

Experiments in Cultural Diplomacy: Music as Mediation in Canadian-Brazilian Relations
(1940s-1960s)

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ABSTRACT

Experiments in Cultural Diplomacy: Music as Mediation in Canadian-Brazilian Relations (1940s-1960s)

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This thesis traces the origins of Canada's cultural diplomacy by analyzing the role of music in Canadian-Brazilian relations from the early 1940s to the late 1960s. Brazil was the only country with which Canada had a cultural agreement at the time. Lacking experience in that realm, the Department of External Affairs let state and non-state actors on the ground lead the show. Those individuals (diplomats, artists, broadcasters, and Canadian capitalists, among others) had considerable leeway to put forward their own vision of Canada with the knowledge that national projection and national self-representation were part of the same feedback loop. Because they were conceived with both foreign and domestic audiences in mind, their experiments in musical diplomacy placed Canadians' simultaneous search for a national and an international identity within a transnational context. Improvised as it was, this musical nation branding exercise was intertwined with a broad range of individual and collective agendas that cut across various combinations of political, business, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and even family ties. Latinity and Catholicism, but also *métissage* and family, were some of the dominant tropes that official and impromptu ambassadors employed to engage Brazilian publics. This process involved a reckoning with Brazil's cultural and 'racial' difference that used musical genres (for example, 'serious music' as opposed to samba and jazz) to foreground 'whiteness' as the normative link between Canadians and Brazilians. As such, Canada's plunge into the realm of musical diplomacy reflected and shaped where 'white' Canadians – whether francophones or anglophones – situated themselves vis-à-vis 'others' at home and abroad. 'Race' and empire, but also religion and gender, informed the musical nation branding efforts of this story's protagonists. According to them, Brazil's location on the periphery of the industrialized North made it an ideal place to experiment with the projection of Canada's image abroad. It was the distant stage upon which internal (identity) politics and aspirations could be played out.

Borrowing from Benedict Anderson's work on nationalism and Georgina Born's research on the mediating potential of music, this thesis is based on a broad range of sources (textual, audio, and visual) collected through multisite research: from Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília to Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Quebec City, and Halifax.

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In many ways, the journey of this dissertation began when I purchased my first drum kit in the summer of 1989 (or maybe it was 1990). Beating the drums – first in my parents’ basement and then in various studios and on international stages – helped me understand that music is not just something you do or listen to; it is also a cultural act with social and symbolic importance through which one communicates, experiences a sense of commonality, and establishes solidarities. I have since become an ardent, inquisitive record collector and an instinctive sound archivist who feels a constant need to listen intently to the past.

I did not realize the extent to which my trajectory as a musician would inform my research and writing when I enrolled as a graduate student in a master’s program at Concordia University many years ago. The Department of History’s outstanding faculty helped me to make that transition. I am profoundly grateful for the guidance I received in these pivotal years. Special thanks to Dr. Ronald Rudin, Dr. Mary Vipond, and Dr. Nora E. Jaffary for having been such inspiring mentors and for having encouraged me to begin exploring topics that I revisited in the course of my doctoral research: from the agency of artists and government support for the arts to cultural/musical nationalisms in Québec and in Brazil.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

British Broadcasting Corporation Overseas Service (BBC-OS)

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Conservatoire de musique du Québec à Montréal (CMQM)

Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP)

Department of External Affairs (DEA)

Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC)

Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual (DCIn)

Divisão Cultural do Itamaraty (DCIt)

École supérieure de musique d'Outremont (ESMO)

Festival Internacional da Canção Popular (FICP)

Geological Survey of Canada (GSC)

House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs (HCSCEA)

International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS)

League of Nations (LON)

Ministério da Educação e Saúde (MES)

Música Popular Brasileira (MPB)

National Film Board of Canada (NFB)

National Gallery of Canada (NGC)

Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA)

Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM)

Organization of American States (OAS)

Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira (OSB)

Pan-American Union (PAU)

Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SSCFAIT)

Toronto Symphony Orchestra (TSO)

Union culturelle des Latins d'Amérique (UCLA)

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

INTRODUCTION

In June of 1943, French-Canadian pianist Jean Dansereau and his wife, soprano Muriel Dansereau, arrived in Rio de Janeiro for a series of concerts organized under the auspices of the Canadian legation in Brazil. This official visit by two Canadian artists had no precedent in the history of the two countries' relations, which led Brazilian journalist H. Coutinho to underline the significance of this "art offer" from a distant neighbour: "The Dansereau couple, with their artistic prestige, is one more link in the strong chain of friendship that unites the two sister nations."¹ This musical event occurred in the midst of a wartime cultural rapprochement between Canada and Brazil. With the conflict disrupting their respective trans-Atlantic trade networks, the two aspiring middle powers hoped to accumulate goodwill and consolidate their economic ties with each other while also trying to subtly offset the United States' political and cultural dominance of the hemisphere.² Opened in 1941, the Canadian legation in Rio de Janeiro was upgraded to an embassy three years later with Jean Désy overseeing the transition. The ambassador and Oswaldo Aranha, Brazil's foreign minister, cemented the rapprochement with a pioneering bilateral cultural agreement – the first of its kind for Canada – aimed at facilitating "the organisation and presentation of artistic exhibitions, concerts, lectures, radio programmes, films, and other activities" so as to further "the understanding of one country by the other."³ Cultural relations, Désy insisted, could help members of both nations understand "le sens

¹ H. Coutinho, "Uma Oferta de Arte do Canadá ao Brasil," *Jornal do Brasil*, July 18, 1943, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/030015_06/23100. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. The original quotations in Portuguese have been reproduced in the footnotes for reference purposes: "... oferta de arte" and "O casal Dansereau, com o seu prestígio artístico, é mais um elo na forte corrente de amizade que une as duas nações irmãs."

² Adam Chapnick defines middlepowerhood in Canadian international history as a "myth" associated with a "subtle process of nationalist self-promotion," which began during the Second World War when Canada sought to position itself advantageously within the postwar international order envisioned through the United Nations project. Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 188. See also Adam Chapnick, "Middle Power No More? Canada in World Affairs Since 2006," *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013): 101-110. For a discussion of Brazil's similarly uncertain claims to middlepowerhood, see Sean Burges, "Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power," *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research* 19, no. 2 (2013): 286-302; and Annette Baker Fox, *The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

³ *Exchange of Notes Between Canada and Brazil Constituting an Agreement for the Promotion of Cultural Relations Between the Two Countries*, Canada-Brazil, May 24, 1944, Treaty Series 1944, no. 15, 3.

profond et permanent de nos vies, apparemment séparées, mais que relie tant d'impondérables et d'invisibles courants.”⁴

Of all the arts, music was favoured as the most potent means of imagining this Canadian-Brazilian community. The Dansereau couple's performances provided impetus to Canada's first official foray into the realm of musical diplomacy. Quatuor alouette, a French-Canadian folkloric vocal ensemble, followed in their footsteps with a two-month tour of Brazil in 1945. The following year, composer Ernest MacMillan travelled south to direct a series of folk-infused programs with the Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira [Brazilian Symphony Orchestra] (OSB). He was accompanied by Claude Champagne who, in addition to conducting, gave lectures at the Escola Nacional de Música [National School of Music]. Champagne was no stranger to Brazil. In 1942, he had revisited a Marajó Island folk melody and composed a musical homage to Brazil at the request of Désy, who was planning Dominion Day celebrations in Rio de Janeiro. Acclaimed pianist Arnaldo Estrella premiered the work, titled “Quadrilha Brasileira,” while Champagne listened from afar. The year 1946 saw another musical exchange when Ellen Ballon premiered renowned composer Heitor Villa-Lobos's “Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1,” a defining work composed for – and dedicated to – the Montreal-born pianist. The International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS) had by then inaugurated its weekly shortwave transmissions in Portuguese with daily broadcasts planned for April of 1948. In 1952, it invited Villa-Lobos to Canada to conduct the Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM) for a performance destined for broadcast to Latin America. The CBC-IS's programming was consistent with the tone set by Désy's musical diplomacy: ‘serious music’ and folk music – representing Canada's French/English and Latin/British dualities – were the chosen vehicles for the projection of the country's image in Brazil.

The Dansereau couple, Quatuor alouette, MacMillan, Champagne, and those who followed their example in subsequent decades played leading roles as impromptu ambassadors for Canada. They embraced the idea that musical performances (on stage, on record, or on radio airwaves) were effective means of engaging foreign publics to foster international dialogue and cooperation while promoting Canada and enriching its musical life. Music's seemingly apolitical and

⁴ Jean Désy, “Fondation de l'Institut Brésil-Canada,” June 14, 1944, MG32-E2, Vol. 1, Discours au Brésil (1942-1947), Jean Désy Fonds, Library and Archives Canada (LAC).

universal qualities, its affective and mediating potential, as well as its ability to travel, made it a compelling instrument of diplomacy for Désy, his successors, and the non-state actors they mobilized. Damien Mahiet and his coeditors, in their introduction to *Music and Diplomacy*, write that music “provides scripted relations that actors can build upon to share experiences, generate new identities, and imagine new configurations of international relations.”⁵ They add: “From this perspective, experiencing sonorous coexistence, and perhaps even establishing a sonorous community in the moment of a musical performance serves as a starting point for a wider process.”⁶ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht concurs although she also pertinently notes that it is difficult to assess or measure the effectiveness of musical diplomacy since it is a multifarious and diffused object in international relations.⁷ Its payoffs may therefore not be readily apparent. Rather than focusing on the link between actions and outcomes, she urges scholars to “consider the term ‘nation branding’ as a creative way to investigate how state and non-state actors have collaborated in an effort to address, project, or activate music and the nation as a metaphor for political, including diplomatic action.”⁸ She argues, in other words, that one can more constructively “make sense of music’s meaning in international relations” by focusing on the practices of national projection and national self-representation.⁹

The argument that musical diplomacy can best be examined through the prism of nation branding is a cogent one when looked at from the perspective of Canadian international history. Nation branding is when countries borrow strategies from the world of corporate marketing to enhance their image overseas and (hopefully) positively engage foreign interlocutors; be they from the public, private, or voluntary sectors. It is about constructing and disseminating a narrative, often through cultural channels, to achieve desired political, economic, or cultural ends. Evan H. Potter contends that nation branding is at the heart of Canada’s efforts to achieve

⁵ Damien Mahiet, Mark Ferraguto, and Rebekah Ahrendt, “Introduction,” in *Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present*, eds. Damien Mahiet, Mark Ferraguto, and Rebekah Ahrendt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Of Dreams and Desire: Diplomacy and Musical Nation Branding Since the Early Modern Period,” in *International Relations, Music, and Diplomacy: Sounds and Voices on the International Stage*, eds. Frédéric Ramel and Cécile Prévost-Thomas (Cham: Springer/Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 272.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 264.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 272.

its national interest objectives.¹⁰ It is about giving “people an exciting story about Canada that they are interested in and to prove it over and over again in a variety of ways, thus creating accumulated recognition.”¹¹ But what do these stories tell us about their authors and the assumptions that are made regarding audiences? What do they reveal about Canadians’ self-perception and their relationship to the rest of the world? As my dissertation shows, Canadians conveyed many of their stories through music in the 1940s, 1950, and 1960s. It was a difficult process marked by competing nationalisms and differing views regarding Canada’s place within the North Atlantic Triangle.¹² Canadians also lacked “a self-confident tradition of transmitting particular values to other countries,” writes Andrew Fenton Cooper.¹³ Improvisation thus prevailed in Brazil, which allowed the protagonists of Canada’s first experiments in musical diplomacy to exercise considerable agency in the making and positioning of their country’s international image.¹⁴ The history of Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations presents, as a result, many opportunities to examine the mechanics of – and representations interlaced within – “musical [n]ation branding.”¹⁵

In my dissertation, I explore the multipronged musical diplomacy briefly introduced above. I argue that individuals on the ground (diplomats, artists, and representatives of Canadian business interests in Brazil, among others) had considerable leeway to put forward their own vision of Canada with the knowledge that national projection and national self-representation

¹⁰ Although Canadians held competing and evolving views regarding what constituted the national interest from the 1940s onward, they tended to focus on issues of sovereignty, economic growth, hemispheric stability, national unity, and liberal democracy. For a detailed discussion of these views, see Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, eds., *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011).

¹¹ Evan H. Potter, *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 279.

¹² The concept of a North Atlantic Triangle is used here to highlight the influence that the United States and Great Britain had on Canada’s external relations (and thus on Canadians’ views on the world) rather than to overstate Ottawa’s importance in the triangular interplays first analyzed by John Bartlet Brebner in 1945. Tony McCulloch explains: “Before 1945 the triangle was essentially isosceles—with two equal powers (Britain and the US) and a much weaker third. But since 1945, the North Atlantic triangle has become increasingly obtuse, with three very unequal powers—the US as the world’s only superpower; Britain, still a great power, even now; and Canada, a middling power in most respects.” Tony McCulloch, “The North Atlantic Triangle: A Canadian Myth?,” *International Journal* 66, no. 1 (Winter 2010-11): 206. See also John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945).

¹³ Andrew Fenton Cooper, “Canadian Cultural Diplomacy: An Introduction,” in *Canadian Culture: International Dimension*, ed. Andrew Fenton Cooper (Toronto: Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, University of Waterloo/Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 3.

¹⁴ On the topic of improvisation and Canada’s approach to cultural diplomacy, see Sean Rushton, “The Origins and Development of Canada’s Public Diplomacy,” in Potter, *Branding Canada*, 92.

¹⁵ Gienow-Hecht, “Of Dreams and Desire,” 260.

were part of the same feedback loop. Because they were conceived with both foreign and domestic audiences in mind, their experiments in musical diplomacy placed Canadians' simultaneous search for a national and an international identity within a transnational context. Improvised as it was, this musical nation branding exercise was intertwined with a broad range of both individual and collective agendas that cut across various combinations of political, business, professional, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and even family ties. Latinity and Catholicism, but also *métissage* and family, were some of the dominant tropes that official and impromptu ambassadors employed to engage their Brazilian interlocutors. This process involved a reckoning with Brazil's cultural and 'racial' difference that used musical genres (for example, 'serious music' as opposed to samba and jazz) to foreground 'whiteness' as the normative link between Canadians and Brazilians.¹⁶ As such, Canada's plunge into the realm of musical diplomacy reflected and shaped where 'white' Canadians – whether francophones or anglophones – situated themselves vis-à-vis 'others' at home and abroad. In the eyes and ears of this story's protagonists, Brazil's location on the periphery of the industrialized North made it an ideal place to experiment with the projection of Canada's image abroad. It was the distant stage upon which Canadian internal (identity) politics and aspirations could be played out.

My research renders audible the voices and sounds of both state and non-state actors who championed musical nation branding through the construction of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community from the turn of the 1940s through the 1960s. In the late 1930s, Canada and Brazil began formal talks regarding diplomatic representation and trade. This was a formative period for the Department of External Affairs (DEA), which saw its diplomatic corps expand in conjunction with the adoption of an increasingly liberal nationalist posture in international affairs. At the same time, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Radio

¹⁶ The protagonists discussed in this dissertation often used the term 'serious music' to refer to the works of classical and modern composers. Although not a musical genre, they often juxtaposed it against other categories to reinforce cultural hierarchies and to align themselves with European cultural centres in their search for legitimacy and power. As an ideology, 'serious music' was a response to the "status anxiety" felt by intellectual and cultural elites who grappled with the social and structural changes that accompanied modernity and nation building in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth century Europe. By making 'serious music' one of the pillars of an emerging national culture, these elites claimed – as did Jean Désy and his cultural ambassadors – that only they had the "technical, intellectual, and emotional resources" to consolidate the nation and give it both shape and direction. Celia Applegate, "How German Is It? Nationalism and the Idea of Serious Music in the Early Nineteenth Century," *19th-Century Music* 21, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 287, 295. See also Tia DeNora, "Musical Patronage and Social Change in Beethoven's Vienna," *American Journal of Sociology* 97, no. 2 (September 1991): 310-346; and Lawrence W. Levine, *Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America* (Harvard University Press, 1988).

Broadcasting listened attentively to calls for the creation of an international service that would be managed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), financed through direct parliamentary grants, and overseen by the DEA: the CBC-IS was established shortly after along those lines. These developments – combined with efforts to establish a national culture in Canada – created opportunities for musical diplomacy pioneers such as Désy, MacMillan, and Quatuor alouette leader Roger Filiatrault who eagerly embraced the challenge of projecting Canada abroad. The politico-cultural landscape changed considerably in the following thirty years. The mid-to-late 1960s saw the collapse of democracy and the consolidation of military rule in Brazil while Canadians increasingly focused their attention on the Cold War as well as on the impact of decolonization and Québec nationalism on Canada’s international relations. The year 1968 also marked the end of the DEA’s oversight of the CBC-IS. The CBC finally assumed full control of its international service by which time broadcasts in Portuguese had been reduced to a trickle.

Music as Mediation

Mark M. Smith, in his introduction to *Hearing History*, notes that “historians are listening to the past with an intensity, frequency, keenness, and acuity unprecedented in scope and magnitude.”¹⁷ Like Gienow-Hecht, he remarks that historians are best positioned to contribute an “explicitly historical dimension” to research inspired by developments in musicology and ethnomusicology.¹⁸ My dissertation makes one such contribution by examining the history of Canada’s musical diplomacy using a theoretical model developed by Georgina Born as part of her work on music and anthropology at University of Cambridge and University of Oxford: the ‘four planes of social mediation.’ The model’s premise is that music is best understood as a ‘constellation of mediations’ since it engenders relationships between and among artists, audiences, producers, and media. Born writes: “[M]ore obviously than visual and literary media, music has no material essence but a plural and distributed material being.”¹⁹ She adds:

¹⁷ Mark M. Smith, “Introduction: Onward to Audible Pasts,” in *Hearing History: A Reader*, ed. Mark M. Smith (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2004), X.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Georgina Born, “After Relational Aesthetics: Improvised Music, the Social, and (Re)Theorizing the Aesthetic,” in *Improvisation and Social Aesthetics*, eds. Georgina Born, Eric Lewis, and Will Straw (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 44.

[Its] multiple simultaneous forms of existence – as sound, score, discourse, site, performance, social relations, technological media – indicate the necessity of conceiving of the musical object as a constellation. Compared with the visual and literary arts, then, music has to be grasped as an extraordinarily complex kind of cultural object – as an aggregation of sonic, visual, discursive, social, corporeal, technological, and temporal mediations.²⁰

As a constellation of mediations, music participates in – and is subjected to – the same socioeconomic and politico-cultural processes that shape all human experiences. It is not an autonomous text.

Born's model is based on Gilles Deleuze's theory of the *assemblage*. It is a systems analysis model that attempts to delineate the form, content, and multilayered processes of musical mediations that occur in the moment of a performance. Born's *assemblage* is comprised of: (Plane 1) socialities engendered among artists at the micro-level through the acts of composing, rehearsing, and performing; (Plane 2) socialities established among audiences through the experience of listening to – and/or reading about – music; (Plane 3) hierarchies of identities (class, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc.) refracted through music in ways that either consolidate or destabilize the socialities established in planes 1 and 2; (Plane 4) the broader structural forces that enable or limit the production, dissemination, and reception of music. Born's approach consists of exploring each of the four planes and their relations to one another – attending to both their “autonomy” and “mutual interference” – through the lens of musical genres in order to better understand how musical experiences inform people's self-perception and sense of belonging.²¹

My dissertation approaches the use of music in Canadian-Brazilian relations as an *assemblage* characterized by a constellation of mediations occurring across eight thousand kilometres (on stage, in studios, via radio airwaves, and in the press) among a diverse cast of protagonists with an equally diverse range of agendas: for example, (Plane 1) the personal and professional context of the 1946 musical encounter between Champagne and Villa-Lobos; (Plane 2) the constitution of audiences, in both Canada and Brazil, around the live performances, radio broadcasts, and newspaper reviews of the two composers' works; (Plane 3) the interplay between

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Georgina Born, “Music and the Materialization of Identities,” *Journal of Material Culture* 16, no. 4 (2011): 377-378.

‘race’ and nation as embodied in the ‘whiteness’ of two male composers whose folk-inspired ‘serious music’ straddled the fence between universalism and nationalism; (Plane 4) the efforts deployed by the DEA and the CBC-IS, in coordination with their Brazilian counterparts and the mass media in both countries, to conceptualize, define, coordinate, and promote the works of the two composers. As Born explains, this approach consists in developing “a position based on a kind of maximum exposure to everything that is out there discursively.”²² In other words, it requires making audible the multiple voices and sounds, which gave the *assemblage* its singular structure throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

In a parallel way, my dissertation underlines the capacity of the protagonists of this *assemblage* to enact what amounts to an imagined community. The concept is, of course, a familiar one for scholars of musical diplomacy. Born writes about “aggregations of the affected” and “musically imagined communities” whereas Mahiet and his colleagues discuss how “sonorous coexistence” generates “sonorous community.”²³ All are indebted to Benedict Anderson who demonstrated the centrality of cultural works in the constitution and endurance, across time and space, of collective identities. On the topic of music, he writes:

Take national anthems, for example, sung on national holidays. No matter how banal the words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an experience of simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody. The image: unisonance. ... How selfless this unisonance feels! If we are aware that others are singing these songs precisely when and as we are, we have no idea who they may be, or even where, out of earshot, they are singing. Nothing connects us all but imagined sound.²⁴

Although it illustrates musical nationalism, the above example is in many ways similar to the ‘sameness-embracing’ that Carol A. Hess examines in *Representing the Good Neighbor*, a study on American hegemony, musical pan-Americanism, and the erasure of difference.²⁵ As Anderson

²² Cited in Petr Szczepanik, “On the Ethnography of Media Production: An Interview with Georgina Born,” *Illuminace* 25, no. 3 (2013): 108.

²³ Born, “Music and the Materialization of Identities,” 383-384; Mahiet, Ferraguto, and Ahrendt, “Introduction,” 10.

²⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 145.

²⁵ Carol A. Hess, *Representing the Good Neighbor: Music, Difference, and the Pan American Dream* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). The topic of musical pan-Americanism is discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation.

argues, what should capture our attention as scholars is not the question of authenticity versus inauthenticity, but rather the forms that imagined communities take. This means shedding light on the boundaries, zones of exclusion, and normative discourses that accompany processes of collective identity formation, be they national or transnational.

With respect to musically imagined communities, it is important to note that they, too, “can only function if they define their own margins.”²⁶ Encounters with musical ‘others’ are never unproblematic in that generally asymmetrical power dynamics are always at play when Western music appropriates, sublimates, erases, or engages (in one way or another) its non-Western counterparts. On the question of this binary opposition and its impact on composition, Timothy D. Taylor insists:

[P]olitical and geographical margins are peculiarly energetic sites where meanings are made, remade, altered, transformed, altered again. ... It becomes clear that marginality – either as positionality or in representation – plays a pivotal role in forming and altering worldviews and thus, among other things, aesthetic processes.²⁷

Edward Said, in *Culture and Imperialism*, demonstrates through contrapuntal analysis that artistic works (both what they say and what they leave unsaid) are often windows into the overlapping histories of power and resistance to it.²⁸ Borrowed from music theory, the concept of counterpoint invites listeners to pay attention to the ways in which apparently independent voices interweave along and through both space and time, like musical lines merging into a polyphonic whole. Born’s ‘four planes of social mediation’ makes it possible to isolate and amplify some of these voices to reveal what was at stake for all the parties concerned.

The concert hall is typically the preferred site for the type of encounters that musical diplomacy seeks to provoke. Yet the symbolic importance and connotative meanings of a work performed on any specific night are not found exclusively in the immediate experience of the performance and its musical attributes. For one, the concert hall itself is a Western construction

²⁶ Magdalena Waligorska, “Music and Imagined Communities. Articulations of the Self and the Other in the Musical Realm,” *H-Net Reviews* (February 2012): <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35409>.

²⁷ Timothy D. Taylor, *Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and the World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 70-71.

²⁸ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 66-67.

that purports to discipline bodies into listening and viewing performances in specific ways.²⁹ The affective and discursive components that precede and follow the concert are equally important in harnessing, to one's advantage, the assumed friendly disposition of foreign audiences. The alignment of musical and extra-musical coordinates upon which musical diplomacy depends occurs at the nexus of information and communication technologies (the press, radio, and sound recordings, which help frame – and set expectations vis-à-vis – the performance). The sense of propinquity that music amplifies operates in ways analogous to those described by Anderson in his discussion of print capitalism's circulation of discourse and image. Danielle Fosler-Lussier explains:

Cultural diplomacy relies on a similar trick of mediation, providing people in many places with shared information and experience – but even as it reinforces linguistic and national borders by showing what is characteristic of a nation, it also crosses those borders by inviting broader participation. The form of globalization we see in cultural diplomacy is not primarily about mobility or even direct communication but about altering local contexts and changing the frame of reference in which people think about themselves and others.³⁰

This transformation arises in and around 'mediated events,' that is, events designed for maximum engagement and widespread diffusion through various media to solicit attention, inform, and influence the targeted audiences.³¹ They are the pivots around which much of musical diplomacy operates. That said, mediated events – irrespective of the planning, control, and surveillance involved – afford protagonists considerable agency. This particularity is what distinguishes musical diplomacy from propaganda and it is what makes it an effective vector for establishing connections among individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions. All parties concerned, including those who, at one time or another, find themselves on the receiving end of a particular initiative, have the prerogative to embrace, interpret, debate, or resist the messages and representations conveyed through music.

²⁹ Darryl Mark Cressman, "The Concert Hall as a Medium of Musical Culture: The Technical Mediation of Listening in the 19th Century" (PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 2012); Edward W. Said, *Musical Elaborations* (London: Vintage, 1992).

³⁰ Danielle Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 219.

³¹ Danielle Fosler-Lussier's discussion of 'mediated events' builds on Daniel J. Boorstin's writings on 'pseudo-events.' See Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Image or What Happened to the American Dream* (New York: Atheneum, 1962).

My dissertation approaches the musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community described above through sources that speak to all four planes of the *assemblage*. Audio recordings for the period under consideration are not abundant, but what is there is relevant nonetheless: for example, sound bites of *Ondas Musicais*, a Rádio Nacional show sponsored by the Canadian-owned Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light); a commercially available 78 rpm disc by Quatuor alouette; a CBC-IS transcription record of Villa-Lobos's 1952 concert at Montreal's Plateau Hall; and Paul Anka's televised performance during the 1968 edition of the Festival Internacional da Canção Popular [International Festival of Popular Song] (FICP). However, one does not listen to the past exclusively through sound objects. Equally important, if not more, is the larger context within which 'musicking' takes place, to use a term coined by Christopher Small.³² He explains:

The essence of music lies not in musical works but in taking part in performance, in social action. Music is thus not so much a noun as a verb, 'to music.' To music is to take part in any capacity in a musical performance, and the meaning of musicking lies in the relationships that are established between the participants by the performance. Musicking is part of that iconic, gestural process of giving and receiving information about relationships which unites the living world, and it is in fact a ritual by means of which the participants not only learn about, but directly experience, their concepts of how they relate, and how they ought to relate, to other human beings and to the rest of the world.³³

Musicking is mediation and it leaves traces. As Barbara Lorenzkowski points out, listening to the past is an "exercise in eavesdropping"³⁴ in the sense that it is about attentively examining the multiple sites where music is made, packaged, heard, and discussed.

Although my dissertation examines musical diplomacy primarily from a Canadian perspective, it also recognizes the paramount importance of the bidirectional connections that Canadians and Brazilians established with each other through music. In addition to operating in three languages (French, English, and Portuguese), I travelled to the three Brazilian cities – Rio

³² Christopher Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1998).

³³ Christopher Small, abstract to "Musicking – The Meanings of Performing and Listening. A Lecture," *Music Education Research* 1, no. 1 (1999): 9.

³⁴ Barbara Lorenzkowski, *Sounds of Ethnicity: Listening to German North America* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010), 8-9.

de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília – that served as politico-cultural hubs during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. In all three places, I found a wealth of archival documents, which complemented – and provided a necessary counterpoint to – the materials I had already unearthed in Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Quebec City, and Halifax. A sample of the sources analyzed here include, among others: the tour diaries of MacMillan and Filiatrault (or the personal papers of their Brazilian counterparts Villa-Lobos and José Siqueira); CBC-IS transcripts, reports, programming schedules, and listeners’ letters (Rio de Janeiro’s Rádio Nacional performed a somewhat similar role in the Southern Hemisphere); concert advertisements and reviews in Canadian newspapers and magazines (notable Brazilian publications include *Brasil Musical* and *O Jornal*); DEA despatches, internal correspondence, and reports (the archives of Brazil’s Ministério das Relações Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the Itamaraty, are comparable in terms of scope). Overlooked by diplomatic historians, the above categories of sources provide multiple entry points into the *assemblage* upon which state and non-state actors constructed their musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community from the early 1940s to the late 1960s.

Accordingly, each of my dissertation’s five chapters has as one of its focal points a mediated event that reveals the power dynamics at play in the practice of musical nation branding. Chapter 1 analyzes the Dansereau couple’s 1943 visit of Rio de Janeiro to show how the tropes of family and Latinity helped advance the project of a distinct, musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community in response to the hegemonic ‘sameness-embracing’ that characterized the musical pan-Americanism championed by the United States. Chapter 2 further explores this affirmation of difference by following Quatuor alouette on its 1945 tour, which foregrounded narratives of colonial exceptionalism and placed French-speaking, Catholic Québec at the centre of Canada’s image in Brazil. In chapter 3, I examine the tension between the process of ‘othering’ and the appropriation of the discourse of *métissage* during the 1946 joint cultural mission of Champagne and MacMillan, whose folk-infused ‘serious music’ straddled the fence between nationalism and universalism. Chapter 4 discusses Villa-Lobos’s 1952 CBC-IS-sponsored performance in Montreal to highlight the limits of the metaphors and technologies deployed to project an engaging image of Canada that audiences, at both ends of the hemisphere, could agree on. Finally, chapter 5 focuses on Canadian participation in the first four editions of the FICP (1966-69) to demonstrate how popular music generated new soundscapes

that both transcended politico-cultural boundaries and pointed at alternate ways of imagining a Canadian-Brazilian community.

Brazil and Québec in Canadian International History

My dissertation engages with recent trends in Canadian international history by decentering the North Atlantic Triangle and investigating how Canada's paradoxical postcoloniality shaped Canadians' relations with the Global South. On the one hand, it seeks to destabilize the liberal nationalist and neo-continentalist views that have dominated the field of diplomatic history for most of the twentieth century. On the other hand, it aims to complicate whiggish colony-to-nation narratives that emphasize Canada's so-called exceptionalism (as a former Dominion turned helpful fixer and model international citizen) and focus exclusively on state responses to the economics and geopolitics of the country's relations with both of its former imperial metropolises and the United States. The field's preoccupation with continental and trans-Atlantic questions has contributed to a neglect of hemispheric affairs until recently.³⁵ The publication of works of business history dealing with The Light did little to change that.³⁶ The international activity of cosmopolitan capitalists was deemed too peripheral, even inconsequential, to Canada's diplomatic history due to their status as non-state actors whose professional connections extended beyond the nation.³⁷ Likewise, liberal nationalist and neo-continentalist paradigms informed the numerous works dealing with Ottawa's ambivalence regarding the issue

³⁵ Robert Bothwell's survey of Canadian international relations is indicative of the ease with which diplomatic historians promptly dismiss Latin American countries as being of no consequence to Canadians' self-perception and their understanding of the place they occupy in the world. Regarding Brazil, he writes that the country was "on the fringes of the world, as most Canadians saw it, unfamiliar and exceedingly distant to all but a few Canadian investors. Latin America, Brazil included, was a caricature of democracy, governed more by dictators than by civilian politicians, its societies remote and incomprehensible." Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 20.

³⁶ J. C. M. Ogelsby, *Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1866-1969* (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976); Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles, *Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1896-1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Duncan McDowall, *The Light: Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company Limited, 1899-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); and Salimah Valiani, "The Articulation of an Independent Foreign Policy: Canada and Latin America in the Early Twentieth Century," *Latin American Perspectives* 39, no. 6 (November 2012): 165-180.

³⁷ The following publications challenge this view: Peter James Hudson, "Imperial Designs: The Royal Bank of Canada in the Caribbean," *Race & Class* 52, no. 1 (2010): 33-48; Paula Hastings, "Rounding Off Confederation: Geopolitics, Tropicality, and Canada's 'Destiny' in the West Indies in the Early Twentieth Century," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 14, no. 2 (Summer 2013): <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/513260>; and Paula Hastings, "The Limits of 'Brotherly Love': Rethinking Canada-Caribbean Relations in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*, eds. Laura Madokoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 38-53.

of membership in the Pan-American Union (PAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS).³⁸ More recently, Rosana Barbosa published a survey of Canadian-Brazilian relations in which she argues that the two countries' "position as satellite economies" determined the nature of their interactions.³⁹ To a great degree, her synthesis of the relationship between the two aspiring middle powers reproduces the motifs that characterize dominant narratives in Canadian diplomatic history although it also successfully brings to the fore a neglected history worth pursuing.

My research approaches Canadian-Brazilian relations in ways that recognize the structuring weight of 'race' and empire in Canadian international history.⁴⁰ Indeed, both continued to matter from the 1930s, when Canadians acquainted themselves with their newfound autonomy in foreign affairs, through the 1960s, when they substituted the Maple Leaf flag for the Red Ensign. Among others, Phillip Buckner shows how Britishness lingered on as a marker of identity in English Canada up to the Centennial decade while David Meren demonstrates that decolonization provided French Canadians with a framework with which to rethink their place within Confederation as well as their relations with France.⁴¹ In both cases, how these French- and English-speaking descendants of 'white' colonizers situated themselves – in relation to their former imperial metropolises – influenced their views on racialized 'others' within and beyond Canada's borders. Numerous recent studies substantiate the argument that imperialist mindsets

³⁸ See James Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994); Asa McKercher, "Southern Exposure: Diefenbaker, Latin America, and the Organization of American States," *Canadian Historical Review* 93, no. 1 (March 2012): 57-80; Jason Zorbas, *Diefenbaker and Latin America: The Pursuit of Canadian Autonomy* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011); and Peter McKenna, *Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995).

³⁹ Rosana Barbosa, *Brazil and Canada: Economic, Political, and Migratory Ties, 1820s to 1970s* (London: Lexington Books, 2017), XV. See also Rosana Barbosa, "Brazilian and Canadian Relations: A Historical Survey," in *Brazil and Canada in the Americas*, ed. Rosana Barbosa (Halifax: Gorsebrook Research Institute, 2007): 31-54.

⁴⁰ Single quotation marks are used throughout the text for 'race,' 'racial,' 'white,' and related terms to indicate that the notion of 'race' is a social construction. As Peter Wade explains: "The idea of race is just that – an idea. The notion that races exist with definable physical characteristic and, even more so, that some races are superior to others is the result of particular historical processes which, many would argue, have their roots in the colonisation by European peoples of other areas of the world." Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 12.

⁴¹ See Phillip Buckner, ed., *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., *Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); and Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005). See also David Meren, *With Friends Like These: Entangled Nationalisms and the Canada-Quebec-France Triangle, 1944-1970* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012); and David Meren, "An Atmosphere of *Libération*: The Role of Decolonization in the France-Quebec Rapprochement of the 1960s," *Canadian Historical Review* 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 263-294.

and racialized constructs informed attitudes and perceptions in both the foreign policy apparatus and civil society throughout the twentieth century.⁴² “[R]ace has been a constant in Canada’s international relations, shaping policy, practice, identity, and alignment in both obvious and subtle ways,” write Laura Madokoro and Francine McKenzie. They add that understanding its impact “requires a comprehensive and critical exploration of *empire* as a structuring agent.”⁴³ This historiographical shift – in its effort to tackle head-on what John Price calls the “avoidance syndrome,” that is “[a] deep-seated reluctance ... to openly identify racism in Canada as a problem, past or present” – is accompanied by a greater focus on non-state actors and a shifting of the gaze away from the North Atlantic Triangle and towards the Global South.⁴⁴ It reexamines Canada’s multilayered histories by bringing into focus the extent to which they overlap, interconnect, and intertwine with those of non-Western societies.

The integration of Québec within the framework of Canadian international history is another objective of this project. Magda Fahrni, Sean Mills, and Meren have each made the case for an “entangled history” that would “put Canada’s own fractured historiographies into dialogue with each other, allowing us to better understand the shared cultural and political space and asymmetrical relations between English and French Canada, as well as their entanglements with other societies around the world.”⁴⁵ Mills’s *A Place in the Sun* and Maurice Demers’s *Connected*

⁴² See John Price, *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); Ryan M. Touhey, “Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia, 1957-1963,” *Canadian Historical Review* 92, no. 3 (2011): 429-454; and Ryan M. Touhey, *Conflicting Visions: Canada and India in the Cold War World, 1946-76* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).

⁴³ Laura Madokoro and Francine McKenzie, “Introduction: Writing Race into Canada’s International History,” in Madokoro, McKenzie, and Meren, *Dominion of Race*, 11.

⁴⁴ Price, *Orienting Canada*, 4.

⁴⁵ Sean Mills, “The End of Empire? Third World Decolonization and Canadian History,” in *Within and Without the Nation: Canadian History as Transnational History*, eds. Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 355. See also David Meren, “The Tragedies of Canadian International History,” *Canadian Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (December 2015): 534-566; and Magda Fahrni, “Reflections on the Place of Quebec in Historical Writing on Canada,” in *Contesting Clío’s Craft: New Directions and Debates in Canadian History*, eds. Christopher Dummitt and Michael Dawson (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2009), 1-20. For a discussion of Québec and its relation to the past of ‘others’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see also Daniel Poitras and Maxime Raymond-Dufour, eds., “Le passé des autres,” *Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française* 71, nos. 3-4 (Winter-Spring 2018). Aside from David Meren, scholars who focus on Québec’s bilateral relations with France accord marginal importance to the Canada-Québec-France triangle while paying no attention to ‘race’ as a factor in international relations. See Fernand Harvey, “Les relations culturelles entre la France et le Canada (1760-1960),” in *France-Canada-Québec: 400 ans de relations d’exception*, eds. Paul-André Linteau and Serge Joyal (Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2008), 95-126; Stéphane Paquin, ed., *Histoire des relations internationales du Québec* (Montreal: VLB éditeur, 2006); as well as Samy Mesli and Ivan Carel, eds., *50 ans d’échanges culturels France-Québec, 1910-1960* (Montreal: AQHP/VLB éditeur, 2011). Robin S. Gendron’s monograph considers both Canada’s and Québec’s competing international interests in French Africa, but it does so

Struggles constitute recent efforts to write this entangled history within the broader framework of hemispheric relations. Whereas the former places ‘race’ front and centre in his study of Haitian migrants and their contributions to political and cultural life in Québec, the latter abstains from racializing the concept of Latinity deployed by French-Canadian nationalists to disassociate themselves from English Canadians and establish wartime relations with Mexican Catholics. My dissertation engages with Demers’s discussion of Canada-Québec rivalries in the Global South, expanding it to factor in the notions of ‘race’ and empire.⁴⁶ It also builds on Mills’s assertion that narratives produced by state and non-state actors in the context of transnational relations informed “cultural attitudes” in Canada and Québec regarding “non-Western peoples.”⁴⁷

The approach proposed here requires an examination of Canada’s paradoxical postcoloniality and the ways it shaped Canadians’ engagement with Brazil, another settler colony with its own convoluted history of ‘race’ relations. Postcolonialism, Stephen Howe explains humorously, is an “elastic” term used either as an “all-purpose label for the entire state of the contemporary world” or as a “tag for a few Professors of English literature, their books, and courses.”⁴⁸ The term is most closely associated with the field of critical theory although historians have been using it, with a hyphen separating the word ‘colonialism’ from its prefix, to describe the reconfiguration of the world following the wave of decolonization that swept across European empires after the Second World War. Postcolonialism, without the hyphen, “deals with the effects of colonization on cultures and societies.”⁴⁹ Its investigative scope therefore extends beyond the 1940s to attend to the experiences of diverse peoples (both colonizers and colonized) dispersed throughout the globe. The authors of *The Empire Writes Back* delimit the postcolonial to a period that begins with European colonialism and continues into the present.⁵⁰ Sanjay Seth concurs when he writes that the prefix ‘post’ essentially “signifies the entire historical period

without engaging with the question of ‘race’: Robin S. Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community: Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).

⁴⁶ Maurice Demers, *Connected Struggles: Catholics, Nationalists, and Transnational Relations Between Mexico and Quebec, 1917-1945* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014).

⁴⁷ Sean Mills, *A Place in the Sun: Haiti, Haitians, and the Remaking of Quebec* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 4.

⁴⁸ Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 25.

⁴⁹ Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *Postcolonial Studies: The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2013), 204.

⁵⁰ Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 1989), 2.

after the beginnings of colonialism.”⁵¹ This periodization follows from the observation that the transition from colonial rule to self-government was marked by continued subservience to (in other cases, resistance to or complicity with) hegemonic forces emanating from a consortium of former imperial powers.⁵² Hence Peter Childs and Patrick Williams’s assertion that postcolonialism as a “historical period is best understood as a phase of imperialism, in turn best understood as the globalizing of capitalism.”⁵³

But is Canada postcolonial? This is the question Laura Moss asks in her edited collection on Canadian literature.⁵⁴ She answers affirmatively by noting that scholars must approach Canada as “both colonial subject and agent” if they wish to “highlight the distinctiveness and specificity of colonial legacies.”⁵⁵ Robert J. C. Young, in *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, briefly mentions Canada in his discussion of settler colonialism. By emphasizing the country’s “[n]ationalist constitutional moves towards decolonization”⁵⁶ and its “[a]ssertion of political rights to self-determination,”⁵⁷ Young seeks to highlight power asymmetries between settler colonies and exploitation colonies such as India in their relations with the metropole.⁵⁸ Antony G. Hopkins, however, argues that Canada’s experience with decolonization continued well into the twentieth century until a series of “ceremonial exchanges,” such as the adoption of a new flag in 1964, brought about the “destruction of the core concept of Britishness.”⁵⁹ Not only are historians studying more intensely than ever before Canada’s “participatory role in empire,” they are also bringing into focus the ways in which the experience of empire influenced how English Canadians understood themselves and their place in the world.⁶⁰ Canada’s paradoxical postcoloniality, then, is partly a function of its Dominion status within the British Empire. It is also about French Canadians’ experience as settler colonists, as a people conquered by the

⁵¹ Sanjay Seth, “Introduction,” in *Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A Critical Introduction*, ed. Sanjay Seth (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2.

⁵² On this topic, see Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 44-56.

⁵³ Peter Childs and Patrick Williams, *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1997), 21.

⁵⁴ Laura Moss, ed., *Is Canada Postcolonial? Unsettling Canadian Literature* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2003).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁶ Young, *Postcolonialism*, 163.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 92-95.

⁵⁹ Antony G. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” *Past and Present* 200, no. 1 (2008): 215.

⁶⁰ Meren, “The Tragedies of Canadian International History,” 537.

British, as one of Canada's so-called 'two founding races,' and as nationalists with evolving views regarding Québec's place within – or outside – Confederation. More importantly, it is about the two groups' history of violence against (and resistance from) racialized 'others,' including indigenous peoples as well as individuals or groups connected to the African and Asian diasporas in Canada.

As a settler colony that developed into a kingdom and then an empire, Brazil has a history that, like Canada, distinguishes it from other republics in the hemisphere. During three centuries (1500 to 1815), the architects of Colonial Brazil sought to subjugate the semi-nomadic indigenous peoples they encountered while exploiting the vast resources they discovered on the continent, namely brazilwood followed by sugar, gold, diamonds, and coffee. The colony's fortunes were dependent on slave labour. By the middle of the nineteenth century, four million slaves had been brought to Brazil – a jarring number that surpassed that of the United States. Throughout much of the country's history, predominantly 'white' governing authorities fought back numerous political challenges to impose their rule over a scattered free population made increasingly diverse through manumission, interracial marriage, and immigration from both Europe and Asia. The colonial venture held together initially with the arrival of King João VI who relocated to Rio de Janeiro following Napoléon Bonaparte's invasion of Portugal in 1807. Returning to Europe in 1821, the monarch left behind his elder son Pedro to act as regent of the colony. The latter led Brazilians to their independence a year later by declaring himself Emperor Pedro I of Brazil. His son, Pedro II, eventually took over and headed the constitutional monarchy until he was deposed in 1889, a year after the abolition of slavery. The country's passage from colony to nation was therefore a relatively peaceful one. Likewise, the transition from empire to republic occurred without bloodshed. Still, tensions continued to simmer among Brazil's various ethnic groups and social classes (including between landed and urban elites) as the country – the fifth largest in the world – grappled with the shifting power dynamics that accompanied industrialization and urbanization.⁶¹

The Brazilian political and cultural elite tackled these challenges with racial theories that were informed by its colonial past and its admiration of industrialized European powers. At the

⁶¹ For concise histories of Brazil, see Thomas E. Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Joseph Smith, *A History of Brazil, 1500-2000: Politics, Economy, Society, Diplomacy* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002).

turn of the twentieth century, proponents of scientific racism in Brazil continued to postulate that human beings could be categorized based on phenotypes and that Caucasians possessed superior qualities as evidenced by the size and scope of their imperial ventures. However, whereas their European and American counterparts opposed interracial mixing on the ground that such practice would contaminate the ‘white race,’ Brazilians advanced the idea that ‘white genes’ would prevail over those of ‘inferior races.’ The theory of ‘racial whitening’ constituted an effort to put Brazil, a country with an ethnically diverse population, on par with Europe and the United States. “Whitening,” Thomas E. Skidmore explains, rested on the assumption “that miscegenation did not inevitably produce ‘degenerates,’ but could forge a healthy mixed population growing steadily whiter, both culturally and physically.”⁶² By the 1930s, the rebuttal of scientific racism and Brazilians’ growing sense of nationhood led to the abandonment of the theory of ‘racial whitening.’ Instead, the country’s elite began promoting the idea that *métissage* preserved and enriched – rather than weeded out and sublimated – the traits and qualities of the population’s three key ethnic groups (indigenous peoples, Afro-Brazilians, and ‘white’ Brazilians). *Brasilidade* [Brazilianness], became a positive marker of differentiation. Yet a colour line, albeit a fluid one, continued to exist in Brazil with *pardos* (Brazilians of mixed ethnic origins) enjoying greater social and economic mobility than their Afro-Brazilian and indigenous counterparts.⁶³ Brazil branded itself nonetheless as a ‘racial democracy’ to promote internal cohesion and enhance its international image. Although the Canadians who travelled to Brazil, from the 1930s onward, interacted primarily with Brazilians who defined themselves as ‘white’ by virtue of their skin colour or their socioeconomic status, they still had to engage with their hosts’ discourse regarding *métissage* and *Brasilidade*.

The belief that English Canadians’ Britishness and French Canadians’ Latinity constituted valid racialized group identities, as well as the claim that racism was largely non-existent in

⁶² Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 65.

⁶³ *Pretos* (‘Blacks’) and *Pardos* (‘multiracial’ Brazilians who did not qualify as ‘Whites’ or Asians) both appeared as ethnic categories on the census of 1940. In the census of 1890, the term *Mestiço* was used to denote *Pardos* while the censuses of 1900 and 1920 omitted questions regarding ‘race.’ In 1890 and 1940, *Pretos* and *Pardos* represented forty-seven percent and thirty-six percent of the total population respectively. For a discussion of ‘racial whitening’ and the myth of ‘racial democracy’ in Brazil, see Skidmore, *Black into White*; Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*; Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Carl Degler, *Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971).

Canada, provided a befitting framework with which to approach the making of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.⁶⁴ In this context, the projection of Canada as the product of a harmonious compact between ‘two founding races’ allowed Désy and his fellow musical ambassadors to define ‘Canadianness,’ so to speak, as a form of *métissage*. Their musical nation branding thus put forward the idea that Brazil and Canada were exceptional in sharing the ideal of ‘racial democracy.’ This exceptionalism was reminiscent of colonial worldviews, notably with respect to its foregrounding of ‘whiteness’ and its silencing of Canada’s indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, in *Drawing the Global Colour Line*, write that ‘whiteness’ emerged at imperial crossroads “as a transnational form of racial identification.”⁶⁵ It fostered an “imagined community of white men,” which helped sustain – both globally and domestically – the subjugating and excluding practices of settler societies, including Canada and Brazil.⁶⁶ Warwick Anderson further explains:

Whiteness functioned at sites of corporeal unease and conflict with others to consolidate and justify claims of privilege and possession. It was a manoeuvre along perceived borders that betrayed anxiety, even as it displayed pride or confidence or solidarity. Whiteness became linked intimately to estimates of civic status, intellectual achievement, and moral standards. A form of registration and communicability, it was additionally a measure of sovereignty and a proxy for self-government. In this sense, the category worked as a gate-keeping mechanism, as a means of assessing and surveying white and non-white populations.⁶⁷

That *métissage* served as a conduit for ‘whiteness’ in Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations is certainly paradoxical. As my dissertation shows, it is also indicative of how important metaphors were for Canadians in their national projection and national self-representation efforts.

In addition to foregrounding racialized identities, the musical nation branding that is the focus of my dissertation was very much a gendered affair. Its protagonists were predominantly ‘white’ men who operated in male-dominated, elite spaces where androcentric discourses and

⁶⁴ On this topic, see José E. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 22-23; and Constance Backhouse, *Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 5-14.

⁶⁵ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁷ Warwick Anderson, “Traveling White,” in *Re-Orienting Whiteness*, eds. Leigh Boucher, Jane Carey, and Katherine Ellinghaus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 68.

practices prevailed. They were well-travelled individuals who channelled their cosmopolitan sensibility and emotive disposition through the disciplined execution (or informed appreciation) of musical works.⁶⁸ They were husbands or crooners, some were fathers, whose task was to embody the nation so as to elicit feelings of friendship, family, and community. Although Désy, Filiatrault, MacMillan, and Anka, among others, embodied alternate forms of masculinity, they all performed the nation in ways that were coded male and that underpinned the normativity of ‘whiteness.’ As such, they embraced what scholars have called ‘national manhood,’ that is the idea that one’s masculine identity is intrinsically linked to his national identity in the pursuit of political, economic, and cultural power.⁶⁹ Yet the above musical ambassadors did not completely subsume themselves within the nation when thinking about their roles as men in the world. Indeed, they embraced other constructions of masculinity that had to be reconciled with both national manhood and the transnational racialized male identity referred to in the above paragraph.⁷⁰ Like ‘race,’ gender is a social construct liable to change depending on time and place. It is a fluid marker of identity constantly performed, renegotiated, and contested. As a category of historical analysis, masculinity constitutes an additional tool for understanding how music works as a form of mediation in an *assemblage* such as the one deployed in the context of Canadian-Brazilian relations.

The Cultural Turn in International History

By focusing on the discursive and performative aspects of musical nation branding, my dissertation also explores what lies beyond the cultural turn in international history. Justin Hart defines cultural diplomacy as “the deliberate attempt to deploy cultural affairs in pursuit of

⁶⁸ The link between the performance of masculinity and musicking is discussed in the case studies around which each of this dissertation’s chapters is based. See Sam de Boise, *Men, Masculinity, Music, and Emotions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Ian Biddle, *Music, Masculinity, and the Claims of History: The Austro-German Tradition from Hegel to Freud* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); and Allison McCracken, *Real Men Don’t Sing: Crooning in American Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).

⁶⁹ Dana D. Nelson, *National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Jeffery Vacante, *National Manhood and the Creation of Modern Quebec* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2017).

⁷⁰ As R. W. Connell points out, gender patterns among men are multiple. She writes: “To recognize more than one kind of masculinity is only a first step. We have to examine the relations between them. Further, we have to unpack the milieu of class and race and scrutinize the gender relations operating within them.” R. W. Connell, *Masculinities*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 76. See also Peter Gossage and Robert Rutherford, eds., *Making Men, Making History: Canadian Masculinities Across Time and Place* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018).

foreign policy objectives.”⁷¹ Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried contend, however, that international cultural relations are not always “subordinate to the foreign policy making process.”⁷² Regardless of how cultural resources are employed, they constitute a form of “soft power” that can help shape elite or mass public opinions in other countries to create, “through attraction rather than coercion,” a climate conducive to reciprocal understanding and productive exchanges.⁷³ Frank A. Ninkovich and Emily S. Rosenberg pioneered the field in the early 1980s by shedding light on the strategies developed by philanthropists, private entrepreneurs, and state actors to export American culture in the defence of the national interest during the first half of the twentieth century.⁷⁴ Writing in a post-Détente context, the two scholars provided the backstory to the state-centric propaganda campaigns conceived by Americans to stop communism in its tracks. From then on, the Cold War came to occupy a central place in the historiography as demonstrated by the abundance of works dealing with the importance of cultural productions (from abstract art to ballet and jazz, among others) in the ideological rivalry that pitted the United States against the Soviet Union.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17.

⁷² Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the Promise of Civil Society,” in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, eds. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 20.

⁷³ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), X. See also Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

⁷⁴ See Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).

⁷⁵ See Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2005); David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); Sarah Nilsen, *Projecting America, 1958: Films and Cultural Diplomacy at the Brussels World's Fair* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2011); Water L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Michael L. Krenn, *Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Andrew J. Falk, *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960* (Amherst & Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Greg Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); and Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

As general editor of a multivolume series titled *Explorations in Culture and International History*, Gienow-Hecht has been encouraging researchers to widen the geographical and temporal scope with which they approach cultural diplomacy. Her call for the “internationalization” of the field is concurrent with her effort to “decenter America” by deepening our understanding of how individuals or groups from – or sometimes representing – different nations perceived and engaged with one another.⁷⁶ This has led to a growing corpus of transnational scholarship on cultural diplomacy.⁷⁷ Among these are numerous studies dealing with the Brazilian experience in the context of regional geopolitics, including Brazilian-American relations, Brazilian-French cultural exchanges, and the internationalism of organizations such as the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁷⁸

Similarly, Canadian historians are also contributing to a realignment of the field although their focus is mainly on the Cold War and the United States. Cooper locates the origins of Canada’s cultural diplomacy in 1951 with the Royal Commission on National Development in

⁷⁶ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “On the Diversity of Knowledge and the Community of Thought: Culture and International History,” in *Culture and International History*, eds. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 14; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Introduction: Decentering American History,” in *Decentering America*, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 7.

⁷⁷ The *Explorations in Culture and International History* series provides a good cross-section of the breadth and depth of the field. See Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher, *Culture and International History*; Gienow-Hecht, *Decentering America*; as well as Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*.

⁷⁸ Flavia Ribeiro Crespo, “O Itamaraty e a Cultura Brasileira: 1945-1964,” in *A Quarta Dimensão das Relações Internacionais: A Dimensão Cultural*, eds. Hugo Rogelio Suppo and Mônica Leite Lessa (Rio de Janeiro: Contra Capa, 2012), 111-138; Juliette Dumont, “De la coopération intellectuelle à la diplomatie culturelle: le parcours du Brésil dans l’entre-deux-guerres,” *Caravelle* 99 (2012): 217-238; Juliette Dumont, *L’Institut international de coopération intellectuelle et le Brésil (1924-1946): le pari de la diplomatie culturelle* (Paris: Éditions de l’IHEAL 2008); Juliette Dumont and Anaïs Fléchet, “Brazilian Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,” *Revista Brasileira de História* 34, no. 67 (June 2014): 1-19; Mychelyne Barros Costa Ferreira, “O Brasil na Criação da UNESCO: 1946 a 1954,” in Suppo and Lessa, *A Quarta Dimensão das Relações Internacionais*, 89-110; Roberta Lima Ferreira, “Difusão Cultural e Projeção Internacional: O Brasil na América Latina (1937-45),” in Suppo and Lessa, *A Quarta Dimensão das Relações Internacionais*, 65-88; Anaïs Fléchet, “As Partituras da Identidade. O Itamaraty e a Música Brasileira no Século XX,” in Suppo and Lessa, *A Quarta Dimensão das Relações Internacionais*, 139-168; Mônica Leite Lessa, “Cultura e Política Externa: O Lugar do Brasil na Cena Internacional (2003-2010),” in Suppo and Lessa, *A Quarta Dimensão das Relações Internacionais*, 169-192; Edgard Telles Ribeiro, *Diplomacia Cultural: Seu Papel na Política Externa Brasileira* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2011); Denis Rolland, “A Instrumentalização das Culturas Estrangeiras no Estado Novo: Entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos, o Espaço da França Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial,” in *Relações Internacionais: Visões do Brasil e da América Latina*, eds. Estevão Chaves de Rezende Martins (Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2003), 223-248; Raquel Paz dos Santos, *Um Novo Olhar Sobre o País Vizinho: A Cooperação Cultural como Crítica ao Paradigma da Rivalidade no Contexto das Relações Brasil-Argentina (1930-1954)* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Multifoco, 2012); and Marquilandis Borges de Sousa, *Rádio e Propaganda Política: Brasil e México Sob a Mira Norte-Americana Durante a Segunda Guerra* (São Paulo: Annablume Editora, 2004).

the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey Commission), noting that its recommendations regarding the projection of Canada abroad reflected, above all, a defensive posture vis-à-vis the pervasive influence of American cultural exports.⁷⁹ “Culture as an expression of Canada’s own foreign policy remained an afterthought,” he argues.⁸⁰ Recent studies on the curatorial dimension of cultural diplomacy and theatre complicate this state-centric approach and its chronology by attending to the complementary – and at times competing – agendas of state and non-state actors who had a stake in how Canada was displayed overseas: from the Europe-bound *Canadian Eskimo Art* exhibition to the Michael Snow showcase at New York’s 49th Parallel, among others.⁸¹ As Lynda Jessup and Sarah E.K. Smith point out, these exhibitions did “function as diplomatic envoys” even if they rested on “complicated partnerships” that often made it difficult for the stakeholders, including audiences, to assimilate the ideologies and meanings built into curatorial activities.⁸² Deciphering these modes of production and their reception is no less a challenge for historians interested in revisiting the multivalent sites of encounter where cultural exchanges took place. Graham Carr and Kayley Miller tackle this in their respective studies by bringing into focus the importance of public-private partnerships and the agency of non-state actors in pursuing foreign policy interests, both in the communist world and at home.⁸³ In light of the importance accorded to the cultural Cold War in the historiography, the absence of scholarly

⁷⁹ See “Section V: Cultural Relations Abroad” in: Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, *Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1949-1951* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King, 1951), 246-408.

⁸⁰ Cooper, *Canadian Cultural Diplomacy*, 6.

⁸¹ Among others, Sarah E.K. Smith, “Art and the Invention of North America, 1985-2012” (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 2013); Norman Vorano, “Inuit Art: Canada’s Soft Power Resource to Fight Communism,” *Journal of Curatorial Studies* 5, no. 3 (2016): 313-338; Elizabeth Diggon, “Experimental Diplomacy: Art and International Cultural Relations at 49th Parallel,” *Journal of Curatorial Studies* 5, no. 3 (2016): 391-410; Kirsty Robertson *et al.*, “‘More a Diplomatic than an Aesthetic Event’: Canada, Brazil, and Cultural Brokering in the São Paulo Biennial and ‘Isumavut,’” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 47, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 60-88; and Elizabeth Diggon, “The Politics of Cultural Power: Canadian Participation at the Venice and São Paulo Biennials, 1951-1958” (MA thesis, Queen’s University, 2012). See also Alan Filewod, *Performing Canada: The Nation Enacted in the Imagined Theatre* (Kamloops: Textual Studies in Canada XV, 2002); Sherrill Grace and Albert-Reiner Glaap, eds., *Performing National Identities: International Perspectives on Contemporary Canadian Theatre* (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2003); Paige Raibmon, “Theatres of Contact: The Kwakwaka’wakw Meet Colonialism in British Columbia and at the Chicago World’s Fair,” *Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 2 (June 2000): 157-190; and Erin Hurley, *National Performance: Representing Quebec from Expo 67 to Celine Dion* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).

⁸² Lynda Jessup and Sarah E.K. Smith, “Introduction: Curating Cultural Diplomacy,” *Journal of Curatorial Studies* 5, no. 3 (2016): 283-284.

⁸³ Graham Carr, “‘No Political Significance of Any Kind’: Glenn Gould’s Tour of the Soviet Union and the Culture of the Cold War,” *Canadian Historical Review* 95, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-29; Kayley Miller, “‘An Ancillary Weapon’: Cultural Diplomacy and Nation-Building in Cold War Canada, 1945-1967” (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 2015).

monographs dealing with the international mission of institutions like the CBC and the National Film Board of Canada (NFB) is glaring.⁸⁴ My dissertation writes the CBC-IS into that story, shifting the focus beyond the Massey Commission and the Cold War, while also paying attention to the interplay between internationalism and nationalism within the context of a contested federalism.

Approaching the past through its soundscapes is an effective means of accomplishing the above and answering Gienow-Hecht's call for a redrawing of the boundaries within which one examines the importance of culture in international relations. In the last ten years, scholars of international history have turned to music in growing numbers. Gienow-Hecht set the tempo in 2009 with her *Sound Diplomacy*, a study of German orchestral music in the United States between 1850 and 1920.⁸⁵ In 2012, she followed Leonard Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic on their 1959 world tour "to challenge the dichotomy and hierarchy between a somehow 'good' soft (and subdued) diplomacy and 'hard' or 'real' politics on the other."⁸⁶ Her most recent edited collection of essays, *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, invites researchers "to consider music ... as an instrument of hegemony and resistance; a reflection of identity and protest; a means of communication; a forum of encounter; but most of all, as a transporter for atmosphere, mood and emotion in the making of international affairs."⁸⁷ Scholars from a variety of disciplines have followed suit with studies on genres ranging from

⁸⁴ The following under-theorized studies of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation fall for the most part in the genre of institutional biography, confining discussions of the broadcaster to the topics of psychological warfare and shortwave transmissions to Cold War Europe: Arthur Siegel, *Radio Canada International: History and Development* (Oakville & Buffalo: Mosaic Press, 1996); James L. Hall, *Radio Canada International: Voice of a Middle Power* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997); Elzbieta Olechowska, *The Age of International Radio: Radio Canada International (1945-2007)* (Oakville & Niagara Falls: Mosaic Press, 2007); Bernard J. Hibbitts, "The CBC International Service as a Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Cold War, 1948-1963" (MA thesis, Carleton University, 1981). For studies dealing with the National Film Board of Canada, see Zoë Druick, *Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014); and Gary Evans, *In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949 to 1989* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

⁸⁵ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).

⁸⁶ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "The World is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 19.

⁸⁷ Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Sonic History or Why Music Matters in International History," in *Music and International History in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015), 20.

classical music to jazz and rock-and-roll.⁸⁸ The winter 2009 issue of the *Journal of Musicology* and the January 2012 issue of *Diplomatic History* suggest that musicologists, ethnomusicologists, and historians alike are taking part in this acoustic turn.⁸⁹ “Who can dispute the power of music,” asks Kathryn C. Statler while Peter J. Schmelz writes enthusiastically about the “dismantling of old conceptual barriers about music and its meanings—or rather old stereotypes about music’s *lack* of meaning and its disconnection from worldly concerns.”⁹⁰ The consensus is that music matters as a form of soft power and that its mediating potential offers myriad channels with which to approach the practices of national projection and national self-representation.

Canadian-Brazilian Relations at the Turn of the 1940s

Désy might have been confident in his ability to orchestrate a Canadian-Brazilian cultural rapprochement using music, but the reality was that the two countries were worlds apart – geographically, but also politically in the early 1940s. Brazil’s europhile elite had come to doubt the assumed superiority of liberal democracies after having witnessed the destruction brought about by the First World War and the collapse of Western economies caused by the Stock Market Crash of 1929. The industrializing cities of the Southeast were shaken by the crisis although not as much as the hinterland coffee exporting regions that saw international prices for

⁸⁸ See Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy*; Graham Carr, “Diplomatic Notes: American Musicians and Cold War Politics in the Near and Middle East, 1954-60,” *Popular Music History* 1, no. 1 (2004): 37-63; Lisa E. Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Ingrid Monson, *Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jennifer L. Campbell, “Creating Something Out of Nothing: The Office of Inter-American Affairs Music Committee (1940-1941) and the Inception of a Policy for Musical Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 29-39; Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Amy C. Beal, *New Music, New Allies: American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Elizabeth Vilhen, “Jammin on the Champs-Élysées: Jazz, France, and the 1950s,” in *Here, There, and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture*, eds. Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 149-162; Michael May, “Swinging Under Stalin: Russian Jazz During the Cold War and Beyond,” in Wagnleitner and May, *Here, There, and Everywhere*, 179-191; Thomas Fuchs, “Rock’n’Roll in the German Democratic Republic, 1949-1961,” in Wagnleitner and May, *Here, There, and Everywhere*, 192-206; Reinhold Wagnleitner, “‘The Empire of the Fun, or Talkin’ Soviet Union Blues: The Sound of Freedom and U.S. Cultural Hegemony in Europe,” *Diplomatic History* 23 (Summer 1999): 499-524; and Stephen A. Crist, “Jazz as Democracy: Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics,” *Journal of Musicology* 26, no. 2 (April 2009): 133-74.

⁸⁹ For the most recent ‘state of the field’ publication, see Ramel and Prévost-Thomas, *International Relations, Music, and Diplomacy*.

⁹⁰ Kathryn C. Statler, “The Sound of Musical Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 71; Peter J. Schmelz, “Introduction: Music and the Cold War,” *The Journal of Musicology* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2009), 7.

their product drop by fifty percent in the closing months of the decade. Getúlio Vargas rose to power in 1930 following a bloodless military coup, which ended the four-decade-old hegemony of the increasingly ailing landed oligarchies from the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Three years sufficed to secure the support he needed to be legitimately elected on a populist and corporatist reform program. A native of Rio Grande do Sul, Vargas experimented with a centralizing model of governance to abate regional discontent and neutralize the various factionalisms that threatened the country's political and economic stability. A failed communist-sponsored coup to overthrow his presidency in 1935 allowed him to take his fascist-inspired national reconstruction experiment to its logical conclusion: Vargas assumed full dictatorial powers in 1937 with the establishment of the *Estado Novo* [New State].

