






Srebrenica - a 'safe' area








Prologue

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-  4. Internal consequences of Yugoslavia's foreign policy
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-  7. Ethnic problems: Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia versus Serbia in around 1970





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-  3. It's the economy, stupid
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-  1. Intellectuals play the nationalist card
-  2. The rise of Slobodan Milosevic
-  3. The end of the 1980s: precursors of a new ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia
-  4. The strengthening of Milosevic's position as Serbian leader
-  5. The economic consequences of Yugoslavia's disintegration
-  6. Elections in Slovenia and Croatia
-  7. The rise of Franjo Tudjman
-  8. Serbian reactions to Tudjman's election as president
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-  10. How should Yugoslavia proceed?

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-  1. The Dutch relation with Yugoslavia until 1990
-  2. Prophets on the sideline
-  3. The summer of 1990 to the summer of 1991: a wretched idleness
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-  2. David and Goliath: A public relations coup
-  3. 'Europe's hour'
-  4. National positions within the European Community
-  5. The Netherlands as EC chairman despite itself
-  6. The Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs

-  7. Hans van den Broek: pros and cons of a long period in office
-  8. Brioni: success or make-believe?
-  9. Dutch assessment of the future of Yugoslavia
-  10. Division along ethnic boundaries?







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-  1. Consequences of the war in Slovenia for the subsequent course of the Yugoslavian conflict
-  2. The action of the JNA in Croatia
-  3. The JNA in relation to the Serbian military and security organizations
-  4. Intermezzo: the nature and form of the conflict
-  5. Intermezzo continued: the unknown Balkans
-  6. The early intervention debate in the Netherlands
-  7. Further problems of the Dutch EC presidency surrounding the monitoring mission
-  8. Dutch energy against the background of the Bonn-Paris axis
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









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-  3. Alija Izetbegovic's political career
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-  5. Election contest in Bosnia in 1990
-  6. New political relations in Bosnia
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-  9. Towards independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina
-  10. Recognition by the European Community and the United States
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-  13. Conclusion: The role of the Dutch EC Presidency with regard to the conflict




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-  4. Dutch participation in a peacekeeping force in Croatia
-  5. Defence in a changed world
-  6. Dutch troops to Yugoslavia: 'a responsible and acceptable risk'

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-  1. New plans for dividing up Bosnia-Herzegovina
-  2. The referendum in Bosnia
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-  4. The recognition of the multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina
-  5. The start of the war
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-  7. The response of the international community
-  8. The 'withdrawal' of the JNA, the creation of the VRS and the rise of Mladic
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-  10. More American involvement?
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-  1. The peace mission begins its task in Bosnia: UNPROFOR-II gets underway
-  2. New security structures in the conflict
-  3. The grand French gesture: Mitterrand goes to Sarajevo

-  4. Aid overland to Sarajevo?
-  5. Refugee streams and policies relating to them
-  6. Reporting on the complicated relations in Bosnia
-  7. First information about camps in north-western Bosnia
-  8. The warring factions' public relations
-  9. Trnopolje: the famous pictures
-  10. The consequences of the pictures in the Netherlands: a stronger call for intervention
-  11. Doubts about the images from Trnopolje
-  12. Increasing readiness to initiate military intervention before the Trnopolje images
-  13. Opponents of intervention after the images of Trnopolje
-  14. The somewhat longer term after Trnopolje: the Netherlands is willing, but the rest of the world ...
-  15. Sights on the airmobile brigade
-  16. The London conference
-  17. Debate in Parliament, 27 August: resistance to 'hypocrisy'
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-  1. After 'London'
-  2. Humanitarian aid after London
-  3. Bosnia-Herzegovina Command in Sarajevo
-  4. To shoot or not to shoot?
-  5. The transport company and the Dutch image problem
-  6. Confusion about the Rules of Engagement
-  7. The No-Fly Zones
-  8. En route to the Tribunal
-  9. The continuation on the debate on intervention in the Netherlands
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-  1. Apathy
-  2. The idea of safe regions
-  3. A month of meetings
-  4. Kooijmans takes over from Van den Broek
-  5. Appeasement or enforcement?
-  6. Panic and the presidential elections in Serbia: a lost chance for the West?
-  7. Conclusion

