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The Anthropological Dilemma of  
Radical Evil

Rodney Andrew Clark

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Religion

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts at  
Concordia University  
Montréal, Québec, Canada

January 1991

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ISBN 0-315-64651-9

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## ABSTRACT

The Anthropological Dilemma of  
Radical Evil

Rodney Andrew Clark, M.A.  
Concordia University, 1991

Kant's philosophy has often be treated as if it were composed of a number of conflicting and disparaging themes, instead of an all encompassing and unified philosophy. This thesis recognizes that all of the questions which Kant had addressed throughout his encyclopaedic philosophical project can be subsumed under the single question 'What is a person?'.

This thesis both demonstrates that Kant's ultimate goal was to unite the speculative with the practical employment of reason, and that this could be accomplished only through the development of an adequate philosophical anthropology; and challenges the structure of Kant's philosophical anthropology, revealing the logical contradictions which resulted from the development of the concept of Radical Evil, logical contradictions which lay at the foundation of Kant's anthropological resolution to the problem of unity.

To Viktoria;

I love you more than the spring rain.

## Table of Contents.

Introduction:	p. 1.
Chapter 1: The Dialectic Foundation of the Critical Project	p. 5.
Chapter 2: The Will	p. 16.
Chapter 3: The <i>Freewill</i>	p. 30.
Chapter 4: The <i>Summum Bonum</i> and Radical Evil	p. 44.
Chapter 5: Kant's Anthropological Dilemma	p. 63.
Conclusion:	p. 69.
Notes:	p. 71.
Bibliography:	p. 90.

In this thesis, the following original works of Immanuel Kant will be referred to in the body of the text by the following abbreviations.

<u>Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View</u>	APV
<u>Critique of Practical Reason</u>	CPrR
<u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>	CPR
<u>Critique of Teleological Judgment</u>	CTJ
<u>Doctrine of Virtue</u>	DV
<u>Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals</u>	FMM
<u>Introduction to Logic</u>	IL
<u>Lectures on Philosophical Theology</u>	LPT
<u>Metaphysical Elements of Justice</u>	MEJ
<u>On History</u>	His
<u>Personal Notes and Letters</u>	PNL
<u>Philosophical Correspondence</u>	PC
<u>Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics</u>	Pro
<u>Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone</u>	Rel
<u>Selected Pre-Critical Writings</u>	PCW
<u>Theory of Ethics</u>	ToE

## Introduction.

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscured in darkness or in the transparent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence. The former begins at the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and it broadens the connection in which I stand in to an unbounded magnitude of worlds beyond worlds and systems beyond systems and into the limitless time of their periodic motion, their beginning and their continuance. The latter begins as my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity but which is comprehensible only to the understanding -- a world with which I recognize myself as existing in a universal and necessary connection, and thereby also in connection with all those visible worlds. The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet the matter from which it came, the matter which is for a limited time provided with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth as that of an intelligence, in which the moral law reveals independent of all animality and even of the whole world of sense -- at least so far as it may be inferred from the purposive destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination which is not restricted to the conditions and the limits of this life but reaches into the infinite. (CPrR p. 166).

The above quotation, taken from the conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason, outlines the entire breadth and depth of Kant's critical project. Though this project appears to be necessarily divisive in its method of demanding that humanity dwell in two distinct worlds -- a world of sensual perception, phenomena, and causal



necessity; and a world of moral obligation, noumena, and absolute freedom; such appearance is merely illusory. Kant had had to so bifurcate reality in order to allow for the possibility of moral autonomy from a natural world bound by causal necessity.

Reality, comprising both what is the case and what ought to be the case, lies not in the unresolved solitudes of categorical declaratives and imperatives, but in the dialectic resolution of these opposing theses in some kingdom of moral ends -- in Kant's interpretation of the Kingdom of Heaven wherein the *Summum Bonum* is to be realized and the possibility of the knowledge of things-in-themselves is tenuously suggested. This complete resolution lays eons beyond this world, but it requires nothing more than time to bring it to fruition, for the grace of God has already been secured through the autonomous moral legislation of humanity <sup>1</sup>.

The fulcrum of Kant's dialectic is neither morality nor freedom, for neither of these exists outside of the legislation of pure reason; nor is it some Supreme Being who legislates nature and moral action, for the existence of such a being is entailed and not presupposed by Kant's system; nor could it be Nature, for Nature is but a shadow of the true form of reality. The fulcrum of Kant's system is, and can ever only be, humanity (IL p. 15) <sup>2</sup>; for all of the questions of Kant's system are subsumed in the single topic of (philosophical) anthropology (PC p. 205) <sup>3</sup>.

Kant had indeed proposed a vast project, for he excluded nothing from his enquiry. Though Kant was a master philosophical composer, being for philosophy what Bach was for baroque music, he was unable to achieve the synthetic unity for which he so earnestly strove (CPR pp. 560 & 642) <sup>4</sup>. His philosophical system reads much like a three part invention. It bares three distinct themes -- scientific knowledge, moral obligation, and rational faith -- each of which stands unto itself, but each of which are needed to reveal the voice of the fourth theme, the voice of their harmony; anthropology <sup>5</sup>.

Kant's discussion and development of these themes adhered strictly to the laws of pure reason, laws which cannot be blighted by internal contradiction lest reason itself collapse into shards of failed syllogisms. Kant's goal was to develop each of the three themes individually, trusting that, because the laws of reason would not be transgressed, the themes would combine in well-ornamented counterpoint, producing a fourth and unifying theme. Unfortunately, the counterpoint which was to have been the anthropological discussion proved to be dissonant, resounding with the troubled sounds of discord. The error within Kant's critical project must lay in one or more of the themes which compose his anthropology. It is the thesis of this paper that the discord lays in the discussions of moral obligation and rational faith; more specifically, in

the discussions of Radical Evil, the nature of freedom, and the differing theories of the will.

## Chapter 1.

### The Dialectic Foundation of the Critical Project

In this chapter the topic of discussion will be the first theme of Kant's three-part philosophical invention, the theme written in response to the question 'What can humanity know?'. This chapter will discuss the limits which Kant placed on 'knowledge', the problems which arose when Reason was faced with the limits of 'knowledge' and the demands of the Transcendental Ideas of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, and the dialectic resolution which Kant developed as a means by which both 'knowledge' and the Transcendental Ideas could be discussed without irresolvable contradiction. Before this chapter can be begun, clarification must first be given to the terminology which shall be employed.

The aim of the Critique of Pure Reason was to both answer 'what can be known?', and to establish the limit between the body of 'knowledge' and the realm of the Transcendental Ideas (CPR p. 29) <sup>1</sup>. Such limitation seems an affront to an inquiry into all possible 'knowledge', for indeed humanity inherited a great body of 'knowledge' of each of the three Transcendental Ideas in its plethoric religious and mythic traditions. Kant does not deny the 'knowledge' of mythic and religious traditions, in fact, he does not deal with this genre of 'knowledge' at all. Instead, he simply classifies such 'knowledge' as

*Erkenntnis*, as the 'knowledge' of life lived, as 'knowledge' which is based upon perception but which lacks the benefit of an apriori framework to render it intelligible; a form of 'knowledge' with which his critical enquiry was not at all concerned (CPR p. 43-45) <sup>2</sup>. Kant's critical project was concerned only with *Wissenschaft*, the 'knowledge' of the professional observer, of the scientist (CPR p. 43-45) <sup>3</sup>. This genre of 'knowledge' demands that the observer have developed a theoretical framework through which to observe the universe so as to render it an ordered and causally-related whole, and not a booming-buzzing confusion of merely contiguously related events. This form of 'knowledge' can be employed as purely *a priori* (CPR p. 96) <sup>4</sup>. Given this much narrow scope of interest, the denial of scientific 'knowledge' -- 'knowledge' which requires an apriori framework as well as sensual perception in order to formulate a judgement -- of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, is but a logically necessary consequence, and not merely an *a priori* denial. Given the importance of the Kantian distinction between the two forms of 'knowledge', henceforth in this thesis Knowledge will refer to scientific 'knowledge', and knowledge to the 'knowledge' of life lived.

A second consequence of the limitation of Knowledge to that which is within possible experience, is the denial of the possibility of Knowing the nature of any thing as it is in itself. The demand to limit Knowledge to that of which we

have sensual intuition, has liberated the Transcendental Ideas from the realm of Natural necessity and determination but has also denied humanity the possibility of the noumenal Knowledge of all that is in Nature. The only being which could know things as they are in themselves would be some being which has a pure intuition, and not a being such as ourselves whose intuition is limited by the categories of quantity, quality, modality and relation. A being with pure intuition could be only a Deity, and although Kant's project points to the possibility that a Holy humanity could acquire the will and the intuition of God, it is a possibility from which Kant flees and yet to which he is necessarily driven.

The next term which must be clarified before this chapter can proceed is the term will. In English translation, the word 'will' is used univocally to refer to the two German words *Wille* and *Willkur*, a reference which tends only to confuse the great difference between these two terms. The distinction which Kant has designated between these terms stems from the distinction between their Latin predecessors, *voluntas* and *arbitrium*, respectively. *Voluntas*, or *der Wille*, acts as the source of an imperative, be that imperative moral or simply legal. This sense of 'will' designates what is right and wrong, and as such it cannot be at fault. Furthermore, this sense of 'will' is identified with the legislation of pure practical reason, demanding its maximization, demanding that it be the 'will' of the universal and not only the 'will' of the particular.

This sense of 'will' is likened unto the 'Will of God' in that it provides the foundation for morality <sup>5</sup>.

*Die Willkur*, or *arbitrium*, differs greatly from *der Wille*. *Die Willkur*, simply put, is the faculty of choice. It is the faculty that chooses which ends should be maximized, which goals pursued, and which desires satisfied. Unlike *der Wille*, which cannot be logically spoken of as being either free or not free (MeJ p. 27) <sup>6</sup>, *die Willkur* is radically -- i. e. practically, transcendently and cosmologically -- free (CPR p. 633) <sup>7</sup>. It is bound neither to the legislation of practical reason nor to the imperatives of the moral law. *Die Willkur* is free both because of its ability to be obliged, and because of its ability to act with caprice, fulfilling ends of its own discretion without obligation to moral imperatives. The two terms are related in that *der Wille* declares the imperative to be fulfilled, and *die Willkur* freely chooses to comply or to violate the imperative <sup>8</sup>.

To avoid confusion in this thesis, *der Wille* shall always be translated as will and *die Willkur* shall be translated as *freewill* <sup>9</sup>. Having completed the necessary terminology clarifications, this chapter will now return to the discussion of the limits of Knowledge, the problem of the Transcendental Ideas, and the dialectic resolution which Kant developed as the means to accommodate these logically contradictory points of view.

As aforementioned, the call to limit Knowledge was the necessary result of demanding that Knowledge be based upon sensory perceptions which could be evaluated with respect to the categories of the understanding and made into synthetic *a priori* or synthetic *a posteriori* judgements. Such a characterization of Knowledge demands that any thing which cannot be discussed with respect to the categories of the understanding -- with respect to quality, quantity, modality and relation -- cannot be the object of any judgment whatsoever. The by-product of this characterization of Knowledge is that Nature can ever only be known as an object of sense perception and never as it is in itself.

Kant offered all of humanity the means to order, to systematize, and to render Nature intelligible through the governance of the laws of human perception. Kant offered humanity a method whereby Nature could be either Copernican or Einsteinian; for the difference rested not in Nature but in humanity's legislation of Nature.

The problems with this method, and with the limitations which result from it, are severe. By so legislating Nature, Kant had necessarily divided it into that which is real and beyond perception, and that which is within perception but not real. Kant had made humanity the theoretical legislators of a world of perception whose ontological reality cannot be known; and he has denied humanity the ability to theoretically legislate in a perceptible and ontologically real world. This shortcoming is compounded by humanity's



unique position of dwelling in each of these two worlds, and of being ultimately concerned with the objects of the ontologically real world, objects which remain necessarily beyond their perception. The first of these worlds, the exterior world of sense which lacks ontological reality, is subject to the legislation of theoretical reason; the second world, the invisible world of ontological reality which begins at humanities inner-self, is subject to the legislation of practical reason. Kant begins to address this dilemma of two worlds and of two employments of reason, in The Critique of Pure Reason.

The ideas which generated the above two-world problem are ideas which found their genesis in the categories of the understanding; in the categories of quality, quantity, modality and relation. These simple categories are made into ideas of transcendental discussion when the limits of sensible perception are removed from them. These ideas are, then, grounded in the structure of human understanding, and their augmentation to the unbounded realm of transcendental discussion is effected through the free exercise of pure reason. When these four categories are discussed without the limitation of perception, they generate the questions of original cause, matter, existence and of perfection. These are logically reducible to the three Transcendental Ideas of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul (CPR p. 315)<sup>10</sup>. Having demonstrated the theoretical origin of the Transcendental Ideas, Kant had to develop a system which

could accommodate the logically contradictory ideas of theoretical and practical reason, acknowledging the ontological superiority of the practical over the theoretical perspective. This method of metaphysical resolve was necessarily dialectic, for neither perspective could be dogmatically rejected. Unfortunately, any dialectic resolution would remain both a practical necessity and a theoretical illusion, for though it would be required to render practical reason plausible, such a resolution would compromise the authority of theoretical reason by reinforcing the claim that the realm of theoretical enquire has no perceivable ontological reality (CPR p. 479) <sup>11</sup>.