The new regime did away with the Congresso Nacional [National Congress] and political parties while setting forth a new constitution that centralized legislative and executive powers in Rio de Janeiro where Vargas governed with the support of the military and an expanding technocracy. His top-down pervasive corporatist paternalism earned him praises as the “father of the poor.”⁹¹ The metaphor of the family deployed in this way sought to instill in the populace a commitment to social harmony and the idea of moral responsibility. Vargas himself cultivated this impression, perfecting “the mannerisms and turns of phrases that contributed to his image of paternalistic competency.”⁹² Through propaganda and censorship, the regime depicted itself as the ultimate arbitrator and primary provider for Brazilians while deploying culture – both ‘high’ and ‘low’ art forms as well as the ever-popular soccer – to rally the population around the idea of *Brasilidade*.

The *Estado Novo*'s cultural project was not so much about co-opting Brazilian artists and intellectuals as it was about channelling their “confidence in their ability to articulate their *own* vision of Brazil's identity and future.”⁹³ Vargas adroitly solicited the assistance of members of the country's cultural and intellectual elite. As Darién J. Davis points out, they were apt candidates for the president's own revolution and many accepted positions on various committees or in federal institutions and ministries due to their “unequivocal faith in Brazilian

⁹¹ Robert M. Levine, *Father of the Poor? Vargas and his Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), X.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 61.

⁹³ Skidmore, *Black into White*, 179 (emphasis in original).

nationhood coupled with a sense of duty.”⁹⁴ In their capacity as cultural producers, policy makers, and administrators, they found a niche for themselves in the state apparatus while helping promote *Brasilidade*. Among them, Villa-Lobos who advocated for the democratization of music education as a means of promoting patriotism among the youths.⁹⁵ The claim that an exemplary Brazilian ‘race’ was emerging through *métissage* served the dual purpose of advancing Vargas’s national project and projecting an engaging image of Brazil abroad, one that compared favourably with those of Nazi Germany and Jim-Crow-era United States.⁹⁶ It did not matter that *Brasilidade* was a construct and that the regime’s paternalistic initiatives privileged urban ‘white’ middle-class Brazilians: the belief that a “Brazilian essence” existed was both reassuring and empowering in 1930s and 1940s Brazil.⁹⁷

The continuance of the *Estado Novo* depended on a pervasive propaganda machine that made extensive use of the modern mass media. Vargas first experimented with information control in the early 1930s with the Departamento Oficial de Publicidade [Official Department of Publicity] and its successor, the Departamento de Propaganda e Difusão Cultural [Department of Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion]. In 1934, Luiz Simões Lopes, Brazil’s representative at the Rome-based International Institute of Agriculture, travelled to Berlin where he experienced first-hand the reach of Nazi propaganda. Fascinated by what he witnessed, he extended his stay with the intent of better understanding the mechanics behind the German government’s total control and systematic use of media and imagery. “The organization of the Ministry of Propaganda fascinates me so much that I allow myself to suggest that we create a miniature version of it in Brazil,” he wrote to Vargas.⁹⁸ The advent of the *Estado Novo* removed all constraints to such a project. Created on December 27, 1939, the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda [Department of Press and Propaganda] (DIP) became one of the cornerstones of the dictatorship.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁹⁵ See Thomas George Caracas Garcia, “Music and the Brazilian Estado Novo: Getúlio Vargas, Heitor Villa-Lobos, and a National Music Education System,” in *Music and Dictatorship in Europe and Latin America*, eds. Roberto Illiano and Massimiliano Sala (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 613-640.

⁹⁶ See Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*, trans., Samuel Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁹⁷ Darién J. Davis, *Avoiding the Dark: Race and the Forging of a National Culture in Modern Brazil* (Aldershot & Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999), 87.

⁹⁸ Luiz Simões Lopes to Getúlio Vargas, September 22, 1934, GCg 1934.09.22, Gustavo Capanema Collection, Fundação Getúlio Vargas/Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (FGV-CPDOC). In Portuguese: “A organização do M[inistério] da Propaganda fascina tanto, que eu me permito sugerir a criação de uma miniatura dele no Brasil.”

Its founding director, Lourival Fontes, oversaw its various divisions – information, radio, theatre and cinema, press, and tourism – with the mandate of shaping public opinion regarding the “regime’s doctrinal guidelines, in defence of culture, spiritual unity, and Brazilian civilization.”⁹⁹

Vargas’s outright control of the press (sixty percent of newspaper articles were reportedly DIP circulars at the turn of the 1940s) was only surpassed by his astute use of radio.¹⁰⁰ The Ministério do Trabalho [Ministry of Work] and the Ministério da Educação e Saúde [Ministry of Education and Health] (MES) each had their own stations (Rádio Mauá and Rádio MES) while the DIP handled *A Hora do Brasil*, a mandatory daily national broadcast that combined carefully scripted cultural programming with speeches from – and news regarding – the presidency. The 1940 takeover of Rádio Nacional, Brazil’s highly popular and most powerful station, completed the dictatorship’s incursion into broadcasting, a move that “offered the hope of linking far-flung territories into a single network of instantaneous communication, and of bridging the gaps of culture and class that divided Brazilians.”¹⁰¹

Brazil’s proclivities to fascism were inevitably worrisome when looked at from the perspective of Great Britain or the United States. This was especially true of the British who had kept a firm grip on the Brazilian economy up to the First World War, at which point the empire began to decline while the Americans and Germans stepped up their efforts to pull the South American giant into their respective spheres of interest. Brazil initially adopted a policy of pragmatic equilibrium in its dealings with the three major powers, trying to preserve ‘autonomia na dependência’ [autonomy in dependency], but Vargas’s ascent to power marked the beginning of an intuitive and aggressive pursuit of national interest objectives: among others, a more evenly distributed economic growth through industrialization and modernization, national unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the accumulation of international goodwill so as to consolidate Brazil’s status as both a regional power and an important player on the international

⁹⁹ Gabinete do Ministro, “Decreto N. 5.077: Aprova o Regimento do Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP),” December 29, 1939, GCg 1934.09.22, Gustavo Capanema Collection, FGV-CPDOC. In Portuguese: “... diretrizes doutrinárias do regime, em defesa da cultura, da unidade espiritual e da civilização brasileira.”

¹⁰⁰ Levine, *Father of the Poor*, 60.

¹⁰¹ Bryan McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 19.

stage.¹⁰² The country's vast resources (coffee, cotton, cacao, but also iron ore, rubber, and quartz), not to mention its eight thousand-kilometre coastline, made it an increasingly valued partner as war clouds began to hover once again on the horizon. Vargas understood that his national reconstruction project was intrinsically tied to his foreign policy and so his 'políticas de barganhas' [bargaining policies] consisted of extracting the greatest possible benefits from the growing ideological rivalry in Latin America between the United States and Germany.¹⁰³

The latter was somewhat advantaged since Brazil was home to growing colonies of German immigrants, most of them settling in the urbanized South where their economic and cultural impact was felt most strongly. The two countries were tied to each other through an uncommon agreement whereby goods were exchanged using a special currency that could only be redeemed through bilateral trade. The agreement worked well for Brazilians who traded agricultural and mineral resources for industrial goods and arms without having to empty their already depleted foreign exchange and gold reserves.¹⁰⁴ By 1938, German exports to Brazil had surpassed those of the United States. Brazilians, especially military officers, many of whom had received training in Germany, were amazed by the rate at which the Nazi economy was growing. Pro-German sentiments thus ran deep in some circles of Brazilian society. To those who perceived American economic and cultural penetration of Latin America as a form of imperialism, German fascism represented an appealing "alternative paradigm," contends Antonio Pedro Tota.¹⁰⁵

The other paradigm was, of course, Americanization. The State Department had been hard at work trying to assert the hegemony of liberal developmentalism over other ideologies in Latin America. According to Rosenberg, this approach had five dimensions, namely the:

¹⁰² Leslie Bethell, "Brazil," in *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948*, eds. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 33; Gerson Moura, *Autonomia na Dependência* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980), 189.

¹⁰³ Gerson Moura, *Sucessos e Ilusões: Relações Internacionais do Brasil Durante e Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1991), 24.

¹⁰⁴ Joseph Smith explains: "The arrangement appeared restrictive but was particularly attractive to Brazil ... not only because it offered a signal opportunity to increase exports at a time of world economic depression, but also because it obviated the need to allocate scarce foreign exchange and gold reserves to finance foreign trade." Smith, *Brazil and the United States*, 108.

¹⁰⁵ Antonio Pedro Tota, *O Imperialismo Sedutor: A Americanização do Brasil na Época da Segunda Guerra* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), 22. In Portuguese: "... paradigma alternativo."

(1) belief that other nations could and should replicate America's own developmental experience; (2) faith in private free enterprise; (3) support for free or open access for trade and investment; (4) promotion of free flow of information and culture; and (5) growing acceptance of governmental activity to protect free enterprise and to stimulate and regulate American participation in international economic and cultural exchange.¹⁰⁶

Conscious of the fact that the use of economic sanctions and military intervention to defend economic interests was detrimental to the United States' image, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced in 1933 that his administration would adopt a 'Good Neighbor' policy vis-à-vis the Southern Hemisphere.¹⁰⁷ In other words, rather than intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries, the United States would nurture friendly relations to promote bilateral exchanges. Because of its geopolitical importance, Brazil found itself the target of a cultural offensive meant to steer the country into the orbit of liberal developmentalism. Visiting Rio de Janeiro in 1936, Roosevelt praised Vargas for his industrialization program, even crediting him as one of the inventors of the New Deal.¹⁰⁸ Brazil's economic arrangement with Germany and its slide towards dictatorship were causes for concern, but the State Department – not wanting to encourage a further Brazilian-German rapprochement – kept a friendly disposition while Vargas continued to champion his 'políticas de barganhas' to advance his country's national interests.

Brazilians, however, could not afford to disregard their bilateral relations with the Americans considering the latter's overshadowing presence throughout the hemisphere. The prospect of another war in Europe made that all the more apparent. The 1934 nomination of Aranha as Brazilian ambassador to the United States was indicative of the two countries' proximity. A loyal friend, confidant, and associate of Vargas, he was an earnest advocate for closer relations with the Roosevelt administration although he also kept a critical eye on its policies vis-à-vis Latin America.¹⁰⁹ The outbreak of war in 1939 did not initially impair Vargas's ability to pursue his 'políticas de barganhas' since the State Department understood how critical it was to secure Brazilians' support in the event that the hemisphere needed to be defended. In 1940, Brazil finally obtained arms and financial support from the United States in exchange for

¹⁰⁶ Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 7.

¹⁰⁷ Hart, *Empire of Ideas*, 17.

¹⁰⁸ Neill Lochery, *Brazil: The Fortunes of War. World War II and the Making of Modern Brazil* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 6.

¹⁰⁹ Smith, *Brazil and the United States*, 104.

raw materials and access to both naval and air bases. The two countries also laid plans for the financing and construction of the government-owned Volta Redonda steel mill. Brazil then obtained more than \$350 million in Lend-Lease aid while signing into a Joint Brazil–US Defense Commission. However, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent entry of the Americans into the conflict forced Brazilians to abandon their neutral stance. In the summer of 1942, Brazil declared war against Germany. With its ties to Europe cut-off, the South American giant now found itself dependent on the North American hegemon.¹¹⁰

By 1940, Brazil urgently needed another partner that could help it fulfill its domestic and international aspirations while offsetting the United States’ preponderant power in the hemisphere. Now was the time to strive more aggressively towards developing a meaningful relationship with Canada. The first significant breakthrough between the two countries had occurred in 1931 when a trade mission visited Brazil and successfully advocated for closer economic relations. Signed on December 4 of that year, the *Exchange of Notes Regarding Commercial Relations Between Canada and Brazil* had minimal impact since it maintained preferential treatment for the British Commonwealth. Aranha was quick to denounce the agreement as an “idiotic treaty.”¹¹¹ From his position in Washington, the Brazilian diplomat followed Canadian politics closely with the hope that opportunities to correct the imbalance – and to diversify Brazil’s hemispheric trade – would arise. The return to power of William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Liberals was one such opportunity. In a letter to Vargas, Aranha expressed satisfaction at the defeat of Richard B. Bennett’s pro-Empire Conservatives, encouraging Brazil’s president to take advantage of the new Canadian government’s disposition towards liberalized trade.¹¹² The resulting 1937 exchange of notes, by removing trade restrictions on goods circulating between the two countries, was a step in the right direction although both Brazilian and Canadian businesses were slow to reorient the flow of their activities, especially since no direct merchant route linked the two groups who were still reeling from the Crash of 1929. Trade actually declined throughout the 1930s until the war disrupted both Canada’s and Brazil’s economic ties to Europe, at which point Brazilian exports to Canada increased by

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹¹¹ Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas, October 15, 1935, GVC 1935.10.15, Getúlio Vargas Collection, FGV-CPDOC. In Portuguese: “... tratado idiota.”

¹¹² *Ibid.*

ninefold.¹¹³ Seizing the moment, Vargas welcomed Minister of Trade and Commerce James MacKinnon whose 1941 trade mission resulted in the signing of a new trade agreement that extended “unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment” to Brazil.¹¹⁴

Vargas and the Itamaraty complemented their trade policy with concerted efforts to engage their Canadian counterparts on the topic of diplomatic representation. In 1937, Lester S. Glass, Canadian trade commissioner in Rio de Janeiro, reported to Leolyn Dana Wilgress (known as Dana Wilgress), his superior in the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC), that he had twice been approached to inform his government that Brazil wished to exchange ministers. His latest encounter with Silvio Rangel de Castro, an ascending member of the Itamaraty, had left him perplexed, noting that he had not realized that “the question was so important to Brazil” and that his interlocutor “would accept no refusal.”¹¹⁵ “Personally, I am at a loss to know what steps to take, because actually it is none of my business,” he added.¹¹⁶ Wilgress forwarded the letter to Oscar Douglas Skelton (commonly referred to as O.D. Skelton), under-secretary of state for External Affairs. He immediately informed King, but no follow-up ensued.¹¹⁷ Aranha, who had returned from the United States to become minister of Foreign Affairs, then reached out to the British ambassador in Rio de Janeiro.¹¹⁸ When this did not work, the Itamaraty went through its ambassador in London to convince Vincent Massey, high commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, to bring up the issue with his superiors in the DEA. The message conveyed was that “Brazil is most desirous of establishing diplomatic relations with Canada, and hope[s] that such a proposal made by a leading South American country would commend itself to the Canadian government.”¹¹⁹ Aranha even contacted Kenneth H. McCrimmon, head of The Light’s legal department, to deliver a message to the Canadian government:

¹¹³ “Intercâmbio Comercial do Brasil com o Canadá em 1941,” September 30, 1941, 36/5/03, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (AHI).

¹¹⁴ *Trade Agreement Between Canada and Brazil*, Canada-Brazil, October 17, 1941, Treaty Series 1941, no. 18, 2.

¹¹⁵ Cited in L. D. Wilgress to O.D. Skelton, February 7, 1938, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, Department of External Affairs (DEA) Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ O.D. Skelton to L. D. Wilgress, February 11, 1938, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁸ Memorandum for the Prime Minister, August 6, 1938, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁹ Massey to Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 25, 1939, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

Pan America in general did not recognize the importance of Canada's continental position either politically or economically and ... a more intimate association of Canada in Latin American affairs would be of political value not only to Canada itself but to the United States in its endeavour to hold the South American countries more or less in line with democratic institutions.¹²⁰

Aside from the irony of a dictatorship claiming to have liberal democracy at heart, it is revealing that Aranha thought it pertinent to reassure Canadians that the Americans would welcome their growing involvement in Latin America as model international citizens.

Canada, it is true, was a newcomer in international affairs and its place in the North Atlantic Triangle presented both constraints and possibilities. Established in 1909, the DEA had yet to blossom into a full-fledged agency in the early 1920s. At its head was Joseph Pope, a competent public servant whose imperialist leanings prevented the articulation of a coherent forward-thinking vision for Canada's external affairs. "Tory to the core and convinced that Canada's national interests were best served within the comforting embrace of the British Empire, Sir Joseph Pope ... had only modest ambitions for his new ministry," explain Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll.¹²¹ The Liberals' return to power in 1921 signalled a new departure since King understood the importance of managing the interplay between domestic policies and foreign affairs, particularly with respect to core issues such as economic development and national unity. Skelton, a Queen's University scholar with a PhD from University of Chicago, was brought in to inject life into the DEA. "More subtle and more resolute than an Anglophobe or an ideologue, Skelton ... posited a new way of calculating and a new direction for Canadian foreign policy based on the logic of Canada's material and political self-interests," explains Barry Ferguson.¹²² Skelton assumed the title of under-secretary of state for External Affairs in 1925. One of his primary goals was to expand the DEA's personnel through a thorough recruitment process that did away with patronage in favour of a merit-based system. Potential recruits had to demonstrate aptitudes in history, political economy, and/or

¹²⁰ K. H. McCrimmon to Dr. Keenleyside, June 19, 1940, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²¹ Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, "Introduction," in Donaghy and Carroll, *In the National Interest*, 2. See also Maurice Pope, ed., *Public Servant: The Memoirs of Sir Joseph Pope* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1960).

¹²² Barry Ferguson, *Remaking Liberalism: The Intellectual Legacy of Adam Shortt, O.D. Skelton, W.C. Clark, and W.A. Mackintosh, 1890-1925* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 89.

international law. Skelton hired forty-three men (twelve of them francophones) between 1926 and 1941. They were “young officers that resembled him – academically trained, versatile professional men ... who could write fluently and reason critically; and rock hard nationalists who were skeptical of hegemonic outreach, whether it emanated from London or Washington,” contends Norman Hillmer.¹²³

The expansion of the DEA’s diplomatic corps was part of the effort to develop Canada’s international identity through overseas posts. By the end of the 1920s, the country had legations in Washington, Paris, and Tokyo, but more were needed to project and consolidate nationhood vis-à-vis Great Britain and the United States. Establishing a distinct Canadian presence in Latin America could help advance this project in light of the fact that one could hardly expect the British to prioritize Canada when its interests conflicted with those of the metropole. Already in 1930, Skelton made the case for establishing legations in other countries, including Brazil, to make Canada’s voice heard on the international stage.¹²⁴ He had been to Rio de Janeiro in 1922 at the request of King who thought it advisable to send a Canadian representative to the International Congress of the History of America, which took place while Brazilians celebrated the centenary of their independence. Skelton had been struck by the similarities – in both economic potential and political evolution – between Canada and Brazil, noting that this “great southern counterpart” could teach “the exploitative ‘white man’ to the north” a thing or two about “racial tolerance.”¹²⁵ Having witnessed the British and Americans at work in Brazil, he had also gained a further appreciation of the “practical advantages that would flow from Canada’s control of its own international existence.”¹²⁶

Hopeful that the worst of the depression had passed, Skelton tried again – unsuccessfully – to secure support for new overseas posts in 1937. The opening of a joint legation for Belgium and the Netherlands the following year proved encouraging. In his 1939-40 budget, Skelton allocated funds for diplomatic representation in both Argentina and Brazil with the rationale that

¹²³ Norman Hillmer, “O.D. Skelton: Innovating for Independence,” in *Architects and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009*, eds. Greg Donaghy and Kim Richard Nossal (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 65.

¹²⁴ Norman Hillmer, *O.D. Skelton: A Portrait of Canadian Ambition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 189.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

the establishment of legations in Catholic and francophile Latin American countries would counterbalance the high commissioner posts planned for Commonwealth nations. The project most certainly flowed from concerns regarding national unity, especially since anti-imperial sentiments in Québec were driving French-Canadian intellectuals to initiate dialogue with fellow Catholics in the hemisphere.¹²⁷ Developments in war-torn Europe finally motivated King to accede to the DEA's recommendations in light of "problems of markets for Canadian products, Pan-American developments in the economic and political spheres, and the added emphasis which both Great Britain and the United States were according to South American countries."¹²⁸ Skelton now had to find a suitable diplomat able and willing to relocate to Rio de Janeiro. Désy, as we will see, was an apt candidate for the post.

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This short history of Canada's rapprochement with Brazil up to the turn of the 1940s has been told here to set the stage for the case studies that follow; not to call attention to the paramountcy of the relationship between the two countries. If the broader context of international events appears as a backdrop to the actions of individuals on the ground, it is because it rarely – if ever – markedly dictated the choices that state and non-state actors made when taking part in the act of musical nation branding in Brazil. Removed as it was from the Pacific and European theatres of war, the country was never a pressing matter for the DEA who, as we will see, also displayed a lukewarm interest for cultural matters. The same was true during the Cold War. The resulting hands-off approach to cultural relations with the South American giant thus afforded protagonists abundant opportunities to experiment and perform their multifaceted individual and social identities. As such, this dissertation is less concerned with the effectiveness of musical diplomacy than it is with the dynamic, relational messiness of musical nation branding. The two neglected histories explored here – that of Canadian-Brazilian relations and that of music's role in Canadian international history – help bring into focus the many ways in which 'race' and empire, but also religion and gender, shaped how Canadians have understood themselves and their relationship to the rest of the world from the early 1940s to the late 1960s.

¹²⁷ On this topic, see Demers, *Connected Struggles*.

¹²⁸ D. R. Murray, "Canada's First Diplomatic Missions in Latin America," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 16, no. 2 (May 1974): 162.

CHAPTER 1: CULTURAL CROSSROADS

*The Dominion of Canada demonstrated a rare genius when it sent to Brazil a new kind of ambassador – Dr. Jean Désy.*¹

– Mary Newton, *Brazilian American*, 1945

Jean Désy arrived in Brazil on September 10, 1941, in “glorious weather, with sunshine and clear skies,” accompanied by his wife, Corinne de Boucherville, and two children, Mariel and Jean Louis, both of whom waved tiny Brazilian flags, much to the delight of journalists who had assembled at the docks to meet Canada’s first minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.² The British ambassador Sir Geoffrey Knox and Lester S. Glass, Canadian trade commissioner in Rio de Janeiro, joined representatives from Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light) in welcoming Désy and his family, accompanying them to the luxurious seashore Copacabana Palace Hotel where temporary offices had been set up until proper accommodations could be found.³ The Brazilian press took note of the Canadian envoy’s impressive pedigree: a Doctor of Law and university professor turned diplomat with considerable overseas experience as well as intimate connections to elite cultural and social circles in Canada. Confident in Brazil’s standing on the international stage, journalists reported that Désy’s appointment was either an indication of his stature at home or a testament to the two countries’ deepening friendship.⁴ Désy was immediately flattered. “[T]here is every evidence of pleasure at the opening of diplomatic relations, and a manifest esteem for Canada and high expectation of further bonds, cultural and economic, between Brazil and the Dominion,” he wrote to Prime Minister – and then Secretary of State for External Affairs – William Lyon Mackenzie King.⁵

¹ Mary Newton, “Portrait of a Man,” *Brazilian American*, December 22, 1945, in MG32-E2, Vol. 1, Coupures sur Jean Désy au Brésil (1941-1947), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC.

² Jean Désy to Norman A. Robertson, September 20, 1941, RG25, Vol. 2884, Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro - Premises – General File, DEA Fonds, LAC; “Uma Nota Tocante da Cordialidade Canadense-Brasileira,” *A Manhã*, September 11, 1941, 1, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/116408/12458>.

³ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 17, 1941, RG25, Vol. 2884, Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro - Premises – General File, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴ “Maior Ligação entre o Brasil e o Canadá,” *A Noite*, September 10, 1941, 1, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/10900; “Chegou Falando o Nosso Idioma,” *A Noite*, September 11, 1941, 3, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/10926.

⁵ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 17, 1941, RG25, Vol. 2884, Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro - Premises – General File, DEA Fonds, LAC.

This was expected, of course, as Brazilians had been pushing tenaciously for reciprocal diplomatic exchanges.

Désy's assessment of Brazilians' friendly disposition was validated on his first interview with President Getúlio Vargas on September 30. He had waited almost three weeks to present his credentials, in part, because the military band – the Banda do Batalhão de Guardas – needed more time to orchestrate and master the Canadian national anthem. Vargas spoke to him “using French with great accuracy,” noting that Canada’s “heterogeneous national components” somewhat resembled Brazil’s own ethnic makeup.⁶ “We are going to do something new together: something outside of the usual practice,” the president told Désy.⁷ The latter listened attentively, perplexed by this cryptic message, which he hypothesized meant that his interlocutor envisioned Canada taking a creative path distinct from those championed by the United States and Great Britain. “Both of these latter Powers had created a certain degree of irritation in Brazil; whereas Canada came with clean hands and a pure heart,” Désy remarked the following day in a dispatch to the Department of External Affairs (DEA).⁸ The French-Canadian diplomat was well suited to bring this Canadian-Brazilian rapprochement to fruition, driven, as he was, to reinvent himself as (1) a new kind of pioneer for the Canadian diplomatic corps and (2) an eminent cosmopolitan ambassador of the Canadian cultural elite.

In both roles, Désy pursued an autonomist course that placed French Canada centre stage in the projection of the country’s image abroad. Whereas Canadian business interests on the ground had foregrounded Britishness as a marker of their identity, Désy emphasized Latinity as a distinguishing attribute that both Canada and Brazil shared. This differentiation made it possible to think outside the homogenizing frame of pan-Americanism that the United States was promoting through its Good Neighbor policy. More importantly, it did so without destabilizing ‘whiteness.’ Désy engaged Brazil’s political and cultural elite with the proposition that closer Canadian-Brazilian relations could be, if not embodied, at least experienced in ways that conjured up feelings of fraternity and family. By inviting his pianist friend Jean Dansereau and his wife to perform in Rio de Janeiro, Désy set in motion a musical diplomacy that reflected both

⁶ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 1, 1941, RG25, Vol. 2640, Political Situation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁷ *Ibid.* (emphasis in original).

⁸ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 2, 1941, RG25, Vol. 2640, Political Situation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

his astute reading of Brazil's politico-cultural landscape and his willingness to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by Vargas's cultural infrastructure. This musical nation branding straddled the fence between tradition and modernity as well as between difference and sameness. It demonstrated the extent to which Canada's international image was malleable in the hands of individual actors eager to conflate personal and national identities. This chapter begins with a discussion of the larger context within which Désy and the Dansereau couple sketched out their musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community: it examines the emergence of musical pan-Americanism and then traces the development of musical nationalism in Brazil. Next, it shows how Britishness and Latinity shaped perceptions of Canada in Brazil in the early 1940s. The chapter's final part provides a detailed analysis of the Dansereau couple's cultural mission in Rio de Janeiro.

Musical Pan-Americanism and 'Sameness Embracing'

Lasting for the greater part of the 1930s and 1940s, the Good Neighbor era was a period during which the United States wished to break with its practice of intervening – or interfering – in the affairs of Latin America.⁹ President Franklin Delano Roosevelt first articulated the policy in his 1933 inaugural address to reassure its southern neighbours that he desired to build bridges through trust and understanding, not coercion, and that commercial and cultural exchanges would henceforth take place in true friendship, such as the one shared by the two nations located alongside the 49th parallel: “The noblest monument to peace and to neighborly economic and social friendship in all the world is not a monument in bronze or stone, but the boundary which unites the United States and Canada.”¹⁰ The rise of fascism and the threat of communism rendered more urgent the cultural outreach of the Good Neighbor policy. In 1938, the Roosevelt administration created the Division of Cultural Relations in the State Department with the hope of promoting both hemispheric stability and goodwill through artistic exchanges. Two years later, it established the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs – renamed

⁹ The Good Neighbor era followed a tumultuous period during which the United States meddled in the Mexican Revolution and interfered in the internal affairs of countries in Central America and the Caribbean to advance its economic interests. For a survey of American intervention in the region, see Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); or Joseph Smith, *The United States and Latin America: A History of American Diplomacy, 1776-2000* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

¹⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address at Chautauqua, N.Y.,” August 14, 1936, *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-chautauqua-ny>.

Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) in 1941 – with businessman and philanthropist Nelson Rockefeller at its head.

Music was one of the preferred instruments in the deployment of the Good Neighbor policy. Departmental Order 768, to which the Division of Cultural Relations owed its existence, considered musical diplomacy to be a potentially potent means of advancing American interests through peaceful means.¹¹ A Music Sub-Committee was thus created within the State Department to provide policy recommendations. In 1939, the United States hosted the first Inter-American Music Conference to foster dialogue among musicians, producers, and agencies while also accumulating knowledge about cultural networks and infrastructure in Latin America. Rockefeller's OCIAA had its own Cultural Relations Division. Operating independently from the State Department, its Music Committee offered both advisory and operational expertise.¹² As a component of an innovative propaganda machine, it had as its mandate to improve the United States' image to facilitate acceptance of – and support for – the country's goals in the Southern Hemisphere. It sought to achieve this by using music to “bolster American cultural prestige” and create opportunities for people-to-people interactions, most notably within elite milieux where decision makers and people of influence congregated.¹³ Hence the Music Committee's preference for exporting educational and artistic projects that championed ‘serious music.’¹⁴ These initiatives aimed to help the United States exert authority in that its state agents, in conjunction with their non-state associates, positioned themselves as cultural producers and critics as well as patrons and officiators.¹⁵ Increasingly, this Good Neighbor cultural outreach took the form of a “cultural offensive.”¹⁶ As Nicholas J. Cull explains, Rockefeller championed a “heavily ideological and emphatically one-way approach to information work” that occasionally made foreign audiences uneasy.¹⁷ According to Darlene J. Sadlier, it was a seduction enterprise

¹¹ Jennifer L. Campbell, “Shaping Solidarity: Music, Diplomacy, and Inter-American Relations, 1936-1946” (PhD diss., University of Connecticut, 2010), 25.

¹² *Ibid.*, 59.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁵ Jennifer L. Campbell further explains: “Nevertheless, for all the talk of service and the self-effacing altruism, there was an underlying motivation for getting experts in the field of music on board with the Division's policy—using musicians and musical exchange as an excuse to have more contact and discussion with foreign governmental officials.” *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁶ Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 207.

¹⁷ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 12.

that evolved from “economic and psychological defence” to “economic and psychological warfare.”¹⁸

But what made ‘serious music’ such an appealing instrument of diplomacy? Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht explains that its antimodernist undertones initially appealed to those who gravitated around elite circles in turn of the century United States. “Classical music, many believed, had the potential to represent a ‘language of emotions,’ and thus form a powerful counterweight to rationalism, industrialization, and international wars,” she writes.¹⁹ The shared emotions that music was thought to convey suggested that those who partook in musicking made connections and discovered affinities with each other. As a language, it seemed to require no translation. It was therefore portable and could serve as a symbol of cosmopolitanism and universalism. This was particularly convenient for Americans who initially lacked a noteworthy repertoire of homegrown works to pull from.²⁰

The mastery of ‘high’ art forms signified a country’s maturity, which was a quality expected of those in leadership positions. By the 1940s, the United States branded itself as “the global center of music, highbrow included.”²¹ It did so in part by placing emphasis on performance rather than repertory. In other words, it dominated the stage by mastering canons and setting standards for how they were to be performed. More importantly, it shaped audience tastes through investments in musical education, the expansion of orchestras, the development of sound reproduction technologies, and the construction of concert halls. Performance thus served as a means of displaying resources, expertise, leadership, and authority with the stage offering a *mise en scène* of the nation and its relationship to the rest of the world: the leader conducted, the orchestra performed, and the audience listened.²² Gienow-Hecht further explains:

The prolonged conservation of the nineteenth-century canon, the simultaneous expansion of the symphony scene, and the increasing cult of the performer during the interwar period dampened artistic visions of cultural internationalism. It also gave a decisive native twist to

¹⁸ Darlene J. Sadlier, *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), 10.

¹⁹ Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy*, 11.

²⁰ As Danielle Fosler-Lussier points out, it “was difficult for the United States to offer art music without drawing accusations that the music was not truly American.” Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy*, 24.

²¹ Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy*, 214.

²² Gienow-Hecht, “The World is Ready to Listen,” 19-20.

the production and dissemination of symphony music in the United States: works and artists might be international, but the setting, the sponsorship, and the culture of performance was not. As such, symphony concerts became increasingly American affairs, celebrating the stage and its actors more so than the works performed. Rather than highlighting the United States' openness to outside imports, symphony orchestras were now supposed to export a specific segment of U.S. culture – highbrow performance – unknown to foreign audiences. Instead of reflecting the internationalism of the U.S. culture, they reflected U.S. ambitions to score points in the international arena by highlighting American cosmopolitanism and, hence, its qualification for world leadership.

This “trial of cultural strength,” to borrow David Caute’s expression, was also one of economic strength.²³

During the early- and mid-1940s, the State Department’s and the OCIAA’s cultural offensives were less about fighting communism than they were about advancing American interests in Latin America. Up to the end of the war, this also meant encouraging countries to remain neutral or, once the United States entered the conflict, to take position on the side of the Allies. Musical pan-Americanism provided the framework within which state and non-state actors discussed culture as well as its intersection with politics and economics. The discourse and practice of ‘sameness-embracing’ put forward through American-sponsored initiatives promoted the idea that the hemisphere’s republics shared a common ‘high’ art language – and thus, a common political culture and set of values – despite variations in their national musical cultures. As a form of soft power, musical diplomacy helped promote liberal developmentalism by resisting nationalisms in the cultural sphere and purporting to erase differences among American nations. In other words, it advanced the idea that music’s ostensibly universal qualities, particularly ‘serious music’ as opposed to folk music and popular music, could help the nations of the hemisphere feel as if they belonged to the same musically imagined community.²⁴

²³ Caute, *The Dancer Defects*, 379.

²⁴ An umbrella term, ‘popular music’ evades easy definition. Roy Shuker’s synthesis of scholarly debates on the topic provides a working definition for the purposes of this dissertation. “Essentially, all popular music consists of a hybrid of musical traditions, styles, and influences, and is also an economic product which is invested with ideological significance by many of its consumers. At the heart of the majority of various forms of popular music is a fundamental tension between the essential creativity of the act of ‘making music’ and the commercial nature of the bulk of its production and dissemination.” Roy Shuker, *Popular Music: The Key Concepts*, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), 228.

The establishment of a musically imagined pan-American community rested in part on the use of metaphors. One of them was sublimation. Carol A. Hess explains that it provided a means for music critics to address the presence – and attenuate the potency – of nationalist undertones in musical works. She writes:

Borrowed from chemistry, this term denotes change ... or purification ..., as explained in two roughly contemporaneous texts, one in chemistry and one in the burgeoning field of psychoanalysis. Such evocative explanations extended handily to the presumably ‘base qualities’ of musical nationalism and a host of related discourses. ... Although subtle hints of difference might surface, the unitary framework of the Western Hemisphere would prevail, in accordance with Pan Americanist ideology. Thus, in embracing sameness through sublimation, critics endowed the time-tested discourse of cosmopolitan universalism with a variety of New World tropes, often with Europe lurking in the background.²⁵

Yet the fact that non-state actors (critics, but also composers and promoters), north and south of the Rio Grande, participated in ‘sameness-embracing’ does not mean that sublimation was a benign process. As Gienow-Hecht points out, musical universalism had become closely associated with ‘high’ culture in the United States by the 1940s.²⁶ It thus tended to strengthen American hegemony.²⁷

Brazil’s Difference

Brazilians were not novices when came the time to modulate the tension between nationalism and universalism in music. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, Carioca elites immersed themselves in the ‘high’ culture of Europe to define themselves outside the core-periphery binary. This process acquired its initial momentum in 1807 when Napoléon Bonaparte’s troops forced King João VI of Portugal to temporarily relocate to Brazil. The monarch’s presence in Rio de Janeiro transformed the colony’s sense of place vis-à-vis Europe. Through marriage, João VI’s son (Pedro) and grandson (Pedro II) maintained ties with Europe’s cultural centres – most notably Germany, Italy, and France. Increasingly, Carioca elites turned to classical and operatic music to elevate Brazilian society and place it on the path of progress. Cristina Magaldi explains:

²⁵ Hess, *Representing the Good Neighbor*, 5.

²⁶ Gienow-Hecht, *Sound Diplomacy*, 214.

²⁷ Carol A. Hess concedes that point when she writes: “I am by no means suggesting that Pan Americanist sameness-embracing was uniformly benign.” Hess, *Representing the Good Neighbor*, 7.

By attending an opera or a concert in which European music prevailed, or by composing or performing homemade European-style music, Rio de Janeiro residents could share with those in European centres ... the ownership of something that for them represented “civilization” and “modernity.” At the same time, by immersing themselves in the music arriving from Europe, Cariocas avoided the general feeling of being left out on the periphery, and shunned the prospect of “not being” European. In sum, European music served some Cariocas well in their attempt to disguise the sharp, local distinctions between “here” and “there.”²⁸

More than a “culture of imitation,” the musical life of imperial Rio de Janeiro denoted an effort to reimagine Imperial Brazil as a centre of culture in its own right rather than a settler colony with no artistic voice of its own.²⁹

Brazil’s most accomplished composer at the time was Antônio Carlos Gomes. Born in 1836 in the town of Campinas, in the state of São Paulo, the aspiring artist moved to Rio de Janeiro in his early twenties. In the imperial capital, he discovered the great works of French and Italian composers. He participated in efforts to enrich the city’s cultural life by juxtaposing European operatic music with Portuguese-language librettos dealing with Brazilian subjects. Adept at mixing musical and spoken languages, he achieved consecration with the premiere of “Il Guarany” in Milan, Italy, on 19 March 1870. Based on a Brazilian novel, the opera employs the Italian language to tell the story of an interracial relationship between the daughter of a Portuguese colonist and an indigenous man from Brazil’s interior. Through “Il Guarany,” Gomes negotiated the tension between the ‘here’ and ‘there’ that preoccupied Carioca elites. In evoking interracial intimacies in positive, romantic terms, within the framework of European ‘high’ culture, he helped Brazilians situate themselves vis-à-vis their European counterparts. Supported by Pedro II, the composer gained international recognition during the ‘golden age’ of opera. He thus served as a sort of “music ambassador” for the Empire of Brazil in the late nineteenth century.³⁰ Although not a nationalistic work per se, “Il Guarany” reflected “Brazil’s early

²⁸ Cristina Magaldi, *Music in Imperial Rio de Janeiro: European Culture in a Tropical Milieu* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), XII.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, X.

³⁰ Cristina Magaldi, “Two Musical Representations of Brazil: Carlos Gomes and Villa-Lobos,” in *Brazil in the Making: Facets of National Identity*, eds. Carmen Nava and Ludwig Lauerhass Jr. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 205. See also: Magaldi, *Music in Imperial Rio de Janeiro*, 142.

attempt to define itself as a nation, exactly by aligning its culture with that of Europe,” writes Magaldi.³¹

The passage from empire to republic did not dramatically alter the cultural preferences of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo’s growing europhile bourgeoisie. It continued to look towards France and Germany even though a landed oligarchy, whose fortunes were based on dairy farming and coffee, now governed Brazil. The country’s urban elites, their numbers swelling with the expansion of the merchant and rentier class, continued the tradition of *salons* that had become a hallmark of Pedro II’s reign. Originating from Italy, these cultural events were integral part of the Parisian soundscape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were now part of Brazil’s ‘tropical *belle époque*.’³² Brazilians first embraced *salons* as opportunities to affirm their elite status. In the early years of the republic, these gatherings served as emerging centres of power as hosts and guests exchanged ideas on how to best steer their country on the path of modernity and growth. ‘Serious music’ continued to be a marker of intellectual sophistication and of a liberal mindset – key attributes in the eyes of those who saw themselves destined to lead their country into the twentieth century. *Salons* were “cultural oases” where patrons and artists met.³³ They were the informal stages where people of influence articulated their vision of Brazil as a nation on par with the rest of the civilized world. By constituting themselves as a high society, urban elites “adopted practices in their homes that identified them not just with aristocratic status, but, *ipso facto*, with Europe,” explains Jeffrey D. Needell. It was a process of national self-definition characterized by “metropolitan identification within a neo-colonial context.”³⁴

The ‘in-betweenness’ of *salons*, the place they occupied between the ‘here’ and ‘there,’ represented a source of inspiration for artists eager to exert their agency by creating original, hybrid works that evoked Brazil’s multilayered histories and modernist inclinations. It was there that many of those who organized and participated in the 1922 São Paulo *Semana de Arte*

³¹ Magaldi, “Two Musical Representations of Brazil,” 221.

³² Jeffrey D. Needell uses the term to describe the cultural life of Rio de Janeiro’s elite between 1898 and 1914. Julio Lucchesi Moraes relies on a similar timeframe to study São Paulo’s ‘*belle époque*.’ See Jeffrey D. Needell, *A Tropical Belle Époque: Elite Culture and Society in Turn-of-the-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Julio Lucchesi Moraes, *São Paulo, Capital Artística: A Cafeicultural e as Artes na Belle Époque (1906-1922)* (Rio de Janeiro: Beco do Azougue, 2014).

³³ Moraes, *São Paulo, Capital Artística*, 83-85.

³⁴ Needell, *A Tropical Belle Époque*, 129.

Moderna first witnessed the potency and limitations of transplanted European art forms – among others, Emiliano Augusto Cavalcanti, Graça Aranha, Mário de Andrade, Oswald de Andrade, Víctor Brecheret, Anita Malfatti, and Heitor Villa-Lobos. The landmark event – with its combination of poetry, music, theatre, and painting – launched a nationalist cultural revolution centred on the quest for a distinctive Brazilian essence that spoke of the country’s indigenous past and ethnic diversity. Rejecting the rigidity of academic art, the modernists also broke with those who advocated ‘whitening’ as a solution to the so-called ‘racial problem,’ championing instead *Brasilidade*, the notion that Brazilians’ national identity was a composite of its indigenous, Afro-Brazilian, and ‘white’ European roots. Although their discourse of *Brasilidade* did not completely displace ‘white’ normativity (it continued to marginalize “black images in favour of whitened forms of the mestizo or mulatto,” argues Darién J. Davis), it helped foster new experimental practices that were increasingly focused inward and thus attentive to the multitude of expressive cultures found in Brazil.³⁵

Villa-Lobos, one of the protagonists of the *Semana de Arte Moderna*, came to play an important role in the “gradual process of decolonization” that characterized Brazilian music in the first half of the twentieth century.³⁶ Gomes’s oeuvre, which belonged to the distant – not to mention foreign – romantic era of classical music, was somewhat of an embarrassment to Brazilian modernists. In the spirit of *Brasilidade*, Villa-Lobos sought to find his own musical language by looking for inspiration in the musical innovations of impressionist and avant-garde European composers.³⁷ The artists he chose to feature during the *Semana de Arte Moderna* included Erik Satie, Achille-Claude Debussy, and Francis Poulenc. They provided templates for Villa-Lobos’s own inward explorations. Magaldi explains:

Polytonality, unstable tonal centers, new timbers, unconventional use of instrument combinations, and varied orchestral colors were among the ‘new’ characteristics of the works presented during the week. But it was Villa-Lobos’[s] attentive use of native materials to achieve those results that allowed him to creatively renew the exhausted European tonal system. In his “Danças africanas,” Villa-Lobos used stylized rhythmic patterns derived from Afro-Brazilian music as a means to explore new harmonies, and thus he achieved the most

³⁵ Davis, *Avoiding the Dark*, 59.

³⁶ Gerard Béhague, *Heitor Villa-Lobos: The Search for Brazil’s Musical Soul* (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies/University of Texas, 1994), 151.

³⁷ Hess, *Representing the Good Neighbor*, 86-87.

coveted goals of Brazilian modernists: the conciliation of the local, native tradition with the European model of modernity.³⁸

Whereas European modernists emphasized rupture and invention, Villa-Lobos and his contemporaries in Brazil championed (re)discovery and memory as a path forward.³⁹

Born in Rio de Janeiro on March 5, 1887, Villa-Lobos developed his appreciation of music at an early age. His father, a writer and civil servant at Biblioteca Nacional [National Library], was an amateur musician who enjoyed attending *salons* and operas. Early on, Villa-Lobos showed resistance to the formal traditional training that music schools offered. Primarily self-taught, he picked up the guitar as well as the cello and began performing with various ensembles (street bands and orchestras) in his search for new musical languages. The young musician developed a deep appreciation for both ‘serious music’ and popular sounds rooted in Afro-Brazilian culture. He gravitated around different music scenes prior to undertaking a series of research trips to Brazil’s interior: through the Northeast as well as to the states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Minas Gerais.⁴⁰ He also sought out recordings of indigenous music as he transitioned from performing to composing.⁴¹ His early works – among others, “Danças Africanas” and “Choros 1” – revealed a keen disposition for hybrid musical languages. His enlarged sound palette, inventive use of traditional instruments, and innovative rhythmic patterns aimed to make audible a cross-section of Brazil’s geography and cultural life.⁴² By the early 1920s, Villa-Lobos had begun establishing his reputation as the champion of Brazil’s “musical mosaic.”⁴³

Villa-Lobos’s two trips to France – in 1923 and 1927 – helped consolidate his status at home. Partially funded by the Brazilian government, the composer’s overseas excursions were greeted with acclaim in Paris. The concerts fulfilled French desires for a musical ‘other’ while advancing Villa-Lobos’s own career interests.⁴⁴ At the same time, the young maestro developed and tested new compositional ideas while acting as a music ambassador by helping disseminate

³⁸ Magaldi, “Two Musical Representations of Brazil,” 217.

³⁹ Santuza Cambraia Naves, *O Violão Azul: Modernismo e Música Popular* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora), 39-42.

⁴⁰ Santuza Cambraia Naves, “Os Regentes do Brasil no Período Vargas,” in *O Brasil em Uníssono: E Leituras Sobre Música e Modernismo*, ed. Eduardo Jardim (Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC/Casa da Palavra), 124.

⁴¹ David P. Appleby, *Heitor Villa-Lobos: A Life (1887-1959)* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2002), 81.

⁴² Simon Wright, *Villa-Lobos* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 61; Béhague, *Heitor Villa-Lobos*, 149.

⁴³ Béhague, *Heitor Villa-Lobos*, 155.

⁴⁴ Anaïs Fléchet, *Villa-Lobos à Paris: un écho musical du Brésil* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 121-122.

Brasilidade.⁴⁵ The professional connections that Villa-Lobos made in France and the press he received won him celebrity status, which gave added legitimacy and urgency to the project of a Brazilian *modernismo musical* [musical modernism]. “By aligning himself with European composers, he made native music acceptable as art by [the] Brazilian elite,” writes Magaldi.⁴⁶ Villa-Lobos was essentially helping his contemporaries resolve the tension between the ‘here’ and ‘there’ that characterized their predecessors’ musical practices. His approach demonstrated that “liberation comes from facing and matching, not from retreating.”⁴⁷

Such a posture inevitably shaped Villa-Lobos’s works and their reception in the United States. The 1939-40 New York World’s Fair provided an exceptional venue to feature Brazil’s contributions to the recent history of ‘serious music.’ The country’s musical program included compositions by Villa-Lobos, Gomes, Francisco Mignone, and Burle Marx (the latter acted as music director of the Brazilian pavilion). This was Villa-Lobos’s first real opportunity to have his compositions heard and written about in the United States.⁴⁸ They made a dramatic impact because of their hybrid nature – more so than other Brazilian works. With its “density of texture, sheer volume, and array of primitive percussion instruments,” the composer’s “Choros 8” proved especially destabilizing.⁴⁹ It evaded sublimation and foregrounded *Brasilidade* in ways that were difficult to reconcile with musical pan-Americanism. It was a “poor vehicle for sameness-embracing,” writes Hess. She adds: “Acknowledging difference so blatantly had little place in the Pan Americanist project.”⁵⁰ The following year, Villa-Lobos’s works were once again played in New York as part of a Brazilian music festival held at the Museum of Modern Art. Critics were no less perplexed by Villa-Lobos.⁵¹

By the early- and mid-1940s, the name Villa-Lobos had become closely associated with the idea of a national musical culture in Brazil. “There cannot be the slightest doubt about Villa-Lobos’[s] adherence to musical nationalism as an aesthetic,” argues Gerard Béhague.⁵² The composer was a staunch supporter of the Vargas regime because of the opportunities it afforded

⁴⁵ Appleby, *Heitor Villa-Lobos*, 79.

⁴⁶ Magaldi, “Two Musical Representations of Brazil,” 219.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Hess, *Representing the Good Neighbor*, 83.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 126-127.

⁵² Béhague, *Heitor Villa-Lobos*, 153.

him and the ways in which the government's national project aligned with that of the modernist artists of his generation. Upon his return from Paris in 1930, Villa-Lobos met João Alberto Lins de Barros, provisional governor of São Paulo and amateur musician, with whom he discussed some of his ideas about music education. The Brazilian politician encouraged the composer to tour the state to test aspects of his project and to "proclaim the power of Brazilian artistic will ... a thunder burst, formidable, unisonous and frightening BRAZILIAN ARTISTIC INDEPENDENCE."⁵³ The venture caught the attention of Vargas who named Villa-Lobos superintendência de educação musical e artística [superintendent of musical and artistic education]. In his capacity as an administrator and composer-educator, he handled the "musical fitness" of Brazilian children, instilling in them nationalism and patriotism, discipline and civic pride, through a demanding countrywide singing curriculum.⁵⁴ Vargas and Villa-Lobos both understood the importance of music and personality in unifying the country around a shared sense of identity.⁵⁵ Their respective visions of Brazil converged in the 1930s and 1940s, which allowed Villa-Lobos to occupy centre stage in these pivotal years of the country's musical life.⁵⁶

Mario de Andrade, a contemporary of Villa-Lobos and a central figure of the *Semana de Arte Moderna*, had a term for the kind of composer that Villa-Lobos embodied: "artist-worker."⁵⁷ This kind of artist advocated and championed a utilitarian and moralizing conception of art. His or her artistic mission was also a social mission in that its value was dependent on how it contributed to the national project. Andrade and Villa-Lobos did not always see eye to eye, but both men "stressed the social value and educational usefulness of music, but primarily art music nationalized through the invigoration of rural folk music."⁵⁸ By 'invigoration,' they meant revisiting traditional forms using methods associated with erudite compositional approaches. Andrade and Villa-Lobos rejected exoticism and sublimation. Their preferred musical forms were those that travelled horizontally (throughout Brazil's diverse cultural geographies) and transcended vertical barriers (across class lines). Andrade referred to this kind of music as "engaged art" although it remained associated primarily with the country's political

⁵³ Garcia, "Music and the Brazilian Estado Novo," 623.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 613.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 623.

⁵⁶ Naves, "Os Regentes do Brasil no Período Vargas," 140.

⁵⁷ Naves, *O Violão Azul*, 31. In Portuguese: "... artista-operário."

⁵⁸ Béhague, *Heitor Villa-Lobos*, 150.

and cultural elite.⁵⁹ That Villa-Lobos was one of its chief evangelists is unquestionable, even if it was at times difficult to dissociate the composer's career-building undertakings from his search for Brazil's musical soul.

Canada's Difference

Canadians on the ground in Brazil were not deaf to the musical life of their hosts and the surge of music in Good Neighbor era hemispheric relations. Nor were they passive spectators when opportunities to shape Canada's image abroad presented themselves. The Light's Kenneth H. McCrimmon is a pertinent example. Born in 1890 on the shores of Lake Huron, in the Scottish Presbyterian town of Kincardine, Ontario, McCrimmon studied law and then served in the 18th Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, earning a Distinguished Service Order and ascending to the rank of major before an injury forced him to return home. His uncle – Sir Alexander Mackenzie, railway magnate and president of The Light – invited him to relocate to Brazil in 1920. Established in 1912 through the merger of two similar companies in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (founded respectively in 1899 and 1904), Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company was known as 'A Luz' [The Light], or less affectionately so as 'o Polvo Canadense' [the Canadian Octopus], by Brazilians who used its public transport, electricity, and telephone services.⁶⁰ The company's virtual monopoly in these areas made it "Canada's largest overseas corporation."⁶¹ Pointing to the fact that its financing and mind power came from various parts of the English-speaking world, Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles argue that the company was the product of a metropolitan finance capitalism rather than the "financial incarnation of Canadian imperialism."⁶² Although it is true that The Light's "initial Canadianness was a function of a highly developed and concentrated capital market that could readily mobilize savings for domestic or foreign investment," its administrators – McCrimmon among them – remained profoundly attached to their Britishness.⁶³ They also did not fail to understand that Canada's image, as a friendly country, could be an asset in times of trouble such as when Vargas raised the spectre of nationalization as a possible component of the *Estado Novo*.

⁵⁹ Santuza Cambraia Naves, "O Brasil em Uníssono," in Jardim, *O Brasil em Uníssono*, 41. In Portuguese: "... arte interessada."

⁶⁰ McDowall, *The Light*, 4.

⁶¹ Ogelsby, *Gringos from the Far North*, 129.

⁶² Armstrong and Nelles, *Southern Exposure*, 277.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 279.

A nationalist in the Canadian imperialist tradition, McCrimmon willingly served as a facilitator between Brazil and Canada.⁶⁴ In the summer of 1937, he wrote to Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian ambassador to the United States, to encourage him to take a vacation from Washington and visit Toronto. The invitation to travel north came from him and the “Polvo Canadense,” he wrote in a friendly and humorous way.⁶⁵ The diplomat could not free himself before his recall to Brazil where he accepted the offer to lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (aka the Itamaraty). The news of Aranha’s return to Rio de Janeiro and his nomination as minister was welcomed favourably at *The Light* since he had made clear to Vargas that he was “very much against the policy of extreme nationalization.”⁶⁶ McCrimmon could therefore hardly refuse Aranha’s verbal request, in 1940, to communicate to the DEA Brazil’s wish for reciprocal diplomatic representation, especially since his “personal relations with him” were of a “somewhat intimate nature.”⁶⁷ It is unclear how much of what was conveyed was Aranha’s, but officials in Ottawa did take note that McCrimmon, who was known as a “very strong imperialist,” now strongly advocated for “direct Canadian representation in Brazil” if Canada was to take its place “in the future commercial and political relations of this hemisphere.”⁶⁸

What appeared as an about-face was an effort to find a place and a role for the Dominion within the Americas without the need for Canadians on the ground to shed their Britishness. McCrimmon sought to accomplish this using the tropes of pan-Americanism and Good Neighborism. Speaking with reporters in Brazil, he underlined Canada’s “spirit of Americanism” and discussed his fellow compatriots’ desire “to live in the happy and harmonious communion which is one of the bases of tranquility and of progress” in the hemisphere.⁶⁹ McCrimmon added: “Canada, although belonging, with pride, to the British Commonwealth, is an American nation, sensitive to the influence and spirit of Panamericanism and which tends, in an ever increasing manner to become part of the same fellowship and to reciprocate the same affection which binds

⁶⁴ Ogelsby, *Gringos from the Far North*, 135; Barbosa, *Brazil and Canada*, 34.

⁶⁵ K. H. McCrimmon to Oswaldo Aranha, June 13, 1937, OAcP 1937.06.13.1 Oswaldo Aranha Collection, FGV-CPDOC.

⁶⁶ C. A. Sylvester to Miller Lash, May 13, 1938, MG28-III112, Vol. 76, 011.4 pt. 17, Brazil: Politics & Elections, Brascan Limited Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁷ K. H. McCrimmon to Dr. Keenleyside, June 19, 1940, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁸ Copy on 261-40, September 1940, RG25, Vol. 2630, Brazil/Canada Diplomatic Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁹ Cited in H. V. Barter to Col. Walter Gow, November 27, 1940, MG28-III112, Vol. 76, 011.4 pt. 20, Brazil: Politics & Elections, Brascan Limited Fonds, LAC.

all the nations of this continent.”⁷⁰ The Canada he described was resolutely British in its origins and its destiny even if it was realigning itself along pan-American ideals such as those championed by the Pan-American Union (PAU). Founded in 1890, the organization sought to promote mutual understanding and unity of purpose among the hemisphere’s republics, primarily with respect to economic and juridical matters, while also serving as the channel through which the United States promoted its liberal developmentalist agenda. Although Canada had yet to join the PAU (its Dominion status and constitutional monarchy were obvious impediments), reporters welcomed the news that the DEA and the Itamaraty had agreed to reciprocal diplomatic representation, noting that the country’s communion with the “American family” was long overdue.⁷¹ As for McCrimmon, he described the two countries’ rapprochement as “a happy moment in the good-neighbour policy which must predominate in the evolution of culture and civilization of America.”⁷²

The Light was an early proponent of musical pan-Americanism as demonstrated by its incursion in the realm of broadcasting. In 1940, it launched *Ondas Musicais*, a Rio de Janeiro-based program dedicated to “all the radio listeners who prefer the works of classical and modern composers who have already been consecrated by good musical taste.”⁷³ Organized and financed by the company, *Ondas Musicais* premiered on April 2, 1940, airing on six radio frequencies for an hour every Tuesday and the last two Fridays of each month. Brazilians were treated to fifty-five minutes of music with a short break in the middle during which The Light offered advice on how to best take advantage of electricity’s potential.⁷⁴ The inaugural show featured the Ferdinand Strack Orchestra performing works by a variety of composers, including Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, Henry K. Hadley, and Brazil’s own Gomes.⁷⁵ The local press celebrated the

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* For the original Brazilian publication, see “O Estabelecimento de Relações Diplomáticas entre o Canadá e o Brasil,” *O Jornal*, November 17, 1940, 4, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/110523_04/4094.

⁷¹ “Brasil-Canadá,” November 21, 1940, *A Notícia*, in MG28-III112, Vol. 76, 011.4 pt. 20, Brazil: Politics & Elections, Brascan Limited Fonds, LAC. In Portuguese: “... família Americana.” James Rochlin argues that Ottawa’s ambivalence towards Latin America and Washington’s concerns that Canadians would act as surrogates for the British in the region were the main impediments to Canada’s membership in the Pan-American Union at the turn of the 1940s. Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas*, 12-32.

⁷² Cited in H. V. Barter to Col. Walter Gow, November 27, 1940, MG28-III112, Vol. 76, 011.4 pt. 20, Brazil: Politics & Elections, Brascan Limited Fonds, LAC.

⁷³ “Hoje, Inauguração dos Programas ‘Ondas Musicais,’” *Correio da Manhã*, April 2, 1940, 8, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/089842_05/1064. In Portuguese: “... todos os rádio-ouvintes que preferem as obras de compositores classicos e dos modernos já consagrados pelo bom gosto musical.”

⁷⁴ “Ondas Musicais,” *A Noite*, April 7, 1940, 8, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/1736.

⁷⁵ “Hoje, Inauguração dos Programas ‘Ondas Musicais,’” 8.

initiative for helping improve the musical culture of Brazilians while enhancing the artistic prestige of the city's broadcasting.⁷⁶ *Ondas Musicais* was as much about marketing The Light to middle-class audiences most likely to require the company's services as it was about serving as a conduit for liberal developmentalism. Attuned to the United States' growing interest in the potency of music, the company branded itself according to pan-American and Good Neighbor ideals while helping shape Brazil's soundscape so that it echoed that of its English-speaking neighbours to the north.

McCrimmon's endorsement of pan-Americanism and Good Neighborism was part opportunism and part public relations since his sense of Britishness continued to shape his reactions to events unfolding on the ground. For example, he was profoundly upset to learn that the Americans had refused to allow Canadians to attend, even only as observers, the PAU conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1942. The Monroe Doctrine continued to limit Canada's presence south of the Rio Grande and, as a result, its ability to advance Canadian and Commonwealth interests in the hemisphere. In a letter to the company's president, Sir Herbert Couzens, McCrimmon decried the fact that Canada's efforts to attend the conference had been "torpedoed by the United States" whose objectionable Latin American policy was: "Great Britain and the British Empire – hands off!"⁷⁷ He denounced the "sweeping anti-British remarks" of Import-Export Bank President Warren Lee Pierson and reserved his most severe criticism for Jefferson Caffery, American ambassador to Brazil, who considered "himself a sort of emperor" and acted dismissively towards both Canadian and British diplomats.⁷⁸ Yet McCrimmon concluded on a positive note by remarking that the United States' self-serving policies in Latin America were bound to enhance "Brazilian sympathy for Great Britain."⁷⁹

The Light's deep connections to the British world shaped Brazilians' perception of Canada in the opening years of the 1940s. It was an essentialized image that centred on the country's Britishness and its so-called exceptionalism as a settler colony turned Dominion. The "English

⁷⁶ "A Violinista Eunice de Conte," *A Noite*, June 2, 1940, 8, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/2728; "Arte e Cultura Pelo Radio," *O Jornal*, December 24, 1944, sec. 2, 9, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/110523_04/25102.

⁷⁷ K. H. McCrimmon to Sir Herbert Couzens, February 3, 1942, MG28-III112, Vol. 325, 21, McCrimmon, K.H., Brascan Limited Fonds, LAC.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

race,” a reporter noted, was responsible for the moral and material progress of the “great Canadian nation.”⁸⁰ More specifically: “Canadians perfectly portray all the British beauties and virtues, and in their blood predominates, substantially, that imperishable principle of love of freedom, human dignity, distinctiveness of manners and clothing that make the ‘homo britannicus’ a unique being.”⁸¹ Such generous and flattering comments were likely intended for Canadian expatriates and their associates in Canada and Great Britain. At the same time, they demonstrated the ease with which Brazilians navigated between biological and cultural understandings of ‘race.’ They also denoted continued admiration, if not adherence, to the normative project of the West as deployed through its former settler colonies. More importantly, the above characterization suggested that Brazilians knew either very little about the Dominion and its diverse population or that their knowledge of Canada centred mostly on the country’s connections to the Commonwealth and to London, the metropole that had fascinated and inspired Brazil’s political and cultural elite during the ‘tropical *belle époque*.’

As the first minister plenipotentiary to Brazil, Désy nuanced – even challenged – that image of Canada. He was an all-around exceptional candidate for the job because of his aptitude for languages as well as the fifteen years of experience he had amassed with the DEA in Ottawa, London, Geneva, Paris, and Brussels. Born in Montreal in 1893, he attended the Jesuits’ Collège Sainte-Marie before earning a degree in law at Université Laval satellite campus in Montreal. He then studied economics at École libre des sciences politiques in Paris, returning home to practice law between 1915 and 1917. Shortly after, he joined the faculty of his alma mater, which had in the meantime obtained its autonomy as Université de Montréal. A founding member of the institution’s Faculté des sciences sociales, Désy taught political history as well as institutional and constitutional law. A short, indefatigable man with an air of nobility about him, he was a lover of the arts, literature, painting, and especially music, which he discovered at a young age through his cousin, Sister Marie-Stéphane, who later became director of École supérieure de musique d’Outremont (ESMO). In the words of Radio-Canada journalist A.-J. Sarrazin, Désy was “[r]acé, élégant, avec des manières de grand seigneur, sans manquer à la simplicité, il sait

⁸⁰ “Brasil-Canadá,” November 21, 1940, *A Notícia*, in MG28-III112, Vol. 76, 011.4 pt. 20, Brazil: Politics & Elections, Brascan Limited Fonds, LAC. In Portuguese: “... a raça inglesa” and “... grande nação canadense.”

⁸¹ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: “Os Canadenses retratam com perfeição todas as bellezas e virtudes britannicas, e no seu sangue predomina, substancialmente aquele princípio imperecível de amor á liberdade, de dignidade humana, de distincção de maneiras e indumentaria que fazem do ‘homo britannicus’ um ser á parte.”

faire sentir les distances qui s'imposent, tout en restant familier. Il n'est pas très grand ..., l'œil vif, les plus belles mains qui soient. On l'imagine fort bien à la cour de Louis XIV."⁸² Désy's wife, a descendant of ennobled aristocrat Pierre Boucher, founder and seigneur of Boucherville, provided additional substance to his grand aura.⁸³

A student – and later a colleague – of economist Édouard Montpetit, Désy participated in the making of the modern university in Québec, acquiring in the process an appreciation for the professionalization of knowledge and the accumulation of cultural capital, both of which could be mobilized for the collective good of the nation. Like his mentor, he believed in the possibility of *bonne entente* between French Canadians and English Canadians, placing emphasis on the French fact and its contributions – past, present, and future – to Canada's national project.⁸⁴ As such, he straddled the fence between tradition and modernity, following the lead of Montpetit who “formed part of a French-speaking Catholic elite that was looking for ways of living with feet in both the older and the newer worlds.”⁸⁵ In a similar way, Désy found himself travelling back and forth between Montreal and Paris, first to study and then to teach history at Université de Sorbonne. Following in the footsteps of Montpetit, he acquired a taste for international cultural relations by taking part in the networks that emerged through Québec-France intellectual exchanges in the 1920s.⁸⁶ Indebted to his mentor, he wrote: “Tout le contraire du technocrate, vous représentiez le type à peu près inconnu chez nous du spécialiste qui est en même temps un amateur éclairé, prompt à tirer des êtres les virtuosités qu'ils recèlent.”⁸⁷ It is this commitment to intellectual curiosity – combined with an attachment to nationhood and a love for culture – that Désy brought to the DEA.

Désy was O.D. Skelton's first recruit in 1925 and he did not disappoint. King had given his under-secretary of state for External Affairs the go ahead to hire a counselor, a post that required a “law degree or membership in a professional bar association, two years of post-graduate

⁸² A.-J. Sarrazin, “Portrait de son Excellence Jean Désy,” September 9, 1949, MG32-E2, Vol. 1, Coupures sur Jean Désy au Brésil (1941-1947), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC.

⁸³ Biographical details about Jean Désy are found throughout the Jean Désy Fonds preserved at LAC.

⁸⁴ Jean Désy's views on this topic would change somewhat in the late stages of his career as discussed in the conclusion.

⁸⁵ Ronald Rudin, *Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 47.

⁸⁶ On this topic, see Marcel Fournier, “Édouard Montpetit et l'Université moderne, ou l'échec d'une génération,” *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* 36, no. 1 (1982): 3–29; and Gérard Fabre, “Un arc transatlantique et sa tangente ou comment se dessine un réseau intellectuel franco-québécois?” *Globe* 7, no. 1 (2004): 43–78.

