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'BUILDING SOCIALIST BROADCASTING WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS'

**The Substance and Contradictions of China's Broadcasting Policy
in the Reform Era (1978 - 1994)**

Jiangang Wang

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

Communication Studies

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts at
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ABSTRACT

'BUILDING SOCIALIST BROADCASTING WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS'

The Substance and Contradictions of China's Broadcasting Policy in the Reform Era (1978-1994)

Jiangang WANG

The denouement of the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989 shocked the whole world. Complex social, political, economic reasons precipitated this tragedy. This thesis attempts to explore the tension between economic liberalization and political totalitarianism, and how it caused increasing contradictions in China's broadcasting system. 'Building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics' was created as a creed of faith to stifle broadcasting reform. The content, the ideological and theoretical bases of this concept will be disclosed. By using the integrative model of media and culture, broadcasting reform from 1978-1994 will be analyzed within the context of political and economic integration as a whole. The critique is mainly based on the libertarian theory of the press. Much attention is paid to the influence and determination of political power on broadcasting policy making.

The main points of this thesis are as follows: The Chinese Communist Party's monopoly of and autocracy in broadcasting has become an obstacle to broadcasting reform; has been shaken by the tremendous economic decentralization, and should be replaced by libertarianism so as to meet the people's demand for information and to regain its credibility.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis is the result of my efforts over the past three years. I have long aspired to express my opinions on the broadcasting policy of China. Six years of study in North America has provided me with abundant knowledge of communication research, and the possibility to put my ideas into words. So far, fortunately, this work may still be the first comprehensive study on China's broadcasting policy in the reform era.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to Lorna Roth, Amir Hassanpour, and Lindsay Crysler for their patient, careful readings and helpful advice that made this final version much different from the initial draft. Sincere thanks also to the following persons who, directly or indirectly, helped me to complete my degree study and this thesis. Among them are: James Lull, Bradley Greenberg, Tuanyu Lao, Hairong Li, Brian Lewis, William Gilsdorf, Mei Wu, Peter Jakubowicz, Michael Dancsok, and Patrick McDonagh.

Not all my points of view, needless to state, are agreeable to everyone. The thesis still has some shortcomings because of its limited length and the fact that this is a preliminary research. However, I hope this study can offer a few helpful ideas so that others may come up with more valuable ones.

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A Note on the Text

1. All translations from the Chinese, unless otherwise indicated, are by the author.
2. Chinese place names are given in accordance with the Chinese Postal Atlas and appear in anglicized forms.
3. Chinese personal names are given in accordance with the Chinese phonetic alphabet (pinyin) in their original order, with the family name preceding the given name, such as Deng Xiaoping. However, if a personal name used overseas is different from official form, the latter form will be used in this work.

I. INTRODUCTION

Just four months after the Tiananmen Square event in June 4, 1989, I greeted professor James Lull at the Beijing Airport.¹ This was his second visit to China to gather more supplemental material for the book, *China Turned On: Television, Reform, and Resistance* (1991), which he was in the process of writing. Instead of a conventional greeting, with emotion and bewilderment, he asked me "What has happened in China?" The question was not beyond reason. When he conducted an investigation for an international project in China in 1985, the country was imbued with vigor and brightness. But only four years later, this nation suffered great pain from the Tiananmen tragedy. The Chinese became reticent under political constraints. Not only Lull, but many people, inside and outside, were bewildered that this tragic event that happened while China was getting fruitful results from its economic reform.

1. 1. The Unbalanced Policies and Increasing Contradictions in China's Reform

There might be many reasons to explain why the students demonstrated, and why the movement ended in mass tragedy. It is possible to discern a number of themes,

¹ James Lull is a professor in the Department of Communication, San Jose State University at California.

including functional struggle and popular disaffection (Tsou, 1991; Dreyer, 1992), but more directly, the students desired political reform, the government's recognition of political rights as embodied in the 1982 constitution, and the end of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) monopoly on power. They showed their aspiration for political reform by holding up a banner with the words "No liberty, rather death". However, while economic reality compelled the government to abandon the central instruments of nonmarket governance, Beijing continued to insist on dictatorial control of the political system. This unbalanced development caused increasing contradictions in Chinese society. Therefore, we have to take into account the political-economic factors within society as a whole.

China embarked on economic reform in 1978. Undoubtedly, this reform has brought many great changes in economy, politics, and society, and also in peoples' lives and social values. Such changes elicited quite oppositional appraisals. While most opinions welcome and support the reform, there were also some critical sounds. A number of Western sinologists condemn everything that has transpired in China since the death of Mao. Bettelheim insisted that the present leadership has succeeded in "turning Marxism into its opposite" (1978: 79); Chossudovsky argues that the "post-Mao political project ... rehabilitated or 'restored' many features of the 'old' social and political order in existence prior to 1949" (1986: xii); Hinton used the term *Great Reversal* as the title of his critical book (1990).

Actually, China's reform itself had been full of contradictions since its beginning. The Party leaders attempted to rescue the state from what they called 'the disturbance of a

ten-year Cultural Revolution'² by making reforms, but they were not willing to give up their political hegemony and ideological orthodoxy. Indeed, the party leaders were so keen on economic development, even after the 1989 crisis, that the regime never gave up its economic priority. To explain this phenomenon, I will provide evidence to show that the Party's ultimate goal of reform, is to allow the socialist system to survive on the strength of economic success. It insisted on the 'Four Cardinal Principles'(四项基本原则)³: acceptance of the leadership of the CCP; adherence to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought; the practice of democratic centralism; and following the socialist road to ensure the 'Four Modernizations' (agriculture, industry, science, and defense) proceed in a predetermined way. The Party leaders wanted "to pursue a middle course, balancing two sets of potentially contradictory principles" (Tsou, 1991: 277).

The conflicts and contradictions among the 'four cardinal principles' and the 'four modernizations' have caused theoretical confusion and unbalanced development between economic and political reform. Theoretically, there were many aspects of Deng's new program that "run precisely counter to Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao. And how could one follow the socialist road when many of the directional signals appeared to be written in capitalist language" (Dreyer, 1992: 149)? In reality, the economic reform, on the one hand, has been encouraged by the government and accepted by the masses, and created a diversified economy and secularized society; The Open-door policy not only

² In June 1981, the Central Committee of the CCP identified the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that had occurred in China between 1966-1976 to have been an economic and political catastrophe. It "was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People's Republic." See *Resolution on CCP History, 1949-1981*, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1981) p. 32. Also see Appendix II, p. 150 & 153.

³ 'Four cardinal principles' laid down by Deng Xiaoping in 1978-1979 when the 'Democratic Wall' movement was suppressed. Originally, they were written into the Preamble of the 1978 Constitution. Deng sternly held on to these principles lest any rashness in China's reforms should lead to unrest.

imported advanced technologies and management skills from the West but also introduced Western thought to open people's minds. Political reform, on the other hand, including a multiparty system, parliamentary politics, and the freedom of speech and press, was only advocated by the intellectuals and has been silenced and suppressed frequently by the regime. The political control or repression coupled with the economic policies of modernization through reduced control and openness has created many problems for Chinese society. Emancipation, satisfaction, expectation, and exhilaration were concomitant with depression, indignation, suspicion, and disappointment during the reform. As Hinton concludes, the problems arose not only from "too much, too fast" on the economic reform, but from "too little, too slow" on the political reform (1990: 12).