The method which Kant used to develop his dialectic resolution was as follows. Kant posited both a rationally justifiable thesis and its antithesis. He then proceeded to disprove each, and by so doing, he proved the other. This method of denying each of two mutually contradictory propositions was Zeno's method of dialectic argumentation, a method which won him the contempt of Plato . What Zeno had attempted to do was neither to confuse his public nor to appear to subscribe to mutually contradictory statements, but to demand recognition for the necessity to accommodate each of the mutually contradictory statements in some dialectic understanding of the world (CPR p. 446) <sup>12</sup>. This was what Kant had hoped to accomplish. Kant had desired neither to subscribe to mutually contradictory statements void of the possibility of dialectic resolution; nor had he

desired the eternal bifurcation of reality into mutually exclusive practical and theoretical worlds. Kant desired reality to be a unity, and though the cost of this unity was the denial of perceivable ontological reality to the phenomenal world, and the denial of knowledge of the noumenal world, unity could be achieved through this method of dialectic resolution. Unfortunately, as aforementioned, any such resolution was an apostasy to theoretical reason for it reinforced the claim that the theoretical world lacked perceivable ontological reality. Had the theoretical world a firm ontological foundation and not one of shadows seen through a glass but darkly, the ideas of reason which contradict sensual experience could have been apodictically denied as but the musings of an unbounded imagination instead of the rationally justifiable ideas which they are.

This dialectic resolution is made at the cost of the world of perceptions, a cost which profits the invisible, though ontologically real, practical world. This dialectic resolution is not an equally distributed dialectic, for though concessions are made by each of the theoretical and practical worlds, it is the practical world which has triumphed both immediately and in the distant future. This resolution is in effect only a temporary measure to allow present humankind to reside in both worlds without suffering undue anxiety over his/her predicament of dwelling in both and neither of two mutually exclusive worlds. The true resolution of the tension between these worlds comes only in

a rationally hoped for eschaton wherein humankind has fulfilled the obligations of holiness and has gained the Deity's perspective upon reality. In this eschaton, the practical world gains preeminence over the theoretical, and humankind has the potential to both know Nature and to legislate it with respect to moral ends. Such an ideal resolution lays immeasurably distant in the future. In the present situation we must remain content with the dialectic resolution offered above <sup>13</sup>.

Thus far in this chapter the division of Kant's enquiry and the method by which he overcame this division has been discussed. Attention will now be focused upon the object which is central to Kant's project and without which there could be neither realms of enquiry nor the possibility of resolution; humanity. The end of this chapter will thus act as prolegomena to the main body of this thesis paper, preparing the structure wherein humanity is to be both the cornerstone and the keystone of Kant's system.

Kant's project, as stated in the opening lines of this chapter, had but a single concern: humanity. It is this topic which demanded the separation of reality into theoretical and practical realms, for prior to human existence Nature was a lawless chaos inhabited by beasts without knowledge, knowledge, or obligation beyond the primal demands of survival and reproduction. It was the advent of rational humanity which caused the bifurcation of reality when humanity first acted with the caprice of a

*freewill*. Humanity is both responsible for the advent of this fracture in reality, the fracture between dwelling in a world without reality and acting in an invisible though real world, and the only avenue through which this fracture can be mended. The Kantian project is reducible to the development of a philosophical anthropology capable of addressing and resolving this tension, both temporarily in the present world, and permanently in the world to come.

Kant's goal was to harmonize the desire for happiness with the moral obligation to fulfill the *Summum Bonum*, believing that happiness would be achieved through the perfection of moral ends. This perfection he found rationally justifiable through faith (*Glauben*) in a moral Deity whom would be obligated to bestow grace upon a humanity which strove earnestly to fulfill the obligation to holiness. In this moral eschaton, humanity's *freewill* would be perfectly aligned with its will, and all action would necessarily be Holy. Having so likened human action to that of the Deity, Kant left open the possibility that humanity could also gain the pure intuition of the Deity, an intuition which would allow for the noumenal Knowledge of Nature. This final possibility was not suggested by Kant, for he did not wish to grant humanity the seat of God, the seat which would be the logical entailment of likening human action to that of the Deity, for humanity could never achieve complete happiness without the ability to know reality as it is in and of itself.

This anthropological evolution was developed through the course of Kant's writings, and it is the true end of his critical project. As shall be demonstrated, the problem with this ideal anthropology is that it is not consistent with the foundation of Kant's project. His project was rooted in the dialectic tension between the theoretical and the practical understanding of reality. Kant proposed a solution to this tension which justified humanity's awkward existence in both of these worlds, and which promised the resolution of this dialectic in a moral eschaton.

It was Kant's faith in a moral eschaton which betrayed the foundation of his enquiry, a faith which was desirable, but not rationally justifiable, given the possibility of the fulfillment of evil ends through the autonomous action of humanity's *freewill*. This crisis within Kant's project is grounded in his discussions of *freewill* and will, and in his development of a metaphysics of morals wherein non-moral ends could not be made into universal maxims. The seeds of this crisis lay in the heart of Kant's moral and religious work, and they become manifest in the anthropological and eschatological conclusion of his project.

## Chapter 2: The Will

This chapter will focus upon the second theme of Kant's three-part philosophical invention -- the question 'What ought I to do?'. Ideally, this second theme would lay in its entirety within some single text which proceeds chronologically from the Critique of Pure Reason. This ideal is partially realized in that the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds from the Critique of Pure Reason, and The Foundations contain the most important material for partial discussion of this theme. Nevertheless, a thorough discussion of the will requires reference to the Metaphysical Elements of Justice and of Virtue, and the Critique of Practical Reason, as well as Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone and Kant's essays On History and his pre-critical ethical treatise wherein he first postulated the nature and the characteristics of the will. To isolate this term from Kant's encyclopaedic project is difficult; it is perhaps not completely desirable, for the will cannot be adequately discussed as a category unto itself, but only as a category central to any discussions of moral philosophy and the practical employment of reason. This discussion of the will will proceed through a discussion of Kant's moral philosophy, and though the concept of will is intimately twined with Kant's moral philosophy, it can be adequately discussed within the limits of the practical enquiry, which

includes moral philosophy as well as religion, teleology, justice and virtue.

Within such limits, the will is found to have been developed with respect to two differing interpretations, a subjective and an objective. The objective interpretation of the will refers to its use as a legislative agency. This use is recognized at both the individual and the communal levels. The subjective interpretation refers strictly to the use of the will as a determining psychological and anthropological characteristic of the human animal. The objective interpretation finds its genesis in Kant's pre-critical ethical work and is brought to fruition in The Foundations and The Metaphysical Elements of Justice; though it remains a topic of discussion throughout each of the aforementioned texts. The subjective interpretation of the will is a much less developed concept, but one which bears great weight for the anthropological understanding of humanity. This interpretation of the will lays almost exclusively in Kant's essays On History and in Religion, though it is an integral part of all developments of Kant's ethical system and it too can be found in all of his ethical and religious works.

In the first chapter of this thesis, the term 'will' was defined with respect to its German and Latin roots. Will, defined as *Voluntas*, or *der Wille*, acts as the source of an imperative, be that imperative moral or simply legal. This sense of will designates what is right and wrong, and



as the designator of morality, it cannot err. This sense of will is identified with the legislation of pure practical reason, demanding that it be the will of the universal. This sense of will is likened unto the will of God for it provides the foundation for morality <sup>1</sup>. This similarity with the will of God is strengthened when Kant claimed that the moral law was a person's inner-most self, was personality itself (Rel. p. 23) <sup>2</sup>; for as the will of God is not just the decree of God but God's Being, so too is the human will both humanities self-legislation and its being.

To accommodate these differing, though intimately twined characteristics of the will, this chapter will be divided into three separate yet dependent sections. The first section will focus upon the objective understanding of the will, and the second section will focus upon the subjective understanding of the will. Each of these sections will be discussed with respect to the entirety of Kant's ethico-religious project. The third section of this chapter will briefly summarize the tensions which these differing aspects of the will bring to bear upon the whole of Kant's moral philosophy.

### The Objective Will

The will is objectively understood as the moral law. In this sense, the will is the legislator of human morality, the originator of the moral law, and the dictator of action <sup>3</sup>. This sense of will is, however, not free for freedom

demands the ability to act and/or to be obliged; for even though the will is the genesis of its own decrees, seeking consultation only from pure practical reason, it can only legislate action and not itself act, demand obligation and not itself be obliged (MeJ p. 27) <sup>4</sup>. Freedom cannot logically be predicated of the will (it could be said that the will has the freedom to legislate, but such a statement would be moot). Only the *freewill* can be spanned by freedom, and this freedom includes both the freedom to act and to be obliged (CPR p. 465) <sup>5</sup>. Though unable to act or to be obliged, the objective sense of the will is empowered by its identification with practical reason itself (FMM p. 29) <sup>6</sup>. The identification of the moral law and practical reason as terms univocal with the will allows for their synonymous usage in order to render the call to morality more intelligible. The advantage of being allowed univocal usage of these terms is that the demand for autonomous self-legislation can be readily guaranteed through the structure of the call. Humanity calls itself individually to abide by the moral law, a law which is identical to the nature of the caller. This self-calling bares the weight of obligation for morality demands obligation, and the possibility of obligation is guaranteed by the dialectical relation of morality with practical freedom <sup>7</sup>. Humanity is, then, practically free, because practical freedom is the necessary pre-requisite for moral obligation; and humanity is morally obliged because it is its nature so to be. Humanity is,

then, practically free because it is also its nature so to be.

The objective interpretation of the will is idealized in Kant's moral philosophy by the decree of the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is the will's autonomous decision to be obliged to strive to fulfill the *Summum Bonum*, an obligation which humanity places upon itself through the desire for complete authentication. Kant formulated the categorical imperative in a number of different, though similar, ways. The following are six formulations of the categorical imperative taken from Kant's pre and post-critical work.

1. "Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law" (FMM p. 39).
2. "Act as though you treat humanity...always as an end and never as a means only" (FMM p. 47).
3. "Act only in harmony with the idea of the will of every rational being as making universal laws" (FMM p. 50).
4. "The moral agent acts as if he were a law giving member of a realm of ends" (FMM p. 57).
5. "I ought to further the total greatest perfection" (PCW p. 32).
6. "I ought to act in accordance with the Will of God" (PCW p. 32).

These formulations of the call to dutiful moral obligation must be understood as synonyms with the will for, as aforementioned, the will, the moral law, the obligation to duty, and personality are terms bearing univocal reference. Each of these formulations of the categorical

imperative embodies the call to fulfill the *Summum Bonum*, the call to perfectly realize the nature of the human personality. This call to holiness, to attain moral perfection, is an ideal to which humanity can strive; but to act with the conviction that it is an attainable end requires more than mere human desire. The call to achieve holiness poses a practically absurd problem -- for either humanity chooses moral perfection as its end, and it is an end which is unattainable; or humanity chooses an end which is attainable, but which is not moral perfection. Any end which is not holiness can not be moral, for it can only be other than the will. But the end which is holy, and which is identical with the will, is beyond the possible achievement of humanity. The *Absurdum Practicum* demands that either holiness be attainable, or morality be logically contradictory, hence unattainable<sup>9</sup>.

Kant resolved this dilemma by positing, on purely logical grounds, the necessity of the immortality of the soul and of the existence of a Just and Gracious Deity<sup>9</sup>. Kant's argument proceeded as follows:<sup>10</sup>

If humanity is to strive to fulfil moral ends, then such ends must be attainable. The only reasonable means by which humanity could attain moral perfection would be through the givenness of an infinite period of time; hence the immortality of the soul is a rationally justified, and a practically necessary, fact. Having been assured of the immortality of the soul, humanity still errs in the face of

moral perfection, for though the human will has been perfectly realized, it is still not without fault; for it bares the burden of the countless moral transgressions committed throughout the multitude of aeons before moral perfection was approximated. The only means by which the emancipation of the human will could be guaranteed is through the rationally justified belief in a Just and Gracious Deity, for if such a deity did not exist, holiness could never be realized, and if holiness could never be realized then morality would collapse through the internal contradictions of the *Absurdum Practicum*.

It was Kant's assertion of the structure of the will which made morality philosophically tenable; and the pursuit of morally perfect ends which made the transcendental ideas of God and of the immortality of the soul into practical objects of necessity. The consequences of the attainment of moral perfection through the gracious assistance of a Just Deity are two-fold -- they are happiness and culture (CTJ thesis 22) <sup>11</sup>. The justification of happiness as the consequence of holiness is as follows: Holiness is the perfect fulfillment of duty; but the disposition to fulfil duty is virtue <sup>12</sup> and virtue is the worthiness of being happy...and the supreme condition of all that may seem desirable (PNL p. 202) <sup>13</sup>. Happiness is understood as the satisfaction of all of my desires (CPR p. 636) <sup>14</sup> and the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes according to wish and will" (CPrR p. 129) <sup>15</sup>. Holiness is,

then, the condition of dictating everything with respect to humanity's desire and will. The justification of culture as a consequence of holiness is not quite as clearly defined.

The most extreme manifestation of the objective will is revealed through the progress of culture. The civil state, a purely human creation, is grounded upon the primary consensus of a legislative will. This legislative body is likened to Rousseau's general will, and it is the desire of the population to emancipate itself through the promotion of justice -- the externalization of morality (MeJ p. 77) <sup>16</sup>. This macrocosmic interpretation of the will is radically objective in that it demands the subordination of the moral behavior of those within a civil society to the legal dictates of the Sovereign ruler, placed there through the due process of election. Kant is so adamantly in favour of submission to the collective will and lawful dictation that he has labeled it an affront to morality to posit action against even the most tyrannical of sovereigns (MeJ p. 86) <sup>17</sup>. Following Kant's logic, such action can only be understood as acting with respect not to morality -- for it was through moral means that the constitution of the state was created -- but to evil ends; for to kill your Sovereign is paramount to killing your own moral personality (MeJ p. 87) <sup>18</sup>.

