

P.D. OUSPENSKY'S EPISTEMOLOGY AS A DEVELOPMENT OF  
THE KANTIAN CRITICAL SYSTEM

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## ABSTRACT

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The possibility of a further development of the Kantian Critical Philosophy is shown through a rational reconstruction of the aims and achievements of the first Critique and analysis of some criticisms of Kant's method and results. An analysis of Ouspensky's epistemology in Tertium Organum then leads to a comparative discussion showing that system to be derivative in the context of the above reconstruction. The derived system in Tertium Organum is shown to be relevant in itself and also to answer the criticisms initially considered. Ouspensky's systematic viewpoint expands the "single-framed" phenomenal reality as presented in the Kantian Objective Deduction. This development provides an epistemological framework which extends the possibility of cognitive validity from the reality of phenomena as seen by a three-dimensional consciousness to possible phenomena in an infinite progression of proximate realities.

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## INTRODUCTION

This paper will attempt to establish that the systematic epistemology of P.D. Ouspensky, as shown in his book Tertium Organum, is a derivative system and development of the Kantian Critical Philosophy.

In considering Kant's Critique of Pure Reason it is clear that Kant's theoretical philosophy is too complex and incomprehensible to yield to direct interpretation. Of the numerous and conflicting positions held by scholars concerning Kant's thought, only a few will be examined here. The following analysis will attempt a rational reconstruction of Kant's critical philosophy; that is, it will attempt to present a theory which meets the three criteria for a rational reconstruction as set out by Stegmüller in his article "Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Kant's Metaphysics of Experience":

- 1) the theory has to be presented in such a way that it remains in accordance with the basic ideas of the philosopher;
- 2) as far as possible it has to be presented in precise terms;
- 3) it is to be presented as a consistent theory, if possible (i.e. if not all rational accounts meeting requirements 1) and 2) turn out to be inconsistent.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> W. Stegmüller, "Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Kant's Metaphysics of Experience", Ratio, IX, 1967, X, 1968.

"Derivative system", from the above context, is defined for the purposes of this paper as a system which is one of a set of possible systems entailed by a proposed rational reconstruction. Ouspensky's system as presented in Chapter II will then be shown to be a derivative system in relation to the rational reconstruction of Kant's critical philosophy as established in Chapter I.

In view of this aim, the first chapter will analyze Kant's aims and methods in the Critique of Pure Reason only in as much detail as is necessary to rationally reconstruct Kant's theoretical philosophy and provide grounds for the proposed development in the derivative system put forward in Chapter II. The vast amount of Kantian scholarship available for the task of critical comment on the aims and methods of the first Critique is limited also to just those comments which are relevant to the rational reconstruction. Of necessity, the analysis is both brief and biased, and should not be viewed as an attempt to present these problems in full.

Chapter two will present in some detail the epistemology of P.D. Ouspensky. Although Ouspensky's works on epistemology are many, only Tertium Organum is sufficiently systematic to make analysis rewarding. Many of the subsidiary arguments in the latter are excluded because while they provide further elucidation of his arguments, they are not arguments or proofs in the rigorous sense, and tend therefore to blur what is otherwise a very clear picture. Similarly, the data supplied at length in Tertium Organum concerning mysticism and the mystical experience is included only briefly in the analysis.

The concluding chapter will attempt to show both that Ouspensky's epistemology is a derivative system of Kant's Critical Philosophy, based in the proposed rational reconstruction of Kant's method and aims in the Critique of Pure Reason in Chapter I and in what that derivative system consists. Finally, it will attempt to show why such a development is relevant, both in terms of providing answers to the criticisms of Kant's method raised in Chapter I, and in terms of providing a framework which has previously been lacking for establishing the validity of cognitive claims based in that realm of experience, usually called mystical, but now defined as apprehension of a higher spatial demension.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>  
Manuscript prepared in accordance with:  
R.M. Wiles, Scholarly Reporting in the Humanities, 4th ed.,  
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1968.

A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF KANT'S METHOD  
AND AIMS IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

In order to advance a case for the possible grounds of a further development of a philosophical system, two things would have to be established at the outset. First, that that system allows the possibility of, or gives grounds for, its further development. This could be established in several ways. The system could employ methodological principles capable of further application. It could also be seen as laying down an architectonic or framework of working principles, each one requiring further vindication or appropriate application. It could also be that the system is assessed as failing to fulfill its own aims, in which case the deficiencies could be meaningfully supplied short of abandoning the system proper.

Second, it would have to be shown that a proposed development is grounded in all or at least some of the above possibilities, and therefore in the first system proper, or that it is itself a separate but derivative system. That is, a second system might be shown to employ the methodological principles of the first, but to aim at conclusions not within its scope. Although derivative in method, it would not be a case of legitimate extension of the first system. Also, in fulfilling the framework of working principles, an extension would have to retain that framework in tact; i.e., remain within the premises of the former, in order to be classed as a development thereof. In answering supposed deficiencies in the first, an extension would have

to recast the argument without introduction of foreign premises.

In the case of an architectonic system, a system at once complete and requiring development, some common aim of that system and its development is of prime importance. Without demonstration of this common aim the latter would not be shown to be an extension of the former, but could claim validity as a derivative system.

### The Purpose of the First Critique

In the case of Kant's system, agreement on aim is not clearly established among his commentators. Kant sees his system as an attempt to answer three questions: "What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?"<sup>1</sup> The first question is dealt with in the Critique of Pure Reason. He states the aim of this work as follows:

I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limits - all in accordance with principles.<sup>2</sup>

In the second edition preface he reaffirms his aim:

This attempt to alter the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely revolutionising it ... forms indeed the main purpose of this critique of pure speculative reason. It is a treatise on the method, not a system of science itself. But at the same time it marks out the whole plan of the science, both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure.

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1. Kant, "Letter to Staudlin, May 4, 1793", Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, ed. Arnulf Zweig, (Chicago: University Press, 1967), p. 205.

2

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1963), A xii, p. 9.

3

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B xxiii, p. 25.



And again in the Prolegomena, he speaks of the Critique "which was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics".<sup>1</sup> Why have differences in interpretation arisen? Kant must have been either mistaken in what he took to be his aim or misunderstood by virtue of what scholars have taken to be his results.

It has been held that the Critique aims to provide a theory of experience, an account of empirical knowledge. That is, that its aim is to show what we do in fact know, not what we can know.

They erroneously suppose that because the Critique proposes to verify metaphysical principles by recourse to conditions of empirical knowledge, its aim is to reach conclusions about empirical knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

In both the first and second edition prefaces to the Critique Kant contrasts the progress of the particular sciences with the lack of progress in philosophy. In physics and astronomy authoritative results have been generally accepted and form a basis for cumulative progress. Philosophy, with the exception of Logic, has failed to yield such results. No progress is possible where each philosophical system begins anew and wins what adherents it can. It is in metaphysics that philosophy has been the most conspicuous failure:

Metaphysics rests on concepts alone - not, like mathematics, on their application to intuition. But though it is older than all other sciences ... it has not yet had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a science.<sup>3</sup>

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I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950) p. 121.

2

D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason", Dialogue, 11, #3 (1963), p. 311.

3

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B xiv, p. 21.

The reason for this failure is twofold: metaphysics cannot, like the specialized sciences, find its ground in the empirical realm, since it rests on concepts alone; and, the analysis of these concepts as opposed to their empirical application has not yet been carried out in such a way as to yield the authoratative results necessary for progress. This is Kant's plan for action.

The Critique holds metaphysics under the critical eye of scientific achievement. Geometry and physics are models for metaphysics to follow in order to achieve the status of a science. The former have achieved scientific stature and proven their results. To provide a metaphysical basis for them would be redundant: this would amount to proving the proven, or providing proof that the proof of the proven is possible. There is scarcely the illusion of progress in such obvious circularity.

It is not a metaphysical foundation for science Kant sets out to provide. This he takes as proven by the fact that there are sciences; i.e., bodies of knowledge which are agreed to be universal and necessary. It is a scientific foundation for metaphysics which is the basic aim of the Critique. That in the process of establishing a scientific metaphysics a metaphysical basis for natural science is also produced is incidental to his aim. In the projected science of metaphysics, metaphysics of experience will be only one branch, that dealing with the application of principles to objects of intuition. But "metaphysics rests on concepts alone ... not their application to intuition". Therefore principles are not to be confused with the empirical models to which they apply. The error made in holding that the Critique aims to establish a metaphysics of experience is a

simple one:

This is like supposing that since a judgment of temperature is checked by a thermometer, it gives information only about the height of a column of mercury.<sup>1</sup>

Kant's aim does not give justification for the view that the intention of the Critique of Pure Reason is to furnish a metaphysics of experience. One could not hold with T.D. Weldon that:

The result of this Critical inquiry was to prove  
 a) that Euclidean geometry is valid of objects;  
 b) that Newtonian mechanics is valid of objects;  
 c) that the metaphysics of Leibniz as developed by the Wolffians is not valid of objects.<sup>2</sup>

unless one also held that either Kant misrepresented his aim or that his results were quite different from those he intended.

Could Kant have gone so far astray without his own knowledge? If this were possible in the heat of the first writing, it could not be the case for the second edition. If anything, Kant endorses his previously stated aim all the more firmly and underlines it again in the Prolegomena. It is not the aim of Kant's Critique which is actually in question. Commentators have rephrased Kant's aim, which they have clearly understood, to fit with what they have interpreted to be his results. It is these results which have been misunderstood. In short, the clarity of Kant's aims has proven an embarrassment to commentators who view Kant's results as an embarrassment to him. They have in fact become apologists.

<sup>1</sup>  
 D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason",  
op. cit., p. 311.

<sup>2</sup>  
 T.D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (2nd ed.;  
 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 73.

The Grounds for Claiming a System to be Derivative

It will suffice for the purposes of this paper to trace this argument as succinctly as possible. The possible grounds for the claim for a valid extension of Kant's system would lie in the argument itself rather than its solution. The grounds for claiming a system to be derivative are less rigorous. There are three possibilities:

- a) Kant aimed at a science of metaphysics and succeeded in providing one;
- b) Kant aimed at a science of metaphysics and succeeded in providing a metaphysics of experience;
- c) Kant aimed at and achieved a metaphysics of experience.

The first is Kant's position, the second that of many commentators, and the third that of the apologists attempting to reconcile the first and second. All three possibilities will be shown to support the case for a valid derivative system, although they fall short of providing grounds of a valid extension of Kant's system. If a) is the case, Kant has provided an architectonic, the extension of which is at least possible and perhaps necessary. If b) is the case, an extension may be possible since results are forthcoming, and possibly necessary since only one of various possible results has been produced. If c) is the case, and if it can be shown that Kant has proven the possibility of a metaphysics of experience but failed to exhaust all experience, then an extension might be argued both possible and necessary.<sup>1</sup> In examining the possible grounds of an extension, the grounds of a derivative system are clearly shown. Since Weldon's position is strongly stated, let it serve as a straw dog.

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"In this inquiry I have made completeness my chief aim, and I venture to assert that there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied". (underlining mine)

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A xiii, p. 10.

It must be made clear that Weldon's position is in part a result of his interpretation of the term "metaphysics" in Kant's work. In his view "The whole purpose of the Critical Philosophy is to demonstrate that metaphysics in the commonly accepted sense is an impossibility."<sup>1</sup> By "commonly accepted sense" Weldon appears to mean the identification of that term with problems of a transcendent nature: the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the problem of freedom. The Dialectic of the Critique discusses and demonstrates at length the impossibility of knowledge in the transcendent realm, i.e., beyond possible experience. It is speculation in this realm which has brought metaphysics to its sad state.<sup>2</sup> These acknowledged limits brought about Kant's attempt to change the procedure of traditional metaphysics by establishing its basis and extent upon scientific lines. The whole of the Critique is concerned with metaphysics. Where Weldon holds that the Aesthetic is concerned with geometry, the Analytic with physics, and the Dialectic with metaphysics (specifically, its impossibility),

It would be more correct to say that the Aesthetic is concerned with the basis for metaphysical knowledge, the Analytic with its extent, and the Dialectic with the limits beyond which such knowledge cannot be got.<sup>3</sup>

Metaphysical knowledge, according to Kant, can be got from the

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<sup>1</sup> T.D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 570.

<sup>2</sup> "... metaphysics has rather to be regarded as a battle-ground quite peculiarly suited for those who desire to exercise themselves in mock combats".

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B xv, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason", op. cit., p. 306.

system of metaphysical principles, the proofs of which are found in the Analytic. These principles are in fact what is usually meant by metaphysics, since they are knowledge of things in general and are not arrived at via experience. However, they are significantly different from their predecessors, as they are synthetic rather than analytic, and transcendental rather than transcendent. They are synthetic propositions, "the intuition of which does not admit of being given a priori".<sup>1</sup> They are rules for synthesis, the concepts following from which are capable of being exhibited in a specific instance only a posteriori, "by means of experience, which itself is possible only in conformity with these principles."<sup>2</sup>

The only concept which represents a priori this empirical content of appearances is the concept of a thing in general, and the a priori synthetic knowledge of this thing in general can give us nothing more than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception may give a posteriori. It can never yield an a priori intuition of the real object, since this must necessarily be empirical.<sup>3</sup>

A transcendental synthesis relates only to a thing in general, as defining the conditions under which the perception of it can belong to possible experience. Such principles are not transcendent of experience, but are a priori limits or grounds of possible experience. "The truth or falsity of a conclusion about things generally cannot be made out empirically. Metaphysical judgments are one and all a priori".<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 749, p. 581.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., B 749, p. 581.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., B 748, p. 581.

<sup>4</sup> D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason", op. cit., p. 309.

truth or falsity of propositions concerning transcendent things cannot be made out at all, in Kant's opinion, although he urges that "there is justification for adhering to certain beliefs on these matters".<sup>1</sup> The knowledge of things in general is the accepted sense of "metaphysics", and metaphysical knowledge as such is possible for Kant.

D.P. Dryer points out that the leading English commentators on Kant, Paton and Kemp Smith, ally themselves with Weldon's view although they recognize that Kant doesn't conclude that metaphysics is impossible and that his case for this is in the Analytic of the Critique rather than in his later system.<sup>2</sup> "Both Paton and Kemp Smith maintain that Kant holds that metaphysics is possible only as a 'metaphysics of experience'."<sup>3</sup> In the Critique then Kant would be asking how any analysis of experience could be judged to be true or false. The term "metaphysics" would then refer to a part of epistemology:

They do not construe Kant as investigating how a metaphysics of experience is possible. Instead, they interpret Kant as merely setting forth a metaphysics of experience. By "experience" Kant means empirical knowledge. If Paton and Kemp Smith are correct in ascribing to Kant the conclusion that metaphysics is possible only as a metaphysics of experience, what Kant means by metaphysics is not then what is usually meant by metaphysics.<sup>4</sup>

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D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason", op. cit., p. 306.