Broadcasting is one of the important components in CCP's political structure. Its reform has gone through many difficulties and setbacks because of political coercion. Like most authorities in developing countries who believe that the special economic, political and social problems they face mandate governmental ownership of the media, the Party advocated broadcasting reform, but adhered to absolute control over broadcasting.

For example, the reconstruction of legislation has played an important role in the reform. China has made great efforts to strengthen its socialist legal system. Many laws and decrees were promulgated during past 20 years, from civil and property to bankruptcy and copyright laws. But China's Press Law and Broadcasting Act, discussed and drafted since 1987, have still not yet been enacted. It is hard to imagine that, while Canada has had its Broadcasting Act for 65 years,⁴ and Britain has modified its Royal Charter On

⁴ Canada passed its first statute, the Canada Radio Broadcasting Commission Act, in 1932, and modified it in 1936, 1958, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1976, and 1991. See Lorimer & McNulty, 1991, p. 167.

Broadcasting six times,⁵ such basic laws are slow in coming in China. The reason is quite simple: because they involve crucial political matters such as the rights of publishers and journalists, ownership of broadcasting, and freedom of speech and the press. These issues are still taboo subjects.

The Party leaders want to hold the broadcasting systems in their hands for the advantages that they offer. They are not allowed to change its mandate and essence. For the Party, the change in these aspects only means the loss of its control. Every attempt of political reform in the broadcasting field, including the draft of the press law and the broadcasting act, has been completely stifled since the repression of the democratic movement in the spring of 1989.

Such repression has placed the broadcasting reform at an impasse. According to the present General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin, "The purpose of [media] reform is to improve the service of journalism as a mouthpiece of the Party, of the government, and of the people, to play a positive part in the construction of socialist modernization."⁶ His tune was exactly the same as the Party's declaration before the reform. The purpose he emphasized was diametrically opposed to what the Chinese people and media personnel expected. The masses want the right to know, to speak, and to learn the true situation about reform. The media personnel desire to have more autonomy, to become more professionally distant from the party, and to create a pluralistic media system through the

⁵ The original charter went into effect in 1927. The last covers the years of 1981-1996. See Head, 1985, p. 71.

⁶ Jiang Zemin, '关于党的新闻工作的几个问题' (Several Questions Concerning the Party's Journalistic Work, November 28, 1989). In 中国新闻年鉴 (*China's Journalistic Yearbook*), 1990, p. 5.

reform. All these were advocated by libertarian doctrine of media theory in the West hundreds years ago.

The philosophy of liberalism developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries followed the geographical discoveries, and provided a new perspective for the minds of men. “The principle of libertarian philosophy aimed to free man from all outside restriction on his capacity to use his reason for solving religious, political and social problems” (Siebert, 1973: 43). The effects of libertarian philosophy on the status and function of mass media were its insistence on the importance of the individual, the reliance on his power of reasoning, and the concept of natural rights. Freedom of religion, speech and press became a part of it. This effect brought a transformation of the press from authoritarian to libertarian principles.

The libertarian theory of the press has had a long and arduous history. Some of the axioms of it have been shown to have limitations and have been criticized. Other advanced perspectives, such as the social responsibility theory have developed and updated the libertarian approach. In spite of such critiques, the libertarian principle has played a historical role in the West, and still maintains its theoretical and practical advantages in developing countries. In today’s China, the political system has long been dominated by the authoritarian approach. The open-door policy brought the country and its people an exposure to the world, and it may be compared with the geographical discoveries in the West.

Referring to the libertarian approach in my thesis does not imply that libertarianism can resolve all the political problems. But we must realize that the crucial problem for

China's media is the Party's autocratism. It is not the time yet to discuss 'negative or positive' aspects of people's freedoms as the social responsibility approach argues (Peterson, 1973: 93). There is still no freedom at all. It is understandable that China rejects the American model of broadcasting because of its private ownership and commercialization, but the mixed-ownership models in England, Canada and Japan have won the advantages of libertarian principles and functions. However, the libertarian approach should be adopted in the preliminary stage for China's media reform even though it has shown some shortcomings in today's democratic society. Libertarian media is still a minimum expectation for Chinese people.

In this study, I hope to achieve two objectives. Theoretically, China's case is significant for communication research. Some scholars consider that although a core of research findings has already helped us understand the relationship between the mass media and the society within which they operate, certain important questions have yet to be explored more carefully. For instance, what is the impact of a society's ideology on its mass media? Why do the mass media take different forms and structures within differing political contexts, economic systems, and historical-cultural settings? How are the production, distribution, and consumption of mass media content sharply influenced by certain conditions like China's totalitarian dictatorship?⁷ Finally, China insists on autocratic broadcasting policy which existed in the West hundreds of years ago, and seems incompatible with the modern information age. Which theory should be emphasized to

⁷ Some of these questions are posed by Mavin L. DeFleur & Sandra J. Ball-Rakeach, in *The Theories of Mass Communication* (New York: Longman Inc., 1989).

analyze it, libertarian approach or other more advanced ones? The exploration of China's broadcasting policy will provide sufficient evidence to answer the above questions.

Practically, this thesis may provide an additional answer to two issues that have perplexed people: the search for the fundamental reasons of the Tiananmen tragedy, and suspicions that China is becoming capitalist. For a long time, there have been very different appraisals of China's media policy. While some scholars gave positive evaluation to China's effective communication system which served overall national planning and goals (Lerner & Schramm, 1967) , many others held very critical points of view (Yu, 1964; Su, 1994; Wang, 1995; etc.). This study attempts to give an adequate evaluation of broadcasting reform, to see through the appearance of reform to get at the substance of the broadcasting system, and to distinguish positive and questionable policies. All these are still understudied areas in communication research referring to China.

1.2. A Brief Review of Literature on China's Media Reform

In recent years, especially after the Tiananmen Square repression in 1989, China has attracted more and more international attention. For many international scholars, modern China is still a *mystery* (Lull, 1991: ix; Gregor, 1995: 12), not only because of its reform and economic miracles but because of its whirling changes on politics and society. However, China seems to appear more often internationally in newly published social-

science books, especially in the discipline of political science, modern economic analysis, and communication studies.⁸

There is a rapidly accumulating body of literature describing and analyzing China's media reform.⁹ Writings on this theme have appeared in popular magazines, sinological study journals such as *Chinese Law and Government*, and academic periodicals such as *Gazette: An International Journal of Communication Studies*. The year 1994 could be regarded as a peak time of this sort of publication, when the *Journal of Communication* issued its special symposium on China's media reform, and a seminal book, *China's Media, Media's China* (Lee), came off the press.

Now, let us take a glance over these literature and contributions on Chinese media studies before starting discussion of broadcasting.

Some general works by international scholars have tried to outline China's media system, its reform and development. Most of these scholars pay attention to the press and its historic roles in China. With the limited knowledge of Chinese systems, their introduction to China's broadcasting system is usually very basic (Howkins, 1982; Bishop,

⁸ Here, I just take three examples on media studies:

(a) while Rowland Lorimer and Jean McNulty published their second edition book: *Mass Communication in Canada*, they use two instances to demonstrate the role of the mass communication in our modern society. One describes China's change and the Tiananmen tragedy accompanied with a well-known picture, a lone man standing in front of the column of tanks to block their path toward Tiananmen square. Another considered the Oka crisis in Quebec in 1990.