By subordinating individual morality, and equally, freedom and duty, to some collective end which is ideally, though by no means necessarily moral, Kant demanded that the

moral law, the law which can only be chosen autonomously by each individual moral agent, must be subordinated to the socially dictated ends. This objectification of morality is an affront to pure practical reason, and an affront to Kant's discussion of the legislation of that same faculty. Even if the socially dictated ends were in compliance with the ends of the autonomously chosen moral law, the social obligations could never be considered moral because of the single fact that such legislation is heteronomous, hence categorically immoral. Were the moral actor to respect the legislation of the state as only legal (external), and not moral (internal) imperatives, then the actor could deceive the state through compliance with its demands. Unfortunately, such deception would also transgress the moral law, and is equally untenable. All that an individual moral agent could do would be to comply with the dictated ends of the state, accepting them as if they were the fulfillment of individual moral ends, and keep hope that in some distant future, society would come to pursue and fulfil moral ends at a cultural level. Until this desired and distant end morality will remain an imperative which shall be aspired to, but which cannot be fulfilled.

#### The Subjective Will

The subjective interpretation of the will stands in diametric opposition to the objective interpretation. Where the objective will served as the ground of morality, both

microcosmically and macrocosmically; the subjective will provides the anthropological origin of humanity, an origin with both micro and macro-cosmic consequences.

In the preceding section of this chapter it has been stated that Kant claimed the will to be not only the ground of personality, but personality itself (Rel p. 23) <sup>19</sup>. By having so designated the characteristics of the will, Kant asserted that humanity was born with the predisposition of obligation to fulfil moral ends. Unlike John Locke's anthropology which posited a humanity born with a *tabula rasa* upon which the experiences of life carve and shape an individual's personality, Kant's anthropology presupposed the moral nature of the personality, predestining humanity to strive towards morally perfect ends.

This predisposition to morality reduced morality to the choice of one's own self, but it did not render morality heteronomous, for the self must still be chosen. Individually, this personality designation reinforces the call to strive to realize holiness, for holiness is understood to be the full emancipation of the human personality. Any end other than holiness is necessarily an inauthentic end, for not only would it not be moral, it would not be human. The result of this definition is that humanness entails holiness. There are equally important consequences of this predisposition revealed at the level of culture.



Kant had claimed that in a civil state the norms and mores which are given the strength of moral and legal imperatives are products of the common will. This will was brought into existence when humanity first realized the benefits of communal action -- the possibility of justice and of emancipation from nature. The common will designated norms and mores, and these were given the strength of law through the action of a legislative assembly under the governance of a constitution which was composed through the consensus of the members of the state, and made manifest in the authority of a duly elected Sovereign (MeJ pp. 80-81)<sup>20</sup>. Given the innate moral predisposition of the individual human personality, just as the individual is called to fulfil his personality, so to should the state be universally obliged to moral ends. This end could be the case if all moral agents had the strength of *freewill* to act only in accordance with moral ends, but such a state has yet to be realized. Consequently, the governance of states is equally susceptible to moral shortcomings, and the construction of a society whose legal and moral behavior are an affront to the moral law within us is a reasonable possibility.

As the morality of the individual and the state are necessarily interrelated, both morally good and morally reprehensible action on either the individual or the cultural level will effect the morality of the other. The problem with this situation is that, though individuals

could act morally were they to dwell as islands unto themselves in an ideal anarchical society wherein all others were necessarily moral, such a situation would require the morality of the universal to allow for the possibility of the morality of the individual. Reciprocally, were a moral society to exist, it would require the pre-existence of universal moral concensus. Furthermore, because individual moral action is subject to the legislation of the state, morality on any level can only be aspired to when moral ends have been universalized.

A further problem results when the state's ends are in contradiction to the moral law. Given Kant's demand to respect the legislation of the state in which you dwell, and given his call to comply dutifully with the dictates of your Sovereign even if that Sovereign be a tyrant; Kant demanded that humanity not subscribe to the dictates of its innate predisposition to the good, but to observe the obligation to fulfill the ends of the state. The observance of the dictates of a tyrant leaves the moral agent moral, for to act with dissent would be immoral (MeJ p. 86) <sup>21</sup>. This is an affront to Kant's imperative to pursue only the autonomous moral law. Given Kant's subordination of the individual to the universal, and his subordination of personality (the moral law) to the ends dictated by the state, Kant has allowed for the possibility of the denial of human nature in order to satisfy social obligation. Morality can then be maximized in a situation wherein that which is maximized is

contrary to the individual's will, but in harmony with the common will.

Kant allowed this apostasy to morality to exist in order to allow for the possibility of the negation of this apostasy -- the possibility of the creation of a just society. Kant spoke of the reality of tyranny, and though he did not approve of despots and their immoral ends, he demanded that the only resistance which citizens could partake in was legal recourse through the recognized legislature and courts of law (MeJ p. 88-89) <sup>22</sup>. These actions could be pursued without breaching the sovereign's legislation. Any other action to depose a tyrant is unequivocally immorally repugnant and could not be pursued.

Through this narrow passage Kant has allowed for the possibility of bringing individual and cultural norms into compliance with the autonomous moral law, and emancipating the individual moral agent at the cultural level.

#### The Will in Summary

The will is to be understood as humankind's personality, and as humanity's self-calling to moral action. This two-fold usage serves to harmonize the problem of proving the existence of practical freedom and morality, and of legitimating the call to duty by offering the single response of it is the nature of humanity to be morally obliged. Equally, this anthropological origin of the ground

of morality serves as the requirement for the practically necessary proofs of the existence of a Just Deity and of the immortality of the soul, justifying rational belief in the attainment of happiness and of culture through the realization of holiness on an individual and a universal level.

The construction of a civil state is also facilitated through the two-fold nature of the will because the requirement to realize individual moral ends is bound necessarily to the externalization of those ends through just legislation, binding the emancipation of the individual moral agent to the emancipation of all moral agents under the governance of universal norms and mores.

The problems which this definition of the will poses for Kant's ethical system are not insignificant. First, his justification of the existence of morality and practical freedom has been reduced to the assertion that it is the nature of the personality to be so obliged. This assertion is an acceptable pre-supposition for a non-critical philosophical system, but for Kant to have dogmatically asserted that the will, which is practical reason, the obligation to morality, and the human personality, is to betray his own critical method. By having done this, Kant has apodeictically denied the possibility of any human possessing a will which is not moral, and has invoked the necessity of the existence of some Radically Evil being in order to justify the existence of moral evil in the world.

### Chapter 3: The *FreeWill*.

The *freewill* is one of the most problematic concepts within Kant's philosophic system to be understood by we, the readers; and to be given a clearly delineated role throughout the entire critical project by Kant, the author.

There are two senses of *freewill*. *Freewill* can refer to either the merely animal freedom to choose which physical maintenance needs are to be fulfilled, or, it can uniquely refer to the possession of reason by humanity, wherein a *freewill* chooses which ends to maximize within a teleologically governed moral world. The unique situation of the *freewill* is that it, in a sense, fulfills both of these roles through its existence, for it is the *freewill* which bridges the chasm between the worlds of phenomena and noumena - between the worlds of nature and morality. Without *freewill* existing between these two realms of human existence, humanity would be unable to realize moral ends within a nature which is governed by the irrevocable laws of causal necessity. Without *freewill*, humanity would be unable to build a civil state, to achieve the end of civilization - which is culture, or to ever achieve the individual end of happiness -- the guaranteed end of moral perfection.

In the previous chapter the will had been presented as an innate characteristic of human composition. Will is a necessary characteristic of human nature given the recognition of human rationality. Kant claimed that the will

was identifiable with human personality and with the practical employment of reason (Rel p. 23 & FMM p. 29) <sup>1</sup>. Kant equally claimed that it is the will which performs the role of law-giver for the individual and, macrocosmically, for the state. The will is also identified as humanity's predisposition to the good for its moral legislation is necessarily flawless, and it is in this sense likened unto the legislative will of the Deity <sup>2</sup>. Will is, then, an absolutely inalienable characteristic of humanity's rational and moral composition, and its existence can be neither proved nor disproved by logical or empirical means. Its existence can be only apodictically asserted as a given human characteristic (CPR p. 479, PNL p. 190 & FMM p. 75) <sup>3</sup>.

Kant treated the will as if it could have been logically deduced in a non-tautologous manner by arguing that because freedom could be neither proved or disproved by reason, it must be accepted as a problematic given; and since humanity could not be morally obliged without the freedom so to be, freedom became the guarantor of the possibility of moral obligation (PNL p. 190) <sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, for the human moral law to be autonomous, it must have recourse to none other than its own imperatives, and without the possibility of recourse from either other humans or a Deity, human morality must, by definition, be a flawless given, for there are no alternative means for humanity to divine the moral law other than through the individual moral agent's use of practical reason. Freedom can be spoken of as

the *ratio essendi* of the moral law; and our respect and duty towards this law (i.e. the experience of being obliged) is in turn the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom <sup>5</sup>. This statement of identity is the most concise and accurate portrayal of the relation between freedom and the moral law.

Following the above identity statement it is imperative to observe that the will, which relates to nothing but the moral law, cannot be called either free or unfree, for it relates not to actions, but immediately to legislation for the maxims of action (and is therefore practical reason itself). Consequently, it is absolutely necessary and is itself incapable of constraint. Only the *freewill* can, therefore, be called free (MEJ pp. 27-28) <sup>6</sup>. Freedom, in its transcendental, cosmological, or, practical sense, becomes the inexplicable ground for the genesis of the moral law. The will, as the personification of practical reason and of the moral law, is plausible only on the pre-existence of the *freewill*, for though freedom is the *ratio cognoscendi* of the moral law, and as such dialectically related to the moral law, freedom had existed prior to morality as *arbitrium brutum*, as the pathologically necessitated action of animals (CPR p. 465) <sup>7</sup>.

The *freewill*, through its manifestation of practical freedom -- *arbitrium sensitivum liberum*, freedom which is understood as the independence of coercion through sensuous impulses (CPR p. 465) <sup>8</sup> is the propaedeutic to moral action. This freedom is the power of human self-determination,

independent of coercion through sensuous impulses. The *freewill* is a faculty grounded *apriori* in human nature for its origin cannot logically be determined (for to determine the origin of the possibility of freedom would necessarily rob freedom of its basic principal of self-determination). Nor can the *freewill* be empirically determined for the empiricist would observe humanity from the perspective of philosophical behaviorism, necessarily denying the possibility of freedom. The will is also an *apriori* given of human nature, for its genesis lays both within the unintelligible origin of freedom and in the apodeictic certainty of the practical employment of reason.

The *freewill* is, then, a faculty of quite different origin and nature than the will.

The *freewill* was translated in the first chapter of this thesis as *die Willkur*, or *arbitrium*, and it was shown to differ greatly from the will (*die Wille*)<sup>9</sup>. *Die Willkur*, simply put, is the faculty of choice<sup>10</sup>. It is the faculty that chooses which ends shall be maximized, which goals pursued, and which desires satisfied. Unlike the will, *freewill* is radically free, and it is bound neither to the legislation of practical reason nor to the imperatives of the moral law. The will cannot logically be spoken of as being either free or not free, for freedom is a term which cannot span the concept will (MEJ pp. 27-28)<sup>11</sup>. The will, as moral law, is autonomously, hence freely, chosen by the



*freewill*; but as a thing in itself it is only a given. In this understanding of will, the moral agent is neither free nor not free, for the moral law is understood to be that agent's personality, and freedom cannot logically span this understanding of the will. Following this line of argumentation, Kant has demanded a sense of moral law which is innate to humanity, which is necessarily perfect, and which has no means of issuing in action. All action, moral and otherwise, is absolutely dependent upon the autonomous *freewill*. This faculty alone bears the torch of freedom and was endowed from the beginning of time with the ability to choose which ends shall be made into maxims.

The *freewill* is free both because it can be obliged to moral ends, and because of its ability to act with caprice, fulfilling ends of its own discretion without obligation to moral imperatives. The will and the *freewill* are related in that the will decrees the law, and the *freewill* chooses -- between the law and some sensual impulse -- to comply with or to violate the moral imperative.

The relationship between these two faculties is of the utmost importance for the correct understanding of Kant's moral philosophy. Kant could not accept a world wherein moral action existed only as some invisible and hoped for end; nor could he accept a world wherein there existed only capricious free action unrestrained by the governance of practical reason. For moral action and moral teleology to be possible, Kant had had to address humanity's situation as

citizens of both worlds. Kant had logically and necessarily demanded that experience be divided between the two worlds of noumena and phenomena. Humanity is challenged by its situation of residing betwixt these two, at present exclusive, worlds. Kant had recognized that the human *freewill* is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine the *freewill* to an action only in so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim; only in this manner can incentive coexist with the absolute spontaneity of the *freewill* (Rel p. 19) <sup>12</sup>. The *freewill* stands in isolation from both the world of brute experience and the world of moral imperatives, for it can choose ends from either realm as incentives for action. This recognition of the nature of the *freewill* demands that it be free in both worlds, that the *freewill* be both cosmologically and practically free (CPR pp. 465 & 468-469) <sup>13</sup>. The problem which arises from this partitioning of experience is one of determining which faculty shall have predominance over the other. Does the will have predominance over the *freewill*? and if so, is there then any possibility of action contrary to the moral law? Or, does the *freewill* predominate in moral discourse, reducing moral imperatives to the level of common animal appetite?

