

Becoming One with the Image

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## **ABSTRACT**

### Becoming One with the Image

Felix Rebolledo

The primary concern of *Becoming One with the Screen* is the question of how experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process. It deals with the problem though the experience of spectatorship in cinema. We present the experience of participating in a film screening as a relational and associative process in order to undo the dualistic spectator/screen relationship reflective of the subject/object relation. And radiating outwards from this problem, memory looms large as explicatory of the integrative process. As such, we examine the concept-cluster of words surrounding memory not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical tradition and deal with the complementary concepts of *Faciality* and *The Fold* from the point of view of imagistic thought and memory. Central to the discussion will be the process of adumbration by which the Many become One as the *perpetuum mobile* of the eventual continuity of change in actuality as being. We shall advance that the façade of becoming actual of the world as a moving imagistic front as the perception of the integrated affirmation of being one with the image world.

Key Words: Memory, immanence, fold, faciality, spectatorship

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## **Dedication**

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## Prologue

In the summer of 1971 my father took me to visit the caves of Altamira in Cantabria, Spain. He had arranged the visit with René, the director of the historical site who had been a schoolmate of his and brother in arms during the Spanish Civil War. René turned out to be a magnanimous host and took it upon himself to give us the grand tour. At that time, the caves were still open to the public and access to the site was not as controlled as it is today. After showing us some of the finer artifacts in the private collection, he led us to the unassuming, almost rustic, steel doorway to the caves, bypassing a mass of tourists impatiently biding their time to view the “frescoes” of the great hall, and proceeded to the depths beyond.

Through the darkness of the labyrinthine halls, René guided us with a flashlight, at times pointing it at the ground to prevent any miss-step and at others flashing the beam to highlight polychrome paintings and petroglyphs scratched into the rock. He took us through La Hoya (the Pot) and into the Horse’s Tail—the deepest and narrowest tunnel of Altamira—affably pointing out features and explaining works which would only be accessible to a select few. We spent the better part of two hours exploring the many galleries and passageways within the cave and we were wending our way back to the exit when René stopped and turned to us, “We’ve seen many beautiful things so far, but I’ve saved the best for last!”

He ushered us into the great hall while a guide was giving his show-and-tell to a group. I listened raptly to the guide's talk, head thrust back in awe at the figures collected on the vault of the Sistine Chapel of the Paleolithic: a panoply of brilliantly

depicted bison, deer, mountain goats, boars, horses and stylized human figures. The animals had been sketched out on the rock with outlines drawn in charcoal and filled in with red and ochre-coloured pigments which in some places had been scratched away to give depth and volume to the shapes. The prehistoric tableau was a beautiful spectacle—one could easily imagine these animals frolicking on the grasslands surrounding what is now Santillana del Mar! Finally, the group left the grotto and René asked the tour guide not to allow anyone else into the hall for a few minutes. In the subdued tungsten light, I could see that we were standing in a trough which had been dug out of the floor at some distance from the walls, leaving an island of massive rock covered with a heavy tarp in the middle of the room. René explained that originally the height of the cavern varied from 0.7 m to 2 m and that to allow viewing without crawling through the cave the excavation had been necessary. He urged us to find a spot in the centre of the space and invited us to lie back on the tarp. As we made ourselves comfortable on the damp canvas, René moved away from us. Standing at one end of the gallery, he reached into the side pocket of his jacket and pulled out a box of matches. I remember thinking “this is a funny place for a cigarette!” He was trying to light the match—an awkward feat with the flashlight clutched under his arm, rendered more difficult by the subterranean clamminess—but finally he was able to fire up the small flame. “Watch this!” he called out. He turned off the tungsten floor lights and the vault came to life with the iridescent glow from the solitary match: what had moments before just been a beautiful, albeit static, depiction of the felt nature of the animals drawn on the vault, became a menagerie of breathing, heaving, bleating, rearing, gambolling

beasts through the agency of the flickering radiance thrown by the diminutive flame of a single match. The play of light on the relief of the ceiling animated the lifeless stone which in turn imparted a vibrant dynamism to the animals depicted on the rocky substrate. Breathless, I stared at this flickering spectacle for a few seconds and then the flame sputtered and died.

## Introduction

The primary concern of *Becoming One with the Screen* is the question of how experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process. It attempts to deal with the problem both as an "archeology of the present" and a "cartography" of imagistic process. And radiating outwards from this problem memory looms large as explicatory of the integrative process. To think of memory in terms of integration is perhaps an odd premise in that nowadays memory is almost exclusively thought of in terms of the accrual and stockpiling of information and not in terms of how experience comes together into a coherent whole. Yet, to conceive of memory in terms of the consolidation of experience is not an outlandish proposal. Words associated with memory such as recollection and remembering allude to this integrative process in that they bring forth the idea of reattachment or gathering together: for example, one often refers to gathering one's thoughts to organize one's ideas so as to give them order and structure when one wishes to remember what is to be said. As soon as we detach the suffix (re) from these memory words we are able to read the conjunction of the two sides differently, map out their novel meanings and observe their effect on our understanding of the processual advance of actuality. To paraphrase Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) in *Foucault* (1988: 53), the enterprise of an archeology of knowledge consists in opening up words, phrases and propositions to extract "the statements corresponding to each stratum and its thresholds" which in turn reveal the operative machinic assemblages and their functional coherence.

The concern for this topic originally arose from questions about spectatorship and the relation between the viewer and the spectacle on the screen but the research eventually became a more general, more philosophical engagement which the concepts demanded in order to deal with relation and its articulation as a methodological and epistemological "problem". This is not to say that cinematic spectatorship does not provide a rich and interesting field of study as a basis to examine experience as processual, but to deal with the cinematic before coming to terms with experience as such would be to put the cart before the horse. If anything, the contradictory dynamics inherent in cinema as an immersive experiential milieu where the interplay between a stop-and-go mechanical process and a supposedly static subject produces moving images constitutive of movement of thought would provide a fascinating arena to test the ideas to be fleshed out in this project.

But the "problem" in my endeavour is not so much to solve it as it is to complicate it in such a way that in articulating that which the problem seeks as a solution, the work reformulates and repositis the conditions which gave rise to it in such a way that novelty arises not so much from the answers but from the repositing of the conditions of its positing and its articulation as a multiplicitous folding of thought, as a complication into itself, in order to foment novelty as part of imagistic thought. But to incite novelty for novelty's sake is not the goal here; the drive is to generate expanses of coherence to push forth creation according to new modes of thought, of relation, of feeling: as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) would say, its proposition be "anexact yet rigorous" (1993: 367) but its expression would need to be precise and

clear-cut. To pose an academic problem in such a way is obviously problematic (in both a Deleuzian and a non-Deleuzian way) in that the pursuit is not the sureness, stability and permanence of knowledge but to compose with an epistemology fraught with openness and indeterminacy and which openly calls into question fundamental aspects of coherent thought, logical systems and universals. In imagistic thought, the Law of Identity, the Law of Noncontradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle<sup>1</sup> cease to have the firmness afforded by subjective and objective entities with precisely defined borders, components or a cut and dry causality. Contrary to the dialectical method of thought with its Kantian transcendence and Ideal perfection, imagistic modes of thought entail conceptual formulations which flourish on the availability of valence and the preservation of associative degrees of freedom in order to keep alive its functional validity, i.e. to perdure, through their built-in evolutive adaptability and relational flexibility within the creative advance of novelty as an ecology.

To posit memory in terms of the integration of experience as imagistic process is a "problematic" move but in itself it is nothing new: there is a dynamic, image-based memorial understanding of the world as foundation for a visual philosophy in the Hermetic thought of the Ancient Egyptians which served as a precursor to the Stoics. In fact, the Stoic philosopher Posidonius (135 BCE-51 BCE) is referred to as "a visual thinker, a defender of monism, the proponent of the doctrines of cosmic sympathy and vitalism" (Edelstein, 1972:413) and an exponent of an image-based understanding

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<sup>1</sup> The Law of Identity: If a thing is *A* then it is *A*; the Law of Non-contradiction: A thing *A* cannot be *A* and not *A* at the same time (at the time it is *A*); the Law of Excluded Middle: A thing *A* is either *A* or not *A*. Angeles, Peter A. *Dictionary of Philosophy*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981.

appealing to "pictorial representation" that is true to life where "succession replaces the concept of substantial existence" (Edelstein, 1966: 28-29) within the universe conceived as a dynamic process. In these few lines, one can already feel a certain "setting" taking place, a consistency forming—we can identify various concepts which work together (or are being made to work together within the confines of this paper) to reconstitute a coherent operational dynamic that not only serves to organize thought and the way thought works but creates an active associative entrainment which invites the accretion of thought and the aggregation of other ideas, concepts and modes of thought as participants in this dynamic. The words "setting" and "consistency" are a big part of it. Normally, these words carry connotations of tending towards a stultifying static state, but here they are expressions of process towards the establishing of a motive, subjective continuity. Setting, as in setting concrete, points to a gelling, to a thickening of relation, to a densification of bonding, to an expression of the complication of clustering which not only expresses a tendency towards a concretized solid state in the sense of an integrated operational circuit but as that which creates expanses of connectedness which constitute strata, fields, territories, planes, milieus as territorializing settings as landscape. Consistency expresses the same feelings—and here we use feeling in the sense Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) conceives it in *Process and Reality* (1929) as that which incites “the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question” (Whitehead, 1985: 40)—but in terms of establishing the unity of expression as a coherent operational dynamic. We normally think of consistency as the acquisition of a repeatable, constant,

steady, homogeneousness as in the creaminess of pudding but not as the rendered-smooth consistency of "the proof of the pudding is in the eating"! In acquiring meaning, that which is acquiring consistency by definition also comes to constitute a body in the most general sense of the term. One cannot think the consistent as a uniform, unchanging, unvarying constitution—the only constancy within the gaining consistency as process is the operative haphazard constancy of change in the perduration of processual continuity.

In this we can see that the consistency of process as constitutive of expanses of operational solidarity seem to create a *montage* of moving parts that works as an apparatus, as a machinic assemblage of organizational and functional agency. The device that emerges here can be likened to a machine where the cogs and gears work together to create operational coherence constitutive of a something other: the machinic assemblage as a processual entity emerges through the expression of its operational constitution as a working-together of parts, as a multiplicity, which at its most naive understanding can be seen as an apparatus contained—as the constituent parts inform themselves into a functional whole, the assemblage acquires a vinculating carapace which provides it with a homogeneous faciality which expresses itself as the integrity of operational coherence. But to speak of cogs and wheels working together is too concrete and mechanical an assemblage—the machinic looks at the ensemble as a functioning-in-unison, as an individuation constituted of parts which do not transform anything material but together generate temporality as subjectivity. The constitutive elements participate in the co-operative functioning according to a reciprocal necessity



within the machinic assemblage as a milieu where the parts maintain their individual integrity yet can only fulfill the role attributed to them as participants contributing to the functioning of the apparatus as a coherent whole. That which is produced by a machinic assemblage is not to be found in the individual parts nor in the entity as a whole; that which results is something indivisible, of a different order than that which constitutes the apparatus itself or the participation in its functioning. Ultimately what is being produced is time as temporality but it bears pointing out that the time being referred to here is not a metricized time but the temporality of being—what Deleuze would call *aionic* time—which refers to the individual expression of processual density and texture as a quality, as an affectual manifestation of intensities that is experienced in some way as feeling, where each assemblage articulates its being through a particular affective quality.

These constitutive participants construed as wheels and cogs function as transmission gears, which in mechanistic thought transmit forces external to the apparatus through direct contact by way of a linear chain of causality. In machinic thought, they become instigators, attractors, proponents of relational meshings in machinic assemblages as productive of the fabric of relation as a continuum so that the circulation of forces, intensities and potentials is a communicative process which simultaneously conveys associative (in)formation as a sharing of structure and operational functionality. The manner in which causality operates and flows in the two modalities is key to understanding their difference. Mechanical causality is a reductionist, linear, one-way chain of cause and effect as to the communication of

information which as a first approximation is compelling but of limited comprehensive explanatory validity: the message, alienated and external to the apparatus of transmission and reception, is directly sent out by a sender and received by a recipient as part of a linear, binary and dualistic subject-object relation. As an approximation, it is reductionist in that the circuitous conjunctive multiplicity of causal determinacy is resolved as a unitary resultant drive where the chain is a simplistic metaphor for the "one-sided singling out of a rich set of interconnections" (Bunge, 1963: 128). As an alternative to this plodding binary process of communication and its need for stop and go affirmative actualizations of catenary linkage, Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) proposes transduction as a process which transmits energy and forces as an (in)formation which communicates aggregative belonging to an organizational structure through its cooptation to a functional becoming instantaneously felt throughout a system as operational integration. In this way, the transmission of information ceases to be an accidental process—accidental not because it arises by chance but because the forces flow from outside the process as a surficial mechanical transmission—so that (in)formation can be seen instead as the process of an unmediated structuration as contiguous operational functionality.

The participating entities which we are here referring to as gears, wheels and cogs, can also be seen as machinic entities in their own right so that the process of substitution of cogs by machinic assemblies within the apparatus becomes a fractal recursivity. The cogs as machinic entities can be considered as relational individuals not because they are *the* relation but because the cog as a linkage makes possible the

transmission and flow of causal determinacy not accidentally, but internally through the operational coherence within the machinic assemblage, and externally to other machinic entities. It is important to point out forthwith that to speak of internal and external in reference to a machinic assemblage is doable but inappropriate in that within the continuum of the integrative fractal recursivity of the machinic, one can differentiate between one process and another as individualizations if we can keep in mind that they are integrally, undifferentially constitutive of one singular process—this conception of recursivity is different from that of mathematics and computer science in that there is no simple base case upon which to found the assemblage in that the base loses itself within the fractal serialization and concomitant associative bridging of assemblages as transindividualized concretizations. As such, within a machinic assemblage or within an assemblage of assemblages, one can introduce additional assemblages to complicate the works yet still maintain the integrity and intent of the machinic assemblage's operational coherence; at times, one can also substitute the workings of several assemblages by one assemblage by means of what Simondon would call in the *Du Mode d'existence des objets techniques* (1958), concretization, where one assemblage fulfills its operational function while simultaneously doubling up its functionality and fulfills the function of another one or several whose individuated participation need no longer be activated. But what is significant in concretization is that this assemblage doing double duty, or triple or more if it is particularly enterprising, is creating a functional associative bridge between machinic assemblages as constituting continuity or operational extension as consistency.

To see the world as a machinic assemblage should not prove to be a big stretch for our imagination. Henri Bergson (1859-1941) helps us over the hump with his undoing of the cinematograph of thought in *Creative Evolution* (1907) and now that the functioning of machinic assemblages is no longer foreign to us, we can understand the idea of being in the world as cogs in a bigger machine in a different way. Charlie Chaplin (1889-1977) showed us in his film *Modern Times* (1936) how easy it was to become one with the machine—his Tramp is the prototypical alienated industrial plantworker who loses himself by unwittingly embroiling himself in the works so as to literally become one with the machine as one of its cogs. It has always been seen as a sad image, one which Simondon would say is illustrative of our ingrained cultural mistrust and fear of technology, that of the human subsumed to the workings of an impersonal, non-living machine—but within this moving image we can reveal another machinic order at work; not the machinic order of the mechanical domain but one of functional integration of bodies within the flow of forces and energy as constitutive of process within the machinic assemblage as the advance of novelty. And further, if we let ourselves be seduced for a second by the trope of cinematographic thought and allow the film screen to stand in for the world, we can extend the conception proposed within the on-screen depiction of the functional integration of bodies as machinic assemblages as a moving image, as an image that both moves and which moves us by engaging our machinism in its machinism, to assert that it is itself also a machinic assemblage.

The realization that the image is itself machinic is major in that it allows us to conceive the world, the image and the flat plane of the screen as a machinic assemblage

which when coupled to perception and the moving image that moves us extends the machinic "inward" as a function of the interior structures of being (Simondon, 1989: 108). Bergson calls this in *Creative Evolution* the inward articulation of movement which Deleuze echoes in *Foucault* as an "interiorizing of the outside" (1988: 98) where a mirrored doubling takes place to show how the inside is somehow always "the folding of a presupposed outside" (1988: 99). The fold is possibly Deleuze's least intuitively graspable concept in that its metaphoric anchoring is itself a very complex, multi-fold, labyrinthine enfolding-into-itself so that an analysis of its conceptual emergence is difficult to carry out. We can relate the fold to the pictorial creation of "life-like" photo-realistic paintings using optical devices in Flanders in the mid-1400's, to perspective and Girard Desargues' invention of projective geometry in the 1600's, to wave theory, to origami, to couture, to Hermetic thought, to topology, to catastrophe theory, to metamorphism in geology... each descriptive/interpretative point of view produces a facet of the crystal of the expression of the fold but does not provide specifics as to its actual constitutive workings. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the "Wise Men and the Elephant" indeterminacy in the general coming to terms with the fold, its conceptual anchoring or its actual operational location and functioning, the fold remains the big concept that mediates between the external and the internal, which "integrates the evolved with the evolved" (Bergson, 1944: 398) and establishes the correspondence between the world of matter and the soul.

For Deleuze, "folding or doubling is itself a Memory: the 'absolute memory' or memory of the outside" related to a memory of the future and processes of

subjectivation (1988: 107): the fold leads us to consider memory in terms of the integration of experience as part of the tradition of the *Ars Memoriae* (the Arts of Memory) and as part of visual thought and imagistic process. In *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1993) Deleuze characterizes *eidos* not as an essence but as a trait or operative function whose role is to produce folds (1993: 3). The folds extend to infinity and subsist on two levels—pleats of matter on the lower and folds in the soul on the upper—where the two levels are connected by a harmonic resonance that transmits the "visible movements below into sounds up above" (1993: 4). Deleuze houses the relation between the two by recycling Leibniz's construct of the great Baroque montage in his allegory of the Baroque House (1993: 5): in the lower floor, girdled by windows signifying the senses, we find rooms endlessly contained in other rooms; the windowless upper floor contains only a stretched canvas "diversified by folds" as the monadic whole.

In philosophical discourse, as soon as we encounter the words room, theatre, cavern, house, architecture, city, building, passages with nooks and crannies, a circuit, a walk or stroll, etc—i.e. anything that seems to be wanting to organize experience spatially—we have found that memory as the driving dynamic is lurking nearby. Usually these memory-location words are used out of context but to consider this misuse a malapropism would perhaps be too harsh a judgment; outside of the imagistic milieu of memory they become disingenuous characters who inadequately express that which they seem to be wanting to say. And the memory here being referred to is not the one based on the accumulative hoarding of the melodramatic nostalgia of the photographic

snapshot nor the version that has emerged from the "scientific Germanic psychology" of the 19th century as a physiochemical process (Sahakian, 1981: 103-184)—rather, it is memory which seeks to revitalize and reactivate the imagistic implications dwelling behind the façade of words such as understand, recollect, remember, recall, recognize and repetition and bring them back to the collective fold of memory from which they originate. Memory then becomes an integrative process where the image is actualized as it is (re)produced in its *réalisation*<sup>2</sup> as it is (re)called into being through the (re)collection of its constituent elements and (re)membering them as part a coherent, machinic, operational flux. In this way, memory is "internally" no different than the experiential unfolding of actuality and how we come to terms with it—an integrative becoming which gradually gains definition as a body in the widest sense of the word.

To think and activate memory in this way reflects an "archeological" treatment of memory as classically conceived in the image-based tradition of the *Ars Memoriae*. It is archeological in that it seeks to identify the various strata in its evolution as planes of consistency and what territories were being created rather than composing with it as a given. This vibrant tradition had been alive since Antiquity and was phased out in the 17th century when it was supplanted by the "imageless dialectical order as the true natural order of the mind" based on the divisive arborescence and hierarchical organization of Ramist memory as "memorizing every subject by the dialectical order of its epitome", the book as a technology of thought and Calvinist theology as backgrounding emergent capitalism (Yates, 2000: 234). According to Frances Yates

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<sup>2</sup> We use the French verb here because it conveys the performative *énonciation* of the making it "real" and the subjective directionality of the becoming actual.

(1899-1981) in *The Art of Memory* (1966/2000), we owe our knowledge of the classical techniques of the art of memory to the only extant Latin treatise on rhetoric, *Ad Herennium* (c. 86-82 BCE) whose unknown author likely drew on Greek teachings on mnemonic technique. This text was vastly influential during the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance and lay the groundwork not only for the understanding of 'artificial' memory and its techniques in relation to rhetoric as a discursive art but as the foundation for an enhanced understanding of memory in terms of an 'artificial' ordering of experience and the structuration of knowledge as imagistic process.

The mnemonic method of the artificial memory of the *Ad Herennium* can be succinctly stated as being established on places and images (2000: 22). It consists of the serial placing of striking versions of idea-images we wish to remember at place holders (*loci*) in a circuit in the same order we wish these images to be recalled. The rhetor wishing to remember a sequence of ideas would walk a pre-established memory circuit (in the mind) and at key locations he would find the striking idea-image he placed there to remember and incorporate it into the narrative performative unfolding of a speech as enunciation. This simple yet powerful process does not in itself bring out into the open the association of image or the locus or the pedestrian perambulation as the "content"; the mnemonic method is simply expressive of the binding "of the psychic life to its motor accompaniment" (Bergson, 1991: 15) as a cartography, as a mapping of the territory of the discourse. Yet, as unlikely as it might seem at first, the method of the *Ad Herennium* serves as the basis for a serious engagement with many aspects of speculative thought as emergent in the writings of Deleuze, Guattari and Deleuze and



Guattari: postulating the memory-image as constitutive of the concept, it becomes explicative of a constellation of key concepts; namely, territorialization, faciality, conceptual personae, the creation of bodies, the plane of consistency and the plane of immanence as a machinic assemblage, among others. In considering the method historically, we can see the evolution of the memory-image as foundational to a (re)contextualizing discourse on memory that enables us to (re)member it to the tradition to which speculative thought belongs.

Like the unwitting Tramp of *Modern Times* that is caught in the machinery of manufacture, we originally got embroiled in "the works" of imagistic machinic thought by wanting to take on the challenge presented by Alfred North Whitehead in *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (1929) of elucidating the meaning of the phrase 'the flux of things' in terms of spectatorship in the cinema. Whitehead considers the task of elucidating this phrase as "one chief task of metaphysics" (Whitehead, 1978: 208) and to consider carrying this out through an analysis of cinematic spectatorship seemed like an interesting proposition. But in reading and researching *Becoming One with the Image* we were embroiled in the *ritornello* of Bergson's siren song: "He who installs himself in becoming sees in duration the very life of things, the fundamental reality" (Bergson, 1944: 344). We do not get to the fundamental reality, but our lashings to the mast of our intellectual enterprise have held. Thus, we propose to deal with the question of how one installs oneself in the midst of duration as an imagistic process through a selection of essays which explore Bergson's contention in *Matter and Memory* (1896) that the universe is an aggregate of images; the various chapters will examine what constitutes

the 'external' image in and of the world, the 'internal' image in and of the mind and the dynamic in the midst of the mirrored correspondence between the two. As was stated earlier, memory looms large in these considerations, so the concept of memory as a catalyzing creator of images and as integrator of the associative milieu of experience as actuality will also be dealt with. We seek to posit the functioning of memory not as creative of memory-images which paraphrasing Bergson "finally 'descend' to perception" (Trifonova, 2007: 54) but as processual aggregation/integration of image-elements as informative of the experiential flux of actuality as novelty. Now, the way that we are here presenting the conceptual cluster around image and memory with words such as 'external' and 'internal' images, mind, memory, etc might signal to some an inadequate reading of Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari. But to get where we wish to go, we need to posit the ideas, identify them operationally and situate them in such a way that they can be seen as anchored, as reflective of that which most deem as the common sense experience of life in the world as usually understood. Perhaps this will be the most significant aspect of the project: to bridge the gap between the demise of integrative imagistic memory in the 17th century and its resurgence in the 20th century particularly in the thought of Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari and other thinkers in the speculative tradition. The endeavour is not historical per se, though some aspects are historiographically driven. Rather, it is a re-drawing of vectors of correspondence between planes of consistency as reconstitutive of the stratigraphic logic in the layered build-up of machinic assemblages aggregating and disaggregating territories between a past and a present separated by 400 years but which for all intents and purposes are

now immediately linked. For this reason one will find a profusion of "as" within the body of the text mostly as a conjunction. They are not there to evoke simile (as opposed to metaphor) but to underscore the layered multiplicity of the becoming-relational where different relational fields activate different aspects of an entity's being as associative empathy.

There is something of the spoiler to our enterprise in that we move to understand by revealing the magic behind the magic, but it is our contention that to truly create with the concepts one must understand how they actually inform process, if not the territorializations are not philosophical but religious in nature. In becoming consistent, concepts perforce must lose degrees of associative freedom which curtail their potential for relation and creativity—without this creative curtailment there would only be an unlivable undifferentiable chaos not of unexpressed potential but of pap. Thus, what concepts lose relationally in their systematic information is not a loss but a trade off towards the acquisition of an attentive discrimination in terms of more specific association which renders them cogent and operationally coherent: the trick is not to make the concepts so deterministically defined, so locked-down in their specificity that their compositional potential is irreparably hobbled and they become incapable of activation except in a very limited way. The point is not to render concepts lifeless, useless towards creative innovation but to enable an on-going operational meta-stability between expressive potential, evolutive adaptability and operational consistency and adequacy.

Our project will be composed of five chapters. Chapter 1, Putting the Image in its Place, will present the experience of participating in a film screening as a relational and associative process in order to undo the dualistic spectator/screen relationship reflective of the subject/object relation. How does an emergent interconnected relationality arise and how does one locate its happening? If memory is constituted as image and place, we look at the 'external' image as part of the tradition of 'memory as integrative process' to better understand what the image as experience contained within place is about. In this chapter, we present that which is happening as an associated milieu in order to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place between the participants and the conditioning territorialities as an environment where the milieu allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being as an event of taking-form as experience. In this way, the associated milieu is the setting and environment of concretion where participants condition each other in order to form something which in turn, simultaneously, allows these very same things to take form themselves.

To re-activate memory as a concept literally "requires a kick in the imagination, a wrenching of tired words" (Daly, 1985: 190). Thus Chapter 2, Memory as an Integrative Process, examines and re-activates the concept-cluster of words surrounding memory not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical tradition from which speculative thought emerges. Over the past three centuries the fuller meanings of this constellation of words have lost their relevance in favour of a scientific definition of memory based on the stockpiling of information as physio-electrochemical synthesis in the recesses of the brain magically adduced by some sort of

representational imagination<sup>3</sup>. Instead of the mechanistic transfer of sensorial impressions along nerve paths to the brain and their conversion into memories through electrochemical operations on networked neural bundles, we propose an alternate mechanism for memory predicated on the processual memory-image in terms of a performative (re)creation of the image content which urges us to (re)produce the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires duration through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory circuit, in which it is operative.

In discussing the image of thought in *Difference and Repetition* (1994), Deleuze considers a process of eliminating all presuppositions in thought as a way to begin with philosophy. He writes that this would entail at the very least a regression to perceptual experience as pure being in order to constitute a beginning even if it is only by virtue of referring all its presuppositions back to a sensible, concrete empirical being which can be known implicitly without concepts. Chapters 3 and 4 will deal with the complementary concepts of Faciality and The Fold from the point of view of imagistic thought and memory. Central to the discussion will be the process of adumbration by which the many become one as the *perpetuum mobile* of the eventual continuity of change in actuality as being. We shall advance that the façade of becoming actual of the

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<sup>3</sup> Imagination is here used as a transitive verb.

world as a moving imagistic front interfaces with perception as the integrated affirmation of being one with the world as constitutive of the fold. The operative function of the fold will be discussed through the invocation of models previously mentioned but primarily through the use of Girard Desargues' theorem as the culmination of perspective and the instauration of projective geometry as a possible model for the apparatus "of correspondence between mind and matter" (Bergson, 1944: 398). This will be further developed topologically to develop the connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a closed surface which would allow the continuous associative motion of territories upon it as expressive of local machinic activity within the monadic movement of process.

The final chapter completes the picture, so to speak, in order to look at the 'internal' imagistic process. The first chapter will deal with experience, the second with the image of the world, the third with processual advance, the fourth with the interfacing of the internal and the external and Chapter 5, On the Creation of the Image Concept, will detail the process of imagination as a faculty. This chapter will review the historical evolution of the arts of memory in order to show how the development of memory images led to the creation of image concepts in the service of rhetoric by way of pictorial Renaissance mnemonic devices called *imagines agentes*. We then seek to show how these give rise or contribute to such important concepts in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari as the machinic assemblage, the constitution of territorialization, the planomenon and the ecumenon, the plane of consistency and the plane of immanence. One will also be able to see emerge an interesting processual

correspondence between the workings of the image concept as an 'interior image' and the 'external image'; even if both types of images are seen as different in character, there is interesting correspondence between the way a concept is constituted internally within imagistic thought and the way that we've written about activity in actuality and its containment in the first chapter—to wit, the internal workings will inform the understanding of the external and vice versa in a way that echoes the *ritornello* of the operational unity of the universe as part of the mnemonic tradition in terms of an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, of the body and the mind, of the outside and the inside: "As above, so below".

*Becoming One with the Screen* shares with *A Thousand Plateaus* the difficulty of trying to present concepts which are so polyandrously concretised within the project that to cause them into appearance as a linear unfolding from the first page to the last will not always be possible: every concept relates with every other concept concretely and reticularly as an on-going dynamic process that to express this multiplicity as the linear unravelling of a thread is not always feasible. Thus, I ask in advance for forbearance from the reader as they progress through the text; if a concept is explicated elsewhere as part of a more pertinent exposition, we will offer cross-referencing links in the footnotes to the relevant passages.

We are very aware that *Becoming One with the Image* is a piece of academic writing and as such a poor substitution for that which it tries to understand: how experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process.

Buddhists are fond of saying that pointing at the moon is not the same as the moon— and there will be a lot of pointing at the moon in *Becoming One with the Image*! But perhaps reading it will make our arm less tired, or let us drop our arm to scratch our head to think of why we are pointing at the moon<sup>4</sup> or extend our arm so we can touch the moon to attest that it is in fact Camembert cheese and shake hands with Georges Méliès' insectoid Selenites! All thought is political in the large sense of the word and at the heart of imagistic thought is an integrated ecological understanding of non-privileged equality and empathy. If *Becoming One with the Image* can move us in that direction then it will have been a successful endeavour.

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<sup>4</sup> Why people supposedly scratch their head when they think is beyond me!



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## Putting the Cinematic Event in its Place

If we ask you to visualize a room, you would likely imagine four walls, a floor and a ceiling. You will likely add a door so you can enter the room and a window to let in the sunshine and fresh air. You will decorate and furnish it and you will likely eventually envision yourself or people you know engaged in some activity or other within it. Thus, your conception of the room would likely entail physical boundaries, a contained volume and an intended use, so that reduced to its barest essentials, we can imagine the physically bounded volume to take on any form we wish; the walls, floor and ceiling can assume any shape or material we desire; and we can dedicate this space to whatever use we fancy. With these suppositions we can engage this Pandora's box of ideas to reflect on fundamental questions dealing with space, place and our participation in actuality in terms of the event. They force us to consider questions dealing with the concept of the container, what delimits the container, and that which is contained.

We as Westerners usually understand space in terms of a Euclidian 3-D space because it is the one we feel we understand implicitly and most accept intuitively as our model of physical reality, specially seeing how we have learned to reify it perceptually. We refer to space as Euclidian because its construction conforms with the intelligible geometrical depiction of space as laid out in Euclid's Elements and the expression of geometrical truths which concur with our sensorial understanding of actuality.

The room is a simple and neat example of a spatial container: the walls, floor and ceiling isolate, delineate, outline, demarcate, confine, impound, enclose and contain a closed volume of space that can be understood perceptually as having depth, width, height. If we abstract the room and conceive it as a cube sitting in space, we end up with an enclosed volume—a hollow, distinct, stand-alone entity—that is differentiated from the surrounding space by its hard-sided boundaries. This enclosed parcel of space which has length, breadth and depth and contained within space is referred to as a place, especially in that we can relate its location to another place. As such, a “place” can be defined in a number of ways: by the volume contained, by the inside surfaces that are in contact with and contain the volume, by the outside surface of the entity which is in contact with the space that surrounds it, and by the “hollowed” volume in space which confines and allows the entity to occupy that space. The room can also be understood in any of these ways, i.e. it can be seen either as the physical limit of the enclosed volume of space as separate from that which contains it, as in a room or the room, or it can be seen as that which is contained within the limits of the physical boundary, room as in room to move. The difference between a room and a place is that a place is a more or less open yet delimited expanse of location for activity whereas the usual conception of a room requires that it be closed. As such, each definition presents different ways of understanding the limit function of that which occupies place and how it goes about doing so. However, we must bear in mind that this sets up a very significant implicit duality of inclusion/exclusion, i.e. of inside/outside, between that which is contained as the what is happening and that which contains it as that which allows the happening to

take place: to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, it represents the binary segmentarity of the dualist opposition of inside and outside (2007: 208). The container allows the happening to be enclosed for its own protection, in order to maintain its integrity. Place seems to want to make the spatial distinction between the location of that which is happening and that which is not in terms of activity as occupation (thereby bringing in aspects of temporality into the mix) whereas room seems to make the objectifying distinction between that which is contained and that which contains it in terms of a static, purely geometric understanding of space.

In order to locate place in space, to establish its location, we make recourse to a relative coordinate system. Greek mathematicians had developed an objective volumetric conception of objects as having length, width and depth but they had not made the leap to a locatory description of place within space in terms of the locus of coordinates measured off on orthogonal axes. Relative location is derived from an extension of Descartes' planar paired coordinate system into a coordinate system involving three dimensions: we set up three intersecting orthogonal planes which in turn create three orthogonal lines or axes where pairs of planes intersect. We define location relative to an arbitrary Origin—the point where the three planes intersect— from which we can metrically specify relative position between different entities as measurements, dimensions along the axes in Euclidian 3-D space (E3). The origin, the "0" point for the metric determination of any local coordinate systems is arbitrary and can be established anywhere we wish. Even so, in order to identify the location of a thing or as an event  $x$ , one has to identify some motionless point of reference and

Newton understood this requisite in order to postulate his dynamics. To make this work, he situates space within an intelligible absolute, abstract, ideal void that is eternal, unchanging, ungenerated and indestructible. This void simultaneously permeates and engulfs sensible space and renders it into a determinate whole; it allows its overcoding and gridding (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 212). This absolute emptiness is infinitely extended, homogenous and isotropic both spatially and temporally yet inconceivable in its totality: it homogenises both space and time thereby allowing their consistent metrical expression. This establishes the limit of the place/space relation of actuality. i.e. that which contains that which contains that which contains, ad infinitum as contained and container where that which encloses and contains space is understood in terms of a theosophic construction that characterizes genesis and teleology as well as the mechanics of causality, potentiality and necessity through divine intervention.