(b) Mowlana and Wilson's book, *The Passing of Modernity: Communication and the Transformation of Society*. While drawing on surprising events around the world, they mentioned China's case which "received worldwide attention everywhere". They also discussed China's media and development many times through the book.

(c) Graham Mytton's book on BBC first international audience research, *Global Audience: Research for Worldwide Broadcasting*. (London: BBC World Service/John Libbey & Company Ltd, 1993). A picture which recorded the demonstration during Beijing's democratic movement in 1989 was chosen as one of eight pictures on the cover.

⁹ In his symposium 'Continuity and Change in China's Media Reform', professor Leonard L. Chu makes a detailed introduction about research on China's media reform. See *Journal of Communication*, Summer 1994.

1989; Chang, 1989). However, studies by overseas Chinese scholars show more detail with updated information about the reform. The earlier work by Yu J.(1986), in which he focused on broadcasting, describes the news reform¹⁰ in Shanghai Television. Cheng (1987), the first to give a general view of China's television system, demonstrates the growth of Chinese television through the introduction of TV programming and its influence on Chinese society. Hong and Cuthbert examine the relationship between media reform and economic and political reforms by analyzing the factors generating the changes and the problems caused by the changes (1991). Hong also illustrates the change in China's TV program-imports over the past 30 years, showing that drastic changes have occurred in China's TV program component (1993). Lee's article shows the rapid growth of mass media and the roles of television and entertainment (1994). Based on a year-by-year chronological study, Chu (1994) undertakes a historical review of China's media reform. All these studies demonstrate the necessity, the procedures, and the progress as well as restrictions of the reforms.

A substantial body of literature concerns China's political situation and struggle. These studies observe the relationship between the media agencies and the governments, and try to show how the structural and operational reforms of media systems are determined and controlled by the political powers. The main topics usually focus on political functions of mass media, Party control, press freedom (Su, 1994, Polumbaum, 1994), and the interplay of politics and the mass media (Lee, 1990; Goldman, 1994; Dittmer, 1994). Some articles are concerned with economic triggers to political democracy and press freedom (Nathan, 1990; Lee, 1990-2). Huang examines the main

¹⁰ There is a detailed discription concerning news reform on page 30 - 31 of this thesis.

aspects of China's TV evolution in the post-Mao era and discusses how "the fundamental transformation of [the] broadcasting institution in China reveals dynamic, causal and contradictory relationships between the Party's fostering of broadcasting expansion for modernization and political control" (1994). Gan's article enriches the key debates on journalism and mass media, showing the current dilemmas of the Party's Communication theory and practice in the reform era (1994).

There are also some informed works that view the reform from sociological, anthropological, or philosophical perspectives. This cluster of scholars sees the changes of the broadcasting system as a part of a social transition. They believe that change is the inevitable outcome of economic development and cultural impact (Starck and Xu, 1988; Rosenbaum, 1992). An earlier cultural view of China's communication system was done by Chu (1988). Another very interesting study paints a daring picture of how the Chinese people opposingly decode the Party-media messages (Friedman, 1994). While most studies focus on the print media, Lull (1991) had his anthropologist's eyes on television throughout Chinese society. Based on his experience as a participant observer, he visited and talked with hundreds of Chinese families and interviewed some media officials in China. His unique work provides a comprehensive description of the role of television during the reform, and reveals how this popular medium changes Chinese society and its everyday life. In terms of audience research, Rogers and Womack introduced China's first audience survey in Beijing to international community of communication research (Everatt, 1985; Womack, 1986). Lau and Wang introduced to Western readers the First

National Survey of Mass Media Use in China's Underdeveloped Areas, which was also conducted for policy design, formation and implementation (1992).¹¹

All of these publications express different views and perspectives that highlight the most important elements, factors and issues. The discussion here cannot be exhaustive. Although the high number of studies may help us significantly to understand China's mass media and reform, policy research on China's growing broadcasting system is still an emerging academic area and remains somewhat fragmented. These writings just show a few details concerning this system: its structures, characteristics, roles in social and political life, and the changes, restrictions, and frustrations experienced during the reform.

Research on broadcasting policy, in my opinion, has become a central issue not only because of the popularity of broadcasting which has permeated through Chinese society, but because of the policy as "sets of principles and norms established to guide the behavior"¹² of the broadcasting system. Policy is a decisive factor in constructing a broadcasting system and determining the development and the future of this system. Since there have been few studies concentrated on this theme, much more needs to be done.

In addition, most articles emphasize the *changes* of China's mass media, its institutional adjustment, its relative autonomy, and its increasing influence in Chinese society. Unlike these studies, the present analysis also concerns the unchanging aspects of broadcasting policy. It is such unchanging aspects and their continuity that play a pivotal

¹¹ The survey was organized by the MRTF, and conducted in 1988 with a variety of goals. The sample covered 12 counties. 1,200 rural dwellers from 12 to 65 years old were interviewed to completed the standized questionnaires. Based data from this survey, 17 analyzing reports were published in a book *Broadcasting System and Rural Development in China*. (Beijing: China's Radio and TV Publishing House, 1989).

¹² Quated from *Reports of the Meeting of Exports on Communication Policy and Planning*. Paris: UNESCO 1972.

role and are of dubious intrinsic value to China's broadcasting policy, and also cause serious contradictions and endless controversies. I believe the unchanging aspects will become more prominent with the advancement of the reform.

To emphasize the unchanging aspects, I will outline some physical issues, such as the advancement of technology, and the extension and diversity of the delivery system. My discussion concentrates on the political and economic aspects of policy-making.

1.3. Methodological Remarks


Despite the growing body of literature, as I mentioned previously, studies on China's broadcasting system still are few. There are several obstacles: the changing climate of politics, the lack of resources in basic information, and obscurity in policy-making. The existence of these three factors has hindered policy research. This study attempts to overcome these three obstacles through appropriate analytical framework, widely collected sources, and personal experiences.

1) Using Integrative Theory as Analytical Framework

Generally speaking, policy-making in China is not carried out through a public legislative sequence, but by a secret procedure influenced by ideological, social, even factional concerns of the party, and affected by China's changing political climate. To examine the changing political climate and its influence on the mass media, to analyze the

unbalanced policy between political totalitarianism and economic liberalization, and to view the relationship between media and society, the integrative theory of media and culture may provide a systematic framework. As a macro-theory, the integrative approach considers that the media system operates in a certain political economic system. This political economic system is based on a more complicated system that consists of a world view, beliefs and culture. The integrative theory provides an easy-to-view relationship between ideological philosophy, political economy and media system as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The Integrative Model of Media and Culture



Source: Hamid Mowlana & Laurie Wilson. *The Passing of Modernity: Communication and the Transformation of Society*. 1990, p. 120. (Italics are mine)

In the integrative model, media is regarded as a dependent variable that is influenced by the economic and political system, which is defined as a sub-independent variable and

determined by deep-independent variables-- the world view, beliefs and cultural system which may be called ideological philosophy.

