

The programmatic writings of Johann Sebastian Drey (1777-1853),
founder of the Catholic Tübingen school
With an approach to their relevance for our time

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A Thesis

In

The Department

of

Theological Studies

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

December 2012

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CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY

School of Graduate Studies

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With an approach to their relevance for our time

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (Theological Studies)

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ABSTRACT

The programmatic writings of Johann Sebastian Drey (1777-1853),
founder of the Catholic Tübingen school

With an approach to their relevance for our time

Hélène Poisson

The present study deals with a part of the work of Johann Sebastian Drey, a German theologian of the first half of the nineteenth century and founder of the Catholic Tübingen school. Drey was renowned for his writings and teaching, but fell into discredit and was forgotten, while one of his disciples, Johann Adam Möhler, whose most fecund ideas he owed to Drey, remains well-known and is held in high esteem in our day.

The rediscovery of Drey dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century in Germany; he then has been discovered in the United States where several studies were devoted to him in the last quarter of the twentieth century, but it seems that research has somewhat slowed down at the beginning of the twenty-first.

This study deals with the context of Drey's thought and presents the analysis of his three programmatic writings for the purpose of understanding the core of his fundamental theology and its relevance for our time.

Acknowledgments

I express my sincere thanks to Dr. Paul Allen, Associate Professor in the Department of Theological Studies at Concordia University, who led my research and my writing with a gentle firmness all his own, and who supported the occasionally rough steps of this research consistently and with great interest.

I am very grateful to Max Seckler, Professor Emeritus of fundamental theology in the Faculty of Theology at Tübingen University, the most qualified specialist on Drey, for having responded to my many questions with great patience. He also helped me to avoid unnecessary explorations and suggested more productive ones.

I also thank Dr. Winfried Werner, scientific colleague of Professor Seckler, who also answered many questions and whose technical support enabled me to make many verifications of the vocabulary in the German texts quickly and efficiently.

It is important to note that the many views expressed in my work are my own. At no time did Dr. Werner and Professor Seckler use their expertise to seek to influence the course of my work or my thinking. For this, too, I thank them with all my heart.

I also thank Father Robert Bonfils, Director of the Jesuit Archives at Vanves, who kindly sent me a copy of the unpublished translation made in the late thirties by P. Chaillet of Drey's *Vom Geist und Wesen des Katholicismus*, and who has kindly allowed me to reproduce extracts therefrom.

I also thank Dr. Jean-Michel Roessli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Theological Studies at Concordia University, who translated, from German into French, a passage from *Vom Geist und Wesen*, some of the first communications from Professor

Seckler, and the titles of the nine chapters of Seckler's (and Werner's) Introduction to Drey's *Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie*.

Finally, my thanks go to Robert Sonin, Master's Student in the Department of Philosophy at Concordia University, who conducted the linguistic revision of my translation of my study, originally written in French, and who translated citations into English, and helped to standardize a number of elements of the formal presentation of this study.

Dedication

I dedicate my work to my mother the Church.

And in particular, at her heart, Monsignor Christian Lépine, Archbishop of Montreal, who unites in his person the mystical and the work of speculative reason, a combination so dear to Johann Sebastian Drey.

As well to Sylvain Desrosiers, Jean Morin, and Stéphane Roy, the three of them priests, and all three ardent defenders and seekers of truth and life, whose temperaments are not alike, and who by that embody a single Church in a diversity of personalities.

Finally, to my father who was dear to me, who departed during my undergraduate studies, and my mother, also dear to me, who departed during my graduate studies.

*“God, the Infinite,
is inscribed in our finitude in order to be perceived by our senses,
and thus the infinite has 'joined' the rational pursuit of finite man.*

*This is where the Christian 'revolution' resides.
God the creator 'joins', today and permanently,
the rational pursuit of man who tends toward Him.”*

*(Benedict XVI,
Message to the Meeting of Rimini,
August 2006)*

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Introduction

In 1812, Johann Sebastian Drey published an essay on the disastrous state of German theology, both Catholic and Protestant. In 1819, he published another essay, on the spirit and essence of Catholicism, and a treatise on the organization of theological studies which would be suitable to revitalize it.

That period was marked by the clash of two philosophical trends: the *Aufklärung*¹ which reached its apogee with Kant; and nascent Romanticism, of which Schelling was the most prominent figure, which intended to recapture life, art, transcendence, and intuitive reason. Newtonian physics nurtured Kantianism; organic chemistry, magnetism, and electricity jostled its mechanistic approach to the world and to reason.²

Protestant theology, undermined by this *Aufklärung* which appeared in its midst, sought a new orthodoxy, or an exalted heterodoxy, or took refuge in pietism. As for Catholic theology, long maintained in the monolithic bloc of baroque scholasticism, it turned towards the *Aufklärung*, or romantic idealism, or mysticism.³

This epoch was also marked by political-ecclesiastical upheavals: the Napoleonic conquest of German principalities brought about their reorganization after the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire. German Catholicism, already uncertain in its theology and subjugated in its life and worship by the despotism of Joseph II, also saw the disappearance of its external structures. The rearrangement of particular Churches

¹ In English: the Enlightenment. I will use both terms.

² On this clash see in particular Th. F. O'Meara, *Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism. Schelling and the Theologians* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982).

³ Cf. id. For a more thorough analysis of the variety of Catholic trends and theological schools, see G. Goyau, *L'Allemagne religieuse. Le catholicisme (1800-1848)*, vol. I and II (Paris: Perrin, ⁵1910).

would be marked by internal struggles between deeply entrenched Josephinism and Febronianism⁴ which carried on after the fall of Napoleon.

In my view, historiographical studies of this period reveal startling similarities between nineteenth century Germany and the present state of the West, and so the way that Drey handled the challenges to the Catholic faith in his own time would appear to be of uppermost significance for us.

A. Genesis of the present study

I was first interested in Drey's treatise from a methodological standpoint. I had just studied the theological method of Bernard Lonergan. The title of *Method in Theology*⁵ and a passage from its introduction imply that no reflection on method had ever been made before his own. It occurred to me that Drey's *Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie*, in its first French edition (*Brève introduction à l'étude de la théologie*) of 2007⁶, which I had leafed through two years before, would be a suitable text for analysis due to the fact that it provides for the organization of theology. Would not this work, published for the French-speaking public, be relevant in our time? A first approach to secondary sources on Drey and on that work in particular, as well as the study of English and French translations, led me to such amazing findings that I gave up

⁴ Josephinism is a state doctrine, elaborated by jurists, according to which religion and religious institutions are the business of the State. Febronianism is a church doctrine, resting on a new German canon law, which provides for the quasi-independence of the German Church from Rome. The first doctrine pleads for the interests of the kings, the second for those of the bishops, and both against those of the papacy. For an extensive and strongly documented history of Josephinism and Febronianism see Goyau, *op. cit.*, vol. 1.

⁵ *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971). In French, *Pour une méthode en théologie* (Montréal: Fides, 1978).

⁶ Johann Sebastian Drey, "Brève introduction à l'étude de la théologie", in *Aux origines de l'école de Tübingen. Johann Sebastian Drey, Brève introduction à l'étude de la théologie (1819)*, M. Seckler, ed., trans. J. Hoffmann (Paris: Cerf, coll. Patrimoines. Christianisme, 2007).

the initial project, which I felt was too restricted. Instead, I concentrated on an attempt that turned out to be a prerequisite: the study of the major themes of Drey's thought.

The state of research on Drey

It is now an established fact that Drey, not Möhler, was the founder of the Catholic Tübingen school, and that Möhler was a disciple of Drey. In Germany, the rediscovery of Drey and the resulting study and publication of his works began in the twenties through the impetus given by J. R. Geiselman, among others. These have continued ever since and owe much to M. Seckler. As my knowledge of German is limited, I cannot report on the articles Seckler has published over the years and which have handled a variety of aspects of Drey's thought, nor can I report on the very thorough studies he has recently published.

In France, the reception of the school of Tübingen began at the beginning of the twentieth century, thanks to the work of G. Goyau, a historian of nineteenth century German religion. It continued with P. Godet, from a more theological standpoint, and mainly with E. Vermeil, a Protestant historian of culture, whose dissertation, explosive in some respects, had a catalytic influence on Geiselman and led to a reassessment of the Tübingen school. In the thirties, the young Jesuit, P. Chaillet, invited by H. de Lubac to go to Tübingen and study Möhler, quickly focused on Drey and made it his duty to move him out of the shadow of Möhler's fame. In 1937 he published a brief study of the Tübingen school.⁷ He then worked on a monograph on Drey and a translation of part of his writings. But his work was interrupted by the vicissitudes of the war and he would not

⁷ P. Chaillet, "L'esprit du christianisme et du catholicisme. I. Les antécédents de l'École de Tübingue. II. L'École de Tübingue. Drey, Baader et Moehler", *RSPTh* 26 (1937): 483-498; 713-726.

be able to resume it afterwards, so it ended up buried in two boxes at the Archives Jésuites of Vanves, putting Drey back into the grave he had just escaped.⁸

But in 2007 the *Brève introduction* mentioned above appeared. It was accompanied by contributions from Cardinals J. Ratzinger and W. Kasper as well as from Seckler. This publication did not only intend to do justice to a thinker whose writings and teachings had been renowned but who was thereafter despised and forgotten for several reasons (expounded by Seckler); it also points out the present relevance, not only of the “method”, but of the theology of Drey. The references Seckler provides in this French edition do not report any valuable French research later than Chaillet’s. Seckler highly praises his 1937 article, “which even today is among the best work concerning this question.”⁹

Among American theologians, the later discovery of Drey, also assisted by Tübingen theologians, was also appropriated for contemporary purposes. Unfortunately, in spite of its contacts with Tübingen – or by reason of the particular contacts chosen – that scholarly theology does not seem, save a few exceptions, to grasp Drey’s thought as Chaillet did, nor is it aware of the political and ecclesiastical circumstances and the philosophical trends that aroused and ripened it. American theologians do not take into account the important historical studies of the German nineteenth century made by Anglophone historians of culture, who have understood Drey much better. These theologians shut themselves away, far from the living Church and from historical disciplines, and they consider it necessary to draw on Drey to claim what they possess: the right to public opinion within the Church, plus the right to exert on the living body of

⁸ To complete this overview, see Seckler, “Pour comprendre la ‘Brève introduction’ de Johann Sebastian Drey”, in *Aux origines de l’école de Tübingen*, 75-86.

⁹ Id., 84. Translation mine, from Hoffmann’s translation of Seckler’s contribution.

the Church an authority they do not tolerate on the part of the magisterium. But we will see that the spirit of Drey was completely different. Another not less burning concern consists in showing that Drey was a mere disciple of Schleiermacher or Schelling.

Judgments about Drey testify to this rupture between the work of historians and that of theologians, whom I am sometimes inclined to call mere “observers of theology”. Here are some examples: Drey is original and, moreover, a giant of theology (O’Meara¹⁰); he is not original, he is a borrower, though, admittedly, an “inspired borrower” (J. Fitzer¹¹). Drey is a theologian of idealism (G.A. McCool, O’Meara¹²), not without some affinity with French traditionalism (McCool¹³); he is a theologian of the *Aufklärung* (A.P. Kustermann¹⁴). Drey has points of contact with a variety of thinkers (O’Meara¹⁵); he is strongly influenced by Schleiermacher (J.E. Thiel, notably¹⁶).

The transformation of the initial project

The general misapprehension (in the Anglophone theological sphere) and the absence of knowledge (in the Francophone sphere) of Drey’s thought and of his intellectual and religious milieu, the lack of relevance of studies of Drey’s significance, and finally the sign of relevance given in 2007, induced me to widen my investigation so as to include Drey’s theology – not only his method. Why, therefore, should I limit my

¹⁰ Cf. O’Meara, op. cit., 94, 12.

¹¹ Cf. J. Fitzer, “J.S. Drey and the Search for a Catholic Philosophy of Religion”, *JR* 63 (July, 1983), 236-237.

¹² Cf. G.A. McCool, *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century. The Quest for a unitary method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977), 68-69; O’Meara, op. cit., 96-97.

¹³ Cf. McCool, op. cit., 71.

¹⁴ Cf. A.P. Kustermann, “Observations Concerning the Tübingen ‘Axiom’ Then and Now”, in *The Legacy of the Tübingen School. The Relevance of Nineteenth-Century Theology for the Twenty-First Century*, D.J. Dietrich and M.J. Himes, eds. (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997), 45.

¹⁵ Cf. O’Meara, op. cit., 96-97.

¹⁶ Cf. in particular J.E. Thiel, “Theological Responsibility: Beyond the Classical Paradigm”, *ThSt* 47 (1986), 580-585.

inquiry to the *Brève introduction*? The other two writings suddenly gained in importance – they could shed light onto the scope of the *Brève introduction*.

But another factor complicated the execution of this study. Due to my limited knowledge of German, I had thought that the comparison of the English¹⁷ and French versions of the *Kurze Einleitung* would help me to keep close to the original text. But the discrepancies between the translations, especially as regards terminology, were so large that they called for a careful analysis. In French, J. Hoffmann firmly stands by the vocabulary he established, and his text is coherent, sometimes at the cost of inelegance. The English version of M.J. Himes does not respect the golden rule of specialized translation – setting the vocabulary by choosing the equivalents that are closest to the original and sticking to them. Himes often uses synonyms or what he considers to be synonyms, or related words, whereas the French always employs the same term; he also uses words which are not the equivalent of the German ones or translate two distinct terms by the same term. The verification of key vocabulary in the German text confirmed the fidelity of the French and the inaccuracy of the English. The organic unity of Drey's thought is lost in Himes' translation; moreover, the presuppositions of American research (the influence of Schleiermacher, notably) and the tendency toward anachronism permeate the translation to such an extent that it betrays major elements of Drey's thought, for instance his theology of revelation and his epistemology, and makes of him a theologian of subjectivity, which he is not. Thus, I thought it essential to meticulously analyse not only the text of the *Brève introduction*, but also the errors in the English translation.

¹⁷ Drey, Johann Sebastian, *Brief Introduction to the Study of Theology with Reference to the Scientific Standpoint and the Catholic System*, trans. M. J. Himes (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

The essay of 1812 has been translated into English by J. Fitzer¹⁸, quite faithfully. Chaillet translated it into French, but I do not have his manuscript. As for the essay of 1819 on the spirit and essence of Catholicism, it has not been translated into English. The omission is meaningful; perhaps some of the American scholars who were interested in Drey belong to the quite large circle of a Catholicism which believes its duty to be as flexible as possible so as to practice ecumenism. On the part of those who sought to be faithful to Catholic doctrine and to the papacy, such an omission is surprising. The essay of 1819 has been translated by Chaillet; I obtained a copy of his manuscript from the Jesuit Archives. The language is beautiful, at the cost of numerous foreshortenings, and the terminology of epistemology, revelation, and tradition is that of neo-scholasticism. Here, too, I verified the vocabulary in the German text.

The analysis of the three programmatic writings, therefore, is new in both the Anglophone and Francophone milieus. It shows that the path followed by Drey from 1812 to 1819 is relevant for the contemporary Catholic Church.

Influences

For the purposes of the present study, I did not think it essential, allowing for exceptions, to deal with the issue of influences separately. Drey, like any thinker, welcomed a variety of influences, but he did so critically and remained independent. The analysis of mistakes in translation and of the presentation of the major themes of Drey's theology constitute the response to the charge of a strong indebtedness to Schleiermacher. The reading, after the *Brief Introduction*, of Schleiermacher's *Brief Outline on the Study*

¹⁸ Johann Sebastian Drey, "Toward the Revision of the Present State of Theology", trans. J. Fitzer, in *Romance and the Rock: Nineteenth-Century Catholics on Faith and Reason*, J. Fitzer, ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 62-73.

of *Theology*,¹⁹ will suffice to convince the reader.²⁰ As for Schelling, we will see that Drey borrowed more from his thought, finding in it an appropriate philosophical substratum for the reconstruction of Catholic theology.

- B. Life and work of Drey in his intellectual and ecclesiastical-social-political context
1. Difficulties posed by the study of the thought of the Enlightenment and Romanticism

I gradually discovered that the study of the philosophical and religious thought which Drey encountered poses three types of problems which are connected. I do not pretend to solve them, but I think it necessary to discuss them in order to situate the choices I made, their limits, and the risk of distortion they present. The first problem, of which the other two are more precise and limited expressions, is the risk of presenting the Enlightenment and Romanticism as two monolithic and irreconcilable blocs. The second difficulty lies in the way the connection between Romanticism (and idealism) and the Enlightenment should be established; is Romanticism a reaction against the Enlightenment of the end of the eighteenth century or the whole of eighteenth century thought? The third difficulty is the approach chosen by historians of the philosophical and religious thought of the nineteenth century.

¹⁹ Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, translated with Introduction and Notes by Terrence N. Tice (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1966). Tice translated the second edition, of 1830. Drey read the first edition, of 1811. To determine which text Drey read, one must refer either to the synopsis of both versions in the German edition of 1910 by H. Scholz, or to the historical and critical German edition of 1998 (for bibliographical information see Seckler, "Pour comprendre", 91, note 51; 92, note 52).

²⁰ The Foreword of the *Brief Introduction* contains a critique of the *Brief Outline* which is almost explicit. The work itself contains implicit criticisms. However, in his *Apologetics*, Drey went back over some positions of his, which originated in Schleiermacher's thought. On that issue see B.E. Hinze, "Johann Sebastian Drey's Critique of Friedrich Schleiermacher's Theology", *HeyJ XXXVII* (1996), 5-20; Seckler, "Pour comprendre", 93. Seckler devotes to this question a part of the third and fifth chapters of the introduction to the critical edition of the *Kurze Einleitung*, published in 2007 (see the note I devoted to this work in my bibliography).

The third difficulty drew my attention at the very beginning of my study and inspired in me a kind of malaise. For instance, after having read McCool and O'Meara, I had the feeling I had studied two distinct religious Germanies whose paths had occasionally crossed. Moreover, what remains for a time after having read a book (one could call that its "scope") may be quite different from the immediate impression it left of what the author had in mind (the "intention"). After a while, O'Meara's left me with the impression that Schelling was the one and only German idealist and that the first three generations of Tübingen theologians were but Schelling's disciples. However, as noted above, O'Meara insists that Drey is original, far from being a mere disciple.

My discovery of an article by C. Welch published in 1992²¹ confirmed that my malaise was well-founded. Looking at the striking revival of interest in the development of theology in the nineteenth century that has occurred over the last quarter-century in English-speaking scholarship, Welch invites his audience into a critical reflection over the works of about fifteen scholars, including himself. He does not doubt their intellectual or moral honesty, nor does he doubt their professionalism. What he questions is their common ambition and presuppositions: all of them think that theology in the twentieth century depends on developments in the previous century; these studies cover the whole nineteenth century and are sometimes transnational in scope. Most of them are more interested in "soloists" (individual thinkers) than in the "chorus" (church doctrine, whether Catholic or Protestant). The decision of which writers should be chosen to represent a trend of thought poses insuperable obstacles. Moreover, once they are chosen (here I express my opinion), how can a historian really grasp the thought of each of them

²¹ "The Perils of Trying to Tell the Whole Story: Historiographical Issues in the Study of Nineteenth-Century Theology", in *Revisioning the Past. Prospects in Historical Theology*, M. P. Engel and W.E. Wyman, eds. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 149-169.

(as it implies the thorough study of the work of each one) while covering a whole century? An example of the difficulty is as follows. I had noticed that McCool directly refers to one theologian only: J. Kleutgen, champion of the scholastic renewal of the second half of the nineteenth century. Otherwise, McCool relies upon European historians who attempted a similar adventure long before him. Though he rightly discerned Drey's originality, he commits a major error of interpretation by ascribing to Drey and to the Tübingen school the same epistemology as found in French traditionalism. Needless to say, I cannot provide a firmly grounded opinion on each and every one of the historians' assertions, so when I refer to them I may express positions whose scope eludes me. It is worth noting that all historians I have read and who published before 1992 are mentioned in Welch's critical reflection.

The second difficulty, which I grasped later, is also examined by Welch:

Is the development of theology in the nineteenth century to be considered as essentially a continuation of the eighteenth century (or even the Enlightenment as a whole), or are the new beginnings sufficiently distinct that a real turning point can be found at the end of the eighteenth century (with Kant, or the French Revolution, or Schleiermacher)?²²

For McCool, O'Meara and Reardon, Romanticism and idealism are a reaction against the Enlightenment of the end of the eighteenth century, and Kantianism in particular. Authors of special studies are inclined to the same conclusion, it seems to me. According to Welch, the interpretation that encompasses the entire eighteenth century generates a negative appreciation of Romanticism; this view would have classic expression in Barth's *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, which presents the nineteenth century as the continuation of the "wrongheaded anthropologizing"²³ trend of the preceding century. As far as I am concerned I had other questions in mind: was it possible that Drey, whose

²² Id., 154.

²³ Id., 155.

first programmatic writing was an overview of the history of theology since the twelfth century, was reacting to the philosophical and theological thought of the end of the eighteenth century alone? In his *Brief Introduction to the Study of Theology* he mentions a number of writers of preceding centuries who wondered about theology and its methods and, consequently, expressed theological positions. In the end, he adopts positions of both the Enlightenment and early Romanticism, but opposes their common subjectivism. So, when considered from the point of view of the first difficulty I evoked above, these trends appear not as diametrically opposed but as a continuum. On the other hand, Drey paid particular attention to the philosophers of the end of the eighteenth century.

Finally, I chose two criteria of presentation which at first glance are contradictory. To avoid the first pitfall, I will present the major themes of both trends in the most nuanced way possible. But to illustrate how rationalism was a fundamental challenge to Catholicism, I chose only one work, Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. I have three grounds for doing so. First, in this work, Kant conceptualizes in a very rigorous way the main themes which Drey recognizes and opposes as major threats to Christianity. Second, *Religion* marked the emergence of a new discipline: philosophy of religion, which became an important challenge to theology. And third, a number of Kant's positions are "in the air" today, deprived of their epistemological and moral foundations, so that they are fragile, if more violent.

2. Drey's life and work

Drey was born in 1777 in impoverished circumstances (his father was a shepherd) in a very poor village in Swabia, a region in the south-west of Germany which was quite prosperous. His intellectual gifts were soon noticed and he attended school

thanks to the help of generous patrons. However, he could not afford to attend university and spent only two years at a second-rate seminary. He mostly studied alone, a fact whose scope is underlined by Seckler:

Il lui a donc fallu apprendre à penser lui-même, à concevoir lui-même les grandes idées, par exemple en étudiant déjà comme vicaire à Röhlingen près d'Ellwangen... les philosophes de son temps, et avant tout Kant, Fichte, Jacobi et Schelling. Le fait que ses commencements intellectuels aient été ceux-là est particulièrement important parce que c'est une clé permettant de comprendre l'œuvre de sa vie et son originalité. Drey ne s'est jamais déplacé sur les chemins assurés et dans les ornières bien creusées de ce qui était habituel : au contraire, il n'a cessé de frayer des chemins nouveaux à sa pensée, partant de façon indépendante de ce qui est élémentaire et originel, et avec cette fraîcheur inentamée qui donne naissance à de nouveaux mondes.²⁴

A remark on this passage: it is a commonplace to say that the magisterium is a rut while the university opens new paths. We may point out that Drey began to think for himself outside the university and that later, as a leading professor at the Tübingen faculty of theology, this helped him to keep his students off any kind of beaten path.²⁵

I will allow myself to locate Drey among some other thinkers of his time: Schleiermacher was born nine years before, Hegel seven years, Schelling two years. Lessing died in 1781, Kant in 1806, Fichte in 1814 and Jacobi in 1819, the year Drey published his second and third programmatic writings.

In 1801, Drey was ordained at Augsburg and for the next five years he worked in a pastoral ministry in Röhlingen, utilizing his leisure time for independent study. So it is at the dawn of the nineteenth century, the period generally considered as a point of fracture between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, that he read the great writings of the past twenty years. During his vicariate, he was acquainted with the poor commonfolk,

²⁴ Seckler, "Johann Sebastian Drey (1777-1853). L'auteur et l'oeuvre", in *Aux origines de l'école de Tübingen*, 52-53.

²⁵ On that question see Thiel, *Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in Catholic Faith* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Thiel, trying to counter the tendency toward fundamentalism, analyses important magisterial doctrinal novelties.

those *anawim* whose blind and simple faith the *Aufklärung* called superstition, whether it was tinged with actual superstition or not. His affable personality, his respect for others, and his faithfulness to himself, allow me to think that he would not forget those simple people when he wrote the Practical Theology pages of the *Brief Introduction*, which testify to a profound pastoral sense.

In 1806, his teaching career began at the lyceum of Rottweil as instructor in physics, mathematics, and philosophy of religion. In early 1812, he published his first programmatic writing, *Revision of the Present State of Theology*, in the *Archiv für die Pastoral Konferenzen*, a periodical of the Catholic *Aufklärung*. In this essay, he lays out an overview of seven centuries of theology, which, he said, ended in a complete collapse of theology. In order to renew theology, he appeals to the great intuitions of the medieval Enlightenment and to idealism. The editorial team of the *Archiv* “sensed the importance of these pages”, writes Goyau, an admirer of Drey, “and published them only in order to criticize them.”²⁶

In the fall of 1812, Drey became professor of dogmatics, history of dogma, apologetics, and encyclopedia at the new State Catholic University of Ellwangen. In 1814, he published an essay on St. Justin’s millenarianism²⁷ and, in 1815, another essay, on the origin of auricular confession²⁸. In 1817, the small faculty of theology was moved to Tübingen to become part of the ducal, Protestant university, which from that time on housed two theological faculties, one Protestant and one Catholic. Drey and his

²⁶ Goyau, op. cit., vol. II, 22. Translation mine.

²⁷ Mentioned only by P. Godet, “Drey”, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 4 (1911), col. 1825-1828; Godet’s article is reproduced in *Aux origines de l’école de Tübingen*, 143-147. The reference above is at p. 145.

²⁸ Cf. Godet, “Drey”, in *Aux origines de l’école de Tübingen*, 145. On this essay see also Himes, “Introduction”, *Brief Introduction to the Study of Theology*, xii-xiii; Seckler, “Pour comprendre”, 68.

colleagues at Ellwangen rejoiced at this transfer which they may have helped bring about. In 1819, they founded the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, in the first four issues of which Drey published his essay on the spirit and essence of Catholicism. In that same year, he also published the *Brief Introduction*.

In 1820, Drey was elected “magnificent rector” by Tübingen University’s senate. Between 1822 and 1827, he was designated by the Wurtembergian crown, against his will, to be bishop of the new diocese of Rottenberg on four occasions, but the confirmation was rejected by Rome, probably because he had signed the Church Pragmatik, a Febronianist document issued by the Protestant crowns of the region after the signature of the Concordat with Rome. I will briefly speak of this issue below.

Drey taught at Tübingen until 1846, when he retired. He had, Seckler writes, “a renowned name as a professor of theology. When he found himself at the height of his creative powers, he was counted among the most famous German theologians. ... [But he] was slowly but surely trapped between the absolutism of the State and intra-ecclesiastical revisionism.”²⁹ He died quite suddenly in 1853. His very stable life, entirely spent in Swabia, with almost thirty years of teaching in Tübingen, followed an ascending curve, from obscure and poor life, to glory, then a descent.

In addition to contributions to the *Kirchenlexikon* of Wetzer and Welte and a number of articles and book reviews in the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Drey published his *Apologetic*³⁰ in three volumes (1838, 1843, 1847). During the Ellwangen years, he

²⁹ Seckler, “Johann Sebastian Drey”, 52 and 56. Translation by R. Sonin.

³⁰ *Die Apologetik als wissenschaftliche Nachweisung der Göttlichkeit des Christenthums in seiner Erscheinung* (Apologetics as the Scientific Demonstration of the Divinity of Christianity in its Manifestation). In the first volume, Drey expounds his philosophy of revelation; in the second, he traces back the history of revelation and religion; in the third one, he emphasises the divine character of the

had written a philosophical, theological, and historical “journal”. He did not publish his dogmatics, but his manuscript notes have been gathered under the title *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*. The *Tagebuch* and the *Praelectiones* have been published by Seckler, with an introduction and a critical apparatus, in 1997 and 2003 respectively. Drey did not publish his history of dogma either, but his manuscripts are being gathered and will be presented in 2013, together with the writings from 1812 to 1819 (save the *Brief Introduction*), in a fourth volume of Drey’s works edited by Seckler. The *Kurze Einleitung* is presented, with an introduction of nine chapters and a critical apparatus, in the third volume, edited in 2007.

3. German theology at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century

Drey’s very stable life contrasts with his time, marked by an effervescence of thought. This contrast speaks for Drey’s personality; though very well informed, he calmly pursued what would be the objective of his life. His thought, patiently matured, would evolve without any reversal of position. His aim, as we saw above, was to provide theology with a new ground. So what was the state of theology at the time Drey elaborated his thought? In 1773, four years before Drey’s birth, the Society of Jesus was suppressed by the Pope, under pressure from the Bourbon family. In Germany, the Jesuits were, with the Benedictines, the custodians of baroque scholasticism.³¹ They had founded colleges, universities and lay sodalities. They were, as in France, hated by the Enlightenment.³² Their suppression led to the disappearance of the post-Reformation

Catholic Church, to which the whole revelation leads and within which the revelation is realized. (cf. Godet, op. cit., 145)

³¹ Cf. O’Meara, op. cit., 66.

³² Cf. M. Printy, *Enlightenment and the Creation of German Catholicism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 128-138.

scholastic revival, which had already slackened owing to a lack of connection with the times.³³

But the rationalism of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), which influenced Kant, had penetrated the University of Würzburg as early as 1713, paving the way for the entry of Kantian thought in Bavaria,³⁴ which was the birthplace of the Catholic *Aufklärung*. What, in fact, does “Kantian Catholicism” consist of? O’Meara offers an idea of what it has been brought down to:

... the Kantian view that the moral dimension of human life was the revealer of religion was accepted. Enlightened society preferred fideism and voluntarism; the New Testament was interpreted as a text for moral behaviour, and the kingdom of God was not a supernatural reality existing in the church or at the end of time but a universal human covenant of morality and freedom realizable in contemporary society. The reforming spirit of the Enlightenment entered the church, encouraging liturgical and educational renewal...³⁵

This Kantian Catholicism had a variety of expressions and nuances. Benedict Stattler (1728-1797) was a moderate Kantian, accepting, at least formally, traditional Christianity resting upon a supernatural revelation. Sebastian Mutschele (1765-1800) was more radical: he intended to transform Christianity into a religion of free fellowship committed to morality and fired by the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth.³⁶

At the turn of the century, Enlightenment theology was the prevailing trend in Bavaria,³⁷ benefiting from powerful allies in the episcopate and in the state. However, nascent idealism entered the country in a quite surprising manner. The prime minister,

³³ The Society was reestablished in 1814 by Pius VII and will be, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the champion of a second revival which will be, according to McCool, stifling for the Tübingen school. (cf. op. cit., esp. 188-203).

³⁴ Cf. O’Meara, op. cit., 66.

³⁵ Id., 67.

³⁶ Cf. id., 67-68.

³⁷ This does not mean that at this time the Enlightenment had entered Bavaria only. Political and political-ecclesiastical absolutism, imbued with rationalism, had already imposed in other German states, in a practical way, a rationalist “implicit” theology. In the present section, I deal only with theology in the strict sense of the term.

Maximilian Montgelas, eager to provide the universities of Würzburg and Landshut with Kantian professors, called on Schelling, for he believed that the terms “new thought” and “new philosophy” meant the thought of the Enlightenment. Schelling’s lectures as well as his writings (which were already known) filled his audience with enthusiasm and led Johann Michael Sailer (1751-1831)³⁸, Patriz Benedict Zimmer (1752-1820)³⁹, and Joseph Weber (1753-1831)⁴⁰ from Kantianism to a hesitant (Sailer) or enthusiastic (Zimmer and Weber) Schellingianism. Zimmer, the sole true theologian among them, was the pioneer of idealism in Catholic theology. Dismissed from his chair for that reason, he was replaced in 1806 by the young Ignatz Thanner (1770-1856), who was Kantian, but who also adhered to the Schellingian objective idealism.⁴¹ Schelling was embattled even before his arrival at Würzburg and within a few months of his inaugural lecture, “the bishop... forbade Catholic attendance at the lectures under threat of excommunication (for laity) and withheld ordination (for clerics).”⁴² Sailer was relieved of his teaching position in 1781 at Ingolstadt and again in 1784 at Dillingen, together with Zimmer and Weber, on the grounds of his openness to modernity and Kantianism.⁴³ In 1803, Zimmer was issued a decree forbidding the second edition of his theological handbook⁴⁴ and in 1806, as related above, he was forced to cease theological teaching, on the grounds of his openness to idealism. Within twenty years or so, Bavaria passed, at least partially, from scholasticism, whether Wolffian or otherwise, to Kantianism then to idealism. It is worth

³⁸ Cf. O’Meara, op. cit., 40-47.

³⁹ Cf. id., 47-51.

⁴⁰ Cf. id., 209, note 21.

⁴¹ Cf. id., 50; 209, note 32; *Aux origines de l’école de Tübingen*, 222, Drey’s note 7; Seckler’s note 57. O’Meara as well as the Internet sources, all in German, mention 1825 as the year of Thanner’s death. The biographical notice which Seckler alone provides (with 1856 as the year of the death) mentions Thanner’s teaching of philosophy at Innsbruck and then Salzburg, from 1810 to 1849.

⁴² O’Meara, op. cit., 68-69. In early 1804, Schelling complains to a friend about that situation. (cf. id, 70).

⁴³ Cf. id., 42.

⁴⁴ Cf. id., 48.

noting that, as Schelling himself, Catholic theologians who adopted idealism were originally Kantian. Kant appears as the necessary path to Schellingianism. In spite of the harsh struggles between the two trends, the second was born out of the first.

4. The major themes of the *Aufklärung* and Romanticism

What is then this *Aufklärung*, this rationalism in the face of which theology must position itself? I will briefly outline its leading ideas. The first one is the autonomy of reason, an autonomy which is so sovereign that it may question the concept of revelation because this latter concept implies something external and simply received. The *Aufklärung* was not atheist as it is frequently thought to be, as in France for example. Nonetheless, revelation remains subject to the critical examination of reason. Schellingian idealism, and Drey with it, grasps the postulate implied by this position, whether it is unconsciously adopted (Lessing) or clearly formulated (Kant): reason does not contain a faculty of immediate knowledge of intelligibles (intuition); paradoxically, sovereign reason is truncated.

This sovereign reason, imparted to human kind, is universal; even though each man is a finite and sensible being, the reason within him is supersensible, and so achieves its universality through each of them in space and time. In view of the contingency of finite and empirical man, reason alone possesses necessity.

Being sovereign, reason is also free, and the exercise of this freedom implies that it keeps nothing external before having critically examined it, and indeed may reject it. As regards revelation, tradition, and the authority it implies – the authority of historical testimony, of biblical and extra-biblical texts, of the hierarchy of the Church, whether Protestant or Catholic – these are subject to the critical examination of reason. Imposed

because they are received, their acceptance rests on prejudices that reason has yet to examine. However, it is incumbent upon each of us – through another *Aufklärung* principle which its practitioners, whether in the state or in the Church, would not respect – to free oneself from prejudices⁴⁵; otherwise, those who would pretend to free them would but impose on them a new tradition and a new authority. In contrast to practitioners, theoreticians' thinking relies on time; at least it intends to do so.

Therefore the idea of progress, that other great idea of the Enlightenment, is the idea of the progress of each man, accomplished through an individual effort to achieve the free exercise of sovereign reason. Progress as it is conceived of in our time – the progress of sciences and techniques, from which man passively expects material benefits without relying on himself – is not an idea of the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, education, which is another important concern of the Enlightenment, though it does not harm individual progress towards freedom of reason per se, thwarts it concretely because education is a communication of imposed knowledge. It is paradoxical, if not utopian, to imagine the abstract universality of reason realizing its conquests through an individual thinking subject who has the duty of examining anything external only after having been educated by someone else.

⁴⁵ H.-G. Gadamer reproaches the *Aufklärung* for a prejudice against prejudices (cf. *Truth and Method*, second revised edition, translation revised by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall (London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 273ff). “The history of ideas,” he writes, “shows that not until the Enlightenment does *the concept of prejudice* acquire the negative connotation familiar today. Actually ‘prejudice’ means a judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined.” (273) Thus the term “certainly does not necessarily mean a false judgment but part of the idea is that it can have either a positive or a negative value... There are such things as préjugés légitimes.” The Enlightenment critique of religion limited its meaning to the sense of an “unfounded judgment”. The fact that religious tradition, especially Scripture, was examined before the judgment seat of reason implied the rejection of the authority of tradition and of the written text itself, and as a consequence, of the truth they contain. That being said, the German Enlightenment, writes Gadamer, being more moderate than the English and French ones, recognized the “true prejudices” of the Christian religion, possibly preparing the way for the rise of the Romantic movement in Germany. (cf. 274-275).

Kant is the theoretician par excellence of the universality, the necessity, and the freedom of reason as well as man's – moral – progress. His three *Critiques* (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781; *Critique of Practical Reason*, 1788; *Critique of Judgment*, 1790) delineate the limits which reason ascribes to itself. Reason rules as beyond the scope of its investigation the order of the suprasensible, including the supernatural, that is, the order of the “thing in itself”, or the “noumenon”. By doing so, it establishes its authority over the “phenomenal” world, which alone is speakable and trustworthy. Kant admits as *a priori* (prior to any experience) knowledge the sensible intuitions of time and space as well as the categories of understanding. In this way, he created his famous “Copernician revolution”: knowledge does not conform itself to requirements imposed by objects of knowledge; objects of knowledge conform to the structure of reason. Christianity, its dogma and its practices, as well as any philosophical dogmatism, are subjected to the riddle of reason.

Romanticism, at least at its dawn, retains subjectivism and attachment to freedom, but it praises tradition and the divine highly, for it cannot imagine how man could realize his potentialities at the cost of becoming uprooted. A.-M. Roviello summarizes, from a slightly different angle, the two great concerns of Enlightenment and Romanticism:

[Ils] sont deux tentatives historiquement déterminées... de penser deux dimensions universelles de l'existence humaine : la dimension de liberté, de non-coïncidence de l'homme avec ce qu'il est, la faculté de se distancier par rapport à cet être..., et la dimension d'appartenance ou la « substantialité » de l'être de l'homme. *Aufklärung* et romantisme se sont colletés avec cette ambivalence fondamentale qui fait l'humanité de l'homme.⁴⁶

Roviello underlines that though great minds of the Enlightenment as well as Romanticism thought that this distortion of human essence was irreducible, “it is to

⁴⁶ A.-M. Roviello, Avant-propos, in *Lumières et romantisme*, G. Hottot, ed. (Paris: Vrin, Annales de l'Institut de philosophie de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1989), 7.

assure the triumph of one dimension over the other that – on either side – most of the thinkers dedicated all their efforts.”⁴⁷ After having established the antagonism of these two movements, Roviello adds that each of them was informed by multiple trends:

Certains penseurs des Lumières ont su rétablir dans ses droits le sensible particulier sans réduire celui-ci à un pur principe d’opacité sur lequel l’universel ne pouvait qu’établir sa domination. L’intuition, l’imagination étaient reconnues comme voies d’accès privilégiées à cette part de la vérité qui déborde la pensée d’entendement logico-déductive. De l’autre côté on trouvait parfois plus de raison et de sens authentique de l’universel chez certains romantiques que chez certains *Aufklärer* qui prétendaient opposer à toute position autre leur pouvoir critique comme un dogme, le plus beau paradoxe... S’il s’agissait bien pour des penseurs comme Herder ou Novalis de détrôner la conscience réflexive de son statut de détenteur exclusif de la vérité de l’homme et sur l’homme, ce n’était certes pas pour inviter à se livrer sans réserves à l’irrationnel, mais au nom d’un plus de lucidité, et donc d’un plus de raison en ce sens.⁴⁸

Three great figures of the *Aufklärung* philosophy, Lessing (1729-1781), Herder (1744-1803), mentioned by Roviello, and Jacobi (1743-1819), appear, it seems to me, to be “watchmen”, paying attention to the drifting of a reason wild with itself. According to H. Declève⁴⁹, Lessing is an *Aufklärer* who put a brake on the inordinate exaltation of reason by the *Aufklärung*, a pre-Romantic whose conscience was worried and who doubted himself as much as what was not himself. Though Lessing was always inquiring, he was unwilling to find himself, because, after all, the task of the philosopher is remaining on alert, uncovering the prejudices – racism, among others – which the *Aufklärung* did not eradicate. However, Lessing maintains the pairing of progress and education, and in his defence of revelation – a defence sometimes clumsy, sometimes clever – he reduces it, through transposition, to mere education of the human race.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ibid. Translation by R. Sonin.

⁴⁸ Id., 8.

⁴⁹ Cf. H. Declève. “Lessing ou la raison dans les limites de la pure religion”, in *Lumières et romantisme*, 119-158.

⁵⁰ Cf. G.E. Lessing. *Lessing’s Theological Writings*. Trans. H. Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956).

Herder is connected to the *Sturm und Drang* (storm and stress) movement, the first strong reaction against rationalism, which spread during the last quarter of the eighteenth century (the second half of the century according to some interpretations) throughout the political, literary and artistic domains, and it can be compared to what some scholars call pre-Romanticism. Herder, as a philosopher, is the “tête forte”⁵¹ of the movement. In my view, his thought is marked by clairvoyance: he saw the far-reaching consequences of the positions of authors of the Enlightenment which they had not appreciated or which did not correspond immediately to their thought. Roviello invites to consider:

... la complexité des glissements et des retournements de sens qui font l’histoire des idées, ... la multidisponibilité d’une idée, l’indétermination ou aussi bien la richesse de sens qui l’habite et qui se révélera de manières très différentes et même contradictoires selon l’horizon de sens ou selon l’ouverture au monde dans la perspective desquels cette idée sera reprise.⁵²

In universal reason coupled with the education of masses Herder did not so much see a desire of emancipation of people, but rather a manifestation of despotism – what we would call in our day the imperialism of the West – in which this education would originate, and that would lead to a stifling of the life and culture of non-Western peoples.⁵³

⁵¹ Cf. J. Patočka, “J.G. Herder et sa philosophie de l’humanité”, in *Lumières et romantisme*, 17. This text, translated from Czech, was written in 1941.