In this conception of space we have a clear notion of spatial and temporal location in that they are regular modalities which reflect the qualities of the homogenous, isotropic and infinitely extended absolute space. Time is a one-dimensional, independent variable which functions as a Euclidian linear entity,  $E_1$ , and ranges over the  $E_3$  space so that given two points,  $x$  and  $x'$ , "i.e. two different events, we have a well-defined notion of their spatial separation, namely the distance between the points  $x$  and  $x'$  of  $E_3$ , and we also have a well-defined notion of their time difference, namely the separation between  $t$  and  $t'$  as measured in  $E_1$ " (Penrose, 2004: 385). So that given two events in space, we have a clear notion of the distance between the two events, two localizable goings-on, as well as a clear notion of their temporal

separation, i.e. the time interval between them: temporal separation is predicated on metricized time as the standardized measure of processual change. According to this model, all events, everything that happens, literally, 'takes place' within space; all activity—all that which exists as an event—happens within the confines of the cosmic container and is fully determinable and determinate as an entity that is separate and distinct from that which bounds and isolates it. Given this striated space, a space that is overcoded and gridded, all events  $x_n$  are fully determinable and in their place and result from a linear cause and effect causality. "It is a space in which objects are situated independently of the presence of subjects" (Lemay and Steiner, 2010: 939) so events are seen as existing as objectified, fully-determined and determinable, stand-alone durational entities spatially and temporally contained as an individualization.

If we jump from the abstract space of mathematics into a more general consideration of the event and of space within this conception, the event can be seen to be set in a place, i.e. as taking form, enclosed within the volume created by the space that circumscribes it or spatially contained by the walls of the room that create a place for it. Obviously, we can also identify the room according to what activity occupies the space within the room so that the activities in terms of relations that occupy the space, that take place, in a room are what define it: that which goes on inside is what enables us to label it. The intended use of the room, its teleological intention, usually defines the activity as event that takes place in it—its occupation—the simple act of naming its purpose, i.e. labelling it, immediately conditions its use. This might seem like a trivial statement but the functional conditioning of the label is often ingrained more deeply

than we realize. For example, the installation “The Empty Museum” by Russian artists Ilya and Emilia Kabacov shown at the 5th Mercosul Bienal in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2007 illustrates this deep conditioning rather well. “The piece reconstructs a true-to-life exhibit room from a traditional museum in a room at the Bienal: all the details such as decoration, furniture and illumination are in place, except that there are no “pictures” on the walls. Although the walls of the installation are empty, with illumination highlighting where the “pictures” should be, the viewers engage the environment and exhibit of “missing pictures” in the same way as if there were “pictures” on the wall” (Oliveira & Rebolledo, 2010). A gallery thus becomes the place where the only thing to be done is to look at pictures on the wall; a movie theater is the place where the only thing to be done is to look at a movie on a screen; a classroom is a place where the only thing to be done is to listen to the lecturer. It is interesting to note that no other activity is likely to be tolerated that detracts from the primary one i.e. in the case of the movie theatre, no talking, no eating, no texting, etc. In this respect, the label acts as an order-word, as an envelope for the implicit pre-conditions contained by the name as an assemblage of enunciations which “designate this instantaneous relation between statements and the incorporeal transformations on non-corporeal attributes they express” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2007: 81).

Usually the simple label applied to a place is sufficient to define its occupation and curtail its possibilities. It conditions how it is going to be used, how time will be spent and defines what kinds of bodies can participate and the types of relations can be entertained in the space: one does not eat in the living room, nor does one play ball in

the kitchen with the dog. The simple act of naming the room, of designating its occupation, creates a virtual, conditioned spatial container for the event—not metaphorically by containing it in terms of creating boundaries with walls for the event, but by providing a telonomical place-holder for the disposition of the unfolding continuity of the event as a subset of all possible relations. Paraphrasing Massumi, the label constitutes “the set of mediating actions shepherding the abstractly thought object into concrete embodiment” (2009: 7). Thus, a sign such as “Cinema 1” above the entrance as an identifier of a room’s purpose preconditions and limits the room’s potential as to its use. The label tells us that whatever activity as an expression of relation we choose to entertain is what gives ultimate meaning to the room either as a spatial unfolding, i.e. taking up room, or as a temporal unfolding, i.e. going on, or as a combination of both as taking place. This label provides causal traction and gives direction to the event although its shape, its body, is only determinable in the event’s unfolding. Whitehead calls the active, relational process of fulfilling the label’s *telos* the “satisfaction”—“The notion of 'satisfaction' is the notion of the 'entity as concrete' abstracted from the 'process of concrescence'; it is the outcome separated from the process... which is both process and outcome” (Whitehead, 1985: 84). Although the processual unfolding of the event is preconditioned by the satisfaction as a “lure”, its actual unfolding is anything but fully determined and its final outcome will be the expression of the event. The label that we accord to the event and its unfolding is not only the name of the event as an objectified entity but as a lure serves as the attractor



which draws the memorial<sup>5</sup> integration of the event—Whitehead’s “lure for feeling” as that which incites “the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question” (Whitehead, 1985: 40). The move towards satisfaction allows concrescence within the super-saturated environment of relational potential and results in the “intensification of ‘formal immediacy’” (Whitehead, 1985: 88).<sup>6</sup>

In contrast to the lure for feeling, Simondon proposes transduction as the operative causality which drives individuation. But the process requires an order-word which acts as a crystal seed which patterns the information as “the very operation of taking on form” (Combes, 2012: 9) within the super-saturated relational medium. As such, that which the order-word designates as seed is a given made up of an infinite recursivity of prior individuations which themselves can be seen as individualizations expressive of extremely complex junctions of inter-penetrated myriad territorialities.<sup>7</sup> These enfoldings of relations and potentials are integrated memorially into vast expanses of relational operational coherence which in turn are capable of enmeshing associatively as part and parcel of other individuations. The lure for feeling can only be effective if these indispensable order-word designates as defining elements are in place; without them there can be no associative aggregative accretion as constitutive of the event. No matter how much labelling we invoke, the pre-conditions that define the

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<sup>5</sup> Memorial integration is dealt with in Chap. 2.

<sup>6</sup> This super-saturation, this over-concentration, of potential-coming-together at the intersection of inter-penetrated myriad territorialities as bodies results in the event expressed as a manifestation of excess, of coming-together-brimming-over the containment of inclusion.

<sup>7</sup> This is why we must always start in the middle.

order-word as seed must be in place. In the case of the cinematic event, the preconditions that must be in place are of a technical nature<sup>8</sup>:

- a high-intensity light source
- a film with sprockets to match the pull-down apparatus
- a rotating shutter mechanism
- a pull-down claw apparatus that works in synch with the shutter
- a gate, aperture plate or frame
- a lens system matched to the projection space
- a reflective screen
- a film

Without these technical preconditions, the cinematic event cannot emerge as each element is a fundamental contributor to that which constitutes the medium and an integral determinant of the possibility of the projection as a cinematic event. Everything else is superfluous: the bucket seats, the popcorn, the arena seating, the THX Surround, etc. And in our case, as will be seen later, the subjectifying apparatus is the associated milieu encompassing the cinematic effect of the constituent as eventual.

If we consider this the constitutive seed of the cinematic event we can move on to consider its conditions of possibility as causes of existence (Combes, 2012: 13). There is a tension within the constitution of the event between the idea-word that proposes the necessary essential preconditions as given for the event's coming into being and the progressive satisfaction of the lure for feeling of the event, but neither is the event. The

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<sup>8</sup> This pertains specifically to the cinematic event during projectino specifically and not to spectatorship.

tension is progressively and gradually resolved through the activation of conditionings and their integration. The pre-constituted given as seed offers the what to latch onto and the lure draws it towards satisfaction—yet, the satisfaction which linguistically we can call a perfection will never be perfected because the event will never consummate its full potential as to what can unfold from it. And although the space of the event is indefinite and the participative relational possibilities are wide open, this localized intensification of relations which expresses itself as an individuation, as the event taking place “contained” in the getting into the film as shared experience between all participants (human and non-human alike), once operationally coherent as a screening it can be seen as an individualization that stands out from the “background”. As an individuation its operational coherence is recognized and identified but the interconnectedness of the continuum is maintained; there is no break with the processual unfolding of the world—this local individuation is coherent and consistent with the general unfolding of process.<sup>9</sup> However, considering the event as an individuation is not a question of rendering it a static object: the event as such will never exhaust its infinite relational potential—the expression of the operational coherence of the relational dynamic of projecting a film onto a screen is an open-ended proposition. Hence, Simondon points out that “individuation must be understood as the becoming of being,

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<sup>9</sup> Only the mapping, the attentional focus, need be changed to bring out en relief, to foreground, some other new event.

and not as a model of being that would exhaust its signification” (Simondon, 2009: 13).

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Thus, apart from the room as container which dictates its use by its label, or by the activities taking place within it, there needs be a conspiracy of conditionings within the space which inform the what and the how an activity can take place within the space. Take for example any empty room with blank walls. As an environment, its potential is unlimited in terms of “housing” an event. As we modify it, dress it, adorn it, decorate it and fill it with objects that condition our movement and relational expression and occupy the space, its degrees of freedom in terms of what can and cannot be done in that space will be curtailed. This physical occupation will define the functionality of the room, reduce its options and limit its potential in terms of its ability to express occupational possibility not only in terms of volume but in terms of what activities can literally take place within it: by adding a bed, a dresser, a bedside table, a lamp, etc. we will eventually conclude that we have content within the room which conditions that which will be able to take place within it and how—it can be the site for sleeping, for sex, for healing, for playing, for reading.... And if we become willing participants within this relational ecology repeatedly and compose with the given contents so that the same relational activity repeats itself, eventually, in the sense of becoming-event, we will be able to call this manifold collection of recurring relational possibilities within the delimited space a “bedroom” as the operative order-word. This belies a another tension between the "order word" and the lure for feeling in that if we

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<sup>10</sup> It bears pointing out here that the seamless, organic process of individuation is the becoming of being in terms of relational dynamic is the “eventual” unfolding of actuality.

propose "bedroom" as the order word a variety of lures for feeling can become simultaneously activated and produce unexpected becoming-events as untoward novelty. Thus, the becoming-event composes with the relational potential available within the container of information as creative possibility in which there is always an element of surprise because of the indeterminate causal conditionings at play. However, if we can lessen the indeterminacy of the relational potential, when we return to the room and (re)call into being our habituated conditioned movements and gestures within this space and (re)member these relational conditionings to the experiencing of the location as repeatable event taking form through the (re)collection of all the constituent relations conditioned by the environmental participants, we end up with an operational solidarity as a navigational familiarity as cartography of memory. That which we eventually end up with is "not the result of a simple step-by-step accumulation, or of a piecemeal adding together of elements. It is non-decomposable. It is holistic. It's not a structure... It does not add elements together to form a structural unity. Rather, it is a holism effect that adds a whole new dimension of existence to the elements' diversity" (Massumi, 2009: 11)—but what can be advanced in novelty is also operative in repetition if the constituent causal determinants are in place. As such, what was just eventual has become the event perfected as the consummation of the relational possibilities as an operational coherence proffered by the *agencement* of the conditionings in place—here *agencement* is understood simultaneously as agency and information<sup>11</sup> immanently arising from the relational conditioning as causal determinant

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<sup>11</sup> Information in the Simondonian sense.

resulting from the disposition of the participants as an assemblage. The *agencement* as a fielding of conditioned relationality as subjective arises from the immanent territory which takes place as a plane of experiential consistency as operational coherence where activity informs the becoming as the eventual (re)calling into being of the individuation as memory pulled along by the lure for feeling. The room itself, as four walls, has now become almost irrelevant other than it allows for the simple designation of the location of the event, and what we are doing is moving towards composing the room not as a spatial, volumetric construction but as the location that houses the repeatable expression of the conditionings of relation, i.e. place as the location of memory. Hence, that which constitutes the place of the event—the taking-up-space within the room—is not the room qua room in terms of physical containment, but the locus of participation created by neighbourhoods of conditioned relational occupation where the homeostasis afforded by participation sustains the meta-stable tension between that which takes place and that which gives room. The locus of participation as that which takes place is easy to conceive as the body of the event and its shape is the manifestation of the event itself at the location where it takes place in its unfolding.

Case in point, recently, it has become commonplace in Montreal for various festivals to offer free open-air screenings for the enjoyment of film-loving Montrealers. Films are projected on impromptu screens set-up in parks, in the street, on the walls of buildings, etc. The conditions for the cinematic experience are in place within the non-specific urban setting but the how of the cinematic event's containment is more difficult

to pin down<sup>12</sup>—one would think that by removing the roof and the walls of the cinema, the event would lose the preconditioning of the environment which gives it form. There is a liberating aspect to watching a film projection out of doors, *à la belle étoile*... until it begins to rain. Containment curtails the activity's relational freedom and "frames" it by enclosing it and structuring its future (re)productive compossibility but at the same time it protects it from external forces seeking its undoing and affords it durational heft. If we consider a cinema's screening room's volumetric extension as a room—the room *qua* room—we can see that to a degree it is *almost* irrelevant to the conception of the event other than in considering capaciousness as determinate of extent as the subjective expression of the holding together of the event. The room's walls are relevant only if while creating capacity for relation they are also concretely<sup>13</sup> creating conditioning modalities other than containment towards the arising of the event: other than the single "gesture" of containing the screening event, the walls of the cinema provide darkness, soundproofing, protection from the elements and somewhere to hang the screen. So that the room as container for the event is a red herring in that it does not create the space within which the event occurs... if anything it contains it so that the event may more easily be posited as a closed-off system created through external agency or at best as an isolated causal system.

The location *per se* is not the event nor constitutive of it—the event only needs a location and room for its unfolding: the room as room is only metonymical. The

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<sup>12</sup> It is the containment created by the relational field. But it is intuition as that which allows one to recognize the *agencement* through the novel assemblage.

<sup>13</sup> Concretely in the Simondonian sense of doing double duty or more (if it is particularly enterprising), as creating a functional associative bridge between machinic assemblages as constituting continuity or operational extension as consistency.

containment is a body as a self, contained, self-contained expressive of the unity created by the identified and named processual operational coherence of the activity at hand as event. The constitution is a fragile attentional coercion induced by the relational directivity necessary for the coming-to-being of the event. This relational directivity is not to dictate the outcome of the event, but to (re)call and (re)collect the elements that together as a coming-to-being lead to the event's constitution. The relational directivity of the associative operational coherence of environmental factors is constituted by the gradual application of a set of accretionary inductions that can be understood abstractly as compelling the unfolding but which act in a concrete way to activate relations which lead experience where it needs to go. These accretionary shifts which inform the becoming event are also eventual, in that they are events which alter the unfolding thereby changing the dynamic as reflective of the activated memorial circuit as becoming. Thus, the event is a dynamic cohesion composed of the gradual interpenetration of the immanent co-arising of territorialities and bodies. Territorialities can be understood as active, material and non-material conditioned expanses of relation that go beyond the internalism/externalism debate: they are open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zones of integrated relational intensities where that which conditions constitutes ingression and cohesion.<sup>14</sup> As such, these territorializations as expanses of consistency or operational coherence interact as relational entities that condition as they themselves become the becoming aggregative accretion of the event as an

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<sup>14</sup> the intersection of territorializations of potential engagements constituting the event as an open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zone of relational intensities arising from that which acts as the defining constitutive seed.



individuation. Even though there is a multiplicity of these territorialities, we can identify several major ones that condition the space of relation—these territorializing preconditions can be experiential, technical or material—although it is sometimes difficult to draw the line as to what is which. Within a movie theatre, they are intended to encourage a heightened relation with the screen by entraining the accreting becoming-event into sequences of imbricated expanses of relational consensus which meld and dissolve into one another as giving way or leading to the various phases of the incipient experiential event taking hold. For example, the experiential could be linked to the posters in the lobby, the sham glamour, the expectant line-ups, the ticket-taker tearing tickets, having a pee before the show, buying popcorn and a soft-drink, the cinema-based quizzes, the turning off of cell phones, etc. The technical include a darkened exhibition space, plush stadium seating, full-range surround sound, superior optics to the projector lens, high-intensity projector lamp, large format film, etc. In the cinema, the screening room itself constitutes the major set of material environmental territorializing preconditions in that the room is conceived for a specific purpose and subscribes to the exigencies of accommodating this particular type of event. The floor is sloped away from the vertical wall supporting the reflective screen and terraced to accommodate stadium seating; the speakers are for the most part oriented towards the seating area; the projector is placed behind the seating diametrically opposite to the screen; etc. The seats themselves are relevant and indispensable in conditioning the event: for example, merely by occupying the space, by filling up the volume of the room, through their affirmation of the directionality of the relation, they restrict movement,

limit degrees of freedom, curtail the potential of what can be done in the room. These constraints induce relation to be expressed in specific ways, if anything to make sure the event unfolds as it should and that there is no variation when it is repeated. The modality of relation that these environmental constituents as active participants impose not only conditions how the screening takes place but how the human spectators move within the room, relate to each other and to the screen: they colour the event itself in that all participants will engage (or not) each other as a function of the relational preconditions established by the spatial disposition of these material accessories or inductions. For example, the fact that the seating is facing the screen curtails the possibility of interaction between the spectators, i.e. the directionality of the seating communicates a specificity as to that which can unfold and how it will unfold as activity in that space. The screen is an attractor that encourages and directs attention and conditions the modality of relation so that "eyes on wall" is the operative drive. But perhaps the most important aspect of this analysis is that these furnishings considered as participants in the event not only take up space, they, in conjunction with the human participants, are simultaneously cause and attribute to the creation of the event: as such, the gradual accretionary effect of progressive territorializations constitutes and expresses an integrative immanence "as the unity of efficient and formal cause" (Deleuze, 1992: 165) where causality can no longer be seen as the result of linear cause and effect but as an interdependent co-arising.

Material and experiential pre-conditions have temporal and proximal values attached to them: their impact is weighted according to values of intensity in terms of

spatial and temporal distance. But non-immediate conditioning inductions cannot be discounted: experiential pre-conditionings that will impact on the experience of the screening could include reading a film review on a blog, a discussion about film over tea by two of the spectators the week before the screening, the physical resemblance of the one of the actors with the next door neighbour, or a screening of another film at another cinema. Although the impact of these non-immediate conditioning inductions might be deemed irrelevant or unimportant to the unfolding of the actual event, they underscore the progressive expression of the intensification of the event as a gradual processual coming-into-being over time. These inductions—material, non-material, environmental, experiential, etc—work as a haphazard concertation and contribute to the modulation of attentive interest as informational drives which increase the probability of an event's occurrence; they have a directive role in the pre-constitutive phases of the event's life-arc as productive of continuity and negotiate the relational continuity of coming-into-being as a memorial integration of (re)membering the constitutional direction of the coming-into-being. The coming-into-being is not a clustering as an instantaneous singularity that happens when all the elementary ingredients are assembled together in the container. The formation of the event as such is a progressive imbrication in time which requires the layered creation, dissolution, amalgamation of pre-constitutive steps leading to an aggregation of participants which as a gradual gaining of definition create the body of the event as an ontogenetic process. These pre-constitutive steps are pre-conditioning and not per se constitutive of the event as direct participants—as "stepping stones" they participate in the directed

relational bridging of causal determinacy from phase to phase of the informational process of the constitution of the event as a memorial discourse.<sup>15</sup> We would be remiss at this point if we neglected to underline that this relational inter-conditioning is at the basis of the continuity of actuality that Whitehead would call the extensive continuum: without that, this cannot be; without this, that cannot be—this inter-conditioning can be extended to infinity so that an organic continuity of relational process is established throughout as a continuum. This continuity blurs the demarcation of the lines of the where and when of the event, what constitutes participation and how deep we need to go so as to establish the genetic origin of the event.

What about the human participants? How does the “me” enter into experiential relation in the seminar as an event? In order to answer these questions, instead of preserving the “I” as an entity, as an unchanging, objective identity, we need to think in terms of individuation. The words “I” or “me” refer to a continual re-inventing of the self, to the continuous production of new relational entities, as that which create new modes and states of relation not only with each other, but with the environmental inductions of the event by dynamically (actively in motion) engaging all others—the gradual accretion of the aggregation as eventual changes the internal constitution of the aggregating body of the event as well as that of the associated participants. This is an important point because in the event as an individuation the subjectivizing dynamic is not the human; the event as subjectivizing, vinculates the participants and extends

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<sup>15</sup> Later we will see these as territorial entities. Territorialities can be understood as active, material and non-material conditioned expanses of relation: they are open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zones of integrated concretized relational intensities.

beyond the human participant or the self as static spectator within the knower-known relation. To quote Deleuze, “This dimension of the Self is not a preexisting determination that can be found ready-made... A line of subjectivation is a process, a production of subjectivity in an apparatus: it must be made to the extent that the apparatus allows it or makes it possible” (Two Regimes: 341).

Although we have been referring to the human participants as preconstituted entities, the preconstituted “I” as a participant in the event does not per se exist. Instead, the spectatorial “me” can be seen as the dynamic, indeterminate plurality of the continuous reconstitution of relations as an individualization within fields of experience. This indeterminate plurality of relations is deemed a body, not in terms of a human body, nor in its “simple materiality, by its occupying space (‘extension’), or by organic structure. It is defined by the relation of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speed and slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and its internal milieu” (Baugh, 2005: 31). And for each and every participant in the screening, human and non-human alike, we can say the same thing—they each carry the same democratic participatory heft in establishing the event qua event. Territorialities entrain, captivate and entrance bodies into relation by “grounding” or “preconditioning” the reciprocal recursive causality of relations that are setting up the incipient experiential event taking hold as an individuation, as a body at the level of species. It becomes a “system of individuations, an individuating system and a system individuating itself” (Simondon, 2009: 7). The event becomes an immanative, dynamic, coherent whole, a body composed of a multiplicity of bodies informed by

enabling constraints, inflected by disparate physical and non-physical inductions through their effects and their abilities to enter into relation. Here, participants are environmental, human, material or affective: they are physical and non-physical alike where “Participation... is the fact of being an element in a greater individuation...” (Simondon, 2009: 9) *où c'est la memoire du monde qui nous emporte.*

I am ensconced in the darkness of my neighborhood cinema, in a plush club chair, my line of sight slightly above dead center of the curved screen, at the focal point of the 5.1 surround sound. I can sense the audience slowly coming together, getting into the mindset of watching a film. Everyone is forgetting their cares, connecting with their movie companion or distracted by the innocuous trivia and advertising flashed onto the screen. I allow the dampened noise of people finding their seats to wash over me and the hushed conversations and laughter to permeate my being. In the penumbra of the cavernous cinema, the dark tones of the wall coverings and the club seating lulls everyone into a homogeneous multitude—into a shared spatio-temporal headspace. By the time the feature film starts, the “me” no longer realizes that it is sitting. It is halfway to forgetting that it has a body. It is becoming one with the chair which is already one with the hall, which is one with the projector, the arc in the bulb and the modulated light beam coursing through space, the narrativized energy reflected on the screen, impinging on my retina which has been impatiently expecting it to close the machinic loop. As Brian Massumi asks, “Didn’t Bergson argue in *Matter and Memory* (chapter 1) that we are beings of light, effects of differential movements? That our bodies, or for

that matter all of matter, are interactions of light with surface dimensions of itself?”  
(Massumi: 1998)

I disconnect for a second... the guy behind me just kicked my seat while trying to find his own center of comfort. The deterritorialized “me” is reminded that the production of the relational meta-stability with the spectacle is a fragile one and I would like to inform them of that fact. As I turn around to establish a new field of relations, i.e. to either chide him or give him a dirty look, my attention is drawn by the faces of the spectators behind me. I see the white of their eyes oscillating in unison, in concert with the modulating coloured glows on their faces. I can sense that everyone is now breathing as one, gasping as one, flinching as one, laughing as one, crying as one: one for all and all for one within the feedback process of the spectacle unfolding before us within which we are enveloped. The all of “me’s” have become lost in this communal flurry of ocular saccades, sonic sampling, shared micro-bursts of memory, and jolts of pleasure melding into one from the sheer enjoyment of consciousness unwittingly being so emphatically and polyphonically turned-on on so many levels. I turn around, and immediately get back into the movie to become one once again with the enormity of the giant screen, the power of the surround sound, and the plushness of the seating. That which was “me” is now continuously engaged in a continuous process of de-territorializing and re-territorializing relations as the film unspools. The content of the film redefines the “me” at the same time that I redefine it as my aggregative understanding of the unfolding narrative as my experience within the conditioning environmental, technological, spectatorial conditions that are equal participants in that

which we are calling the cinematic event. This working together of tangible and intangible relations, the creation of relational territories through de-territorializing and re-territorializing assemblages within a durational continuity is what constitutes the associated milieu of the cinematic event. In other words, in the cinematic event as a machinic assemblage, the experience incessantly re-invents itself as a subjectified cluster as a recurrent, reciprocal causal dynamic: the associated milieu is not so much an apparatus or machine which transforms but the expression of the integrated sequential process which oversees the alternation between the aggregation of planes of consistency as a simultaneous, reciprocal constitution imbued with duration and its subsequent dissolution or break up to make itself available as potential constitutive material towards the aggregation of new planes of consistency as machinic assemblages capable of extending the duration of the event.<sup>16</sup>

Usually, the event as a significant occasion is defined as a happening taking place at a particular location and at a particular time, where entering the designated location and starting the event at the scheduled time constitutes the inception of the event as a stand-alone entity. Although one usually refers to the cinematic event as the screening, which starts when the lights are dimmed and the curtain of the *arco scenico* goes up, or when the projection begins, this “instantaneous” crossing of the threshold fails to consider the gradual coming-to-being of the event and is part of the conception of the

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<sup>16</sup> Yet, the projection as an event can in turn be related to other events that are simultaneously taking place: the importance of the spectacle relativized to other happenings in the room allows it to stand out as the dominant and distinct individuation from all others—i.e. people necking, eating popcorn, texting or daydreaming without paying attention to the film, etc—the film becomes one-event-among-a-possible-many and not the-one-and-only event at that time. And though this “democratic” deployment of possible activity might seem disruptive, spectators are cognizant that there are other activities taking place while the main one is happening even if they are more or less tolerant of these other events taking place.



stand-alone, self-determining, objectified event and of the inside/outside duality. At best, the gradual dimming of the lights and the slow raising of the proscenic curtain can be said to stand-in or symbolise the crossing from the before the event to the actual happening as taking place—as in the time-worn cliché where the groom carries the bride through the threshold. A gate or arch is more descriptive, i.e. a richer expression, of that which constitutes crossing the threshold in terms of what can be expected beyond as often illustrated by the “Gates of Chinatown” in Montreal, San Francisco, Incheon or Manchester. These illustrated gates as images "instantly" prepare us for the inside and outside shift between connected milieus<sup>17</sup>. The contemplation of their ornamental narrativity provides the gradual transition from one environment to the next.

As we have seen, the becoming of the event is a gradual aggregative accretion whose inception is difficult to pinpoint—an exacting binary "on/off" is difficult to provide if anything because of the fuzzy nature of the event. If we examine the enabling pre-conditions which give way to the event and decide on a point that establishes where the cinematic event takes hold, "beneath" the territorializing assemblages which work together to constitute the event, there are always underlying territorializing assemblages that constitute the preconditions to the underlying territorializing assemblages that constitute the preconditions, etc—and we can continue this regression *ad infinitum*, to the beginning of time if we wish.

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<sup>17</sup> Later we will be able to say that these gates as images herald the jump from one memorial register to another.

As we saw earlier, environmental and architectural inductions guide and inform the gradual formation of the event, experiential inductions gradually prepare the way for what awaits us. In our cinema screening example, wending our way through the crowds of the lobby, taking the escalators to the designated cinema, the ticket-taker ripping our ticket, the frisking of my bag for camera devices, lining up to buy popcorn and a soft drink, making our way to our seats, the dimmed lights, the advertising and the on-screen quizzes, etc constitute transitional events which in themselves constitute mini-events which not only announce the coming-to-being of the screening-event as one line of convergence among many but establish imbricated relational layerings which are activated and de-activated in order to allow the activation of other relations etc as progressive linkages, as stepping stones which appear when needed and disappear when they are no longer needed. As stepping stones, they show the way and cue the incipient micro-events which constitute the becoming.

As such, the succession of territorializations (and prior and subsequent de-territorializations) as convergent relational inducements of micro-events as bodies is a better expression of the constitution of the event—a process that “conserves within itself a permanent activity of perpetual individuation” (Simondon, 2009: 7). The event's progressive gradual coming-to-being requires the concurrent coming together, the spatio-temporal convergence, of territories and bodies as constitutive subsidiary events so that strictly speaking it is almost pointless to determine the where and how and when of the inception of the cinematic event. Thus, we need to conceive differently the threshold that must be “crossed” for the event's being considered as happening.

The gradual coming-to-being of the event is a relational intensification where its heft in terms of concretization can only be defined experientially as a knowing that one is in fact in the event. There is no line in the sand which serves as threshold: in the event of day giving way to night, the point in time where day actually becomes night is very difficult to define, though we know when night has come. As the gradual intensification of night overwhelms day, we realize that a threshold has been crossed when it is no longer day and we stand in the darkness of night. We can arbitrarily define a measurable threshold that will define night, e.g. a measure of the intensity of light, but in terms of the event, we can describe the coming of night as the sun going down, the appearance of stars in the sky, the substitution of the sea breeze by a land breeze, workers heading home after work, families preparing for dinner, children preparing for bed, etc. But even in this mundane example, we can see that the constituent territorialities and bodies as actual occasions defining the event are imbued with disparate temporalities of gradated intensification and duration which are themselves entrained into the conrescence here understood as day giving way to night. Once territorialities and bodies actually engage and interpenetrate they can be said to enter into relational participation in the event as an overwhelming, as a beyond the threshold. At the intersection of overlapping territorializations and bodies, thresholds are crossed in order that the individualization can be deemed accomplished. At each juncture, the threshold “interposes itself between two diversities, whose discontinuity it marks by a change in intensity accompanied by a qualitative change in the defining properties of the system.” The threshold is both spatial and temporal: it marks “that moment at which the system

makes the leap into operative-self-solidarity” (Massumi, 2009: 12). And once the experiential threshold has been crossed, in that the participants have come into relation and the event is in full formation, “we must recognize not only the genesis of what participates, but also of what is participated itself, which accounts for the fact of its being participated” (Deleuze, 1992: 171).

In our conception of the event as the dynamic inducement of the becoming-conjunction of these relational conditionings as bodies, the equation of their coming together is not a simple sum, it is not  $a + b + c + d = \text{the event as one}$ , but where the participation of bodies as variables in the relation is what dynamically defines them as they simultaneously, reciprocally instigate their own becoming within an individuation that is different and operationally other than the simple containment of constituent parts in a room as holding tank—the event is a unity that is more than one, “more than unity and more than identity” (Simondon, 2009: 6) in that it is not so much quantitatively the sum total of its parts, the container and the environment which holds them but qualitatively in terms of potential as to what a body can do.

The event as an emergent amalgam of territorialities and bodies acquires and expresses its own spacetime in that it overcodes the spatial extent and individual temporalities of the constituent relations. The event integrates them into a coherent operational entity which expresses its own particular spacetime through the affective tonality of the ensemble as a becoming-body within the experiential milieu that involves and enfolds the participating entities. In French, the term milieu does not only refer to a physical environment or setting, it means “surroundings,” or a “medium” as in

chemistry, or as “middle.” The milieu is normally understood as the ensemble of external conditions within which a living being lives and develops or as the assemblage of material objects and physical circumstances which surround and influence an organism. Conceptually, “milieu” can also be seen as an environment in the widest ecological sense of the term, i.e. as the locus of the dynamic interaction of all the factors and mechanisms that participate in the sustenance of an ecosystem. To paraphrase Massumi (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: XVII), the term milieu should be read as a technical term combining all these meanings. It also changes our understanding when asked to start from the middle, from the milieu.

The concept of the associated milieu, conceived by French philosopher Gilbert Simondon in his book *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques* (1989), is a useful model to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place between the participants and the conditioning territorialities as an environment. The descriptive term "associated" when applied to describe milieu refers to a specific mapping of an ensemble made up of constitutive elements and conditioning environmental modalities which come together to create an individuation through the ongoing exchanges of energy that take place within that specific milieu (Simondon, 1989: 57).

The milieu allows for a reciprocal recursive relational causality to take place between the elements so that we may conceive of spacetime as the immanent plane from which the subject and object arise as the generic activity of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity as a process. “The associated milieu sustains, unites and brings together bodies: it is not a stage upon

which a scene unfolds, or a play where only the actors perform, or a canvas upon which the pigments run into each other, or a manuscript where the words follow each other in sequence.” (Oliveira, 2010). The associated milieu is the setting and environment of concretion where participation conditions as information which in turn, simultaneously, allows the relational to take form itself as operational coherence as unfolding. In other words, the milieu is not a substrate—it allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being as an event of taking-form as experience. According to Deleuze and Guattari: “The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially communicating” (1987: 313).

The associative milieu allows the bringing together of the various participants in the event where memory is expressive of the aligned directionality of the causal efficacy informing and guiding the becoming. As such, memory accommodates process to dissolve the tension in the adaptive evolution taking place between the idea-word and the satisfaction of the lure for feeling. Memory guides the (re)constitution of the relational as the eventual coming together which (re)constitutes the event through its (re)petitioned becoming by not only (re)calling itself into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of the actuality as event. The information of the event as memorial is durational through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of its self-expression as an individuation as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage within the memory circuit in which it

is operative. In this way memory is not essential to the event but conspiratorial with it and with the rest of the world which allows its operation. In this way, memory is not eidetic but paradigmatic in that it is a self-informing knowledge which informs without any external coercion.

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In this chapter we have attempted to present the cinematic event in terms of the film screening. We have shown how the progressive, gradual accretionary agglomeration of relational conditionings whose locus of participation is that which constitutes the body of inclusion of the event. We have demonstrated how the event is constituted as an open-bodied, fuzzy-bounded, concrescence of inter-penetrated territorialities expressed in terms of gradated zones of intensities formulated through considerations of material, environmental and experiential relational conditionings which inflect its unfolding. We have steered away from presenting the event in terms of human subjectivity, and replaced it by the internal logic of the event's becoming as subjectivity. By defining the event in this way, we are trying to build a conceptual scaffolding which will allow us to postulate the event as memory driven. The first step of this construction is the framing of activity as a containment which will then allow us to constitute circuits of memory as informing and guiding process to dissolve the tension in the progress taking place between the idea-word and the satisfaction of the lure for feeling.