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-  1. Campaigns in the Netherlands
-  2. Rapes in Bosnia: a new theme in the media
-  3. 'If oil is a reason to go to war, then these rapes certainly are'
-  4. 'The objective has been achieved: everyone knows that it is happening'
-  5. A tribunal for Yugoslavia
-  6. The Vance-Owen peace plan
-  7. Milosevic as an apostle of peace
-  8. The consequences of the change of administration in the United States
-  9. Developments in Bosnia itself
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-  3. The Parliament debate of 9 March 1993
-  4. Pressure to deploy a 'grossly exorbitant showpiece'
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-  6. The Prime Minister and the Ministry of General Affairs
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-  8. Enforcing the no-fly zone
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-  1. Gloomy prospects for the Vance-Owen plan
-  2. The Dutch Government en route to the deployment of the Airmobile Brigade
-  3. The rejection of the Vance-Owen plan
-  4. Parliament almost unanimous in requiring the deployment of the Airmobile Brigade
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-  6. The Airmobile Brigade in the debate about the Priorities Memorandum
-  7. The Van Vlijmen and Van Traa motion
-  8. A joint programme of action
-  9. Detailing the concept of 'safe areas'
-  10. Resolution 836: What protection?
-  11. Security with the aid of air support
-  12. Troops for the Safe Areas
-  13. 'Silly Sod' and the Netherlands' role as a catalyser
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-  16. The protection of the Safe Areas: 'I think that that will work'
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-  4. The further progress of the negotiations
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-  2. The strength of the weaponry: .50 or 25 mm?
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-  3. The beginning of the war, April 1992
-  4. The Muslims fight back
-  5. Consequences of the Serb counteroffensive for Srebrenica in the beginning of 1993















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-  3. The planning order for the dispatch of Dutchbat
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-  8. How Dutchbat came to be in Srebrenica
-  9. The Canadians move out, the Dutch move in
-  10. The third reconnaissance mission: Srebrenica and Zepa (21 January - 10 February 1994)
-  11. Departure and deployment: February - July 1994
-  12. The operational zone of Srebrenica and Zepa changes to Srebrenica and Sapna-finger
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-  5. Rules and instructions for Dutchbat: Standing Orders
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-  7. The VRS around Srebrenica
-  8. The Dutchbat information picture
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-  10. Dutchbat I and the Ceasefire Line
-  11. Dutchbat II and the Ceasefire Line
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-  13. Patrols
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-  15. Limited possibilities in times of tension
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-  17. Dutchbat II: a logistical squeeze and operations on foot
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-  20. More emphasis on observation from permanent points: new OPs
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-  3. Stereotypes and 'Balkan Man'
-  4. Conclusion: was the training deficient?
-  5. The arrival of Dutchbat I, II and III in the enclave: an impression of the atmosphere
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-  13. Peacekeeper stress
-  14. Problems with the behaviour of Dutchbat personnel: the attitude towards Muslims
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-  16. The attitude towards the Bosnian Serbs
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-  3. The role of the Battalion Commander
-  4. Sources of frustration and discouragement
-  5. Differences in the morale per battalion
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-  9. Conclusions concerning misconduct



















-  10. The B-Company attitude
-  11. Right-wing extremist behaviour in B-Company
-  12. Summary concerning the internal functioning of Dutchbat I, II and III
-  13. The functioning of the Dutchbat III leaders

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-  4. More robust use of air power?
-  5. The new Dutch 'purple' Government and Bosnia
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-  7. Concessions of the Contact Group
-  8. The meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff in The Hague: improvement of the effectiveness of UNPROFOR
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-  3. Commander UNPROFOR general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo
-  4. The differences between Smith and Janvier
-  5. The Split meeting: split visions?
-  6. The strategic field of forces spring 1995, seen from UNPROFOR
-  7. After the end of the cease-fire
-  8. Boutros-Ghali's move in the Security Council
-  9. Janvier in the Security Council and in consultation with the troop contributing nations
-  10. The air strikes on Pale
-  11. Direct consequences of the air strikes for UNPROFOR
-  12. The report from the UN Secretary-General
-  13. Response to the air strikes on Pale: formation of the Rapid Reaction Force
-  14. The situation on the ground for UNPROFOR in June 1995
-  15. At the political front in Bosnia after the air strikes: the situation in June 1995
-  16. The strategy of the Bosnian Muslims in the fighting
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-  2. Backgrounds of the differences of opinion between NATO and UN
-  3. Air strikes in practice: the second half of 1994
-  4. Discussions on air strikes in spring 1995
-  5. After the O'Grady incident: air power in July 1995
-  6. Discussions on air power between UN and NATO at the highest level
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-  3. Further investigation into a deal in New York and Paris
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-  5. The report on the meeting with Janvier and Mladic
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-  7. Visions from later days
-  8. Continuing the use of air power, also during the hostage crisis?
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-  3. The home straight was the heaviest for Dutchbat
-  4. Bosnia in the Netherlands domestic political arena - June 1995
-  5. The relief of Dutchbat III
-  6. The morale of ABiH and the population
-  7. VRS propaganda in the enclave
-  8. The absence of Naser Oric
-  9. The humanitarian situation in Srebrenica
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-  3. The days of late May and early June 1995: the VRS threaten around OP Echo
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-  5. The NATO withdrawal plan
-  6. The ABiH offensive at Sarajevo
-  7. The situation around Srebrenica in mid June
-  8. Individual skirmishes between ABiH and VRS
-  9. The final two weeks before the attack
-  10. The motivation for starting the attack
-  11. VRS plans for the attack on Srebrenica
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-  5. Combat action and Close Air Support from day to day: 6 July
-  6. Combat action and Close Air Support from day to day: 7 July
-  7. Combat Action and Close Air Support from Day to Day: 8 July
-  8. Combat Action and Close Air Support from Day to Day: 9 July
-  9. A Line in the Sand: The Blocking Positions
-  10. The Early Morning Hours of 10 July: Dutchbat Activities at the Blocking Positions
-  11. Close Air Support: A Third Request from Dutchbat
-  12. Further Activities of the Blocking Position on 10 July
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-  14. The Start of the Refugee Stream
-  15. The Evening of 10 July: Emergency Meetings in Various Locations
-  16. The Night of 10 to 11 July: Last Meeting between Karremans and the Opstina
-  17. 11 July: No Air Strikes
-  18. The Situation in the Early Morning Hours of 11 July
-  19. The Morning of 11 July: Is Close Air Support Coming?
-  20. Close Air Support Approved
-  21. The VRS occupy the city - the population moves to Potocari
-  22. From Srebrenica to Potocari
-  23. The fate of the remaining OPs
-  24. The ABiH reaction to the VRS attack