⁸⁷ Jean Désy, *Les sentiers de la culture* (Montreal: Fides, 1954), 12.

studies in international affairs, practical experience in legal work, and good knowledge of both English and French.”⁸⁸ Although he apparently was the sole applicant, Désy got the job because he was evidently qualified to handle the tasks Skelton had reserved for him: “legal matters, protocol, treaties, the League [of Nations (LON)], and, when time permitted, commercial subjects.”⁸⁹ In addition to these, he occasionally chaired the committee responsible for evaluating potential recruits.⁹⁰ Désy subsequently held the posts of counselor to the delegate at the LON, assistant to the permanent delegate at the LON, and counselor at the Paris legation. He was also part of the DEA delegation at the 1929 Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation in London and represented Canada at the Conference for the Codification of International Law held in Hague the following year. This experience equipped him to assume the title of minister plenipotentiary at the joint Belgium-Netherlands legation when it opened in 1938. Désy was pleased with the appointment and he might have stayed in Europe longer if war had not broken out.

Désy’s debut as minister became the source of considerable anxieties for him. On May 10, 1940, German forces invaded Belgium. Eighteen days later, the country capitulated. At the sound of the first bombs, Désy’s wife and children fled through France to Portugal where they safely boarded a ship headed to North America. The Canadian diplomat stayed behind with his staff, relocating first to Ostend, Belgium, before fleeing to Paris then Lisbon. From there, they travelled to London where they shared their time between the Park Lane Hotel and bomb shelters. Exhausted after a long journey, all suffered sleepless nights while the Battle of Britain raged on. Writing to Skelton and King, Désy inquired about the future of the joint Belgium-Netherlands legation and the possibility of being relocated to a new post. Told to stay put, Désy replied that a home leave ought to be considered if he and his staff were not to be reappointed elsewhere. He added: “I beg respectfully to submit that I consider myself as responsible for the life of my personnel and that responsibility or mine rests with you.” The tone and content of the

⁸⁸ Norman Hillmer, “National Independence and the National Interest: O.D. Skelton’s Department of External Affairs in the 1920s,” in Donaghy and Carroll, *In the National Interest*, 15.

⁸⁹ John Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs. Volume 1: The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 104. Hilliker indicates that “only one qualified candidate presented himself” for the competition organized for the post. Yet internal correspondence suggests that there “were a number of very good men from Ontario, Quebec, and the West.” O.D. Skelton to Léon M. Gouin, July 13, 1925, RG25, Vol. 2960, Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs: Jean Désy, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 119.

letter displeased King. Désy apologized profusely, noting that he was under tremendous stress, had been ill, and felt helpless in not being able to do something productive for Canada. In a separate, private letter to Skelton, Désy wrote in a “confidential and private manner,” not to his “chief,” but to “the man who has ... honoured me with his friendly confidence.” He emphasized the hardship he had experienced since arriving in Europe, his wife’s difficult pregnancy, the pain of being separated from family, and his recent illness. Désy added:

I did suffer very deeply and I do continue to suffer from the separation both as a father and as a husband. So much the more because day after day I have the acute and persistent sensation that my presence here is worthless, that my mission has practically come to an end, and that I can render no service of any value either to my country or to my own family.

Whether the DEA sent Désy to Brazil to give him a much-needed break or to keep him away from Ottawa is difficult to say. The opening of a legation in an exotic city located practically next to the distant Tropic of Capricorn was certainly good timing.

The timeliness of this Canadian-Brazilian rapprochement was also due to the fact that non-state actors in Québec had begun using the province’s Latin and Catholic heritage as leverage to advocate for a distinctive French-Canadian voice in the hemisphere. This manoeuvre doubled as a strategy for defending the province’s autonomy while advancing the interests of French Canadians both within and outside Canada’s borders. The O’Leary brothers, Émile-Dostaler and Walter-Patrice, were political dissenters who had honed their organizing skills with Jeunesses patriotes du Canada français, a conservative separatist organization founded during the Great Depression. At the turn of the 1940s, they orchestrated a rapprochement between Catholic militants in Mexico and French-Canadian nationalists with the creation of the Unión Cultural México-Canadá Francés. The organization’s Montreal chapter subsequently adopted a new name – Union culturelle des Latins d’Amérique (UCLA) – to reflect its broader mandate: that is, to (a) establish direct and ongoing contact with the people of Latin America and (b) to develop cultural, educational, social, and commercial relations with them. The UCLA’s focus was primarily on Spanish-speaking Latin America, but Brazil did feature on the radar of the O’Leary brothers. As Maurice Demers explains, they were pursuing transnational collaborations to advance a politico-cultural project rooted in identity politics. He writes: “By mobilizing *latinité* as a meaningful discourse of identity for francophones, the U[C]LA tried to locate French

Canada at the crux of Canadian-Latin American diplomatic relations, thus improving the grim outlook for survival of its culture on this continent.”⁹¹ Although the organization was not yet a concern when Désy arrived in Brazil, it did garner attention, in both Montreal and Ottawa, while delineating emerging views about the place that French Canada could occupy in the Americas.

In some respects, Brazil was an ideal venue for the Québec-centred cultural outreach that the O’Leary brothers and – as we will see – Désy were envisioning. Since the heydays of the ‘tropical *belle époque*,’ the country’s cultural and political elite had developed its anglophilia and francophilia at the expense of the Portuguese metropole. But it was France that made the most indelible mark on Rio de Janeiro, the capital city of the Old Republic and, since 1937, Vargas’s *Estado Novo*. Its central avenue evoked Paris with its architectural marvels, many of which (among others, the Teatro Municipal [Municipal Theatre] and the Museu Nacional de Belas Artes [National Museum of Fine Arts]) were inspired by French landmarks (the Opéra de Paris and the Musée du Louvre, respectively). “The Avenida, like the *belle époque* for which it stood, pulsed between ... colonial realities and metropolitan dynamism, in a constant counterpoint,” writes Needle.⁹² “Civilization and Progress were generally rendered in French,” he adds.⁹³ Mônica Leite Lessa and Hugo Rogélio Suppo both demonstrate that the Quai d’Orsay, France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, actively nurtured this francophilia by strengthening Brazilian-French cultural relations through initiatives such as the 1922 foundation of the Institut franco-brésilien de haute culture.⁹⁴ Wealthy Brazilians learned French as a second language or attended classes in *lycées*. Many travelled to Paris to perfect their education or to find inspiration if they were artistically inclined. As a French-speaking Canadian envoy who had spent many years studying and working in France, Désy could expect to be well received in Brazil. He could perhaps even feel at home among Brazil’s francophile political and cultural elite.

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⁹¹ Demers, *Connected Struggles*, 16.

⁹² Needell, *A Tropical Belle Époque*, 45.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁹⁴ Mônica Leite Lessa, “L’influence intellectuelle française au Brésil: Contribution à l’étude d’une politique culturelle (1886-1930)” (PhD diss., Université de Nanterre, 1997); Hugo Rogélio Suppo, “La politique culturelle française au Brésil entre les années 1920-1950” (PhD diss., Université Paris III - Sorbonne, 1992). See also Regina R. Felix and Scott D. Juall, eds., *Cultural Exchanges Between Brazil and France* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2016).

Désy's arrival in Rio de Janeiro complicated the image of Canada put forward by McCrimmon. For one, he was a French-speaking Catholic. Secondly, he seemed more interested in developing intimate bilateral relations with Brazilians than in subsuming Canada's autonomist moment into a Washington-dominated pan-Americanism. He tried to accomplish that by foregrounding French Canadians' Latinity and sense of family. Whereas *A Notícia* had reduced the country to its Britishness, *A Noite* was quick to point out that Désy's roots on the continent extended to the eighteenth century when his ancestors left France for the New World. The daily featured the minister on its cover with the headline: "He arrived speaking our language!"⁹⁵ The *A Noite* journalist was manifestly impressed by Désy's knowledge of Portuguese. The article highlighted the importance of Latinity in Canada – "forty percent, or approximately four million, but from the highest cultural and social circles" – while depicting Désy as a high-minded representative of French-Canadian society who juggled both family and diplomatic affairs with ability and genuine interest.⁹⁶ The minister plenipotentiary spoke of his intentions to travel throughout Brazil to develop further his appreciation of the country's rich and diverse landscape, its long history, and its cultural accomplishments. "I want to live the Brazilian way," Désy said, as if the Canada-Brazil rapprochement he was tasked with promoting could be embodied.⁹⁷ He insisted that it was about time that the two nations get to know each other better. Believing that intellectual curiosity could drive expertise, he immersed himself in Brazil's cultural and social life while looking for opportunities to project an image of Canada that his Brazilian interlocutors could relate to and engage with.

Désy embarked on his first musical nation branding campaign in 1943 when he invited Jean Dansereau to give a series of concerts in and around Rio de Janeiro. Born on the outskirts of Montreal in 1891, Hector changed his name to Jean at the turn of the 1920s, possibly to make himself more marketable in the United States or presumably in honour of Jean de Reszke, a Polish tenor with whom he worked as a *répétiteur*. Dansereau acquired a taste for music through his mother who was a cousin of Calixa Lavallée, the accomplished composer who had written the music to "O Canada," a work which allegedly became – albeit unofficially – the country's

⁹⁵ "Chegou Falando o Nosso Idioma," 1.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3. In Portuguese: "... quarenta por cento, ou seja, a cerca de quatro milhões, mas de todos os altos círculos culturais e sociais."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: "... quero viver brasileiroamente."

national anthem with the visit of King George VI in 1939.⁹⁸ He studied at McGill University's Conservatory before being awarded the 1914 Prix d'Europe, a prestigious annual competition sponsored by the government of Québec and administered by the Académie de musique du Québec. In France, he studied with harmonist Charles-Marie Widor as well as pianists Isidore Philipp and Édouard Risler. He subsequently accompanied RCA recording artists in the United States (Mary Garden, among others), worked alongside Reske, and performed throughout Europe until his return to Canada in 1938. Dansereau soon found himself at home teaching at ESMO and then at the recently established Conservatoire de musique du Québec à Montréal (CMQM), institutions where Désy had personal connections.⁹⁹

Accompanying him was his wife, Muriel Tannehill, a native of New Jersey who was mistaken as Canadian-born in the Brazilian press.¹⁰⁰ The confusion was understandable considering that she was married to Dansereau and that she had spent the greater part of her formative years training in France under the mentorship of Reske and Widor. She particularly liked singing works by French composers such as Maurice Ravel and Debussy, the latter being a favourite of her husband. Incidentally, the couple had a Debussy special planned for *Ondas Musicais*. Although the spotlight was on her husband, Tannehill's presence in Brazil did not go unnoticed, partly because she had rubbed shoulders with acclaimed Brazilian soprano Balduína de Oliveira Sayão (aka Bidu Sayão) who also studied with Reske in the 1920s. More importantly, the image of an artistic couple made for great headlines in the effort to promote more intimate cultural relations between Brazilians and Canadians.

In his capacity as minister plenipotentiary, Désy skillfully mobilized and consolidated his network of friends and contacts to reinvent himself as a cultural promoter – a status that helped him fulfill, both at home and abroad, his personal and professional ambitions. He had planned to get Dansereau and his wife to Brazil in the spring of 1943, but delays in the issuing of visas

⁹⁸ Brian Bethune, "A Gift Fit for the King," *Maclean's*, July 7, 2011, <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/a-gift-fit-for-a-king/>.

⁹⁹ See Guy Gallo, "Dansereau, Jean," in *Encyclopédie de la musique au Canada*, eds. Helmut Kallmann, Gilles Potvin, and Kenneth Winters (Montreal: Fides, 1983), 259; Jean Laurendeau, *Cent ans de Prix d'Europe* (Montreal: Académie de musique du Québec, 2011).

¹⁰⁰ "Música – Expressão de Harmonia Continental," *Correio da Manhã*, July 10, 1943, 7, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=089842_05&pagfis=16677; "A Arte a Serviço dos Ideais Panamericanos," *Diário de Notícias*, July 18, 1943, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/093718_02/14731.

resulted in the visit being postponed by a few months.¹⁰¹ This was all for the better, since the couple could then participate in Dominion Day celebrations scheduled to take place in Rio de Janeiro. With the approval of his pianist friend, Désy wore the hat of an impresario, coordinating with the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) and the Itamaraty to book concerts and arrange performances on Brazilian radio airwaves. He also reached out to the press whose support proved essential to the success of this first experiment in musical diplomacy. From early June to late August, Dansereau and his wife offered the gift of music to their Brazilian hosts, accompanying Désy on a round of social functions that put the artistic couple in contact with Rio de Janeiro's political and cultural elite. Their multiple appearances on radio and in the press also made it possible for their music to reach into people's homes, thanks to the assistance of the DIP.

Conscious of the fact that Brazilians consumed their share of state propaganda every day, Désy softened his musical nation branding campaign by presenting the Dansereau couple primarily as his personal guests rather than as Canadian envoys. The approach was also consistent with his efforts to present himself as both personable and dependable. It nicely complemented his fatherly image, which is something Désy increasingly embraced after reuniting with his wife and children (*figure 1.1*). Drawing attention to his leadership qualities and caring abilities, he sought to accentuate paternal attributes that presumably qualified him for diplomatic work, especially since it involved managing cultural relations between two 'sister nations.' Désy's masculine sense of self was a composite of his domestic and civic identities (as a devoted father and as a skilled diplomat), which proved easy to reconcile considering that he had free rein to experiment in Brazil, a country that must have felt like an oasis compared to war-torn Europe.¹⁰² It was also informed by his membership in what can be described as an imagined transnational brotherhood of elite 'white' men – that is, descendants of settler colonists who saw themselves as champions of Western Christian civilization. On Dominion Day 1942, the daily *Correio da Manhã* published an interview with Désy. Pictured with his daughter, the Canadian diplomat spoke of family and of how much he felt at home in Brazil. He confided that he had

¹⁰¹ Jean Désy to T. da Graça Aranha, January 8, 1943, 82/3/5, Representações Diplomáticas Estrangeiras – Canada (Notas Rec.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹⁰² Located on the periphery of the North Atlantic Triangle, the diplomats who operated the Canadian legation in Japan prior to the Second World War enjoyed a similar level of autonomy, which allowed them to develop highly individualized styles based on both their civic and domestic identities. See Jason Butters, "From Empire or Dominion? Prestige or Adventure? The Men of the Canadian Legation in Tokyo, 1929-1933" (MA thesis, Concordia University, 2016).

been seduced by the country's rich history, folklore, literature, and music, which reminded him of Canada. The two nations were similar, Désy suggested, in that they were resilient and both carried forward into the 'New World' the core values of Western Europe: "Canada and Brazil are young countries whose unity is manifested through culture and patriotism."¹⁰³ He added: "We make common cause against everything that threatens our national and Christian heritage."¹⁰⁴ The Brazil he described was one that corresponded with his self-image and with which he wished to engage. Hence his confidence that he could turn the "air de famille" he found in Rio de Janeiro into a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.¹⁰⁵




Figure 1.1. Jean Désy reunited with his family on the day they arrived in Rio de Janeiro (1941). Source: A Manhã, Biblioteca Nacional.

Désy knew just the right person to help with this. "Jean Dansereau is my compatriot and my friend," he wrote in the program notes for the pianist's first solo recital at the Teatro Municipal.¹⁰⁶ The text established the terms with which to discuss the performance, but its reproduction in *A Manhã*, the following day, indicated that it also served to delimit the frame within which to think about Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations.¹⁰⁷ Dansereau's debut featured

¹⁰³ Cited in "Uma Entrevista com o Ministro do Canadá no Brasil," *Correio da Manhã*, July 1, 1942, 1, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/089842_05/12659. In Portuguese: "O Canadá e o Brasil são países jovens cuja unidade se manifesta pela cultura e patriotismo."

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: "[Nós] fazemos causa comum contra tudo o que ameaça o nosso patrimônio nacional e cristão."

¹⁰⁵ Jean Désy, "Fondation de l'Institut Brésil-Canada," June 14, 1944, MG32-E2, Vol. 1, Discours au Brésil (1942-1947), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁶ "Recital do Pianista Jean Dansereau," June 14, 1943, MG32, Vol. 1, Coupures sur Jean Désy au Brésil (1941-1947), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC. In Portuguese: "Jean Dansereau é meu compatriota e meu amigo."

¹⁰⁷ Jean Désy, "Jean Dansereau," *A Manhã*, June 15, 1943, 4, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/116408/20701>.

a series of preludes by Debussy and Frédéric Chopin, pieces that formed part of a canonical repertoire shared by many of the nations that partook in musical pan-Americanism. But Dansereau was different by virtue of his French-Canadian roots and his Latinity, Désy suggested. He placed emphasis on his friend's cultural background in the program notes, remarking that it made him a particularly effective translator of both 'Old World' and 'New World' sensibilities. Dansereau's virtuosity was about technique as much as it was about emotional depth. His mastery of Debussy's impressionist sonic palette was about capturing majestic landscapes with near-scientific precision whereas his heartfelt rendition of Chopin's romantic preludes was a testament to his humanity. Désy's insistence on this duality as well as his discussion of Dansereau's background indicated that one needed to engage with not only the repertoire and delivery, but also the man, his worldview, and the values for which he stood. In some ways, Dansereau was Désy's musical alter ego with both men personifying a distinctively unique Canada to which Brazil's cultural and political elite were expected to relate.

Promoters and critics took their cues from Désy in discussing Dansereau, "ambassador of Canada's musical art" and "français de vieille souche."¹⁰⁸ In Brazil, the pianist performed works by Debussy and Chopin, but also Franz Liszt and Ludwig van Beethoven, among others. One writer described the concert he attended as a triumph. Dansereau was a musical genius with an ability to combine virtuosity with sensitivity, he wrote.¹⁰⁹ Another was less categorical: the Canadian pianist possessed an impressive arsenal of musical skills to pull from, but that did not make him a virtuoso. Still, his performance was sufficiently enticing to merit long applause.¹¹⁰ Dansereau's personalized touch either denatured the works he played or it augmented their resonance. The latter was generally truer according to a *Fon Fon* review, which noted how skillfully the Canadian pianist engaged with the great European masters without ever losing his personality.¹¹¹ His soulfulness and ability to turn the concert stage into an intimate space were qualities that made him different. Alda Caminha, writing for *Diario Carioca*, expected nothing

¹⁰⁸ "Ondas Musicais," *O Radical*, June 1, 1943, 23, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/830399/26184>. In Portuguese: "... Embaixador do Arte Musical do Canadá." Ariel, "Brasil-Canadá," *A Noite*, July 7, 1943, 4, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/21504.

¹⁰⁹ "Jean Dansereau na Cultural Artística," *Gazeta de Noticias*, June 16, 1943, 9, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/103730_07/15411.

¹¹⁰ "Jean Dansereau na Cultural Artística," *Dom Casmurro*, June 26, 1943, 7, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/095605/2652>.

¹¹¹ "Notas de Arte," *Fon Fon*, July 3, 1943, 11, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/259063/110499>.

less after having read Désy's program notes. She stressed Dansereau's difference, particularly with respect to his musically inquisitive mind and enchanting personality, which demonstrated a rare predisposition for the polyphony of the world.¹¹² Different indeed, concurred her colleague from *Correio da Manhã*.¹¹³ Echoing Désy, a reporter from that same paper marvelled at Dansereau's ability to marry technique with emotion in a distinctively original style.¹¹⁴ The widely respected musicologist and critic Ayres de Andrade also fell under the charm of Dansereau although he thought that the French-Canadian pianist's personality shone best through the works of the great French composer Debussy.¹¹⁵

The emphasis on difference made it possible to think beyond the frame of musical pan-Americanism even if Dansereau's repertoire centred on canons. One critic, writing for *Diário de Notícias*, did describe the tour as a "good neighbour mission" serving continental ideals and values, but such a reading was the exception rather than the rule.¹¹⁶ When music's potential to foster continental harmony was evoked, it was to better delineate the qualities that supposedly differentiated Canadians and Brazilians from the rest of the hemisphere. The image that emerged was that the two nations were bound to tradition yet progressively minded, industrious, non-imperialistic, peace-driven, sincere in their dealing with the world, and – most of all – both freedom-loving and spiritually inclined. According to music critics, Dansereau's goodwill cultural mission conveyed all these qualities. It rendered audible and corporeal the sororal ties that existed between the two "sister nations."¹¹⁷ The trope of family spoke of closeness and intimacy, which the Dansereau couple both embodied and projected on stage, in the press, and during outings with Désy. Although Tannehill did not perform as often as her husband did, she helped set the musical mood for this cultural rapprochement, even if only by her presence. As an

¹¹² Alda Caminha, "Jean Dansereau, Um Artista Diferente," *Diário Carioca*, June 27, 1943, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/093092_03/13344.

¹¹³ "Música – Expressão de Harmonia Continental," 7.

¹¹⁴ "Correio Musical: O Pianista Jean Dansereau na Cultural Artística," *Correio da Manhã*, June 16, 1943, 11, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/089842_05/16405.

¹¹⁵ Ayres de Andrade, "Música: Recital de Jean Dansereau," *O Jornal*, June 16, 1943, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/110523_04/16415.

¹¹⁶ "A Arte a Serviço dos Ideais Panamericanos," 2. In Portuguese: "... missão de boa vizinhança."

¹¹⁷ "Dois Grandes Povos, Duas Pátrias Irmãs," *Jornal do Commercio*, July 18, 1943, 10, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/364568_13/16917. In Portuguese: "... pátrias irmãs." Ariel, "Canadá," *A Noite*, August 29, 1943, 4; "Música – Expressão de Harmonia Continental," 7.

artistic couple, they symbolized the interplay between tradition and modernity – between family and nation (*figure 1.2*).¹¹⁸



Figure 1.2. Newspaper ad featuring Jean and Muriel Dansereau as an artistic couple in Brazil (1943). Source: O Radical, Biblioteca Nacional.

These metaphors, although expressed in gendered terms, did not necessarily ‘effeminize’ Dansereau and his performance of nation. Like Désy, the multidimensionality of his masculine identity (as a husband and as an agile musician) tied in nicely with his newfound calling as impromptu ambassador. Although the figure of the sensitive pianist deviated somewhat from normative gender expressions, Dansereau conceptualized and embodied emotional experiences in ways that were coded male in 1940s Brazil.¹¹⁹ The press portrayed him as a grounded and sensible erudite performer whose skills commanded admiration and respect. Pictures showed him with an intent look, seated at a piano, with full mastery of the instrument. Dansereau played with

¹¹⁸ For a discussion of the artistic couple and postwar modernity, see Tag Gronberg, “Sonia Delaunay’s Simultaneous Fashions and the Modern Woman,” in *The Modern Woman Revisited: Paris Between the Wars*, eds. Whitney Chadwick and Tirza True Latimer (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 113.

¹¹⁹ The piano was considered predominantly a female instrument, particularly within middle-class circles where it was associated with housebound femininity. See Rita Steblin, “The Gender Stereotyping of Musical Instruments in the Western Tradition,” *Canadian University Music Review* 16, no. 1 (1995): 128–144.

so much vigour that one of Chopin's waltzes became something entirely different.¹²⁰ His repertoire's "manly lineage" lent credence to his stature as an authoritative performer.¹²¹ The French-Canadian pianist provided more evidence of the masculine overtones that permeated Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations when he listed the names of Brazilians artists with whom he associated the most as a Canadian: among others, Villa-Lobos, Mignone, José Siqueira, Radamés Gnattali, Arnaldo Estrella, and Magda Tagliaferro (all men except for the last). In Rio de Janeiro, he rubbed shoulders with many of these artists while making a name for himself in the city's male-dominated cultural milieu. If there were any doubts about Dansereau's manliness, the presence of his wife assuaged them. Together, they helped clarify the terms within which musical nation branding was to take place.

Musical diplomacy thus offered multiple opportunities to fabricate – even amplify – fraternal feelings. In late 1942, Désy commissioned Claude Champagne to prepare a musical homage to Brazil. The Montreal-born composer acquiesced to the demand by writing "Quadrilha Brasileira," a composition for piano based on an indigenous folk melody rooted in Marajó culture. Brazil's response came shortly after with Mignone proposing his own musical homage: "Três Prelúdios (Sobre Temas Canadenses)," a short piano piece based on three French-Canadian folksongs that featured female characters – "Marianne s'en va t'au moulin," "Sainte Marguerite veillez ma petite," and "À la Claire fontaine."¹²² Dansereau's presence in Brazil provided the opportunity to augment this musical exchange with a performative component. On July 1, 1943, Rádio Nacional celebrated Dominion Day with a special program featuring Estrella and Dansereau. The Brazilian pianist premiered Champagne's "Quadrilha Brasileira" while Dansereau played Mignone's "Três Prelúdios (Sobre Temas Canadenses)."¹²³ Brazilians heard the performance live on radio at 5 p.m. while North American audiences listened to it via

¹²⁰ "Correio Musical," 11. Jean Dansereau was injecting virility in what could be constructed as a 'feminine' genre, to use Jeffrey Kallberg's taxonomy. See Jeffrey Kallberg, *Chopin at the Boundaries: Sex, History, and Musical Genre* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), IX; and Graham Carr, "Visualizing 'The Sound of Genius': Glenn Gould and the Culture of Celebrity in the 1950s," *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes* 40, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 28.

¹²¹ As Graham Carr points out, pianists could rely on a repertoire of canonic works by male composers to enhance their "masculine authority" on stage. *Ibid.*

¹²² The two works are discussed in greater details in chapter 3.

¹²³ Renditions of these two works can be heard on the following recordings: André-Sébastien Savoie, *PianoFiesta*, n.d., Radio Canada International RCI 418, 33½ rpm LP; Claude Champagne, *Anthologie de la musique canadienne*, 1982, Radio-Canada International ACM-30, 4 X 33½ rpm LPs.

shortwave transmission at 11 p.m.¹²⁴ That evening, Dansereau entertained Rio de Janeiro's political and cultural elite in the main hall of the Associação Brasileira de Imprensa [Brazilian Press Association]. In addition to Mignone's and Champagne's works, he played two folk-infused compositions by Canada's Ernest MacMillan ("Les jeunes filles à marier") and Achille Fortier ("Lève ton pied, bergère"). Tannehill then joined her husband and sang a few French-Canadian folksongs to the great pleasure of the audience. As an extra friendly gesture, Dansereau dedicated his performance to Mignone and Villa-Lobos.

Not only did this musical diplomacy elevate Désy's status within Rio de Janeiro's elite circles, it also changed the perception that Canada was defined, foremost, by its Britishness. In a piece published shortly after the Dansereau couple's Dominion Day performance, a reporter from *A Noite* described a room filled with Canadian and Brazilians flags, symbols of harmony that spoke of the closeness between the two nations. Music, the piece concluded, provided a vivid experience of this growing bond of friendship: "It is now the hearts that intertwine in a common affection, a feeling made more refined and more harmonious through the art of Jean and Muriel Dansereau."¹²⁵ Canada, another journalist wrote, is a "romantic northern country, where spirit and 'finesse' miraculously fuse Latin grace with British solemnity, in the happiest and most perfect of alliances."¹²⁶ Through this musical nation branding, Désy and his friends demonstrated to Brazilians that Canada had, like Brazil, a culture of *métissage*, albeit one that centred on 'whiteness.' This particularity was, from the beginning, central to the making of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.

As for Dansereau, it is unclear what he got out of this experience. He had moved back to Canada five years earlier after an absence of close to twenty years. Composer Wilfrid Pelletier, then artistic director of Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM), had greeted him at the station after having invited reporters to join him in celebrating the pianist's return. None came. Pelletier felt "hurt" and made it his mission to prepare his friend's success in the

¹²⁴ "A Rádio Nacional Homenageia o Canadá," *A Noite*, July 1, 1943, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/21402.

¹²⁵ "Brasil-Canadá," *A Noite*, 4. In Portuguese: "Agora são os corações que se entrelaçam em um sentimento comum, a que a arte de Jean e Muriel Dansereau, deu um requinte maior e uma harmonia mais pura."

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: "... romântico país do Norte, onde o espírito e a 'finesse' reúnem miraculosamente a graça latina e a gravidade britânica, na mais feliz e perfeita das alianças." See also Coutinho, "Uma oferta de arte do Canadá ao Brasil," 2.

province.¹²⁷ A few weeks later, Dansereau performed Beethoven's third piano concerto with the OCSM to great acclaim. By 1943, he was teaching at ESMO and CMQM (Pelletier was its first director with Champagne serving as assistant director). In addition to being an exotic destination, Brazil was most likely an opportunity for Dansereau to network with renowned composers such as Villa-Lobos and Mignone, enhancing his image as a great cosmopolitan artist, while familiarizing himself with his counterparts' approach to musical nationalism and music education. One thing is certain: he embraced the mandate of cultural ambassador given to him by Désy. In an interview with Sheila Ivert, published in the magazine *Carioca*, Dansereau attributed to Brazilians the same qualities they had attributed to him. He complimented them for their generosity as well as for their distinctive personality and character. He may have stretched the truth when he claimed that Brazil's culture was well-known and appreciated in Canada, but his intent was to remind Brazilians that, as a "creative civilization," they shared with Canadians a need for "a continuously renewed spiritual source."¹²⁸ Music was the means through which they could bridge their shared past and their future. It was also the backdrop to conversations taking place within the Itamaraty about a possible cultural agreement between the two nations.

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The fact that this first experiment in musical diplomacy went on, unperturbed by the urgencies of war, reveals the extent to which Brazil was far removed from the issues that preoccupied Canadians in 1943. The Vargas regime found a very eager interlocutor in Désy who brought to the DEA a particular understanding of how culture – French-Canadian culture, more specifically – could enhance Canada's image overseas. A skilful actor in the influence game in Brazil, the Montreal-born diplomat availed himself of the opportunities presented to him despite his host country's fascist inclinations. His astute interpretation of the Brazilian politico-cultural landscape and his opportunistic use of the dictatorship's cultural infrastructure helped ensure that the Dansereau couple's stay in Brazil would be productive. As an exercise in musical nation branding, the tour was about juxtaposing difference against the hegemonic sameness-embracing

¹²⁷ Wilfrid Pelletier to Jean Dufresne, October 25, 1938, MSS20, 2006-10-001\358, Wilfrid Pelletier Fonds, Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec (BAnQ). See also Wilfrid Pelletier to E. Leteille, October 25, 1938, MSS20, 2006-10-001\358, Wilfrid Pelletier Fonds, BAnQ.

¹²⁸ Cited in Sheila Ivert, "Jean Dansereau," *Carioca*, June 26, 1943, 62, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/830259/24197>. In Portuguese: "... civilização criadora" and "um alimento espiritual incessantemente renovado."

of a Washington-driven musical pan-Americanism. It was about advancing an autonomous vision that placed French Canada centre stage while instrumentalizing Brazil's difference to evoke the idea of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. Latinity and family served as apt tropes for this cultural rapprochement. The initiative, however, was never the DEA's own. Instead it was heavily influenced and directed by individuals like Désy and the Dansereau couple who – with the encouragement of their foreign counterparts – juggled personal and national narratives to imagine new ways of thinking about hemispheric relations.

CHAPTER 2: A FAMILIAR FOLK

*The Alouette Quartet itself does not consist of actual folk singers. It is a group of trained singers of Montreal, organised over ten years ago by its present members. ... Its approach is professional, which makes a difference.*¹

– Marius Barbeau, 1942

“En entrant dans la baie de Rio, ce qui frappe le plus, c’est cette imposante statue du Christ-Rédempteur que l’on peut voir de toutes les parties de la ville, telle que les [M]ontréalais peuvent voir la croix sur le Mt-Royal,” explained Émile Lamarre to Montreal journalist Oscar Richer in December of 1945.² The singer had just returned from a two-month tour of Brazil with his colleagues from Quatuor alouette: Jules Jacob, André Trottier, and Roger Filiatrault. They were not mere amateurs, as Marius Barbeau had pointed out after their performance at the 1942 edition of the American National Folk Festival, which was held in Washington and New York that year.³ The four men were folklorists themselves and their project to give a “Fine Interpretation and Artistic Vulgarizing of French Canadian Folklore” was intertwined with their desire to use music as a means of articulating an antimodernist vision of the world.⁴ Filiatrault and Jean Désy were cousins, but that alone did not explain the group’s presence in Brazil in October and November of 1945. A regular fixture on radio airwaves, Quatuor alouette was wildly popular in Québec. Moreover, its members possessed experience as cultural ambassadors, having performed in France during the celebrations organized for the Fourth Centenary of Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to Canada (1934) as well as in the United States where they twice acted as official Québec delegates to the National Folk Festival (1942-43).⁵ Désy invited Quatuor alouette to Brazil to provide additional momentum to the cultural rapprochement spearheaded by Jean and Muriel Dansereau two years earlier. It was a departure from ‘serious music,’ but the

¹ Marius Barbeau, “Folk-Songs from French Canada,” 1942, F454/5/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, Archives de folklore et d’ethnologie de l’Université Laval (AFE-UL).

² Cited in Oscar Richer, “Rio de Janeiro vu par le Quatuor,” n.d., F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

³ Marius Barbeau, “Folk-Songs from French Canada,” 1942, F454/5/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁴ Quatuor alouette, “Biography,” n.d., F454/3/2.1, Historique, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁵ More about this in the fourth section of this chapter.

diplomat was optimistic that the group's performances and repertoire would resonate with Brazilians.

Much had happened between August 1943, when the Dansereau couple left Brazil, and October 1945, when Quatuor alouette disembarked in Rio de Janeiro. Désy had graduated from minister plenipotentiary to ambassador with the elevation of Canada's legation to embassy status in 1944. The change had preceded the signing of a cultural agreement between the two countries by just a few months. At war since 1942, Brazil had been providing valuable assistance to the United States, mostly by helping beef up hemispheric defence and providing support in the Battle of the Atlantic. President Getúlio Vargas's clearest commitment to an Allied victory came in July of 1944 with the deployment of a 25,000-strong Força Expedicionária Brasileira [Brazilian Expeditionary Force] to the Mediterranean war theatre. The mobilization was consistent with Brazilians' desire to demarcate themselves within the hemisphere and to improve their standing on the international stage. The war experience bolstered nationalism, but it also brought into focus the evident contradiction of a dictatorship fighting undemocratic fascist regimes overseas.⁶ Vargas's ongoing reluctance to commit to a return to democracy in Brazil fuelled a range of domestic discontents, from the spectre of a fifth-column communist subversion to the threat of a military coup. Despite these developments, Canadian policy makers in Ottawa paid little attention to Brazil, focused as they were on winning the war, managing bilateral relations with the United States, and dealing with a series of domestic problems – most notably French-English tensions over conscription, the fear of enemy aliens, and labour militancy. Désy's musical nation branding effort thus continued its course unencumbered by the urgency of war.

In Brazil, Quatuor alouette performed folksongs that spoke of nostalgia for an idyllic time, the sanctity of *bonne entente* and community, the picturesque and majestic Canadian landscape, and the importance of Christian values in changing times. Antimodernist undertones permeated these works and their rendition on stage and on radio airwaves. However, the tour provided Quatuor alouette with the opportunity to expand and attach new meanings to its repertoire. First, the four singers relied on a selection of French and French-Canadian songs, combined with an "Empire" potpourri (works originating from the British Isles), to depict Canadians' national

⁶ Smith, *A History of Brazil*, 149.

identity as a composite of Latinity and Britishness. The group therefore engaged with the trope of *métissage* that was at the heart of *Brasilidade*. Filiatrault and his bandmates also emphasized their Catholic heritage, which in addition to Latinity, was something that French Canadians and Brazilians shared. The fact that Quatuor alouette arrived in Brazil at the same time as missionaries from the congregation Les Frères du Sacré Coeur was pure coincidence. But both parties were delighted by the serendipity of their encounter. It inspired the singers to lend their voices to the cause of their ordained brothers when performing for elite audiences in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and the old imperial city of Petrópolis. They assumed that their publics – descendants of ‘white’ settlers themselves – would appreciate and recognize themselves in the music. Quatuor alouette’s contribution to Désy’s musical diplomacy thus helped further foreground ‘whiteness’ as the normative link between the two nations while placing French-speaking, Catholic Québec at the centre of Canada’s image in Brazil. This chapter discusses the making of the 1944 cultural agreement and the broader politico-cultural context within which Désy designed this new musical diplomacy initiative. It then focuses on the discourses and practices of folklore studies pioneers, both Brazilians and Canadians, before zooming in on the logistics and deployment of – as well as reception to – Quatuor alouette’s tour.

Making a Cultural Agreement

Quatuor alouette’s tour occurred in the aftermath of two milestones in Canadian-Brazilian relations: Canada elevated its legation in Rio de Janeiro to embassy status and it entered, in May of 1944, into its first cultural agreement with another country. Neither were indications that the Department of External Affairs (DEA) wished to prioritize its bilateral relations with the South American giant. The first of these two developments was consistent with Canada’s ongoing efforts to assert its autonomy in international affairs by finding its place vis-à-vis both the United States and Great Britain (changes from legation to embassy occurred simultaneously across diplomatic missions). Canadians’ wartime contributions – from their skilful repurposing of the economy in support of the Allied cause to the hundreds of thousands of men and women who went overseas – made it difficult not to notice that Canada was making enormous sacrifices. The Second World War elevated the country’s reputation on the international stage, particularly within the Commonwealth where Canadians imagined themselves playing an inspirational role, if not a leadership one. At the same time, they saw Canada increasingly as a North American

nation, working through the challenges of closer relations with the United States as a means of developing a more stable autonomous footing outside of the British Empire. A signatory of the January 1, 1942, *Declaration by United Nations*, Canada pursued – somewhat timidly and haphazardly – its middle power aspirations with the help of British intermediaries at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference where Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union met to discuss the creation of the United Nations.⁷ As Robert Bothwell explains: “Canadians believed that there was still a place in Anglo-Saxon geometry for their country, and they liked the British and Americans to understand that Canada was close to them politically, perhaps even that Canada was their best friend.”⁸ Minister of Trade and Commerce James MacKinnon and the DEA’s own Escott Reid championed this idea of Canada as a middle power, as a linchpin, even as a helpful fixer, when they argued in 1941 that it could play the roles of “interpreter and mediator between the United States and Latin America and between the United States and Great Britain in Latin America.”⁹ Notwithstanding these aspirations, Brazil, in itself, was of negligible importance to the DEA who remained focused on the war in Europe and on power dynamics within the North Atlantic Triangle.

Likewise, the DEA agreed to go ahead with the 1944 cultural agreement due to factors that were, for the most part, external to Brazil. Not only did the department lack experience in the realm of cultural diplomacy, it was also unenthusiastic about the project, which Désy had unexpectedly brought to the fore as a near-*fait accompli*. It is not clear who initiated discussions regarding the establishment of closer bilateral cultural relations, but they most likely followed from Vargas’s suggestion, on his first meeting with Désy, that Canada and Brazil “do something new together.”¹⁰ On May 17, 1942, the Canadian diplomat and Temístocles da Graça Aranha, head of the Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual [Division of Intellectual Cooperation] (DCIn) in foreign affairs (aka the Itamaraty), met to brainstorm on the means of achieving a greater rapprochement between the two nations. From that point on, the two men discussed the issue

⁷ Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2005), 95.

⁸ Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion*, 5.

⁹ Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas*, 16.

¹⁰ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 1, 1941, RG25, Vol. 2640, Political Situation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC (emphasis in original).

frequently while making plans for bringing Canadian art to Brazil.¹¹ On December 9, they apparently agreed on a draft for a five-point agreement that covered a variety of topics: from promoting cultural manifestations to translating books and facilitating the exchange of students as well as professors.¹² Considering Désy's own experience as a travelling scholar and his experience with the DEA, it is surprising that he did not raise the issue of provincial jurisdiction over education with his interlocutor. Much of this was either wishful thinking or poor planning, both of which could be explained by the fact that Canada was a novice when it came to cultural diplomacy. It is more likely, however, that Désy acted intrepidly knowing very well that he would face resistance – or worse, indifference – in Ottawa.¹³ On December 17, he broached the topic with his superiors in a letter detailing what he and T. G. Aranha had been working on for several months. Désy's closing statement read: "I need, of course, scarcely mention to you the importance for our purposes of establishing our cultural propaganda on a definite and official basis."¹⁴ By presenting the agreement as a near-*fait accompli*, he was increasing his chances of having it be given the attention he thought it deserved.

The DEA could not, however, be expected to move too promptly on the issue, especially since it could be misconstrued by the Americans as a form of British interference in Latin America. From Washington's perspective, Canada had yet to demonstrate its autonomy in international affairs. This was the rationale for the State Department's opposition to Canada attending the Pan-American Union (PAU) meeting held in Rio de Janeiro earlier in 1942.¹⁵ On January 8, 1943, the DEA sent a teletype message to Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian minister in Washington, informing him of Désy's letter and asking if the United States had concluded similar bilateral agreements with Latin American countries in the past.¹⁶ It seems likely that the strategy was to take the pulse of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration on the issue without asking

¹¹ T. Graça Aranha to Jean Désy, June 9, 1942, 82/3/11, Representações Diplomáticas Estrangeiras – Canada (Notas Exp.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI; T. Graça Aranha to Jean Désy, July 8, 1942, 82/3/11, Representações Diplomáticas Estrangeiras – Canada (Notas Exp.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹² T. Graça Aranha to Jean Désy, December 9, 1942, 82/3/11, Representações Diplomáticas Estrangeiras – Canada (Notas Exp.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹³ Jean Désy and Temístocles da Graça Aranha eventually discussed the topic of student exchange with Hector Perrier, Québec's provincial secretary, in 1943.

¹⁴ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 17, 1942, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁵ Ogelsby, *Gringos from the Far North*, 52. See also Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas*, 31.

¹⁶ Escott Reid to Canadian Minister in Washington, January 8, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

directly whether or not it approved of Canada proceeding with the agreement. The response came a few days later – Washington had concluded no such agreements. Pearson added: “I understand they were afraid that if the agreements were not identical, it would immediately be a cause for complaint on the part of the Latin-American Republics themselves.”¹⁷ Norman A. Robertson, who succeeded O.D. Skelton as under-secretary of state for External Affairs in 1941, then wrote to Désy to tell him not to proceed. His explanation was hardly original; he simply appropriated the language used in Pearson’s message to describe the “general feeling” of the “Canadian authorities.”¹⁸ Désy refused to take no for an answer.¹⁹ The DEA contacted Pearson, once again, asking for additional information on American views regarding cultural diplomacy.²⁰ His response was a repeat of his previous message although he added that Charles A. Thompson, chief of the State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations, had informed him, “[o]ff the record,” that comprehensive agreements such as the one proposed by Brazil “seldom work” and that Canada “might think it expedient to resort to a practical arrangement” such as a less binding exchange of notes.²¹ If the DEA had stalled on the issue for fear of antagonizing its neighbour to the south, it finally had some sort of green light allowing it to proceed.

Yet many within the DEA were hesitant to embark on a cultural diplomacy project such as this one. Robertson captured the mood of the group when he wrote that “some of us are still old fashioned enough to have reservations about the whole trend, and cannot work up very much enthusiasm for organized Canadian participation in it.”²² He added that provincial prerogatives in education and “lingering suspicion of state-aided support of ‘culture’” provided additional obstacles.²³ On November 8, 1943, Désy finally had a chance to discuss the issue, face to face, with his colleagues during a short stint back in Ottawa. Robertson, Reid, Kenneth Rae, and Frederick H. Soward represented the DEA while John Grierson, Geoffrey C. Andrew, and Allan

¹⁷ Canadian Minister in the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 11, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁸ N. A. Robertson to Jean Désy, January 26, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁹ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 5, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

²⁰ H. F. Feaver to Canadian Minister in Washington, April 6, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

²¹ L. B. Pearson to Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 14, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

²² N. A. Robertson to Jean Désy, August 18, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

²³ *Ibid.*

Anderson spoke for the Wartime Information Board. A number of points were raised in opposition to the project: namely (1) the fear of setting a precedent in the Americas where none existed within the Commonwealth; (2) discomfort with the notion of exporting culture in a manner reminiscent of fascist propaganda; (3) concerns with the “danger of admitting undesirable propaganda into Canada virtually under government sponsorship”; (4) ambivalence vis-à-vis the “value of ‘exporting culture’”; and (5) apprehension at the thought of encroaching upon areas of provincial competence.²⁴ The latter point might have sealed the fate of the agreement if the attendees had not realized that this was the one area where a precedent might be necessary. They remarked that “here there was the risk that if the federal government took no action the provinces might come to make cultural working arrangements abroad on the basis of their educational powers.”²⁵ The need to protect Canada’s prerogatives in that area sufficed to rally everyone behind Désy’s proposed cultural agreement with Brazil.

Things moved swiftly following that meeting. The Legal Division reworked Désy’s draft from a year earlier and submitted it to the DEA – and then to the Itamaraty – for approval. It now read:

It is considered that, in the relations between the two countries, there should be a recognition of the desirability of promoting a greater mutual knowledge and wider comprehension of the respective peoples, their cultures, traditions, and institutions.

In particular the Government welcomes efforts made: to encourage and facilitate the exchange of official, scientific and technical publications, reviews, newspaper articles, books, et cetera; and to encourage and facilitate the organization and presentation of artistic exhibitions, concerts, lectures, radio programs, films, and other activities and contacts.

To this end the Government of Canada is resolved, within its constitutional powers, and by such means as are at its disposal, to encourage intellectual and cultural activities of reciprocal value in furthering the understanding of one country by the other.²⁶

The Exchange of Notes Between Canada and Brazil Constituting an Agreement for the Promotion of Cultural Relations Between the Two Countries was signed on May 24, 1944, at a

²⁴ Minutes of Meeting on Cultural Relations with Latin America, November 8, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Exchange of Notes Between Canada and Brazil Constituting an Agreement for the Promotion of Cultural Relations Between the Two Countries*, Canada-Brazil, May 24, 1944, Treaty Series 1944, no. 15., 3.

ceremony held in the Itamaraty. Interestingly, no one at the DEA seemed to have noticed that Brazilian authorities had opted for a much shorter name for the Portuguese-language version of the agreement: *Acordo Cultural*, a less obfuscating title that perhaps signalled Brazilians' – or possibly Désy's – intention to give the document more importance than the DEA intended.²⁷

Projecting (French) Canadian Exceptionalism

With the agreement signed, Désy wasted no time mobilizing his network in Brazil to keep the momentum going. He was especially committed to soliciting the help of non-state actors, many of whom were more than willing to indulge in the metaphors deployed to encourage a rapprochement between the two countries. The inauguration of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá [Brazil-Canada Institute] in Rio de Janeiro, on June 14, 1944, helped kick-start this new chapter in Canadian-Brazilian relations.²⁸ Designed by Désy and his counterparts in the Itamaraty, the institute was meant to serve “as a clearing-house for all activities of a cultural nature which can be more easily directed by an organisation outside the Embassy.”²⁹ Mindful that he should not overstretch himself, he reassured his less adventurous colleagues in Ottawa that the intention was to make the institute “a largely Brazilian affair.”³⁰ Needless to say, they agreed on that point.³¹ Raul Leitão, rector of Universidade do Brasil [University of Brazil] and founding president of the institute, celebrated the initiative for it proposed to transcend the physical distance that separated Brazilians from Canadians. In a speech delivered on inauguration day, Leitão evoked the trope of *métissage* to indicate that Brazilians were now seeing Canada as more than a British Dominion. He said: “Canadian history reveals the beneficent efforts of the coinciding influences of the energies and virtues of the aborigenes, Indians and Esquimoes, and of the Europeans, English and French, in the formation of the superior qualities of the Canadian people.”³² Approaching Canada's past through the same logic that informed the concept of *Brasilidade*

²⁷ *Acordo Cultural Entre O Brasil e o Canadá*, May 24, 1944, Coleção de Atos Internacionais, no. 207, in RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

²⁸ Exteriores to Embaixada em Ottawa, June 16, 1944, 37/03/07, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Teleg. Exp.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

²⁹ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 23, 1944, RG25, Vol. 3278, Brazil-Canada Institute – Establishment and Activities of, DEA Fonds, LAC.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ R.M.M. to Jean Désy, July 11, 1944, RG25, Vol. 3278, Brazil-Canada Institute – Establishment and Activities of, DEA Fonds, LAC.

³² Raul Leitão da Cunha, “Speech of Professor Raul Leitão da Cunha,” n.d., RG25, Vol. 3278, Brazil-Canada Institute – Establishment and Activities of, DEA Fonds, LAC.

allowed Leitão to underscore the exceptionalism of the Canadian settler experience. However, in doing so he attributed to indigenous peoples a more important role than the one Désy had reserved for them in his own narratives.

A former professor of history, the Canadian diplomat excelled at telling stories and weaving compelling narratives to engage audiences. The signing of the cultural agreement and the inauguration of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá were occasions for him to explain how the two nations shared a common past and destiny. Aside from their resource-rich and idyllic landscapes, Canada and Brazil were both penetrated by majestic rivers that carried the names of canonized Catholic figures: São Francisco and Saint Lawrence. Désy liked to populate his narratives with ‘great men’ who embodied nationhood. Brazilian and Canadian men who, once juxtaposed, brought into focus a “communauté d’influences” as well as a “communauté d’habitudes et de pensées.”³³ Men like *bandeirante* Pascoal Moreira Cabral and explorer Pierre Gaultier de Varennes, or Jesuit missionaries Antonio Vieira and Jean de Brébeuf, whose lives left a deep imprint on the economic and spiritual character of both Brazil and Canada. Désy continued:

[Our two nations] have slowly discovered, cleared, and fashioned the land which our ancestors had chosen for us. We have humanised it in our image. We have peopled it with men, sacrifices, words, and thoughts. Our works have given it their impress. We can say ... that in the barbarous force of a new country an old root has found once more its adolescence.

The first problem which we had to resolve was to endure physically. The second problem, no less important than the first, was to endure spiritually.³⁴

In his speeches, Désy marvelled at the exceptionalism of the two ‘white’ settler colonies, their warm and resilient community-oriented peoples, and the importance of culture in preserving “the essential features which differentiate us, while bringing us together.”³⁵ Although most of his protagonists were French Canadians, Désy noted that industrious and enlightened English-speaking Canadians played no small part in Canada’s development.³⁶ The country’s so-called ‘two founding races’ had learned to live harmoniously with each other in ways that set them

³³ Jean Désy, “Fondation de l’Institut Brésil-Canada,” June 14, 1944, MG32, Vol. 1, Discours au Brésil (1942-1947), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC.

³⁴ Jean Désy, “Speech of the Canadian Ambassador,” 1944, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

apart from less tolerant societies, he implicitly argued.³⁷ The essentialized depiction of indigenous peoples as having little to no agency was not accidental: Désy had not reserved a role for them in his imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.

The French-Canadian diplomat therefore championed a cultural understanding of *métissage* that foregrounded ‘whiteness.’ He also discussed the past in gendered terms that obfuscated the contributions of women and celebrated the enterprising spirit of the manful *coureurs des bois* and missionaries. Through these figures, he established a link between the past and the present, as others were doing in Québec, to demonstrate the central role that men played as nation builders. The Catholic priest and historian Lionel Groulx was among those who articulated the idea of ‘national manhood’ as a means of negotiating the tension between tradition and modernity. Jeffery Vacante explains: “This coupling of national and masculine identities released French Canadian men from the supposed effeminizing grip of modernity as well as from the confines of biological racial identity, and it permitted them to regain some of the power that they claimed they had lost over their fates by making male identity dependent upon their commitment to national identity.”³⁸ Like Groulx, Désy placed the *coureur des bois* alongside the missionary in the “pantheon of heroes from New France.”³⁹ He believed that French-Canadian men had played – and could continue to play – a crucial role as agents of cultural survival. Yet as a French-speaking, Catholic intellectual serving Canada in Brazil, his masculine and national identities were fluid, even situational, which is why he saw no contradiction in the fact that he was using nationalistic narratives from Québec to imagine a transnational community based on Canadians’ and Brazilians’ supposed shared culture of *métissage*.

Latinity and Catholicism were the leitmotifs of Désy’s narratives. The Catholic Church in Brazil traced its origins to the sixteenth century when religious orders – among others, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits – entrenched themselves throughout the land, thereby assisting the colonial regime.⁴⁰ Catholicism became the official religion of Brazil from the moment the country declared its independence in 1822 to the end of Dom Pedro II’s reign in

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Vacante, *National Manhood and the Creation of Modern Quebec*, 179.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁴⁰ Skidmore, *Brazil*, 26-27.

1889. The advent of the republic was marked by the separation of Church and State, but this did not prevent additional bishoprics from being established across the country. Vargas's ascent to power signalled the beginning of a new era for the Catholic Church, which endorsed the president's centralizing and corporatist approach to governance.⁴¹ During the *Estado Novo*, Church and State worked conjointly. "[T]hey became mutually-legitimizing allies in the face of perceived ideological threats such as 'anarchic liberalism' and 'atheistic communism,'" explains Marcelo Campos Hazan.⁴² He adds that this "reciprocal legitimation was played out musically" through liturgy, which acted as a "musical simulacrum of the authoritarian order," and orpheonic singing, which "aimed at suppressing dissent, infusing obedience, and subordinating the urban masses to their political and musical leaders [i.e. Vargas and composer-educator Heitor Villa-Lobos]."⁴³ Désy was attuned to his hosts' politico-cultural environment when he made the decision to recruit four singers for his new musical diplomacy initiative. Speaking on radio airwaves, while on vacation in Montreal during the summer of 1945, he explained: "Entre le Canada et le Brésil il y a une parenté d'esprit, de culture, de tradition, parenté qui se retrouve même dans le folk-lore et l'art religieux, parenté ancienne qui, malgré les apparences, s'affirme chaque jour dans les traits fondamentaux du caractère des deux peuples."⁴⁴ Quatuor alouette's upcoming tour of Brazil would help give credence to this idea.⁴⁵

Searching for the Folk

Désy's reading of the Brazilian politico-cultural landscape and his familiarity with the state of knowledge regarding folklore studies in Canada informed his decision to invite Quatuor alouette to Brazil in 1945. Québec itself was the site where much of the fieldwork had taken place, which led some to argue that French Canadians embodied the essence of a folk society.⁴⁶ A composite

⁴¹ Levine, *Father of the Poor*, 36.

⁴² Marcelo Campos Hazan, "Religious Music and Church-State Relations in Brazil During the Vargas Era (1930-1945)," *Review: Literature and Arts of the Americas* 44, no. 2 (2011): 303.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 505.

⁴⁴ Jean Désy, "Palestra Radiofônica do Embaixador Jean Désy," August 18, 1945, 36/05/07, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

⁴⁵ See "Cultura Artística do Rio de Janeiro Apresenta Le Quatuor alouette," October 8, 1945, 170P-600/5, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, Service des archives et de gestion des documents de l'UQÀM (SAGD-UQÀM); "Le Quatuor alouette chante," November 12, 1945, P232/4/10, Marcel Roussin Fonds, Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française de l'Université d'Ottawa (CRCCF-UO); and "La tournée triomphale du Quatuor alouette," *Le Devoir*, November 3, 1945, 7.

⁴⁶ On this topic, see Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

term, folklore refers to a somewhat homogeneous social group (folk) and the totality of its cultural manifestations (lore), including the particular vision of the world that characterized it from one generation to another. A product of the investigative gaze, folklore is a “constructed term,” even an “essentialist abstraction,” that traced its origins to the Romantic period.⁴⁷

Philosopher and literary figure Johann Gottfried von Herder had placed the Folk at the heart of a nascent Germanic nationalism to counteract the disruptive effects of industrialization and cosmopolitan foreign influences in the eighteenth century. Herder’s championing of traditional local expressive cultures (from language to poetry and music) inspired others, such as German academics Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, to pursue his search for a fixed – thus stable and enduring – national essence. Ian McKay explains:

As one of the great abstractions of Romanticism, “the Folk” came to be regarded as the epitome of simple truth, work, and virtue, the antithesis of all that was overcivilized, tired, conventional, and insincere. The Folk were closer to nature ... and could respond more spontaneously to “natural music.” For romantic nationalists, the “Folk” were those whose very existence and culture testified to the possibility and necessity of the nation.⁴⁸

In posing the question of selfhood and nationhood versus ‘otherness’ – of ‘race’ and origins – folklorists such as Herder and the Grimm brothers searched for order and purpose in ways that betrayed their discomfort with the changing world around them.⁴⁹

A similar uneasiness inspired folklorists at the turn of the twentieth century. Responding to multifarious combinations of phenomena (from industrialization to urbanization, population migration, leftist agitation, changing sociocultural mores, and shifting power centres), they searched for an idyllic corporeal entity that could provide reassurance while serving as a model to cling to, perhaps even emulate, in the face of disquieting change. Francis James Child and John Lomax were folklore studies pioneers whose respective works on music contributed to the invention of the Folk as an agent with little to no agency (the former studied English and Scottish ballads whereas the latter focused on American folk music). In other words, the Folk was a repository and passive transmitter of expressive cultures, which folklorists could mine,

⁴⁷ Gillian Mitchell, *The North American Folk Music Revival: Nation and Identity in the United States and Canada, 1945-1980* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007), 8; Ian McKay, *The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 14.

⁴⁸ McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 12.

⁴⁹ Mitchell, *The North American Folk Music Revival*, 8.

document, display, and comment on by drawing from anthropological and literary approaches. “There was ... a complex and powerful *Anglo-American* folklore matrix, a common trans-Atlantic entropic sensibility that structured assumptions and methods in the study of the Folk and their supposed lore,” argues McKay.⁵⁰ Folklorists could be one or all of the following: academics, musical experts, cultural producers, or educators. In those capacities, they harnessed the potential of information technologies to record, preserve, frame, and disseminate their findings. Their project was as much about constructing a past that could offset the more disruptive aspects of modernization as it was about finding anchors for the nation and the social order within which they thrived as elite members of society. The turbulence of the First World War and the Great Depression made that project even more important, if not urgent.

Folklore studies developed under a similar set of circumstances in Brazil with the difference that the country’s distinct demography and political evolution demanded a much broader interpretation of the Folk. From abolition up to and through the *Estado Novo*, Brazilians came to embrace the myth of the national family whose two pillars were the nation-state and cultural elites. The former was both the legitimate incarnation and the safe keeper of the myth whereas the latter defined its contours and gave it resonance.⁵¹ Corporatism and cultural populism provided the framework within which Brazilians imagined and experienced the national family. The search for the Folk coincided with the search for a national essence that could foster national unity and offset the destabilizing effects of the non-Portuguese immigration to Brazil, cultural imperialism, and industrialization on social order. Because it championed *métissage* rather than ‘whitening,’ *Brasilidade* demanded both a reengagement with indigenous folklore and the incorporation of Afro-Brazilian expressive cultures in the national imaginary. The country’s North and Northeast were coveted sites for fieldwork, because they were wellsprings of pre-Columbian and Afro-Brazilian cultures. They were also the sites of the first Portuguese settlements that followed Pedro Álvares Cabral’s landing in what is now Bahia. Hence the feeling of “*saudade*, or longing,” that accompanied evocations of the Northeast, a region that many considered “the cradle of Brazilian civilization.”⁵²

⁵⁰ McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 21.

⁵¹ Davis, *Avoiding the Dark*, 47.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 62.

A coorganizer of the 1922 *Semana de Arte Moderna*, Mario de Andrade helped articulate and popularize *Brasilidade* through his poetry, novels, and writings on music. His search for a national language and for national symbols placed him at the centre of folklore studies in Brazil. The São Paulo artist and intellectual initially refused to consider himself a folklorist: “I am certainly not a folklorist.”⁵³ Yet he played a pivotal role in documenting – and theorizing about – expressive musical cultures from throughout Brazil. As founding director of São Paulo’s Departamento de Cultura [Department of Culture], he organized and sent a folklore research mission to the North and the Northeast in 1938. It returned with recordings of one thousand melodies, loads of musical instruments, close to eighteen thousand textual documents (from notebooks to notations and lyrics), cult objects, over one thousand photographs, and nineteen films.⁵⁴ Andrade also founded the Discoteca Pública [Public Music Library], which eventually assured the cataloguing, preservation, display, and dissemination of the documents and items collected. As such, he actively sought out and mobilized source materials that he could then deploy as symbols to advance the national project. He thus participated in efforts to reimagine Brazil as an exceptional nation capable of “creating a cultural (if not a biologically) *mestiço* people.”⁵⁵

As for folklorists in Canada, they operated within the framework of the Anglo-American folklore matrix referred to above.⁵⁶ Systematic fieldwork began in 1910 when anthropologist and linguist Edward Sapir became involved in the Geological Survey of Canada (GSC), which then included the Victoria Memorial Museum (later renamed National Museum of Canada). As the founding director of the Anthropological Division, he initiated a vast study of indigenous languages and expressive cultures, including music. Returning from Great Britain where he had studied on a Rhodes Scholarship, Marius Barbeau joined Sapir at the GSC in 1911 to conduct research in Québec and Ontario primarily. A chance encounter with Franz Uri Boas, the

⁵³ Mario de Andrade, *Música Doce Música* (São Paulo: L.G. Miranda, 1934), 77. In Portuguese: “Não sou folclorista não.”

⁵⁴ Fernando Giobellina Brumana, “Mario de Andrade y la Missão de Pesquisas Folclóricas (1938): Une Etnografia que no Fue,” *Revista de Indias* LXVI, no. 237 (2006): 545-572.

⁵⁵ Davis, *Avoiding the Dark*, 61.

⁵⁶ McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 80. For more on North American cosmopolitan elites and their cultural works in Canada, see Jeffrey D. Brison, *Rockefeller, Carnegie, & Canada: American Philanthropy and the Arts & Letters in Canada* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

renowned German-American anthropologist and one of Sapir's former mentors, set him on the path of French-Canadian folklore. Loren Lerner explains:

In the course of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Boas pioneered what he believed to be a science-based approach to anthropology. ... This involved studying a unique culture in all its aspects, including art, languages, history, and religion. From his perspective, the French Canadians qualified as a culture and a history as a result of distinctive historical, social, and geographic conditions.⁵⁷

Boas thus encouraged Barbeau to set his gaze beyond the “native races.”⁵⁸ If French Canadians were legitimate research objects, so were the Scots of Nova Scotia as folklorist William Roy MacKenzie might have argued. His work on British Isles ballads preserved in the province was in the Child tradition although he came on the scene a little too early to ride the “antimodernist wave” of the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁹ His successor, Helen Creighton, had better luck – and timing – in constructing and popularizing an essentialist past for Nova Scotia.⁶⁰

Marius Barbeau set himself apart from his professional and semi-professional colleagues through his ability to combine research and knowledge mobilization in both French and English Canada. Born in 1883 in Sainte-Marie, Québec, he first studied law at Université Laval before transitioning to anthropology while in Great Britain. Following his meeting with Boas in 1913, he began fieldwork in Québec with the intent of better understanding how French-Canadian folk tales intersected with the expressive culture of the Wyandot people. Music, especially, captured his interest. His mother, an organist with the local parish, had taught him rudiments on the piano, which proved handy in preparing transcriptions, harmonizations, and arrangements for the folksongs he was recording. Johann-Baptist Beck, a philologist with an interest in troubadours, English composer Arthur Somervell, and Canadian-born composer Ernest MacMillan, among others, provided assistance with some of that work.⁶¹ Barbeau's *Folksongs of French Canada*

⁵⁷ Loren Lerner, “Marius Barbeau and Sam Borenstein,” in *Around and About Marius Barbeau: Modelling Twentieth-Century Culture*, eds. Lynda Jessup, Andrew Nurse, and Gordon E. Smith (Gatineau: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 2008), 121.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 50.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

⁶¹ Elaine Keillor, “Marius Barbeau as a Promoter of Folk Music Performance and Composition,” in Jessup, Nurse, and Smith, *Around and About Marius Barbeau*, 141-149.

(coauthored with Sapir in 1925) and subsequent publications established his expert status, which he built upon to reinvent himself as a cultural producer.⁶² At the turn of the 1920s, he started organizing and staging lecture recitals to popularize French-Canadian folklore and to educate audiences about the merits of a music that spoke, in the present, of *terroir* and an idyllic past. As John Haines explains, “les villages évoqués par Barbeau pour ses lecteurs citadins sont éloignés du Canada moderne et de ses grandes villes hétérogènes et modernisées.”⁶³ He adds: “Il en va ainsi du chant du terroir: rustique, car lié à la terre dont il émane; joyeux, car non frustré par la corruption moderne; brillant et splendide, car préservé pendant des siècles à l’état brut.”⁶⁴ Whether it was the *Veillées du bon vieux temps*, held at Montreal’s Bibliothèque Saint-Sulpice in 1919 and 1920, or the concerts presented under the auspices of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) Festival, organized by publicity agent John Murray Gibbon between 1927 and 1931, Barbeau tirelessly conveyed his antimodernist and federalist vision to elite audiences throughout Canada.⁶⁵

Désy was among those who engaged with Barbeau’s work. In 1945, he published an article on Canadian folksongs in *Brasil Musical*, a prestigious publication destined for members of the country’s highest social and cultural circles. In it, he outlined the history of French-Canadian folklore, starting with songs imported from France in the seventeenth century to songs invented in the ‘New World’ by explorers, missionaries, and settlers. Borrowing from Barbeau, he proposed a taxonomy that accounted for variations in melody, wording, and pronunciation: lullabies, love songs, dialogues and vaudevilles, humorous songs, dance and work tunes, and religious hymns. Désy explained to Brazilian audiences that generations of French Canadians had preserved and nurtured the collective memory of folksongs that had long been lost in France. He stressed the nomadic character of these songs as if they had a life of their own; a life from which one could draw lessons about survival and endurance as well as the need for anchors in order to adapt and thrive. “No frontier prevented them from progressing for long; they knew how to change appearance and penetrate everywhere; how to modify their language, how to hide their

⁶² Ernest Gagnon was a precursor whose work also inspired Marius Barbeau: Ernest Gagnon, *Chansons populaires du Canada* (Quebec City: Bureaux du Foyer canadien, 1865).