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## Memory/Integration

Thus far, we've seen the event as a coming together of participation and have managed to recognize the genesis of the participation. And to paraphrase Deleuze, we still need to come to terms with the what is participated, and that which accounts for its being participated (Deleuze, 1992: 171). What is at stake in the cinematic event as a screening is obviously not the assemblage of the happening of the getting together as a screening: not too many people are willing to shell out \$12.99 to sit in a dark room for two hours. It is somewhat like purchasing a drill—nobody wants a drill as such, they just know that if they want to make a neat hole in the wall they're going to need a drill. In the cinematic event, spectators come to see a film projection. The perfection of that drive is not the attestation of fact that an image appears on the screen but a question of the experience of the satisfaction of the integrative memorial process of becoming one with the screen. And as we saw earlier, the preconditions that must be in place for the projection to happen are of a technical nature. Without these technical preconditions, the cinematic event cannot emerge as each element is a fundamental contributor to that which constitutes the medium as milieu and an integral determinant of the possibility of the projection as a cinematic event. As such, these are the *sine qua non* which constitute the order-word of the cinematic event and it is around the assemblage of these elements as a technical object that "everything" happens. But what is it that happens? They allow the projection of sequenced images on a screen and the creation of the world that surrounds it (Deleuze, 1989: 68).

In the last chapter we formulated the event as a dynamic amalgam of causal conditionings as constitutive of territorialities and bodies emergent in an associated milieu and, as such, it is a convincingly coherent depiction of the event in that it concurs with our experience of it.<sup>18</sup> The organizational aspect of the order-word of the cinematic is focused on the appearance of an image on the screen, which also concurs with the desire for an appearance of an image on our internal screen—the images that appear are putatively "the same" but their constitution is of two different natures: on one side we have the event as an aggregative accretion having its own internal logic and on the other is the event's taking place seemingly for our benefit and satisfaction. Yet this bipolar anthropocentric self-serving you-rub-my-back-and-I'll-rub-yours dynamic, seen as the external manoeuvring of the world solely for the satisfaction of humanity's needs and the humans' formulation of needs that are eventually satisfied by the world, is expressive of a very limited understanding of relation and the interwoven dispersal of causal determinacy of process. We can impute this self-interest to every participant within the assemblage, each one selfishly tugging at the edges of the sheet of relation for their own exclusive satisfaction, but the immanent unfolding of actuality is anything but egocentric; becoming is effortless in its shared co-operative ecology: each relation of terms is marked by completion, by perfection, by their consummation so that there is no possible differentiation between terms and relation as constitutive of the event—terms and relation exist as conjunction, as contractual possibility within its constituents and as constituents.

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<sup>18</sup> If we go along the diminished role of human agency.

So that what makes the event eventful is the fulfillment of participative expectation, of the satisfaction as operative coherence through their integration of the participants' desire for completion. It is this concretization of relations where each participant loses itself as it contributes to the complete satisfaction of the everything-other as perfection is not a selfish, self-centred pursuit but one where completion is understood as shared communal experience as the affirmation of society. The shared concretization of relation as reciprocal and mutual is the realization of completion in the advancement into novelty of the event's information.

But what makes this memorial?

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To think of memory as integrative is an odd premise in that nowadays memory is almost exclusively thought of in terms of the stockpiling of information as images which reconstitute the past and not in terms of how experience as information comes together into a coherent whole. Yet, to conceive of memory in terms of the consolidation of experience is not an outlandish proposal. Words associated with memory such as recollection and remembering allude to this integrative process in that they bring forth the idea of reattachment or gathering together—as in the act of gathering one's thoughts in attempting to organize one's ideas so as to give them order and structure and remember what one wishes to say—as they once did in the memory treatises of the *Ars Memoriae* from Antiquity to the 17th century. However, over the past three centuries the fuller meanings of these words have lost their relevance in favour of a scientific definition of memory based on the stockpiling of information as physio-

electrochemical synthesis in the recesses of the brain magically adduced by some sort of representational imagination<sup>19</sup>.

A common-sense understanding describes the activity here related to memory as the result of the mechanistic transfer of physio-electrochemical sensorial impressions along nerve paths to the brain and their conversion into memories through electrochemical operations on networked neural bundles whose mysterious interaction provide us with the "sound and light show" of consciousness. However, the "imagery" which construes consciousness somehow persists within our brain as the result of impressions made upon the fabric of networked neural bundles. Using the example of vision, the lens of the eye creates an optical image on the retina and its effects make their way through the optic nerves where they imprint themselves onto the mind—a process which concurs with the Ancient's ideation of perception as an impermanent imprint onto a wax tablet with a stylus<sup>20</sup> or as the mirror-image imprint of the matrix of a signet ring on a wax seal. The perduration of the impression can either occur as a result of intensity of impression or through repetition and habituation—the deeper the impression the longer its staying power. Intensity is ideated as the result of a powerful image in terms of shock value or sheer luminous intensity where the effect of either one can be likened to a hot branding iron to the mind: the effect of intense luminosity can be observed in the firing of a high-intensity strobe light which overwhelms the dissipative capacity of the retina and creates an after-image which perdures but which can be overprinted by succeeding after-images. This is the foundation for the

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<sup>19</sup> Imagination is here used as a transitive verb.

<sup>20</sup> This is like as an Etch-a-Sketch

persistence of vision theory where the residual image resulting from cinematic projection as impression is one of the main tenets that lay the groundwork for cinema as a memory-based medium.

The perduration of memory attained through repetition and habituation can be likened to the progressive cutting of a groove or furrow resulting from the repeated treading upon the same path. In terms of memory, at first the impression is faint and ephemeral, then, with repetition, the impression becomes impressed, ingrained, in our neural pathways: the pattern of repetition becomes woven into the fabric of our very being and comes to be expressed as a reticulated behavioural habit which conditions our being as experience in the world. As the body's imagination, as the expression of the body's ability to create images that are non-pictorial, these sensoria as impressions are what we see, what we touch, what we smell, what we hear and how we move—they are the impressions we label images that we recall and remember as the reconstitution of memory. However, these images are barely pictorial in the sense that if we close our eyes and try to bring up one of these images to the mind's eye, we end up with thin, evanescent 'phantasma' which in no way resemble the rich perceptual images from which they were drawn and to which they are compared. If one listens to the first movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's (1770-1827) *Symphony No. 6* (1808), one would readily "visualize" rolling countryside, birds chirping, trees swaying in the wind, sunlight streaming through the leaves... but if we really look at the image created by the music's programmed content, we can see that there is no pastoral landscape to speak of—or at least not in terms of pictorial imagery; nor can we say that what the music sounds like

the countryside! What is the image of the awakening of happy feelings? And to call these impressions in the mind's eye an image is a big statement, for it is quite evident that there is no pictorial image there—the images evoked are memorial and memory-images are actualized only when performatively expressed.<sup>21</sup> It is only as a by-product, as an epi-phenomenon of their performance can memories be enlivened and (re)actualized. This memorial imagistic re-constitution can be either be as powerful as the original direct perception from which they were derived, more powerful or less powerful: it all depends on the richness of what is (re)collected in terms of the (re)membered resultant integration.

But one only needs to observe how one sees to know that we don't see in frames and that the image of the world is not printed on the retina as an image. Vision is at first hand immersive: one "sees" a presentation of the world before us; we can feel our eyes dart to and fro upon/within that visual immersive environment as reality without everything becoming a stop-and-go understanding made up of successions of jumbled swish pans and stills of imagery. The screen upon which the audio-visual show of reality presents itself is at first view stationary and allows us to "pan and scan" upon it as if we were looking at a surround, true-to-life pictorial rendition of the world—we can hold our head steady, and move our eyes within that presentation while acknowledging that the "background screen" remains static. This optical relationship to the world retains the stereoscopic reconciliation which informs depth perception and

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<sup>21</sup> Memory can be performatively expressed via any narrative device or enactment as constitutive of the movement of thought.

where the indeterminacy of the reconciliation of colour differences between the two sides creates the perceptual volume of space.



Fig. 1.1 Mars Landscape Stereo-pair Photographs<sup>22</sup>

This can be demonstrated with a set of stereo-images. We can attest to this by visually superposing one image on top of the other by crossing our eyes over the stereo-pair, and staring at them without a stereoscopic viewer, locking the integration and once the 3-D effect locks in, allowing one's eyes to literally wander over the images. Thus, this reveals a disjunct between the way we see and the way that experience as resolved into an integrated coherent whole as what is. However, it is this resolved static image as our immersive reality which constitutes the screen as the integration of experience into the general unfolding of actuality.<sup>23</sup> It is this static screen which appears to exist and allows our eyes to wander on top of it and not see "differently". And it is

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<sup>22</sup> <http://www.lab-tools.com/instrumentation/StereoPanorama/>

<sup>23</sup> This points to the *firmamentum* as static background and the constellations of stars moving before it.



here that the screen of vision finds its *analogon* in the cinematic screen: the panoramic size and extent of the cinematic screen seeks to duplicate the immersive embrace of the visual. The cinematic screen replicates the relation of vision to the internal screen in that our eyes can travel on the surface of the static screen much the same way that the eyes travel on the surface of the screen of the world as vision. And just as our eyes were locked on the stereo-pair of the surface of Mars as constitutive of the plane of the screen of vision, our eyes are locked on the screen of cinema—and it is because of this invariable parallactic lock on the screen that we interpret the moving spectacle of the projection as just that, a spectacle.<sup>24</sup>

And at the center of this problem memory looms large as explicatory of this fusional imagistic process—not because it pulls together images of pastness to be resolved but because memory itself is the process of integration. As Bergson would say, "Practically, we perceive only the past," (Bergson, M&M p. 150), and we would add, that it is not a question of "practically" for all intents and purposes, but that what we perceive actually at face value is the relationally imagistically bygone as passed, for by the time the image has been created in our mind's eye as a result of our six senses,<sup>25</sup> whatever was its cause, that which produced it, is now gone as "part of the past". But

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<sup>24</sup> The suspension of disbelief has a physiological foundation in the parallactic lock in that as long as my eyes do not need to invoke the correlation of focus to parallax angle the spectacle is "not real". We no longer need to learn this lesson as the first filmgoers had to when they first leapt out of the way of the oncoming train at the screening of *Train Entering the Railroad Station* (1898) by the Azerbaijani film pioneer Aleksandr Mişon (d. 1921), or more recently as the Cuban peasants in a remote mountain village learned "spectatorship" in the Cuban documentary *Por Primera Vez* (1967) <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKf4maMqbVo>.

<sup>25</sup> This can be interpreted naïvely as that which we see, or more scientifically as the complexification of retinotopic mapping on the lateral geniculate nuclei (LGN). Goldstein, Bruce E. (2010) *Sensation and Perception. 8th Edition*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. p.76

we can take this further and say that we perceive in the past because the past is the integration of memory as a déjà-felt of progressive satisfaction of the implicit desire within becoming.

Yet in spite of the disjunct between that which we call an image as a pictorial offering and that which we refer to as a memory-image, we persist in referring to the processes around memory in imagistic terms: it would appear that the concept of the optical image is central to the process of the integration of experience as memory. And in trying to explain consciousness as a reflection of experience, experience has come to be expressed as imagistic—i.e. as a pictorial image which fully expresses the manifestation of the world as it appears before us—even if to express experience solely in terms of the optically pictorial is to shortchange its indescribable fullness: there is not only the sense data of the other five senses to contend with<sup>26</sup>, but their combined inexpressible affectual elusiveness as well as the indiscernible 'hidden' of the stratified plateaus understanding experience. These negatives refer to a lack while simultaneously expressing an existence by the double negative which expresses that which is in terms of that which is not that which is not: it is the light left over once obscurity has stopped encroaching upon it.<sup>27</sup> Yet we persist in referring to these impressions as images and we reify and perpetuate the belief in the image as an image of pastness not only for the

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<sup>26</sup> The visual, the tactile, the olfactory, the auditive, the gustatory and the proprioceptive. Even though our age favours the visual as constituting the image of choice the image of memory is a composite of all the senses.

<sup>27</sup> Still the question lingers: how can we fully express positively the uncorroborable affectual manifestation of experience as process?

short-term memory of the recent past or for the long-ago past of distant memory but for the immediate pastness of perception as an on-going individualization.<sup>28</sup>

To conceive of memory as solely imagistic in terms of a pictorial image is naive even if nowadays it is seen as the dominant popular or common sense of understanding memory—one which is based on the melodramatic nostalgia of the photographic snapshot.<sup>29</sup> But to subscribe to the non-imagistic version emerging with the "scientific Germanic psychology" of the 19th century founded on an experimental physiochemical mechanistic causality (Sahakian p. 103-184) is to sell memory short. This rift in how memory is conceived, i.e. the pictorially imagistic versus the non-imagistic scientific/experimental, has its roots in antiquity in the divide that emerged between the image and the word<sup>30</sup>. But this split proved inconsequential until the widespread proliferation of books in the 16th and 17th centuries<sup>31</sup> which made the dynamic systems of the practical arts of memory obsolete and gave way to the dominant non-imagistic word-based dialectical approach as a linear integrative method of understanding. The appearance of the book as a systematic structuring and organizing technology of knowledge did away with the work of memory and made the *Ars Memoriae*, the arts of memory, outmoded in terms of making sure everyone was on the same page but in a different way.<sup>32</sup> The linear exposition/acquisition of knowledge from writing creates a

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<sup>28</sup> The half-second lapse between the impression and the perception.

<sup>29</sup> And which is now being called melancholic.

<sup>30</sup> The story of Theuth and the King God Thamus in Plato's *Phaedrus* would indicate that the divide was felt by the Ancient Egyptians before it was handed down to the Greeks.

<sup>31</sup> As a result of the invention of the printing press (1440 C.E.) and the instauration of a dialectical method of memory. This is covered in more detail in the last chapter.

<sup>32</sup> We do not wish to be flippant here. On the same page refers both to the pictorial image proper on a flat surface and to the page of words in a book as integrative.

restricted dynamic of cause and effect whose logical progression can ascertain truth more readily than the potentially deceptive sense-based image where the image is not only worth a thousand words but in that there's much hidden in what it shows even if it shows everything.


Nowadays, the popular understanding of memory is such that most everyone conceives of memories either as a collection of snapshots pasted in an album or digitally stored in a hard drive as "zeros and ones", as reconstitutable images or as "memory images as snapshots" squirreled away somewhere in the brain. These collections are usually classified thematically (relationally) or chronologically. No matter how these images are organized and stored, it reflects both a mistrust in the innate ability of the brain to remember and a faith in scientific technology as a superior "substrate" for the upkeep of our memories.<sup>33</sup> In accounts of the aftermath of catastrophic disasters where a person's home is washed away by flood or ravaged by fire, we often hear the following complaints: "My priceless memories were simply washed away" or "My cherished memories went up in smoke." The expression of the obliteration of memories as a result of catastrophic events as disasters is certainly correct, but perhaps not in the way that it is popularly understood!<sup>34</sup> This destruction of memories existing as objective entities outside of the self resides on the belief in the inviolate perduration of the objectively material as opposed to the evanescent, changing and perfidious nature of the ideatic

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<sup>33</sup> I readily associate this to the distrust of the senses and a mistrust in artists and artistic creation which always calls upon the truthful experience of "reality".

<sup>34</sup> The cataclysmic disaster as the instigating catalyst of the event is of significance because the event gives way to the obliteration of the past in terms of memory as leading into the future; the event serves as a novel realignment of memory which reconfigures the expression of being along new lines (of flight into novelty).

mental or the spiritual immaterial. The "I refute it *thus!*"<sup>35</sup> attitude towards snapshots as memory images is in itself interesting in that in expressing the need for the physicality of the snapshot there is a metonymic transference operating on tactility as a stand-in for truth. The trope involves the transfer of the generation of truth from touch as opposed to vision as in the disciple Thomas' affirmation of the presence of Jesus by touching the stigmata and the analogous truth value of the image in the snapshot emergent in the sensation of having the material snapshot in hand, where the corroboration of memory resides in the physicality of the print.



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<sup>35</sup> 57. Refutation of Bishop Berkeley. "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- "I refute it thus."" Samuel Johnson. Boswell: Life. Supplied by Frank Lynch. <http://www.samueljohnson.com/refutati.html>

Fig. 2.2 Duane Michals' *This Photograph is my Proof* (1967)

These ideas are evoked by Duane Michals' *This Photograph is my Proof* (1967) which comes with a handwritten inscription on the oversized bottom border of the print "This Photograph is my proof. There was that afternoon, when things were still good between us, and she embraced me, and we were so happy. It did happen. She did love me. Look see for yourself!" At face value, the photograph invites us to engage with it as a testament of fact—an image imbued with truth—a permanent record of the past as it "really" was.<sup>36</sup> And not only is it an image imbued with truth because it concurs with that which the "I" as the character in the picture and supposed narrator experienced but it was created through the agency of a mechanical device whose disinterested functioning represents an objective point of view free from the vagaries of the senses. It is the snapshot as an object which not only portrays truth, its physical being substantiates it and its perdurance as an object reinforces its truth value. The photographer can tell you all he wants about the shot, the narrator can fill you in on issues that are not apparent, and any spectator can interpret it any way they like, but the snapshot sums it all up—it captures the moment, it seizes the instant, it creates an objective image which can be grasped, perceived in its entirety within the frame established by a particular point of view. Putatively, the snapshot concurs with what the photographer saw when the shutter release was pressed and with the image impressed upon the photographer's brain. Thus, the snapshot is not only a valid representation of

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<sup>36</sup> This is a very complex photograph couched in a deceptively easy-going, innocent packaging which would require a much deeper engagement to deal with all the aspects of spectatorship, authorship, point of view, pictorial narrative, generation of truth value, etc. These issues are not lost on the author but this is not the place to explore the implications.

the memory-image, but a "better" one: the memory as an image is more securely fixed upon the paper and unaffected by the competence of the memory-holder; the image as snapshot is "more permanent" because by being affixed to the backing it is not affected by the ravages of time and will likely outlast the party interested in the perduration of the image as memory.<sup>37</sup> Memory is thus popularly understood as a process whose sole undertaking is the storage and retrieval of snapshots of memories in their correct serial progression. As such, in this way of seeing, memory is the accrual of static, imagistic entities which are either stockpiled in the storehouse of memory as a result of new experiences or erased by the deteriorative effects of time or through physical damage.

This conception of images as outside the self constitutive of identity and corroborative of the inner dimension of being as a continuation of having been, as proof of the perduration of the self as a continuity is often echoed in popular culture. If we compare the presentation of images of memory in Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982) with the Wachowski's *The Matrix* (1999), we see the popularly held conceptions of memory at work as we fall back on the familiar territory of the visual image as memory, as an objective entity stored somewhere in the head and externally corroborated with snapshots. In the first movie, memory is presented in the traditional form of a passive repository filled up with imagistic content: the snapshot of Zhora left behind in Leon's hotel apartment, or the memory "implants" presumably added during inception of the Nexus 6 replicants which are related or performed by Rachael in Deckard's apartment—

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<sup>37</sup> We all seem to be subject to the prejudice that the objectively physical or the materially memorable is more durable than the psychologically memorial in spite of our being fully cognizant of the deterioration of physical images over time no matter their substrate.

namely, the story of the spider and the nostalgic piano solo where she is unsure if the memory's are really hers or Tyrell's niece—or when Roy Batty evocatively relates his exploits of war in the off-world colonies and muses to Hannibal Chew, the eye fabricator, “if only you could see what I’ve seen with your eyes”. For the replicants, their understanding of their "human essence" is based not so much in terms of their appearance or mortality but in their belief and faith in their continuity of being constituted by pastness which has given way to a progression of presents which they can express as memories of having been participants in the world—they relate to themselves as memorial beings through the intercession of memory-images/snapshots as memories. *The Matrix* presents memory in somewhat different terms by adding seriality to the image: when Neo (Keanu Reeves) is first connected to the learning program, he is given a complete training in martial arts through the plug—a prod which is inserted into a receptacle in the back of his head directly connected to his brain—as a massive download of static serial images to which he replies when he realizes the extent and depth of the content with the trademark wide-eyed underwhelmed Keanu Reeves “Gimme more!” But what is the realization? The awareness of the size of the file making room for itself amidst the other memories in store? The sensation of massive amounts of information coursing through the probe? That he suddenly ‘remembers’ that he knows all the moves of Jiu Jitsu? Or that he can (re)member it to his store-house of past experience? Neo’s “Gimme more!” is not only the response to the result of an integrative process arrived at from the consolidation of serial order and structure expressed as a novel integration of experience which results in a "Eureka!" moment but



to the desire implicit in the opening up of new vistas, new horizons opening up as a result of the new bodies he is now able to assume and their novel perceptual potential—the same feeling of elation we should have after watching a movie! The satisfaction of these new desires are achieved performatively in the exercise of the memory so that when Neo realizes his knowledge, makes it actual, i.e. activates his memory, he remembers how to do Jiu Jitsu when he ‘unpacks’ it in combat with Morpheus. But the desire is implicit in the novelty; desire is insatiable and incessant in that newness begets new bodies whose newness creates new desires and their attendant integrations thus perpetuating the appetite of novelty.

Curiously, in Michals' photograph and in Neo's activation of memory there is a common aspect which is not readily explicit: the (re)creation of memory through its performative expression—both works would seem to indicate that memory is (re)productive as an activation through narrative (re)creation. In Michals' photograph the inscription invites us to "look see" for ourselves and Neo remembers Jiu Jitsu by hashing it out with Morpheus: thus, we actualize the image of memory as it is activated, i.e. when it is realized<sup>38</sup> through gestural activity, as in its being (re)imagined as the (re)seeing of the photograph, or by its (re)creation through the performance of the physical intuitions which inform Neo's pugilistic interaction with Morpheus. Michals' snapshot invites us to see the pictorial image in the same way as the absent narrator supposedly does—as a memory image in terms of a performative (re)creation of the image content by urging us to "look see" and (re)produce the image by (re)calling into

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<sup>38</sup> The French verb *réaliser* is a better choice here for realize in that the French conveys both the performative making it real and the awareness of the becoming actual of the memory-image

being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them into a coherent whole where the snapshot plays the role of the stand-in for the *nec plus ultra* expression of (re)collection and (re)membering. The image as memory acquires duration through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as an assemblage, i.e. in the memory circuit, in which it is operative.

As the last paragraph indicates by the profusion of parenthesized re's, the concept-cluster of words surrounding memory needs to be examined and activated anew not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical tradition from which speculative<sup>39</sup> thought emerges. To paraphrase Mary Daly, the discourse of memory "requires a kick in the imagination, a wrenching of tired words" to (re)vitalize and (re)activate the imagistic implications dwelling behind the façade of words such as understand, recollect, remember, recall, recognize, repetition and bring them back to the collective fold of memory from which they originate.

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According to Yates' *The Art of Memory*, there were two kinds of memory in Antiquity: the natural memory with which we are all endowed, "which is engrafted in our minds, born simultaneously with thought" and the artificial memory which uses techniques through which the mnemonic faculties are "strengthened or confirmed by training" (1992: 20). Thus, the artificial memory augments our innate capabilities by

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<sup>39</sup> The speculative in speculative thought is not only the one suggested by its Latin root *speculare* as watchtower or lookout but also ties in to *speculum*, the mirror. The speculative as based on the visual readily ties into imagistic thought as pertaining to vision but also of that which is occulted by it.

building upon the natural through the use of techniques which cultivate and enhance our inborn powers in order to "Let art, then, imitate nature, find what she desires, and follow as she directs" (Benson, 1988: 297). We owe our knowledge of these classical techniques of the art of memory to the only extant Latin treatise on rhetoric, *Ad Herennium* (c. 86-82 B.C.E.) whose unknown author likely drew on Greek teachings on mnemonic technique. This text was vastly influential during the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance and lay the groundwork not only for the understanding of memory and its techniques in relation to rhetoric as a discursive art but as the foundation for the enhanced expression of memory in terms of the ordering of experience and the structuration of knowledge.

The mnemonic methods of the Ancients relied on astonishing or striking imagery, so that to remember something one only needed to associate the image of a whatever was needed to remember and associate it to something outlandish. For example, if one wanted to remember someone's name, the rhetor using these methods would associate the name to some physical feature on the face of the person in question. So that if the person's name was Daigle<sup>40</sup>, they could visualize a large eagle beak replacing the person's nose. The association of these two images would be sufficient to (re)mind the rhetor of the person's name as the identity relation for that person. Person with huge aquiline nose=Daigle. Thus, rhetors would go out of their way to present their images in outlandish ways so as to create the necessary memorial impact and retain the image as a memory-image.

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<sup>40</sup> Daigle or D'aigle in French means of an eagle.

This method was extended to being able to memorize a series of items by generating striking memory-images with all the items and "pegging" them to some kind of pre-conceived ordering sequence. By retracing this sequence of memory-images one would end up with a narrative sequence composed of memory images as a memory circuit. "The artificial memory is established from places and images (*Constat igitur artificiosa memoria ex locis et imaginibus*), the stock definition to be forever repeated down the ages. A locus is a place easily grasped by the memory, such as a house, an intercolumnar space, a corner, an arch, or the like. Images are forms, marks or simulacra (*formae, notae, simulacra*) of what we wish to remember" (Yates 2000: 22). The method essentially consists of the serial placing of outlandish versions of the images we wish to remember at place holders—image containers—or *locus* in the same order we wish these images to be recalled. The person wishing to exercise their artificial memory would first have to create a set of *loci* (plural of *locus*) upon which to place the outlandish images. This would entail setting up a route, a circuit, which would serve not just once, but over and over as a reusable platform or foundation upon which one could place or impress images to be retained in memory so that in the words of Cicero "we use places as wax and images as letters." (Yates 2000: 38) To find one's own personal *loci* one would follow very specific rules that would guarantee a practical locus. "One must employ a large number of places which must be well lighted, clearly set out in order, at moderate intervals apart." (Yates 2000: 38) Thus, in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, scholars and rhetoricians wishing to heighten their powers of artificial memory would be seen walking, retracing their steps over and over, in large buildings such as

churches, palaces, or their courtyards or within cities or landscapes, memorizing the layout a building or lay of the land in order to build up a satisfactory locus which would exist as a cartography of memory. The objective here was to commit to memory the greatest number of sequentially ordered *loci* so as to make available as detailed a serial order as possible to the perambulation to provide an adequate and comprehensive structure with enough memory pegs to allow as fine grained a reconstitution as possible of that which one needed remembered. The simple process of *Ad Herennium* does not of course in itself bring out the elements into the open such as the image, the locus and the pedestrian perambulation as the binding "of the psychic life to its motor accompaniment" (Bergson M&M: 15) at a gross scale—this is obviously not a reading of Bergson at the scale he intended but our application is an interesting echo of the *ritornello* of memory. It forces the consideration of these three elements and look for their integration as the expression of memory. The perambulation of memorial reconstitution of *Ad Herennium* is *the* method, where method from *meta-* "after" and *hodos* "a traveling, way" constitutes the organization of knowledge. As the lay of the land, as a cartography of knowledge, the method of memory allows for the systematic reconstitution of knowledge through the discursive unfolding of territory as the narrative of memorial revelation: it allows one to systematize knowledge as an enfolding/unfolding where all knowledge is spatially organized and performatively revealed. The enfolding/unfolding happens at every stop of the circuit which contains a memory-image constituted by another memory-circuit which in itself can be constituted by countless other memory-images and circuits. The enfolding of knowledge is itself

infolding within enfolding so that the arborescent recursivity of memorial reconstitution of the method of *Ad Herennium* is not only the organizational dynamic of knowledge, the organizational is the dynamic. In this way, we can conceive of a reticular organization of knowledge where nodes in a network of relation are memory-images forming part of the recursive memorial composition shared with other memory-images. As such, memory was seen as the systematic organization of information not only of knowledge but of the world.

Within this perambulatory method of keeping track of knowledge, we can see parallels to our keeping track of events in our own lives. We walk through life, pegging significant events as memory-images to a temporal unfolding as a relational reticulation where the inter-relation of the memorable moments is what constitutes the pegging of one event to another—yet reticulation does not do justice to the understanding. Reticulation implies a distinction between the terms and the relation where there is none: the nodes are both nodal and relational simultaneously. As such, we can organize the logic of life's unfolding, understanding its method so to speak, according to the causality implicit in memory: one can either subscribe to a top-down linear, reductive cause and effect, or to a consensual, horizontal relational complication of causal determination. Both can be said to be temporal in that change takes place, but one expresses it as the numbered succession of before and after as *chronos* time and the other in terms of the relational denseness of experience as intensity expressed as

temporality—what Deleuze calls *aionic* time.<sup>41</sup> As such, the serialized imagery of both understandings unfolds temporally but their logic is poles apart: the associative relational unfolding creates a narrative which is different from the linear mechanical cause-and-effect narrative of historical sequential account in that the directive line is not based on a what-came-before logic of cause and effect but on a narrative of relational flow where the reason for the why of what's happening does not lie in a cause and effect rationale based on the "what came before must be the cause" reasoning but on the novelty from the coming into relation as the expression of temporality in the making. The logic of becoming of the relational has a different recounting:<sup>42</sup> it is experiential in its unfolding in that in its immanence it tends towards the immersive as the all-encompassing drive of integration. The expression of the relation as a reconciliation of the duality of the terms of relation as constitutive of the advance of novelty is always the overwhelming as an alteration of the course of events.

It results from a mapping of time as a topography of intensities which serves to organize the various durations of our life whether they are seen in terms of days, weeks, years, career, relationships, apartments or cars and determine eras of durational consistency according to the terms upon which we wish to settle on stratigraphically: as a cartography of intensities these territorializations as expanses of consistency or operational coherence interact as relational entities that condition as they themselves

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<sup>41</sup> As per Heraclitus. David Kennedy and Walter Kohan have an interesting discussion between three different ways of understanding time: *Aión*, *Kairós* and *Chrónos*. They describe *Aion* as childhood time, as the child's way of experiencing time. This has notable repercussions in the reading of Simondon's division between *minorité* and *majorité*. *Aión*, *Kairós* and *Chrónos*: Fragments of an Endless Conversation On Childhood, Philosophy And Education. Published in *Childhood & Philosophy*, Volume 4, Number 8, 2008: 5-22.

<sup>42</sup> It is also what differentiates the oneiric narrative from the historical.

become the becoming aggregative accretion of the event as memorial individuation. I pull out a photo of my silver 1987 SAAB 16 valve Turbo 2-door hatchback... How did the ownership of that car structure my being? How was my life in 2005 organized by it? What kind of durational consistencies did that car afford? What intensional clusters informed themselves through it, within it, alongside of it, orbitally around it?



Fig. 2.3 A Saab 900 Turbo 16S, 1984. <http://www.caranddriver.com>

The constellation of images that arise immediately evoke the commonplace ordinariness of everyday life of the time, such as where I lived, who I was dating, where I worked, but they also allude to seemingly unrelated patterns of engagement and conceptualization of relation such as the expression of mobility, the wariness towards independent entrepreneurs, my image of self as a sailor, expectations towards the postal service, the aesthetics of driving and the development of a taste for Swedish vodka. These islands of relational coherence conspire towards a way of being as a consistency of expression as an integration that is a dynamic of relations as a corporeal being as an individuation of interpenetrated relations and not as a flesh-and-blood



being doing stuff.<sup>43</sup> Each of these patterns of engagement contract agreement within and between themselves as involved in the relation and extend outwards to create fields of relation as polyandrous territories which alter the landscape of association which together create sheets of past. But they also contract in the sense of contraction as elision towards concretization of the shared relation and in the sense of an infectious shared incorporation by transduction. The photo of a Saab 900 immediately steps on the clutch of my memorial gear box and proposes the possibility of changing gears in the machinic assemblage of my memory circuits. It brings round the relational potential available for engagement of the constellation of the could be of the already-has-been as sheets of past; it seeds the activation of the reconstitution of relationed fields of experience as memory-images; it sets the relational stage for a novel *agencement* of conditioned causal becomings; it posits propositions for relational conditioning—it adds a new dimension to existence as a possible activation of potentials to redirect the unfolding of actuality by producing a shift within the integration of actuality as a memorial process. As such, the intrusion of the snapshot as a memory-image, as a plane of coherence and relational consistency, opens the possibility of diverting the circuit of unfolding unto another circuit of unfolding of possibility as the accidental in the event—and we can extend this kind of thought-image to the cinematic frame and to the cinematic in general as a successive process of eventual intrusion where each incoming

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<sup>43</sup> Isn't this what's operative in Andrei Tarkovski's (1932-1966) *Solaris* (1972)? Where the alien life form is capable of reifying the memorial as embodiments and landscapes as informations intelligible to our senses?

frame alters the memorial unfolding: it changes that which has transpired, that which is transpiring and the way the future transpiring will take place.

Thus far we have been using the word memory in an atypical manner. We have been presenting memory-images as what may be understood as an integrated image not of pastness expressed pictorially but as an expression of the relational in terms of the activation of potential as a circuit of memory. We need to clarify here that memory is not to be understood as an individualization of pastness, as a static image depicting the past as pictorial but as a process descriptive of individuation as the integrative touch that assembles relationality as the quality of participation as constitutive of the unfolding of actuality. Memory is not a Foucauldian disciplinary matrix; it is not a seed crystal and it is not a storehouse; memory is the process which holds the repeatable to account for its becoming.