The universal significance of the integrative model is that it provides a general framework to show the position of media in society and illustrate the main composition of media systems. With the integrative model, it is easy to explain why the world broadcasting systems were built differently. Head characterized world broadcasting into three typical models: the U.S. *permissive*, the British *paternalistic*, and Soviet *authoritarian* (1985: 59). The first two broadcasting systems were created in the two democratic and capitalist nations. But U.S. broadcasting is a consumer driven system which relies on market forces more than on government supervision. British broadcasting puts more emphasis on people's needs by building its public system. It is hard to explain this difference by comparing their economic and political systems in integrative terms -- their influential sectors are the same. But their determined sectors are distinguishable: they have different world views, beliefs, and cultural traditions influencing their distinctive broadcasting systems. Comparatively, there is much more oppositional ideological philosophy between Western and socialist media. Schramm defined six aspects of such differences (see Figure 2 on next page).

In terms of this study, the major concern is the relationships between media and its influential sectors, and determined sectors as shown in the integrative model. The analysis demonstrates how the Party's ideology - world view, beliefs, and political culture -- as a determining sector, decides the essence and fundamental characteristics of China's broadcasting system, and why the economic variable, which defined as an influential sector

in the integrative model, can play only an indirect and potential role in broadcasting reform even though great changes have taken place in the economic infrastructure. Jessop explained: the 'non-economic system' has 'significant autonomous institutional logic' and 'significant independent effects on the economy' (1990: 79).

Figure 2. Six Differences Between the Socialist and Western Media System

	Soviet system	West system
The philosophies behind the two system	Marxist materialistic determinism and class struggle	the rationalistic, natural rights philosophy of the Enlightenment
The concepts of man	man as a mass, malleable, unimportant in himself, in need of Promethean leadership	man as intelligent, discriminating, able to purchase by himself in a "free market place of ideas"
The concepts of the state	a self-appointed dictatorship, conceived of as 'caretakers' of the people against untrue or misleading ideas	an elected democracy conceived of as governing best when governing least
The concept of truth	something to be derived by straining events through a ready-made theoretical sieve	something to be arrived at by argument and confrontation of evidence
The concepts of control	extreme and complete control by ownership, directives, censorship, review, criticism, coercion, etc.	the self-righting process of truth in the free market place, with the minimum of government control
The emphasis	on responsibility	on freedom

Source: Schramm, 'The Soviet Communist Theory of the Press'. in Siebert, Peterson & Schramm. *Four Theories of the Press*. p.145.

The integrative model can provide a framework to analyze broadcasting policy in combination with its political environment. China is undergoing a radical social change, its political climate changing quickly and unpredictably. As Lull observed, China underwent 'extreme ups and downs' within just four years (1991: ix). This turbulent situation has

been a challenge to communication scholars. Comparatively speaking, there are many random factors in China's broadcasting policy, and Western communication theory and practice can hardly be used to observe and explain China's media system.

By referring to the integrative theory, this thesis starts by examining an official concept: building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics, which can be regarded as a determining factor in China's broadcasting policy-making. It is the contents and political and practical implications of this concept that condenses the Party's world view, beliefs and conception of Chinese political culture, so as to determine the main features of broadcasting, including its development strategy, administrative patterns, financial structure, journalistic practices, and censorship standards.

2) Reference to a Wide-range of Documents and Sources

Another problem for policy researchers is the difficulty to access official information. As Schoenhals points out, it is "most significant, [that] the quality of research on communication within the CCP has remained low because scholars have been unable to access *key* sources (1991-92: 5. emphasis mine). The CCP has constructed an elaborate internal web of bureaucratic communication by issuing 'internal circulars' known in popular parlance as red-heads (红头文件) -- "a generic term that refers to the red ink used to print the words 'Document of the CCP...' across the top of the first page of each circular" (Schoenhals, 1992: 32). Such documents were circulated within the Party and called internal publications (内部发行).

There are two sorts of key documents on the party's broadcasting policy. One is issued by the Party's administrative bureau, distributed from top to bottom, such as circulars, bulletins and periodicals. Most of these circulars, not surprisingly, are issued by the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the Party committee of the Ministry of Radio, TV and Film (MRTF), and sometimes by the Central Committee. A large number of circulars carried many types of directives.

Another sort of publication is submitted by major media institutes. This kind of document usually contains some bad news such as disasters, or investigative reports on issues such as social problems, bureaucracies and corruptions. They are submitted to a high level of the party's committee, and are called 'internal references' (内部参考).

Both sorts of documents are classified with different secret levels. Access to them is a political or professional privilege for certain ranks of cadres in the party. The higher the class of degree, the less the readership. Nearly all of them are not accessible to ordinary Chinese citizens, let alone foreign researchers. For example, the *Broadcasting Editor's Daily* was edited by the General Editing Office of MRTF.¹³ This publication carried very detailed directives from the Party Central Committee and leaders, and was distributed to media institutions within the ministry. The vast majority of such internal publications are not accessible. Very few of them were obtained by foreign scholars.¹⁴

¹³ There are a few of issues of this publication introduced by Won Ho Chang; see *Mass Media in China: The History and the Future*, pp. 167-169.

¹⁴ Michael Schoenhals introduces *Propaganda Trends* (宣传动态), published weekly by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department as the official guide for the entire propaganda field. See 'Selection from *Propaganda Trends*, Organ of the CCP Central Propaganda Department', *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter 1991-92)

Demographic information on broadcasting are also difficult to find. There were almost no statistical numbers on China's broadcasting available before 1978. There were still no accurate numbers after 1978. One may find a lot of blank spaces in China's line in the tables of the international statistical source books, even in *UNESCO's Latest Statistics on Radio and Television Broadcasting* published in 1987. Chinese numbers listed in the *World Radio and TV Handbook* and in *China's Statistics Yearbook* are not quite identical. Table 1 demonstrates the uncertainty inherent in assessments of radio and TV receivers.

**Table 1. The Statistics on China's Radio and TV Receivers
As Shown in Three Source Books**

	Radio receivers (thousands)			Television Receivers (thousands)		
	UNESCO	Handbook	Yearbook	UNESCO	Handbook	Yearbook
1980	55,000	n/a	119,100	4,000	3,900	9,020
1982	65,000	13,000	163,010	6,000	9,010	19,500
1983	70,000	13,000	214,650	7,000	9,500	36,110
1984	n/a	13,000	223,730	n/a	9,700	47,630

Source: The numbers from UNESCO are abstracted from two tables: "Numbers of Sound Broadcasting Institutions," and "Numbers of Program Services and Annual Revenue of Broadcasting." See UNESCO, Division of Statistic on Culture and Communication. *Latest Statistics on Radio and Television Broadcasting*. Paris: UNESCO, 1987. The numbers from *Radio and Television Handbook* appeared in its 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984 editions. London: Billboard Publications Inc. The number from the yearbook are listed in *China's Statistical Yearbook* 1988, p. 714 (1980); 1983, p. 508 (1982); 1988, p. 714 (1983-84)

Note: According to *World Radio and TV Handbook*, all numbers about China are estimated.