2  
"Many commentators recognize that the concern of the Critique is with metaphysics. They urge that Kant develops his solution only after the Critique of Pure Reason, in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment."  
Ibid., p. 306.

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Ibid., p. 307.

4  
D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason", op. cit., p. 307.

However, as Dryer points out, although the Critique is an investigation of knowledge, it is not an inquiry into empirical knowledge, or knowledge in general, but into the ground or possibility of experience in general:

Metaphysics, in the narrower meaning of the term, consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure reason. The former treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of objects that may be given.<sup>1</sup>

It is the aim of the particular sciences to reach conclusions about specific things with recourse to concrete instances in experience. Principles in regard to the nature of things generally as set forward in the Analytic have no recourse to experience but are its grounds. Such principles are to be got from judgments that are both synthetic and a priori:

Now the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?<sup>2</sup>

The Analytic of the Critique deduces from the nature of human understanding the metaphysical principles governing the possibility of any human experience. These metaphysical principles are synthetic and a priori, and can be known to be true neither by recourse to observation nor by analysis of the concepts contained in them.

The Critique is concerned with metaphysics in the commonly accepted sense. Kant does not, however, present a metaphysics of experience, one system among others. He provides the system for any

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 874, p. 662.

2

Ibid., B 19, p. 55.



other system which wishes to be scientific.<sup>1</sup> Thus he is neither proposing to refute Leibniz and the Wolffians, nor to mediate between rationalism and empiricism in epistemology, nor to establish ontology as metaphysica generalis as Heidegger suggests. It is not the supremacy of one system over another, that Kant is concerned with - but the possibility of its becoming a science.

Kant, in inquiring as to what we can know, must include what we do in fact know. The possibility of experience is the ground: what we do know must lie within the sphere of what we can know. But what we do know is not inclusive of the rules by which it comes to be known. To look to the Critique for a fully developed theory of experience is a disappointment:

It provides only a partial theory of perception and no treatment of probability or induction. Since the Critique investigates what will verify a priori judgments, it takes account only of conditions of empirical knowledge that can be ascertained a priori. Much information about empirical knowledge can be obtained only empirically.<sup>2</sup>

Knowledge of things in general, the traditional concern of metaphysics, can be got directly only from observation of them. Yet it cannot proceed from specific things to the thing in general, or it would not then be a priori. "Hence metaphysics cannot make out what is true of things generally save by recourse to what is necessary to secure empirical knowledge of them."<sup>3</sup> A science of metaphysics deals with the a priori

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"It is a treatise on the method, not a system of science itself. But at the same time it marks out the whole plan of the science, both as regards its limited and as regards its entire internal structure."

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B xxiii, p. 25.

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D.P. Dryer, "The Aim of the Critique of Pure Reason", op. cit., p. 311.

3

Ibid., p. 311.

synthetic conditions of possible experience, not with empirical principles. With some clarification of terminology in hand, it is possible to begin to unravel the main implications of Weldon's position.

### Weldon

In holding that the Critique results in proving Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics valid of objects, Weldon is directing his attention primarily to the validity of the proofs in the Analytic. He is mistaking the model for that which Kant sets out to prove. Metaphysical judgments are possible if and only if a priori synthetic judgments are possible. Geometry and physics are grounded in a priori synthetic propositions. Therefore a priori synthetic propositions are possible. It remains to be proven that metaphysical propositions can be similarly grounded:

Geometry, however, proceeds with security in knowledge that is completely a priori, and has no need to beseech philosophy for any certificate of the pure and legitimate descent of its fundamental concept of space.<sup>1</sup>

The argument here would be simple if metaphysical propositions possessed the immediate evidence in intuition which geometrical propositions enjoy. However, this is not the case:

For since they [pure concepts of the understanding] speak of objects through predicates not of intuition and sensibility but of pure a priori thought, they relate to objects universally, that is, apart from all conditions of sensibility [space and time]. Also, not being grounded in experience, they cannot, in a priori intuition, exhibit any object such as might, prior to all experience, serve as ground for their synthesis.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>  
1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 120, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup>  
Ibid., B 121, P. 123.

It is this difference which necessitates the Transcendental Deduction of the Analytic.

The Critique does not set forward a philosophy of mathematics validating the systems of Euclid and Newton. Kant examines these only for the clues they furnish for how metaphysics may also achieve knowledge. Kant does not ask if these sciences are possible, but how:

Since these sciences actually exist, it is quite proper to ask how they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist.<sup>1</sup>

That geometry and physics are valid of objects cannot be the thrust of Weldon's position. Weldon could not be entirely naive of Kant's claim to proceed along Copernican lines.<sup>2</sup> The a priori synthetic propositions of geometry and physics need not conform to objects, but objects must conform to them, otherwise scepticism is unavoidable:

If intuition must conform to the constitution of objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas the propositions of geometry and physics are both prescriptive and descriptive of objects, the propositions of metaphysics by their nature can be prescriptive only. Their objects are objects in general and therefore not given in experience. Neither are they a priori intuitions of real objects, since this is by definition impossible. They are rather rules for the synthesis of possible experience; that is, conditions of any experience.

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 21, p. 56.

2  
Ibid., B xvii, p. 22.

3  
Ibid., B xvii, p. 22.

Weldon is calling into question the validity of the Transcendental Philosophy as a whole by directing criticism at its essential element of proof, the Transcendental Deduction. Unlike the propositions of geometry and physics, "The categories of understanding ... do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition".<sup>1</sup> They represent conditions under which things may be thought. Although it is evident that sensible objects must conform to our forms of sensibility, that is, space and time,

... that they must likewise conform to the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought, is a conclusion the grounds of which are by no means so obvious.<sup>2</sup>

The buzzing, blooming confusion is under no obligation to the understanding, since "intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the function of thought".<sup>3</sup>

Kant draws up his position clearly:

This strict universality of the rule is never a characteristic of empirical rules; they can acquire through induction only comparative universality, that is, extensive applicability.<sup>4</sup>

This is the conclusion reached by Hume which moved Kant from dogmatic metaphysics. It is Kant's point of departure in the Transcendental Deduction of the Analytic. The Transcendental or Critical Philosophy is to be a propaedeutic to the system of pure reason:

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 122, p. 123.

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Ibid., B 123, p. 124.

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Ibid., A 91, p. 124.

4

Ibid., A 92, p. 125.

This discipline does not yield knowledge about the objects of the several sciences, but rather concerns itself with the methods, limits, sources, and nature of all branches of human inquiry.<sup>1</sup>

There are, according to Kant, only two possible ways in which a necessary relation between synthetic a priori principles, (i.e. rules) and the objects to which they refer, (i.e. synthesize in a manifold of sensible intuition), can be shown. Either that which is ordered dictates the principles by which it is ordered, or the rules for order make that which is ordered possible. If the first were the case, then the relation would not be necessary, as it would be empirical and not a priori. If the second were true, rules produce their objects as representations, not in the sense of giving these objects existence, but in the sense of determining the object through representation in so far as objects can in fact only be known as representations. All objects of intuition are appearances falling under the a priori conditions of sensibility. The forms of sensibility, space and time, are the conditions of all appearances empirically intuited or given.

The second condition under which knowledge of an object is possible is the concept, by which an object is thought corresponding to an intuition:

The question now arises whether a priori concepts do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general. In that case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as object of experience.<sup>2</sup>

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R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 35.

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 126, p. 126.

The Transcendental Deduction is the deduction of these a priori concepts of the understanding, the categories. Kant cautions that although the deduction will deal with a priori concepts which "yield the objective ground of the possibility of experience," the examination of the experience is not their deduction:

... The unfolding of the experience wherein they are encountered is not their deduction; it is only their illustration. For on any such exposition they would be merely accidental. Save through their original relation to possible experience, in which all objects of knowledge are found, their relation to any one object would be quite incomprehensible.<sup>1</sup>

Weldon is then challenging either the validity or the success of the Transcendental Deduction when he holds that the Critique proves Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics valid of objects. If the Critique does in fact do so, this is not to be confused with its intention:

As it happens, Kant nowhere in the Critique presents a demonstration of the validity of Euclidean geometry as such. What he does attempt to prove in the Aesthetic and again in the Axioms of Intuition is that there must be some body of synthetic propositions a priori which has space as its object.<sup>2</sup>

He is accusing Kant of an argument which is analytic or regressive, moving from an empirical basis and yielding principles which are in turn analytic. In this case Kant would be by default setting out a metaphysics of experience. As Kant recognized, only empirical rules of an extensive but not universal applicability can be reached by this method. Wolff puts it simply:

To show that a science is possible we assume it as given and then perform a regress to some premise or set of premises from

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 127, p. 127.

2

R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., footnote #2, p. 45.

which its existence can be deduced. But we have not yet 'made the science actual'.<sup>1</sup>

The regressive or analytic method is explicative, not demonstrative, and Kant maintains the necessity of undertaking the transcendental deduction due to this. The synthetic or progressive deduction is necessary to yield the certainty which a science of metaphysics requires. As Beck points out in his introduction to the Prolegomena, to accuse Kant of such a sophomoric petitio principii as assuming what he sets out to prove is a serious charge.<sup>2</sup> However, give or take a few words, this is the charge brought. It implies, as Wolff points out, that

Weldon and Kemp Smith and Beck and the others are asking us to believe that the man who is considered the greatest philosopher since Aristotle spent eleven years at the height of his powers searching for an argument (which Weldon assures us cannot be found) and then had not the wit to realize that he had failed.<sup>3</sup>

In his analysis of the method of the Analytic, Wolff rephrases the problem and points out that the analytic method ascends a series of conditions from the assumed conclusion to the premises. In this way only sufficient conditions can be established. By the synthetic method, moving from accepted premises to a conclusion, necessary conditions can be found. In an analytic regress, if the sufficient conditions are the only such conditions, then they will also be necessary. Weldon allows that Kant's claim to have presented a synthetic deduction

<sup>1</sup> R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Lewis White Beck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. xix.

<sup>3</sup> R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

is formally valid, but that his arguments are not rigorous, and that his premises cannot be shown to have claim to universality. The final question is whether proof is possible ...

... that the validity of the pure concepts, especially 'space', 'time', 'substance', and 'causality' is a necessary condition of the existence of self-consciousness as a fact, not just a 'presupposition' of it. I do not see how this could be proved.<sup>1</sup>

Kant would agree here, since it is the universally held premise of the unity of apperception which Kant works from to deduce the categories. To work back up the chain is impossible by the nature of the analytic regress, since the validity of the conclusion does not confer validity on the premises. It is the above view that brought Weldon to his conclusion concerning the regress from the actuality of the sciences to their presuppositions. However, if Weldon were correct about Kant's argument, the resulting exposition would serve as proof neither for the categories nor for Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics, and he would himself be incorrect in holding that Kant proves them valid of objects.<sup>2</sup>

Thus far it has been shown that there are grounds in Weldon's position which in refuting Kant's purpose also turn in on themselves and leave Weldon in a position of self-contradiction. In order, however, to completely refute Weldon it will be necessary to present the case for a valid synthetic argument in the Transcendental Deduction. This case is made out by both Wolff and Strawson on similar but not identical grounds. It is Weldon's position that Kant's argument here is analytic, since if it is viewed as synthetic it rests on a premise

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<sup>1</sup> T.D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>2</sup> R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 55.



which cannot be viewed as universally valid; the fact of self-consciousness.

### Wolff and Strawson on the Transcendental Deduction

The Transcendental Deduction as explained in general by Strawson is:

a general argument to the effect that the concepts under which we bring the contents of our experience must be such as to confer upon that experience a certain rule-governed connectedness or unity.<sup>1</sup>

Stress must be laid on "we" and "our" since for Kant experience must conform to the forms of our sensibility in order to be ours, and all experience is then experience for us; all experience is subjective, and all experience is of what appears, not what is. Strawson restates Kant's problem as that of showing that the necessary unity of experience (subjective), leads to the necessary experience of unity (objective). It should be noted that the experience of necessary unity is accepted as impossible in light of Hume's arguments. The thesis of objectivity must be viewed in the light of the Aesthetic: that this is actually the case for us, as beings who order the world in a unified spatio-temporal framework, not necessarily the case for other types of consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

What question now confronts us? It seems that the question must run something like this: abstracting from the forms of particularity, from the temporal and spatial ordering of particular items encountered in experience, what features can we find to be necessarily involved in any coherent conception of experience solely in virtue of the fact that the

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1  
P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, (London: Methuen, 1966), p. 30.

2  
"Were that constitution different, the same thing would appear differently."  
Ibid., p. 39.

particular items of which we become aware must fall under  
(be brought under) general concepts?<sup>1</sup>

Again, this would read "any coherent conception of experience for us". This is the point which Weldon is denying can be made, when he states that the unity of apperception as a unique factual premise is impossible: "this is not a feasible project. Nothing, or anything, can be said to follow from the 'fact of self-consciousness'."<sup>2</sup> Weldon is saying that apart from sensible intuition, the buzzing, blooming confusion, the concept or representation of that intuition is merely contingent; that is, that Kant has failed to prove what he has set out to prove.

Kant has added to the confusion on this point by declaring the subjective deduction non-essential to his argument as a whole, and that it is "somewhat hypothetical in character." He later adds in parentheses: "though, as I shall show elsewhere, it is not really so."<sup>3</sup> It is Wolff's opinion that, far from non-essential, the subjective deduction is essential if only for its presentation of the theory of synthesis which is instrumental to a proper understanding of the Critique:

Kant is struggling in the Deduction with the apparently contradictory notion of synthetic unity. On the face of it, there can be no such thing as the unity of a manifold (literally, the oneness of a manyness). Yet consciousness exhibits just this property, for all the varied and everchanging contents of

1

P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 72.

2

T.D. Weldon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 179.

3

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A xvii, p. 12.

consciousness are united in my thoughts. How to explain this ... is in a sense the central problem of the deduction.<sup>1</sup>

The Metaphysical Deduction of the categories proceeds in three steps: 1) since the fundamental activity of the understanding is to assert the unity of representations through judgments concerning these representations, then tracing the functions and types of judgments will supply a list of the functions of the understanding; 2) this list is in fact offered by traditional logic which abstracts from all material the forms of judgment themselves; 3) since these synthetic connections of the manifold introduced by judgment are the unifying of representations, then the function of unity in judgment will provide a "clue for the discovery" of the functions of synthesis shown by the categories.

