THE CONSISTENCY OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION

OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

Robert Kelly

A THESIS

in

The Department

of

Philosophy

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at
Sir George Williams University
Montreal, Canada

September, 1974

ABSTRACT

ROBERT KELLY

THE CONSISTENCY OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION

OF THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

This thesis is intended to show that Wittgenstein views philosophy as the analysis of language primarily in both his early and later writings. The purpose of his analysis is to clarify the propositions of the natural sciences and ordinary language - which he refers to as what can be said in factual discourse; and to eliminate the metaphysical propositions of traditional philosophers - which he refers to as nonsensical because certain of their terms lack meaning in factual discourse. In the TRACTATUS his analysis attempts to find the essence of language; whereas in the INVESTIGATIONS his analysis examines the uses of language in language-games and searches for family resemblances rather than essences. My thesis will attempt to show that although his viewpoints on language and the method of its analysis have changed from his earlier to his later writings, his viewpoints as to the nature of philosophy itself have remained consistent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The theme of this thesis is the consistency of
Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy. The
major point to clarify here is whether or not there are two
views of philosophy put forth by Wittgenstein. Some authors
suggest that Wittgenstein abandoned the early view of phi-
losophy that he had in the TRACTATUS for a different one in
his later works such as the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS.
George Pitcher for one says that there are two Wittgensteins
to be considered - the early one of the TRACTATUS and the
later one of the INVESTIGATIONS. This thought is also
brought out by Justus Hartnack when he says:

> No unbroken line leads from the TRACTUS
> to the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS; there
> is no logical sequence between the two
> books, but rather a logical gap. The
> thought of the later work is a negation
> of the thought of the earlier.[1]

As further evidence that this viewpoint has had some serious
influence in interpretations of Wittgenstein's books, we
can also look at a quotation from Peter Winch:

> And on the other hand it would be quite
> absurd to deny that the philosophy of
> say, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, is

in obvious and fundamental conflict with
that of the TRACTATUS. Indeed, the earlier
sections at least of PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTI-
GATIONS are an explicit criticism of the
point of view underlying the earlier work.[2]

My position will be that Wittgenstein has kept to
the same view of philosophy in both texts, and has altered
only his methods. In fact, even though I have quoted Winch
above as referring to the fundamental conflict between the
TRACTATUS and the INVESTIGATIONS, this quote is from his
article entitled 'The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy.'
In this article he acknowledges that people do refer to two
distinct Wittgensteins, but he wishes to refute this view-
point as well. His article supports my position that the
method, or system as he calls it, may change, but the philo-
sophy itself can remain constant in spite of this. The
fundamental conflict for him turns out to be one of method
as well. In the preface to the INVESTIGATIONS, Wittgenstein
says, "that the latter could be seen in the right light only
by contrast with and against the background of my old way of
thinking."[3] Pears suggests this was not to show the differ-
ences of each as much as to suggest that ". . . what he was
trying to do was still the same kind of thing, and that the
change in method was not a sharp break with the past."[4] I
would contend that one should view the INVESTIGATIONS as a
development of the views put forth in the TRACTATUS, although

one cannot deny that his early method is later altered. I will attempt to defend this position by brief descriptions of both the TRACTATUS and the INVESTIGATIONS, showing that the same theme is central to both.

Before I begin these descriptions it would be advantageous to have a general introduction into just what it is that Wittgenstein is referring to when he uses the word 'philosophy.' His definition of philosophy must be seen to be completely different from that held by most traditional philosophers. In fact it is referred to as a new subject here. Traditional philosophy may be seen as various attempts to answer philosophical questions; and then Wittgenstein's philosophy would be seen as an examination of these various attempts themselves, rather than further examination of the questions. He examines language to see what can and cannot be said factually. Maslow refers to this point generally:

> Philosophy is not a body of knowledge.
> Neither is it a theory about the world
> based upon empirical investigation; nor
> is it a special knowledge of the ulti-
> mate nature of reality, obtained a
> priori by some extra-empirical reve-
> lation. It is but an activity of clari-
> fying our language.[5]

This conception of philosophy can be seen to be developing for Wittgenstein in the NOTEBOOKS 1914-16 when he says that the philosopher must not occupy himself with questions which

do not concern him. The subject matter of the philosopher now must be seen as distinct from the questions traditionally asked by philosophers, in particular metaphysicians. The subject matter must be restricted to the analysis of language. The purpose of this is to clarify what can be said - the sentences of ordinary language which include those of the natural sciences - and to reject what cannot be said - the metaphysical propositions of traditional philosophers. Furthermore it must be seen that philosophy is purely descriptive, it is not meant to explain anything or give new knowledge, but merely to aid us in seeing clearly what we already know. Wittgenstein says, "In philosophy there are no deductions; it is purely descriptive . . . . Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing."[6] His basic assumptions are that logic is the basis of language and that language describes the world. Thus the topics to be discussed are logic, language, and the world. As we shall see, the link between language and the world is brought out through logical form. Maslow explains this relation of language to the world and helps us to see why Wittgenstein viewed the study of language as so important.

> Language is the activity in which we use
> some parts of our experience to stand for
> or signify certain other parts of our
> experience. And the result of such an
> activity is a world . . . .. All our

> experience and knowledge of the world is
> through language in this wide sense of
> the word; there can be no other world for
> us besides the one that is organized on
> our own terms, and thus there can be no
> world for us except as understood through
> language[7].

When we realize that Wittgenstein does not distinguish bet-
ween thought and language, and that his texts are concerned
with meaning and sense rather than establishing the veracity
of statements, we can understand what he means when he says
that the limits of language are the limits of one's world.
What we experience has meaning or sense for us only if we
can think of it or speak of it, and this is done through
language. The world acquires meaning for us through language.
The criticism that the world is being made to conform to the
symbolization of language is easily dismissed when it is
remembered that Wittgenstein is not attempting to make any
significant statements about the world but rather is con-
cerned with establishing grounds for understanding how we
can talk about the world at all, the grounds of meaning.

Another point to be clarified at the beginning is
that the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS is a book about logic
as well, where logic is still the basis of language. Granted
that the question is handled differently later on, he is
still concerned with the nature of logic and its relation
to language and applicability to reality. As Winch says,

> It was precisely Wittgenstein's insight
> into the deficiencies of his treatment
> of these problems in the TRACTATUS that
> led him to see that the problems about
> logic require for their understanding a
> treatment of very diverse-seeming philo-
> sophical problems . . . the problem about
> the nature of logic is itself seen as
> under constant and developing treatment
> in all the later philosophical discussions.[8]

As we shall see in discussing the TRACTATUS, logical form is stressed as what can only be shown, not said, by language. In a later writing, ZETTEL, this point is brought out again in different words: "sometimes the voice of a philosophical throught is so soft that the noise of spoken words is enough to drown it."[9] That logic is still a concern in the INVESTIGATIONS will become even clearer in discussing that text.

I suggest that Wittgenstein sees philosophy as describing how we ordinarily use language, and so pointing out where traditional philosophers have been led into confusion by misusing it. It has been argued that Wittgenstein is not really concerned with ordinary language, but rather that he was attempting to construct a logically perfect language in the TRACTATUS, and then only in the INVESTIGATIONS does he examine ordinary language usage when he realizes that his previous attempts must fail. This seems to be a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's goals in writing his books. In the TRACTATUS he says, "All propositions of our colloquial

language are actually, just as they are, logically completely
in order."[10] The propositions of our everyday language, once
again, are to be seen as including those propositions of the
natural sciences which alone can be factually verified. He
grants that we cannot always see the logical order of ordi-
nary language and that is why he attempts to clarify language
- to show that normally it is used properly. In this exami-
nation of language it will be seen that the so-called propo-
sitions of metaphysicians are merely pseudo-propositions, as
certain terms of their expressions lack meaning and thus have
no sense. In this sense they cannot be said, at least as
factual statements. Ordinary language can be said to be
natural language and metaphysical language to be formal or
unnatural language. The differences will become clearer in
defining the terms used in the TRACTATUS, and in examining
the synthetic-analytic distinctions in language. For now
it is sufficient to say that Wittgenstein viewed metaphy-
sicians as misusing ordinary language; and his analysis of
language is an attempt to show how this misuse has occurred.
The logic of language is to be understood in both texts.
In doing this he is attempting to set the limit (in the
TRACTATUS) or the limits (in the INVESTIGATIONS) to what can
be said factually. This then will be the aim of philosophy
- to clarify what can be said and to eliminate metaphysical

propositions by showing that they represent a misuse of
language. As examples of propositions of ordinary language
one could say 'This table has four legs' or 'Man is mortal'
- statements which can be factually verified. An example of
a metaphysical proposition could be 'Material objects are
not real but apparent.' In analysing this latter statement
it would be seen that certain terms or signs of this propo-
sition lacked a reference to reality and thus the proposition
is said to lack sense, to be nonsensical. Only propositions
of ordinary language are seen to have sense upon analysis,
Wittgenstein attempts to show, and so he can be called an
ordinary language philosopher.

It must be mentioned here that Wittgenstein must not
be viewed as being anti-metaphysical. Rather I will argue
that he holds philosophy should be non-metaphysical, as it
should be concerned only with factual problems concerning
the uses of language. Metaphysical questions are not said
to be false, but nonsensical. The question as to whether
a metaphysical proposition is true or not is irrelevant to
Wittgenstein's analysis. It is the question of whether a
question can be asked at all or a proposition stated that
is the task of philosophy now. His philosophy is concerned
only with establishing if propositions have meaning or not,
if they can be said factually, sensibly. As will be seen,

later on, Wittgenstein does stress that metaphysical state-
ments have value in other senses outside of philosophy. The
first task of this paper then will be to make clear exactly
what it was that he was saying in his early writings and
then in his later ones. It is important to study the texts
themselves to see why he rejected his early method; and also
to be able to formulate an acceptable argument to show that,
in spite of this change, his view of philosophy has remained
consistent throughout.

CHAPTER II

TRACTATUS AND EARLY WORKS

(a) Definitions of Terms Used in TRACTATUS

What Wittgenstein's philosophy is concerned with will first of all be examined from the viewpoint of the TRACTATUS. He believes that the problems of philosophy up to now, the pseudo-propositions of metaphysicians, would not even arise if it were not for the misunderstandings of the logic of language. So he will attempt to put an end to this traditional-type of philosophy. In his method of analysis, as I have stated, he does not distinguish between language and thought. Although he confessed that he did not know what the constituents of thoughts were, he believed that they must correspond to the words of language. Thus he held that language was the limit of the expression of the thought. As there is no distinction made between language and thought in his philosophy there is no need then to explain their interrelationship. Language just is the expression of thought. Though of course thought can be conveyed in other ways, such as gestures, this is not a concern of his philosophy. Metaphysical problems have arisen in language and

these are what he is attempting to eliminate, so he now
decides to examine the essence of language. Briefly here,
in reference to the term 'essence,' it must be noted that
the idea put forth in the TRACTATUS by this term is maintained
in a modified version in the INVESTIGATIONS by the term 'fami-
ly resemblances.' In the INVESTIGATIONS there is no longer
one common feature to be found in all of language, but there
is still the desire for some sort of unity, which is expressed
in overlapping similarities called family resemblances. In
the TRACTATUS Wittgenstein accepts as given that there is an
a priori order in the world. He sees language as related to
the world in structure, or else we could not talk about it;
and as logic reveals the nature of language, so it must also
reveal the nature of the world. So he investigates the
nature of logic to get to the nature of the world, through
language. The relationship between the terms 'language' and
'world' as well as their meanings have been discussed briefly
in the introduction, and we must now consider the meaning
of the term 'logic.' As a definition one could quote Maslow:

> . . . logic is concerned with the rules of
> our symbolism, and not with the objects and
> facts symbolized; it is merely the consis-
> tent use of our symbols . . . . Logic then
> means for Wittgenstein . . . the body of
> all the possible transformations of our
> symbols according to the rules of our
> symbolism. The rules may be arbitrary,

and the nature of the signs which we use
tq express them is arbitrary; but if we
are to talk sense we must follow the
rules.[11]

With this definition of logic as the following of

rules of symbolization it becomes clearer that the INVESTI-

GATIONS is also a book of logic, as here also Wittgenstein

attempts to describe how we can speak sensibly only by

following the rules that are set up in language-games.