For foreign scholars, secret documents and unreliable statistics have made research on China's broadcasting policy very difficult. Comparatively, I gained more opportunities to access both 'key sources', including many internal circulating documents. I had twenty

years working experience related to China's mass media communication.¹⁵ I have paid attention for a long time to the open publications in Chinese dealing with broadcasting policy, its principles, functions, and operations. More recently, five years of study in North America have provided me with knowledge of communication theories which led me to realize that further exploration into China's distinct broadcasting practice and approach would be beneficial in terms of developing an appropriate Chinese communication theory.

Methodologically, this thesis is based on documentary research as well as direct observation, and personal experience and memories. The study focuses on the general concept -- building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics --, and relative explanations, published in Chinese. This thesis will define the meaning of this concept not only in a pragmatic manner, but, is designed to be a 'text-in-context' study, so the analysis will be built within an integrative framework, and extends to the historical placement of the concept and its social context.

To remedy the lack of official reference material as mentioned above, I have drawn not only on published sources, but on my participant observations in the broadcasting institutions in China, and recent conversations with Chinese visiting scholars in Canada. I may "approach the text 'experientially', attempting to construct a compelling argument about the implication" (Condit, 1990: 247) of the conception based on my own educated responses and findings in several research surveys undertaken in China. My description

¹⁵ In 1975, I was trained as an amateur correspondent for the *Beijing Daily* and Beijing People's Radio Station. I was educated with the Party's media theory and knowledge for four years in the Department of Journalism of People's University. After getting my B.A. degree, I was hired by the Department of Policy Research of the CCP's Municipal Committee in Beijing. Two years later, I quit this job and transferred to my old university as a teacher in the area of broadcasting. All these jobs gave me opportunities to access some internal publications.

provides a brief overview of how the Chinese leaders and professionals think about broadcasting, what efforts and controversies have had impacts on these modern media, and what new policies were adopted in the reform period to meet China's new goals.

As qualitative research, the principal part of the critical analysis will demonstrate the incompatibility between the fundamental changes of infrastructure and the restricted variation of broadcasting policy. Meanwhile some arguments will be based on the data and facts available, and bring my study into the grand debates about communication theories.

The discussion begins with a description of the reform background. Chapter Two describes the reform procedure, and gives a brief introduction to the concept. Chapter Three exposes the principles and restrictions of broadcasting reform. Chapter Four examines the major impetus of the economic reforms and its challenges to the broadcasting structure. Following this, Chapter Five emphasizes the theoretical, ideological issues and the Party's political control over broadcasting. All these analyses will reveal the momentum and restrictions of broadcasting reform. One will see how the ideological philosophy as an independent variable determines and blocks broadcasting reform, and intensifies inherent contradictions within broadcasting systems. In the last chapter, the static integrative model will be modified to a dynamic view so as to conclude that the economic sector will be the potential force undermining the Party's monopoly on broadcasting.

II. THE CONCEPT OF 'BUILDING SOCIALIST BROADCASTING WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS'

China initiated its economic reform in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Congress of the CCP in 1978. Since then, the CCP has shifted the focus of its work from class struggle to the modernization of China's economy, sciences and technology. Broadcasting became imperative to serve these agendas, because the reform "demanded a more efficient system of mass communication that can provide more timely information and more diverse entertainment to enrich people's cultural life" (Yu, 1990: 86). As one of the most remarkable consequences of the reform, China's broadcasting system has changed greatly.

But do the changes mean that the progress of the broadcast system has kept a synchronized pace with economic reform and people's demands? The answer is absolutely not. The Party raised the concept of 'building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics', and adhered to it as a political boundary so as to ensure that broadcast reform went along with the Party's designs. This chapter will outline the growth of the broadcasting system, and the tortuous process of its reform. This introduction will provide the background to understanding the origin and the implications of the official concept, which will also be explored in this chapter.

2.1. The Revival and Boom of China's Broadcasting System

In this section, I demonstrate the demographic and technological changes of China's broadcasting, and show what policies were promoted by the CCP during reform.

Radio broadcasting was introduced into China by foreign capital as early as 1923. In the following decade, dozens of broadcasting stations were established by Japanese occupiers, Chinese warlords, and the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) government.¹⁶ The CCP established its first radio station in Yanan, the revolutionary headquarters, on September 30, 1940, when China was involved in the anti-Japan war. Since then, the CCP has recognized the significance of this kind of modern communication. The Central Committee of the CCP repeated the importance of broadcasting in its documents.¹⁷ Before taking power in China, the CCP created almost 40 radio stations. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, radio broadcasting was developed into a nationwide network through air, wire, and loudspeaker systems. However, the radio stations did not number more than 90 before the reform in 1976.

The development of China's television system underwent twenty years of difficulty after three TV stations were created in Beijing, Shanghai, and Harbin in 1958. The difficulties first came from the national economic problems during 1960-63, which stopped the technical development of TV completely for several years. Then, beginning in 1966,

¹⁶ See 当代中国的广播电视 (*China Today: Radio and Television*), Book One, pp. 7-9. For a brief English introduction, see Won Ho Chang, *Mass Media in China: the History and the Future*, p. 152.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 16-17.

the ten-years of the Cultural Revolution raised havoc with the national economy.

Television did not become a common household item until 1980, when only 30 percent of the population could access it.¹⁸ At that time, although color TV programs could be sent to twenty-seven provinces by a microwave network,¹⁹ viewers in major cities could watch only 2 channels, and most provincial TV stations had very little ability to produce their own TV programming. Each of them usually produced a dozen hours of programming per year. Even China's Central Television Station (CCTV), would only broadcast 2 or 3 hours each day in 1979.²⁰

Driven by the reform momentum, China's broadcasting system developed very rapidly during the 1980s. The number of radio and TV stations, transmitting and relay stations, and low power relay stations all increased sharply (see Table 2 on next page).

Table 2 shows that during the past 16 years, the number of radio stations has grown 11 times, and the number of TV stations is 18 times what it was before the reform. A nation-wide TV broadcasting network was initially formed during 1978-1983 through thousands of microwave relay stations. TV news programs became an important information source. Many kinds of programs appeared on the screen, such as educational, health, sports, service, arts and variety shows. TV drama production also flourished. One hundred and three TV dramas were produced in 1980. This number was equal to that of

¹⁸ Dong Lin, Vice Director of the Central Broadcasting Administration Bureau, 'A Speech at the Meeting of Radio and TV Developmental Planning', Feb. 25, 1980. In 广播电视工作文件选编 (*The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*), Vol. 1, p. 267.

¹⁹ There were 29 provinces in China before the 1980s. Two provinces, Xinjiang and Tibet, could not receive the central TV signals through the microwave network.