In the few preceding paragraphs of this chapter it has been argued that the *freewill* must have existed prior to the will, for though each faculty is grounded upon the unintelligible origin of freedom, it is the *freewill* which

can exist without moral imperatives, and morality which is necessarily dependent upon the possibilities of choice and of action. This argument is, however, not that which Kant had presented in his essays on Religion. In the essay "Radical Evil in Human Nature" Kant presented an anthropological explanation for the origin of both the will and the *freewill*. These explanations are, respectively, given under the titles *Concerning the Original Predisposition to Good in Human Nature* (Rel p. 21), and *Concerning the propensity to Evil in Human Nature* (Rel p. 23). It should be immediately noted that Kant relates the origin of the will to the origin of the good in human nature, and the origin of the *freewill* to the propensity to evil in human nature <sup>14</sup>, though evil is not a necessary choice of the *freewill* but only one of the two practical categories of the *freewill* (the other being the good) (PNL p. 194) <sup>15</sup>. Kant also addressed the will as an objective legislative agency <sup>16</sup>, and the *freewill* as a subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (Rel p. 23) <sup>17</sup>.

In "The Radical Evil in Human Nature" Kant listed three innate characteristics of human nature which are good in principal, but corruptible none the less. These characteristics are the predisposition to animality in Man, taken as a living being; the predisposition to humanity in Man, taken as a rational and living being; and the predisposition to personality in Man, taken as a rational and an accountable being (Rel p. 22) <sup>18</sup>. The first

predisposition includes the general category of purely mechanical self-love, such as reproduction and survival, and does not require the use of reason. This predisposition is good, though it can be corrupted through its misuse and lead to the beastly vices of gluttony, lasciviousness, or drunkenness <sup>19</sup>. The second predisposition offers humanity the choice of maximizing the cultural virtues of equality, and fraternity; but it too can be corrupted and be made manifest in the cultural vices of jealousy, envy, and ingratitude <sup>20</sup>. The third predisposition cannot be corrupted. It is the choice of the virtue of good character, which is respect for the moral law within us. The reason why this predisposition, the predisposition to personality, can be made manifest solely in the realization of virtuous ends is because moral feeling...the property of which is good character....demands the presence in our nature of a predisposition on which it is absolutely impossible to graft anything evil (Rel p. 23) <sup>21</sup>. Kant continued in the following sentence to claim that we cannot rightly call the idea of the moral law...a predisposition to personality; it is personality itself (Rel p. 23) <sup>22</sup>.

Human nature is, by Kant's definition, undeniably and irrevocably good. The *freewill* is, following these assertions, able to choose to act in accordance or in discordance with the predispositions to animality and to humanity; but there is no choice save to act in accordance with the predisposition to personality, which is to act in

accordance with the moral law, which is practical reason and the will. The *freewill* is, then, not absolutely free.

Kant also listed three propensities to Evil in Human Nature. A propensity differs from a predisposition in that a predisposition is necessarily innate, whereas a propensity need not necessarily be innate. A propensity can be acquired (if it is good), or brought by man upon himself (if it is evil) (Rel pp. 23-24) <sup>23</sup>. The first propensity to evil is the frailty of the human heart. This is expressed when an objectively good maxim is adopted by the *freewill*, but the *freewill* treats it as subjectively weaker (in comparison with inclination) <sup>24</sup>. The second propensity to evil is the impurity of the human heart. This propensity is the *freewill*'s choice of maximizing not purely moral ends; or the decision to not make the moral law the sole incentive for action <sup>25</sup>. The third propensity to evil is the wickedness or the corruption of the human heart. This is the propensity of the *freewill* to maximize ends which neglect or ignore the imperative of the moral law <sup>26</sup>.

Kant is not content with claiming that humanity has innate propensities to evil, he wishes to claim that humanity is evil by nature, though not so by necessity (Rel p. 27) <sup>27</sup>. Kant does not wish to claim that there is an innate evil in humanity, for evil resides in the ends which are maximized (Rel p. 17) <sup>28</sup>, and not in the being whom is choosing the maxim. As Kant states elsewhere, the free production of evil is an act of *freewill*, the faculty of

choice which is subject to both rational and sensuous incentives (CPR pp. 465, 469 & MEJ p. 13) <sup>29</sup>. Furthermore, Kant cannot logically ascribe evil to an innate characteristic of human composition, for he would then be asserting that humanity was by nature both good and evil, a resolution which is philosophically untenable (Rel p.20) <sup>30</sup>.

Kant has, through his anthropological definition of the rational human animal, defined the will as univocal with personality (Rel p. 23) <sup>31</sup>, and he has rendered the *freewill* subservient to the will by allowing the *freewill* the choice of maximizing either the affirmation or the negation of the predispositions to animality and to humanity; but demanded that the predisposition to personality be inviolable (Rel p. 23) <sup>32</sup>. Humanity is left in the paradoxical situation of being innately good, though able to adopt the most venomous and devilish of ends as maxims for action. Given this paradoxical statement of the nature of a person, Kant is faced with the dilemma of accounting for the existence of evil. If humanity is necessarily good and only contingently evil, then there is no justifiable reason for the existence of evil in human action (the Natural world from which humanity arose could be observed as being evil, but to call it so is jejune, for a moral judgment cannot span an amoral situation).

Kant attempted to account for the existence of evil in the event of human freedom, claiming that the first action of a *freewill* must have been a fall from innocence

instigated through some desire (Rel p. 36) <sup>33</sup>. This proved to be an inadequate explanation for it required that there have been some instigator which had encouraged humanity to abandon its innocence in favor of choosing a maxim. It is necessary to here remind the reader that even in a state of innocence humanity possessed a *freewill* (*arbitrium brutum*), though not a *freewill* informed by the obligations of morality. This brute freedom was a given, as were the predispositions to animality and to humanity (both of which can exist without the moral law); but these givens did not in themselves offer justification for a fall (or a rise, as truly was the case) from innocence to the choosing of a maxim. This choice had to have been instigated, and the only possible instigator, according to Kant, is a Radically Evil Being (Rel pp. 38-39) <sup>34</sup>. Kant claimed that evil could have arisen only through the instigation of the morally evil, and because humanity was by nature morally good, humanity must have been seduced into evil by some devilish being...for despite a corrupted heart, humanity yet possesses a good will, and in this remains the hope of a return to the good from which it has strayed (Rel p. 39) <sup>35</sup>.

This response to the question of the origin of evil in the choosing of human maxims is as (in)sufficient as Kant's response to the origins of freedom and morality. The origin of evil is a plausible conjecture, for Kant cannot label humanity innately good and evil, for that would be absurd, neither can Kant label natural inclinations evil, for that

would entail the depiction of all of Nature as evil as opposed to amoral. Kant had no choice save to place evil outside of the individual moral agent and to claim that evil exists only as a possible maxim for human action and not as a thing-in-itself.

Humanity is predisposed to the good, though fraught by the propensity to maximize evil ends. The *freewill* is, then, by nature neither morally good nor morally evil. It is necessarily undetermined. Were the *freewill* to be by nature evil, there could never be harmony between the objective decree of the will and the subjective desire of the *freewill*, and moral action would be impossible. Were the *freewill* to be by nature good, there would have been neither a fall from innocence, nor the possibility of moral choice, for moral choice demands the liberty to choose between the practical categories of the good and the evil (PNL p. 194)<sup>36</sup>. The *freewill* must remain morally undetermined, i.e. cannot have a nature, lest its moral determination render moral action null and void.

Kant's response to the question of which faculty has dominion over the other is fraught with problems. First, Kant has ignored the fact that it is transcendental freedom which was proven to be a philosophically tenable thesis, and the demonstration of the possibility of morality is dependent upon the prior existence of the practical freedom of *freewill*. Secondly, the structure of morality demands



that the moral law be freely chosen as the maxim which shall be pursued lest the moral law be rendered heteronomous through either its imposition or its pursuit from ulterior motive. By designating the moral law as innate, flawless, and inviolable, Kant has allowed humanity the liberty to choose maxims and to designate which ends shall be pursued, but he has also categorically limited the nature of moral action to the mere actualization of potential - a return to an Aristotelian interpretation of human development <sup>37</sup>. Thirdly, If the *freewill* is to be radically free, and not simply free to be obliged, then its scope of action cannot be limited. The moral agent must be free to designate its ends and through that designation create itself. Anything less than this does not respect the moral agent as the autonomous and dignified being which it is and must be (DV p. 99) <sup>38</sup>. If the moral agent is to be understood as a self-making and a self-determining being, it cannot be limited to, or defined by, categorical assertions which extend beyond the single claim to rationality. Any further *apriori* definition of humanity categorically limits the radical freedom of the *freewill*.

Kant has claimed that humanity be considered as being by nature good, though fraught by the propensity to pursue evil actions. Kant has further claimed that it is the will which dominates moral legislation, and the *freewill* which simply designates the ends which shall be maximized. The

*freewill* may or may not act in accordance with the will, and action in discordance with the will is a common, though ultimately unintelligible and futile event. Kant has placed the freedom to choose and to act under the governance of the moral law. when in fact the freedom to act had necessarily existed prior to morality. Kant has also effectively limited human freedom to the freedom to act morally, for any action contrary to the morally law is ultimately futile given that the human personality is incorruptibly good, and that happiness -- the desired end of humanity -- is attainable only through moral perfection. This limitation of freedom, both cosmological and practical as embodiments of the transcendental idea, is an affront to Kant's ambition of guaranteeing humanity the liberty to be a self-determining being, dependent upon nothing other than individual rationality. These problematic situations within Kant's system will be the subject of discussion in the following chapters of this thesis.

## Chapter 4:

### The *Summum Bonum* and Radical Evil

In the previous chapters the characteristics of the *freewill* and the will were discussed and developed with reference to Kant's metaphysics of morals and his moral anthropology, anthropology being both the ground for the possibility of morality and the guarantor of morality's fulfillment. This chapter will, in part, be focused upon Kant's anthropology as a determining factor of the choice between the Good and the Evil, though moral anthropology will be used only as a foundation for the body of this chapter. The main topic of concern for this chapter will be the teleological reasons which Kant offered, in his second and third critiques and in his historical and religious writings, in support of the necessity of moral action and in anticipation of the end of history. This chapter will examine the process whereby the individual moral agent chooses to fulfil good ends, pursues holiness as the perfection of virtue, and desires happiness as the end of moral perseverance. This discussion of the desire to realize holiness will be broadened so as to demonstrate that Kant's philosophical system is dependent upon the necessary realization of holiness and of happiness, and in turn upon the theses which guarantee a purposeful and moral end for humanity -- the immortality of the soul and faith in a Just and Gracious Deity. Without these desired ends guaranteed

through the structure of autonomous moral action, Kant's entire philosophic system -- the theoretical as well as the practical enquiry -- will collapse through inner contradiction.

The second part of this chapter will attempt to develop the situation wherein the moral agent chooses to pursue evil ends, chooses willingly to violate the moral law. This situation is not at all well developed by Kant, for he continually failed to recognize the possibility of the pursuit of radically-free self-determination as a sufficient motivation for human action. Given Kant's faith in a moral eschaton and in a just judgment of all moral agents, the pursuit of evil maxims as a possible, though not sufficient, *raison d'être* for human action is non-existent. It will be demonstrated that Kant's anthropology, his eschatology, and consequently his entire philosophical system, demands that either the pursuit of evil maxims as a sufficient incentive for action is impossible, which results in an unacceptably pre-determination of human destiny and a necessary limitation of human freedom; or, that the pursuit of evil maxims is a sufficient incentive for action, and Kant's critical project is torn asunder by the inviolable guarantee of radical human freedom.

It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that Kant claimed humanity to be by nature inviolably good, though fraught with the temptation of choosing to maximize evil ends <sup>1</sup>. Humanity is, in a sense, born into evil -- for evil

is an innate propensity (Rel pp. 23-24) <sup>2</sup> -- though destined to good ends; for no other end of humanity or of culture is possible save a holy and a happy one <sup>3</sup>. The anthropological justification which Kant offered in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone is insufficient and unacceptable. Insufficient, because it is reducible to a dogmatically asserted predisposition to the good (Rel pp. 23-24) <sup>4</sup>; and unacceptable, because his explanation of the propensity to the evil is ultimately unintelligible (Rel pp. 36 & 38-39) <sup>5</sup>. Kant recognized evil as some thing which dwells outside of humanity which humans can choose to regard as an end (Rel p. 17) <sup>6</sup>. In itself, with respect to humanity, evil has no ontological existence. Evil is only a possible maxim, an object of the *freewill* (PNL p. 194) <sup>7</sup>. Kant did not offer the possibility of submersion in evil ends, for in every moral choice the moral agent stands anew between the good and the evil, stands as if this choice were being made without a history of previous choices (Rel p. 36) <sup>8</sup>. Evil has, then, no permanence in human nature. It is dependent upon the choice of a *freewill*, and if the moral law is chosen instead of evil ends, then evil ceases to exist.