⁶³ John Haines, “Marius Barbeau et le Moyen-Âge,” in Jessup, Nurse, and Smith, *Around and About Marius Barbeau*, 187.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁶⁵ Jean-Nicolas de Surmont, “Genèse de l’enquête ethnomusicologique collective au Canada français,” in Jessup, Nurse, and Smith, *Around and About Marius Barbeau*, 205.

origin,” he wrote.⁶⁶ Désy concluded by highlighting that Canada’s repertoire of folksongs included Irish, Scottish, and English materials. Its heterogeneity spoke of diversity, mutuality, and *bonne entente*, even *métissage*. It was, in other words, presumably analogous to Brazil’s own repertoire.

By focusing on the cultural manifestations of settler colonists, Désy placed limits on what could be included in his musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. In the article, he made references to popular Brazilian songs such as “A Canoa Virou” and “Entrei na Roda,” which he described as being of Spanish-Italian and French origins. As for works originating from Africa, he briefly noted that their presence in Brazil could be explained by “the size of the black race established in this country.”⁶⁷ It is revealing that Désy made references neither to Afro-Canadians nor to the two countries’ role in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. By avoiding both topics, Désy could present Canada as having been forever ‘white’ and free of racism. Accordingly, he also made no mention of indigenous expressive cultures. The omission was consistent with the “discourse of disappearance” put forward by folklorists such as Barbeau.⁶⁸ Leslie Dawn explains that this “discursive framework ... included the proposition that the diverse native populations in Canada formed a homogeneous group and a single race, that they had long been absent from the contemporary scene, and that they had left a vacant site to be filled by ... artists who could produce the image of a nation based on their absence.”⁶⁹ Whereas the birth of a Brazilian identity necessitated an engagement with indigenous cultures, the birth of a Canadian identity required relegating these same cultures to the distant – and dead – past in the 1940s. The narrative that Désy deployed in *Brasil Musical* thus centred on the ‘exceptionalism’ of ‘white’ settler colonists – French and English – at the expense of other groups deemed to be

⁶⁶ Jean Désy, “O Embaixador Jean Desy Escreve para ‘Brasil Musical’ Sobre a Música Folclórica no Canadá,” *Brasil Musical*, 1, no. 8 (1945): 3. In Portuguese: “Nenhuma fronteira lhes impedia o progresso por muito tempo; eles sabiam como mudar de aspecto e penetrar em toda parte; mudavam de língua, escondiam a sua origem.”

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: “... o volume da raça negra estabelecida neste país.”

⁶⁸ Leslie Dawn, *National Visions, National Blindness: Canadian Art and Identities in the 1920s* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 142.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 105. Patrick Wolfe further explains that settler colonialism adhered to a “logic of elimination” whereby the indigenous ‘other’ had to make way for the colonizers who could still recuperate indigeneity – either as a referent to the past or as a differentiator vis-à-vis the metropole – to establish control of both coveted territories and colonial narratives of occupation. Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387. See also Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (New York: Verso, 2016).

outside the nation. Published in the fall of 1945, the article served as a prelude to Quatuor alouette's tour of Brazil.

Singing in Unison with Quatuor alouette

Founded in 1930 by Filiatrault and Trottier, Quatuor alouette permanently recruited Jacob and Lamarre the following year. Oscar O'Brien joined the four singers soon after to be their artistic director. The group traced its origins to the *Veillées du bon vieux temps*, which Barbeau had organized as part of his efforts to mobilize support for his study of French-Canadian folklore.⁷⁰ Filiatrault and his colleagues saw themselves as pursuing that project although there was also a personal – albeit indirect – connection to these events. In attendance was Charles Marchand, a baritone and folklorist, who felt inspired to form his own vocal ensemble in 1927. His Troubadours de Bytown quickly became a sensation as they associated themselves with Gibbon's CPR Festival. In addition to performing, Marchand handled aspects of the events' artistic direction. His sudden death on the eve of the 1930 edition created a significant void and led to the disbanding of the group he had founded. O'Brien, a long-time associate of Marchand, stepped in as artistic director for Gibbon. He then began looking for another group that could be the voice of French-Canadian folklore. Quatuor alouette's professional approach and its mastery of the repertoire Barbeau had assembled in his numerous works impressed him.⁷¹ The group and O'Brien gave their first concert at Montreal's Salle des artisans canadiens-français on May 29, 1932, under the patronage of Gibbon and Lieutenant-Colonel Elzéar Hurtubise. Their success was not long coming. Within a few years, Quatuor alouette had become a regular fixture on radio airwaves while also performing throughout Canada as well as in Europe and in the United States.

Born in 1892, Oscar O'Brien was an educator and a musician whose chosen instruments were the piano and the organ. He began collaborating with Marchand in 1915, accompanying him in his efforts to elevate folk singing to the status of a legitimate popular art form. From that point on, he harmonized and prepared arrangements for hundreds of songs in accordance with the vision that Barbeau put forward in his publications and on stage during the *Veillées du bon vieux temps* or in the context of similar events. On December 4, 1933, Quatuor alouette and

⁷⁰ Quatuor alouette, "The Alouette Vocal Quartette," n.d., F454/3/2.1, Historique, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

O'Brien organized a lecture recital for the École technique de Montréal's faculty. He had three questions for the audience: Is folk music worthy of attention? Is it genuinely beautiful? Can it be the basis of our national music?⁷² He responded affirmatively to all three. After having detailed the work accomplished thus far by the likes of Barbeau, O'Brien stated unequivocally that folk music would not be studied, discussed, and performed so assiduously if it did not have intrinsic value. Its poetic and musical qualities, which folklorists had documented, lay in understated yet evocative imaging that only true art conveyed, he argued. Hence its popularity. It travelled through space and in time, from one generation to another, anchored in the *terroir* so that artists could harvest its fruits. According to O'Brien, folk singers and composers who let themselves be inspired by folk tunes made audible the essence of nation.⁷³ His line of argument was evidently self-serving. There were also elements of self-fulfilling prophecy in his intellectual and artistic journey. Still, there is little doubt that he believed in the potency of music as a means of coping with the rapid pace of change during the interwar years.

However, O'Brien did not lead Quatuor alouette in Brazil. In 1945, the group's artistic director decided to embark on a new journey by entering the Benedictine Monastery of Saint-Benoit-du-Lac. Roger Filiatrault thus found himself stepping into his departed colleague's shoes while continuing as the group's baritone. Born in Montreal in 1905, he first learned the piano and the violin before committing himself entirely to singing. In Brussels, he studied voice and choral conducting at the Royal Conservatory. One of his teachers, Désiré Defauw, would go on to direct the Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM) from 1941 to 1952. In Paris, Filiatrault studied the physiology of the voice. Back in Montreal, he founded Quatuor alouette and subsequently started teaching at École supérieure de musique d'Outremont (ESMO) as well as at Université de Montréal and at Université d'Ottawa. Like his three other colleagues in the group, he found his calling in the study, performance, and teaching of folk music. Their first decade and a half together reached its apex with a highly acclaimed recital at Montreal's Plateau Hall, which was filled to capacity. Thinking back on the work accomplished since 1930,

⁷² Oscar O'Brien, "Causerie au sujet du folklore du Canada," December 4, 1933, F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

Filiatrault noted proudly that the experience disproved the proverb, “No one is a prophet in his own country.”⁷⁴

Quatuor alouette’s overseas experience played an important part in its reception at home. In 1934, as already mentioned, the group had accompanied the official Canadian delegation to Paris for the Fourth Centenary of Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to Canada.⁷⁵ The group had performed as a quartet most of the time although other singers (Gérard Gauthier, Paul Leduc, Antonio Dupras, Alexis Pepin, and Émile Boucher, who had been involved with the Troubadours de Bytown) had joined in on a few occasions. The highlight of that first trip to Europe had been the performance of “Panis Angelicus” at Notre-Dame de Paris and at Saint-Malo Cathedral where Cartier had received his blessings before departing for his voyage across the Atlantic.⁷⁶ Filiatrault and his associates returned to Europe in 1937 equipped with a better understanding of their status as cultural ambassadors. With the support of Québec’s Tourism Office and Provincial Secretary Joseph-Henri-Albiny Paquette, the group travelled to France and Belgium under the patronage of Philippe Roy, Canada’s minister plenipotentiary in France, who helped promote a picturesque and inviting image of both the province and the country.⁷⁷ Filiatrault then wrote to Désy, his cousin, who was counselor at the Paris legation, to see if he could provide some assistance, which he did by reaching out to influential people he knew in the press and in broadcasting.⁷⁸ The tour, which lasted from September 25 to November 20, included thirteen concerts, not counting those that the group gave at sea in the stunning Mayfair Lounge of the *Empress of Britain*. “[C]es jeunes gens ont fait en France une excellente propagande canadienne-française,” stressed Désy in a letter addressed to Paquette.⁷⁹ He was likely trying to help facilitate other such opportunities for his cousin’s increasingly popular and experienced vocal ensemble.

⁷⁴ Quatuor alouette, “The Alouette Vocal Quartette,” n.d., F454/3/2.1, Historique, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁷⁵ The tour was most likely an initiative of the Paris-based Comité France-Amérique, which had created the Mission Jacques-Cartier early in 1934. Harvey, “Les relations culturelles entre la France et le Canada,” 120.

⁷⁶ “Fête du quatrième centenaire de la découverte du Canada par Jacques Cartier,” July 10, 1934, F454/6/4, Tournée en Europe en 1934, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁷⁷ “Vers la terre canadienne : drame et chants du terroir par le Quatuor alouette,” 1937, F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁷⁸ Roger Filiatrault to Jean Désy, October 10, 1937, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁷⁹ Jean Désy to J. H. A. Paquette, November 24, 1937, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

The four singers and their artistic director were skilful self-promoters who understood early on the career-building advantages of aligning their artistic *démarche* with the political and cultural trajectory of the French-Canadian nation. In a letter to renowned composer Wilfrid Pelletier, O'Brien explained that the group was pursuing "une œuvre nationale" and that their battle had two fronts: the first concerned the need to prevent amateurs from tarnishing the art of folk music while the second consisted of confronting the snobbery of those who failed to understand its importance as a form of national expression.⁸⁰ "Je ne crois pas que nous ayons abaissé notre race," he stated confidently.⁸¹ At the end of 1940, the group heard that Québec's Tourism Office was considering hiring a group of amateur folk singers to promote the province south of the 49th parallel. O'Brien protested by reaching out to Hurtubise, a friend of Quatuor alouette since its beginnings, who had some influence within political circles.⁸² Hurtubise promptly obliged with a letter to newly elected Provincial Secretary Hector Perrier.⁸³ The tactic worked. Perrier arranged for Quatuor alouette to receive funding for the 1942 (\$600) and 1943 (\$500) editions of the American National Folk Festival.⁸⁴ The first of the two was held in Washington and New York while the second took place in Philadelphia and Chicago. As had been the case in Europe, the Canadian legation provided assistance on the ground.⁸⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt, the First Lady, reportedly described the folk singers as "marvellous" after having seen them perform.⁸⁶ Enthused, O'Brien hoped to see Canada, and thus Quatuor alouette, participate in more of these events. "[T]he fact of seeing all the people of the North hemisphere, from Alaska to Panama," he wrote, "united in a spirit of good will, expressing themselves through the medium of their songs and dances, each in their own traditional way, this, I think, would be the greatest lesson of tolerance and understanding ever given to the whole world."⁸⁷ O'Brien no

⁸⁰ Oscar O'Brien to Wilfrid Pelletier, December 7, 1940, F454/5/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Oscar O'Brien to Elzéar Hurtubise, December 30, 1940, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁸³ Elzéar Hurtubise to Hector Perrier, January 11, 1941, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁸⁴ Jean Bruchési to Oscar O'Brien, March 5, 1942, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; Chambre du conseil exécutif, "Arrêté en conseil no. 3411," November 12, 1943, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁸⁵ Oscar O'Brien, "Rapport du voyage du Quatuor alouette," 1942, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Oscar O'Brien to M. J. Pickering, June 8, 1942, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

doubt understood that these events would also be effective forums for national projection and national self-representation.

The members of Quatuor alouette were convinced that their work was of great importance, particularly in the context of the Second World War. Being a cultural ambassador in these turbulent times also had its advantages as Filiatrault found out. In the summer of 1943, he received a notice that the Canadian army requested that he pass a series of medical examinations to determine whether he was fit for battle or not. Much to his dismay, he found himself face to face with the possibility of military service. Filiatrault immediately reached out to people of influence who could attest to his important role as a cultural ambassador. Among others, he sought an intervention from Pelletier, Édouard Montpetit (Désy's former mentor and colleague at Université de Montréal), Sister Marie-Stéphane (director of ESMO and a relative of both Désy and Filiatrault), and Joseph Morin (director of Québec's Service de ciné-photographie).⁸⁸ "Sans aucune prétention, je m'estime plus utile à la nation en agissant comme professeur ... et en faisant une saine propagande nationale au pays et à l'étranger, comme chanteur en interprétant nos chants du terroir dans les rangs du Quatuor alouette," the singer wrote.⁸⁹ It is true that in addition to the performances discussed earlier, Filiatrault and his colleagues had performed a propaganda role by appearing on wartime broadcasts, including Columbia Broadcasting System's *Millions for Defence*.⁹⁰ In New York, the group had also recorded material destined for the French resistance.⁹¹ On August 19, 1944, Filiatrault received the good news that his request to be exempted from military service had been approved.⁹² He was now free to pursue his role as a national and war propagandist.

The four singers were therefore ideal candidates for the kind of musical diplomacy that Désy wished to deploy in Brazil. The initiative was entirely his in that the DEA and the Itamaraty appeared to have played only a minimal role in the organization of the tour. The same

⁸⁸ Roger Filiatrault, "E. 233438," August 10, 1943, F454/1/7, Exemption militaire de Roger Filiatrault, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁸⁹ Roger Filiatrault to Wilfrid Pelletier, August 5, 1943, F454/1/7, Exemption militaire de Roger Filiatrault, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁹⁰ Henry Letondal to Oscar O'Brien, September 8, 1941, F454/1/7.32, CBS - Millions for Defense, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁹¹ Oscar O'Brien, "Rapport du voyage du Quatuor alouette," 1942, F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁹² A. de Gaspé Taché to Roger Filiatrault, August 19, 1944, F454/1/7, Exemption militaire de Roger Filiatrault, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

was true for the provincial secretary despite the fact that the DEA enclosed the following note in Filiatrault's passport: "The bearer ... is proceeding to Brazil on an official cultural mission on behalf of the Government of the Province of Quebec, Canada."⁹³ Was that entry a gesture meant to acknowledge Perrier's earlier efforts on behalf of Quatuor alouette or did someone – within the group or its entourage – request that there be some official recognition that the tour would speak foremost about French Canada? There is no evidence to support either hypothesis, except for a letter that Désy sent to Premier Maurice Duplessis at the end of the tour. In it, he provided a list of Quatuor alouette's multiple engagements while praising the singers for their professionalism. It is revealing that Désy made no mention of their ambassadorial role – for either Québec or Canada – when highlighting the group's "rayonnement" throughout Brazil.⁹⁴ He was evidently walking a fine line between promoting French-Canadian culture and projecting Canada. That said, the contract stipulated clearly that the agreement was between Désy and Quatuor alouette, the latter agreeing to travel – all expenses paid – to Brazil to give an unspecified number of performances for a minimum period of two months. The weekly fee was fixed at \$600 with all living expenses covered by the ambassador. The contract also included a note to the effect that Désy would essentially act as an impresario, collecting payments and remitting to the group any amount collected in excess of the costs incurred by the embassy.⁹⁵ In the end, Filiatrault and his associates received \$970 in travel expenses and \$6,000 for ten weeks of work, which suggests that no other party contributed financially to the tour and that Désy either broke even or lost some money with this experiment.⁹⁶

The terms of the contract were such that the Canadian ambassador had plenty of reasons to keep Quatuor alouette busy in Brazil. The four singers therefore had their work cut out for them. On September 4, they boarded a train from Montreal to New York where the steamship *Jose Menendez* awaited them. They arrived in Rio de Janeiro a month later, on Friday October 5, to the great pleasure of Désy who organized a reception for them. The group had its premiere at the Teatro Municipal the following Monday. It then travelled to Petrópolis, which was then a

⁹³ "Passport," 1945-47, F454/1/1, Passeports, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL

⁹⁴ Jean Désy to Maurice Duplessis, November 26, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁹⁵ "Contrat," August 28, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁹⁶ "Rapport financier sur la tournée au Brésil," n.d., F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

summer retreat for the who's who of Brazilian high society. It gave two concerts at the prestigious Palácio Quitandinha before returning to Rio de Janeiro for a two-week residence at Urca Casino. The tour also included a short stint in São Paulo for a recital at the city's municipal theatre. Désy squeezed in additional performances here and there, including at the Igreja da Glória [Church of Glory], the Conservatório Brasileiro de Música [Brazilian Conservatory of Music], and the Ministério da Educação e Saúde (MES). If that was not enough, Quatuor alouette appeared more than a dozen times on radio thanks to the enthusiastic support of Rádio Tupi, Rádio Gazetta, and the hosts of *Ondas Musicais*, the musical program of Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light).⁹⁷

However, this busy itinerary was not just about balancing the budget. Désy wished to use Quatuor alouette to give shape and substance to the musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community he had been envisioning. Since his arrival in 1941, he had been stressing similarities between the two nations; focusing on their so-called exceptionalism as former 'white' settler colonies, their resource-rich and picturesque landscapes, their shared spirit of community and family, their Latin and Catholic heritage, and – taking cues from Brazilian discourses on *métissage* – their exemplary commitment to 'racial harmony.' Désy instrumentalized Brazil's and Canada's differences to stress – paradoxically – their shared uniqueness vis-à-vis the rest of the hemisphere although he did so by underscoring 'whiteness' as the normative link between the two countries. As he had done with the Dansereau couple, Désy reverted to writing to make sure that people understood how to engage with Quatuor alouette's onstage and radio performances. Hence, his article in *Brasil Musical* and the program notes that he prepared for the group's Rio de Janeiro debut. The ambassador turned cultural promoter explained that the folk singers' repertoire reflected Canada's French heritage, but also the "precious contribution of Celtic lyricism and Anglo-Saxon joviality."⁹⁸ Their songs were "from a good race and a respectable genealogy."⁹⁹ In other words, Quatuor alouette's repertoire was respectable because it was rooted in 'white' European cultures. The story it told was one that started with 'white' settlers. The history it celebrated was that of discovery, colonization, and Christianization.

⁹⁷ "Agenda," 1945, F454/1/2, Agendas, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

⁹⁸ "Cultura Artística do Rio de Janeiro Apresenta Le Quatuor alouette," October 8, 1945, 170P-600/5, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM. In Portuguese: "... contribuição preciosa de lirismo céltico e jovialidade saxônia."

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: "... de boa estirpe e respeitável genealogia."

Quatuor alouette had a vast repertoire of folksongs to work with – a collection that conveyed an antimodernist image of Québec with discernable federalist and religious undertones, but also an implicit celebration of settler colonialism. Most of the songs fell under the following categories: (1) old French songs; (2) French folksongs preserved in Canada; (3) folksongs originating from Canada; and (4) Irish, Scottish, and English folksongs preserved in Canada. The group complemented this repertoire with a selection of religious works, including “Panis Angelicus,” “Ave Maria,” and “Tantum Ergo.”¹⁰⁰ Quatuor alouette performed “Panis Angelicus” on numerous occasions, most notably on its 1934 trip to France and during its fifteenth anniversary concert at Plateau Hall, but otherwise it reserved its religious songs for special occasions such as Christmas and Easter radio broadcasts.¹⁰¹ Also included in the repertoire was “Tenaouiche tenaga, ouichka,” a derogatory song that mocked indigenous languages and denoted a belief in settler exceptionalism. As for English-language songs, Filiatrault and his bandmates performed them infrequently. “Annie Laurie,” “Believe Me, if All Those Endearing Young Charms,” and “Drink to Me Only with Thine Eyes” were favourites of the group who inserted them in programs that featured an “Old Irish, Scots, and English Songs” subsection or an “Empire” potpourri.¹⁰² Otherwise, Quatuor alouette’s stage and radio performances in Québec, Canada, Europe, and the United States featured mostly French-language songs that belonged to the first three categories listed above.

For its debut concert in Rio de Janeiro, Quatuor alouette put together a program that reflected the breadth and scope of its repertoire as described by Désy. The group performed its “Empire” potpourri and even sang “Vive la Brésilienne,” a playful rendition of the widely popular hymn “Vive la Canadienne.”¹⁰³ Efforts to promote the group using the trope of *métissage* resulted in some unusual collages, such as ads that featured the singers wearing traditional French-Canadian attire, including the colourful *ceintures fléchées*, with illustrations of the Brazilian landscape juxtaposed with a drawing of the Canadian Rockies next to either pine

¹⁰⁰ “Catalogue complet du répertoire du Quatuor alouette,” July 1, 1940, F454/8/1, Catalogue complet du répertoire du Quatuor Alouette, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹⁰¹ See set lists for broadcasts between June 1, 1944 to October 4, 1945, in F454/7/1.3, Radio-Canada - Programme du Quatuor alouette, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹⁰² “Catalogue complet du répertoire du Quatuor alouette,” July 1, 1940, F454/8/1, Catalogue complet du répertoire du Quatuor Alouette, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹⁰³ “Cultura Artistica do Rio de Janeiro Apresenta Le Quatuor alouette,” October 8, 1945, 170P-600/5, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM.

trees or a mounted police officer in the foreground (*figure 2.1*).¹⁰⁴ Quatuor alouette, however, promptly gave precedence to their French-Canadian identity on stage and on the airwaves. Journalist Mary Newton remembered fondly one of the group's performances at Urca Casino:

Dressed in the heavy, colorful garb of the northwoodsman, they stood in front of a big mural of the Canadian countryside in this gay night club setting, and sang the beautiful, old songs of "New France."

Night after night the gay crowds applauded melodies of the Quebec lumber camps, of the country parishes, of family groups around their kitchen fireside and of school children playing in the convent yard.¹⁰⁵

Quatuor alouette's performance of nation led the host of The Light's *Ondas Musicais* to introduce the four singers as French Canadians rather than Canadians. However, someone edited the script to stress the fact that Filiatrault and his colleagues were, above all, cultural ambassadors for Canada. The host thus explained that their music was "l'expression de l'esprit d'une race" and that "les Canadiens ~~français~~ naissent naturellement chanteurs."¹⁰⁶ The group did perform its "Empire" potpourri, but it noted that the works that it comprised were not "à proprement parler du folklore."¹⁰⁷ Subsequent broadcasts on the airwaves of Rádio Gazetta and Rádio Tupi featured no English-language material.¹⁰⁸ French was becoming the language of choice to "intensify the shared understanding and to further strengthen the relations that unite the peoples of Brazil and Canada."¹⁰⁹ The singers were manifestly on an official cultural mission for Québec even if the tour was taking place under the auspices of the Canadian embassy.

¹⁰⁴ "Cotovias do Canadá," *Gazeta de Noticias*, October 9, 1945, 5, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/103730_07/24497; "Ménestrels do Canadá," *Diario de Noticias*, October 16, 1945, 3, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/093718_02/24920. For example, see "Canções do Canadá," *7 Dias*, October 18, 1945, in F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; and "Hoje Despedida ... do Quarteto alouette," *Correio da Manhã*, October 24, 1945, 13, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/089842_05/28459.

¹⁰⁵ Newton, "Portrait of a Man," 19.

¹⁰⁶ "Le patrimoine musical du Canada français," October 16, 1945, F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL (strikethrough in original).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ "Radio Gazeta: Quarteto Alouette," November 16, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹⁰⁹ "Quarteto alouette: Audição do dia 18/10/945," October 18, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL. In Portuguese: "... intensificar a compreensão e estreitar cada vez mais as relações que unem os povos do Brasil e do Canadá."

O QUARTETO ALOUETTE NAS ONDAS MUSICAIS

"Menestrel's" do Canada

O QUARTETO "ALOUETTE" Hoje NAS ONDAS MUSICAIS

Em um intercâmbio cultural e artístico entre o Canadá e o Brasil o renomado conjunto vocal canadense interpretará a alma musical do seu país para os amigos dos trópicos.

FOLCLORE PRIMITIVO E SUA EVOLUÇÃO MELÓDICA POR INFLUÊNCIA DOS MISSIONÁRIOS:

a) Danse indienne n.º 1, O'Brien-O'Brien -
 b) Danse indienne n.º 2, O'Brien-O'Brien -
 c) Noël Huron, J. J. Gagnier - J. J. Gagnier -
 CANÇÕES POPULARES ESCOCEZAS E INGLESAZ: a) Annie Laurie, Lady J. Scott-O'Brien -
 b) Drink to me only with thine eyes, H. Harrington-O'Brien - CANÇÕES DE ORIGEM FRANCESA: a) Au clair de la lune, Marnier-O'Brien - b) Rossignol sauvage, O'Brien-O'Brien - c) Vive Napoléon, O'Brien-Gautier -
 d) Filer, ô mon navire, Gagnier-Gagnier -
 e) Sur la route de Berthier, O'Brien-O'Brien -
 CANÇÕES DE MARUJOS, DE DANÇA E DE TRABALHO: a) Vive les matelots (Marinha), O'Brien-O'Brien - b) Le fils du Roi (trabalho), O'Brien-Gautier - c) Dans les Haubans (Marinha), O'Brien-Gautier - d) Dans tous les Cantons (Bodas), O'Brien-Gautier - e) J'ai tant dansé, j'ai tant sauté (dança), O'Brien-O'Brien. — Números em gravações completarão o programa.

DAS 13 ÀS 14 HORAS PELAS EMISSORAS:
 Rádio Tamoiá, Rádio Jornal do Brasil, Rádio Nacional, Rádio Cruzeiro do Sul, Rádio Mauá, Rádio Globo, Rádio Meyrink Veiga, Rádio Guanabara.

Organizador: J. W. Campos Locutor: Celso Guimarães



"QUARTETO ALOUETTE" - Jules Jacob, Tenor - André Fratlier, Barão - Roger Filastreuil, Baritone - Edite Lenarra, Alto

Companhia de *Carris, Luz e Força* do Rio de Janeiro Ltda.

O QUARTETO ALOUETTE NAS ONDAS MUSICAIS

Figure 2.1. Ad for a performance by Quatuor alouette on the airwaves of Ondas Musicais (1945). Source: Diário de Notícias, Biblioteca Nacional.

If Désy's Dîner canadien was an attempt to rectify the situation, it failed. On November 12, the ambassador and his wife hosted an elaborate dinner in the main hall of the Associação Brasileira de Imprensa; the same room where the Dansereau couple had performed on Dominion Day in 1943. More than two hundred guests accepted the invitation. They came from either the diplomatic corps or they belonged to Brazil's highest political, economic, and cultural circles. Those present included the British ambassador, the American ambassador, France's cultural attaché, Brazil's minister of Foreign Affairs, and Rio de Janeiro's mayor. The invitation they had received provided hints regarding what would be on the menu. The card's design included a variety of illustrations that doubled as national symbols: a Canadian moose, a beaver, maple groves, snowshoes, and snowflakes as well as men and women seen fishing, farming, and baking

(figure 2.2).¹¹⁰ The extensive menu offered a taste of Québec with its apple juice, Gaspé salmon, pork stew and pie, leg of lamb, potatoes, brown beans with bacon, cheese, and maple ice cream. Seagram’s whiskey was, no doubt, the most Canadian of all the items and it too originated from Québec.¹¹¹




Figure 2.2. Marcel Roussin’s invitation card for Jean Désy’s *Dîner canadien* (1945).
Source: Marcel Roussin Fonds, Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française, Université d’Ottawa.

Culture was front and centre throughout the entire evening. Quatuor alouette served as the artistic *apéritif* with its “chansons à boire,” “chansons à manger,” and “chansons à digérer.”¹¹² Rather than interrupting the dinner with a formal speech, Désy opted to print and distribute the text, which he titled “Discours qui ne sera pas prononcé par l’Ambassadeur du Canada.” In it, he explained that he thought often of his Brazilian friends while on vacation in Canada. It was impractical to invite them all north, so he decided to bring a little more of his country back to Brazil with him. With this *Dîner canadien*, he ventured into the unknown territory of culinary diplomacy, which he subsumed within the broader framework of cultural diplomacy when he explained: “Gastronomy is a civilized act. It is an art that has its traditions and its disciplines; it translates a refinement of the palate, at the same time that it represents the faculty of adaptation

¹¹⁰ “Dîner canadien,” n.d., P232/4/10, Marcel Roussin Fonds, CRCCF-UO.

¹¹¹ “Menu,” 1945, P232/4/10, Marcel Roussin Fonds, CRCCF-UO.

¹¹² “Le Quatuor alouette chante,” November 12, 1945, P232/4/10, Marcel Roussin Fonds, CRCCF-UO.

to the geographical environment.”¹¹³ He added: “Good dishes and good wines are made for smart and educated stomachs.”¹¹⁴ Not forgetting that this initiative was meant to complement his musical nation branding (in addition to complimenting Brazilians in attendance), he concluded by noting that his “ancestors – who knew how to live, eat, and drink – would digest while singing.”¹¹⁵ Quatuor alouette was there to help with that part of the program.

In trying to engage Brazil’s cultural elite and francophile bourgeoisie, this fanciful affair spoke more about the persistence of the French fact in North America than it did of Canada’s so-called culture of *métissage*. French expatriate Jean-Gérard Fleury certainly thought so as he explained to the middlebrow readers of the Montreal-based *La Revue Populaire*. He was essentially corroborating *La Presse* which had described the event as a great success.¹¹⁶ Conflating Québec with Canada, Fleury explained that Désy and his wife had shown their guests “combien ce dominion britannique est resté français dans ses goûts et sa pensée.”¹¹⁷ He noted that Brazilians welcomed this cultural rapprochement, because the war had cut off their ties to France: Québec culture – and Québec cheese – were valid substitutes, according to him. Fleury also reserved praises for Quatuor alouette’s performance. “Qu’importe si la France n’est pas maîtresse du nickel ou de l’uranium, des Montagnes Rocheuse; elle a bien mieux: la fidélité d’un peuple entier, dont la vie, les arts et la cuisine témoignent de la vitalité et de la grandeur éternelle de la mère-patrie,” he wrote.¹¹⁸ Canada – or perhaps more so Québec – was not a mere surrogate of the old imperial motherland. It was its extension, if not its new subimperial incarnation, into new territories. Perhaps inadvertently, Désy had emphasized Québec’s distinctiveness at the expense of the country of which he was the official representative in Brazil. It is revealing of the DEA’s laissez-faire approach (and lack of interest in cultural matters) that no one in Ottawa noticed that Quatuor alouette’s tour had taken a somewhat unexpected turn.

¹¹³ “Discours qui ne sera pas prononcé par l’Ambassadeur du Canada,” November 12, 1945, P232/4/10, Marcel Roussin Fonds, CRCCF-UO. In Portuguese: “A gastronomia é u’a manifestação civilizada. E’ uma arte que tem as suas tradições e as suas disciplinas, que traduz um requinte do paladar, ao mesmo tempo que representa a faculdade de adaptação ao meio geográfico.”

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: “Os bons pratos e os bons vinhos são feitos para os estômagos inteligentes e educados.”

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: “... antepassados – que sabiam viver, comer e beber – digeriam cantando.”

¹¹⁶ “Brillant succès du dîner canadien à Rio-de-Janeiro,” *La Presse*, November 14, 1945, 3.

¹¹⁷ Jean-Gérard Fleury, “Le Canada reçoit le Brésil,” *La Revue populaire*, December, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Catholicism also set French Canadians apart, which is a cultural trait that Quatuor alouette seemed more than willing to emphasize while in Brazil. Since its beginning in 1930, the group performed some of the religious songs that made up its repertoire on Christmas and Easter or on special occasions, such as on its fifteenth anniversary or during the celebrations for the Fourth Century of Jacques Cartier's first voyage to Canada. What must have struck Désy is the frequency with which Filiatrault and his colleagues turned to religious material during the tour. "Le curé de notre village" continued to be a favourite, but other less popular works found themselves on set lists destined for Brazilian audiences more often than before. The group's radio performances are a case in point. On October 9, it sang "Grâces soient rendues" followed by a series of works that told stories from the life of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary.¹¹⁹ Two weeks later, on October 23, Quatuor alouette opened with a triptych: "Notre Père," "Panis Angelicus," and "Sanctus et Benedictus."¹²⁰ These broadcasts followed the group's October 14 concert at Rio de Janeiro's Igreja da Glória. Inaugurated in 1739, the church was a Brazilian landmark visited assiduously in the past by the imperial family, including Dom Pedro II who was baptized there. Hence its extended name: Imperial Igreja de Nossa Senhora da Glória do Outeiro. The program included the above three works augmented with "Hymne des Frères Moraves" and "D'où viens-tu bergère."¹²¹ On October 30, the singers celebrated Christmas on the airwaves, two months early, with a selection that included "Le fils du roi de gloire" and "Allons bergers, partons tous." They wished to tell Brazilians that they would remain close to them, in their heart and soul, on Christmas Day after having returned home.¹²²

It is likely that the new friends Quatuor alouette made *en route* to Brazil influenced the group's musical choices. The four singers were not the only French Canadians aboard the steamship *Jose Menendez*. Missionaries from the congregation Les Frères du Sacré Coeur were also headed to Brazil to begin work in the small interior city of Campanha. The two parties bonded; the missionaries teaching Portuguese to the singers in exchange for informal classes on the physiology of the voice. Quatuor alouette also gave impromptu performances on the deck, especially on Sundays, to the great pleasure of their fellow travellers. Filiatrault was pleased with

¹¹⁹ "Programa no. 357," October 9, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²⁰ "Programa no. 359," October 23, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²¹ "Le Quatuor alouette à l'Église Gloria," October 14, 1945, F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²² "Programa no. 360," October 30, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

the opportunity to sing “Panis Angelicus” in such a setting. “Quand il s’agit d’une bonne action le quatuor ne se fait jamais prier,” he noted humorously in his diary.¹²³ On October 1, the singers offered a free recital, which featured three Brazilian songs they had learned on the sea: “Nesta rua,” “As bonecas,” and “O café.”¹²⁴ They must have lacked confidence in Portuguese, because they only performed them infrequently in Brazil and they did so with mixed results.¹²⁵

Although the two parties went their separate ways upon arriving in Rio de Janeiro, the encounter left a deep imprint on Quatuor alouette. Les Frères du Sacré Coeur made sure to remind the singers that they formed part of the group’s audience in Brazil and in Canada. They attended its debut concert at the Teatro Municipal and listened with great interest to its radio performances. They sent letters of congratulations and invited Filiatrault, Lamarre, Trottier, and Jacob to the Sacré Coeur mission in the state of Minas Gerais.¹²⁶ The four men could not make it to the interior, but they did visit other missionaries in São Paulo. Filiatrault maintained a correspondence with them and carried with him photos he took at the Dominican mission, one of which showed the group and three Fathers (Étienne-M. Laporte, Gustave-René Picher, and Marcel-Marie Desmarais) posing cheerfully in front of a lush palm tree.¹²⁷ The missionaries were just starting to establish their presence in Brazil, but they were building on experience acquired elsewhere in Latin America and Asia. This experience gave them confidence in the possibility of extending Canadian goodwill through the people-to-people interactions that missionary work entailed.¹²⁸ Informal ambassadors themselves, they conflated their religious and national

¹²³ “Journal de bord,” September 9, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²⁴ “Concert du Quatuor alouette,” October 1, 1945, F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²⁵ Marcel Roussin reported to the Québec press that Brazilians responded with enthusiasm to Quatuor alouette’s rendition of these songs, but Andrade Muncy, writing for *Jornal do Commercio*, thought otherwise. See “La tournée triomphale du Quatuor alouette,” 7; and Andrade Muncy, “Quatuor alouette,” *Jornal do Commercio*, October 10, 1945, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/364568_13/27531.

¹²⁶ Frère Alfred to Quatuor alouette, October 10, 1945, F454/5/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; Frère Gérald to Quatuor alouette, October 16, 1945, F454/5/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²⁷ Étienne-M. Laporte to Quatuor alouette, n.d., F454/5/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; “Album do Rio de Janeiro,” n. d., F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹²⁸ On the topic of public diplomacy, transnational solidarities, and missionary work, see Demers, *Connected Struggles*; Maurice Demers, “Les jésuites du Québec et la représentation de l’histoire mexicaine, 1928-1954,” *Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française* 71, nos. 3-4 (Winter-Spring 2018): 41-60; Mills, *A Place in the Sun*; Hamish Ion, “Soul Searchers and Soft Power: The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movements in Japan, 1873-1951,” in *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds., Greg Donaghy and Patricia E. Roy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 10-28; Richard Leclerc, “God’s Envoys: Canadian Catholic Missionaries in Japan, 1898-2000,” in Donaghy and Roy, *Contradictory Impulses*, 29-45; Fred Burril and Catherine C. Legrand, “Progressive Catholicism at Home and Abroad: The ‘Double Solidarité’ of Quebec Missionaries in Honduras, 1955-1975,” in Dubinsky, Perry, and Yu, *Within and Without the Nation*, 311-340.

identities while encouraging the four singers to do the same. On the eve of Quatuor alouette's departure for Brazil, Dom Raoul Hamel from the Benedictine Monastery of Saint-Benoit-du-Lac, the same community that O'Brien had joined, had sent an article to *Le Devoir* in which he addressed the group while praising it for its "œuvre nationale."¹²⁹ He wrote: "Ce n'est pas une unité matérielle que vous réalisez, une unité mécanique, inférieure, mais une unité vivante, rythmique, appuyée sur une interprétation spirituelle, objective, qui établit la différence d'après vos chansons et qu'éclairent une articulation très nette et une justesse rigoureuse."¹³⁰ It is this difference – and this spiritual calling – that animated the four singers in Brazil.

Accordingly, Quatuor alouette augmented its set lists with songs that spoke of the 'civilizing mission' of settler colonialism. "Danse indienne no. 1," "Danse indienne no. 2," and "Noël Huron." The first two originated from Northern Ontario and reportedly illustrated the primitive sound of indigenous folklore. The third revealed indigenous music's "melodic evolution under the influence of Canada's missionaries."¹³¹ The group sang them in that order – in other words, chronologically – to make the case that presumably dead indigenous expressive cultures could only subsist through sublimation. After all, Désy had told Brazilians that Quatuor alouette's repertoire was a rare opportunity to hear Canada's "first civilizing and civilized songs."¹³² As for "Tenaouiche tenaga, ouichka," the group chose not to perform it in Brazil despite the fact that it had sung it on numerous occasions prior to the tour: on stage in the United States during the National Folk Festival, at Montreal's Plateau Hall, and on Canadian airwaves.¹³³ Filiatrault and his colleagues perhaps felt that the song's blatant racism would be difficult to reconcile with the discourses of *métissage* and 'racial democracy' that were being mobilized to musically imagine a Canadian-Brazilian community.

Quatuor alouette's final recital on Sunday, November 18, best exemplified the reach – and zones of exclusion – of its "œuvre nationale."¹³⁴ Held in São Paulo's Teatro Municipal, the

¹²⁹ Dom Raoul Hamel, "Pour la chanson populaire," *Le Devoir*, September 1, 1945, 8.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ "Programa no. 358," October 16, 1945, F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL. In Portuguese: "... evolução melódica por influência dos Missionários do Canadá."

¹³² "Cultura Artística do Rio de Janeiro Apresenta Le Quatuor alouette," October 8, 1945, 170P-600/5, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM. In Portuguese: "... primeiras canções civilizadas e civilizadoras."

¹³³ See set lists available here: F454/6/1, Correspondance, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; and F454/7/1.3, Radio-Canada - Programme du Quatuor Alouette, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

concert featured only French-language material and it began with “La légende dorée,” a succession of short works evoking the life of Jesus Christ.¹³⁵ A reporter from *A Gazeta* remarked that the singers had succeeded, through their heartfelt rendition of French-Canadian folklore, in engaging the *Paulistas* who responded with warm applause. “Il y a une communion instantanée qui montre clairement ce que pourrait être cet art collectif dont nous cherchons parfois la formule,” he explained.¹³⁶ His review of the concert suggested that Filiatrault and his colleagues had finally succeeded in bringing to life a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. He continued:

Dans la salle on ne voyait plus les spectateurs d’un côté et les artistes de l’autre, mais seulement une assemblée d’amis, cherchant de tout cœur à se plaire mutuellement. Il est rare qu’une telle unanimité soit atteinte, même dans les cercles les plus homogènes, comme dans les familles : mais le plus prodigieux dans ce pacte d’amitié si spontané fut l’enthousiasme avec lequel le public se joignit au quatuor pour chanter la chanson de l’Alouette – l’oiseau vivace et symbolique, image de la gaieté et de la bravoure, de la confiance impérissable dans la vie et en Dieu.¹³⁷

The sonorous community thus imagined was one that was united in faith. If it differed from that initially imagined by Désy, it is because of the agency he afforded to his cultural ambassadors and the confidence he placed in music’s potential as a forum of encounter.

The above report from *A Gazeta* demonstrates that the local press responded favourably to this latest musical diplomacy initiative. Reporters did so by using, once again, the tropes of family and friendship.¹³⁸ At the same time, they underscored difference and championed singing – like Vargas and Villa-Lobos were doing – as a means of imagining the nation and giving it both purpose and direction. The spontaneity and raw authenticity of Quatuor alouette’s music

¹³⁵ “Teatro Municipal: Programa Oficial,” November 18, 1945, F454/6/2, Programmes, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹³⁶ Jean Désy translated and sent this newspaper clipping to Québec: “Quatuor alouette à Sao-Paulo,” *L’Action Catholique*, December 15, 1945, 4.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ See “Vozes de um País Amigo Trazem ao Brasil Mensagens de Harmonia,” *O Cruzeiro*, October 29, 1945, 62, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/003581/43514>; “Vozes Cheias de Encanto Interpretando Lindas Canções,” *Vanguarda*, October 15, 1945, in F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; “Chega ao Rio o Quarteto Alouette,” *A Notícia*, October 6, 1945, in F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; and “Arte – Cartão de Visita dos Povos,” *Correio da Noite*, October 29, 1945, in F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

sparked interest, because it was soulful and conveyed the “pulse of the collectivity.”¹³⁹ If art was “the revelation of the moral and material greatness of peoples,” one could legitimately argue that there is no “other manifestation more expressive than the human voice to evoke and exalt the riches of the earth and the virtues of the peoples themselves.”¹⁴⁰ Reporters praised Quatuor alouette for its professionalism and its unwavering performance of nation.¹⁴¹ As for Québec’s French-language newspapers, they showed continuous interest in the tour, especially when self-congratulatory reports from Brazil started trickling in. *La Presse* congratulated the four singers for having so brilliantly fulfilled their mandate as “ambassadeurs du folklore Canadien” while *Le Devoir* noted approvingly that Quatuor alouette is “un organisme lyrique qui fait honneur à notre race.”¹⁴² Not surprisingly, Canada’s English-language newspapers took little to no interest in the tour.¹⁴³ In hindsight, one could argue that the *Montreal Star* demonstrated surprising clairvoyance when it referred – perhaps inadvertently – to the four singers as “missionaries” instead of ambassadors on the eve of their voyage to Brazil.¹⁴⁴

Impromptu ambassadors or missionaries, Filiatrault and his bandmates embodied Catholic French Canada in ways that evoked the ‘great men’ that populated Désy’s narratives. However, the success of this enterprise was not guaranteed since singing had become increasingly marked as feminine in the first half of the twentieth century. Although widely accepted as a masculine activity in the past, singing was now suspect due to the growing popularity of crooners in the 1920s and 1930s. Their fragile, emotionally charged voices, which required amplification, contrasted with the masculine vocal performances of the past. “To the primarily male

¹³⁹ “Músicas de Ontem, Melodias de Sempre,” *Brasil Portugal*, October 23, 1945, in F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL. In Portuguese: “... modo vibrátil da coletividade.”

¹⁴⁰ “O Folclore Canadense Através de Docas Canções Entrelaçado os Sentimentos de Dois Povos Amigos,” *A Notícia*, October 16, 1945, in F454/6/6, Tournée au Brésil en 1945, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL. In Portuguese: “... na revelação da grandeza moral e material dos povos” and “outra manifestação mais expressiva que a voz humana para evocar e exaltar as riquezas da terra e as virtudes da própria gente.”

¹⁴¹ “O Quarteto alouette,” *Correio da Manhã*, October 24, 1945, 11
http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/089842_05/28361.

¹⁴² Roger Champoux, “Le Brésil est la terre de l’avenir,” *La Presse*, December 5, 1945, 3; “La tournée triomphale du Quatuor alouette,” 7.

¹⁴³ Most English-language papers contented themselves with printing the same press release prior to Quatuor alouette leaving for Brazil. See “Alouette Quartet Leaves for Brazil,” *Sherbrooke Telegram*, September 7, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; “Alouette Quartet Heads for Brazil,” *Leaside Tribune*, September 13, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; and “Alouette Quartet,” *Toronto Saturday Night*, September 15, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

¹⁴⁴ “Peace Brings Changes for Many Musicians,” *Montreal Star*, September 1, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL.

representatives of both highbrow and lowbrow culture ..., crooners' high voices, their privileging of emotional vulnerability, and their association with female audiences devalued them artistically *and* suggested a lack of manliness," writes Allison McCracken.¹⁴⁵ The four performers' reliance on an earlier style of singing ensured that there was no ambiguity regarding their manful effort – the more so because it restrained emotions through an intellectual engagement with folk music's historical origins and contemporary manifestations.¹⁴⁶ The group's approach was also easily reconcilable with the regimented singing culture that Villa-Lobos championed during Vargas's *Estado Novo*. As musical diplomacy pioneers, the singers acted as *de facto* musical emissaries for national manhood in that they sought to position themselves as inspirational figures (like the *coureurs des bois* and Catholic missionaries) for their nation's 'heroic' struggle for cultural survival.

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There was, of course, a prescriptive dimension to Quatuor alouette' performance in Brazil; at least in the group's promotion of an antimodernist vision of the world and its championing of Western Christian values. Yet the four singers appeared more intent on approaching the South American giant as a stage upon which to perform their own identity politics than in engaging dialogue with their Brazilian counterparts. In fact, they remained uncritical of the *Estado Novo*'s fascist leanings – possibly because of how familiar the country seemed to them when looked at through the gendered tropes of family, Latinity, and Catholicism. Examining the group's records of its stay in Brazil, you would not know that the country was going through dramatic changes in the fall of 1945. On October 29, the military forced Vargas to resign and placed José Linhares, president of the Supremo Tribunal Federal [Supreme Federal Court], at the helm of the country. Brazilians had grown impatient with the dictator's promises of a return to democracy, so the new president was tasked with organizing proper elections before the end of the year. None of the events preceding or following the coup d'état interfered with Quatuor alouette's national performance, which centred on Catholic French Canada above anything else.

¹⁴⁵ McCracken, *Real Men Don't Sing*, 6.

¹⁴⁶ Reliance on the idea of 'rationality' over 'emotionality' when performing or listening to music is "a benchmark of normative 'masculinity,'" writes Sam de Boise. Boise, *Men, Masculinity, Music, and Emotions*, 78.

In Brazil, the four singers looked for a validating reflection of themselves and their struggle for cultural survival. Lamarre had, after all, compared the Cristo Redentor statue perched atop Corcovado mountain to the Mount Royal cross. Back in Montreal, Filiatrault told *La Presse*'s Roger Champoux:

Le Brésil est le creuset de trois cultures : si la formation intellectuelle européenne est battue en brèche dans la jeune classe bourgeoise par les captivantes formules américaines, il reste néanmoins que l'esprit nationaliste portugais tient victorieusement le coup dans les couches supérieures où la langue française est amie de la portugaise et ne souffre pas l'intrusion des idiomes anglo-saxons.

Le Portugais cultivé a peut-être oublié la mère patrie mais il ne cesse de puiser aux sources vives de la culture latine dont le centre sera toujours Paris. Cependant, le Brésilien est un nationaliste autocrate. Le Brésil d'abord et avant tout. Les formes de la beauté qu'il découvre ailleurs, il se refuse à les imiter, satisfait de les interpréter selon une conception spécifiquement brésilienne.¹⁴⁷

As an exercise in musical diplomacy, Quatuor alouette's tour was undoubtedly one-sided, oriented as it was towards national projection and national self-representation. As an exercise in musical nation branding, it showed how vulnerable Canada's image was in the hands of non-state actors with a mission of their own.

¹⁴⁷ Cited in Champoux, "Le Brésil est la terre de l'avenir," 3.

CHAPTER 3: THE ART OF COUNTERPOINT

I do think your Department [of External Affairs] ought to be kept reminded of the absolute necessity for doing something reasonably adequate to promote better international relations through music.¹

– Ernest MacMillan, 1946

Ernest MacMillan was a towering figure of Canada's musical life when he departed for Brazil in the summer of 1946. At the helm of the Toronto Symphony Orchestra (TSO) since 1931, he was knighted by King George V for his service to music, some of which involved transcribing material for Marius Barbeau and preparing arrangements for John Murray Gibbon's Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) Festival. A conductor and composer of 'serious music,' MacMillan was also well versed in folk music. He was undoubtedly flattered when Jean Désy invited him to Rio de Janeiro for a series of concerts with the Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira (OSB). He embraced the status of cultural ambassador offered to him with the hope that the dissemination of Canada's music overseas would create additional work and funding opportunities for artists at home. The Toronto-based composer had just helped establish the Canadian Music Council whose mandate was to organize and promote a national musical culture.² He certainly did not hesitate to remind the Department of External Affairs (DEA) that it could do more in that area. In any case, whatever high hopes he had for Brazil, the reality on the ground kept them in check. "Rio is the most beautiful city I have ever seen," but it is also "the most exasperating," he wrote in his diary.³ He added more tellingly: "Désy and [Chargé d'affaires Benjamin] Rogers came to represent in my mind the only solid ground in a country of quicksands."⁴ Repetitive administrative, scheduling, and rehearsal problems with the OSB were at the root of some of his

¹ Ernest MacMillan to T. W. L. MacDermot, January 26, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

² Although it was created at the end of the war, the Canadian Music Council only acquired its federal charter in 1949. See Esra Schabas, *Sir Ernest MacMillan: The Importance of Being Canadian* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 202-205.

³ Diary p. 1, September 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

⁴ *Ibid.*

frustrations although city life in the tropics also brought its share of discomfort and unpredictability.

The six weeks that MacMillan spent in Brazil might have been even more challenging had Claude Champagne not joined him on this goodwill tour. The Getúlio Vargas era had just ended with a fragile return to democracy under the presidency of former Minister of War Eurico Gaspar Dutra. Concerns over leftist agitation were growing even though the Cold War had not yet become front-page news in Brazil.⁵ Désy kept his superiors in the DEA sporadically informed about political developments. One such instance concerned the appointment of Soviet ambassador Jacob Suritz. Désy explained that his communist counterpart's role was to "convince the Brazilians of the imperialistic aims of Anglo-Saxon capital with regard to Brazil."⁶ Yet he saw no signs of an emerging cultural Cold War in 1940s Rio de Janeiro. In fact, he pursued his musical nation branding efforts as if little had changed in Brazil. The DEA neither interfered nor requested that Désy explain his cultural campaigns, which indicated that there was little appetite in Ottawa for his intelligence gathering and his unorthodox approach to diplomacy. Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations thus evolved as if detached from the larger geopolitical context of the immediate postwar years. Désy and his new impromptu ambassadors, MacMillan and Champagne, preoccupied themselves primarily with projecting an image of Canada that validated their self-perception and accommodated their professional ambitions. The two composers were to participate in the making of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community by sharing a multiday program that would feature each other's compositions and present a sophisticated image of a bicultural Canada.

A thorough examination of MacMillan and Champagne's national performance in Brazil reveals how fragile the metaphors deployed to imagine a Canadian-Brazilian community through music were. In Rio de Janeiro, the two men sought experiences that could enhance Canada's prestige abroad while confirming their status as cosmopolitan artists. They accomplished this, in part, by mingling in the city's male-dominated elite 'high' art milieu. As representatives of Canada's 'two founding races,' they embodied Britishness and Latinity through the seemingly

⁵ Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917-1947* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 220-222.

⁶ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 15, 1946, RG25, Vol. 3238, Reports Re. Organizations of and Personalities of Diplomatic Representation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

apolitical language of folk-infused ‘serious music.’ Their parallel efforts in Brazil aligned with the trope of *métissage*, but it did so – once again – through the prism of ‘whiteness.’ Their encounter with ‘others,’ musical or otherwise, shaped their self-image as ‘white’ male composers in ways that influenced their perception of distance between Canadians and Brazilians. The South American giant appeared increasingly foreign, even inchoate, when looked at from a northern gaze. In the eyes of MacMillan and Champagne, Brazil was indeed a distant stage upon which Canadian aspirations could be played out. Oscillating between nationalism and universalism, between difference and sameness, they demonstrated ambivalence vis-à-vis Brazilians whom they considered inferior, as did some of their compatriots. Further undermining the project of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community was the fact that the tour also put onto display Canada’s ‘two solitudes’ despite attempts to depict the country’s national culture as a form of *métissage*. In Brazil, the two impromptu ambassadors followed complementary yet separate paths rather than collaborating on a multiday program as originally intended. This chapter begins with a discussion of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá to depict the broader context within which the tour took place. It then juxtaposes the national musical cultures of the two countries before examining the highs and lows of the Champagne-MacMillan excursion to Rio de Janeiro.

The Instituto Brasil-Canadá and the Northern Gaze

Although the signing of the 1944 cultural agreement and the subsequent opening of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá failed to propel the DEA into action, it did bring into focus the impact that individuals on the ground could have on shaping the country’s image overseas, particularly in the context where Canadians had yet to agree on what to project and how. Malcolm MacDonald, high commissioner to Canada, shared with others in the British Foreign Office the belief that Canadians had yet to find a unified voice with which to assert themselves on the international stage.⁷ Charles E. Shuckburgh, in a memorandum prepared for London, further explained that Canada’s inability to articulate and perform its self-designated status as a “catalyst-nation” revealed “the characteristic uncertainty of the country’s position” as both an American nation

⁷ Malcolm MacDonald to Mr. Attlee, August 15, 1942, FO 370 – 764, British Council, Foreign Office Fonds, National Archives; British Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to Anthony Eden, May 29, 1944, FO 370 – 891, British Council, Foreign Office Fonds, National Archives.

and a member of the Commonwealth.⁸ According to him, it also revealed deep schisms within Canadian society among continentalists, imperialists, and autonomists. As for French Canadians, he refused to believe that they had the vision and cultural infrastructure to act upon their so-called “racial affinity” with Latin Americans.⁹ “They have failed, partly though their own narrowness of outlook and partly by deliberate localism, to create in Quebec or Montreal centres of attraction for modern French thought and culture on this continent,” Shuckburgh wrote in a contemptuous tone.¹⁰ Still, he noted that Désy may eventually succeed in projecting an engaging image of Canada in Brazil and that he “may well play a part in making ... ‘Latin affinity’ ... something more of a reality than it has hitherto been.”¹¹ Canada’s ambassador to Brazil seemed intent on proving him right on that point while countering the view that the country’s elusive international identity was a function of its Dominion status and its vacillating posture vis-à-vis the United States.

The Instituto Brasil-Canadá was one of the venues used by Canadians to display their intellectual and cultural proficiency. With branches in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, it served as a forum of encounter for mostly francophile elite men from Brazil’s highest intellectual and economic circles. Designed by Désy and his Brazilian counterparts in foreign affairs (the Itamaraty), the institute was to operate independently with little to no government involvement, but the reality was otherwise. The Canadian ambassador held the title of honorary president, which was an acknowledgment of his role in founding and providing momentum to the organization. Building from a narrow network of personal and professional contacts, Désy engaged an ever-growing range of protagonists by putting them in relation with each other through occasional cultural initiatives. Invariably, these began with the Canadian diplomat doing some heavy lifting and fundraising himself as when he handpicked paintings to bring back to Rio de Janeiro for a planned exhibition or when he convinced influential friends in Brazil, including representatives at Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light) and the Royal Bank of Canada, to provide financial support to the Instituto Brasil-Canadá. He himself added

⁸ C. E. Shuckburgh, “The Attitude of Canada Towards Pan-America in General and Latin America in Particular,” memorandum attached to Malcolm MacDonal to Mr. Attlee, August 15, 1942, FO 370 – 764, British Council, Foreign Office Fonds, National Archives.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

\$15,000 to the organization's coffers – money he raised “from private firms and individuals” while he was undergoing medical treatment in Canada in the fall of 1943.¹² The pattern that emerged through his dealings with the institute was one of directed improvisation and it allowed eager individuals, such as political scientist Marcel Roussin and painter Jacques de Tonnancour, to navigate around bureaucracies to pursue their professional ambitions beyond Canada's borders in a context that initially appeared – as it did for *Quatuor alouette*– familiar to them.

As the institute's first scholarship recipient, Roussin astutely seized the moment by using Canada's cultural rapprochement with Brazil as a stepping stone for his career.¹³ Born in 1918, he earned a Bachelor of Arts from Séminaire de Joliette before relocating to Montreal where he spent two years studying international law. He then undertook graduate studies in political science at Université d'Ottawa. He completed his master's degree in 1941 and successfully defended his doctoral dissertation four years later. Roussin learned Spanish and Portuguese to establish his reputation as a Latin Americanist. He published numerous articles, including in *L'Action Catholique*, *Les Carnets victoriens*, *L'Étoile du Nord*, and *Le Jour*, which featured his multipart series on Latin America. A sessional lecturer at Université d'Ottawa, he represented the institution at the National Federation of Catholic Universities, a position that entailed coordinating “la propagande de Pax Romana” towards the Southern Hemisphere.¹⁴ Starting in 1943, the young scholar began advocating for the creation of a Comité Canada-Brésil to promote closer economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The commonality of feelings, identities, and desires that he claimed existed between the two nations rested on Brazilians' adherence to Western Christian values and their knowledge of the French language, which allowed them to go “n'importe où au monde où il y a des gens civilisés.”¹⁵ Yet Brazil also was on the periphery of the world as Roussin knew it. It was therefore both familiar and exotic to him. He already had his eyes set on a research trip to Rio de Janeiro so this public support for closer Canadian-Brazilian relations gave him both visibility and credibility. Caio de Mello

¹² “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” November 22, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹³ Exteriores to Embaixada em Ottawa, April 5, 1945, 37/03/08, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Teleg. Exp.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹⁴ Marcel Roussin to Jean Désy, November 11, 1943, P232/1/5, Marcel Roussin Fonds, CRCCF-UO. On this topic, see Pierre Savard, “Pax Romana, 1935-1962. Une fenêtre étudiante sur le monde,” *Les Cahiers des dix*, 47 (1992): 279–323.

¹⁵ Marcel Roussin, “Pour un comité Canada-Brésil,” *Le Droit*, September 30, 1943, in 36/05/04, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

Franco, Brazilian minister in Ottawa, took note of Roussin's "sympathetic disposition" towards Brazil and the "disinterested nature" of his intentions.¹⁶ The young scholar was undoubtedly earnest, but to describe him as disinterested is to miss the fact his publication record served to establish his expert status as an observer from the North.

Roussin's ethnocentric gaze helped validate his belief that Canadians were politically, economically, and culturally more advanced than Brazilians. The power-asymmetry implicit in this North-South binary resulted in the young scholar prioritizing performance and projection over engagement. It led him to seek the familiar in Brazil while adopting an essentializing outlook to deal with difference. As the recipient of a scholarship from the Instituto Brasil-Canadá, he intended to spend a full year overseas, but he shortened his stay to six months, apparently for health reasons.¹⁷ In Rio de Janeiro at the same time as Quatuor alouette, he enjoyed the sense of family that he felt around his compatriots. The reports he sent back to *La Presse* applauded the group for being eminent dignitaries for the Canadian nation. He reserved similar praises for the French-Canadian Dominican Fathers he met in Brazil. In both instances, Roussin's observations centred on the question of national self-representation.¹⁸ His one-way approach to Canadian-Brazilian relations on this trip resulted from the ambivalence he felt vis-à-vis his hosts. His depiction of Rio de Janeiro betrayed his contempt for Brazilians who, because of their place on the periphery of the industrialized North, were destined to fail in their efforts at emulation.¹⁹ Roussin weighed his words carefully in public forums, but his private notes reveal

¹⁶ Caio de Mello Franco to Oswaldo Aranha, October 14, 1943, 36/05/04, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Embaixadas – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹⁷ Osório Dutra to Secretário Geral, October 25, 1945, 135/05/07, Diversos no Exterior – Divisão Cultural, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹⁸ See Marcel Roussin to Roger Champoux, October 14, 1945, in F454/6/3, Coupures de presse, Roger Filiatrault Fonds, AFE-UL; and "Les Dominicains du Canada ouvrent une maison à São Paulo," *La Presse*, December 5, 1945, 16.

¹⁹ In postcolonial theory, 'ambivalence' is the simultaneous desire for one thing and its opposite (in other words, it consists of the interplay between attraction and repulsion). The concept is closely related to 'mimicry,' which is when subalterns adopt the modes of being (the language, values, and appearance) of colonialist/imperialist agents to fulfill either a desire for assimilation or a need to resist. That process is often fraught with tension and it tends to disrupt the racist gaze of those who exert hegemonic power. Homi K. Bhabha further explains: "[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a *subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite*. Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference." Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 86 (emphasis in original). See also Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995), 133.

the extent to which his scalding gaze informed his perception of urban life in Brazil. The following excerpt from his “Impressions et dépressions” is a case in point:

A la messe, on chante n’importe quoi. Ce matin, 29 juillet 1945, à l’église N.S. de Copacabana, un baryton a chanté un Ave Maria sur l’air de la Berceuse de Jocelyn, et un ténor a chanté la deuxième partie du Sanctus ... en omettant la première, et le tout finit sur un air de valse. Sans oublier un petit nègre, qui se croit obligé de danser pieds nus dans la grande allée, en allant d’avant en arrière, au milieu des fidèles. Le Créateur doit avoir des regrets des fois.²⁰

In this entry and many others dealing with topics ranging from tramways to fashion and domestic life, Roussin mocked Brazilians for failing to reproduce adequately the values and habits of Western Christian civilization, as he understood them. He described Brazilian life as disorganized and rudimentary as well as deficient on questions of morality and religion. Going from attraction to repulsion, Roussin’s ambivalence towards his hosts reflected his perception of Brazil as a distant stage where – through encounters with an ‘other’ – he could perform, and thus validate and propagate, a boastful self-image centred on ‘white’ normativity.

Roussin was not alone in travelling south to define himself in relation to a Brazilian ‘other.’ Montreal-born painter Jacques de Tonnancour had tried unsuccessfully in the past to secure government funding to study overseas so he was ecstatic when he learned that the Brazilian government, following Désy’s recommendation, was inviting him as a guest of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá.²¹ Tonnancour was twenty years old when he enrolled at École des beaux-arts de Montréal. An admirer of Paul-Émile Borduas, Pablo Picasso, Goodridge Roberts, and the Group of Seven, he dropped out after just a few years in reaction to the conservative and regionalist mindset of his teachers. He then rented a studio, befriended established painters such as Alfred Pellon, published short pieces in various art publications, and held his first solo show at Montreal’s Dominion Gallery in 1943. But he found it difficult to make a name for himself in Québec. “Chez soi nul est prophète,” he confided to a journalist once in Brazil.²²

²⁰ “Impressions et dépression... Rio de Janeiro,” 1945, P232/10/03, Marcel Roussin Fonds, CRCCF-UO.

²¹ J. E. Ribeiro to Jacques de Tonnancour, April 16, 1945, 170P-030/1, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM.

²² Cited in Marc Berkowitz, “Cultural Activities: The Canadian Painter Jacques de Tonnancour,” *Brazil Herald*, May 22, 1946, in 170P-600/6, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM.

Désy had set the stage for Tonnancour by displaying Canadian art in Brazil as early as 1942. With the help of Harry Orr McCurry, director of the National Gallery of Canada (NGC), he had arranged to have a bundle of ten paintings shipped to him to decorate the walls of the legation and of his residence in Rio de Janeiro. Surrounded by the works of painters Clarence A. Gagnon, Walter J. Phillips, and David B. Milne, Désy was able to show his “Brazilians friends” that Canada could produce “something more than wheat, salmon, and apples.”²³ Pellan was one of his favourites, which is why he commissioned him to create two large panels for the waiting room of the legation.²⁴ The murals depicted Eastern and Western Canada in vivid colours that evoked the depth and breadth of the country’s diversity as well as the interplay between tradition and modernity. Always resourceful, Désy got the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC) to cover the \$1,560 bill.²⁵ He also arranged to place two articles about Pellan’s work in Brazilian publications. Robert Ford’s piece appeared in *Sombra* while Maurice Gagnon published his in *A Vida*.²⁶ The language they used to describe the paintings was consistent with that used by Désy to promote Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations: “In authentic tones, the profound honesty of our race, its generous hospitality with which it serenely welcomes the friend who falls under the charm of our landscape.”²⁷ News of this initiative did not take long to reach the NGC. “You are setting a very important precedent which I hope will be widely followed,” wrote an evidently enthused McCurry.²⁸

The ambassador carried on with an exhibition of Canadian paintings and handicrafts whose stars turned out to be Pellan and Tonnancour. Held first in Rio de Janeiro and then São Paulo at the turn of 1945, the *Pintura Canadense Contemporânea* show brought together close to two

²³ Jean Désy to McCurry, November 14, 1941, Vol. 130, File 13, Loans-Foreign – South America, National Gallery of Canada (NGC) Fonds, National Gallery of Canada Library and Archives (NGC-LA).

²⁴ Jean Désy to Oliver Master, May 15, 1943, RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce (DITC) Fonds, LAC.