We can now see the complex of words around memory in such a way that we can appreciate its integrative dynamics. As such, we can say that memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as content which urges us to (re)produce the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires duration through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory circuit, in which it is operative. But to speak in terms of constitutive elements is to render the process too much as an assemblage of discrete parts working together—instead we need to

think this as a flowing immanent becoming of reciprocal relational conditionings constitutive of being. And here of course one would ask, relational of what if there are no parts? Of whatever it is that constitutes whatness—the multiplicity of terms of the relational as they become the *au delà* of the threshold that limits something as not nothingness and whose affective tonality constitutes the clinamen. We are invoking the clinamen as the differential in action at the indeterminate point of its possibility at the incipience of becoming as the expression of the event or the eventual as pure *détournement*.<sup>44</sup>

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The role of memory within event as process is both cumulative and adumbrative in that it integrates experience and the experiential past without our being aware of it. It is cumulative in that the process doesn't just change the now, but changes the consistency of the past as a memorial object and this new conception of the past as its new future-facing face hides, and it adumbrates everything that came before even though it presents the where it's at as the resultant as a what has happened as it is happening. But this future-facing dynamic façade or front of flow as the immanent becoming of reciprocal relational conditionings constitutive of being is to be seen as a happening together of moving forward as creative advance as a sheet of consistency and operational coherence. These future-facing faces of happening as phases can be understood in various ways as machinic. Machinic in that they are desire-generating

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<sup>44</sup> We like the word *détournement* because it expresses the activity of change of course as agent and change as active and perfect, but it also has the negative connotation of hijacking and corruption of a minor which coupled with Simondon's conception of minor transposed to *aionic* time as altering the temporality of becoming.

machines which introduce slices which can remain unstated as layers of operational consistency that can beget extensive continuity; machinic in that they generate the pulsion to move ahead; machinic in that as an assemblage they produce novel possibilities of becomings; machinic in that as organizational and informational they propagate the causal determinacy of the system; machinic in that its invocation activates and sets in motion other machines which in turn activate other machines... We can write machinic to invoke the full-potential of that which is hidden in machinic but to enunciate it we need the directive machinic of memory to activate its gest discursively for it to become operational. And in producing these layers of operational consistency how thin can we make them? As thin as the emulsion of the image on a piece of film or thinner or as thick as a SAAB 900 or all eternity.

In this chapter we have come to terms with what is participated, and that which accounts for its being participated on the screen. We have looked at how the image frames work memorially with and through each other as a completion towards advancement which performs double duty in its simultaneous backward-gazing and forward-gazing stance in the unfolding of the cinematic spectacle. We have discussed the creation of the screen, the dynamic of superposition of frames and the instauration of the montage effect, the dynamics of the desiring-machine at the core of the cinematic assemblage. Now we are ready to move on to look at how the internal screen operates and establishes oneness with the external.

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## Faciality

In discussing the image of thought in *Difference and Repetition* (1994), Deleuze considers a process of eliminating all presuppositions in thought as a way to begin with philosophy. He writes that this would entail at the very least a regression to perceptual experience as pure being in order to constitute a beginning even if it is only by virtue of referring all its presuppositions back to a sensible, concrete empirical being which can be known implicitly without concepts. However, "whatever the complexity of this process, whatever the differences between the procedures of this or that author—the fact remains that all this is still too simple" (Deleuze, 1994: 129). However, if one continues to peel back the layers in order to pursue this regression, one will immediately have to make recourse to the agency of memorial process as constitutive of whatever is to be known implicitly. The pre-philosophical, pre-conceptual formula of the "Everybody knows" is still too far along the chain of supposition and to ascribe conceptual philosophical thought as having its implicit presupposition as composed of "a pre-philosophical and natural Image of thought, borrowed from the pure element of common sense" (Deleuze, 1994: 131) short-changes the problem in favor of a derivative image of thought which is dogmatic, orthodox or moral. For one, the common sense presupposes God, the Good and the moral right implicit in Natural Law which at this point in the development of these ideas would be misplaced and irrelevant. Deleuze is correct to point out that to say that "we do not speak of this or that image of thought, variable according to the philosophy in question, but of a single Image in general which

constitutes the subjective presupposition of philosophy as a whole" (Deleuze, 1994: 132) as the foundation of common sense and therefore the basis for Truth is to present as a *fait-accompli* the machine that produces that which Deleuze and Guattari call the face and facialization. "The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the face" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 170). And to deconstruct this abstract machine requires a "radical critique of this image and the 'postulates' it implies" (Deleuze, 1994: 132) by removing the Image from the mental and the Ideal and setting it back in the body. It requires examining how the constitution of the pre-suppositioned comes to be.

If a child were to ask "what is a circle?" few of us would answer "It is the locus of points at a predefined set distance, the radius, from a predefined point, the centre" or "it is the closed curve that will contain the largest area for a given perimeter" or "given a Cartesian coordinate system, a circle is the resulting shape that satisfies the equation  $x^2 + y^2 = r^2$ ".<sup>45</sup> We could demonstrate what a circle is by picking up a pen or pencil and drawing a semblance of one on a piece of paper wherein by demonstrating the drawing of the circle, we create a correspondence for the child between the physical gesture of drawing a circle and the pictorial result on paper. If the child is not particularly adept at "aping", we can take this a step further: we can grasp the child's hand and guide it through the gesturality of drawing a circle. Either way, the child will in turn be able to

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<sup>45</sup> In Montreal, first graders are told that the circle is a closed curved line.

pick up a pencil, replicate the gestures and plausibly obtain a similar result—with pencil in hand and after a few repetitions, the child comes to coordinate the movement of parts of the body in conjunction with vision<sup>46</sup> in such a way that the gestures will result in drawing a closed loop. We can say that as the drawing of the circle is being executed it is performatively being composed through the co-operative, simultaneous, co-ordination between the proprioceptive, the ideal and the visual.<sup>47</sup> In time, with repetition, there will be no separation in the child's mind between the result on the paper and the closed set of gestures which constitute the circle—unnamed as such and pre-philosophically and pre-conceptually conceived— as an ingrained non-pictorial image woven into the fabric of neural pathways as an associated mapping of the visual and the proprioceptive.

Deleuze and Guattari take up the discussion of the creation of the circle in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1988: 367) in a way which might be linguistically difficult for Anglophones to grasp the nuances since they are working on the distinction between *rond/le rond* (roundness/the round) and *le cercle* (the circle) which is not usually conceptually obviated in English. *Le rond* as a vague essence is pre-conceptual to the circle in that a French child will understand *le rond* before they understand the circle for what it is. So "*fais-moi un rond*" (make me a round) will be understood by a six year old child out of kindergarten whereas "*dessine-moi un cercle*" (draw me a circle) will require

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<sup>46</sup> Here the most obvious would be to say that it is the fingers, hand and arm which provide the proprioceptive image of circularity, but it is the body as a whole which engages in the performative expression of the proprioceptive image of circularity.

<sup>47</sup> The other senses could also be brought in: e.g. the auditory sense could also be implicated as regulatory through the auditive clues arising from the action of the pencil on the paper as an indication of speed.



a few more years of schooling.<sup>48</sup> This difference illustrates the vibrational dynamic between the corporeally vague and material essences which are vagabond, anexact and yet vigorous (*le rond*) and their fixed, metric and formal ideal conceptual essences (*le cercle*) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 407-408). So here it is important to make a number of important distinctions within this set of circulating ideations:

1) The understanding of "*rond*" as a blind, proprioceptive and corporeal intuition of roundness... the non-visual, body-feeling of the movement of roundness.

2) The establishment of "*le rond*" as a proprioceptive circuit constituting a memory image.

3) The availability of "*le rond*" as a performative choreography which can be (re)called into actuality whenever the conditions exist that require its (re)petition.

4) The Circle understood as a facialized conceptual image that exists as an integrated memory image (which even if closed, is open to conceptual emendation). It exists as an adumbration of an enlarged set, as a complication, of constituent elements whose base is still "*le rond*" as a schematic or vague essence (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 408).

5) The comparison of the rear-projected complexified and facialized conceptual image of the Circle with the perceptual visual image as guidance during the performative proprioceptive choreography of drawing a circle.

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<sup>48</sup> We can interpret "make me a round" differently and tell the child that it is up to each one to make themselves into a round; that one cannot make someone else a round; and that to make oneself a round, the whole body needs to get into the rounding as becoming round.

What this is trying to say is that the Circle is not a God-given Form but the result of an on-going process of enfolding of an iterative, evolutive development which compares and contrasts that which one does in the world with that which is abstract and ideal but regulated by the visual<sup>49</sup>: the supervision of the corporeal performative choreography in accordance with the established Law of the Ideal as regulated by vision as a perceptive process. The Circle as an idealised Form, as a 'despotic formation', is also a conceptual entity and as such can be revised: its definition as a conceptual body, as a windowless monadic conception, is still open to emendation and modification: It can be "rocked by incessant revolts, by secession and dynastic changes, which nevertheless do not affect the immutability of the form" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 385). Vision regulates the execution and enforces the proprioceptive choreography in the world to conform to idealised norms and forms. "It is noteworthy that the dogmatic image, for its part, recognises only error as a possible misadventure of thought, and reduces everything to the form of error" (Deleuze, 1994: 148). The visual serves to progressively refine the conformity between the doing and the ideal towards the eventual full-compliance with the Ideal as *telos*. This iterative process of enforcing conformity, of control and command, through visual compliance, implies the sense of 'comply' not only as a continual folding over itself, as a complication towards the attainment of a perfection in the execution which will coincide fully with the ideal and exhaust its potential in its expression, the projective superposition of one image over the other for comparison, but as an expression of civil complaisance in conduct and action. The

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<sup>49</sup> In this case the visual because it is the operative sense we are considering. If we were considering a different sense, the resulting image would be have a different sensorial nature.

society of control is the drive which reduces the mobility, the degrees of freedom, of an executant body through the continual on-going regulation of its doing by a supervisory surveillance which progressively constrains and constricts the variance of conduct and action to attain uniform behaviour through a prescribed conformity to an ideal; the body as controlled through vision as enforcer of that which we have internalised as the abstract vague essence of the Good as a common sense.

The obvious presupposition here is the Circle as the guiding idea which regulates the gestures of the body towards the execution of the circle as the result of a gestural protocol informed by the non-pictorial mapping. But we can take this one step further and bring the circular gestural protocol of the body-feeling<sup>50</sup> coenasthetic creation of circular motion as the proprioceptive intuition that guides the manifestation of corporeal motion as that which can be labelled as roundness—*le rond* as the expression of roundness through the body. If I pick up a pencil and repeat the same identical circular motion over and over again, over and over on itself, as I trace the same circular figure on the paper, the differences of the repetitions will constitute the limit of possibility of that gesture as a resultant of what that circumscribed bodily movement can be. "Thus, the goal is no longer defined by an essential form, but reaches pure functionality, as if declining a family of curves, framed by parameters, inseparable from a series of possible declension or from a surface of variable curvature that it is itself describing" (Fold p.19) The parameters answer the question "What can a body can do?" given the body being (re)called upon to emerge for every iteration, so that the memory

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<sup>50</sup> Here feeling is used in the sense given by Whitehead in *Process and Reality*, where feeling is the general operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity as a process.

of the body-becoming-circle (re)members the elements which constitute the moulding of the form according to a circuit as a prescribed choreography. "Moulding amounts to modulating in a definitive way; modulating is molding in a continuous and perpetually variable fashion" (Deleuze, 1993: 19). Can we not affirm that modulation is what Leibniz is defining when he states that the law of series posits curves as "the trace of the same line" in a continuous movement, continually touched by the curve of their convergence?" (Deleuze, 1993: 19) The limiting commonality of the movement as the that which constitutes the definitive circularity of the circle between all the inherent possibilities in the iterations of the movement constitute its Ideal Form as a bodily intuition which is first learned as a body-based intuitive geometry of habitual expression which can be expressed *a posteriori*. The communality in the iterations as a common sense of the circle as an actuality lies in the experiential concurrence of similar results from the execution of the same choreography by different individuals and the yielding of similar results. In this sense, to say that "roundness exists only as a threshold-affect (neither flat nor pointed) and as a limit-process (becoming rounded), through sensible things and technical agents, millstone, lathe, wheel, spinning wheel socket, etc" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1989: 408) is not to tell the full story as all these derivative expressions of roundness pre-suppose roundness as already in the world. So the proprioceptive intuition of roundness is not only a threshold-affect, it is the foundational-affect which once set up as an objective truth created in the making, as an established circuit emergent in the performance of its becoming, that once facialized serves as a stepping-stone towards subsequent intuitions—the feeling-doing of

roundness as an associated metonymical construct. The (re)petition into being of the very same sensori-motor intuitions, i.e. the guided recalling of the proprioceptive protocol of drawing a circle or other things circular, will be re-cognized as the bodily movement which produces a circle on paper as well as the circular movement-becoming of circle-making-as-a-body in terms of a common sense affirmation of circle-making potential. But again, we can (re)view the difference between "*fais-moi un rond*" and "*dessine-moi un cercle*" as operating on two regimes. The first, as the expression of a body-becoming-roundness, is open-ended and in touch with the virtual potential of the expression of 'what can a body do?' Whereas the second, as the conformation of the body of the round as an individualization. One could not just have the bodily movement without the guidance of a perceptual image of the circle within the coordinative eyeballing of its creation—as Massumi would say, "It requires a coupling of at least two movements: a chaotic<sup>51</sup> appearance and disappearance of spacelikes and formlikes and a movement of the body with them" (Massumi, 2002: 149). It is important to emphasize that the circle as a pictorial image as the end result of drawing a circle is only the satisfaction of the re-constitutive drives emergent in the performative execution of the body-movement-becoming-circle which re-petitions the proprioceptive image into being as the performative sensori-motor intuition of the re-production of the circle which through vision as perceptual regulatory guidance allows its re-cognition as a fused association between the gesture as executive and the visual as regulatory integrated as

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<sup>51</sup> Chaotic is here used by Massumi not as haphazardly disordered but as a random coming into and out of existence of all possible particles.

an actual satisfaction evidenced by the pictorial result.<sup>52</sup> As such, the proprioceptive image as a memory circuit of the performative execution is the basis for the conceptual basis of that which can be labeled 'Circle'.

Genetically speaking, the Circle as a Form is a statistical reduction which emerges as a singularity "surrounded by a cloud of ordinaries or regulars " (Deleuze, 1989: 60). It is an expression of the totality of the intersections of the countless intuitions of circle-making-as-a-body in the world as an asymptotic striving of the fusion of proprioception and vision to the ideal Form as *telos*. No matter how precisely, cautiously or attentively a circle is created in the real world, it will never attain the expression of the Form or exhaust its potential whose Ideal perfection can only be attained by God. Thus, we sin the circle: our striving to create a circle will always fall short of the Ideal Circle and as such, any and all of our efforts will always be an affront to God's Creation. In our performance of the circle-making-as-a-body to create a Circle, in our attempt to emulate the work of God, we sin. Our circle-making-as-a-body will never attain the perfection of God's creation; thus, the body will never attain the perfection that the mind, as that which is closest to God, can attain. We are born with original sin as the faculty of humanity's innate imperfection as to the emulation of God's ideal creation and none of humanity's creations<sup>53</sup> will ever attain God's creative perfection: the tentativeness of the lived world will never attain the instantaneous certitude of the

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<sup>52</sup> If I close my eyes and trace the image of a circle in the air, that gesture will be noticeably different than tracing the image of a spiral. But the effort will be lacking coordination without the visual feedback. Painting with light into a long-exposure photograph readily demonstrates this fact, even with individuals who are practiced and proficient at free-hand drawing. So the tactile sensori-motor intuition requires the visual as a determining component to its proper exercise.

<sup>53</sup> Including progeny. God's son was Jesus; Adam's progeny were Abel and Cain.

Ideal. And in seeking knowledge in order to attain a perfection to our understanding, we insult God by rebuffing the gift of pure experience through our disdainful pride in our pursuit of knowledge—thus, research/creation is the handiwork of the Devil.

When the child perceives a pictorial circle, the mind will hearken back to the gestural protocol which results in a circle of sorts. The repeated activation of this sensory-motor intuition, the habituation which results in a circle, will in time, succumb to a “shorthand” where the proprioceptive image of the circle in the mind can be made to be represented on paper without requiring the *conscious* evocation of that very same proprioceptive activation. It is the same dynamic as when a child encounters for the first time a polysyllabic word such as 'repetition'—i.e. pointing out and sub-vocalising each syllable with their index finger, associatively assembling pairs of syllables, until they manage the full integrative satisfaction of the word as a whole, as a one: re-pah-tee-shan, repah-ti-shun, repah-tishun, repahtishun, repetition! Once the word has been learned, there is no need to re-perform its cognition every time it is encountered as its understanding becomes immediately operative.

The usual explanation implicit in presupposition is that the circle itself is an object created by a subject where, at face value, the circle is a Circle—the pictorial image of a circle as a Circle tells me all that the circle is but doesn't tell me a thing about it. It takes for granted that "everyone knows" what a circle is and this familiarity as the communal, common-sensical knowledge of the circle presents a front which indubitably and truthfully reveals all that a circle is but dissembles its constitutional emergence: it is a mask, a disguise, in that it conceals the coming to being of the circle as a processual

becoming, covers up the durational structure of its underpinnings, usurps the value implicit in becoming as a creative enterprise and presents itself as what is. This tenacious, static overcoding as an adumbration of creation is called faciality by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) and they present the concept of the face as a white screen in that it projects all the virtual potential of what it is to be a circle, yet it is a black hole in that it takes in anything and everything one throws at it as far as coming to terms with it and gives nothing back.<sup>54</sup> In our example, the circle-drawing child subject and the drawn circle object constitute a relational system where "each serves as a correlate of the other" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 172) as participatory entities in a mirrored subject-object, doubly-reciprocating machinic assemblage whereby in the creation of which the face as a front reveals "all" about the circle as an actualization and as the full expression of the virtual potential which can be actualized within the given ecology of becoming. Faciality as a machinic assemblage identified as such does not lie by misstatement of fact, omission, deception, or false fabrication—thus, that which presents itself as that which is as a given is the image of truth in the world. And by extension, the abstract machinic assemblage can be seen as the processual creation of truth. In the clash of collision of planes of consistency, the ensuing deterritorializations and reterritorializations will constitute an event which will set up new planes of consistency and machinic assemblages different from our pre-conceived memorial expectations.

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<sup>54</sup> This process of facialization is the prototypical reification of alienation in that the end product as resultant usurps the creation of value production in favour of an interested strangeness where the end product is divorced from its nature and appears as a fully-formed object not as the satisfaction of creation but as the satisfaction of ulterior need as a creation of value.



The role of memory within event as process is both cumulative and adumbrative in that it integrates experience and the experiential past without our being aware of it. It is cumulative in that the process doesn't just change the now, but changes the consistency of the past as a memorial object and this new conception of the past as its new future-facing face hides, and it adumbrates everything that came before even though it presents the where it's at as the resultant as a what has happened as it is happening. But this future-facing dynamic façade or front of flow as the immanent becoming of reciprocal relational conditionings constitutive of being is to be seen as a happening together of moving forward as creative advance as a sheet of consistency and operational coherence. These future-facing faces of happening as phases can be understood in various ways as machinic. Machinic in that they are desire-generating machines which introduce slices which can remain unstated as layers of operational consistency that can beget extensive continuity; machinic in that they generate the pulsion to move ahead; machinic in that as an assemblage they produce novel possibilities of becomings; machinic in that as organizational and informational they propagate the causal determinacy of the system; machinic in that its invocation activates and sets in motion other machines which in turn activate other machines... We can write machinic to invoke the full-potential of that which is hidden in machinic but to enunciate it we need the directive machinic of memory to activate its gest discursively for it to become operational. And in producing these layers of operational consistency how thin can we make them? As thin as the emulsion of the image on a piece of film or thinner or as thick as a SAAB 900 or all eternity.

As presented earlier, the information of an event requires an order-word and a lure for feeling. If for example I am sitting with my partner at home and she asks me to make her a cup of coffee, I would embark upon a considerably lengthy and complicated protocol called "Make a cup of coffee" which can take on various expressive manifestation but which all end up with a cup of coffee. The protocol "make cup of coffee" as an order-word consists of an obviously simple set of procedures which most everyone masters in some form or other and executes daily without giving the protocol a second thought. I will outline the protocol constituting the procedure of making a cup of coffee and will be quite detailed about it even at the expense of being tedious because in doing so one can actually be made aware of the adumbrative nature of memory and its habit-formed expression:

- 1) Get up, push back the chair, walk to kitchen
- 2) Go to cupboard and get coffeemaker and grinder
- 3) Go to freezer and take out coffee beans
- 4) Go to utensil drawer for measuring spoon: realize that it is not there
- 5) Go to dishwasher and pull out measuring spoon. Note: the dishwasher needs emptying<sup>55</sup>
- 6) Measure coffee beans: a flush or heaping spoonful?
- 7) Grind coffee: fine, medium or coarse
- 8) Unscrew the coffeemaker
- 9) Fill the reservoir with water

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<sup>55</sup> This is just to show that the unfolding of the event is not immune to distractions and becoming others, even if the event is bookended by an order-word and a teleonomic lure for feeling.

- 10) Place ground coffee in coffee maker basket: halfway or to the top
- 11) Screw the coffeemaker together
- 12) Turn on the stove and set the coffeemaker on the burner
- 13) Go to the cupboard and take out two mugs
- 14) Go to the other cupboard and take out the brown sugar
- 15) Get milk from the refrigerator
- 16) Empty the dishwasher
- 17) Turn off the stove
- 18) Pour the coffee into the mugs
- 19) Add sugar and milk
- 20) Stir the sugar and milk. Think how the stirring motion allows one to conceive circularity as a circle<sup>56</sup>
- 21) Bring the two mugs of coffee out to the deck and enjoy

The expression "make a cup of coffee" as simple and banal an example as it is illustrates the adumbrative aspect of memory and its expression through language. When we hear "make a cup of coffee" we don't need to have the 20 plus steps of the process spelled out: we know what needs to be done—we have come to understand implicitly the processual unpacking in the doing as the performative unfolding of the protocol. Now, each step in this protocol can in turn be broken down into a series of protocolary processes, each of which can in turn can be broken down again and again *ad infinitum* into its constituting elements, relations and conditionings as participants

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<sup>56</sup> The distractions can be not only external but internal as well.

which are indeterminate, concrete and ultimately non-individualizational. And in spite of Zeno's Race Course Dichotomy Paradox<sup>57</sup> we have faith that this infinite series is convergent because actuality happens and takes place—we end up with actuality and in this case hopefully with a cup of coffee. Further, each step, as an identified action, no matter how insignificant, has itself already been integrated as part of a labeled stand-alone individualized memory circuit which can in turn become part of an overarching process—in our case the assemblage of all these protocolary units are "covered" or "adumbrated" by the expression "make a cup of coffee" and belie its satisfaction which is bookended by the order-word and the lure for feeling as the enjoyment of the cup of coffee. To paraphrase Bergson, the steps succeed and condition one another according to a determined order (Bergson, 1988: 226)—each step is necessary and integral to the success of the outcome and every step is as important as the next as without any of them to "make a cup of coffee" will not be able to take place. And here again, to refer to each step as an individualization is improper in that the individual steps can be recognized as such because the image of their satisfaction is a coherent operational surface of phasing towards becoming, but they do not exist on their own—as William James (1842-1910) would say, it is like "the front edge of an advancing wave-crest" (James, 1912: 69). Further, as each step is carried out and aggregated to the accretion of steps that came before, the past as the given as ground for the next step is changed and provides a new "face" for what comes next as a succession of phases of becoming—which is the matter of fact in every creative processual advancement into novelty which

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<sup>57</sup> In a race between a tortoise and a hare, the hare will never be able to catch up to the tortoise because the hare will always have half the remaining distance to cover before overtaking the tortoise.

Bergson refers to as the coexistence of the present with the past. The expression "make a cup of coffee" overlies the processual protocol as a kind of "miracle" which guides the information of the protocol as an understanding, but it can only be said that it establishes a harmony between the constituent participants as constitutive of the "make a cup of coffee" as an individuation within the unfolding of actuality once all is said and done as perfective, as a satisfaction. But this miracle is not just one miracle but the constant progression of the miraculous as transitional where the agency at work is the conspiracy of memory as informant—"the conspiracy which conditions it from within" (Deleuze, 1989: 77).

As a subjective entity, "make a cup of coffee" does not exist preindividually so that in the progressive, transitional gradation of its becoming there are no modifications to or of a pre-existing individual.<sup>58</sup> The invocation of "make a cup of coffee" is not an ordering "initiated by the spark of the exceptional event" (Simondon, 1989: 156), but a putting into movement or activation of relational potential at hand—it has a life of its own. The directionality of the memorial unfolding of actuality is nudged so that a new dynamic becomes gradually operative through the integration of new linkages of relation. This veered unfolding of memory as eventual is expressive of a conditioning causality which is conspiratorial in its realization of the proposition "make a cup of coffee" as an individuation through the progressive and gradual integration of the fractal recursivity of protocolary steps which taken together as an accretionary process

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The conditions are made propitious for its happening as a becoming when "make a cup of coffee" is invoked and we as self-appointed coffee-maker are but one constituent participant in the unfolding of the individuation.

constitute the informant memory which results in "make a cup of coffee". The progress of becoming is progressive in that the protocol requires that certain steps as phases of becoming need to be satisfied before proceeding; it is gradual in that the becoming of the individuation "make a cup of coffee" is not instantaneous (not even with instant coffee) and does not happen all at once and as an individuation gains definition, acquires focal clarity and corporeal heft. Its becoming is fraught with persistent eventual change which shifts the existent memorial circuit as a given giving way in its completion to a new memorial circuit as a momentous event—by definition, the event is the outcome of any causal dynamic which alters or disrupts the unfolding of the integrative process of memory; the event is accidental in that it is considered to be external to the "uneventful" unfolding where the unfolding of life as process is all event. The event as a significant event is one where the intensity and density of relation as processual change is so high that a threshold is passed so that the *topos* upon which a particular memory circuit is operative is replaced by a different *topos* as definitive of the body being created through the activation of new relations.

In fact, Bergson might say that the expression "make a cup of coffee" is a perception that "consists in condensing enormous periods of an infinitely diluted existence into a few more differentiated moments of an intenser life, and thus summing up a very long history." And to this he adds, "To perceive means to immobilize" (Bergson, 1988: 208)—and this immobilization is the individualization as an excision from process; and this happens at every step or phase we can identify either within the protocol or as the protocol as a whole (itself excised from a larger protocol as an individualization). The

immobilization referred to by Bergson resides in its Latin root of perception as alluding to the ability of the mind to grasp, seize or collect. But what is there to be grasped? It requires something seizable, clearly an object of some kind, an objectified form of something that has been 'collected' together—in our case that which is to be grasped is the expression "make a cup of coffee" as an object, as something that is presented objectively to the sight as a material<sup>59</sup> entity that is fully formed and distinct and external to the mind. By making the expression "make a cup of coffee" a distinct object, the resultant is definitive and, seen as such, has no loose ends, no degrees of freedom that leave room for misinterpretation as to what the result of the expression ought to be, and no opportunity for it to link with any other objective entity to create an undesirable or unexpected outcome than the one intended—so in that respect the expression "make a cup of coffee" is objective, static, closed and definitive in that it is all encompassing as far as making a cup of coffee is concerned until it is rendered specific way as in "make me an espresso". Yet as an object, the expression "make a cup of coffee" is an image that is a (re)presentation that presents itself as a whole, as a coherent (re)collection of the participating constituents where each one is in turn a subsumptive image because each step can be understood as constituting its own closed static objectival entity (even if this is not what it is). But to use the word perceive in the context that Bergson uses runs counter to the subject and object becoming one. A happier choice to replace 'perceive' might have been 'cognize', as once "make a cup of

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<sup>59</sup> In the sense of a material witness which is external to the subjective entity.

coffee" is cognized it can be '(re)cognized' and yields interpretative wiggle room to the process and what it can do as a body.

But the relatively simple break-down of the sequence of gestures and actions involved in making of a cup of coffee reveals a pattern of aggregation or compilation, a repeatable (re)collection of the under-standing steps or phases of becoming as a sequence of frames, which when seen in this way make up the self-fulfilling prophesy of the fractured yet continuous linear mechanical top-down causal pattern we popularly use to constitute the processual continuity of making a cup of coffee. The dialectical analytic manner in which we broke down the protocol as an ordered, numbered list where each step follows on the heels of another helps to organize the A begets B begets C etc causal progression, where A precedes B, and both must precede C etc, so that by ordering the processual progression according to an ordered numbered list one can follow the procedure according to the sequence laid out by the protocol and end up with a cup of coffee. The ordered-number line serves the ordering purpose of a convenient and familiar memory *loci* by offering the structural and organizational backbone to the experiential unfolding and affords a continuity to the process in terms of an atomistic mechanical step-wise sequence. This series of discontinuous, static, procedural objective entities which lead to a certain satisfaction fits in very nicely with the understanding of causality as an action-reaction dynamic and to the necessities of irreversible temporal progression.

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If the expression "make a cup of coffee" means something (to us), we see that it reveals all yet hides everything. It reveals all because implicit in the expression "make a cup of coffee" we possess the memorial understanding of all that which constitutes "make a cup of coffee" yet hides everything that came before and the possible forms that the event-body "make a cup of coffee" can take on. It is in this respect that memory is adumbrative. However, in spite of the concreteness and definiteness afforded by the expression "make a cup of coffee" and our proposed step-wise procedural protocol, we can see that the entire arrangement, even though linear, can be jumbled about somewhat in that it doesn't matter whether I get the mugs ready first, or take the sugar out of the cupboard later, as long as the operational critical path is followed which will consistently, efficiently and reliably yield the desired result:

- 1) Unscrew the coffee maker
- 2) Fill the bottom to the appropriate level with water
- 3) Place coffee basket in the bottom container
- 4) Measure out the desired amount of coffee beans
- 5) Grind the coffee beans
- 6) Place ground coffee in basket
- 7) Screw top onto the bottom of the coffee maker
- 8) Put the coffee maker on the round and fire it up
- 9) Pour into a mug
- 10) Enjoy

But even if this procedure were to be simplified to its barest essentials, i.e. if we invoke the order-words infuse hot water through ground coffee into a cup, what this says is that every step in the process has forward-feeling needs—desires—which must be satisfied in order for the process to coalesce into a coherent whole as an operational perfection. There's a logic to the process where progress proceeds from a (pre)existing conditioning as a given to that which follows: the process cannot proceed until the necessary preconditions for advancement are in play; this has had to have taken place, before it can move on to satisfy the memorial advancement towards the lure for feeling—I cannot screw the top of the coffee maker before I put the ground coffee into the recipient, nor can I put the coffeemaker on the round before I put the water in the bottom container. The satisfaction, the complete perfection, of each of these conditioning requirements constitutes the concrete fusion which enables the future becoming desire for coalescence of the next step. So that each step in the process is a bridge between the coalescence of the past that yields it and the future it is begetting to which it is coalescing—what Whitehead calls the prehension, i.e. "the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things" (Whitehead, 1985: 52). In our coffee making example, we are grinding coarsely indeed, but we can scale down the grind to see that every aspect of "make a cup of coffee" subscribes to this backwards and forwards-gazing coalescence. And as each completion towards advancement performs double duty in its simultaneous backward-gazing and forward-gazing stance in the unfolding of the process, we come to grasp the ontogenetic significance and relevance of Simondon's concept of concretization not only in terms of the material

doing double-duty but in terms of a conditioning double-function both as a bridging of temporalities and operational functionality.

The progression here is not mechanical in the sense of the action-reaction dynamic exemplified by a billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. It is more of a tressing or pleating of strands which run through the process conditioning the textural interlacing of the participating elements as transversal vectors. And it is a curious weave in that the transversal vectors as yarns that constitute the warp of becoming do not necessarily need to run the entire length of the individuation. The yarns of the processual warp are discontinuous—they each play their role as a participating constituent imbued with their own duration and temporality—and enter into the weave when and where they are needed and allow other yarns to take their place whenever that which they offer is called upon as necessary to complete the complex plait. But it is their concretized intertwining about the inexistent directive outline constituted by the synced, out of phase desires of the multitude of participating constituents which gives heft and substance to the stuff of becoming as matter as a body, as an ecological economy of functional becoming. In this respect, the memory *loci* are the way points in the making of becoming as performative of the *causa sui* as a progressive, processual immanence in terms of a concretized sequence of planes of consistency. As such, agency is implicit—it resides in the self-propelling drive of memory where the causality is lured forward by the processual satisfaction of the reciprocal and simultaneous desires implicit in the dynamic becoming of (re)collection and (re)membering. The order of becoming as the progression of unfolding serves as its own memory pegs which allow

one to find one's relative position along the process and (re)produce the operative conditions at that point. Yet these *topoi*, these constitutive categories of being as participants, are in themselves indivisible in terms of the motion which constitute them just as the flight of Zeno's arrow's flight constitutes its own indivisible movement whose satisfaction creates a landing site that both creates its "landing site" by landing upon it and locates the "landing" as an expression of creation of a territorialization of landscape.

If for the sake of argument we assume that the process of integration we have been examining can be said to be vertical, we can ascribe to each step a level of attainment, a plateau of accomplishment, an achievement of realization which melds with the one preceding it and eventually with the one that succeeds it. Each plane of consistency integrates that which came before it; the antithetical progress, differentiation, allows us to distinguish the constituent participants as tendencies of becomings which when integrated become cogent, concretized actualizations. Thus, we have a continuous processual advancement of simultaneous individuations as becomings where each plateau reveals a new consistency which adumbrates the one which it covers. We can now also apply this model of continuity horizontally and say that the extensive continuum which emerges is simply the (re)petition, the (re)calling into being, of the expression "without that this cannot be" and its necessary corollary, "without this that cannot be" and we see that the necessity extends itself not only locally but globally. Relation as such is infinitely multi-dimensional in that it is not only relation between two terms, or three terms, but in that it is a relational articulation to

infinite concretized relational possibility in number and extension. The roasted coffee bean, like any and all of the other participants in the making coffee exercise, is not only the resultant expression of a concretized, unstated, and profound processual unfolding which is all its very own, but which is also the expression of the full interconnectedness of becoming in the unfolding of nature as a process. It is simultaneously a one and many, not as a one or as a many, but as a one as many and many as one, rolled into that which is a becoming in terms of its role as an identifiable participant in the assemblage which requires it. As circular and paradoxical as it is, the reconciliation between these expressions of understandings are reconciled thus: as the expression of the coffee bean as a participant being, as a coffee bean being. As such, our "human" actuality as a perceptual image is the graspable resultant of the fully integrated interconnectedness of nature as a monadic concretization: the image reveals all yet hides everything. Only through the (re)petition in memory as a performative unfolding of (re)association can the participants be (re)collected as a coherent imagistic whole (re)membered as a body constituting the under-standing of the image.

The creative advance of the world as a continuous integrative process is thus understood as the succession of (pre)conditioning plateaus of becoming as constituting a memory-image in movement where each instance is called into existence and attached to the collection as a temporal concretization. If this creative advance into novelty is somehow remarkable, important "as an aspect of feeling whereby a

perspective is imposed upon the universe of things felt" (Whitehead, 1968: 11)<sup>60</sup> and bears (re)producing, the conditionings can be (re)called into play so that the participating elements can be (re)collected, (re)membered into a society as "a nexus of actual entities which are 'ordered' among themselves" (Whitehead, 1985: 89). To paraphrase Whitehead, in the (re)petition to order, the process of concrescence as the processual creation of coherence becomes its own reason, its own *causa sui*, by which the lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency (Whitehead, 1985: 88).<sup>61</sup> And to say that memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as content is not only applicable in terms of reconstituting the image of the past it is the constitutive dynamic of the coming together of actuality.