⁵² Roviello, op. cit., 9. By “multidisponibilité” of an idea, Roviello means the availability of an idea for further developments that its author could not have in mind.

⁵³ Cf. M. Caisson, “Lumière de Herder”, *Terrain* 17 (1991), electronic version, esp. 2-3, 10, 12ss; paper version of the article: 17-28. Patočka, mentioned above (note 51), has a less positive evaluation of Herder; he admits that Herder advocated “une nouvelle et puissante poussée de la vie à laquelle l’on restitue sa chaleur affective”, but he reproaches him for thought that was more brilliant than really solid, and a final reconciliation with the ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment. The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* salutes Herder’s immense intellectual influence on the thinkers of the nineteenth century; I will just mention his influence upon Schleiermacher’s theory of language, interpretation and translation. Drey mentions in n. 83 of the *Brief Introduction* two works by Herder which I did not find cited elsewhere: the *Letters regarding the study of theology* and his *Conception of the education years of the young theologian* [the approximate translation of titles is mine].

The coincidence of Enlightenment philosophy and absolutism may generate endless debates on the links that unite them. But if in France philosophy was mundane and moved in the salons of the aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie, such was not the case in Germany, where the philosophers were of modest extraction, if not poor (Herder, Fichte), and did not have many acquaintances with the nobility, save to earn their living as preceptors. One of the positions I will defend is that the practitioners of the *Aufklärung*, whether absolutist states in the line of Josephinism or church leaders in the line of Febronianism, used philosophical thought – or that part of Enlightenment thought that they deemed useful – as an instrument for their politics. I will give an example.

Jacobi was a critic of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. He highly praised Kant on several accounts but harshly criticised his epistemology. Without denying the role of understanding, he posited intuition as an immediate knowledge of things transcendent and, in the end, as faith (in a very broad sense). He is credited for having forged the concept of nihilism, a condition which he accused Fichte of suffering.⁵⁴ As for Schelling, he accused him of pantheism, if not pure atheism.

⁵⁴ Cf. D. Folscheid, “Kant”, in *La philosophie allemande de Kant à Heidegger*, D. Folscheid, ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, coll. Premier Cycle, 1993), 45. In the brief notice he devotes to Jacobi, Folscheid presents him, not as a critical *Aufklärer*, but as a vigorous opponent to the Enlightenment. In the abstract of his doctoral thesis (*Les lumières platoniciennes de Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819)*, Paris, 2006), P. Brunel presents Jacobi as a philosopher who examined the Enlightenment according to its own principle and studied it as an already formed tradition whose contradictions must be put in full light. “Jacobi entreprend une généalogie philosophique de la modernité. Selon Jacobi, le philosophe qui tenta la compréhension la plus ample de la situation, c’est Kant. La première partie expose comment Jacobi fait certes l’éloge de la philosophie kantienne, mais estime que l’idéalisme critique reste fondamentalement ambigu et contradictoire.” In his brief and dense study of Jacobi (*De Kant à Schelling. Les deux voies de l’idéalisme allemand*, Grenoble: Jérôme Million, vol. II, 2000, 242-254), M. Vetö writes that Jacobi has accompanied idealism (in the broad sense) since its origins, always in a very polemical way.

5. Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 1793⁵⁵

Presenting a work by a philosopher in whose thought one is not a specialist is no easy task, and the task appears to be all the more hazardous since, even two centuries after Kant's death his work continues to be the subject of new research, interpretation, and translations. Even the sources of his thought have been quite recently scrutinized,⁵⁶ for Kant is not an erratic rock of the Enlightenment and positioning his thought on a diverse continuum has been seen as a possible way to shed more light on it. Also, as my presentation of *Religion* has a particular aim, it runs the risk of distortion. I will keep close to the text to avoid as far as possible to say what Kant does not say.

Religion is of particular interest because it marks the appearance of a new discipline: the philosophy of religion. The term was used for the first time, it seems, by the Jesuit Storchenau (1731-1797), a Wolffian philosopher, in a work published in 1772, which consisted of a philosophical apologetic. The true profile of the discipline took form in *Letters on Kant's Philosophy* (1786-1787) by Karl Reinhold, an ex-Jesuit who returned to Protestantism.⁵⁷ Kant, who planned to publish the four parts of *Religion* successively

⁵⁵ I use *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*, trans. A. Wood and G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). There is another, more recent translation, by W. S. Pluhar: *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009). In his Preface, Pluhar acknowledges that Di Giovanni erased the vast majority of the errors in the traditionally dominant translation by Greene and Hudson (1934), but according to him, "it has also created a considerable number of new ones." (xi) He adds that he made every attempt to avoid creating his own.

⁵⁶ Cf. for example R. Theis and L. K. Sosoe, eds., *Les sources de la philosophie kantienne aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*, Actes du 6^e Congrès international de la Société d'études kantienne de langue française, Luxembourg, 25-28 septembre 2003 (Paris: Vrin, 2005).

⁵⁷ Cf. J. Greisch, *Le buisson ardent et les lumières de la raison. L'Invention de la philosophie de la religion*, vol. I – *Héritages et héritiers du XIX^e siècle* (Paris: Cerf, coll. Philosophie et religion, 2002), 31. Greisch contrasts philosophy of religion to "philosophical theology" (a term he likes more than "natural theology") which is as ancient as philosophy itself and is a specifically philosophical inquiry on the nature of the divine and its modes of manifestation. (cf. 27) He also contrasts it to "religious philosophy", in which personal belief is accounted for. (cf. 34) "D'un côté, nous avons une attitude philosophique qui, pour des raisons de méthode, s'interdit toute prise de position prématurée en faveur d'une croyance religieuse

in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, gave each part a general title: “Philosophical Doctrine of Religion”. Romanticism – Drey, Schleiermacher, Schelling – would have to take into account what was implied by the irruption into the philosophical corpus of this new discipline applying the rules of criticism to religion.⁵⁸

Religion was and still is much read: J. Greisch has produced a critical examination of the work⁵⁹ and mentions other assessments: F. Alquié is of the view that the religious fact escapes Kant, and that he only sought to adapt Christian religion to his three *Critiques*; A. Philonenko thinks that Kant shows a total lack of religious sensibility; according to J.-L. Bruch, *Religion* is one of the masterpieces of Kantian philosophy; and according to P. Ricoeur it provides a “philosophical hermeneutic of religion”, which appears to be a “philosophical hermeneutic of hope”.⁶⁰ In the Introduction to Pluhar’s translation of *Religion*, S. R. Palmquist touches on the importance of the religious context of Kant’s life, which he sees as “conflicts of heart and mind”:

The book is bound to be misunderstood by readers who forget that the author was raised as a devout Pietist at the hands of a loving mother... Prussian Pietism arose as a movement within the Lutheran (state) Church, its leaders emphasizing private devotion to God, individual Bible study and moral integrity, while deemphasizing church hierarchy, dogma and the theological presumptuousness that regards ritual as transmitting saving power.⁶¹

Kant appreciated and respected the education received from his mother, but:

... he experienced such harsh treatment from his Pietist teachers that the very thought of those days filled the mature Kant with dread. Teachers... would force students to *appear*

déterminée; de l’autre, il y a des penseurs qui, du dedans même de leur foi, cherchent à élucider philosophiquement les raisons qui les ont conduits à adhérer à cette foi...” (34-35)

⁵⁸ According to Greisch, Schleiermacher’s *Speeches on Religion* and Schelling’s works belong to philosophy of religion (cf. id., 73-119 and 175-206). They each illustrate the “speculative paradigm”, as opposed to Kant’s *Religion* which represents the prototype of the “critical paradigm”. Greisch’s position regarding Schleiermacher and Schelling does not convince me. I will explain my position as regards Schelling.

⁵⁹ Cf. id., 307-349.

⁶⁰ Cf. id., 321.

⁶¹ S.R. Palmquist, “Introduction”, in *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, xv-xvi.

devout by requiring them to pray aloud, memorize long passages of Scripture, recite creeds, etc.⁶²

Palmquist then invites the reader to avoid “the tendency of Kant’s antireligious readers, including many Kantians who are attracted by other aspects of his System, to read into *Religion* a total disdain of anything religious...”⁶³

Kant already dealt with religion in his three *Critiques*, which in turn underlie the theses of *Religion*. This work is divided into four parts, as I mentioned above; each of them is followed by a General Remark related to what Kant calls the *parerga* (margins, limits) of pure religion within the boundaries of reason. These *parerga* are: “effects of grace”; miracles; mysteries; and “means of grace”. Part One is a small treatise of moral philosophy; it is autonomous and Kant published it on its own in 1792. This treatise is of utmost importance in understanding the spirit of Part Four which consists in a pitiless critique of priestcraft and worship. Part Four is also quite autonomous, and, according to some interpreters, for that reason was published by itself in French. Two kinds of reading of this part are possible: a reading that refers to Part One may help the fervent believer, even the most anti-Kantian possible, to wonder whether his or her practice of worship is somehow diverted from its ends by a certain Pharisaism. A reading not referring to Part One may generate or justify the harshest agnosticism, or atheism and anti-Christianity; this reading justifies what Kant denounces, that is to say, pusillanimous laziness as regards the fulfilment of duty.

Part One is entitled “Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle alongside the good, or, Of the radical evil in human nature”.⁶⁴ Kant comments on two opinions

⁶² Id., xvi.

⁶³ Id. On the Lutheran origin of *Religion* see also H. Lorenz, “La théologie luthérienne comme source de la philosophie critique de Kant”, in *Les sources de la philosophie kantienne*, 117-124, esp. 117-121.

regarding moral good or evil: the first one, which he called the “oldest among all fictions, the religion of the priests”⁶⁵, allows for an original good, a Golden Age, that disappears in a fall into evil. The second one, which is the opinion of philosophers, especially of pedagogues in Kant’s time, is that man steadfastly forges ahead from worse to better. As for Kant, he advocates a middle ground: there is in human nature an “original predisposition to good”, which consists of the universal moral law⁶⁶ found by practical reason; and a “propensity to evil”, recognized, by experience rather than by reason, as also universal. Freedom consists in respect for the moral law, more precisely in the fulfilment of the duty it prescribes without any incentive other than the fulfilment of duty itself. However, the exercise of the power of choice may lead one to incorporate immoral or moral incentives into one’s maxims for actions, so that there are actions which may be morally good though they have impure incentives.

So far as the agreement of actions with the law goes..., there is no difference... between a human being of good morals... and a morally good human being..., except that the actions of the former do not always have, perhaps never have, the law as their sole and supreme incentive, whereas those of the latter *always* do. We can say of the first that he

⁶⁴ Cf. *Religion*, 45-73.

⁶⁵ *Id.*, 45.

⁶⁶ What is this moral law, which is the leitmotif of the whole *Religion*? Kant deals it the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. The formulation takes the form of a categorical (that is, unconditional) imperative as opposed to a hypothetical imperative. Kant’s first formulation may be said to be the formula of the Universal Law of Nature: “do act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” Kant also provides other formulations:

1) The Humanity formula: never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself.

2) The Autonomy formula may be as follows: act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws.

3) The Kingdom of Ends formula: “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends.” The kingdom of ends is a “systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”. (cf. “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, article first published on Feb 23, 2004; substantive revision on April 6, 2008) In quotation marks, citations from *Groundwork*. The names of the formulas are from the article’s author.

On the number of Kant’s formulas see R. Theis, “L’impératif catégorique: des énoncés à l’énonciation”, *Le Portique* 15 (2005), electronic version (2007), 4.

complies with the law according to the *letter*...; but of the second, that he observes it according to the *spirit*...⁶⁷

Does it mean that the power of choice may lead one to adopt the maxims of the moral law and opposite maxims at the same time? From the viewpoint of ethics (the theory of mores), it is of great consequence to preclude any moral intermediate as regards actions or human characters. Such is the position taken by the rigorists (and Kant considers himself to be a rigorist). In opposition stand the “latitudinarians”, either of neutrality – the indifferentists – or of coalition – the syncretists. As regards the intention, or “disposition”, the issue is not easy to solve.

To examine this issue, Kant first studies the original predisposition to good. It itself comprises three predispositions: the first is to the animality of the human being as a living being; the second is to humanity as a living and rational being; and the third is to personality, as a rational and responsible being.⁶⁸ The predisposition to animality is physical or mechanical self-love; the predisposition to humanity is physical self-love as well, but involves comparison (for which reason is required), out of which originate vices (jealousy, rivalry, envy, ingratitude, etc.); the predisposition to personality is the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice. The first predisposition does not have reason at its root; the second is rooted in practical reason though it is subservient to other incentives; the third is rooted in practical reason alone, as legislating unconditionally.

⁶⁷ *Religion*, 54.

⁶⁸ Neo-Kantianism, which focuses on ethics, will draw from these definitions disastrous consequences that Kant surely did not have in mind. Responsibility, which is incumbent to the will, becomes the criterion of the definition of “person”; it will follow that if every person is a human being, not every human being is a person. The idea of person, a Judaeo-Christian idea, which needed so many centuries to acquire the primacy over the ancient notions of citizen, slave and freed slave so to make slavery unacceptable, begun to set back at the same time, as people deemed to be irresponsible because of senility, mental handicap or infancy were not considered persons. It paved the way to eugenics, with its various forms.

By propensity to evil, Kant means the subjective ground of the possibility of deviation from the maxims of the moral law. This propensity has different grades: human frailty; impurity that mixes immoral and moral incentives, even with a good disposition; depravity (or corruption of the heart, or perversity of the heart), that subordinates the incentives of the moral law to other, non-moral, ones. It reverses the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice. The propensity to evil, though not necessary as regards the human species, is subjectively necessary in each human being for it is testified to by experience. Its universality makes it a radical evil.

Where is the root of this radical evil? Not in the sensuous nature of the human being and in the natural inclinations originating from it, nor in a corruption of the morally legislative reason, but in the power of choice which corrupts the ground of all maxims and reverses the order of incentives and makes self-love and inclinations the condition of respect for the moral law. It is on this analysis that the Kantian critique of worship lies in so far as worship implies replacing the fulfilment of duty. A passage announces the spirit of this critique:

Granted that some supernatural cooperation is also needed to his becoming good or better, whether this cooperation only consist in the diminution of obstacles or be also a positive assistance, the human being must nonetheless make himself antecedently worthy of receiving it; and he must *accept* this help (which is no small matter), i.e. must incorporate this positive increase of force into his maxim: in this way alone, it is possible that the good be imputed to him...⁶⁹

The restoration of the original predisposition to good is not the acquisition of a lost incentive for the good, but the recovery of the purity of the law, which Kant calls “holiness of maxims” in compliance with one’s duty. Of course the one who incorporates this purity into his maxims is still not holy as such, but he is upon the road of endless

⁶⁹ *Religion*, 65-66.

progress toward holiness. In fact, he may follow two paths. Either his constant maxim is to act in accordance with the law, and he is then virtuous, though his virtue may be called “phenomenal” as it regards only action for which, owing to its empirical and legal character, not the slightest change of heart is necessary; or he practices virtue according to its intelligible character (“noumenal virtue”), and he does not need any other incentive to recognize a duty except the representation of duty itself. This latter path, which alone restores the purity of the predisposition to good, cannot be effected through gradual reform; it needs a revolution, a total conversion to the maxim of holiness. It is only after this revolution in the mode of thought is accomplished that the gradual reformation in the mode of sense can take place. “From this, Kant insists, it follows that human being’s moral education must begin, not with an improvement of mores, but with the transformation of his attitude of mind and the establishment of a character...”⁷⁰ Teaching is what therefore must arouse this internal revolution. The practitioners of the *Aufklärung* (statesmen, church leaders) never applied this lesson and believed that they ought to begin with an empirical revolution; they roughly suppressed the cultural mores they deemed contrary to the mere phenomenal virtue of duty.

At the end of Part One Kant specifies the spirit of his critique of worship:

Against this expectation of self-improvement, reason, which by nature finds moral labor vexing, now conjures up, under the pretext of natural impotence, all sorts of impure religious ideas...; the human being either flatters himself that God can make him eternally happy (through the remission of his debts) without any necessity on his part to become a better human being; or else, ... that God himself can make him a better human being without his having to contribute more than to ask for it, and... this would amount in fact to doing nothing...⁷¹

All ideas of “religion of rogation” (of mere cult) fall into four classes:

⁷⁰ Id., 68.

⁷¹ Id., 71.

... (1) supposed inner experience (effects of grace), *enthusiasm*; (2) alleged outer experiences (miracles), *superstition*; (3) presumed enlightenment of the understanding with respect to the supernatural (mysteries), *illumination*, the delusion of the initiates; (4) adventurous attempts at influencing the supernatural (means of grace), *thaumaturgy*, sheer aberrations of a reason that has strayed beyond its limits, indeed for a supposed moral aim (one pleasing to God).⁷²

Part Two is entitled “Concerning the battle of the good against the evil principle for dominion over the human being”.⁷³ I will outline only two major aspects of this part. To show the rightful claim of the good principle, Kant presents the Son of God (whom he never calls Christ) as the personified idea of the good principle, a divinely disposed man, nevertheless naturally begotten, who “represents” the prototype of a human being well-pleasing to God; he himself is not the prototype for the prototype resides in reason.

Kant thus operates a reversal of the loci of necessity and contingency. Reason appears as the place in which the absolute moral law, almost substantified, resides; it “must be” (it is “necessary”), but it cannot be elsewhere than in reason. On the contrary, what can not be is contingent; the historical Christ, naturally begotten, who personifies the moral law, is contingent. To be sure, reason cannot absolutely deny that he might indeed also be a supernaturally begotten human being, but any such “presupposition”⁷⁴ is of no benefit to us because reason cannot say anything regarding the supernatural.

Kant then speaks of the struggle of the two principles with one another as it is “represented” in the Holy Scriptures by an “evil spirit” and a person who is the Son of God. The outcome of this combat is the death of the latter (Kant does not deal with resurrection save in a note, with reservations) and this death was “the manifestation of the good principle, that is, of humanity in its moral perfection, as example for everyone to

⁷² Id., 72.

⁷³ Cf. id., 77-102.

⁷⁴ Id., 82.

follow.”⁷⁵ The followers of the Master who remain faithful to the good principle will experience sufferings, sacrifices and mortifications of self-love; there is no need for completion of this effort by way of superstition, through expiations, or through enthusiasm or alleged inner illuminations.

Part Three of Kant’s work is entitled “The victory of the good principle over the evil principle, and the founding of a kingdom of God on earth”.⁷⁶ I will deal with only the concept of the kingdom of God and the concept of “representation”. The human being taken in isolation has an undemanding nature, but he is corrupted by his relationship with other human beings. However much the individual man might escape from the dominion of evil, he still is held in incessant danger of relapsing into it. It follows that the dominion of the good principle requires the setting up of a society in accordance with the laws of virtue. Kant calls this type of society an “ethical community”. The setting up of such a community is a duty, “not of human beings towards human beings, but of the human race towards itself.”⁷⁷ This very special duty which is not incumbent on an individual, but on a union of individuals, needs “the presupposition of another idea, namely, of a higher moral being through whose universal organization the forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect.”⁷⁸ This common legislator is God, a “postulate” of practical reason.⁷⁹ This makes the ethical community a “people of God”,

⁷⁵ Id., 97.

⁷⁶ Cf. id., 105-147.

⁷⁷ Id., 108.

⁷⁸ Id., 109.

⁷⁹ It is in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that Kant expounds the “postulates” of practical reason. The moral law defines each person’s duty, yet every person is entitled to hope for the “highest good”, which is the union of virtue and happiness. It is at this point, in the sphere of hope, that religious ideas come to the stage. “... the eventual happiness of moral agents in strict proportion to their virtue [is] beyond our power to achieve, and also beyond anything we can reasonably expect from the ordinary course of nature. Therefore,... we can reasonably believe the highest good possible, and seriously take it as our end, only if

though its constitution is not a theocracy resting on “statutory laws”, that is, laws which “do not involve the morality of actions, but only their legality”⁸⁰; rather it is “a republic under laws of virtue”⁸¹, that is, the inner legislation of noumenal virtue.

The idea of a people of God cannot be realized in human organization except in the form of a church, which Kant defines as “an ethical community under divine moral legislation”⁸². Thus, the kingdom of God has two aspects: from the viewpoint of noumenal virtue, it is “the church invisible”; from the viewpoint of the empirical union of human beings devoted to virtue, it is “the church visible”. This visible society implies the subordination of its members to superiors who only administer the affairs of the invisible supreme head and are called “servants” of the church. So the constitution of this church which “represents” a “State of God” “is neither *monarchical* (under a pope or patriarchs), nor *aristocratic* (under bishops or prelates), nor *democratic* (as of sectarian *illuminati*).”⁸³

Morality, we may note, has entered the domain of religion, which Kant defines in Part

we believe there is a God who can and will supplement our contribution to the achievement of the highest good with whatever divine assistance may be required.” (R.M. Adams, “Introduction”, *Religion*, viii).

As to the postulate of immortality, it may be explained as follows: we need to believe in the possible attainment of the perfection of our virtue. But as “we cannot reasonably hope to reach perfect virtue in any finite period of time, ... the only reasonable way in which we can seriously take perfect virtue as an end is by believing in an immortality which makes possible an infinite approximation to perfect virtue.” (id.)

The Kantian notion of “postulate” has been diversely assessed. For instance: “Kant emprunte ce terme aux mathématiques pour caractériser des affirmations qui ne peuvent en aucun cas être démontrées, mais que l’on est obligé de *présupposer* pour penser une réalité. Les postulats sont donc des hypothèses subjectives (et non des connaissances objectives), nécessaires pour pouvoir espérer légitimement que l’action morale aura des effets sur la nature et que le monde peut être transformé.” (*La religion dans les limites de la simple raison* (Quatrième partie), trans. M. Schweyer (Hatier, coll. Les classiques Hatier de la philosophie, 2000), 98-99.) For Greisch, the postulate is “plus qu’une simple ‘hypothèse’ (‘Admettons que...’), et aussi autre chose qu’un simple impératif (‘Il faut y croire’). Dès la Préface à la *Critique de la raison pratique*, Kant met en garde contre un malentendu possible concernant l’expression ‘postulat de la raison pure pratique’, qu’il ne faut pas confondre avec la certitude apodictique qui caractérise les axiomes mathématiques. Ici, c’est un autre type de certitude qui est visé, mais non moins apodictique. La raison pratique ‘postule la possibilité d’un *objet* même (de Dieu et de l’immortalité de l’âme) d’après des lois pratiques apodictiques, donc uniquement au profit d’une raison pratique.” (*Le buisson ardent*, 315-316).

⁸⁰ *Religion*, 110.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Id.*, 111.

⁸³ *Id.*, 112.

Four as “the recognition of all our duties *as* divine commands,”⁸⁴ and so the domain of religion we enter is one of “religion of reason”, of “pure religious faith”, or of “rational faith”.

Now, here as well, philosophy has encountered the pre-existing religious fact, which embodied itself in Churches existing for centuries. These pre-existing Churches do not have the rational faith which may be communicated to everyone who will then be convinced, and so alone is able to ground a universal church; rather they have a revealed “historical faith”, merely based on facts, so they can extend their influence no further than the tidings relevant to a judgment on their credibility can reach. What kind of status does Kant accord to historical (or “ecclesiastical”) faith? He admits that “in the molding of human beings into an ethical community, ecclesiastical faith naturally precedes pure religious faith.”⁸⁵ And it is “the gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith toward the exclusive dominion of pure religious faith [that] is the coming of the kingdom of God.”⁸⁶

Later on, Kant insists once more that the reform he advocates must be gradual:

The basis for the transition to the new order of things must lie in the principle of the pure religion of reason, as a revelation (though not an empirical one) permanently taking place within all human beings, and this basis, once grasped after mature reflection, will be carried to effect, inasmuch as it is to be a human work, through gradual reform; for, as

⁸⁴ Id., 153. On this “as” Kant has two comments in a long note; I cite the first one: “With this definition some erroneous interpretations of the concept of religion in general are obviated. ...so far as theoretical cognition and profession of faith are concerned, no assertoric knowledge is required in religion (even of the existence of God), since with our lack of insight into supersensible objects any such profession can well be hypocritically feigned; speculatively, what is required is rather only a *problematic* assumption (hypothesis) concerning the supreme cause of things, whereas with respect to the object toward which our morally legislative reason bids us work, what is presupposed is an *assertoric* faith, practical and hence free, that promises a result for the final aim of religion; and this faith needs only *the idea of God* which must occur to every morally earnest (and therefore religious) pursuit of the good, without pretending to be able to secure objective reality for it through theoretical cognition. Subjectively, the *minimum* of cognition (it is possible that there is a God) must alone suffice for what can be made the duty of every human being.” (ibid.)

⁸⁵ Id., 115.

⁸⁶ Id., 122.

regards revolutions, which can shorten the advance of the reform, they are left up to Providence and cannot be introduced according to a plan without damage to freedom.⁸⁷

Reform Catholicism of the beginning of the nineteenth century, rather than resting upon the logically rigorous and demanding Kantian conceptualization of individual freedom, which, by the way, would have required that it reform itself, would continue to apply the brutal methods of the State inherited from Joseph II.

Kant attributes to “ecclesiastical faith” a consciousness of its contingency which corresponds to his own opinion, or what he may have noticed in his milieu:

The distinguishing mark of the true church is its *universality*; and the sign of this, in turn, is the church’s necessity and its determinability in only one possible way. Now historical faith (which is based upon revelation as experience) has only particular validity, namely for those in contact with the history on which the faith rests, and, like all cognition based on experience, carries with it the consciousness not that the object believed in *must* be so and not otherwise but only that it *is* so; hence it carries at the same time the consciousness of its contingency. This faith can therefore indeed suffice as an ecclesiastical faith (of which there can be several); but only the pure faith of religion, based entirely on reason, can be recognized as necessary and hence as the one which exclusively marks out the *true* church.⁸⁸

So Kant insists that the locus of necessity is reason and that the locus of contingency is revelation as experience and history. This is one of Kant’s positions that Drey will brilliantly overcome.

In the second Division of Part Three, Kant studies the “historical representation of the gradual establishment of the dominion of the good principle on earth”⁸⁹ in Judaism and Christianity. I will not summarize it; I will only underline the scope of the term “representation” that Kant uses quite often. As it belongs to his key vocabulary, it has been defined by Kant’s interpreters.⁹⁰ Greisch’s reflection about *Religion* faithfully

⁸⁷ Id., 128.

⁸⁸ Id., 122.

⁸⁹ Id., 129. It is the title of the Division.

⁹⁰ See, for example, in French, J.-M. Vaysse, *Le vocabulaire de Kant* (Paris: Ellipses, coll. « Vocabulaire de... », 1998), 49.

expresses, in my view, Kant's intention. The figure of the tempter "represents" the malice of the human heart; heaven and hell are "figurative representations" of the moral good and moral evil, and it is for that reason that Christian morality does not contrast heaven and earth, as Kant observed⁹¹. Christ is the "representation" of the good principle. Christianity, more than any other religion, has been able to "represent", under the form of a story, the internal struggle of man between the good and the evil. "In this philosophical interpretation of the world of religious representations," writes Greisch, "the term 'representation' must be taken in the strong, theatrical and dramaturgical sense of the word."⁹² Finally, the kingdom of God itself is a "representation" of the gradual ushering in of the good principle.⁹³

Part Four of *Religion* is entitled "Concerning service and counterfeit service under the dominion of the good principle, or, Of religion and priestcraft".⁹⁴ I will touch on the themes of church, revelation and faith, which Kant deals with in greater detail in this part. As regards the church, Kant wrote in Part Three that ecclesiastical faith naturally precedes rational faith. Here he adds that it is within the existing church that the true church must embody itself:

... since every church erected on statutory laws can be the true church only to the extent that it contains within itself a principle of constantly coming closer to the pure faith of religion... and of eventually being able to dispense with ecclesiastical faith (in its

⁹¹ Cf. *Religion*, 79, note.

⁹² Greisch, op. cit., 331. Translation by R. Sonin. It is also the interpretation given in the analysis following *La religion* (trans. Schweyer): "... le propre de l'Écriture Sainte est de présenter ce conflit entre deux principes intelligibles 'sous la forme d'une histoire' qui raconte la lutte de deux 'personnes extérieures' à l'homme. ... Il faut comprendre ce terme... en un sens quasi théâtral puisqu'il s'agit bien là de 'personnages' (le Christ et le diable) qui s'affrontent sur une scène symbolique. Et ces personnages présentent la caractéristique d'être suprahumains, ce qui correspond parfaitement aux principes qu'ils représentent (le bien et le mal) en tant qu'ils appartiennent à l'ordre intelligible." (104)

In this framework, the presentation of Christ as the "personification" of the good principle leads us back to the etymology of the word *persona*, mask bore by the actors of the Greco-Roman Antiquity, which ought to make audible and visible the characteristic traits of the character they represented.

⁹³ Cf. *Religion*, 137.

⁹⁴ Id., 151-191.

historical aspect), we shall nonetheless be able to posit in these laws, and among the officials of the church founded on them, a *service* of the church (*cultus*), provided that these officials direct their teaching and order to that final end (a public religious faith). By contrast the servants of a church who do not take this end into consideration but rather declare the maxim of constant approximation to it as damnable, while dependence on the historical and statutory part of the church's faith as alone salvific, can justly be accused of *counterfeit service* of the church or the ethical community under the dominion of the good principle (which is represented through the church).⁹⁵

Kant then examines the issue of revelation. By "revealed religion" he means that "in which I must first know that something is a divine command in order that I recognize it as my duty"; and by "natural religion" that "in which I must first know that something is a duty before I can acknowledge it as a divine command".⁹⁶ So Kant reduces revelation to a divine communication of duties.

Christian religion, being strongly focused on morality, may be considered a natural religion, though at the same time revealed. The rationalist, as opposed to the naturalist, the pure rationalist, and the supernaturalist, declares natural religion alone as morally necessary though he admits the possibility of a revelation, which might be wise and advantageous at a given time and a given place and may confirm natural religion. It is what the "teacher of the Gospel" did; in the Sermon on the Mount he strongly expressed the moral law. But as the ethical community cannot of itself preserve itself, and thus certain statutory ordinances which have standing authority as law may be accepted as means towards that end, one may admit that the teacher of the Gospel supplemented the universal religion of reason he taught with certain statutes containing "forms and observances" to serve as a means for the establishment of the church founded upon this religion. Then:

⁹⁵ Id., 152.

⁹⁶ Id., 153.

... despite the accidentality and arbitrariness of what he ordained to this end, we cannot deny to the said church the name of the true universal church, nor can we deny to him the authority due to one who called human beings to union in this church, which he did without wishing to add to their faith with new and onerous ordinances, or to turn actions first instituted by him into special holy practices, obligatory in themselves as constitutive elements of religion.⁹⁷

So Kant posits that from Christ himself come the contingency and arbitrariness he connects with statutory religion, while “religion..., free from every dogma, is inscribed in the heart of all human beings (for there is nothing arbitrary in the origin of this religion)”⁹⁸. Laws, i.e., practical principles, are endowed with “unconditional necessity” of which we may become conscious and “recognize as revealed through pure reason (not empirically).”⁹⁹

Faith is the “acceptance of the principles of religion.”¹⁰⁰ In accordance with what he said before, Kant distinguishes two aspects in Christian faith: pure rational faith, freely accepted by everyone (*fides elicita*); and revealed faith, or statutory faith, or commanded faith (*fides imperata*). Worship in accordance with statutory faith and worship in accordance with rational faith cannot be separated from one another. However:

... to deem this statutory faith... essential to the service of God in general, and to make it the supreme condition of divine good pleasure, is a delusion of religion, ... and acting upon it constitutes counterfeit service, i.e. a pretension of honouring God through which we act directly contrary to the true service required by him.¹⁰¹

Here Kant begins, under the generic theme of “religious delusion”, his critique of counterfeit service of God and of its constitutive elements: sacrifices (penances, castigations, pilgrimages, sacrifices of natural goods, and even the immolation of one’s

⁹⁷ Id., 156-157.

⁹⁸ Id., 157.

⁹⁹ Id., 164.

¹⁰⁰ Id., 160.

¹⁰¹ Id., 164.

own person, losing oneself in the ranks of monks or hermits), prayer, etc. The term “superstition” here receives a larger meaning than in Part One:

It is superstitious delusion to want to become well-pleasing to God through actions that any human being can do without even needing to be a good human being (e.g. by the profession of statutory articles of faith, the observance of ecclesiastical practice and discipline, etc.) And it is called ‘superstition’ because it is a choosing of merely natural (not moral) means which on their own can have absolutely no effect on something which is not nature (i.e. the ethical good).¹⁰²

Delusion is called “enthusiastic” when connected to an imagined feeling of the immediate presence of the highest being. It would rest upon the receptivity of an intuition for which there is no faculty in human nature.¹⁰³ Here Kant explicitly rejects the possibility of intellectual intuition.

Another term, which Drey will use once, but in another sense, is “fetishism”:

Whoever, ... gives precedence to the observance of statutory laws..., not indeed merely as a means to the moral disposition but as the objective condition for becoming well-pleasing to God directly, and whoever places the striving for a good life-conduct behind the historical faith... transforms the service of God into mere fetishism.¹⁰⁴

“Priestcraft” is “the constitution of a church to the extent that fetish-service is the rule.”¹⁰⁵

The overview of a single work of the *Aufklärung*¹⁰⁶ may give the impression that Kant originated the critique of revelation and Christian worship, and the identification of Christianity with superstition and fanaticism. These ideas preceded Kant and were given substance by political despotism before 1793, as we will see in section 7.

¹⁰² Id., 170.

¹⁰³ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Id., 173.

¹⁰⁵ Id., 174.

¹⁰⁶ For an overview of Kant’s religious thought as expressed in his entire work see for example Vetö, *op. cit.*, vol. I, Chapter “Vertu, bonheur, religion”, 176-194, esp. 186-194.

6. Schelling

Schelling is the indefatigable thinker of the Absolute in which the opposites made up by the human mind (subject-object; necessity-freedom; thing in itself-empirical reality) are reconciled. He confronts the relation of the infinite to the finite, of time and eternity, and even the issue of the Absolute in history (or the history of the Absolute)¹⁰⁷. His journey leads him from the Fichtean absolute Self to the philosophy of revelation. To express Schelling's thought in an image, I would say that he confronts the "horizontal" universality of the Kantian reason laid down under the leaden sky of the inaccessible thing in itself, by positing the "verticality" of the Absolute which embraces everything and in which the true human freedom is located. He pierces the leaden sky with lightning assertions whose evidence sometimes imposes itself on the amazed reader. In service to his thought, he restores the "intellectual intuition"¹⁰⁸, as do Jacobi and Schleiermacher. However, his writings are marked by daring touches which are more adventurous than judicious, and by aporias which his opponents underline and which lead him back to his journey before the Eternal.

The evolution of his thought is generally divided into four periods. The first period, 1794-1798 according to O'Meara¹⁰⁹, or 1792-1800 according to E. Brito¹¹⁰, was marked by studies at the Protestant faculty of theology of Tübingen, whose new Kantian orthodoxy he criticized. These were the years devoted to the study of Kant, Fichte,

¹⁰⁷ On that subject see the excellent work of P. David, *Schelling. De l'absolu à l'histoire* (Paris: PUF, coll. Philosophies, 1998).

¹⁰⁸ In the Fourth of his *Lectures on University Studies*, Schelling defines intellectual intuition as the faculty of seeing the universal in the particular, the infinite in the finite, both terms being brought back to their living unity. For Schelling, philosophy is the intellectual intuition of the absolute. (cf. David, *Le vocabulaire de Schelling*, Paris: Ellipses, coll. « Le vocabulaire de... », 2001), 33.)

¹⁰⁹ Cf. op. cit., 6-7.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *Philosophie et théologie dans l'œuvre de Schelling* (Paris: Cerf, coll. Philosophie et théologie, 2000), 21-22.

Spinoza, and the years of his first publications, already marked by the rise toward the Absolute. The second period, 1798-1806 or 1800-1806, was the period of the philosophy of identity (of the real and the ideal). The third period, 1806-1821, saw his entry into the religious domain. The fourth and last period, from 1821 or 1827, was the period of Christian philosophy. Contrary to Greisch, who locates Schelling's thought in the category of philosophy of religion (see above, 24-25, notes 57 and 58), Brito shows a path from theology at the beginning of the first period to theology in the last period, separated by an enquiry which resembles what Greisch calls "philosophical theology" more than a philosophy of religion. In any case, Greisch himself underlines the anxiety that Kantian criticism gave the young theologian:

... il comprend vite, comme il l'écrit à Hegel [en 1795], la nécessité d'arracher au bûcher kantien un certain nombre de matériaux, pour empêcher l'incendie généralisé de la dogmatique chrétienne. A ses yeux, la manière dont Kant a déterminé le statut de la religion à l'intérieur des limites de la simple raison comporte le risque d'un nouvel asservissement de la religion à la raison naturelle.¹¹¹

Drey probably read a number of the writings of the first three periods and in my view relied mostly on the philosophy of identity that I will touch on in my analysis of the *Brief Introduction*. At the time Drey began to write another theologian, Georg Hermes (1775-1831)¹¹² began to write as well. Hermes was the most prominent representative of Kantian Catholicism of the nineteenth century. He tried to reconcile historical revelation and the claims of rationalism. The quality of his teaching at Münster and Bonn brought him renown and he had many disciples; one may say he founded a theological school. Another school, along the Tridentine line, gained importance in Mainz. But Drey would open another path, following his forerunner I. Thanner, whose *Introduction to the Study*

¹¹¹ Op. cit., 175.

¹¹² On Hermes see McCool, op. cit., 59-67.

of *Positive Theology* he cites at n. 84 of the *Brief Introduction*; in Germany Thanner is considered as the pioneer of theological epistemology along the lines established by Schelling.¹¹³

7. The implementation of Enlightenment ideas in the German Church at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century

There remains to touch on, briefly, the concrete situation of the Church that Drey was led to reflect upon. After the Reformation most German territories were ruled by two great families, the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburgs. But the feudal division of lands remained and Germany was divided into 350 states and principalities. The political-ecclesiastical geography of southwest Germany appeared to be quite unified as regards Protestantism, but very atomized as regards Catholicism: the Holy Roman Empire ruled only some regions (Swabia, for instance); prince-bishops, usually belonging to the small nobility, governed miniature states; there were a few free imperial cities; and there were a certain number of independent estates belonging to great abbeys.¹¹⁴ Catholics made up one-third of the population.¹¹⁵ The Rhineland, in the north, was ruled by the prince-archbishops of Trier, Cologne, and Mainz.

The Enlightenment, with its notions of ecclesiastical reform, had pervaded southwest Germany during the second half of the eighteenth century, according to R.W. Franklin¹¹⁶, and the German States in general as soon as the beginning of the eighteenth

¹¹³ Cf. *Aux origines de l'école de Tübingen*, 222, Seckler's note 57. For a thorough study of Kant and Schelling (as well as Fichte, whom Drey also read) compensating for the almost unbearably basic character of my overviews, see Vetö, *op. cit.* For a critical assessment of the theological aspect of Schelling's philosophy, see Brito, *op. cit.*, 203-215.

¹¹⁴ Cf. R.W. Franklin, *Nineteenth-Century Churches. The History of a New Catholicism in Württemberg, England and France* (New York: Garland Pub., 1987), 80.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *id.*, 84.

¹¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

century, according to Printy¹¹⁷. The Catholic Enlightenment developed in various, sometimes contradictory, directions¹¹⁸, writes Printy, who also distinguishes between reform Catholicism and Catholic Enlightenment:

“[Reform Catholicism], more narrowly directed, deals with practical efforts, such as those to change the liturgy, religious practices, administration of church property, or the education of priests and laypeople. Reform Catholicism is usually understood in national context, though this is not necessarily so. ... Catholic Enlightenment... is broader and more ambitious in scope. At its heart is the central problematic of the relationship of Catholicism to the emergence of the modern world.¹¹⁹

This spirit of reform Catholicism does not appear as resting on a theological school, but rather on political absolutism which is connected to the nascence of the modern State. Joseph II, the sole master on board in 1780 after the death of his mother, Maria Theresa, and who left his name to his ecclesiastical politics, was a great “reformer”.

[II] croira très réellement être utile au christianisme en inaugurant la longue série de mesures qui lui ont valu, non sans raison, le renom d’un persécuteur... Il a une conception du bien de l’Etat, dans laquelle l’idée religieuse entre comme un facteur : l’Eglise, telle qu’il la voit et telle qu’il la veut, telle que par ses corrections il la réalisera, et telle qu’après ses corrections il la protégera, est un établissement d’Etat, qui doit jouer un rôle pédagogique dans la formation des sujets.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Cf. op. cit., 161.

¹¹⁸ Cf. id., 160. The anti-monastic trend is the most radical; on that subject: “Behind the vigorous attack on monasticism lurked a deeper antipathy toward the semi-monastic nature of the secular clergy of the Latin church.” (151) A number of *Aufklärers*, who were monks or moderate laymen, appreciated the historical importance of monasteries and the part they still had to play in the preservation of culture and learning. (cf. *ibid.*) Another trend, indifferent to reason and natural religion, advocated a simple Christian morality based on revelation. (cf. 155). In the 1780’s a trend appeared and grew that opposed the state, which was viewed as a threat for the liberty of the Church. (cf. 160)

¹¹⁹ Id., 10.