²⁵ Decorative Panels Account Statement, September 11, 1942, RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC.

²⁶ Maurice Gagnon, “Pintura: As Pinturas Murais da Legação do Canadá no Rio de Janeiro, Pelo Pinto Canadense Alfred Pellan,” *Vida*, n.d., in RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC; Robert Ford, “Um Canadense Pinta Para O Brasil,” *Sombra*, n.d., in RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC.

²⁷ Maurice Gagnon, “Pintura: As Pinturas Murais da Legação do Canadá no Rio de Janeiro, Pelo Pinto Canadense Alfred Pellan,” *Vida*, n.d., in RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC. In Portuguese: “Em tons francos, a honestidade profunda da nossa raça, sua hospitalidade generosa que acolhe serenamente o amigo que se encanta com o nosso torrão.”

²⁸ Director to Jean Désy, February 3, 1943, Vol. 130, File 13, Loans-Foreign – South America, NGC Fonds, NGC-LA.

hundred works by seventy-four artists from across Canada.²⁹ Désy had begun collecting paintings on his own, but he reached out to McCurry once he realized that his connections did not stretch far enough beyond Montreal and Quebec City.³⁰ The exhibition thus turned out to be a collaborative affair that involved the NGC, the DEA, the DTC, galleries in Montreal and Toronto, the Québec government, the Instituto Brasil-Canadá, the Itamaraty, and Brazil's Ministério da Educação e Saúde (MES).³¹ "It was the common work of us all in furthering in Brazil the propaganda of Canada at a time when it is extremely important, commercially, as well as politically, to keep Canada on the map in this country," explained Désy to James Angus MacKinnon from the DTC. The embassy estimated that total attendance for the two events was close to fifty thousand. Even Vargas made an appearance to the great pleasure of Désy.³² The press wrote enthusiastically about *Pintura Canadense Contemporânea* although the opposite would have been surprising considering that the exhibition was organized under the official seal of the then still-in-office dictatorship.

The NGC undeniably deserved much of the credit for this success. It already had considerable experience with developing art exhibitions abroad, which included dictating the stories conveyed through the works put on display. In this instance, McCurry commended Désy for taking the initiative, particularly since it provided an opportunity to nudge the DEA into doing more to assist the NGC in its operations.³³ Even though the exhibition was not being managed by his institution, McCurry did not spare any effort in helping make *Pintura Canadense Contemporânea* a truly pan-Canadian exhibition. In the end, the "école de Montréal" stole the show despite the attempt to feature artists from all provinces.³⁴ McCurry might have encouraged such a *dénouement* by highlighting in the catalogue that the meeting of Anglo-Saxon and Latin cultural forces in Montreal "will undoubtedly produce a Canadian school of painters of

²⁹ *Pintura Canadense Contemporânea*, 1944, RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC.

³⁰ Jean Désy to H. O. McCurry, November 22, 1943, Vol. 304, File 4, Outside Activities/Organizations – Jean Désy, NGC Fonds, NGC-LA. See also Canadian Ambassador to Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 31, 1944, Vol. 304, File 4, Outside Activities/Organizations – Jean Désy, NGC Fonds, NGC-LA.

³¹ Jean Désy to J. A. MacKinnon, February 9, 1945, RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ H. O. McCurry to T. W. L. MacDermot, March 9, 1945, Vol. 304, File 4, Outside Activities/Organizations – Jean Désy, NGC Fonds, NGC-LA.

³⁴ D.W.B, "Brazil Sees Canadian Art," *Canadian Art* 2, no. 3 (March 1945), 105.

unusual power and interest.”³⁵ The enthusiastic reception accorded to Pellan and Tonnancour suggested that Montreal-based, French-Canadian painters were best equipped to visually translate for Brazilians the idea of ‘Canadianness’ as a form of *métissage*. Tonnancour, who had yet to receive the good news that he would be travelling to Brazil, sold three of the six paintings he had loaned for the exhibition.³⁶

Like Roussin, Tonnancour adopted a northern gaze that allowed him to situate himself vis-à-vis both his hosts and his compatriots in Brazil. During his twelve-month stay, he befriended members of Quatuor alouette and lent a helping hand to Désy by designing programs for the singers’ debut concert and the embassy’s Dîner canadien. He first shared a studio with exiled Polish painter Count August Zamoyski before moving his tools into Désy’s garage, which was located atop Santa Teresa Hill. Towards the end of his stay, in August of 1946, he showed his work during a well-attended solo exhibition – about ten paintings and twenty drawings. Critics responded favourably to his interpretation of the Brazilian landscape, noting that Tonnancour had captured the essential qualities of the city’s tropicity. The painter indicated that he had no choice but to adopt a tourist gaze to shut out the buzzing city life and take in the immensity of the hills, bays, and ocean that surrounded him: “Peintre, je dus, par la force des choses, me faire touriste, c’est à dire consommateurs.”³⁷ Tonnancour was very much conscious of both his personhood and his nationhood, as well as the importance of the ‘other’ in defining the ‘self’ prior to leaving for Brazil. In an interview with *Le Canada*’s Eloi de Grandmont, he explained: “[J]e pourrai mieux situer le peuple canadien par rapport à d’autres et mieux situer mon plan à moi ... je pourrai mieux me situer sur mon propre plan.”³⁸ He added: “Vous devinez à quoi je veux en venir: aux qualités les plus authentiquement miennes (et canadiennes donc) exprimées dans la forme la plus universelle que je puisse inventer.”³⁹ Ultimately, he hoped that the intensity of life in Brazil, once tamed and juxtaposed against its surrounding landscape, would help him cast a different gaze on the world, including his own. Tonnancour did not leave much behind in

³⁵ H. O. McCurry, “Duas Palavras,” in *Pintura Canadense Contemporânea*, 1944, RG20-3, Vol. 1323, Exhibitions in Brazil – General, DITC Fonds, LAC.

³⁶ H. O. McCurry to Jacques de Tonnancour, May 17, 1945, 170P-030/1, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM.

³⁷ Jacques de Tonnancour, “Rio de Janeiro – A Challenge!,” *Canadian Art* 4, no. 2 (March 1947), 57.

³⁸ Cited in Eloi de Grandmont, “Jacques de Tonnancour est-il le fruit mûr de nos Beaux-Arts,” *Le Canada*, June 12, 1945, 7.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

terms of his impressions of Brazil, but he did complain to a friend that the trip cost him opportunities in France while providing little in terms of creative enrichment: “c’est de l’immédiat, or très limité.”⁴⁰ Brazil, it seemed, was of little use in and of itself, aside from its function as a stage for self-representation and national projection.

Brazil’s Image Problem and Music

In the eyes of Tonnancour, Roussin, and many other Canadians, Brazil could not escape its ‘peripheral’ status despite the efforts of its political and cultural elite. Vargas’s fatherly image as the “great protector of the poor” may have helped sustain the *Estado Novo*, the reality was that an enormous socioeconomic gulf separated the haves and the have-nots in both urban and rural areas.⁴¹ It also did not matter that Brazilians had fought alongside the Allies in the Atlantic and Mediterranean war theatres; the country continued to be ruled by a dictatorship, which made its alignment with the West suspect. Désy’s musically imagined community did little to change perceptions in Canada, especially considering the tremendous sacrifices Canadians were making in the fight against totalitarian regimes in Europe. *The Montreal Gazette*, for example, did not hesitate to attach the label “FASCIST” – in bold capital letters – to Vargas in 1940.⁴² *Photo-Journal* did the same in the midst of Brazil’s war efforts, noting that resistance was growing within the country against Vargas’s fascist government.⁴³ In both instances, Brazilian authorities voiced their opposition to this unfavourable coverage: first in a letter to under-secretary of state for External Affairs O.D. Skelton and then through a letter to *Photo-Journal* in which consular officials decried the misrepresentation of Vargas.⁴⁴

These interventions and the president’s faltering commitment to hold elections after the war did not help assuage suspicions. Désy’s reports were more frequent throughout 1944, which in Brazil was a transitional period characterized by civil unrest, continuous political intrigues, heightened fears of a coup, and desperate political maneuvering by the Vargas regime. “The situation is very speculative and I do not believe the atmosphere has been more tense since I

⁴⁰ [Jacques de Tonnancour] to Julien [Hébert], [Christmas] 1946, in 170P-030/18, Jacques de Tonnancour Fonds, SAGD-UQÀM.

⁴¹ Levine, *Father of the Poor*, 103.

⁴² Frank M. Garcia, “Brazil President Predicts New Era,” *The Montreal Gazette*, June 12, 1940, 17.

⁴³ André de Mérancourt, “La résistance grandit au Brésil contre le gouvernement fasciste de Getulio Vargas,” *Photo-Journal*, March 9, 1944, 3.

⁴⁴ Aluisio Martins Torres to O.D. Skelton, June 14, 1940, RG25, Vol. 2640, Political Situation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC; “À propos d’un article sur les États-Unis du Brésil,” *Photo-Journal*, March 30, 1944, 3.

came to Brazil,” he wrote on July 4.⁴⁵ Things quieted down shortly after, at least from the embassy’s perspective with Désy busying himself again with cultural matters. Brazilians did return to democracy in December of 1945. It was a timid transition in that the country elected Dutra who had been minister of war during the *Estado Novo*. Brazil also managed to elevate its status on the international stage during the closing months of the war, most notably as a founding member of the United Nations. These developments motivated Quatuor alouette’s Roger Filiatrault to manifest some optimism regarding the future of the South American giant: “Le Brésil, terre d’avenir,” he told *La Presse*’s Roger Champoux in the days that followed the group’s return to Canada and Dutra’s ascent to power.⁴⁶

Notwithstanding the prejudices of some of his compatriots, Filiatrault felt especially inspired by the ease with which Brazilians negotiated the tension between nationalism and universalism. In musical terms: their ability to participate in the concert of nations without having their individual parts overpowered by that of the larger ensemble. The metaphor is an apt one since music was central to Brazilians’ efforts to define, consolidate, and project their national and international identity. In other words, it was a core component of the strategies deployed to remedy the country’s image problem. From Antônio Carlos Gomes’s Luso-Brazilian operatic imaginaries to Heitor Villa-Lobos’s hybrid patriotic works, Brazil’s musical life no longer drifted between the ‘here’ and ‘there’ under Vargas. State support for the arts facilitated the proliferation of a national musical culture that centred on the idea of *Brasilidade*. It helped establish the reputation of Brazilian composers – and by association Brazil – as worthy interlocutors on the international stage.

Efforts were internal at first. Through his regime’s multiple radio stations, Vargas created a nationwide outlet and receptive audience for domestic works. The daily radio show of the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP), *A Hora do Brasil*, also rehabilitated Gomes by making “Il Guarany” compulsory listening and *de facto* substitute to Brazil’s national anthem.⁴⁷ State and municipal governments did their part. São Paulo’s Discoteca Publica is a case in point. Created in 1935 by Mario de Andrade, then director of the city’s Departamento de Cultura, this

⁴⁵ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 4, 1944, RG25, Vol. 2640, Political Situation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴⁶ Cited in Champoux, “Le Brésil est la terre de l’avenir,” 3.

⁴⁷ Magaldi, “Two Musical Representations of Brazil,” 205.

sound library was conceived with the idea of democratizing access to culture while demonstrating the socializing power of music through educational projects. The importance accorded to ‘serious music’ – foreign and domestic works – reflected the belief that it was the perfect medium for forming the cultural elites whose task it would be to provide depth and resonance to *Brasilidade*. The institution’s director, Oneyda Alvarenga, also oversaw the production of records for libraries, radio stations, and embassies both within and beyond Brazil’s borders.⁴⁸ These initiatives prepared the terrain for the reception, production, and dissemination of musical works that the Vargas regime could recuperate for its nation building and nation branding projects.

The Brazilian government was not alone in trying to tackle the country’s image problem while creating opportunities to both unify the country and foster dialogue with foreign interlocutors. Initiatives also came from practitioners who understood how a more engaging image could benefit their career. Founded in 1940 by a “group of Brazilian idealists,” the OSB saw itself as the vehicle through which Brazilians could demonstrate their cultural sophistication and *savoir-faire*.⁴⁹ Conceived as a great patriotic endeavour, it sought to educate the masses and promote national pride and unity through its performance of works by Brazilian composers and its rendition of the canon of Western music. It also aimed to energize musical life in Brazil by providing a forum for interaction with visiting composers. Supported by Vargas, the OSB’s mandate rested on the twin pillars of cultural democracy and musical nationalism; hence the orchestra’s efforts to connect with broader publics through religious and youth concerts, radio broadcasts, and cross-country tours.⁵⁰ Launched in 1944, the magazine *Brasil Musical* served similar purposes by featuring Brazilian artists and opening its pages to foreign composers and writers. Published exclusively in Portuguese, the overseas reach of this expansively produced magazine was somewhat limited although it did position Brazil’s national musical culture

⁴⁸ See “No Mundo dos Discos,” *Diario da Noite*, August 18, 1938, in Pasta 01 – Discoteca (1936-1939), Discoteca Oneyda Alvarenga Records, Centro Cultural – Discoteca Oneyda Alvarenga (CC-DOA); “O Brasil é a Maior Expressão Musical do Continente,” *Diario de São Paulo*, July 20, 1940, in Pasta 02 – Discoteca (1940-1944), Discoteca Oneyda Alvarenga Records, CC-DOA; “Não Me Preocupo, em Absoluto, em Fazer Música Brasileira,” *A Noite*, January 10, 1944, in Pasta 02 – Discoteca (1940-1944), Discoteca Oneyda Alvarenga Records, CC-DOA; and Justino Martins, “Música para Milhões,” *Revista do Globo*, January 26, 1946, in Pasta 03 – Discoteca (1945-1949), Discoteca Oneyda Alvarenga Records, CC-DOA.

⁴⁹ “Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira – 1940-1943,” n.d., GC 1355F, Gustavo Capanema Collection, FGV-CPDOC. In Portuguese: “... um grupo de brasileiros idealistas.”

⁵⁰ “Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira,” n.d., Pasta 30/4 – Textos Narrativos Sobre OSB, José Siqueira Fonds, Biblioteca Alberto Nepomuceno – Escola de Música da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (BAN-EM-UFRJ).

favourably for the world to see by placing Brazilian artists alongside some of the great names in the world of ‘serious music.’ *Brasil Musical*, like the OSB, was conceived partly as a vehicle for the projection of an appealing and engaging image of Brazil – an image destined to cosmopolitan artists and intellectuals most likely to influence perceptions of the South American giant in their own country.⁵¹

The Itamaraty’s interest in these matters became more pronounced in 1946 with the realization that domestic cultural policies and musical diplomacy were intricately connected. Throughout much of the *Estado Novo*, initiatives lay in the hands of the MES, the DIP, and the Divisão de cooperação Intelectual (DCIt) whose task was to do the work of the Itamaraty with regards to “cultural relations with other countries, the diffusion of Brazilian culture, and the publicizing of useful knowledge ... in the principal foreign centers.”⁵² However, inadequate budgets and a lack of coordination between government bodies impeded early efforts, which ranged from supporting touring musicians, inviting foreign artists, financing cultural events, sponsoring private organizations, and sending both records and musical scores to embassies and consular offices overseas.⁵³ Domestically, the Vargas regime used ‘serious music’ and *musicais populares* [popular music] such as samba to rally the population around the ideal of *Brasilidade*, but only the former appealed to the agencies who shared the responsibility for devising Brazil’s musical diplomacy in the 1940s.⁵⁴ Juliette Dumont and Anaïs Fléchet contend that there was a clear “disassociation between what was valorized in the internal spheres and what was shown about Brazilian culture in the international scenario.”⁵⁵ It is not that ‘serious music’ served no purpose domestically – it did as indicated above, but unlike popular music it served the added purpose of enhancing Brazil’s prestige overseas while increasing confidence in the country’s ability to join the concert of nations as an adept and mature player. The end of the Vargas era and the subsequent dismantling of the DIP brought about dynamic changes on that front. In 1946, the Dutra government centralized and further institutionalized its cultural diplomacy through a new agency: the Divisão Cultural do Itamaraty [Cultural Division of the Itamaraty] (DCIt). The

⁵¹ João Batista, “Nossa Plataforma,” *Brasil Musical* 1, no. 1 (November 1944), 1-2.

⁵² Dumont and Fléchet, “Brazilian Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,” 4.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁴ A broader range of musical genres will be mobilized from the late 1950s onward. These are discussed in chapter 5.

⁵⁵ Dumont and Fléchet, “Brazilian Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century,” 7.

defence of Brazil's international identity – that is, the measures taken to address the country's image problem – was a priority for the DCIt who began to more actively seek out the support of composers and cultural producers.⁵⁶

It is revealing of the defective state of the *Estado Novo*'s cultural diplomacy that its first musical ambassador to Canada travelled with the support of an American-based organization: Columbia Concerts.⁵⁷ Born in Rio de Janeiro in 1908, Arnaldo Estrella mastered the art of the piano at the Escola Nacional de Música where he familiarized himself with the works of Villa-Lobos. The two became close friends – so much so that the pianist became one of the key interpreters of the composer's works. A connoisseur when it came to Frédéric Chopin and Johannes Brahms, Estrella was foremost a champion of Brazilian music. He found himself travelling north in the winter of 1943 after having won a Columbia Concerts competition held to promote better cultural relations between the United States and Brazil. By that time, discussions between Désy and Temístocles da Graça Aranha regarding a possible Canada-Brazil cultural agreement were well under way. The Dansereau couple's tour of Brazil was also in the works. It is not clear who proposed to bring Estrella to Canada, but plans were in place a full month prior to the pianist's New York debut on February 7.⁵⁸ Burdened with a busy schedule, Estrella managed to cross into Canada on March 30 for a one-off performance of Brazilian works on the airwaves of Radio-Canada: Villa-Lobos, Brasília Itiberê da Cunha, and Camargo Guarnieri.⁵⁹ Brazilian diplomats in Montreal reported enthusiastically that their compatriot had demonstrated "superior technique and Brazilian sensibility" at the piano.⁶⁰ Yet the press failed to take note of the event since it was poorly promoted. Still, Estrella managed to meet with Champagne who had just finished his "Quadrilha Brasileira" at the request of Désy. On vacation in Montreal at the time, the Canadian diplomat organized a reception for the Brazilian pianist.⁶¹ It is likely that it is on that occasion that the idea of having Estrella premiere Champagne's composition on

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁷ "Le pianiste Estrella à Radio-Canada, le 30," *L'Avenir du Nord*, March 26, 1943, 4.

⁵⁸ T. Graça Aranha to Caio de Mello Franco, January 7, 1943, 37/02/13, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Despachos), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

⁵⁹ "Le pianiste Estrella à Radio-Canada, le 30," 4.

⁶⁰ Letter to Oswaldo Aranha, April 3, 1943, 48-931, DCI, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, Arquivo Central do Itamaraty (ACI). In Portuguese: "... superior técnica e sentimento brasileiros."

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Dominion Day in Brazil was born. A musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community was decidedly in the making.

José Siqueira followed a similar route to Canada with no more luck than Estrella. Born in 1907 in the small town of Conceição, in the northern part of the country, he acquired his musical education in the army and then at Rio de Janeiro's Instituto Nacional de Música. He started making a name for himself as a composer and conductor in the 1930s, but his career really took off with the OSB of which he was the director and a founding member. He had travelled to the United States at the invitation of Nelson Rockefeller in 1943. He was again northbound in December of 1945 to meet with composers Leopold Stokowsky and Karl Krueger. Siqueira had reached out to the DCIn for assistance in October although it was not until Désy got involved weeks later that the idea of performing in Canada was raised.⁶² On December 6, the Canadian ambassador contacted MacMillan to see if he could arrange for the Brazilian composer to direct the TSO in January of 1946.⁶³ He had also written to Champagne to inquire about the possibility of organizing something in Montreal. Whereas Champagne managed to secure a Radio-Canada performance for Siqueira, MacMillan failed to generate opportunities for his Brazilian counterpart with such short notice. The situation caused him much anxiety since Désy had just shared the news that plans were being made to bring him and Champagne to Brazil. Siqueira appeared somewhat annoyed in his correspondence – at least in the eyes of MacMillan who felt that his reputation and that of the TSO were being damaged unnecessarily. Seemingly indulging in self-importance, MacMillan voiced his frustration to the DEA in a letter which evoked the likelihood of a diplomatic incident. He was certainly exaggerating although such language allowed him to make the point that more could be done to facilitate cultural exchanges and that better planning would be consistent with Canada's efforts to project a positive image overseas.⁶⁴ Yet there were domestic power dynamics at work as well in this episode: "Montreal will get the credit and Toronto the blame," MacMillan complained to the DEA.⁶⁵ In the end, Siqueira's radio

⁶² José de Lima Siqueira to Diretor da Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual, October 9, 1945, 112/01/14, Diversos no Exterior – Literárias e Artísticas, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

⁶³ Jean Désy to Ernest MacMillan, December 6, 1945, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁴ Ernest MacMillan to T. W. L. MacDermot, January 26, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

performance, on January 30, went largely unnoticed although it probably earned Champagne additional goodwill with elite Brazilian francophiles.⁶⁶

A Canadian Musical Mosaic?

Canada's musical life still bore the indelible mark of its British and French origins in 1946. As Paul Helmer explains, it "was bifurcated in a manner that reflected its history: there was an anglophone community oriented towards London and Edinburgh, and a francophone community oriented towards Paris, with Montreal serving as the geographical synapse of the two."⁶⁷ Whether it emanated from Toronto or Montreal, Canada's 'serious music' continued to be inspired by both British and French traditions dating back to the turn of the twentieth century. The two cities had their own music schools, music faculties, and orchestras with which to assert their identity, if not dominance, on the national stage. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) often served as a conduit for these efforts although it was itself a potential competitor since it also employed artists and had its own orchestra. In this contest, Toronto and Montreal counted on the patronage of wealthy families eager to help Canadian talent graduate from musical *salons* to concert stages: the Massey family who funded Toronto's Massey Hall and the Athanase family who helped found the Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM). Composers and musicians who travelled to Great Britain and France to perfect their training could then return to dynamic music scenes although they still faced financial precarity in the 1930s and 1940s. Many went back to Europe or travelled to the United States for further training or work opportunities. This was true for both Toronto and Montreal, but also other cultural centres with blossoming music scenes: among others, Quebec City, Halifax, and Vancouver.

Those trips to Europe and the United States reveal the importance of international connections in the development of an elitist, cosmopolitan culture in Canada. The permeability of the border was of significance during the interwar years, because it permitted the circulation of people (touring orchestras), sounds (radio broadcasts), and funds (philanthropic endeavours); all of which encouraged the professionalization, institutionalization, and modernization of

⁶⁶ "Jose Siqueira," *Radio Monde*, February 9, 1946, 6.

⁶⁷ Paul Helmer, *Growing with Canada: The Émigré Tradition in Canadian Music* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 83.

musical life in urban cultural centres. Philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation played an especially important role by providing the means and the skills necessary to advance from a private approach to cultural patronage to one increasingly dependent on corporate and state structures.⁶⁸ Such transnational exchanges brought into focus a commonality of values among those who defined themselves as members of a cosmopolitan elite – most of them “white, financially comfortable, middle-aged males,” according to Jeffrey D. Brison.⁶⁹ He adds: “In short, a basic community of interest, shaped by social class, education, and gender, more often than not obscured national interests, loyalties, and differences.”⁷⁰ However, by the 1940s, Canada’s cosmopolitan elite increasingly turned to governments to maintain its cultural hegemony and to shield itself from the so-called lowbrow culture that was emanating from the United States – a process that led to calls for greater public support for the arts and active efforts to develop a national culture.⁷¹ Writing about English Canadians, Maria Tippett argues that this “gave them a distinctly heightened sense of their importance, for they now saw themselves more clearly than ever before, not simply as nation-builders or educators but as the custodians of the values their civilization was struggling to preserve.”⁷² French Canadians were not passive spectators in all of this, Paul Litt reminds us.⁷³ Indeed, MacMillan and Champagne were both participants in – and products of – these developments.

Canada’s evolving soundscape provided an engaging environment for European musicians fleeing both persecution by totalitarian regimes and war. Their presence in cities like Toronto and Montreal provided additional stimulus to the development of a cosmopolitan culture rooted in Canadians’ experience with modernity. Between 1933 and 1942, thirty-eight of them arrived in Canada – a small number that does not quite capture the breadth of the contributions these artists made to their host country’s musical life.⁷⁴ Born in Vienna, pianist and harpsichordist Greta Kraus fled the Nazis in 1938. She relocated to Toronto where she established her

⁶⁸ Brison, *Rockefeller, Carnegie, & Canada*, 12.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 10. See also Paul Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 21.

⁷⁰ Brison, *Rockefeller, Carnegie, & Canada*, 9.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷² Maria Tippett, *Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts Before the Massey Commission* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 168.

⁷³ Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission*, 20.

⁷⁴ Helmer, *Growing with Canada*, 9.

reputation as a stellar performer and a dedicated educator. Mannheim-born cellist Lotte Brott also arrived in Canada in 1938, performing with the McGill String Quartet and the OCSM throughout the 1940s. Born in Berlin, pianist Helmut Blume escaped to England in 1939 where he was interned and then transferred to Canada. Released in 1942, he participated in wartime propaganda broadcasts and made his mark as an instructor and administrator at McGill University's Faculty of Music. These individuals, and many others like them, injected new life into Canada's compositional and educational culture. Their experience, Helmer argues, is "essentially a story of liberation."⁷⁵ According to him, it is also a story of decolonization in that they encouraged Canadians to think beyond French-English binaries. He writes: "Émigré musicians helped us to move beyond a colonial mentality by opening our musical consciousness and giving us a new appreciation of the rich tapestry that constitutes the Canadian mosaic."⁷⁶ "Their efforts brought about a Canadianization of our musical life," he adds.⁷⁷ Yet to describe Canada's wartime and postwar musical life as a mosaic would be to look at the past through the prism of the ideology of multiculturalism, which had yet to move individuals such as Désy, MacMillan, and Champagne in 1946.

At the turn of the 1940s, Canada's cultural elite continued to seek inspiration in the works of folklorists who prioritized source material that spoke of the country's cultural survival and 'white' settler origins. George A. Proctor refers to the interwar decades as a period of "early nationalism" in Canadian music.⁷⁸ During this period, composers experimented with melodic or thematic elements that they could quote or incorporate into their works to evoke Canadian life and spaces. Theirs was not a systematic or concerted effort. "In many European countries nationalism was crystallized through the works of a major composer ..., but in Canada no single significant composer had emerged; indeed musicians were generally not cognizant of music produced elsewhere throughout the country," explains Elaine Keillor.⁷⁹ Hence, the crucial role that Barbeau played in the development of folk-infused art music in Canada. His efforts and those of Gibbon provided incentives for composers to begin transcribing folksongs to create

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 241.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ George A. Proctor, *Canadian Music of the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 18.

⁷⁹ Elaine Keillor, *Music in Canada: Capturing Landscape and Diversity* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 302.

vocal and instrumental arrangements. Their 1927 and 1928 editions of the Quebec City CPR festival saw MacMillan and Champagne contributing “Two Sketches for String Quartet” and “Suite Canadienne,” respectively. MacMillan went on to focus increasingly on English-Canadian and Irish folksongs with the encouragement of Barbeau while Champagne continued his exploration of French-Canadian folklore through works such as “Danse villageoise” and “La Laurentienne.”⁸⁰ The international connections and émigré contributions discussed above injected dynamism and direction in the country’s musical life without necessarily rendering obsolete the interest in folk material, especially in Québec where the practice of engaging with stories of origins remained strong.⁸¹

French-English binaries thus continued to matter and affect dynamics within – and between – cultural centres such as Toronto and Montreal. Not surprisingly, they informed many of the works of non-fiction and fiction published at the time. Gibbon’s *The Canadian Mosaic* discussed the immigrant experience of ‘racial groups’ from Europe and their acculturation into Canadian society, but it did so in ways that celebrated Britishness and English-Canadian cultural hegemony.⁸² French Canadians were marginal characters in the cityscapes that Gibbon depicted in 1938. Set in Montreal and its surrounding region, Hugh MacLennan’s *Two Solitudes* provided a more accurate description of French-English and Catholic-Protestant relations in Canada. Published in 1945, the novel revolves around a wealthy, Catholic, French-Canadian family torn by incongruous forces – tradition and modernity, family and individualism, religion and secularism, country and city – and the need to navigate around sociocultural mores that encouraged allegiance to one’s ‘race’ and nation while nurturing suspicion of ‘others’ in the struggle for cultural survival and progress. In his work, MacLennan encapsulated many of the tensions that troubled Canadian society in the years leading up to the Second World War – tensions that also shaped the country’s international image.⁸³ By engaging with the trope of *métissage*, the joint MacMillan-Champagne tour of Brazil was both a challenge to the idea of ‘two solitudes’ and an effort to offer a more modern and rounded image of Canada than that proposed by Quatuor alouette the previous year.

⁸⁰ Keillor, “Marius Barbeau as a Promoter of Folk Music Performance and Composition,” 147.

⁸¹ Keillor, *Music in Canada*, 302.

⁸² John Murray Gibbon, *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1938).

⁸³ Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1945).

Musical Envoys from Canada's 'Two Solitudes'

Sir Ernest MacMillan, as many people called him, was one of the central forces behind the emergence of a distinctively Canadian 'high' art musical culture in the 1940s. Born in 1893 in Mimico, Ontario, he grew up in a Presbyterian family. A minister and hymnist, his father encouraged him to play the organ at Church. In 1905, MacMillan accompanied his family to Scotland where he perfected his musical education. Back in Canada in 1908, he was once again eastbound; although this time he was headed to Paris to study the piano. He was in Germany for a music festival when the First World War broke out. Interned at Ruhleben as an enemy alien for the duration of the conflict, MacMillan used that time to refine and develop his organizational, compositional, and conducting skills with musicians that he assembled into impromptu orchestras. After the armistice, he was released from the detention camp and returned to Canada where he began a prolific teaching and administrative career while also taking up the position of conductor at the TSO. He subsequently collaborated with Barbeau and Gibbon in their efforts to find a place for folk materials within Canada's emerging national musical culture. MacMillan accepted the Knighthood awarded to him in 1935 not because he was an imperialist, but because the title was an "acknowledgment of the growing importance of music in public life."⁸⁴ Throughout the 1930s, he tirelessly called attention to the need for more funding, better coordination, and greater promotion of the strategies deployed to train musicians, disseminate their works, and educate publics about the value of 'serious music.'⁸⁵ Resolvedly, he put his career at the service of the nation, although the Canada that he embraced was one that was characterized – above all – by its Britishness.⁸⁶ According to Helmer: "A super musician and a consummate gentleman, MacMillan was a prime example of the British domination of the musical scene in Toronto and to some extent across Canada."⁸⁷

Wilfrid Pelletier was in many ways "MacMillan's francophone counterpart."⁸⁸ Born in Montreal in 1896, he played percussion with local bands in his youth before learning rudiments on the piano. With the help of a private instructor, he rose through the ranks of the city's small

⁸⁴ Carl Morey, "Introduction," in *MacMillan on Music: Essays on Music by Sir Ernest MacMillan*, ed. Carl Morey (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 11.

⁸⁵ Ernest Macmillan, "Problems of Music in Canada," in Morey, *MacMillan on Music*, 92.

⁸⁶ Morey, "Introduction," 9. See also Schabas, *Sir Ernest MacMillan*, 310.

⁸⁷ Helmer, *Growing with Canada*, 84.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

music community to secure a position with the National Theatre's orchestra. In 1915, he won the Prix d'Europe although he had to wait until the following autumn to cross the Atlantic due to the war raging overseas. In 1917, he made his way to New York where he found work as a *répétiteur* for the singers of the Metropolitan Opera's French repertoire. Within just a few years, he was conducting orchestras himself and giving performances throughout the United States. He was one of the Metropolitan Opera's regular conductors when news reached him that he was needed back in Canada. Montreal philanthropists wanted him to serve as artistic director for a new orchestra that would have as part of its mandate to feature Québec-born and Québec-trained soloists and composers, particularly Prix d'Europe recipients. Pelletier participated in the creation of the OCSM in 1934 out of national pride and to repay his debt to the burgeoning cultural elite that had made it possible for him to travel overseas almost two decades earlier. Like MacMillan, he became a champion of 'serious music' by appealing to broader audiences through youth concerts and by working towards better training opportunities for French-speaking musicians. The opening of the Conservatoire de musique du Québec à Montréal (CMQM) in 1943 was the culmination of these efforts.⁸⁹

Although MacMillan shared with Pelletier certain preoccupations regarding the teaching and dissemination of 'serious music,' his true counterpart in Québec was arguably Claude Champagne.⁹⁰ Born in 1891, the Montreal-born composer-educator adopted the violin as his instrument of predilection. Educated at the Dominion College of Music and the Conservatoire national de musique, he first made a name for himself as a teacher and performer. Champagne completed his first composition in 1914, but it is his "Hercule et Omphale," a 1918 symphonic poem, that caught the attention of Montreal's cultural elite. Between 1921 and 1928, he studied in Europe – first in Belgium and then in Paris – where he premiered "Hercule et Omphale" to great acclaim. From there, he composed "Suite canadienne," which won one of the prizes awarded during the May 1928 edition of the Quebec City CPR festival for works inspired by French-Canadian folk melodies. Incidentally, MacMillan also secured a prize with his "Six bergerettes du Bas Canada" that year. Back in Montreal in 1929, Champagne concentrated most of his energies on administrative and teaching duties while helping reform music education in Québec. He was instrumental in preparing the terrain for the provincial law to which the CMQM

⁸⁹ See Wilfrid Pelletier, *Une symphonie inachevée* (Montreal: Leméac, 1972).

⁹⁰ See Keillor, *Music in Canada*, 181; and Schabas, *Sir Ernest MacMillan*, 94.

owed its existence. In his capacity as assistant director of the new institution, he strove to elevate musical life in Montreal and prepare future generations for successful careers within the province and beyond.⁹¹ Champagne travelled in the same social and cultural circles as Désy, which is how he found himself tasked with writing “Quadrilha Brasileira” and helping arrange opportunities for Siqueira. He was therefore better positioned than Pelletier to accompany MacMillan to Brazil in 1946, especially considering his previous accomplishments as a composer of folk-infused works.⁹²

The initial plan for the joint MacMillan-Champagne tour revealed that Désy’s musical nation branding efforts were designed with both domestic and foreign audiences in mind. It also indicated unambiguously that the trope of *métissage* would, once again, serve to promote a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community that centred on ‘whiteness.’ The ambassador invited MacMillan and Champagne to Brazil for two concerts that would launch the OSB’s 1946 musical season in Rio de Janeiro. They were expected to share a two-part program whereby MacMillan would direct works by French-Canadian composers while Champagne would handle the English-Canadian repertoire. The former would begin the first concert and end the program on the second night. Désy insisted that this musical scheme would provide a great example of *bonne entente* and intercultural exchange “for both compatriots and foreigners.”⁹³ A rebuttal, in some ways, of the ‘two solitude’ thesis. Hence the suggestion that the concerts be broadcast on Brazilian airwaves and then relayed to the CBC. Désy was inviting Champagne and MacMillan as his official guests “with the assistance of his friends in Brazil.”⁹⁴ The DEA did not seem too keen on contributing to the scheme although it was willing to offer logistical support. Québec, on the other hand, offered \$4,000 to cover some of the costs for one of the concerts. As for Ontario, it declined to help fund the project – possibly because the predominantly English-speaking province could not see how a tour framed as a “Cultural Propaganda Movement” with “no commercial character whatsoever” could benefit Ontarians with marginal ties to Brazil and

⁹¹ For a discussion of Claude Champagne’s importance, see Laurendeau, *Cent ans de Prix d’Europe*.

⁹² Incidentally, Wilfrid Pelletier was in Rio de Janeiro at the same time as Ernest MacMillan and Claude Champagne. He was accompanying his wife, opera singer Rose Bampton, who was performing with the Metropolitan Opera in Brazil. Jean Désy organized a recital at his house with Pelletier and Champagne accompanying Bampton on the piano and organ, respectively. “Trois musiciens sont applaudis à Rio,” *La Presse*, September 7, 1946, 55.

⁹³ Claude Champagne to Ernest MacMillan, September 5, 1945, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

whose cultural standing in Canada seemed secure.⁹⁵ The discrepancy between each province's response to the project was another indication that the idea of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community resonated more with French Canadians than with English Canadians.

The difficulties encountered by MacMillan and Champagne during the planning stages of the tour demonstrated the extent to which Désy's musical diplomacy was improvised. The two composers first heard about the project in the summer of 1945. Details were blurry; there were talks of a shared program to be performed with the OSB on two consecutive nights, but also mentions of potential concerts in various venues throughout Rio de Janeiro, performances on the airwaves, and lectures at the Escola Nacional de Música. The concerts were to take place in May although they were later postponed to June, then July, and finally August. Whereas Champagne was happy to keep his schedule open until full details were available, MacMillan was becoming increasingly impatient with the fact that Désy could confirm neither the dates nor the financial terms. He had also asked the ambassador if he could arrange for him to conduct more concerts since he thought it was "absurd" to travel all the way to Brazil only to perform a shared program twice.⁹⁶ It did not help that the DEA was not more informed than him regarding this new experiment in musical diplomacy. MacMillan had "not yet given up hope" although he was clearly exasperated by the slow pace at which things were moving.⁹⁷ As for Champagne, he was "rather surprised, and worried" by the fact that his Ontarian counterpart seemed to have second thoughts regarding the tour.⁹⁸ His personal relationship with Désy gave him confidence that everything would work out in the end. On April 10, 1946, he wrote to MacMillan to remind him of how important the tour was for "boosting Canadian music abroad."⁹⁹ He added: "Of course, with you, being a professional conductor, the case may be a little different, but I feel sure if you will visualize the 'overall' good it will do Canada, you will think it a very worthy gesture."¹⁰⁰ Champagne appeared to doubt MacMillan's willingness to put his career at the full service of the

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* See also T. W. L. M. to Dana Porter, August 16, 1945, RG25, Vol. 3799, Exchange of Musical Artists Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC; T. W. L. M. to Jean Désy, September 24, 1945, RG25, Vol. 3799, Exchange of Musical Artists Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁶ Ernest MacMillan to T. W. L. MacDermot, January 26, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* (emphasis in original).

⁹⁸ Claude Champagne to Ernest MacMillan, November 7, 1945, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁹ Claude Champagne to Ernest MacMillan, April 10, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

nation. In the end, Canada seemed barely more capable than Brazil to organize such a tour on its own since MacMillan only agreed to go after Columbia Concerts got involved and negotiated terms for him.

The DEA, more so than Désy, was to blame for the haphazard way in which the tour was organized. At least, this is what MacMillan believed. He did not need Champagne to lecture him on cultural diplomacy. “He is preaching to the converted,” he thought.¹⁰¹ MacMillan had resisted the temptation to walk away from the project to avoid embarrassing “our Ambassador in his genuine efforts to promote international good will.”¹⁰² The DEA had told Désy and MacMillan that Ottawa did not have the resources to support such initiatives in the immediate aftermath of the war.¹⁰³ Its resources were presumably stretched so thin that it could only make partial photostats of the scores needed in Brazil. MacMillan, who had been actively campaigning for public support for the arts, was disappointed that Ottawa could not do more to support its artists by ensuring the best of conditions when performing abroad. More importantly, he felt that the DEA was failing Canadians by not keeping up with less developed nations that had already equipped themselves with a cultural diplomacy apparatus. “I am not wishing to plague you personally but I do think your Department ought to be kept reminded of the absolute necessity for doing something reasonably adequate to promote better international relations through music,” he told Information Division Director Terence W. L. MacDermot.¹⁰⁴

Although MacMillan made frequent references to music’s ability to foster international cooperation, his lobbying efforts were aimed primarily at creating opportunities for artists like himself and those he was working with as a conductor and an educator. The insistence with which he brought these matters to the DEA was less about creating a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community than about creating the conditions for the projection of an appealing image of Canada that corresponded to the high-ranking place he thought the country occupied in the concert of nations. In that sense, he was not much different than Siqueira who

¹⁰¹ Ernest MacMillan to Bruno Zirato, April 13, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰² Ernest MacMillan to Bruno Zirato, April 8, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰³ T. W. L. MacDermot to Ernest MacMillan, January 23, 1946, RG25, Vol. 3799, Exchange of Musical Artists Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁴ Ernest MacMillan to T. W. L. MacDermot, January 26, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

also championed musical nation branding to consolidate his career and elevate his country's status on the international stage.

In this context, MacMillan and Champagne embodied the domestic power dynamics between Montreal and Toronto referred to above. The two composers appeared to collaborate somewhat reluctantly throughout the year that it took to conclude the details of the tour. MacMillan politely expressed his reservations regarding the original two-part program by indicating that having conductors share a stage was destabilizing for both the orchestra and the audience.¹⁰⁵ He also mentioned that it would be more appropriate for him to headline the first concert, which suggests that his indisposition had to do with practicality as much as status.¹⁰⁶ He shared some of his concerns in private correspondence with Désy who kept Champagne in the loop. The ambassador and the French-Canadian composer were on a first name basis and spent time together in Montreal during the summer of 1945. Proximity and familiarity informed Champagne's response to Désy's proposal. The opposite was true for MacMillan. Latent tensions between the two composers, especially in light of MacMillan's reluctance to commit to the project until April 1946, resulted in the abandonment of the initial plan. Evoking health reasons, Champagne told his diplomat friend that he preferred to focus on teaching while in Brazil and that it would be best to let MacMillan handle the concerts with the OSB.¹⁰⁷ Final details for the tour were finally agreed on just weeks prior to departure: MacMillan would conduct eight concerts while Champagne would give eight lectures at the Escola Nacional de Música in addition to conducting two concerts (at Cine-Rex and in the auditorium of the MES). This new experiment in musical national branding would be about the 'two solitudes,' after all.

The trope of *métissage* was a doubtful metaphor for the tour as evidenced by the works performed by the two composers in Brazil. Siqueira had confused Champagne and MacMillan by telling them that he was looking forward to their shared program of "Canadian and British music."¹⁰⁸ More than a semantic mistake, the use of these adjectives suggested that he associated Canadian culture primarily with French Canada. Correspondingly, the culture of English-speaking Canadians appeared to him as more colonial in its adherence to Britishness. Thinking

¹⁰⁵ Ernest MacMillan to Jean Désy, August 30, 1945, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁶ Ernest MacMillan to Claude Champagne, November 4, 1945, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁷ Letter to Jean Désy, June 3, 1946, MUS 29, Vol. I3, Claude Champagne Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁸ José Siqueira to Claude Champagne, March 21, 1946, MUS 29, Vol. I3, Claude Champagne Fonds, LAC.

that Siqueira actually meant works by British composers, Champagne told MacMillan that works by French composers would then have to be incorporated to properly balance the shared program.¹⁰⁹ That was before the initial musical scheme fell apart. Désy ultimately agreed to let the two composers conduct their own affairs although he encouraged them to include Canadian works in their respective programs. For his Rio de Janeiro debut, Champagne performed his “Berceuse” alongside Czech (Bedřich Smetana), Russian (Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov), and French (Arthur Honegger and Henri Rabaud) works. He dedicated his second concert entirely to Canadian composers, all of them from Québec. Aside from his own “Two Sketches for String Quartet” and a one-off performance of Champagne’s “Danse canadienne,” MacMillan performed mostly compositions associated with the canons of ‘serious music’ (from Ludwig van Beethoven to Franz Schubert and Gustav Theodore Holst, among others). Whereas Champagne focused on Québec’s cultural output and its connections to both France and the musical nationalisms of Smetana and Rimsky-Korsakov, MacMillan situated his practice within the cosmopolitan universalism of Western ‘high’ culture – ‘two solitudes,’ indeed.¹¹⁰

Coverage of the tour inevitably reflected this polarization. The Brazilian press welcomed MacMillan and Champagne as “guests of maestro Siqueira” and “messengers from Canada,” but it also emphasized their difference from one another by noting that they embodied distinct musical manifestations – rather than variations – of Canada’s musical culture.¹¹¹ Reporters often found themselves discussing the two composers simultaneously since they were in Brazil at the same time to foster cordial relations between Canadians and Brazilians.¹¹² Yet this made it easier to consistently juxtapose MacMillan’s connections to the English-speaking world against Champagne’s connections to the French-speaking world. Toronto and Montreal appeared as worlds apart in the Brazilian press, especially with MacMillan and Champagne following their

¹⁰⁹ Claude Champagne to Ernest MacMillan, April 17, 1946, MUS 29, Vol. I3, Claude Champagne Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁰ Jean Désy submitted separate reports to the Department of External Affairs. See Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 24, 1946, RG25, Vol. 3799, Exchange of Musical Artists Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC; and Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 3, 1946, RG25, Vol. 3799, Exchange of Musical Artists Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹¹¹ See “Mensagem do Canadá,” *Brasil Musical* 17, 1946, 19; Roberto Lyrafilho, “Os Convidados do Maestro Siqueira,” *Revista da Semana*, December 7, 1946, 19, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/025909_04/19826; and “Sir Ernest MacMillan e Claude Champagne: Duas Grandes Expressões Musicais do Canadá,” *Diário Carioca*, July 28, 1946, 9, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/093092_03/25469.

¹¹² See “Ondas Musicais Dedicam a Dois Notáveis Regentes Canadenses,” *O Jornal*, July 30, 1946, 6, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/093718_02/28984; and “A Caminho do Rio Dois Notáveis Musicistas Canadenses,” *A Notícia*, July 26, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

own itineraries in Rio de Janeiro. The fact that Ontario newspapers took an interest in the tour did not mean that Désy was more successful in his efforts to have an image of national unity reflected towards Canada. English-language newspapers had for the most part shown no interest in Désy's earlier cultural diplomacy initiatives, but MacMillan's successes with the OSB were cause for celebration for reporters. Most of them, however, failed to take note of Champagne's presence in Brazil.¹¹³ French-language newspapers did not do better in that they focused on their Montreal-born musical envoy and his ambassador friend rather than engaging with the image of *bonne entente* and the trope of *métissage* that initially informed this latest musical nation branding experiment.

What did all this mean for Désy's musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community? As was the case with other aspects of the tour, the way in which the two composers engaged with their hosts' culture differed. MacMillan thought it appropriate to ask Désy and Siqueira, shortly before the trip, whether he should include a Brazilian composition in one of his concerts. He was therefore shocked to learn that Brazil's government had passed a law requiring all conductors to feature at least one Brazilian work in their programs.¹¹⁴ Coming as it did at the last minute, this new restriction became an additional source of annoyance. Not everyone in Brazil endorsed the law since it generally meant that visiting conductors usually picked compositions that were easy to play and could be learned quickly. The result was that audiences were often confronted with lesser quality works that did not quite reflect the richness of their country's musical culture.¹¹⁵ Still, the law forced foreign artists to familiarize themselves with the Brazilian repertoire, which meant that some of them became informal ambassadors for Brazil when returning home. In Rio de Janeiro, MacMillan performed Siqueira's "Crepúsculo" and "Dança Brasileira" as well as Villa-Lobos's "Caixinha de Boas."¹¹⁶ Champagne, on the other hand, was above the law. Neither

¹¹³ For example, see Charles Lynch, "Desy, MacMillan Give Brazilians Respect for Canada," *Times*, September 10, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC; "Canadian Culture," *News*, September 26, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC; and "Jean Desy Puts Canada on Map in Brazil," *Star*, September 12, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁴ Jose Siqueira to Ernest MacMillan, May 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.52, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC; Secretary of Ernest MacMillan to Walter P. Brown, June 12, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.52, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁵ Vasco Mariz, *Vida Musical (1946-1950)* (Porto: Lello & Irmão Editores, 1950), 171. Eugene Ormandy, William Steinberg, and Charles Munch were among the Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira's other guests in 1946.

¹¹⁶ Ernest MacMillan was also supposed to perform Francisco Mignone's "Congada," but the score never arrived from São Paulo: Marc Berkowitz, "Cultural Activities," *Brazil Herald*, August 27, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

of his two concerts included Brazilian works although he did share the stage with Siqueira who opened the Cine-Rex program with works by Carl Maria von Weber and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. It is possible that Champagne was exempted from the law's requirement because of the close friendship he seemed to be developing with Siqueira. His reputation was also in good standing since he was already known for "Quadrilha Brasileira," an original composition based on an indigenous folk melody from northern Brazil. Aside from this 1942 composition and unlike their Brazilian colleagues, neither Champagne nor MacMillan were inclined to seek inspiration in indigenous musical cultures that were "alien to the white race."¹¹⁷ If a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community was to emerge from their efforts, it would have to foreground 'whiteness.'

It would also have to be androcentric as *Brasil Musical* indicated shortly before MacMillan and Champagne arrived in Rio de Janeiro. Seeking to set the stage for the tour, Désy arranged for the publication to feature the young French-Canadian pianist André Mathieu in its pages (*figure 3.1*). Born in 1929 in a prolific musical family, Mathieu wrote his first piece for piano at the age of four. By 1936, he had performed his own works in front of bedazzled publics and had settled in Paris, thanks to the support of the Québec government. Acclaimed as a genius in Europe, he then conquered audiences in New York before returning to Montreal where he composed what would soon become his defining work: "Concerto #3." Mathieu was close to the peak of his career when he appeared on the cover of the ninth issue of *Brasil Musical*. He was depicted reading the first issue of the magazine, which featured Villa-Lobos on the cover. This play of opposition served to underline the exceptional character of the child prodigy in his passage to adulthood. Wearing a suit and tie, Mathieu fixed his intent gaze on the publication in ways that masked the fact that he could not read Portuguese. He projected a confident curiosity, composure, and intellect. Combined with the idea of creative genius, these attributes ensured that Mathieu's performance in front of the camera would be coded male. The ability to communicate authentic experiences through the language of 'serious music' was understood as a form of mastery, even authority, over otherwise feminine emotions, which is why the "creative genius could only ever be a man" in the popular imagination.¹¹⁸ However, Mathieu – the 'Canadian

¹¹⁷ Ernest Macmillan, "Musical Composition in Canada," in Morey, *MacMillan on Music*, 103.

¹¹⁸ Claire Taylor-Jay, "'I am Blessed with Fruit': Masculinity, Androgyny, and Creativity in Early Twentieth-Century German Music," in *Masculinity and Western Musical Practice*, eds. Ian Biddle and Kirsten Gibson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 194.

Mozart,’ was not yet a full-grown man, which explains why additional elements were mobilized to substantiate his performance of masculinity. The interview that accompanied this *mise en scène* brought into focus the young pianist’s big and strong hands, his calm and mature demeanour, his interest in competitive sports, and his recent adoption of smoking habits. By his own admission, Mathieu avoided unflattering photo angles that trapped him in the image of the “child prodigy.”¹¹⁹ The young artist was not scheduled to perform in Brazil, but his presence in the pages of *Brasil Musical* revealed the gendering process at work in Canada’s musical nation branding on the eve of the Champagne-MacMillan tour.




Figure 3.1. André Mathieu pictured reading about Heitor Villa-Lobos on the cover of *Brasil Musical* (1946). Source: *Brasil Musical*, Biblioteca Alberto Nepomuceno.

The two impromptu ambassadors gravitated in and around predominantly male political and cultural circles in Rio de Janeiro. They befriended and developed collegial relationships with

¹¹⁹ See “Nossa Capa: André Mathieu,” *Brasil Musical* 9, 1945, 38; and “André Mathieu,” *Brasil Musical* 5, 1945, 18-19.

the likes of Villa-Lobos, Francisco Mignone, and Oscar Lorenzo Fernández; towering male figures that the two composers needed to measure to. MacMillan's on-stage performances provided evidence that he was up to the task, according to Brazilian music critics. They placed him in the same category as Mathieu, by noting that his musical genius shone through his playing at a very early age.¹²⁰ Not only had he grown into an accomplished and widely respected composer-educator, he had also survived German internment camps during the First World War and had been awarded Knighthood.¹²¹ His "vigorous artistic attitude," objective outlook, and even temperament allowed him to rest control and guide the OSB to "one of the biggest musical triumphs" ever experienced in Rio de Janeiro.¹²² These journalistic hyperboles were thought to capture the full measure of the man. In a parallel way, he and Champagne were pictured smoking with radiant – almost victorious – smiles in the Canadian press.¹²³ A similar photo of Champagne with Villa-Lobos served to further convey the normative framework within which the Canadian-Brazilian cultural rapprochement was to take place.¹²⁴ Pipe and cigar smoking were practices that reinforced one's sense of masculine and bourgeois identity. It was also a marker of sociability as the Champagne and Villa-Lobos picture seemed to suggest (*figure 3.2*).¹²⁵ This representation helped depict the French-Canadian composer as being on par with his Brazilian counterpart whom the press described as the "arbiter" and "absolute ruler of things musical in his country."¹²⁶ A photo, rather than words that evoked patriarchal power, sufficed to argue that the two men were in the same league.

¹²⁰ For example: "A Caminho do Rio Dois Notáveis Musicistas Canadenses," *A Notícia*, July 26, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹²¹ *Ibid.* Another journalist thought that Ernest MacMillan had survived a Nazi internment camp: "Maestro Sir Ernest MacMillan," *Jornal do Commercio*, August 4, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 41, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹²² Ayres de Andrade, "MacMillan e a Sinfônica Brasileira," *O Jornal*, August 16, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC. In Portuguese: "... atitudes artísticas vigorosas." See also "Canadian Music for Brazilians," *Examiner*, September 12, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC; D'or, "Música. Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira," *Diário de Notícias*, August 15, 1946, 2, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/093718_02/29301.

¹²³ "Canadiens à Rio-de-Janeiro," *La Patrie*, October 8, 1946, 10.

¹²⁴ Thomas Archer, "Report from Brazil," *The Montreal Gazette*, September 28, 1946, 10.

¹²⁵ Claude Champagne is often pictured smoking in the press. A photo like the one of André Mathieu that appeared on the cover of *Brasil Musical* was published in a later issue of the publication: "Mensageiros do Canadá," *Brasil Musical* 17, 1946, 19; Lyrafilho, "Os Convidados do Maestro Siqueira," 19. On the topic of smoking and masculine sociability, see: Jarrett Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco Consumption and Identity* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014).

¹²⁶ Archer, "Report from Brazil," 10.



Figure 3.2. Claude Champagne and Heitor Villa-Lobos discussing cigars at a social event (1946). Source: Ernest MacMillan Fonds, Library and Archives Canada.

One thing is certain; the OSB put MacMillan's manful authority to the test. Although he successfully surmounted obstacles with vigour and valour during live concerts (from inexperienced musicians struggling through hard passages to horns playing out of tune), he found himself discouraged and enervated, even powerless, during rehearsals.¹²⁷ The problems he faced ranged from a missing key to open the piano to the double booking of rehearsal halls, delayed payments of conductor fees, missing and incomplete scores, as well as rehearsal and concert calendars that kept changing. Most tiring were the musicians themselves. MacMillan sympathized somewhat with them in that he recognized that they were underpaid and overworked, but he still reprimanded them for their indiscipline, lack of focus, and frequent absences. "Musicians are a bit like children anywhere, but here perhaps more than elsewhere,"

¹²⁷ Diary p. 36, September 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC. See also Marc Berkowitz, "Cultural Activities," *Brazil Herald*, August 15, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

he wrote in his diary.¹²⁸ Being old did not shield them from criticism: “The oldest player must have been 75 and seemed very short-sighted; he was certainly abysmally stupid.”¹²⁹ Echoing Roussin’s disparaging remarks, he described the OSB as a subpar orchestra based in a city whose musical standards did not compare with those of true metropolises.¹³⁰

MacMillan’s ambivalence vis-à-vis Brazilians was not just about their heedlessness and their unresponsiveness to his patriarchal power. They were a disconcerting ‘other’ in a disorienting city. Rio de Janeiro had, at first, seemed familiar with its layout, cafés, and buildings, which reminded MacMillan of Paris: its Avenida Presidente Vargas was a little bit like the Avenue des Champs-Élysées and the Teatro Municipal was a “miniature of the Paris Opera.”¹³¹ Spending most of his time in elite ‘white’ circles, he found the city not as ethnically diverse as he expected.¹³² Yet Rio de Janeiro had none of the comforts that Toronto offered. MacMillan’s first room did not have a bath. The room he moved into after had plumbing issues, which forced him – on one occasion and to his great chagrin – to conduct a concert unbathed. “Even toilets call for patience,” he noted with exasperation in his diary.¹³³ Brazilians mishandled his laundry and his mail when they did not overcharge for cabs and stamps. He complained of their attitude, their unreliability, and their inability to hold promises.¹³⁴ “How so apparently lacka daisical a race managed to build Rio I don’t know,” he wrote.¹³⁵ Growing increasingly disenchanted with his hosts, MacMillan feared being contaminated by what he considered to be their flawed character. He conceded that this “sweeping generalization” applied primarily to Brazilians although “visitors and foreigners of brief residence” were susceptible “to be infected by the Brazilian attitude.”¹³⁶ His compatriots were also at risk since this improvidence “was beginning even to creep into the Canadian embassy.”¹³⁷ Fortunately, he could turn to Désy and Rogers who provided unceasing support and made him feel at home. Like Roussin, he sought comfort in the familiar and held Brazilians accountable for not living up to the standards he set

¹²⁸ Diary p. 73, August 8, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹²⁹ Diary p. 32, September 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³⁰ Diary p. 64, August 7, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³¹ Diary p. 9, August 2, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³² Diary p. 27, August 4-5, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³³ Diary p. 11, August 2, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³⁴ Diary p. 3, September 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³⁵ Diary p. 38, August 4-5, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³⁶ Diary p. 3, September 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

for them through his northern gaze. Reflecting on his experience in Brazil, he penned the following words in his diary: “Never in my life have I wished more ardently to get away from a place – unless perhaps Ruhleben.”¹³⁸ In his eyes, Rio de Janeiro was barely more bearable than a detention camp in wartime Germany.

Champagne did not leave behind a tour diary detailing his impressions of Brazil, but it is fair to assume that his experience of Rio de Janeiro was more enjoyable than that of MacMillan’s since he concentrated his activities on lecturing, which put him into contact with fellow composers and educators, many of whom were francophiles. Unlike MacMillan, he felt “very much at home” in the city because of its “European atmosphere,” its “cosmopolitan spirit,” and the supposed absence of “race discrimination.”¹³⁹ Champagne’s positive depiction of Rio de Janeiro reflected, of course, the fact that he spent most of his time in elitist circles and had few contacts with musicians who often came from the popular classes. Yet it was also consistent with his support of Désy’s cultural initiatives in that he was not going to disparage a people with whom Canadians were expected to engage. It would also have been ungrateful considering the high esteem in which Brazilians held him because of his closeness to Désy and the assistance he provided to Siqueira during his trip to Canada earlier that year. In attendance during one of MacMillan’s concerts, Champagne was honoured with a long ovation by the “*habitués*” of the Teatro Municipal.¹⁴⁰ By using a French term to describe the concert hall’s audience, *Jornal do Brasil*’s Francisco Cavalcanti underlined the continued importance of Latinity and France-derived ‘high’ culture in Canadian-Brazilian relations. In fact, Désy and his many impromptu ambassadors had been so successful at dislocating Britishness from the centre of Canada’s international image that Brazil’s elite now assumed that all Canadians spoke both French and English fluently.¹⁴¹

If there is one thing that MacMillan and Champagne agreed on, it was that Brazilians were an exemplary nation in terms of their engagement with culture and their support for the arts. The

¹³⁸ Diary p. 1, September 16, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹³⁹ “Interview with Claude Champagne,” n.d., MUS 29, Vol. I3, Claude Champagne Fonds, LAC; Pierre de Grandpré, “Les Brésiliens vu par M. Claude Champagne,” *Le Devoir*, September 30, 1946, 5.

¹⁴⁰ Francisco Cavalcanti, “Ernest Mac Millan, Claude Champagne e Gyorgy Sandor no Municipal,” *Jornal do Brasil*, August 15, 1946, 8, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/030015_06/41294.

¹⁴¹ Charles Lynch, “Desy, MacMillan Give Brazilians Respect for Canada,” *Times*, September 10, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

two composers returned inspired – but also somewhat embarrassed, even angry – that Brazil, a country on the periphery of the world as they knew it, had progressed more than Canada on the question of government support for the arts.¹⁴² This realization certainly destabilized their self-image as dignified cultural representatives of a great modern nation from the North. The interviews they gave to the press upon returning to Canada revealed the urgency with which they sought to tackle that issue. Champagne romanticized what he witnessed in Brazil when he stated that “la musique y prime tout,” but the point that he was trying to make was that governments (federal and/or provincial) had a responsibility to subsidize artists if they wished to create an authentic national culture and see Canadians take their rightful place in the concert of nations.¹⁴³ “Brazil is far ahead of Canada so far as creative musical activity is concerned,” he told Thomas Archer as if to create a shock response in *The Montreal Gazette*’s readership.¹⁴⁴ MacMillan, who should not have been forthcoming in talking about Brazil, qualified his compatriot’s statement in an interview with *The Globe and Mail*: “They are far ahead of us as far as opera and the ballet are concerned, but I think their symphonic tradition has perhaps lagged behind ours.”¹⁴⁵ That said, he concurred with Champagne with regards to government support, productivity, and audience receptivity to ‘serious music.’ MacMillan had, of course, reserved some of his criticisms for the “unimaginative people” at the DEA who were failing to understand “the place that cultural propaganda can and should take in foreign (or for that matter, any) relations.”¹⁴⁶ The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey Commission) would allow him to articulate and disseminate some of his ideas regarding these matters.¹⁴⁷

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Since the opening of the legation in 1941, Désy and his associates – state and non-state actors from both Brazil and Canada – championed cultural intercourse to put forward the idea of a

¹⁴² Diary p. 42, August 4-5, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁴³ Cited in Grandpré, “Les Brésiliens vu par M. Claude Champagne,” 5.

¹⁴⁴ Archer, “Report from Brazil,” *The Montreal Gazette*, 10.

¹⁴⁵ “Jean Desy Puts Canada on Map in Brazil,” *Star*, September 12, 1946, in MUS 7, Vol. 108, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC. See also Colin Sabiston, “Music Subsidy Solution Seen in Happy Medium,” *The Globe and Mail*, October 2, 1946, 21.

¹⁴⁶ Diary p. 16-17, August 3, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 31, D.48, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁴⁷ Ernest MacMillan, *Music: An Essay Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1949-1951* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King, 1951).

musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. However, the circulation of peoples, ideas, and cultural works was for the most part unidirectional, which was consistent with the emphasis placed on musical nation branding. Projection, rather than reciprocal engagement, defined Canada's musical diplomacy in the early years of the two countries' cultural rapprochement. *The Globe and Mail*, in the aftermath of the Champagne and MacMillan tour, wrote that Brazilians were now more "inclined to think of Canada as a nation of artists, poets and musicians, rather than to harbour the more frequent foreign notion that Canada is a glacial land inhabited by trappers, Eskimos and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police."¹⁴⁸ Désy deserved much credit for this state of affairs. *Mayfair*'s George Austen attributed his success to two things: "[A] real interest in Canadian painters and musicians, and a combination of showmanship and hard work that would get him a hearing as a press agent, let alone as the ambassador of a friendly power."¹⁴⁹ However, Désy did not have full control of his musical nation branding campaigns since the non-state actors that he mobilized had plenty of opportunities to enact agency, which is why Canada's international identity was a contested matter. Between *métissage* and 'two solitudes,' the latter predominated in 1946. And while Champagne and MacMillan took part in the acts of national projection and national self-representation, 'othering' Brazilians in the process, they also served as conduits through which Brazil's own cultural ambassadors propagated their ideas and works. Having failed to help Siqueira in the winter of 1946, MacMillan had indicated that he would do his best to reciprocate upon returning home. In March of 1947, he wrote to his Brazilian counterpart to let him know that he had just introduced Torontonians to his "Danças Brasileiras [1 and 5]."¹⁵⁰ Boldly and with the satisfaction of having accomplished one of his goals, Siqueira replied: "I hope you will go on playing Brazilian composers since the public seemed to like it."¹⁵¹ Brazilians were evidently not passive actors in this story as the following chapter indicates.

¹⁴⁸ Charles Lynch, "Rio Welcomes Canadian Culture," *The Globe and Mail*, September 10, 1946, 7.

¹⁴⁹ George Austen, "Exterminating the Domesticated Bison," *Mayfair* 21, no. 1, January 1947, in MUS 29, Vol. 13, Claude Champagne Fonds, LAC.

¹⁵⁰ Ernest MacMillan to José Siqueira, October 19, 1946, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.53, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

¹⁵¹ José Siqueira to Ernest MacMillan, March 17, 1947, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.53, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

CHAPTER 4: CIRCULAR (RE)TRANSMISSIONS

*Exchanges with other nations in the fields of the arts and letters will help us to make our reasonable contribution to civilized life, and since these exchanges move in both directions, we ourselves will benefit by what we receive.*¹

– Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951

On March 12, 1953, Jean Désy found himself in the unenviable position of having to testify in front of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs (HCSCEA) to discuss the recent activities of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS). He was there in his capacity as director general of the organization, a title he held since January 1952. He had left Brazil in 1947 to continue his diplomatic career in Italy; that is, until he was recalled to help reorganize the CBC-IS so that its policies better aligned with those of the Department of External Affairs (DEA). He might as well have kept his ambassador and impromptu impresario titles since the HCSCEA had convened him in part to explain why he had spent close to \$25,000 on the production of a concert and a recording by Heitor Villa-Lobos at Montreal's Plateau Hall. Held on December 17, 1952, the event, which was broadcast live to South America, was the culmination of a decade-long history of cultural relations between Canada and Brazil, but not everyone agreed that this was a sound investment of taxpayer money.