In film, the protocolary process is replaced by the montage of superposition as a memorial process of one frame over the next. Each frame exists as its own impression which builds on the nothingness of black as foundation, as the frame of reference of change through comparison. The stroboscopic shuttering of the image in film complicates the serial progression by intercalating a frame of black between each image which throws an unexpected into the works. Not only does the process of impressive superposition create the two-fold process of modifying the memory content of what has

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<sup>60</sup> And here it is important to underline the specific meaning which Whitehead gives to feeling as "the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question...[which] is a process). *Process and Reality*, p. 40.

<sup>61</sup> Although Whitehead's concrescence and Simondon's concretization come from the same root, the first refers more to the creation of coherence in a cross-section of the universe as a duration (Whitehead, 1985: 125), whereas the second refers to "the multi-functionality of operative solidarity... toward future uses." (Massumi, "Technical Mentality" Revisited: Brian Massumi on Gilbert Simondon. With Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, and Jon Roffe).

been seen, but it complicates the future-gazing dynamic by desire and expectation with the *Fort-Da*<sup>62</sup> mechanism of the butterfly shutter.

Jean-Luc Goddard's assertion of cinema as "truth 24 frames a second" is only half right. In fact, the way that film projection works is that every film frame is seen twice in order to reduce the flicker effect of the shutter blades passage before the projector lamp. This creates a peek-a-boo, the-image-is-there-and-then-it's-not, now-you-see-it-now-you-don't dynamic: when the image is not there, you wish it to be there, and when it is there, you wish it not to go away. Fort-Da. Fort-Da. Fort-Da. The alternation between the pleasurable (agreeable state) and the unpleasant (disagreeable state) creates what Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) refers to as an intersection between a play of occultation and an alternative scansion of two phonemes. But contrary to the usual conception of Freudian pleasure in the Fort-Da game between mother and child where pleasure happens in seeing the mother and displeasure in her absence, perhaps the pleasure exists elsewhere. Freud discusses the erotogenic pleasurable aspects of sucking (for its own sake, i.e. a pacifier without milk)—perhaps a parallel sensorial mechanism (pleasurable machinism) can be extended to the activation of sight for its own sake? According to Guattari's reading of Lacan, there seems to exist a desire mechanism in the Fort-Da game where "the wait for the return of the object is constituted as an "anticipating provocation." In playing the Fort-Da refrain, the projector becomes a producer of desire (negative affect) during the black out and a generator of satisfaction

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<sup>62</sup> Fort-Da literally translates from the German into Gone and Here. The Fort-Da game described by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) refers to playing peek-a-boo with his grandson Ernst.

(positive affect) during the instances of light. This creates a genderless masturbatory “compulsion to repeat” that is checked or contained by the presentation of content on the screen. Further, most film spectators do not realize that a film frame is projected twice. So instead of seeing a frame of film for 1/24th of a second (i.e. 24 fps), we see the image frame 1/96th of a second, black 1/96th of a second, the image frame again 1/96th of a second, black 1/96th of a second, then we see the new frame 1/96th of a second, etc. And to reinforce this desire-driven hunger for more, the twice-repeated projection of a frame perhaps could very possibly condition a habituated expectation of its continued projection—like they say in French, *jamais deux sans trois!*<sup>63</sup> Although most dismiss the shutter effect as too rapid to be sensed (even subliminally) as a Fort-Da process, Oliver Sacks has shown through clinical study in his own practice that certain patients with Parkinsonism react to vibratory stimuli many times faster than the shutter of the cinematic apparatus. The fact still remains whether we “see” it or not, when we watch a film from a film projector, we spend half the time looking at a black screen. Thus, we foreground the Fort-Da of the shutter flicker as a generator of memorial drive which demands immediate satisfaction in its unfolding. The strobing of the shutter is a Fort-Da refrain that runs as a bass line to the parallel polyphony of all other drives, i.e. transverse vectors, seeking integration within the film i.e. narrative content, plot, character development, art direction, dialogue, music and sound effect tracks, visual stylistics, etc: the (usually underplayed) variable affective intensities of the plane of expression that run simultaneously with the enunciative assemblage of the

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<sup>63</sup> If it happens twice, it will happen a third time.



plane of content. This desire-generating machine makes film eminently more watchable over other moving image projection systems and differentiates this desire-generating medium from all others. The combination of these two effects, the desire implicit in the Fort-Da beat of the butterfly shutter and the expectation created by the doubly-repeated projection of the frame work together to make of cinema a powerful generator of desire and expectation as its driving undertow. And we should emphasize that the desire is not an expression of Oedipal lack but of a working-together-towards and a satisfaction-in-the-making. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the desiring-machine, the dynamic set-up of, and set up by, the cinema projector is a perfect prototype of its expression in that the shutter blades provide the "*system of interruptions or breaks (coupures)*" that slice away, removing portions, from the immense thigh of a pig (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 36).

In film, the montage of superposition as a memorial process of one frame over the next builds on the protocolary model developed earlier where each successive frame constitutes a step in the processual advance. The word montage as used in French connotes both an assemblage constitutive of a mechanical device or assemblage and as used in film editing as the creation of meaning arising from the proximate association or juxtaposition of film sequences.<sup>64</sup> Although the mechanism producing the cinematic effect presents as a step-wise advance the result of the doubly-repeated projection and the dissipative fade of the superimposed impressions (usually) produces

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<sup>64</sup> However, montage also refers to the generation of meaning emerging from the considered juxtaposition of how cinematic elements are treated, presented and work with themselves and with each other throughout the film.

a transitory fluidity between one frame and the next. The cut, whether it occurs between frames<sup>65</sup> or shots, represents that simultaneously backward- and forward-gazing junction which presents the face of the past as associative potential being pulled from the future as a modification of the past as it simultaneously creates the novel which it engages as actuality. The imagistic drives within the frame as internal drives seeking integration within the film constitute the internal logic as a memorial drive which seek integration and as such create the experiential as satisfaction made actual.

The elements constituting the image within the frame participate in the tressing or pleating of strands as transverse vectors which run through the process of superposition as conditioning memorial integration as the textural interlacing of these very same participating elements: this can include such aesthetic elements such as the lighting, camera movement, actor direction, art direction, shot length, lens choice, etc. And as mentioned before, the weave of the yarns that constitute the warp of meaning created by the montage of these transverse vectors do not necessarily need to run the entire length. The yarns of the processual warp are discontinuous—they each play their role as a participating constituent imbued with their own duration and temporality—and enter into the weave when and where they are needed and allow other yarns to take their place when what they offer is called upon as necessary to complete the complex plait, but it is their concretized intertwining about the director's direction as the guiding hand of memory's unfolding. Memory is then an invisible external agency

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<sup>65</sup> There is always a jump cut between one frame and the next—montage is operative at every structural level in film. There is always an element of movement between two frames, at the micro-structural level of the film grain and also in terms of temporality of the image capture and projection.

constituted by the synced, out of phase desires of the multitude of participating constituents which makes the cinematic play, play and gives heft and substance to the stuff of becoming as matter as a body, as an ecological economy of functional becoming. The cinematic event as a film screening constitutes a memorial narrative in that all the elements are integrated into the processual unfolding of the film. Each aesthetic component that we can deem a constitutive element of the image within the frame constitutes a memorial narrative through and through in that its unfolding not only reifies the memorial drives inherent in the film but constitutes the becoming significance of its being.

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## The Fold

The geometry of the screening room is rather simple and can be quite readily understood through basic Euclidian optical geometry. However, the questions that can be raised while examining the relationship between the spectator and the screen present geometrical/mathematical implications which bear teasing out. To better understand the spectator's becoming one with the unfolding spectacle on the screen as an aspect of coming to terms with the cinematic event, one can ask the following questions: What is the nature of the shared experience of spectatorship? What is at the root of the commonality of cinema? How does one become one with the screen image?

What constitutes the shared experience of the cinema is not simply the content of the spectacle, the film in itself, but the relation that all spectators have with the screen: pretty much everyone is in-line, on-axis with the projection and the screen;<sup>66</sup> and as such everyone is "seeing" the same thing, everyone is on the same page<sup>67</sup>: there is no subjective difference in terms of optical point-of-view between one spectator and the next. They all share the same perspectival relation to the images unfolding on the screen. Every spectator is served the same relational proposition as a "replacement" to their own individual subjectivity: the spectator willingly checks at the ticket counter their expression of subjectivity as a being in the world and it is replaced by the pre-packaged being in the world of the unfolding spectacle.<sup>68</sup> In the cinema screening,

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<sup>66</sup> Even if one is seated off-axis, in one of the side seats, the axis of the point of view of the projection is maintained in that there is no variation to the subjective axis of the presentation.

<sup>67</sup> Of course this means, that each spectator can read the page differently but they are working off the same "data".

<sup>68</sup> Subscribers to the auteur theory would say that this is the expression of the subjectivity of the director's vision.

there's less chaos to contend with in that the visual faculty has a lot less to do than when being presented with raw, real life—if anything because half the time the spectator is looking at a black screen and the rest of the time, the screen is a still... the spectator doesn't have as much information to process so there's a lot of processing headroom for the spectator to come to terms with the image being cast onto the screen. But becoming one with the screen image is a more complicated matter.

In the previous chapters we have been progressing from the external to the internal and attempting to construct an extensive continuity constitutive of the integration of actuality. In this chapter we look at the formation of the image as a visual conception. As we saw earlier in chapters 2 and 3, the image of the world we live in is the image we have inside. It begins with the traditional model of the retinal impression of the external on the retina and its production of an image in the mind. But there is no difference between the image of the world and the image we have inside. They are one and the same. There is no inside and no outside; it is all one and the same. In the same way that we could understand the event as individualization as part of individuation within creation, the perceptual image of the outside is the same image that is inside. How can we come to terms with this realization? How can we formulate the image that we have come to accept as "residing within our brain" and simply state that that which is out there is exactly the same as that which is inside? How can the inside be the outside simultaneously?

We will seek to answer these questions through Deleuze's concept of the fold through a consideration of geometrical optics derived from Euclid, the optical

perspective models of Alberti and Viator, Kepler's explorations of continuity through a generalized understanding of conics and perspective, as well as some of the implications of projective geometry through Desargues' theorem and their extension into topology. It is decidedly an ontological exploration mathematically informed and as such no different from using any other descriptive program: we do not see any other way of going about comprehending the operative dynamic of this concept without tracing it back to its origins. As Sha Xin Wei (2005) would say, we cannot confound "mathematics as ontology" with "mathematics is ontology" and his point is well taken—I hope that I am not catching myself in the Pythagoric Snare by confusing contingent attributes of informal models with the necessary consequences of the axioms (Nierenberg & Nierenberg, 2011: 586). If the Fold means anything, then its foundational essence must reside in that which we know as a fold; when someone writes the "unfolding of thought" there is an underlying logic to the statement which must make sense at some level, for if it didn't Deleuze could have called the Fold a camel or JimmyJoe. But how does one fold thought? Or how does the fold name the relationship? Or how does the fold achieve "a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity, that presume a simple interiority and exteriority" (Deleuze Dictionary p. 103)? What we seek to define is the operative intuition behind the concept.

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Deleuze is right when he writes in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* that the Baroque (1590-1725) refers not to an essence but rather to the operative function of endlessly producing folds. But what is that he means by that? A plausible answer lies in

the etymology of the Latin root *pli* which in English replicates itself as plic-, pli- plect-, plec-, plici-, -plex, -plexity, -plexus, -ple, -pli, -plic, -plicat, -plicit, -plicate, -plication and reflective of the Latin: *plicare, plecure*, to fold, bend, curve, turn, twine, twist, interweave, weave, unfold and unroll. These meanings emerge in different ways throughout Deleuze's writings as part of his rhetorical *explicatio*, in his explanations, explications and expositions. But these meanings are derivative; the first meanings of *explicatio* are unfold and unroll and these refer to the act of unrolling papyrus or parchment scrolls prior to the invention in the first century CE of the bound codex or book of sheets of vellum or a concertina-style folded scroll. The act of unrolling the scroll metonymically came to be understood as the explication of the text written on the scroll in terms of its linear unfolding and later as the exegesis of the text.

Another answer, also linguistically bound, could arise from the myriad possibilities that arise in words which include the root *-pli*. These words of Latin descent are equally found in English and French, mean more or less the same thing and imply many aspects of thought and its operations. Words such as amplify, apply, complement, complicate, discipline, example, explain, explore, implicit, implicate, replica, replicate, reply, simple, triple etc can all be seen as complicit and implicit in the complexification of thought to express the richness of the Baroque—not in terms of inventiveness but in its deployment of amplification, multiplication and plication in all things Baroque.

Yet there is another take on folds but it requires us to take as point of departure the world of painting of the pre-Renaissance. If one compares the depiction of pictorial space in art prior to 1450 and after, it would be an easy thing to say that up



to the end of the Middle Ages the depiction of pictorial space was fraught with disunity, discontinuity and incoherence until the invention of perspective in the 1400's. In David Hockney's epistolary exchange with Martin Kemp in *Secret Knowledge*, there is discussion as to how the first half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century served as hinge in the paradigmatic shift in the history of pictorial representation. Their comparison of paintings before and after those years reveals a quantum leap in the abilities of artists in two European art centres, Florence and Flanders. And key to the emergence of these new-found abilities appears to be the use of optical devices in art, i.e. mirrors. The use of mirrors resulted in techniques which revolutionized the way that architects and painters would pictorially depict the world: it resulted in Filippo Brunelleschi's putative discovery<sup>69</sup> of perspective in 1412 in Florence, and Jan van Eyck's painterly naturalism which emulated the photographic in Flanders.<sup>70</sup>

Although the use of mirrors likely provided both painters with similar departure points, the two regional concerns provided markedly different outcomes. In Florence, it was primarily with perspective as a depiction of coherent pictorial geometry, a visually rational depiction of depth and the relative position of objects not only to one another but projectively in relation to the world and the spectator. In Flanders, though the depiction of depth and the relative position of objects was important, the emphasis was on conveying the reality of the scene not as objects outlined relative to the viewer but

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<sup>69</sup> There are Roman wall-paintings with perfect geometrical perspective. See Battisti, 1981, p.102.

<sup>70</sup> When we refer to lenses in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, we are referring to the use of concave mirrors in a *camera obscura* to project their subject onto a canvas. Prior to this there was the pinhole *camera obscura*, where an inverted image would appear as a projection on a wall in a dark room as a result of a small hole opposite connecting to a brightly lit exterior. In the late 16<sup>th</sup> and into the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, painters will move towards the use of glass lenses as the technology emerges for the fabrication of microscopes and telescopes. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, artists will move towards the use of the *camera lucida*.

what one could describe as the effect on the eye. In terms of the rationalization of pictorial space as a depiction of space,<sup>71</sup> these two techniques have been conflated as the emergence of a naturalistic pictorial perspective by the back-gridding of history and other than pictorial perspective, what it did contribute to painting was the ability to depict photo-realistic fabric folds like never before. However, the rational and the affective need to be considered separately since the pictorial results emerging from these two techniques have profoundly different intuitions one is capable of deriving from them. If we subscribe to the usual historical presentation, the first half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century gave us:

(1) the discovery of perspective in 1412 as a systematic pictorial rendering technique as demonstrated by Florentine architect Filippo Brunelleschi (1377–1446).

(2) the geometrical rationalization of perspective as presented by Florentine painter Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472) in his *Della pittura* of 1435-36.

(3) the use of mirrors as a tool for naturalistic “painterly” pictorial rendering first by Flemish painters and later by Italians but not specifically for the geometric rendering of space.

According to most historical accounts, Brunelleschi is deemed to have discovered perspective in 1412 as a result of his work with mirrors and as demonstrated in front of the Baptistery of San Giovanni in Florence.<sup>72</sup> The demonstration was such that when the viewer stood at the same spot where the painter had stood in creating the drawing in

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<sup>71</sup> We ought to keep in mind that space *qua* space would not be understood as such until the late Renaissance.

<sup>72</sup> The two most recognized biographical accounts of Brunelleschi’s demonstration are by Antonio Manetti (1423 –1497) and Giorgio Vasari (1511 – 1574). Manetti writes, “I have had it in my hands and seen it many times in my days, so I can testify to it.” (Saalman

front of the Baptistery, and the created portrayal was perceived through a hole in a mirror, when “held at the correct distance, painting and reality are interchangeable.” (Hockney, 2006: 208) Apparently, this demonstrated that Brunelleschi had found “a practical means for securing a rigorous two-way, or reciprocal, metrical relationship between the shapes of objects definitely located in space and their pictorial representation.” (Ivins, 1938: p. 9) Whether the mirror aided Brunelleschi’s creative intuition as to the geometric functioning of perspective or as proof positive of his understanding of the geometry of perspective is beside the point; what really counted is that Brunelleschi had come upon a method of depicting nature in an optically correct manner. The likeness of nature was apparently perfectly reflected in his image, and no wonder—it had been executed off a mirror! Yet, what is particularly significant in Brunelleschi’s demonstration of this heightened naturalism is not so much the possibility of a new method of depicting nature, but the discovery of a new way of understanding sight, *una nova perspettiva*.

Throughout the ages, the term perspective referred to what we would now call optics, so when it is said that Brunelleschi discovered perspective, what he discovered in fact was a new optics, a new way of seeing. Instead of the “unsatisfactory or disjointed” depictions of space in painting up to the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century, Brunelleschi presented an integrated, rationalized whole: the mirror served as a picture plane, a flat surface, on which the eyes could rest to take in optical perspective and visually give pause to attest to the convergence of parallel lines. The mirror was a visual aid towards integrating the implicit disparate “perspectivities” of individual ocular saccades into a unified whole—

what Foucault might call a rationalization of the disorder of our impressions (Foucault, 2002: 77). The mirror allows the eye “to quiet down so it can listen”—to stop moving, so it can see: by short-circuiting the eye’s “restlessness”, i.e. its continual adjustment of binocular parallax and the reflex accommodation resulting from saccadic ocular movement, the eyes get to see what the lines are doing on the picture plane.<sup>73</sup> Once the eye’s incessant “darting to and fro” is stopped, and the head held motionless by fixing the gaze unto the mirror, the eyes can see that orthogonals do converge and thereby begin to realize that the “I” is here and that the “there” can be spatially rationalized from “here” as an independent coherent whole. The stilled eye allows for the establishment of a direct geometric correspondence between the external world of nature and the internal world of the mind as projected into the eye and mapped out imagistically “in the brain”. The stilled eye lays the foundation not only for the logical two-way, reciprocal correspondence between the pictorial representations of objects and the locations of those objects in space as a projection but situates the spectator in relation to those objects according to a knowable and repeatable, geometrically-correct reciprocal correspondence between the pictorial representation of objects and the spectator. This is what formally constitutes the knower-known relation at its most fundamental.<sup>74</sup>

Leon Battista Alberti in his *Della pittura* of 1435-36. His technique, the *costruzione legittima*, would prove to be his biggest achievement and serve as the best

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<sup>73</sup> This is the visualization which is at the foundation of projective geometry and will be discussed in upcoming pages.

<sup>74</sup> In terms of cinematic projection, the technologically built-in perspective of the cinematic apparatus imposes an order appropriated from the world and offers this appropriation to others thus robbing them of their subjectivity.

method for producing perspective on a flat panel for generations (Ivins, 1938: p. 14). “Whatever its debt to Brunelleschi, this treatise is the starting point of much of later Renaissance artistic theory and practice.” (Grayson 1963: 14) Alberti’s stroke of genius was the establishment of the picture plane perpendicular to the ground so as to slice through the pyramid of vision. Although, to say that Alberti “demonstrated for the first time a complete understanding of the primary geometry, i.e. the relationship between spectator, picture plane and object and the resulting visual array formed by projection lines intersecting the picture plane” (Dubery and Willats, 1972: 53) is perhaps to be overly generous. Alberti had based his solution to the problem of perspective “upon the simplest kind of practical ingenuity.” Through his research-creation<sup>75</sup> project of boxing perspective, he was able to “determine correctly the intervals of recession of the transversals in relation to a chosen distance point.” (Grayson, 1964: 17) From Alberti’s demonstration we can see that his perspective method provides coherence and gives relational order to that which appears on the picture plane within a frame from a singular point of view: the perspector or point of perspective. What Alberti had done is “discovered that, pictorially at least, form and position were functions of each other, and thus were relative and not constant, and also that there could be no statement of position in three-dimensional space in anything short of a three- or four-term relation.” (Ivins, 1938: 32)

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<sup>75</sup> In his piece on Alberti, Grayson tries to figure out Alberti’s terminology and method simply from the translation of the text. Because the pamphlet has no drawings, in order for it to reveal its insights, the reader must construct the perspective box that Alberti created. This is something that Ivins did in 1938 and as a result his observations and conclusions are that much more insightful.

Although it would appear that producing a correct perspective drawing of a scene in front of a painter is the most obvious thing in the world to do—in that if he goes to the nearest window he can simply trace the lines of the world outside his window in correct perspective, it was not done in the 15<sup>th</sup> century because the technology had not been invented to produce a pane of glass big enough, flat enough or clear enough to do it! Technologically, to create a flat piece of clear glass was a difficult, if not impossible, undertaking; it would have to be made from a blown piece, cut, laid flat and then polished by hand and then there was no guarantee that the glass would be clear—and definitely not of optical quality. In the early 15<sup>th</sup> century, windows of any size would be manufactured out of small pieces of flat glass assembled with H-sectioned lead comes as in the Gothic stained-glass windows or out of circular pieces of blown glass bull’s eyes as depicted on Van Eyck’s *The Arnolfini Wedding* (1432), *The Annunciation* (1434) or *The Madonna of Chancellor Rolin* (1435). So the idea of the pane of glass window as the support for a drawing of perspective was not a likely prospect at that time. Alberti had predicated his theory on a window (*fenestra*) as an easily understandable location of the perpendicular intersectional picture plane bounded by a frame. It had to be orthogonal to the scene at hand and somewhat above it. In Alberti’s words, “I inscribe a quadrangle of right angles, as large as I wish, which is considered to be an open window through which I see what I want to paint.” And instead of a pane of glass Alberti uses a quasi-transparent scrim or veil—a screen: “Nothing can be found, so I think, which is more useful than that veil which among my friends I call an intersection. It is a thin veil, finely woven, dyed whatever colour pleases you and with larger threads

[marking out] as many parallels as you prefer. This veil I place between the eye and the thing seen, so the visual pyramid penetrates through the thinness of the veil” (Alberti, 1980: 68).<sup>76</sup> By placing the veil, i.e. by inserting the picture plane across the cone of vision, the representation on the screen will create a strict formal relational network between the elements on the plane and within the frame relative to the viewer, and it is in this way that Deleuze can assert in *The Fold* (1993) that “the screen makes something issue from chaos”<sup>77</sup> (Deleuze, 1993: 76). “This relation alone furnishes the law, the *certa ratio*<sup>78</sup> that henceforth exists between all the elements in the representation. The representation implies an immanent rationality based on the possibility of relating each element to the others and to the whole. The painting is a representation endowed with the force of a sanction, permitting one to “know” each element as a relational element in the whole that one “sees”<sup>79</sup> (Hallyn, 1997: 68-69). And the perspective which is established as that which one knows through that which one sees is the singularly coherent point of view which renders the world objective to an individual subjectivity.

In 1505, the French diplomat and man of letters Jean Pelèrin *dit* le Viator in his *De Artificiali Perspectiva* took Alberti’s method and improved upon it by establishing

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<sup>76</sup> Very much like a rear projection system, indeed!

<sup>77</sup> Although Deleuze states this in a more general sense, his metaphor originates in Alberti. As will be seen later, the relation between monadic substance, the fold, the window and the screen as discussed in Deleuze’s *The Fold* and in Heidegger’s *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1988) is not lost on the author.

<sup>78</sup> The precise relation. Interestingly, in *Ethics*, II, p13 Spinoza determines the essence of a body by a *certa ratio motus et quietis* which Ramond translates as a ‘precise relation of movement and rest.’ Duffy, Simon. *The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity, and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze*. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy. Aldershot and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. P.137

<sup>79</sup> Curiously, Hallyn brings out the immanent relationality between the elements on the plane but fails to grasp that the immanence of the relation also encompasses the viewer and the world beyond the screen.

distance points<sup>80</sup> on the horizon based on the convergence of parallel diagonals to a single point. This not only allowed the correct depiction of depth recession but also established three point perspective i.e. two lateral vanishing points and one central vanishing point. Where Alberti's was an intuitive and arbitrary method, Viator's demonstrates a "more considerable effort of geometrical imagination and knowledge" (Ivins, 1938: 27). Viator's diagrams demonstrate a richer comprehension of the method and a more abstract understanding of the relations inherent in perspective. His most important realizations are that "his center point and his two distance points are located on a line at the level of the eye, and that his two distance points are "equedistans du suiect: plus prochains en presente, et plus esloignez en distant veue."<sup>81</sup>" (Ivins, 1938: 27) As a result, Viator's diagrams are deemed to be believable, naturalistic and optically correct. Although there are significant differences between Alberti's and Viator's schemes, both methods produce almost identical results: where Alberti's lateral distance points do not concur with the point of intersection of parallel diagonals, Viator uses the point of convergence of parallel diagonals as the point of perspective to generate the optically correct and rationalised position of foreshortened depth parallels. As a method of depicting pictorial perspective, Alberti's *costruzione legittima* is well and good but geometrically Viator's is more legit: Viator makes recourse to the convergence of parallel lines as the premise for the correct pictorial depiction of recession thereby presenting a more coherent statement of perspective in the optical

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<sup>80</sup> These will be called vanishing points later in the story of perspective:

<sup>81</sup> Equidistant from the subject: the more present as nearer and further away as seen more distantly. (Our translation)



plane. By relying on distance, Alberti's method is metrical and intuitive and remains based on the compass and straightedge methods of Euclidian geometry, whereas Viator's construction is based on the straightedge alone<sup>82</sup> and is only fully explainable in projective geometry i.e. why we can say that parallel lines converge in infinity. As such, Viator's constructions "work" and the expression of the convergence of parallels at distance points on the horizon lays down the foundations for French architect, engineer and mathematician Girard Desargues (1591-1661) to present the most generalized description of geometrical thought in terms of projective geometry.

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Perspective allows one to establish the optical concordance between that which offers itself visually to the lens of the eye and its supposed ophthalmic projection onto the back of the eye according to a rational, determinate, knowable relation that can be geometrically ascertained and thereby depicted pictorially. As a pictorial method, perspective allows the draughtsman to depict that which offers itself visually to him in a way that corresponds to the ophthalmic projective transformative<sup>83</sup> mapping which can be paired with the image as an ordered, coherent and integrated whole created in the mind and which concurs consistently, and repeatably i.e. habitually, with the intuited

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<sup>82</sup> Although every depiction of the workings of perspective presents a black and white tiled floor pattern it has been presented by modern scholars as a perverse preoccupation by Renaissance painters and geometers with tiled floor panels rather than as a very effective demonstration of convergence of parallels and the depiction of depth recession on a 2-D plane. The ability to create the tiled floor pattern using only a ruler can also be seen as the construction of the coordinate grid for affine geometry. Reference to the construction in the Real Projective Plane

<sup>83</sup> Ophthalmic projection onto the retina is transformative in that it maps 3 dimensions onto 2.

metrical<sup>84</sup> geometry created by sensori-motor interaction with objects in the world. And contrary to what is usually said about perspective creating a dualistic binary relationship between knower and known<sup>85</sup>, we propose an alternate interpretation of this duality and say that the knower and the known, the seer and the seen, the subject and object create each other simultaneously as a reciprocal-ordering pair: the subjective pole and the objective pole emerge concurrently as the immanent subjectivity of perspective. Perspective short-circuits the rational and undermines conscious understanding by the homotopic presentation of the world through its transformational mapping because once one sees in terms of perspective, it is very difficult to undo—primarily, because of the geometrical correspondence between the “somagonic”<sup>86</sup> metricity and the optical as ophthalmically correct: once you “get” perspective there’s no turning it off to “unget” it—the experimentation with pictorial representation in painting over the last two centuries could be said to represent the struggle to undo the coercive perspectival stranglehold on vision. This means that in the “intervention of the understanding” there is a double bind: on the one hand we have perspective as a representational device and, on the other, we have perspective as an optical model which rationalizes vision by giving it order. Like Molière’s *Bourgeois gentilhomme* (1670) who was unaware of speaking in prose, most of us are not conscious that we are seeing “perspectivally”—when we see a pictorial image that does not conform to the

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<sup>84</sup> Here, metrical is used in the sense of being related to body-based “units of measurement,” e.g. the span, the pygmé, the inch, the pace, the palm, the cubit, the pous, etc.

<sup>85</sup> See above on the immanent relation between elements of the perspectival composition.

<sup>86</sup> My neologism for the intuited metrical geometry created by sensori-motor interaction with objects in the world.

perspectival schema, we feel that it is wrong<sup>87</sup>—yet, perspective as such does not exist in the world. Is the perspectival schema a description, an explanation, a representation, or bodily experience?<sup>88</sup>

Implicit in the expression of the unioocular, static perspectival gaze is the reconciliation of the opposing theories of intromission and extromission of light rays as cause of vision. In terms of perspective, the ophthalmic geometry of the eye presents light rays to the retina according to specific geometric rules, but the establishment of the unioocular point of view of perspectival vision invokes the necessity to still the eye to create the subjectivity which allows for the composition of order and coherence to the seen/scene and concurrently allows for the phenomena of nature to present themselves to the eye in a geometrically coherent fashion: the parts of the whole as an integrated system “have no relevant properties independent of one another.” Thus, we can also affirm an organicist take on optical perspective as a system whose specific totality “conditions the mode of being of its parts according to the internal logic of its own coherence.” (Hallyn, 1997: 17)

Perspective allows us to depict the world in a way that corresponds to the integrated ophthalmic projective transformative mapping which can be paired with the image created in the mind and which concurs consistently, reliably and repeatably with the intuited geometry created by the body’s sensori-motor interaction with things in the world. It allows us to bring physical experience to the mind and back again. Perspectivist

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<sup>87</sup> It’s as if a there’s a sensorially based hard-wired ethics, a normative structure built-in to the senses—the harmonic basis of Pythagorean hearing; the reflex gagging action; the repulsion of certain smells; the recoil from sharp objects, etc. There’s no prescriptive statement from the outside that tells us that things are not right.

<sup>88</sup> At this point this will remain a rhetorical question and will be addressed in the section post-Kepler.

knowledge is not only knowledge of perspectivist phenomena—as the rationalization of sight, perspective serves as the primary (technological) gateway for the expression of correspondence from the outside to the inside and vice-versa. It creates and closes the loop between the visual, the mind and the body. In a visual sense, “the boldness of the perspectivist paradigm consists precisely in presenting this controlled access to the world as the real possibility of a valid rationalism embracing human experience.” (Hallyn, 1997: 69) Perspective becomes a transductive<sup>89</sup> process whose axiomatic veracity is based upon the duality expressed in incidence<sup>90</sup>: in the symmetrical relation between lines and points, in the strict correspondence between a pencil and a range, the intromission and extromission of sight can be formally expressed as the duality emerging from the perspectivity from a point to a line and the perspectivity of a line to a point. In the reciprocity of duality on the plane, a line will map onto a point and a point onto a line. Instead of creating a binary couple between the “here” and the “there”, the duality of perspective states that they are both the same and simultaneously reciprocally created.

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In 1604, Kepler published the *Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena quibus Astronomiae Pars Optica traditur* (*Optics: Paralipomena to Witelo and the Optical Part of Astronomy*) in which he developed the doctrine of optical perspective of the Polish Scholastic theologian, natural philosopher and mathematician Erazmus Ciolek Witelo (b. ca. 1230—d. bet. 1280 and 1314). “It began as an attempt to give astronomical optics a

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<sup>89</sup> Transduction as meant by French philosopher Gilbert Simondon and not like in the biological sciences.

<sup>90</sup> As the concept of projective geometry

solid foundation, but soon transcended this narrow goal to become a complete reconstruction of the theory of light, the physiology of vision, and the mathematics of refraction.” (Donahue: 2010) One of Kepler’s big mathematical achievements in this book was his presentation of the conic sections as “different manifestations of a single curve,” (O’Leary, 2010: 299) and from there to formulate a theory of continuity. This was laid out in a chapter entitled “On Conic Sections” where he points out “that a plane section of a cone can be a straight line, a parabola, a hyperbola, or an ellipse, and that “a straight line goes over into a parabola through infinite hyperbolas, and through infinite ellipses into a circle.”” (Rosenfeld p. 744) The manifestation of different curves from one conic section can be intuitively seen from the reconstruction of a figure from its two projections. The most widely known example is the reconstruction of an ellipse cut from a cone of revolution as performed and illustrated by Dürer. (Coolidge, 1940: 111) This can also be deduced from geometric construction: if we construct a parabola with compass and straightedge<sup>91</sup> (or an ellipse or hyperbola), and play with the position of what Kepler termed the focus, or foci,<sup>92</sup> we end up with a way of describing conic curves according to the position of the focus and a directrix. But more elegantly, this can also be shown by combining the theories of conics as laid out by Apollonius with the perspectival representation of the conic sections. If we again construct an ellipse with

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<sup>91</sup> The parabola is thus constructed as the locus of points defined by the intersection of concentric circles with center at F and radius r, and lines parallel with the directrix L, at a distance equal to r from L. (Holme, Audun. *Geometry: Our Cultural Heritage*, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2010 p.337)

<sup>92</sup> Most everyone translates the word focus from Latin as hearth and invokes the parallel with parabolic “burning mirrors” and reject by omission the reference to the sun as the divine fire which was held with religious awe by the Ancient Greeks and lauded with such titles as Hearth of the Universe, Tower of Zeus and Throne of Zeus. Guthrie, W.K.C. (1962) “Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,” in *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

compass and straightedge and map it out onto a perspective plane with one central vanishing point (the one with the black and white tiled floor), through projection we end up with an ellipse. And if we pursue this construction method with the hyperbola, we end up with one branch laid out on the projective plane which extends to the horizon, i.e. into infinity, as one half of an ellipse and the other branch engulfing us from behind as the other half of the ellipse whose second focus resides within us as the corollary projective point to the polar at infinity before us. (Stillwell, 2010: 138)

From Kepler's ophthalmic investigations on refraction and vision, he was able to demonstrate by using glass globes filled with fluid—much like the vitreous humour of the eye—that light rays which traverse the eye converge at a single point through the action of a lens. And contrary to Alhazen and Galen, who believed that the image was formed on the lens of the eye, Kepler concluded that the image was formed on the retina but laterally reversed and vertically inverted. Once on the retina, the image was transmitted to the brain via the optic nerve to the *sensus communis* (the common sense) in the brain<sup>93</sup> but how that happens, according to Kepler, is no longer a problem of optics or the physicist's concern but for the physiologists to figure out<sup>94</sup>. (Xuan Thuan, 2008: 66-67) "Kepler looked upon any source of light as a collection of luminous points, from each of which, as from a little star, rectilinear rays shot out in all directions. Such of these rays as entered our eye formed a divergent cone having its vertex in the star point and its base in the pupil of the eye. As these rays passed through the inner structure of

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<sup>93</sup> In Descartes, the theatre of the mind takes place in the pineal gland because it is shared by both hemispheres.