In Religion, Kant at least allowed the autonomous moral agent the ability to choose evil ends and to regard those ends as maxims. But in his other texts he was not nearly as generous. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Kant claimed that the moral agent never sanctions the evil in herself...for there is really no evil from principles; it

comes only from abandoning principles (APV pp. 158-159) <sup>9</sup>.  
 And again in the Lectures on Philosophical Theology, in the section subtitled *The Origin of Evil*, Kant stated that:

the evil in the world can be regarded as the incompleteness in the development of the seed toward good. Evil has no special seed. It is only negation, and consists only in the limitation of what is good. It is nothing but the incomplete development of the seed of goodness out of its uncultivated condition....A special seed of evil is unthinkable. It is rather the first development of our reason towards goodness which is the origin of evil. Or, it is the uncultivatedness still remaining in the progress of humanity's condition which is evil. Evil is, therefore, inevitable (LPT p. 117).

In both of these quotations Kant has denied the possibility of the existence of evil as some thing. This differs greatly from his position in Religion which stated only that evil was not some thing in human nature. Kant not only allowed evil to exist, he demanded that evil exist. For without the existence of some Radically Evil being, Kant could neither have accounted for the fall, nor for the persistence of evil as a maxim for action (Rel pp. 38-39) <sup>10</sup>.

Kant had much less difficulty justifying the existence of the good. The good is identifiable with morality, with a Just and Gracious Deity, with practical reason, and with the human personality <sup>11</sup>. Kant had not only demanded that the personality be good, he had declared that the personality was inviolably good <sup>12</sup>. No action, no lasciviousness, no ignorance could tarnish the nature of the personality. The inviolability of the personality followed from Kant's demand

that the good be independent (LPT p. 117) <sup>13</sup>. Being independent, the good could be spoken of as a seed which God had placed in humanity (LPT p. 117) <sup>14</sup>. The good, then, possesses being, exists both within and without of humanity, and as it is humanity's determined nature, is the inevitable and inviolable end of humanity.

The language of the Good and the Evil calls for caution, for they are neither symmetrical nor parallel concepts. The Good is the logically necessary entailment of moral action, and the ground for the possibility of the same. The Good in human nature is an inviolable predisposition, and the foundation on which the just civil state will be constructed. The Good is also the logical guarantor of happiness, and of the moral end of all things. The Evil, however, is an innate, though not an inviolable, propensity. It is not a 'thing' in itself, but either the absence of the Good or the product of a Radically Evil being. The Evil could be the ground for a civil state, though such a state would be without law or justice; but the Evil cannot be either the ground for human happiness or for the end of all things.

This ends the anthropological discussion of the Good and the Evil. Attention will now turn to the teleological justification of these two objects of the *freewill*. The *freewill* must, in every moral judgment, choose between the good and the evil. The following paragraphs will present Kant's interpretation of each of these objects as possible

ends for human action -- the pursuit of the Good being the fulfillment of the *Summum Bonum*, and the pursuit of the Evil being the fulfillment of the *Bonum Supremum*. The *Summum Bonum* and the *Bonum Supremum* differ in that the first is pursued as the fulfillment of moral obligation, and is not itself an incentive for action, but rather the result of the perfection of duty; and the second is pursued as an end in and of itself, for the sole purpose of satisfying desires, with no incentive to duty whatsoever.

#### The Good

When the moral agent chooses the good in any moral judgment, the good is chosen as a universal maxim and a universal end. The moral agent must believe that the moral law which has been adhered to must be realizable, for if the moral agent doubts the possibility of the attainment of the good, the moral agent commits itself to not make the good its end, and in turn commits itself not to act in accordance with the moral law. This immoral commitment constitutes the *absurdum practicum*<sup>15</sup>. It is the doctrine of moral teleology which resolves the problem of the *absurdum practicum*, and it does so by positing the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Gracious and Just Deity.

The obligation to perfectly fulfil the good -- to actually realize it as the end of morality, demands also that the good be the end of Nature and of humanity, for it is of great concern to morality that it form for itself the



concept of a final end...for only thereby can...practical reality be given to the union of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the purposiveness of Nature (Rel p. 5) <sup>16</sup>. The emancipation of The Good as the end must satisfy the demands of both nature and freedom, presenting them ultimately in a single philosophic system (CTJ p. 92) <sup>17</sup>. The resolution of the division of human experience and legislation between the knowable and ontologically unreal world, and the unknowable and ontologically real world, demands that the totality of human experience must ultimately be purposively united, in turn uniting the practical with the speculative use of reason (CPR pp. 560 & 642) <sup>18</sup>. This purposive unity of all things can only be accomplished through the perfection of the action of *freewill* under the governance of the moral law, and such perfection can only be called holiness.

If The Good is to be regarded as the purposeful end of all, then pursuit of the good must offer response to the following three problems: How is holiness possible? How is happiness to be realized? and: How does the resolution of the *Absurdum Practicum* resolve the problem of uniting the three ideas of the Canon of Pure Reason -- the ideas of God, Freedom, and the Immortality of the soul -- with reason's legislation through Practical and Theoretical Metaphysics?

Kant faces the first two of the above problems -- the problems of holiness and happiness -- in the *Antinomy of Practical Reason* in the Critique of Practical Reason, and

resolves them in the dialectic of that same text <sup>19</sup>. This chapter will begin responding to the questions of holiness and happiness by outlining Kant's development of this antinomy.

Either happiness is the motive for virtue, or virtue the motive for happiness. The former -- that happiness is the motive for virtue -- must be false, for no motive other than duty itself can lead to the possibility of virtue. Were virtue possible through other than the pursuit of moral obligation, or, were virtue achieved by pursuing some end other than The Good, morality would be robbed of its autonomy. The later -- that virtue is the motive for happiness -- must also be false, for experience has demonstrated that moral striving is rarely, if ever, rewarded with happiness in this world. There are two possible resolutions to this antinomy: either the moral law is inherently false; or, the experience which a finite moral agent has of the world is not necessarily the actual nature of reality. Kant refused to deny the moral law. He chose instead to construct a teleologically governed world -- the arena for moral action -- in which happiness is indeed the reward for virtuous striving. Kant demanded a teleological principle operating within the Kingdom of Nature.

The command of practical reason is the obligation to strive to fulfil perfect morality. Such perfection is impossible for the moral agent if bound to a finite existence. Because the moral agent's personality (will)

demands that it be completely and perfectly actualized, and because of the purely logical principle that ought implies can, such fulfillment must be consistent with the nature of the moral agent. It follows from the desire to perfect moral action that human existence must be without end to allow for this to occur. The immortality of the soul is postulated strictly as a logical entailment of the demand of moral obligation.

With the guarantee now offered of an infinite duration in which to perfect moral action, the moral agent is still unable to free itself from transgressions past, unable to be assured that even if the moral law is perfectly realized that happiness will be acquired. The moral agent has been guaranteed of an immortal existence in which to strive to perfect moral action; but still there is no reprieve from transgressions past, and no guarantee of future happiness. Kant is again faced with a morally repugnant situation. Holiness and happiness seem to have remained beyond the grasp of the immortal moral agent, now damned to eternal unhappiness and eternal moral struggling. It is in response to this dilemma that Kant postulated, on strictly logical grounds, the existence of a Just and Gracious Deity.

The postulate of the existence of a Just Deity extends, like the postulate of immortality, from the demands of the will. It is a postulate consistent with the logic of Pure Reason in that if ought implies can, then the obligation to fulfil moral imperatives must imply a world wherein those

imperatives can be fulfilled. This postulate ensures that the will can be perfectly actualized through the autonomous action of the *freewill*; and that happiness will be proportioned to moral striving. With rational faith in the existence of a just and gracious Deity, the moral agent can legitimate the aspirations of will and *freewill* and fulfil the *Summum Bonum*. The moral agent knows that as long as she has strived with all of the strength of her *freewill* to perfectly actualize the decrees of her will, that she is justified in trusting that God will make up for her shortcomings. Through the free gift of Grace does God allow the moral agent to realize holiness. Grace is not a desired end in and of itself, but a freely given gift expected on the grounds of reason alone.

The moral agent does not lay back and expect God to simply bestow upon her the perfection offered through pardoning grace. Were this to happen, grace would lead to virtue, and the moral agent would be robbed of the imperative to autonomously strive to actualize his will. Were grace to lead to virtue, the moral agent would not be in possession of happiness proportioned to his moral struggling, for he would not have struggled at all. The right course of action, says Kant, is not from grace to virtue, but from virtue to pardoning grace (Rel pp. 189-190)<sup>20</sup>. Now that the moral agent has been released from past transgressions by the atoning act of a Just and Gracious

Deity, half of the demand of the *Summum Bonum* has been fulfilled.

The happiness which the moral agent now desires is absolute happiness, for the will to which it is to be proportioned is now a perfectly actualized will. The moral agent has not pursued holiness in the hope of obtaining complete happiness, for such a motive would remove the moral agent from the realm of morality, casting him back into the situation of an heteronomously determined *freewill*. The moral agent instead expects happiness to be proportioned in the same manner as was grace. Practical faith allows the moral agent to be secure in the belief that both grace and happiness will be justly given, not as rewards, but as the guarantee of the fulfillment of moral obligation. It is this logically demanded guarantee of the fulfillment of the moral law which led Kant to claim that morality leads inevitably to religion (Rel p. 7) <sup>21</sup>.

Kant has liberated the moral law from the morally repugnant situation of the *Absurdum Practicum* by postulating on strict logical grounds the existence of a gracious Deity and the immortality of the soul. Two of the three questions with which this section of this chapter was concerned have now been answered, namely: How is holiness possible? and, How is happiness to be attained?. The final question to be dealt with is: How does Kant bridge the gap between the practical and the theoretical, for without this synthesis

the integrity of the unity of the Canon of Pure Reason will not be upheld, and reason will collapse.

This one question breaks down into three, asking: How is happiness to be realized? for happiness is concerned with sensuous objects. How is culture to be realized? for though it is the internal manifestation of the end of humanity, it can only be realized in Nature; and, How is the end of all things to be realized? These three questions rest upon teleological concerns.

Moral teleology, the demand that there is purpose to the imperative to strive to perfect one's moral action, expresses a rational faith in the attainment of a design <sup>22</sup>. The belief in the attainment of a design is the belief in one's citizenship in a world of moral ends. It is rational faith in God which allows humanity to set before itself a final end in conformity with the requirements of the moral law (CTJ p. 119) <sup>23</sup>. Only with this rationally justified belief in God can humanity fulfil the demands of morality. Morality is not to be realized in exclusion from either the Kingdom of Nature or from the appearance which humanity has of that Kingdom. Morality's end -- perfect happiness and culture -- can be realized only in a sensual world. This imperative of practical reason demands the possibility of natural teleology, for only if purpose and order can be found in nature can humanity hope to have its purpose as an agent in a morally intelligible world made to agree with its desired ends of happiness and culture. Only if humanity can

propose both natural teleology and a final unified end, can moral teleology be fully realized.

The idea of natural teleology furnishes a regulative principle for the employment of Theoretical Metaphysics. This idea proceeds from the Transcendental Idea of an Author of the World and serves to schematize the highest form of systematic unity to which empirical knowledge can be brought -- the purposive unity of all things (CPR p. 560) <sup>24</sup>. The idea of God in its regulative employment allows the moral agent to propose natural teleology and the union of the natural with the moral world. From the practical point of view, moral teleology brings both Kingdoms -- the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Nature -- into purposive unity. This faith in the purposefulness of nature and morality is expressed by Kant when he speaks of Christian ethics.

Christian ethics presents a world wherein reasonable beings single-mindedly devote themselves to the moral law; this is the Kingdom of God, in which nature and morality come into a harmony which is foreign to each as such, through a Holy Author of the World, who makes possible the derived highest good (CPrR p. 133).

The derived highest good is expressed through the systematic unity of ends. And it is this systematic unity of ends....that leads inevitably...to the purposive unity of all things, which constitutes this great whole, in accordance with the universal laws of nature, and thus unites the practical with the speculative use of reason (CPR p. 642) <sup>25</sup>.

The legitimation of the unity of all things allows the moral agent to rationally believe that morality can be fulfilled in the phenomenal world; purposefully combining both worlds in a holy and happy civil state. This final relationship between humanity and the natural world is the final end of all things.

In itself and strictly, the idea of a last end is independent of sensible nature and must be set up by humanity. The establishment of the final relation is the formulation of a perfect civil constitution. This is the highest object of culture, the end of history; or the truly terrestrial good sovereign (CTJ theses 92 - 97 & His p. 16 - 32) <sup>28</sup>.

The choice of The Good had been defended through recourse to Kant's anthropology and teleology. Kant has philosophically justified the assertion of the immortality of the human soul, the existence of a Gracious and Just Deity, and the existence of purposefulness in both nature and obligation. The problem with this situation is that the free pursuit of the Good as the maxim for action has been predetermined through the assertions of the nature of personality, which is inviolably good, and the nature of moral obligation -- that ought necessarily implies can -- justifies the moral agent's assertion of and belief in a gracious and just Deity. The problems with the anthropological determination of the moral agent have been discussed above. The proceeding paragraphs will discuss the problems with Kant's teleological justification for the possibility of moral fulfillment.