The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey Commission) had published its report less than two years earlier and Désy had found in it plenty of arguments to support his most recent musical diplomacy initiative. Quoting from the document, the ambassador turned administrator evoked the need to reciprocate to continue accumulating international goodwill and enriching Canada's cultural life.² After all, the report did stress that the "promotion of a knowledge of Canada abroad is not a luxury but an obligation" and that Canadians had neglected their "distant neighbours, taking little and giving less."³ Not only that, the commissioners had argued that the use of culture in international relations was an effective means of countering "false propaganda" by hostile regimes.⁴ It should

¹ Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, *Report*, 254.

² Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 6: International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*, 7th Session, 21st Parliament, March 12, 1953, 155.

³ Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, *Report*, 254.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 263.

not have come as a surprise that Désy saw in the report a vindication of his earlier efforts and an opportunity to provide impetus to Canada's Cold War cultural diplomacy.

The turn of the 1950s was a time of both hopefulness and insecurity in Canada. Established on April 8, 1949, the Massey Commission had as its mandate to report on the significance and state of culture from coast to coast while making recommendations on how best to promote and sustain "the national tradition of the future."⁵ Through its proceedings, it gave voice to – and served as a forum of encounter for – artists, administrators, producers, and patrons who were investing much hope in the project of a state-supported national culture. The prosperity and growing sense of national identity that followed the Second World War fuelled their optimism. At the same time, this bustling activity masked growing concerns regarding continental economic integration and American cultural penetration in the form of low art forms, both of which threatened the hegemony of the country's cultural elite. With the Cold War in full swing, Canadians found themselves seeking consensus on their national and international identities to fend off perceived 'red threats' while avoiding complete subservience to the United States and its anti-communist agenda. Launched in 1942, the CBC-IS served to channel and give direction to these ambitions. Under-Secretary of State Dana Wilgress told the HCSCEA that the organization was entering its third phase after just ten years of existence: (1) from sending messages of support to Canadian forces in war-torn Europe to (2) promoting postwar "peaceful international collaboration" and (3) engaging in the "war of ideas" against communism.⁶ The Massey Commission had emphasized phase two of the CBC-IS in its report although it also couched its discussion of the broadcaster in Cold War language when it underlined that "information and cultural matters are now becoming more and more an essential part of foreign policy."⁷ The Louis St-Laurent government put Désy at the helm of the CBC-IS to solidify the broadcaster's mandate as an instrument of psychological warfare aimed at Europe, but the former ambassador believed – as did the commissioners – that shortwave radio was, first and foremost, a powerful nation branding tool; particularly vis-à-vis Brazil, the only country with which Canada had a cultural agreement at the turn of the 1950s.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶ Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 2: Main Estimates of the Department of External Affairs – Departmental Administration*, 7th Session, 21st Parliament, Thursday February 26, 1953, 43.

⁷ Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, *Report*, 263.

The Villa-Lobos concert, coming as it did during the Cold War and at the end of the CBC-IS's first decade of shortwave transmissions, exposed the limits of the metaphors and technologies deployed to project Canada abroad. While commentators sought to distinguish between psychological warfare (the dissemination of information for propaganda purposes) and broadcasting (the dissemination of ostensibly apolitical, objective information), the international service performed a less apparent, but equally important third and crucial role, namely that of an instrument for national projection and national self-representation.⁸ In the same way that pan-Canadian broadcasts helped listeners imagine themselves being part of a nation from the 1920s onward, the CBC-IS used shortwave transmissions to tell stories, often through music, about Canadians and the place they occupied – or thought they ought to occupy – in the world.⁹ Its mastery of radio technology and enterprising use of transcription records, combined with the staging of sophisticated mediated events such as the Villa-Lobos concert, also put Canadian *savoir-faire* and economic power on display while facilitating the transnational circulation of sounds and musicians, all of which were meant to shape perceptions of the country at home and abroad.

In this context, the elaborate 1952 broadcast concert was supposed to be about the projection of Canadian identity more than Brazilian music. Above all, the event was about embodying a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community that – it was hoped – corresponded with Canadians' self-image and sense of place in the world. Villa-Lobos's 'difference,' however, proved too destabilizing to the Plateau Hall audience who failed to recognize themselves in the image reflected back at them. Negative reviews of the concert and the controversy over costs that surrounded it revealed that Canadians had yet to reach consensus on what to project (and how) to secure their place in the concert of nations. This chapter begins with a brief history of shortwave technology, looking at the emergence of radio diplomacy in the United States, Great Britain, and Brazil to contextualize the nation branding imperatives that

⁸ For example, Bernard J. Hibbitts differentiates between the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS) as "a broadcasting organization *per se*" and the CBC-IS as "a psychological instrument" when he writes: "The broadcast historian is equally interested in shortwave transmissions and transcriptions; he is as much concerned with broadcasts to Latin America as with broadcasts to the USSR. The student of foreign policy ... must be far more sensitive to the explicitly political aspects of his subject – thus the concentration ... on shortwave transmissions to European, and especially East European, targets." Hibbitts, "The CBC International Service as a Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Cold War," IX.

⁹ For a discussion of the early history of domestic broadcasting, see Mary Vipond, *Listening In: The First Decade of Canadian Broadcasting, 1922-1932* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).

motivated Canada's late arrival on the international broadcasting stage. It then examines the CBC-IS's southbound transmissions, which echoed the cultural diplomacy championed by Désy, who was still in Brazil when broadcasts began in 1945. The chapter then situates the Villa-Lobos concert, including the criticisms and commentaries that accompanied it, along a continuum of earlier musical nation branding efforts in order to shed light on the tensions inherent to the process of projecting Canada abroad.

Radio Diplomacy

Canada was a novice player when it entered the international broadcasting arena in 1945. The first breakthroughs in shortwave transmissions had occurred more than two decades earlier when radio amateurs in the United States and Great Britain established transatlantic communication with each other. From the First World War onward, radio technology developed at a rapid pace with commercial broadcasters competing for limited space on the airwaves, which they also shared with military organizations. Believing that high powered, low frequency longwave transmissions held greater potential, regulators forced amateurs into the upper portion of the radio spectrum to prevent them from creating interference in military and commercial communication.¹⁰ However, radio amateurs successfully experimented across long distances using high frequencies to the great surprise of observers who had yet to fully understand the physics of radio communication in the early 1920s. Fred Fejes explains:

Shortwave transmission depends on skywaves, or those radio waves which do not follow the surface of the earth, but are directed upward. The groundwave of a shortwave signal travels only a very small distance, ... a phenomenon that led early engineers to dismiss the long distance capability of shortwaves. The skywave of the shortwave signal, however, is transmitted upward, bounces off the ionosphere, travels back to earth, bounces back towards the ionosphere again and finally returns to earth. This type of skywave propagation pattern allows shortwave signals of very low power to travel immense distances and to be received thousands of miles away while receivers within 10 miles of the transmitter may not pick up anything at all.¹¹

¹⁰ Fred Fejes, *Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor: New Deal Foreign Policy and United States Shortwave Broadcasting to Latin America* (Norwood: Ablex Publishing, 1986), 44.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Despite these developments, the commercial potential of shortwave radio was not yet apparent, although imperial governments were quick to note that long-distance communication could serve to link together their colonial holdings. At the turn of the 1930s, the British, the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch began experimenting with shortwave broadcasts, which they aimed at ‘white’ settlers in their colonies.¹² The Soviet Union, on the other hand, turned to transnational broadcasting to convey the meaning and promises of the Communist Revolution to the world. Established in 1929, its Radio Moscow pioneered the use of airwaves for propaganda purposes. Other nations, most notably Germany and Italy, followed suit with greater vigour and belligerence as war clouds rolled over Europe in the late 1930s.¹³ Canadians had much catching up to do and time was short.

Although Great Britain may have been ahead of the curve, it was still a reluctant participant in the propaganda contest that was unfolding on the airwaves. The first official British foray into the world of shortwave communication occurred in 1926 when the Marconi Company, in conjunction with the British Post Office, established an imperial radio network that linked Canada with its mother country. The following year, the network expanded to include Australia, South Africa, and India. Great Britain’s experience with shortwave communication was limited mostly to imperial broadcasts by the aptly named British Broadcasting Corporation Empire Service. Launched in 1932, the organization adopted a new name in the closing year of the decade: the British Broadcasting Corporation Overseas Service (BBC-OS). The change reflected the fact that the British could no longer confine their long-distance communication to the Commonwealth if they wanted to maintain their hegemony throughout the world. The Germans and Italians had been actively disseminating anti-British propaganda using transnational broadcasts in multiple languages. English strategists understood that radio diplomacy held potential for projecting an honest and engaging image, maintaining alliance relationships, refuting Axis propaganda by disseminating ostensibly impartial news, and shaping public opinion in other countries. By 1945, the BBC-OS transmitted content in forty-five

¹² Stephanie Seul and Nelson Ribeiro, “Revisiting Transnational Broadcasting: The BBC’s Foreign-Language Services During the Second World War,” *Media History* 21, no. 4 (2015): 367.

¹³ Gary D. Rawnsley, *Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956-64* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 7.

languages.¹⁴ A form of public diplomacy, international broadcasting quickly became a central component of the modern state's foreign affairs apparatus from the late 1930s onward.¹⁵ The appeal of radio was that it also offered opportunities to activate, even amplify, other public diplomacy practices such as disseminating advocacy, transmitting culture, or contextualizing international exchanges.¹⁶

State and non-state actors in the United States demonstrated flexibility in exploiting the potential of international broadcasting. American radio amateurs had played a key role in demonstrating the ability of shortwaves to travel across borders over long distances. Following those experiments, commercial broadcasters began competing for influence in the upper portion of the radio spectrum to secure control over larger portions of their country's communications market. The companies that dominated the domestic soundscape during the Great Depression – Westinghouse Radio Stations, Radio Corporation of America, General Electric, and American Telephone and Telegraph Company – were doubtful about the economic potential of shortwave radio, but they acquired experimental licences nonetheless to explore opportunities in Latin America. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, on the other hand, saw international broadcasting as a potentially effective public relations tool for its Good Neighbor policy. Commercial broadcasters were hesitant at first to make room for the State Department since they feared that such a precedent would lead to government intervention in domestic markets. Executives soon realized, however, that Good Neighborism's emphasis on trade promotion and cultural penetration was consistent with their self-interests, particularly as a means of countering propaganda by regimes that undermined liberal developmentalism.¹⁷ Joint private and public approaches to economic and cultural expansion in Latin America thus served to establish American "hegemony in hemispheric communications."¹⁸ By 1941, Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) had joined the fold with its radio division whose tasks were to amplify transmissions throughout Latin America, analyze Axis propaganda,

¹⁴ Seul and Ribeiro, "Revisiting Transnational Broadcasting," 368. See also Fejes, *Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor*, 44-46.

¹⁵ Gary D. Rawnsley, "Introduction to International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century," *Media and Communication* 4, no. 2 (2016): 43.

¹⁶ Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 34.

¹⁷ See Fejes, *Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor*, 46-60.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4. See also Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*, 92-97.

and create Good Neighbor content for audiences south of the Rio Grande.¹⁹ The entry of the United States into the war saw the State Department venture further into the realm of international broadcasting with the launch, in February of 1942, of a station that would soon become known as the *Voice of America*.²⁰

Brazil was one of the main targets of these efforts, because of its economic and strategic importance for hemispheric stability and defence from the 1930s through the 1950s. American national interests were conveyed in great part through the medium of radio, a process facilitated by the fact that the Getúlio Vargas regime welcomed cooperation in the field of communications as part of its bargaining strategies with major Western powers. For example, its Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) demonstrated pragmatism when it opted to discuss broadcasting opportunities with Columbia Broadcasting System executives.²¹ By allowing commercial broadcasters to maintain and further develop relations with affiliate stations in Brazil, Vargas permitted an influx of expertise and equipment that greatly enhanced the *Estado Novo*'s own broadcasting capabilities. The trend continued through the Eurico Gaspar Dutra presidency and Vargas's final term in office (he returned to power in 1951). From Roosevelt's 'Good Neighborism' to Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'Campaign of Truth,' broadcast strategists strove to spread the 'American dream' to advance the United States' economic and political interests in South America while countering the view that North Americans were a racist and imperialist-minded people. They did so by disseminating content from shortwave stations in the United States and by either sending scripts to affiliates in Brazil or getting involved in local productions. Assessing the effectiveness of such strategies was made difficult by the fact that Brazilians clearly expressed their preference for their own music and for BBC-OS content.²² What could not be denied, however, was the impact that these strategies had on the modernization, consolidation, and expansion of the South American giant's broadcasting infrastructure.²³

¹⁹ Sadler, *Americans All*, 27.

²⁰ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 14. For a broader discussion of shortwave broadcasting, see Elizabeth Fox, *Latin American Broadcasting: From Tango to Telenovela* (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1997); Jerome S. Berg, *On the Short Waves, 1923-1945: Broadcast Listening in the Pioneer Days of Radio* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2007); and Jerome S. Berg, *Broadcasting for the Short Waves, 1945 to Today* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2008).

²¹ Tota, *O Imperialismo Sedutor*, 144-145.

²² *Ibid.*, 157. See also Gerald K. Haines, *The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1989), 171-173.

²³ Sousa, *Rádio e Propaganda Política*, 131.

When it came to radio, Brazilians were engaged, pragmatic, and purposeful. In 1922, they celebrated a century of independence with a world expo that attracted participants from fourteen countries: among others, Belgium, France, England, Portugal, and the United States. The festivities began with a special broadcast – a national first – from atop Corcovado Mountain. The event was a perfect display of prowess, which reinforced the image of economic, political, and cultural progress that the Brazilian government wished to foreground during its Independence Centenary International Exposition. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company – with some assistance from Canada’s Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka the Light) – had helped the country enter the age of radio in a spectacular way.²⁴ With Vargas’s rise to power in 1930, broadcasting in Brazil went through a rapid phase of expansion carefully scripted through regulatory mechanisms, state censorship, and adroit negotiations with North American organizations. Radio helped unite a dispersed population, a large portion of which was illiterate, around the regime’s nation building project. The DIP and the Ministério da Educação e Saúde (MES) participated actively in these efforts, which ranged from the deployment of education programming to the dissemination of musical works that propagated the idea of *Brasilidade*. Starting in 1940, the DIP dedicated much of its attention to nation branding. The Vargas regime had just acquired the popular Rádio Nacional and it wished to direct some of its activities to international broadcasting with the hope of seducing foreign audiences with a positive image of Brazil.²⁵ Launched on December 31, 1942, Rádio Nacional’s shortwave transmissions to the world represented a “victorious initiative” for the *Estado Novo*.²⁶ Its inaugural broadcasts revealed Brazilians’ confidence in their national musical culture. They also provided an indication of what Brazil’s priorities were in terms of interlocutors. The four-part, trilingual program was aimed to (1) Latin America, (2) Portugal, (3) England, and (4) the United States. Scheduled from 11 p.m. to midnight, the North American transmission focused exclusively on music except for a brief introduction by American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery.²⁷ It is likely

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 110. See also Patrícia Coelho, *Educadores no Rádio: Programas para Ouvir e Aprender, 1935-1950* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC, 2016), 33.

²⁵ See Lia Calabre, “Políticas Públicas Culturais de 1924 a 1945: O Rádio em Destaque,” *Estudos Históricos* 31 (2003): 168; and Lia Calabre, *Políticas Culturais no Brasil: Dos Anos 1930 ao Século XXI* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV), 37-39.

²⁶ R. Magalhães Junior, “A Onda Curta da Rádio Nacional Representa uma Grande Vitória do Brasil,” *A Noite*, February 2, 1943, 1, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/19103. In Portuguese: “... iniciativa vitoriosa.”

²⁷ “Onça Hoje e Sempre,” *A Noite*, December 31, 1942, 7, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/18601.

that the signal travelled north of the 49th parallel although few people would have been listening at that time of the day in this early phase of Canada's rapprochement with Brazil.

The CBC-IS

It took another two years for the CBC-IS to launch *Voice of Canada* and join the international broadcasters club. Established in 1936 through an Act of Parliament, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) concerned itself exclusively with the domestic stage in the years leading up to the Second World War. The projection of Canada abroad was not in the plans of the crown corporation even though Canadians had been allocated shortwave frequencies at the 1932 International Telecommunications Conference.²⁸ Yet voices within the CBC and the DEA expressed interest in broadening the institution's mandate as early as 1937. "While politicians viewed an international broadcasting service as an instrument for war-induced counter-propaganda, the CBC personnel referred to the proposed station as an instrument for delineating the Canadian identity," explains Hall.²⁹ One of the key arguments made was that the Canadian government had to "occupy" the frequencies assigned to it by the international community to prevent other nations from taking them over.³⁰ Failure to do so would result in Canadians being "shut out of the field."³¹ Leonard W. Brockington, chairman of the board of governors of the CBC, remarked that Canada's national prestige was at stake since the country was lagging behind others in the competition taking place on radio airwaves.³² Proponents of shortwave broadcasting insisted that an international service would help Canada "take her rightful place among the nations of the world," which was imperative to ensure continuous economic growth.³³ Canadians needed to be heard and noticed if they wanted to enhance and develop trade relations. Projecting an appealing and esteemed image would help them accumulate goodwill and position

²⁸ Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁰ "Establishment of a Short Wave Station," September 3, 1941, in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) Fonds, LAC.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² L.W. Brockington to Prime Minister, October 26, 1937, in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC. See also "Establishment of a Short Wave Station: Digest of Editorial Opinions," n.d., in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

³³ Augustin Frigon, "Report on the Desirability of Establishing a Short Wave Station in Canada," n.d., in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

their country favourably in anticipation of a new postwar world order. These arguments revealed Canadians' concerns with self-image, but also their search for an international identity that could foster national unity. The debates surrounding international broadcasting foregrounded internal benefits, which ranged from partaking in program exchanges to extending the reach of French-language broadcasts to "contribute to a better understanding between the two mother races in Canada."³⁴

Wartime exigencies and Canadians' middle power aspirations also factored into the debates. Some commentators argued that international broadcasting could help Canada keep its soldiers and allies informed about its national war efforts. It could also complement the broadcasts deployed by the United States and Great Britain to discredit Axis propaganda. Canada's presence on the airwaves was needed to ensure ongoing transmissions in the event that the BBC-OS stations were damaged. This would permit the relaying of critical information to combatants at the front and the resistance in occupied territories.³⁵ Canadians of European origins would have a role to play in inviting their former compatriots to embrace "peace and understanding" over war.³⁶ Canadians were well equipped to disseminate such messages argued CBC Assistant Manager Augustin Frigon:

There is a legitimate and dignified place which Canada can occupy in international broadcasting. The experience of our country in reconciling differences of race and religion and our unique background of a joint cultural heritage constitute a message which can unobtrusively and profitably be made available in the world's present troubled state and in the period of reconstruction, when peace has been restored.³⁷

The above arguments suggest that psychological warfare on the airwaves was about defeating belligerent foes and defending liberal democracy as much as it was about branding Canada and accumulating goodwill to help the country find its place in the concert of nations alongside the

³⁴ L.W. Brockington to Prime Minister, October 26, 1937, in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

³⁵ "Order-in-Council 8168," September 18, 1942, RG25, Vol. 2203, Establishment of Short-Wave Station in Canada, DEA Fonds, LAC.

³⁶ L.W. Brockington to Prime Minister, October 26, 1937, in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

³⁷ Augustin Frigon, "Report on the Desirability of Establishing a Short Wave Station in Canada," n.d., in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

United States and Great Britain. Champions of international broadcasting hoped that the CBC-IS would serve Canadians well as a wartime and peacetime instrument of public diplomacy.

The William Lyon Mackenzie King government finally opted to move ahead with the project after having carefully considered the briefs presented to the House of Commons Standing Committees on Radio Broadcasting in 1938, 1939, and 1942. On September 18, 1942, the Privy Council recommended that immediate actions be taken to establish “two 50 kW short wave transmitters, three directional antennas and associated apparatus” in Sackville, New Brunswick.³⁸ Already occupied by a CBC-owned radio station, the site was ideal because it was at a safe distance from the disruptive electromagnetic field generated by the magnetic pole and it offered “high ground conductivity for the antenna arrays,” which needed to reach Europe, Africa, and South America.³⁹ As per the directives outlined in Order-in-Council 8168, the CBC was put in charge of the international service with operational funds coming from direct parliamentary grants and the DEA acting as a consultant on programming content. In December 1942, CBC-IS and DEA representatives began discussions about which regions to prioritize and whether wartime needs should take precedence over postwar needs. Unable to predict how much longer Canada would be at war, they decided to plan for both, prioritizing the United Kingdom and Commonwealth first, followed in order by Latin America, France, China and the Far East, and Russia and Central Europe.⁴⁰ Delays with network construction, and the growing realization that the war could last several more years, provided a new context that squarely prioritized wartime over postwar imperatives. On March 8, 1944, then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Norman A. Robertson sent Frigon a revised priority list with the United Kingdom at the top followed by the whole of Europe. In this new hierarchy, Latin America slipped to sixth place.⁴¹ Finally, on February 25, 1945, Prime Minister King officially inaugurated the CBC-IS when he announced on air: “Tonight ... Canada enters the world radio arena.”⁴²

³⁸ “Order-in-Council 8168,” September 18, 1942, RG25, Vol. 2203, Establishment of Short-Wave Station in Canada, DEA Fonds, LAC.

³⁹ Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 17.

⁴⁰ “Note for Mr. Robertson,” December 2, 1942, RG25, Vol. 2203, Establishment of Short-Wave Station in Canada, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴¹ N.A. Robertson to A. Frigon, March 8, 1944, RG25, Vol. 2203, Establishment of Short-Wave Station in Canada, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴² Cited in Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 27.

The advent of the Cold War resulted in wartime priorities being extended beyond 1945. The CBC-IS initially beamed its broadcasts in French, English, and German although Dutch, Slovak, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian programming were soon added to the list. By 1952, tensions between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc had reached such proportions that the CBC-IS launched Russian and Ukrainian programs.⁴³ In this context, the term ‘psychological warfare’ was often used synonymously with ‘political warfare’ and referred to the dissemination of content to shape – to one’s advantage – public opinions and attitudes in other countries. As Andrew Burtch notes, it included “not only offensive propaganda but ostensibly impartial news services and state-produced ‘publicity,’” both of which aimed to lend legitimacy to the *Voice of Canada*.⁴⁴ Unlike propaganda, the term found greater acceptance in official discourses since it was more easily disassociated from the communication strategies deployed by totalitarian regimes. Yet psychological warfare was propaganda nonetheless since it aimed to “influence attitudes of large numbers of people on controversial issues of relevance to a group.”⁴⁵ Whereas “black propaganda” tended to promote insurgency through the somewhat covert dissemination of subversive material, “white propaganda” employed so-called “dispassionate and honest news service that would discredit enemy suppression and distortion of the facts without specifically addressing (and thereby lending credibility to) enemy propaganda,” explains Burtch.⁴⁶ Canadians favoured the latter, particularly since it reinforced their self-image as a friendly, impartial, and exemplary people.⁴⁷ In the end, the distinction between psychological warfare and national projection through shortwave radio was not a clear cut one.

The Massey Commission paid attention to these developments, because it recognized the CBC-IS as the “most important agency engaged in the task of promoting a knowledge of Canada abroad.”⁴⁸ The commissioners and lobby groups whose influence is most apparent in the report championed cultural nationalism and national unity as a means of giving purpose and direction to

⁴³ For an overview of the early years of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and its shortwave broadcasts to Europe, see also Siegel, *Radio Canada International*; and Hibbitts, “The CBC International Service as a Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Cold War.”

⁴⁴ Andrew Burtch, “The Sword and the Mind: Canada’s Psychological Warfare at Home and Abroad, 1945-1960,” unpublished paper presented at the 87th annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Vancouver, BC, July 2008.

⁴⁵ James L. Hall borrows this definition of propaganda from Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites. Cited in Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 34.

⁴⁶ Burtch, “The Sword and the Mind.”

⁴⁷ Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 6*, 141.

⁴⁸ Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, *Report*, 256.

Canada. Paul Litt explains that members of the country's cultural elite adopted a liberal humanist approach to justify government participation in the media landscape and government support for the arts; both of which would serve as a defence against the tyranny of totalitarian ideologies and the "illiberal menace of mass culture" poring over the border from the United States.⁴⁹ In their eyes, "Canada alone represented the last best hope for liberal democratic values in an uncertain world," writes Litt.⁵⁰ The cultural nationalism of the Massey Commission lent itself easily to nation branding, which in turn helped legitimize the idea of Canada as an independent-minded middle power and trustworthy voice in international affairs. The commissioners thus recommended:

- a. That the International Service of the C.B.C. be continued and expanded with a view to increasing the knowledge and understanding of Canada abroad.
- b. That every effort be made to use for this purpose as often as possible the service of Canadians eminent in various fields.⁵¹

If, as Zoë Druick argues, the Massey Commission sought to establish the cultural foundation for Canadian membership in an international community such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), it is fair to assume that it also perceived the CBC-IS to be one of its key instruments.⁵²

Canada's entry into the world radio arena came with its share of complications, which the Cold War exacerbated. Firstly, the expansion of services – from the lengthening of the broadcast schedule to the creation of programs in an increasing number of languages – created budget headaches in the immediate postwar years since the funds set aside for peacetime transmissions were insufficient. The situation led CBC-IS representatives to seek more funds by highlighting the "comparative cheapness and effectiveness of radio as a potent weapon in the arsenal of defence."⁵³ In other words, shortwave radio was an economical way to fight the Cold War against the Eastern Bloc. Another source of concern was the lack of effective coordination

⁴⁹ Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission*, 250.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, *Report*, 366.

⁵² See Zoë Druick, "International Cultural Relations as a Factor in Postwar Canadian Cultural Policy: The Relevance of UNESCO for the Massey Commission," *Canadian Journal of Communication* 31, no. 1 (2006): 177-195.

⁵³ "International Service of the CBC," February 9, 1951, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

between the CBC-IS and the DEA. This raised other questions as Hall points out: “Which agency was responsible for International Service actions? Was it the CBC or External Affairs? Or both?”⁵⁴ These were important questions that sought to shed light on the policy aspects of international broadcasting and the effectiveness of the service in accomplishing its stated goals. Between 1942 and 1951, liaison between the CBC-IS and the DEA was imperfect with the two experimenting with different approaches, all of which “met with varying degrees of success.”⁵⁵ This situation exposed the CBC-IS to various attacks, the most serious being that it had been infiltrated by Communists whose “pinkish influence” tainted Canada’s image overseas.⁵⁶ In January and October of 1951, *The Ensign*’s Robert Keyserlingk published two pieces claiming that the CBC-IS’s neutral tone could mislead Iron Curtain countries into thinking that Canada was sympathetic to their cause. The organization, he claimed, was guilty of adopting an “anti-anti-communist slant.”⁵⁷ However unfounded or sordid the accusation, it caused considerably anxiety within the CBC-IS in the aftermath of the red scare that had plagued the National Film Board of Canada (NFB) earlier in 1948.⁵⁸

Established through an Act of Parliament in 1939, the NFB pursued the mandate of interpreting “Canada to Canadians and to other nations.”⁵⁹ From its inception, it served both nation building and nation branding purposes using the medium of cinema, most notably animation films and the documentary genre, two cinematic languages with which Canadian artists excelled. Rather than impeding the growth of the NFB, the war generated opportunities for the organization, which busied itself with “progressive film propaganda of education, inspiration, and promise of a better tomorrow.”⁶⁰ Its impressive wartime and postwar output elevated the status of Canadian filmmakers – and Canada – on the international stage.⁶¹ NFB productions did find their way to Brazil in the 1940s, specifically in the context of a photograph exhibition on life

⁵⁴ Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 56.

⁵⁵ “Memorandum for the Establishment Board: Political Coordination Section – Proposed Establishment,” January 29, 1953, RG25, Vol. 4338, Establishment & Organization for Political Co-ordination Section, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁶ A. Anderson to John E. Thompson, May 19, 1950, RG25, Vol. 2203, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service – Short/Wave and Transcription Service: General File, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁷ Cited in Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 56. See also I. Dilworth to A.D. Dunton, October 18, 1951, RG25, Vol. 2203, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service – Short/Wave and Transcription Service: General File, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁸ On this topic, see Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

⁵⁹ Evans, *In the National Interest*, 17.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶¹ Druick, *Projecting Canada*, 90.

in Canada and for a screening on organ production organized during the Ernest MacMillan and Claude Champagne tour. Désy, however, felt that it was futile to rely on films to compete against initiatives such as those of the OCIAA.⁶² That said, the NFB, which employed its share of left-leaning and broad-minded artists, faced much bigger problems than American competitors in the immediate postwar years. In 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected with documents that revealed the existence of spy rings involving members of the Canadian civil service. The resulting climate of national insecurity placed the NFB inside the bullseye of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which spearheaded a communist witch-hunt that led to substantial purges on the basis of ideology despite little to no evidence of subversion within the organization.⁶³ In this context, the DEA could not afford to dismiss *The Ensign's* accusations without first doing some house cleaning within the CBC-IS.

The appointment of Désy to the newly created position of director general constituted an effort to deal with the crisis in direction, authority, and trust in the organization.⁶⁴ The former ambassador had some relevant experience in the broadcasting policy field. In 1927, he had joined his colleagues in the DEA and the Department of Marine and Fisheries at a meeting held in the United States to discuss the allocation of wavelengths in North America.⁶⁵ He had also helped extend the reach of CBC-IS broadcasts to Brazil when they began in 1945. Told that he would maintain his rank and status while “on loan” to the CBC-IS, Désy served for eighteen months from January 1, 1952, to July 15 of the following year.⁶⁶ During this period, he undertook a major overhaul of the organization by bringing previously relatively autonomous language

⁶² Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, April 28, 1944, RG25, Vol. 2640, United States-Brazil Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁶³ For a detailed account of the purges at the National Film Board of Canada, see Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby, *Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 192-195.

⁶⁴ Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 60.

⁶⁵ Vipond, *Listening In*, 159.

⁶⁶ J.W. Pickersgill to Jean Désy, October 5, 1951, RG41, Vol. 492, CBC Fonds, LAC; N.A. Robertson, “Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board – 31/1722,” March 26, 1952, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC. Jean Désy was most likely pleased to settle back in Montreal with his family. Not long before, he had declined a promotion to the post of under-secretary of state for External Affairs, because he preferred moving to a francophone city (one with adequate and affordable schools for his children) after leaving Italy. The likelihood of the ambassadorial seat soon becoming vacant in Paris was probably also in the back of his mind. Désy did end up relocating to France to replace George Vanier in 1953. Jean Désy to Louis Saint-Laurent, October 1, 1948, MG26-L, Vol. 89, Louis St. Laurent Fonds, LAC

sections under the control of an expansive administrative structure. He also recruited Yvon Beaulne, a foreign service officer with whom he served in Italy, to handle the circulation of classified materials back and forth between Ottawa and CBC-IS offices in Montreal. He further improved liaison with the DEA through the creation of a Political Coordination Unit that had “as its primary responsibility the provision of policy guidance.”⁶⁷ These changes allowed him to correct the CBC-IS’s ‘red-tainted’ image without having to fire or demote anyone.⁶⁸

But while bringing administrative order to the international service, Désy was also emboldened by the Massey Commission report and seized the opportunity to advance his own dearest passions by ensuring that more attention was lavished on music and Latin America. However, the heavy hand with which Désy approached his job combined with the DEA’s intrusiveness into the everyday operations of the CBC-IS alienated many people. According to the institutional biographers of the CBC-IS, the director general’s ostentatious, tactless, and condescending managerial style demoralized employees.⁶⁹ Similarly, they claimed that his elitist posture translated into grandiloquent self-serving undertakings that were difficult to reconcile with the foreign policy goals of both the DEA and the CBC-IS. Accused of being a “big spender” who “never lost sight of his own personal interests,” Désy was especially tarnished by the 1952 Villa-Lobos concert, which his critics dismissed as a “pet project” emblematic of his wasteful “flair for the extravagant.”⁷⁰ While an easy target, the focus on Désy’s personality does not explain fully the increasingly ambitious nature of Canada’s emerging radio diplomacy.

Southbound Transmissions

The cultural Cold War unfolding on the airwaves in Europe and the need to defend the organization against accusations that it was soft on communism mobilized much of the CBC-IS’s resources at the turn of the 1950s. That said, Latin America continued to be an area of concern

⁶⁷ The idea of a “political intelligence unit” was already circulating within the Department of External Affairs in the summer of 1951. See J.K. Starnes to Mr. Ritchie, July 24, 1951, RG25, Vol. 4338, Organization of and Establishment for Political Coordination Section, DEA Fonds, LAC; and “Memorandum for the Establishment Board: Political Coordination Section – Proposed Establishment,” January 29, 1953, RG25, Vol. 4338, Establishment & Organization for Political Co-ordination Section, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁸ Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 6*, 150. For dismissals prior to Jean Désy’s appointment, see Hibbitts, “The CBC International Service as a Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Cold War,” 47-48.

⁶⁹ See Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 89; Siegel, *Radio Canada International*, 117; and Frank W. Peers, *The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, 1920-1951* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 422.

⁷⁰ Siegel, *Radio Canada International*, 116-118; Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 64 and 89.

even if most eyes and ears were directed at Iron Curtain countries in the aftermath of the 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état. In fact, the Caribbean and the South American continent were on the agenda of the CBC-IS's masterminds from the very beginning. The Order-in-Council to which the broadcaster owed its existence stipulated that southbound transmissions would help promote internationalism while projecting an engaging image of Canada to complement diplomatic relations in countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.⁷¹ Parliamentary debates echoed those views since Axis propaganda threatened to undermine Canadians' emerging economic ties to the region.⁷² The DEA and the CBC-IS remained committed to begin beaming towards South America before the end of the war even if the continent slipped down the list of priorities in the months leading to the construction of the Sackville transmitters. On April 26, 1944, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Hugh L. Keenleyside informed Canada's ambassadors in Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and Buenos Aires that all services would be in operation by January 1 of the next year.⁷³ Further delays resulted in the Latin American service being inaugurated a couple of years later although experimental broadcasts did begin in 1945. Internal correspondence from 1951 stressed that shortwave transmissions to the Southern Hemisphere were to remain a pressing matter: "While the Latin America area cannot be considered to have the same primary political importance as Europe, it has its own urgency which cannot be ignored without risk."⁷⁴ It is true that total weekly broadcast hours to Europe (59 hrs: 50 mins.) were more than those allocated to Latin America (29 hrs: 10 mins.) in 1952, but this was also the result of needing to reach a more diverse population using a greater number of languages; 11 for Europe and 4 for Central and South America (*figure 4.1*). A case in point: weekly hours of Portuguese-language programming totalled 8 hrs: 10 mins., which surpassed any other language service aimed at Europe except for French (8 hrs: 10 mins.), English (8 hrs: 45 mins.), and Czech (9 hrs: 45 mins.).⁷⁵

⁷¹ "Order-in-Council 8168," September 18, 1942, RG25, Vol. 2203, Establishment of Short-Wave Station in Canada, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁷² "Establishment of a Short Wave Station: Extracts from Hansard," n.d., in *International Broadcasting Service: Information Prepared on the Desirability of its Establishment, 1937-1942*, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

⁷³ Hugh L. Keenleyside to Canadian Ambassador to Mexico, April 26, 1944, RG25, Vol. 2203, Establishment of Short-Wave Station in Canada, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁷⁴ I. Dilworth, "International Service of the CBC," February 9, 1951, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC (emphasis in original).

⁷⁵ Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 80-85.



Figure 4.1. The reach of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation at the end of the 1950s. Source: Department of External Affairs Fonds, Library and Archives Canada.

In his capacity as ambassador of Canada in Brazil, Désy immediately understood that shortwave transmissions would make a wonderful addition to his cultural diplomacy arsenal. He was therefore disappointed to learn in 1945 that the CBC-IS had not yet made definite plans for the inauguration of its service to Latin America.⁷⁶ His eagerness to support Canada’s foray into the realm of international broadcasting led Director Peter Aylen and his colleagues to act to “live up” to the promise made to Canadian diplomats in South America. They therefore set aside funds for experimental broadcasts, which began on August 12, 1945.⁷⁷ “After only one week of broadcasting, word has been received that the new short-wave programs beamed to Latin America ... come in loud and clear,” announced the CBC-IS shortly after.⁷⁸ Benjamin Rogers, chargé d’affaires at the Rio de Janeiro embassy, agreed although he also volunteered constructive criticism with regards to the language proficiency of the announcer. More importantly, he wrote:

I think particular attention should be paid to the musical tastes of Brazilians and Latin Americans in general. The consensus ... seems to be that the music played on the test broadcast is not very good. The competition with American, British, French, Spanish,

⁷⁶ Jean Désy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 5, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC-IS S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁷⁷ Peter Aylen to T. W. L. MacDermot, July 11, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC-IS S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁷⁸ “International Service News: Canadian Broadcasts to South America Reported Strong and Well Received,” August 21, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC-IS S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

Argentine and other short wave broadcasts is going to be intense and unless the C.B.C. programmes are as good or better, the great expense in building this station will be lost. People are only going to listen to the best.⁷⁹

An ally of Désy since the opening of the legation in 1941, Rogers was an active participant in the musical nation branding of his country in Brazil. Having taken advantage of Brazil's radio infrastructure in the past, he and the ambassador immediately arranged for domestic broadcasters to record and replay CBC-IS programs to reach larger sections of the population.⁸⁰ By doing so, they were able to further disseminate the *Voice of Canada*, which Brazilians could normally hear for thirty minutes every Sunday evening at 9 p.m.⁸¹

The CBC-IS arrived in Brazil at a pivotal moment in the country's history. Brazilians' return to democracy launched the Second Republic (1946-64) – a period characterized by growing instability, factionalism, and economic hardship. The end of the dictatorship meant, among other things, a return of the Partido Comunista do Brasil [Communist Party of Brazil], which collected ten percent of the popular vote in the election that brought Dutra to power. Brazil had enriched itself somewhat during the Second World War, but its fortunes decreased significantly in the immediate postwar years. The South American giant was, “in the parlance of the day, still a ‘backward’ country,” notes Thomas E. Skidmore.⁸² By 1947, its foreign reserves were depleted so the government resorted to promoting staple exports at the expense of the continued industrialization and modernization of the economy. Faced with stagnating – even decreasing – standards of living, workers turned an increasingly sympathetic ear to left-leaning organizations until Dutra, with the encouragement of the United States, moved to crack down on Communists and terminate diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. As Robert M. Levine explains, the former general's “somber presidential style subdued the heated political atmosphere that had been generated at the end of Vargas's tenure.”⁸³ At the same time, it extended “the

⁷⁹ Benjamin Rogers to Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 22, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC-IS S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC. Unfortunately, the documents concerning these test broadcasts do not provide information about the music that was played.

⁸⁰ Canadian Ambassador to Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 27, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC-IS S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁸¹ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 24, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC-IS S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁸² Skidmore, *Brazil*, 129.

⁸³ Levine, *Father of the Poor*, 78.

shadow of the Estado Nôvo ... over a newly democratic Brazil.”⁸⁴ Vargas’s populist rhetoric and his skilful manipulation of the recently founded Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro [Brazilian Labour Party] allowed him to defeat a divided opposition during the election of 1950. He returned to power with a nationalist and interventionist platform that alerted both champions of liberal internationalism and hardened anti-communist nationalists. Unable to revert to presidential decrees as he had done in the past, Vargas struggled to overcome congressional opposition to unite the country and reverse its economic decline. Désy thus found himself looking at a Brazil that was both strangely familiar and confoundingly different when he arrived at the CBC-IS in 1952.

The man who succeeded Désy in Brazil, James Scott MacDonald, did not deviate much from the course set since 1941. Rogers, who remained in Rio de Janeiro, provided continuity. The DEA initially struggled “to find a suitably qualified person ... who would be willing or able to accept the appointment at short notice.”⁸⁵ The post had been vacant for several months and time was of the essence since the Governor General of Canada, Harold R.L.G. Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis, was due to visit Brazil in June of 1948. With the DEA since 1927, MacDonald served as high commissioner in Newfoundland before joining Rogers in South America. Possibly taking cues from his chargé d’affaires, the new ambassador seemed inclined in Brazil to look for similarities that could inform and validate Canada’s autonomist impulse. MacDonald was particularly interested in the Divisão Cultural do Itamaraty (DCIt), because it had been created to tackle problems that Brazilians and Canadians shared:

Both of us fall in the group of countries which have neither a colourful, ancient civilization ... nor yet a modern culture like that of the United Kingdom, the United States or France whose literature, press, radio, films, etc., are distributed on such an extensive scale by ordinary commercial agencies that they practically monopolize interest and rule out effective competition from official cultural agencies operating with meagre funds.⁸⁶

In Brazil for only two years, MacDonald did not show much initiative with regards to cultural relations aside from helping coordinate Canadian participation in both the newly established

⁸⁴ Skidmore, *Brazil*, 130.

⁸⁵ Canada, “Brazil,” in *External Relations: Documents, 1948*, Vol. 14, ed. Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), 1871.

⁸⁶ J.S. MacDonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 22, 1949, RG25, Vol. 3749, Information & Cultural Services of the Government of Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

Bienal Internacional de Arte (São Paulo) and the first Exposição Indígena Interamericana (Rio de Janeiro).⁸⁷ The embassy's priority was to emphasize Canadian autonomy in international affairs, which the Governor General's visit threatened to undermine. Alexander had been invited by Brazilian authorities in part because the Força Expedicionária Brasileira had been under his command during the Second World War. The British embassy in Rio de Janeiro was keen to capitalize on the visit so Rogers and MacDonald had to carefully script the entire trip so that it was branded primarily as a Canadian-Brazilian affair.⁸⁸

MacDonald hosted another important visitor during his short tenure: Hugh W. Morrison, supervisor of the CBC-IS's Latin American Section. Born in 1908 in Vegreville, Alberta, Morrison began his career in journalism prior to acting as director of Talks and Public Affairs at the CBC in the early years of the Second World War. He then relocated to New York where he served as assistant to the president of the pan-American airline company Transportes Aereos del Continente Americano until 1947. Homesick and seeking to refocus his career, he initiated a correspondence – followed by “exploratory” meetings – with Lester B. Pearson who had just accepted the position of secretary of state for External Affairs.⁸⁹ Morrison was wondering, among other things, whether he “would fit into External Affairs” considering his familiarity with Latin America and his experience in communications and wartime transportation. His pitch included a short biography, which revealed the extent to which his conception of the Canadian identity was rooted in Britishness and geography:

I think I know my native land pretty well – well enough to have pride in calling myself a Canadian. My father was from the Maritimes and my mother is from New England. I was born and raised on the Prairies with occasional spells on the Pacific Coast. After returning from Oxford and a few months on Fleet Street I went through the mill of the Toronto “Star”

⁸⁷ Pressed by James Scott MacDonald, the National Gallery of Canada and the National Museum made modest contributions to the two Brazilian events in their inaugural years. To find out more about Canadian participation in subsequent editions of the biennial, see Diggon, “The Politics of Cultural Power”; and Robertson *et al.*, “More a Diplomatic than an Aesthetic Event.”

⁸⁸ For example, see Benjamin Rogers to Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 5, 1948, MG27-III A1, Vol. 1-8, Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander – 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis Fonds, LAC; Benjamin Rogers to Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 1, 1948, MG27-III A1, Vol. 1-8, Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander – 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis Fonds, LAC; and James Scott MacDonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, June 18, 1948, MG27-III A1 Vol. 1-8, Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander – 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis Fonds, LAC.

⁸⁹ L.B. Pearson to Hugh W. Morrison, November 20, 1947, MG30-E408, Vol. 10, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

... and then ... with CBC. Thus having experienced a pretty good cross-section of Canada, I am constantly finding myself prodded by two things here: the fundamental misconceptions about Canada ... and the recurring remark that Canada exports its brains.⁹⁰

Pearson did not hire Morrison, but he encouraged him to resume his career in broadcasting and disseminate his vision of Canada by arranging for his appointment to the post of supervisor of the Latin American Section.⁹¹ Morrison's career path suggests that the line separating policy makers at the DEA and information specialists at the CBC-IS was not as clear cut as depicted in institutional biographies.

Morrison began his new job on April 1, 1948, with the mandate to examine and possibly expand services to Latin America. Regarding Brazil, the CBC-IS had begun beaming weekly thirty-minute experimental broadcasts using two frequencies in August of 1945.⁹² Shortly after taking office, Morrison authorized daily transmissions to Brazil to better account for the country's importance in terms of both geography and population. Seeking to understand the radio landscape in the Southern Hemisphere, he visited nine countries and thirteen cities in November and December of 1950. His itinerary included a short stop in São Paulo (December 5-10) and a one-week stay in Rio de Janeiro (December 10-17). The CBC-IS's expanded programming schedule, which included a range of content (general continuity, news bulletin, commentaries and news talks, expository talks, music, audience mail answers, and feature programs), paid off with the Brazilian press welcoming Morrison as a champion of Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations.⁹³ Such an enthusiastic response was expected considering that audience mail received from Latin America had tripled between 1948 and 1950: from 1,842 to 5,472, with forty percent of the letters coming from Brazil.⁹⁴ Most of these were favourable with praises highlighting the clarity of the transmissions, the quality of the content, or the positive image of Canada that the CBC-IS was helping disseminate. An enthusiastic listener confided: "Two languages, but one

⁹⁰ Hugh W. Morrison to L.B. Pearson, December 30, 1947, MG30-E408, Vol. 10, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

⁹¹ T. W. L. MacDermot to Hugh W. Morrison, January 17, 1948, MG30-E408, Vol. 10, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

⁹² Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador, December 26, 1945, RG25, Vol. 2215, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service – Shortwave Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹³ For example, see "Radialista Canadense em Visita a São Paulo," December 7, 1950, MG30-E408, Vol. 3, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC; and "Programas de Músicas Brasileiras no Canadá," December 7, 1950, MG30-E408, Vol. 3, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁴ "General Notes re. CBC International Service," n.d., RG41, Vol. 127, CBC Fonds, LAC.

heart – that is the Canadian people! The way you attract your listeners with your programs is winning more and more new friends and admirers for Canada.”⁹⁵ The broadcaster badly needed positive reports like these to deal with the crisis in which it was embroiled at the turn of the 1950s.

As noted above, the CBC-IS faced accusations that it was soft on communism at the turn of the 1950s. Budget concerns and liaison challenges with the DEA did not help matters, especially for the Latin American Section, which had been singled out in one of the pieces published in *The Ensign*. Both CBC-IS Director Ira Dilworth and Morrison dismissed the attacks as unfounded and politically motivated.⁹⁶ Still, public criticisms put the international service in a position where it constantly needed to justify its usefulness whether as a trade facilitator or as a tool of psychological warfare. The latter proved more expedient in the context of the cultural Cold War. On February 8, 1951, representatives from the DEA, the CBC-IS, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC) met to discuss these matters. All were unsure about the political, economic, and cultural value of the southbound broadcasts since there was insufficient evidence to assess their true impact on populations.⁹⁷ In a report submitted the following day, Dilworth retorted that Latin America was “a fertile ground for communist penetration” and “an exposed flank in the Western Hemisphere.”⁹⁸ The *Voice of Canada*, he argued, had a role to play in championing Western liberalism alongside the United States and Great Britain in the hemisphere.⁹⁹ In his post-tour report, Morrison used the same alarmist tone by describing Latin America as a “politically combustible area” that could very well “become another Far East” since “communism and its agents” were everywhere, “lying in wait.”¹⁰⁰ Broadcasting time in Spanish and in Portuguese should be maintained, even increased, he argued. Morrison was overstating his case, at least with regards to Brazil where anti-communism had become *de facto* state policy. As a matter of fact, reports coming out of Rio de Janeiro by

⁹⁵ “Latin American Listeners to CBC: What They Say About Radio Programs from Canada (excerpts from 5,472 letters received from all 19 Republics during 1950),” n.d., RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S Shortwave Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁶ I. Dilworth to A.D. Dunton, October 18, 1951, RG25, Vol. 2203, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service – Short/Wave and Transcription Service, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁷ C.S.A. Ritchie, “Memorandum for the Under Secretary: Latin-American and Caribbean Service of the CBC-IS,” February 8, 1951, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S Shortwave Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁸ I. Dilworth, “International Service of the CBC,” February 9, 1951, RG41, Vol. 125, CBC Fonds, LAC.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ H. W. Morrison, “Report and Analysis of the Latin American Service, 1948-1950,” January 12, 1951, MG30-E408, Vol. 6, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

MacDonald and Ephraim Herbert Coleman, Canada's new ambassador to Brazil in 1951, suggest that ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism threatened democracy there more than communism.¹⁰¹

Morrison might have lacked a proper understanding of the politico-cultural landscape in Brazil, but he nonetheless collected ample evidence to demonstrate that Brazilian shortwave listeners welcomed the CBC-IS and that Canada had a role to play on the airwaves, even if only as a junior partner in the war of ideas. His discussion of the BBC-OS and *Voice of America* broadcasts reflected his faith in Canada's middle power capabilities, which he sought to validate through a comparative analysis of shortwave transmissions aimed at Brazil. CBC-IS broadcasts could be heard daily for thirty minutes on two frequencies. *Voice of America* transmissions followed a similar schedule using four frequencies. As for the BBC-OS, it disseminated its hours-long programs using three frequencies. Morrison noted that the CBC-IS's counterparts thus had a greater presence on the airwaves, which explained why they were "easier" to find although the discrepancy in programming times and frequencies did not mean that their transmissions were "better."¹⁰² Indeed, his report stressed the quality of *Voice of Canada* signals and the enthusiastic reports of listeners. Morrison proudly noted that Canada received more letters from Brazil than the United States did: "Remembering that we are heavily outnumbered in frequencies this is no small achievement."¹⁰³ That said, he nurtured no illusions that Canadians could compete with their American neighbour. Yet, he insisted that the CBC-IS occupied an important space and that its role was likely to grow, especially since the BBC-OS and the *Voice of America* were likely to increasingly focus their attention towards Cold War Europe.¹⁰⁴ Keeping in mind the need for ammunition to deal with the crisis plaguing the CBC-IS, Morrison emphasized that trade and "considerations of human brotherhood" are but two reasons why broadcasts should be maintained at their current level. A more important incentive, he explained at a luncheon of the Canadian Inter-American Association, was "to preserve our inherited system

¹⁰¹ See Benjamin Rogers to Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 14, 1948, RG25, Vol. 3246, Brazilian Labour Legislation & Reports, DEA Fonds, LAC; E.H. Coleman to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 9, 1952, RG25, Vol. 8054, Political Situation in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰² H. W. Morrison, "Report and Analysis of the Latin American Service, 1948-1950," January 12, 1951, MG30-E408, Vol. 6, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Jean Désy validated this observation in 1952: Jean Désy, "Report on my work as Director-General of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation from January, 1952 to July, 1953," MG32-E2, Vol. 3, Correspondance (1951-1965), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC.

of government by consent of the governed, by showing our friendly neighbors that we are reasonably happy and healthy under such a system and that we have no aggressive designs upon their territory or fanatical plan to convert them to our individual national way, willy-nilly.”¹⁰⁵ Canadians had accumulated plenty of goodwill to undertake that mission, he explained unequivocally.

Music was a key component of the CBC-IS’s strategies since it was an ostensibly apolitical – and thus inconspicuous – means of projecting both Canadians’ adherence to normative Western values and their difference vis-à-vis Americans. At the turn of the 1950s, it represented approximately thirty-eight percent of the content beamed towards Brazil compared to thirty-one percent for the rest of Latin America. What most differentiated the broadcasts in Portuguese from those in Spanish is the exclusive focus on ‘serious music’ and folk music. Jazz and other popular shows were notably absent from the schedule prepared for Brazilian audiences.¹⁰⁶ Morrison’s musical choices were consistent with those championed by Désy in his efforts to musically imagine a Canadian-Brazilian community. He observed that there was “more than a surfeit of popular music on local Latin American stations” and that he could well “imagine that shortwave listeners would seek relief.”¹⁰⁷ He thus argued for “continuance of serious and folk music,” which could be further disseminated through transcription records; that is sound discs prepared specifically for distribution to overseas broadcasters. These albums made it possible for Canadian music to reach broader audiences while providing a solution to fidelity issues which often emerged when transmitting recordings over long distances using shortwave bands. They were also economical since they could be reproduced and used repeatedly unlike live performances. The CBC-IS thus fulfilled an important need when it launched its first series of transcription records in 1949. By December 1952, the Transcription Service had produced more than 80 albums featuring works by a variety of Canadian artists: among others, composers Ernest MacMillan and Claude Champagne, folk singers Alan Mills and Quatuor alouette, jazz pianist

¹⁰⁵ H. W. Morrison, “Address Given to the Canadian Inter-American Association,” January 22, 1951, MG30-E408, Vol. 6, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁶ “Latin American Transmission (Spanish & Portuguese): Time Breakdown for Different Types of Program at March 3, 1950,” n.d., RG25, Vol. 2203, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service – Short/Wave and Transcription Service: General File, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁷ H. W. Morrison, “Report and Analysis of the Latin American Service, 1948-1950,” January 12, 1951, MG30-E408, Vol. 6, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

Oscar Peterson, as well as pop singers Gisele and Alys Robi.¹⁰⁸ There was, however, no place for jazz and other popular sounds in the projection of Canada in Brazil as evidenced by Désy's early initiatives and Morrison's recommendations. MacDonald concurred with them. Désy, however, believed that more could be done to better align CBC-IS and DEA objectives using music when he reinvented himself as an international broadcaster in 1952.

Villa-Lobos's Difference

The CBC-IS participated actively in the musical nation branding efforts deployed in Brazil. Its programming put forward the idea that Brazilians' musical tastes were as sophisticated and informed as those of Canadians, particularly regarding popular sounds coming through *Voice of America*. If not, they could be shaped to be so. The broadcaster's musical choices reflected the Canadian cultural elite's expectation that its South American counterparts share its liberal humanist and highbrow nationalist ideals. In the context of the Cold War and Brazil's faltering return to democracy, such programming concealed normative undertones. More revealingly, it betrayed Canadians' desires to validate their self-image as model international citizens and stalwarts of democracy worth emulating. On the one hand, this approach called for more exchanges with prominent individuals with whom Canada's cultural elite could identify. On the other hand, it required 'othering' Brazilians who were at the receiving end of southbound transmissions. Villa-Lobos was a first-rate interlocutor due to his extensive experience as a cultural ambassador as well as his fearsome reputation on the world stage – notably in France and in the United States – where he confidently proclaimed his difference.¹⁰⁹ More significantly, he had taken a keen interest in Désy's early musical diplomacy initiatives, whether it was to provide a venue for Quatuor alouette at the MES or helping Champagne network with Brazilian colleagues. The ambassador had made sure to thank him personally before leaving his post for Italy.¹¹⁰ He also intended to reciprocate at the first opportunity.

Reciprocating was easier said than done. Part of the problem, some had argued sardonically, was that Brazilians were lacking in effectiveness and efficiency. What was more

¹⁰⁸ See "Transcription Service Catalogue," n.d., MG30-E408, Vol. 6, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰⁹ Cited in "Minha Personalidade é Diferente," *Folha de Minas*, December 12, 1953, in Livro 31, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, Museu Villa-Lobos (MVL).

¹¹⁰ Jean Désy to Heitor Villa-Lobos, September 8, 1947, Correspondência – Embaixada do Canadá, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, MVL.

difficult to recognize was that Canada was never a priority for Brazilian artists who saw the United States as a more promising stage for career building. For many of them, travelling north of the 49th parallel was either an afterthought or an opportunity to explore, but only once firmer plans had been established south of the border. This was the case with Arnaldo Estrella, in 1943, and José Siqueira, a few years later, both of whom travelled to Canada following invitations to perform in the United States. As ambassador, Désy had been instrumental in encouraging the Brazilian composer to continue travelling north. He had initially tried to get the CBC-IS to invite Siqueira for a concert that could be broadcast to South America. He had even arranged for Rádio MES to relay the performance, but the Canadian broadcaster could not locate the composer who eventually contacted Champagne and MacMillan.¹¹¹ As noted earlier, the former managed to get Siqueira on the air in Montreal to the great displeasure of the latter, who thought there just was not enough time to organize something in Toronto. Villa-Lobos was an exception since he had taken great care to insert a few Canadian dates in his 1944-45 tour of the Americas, which Foreign Affairs (the Itamaraty) was keen on supporting. He originally planned to spend two weeks in Canada where he hoped to perform four concerts. However, in the end the tour did not include Canada.¹¹² Exasperated by the missed opportunity, Désy later confided to MacMillan: “I do not understand why Brazilian artists go to Canada and the United States without making arrangements a long time in advance through the usual agencies.”¹¹³

Notwithstanding these problems, Brazilian composers managed to have their works heard in Canada by exploiting the connections they were making via Désy’s cultural diplomacy. Just as Siqueira was pleased to hear that MacMillan had made good on his promise to perform two of his “Danças Brasileiras” with the Toronto Symphony Orchestra (TSO), Villa-Lobos was encouraged to find out that Wilfrid Pelletier was also disseminating his music after his return from Brazil. The two had met in 1946 when the Metropolitan Opera visited Rio de Janeiro. There primarily to accompany his wife, singer Rose Bampton, Pelletier made the most of the trip by

¹¹¹ See Donald Manson to F. H. Soward, January 4, 1946, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S Shortwave Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC; Jean Désy to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 5, 1946, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S Shortwave Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC; and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 9, 1946, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S Shortwave Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹¹² Heitor Villa-Lobos, “Exposição do Plano de Excursão Artístico-Educacional do Maestro H. Villa-Lobos Pelo Continente Americano,” August 10, 1944, 49-512, DCI, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, ACI.

¹¹³ Jean Désy to Ernest MacMillan, March 6, 1947, MUS 7, Vol. 2, A.51, Sir Ernest MacMillan Fonds, LAC.

familiarizing himself with his hosts' national musical culture and music education system. Back in Québec, he used Villa-Lobos's national *oeuvre* to nudge Premier Maurice Duplessis into paying attention to the work that composers and educators were doing in the province. "J'ai appris et non sans joie que vous étiez vraiment un amateur de musique," he wrote, before explaining that the enclosed gift was a record by "un compositeur brésilien qui fait un travail considérable pour l'avancement de la musique dans son pays."¹¹⁴ Pelletier had just premiered Villa-Lobos's "Bachiana Brasileira No. 1" to great acclaim at Montreal's Plateau Hall. The two-night concert, held on October 22-23, had been organized under the patronage of Désy and Omer Côté, Hector Perrier's successor as provincial secretary. The Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM) program offered the following reassurances regarding the Brazilian composer:

His nature displays a certain primitive quality in keeping with one who was in his youth near to the jungles of the Amazon. His music gives evidence of this exotic vastness, yet it is couched in terms that conform with western European technique. In spite of his most natural leaning towards his native folk music, Villa-Lobos regards J.S. Bach as the one foundation on which the entire structure of music should rest.¹¹⁵

Critics concurred; "Bachiana Brasileira No. 1" was an enthrallingly original yet comprehensible work, particularly when tamed and performed under the baton of one of their own.¹¹⁶

Pelletier was not alone in promoting Villa-Lobos in Canada. One of the Brazilian composer's chief supporters was Montreal-born pianist Ellen Ballon. She was the only woman to travel to Brazil as a Canadian impromptu ambassador and she did so mostly out of her own initiative. The embassy appears to have provided some logistical support although the evidence – or lack thereof – suggests that she was relegated to the margins of Désy's androcentric musically

¹¹⁴ Wilfrid Pelletier to Maurice Duplessis, November 5, 1946, MSS20, 2006-10-001\358, Wilfrid Pelletier Fonds, BAnQ. The composer had written earlier to Provincial Secretary Hector Perrier to share his concerns that Duplessis's return to power might jeopardize the work accomplished to modernize music education in Québec. See Wilfrid Pelletier to Hector Perrier, August 11, 1944, P142, 2002-07-002\1-21, Hector Perrier Fonds, BAnQ; Hector Perrier to Wilfrid Pelletier, August 17, 1944, P142, 2002-07-002\1-21, Hector Perrier Fonds, BAnQ.

¹¹⁵ "Concerts symphoniques de Montréal, 22-23 octobre 1946," n.d., Orchestre symphonique de Montréal Records, Orchestre symphonique de Montréal (OSM).

¹¹⁶ See Frank Coleman, "Pelletier Directs Unusual Program," *The Montreal Gazette*, October 23, 1946, 3; and Marcel Valois, "Villa-Lobos révélé avec autorité par Wilfrid Pelletier," *La Presse*, October 23, 1946, 11.

imagined Canadian-Brazilian community in the 1940s.¹¹⁷ Born in 1898 of Russian parents, Ballon was a child prodigy who studied at the McGill Conservatory before continuing her training in New York where she also performed. From there, she travelled throughout North America until Europe came calling. She settled in London until the outbreak of the Second World War. Ballon met Villa-Lobos in the United States in 1945. Recognizing the composer's growing appeal in the context of musical pan-Americanism and taking advantage of Canada's cultural rapprochement with Brazil, she astutely commissioned Villa-Lobos to write a piano concerto, which he promptly accepted out of recognition for her talent. After agreeing on the terms of the project, Villa-Lobos wrote his "Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1" and dedicated it to Ballon.¹¹⁸ He then arranged for his government to invite her to premiere the work in Rio de Janeiro on October 11, 1946. The Canadian press enthusiastically framed the event within the context of Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations even though it had not been orchestrated by the embassy. The *Montreal Daily Star* noted that although Ballon had become a "cosmopolite" who worked mostly "outside the Dominion," she always kept her "identity as a Canadian."¹¹⁹ This collaboration demonstrated the ability of non-state actors to advance their own agendas by interjecting themselves within government-driven international cultural relations. Villa-Lobos, of course, understood this very well and he counted on Ballon to promote his name by premiering "Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1" in North America.

The name Villa-Lobos was becoming familiar to music connoisseurs, thanks to Pelletier who performed the Brazilian composer's work in Montreal. Ballon helped further disseminate his image as a cosmopolitan yet distinctively singular artist that her compatriots could relate to and feel a personal connection with. The October 28, 1947, Canadian premiere of "Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1" served as an important precedent for Villa-Lobos's 1952 concert at Plateau Hall; it was the first instance during which all components of Canada's musical diplomacy coalesced to render more tangible the project of a musically imagined Canadian-

¹¹⁷ P.W. Cook to Saul Rae, September 15, 1947, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹¹⁸ Ellen Ballon to Heitor Villa-Lobos, March 3, 1945, Correspondencia – Ellen Ballon, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, MVL. A later recording of the work can be heard on the following album: L'Orchestre de la Suisse Romande, with Ellen Ballon (piano), *Villa-Lobos: Piano Concerto*, 1949, London Records LLP.7535, 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ rpm LP.

¹¹⁹ "City Pianist Wins Success in Rio Concert," *Montreal Daily Star*, October 26, 1946, in MS-5-2/3.27, Ellen Ballon Music Collection, Dalhousie University Killam Library Special Collections (KLSC-DU).

Brazilian community.¹²⁰ Désiré Defauw, artistic director of the OCSM, directed the orchestra with Ballon at the piano. The CBC-IS beamed the concert to Latin American shortwave radio listeners with the encouragement of Désy who was looking for ways to reciprocate while still in Brazil.¹²¹ P.W. Cook, Morrison's predecessor at the Latin American Section, had written to the DEA to see if the Prime Minister would consider either attending the performance or recording a short message that could be incorporated in the program. King had politely declined for fear of setting a precedent and because he thought it "better to stay out of such things altogether."¹²² Villa-Lobos could not be there either although he did send a message which was relayed on the airwaves. In it, he stated that music was "one of the principal elements towards the conclusion of an understanding of peace between men."¹²³ He also saluted "Canada for the splendid initiative of using music as an excellent vehicle for an understanding between the nations of the world."¹²⁴ *The Montreal Gazette's* Thomas Archer was profoundly impressed by the scope and sophistication of the event, noting that it was "a hearing that had definite significance and meaning" in the ways it brought audiences together around the shared experience of music.¹²⁵ He was especially invigorated by Defauw and Ballon's performance, which made accessible the "luxuriant, generous music" as well as "extravagant" and "lusty tunes" of Villa-Lobos.¹²⁶ The composer's exoticism, his 'otherness,' was intriguing and inspiring, rather than unsettling or threatening, when framed in such a way by the CBC-IS in collaboration with its state and non-state partners. Brazilian diplomats were evidently pleased, especially since Canadians, independent of state sponsorship, were doing propaganda work for them.¹²⁷

The 1952 concert should have been received just as enthusiastically considering that it was the continuation of these efforts, albeit augmented with the presence of the maestro himself. It was also to be the culmination of a decade-long cultural rapprochement. Although the CBC-IS

¹²⁰ Another work by Heitor Villa-Lobos was performed that night: "Descobrimiento do Brasil."

¹²¹ P.W. Cook to Saul Rae, September 15, 1947, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²² A. Anderson to P.W. Cook, September 22, 1947, RG25, Vol. 2215, CBC I/S S/W Service to Latin America, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²³ Thomas Archer, "Continuity for Villa-Lobos Concert," n.d., Pasta 33 – Programas, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, MVL.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Thomas Archer, "CBC Introduces Villa-Lobos Here," *The Montreal Gazette*, October 29, 1947, 10.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Acyr Paes to Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores, "Concerto de Música de Villa-Lobos," October 29, 1947, 37/02/14, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Cartas Tel. Rec.), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

was in the midst of a crisis in 1952, Désy and the diplomatic corps in Brazil believed that the institution could continue to play a role in creating a climate conducive to healthy diplomatic and economic relations in South America. They saw music as central to these efforts. “Elle offre des analogies avec ce qu’on a appelé le grand concert de la nature, l’harmonie des sphères et des mondes,” Désy told the students and faculty of École de musique Vincent-d’Indy a few weeks prior to the Villa-Lobos concert.¹²⁸ On December 14, the Brazilian composer had settled in Montreal and was ready to speak to the media (*figure 4.2*). A believer in the mediating potential of music, Villa-Lobos lent credence to Désy’s vision of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community when he described the former ambassador as an “honorary Brazilian.”¹²⁹ During the press conference, he emphasized the importance of negotiating the tension between patriotism and universalism using the principles of humanism. His music, he explained, was rooted in the lived experiences of the people of Brazil as well as in the country’s geography. Through the “transfiguration” of folklore, he could transform the nation – perhaps even humanity.¹³⁰ “I am the maestro of the world,” he had said prior to leaving for Canada.¹³¹ There was some arrogance in his posturing, but it did not offend journalists. Either they thought that it was part of his exotic persona or they believed that Canadians had it in themselves to perform a somewhat similar role. Expectations were high with many hoping that the concert would energize the city’s cultural life and validate the self-image that Canadians had been encouraged to embrace through cultural exchanges with Brazil. Pelletier and Ballon having set the stage, audiences were expected to find themselves at home in Villa-Lobos’s musical universe.