<sup>94</sup> A sentiment echoed by Bergson.

the normal eye, they were all refracted so that they reassembled at a single point on the retina. In so doing they formed a second convergent cone, which likewise had its base in the pupil of the eye but its vertex in a point on the retina. These two divergent and convergent cones, back to back, so to say, coupled with the punctiform analysis of luminosity, provided the essential structures in Kepler's theory of vision." (Rosen, 1975: 282) Thus, the line segment which extends from the focal point of the ray emanating from the light source and traverses orthogonally the lens of the eye to focus on the retina creates "two ends of the line as meeting in infinity so that the line has the structure of a circle." (Kline, 1972: 290) In modern mathematical parlance one would say that the 1-D projective line—the one from the drawings in perspective extending to the vanishing point on the horizon, defined as a line segment  $R$  plus a point at infinity<sup>95</sup>—will come to be defined as the space of 1-D subspaces in 2-D space so that a straight line can be extended on both ends, i.e. to  $+\infty$  "forwards" before us and to  $-\infty$  "backwards" behind us, where they eventually meet, to reconcile the two extremities at infinity so that the line has the structure of a circle of infinite radius.<sup>96</sup> This in turn will allow the definition of the real projective plane  $RP^2$  as the space of 1-D subspaces in 3-D space, as a plane plus a projective line.<sup>97</sup> Thus, through the principle of duality, the projective line is seen as all the 1-D sub-spaces, i.e. the 2-D pencil of lines through the origin, and the projective plane will be seen as the projection of the 3-D pencil of lines through the

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<sup>95</sup> And here, at the junction of the circularity of infinity, the mind of man unites with the mind of God!

<sup>96</sup> This states that the 1-D projective line—the one from the drawings in perspective extending to the vanishing point on the horizon, can be defined as a line segment  $R$  plus a point at infinity.

<sup>97</sup> Although I am trying to build a linear exposé and build the argument chronologically, it is difficult to bring out the significance of some of the concepts without taking flash-forward liberties to mathematical ideas which were only discovered later.

origin in 2-D space<sup>98</sup>: this projection was not only of importance to Kepler but to Descartes as well as it allows the transference from scale-invariant 3-D coordinates in non-metrical projective space to ordinary Cartesian 2-D coordinates: is this not a “generalized expression” of what happens in the eye?—it allows for the transformational mapping—i.e. establishes the correspondence—between general projective geometry and metrical algebraic geometry; optical perspective, as subsidiary and explainable by projective geometry, can now also be mathematized.<sup>99</sup> But all this would only be able to be fully expressed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; the 20<sup>th</sup> century will see this presented afresh through differential geometry and topology, but the proposition of mapping a 3-D space onto a 2-D plane remains essentially the same.

Kepler’s discoveries, however, found relevance in the 17<sup>th</sup> century: his work on conics proved to be invaluable in that they would be of use to Desargues in the development of projective geometry and to Fermat, Descartes to unify algebra and geometry in terms of coordinate algebra and for Leibniz and Newton to formulate the calculus and redefine mechanics. The geometrical conceptions developed by Kepler, particularly those on conics and continuity, would now be able to be expressed mathematically by Descartes through co-ordinate geometry and the ensuing analytical algebra as “the identification of the algebraic correlation with the geometrical locus.”

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<sup>98</sup> I must acknowledge the support and encouragement of Dr. Sha Xin Wei and the participants of the Math Seminar at the Topological Media Lab at Concordia University, namely Sean Brathwaite, Michael Fortin, Morgan Sutherland and Tyr Umbach in developing these ideas and Dr. N.J. Widberger’s invaluable YouTube lectures from his series on the History of Mathematics, Math Foundations, Wild Trigonometry, Hyperbolic Geometry, Algebraic Topology and Universal Hyperbolic Geometry.

<sup>99</sup> I have taken some liberty here. Instead of the concordance established with planar geometry the relation would be better expressed in terms of the projection onto a spherical surface, i.e. the retinal surface of the eye.



(Whitehead, 1958: 88) Thus that the idea of form as expressed through its loci (i.e. straight lines, circles, ellipses, etc) could be expressed in terms of ordered co-ordinate correlation and general algebraic expressions between variables. In the Cartesian coordinate system, the general form of the conics is  $ax^2+2hxy+by^2+2gx+2fy+c=0$  so that the “equation of every conic section can always be put into this shape.” (Whitehead, 1958: 104) This not only “relates together geometry, which started as the science of space, and algebra, which has its origin in the science of number” (Whitehead, 1958: 84) but fuses the entirety of the conic system into an aggregate of discrete points. This innovation ties in nicely with the new corpuscular theory of matter and the mechanical philosophy. Thus, we now have a geometrical method and an algebraic numerical method as the basis for the understanding, description and expression of conics where any section or non-degenerate slice “represents reconstructing the parent cone.” (Kendig, 2005: 3) In both of these methods, the plane cutting the cone becomes a “screen,” a projection giving a particular view of the conic.<sup>100</sup> In the first, by moving the foci, we can slide from one conic section to the next, from one view to the next, and see in the continuous deformation the extensive non-metrical manifestation of continuity: we can plastically deform a conic curve from a circle, to a parabola, to an ellipse, to a hyperbola as equivalent representations of the parent cone. “From the standpoint of screens, they’re simply different views of the same thing.” (Kendig, 2005: 3) Similarly, we can say that the general algebraic expression of the conics provides the same

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<sup>100</sup> In terms of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of the desiring-machine, the dynamic set-up of, and set up by, the cinema projector is a perfect prototype of its expression in that the shutter blades provide the "system of interruptions or breaks (coupures)" that slice away, removing portions, from the immense thigh of a pig (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 36).

function and thus, both methods of expressing the relation between the parent cone and the continuity in extension of the subsidiary curves allow one to take an easy abductive leap to be able to state metaphorically that these two methods represent diagrammatic expressions of “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (Spinoza Ethics I D5) where attribute is the essence of substance (Spinoza Ethics I P19 D) and essence is the expression of being in substance: substance manifests its essence as being through an infinite number of attributes each expressing an aspect of its being.<sup>101</sup> Mathematically speaking, perspective becomes a transductive<sup>102</sup> process whose axiomatic veracity is based upon the duality expressed in incidence<sup>103</sup>: in the symmetrical relation between lines and points, in the strict correspondence between a pencil and a range, the intromission and extromission of sight can be formally expressed as the duality emerging from the perspectivity from a point to a line and the perspectivity of a line to a point. In the reciprocity of duality on the plane, a line will map onto a point and a point onto a line. Instead of creating a binary couple between the “here” and the “there”, the duality of perspective states that they are both the same and simultaneously reciprocally created.

Although the fold of the Baroque as an ontological notion emerges out of Renaissance optics and mathegraphies, the development in full of its implications will only be able to be expressed through the understanding of projective geometry as a

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<sup>101</sup> Although I am giving Spinoza short shrift here, before engaging the ideas of Spinoza as laid out in the *Ethics* we need to see how Kepler made use of these mathematical ideas in his cosmology.

<sup>102</sup> Transduction as meant by French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (19 - 19 ) and not like in the biological sciences.

<sup>103</sup> As the concept of projective geometry

generalized form of geometry. Girard Desargues (1591-1661), a French mathematician and engineer, friend of Descartes, Fermat and Pascal, published a pamphlet on perspective, *Brouillon project d'une atteinte aux evenemens des rencontres du cone avec un plan*, which laid the groundwork for projective geometry. In it, Desargues "shows that the visual convergence of parallel lines is the logically necessary result of the geometrical definitions of point, line, and plane, in terms of each other, devoid of and prior to all metrical assumptions" (Ivins, 1964: 89). In terms of the ontological quantum leap of the Baroque described in *The Fold*, the key phrase in this quote is "devoid of and prior to all metrical assumptions" for this expression as presented through Desargues' Theorem is what allows the Deleuzian fold to take hold.




Fig. 1 Desargues' Theorem as a Fold. In Hilbert, D. *Geometry and the Imagination*. 1952

The theorem states: "Two triangles  $ABC$  and  $A'B'C'$  in space being given, let them be so placed that the lines connecting corresponding vertices pass through a single point  $O$ . Then the three pairs of corresponding sides have points of intersection,  $R$ ,  $S$ , and  $T$ , and these points of intersection are, moreover, collinear" (Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen,

1952: 121). To derive an ontology based on two triangles, a point, and an additional line called the directrix, as per the figure is almost unfathomable but this is what provides the rationale for the fold.

If we take point  $O$  as the eye of the observer, and the two triangles  $ABC$  and  $A'B'C'$  to be perspectival images projected through  $O$ , external reality is projected perspectively inwards, represented here as triangle  $ABC$ , and the corresponding image created within as  $A'B'C'$ . For the sake of empirical coherence, correspondence and consistency as a foundation of rationality, needs to be a homotopic mapping of external reality subject to the strictures of perspectivism and thereby remain a valid representation of external reality—the internal image must conform with the external as corroborated by the pictorial image that substantiates it conformally. Given a focus, i.e. a point of attention, and an observer, i.e. a subjective point of view, the directrix is the axis of symmetry which defines the validity and guides the integration of the internal perspectival projection. "Subjectivation is created by folding" (Deleuze, 1988a:104): the fold is the expression of the directive subjective agency between the "retinal" image impressed inwards and its projected correspondence and concurrence with the perception image created in the mind as a monad—it is an individuation inside the individuation considered as an individualization. It is what holds together the concordance between the image of the exterior and its internal manifestation as a perception image as a memory image. The directrix as the hinge of the fold, as the apex of the crease, as an axis separating two instances of the same perspectival projection, acts simultaneously as a hinge and as origin of the separating fissure; it serves as the

"linking factor" (Deleuze, 1988a: 65)<sup>104</sup> between the two projections, "between matter and soul, the façade and the closed room, the outside and the inside" (Deleuze, 1993: 35). The void as a zone of indeterminacy hides the process between that which is projected onto the back of the eye and the creative integration of the screen as the concept. The void between the two projections is not empty; it is full of folds (Deleuze, 1993:36) and is imbued with "infinite comprehension: it "envelops the infinite" (Deleuze 1993: 49) as a multiplicity: it is filled with the myriad folds of other projections constituting other retinal "cepts" which are tied to the directrix of subjectivity as integrative. "It is a world of captures instead of closures" (Deleuze 1993: 81). The folds within the fold as implicated projections define each other within the process of becoming as an actual entity different from its constituent components and immediately go on to become the objective data for a new becomings. In Whitehead's organic philosophy of process, this is what constitutes the prehension and the object-subject-superject flow of relation within the event as an actual occasion as constitutive of the process of "continual relinking which takes place over the irrational break or the crack" (Deleuze, 1988: 65).

Most "everyone" understands what we see as that which is imprinted on the retina: vision is traditionally understood as a Cartesian mechanical process expressed in terms of a linear causal chain consisting of object—waves—lens—retina—nerve impulses—brain activity within a passively percipient subject. Therefore, this conception of the image takes as a given the visual impression as pre-constituted: it lands on the

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<sup>104</sup> Deleuze states in *Foucault* that the void is the 'linking factor'.

retina's surface as a planar whole—the external world as that which we see because that is what is imprinted on the retina. But as was discussed in chapter 2, that which we "see" is not that which we see: if we still our head and look out into the world, we see the world; but if we move our eyes, the world remains static as the eyes dart about—we do not see "that which is imprinted on the retina" as the eyes take in the scene! If we saw "that which is imprinted on the retina" then the world would be a succession of swish pans and not the coherent vision of the world as a screen upon which our eyes can wander as the "stabilized" immersive concept as the that which appears before us. This implies that the impression on the retina, triangle ABC is not what we see; what we "see", triangle A'B'C', is a (re)collection and a (re)membering of the various ocular wanderings as graspings, of ABC "cepts" brought together and assembled as a conceptual whole—this reveals vision as a screen as a reconstitutive and integrative memorial process which guided by the directrix "retains its irreducible point of view. It is the accord of singular points of view, or harmony, that will replace universal complication" (Deleuze, 1993:24). The memory image emerges out of the chaos, with the imperceptible infinite celerity of becoming with the intervention of the screen as an integrative catch all. Without the screen, "Chaos would be a pure Many, a purely disjunctive diversity, while the something is a One, not a pre-given unity, but instead the indefinite article that designates a certain singularity. How can the Many become the One? A great screen has to be placed in between them" (Deleuze, 1993: 76).

This impression of focused luminous energy which is projected inwards is not a mirror image of the world and neither is it a planar whole taken in as such, but an

inverted and reversed projection. The world exists spatially for our stereoptic eyes as a 3-D scale-invariant projective conception which reconciles binocular disparity maps itself conformally as the Cyclopean 2-D plane, as a flat image, so that even if the information of the third co-ordinate appears to be lost in the transformative 2-D mapping, the 'fixed' geometry of the eye as a constant<sup>105</sup> provides us with spatial depth intuitions which are cybernetically learned in conjunction with other senses and which remain stable over time. Thus, we have a mapping of the 3-D world as a 2-D image which in turn is projected, i.e. cast backwards and inwards, to create the perceptual image as an impression which can be grasped and made available for storage, i.e. integrated as a memory image, under the regulatory guidance of the directrix as a faculty. But given the concept of continuity from Kepler—the space of 1-D subspaces in 2-D space so that a straight line can be extended on both ends ( to  $+\infty$  “forwards” before us and to  $-\infty$  “backwards” behind us, where they eventually meet, as a reconciliation of the two extremities at infinity so that the line has the structure of a circle of infinite radius)—where at the juncture of the two extremities we have a laterally reversed and vertically inverted image, do we not have as resultant an imagistic Moebius strip? Which if we extend laterally gives us a Klein surface to satisfy the strictures of the extensive continuum as a monadic closed surface of infinite extent?

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<sup>105</sup> The retina as a local projective plane, as the totality of all 1-D subspaces of a 3-D space is the projective plane for all lines through the origin (the lens) in 3-D space is the same as the plane  $z=1$  (where the eye's constant geometry constitutes the unitary measure) allows the transformation of homogeneous projective coordinates (including those at infinity) into finite Euclidian coordinates as constituent of the retina.




Fig. 2 Klein Bottle or Surface. From

<http://scientific.tumblr.com/search/klein+bottle>

A more formal way of expressing this would be to say that we develop the connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a closed surface (Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen, 1952: 313-324). In this way, we have "an outside, more distant than any exterior, [which] is 'twisted', 'folded' and 'doubled' by an Inside that is deeper than any interior, and alone creates the possibility of the derived relation between the interior and the exterior" (Deleuze, 1988a: 110). This affords us another interpretation of the Latin *plicare*, which we have been reading as fold but which is also legitimately translatable as twist. This surface has no inside or outside, has no discontinuity and has no windows. Thus, "the general topology of thought, which had already begun 'in the neighborhood' of the particular features, now ends up in the folding of the outside into the inside: 'in the interior of the exterior and inversely' "(Deleuze, 1988a: 118).



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In terms of becoming one with the screen of cinema as a production of a fold, the cinema as a medium makes the spectacle as fold-friendly as possible. By feeding the eyes static frames that are actually only alive in terms of novelty only 25% of the time, the brain has lots of time to sit back and enjoy the film's unfolding.<sup>106</sup> Depending on where we sit in the cinema and how one prefers to enjoy the screening, because of the constant screen-size to spectator relation, the cinema frame presents us with images that are already "chunked" and easy to digest; most often, the eyes can remain static on the screen so that the projected image cast inwards is much the same image as that of the inner screen: there is very little chaos to contend with and lots of time to "appreciate the variation" in the difference and repetition of one frame and the next. Yet our relation of oneness with the screen is topologically maintained as just described so that "if the inside is constituted by the folding of the outside, between them there is a topological relation: the relation to oneself is homologous to the relation with the outside and the two are in contact, through the intermediary of the strata which are relatively external environments (and therefore relatively internal) (Deleuze, 1988a: 119).

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Our interpretation of the fold as based on the articulation of optical perspective, projective geometry and the topological expansion of the projective plane into a

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<sup>106</sup> If the film is running at 24 frames per second, and half the time is spent in darkness, and the same frame is shown twice, a new frame is being dealt with only 25% of the time; a second 25% is only affirmative repetition of that which has been seen and as such requires limited comparative crunching. The remaining 50% is blackness.

continuous one-sided surface is that which allows Deleuze to develop the concept of the fold. Unfortunately my limited, intuitive grasp of the mathematics and its pidgin articulation do not do full justice to the topic at hand but it is my contention that this is what is operative. Deleuze's *Fold* fits into a "mathematics as ontology" scheme and its mode of expression relies on different aspects of the mathematical ideas presented above to express its unfolding: there is a mathematical/geometrical system as its basis and an ontology founded on its metaphoric interpretation.<sup>107</sup>

Deleuze deals with memory cursorily in *Foucault* (1988a) and *The Fold* (1993). In *Foucault*, memory is engaged with overtly but cursively in the "Foldings or the Inside of Thought" chapter. In *Foucault*, Deleuze refers to "a taste for trips down memory lane" and directly refers to the folding or doubling as Memory, as the "real relation to oneself, or the affect on self by self" where "time as subject, or rather subjectivation, is called memory" (Deleuze, 1988a: 107). If this is tied to "Subjectivation is created by folding" (Deleuze, 1988a: 104) and "To think is to fold" (Deleuze, 1988a: 118) it would seem to imply memory as folding is temporality's subjectivity as thought—which in itself is a big conclusion and something we will look at in our next chapter. Yet, behind the mathematics in *The Fold*, there is a more constant allusion to memory as imagistic process and its presence is felt throughout though it is only explicitly mentioned twice in the entire book. Chapter 3, "What is Baroque?", contains one of the mentions and within this chapter we detect incessant suggestions as to memory as integrative by way of references to urbanism "fold after fold, revealing the city" (Deleuze, 1993: 31) and

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<sup>107</sup> We have not engaged the concept of the differential in this chapter because it would distract from the line of development of imagistic thought.

architecture—"For ages there have been places where what is seen is inside: a cell, a sacristy, a crypt, a church, a theater, a study, or a print room" (Deleuze, 1993: 27). Anytime one encounters these terms, memory lurks near as integrative of experience. When Deleuze mentions the *studiolo* and compares it to the monad, we can immediately connect this to the Memory Theatre of Giulio Camillo (1480-1544) with its "many images, and full of little boxes" (Yates, 1992: 136) as a memory system as an adaptation of the classical art of memory. "The *Studiolo* of Florence, with its secret room stripped of windows: The monad is a cell. It resembles a sacristy more than an atom: a room with neither doors nor windows, where all activity takes place on the inside" (Deleuze, 1993: 28). And where the activity is all memory work. As such, the monad is where memory work as integration takes place—it is the work which takes place behind the façade of faciality as autonomous process of the gazing back which comes to look at one in the face as becoming. But Deleuze ratchets it up on the memory front by tying the *studiolo* as reading room to the book as the fold of the Event: "The monad is the book or the reading room. The visible and the legible, the outside and the Inside, the façade and the chamber are, however, not two worlds, since the visible can be read and the legible has its theater" (Deleuze, 1993: 31). And he continues with "emblems"—another memory idea. The book becomes the reading room as the *explicatio* of memory as event—the book, is an image of memory but one divorced from imagistic thought as a container of the imageless *epitomes* transferred to the printed book and the 'method' of memorizing through dialectical order which rejects and forsakes imagination (Yates, 1992: 230). The monad is the integrative image of the memory of the world. Our next

chapter explores the image of the concept as the internal image that organizes memory and surfaces as integration.

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## On the Creation of Image Concepts

In the last chapter we examined the process of how the "external" becomes "internal" in terms of the optical image through the intermediary of the fold and posited the screen as the integrative composite of perception as the *Concept*. As part of the process as perceptive, the Concept is not like that which we normally consider a concept. However, the way the concept has come to be understood as part of the tradition of thought which considers memory as imagistic process is quite informative of the dynamics of integration within the internal Concept. Thus, in this chapter, we look at how the development of memory images led to the creation of image concepts in the service of rhetoric by way of pictorial Renaissantist mnemonic devices called *imagines agentes*. We then seek to show how these give rise or contribute to such important concepts in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari as the machinic assemblage, the constitution of territorialization, the planomenon and the ecumenon, the plane of consistency and the plane of immanence. One will also be able to see emerge an interesting processual correspondence between the workings of the internal screen and the external image of the world: even if both types of images are seen as different in nature—to wit, the internal workings will inform the understanding of the external and vice versa in a way that echoes the *ritornello* of the operational unity of the universe as part of the mnemonic tradition in terms of an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, of the body and the mind, of the outside and the inside: "As above, so below".

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In the Middle Ages, the arts of memory shifted from the rhetoric to ethical considerations (Yates, 2000: 69) where they were principally put to work in the service of religion for the support of ecclesiastical oratory in order to organize and expound on the virtues and vices. In the *Summa Theologiae* (1265–1274), St. Thomas Aquinas presented an extensive study of memory as incorporating a moralising interpretation of the rules of memory its foundations but which still kept the old Latin precepts presented in the *Ad Herennium*. He proposed four precepts for memory: similitude, a considered order, solicitude<sup>108</sup> and affection, and frequent meditation—these in turn are rendered as images, *loci*, sympathy and habit/repetition (Yates, 2000: 85). But when memory is enlisted into the service of Christianity and dons a pietistic teleology, memory goes beyond the moral dimension given to it by the Roman rhetors and acquires both a directed dynamism to the cohesiveness required for its integration and a telic dimension which as part of the neutral rhetorical techniques it never had as part of its constitution. The acquisition of a moralistic teleology gives memory *intentio*<sup>109</sup> which provides it with a teleological drive towards Virtue and the Good Life and thus makes it an inherently active and directed striving, whereas in the Latin *Ars Memoria*, movement was simply

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<sup>108</sup> Yates ascribes Aquinas' replacement of solitude by solicitude to simple error. I believe it is part of a larger project by Aquinas to integrate the ideas of the Stoics into his thought. Solicitude fits in with an etiology of sympathy advocated by the Stoics and particularly by Posidonius.

<sup>109</sup> Sympathy and *intentio* are both derived from the Stoic philosophy of Posidonius (135 BCE- 51? BCE) and possibly absorbed through the study of Cicero's writings or through Neo-Platonism, a philosophy to which he was considered to be the first proponent. He is considered to be "a visual thinker, the defender of monism, the proponent of the doctrines of cosmic sympathy and vitalism," and in these respects he can be seen as a precursor to Bergsonian and Deleuzian thought. In his etiologies, Posidonius ascribes first cause to teleology. In his view of things, "God pervades the world; the passions follow the leadership of rational insight; man is here to contemplate and act." Edelstein, Ludwig. Entry on Posidonius. *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy vol. 6 Logic to Psychologism*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. & The Free Press. 1972. p. 413-414)

provided by the pedestrian translation from one locus to the next. Its "solicitous" aspect aligns it with an etiological sympathy which as an expression of associative similitudes is constitutive of the body.

For Aquinas, as was for the *Ad Herennium*, artificial memory is perfected through its two traditional aspects, namely *loci* and *imagines*, which according to Yates, when harnessed in the service of piety are transformed into "corporeal similitudes", they can provide striking memory images as vices and virtues which can be readily cognizable as human characters with human bodies. In the service of pietism, religious orators would structure their sermons by using "corporeal forms in which to clothe the spiritual intentions which he wished to impress on the souls and memories of his hearers" (Yates, 2000: 95) and which they called *imagines agentes*. These mental "images" were invisible in that they existed in the memory of its user and worked in accordance with the mnemonic dicta of creating interior images that were remarkable or unusual in character and which were to be set in striking dramatic situations. These internal *imagines agentes* were "clothed" *per accidens*<sup>110</sup> with pictorial attributes which while being unusual could easily be associated to the conceptual make-up of these characters and make them more readily remembered. As *imagines agentes*, they were intended to be complete and active, capable of prompting ideas coherently and without vagueness so as to allow them to vehicle moving spiritual intentions. The rationale for the use of these striking and memorable human-like images can be traced back to the Stoics, and specifically to Posidonius' (ca. 135 BCE-51 BCE) fragments on memory: "For I think you

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<sup>110</sup> Accidental in terms of being external to the internal causal nexus provided by the essence.

have long since observed how people are not frightened or distressed when persuaded by reason that some evil is present or approaching them, but only when they get images (*phantasia*) of those things. For how could one excite the irrational by reason, unless you present it with a sort of picture (*anazographesis*) like a visible one?" (Sorabji, 1996-1997) Originally intended as internal memory images for the oratorical reconstitution of sermons by the clergy, the *imagines agentes* were externalised as pictorial imagery during the Renaissance as part of the movement to secularize knowledge and to vulgarize mnemonic techniques during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Once outed, pictorial *imagines agentes* provided a new way to express a substantive consistency of ideas.

In terms of the *Ars Memoriae*, the first kind of artificial memory is *memoria rerum* (things); the second kind is *memoria verborum* (words); and according to Cicero 'memory for words' is much harder than 'memory for things' (Yates, 2000: 24). A memory of things is relatively straightforward because things are visible and as such their visual attributes and their location in space in relation to other entities serve the function of being able to reconstitute them objectively as images in the mind. But words and the "language in which the subject matter is clothed," require a different treatment. Obviously, the words we are dealing with are not visual signifiers such as "tree" but abstract idea-words which can only be appreciated intellectually and which have no programmatic or emotional content. The obvious word to use here is "concept", but we have to keep in mind that the word "concept" did not enter into use in the English language until 1591 (and only as a variation of the word "conceit") from the late Latin

*conceptus* and *concipere*, derived from *capere*, to take—which brings us back to perceive as grasping, so that the concept is that which allows the creation of a mental subjective/objective relation to an ideatic conception of that which is grasped and possibly grasps in return<sup>111</sup>. Thus through the pictorial depiction of these *imagines agentes* as corporeal beings, concepts as mental entities understood by their components are made graspable, perceivable, as objective visual formations which could be perceived in their entirety, so that a concept such as *Gramatica* (see Fig. 1 below) would be represented as a human being dressed up with all its conceits as a memory image from which an instantaneous, coherent, comprehensive and integrative understanding of the concept could be made.



Fig. 1 Johannes Romberch, *Gramatica* 1533

<sup>111</sup> In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari write "From the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, Christianity made the *impresa* the envelope of a "conchetto," but the conchetto has not yet acquired consistency and depends upon the way in which it is figured or even dissimulated" (1994: 92). The *impresa* or seals will be examined later.

The rationale for this transformation is a valid one according to Aquinas, "because human cognition is stronger in regard to the sensibilia, and therefore 'subtle and spiritual things' are better remembered in the soul in corporeal forms." (Yates, 2000: 85) So for the narrative re-constitution of concepts in oratory, the *imagines agentes* were adequate as memory images that would allow the (re)membering of all the aspects of a concept without necessarily prescribing a strictly defined, rationally linear development: they offered a means for the (re)collection of the concept, completely and coherently, in all its fullness as a real-time spoken-word (re)cital as the performative gesture for its *énonciation*.

Although the imagery of the *imagines agentes* was originally only to be used as a mental mnemonic device, it was only to be a matter of time before they were "externalized" and presented as pictorial images. Experimentation with the creation of *imagines agentes* to render them more striking and vivid for purposes of memory released new possibilities as to "what a body could be" and thereby "what a body could do". The portrayal of these 'subtle and spiritual things' as corporeal forms, in terms of an accessible vulgate understanding, allowed the laity to (re)member ideas as graspable entities and provided them with an intellectually unrestrained creative freedom they had never been able to enjoy. And as these figures of initiated learning became more widely available, they gave rise to a wildly creative aesthetic output. The wide-spread creation and propagation of striking imagery pushed the drive towards the complexified narrativization of memory images and provided impetus to the secularization of

knowledge and the emergence of the encyclopaedic movement.<sup>112</sup> Although the *imagines agentes* as conceptual memory images were extremely useful for the revival of a laicized Ciceronian oratorical rhetoric which drove the "second wave" of the Italian Renaissance in Venice<sup>113</sup>, they were also instrumental in the furthering of occult thought and the natural sciences as well as innovation in the modalities of transmission of knowledge. The new graphic expression pushed the envelope of conceptual thought not only through the creation of new concepts derived pictorially, but through the release of the expressive potential of the image of thought as a sophisticated pictorial means for the communication of ideas, procedures and possibilities whose veracity could be easily and immediately grasped and directly ascertained by their presence on paper: their ideatic power was undeniable. The outlandishness of the imagery in the *imagines agentes* pushed the limits and expanded the horizon of what could be thought, how it could be thought and how it all held together. And in the service of memory as expressive of an integrative drive to the understanding of the universe—now in terms of "As above, so below"—these inventive ideations acquired a dynamic cosmic dimension when they were tied to Cabalistic mysticism and occult Hermetic thought as expressed in all aspects of Renaissance natural philosophy as science: mechanics, chymistry,

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<sup>112</sup> This secularization of the *imagines agentes* also spurred the creation of "secret" memory images as "occult" visual narratives which revealed all, yet hid everything and served as a covert visual language used to express occult teachings and explain alchymical procedures. Unlike the many esoteric images illustrative of spiritual processes, the memory seals devised by Giordano Bruno in the late 16th century are more diagrammatic than imagistic. The wildly creative and oftentimes erotic memory images were one of the reasons for the demise of the *Ars Memoriae*. The Catholic Church deemed *imagines agentes* too racy for its

<sup>113</sup> The Venetian Renaissance in contrast to the Florentine Renaissance. The Italian Renaissance (1330-1550) emerged in Florence and was its cultural centre until the mid 15th century when it was supplanted artistically, intellectually, commercially by Venice.

astronomy, medicine and mathematics.<sup>114</sup> To think of Cabalistic mysticism and occult Hermetic thought as minority during the High Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Reformation represents a questionable conclusion as an acceptance of the simplistic gospel of the Christian Churches as a perverse one-sided victor's rendition.

So in these *imagines agentes* we have a new conception for the expression of the idea-word, of the concept, as an imagistic object made up of various components which together constitute a graspable entity—and central to this "conception" of these *imagines agentes* as corporeal similitudes is the body, so one can speak of a body-idea as a representational embodiment of thought. And thus, we end up with a pictorial image as an integrated, coherent and graspable whole, something like a perception except that the *imagine agente* before us on paper is a pictorial re-presentation of a mental creation and not a perceptual image which is the result of the senses—what emerges from these images is what Deleuze and Guattari would call in *What is Philosophy?* a concept. From the example of *Gramatica*, we can see that an *imagine agente* as an "embodied" pictorial representation of a concept is a multiplicity defined by the summary association of its components—it is simultaneously a One and a Many—but the sum total is not so much greater, a more than, as it is of a different nature than the components: if we mix water and salt, we do not have "more than" or "less than" water and salt, but something different: we have brine. The concept itself is "incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated" in a body (Deleuze and

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<sup>114</sup> Where the *imagines agentes* came into being in service of the Church as a memory method for remembering sermons, they were now being used to transmit secular ideas in new ways divergent from Catholic orthodoxy and to develop esoteric thought which of course ran afoul of the Church. There is also a linguistic dimension to these operations which activated categories within grammar as to their explicative possibilities in terms of metaphysics.



Guattari, 1994: 16) and though the image of *Gramatica* is literally a human body which embodies a concept, Deleuze and Guattari use the term incarnated body as a fleshed-out idea whose consistency, whose substantiality in terms of a unified matter, constitutes a body in the widest sense of the term. The image of *Gramatica*, for example, is "a whole which totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 16) in that its sundry components are fragments of a discourse, distinct and separate yet inseparable within itself. "Each concept will therefore be considered as the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of its own components" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 20) which will allow the expression of its entirety and completeness. In this respect, "the concept is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 22): it exists as such as a construct which in itself cannot be ascertained by touch but only by indicating or pointing out its agency. It reveals itself through what Deleuze and Guattari, refer to as "speaking the event" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 21) where its application as an event is the re-collective re-alignment of discourse into a new circuit of becoming according to a new set of activated possibilities actualized by the expression of the concept, by its enunciation.

In the move from an internal memory image to an external pictorial image, there is a big difference in the way that the consistency of the concept is not only seen but conceived and expressed. The first observation that can be made here is the obvious establishment of a plane of consistency on the flat panel upon which it is created. By virtue of the components being found together on the same surface, the concept as

image is coherent, it holds together, by the sheer virtue of existing together on the same plane. Further, the components are contained within a frame which serves as a container which collects the components and coerces them to co-exist surrounded by a border. Thus, the concept as a delimited entity, contained by the frame which circumscribes it, defined by the terms held captive by the limiting border, bound together by its operative coherence and identified by name all together constitute a very cogent expression of what the definition of the concept entails. As a pictorial entity, its coherence appears instantly, and as a figure, it can be perceived at once. And because the constitutive elements co-exist within the frame there is harmony and compatibility, even if it is forced, because sight does attest to their co-existent agreement on the pictorial plane.<sup>115</sup> The fact that it is pictorial makes it objectile, internally harmonious and thus coherent and imbued with (a semblance of) truth value.

But the *imagine agente* needs the concept word as an *a priori* to permit the aggregation of components which define the consistency of the concept—its endoconsistency—as well as its limits as a horizon in terms of possible association with other concepts—its exoconsistency (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 19). This establishes the two diametrically-opposed enabling constraints which inform the formation of the concept-image: we have the openness of the concept motivated by inclusion and tending towards extensive comprehensiveness and then there's the need for correction and containment by a rule. The concept as a body is a continual, adaptive reconciliation of a meta-stable dynamic between that which, on the one hand, constitutes its internal

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<sup>115</sup> I believe that this is a significant aspect of René Magritte's art.

consistency and, on the other, its external accidental coherence. This meta-stability which constitutes the concept becomes a quandary which now plagues all objects, mental or physical alike, graspable as such: they need to simultaneously satisfy their polyvalency as a social being as a unit while allowing the sympathetic associative promiscuity of its components engaged as concretized participants in other conceptual entities. But even if the concept as an *immagine agente* is enclosed and delimited by the frame which surrounds it, it does not mean that the concept is a transcendental unchangeable entity.