Kant's moral system is grounded upon the indiscernible foundation of transcendental freedom (CPR p. 479, PNL ¶. 190 & FMM p. 75) <sup>27</sup>. It is upon this precarious foundation that Kant has built his moral teleology in justification of the efficacy of the Good. Through Kant's argument for the necessity of a purpose for moral action and of a purpose for the existence of the Natural world, he has effectively predisposed all of humanity to holiness and to happiness. Kant's just Deity becomes the guarantor of the possibility of morality and of the possibility of purposefulness in nature and obligation. Humanity no longer fills nature and obligation with purposefulness, for humanity cannot in itself provide adequate reason for purposefulness in either realm beyond providing justification for the existence of a Deity. Kant has effectively robbed humanity of its dignity by placing the ultimate ground of human worth in a Deity and not in individual moral agents.

Kant had attempted to bestow morality with worth independent of the existence of a deity. For he claimed that

it is not as necessary to assume the existence of God as it is to recognize the validity of the moral law, consequently, one who is unable to convince himself of the former may not deem himself absolved of the obligation to the latter. All that must be abandoned is the premeditation of the final end in the world to be effected by the pursuit of the moral law (CTJ p. 119).

This non-theistic interpretation of the moral law falls prey to the dilemma of the *absurdum practicum*, and lacking purpose in the world, it is inherently false.

Kant has generally recognized the dependence of his thought upon the existence of a Deity, for

without God I would have to be either a visionary or a scoundrel. I would have to deny my own nature and its eternal moral law. I would have to cease being a rational man (LPT p. 110).

And again Kant recognizes that

without a God and without a world invisible to man now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but nor springs for purposeful action (CPR p. 640).

Without a Deity whom can act as guarantor of grace and of happiness, morality becomes, through its demand of the unattainable, immoral, fantastic, and inherently false (CPR p. 127) <sup>28</sup>. It is not only the realm of moral ends which is rendered inherently false and impossible, but all of Nature also falls victim when the Deity is removed from Kant system. Nature, like morality, is robbed of its purposefulness, but it is also robbed of its ontological foundation, of its noumenon, for God is the creator of the noumenon (PNL p. 201) <sup>29</sup>.

In summary, The Good can be the maxim for human action because God pre-ordained humanity to be good, because God created Nature to fulfil good ends, and because the distinct realms of natural necessity and moral action will be united in a moral eschaton. The only problem with this system is that it denies the moral agent the possibility of determining its own nature and destiny. Ultimately, Kant has denied human liberty in order to guarantee the possibility of the fulfillment of moral action; action which is rendered

impossible given that human liberty was the determining ground for the possibility of morality.

Kant's demand for the purposeful fulfillment of The Good has been shown to rest upon an inherent logical contradiction. It is now time to discuss the possibility of pursuing The Evil as the end of human action.

### The Evil

This discussion will be brief for Kant does not dwell upon the possibility of evil action. He regards such action as moral frailty, as impurity, and as wickedness (Rel p. 24-25) <sup>30</sup>, and each of these reasons for evil action proceeds from the decision of a moral agent to place sensuous motives before moral ones. The choice of the Evil is not a choice of something in and of itself, it is only negation and consists only in a limitation of what is good (LPT p. 117) <sup>31</sup>.

It is in this depiction of evil that Kant errs. He regards evil as only the negation of the good and the decision to pursue evil ends as mere moral slothfulness. Were Kant to interpret immoral action as being radically free instead of being radically evil (Rel p. 32) <sup>32</sup>, Kant could have affirmed the dignity of the moral agent in the act of the choice (DV p. 99) <sup>33</sup>. Because Kant was bound to the assertion of the pre-determination and the inviolability of the will, he perceived the choice of evil maxims as the decision to willingly corrupt the moral law (Rel p. 32) <sup>34</sup>. Kant employed poetic license and identify his moral eschaton

with the reign of the Christ; and the negation of this end with the reign of the Anti-Christ (His p. 84) <sup>35</sup>. The decision to pursue The Evil was identified with the perverse end of all things (His p. 84) <sup>36</sup>, though the predisposition to good which is innate in humanity, has remained inviolable.

Kant has created a situation wherein the Deity has predetermined the nature of the human will, and has created both the Natural and the moral worlds for some teleologically governed end. Through the structure of this purposefully organized universe, Kant has granted the Deity the immoral license to treat humanity as the means to fulfil some end, rather than as an end in itself. Given the absolute dictum of morality offered in the Foundations to the Metaphysics of Morals, "Treat humanity always as an end only and never only as a means" (FMM p. 47) and, pre-critically, "I ought to act in accordance with the Will of God" (PCW p. 32), it is most intriguing that Kant has demanded that the Deity both can and must treat humanity as a means to an end, but that such action is immoral; or, that humanity must act morally, but not in accordance with the Will of God. Because neither of these logically contradictory situations is philosophically tenable, it follows that Kant's teleologically governed universe is itself logically untenable.

Seen from this perspective, the choice for humanity is between submission to a pre-ordained system of moral and Natural teleology wherein liberty and consequently, morality, are proven to not exist; or, to choose to be a self-determining, self-judging being who is radically free, morally undetermined, and under the governance of pure reason alone. This situation will be the topic of the following chapter.

## Chapter 5:

### Kant's Anthropological Dilemma

The dilemma with which this, the final chapter of this thesis, will be concerned, is the dilemma between the choice of submission to a pre-ordained system of moral and Natural teleology wherein liberty and morality are proven to not be viable possibilities of the human condition, and the choice to be a self-determining, self-judging being whom is radically free -- not morally pre-determined -- and under the governance of nothing but reason alone. This chapter will discuss the situation within Kant's philosophic system that demanded the propositioning of radical freedom, and the philosophical presuppositions which made such freedom teleologically untenable. This dilemma is expressed through the positing of the doctrine of historicity -- the philosophical belief in the autonomous self-making of humanity.

The two assumptions required for the positing of the doctrine of historicity are that:

- i. History is qualitatively distinct from Nature because there are actions performed by humanity, as well as events which happen to him or in him.
- ii. The distinction between human being and human acting cannot in the end be maintained. Humanity is not endowed with a permanent nature capable of acting, and hence not a proper nature at all. *In acting, humanity makes or constitutes itself*<sup>1</sup>.

This doctrine is to be claimed as the key to Kant's philosophical dilemma for Kant both presents a situation

wherein historicity appears to be necessary, and yet he apodeictically denies the possibility and the consequences of such a doctrine. To adequately respond to this claim, this chapter will discuss the necessity and the impossibility of historicity for Kant's system, based upon his moral, anthropological and teleological demands, and it will argue that the problem of historicity is a problem which lays within Kant's anthropology, and was specifically promoted through the proposal of the possibility of Radical Evil.

Kant had constructed the foundation for the philosophically tenable concept of historicity through his structuring of human experience. By categorically demanding the division of all experience into the mutually exclusive realms of Nature and moral obligation -- of phenomena and of noumena -- Kant had effectively asserted that History, understood as the march of freedom through time, or the forum for moral action, differed categorically from Natural events -- such as tempests and plagues -- which do affect humanity, but which are not affected by humanity. This categoric assertion satisfies the first demand of the doctrine of historicity.

The second assumption of the doctrine of historicity has two parts. First, it states that human being be identifiable with human acting. Secondly, it demands that there be no such thing as a permanent human nature.

There is little doubt that Kant had desired to equate human being and human acting. In support of this identification, Kant demanded that humanity be radically -- i.e. cosmologically and practically -- free, for such freedom separates humanity from the animal world (CPR p. 465) <sup>2</sup> and is the crowning point of the entire system of pure reason (PNL p. 190) <sup>3</sup>. This freedom is the ground for human dignity (DV p. 99) <sup>4</sup>, and the ultimate ground of the adoption of our maxims (Rel p. 17) <sup>5</sup>. This freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law <sup>6</sup>, the law which is the given nature of the moral agent (Rel p. 23) <sup>7</sup>. Kant recognized that this given nature could only be brought to fruition through the process of autonomous moral action (Rel p. 190) <sup>8</sup>. Action has, then, become the means for human authentication.

Were the moral agent to choose not to act in accordance with the moral law, the moral agent would simply fail to actualize her "being", for it is only by what the moral agent makes of herself that we can recognize that she has (moral) character (APV pp. 157-158) <sup>9</sup>.

Human action is identifiable with human being for Kant, for he demands that it is only through tireless moral striving that humanity can realize its true end by having made itself fit to receive the free gifts of grace and of happiness <sup>10</sup>. The identification of being and acting was possible in Kant's metaphysics of Morals prior to his positing the possibility of Radical Evil. Until Kant had



made this proposition, morality had been essentially freed from the possibility of willful action contrary to humanity's inviolably good nature. The demand that human acting be identifiable with human being had been satisfied until Kant offered the moral agent the freedom to choose its own maxims rather than have them decided through *apriori* anthropological determination.

The final demand of historicity is that human nature cannot be permanently determined. This demand Kant categorically denied through his assertion that humanity's nature is given *apriori* as being necessarily good (Rel p. 23) <sup>11</sup>. This demand apodeictically denied humanity the freedom to choose its being, and consequently, denied humanity the freedom to act (given that, with respect to historicity, action implies being).

Kant's philosophical anthropology does not satisfy all of the demands of the doctrine of historicity, for it becomes fraught with inherent self-contradiction over the nature of human freedom and determination. The problem of Radical Evil can be expressed as the fear of asserting that humanity is a self-determining and self-making being, independent of both Nature and God. The problem of Radical Evil can be identified with the fear of recognizing and affirming the necessity of the radically free nature of human being, can be identified with the affirmation of the demands of the doctrine of historicity.

The fear of acknowledging the necessity of the doctrine of historicity was expressed by Kant in his Theory of Ethics.

Even as to himself, a man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by internal sensation. For as he does not as it were create himself, and does not come by the conception of himself *a priori* but empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by inner sense, and consequently only through the appearance of his nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected (ToE p. 70).

Kant has, then, categorically denied the possibility of human self-determination and self-legislation; opting instead for a system of universal determination wherein a radically *freewill* is denied so as to allow for the unspoken dictum of the Canon of Pure Reason -- *Ut Omnes Unum Sint*, that all may be one (CPR pp. 560 & 642) <sup>12</sup>.

The Anthropological dilemma of Radical Evil is the philosophical problem of recognizing the nature and the entailment of freedom -- that a radically *freewill* must belong to a necessarily self-determining and legislating being, under the governance of nothing other than pure reason alone. Kant had desired to liberate this very being from the realms of Nature and revealed religion, but once he had opened the Pandora's Box of historicity and suggested the possibility of radical freedom, he discovered the impossibility of systematically legislating such a being, and he fled, like Pandora, from the entailment of his actions. Had Kant not posited the possibility of Radical

Evil, his philosophical system would have not been torn asunder by internal contradiction, though it would have remained a closed circular argument wherein all things depended upon the existence of a Just and Gracious Deity, and wherein the possibility of authentic human freedom was to be denied as the price of attaining the unity of all things.

## Conclusion.

Philosophy...is the science of the relation of all knowledge and every use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as supreme, all other ends are subordinated and must be combined into unity in it.

The fields of philosophy, in this sense, may be reduced to the following questions:

What can I know?

What ought I to do?

What may I hope?

What is man?

The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by morals, the third by Religion, and the fourth by anthropology. In reality, however, all these might be reckoned under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to the last (IL p. 15).

It is in recognition of the unity which anthropology offered to Kant's philosophic project that this paper had chosen to confront the problem of Radical Evil from an anthropological perspective. This point of view necessarily encompassed the domains of metaphysics, of morality, and of religion, uniting these three distinct disciplines into a unified understanding of humanity and of the world through the employment of Kant's teleology.

If unity was to be found amongst the various and differing theses in Kant's critical project, it must be realized in his understanding of anthropology. Conversely, if it can be demonstrated that Kant's anthropology cannot be spoken of in a united and consistent manner, his entire philosophical project cannot be united.

The thesis which prohibited the unity of Kant's thought was the idea of Radical Evil. This idea was both logically

necessary in order to guarantee the possibility of human freedom; and logically untenable for Kant's theory of a united and purposeful cosmos under the governance of a Just and Gracious Sovereign Deity. The unity which Kant demanded as necessary for his critical project (CPR pp. 590 & 642) <sup>2</sup> could not be attained given Kant's attempt to assure the autonomy of human freedom. Kant's choice had become either to demand unity at the cost of freedom, or, to demand freedom at the cost of unity. Need it be stated that Kant chose the former resolution to the dilemma posed by Radical Evil. Kant chose, ultimately, to deny freedom in order to preserve the unity of his comprehensive philosophical project.

## Notes

### Introduction.

1. This rather unorthodox interpretation of Kant's eschatology will be developed in chapter 4 of this thesis. For a further development of Kant's moral eschaton, please see CPR p. 133, CJ theses 92-97, His pp. 17 - 26. See also Gilles Deleuze. Kant's Critical Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1984. pp 68 - 75.

2. "Philosophy...is the science of the relation of all knowledge and every use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as supreme, all other ends are subordinated, and must be combined into unity in it.

"The field of philosophy, in this sense, may be reduced to the following questions:

- 1) What can I know
- 2) What ought I to do
- 3) What may I hope
- 4) What is man.

"The first question is answered by Metaphysics, the second by Morals, the third by Religion, and the fourth by Anthropology. In reality, however, all these might be reckoned under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to the last." IL p. 15.

3. "...The plan I prescribed for myself a long time ago calls for an examination of the field of pure philosophy with a view to solving three problems: (1) What can I know? (metaphysics). (2) What ought I to do? (moral philosophy). (3) What may I hope? (philosophy of religion). A fourth question ought to follow, finally: What is man? (anthropology, a subject on which I have lectured for over twenty years)." PC p. 205.