In short, judgment is the product of the logical use of understanding, and synthetic unity is the product of its real use. By tabulating the forms in which it performs the former activity, we will also discover the forms in which it performs the latter.<sup>2</sup>

Whereas Kant holds that intuiting is passive, concepts rest on functions. "A function is the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation."<sup>3</sup> There is a threefold division here: in sensible intuition the mind is in immediate relation to objects as represented (i.e., in space and time); in intellectual intuition,<sup>4</sup> the concept unifies various intuitions by abstracting common characteristics for representation, and is removed from the object by

<sup>1</sup> R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>4</sup> "intellectual intuition" abandoned by Kant after the Dissertation, makes clear the distinction between sensual intuition and understanding and is retained here, in place of understanding.

this function of representation; a judgment combines concepts and is removed again from concepts since it is a representation of representations of an object as represented.<sup>1</sup> As Wolff puts it:

concepts turn out to be rules for the performance of mental activities, and according to Kant these rules are built on certain underlying simple 'functions'<sup>2</sup>

It is then sensible intuition which is contingent and a posteriori as Weldon has held. Intellectual intuition in that it is rule-directed is universal and necessary, since concepts are functions grounded by a priori rules. These concepts in their empirical employment are contingent. Weldon seems then to deny intellectual intuition completely in holding it to be contingent.

Concepts are rules of one order, that of sensible and intellectual intuition. Categories are rules for these rules. The Categories are rules for the ordering of concepts, and are themselves pure concepts. For Kant, it is clear that all knowledge demands relation to an object. The pure concepts of the understanding must then also relate to an object, but their object must be a priori. The object to which they relate must be a "manifold of a priori sensibility."<sup>3</sup> This holds that intuition is possible without sensation:

According to Kant, when an object affects the senses, there is produced a variety (manifold) of sensible intuitions, called perceptions. These perceptions are composed of two elements,

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I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 93, p. 105.

2

R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 63.

3

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 77, p. 111.

material and formal. The material element, which is purely subjective and cognitively valueless, is sensation (colours, tastes, hardness, etc.). The formal and knowledge-giving element is the spatio-temporal ordering of sensations. Now it is possible to take away from perceptions, at least in imagination, all that belongs to sensation [B35]. What remains is the pure form of intuition, devoid of all content. What remains, in short, is pure intuition.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, the first problem of the Transcendental Deduction will be to explain how a concept which yields a priori knowledge obtains relation to its object and to demonstrate that its employment is legitimate. That is, to show how representations can relate a priori to their objects.

The concept of synthesis is introduced in section 3 of the Metaphysical Deduction and is further elucidated in the Transcendental Deduction. The function of the understanding can be seen as twofold: it produces the analytic unity of representation by forming class concepts based on the bond of partial identity or possession of common characteristics. However, synthesis must precede this process, since unity of the representations in one consciousness is necessary before analysis can take place. That is to say, that no representation can precede the unity of the manifold of perceptions which each representation holds in synthesis:

Hume has shown that such unities can never be given as such to the understanding. Consequently, the mind must create them by a spontaneous act of unifying, an act to which Kant gives the title synthesis. The synthetic unity of a manifold of perceptions is thus the necessary condition of the analytic unity of a concept, and indeed of all knowledge and experience.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

The Subjective Deduction which is omitted entirely from the second edition of the Critique and has precipitated the arguments above is the first section of the Transcendental Deduction. Wolff has suggested that this section is not only essential but that with its aid Kant's following argument becomes "perfectly clear". The concept of synthesis is the pivot point for Wolff, leading to the importance of the Subjective Deduction in producing Kant's "theory of mental activity". For Strawson, the fact that the Categories as derived from logic are unschematized and do not rest on the basis set up in the Aesthetic, the spatio-temporal character of experience, is the pivot point:

We must take it that the Categories are here derived (in the Metaphysical Deduction) simply by adding to the forms of logic the idea of applying those forms in making true judgements about objects of awareness (intuition) in general, whatever the character of our modes of awareness of these objects may be.<sup>1</sup> (underlining mine)

Strawson's interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction rests heavily on the Objective Deduction. He rephrases the question again in the light of the objectivity thesis:

How in general must we conceive of objects if we are to be able to make judgements, determinable as true or false, in which we predicate concepts of identified objects of reference, conceived of as related in a single unified spatio-temporal system?<sup>2</sup>

If the Metaphysical Deduction proves that the pure concepts of the understanding are the necessary conditions for the representation of an object, then the Transcendental Deduction cannot be necessary as

<sup>1</sup> P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

another and independent proof of the same conclusion. Yet Kant says in the introduction to the Transcendental Deduction that if he can prove "that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them and will justify their objective reality."<sup>1</sup> Strawson sees the role of the Transcendental Deduction as partially explanatory of previously established premises from the Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction. Its role as an argument is that

we shall find that its fundamental premise is that experience contains a diversity of elements (intuitions) which, in the case of each subject of experience, must somehow be united in a single consciousness capable of judgement, capable, that is, of conceptualizing the elements so united. We shall find that its general conclusion is that this unity requires another kind of unity or connectedness on the part of the multifarious elements of experience, namely just such a unity as is also required for experience to have the characteristic of experience of a unified objective world and hence be capable of being articulated in objective empirical judgements.<sup>2</sup>

#### Kant vs. Weldon, Wolff and Strawson

For Kant, in order for representations to have objective reference, they must possess or exhibit a certain unity or connectedness among themselves. Since concepts of objects are rules governing the connection of objects,

we could not employ any empirical concepts of objects unless our manifold perceptual experiences possessed the kind of coherence and interconnection which is required for the application of such concepts.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 97, p. 130.

<sup>2</sup> P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

If this were not the case, then rule-connectedness might be allowed as implied by the employment of empirical concepts, but it might be denied that this necessity of employment extends beyond particular subjective states of awareness. Since our experience is subjective,

all that can be really understood by empirical knowledge of objects is the existence of such rules and order among those perceptions as is involved in our being able to count them as perceptions of an objective world, having its own independent order, to which we can ascribe, as a consequence, the order of our perceptions. The notion of experience of objects can have no more meaning than this; but, for the same reason, it can have no less.<sup>1</sup>

Wolff sees the "indissoluble tie between the two sides of the Deduction", the Subjective and the Objective, to lie in the fact that the Metaphysical Deduction gives premises of the unity of consciousness on purely metaphorical grounds, and therefore the Subjective Deduction must precede the Objective by presenting an analysis of synthetic unity by explaining the process by which it is produced.<sup>2</sup>

A manifold acquires unity by being subjected to a certain operation, which in general can be called "reproduction according to a rule". In the case of the unity of the manifold of contents of consciousness, this process of reproduction is according to a rule called synthesis.<sup>3</sup>

The unity of consciousness isn't an object, but a process. Hence the form of inner sensibility, time, must contain events ordered in temporal succession and each representation must be capable of being accompanied by "I think":

1  
P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 91.

2  
R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 101.

3  
Ibid.



Kant sometimes expresses the thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness by saying that it must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representations.<sup>1</sup>

The cogito from which Kant begins his argument is not ordinary empirical self-consciousness.<sup>2</sup> This is merely empirical apperception. The cogito here refers to the most general fact of consciousness: its unity.

There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception.<sup>3</sup>

The "I think" from which Kant begins is attached to each mental content, binding these contents in a whole.<sup>4</sup> The connectedness of perceptions is produced by the activity of the mind, synthesis. The supreme principle of synthetic unity ...

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P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 93.

2

"Consciousness of self according to the determination of our state of inner perception is merely empirical and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner experience."

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 107, p. 136.

3

Ibid.

4

"Thoughts are not like stones in a heap, or rabbits in a hat. They do not simply lie in the mind as an aggregate of unconnected contents. They are all bound up together as thoughts of one mind. They are all my thoughts, and only mine."

R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 105.

... says no more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression, "I think".<sup>1</sup>

The unity of consciousness cannot be merely a matter of association of ideas. Kant argues that the relation between the unity of consciousness and the association of the contents of consciousness is one of entailment rather than equivalence. It follows that if a manifold of representations is in one consciousness, they must be related by association; however, perceptions or concepts may not stand in association without being bound in one consciousness.<sup>2</sup> It follows then that since we have representations of objects, we have the unity of consciousness which is their necessary condition. The synthesis of perceptions in concepts or representation of objects is dependent upon the synthesizing function of the understanding through the pure concepts of the understanding.

If this is a product of analytic, regressive argument as Weldon holds to be the case, then synthetic unity of apperception is a sufficient, not a necessary condition of a unified manifold of sensible intuition, and a necessary condition of intellectual intuition. But intellectual intuition in turn requires sensible intuition as its ground. Therefore synthetic unity of apperception is only a sufficient condition of intellectual intuition. However, as Wolff shows, since it is the only sufficient ground of possible experience, sensible and

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<sup>1</sup> I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 138, p. 157.

<sup>2</sup> R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 107.

intellectual, it is therefore the necessary condition.

### Conclusion

To sum up then: Weldon takes the position that Kant presents a metaphysics of experience since the Critique results in proving Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics valid of objects and disproving the metaphysics of Leibniz and the Wolffians valid of objects. In this he assumes metaphysics as a whole is shown to be impossible in the Critique, by taking a view of metaphysics contrary to that of Kant; that is, that metaphysics is a study of transcendent objects, or reality. It has been shown in a brief analysis of current views of the possible interpretations of the Transcendental Deduction and the Analytic as a whole that: 1) Kant is concerned with objects in general, not empirical objects and that therefore the Critique as a whole is concerned with proving a scientific basis for metaphysics, not the repudiation of metaphysics; 2) Kant nowhere specifically proves either Euclidean geometry or Newtonian physics valid of objects; and 3) if Weldon holds the Transcendental Deduction to be an analytic and regressive argument, then Kant could neither prove the validity of a priori synthetic propositions which would make metaphysics scientific, nor the validity of a priori propositions on which the empirical sciences of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics are based. That being the case, then Weldon's view becomes self-contradictory. If it is an analytic regress then it fails to prove what it assumes, since it can result in merely finding sufficient conditions for unproved premises.

On the other hand, Weldon allows that Kant presents an argument which is formally synthetic, but denies any propositions deduced on that basis since he denies the validity of the first premise, the

necessary unity of apperception. In the course of the above argument it has been shown that if both everything and nothing can be the product of such a premise, then it would be the case that both sensible and intellectual intuition are impossible. The world would remain a blooming, buzzing confusion. Since intellectual intuition relies on sensible intuition for its object, and sensible intuition relies on intellectual intuition for its form, in order to have experience of objects at all, perceptions must be bound in one consciousness. If that consciousness were not unified, then no object could exceed a conglomerate of perceptions "like rabbits in a hat". Weldon does not want to deny experience of objects; in turn, he cannot deny their necessary condition.

Where Weldon's analysis of the argument breaks down is in the assessment of this relation of condition. Wolff notes that Beck and Kemp Smith are also in tacit agreement with Weldon since they tend to see the first section of the Analytic as regressive (from experience to its possibility) and the second section as synthetic (from the possibility as established to the actual). This retreat and advance "will yield no data, as Kemp Smith says, but mere unsupported hypotheses".<sup>1</sup> The subsequent deduction would have no validity since the premises are merely hypothetical. In a synthetic argument, a deduction, it is the conclusions which are the necessary conditions of the premises, and the premises are the sufficient conditions of the conclusions. Kant's premise in the Transcendental Deduction is the unity of apperception.

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<sup>1</sup>R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 50.

Since it is the only sufficient condition, it is necessary as well. Weldon and others have failed to note this fact.

From this it follows that whether the Transcendental Deduction is judged to be analytic or synthetic, its validity as an argument is vindicated. It is possible for Kant to prove a priori synthetic propositions possible. Whether he does in fact succeed in doing so cannot be decided on the grounds of the possibility of the Transcendental Deduction as a valid form of argument. Since Kant saw the Subjective Deduction as less important, it seems to be the case that he saw the validity of his premise as proceeding from the Metaphysical Deduction, and that the Transcendental Deduction is a means of showing the Metaphysical Deduction in the light of the Aesthetic. That is, that the main function of the Transcendental Deduction is, as Strawson maintains, to schematize the categories which are unschematized in their first deduction. Viewed in this way, the Transcendental Deduction cannot be invalidated by the historical perspective from which Kant argued to schematization, since any spatio-temporal framework could have served to root the pure concepts of the understanding in an objective world.

Weldon's position is very close to that of Körner, although it proceeds from a different basis. Both hold that a Transcendental Deduction is not strictly possible. Körner holds that the Transcendental Deduction is logically impossible since it is by its nature self-contradictory: "It is the impossibility of demonstrating a schema's uniqueness that renders transcendental deductions impossible."<sup>1</sup> A

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<sup>1</sup>S. Körner, "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions," Kant Studies Today, ed. Lewis White Beck, (Illinois: Open Court, 1969), p. 234.

schema to be shown unique requires judgment outside that schema, which is impossible if that schema is unique. As it is shown above, the categories as deduced in the Metaphysical Deduction are pure, unschematized categories. As Strawson points out, these unschematized categories are "the primitive or underived pure concepts of the understanding":<sup>1</sup>

... it is to be remarked that the categories, as the true primary concepts of the pure understanding, have also their pure derivative concepts . . . . .  
I beg permission to entitle these pure but derivative concepts of the understanding the predicables of the pure understanding - to distinguish them from the predicaments [i.e. the categories].<sup>2</sup>

Körner mistakes the "family tree" of derivative and subsidiary concepts for its root principles. He confuses rules for rules, the categories, with rules themselves, concepts. The latter are empirical rules, and as such are not and should not be unique. In the above refutation of Weldon, Körner's position is also shown to be untenable. Euclidean geometry is a body of a priori synthetic propositions which yield empirical concepts representing objects in our spatio-temporal framework. That is, the objective realm of experience for consciousness such as ours. As empirically employed, the propositions of Euclidean geometry (and Newtonian physics) have only extensive applicability, never universal validity. As a priori rules for concept formation, they are only some of the possible derivative rules which arise from "a body of

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<sup>1</sup> P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 82/B 108, p. 114.

synthetic propositions a priori which has space as its object".<sup>1</sup> The space which is its object is the manifold of a priori sensibility, not the space of sensible or intellectual intuition which is a representation of empirical space formed by our sensibility and our experience of objects.

Of the three possibilities outlined initially, the first, that Kant aimed at and succeeded in producing a science of metaphysics, is the position held by Strawson, Wolff, Dryer, and Beck, albeit for different reasons and with different degrees of conviction. The second, that Kant's aim, to produce a science of metaphysics, resulted in producing instead a metaphysics of experience, is the position of Weldon and Korner, and to some extent also of Kemp Smith and Paton.<sup>2</sup> The third possibility, that Kant aimed at and achieved a metaphysics of experience, is a position at times taken by Beck and Kemp Smith, and the final analysis made by Weldon in so far as he sees Kant as having made a significant philosophical advance.<sup>3</sup>

In the argument as set forward above the first possibility is endorsed: Kant was not mistaken in his assessment of his aim and his results bear this out. As an architectonic, Kant's system appears to provide some grounds on which to base a possible extension. The pure concepts of the understanding, unschematized, are derived from tradi-

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<sup>1</sup>  
R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit.,  
footnote #2, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>  
Paton would not, however, find this inconsistent with Kant's stated aim, since Paton would see metaphysics as being possible only as a metaphysics of experience. Kemp Smith, on the other hand, seems to have a foot in both camps and would fall under the conditions set by possibility number three.