Rule-following, however arbitrary the rules of the language-

game, is a crucial notion in the INVESTIGATIONS as well.

To continue with the discussion of logic it must be seen

that logic deals with rules alone and not with the reality

to which the symbols of language refer. In this sense it

is not a science as it does not deal with experience, but

rather with the possibilities of talking of experience in

our symbolism. As Maslow further explains:

> At the end of any explanation we have to
> come to something which we cannot explain
> any further; and logic, being assumed in
> any rational discourse whatsoever, cannot
> be explained in its turn by a discourse
> but has to be grasped intuitively when it
> is present.[12]

As will be seen later on, the logical form of both language

and the world is what links them together. This is to be

understood first of all through the realization that logic

is merely the possibilities of transforming the rules of our

symbolism into sense about the world. Logic is not concerned with truth but with validity, or what can be said sensibly.

The two basic theories of the TRACTATUS used to explain the connection between logic, language, and the world are the picture theory and the truth-function theory. However, before these theories can be properly discussed I think that one should have a clear idea of the technical terms involved in these theories. If these terms get confused in one's mind it is very hard to grasp what Wittgenstein is referring to. The first point to see is that Wittgenstein is attempting to describe the relationship of linguistic terms of language to the real world. At certain points in the TRACTATUS his uses of these terms tend to become rather confusing but I believe that generally they are used as follows. Primarily the relations to be grasped are between the 'simples' and 'elementary' or 'atomic propositions' of language and the 'objects' and 'atomic facts' of the world. 'Simples' of language are often called 'names.' 'Names' are the primitive signs of a completely analyzed proposition. They are the words of elementary propositions and are also called 'signs' or 'symbols.' The distinction between 'sign' and 'symbol' is rather confusing and Wittgenstein appears to use each with the same meaning

at various places so this distinction will be overlooked
here, after the brief remark that a 'symbol' appears to be
a 'sign' that has acquired meaning in a specific context.
A 'simple symbol' is one which has no parts that can be
broken down into further symbols. These 'simples' are said
to refer to 'objects' in the world. A simple symbol of
language refers to one specific object in the world at a
time. The role of proper names is not a problem for Witt-
genstein as it is not taken as a unique concept. Like
Russell, he sees it as distinct from a description, but it
plays the same role as a simple sign here. As Anscombe
says, ". . . the way a proper name contributes to the mean-
ing of a sentence in which it occurs is simply that it
stands for its bearer."[13] 'Simples' are said to refer to
'objects' in the world, but it is difficult to describe what
'objects' are. Maslow suggests that they are the ultimate
sense-data of our experience, the limits to which experience
in the world can be analysed. By themselves though, 'objects'
also are not meant to be experienced with sense. They are
experienced as sensible only as part of 'atomic facts.'
Maslow goes as far as to call the term a variable pseudo-
concept, as it is not formed by an observation of experience.
Pinch comments on the difficulties of this term 'object' :

> They are essentially simple (not factually
> simple), which means that they have only
> one form and one content each . . .. In
> having only one form an object is unlike
> any thing we are acquainted with, but in
> any completely analyzed proposition we
> name things in just that way.[14]

'Simples' are the signs of propositions and 'simple objects' are what they refer to in the world. These simples are said to acquire meaning in elementary propositions. Elementary propositions are those propositions which are said to be directly related to the world. Their truth or falsity is not determined by other propositions but rather by the world. They must remain possibilities until they are compared to reality. Anscombe refers to certain characteristics of elementary propositions:

(1) They are a class of mutually independent propositions.
(2) They are essentially positive.
(3) They are such that for each of them there are no two ways of being true or false, but only one.
(4) They are such that there is in them no distinction between an internal and an external negation.
(5) They are concatenations of names, which are absolutely simple signs.[15]

These characteristics are fairly easily explained when the definition above is considered. To remain directly related to the world they must be mutually independent. They are essentially positive as they refer to atomic facts. If they were negative it would imply the non-existence of an

atomic fact. There must be only one way of being true or
false or else a person could never know if he had examined
all possibilities. It would remain a complex proposition.
There can be for such a proposition no possibility for being
negative internally or externally. Either it refers to an
atomic fact or it does not. An example of a proposition
which has an internal and an external negation is 'Everyone
is wise.' Internal negation would be 'Everyone is unwise'
and external negation would be 'Not everyone is wise.'
Finally, Wittgenstein says, "The elementary proposition
consists of names. It is a connexion, a concatenation, of
names."[16] Now we are left to define 'atomic facts.' As
elementary propositions are said to be made up of simples,
so atomic facts are said to be made up of objects. Atomic
facts are the facts of the world which have no further
facts as part of them. In analyzing the facts of the world,
which could be called molecular, the simplest facts would be
the atomic facts which are collections of objects. Above,
I have said that objects have been called the 'ultimate
sense-data,' but they have also been called 'variable pseudo-
concepts' as they are not directly perceived by us. It would
seem that atomic facts are those facts which are directly
perceived in our experience and are made up of these objects,
however vaguely they are described. One further point must

be made in reference to these terms. Anscombe states it
this way:

> ... . for he [Wittgenstein] held that names
> had no sense but only reference, and propo-
> sitions no reference but only sense; and
> also that a proposition could not have a
> sense without being either true or false.[17]

Elementary propositions must remain possibilities in order
to have sense, as must any proposition in order to be a
picture of reality. The reasons for this will become clear
shortly in discussing analytic-synthetic distinctions in
language.

Right now the term 'world' must be further defined.
Wittgenstein says that the world is the totality of facts,
not things. This statement can be made clearer by referring
to certain passages from Finch's 'WITTGENSTEIN - THE EARLY
PHILOSOPHY.' The world as we speak of it is complex, it is
made up of facts. Finch says that 'things' are empirical
complexes which can be either named or described, and they
are what we experience directly in the world. If they are
merely named they function as objects, but if they are des-
cribed they function as facts, combinations of objects.
They are then distinct from objects in that they are not
restricted to one form, one content; their forms can change.
Two terms 'states-of-affairs' and 'situations' must be

clarified now. When 'things' are named by words they are named in 'states-of-affairs.' And "States of affairs are the fixed possible structures of a world. They define possibility. A single state of affairs is always one of all possible combinations of its objects."[18] On the other hand when things refer to facts they describe situations which can occur. We must remember that Wittgenstein's philosophy is concerned with meaningful, sensible language and not with the truth of that language per se. He is concerned with possible propositions, not true propositions. Situations are empirical occurrences of things and we decide if they are possible or impossible ones. Situations remain possibilities as they are not fixed like states-of-affairs. They are what the propositions of everyday life refer to. In order to relate language to the world then, the world must be seen as complexities of facts, rather than things, because as such the complexes remain possibilities. Propositions, to be meaningful for Wittgenstein, must remain possibilities until compared to reality, and so they must refer to facts, which are seen as possible structures of reality. These facts which are complexes of atomic facts are expressed in language through complex propositions. How we go from complex to elementary propositions is the subject-matter of the truth-function theory.

(b) Analytic-Synthetic Distinctions in Language

The distinctions between sense, senseless, and non-sense should be made clear. In order to do this one must first examine the differences between analytic and synthetic propositions in language. One must remember once again that in the analysis of language one is striving for logical clarity and not for empirical truth. Truth referred to in language refers only to validity, whether something can be said or not, whether it has sense when analysed by the rules of logic. Keeping this in mind one can examine the definitions of analyticity and syntheticity. Hospers says that,

> An analytic proposition is one whose truth
> can be determined solely by an analysis of
> the meaning of the words in the sentence
> expressing it. You do not have to express
> anything in the world apart from language
> to discover whether or not the proposition
> is true.[19]

An analytic statement may also be said to be one whose negation is self-contradictory. Synthetic propositions are then said to be those propositions which are not analytic. Their negation is also a possibility. An example of an analytic statement is 'Snow is snow.' Its negation would be 'Snow is not snow' which is self-contradictory. An example of a synthetic proposition is 'Snow is white.' Its negation would be 'Snow is not white' which may be false, but is not self-contradictory. It is also a possibility that must be

confirmed in relation to the world? But there are also pro-
positions which are neither synthetic nor analytic. The
term 'propositional form' must be introduced here. If one
takes the words of a proposition and substitutes them with
symbols and only retains words for the relations between the
symbols, then the proposition is said to be in propositional
form. An example of this would be writing the proposition
'If you are a dog, then you are mortal' as 'If d, then m.'
'Propositional form' statements are not described as true or
false until the letters in them are substituted by propo-
sitions. A tautology is then easily seen as a propositional
form in which all propositions which substitute words for
its symbols would be true. An example of this is the pro-
positional form 'either P or not P.' From the above defi-
nitions we can begin to see where the problem with metaphy-
sical propositions come in. Hospers says that a proposition
of this type has left a certain term or terms undefined and
so it cannot be verified as being either synthetic or ana-
lytic. He says,

> As they stand, such propositions are more
> like propositional forms than like propo-
> sitions: an important ingredient of their
> meaning must still be specified, and as
> long as it is not, it is no wonder that
> we can't say whether they are to be
> classified as analytic or synthetic.[20]

Metaphysical statements are seen as meaningless or non-sensical because they fail to give meaning to certain of their terms. Certain of their terms are empirically unveri-fiable, they are like a symbol in propositional form that has not been defined. In the statement 'There is a God' it would be said that the term 'God' is meaningless as it is impossible to empirically verify its definition. Thus this proposition could not be classified as either synthetic or analytic, it falls in the realm of the nonsensical meta-physical propositions.

A further distinction to be observed is between the 'a priori' and the 'a posteriori.' Something is said to be true 'a priori' if it is seen as a necessary truth, one that is self-evident and needs no investigation to establish its truth. A statement is said to be true 'a posteriori' if it is a contingent statement whose truth is established only after investigation. From these distinctions it should be clear that tautologies are analytic propositions that are true a priori; as are the truths of mathematics. They say nothing in the way of new information, their negations are self-contradictory, and they are self-evident. These pro-positions are said to be senseless in that they need not be verified in experience, nor can they be said with sense as they are certain already. The laws of logic and logical

form, Wittgenstein wishes to say, fall into this category
of the senseless, of what cannot be said. Logical form is
seen as the basis of all language and reasoning, and as such
cannot be expressed in language as this would lead to an
infinite regress. All that can be expressed in language,
at least language that is verifiable truth - functionally,
are the propositions of natural sciences and ordinary lan-
guage. They have sense in that they are synthetic a pos-
teriori statements. Their truth is established in comparing
them to reality. It is for this reason also that they must
remain possibilities. If they were actualities they could
not be contradicted, their negation would be self-contra-
dictory, and their truth would be established without com-
parison to the world. Elementary propositions, as well as
complex propositions that can be broken down into the ele-
ments of elementary propositions, are seen to be the only
propositions that can be said factually. For a proposition
to have sense it must state a possibility, and these are the
only propositions that retain possibility. Logical form,
tautologies, and mathematical propositions are senseless
because they are certain and need not be factually verified.
Metaphysical propositions are nonsensical in logical terms
as it is impossible to establish their truth or falsity. It
must be added here that senseless propositions may have

sense in ways other than factual discourse. They may say

nothing, but show something. They are beyond the realm of

the natural sciences but may have sense in other ways.