4. "This highest formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the purposive unity of things." CPR p. 560 (B 714).

"But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences - a world which is indeed, as mere nature, a sensible world only, but which, as a system of freedom, can be entitled an intelligible, that is, a moral world (regnum gratiae) - leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is

in accordance with universal and necessary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the speculative reason." CPR p. 642 (B 843).

5. The division of Kant's critical enquiry into the four themes of metaphysics, morals, religion, and anthropology, do not correspond to the Critiques of Pure Reason, Practical Reason, Aesthetic and Teleological Judgment, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View; for each of the four themes are present throughout the breadth of Kant's philosophical texts. The best example of this fact is in the Critique of Pure Reason, for in that single text Kant was concerned with knowledge and its limitations, with freedom and the possibility of moral action, with practical reason and the noumenal realm, with the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Deity, and with the final unity of all things. Clearly, the themes of Kant's critical project cannot be specifically identified with individual Critiques.

#### Chapter 1.

1. "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith." CPR p. 29 (B XXX).

2. This class of knowledge Kant categorized as synthetic a *posteriori* or empirical knowledge; as opposed to synthetic a *priori* or analytic a *priori*, or pure knowledge. Kant describes the criteria by which to distinguish between these forms of knowledge on pp. 43 - 45 of the CPR.

3. This class of knowledge is synthetic a *priori*, synthetic a *posteriori*, or pure knowledge; and it, too, is defined on pp. 43 - 45 of the CPR.

4. "Not every kind of knowledge a *priori* should be called transcendental, but only that by which we know that -- and how -- certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a *priori*." CPR p. 96 (B 80).

5. "*Der Wille* is used by Kant to stand for "will" when it functions as the source of a command. This sense of "will" appears in sentences like "This is my Will," "The Will of the sovereign is law," and "Thy Will be done." Will is, in this sense, a legislative will. For Kant, it is the source

of law, moral as well as legal. His conception of Will resembles closely Rousseau's conception of the general will, and, like that Will, it lays down the principles of right and wrong and cannot itself err. Moreover, because in Kant's system Will is identified with practical reason, The Will of each is the same as the Will of all, and its commands have universal validity. It is clear, therefore, that, in Kant's theory of moral autonomy, the individual's Will plays the same role that is assigned to the will of God by some theologians; it provides the foundation of morality."

John Ladd's introductory essay to The Metaphysical elements of Justice. p. xxvii.

6. "The will, which relates to nothing but the law, cannot be called either free or unfree, for it relates not to actions, but immediately to legislation for the maxims of actions (and is therefore practical reason itself). Consequently, it is absolutely necessary and is itself incapable of constraint." MeJ p. 27.

7. "A will is purely animal (*arbitrium brutum*), which cannot be determined save through sensuous impulses, that is, pathologically. A will which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, and therefore through motives which are represented only by reason, is entitled *freewill* (*arbitrium liberum*), as everything which is bound up with this will, whether as ground or as consequence, is entitled *practical*." CPR 633 (B 830).

8. The basis for the distinction between these two terms comes in part from John Ladd's introduction to Kant: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. Bobbs-Merrill Company, inc. Indianapolis. 1965. pp. xxv-xxvii. A more detailed discussion can be found in Lewis White Beck. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago University Press. Chicago. 1960. pp 176-181. See also Theodore M. Greene's "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion." in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Harper & Row. N.Y. N.Y. 1960. pp. ix-cxxxiv.

9. These translations are taken from The New Cassell's German Dictionary. Funk and Wagnalls Inc. N.Y. N.Y. 1958. p. 568.

10. "...Similarly, we may presume that the form of syllogisms, when applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions under the direction of the categories, will contain the origin of the special a priori concepts, which we may call pure concepts of reason, or transcendental



ideas, and which will determine according to principles how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality." CPR p. 315 (B 378).

11. "Freedom is here being treated only as a transcendental idea whereby reason is led to think that it can begin the series of conditions in the field of appearance by means of the sensibly unconditioned, and so becomes involved in an antinomy with those very laws which it itself prescribes to the empirical employment of the understanding. What we have alone been able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests upon a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with reason." CPR p. 479 (B 586).

12. "Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato as a mischievous Sophist who, to show his skill, would set out to prove a proposition through convincing arguments and then immediately overthrow them by other arguments equally strong. Zeno maintained, for example, that God is neither infinite or finite, neither in motion or at rest, neither similar or dissimilar to any other thing...." CPR p. 446 (B 530).

13. Please see Introduction, note 1.

## Chapter 2.

1. "*Der Wille* is used by Kant to stand for "will" when it functions as the source of a command. This sense of "will" appears in sentences like "This is my Will," "The Will of the Sovereign is law," and "Thy Will be done." Will is, in this sense, a legislative will. For Kant, it is the source of law, moral as well as legal. His conception of Will resembles closely Rousseau's conception of the general will, and, like that Will, it lays down the principles of right and wrong and cannot itself err. Moreover, because in Kant's system Will is identified with practical reason, The Will of each is the same as the Will of all, and its commands have universal validity. It is clear, therefore, that, in Kant's theory of moral autonomy, the individual's Will plays the same role that is assigned to the will of God by some theologians; it provides the foundation of morality."

John Ladd's introductory essay to The Metaphysical elements of Justice. Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. Indianapolis. 1965. p. xxvii.

2. "We cannot rightly call the idea of the moral law, with the respect which is inseparable from it, a predisposition to personality; it is personality itself (the idea of humanity considered quite intellectually)." Rel p. 23.

3. Please see above, note 1.

4. Please see Chapter 1, note 5.

5. "It should especially be noted that the practical concept of freedom is based on this transcendental idea, and that in the latter lays the real source of the difficulty by which the question of the possibility of freedom has always been beset. Freedom in the practical sense is the will(kur)'s independence of coercion through sensuous impulses. For a will(kur) is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically affected, i.e. by sensuous motives; it is animal (*arbitrium brutum*), if it can be pathologically necessitated." CPR 465.

6. "Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws, i.e., according to principles. This capacity is will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, will is nothing else than practical reason". FMM p. 29.

7. "(Thus) Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the obligation to obey the moral law; our respect for and duty toward this law, in turn, is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom." Theodore M. Greene. "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion". Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Harper Torchbooks. N.Y. N.Y. 1960. p. LV.

"Thus we treat rational beings as ends because of their freedom of *Willkur*, because they are responsible persons and not things. This freedom to choose for good or evil is what gives morality a point....Freedom of *Willkur* is thus the *ratio essendi* of morality - the condition without which it would be pointless". Jefferie G. Murphy. Kant: The Philosophy of Right. MacMillian and Company. London. 1970. p. 85.

8. Kant developed and discussed the problem of the *Absurdum Practicum* in the chapter entitled "The Dialectic of Pure Reason in Defining the Concept of the Highest Good" of the Critique of Practical Reason (pp. 114 - 150), and he proved the necessity of the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Just and Gracious Deity in sections IV and V (pp. 126-127 and 128-136) of that same chapter.

9. Ibid.

10. For the sake of brevity, Kant's argument for the necessity of the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Just Deity will be developed without direct reference to the text referred to in note 7.

11. "What now is the end in man, and the end which, as such, is intended to be promoted by means of his connection with nature? If this end is something which must be found in man himself, it must either be of such a kind that man himself may be satisfied by such a means of nature and its benefices, or else is the aptitude and skill for all manner of ends for which he may employ nature both external and internal. The former end of nature would be the happiness of man, the latter his culture." CTJ p. 92.

12. Kroner, S. Kant. Penguin Books. London. 1955. p. 131.

13. "Virtue, i.e. worthiness of being happy, is the supreme condition of all that may seem desirable, but it is not enough if happiness is not achieved. To be worthy of happiness and yet not to obtain it, cannot be consistent with the perfect will of a rational being." PNL. p. 202.

14. "Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, extensively, in respect of their manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree, and protensively, in respect of their duration." CPR p. 636 (B 834).

15. "Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world, in whose whole existence everything goes according to wish and will. It thus rests on the harmony of nature with his entire end and with the essential determining ground of his will." CPrR. p. 129.

16. "A state (civitas) is a union of a multitude of men under laws of justice. Insofar as these laws are necessary a priori and follow from the concepts of external justice in general (that is, are not established by statute), the form of the state is that of a state in general, that is, the Idea of the state as it ought to be according to pure principles of justice. This Idea provides an internal guide and standard (norma) for every actual union of men in a commonwealth." MeJ p. 77.

Please also see above, note 1.

17. "There can therefore be no legitimate resistance of the people to the legislative chief of the state; for juridical status, legitimacy, is possible only through subjection to the general legislative Will of the people. Accordingly, there is no right of sedition (*seditio*), much less a right of revolution (*rebellio*), and least of all a right to lay hands on or take the life of the chief of state when he is an individual person on the excuse that he has misused his authority (*tyrannis, monarchomachismus sub specie tyrannicidii*). The slightest attempt to do this is high treason (*proditio eminens*), and a traitor of this kind, as someone attempting to destroy the fatherland (*parricida*), can receive no lesser punishment than death." MeJ p. 86.

18. "...Consequently, the people might have at least some excuse for forcibly bringing this (the dethronement of a monarch) about by appealing to the right of necessity (*casus necessitatis*) but they never have the least right to punish the suzerain for his previous administration, inasmuch as everything he previously did in his role of suzerain must be regarded as having been externally legitimate; and, because he is regarded as the source of the laws, he cannot himself do an injustice....It is the formal execution of a monarch that fills the soul, conscious of the ideas of human justice, with horror, and this horror returns whenever one thinks of scenes like those in which the fate of Charles I or Louis XVI was sealed. How can this feeling be explained? It is not an aesthetic feeling (of the kind of compassion that results from imagining oneself in the place of the sufferer), but a moral feeling arising from a complete subversion of every concept of justice. It is regarded as a crime that remains eternally and cannot be explained (*crimen immortale, inexpiabile*), and it appears to resemble the kind of sin that, according to theologians, can never be forgiven in this world or the next". MeJ p. 87.

19. Please see above, note 2.

20. "All three authorities in the state are dignities, and, inasmuch as it follows from the Idea of the state in general that they are necessary to the formation of a state (*constitutio*), they are public or civil dignities (*Staatswurden*). They embody the relationship of a universal suzerain (who, if regarded under the laws of freedom, can be none other than the united people) to the aggregate of individuals regarded as subjects, that is, the relationship of the commander (*imperans*) to one who obeys (*subditus*). The

act by means of which the people constitute themselves a state is the original contract. More properly, It is the Idea of that act that alone enables us to conceive of the legitimacy of the state. According to the original contract, all (*omnes et singuli*) the people give up their external freedom in order to take it back again immediately as members of a commonwealth, that is, the people regarded as the state (*universi*). Accordingly, we cannot say that a man has sacrificed in the state a part of his inborn external freedom for some particular purpose; rather, we must say that he has completely abandoned his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his whole freedom again undiminished in a lawful dependency, that is, in a juridical state of society, since this dependency comes from his own legislative Will." MeJ pp. 80 - 81.

21. "It is the people's duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse of supreme authority. The reason for this is that resistance to the supreme legislation can itself only be unlawful; indeed it must be conceived as destroying the entire lawful constitution, because, in order for it to be authorized, there would have to be a public law that would permit the resistance. That is, the supreme legislation would have to contain a stipulation that it is not supreme and that in one and the same judgment the people as subjects should be made Sovereign over him to whom they are subject; this is self-contradictory." MeJ p. 86.

22. "Even in what is called a limited constitution (*eingeschränkte Verfassung*), that is, in a constitution of a state in which the people through their representatives (in parliament) can lawfully oppose the executive or his representative (his minister), no active resistance is permitted -- no resistance, that is, in which an arbitrary association of the people coerces the government into acting in a certain way, for this would be arrogating to itself an act of executive authority. A limited constitution permits only a negative resistance, that is, a refusal by the people (in parliament) to accede always to the demands of the executive authority with regard to what the latter alleges to be required for the administration of the state." MeJ pp. 88-89.

### Chapter 3.

1. Please see chapter 2, notes 2 & 6.

2. Please see Chapter 2, note 1.

3. "Freedom is here being treated only as a transcendental idea whereby reason is led to think that it can begin the series of conditions in the field of appearance by means of the sensibly unconditioned, and so becomes involved in an antinomy with those very laws which it itself prescribes to the empirical employment of the understanding. What we have alone been able to show, and what we have alone been concerned to show, is that this antinomy rests upon a sheer illusion, and that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with reason". CPR p. 479 (B 586).

"Practical reason establishes freedom as a fact, theoretical reason had no means of demonstrating this fact. This demonstration is the crowning-point of the entire system of pure reason." PNL p. 190.

"(Hence) It is as impossible for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonness reasoning to argue freedom away. Human reason must, therefore, assume that no true contradiction will be found between freedom and natural necessity in the same human actions, for it cannot give up the concept of nature anymore than it can give up that of freedom." FMM p. 75.

4. "Without freedom there could be no moral law, and without the moral law, we would not become conscious of our freedom." PNL p. 190.

5. Please see Chapter 2, note 7.

6. "Laws proceed from the Will(e); maxims, from the will(kur). In man, the will(kur) is free. The Will(e), which relates to nothing but the law, cannot be called either free or unfree, for it relates, not to actions, but immediately to legislation for the maxims of action (and it therefore practical reason itself). Consequently, it is absolutely necessary and is itself incapable of constraint. Only will(kur) can, therefore, be called free...." MEJ pp. 27 - 28.