<sup>3</sup>  
R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit., p. 55.

tional logic. As Strawson points out, the Metaphysical Deduction pivots too neatly around the traditional twelve forms of judgment as set forward by Aristotle. In the light of new developments in modern logic, it is possible that further forms of judgment could provide grounds for deduction of more pure concepts (predicaments), or that the twelve forms deduced here could be collapsed into fewer basic or even more primitive logical pre-assumptions inherent in the nature of traditional logic.

If we are to take the clue from formal logic seriously, we must think again. We must ask what is the minimum that the logician must acknowledge in the way of logical forms. This brings us up against the difficulty that, as far as logical forms are concerned, the logician's choice of primitives is a choice.<sup>1</sup>

Prior to the fundamental logical forms are the "fundamental logical ideas - the basic equipment out of which the logical system is built."<sup>2</sup> This is to make a choice of one logical system rather than another. Kant's derivation of the categories does not rule out derivations arising from a system of logic other than the traditional Aristotelian logic.

It is also the case that the predicables arising from the schematized categories are not complete, and Kant sees the necessity of deriving all the pure derivative concepts of the understanding which the nature of his architectonic does not allow:

from the little I have said, it will be obvious that a complete glossary, with all the requisite explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy task.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> 1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 109, p. 115.



In order to be a system rather than a propaedeutic and architectonic, Kant's Transcendental Philosophy must provide a base for derivative systems, if not for an extension.

If Weldon and Korner are correct, and Kant produces a metaphysics of experience due either to the invalidity or miscarriage of his argument, then a new attempt at a Transcendental Deduction is both a possible and a worthwhile endeavor. If the Transcendental Deduction can produce a metaphysics of experience by analytic regress, then the same method could yield other results. If the Transcendental Deduction yields non-unique a priori concepts as Körner holds, then it must be possible to deduce alternative a priori concepts. If Kant has mistakenly identified his argument with his model, it must then be possible to rectify this:

Suppose we grant, as Collingwood held, that deficiency of historical sense led Kant into the mistake of supposing that the fundamental assumptions of the scientific thinking of his day were the absolutely necessary assumptions of scientific thinking in general. It does not follow, from his making this mistake, that there are no storable necessary conditions of the possibility of experience in general, nor does it follow that Kant at no point in the Principles comes anywhere near stating such conditions.<sup>1</sup>

If the Transcendental Deduction is actually as Kant maintained, synthetic and progressive, then validly deducing only one set of results, a metaphysics of experience, shows that it is possible and points to the possibility of deducing other results by this method.

If the third possibility is held to be the case, that Kant aimed at and achieved a metaphysics of experience, then in so doing he should have achieved the completeness which he claimed. However, Kant's metaphysics of experience does not exhaust all experience:

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P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 120.

the categorial framework presented is inadequate for this purpose. There are aberrant and veridical perceptions. Why is it that "a particular unruly perception is not reckoned as a glimpse of another objective world, but is relegated to the status of subjective illusion"?<sup>1</sup> Strawson suggests that objectivity stretched to this extreme can be construed as either personal subjective fiction, or, on the other hand, it could be a public "harmonious dreaming".<sup>2</sup> The schematized categories yield objects in one spatio-temporal framework. The unschematized categories are a priori pure concepts of the understanding which can be schematized in alternate and diverse spatio-temporal frameworks for consciousnesses with different forms of sensibility and different forms of synthesis. No other possible schematizations have been in fact precluded. Therefore a further application of Kant's method to other possible schematizations is both possible and necessary to complete Kant's task.

Therefore, considering the three possible positions concerning the direction and success of the Critique of Pure Reason, all three have been shown to lay grounds for further valid application of Kant's principles and method, although the grounds for the possibility and necessity of extension in the rigorous sense would require further consideration and study. P.D. Ouspensky's philosophy may be viewed as one of many possible uses of Kant's method, and it is the object of the second and the concluding parts of this study to describe this derivative epistemology in detail and to evaluate its faithfulness to Kant on the light of the above discussion.

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<sup>1</sup> P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 152.

## THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF P.D. OUSPENSKY

Context

Some historical, philosophical and biographical context is necessary for a clear exegesis of Ouspensky's epistemology in Tertium Organum. Ouspensky was born in Moscow in 1878, and educated as a mathematician in the main stream of the rapidly changing scientific trends of the early 1900's. He worked as a journalist during the social upheaval of the last years of the Czarist regime and the long revolutionary period which followed its subsequent collapse. In 1921 he took up residence in London, England, and taught verbally and in written form the epistemology initiated in the Tertium Organum in 1912, and the psychology of evolution which was the product of his search from 1912 until his death in 1947.

From a scientific and positivistic early training, Ouspensky's disillusion with the pre-war world it was his purpose to report lead him to a search beyond.

When leaving Petersburg at the start of my journey I had said I was going to 'seek the miraculous'. The 'miraculous' is very difficult to define. But for me this word had a quite definite meaning. I had come to the conclusion a long time ago that there was no escape from the labyrinth of contradictions in which we live except by an entirely new road, unlike anything hitherto known or used by us. But where this new or forgotten road began I was unable to say. I already knew then as an undoubted fact that beyond the thin film of false reality there existed another reality from which, for some reason, something

separated us. The 'miraculous' was a penetration into this unknown.<sup>1</sup>

The search was through the esoteric schools of the east, but the outbreak of World War 1 took him back to Petersburg, where he began to study with George Ivanovitch Gurdjieff, a charismatic teacher whose doctrines, suspiciously viewed by many, formed the basis of Ouspensky's next seven years of 'search'. In 1921 he left Gurdjieff's direct influence to teach and write in London, and in 1924 he announced "that thereafter his own work would proceed independently".<sup>2</sup>

The period between 1924 and his death in 1947 has until quite recently been difficult to document. Although he published several works during that time, A New Model of the Universe is actually a compilation from 1905-1929, In Search of the Miraculous was posthumously published, yet deals with events between 1915 and 1924, and The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution, written in 1934 and published in 1950, is a work so concisely formulated from the bulk of his oral teachings that interpretation is difficult.

George B. Burch, one of the very few scholars to bring Ouspensky to critical attention, has categorized Ouspensky's works in what might appear to be an order of descending preference. Dr. Burch's concise listing begins with Tertium Organum, 1912, as "the most interesting

<sup>1</sup>  
P.D. Ouspensky, In Search of the Miraculous, (New York: Harcourt, 1949), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", The Review of Metaphysics, V #2, (December, 1951), p. 251.

and important of these works ... a systematic treatise on epistemology."<sup>1</sup> This is followed by A New Model of the Universe, 1905-1929, which is, rather than a systematic work, a collection of essays which "explore some parts of that infinite field of mystery which various aspects of experience reveal,"<sup>2</sup> and are "subjective impressions"<sup>3</sup> in his opinion. The Strange Life of Ivan Osokin, 1917, is a philosophical novel exploring eternal recurrence as presented previously in A New Model of the Universe. In his view, In Search of the Miraculous, 1915-1924, is "an unhappy anticlimax" dealing autobiographically with Ouspensky's years as a disciple of Gurdjieff, whose doctrines Dr. Burch sees as "peculiarly unappealing" in spite of Ouspensky's literary prowess.<sup>4</sup> He states in his article:

... even persons sympathetic with occultism will find little of interest in this fantastic jumble of pseudo-alchemy, pseudo-astrology, and pseudo-musicology ... While one wonders how a man of Ouspensky's intellectual and moral force could have been so captivated ...<sup>5</sup>

What was at the time of Dr. Burch's article the final work of Ouspensky, The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution, 1934, he speaks of as a manual of "esoteric instruction" for those possibilities of higher consciousness open to the exceptional man: "A fitting conclu-

<sup>1</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 248.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 249.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 249.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 251.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 251.

sion to the body of Ouspensky's works".<sup>1</sup> The Fourth Way, "verbatim extracts from talks and answers to questions given by Ouspensky between 1921 and 1946",<sup>2</sup> was published only as recently as 1957 and therefore did not come to Dr. Burch's attention.

A different perspective on Ouspensky's works is suggested by an analysis of the internal dating of the works themselves. The essay making up chapter VIII of A New Model of the Universe, "Experimental Mysticism", is dated by Ouspensky as concerning events falling in the years 1910 and 1911, and contains carefully gathered experimental results on artificially induced altered states of consciousness.

... This idea and several other thoughts that remained in my memory from my experience entered into my book Tertium Organum, which was actually written during these experiments. Thus the formulations of the laws of the noumenal world and several other ideas referring to higher dimensions were taken from what I learned during these experiments.<sup>3</sup>

The essay, "Superman", which makes up chapter III of A New Model of the Universe, is again coincident with the Tertium Organum, dated 1911-1929. It elucidates the idea of the Superman, the man of cosmic consciousness, which Ouspensky sees as "as old as the world".

Popular wisdom ... always accepted and admitted the thought that there can and must be beings who, though also human, are much higher, stronger, more complex, more 'miraculous', than

<sup>1</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, The Fourth Way, (London: Routledge, 1957), p. v.

<sup>3</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, A New Model of the Universe, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), p. 324.

ordinary man.<sup>1</sup>

"Experimental Mysticism" may then be viewed as scientific experimental data providing initial stimulus and sustaining data for the systematic epistemology of Tertium Organum; "Superman", drawing heavily from Nietzsche's Zarathustra, may be viewed as both a furtherance of the description of higher consciousness as proposed in Tertium Organum, and an initial step in the realization of the systematic framework it presents. It could reasonably be argued that but for economy of presentation, its place in the "systematic epistemology" would rival that of chapter XXII, in which Ouspensky presents selections from mystical literature in an overview, and that of chapter XXIII, in which cosmic consciousness is discussed in reference and refutation to Dr. Bucke's work, Cosmic Consciousness. As Dr. Burch states:

Cosmic Consciousness by R.M. Bucke, he considers as presenting the correct subjective approach to epistemology, but as vitiated by the error of believing the higher consciousness to be evolving with the human race, instead of being, as Ouspensky believes characteristic of a small minority within it.<sup>2</sup>

This small minority being the rank from which the Superman may evolve, its inclusion here would perhaps be systematically relevant. The two essays, although not organized in a system in A New Model of the Universe, can be legitimately included within the systematic epistemology of the Tertium Organum. Therefore they are not as mysterious and "subjective impressions" as Dr. Burch has implied.

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P.D. Ouspensky, A New Model of the Universe, op. cit., p. 113.

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G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 253.

It also follows from Ouspensky's theory of art as the language of the fourth dimension, that The Strange Life of Ivan Osokin is redeemable from simply literary significance as an embodiment of this principle. In Search of the Miraculous, seen also in the light of furthering the epistemological premises of Tertium Organum, is similar to chapter XXII. It differs only in its journalistic harshness of style from works generally accepted as recording "the mystic way" in various religious contexts. That as such it should seem aberrant if not pathological to the "logical" mind has been established in Tertium Organum as a systematic result of it falling in the systematic domain he calls the "third canon of thought". A similar case may be put forward for The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution and The Fourth Way as guide books for attaining the supraconsciousness for the fourth dimension, which requires that man's perception of "reality as if through a narrow slit" be radically altered.

From this point of view, the works following the Tertium Organum may reasonably be seen as successive attempts at actualizing in application that "systematic epistemology" which Dr. Burch finds of enough importance to class, with the works of Bergson in the sphere of temporal relations, as important additions, in the western philosophical tradition, to Kantian epistemology.<sup>1</sup>

Few scholars have as yet shown an awareness of Ouspensky's place in modern epistemological thought. Dr. Burch's article clearly sets out this context for our use. He traces modern epistemology from the Cartesian certitude of mind and matter, through the empiricist stands of Locke and Berkeley, to Hume's radical scepticism which had

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<sup>1</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 268.



the appearances of a complete impasse. With the Kantian division of reality into phenomenon and noumenon, science was rightfully established in the realm of phenomena and the noumenon, reality itself, was shown to be unknowable.

But in demonstrating the possibility of science Kant at the same time demonstrated the impossibility of mysticism. Mysticism is an alleged knowledge of reality, and reality is just what Kant showed to be unknowable.<sup>1</sup>

The distinction between subjective self and objective world is extended to the further division of the latter into reality-for-us and reality-beyond-us.

If the mystics have forms of intuition and categories of understanding different from those of other people, then no doubt the world must appear to them differently, but this peculiar world of the mystics is only a different appearance, a different phenomenal world, and could at best claim only an equal validity with the ordinary phenomenal world.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Burch sees Ouspensky as standing in the same relation to Kant as that of Kant to Hume, in that Ouspensky proceeds from the Kantian premises to a further distinction between ultimate and proximate reality:

Ultimate reality, the thing-in-itself, is unknowable, as Hume, Kant, and Ouspensky all agree. But the proximate reality, that is, the reality of which a given appearance is an appearance, may be knowable, though not by the same means by which the appearance is known. Although the proximate reality is itself only an appearance of the ultimate reality, still it is reality relative to its own appearances.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit.,  
p. 265.

<sup>2</sup>  
Ibid., p. 266.

<sup>3</sup>  
Ibid., p. 266.

The realm which Ouspensky picks to explore for an opening into these higher realities is that of space, because "Ouspensky believes that knowledge is apprehension of space because space is the synthesis of reality and knowledge is the synthesis of our experience of reality".<sup>1</sup> In An Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson states:

And if metaphysical knowledge is really what Kant supposed, it is reduced to a choice between two attitudes of the mind before all great problems, both equally possible; ...<sup>2</sup>

Ouspensky and Bergson represent two such contemporary attitudes of mind, Ouspensky moving in lines with Platonic tradition most widely accepted in his time by English and German schools of philosophy, and Bergson at the forefront of the French philosophers of becoming, which has produced many noted existential philosophers.

For Kant space and time are equally subjective and, in a sense, unreal. Both Ouspensky and Bergson reject this coordination, but in opposite ways. For Bergson time is reality, while space is an artificial creation or illusion due to our conceptualization of reality. For Ouspensky space is the reality, and time is the illusion resulting from our inadequate comprehension of space. For Ouspensky only being is real; for Bergson only becoming.<sup>3</sup>

Ouspensky's place in the philosophical context above is further assured by a view of the sources he employs. Tertium Organum has a broad philosophical base. Ouspensky begins his philosophy from his primarily mathematical scientific background: much use is made of C.H. Hinton's A New Era of Thought, which he admires but rejects since

<sup>1</sup>G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 267.

<sup>2</sup>H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1949), p. 59.