Propositions classified as senseless do not try to say what

cannot be said, but rather to show it. Chief among these

is logical form, but there are also aesthetics, religion,

and mathematics. Passmore says:

> All the propositions of logic, he argues,
> stand on exactly the same footing; they
> all say the same thing, i.e. nothing at
> all. What of mathematics? That consists,
> Wittgenstein argues, of equations; from
> which it follows directly that propositions
> of mathematics too, are without sense . . .
> Mathematics says what in its symbolism we
> can see, that certain expressions can be
> substituted for one another, that this can
> be done shows us something about the world
> but does not picture the world. Thus the
> propositions of mathematics are 'senseless.'
> Senseless but not nonsensical.[21]

The point to be seen now is that metaphysical state-

ments are nonsensical because they are mistaken for factual,

empirical statements when actually they are grammatical or

conceptual, according to Wittgenstein. An empirical pro-

position is experiential in that it can lead to new facts

or be verified, as we see with the propositions of the

natural sciences. A grammatical proposition is purely logi-

cal, that is, it may give us rules referring to the use of

a word, but it does not give us any facts, nor can it be

verified empirically. When we speak of verification here it must be noted that we are speaking of the type of verification that applies to sensible propositions. This is the verification of propositions of possibility as being true or false by comparing them empirically to reality. Verification by intuition or comparison to rules established in a book for example, is not sufficient to make a proposition sensible. This is the problem with metaphysical propositions - they try to say in factual discourse what cannot be said but only shown. Perhaps their propositions could be verified in another manner, but not in factual, sensible discourse. This is why traditional philosophers' metaphysical questions have been unanswerable. Their questions are asked without distinguishing between empirical and grammatical statements. The aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy then will be to get philosophers to make this distinction and thus eliminate unanswerable questions. A question like 'Is there a God?' would be seen to be nonsensical when it was realized that the term 'God' was indefinable from an empirical viewpoint. The question would no longer be asked in sensible discourse.

(c) <u>Nature of Philosophy</u>

The TRACTATUS can be seen to be based on a logical

atomism in which Wittgenstein believes that all objects and states of affairs in the world can be reduced to simples which conform to the logical form of propositions. He accepts as a priori that language has logical form. Propositions express thoughts and are seen to be related directly to the world by their sharing in the same logical form. The picture theory of meaning is the view that language consists of elements which, as it were, picture or mirror the world. Wittgenstein believed that through the examination of all elementary propositions the whole world could be described. Because sensible propositions are not a priori true, all positive facts, that is, those possible situations that are found to be true when compared to reality, will be described by true propositions, and all negative facts consequently will be described by false propositions. Furthermore, by the truth-function theory, complex propositions are analysed into elementary ones until their terms are reduced to the point where they can be analysed no further. They are then called names, or simples. Wittgenstein believes that all valid propositions can be reduced to these simples. He accepts it as a priori that language can be reduced to simples by analysis. His search is for these a priori solutions to philosophical problems. His aim is to show that ordinary language is perfect as it is, when analysed into

its logical structures. He is not trying to create a new logically perfect language, but trying to justify the language that we have by saying that philosophical problems only arise out of misunderstanding its essence. Thus he searches here for an ultimate dissolution of pseudo-problems in the search for the limit of language.

The nature of philosophy, which holds for both books, will be described here in terms of the TRACTATUS. The first point to be seen is that all true propositions are found only in the natural sciences in ordinary language. True here means empirically verifiable in the sense of being synthetic. Since philosophy is not one of the natural sciences, it cannot maintain any true propositions. As Passmore puts it:

> So Wittgenstein argues, his general con-
> clusion remains - all propositions which
> picture the world belong to the natural
> sciences, and those which do not picture
> the world, if they are not nonsense, are
> tautological. Nowhere is there any room
> for a peculiar class of philosophical
> propositions.[22]

Philosophy in the TRACTATUS will be something new now. Wittgenstein says,

> Philosophy aims at the logical clarifi-
> cation of thoughts . . . is not a body
> of doctrine but an activity . . . does
> not result in 'philosophical propositions,'
> but rather in the clarification of propo-
> sitions.[23]

In this way it would set the limit of natural sciences. By clarifying what can be thought and said, it will demonstrate what cannot be thought or said. He says, "It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said."[24] The propositions that this type of philosophy will clarify are the propositions of the natural sciences expressed in ordinary language, not metaphysical propositions. When they are clarified they will mirror the logical form of the world, thereby showing what cannot be said. So philosophy here becomes something new - an activity of clarifying propositions to see what can be said, and in so doing presenting the logic of language. Philosophy becomes an analysis of language to rid us of the philosophical questions of metaphysicians. Kenny says,

> More precisely, the activity of analysis
> applied to nonmetaphysical propositions -
> to the propositions of everyday speech that
> are in perfect logical order, to the pro-
> positions of natural science - makes them
> sharp; applied to philosophical proposi-
> tions it reveals them as nonsensical.[25]

The function of philosophy from now on would be a negative one in that it would point out to someone speaking metaphysically that his propositions were nonsensical, that certain terms of his expressions lacked meaning. It must be seen finally here that philosophy is only applicable to factual speech, in any other use of language, such as poetry

or aesthetics, the analysis is irrelevant. It is strictly
concerned with the rational, logical use of language.

Previously I have stated that propositions and the
world are related through logical form and that, in fact,
this logical form is mirrored in propositions; it is what
cannot be said but only shown. I will now attempt to
expand on this relationship and explain exactly what logi-
cal form is. Wittgenstein states explicitly what cannot
be said, but is shown,

> Propositions cannot represent logical
> form: it is mirrored in them. What
> finds its reflection in language, lan-
> guage cannot represent. What expresses
> itself in language, we cannot express
> by means of language. Propositions
> show the logical form of reality. They
> display it.[26]

Logical form must be seen as outside of language, as by it
we judge the consistency of facts in the world. If it were
sayable, then it would also have to allow for the possibi-
lity of being true or false, and so would be incapable of
being used to judge language. It cannot be totally indepen-
dent of the world though, or else we could not judge facts
by it at all. This is where the idea of the picture theory
comes in, whereby language and reality mirror the same
logical form. Anscombe refers to Wittgenstein's unique
approach here to solving the problem of describing the

connection between thought or language and reality. Refer-

ring to this point Anscombe says:

> Propositions thus have a feature that is
> very comparable to a feature of pictures.
> We call the possibility of the kind of
> connection that sets up a proposition
> 'logical form,' as the possibility of
> any particular spatial arrangement can
> be called spatial form. And since logi-
> cal form is that through which a struc-
> ture can have T and F poles, and for
> something to be true or false is the very
> same thing as for reality to be thus or
> otherwise, Wittgenstein calls 'logical
> form' also 'the form of reality.'[27]

Logical form then is the potential for possibilities that

is common to both language and reality. It is seen in the

fact that propositions are synthetic and that reality is not

determined, it could be otherwise. The distinction between

form and essence must be made clear here. Logical form is

the given possibilities of the world, while the essence is

what is searched for as actually existing in the world,

the simples of language or objects of the world. Finch says,

> We cannot picture or talk about the world
> at all without making use of form and
> logical form, while it is in the course
> of doing this that we discover something
> about what is the essence of the world
> and what is essential to pictures and
> propositions. In regard to the world
> especially it can be said that form is
> the possibilities of existence (what
> possibilities could exist), while essence
> is the existence of possibilities (what
> possibilities do exist).[28]

(d) Truth-Function Theory and Picture Theory

Now that the nature of philosophy has been discussed it would be worthwhile to examine the two major theories that Wittgenstein has put forward to describe the relationship between logic, language, and the world - namely the picture theory and the truth-function theory. First the truth-function theory will be looked at. Wittgenstein conceived of this theory as a means whereby any proposition, analysed into terms of an elementary proposition, could be seen to have sense or not, at least factually. Pann describes this theory:

> the truth-value of a compound proposition
> is completely determined by the truth-
> values of its components - once the truth-
> values of its components are given, the
> truth-value of the compound proposition
> can be calculated. Wittgenstein claims
> that all propositions are related to ele-
> mentary propositions truth-functionally.[29]

By reducing complex propositions to the terms of elementary propositions - the simples - it can be determined if these propositions have sense or not. The picture theory must be discussed here as it is the picture theory on which Wittgenstein bases his analysis of language. Propositions are said to be pictures of reality. These pictures may be referred to as representations, and then the questions to be examined are what these pictures represent and whether they

represent it accurately or not. To begin with it must be remembered that a proposition must always represent a possibility. If it is a logical proposition or tautology for example, it will be a senseless proposition in that it is analytic. If it is a metaphysical proposition it will be seen that it is nonsensical as one or more of its terms is without reference. So we are dealing here with propositions that have sense. They are neither true nor false a priori. The picture theory is a description of how language relates to the world, so it is used to analyse an elementary proposition into the relations between its simple names which picture, truly or falsely, the objects they represent. The picture theory is a rule whereby this relation between the simples of these propositions to the objects of the world can be observed. Fann describes the view as follows:

> there is a general rule correlating the
> elements of a proposition with the elements
> of a fact. One can, as it were, draw lines
> between names of an elementary proposition
> and objects of the atomic fact which is
> pictured by the elementary proposition.
> That is how an elementary proposition is
> in touch with the world . . .. If an
> elementary proposition matches the atomic
> fact it describes, then it is true - other-
> wise it is false. But a proposition need
> not be compared with reality to be under-
> stood, because it is a picture of reality.[30]

A proposition can be understood because it has sense; its truth value will be determined only by comparing it to

reality.   Anscombe makes a comment on this point also:

> We have seen what 'can be said' accord-
> ing to this theory: that, and that only,
> 'can be said' the negative of which is
> also a possibility, so that which of the
> two possibilities is actual has to be
> discovered by 'comparing the proposition
> with reality.'31

Therefore the picture theory deals with the possibilities
of what can be said. This is called the 'pictorial form'
and it represents possibility in the real world. Language
then, has sense only when it deals with possibilities. The
possibilities of truth or falsehood in the propositions
become actualities only when the person determines one or
the other in reality. For something to be a picture of
something else it must not be completely identical with
what it pictures or else it would be what it pictures.
Therefore the proposition must remain a possibility to have
sense logically. But it must not be totally unlike what it
represents either, or else it would not be a picture. What
the proposition and the world or reality that it represents
must share for it to be a picture at all then, is logical
form. This then is the connection between logic, language,
and the world. Propositions picture the world by showing
the same logical form. The propositions of metaphysicians
are seen to lack this logical form when analysed, and so
lack sense factually. It is not a question of whether their

propositions are true or not. The point is that they should not be said at all. Furthermore metaphysical philosophers may attempt to pass beyond the limit of language by trying to describe the logical form of the world - by trying to describe how the world is pictured by propositions. But a picture must be independent of what it pictures, and propositions must use logic to explain the logical form of the world in order to be understood at all. So such propositions could not be independent of what they picture. They would have to be seen as misuses of language. Wittgenstein states,

> A picture represents a possible situation
> in logical space . . ... What it repre-
> sents it represents independently of its
> truth or falsity, by means of its pictori-
> al form. What a picture represents is its
> sense . . ... In order to tell whether a
> picture is true or false we must compare
> it with reality.[32]

If a proposition cannot be analysed into an atomic picture of the world then it is not really a proposition. Some distinctions between names and propositions are important in the picture theory also. As I have previously stated, propositions must express possibilities to have sense, and to be understood a person would have to know what would be the case if it were false and also if it were true. A name, on the other hand, must signify one object in reality

alone or else it is not a meaningful sign. A name is under-
stood through its reference to an object in the world then,
which object also must be indicated. The sense of a propo-
sition is grasped without explanation, whereas a name must
be explained. Furthermore a name is a constant while a
proposition is a possibility. This relation between name
and object led Wittgenstein to the idea of a private lan-
guage whereby their relatiohship would be established
privately by each indivudual. As we shall see this idea
is rejected by the time the INVESTIGATIONS are written.