When Deleuze and Guattari, write that "concepts are not eternal" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 27) it does not mean that their shelf-life is limited but that modalities of non-transcendence take on a different complexion. The concept is changeable and variable in that different modes of becoming will activate a concept and transform it so that operatively it fulfills the same rhetorical function even if its endo- and exo-consistencies are altered. So that in accommodating and adjusting to the conditional milieu of its use, the concept may lose some components or acquire others that transform it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28) or activate some and de-activate others that are not required for operational efficacy within the given conceptual ecology. This wiggle room in the expression of the concept reveals a rift in the *ritornello* of durational becoming of the (re)called concept within the creative advance of actuality: on the one hand, the open potential for creativity afforded by its adaptability speaks to its indeterminacy, i.e. lack of a total and complete specificity, and, on the other, the repressive drive towards full objectification as a lock-down which maintains total control

over associative potential and expressive freedom. As such, the assemblage as a machinic process is vague, indefinite and non-transcendental—in its creation of coherence and consistency it is the serial alternating progression of dissolutive deterritorializations and successive novel constitutions of coherence and extensive reterritorializations based on linkages between conceptual incorporations that constitute Guattari's conception of the machinic. The process is on-going by virtue of the breaking/making of linkages of relation and the demand/satisfaction dynamic of out-of-phase completeive drives implicit in desire. Thus, the over-determination of concepts kills their vitality yet a certain specificity is necessary to establish planes of consistency that are operationally durational and functionally legitimate. Thus, the concept creates a vibratory meta-stability between the creative inflection of its open advance and the conservative involution of its controlling repressiveness.

The concept does not emerge without the propitious conditions for its creation and a label with which to identify it, (re)call it into being and give "it the forces it needs to return to life" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28). As a gathering or cluster, the image-concept as a structuring changes the "happening" of the concept, i.e. its duration, not only in terms of its temporal perduration over time, but also in the temporality of its constitution. While the concept in itself can be said to be instantly grasped as an image simply through the intercession of its label, or the instantaneousness of its (re)cognition, its reconstitution has an uncertain and indeterminate duration and an unsystematic, non-linear, internal, self-referential causal dynamic: "it posits itself and its object at the same time it is created" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 22). This is not to say that an idea

or a concept expressed abstractly, non-imagistically, i.e. discursively enunciated through language, does not have these aspects as part of its conception, but that the internal consistency of *imagines agentes* self-consciously calls attention to themselves as having a specific constitutional make-up. The accretion of consistency, the gain of bodily definition, need not take place as a method, as a strict protocolary ordering; the concept as a pictorial image can be (re)cognized in the same way that vision works as ocular saccades in what can almost be deemed a non-linear, haphazard manner where each attractor as an element contributes to the ultimate form not as a gradual accumulation of corpuscular clumps but as processual meldings, as an agglutinative process of discursivity or performance, which changes the consistency of that to which theyglom and alter the manner in which it willglom to that which will come next in the clustering/glomming sequence. The order of accretion, the process of description as an accumulation of meaning, is *almost* irrelevant as it is the final operational coherence as a "graspable" entity which is of import in that it can be identified and named. Almost in that there is a "critical path" which establishes the circuit of operational coherence of becoming assemblage which must be respected as dictated by the attractors.

But apart from their being corporeal similitudes which concretized the image-locus memory linkage, they expressed a deeper integrative role for the place of humanity in the universe. The Stoics, particularly Posidonius, considered that everything was one organic, natural whole where the body was not only a participant but an image, an expression of a universal, cosmic unity interconnected by sympathy and in this

respect the corporeal similitude of the human *imagines agentes* provide a resonant memory circuit between the worldly and the cosmic order of the universe.

We can begin to see that through the structuration of memory with the aid of *imagines agentes* there is an inkling towards a dynamic, image-based understanding of the world as foundation for an image-based or "visual" philosophy. Curiously, Edelstein refers to the Stoic philosopher Posidonius (ca. 135 BCE-51 BCE) as a visual philosopher (Edelstein, 1972: 413-414)—an exponent of an image-based understanding appealing to "pictorial representation" that is true to life where "succession replaces the concept of substantial existence" (Edelstein 1966: 28-29) within the universe conceived as a dynamic process. The generation of conceptual novelty resulting from the creation of *imagines agentes* as concepts tied to memory as integrative of the understanding of the workings of the universe resulted in dynamic imagistic systems which were not only explicative of the internal workings of conceptual bodies, but of bodies in general and of the cosmos as a whole. To express the operational unity of the universe, these dynamised memory systems were not understood as machinic in the sense of the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy of parts and atomic corpuscles but in terms of occult powers and forces whose integrated coherent, consistent functionings could only be understood by the initiated—so that those who "...have not had the Hermetic experience, have not achieved the gnosis, have not seen the vestiges of the divine in the *fabrica mundi*, have not become one with it by reflecting it within" (Yates, 2000: 265). Thus, to express the operational unity of the universe as part of the mnemonic tradition one needs to be able to formulate its functioning as a dynamic whole which maintains

an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, of the body and the mind, "As above, so below".<sup>116</sup>

The *imagines agentes* were capable of doing this "locally" as zones of consistency of operational coherence as 'local' monads. But to understand the whole as a monadic categorical *survol* composed of the plurality of the many, one has to come to terms with the universe as an operational unity, as a functioning dynamic whole—as a processual machinic assemblage operating within expanses of consistency capable of being expressed as a single monad but also capable of being expressed as the plurality of the many and their interconnected intertwined functioning as a subjective One. The Memory Wheels of Giordano Bruno based on the work of Ramon Llull and Cosmos Rossellius<sup>117</sup> were capable of doing just that: they could integrate the local and the universal as a machinic memory system capable of expressing the functioning of the universe as a coherent image-based apparatus which was capable of "harnessing the inner world of the imagination to the stars, or reproducing the celestial world within" (Yates, 2000: 212). The apparatus consisted of interlocked discs which could rotate relative to one another. Each disc was divided into 30 sectors, each representing a conceptual entity. The discs could be made to turn relative to each other in order to realize conceptual combinations reflective of the myriad potential of the world in terms of 7 levels of knowledge or understanding which could be tied to cosmological schemes.

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<sup>116</sup> There is no more apt depiction of the integration of dualism than the Hermetic Caduceus.

<sup>117</sup> Ramon Llull (ca. 1232 – ca. 1315) and Cosmos Rossellius (Venice, 1578) created less complex combinatory memory wheels which provided movement to the integrative expansiveness of conceptual association in memory.




Fig. 2 Combinatory Memory Wheel by Giordano Bruno. *De Umbris Idearum*, 1582

Although one cannot properly speak of universal operational unity without engaging the extensive as an expression of meshings of local operational truth, the combinatorial memory wheels of Giordano Bruno sought to do just that. His apparatus attempted to provide an exhaustive machinic combinatorics by bringing together variegated concepts side-by-side as to create *montages*<sup>118</sup> capable of novel and unexpected associative novelty. As existing on a plane and bounded by the machinic framework of the interlocked wheels, the various combinations extended the principle of internal coherence of the *imagines agentes* to a mechanistic combinatoric which putatively exhausted the entire universe of possible expression by the simple rotation of the wheels relative to each other. Each sector on a wheel represented a concept, and

<sup>118</sup> The word *montage* as used in French connotes both an assemblage constitutive of a mechanical device and as used in cinema as a juxtaposition of images from which new meaning arises due to their proximate association.



when rotated relative to another concept-sector, the association would create a novel combination whose expression would be of a different nature than the constitutive concepts of the associated grouping; thus, expanses of novel meaning are created by the relative movement of image-blocs adjacent to one another which when set in motion could be termed machinic. The movement involved is of a second order yet exists on the same plane: the first order arises from the discursive conceptual associative activity taking place within each of the concept-images existing within each square; the second order is the dynamised expression of meaning arising from the movement of thought emerging from novel associative combinatorics resulting from the movement of the wheels relative to one another. The causal determinism at play in the emergence of meaning is immanent and results from the association itself as an integrative move and not from the imposition from above nor from an internal or telic essential drive.

The heraldic device as generative of expanses of consistency in the emblematic is possibly the simplest expression of what Deleuze and Guattari, express as imagistic conceptual machinism identified as such. To label the heraldic emblem machinic is to hearken back to Bruno's "Hermetic-Cabalist mysticism" and the late medieval and Renaissance conception of the *impresa* or device (Yates, 2000: 173) as identity<sup>119</sup>. Here,

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<sup>119</sup> "An *impresa* (plural: *imprese*) first appeared in the Burgundian French courts in the late fourteenth century. Rapidly, *imprese* became popular with the European nobility, who displayed them in heraldry, on embroidered clothing, in tournaments, painted them in portraits, described them in literature, and even carved into wooden ceilings. Then, the *impresa* as badge or insignia continued to be popularized during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." Daly, Peter Maurice. *Companion to Emblem Studies*. New York: AMS Press: 2008. p. 252. William Camden in his *Remaines* published 1605, gave this definition: "An *imprese*, as the Italians call it, is a devise in picture with his Motte, or Word, born by noble or learned personages, to notifie some particular conceit of their owne." In Clark and Wright's annotations to William

the vulgate Italian *impresa* does homonymic double-duty as enterprise and as a derivative of impression, so that enterprise, understood in French as an *entreprise*, as an under-taking—as in grasping that which comes from above—is meshed with impression as sensorial and perceptually unitary. *Impresa* is played against device, etymologically rooted in division or parts, as the action or faculty of devising, of invention, of ingenuity as an arrangement, plan or contrivance that was immediately grasped as a cognizance or badge. The jump from *imagines agentes* to *impresa* constitutes a marked shift: it represents the quantum leap from the "set logic" of mere containment to conceptual emblematic integration as constitutive of a coherent and identifiable originary concept-image assembled upon a "plane of consistency" permeated through and through by mechanisms<sup>120</sup> for its perpetuation and propagation. The *impresa* as an heraldic emblem was also a device with a motto which tied everything together to synecdochically distinguish the bearer personally and bring together the signs or marks which make out the identify of the bearer as a character.<sup>121</sup> The conceptual cluster of ideas surrounding *impresa* would indicate that the bearer of the device is the prototypical *conceptual persona*—the owner of the device as the reconstitutive capacity of identity through memorial integration. The *impresa* not only identified one individual as exemplar but categorized all those sporting the same *impresa* as members of a

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Shakespeare's *The Tragedy of King Richard II*. Clarendon Press Series. *English Classics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1884. p.119

<sup>120</sup> We could say permeated through and through by lines but this would require an additional level of metaphor where lines constitute a plane of identity projectively from an origin and the creation of homogeneous coordinates.

<sup>121</sup> These ideas also allow us to think of the commercial enterprise as an incorporation, as a corporate entity whose identity is expressed by its logotype and brand as image.

house<sup>122</sup>—their own singular identity adumbrated by the application of the *impresa* to constitute a corporeal expanse of like-minded individuals operating under the aegis of the same ideatic identity in order to perpetuate the enterprise and further its interests. The shield as a coat of arms—*ecu* in French—is thereby an instrument which (re)members the bearer's identity as integral to the enterprise of the social corporation in terms of a bond to the vesting power of the *impresa*.<sup>123</sup> The *impresa* as an image is bounded by the edges or borders of the coat of arms to protect the integrity of the associated contents.

It is as part of this imagistic tradition that Guattari and Deleuze posit the mirror concepts of ecumenon and planomenon<sup>124</sup> as components of the machinic assemblage in terms of establishing planes of consistency as "territories of replacement" (Guattari, 2011: 11), as an adumbrative montage, where the machinic refers to the relational dynamic producing operational coherence between constituent parts of consistency and their extensions to create expanses of relation as constitutive of territory. Though Guattari applies the label 'machinic' to the unconscious as an imagistic process, it is equally applied to the plane of consistency to stress that it "is not only populated with images and words, but also with all kinds of machinisms that lead it to produce and reproduce these images and words" (Guattari, 2011: 10). This machinic perpetuation can be understood as a desire-driven assemblage creative of intensive perduration and

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<sup>122</sup> The tie-in to cosmic mechanisms of identity subsumed to celestial houses of the zodiac should be quite obvious although the dynamic projective implications of the conception might not be.

<sup>123</sup> The relation here to currency and finance is overt.

<sup>124</sup> Ecumenon and planomenon are sister concepts which are created by D&G to express planar creation processes; the ecumenon represents a locative milieu of consistence whereas the planomenon is the formal consistence of immanence in itself.

driver of memorial reconstitution, but the relational machinism Guattari refers to is not one which constitutes the internal agglutinative coherence, the endoconsistency, of the concept.

In addition, this internal agency can be said to extend outwards from rhizomic junctures or folds (the "axillary buds") as extensive "feelers"<sup>125</sup> within the serial disaggregation and amalgamation of regions of consistency as constitutive of the associative linkages which allow the successive process of extensive territorialization, the internal process of consistency also extends outwards to create a plane of consistency. This dynamic latticework implies a reticulate structure of internal relation between the corpuscular<sup>126</sup> elements of the concept as constitutive of "a crystal of the possible which catalyze connections" as it extends outwards to other conceptual entities (which are to be themselves regressively understood as being constituted in this way all the way down to irreducible forms): it is reminiscent of the balls and sticks of molecular or crystallographic models where the atom is a node and the sticks are the bonds which keep the whole together and as one constitute the unitary replicative structure upon which the aggregative pattern of extension is based upon. If we pursue the crystallographic model, the seed crystal is the causal patterning agent around which expanses of similarity take form as expressive of the seed crystal's *noesis* or intellect through the guiding bonds of an informed empathy towards similar minded nodal entities recognized as such. It is interesting to note that these see-through ball and stick

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<sup>125</sup> Again, in the Whiteheadian sense of feeling as presaging of prehensive process.

<sup>126</sup> In the sense of body-like individuations but which can be understood as particulate entities as coherent constituent parts.

models have no adumbrating unifying corporeal silhouette<sup>127</sup> and are usually understood simply as the expression of the structural constitution of its parts, in that the crystal seed was nothing but atoms and bonds without requiring the superposing of the crystal's outward faces. The crystal's consistency in the ball and stick model, if one can call it that, is simply the organizational structure of the constituents but not expressive of a facialized entity nor of a machinic expression—it putatively just identifies the crystal seed as a genetic initiator conducive towards the creation of extension. Although it is an interesting illustration of the process of the production of extension, it is a misleading conception since extension is not the repeated agglomeration of simple likeness which replicates and reproduces the seed towards the creation of a repetitive pattern. Extension can better be seen as aggregative expanses of machinic entities meshing together as functional operative systems working synchronously on one plane yet also capable of meshing with operative expanses coming into being above and dissolving below. The metaphor works if we take the notion of the crystal as a homogeneity of identity pointing towards the indivisibility of that which is named as basis for comparison but the dynamic at work is not one of patterning the relation.

The adjective machinic when applied to the image of thought can be said to be an appropriate descriptor in terms of its implication as a transformative device producing identity as creative novelty. To be considered machinic, and not simply as a simile of machinic—not "like a" machine, or machine-like but actually functioning as one—a conceptual entity would need to be constituted of parts that mesh together

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<sup>127</sup> The word silhouette is selected in that the word outline would tie it to the enclosing delimitative frame.

"mechanically", where pieces connected to each other act as the efficient causes of movement of each other, and whose coherent operational functionality works in such a way so as to transform "something" given, usually external to the machine, into a product or outcome. But before one can even call the conception machinic, one would have to consider the image not in terms of a coherent whole but as a rational operative coherence of parts. It requires a shift in how we understand the transformation inherent in cohesive association: from the remapping of the layout of constituent elements as a static federative ensemble and the removal of quasi-arbitrary territorial borders of parts to an internal coherence based on the dynamic inter-relation of parts as a transformative entity. The consistency of the machinic assemblage then arises from the operational logic of interlocking parts working together, synchronously, in phase, as a transformative undertaking or enterprise—it is not simply a result of an enforced coherence from above which arises from the categorical designation applied as label to the containment of its constituent parts within the frame; it is the expression of the memorial integration of the concept in terms of an operative need as a transformation. This establishment of machinic endo- and exo- consistencies maintains an integrative symmetry through the reconciliation of dualities expressive of being as internally coherent and externally extensive—and vice versa. This represents a complete paradigmatic shift as to the understanding of the concept in terms of the one and the many as it creates an integrative vibrational dynamic advance of reconciliation between the paradoxal expression of wholeness as such and the synthetic aggregation of parts.




Fig. 2 *Machinic Portrait of Kant*. In Deleuze and Guattari (1994)<sup>128</sup>

Based on the ideations of the *imagines agentes* and the *impresae*, Deleuze and Guattari can propose their "Machinic Portrait of Kant" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 56). The machinic label applied to this image in particular exposes a variety of conceptual twists not readily apparent—it takes what is essentially a memory image in the Ciceronian rhetorical style as a coherent synoptical illustration of Kant's thought and labels it machinic: with this *imagine agente*, we not only discursively (re)member Kant's thought as a process, one identifies "Kant the conceptual persona" as the auteur function of Kant's Thought. So to refer to the image as a "Machinic Portrait of Kant" underscores the inherent limitations of Kant's thought: it is machinic in that it is demonstrative of a dynamic and integrative transformational process but it falls back

<sup>128</sup> The functioning of this image is irrelevant to this discussion. A full explanation is given in Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 57) without our having to repeat it here.

into the dialectical-system of thought in that on its own the portrait lacks the creative relational expansive freedom of the rhizomatic.

The *Machinic Portrait of Kant* is self-sufficient and coherently machinic in that its transformative operational functioning is exclusively self-referential and therefore closed off—it is machinic only within its own limited plane of consistency and through its discursiveness. And to call it monadic would be inaccurate for "it lacks the sensitivity to outside information" (Simondon p.5). It is machine-like rather than machinic in that it appears open and relational—it has no frame to circumscribe it or enclose it but it is a self-contained assemblage. As a result of its bounded operational integrity, it invites us to use it objectively, prosthetically as a tool—we can use it purposefully and watch it do what it does without being implicated in the process. It lures us to engage it to create limited territorializations but it is hardly the rhizomatic machinism we wish to extract from immanence. "Most important, it invites us to go further" (Foucault in AO: xii) and create other machinic assemblies which will be more open and relational in the expression of their transformative possibilities.

The associationism at play between the constituent elements is not solely and simply "a chain of propositions and reasonings" as Hume would have it in *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary* (1825: 257) nor is it a simple reticular arrangement of nodal associations. The concept does not emerge without the propitious conditions for its evocation and a label with which to identify it and (re)call it into being.<sup>129</sup> The

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<sup>129</sup> Concepts as operational entities act as anonymous agents within processual advance until they are discovered. As such, concepts can be hidden, invisible and unidentified, working behind the scenes of faciality. And herein lies the principal task of philosophers: they are the revelatory agency behind the



simultaneous co-arising and reciprocal necessity of the constituent parts of the conceptual image (including its location) create an exclusive internal self-referential consistency regulated by the concretized association of components: at face value, the coalescence is instantaneous and given, imbued with infinite celerity. Yet, while being closed and exclusive, for the concept to remain relevant and vital, it must retain "a certain margin of indetermination" (Simondon, 1989: 5) for it is this dynamic indetermination arising from the relational loose ends produced by the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as constitutive of bodies that allows for the assemblage's receptivity to outside information and enables it to endure the adaptative evolution which affords it its perduration as a machinic assemblage—it is the organicity of the polyvalent indeterminacy as wiggle room which allows for its machinic perduration. Contrary to Bergson's assertion that impetus, i.e. the original impetus of life as process itself "is the fundamental cause of variation" (Bergson, 1944: 98), evolutive adaptation is possible because of the indeterminacy inherent in the becoming-consistent of the image-concept as a relational entity. Impetus sustained, i.e. if there is no inertial change to the system, it is a steady-state and therefore unchanging—if it is disturbed by a force, the system's dynamic composure will be altered at which point the variation will be causally motivated and responsible for one singular alteration. It needs to be persistent or directed. Further, the original impetus of life should be applied as a resultant unitary agent applicable to the monad as the One; it

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discovery of concepts at the horizontal leading edge. Philosophers identify and map out the operational extent of a concept so that it can be remanded into use as part of the integrative understanding of memorial reconstitution.

does not apply universally to the constituent Many. As an individuated discursive unity, as a closed set of serial performative gestures, the concept can be *described* as a linear accretion of consistency, of corporeality or formal substantiality, but its becoming cannot be thus understood or construed as a static unchanging entity—it needs to be considered as a dynamic vibratory meta-stable system of endoconsistent coherence and as an exoconsistent perduration. The internal associations and sets of relation are not simply binary, but polyandrous, in that every constituent element relates to every other constituent element concretely and reciprocally to every other constituent element as an on-going dynamic process. And it is through this associative process that the conceptual image defines itself, gains definition as a body which while gaining consistency, loses degrees of associative freedom that curtail its potential for relation but imbue it with an *intentio*, an attentive discrimination, selective focus, directive in terms of subsequent association in movement which comes to be expressed as what a body can and cannot do. But the loss of associative freedom described here is no more permanent than the body gaining definition: the landscape of becoming is dynamic and ever-changing—the only transcendence here is the operative haphazard constancy of change.

The constitutional make-up of the concept cannot be found in their genus or species, but "in something indiscernible that is not so much synesthetic as syneidetic"<sup>130</sup> (Deleuze and Guattari, 20). Bergson writes that "life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division" (Bergson,

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<sup>130</sup> Synesthetic: Involving more than one sense. Syneidetic: Serving to connect, as a conjunction; copulative or conjunctive.

1944: 99) and this would be the statement to which Deleuze (Deleuze, 1989: 10) refers when he writes that Bergson forgets what he posits in *Matter and Memory*. In this decidedly dialectical move, Bergson dissociates himself from an integrative imagistic ontology to one based on dissection and division where the image is broken down into pixels—an idea echoed by Whitehead's notions of atomistic indefinite divisibility of extensive continuity: "An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by the various allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as to possess common parts, and of contact, and of other relationships derived from these primary relationships. The notion of 'continuum' involves both the property of indefinite divisibility and the property of unbounded extension" (Whitehead, 1985: 66). In terms of images and image-concepts, it is critical to remember that the image is not pictorial and as such is not composed of dots or of an "infinity of elements infinitely small" (Bergson, 1944: 100)<sup>131</sup>. The image is constituted as a fractal immanent continuity of concretized synesthetic machinic assemblages engaged in the satisfaction of desire drives and the creation of new ones as the process of memorial (re)constitution. The machinism of the concept as syneidectic drives towards inclusiveness and integration both inwards and outwards so that in its transformative expression it tries to create a plane of consistency as functionally extensive as possible in an attempt to fulfill the Hermetic drive towards totalization and unity.

The plane is not all there is to the process: the establishment of the plane of immanence is a prehensive process—it expresses temporal continuity as well as

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<sup>131</sup> Apart from its retinal breakdown analogy, the impressionist's pointillist conception of the image was a major point of contention with the post-impressionist's efforts to re-think imagistic assemblages.

expanse. The syneidectic promiscuous polyandry of its constituent elements not only works transversally as constitutive of regions of consistency in lateral extension but vertically as well. It extends its associative machinism downwards within underlying planes as meshed to processes of disaggregation and gears upwards into overlaying regions of becomings-consistent of simultaneous aggregative processes. These same processes occur diachronically through the strata as part of the accrual process of planes of consistency as a layered build-up of syncopated aggregating and disaggregating territories constituting and disbanding zones of extended consistency expressive of a sympathetic resonance resulting in the synchronized, rhythmic thrumming of undamped enthusiasm<sup>132</sup>. Thus we can move from an infinitely thin film (Deleuze and Guattari's *décalcomanie*) or membrane of immanence to a stratified zone of shimmering, pulsating becoming where the plane of immanence is the midst, where the participants do double-duty crosswise as extension as spatial linkage and vertically through strata as expressive of temporality as *anionic* time. The internal associations and sets of relation are not simply binary, but polyandrous, in that every constituent element is reciprocally associated to every other constituent element, their determination concretely expressed as a reciprocal dependence within the on-going dynamic process. Thus the surface of becoming is more like the indeterminate surface of a cloud's becoming where the molecular fuses with the molar as the impossibility of distinguishing between the internal and external determinant processes of becoming or between the temporal and the extensive even if the process is construed as ontogenetic

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<sup>132</sup> Not in the rah! rah! sense but as the divine inspiration of unexpected new ideas as breath-taking creativity.

and set apart from the totality of process. In this way the machinic assemblage of stratified becoming constitutes the associated milieu of spacetime where the various plateaus of consistency exist as zones of concretized temporality.

The apparition of a concept within an associative milieu as a discernible event within memorial reconstitution provides the concept "the forces it needs to return to life" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 28). The creation of the concept within an associative milieu as an assemblage constitutes an event as a memorial systemic shift in that its constitution is processually transformative, integrative and reliant on the (re)membering of the constituent elements to the becoming-body of consistency; as such the concept as a novel circuit of memory as a *détourné* memorial process is an event. The coming into being of the concept as a functional entity is a durational process both in terms of its taking time as the celerity of becoming-operative as well as in the embedding of a new temporality in the implication of the double (re)collection and integration of components and environmental enabling conditions: double, in that the process is in itself both collective and integrative, but once again remanded when the satisfaction of operational functionality is attained as a meta-stability between the promiscuous polyandry of its components and the re-implication of desires and satisfactions as a perduring *dispositif* concretised to other entities as an emergence of extended consistency as a plane of immanence. The establishment of the functionality of a concept is as immediate as its positing in that the communication of its intention is felt as the immediate diffusion of the transductive wave through the system, as the

expression of an operational drive engaged towards the teleonomical fulfillment of its designation experienced as the foregrounded memorial (re)constitution as becoming.

Although "the concept always has the truth that falls to it as a function of the conditions of its creation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 27) we can also say that its expression and functional validity, its operational coherence in terms of an extensive machinic assemblage, as an associated milieu, is a *dispositif* of truth. The *dispositif*, as a machinic assemblage, as a functional technical object, is "the part of a judgement that contains the decision separate from the opinion" (Agamben, 2007: 7). So that in the sense that "the concept is realized by becoming the field of experience itself" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 18), its operational coherence expressed as the causal determinacy of embodiment is self-contained and casts off its status as a machinic assemblage in order to become "being and praxis" as a *dispositif*. The move is significant in that one results in a mechanism of external agency upon the participative constitutive terms as an imposed transformational *force majeure*, whereas the second constitutes an emergent subjective immanence whose constitution is driven by its narrative coherence as part of an immediate progressive process of implication, enfolding recurrent desires and satisfactions entrained and required by the (re)current activation of the associated concretization of consistency in the actualization of the plane of immanence as the process of memorial integration as actuality. Truth lies in the expression of its operational coherence—if the assemblage works, it expresses truth. And no matter what it expresses, if it is expressive, it is truth—even if its machinic truth is the creation of lies.

The concept-image while being a truthful expression of the ideal concept, will always be lesser than its virtual, idealized counterpart because it will never actualize or exhaust the full potential of the Ideal; as an image, as a participant in its emergence in the plane of immanence, it will be able to actualize potential to the full extent that the ecology of becoming at hand makes possible, but no further—there will always be a residual relational potential at hand to activate the image in different and novel ways. And as such, although the image is less abstract, it will always be unfaithful (but not disloyal) relative to the concept as an Ideal Form. As such, it will be a liar by omission—not devoid of truth value, but untruthful. As an objectile entity, the image-concept's indeterminate and fallible relational determination, while being its most powerful life-giving qualities, exposes the major weakness of imagistic conception and undermines its truth value, reliability and solidity as an integrated entity within orthodox dialectical thought.

This has very heavy implications on the foundations of that which constitute the Principles or Laws of Thought and as to what constitutes the ontologically real, the cognitively necessary and what can be taken as uninferred knowledge. The Law of Identity, the Law of Noncontradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle<sup>133</sup> cease to have the (false) certainty afforded by subjective and objective entities with precisely defined borders or components and calls into question fundamental aspects of coherent thought, logical systems and universals. A coherent system of thought is impossible to

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<sup>133</sup> The Law of Identity: If a thing is *A* then it is *A*; the Law of Noncontradiction: A thing *A* cannot be *A* and not *A* at the same time (at the time it is *A*); the Law of Excluded Middle: A thing *A* is either *A* or not *A*. Angeles, Peter A. *Dictionary of Philosophy*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981.

construct on the "Yes, but..." or the "You know what I mean..." imagistic order of things where exceptions, ambiguity and vagueness continually call into question the validity of the structures of knowledge and their expression. There will always be uncertainty in the coming to terms with becoming: compromise will wend its way whether we accept the looseness of expression resulting from unbounded creativity and the sham certainty and more controlled expression afforded by Formal formulaic thought. As such, the ideation of rhizomic thought calls out for a philosophy which allows leeway and looseness to the definition of categorical schemes and the bodies they create to take into account the accidental differences in dissimilar repetitions of what can be likened as exemplars of the same "thing"—its thought would be "anexact yet rigorous" but its expression would need to be precise and clear-cut.

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## Conclusion: The Whatness of Immanence

The primary concern of *Becoming One with the Screen* has been the question of how experience is integrated into the general unfolding of actuality as an imagistic process. The work that has been carried out as such constitutes a serious engagement with many aspects of speculative thought; through a (re)contextualizing discourse on memory as integrative of experience I have (re)membered it to the tradition to which speculative thought belongs. Through the writings of Spinoza, Leibniz, Bergson, Whitehead, Simondon, Deleuze, Guattari and Deleuze and Guattari we have re-positioned the memory-image as constitutive of the concept and enabling the explication of a constellation of other key concepts; namely, territorialization, faciality, the creation of bodies, desire, the plane of immanence as a machinic assemblage, and the fold among others.

*Becoming One with the Screen* is important and relevant in that it defines and anchors many of these concepts in the memorial-imagistic tradition from which they emerge by engaging them technically through their constitution. Various writers have activated these concepts in creative and remarkable ways so that they acquire an operational consistency which gives them definition and affords them a flexibility and openness which allows for tremendous expressive leeway in *idéatic* generation. However, the downside to this openness has been conceptual incoherence brought on by a lack of formal definition and the frequentative familiarity with the concepts. This

lack of unambiguous definition leads to accusations of obscurantism, banality and confusion as well as admonitions appealing for precision. In my opinion, these accusations are all too often founded, but perhaps wrongly motivated: for example, in *Fashionable Nonsense* (1998) Sokal and Bricmont attack speculative thought on concept abuse but they don't get the imagistic/memorial underpinnings to the concepts so that their derisive ridicule of the morphological field is of questionable validity. I do believe that *Becoming One with the Screen* provides the concepts with a coherent and consistent foundation which serves to cogently and succinctly define them constitutionally so that reading Deleuze and Guattari, for example, becomes less of a daunting task.

An important part of these thesis has been the (re)integration of memory to its image-based origins. And in doing so, we have come to terms with the concepts as memory work. We have conceptually repositied them by (re)creating the causal conditions for their (re)collection, for their being (re)called into being and (re)membering them performatively through the writing as a process of discovery. This expository approach is not a traditionally academic one—our thesis is more of a record of a path of discovery, more of a tracing of thought as research-creation than it is a systematic summary or survey of the Big Ideas. *Becoming One with the Screen* is a creative diary of sorts in that the thesis is the record of the emergence of our comprehension of these concepts as memory process. When we began writing we had a very limited understanding of the concepts and no structure to articulate their unfolding. As such, the project became a work of memorial self-discovery and self-

understanding in that I was more concerned with the relevance of the concepts to my existential scheme of things than in systematically presenting the work of the thinkers we have been reading. So when we started to write, we had a title, a gnawing anxiety about the problem and the constellation of concepts and little else. Yet, like the navigational channel markers on inland waterways which present themselves into view as they are needed, the expository direction of the concepts revealed themselves as we created propitious conditions for their emergence through the writing. And as a record of that progressive revelation, our thesis presents recurring concepts as players in the theatre of memory as an evolutive dynamic; the changing milieus which activate the concepts as they are articulated sometimes gives them a plasticity that more inflexible schemas might balk at but to me is part of the implicit degrees of freedom available as a consequence to the imperfection of prehensive becoming. This might sound like we are recanting on precision, but we think there is a rigour to the exposition which rounds out the account.

In this respect, *Becoming One with the Screen* has always been a very personal undertaking and not the customary academic endeavour—my pursuit can ultimately be deemed selfish but as a writer and thinker we feel one should be more responsible to oneself than to the world. This is not to say that our work is not academic, but that it is academically different. The *cheminement* is more of a personal pursuit than a scholarly one in that the need to find an answer to the question of experience as integrated into the general unfolding of actuality was more of an existential research/creation rather than intellectual curiosity—so that the mastery was not so much the mastery of what

others have said but the mastery of their contribution to our thought on our own terms. Deleuze is fond of his intellectual offspring ill-begotten from the philosophers he works with and we feel we have created similar progeny with the memorial take on the concepts—like the creatures that run around the space-station in Tarkovsky's *Solaris*.

Thus, our research has been an interdisciplinary study which combines philosophy and film studies to come to terms with experience as immersive, i.e. how one becomes one with the screen in film spectatorship and more generally in the image-world of actuality. It is not about the analysis of film but about how one relates with the unfolding spectacle as imagistic process. It has to do with the way one forgets oneself while watching a film or while being in the world. Usually this is seen as a rift between the spectator and the film, between the me here and the world over there, between the inside and the outside, between the subject and the object, but our thesis contends that the experience is not divisive in this way but relationally integrative. To prevail over this conventional divide, we present the experience of participating in a film screening as a relational and associative process in order to undo the dualistic spectator/screen relationship reflective of the subject/object relation. And to do this we progress from the consideration of being immersed in a film screening as a large scale event to the topological twist that arises at the juncture of what traditionally has been seen as the inside and the outside of experience. The twist here is memorial, figuratively and literally, but I need to clarify here that memory is not to be understood as an individualization of pastness, as a static image depicting the past as pictorial but as a process descriptive of individuation as the integrative touch that assembles relationality

as the quality of participation as constitutive of the unfolding of actuality. Memory is the process which holds the repeatable to account for its becoming and the memory-image as what may be understood as an integrated image not of pastness as what came before expressed pictorially but as an expression of the relational in terms of the activation of potential as a circuit of memory.