<sup>3</sup>G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 267.

it studies mathematically the fourth dimension of space and attempts to use a rational method in what Ouspensky sees as the province of the "third canon of thought". For Ouspensky, Hinton's efforts serve to pinpoint the futility of the positivistic approach. The theory of evolution and the theory of relativity which had such influence in the early 1900's provided him with both subject matter and a framework in which to place it. Dr. Burch mentions N.A. Oumoff and H. Minkowsky as strong influences in the field of relativity, and as "of the greatest importance for his treatment of the fourth dimension."<sup>1</sup> Ouspensky also makes extensive use of Plato and Plotinus, and his entire formulation of the Tertium Organum's argument is based solidly on Kant. The influence of the theosophical writers of his day, specifically Mabel Collins and Mme. Blavatsky, is also evident. Yet as sources these writers are used as alternate explanations or second attempts at conveying what is finally outside the realm of conceptual thought, not as participants in the main stream of the systematic epistemology.

Special significance is lent both William James' Varieties of Religious Experience and Dr. R.M Bucke's Cosmic Consciousness. The former is specifically and extensively used in Chapter XXII, and James' definition of the mystical experience is examined at length. The latter forms the subject matter of Chapter XXIII and the vehicle for Ouspensky's theory of individual evolution as opposed to Bucke's general evolution theory.

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<sup>1</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit.,  
p. 253.

In Tertium Organum mathematics enters and pervades the field of philosophy; but so adroitly, so silently as it were, that one hardly knows that it is there. It dwells more in Ouspensky's method than in his matter, ...<sup>1</sup>

Tertium Organum is a pleasure to read; it is clearly thought out and the corresponding clarity of expression "make one wish that all philosophers were required to serve an apprenticeship in newspaper writing."<sup>2</sup> The Tertium Organum is essentially a study of consciousness, organized into an initial section of seven chapters which deal with the problem of understanding the world order by the objective method. Ouspensky points out finally that it is impossible to objectively analyze space and time in the physical world when these are in fact mere projections of a subjective organization on external phenomena. Chapters VII to XXI explore the problem from the standpoint of subjectivity - of consciousness. The final two chapters present mysticism as a change of state of consciousness, and a consideration of cosmic consciousness, or consciousness of a world of four dimensions.

With our study of Ouspensky's epistemology placed in a solid context, we may proceed to the argument itself, remembering Bragdon's words of warning: "To the timid and purblind this philosophy will be nothing short of terrifying ... Fear not the new generalization."<sup>3</sup>

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P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, trans. N. Bessaraboff & C. Bragdon, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), "Introduction to the English Translation" by Claude Bragdon, p. 1.

2 G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 248.

3 P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., "Introduction to the English Translation", by Claude Bragdon, p. 5.

Exegesis of Tertium Organum

Ouspensky's epistemology is based on an argument which is three arguments in one. The first argument is mathematical, and examines mathematical dimensions as leading to the fourth dimension. The second argument is an attempt to apply these dimensions in terms of spatial dimensionality to analogous degrees of consciousness. It then relates these degrees of consciousness to degrees of synthesis of empirical manifolds, in order to show as possible a supra-consciousness or cosmic consciousness, and a four dimensional world providing the larger manifold of phenomena for synthesis, through a function which he calls intuition or love. The third argument is through empirical evidence of altered states of consciousness in the bulk of experiences generally categorized as mystical. This argument, thoroughly Jamesian, is the crucial point of intersection for the first two arguments. No one of the three arguments would prove sufficient in itself for Ouspensky's epistemology, except perhaps the last and shortest; however, in itself it would suffice, as Dr. Burch points out, only to convince those already convinced of the actuality of mysticism, and provide an interesting hypothesis for those wishing to further their conviction:

But those who, while unable to ignore the evidence for the existence of mystical experience, are equally unable to understand in what sense such experience can validly claim a value or reality beyond that of ordinary experience, will find in Ouspensky's doctrine a hypothesis by which this claim can be defended.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 267.

Tertium Organum begins on a Cartesian note by attempting to narrow the inquiry to what we can with certainty be said to know and not to know:

The most difficult thing is to know what we do know, and what we do not know.

Therefore, desiring to know anything, we shall before all else determine what we accept as given, and what is demanding definition and proof; that is, determine what we know already, and what we wish to know.<sup>1</sup>

It is impossible to assume nothing as a point of departure. A premise or premises must be adopted in order to proceed. The premises of the experimental and positive sciences which form our general basis for knowledge, matter and energy, are defined in terms of one another, and result only in the identity of the unknown: "Matter is that in which proceeds the changes called motion; and motions are those changes which proceed in matter."<sup>2</sup> A tautology cannot supply valid grounds for the deduction of propositions of cognitive value.

The point of departure is to be found instead in a more phenomenological point of view:

We know that with the very first awakening of knowledge man is confronted with two obvious facts:

The existence of the world in which he lives, and the existence of psychic life in himself.

Neither of these can he prove or disprove, but they are facts: they constitute reality for him.<sup>3</sup>

From these premises all knowledge proceeds: the subjective, direct inner world and the objective outer world of things and changes in

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

states of things. "The phenomena exist for us in time; the things, in space."<sup>1</sup> These are not properties appertaining to things, but properties of sensuous receptivity:

Projecting outside of ourselves the causes of our sensations, we are designing those causes in space, and we picture continuous reality to ourselves as a series of moments of time following one another. This is necessary for us because a thing having no definite extension in space, not occupying a certain part of space, and not lasting a certain length of time, does not exist for us at all.<sup>2</sup>

Ouspensky states the above as a fact. He has no reservations concerning the validity of Kant's position: "it is possible not to know Kant, but it is impossible to controvert him."<sup>3</sup> He asks how it is possible that philosophy has failed to act in light of the Copernican revolution, but as returned to the empirical object in order to gain knowledge of the world as it is: a feat which has been proven to be impossible. It is especially obvious in the modern sciences that the "enormous number of facts destructive of the harmony of existing systems"<sup>4</sup> have come to outnumber the facts which we have systematized and accepted:

The systematization of that which we do not know may yield us more for the true understanding of the world and the self than the systematization of that which in the opinion of "exact science" we do know.<sup>5</sup>

The problem of scepticism is as threatening today as it was in Kant's day.

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

The question Ouspensky raises is: how can we move from the world of phenomena to the world of causes, the noumenal world? This he sees to be a problem the solution for which Kant fails to provide in the entirety of his system, although his later works do hint at a solution. What Kant has established is that things-in-themselves are unknowable under the existing conditions of receptivity. For Ouspensky, the forms of sensibility, space and time, are a function of the conditions of receptivity; that is, the senses and the linear thought process of causal integration proceeding from those senses. In this case it follows that the forms of sensibility may be altered or destroyed by changes in the conditions of receptivity.

There are theories which hold the possibility of changing these conditions of receptivity. Ouspensky considers Hinton's attempt at expanding the space sense as interesting but misguided. Hinton devised a method of mathematical and geometrical analogy to augment the space sense by accustoming it to work not only on the data of sensation but also via imagination of geometrical possibilities of space interpretation unavailable to the eye through "augmenting the faculty for perceiving analogies."<sup>1</sup> This is not the clue to a changed receptivity: it is a mere lesson in abstraction. Yet Ouspensky sees the mathematicians of his day as closer to the Kantian philosophy than Kant's philosophical successors.

a) The Mathematical Argument

Ouspensky defines "the dimensionality of space by the number of lines it is possible to draw in it which are mutually at right angles

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<sup>1</sup>

P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 19.



one to another."<sup>1</sup> This mathematical definition yields the following: one-dimensional or linear space is the line; two-dimensional space is the surface; and three-dimensional space is the solid. The idea of four-dimensional space arose from the assumption that a mysterious fourth perpendicular is possible, and that there are things of some sort, beyond phenomena as we know them, which "exist" but lie outside three-dimensional space; that is, a noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal realm of our sensibility. The existence of such an entity Ouspensky calls a metaphysical fact, as distinct from physical facts. He holds that the concept of such an entity deserves as much notice as those concepts of "matter" or "force" which our scientific orientation has brought us to accept as proven. When carefully considered, the equation of unknowns cannot be more concrete. Neither "matter" nor "force" is given as a physical fact. The idea of such metaphysical entities gives the idea of a fourth-dimension in which such are existing. The clue provided however is still insufficient.

An approach to the study of space is grounded in Ouspensky's definition of dimensionality: by considering this point, the line, the surface, and the solid in their relations one to another, the dimensions of space can be related one to another. From geometry it is clear that a line traces the movement of a point, the surface, of a line, and the solid, of a surface: "Is it not possible to regard the 'four-dimensional body' as a tracing of the movement of a three-dimensional body?"<sup>2</sup> Each of the above moves in a direction not contained in it. Therefore "the

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

direction of the movement in the fourth-dimension lies outside of all those directions which are possible in a three-dimensional figure."<sup>1</sup> From the above comparison also, it follows that since a line is an infinite number of points, a four-dimensional body is an infinite number of three-dimensional bodies and four-dimensional space is an infinite number of three-dimensional spaces. Also, since a line is limited by points, so a four-dimensional body is limited by three-dimensional bodies; and, as a line binds certain points in a whole, so

It is possible that four-dimensional space is the distance between a group of solids [three dimensional bodies], separating these solids, yet at the same time binding them into some to us unconceivable whole, even though they may seem to be separate from one another."<sup>2</sup>

As the point is a section of a line, then the three-dimensional body will be a section of the four-dimensional body. Ouspensky's example here, since it recurs in his argument from degrees of consciousness, is particularly worth noting. When one places one's fingertips on a table, five separate circles appear on the surface. From the point of view of the surface, the hand is inconceivable:

Our relation to the four-dimensional world will be analogous to the relation of that consciousness which sees five circles upon the table to a man. We see just "finger tips" - to us the fourth dimension is inconceivable.<sup>3</sup>

The idea of movement in space is "indissolubly bound up with the idea of time",<sup>4</sup> since to see motion at all one must see what and where a thing was, is, and will be. Time, as we understand it is the

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

movement of phenomena past our narrow slit of observation on the world, and the past and future are defined in terms of what is currently, was just, and might possibly be occupying the slit. It is bound up in notions of "causation and functional interdependence."<sup>1</sup>

Ouspensky emphasizes the phantasmal aspects of such a view of time in an anecdote concerning a traveller half-way between two cities: the one he has left behind no longer exists but in memory: "... the walls are ruined, the towers fallen, the inhabitants have either died or gone away."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, he is going to another city, which does not exist now either, but is currently being built, occupied and set in order pending his arrival. Such an analogy seems ridiculous, but Ouspensky points out:

We are thinking of things in time exactly in this way - everything passes away, nothing returns! The spring has passed, it does not exist still. The autumn has not come, it does not exist as yet.

But what does exist?

The present.

But the present is not a seizable moment, it is continuously transitory into the past. So, strictly speaking, neither the past, nor the present, nor the future exists for us. Nothing exists.<sup>3</sup>

If the narrow slit were opened, by the higher consciousness, that consciousness would stand on such a height that it could see the stupid traveller on route, the city which he had left, still intact, and the city to which he was travelling, already there. Time must be viewed as spatial to escape this abyss of nonexistence:

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 34

By time we mean the distance separating events in the order of their succession and binding them in different wholes. This distance lies in a direction not contained in three-dimensional space, therefore it will be the new dimension of space.<sup>1</sup>

Time is then the fourth dimension of our three-dimensional world; time is not deduced from observation of motion and is not only "the idea of that succession which is observed by us in motion."<sup>2</sup> We fail to synthesize space beyond our conditioned subjective slit on phenomena, and this fourth dimension, time, is what gives us the "illusion of motion which does not exist in reality."<sup>3</sup>

This strange view of time takes on substance when placed in the context of mathematical and spatial dimensionality and analogous degrees of consciousness. Dr. Burch handles this aspect of Ouspensky's presentation extremely well:

If space is the measure of our apprehension of reality, time is the measure of our lack of apprehension. The higher the consciousness, the richer its space sense, and the lower the consciousness, the richer its time sense; but richness of time sense is only a pseudo-richness, because time is the measure not of knowledge but of ignorance.<sup>4</sup>

A consciousness of the first dimension, the point which traces a line in mathematical terms, senses the line he traces as a succession of non-integrated events in time. A consciousness of the second dimension, a line which bounds a surface in mathematical terms, senses the surface

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>4</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 259.

but fails to integrate a solid, which he sees as surfaces moving in time. A consciousness of the third dimension, such as man, is two-dimensional in actual perception but apprehends solids via concepts which supply that dimension actually not empirically given. The other side or missing side of a house is existing for us by virtue of our ability to conceive that side which we do not actually perceive. Thus a surface which moves in time for an animal is an immobile solid for man. What is future, seen as in time, for the animal, a thing such as the missing wall of the house, is present and in space for man.

Ouspensky holds that the term time actually designates two ideas: a certain space, and motion upon that space. From the mathematical analogy and his sketch of consciousness on each dimensional level, it is shown that the idea of time is not in fact deduced by us from observation of motion. The idea of succession is not the idea of time. What is the case is the reverse:

That the idea of motion is deduced by us out of an incomplete sensation of time, or of the time sense, i.e., out of a sense or sensation of the fourth-dimension, but out of an incomplete sensation.<sup>1</sup>

The sensation of time is a faulty sensation of space. For the being on the plane, the second-dimensional being, solids are seen as surfaces moving in time. For the three-dimensional being, solids are immobile objects in space; change or motion in these solids is viewed as taking place in time, the fourth dimension of three-dimensional space. The higher degree of consciousness perceives the time of the lower as spatial. Then the man of supra-consciousness, who synthesizes by intuition the fuller manifold of the phenomenal world:

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 39.

What we call time he will call the fourth dimension of space.  
 What we call motion he will call extension in the fourth dimension. What we call acceleration he will call an angle.  
 What we call life he will call motion. And what we call space he will call a surface.<sup>1</sup>

To sum up, time and space are the forms of our sensibility, as Kant has shown. The forms of sensibility are a direct result of the forms of receptivity of each degree of consciousness. That is, although space and time are forms of sensibility, each type of receptivity sets different limits on the manifold which is thus formed. In examining degrees of receptivity in mathematically devised analogies of dimensional beings, it can be shown that: a) time sense varies inversely with spatial integration, b) the higher space integration apprehends the time of a lower level as space. Therefore, at higher levels of consciousness, the forms of sensibility, space and time, collapse into one form, space. Time is spatial. It is then redefined as an incomplete sensation of space. In other words, time is a product of the incomplete synthesis of a manifold of experience. Each degree of consciousness synthesizes the manifold by schematization in the time appropriate to its forms of receptivity which govern its forms of sensibility.

Thus far Ouspensky has proposed an idea of interest, the validity of which is far from proven. "Geometry, from the standpoint of mathematics is an artificial system for the solving of problems based on conditional data, deduced, probably, from the properties of our psyche."<sup>2</sup> Although the above analysis can point to possibilities otherwise neglected, it is inadequate to further any analysis of space. The question

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<sup>1</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 260.