The Canadian debut of Villa-Lobos took place at Plateau Hall on December 17. Organized under the auspices of the CBC-IS, the concert fell outside the regular programming of the OCSM. The Brazilian composer led the orchestra through four compositions: his own “Bachianas Brasileiras No. 7” and “Choros No. 6” followed by “La Voz de la Calles de Padre,” a Chilean symphonic poem by Humberto Allende, and “Obertura Criolla” by the Argentinian composer Ernesto Drangosch. Although Désy framed the event as a gesture of reciprocity, Villa-

¹²⁸ Jean Désy, “Propos sur la musique,” *Notre temps*, October 25, 1952, in MG32-E2, Vol. 3, Articles et coupures sur la carrière de Jean Désy (1951-1965), Jean Désy Fonds, LAC. Prior to 1951, the school was known as École supérieure de musique d’Outremont (ESMO).

¹²⁹ Cited in “Stravinsky Finest Says Villa-Lobos,” *The Montreal Gazette*, December 15, 1952, 15.

¹³⁰ “Heitor Villa-Lobos entend servir l’humanité par la beauté de l’art musical,” *La Patrie*, December 15, 1952, 15.

¹³¹ Cited in “Sou o Maestro do Mundo,” *Diário da Bahia*, December 16, 1952, in Livro 31, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, MVL.

Lobos declined to perform his concerto for piano with Ballon and he seemed to have given no thought to performing Canadian works.¹³² The event thus took the form of a South American evening with Villa-Lobos asserting his predominance over his continental counterparts. His works took up most of the program and overshadowed – in both colours and sophistication – the other two compositions, which critics dismissed as being of little significance. Instead, they focused on “Choros No. 6” and “Bachianas Brasileiras No. 7.” Written in 1926, the former was a sort of *Brasilophonia* in that it proposed a musical synthesis of Brazil’s social and cultural history; from the jungles of the Amazon to the coasts of Bahia and the streets of Rio de Janeiro. The latter borrowed from the Baroque period, most notably Johann Sebastian Bach’s approach to counterpoint, to revisit and transfigure an array of Brazilian popular sounds. It was part of a series composed to champion *Brasilidade* during the Vargas era. Bach’s music, Villa-Lobos claimed, was a music of mediation that could help bring ‘races’ together.¹³³ It had universal appeal, but its inventive use of counterpoint – the interweaving of apparently distinct melodic lines – gave it added resonance in Brazil where it could be redeployed to imagine a mosaic-like national musical culture. There was an obvious tension, if not a paradox, between Villa-Lobos’s universalism and his musical nationalism, noted *Le Devoir* in its review of the concert.¹³⁴



Figure 4.2. Heitor Villa-Lobos in the Montreal studios of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1952). Source: Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, Museu Villa-Lobos.

¹³² C.R. Delafield to Heitor Villa-Lobos, October 9, 1952, Correspondencia – Société Radio-Canada, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, MVL.

¹³³ “Bach, Mediador Entre Todas as Raças,” *O Globo*, February 6, 1945, in Livro 49, Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, MVL. See also “Stravinsky Finest Says Villa-Lobos,” 15.

¹³⁴ Jean Vallerand, “Heitor Villa-Lobos dirige au Plateau,” *Le Devoir*, December 19, 1952, 6.

The Montreal daily was not alone in expressing skepticism and disappointment in the days following the event. Music critics agreed that this had been a subpar performance although they stressed that the OCSM was not at fault. It is true that the musicians were unfamiliar with the works and that they did not have enough time to rehearse. But the sound at Plateau Hall was deficient and the stage could barely hold the orchestra, which had to accommodate additional instruments as required by the scores. Music critics regretted that what was supposed to be a great event could barely be called an event despite all the publicity surrounding Villa-Lobos.¹³⁵ The problem was the music itself. It was colourful and intricate, but it also lacked direction, restraint, and finesse. The great length of Villa-Lobos's works "struck me as a sort of musical knitting in which he forgot the normal length of sleeves," complained *Montreal Star's* Eric McLean.¹³⁶ The composer's works were tiresome and overwhelming for the senses. The music's points of references were foreign and difficult to assimilate if not completely disorienting and incomprehensible. *Le Canada's* Paul Roussel complained: "On sort repu d'une audition de ce genre comme d'une table trop plantureuse."¹³⁷ The only favourable review appeared in *La Patrie*. Its music critic had nurtured no illusions of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community; the Brazilian composer was an exotic 'other' and his concert had been nothing more than a voyage to distant lands.¹³⁸ Performed under Villa-Lobos's baton, "Choros No. 6" and "Bachianas Brasileiras No. 7" sounded worlds apart from the other works that Canadians had discovered through Pelletier, Ballon, and Defauw.

The consensus, then, was that Villa-Lobos's difference posed problems. In trying to situate the Brazilian composer vis-à-vis his Canadian counterparts, the local press constructed a masculine 'other' that was more likely to favour emotionality over rationality, primitive ardour over enlightened self-command, and flamboyance over humility. If Villa-Lobos had shared with Champagne a masculine identity based on bourgeois respectability and patriarchal eminence, he was now assumed to be closer to the common peoples of Brazil than the cosmopolites with

¹³⁵ For example, Jean Hamelin, "Villa-Lobos dans quelques-unes de ses compositions," *La Presse*, December 18, 1952, 41.

¹³⁶ Eric McLean, "Villa-Lobos Conducts Here," *Montreal Star*, December 18, 1952, in *Orchestre symphonique de Montréal Records*, OSM.

¹³⁷ Paul Roussel, "Concert de musique sud-américaine dirigé par Villa-Lobos au Plateau," *Le Canada*, December 19, 1952, 15.

¹³⁸ Maurice Huot, "Villa-Lobos déploie toutes les couleurs de sa palette orchestrale," *La Patrie*, December 18, 1952, 14.

whom he was known to associate. Music critics were evidently choosing to favour certain biographical elements over others, such as Villa-Lobos's primitivist inclinations and his proximity to the musicians who populated Rio de Janeiro's nightlife or Minas Gerais' interior. Seeking to further emphasize the distance between the composer's musical world and the musical life of their city, they challenged his masculine identity by deploying emasculating gendered metaphors. It is revealing that *Le Canada* and *Montreal Star* referred to knitting and cooking in their respective reviews of the concert. Roussel pressed on by describing Villa-Lobos as a chatterbox who "bavarde incessamment" while McLean lamented that this was "not a concert to ask a man to."¹³⁹ In this context, *La Presse*'s Jean Hamelin was quick to conclude that Canadian composers were superior to their Latin American counterparts.¹⁴⁰

Music critics were not alone in questioning the idea of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community and the pertinence of investing taxpayer money into musical diplomacy initiatives such as these.¹⁴¹ The CBC-IS had its own dissenters who believed that the projection of Canada abroad did not need to be complemented by reciprocity efforts that celebrated foreign artists at the expense of domestic ones. Patricia FitzGerald, music producer at the Transcription Service, did not hesitate to share her thoughts with Désy. She had already given her letter of resignation, so this was a "heart-breaking final assignment" for her.¹⁴² FitzGerald insisted that the event had cost too much, both financially and from a musical nation branding perspective. She believed that the venue had been a poor choice, which made it impossible to properly capture the performance. This was problematic since the CBC-IS broadcast the concert to Brazil and planned to make a transcription record with it. According to her, the OCSM's less-than-satisfactory performance and the poor quality of the recording threatened to damage Canada's image. What was worse was that the event monopolized scarce resources that could have been used to produce three transcription records by local artists. More importantly, FitzGerald firmly opposed the idea of adding a foreign composer to her carefully curated catalogue of transcription

¹³⁹ Roussel, "Concert de musique sud-américaine dirigé par Villa-Lobos au Plateau," 15; Eric McLean, "Villa-Lobos Conducts Here," *Montreal Star*, December 18, 1952, in Orchestre symphonique de Montréal Records, OSM.

¹⁴⁰ Hamelin, "Villa-Lobos dans quelques-unes de ses compositions," 41.

¹⁴¹ Both *Montreal Star* and *Le Devoir* wondered how much the event had cost and whether the funds could not have been better used elsewhere. See Eric McLean, "Villa-Lobos Conducts Here," *Montreal Star*, December 18, 1952, in Orchestre symphonique de Montréal Records, OSM; and Vallerand, "Heitor Villa-Lobos Dirige au Plateau," 6.

¹⁴² Patricia FitzGerald to C. R. Delafield, December 31, 1952, MG30-E408, Vol. 6, Hugh Whitney Morrison Fonds, LAC.

albums. Désy might have been an ‘honorary Brazilian,’ but this did not justify placing Villa-Lobos alongside the dozens of Canadian artists whose music the CBC-IS had engraved on vinyl records.¹⁴³ Ultimately, the event exposed the fact that Canadians – whether they worked at the CBC-IS or not – had yet to agree on what constituted an effective and acceptable cultural diplomacy. Clearly, better lines of communication were needed between the various parties concerned.

Désy had some explaining to do, especially once it became known that the whole venture had cost close to \$25,000. The HCSCEA questioned him on this matter while also wondering whether broadcasts to South America served tangible purposes. The discussion that ensued demonstrated the extent to which Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations were a conduit for the performance of middle power aspirations. In his responses, Désy insisted that Canada needed to show that it had the means and *savoir-faire* to reciprocate if it wished to continue accumulating goodwill and speak with authority on the international stage. Canadians could not afford to fail their test with Brazil, the only country with which they had a cultural agreement at the time, since people were listening. The former ambassador brushed aside concerns regarding the budget by pointing out that there was nothing abnormal about it since it included a broadcast to South America and the production of a transcription record. Brazilians, he noted, had invested far more money than Canadians in this cultural rapprochement. They had provided tremendous support to touring artists such as Quatuor alouette and MacMillan in addition to hosting various art exhibitions. Villa-Lobos himself had been instrumental in making these cultural exchanges possible. Quoting from the report of the Massey Commission, Désy emphasized that the projection of Canada abroad was “an obligation” that also entailed reciprocating. Canadians’ poor performance on that front was “particularly illustrated by our relations with Brazil,” he emphasized.¹⁴⁴ Reading again from the report, he said: “Exchanges with other nations in the fields of the arts and letters will help us make our reasonable contribution to civilized life and since these exchanges move in both directions, we ourselves will benefit by what we receive.”¹⁴⁵ Canada, Désy argued, had much to offer the world and it was through interactions and comparisons with others that Canadians could assess both their strengths and the true value of

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* L’Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal, with Heitor Villa-Lobos (conductor), *Program no. 87*, n.d., International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation S-7021-7022-7023, 33½ rpm 16-inch LP.

¹⁴⁴ Cited in Canada, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 6*, 153.

¹⁴⁵ Cited in *ibid.*, 155.

their contributions.¹⁴⁶ The data he provided suggested that business men, professionals, and workers were listening in greater numbers each year in Brazil – three hundred thousand synchronized their shortwave receivers daily while more than a million did so for special CBC-IS broadcasts such as those prepared for Dominion Day, Brazil’s Independence Day, or visits by eminent artists like Villa-Lobos.¹⁴⁷ His conclusion was that Canada’s image was at stake.

Shortwave audiences were likely to grow even more since *Voice of America* and the BBC-OS planned to significantly reduce their presence in South America. With the crisis plaguing the CBC-IS in the early 1950s, Désy and his colleagues in broadcasting (Dilworth) and external affairs (Pearson) thought it pertinent to couch their HCSCEA testimonies in Cold War language while also highlighting the economic benefits of southbound transmissions, even if non-quantifiable. The three men further emphasized Canada’s middle power aspirations by depicting the CBC-IS as a junior – but also critical – partner in international broadcasting. With the *Voice of America* and the BBC-OS focusing on the ‘war of ideas’ in Europe and the Middle East, the CBC-IS could expect to become the voice of liberal democracy and the English-speaking world in South America. Pearson stressed that coordination with these Cold War allies was key to making sure that “what we do in this field dovetails into a general scheme of propaganda.”¹⁴⁸ Désy reassured the HCSCEA that his team was equipped to deal with the “Niagara of teletypes” coming from the United States and Great Britain.¹⁴⁹ Both Dilworth and Morrison had argued for the continuance of southbound transmissions to counteract potential threats to the political and economic stability of the region. Désy concurred and added that service to “friendly countries” like Brazil was a cost-effective means of nurturing goodwill and ensuring control of Canada’s image and that of its allies.¹⁵⁰ He boastfully added: “Listeners will be inclined to attach more importance to the *Voice of Canada*, because our country, although a world power, has no extra-territorial ambition except international peace and co-operation.”¹⁵¹ Although framed in the context of the cultural Cold War, Désy’s latest musical diplomacy initiative was above all about

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 140 and 145.

¹⁴⁸ Cited in Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 1: Main Estimates of the Department of External Affairs – Departmental Administration*, 7th Session, 21st Parliament, February 19, 1953, 12.

¹⁴⁹ Cited in Canada, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 6*, 170.

¹⁵⁰ Cited in *ibid.*, 151.

¹⁵¹ Cited in *ibid.*, 141.

national projection and national self-representation. This is perhaps why it left many unswayed, including Progressive Conservative Gordon Graydon, who stated that such a costly initiative should not be repeated “sans mûre réflexion.”¹⁵² As for *The Globe and Mail* and *The Montreal Gazette*, they decried this “cultural and artistic splurge” on an “ultra de luxe ... program” that seemed to offer no evident return on investments.¹⁵³

Brazil’s diplomatic corps was neither impressed by Canadians’ response to the whole affair nor convinced that they possessed a truly national culture. Notwithstanding Brazilians’ willingness to engage with the trope of *métissage* deployed through Canada’s musical diplomacy, the fact is that state actors in Brazil had long been aware of the tensions between French-speaking Canadians and their English-speaking counterparts. In 1943, former DIP Director Lourival Fontes visited Montreal in his new capacity as Brazilian representative on the administrative council of the International Labour Office. In a letter to Vargas, he described French Canadians as a “conservative and reactionary [race]” that found itself constantly pitted against a heterogeneous English-speaking population whose loyalty lay with either the British Empire or the United States.¹⁵⁴ Caio de Mello Franco, Brazil’s minister in Canada, concurred when he characterized the Canadian politico-cultural landscape as opposing an “ardent English mistrust” to a “proud French inferiority complex.”¹⁵⁵ As for F.C. de Bittencourt Berenguer, he explained in a report prepared for the consular office in Montreal that the “incomprehension among Canadians of these two races” was “total” and that neither party seemed willing to work towards a common understanding.¹⁵⁶ Further reports corroborated these observations, which painted an unequivocally bleak picture of Canada in its passage from colony to nation.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Cited in Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 7th Session, 21st Parliament, Vol. 5 (1952-1953), May 15, 1953 (Gordon Graydon, PCC), 5102.

¹⁵³ George Bain, “Cultural and Artistic Splurge: MP Asks About \$24,278 Recordings,” *The Globe and Mail*, January 26, 1953, 1.; Arthur Blakely, “Ottawa Day by Day: Cultural,” *The Montreal Gazette*, January 28, 1953, 2.

¹⁵⁴ Lourival Fontes to Getúlio Vargas, July 19, 1943, GVC 1943.07.18, Getúlio Vargas Collection, FGV/CPDOC. In Portuguese: “... conservadora e reacionaria.”

¹⁵⁵ Caio de Mello Franco to Oswaldo Aranha, February 21, 1944, OAcP 1943.01.06.02 Oswaldo Aranha Collection, FGV/CPDOC. In Portuguese: “... viva desconfiança inglesa” and “orgulhoso complexo de inferioridade francês.”

¹⁵⁶ F.C. de Bittencourt Berenguer to Oswaldo Aranha, “Origem Racial da População do Canadá,” June 21, 1944, 36/05/05, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI. In Portuguese: “A incompreensão entre os canadenses dessas duas raças é total, não existindo mesmo nenhum desejo de compreensão.”

¹⁵⁷ Raul de Sá Barbosa to Oswaldo Aranha, “O Mês Cultural: Outubro de 1952,” November 13, 1952, 37/01/11, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

Drawing from their experiences with communications and cultural institutions, Brazilian state actors demonstrated acuity in their analysis of the Canadian cultural landscape. Far from being passive spectators, they complemented their discussion of the “racial-origins” of Canada’s population with a series of post-Massey Commission reports that sought to explain the country’s “cultural deficiency.”¹⁵⁸ The staff at the embassy commended the CBC for trying to connect Canadians from coast to coast through the production of broadcasts, the dissemination of records, and the organization of music festivals.¹⁵⁹ Yet it doubted that the Massey Commission would create the necessary momentum for a sustained “cultural recovery” that would see Canadians – both francophones and anglophones – come together around a shared national culture.¹⁶⁰ Raul de Sá Barbosa, third secretary at the embassy, recognized the validity of the points raised by the commissioners in their introductory chapter on the forces of geography, whether it concerned the need to resist American cultural hegemony or the challenge of bringing together a scarce population dispersed over an immense territory.¹⁶¹ However, he insisted that the bigger challenge was to address the tension between the two groups that language and history had separated. Their concentration in Québec and Ontario made a nationwide culture non-viable, which in turn perpetuated a colonial mentality where each group was set in its ways with little chance of reconciliation and engagement with the ‘other races’ that populated the rest of the country. Brazil, these reports suggested, could teach Canada a thing or two about national unity, ‘racial democracy,’ as well as cultural autonomy and patriotism.¹⁶²

The members of Brazil’s diplomatic corps could have hardly been surprised at the reactions to the Villa-Lobos concert. The truth is that the reviews validated the observations that they had made over the years and provided an added sense of purpose to the work accomplished by the maestro in Canada. Brazilian diplomats perceptively observed that the event had been

¹⁵⁸ Raul de Sá Barbosa, “O Mês Cultural: Agosto de 1952,” September 17, 1952, 37/01/10, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI. In Portuguese: “... deficiência cultural.”

¹⁵⁹ Raul de Sá Barbosa, “O Mês Cultural: Dezembro de 1952,” January 13, 1952, 37/01/12, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI. See also Raul de Sá Barbosa, “O Mês Cultural: Novembro de 1952,” December 1, 1952, 37/01/11, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

¹⁶⁰ Raul de Sá Barbosa, “O Mês Político: Abril-Maio de 1952,” June 1, 1952, 37/01/09, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI. In Portuguese: “... recuperação cultural.”

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Heitor Lyra to João Neves da Fontoura, “Discriminação Racial no Canadá,” September 26, 1952, 37/01/10, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.

about projecting Canadian identity more than anything else. They thus saw the controversy surrounding it as an opportunity for Canadians to learn something about themselves. In his report, Barbosa built on earlier observations regarding French-English tensions and the inchoate state of Canadian culture to explain why music critics failed to grasp the social and symbolic significance of Villa-Lobos's music. He began with a dismally depressing portrait of the country's musical landscape: from conservative orchestras playing unimaginative repertoires to inadequate government support for the arts, which placed musicians in a situation of precarity and kept audiences ignorant. Returning to the negative reviews of the Villa-Lobos concert, he asked: "How do we explain this? How do we explain the lack of interest, this neglect, this deficiency?"¹⁶³ In his answer, he referred to the problems of geography and population distribution, but also Canadians' national immaturity and their colonial mentality. More importantly, he blamed a "certain Anglo-Saxon" predisposition towards greed and material things at the expense of cultural enrichment.¹⁶⁴ Barbosa was more sympathetic towards French Canadians whom he saw as more inclined towards the "free flowering of arts and humanism," although he thought that they too lacked a modern, long-term vision for their country.¹⁶⁵ The esteem in which Brazilians held Désy and their exposure to French-Canadian artists over the past decade most likely explained this more nuanced assessment of Québec's cultural life. Ironically, the conclusion reached at the embassy was that the Villa-Lobos concert had been a necessary cultural shock. It might even have been a transformative experience that could accelerate Canadians' passage to modernity and true nationhood.¹⁶⁶



No doubt, this was not what the Massey Commission had in mind when it claimed that Canadians would benefit from the bidirectional flow of culture that the projection of Canada abroad encouraged. This also was not the outcome Désy envisioned for an event meant to be remembered as the crowning achievement of his decade-long cultural diplomacy with Brazil.

¹⁶³ Raul de Sá Barbosa, "O Mês Cultural: Dezembro de 1952," January 13, 1952, 37/01/12, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – Ottawa (Ofícios), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI. In Portuguese: "Como explicar o fato? Como explicar a falta de interesse, o descaso, a incúria?"

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: "Juventude, dispersão, como já foi dito. Problemas de distância, de imaturidade, espírito colonialista. Mas também certo apêgo demasiado ao dinheiro e às atividades renumeradoras, certa ganância anglo-saxônica, certa pressa de enriquecer – e o gosto inato, incrível, das coisas econômica: negócios, moeda, petróleo."

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* In Portuguese: "... floração gratuita de artes e humanismo."

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Although he succeeded in placing French Canada front and centre in the country's international image, he failed to substantiate the trope of *métissage* on which he relied to convince Brazilians that Canadians shared with them the ideal of 'racial democracy' and *bonne entente*. That *Brasilidade* was a construct did not seem apparent to Canadian observers who underestimated Brazilians' ability to dissect the stories directed at them via music and shortwave transmissions. Part of the problem was a lack of reciprocity, but also an insufficient disposition to listening, both of which betrayed Canadians' assumption that their interlocutors would be an easy public. Misplaced confidence and a self-serving approach to cultural relations partly explained the inability of the two nations to properly synchronize their activities around the project of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. The CBC-IS simply amplified these non-aligned signals. Debates regarding the broadcaster's ostensibly separate functions as an instrument of psychological warfare and a nation branding tool only illustrated the extent to which Canadians lacked a proper understanding of cultural diplomacy's multifaceted nature. The Massey Commission may have contributed to the conversation, its recommendations – informed as they were by the cultural elite's liberal humanism – had yet to resonate with the common Canadian and Désy's colleagues in the DEA. Evan H. Potter argues that a truly successful cultural diplomacy is one that finds widespread public support at home.¹⁶⁷ As the latest episode in Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations, Villa-Lobos's visit to Canada was evidence that the battle would be fought uphill.

¹⁶⁷ Potter, *Branding Canada*, 55.

CHAPTER 5: POP INTERFERENCES

*[Allan Blye and Jimmy Dale] were splendid informal “ambassadors” and reflected credit on Canada in everything they did, thus reaching a wide segment of the Brazilian public perhaps previously unaware of Canadian competence or achievement in the field of popular music.*¹

– The Canadian embassy, Rio de Janeiro, 1966

Canada’s participation in the Festival Internacional da Canção Popular (FICP) was a departure from earlier musical diplomacy endeavours. This was the first time that pop singers were travelling to Brazil as official envoys of the Department of External Affairs (DEA) in collaboration with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). It would have been difficult to decline invitations to send competitors considering that these were all-expenses-paid trips, courtesy of the State of Guanabara. Launched in 1966, the event was the brainchild of journalist Augusto Marzagão who – with the help of TV RIO, TV Globo, the state’s Secretaria de Turismo [Secretariat of Tourism], and the Ministério das Relações Exteriores (aka the Itamaraty) – brought international spotlights on Rio de Janeiro’s Maracanazinho stadium. An astute cultural promoter and propagandist, Marzagão declared that the festival was a testament to the city’s status as “the world’s capital of popular music.”² Preceded by a national competition during which Brazilians picked their contender, the event gave visibility to local artists while projecting a youthful and jubilant image of Brazil. Singer-songwriter Allan Blye and arranger Jimmy Dale travelled together to the first edition of the festival to perform “It Never Came to Be,” a song they cowrote at the request of the CBC. The two impromptu ambassadors did not make it to the finals, but their “warm and attractive personalities” won Canada much goodwill, according to embassy staff.³ What the report failed to comment on, however, was the fact that Brazil was no longer what it used to be.

The immediate postwar years had been eventful, but they paled in comparison to the last decade of the Second Republic. The country plunged into an unprecedented crisis in 1954 when

¹ Canadian embassy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 1966, RG25, Vol. 16106, Cultural Affairs – Performing Arts – Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

² “II Festival Internacional da Canção Popular,” 1967, No. 1058.1.09, Rádio Nacional Collection, Museu da Imagem e do Som (MIS). In Portuguese: “... capital mundial da música popular.”

³ Canadian embassy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 1966, RG25, Vol. 16106, Cultural Affairs – Performing Arts – Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

President Getúlio Vargas, faced with growing opposition from the military, committed suicide rather than being ousted from power.⁴ From August of that year until January of 1956, Brazilians stood by as a succession of presidents (Café Filho, Carlos Luz, and Nereu Ramos) sought to wrest control of a volatile political environment. The election of Juscelino Kubitschek ultimately brought some stability and optimism. His economic plan, branded as fifty years of progress in five, called for modernization, diversification, and territorial integration through education, energy reforms, and the expansion of the country's transportation network. His lasting contribution was the construction of a new capital: Brasília, a feat of urban design whose skyline juxtaposed modern architectural wonders against the surrounding tropical scrubland and savannahs. Faced with a creeping national debt, inflation, and a polarizing economy of haves and have-nots, Brazilians opted for the left-leaning Jânio Quadros in the 1960 election. In office for seven months, he ceded his presidency to the equally Soviet-friendly João Goulart who garnered popular support with his nationalization and land redistribution program. Fearing a slide towards communism, the military launched a coup with the perceived implicit support of the United States on March 31, 1964.⁵ By 1966, the military had placed Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco at the helm of the country, neutralized the official political opposition, suspended civil rights, and launched a campaign of repression that would lead to the arrest, imprisonment, torture, and exile of so-called enemies of the government.⁶ In those pivotal moments, Canada refused to either denounce or recognize the new regime. Instead, it chose simply to "continue formal relations" with the military, thereby acknowledging that it had "effective control of the territory."⁷ This faint response was a means of asserting autonomy without antagonizing the United States. It also indicated that the defence of democratic principles could be set aside for the benefit of economic and political stability. Aiming for a reassuring tone, the embassy in Rio

⁴ Jens R. Hentschke writes: "When Vargas's power waned, he would not just resign but shape the legacy of his death." Jens R. Hentschke, "The Vargas Era Institutional and Development Model Revisited: Themes, Debates, and Lacunas," in *Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives*, eds. Jens R. Hentschke (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 21.

⁵ Smith, *Brazil and the United States*, 130.

⁶ The regime-sanctioned two-party system provided a semblance of democracy. The opposition party, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro [Brazilian Democratic Movement], had no real power and influence over the Aliança Renovadora Nacional [National Renewal Alliance], which was known as the official party of the military. For a survey of the Second Republic and its immediate aftermath, see Skidmore, *Brazil*, 127-163.

⁷ Alfred Pick to Acting Under-Secretary, April 6, 1964, P853-S2-SS1-D7-1/2, Paul Beaulieu Fonds, BAnQ; Marcel Cadieux, Memorandum for the Minister, April 8, 1964, P853-S2-SS1-D7-1/2, Paul Beaulieu Fonds, BAnQ.

de Janeiro reported that the coup aimed to create “the conditions in which a democracy can exist.”⁸

This, then, was the backdrop for the cultural visit of Blye and Dale, and for those of other pop singers who performed in subsequent editions of the FICP; Donald Lautrec (1967), Paul Anka (1968), and Marc Gélinas (1969). Like other impromptu ambassadors before them, they prioritized projection over engagement while appearing unaware, or perhaps unconcerned, by Brazil’s anti-democratic political climate. In all fairness, the news coming out of Brazil was heavily censored and their chaperons in Rio de Janeiro ensured that their experience would be a festive one. Moreover, political strategists and intelligence agencies insisted that the Cold War created extraordinary circumstances that required extraordinary measures. Most Canadians were probably unaware of the scope of their own government’s illiberal practices and naively willing to tolerate some deviation from democratic principles by perceived partner countries aiming to ward off the virus of communism.⁹ Arguably, this indifference was especially pronounced in terms of Canadian attitudes towards Latin American regimes, like Brazil, which existed largely on the periphery of the world as Canadians knew it.¹⁰

Canada’s cultural diplomacy did not miss a beat through these successive regime changes in Brazil, including the return to dictatorship. Instead, what changed was the recruitment of pop singers, as opposed to classically trained musicians, for the next performance of the nation. Significantly, the change did not come from inside the Canadian establishment. Rather than the DEA or the CBC, it was the Brazilians themselves who sought out Canadian pop stars to represent the northern nation. The impetus was a pragmatic domestic response to the growing international popularity of local artists who were using Good Neighbor channels to promote the distinctive sounds of Brazilian music, in particular the popularity of samba and bossa nova, which had exploded onto the North American pop and jazz scenes in the 1940s and 1950s when artists such as Carmen Miranda and Antônio Carlos Jobim became global stars. Canadians also developed an ear for the new sounds of Brazil with many performers borrowing from their South

⁸ Canadian embassy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 1, 1967, RG25, Vol. 8936, Political Affairs – Policy & Background – Internal Policy Trends – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁹ On this topic, see Whitaker and Marcuse, *Cold War Canada*; and Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History,” *Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 4 (December 2000): 616-678.

¹⁰ Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas*, 37.

American counterparts – albeit often filtered through American media – to claim a distinctive style. These trends slowly proposed alternate ways of imagining a Canadian-Brazilian community using musical forms that were at once more global and hybridized. The DEA and the CBC had inexplicably lost control of the cross-cultural messaging and it was now Brazil that was setting the agenda for cultural exchange. Notwithstanding its internationalist pretensions, the FICP also turned out to be a perfect nation branding spectacle with which to mask the excesses of the military dictatorship. This chapter explores these developments by tracing the evolution of Brazil's *musicais populares*, their intersection with national politics, and the internationalization of samba and bossa nova, first in the United States and then in Canada through the works of singer Alys Robi and jazz pianist Oscar Peterson. It concludes with a discussion of the Canadian singers who participated in the first four editions of the FICP.

Musicais Populares Intersect with Politics

The absence of popular music in official Canadian-Brazilian relations prior to the 1960s did not mean that the music had no resonance with the urban middle class or that it served no political purposes. On the contrary, the history of *musicais populares* is rooted in cities like Rio de Janeiro where there was an abundance of media available to artists, producers, and audiences who frequently crossed class and 'racial' boundaries. The Vargas regime was quick to pick up on music trends in order to disseminate its ideologies and create national symbols. By the time Canada opened its legation in 1941, samba had become the national music of Brazil. Although tracing its origins to the early colonial period, samba emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century among African slaves; notably in the northern region of Bahia. Developing from – and morphing with – other forms of music and dance (among others, Candombe, Lundú, and Maxixe), it acquired its own distinctive character once it arrived in Rio de Janeiro, absorbed elements of other popular genres, and became an integral component of the city's pre-Lenten Carnival. Samba owed its rise to pre-eminence in part to an Afro-Brazilian musician named Ernesto dos Santos (aka Donga) whose "Pelo Telefone" is regarded as the genre's first recording. Not only did he record the work, he registered it with the Biblioteca Nacional and solicited the support of 'white' journalists to substantiate his claim of authorship. The strategy brought into focus the "complex inner workings of Rio's black communities and the intricate often fraught

alliances between whites and blacks,” writes Marc A. Hertzman.¹¹ It also revealed the internal dynamics of the contest for influence that opposed samba’s practitioners. Bryan McCann explains:

Much of the debate in the samba world concerned questions of the origins and nurturing grounds of the genre, with some sambistas claiming that samba was music of the *cidade*, or city, and others contending that it was originally and primarily music of the *morro*, or hill. Both were collective terms, with *cidade* standing for the various working and middle-class, white and mixed-race neighborhoods of downtown Rio as well as for the city’s radio stations and recording studios, and *morro* for the predominantly black favelas. The polemic regarding these two vaguely defined locations explicitly treated questions of style, and implicitly involved more sensitive questions of class and race.¹²

A hybrid and contested malleable genre, samba was ripe for appropriation by the time Vargas rose to power.

The music’s symbolic significance was such that it quickly became one of the key soundtracks of the *Estado Novo*. It was an apt vehicle for promoting and eliciting pride in the idea of *Brasilidade*. Initially supported by municipal governments, samba schools and the Carnival fell under state sponsorship with Rádio Nacional acting as the authoritative voice on the question of origins. In its search for the constitutive components of the nation’s so-called distinctive essence, the broadcaster tended to prioritize *morro*-esque samba because it was more resoundingly anchored in the history and lived experiences of Afro-Brazilians.¹³ The choice served to legitimize the myth of ‘racial democracy’ deployed to foster social cohesion and national unity. That said, samba’s presence on government-run airwaves meant that the music had to be somewhat tamed. For example, songs with lyrics that romanticized images of *malandros* (nonconformist, law-defying troublemakers) received limited to no airplay. Rádio Nacional and the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) did not stop at censoring works. They also commissioned songs that “helped popularize and commercialize hyperpatriotic

¹¹ Marc A. Hertzman, *Making Samba: A New History of Race and Music in Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 3. On the topic of transcultural mediator, see Hermano Vianna, *The Mystery of Samba: Popular Music and National Identity in Brazil*, trans., John Charles Chasteen (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

¹² McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil*, 42.

¹³ *Ibid.*

lyrics that complemented the Vargas regime's goals of civic renewals and social uplift," notes Daryle Williams.¹⁴ Sambistas, of course, could not be completely muzzled or co-opted. Their music continued to be regarded as a means of collective self-affirmation and resistance in various public arenas that lay beyond the gaze of the state apparatus.¹⁵ Samba's potency and resilience was such that it could accommodate competing interpretations and purposes while effectively linking the past to the present in the national imaginary.

Emerging in the 1950s, bossa nova also championed hybrid musical forms although it was more resolutely turned to the future. In that sense, it echoed the self-confidence that accompanied Kubitschek's presidency. As a genre, it built on samba's core rhythmic structure while incorporating chromatic and harmonic elements of modern jazz. However, bossa nova's affiliation with this Afro-American genre must not be overstated.¹⁶ As Gerard Béhague argues, the music's novelty was that it originated from different urban quarters, namely those of urban elites "whose aspirations to modernity coincided with post-war progress toward industrialization and modernization."¹⁷ With lyrical themes ranging from longing to love and hopefulness, bossa nova appealed to middle-class listeners who appreciated its intimate and restrained musical register.¹⁸ Its escapist undertones reflected above all the optimism of Brazilians who embraced Kubitschek's developmentalism and internationalism.¹⁹ Juca Chaves's "Presidente Bossa Nova" best exemplified this new alignment of music and politics:

This is living as one must,
It's to be a bossa nova president.
Bossa nova, very young,
Absolutely new, ultra new!²⁰

¹⁴ Daryle Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 86.

¹⁵ McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil*, 90.

¹⁶ Gerard Béhague, "Bossa & Bossas: Recent Changes in Brazilian Urban Popular Music," *Ethnomusicology* 17, no. 2 (May 1973): 213.

¹⁷ Gerard Béhague, "Brazilian Musical Values of the 1960s and 1970s: Popular Urban Music from Bossa Nova to Tropicalia," *Journal of Popular Culture* 14, no. 3 (Winter 1980): 440.

¹⁸ Albrecht Moreno, "Bossa Nova::Novo Brasil: The Significance of Bossa Nova as a Brazilian Popular Music," *Latin American Research Review* 17, no. 2 (1982): 134.

¹⁹ Béhague, "Brazilian Musical Values of the 1960s and 1970s," 452.

²⁰ In Portuguese: "Isto é viver como se aprova, É ser um presidente bossa nova. Bossa nova, muito nova, Nova mesmo, ultra nova!" See Marleine Cohen, *Juscelino Kubitschek: O Presidente Bossa-Nova* (São Paulo: Editora Globo, 2005).

Santuza Cambraia Naves pertinently uses the figure of the “engineer” to describe musicians such as João Gilberto, whose “concise and rational style” evoked the idea of the self-made artist able to build something new from scratch in the same way that Kubitschek proposed to erect Brasília in the country’s hinterland.²¹

Bossa nova initially served the official discourse of authorities without needing to be appropriated, because it was of its time; it aligned with the urgent need for renewal and reinvention that followed the end of the Vargas era. However, the coup of 1964 changed the politico-cultural landscape. Criticisms that the music was not authentically Brazilian returned with added vigour with the realization that the United States had played some part in the abrupt end to the Second Republic. Bossa nova, many argued, had been contaminated by foreign influence and its personable, apolitical tone was out of place in post-coup Brazil.²² Whereas some musicians carried on undeterred, many others adopted a more militant posture to maintain their pertinence and confront the challenges facing their generation. Increasingly, they dealt with questions of poverty, repression, and imperialism in their lyrics while experimenting musically to challenge established norms. Francisco ‘Chico’ Buarque de Hollanda excelled at evading censors by using a type of lyricism that veiled his social commentaries and his attacks on the military.²³ He was not always successful. In 1967, he wrote a satirical play titled *Roda Vida*, which dealt with an artist who commits suicide to free himself from the manipulative schemes of the establishment. Buarque’s performance of the theme song during the 1967 edition of the FICP went smoothly, but the theatrical work itself was interrupted by the regime’s censors. The singer chose to exile himself to Europe the following year as the military clamped down on dissenting students, workers, and artists. He did manage to throw another punch at the dictatorship in 1968 using, once again, the FICP as a platform. Cowritten with Jobim, “Sabiá” is a song of longing that evokes one’s exile into an idyllic Brazilian past; an image that stood in sharp contrast with the cloud of repression weighting over the country. The song went on to win first place in the

²¹ Santuza Cambraia Naves, “From Bossa Nova to Tropicália: Restraint and Excess in Popular Music,” in *Imagining Brazil*, eds. Jessé Souza and Valter Sinder (New York: Lexington Books, 2005), 254.

²² Charles A. Perrone, “Nationalism, Dissension, and Politics in Contemporary Brazilian Popular Music,” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 39, no. 1 (Summer 2002): 66.

²³ Lorraine Leu, “Music and National Culture: Pop Music and Resistance in Brazil,” *P: Portuguese Cultural Studies* 0 (Winter 2006): 37.

international competition. Characteristically, it also earned criticisms from more vocal opponents of the regime.²⁴

Protest music offered rallying cries to large segments of Brazil's youth in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Its widespread appeal assured it a place on the stage of the FICP in the early years of the event. *Música Popular Brasileira* [Brazilian Popular Music] (MPB), a term that encompassed a range of post-bossa nova genres, initially called for a nationalist and politically engaged posture, which meant a rejection of foreign influence and a revisiting of traditional musical styles. Supporters of MPB tended to champion acoustic music over rock-infused songs that leaned too heavily on American or British trends. They also expected performers to be free-spoken, if not bold, in their social commentaries. Audiences in the 1968 edition of the FICP were therefore upset when Geraldo Vandré's "Pra Não Dizer Que Não Falei de Flores," a pro-democracy anthem promptly banned by the military, finished second after Buarque and Jobim's "Sabiá."²⁵ Ironically, audiences were themselves becoming more rigid vis-à-vis the artists who sought to articulate their generation's dismay. Caetano Veloso and the group Os Mutantes, vanguards of the Tropicália movement, could hardly be surprised when their performance at the FICP raised a real hue and cry. Blending traditional Brazilian music with psychedelic rock, they provoked the audience with a loud and chaotic performance of "É Proibido Proibir" [It is Forbidden to Forbid], a direct reference to the Parisian anti-authoritarianism protests of May 68, which the musicians directed at both the audience and the military regime.²⁶ The 'tropicalistas' called for Brazil's youths to take their place in the "global sixties" by rejecting the status quo of their parents while thinking more creatively and self-confidently about the ways in which they engaged with other cultures.²⁷ "We assumed an immediate posture of 'being-in-the-world,' we rejected the role of a Third World country living

²⁴ See Charles A. Perrone, "Dissonance and Dissent: The Musical Dramatics of Chico Buarque," *Latin American Theatre Review* 22, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 81-94; Christopher Dunn, *Brutality Garden: Tropicália and the Emergence of a Brazilian Counterculture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 62-64; and Zuza Homem de Mello, *A Era dos Festivais: Uma Parábola* (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2003), 295-300.

²⁵ Dunn, *Brutality Garden*, 137.

²⁶ Christopher Dunn writes: "The tropicalists' ambiguous position led to a curious situation in which they were severely criticized by the Left yet ultimately persecuted by the military regime as subversives." *Ibid.*, 212.

²⁷ Martin Klimke and Mary Nolan define the "global sixties" as a period of "growing dissatisfaction with the existing political, socioeconomic, and cultural status quo." Martin Klimke and Mary Nolan, "Introduction: The Globalization of the Sixties," in *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties: Between Protest and Nation Building*, eds. Chen Jian, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, and Joanna Waley-Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2018), 6.

in the shadow of more developed countries,” explained Veloso.²⁸ The FICP had evidently become an important stage where performers and audiences defined, performed, resisted, and reimagined their collective identity. The authorities, of course, watched and listened attentively. Veloso and Gilberto Gil, another key ‘tropicalista,’ were arrested shortly after and forced into exile.²⁹

The fact that musicians were able to voice their opposition up to 1968 did not mean that the dictatorship was benign. It did mean, however, that the authorities had perhaps overlooked the possibility that dissidence could spread through ostensibly apolitical musical forms popular among middle- and upper-class youths. The military caught on by 1968 when it gave up all appearances of preparing for an eventual return to democracy. Branco’s successor, former War Minister Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva, adopted a hardline approach that translated into increased censorship and social control as well as a more aggressive repression of dissent. The government’s authoritarian turn failed to alarm most Brazilians since they stood to benefit from the political and economic stability that the military regime promised. Its technocrats secured huge sums of money from the United States and international agencies to restructure the economy. They brought inflation down by sixty-four percent in just a few years and successfully renegotiated the country’s foreign debt all the while maintaining a ten percent growth rate through a diversified staples export strategy led by coffee, oranges, and soybeans, among other products. The dictatorship’s austerity measures hurt the poor and working class the most while the middle-class appeared content that an economic collapse had been avoided. As for the Brazilian elite and foreigners with investments in Brazil, they reaped significant dividends, which helped assuage concerns regarding the illiberal practices of the military.³⁰

The Canadian embassy’s responses to these developments were a function of Canada’s junior role alongside the United States in South America. They also flowed from the fact that Brazil was something of a revolving door for diplomats who were typically stationed there for relatively brief postings. Indeed, Canada sent almost as many ambassadors there as Brazil had presidents between 1954 and 1969. Sydney Pierce, former Canadian ambassador to Mexico, was

²⁸ Cited in Christopher Dunn, “The Tropicalista Rebellion: A Conversation with Caetano Veloso,” *Transition* 70 (1996): 121.

²⁹ Dunn, *Brutality Garden*, 146.

³⁰ For a survey of the early years of the military dictatorship, see Skidmore, *Brazil*, 176-183.

in the post when Vargas committed suicide. He had replaced Herbert Coleman who had been in Brazil since 1951. Arthur Irwin had his ambassadorial debut in 1957. Returning from Sweden, Jean Chapdelaine took over two years later. His former college friend, Paul Beaulieu, succeeded him in 1963 after having pioneered diplomatic relations in the Middle East. Yvon Beaulne then inherited the post in 1967. He had previously been posted to Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, which meant that after Pierce, he was the only senior Canadian diplomat who had any sort of connection to the region. In addition, Beaulne was very much cut from the cloth of Jean Désy, having previously served under him in Italy and in Montreal as liaison between the DEA and the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS). The turnover of ambassadors during these pivotal years was an impediment to the development of a sustained policy of engagement. It was also a reflection of how little interest the South American giant generated among aspiring and emerging diplomats. The lukewarm replies that Irwin and Beaulieu sent to the DEA upon learning that they were heading to Brazil are revealing. The former did not seem to think much of Brazilians and their country's geopolitical importance when he indicated that he "might be most useful" in another country where there is "substantive political work" to be done.³¹ Beaulieu was no more enthusiastic than Irwin after "five years at [an] unhealthy post."³² "[I] trust assignment will only be for one tour of duty," he replied to Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux.³³

Irwin's and Beaulieu's responses were an indication that "Brazilian politics were not easily understandable from abroad."³⁴ Jules Léger, under-secretary of state for External Affairs, was willing to admit that much. Seeking to make Irwin's transition into his new post smoother, he prepared a letter of instructions detailing what the DEA considered priorities: keeping abreast of communist inroads, generating interest for increased bilateral trade, keeping an eye on domestic policies that may affect Canadian business interests in Brazil, providing updates on the country's foreign policy objectives, and collating information regarding the "rather delicate subject" of

³¹ Arthur Irwin to Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 30, 1956, MG31-E97, Vol. 26, Appointment to Brazil, W. Arthur Irwin Fonds, LAC.

³² Paul Beaulieu to TT External FM GVE, "Transfer to Rio," August 20, 1963, P853-S2-SS1-D7-1/2, Paul Beaulieu Fonds, BAnQ.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Jules Léger to W.A. Irwin, January 22, 1957, MG31-E97, Vol. 26, Appointment to Brazil, W. Arthur Irwin Fonds, LAC.

Canada's relationship to the Organization of American States (OAS).³⁵ On the latter subject, Irwin gained considerable insight on the Itamaraty's position, which rested on the perception of profound affinities between Canadians and Brazilians with respect to their shared middle power aspirations and their parallel efforts to offset the hegemonic pull of the United States.³⁶ The ambassador found his interlocutors' arguments so compelling that he recommended that Canada join the OAS, but also suggested, ironically and patronizingly, that Brazil was a third-class nation in much need of Canadian middlepowerhood.³⁷ Although Prime Minister John Diefenbaker flirted with the idea of membership in the OAS at the turn of the 1960s, it would take another thirty years before Canada joined the multilateral organization.³⁸ In the end, Irwin did warm up to Brazilians, even noting encouragingly that they were destined for a great future and that "things both economic and political in Brazil are rarely, if ever, as bad as they look."³⁹ He therefore advocated for closer relations, which proved increasingly difficult with the embassy having downgraded to the status of a "second or third class Consulate" under Pierce's leadership, or lack thereof, according to a former staffer.⁴⁰ Chapdelaine concurred with both observations: Brazil was the country of the future and the DEA's "piecemeal" efforts there were insufficient.⁴¹ Prospects, however, took a turn for the worse in 1963 as the staff at the Canadian embassy watched Brazil slide towards an imminent political crisis.⁴²

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ W. Arthur Irwin to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, July 11, 1957, MG31-E97, Vol. 26, Despatches and Drafts of Despatches (2 of 2), W. Arthur Irwin Fonds, LAC.

³⁷ W. Arthur Irwin to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 17, 1958, MG31-E97, Vol. 26, Despatches and Drafts of Despatches (1 of 2), W. Arthur Irwin Fonds, LAC.

³⁸ For a discussion of the domestic and international factors that informed Canadian hesitancy on the issue of membership in the Organization of American States, see McKercher, "Southern Exposure," Zorbas, *Diefenbaker and Latin America*, McKenna, *Canada and the OAS*, and Asa McKercher, "'Ultimate Destiny' Delayed: The Liberals, the Organization of American States, and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1963–1968," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 25 (2014): 472–491.

³⁹ Arthur Irwin, "Brazil – Final Draft," n.d., MG31-E97, Vol. 26, Despatches and Drafts of Despatches (2 of 2), W. Arthur Irwin Fonds, LAC.

⁴⁰ Arthur Irwin to Jules Léger, September 5, 1957, MG31-E97, Vol. 26, Correspondence – Personal – Dept. of External Affairs, W. Arthur Irwin Fonds, LAC; Letter to Joseph Jean Martial Coté, October 16, 1957, RG25, Vol. 7229, Reports on Information Activities in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴¹ Jean Chapdelaine to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 15, 1960, RG25, Vol. 7229, Reports on Information Activities in Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC; Jean Chapdelaine to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 19, 1961, RG25, Vol. 5433, Canada Council Non-Resident Fellowship Programme: Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴² "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the President is more and more losing control of the country," wrote Robert Morrice Middleton, chargé d'affaires for Jean Chapdelaine, in 1963. Robert Morrice Middleton to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 27, 1963, RG25, Vol. 8936, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Internal Policy Trends – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

In Brazil during the military coup that ended Goulart's presidency, Beaulieu lived through "troublesome, but historic days."⁴³ Reports coming out of the embassy demonstrate the extent to which democratic principles were expendable in the search for economic stability and the fight against perceived communist threats in the distant and foreign Global South. Canadian diplomats noted approvingly that the military had dealt a near-fatal blow to one of Vargas's legacies, populist politics, but they showed little concern with the authoritarianism of successive regimes. Their reports praised the military for showing "commendable restraint" in pursuing subversive elements although they noted that authorities had room to be slightly more aggressive in hunting down communists.⁴⁴ According to Beaulieu, Brazilians valued their new government's ability to manage the economy even if they were not particularly inspired by it. The ambassador described the new regime as a "government of good progressive administrators" who deserved praise for attempting to put their house in order and for aligning their country, economically and ideologically, with its North American Cold War allies.⁴⁵ The "literate classes" who "feel they have been cheated" by the rise of populism and self-serving politicians could therefore be forgiven for turning a blind eye to the military regime's illiberal practices.⁴⁶ Canada, these reports suggested, should do the same and acknowledge that Brazil was a less advanced society where different standards could be tolerated if they served the interests of the normative international order. Beaulne concurred with this elitist and neo-colonial worldview: "[T]he people that count, for want of a better word the middle class of functionaries, military officers, intellectuals, the business and industrial community in particular, have their minds focused on the material challenges before them and the quest for economic betterment."⁴⁷ Canadians should seize the moment to "expand and diversify" their relations with Brazilians, he added.⁴⁸

Although neither Beaulieu nor Beaulne managed to replicate the close bonds of contact that Désy had developed with the 'literate classes,' they both insisted that greater efforts were

⁴³ Alfred J. Pick to Paul Beaulieu, April 9, 1964, P853-S2-SS1-D7-1/2, Paul Beaulieu Fonds, BANQ.

⁴⁴ Chargé d'affaires to Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 4, 1965, RG25, Vol. 8936, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Internal Policy Trends – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴⁵ Paul Beaulieu to External Affairs, October 1, 1964, RG25, Vol. 8936, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Internal Policy Trends – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴⁶ Chargé d'affaires to Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 4, 1965, RG25, Vol. 8936, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Internal Policy Trends – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴⁷ Yvon Beaulne to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 13, 1967, RG25, Vol. 8936, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Internal Policy Trends – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

needed to engage Brazilian elites. They argued that culture was a potent means of providing substance and resonance to Canada's presence in Brazil and projecting Canadian values. This, it was assumed, would presumably make it easier to champion the economic interests of companies such as Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light). But additionally, it was important to convince Brazilians that Canada was a trustworthy interlocutor and capable mediator, particularly when it came to coping with the power asymmetry associated with both countries' proximity to the United States.⁴⁹ Although none of the ambassadors posted in Brazil from 1947 onward succeeded in launching any bold new initiatives, they all recognized that Désy's pioneering efforts had generated goodwill for Canada and that cultural diplomacy provided an exceptional stage for the performance of middle power aspirations.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, for many of their colleagues in Ottawa, cultural diplomacy continued to remain an elusive concept, even with the creation of a Cultural Affairs Division in the DEA in 1966.

Since 1947, the DEA's experience with the projection of Canada abroad had for the most part been the purview of the Information Division which handled press enquiries and took care of disseminating press releases and reference material to foreign outlets or other interested parties.⁵¹ Its employees were not particularly imaginative and their efforts were often impeded by defective liaison with the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC), the National Film Board of Canada (NFB), and the CBC-IS. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey Commission) had offered food for thought and enough incentives for the establishment of the Canada Council for the Arts as an arms-length agency of the federal government. Despite this progress, Canadians' cultural relations with other nations remained limited to ad hoc, discontinuous, uncoordinated, and shortsighted initiatives by decentralized agencies often working at cross-purposes.⁵² The Quiet

⁴⁹ Even John Moors Cabot, American ambassador to Brazil, thought that Canada could serve as a model to emulate for Brazilian nationalists who were trying to position themselves vis-à-vis his country. Jean Chapdelaine to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 5, 1959, RG25, Vol. 8054, United States-Brazil Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁰ See S. D. Pierce to Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 29, 1955, RG25, Vol. 3018, Brazil-Canada Relations, DEA Fonds, LAC; Jean Chapdelaine to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, September 19, 1961, RG25, Vol. 5433, Canada Council Non-Resident Fellowship Programme: Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC; and Jean Chapdelaine to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Reports on Information Activities in Brazil, January 15, 1960, RG25, Vol. 7229, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵¹ John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 2: Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 11.

⁵² Rushton, "The Origins and Development of Canada's Public Diplomacy," 83-88.

Revolution provided the spark that propelled the DEA into action. The 1961 opening of the Maison du Québec in Paris, with the explicit support of the French government, constituted a direct challenge to Ottawa's prerogatives in the realm of international relations. It was founded on the notion that a province's domestic areas of jurisdiction (specifically culture and education) should extend to the global arena. The doctrine found its clearest expression in a speech given by neo-nationalist Vice-Premier Paul Gérin-Lajoie in 1965.⁵³ What the DEA had sought to prevent when it signed its cultural agreement with Brazil in 1944 had finally happened: a province had made "cultural working arrangements abroad on the basis of [its] educational powers."⁵⁴ Ottawa responded by signing a cultural agreement with France in 1965, which led to the creation of the Cultural Affairs Division the following year. Yet the road ahead promised to be a long one since the DEA's efforts in that area had been "less than inspired and less than effective" up to that point.⁵⁵

From his post in Rio de Janeiro, Beaulieu was hopeful that these developments would spur the DEA into revisiting the 1944 Canada-Brazil cultural agreement and allocating more resources to "cultural cooperation between the two countries."⁵⁶ He was told that both were unlikely since the creation of the new division did not come with an additional budgetary envelope; it was therefore best to let non-state actors such as "private concert managers" take the lead.⁵⁷ Moreover, the DEA intended to prioritize Europe where Cold War tensions remained acute, and in particular, "the countries from where the largest ethnic groups of Canada originate."⁵⁸ Beaulieu added his voice to the chorus. In the spring of 1968, he wrote to the under-secretary of state for External Affairs: "I am becoming more and more convinced that my late

⁵³ For a detailed analysis of the political and cultural dimensions of the Canada-Québec-France triangle, see Meren, *With Friends Like These*, 207-237.

⁵⁴ Minutes of Meeting on Cultural Relations with Latin America, November 8, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁵ L.A.D. Stephens, *Study of Canadian Government Information Abroad, 1942-1972: The Development of the Information, Cultural, and Academic Divisions and their Policies* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1977), 9-1. According to Stephens, Québec's efforts to project its international identity heightened the urgency of creating a Cultural Affairs Division in the early 1960s.

⁵⁶ Paul Beaulieu to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 7, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951,

Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁷ René de Chantal to Paul Beaulieu, May 30, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁵⁸ Jacques Gignac, n.d., RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC. See also Jacques Gignac to M. Wallis, April 18, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

predecessor ... was right in advocating the cultural agreement of 1944 between Canada and Brazil ... and I should hope that it will not continue to remain at the very bottom of the Department's priorities."⁵⁹ Alas, it appeared destined to remain there because of other Cold War priorities and Québec's increasingly frequent forays into the international arena. "[T]here is thus little immediate prospect of increased activity in this area," the DEA told Beaulne on July 4, 1968.⁶⁰ As if to prove the point, Anka, one of Canada's most acclaimed pop singers, had just been confirmed to perform in the third edition of the FICP later that year, but he would travel as a guest of Marzagão and the Brazilian government, rather than as an envoy for Canada.

Brazilian Pop Travels North

The FICP saw private cultural workers, the Itamaraty, and a variety of state actors collaborate to project an image of Brazil as a modern country with a dynamic culture founded on the twin pillars of *Brasilidade* and 'racial democracy.' The idea that the country's *musicais populares* were effective tools of diplomacy was somewhat new. In fact, the northbound dissemination of popular music did not pick up until the Good Neighbor era, a period during which the State Department used cultural exchanges to counter anti-Americanism and promote liberal developmentalism in Brazil while encouraging the country's decision makers to align their domestic and international policies with those of the United States. The Americanization of Brazil continued with the advent of the Cold War.⁶¹ From the 1930s through the 1960s, state and non-state actors mobilized the power of entertainment media to engage Brazilians and get American audiences, on whose support they counted, excited about the South American giant.

Recording and radio technologies were integral to this process. Already in the 1930s, Columbia's Wallace Downey and RCA Victor's Leslie Evans were helping shape the Brazilian music industry using production and marketing methods developed in the United States. Although not 'Americanizers' per se, Downey and Evans nonetheless laid the foundations upon which Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) established part of its cultural diplomacy at the turn of the 1940s.⁶² Broadcasting from Rio de

⁵⁹ Yvon Beaulne to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 31, 1968, RG25, Vol. 8622, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁶⁰ C.S. Gadd to Yvon Beaulne, July 4, 1968, RG25, Vol. 8622, Political Affairs – Policy and Background – Canadian External Policy and Relations – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

⁶¹ Haines, *The Americanization of Brazil*, 185.

⁶² McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil*, 141.

Janeiro on April 14, 1942, the goodwill ambassador George Orson Welles put samba on the airwaves for his compatriots up north. He had been working on a film about the Carnival at the request of the OCIAA.⁶³ Back in New York later that fall, he opened *Hello Americans*, his new radio series, with a feature on Brazil set to the sound and narrative rhythm of samba.⁶⁴ His guest on the show was Carmen Miranda, a Brazilian singer and dancer who recorded with RCA Victor in the 1930s before achieving stardom on stage and on the big screen in the United States.

Miranda had just turned twenty when she recorded “Prá Você Gostar de Mim,” her second single and the one that catapulted her to fame in Brazil in 1930. Her domestic popularity grew as her appearances on radio and in movies multiplied. By the end of the decade, she had performed in four Brazilian musical films and earned an invitation to perform on Broadway in *The Streets of Paris*. At her request, the producer Lee Shubert agreed to hire her musicians. Because he refused to pay their travelling expenses, Miranda got the Brazilian government to cover the fares from Rio de Janeiro to New York.⁶⁵ A goodwill ambassador in her own right, Miranda’s stage performances soon inspired Hollywood’s Twentieth Century Fox to recruit her for a series of lucrative films. These productions capitalized on her exotic image, which centred on her expressive features, foreign accent, and colourful clothing, including her signature fruit hat and beaded jewelry. Although she continued to record singles, musical films were the vehicles through which she promoted her samba-inspired tunes. By the end of 1945, she had acted in nine feature films, one of which – *That Night in Rio* (Irving Cummings, 1941) – was set in Brazil while another – *Springtime in the Rockies* (Irving Cummings, 1942) – took place in Canada. The “Brazilian Bombshell” had arrived north of the 49th parallel.⁶⁶

Miranda’s informal ambassadorial work left some of her compatriots perplexed, if not embarrassed. They disapproved of her complicit role in essentializing South Americans and propagating damaging stereotypes that were at odds with the sophisticated image that Brazilian

⁶³ George Orson Welles planned to integrate *Carnaval* (aka *The Story of Samba*) into a three-part film to be titled *It’s All True*, which he never completed. For a detailed history of the project, see Robert Stam, *Tropical Multiculturalism: A Comparative History of Race in Brazilian Cinema & Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 107-132; and Catherine L. Benamou, *It’s All True: Orson Welles’s Pan-American Odyssey* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

⁶⁴ Darlene J. Sadlier, *Brazil Imagined: 1500 to the Present* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), 218-224.

⁶⁵ Martha Gil-Montero, *Brazilian Bombshell: The Biography of Carmen Miranda* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1989), 70-72.

⁶⁶ The moniker ‘Brazilian Bombshell’ helped market Carmen Miranda and her films: Sadlier, *Brazil Imagined*, 215. See also Gil-Montero, *Brazilian Bombshell*, 77.

elites wished to foreground. More problematically, they saw her as an embodied image of a colonized Brazil. On her first trip back to Rio de Janeiro in 1940, she was greeted by a hostile crowd who disapproved of her Americanized rendition of their national music. The experience taught her that each visit to her homeland would be a “test of nationalist commitment,” which was an experience she wished to avoid.⁶⁷ Yet she retained agency while in the United States. McCann argues that Miranda was “systematically Brazilianizing her material” through (often improvised) coded messages meant to assert her independence and communicate her attachment to Brazil.⁶⁸ Despite these acts of resistance, she “symbolically embodied the image of a *mestiço* Brazil” in ways that proved non-threatening to North American audiences.⁶⁹ Darlene J. Sadlier explains:

Carmen Miranda overturned earlier Hollywood stereotypes of Latin Americans by playing a charismatic, talented, and “good-willed” Latin who enchants everyone around her. However, by repeatedly playing that role, she became another kind of stereotype—a hybrid created by Hollywood of its image of Latin America on the order of the indigenous, exotic Other depicted in colonial texts.⁷⁰

The spectacle served Good Neighbor objectives while selling movie tickets and singles. It also brought samba to the United States – and subsequently, Canada – even if not all Brazilians felt at ease with the paths taken and the images conveyed.

Bossa nova followed a similar route to North America. The first recordings made their way there through a chance encounter between Rio de Janeiro radio host Paulo Santos and his Washington counterpart Félix Grant. The Brazilian jazzophile was in the United States to attend the Newport Jazz Festival. The two men began exchanging records, which turned Grant into an avid promoter of bossa nova. He later introduced the guitarist Charlie Lee Byrd to the music. A goodwill ambassador for the State Department, Byrd travelled to South America with bassist Keter Betts and percussionist Buddy Deppenschmidt in 1961. The trio spent two weeks in Brazil, familiarizing themselves with the bossa nova genre.⁷¹ Back in Washington, Byrd played Gilberto

⁶⁷ McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil*, 141.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁶⁹ Dunn, *Brutality Garden*, 28. See also Davis, *White Face, Black Mask*, 162.

⁷⁰ Sadlier, *Brazil Imagined*, 229.

⁷¹ Charlie Lee Byrd eventually brought bossa nova to decolonizing Africa as part of the State Department’s late 1960s Cold War jazz diplomacy: Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World*, 177.

and Jobim albums for jazz saxophonist Stan Getz, which led to the pair recording *Jazz Samba* for Verve Records in 1962. Except for Byrd's "Samba Dees Days," the album featured only Brazilian compositions. The recording proved a runaway success and the bossa nova craze had begun. Getz went on to record two collaborative albums with Brazilian composers the following year: *Jazz Samba Encore!* And *Getz/Gilberto*. In 1964, he recorded the iconic "The Girl from Ipanema" with Brazilian singer Astrud Gilberto. Her appearance in the United States followed in the footsteps of a government-sponsored delegation of bossa nova artists who had performed at New York's Carnegie Hall two years earlier and which included her husband (João), Jobim, Luíz Bonfá, and Sérgio Mendes, to name but a few.⁷² The appropriation and crass commercialization of the music, which critics decried as "industrial bossa-nova-ization," promptly followed with the genre finding itself readily "exploited for quick turnaround in hastily conceived jazz albums and in thoughtless pop renditions."⁷³

The Itamaraty was reactive more than proactive during most of this period. Its reluctance to use *musicais populares* for diplomatic and nation branding purposes resulted from the need to find a balance between projecting an image of Brazil as a modern 'racial democracy' and avoiding bringing attention to domestic tensions that could reveal how fragile the construct of *Brasilidade* was. In the 1940s, the Vargas regime "tried to seduce and discipline the foreign imagination of Brazilian culture against significant internal debate over the look and meaning of Brazilianness."⁷⁴ This did not preclude supporting Miranda and her musicians although government support for their New York debut was the exception rather than the rule. That Vargas purportedly told them to "display musical honesty" was an indication that samba had the potential to disrupt Brazil's image overseas.⁷⁵ The connection between the Itamaraty's musical diplomacy and the 'Golden Age of Samba' was therefore a loose one that probably rested more on Vargas's personal relationship to Miranda than it did on the government's efforts to boost

⁷² Dunn, *Brutality Garden*, 29.

⁷³ Charles A. Peronne and Christopher Dunn, "'Chiclete com Banana.' Internationalization in Brazilian Popular Music," in *Brazilian Popular Music & Globalization*, eds. Charles A. Peronne and Christopher Dunn (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 17-18.

⁷⁴ Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil*, 201.

⁷⁵ Peronne and Dunn, "'Chiclete com Banana,'" 13.

coffee exports.⁷⁶ The Itamaraty's cultural divisions were slowly articulating their vision of musical diplomacy in the early 1940s. Their library featured mostly records of 'serious music.' They nonetheless fulfilled requests by foreign embassies and radio stations, including the CBC, for records of *musicais populares*.⁷⁷ By the end of the 1950s, samba and bossa nova were integrated into the Itamaraty's arsenal of cultural diplomacy. The two genres offered a means of attracting investments and tourists by providing the experience of "*terra brasilis*" to foreigners.⁷⁸ However, the American entertainment industry had – to a great extent – already stolen the show.