¹²⁰ Cf. Goyau, op. cit., vol. I, 23. Among other measures, Joseph II forbade the distribution of bulls, for the sake of a stringent law; he authorized some, by way of condescension (cf. 26); he created a kind of secular bureau for the censorship of books (41); he founded “general seminaries” in order to control and watch in every detail the education of enlightened priests (cf. 30-32); the practice of exorcisms was subject to the authorization of the State, the issue of indulgences to the authority of the ecclesiastical commission of the State; homilies and sermons were closely watched, and a newspaper was founded for the enlightened criticism of preachers; a sermon marked by “fanatical asceticism” was punished by a fine or a prison sentence; asceticism et contemplative life were condemned as fanatic and idle games; innumerable monasteries were suppressed as well as the lay brotherhoods founded by the Jesuits; even liturgy became the business of the State whose civil officers inspected churches and sacristies, in order to suppress any “useless” spending (cf. 42-48). Swabia was not spared Josephinism (cf. Franklin, op. cit., 85).

In his mind, the rights of the prince extended to all institutions later than the primitive Church.¹²¹ The exercise of these rights implied making the Church a mere agent for the moralisation of common life. According to Printy, the *Aufklärung* attack on monasteries as “nests of superstition”, along with pilgrimages and processions as external expressions of the superstitious nature of Catholicism, was rooted in the financial needs of rising absolutism.¹²²

As to the authority of Rome, Joseph II did not accept it. In his struggle to separate the imperial Church from Rome, he found powerful allies in the prince-archbishops, who were faithful to the Febronianist¹²³ principle of the independence of particular Churches vis-à-vis Rome. At the same time, the Emperor had to defeat them on their home ground. Thus, these prince-archbishops were his allies against Rome, but his enemies at home. Two groups were in the midst of them: bishops, Febronianists opposing Rome, and anti-Febronianists opposing archbishops who made decisions without consulting them; and the leaders of lay principalities, who opposed others’ absolutism, favouring their own.

¹²¹ Cf. Goyau, op. cit., vol. I, 20.

¹²² Printy evokes the new conceptualization of the state, an entity to which duties are exclusively owed. This conceptualization includes the notion of “utility”; and the useful would include modern means of war-fighting and modern bureaucracy. The common good is the one of the state; trade and manufacturing are to be pursued for themselves, not for the common good of the people. Though Germany was mostly agricultural – and agriculture had been favoured by monasteries –, this economic activity was not perceived as rightly economic. Finally, this conceptualization implied a shift in the aim of morality: good morals are needed for the strength of the state. (cf. op. cit., Chapter 3 – “The German Church and the Absolute State”, 55-81)

¹²³ On Nikolaus von Hontheim (surname: Justinus Febronius) (1701-1790), see Goyau, op. cit., Livre I – “Du joséphisme aux concordats”, chapitre I – “L’esprit d’opposition dans la deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle: Febronius et Joseph II”, 1-56; Printy, op. cit., Chapter 2: “The Liberty of the German Church: Febronianism and the German Gallicans”, 25-54. Goyau and Printy show how Febronianism grounded its struggles against the papacy on canon law. Printy evokes the *Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum* of 1700, from Van Espen, forerunner of Febronius. He then meticulously analyses Febronius’ *De statu Ecclesiae et legitima potestate romani pontificis liber singularis* (1763).

Prince-archbishops were reformers as well. At the Congress of Ems in 1786, they passed, besides a variety of measures to prevent any Roman influence¹²⁴, “liturgical legislation... which called for the service of God to be rational, educational, moral and individualistic.”¹²⁵

In 1790, Joseph II died, but Josephinism survived him. The Napoleonic conquest begun two years later completely destroyed the political and ecclesiastical map of German territories. In 1803, Napoleon reduced the number of German states and principalities to 39. In 1806, he suppressed the Holy Empire. In the same year, Francis II took the title of emperor of Austria. This political reorganization favoured the Protestant Prussia which annexed a large part of the right bank of the Rhine, and consequently gained a large population of Catholic subjects whom it could not disregard as before in the Prussian territory. The new kingdom of Württemberg was also enlarged so as to include strongly Catholic Swabia, and so came to rule 230,000 Catholics whereas, in the old duchy they numbered only 5,000.¹²⁶

After lengthy negotiations which lasted up to 1815, the reorganization of the Church followed the path of separate concordats with Rome instead of a general concordat after the French model. The new states feared that Napoleon’s fall would foster in the Emperor of Austria a strong desire to build up again the former Empire. They also feared the constitution of a German Church almost independent from Rome and ruled by a unique prince-primate, an idea which was defended by the Arch-Chancellor von Dalberg and his coadjutor Baron von Wessenberg. But after having rejected the general concordat, the states sought to make concordats simple appendices to the constitutions of

¹²⁴ Cf. Goyau, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 72.

¹²⁵ Franklin, *op. cit.*, 85.

¹²⁶ Cf. *id.*, 88.

their kingdoms. Each state realized its own absolutism, for itself. The negotiation of all these concordats took ten years. Württemberg joined other Protestant states of southwest and western Germany to define the status of their Catholic subjects with the Holy See.

Les souverains... réclamaient du Vatican qu'il voulût bien dessiner sur une carte d'Allemagne des circonscriptions ecclésiastiques nouvelles et leur laisser ensuite la paix; le Pape se refusait à n'être qu'un arpenteur et à sacrifier implicitement ses prérogatives de chef spirituel de l'Eglise. Telles étaient pourtant la détresse des âmes et l'anarchie des clergés, que, pour mettre au plus tôt un peu d'ordre dans ce chaos, l'on signe, en 1821, une entente provisoire: Rome crée quatre évêchés et un archevêché, et les gouvernements promettent des dotations à ces églises ressuscitées. Mais à peine ces cadres sont-ils tracés, que les pouvoirs laïques, jaloux d'éconduire le Saint-Siège dont ils croient n'avoir plus besoin, tirent de leurs cartonniers deux documents, dont l'un s'appelle l'« Instrument de fondation » et l'autre la « Pragmatique d'Eglise ». Les cinq ecclésiastiques dont ils songent à faire des évêques sont mis en demeure d'adhérer à ces actes: quatre sur cinq y consentent. Or, dans ces actes, tout Febronius revit: en y donnant leur signature, ces quatre évêques éventuels assoient sur le système fébronien, comme sur une pierre nouvelle, les établissements ecclésiastiques dont ils escomptent la gérance. ... Rome proteste [en 1823], refuse toute investiture épiscopale aux ecclésiastiques signataires, l'effet de la bulle de 1821 est suspendu.¹²⁷

Five years later, the pope, more explicit and more demanding, issued a new bull stipulating the freedom of the episcopal jurisdiction regarding lay powers.¹²⁸ The states accepted this document with a number of reservations.

The states did not wait for the bull of 1827 to regulate their confessional affairs. The king of Württemberg awarded the Catholics the full rights of citizenship he had not previously granted his small Catholic minority. At the same time he had them pass from Catholic absolutism to Protestant absolutism¹²⁹ and for this he used the services of

¹²⁷ Goyau, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 151-152. Among these five candidates, Drey, for the future diocese of Rottenburg (cf. *id.*, 152, note 1). Drey accepted to sign the Instrument of Foundation and the Church Pragmatic (cf. *ibid.*; see also Seckler, "Johann Sebastian Drey", 56).

¹²⁸ Cf. Goyau, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 152-153. "L'article 5 de cette bulle garantissait l'éducation des clercs dans des séminaires épiscopaux qui seraient subventionnés par l'Etat. L'article 6 garantissait la liberté des communications entre les évêques et le Saint Siège et énonçait que 'chaque évêque, dans son diocèse, exercerait dans sa plénitude la juridiction que lui conféraient les lois catholiques en vigueur.'" (153)

¹²⁹ Cf. Franklin, *op. cit.*, 89. [The king] "assumed the right to make the parochial assignments of the clergy, except in a few cases. An annual report to the king was required of all parish priests which included a statement of the physical and financial condition of the church, as well as the state of organs and clocks, and the number of hosts, the amount of wine, and the quantity of incense consumed in a year. All

Catholic Febronianists. In 1806 he had all ecclesiastical affairs conducted by the Royal Catholic Church Office placed in Stuttgart, and the Office headed by Protestant aristocrats helped by Maria von Werkmeister and his assistant Beda Pracher, both ex-Benedictines and reformers in the line of Josephinism.¹³⁰ In 1817, the Ministry of the Interior and of School and Church Affairs was placed in charge of parishes. The former imperial lands of South Swabia were shepherded by Baron von Wessenberg, Vicar General of the diocese of Constance, who tried from 1802 to 1819 to overcome the low state of religion in his parishes which had suffered a variety of devastations. But he implemented his reforms without delicacy and without realizing that his measures were disorienting to the faithful and a number of his priests who charged him with “sultanism”. Indeed, he used strong-arm tactics, and when there was resistance he made recourse to the civil authority.¹³¹ Catholic reformers were highly educated and surely sincere, and certain of the reforms that they tried to impose eventually found their way up to Vatican II; but, forgetting Kant’s precepts concerning individual freedom, they simply replaced a “commanded faith” with another commanded faith, and rather than constituting an “ethical community” they assailed the communal aspects of Catholic life (processions, pilgrimages, monastic life) which had already been markedly diminishing. Their attempts actually failed, at least in part: the reforms of the Wessenbergians and Werkmeister did nothing to check the growing weakness of faith.

government orders were required to be announced from the chancel. Parish business and any request for appointment to higher positions was [sic] required to be discussed with Stuttgart.”

¹³⁰ Cf. id., 89, 94-95. “[Werkmeister] ordered that worship in the parishes be altered so as to make it more an occasion for ethical instruction that would ‘commend practical Christianity’. To accomplish this, pilgrimages, processions, fold devotions, the cult of the saints and the rosary... were denounced by Werkmeister and suspended along with brotherhoods and novenas.” (95)

¹³¹ Cf. L. Swidler, *Aufklärung Catholicism 1780-1850 – Liturgical and Other Reforms in the Catholic Aufklärung* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978), 14. Swidler, a devoted admirer of Wessenberg, is a bit embarrassed when he must admit Wessenberg’s authoritarian way of doing things, all the more since he supports the thesis of unbearable Roman authoritarianism. See also Franklin, op. cit., 98-99.

In many places ordinary people resisted the elimination of their communal religious rights as they had protested the destruction of common ownership in the secular sector. They kept on making pilgrimages, processing, reciting the offices, and attending mass, and when their church was transformed, they turned away.¹³²

The reform of the Church was simply following the entry of society into modernity: the beginning of the industrial revolution, with the appropriation of public meadows and forests, the suppression of the autonomy of the villages. The dissolution of ecclesial bonds followed the dissolution of social bonds. As Printy says, the rising middle class and the aristocracy wished to reshape the Church in their image.

Drey's path regarding Christian life and worship and regarding church-state relations would be different: neither attachment to the past (for he would advocate reforms), nor allegiance to the state.

THE PROGRAMMATIC WRITINGS¹³³

A. *Towards the Revision of the Present State of Theology*, 1812¹³⁴

This 1812 essay consists of an overview of the history of theology since the eleventh and twelfth centuries and the circumstances which led to the collapse of that theology. It foreshadows the great themes of the essay of 1819 and of the *Brief Introduction*.

According to Drey, medieval theology rested upon the union of *intuition* [*Anschauung*] and *understanding* [*Verstand*], that is, of religion and speculation. Religion therefore is the intuition of the divine; it is *given* [*gegeben*], not produced artificially by

¹³² Franklin, op. cit., 100-101.

¹³³ In italics in my text, the key elements of Drey's vocabulary. In italics and in square brackets, the German terms in the spelling of the epoch. Also in italics of course, titles of works and German or Latin terms or phrases not related to my study of Drey's terminology.

¹³⁴ The essay was published in the *Archiv für die Pastorkonferenzen in den Landkapiteln des Bisthums Konstanz*, I briefly touched on above. I base my analysis on the translation of Fitzer (see above, 7, note 18). The pages to which I refer are those of the work in which this translation has been published.

demonstrations. Consequently, it is *conviction* [*Ueberzeugung*] and this conviction is faith. This living religious intuition [*lebendige religiöse Anschauung*] is *mysticism* [*Mystik*].¹³⁵ Medieval mysticism sees in the temporal and finite an allegory and intimation of the divine. Understanding cannot produce more than a “copy” of that intuition by way of words and concepts. (cf. 64)¹³⁶

Heart [*Gemüth*]¹³⁷ is the locus of intuition, and *feeling* [*Gefühl*] is, so to speak, its expression; they have nothing to do with emotion, sensibility, imagination, experience. When Drey contrasts the heart with understanding, it is divine reason received in the human intuitive reason that he contrasts with discursive reason. A brief passage illustrates these epistemological positions which Drey will maintain in the other two programmatic writings. Speaking of the seeds of the future dissolution of theology, he writes that “there first arose the foolish conceit of an essential and natural opposition between reason and revelation.” (65)

The union of mysticism and speculation that characterizes the great scholasticism must be grasped again by theology if the latter is to rediscover its beginning as a *science*. Here Drey posits the ground of his scientific conception of theology. Theology cannot be a science unless it is the work of human reason welcoming enlightening divine reason. The mystical and scientific elements are indissolubly linked. If theology, and the philosophy which it grounds (in the Middle Ages) or on which it will have to be

¹³⁵ Drey’s concept of *Mystik* is therefore closely linked to his epistemology. *Mystik* is a religious intuition working together with speculation. *Mysticismus*, which Drey touches on in the *Brief Introduction* (n. 56) – also translated by “mysticism” –, “renounces all science and intellectual study”; it is a degenerated form of *Mystik* (cf. note to n. 46).

¹³⁶ Fitzer translates *Anschauung* mainly by “contemplation”, twice by “perception”. It is true that contemplation is the immediate and concomitant result of intuitive reception of divine revelation. But the term does not belong to the vocabulary of epistemology. Here Drey sets the epistemology of idealism against Kantian epistemology.

¹³⁷ Translated three times by “soul and feeling(s)”, once by “soul”, once by “head”.

grounded (in the nineteenth century) push aside eternal *necessitation* [*Nothwendigkeit*], they fall into *contingency* [*Zufälligkeit*] which does not provide a science of foundations with anything to study. Once deprived of the necessarily transcendent foundation of any *objectivity* in the intramundane reality, they also fall into *subjectivity*, which is by definition opposed to the spirit of science, as it also leads to the contingent. Such are the vital threads which tie together the overview of the history of theology.

Medieval thinkers sought to conceptualize the intuition of faith. Their tool for this conceptualization is dialectics. Dialectics, as the unifying tension of the intuition-understanding pair, advisedly used multiple conceptual distinctions, thanks to the creation of an elaborate terminology. It was not at that time “barbaric”, contrary to what has been said later on. It became pointless when, instead of remaining in the service of mysticism it separated itself from it and eventually came forward as its opponent. (cf. 64-65) When the understanding outgrows the dominion of faith, it necessarily becomes the enemy of the supersensible. (cf. 65) These considerations say much about Drey’s thought. He highly praises discursive reason which he himself uses to the extent that it serves faith as the work of divine reason and intuitive human reason. He restores intuition, by saving it from Kant’s reductive surgery, without reducing the proper work of understanding.

Drey thinks that the separation of dialectics and mysticism first took the form of the quarrel of the nominalists with the realists. This quarrel, which also opposed philosophy and theology, resulted in mysticism gradually disappearing from philosophy and theology, and standing apart from them (cf. 66).

The Renaissance¹³⁸, which is in fact the revival of Greco-Roman antiquity, especially of its lively and sensitive art, led to a rejection of authority. The Reformation, after having rejected the authority of tradition and abandoned “the contemplation of the living organism [the Church] developing out of the life principle dwelling within it” (67) – “the historical Christ in the wholeness of his glory”, Drey will write in *L'esprit et l'essence* – had to seek somewhere else an authority. The Reformation found inspiration in books written in dead languages, and tried to copy and describe the living organism so as to determine, arbitrarily, its essence rather than acknowledge it in the anatomy of the body, in spite of its numerous ulcers.

But initially, in the best spirit of Reformers, mysticism, at the visible collapse of scholasticism, lifted up its head and turned not to the letter of Scripture but to true religious life and faith, which it believed was not in the living body. Heresy proceeds not from irreligion but from error, and pride: “pride inclines mysticism to take its inner, subjective perceptions as objectively, universally valid, to oppose them to universal faith.” (69)

Then, empiricism in the sciences led to the total collapse of theology, which then rejected mysticism, “which is, after all, the very soul of Christianity”:

With the disappearance of mysticism there vanished also the exalted conception of Christianity as a great divine decree encompassing the whole history of mankind. Also lost was the concept of the church as the infinitely progressive realization of this decree. (ibid.)

¹³⁸ Drey does not use the word “Renaissance”. What history calls Renaissance is in his mind the last period of the Middle Ages. Yet, it is indeed the people of this renaissance of antiquity who gave the name of Middle Ages to the median period separating the antiquity from themselves. Their renaissance was by this very fact a restoration, that is, a discontinuity imposed onto history. Romantics would seek to revive the Middle Ages, not by nostalgia for that time they did not really know, but to put history back on the path, so it may resume its original evolution, whether artistic, intellectual or religious.

These two sentences are highly programmatic. For Drey, Christianity itself is God's decree regarding the universe and mankind. It follows that a true Christian theology is necessarily a theology of the whole of history. The Church, that "living body", that "organic whole", is the visible manifestation of the divine decree. The *Brief Introduction* provides the historical and scientific "construction" of that *given*.

Now I come back to empiricism. It led to the consideration of Christianity as a contingent event in history. Well, it did more: it led Protestantism to work on a new task – the examination of what is *unessential* [*ausserwesentlich*] in Christianity; in this pursuit, "Semler and Bahrdt achieved great triumphs..." (70)¹³⁹

Empiricism did even more: as the contingent has nothing to do with authority and history, it necessarily ends in skepticism and materialism. As they had nothing left to do, philosophers turned against religion. Theologians whose theology was already weakened and deprived of mysticism "attack[ed] naturalism on its own ground, on which Christianity can never be defended" (*ibid.*). They relinquished all their positions and made themselves unconscious naturalists.

This critique pertains to the Reformation. About Catholic theology there is almost nothing to say, according to Drey. It laid itself open to the same setbacks as Protestant theology, which at last inspired it. It also rejected mysticism, and lost the sense of the living body which is the Church, and clung as well to the letter. It only added to the letter of the Bible the letters of tradition and history, of the Fathers and Councils. In the end it also admitted the contingency of all things in Christianity.

¹³⁹ Nevertheless, in both writings of 1819, Drey retains the concept of the "unessential" in Christianity, especially in worship. But he opposes it to the essence of Christianity and its worship. If Christianity in its entirety is deemed contingent, there remains only a variety of degrees in the unessential, and it is this position that Drey denounces.

Drey finishes his essay with a pungent criticism of the Catholic *Aufklärung* which he did not address to Protestantism though that was its source. The passage is spicy:

No matter how much they [the theologians] hurried after the Protestants, ... they still did not manage much progress in the philological arts. But practical reason was more successful, because it was, well, practical... People hastened everywhere to prescribe this moral religion that had so opportunely appeared on the scene to remedy the immorality of the time, and since the simplest medicines are supposed to be the best, so must this one be given as pure as possible, with no addition of the positive. Everything historical, symbolic or mystical one ought to push aside... (72)

In this respect, Drey concludes with a mordant irony, “the Catholics are going about things more intelligently than the Protestants. The former now throw overboard *brevi manu*, with only a categorical imperative as ballast, what the others had anguished over carrying out through half a century of learned folios.” (ibid.)

B. *L'esprit et l'essence du catholicisme*, 1819¹⁴⁰

1. Introduction

This essay, just as the preceding one, belongs to the literary genre of polemics.¹⁴¹ It is aimed at the triumphalist Protestantism, religious and philosophical, of this German land. It is not aimed at the Eastern Churches that resulted from the schism of 1054, save as regards the issue of the supreme hierarchy of the Church. As with the preceding essay (though less explicitly), it is also aimed both at the narrow Catholic conception of

¹⁴⁰ Drey published the four parts of this essay in the four issues of the first volume of the *Theologische Quartalschrift* he had just founded with some colleagues. It has not been translated into English. I rely upon Chaillet's unpublished French translation. The manuscript, typed in double space format, goes from pages 19 to 66 of the collection of translations of Drey that Chaillet wanted to publish. I refer to these pages in citations. The title should be, more accurately, *De l'esprit et de l'essence...* (or *Sur l'esprit et l'essence...*) (“about” or “on”) [*Vom Geist und Wesen...*]; indeed, Drey deals with major aspects of the issue but he does not intend to work out the entire subject matter; it is an essay, not a treatise. J.-M. Roessli translated into French a passage I will cite twice; his translation gives a good idea of Drey's style and spirit.

¹⁴¹ Polemics in Drey's time is justification of Christian faith before other religions or of faith of a Christian confession before another one. By contrast, apologetics is justification of Christian faith or faith of a Christian confession before reason. (cf. *Brief Introduction*, n. 229, 230, 238, 246)

tradition and at the Catholic *Aufklärung*. But while the first essay was a stern diagnosis of the state of Christian theology, the second one proudly expounds true Catholicism.

The breath of revelation and life flows right through *L'esprit et l'essence*.¹⁴² This life is first of all God's life, not a God imprisoned in the letter of "our lifeless archives" (26) – the Bible and ecclesiastical writings – but a truly living God, in an *Incarnation* which is continued (cf. 46, 49); a God really *present* in his Church – Catholic – in whom he still *reveals himself*, and in a supereminent way in those everlasting *miracles* (35) whose *sacraments* are the sign; a God who gives *faith to reason* and makes it operative, that is, *love*; a God who in Christ and through him creates *his community*, gives it *his own doctrine*, and provides for its *worship* and *organization* – hierarchy and discipline.

All that, all this life, is *tradition* which, understood that way, pervades the entire essay. However, to avoid any misleading interpretation of Drey's conception of tradition, I think it important to give an example of misinterpretation and then to delineate the scope of the words *Tradition* and *Überlieferung* which Drey uses to speak of what we generally call "tradition". The French theologians of Chaillet's time (de Lubac, for example) strongly opposed the narrow neo-scholastic schema of tradition, which, roughly, limited revelation to "things", to "truths" revealed by God so that any possible development was limited to dogma, and understood as that which could help to better understand the "contents" of revelation. So, revelation came to be an element of tradition, taking the form of "a batch of truths", and tradition became the framework of theology. As I said above, French theologians opposed the neo-scholastic schema. Nevertheless, they did not grasp how theology came to be confused with tradition. An

¹⁴² In italics in my text and in citations, the meaningful elements of Drey's vocabulary. Certain terms are seldom employed (miracle, Incarnation), but their scope is important.

article by de Lubac on the development of dogma¹⁴³ shows how he remained imprisoned in this schema at that time. When he looked to Tübingen for a renewal of theology, and sent Chaillet to Tübingen, what they sought was “tradition” as the theological theme *par excellence*. Chaillet’s translation of *L’Esprit et l’essence* testifies to this approach to Drey’s thought. It follows that Drey’s epistemology partly eluded him, that Drey’s conception of revelation eluded him, and, in the end, that even Drey’s conception and vocabulary of tradition eluded him.

As I will gradually show in the analysis of *L’esprit et l’essence* and of the *Brief Introduction*, for Drey tradition is not a theological theme per se; it is encompassed by the themes of revelation and life. Tradition is the continuous self-delivery of the *gift of revelation* [*Offenbarungsgabe*] in the life of the Church; a living, *always the same, gift* [*Weitergabe*].¹⁴⁴ Tradition is, so to speak, the ultimate revelation in and through Christ, which delivers itself in the course of history as a continuous presence. Drey uses the word *Überlieferung*¹⁴⁵ to expound this conception of “tradition”. It follows that theology cannot be more or less equated with “tradition”; the task of theology is to reflect this gift and to better understand it. Theology and its development are a kind of phenomenon that accompanies the gift of revelation which continues, living, in the life of the Church.

The Church, more precisely Catholicism as we will see later, is the “living tissue” of this continuous gift of revelation, and in this respect it itself is *Überlieferung* in so far

¹⁴³ “Le problème du développement du dogme”, *Recherches de science religieuse* 35 (1948): 130-160.

¹⁴⁴ For the exposition of Drey’s conception of tradition, here and in further passages, I rely on Seckler, personal communications of July 22 and August 22, 2012. All opinions and comments including but not limited to those pertaining to French theology and Chaillet’s translation are mine. The choice of citations, the translation of one of them directly from German, and the decision to use the German term to make Drey’s thought easier to understand are mine as well.

¹⁴⁵ *Lieferung* means delivery, distribution; *über* means over, above, trans. Drey did not introduce the term into theology; but he used it to integrate “tradition” into his organic conception of revelation.

as it is the *manifestation* [*Erscheinung*] of revelation. Schelling's philosophy of the identity of the ideal, the infinite, the Absolute, on the one hand, and the real, the finite, history, on the other hand, may help to understand the two sides of the *Überlieferung* in Drey; it has an ideal side which is the continuous, living, unchanged, gift of the ultimate revelation, and a real side which is the manifestation of this gift in the life of the Church. Christ alone, the God-man, realizes the identity of both sides in him. Outside him, one may speak, using Schelling's terminology, of an "identity in the difference."¹⁴⁶

As to the word *Tradition*, Drey employs it on some occasions: in his general polemics against the scholasticism born out of the Counter-Reformation (or during that period), or to refer to a precise baroque concept of tradition, or to refer to a Catholic concept which dates back to the first centuries. So he completely transforms the relationship between revelation and tradition established by baroque scholasticism, and he re-establishes revelation in its right living place instead of making it a "thing" subjected to mere speculation. In my presentation, to overcome the crushing and persistent weight of centuries of conscious or unconscious baroque and neo-scholastic conceptualization of tradition, I will use the term *Überlieferung* to speak of "tradition" in Drey's sense¹⁴⁷, and I will use the term "tradition" either where Drey uses the word *Tradition* or to refer to tradition as usually understood.

Among the four theological themes I will deal in the presentation of the *Brief Introduction* – revelation, truth, life, and Kingdom of God –, only one is not treated in *L'esprit et l'essence*: the Kingdom of God. The other three flood the essay with

¹⁴⁶ On the meaning of the words *ideal and real* (the level of the noumenon, of the thing in itself), and of the words *ideel and reel* (the level of the phenomenon, of the empirical) which I do not use here, see my section 4.1. It sheds light on the very rich scope of what I touch on here from an angle truncated by the inadequacy of the English language.

¹⁴⁷ In my text, I write the term in its current spelling. In citations, I use the spelling of Drey's time.

continuous light and constantly intertwine. I will study them as I go through the four chapters of the essay, either in their crossings or separately, from a particular angle I could not select right away in the analysis of those themes in the *Brief Introduction*, but which seems proper to shed light on some of their aspects.

2. The four chapters, with themes selected in order to clarify some aspects of the *Brief Introduction to the Study of Theology*

2.1 Life and *Überlieferung*

In the first chapter, entitled “Rapport du catholicisme avec le christianisme primitif”, Drey posits the *fundamental dogma* (20) [*Grunddogma*] of that relation, which is more important in the face of other Christian confessions than the whole sum of dogma: Catholicism is “the *continuation* [*Fortsetzung*], truly *objective*, uninterrupted, consequent and pure”¹⁴⁸ (ibid.) of primitive Christianity, “the living *continuation* of the primitive fact” (21), the “*permanence* of the primitive fact..., *continuation* of that fact”¹⁴⁹ through centuries, without interruption or corruption” (ibid.), it is “permanent *identity with* primitive Christianity, an identity resting upon the unchanging basis of an uninterrupted and *objective foundation*¹⁵⁰” (23), the “living tissue” (26) of the being-Catholic, which preceded what the Church wrote about it, the “*uninterrupted development* of primitive Christianity” (29), the “real and living *continuation*” (ibid.) as opposed to an “*Ueberlieferung*”¹⁵¹ through a dead and silent intermediary, the vehicle of

¹⁴⁸ Translations mine, from the French, unless otherwise indicated.

¹⁴⁹ “Car aucun fait n’est instantané, c’est-à-dire ne s’évanouit au moment même de sa naissance : il s’insère dans la série de tous les autres faits, dans la trame des actions et réactions de tous ces faits les uns sur les autres; il étend plus ou moins son champ d’influence; frein ou stimulant, il concourt à déterminer la marche de l’histoire et par là devient lui-même histoire.” (19)

¹⁵⁰ *Grundlage*. Underlined in citations, either in English or French: my translation from German. Chaillet: “tradition”.

¹⁵¹ Chaillet: “transmission passive”. So Drey transfers the entirety of means of revelation into the scope of the *Überlieferung*. He leaves nothing to the dead concept of tradition of baroque scholasticism.

the letter” (ibid.); in short, “a living and uninterrupted Whole” (30). “No writer can determine this inner *feeling*¹⁵² of Catholicism about being a supreme, living and consciously active *Ueberlieferung*¹⁵³.” (27)

The principle of this life, of this “living tissue” of Catholicism, and of the objectivity of that *Überlieferung* it itself is, is the “historical Christ in the wholeness of his glory”, “Christ and his history”, Christ who “did not abandon his doctrine to an uncertain fate, to the blind chance of earthly events, to the human changing and capricious arbitrariness” (22), but who entrusted his doctrine and the *institution*¹⁵⁴ he founded to men he himself chose. (ibid.)

If one abandons this historical and divinely positive path, there remains only the “line of purely philosophical contemplation, which considers any positive and historical data as a simple allegory or symbol of an idea” (27) or the “line of historical criticism and arguing understanding” (28). Drey proceeds with the critique of these two lines, and his own line appears. The second line produces the “antiquarian spirit” and transforms Christianity into an “object for archaeological studies”; it does not suppress its historical character, but it limits it to the history of Christ and apostles. (cf. 29) However, Drey adds, historical criticism and philosophical construction have their place once the primary work of ever living Christ is acknowledged.

¹⁵² *Gefühl*. In other places, Drey calls sentiment “intuition”. I will go back over these terms later on.

¹⁵³ Chaillet: “tradition”.

¹⁵⁴ By “institution” [*Institution, Stiftung*] Drey does not mean a “corporate body”, a “legal entity” as the word is understood in our time (state and other jurisdictions, financial “institutions”); it is a commonplace to set a living Christianity which would be inorganic and unorganized against a Christianity which would be a legal entity caught up in organization, law and the letter. Drey uses the term in the theological sense: what Christ wanted and “instituted”: worship and government. In the same way, theology speaks of the institutions of Israel, given by God: the land, kinship, the Temple.

Speaking of the living tissue of Catholicism, and of the life of the Catholic Church and her lifeless archives, Drey summarizes his view:

Telle est la vraie *paradosis* du catholicisme, qui embrasse tout¹⁵⁵; les premiers siècles l'ont ainsi entendue; non pas dans le sens détourné où ce mot fut employé dans un langage scolaire assez tardif ou pour les fins particulières d'une querelle d'érudits, – doctrines transmises oralement par opposition à la doctrine attestée dès le début par écrit, ou encore propositions dogmatiques par opposition aux simples usages rituels, etc. – loin de là!

Parole écrite ou non; dogmes, sacrements et rites; hiérarchie et discipline; bref, la totalité objective du christianisme originel, voilà l'objet de la tradition¹⁵⁶; la vie de l'Eglise, la foi et l'accord unanimes de l'Eglise, les témoignages écrits de cette vie et de cet accord, voilà les différentes formes de la tradition; enfin le jugement de l'Eglise sur elle-même, voilà le critère de la tradition. (26)

2.2 Truth, revelation and life, from the epistemological angle

In Chapter II (“Rapport du catholicisme avec les principes fondamentaux du christianisme primitif”), Drey first expounds the two fundamental principles of any *religious system*¹⁵⁷, hence of Christianity as well. The first one is *theoretical*, called *faith* in biblical language, through which the religious system seizes hold of the *heart* [*Gemüth*]¹⁵⁸ and takes root in it. The second one is *practical*, which biblical language calls *love*, through which religion becomes active and expresses itself in life. Faith is

¹⁵⁵ *Dies ist die wahre paradosis des Katholicismus, die große allumfassende*. Chaillet: “Voilà le sens de la véritable *paradosis* catholique, c'est la grande tradition qui embrasse tout.” Chaillet, enchanted by this passage, adds “c'est la grande tradition”, though it is not in the original text.

¹⁵⁶ Here Drey employs the word *Tradition*. It is the one and single occurrence of the word in the singular in the entire essay. He employs it in this passage only once; Chaillet, decidedly enchanted, repeats them twice to make things clear! But he does not understand that here Drey is highly polemical; he addresses baroque scholasticism, saying: well, the *paradosis*, the *traditio* you speak about is this and this. Its object is this, its forms, this, and its criterion, this. Once it is said, Drey would abandon the term (save in the plural – three occurrences) and adopt another one to express his conception of the *paradosis*.

¹⁵⁷ In the *Brief Introduction* (n. 9), Drey explains his distinction between religion and religious system. Religion is an impulse, an orientation (a divine annunciation, and the human feeling of, a link between all things and of all things to the originating ground, Drey says in n. 6). The religious system is the conceptual *representation* of that link. Drey deplores the conflation of fact and its conceptualization.

¹⁵⁸ Chaillet translated *Gemüth* – as well as *Herz* and *Seele* – by “âme”. I use the words “heart” [*Gemüth*, *Herz*] (“cœur”, underlined in citations in French) and “soul” [*Seele*] (“âme”) as Hoffmann in the *Brève introduction*.

primary in that it is the “theoretical and properly genetic principle of Christianity” (31). Love follows as the principle of Christian life (cf. *ibid.*, and 43).¹⁵⁹

Drey then shows how Catholicism provides both faith and love with the support of the permanence of the primitive fact within the Church: for faith, the support of *conviction* [*Ueberzeugung*]¹⁶⁰ which results from the permanent presence of Christ and his history within the Church¹⁶¹; for love, the source of action, the support of the Christian idea of a universal brotherhood which vigorously opposes all forms of egoism.

The fundamental dogma of the relation of Catholicism to primitive Christianity expounded in Chapter I from the angle of life and *Überlieferung* is expounded again in Chapters II and III from an epistemological angle. I will study Drey’s epistemology at greater length in the analysis of the *Brief Introduction*. Suffice it to say here that, as in the 1812 essay, Drey firmly posits the existence of *intuitive reason* [*Vernunft*]¹⁶², which is primary in the genesis of religion and faith; *discursive reason* or *understanding* [*Verstand*] finds its momentum and true fecundity only by obediently welcoming divine revelation. It is only through humility, a form of courage, that man may submit to God

¹⁵⁹ This position recalls the one of St. Thomas Aquinas.

¹⁶⁰ Chaillet: “assentiment”. The term *Ueberzeugung* belongs to the vocabulary of the theme of truth I will study in the analysis of the *Brief Introduction*.

¹⁶¹ “Le Christ est encore là dans son Eglise et avec elle; les grands moments de sa vie et de son histoire se rencontrent toujours chaque jour et en vérité, et les croyants les contemplant dans le sacrement et les célèbrent chaque année les jours de fête. Les plus grands miracles se répètent sans interruption, et même ce qui, en tant que pure apparence forme le chœur dans la vie du Christ, à savoir ses liens communautaires, dure encore. Le chœur de ses apôtres existe dans les hiérarchies, et l’apôtre que le Christ a choisi comme excellent vit toujours dans ses successeurs; les foules de croyants, qui entouraient ce corps professoral divin et constituaient le cercle de l’Eglise, ont aussi peu fait défaut qu’au début, de même que les sceptiques, les adversaires et les impies ont toujours été là et le sont encore.” (34-35) (Translation by J.-M. Roessli)

¹⁶² The term *Vernunft* is mostly employed in that sense in *L’esprit et l’essence*. In the *Brief Introduction*, Drey also uses it in other senses. Chaillet translates it sometimes by “intelligence”, sometimes par “raison”, and *Verstand* either by “raison” or by “entendement”; in my view, it obscures Drey’s intention.

with complete freedom his reason at the service of faith and his will at the service of love. (cf. 32)¹⁶³

Catholicism's conviction of being the living, uninterrupted, consequent, and pure continuation of primitive Christianity is a *living intuition* [*lebendige Anschauung*], the intuition of its essence. Reflection about this intuition "was generated only by the opposition of those who separated and sought a new basis upon which they could build a new Christianity, or, as they said, to reform Christianity." (23) But in fact:

La réflexion de la foi sur elle-même n'a dans le catholicisme rien de plus à justifier que l'*intuition directe*¹⁶⁴ elle-même; ce n'est pas le cas dans un système religieux qui n'admet aucune intuition directe, mais qui doit *reconstruire un fait ancien*, faire revivre un passé. Ici, ce n'est pas l'*objet* lui-même qui est *donné* mais seulement sa *reconstruction*; l'*intuition* fait défaut pour la *saisie réelle* de l'objet. C'est le *jugement* qui doit recréer cet objet. (38)

Outside of Catholicism, Drey concludes, a total *resolution* of faith into its object is forever impossible. (cf. *ibid.*) By resolution [*Auflösung*], Drey means here the absolute point of contact of objective revelation and its subjective reception, the point that guarantees the objectivity of faith. Christ only can give that guarantee, "by being there, forever", he, himself. "Everything is given the Catholic so that he may base his faith on a direct and real intuition." (36)

Hors du catholicisme, ... rien n'est donné en dehors de la parole qui puisse contribuer à lui rendre vie et intelligibilité, à l'accréditer et à la faire accueillir. ... Quel art et quel travail philologique ne sont pas nécessaires pour réveiller ce passé et combien les résultats ne restent pas incertains, par comparaison avec la *claire intuition* et la ferme *certitude* qu'engendre la *présence réelle de l'objet*. (*ibid.*)

So intuition in Drey is a permanent state of immediate knowledge (the *habitus* of St. Thomas). Such a position and what it implies regarding the reception of revelation

¹⁶³ So Drey reverses Kantian positions; intuition ranks first as it is immediate and does not need discourse; discursive reason ranks second, and the good which the will aims at is not the union of moral virtue and happiness, but love.

¹⁶⁴ *unmittelbare Anschauung*.

preclude any rapprochement, however much enticing at first glance, with French traditionalism.¹⁶⁵ It is the medieval intuition, so present in St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, which Drey recaptures. We will see that he recaptures it through an idealist epistemology which does not exactly coincide with the medieval.

A concluding remark: Drey extends, so to speak, intuition, which in itself is individual, to the community. From the standpoint of epistemology, community is a fiction of the mind. It is my understanding that the real presence of Christ, who is perfect truth and objectivity, is the source of individual and group intuition in his Church.

2.3 Revelation and life in sacraments and liturgy

In Chapter III (“Rapport du catholicisme avec la religion vivante”), after having recalled the anthropological and epistemological ground of the reception of revelation, Drey treats the “radical disproportion of the Eternal and the temporal, of the supersensible and the sensible” (52), which requires from God, so to speak, that he proportions the mode of his revelation to the capacity of the receiving subject, and from the Church, that she acknowledges the structure of the human soul and lends her support to revelation by setting the heart in *motion* [*Bewegung*].

There are three ways of moving the heart: “the immediate action of the creative Spirit which penetrates and supports every created spirit; ... an external action of the created world which appeals to the heart; ... an inner reaction of ideas on the heart.” (44)

¹⁶⁵ French traditionalism believed in a primitive revelation, simply handed down from generation to generation; intuition does not play any part in such handing down. On that subject see McCool, *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, 37-58. In the radical form of J. de Maistre, L. de Bonald and F. de Lamennais, traditionalism rested upon the following theses: the inability of unaided human reason to reach any moral or religious truth, hence the necessity of revelation, which is primitive; tradition reduced to only the infallible transmission of revelation; and the universal assent of humankind as the criterion of certainty of revealed data. (cf. 37) The moderate form of that trend was represented by L. Bautain, whose borrowing from Jacobi’s conception of intuition and understanding connected, according to McCool, his traditionalism with the one of Tübingen theologians. (cf. 55)

Catholic worship implements the second way: “it moves the heart by prompting the divine seed which is within it, so *religiosity*¹⁶⁶ may come out of it.” (ibid.) “Sketching out this living dynamism which Catholicism sets in motion through the objects and forms of its worship shows the relation of Catholicism with living religion.” (ibid.)

Drey does not intend to say that worship is not God’s business. Two parts are involved in worship: one of them consists in calling the supersensible to life through sensible means (cf. ibid.) which are within the reach of those to whom God wants to reveal himself. But the sensible must not be more than the “envelope” of the Sacred. There lies the difference between paganism and Christianity, and what separates Christian worship from fetishism, in which the supersensible purely and simply passes into the sensible. (cf. 45)

On the other hand, Catholic worship is, in its entirety, *mystery*. The mystery belongs to its essence. Pagan worship, by divinizing the finite, mitigates the mystery into a thousand *manifestations* [*Erscheinungen*]¹⁶⁷, while Christianity knows only one manifestation through which the truly divine appears; “this manifestation is Jesus Christ, the God-man.”¹⁶⁸ (46) Incarnation, therefore, is the fundamental mystery of Christianity (cf. ibid.). Drey clearly posits the continued Incarnation of Christ, of Christ “in the wholeness of his glory”. To be sure, continued Incarnation belongs to the Catholic doctrine, by virtue of the Resurrection; but Drey develops within doctrine what that

¹⁶⁶ *Religiosität*. Drey defines the term in the *Brief Introduction* (n. 36): it is the “true religion of the heart ..., that living Christianity which is the will of God and of Christ, the vocation and the mission of the Christian.”

¹⁶⁷ Chaillet translates *Erscheinung* by “phénomène”, when he translates it. The term belongs to the vocabulary of revelation; I will present it in the analysis of the *Brief Introduction*.

¹⁶⁸ *diese Erscheinung ist Jesus Christus, der menschengewordene Gott*. Chaillet writes that Christianity knows only one phenomenon, through which the divine manifests itself and that this phenomenon is Christ.

implies: the ultimate revelation which Christ brings about, and he himself is, is ultimate as regards God, but not as regards man; otherwise, worship would not be necessary.

Well, writes Drey, it is this mystery that worship *represents*; this representation is permanent and active, without sacrificing or suppressing its *mysterious* character. (cf. 46) Moving the heart is what Christ himself wanted by instituting sacraments, and he wanted that, because intuition is frail, attacked by an understanding prone to planting seeds of doubt and generating ceaseless investigation.