To conclude this discussion of the picture theory,
its main concepts can be clarified by examining them in
eight points, as Kenny has done.

> (1) A proposition is essentially composite.
> [A proposition is a fact consisting of
> parts which can occur differently in
> another proposition. In each proposi-
> tion there is a special relationship
> between the simples to make it a certain .
> fact.]
>
> (2) The elements which compose a proposition
> are correlated by human decision with
> elements of reality.
>
> (3) The combination of such correlated ele-
> ments into a proposition presents -
> without further human intervention - a
> possible state of affairs. [Although
> man may choose any combination he wishes,
> to be a proposition it must present a
> possible reality.]
>
> (4) A proposition stands in an internal
> relation to the possible state of
> affairs which it represents. [This
> internal relation is the logical form]

(5) This internal relation can only be
shown, it cannot be informatively
stated. [As I have previously men-
tioned, logical form can only be
mirrored in propositions, not said.]

(6) A proposition is true or false in vir-
tue of being compared to reality.
[Propositions can be verified only by
comparing them to reality. Alone they
are pictures that remain possibilities.]

(7) A proposition must be independent of
the actual state of affairs which makes
it true or makes it false. [If it were
not independent it would not be a possi-
bility, but an actuality, and then it
would not be a proposition.]

(8) No proposition is a priori true. [I
have stated that the world is the tota-
lity of facts, true and false. For
this to be shown in propositions, the
propositions must be capable of being
true and false. In order to be actually
one or the other it must have the possi-
bility of being either. It is man who
determines if it is true or false by
comparing it to reality.][33]

The aim of the TRACTATUS becomes clear when it is seen that

many propositions of ordinary language do not have a pic-

torial appearance. The essence of language is hidden and

must be brought out by analysis to show that the ordinary

propositions of language picture the world. The relation-

ship is seen in their logical form. Then the limit of lan-

guage will be the limit of the world - a point which I have

explained at the beginning of this paper.

(e) What Can Be Shown Only

This leads to the main point of the book, which has

been the center of a great deal of controversy because it often has been misunderstood. In fact, it is very important to understanding Wittgenstein's view of the nature of philosophy. He concludes the TRACTATUS with the sentence: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."[34] People have been led into error concerning Wittgenstein by taking this to mean that everything except science is non-sensical and has no meaning. What they have failed to grasp is the accompanying sentence: "What can be shown cannot be said."[35] The distinction to be seen here is between 'shown' and 'said.' Above I have said that logical form is what is shown in language. It sets the limit to factual language. But logical form is not all that should be included in what can be shown. Although this is what is shown in factual language there are other things that have sense or meaning in other modes of communication as well. David Pears says that Wittgenstein meant by these statements referring to silence,

> . . . that there is nothing factual outside
> the limit of factual language. He allowed
> that there are also things which cannot be
> said in factual propositions, but which can
> be shown. Now these factually unsayable
> things belong to other kinds of discourse,
> the most important . . . being religious,
> moral, and aesthetic.[36]

It would be extremely naive to suggest that Wittgenstein

held everything in life to be meaningless except what could be said factually. In LECTURES & CONVERSATIONS he is quoted as saying that in the area of aesthetics, language cannot express one's appreciation. This can only be shown. He says, "It is not difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment."[37] In fact we know from his own life that he took an interest in the arts, as well as language. So although logical form is what is shown in language, it must be seen that there are other things that can be shown outside of factual language.

A brief account of Wittgenstein's method of philoso-phizing in the TRACTATUS is necessary here to understand how the things which can only be shown are in fact seen. This is not to be a further discussion of his picture theory and truth-function theory but rather a defense of his actual writing of propositions, of saying what can only be shown, not said. Wittgenstein says:

> My propositions are elucidatory in this
> way: he who understands me finally recog-
> nizes them as senseless, when he has
> climbed out through them, on them, over
> them. (He must so to speak throw away
> the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
> He must surmount these propositions; then
> he sees the world rightly.[38]

On this point Wittgenstein has been severely criti-cized as contradicting himself. In the Preface to the

TRACTATUS, he states that the truth of his thoughts seems to
him to be unquestionable, and then later on he calls these
propositions senseless. George Pitcher says,

> Wittgenstein considers his philosophical
> assertions to be illuminating nonsense
> . . .. Wittgenstein has said these things
> and therefore they can be said. What is
> nonsensical is to deny that what has been
> said can be said.[39]

In reply to this criticism it may be remarked that Witt-
genstein has not called his propositions 'illuminating non-
sense' but rather 'senseless.' This distinction is quite
important when the distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic propositions is recalled. Although Wittgenstein
might say his propositions are senseless in the traditional
sense, they may still show the meaning in his philosophy.
They could be seen as leading to an awareness of the truth
of his book as analytic propositions. They are nonsensical
from the viewpoint of being metaphysical propositions, but
they could be seen as senseless from the viewpoint of being
analytic propositions which can show meaning, even if they
cannot say it. In fact the knowledge that they give is of
what we know already but seem to have forgotten - Wittgenstein
just says that we know how to use language already, he does
not try to explain how we have this knowledge. He wishes us
to treat his philosophical propositions as if they were true

in the traditional sense, but if one does this and understands them in terms of his new philosophy, one will have to conclude that they are senseless. In understanding comes a transcendence, beyond the propositions, to seeing what can and cannot be said. This was not clear before, but it becomes so in rejecting these propositions. The propositions of the TRACTATUS cannot say anything factual, but just because of that, they can show what cannot be said. In language this is logical form. But the meaning of life and the setting of values are also seen to lie outside the world of language. The process of raising questions about the meaning of life, for example – metaphysical questions – and then rejecting them shows one that the answers to these questions lie outside the realm of the factual discourse of the natural sciences. This is the mystical side of Wittgenstein. He says:

> We feel that even if all possible scientific
> questions be answered, the problems of life
> have still not been touched at all. Of
> course there is then no question left, and
> just this is the answer.[40]

Wittgenstein goes on to say that the sense of life has become clear to some people, but they have been unable to express it. Anscombe states that these remarks of Wittgenstein's tend to show that he believed that questions about life and values, which fall into the category of

metaphysical questions, could only be solved in ways other than factual language. As such they would be part of what can only be shown. Wittgenstein therefore believed that all the questions of philosophy in the traditional metaphysical sense would be abandoned now when doing philosophy. Philosophy would be an analysis of language into elementary propositions to show what can and cannot be said. From this also would come seeing what can only be shown.

CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS AND LATER WORKS

(a) Reasons for Change of Method

Now that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy has

been stated in terms of the TRACTATUS, I will attempt to

state his views in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS to show

that they are the same there. The nature of philosophy still

will be the analysis of language, but the method of analysis

will change. Wittgenstein here abandons his a priori method

of analysis, the use of which was to find the single essence

which will be the limit of language, in favor of a pragmatic

approach, looking not for the 'limit',' but rather the

'limits' in the ways language is used in all its different

contexts. Pann says,

> The eternal striving for absolute exactness
> and precision is now regarded as an illu-
> sion - and vagueness, insofar as it serves
> our ordinary purposes is accepted as reality.[41]

The question to be discussed now is why Wittgenstein has

changed his method. His philosophy at the time of the

TRACTATUS was based upon an atomism wherein the essence of

language was to be discovered. But by the time of the.

INVESTIGATIONS he no longer searched for such an essence

hidden in language. His conception of 'essence' itself

leads to more problems:

> The so-called 'essence,' which was the
> center of interest might have no better
> claim to recognition than the specific
> differences which were neglected.
> Second, it might not really be the essence,
> because a closer look at the different
> varieties might reveal that it was not
> really shared by all of them.[42]

It would be very hard to locate such an essence in language;

in fact he later believed it too rigid a restriction on lan-

guage. Also the varieties of usages of language would make

it difficult to determine if they all shared this 'essence.'

He had earlier held that every proposition should have a

definite sense. He now came to see that this was a require-

ment that he had imposed on language in his search for a

single essence, not something he had observed. He noted

that when ordinary language is observed more closely it

becomes clearer that it does not adhere to this requirement.

In actual usage of language many propositions are vague and

indefinite, but they are still perfectly capable of express-

ing what we want them to. The notion that everything must

be reduced to a final analysis in order to be really known

is rejected. Wittgenstein says,

> For example, we think: If you have only
> the unanalysed form you miss the analysis;
> but if you know the analysed form that
> gives you everything. - But can I not say
> that an aspect of the matter is lost on
> you in the latter case as well as the
> former?[43]

Language is to be examined in its multivarious uses. A
final analysis is no longer required to understand language.
His earlier method of logical atomism will change.

His rejection of logical atomism can be seen to
begin with his evaluations of the role of elementary propo-
sitions. In 1929 Wittgenstein wrote a paper, SOME REMARKS
ON LOGICAL FORM, in which he rejected his previous position
that elementary propositions were independent of each other.
It was statements of degree, whereby one statement would ex-
clude all others, that made him realize that they were not
independent of each other. For example, if it were said
that a car was painted a bright red, then any statement
referring to that car as being another shade of red would
be denied in reference to the original statement. Indepen-
dently these further statements could not be rejected. Such
statements of degree also could not be further analysed as
their terms could not be broken down into smaller units.
As they are, they remain elementary propositions that could
not have sense independently. A further problem which
troubled him was that he had been unable to give even one

example of an elementary proposition. It was only with logical symbolism that he could construct examples. So he began to question his earlier method of analysis. He still believed that language must be analysed to be understood, but the analysis would change to an analysis of usage. He began to believe that the analysis of language would have to take into account the internal relations between propositions, the inner workings of language. ' Kenny refers to this point,

> Simultaneously he began to regard it as an
> oversimplification to regard the connection
> between language and reality as consisting
> only of two elements, the name-relation and
> the pictorial nature of the proposition.
> It was this, among other things, that led
> to the development of the theory of meaning
> as use and the exploration of the notion of
> language-games.[44]

The search for the single essence as the goal of analysis to set the limit of language is being abandoned for the more pragmatic approach of discovering the limits of lan-guage in the uses involved in language-games. This idea of 'language-games' becomes central to his new method in the INVESTIGATIONS, and will be developed further on in this paper.

