to tackle the complex question *why* norm changes take place and examine further independent variables influencing policy changes.

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