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-  1. DCBC: Defence Crisis Management Centre and the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff (RNLA Crisis Staff)
-  2. Discussions at the Defence Crisis Management Centre up to 11 July 1995
-  3. Discussions at Defence Crisis Management Centre: 11 July 1995
-  4. Meeting of the Ministerial Council at the Defence Crisis Management Centre on 11 July
-  5. Calling a halt to further air support on 11 July
-  6. The discussions in Zagreb on 11 July
-  7. Prior knowledge of the attack in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
-  8. Retrospective accounts relating to air support: Zagreb, The Hague, Mons, Naples, Washington etc.
-  9. The non-arrival of air strikes
-  10. Close Air Support at the 'large' debriefing in Assen, and later in The Hague
-  11. A retrospective at the blocking positions and the Rules of Engagement
-  12. First impressions of Dutchbat action
-  13. Later criticism of Dutchbat
-  14. The Dutchbat command
-  15. Military honours for Karremans and the Forward Air Controllers?
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-  3. UN Resolution 1004: formulation and consequences
-  4. Military plans for retaking Srebrenica after the UN resolution
-  5. Conclusion

Chapter 9: The departure of Dutchbat from Srebrenica





















-  1. Plans for the departure of Dutchbat
-  2. No withdrawal, stay put
-  3. The hard truth: Mladic dictates whether and how Dutchbat withdraws
-  4. The Hague, Zagreb and New York deliberate on the departure of Dutchbat
-  5. Is a withdrawal in sight after all? The birth of the Smith-Mladic Agreement
-  6. The arrangements for the withdrawal and the route
-  7. Consultations between Mladic and Nicolai on the Dutchbat equipment
-  8. The Dutchbat withdrawal as a public issue
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-  3. The motives for the flight
-  4. The night of 11 and 12 July: attempts to coordinate efforts
-  5. Why was this particular route to Tuzla chosen?
-  6. 12 July: the departure of the column
-  7. 12 July: the VRS discovers the departure
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-  9. 12 July: the first prisoners are taken
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-  12. 14 July 1995
-  13. 15 July 1995
-  14. 16 July: the breakthrough at Baljkovica
-  15. 17-20 July: the battle with the stragglers
-  16. A prisoner of war's story

-  17. After 20 July
-  18. The fate of those remaining in Kamenica
-  19. The arrival of the men in Bosnian territory
-  20. The disbandment of the 28th Division
-  21. Summary and conclusions






















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-  2. The extent of the mass murder and the number of missing persons
-  3. The motives for the executions
-  4. The executions
-  5. The morning of 13 July 1995: executions alongside the River Jadar
-  6. The afternoon of 13 July 1995: executions in the Cerska valley
-  7. The late afternoon of 13 July: executions in the warehouse at Kravica
-  8. 13 and 14 of July 1995: executions at Tisca
-  9. 14 July 1995: executions at the Grabavci school and elsewhere in Orahovac
-  10. 14th and 15th of July 1995: executions at the school and the dam in Petkovici
-  11. 14 to 16 July 1995: executions at the Pilica school and the Branjevo Military Farm
-  12. 16 July 1995: executions in the Dom Kultura in Pilica
-  13. Kozluk
-  14. Other execution sites
-  15. Obscuring the evidence
-  16. Excavations and exhumations
-  17. Responsibility
-  18. The involvement of the General Staff
-  19. Who was in command of the Drina Corps?
-  20. Review