The *Überlieferung* therefore appears here to be the self-delivery of living Christ at the core of worship. “In all sacraments, the divine is *present* [*gegenwärtig*]...”, “the divine is infallibly *present* as the sign itself...” (ibid.) “In Catholic worship, God is really *present*, a *mysterious* and sacred *presence*. It is in the requirements of worship that the divine really *reveals itself*...” (48) The Word who said “I am the living bread”, he who said “Here am I with you”, is the same God who in the sacrament is *present* under a sensible form to live among us. (cf. ibid.) “God is *present*, humanly.” (49) God, living and *present*, whom Catholic worship *represents*, is the source of living religion, of the faith that, being efficient, becomes love. (cf. 38)

Here, Drey approaches a new element of his epistemology, the Beautiful, as the third form of God’s revelation: “eternal Truth for reason, eternal Goodness for the will, God presents himself to sensibility as eternal Beauty.” (50) This is why Catholic worship represents the divine under the most beautiful forms. This position, which hurts a Thomistic epistemology, originates in the epistemology of Schelling, according to whom

intuition unites receptivity of sensible impressions given by objects and intellectual activity which depends on sensibility.¹⁶⁹

2.4 Life, *Überlieferung* and development in Catholicism as Church

In Chapter IV (“Rapport du catholicisme avec l’Eglise chrétienne”), Drey treats the essential, constitutive elements of the Church (Catholicity, apostolicity, unity related to the Petrine office) and the non-essential elements arising out of her development.

The origin and formation of the Church do not lie in subjective needs (support of faith by the congregation; communication of personal religious ideas), but in God’s authority, which is her objective ground. “Christ wanted that the religion he brought out to the world be maintained and act among men in a permanent and sure way.” (55) To those who pretend that Christ did not want a Church Drey opposes first this objective ground, and then the dogma of the relation of Catholicism with Christianity – Catholicism is the primitive fact in the permanent identity of its duration, a living *Überlieferung*, not the result of a dead *Überlieferung* handed down to succeeding generations. He then turns the argument against the Reformers and asks them the question:

Dans tout autre système que le catholicisme, chaque période successive du christianisme est considérée comme une manifestation qui s’est formée seulement sous l’influence de l’*Überlieferung*¹⁷⁰ morte du christianisme primitif; et si une telle manifestation porte réellement le caractère et la forme d’une Eglise, il faut nécessairement, pour en juger, se demander si le Christ a réellement voulu une Eglise et une telle Eglise. (56)

After having sketched out an “historical portrayal” (58) of the life of Christ and his “troop of believers”, that community he himself founded and organized, Drey adds

¹⁶⁹ On the context within which Schelling posits his epistemology see below, 109, note 265. In his *Philosophy of Art* (1802-1803), art being the “effusion of the Absolute”, the “one and only document of the Absolute”, Schelling speaks of truth as being beauty (cf. David, *Le vocabulaire de Schelling*, 14).

¹⁷⁰ Chaillet: “transmission”.

this powerful response to all those, Catholics and others, who contend that the Church is the product of pure human initiative:

Aussi est-il bien vain de demander si le Christ a voulu ou non une Eglise, si l'Eglise s'est à tort ou à raison ajoutée au christianisme; car le christianisme lui-même était Eglise, et cela dès le premier instant de son existence, par le lien même qui unissait le Christ et les siens : quand ce lien à la fois intérieur et extérieur produisit ses effets sur le plan visible de la vie sociale, le christianisme fut aussi visiblement l'Eglise du Christ. (ibid.)

To the centre of unity – the successor of Peter – Drey devotes a quite long passage. Such a centre is necessary, and necessary for ever “if the Church is to remain the pure and faithful continuation of the primitive apostolic Church.” (60)

Drey then deals with “the succeeding forms that this immutable essence took on according to the spirit and needs of times, places and men, and that it will continue to take on” (61), such forms belonging to the inessential. He is sensitive to the tension between identity in duration and the necessity of *progress, change* and *transformation*:

Comme institution conçue par son fondateur pour tous les temps et tous les peuples, elle [l'Eglise] doit *progresser* avec le temps, à travers les peuples, suscitant partout la vraie *vie en Dieu* par le Christ, soutenant et faisant croître cette *vie divine*. Or il en est de la *vie spirituelle* comme de la *vie physique* : dans tous les temps et sous toutes les latitudes c'est toujours la même *vie*, cependant en perpétuel *changement*; ce sont bien les mêmes éléments fondamentaux et les mêmes puissances, mais partout en des rapports différents. Ce sont les mêmes moyens chrétiens que l'Eglise met partout en œuvre pour la même *vie spirituelle*, mais de façon différente. (61-62)

So, age after age, development must meet human needs, the spirit of the time, and the requirements of the pursued goal. “Each of these transformations is good if it meets those requirements; otherwise it ceases to be so.” (62). It may have happened that some transformations in the Church over time were not desirable. In view of the “upheavals” and “quick revolutions” which characterize his day, Drey writes: “there is an urgent need for reflection upon the nature of that development; its criterion and extent would not be found through an excessive faithfulness to the past or, on the contrary, through an

opportunist concern for a quickly outdated topicality.” (62-63) Drey goes on, thinking about those who are longing to reshape the Church:

Ce qui a pour l’Eglise catholique encore bien plus d’importance que ce développement dicté par le temps et les circonstances, ce qui est indissolublement liée à l’idée fondamentale qu’elle a d’elle-même et de l’Eglise chrétienne primitive, c’est l’autorité sur laquelle reposent son existence et tous ses pouvoirs, c’est la force par laquelle elle maintient tous ses membres dans l’unité. On a déjà montré plus haut que c’est une force divine : celui qui veut fonder une église doit pouvoir en appeler à une autorité divine. (63)

In this very dense essay, Drey implicitly shows how the prevailing Catholic theological thought born out of the Counter-Reformation, by overemphasizing the written tradition, missed the point and finally separated itself from living Catholicism. After his diagnosis of 1812, he shows the path that theology must follow to be... really Catholic. Catholic theology springs from *revelation in its self-delivery*¹⁷¹, that is, from *the living self-delivery of the primitive Christian fact*¹⁷². The foundation, the object, and the source of theology are given by Christ and by the Christian *res* (“what is Christian”) delivered in the life of the Church. This *res* – and not theology or dogma – is the true object of Christian faith. *Actus credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem*, Thomas Aquinas wrote. This living self-delivery, being truth itself, is immediately available through intuition, and leads to love and life.

Another important aspect of Drey’s conception of *Überlieferung* appears in full light in one of the most powerful passages of his essay. I translate it here from German, as literally as possible, and I use the words “delivery” and “self-delivery” (in its verbal form), since they are the most faithful equivalents of *Überlieferung*.

[Catholicism considers Christianity] not as a momentary fact, brought up to posterity through dead *delivery* means, but rather as a *manifestation* which, though incurred at a

¹⁷¹ *Offenbarung in ihrer Selbstüberlieferung* (Seckler’s communication of August 22, 2012).

¹⁷² *die lebendige Selbstüberlieferung der christlichen Urtatsache* (ibid.).

determined time, *delivers itself*, uninterrupted and permanent through its living *being-there*¹⁷³.

This passage contains the most explicit expression of Drey's philosophy of existence. His conception of revelation and *Überlieferung* cannot be understood in the framework of a substantialist philosophy. The *Dasein*, the "being-there", is, firstly, the *Dasein* of Christ, he who said "I am with you up to the end of time", he, the Son of God, God whose name is "I am". The *Dasein* is, secondly, Christ's doctrine and the worship and constitution he delivered into the hands of the apostles and which deliver themselves within the Church. Therefore, the *Dasein* is, thirdly, the being-there of the Church in her essence. The manifestation that occurred at a determined time as the ultimate revelation in history continuously delivers itself, and so any further development faithful to it will occur within this manifestation, not alongside it. It is worthy of notice that Drey recaptures through his own path Aquinas' philosophy of the *esse* ("to be", as opposed to the *ens*, "a being").

C. *Brief Introduction to the Study of Theology with Reference to the Scientific Standpoint and the Catholic System*, 1819

1. Introduction

The *Brief Introduction* (hereafter the *BI*) is a didactical writing as to its primary end, as Drey intended it to arrange his theological ideas for his teaching. But Drey published it, which means that he intended more. The literary genre of encyclopedias or introductions to the study of a science (cf. section 5.1), to which the *BI* belongs, testifies

¹⁷³ *Gleichwie er dieses nicht als eine momentane Thatsache, die nur durch tode **Ueberlieferungsmittel** auf die Nachwelt gebracht wird, sondern als eine in einer bestimmten Zeit zwar entstandene, aber von da an ununterbrochen fortbestehende, durch ihr lebendiges **Daseyn** sich **selbst überliefernde Erscheinung** betrachtet...Chaillet: "Le christianisme n'est pas pour le catholique un fait momentané, qu'une *tradition* morte *transmet* aux âges suivants, mais un *phénomène*, qui, apparu il est vrai à un moment donné de l'histoire, *se transmet lui-même* de façon ininterrompue et active par la continuité d'une *tradition* vivante."*

to Drey's larger intention. This kind of writing was aimed at contributing to the reorganization of the teaching and practice of sciences, theology included. Contrary to Schleiermacher, who, in this respect, knew only his two masters, J.A. Nösselt et G.J. Planck, whose writings he did not much esteem,¹⁷⁴ Drey was an informed connoisseur of this kind of work. In the *BI* itself, he cites sixteen such works, Catholic or Protestant (including those of Nösselt and Planck, in which he sets greater store than Schleiermacher did), written during the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries (cf. n. 83, 84).¹⁷⁵ Schleiermacher's *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology* is but the last in this long list, and "somewhat limited" as a real handbook of encyclopedia (cf. n. 84). Drey really did intend to contribute to the reorganization of the teaching of theology in Catholic universities.¹⁷⁶

Lastly, the *BI* is a polemical and apologetical writing¹⁷⁷; Drey knew he would be read by Protestants just as Protestants were read by Catholics. In spite of its polemical aspects, the *BI* would receive laudatory reviews from Protestant milieus which Schleiermacher's *Brief Outline* did not receive.¹⁷⁸ Reviewers may have appreciated Drey's powerful justification not only of Catholic faith, but Christian faith, before the seat of reason; indeed, Drey's apologetics is more scientific than Schleiermacher's which historicised systematic disciplines. Reviewers may have admired Drey's outstanding

¹⁷⁴ Before writing the *Brief Outline*, Schleiermacher used their writings for his class of encyclopedia, "en lisant quelques conseils de notre honorable Nösselt ou en recourant à l'Introduction tout aussi bavarde de Planck, mais cela ne sert pas à grand-chose..." (cited in B. Kaempf, "Avertissement", in Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Le statut de la théologie. Bref exposé*, trans. B. Kaempf (Genève: Labor et Fides/Paris: Cerf, 1994), 11).

¹⁷⁵ Without taking into account the works belonging to the prehistory of this literary genre (cf. n. 81, 82).

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Seckler, "Pour comprendre", 109.

¹⁷⁷ On the meaning of the words "polemics" and "apologetics" in Drey's time, see above, 53, note 141.

¹⁷⁸ In the two years from its publication, the *BI* was given three reviews by Protestant specialized publications. (cf. Seckler, « Pour comprendre », 91, note 50) Schleiermacher's encyclopedia, published eight years before, was given only one review (cf. id., 92, note 52). Reviewers had had the opportunity to compare the two works. "The *BI* clearly and unanimously benefited from the comparison." (id., 92)

master of the literary genre of the encyclopedia. And, finally, they may have been sensitive to Drey's implicit critique of the Catholicism born out of the Counter-Reformation as well as his concessions (which are surprising in my view) to Protestantism – of to the Catholic Aufklärung – in the chapter devoted to practical theology. Only the study of these reviews may allow an accurate assessment of this issue.¹⁷⁹ At any rate, these praises account for part of the Catholic suspicion toward Drey.

The *BI* presents itself in the form of 388 numbered paragraphs, distributed among scarce divisions and subdivisions. The English table of contents drawn up by Himes and the one of Seckler for the French edition testify to this scarcity.

The density and complexity of the *BI* led me to consider various presentations. Several starting points were possible: the structure and layout of the parts; the conceptual system; or one of the major ideas that go through the work – revelation or Kingdom of God, for instance. Finally I thought it could be interesting to start from my own approach. The discrepancies between the English and French versions had retained my attention. While looking into the French text, I noticed great terminological constellations which eluded the English translator. The study of these constellations helped me to enter into Drey's thought. That is therefore the starting point I selected.

¹⁷⁹ Readers who read German may wish to refer to the study of reviews made by Seckler, "Bandeinleitung. Drittes Kapitel: Die Kurze Einleitung im Hinblick auf Schleiermacher und Schelling », in Johann Sebastian Drey, *Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie mit Rücksicht auf den wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt und das katholische System*, Tübingen 1819, Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Max Seckler, Tübingen, Francke Verlag, 2007, 70-106*.

2. From terminological constellations¹⁸⁰ to theological constellations

2.1 The constellation of revelation

2.1.1 The continued original revelation

Revelation may be *original* [*ursprüngliche Offenbarung*]: it then corresponds to an *annunciation* [*Ankündigung*]¹⁸¹. Through this term Drey softens the character of *unveiling*¹⁸² generally linked to revelation. What is announced? It is that all things have a *bond* [*Verbindung*] between them and a *bond* [*Gebundenheit*]¹⁸³ with an *original ground* [*Urgrund*], in which they remain rooted. This annunciation grounds *original consciousness* [*ursprünglichen Bewußtseyn*] (n. 6). The bond between God who announces and man who receives the annunciation is so intimate, according to Drey, that he may write: “... the annunciation¹⁸⁴... is one with original consciousness; in fact, it is

¹⁸⁰ In italics in my text, terms belonging to these constellations.

¹⁸¹ Cf. *Aux origines de l'école de Tübingen*, 173, Seckler's note 9. In this important n. 6, Himes translates the two occurrences of the German term by “experience”, making revelation collapse into the hands of man, that is, into this subjectivism so firmly embattled by Drey (cf. n. 19). “Experience” in German: *Erfahrung*. Elsewhere Himes uses circumlocutions including verbs: “is seen”, “is expressed”, “manifested”, “announced”, “proclaim”. In one case, he does not translate at all.

Fitzer translates *Ankündigung* by “awareness” (“J.S. Drey and the Search”, 240), O'Meara by “annunciation” (op. cit., 98), without understanding why he does so, as he then speaks of experience.

¹⁸² I noticed only two occurrences of the term, under the verbal form, in n. 59 and 65. Himes: “to uncover” and “to set forth”.

¹⁸³ Himes calls “connectedness” the bond between all things and “dependence” their bond with the original ground. The French translation is not elegant, but closely linked to the reflection which concludes the first seven paragraphs, in which Drey considers he has solved in a quite satisfying way the question whether the word *religio* must be derived from *religando* or *relegendo*: “It seems to me that the answer is from both: through what religion objectively means (Himes: “is called objective religion”) man is bound; in feeling and reflection on himself and his interior life he *discovers* that he is bound. *Relegendo sentit se religatum.*” (n. 7) [Italics in the text] The English prefers elegance – and the theory of an influence – to coherence. The “experience” of “dependence” completely obliterates the scope of n. 7. Himes makes Drey depend upon Schleiermacher's subjectivism. Fitzer, more skilfully, speaks of “interrelatedness and “relatedness” (“related” in the text) (cf. “J.S. Drey and the Search”, 240).

In the famous expression “feeling of absolute dependence” which Schleiermacher uses in his *Glaubenslehre*, “dependence” translates *Abhängigkeit*.

That being said, the term *Gebundenheit* used by Drey is very strong (subservience, subjection). Drey, faithful to tradition, does not deny the dependence of the created upon the creator. The Schleiermacherian notion of dependence may be distinguished from the Catholic notion by its subjective character.

¹⁸⁴ Underlined in citations, my translation from Hoffman's French translation. Where I translate from German, I specify it.

this consciousness itself.” (n. 6) Later on he speaks of “that clearest voice of revelation, conscience in the human breast”. (n. 19) So Drey posits the principle of the immediate encounter between the absolute *objectivity* peculiar to God alone and human *subjectivity*.

“This annunciation, and the feeling one has of it, is religion.” (n. 6)¹⁸⁵

Original revelation may be *primitive*. But it may not be so as it announces itself in consciousness and is one with it, which means that it addresses every man, in all times. It is why “[a]s with religion, revelation has been from the beginning, continues in the present, and can never come to an end.” (n. 16)

Before going on, I must call attention to a detail about this original revelation. In n. 1, Drey writes that “every existing finite reality has not only emerged from an eternal and absolute ground but ... its temporal being and life remain rooted in that ground and borne by it.”¹⁸⁶ Drey’s theology of creation is expressed in this passage, and is surprisingly close to that of St. Thomas Aquinas: creation is a continuous donation of being (existence). That the world has a beginning does not mean that the creative act stopped once this world began to exist. This is what is announced to man.

In n. 16 Drey makes the “content” of this continuous original revelation explicit:

¹⁸⁵ *Diese Ankündigung und ihr Gefühl ist Religion*. Himes: “This experience and its accompanying feeling are religion.” The error of translation has repercussions. For instance in the few pages he devotes to Drey in his book *Answering the Enlightenment. The Catholic Recovery of Historical Revelation* (New York, The CrossRoad Publishing Company, 2006), originally a dissertation supervised by Himes, G. Kaplan writes: “The influence of Schleiermacher emerges in the opening pages of the *Brief Introduction*.” (101) He then cites the n. 6 in Himes’ translation, putting “experience” in italics. This leads him to skip over the correction he would have found in n. 7 and which he does not understand, and to believe that his interpretation is confirmed in n. 8 in which Himes gets deeper into misunderstanding and translates the verb *liegen*, which means “to be placed” or “located” or “situated”, by “to arise”. And “la religion... est présente en lui [l’homme] comme un premier sentiment, comme une orientation originaire essentielle de son esprit” becomes “religion... *arises* in him [man] as the first feeling, his spirit’s primal and essential orientation.” On p. 109, Kaplan cites again the above extract of n. 6, here with his interpretation of n. 7: Drey’s position would not imply a “subjective, unscientific method. Instead, the experience is both personal and universal.” So in his view, objectivity is a universal subjectivity!

¹⁸⁶ *von ihm getragen*. Himes: “dependent upon it”.

God's revelation is the presentation [*Darstellung*]¹⁸⁷ of God's essence¹⁸⁸ in another which is not God and so to that extent outside God's self. Outside God's self is the universe and that alone. All God's revelation can thus occur only in the universe, and the universe is nothing other than that revelation. (n. 16)

Revelation appears to be God's continuous self-presentation. In the universe, man alone can recognize this God's self-presentation "in another". This passage also means that God cannot reveal himself otherwise than by continuously creating. Should we reproach Drey for having borrowed the neoplatonic schema of revelation-creation? Theology has but one question to ask about such recourse: does it imply emanationism, which leads, in the end, to pantheism? Drey explicitly rejects this, as we saw in the citation above. In the same way nobody charges St. Thomas with emanationism because he placed the architecture of the *Summa Theologiae* within the neoplatonic schema of *exitus-reditus*.

The word *Darstellung* employed in n. 16 is interesting; Drey often uses this seemingly commonplace term to speak of the "presentation" of a science. The semantic content of the term is rich and precise: a science must be presented in its entire layout, revealing the interrelations of its constitutive disciplines or ideas. Moreover, it must show concern for those who learn. In the same way, so to speak, the essence of God that he presents in the universe is good order, relations, *harmony* [*Harmonie*]. Also, God presents himself so that he may be grasped, recognized, by humankind.

2.1.2 The ultimate revelation in Christ, over time

The *ultimate* revelation is accomplished in Christ in whom God revealed himself in the most perfect way (cf. n. 32). This revelation, in which God had to "show

¹⁸⁷ Himes: "expression".

¹⁸⁸ *Wesen*. Himes: "being".

*himself*¹⁸⁹ (n. 22) as being more powerful than man and the universe, to free man from his state of *estrangement* [*Entzweyung*]¹⁹⁰, that is, of his severance from the universe and from God, is called *supernatural* as opposed to *natural revelation*. However:

Both being God's action, the former is nothing other than the latter. The operation of both is likewise the same... Supernatural, of course, in light of what humanity in its folly makes of itself and nature around it, but entirely natural in light of what humanity and nature always were and ever remain before God and in the eyes of faith. (n. 24)

Between natural revelation (or natural revelations – Drey often speaks of revelations in the plural) and the ultimate revelation, there are *extraordinary* revelations to which reports and legends of peoples testify, and which are recounted as *theophanies*.

Drey does not disparage them:

They seem... to have as their purpose to be instructions and reminders given to a race which has separated itself from God, always to point us back to the original and eternal conditions of things, and to prevent humanity's destruction amidst the folly of its selfishness. (n. 26)

Besides, “in the infancy of the world”, these extraordinary revelations appear natural and belonging to the world; only later do they separate and stand in face of it (in man's spirit).

The most frequently employed correlative of revelation is *manifestation* [*Erscheinung*]. It denotes not so much the locus of the encounter of God revealing and man receiving revelation as ranges of revelation: the universe; a group of persons to whom and through whom Christ reveals himself; Christianity, the manifestation of

¹⁸⁹ *sich zeigen*. Himes: “*reveal himself*”. Drey uses here a very strong term. He does not speak of revelation at large, but of the strongest possible mode of God's self-revelation.

¹⁹⁰ Himes: “*estrangement*” (n. 13 and 15), “*dualism*” (n. 15), “*separation*” (n. 29), “*fragmentedness*” (n. 29), and “*fragmentation*” (n. 33). Such recourse to related words dissolves the notion, which is important because it corresponds to what Drey calls, in his summary of “the full range of Christianity's religious ideas”, *sin* (n. 33), a word he will not use later on (save once, in a context whose scope is unimportant (cf. n. 318)). Drey has been reproached for dismissing the concept of sin. The criticism seems unwarranted to me; the defense of Drey's thought may be grounded on all the contexts that reveal the presence of this concept in his thought (contexts of fall, reconciliation, restoration, salvation of souls), and also on the very notion of estrangement, which corresponds to the notion of sin.

revelation; the Kingdom of God, this eternal idea of God manifested in Christ's doctrine and life and in the Church.

Frightened, perhaps, by such an outpouring of revelation which oversteps their understanding, translators draw back before the meaning of the word *Erscheinung* and take refuge in the "phenomenon",¹⁹¹ in the comfort of the pure intramundane separated from its ground, the latter being allowed only brief and few appearances in the former. But Drey uses the term *phänomen* only three times (n. 24 and 276), two of which (n. 276) denote the sacrament as the sign of a transcendental act out of reach even of intuitive intelligence. From his standpoint, therefore, man can consider the sacrament only as a phenomenon.

As to himself, if his state of estrangement does not stifle his intuition, man knows that he also is called to be "a worthy revelation of God" (n. 96)¹⁹².

From God's manifestation in Christ and in eternal decrees stated by Christ it follows that the course of Christianity is its beginning, *continued*: "As a temporal

¹⁹¹ Cf. n. 4, 6, 7, 9 (faithfully translated in English; in French by the verb "apparaître"); 11, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, 41, 47, 59, 60, 65, 69, 71, 75, 107, 175, 176, 177, 179, 189, 190, 217, 222, 225, 226, 233, 237, 244, 268, 275, 278, 383. Himes uses the terms "manifestation" (and "manifested") 7 times, "appearance" (and "to appear") 5 times, a word which leads to a countersense ("phenomenon" – 24 occurrences) or vague terms: "event" (6), "is seen" (1); "to become clear" (1); "to be given clarity" (1), "outward form" (1), "forms" (1), "reality" (2), "epiphany" (1), "tangible forms" (2), "in working through them" (1), "data" (2), "embodiment" (1); "visible" (1).

Sometimes the English version does more than dissolve the concept, it betrays Drey's thought. Here is an example; while in French we have: "l'objet de toute théologie, la religion [est] la première *manifestation*, la plus nécessaire, la plus universelle, et par conséquent la plus éminente *dans* l'esprit humain." [... *Religion [ist] die erste... Erscheinung im menschlichen Geiste...*] (n. 75), the English says: "the subject of all theology, religion, is the earliest, most essential, most universal, and so highest *phenomenon of the human spirit*." That is true, from the subjective standpoint, if the subject acknowledges revelation. If he does not do so, and it collapses into his hands, he will even not speak of it. There remains no more theology, only a psychology of human imagination.

Hoffmann translates *Erscheinung* by "phénomène" on several occasions, mainly in the Historical Propaedeutics; see n. 41, 57, 107, 113, 114, 174, 175, 189, 217, 219, 247, 312. Himes also employs "phenomenon" in all these paragraphs.

¹⁹² *würdige Offenbarung Gottes*. The French translation is a countersense: a revelation worthy of God.

manifestation, Christianity has a beginning and a course which is the continuation¹⁹³ of the beginning.” (n. 69; see also n. 47)

So for Drey the original revelation is continuous, and the ultimate revelation in its self-delivery within Christianity manifested by the Church is also continuous. We are not in the aftermath of a past event! We do not have to painfully reconstruct “a something” that occurred a long time ago to be able to believe; we have only to free our intuition from the Kantian interdict and from the scholastic implicit denial, and we will realize how we are bathed in the light of ceaseless revelation.

2.1.3 Givenness and positiveness

Revelation, annunciation, and manifestation imply *givenness*, that is, the fact of being *given* [*gegeben*]. (cf. n. 2, 7, 12, 28, 50, 56, 64, 272, 275, 290; see also n. 231: the *concept of being given* [*der Begriff des Gegebenseyns*])¹⁹⁴ The original annunciation is given (cf. especially n. 12), and Christianity in its entirety has been given by Christ (cf. n. 50) in its major three components – its doctrine, its worship, and its polity (cf. n. 275). A religious system, writes Drey, may be invented or given. Its givenness implies that it is revealed. (cf. n. 231) Since Christianity presents itself as revealed, it follows that apologetics must demonstrate that givenness is a characteristic of revelation. (cf. n. 232) The *Überlieferung* (the continuous self-delivery of the primitive Christian fact) I spoke

¹⁹³ *Das Christentum als zeitliche Erscheinung hat einen Anfang, und einen Verlauf als die Fortsetzung des Anfangs.* Himes: “As a temporal phenomenon, Christianity has a beginning and a development which grows out of its beginning.” Himes confuses continuation [*Fortsetzung*] and development [*Entwicklung*]. The distinction is of utmost importance to grasp Drey’s hermeneutics of continuity we will see later on. Continuity encompasses continuation and development. “Continuation of the beginning” refers to the *Überlieferung*, i.e., the continuous self-delivery of the gift of revelation in the life of the Church.

¹⁹⁴ Himes often uses the words “given” and “givenness”, but he is also inclined to dissolve the notion into several terms: “fixed” (n. 12), “brought into” (n. 28), “appeared” (n. 50), “resulting from” (n. 56).

about above, and which Drey touches on in n. 232, is, so to speak, the continuation of revelation in its common characteristic of being given, delivered.

The *positiveness* [*Positivität*] of Christianity is defined in n. 34: it encompasses an historical element and a divine element which is God's intervention in the genesis and expanding life of Christianity. (see also n. 56: "the positive character of Christianity and its doctrines given by¹⁹⁵ revelation"; 232; 275) Givenness and positiveness stand, therefore, in a very close relation. Another passage illustrates very strongly their correlations: "... that the characteristic of givenness, of positiveness, does not exclude a science of that which is given we demonstrate by the example of natural science." (n. 56)

Needless to say, positiveness, as givenness, also regards the genesis of religion in general. (cf. note to n. 46) Moreover, for Drey, everything "positive", whether it be Christianity or the universe – man and nature – is given (cf. n. 16) because all existents are rooted in an original ground (cf. n. 1) which is God. The subject matter of natural – *positive* – science is *given* as well as Christianity.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ *durch gegebenen*. Himes: "resulting from".

¹⁹⁶ Drey's conception of positiveness differs from those of Schelling and Schleiermacher.

For Schelling, for instance in the *Lectures on Academic Studies* (which Drey mentions in n. 84), positive sciences are those that "outre leur statut de corps de connaissances, ont une fonction déterminée dans la société civile et dans l'État, fonction qui s'incarne à travers une institution elle-même établie et reconnue par les pouvoirs publics. C'est le cas de la Médecine et du Droit." (Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, "Leçons sur la méthode des études académiques", trans. J.-F. Courtine and J. Rivelaygue, in Collège de philosophie, ed., *Philosophies de l'Université. L'idéalisme allemand et la question de l'Université. Textes de Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, Hegel* (Paris: Payot, 1979), "Notes des traducteurs", n. 1, 164). This remark, pertaining to the seventh lecture, is, in my view, accurate though somewhat limited.

In the *Brief Outline*, Schleiermacher borrows the term "positive science" from Schelling without defining it in the 1811 edition, but with a comment in the 1830 edition saying that the end of any positive science is the fulfilment of a practical task (n. 1, Remark). (cf. H.-J. Birkner, "Le 'Bref exposé' de Schleiermacher : un programme pour une réforme de la théologie", in Schleiermacher, *Bref exposé*, 124.)

Drey's theology of revelation, as shown in this brief overview, is also a theology of creation,¹⁹⁷ a continuous creation which is given. Thus, it is a theology of history, encompassing the entirety of history. Such is the first of the three meanings that Drey gives to what he calls in all cases *historische Theologie*.¹⁹⁸

2.1.4 On miracle and inspiration

Does some space remain in Drey's thought for miracle and inspiration, those traditional proofs of revelation? Miracle occupies at once little space and all space. Drey expounds his position in n. 114, in relation to the spirit in which the theologian must approach biblical history: on the one hand, the spirit of any historical investigation, and on the other hand, theology's own spirit, which sees everything from the perspective of religion and grasps the miraculous character of biblical history:

This history is in large part miraculous. And the miraculous finds no place in the realm of ordinary history. Instead ordinary history explains its manifestations¹⁹⁹ by natural causes and the recognized kinds of causality. Anyone who tried to impose this sort of explanation on biblical history would be battling against the spirit in which the earliest witnesses understood that history and recorded it in scripture. It remains up to the researcher of this later age whether or not he is convinced by the miraculous character of the events which are presented as miraculous. But he should never allow himself to project his perspective onto the original witnesses and substitute his purely subjective explanatory system for that objective history which is presented as miraculous. (n. 114)

Drey does not dismiss isolated miracles, “manifestations” of divine almightiness; but it is history, all history, that “drama of providence”, that is miraculous, that is revelation. Miracles are not simply a matter of the past, nor are they only a matter of curing the sick and feeding the hungry. In *L'esprit et l'essence*, Drey fully expresses his thought:

¹⁹⁷ In his *Apologetics*, Drey will specify that the activity of creation and the activity of revelation stand in “a relationship of identity in difference” (cf. Hinze, “Johann Sebastian Drey's Critique”, 10).

¹⁹⁸ I will treat the second and third meanings in sections 5.2 and 6.

¹⁹⁹ *Erscheinungen*. Translation mine, from German.

Le Christ est encore là dans son Eglise et avec elle; les grands moments de sa vie et de son histoire se rencontrent toujours chaque jour et en vérité, et les croyants les contemplent dans le sacrement et les célèbrent chaque année les jours de fête. Les plus grands miracles se répètent sans interruption, et même ce qui, en tant que pure apparence forme le chœur dans la vie du Christ, à savoir ses liens communautaires, dure encore. Le chœur de ses apôtres existe dans les hiérarchies, et l'apôtre que le Christ a choisi comme excellent vit toujours dans ses successeurs; les foules de croyants, qui entouraient ce corps professoral divin et constituaient le cercle de l'Eglise, ont aussi peu fait défaut qu'au début, de même que les sceptiques, les adversaires et les impies ont toujours été là et le sont encore. (34-35)²⁰⁰

Primitive Christianity continued in the Church is the ultimate revelation, continued in its self-delivery. There lies the very miracle.²⁰¹

As for inspiration, Drey deals with it only twice: in n. 140, where he wonders whether the history of the biblical canon should include “the question of the inspiration of sacred scripture, which has clearly been part of its history”; and in n. 232, where he demonstrates that divine inspiration of human minds cannot have suddenly stopped. The passage is worth quoting because it remains highly relevant for our time.

Even if one accepts that the Christian religion originated through an initial revelation, the word of God proclaimed at a given time may be thought²⁰² either as having been left to its fate or as being maintained by the same Spirit by whom it was introduced and proclaimed. As can be readily be seen, it is not a matter of indifference for the historical essence of Christianity and for faith in revelation which of these alternatives is taken as true. There is thus this ... line of inquiry in Christian apologetics: has Christianity, which is positive and divine in its origin, maintained this character in its *Ueberlieferung*²⁰³? The demonstration which leads one to answer “yes” is the demonstration of the *divine character of Christianity's means of Ueberlieferung* and of their importance.

* Most theologians call this the proof for the inspiration of sacred scripture. But this is entirely beside the point in our concern. For scripture is neither the only, nor the earliest, nor the ordinary *Ueberlieferung* of the originating Christian revelation. If the *Ueberlieferung* of that revelation to the world is to be protected, then it must be protected first of all and especially in its most usual means. Otherwise, of what use would the

²⁰⁰ Translation by J.-M. Roessli.

²⁰¹ So Drey includes miracles into that very miracle. As to the isolated miracle, the individual event, in its usual sense, Drey will write in his *Apologetics* that it “leaves all natural powers and laws in their nature and their efficacy, and appears only with the divine causality which is unique to it in their midst.” (translation by Hinze, “Johann Sebastian Drey's Critique”, 10) He will reproach Schleiermacher for having considered only the ends of miracles – moralization and Christianization of the world – thus their effects, which are undeniable, but do not pertain to the essence of miracles – the revealing activity of God. (cf. id., 10-11)

²⁰² *das einmal ausgesprochene Wort Gottes gedacht werden*. Himes: “when the word of God had been proclaimed *once and for all* one can imagine it”. Italics in the text.

²⁰³ For the four occurrences: Hoffmann: “transmission”; Himes: “tradition”.

inspiration of the sacred authors have been to subsequent ages? If we are to be consistent in our belief that the word of God is still to be found in their writings, then we must regard what we term their inspiration as something which perdures, certainly not in them and not even in their writings, but in the whole institution of Christianity. (n. 232)

So “inspiration” appears to be very limited unless we understand it as the uninterrupted self-delivery of the spirit of God into human spirits. The word is then close to the term *Überlieferung* which may be understood here in its deepest meaning: it is revelation’s “self-delivery”, its “self-handing over” to the world, in the same way we say that Christ was delivered, handed over into the hands of the enemy. The process of *Überlieferung*, continuously originating in God, consists in the “delivery”, the “distribution” of “what is Christian” in the world and in history, and of the means which are necessary to maintain the identity and duration of “what is Christian”. The origination in God of the delivered existence of “what is Christian” gives us the true sense of “inspiration” and “miracle”, and what we call “tradition” denotes this delivered existence. As to the “means” of that tradition, whether they are written or oral, they are more than means of transmission, they are forms of “delivery”. So n. 232 sheds light on the intimate relationship between “tradition” and revelation that I touched on above. On the one hand, there is a time of revelation understood *sensu stricto*, as the constitution of the primitive Christian fact through positive revelation; and a time of tradition understood as the historical process of the gift of this primitive Christian fact. On the other hand, revelation, i.e. the primitive Christian fact, carries itself on through the event of self-delivery, or “tradition”. In this respect, there is not a time for revelation – the time of God – and a time for tradition – the time of man, who would manage a finished revelation so that he “hands down”, “communicates”, “transmits” dead contents. Rather it is “what is Christian” [*Christliche*], the Christian *res*, which continuously “delivers itself” as a living revealing presence, or

Dasein in the organism that the Church is. This is not to say that Christians can afford to be irresponsible! We will see below (82, note 208) how Drey deems as important that the Christian, the theologian in particular, be “a worthy revelation of God”. But the Christian must allow the *Überlieferung* to pervade him in order to be really Christian.

Drey’s thought on revelation and tradition is deeply Catholic. But to grasp it, in particular to grasp his presentation of tradition, one must study *L’Esprit et l’essence*. One must also free himself from the enduring consequences of the narrow notion of tradition of the scholasticism born out of the Counter-Reformation and maintained by neo-scholasticism. And, finally, one must avoid the pitfall of modeling, which is practical but not very scientific. To overemphasize revelation in Drey as the education of the human kind, in the line of Lessing²⁰⁴, or to attribute to Drey an apologetics of revelation devoid of Christian terminology, in the line of S. Justin Martyr and Schleiermacher²⁰⁵, or lend to him the thesis of an endless Christic revelation and to reproach him for having broken with Catholic tradition, which has been asserted anew by the Second Vatican Council²⁰⁶,

²⁰⁴ Cf. W.L. Fehr, *The Birth of the Catholic Tübingen School: The Dogmatics of Johann Sebastian Drey* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981). In the two chapters he devotes to revelation in Drey, Fehr studies revelation as divine creative activity, on the one hand, and as the education of human reason, on the other hand.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Kaplan, op. cit., 108-109: “In both the ‘Aphorisms’ and the *Brief Introduction*, Drey does not assume a Christian readership. Instead, like Justin Martyr and Schleiermacher in the *Speeches*, Drey addresses a wider readership. ... [He] avoids a Christian terminology in his discussion of revelation.” Yet, as we saw above, Drey uses the Christian (and biblical) terminology of revelation: annunciation, manifestation, gift, given, miracle. Only the term “positiveness » belongs to the scientific vocabulary. Besides, while St. Justin addressed the Greco-Roman philosophy and paganism, Drey did not address atheism or a new paganism; he addressed Christians whose faith was shaken.

²⁰⁶ Cf. id., 110: “Despite calling the Incarnation the culmination of revelation, Drey does not make clear that public revelation ceases with the biblical period. For Catholic theology, as the Second Vatican Council confirmed, there is no new public revelation, yet people continue to have legitimate experiences of God.” Kaplan refers to *Dei Verbum*, 4. One may see here the combined weight of two misunderstandings : the attribution to Drey of a subjective theology in the Schleiermacherian line - an attribution inherited from the spirit of the *Kulturkampf* (I will touch on the origin of the assertion of Drey’s dependence on Schleiermacher in the conclusion of my presentation of the *BI*); Catholics who are very concerned with a “magisterial” Catholicism but remain in the grip of the hidden influence of the inheritance of this *Kulturkampf*, deprive themselves of the important resource of *L’esprit et l’essence*, which they do not want to read. The second misunderstanding is the attribution of the narrow conception of tradition born out of the Counter-Reformation to the great age-old tradition of the Church.

all shows how the study of Drey's writings is predetermined by a complex mix of presuppositions which are sometimes contradictory.

2.2 The constellation of truth

For Drey, the absolute *objectivity* of revelation necessarily corresponds to its truth. From the subjective standpoint, truth may be considered from three angles.

2.2.1 Truth, faith and conviction; doubt

Truth constitutes *faith*. Faith, reason's adherence to what is true because it is received from God, is *conviction* [*Ueberzeugung*]. The word "conviction", unexceptional at first glance, appears in n. 50 in correlation with intuition, and is identified with faith: *with* Christian intuition, original and continued, there is conviction; this conviction *is* faith.²⁰⁷ Drey specifies in n. 214 and recalls in n. 318 that truth is their source.

This conviction, received in intuitive intelligence, expands in the operations of understanding. It *becomes* Christian doctrine or, in its abridged form, the creed (n. 189, 268) which is the *common conviction*, which constitutes the ecclesial reality. (n. 269, 272) The theologian must share it "for only under this condition does the church assign him a place to work within its domain." (n. 318) Individual conviction must be grounded in common conviction.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ The two terms are placed in apposition in the German text and in the French version.

²⁰⁸ The theologian must welcome Christianity's moral exigency – to see oneself as the worthy revelation of God – and proclaim it to others with living conviction. (cf. n. 96) His inner conviction must lead him to grasp history, and especially biblical history as being under God's governance, as the drama of providence. (cf. n. 114) Pastors' conviction must be firm. (cf. n. 387) Conviction builds character (cf. n. 318). It is from conviction that one freely enters the Church. (cf. n. 287) Doctrinal instruction will seek to bring about conviction. (cf. n. 354)

Himes: "conviction", but most often "belief" (which means faith or belief, not firmness in faith); "beliefs"; "tradition" (about the common conviction); "commitment, committed", "motivated" (words denoting the movement of the will, not reason's adherence to truth).

The opposite of conviction is *doubt*. Of course, it cannot be prevented, but it has no place in any teaching in the Church:

... wherever doubt is extolled as the highest rule for this study [study of theology], religious life has fallen into decay; wherever doubt and lack of ecclesial faith are found united to a teaching office in the church, ecclesial life has fallen into decay along with religious life. (n. 318)

Drey's position on conviction and doubt is an important aspect of his thought. We will see that he assigns the theologian a major role in the development of Church doctrine, worship, and polity. But Drey's interpreters cannot afford to forget that such a role cannot be played, in his eyes, at the cost of conviction and sharing in the ecclesial faith.

2.2.2 Truth and certitude

From the subjective standpoint, truth has a second aspect: *certitude*. (cf. n. 45) Man can only be certain of truth. His certitude may be immediate: the certitude of intuition. It may be mediated through discursive reason (cf. n. 45), which opens the path to *knowledge* and to *knowing* (cf. n. 46). It is with respect to certitude, immediate or mediated, to the acceptance or rejection of revelation, that Drey analyses supernaturalism, theological positive rationalism, naturalism, and mysticism. (cf. *ibid.*)

On mysticism [*Mystik*], grounded in immediate certitude, Drey writes: “practically considered, it is the flower of religious life, but theoretically viewed, a source of innumerable delusions and errors” (*ibid.*), because it “renounces all science and intellectual study and hopes to attain the goal of religion without them.” (n. 56) In that case, Drey does not speak of *Mystik* but of *Mysticismus*.

So Drey is fully aware that intuition may be confused with mere inner “experience”, emotional feelings, etc. He implicitly proposes a criterion to distinguish true and false intuitions: the true intuition accepts and demands the work of discursive

reason so that its “knowledge beyond all knowledge”, so to speak, becomes full human knowledge. In doing so, Drey responds to the charge of irrationalism raised – and still raised today – against the defenders of intuition (Jacobi and Schelling in particular).