²⁰ Zhang Xiangshan, the director of the Central Bureau of Broadcasting Administration (CBBA), 'A Speech at the First National Conference of TV Program', Aug. 26, 1979. In *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, pp. 217-29.

the nine years before the Cultural Revolution, from 1958 to 1966. The number rose to almost 1,000 in 1984.²¹

Table 2. The Development of Broadcasting Stations in China (1978 -1993)

Year	RADIO				TELEVISION			
	Radio Stations Number	Growing (%)	Trans. Stations Number	Growing (%)	TV Stations Number	Growing (%)	Trans. Stations Number	Growing (%)
1978	93				32			
1979	99	6			38	18		
1980	106	7			38	0		
1981	114	8			42	11		
1982	118	3.5			47	12		
1983	122	3.3			52	10.6		
1984	167	36.9	556		93	78.8	9,708	
1985	213	27.5	568	2.1	202	117.5	12,159	25
1986	278	30.5	599	5.5	292	44.6	15,177	24.8
1987	386	38.8	624	4.2	366	25.3	17,570	15.8
1988	461	19.4	642	4.1	422	15.3	19,876	13.1
1989	531	15.2	655	2.9	469	11.1	22,139	11.4
1990	635	19.6	687	4.9	509	8.5	24,713	11.6
1991	724	14.0	706	2.8	543	6.7	28,479	15.2
1992	812	12.2	711	0.7	586	7.9	32,643	14.6
1993	987	21.6	716	0.7	684	16.7	35,880	9.9

Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 1985, p. 601 (1978-83); 1986, p. 680 (1984-85); 1988, p. 853 (1986); 1989, p. 776 (1987-88); 1990, p. 739 (1989); 1992, p. 730 (1990-91); 1994, p. 654 (1992-93).

Television signals reached just 45 percent of the population in 1980; this percentage had jumped to 82 in 1993.²² At the same time, TV receivers became a popular household item. In rural areas, there were 0.4 TV sets per 100 household in 1980, but this

²¹ *China Today: Radio and Television, Book Two*, pp. 17-20.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 217. Also see *China's Statistical Yearbook* (1994), p. 654.

number had increased to 69.2 in 1993. In urban areas, there were 17.2 color TV sets per 100 households in 1985; eight years later, this number had reached 79.5.²³ (see Table 3)

Table 3. The Growing Number of Radio and Television Receivers (millions)

Year	Radio Receivers	TV Receivers	Year	Radio Receivers	TV Receivers
1978	75.46	3.04	1986	253.9	92.14
1979	n/a	4.85	1987	260.67	116.01
1980	119.1	9.02	1988	261.97	143.44
1981	149.33	15.62	1989	262.26	165.93
1982	163.01	19.50	1990	251.23	185.46
1983	214.65	36.11	1991	233.99	206.71
1984	223.73	47.63	1992	215.95	228.43
1985	241.81	69.65	1993		

Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 1988, p. 714 (1978, 1980); 1981, p. 450 (1981); 1983, p. 508 (1982); 1988, p. 714 (1983-87); 1994, p. 246 (1988-92). China Today, Radio and Television, Book Two, p. 216 (1979).

Although the amount of radio receivers declined after 1989, the total number of TV sets were continually increasing. The TV audience has extended to 975 million viewers, 82.3 percent of the country's population. In a broad sense, the maturity of China's broadcasting industry was a partial outcome of the reform principles. Precisely, its growth was encouraged by the changes of the structural policy on broadcasting development.

²³ *China's Statistical Yearbook, 1994. p. 241.*

2.2. The Winding Process of Broadcasting Reform

In tandem with the reforms in the economic and political sectors, China's broadcasting reform could be divided into five phases characterized by their emphasized themes: resurgent period, journalistic reform, great development, political reform, and semi-commercialization. Each phase focuses on a given subject according to the general principles of reform policy as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The Phases of Broadcasting Reform in China's Overall Reform

Phases	Period	Starting Mark	National Reform	Broadcasting Reform
Resurgent period	Oct. 1976 to 1978	The ultra-leftist 'Gang of Four' was removed from power	Clear away the confusion, and its policies. Emancipate the mind	Rethink the nature and character of the party's mass media.
Journalistic reform	1979 to 1983	The 3d Plenary Session of 11th Conference of CCP	Commune system was replaced by household contracts	News reform such as: time effectiveness, writing style.
Great development	1984 to 1987	The Eleventh National Broadcasting Conference	Urban economic reform started, the Party's central power dispersed	Encouraged local government to build radio and TV systems
Political reform	Oct. 1987 to 1989	The Thirteenth National Conference of the CCP	Political reform, such as multi-candidate voting, publicity.	Press freedom, editor's rights, draft of an Act of Broadcasting and Press Law.
Commercialization	1989 to 1994	Crackdown on the pro-democratic movement	Economic reform was continually boosted, political suppression was resumed.	Restored tight censorship, turned to semi-commercialization

Source: Compiled by author.

Figure 2 provides an overview on the procedure of broadcasting reform combined with the overall national reform. Its track reflects that, to adapt to the reform trend, a series of adjustments on broadcasting structure were made to meet the demand for new situations and new strategies. In the first four phases, the reform went from surface to depth, developed step by step, even though the path was tortuous. But this trend suddenly veered from its course. After the suppression in 1989, broadcasting was forced to stop its search for editorial autonomy, and turned to the commercialization process and the Party tightened its control.

Figure 2 sums up the mainstream in each of the phases, but it does not imply that each phase can be isolated from the other. In fact, some reforms run through every phase, such as journalistic reform; some phases are still in the process of developing, such as political reform and commercialization. Since this thesis is organized thematically, rather than chronologically, it seems necessary to have a brief introduction of each phase to help the reader to make sense of the whole reform procedure. An outline of each phase will also give a concentrated description of each kind reform. By doing so, the reader may find it easier to follow the themes throughout this thesis.

Phase 1. Resurgent Period (1976 - 78)

During the period of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and the control of the leftist ‘Gang of Four’ between 1966-1976, broadcasting was defined as a ‘tool of proletarian dictatorship’. Broadcasting news was flooded with political concepts and slogans. Even

though 50 percent of the time was scheduled with art programming,²⁴ most programming time was filled with revolutionary songs, dances, 'Eight model plays',²⁵ and a few revolutionary films.²⁶

China entered its resurgent period in the late 1970s after chairman Mao Zedong died and the ultra-leftists of the 'Gang of Four' were arrested in 1976. The predominant concern was to restore the morale and dynamism of the Chinese people. Since Hua Guofeng, who was appointed by Mao, was duty-bound to preserve Mao's legacy, the party elite advocated a 'Mind Emancipation' campaign to revise Mao's class struggle theory. They also advocated 'seeking truth from facts' to criticize the dogmatism on Marxism.²⁷ The major mistakes made in Mao's era were addressed. Hundreds of thousands of individual verdicts were reversed. Many people who had been exiled to remote provinces since the 1950s were able to return to their homes. The focus of the Party's work shifted from class struggle to economic recovery.

Broadcasting was no longer recognized as 'the tool of proletarian dictatorship'. Radio tried to change from simply 'voice-copying' the newspaper to strengthening news reporting. The revival of TV started with the lifting of the ban on some films that were produced before the Cultural Revolution, and even before China's liberation in 1949. The term 'comrade' as a traditional revolution greeting and a 'glorious title' in news

²⁴ Zhang Xiangshan, 'A Speech at the Symposium of Journalistic Work', March 15, 1979. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, p. 181.

²⁵ The 'Eight Model Plays' were the only theatrical works performed on screen and in the theater. These plays were approved by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, because of their revolutionary elements such as their emphasis on politics and class struggle. The Eight Model Plays include six Beijing operas and two ballets. For more detailed introduction, see Li Kwok-sing, *A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China*, p. 6.

²⁶ See *China Today: Radio and Television, Book Two*, p. 13.