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-  3. American impetus for further investigation
-  4. New efforts
-  5. Conclusion

Chapter 4: Potocari - Dutchbat and the fate of the local population






-  1. Introduction
-  2. The rules regarding allowing refugees into the Potocari compound
-  3. July 10: admitting (refugees into the compound) in practice
-  4. July 11 - the flight to Potocari
-  5. The issue of people getting knocked down (by Dutchbat vehicles)
-  6. Reception in Potocari
-  7. Numbers of refugees
-  8. The meetings of Mladic and Karremans: introduction
-  9. The events leading to the first meeting of Karremans and Mladic
-  10. The first meeting of Karremans and Mladic
-  11. The second meeting with Mladic
-  12. July 12: the third meeting with Mladic
-  13. The 'instruction to Karremans'
-  14. Mladic breach of promise: the buses are coming
-  15. Dutchbat and the problem of the murders in Potocari: the rules
-  16. The question of numbers
-  17. Reports on missing people
-  18. The question of the old and the young men
-  19. Why did murders take place in Potocari?
-  20. What happened to the remains of those who were executed?
-  21. Murders in the night of July 12-13





-  22. Protective effort in the night of July 12-13
-  23. Going around with blinkers on?
-  24. Observations and reports by the UNMOs
-  25. Sightings and reports by Mdecins Sans Frontiers
-  26. Lieutenant Colonel Karremans And The Reports Of Executions
-  27. Protests To Mladic?
-  28. Suspicions And Dilemmas: Van Duijn And Rutten
-  29. The Role Of Major Franken
-  30. The 'List Of 239'
-  31. The Issue Of Locally-Employed Personnel
-  32. Uncertainties Surrounding The Deportation
-  33. The 'Declaration Of July 17'
-  34. Development Of Evacuation Plans After July 17
-  35. Conclusion Regarding the Killings in Potocari

Chapter 5: The debriefings in Zagreb














-  1. Confusion surrounding the Dutchbat debriefings
-  2. Reporting human-rights violations - methodological problems
-  3. Dutch reception of KHO-5 and the 55 ex-hostages
-  4. KHO-5's journey to and arrival in Zagreb
-  5. The group of 55's journey to and arrival in Zagreb
-  6. Couzy's role during the psychological debriefing
-  7. Couzy's level of knowledge after the first debriefing
-  8. Couzy, the group of 55 and the media
-  9. Debriefing of the 55 by the intelligence section in Zagreb
-  10. Why was the KHO group not debriefed?
-  11. The role of the Military Information Office during the debriefing of the rest of the battalion on 22-23 July
-  12. The debriefing of the 55 and KHO-5: conclusion
-  13. 'The politics of suffering': Tuzla Air Base - Introduction
-  14. The role of the Bosnian Government
-  15. Organization and course of the initial care and reception
-  16. Barometer of a genocide?
-  17. Investigations among Displaced Persons
-  18. Genocide?
-  19. Pronk's use of the term 'genocide'
-  20. Couzy and the pressure of the media
-  21. The instructions given to Bastiaans for an operational debriefing
-  22. Involvement of the Military History Section
-  23. The course of the operational debriefing
-  24. The conflict about the content of the debriefing report
-  25. Debriefings and human rights: introduction
-  26. The UN becomes involved
-  27. The UN debriefs the main group in Zagreb
-  28. Problems with Bastiaans
-  29. Reports by Dutchbat soldiers to UNCHR and UNPF Civil Affairs
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-  4. The relationship between the Central Organization and the Army
-  5. The Management Report (MR)
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-  2. After Srebrenica, next objective: Zepa
-  3. Reinforcement and air support?
-  4. Orders of the parties involved
-  5. Negotiations and battle
-  6. Departure of the men from Zepa
-  7. Conclusions about Zepa
-  8. Gorazde: military plans are hatched
-  9. The London Conference
-  10. The Dutch attitude towards Gorazde
-  11. The ball in NATO's court
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-  5. The 'emergency stock'
-  6. Humanitarian aid in the period from 6 to 13 July 1995
-  7. 6 July 1995
-  8. Return to Srebrenica
-  9. 13 July 1995
-  10. 14 July
-  11. 15 July
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-  15. Involvement of the International Red Cross
-  16. Dutchbat's internal problems
-  17. Criticism of Dutchbat's medical actions
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-  6. The Signals Intelligence war of the Western intelligence services in and around Bosnia
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
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












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