2.2.3 Truth, error and indifferentism

The third subjective aspect of truth is the elaboration of knowledge. To truth is opposed error, which takes on two forms: *denial of truth* [*Abfall*]²⁰⁹ (cf. n. 240-242; 244-247) and *lagging behind truth* [*Zurückbleiben*]²¹⁰ (cf. n. 240-247). The polytheism of the ancient world can only be understood as the denial of the idea in favour of the concept, of heart in favour of sensibility (cf. n. 242) Within Christianity, the great “separation” [*Trennung*] still existing in the West appears from the Catholic point of view as a headstrong denial. (cf. n. 245) “Mosaism” appears as having lagged behind its own idea, in which it had been received; “Mohammedanism” as having lagged behind the spirit and culture of Christianity. (cf. n. 243) Within Christianity, the great “separation” of East from West presents itself from the Catholic point of view as the East lagging behind. (cf. n. 245)

The other Christian confessions must attempt to demonstrate a Catholic *corruption* in the development of the Christian principle. (cf. id., note, and n. 246) Denial, lagging behind, and corruption strike at the three components of living Christianity: doctrine (then appears heresy), worship and common life (separatism), Church’s polity and government (schism). (cf. n. 246)

Also opposed to truth and knowledge is *indifferentism* (cf. n. 237-238, 244 – without the word –, 247) which we rather call relativism. It may be religious or ecclesial,

²⁰⁹ Himes: “departing (from truth)”, “debasement”, “distorsion”.

²¹⁰ Himes: “falling short of truth”, “inadequacy”.

and makes it impossible to enter into any polemics – “inter-religious or ecumenical dialogue” as we say today. Drey makes two remarks on that point: denial and lagging behind may be considered as necessary manifestations in the history of the development of religious ideas, but Christianity cannot adopt such viewpoint without suppressing itself. (cf. n. 244)²¹¹

As to conflicts between Christian confessions, lagging behind and denial may be considered necessary to the development of Christian ideas, either because no doctrine and no ecclesial association may correspond precisely to its idea (the viewpoint of indifferentism) or because “every temporal form calls forth its antithesis and only attains its definite character through that antithesis” (n. 247). The latter is the point of view of the Catholic Church, who has always considered that parties [*Partheyungen*]²¹², though separated from her, still belong to her as she considers herself as an entirety. (cf. *ibid.*)

Up to now, we have explored, with Drey, three subjective angles from which truth may be considered. First, the angle of conviction, made possible thanks only to intuition, because understanding, left to itself, may only lead to doubt. Only intuition fully corresponds to truth, for it represents the point of encounter of God who reveals and man who receives revelation, so that the “knowledge” this encounter generates is “beyond all knowledge”. Then, we examined the angle of certitude which, if immediate, resembles conviction and, if also mediated through discursive reason, leads to knowledge. If certitude is merely mediated, it runs a higher risk of error. Here, Drey introduces various levels of certitude and knowledge. Our third step was considering the angle of knowledge

²¹¹ Nevertheless, Drey adds, this perspective is implied in the fundamental idea of Christianity and referred to in the Bible which calls it “a mystery hidden in the depths of the divine wisdom”. (n. 244) Does Drey think of the parable of the darnel (Mt 13: 24-30), now the Trojan horse for the Christian warriors of abdication?

²¹² Himes: “faction” (n. 228) or “sect” (n. 245, 247, 250, 254).

itself and the types of errors it undergoes, which range from lagging behind truth to pure denial of truth. It remains to examine the status of opinion, which may, objectively, correspond to truth or correspond to the various levels of error.

2.2.4 Truth and opinion

The term *opinion* [*Meynung*, sometimes *Ansicht*] appears here and there, sometimes qualified, but never defined. Drey speaks of religious opinions of the non-Christian world (cf. n. 185), of the general opinion of a religious society, of opinions and maxims of the world (cf. n. 198), of the personal opinions of Church Fathers, which one must distinguish from what they state as the universally accepted teaching of the Church (cf. n. 212). It is as related to the history of Christianity and historical theology that opinion is qualified, and severely. The opinions of church historians are marked by “narrowness of view” (n. 214) and “prejudices” (n. 217), and the necessarily pragmatic character of history is struck through with the “arbitrary” (n. 218). With respect to the history of doctrine, Drey is pitiless; if it overlooks “the higher concept of history” (cf. n. 175, cited below, 90) which it ought to follow to understand Christianity, “there is no common thread in the history of doctrines to link its manifestations²¹³ together; they then become no more than a motley mix and whirl of human opinions to which the adjective ‘*Christian*’ cannot be applied with any justification.” (n. 190) He concludes: “Les opinions des hommes concernant le christianisme ne sont pas en effet le christianisme lui-même; et si après l’époque du Christ et des apôtres il n’a existé que des opinions à son sujet, en vérité, il s’est déjà étouffé dans ses commencements.”²¹⁴

²¹³ *Erscheinungen*. Himes : “data”.

²¹⁴ Not translated by Himes. The French is Hoffmann’s. “Indeed, the opinions of men concerning Christianity are not, in effect, Christianity itself, and if after the era of Christ and the apostles there have

Such are the occurrences of the word “opinion” in its general meaning. Opinion may regard not only doctrine but also worship and polity.

2.2.5 Truth, dogma and opinion

Drey is more specific about opinion in his consideration of doctrine. Here truth appears under the form of *dogma*; thus it is to truth as dogma that opinion is opposed.

But what do we mean, precisely, by “dogma”? The word “doctrine”, which was acceptable until now in my presentation, must now give way to the very accurate notion of *doctrinal concept* [*Lehrbegriff*]²¹⁵, for it is what dogma refers to. The *primitive Christian doctrinal concept* (n. 117) is made up of “the inner core of all God’s decrees in the universe, a pure inner core of the ideas which have been proclaimed by Christ” (n. 71). From the point of view of the sources which testify to it, Drey calls it the *biblical doctrinal concept* (n. 109, 110, 119, 123). It is *given*.

The course of Christianity, as we saw above, is the continuation of its beginning. But its spirit, whose basis, as a manifestation in the world, is made up of its ideas, expresses itself in an immediate way in the constant development, elaboration, and combination of its ideas into a whole which is regarded as the *common doctrinal concept of Christians*. (cf. n. 189) Development, and thus opinion, must allow the *Überlieferung* to expand through it, to *manifest itself* in it. Such is the necessary condition for opinion to access truth. Otherwise opinion runs the risk of being the expression of the inner *estrangement* of man, of his fall into “the folly of his selfishness” (n. 26), and thereby revelation, including the ultimate revelation, once more “collapses into the hands and the

existed only opinions on the subject, in truth, it has been repressed from the outset.” (translation by R. Sonin)

²¹⁵ Himes did not see the scope of this term, though omnipresent, and translated it by “doctrine”, in the singular or in the plural; it follows that the notion, of utmost importance in Drey’s thought, is completely absorbed by the notion of doctrine in general [*Lehre*], also present in the *BI*.

will of humanity, becomes the work of humanity.” (n. 19) Opinion ought not to follow the path of inner estrangement, which leads to naturalism. These considerations help to correctly understand opinion and development as Drey conceives of them.

The doctrinal concept, itself a totality of particular concepts, is partly closed and partly still being developed. (cf. n. 256) A *closed concept* is called dogma. Either it was originally closed and it is an *explicit dogma*, a part of the biblical doctrinal concept, or it achieved its finished state later on, and was then declared closed by the Church, a *declared or proclaimed dogma*. (cf. n. 257) Such is the *fixed element* of the doctrinal concept. It is from this that the *mutable element* must be developed.

Development accomplished from the original explicit dogma into any proclaimed dogma took on the form of opinion before achieving its quality of dogma. (cf. n. 258) Today (Drey’s time for him, our time for us) also, ongoing development takes the form of opinion. Therefore, opinion, in our time as in the past, may correspond to truth: to a truth which is not yet universally recognized. It is then an *implicit dogma*. (cf. n. 257) Or, it may not correspond to truth. In that case, it must be regarded simply as a “product of the spirit of a certain time”²¹⁶ (n. 259). In fact, it falls or has already fallen into the domain of error (denial of truth, including headstrong denial; lagging behind truth; or corruption of the Christian principle).²¹⁷

²¹⁶ *Erzeugnis eines gewissen Zeitgeistes*. Himes: “a testimony of a certain intellectual period”.

²¹⁷ According to Thiel’s analysis (which I will criticize later on) Drey would have directly borrowed from Schleiermacher his positions on opinion and dogma. Yet, the idea of an implicit revelation made explicit through tradition is neither Schleiermacherian nor even Protestant. It is a Catholic idea, formulated in the sixteenth century by the Jesuits of the University of Salamanca, in an atmosphere unhampered by the Protestant controversy and in opposition to the Gallican thesis of an immutable and unchangeable revelation (one may think of the celebrated Bossuet’s axiom: “variation is a sign of an error”). For the Jesuits, explicitation of revelation was to be made by way of logical deduction. The conclusion deduced from two revealed premises is revealed. Such revelation is received by an individual person, whether the Church proclaimed it or not; it corresponds to implicit dogma. Where one premise is not revealed, but morally certain, the conclusion is *de fide*, according to Gabriel Vasquez (1551-1604), *de fide* to the

To treat opinion in Drey merely by contrasting it to dogma is to betray his thought by removing both notions from their context. It is easy to avoid the error by carefully reading n. 258 in which opinion and dogma on the one hand, and truth on the other hand, are correlated in an immediate and explicit way. Moreover, the correlation of the constellation of truth and the constellation of revelation emerges strikingly from n. 258 and n. 259.

I will deal with the question of public opinion in my study of the theologian's responsibility, another subject matter that rouses heated passions.

A remark on these two constellations: the exploration of Drey's thought through them confirmed the hypothesis I had formulated some time ago, to wit, that Drey originated the present fundamental theology, centered on revelation, and more precisely, of German fundamental theology, focused on truth. Seckler examines the role played by

theologian who inferred it even before the Church declares it to be so. According to Luis Molina (1535-1601), a Church definition from one revealed premise and one which is not revealed cannot be said to be revealed for the Holy Spirit was not given to the Church so she might make additions to revelation. A third trend, the one of Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), came nearest to expressing what would be later called a "theory of doctrinal development": where a premise is not revealed, the conclusion, humanly speaking, cannot be said to be revealed. However, all doctrines which the Church defined over the centuries brought about a new certainty, a revealed certainty which was not available to the theologian before the Church defined them. The definition of the Church had compensated for the weakness of the unrevealed premise. Suarez makes the Church a source of revelation. Suarez' successor and critic, John of Lugo, softens the scope of Suarez' position without changing it: God does not reveal new truth; what he does reveal is that the Holy Spirit guides the Church to correct definitions. See on that subject O. Chadwick, *From Bossuet to Newman* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. II. "Logical Explanation", 21-48, on whom I rely.

It was possible that Drey was familiar with this "conclusion theology", as he studied in a seminary directed by ex-Jesuits.

Suarez' thought is probably the origin of the theory of the "two sources of revelation" – Scripture and tradition – which generated at Vatican II endless and sometimes violent controversies between theological schools. Things were made still more complicated by the issue of the dialogue with Protestants, for whom, needless to say, Scripture is the one and single source of revelation. As the Jesuits were influential again in Rome, their opponents may have quite unconsciously and inordinately leaned on the Protestant principle, so at last everybody forgot that God alone is the source of revelation, the very point that Drey had seen.

That being said, the conclusion theology, strange as it may seem in our eyes, so stifling with its confinement within syllogisms and its unhistorical character, was in the same time full of implicit and explicit dogma, of opinions of theologians and Church declarations, of *fides infusa* (simply received) and *fides acquisita*, acquired through rational reflection.

Drey in the renewal of fundamental theology, but from a different perspective.²¹⁸ From my perspective, Drey renewed apologetics, which from that time took on the name of fundamental theology, and is represented by two major schools: the German school; and the Gregorian school, also grounded in revelation, but from the angle of its credibility, and consequently attaching great importance to testimony. It is worth noting that Drey speaks about credibility of revelation only once – as regards mosaic revelation (cf. n. 27) – and about testimony only in his summary of Christianity’s religious ideas (cf. n. 33) and as regards the sources of biblical history and Church history (cf. n. 130, 203, 206). His point of view on the value of testimony for the construction of theology is clear:

We regard a rigorously scientific construction of theology as a necessity, given the spirit of our age and the current stage not only of theology but of Christianity itself. The spirit of our age is strongly scientific; an arbitrary and merely contingent²¹⁹ division and association of concepts²²⁰ no longer satisfies it, nor does historical proof by testimony to events. (n. 56)²²¹

2.3 The constellation of life

At first glance, life cannot be considered a theological theme. But in Drey it is considered so, and its principle is, of course, the living Christ, Christ still *überliefert*, in the wholeness of his glory. Life abounds in the *BI* as in *L’esprit et l’essence*.²²² It has two

²¹⁸ Seckler, “Pour comprendre”, 87, 99-107, 113-115. I will deal in sections 5.1 and 5.3 Seckler’s perspective, which is of utmost importance to understand the deep structure and organization of the *BI*.

²¹⁹ *zufälliges*. Himes: “casual”.

²²⁰ *Begriffe*. Himes: “ideas”.

²²¹ Drey expresses the viewpoint of apologetics, which must justify faith in revelation before reason, hence with reason and not with accounts of facts and testimonies. On the other hand, testimony occupies an important place in confessional polemics, because it is not revelation that must be justified, but its *Überlieferung* after the facts recounted in biblical history; it is why in *L’esprit et l’essence* Drey contrasts living oral testimony of the apostolic and post-apostolic periods with Christian lifeless archives (the Bible and ecclesiastical writings).

²²² One may be surprised that in the first paragraphs Drey attributes life to everything: in n. 1, he speaks of the being and life [*Seyn und Leben*] of every existing finite reality; in n. 2, of the existence of things [*Seyn der Dinge*] and of their actualization which is the form of their life [*die Form ihres Lebens*]; in n. 4, of the life of things [*Leben der Dinge*]; in n. 5, of the “particular” and its life [*Einzelne, sein Leben*]; in n. 10, of the life of earthly things [*Leben der irdischen Dinge*]. Drey shows here his affinity with Romanticism, and still more with the Schellingian thought of identity of ideality and reality within the Absolute which is all-

components: the first one is *preservation, conservation, continuation, permanence*. In Aristotelian terms, one would say the substance admits and demands accidents though it intends to remain the same. The other component is *development*, which we again find here in its fullness, with its multiple correlatives: *evolution, change, modification, transformation; propagation, expansion; elaboration, formation; effect on; emerge, affect, spread*. These are the expressions, so to speak, of properties and accidents of the substance, which make it possible for it to remain itself over time. We have studied these two components of life in *L'esprit et l'essence*. I will not deal with them again here.

In the First Principal Part (General Introduction) of the *BI*, Drey sketches out a portrayal of three major developments, which could be presented under a synoptic form: the development of religion; the development of revelation; and the development of theology. The development of revelation and of religion (not as a system of concepts, but as a living reality) presents itself as the encounter of two *spirits*: the *spirit of God*, which is steadfast; and the *spirit of man*, who gives up his original harmony with God and with the universe so he may exert his dominion on God and the universe, but whom God condemns through his conscience and whose initiatives the universe destroys. Drey brings to light the tension between successive revelations of God which aim to point estranged man back to “the original and eternal conditions of things” (n. 26)²²³, and man’s – every man’s (cf. n. 19) – desire to master his ego and his I-ness (cf. n. 12).

organic, all-living. Life even includes knowledge: “Those sciences which reflect primordial knowledge most directly ... are, so to speak, the sensorium of the organic body of knowledge. We must start from the central organs and trace the life that flows from them through various channels to the outermost parts.” (F.W.J. Schelling, *On University Studies*, N. Guterman, ed., trans. E.S. Morgan (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), Fourth Lecture, 42)

²²³ See also n. 28: “And in full accord with natural revelation, which in proclaiming the unchanging, eternal conditions of all reality to the roots of self-will which oppose them, condemns in conscience that self-will even as nature negates its effectiveness, we find curses and blessings pronounced throughout the whole of

That tension underlies the movement of life as its higher principle. Thus, theology may actually follow one of two paths, and there is no other path. It may strive to work in the spirit of God; or it may work in the spirit of estranged man. Drey's path is, of course, the first one. It follows that his theology replicates that tension: it seeks to open the way to the contingencies of worldly life while remaining faithful to God's firm and coherent plan (cf. n. 27), to help bring estranged man to these original and eternal conditions of things, in short to be a "manifestation" of the spirit of God. This is why:

... the higher concept²²⁴ of history demands that they [the sum of all historical manifestations called Christianity] be seen as the straining and struggling of one single principle, of one spirit²²⁵ which spreads beneath the spirits of the age to take its own distinctive shape, which expands beyond itself and draws all things into its orbit, forming into itself what is open to such formation and destroying what is in contradiction to it. (n. 175)

This is why the present development (in Drey's day, in our day) of Christianity (the Church) and its three components (the doctrinal concept, worship, and polity) (cf. n. 213) must be safeguarded "against human arbitrariness and its concomitant dissolution into mere subjectivity" (n. 75); this is why it must be continuously referred back to revelation, which is "religion's objectivity, a necessity from every point of view" (ibid.); this is why it must remain the continuation of its beginning (cf. n. 69) given by Christ, whether it is a matter of doctrinal concept, worship, or polity.²²⁶

the law of Moses and the prophets which directly link good or evil consequences to an act and execute judgment through the nemesis omnipresent in all of history."

²²⁴ *Begriff*. Himes: "idea".

²²⁵ *Geist*. Himes: "living force".

²²⁶ This does not make Drey someone who longs for the past. He praises the development of the human spirit, whose knowledge spreads in liberal education and humanistic culture (cf. n. 88); in sciences including, in the meaning it then had, philosophy (cf. especially n. 92-96), to which are related psychology (cf. n. 381) and ethics in the sense Drey borrows from Schleiermacher – "the general science of the principles by which necessary ideas which are in the human nature take shape in history and form societies and mores" (n. 383) [*die allgemeine Wissenschaft der Principien, wie sich nothwendige in der Natur des Menschen liegende Ideen in der Geschichte gestalten, Gesellschaften und Sitten bilden*] (English translation mine, from French); in world history (cf. n. 90), including the history of religious systems, especially those of the ancient world (cf. n. 91), and its auxiliary sciences, archaeology, geography, chronology (cf. n. 213),

One can easily see how strong the tension between these two spirits is. The principle of continuation of the beginning runs the risk of being the source of opposition to progress; the principle of development runs the risk of being the source of fracturing, of Christianity's own suppression. Drey expresses this tension powerfully in the section on the method of study and presentation of scientific theology:

Through this strictly scientific construction, the student will be able to maintain the middle, happy, path²²⁷ between two parties which now stand resolutely in mutual opposition, between the *immobilists* (*les immobiles*) who always cling to whatever is antiquated and discarded by the Spirit and the *eccentrics* who manufacture innovations while they themselves are abandoned by the Spirit²²⁸ and sometimes want to make whatever is most ancient that which is most recent.²²⁹ (note to n. 321)

Drey expresses this tension once more regarding church government which is the third component of living Christianity, and for which a number of students may be destined. How ought church government welcome the activity of those who teach and who write? To be sure, the scientific element must prevail in such activity. However:

... the animating element in the church is not knowledge but practical religiosity²³⁰, and it is in that direction that church governance works²³¹. In its wisdom it must find means which, without stifling scientific vitality, prevent the religious element from being undermined by the scientific element and in such a way that²³² science does not adopt a profane orientation but remains directed to what is of practical importance. (n. 344)

and exegetics, which encompasses textual history and criticism, philology and hermeneutics (cf. n. 124-174; 207-212); and lastly "science of education" (n. 382).

²²⁷ *glückliche*. Not translated.

²²⁸ *die selbst vom Geiste verlassen Neues schaffen*. Himes: "who manufacture for themselves innovations quite independently of the Spirit".

²²⁹ *mitunter das Aelteste zum Neuesten machen wollen*. Himes: "want to exchange whatever is most ancient for whatever is most recent."

²³⁰ *Religiosität*. Himes: "religious life". It may be useful to recall what Drey means by *Religiosität*: the "true religion of the heart..., that living Christianity which is the will of God and of Christ, the vocation and the mission of the Christian". (n. 36) Religiosity is true religious life; religious life may be deprived of religiosity.

²³¹ *und dahin wirkt die Regierung der Kirche*. Himes: "here church governance makes its appearance."

²³² *wie sie ohne die wissenschaftliche Regsamkeit zu ersticken verhüten könne, daß das wissenschaftliche Element das Religiöse nicht schwäche, die*. Himes: "to prevent religious life from being stifled for lack of scientific clarity but in such a way that the scientific element does not undermine the religious element and that".

Once again the struggle between two spirits appears, the spirit of God, versus the spirit of the world, the profane spirit. What is the mission of church governance?

... church governance is preserving²³³; its attention is fixed first and foremost on that which lasts and is valid.²³⁴ Because of the principle of permanence²³⁵ from which it looks at the totality²³⁶, it must seek to avoid any break between the old and the new; in this perspective, the new must appear as simply another form of the old and even error as an imperfect grasp of the truth to which alone error also may be related²³⁷. For wise governance there must, therefore, be means allowing, without impeding new developments and its own improvement, to maintain permanence²³⁸ and to avoid discarding truth with error and the church's foundations with its current form. (n. 344)

Therein is formulated the principle of the hermeneutics of continuity.²³⁹

²³³ *erhaltend*. Translation mine, from German. Hoffmann: “soucieux de conserver.” Himes: “concerned with conservation.” By *erhaltend* Drey means that church governance is preserving by its very nature; it does not have only a “concern”, a “souci”.

²³⁴ *das Bestehende und dessen Giltigkeit*. Translation mine, from German. Hoffmann: “ce qui existe et sa validité”. Himes: “the fact and the importance of what is currently the case”. *Bestehend*: to exist, to last, to remain. *Giltigkeit*: validity.

²³⁵ *Princip der Stätigkeit*. Himes: “conservation perspective”. *Stätigkeit* is said of what continues without interruption, in faithful continuity. In my view, the translator must keep in mind that which Church governance must seek to conserve: what “lasts and is valid”, as stated just above, that is, what belongs to the essence of Christianity, not the non-essentials. The distinction between “conservation” and “permanence”, therefore, is quite important. Moreover, Drey speaks of a “principle”, that is, a firm rule, not of a “perspective”, that is, a manner of seeing things which could go side by side with another one.

²³⁶ *das Ganze*. Himes: “everything”. While in commonplace language “everything” corresponds to what is called in French “le tout”, “tout”, “la totalité”, here we are bathed in the language of German idealism, which considers “the whole in its entirety”, not “the whole as the sum of its parts”.

²³⁷ *woran er auch allein haften kann*. Himes: “which it must accompany”.

²³⁸ *wie sie ohne neue Entwicklungen und ihre eigene Vervollkommnung zu hindern, darin die Stätigkeit festhalten*. Translation mine, mostly from French, also from German. Himes: “to maintain continuity without impeding new developments and the improvements they bring with them”.

²³⁹ Thiel devotes a part of his work *Senses of Tradition* to tradition in the sense of “development in continuity” and discerns four “models” of development: dialectical, organic, noetic, and reception. He wonders whether Drey’s thought falls into the dialectical or the organic model. He first places it in the former but then thinks that it perhaps belongs to the latter (see esp. 61, 62, 65, 66). He eventually notices that Drey’s thought could fall in some regards into the noetic model (cf. 67). Such questioning is just idle, it seems to me. A living whole is organic by definition and at the same time subject to dialectical tension; organic hermeneutics relies on taking the tension between the Spirit of God and the spirit of the world into account, and between those two spirits in the human mind. Theology expresses both aspects and reports on them by way of science. Drey certainly would have relieved Thiel’s perplexity by recalling to him that there is but one Christianity, envisaged from several angles.

The phrase ‘development in continuity’ used to characterize a sense of the word “tradition” is misleading in my view. It conveys the idea of a continuous gradual development or of the predominance of development. The term “hermeneutics of continuity” is more accurate; “continuity” encompasses, as I said above, the continuation of the beginning and development referred to it, born in its midst. It seems to me that Thiel did not grasp Drey’s conception of the *Überlieferung*. In Drey the continuation of the same ranks first, because it is the continuous divine gift of the same, unchanged, finished revelation in the life of the Church. Authentic development of the Church must follow from this gift.

In this powerful passage, marked by precision and firmness, Drey reminds the Church that she must avoid confusing her essence with her non-essentials; the former, which is permanent, is to be conserved; the latter, which is contingent, is not to be conserved at any cost. Drey also reminds “developers” that development is not necessarily something valuable; it ought not to be searched for its own sake, and it does not imply the disappearance of whatever is old, but only of what is contingent in the old.

More generally, for Drey, development is not only a matter of doctrine, contrary to what many of his American interpreters reduced his thought to; it is also a matter of worship and mores, of polity and discipline. It means that development must constantly be referred to the permanent element of doctrine, worship, and polity, that is, to what is *given*.

3. The ideal side and the real side of the Kingdom of God

The idea of the Kingdom of God is “Christianity’s supreme idea” (n. 32, 60), its central idea [*Central-Idee*]²⁴⁰ (n. 71), its “fundamental religious *insight*” [*Anschauung*] (n. 254), “the central idea of the New Testament” (n. 60). It is Christianity alone that gave this idea and made it known. (cf. n. 65) “But it is grounded in reason, a true idea of reason, which, like all such ideas, was first energized thanks to the stimulating light of educative revelation so that it emerged independently in reason.” (ibid.) Thus it is also

And, finally, it is worthy of notice that in Drey’s thought development – the thing, not the word – begun well before the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth century. In his first programmatic writing he examines fecund theological “developments” that occurred during the golden period of the Middle Ages and the harmful later developments that led to the complete collapse of theology. On the issue of medieval theological development see for example C. Kaczor, “Thomas Aquinas on the development of doctrine”, *Theological Studies* 62 (2001): 283-302.

²⁴⁰ Himes: “controlling idea”.

“the highest religious idea” (n. 58), “the authentic idea of all religion” (n. 60).²⁴¹ Drey refers here to n. 1-7. This means that this idea corresponds to the “presupposition that every existing finite reality has not only emerged from an eternal and absolute ground but that its temporal being and life remain rooted in that ground and borne by it.” (n. 1) This presupposition, mediated through reflection, allows one to discern that all things are bound to one another and bound to and through an original ground (cf. n. 3), and that through those bonds “the totality of things rises to unity in the allness, i.e., a universe.”²⁴² (ibid.) This is why “[t]he world was such a Kingdom of God from its beginnings; the most primitive original revelation announced this Kingdom to mankind.” (n. 27)

I cited above an extract of n. 1 which I previously cited and in which I saw an expression of Drey’s theology of creation. We see through this passage, read again from another angle, that the Kingdom of God is the whole of creation. Drey does not often

²⁴¹ Drey makes the idea of the Kingdom of God the keystone of the theological architecture of the *BI*. We saw that in Kant the Kingdom of God – God being a postulate of practical reason – is a “republic under laws of virtue”, a visible church due to the empirical gathering of its members, the invisible church of their noumenal virtue which will gradually free it from the statutory faith of the existing Church. Did Kant originate the extraordinary success of the ideas of Kingdom of God and invisible church in the beginning of the nineteenth century? I am not competent to answer the question. In the Catholic milieu, the idea of the Kingdom of God played an important role in the encyclopedia of M. Dobmayer, published in 1807, mentioned by Drey (cf. n. 84, Drey’s note 4, Seckler’s note 54), as well as in the encyclopedia of I. Thanner, published in 1809, also mentioned by Drey (cf. n. 84, Drey’s note 7, Seckler’s note 57). The formulas of Kingdom of God, invisible Church or new Church circulated in the Protestant milieu, especially in the faculties of theology and philosophy of Tübingen. X. Tilliette, the undisputed specialist on Schelling in francophone and anglophone milieus, touches on the uncertain, flexible, contours of these formulas: “L’Eglise invisible évoque la ‘nouvelle alliance des esprits’ (Hölderlin), la ‘fédération des esprits libres’ (Schelling) et, par leurs efforts, la régénération de l’humanité dans l’histoire, une eschatologie terrestre qui est l’avenir du Seigneur’. Le Royaume de Dieu, chargé encore de réminiscences théologiques, incline vers la religion séculière, la *Weltfrömmigkeit*. Il devient le mot de passe d’un monisme immanentiste.” (*Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir*, vol. I - *Le système vivant 1794-1821* (Paris: Vrin, 1970), 70). It is possible that Drey intended to move the Kantian idea of the Kingdom of God out of the moral kingdom of ends and to free the Romantic idea of the Kingdom of God from the vaguely Joachimite swamp into which it was bogged down, and to bring it back to its sources – the Gospel’s parables of the Kingdom, and St. Paul’s acute sense of the cosmic.

²⁴² *erhebt sich die Gesamtheit der Dinge zur Einheit in der Allheit, d.h. zu einem Universum*. Himes: “the totality of things becomes a unity in multiplicity, i.e. a universe.” *Allheit*: totality, allness.

speak of the creation and the creator, as this theme is contained in those of revelation and the Kingdom of God.

Drey goes on by saying:

But as humanity, ignoring the Kingdom of God, exalted itself above this original revelation, the revelation too was raised above humanity and so the Kingdom of God was assigned to a higher order of reality as mystery. – This is the historical course of revelation up to Christ. (n. 27)

This passage sheds light on the *continuation* of revelation in its object, the Kingdom, and its *development* whose end is the human acceptance of this Kingdom.

Let us briefly explore this historical course of revelation up to Christ. Among the most ancient *Überlieferungen* (cf. n. 25) of divine revelations, the one contained in the Old Testament expresses most clearly the idea of the Kingdom of God. (cf. n. 58) It is a political kingdom, whose God is the true king, peoples being his vassals (Israel is the best beloved among them) and kings his viceroys. The vicissitudes of this world give birth to the idea of a new dispensation of this kingdom in which all nations will be reconciled, thanks to a man of Israel's lineage, raised up by God and fashioned as a worthy regent. (cf. *ibid.*)

Christ “refined the material idea of *an earthly Kingdom of God and worldly dominion* into the purity and universality of a *heavenly kingdom*, a moral kingdom within the universe; he transformed the king of a nation into the Father of humanity, and the viceroy of the king into the Son of the Father...” (n. 59)²⁴³

²⁴³ We may note the Kantian resonances of this particular passage. Drey speaks of a “moral kingdom” within the universe while anywhere else he speaks of the whole universe as having been divinely provided with a moral dimension. Also, Drey speaks of Christ as if he were but a man transforming ideas and inventing the idea that he is the Son of God. At the same time, Drey speaks of a heavenly Kingdom, and this is not a Kantian concept; he also speaks of the “God-man” (n. 32; see below).

“This is the idea of the Kingdom of God in the meaning which Christ has given it: God’s decrees concerning human beings and the world, the eternal thought of his Spirit.” (ibid.) In the fullness of time Christ revealed those decrees, explained them with determined concepts, and connected them to his own history. (cf. ibid.)

Here is posited “Christ’s doctrine” (n. 115; cf. n. 111), which, united with the doctrine of the apostles, makes up “biblical theology” in the strict sense of the term (cf. n. 115) – the source and beginning of the “Christian doctrinal concept”. Drey does not cling to the *Überlieferung* for the sake of faithfulness to tradition taken in the scholastic sense, but because authentic *Überlieferung* is the self-delivery of God’s eternal decrees, as they have been stated by Christ.

Here is also posited, side by side with doctrine, *life*, “Christ’s own history”. His history, “*God’s becoming-man*” (cf. n. 32), his teaching and his action, are the apex of revelation, aimed at the restoration of the estranged human mind: the ultimate revelation “can have brought about nothing less than the restoration of the condition of original unity under the form of a freely willed and conscious union.” (ibid.)

And from this effect there must follow the idea of a *universal reconciliation*²⁴⁴; thus the idea of a *universal mediator and reconciler* is both necessary and intrinsic to Christianity. – In and through this oneness the *idea of a Kingdom of God* is once again discovered..., the idea which was expressed in the universe at its beginning, which grounded our first religious feelings, and which was forgotten during egoism’s long dominance. (ibid.)²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ *Versöhnung*. Himes: “redemption”. Reconciliation is the end of the ultimate revelation; “redemption” [*Erlösung*] is the mean. In n. 59, the verbal form *versöhnen* is translated by *to reconcile*.

²⁴⁵ Kaplan thinks that “[f]or Drey... the Christ event is the culmination of the human spirit’s longing for God and the apex of the divine initiative to fulfill such a longing.” (op. cit., 102) So the Christ event would be first a product of the human spirit (a subjective event) and then a divine event responding to this human call. Neither the passage cited above nor any other passage from the programmatic writings confirms Kaplan’s analysis. Faithful to the testimony of the Scripture and to the great Catholic thought Drey sees in the ultimate revelation the work of salvation, a salvation offered to the rebellious man who stifles his longing for God.

But now the Kingdom of God gets narrower. So far we have seen that its loci are the decrees of God's eternal reason, on the one hand, and the whole universe, on the other hand. Yet n. 32 ends as follows: "... Christ... is the *visible head of the Kingdom*, just as its visible presentation²⁴⁶ and sensible perception²⁴⁷ is the *church*." This viewpoint is strongly emphasized in n. 71. In this paragraph, of utmost importance to understand the spirit and structure of the *BI*, Drey presents the Kingdom as having an ideal *side* [*Seite*]²⁴⁸ and a real side which is the Church:

Scientific theology..., by means of its own unique construction – by transforming historical material into ideas ... – ... builds it into a true system of Christian religious doctrine... Because it takes as its basis the central idea of Christianity, the Kingdom of God, it constructs this system in a twofold fashion in accord with the two perspectives in which that idea is presented in the Bible. The Kingdom of God has an *ideal side*, from which it is seen to be the inner core of all God's decrees in the universe, a pure inner core of the ideas which have been proclaimed by Christ and which, when organized by the science of religion, produces the *doctrinal concept of the Christian religion*. And it has a *real side* in which those decrees manifest themselves realized²⁴⁹ and those ideas are actualized and attain objectivity in determined forms of manifestation²⁵⁰. During the stage of the Kingdom of God which Christianity has introduced, this objectivity in determined forms of manifestation is *the church*.

Here the Kingdom of God is equated with the Church. Christ comes to reconcile humanity and its world with God and the world. He gradually restores original unity through an objective manifestation of revelation which is the Church.

This implies the divine, positive, character of the Church.

Even if one accepts that the Christian religion originated through an initial revelation, the word of God proclaimed at a given time may be thought either as having been left to its fate or as being maintained by the same Spirit by whom it was introduced and

²⁴⁶ *Darstellung*. Translation mine, from German. Hoffmann: "représentation"; representation [*Vorstellung*] is not the same thing, as we saw in the presentation of Kant's *Religion* and as we will see again in section 4.2. Himes: "expression". On the scope of the word *Darstellung* see above, 71-72.

²⁴⁷ *sinnliche Wahrnehmung*. Himes: "tangible realization".

²⁴⁸ Himes: "aspect". What Drey has in mind is not *Seite* in the sense of *Aussehen* (aspect, appearance, point of view, that is, what the knowing subject left to his mere understanding may conceive), but the objective ideal as well as real sides of the Kingdom, that the knowing subject in accord with the Absolute may intuitively grasp and then conceptualize. I will deal with Drey's philosophical schema in section 4.1.

²⁴⁹ *realisirt erscheinen*. Himes: "are seen as realized".

²⁵⁰ *in bestimmten Erscheinungsformen*. Himes: "in definite tangible forms".

proclaimed. As can readily be seen, it is not a matter of indifference for the historical essence of Christianity and for faith in revelation which of these alternatives is taken as true. There is thus this ... line of inquiry in Christian apologetics: has Christianity, which is positive and divine in its origin, maintained this character in its *Uebelieferung?* (n. 232)²⁵¹ Thus apologetics of the church has to demonstrate that *the church of Christ is in its origins a divine institution.* (n. 234)

But the fundamental concept of the Christian Church also implies something else, namely, that in this religious society – the Church – the Kingdom of God “attains empirical reality and objective meaning”. (n. 268) To be sure, as regards God, his created Kingdom is always endowed with empirical reality. But in the mind of estranged man, there is no Kingdom of God at all, no possible objective manifestation of God’s decrees through an empirical reality. Empirical reality is nothing more than itself. Thus the single and only mission of the Church is to *manifest* the Kingdom. I will shed greater light on n. 71 below by placing it in its philosophical framework.

For the moment I will return to the universal reconciliation effected by Christ. Drey brings up further information concerning this question. The fundamental idea of the doctrinal concept is the idea of the Kingdom of God, understood “as a moral order of the world” (n. 264)²⁵². It follows that the major ideas of the doctrinal concept belong to the moral order: *fall, restoration, eternal life.* (cf. n. 264) Such are “the great moments of the Kingdom through which it expands and achieves its fulfillment.” (n. 275)

It is in the Church, as “the temporal and sensible manifestation of the Kingdom”, that these ideas attain *reality* [*Realität*] which worship makes perceptible and promotes (cf. n. 275), mostly in the sacrament. This *phenomenon* [*Phänomen*] is a symbolic action, a sensible sign, though meaningful and powerful, of a concomitant and *real* [*wirklich*]

²⁵¹ For the German text and Himes’ translation see above, 79, notes 202 and 203.

²⁵² *moralische Weltordnung.* In French: “un ordre du monde moral”. The English translation is grammatically accurate and confirmed by the text which follows and reminds us of what Drey writes in n. 3, 5, 10, 14, 16 and 28. Nevertheless, in n. 59, as we saw above, Drey speaks about a moral Kingdom in the universe [*moralische Reich im Universum*].

transcendental act [*transcendentale Act*]. The transcendental act is a mystery and the essence of the ideas of the Kingdom; it effectuates them in the single person. (cf. n. 276) So it is “through her worship”, especially through the fulfillment of sacraments, that the Church “creates and forms true citizens of that Kingdom.” (n. 324)

The interior polity of the Church provides for her interior life to this end. (cf. *ibid.*) Through her exterior polity her typical relation to states posits her as “*the Kingdom of God – among human beings*”. (n. 301; cf. n. 383)

Drey’s conception of the Kingdom of God is integrated into his theology of revelation and creation. The Kingdom is the whole universe, which is the revelation of God’s essence “in another” (cf. n. 16). In the spirit of God, it remains the whole universe, but, to put it in the language of computer programming, it has been devastated by the “bug” of human estrangement so it must be “reset”, and this is the task of Christ through the Church.

Considering our overview of Drey’s major theological themes, we may note that human freedom is not the subject matter of any section of the programmatic writings. Fehr²⁵³ reproached him for that, saying that it was due to his recourse to an idealist-deterministic philosophical schema. But one must avoid an anachronistic approach to freedom (which in practice reduces to one’s capability to do as one pleases); Kantian freedom is respect for moral law, that is, acting in accordance with what is universally and necessarily inscribed in us; freedom for Drey is acting in accord with the divine decrees which alone are objective, universal and necessary; “estrangement” is departure

²⁵³ Cf. *op. cit.*, sixth chapter. Fehr globally rejects German idealism as inoperative in our time. I think he confuses Spinoza’s determinism with idealism, ignoring that the appearance of the latter, with Fichte and the young Schelling, was based on the absolute freedom of the self. That being said, it is true that Schelling strived to solve the problem of freedom associated with his thought of the Absolute.

from true freedom. In that sense, one may say that freedom and loss of freedom pervade Drey's theology of revelation, creation, and of the Kingdom of God. One must avoid confusing ontological "necessity" with determinism – this error is the basis of the reproach addressed to Drey.

4. The conceptual framework

4.1 The philosophical system

The philosophical system upon which Drey relies appears beneath the surface of what precedes, especially the section on the Kingdom of God. Here is how Drey explicitly states his choice:

... depending on the type and method of thinking about the task of philosophy and grounding it, one system may be more congenial to the spirit of Christianity and hence of greater usefulness to Christian theology than another. Unquestionably, that system has to be regarded as the best which, because it is already religious at its base, proposes the same view of history and the world, refuses to separate them from God but instead denounces belief in their autonomous existence as the worst of errors, and concedes to them only such reality as is consistent with regarding them as God's revelation unfolding in two perspectives or two fundamental and essential forms. While from the theoretical side this system is in entire agreement with the views of Christianity, from the practical side it assists the theologian to appreciate Christianity's moral exigency²⁵⁴ and proclaim it to others with living conviction. That exigency is to see oneself as the worthy revelation of God (his image), and in order to do this, to recognize the eternal design for human self-development in the whole schema of divine revelations, especially the perfect revelation (Jesus, the God-man), and so come to authentic religious life, harmony with God through harmony with his revelations. (n. 96)

The system Drey alludes to is Schelling's. This recourse to Schelling requires qualifications. Drey accepted, it seems to me, two fundamental elements of Schelling's thought: "objective idealism" and the "philosophy of identity". Let us begin with the latter whose analysis makes the former obvious. The identity at question is the one of the infinite (or the absolute) and the finite; of the ideal and the real. Drey modifies the first

²⁵⁴ *Anforderung*. Himes: "imperative". It is worthy of notice that Drey does not use the word *Imperativ*. One may remember how ironically he alluded to Kant's categorical imperative at the end of the 1812 essay.

pair of identicals; to the finite he opposes, not the infinite, but the *original ground* [*Urgrund*] (n. 1, 2, 4), which is *eternal* [*ewig*] and absolute²⁵⁵, and, in the end, God. But Drey softens the Schellingian principle of “identity in the difference”. In n. 16, he clearly specifies that God presents his essence *in another* [*in einem Andern*] which is not himself. Tradition often speaks of “reflection”, of “traces”; Drey’s conception is more realist than the idea of reflection, and more majestic and positive than the idea of traces.