7. Please see Chapter 2, note 5.

8. "The human will(kur) is certainly an *arbitrium sensitivum*, not, however, *brutum*, but *liberum*. For sensibility does not necessitate its action. There is in man

a power of self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses." CPR p. 465 (B 561-562).

9. Please see Chapter 1, note 7 for references to the distinction between these two terms.

10. Please see Chapter 1, note 8.

11. Please see above, note 6.

12. "... (that) Freedom of the will(kur) is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine the will(kur) to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it the general rule in accordance with which he will conduct himself); only thus can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the absolute spontaneity of the will(kur) (.e. freedom)." Rel. p. 19.

13. Please see above, notes 7 & 8, and:

"In its empirical character, therefore, this subject (the *freewill*), as appearance, would have to conform to all the laws of causal determination. To this extent it could be nothing more than a part of the world of sense, and its effects, like all other appearances, must be the inevitable outcome of nature.... In its intelligible character (though we can have only a general concept of that character) this same subject must be considered to be free from all influence of sensibility and from all determination through appearances." CPR p. 468-469 (B 568-569).

14. The origin of the good and the evil in human nature will be discussed in the proceeding paragraphs of this thesis; and were developed by Kant on pp. 21-27 of Rel.

15. "The sole objects of practical reason are The Good and The Evil. Good is an object of volition, Evil of detestation. If we did not derive the idea of the concept of Good from a pre-supposed moral law, but conversely based the law on it, The Good could only be the notion of something that promises pleasure. But since pleasure and displeasure cannot be decided a priori, it would have to be left to experience to decide what is good or bad. Nothing would be good in itself, everything would be good only for some purpose, either to create an agreeable situation or to be somehow useful." PNL p. 194.

16. This is the sense of will which was developed by John Ladd's introductory essay to The Metaphysical elements of Justice. Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. Indianapolis. 1965. p. xxvii.

17. Please see above, note 14.

18. *ibid.*

19. *ibid.*

20. *ibid.*

21. "The predisposition to personality is the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive for the will(kur). This capacity for simple respect for the moral law within us would thus be moral feeling, which in and through itself does not constitute and end of the natural predisposition except so far as it is the motivating force of the will(kur). Since this is possible only when the free will(kur) incorporates such moral feeling into its maxim, the property of such a will(kur) is good character. The latter, like every character of the free will(kur), is something which can only be acquired; its possibility, however, demands the presence in our nature of a predisposition on which it is absolutely impossible to graft anything evil". Rel p. 23.

22. See Chapter 2, note 2.

23. "By propensity (*propensio*) I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual craving, *concupiscentia*) so far as mankind in general is liable to it. A propensity is distinguished from a predisposition by the fact that although it can indeed be innate, it ought not to be represented merely thus; for it can also be regarded as having been acquired (if it is good), or brought by man upon himself (if it is evil)". Rel pp. 23-24.

24. Please see above, note 14.

25. *ibid.*



26. *ibid.*

27. "He is evil by nature, means but this, that evil can be predicated of man as a species; not that such a quality can be inferred from the concept of his species (that is - of man in general) - for then it would be necessary; but rather that from what we know of man through experience we cannot judge otherwise of him, or, that we may presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even to the best." Rel p. 27.

28. "(Hence) The source of evil cannot lie in an object determining the will(kur) through inclination, nor yet in a natural impulse; it can lie only in a rule made by the will(kur) for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim". Rel p. 17.

29. Please see above, note 13. and:

"Insofar as reason can determine the faculty of desire in general, will(kur) and even mere wish may be included under Will(e). A will(kur) that can be determined by pure reason is called free will(kur). A will(kur) that is determined only by inclination (sensible impulse, *stimulus*) would be animal will(kur) (*arbitrium brutum*). Human will(kur), on the other hand, is the kind of will(kur) that is affected but not determined by impulses. Accordingly, in itself (apart from an acquired faculty with reason), it is not pure; but it can nevertheless be determined to actions by pure Will(e). Freedom of the will(kur) is just the aforementioned independence from determination by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical." MEJ p. 13.

30. "Neither can a man be morally good in some ways and at the same time be morally evil in others. His being good in one way means that he has incorporated the moral law into his maxim; were he, therefore, at the same time evil in another way, while his maxim would be universal as based on the moral law of obedience to duty, which is essentially single and universal, it would at the same time be only particular; but this is a contradiction". Rel p. 20.

31. Please see Chapter 2, note 2.

32. Please see above, note 21.

33. "In the search for the rational origin of evil actions, every such action must be regarded as though the individual had fallen into it directly from a state of innocence. For whatever his previous deportment may have been, whatever natural causes may have influenced him, and whether these causes were to be found within him or outside him, his action is yet free and determined by none of these causes; hence it can and must always be judged as an original use of his will(kur)". Rel p. 36.

34. "Evil could have sprung only from the morally evil (not from mere limitations in our nature); and yet the original predisposition (which no one other than man himself could have corrupted, if he is to be held responsible for his corruption) is a predisposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could originally have come. This inconceivability, together with a more accurate specification of the wickedness of our race, the Bible expresses in the historical narrative as follows. It finds a place for evil at the creation of the world, yet not in man, but in a spirit of an originally loftier design....man is represented as having fallen into evil only through seduction, and hence as being not basically corrupt (even as regards his original predisposition to good) but rather as still capable of improvement...." Rel pp.38 - 39.

35. "For man, therefore, who despite a corrupted heart yet possesses a good will, there remains hope of a return to the good from which he has strayed". Rel p. 39.

36. Please see above note 15.

37. See Aristotle's Psychology in The Philosophy of Aristotle. Mentor Books. N.Y. N.Y. 1963. pp. 235-279.

38. "Humanity's dignity is derived from its legislative capacity to choose any course of action (be it moral, immoral, or amoral) rather than have it forced upon it by sensuous inclination". Jefferie G. Murphy. Kant: The Philosophy of Right. MacMillian and Company. London. 1970. p. 83.

"That which gives humanity its dignity is that which essentially distinguishes it from brutes and physical objects. That which essentially distinguishes humanity from brutes and physical objects (makes it human as opposed to a

thing) is that humanity is responsible or accountable for what it does". *ibid.*

"(But) Man regarded as a person -- that is, as the subject of morally practical reason -- is exalted above any prize; for as such (*homo noumenon*) he is not to be valued as a mere means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself. He possesses, in other words, a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them." DV p. 99.

#### Chapter 4.

1. Please see Chapter 3, note 14
2. Please see Chapter 3, notes 14 & 23.
3. Please see Introduction, note 1.
4. Please see Chapter 3, notes 14 & 21.
5. Please see Chapter 3, notes 33 & 34.
6. Please see Chapter 3, note 28.
7. Please see Chapter 3, note 15.
8. "However evil a man has been up to the very moment of an impending free act (so that evil has actually become custom or second nature) it was not only his duty to have been better, it is now still his duty to better himself. To do so must be within his power, and if he does not do so, he is susceptible of, and subjected to, imputability in the very moment of that action, just as much as though, endowed with a predisposition to good (which is inseparable from freedom), he had stepped out of a state of innocence into evil". Rel p. 36.
9. "A disposition (*Sinn*) that is inflexible and unbending, once a resolution has been formed (as, for example, in

Charles XII) is indeed a natural tendency very favorable to character, but it is not yet a determining character as such. For character requires maxims that proceed from reason and morally practical principles. So it is not correct to say that evil in a certain man is a quality of his character; for in that case it would be diabolic. But man never sanctions the evil in himself, and so there is really no evil from principles; it comes only from the abandoning of principles." APV p. 159.

10. Please see Chapter 3, note 34.

11. Please see Chapter 2, notes 1 & 2.

12. Please see Chapter 3, note 21.

13. "Thus the evil in the world can be regarded as the incompleteness in the development of the seed toward good. Evil has no special seed. For it is only a negation, and consists only in a limitation of what is good. It is nothing but the incomplete development of the seed of goodness out of its uncultivated condition. But the good does have a seed; for it is independent. The predisposition to good, which God has placed in Man, must be developed by man himself before the good can make its appearance". LPT p. 117.

14. Ibid.

15. Allen Wood. Kant's Moral Religion. Cornell University Press. London. 1970. p. 101.

16. "Therefore it cannot be a matter of unconcern to morality as to whether or not it forms for itself the concept of a final end of all things (harmony with which, while not multiplying men's duties, yet provides them with a special point of focus for the unification of all ends); for only thereby can objective, practical reality be given to the union of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the purposiveness of nature, a union with which we cannot possibly dispense". Rel. p. 5.

17. "We have shown in the preceding section that, looking to principles of reason, there is ample ground -- for the reflective, though not of course for the determinant, judgment -- to make us estimate man as not merely a physical

end, such as all organized beings are, but as the being upon this earth who is the ultimate end of nature, and the one in relation to all other natural things constitute a system of ends." CTJ p. 92.

18. Please see Introduction, note 4.

19. For the sake of brevity, this lengthy argument (pp. 117-123 of the CPR) will be discussed in brief in the body of this chapter without reference to Kant's text.

20. "But thus far we do not see that those who, in their own opinion, are extraordinarily favored (the chosen ones) surpass in the very least the naturally honest man, who can be relied upon in social intercourse, in business, or in trouble; on the contrary, taken as a whole, the chosen ones can scarcely abide comparison with him, which proves that the right course is not to go from grace to virtue but rather to progress from virtue to pardoning grace". Rel pp. 189-190.

21. "But if, now, the strictest obedience to moral laws is to be considered the case of the ushering in of the highest good (as end), then, since human capacity does not suffice for bringing about happiness in the world proportional to being happy, an omnipotent moral being must be postulated as ruler of the world, under whose care this (balance) occurs. That is, morality leads inevitably to religion". Rel p. 7.

22. Allen Wood. Kant's Moral Religion. Cornell University Press. London. 1970. p. 162.

23. "Consequently we must assume a moral world-cause, that is, an Author of the world, if we are to set before ourselves a final end in conformity with the requirements of the moral law". CTJ p. 119.

24. Please see Introduction, note 4.

25. Please see above, note 18.

26. Gilles Deleuze. Kant's Critical Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis. 1984. p. 74.

27. Please see Chapter 3, note 3.

28. "Without it, either the moral law is completely degraded from its holiness, by being made out as being lenient (indulgent) and thus compliant to our convenience, or its call and its demands are strained to an unattainable destination, i.e., a hoped-for complete attainment of holiness on will, and are lost on fanatical theosophical dreams which completely contradict our knowledge of ourselves". CPrR p. 127.

29. "Only the noumena can be said to have been created by God: God is not a creator of appearances". PNL p. 210.

See also Kant's essay *A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge* as presented in James Collins *God in Modern Philosophy*. Henry Regency Co. Chicago. 1959. p.171.

30. Please see Chapter three, note 14.

31. Please see above, note 13.

32. "Now if a propensity to (invert the ethical order of incentives) does lie in human nature, there is in man a natural propensity to evil; and since this very propensity must in the end be sought in a will (kur) which is free, and can therefore be imputed, it is morally evil. This evil is radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; it is, moreover, as a natural propensity, inextirpable by human powers, since extirpation could occur only through good maxims, and cannot take place when the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is postulated as corrupt; yet at the same time it must be possible to overcome it, since it is found in man, a being whose actions are free". Rel p. 32.

33. Please see Chapter 3, note 38.

34. Please see above, note 32.

35. "Should Christianity once reach the point where it ceases to be worthy of love (which might well happen if it were armed with dictatorial authority instead of its gentle spirit), then natural antipathy and subordination toward it would be bound to become the predominant mode of men's thinking, since no neutrality prevails in matters of

morality (still less a coalition of conflicting principles). And the Antichrist, who is considered to be the harbinger of Doomsday, would take up his reign (presumably founded on fear and selfishness). Then, however, Christianity, though indeed intended to be the universal world religion, would not be favored by the workings of fate to become so, and the (perverse) end of all things (in a moral point of view) would come to pass". His p. 84.

36. Ibid.

### Chapter 5.

1. Emil Fackenheim. Metaphysics and Historicity. Marquette University Press. Milwaukee. 1961. p.26.

2. Please see Chapter 2, note 5.

3. "Practical Reason established freedom as a fact. This demonstration of the reality of freedom is the crowning-point of the entire system of pure reason. Without freedom there could be no moral law, and without the law we would not become conscious of our freedom". PNL p. 190.

4. Please see Chapter 3, note 38.

5. "But since the ultimate ground for the adoption of our maxims, which must itself lie in free choice (the *freewill*), cannot be a fact revealed in experience, it follows that the good or the evil in man (as the ultimate subjective ground for the adoption of this or that maxim with reference to the moral law) is termed innate only in this sense, that it is posited as the ground antecedent to every use of freedom in experience (in earliest youth as far back as birth) and is thus conceived of as present in man at birth -- though birth need not be the cause of it". Rel p. 17.

6. Please see Chapter 2, note 7.

7. Please see Chapter 2, note 2.

8. That the human personality can only be authenticated through action is made apparent in Kant's statement that "...the right course is not from grace to virtue, but from virtue to pardoning grace" (Rel p. 190). For even though grace is a desired and assured end, it can only be received through the effort of individual authentication.

9. Please see Chapter 4, note 9.

10. Please see Chapter 4, notes 19 & 21.

11. Please see Chapter 3, note 21.

12. Please see Introduction, note 4.

#### Conclusion.

1. Please see Intruduction, note 4.



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