<sup>2</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 65.

cannot be advanced by an examination in the fields of science and mathematics because the three-dimensional spatio-temporal framework is a part of their techniques and integral to their premises. Ouspensky concludes that since space and time have their source in the knowing subject, they must be sought through an examination of our way of knowing, or consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

We possess such a psychical apparatus and the world is three dimensional. How is it possible to establish the fact that the three dimensionality of the world depends upon such a constitution of our psychical apparatus? This could be proven or disproven undeniably only with the aid of experiments. If we could change our psychic apparatus and should then discover that the world around us was changing, this would constitute for us the proof of the dependence of the properties of space upon the properties of our consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

#### b) The Argument from the Degrees of Consciousness

Due to the difficulties inherent in the study of higher consciousness, Ouspensky turns to those which are lower. He goes briefly into psychology to define actions of a given form in this hierarchy of consciousness: reflex, which is "irritability of a cell"<sup>3</sup>; instinct, which is expedient irritability fixed on a pleasure/pain motive, but made "without conscious selection or without conscious aim"<sup>4</sup>; rational actions which are consciously learned for a given purpose but later become unconscious and habitual; and finally conscious actions

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<sup>1</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 254.

<sup>2</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 73-74.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 77.

which belong to "men of a higher type"<sup>1</sup>. The first three "all may be regarded as reflected, i.e., as not self-originated,"<sup>2</sup> and the beings, including the men of the last sphere, rational actions, are all automata "created and determined by his impressions of the outside world."<sup>3</sup>

The relation of psyche to external world he defines also in four categories corresponding to the four dimensions. The lowest order, sensation, is defined as "an elementary change in the state of the psyche"<sup>4</sup>; perception, he defines as grouped memories of sensations according to character of sensations or simultaneity of reception.<sup>5</sup>

... the memories of perception proceed as with the memories of sensations. Mingling together, the memories of perceptions, or the 'images of perceptions', combine in various ways: they sum up, they stand opposed, they form groups, and in the end give rise to concepts.<sup>6</sup>

Conception is the realm of man, and coincident with speech. Ouspensky's basis for equating concepts with speech is similar to that expressed by Cassirer in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Sensations can be expressed by sounds; perceptions give rise to direct reference designatory words of noun value; however, speech exceeds the function of designation

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 71.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.



and symbolizes concepts:

Speech consists of words, each word expressing a concept. Concept and word are in substance one and the same thing; only the first (the concept) represents, so to speak, the inner side, and the second, the word, the outer side.<sup>1</sup>

As well as concepts, speech also expresses ideas: "By ideas are meant broader concepts, not representing the group sign of similar perceptions, but embracing various groups of perceptions, or even groups of concepts. Therefore an idea is a complex or an abstract concept."<sup>2</sup>

The fourth category of relation of the psyche to the external world he calls intuition. Even ideas can never express adequately emotions of even the simplest nature. These can be neither confined to concepts and ideas nor correctly and exactly expressed by words. The vehicle suitable for expressing emotional understanding is the realm of art. The metaphorical and evocative connotational realm of art can transmit such feelings, but cannot in turn be analyzed in terms of concepts. Conversely, music or art can never express concepts: "Thus in art we have already the first experiments in a language of the future. Art anticipates a psychic evolution and divines its future form."<sup>3</sup> The parallel here with the work of Cassirer and his later "disciples" is evident. At this point Ouspensky remarks that the fourth sphere

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

"appears now accidentally as it were and depends upon insufficiently studied conditions".

Ouspensky proceeds to link these four levels of psychic relation to the world to indicate that each level proceeds on a different basis for synthesis of the empirical manifold due to its different form of receptivity. It is important to note here that from each level of synthesis the level of synthesis above appears to synthesize the noumenal realm. For Ouspensky, noumena is a limiting concept to the dimensionality of any phenomenal world for any form of receptivity. Therefore the fifth-dimensional world is noumenal in relation to the fourth, and the  $n + 1$  dimensional world is noumenal in relation to the  $n$ -dimensional world. It is a sliding scale of proximate realities, not merely the fourth-dimension Ouspensky is setting out to show as possible. At the first level, sensation, Ouspensky provides little data. There is little to be said of such a realm but that it consists of sensations strung together like beads in a time sequence. Each now is merely the excitation of the cell. At this level, although Ouspensky does not speak of a "logic" of such a level, there is some justification for proposing what could be called a logic of momentary identity:

This here now  
This here now  
This here now

Not only class but name is missing. Each sensation is distinct and an immediate state of the one-dimensional psyche. Each is organized only in time.

At the second level, the level of perception, the manifold is subjected to a primitive logic. This primitive logic is one of separate 'noun value', if interpreted from the point of view of concept or speech. Animals lack concepts. Expediency guides animals in such a way that it often appears they reason. We are duped into a view of animals which is more anthropomorphic than evidence warrants.

... all actions of animals, sometimes highly complex, expedient, and apparently reasoned, we can explain without attributing to them concepts, judgments, and the power of reasoning. Indeed, we must recognize that animals have no concepts, and the proof of this is that they have no speech.<sup>1</sup>

Man is an animal who has his powers of sensible receptivity at the same level as other animals: the added power which makes man "rational animal" is the power of concept formation and communication of those concepts through speech. It is a difference in psychic rather than sensible receptivity which marks man's evolutionary position.

An animal would have a peculiar logic, It indeed would not be logic in the true meaning of the word, because logic presupposes the existence of logos, i.e., of a word or concept.<sup>2</sup>

Both man and animal live in a world which appears as a surface. The third dimension is open to man due to concepts. Impressions received of the world are usually incorrect; but we know we see it incorrectly. "Behind the surfaces we think the solid."<sup>3</sup> We continuously correct

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>2</sup> ibid., p. 81.

<sup>3</sup> ibid., p. 87.

what data we receive through our sense organs. In fact, 'we think the world as other than it appears.'<sup>1</sup> The evidence for these facts is easily to hand. One example Ouspensky cites which is particularly noteworthy is that of our immediate perception of 'an enormous number of non-existent motions:

Every motion of ours in our direct sensation of it, is bound up with the motion of everything around us. We know that this motion is an illusory one, but we see it as real. Objects turn in front of us, run past us, overtake one another. If we are riding slowly past houses, these turn slowly, if we are riding fast they turn quickly; also, trees grow up before us unexpectedly, run away and disappear.<sup>2</sup>

The animal lives in a world of two dimensions, and on this surface occur movements of the "most fantastic character". Animals manoeuvre in the three-dimensional world we inhabit by virtue of the pleasure/pain emotional charge attached to their perceptions, which they remember in complex detail. Therefore the animal, lacking concepts, is forced to maintain in memory masses of discreet perceptions; that is, the animal remembers definite properties of observed objects in order to survive in its two-dimensional world. "The logic of animals will differ from ours, first of all, from the fact that it will not be general":<sup>3</sup>

This is this	or	A is A
This is that		B is B
This is not that		A is not B

<sup>1</sup>  
P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 88.

<sup>2</sup>  
ibid.

<sup>3</sup>  
ibid., p. 82.

From this it follows that this tree and that tree will remain incommensurable, since the concept "trees" is lacking. Only the concept, which synthesizes perceptions according to resemblance or identity of similar essential characteristics, would make perceptions of concrete individuals commensurable one with another. (i.e., measurable by the same type of judgment.)

In terms of the third level, synthesis of the empirical manifold at the second level is complete, in so far as the forms of sensuous receptivity are concerned. The synthesis however is incomplete in so far as the categories of the understanding are concerned. The limited logic of the two-dimensional world schematizes the categories in a spatio-temporal framework different from that of the three-dimensional world, in which man adds to 2-dimensional phenomena the concepts which supply the third-dimension. The empirical manifold is the same for both, but interpreted differently: It is perceptually the same, but conceptually different. Therefore, dimensionality or space is contingent upon the forms of receptivity, both sensible and psychical.

This is then in part what Ouspensky set out to prove initially:

Kant's idea [that space with its properties is a form of our sensuous receptivity] would be proven experimentally if we could be convinced that for the being possessing sensations only, the world is one-dimensional; for the being possessing sensations and perceptions the world is two-dimensional; and for the being possessing, in addition to concepts and ideas, the higher forms of knowledge the world is four-dimensional.<sup>1</sup>

It remains to be proven that the being last-named does or can exist and

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P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 74.

has or could have knowledge of a four-dimensional world.

At the third level, that of conception, the logic of concepts governs the synthesis of the empirical manifold:

A is A  
 A is not Not-A  
 Everything is either A or Not-A

Aristotelian and Baconian logic are the regulative principles or definitions of possible experience of the phenomenal world of man. They are subject to and constitutive of his three-dimensional world.

We have established that the three-dimensional extension of the world depends upon the properties of our psychic apparatus.

Or, that the three-dimensionality of the world is not its property, but a property of our receptivity of the world. In other words, the three-dimensionality of the world is a property of its reflection in our consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

In so far as the above examination of the different psychic levels is successful, the possibility of the higher psychic function and the four-dimensional world is established:

If all this is so, then it is obvious that we have really proved the dependence of space upon the space-sense. And if we have proved the existence of a space-sense lower in comparison with ours, by this we have proved the possibility of a space-sense higher in comparison with ours.<sup>2</sup>

There are two ways to approach the four-dimensional world: one can develop the space-sense and other higher faculties; or, one can "under[stand] it mentally by a perception of its possible properties through the exercise of the reason."<sup>3</sup> The fourth dimension

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

must lie in what is for us, time. Only a section of a four-dimensional object lies in our space. If we look at those parts of it that lie in time, we see as motion that which is part of the extension of the thing we examine. Oddly enough, this is in fact how computers look at extension in space flight: time is the fourth dimension translated here into the extension of the spatial object. "By time are designated the characteristics of a space relatively higher than a given consciousness":<sup>1</sup> time then is completely conditional.

Ouspensky then proposes a third logic, the logic of his fourth level; this logic has as its process of synthesis intuition, not conception.<sup>2</sup> As stated previously, Ouspensky agrees with Kant that ultimate reality, the noumenon, is unknowable. He has set out to prove that the three-dimensional phenomenal world is not exhaustive of all possible experience, but that it extends beyond the realm of conception to a higher synthesis; that is, that in the realm of intuition experience extends to a higher proximate reality which is open to a different consciousness. This third logic he calls the "third canon of thought":

I have called this system of higher logic Tertium Organum because for us it is the third canon - third instrument - of thought after those of Aristotle and Bacon. The first was Organon, the second, Novum Organum. But the third existed earlier than the first.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 105.

<sup>2</sup> The provisional logic of the one-dimensional consciousness is not properly called a logic, as remarked above.

<sup>3</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 236.

Since higher consciousness is not within the realm of conception, its formulation in words is in effect impossible. The axioms of higher logic are unexpressable; however, to master the higher logic is to master the fundamentals of the understanding of a space of higher dimensions.

A is both A and Not-A  
                                   or  
 Everything is both A and Not-A  
                                   or  
 Everything is All<sup>1</sup>

The logic of the unity of all is a paradox when expressed in language, by virtue of the fact that one views it from a logic incommensurable with it, a logic of another and lower degree of consciousness. Ouspensky's premise was, "If we could change our psychic apparatus and should then discover that the world around us was changing ...". We then are in a similar position in regards the third canon of thought as the dog of the primitive logic is in regards the second logic of concepts, the logic of man. Were it possible to teach a dog that his house, A, and a strange house, B, are both houses, this would be tantamount to teaching the dog in his logical system that A and B are the same:

But having no concepts it will not be in a position to construe the axioms of Aristotelian logic, and will express its impression of the new order in the form of the entirely absurd but more nearly true proposition: This is that.<sup>2</sup>

And this is the case for man in face of the third logic. Its statement in his speech, in the conceptual realm, results in a paradox.

<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 236.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 220-221.



The same fright, the same loss of the real, the same impression of utter and never-ending illogicality, the same formula 'this is that', will affect us.<sup>1</sup>

Aristotelian logic provides categories of judgment concerning the three-dimensional phenomenal world. "Logic, or the science of concepts, is that system which studies the qualitative (categorical) relations between things"<sup>1</sup> and is deduced by us from the observation of our world. Such a logic, based on concepts and words, excludes that which cannot be expressed in words. But, as previously established, not everything can be so expressed; therefore, not everything is entirely logical for us. Even mathematics is entirely illogical. The axioms of logic and the axioms of mathematics (axioms of identity and difference) fully correspond to one another. Yet these mathematical axioms cannot be applied to infinite and variable magnitudes. Both logic and mathematics have axioms which are deduced from phenomena, and "represent in themselves a certain conditional incorrectness, which is necessary for the knowledge of the unreal 'subjective' world."<sup>2</sup> The axioms of infinite mathematics appear as paradoxes also:

A magnitude can be not equal to itself.  
 A part can be equal to the whole, or it can be greater than the whole.  
 One of two equal magnitudes can be infinitely greater than another.  
 All different magnitudes are equal among themselves.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 224.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 226.

From the fact that the four-dimensional realm cannot be actually expressed in words or concepts, it follows that all that can be deduced from the third canon of thought regarding the possibility of experience of this realm will appear as paradoxical. The experience of the four-dimensional realm is deduced as necessarily containing certain elements which are incommensurable with the three-dimensional phenomenal realm. Ouspensky prefaces his deduction of these elements with a clear warning:

Generally speaking, everything said in words regarding the world of causes is likely to seem absurd, and is in reality its mutilation. The truth it is impossible to express, it is possible only to give a hint at it, to give an impulse to thought ... This explains why truth very often can be expressed only by means of a paradox, or even in the form of a lie. Because, in order to speak of truth without a lie, we should know some other language - ours in unsuitable.<sup>1</sup>

Ouspensky lists twelve conditions experience must meet in order to be experience of the four-dimensional realm. A list will serve to clarify the material:

- 1) What is time in the third dimension will exist as space, and the law of causality will be nullified since all potentials will be actualized simultaneously.  
i.e. timeless
- 2) Higher dimensions will be incommensurable with the three-dimensional realm.  
i.e. incommensurable
- 3) Higher dimensions are non-sensuous or immaterial, and subject to different categories of perception.  
i.e. immaterial
- 4) The higher realm is all conscious: "everything lives, everything breathes, thinks, feels".  
i.e. conscious

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P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 241.