As to the ideal-real pair, we find, by reason of certain inadequacies of English vocabulary, a reduction to one single pair, with crossed meanings, of the two pairs established by German idealism: *real-ideal*; *reel-ideel*. I refer here to a note of the French translators of Schelling’s *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* (On Academic Studies): “By *real* [in German] one must understand what the Latin *realis* infers from the *realitas*, itself understood as what points towards the intrinsic conceptual content of a *res*, its *Sachheit* (real-ity) much more than towards its factual existence, effective or *reel*.”²⁵⁶ The *reel* existence, the empirical effectuation, is the *Wirklichkeit*. So real-ity is not to be opposed to ideality. Both the infinite and the finite are real-ity and ideality. It is by reason of this position that Schelling has been charged with pantheism. But what he intuits is that only the finite consciousness creates false oppositions. When opposing its *idees* which are internal in the mind to the *reel* [*wirklich*] which is external to the mind the finite consciousness believes it may in the same way oppose the *Realität*

²⁵⁵ This is why it is not accurate to say, as Hinze does (“Johann Sebastian Drey’s Critique”, 3), that Drey took from Schleiermacher’s *Speeches on religion* and expressed in the first paragraphs of the *BI* the conception of religion as “an attraction to the infinite and the universe”. The idea of attraction appears only in n. 10; and the attraction in question is the one of the eternal love, not of a vague infinite. Elsewhere Drey speaks of bonds.

²⁵⁶ Schelling, *Leçons sur la méthode des études académiques*, “Notes des traducteurs”, n. 1, 163. Translation mine, here and below.

whose empirical existence it does not know and calls “*ideal*” to the *Realität* of what whose empirical existence (the *reel*) it knows but remains the *real*.

Dans la mesure où... ces deux termes sont posés par la conscience finie, c’est-à-dire pensés unilatéralement à partir du terme idéal, leur différenciation est en idée (idéellement) posée elle-même comme absolue – c’est-à-dire non supprimée dans l’absolu, comme elle l’est pourtant en son fond; dans ce cas, les deux termes sont désignés respectivement comme idéal et comme réel.²⁵⁷

Thus the idea [*idee*] is produced by human consciousness; the empirical *reel-ity* [*Wirklichkeit*] is, so to speak, the external side of *real-ity* [*Sachheit*]. The translators illustrate their explanation with a passage from Schelling’s *Bruno*: “You wanted to make the *real* a term truly opposed to the *ideal* but such opposition is always only *ideel*.”

Drey does not strictly employ these distinctions. However, we find the *ideal-real* pair in n. 71, the cornerstone of Drey’s theological construction. Read again in the light of those explanations, the passage attains the fullness of its meaning: both sides of the Kingdom of God belong to the sphere of the *ideal-real* [*ideale Seite* and *reale Seite*]. The *ideal* side is “the inner core of all God’s decrees in the universe, a pure inner core of the ideas which have been proclaimed by Christ”. From God’s perspective, this ideal is *real*. We, who take our starting point in the *ideal* term, conceive of it “ideally” and do not ascribe any *real-ity* to it. It is Christ, the perfect mediator, who expresses it “ideally” and shows its *real-ity*, through the parables of the Kingdom, for example, which aim to help us to perceive the “thing in itself”.

On the *real* side, God’s decrees “manifest themselves realized [*realisirt erscheinen*], ideas [*Ideen*] are actualized [*zur Wirklichkeit werden*] and attain objectivity in determined forms of manifestation [*in bestimmten Erscheinungsformen Objectivität*]

²⁵⁷ Id., 164. The translators translate *real* by « réal » (in French), in order, they say, to avoid rendering Schelling’s thought incomprehensible.

erlangen].²⁵⁸ During the stage of the Kingdom of God which Christianity has introduced, this objectivity in determined forms of manifestation is the Church.” So, it is in that *real* side that the identity of the *reel-ideel* pair is fulfilled. The English translation does not express these distinctions.

Drey unites what Kant had separated: the empirical, the phenomenon, the *Wirklichkeit*, on the one hand, and the thing in itself, the noumenon, the *Sachheit*, on the other hand. And objectivity may enter, so to speak, the empirical effectuation, and inhabit subjective consciousness.

A remark, here, on the vocabulary of revelation: Drey establishes, without justifying it, a distinction between annunciation and manifestation. This distinction takes on its full meaning in the light of what precedes. Annunciation is the first revelation of God to the intuitive capacity of human reason; there and only there the *ideal-real* pair may be present in the human mind, whether dimly or clearly (cf. n. 1). Manifestation is the gradual effectuation, in the *ideel-reel*, of the *ideal-real* whose harmony man destroyed.²⁵⁹

We have seen how Drey welcomes objective idealism. Needless to say, he rejects pure idealism, which he likens to all-time Gnosticism, whose only forms may vary. It is in *L'esprit et l'essence* that he critically assesses it. Such idealism is one of the two paths to which one may reduce any approach to Christianity that denies its living historical

²⁵⁸ The translation of *Wirklichkeit* by actualization is quite close to the German word. The French translation (“réalité”) fractures the two pairs of identicals.

²⁵⁹ Tilliette explains this notion of manifestation from a strictly philosophical perspective: “La *Wirklichkeit* n’est pas le reflet de l’Absolu. Mais c’est *en elle*, quoique de façon inadéquate et sous forme d’ouvrage inachevé, que par la médiation de l’activité finie-infinie l’Absolu imprime ses traits.” (op. cit., 81)

reality: it is “the transposition of history into philosophy, of the *real*-historical into ideas [Umwandlung... des historisch-Realen in Ideen], of positive faith into speculation.”²⁶⁰

For Fehr, Drey’s idealism is inadequate from the perspective of both later intellectual developments and the contemporary worldview. The second argument is worthless, firstly because German idealism has already been judged inadequate in Drey’s time; and secondly, it makes no sense because more than one “contemporary worldview” exists. The first argument is strange. Among “later developments” certain were or are inappropriate or transient, others are valuable though different, and others’ origins must be traced back directly to Drey’s thought. Now the question is whether “later developments” and contemporary worldviews are in accord with the spirit of God or if they slavishly follow the spirit of the estranged world. And, finally, one must acknowledge that German idealism reopened a path for Christian thought, in a line from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas, which Aristotelian post-Thomistic scholasticism had left aside.

4.2 The key vocabulary of Drey’s conceptualization

The *idea* is, if I may say so, the unit of conceptualization. Drey uses the term, from time to time, in the usual sense of the product of speculative thought. He never uses it in the Aristotelian meaning of a universal drawn by abstraction from the empirical datum. The *fundamental idea* [*Grundidee*] of religion is the Kingdom of God, which is

²⁶⁰ *L’esprit et l’essence*, 28. Translation by R. Sonin.

It should be noted that in the *BI* Drey makes a concession, but one only, to pure idealism when he writes that once estranged man, exhausted by “the blows of an ever-present nemesis”, finally converts, “then will the supersensual world become the only real one and this present world become the merely apparent one.” (n. 28) Schelling also makes that concession; see F.W.J. Schelling, *On University Studies*, trans. E.S. Morgan, N. Guterman, ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), “Lecture 8”, 84: he writes that Christianity thinks of the finite as a mere allegory of the infinite.

also the fundamental idea of Christian religion. To this idea are connected *key ideas* (*Hauptideen*): fall, restoration, eternal life.

The *concept* [*Begriff*] is the elaboration, the expression of one idea (cf. n. 316) or several ideas. The *doctrinal concept* [*Lehrbegriff*] gathers together a body of ideas and concepts; in this phrase, “concept” takes on an extended meaning.

The *representation* [*Vorstellung*] is the formation of an idea made up of what intuition grasps, or a concept made up of what understanding elaborates. Drey defines the term in n. 9, to distinguish religion which is the divine annunciation and its human intuition, on the one hand, and the religious system which is only its human representation, on the other hand. Drey speaks of the renegade will of man who seizes hold of “the power of representations” (n. 12) so that all representations “become his thoughts which he fashions for himself.” (n. 19) In n. 189, Drey speaks of the doctrinal concept as a “system of representations”.²⁶¹

²⁶¹ Himes: - “representation” in n. 9;

- “ideas” in n. 19; hence “all ideas now become his thoughts”: the error is unfortunate, but it does not generate a countersense; in German: *alle Vorstellungen werden nun seine Gedanken*;

- “power of imagination” in n. 12: the countersense is very regrettable; the power of imagination belongs to imagination, which is an internal sense, incapable of conceptualization; the countersense leads to absurdity: compare “dans la mesure où cette volonté rebelle s’empare du pouvoir des représentations et même du pouvoir physique qui lui est soumis en vue du bien” and “while this renegade will may be controlled by the power of the imagination drawing it toward the good and by physical forces...”; in German: *und indem dieser abtrünnige Wille sich der ihm zum Zwecke des Guten unterworfenen Macht der Vorstellungen und selbst der physischen sich bemeistert*;

- “system of images” in n. 189: presenting the doctrinal concept as a system of images is just absurd.

In n. 41, speaking of the religious feeling which has not yet broken through to reflection but cannot be fixed in concepts, Drey writes that man does so through his *powers of imagination* [*Einbildungskraft*] and sense perception [*sinnliche Anschauung*] by connecting them to some natural manifestation. Here the equivalent “powers of imagination” is accurate. In the same way, in n. 102, it is imagination [*Einbildung*] that Drey touches on.

The issue of “representation” [*Vorstellung*] took on an very important place in German idealist philosophy as the Kantian approach to the relation between representation and the thing in itself generated much criticism (from Beck and Schelling in particular). On that question see V. Verra, “La ‘construction’ dans la philosophie de Schelling”, *Actualité de Schelling*, G. Planty-Bonjour, ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1979), 29. The word belongs to the terminology of philosophy, not to ordinary language, and it is in its philosophical meaning that Drey uses it.

Construction [*Construction*] is shaping into a system. (cf. n. 66) But not every system is a construction. That is why Drey does not speak of “systematization” but rather uses the vocabulary of idealism. Following Schelling he sees in construction the condition of the scientific character of philosophy.²⁶² But he does not limit himself to it and intends to proceed also with the historical construction of Christianity, upon which the philosophical construction must be grounded. It is in *L'esprit et l'essence* that he best explains his position: a true construction must have an objective, divine, foundation.²⁶³

Thus the *system* is the product of that construction. But it is not fixed or immovable like a house one has built. Its elements have dynamic interrelationships, as does the living organism whose expression it must be.²⁶⁴

4.3 The anthropology and epistemology

The *heart* [*Gemüth*] is the seat of the faculties of intelligence (reason) and will. Sometimes Drey employs the word *Herz*. (cf. n. 30, 36, 38, 41, 51) He speaks of the *soul* [*Seele*] in the Practical Theology, in a soteriological context, not an anthropological one.

The word *heart* is equivocal: it also denotes the seat of reason alone, whether intuitive or discursive, or intuitive only, or of the will alone.²⁶⁵

²⁶² On Schelling's conception and his rejection of Kant's meanings of the word see Verra, “La ‘construction’”, especially 30.

²⁶³ Cf. *L'esprit et l'essence*, 30. After having made the criticism of pure philosophical contemplation (pure idealism) and of historical criticism, both of which suppress the essence of Christianity by handing it over to subjectivity, Drey reasserts that Catholicism maintained the historical and divinely positive – hence objective – essence of Christianity, and he adds: “Once this basis is firmly established, there is nothing that could prevent one from attempting to sketch out the philosophical construction as well as the historical criticism of Christianity.” (translation mine, from French)

²⁶⁴ On the notion of system, Seckler writes that it has been much discussed since Kant. “Drey... avait sans aucun doute présente à l'esprit la définition donnée par Kant dans la *Critique de la raison pure* : ‘J’entends par système l’unité des connaissances multiples sous une idée. Cette idée est le concept rationnel de la forme d’une totalité.’ (B 260s.) (“Pour comprendre”, 135) In English: ‘By system I intend to mean the unity of multiple knowledge under an idea. This idea is the rational concept of the form of a totality’ (translation mine).”

²⁶⁵ The heart travels, so to speak, through the whole *BI*.

Reason may be taken to mean intuitive reason [*Vernunft*] (n. 8, 65, 97) whose operation is *intuition* [*Anschauung*]. Intuition is by definition immediate [*unmittelbare Anschauung*] (n. 21, 28), [*unmittelbares Shauen*] (n. 46). The phrase *unmittelbare Anschauung* seems pleonastic to someone who knows, even superficially, the Thomistic or Bonaventurian epistemology. But it was not so in this tumultuous age when Romantics gave back reason the capacity for immediacy which Kant had confiscated from it.²⁶⁶ Schelling, in particular, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, would speak of *intellectuelle Anschauung* or of *Vernunftanschauung*, a term which Drey uses once (cf. n. 46)²⁶⁷.

On the heart as the seat of reason and will: "... because the heart, ...takes its direction from this source of instruction and with a pure cast of mind [*Gesinnung*] (Himes: "devotion") and willing energy strives to realise these ideas in life and action... there develops... practical religious cast of mind, true religion of the heart..." (n. 36) Sometimes it is the will, generally erroneous, which moves reason: "... sensual hearts enslaved to the self-deceit of selfishness..." (n. 28)

On the heart as the seat of reason: "Christianity is a particular positive religion..., with a distinctive set of religious ideas... which, when absorbed into the human heart, establish there a religious faith... it not only permits a purely intellectual engagement with its central concerns but, following the necessary course which religious faith [*Glaube*] ("belief") always takes, demands it to the point that construction of this faith through knowledge becomes a necessity, at least for some people..." (n. 48) "... those who are driven to construct religious faith through knowledge by... the importance which religious faith has in their hearts." (n. 51) "... fruitful effect of these ideas [of biblical theology] in people's hearts." (n. 115) "... the impact of the Christian doctrinal concept itself [*des christlichen Lehrbegriffs selbst*] ("these key Christian ideas have had") on human hearts..." (n. 185)

On the heart as the seat of intuitive reason: "a lively sense for the truth which dwells in the heart and guides and directs the head." (n. 101)

On the heart as the seat of will: "... the heart..., if freed from self-will..." (n. 10) (translation mine) "... the religious heart [*das religiöse Gemüth*] ("religious affection") responds gladly and willingly to the force of love for God." (n. 11) "... what previously moved the heart as gentle spontaneous attraction." (n. 13)

²⁶⁶ To counter empiricism, which subjects all knowledge to experience (a position which is not deprived of realism since objects exist whether they are known by men or not), Kant elaborated a theory of knowledge according to which the object aligns itself with knowledge. Therefore he can not accept an intuitive reason which apprehends the objects as they are. He only admits a "sensible intuition" (the sensible "perception" of Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology), which provides the mind with the *matter* of knowledge, passive, inert, unconnected data. But such sensible intuition cannot be entirely explained by the impressions received from outside. Kant is aware that external senses do not apprehend forms. He then concludes that sensible intuition implies *a priori* elements, *forms* inseparable from any knowledge; these are, in his view, space and time, the *a priori* forms of "pure" (as opposed to "sensible") intuition. Drey scarcely treats sensible knowledge and marks some hesitation; he speaks once of sensible intuition [*sinnliche Anschauung*] (n. 41), another time of sensible perception [*sinnliche Wahrnehmung*] (n. 276).

²⁶⁷ M. E. Fleischmann, studying Schelling's philosophy of nature, shows the radical transformation that Schelling imposes on the Kantian intuition: "[Pour Schelling,] ce n'est pas la nature qui est un problème

Original intuition [*ursprüngliche Anschauung*] (n. 18; cf. 28; 50) is religious. It must be noted again here that by “original” Drey does not mean “primitive”.

This *fundamental religious intuition* [*religiöse Grundanschauung*] (n. 57, 301) is the idea of the Kingdom of God. Estrangement leads man to lose it; Christianity allows him to restore the *intuition of his faith* [*Ansicht seines Glaubens*] (n. 28) and grounds a *determined intuition* [*bestimmte Anschauung*] (n. 36) of man’s destination. It follows that the fundamental religious intuition of Christianity, and thus its fundamental idea, is also the idea of the Kingdom of God. (cf. n. 264, 268)

Reason may also be taken to mean the capacity of reasoning discursively or *understanding* [*Verstand*]²⁶⁸ (sometimes also *Vernunft*).

Drey scarcely uses the word *intelligence* [*Intelligenz*]; only once does he speak of the eternal intelligence (n. 10) and on some occasions of human intelligence (n. 52 – nominal form; 37, 38, 48, 56, 102 – adjectival form) in the sense of discursive reason.

Drey also speaks of the *spirit* [*Geist*] as the seat of reason, in its intuitive or discursive operation. (n. 6, 7, 8, 9, 39, 40, 42, 44, 59, 75, 86, for instance)

mais justement cette distinction artificielle que les philosophes comme Kant et Fichte ont posée entre elle et la rationalité humaine, entre le monde concret dans lequel nous vivons et le monde intellectuel a priori déductible que préfère la philosophie du type kantien. Cette séparation entre le sensible et l’intelligible se reflète dans l’épistémologie kantienne, où les sens et l’intellect sont envisagés séparément quoique réunifiés plus tard ou peut-être même trop tard. Le refus de ce dualisme épistémologique conduit Schelling à la présupposition d’un mode unique de connaissance qui doit servir de base à toute philosophie, appelé par lui ‘intellectuelle Anschauung’, ce que nous traduisons par intuition tout court et qui, dans son acception moderne, signifie plus ou moins exactement ce que Schelling voulait dire. L’intuition l’emporte sur les facultés cognitives énumérées par Kant en ce qu’elle réunit aussi bien la réceptivité vis-à-vis des impressions que nous avons des objets et l’activité intellectuelle qui dépend de la sensibilité, mais peut également nous guider vers les objets réels soit en attirant l’attention vers eux, soit en les créant [il s’agit de la création artistique].” (“Science et intuition dans la naturphilosophie de Schelling”, in *Actualité de Schelling*, 53) On the evolution of the notion of intellectual intuition in Schelling see X. Tilliette, *L’Absolu et la philosophie. Essais sur Schelling* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, coll. Epiméthée, 1987), I. “L’Absolu et la philosophie de Schelling”, 13-25. See also id., *L’intuition intellectuelle de Kant à Hegel* (Paris: Vrin, coll. Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie, 1995).

²⁶⁸ N. 9, 25, 38, 41, 100, 102, cf. 115; 226, cf. 252; 281; cf. 319; 354, 356.

The obscure or clear ground of reason is *consciousness* [*Bewußtseyn*]. The word does not call for a comment, for it is univocal. What is to be underlined is that the *annunciation* [*Ankündigung*] of the bonds of things among themselves and with God “is one with *original consciousness* [*ursprüngliches Bewußtseyn*]; in fact it is this consciousness itself.” (n. 6) Thus “the original revelation of God in him [man] [*ursprüngliche Offenbarung Gottes in ihm*]” (ibid.) grounds every man’s consciousness. The close link that Drey establishes between revelation and creation – of mankind and of each man – appears in full light. The uncreated Word creates each human faculty called to be the seat of knowledge. This ground, Drey insists in n. 7 et 9, is objective, and remains, whatever human subjective wandering may occur.

Feeling [*Gefühl*] is an orientation of the mind: “... religion... is present²⁶⁹ in him [man] as the first feeling, his spirit’s primal and essential orientation.” (n. 8).²⁷⁰ This very dense passage is worthy of specific attention. The *primal orientation* [*ursprüngliche Richtung*] of the spirit is primal, original, in that it is the active locus of the foundation of consciousness, not in the sense that it would be given only at the origin of each person. It belongs, therefore, to the *essence* [*Wesen*] of the human mind; it is in that sense that it is *essential* [*wesentliche Richtung*]. Thus it is always *given*. And it is given upstream of feeling, so to speak: to *instinct* [*Instinct*]. (n. 12, 27) It is worthy of notice that “feeling”

²⁶⁹ Himes: “arises”. On this error see above, 72, note 185.

²⁷⁰ The remainder of the paragraph shows how much feeling belongs to the constellation of reason: “It [religion] is not acquired subsequently through instruction or education nor initially self-generated in *reflection*. Reason, when it begins to *perceive* anything, first of all perceives God...” (n. 8) And: “But like every other *feeling*, *perception*, *conscious act*, etc., religion too needs to be broadened and clarified in its *concept* and *object*. And to this end, instruction and *reflection*... are useful.” (ibid.) Also: “*Faith* in this revelation is no longer given [*gegeben*] through immediate feeling [*unmittelbares Gefühl*] or through immediate intuition [*unmittelbare Anschauung*] but only mediated by *reflection*...” (n. 21) “... the *idea* of a Kingdom of God... which grounded our first religious *feeling*...” (n. 32) Italics mine in citations in this section. Most of other occurrences of the term are also in a context of idea, concept, or reflection.

Drey also uses the word *Empfindung* (sensation, feeling) (n. 31, 38, 39, 41, 101, 173), once as a synonym of *Gefühl*.

is related to reason, not to emotion or affection, for Schleiermacher as well.²⁷¹ It is not on this account that Drey opposes Schleiermacher, it is on the issue of objectivity and revelation.

This primal orientation is also given – *announced* – to the will. (cf. n. 12) On the will, that other faculty of the heart, there is no particular comment to be made, as the word is univocal. Its correlates are what are worthy of notice: *impulse* [*Trieb*] (n. 9, 10, 11, 12) and *drive* [*Streben*] (n. 9, 10, 12). The two terms are closely related. Drey denotes through them what could be called spontaneous will, prior to the formation of free will which appears with self-consciousness. This spontaneous will is given as well: it is *announced* into the heart. (cf. n. 10) Thus, it is also to that spontaneous will that religion is announced as a fundamental orientation of human kind.

Nevertheless, revelation is first received in reason: “... all revelation is received²⁷² from God’s eternal absolute *reason* [*Vernunft*] and proceeds from that *reason* and so can not be totally alien to human *reason* in which *the divine reason*, in sum, reveals itself.” (n. 97) So reason is primary in the genesis of religion.

In this powerful passage, we may note how important the accuracy of the translation is. The German text, *sich...offenbart*, with the active verbal form, was translated by “is revealed”. The passive form implies an efficient cause of the revelation of divine reason, that is, a God beyond the God who “is revealed”. Drey, here, is in my view, at the origin of both German and Gregorian schools of revelation, which emphasize

²⁷¹ On that subject see L. Roy, “Consciousness according to Schleiermacher”, *The Journal of Religion* 77, 2 (1997), 217-232. The author proceeds with a meticulous analysis of Schleiermacher’s vocabulary, especially the term *Gefühl*, which most often describes pre-reflexive consciousness. Schleiermacher often contrasts it with knowledge and action. The word is close to the term “intuition”.

²⁷² *empfangen*. Himes: “comes”.

God's self-revelation, self-manifestation. Vatican II's Dogmatic Constitution of Divine Revelation took this theology into account.²⁷³

Drey's position is reminiscent of the Augustinian theory of illumination: the idea of the Kingdom of God "is grounded in *reason, a true idea of reason*, which, like all such ideas, was first energized thanks to the stimulating *light of educative revelation* so that it emerged independently in *reason*." (n. 65)

So Drey resolutely rejects Kantian pure reason, a faculty of thinking higher than understanding and which brings the rules of understanding back to unity through transcendental ideas, the *a priori* syntheses of reason (there are three such ideas: the thinking substance, the I – or the soul; the universe; and God). Drey also resolutely rejects the Aristotelian logic which was the basis of the epistemology of baroque scholasticism.

As to the will, Drey mostly speaks of it in the passage on the human state of estrangement and on the response of God who manifests his will as a peremptory law; it is the erroneous will which leads reason astray. (cf. n. 12-22)

Drey's epistemology may seem "impressionist" at first glance, mainly in the section on religion, and grounded in internal senses or appetitive potencies of the will (feeling, sensation, emotion, etc.). This is not the case, as we may infer from the analysis of the vocabulary. In fact, I will employ here a quite typically Thomistic language, which is not Drey's, but helped me to explore his thought. Although the two faculties of the soul are distinguished as regards their object and their effect, they are united in the soul, otherwise man would need two souls. In their operations, these two faculties penetrate

²⁷³ Cf. *Dei Verbum*, n. 2. The shift of focus of the introductory formulation (*Placuit Deo... Seipsum revelare*) as compared to the corresponding sentence of Vatican I's Constitution *Dei Filius* (*placuisse eius sapientiae et bonitati... se ipsum revelare*) is meaningful and has been widely commented.

each other without consciousness distinguishing them. The intelligence presents the true, or what is thought to be so, to the will, under the form of the good, and moves it to its proper act, which is action. In the same way, the will moves intelligence and determines it to posit its proper act which is knowing. It is into this zone of interpenetration of intelligence and will that creep some misunderstandings of them both.²⁷⁴

Drey explores this zone of interpenetration very finely. He touches on it by using equivocal terms; or he calls it the *obscure ground of the heart* [*der dunkle Grund des Gemüths*] (*L'esprit et l'essence*, 43, 44). He finally explores it by analyzing what moves reason and will to their proper acts. The vocabulary of movement (*Bewegung*, and its verbal from *bewegen*; *ergreifen* and its past participle or adjective *ergriffen*; *Rührung*; *Regung*; in English, movement, emotion, affection, etc.) introduces us into this zone of interpenetration as well as into the order of appetitive potencies of both faculties. The terms already studied above (feeling, orientation; impulse, drive) then take on their whole dynamic scope; they denote the appetitive potency as well as the movement that it imprints on one or the other faculty, or that one faculty imprints on the other.

It remains, in order to complete the study of Drey's epistemology, to deal with the reception of Christian revelation. It is mostly in *L'esprit et l'essence* that Drey treats the

²⁷⁴ For instance, Descartes, in the *Fourth Meditation on the First Philosophy*: "It is the faculty of will only, which I experience in myself to be so great that I do not conceive the idea of another faculty that would be more ample and extended; so that it is chiefly my will which leads me to discern that I bear a certain image and similitude of God." And more in the *Principles of Philosophy, First Part*, n. 32: "That there are in us only two kinds of thoughts, that is, the perception of the understanding and the action of the will." Descartes comes to make the will the faculty of thinking to such an extent that he makes God himself a pure power, indifferent to the good and to the true; in the *Responses to the Sixth Objections*, n. 6, he writes: "As to the freedom of free will, it is certain that the one which is in God is strongly different from the one which is in us, all the more since we cannot admit that the will of God has not eternally been indifferent to all things that have been made or will be made, for his will has no idea of what may represent the good or the true." (Translations mine, from Descartes, *Œuvres philosophiques*, Paris: Garnier, vol. II, 1967, 460-461; vol. III, 1973, 111; vol. II, 1967, 872, respectively.)

link between faith and reason and the link between reason and will. Let us come back to this question, which we have already touched upon previously.

Faith is gift of God and reception in the heart, and this reception has the character of *conviction*. “It does not result from a pure analysis or a pure synthesis of concepts; faith is beyond knowledge due to its transcendent origin and the mysterious nature of its object.” (31) Drey clarifies his thought in an outstanding passage: “the Sacred, who acts in the *obscure ground of the heart*, enters through faith *clear consciousness* as *Idea* which *reason* contemplates as eternal *Truth*.” (43) This sentence describes, as it were, the path of the sacred into the core of the intellectual faculty; it is the path of intuition, moved to its act by God’s gift. Discursive reason does not intervene in the genesis of faith; it influences, correctly or incorrectly, its blossoming.

However, Christian faith needs a mediation to acquire its *certitude*; it “finds its mediating principle in Christ, that is, historical Christ in the wholeness of his glory”; (32) Christ is the content, the object and the motive of faith. Then:

Through *reflection* on the relationship between the interior gift of faith and this objective foundation, the heart becomes *conscious* of the *reasonable* character of its *conviction*; *reflected* in this way, interior conviction tends to resemble *knowledge*, but this *reflection* is the work of man. (31-32)

Reflection needs to be maintained in its right place. Another passage²⁷⁵ allows the proper placement of the respective roles of intuition and understanding:

The Divine, who is residing in the human soul as an unlimited power, an obscure and indefinite potentiality, must determine itself towards *intelligence* and *will*, without ceasing to be the Divine; he must not, by reason of those determinations, become absorbed in the finite. *Mystery* is precisely the sole form where the Divine may determine itself without losing its sacred character. The *Idea* and the *Ideal* are the sole form, for *reason* and for the *heart*, higher than the concepts of the *understanding*; the latter cannot contend to move downward in its inferior sphere the mysteries of the Divine. The

²⁷⁵ Here I translate from Chaillet’s text as is. This text is an adaptation, not a translation. I cannot provide my own translation of the original text.

understanding is, therefore, powerless to beget religious fervour; the *heart* remains chilly before its accurate work of conceptual representation. (47)

These passages from *L'esprit et l'essence* emphasize the continuous character of intuitive work. "Original" intuition, "original" consciousness, "original" orientation, which I have explored above, are by no way a "brief instant" of the intellectual activity that immediately gives way to the understanding. When Drey speaks of "living" intuition, he has in mind not only its effects, but its very nature; immediate knowledge of something which is continuous is itself continuous. If intuition is not denied by understanding or stifled by imagination, it is a continuous state of apprehension of the "intelligibles".

So, Drey recaptures medieval anthropology and epistemology in an outstanding manner; first, the faculties of the soul, intelligence and will, and their respective objects, the good and the true. Descartes confuses the faculties by ascribing thought to the will, and Kant assimilates the good to the pair virtue-happiness, transforming will into voluntarism and giving Christianity the task of deontology, to the detriment of love, which God does not experience and which we do not owe him. Drey also recaptures, through idealism, the intuition so present in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure who call it *intelligentia* or *simplex apprehensio*. Such a recapturing is all the more outstanding since neither Drey nor the idealists knew Aquinas and Bonaventure. In the essay of 1812, speaking of the great scholasticism, Drey mentions, among others, Bonaventure whom he places in the twelfth century; it means that he did not read him much, or at least he did not read about him. As to Aquinas, he does not even mention him, perhaps because he associates him to the pure Aristotelianism which baroque scholasticism attributed to him.

5. Structure and organization of the *Brief Introduction*

5.1 Introduction, encyclopedia, propaedeutic, method

In the opening words of his Foreword, Drey gives the reader to understand that the *BI* is a “textbook on encyclopedia” and presents the two main types of theological encyclopedia then existing. But we know that he employs only the word “introduction” in the title of his textbook. Why? What is the difference between an introduction and an encyclopedia? For what reasons is the First Principal Part²⁷⁶ of the *Brief Introduction* an “introduction”, but not the Second Principal Part²⁷⁷? For what reasons is the Second Principal Part “encyclopedic”, but not the first one? For what reasons is the *BI*, entirely aimed at teaching, said to be “propaedeutic” in Chapter I of the Second Principal Part, and not elsewhere? And, lastly, does Drey speak of method in this work?

Seckler provides a thorough analysis of the complex situation of the presentation of sciences in general and theology in particular that prevailed in Drey’s day.²⁷⁸ He explains Drey’s choices as regards these first three notions. This analysis makes the approach of the *BI* clearer and shows how important the discussion of the method of study and presentation of a science was in the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.

5.1.1 The introduction

In Drey’s time as today, the word “introduction” could have several meanings. In the broad sense, it referred to texts of initiation – to a work for instance – or to didactical guides. In a narrower sense, it was a technical term of scientific language designating

²⁷⁶ *Erstes Hauptstück*. Himes: “Part One”.

²⁷⁷ *Zweytes Hauptstück*. Himes: “Part Two”.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Seckler, “Pour comprendre”, 99-107. I refer to those pages for the whole section 5.1.

fundamental reflections set out in a methodical way, upon which the treatment of an issue relied. From the viewpoint of the theory of the science, such reflections stood “at the beginning” of the science, as its foundation.

It is at the beginning of modern times that the necessity to ground sciences began to be acutely felt: in sciences in general it was the result of their explosive and inordinate multiplication; in theology it was a consequence of the confessional controversies.

Ad hoc introductions which succeeded one another according to the circumstances formed the first step of the process within which the literary genre of writings devoted to scientific introduction developed. But with the perception of the necessity of such preliminary clarifications, the later course of things was opened up in advance: generalization (indispensable character in its very principle, of an introduction to every science), categorization (reflection on foundations understood as a set of tasks *sui generis*), autonomization of the subject matter (the “introduction” comes to be a specific subject of the discipline, placed from a logical or didactical point of view before other subject matters), academic institutionalization (it was integrated with curriculums as a specific discipline). At the end of the eighteenth century, a stage was reached in theology and the necessity of a fundamental specific discipline *of that type* was acknowledged, and for *that discipline* the term “introduction” was employed as well.²⁷⁹

5.1.2 The encyclopedia

Two other tasks which also stand upstream of sciences went through a similar development. The question of encyclopedias pertained to the plurality of sciences as well as the plurality of disciplines within a science, the number and specificity of disciplines, their own specific methods, their structure, and their unifying principle.

Thus, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a new literary genre, the formal encyclopedia, appeared, and entered academic curricula as a more or less autonomous discipline. The information from Seckler is interesting: the encyclopedia took on a “formal” character during the eighteenth century. In the Foreword of the *BI*, Drey also speaks of another, older, trend, more “material”. Schleiermacher’s *Brief Outline* belongs

²⁷⁹ Id., 101. Italics in the text, here and in the following citations. Translation mine, from Hoffmann’s French translation, here and below.

to the trend of formal encyclopedias; Schleiermacher explained his choice in n. 18 and 20 of his *BO*, and in the note to n. 20 in the edition of 1830. So it is worthy of notice that Drey departed from that trend – and, by the way, from the other one: in fact, he dismissed unilateral trends. In the Foreword, he expounds the formal trend and mentions Schleiermacher’s *Brief Outline* in this regard. He then writes that the limitation to the formal aspect of a science gives it a character of contingency [*Zufälligkeit*]. For that reason, he says, he devotes the First Principal Part of the *BI* to a detailed deduction of the fundamental concepts of Christianity – religion, revelation, Christianity, and theology. In doing so he elaborates a theology of religion, so to speak, which is material, not formal, in order to protect students against the feeling of contingency that the Enlightenment associates with Christianity. As to the Second Principal Part, the actual presentation of the encyclopedia, he deems it “most useful to relate to one another an encyclopedia’s two principal concerns, the formal and the material”. (xxxiv) In fact, Drey insists in n. 80, “the doctrine of method²⁸⁰ ... cannot be easily separated from the [encyclopedic outline]; instead, they must be treated together, otherwise one puts oneself in the uncomfortable position of having to deal with the science’s formless matter on the one hand and contentless form on the other.”²⁸¹

5.1.3 Propaedeutic

²⁸⁰ *Methodenlehre*. Himes : “study of method”.

²⁸¹ This is why it is not accurate to pretend, as Himes does, that Drey was mostly interested in the formal aspect of the encyclopedia. Himes justifies his interpretation by ascribing to Drey positions which Drey does not state. (cf. “Introduction”, xiv.) Yet, one has only to read Schleiermacher’s *Brief Outline* to understand what a formal encyclopedia is. Of course, a formal encyclopedia necessarily implies theological positions (e.g., Schleiermacher’s *Brief Outline* announces a subjective theology where revelation is not primary). By contrast, the *BI* contains the explicit exposition of Drey’s theology.

The third task which stands upstream of a science is propaedeutic. It consists in the didactical introduction to the presuppositions, the foundations, the subject matters and the goals of a given science as well as to the initiation to the practice of that science.

The three tasks pertain to the foundations, though from different angles: the fundamental function of founding the theory of the science; the fundamental function of structuring the science; and the fundamental function of formation and communication.

5.1.4 Drey's approach: a single, tridimensional treatise

Besides dogmatics and history of dogma, Drey taught separately, in accordance with the programs then required, encyclopedia, methodology, and propaedeutic. But he had in mind to unify all of what is "foundation", and this is what he attempted to do in the *BI*. Nevertheless, he confirms in n. 81 that the *BI* really belongs to the literary genre of introductions. It means that the introduction is the common denominator of the three tasks. What then matters, Seckler writes, is to determine how he accomplishes this triple task in this work: in three successive parts, loosely interconnected, or within a unified tridimensional conception. If one examines the *BI* as regards this point, it becomes clear that the latter is exactly what Drey intended to do. In doing so, his work anticipated what we mean in our time by a "*fundamental overall treatise of theology*".

The *BI* is propaedeutic in its entirety, on the didactical, methodological, and spiritual planes. It is intended for beginners, but if it is elementary it is so at a high level. Drey unites the formal elements and the material elements of theology in order to captivate the interest of students in their discipline. It follows that the *BI* is "*at the same*

time an initiation into theology and an initiation into the essence of Christianity. It is in this eminent sense a *propaedeutic fundamental treatise*.²⁸²

But it is so *under the form of a work devoted to the foundations which belongs to the “science of introduction”*. The two “principal parts” according which the *BI* is arranged are solely devoted to the foundation (“First Principal Part: General Introduction”, § 1-106) and to the encyclopedia (“Second Principal Part: Encyclopedic Presentation of the Principal Parts of the Study of Theology, § 107-388). Those parts pertaining to the theory of science intertwine in many ways... Drey conceived of this work with a concern for a “stronger grounding of issues in their deepest principles and with equal insistence at scientific form in their organization”... (see *BI* § 84).²⁸³

Thus Drey transforms the science of introduction with this unifying design. “It means that the organization of the *BI* really aimed to realize within the unity of a single ‘fundamental treatise’ those three tasks which belong to the scope of ‘fundamental’ theology..., but to construct it with the rigor of a science of introduction.”²⁸⁴

These pages of Seckler restore the transparency that the *BI* surely possessed in the eyes of Drey’s contemporaries. The paragraphs in which Drey presents his theological *encyclopedia* clearly illustrate the intertwining of his concerns. In n. 75, he recalls the foundation of theology he expounded in the *General Introduction* (religion, revelation, theology, and Christian theology) and the *propaedeutic* aspect of this introduction, leading the beginner “to the only point from which he can enter upon his science with full appreciation, from which he will not stumble into it accidentally and blindly”.

In n. 76, he writes that the *introduction* he presented is still too general “to keep one from blindly fumbling about within the various branches” of theology (the *propaedeutic* aspect). Therefore, “there must be preliminary to the study an outline which includes a division of the whole science into all its parts, which allows us to see the

²⁸² Seckler, “Pour comprendre”, 107.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

importance to the science of each part in turn and the way all of them are united into a single whole. This preliminary outline of the science is called *encyclopedic*.” N. 77 and 79 also insist that the propaedeutic aspect of teaching calls for an encyclopedic presentation.

Now it remains to understand, given that propaedeutic concerns are found throughout the *BI*, why Drey chose to entitle Chapter I of the Second Principal Part “Historical Propaedeutic” rather than “Historical Theology” as opposed to Chapter II which is entitled “Scientific Theology”. Why does he contrast what does not come to be contrasted? Why does he emphasize an aspect of the framework of theology (propaedeutic) in the first chapter, while in the second chapter he emphasizes the very nature of the discipline? Drey explains this in n. 66: “it is not so much their material as their form of knowledge which distinguishes them”; the reality aimed at in historical and scientific theology is the same – the same Christianity. This one reality “is first *found*²⁸⁵ by way of historical study and then *brought into a system*²⁸⁶ by way of scientific construction.” This means that the historical branch relates to the scientific branch as its propaedeutic. It also means that Drey employs the word “propaedeutic” in its usual sense of preparatory teaching. We will see in section 5.2 that Drey’s choice poses other problems.

Two recurring elements of Drey’s vocabulary illustrate the intertwining of the propaedeutic and encyclopedic concerns in his thought: *study* [*Studium*] and *presentation* [*Darstellung*].

²⁸⁵ *gefunden*. Himes: “grounded”.

²⁸⁶ *in ein System gebracht*. Himes: “systematically shaped”.

5.1.5 Method

The consideration of method relates to the study and presentation of specific disciplines (exegetics, church history, scientific theology). In each case, the method must be the one suited to the specific discipline, though inhabited by “conviction” (see above) as well as by the fundamental intuition of Christianity – the Kingdom of God – and by the higher concept of history (cf. n. 175; see above, 90). Otherwise, the discipline falls into the profane domain or into “a motley mix and whirl of human opinions to which the adjective ‘Christian’ cannot be applied with any justification.” (n. 190)

Drey, as was usual in his time, clearly distinguishes the theory of the discipline and its implementation (exegetics-exegesis; ethics [*Ethik*]-mores [*Sitte*])²⁸⁷.

For an overview of Drey’s implementation of distinctions between encyclopedia, propaedeutic and method in the Second Principal Part of the *BI*, the reader may refer to my *Detailed Table of Contents* of this part (cf. 172). We may summarize each of Drey’s four distinctions. The “introduction” pertains to the very foundations of theology and must pervade the entirety of one’s theology. The “encyclopedia” pertains to the formal and material structure, organization and presentation of the various disciplines involved in theology, including their organic relations and their methods. “Propaedeutic” pertains primarily to the didactical aspect of theological teaching and writing, and secondarily to the preparatory character of historical theology as related to scientific theology. Finally, theology as a whole must respect the proper “methods” of each of the disciplines it needs for its construction, while maintaining in each of them the fundamental intuition of

²⁸⁷ Himes speaks of exegesis only, without grasping that Drey speaks of the theory of the discipline; and he most often uses “ethics”, sometimes “mores” or “way of life”, without grasping that Drey most often speaks of mores.

Christianity and the higher principle of history, as well as requiring from the theologian that he be “a worthy revelation of God”.

5.2 Theology of history, historical theology

I showed above that for Drey true Catholic theology is a “theology of history” in that it must encompass the whole history of the world, be it also “historical” thanks to sources or not historical for lack of sources. Now, Drey says, according to the Catholic conception “historical theology” embraces the theology of primitive Christianity (biblical theology) and the theology of its post-biblical course (theology of the Christian Church); Drey supports this conception. (cf. note to n. 174) However, as we saw above, in his encyclopedic outline he presents historical theology defined that way as “historical propaedeutic”. He then divides it into “biblical study” (sub-heading, 51) or “biblical theology” (n. 69) and “historical theology” (sub-heading, 80, and n. 69) in the narrow sense of Church history, that is, he writes, “as that title has usually been used” (n. 69). Is it a formal concession to what is “usual”, a concession which would contradict what Drey really thinks and its material presentation?