Returning to Wittgenstein's rejection of logical atomism, we see that he also begins to reject the use of 'simples' in some absolute sense. He realizes that terms

like 'simple' and 'complex' are relative terms, not abso-

lute, and can be discussed only in light of specific con-

texts. Pitcher comments on this point:

> The correlative notions of absolute complex-
> ity and simplicity were shown by the later
> Wittgenstein to be groundless. Nothing, he
> argues, is in itself absolutely simple.
> Compared to the whole chess board, one of
> its white squares is relatively simple.
> But it is not absolutely simple . . . in a
> certain context . . . a thing may be called
> simple. In other contexts, however, that
> same thing may have to be called composite.[45]

To summarize, logical atomism, the search for the essence

of language by analysing it into the simples of elementary

propositions that are linked directly to the objects of the

world, was being rejected now because of his new views on

the independence of these propositions and the nature of

names and objects. By the time of the INVESTIGATIONS

Wittgenstein held that an elementary proposition could be

an incomplete picture of a state of affairs. In the

TRACTATUS he had said that even if a proposition did not

completely picture a situation, it was still a complete pic-

ture itself of what it did picture. Now that incomplete

pictures of situations were accepted as being possibly

incomplete in themselves, there would have to be possible

relationships between complete and incomplete descriptions

of the same situation to be considered. Now there are no

propositions that have sense solely from a direct relation-
ship to the world. Propositions that were formerly called
'elementary' would now be said to have sense only when exa-
mined in the context of language-games and their usages
therein. The logical atomism of the TRACTATUS has been
abandoned for a method of analysis which is more flexible
and pragmatic in its application to ordinary language.
"Crudely oversimplifying, one could say that Wittgenstein
abandoned the atomism of logical atomism but kept most of
its logic."[46] Logic here refers of course to the following
of the rules of our symbolism, a point to be developed later
on in this paper. Wittgenstein has changed his method of
philosophy now, but retained his original conception of its
nature, that is, of its aims and purposes. Finally here, we
see that Wittgenstein also became more interested in the
philosophy of mind. In the TRACTATUS he had viewed such
things as understanding and intentions as being the material
of empirical psychology, not philosophy. But he now came to
think that they were important themselves for philosophy, in
order to understand how we use language. His changing view-
point on those topics of thought and meaning became apparent
in PHILOSOPHISCHE BEMERKUNGEN and PHILOSOPHISCHE GRAMMATIK
written in the 1930's, and also in the collection of his
notes, THE BLUE and BROWN BOOKS. Much of the material in

the INVESTIGATIONS in fact, comes from these writings, or
is developed from their initial ideas. The relation of lan-
guage to thought and states of mind is examined at length in
the INVESTIGATIONS.

(b) <u>Aim of Philosophy in INVESTIGATIONS</u> .

So we see at least generally some reasons why the
method changes. But what is the aim of philosophy now?
Wittgenstein says, "What is your aim in philosophy? - to
shew the fly the way out of the fly bottle."[47] The aim,
then, still is to probe the questions of philosophy in order
to eliminate them by clearing up misunderstandings of lan-
guage. Wittgenstein still sees philosophy's task as setting
up the boundaries of sense, only here sense is found within
the 'limits' of a certain language-game rather than in the
'limit' of language based upon a single essence whereby it
becomes clear what can and cannot be said. Philosophers
have misunderstood how a word is used and attribute meanings
to it that do not apply. This leads them to ask unanswer-
able questions. It is the form of words that is confusing,
says Wittgenstein, so we must look beyond their mere appear-
ance. He states the problem: "When language is looked at,
what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made
of the form of words."[48] Fann refers to the form of words
as surface-grammar, and their uses as the depth-grammar.

When two sentences have the same surface-grammar, philo-
sophers think both can be treated in the same way. What
they have failed to see is that the depth-grammar may be
different, because one sentence may be empirical while the
other is only grammatical or conceptual. As an example of
the difference Fann offers the two statements 'All roses
have thorns' and 'All rods have length.' Although both
appear to be the same, their depth-grammar is different.
The first statement is evidently experiential, but the
second is merely grammatical, as it does not give us any
new information but merely states a rule referring to the
usage of the word 'rod.' Now, as in the TRACTATUS, Witt-
genstein attempts to show the metaphysician that his propo-
sitions are unverifiable; only now he attempts this through
the analysis of the uses of language in language-games,
rather than in the complete analysis of language into its
simplest parts.

Words will derive their meaning from whatever use
they have in a particular situation. Language-games are
introduced to show that words have meaning only in social
contexts. This is a major distinction from the TRACTATUS.
There one surpassed the limit of factual sense by saying
what cannot be said. In the INVESTIGATIONS, one can misuse
language not only by surpassing the limits of factual sense,

that is, by using a word outside of any language-game, but also by using a word in a language-game inappropriate to it. Specht attempts to clarify this point,

> According to Wittgenstein the genesis of
> philosophical problems is to be seen in
> the fact that certain analogies exist bet-
> ween various language-games, particularly
> in their external grammatical form, and
> these analogies lead to a misinterpretation
> of the specific objectivity constituted in
> the individual language-games.[49]

The bounds of sense of language are drawn by the particular language-game employed, and the uses of the words therein, whereas previously they were to be discovered as the limit of language. The basic unit of sense here moves from words to sentences. It becomes a dynamic philosophy rather than a static one. The given shifts from 'objects' to 'forms of life.' Meaning occurs as words are used in a certain context, there is no fixed relation between 'simple' and 'object' as before. The connection now is between language and forms of life, which connection is explained by the term language-games.

In the INVESTIGATIONS Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is to be examined from the investigations of language-games as forms of life, in the idea of meaning as use, and in the rejection of the private language theory. It must be stressed that this examination is meant to show that

Wittgenstein has maintained the same conception of philoso-
phy as he had in the TRACTATUS - that is, the analysis of
language to clarify what can and cannot be said and thus
eliminate metaphysical propositions, and in so doing to
point towards what can only be shown. First of all we must
examine just what it is that Wittgenstein means by the term
'language-games.' In the TRACTATUS theory of logical
atomism, the relationship between the names of elementary
propositions and objects of the world was to be established
by the truth-function theory and the picture theory. As I
have stated above, Wittgenstein now realizes that this is
not enough to understand how words are used. Words must be
examined in use to determine their meaning. This then is
Wittgenstein's theory of language-games. Language is com-
pared to games which follow different rules, not just one
rule. The point to see is how to use rules of language,
not just one particular rule. Language can be understood
only when its words are seen in the human context in which
they are used, in the total environment which is called the
language-game. Wittgenstein says that we should realize that
speaking a language is not an isolated event but a part of
an activity, a form of life. A word may have one meaning in
one context or language-game, and another meaning in another
context. The meaning is not fixed, and can only be determined

in examining its usage in a specific language-game where it
is employed. There are all kinds of language-games --
Wittgenstein says there are an indefinite number of them.
Some examples that he gives are: giving or taking orders,
reporting an event, making jokes, play-acting. All of these
activities must be seen to follow certain rules in their
usage in order to have sense. Specht refers to Wittgenstein's
theory of language-games as follows:

> In constructing his theory, he starts from
> linguistic entities in which linguistic
> signs and objects are incorporated into the
> totality of the performance of a human
> action. Wittgenstein calls these totalities
> 'language-games' . . . . A language-game is
> thus a homogeneous structure in which word
> and signified object do not occur as iso-
> lated structures, as is the case in the
> atomic model.[50]

Language-games are to be seen not as a rejection of the phi-
losophy of the TRACTATUS, but as a supplement to and improve-
ment on the former method of doing the same thing. The limit
of factual sense will be language again, but now this sense
will be discovered in the limits established in use. There
is no one use to be discovered like an essence. He says,

> We want to establish an order in our know-
> ledge of the use of language: an order with
> a particular end in view: one out of many
> possible orders; not the order.[51]

The role of rules in language-games should be looked
at to make clearer the conception of language in 'forms of

life.' Language is compared to games in that it follows certain rules, and the role of rules in language should be seen as the same as their role in games. Games may be played with rules that may change - they are arbitrary, not fixed absolutely. Similarly in language-games, rules must be seen as flexible. Wittgenstein is not concerned with some specific rule, but states that all languages have rules, or else there would be no consistency in them, and consequently, they would not be communicable. As we shall see later on, language cannot be private for Wittgenstein; nor can rules be private. The point here is that in order to say one is following a rule, a person also must be able to determine if one is making a mistake. If rules were private there would be no possibility of detecting errors in their usage. Following rules is said to presuppose a 'form of life,' as they are customs or practices. Alone rules would have no sense. For example, Wittgenstein says that we use an arrow sign (——➤) to point, and we understand what it means. But if man did not decide that it meant this, then it would be meaningless by itself. The rule for its usage is established in its human context, in the language-game in which it is employed. If the context changes, the rule for its meaning changes as well. Rules that are used in a particular language-game however, must remain constant in that particular

context. Any rule-guided activity is essentially a public activity, as I have stated, as rule-following presupposes a setting for the rules to be applied in. As rules are seen to be public, they must be able to be taught and understood by more than one person. What makes it possible for rules to be taught and learned is the fact that rule-following implies an habitual pattern of behaviour. In order to follow rules one must develop skill in their usage, and this comes about through practice. If the rules established for application in certain language-games did not remain constant once determined, if they could change from one second to the next, then one would not be able to develop the skills necessary to use them properly. Only with the type of regularity that exists in the rules of language, however arbitrary the rules may be, could someone learn how to use these rules, and be able to communicate with and understand another person.

What is important is not merely to understand some rule or even all rules of language. The whole concept of following rules is what one must understand. Rules, moreover, are set up in a particular environment and can be understood only in that particular setting. It is important to realize that rules are man-made and therefore arbitrary. They can change from setting to setting, and in fact do.

This should lead us to an awareness of the human aspect of language. Language-games are a combination of language and its environment. Alone language has no meaning. Meaning is given only in the uses of language in particular contexts. Previously the meaning of a word was to be established by its reference to the object that it named. There is no longer any such fixed meaning to be discovered. In different contexts the same word may refer to different things, acquire different meanings. Also, words need not refer to any object. If one asked what the word 'five' referred to in a statement such as 'Bring me five applies,' it would be seen that the question has no sense. 'Five' does not refer to any object, one can be said to understand its meaning when one understands how to use the word in a particular context. Words serve different functions in different contexts, and so for meaning to be established the situation in which the words are used must be observed also. This is what language-games should make us aware of. The role of rules in language-games should help to show that language gets its value only as part of a 'form of life.' Rule-following is a skill and there is no rule for formulating rules. They are chosen by man and as such they are subject to his changes. Rules are not fixed constants then, but are more like 'sign-posts.' It is the 'form of life' which is central for Wittgenstein. High

elaborates on the importance of the 'form of life,' the

human aspect of language:

> Language qua language is rooted in and
> receives accreditation from the human
> order. It is not rooted in and accre-
> dited by some sterilized or virgin logi-
> cal order higher than the one which
> human beings are responsible for as well
> as responsive to.[52]

This discussion of 'forms of life' serves to bring

out the point made earlier that the INVESTIGATIONS is still

a book based on logic. Logic has already been defined as

the following of the rules of our symbolism. In the TRACTATUS,

the rules of logic by themselves were seen to be enough to

show the limit of what can be said. In the INVESTIGATIONS

Wittgenstein comes to realize that even in applying the rules

of logic, the human aspect of this application must be consi-

dered. His scope has widened here but his concern remains

the same. Logical analysis is still the aim, but it is now

accomplished through establishing meaning in the uses of lan-

guage in specific language-games. The human environment seen

in the 'forms of life' must not be overlooked, nor can the

rules be isolated from life. Wittgenstein is an ordinary

language philosopher, as now he does not even look for logi-

cal perfection hidden in language as he previously did, but

accepts it as perfect as it is, even in its vague common

appearance. There is no hidden essence to justify ordinary

language, only its uses in its language-games.

(c) Meaning as Use and Rejection of Mental Processes

The theory of meaning as use is closely connected with the idea of language-games, and so should be examined at this point. The idea that the meaning of the words of a proposition should be looked for in their use rather than in an essence is developed in notes from THE BLUE BOOK.