- 5) From the third dimension, the higher realm appears infinite and variable.  
i.e. infinite
- 6) "The laws of our logic cannot act there. From the standpoint of our logic, that world is illogical. This is the realm the laws of which are expressed in Tertium Organum".  
i.e. illogical
- 7) All in this realm is whole in itself and one with a greater whole.  
i.e. organic unity
- 8) "That world is the world of the unity of opposites"  
i.e. non-dichotomous
- 9) The higher realm is real in comparison to lower realms yet such a distinction does not exist in the higher realm.  
i.e. real
- 10) This realm is a new and wonderful perception of what in the lower realm we see incorrectly. "That world and our world are not two different worlds".  
i.e. coextensive
- 11) ... "even comprehending it we will not grasp it as a whole, i.e., in all its variety of relations, but can think of it only in this or that aspect".  
i.e. ineffable
- 12) "Everything that is said about the world of causes refers also to the All. But between our world and the All there may be many transitions".  
i.e. progression of realities<sup>1</sup>

Some clarification is needed here. Most of the above conditions are antithetical to the conditions of the three-dimensional phenomenal realm. Yet it should be noted that from the two-dimensional framework the above conditions would apply to possible experience of the three-dimensional realm. Although from the perspective of the three-dimensional realm the four-dimensional realm is timeless, time

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<sup>1</sup>

P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 241-243.

is the fifth dimension of the four-dimensional realm, and on to the  $n + 1$  dimensional realm. Each higher dimension has its own condition of time. Since our forms of receptivity in their sensuous nature reach only to two-dimensional perceptions of phenomena, the psychic receptivity which gives us the third dimension through conception is the form of receptivity which admits of change. It is our psychic apparatus, not our sense receptors, Ouspensky set out to examine. It is in light of this that Ouspensky calls the higher dimensions conscious and immaterial. The lower realms are sensuously based and therefore limited by the forms of sensible receptivity; however, the higher are infinite since the psyche has no such limits to its evolution. The last six conditions are mutually dependent. From the standpoint of man who synthesizes the manifold of intuition through concepts which are by their nature dichotomous, the higher realm of consciousness is the real, the non-dichotomous organic unity which is coextensive with that three-dimensional world which is merely a section of it. It completes the lower realm in just such a way as the hand completes the five finger tip circles which touch the surface, binding them in a whole. This binding force is the final step to knowledge of the All, although the  $n + 1$  dimension can be reached only after a long progression of proximate realities, and even then is merely the limiting concept of the infinite All which extends indefinitely again as the noumenon from even this dimension.

It remains then for Ouspensky to show that these conditions of possible experience of higher spatial dimensions are in fact the case for some consciousness. Ouspensky defines mystical states or experiences as "knowledge by expanded consciousness".

## c) The Argument from Empirical Evidence

Ouspensky holds that the third canon of thought is older than the other two. The higher phenomenal realm is reached through a process of synthesis he calls intuition or love. Love is the higher emotional faculty: "Just as perception correlates distinct sensations and conception integrates different perceptions, so love unites things which would otherwise be separate."<sup>1</sup> Since concepts fall short of expressing emotions, it is through art, which shows the differences in things physically similar, and the similarities between things widely divergent, that this new dimension is expressed.

In the fine arts we possess a technique by which conceptually indefinable beauties and meanings are intuited emotionally, though only by those who are capable of such intuition.<sup>2</sup>

The space-sense is the power of representation by means of form, and therefore the measure of our apprehension of the world. Music, poetry, painting, allows representation of form not bounded by discursive or deductive elements. Again, the similarity of Ouspensky's epistemology to Cassirer's work is unescapable. In both the third dimension and the fourth, consciousness is not confined to sensible forms of receptivity, but employs psychical receptivity to complete the sensuous phenomenal realm.

Ouspensky quotes at length from both Plato and Plotinus. The synthesizing and integrating faculties beyond the discursive and deductive realm of "thinking", intuition into forms as first principles,

<sup>1</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit.,  
p. 262.

<sup>2</sup>  
Ibid., p. 261.

is the highest goal of men's knowledge as Plato set forward in The Republic. Here love of wisdom is the vehicle for the highest achievement of man's consciousness, consciousness being in this case a mode of being or integration of man's soul as a necessary correlate of his mode of cognition. This philosophical madness is abandonment of conception to directly intuit the form of the Good as the highest source of all the forms. The seer who returns to the cave to attempt to report his new insight is mad; that is, he is forced out of the realm of logic:

They would laugh at him and say that he had gone up only to come back with his sight ruined; it was worth no one's while even to attempt the ascent. If they could lay hands on the man who was trying to set them free and lead them up, they would kill him.<sup>1</sup>

Ouspensky provides a variety of data from mystical literature to show that expanded consciousness is consciousness of an extended spatial world:

The conscious person is continuous with a wider self ... The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely "understandable" world.<sup>2</sup>

Unlike William James, Ouspensky presents only that data which will serve his epistemological premises, rather than the compendium which is available. Mystical states of consciousness are for him closely bound up with knowledge received under conditions of expanded recep-

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Plato, The Republic, trans. F.M. Cornford, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), vii 517, p. 231.

2

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, (New York: Mentor, 1958), pp. 384 & 389.

tivity. James sees ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity as the earmarks of mystical states. But Ouspensky is more definite:

Considering mystical states as "knowledge by expanded consciousness", it is possible to give quite definite criteria for their discernment and their differentiation from the generality of psychic experiences.

1. Mystical states give knowledge which nothing else can give.
2. Mystical states give knowledge of the real world with all its signs and characteristics.
3. The mystical states of men of different ages and different peoples exhibit an astonishing similarity, sometimes amounting to a complete identity.
4. The results of the mystical experience are entirely illogical from our ordinary point of view. They are super-logical, i.e., Tertium Organum, which is the key to mystical experience, is applicable to them in all its entirety.<sup>1</sup>

The reports of experience of just such a four-dimensional world, a timeless higher spatial world, are in abundance. These reports do indeed precede our systems of logic, and fall in the realm of the third canon of thought: the axiom of the higher logic is expressed as Tat twam asi, and in Plotinus' On Intelligible Beauty which Ouspensky quotes at length, the axiom has a strange resemblance to its counterpart in the mathematics of infinite magnitudes:

There each part always proceeds from the whole, and is at the same time each part and the whole. For it appears indeed as a part; but for him whose sight is acute, it will be seen as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

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P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., pp. 251 & 252.

2

Quoted in P.D. Ouspensky, Tertium Organum, op. cit., p. 253, (abridged quotation from "Select Works of Plotinus", trans. Thomas Taylor, Bohn's Library, pp. lxxiii & lxxiv.).

Chapter XXII gives selections from eastern and western mysticism to support its contention that experience of a higher proximate reality is not only possible, but is a fact. It also entertains to some extent the altered states of consciousness brought about by drugs or induced by meditation and hypnosis and shows these to be of a similarly extended spatial realm. Ouspensky's experience with ether reported in A New Model of the Universe is compared to that of James reported in The Varieties of Religious Experience.

In this third argument Ouspensky links the new forms of psychical receptivity with the experience of the fourth dimension by grounding both in experience which is mystical, or noetic of a higher realm. He does not, however, see this fuller knowledge as final.

We grow in wisdom not by denying experience, but by enlarging it. Love frees us from the limitations of ordinary human thinking, and this freedom gives us a fuller knowledge of the truth ... Reality is knowable, but only because ultimate reality is unknowable.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 268.



### OUSPENSKY'S SYSTEM AS A POST-KANTIAN DEVELOPMENT

In chapter one, three views on the purpose and achievement of the Critique of Pure Reason were briefly analyzed, and all three were shown to allow grounds for a derivative system employing Kant's method. Ouspensky's epistemology as set out in Tertium Organum was presented and its arguments clarified in chapter two. Three questions remain to be answered: a) Is Ouspensky's epistemology in Tertium Organum a valid derivative system applying Kant's method; b) As such a system, can it withstand or answer criticism of Kant's system; and c) What is the relevance of this derivative system as opposed to other possible derivative systems?

In section one, Ouspensky's use of Kant's method will be made clear and the resulting extension drawn up.<sup>1</sup> In section two, some possible answers to the questions raised in chapter one will be considered in light of the extension. In section three, the relevance of the extension will be tentatively mapped out.

#### Ouspensky's Use of Kant's Method

Ouspensky's epistemology in Tertium Organum is a result of the application of Kant's method to another empirical realm. What Kant has proven true of possible three-dimensional experience, Ouspensky has proven to be the case also for one- and two-dimensional phenomenal experience and then for higher dimensional realms.

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<sup>1</sup>"extension" in its broad sense shall be used for the sake of clarity to signify "derivative system" in this chapter.

The broad parallels of method are evident. Ouspensky's first argument, the mathematical, is analogous to the Aesthetic of the Critique. The argument from the degrees of consciousness to the possibility of cosmic consciousness is analogous to the Subjective Deduction and its analysis of synthesis in a higher realm through a higher logic corresponds to the Metaphysical Deduction. The third argument, from empirical evidence, is analogous to the Objective Deduction of the Critique. By drawing these parallels in some detail, both the parallel method and its extension of Kant's position will be shown clearly.

In the Aesthetic Kant presents an argument for the a priori forms of sensibility, space and time as those conditions governing the possibility of any awareness for man. The mathematical argument of Tertium Organum examines space and time as they correspond to a mathematical model of dimensionality. Ouspensky equates these dimensions with hypothetical consciousnesses having such different dimensionalities as their phenomenal realms. He concludes that if there were such consciousnesses, then although the forms of sensibility, space and time would be a common condition of experience, their limited receptivity would result in the inverse variation of space and time as represented in the worlds of their experiences. As the limits of receptivity expanded, the space-sense would expand and the time-sense recede. Ouspensky then extends Kant's position to include different spatio-temporal frameworks of experience in the phenomenal realm.

"Space-sense, defined as 'the power of representation by means

of form', is for any consciousness, the measure of its ability to apprehend the real world".<sup>1</sup> Time is, on the other hand, a vague representation of space, or a failure of the space-sense:

Time and space, therefore, are functions of our way of thinking, but they are by no means coordinate and equally subjective forms of intuition, as Kant suggested.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Burch makes clear the distinction which Ouspensky wants to make here, that space and time are the forms of sensibility for any possible consciousness of appearance, but that they differ according to the degree of consciousness in sensible intuition. Space-sense is the degree of synthesis of space possible to each degree of consciousness due to its forms of receptivity. Space as a pure form of sensibility is not intuited but is the subjective condition of sensibility and contains "prior to all experience, principles which determine the relations of these objects".<sup>3</sup> These relations are not limited to only one possibility.

Kant makes the distinction between the forms of sensibility and receptivity. But since he deals with only one degree of consciousness, he fails to draw the distinction to its logical conclusion :

It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.

<sup>1</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 259.

<sup>2</sup>  
Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>  
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 26/B 42, p. 71.

This predicate can be ascribed to things only in so far as they appear to us, that is, only to objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we term sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations in which objects can be intuited as outside us.<sup>1</sup> (underlining mine)

The form of receptivity is constant for each level of consciousness. But space and time as forms of sensibility are not contingent on receptivity, which varies from one dimension of consciousness to another. The forms of sensuous receptivity, i.e., the sense receivers at the physical level, are the same in man and animal. It is psychical receptivity which gives man a new space-sense and is the condition of his three-dimensional spatial experience as opposed to that experience of higher and lower animals and higher man which is of the two- and one- and four-dimensional spatial realms of appearance respectively. Ouspensky's premise is "if we could change our psychical apparatus ... the world around us is changing". For each level, the forms of receptivity are the conditions of presentation of a world which affects consciousness; the forms of sensibility are the conditions of representation of the outer world which affects consciousness.

Where Kant is dealing with the a priori forms of sensibility of the three-dimensional consciousness, the form of receptivity of which is constant, Ouspensky is dealing with forms of sensibility of different dimensions of consciousness and their different forms of receptivity. There is nothing in the Critique which precludes such treatment, and much which would encourage it. The examination of the

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 27/B 43, pp. 71-72.

forms of receptivity says much about why the world appears as it does for us, as well as what Kant has previously established: that it is as it appears for us.

It must be noted here that although at higher levels of consciousness Ouspensky holds that time is spatial, the time referred to is the time of the lower level seen in terms of the higher. Since at each level the next is synthesized as time, then the forms of sensibility are always both present at a given level. In this first argument Ouspensky has not yet introduced dimensionality above the mathematically possible fourth-dimension. In such a non-denumerable infinity of possible dimensions the limiting factor of each is time, the vague representation of the next spatial limit.

However, were Ouspensky interpreted here as holding that the forms of sensibility become one form, space, in the fourth dimension, this would not in fact conflict with Kant's position. Kant holds that the forms of sensibility are the conditions of all appearances empirically given or intuited.<sup>1</sup> Ouspensky is not referring to either 'appearances' or that which is empirically given to sensuous receptivity. This is not, however, a point at issue in the argument as it progresses to its next stage.

Ouspensky's second argument, from the degrees of consciousness to the relations of those consciousnesses to the outer world in different forms of synthesis, is directly analogous to the Metaphysical and Subjective Deductions in the Critique. Kant argues from

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 126, p. 126.

Aristotelian logic and the pure concepts of the understanding to the process of synthesis which allows representation of the three-dimensional phenomenal realm in the synthetic unity of apperception. Ouspensky goes on to examine lower and higher logics and certain concept-like conditions of other possible synthetic unities of the manifold proceeding from other types of synthesis and resulting in other phenomenal realms for other degrees of consciousness.

In the Subjective Deduction synthesis for Kant is defined as that process by which the manifold given in intuition is represented in consciousness as belonging to that consciousness. By this process consciousness can "comprehend them [representations] as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression, 'I think'.<sup>1</sup>

In the second argument Ouspensky establishes that there are consciousnesses corresponding to those hypothetical consciousnesses of the first argument. Man and animals of a higher nature have the same conditions of sensuous receptivity. Animals however do not possess the psychical receptivity of man: the concept which supplies the third-dimension not given in the two-dimensional visual field. Therefore man can deduce of what such a two-dimensional phenomenal world will consist. Similarly, the lower animal forms have a restricted sensuous receptivity and man can conjecture what characteristics of limited phenomenality such a one-dimensional phenomenal world would present.

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1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 138, p. 157.

For Ouspensky, there are four relations of consciousness to the external world, and four degrees or types of synthesis proceeding from four different functions of synthesis. As Kant has shown, the three-dimensional consciousness, man, synthesizes the sensible manifold in the same way as the lower animal, but also through conception, psychical receptivity. The two lower degrees of consciousness have two different degrees of sensuous receptivity: the one-dimensional consciousness synthesizes only discreet moments through sensation; the two-dimensional consciousness synthesizes different sensations in discreet perceptions of individual things through perception; the possible four-dimensional consciousness will synthesize the manifold of discreet concepts through both forms of receptivity, through intuition. Ouspensky carries Kant's theory of synthesis several steps further in generality of application. A specific type of synthesis at one level is shown to provide a clue to the process of synthesis in general in its application to diverse manifolds of different complexities.