Thiel provides interesting information on this “usual sense up to now”.²⁸⁸ The academic study of Church history, born from Reformation and Counter-Reformation, gradually became a distinct discipline within theology. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, theology was made up of four specific disciplines: exegesis, church history, dogmatics, and practical theology. At the same time, the term “historical theology” made its appearance in the encyclopedia of the Protestant theologian G.J. Planck. The idea he

²⁸⁸ Cf. Thiel, *Imagination and Authority. Theological Authorship in the Modern Tradition* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 66-71. Thiel refers to the encyclopedic works of five authors among those mentioned by Drey in n. 82, 83 and 84 of the *BI*, including Planck.

sought to convey is that the history of Christianity could not be dealt with merely in accordance with the general rules of historical research; he had in mind the history of post-biblical Christianity from the perspective of faith. So the question which may be asked, in my view, is whether such historical theology remains primarily history or whether it becomes theology. More precisely, would it not be a “theology of history” with sources? The fact that Drey employs three terms – “historical theology” (n. 64, and note to n. 174); “historical propaedeutic” (n. 66, 67, 68, heading of the chapter); “theological propaedeutic” (n. 70²⁸⁹) – to denote the discipline whose study precedes the presentation of scientific theology shows the difficulty of establishing the status of the discipline.

The true question is whether the “historical construction” is limited to the phenomenon – and thus falls into the domain of profane historical science – or whether it also bears upon the manifestation of God’s spirit which permeates everything created. In that case, it would be a theological construction, not only as to its end, but also as to its content. In that case, it is “theology of history” – and this is what Drey has in mind. But a name must be given to the part of theology of history that pertains to the history of biblical time and post-biblical time. Drey chooses a designation, Historical Propaedeutic, which allows the positioning of the discipline in relation to scientific theology, from the point of view of its means and from the point of view of its anteriority. This does not mean that in Drey’s thought scientific theology would not be a theology of history; it is a theology of history as well. As for the term “historical theology” in the narrow sense (history of the post-biblical time) which had been “usual” since the end of the eighteenth

²⁸⁹ Drey also uses once “theological propaedeutic” (cf. n. 69) in the broad sense of theology, whether historical or scientific, from the angle of the propaedeutic (didactical) concern that must nourish the whole teaching of theology.

century, Drey finally keeps it and makes it the title of the second section of the Chapter I - Historical Propaedeutic (historical theology in the broad sense) of his encyclopedic presentation. The reader may refer to my *Detailed Table of Contents* of the Second Principal Part of the *BI* (cf. 172) to locate Drey's positioning of "historical theology" in its broad and narrow senses.²⁹⁰

5.3 Scientific, or philosophical, theology

The whole *BI* "is oriented towards the *issue of science*"²⁹¹, Seckler writes, and one cannot understand it if one thinks that it is scientific only in the second chapter of the Second Principal Part. This notion of "scientific theology" may surprise and, moreover, annoy the contemporary reader, Seckler says. To be sure, the *BI* is marked in some respects by the spirit of the time. Drey was concerned about meeting the requirements of the "rigorously scientific spirit of his time", all the more since he shared in this spirit. But

²⁹⁰ In the English-speaking world, the concept of "theology of history" may be understood in a variety of ways. Such theology may be seen as approaching its science by making history the very subject matter of the science of God and of the world *because* it relates to God. It may be understood in a narrower sense, and be synonymous with "theological history"; this is the sense adopted by Welch: "...the story is told explicitly from the viewpoint of the historian's own theological commitments, whether with a view to showing how the past establishes the present view or with the purpose of pointing out the errors that need correction." ("The Perils", 155)

As to « historical theology », if, as it should be, the adjective qualifies the noun and indicates its mode of being, one of its properties, one may speak of "historical theology" in contrast with "speculative theology", for instance, to denote their respective approaches to the science of God and things *in so far as* they relate to God. Theology is historical in that it approaches its science through history and therefore needs written sources as does any historical research. In Drey's thought historical theology so defined (in its broad sense) remains inhabited by the spirit of theology of history; it may be viewed as one of its fields.

However, according to Welch, "historical theology" is "history of theology", a caption, he says, often used by the historians of the religious thought in the nineteenth century. (cf. *id.*, 157) I think that Welch confuses two very different kinds of sub-disciplines.

The point of view of a theologian would be different. P.L. Allen suggests two understandings of the term "historical theology": "1) It can be distinguished from systematic theology. In this sense, historical theology is directed to an understanding of an aspect or figure from the past whose contribution toward a theological expression is of significance and deserves further study – textually and hermeneutically. 2) It can also be distinguished from modern theology, in the sense that it deals with figures and events through to 1850, though with the same analytical skills and critical hermeneutical approaches that are adopted with respect to contemporary or recent theologians (since 1850)." (Personal correspondence, April 12, 2012)

²⁹¹ Seckler, "Pour comprendre", 122. I refer to p. 122-134, mostly 122-129, up to my section 5.3.4. Translation mine, from Hoffmann's French translation, here and below.

his thought rather falls within the scope of the great tradition of the Church who always considered theology as a science, as *scientia fidei*. The fact that Christian faith took the path of science is “a situation that existed before Drey and which he encountered; he could and he ought to take it as his starting point.”²⁹²

5.3.1 The principle of faith as the principle of knowledge

According to Seckler, “... in his eyes the question whether theology may be a science is identified with the question whether epistemology is able to vouch for the certitude of faith.” Subjective, prescientific, mystical certitude which is peculiar to Christianity, “cannot sufficiently legitimate its pretension to truth but rather needs to be grounded”; since “such grounding, in the last analysis, may lie only within the characteristic of truth of the object of certitude, certitude is necessarily to be grounded through a reflexive process which ascertains truth.”²⁹³

For [theology] religious states of consciousness are not an instance of authentication, but an object of study; nevertheless theology helps them to find their legitimacy and their truth, as regards their contents and as regards their level of certitude. Consciousness, true to say, is the native place of religion, but a critical hermeneutics is necessary for the normative clarification of its contents.²⁹⁴

The clarification of the religious feeling “in its concept and in its object” Drey speaks about (n. 8) is “scientific” if the intended results may be characterized as knowledge. Here lies “the essential point of Drey’s concept of science”:

As in the scholastic concept of *scientia*, which may mean “knowledge”... and “science” ... (the latter being referred to the former), the lexeme “knowledge”... is also the determining conceptual support of “science”. Therefore, what is called “scientific” here is not only the method, but the epistemological status of the results.²⁹⁵

²⁹² Id., 124-125.

²⁹³ Id., 126.

²⁹⁴ Id., 127.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

5.3.2 The idea of the Kingdom of God

Since the principle of faith (*announced, given* in consciousness) is the principle of knowledge, reflection must find in the principle of faith the starting point, the “leading idea” from which it is to elaborate this knowledge. This leading idea, as we saw above, is the idea of the Kingdom of God, that “true idea of reason” (n. 65) present in the ground of religious feeling and also present in the Bible since it is the “central idea of the N.T.”

This idea of the Kingdom of God understood as a moral kingdom in the universe (cf. n. 59), that is, a totality made up of all men and all peoples under the lordship of God, allows for a theological articulation of Christianity’s pretension to universality and for the interpretation of Christianity among religions as being the inner core of religion.²⁹⁶ It is from this idea that it becomes “possible to reconstruct Christianity in the hierarchy of its truths and in the components of its historical manifestation.”²⁹⁷

5.3.3 Drey’s science: a positive theological rationalism

As underlined by Seckler, Drey seeks a middle way between two ways. The first is theological supernaturalism, which rests on faith in revelation, and traces the religious concept back to an original reality as something immediately certain that is valued as the concept’s probative authority. In this case, the construction is purely historical as are the corresponding knowledge and certitude. (cf. n. 46) The second way is rationalism which seeks to transform faith into knowledge. (cf. *ibid.*)

The middle way chosen by Drey is called, Drey himself says, “theological (positive) rationalism” (n. 46): “the concept is first taken from historical *Ueberlieferung*, including revelation, and then it is brought back into an idea which is immediately certain

²⁹⁶ Cf. *id.*, 128.

²⁹⁷ *Id.*, 129.

is so far as it flows from intuitive reason.²⁹⁸ In this case, the construction is philosophical, rightly termed scientific, as are the corresponding knowledge and certitude.”

5.3.4 Morals

Drey locates morals in scientific theology.²⁹⁹ He does the exact opposite of what Kantian Catholicism advocates. First, in accordance to the general spirit of the *BI*, he sees in morals and dogmatics the presentation of one and the same doctrinal concept, “the same ideas of Christianity” (n. 264), morals under its practical aspect, and dogmatics under its speculative aspect. Therefore, there is no reason why one should separate morals from dogma as if dogma were the “statutory” adversary of morals.

Drey then locates the source of morals, not in human reason but in God’s love:

... the root idea of Christian theology is the idea of the Kingdom of God as a moral order of the world. If this is looked at as it exists in itself and as it is established by God, then it appears as the culmination of the decrees of eternal providence made manifest in time. ... If this moral order of the world is looked at in the way it comes to be and is actualized³⁰⁰, it appears as the product of an all-encompassing and all-penetrating moral power which maintains together and unites that totality³⁰¹. Such a power can only be holy love which radiates outward from the center of the totality³⁰², embraces every individual³⁰³, and so actualizes³⁰⁴ the moral order of the world. That love is the principle of Christian morals³⁰⁵, and to explain all moral effort³⁰⁶ on its basis is the task of Christian moral doctrine³⁰⁷. (note to n. 264)

²⁹⁸ *der Begriff aus historischer Ueberlieferung, und auch Offenbarung, zunächst geschöpft wird auf eine Idee, als ein durch Vernunftanschauung unmittelbar gewißes zurückgebracht*: Translation mine, mostly from German, also from French. Hoffmann’s last part of the sentence: “est ramené à une idée comme à quelque chose de certain par la perception rationnelle.” Himes: “the notion may be first fashioned from historical tradition, including revelation, into an idea and so an immediate certitude is reintroduced by means of rational insight.”

²⁹⁹ For its positioning within scientific theology see *Detailed Table of Contents*, 172.

³⁰⁰ *wirklich wird*. Translation mine, from German. Himes: “is realized”.

³⁰¹ *jenes Ganze zusammenhält und verbindet*. Himes: “gathers together and binds everything into unity.”

³⁰² *des Ganzen*. Himes: “of this unity”.

³⁰³ *alles Einzelne*. “Individual” here must be rightly understood as a single thing, an indivisible entity, not as a person.

³⁰⁴ *wirklich macht*. Himes: “realizes”.

³⁰⁵ *Moral*. Himes: “morality”.

³⁰⁶ *Streben*. Himes: “action”.

³⁰⁷ *Sittenlehre*. Himes: “ethics”. On the sense of *Ethik* in Drey see above, 92, note 226.

Drey therefore reverses Kant's rigorism which commends the fulfilment of duty as defined by practical reason and opposes justification through the acts of worship or through the useless attempt to eradicate sensuous inclinations. Drey also reverses the rigorism of other moralists who, in contrast to Kant, locate the fulfilment of duty through the acts of worship and through the eradication of sensuous inclinations. Drey's morals consist in a free response of love to the divine love.

Drey also reproaches Kantian Christianity for its replacement of Christian morals with philosophical morals:

In all the manuals, large and small, of Christian morals³⁰⁸ we find at the outset questions which may well belong in a rational³⁰⁹ morals³¹⁰ but not in a Christian one. So, for example, there are general discussions of the moral nature of the human being, his capacities and powers, of freedom, the idea of the good, the principle of morals³¹¹, etc. ... The same is true in the doctrine of duties³¹². This is usually construed in accord with some arbitrary model and undergirded with biblical texts or with a higher sanction appended to these rational duties³¹³ by the authority of Christ. (n. 265)

Drey then makes two citations whose sources he does not mention but which resemble what can be found in *Religion*, and he makes his position clear:

Were it the goal of such presentations³¹⁴ of Christian morals³¹⁵ to show "how the whole of Jesus' religious doctrine in its necessary and fundamental concepts and in its ultimate tendency may be perfectly harmonized with the moral religion of reason," – or ... "that in its fundamental ideas and its final end Christianity is in fact nothing other than a pure religion of reason³¹⁶" ... – then such a demonstration would not be the work of Christian morals³¹⁷ but of Christian philosophy of religion; and if the former³¹⁸ is to be treated in a true and authentic fashion, it would have to be done on the basis of its own resources. (note to n. 265)

³⁰⁸ *Moral*. Himes: "moral theology".

³⁰⁹ *rationelle*. Himes: "rationalist".

³¹⁰ *Moral*. Himes: "moral theory".

³¹¹ *Moral*. Himes: "morality".

³¹² *Pflichtenlehre*. Himes: "theory of moral obligations".

³¹³ *Pflichten*. Himes: "obligations".

³¹⁴ *solcher Darstellungen*. Himes: "the study".

³¹⁵ *Moral*. Himes: "moral theology".

³¹⁶ *reine Vernunftreligion*. Himes: "the religion of pure reason".

³¹⁷ *Moral*. Himes: "moral theology".

³¹⁸ Himes: "latter".

5.4 Practical theology or introduction to the skills and ways of doing aimed at a theological practice of church government and religious education within the Church

In n. 73 and n. 74, Drey presents practical theology which he does not consider to be theology strictly speaking. It is a “direction” or “instruction” in view of church government and religious education. Historical propaedeutic and scientific theology embrace the entire “knowledge” of the theologian, but not his whole “study”. Theological knowledge has nothing to do with know-how. However, Drey maintains the term “practical theology” for the sake of the principle of “whole study” (cf. n. 74) – a quite weak argument in my view. He makes the term the title of the third chapter of his encyclopedic presentation. Now it is true that this know-how is permeated by the distinctions between the essence and configuration of the essence of living Christianity, between necessity and contingency, and by the principle of continuity which embraces the continuation of the same and development. Drey’s practical theology is not a flight to a motley mix and whirl of human opinions, i.e., to a praxeology without foundations.

An interesting aspect of this chapter is the appeal to disciplines which are independent from theology, like psychology, ethics – in the sense borrowed from Schleiermacher –, and science of education. Knowledge in such disciplines may contribute to the know-how of those who have a mission of government or religious education. Nevertheless they are auxiliary disciplines from which theology has nothing to expect in relation to its concerns. In today’s terms Drey would say that praxeology together with its various disciplines must not expect to govern theology.

Two other interesting aspects of Drey’s positions regard the reforms of worship (cf. n. 336-337) and church-state relations (cf. n. 345-349). As regards worship, Drey first

posits the principle of safeguarding its essence. As to the liturgical forms symbolizing the mysteries expressed in cultic actions, Drey advocates the determination of principles and rules aimed at maintaining the efficiency [*Wirksamkeit*] of these forms by means of appropriate modifications and transformations. The general principles are as follows:

It must be a maxim of all ecclesiastical government³¹⁹ that no liturgical form and no formulary be allowed to exist beyond the limits of that time and culture³²⁰ in which and from which they originated, for otherwise the liturgy loses both its significance and its efficiency³²¹. – But it must also be a maxim in church government to guard against continual instability and still more against violent and lawless reform of ritual. In the first case, no liturgy will ever take form, and in the second, its impact on the heart and behaviour will be interrupted³²². (note to n. 337)

This passage testifies to Drey's pastoral prudence and to his firm opposition to the violent practices inherited from Josephinism.

As regards church-state relations, Drey opposes the two possible types of interference: from the Church in the affairs of the state; and from the state in the affairs of the Church. There would be no question, in Drey's mind, of appealing to the state to solve the problem of homilies! Drey also underlines that in the framework of its relations with the state the Church runs the danger that its government [*Regiment*] might be infected with the "disease of secular government" – despotism [*Herrschaft*]. (n. 339; see also note to n. 340)

All that being said, I have some reservations about Drey's practical theology. For example, Drey introduces in this chapter a conception of priesthood, whether baptismal or ministerial, which rests upon the Protestant theory of "functions" and dismisses the great Pauline theology of "missions", states of life, and charismata. He limits ministerial

³¹⁹ *Regierung*. Government must be understood here in the sense of the activities, methods and principles involved in governing, not in the sense of the governing body (which Drey most often calls *Regiment*).

³²⁰ *Bildung*. Himes: "circumstances".

³²¹ *Wirksamkeit*. Himes: "reality".

³²² *unterbrochen*. Himes: "undermined".

priesthood to liturgy and makes the priest a liturgist. (cf. n. 360) The other tasks (teaching, administration of church discipline) belong to the other “functions” of clergy. (cf. n. 325) It is possible that regardless of the influence of Protestantism³²³, Catholicism experienced a narrowing of its theology of priesthood or, at least, a hesitation which extends in many respects to the texts of Vatican II as regards Christ’s priesthood, baptismal priesthood, and priesthood of ordained ministries.³²⁴

5.5 Parallelisms in the encyclopedic presentation

Christianity’s three major components (the doctrinal concept; worship and mores which follow from it; polity and the government associated to it) are present in the three chapters of the encyclopedic presentation.

As Drey specifies in n. 66, it is not so much the matter as the form of knowledge which distinguishes the two principal branches of theology (historical propaedeutic and

³²³ It is here that one may be tempted to see in this chapter a very strong influence of Schleiermacher’s encyclopedia. However, it is Drey’s study of other Protestant encyclopedias (those of Nösselt and Planck for instance, that Drey mentions in n. 83) which may enable us to determine the source of the Protestant influence. It is also possible that the Catholic Enlightenment exerted an influence, which would be an indirect influence of Protestantism.

³²⁴ Catholic historical criticism of the twentieth century studied the concept of priesthood and singled out its essence: it is mediation between God and man. In the religions of peoples near Israel, mediation was ascending and limited to the offering of sacrifices in order to obtain that gods carry out man’s wishes, and it was therefore limited to sacrificial liturgies and the priest or priestess was only a liturgist. Israel gradually extended mediation. It became descending as well as ascending. Mediation through the Word and through words took on an important role, and the formation, gathering and government of people were entrusted to the mediator. With the institution of kinship, mediation fell into the hands of the political temporal power, and then of the economic power of great landowners. Both constantly fought to rob the sacerdotal class of mediation and finally left it only the sacrificial function, with honours. Christ recaptures these three great missions of mediation, transforms them, purges them of their “functional” aspects – to some the interpretation of Law, to others sacrifices, and to others the moral government of people – and unifies them into a state of life, which is his own.

In n. 188, Drey underlines that there is “no general pragmatic history of Christianity’s effects on the world. Theologians do not customarily count these areas of inquiry as part of historical theology, but they are certainly part of historical knowledge and part of a correct assessment and evaluation of Christianity, and in fact there is more greatness and edification in these histories than in whole libraries of ordinary works of church history.”

There was indeed “greatness and edification” in the gradual disappearance of human sacrifices in Israel’s liturgy and of sacrifices of beasts in Christianity. There is sadness in the reappearance of a variety of sacrifices where Christianity or Christianity’s effects withdraw.

scientific theology): “for this reality which is first *found* through historical studies, is then *brought into a system* by means of scientific construction: the same Christianity.” As to practical instruction, it is the implementation of this theological knowledge. It is therefore from these three perspectives, historical, scientific, and practical, that Drey presents the three components of Christianity. My *Detailed Table of Contents* (cf. 172) attempts to shed light on the continuous presence of these three components in the three chapters of the encyclopedic presentation.

I have also tried, in this table, to shed light on two other parallelisms which intertwine without merging: the pair “ideal side-real [*real*] side” of Christianity and the pair “essence-configuration of the essence” of Christianity. The essence is not limited to the “ideal” side (the doctrinal concept), nor is the configuration limited to the “real” [*reel*], or, empirical side (the Church with her worship, mores, and polity). The Church does have an essence. This essence (doctrinal concept, worship, mores, and polity) is given her by living Christ who “is always there, in his Church and with her”, as Drey says in *L’esprit et l’essence*.

6. The *Überlieferung* and the Bible. A new look at the notion of historical theology

We have examined Drey’s overall conception of *Überlieferung*. There remains to look at it from a more limited perspective: its relationship to the Bible and to the ecclesiastical writings which Drey described as “lifeless archives” in *L’esprit et l’essence*. In fact, he does not despise them; he devotes n. 107-173 of the *BI* to the

Bible³²⁵ and n. 174-220 to ecclesiastical writings³²⁶. What he fights is false oppositions.

Here is the first one to which he objects:

... any historical subject—and so Christianity in its origin and later history—must depend on a *Ueberlieferung*³²⁷ which, in any even moderately advanced culture, is written or comes to be written. From its beginning, Christianity has possessed a written *Ueberlieferung* of its history, and very early this written *Ueberlieferung* was divided up in the same fashion as was the history itself. The written sources which deal with the history of its origin are distinguished from later writings which deal with the subsequent history of Christianity; the former are called *sacred* scripture, the latter *ecclesiastical* literature. (n. 124)

Hence the Bible does not contrast with “tradition”. The *Überlieferung*, as the continuous divine self-delivery in the world through “inspired” believers, whether they come to write or not, embraces the oral and written human testimonies, whether biblical or post-biblical, more, anything which is Christian. I would say they are more than “testimonies”; they “participate” in the *Überlieferung*.

That being said, contrary to what Drey asserts it is not “very early” that the former writings were called “sacred” and the latter “ecclesiastical”. *Doctrina sacra*, or *pagina sacra*, has encompassed the “writings”, whether biblical or extra-biblical, up to a late period. The Council of Trent maintained this view, which was grounded in the intuition of the uninterrupted continuation of Christianity within Catholicism.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that in Drey’s spirit, or in the spirits of the first centuries, of the medieval period, and finally of Trent, the Bible did not possess an unsurpassed value. It lived on, as it were, in the ecumenical councils of the first centuries as well as in the exegesis of Church Fathers and medieval writers as their inspiring force.

³²⁵ Exegetics – the science of exegesis – embraces four disciplines: textual history, criticism, philology and hermeneutics, “paired off together as principles and application of principles to a given topic”: criticism and hermeneutics form the actual theory of exegetics while history and knowledge of languages are rather empirical disciplines. (cf. n. 126)

³²⁶ “Exegetics of church history” (n. 70) rests upon the same disciplines as biblical exegetics (cf. n. 202, 208) but their principles are not identical.

³²⁷ Hoffmann: “tradition”; Himes: “tradition”.

Thiel offers interesting remarks on that question:³²⁸ the Protestant principle of *sola scriptura* had the effect of providing tradition with an identity and an authority in its own right that it had not possessed before. But the idea of this identity and authority (one thinks of the celebrated *partim-partim* formula as revelation imparted partly in scriptures and partly in tradition), often wrongly ascribed to the Council of Trent, had appeared before among the theologians of the Counter-Reformation. Thiel mentions a treatise of 1533, by Johannes Driedo, a Louvain theologian. Thiel suggests that Trent, which must have studied the *partim-partim* formula and finally rejected it, was possibly fighting a dangerous Catholic trend in addition to the Lutheran challenge to medieval unity. Be that as it may, post-Tridentine theologians (Martin Perez de Ayala, Peter Canisius, Robert Bellarmine), rather than sticking to the principle of “written books” and “unwritten traditions” maintained by Trent, typically invoked a *partim-partim* understanding of the council’s vague “*et*” formula and this sense of scripture and tradition has flourished up to the great harrowing debates of Vatican II.³²⁹

Thiel also points out that the unwritten traditions of Trent, which encompassed worship, devotions, lives of the saints, etc. – in sum all of what was open to life and practice as well as to the *sensus fidei* – vanished from the concept of tradition, stifled by the hypertrophy of the written tradition administered by post-Tridentine theology.

Drey recaptured the organic unity of the written and the unwritten still present in that last and misunderstood attempt of the Council of Trent. Did he read the conciliar

³²⁸ Cf. *Senses of Tradition*, 19-22.

³²⁹ So, while the theologians of Salamanca were busy elaborating, far from the confessional disputes, their conclusion theology which, with Suarez, was to make the Church a source of revelation, the theologians of the Counter-Reformation made written tradition a source of revelation. The theory of the “two sources of revelation” had two sources! Thiel points out that Trent spoke of a unique divine source of revelation and of two “witnesses” or two “modes of communication” of that revelation.

decrees? He does not mention them in the programmatic writings. What he does criticize, in particular in *L'esprit et l'essence*, is another false opposition, generated by those “disputes of learned men” who, in “a late scholarly language”, attempt to reduce tradition either to the domain of the oral or to the domain of the written.

In the *BI*, he writes: “Since theology which is drawn from the Bible must be *entirely biblical* by the very nature of the case, the Catholic principle of historical theology which sets tradition *alongside*³³⁰ the Bible is, here at least, inapplicable.” (n. 123) Here, Drey uses the word *Tradition* because he refers to the pre- and post-Tridentine “Catholic principle” which, of course, does not correspond to what he would allow to be called tradition. A hasty reading of this passage could lead one to believe that Drey grants this principle a perennial character, at least partially. We know that it is not the case. The principle which Drey advocates is the principle of a single and unique Christianity which has a beginning (history of Christ and the apostles) and which follows a course (the Church’s history) which is the continuation of the beginning. This principle is by no way connected with the principle of a *partim-partim* revelation. However, what is surprising is that Drey does not seem to exclude entirely that pre- and post-Tridentine “alongside”. In fact, his admission of a separation between the Bible and “tradition” is governed by another principle: paradoxically, it is the very principle of the living *Überlieferung*. As he examines the internal history of Christianity, especially the development of the doctrinal concept, Drey touches on the influences exerted by external factors on Christian ideas. He writes:

Since the ideas of Christianity are by their nature living realities, they originally spread abroad as living realities – through the living word – and through all centuries have been communicated in the same way in the church through the agency of the teaching office

³³⁰ Italics mine.

established by Christ. And so the scripture which began and was preserved along with this living Überlieferung had to become³³¹ external to it and thus act on the development of the doctrinal concept as an external factor. (n. 192)

The Bible began “alongside” the living *Überlieferung* without stifling it and then was pushed into the past by this *Überlieferung* from which sprung new writings. It is on that account that Drey justifies the distinction between biblical theology and Church theology (historical theology in the narrow sense). The motives for unity and distinction are well grounded in my view. But the organization of studies must provide for the preservation of the sense of unity and of the motive of distinction. The *BI* provides for both. If a curriculum favours biblical exegesis and gives it a sound organization but presents Church theology in a fragmented way, it can only lend the Bible the mythical status of a supra-historical monument; the history of biblical times and its theology can only appear as unhistorical, as testifying to a kind of timeless period where God really manifested himself, really spoke, really inspired writers who nevertheless would seem more legendary than real in our eyes. “Historical” theology would begin “after”.³³²

I will now, to complete this brief overview, touch on the relationship of tradition to canonicity. The criterion for the determination of the biblical canon is the reception of biblical books by the community of Christians as “the uniquely authentic written

³³¹ *mußte werden*. Himes: “must be”.

³³² The separation between the study of the Bible and the study of written post-biblical tradition does not imply a separation as regards their contents. To avoid any misinterpretation, I refer to the notion of “integrity of tradition” formulated by the Council of Trent, which Thiel analyses: “If tradition cannot be reduced to scripture, and yet does not present a truth different from biblical revelation, then tradition possesses an integrity, a meaningful richness of its own.” It is then open to a hermeneutics different from biblical hermeneutics. If it is reduced to a mere handing down of scripture, then its interpretation is merely a function of scripture. If tradition is reduced to the teaching of the magisterium, then it becomes “separable” rather than “distinguishable” from scripture. (cf. *Senses of Tradition*, 14, 24) For Drey, as we have seen, there exists only one written tradition of the history of Christianity. The development of post-biblical Christianity (doctrine, worship, polity) remains grounded in the doctrinal concept, worship and polity given by Christ and the apostles.

*Ueberlieferung*³³³ of primitive Christianity”. (n. 134) Even if an apostolic writing were discovered and its genuineness established, “it would still be deficient by the standard of its most important criterion, tradition³³⁴.” (n. 140) The judgment of the Church depends upon the common heritage of Christians, received in a living way.

In principle, ecclesiastical writings do not have any canonical character. However, writes Drey, “the pronouncements of general councils also possess their own kind of canonicity, to wit, that of creedal documents, through which they form a unique collection with special authority.” (n. 209) Hence, conciliar texts possess the same canonicity as the Creed they contain; this is logical. But the same character of canonicity should be granted to the conciliar texts which defined the biblical canon. It seems that Drey did not think of that.

7. About the theologian and his role within the Church

As this question caused much ink to flow, I will depart from my rule which has been to present Drey’s thought and then, incidentally, how it is interpreted. In what follows, I will first present interpretation, and then Drey’s positions.

7.1 An extreme example of misrepresentation of Drey’s thought

In an article published in 1986 entitled “Theological Responsibility: Beyond the Classical Paradigm”³³⁵, Thiel, in his opening remarks and in the main part of his development, deals with frictions between the magisterium and the Catholic theologians. That is the subject matter of the article; the means implemented to deal with it is the analysis of two “paradigms”, that is, two ways of conceiving of the role of the theologian

³³³ Hoffmann: “tradition”; Himes: “tradition”.

³³⁴ Hoffmann: “tradition” also. Here Drey employs the term *Tradition* (from *traditio*) always used by the Church.

³³⁵ *ThSt* 47.

within the Church. The first one, which Thiel calls the “classical” paradigm, covers the Middle Ages – which, surprisingly, begin with the golden centuries of the medieval period – and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whatever the length of this period, the classical paradigm seems immutable for its duration in Thiel’s eyes. Then appeared the “Romantic” paradigm which fills him with enthusiasm and which extends into the twentieth century.

By “theological responsibility” Thiel means “the vocational norms to which the theologian is accountable in his or her intellectual efforts to clarify the truth of an ecclesial tradition.”³³⁶ During the classical period, the authority of revelation, expressed in the biblical text and in authoritative post-biblical writings, tended to eclipse the value of “individual insight”, of “individual theological judgment”, of “individual authority”, or of “experiential revelation”. Classical Protestantism shared this paradigm, though in a somewhat altered form. In both confessions, the theologian was responsible to an objective authority, whether Scripture expounded by tradition or Scripture alone. He sacrificed his “creativity”, his “individual originality”. In other words, he was not an “author”.

In the classical paradigm, God is the sole author of the truth of salvation in Scripture or tradition or both. Theologians were not seen to be functioning as authors in the sense that their vocation entailed the creative presentation of divine truth through individual experience or original insight.³³⁷

The Enlightenment at first, and then Romanticism, put an end to this painful sacrifice. At the origin of creativity, of imagination, of theological originality, of authorship, we find... Schleiermacher and Drey! Why, Thiel wonders just before devoting several pages to Schleiermacher and a little space to Drey, should he deal at

³³⁶ Id., 574.

³³⁷ Id., 577.

length with the former in an article devoted to a typically Catholic issue? Well, it is because Drey has been strongly influenced by Schleiermacher, and hence the similarities of their views on doctrinal development and on “theological responsibility”, that is, the creativity of authorship.³³⁸ After having given his verdict, Thiel proceeds without hesitation with a near absorption of Drey’s thought into Schleiermacher’s, and with an engineering of citations. Here is a first choice passage:

These Romantic theologians, in their apologetical efforts to address the rationalists, resisted the more traditional notion of theological responsibility as faithfulness to the scriptural text, the normative creeds of the Christian past, or the present judgments of an ecclesiastical hierarchy.³³⁹

As regards citations, Thiel’s method is as follows: he reads a passage in Schleiermacher, cites it textually and then seeks its equivalent in Drey – but it may happen that he takes on the wrong passage. For instance, he cites a passage where Schleiermacher defines orthodoxy as the construction of a doctrinal element aimed at adhering to what is generally recognized, and heterodoxy as the construction of a doctrinal element aimed at keeping doctrine mobile. He then writes: “Drey appropriated this model of development in his own theological encyclopedia..., with only minor terminological changes...”³⁴⁰ And he cites n. 256 where Drey presents the concepts of fixed and mutable elements of the doctrinal concept, instead of n. 260 where Drey defines orthodoxy and heterodoxy (as well as hyperorthodoxy):

The theologian and his scientific efforts are to be evaluated by the stance he takes with regard to the doctrinal concept. The effort to hold fast to what has been definitively closed in the doctrinal concept and to construe what is mutable in the sense of and in agreement with what has been closed is *orthodoxy*. The attempt to make what has been fixed mutable or to construe what is mutable in opposition to what is fixed is *heterodoxy*.

³³⁸ Cf. id., 580.

³³⁹ Ibid. So Thiel attributes to Romanticism what was accomplished by the Enlightenment rationalism. He does not correctly locate the characteristics of either of these two movements.

³⁴⁰ Id., 580-581.

Drey was far from making minor terminological changes!³⁴¹

But let us pass, without entering into more detail, to the peak of the romance: the narrative of the “Romantic hero” whose traits Thiel borrows from Walter L. Reed’s study of the hero in nineteenth-century fiction:

First, though neither divine nor immortal, the Romantic hero stands “in a privileged relation with the supernatural...” Second, the hero is “related as an actor is to an audience, as an extraordinary person is to the ordinary members of society.” Third, in addition to the “gods” and to society, the Romantic hero is related to his own heroic identity. ... These traits are readily apparent in the vocational definition of the theologian set out by Schleiermacher and, to a lesser extent, Drey. Within the Romantic paradigm the theologian stands in a privileged relationship to the evolving immediacy of divine revelation in ecclesial experience. His divinatory sensibilities, expressive talent, and heuristic abilities distinguish him from the Church at large...³⁴²

In sum, thanks to his “divinatory sensibilities, expressive talent and heuristic abilities”, the theologian of Schleiermacher’s encyclopedia and, to a lesser extent, the theologian of Drey’s encyclopedia, is a defender of “the freedom of religious imagination”.³⁴³

Surprisingly, Thiel, besides several interesting remarks, draws from his imaginative story some valuable conclusions on the relationship between the magisterium

³⁴¹ Here are two other examples of the manipulation of citations: “In one of the most interesting entries in his theological encyclopedia, Drey defines one form of theological irresponsibility as ‘hyperorthodoxy’, a torpid complacency satisfied with the replication of the doctrinal past and ignorant of the tradition’s present mobility.” (583) Yet, in n. 260, Drey writes that the hyperorthodox “denies the mutability of the [doctrinal concept] either because he rejects the idea altogether or elevates opinion into dogma.” Thiel omitted the second form of hyperorthodoxy! But we discover that he had read that n. 260 whose first two elements he omitted, so he lost sight of the fact that heterodoxy in the meaning Drey gives it is also “irresponsible”.

Lagging behind truth, which we saw above and which Drey does not charge Catholicism with, is considered by Thiel to be a passage “illuminated by [the] idea of hyperorthodoxy”. Actually, Thiel was aware that Drey operates at two different registers in these passages: the first one, related to the fixed and mutable elements of the doctrinal concept, situates the theologian within his confession; the second one, pertaining to denial of, or lagging behind truth, is connected with polemics with other religions or Christian confessions. It is why, to make Drey a disciple of Schleiermacher, Thiel must fail to mention that Drey charges Protestantism with headstrong denial of truth. That being said, Thiel would have rightly connected hyperorthodoxy in respect of doctrine with “immobilist” and “eccentric” positions in respect of worship and church polity (cf. *BI*, note to n. 321).

³⁴² *Id.*, 584.

³⁴³ *Id.*, 584, 585.

and the theologians.³⁴⁴ But he misses the only conclusion which would have justified the study of Schleiermacher (it being agreed that he ought to have studied Drey separately): Protestantism's subjective theology exerted an influence, not on Drey who opposed it firmly and brilliantly, but on a number of theologians of the Catholic Enlightenment of the end of the eighteenth century and of the nineteenth, as well as their followers of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. These theologians are a source of part of the tensions with the magisterium.

7.2 From the approach of imagination to a more realistic approach to Drey's stance

As we may infer from the overview of the programmatic writings, Drey's thought eludes Thiel. When an observer of theology deals with a specific aspect of a theologian's thought without studying first the whole of this thought, he is left to himself, and then his imagination and unverified hypotheses may but lead him to pure anachronism.

Thiel's argumentation calls for two supplemental responses: one pertaining to Drey's temperament, in which one cannot perceive any evidence of early theological showmanship which swept through theology in the second half of the twentieth century; the other pertains to what Drey really defended, that is, the public role of theology.

We caught a glimpse of Drey's temperament through the analysis of his writings: bold, polemical, but reflective and independent. As underlined by Seckler, a part of his work remained unpublished.³⁴⁵ Moreover, Drey and his colleagues had not signed the

³⁴⁴ Here I must do partly justice to Thiel who, in *Imagination and Authority*, 63-94, studies in two distinct chapters Schleiermacher and Drey's respective positions and corrects his analysis of orthodoxy and heterodoxy in these two thinkers. However he maintains his classical-Romantic dualism and the recourse to the image of the Romantic hero.

³⁴⁵ Cf. Seckler, "Pour comprendre", 87. See also Fehr, op. cit., 4.

articles they published in the *Theologische Quartalschrift* before 1832.³⁴⁶ It follows that the theory of “authorship” is not applicable to Drey.³⁴⁷ Seckler writes:

... he himself had not especially drawn the attention of the public by those traits which make somebody a “star”. To manifest oneself publicly with glamour did not belong to his nature, and anyway he was reluctant to accept what was all show. “Modesty” would not be the right word and “solid” would not mean enough. A good specialist of the milieu characterized him, retrospectively, by saying that he “sowed his seed in silence”... What is accurate ... in this formulation is the fact that Drey was not a man who, publicly, was outstandingly eloquent. Nevertheless, he enthralled his students... But he did not have the charismata of a Möhler, a Görres or a Döllinger, and he himself was not inclined to surround himself with the aura of an academic guru.³⁴⁸

So Drey did not convey the image of a Romantic hero.

7.3 The peculiar question of public opinion in the Church. The theologian’s responsibility according to Drey

That being said, Drey “was not for all that a silent and solitary worker, who fulfills his task with discretion.”³⁴⁹ He actively took part in public life and from the professional standpoint he considered himself as a professor who publicly teaches theology and whose place and task are at the crossroads of current events.³⁵⁰ It follows that he was interested in the question of “public opinion” in the Church. (cf. n. 342)

A certain number of minds were enthusiastic over this theme; they believed that Drey claimed a right to public opinion which would never have been exerted in the Church. Kustermann³⁵¹ seeks to dampen their spirits and invites them to read what Drey really wrote: “Church history demonstrates that such a channel of opinion has always

³⁴⁶ Cf. Fehr, op. cit., 4.

³⁴⁷ Thiel acknowledges (cf. “Theological Responsibility”, 595) that Seckler suggested a much more elaborate division of the paradigms of the history of theology, based not on the emergence of authorial theology but on various types of relationship between the teaching office of the Church and theological science. One may regret that Thiel had not used this source.

³⁴⁸ Seckler, “Pour comprendre”, 87-88. Translation mine, from French, here and below.

³⁴⁹ Id., 88.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Op. cit., 38-55.

existed in the church.” (n. 342)³⁵² Here, what deserves attention is how Drey deals with the question. Kustermann analyzes n. 342-344 and n. 259 to which Drey refers as well as the paragraphs surrounding it.

I will first attempt to clarify what Drey means by “public opinion”. The adjective “public”, writes Kustermann, received from Kant a specific meaning, both philosophically and politically, which prevailed at the time.³⁵³ Kustermann cites an extract of the work *What is Enlightenment?* of 1783:

The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men... By the public use of one’s reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him.³⁵⁴

It is in this sense that Drey uses the term “public” opinion. He speaks of the opinion of an individual person who is competent to express his views in published writings. Public opinion is not general opinion of the common people of God, and Drey never speaks of the *sensus fidei*. As to private opinion, Drey briefly touches on it in the note to n. 343, where it has the same sense as in Kant.

It seems to me that Kant’s definitions engender a difficulty which Drey saw: his opinion is public if he publishes it and it is read. But it is private – though, presumably, the same opinion – where he teaches in the framework of the post entrusted to him by a university controlled by the state of Württemberg. But his renown goes beyond the walls of the class, and students come from distant places to hear his teaching. Renown makes

³⁵² Cf. id., 43: “Drey’s famous position in #342 does not really require, as is generally thought, the institutional realization of a long overdue option, public opinion within the church.”

³⁵³ Cf. id., 44.

³⁵⁴ Ibid. Kustermann uses the English translation by Lewis White Beck, “What is the Enlightenment?” in Immanuel Kant, *On History*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis and New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 3-10 at 5.

private opinion public.³⁵⁵ It is probably for that reason that in his study of the fixed and mutable elements of the doctrinal concept Drey calls the mutable element still discussed among scholars “theological opinion” of “opinion of a school” (n. 258) without specifying whether such opinion is public or private. Kustermann did not see this problem, which may explain why Drey does not speak much about public opinion.

That being said, opinion, whether public or private, whether heavy with truth or corrupted by error, pertains not only to the doctrinal concept but also to worship and polity. It is in the “Practical Theology” and as regards the instruction in church government³⁵⁶ that Drey explicitly deals with public opinion. In n. 343 and 344 he studies the problem of the relationship between church government and the theologians. It is a strange thing that Thiel has not seen these passages, which are directly related to the subject matter of his article. It is true that he could not find their counterparts beforehand in Schleiermacher. Kustermann underestimates the sense of balance which is expressed in these passages. He mostly sees in them a powerful appeal for institutionalization of free expression of opinion and for supervision of church government’s intervening authority. Yet, this is not the case.

The principles here are as follows:³⁵⁷ no church government either can or³⁵⁸ ought to suppress the activity and influence of individuals which are addressed to the church at large through the spoken or written word, because it would at the same time deprive itself of the devotion and insight inherent in the mass of its members; but³⁵⁹ neither can a church government acknowledge or admit an influence acting in this way which is not

³⁵⁵ In n. 342, Drey also writes that public opinion within the Church “can only be the positions taken by officially recognized teachers and writers.” Kant’s theoretical divide does not hold against empirical reality.

³⁵⁶ The other major branch of Drey’s Practical Theology is Church ministry. See my *Detailed Table of Contents*, 172.

³⁵⁷ *Die Grundsätze hierüber sind*: Himes: “The fundamental principle here is that”. Drey expounds two principles and what happens for lack of respect of each of them.

³⁵⁸ *kein Kirchenregiment kann und darf*. Himes: “church government neither can nor”. For Drey these two principles apply to any level of church government. Himes himself writes below “a church government”.