²⁷ Dreyer called the period from 'Gang of Four' was removed in 1976 to when Deng replaced Hua in 1978 as an 'interregnum period', and gives a more detailed introduction to it. See June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, pp. 141-151.

broadcasts was replaced by 'good evening'. Not long after, a variety of broadcasting programming was initiated into the radio service. TV drama re-appeared on the screen. Both radio and TV stations began gathering their own news.

Phase 2. Journalistic Reform (1979 - 83)

Deng Xiaoping, who had been expelled two times from the party's top post because he insisted on the priority of economic development over class struggle, took power back with the growing force of reformers in the party. Deng declared the 'Reform and 'open-door' policies in 1978.

The reform began with the dismantling of the commune system in the countryside, to be replaced by household agriculture, in what was called the 'Productive Responsibility' policy, which was symbolized by the contract between the government and the peasants. The state rented land to the peasants. The only responsibility for peasants was to hand over a contractual amount of agricultural products to the state. In factories, the government authorized managers to retain a portion of their profits and to pay bonuses to workers. Political activities were ignored because they were time-consuming and irritated the workers. In cities and small towns, small private enterprises had become numerous.

Broadcasting was required to make concerted efforts in relation to national modernization. Its reform began with the changing foci of the news service in 1980: paying more and more attention to economic news and information, reducing and modifying common reports about official activities, adding some social news and critical news, and setting up broadcasters' own comments on current affairs. These tactics had

news, and setting up broadcasters' own comments on current affairs. These tactics had been adopted as the mainstream of broadcasting reform. In the following years, not only the content, but the format of broadcasting news was also modified to improve the news. On-the-scene field reporters appeared in the news; TV reporters learned to use more synchronized live sound in their reports; magazine-formatted TV programs had been adopted as an advanced news program.

Phase 3. Great Development (1984 - 1987)

The reform accelerated the development of broadcasting institutions. Many new agencies were established, such as the Radio and TV University²⁸ and the Broadcasting Publishing House. The first academic periodical of broadcasting, the *Journal of China's Radio and Television*, began publishing in 1982.²⁹ China's broadcasting system had been administered by the Central Bureau of Broadcasting Administration (CBBA) since 1949, which was responsible to the State Council. With the new developments in broadcasting, this administrative body was elevated to a ministerial level, re-named as the Ministry of Radio and Television in 1982. This agency was later to become the Ministry of Radio, Television and Film (MRTF) which includes the film industry, previously under the Ministry of Culture. Meanwhile, the policy research office was also initiated.

²⁸ In February 1979, an official notification was issued from the State Council, named 'Approving and Transmitting the Working Report of Ministry of Education and the Central Bureau of Broadcasting Concerning to found a TV Broadcasting University'. From then on, this university got into operation and provided general tele-courses throughout the country. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, p. 3.

²⁹ See *China Today: Radio and Television*, Book one, p. 536.

In order to extend TV programming into rural areas and inland provinces to meet the increasing popularity of TV receivers, the CBBA announced at the Tenth National Broadcasting Conference in 1978, that it would give priority to TV development.³⁰ But in the following years, the central government realized the scarcity of funds to extend the transmitting system into all counties. It became necessary to attract local participation in investment to accelerate the popularity of TV systems. Under the previous policy, there was not enough incentive for the city and county leaders to invest money into the TV system because they were unable to get permits to build local television centers. So the local governments spent money on transmitting systems only for relaying central TV signals. Accordingly, five years later, the MRTF launched a new policy in the Eleventh National Broadcasting Conference in 1983 to allow cities and counties to build their own local production centers. The new policy was called the 'complex programming coverage from four administrative level stations'. It meant that, from then on, not only state and provincial governments, but city and county government were also allowed to build their program production centers.³¹

This new strategy had two expected goals: for underdeveloped areas, it might attract local leaders to develop their own TV networks, and then central TV programming could draw support from them to reach more local audiences; for developed areas, the local audience could receive the programs not only from the central and provincial stations, but also from their local production centers.

³⁰ The conference was held in October 1978, fourteen years after the last conference because of the interruption of the Cultural Revolution. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, pp. 344-389.

³¹ This strategic change was written in 'An Outline of Report on Broadcasting Work'. There will be further details about this important document on page 46 and Note 59 of this thesis.

This new policy generated an amazing boom in broadcasting systems. The average growth rate of radio stations within the following four years reached 33.4 per cent. TV stations sprang up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. The average growth rate was as high as 66.6 percent during the next four years (see Table 2 on page 22). The most notable year was 1985; two years after the new policy was issued, 109 new TV stations were built, more than the total number during the previous twenty-seven years.

Phase 4. Political Reform (1987 - 89)

After the reform was inaugurated, broadcasting agencies were trying to avoid blatant propaganda overtones and were cautiously constructing a balance between being totally submissive to the ideological organs of the Party and more audience-oriented mass media.

Up until the mid-1980s, further liberalization of the economy depended upon political reform. It was becoming clear that in a few key areas, the political system must be revised if the party wanted economic reform to continue. Political reform meant things like separation of the party and government, more participation by experts, academics and non-communist politicians in government, and giving people the right to elect and to speak. The General Secretary of CCP, Hu Yaobang, promoted political reform and relaxed the Party control on the mass media. But he encountered strong resistance from orthodox ideologues within the Party. He was accused of being too soft on liberals. Conservatives blamed him on losing ideological control. The student demonstrations at the

end of 1986, a precursor to the 1989 democracy movement, gave conservatives a reason to force him to resign in 1987.

His successor, Zhao Ziyang, however, did not stop the effort of political reform and advocated political publicity. For a long time, policy-making had been the party leaders' secret. Only a handful of leaders knew precisely how and why decisions were made. Such secretiveness made it almost impossible for the masses, or even other leaders, to know who said what, upon what information decisions were based, and what alternatives were possible (Ogden, 1995: 272). To break through this secrecy and elitism, the mass media were asked to become a public forum. Therefore, media reform became a branch of political improvement and a key issue of social topics for the time.

In 1988, a survey of 200 high-ranking officials and intellectuals in Beijing showed that 62 percent of them were not satisfied with the existing media system.³² Another survey in March found that 87.7 percent of the media personnel did not agree with the Party's control and management of the media.³³ A senior journalist summed up the crucial problems of the partisan media: it lacked information, printed untrue stories, had a single voice, and evaded critical questions.³⁴ The journalists called for solutions to these problems by journalistic reform, which included giving more autonomy to media institutes, drafting and enacting a press law, separating the Party from the daily news production,

³² This survey was conducted by the Public Opinion Institute of the People's University. 200 high-ranking officials responded to the questionnaires. 34.5 per cent of them were ministers or higher. See The Public Opinion Institute, 'Prospects for the Coming Year of Dragon (1988) from Notable Figures in Beijing'. in Chen & Er (eds.) 中国传播效果透视 (*The Perspective on Communication Effects in China*), p. 103 & 110.

³³ The Public Opinion Institute of the People's University, 'A Survey on the Attitude of the Media Personnel to the Journalistic Reform'. in *ibid.* p. 177.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

casting away the emphasis on the party's journalistic theory, renewing the concept of news, respecting the facts in the report, and creating nonpartisan newspapers.