At this point Ouspensky moves to consideration of the "logics" of the different degrees of consciousness. Unlike the Metaphysical Deduction of which this section forms the extension, the argument here is not a deduction of fewer or further categories for the lower or higher degrees of consciousness. Since these consciousnesses inhabit spatially different and incommensurable phenomenal worlds in which a variety of manifolds of intuition are synthesized in different ways, the concept belongs only to the psychical receptivity of the three-dimensional consciousness. The pure concepts of the understanding are the necessary conditions for the representation of the

three-dimensional object. They are rules for the ordering of concepts, and as such are valid for only the third-dimensional consciousness.

The "logics" of the one- and two-dimensional realms, and the "logic" proposed for the four-dimensional realm are used by Ouspensky to illustrate the transitional paradox which exists between levels of consciousness and the phenomenal worlds they cognize. This paradox results from the application to a phenomenal realm of a "logic" or form of synthesis inappropriate to it due to the incommensurability of these levels. The incommensurability as shown in the first argument is the factor which brings about this paradox or confrontation of one world for consciousness with another. Such a paradox is hinted at in the Antinomies of Pure Reason. Each "logic" belongs to its realm of synthesis and it cannot extend to the next degree of synthesis and its "logic" except by confronting it as its antithesis.

It is from these grounds that Ouspensky goes on to show the hypothetical conditions of paradox which would delimit a "logic" incommensurable with Aristotle and Bacon's logic of concepts which is applicable in the three-dimensional phenomenal realm. The antithesis of the logic based on noun value or particulars is the logic of the syllogism. The antithesis of the logic of syllogisms is the logic of the unity of all: Tertium Organum.

The outcome of such a logic is not unlike the pure concepts which are conditions of the representation of three-dimensional objects. Such concepts belong to the three-dimensional consciousness. However, what can be here so derived are concept-like rules for the ordering of intuitions of the fourth-dimensional phenomenal realm. The pure un-



schematized categories of the Metaphysical Deduction are not concepts, but rules for concept formation or rules for synthesis of the manifold. They are pure concepts without empirical admixture, the application of which lie in space and time. Synthesis of the fourth-dimensional phenomenal world is through intuition. The third canon of thought provides the rules for synthesis of intuitions. These will be concept-like in so far as they are rules or ordering principles, but not concepts since concepts order the world of three-dimensional phenomena in one spatio-temporal framework, and the higher logic orders intuitions of the four-dimensional phenomenal world in another spatio-temporal framework. They are the same in function but different in resulting structure of phenomenal realm.

Ouspensky's argument from empirical evidence, analogous to Kant's Objective Deduction, exhibits the phenomenal realm structured in this new spatio-temporal framework and synthesized by different rules for ordering the spatially larger manifold of experience. The possibility of such experience follows from the nature of higher consciousness as the experience of the three-dimensional phenomenal world follows from the necessary conditions of possible experience so grounded in Kant's system. In selected reports of mystical experience throughout recorded history, Ouspensky demonstrates that as Kant grounded three-dimensional phenomenality in the necessary conditions of any possible experience for three-dimensional consciousness, so Tertium Organum provides the grounds for any possible experience of a four-dimensional phenomenal realm for a four-dimensional consciousness, and also exhibits a direction of extension of Kant's system which leads to the possibility of an indefinite progression of dimensions.

How Tertium Organum Answers Kant's Critics

Ouspensky's new epistemological system suggests some answers to the criticisms of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason discussed in the first chapter. The systematic framework the Critique is extended to another empirical reality: Kant proves that the appearances which are reality for us are grounded in our forms of sensibility and the nature of our understanding. Ouspensky shows that if we apply our forms of sensibility differently and synthesize the manifold of intuition differently, then reality for us will be a different appearance. Ouspensky argues that this is a different and a higher appearance, an appearance which approaches reality more closely. A four-dimensional entity has been established as the reality of which any of its three-dimensional appearances is an appearance. A system of proximate realities is then set up, and marks the further division of objects into appearances of appearances, appearances, and "reality". This is the division of the phenomenal world which Dr. Burch sees as analogous to the division of the unknown reality of Hume into the phenomenal and noumenal realms by Kant.

To know the reality, rather than the appearance, in this sense of proximate reality, is to have knowledge infinitely greater in spatial content, in values, in significance.<sup>1</sup>

Such an extension enlarges the sphere of knowledge and leads to "a fuller, but never a final, knowledge".

It should be clear at this point that if Kant's Critique is seen as presenting a metaphysics of experience, then Ouspensky's ex-

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<sup>1</sup>  
G.B. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 266.

tension includes more experience within this metaphysics of experience. Also, if the Critique is seen as presenting first principles of a science of metaphysics, then Ouspensky's extension applies these principles in the another realm of empirical reality, while remaining within the limits of the system and maintaining its internal structures in tact.

Tertium Organum clearly refutes Weldon's position: that Kant provides a metaphysics of experience which proves Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics valid of objects. The mathematical argument in Tertium Organum and the emphasis placed on the identity of the axioms of Aristotle's logic and the axioms of mathematics clearly demonstrate that the extended metaphysics of experience provides a sphere in which the validity of Non-Euclidean geometry and Einsteinian relativity is proven. The possibility of extension beyond the fourth-dimension should yield proof of validity of further possible systematic interpretations of objects in higher realms. If it were the case that Kant produced a metaphysics of experience which entailed the validity of only certain scientific interpretations, then such an extension would not be possible on the same grounds of argument.

To rephrase this: if Kant had indeed confused his scientific model with that which he was setting out to prove from it, then the petitio principii which resulted from such an assumption of that which was to be proven would have resulted in a closed argument incapable of extension. It is, in virtue of the fact that Kant sets the grounds for a science of space, not the proof of one particular science of space. Kant has indeed proven that "there must be some body of synthetic pro-

positions a priori which has space as its object",<sup>1</sup> since Ouspensky has succeeded in proving that non-Euclidean geometry and Einsteinian physics are valid of objects in another realm of experience by the same argument.

However, Weldon might contend here that Ouspensky had also performed a petitio principii from his chosen model and assumed what he set out to prove. But then both Euclidean and Non-Euclidean, Newtonian and Einsteinian physics would be valid of objects, albeit the objects of different realms. If this is held, then there are surely two separate spaces and two separate objects, since Weldon sees this kind of argument as grounding a metaphysics of experience. There would then be two metaphysics of experience, rather than one which has been extended to two possible experiential realms. But if there are two metaphysics of experience, they must be species to some genus. The genus then would be the science of metaphysics with principles which extend to include two metaphysics of experience. This would be the metaphysica generalis for which Heidegger sees Kant as setting the grounds. Therefore, Ouspensky's extension serves to endorse Kant's claim to having aimed at and achieved in its entirety a scientific framework for metaphysics.

To proceed further in this vein, both Weldon and Körner hold that the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique is impossible: Weldon, because he sees a synthetic deduction from the premise of necessary unity of apperception as invalid since that premise is not pro-

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<sup>1</sup>  
R.P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, op. cit.,  
footnote #2, p. 45.

ven; Körner, because a schema's uniqueness cannot be proven by definition. Ouspensky's extension of the schematization of the categories into different spatio-temporal frameworks provides a number of specific and discreet "schemas": the perceptual "schema" at the second-dimensional level, the intuitional "schema" at the fourth-dimensional level. Tertium Organum illustrates different possible spatio-temporal frameworks, and presents proof that any of these will serve to ground in an objective world the synthesis appropriate to that world. This is to say that, a schema can be shown to be unique from another schema. Since each schematization at each different level of consciousness is for that level the only possible schema, it is unique in and for that level of schematization. The extension Ouspensky makes of Kant's theory provides these alternate schemas. The necessary grounds for the uniqueness of any schema is the incommensurability of that schematization of possible experience with that of any other level of consciousness proceeding in schematization from the basis of other forms of synthesis.

The extension serves to answer Körner on other grounds of contention. The schemata are not unique for any possible experience, but only for the specific kind of possible experience each schematizes. Ouspensky then provides another kind of possible experience and shows the concept-like quality of the rules for schematization which result in another set of "predicables". Ouspensky's extension begins "the easy task" of making a glossary of other pure derivative concepts of the understanding. That is to say, the pure concepts of the understanding when unschematized are rules for concepts. The empirical rules, for which they are rules, can exemplify a variety of empirical realms due

to the type of spatio-temporal framework applied in their synthesis according to these rules.

Tertium Organum applied Kant's method to another spatio-temporal framework and thus points out that Körner's position is based on a confusion of predicaments and predicables, pure concepts of the understanding and pure derivative concepts. The pure unschematized categories cannot be concepts in the usual sense. This is clear from the Critique: a concept is the representation of an object to consciousness and unites through synthesis matter and form; "concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind". Pure concepts are empty formal rules which become concepts only through schematization of objects in a spatio-temporal objective framework. That is, unless the pure concept as a formal element is applied to the realm of intuition, it remains an empty formula or incomplete function. Then in this sense, the pure concepts of the understanding are concept-like predicaments and the empirical concepts or schematized categories are predicables, or pure derived concepts.

It is the purpose of the Objective Deduction to show how objects must be conceived in order that judgments of the truth or falsity of the predication of concepts to these identified objects of reference, conceived of as related in a single spatio-temporal system, can be possible. Körner mistakes Kant's choice of one spatio-temporal framework as being the only spatio-temporal framework possible. Ouspensky's extension of Kant's method in another spatio-temporal framework clearly points out Körner's mistake of one set of predicables for the predicaments which are of higher order of generality and admit

of now proven derivations of other predicables as Kant suggested they would do:

from the little I have said, it will be obvious that a complete glossary, with all the requisite explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy task.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the contention set out above, Kant might well have said it was a necessary task.

To return to Weldon's criticism of the Transcendental Deduction, the results of the rejection of Kant's premise, the necessary unity of apperception, are shown by Ouspensky's analysis of two-dimensional synthesis, perception. As Wolff points out, without unity of apperception, the "I think" which can be added to any content of three-dimensional consciousness, no object would exceed a conglomerate of perceptions rather like "rabbits in a hat". He points out that Weldon does not want to deny our experience of objects, and therefore cannot deny the necessary condition of their being objects for us.

In his analysis Ouspensky shows that two-dimensional synthesis has exactly the quality of dissociation of rabbits in a hat since the concepts which synthesize objects as we know them are lacking at this level. Each individual discreet object is what it is and is unlike any other. If synthesis in one consciousness is denied, then experience as we know it is denied. Animals perceive but do not conceive; they therefore live in a world of phenomena incommensurable with phenomena as we know them. In terms of Ouspensky's extension, in deny-

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<sup>1</sup>

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., B 109, p. 115.

ing Kant's premise Weldon is denying three-dimensional consciousness entirely.

It is clear then that as an extension of Kant's system, Tertium Organum provides meaningful answers to some of the criticisms directed to the first Critique. Failing that, it at least presents good reason for a reformulation of these criticisms. The strongest function of the extension is that it shows by Kant's own method an alternate or expanded metaphysics of experience, and in so doing lends additional emphasis to Kant's stated aim:

I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limited - all in accordance with principles.<sup>1</sup>

Ouspensky's epistemology in Tertium Organum shows new sources which extend the limits of metaphysics, all in accordance with the principles of Kantian Critical Philosophy.

#### The Relevance of the Derived System

Ouspensky's epistemology is a valid application of Kant's method and principles, albeit one of an infinite number of possible extensions. It is particularly significant, however, because of the frequency of reports of what would otherwise be seen as aberrant perceptions by serious and thoughtful individuals throughout recorded history. The bulk of these reports alone should draw the attention of critical philosophers, since these experiences have not been integrated

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<sup>1</sup>

1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A xii, p. 9.



into the framework of epistemology proper.

Kant, in demonstrating the possibility of science, at the same time ruled out the possibility of mysticism. This is due to the claim of the mystics to knowledge of reality. This is impossible due to the distinction Kant makes between phenomena and noumena. Reality is just what Kant showed to be unknowable. However, as George B. Burch points out:

If the mystics have forms of intuition and categories of understanding different from those of other people, then no doubt the world must appear to them differently, but this peculiar world of the mystics is only a different appearance, a different phenomenal world.<sup>1</sup>

Ouspensky's epistemology gives meaning to the claim that the mystic's experience of a different phenomenal world is an experience of reality, in so far as reality is a higher appearance, or a higher spatial realm, not in so far as it is ultimate reality. Therefore, Ouspensky establishes by Kant's system the possibility of mysticism. The actuality of mystical knowledge is shown in his final argument from empirical evidence, the existence of which is well known.

The twelve conditions experience must meet in order to be experience of a higher dimension as laid down by the third canon of thought, are those empirical conditions reported by the mystics: the mystical experience is of a timeless, immaterial, unified, whole which is beyond reason and ineffable except through analogy with a lower realm, or artistic expression through metaphor. The steps of transition in this higher realm form a progress to higher and higher states and realms, and although the path begins in the world of common ex-

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<sup>1</sup>  
G.P. Burch, "The Philosophy of P.D. Ouspensky", op. cit., p. 266.

perience, it leads by degrees to the All.

If such reports were merely subjective flights of fancy, as Strawson pointed could be the case, then such subjective fictions would be merely "harmonious dreaming". However, harmonious dreaming on such a scale as the reports of mystics from all over the world and from a vast variety of cultures, over such an extended period of time, is dreaming which would suggest that another "harmonious dream" called the three-dimensional realm is perhaps another subjective fancy.

Once I dreamt that I was a butterfly, fluttering here and there; in all ways a butterfly. I enjoyed my freedom as a butterfly, not knowing I was Chou. Suddenly I awoke and was surprised to be myself again. Now, how can I tell whether I was a man who dreamt that he was a butterfly, or whether I am a butterfly who dreams that she is a man? Between Chuang Chou and the butterfly, there must be differentiation. [Yet in the dream nondifferentiation takes place]. This is called interfusion of things. (Ch. II)

Ouspensky suggests that in each subjective dream we approach more or less closely noumenal reality which is beyond all reach of knowledge.

In the Antinomies of Pure Reason Kant shows the outcome of the wrong employment of reason. Yet he remarks that such paradoxes are a necessary pushing of the limits of human understanding, the process by which human knowledge may grow:

Reason is compelled by a tendency in its nature to go out beyond the field of its empirical employment, and to venture in a pure employment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost limits of all knowledge, and not to be satisfied save through the completion of its course in [the apprehension of] a self-subsistent systematic whole.<sup>2</sup>

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Chang Chung-yuan, Creativity and Taoism, (New York: Harper, 1970), trans. from Ch. II, Works of Chuang Chou, p. 20.

2

I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., A798/B 826, p. 630.

The Antinomies suggest that Chuang Chou and the Butterfly are mutually exclusive. Reason in its three-dimensional employment stops here. Tertium Organum argues the logic of "interfusion of things" and a possible means of achieving approach to the "self-subsistent systematic whole" towards which reason continually strives.

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