New Musically Imagined Communities in the Making

Brazilian popular music thus arrived in Canada filtered primarily through the United States. It incidentally disrupted the musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community championed through Désy's musical diplomacy. Canadians could not have missed the phenomena of samba and bossa nova if they tuned in to the stations broadcasting over the border or if they lived near or in a city that had a dance hall, a concert venue, or a movie theatre in the 1940s. In Canada, the age of modernity, with its radio airwaves and silver screens, combined with the ease of cross-border movement and the shared language reality for much of the population, had accelerated a massive degree of American cultural penetration that had begun shortly after the First World War.⁷⁹ Because of the ready access that Canadians had to cultural products pouring in from the United States, the State Department did not expend any energy or resources northward during the Good Neighbor era.⁸⁰ While some members of the Canadian cultural elite were reticent about growing American cultural domination, few resisted it initially. Furthermore, many Canadian commentators overtly welcomed the support for cultural and intellectual life sponsored by prestigious organizations such as the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.⁸¹ By the turn of the 1950s, the cultural pull of the United States, not to mention its economic

⁷⁶ Martha Gil-Montero advances some of these hypotheses in her biography of Carmen Miranda: Gil-Montero, *Brazilian Bombshell*, 70-71. Charles A. Peronne and Christopher Dunn write about the link between the 'Golden Age of Samba' and musical diplomacy, which Anaïs Fléchet argues must not be overstated. See Peronne and Dunn, "'Chiclete com Banana,'" 10; and Fléchet, "As Partituras da Identidade," 237.

⁷⁷ For example, Benjamin Rogers to Julio Barata, July 24, 1945, EH Lata 190, Agência Nacional Fonds, Arquivo Nacional (AN).

⁷⁸ Fléchet, "As Partituras da Identidade," 251.

⁷⁹ On this topic, see Ryan Edwardson, *Canadian Content: Culture and the Quest for Nationhood* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 27-50.

⁸⁰ Robert Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 227.

⁸¹ See Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission*; and Brison, *Rockefeller, Carnegie, & Canada*.

importance, had reached dramatic heights while the influence of Great Britain was in sharp decline. Liberal humanists turned to the Massey Commission to map their distinctive cultural nationalist project, but not all Canadians embraced the binary vision that pitted Canada versus the United States, and popular against middlebrow or highbrow culture. Robert Teigrob pertinently notes that “hegemonic confrontations operate both within and across national borders.”⁸² This was certainly true of Canadian popular musicians who resisted both the paternalism of their country’s cultural elite and American cultural imperialism. Artists such as Robi and Peterson listened to new sounds coming from the United States to provide alternate means of thinking about the Canadian experience. If, as Ryan Edwardson argues, the “proliferation of communicative commodities in the wake of modernity ... furthered the ability of individuals to mediate a connection to the nation,” then popular music could also mediate new connections to the world.⁸³

Born Alice Robitaille in a working-class family, Alys Robi was seven years old when she performed in *Ten Nights in a Bar Room*, a professional stage adaptation of an American novel from the mid-nineteenth century. Her father’s investment in singing and dancing classes were evidently yielding results. She soon began winning numerous contests and making a growing number of appearances on radio. In 1935, Robi relocated to Montreal where she performed alongside Rose Ouellette (aka La Poune) at Montreal’s Théâtre national before moving on to bigger and better opportunities, notably on the road with promoter Jean Grimaldi. Significantly, she rose to fame in the rest of Canada in 1944 thanks to her performances on *Latin American Serenade*, a CBC show of which she was the star. French Canadians had long been interested in the music of South America, which they discovered through sheet music, dance manuals, and early recordings.⁸⁴ The O’Leary brothers’ Union culturelle des Latins d’Amérique (UCLA), an organization of which Robi was a member, did its part by regularly organizing cultural events.⁸⁵

⁸² Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War*, 13.

⁸³ Ryan Edwardson, *Canuck Rock: A History of Canadian Popular Music* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 19. See also Edwardson, *Canadian Content*, 17.

⁸⁴ Jean-Pierre Sévigny, “The Influence of Latin Music on the French-Canadian Popular Song and Dance Scene, Especially as Reflected in the Career of Alys Robi and the Pedagogy of Maurice Lacasse-Morenoff,” paper presented at the 1994 meeting of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music (Montreal: Productions Juke-Box, 1994), 5.

⁸⁵ See the following newsletter for the Union culturelle des Latins d’Amérique’s member list and for examples of the organization’s cultural activities: UCLA, *Union des Latins d’Amérique* 6, no. 17, December 31, 1947, CLG40 P40/C4-11, Dostaler & Walter-Patrice O’Leary Fonds, BAnQ.

However, arguably the most decisive factor that brought Latin American music in the limelight in Canada was the popularity of Miranda's Hollywood film performances. It was these productions that inspired Robi to incorporate Brazilian songs into her repertoire.⁸⁶ In December of 1944, she travelled to New York for her first studio session with RCA Victor. She intended to record English-language versions of some of the works that were helping her conquer new publics, including the Brazilian choro song "Tico-Tico No Fubá," but the label thought it preferable to prioritize French-language versions. The market for such material had quickly become saturated so RCA Victor was most likely trying to capitalize on Robi's difference as a French Canadian. The song had first been popularized through the Walt Disney animation film *Saludos Amigos* (Wilfred Jackson *et al.*, 1942). In 1944, Ethel Smith's rendition of the song, which was featured in *Bathing Beauty* (George Sidney, 1944), climbed through American pop charts. It was followed shortly after by the Andrews Sisters' jazzed-up version. Because Miranda had yet to record her own single of "Tico-Tico No Fubá," Robi's French-language rendition fulfilled listeners' desire for the exotic.⁸⁷

In the mid-to-late 1940s, Robi found herself in the ambivalent position of performing three roles simultaneously: transcultural mediator, cultural appropriator, and exotic 'other.' Regarding the first, she introduced North American audiences to Latin American works. Many of those either originated from Brazil or were inspired by samba: among others, "Tico-Tico No Fubá," "Aquarela do Brasil," "Samba Samba," and *That Night in Rio*'s "Chica Chica Boom Chic." Robi's genuine interest in the music was evidenced by her travels to Mexico and her membership in the UCLA as well as by her correspondence with Brazilian composer Ary Barroso whose permission she sought before translating some of his songs into French.⁸⁸ According to her biographer, she also intended to bring Canada's "deux solitudes autour d'une samba brésilienne."⁸⁹ At the same time, she participated uncritically in the process of essentialization that accompanied the appropriation of Brazilian popular music by emphasizing its infectious, exhilarating, and sensual qualities.⁹⁰ Yet Robi's difference marked her as an exotic 'other' in

⁸⁶ Jean Beaunoyer, *Fleur d'Alys* (Montreal: Leméac, 1994), 64.

⁸⁷ A. H. Joseph to Alys Robi, November 28, 1944, MCQP1 S2-SS1-D28, Lady Alys Robi Fonds, Musée de la civilisation (MC).

⁸⁸ Sévigny, "The Influence of Latin Music on the French-Canadian Popular Song and Dance Scene," 12. Alys Robi, *L'Anthologie*, 2004, Disques XXI-21 XXI-CD-2-1502, 3 X compact discs.

⁸⁹ Beaunoyer, *Fleur d'Alys*, 75.

⁹⁰ See radio transcripts excerpts in MCQP1 SS2-SS1-D12, Lady Alys Robi Fonds, MC.

ways that ostensibly legitimized – and rendered authentic – her performance of this material. The American entertainer Jack Benny, with whom she shared the stage in 1943, referred to her as ‘Canada’s Carmen Miranda.’ The moniker was misleading since Robi never wore extravagant attire, yet it proved an effective shorthand for introducing her to audiences in the early 1940s.⁹¹ It may have even contributed to her being invited to Hollywood to discuss potential projects with film executives. There, Robi met Miranda who was both friendly and, it turned out, francophile.⁹² The French-Canadian singer did not take the place of her Brazilian counterpart on the big screen, nor did she ever tour Brazil.⁹³ Although her music did chart briefly there, Brazilians seemed unaware of Robi’s reputation as ‘Canada’s Carmen Miranda,’ with one critic for *Diario da Noite* comparing her instead to a lesser version of the famous Wisconsin-born cabaret singer Hildegard.⁹⁴

Oscar Peterson fared better than Robi in Brazil, both as an Afro-Canadian and a jazz musician, which was a genre widely popular within certain sectors of Brazilian society. Born in Montreal in 1925, Peterson first learned the trumpet before settling on the piano. His father, an amateur musician and porter for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), nurtured his children’s musical inclinations. Peterson soon distinguished himself from his four siblings during performances at local community halls and at Church. Before long, he earned a spot on the airwaves of Montreal’s CKAC on the show *Fifteen Minutes of Piano Rambling*. He was fifteen. Five years later, he performed live on CBC Radio and became a regular fixture of the Montreal jazz scene where RCA Victor talent scouts noticed him. He thus began a long and prolific recording career, which received a major boost following an unannounced performance at Carnegie Hall on September 18, 1949. Peterson’s New York debut, as part of promoter Norman Granz’s *Jazz at the Philharmonic*, made him an immediate star in the United States. He “returned to Montreal a conquering hero,” writes John Gilmore.⁹⁵ With Granz as his manager, Peterson recorded and performed throughout the world, notably with the *Jazz at the*

⁹¹ Beaunoyer, *Fleur d’Alys*, 72. See also “Latin American Frolics,” March 1943, MCQP1 S2-SS1-D11, Lady Alys Robi Fonds, MC.

⁹² Beaunoyer, *Fleur d’Alys*, 89-91. See also Marie-Jeanne Patry, “Alys Robi, reine de la chanson légère de chez nous,” *L’Oeil*, December 15, 1945, 24.

⁹³ A car accident derailed Alys Robi’s career and prevented her from pursuing opportunities in the United States.

⁹⁴ “Discos Mais Vendidos,” *A Scena Muda*, September 7, 1948, 28, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/084859/49434>; Sylvio Tulio Cardoso, “Discos Populares,” *Diario da Noite*, August 19, 1948, 8, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/221961_02/46022.

⁹⁵ John Gilmore, *Swinging in Paradise: The Story of Jazz in Montreal* (Montreal: Véhicule Press, 1988), 110.

Philharmonic troupe in the early 1950s. Increasingly associated with American jazz, the Montreal musician contributed nonetheless to the consolidation of the Canadian jazz scene, which traced its origins to the 1910s. Mark Miller notes how Peterson's distinctive playing style placed Canadian jazz on the map while elevating the music from an imported 'low' art to a domestic 'high' art through cross-country broadcasts that helped "transcend the regionalism of the Canadian jazz scene."⁹⁶

A fast-rising superstar on the global jazz scene, Peterson travelled to Brazil in 1969, but he did so through the non-official channel of private concert promoters. As if to underscore the missed opportunity for Canadian cultural diplomacy, Brazilian critics described him as "one of the United States' most famous jazzmen," no doubt because of his seminal recordings for Granz's Verve and Clef Records or the Chicago-based Mercury Records, which included Peterson's own appropriation of bossa nova.⁹⁷ His *We Get Request* and *Soul Español*, released in 1964 and 1966 respectively, participated in the commercialization of the music by revisiting Brazilian classics with a touch of swing and exotic exuberance. The former included an original interpretation of Jobim's "Quiet Nights of Quiet Stars," known in Portuguese as "Corcovado," and yet another version of "The Girl from Ipanema." The music critic Oswaldo Miranda responded favourably to the record, which he saw as evidence of Jobim's great ambassadorial role in the United States. Yet he noted that its "low dosage of Brasilidade" betrayed the trio's 'North Americanness,' which signalled that authentic bossa nova could only come from Brazil.⁹⁸

Peterson carried on with an album conceived as a sort of musical homage to Brazilian composers, which unfortunately was released with a title – *Soul Español* – that demonstrated a profound misunderstanding of, or flagrant indifference to, the cultural specificities of South America. Although nine of the ten songs were either based on Brazilian themes and written by or cowritten with Brazilian composers, Mercury Records staffers and executives decided to package the album in ways that obliterated the national focus and instead sought to capitalize on a more

⁹⁶ Mark Miller, *Such Melodious Racket: The Lost History of Jazz in Canada, 1914-1949* (Toronto: Mercury Press, 1997), 20.

⁹⁷ "Oscar Peterson," *Jornal do Brasil*, April 24, 1969, 7, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=030015_08&pagfis=132815. In Portuguese: "... [u]m dos mais famosos **jazz-men** dos Estados Unidos" (emphasis in original).

⁹⁸ Oswaldo Miranda, "Visto e Ouvido," *Jornal do Commercio*, August 2-3, 1965, 6, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=364568_15&pagfis=37048. In Portuguese: "... pouca dosagem de Brasilidade."

generic ‘latinophilia’ in the United States.⁹⁹ The cover itself featured a photo of Karyn Calabrese, a Chicago-born model who the producers hoped could pass as Latin American despite her African-American and Italian heritage (*figure 5.1*).¹⁰⁰ Destined for the North American market, the album, perhaps fortunately, was not distributed in Brazil.



Figure 5.1. Oscar Peterson’s Soul Español foregrounding ‘latinophilia’ (1966). Source: author’s personal collection.

On another level, however, it is equally likely that the confusion around Peterson’s national identity went beyond his musical affiliations. If they had been paying any attention at all to Canada’s official projection of its international identity in Brazil, local audiences and critics might well have assumed that Peterson was American given the fact that Désy and his successors had so deeply centred their representations of Canadians on ‘whiteness.’ The pianist’s trajectory may have mirrored that of Canada in its passage from colony to nation in the eyes of jazzophiles, but it did not guarantee acceptance from those who found the music morally suspect and un-Canadian. The diplomatic corps’ disinterest in the power of jazz as a cultural tool stemmed in

⁹⁹ John Patrick Leary traces ‘latinophilia’ to the cultural ‘rediscovery’ of Latin America during the Good Neighbor era. He characterizes it as “exoticist in its fetishization of racial, national, and ethnic difference, anecdotal and observational in its use of evidence, and generally popular rather than scholarly in tone.” John Patrick Leary, *A Cultural History of Underdevelopment: Latin America in the U.S. Imagination* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016), 112.

¹⁰⁰ Oscar Peterson, *Soul Español*, 1966, Mercury Records LS-86044, 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ rpm LP.

part from an elitist preference for ‘serious music’ as ‘high’ culture. During his travels, Peterson was often dismayed by the indifference of Canadian embassy staff abroad.¹⁰¹ He criticized the mainstream media for not providing more support for jazz; a lamentable situation, which he attributed to “bigotry” and to Canadians’ “smugness about race relations.”¹⁰² Although Peterson’s international reputation as a jazz musician was firmly established by the 1960s, his takes on Latin American music, much like Robi’s Americanized Afro-Brazilian samba tunes, were not considered an appropriate vehicle for the projection of Canada in Brazil.

However problematic were parts of Robi’s and Peterson’s Brazil-inflected repertoires, their successes revealed that popular music could indeed be a legitimate vehicle for capitalizing on the hegemonic pull of the American entertainment industry despite the biases and assumptions of the Canadian cultural elite. By engaging with a musical ‘other,’ both artists – each of whom was to some degree themselves an ‘other’ – championed their own approach to ‘being-in-the-world.’ Holding steadfast to their Canadian identity, Robi and Peterson both turned to hybridized musical forms to negotiate the tension between difference and sameness in an increasingly globalized cultural environment. Through their music, they mediated new connections to the nation and to the world, even if the Brazilian sounds that inspired them came filtered – and thus somewhat distorted and essentialized – through American media. In other words, they staged alternate means of musically imagining a Canadian-Brazilian community. That said, ‘race’ and gender, in addition to the cultural and political elite’s contempt for popular music, meant that there was no place for Robi and Peterson in Canada’s musical diplomacy.

Canada Sings at the Festival Internacional da Canção Popular

International music festivals constitute an exceptional platform where audience members and performers develop their individual and social identities, both of which are key to establishing a sense of place and a sense of citizenship; through either identification with or opposition to

¹⁰¹ Alex Barris, *Oscar Peterson: A Musical Biography* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2002), 183-184. Both Alys Robi and Oscar Peterson recorded for the Transcription Service of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, but neither of them received support for their travels overseas during the period studied here. For Peterson’s tumultuous tour of the Soviet Union in 1974, see Gene Lees, *Oscar Peterson: The Will to Swing* (Toronto: Prospero Books, 2008).

¹⁰² Oscar Peterson, *A Jazz Odyssey: The Life of Oscar Peterson* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 335. For a discussion of ‘racial’ discrimination in the Montreal jazz scene and resistance to it, see Gilmore, *Swinging in Paradise*; and Sean Mills, “Democracy in Music: Louis Metcalf and Montreal’s Jazz History,” *Canadian Historical Review* [forthcoming].

others.¹⁰³ They are effective entry points into the cultural public sphere. As Jim McGuigan explains, the “concept of a cultural public sphere refers to the articulation of politics, public and personal, as a contested terrain through affective (aesthetic and emotional) modes of communication.”¹⁰⁴ Taking place amid the “global sixties” – a period of “growing dissatisfaction with the existing political, socioeconomic, and cultural status quo” – the FICP served as a test for both civil society and the military regime.¹⁰⁵ It provided Brazilians with the unprecedented opportunity to articulate new narratives regarding their country’s domestic politics and its international image. At the same time, it was a contested terrain where divergent views and competing agendas collided and where new solidarities emerged through cultural transfers.¹⁰⁶ The FICP thus offered a mediated stage for dynamic interactions among a variety of state and non-state actors from Brazil and elsewhere in the world. It was a risky endeavour in that it had the potential to expose to the world the tensions unravelling within the Brazilian cultural public sphere.

Considering the above, international festivals can hardly be described as apolitical events. They are “nation-builders,” writes Jean-Louis Fabiani.¹⁰⁷ States embrace them as “political devices” for national self-representation and national projection purposes.¹⁰⁸ Festivals make it possible to circumscribe – in one place or in a series of adjoining sites – the multitude of discourses and practices deployed within the cultural public sphere. This facilitates the hierarchization – and thus marginalization or exclusion – of those who challenge normative individual and social identities.¹⁰⁹ Festivals foster solidarities through a self-reflective process whereby performers and audiences recognize themselves in the cultural values and canons around which consensus exists while evolving in conjunction with the interplay between local

¹⁰³ Kari Jaeger and Reidar J. Mykletun, “Festivals, Identities, and Belonging,” *Event Management* 17 (2013): 214; Udo Merkel, “Making Sense of Identity Discourses in International Events, Festivals, and Spectacles,” in *Identity Discourses and Communities in International Events, Festivals, and Spectacles*, ed. Udo Merkel (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 24.

¹⁰⁴ Jim McGuigan, “The Cultural Public Sphere,” *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 8, no. 4 (2005): 435.

¹⁰⁵ Klimke and Nolan, “Introduction,” 6.

¹⁰⁶ Anaïs Fléchet, “Por uma História Transnacional dos Festivais de Música Popular. Música, Contracultura e Transferências Culturais nas Décadas de 1960 e 1970,” *Patrimônio e Memória* 7, no. 1 (2011): 261.

¹⁰⁷ Jean-Louis Fabiani, “Festivals, Local and Global: Critical Interventions and the Cultural Public Sphere,” in *Festivals and the Cultural Public Sphere*, eds. Liana Giorgi, Monica Sassatelli, and Gerard Delanty (New York: Routledge, 2011), 94.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁰⁹ Jonathan R. Wynn, *Music/City: American Festivals and Placemaking in Austin, Nashville, and Newport* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4.

circumstances and global dynamics.¹¹⁰ What follows is a contest for influence over the sociopolitical and symbolic meanings of these events. Illiberal states have a vested interest in controlling the outcomes of that contest. They also have the means. To describe international festivals as exuberant moments of collective self-affirmation and openness to the world is thus to overlook the fact that they often represent “internal political devices.”¹¹¹ Neil Ravenscroft and Xavier Matteucci contend that the liminal zones that festivals create are ephemeral since they ultimately serve to contain and defuse disruptive discourses and practices. They write that this “temporary liberation offer[s] the possibility of excitement and entertainment, but also ... the potential to develop the new forms of regulation required to maintain social control.”¹¹² The FICP is a case in point.

Brazil’s popular music festival was a contested site. It constituted a venue for the expression of dissent although it also created conditions for the delimitation and suppression of oppositional voices. It thus provided a stage to create consensus around a state-sanctioned national musical culture while projecting a positive and engaging image of Brazil overseas. Anaïs Fléchet emphasizes the tensions between the international and domestic aspects of this project when she depicts the FICP as both a “true diplomatic success” for the Itamaraty and a battleground for civil society.¹¹³ This double binary – domestic versus international as well as civil society versus the military regime and its Itaramaty – fails to underline the festival’s multifunction as an internal political device. Nor does it account for the complicity of non-state actors. Marzagão, founder and director of the FICP, was *au fait* regarding Brazilian politics due to his background in journalism and his work on the campaign trail for Negrão de Lima, Brazil’s ambassador to Portugal who went on to win the governorship of the State of Guanabara in 1965. Initial support for the FICP came from the newly elected governor and the state’s Secretaria de Turismo, not the Itamaraty. Other key partners included TV Rio and TV Globo, as well record labels Cudil and Philips, which produced compilation albums, along with the Secretaria de

¹¹⁰ James F. English, “Festivals and the Geography of Culture: African Cinema in the ‘World Space’ of Its Public,” in Giorgi, Sassatelli, and Delanty, *Festivals and the Cultural Public Sphere*, 63.

¹¹¹ Neil Ravenscroft and Xavier Matteucci, “The Festival as Carnavalesque: Social Governance and Control at Pamplona’s San Fermin Fiesta,” *Tourism, Culture & Communication* 4 (2003): 1.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 2. See also Wynn, *Music/City*, 4.

¹¹³ Fléchet, “Por uma História Transnacional dos Festivais de Música Popular,” 266. In Portuguese: “... verdadeiro sucesso diplomático.”

Turismo, for commercial sale or for distribution to embassies and consular offices.¹¹⁴ Marzagão secured support for his festival by indicating that it would engage Brazil's youth and help them cope with the changing politico-cultural landscape. He added that it would also benefit the country's international image by displaying order and stability, public participation and popular contentment, economic strength, and goodwill.¹¹⁵ With the explicit support of the Itamaraty, Marzagão sold the FICP to the world by using the trope of internationalism. In a letter to the DEA, Minister Carlos Rocha Mafra de Laet explained that the festival "did not and does not have commercial characteristics, seeking exclusively to assemble in Rio the music of every country without discrimination, honouring its composers and performers and thereby promoting greater understanding among the peoples."¹¹⁶ There was evidently more than that to the FICP, but such messaging made for good branding.

The first four editions of the FICP (1966-69) encompass the arc formed by the festival's seven-year history, capturing the essence of its evolution from a site of multiple discourses and practices to one of consensus under the shadow of the military regime. It follows the trajectory of the country's political history from democracy to crisis and dictatorship. The festival's highs and lows were many during these four years. They ranged from inadequate budgets to poor acoustics, controversies regarding the jury selection process, disagreement with broadcasting partners, subversive performers and discontented audiences, as well as growing censorship and repression. A few months after the closing of the fourth edition, a fire caused serious damages to the Maracanzinho's structure and dome. The stadium and the FICP survived the turn of the 1970s, but the ambiance had changed once the military regime was firmly in place. 1968 was a pivotal year with some performers and large segments of the audience openly taking positions against

¹¹⁴ Mozart de Araújo to Chefe Substituto da Divisão de Difusão Cultural, March 2, 1967, DDC, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, ACI. See also Mello, *A Era dos Festivais*, 249. The following records feature Canadian works performed at the festival: Donald Lautrec and Hervê Vilar, *As Canções de Mônaco e Canadá no II Festival Internacional da Canção Popular*, 1967, Mercury/Companhia Brasileira de Discos DC-68.001, 45 rpm EP; Various Artists, *I Festival Internacional da Canção Popular: Disco no. 1*, n.d., Secretaria de Turismo do Estado da Guanabara ST-1, 33½ rpm LP; Various Artists, *II Festival Internacional da Canção Popular: O Melhor dos Sucessos Internacionais*, 1968, Philips/Companhia Brasileira de Discos R-765.027, 33½ rpm LP; Various Artists, *III Festival Internacional da Canção Popular*, 1968, Philips/Companhia Brasileira de Discos SLP-199.026, 33½ rpm LP.

¹¹⁵ Augusto J. Marzagão to Juracy Magalhães, October 3, 1966, JMc 1966.01.14, Juracy Magalhães Collection, FGV/CPDOC. See also Mello, *A Era dos Festivais*, 249; and Augusto Marzagão, "Festival do Aor e da Perseverança," *Guarnabara em Revista*, no. 11, 1967, Discoteca Oneyda Alvarenga Records, CC-DOA.

¹¹⁶ Carlos Rocha Mafra de Laet to Ambassador, May 30, 1967, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

capitalism and authoritarianism in the spirit of the ‘global sixties.’¹¹⁷ Buarque had already exiled himself to Italy when “Sabiá” was chosen as the winner of both the national and international competitions.¹¹⁸ Vandr e, the audience choice for national contender, saw his “Pra N o Dizer Que N o Falei de Flores” promptly banned by the authorities. He left for Paraguay the following year.¹¹⁹ The ‘tropicalistas’ Veloso and Gil also went into exile in 1969. Discordant voices were thus expurgated from the FICP in the closing year of the decade. Zuza Homen de Mello notes how the fourth edition provided an apt metaphor – or *mise en sc ne* – of Brazilian society: a well-lit and colourful stage, which served as a distraction to star-stricken and bedazzled audiences who failed to see the violence deployed by the authorities backstage.¹²⁰ Singers from all over the world, including Canada, were needed to keep the spectacle afloat.

An analysis of the contender selection process in Canada reveals that the DEA and the CBC lacked both the vision and the means to mobilize popular musicians. Moreover, the correspondence dealing with Canadian participation in the FICP indicates that Marzag o actively interfered in this process in his efforts to enhance the visibility and resonance of the festival. The DEA learned about the event in March of 1966, but it failed to seize the opportunity, instead inviting the organizers to solicit the help of private organizations to find a suitable Canadian candidate. The embassy in Brazil proposed the *chansonnier* Gilles Vigneault, but the suggestion went nowhere because, as per competition rules, the selection had to come from Canada.¹²¹ Nor did the Canada Council for the Arts offer any help since it had no expertise in the “largely self-supporting” realm of popular music.¹²² Pressed by Marzag o and the diplomatic corps in Brazil, the Cultural Affairs Division reached out to the CBC who agreed to find a representative song and select an appropriate singer. By mid-August, the broadcaster had yet to make progress on either front, which led the FICP to take matters in its own hands by contacting Anka who declined for family reasons.¹²³ At that point, the DEA told Marzag o to print the program and

¹¹⁷ Mello, *A Era dos Festivais*, 271-273.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 297.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 299-302.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 349.

¹²¹ Rio to External, June 24, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²² Peter M. Dwyer to Ren e de Chantal, July 18, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²³ Exteriores to Embaixada em Ottawa, August 16, 1966, 05-603-05, DDC, Minist rio das Rela  es Exteriores Fonds, ACI. See also Dora Alencar de Vasconcellos to Secretaria de Estado das Rela  es Exteriores, November 16, 1966, Ottawa 02530, MDB, Minist rio das Rela  es Exteriores Fonds, ACI.

leave the name for Canada's entry blank. With less than three weeks to go before the competition, the Secretaria de Turismo shamed Canadian diplomats in Rio de Janeiro by reminding them that they were the "only participating country without [a] singer nominated."¹²⁴ At least the CBC had picked the song it wanted to feature, "It Never Came to Be" by Blye and Dale, and on the basis of this the broadcaster decided a week later that it would send the two very talented, but largely unknown, artists to Brazil.¹²⁵

The following year, perhaps chastened by the diplomatic embarrassment associated with the inaugural festival, the CBC designed an elaborate scheme to find a contender for the FICP. Taking its cues from Brazil, it planned to launch a national competition that would culminate with a special program during which the winner would be announced. But even this strategy did not sit well with the Brazilians. Concerned that things were moving too slowly, the incredulous Marzagão violated his own rules by reaching out to the wildly popular Lautrec without consulting either the CBC or the DEA. Offended by this breach of protocol, Canadian authorities believed that "some form of protest" would be in order, but it was too late: Lautrec had accepted the invitation.¹²⁶ Amazingly, despite reassurances that the FICP would not again undermine the Canadian selection process through unilateral and arbitrary actions, Marzagão repeated the same scenario the following year when he persuaded Anka to accept his invitation rather than working with Canadian authorities.¹²⁷ When Marzagão finally held to his promise in 1969, the comedy of selection errors took another turn when the CBC, now in full control of the process, was embarrassingly unable to find a suitable candidate.¹²⁸

It is easy to understand why Marzagão was so determined to have Paul Anka compete in Brazil. The Ottawa-born singer was one of the most widely acclaimed Canadian pop artists at the

¹²⁴ Rio to External, October 7, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²⁵ Ext to Rio, "First International Festival of Popular Song," October 14, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²⁶ Betty Zimmerman to Head of Cultural Affairs Division, August 8, 1967, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²⁷ Augusto J. Marzagão to Dora Alencar de Vasconcellos, July 15, 1968, DDC, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, ACI. See also Jacques Gignac to Betty Zimmerman, June 25, 1968, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹²⁸ Augusto J. Marzagão to Ludovic Hudon, February 13, 1969, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC. See also Sheila Skelley to Augusto J. Marzagão, May 21, 1969, RG25, Vol. 16106, Cultural Affairs – Performing Arts – Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

time. Having previously performed in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 1960, audiences were anxiously awaiting the return of the former teen idol whose stage, radio, and television performances had caused quite a commotion in both cities.¹²⁹ Having him on the stage of the FICP would be a great *coup* for Marzagão as well as his state and non-state partners. Born in 1941, Anka masterfully used his music education to propel himself to stardom as a singer-songwriter. In 1957, he travelled on his own to New York to audition for ABC-Paramount Records. With contract in hand, he recorded “Diana,” which peaked in music charts throughout North America. By the end of the decade, he had recorded several other major hits – including “It’s Time to Cry,” “Lonely Boy,” and “(All of a Sudden) My Heart Sings” – in addition to writing for acclaimed performer Buddy Holly and touring throughout the world. At the turn of the 1960s, he appeared in four feature films while also starring in the pioneering *cinéma vérité* NFB film *Lonely Boy* (Wolf Koenig and Roman Kroitor, 1962). Anka then successfully reinvented himself as an easy-listening pop performer by joining the likes of Frank Sinatra in Las Vegas. Although it was a different singer who would be returning to Brazil, Marzagão did not doubt that his presence would still be an asset for the FICP.

Canada’s other FICP participants were about the same age as Anka, which meant that they were a generation younger than the cultural ambassadors who had preceded them to Brazil. Reaching their teens in the prosperous late 1940s and early 1950s, they grew up in the golden age of television as well as with the rhythms of jazz and rock-and-roll. Born in London, Jimmy Dale arrived in Canada in 1947. Schooled in music theory and composition, he performed in various dance bands and orchestras throughout Toronto before securing a job at the CBC. There, he met singer-songwriter Allan Blye who had started working for the broadcaster while still living in his home town of Winnipeg. The two men were respected artists despite being relatively unknown beyond Toronto and the CBC. Donald Lautrec, on the other hand, was an international star in the French-speaking world. Born in Jonquière, north of Quebec City, he started off as a touring acrobat and had his first taste of stardom as the bodyguard of crooner Michel Louvain. In 1961, he decided to try his hand at singing. His success was near-instantaneous. By 1967, he had recorded several hit records, including “Manon, vient danser le ska,” had starred in the musical

¹²⁹ See “Rei do ‘Rock’ Chegou Ontem: Delirio de Fãs no Aeroporto,” *Ultima Hora*, September 21, 1960, 8, <http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=830348&pagfis=7156>; and “Garotas Queriam Ver Paul Anka de Perto: Transito Interrompido no Viaduto do Chá,” *Ultima Hora*, September 23, 1960, 3, <http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=830348&pagfis=7201>.

film *Pas de vacances pour les idoles* (Denis Héroux, 1965), toured in France, finished in third place at the 1967 edition of the Sopot International Song Festival, and recorded the theme song for Expo 67; “Un jour, un jour.” Marc Gélinas, who was a last-minute selection when the CBC dropped the ball in 1969, was a respected Montreal-based artist, but not one that could compete with either Lautrec or Anka. A singer with a limited range, he was more successful as a songwriter and a television actor. It was his song “Avec une chanson” that would feature in the fourth edition of the FICP and be performed by Guy Boucher, an aspiring artist who had a modest success in Québec and was also a last-minute choice for the competition.

Apart from age, the artists who made up Canada’s uneven talent delegation from 1966 to 1969 shared an important trait in that they were all ‘white’ male performers. Although Anka’s classmates called him “the black Syrian” because of his Middle Eastern heritage, his Christianity and cultural standing in Canada and in the United States alongside Holly and Sinatra marked him as resolutely ‘white’ in the 1960s.¹³⁰ There was no shortage of talent in Canada, both men and women, including the Afro-Canadian award-winning vocalist Shirley Matthews, the acclaimed indigenous singer-songwriter Buffy Sainte-Marie, and Shirley Harmer who had graduated from the broadcaster’s *Four for the Show* to the *Johnny Carson Tonight Show* in the United States. Although Matthews and Sainte-Marie were no doubt disqualified on ‘racial’ grounds, the CBC had considered sending Harmer to Brazil in 1966; however, she declined when she learned that no funds were available to cover her husband’s travel expenses.¹³¹ Ironically, the big hit of the Canadian delegation that year was Dale’s wife, Irene, who was not a singer but who earned the FICP’s “Golden Rooster Award for top elegance” and was interviewed by *O Globo* about fashion, shopping, and housekeeping.¹³² This unforeseen moment of fashion diplomacy was noteworthy enough for the embassy to mention in its report that Dale’s wife had “created an excellent impression, particularly attracting favourable attention for her fashionable wardrobe.”¹³³ By contrast, Lautrec’s status as one of the most elegant and most handsome men

¹³⁰ Paul Anka, *My way: An Autobiography* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2014), 10. See also David Scott Diffrient, “Backup Singers, Celebrity Culture, and Civil Rights: Racializing Space and Spatializing Race in *20 Feet from Stardom*,” *Black Camera* 8, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 29.

¹³¹ Ext. Ottawa to Rio de Janeiro, October 11, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹³² See “Moda ‘Mod’ no Canadá,” *O Globo*, October 31, 1966, in RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹³³ Canadian embassy to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 1966, RG25, Vol. 16106, Cultural Affairs – Performing Arts – Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

of the festival was rewarded with articles that celebrated his masculinity, from his tall and imposing body to his love of sports and women.¹³⁴ Photos showed him towering over his fans, *garotas* [young women], when not seductively wrapping his arms around one of the festival's hostesses in the garden of the Canadian embassy (*figure 5.2*).¹³⁵ Likewise, Anka's charm and fearlessness in sports were presented as masculine attributes that complemented his iconic stage personae.¹³⁶ The exuberant and alluring performances of Canada's impromptu ambassadors marked a departure from the more formal and restrained performances of their predecessors, which was not altogether surprising considering that the 1960s delegations and their Brazilian supporters were increasingly drawn into the cultural habits of American popular culture.



Figure 5.2. Donald Lautrec exploring the grounds of the Canadian embassy with one of the festival's hostesses (1967). Source: O Cruzeiro, Biblioteca Nacional.

¹³⁴ Afrânio Brasil Soares and Sônia Beatriz “Per ina Donna Vitoriosa em Noite Margarida,” *O Cruzeiro*, November 11, 1967, 18, <http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/003581/165132>; and “O Belo Lautrec,” *Correio da Manhã*, October 21, 1967, 3, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=089842_07&pagfis=86666. See also “Aplausos Mais Demorados no Festival Foram Para 8 Canções,” *Jornal do Brasil*, October 21, 1967, 5, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=030015_08&pagfis=106228; and “O Colecionador,” *Jornal do Brasil*, October 29, 1967, 4, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=030015_08&pagfis=106389.

¹³⁵ “O Belo Lautrec,” 3; and Afrânio Brasil Soares and Sônia Beatriz “Per ina Donna Vitoriosa em Noite Margarida,” 12, <http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=003581&pagfis=165128>.

¹³⁶ Anibal *et al.*, “Aquêles que Cantam no Rio” *O Cruzeiro*, October 12, 1968, 24, <http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/003581/172349>.

That said, it is revealing that Canadian representation at the FICP alternated between English and French as it shifted from one year to the next between Blye and Dale's "It Never Came to Be" to Lautrec's "Je ne t'en veux pas," Anka's "This Crazy World," and Gélinas's "Avec une chanson." From the onset, Désy's early musical diplomacy initiatives had placed French-Canadian culture at the heart of Canada's international image for a number of reasons. It had been a way to capitalize on Brazilians' francophilia, but it also allowed him to elevate his status within Montreal's elite cultural circles and advance his vision that a bicultural federal state was the best approach to protecting, enriching, and broadening the reach of French-Canadian culture. The Massey Commission had put forward a similar defence of biculturalism in its efforts to rally support for its recommendations in Québec.¹³⁷ And beginning in 1963, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had further pursued that project by seeking ways to enlighten the path towards "equal partnership between the two founding races" to offset the rise of nationalism in Québec.¹³⁸ As state broadcasters, the CBC and its French-language counterpart, Radio-Canada, were expected to champion a similar vision although the latter tended to sympathize with the more autonomist, and subsequently separatist, tone of 'québécois' politics in the 1960s.¹³⁹ However, Marzagão's interference with the selection process meant that neither the CBC nor the DEA could take credit for alternating between English and French as a means of giving equal voice to the country's 'two founding races.' Although *La Presse's* Pierre Vincent hypothesized that it was the "politique (avouée ou inavouée) des organisateurs du festival," that assertion was not correct either since Marzagão had not chosen the candidates for 1966 and 1969.¹⁴⁰ At the end of the day, however, whether by accident or design, the sequence of participants revealed how easy and convenient it was to fall back on the androcentric, settler narrative of 'two founding races.'

Marzagão's meddling in the internal process of the CBC, the broadcaster's handling of the situation, and the DEA's detached role meant that the artists who were selected to perform did not necessarily understand that they were to act as impromptu ambassadors. Although it was

¹³⁷ Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission*, 73.

¹³⁸ Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. General Introduction: Book 1* (Ottawa: Roger Duhamel, Queen's Printer, 1967), XXI.

¹³⁹ See Greg Marc Nielsen, *Le Canada de Radio-Canada: sociologie critique et dialogisme culturel* (Toronto: Éditions du Gref, 1994).

¹⁴⁰ Pierre Vincent, "Marc Gélinas: déception à Rio et déception à Montréal," *La Presse*, October 16, 1969, 3.

obvious that they had been selected to represent Canada, they did not know to whom they were accountable in the performance of the nation.¹⁴¹ While the embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported positively on the socializing skills of Blye, Dale, and Lautrec, it seems that, as singers and songwriters, the musicians saw themselves primarily as performers operating in the globalizing realm of pop culture.¹⁴² They were therefore inclined to think in transnational rather than national terms, particularly since the process of ‘canadianizing’ popular music in Canada was still in its early stages.¹⁴³ Nor did it bolster their sense of patriotism that the Canadian delegations were smaller compared with other countries who sent reporters to cover the achievements of their artists. Reflecting back on his experience, many years later, Lautrec acknowledged that he never saw himself as needing to carry out ambassadorial duties on behalf of Canadian culture and treated the festival much as he treated every performance with his image and identity as a singer predominating above all else.¹⁴⁴ A possible exception was Blye who, “thrust in the situation,” at least felt some loyalty to his employer, the CBC, for having selected him even if he did not clearly understand his role as an ‘informal ambassador’ for Canada.¹⁴⁵

The DEA and the diplomatic corps were largely to blame for this gap in understanding since they failed to brief the artists or provide them with any context about the decades-long history of cultural relations between the two countries. Instead, the perception of Brazil held by contenders at the FICP came primarily from the *musicais populares* that they had discovered courtesy of their familiarity with the United States’ entertainment industry. In an interview with *Correio da Manhã*, Dale confided that Canadians are seeking their own voice and they are “tired of always being the little brothers” of their American neighbours.¹⁴⁶ What he and Blye heard in bossa nova was a music of resistance and collective self-affirmation that could dynamize Canada’s cultural landscape. Lautrec also saw potential in that music, but his appropriation of it

¹⁴¹ Allan Blye, telephone interview by author, December 4, 2018; Donald Lautrec, telephone interview by author, January 6, 2018.

¹⁴² Yvon Beaulne to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, November 14, 1967, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁴³ Edwardson, *Canuck Rock*, 242.

¹⁴⁴ Donald Lautrec, telephone interview by author, January 6, 2018. See also Rudel-Tessier, “Lautrec à Rio selon Dufresne et les journaux brésiliens,” *Photo-Journal*, November 15-22, 1967, 92.

¹⁴⁵ Allan Blye, telephone interview by author, December 4, 2018.

¹⁴⁶ “Artistas Presos na Urca,” *Correio da Manhã*, October 28, 1966, 5, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=089842_07&pagfis=76011; and “Mancini Não Fala em Política Porque só Música o Interessa,” *Jornal do Brasil*, October 27, 1966, 14, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=030015_08&pagfis=91377.

was first and foremost opportunistic. The sounds, dance steps, and essentialized symbolic representations of musical ‘others’ sold albums, which is why he had recorded French-language versions of Billy Strange’s “Limbo Bossa” and Elvis Presley’s “Bossa Nova Baby.” As for Anka, he followed the lead of Sinatra who started the year 1967 in the studio with Jobim. That summer, the Canadian singer recorded a live album that featured three works by the Brazilian composer: “Inesatez,” “Meditação,” and “Corcovado.” If either Lautrec and Anka imagined that they could find their own voice by seeking inspiration in Brazil’s *musicais populares*, they were misguided, because the bossa nova they listened to was not authentic having been filtered through the American media. Although neither Lautrec nor Anka thought of their performance in terms of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community, they did demonstrate that popular music could help mediate new connections to the world.

The Canadians who stood on the stage of the FICP were for the most part oblivious to the internal politics of Brazil. They were reminded by embassy staff that the country was ruled by the military, but did not necessarily grasp the full extent of its powers in civil society, including its treatment of artists. Lautrec’s experience is revealing of how successful the FICP was as a public relations campaign. The singer’s stay in Rio de Janeiro and his visit to Bahia were carefully scripted to foreground *Brasilidade* while substantiating the idea that Brazil was a ‘racial democracy’ run by a benign regime. Lautrec was chaperoned for most of his trip. In addition to visiting key tourist attractions, he toured the cities’ embassies, attended a voodoo-like ceremony, and witnessed a capoeira performance, all of which left a deep impression on him. The concentration of contenders from all over the world at Copacabana Beach and the energizing atmosphere of Maracanazinho stadium made Lautrec forget that Brazil had taken an authoritarian turn. The military did its part by entertaining the performers with motorcycle acrobatics on their way from their hotel to the festival site. It was only when he visited the country as a tourist later in his life that he began to realize how naïve he had been in 1967, and how artful and delusive his hosts had been in projecting Brazil through the festival scene.¹⁴⁷

Staging Brazil in its domestic context was a sound decision. Hosting an international event rather than going to one made it easier to control the messaging and the parameters. It was also more viable financially since existing infrastructure could be used and public-private

¹⁴⁷ Donald Lautrec, telephone interview by author, January 6, 2018.

partnerships secured without having to worry about the fluctuating value of the country's currency in the global arena. Besides, it was more expedient to bring the world – its delegations of artists and journalists – to Brazil rather than the other way around. São Paulo's Bienal Internacional de Arte [International Art Biennial], which was in its ninth year in 1967, had proven the success of this approach, which is why the Itamaraty continued to support it.¹⁴⁸ Canadians had been among the first to participate in the biennial when it was launched in 1951, albeit with some reservation due to scheduling and space allocation issues.¹⁴⁹ These problems had been ironed out by the mid-1960s. Beaulieu could therefore report positively on Brazilian accomplishments in the arts and the increased possibilities for reciprocal exchanges between the two countries.¹⁵⁰ The management group of the Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition was therefore perplexed by the South American giant's reluctance to participate in what was to be the highlight of Canada's Centennial, particularly since Expo 67 centred so much on culture. The group and the DEA sent delegations to Brazil in an effort to cultivate interest in the event. They proposed strategies that ranged from helping finance the Brazilian pavilion in exchange for assistance in the construction of the new embassy in Brasília, to luring Brazilian participation with the promise that an international soccer tournament would be held in parallel to Expo 67.¹⁵¹ And when these proposals failed, the DEA contemplated bringing the Centennial to Brazil by using unexpended funds to send Canada's delegate to the FICP on a countrywide tour.¹⁵² But that plan fell through when Marzagão reached out directly to Lautrec instead of letting the Canadian selection process run its course. It was clear that the Brazilian authorities

¹⁴⁸ See Vasco Mariz to Chefe do Departamento de Administração, October 4, 1965, 01-597-02, DDC, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, ACI; and Vera Regina Amaral Sauer to Secretario Geral, February 14, 1968, 03-597-02, DDC, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, ACI.

¹⁴⁹ H. O. McCurry to Paul Tremblay, November 20, 1950, Vol. 150, File 10, Canadian Exhibitions – Foreign, São Paulo Bienal 1st, NGC Fonds, NGC-LA; H. O. McCurry to Bruce Keith, December 20, 1952, Vol. 150, File 11, Canadian Exhibitions – Foreign, São Paulo Bienal 2nd, NGC Fonds, NGC-LA. See also Diggon, “The Politics of Cultural Power.”

¹⁵⁰ Paul Beaulieu to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, March 7, 1966, RG25, Vol. 15951, Cultural Affairs – Treaties and Agreements Between Canada and Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

¹⁵¹ See Pierre de Bellefeuille to Robert Letendre, December 3, 1965, R869, Vol. 657, Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition Fonds, LAC; Pierre de Bellefeuille to P. Dupuy, October 1965, R869, Vol. 657, Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition Fonds, LAC; and F. W. O. Morton to João Havelange, August 11, 1966, R869, Vol. 657, Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition Fonds, LAC. See also Sergio Corrêa da Costa to A.B.L. Castello Branco, December 22, 1965, Ottawa 02515, MDB, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, ACI.

¹⁵² D. W. Munro to Information Division, June 28, 1967, RG25, Vol. 16106, Cultural Affairs – Performing Arts – Canada with Other Countries – Brazil, DEA Fonds, LAC.

felt they would have more success in pursuing their own interests and contacts rather than waiting for Canadian leadership on the transnational file.

1968 was the year when politics were front and centre at the FICP. The international delegations missed most of the action, which took place earlier during the national competition. Anka did try to place himself in the ‘global sixties’ when he claimed that his song was in response to the troubled state of the world.¹⁵³ Had “This Crazy World” been written by a Brazilian artist, it is possible that the song would have raised concerns among censors, but Anka had the privilege of being an English-speaking performer from Canada with a distinguished career in the United States. That said, the song’s musical form and lament-like lyrics were far from constituting an anti-war or an anti-authoritarianism anthem. A more militant stance would have been out of character for Anka considering his reluctance to openly discuss his political views. When asked to comment on the Vietnam War, he politely replied that he could not discuss the topic as a Canadian living in the United States. He added, however, that he was a pacifist and that card-carrying, flag-waving protesters would not change the world.¹⁵⁴ Anka’s political posturing sounded hollow in the context of late 1960s Brazil. A case in point was his response to the audience members who booed Jobim in the final moments of the FICP. Many in attendance were still bitter that Vandr e’s “Pra N o Dizer Que N o Falei de Flores” had been withdrawn in favour of “Sabi a” during the national competition. They promptly manifested their dissatisfaction upon learning that Jobim and Buarque’s song had won first place in the international phase. Anka, who finished second, concurred with the jury and lamented the disrespect shown to his Brazilian counterparts. But his position was inevitably informed by his personal connection to the composer’s music rather than his understanding of domestic politics. As if to unintentionally underline how ill-attuned he was to the politico-cultural climate in Rio de

¹⁵³ “O Que  les Disseram,” *Di rio de Not cias*, October 13, 1968, 3, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=093726_04&pagfis=53871. See also “Em Dia Com a Not cia,” *Tribuna da Imprensa*, October 8, 1968, 7, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=030015_08&pagfis=91377.

¹⁵⁴ “Paul Anka Teve M do de Ser Rid culo,” *Jornal do Brasil*, October 6, 1968, 32, http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=030015_08&pagfis=122881.

Janeiro, Anka risked further upsetting disgruntled festivalgoers when he stated that Jobim should be named “world ambassador for Brazilian music.”¹⁵⁵

The controversies and confrontations that had exploded in 1968 were largely subsided by the time Marzagão launched the fourth edition of the FICP. However, the less volatile climate was due in no small part to a hardening of the military regime’s hold on authority and its more aggressive position vis-à-vis urban subversives and guerilla groups in the countryside. Dissenting artists had been silenced, if not imprisoned or forced into exile, by the authorities by the time the 1969 edition of the FICP came around. Moreover, the spectacles of the festival itself had also been fine-tuned to ensure consensus and discipline. By the time Gélinas landed in Rio de Janeiro as a hastily chosen emissary to represent Canada, the military junta had taken complete control of government. There was no Canadian ambassador on hand to greet the songwriter because Beaulne had recently left his post and his successor, Christian Hardy, had yet to present his credentials. Equally important, Gélinas had another crisis of his own to deal with because Boucher, who was supposed to sing “Avec une chanson,” had failed to join him on the flight from New York to Rio de Janeiro. After days passed with no news from or about Boucher, who was in an American hospital recovering from a car accident, Gélinas realized that he would have to sing in order to save face. So as to accommodate his limited vocal range, he decided to substitute “Consuelo” for “Avec une chanson,” but was disqualified by the organizers who nonetheless allowed him to perform to avoid further humiliation.¹⁵⁶ In a supreme irony, Gélinas, who had never signed on to participate in the FICP as a singer, let alone as an ambassador, left Brazil in a state of political angst, certain he had inadvertently damaged Canada’s image through this trying episode.¹⁵⁷ The country’s musical diplomacy had indeed seen better days.

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During the first four-year run of the FICP, Canadian government and cultural officials completely failed to understand, let alone value, popular music’s ability to mediate new

¹⁵⁵ “Cantor Sugere a Nomeação de Tom Jobim Para Embaixador,” *O Estado de Mato Grosso*, October 10, 1968, 2, <http://memoria.bn.br/docreader/DocReader.aspx?bib=098086&pagfis=43360>. In Portuguese “... embaixador da música brasileira para todo o mundo.”

¹⁵⁶ See “Acidente Fêz Vir Gelinas em Lugar de Guy Boucher,” *Correio da Manhã*, September 28, 1968, 1, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/089842_07/104211; and “FIC Abre com Nível Bom e Aplausos para ‘Luciana,’” *Jornal do Brasil*, October 3, 1969, 12, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/030015_08/141758.

¹⁵⁷ Vincent, “Marc Gélinas,” 3.

connections to the world. Caught up in their own elitist version of cultural nationalism, they had yet to fully comprehend how music styles so deeply anchored in American or Latin American popular cultural tastes and so highly commercialized could be coded as ‘national’ and rendered “ideologically valuable” in the Centennial decade.¹⁵⁸ Canadian artists had already been exploring more global and hybridized musical forms in their efforts to negotiate their way through the hegemonic confrontation taking place between the United States’ cultural industry and Canada’s cultural elite. They had already established new solidarities to develop their creative and commercial potential, most notably by exploiting the symbolic weight of samba and bossa nova. The FICP offered up an exceptional stage for such cultural transfers and for the performance of nation. By engaging with Brazil’s *musicais populares*, these artists, as individuals, inadvertently proposed alternate ways of musically imagining a Canadian-Brazilian community while advancing their own careers. They did not, however, displace the markers of identity that had been – and continued to be – foregrounded in the official cultural relations between the two countries. In the past, projection had taken precedence over engagement. The same was true with this latest musical nation branding episode, except that as an exercise in musical diplomacy, it was more tepid to the point of incompetence than ever before, and more complicit with the interests of Brazil’s military regime to value spectacle over cultural authenticity in the geopolitical realm.

¹⁵⁸ Edwardson, *Canuck Rock*, 74, 239.

CONCLUSION

On May 30, 2018, the University of Southern California public diplomacy scholar Nicholas J. Cull travelled to Ottawa to testify in front of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SSCFAIT). He had been invited to bring his expertise to a recently launched study on the “impact and utilization of Canadian culture and arts in Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy.”¹ The initiative followed the federal Liberals’ return to power and their stated commitment to rebrand Canada and retune the country’s soft power.² “I see four core approaches to cultural diplomacy,” explained Cull.³ The first, ‘cultural gift,’ consists of selecting a valued cultural element that is representative of Canada and offering it to foreign audiences in an effort to solicit their attention and earn their admiration. ‘Cultural information’ is the dissemination of lesser-known works and practices to provide depth and nuance to Canada’s image in countries where there is either a lack of information or an abundance of misinformation. Third, ‘cultural capacity building’ is the allocation of resources to help foreign audiences fulfill needs that they may have in the realm of culture. Finally, ‘cultural dialogue’ aims to promote person-to-person interactions through various forums. Cull told the senate committee that a “well-planned piece of cultural diplomacy can actually hit all four of these marks.”⁴ He added, however, that productive dialogue is based on humility and a willingness to consider interlocutors as equals. More importantly, a truly engaging cultural diplomacy is one that is attuned to the needs and realities of others: “It isn’t enough to think who Canada would like to be in the world.”⁵ Listening, he seemed to suggest, is the *sine qua non* of successful cultural relations on the international stage.

What Cull no doubt understood implicitly, but omitted to mention explicitly, is that it is also important to listen to the past. A critical examination of the history of Canadian cultural

¹ Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Proceedings: Issue No. 47 – Evidence*, May 30, 2018, <https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/Sen/Committee/421/AEFA/47ev-54119-e>.

² Evan Solomon, “The Soft Power of Justin Trudeau, Canada’s Viral PM. As Justin Trudeau Takes his Branding Tour to the United States, the Question Emerges: How Long Will the Sheen from this ‘New Canada’ Last?” *Maclean’s*, March 9, 2016, <http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/the-soft-power-of-justin-trudeau-canadas-viral-pm/>.

³ Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Proceedings: Issue No. 47*.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

diplomacy is key to understanding the interplay between the country's use of soft power and the values it puts forward. In this regard, the silences in the literature surrounding the pioneering efforts undertaken in Brazil are striking. This state of affairs is partly a function of the sustained attention accorded to Québec in the aftermath of the 1961 opening of the Maison du Québec in Paris, a move that signalled the province's determination to develop an international identity in accordance with its jurisdictional authority in the fields of education and culture. Scholars tend to focus on that decade by depicting Québec's challenges to federal jurisdiction in international relations as the founding moment of Canadian cultural diplomacy.⁶ Their neglect of the precedents set in Brazil echoes that of L.A.D. Stephens who failed to mention Jean Désy and the Canada-Brazil *Acordo Cultural* in his 1977 report on the history of government information abroad.⁷ The same oversight in a study prepared by Stephens a decade earlier is especially difficult to explain.⁸ If the 1944 agreement and its supporting documentation had been disregarded by the mid-1960s, they certainly had not been lost. A case in point are the minutes of the November 1943 meeting during which the decision was made to go ahead with the proposed cultural agreement with Brazil for fear that inaction would lead provinces to enter into cultural agreements of their own on the basis of their jurisdictional powers.⁹ An unattributed note in the margin of the above minutes reads: "So true now in 1965."¹⁰ Not only were textual records handy, Paul Beaulieu and Yvon Beaulne, Canadian ambassadors to Brazil between 1963 and 1969, had brought up – albeit unconvincingly – the question of Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations with their colleagues in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) where Stephens worked. It is likely that Brazil was seen as too peripheral – in terms of geopolitics – to warrant attention in the context of the contest with Québec. Regardless, the DEA's inability to examine and reflect on the southbound projection of a bicultural image of Canada may inadvertently have lent credence to claims that Ottawa lacked the means and vision to adequately represent French Canadians overseas.

⁶ Rushton, "The Origins and Development of Canada's Public Diplomacy," 86.

⁷ See Stephens, *Study of Canadian Government Information Abroad*.

⁸ [L.A.D. Stephens], *Information and Press Activities of the Department of External Affairs at Home and Abroad: A Study* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, [1967]).

⁹ Minutes of Meeting on Cultural Relations with Latin America, November 8, 1943, RG25, Vol. 3243, Cultural Relations Between Canada and Brazil, Department of External Affairs Fonds, LAC.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Stephens's 1967 and 1977 reports point to another problem in the study of the history of Canada's cultural diplomacy: the inclination to focus almost exclusively on top-down, government-sanctioned initiatives that aligned with liberal nationalist narratives and spoke to the country's middle power aspirations in the North Atlantic Triangle. Brazil's place on the periphery of the world as Canadians knew it at the time thus constituted a blind spot. Furthermore, on a more prosaic level, the paper trails left by the DEA, the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS), and other government departments or agencies are much easier to collate and track than those of non-state actors and independent-minded diplomats such as Désy.¹¹ Operating without much oversight, the protagonists on the ground in Brazil exercised considerable agency, often in ways that were difficult to align or reconcile with high-level policy priorities established in Ottawa. The apparent disassociation between the Canada-Brazil cultural rapprochement and the DEA's North Atlantic orientation did not make the former less significant as a formative moment in the projection of Canada abroad. To understand this, one requires a different theoretical outlook to make sense of what was happening, how, and why. Among other things, this entails a willingness to go beyond government archives in the search for insights on the breadth and scope of Canadian cultural diplomacy in order to consider concert promoters, artists, journalists, and audiences as legitimate actors in international relations. Even Stephens seemed to acknowledge as much when he conceded that the early history of the DEA's information programs "is not a brilliant record but [it] is marked by a great deal of conscientious endeavour by employees ... who worked with a bare minimum of government policy to guide them, in the face of frequent indifference from their own departmental leadership and almost always with a level of resources which permitted only threshold operations."¹² While some officials were no doubt demoralized or, at best, less than inspired by such indifference, others, such as Désy, saw it as an opportunity to experiment and operate under the radar.

If Désy occupies centre stage in this story, it is because of his pioneering role in the history of Canadian cultural diplomacy and the anomalous, if timely moment of his tenure at the head of the CBC-IS when many observers doubted the former ambassador had the credentials to reinvent

¹¹ L.A.D. Stephens worked exclusively with "files available in the Public Archives and the Department of External Affairs." Stephens, *Study of Canadian Government Information Abroad*, 1-1.

¹² *Ibid.*

himself as a broadcast administrator.¹³ Désy's overshadowing presence from the 1940s onward provides a unique longitudinal window into the deployment of bilateral cultural relations over a period of several decades when the DEA had yet to fully equip itself in the sphere of cultural diplomacy. Operating both within the power apparatus and somewhat parallel to it, Désy as a foreign affairs diplomat and a bureaucrat was single-minded in his devotion to the idea of culture as a force for mutual understanding between peoples and as an expression of national authenticity. An ambitious French-speaking Catholic with intimate ties to Montreal's intellectual and cultural elite, he held a liberal humanist vision of Canadian culture and championed the image of Canada as a bicultural/bilingual federal state rooted in the 'exceptional' histories of two 'white' settler societies. His personal and social identities were relational as well as malleable, particularly when juxtaposed against those of his counterparts in Brazil. A multifaceted protagonist pursuing several agendas simultaneously, Désy modulated his performance of nation to make it correspond with his evolving sense of self.¹⁴ From this perspective, he was no different than the other informal ambassadors who provided impetus to Canada's musical nation branding in Brazil. These included artists such as the Dansereau couple and Quatuor alouette whom he promoted together with Claude Champagne and Ernest MacMillan, but also Allan Blye, Jimmy Dale, Donald Lautrec, Paul Anka, and Marc Gélinas with whom Désy was not associated and of whose music he may not have approved. Similar in some respects and different in many others, each and every one of these individuals represent a point of entry, of mediation, in the emergence of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.

¹³ See Hall, *Radio Canada International*, 89; and Siegel, *Radio Canada International*, 119.

¹⁴ According to David Meren, "nationalist resentment" motivated Jean Désy to lobby Premier Maurice Duplessis "to be appointed, even unofficially, Quebec's representative in Paris" in 1957. Meren, *With Friends Like These*, 149. Désy had gone through a controversy of sorts earlier in 1953 when Progressive Conservative Party member George Hees accused him of wanting to deny rights to new immigrants. The then director general of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation had just given a speech in which he promoted the idea of pan-Canadian bilingualism by evoking the idea of French Canadians' inalienable rights as first settlers. However unpleasant the episode, Désy continued to believe in the project of a bicultural federalism, remaining at the service of Canada until the end of his diplomatic career. His lobbying of Duplessis might have been an effort to stay in Paris since his posting there was coming to an end. After all, he had begun his academic and diplomatic careers there. He had also declined the offer to be the first French Canadian to occupy the post of under-secretary of state for External Affairs, because he preferred raising his children in a city that had good and affordable French-language schools. He had also indicated that he wished to stop moving to provide a more stable environment for his family. Personal and professional imperatives defined his trajectory as a diplomat. Jean Désy to Louis Saint-Laurent, October 1, 1948, MG26-L, Vol. 89, Louis St. Laurent Fonds, LAC; "Le bilinguisme, facteur d'unité et de culture," *La Presse*, April 7, 1953, 17; "Chose que M. Désy n'a pas dite attaquée par un tory à Ottawa," *Le Canada*, April 25, 1953, 7.

Looked at through the prism of Georgina Born's 'four planes of social mediation,' this cast of protagonists revealed the extent to which Canada's musical diplomacy in Brazil was first and foremost about national self-representation and national projection. The *assemblage* opens a window into the mechanics of musical nation branding. It brings into focus the markers of identity that delineated the project of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. It was a largely improvised androcentric project that foregrounded 'whiteness' and revolved around the tropes of Latinity, Catholicism, *métissage*, and family. Brazil served as a distant stage to mediate old and new connections to the nation. It provided a venue where identity politics played themselves out through aesthetic modes of communication. In their interaction with musical 'others,' Canada's informal ambassadors negotiated the tension between difference and sameness – as well as between nationalism and universalism – using channels first opened by the embassy in Rio de Janeiro and the CBC-IS. Mediated events added resonance to this effort. They also amplified the dissonance between the discourses deployed to sell the idea of a Canadian-Brazilian cultural rapprochement and their reception in Canada. Notwithstanding its incongruity, this exercise in musical nation branding demonstrated that Canadians' search for an international identity could not be dissociated from their search for a national identity. It also underlined the important role that artists could play in this process.

Going back to what Cull told the SSCFAIT, it is obvious that musical diplomacy efforts in Brazil were too focused on "who Canada would like to be" and not enough on "listening to the foreign public, finding out what the world needs, and then thinking how Canada's interests intersect with this need."¹⁵ It is also evident that Brazilian interlocutors were not treated entirely as equals if we consider how certain sounds (i.e. samba and bossa nova) were kept on the sideline or off the airwaves; or if we examine the response of critics and audience to Heitor Villa-Lobos's 1952 performance in Montreal. That said, the protagonists of this story did demonstrate remarkable ingenuity with their strategies, particularly in cases where they were able to hit the four marks that Cull identified. For example, Champagne's "Quadrilha Brasileira," an homage to Brazil written for Dominion Day celebrations in Rio de Janeiro, was a splendid 'cultural gift.' The composer's performance in Brazil of works infused with French-Canadian folkloric elements conveyed 'cultural information' about Québec and its relationship to the rest

¹⁵ Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Proceedings: Issue No. 47*.

of Canada. The courses that Champagne taught at the Escola Nacional de Música constituted a form of ‘cultural capacity building,’ which doubled as ‘cultural dialogue’ if we consider the extracurricular activities that accompanied his teaching duties; notably as a guest of Villa-Lobos at various events. Although these efforts did not suffice to secure widespread popular support at home, they did call attention to the mediating potential of music in international relations.

As constructs, musically imagined communities are complex *assemblages* that put individuals and collectivities in relation with one another in ways that either support or contest, reinforce or transgress, existing boundaries. Their dynamic nature and scalability make them rich and resonant objects of study in international relations. Not only does music travel, it is also both a means of negotiating hegemony and a means of “bounding identity and providing continuity or homogeneity, perhaps with the past, perhaps with a community elsewhere.”¹⁶ Its social and symbolic significance thus reaches beyond the producer-performer-audience relationship. Born explains:

Music ... produces its own varied social relations – in performance, in musical associations and ensembles, in the musical division of labour. It inflects existing social relations, from the most concrete and intimate to the most abstract of collectivities – music’s embodiment of the nation, of social hierarchies, and of the structures of class, race, gender and sexuality. But music is bound up also in the broader institutional forces that provide the basis of its production and reproduction, whether elite or religious patronage, market exchange, the arena of public and subsidized cultural institutions, or late capitalism’s multi-polar cultural economy.¹⁷

Analyzed through this constellation of mediations, the discourses and practices of both state and non-state actors in Brazil reveal the competing sets of values, attitudes, and perceptions with which Canadians approached ‘others,’ musical or otherwise, at home and abroad. In other words, the study of music in Canadian-Brazilian relations makes audible the structuring power of ‘race’ and empire as well as religion and gender in Canadian international history. Simply put, it uncovers the biases embedded in representations of Canada by tracing one of Canadians’ earliest

¹⁶ Beverley Diamond, “Introduction: Issues of Hegemony and Identity in Canadian Music,” in *Canadian Music: Issues of Hegemony and Identity*, eds. Beverley Diamond and Robert Witmer (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 1998), 16.

¹⁷ Georgina Born, “On Musical Mediation: Ontology, Technology, and Creativity,” *Twentieth-Century Music* 2, no. 1 (2005): 7.

self-conscious efforts to activate music as an instrument of diplomacy. To the extent that all international relations are intercultural relations, musicking is socially and politically consequential; even if only for how it reflects and shapes people's self-perception and sense of belonging in the world.¹⁸ Hence the need to tune in and listen.

¹⁸ Akira Iriye writes: "A nation is a culture in that its inhabitants share certain consciousness – of their land, of their history, and of who they are. Since all nations are in this sense cultures, international relations become intercultural relations." Akira Iriye, "Culture and International History," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed., eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 242.

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