We begin our thesis by asking how does an emergent interconnected relationality arise and how does one locate its happening? If memory is constituted as image and place, we look at the 'external' image as part of the tradition of 'memory as integrative process' to better understand what the image as experience contained within place is about. We present the relationship between the me and the world as an associated milieu in order to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place between the participants and the conditioning territorialities as an ecology where the milieu allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being as an event of taking-form as experience which does not differentiate between the human and the non-human. In this way, the associated milieu is the setting and environment of concretion where participants condition each other in order to form something which in turn, simultaneously, allows these very same things to take form themselves. But perhaps the most important aspect of this analysis is that these conditionings are considered participants in the event as simultaneously constitutive of space and time as temporality—they are simultaneously and reciprocally cause and attribute to the creation of the event: as such, the gradual accretionary effect of progressive territorializations constitutes and expresses an integrative immanence “as the unity of

efficient and formal cause" (Deleuze, 1992: 165) where causality can no longer be seen as the result of linear cause and effect but as an interdependent co-arising or what Deleuze calls a reciprocal determination as a parallel line of development to Whitehead's thought.

To re-activate memory as a concept has literally required "a kick in the imagination, a wrenching of tired words" (Daly, 1985: 190) where imagination is both a noun and a transitive verb. Thus we have explored memory as an integrative process and examined and re-activated the concept-cluster of words surrounding memory not only to (re)contextualize the discourse on memory but to tie it to the historical tradition from which speculative thought emerges. Over the past three centuries the fuller meanings of this cluster of words have lost their relevance and their significance taken for granted and forgotten in favour of a scientific definition of memory based on the stockpiling of information. Instead of the mechanistic transfer of sensorial impressions to the brain and their conversion into memories through electrochemical operations, we have proposed an alternate mechanism for memory predicated on the processual memory-image as a performative (re)creation of the image content as a directive urge which (re)produces the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the relations and (re)membering them as the unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires duration through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of constituent relations as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory



circuit, in which it is operative. We can now see the complex of words around memory in such a way that we can better appreciate its integrative dynamics.

In discussing the image of thought in *Difference and Repetition* (1994), Deleuze considers a process of eliminating all presuppositions in thought as a way to begin with philosophy. He writes that this would entail at the very least a regression to perceptual experience as pure being in order to constitute a beginning even if it is only by virtue of referring all its presuppositions back to a sensible, concrete empirical being which can be known implicitly without concepts. And to do this we have revisited the complementary concepts of Faciality and The Fold from the point of view of the relational aspects implicit in imagistic thought and memory. Central to the discussion has been the prehensive process of adumbration by which the many become one as the *perpetuum mobile* of the eventual continuity of change in actuality as becoming. Our project has advanced that the façade of becoming actual of the world as a moving imagistic front constitutes perception as the integrated affirmation of becoming one with the world as constitutive of the fold. And as flawed as it may be, this part of the project is of particular importance in that it fleshes out the work of Michel Serres, renders it explicit and takes it up a notch to bring it to be able to do what Deleuze does with it. The description of the coming to being of the operative function of directivity within the fold was developed through the intertwining of geometry, optics, and the activation of Girard Desargues' theorem as the culmination of perspective and the instauration of projective geometry as a possible model for the apparatus "of correspondence between mind and matter" (Bergson, 1944: 398). This was further

developed as the connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a single closed surface which allows for the expression of a continuous associative motion of surficial territories (which need not be seen as continuous surfaces) as expressive of local machinic activity within the movement of process.

The final chapter completes the picture, so to speak, in order to look at the 'internal' imagistic process as conceptual. The first chapter dealt with experience, the second with the image of the world, the third with processual advance, the fourth with the interfacing of the internal and the external and the fifth and last chapter detailed the process of imagination as a faculty. This last chapter is of particular significance in that it reviews the historical evolution of the arts of memory through the image in order to show how the development of memory images led to the creation of image-concepts. We then show how these give rise or contribute to the big concepts in the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, namely, the machinic assemblage, the constitution of territorialization, the planomenon and the ecumenon, the plane of consistency and the plane of immanence. The importance of this work is that it links the thought of Deleuze and Guattari to an image-based or visual philosophy which calls upon a "pictorial representation" that is true to life where "succession replaces the concept of substantial existence" (Edelstein 1966: 28-29) within the universe conceived as a dynamic process. It has also worked out the processual correspondence between the workings of the image concept as an 'interior image' and the 'external image'. Even if both types of images are seen as different in character, we have established a correspondence between the way a concept is constituted internally within imagistic thought and the

event in actuality—to wit, the internal workings inform the understanding of the external and vice versa in a way that echoes the *ritornello* of the operational unity of the universe in terms of an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, of the body and the mind, of the outside and the inside: "As above, so below".

Yet all this leads to a very big problem. We have been referring to the constitution of the image in terms that are pictorially-friendly but which act otherwise. The pictorial as constitutive of the imagistic is simply the premise to be able to formulate the relational as foundational, so assuming that we are ready to divest ourselves of an atomic corpuscular foundation to the ontology, what will replace it as constitutive of the image yet allow it to function imagistically?

To be able to posit these ideas we have come up with the concept of **whatness** as a surrogate of matter. Thus far we have been elaborating the concepts by relying on material or physical properties in that they agglutinate, aggregate, gain consistency, integrate, are amassed and constitute bodies which interact and constitute other bodies. We can of course ask ourselves what constitutes this material physicality and fall back on matter as traditionally done and arrive at the same unsatisfactory conclusions which plague our understanding of participation in the world. But breaking away from the habit of the sophistry of physicality is a daunting task in that it is difficult to cast aside the I refute it thus! In order to do this, I conclude my project with a left-to-be-completed ontological manifesto which defines and characterises whatness.

1. Whatness is monadic in that it is without parts and without extension.
2. Whatness is not a composite, it is constitutive of relational becoming. It is 'not describable in terms of the morphology of a 'stuff'" (Whitehead, 1985: 41).
3. Whatness is corpuscular in that it is *beyond* the threshold that limits something as not nothingness but it is not atomic. It is constitutional in nature with a discriminatory tendency towards corpuscularity in the sense of making bodies in the widest sense of the term.
4. Whatness is the in-the-midst of reciprocal relational conditioning constitutive of being.
5. Whatness is not a given; it is virtual until activated.
6. Whatness arises out of the expression of the need for its existence—it is called into being but in no way does whatness beget itself. It neither comes into being nor will it cease to be as its becoming has neither been nor will it be. It simply is in the midst as being.
7. The inner make-up of whatness is not alterable or capricious. It is felt as an affective tonality within the midst of participation but otherwise it is indiscernible and non-presentable. There is nothing to transpose or change or transmogrify in whatness because there is really nothing to change as it becomes ready-made as made-to-fit in its taking place as it is called into being. Thus it is neither substance nor accident.
8. Whatness has a quality of being unique to itself and that is its perspectival discriminatory tendency as differentiation. In that way it can be differentiated

from all other whatness and because of its unique slant on the state of affairs, it makes sensible the distinction between participation in one or another.

9. Thus, it is necessary for whatness to be different from one state of participation to another. There are no two instances that are perfectly alike which would call into being the same whatness.
10. Because every created being as a participatory enterprise is constituted differently, the affective tonality of the whatness in question steers the contraction of participation differently in every instance and produces the differential in action as the indeterminate point of its possibility at the incipience of becoming of the eventual as pure *détournement*.
11. Whatness conditions the mode of being of its participation as the internal logic of its own coherence. It configures the locus of participation as a neighbourhood of conditioned relational occupation as taking up space and taking time where participation sustains the meta-stable tension between that which takes place and that which gives room as temporality.
12. Within whatness there is no internal complexity for the complexity is complicity in the reciprocal relational conditioning of participation. It is the concretising bridge of relation by which participants become otherwise by way of completive satisfaction. The shared concretization of relation as reciprocal and mutual is the realization of completion in the advancement into novelty of the event's information as the very operation of taking on form as a body.

13. In the complicit complexification of whatness, concretization happens as a pluri-dimensional functional associative bridging of temporalities and operational functionality.
14. The satisfaction, the complete perfection, of each of these conditioning concrete fusions activates and enables the future becoming desire for coalescence of the consequence of the process as a paradoxal reconciliation, as a bridge between the coalescence of that which we consider the past that yields it and the future it is begetting to which it is coalescing as prehension as actual present, i.e. as "the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things" (Whitehead, 1985: 52). This prehension as enfolding is "a world of captures instead of closures" (Deleuze 1993: 81). The prehension folds within folds as implicated perspectival projections defining each other within the process of becoming as the object-subject-superject flow of relation within the event as an actual occasion. The state of passage which prehends the becoming and understands the multiplicity in the unity is perception.
15. "The action of the internal principle which produces change, that is, the passage from one perception to another, may be called *appetition*" (Leibniz, 1965: 150). Appetition arises from novelty: newness creates new desires along with their attendant integrations thus perpetuating the appetite of novelty. Hence, appetite is implicit in the novelty as incessant and insatiable desire for complete integration which perpetuates the appetite of/for novelty as the drive of self-perpetuation of processual becoming.

16. The advancement of process has forward-feeling desires whose satisfaction moves the process towards a coherent whole as operational perfection. The logic to the process proceeds from the (pre)existing conditioning as a given to that which follows as the memorial advancement through being called to participate and integrating within the operational coherence of the enfolding of experience which incites "the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question" (Whitehead, 1985: 40). The guiding apparent purposefulness of the process is unknowable and beyond understanding and its perfection is in the moment at hand in the immanent arising of actuality.
17. If this creative advance into novelty is somehow remarkable, important "as an aspect of feeling whereby a perspective is imposed upon the universe of things felt" (Whitehead, 1968: 11) and repeatedly bears (re)producing, the multiplicity of whatness of these associated conditionings can be (re)called into play so that they can be (re)collected, (re)membered into a society as "a nexus of actual entities which are 'ordered' among themselves" (Whitehead, 1985: 89). In the memorial (re)petition of (re)calling to order, the process of concrescence as the processual creation of coherence becomes its own reason, by which the lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency (Whitehead, 1985: 88)<sup>134</sup> and allows us to say

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<sup>134</sup> Although Whitehead's concrescence and Simondon's concretization come from the same root, the first refers more to the creation of coherence in a cross-section of the universe as a duration (Whitehead, 1985: 125), whereas the second refers to "the multi-functionality of operative solidarity... toward future uses." (Massumi, "Technical Mentality" Revisited: Brian Massumi on Gilbert Simondon. With Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, and Jon Roffe).

that memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as the constitutive dynamic of the coming together of actuality.

18. Whatness is directed and intentioned so in that in its appetition it can be said to be perceptive. Merely by taking place and through their affirmation of the directionality of the relation, they restrict movement, limit degrees of freedom, curtail the potential of what can happen. These constraints induce relation to be expressed in specific ways, if anything to make sure the event unfolds coherently as an integrated individuation within the general unfolding of actuality. As environmental pre-constituents, they impose not only conditions for how and when, but they colour the event itself in that all participants will engage (or not) each other as a function of the relational preconditions established by the spatiotemporal disposition of these relational inductions. The directionality and intention of whatness informs specificity as to that which can unfold and how it will unfold as occupation in terms of a discernible individuation.
19. The gradual accretionary effect of progressive agglutination constitutes an integrative concretized immanence “as the unity of efficient and formal cause” (Deleuze, 1992: 165) where causality can no longer be seen as the result of linear cause and effect but as an interdependent co-arising through a systemic causal reciprocity in becoming.
20. Whatness cannot perish or cease to exist as its being as the cusp of becoming is relational potential activated and actualized by memorial invocation when (re)called into operational participation. The tonality of relation as operational



participation is the affect of the directionality and intention of whatness associated.

21. Even if we cannot consider it as a singular entity, whatness is eventful. The manifestation of associated whatness as discernible process is event.
22. The discretionary ability afforded by the specificity of whatness is perceptive quality which when associated as event becomes perception as a subjective faculty.
23. The concretizing of relation changes the whatness of the associative concretization as novelty. Novelty as expressive of eventful change heralds the eventual unfolding of becoming while adumbrating that which conditions it. This successive process of eventual alteration is what characterizes the memorial unfolding: it changes that which has transpired, that which is transpiring and the way the future transpiring will take place.
24. Memory can be described as an expression of the relational in terms of the activation of potential as a consequential circuit of memory. Memory is not to be understood as a storehouse of pictorial imagery, and neither as an individualization nor as an activation of pastness as the that which has been. It is the dynamic process informing individuation as the integrative touch that assembles relationality as the quality of participation as constitutive of the unfolding of actuality. Memory is the process which holds the associative recollection to account for its becoming. Memory is thus paradigmatic in that it keeps track of the synced, out of phase desires of the multiplicity by

(re)membering whatness and gives heft by integrating them into the ecological economy of operational becoming.

25. Memory guides the (re)constitution of the relational as the eventual coming together which (re)constitutes the event through its (re)petitioned becoming by not only (re)calling itself into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of the actuality as event. The information of the event as memorial is durational through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of its self-expression as an individuation as it is (re)petitioned to participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage within the memory circuit in which it is operative. In this way memory is not essential to the event but conspiratorial with it and with the rest of the world which allows its operation. In this way, memory is not eidetic but paradigmatic in that it is self-informing without any external coercion.
26. The directed whatness as eventful expressed as a panoply of perceptions as a conception is the image. The image of becoming is always distinct.
27. The constitution is a fragile attentional coercion induced by the relational directivity of the coming-to-being of the event. This relational directivity is not to dictate the outcome of the event, but to (re)call and (re)collect the elements that together as a coming-to-being lead to the event's constitution. The relational directivity of the associative operational coherence of environmental factors is constituted by the gradual application of a set of accretionary

inductions that can be understood abstractly as compelling the unfolding but which act in a concrete way to activate relations which lead experience where it needs to go. These accretionary shifts which inform the becoming event are eventual, in that they are events which alter the unfolding thereby changing the dynamic as reflective of the activated memorial circuit as becoming.

28. The event is the dynamic directed *détournement* composed of the gradual interpenetration of the immanent co-arising of territorialities and bodies. Territorialities can be understood as active, material and non-material conditioned expanses of relation that are neither internal nor external: they are open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zones of integrated relational intensities where that which conditions constitutes ingression and cohesion.<sup>135</sup> As such, these territorializations as expanses of consistency or operational coherence interact as relational entities that condition as they themselves become the becoming aggregative accretion of the event as an individuation.
29. That which is advanced in novelty is also operative in repetition if the constituent causal determinants remain in place durationally. As such, what was just eventual has become the event perfected as the consummation of the relational possibilities as an operational coherence proffered by the *agencement* of the conditionings in place—here *agencement* is understood simultaneously as

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<sup>135</sup> the intersection of territorializations of potential engagements constituting the event as an open, fuzzy-bounded, gradated zone of relational intensities arising from that which acts as the defining constitutive seed.

agency and information<sup>136</sup> immanently arising from the relational conditioning as causal determinant resulting from the disposition of the participants as an assemblage. The *agencement* as a fielding of conditioned relationality as subjective arises from the immanent territory which takes places as a plane of experiential consistency as operational coherence where activity informs the becoming as the eventual (re)calling into being of the individuation as memory pulled along by the lure for feeling.

30. The *agencement* as a memory-circuit brings round the relational potential available for engagement of the constellation of the could be of the already-has-been as sheets of past; it seeds the activation of the reconstitution of related fields of experience as memory-images; it sets the relational stage for a novel *agencement* of conditioned causal becomings; it posits propositions for relational conditioning—it adds a new dimension to existence as a possible activation of potentials to redirect the unfolding of actuality by producing a shift within the integration of actuality as a memorial process.
31. memory is the performative (re)constitution of the relational as content which urges us to (re)produce the image by (re)calling into being, (re)collecting the elements and (re)membering them as the unfolding of actuality. The image as memory acquires duration through its gradual coming into definition as a body through the iterative (re)cognition of the image as it is (re)petitioned to

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<sup>136</sup> Information in the Simondonian sense.

participate in its assembling, in its (re)collection of its constituent elements as a machinic assemblage, i.e. within the memory circuit, in which it is operative.

32. The advance of the creative front of novelty is a machinic assemblage identified as such does not lie by misstatement of fact, omission, deception, or false fabrication—thus, that which presents itself as that which is as a given is the image of truth in the world. And by extension, the abstract machinic assemblage can be seen as the processual creation of truth. In the clash of collision of planes of consistency, the ensuing deterritorializations and arising territorializations will constitute an event which will set up new planes of consistency and thereby machinic assemblages different from our pre-conceived memorial expectations.
33. The advance of the creative front of novelty is faciality and it indubitably and as a machinic assemblage truthfully reveals all that has been locally activated or at least perceived within the local horizon of becoming but disassembles its constitutional emergence: it is a mask, a disguise, a front in that it conceals coming to being as a processual becoming, covers up the durational structure of its underpinnings, usurps the value implicit in becoming as a creative enterprise and presents itself as what is. Faciality as a machinic assemblage identified as such does not lie by misstatement of fact, omission, deception, or false fabrication—thus, that which presents itself as that which is as a given is the image of truth in the world. It is not a question of the Leibnizian best of possible worlds but the only one that ads up as an integrated becoming as the convenient

individuation which incorporates all discernible and indiscernible local individuations.

34. The adjective machinic can be said to be an appropriate descriptor in terms of its implication as a transformative device producing identity as creative novelty. But before one can even call the conception machinic, it requires a shift in how we understand the transformation inherent in accretionary association: from the remapping of the layout of constituent elements as a static federative ensemble and the removal of quasi-arbitrary territorial borders of parts to an internal coherence based on the dynamic inter-relation of parts as the transformative entity. The coherent consistency of the machinic assemblage then arises from the operational logic of interlocking parts working together, as a transformative undertaking or enterprise—it is not simply a result of an enforced coherence from above which arises from the categorical designation applied as label to the containment of its constituent parts within the frame; it is the expression of the memorial integration conceptually in terms of an operative requisite co-arising as the transformation.
35. The primary fact of truth is the expression of the immediacy of feeling as the "generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity" which is a process (Whitehead, 1985: 41). Becoming as expressive of a processually emergent efficient causality is a contingent truth expressed as a machinic assemblage incorporating and integrating areas of functional coherence and operational consistency. Here machinic refers to the

relational dynamic producing operational coherence between constituent parts of consistency and their extensions to create expanses of relation as constitutive of territory.

36. Directional agency can be said to extend outwards from junctures or folds within the serial disaggregation and amalgamation of regions of consistency as constitutive of the concretization of whatness called into play as the successive process of extensive territorialization. This establishment of machinic endo- and exo- consistencies maintains an integrative symmetry through the reconciliation of dualities expressive of being as internally coherent and externally extensive—and vice versa. Extension can better be seen as aggregative expanses of machinic entities meshing together as functional operative systems working synchronously on one plane: it is a dynamic vibratory meta-stable system of endoconsistent coherence and exoconsistent perduration as its whatness. The internal associations and sets of relation of whatness are not simply binary, but polyandrous, in that every zone of constituent element relates to every other constituent element concretely and reciprocally to every other constituent element as an on-going dynamic process—the associative concretization is a dimensionally infinite topological manifold. And it is through this associative process that the conceptual image defines itself, gains definition as a body which while gaining consistency as an accretion of whatness, loses degrees of associative freedom that curtail its potential for relation but imbue it with an *intentio*, an attentive discrimination, selective focus, directive in terms of

subsequent association in movement which comes to be expressed as what a body can and cannot do.

37. The prehensive molting of the creative advance does not cast off its processual has-been as a memorial carapace, but enfolds the exfoliation as part of the integrative vibrational dynamic advance of reconciliation of the paradoxal expression of wholeness as such and the synthetic aggregation of parts.
38. As a subjective entity, the creative advance of actuality as a becoming does not exist preindividually so that in the progressive, transitional gradation of its becoming there are no modifications to or of a pre-existing individual nature. The invocation of the event is not an ordering "initiated by the spark of the exceptional event" (Simondon, 1989: 156), but a directed activation of fields of relational potential at hand—it has a life of its own. The directionality of the memorial unfolding of actuality is nudged so that a new dynamic becomes gradually operative through the integration of new linkages of relation. This veered unfolding of memory as the *détournement* of the eventual is expressive of a conditioning causality which is conspiratorial in its realization of the proposition as an individuation through the progressive and gradual integration of the fractal recursivity of the accretionary process constitute the informant memory which results in the body of the event—as an individuation it gains definition, acquires focal clarity and corporeal heft. The progress of becoming is progressive and gradual in that the becoming is fraught with persistent eventual change which shifts the existent memorial circuit as a given giving way in its



completion to a new memorial circuit as a momentous event—by definition, the event is the outcome of any contingent dynamic which alters or disrupts the unfolding of the integrative process of memory; the event is deemed accidental in that for change to take place, its cause would need to be external to the "uneventful" unfolding where the unfolding of life as process is all event.

39. The directionality of the memorial unfolding of actuality is *détourné* so that a new dynamic of whatness becomes gradually operative through the integration of new linkages of relation. This veered unfolding of memory as eventual is expressive of a conditioning causality which is conspiratorial in its realization of the proposition as an individuation through the progressive and gradual integration of the fractal recursivity of individuation which taken together as an accretionary process constitute the informant memory which results in the local event and in the infinite expression of extension as the oneness of unity as the Image Universe.
40. This unity as such is unique, necessary, efficient, self-motivating, operationally coherent and infinitely functionally continuous and extensive. It is simultaneously internal and external, many and one as the reconciled integration of both paradoxal modes of co-existence.
41. Thus, the perfection of integrative unity is not the stultifying satisfaction of completion but the simultaneous satisfaction of consummation of whatness implicit in the advance as the awakening of the directed desire of novelty.

42. Becoming as the "on the cusp" or "at the point of unfurling" of being, while fully satisfied and imbued with limitless potential, is imperfect and incomplete yet not lacking.
43. There are no essences to speak of in the Image Universe, only a propensity to create folds as necessary being in terms of the functional coherence of processual advance as the ever-changing operational truth of actuality.
44. The present is not de-actualized to become past or future. The present is eternal in that it has no beginning and no end but is one continuous becoming. It is untimely in that it does not exist within time but is infused with temporality as an expression of relational density and intensity.
45. The Image Universe is necessary being in that it can only happen in the way that it happens—not in a pre-determined manner but in the happening that takes place as it becomes. As such becoming is not pre-ordained but occurs on the spur of the moment at the cusp of becoming as a having to take place unhindered. As unimpeded, it exercises the perambulation of the memory circuit—it fulfills its destiny as it is happening.
46. The Image Universe has no will other than that which is expressed as it expressed as the logic of its own integrative memory. It is not a best fit or linear extrapolation as the best possible but it is the only fit possible—this could be understood if we could follow the fractal recursivity of the causal determination of functional extension and operational coherence. By definition, it is the only fit, because it is the one that takes place.

47. Perduration within the Image Universe is immaterial as no aspect of becoming is ever permanent: there is no permanence, only change with less intense or more intense zones of relation which constitute territories of operational solidarity as individuating bodies. These bodies are the continual prehensive fulgurations of zones of local becoming which change the becoming as the reciprocal recursive causal determination of relations that are taking hold as an individuation.
48. The Image Universe becomes an integrated “system of individuations, an individuating system and a system individuating itself” (Simondon, 2009: 7). Thus, the Image Universe as an event becomes an immanent, dynamic, coherent whole, a body composed of a multiplicity of bodies informed by enabling constraints, inflected by the action of their reciprocal, directed induction as their ability to engage relation. Within the Image Universe as a frontal surface of becoming, the power to exist is the expression as the actualization of all potential as the accretionary prehensive whatness of becoming which through the recursive fractality of concretization expresses the All in infinite detail according to the directed intention of the unhindered fulfillment of its destiny as it is happening. As such, this expresses the subjective, perceptive and appetitiveness of becoming.
49. Being does not come into being nor cease to be. Creation is the becoming as being; there are no active components and no passive components; no discernible action and no discernible reaction. There is no perfection in the sense of an ideal transcendent teleonomy that is being striven for. Perfection is in the

moment as the prehensive completion of the advance into novelty; there can be no attribution of activity or passivity as becoming integrates simultaneous reciprocal conditioning as memorial becoming.

50. All of creation is an equal-opportunity occupation. There are no superior beings and no inferior beings; there is no justification to the claim of superiority, of greater value, of a higher nature, of permanence, of immunity to change—just adequacy in the satisfaction of the necessity of extension so that the extensive continuum which emerges is simply the (re)petition, the (re)calling into being, of the propositional expression "without that this cannot be" and its implied corollary, "without this that cannot be" so that the necessity extends itself not only locally but throughout the Image Universe. Relation as such is infinitely multi-dimensional in that it is not only relation between two terms, or three terms, but in that it is a relational articulation to infinite concretized relational possibility in number and extension. Their complicated existence belies a harmonious attunement of perfect accommodation.
51. The Image Universe does not intervene directly in the individuation process as it is the process itself as immanent unfolding of whatness. If we can differentiate between participants in becoming, each participant reciprocally conditions the becoming whatness of each and every other participant recursively and scalarly across the Image Universe.

52. As such, there's an interdependent and reciprocal relation of scalar concretization of power to power in terms of relational potential to be actualized whose directive whatness is determinant.
53. There is an infinity of possible becomings that exist virtually as potential outcomes but only one becoming that does actually take place. The outcome as resultant is not a question of choice but of sufficient reason: becoming is not susceptible to arbitrariness or capriciousness as it does not choose between one outcome and another.
54. Within the processual advance of becoming as the exercise of whatness and its sufficient reason expressed through the integrated concretization of relations as the Image Universe, bodies come and go as fuzzy-bounded expanses of functional relational coherence. Consistent expanses of relational coherence are being created while some are being dissolved so that there is no perfection, no attainment, no permanence inherent in the creative advance of novelty as the Image Universe. There is no reason to believe in a moral underpinning to the directivity of whatness or to apply a value-laden normativity to memorial integration of actuality in terms of good or evil.
55. Because there is no moral underpinnings to becoming, an ethics can only be descriptive of whatness and accretion and not prescriptive of the processual becoming. What is considered as evil and imperfect as undesirable, objectionable, detrimental or harmful is no different from that which is deemed beautiful and good as desirable, useful, advantageous or pleasing in the

constitution of becoming. They co-exist as manifestation of various aspects of becoming in that which is deemed from one perspective as constitution is seen simultaneously as dissolution from another perspective within the Image Universe—e.g the unfurling of a wave can be seen simultaneously as the breaking up of one wave but as the pre-constitution of the succeeding one.

56. The concretized associations and sets of relation are not simply binary, but polyandrous, in that every constituent element is reciprocally associated to every other constituent element, their determination concretely expressed as a reciprocal dependent co-arising within the on-going dynamic process. It is not a question of mirroring or reflection—the surface of becoming is usually referred to as a plane, but it is more like the indeterminate surface of a cloud's becoming where the molecular fuses with the molar as the impossibility of distinguishing between the internal and external determinant processes of becoming, the one and the many or between the temporal and the extensive even if the individuation is construed as ontogenetic and set apart from the totality of process.

57. "And as one and the same town viewed from different sides looks altogether different, and is, as it were, *perspectively* multiplied" (Rescher, 1991: 200) but still remains one city, there is but one Image Universe. In the same way that "the projections in perspective of the conic sections of the circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straight line and a point" (Leibniz, *Theodicy*, sec.

357), the plane hinging about the directrix and cutting the parent cone becomes a screen or planar projection which allows the infinite enfolding and expression of the totality. Thus, by slicing from one conic section to the next, or by radially sweeping from one view to the next, one can see in the continuous deformation the extensive non-metrical manifestation of continuity and of the possibility of infinite attributes and implicit potential of the same. Each slice can be said to characterize the directed perspectival point of view of whatness and the sweeping as the continuity of extension of whatness. Given the directionality as established by whatness, an axis of symmetry or directrix defines the validity and guides the integration of the perspectival projection. It is what holds together the concordance between the image of the exterior and its internal manifestation as a perception image as a memory image. The directrix as the hinge of the fold, as the apex of the crease, as an axis separating two instances of the same perspectival projection, acts simultaneously as a hinge and as origin of the separating fissure; it serves as the "linking factor" (Deleuze, 1988a: 65) between the two projections, "between matter and soul, the façade and the closed room, the outside and the inside" (Deleuze, 1993: 35).

58. Orderliness reveals itself in the relational correspondence revealed in perspective whereas variety is brought forth through the dynamic nature of process.
59. Mathematically speaking, perspective becomes a transductive process whose axiomatic veracity is based upon the duality expressed in geometrical incidence:

in the symmetrical relation between lines and points, in the strict correspondence between a pencil and a range, the intromission and extromission of sight can be formally expressed as the duality emerging from the perspectivity from a point to a line and the perspectivity of a line to a point. In the reciprocity of duality on the plane, a line will map onto a point and a point onto a line. Instead of creating a binary couple between the “here” and the “there”, the duality of perspective states that they are both the same and simultaneously reciprocally created. By continuing this line of thought, we can develop the connectivity of the projective plane topologically as a closed surface (Hilbert and Cohn-Vossen, 1952: 313-324) which has no inside or outside, has no discontinuity and no windows. Thus, perspective "ends up in the folding of the outside into the inside: 'in the interior of the exterior and inversely' "(Deleuze, 1988a: 118).

60. Thus, if we were to describe whatness as a delimited entity, we could posit that it is created by neighbourhoods of conditioned relational occupation as operational coherence where the homeostasis afforded by participation sustains the meta-stable tension between that which takes place and that which gives room within the *milieu*. The locus of operational coherence as that which takes place is easy to conceive as the body of the event and its shape is the manifestation of the event itself as localized in its unfolding—contained by the frame which circumscribes it, defined by the terms held captive by the limiting border, bound together by its operative coherence and identified by name all



together constitute a cogent expression of what the definition of the concept as a body entails.

61. A locally identified individuation as a named functionality exhibiting operational coherence harmoniously accords up and down the line of fractal recursivity and across the extensive continuum with any and all other local processes, identified or not. Consequently, the operational unity of the Image Universe expresses its coherent functioning as a dynamic whole while maintaining an integrative symmetry as the reconciliation of paradoxical ontological dualities: from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic, of the parts to the whole, "As above, so below". As such, that which can be deemed simpler individuations, i.e. as exhibiting lesser relational activation, are locally operationally coherent and enfolded in, integrated within that which can be understood as more complex as a machinic memory system capable of expressing the functioning of the Image Universe as a coherent image-based apparatus. The memory of whatness which emerges is simply the (re)petition, the (re)calling into being, of the propositional expression "without that this cannot be" and its implied corollary, "without this that cannot be" so that the necessity extends itself not only locally but throughout the Image Universe. Whatness as such is infinitely multi-dimensional in that it is not only relation between two terms, or three terms, but in that it is a relational articulation to infinite concretized relational possibility in number and extension. The complicated existence of whatness belies a harmonious attunement of perfect accommodation as universal concretization.

62. Whatness is thereby infinitely linked to all other whatness as the concretized expression of the whatness of the Image Universe—whatness vinculates the integrated concretized relatedness of being as becoming. One cannot think the consistent as a uniform, unchanging, unvarying constitution—the only constancy within the gaining consistency as process is the operative constancy of change in the perduration of processual continuity. That which is acquiring consistency by definition also comes to constitute a body in the most general sense of the term.
63. To ascribe bodies to becoming is to continually fall back upon an inadequate approach to the conception of the whole where individual parts as part of a hierarchy of perfection strive individually towards perfection as corpuscular entities constitutive of a greater ordering. This approach which looks to the body as "an integrated aggregate dominated by an entelechy" (Rescher, 1991: 220), always seeks to define the body as an entity striving for perfection as an idealised, complete and satisfied state of physical, mental or moral flawlessness which concurs with some previously ascribed definition expressive of normative values.
64. There is no difference between that which we deem artificial and that which is deemed natural. To differentiate between the artificial and the natural, the organic and the machinic, the worldly and the divine, the material and the spiritual is to introduce speciesism as constitutive of distinctions of hierarchical superiority where there should be none. If we describe process as machinic, we need to imagine it differently; not in terms of the machinic order of the

mechanical domain but one of functional integration as the flow of forces and energy as constitutive of the advance of novelty. The process at work can be termed transduction as the transmittal of energy and forces as an (in)formation which communicates novel aggregative belonging to organizational structure through its cooptation to a functional becoming instantaneously felt throughout a system as operational integration. In this way, the transmission of information ceases to be an accidental process—accidental not because it arises by chance but because the forces are seen to flow from outside the process as a surficial mechanical transmission—so that (in)formation can be seen instead as the replicating machinic process itself of an unmediated structuration as contiguous operational functionality.

65. In this we can see that the consistency of process as constitutive of expanses of operational solidarity seem to create a *montage* of moving parts that works as an apparatus, as a machinic assemblage of organizational and functional agency. The device that emerges here can be likened to a machine where the cogs and gears work together to create operational coherence constitutive of a something other: the machinic assemblage as a processual entity emerges through the expression of its operational constitution as a working-together of parts, as a multiplicity, which at its most naive understanding can be seen as an apparatus contained—as the constituent parts inform themselves into a functional whole, the assemblage acquires a vinculating carapace which provides it with a homogeneous faciality which expresses itself as the integrity of operational

coherence. But to speak of cogs and wheels working together is too concrete and mechanical an assemblage—the machinic looks at the ensemble as a functioning-in-unison, as an individuation constituted of parts which do not transform anything in particular but together generate temporality as subjectivity. The constitutive elements participate in the co-operative functioning according to a reciprocal necessity within the machinic assemblage where the parts maintain their individual integrity yet can only fulfill the role attributed to them as participants contributing to the functioning of the apparatus as a coherent whole. That which is produced by a machinic assemblage is not to be found in the individual parts nor in the entity as a whole; that which results is something indivisible, of a different order than that which constitutes the apparatus itself or the participation in its functioning. Ultimately what is being produced is time as temporality but it bears pointing out that the time being referred to here is not a metricized time but the temporality of being—what Deleuze would call *aionic* time—which refers to the individual expression of processual density and texture as a quality, as an affectual manifestation of intensities that is experienced in some way as feeling, where each assemblage articulates its being through a particular affective quality. Thus, they become instigators, attractors, proponents of relational meshings in machinic assemblages as productive of the fabric of relation as a continuum so that the circulation of forces, intensities and potentials as a diagram. The image is constituted as a fractal immanent recursive continuity of concretized machinic

assemblages engaged in the satisfaction of desire's appetite and the creation of new ones as the process of memorial (re)constitution.

66. The machinism at play is syneidectic<sup>137</sup> in that it drives towards inclusiveness and integration as a scalarly recursive modality within all frames of reference. It is functionally extensive to fulfill the Hermetic drive towards operational totalization and unity.
67. Thus there is no thing in the Universe which is "fallow, sterile or dead" (Rescher, 1991: 231).
68. ...

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<sup>137</sup> Synesthetic: Involving more than one sense. Syneidectic: Serving to connect, as a conjunction; copulative or conjunctive.

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