> Without a sense, or without the thought,
> a proposition would be an utterly dead and
> trivial thing. And further it seems clear
> that no adding of inorganic signs can make
> the proposition live. And the conclusion
> which one draws from this is that what must
> be added to the dead signs in order to make
> a live proposition is something immaterial,
> with properties different from all mere
> signs. But if we had to name anything which
> is the life of the sign, we should have to
> say that it was its use.[53]

The meaning of words is shown as they are used in particular language-games. There is no one meaning that is constant, like an essence. This was an error from the TRACTATUS that had to be corrected. There, the words of elementary propositions were fixed in relation to reality in that they related directly to the objects of the world. Now the human decision as to their use in language-games is seen to be the determining factor in their meaning. Wittgenstein's concept of meaning as use becomes central with the introduction of language-games, as it is here that words are seen

to have meaning and consequently language to have sense
only in a total environment. How words are used in that
language-game determines if they have meaning or if they
are understood. In fact, language-games are introduced in
order to show that meaning is to be determined only in the
application of words. There is no one function that all
words are seen to adhere to, such as naming objects; there-
fore there can be no general theory of meaning. There is
no longer a single relationship to be sought between a
word and the object it signifies. Words can signify in
many different ways. In fact, words do not have to signify
anything at all. They are compared to tools in that differ-
ent words in different contexts may signify different things,
just as all tools are not used for the same purpose. The
word 'red' for example would not signify the same type of
thing as the word 'runs' in most cases. The meaning of a
word will be determined only by examining its use in a par-
ticular context. Referring to the distinction between ana-
lytic and synthetic propositions, and consequently to the
reference to propositions as senseless, nonsensical, or sensi-
ble, this is to be determined solely from the contexts in
which propositions are employed. Hospers agrees that this
distinction can be made only with reference to the context
of use of a proposition:

> Whether a statement in the context of a
> systematic body of statements is defini-
> tional (and therefore analytic) or non-
> definitional (and therefore synthetic)
> depends on this context and on the manner
> in which the entire system is constructed
> for possible application to the world of
> things.[54]

This brings us to a discussion of Wittgenstein's

rejection of the notions of meaning and understanding as

being mental processes. The desire to view understanding

and meaning as mental processes arises from the same error

that caused him to look for elementary propositions directly

related to the world, rather than to examine them in a parti-

cular context, says Wittgenstein. It is the desire for one

answer, a unity or essence, to guarantee that something has

occurred, when such a desire must be suppressed. Meaning

instead should be sought in usage. Winch refers to this

problem:

> In just the same way as no 'labelling' oper-
> ation could by itself, outside the context
> of an established grammar, establish any con-
> nexion between name and object . . . just so
> could no process by itself constitute thinking
> something, meaning something, understanding
> something. Here too it is what surrounds the
> process, not the process itself (given that
> there is one at all), which enables us to say
> that someone has understood something, means
> something, understands something.[55]

This is an area in which his picture theory led into error.

For example, if one is told to do something, we say that bet-

ween the order and its being carried out there must come an

understanding of the order. This way of speaking leads one

to conceive of understanding as a separate step, a process in the mind, which is pictures as occurring. Wittgenstein says that just as terms must be examined in the language-games in which they are employed, and cannot be said to have meaning in isolation, so also must it be granted that understanding or meaning cannot be said to consist in a single process common to all instances of understanding or meaning, but must be seen as assuming different forms in various contexts. How a person acts or carries on, if he knows how to go on, in this context, will determine if there has been understanding, or if he has meant a certain thing. There is no one circumstance or process occuring in one's mind that can apply to all situations where meaning or understanding has taken place. The desire to reduce all meaning to one act is just another example of the search for an essence that was evidenced in the TRACTATUS. As I have stated above, Wittgenstein came to see that elementary propositions by themselves cannot picture the world. Words by themselves are lifeless, and cannot by themselves be connected to the world. It had been thought that the connection between word and object occurred in the mind in mental processes. Pitcher states clearly the fallacy of this line of reasoning:

> The connection, we thought, must be made by
> a mental act of meaning: the speaker means
> his words to stand for something, and that
> is how the connection between words and the

> world is made. But . . . if the alleged
> act of meaning consists merely in con-
> juring up an image, it will not do what
> we require it to do . . . one would still
> need to know how the connection between
> the picture and what it represents is to
> be established . . .. So the bridge from
> words to the world cannot be built of any-
> thing as insubstantial as mental images.[56]

These mental images themselves would need further images to

explain their connection between words and the world, and

that further image would also require another image to ex-

plain their connection, ad infinitum. The answer than is to

reject the desire to seek for the essence of meaning and un-

derstanding in a mental process, and to see that they occur

differently in various contexts. It is in this way that his

previous way of thinking is aided and altered. The meaning

of words is to be found in their use in language-games only.

Use is the bridge between words and the world. It is by one's

behaviour in a specific situation that we can decide if one

understands or means something. Pitcher sums up this solution

to the problem of establishing meaning or understanding as

follows:

> All that is actually required, in addition to
> the words themselves, is the behavior of human
> beings, the language-games which they play with
> words. It is, in short, the use of words which
> gives them life. In use, they are alive.[57]

(d) <u>Family Resemblances Replace Notion of Essence</u>

The criticism that may come up now is that the meaning

of a given word is hopelessly ambiguous if it is different in

different situations. If there is no one essence of meaning,
then what are we to look for in all the different situations
where it is said to occur, to establish if it has, in fact,
occurred? The answer to this criticism is to be found in
Wittgenstein's conception of family resemblances, where many
different things are related in various different ways.
Establishing meaning is another example of the application
of this theory. In the BROWN BOOK Wittgenstein says,

> We find that what connects all the cases of
> comparing is a vast number of overlapping
> similarities, and as soon as we see this,
> we feel no longer compelled to say that there
> must be some one feature common to them all.[58]

Wittgenstein wants to get away from generalities in order to
deal with particular cases. As he is examining the uses we
make of language, he sees that there is no one feature com-
mon to all the different ways we use it. But he does find
there to be some sort of relationship between all these uses
and so he sets up the concept of language-games to describe
this. There is no single essence to identify language or
language-games; rather, they are identified by different
relationships called family resemblances. There is no one
common feature but various similarities overlapping to unite.
Language-games are seen to form a family, and propositions
are seen to be members of a specific family if they share
certain similarities with other members of that family.

that language-game. These resemblances are at the level of depth-grammar, not surface-grammar. Language itself can be seen as a family which can grow by adding and inventing new language-games. Wittgenstein says,

> . . . we see a complicated network of simi-
> larities overlapping and crisscrossing:
> sometimes overall similarities, sometimes
> similarities of detail. I can think of no
> better expression to characterize these
> similarities than 'family resemblances';
> for the various resemblances between mem-
> bers of a family . . . overlap and criss-
> cross in the same way. - And I shall say:
> 'games' form a family.[59]

The idea of family resemblances is established in order to halt our tendencies to search for an essence in language. Propositions will be seen to have sense as they are used in particular language-games. If they share those similarities of that language-game they are sensible, otherwise they are senseless or nonsensical, into which category will fall all metaphysical propositions. They misuse language as their depth-grammar is conceptual, while the propositions of natural sciences share family resemblances in an empirical grammar. Metaphysical propositions seem to be expressed in the language-games of natural sciences, but they lack the depth-grammar to have any resemblance to these other propo-sitions as they are not empirically testable. So they must be rejected. The concept of family resemblances replaces

the view that language-games must have some one common fea-
ture, and it also involves the denial that they have nothing
in common besides being called games. The relationships are
a series of overlapping similarities instead. Family resem-
blances can be shown, moreover, through 'intermediate cases.'
Here certain things which do not appear to have anything in
common with each other are linked together in a series of
intermediate cases. The original two things may appear to
have nothing in common with each other, but they may each
have some similar feature with a third thing that is intro-
duced. In this way the original two are linked through an
intermediary. Their resemblances can be brought out in that
way. Wittgenstein gives us an example of intermediary cases
on page 129 of the BROWN BOOK. He asks what is the simi-
larity between looking for a word in your memory and looking
for my friend in the park. They do not appear similar at
first. He suggests then that the case of looking for a word
in your memory may be more similar to the case of looking up
the spelling of a word in a dictionary. From that case we
could go on to other cases till the similarity between the
original two cases was shown.

A point which must be examined here is the criticism
against the continuity thesis based on the differences bet-
ween the essence of the early works and the concept of

family resemblances, which replaces it in the later works.

Some authors have argued that the TRACTATUS is a different

view of philosophy from the INVESTIGATIONS as it is devoted

to searching for the essence of language through the struc-

tures of formal logic, whereas the later book is seen as

being concerned only with examining the uses of language.

The search for an essence is said to be rejected, and for

this reason the nature of philosophy is said to change.

Pitcher is one author who takes such a position, arguing that

the rejection of an ideal essence is a rejection of logic.

I have earlier argued against this viewpoint and maintained

that the INVESTIGATIONS is also a book about logic. Logic

is seen as the possibilities of transforming the symboli-

zation of our language according to rules, and it has been

stated that this is the objective of the conception of lan-

guage-games as well. Logical form was what cannot be said

only shown in the TRACTATUS, and it is also what can only

be shown in the INVESTIGATIONS as well. It has been said

that logical form is the potential for possibilities that

is common to both language and reality. This potential for

possibilities, the T-F poles, is still the basis of esta-

blishing meaning in the INVESTIGATIONS. The link between

language and the world can no more be said here than it

could be earlier. We would still be unable to judge the

relations between language and the world by logic if logical form could be said, as I have already explained. So it is also beyond the limits of language here and is in the realm of the 'senseless,' what can only be shown'. Only here logical form is not to be found in a single essence, but in family resemblances. Körner refers to the investigations of family resemblances in language-games as the continuation of the analysis of the logic of language and its relation to the world. Kenny argues along similar lines that the afore-mentioned criticism is based on an erroneous contrast between 'essence' and 'family resemblances,' and so it cannot be used to show that the nature of philosophy has changed. He states that although the INVESTIGATIONS does attack the formulation of the logical essence of the TRACTATUS, it does not reject the notion of an essence completely. Rather, the notion of essence changes to that of family resemblances; the old con-ception is partially maintained in a more viable way. There is no longer one common feature for all propositions, but rather overlapping similarities, like family likeness. There is still a search for the essence of language, in the sense of showing the logical structure that could establish limits of sense to language; but now essence is not seen as one single structure hidden beneath language and applying to all propositions. Now logical form is identified as shown in

the depth-grammar of language as it is ordinarily used.

Kenny says,

> General terms such as 'game,' 'language,'
> 'proposition' were applied not on the
> basis of the recognition of common fea-
> tures, but on the basis of family like-
> ness. Nonetheless, the concept of family
> likeness leaves room for the notion of
> convergence on, and divergence from, a
> paradigm.[60]

We can conclude that the criticism mentioned above has been answered, and so it can be stated again that Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy has remained consistent on this point as well. The notion of essence is not rejected completely, but altered to that of family resemblances. The INVESTIGATIONS can be seen as a book based on logic in the same manner as the TRACTATUS was then. Philosophy, in the traditional sense, is seen as starting in confusion and puzzlement due to our misunderstandings of language. Our intelligence is fooled into asking unanswerable questions. Wittgenstein wishes to correct this. He compares his methods of treatment to the treatment of an illness. As there are different methods for treating different illnesses, so there are different philosophical methods for examining these questions. One of his methods that we have already referred to is that of introducing or inventing intermediate cases; another is to imagine the world as different to see

the language-games then.   These are just two of his many
methods.   The point to realize is that many methods can be
applied, not just one.