³⁵⁹ ; *aber*. Himes: “. But”. From here Drey expounds the second fundamental principle.

directed toward preserving and edifying the church; because in the opposite case³⁶⁰, the government would be working for its own and the church's dissolution. (n. 343)

The problem is not so simple. Allowing for “free expression of religious zeal and insight” is not difficult; a policy of *laissez faire* suffices. What is difficult is restraining “through appropriate means the dangers which might possibly be incurred by this.” What kind of means would be appropriate?

The chief considerations in ecclesiastical governance are the following. By the very nature of the case, the scientific element must predominate in the work of teachers and writers within the church. But ... the animating element in the church is not knowledge but practical religiosity, and it is in that direction that church governance works. In its wisdom it must find means which, without stifling scientific vitality, prevent the religious element from being undermined by the scientific element and in such a way that science does not adopt a profane orientation but remains directed to what is of practical importance.³⁶¹ (n. 344)

Drey picked out, precisely, the heart of the problem. The vital element of the Church is religiosity, that is, the living religion, religion of the heart, by which man believes in God and loves God with all his being, with all he is. It is that religion of the heart which the theologian's science must serve. There is located his “responsibility”. It is why he must live in the Church and really for her; he must breathe with her and in her. She must not enter the service of his creativity or his originality. Her governance must protect the faithful against the multiple religions of originality.

The scientific work of individuals is concerned with new developments and with criticism of whatever is old and currently the case. And in this way it cannot fail to happen that... useless, inappropriate, indeed, even destructive and wrong things will be uncovered which public opinion will recognize as being so. (n. 344)

Here Drey gives way to the requirements of the Catholic *Aufklärung*. But he immediately expresses his reservations:

... church governance is preserving; its attention is fixed first and foremost on that which lasts and is valid. Because of the principle of permanence from which it looks at the

³⁶⁰ ; *denn im entgegengesetzten Falle*. Himes: “For in either of these opposed situations”.

³⁶¹ For the German text and Himes' translation see above, 93, notes 230, 231 and 232.

totality, it must seek to avoid any break between the old and the new; in this perspective, the new must appear as simply another form of the old and even error as an imperfect grasp of the truth to which alone error also may be related. For wise governance there must, therefore, be means allowing, without impeding new developments and its own improvement, to maintain permanence and to avoid discarding truth with error and the church's foundations with its current form.³⁶² (n. 344)

This passage reveals Drey's outstanding ability to envisage the issue of opinion from the standpoint of the magisterium as well as of the theologian. Apart from some nuances Kustermann makes of Drey a theologian of the *Aufklärung*, close to the ideas of Wessenberg. The only way such a position may be justified is ignoring this important n. 344, only the conclusion of which Kustermann cites.³⁶³

In sum, Kustermann, like most interpreters of Drey, remains on the margins of his thought. Drey's real position on the role of the theologian cannot be grasped without the study of the whole of his thought about opinion and his conception of the *Überlieferung*.

8. Conclusive remarks

As regards the apodictic assertion of Drey's strong dependence on Schleiermacher, a thesis I showed with examples does not resist precise analyses, I may now that my presentation of the BI is over, conclude on my examination of this issue. In the course of my study, I touched on Drey's relationship with Protestantism in general; we may now sketch out a more precise portrayal of this relationship. I will then locate, as accurately as possible, the place of Schleiermacher in Drey's thought. And, finally, I will indicate the origin of the thesis of Drey's strong indebtedness on Schleiermacher.

³⁶² For the German text and Himes' translation see above, 94, notes 233-238.

³⁶³ Cf. "Observations", 45 : "And finally we recall in a general way the whole movement of the 'Catholic *Aufklärung*'... with whose directions and maxims (contrary to all the denials and mystifications of so many interpreters) Drey demonstrates that he is in full and deliberate continuity, at least in his early period—not, to be sure, with its radical elements, but with the 'mainstream' of its activity in southwest Germany where its symbolic figure is the last vicar general of Constance, Ignaz Heinrich Freiherr von Wessenberg..." Here one understands why the extract of n. 342 related to public opinion within the Church comes to be "the Tübingen 'axiom' then and now" in Kustermann's thought (part of the title of his essay).

As we saw above, Drey practiced polemics in the framework of a critical openness to Protestant philosophers and theologians. One cannot contend that Drey was anti-Protestant on the ground of his assertion that Protestantism is based on “headstrong denial of truth”. Drey’s polemics does not resemble the Counter-Reformation’s which was often based on a mere rejection of anything Protestant. Drey shows in a quite outstanding way what the “ecumenical dialogue” must be. A dialogue is not a “conversation” whereby both parties agree in order to avoid dispute; in such a case, one of them must relinquish positions defining its identity. Drey marked his time by a very demanding “dialogue” which brought the esteem of Protestantism to him, in spite of the critique he stated in his first programmatic writing, in spite of his uncompromising statement of the spirit and essence of Catholicism in his second writing, and in spite of his positioning of Protestantism within a “headstrong denial of truth” in his third writing. But at the same time Drey applied himself in a very demanding way to a thorough study of Protestant philosophical and theological thought and drew from it a number of fecund elements he deemed capable of reviving Catholic thought. During the same period, Catholic Enlightenment was often prone to prefer conversation and a kind of single Christianity based on the smallest common denominator. Drey’s intellectual thought process foreshadowed the true dialogue which took place in the twentieth century, alongside conversation.

As to Schleiermacher, he needs to be properly placed in the intellectual context of Drey’s time. German Protestant theological thought of the first half of the nineteenth century, far from being limited to F.C. Baur, Schleiermacher and D.F. Strauss (1808-1874), the author of the controversial *Life of Jesus* (1835), had a variety of trends:

faithfulness to original Lutheranism, more or less liberal trends, pietism. Drey probably knew the history and tormented evolution of the prestigious Protestant faculty of theology of Tübingen, of which Baur was not the only great representative.³⁶⁴

In the specific field of “introductions” or “encyclopedias”, Drey mentions, as I said above, numerous sources (see in n. 81-84 his overview of the Protestant and Catholic history of the “doctrine of methods”). In this respect, Schleiermacher’s renown was very limited; to his great disappointment, his 1811 *Kurze Darstellung* was unsuccessful. One of his two masters, G.J. Planck (1751-1833) Schleiermacher thought he could disparage, enjoyed a great prestige and has exerted a lasting influence. Seckler writes:

From 1784 to 1833, he was Church historian at the Protestant faculty of theology of Göttingen. He was not only an eminent representative of Church pragmatic historiography (he is considered as the founder of modern Protestant history of dogma and of comparative symbolics), but also of the theological encyclopedia. His *Einleitung in die theologische Wissenschaften...*, 1794 and 1795... is considered as an important work of this literary genre, before Schleiermacher’s encyclopedia.³⁶⁵

In the *BI* Drey refers to Planck five times, in a neutral, favourable or unfavourable way (Foreword, n. 56, 83, 133, 140) and to Schleiermacher five times, two of which are unfavourable (Foreword, on the issue of subjectivity and contingency; n. 84, on the limited interest of the *Kurze Darstellung* as an encyclopedia) and three favourable (n. 165, 170, 183, pertaining to the history of biblical texts, hermeneutics, and ethics).³⁶⁶ These references testify to Drey’s careful study of both encyclopedias.

³⁶⁴ On that faculty see H. Harris, *The Tübingen School*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

³⁶⁵ *Aux origines de l'école de Tübingen*, 166, Seckler’s note 3. Translation mine, here and below.

³⁶⁶ Later Drey reconsidered Schleiermacher’s concept of apologetics he deemed acceptable at the time of the *BI*. On that subject see Seckler, “Bandeinleitung. Fünftes Kapitel: Die werkinterne Programmentwicklung und das Problem der Retraktionen”, in Johann Sebastian Drey, *Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie mit Rücksicht auf den wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt und das katholische System*, Tübingen 1819, Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Max Seckler, Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2007, 143*ff.

In the years that followed its publication the *BI* was considered among Protestants as an independent and more valuable work than the *Kurze Darstellung*. During the second half of the nineteenth century, this praise was maintained. “However, in the twentieth century the presentation of the *BI* as strongly depending on Schleiermacher, as a kind of copy of the *Kurze Darstellung*, became commonplace.”³⁶⁷ It is mainly H. Scholz, in the framework of his 1910 edition of Schleiermacher’s 1811 and 1830 *Kurze Darstellung*, who initiated this understanding of the *BI* as belonging to the history of the reception of Schleiermacher’s encyclopedia. Writes Seckler:

Following Scholz, specialized literature of the twentieth century got used to incorporate the *BI* into the tradition coming from Schleiermacher or to locate it in Schleiermacher’s sphere of influence on the basis of pseudo-parallels. Drey’s dependence on Schleiermacher is often presented as immediately obvious or scientifically proved...³⁶⁸

Faced with external similarities, scholarship thought it unnecessary to proceed with an internal comparison of both works.

An important factor of this distorted assessment is, according to Seckler, the spirit of the *Kulturkampf* which spread the idea that the momentum of Catholic theology at the beginning of the nineteenth century was necessarily due to Protestant influences. This presupposition was largely accepted, at least in Germany, either *expressis verbis* or through a subliminal influence.³⁶⁹ In the beginning of the twenty-first century the alleged dependence of the *BI* on Schleiermacher remains commonplace in specialized literature, even in Germany.³⁷⁰

I will underline here as a conclusion an important difference between Drey and Schleiermacher’s positions on the central point of the scientific status of theology, a point

³⁶⁷ Id., « Pour comprendre », 93.

³⁶⁸ Id., 94.

³⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁷⁰ Cf. *id.*, note 59.

I did not touch on in my analyses. On that issue, the influence of Schleiermacher is usually presented as extremely strong, Seckler writes. Yet the simple reading of both encyclopedias reveals the extent to which a subjective approach to religion and revelation (Schleiermacher) and a positive-subjective (dialogic) approach (Drey) may lead to different conclusions regarding the very possibility of a scientific status of theology.

The ecclesiality (i.e. positiveness) of theology and the historicity of its subject matter led Schleiermacher to historicise systematic disciplines. This path Drey did not want to follow. Rather, in the line of Schelling, he joined reason and faith, truth and history, scientificity and ecclesiality, in a very differentiated and more constructive way, within a concept of theology understood as an endeavour capable of being scientific at the highest level.³⁷¹

Conclusion: An approach to the relevance of Drey's thought for our time

General remarks

As shown in the analysis of the programmatic writings, Drey cannot be placed in a straitjacket. Overall, he is at the turning point between the Enlightenment and Romanticism. One could say that he greets the better of these two great moments of German thought: of the former, the passionate work of discursive reason, the struggle for freedom of thought and research, and the methodical grounding of sciences; of the latter, the acute sense of the Absolute, and the recovery of intuition and history.

From the formal and material standpoint, Drey's theology is organic, as it has to represent the living Whole that Christ and his Church are. Inside this organicity, Drey takes into account the "dialectics of the living", so to speak: the tension between the spirit of God and the spirit of the world. Then, the very tensions of the human spirit itself: openness to the infinite and to absolute objectivity and the quest for acknowledgment of finitude and subjectivity; the quest for truth which can only find its way through opinion;

³⁷¹ Id., 95.

and an acute Catholic sense of the prerequisites of the unity and universality of the Church and the quest for the particular and the singular. Drey does not practice dialectics for its own sake, but as the expression of the real. Finally, his theology rests upon a knowledge enlivened by the scientific spirit: establishment of first principles, demanding practice of deduction, a complete epistemology.

Romanticism, and Drey with it, recapture the most fruitful gains of the Enlightenment of the Middle Ages – twelfth and thirteenth centuries – and remedy the desiccating atmosphere of two types of rationalism, that of baroque scholasticism and that of the *Aufklärung*, both enemies of life and unhistorical, though for different reasons. Without knowing, we may presume, the intellectual intuition so present in St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, they nevertheless recover it. Without knowing, we may presume, either the theology of history of those two giants of medieval Enlightenment³⁷² or the importance of gradual revelation in St. Bonaventure, Drey reconquers them, transformed, of course, by the history of thought. Without knowing, we may presume, Aquinas' philosophy of the *esse*, Drey reconquers it. Those reconquests are not a “renaissance” of the Middle Ages, in the way the sixteenth century was a Renaissance of classical antiquity; Romanticism revives not only historical thinking, but the history of thought. I think it is from that angle that we may better understand the movement of Drey's thought and his relevance for our time.

We saw that the limited research pertaining to Drey's relevance in the English-speaking world is based on unspoken assumptions, not on openness to the whole of his

³⁷² On that question see Seckler, *Le salut et l'histoire. La pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur la théologie de l'histoire* (Paris: Cerf, 1967); original: *Das Heil in der Geschichte. Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin* (Kösel Verlag, 1964); no English translation. Also J. Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971, 1989); original: *Die Geschichtstheologie des Heiligen Bonaventure* (Verlag Schnell & Steiner München, 1959).

approach and his thinking. There is no attempt to discover them; rather there is an effort to find in them something to support pre-established theories. But is not this attitude the expression of a deeper problem which is not unique to the Anglophone milieu? May it be that it expresses a situation largely prevailing in western Catholicism, especially now in the early twenty-first century, when theology seems to move in slow motion? Despite Welch's criticisms, the effort of English-speaking historians to recover the sources which are similar to the fruitful content of the present time represents in my view a very fair insight; we only need to go further back in time and gather the lost foundations. It is for theologians to make this effort. Drey's approach seems exemplary in this respect. In a first step, he wants to diagnose the state of theology in his time; for this purpose, he performs a very encompassing overview of the history of theology since the Middle Ages, guided by a keen sense of the essential. We can repeat this journey, extend it over the two centuries after Drey's writings, and retain with him the grounding elements of any theology eager to escape dead ends. In a second step, on the basis of this diagnosis, Drey posits what constitutes the spirit and essence of Catholicism. In doing so, he states his positions, openly, clearly. In a third step, on these foundations, he builds his theology.

Necessity and contingency

The first foundation is the pair of necessity-contingency that Drey repositions by opposing what is really opposed: the necessary is what cannot not be; and the contingent is what can not be. The opposite of freedom is determinism, not necessity, and for that reason Drey never speaks of determinism. Whether one believes in God or not, the idea of God is connected to the necessary, the Absolute, the infinite, the eternity. In human

language, we say that God “cannot” not be, but for God there is no question of not being able to not be; he simply is and therefore he is supremely free. The autonomy of the created world and human freedom are conditioned by finiteness. To reverse these notions and locate necessity in the contingent – human reason for example – or, still more, to leave out any notion of necessity as many are prone to do today, leads to building theology on sand.

But Drey does not position the necessary and the contingent as if they were two mutually impervious worlds. He draws from Schellingian idealism – though through major changes – the ground of his theology of revelation: the presence of the infinite in the finite, which the former entirely shrouds. Knowledge is included in this manifestation. In the Foreword of the *BI* (xxxiv) Drey emphasizes how important it is to teach theology so that students do not have the sense of discovering something contingent, “something merely given, something which happens to be the case and about which consequently an equally contingent way of speaking has grown up, like a dead leaf on which travelers tread without knowing whence the wind has blown it.”

This issue of necessity and contingency is not only a matter for discussion among academics or Church leaders, sparing the ordinary faithful who would not understand it at all. The *sensus fidei* is acutely aware, not of the words, but their contents. When a body of liturgical reforms was imposed by Paul VI in a short lapse of time in the aftermath of Vatican II, thousands of Catholics in the West silently left the Church, no longer recognizing in her the continuation of primitive Christianity. A number of the leaders of national Churches believed that everything – not only worship, but also the theology it expresses – in the Church was contingent, so that their worship and theology lost out to

personal opinion. I did not experience that period, but I have heard many people tell their priests: “this is what you teach now, and you celebrate this way now; but if what you were doing before was wrong, what you are doing now will be wrong in twenty years.” In their way, they reproached their pastors for having made Christianity something absolutely contingent. Yet certain Vatican II reforms were appropriate and did not affect the essence of worship.

The constant claim addressed to the Church, even from inside, that she must “adapt” to our time, means that she ought to insert herself into contingency. At the same time, the contingent of our time is considered necessary. It seems to me that the difficulty so many bishops have in positioning themselves with respect to requests for adaptation is due to the fact they do not distinguish between what in the Church is divinely necessary and what is finite and contingent. Drey’s very Johannine remarks on the struggle of the spirit of God and the spirit of the world provide a first criterion of discernment. Drey gives other criteria I will touch on later.

Revelation and *Überlieferung*

Revelation, which becomes entirely meaningful once the loci of contingency and necessity are rightly posited, is never, at least in my country, the object of catechesis and preaching. The common way of both of them is referring to the “Word” of God, which appears to be a word limited to writing, and which therefore is neither a present divine act nor a divine presence. It follows that a number of Catholics, though faithful to the Church – at least intending to be so – are prone to believe that the ultimate revelation is finished, because, well, it is ultimate. They are like inhabitants of a mining village next to a closed mine, a miserable remnant of a golden time when God was speaking, when he incarnated,

when he did great, marvellous things. Therefore they limit their faith to an effort of memory. Drey reproached Protestantism for limiting its effort to merely revive an ancient book, but we do the same. More, sacramental life also resembles a mere revival of a past event. We attempt to believe that Christ is there, in the Eucharist, but the mass should not last more than an hour!

Drey shows that the ultimate revelation is over as regards what God may intimate concerning himself, but that it is not over as regards humankind. In fact, that the ultimate revelation continues in its self-delivery in the life of the Church and through the Church should be clear to us as the Church continues to proclaim the Gospel throughout the world. But we do not understand it because we dimly feel that there is no more revelation, that Christ is not really present now and that the proclamation of the Gospel belongs to “tradition”, understood as merely human “handing down” of “data”.

Drey shows the scope of the Incarnation. Through his Incarnation, the Son tells us that revelation, more precisely tradition as the continuous gift of revelation, follows the path of what is incarnated in his likeness. It is why each of us must be “a worthy revelation of God”. At Christmas, after having seen a pastoral agent come and go in the sanctuary before and during the mass, as if she were the owner and as if God was in her home, I showed her the sanctuary lamp shining at its brightest, and asked her with a smile what that shining lamp meant. The agent was dumbfounded at the question. The lamp is, I said, the sensible sign of God’s presence, at the Tent of Meeting, as previously the *shekinah* in the desert where God had called his people so that he worships him. “He is really here, and we, we must reveal his presence. God entrusts us a mission in revelation.” The agent, overcome, looked at me with a hint of irritation.

Five years ago, the single time I had been authorized to speak on my own at a catechesis, I spoke of revelation, in very simple words, and I presented the Church as the gathering of people who receive and greet God's self-revelation. In ten minutes, I shattered the parents' hostility toward the Church which they thought was the inventor of a religion, seeking to impose it arbitrarily and disregarding individual consciences. For this is what public opinion believes. Church authorities of my country have difficulty understanding what is problematic in collective consciousness.

By the late 1990s, once more in my country, a shift in the way of saying things was deemed able to make the Gospel more acceptable: rather than proclaiming the Gospel, we ought to “propound faith”³⁷³. It was faith, no longer God, which was a “strength to live”. This *pro nobis* theology, which Luther himself would have rejected for he never replaced God with faith, leads Christianity back to being the opium of the people, which remains a strong argument against us. I have been told quite often, “do believe if it makes you feel better.” Each of us will have the kind of faith he or she needs to “live” and God will be an instrument *ad hoc* of this faith. I cite an extract from the text mentioned in footnote: “In the pastoral reflection on the future of parishes, we readily insist on the necessity for them to conceive of themselves as an ecclesial ‘relay’ rather than a ‘paddock’... The paddock encloses.”³⁷⁴ What an insult to God who gathers his people into a place – we call a parish – so that they worship him and then go living from his life and reveal him, with him.

³⁷³ Assemblée des évêques du Québec, *Proposer aujourd'hui la foi aux jeunes. Une force pour vivre* (Montreal: Fides, 2000). The document was elaborated by naive laypeople and approved by the AEQ.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39. Translation by R. Sonin.

Essence and configuration of the essence of Christianity

This distinction which Drey derives from the pair of necessity-contingency and which regards the three components of Christianity – doctrinal concept, worship, and Church organization – would help, it seems to me, to counter the current hardening of two important trends in the Western Church : the so-called “progressive” trend which requires that the Church “adapt”, that is to say, that she “adopt” the spirit of the world; and the so-called “conservative” trend which dreams, to various extents, of an immutable Church. These two trends have a common feature: they are modeled on the political and social thought of the atheist world. The former is in accord with the Gospel, to some extent, as regards the social field, and the latter is in accord with the Gospel, to some extent, in individual morals. The former sees only non-essentials in doctrine and in the Church; the latter confuses essence and configuration of the essence. Paradoxically, the “progressive” trend is backward-looking for it dreams of the Church configuration inherited from Constantine – what we call Christendom, with crowded churches on Sundays, a few lay people involved in policies and evangelizing initiatives, the immense remnant of lay people being deemed deprived of charismata and dedicated to funding and menial tasks. Episcopal conferences would find in the distinction between the essential and the non-essentials a second criterion to position themselves as regards doctrine, worship, and polity; in this way they would be more able to warn the faithful against the excesses of both trends.

On life and development

In this regard I look back at what Drey means by the life of the Church, by Christian life. As he says, any idea of a Christian, any morals of Christians, any liturgy

made up by Christians are not in essence a Christian idea, Christian morals, Christian liturgy. The life of Christians must be permeated by the *Überlieferung*: by revelation in its continuous self-delivery, by Christ's *Dasein*, by the Christian *res*. It is against the *Überlieferung* that we must measure the merits or drift of any development of doctrine, worship, mores and polity, whether it is spontaneous or voluntary, and of responses to the claims of the present day.

I will give two examples of development, referred and not referred to Christ, to the Christian *res*. When, in the summer 2010, President Sarkozy expelled from France, *manu militari*, Roma because they were Roma, the French Church kept silent out of respect for her monarch-president. In the message delivered in French on August 22, Benedict XVI called for the reception of legitimate human diversity. As this call was not in the messages written in other languages, the French Church understood the reprimand; she remembered that Christ did not practice discrimination and she broke her silence. The Elysee was offended. The media went on a rampage, accusing the pope of political interference, and right and extreme right media accused him of an intolerable left turn.

On June 11, 2011, Benedict XVI received two-thousand Roma and Gypsies at the Vatican (see *Zenit*, June 12, 2011). These marginalized people had never been received by a pope. The doctrinal message of August 22, 2010 was embodied in the life. That is what the living religion is, what a really Christian doctrine and life are.

The other example is the feminist claim to ministerial priesthood. A first observation: the lack of historical sense of the feminist movement, which manifests itself in two ways. First, by wilful ignorance that the situation of women first improved only in Christendom, and first of all in the oldest Christendom. Yet news shows what the

situation of women is in non-Christian lands, and history shows how in Christian lands it depends on the slow progress of Christian ideas. Second, the lack of historical sense is also evidenced by an absolutization of the present time such that feminism believes it has reached the pinnacle of its evolution.

In the sixties, Albert Memmi, a Tunisian Jewish francophone writer, traced a vivid portrait of the evolution of the collective consciousness of colonized peoples and oppressed groups (Blacks, Jews)³⁷⁵, which inspires the following lines. In the first phase, the colonized, the oppressed, have a native sense of their inferiority; they unreservedly admire their colonizer, their oppressor. In a second phase, they try to break away from their inferiority by identifying with their colonizer whom they still admire and with whom they want to merge. This phase of self-denial is all the more painful since it includes the unacknowledged self-hatred and, quite often, an error in judging the opponent. Feminists are in this phase of a demand for equality by an identification with man. They intend to exercise this same power they reproach men for, and exclude other women, if necessary. They are interested, not in the authority of truth, but in coercive power on consciences. The third phase, which Martin Luther King greatly represented, is the one of reconciliation with oneself, of stopping comparisons, of peaceful claim to equal fundamental social and political rights. Once feminists have reconciled with themselves, it is their own identity they will seek to enforce. But the conquest of oneself (not of the other) is not easy; Memmi writes that the colonized almost never succeeds in

³⁷⁵ See among other titles *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, trans. H. Greenfeld, expanded edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991); original: *Portrait du colonisé, précédé du Portrait du colonisateur* (Pauvert, 1966); *Dominated Man. Notes toward a Portrait* (New York: Orion Press, 1968); original: *L'homme dominé* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).

coinciding with himself.³⁷⁶ Nevertheless, among the younger generations of women this step is coming. They are grateful to feminism for the conquest of fundamental public rights, but they know its deficiency regarding private life, and they confidently assert their own identity, without hatred or resentment. In the Church, this liberation will have to go through the discovery of baptismal priesthood. Few know what it is and what it requires. Only the union of mysticism and reason will make it possible to understand it and live it. Its requirements are so high that we will not ask more than that.

Drey underlines in note to n. 259 that opinions “which may indeed have had weight for a long time... but which have remained without effect on the doctrinal concept, are to be regarded simply as products of the spirit of a certain period.” This is a remark of great wisdom.

Now I must explain why the claim for women in the priesthood is not referred to Christ. The main argument that is invoked is that would Christ incarnate now and in another place, he would certainly choose women among the apostles; this implies that he would perhaps make himself a woman. In other words, one may regret that he incarnated two thousand years ago in Palestine; he would have been more useful by incarnating now in the West. It is the argument of contingency. But Incarnation is not God’s ontological fall into contingency; it is the irruption of the necessary into the contingent which it bathes and transforms, at any time and anywhere, because Christ remains incarnated!

On Christianity’s effects in the world

Only in the Appendix have I presented the internal organization of Drey’s historical propaedeutic. I will touch here on one of its aspects. Drey divides the history of

³⁷⁶ Cf. *Portrait du colonisé*, 175.

Christianity into external and internal history. The external history (cf. n. 178, 180-188) embraces the history of Christianity in so far as it “undergoes” the opposition of the world and in so far as it “acts” in the world. The history of distortions of suffering Christianity, its “vicissitudes”, is highly praised by its internal and external opponents, who add supplemental distortions. What Drey calls the “general pragmatic history of Christianity’s effects on the world” (note to n. 188) is passed over in silence. In Drey’s time, such history did not exist. (cf. n. 188) In our time, not much more of such history exists, save as regards the early Middle Ages, and it still does not exist as a discipline. A strongly documented work published in 2005 gives an idea of what such a discipline could provide: *How the Catholic Church built Western Civilization*.³⁷⁷ Such history should be included in the program of historical studies for future priests and for lay persons who will cooperate with priestly ministry. Catholics could then make a more accurate judgment about their own confession. Bishops, priests, and lay who reproach the Church for never “adapting” will discover that the Church ceaselessly “took into account” – which is not the same thing – the variety of human needs over the centuries, in the light of the spirit of God, not the spirit of the world, and this she continues to do. The social doctrine of the Church appeared at the end of the nineteenth century as a response to the violence of industrial capitalism. The elaboration of this doctrine has never stopped, as we saw with Benedict XVI’s third encyclical which confronts neo-liberalism and the recent economic crisis generated by pure financial capitalism. John-Paul II strongly opposed, in 2001-2002, invading wars and the recourse to war in general. The

³⁷⁷ T.E. Woods, Jr., *How the Catholic Church built Western Civilization* (Washington, Regnery Publishing, Washington, 2005). Besides the early Middle Ages, Woods deals the following subjects: the Church and the University; the Church and science (the longest chapter); art, architecture, and the Church; the origins of international law; the Church and economics; the Church and charity which changed the world; the Church and Western law; the Church and Western morality.

Church possesses a bio-ethics she constantly refines with the help of true scientists. That the Church is not heeded does not mean that she does not speak. That being said, it may be that the Church vigorously opposes trends expressing contempt for life or for the integrity of the human person. Did Christ, her Master, “adapt” his discourse to the desires of his audience? When many disciples went away after the discourse on the bread of life, did Jesus retract to “adapt”? No, he let them go away and abandon him and simply asked the Twelve whether they wanted to go away too. In the same way we must learn to give leave to people to go away if we are to refer our life to Christ’s.

On the unity of faith and reason

Faith may be incompatible with reason: to be compatible it must have an objective ground. But the locus of objectivity cannot be in man. Drey posits absolute objectivity in God alone, while in man it is received. As what is objective or not belongs to the order of knowledge, absolute objectivity is knowledge, thus truth, and for this reason revelation is true communication from divine reason to human reason, in this place we name, with an etymological certainty we must not forget, consciousness (knowing-with). This knowledge which is beyond any knowledge remains knowledge and therefore has a connection with reason: it is why faith is knowledge, and therefore conviction. In the opening pages of the *BI*, Drey excludes dead-end paths which render Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, incapable of speaking about revelation and of positing the unity of faith and reason. These paths belong to an approach to God which claims to be subjective only (the so-called “ascending theology” as we name it today): the authority of the “I” concerning his dependence upon God (Schleiermacher’s contradictory path); and the inner experience of the will or of reason which blindly fumbles about (the path of

degenerate mysticism which rejects the proper work of reason or the short path of short-lived emotion).

On epistemology

It is certain that to achieve such a firm unity of truth, objectivity, faith, and reason an epistemology is needed. We saw Drey's: he unambiguously posits immediate knowledge of intuitive reason, upon which discursive reason starts work. He implicitly shows that rationalism, by accusing immediate knowledge of irrationalism, makes itself irrational.

But is the intellectual intuition posited by Drey an option, an arbitrary choice, appropriate to counter Kant and baroque scholasticism, conveniently found in Schelling? Could somebody tell Drey: "intelligence includes intuition, well, for you!"? It seems to me that Drey's epistemology has a deeper source, connected to the union in him of life and thought, of his person and the Church, and finally to his conception of inspiration.

It seems to me that during his five years of vicariate Drey met in life, in the life of the small and the poor, the intuition which Kant denied in his works. As for me I met it in my parish, among people who are not educated but are worshipers in spirit and truth, and show an exemplary charity. I admire them; their presence reminds me of the essential. Their faith is not irrational. Informed by intuition, it rests upon a right and inventive reason, the one which sets up the social works of the Church. "I bless you, Father, for hiding these things from the learned and the clever and revealing them to little children." (Mt 11: 25) It is there, intuition, posited in the biblical texts themselves. Historical criticism and ratiocinating understanding cannot achieve this exegesis; Drey could do it, for he grounds the living exegesis of ancient texts in living Christianity.

And inspiration, which we often are so nostalgic for while reading the Prophets and which spiritual delusions believe they may recover by transforming the Holy Spirit into a kind of flying saucer that comes down here and there – on man’s side is it not in its very essence intuition? The end of the note to n. 232 of the *BI* (see above, 78) may be connected, it seems to me, with the repeated assertion of the living intuition of an uninterrupted link with the source, in which true Catholicism is moving and which alone gives it a fecundity similar to the one of biblical history.

Among drug addicts, prisoners, trisomics, persons suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, there is often a discourse which astounds the understanding. If only a Christian visits them and sees in them the Christ of the Last Judgment, they come to employ the biblical vocabulary they do not know, and the ecclesial vocabulary they do not know either. Drug addicts (who try to get themselves out of their situation) and prisoners are often masters of the theology of priesthood. Thus the prisoner telling the young chaplain who circulates, unarmed, in the courtyard of the prison: “God is with us.” “Well,” the chaplain says, “tell me how.” “There you are,” the prisoner says simply. No prisoner comes up with this to a lay person, even if he knows his or her faith and fervour. For him the priest is the one who, through the gift of his life to God and through the grace of the sacrament of the Order, is a river through which God’s very presence streams: the priest is the supereminent “manifestation” of God. But the prisoner does not say it with these words; he has no words, and needs no words. Now, the river should not overflow its banks; the enlightened, progressive priest for whom the priesthood is only the survival of an ancient superstition and who does not run the risk of circulating in the courtyard, is not

a divine river, just a human swamp. One cannot deceive those men who are in the abyss.³⁷⁸

On the need for a reference philosophical system

Now, epistemology is not the sole philosophical discipline that theology needs. It needs a philosophical system. By this I do not mean a closed system. But it needs a system, and besides, it always rests upon philosophical presuppositions. As Drey says, even “those who pretend to dispense with every set form [of philosophy] precisely by this fact adopt one particular form in their philosophizing.” (*BI*, n. 95) When theology believes it may dispense with philosophy it rests on grounds it does not recognize. The present drift of theology into praxeology (or, as I would call it, theory of adaptation) in my country rests on a mix of distorted Kantian doctrines, vaguely Sartrean existentialism, and socio-constructivism.

³⁷⁸ The young chaplain remained dumbfounded by his interlocutor’s answer. He did not expect it; he is too humble to expect such an answer; he has the humility Drey requests as the primordial virtue. But why did the prisoner see the full meaning of ministerial priesthood in the young chaplain? First, because the chaplain circulates in the courtyard, this place of extreme violence, without having himself accompanied by armed guards. He “represents” Christ descending alone into hell. The prisoner knows nothing of the days which followed Christ’s death and the day of his resurrection. It is not necessary; he intuits it. The progressive chaplain, for his part, does not “descend” into hell; he stands in his office, where prisoners must “ascend” to see him, like the damned who are trying to get into the Barque of Dante and whom Delacroix so powerfully imagined in a painting exhibited at the Paris Salon of 1822.

There are other reasons: the young chaplain invited the nuns of the Charity to make catecheses; he also invited a young Orthodox priest who explains the scope of the Gospels, in a beautiful and fluid language, where life flows. Prisoners drink in the words of the former and the latter. After a catechesis on prayer, the chaplain says: “Let us let prayer enter life; and first, the greatest one: adoration.” He goes to get the Blessed Sacrament and comes back preceded by a prisoner who carries a lighted candle. The prisoner is upset: he “precedes” the Lord. Another, seeing the “arrival of God”, falls on his knees, sobbing. What Drey says in *L’esprit et l’essence* – Christ is really present in his Church and with her – is not the fruit of imagination or intellectualism.

Finally, the chaplain celebrates mass and gives the sacrament of reconciliation, without being accommodating. After less than a year of ministry, he received two requests for baptism and two for confirmation. He goes to see the prisoners tortured by prisoners at the hospital. He is the man of sorrows. He is the man of hope. He is the man of living Christianity. His progressive, enlightened colleague reproached him for all that. “We are here only to listen,” he said. “Well, let you be replaced by a psychoanalyst,” the young chaplain replies. “Listening without saying anything is his function. It is not the mission of the priest.”

Of course, theology ought to rely on a system congenial to the spirit of Christianity (cf. *BI*, n. 96). Neo-platonic idealism will always be congenial because it is confirmed by Christ as the prototype of *exitus* (from the Father) and *reditus* (to the Father). Schellingian idealism, with its insistence on the life and becoming of the Absolute, hence on the history of the Absolute, of God finally, has confronted in an unequalled way, despite its own excesses and aporias, another persistent aporia within Catholicism: the idea of a living, personal, loving God, incompatible with the idea of an impassible, hence non-loving, impersonal, immobile God. Drey's critical use of this aspect of Schelling's thought allowed him to give substance, so to speak, to the continued incarnation of Christ. Christ's presence is not simply the presence of an ethereal "to be" we can say nothing about, but the presence of a living "to be", of his *Dasein*.

On the union of mysticism [*Mystik*] and speculation

Faced with a Catholicism emptied of mysticism by "progressivism" as well as "conservatism", a number of faithful, now as in the nineteenth century, turn towards forgeries of mysticism: at best the inner experience, emotion and "God's winks", the "motions of the Holy Spirit", at worst towards the New Age and its recipes – miraculous autosuggestion, the tree of life, the energy of stones, the virtues of incense against evil spirits, tarot, mantras, past lives and reincarnation, and finally the "memorandum of God" (which makes each of its readers a God who ought to discover himself and to whom God suggests a means for becoming God faster than he himself did) and the satanic "Bible" that circulates in the underground of drug addiction.

Nevertheless, in my country, there still are a number of bishops, priests, and lay who pursue their struggle against the true link with the sacred without worrying about or

at least realizing the fall of so many baptized into the real superstition they generated. “May God preserve us from the mystics,” a bishop said to his presbytery. Monasteries, why? Monks and nuns should be useful rather than pray all the time. Clerical celibacy? Why does one consecrate himself to God in our day? Statues? It opens the way to the worship of idols. Closing a church? Sure, one fewer tabernacle. Proclaiming the Gospel and celebrating the Liturgy of the Hours in a Catholic house for healing drug addicts? No! This would impede each one’s freedom – the memorandum of God is better, it is not a threat to freedom. Get out, the Gospel proclaimers, the Psalm readers, in spite of the objurgations of the drug addicts themselves, who from their abyss greeted and marvelled at these liberating proclamations and prayers and told their visitors: stay with us a little longer. In the sight of all these unprecedented tragedies which hit Christians, Drey’s observations about the consequences of the separation of mysticism and reason seem prophetic to me.

About method

Drey posits with a flawless firmness the independence of theology; it reigns supreme at home. He then posits the independence of the various disciplines which may have a connection with theology. Thirdly, he posits the ensuing need for theology to receive, in a critical way, the import of those disciplines. In this way theology is still reigning supreme at home, and God reigning supreme within it. The discipline that is the most eager to govern theology, that is, biblical exegesis, may freely achieve its results, but cannot pretend to impose them on theology. The whole of Drey’s theology – and the *BI* – is organized and presented rooted in these points.

Lonergan's theological method which inspired in me a strong dissatisfaction and the desire to explore the *BI*, is not in fact a theological method, but a method applicable to any other discipline and which he intends to apply to theology.³⁷⁹ It follows that theology is made dependent at the very beginning of its work. What does this method consist in? In the transcendental method, that is, a "general empirical method", as Lonergan writes in *Insight*, a method that is foundational, universally significant, relevant and spontaneously employed, and that can be consciously objectified.³⁸⁰ More precisely, it is transcendental in two senses: first, insofar as it is not particular; second, "in that it promotes self-transcendence, or self-appropriation, by moving the knower beyond each level of intentional consciousness."³⁸¹ Well, that is a Cartesian-Kantian-Husserlian discourse! Through this transparent prism, the notions of human good, meaning, and religion ensure the transition to the theological method. We are under the reign of absolute subjectivity. The "objectification" of the "contents of consciousness" has nothing to do with the objectivity of which Drey posits God as the one and single source. It consists in the subject positing his ego and his "I-ness" before his ego and I-ness, and making himself the object of first, preliminary, knowledge.

So one cannot be surprised that among the eight "functional specialties", that is, the great tasks of any discipline, related by pairs in accordance with the operations of the knowing subject (experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding)³⁸², the speciality called "foundations" first consists in an intellectual, moral and religious conversion, correlated

³⁷⁹ I refer to the interpreter par excellence of Lonergan's method, J. B. Sauer, *A commentary on Lonergan's Method in Theology* (P.L. Monette and C. Jamieson, eds., The Lonergan Web Site, Ottawa, Ontario, 2001), 2.

³⁸⁰ Cf. id., 28.

³⁸¹ Id., 35.

³⁸² Cf. id., 144.

with the fourth level of intentional consciousness. It is a decision, careful, weighed, and not spontaneous, unreflective, arbitrary, or merely subjective, about the horizon in which doctrines have their meaning, systematics reconcile, and communications are effective.³⁸³ Foundations do not ground theology; they ground the approach of the scientist, of the theologian, and in this regard Lonergan's work is remarkable. His method seeks to form an upright reason and an upright will. Would it be better known, it would protect scholarship (present scholasticism) from the tendency to proof-texting, anachronisms, and the ceaseless search for originality. Freed from its pretension to organize theology in accordance with its general categories, it would be an outstanding psychological propaedeutic for future theologians, and Drey would have appreciated it in this regard for he had sensitivity to the disorders of the spirit and the heart. He would have set it among the disciplines of practical theology, at the last rank as to its end, which is not theological, and perhaps at the first rank as a precondition of a fruitful practice of theology, all the more since the imperialism of subjectivity has thoroughly pervaded the collective and individual unconscious over the past two centuries.

Lonergan's thought is considered to be transcendental Thomism, but his methodological work is by no means Thomistic. Drey's interpreters did not establish a connection between Drey and St. Thomas, yet the *BI* reveals deep affinities between these two thinkers, be it only the courage to confront the totality within the framework of different theological architectures, each of them meeting the challenges of his time.

Lonergan grounds theology on man, St. Thomas on God, and Drey on the encounter of God and man, on God's initiative. As in the Bible.

³⁸³ Cf. *id.*, 268-269.

The *Brief Introduction*
**“Second Principal Part: Encyclopedic Presentation
of the Principal Parts of the Study of Theology”**

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In normal characters: Drey’s headings

In italics: my additions or changes

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– *Kurze Einleitung in das Studium der Theologie mit Rücksicht auf den wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt und das katholische System*, Tübingen, bey Heinrich Laupp, 1819, Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Max Seckler. Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2007.

Readers who know German will greatly benefit from that book, which comprises three parts: an introduction; the *Kurze Einleitung* with a critical apparatus; the text of notes taken by Drey's students, also with a critical apparatus.

The introduction comprises nine chapters written by Max Seckler and Winfried Werner. Hereafter the titles of these chapters, whose translation is mine, from the French translation provided by J.-M. Roessli.

First chapter: Characteristics of the *Kurze Einleitung* in the light of its title (*Max Seckler*)

Second chapter: Positioning the *Kurze Einleitung* in the history of its literary genre and among writings belonging to this genre (*Max Seckler*)

Third chapter: The *Kurze Einleitung* in relation to Schleiermacher and Schelling (*Max Seckler*)

Fourth chapter: The *Kurze Einleitung* in Drey's academic teaching (*Max Seckler*)

Fifth chapter: The development of the program of the *Kurze Einleitung* in Drey's thought and the problem of retractions (*Max Seckler*)

Sixth chapter: Drey's manuscript (*Winfried Werner*)

Seventh chapter: Printing and History of the Publication of the *Kurze Einleitung* (*Winfried Werner*)

Eighth chapter: Reception and influence of the *Kurze Einleitung* (*Max Seckler*)

Ninth chapter: editorial principles of the present edition of the *Kurze Einleitung* (Max Seckler / Winfried Werner)

The third part of the work contains the following texts:

- 1) Notes taken by Johann Georg Kollmann during the course “Encyclopedia of theological sciences” given by Drey in 1842, in Tübingen.
- 2) Notes taken by Matthäus Wiehl during the course “Encyclopedia” given by Drey in 1845-1846.

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