(e) Rejection of Private Language Theories

Wittgenstein's rejection of a private language in
which the words referred to what could be known only by the
speaker of such a language also may be seen as a method of
clearing up confusion due to misunderstanding language.
Wittgenstein's rejection of a private language can be seen
to be a rejection of either of two positions. First of all,
a 'private language' could refer to an entire language to-
tally unknown to anyone else and made up solely by the speak-
er.   Secondly, it could refer to a certain code into which
a certain speaker had translated words of an already exist-
ing public language so that he could describe private sen-
sations known only to himself. 'Private language' would then
be the use of private words in a public language, the meaning
of these words coming from the speaker himself. Wittgenstein
is most anxious to reject the second of these two positions,
which he sees as the basis of sense - data empiricism which
states that language has it foundation in certain special
experiences, called sensations.   Such a position would be
based on the same type of reasoning found in the TRACTATUS

where one is searching for an essence, he believed. He
wishes to overcome the temptation to seek a foundation that
will link language to reality directly, without taking into
account public use in different contexts. Before continuing
with this point it should be seen that the first position is
rejected also. If a language were totally private it could
not be called a language at all. At the beginning of this
paper language has been described as that activity whereby
we use certain parts of our experience to stand for or signify
other parts of our experience. If a person was totally iso-
lated and used a word to re-identify something, that word used
to re-identify would be meaningless. If the person could
directly re-identify the thing then his words would serve no
purpose as no new knowledge would be gained from the words.
They would be senseless as I have described the synthetic-
analytic distinctions; as they would give no new information
they would be analytic and therefore not sayable in any fac-
tual sense. Furthermore, it would be hard to explain how the
speaker moves from his own experiences to forming concepts
and translating them into words, without the use of language.
Earlier I have mentioned the role of rules in language. It
has been noted that the rules must remain constant in the
context they are used in, and also that they refer to habi-
tual patterns of behaviour. Language must be public when

these points are considered. One could not follow a rule

privately or else thinking one was following a rule would

be the same as actually following one. One would have to

know if he was making a mistake or not, and only others

could tell him this. In genuine language acquisition then,

we see the need to be corrected by others. The private lan-

guage appears to be unintelligible to the speaker himself.

Even if it were intelligible to him it would be impossible

for him to communicate his meaning to others without a lan-

guage that the other could understand also. There would

have to be some basis for communication, and none is availa-

ble if a language is completely private. Manser sums up the

rejection of the first position:

> There are two points here: first, language
> must play a role in some way of life, second
> it must involve public rules . . .. What-
> ever noises a linguistically isolated indi-
> vidual might make, they would not count as
> a 'language.' In this sense a 'private lan-
> guage' is a chimera, for language is always
> a social activity, involving the rules that
> only a social situation can provide. This
> general conclusion seems to be completely
> established by Wittgenstein, but it has
> nothing to do with the question of the mean-
> ing of sensation words in our normal voca-
> bulary.61

This brings us back to Wittgenstein's rejection of a

private language from its second position. This position is

based on the same error as found in the TRACTATUS. I have

said that 'names' are central there, and 'pain' is what is discussed here. The problem to be examined is how sensation words have been introduced into our language. The problem is not that of calling a sensation by a new, different name, as that is merely describing it in reference to our already existing language. The question to be examined is how a sensation word is first introduced into our language. The word 'pain' is used in these discussions as it is seen as being one of the most basic sensation words. When pain is first talked about no other sensation words can be used to explain it. If it is private first then, there are no elements that it can be broken down into to be described. It must be experienced first, the private linguist argues. In this sense pain would be like an 'object' in the TRACTATUS, and the sentence where the word 'pain' was introduced would be like an 'elementary proposition' in the TRACTATUS. The 'pain-talk' would be directly related to the experience of pain in the world. This type of empiricism is to be rejected by Wittgenstein. It will be refuted along similar lines to those used in refuting the idea of mental processes in meaning and understanding. The first point to be emphasized is that Wittgenstein is basically concerned with analysing our uses of language. Confusion arises here also only from misusing it. We see that we experience sensations individually,

privately as it were, and we assume that talk of them is

private as well. The key to Wittgenstein's solution is

differentiating between 'sensations' and 'talk of sensations.'

As we shall see, he argues that when we talk of sensations

it does not refer to some 'objects' called sensations, which

could be experienced privately. We use the word 'pain'

incorrectly when we think of it as belonging to a private

language-game. Confusion arises first of all when one recog-

nizes that his sensations are private and then he states that

because of this he can learn the meaning of the word 'pain'

only from his own experience. But we do speak of others as

'in pain' also, and we believe that they have the same sen-

sations as we do. The problem of identifying the pain as

the same comes in here. Private linguists thought that the

term 'pain' must refer to behaviour for others and feeling

for oneself, as a person can be mistaken in reference to

another's pain but not about his own. We do, in fact, refer

to pain both in ourselves and in others, so it can be known

and said. The problem is to show why the private 'linguists'

way of doing this is incorrect. Wittgenstein's solution can

be seen in the following quotation from the INVESTIGATIONS:

> If I say of myself that it is only from
> my own case that I know what the word
> 'pain' means - must I not say the same
> of other people too? And how can I gener-
> alize the one case so irresponsibly? Now

someone tells me that he knows what pain
is only from his own case. -Suppose every-
one had a box with something in it: we
call it a 'beetle.' No one can look into
anyone else's box, and everyone says he
knows what a beetle is only by looking at
his beetle. - Here it would be quite
possible for everyone to have something
different in his box. One might even ima-
gine such a thing constantly changing. -
But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use
in these people's language? - If so it
would not be used as the name of a thing.
The thing in the box has no place in the
language-game at all; not even as a some-
thing: for the box might even by empty.
- No, one can 'divide through' by the
thing in the box; it cancels out, what-
ever it is. That is to say: if we con-
strue the grammar of the expression of
sensation on the model of 'object and
designation' the object drops out of consi-
deration as irrelevant.[62]

The private linguists' error becomes clear from this passage.

When the word 'pain' is used it does not refer to a thing,

like a private sensation for instance. It refers to the

meaning it has in a certain public language-game only. Pain-

talk then does not originate from private sensations. If it

did there would be no guarantee that it was being used in the

same sense by different people. Confusion has arisen by try-

ing to relate the word 'pain' directly to a thing - the sen-

sation 'pain' - without taking into account the differences

between the two. The word 'pain' does not get its meaning

in language from an object 'pain,' but rather its meaning

is its public use in a certain language-game, even though

its referent may be private. Manser continues,

> It might be added that anyone who believed
> that there could be a private language in
> this sense would be unable to explain how
> it was possible for us to get from this
> situation to that of our normal use of
> pain-vocabulary.[63]

The use of the word 'pain' is intimately connected to the social and behavioral context in which pain is experienced. As we have seen in talking about the rules of language, it is necessary for language to be public in order to teach and learn the meaning of words. Similarly with sensation words like 'pain,' their meaning can only be determined by examining how they are publicly used in the context of the language-game there.

An examination of the word 'private' here would help to clear up the situation. If 'private' refers to knowledge, where only I can know about something, say pain, then to say I am in pain means nothing. For we cannot know of our pains in the sense of learning about them, we just have them. To say one knows he is in pain is seen as a senseless statement as it cannot be doubted. It does not give any information, but is strictly analytical, therefore unsayable. To say 'I know I am in pain" is uninformative because you could not fail to know it. If a metaphysician tried to say this he would be uttering a nonsensical statement, as this would be,

merely a case of conceptual grammar, rather than empirical grammar. Also, if 'private' refers to possession, whereby only I can have something, then here also talk of privacy is seen as nonsensical as well. Privately there would be no basis for naming anything. One would never be capable of giving a meaning to a certain thing and later on knowing how to identify something as the same. There must be some sort of public language to establish meaning. For even to think that something is something, say pain, one must know the meaning of the word 'pain,' and this could be attained only through having a definition of it already. Wittgenstein says, "In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain."[64] Talk of pain then cannot simply mean a private sensation, like a thing; for to identify pain at all with any sense, there must be some information given, or else the statement is nonsensical. The point is that talk of one's feelings or thoughts as private sensations is not sensible, as it is not talked of in propositions that remain possibilities. Talk of such sensations would have to remain outside the realm of factual discourse, and knowledge of them could not come from such factual language. So one can talk of sensations only in words where possession is not taken to mean private. Therefore in language sensations

can be expressed only in the words of a community language.

Having refuted the private language theorists now,
Wittgenstein offers another solution as to how sensation
words are introduced into our public language. He intro-
duces the concept of 'pain-behaviour.' He says,

> How do words refer to sensations? . . . how
> does a human being learn the meaning of the
> names of sensations? - of the word 'pain'
> for example. Here is one possibility:
> words are connected with the primitive,
> natural expressions of the sensation and
> used in their place. A child has hurt him-
> self and he cries; and then adults talk to
> him and teach him exclamations and, later,
> sentences. They teach the child new pain
> behaviour. 'So you are saying that the
> word 'pain' really means crying?' - On the
> contrary: the verbal expression of pain
> replaces crying and does not describe it.[65]

Talking of sensations is done in reference to pain-behaviour.
A child learns to react differently in words to his sensa-
tions. Instead of crying in a certain situation he will say
that he has a pain for example. This does not mean that he
is reporting on a private sensation. Rather, in certain con-
texts, in certain language-games, a child will use certain
words. This is called 'pain-behaviour.' It does not refer
to a specific object, but is a certain kind of behaviour
elicited in certain contexts only. Wittgenstein wishes to
remove 'pain' from the problems that arose in reference to it,
by substituting the concept of pain-behaviour for that of

the word 'pain.' Seen as pain-behaviour it becomes easier to
talk of pain in reference to oneself and others. Manser
sums up this point:

> Thus the statement 'I have a pain' is to
> be construed as a particular form of pain-
> behaviour rather than an assertion that
> I 'have' a peculiar kind of object, a sen-
> sation. My statement about my own pain is
> on the same level as the pain-behaviour
> from which I deduce that you are in pain,
> or rather there is no need to talk of deduc-
> tion or of any sort of inference here.[66]

Sensation words are introduced into language then by means
of public language, in language-games. A child learns to
modify his reactions to sensations, which reactions are
called pain-behaviour, so that eventually he uses the same
sensation words both to refer to his own sensations directly,
and to those of others as well.

(f) Philosophy as Description

Now it should be mentioned that in the INVESTIGATIONS,
as in the TRACTATUS, this analysis is meant as a description
of how we use language, rather than an explanation of these
uses. Nor is the analysis meant to lead to explanations. He
says that philosophy will not teach us anything new, it will
only describe what we already know, what lies open to view,
but that which we seem to have forgotten. He says, "We want
to replace wild conjectures and explanations by quiet weighing

of linguistic facts."[67] There are no strict rules or meanings to be set forth as philosophical theories; only our actual uses of language are to be described. Trying to explain a language-game is really just introducing another language-game. Explanation cannot explain itself, it must be grasped at some point. All philosophy does is describe how we do in fact ordinarily use language. Pole has criticized Wittgenstein as doing more than just describing how we use language. Pole argues that one can describe something without understanding how it is related to the whole, here our ordinary language. He says, "We require an intuition into the unity of a complex, a grasp of the way in which a set of terms or elements cohere."[68] Pole is suggesting that Wittgenstein is employing intuition to make sense out of his descriptions, as just describing how we use language would not give us an understanding of how our varied language-games are all related to our ordinary language as a whole. But this is just the point that Wittgenstein has been trying to make and which Pole appears to be overlooking. Wittgenstein says,

> Not, however, as if to this end we had to
> hunt out new facts; it is rather, of the
> essence of our investigation that we do
> not seek to learn anything new by it. We
> want to understand something that is al-
> ready in plain view. For this is what we
> seem in some sense not to understand.. .

> Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away.[69]

Philosophy for Wittgenstein is not a science as it does not explain anything or discover new facts. The point Pole has overlooked is that philosophy merely arranges and gathers what we already know. Wittgenstein says, "In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. 'But it must be like this!' is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone admits."[70] Everyone would admit what he says, Wittgenstein suggests, if they were not confused by language. The task then is to get people to realize what they do in fact admit and know, and so to stop asking nonsensical metaphysical questions. Now if we already know how to use language (and Wittgenstein suggests that we do, although he does not say how we know this - it is part of the given of 'forms of life'), and we only run into metaphysical problems because we misunderstand language or forget how we ordinarily use it, then no intuition is necessary to understand what he is describing. Understanding comes solely from the description of what we already know, by making clear to us that that is in fact what we do know - how our language-games are related to, and are part of, our ordinary language.

The question which may come up now is what value or

importance this type of philosophy has if it does not teach us anything new or explain anything to us: Pitcher replies, "It takes a man of great philosophical skill and insight to pick out the obvious and to realize its profound importance."[71] From Pitcher's remark we may see the value of this type of philosophy is that it clears away errors which others have overlooked. As has been said in reference to the TRACTATUS, this type of philosophy helps us to see more clearly those things that can be said, and from this also to eliminate metaphysical propositions by showing that they misuse language. It also shows from this analysis what can only be shown. Philosophy for Wittgenstein has become non-metaphysical, thought not anti-metaphysical. Despite the fact that Wittgenstein's philosophy does not teach anything new, it does teach in the sense of describing what is difficult to see ordinarily. What it shows leads to knowledge also. Moreover, the knowledge sought for is merely of what can be said, but more importantly, to learn what cannot be said, only shown. This is what lies outside the limits of factual discourse, and includes first of all logical form, but also the meanings and values of life that cannot be expressed in factual language but are shown in other ways such as poetry, aesthetics, or religion. The analysis of language, as I have stated before, is not important to Wittgenstein merely

for its own sake, but more importantly, to help us to see
those things which can only be shown. A criticism by Pitcher
about the limits which Wittgenstein's philosophy puts on know-
ledge should be examined here. Pitcher asks,

> Why, when we are cured, should we stop
> gaining knowledge of the workings of lan-
> guage, and of lots of other philosophically
> interesting things as well? Why should we
> not continue gaining such knowledge simply
> for its own sake?[72]

This question implies a misunderstanding of one of Witt-
genstein's main points. The point is that the limits of
factual discourse are the limits of factual knowledge and
sense. We can talk factually only about what can be empiri-
cally verified in the present, but this does not mean that
our knowledge cannot expand. The only restriction on future
knowledge is that one must be able to talk in sensible pro-
positions, where all the terms have meaning, for it to be
factual knowledge. However, as we have seen, outside of
these factual limits there is more knowledge that cannot be
spoken, but only shown, or else referred to in language out-
side of factual discourse.

In concluding my description of the INVESTIGATIONS
I would argue that this description, along with the earlier
description of the TRACTATUS, shows sufficient evidence to
warrant the viewpoint that Wittgenstein's conception of the

nature of philosophy has remained consistent throughout his works. Even though his method of philosophy is seen to change, the basic ideas behind these two methods, that is, his conception of philosophy's purpose and aims, is seen to be constant.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

To conclude this thesis I would like to say that I have not intended this work to be an exhaustive study of all of Wittgenstein's works. There have been descriptions and discussions of the basic points of the TRACTATUS and the INVESTIGATIONS, along with remarks from and about some of his other texts. The study has not been more in-depth as I think that it has been quite adequate as it is in bringing out the main ideas of these books. This is all that I have found necessary to defend my position that Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy has remained consistent throughout his works. A more in-depth survey may have taken me away from seeing the main purpose of his books, as I believe it has done with some critics who became entangled in technical details. I hope that my work has cleared up some of the confusions about specific issues in his works, but more importantly, that it has made clearer the general intentions of Wittgenstein's writings. After all, that is what should be really important to see, even to be able to criticize his ideas on various technical points correctly.

I have argued that Wittgenstein consistently saw his philosophy as the analysis of language. This analysis applied to the propositions of the natural sciences and ordinary language would clarify them for those who had not seen their sense. Applied to metaphysical propositions, the analysis would show that they lack factual sense and are therefore nonsensical. This analysis is seen as leading to seeing what can only be shown also. What can only be shown by factual language is the logical form that connects language to the world; but outside of this factual realm what can only be shown also will be the truths and values of life seen in religion and aesthetics among other things. The main difference between the early and later writings is one of method only, and should not be considered a complete change of philosophy. In the TRACTATUS the meaning of a word is its relation to an atomic object in the world, while in the INVESTIGATIONS the meaning of a word is its application or use in a language-game. But in both cases the aim of philosophy is to analyse language and to establish meaning. The only change is one of method - how that analysis should be done.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Justus Hartnack, <u>Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy</u>, (New York: New York University Press, 1965), p.62.

[2]Peter Winch, "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy," in his <u>Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein</u>, (London: Hutchison & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1959), p.2.

[3]Ludwig Wittgenstein, <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), p.viii.

[4]D. Pears, <u>Ludwig Wittgenstein</u>, (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), p.95.

[5]Alexander Maslow, <u>A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus</u>, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), p.137.

[6]Ludwig Wittgenstein, <u>Notebooks 1914-16</u>, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p.93.

[7]Maslow, p.20.

[8]Winch, p.2.

[9]Ludwig Wittgenstein, <u>Zettel</u>, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), sect. 453.

[10]Ludwig Wittgenstein, <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u>, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), sect. 5.5563.

[11]Maslow, p.53.

[12]Maslow, p.56.

[13]G.E.M. Anscombe, <u>An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus</u>, (London: Hutchison & Co. (Publishers Ltd., 1959), p.44.

7

[14] Henry Le Roy Finch, _Wittgenstein - The Early Philosophy_, (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p.1.

[15] Anscombe, p.31.

[16] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 4.22.

[17] Anscombe, p.17.

[18] Finch, p.22.

[19] John Hospers, _An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis Second Edition_, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), p.162.

[20] Hospers, p.169.

[21] J. Passmore, _A Hundred Years of Philosophy_, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1957), p.358.

[22] Passmore, p.360.

[23] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 4.112.

[24] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 4.115.

[25] Anthony Kenny, _Wittgenstein_, (London: The Penguin Press, 1973), p.101.

[26] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 4.121.

[27] Anscombe, p.75.

[28] Finch, p.190.

[29] K.T. Fann, _Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy_, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p.17.

[30] Fann, p.16.

[31] Anscombe, p.161.

[32] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sects. 2.202 - 2.223.

[33] Kenny, pp.62-63.

[34] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 7.

[35] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 4.1212.

[36] Pears, p.97.

[37] Cyril Barrett, ed., _L. Wittgenstein Lectures & Conversations_, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p.7.

[38] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 6.54.

[39] G. Pitcher, _The Philosophy of Wittgenstein_, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1964), p.155.

[40] Wittgenstein, _Tractatus_, sect. 6.52.

[41] Fann, p.82.

[42] Pears, p.98.

[43] Wittgenstein, _Investigations_, Part 1, para. 63.

[44] Kenny, p.160.

[45] Pitcher, p.179.

[46] Kenny, p.119.

[47] Wittgenstein, _Investigations_, Part 1, para. 309.

[48] Barrett, p.2.

[49] Ernst Konrad Specht, _The Foundations of Wittgenstein's Late Philosophy_, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969), p.187.

[50] Specht, p.25.

[51] Wittgenstein, _Investigations_, Part 1, para. 132.

[52] Dallas M. High, _Language, Persons, and Belief_, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.102.

[53] Ludwig Wittgenstein, _The Blue and Brown Books_, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), p.4.

[54] Hospers, p.169.

[55] Winch, p.14.

[56] Pitcher, p.265.

[57] Pitcher, p.280.

[58] Wittgenstein, Brown Book, p.87.

[59] Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part 1, para. 66-67.

[60] Kenny, p.224.

[61] Anthony Manser, "Pain and Private Language," in Peter
    Winch, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein,
    (London: Hutchison & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1959),
    p.168.

[62] Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part 1, para. 293.

[63] Manser, p.174.

[64] Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part 1, para. 253.

[65] Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part 1, para. 244.

[66] Manser, p.175.

[67] Wittgenstein, Zettel, sect. 447.

[68] D. Pole, The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, (University
    of London: The Athlone Press, 1958), p.82.

[69] Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part 1, para. 89-90.

[70] Wittgenstein, Investigations, Part 1, para. 599.

[71] Pitcher, p.323.

[72] Pitcher, p.324.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anscombe, G.E.M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
    London: Hutchison & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1959.

Barrett, Cyril, ed. L. Wittgenstein Lectures & Conversations.
    Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
    1967.

Fann, K.T. Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy. Berkeley,
    and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

Finch, Henry Le Roy. Wittgenstein - The Early Philosophy.
    New York: Humanities Press, 1971.

Hartnack, Justus. Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy.
    New York: New York University Press, 1965.

High, Dallas M. Language, Persons, and Belief. New York:
    Oxford University Press, 1971.

Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis
    Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
    Inc., 1967.

Kenny, Anthony. Wittgenstein. London: The Penguin Press,
    1973.

Maslow, Alexander. A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
    Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
    Press, 1961.

Passmore, J. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Middlesex,
    England: Penguin Books, 1957.

Pears, D. Ludwig Wittgenstein. New York: The Viking Press,
    1969.

Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Englewood
    Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.

Pole, D. The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein. University
of London: The Athlone Press, 1958.

Specht, Ernst Konrad. The Foundations of Wittgenstein's
Late Philosophy. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1969.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Notebooks 1914-16. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1967.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1953.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Zettel. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1961.

ARTICLES

Butchvarov, P. "Meaning-as-Use and Meaning-as-Correspondence,"
Philosophy 35 (1960), 314-25.

Cavell, Stanley. "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later
Philosophy," Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 67-93.

Collins, J. "Review of Investigations," Thought 29 (1954),
287-9.

Erickson, Steven A. "Meaning and Language," Man and World 1968,
563-86.

Fann, K.T. "A Wittgenstein Bibliography, Writings By and About
Him," Int. Phil. Quart. 7, 311-339, J.E.67.

Feibleman, J.K. "Reflections after Wittgenstein's Philoso-
phical Investigations," Sophia 23 (1955).

Findlay, J.N. "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,"
Philosophy 30 (1955) 173-9.

Headlee, Mark B. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy: Old and New,"
Dialogue (PST) 18, 39-44 JA 73.

Koehler, Conrad J. "A Study in Wittgenstein's Theory of
Meaning," Kinesis 1, 36-42, Fall 68.

Körner, S. "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein," in Rush Rhees,
ed., Discussions of Wittgenstein. New York: Schocken
Books Inc., 1970.

Malcolm. "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,"
Philosophical Review 63 (1954) 530-59.

Manser, Anthony. "Pain and Private Language," in Peter Winch,
ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. London:
Hutchison & Co., (Publishers) Ltd., 1959.

Mosier, Richard. "Reflections on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein,"
Proc. Phil. Educ. 23, 121-126, 1967.

Mundle, C.W.K. "Private Language and Wittgenstein's Kind of
Behaviorism," Philosophical Quarterly, 16, (1966) 35-46.

O'Brien, George. "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Thought,"
International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966) 45-70.

O'Shaughnessy, R.J. "On Having Something in Common." Mind 79,
436-440 JL 70.

Pears, David. "The Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy."
New York Review of Books, Jan. 16, 1969, pp.21-30.

Richman, R.J. "Something Common," Journal of Philosophy 59,
(1962) 821-30.

Rosenberg, Jay F. "Wittgenstein's Self-Criticisms or Whatever
Happened to the Picture Theory?" Nov. 4, 209-224, Sept. 70.

Sanka, Fumio. "On the Philosophy of L. Wittgenstein - From
Logism to Mysticism," The Science of Mind, no. 8
(March 1969) 78-84.

Stigen, A. "Interpretations of Wittgenstein," Inquiry 5
(1962), 167-75.

Strawson, P.F. "Critical Notice of Philosophical Investigations,"
Mind 63 (1954) 70-99.

Wertz, S.K. "On Placing Wittgenstein in History," S.J. Phil. (The Southern Journal of Philosophy) 11, 337-350, Wint. 73.

Winch, Peter. "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy," in his Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. London: Hutchison & Co.