Some of these appeals were adopted by the radical party leaders. In the 13th Congress of the CCP in 1987, information policy was listed in the Party's agenda as an important part of political reform. A new principle stressed media role on dialogue between government and people. It was declared: the important issues should be communicated to the people, the important policies should be discussed with the people.³⁵ The term *transparency*, substituted for Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost*, was used in the Congress and then spread everywhere.

Under the new principle, the production of news became more professional, which meant to 'report the facts of the day' (Siebert, 1973: 61)³⁶. Chinese people could learn about the bright and seamy sides of society, about agricultural harvests as well as hardships. The debates on some sensitive ideological subjects, such as a nation-wide vote in elections, and freedom of speech and organization, were also discussed in the mass media during this period. But the contest between radical reformers and conservatives tragically ended up with the crackdown on the student movement in 1989. Since then, the post-Tiananmen square leadership has circumscribed economic reform and minimized political change. The leadership has given up on the attempts at political liberalization advocated by Hu and Zhao since the mid 1980s.

³⁵ See *The Political Report of the 13th Party Congress*. Beijing Review Press, 1987, pp. xv-xvi.

³⁶ Although the libertarian concept of objective reporting has been severely criticized we must admit that, it is a progress from the authoritarian press. It is still useful in China's case.

Phase 5. Commercialization (1989 - present)

During the reform, a series of new economic policies had been initiated in the broadcasting system. The basic change was that financial support came from a variety of places, not only from government funds as before, but also from business revenue. After the Tiananmen suppression, broadcasting reform drifted off its course and was narrowed only to the economic track. Many provincial radio stations divided their productive sections into affiliated stations that were responsible for their own financial budget. The broadcasting system became more commercially driven. These economic changes and consequences will be discussed in detail in Section Three of Chapter Four.

Commercialization brought energy to the broadcasting system. TV advancement in the 1990s was directed toward cable and satellite systems. Since 1993, there have been more than 600 cable TV companies operating under licenses. Approximately 30 million families are connected to them.³⁷ People who live in major cities like Beijing can receive twelve channels including three cable channels. By 1993, there were 54,084 satellite ground stations in operation.³⁸ With its extended audience, the increase in TV set ownership, and other technological changes, China's broadcasting programming has become more varied and colorful, more entertaining and audience oriented.

From the above description, one can see the drastic revival and boom of China's broadcasting during the reform era. But looking through the political aspects of the reform, it is hard to find such optimistic changes. Instead, it confronts the ideological Puritanism of the conservatives. The relative flexibility on broadcasting reflects the relative

³⁷ Liu Xianri and Xia Xiaolin, 'The Cable TV is Reaching You.' 人民日报 (*The People's Daily*), Dec. 14, 1993.

³⁸ See *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1994, p. 624.

health of the reform, and tightened control always signals some kind of power struggle or political controversy. The whole process presented various restrictions to block the path of reform because it always linked to overall reform and the Party insisted on its traditional ideology, broadcasting must remain the 'mouthpiece' of the Party and its ideological apparatus. The crucial problems in political reform were still unresolved.

It is not difficult to understand this phenomenon. According to the integrative theory, economic and political systems are influential sectors of the media. Their changes may influence the media system. But the ultimate factor determining the basic feature of broadcasting is ideological philosophy. In China's case, the changes only take place in economic systems, one of the sub-independent variables. The ideology, as deep-independent variables, is under conflict, and the old one is still in the dominant position. Therefore, the broadcasting reform was unable to move forward in such unchanging political environment.

What ideological philosophy did the Party hold? Why do I say this system has not changed and still dominates the broadcasting system? The answers follow in the next section by examining the concept of 'building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics'.

2.3. The Origin and Implication of 'Building Socialist Broadcasting With Chinese Characteristics'

China's reform took place in the post-Mao era as well as the final stage of the Cold War between the East and West. Chinese leaders confronted a dilemma from the very

beginning: on the one hand, they realized the failure of a command economy and tried to recover from economic backwardness by accepting a market economy; on the other hand, they still wanted to adhere to a socialist system by excluding the capitalist values that are combined with the market economy. This dilemma caused endless controversies, and struggles permeated through the reform. Deng created the formulation, 'Building socialism with Chinese characteristics,' to dispel this dilemma. Then it was extended to broadcasting: the concept of 'building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics' was created as the blueprint for broadcasting reform. This section elaborates the creation of both concepts and defines their complexity within the political economy.

1) The Genesis of Deng's Formulation

The motive of the reform was to accelerate economic development. Over the past decades before the reform, the CCP, as the government body, controlled most of the investment funds and directly or indirectly administered all economic enterprises, including factories, farms, and commerce. The state controlled interactions between enterprises through systems of material allocations and price setting. Also, it eliminated a labor market by assigning life time jobs to urban school graduates. It also allocated housing in the cities.³⁹

Economists inside and outside argued that China's command of the economy had serious inefficiencies. The post-Mao leaders accepted this analysis. Actually, the ten years

³⁹ For a more detailed introduction, see Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.). *State and Society in China: The Consequences of reform*, pp. 23-27. Introduction.

of disturbance of the Cultural Revolution damaged China's economy very seriously.⁴⁰ The reform leaders were very anxious about China's economic performance. Deng Xiaoping compared China unfavorably to the global experience:⁴¹

In 1980, our per capita GNP was only about US \$250, and today it is just a little over 400, which puts us behind 100 countries in the world. By the end of the century when we become well off, the per capita GNP will only have reached US \$800-1,000.⁴²

Deng wanted to save the nation from 'the edge of economic collapse'. But initially, he had no master plan for the reform except his pragmatic sense that 'Black cat, white cat, as long as it catches mice, it's a good cat.'⁴³ To accelerate economic development, the party adopted the commodity economy and sophisticated Western technologies, and even absorbed foreign capital and managerial skills.

In China's contemporary history, economic development has been a goal shared by virtually the whole of the Chinese elite for nearly a century because of its crucial importance in consolidating China's independence in the face of foreign pressure. Deng Xiaoping formulated this question to the Party:

The magnitude of the influence we exercise in the world affairs depends on the

⁴⁰ In the first two years of the Cultural Revolution, the total output value of industry and agriculture had declined 13.4 percent. By the close of the Maoist period, the economy, in the estimate of the Chinese themselves, was on the 'brink of bankruptcy'. See James Gregor, *Marxism, China, and Development*, pp. 84 & 103.

⁴¹ 'Deng on Recent Events in China'. *Beijing Review*, No. 31 (March 30, 1987), p. 34.

⁴² According to a World Bank report, China's GNP per capita in 1980 was 290 US\$. See World Bank, *World Tables*, 1992, (The John Hopkins University Press) p. 15.

⁴³ This is Deng's well-know metaphor. He used this folksy saying in 1962 to suggest the party putting economic development in priority when China was in economic hard times. His original meaning was that whatever systems, central planning or commodity, which can promote economic growth, should be accepted. But this saying became a bullet used by Mao to attack Deng during the Cultural Revolution. For a detailed explanation, see Kwok-sing Li, *A Glossary of Political Terms of the PRC*, p. 12.

magnitude of our successes in economic construction... At present our influence in world affairs is by no means small, but if our material basis, and our material strength increase, our influence will be greater.⁴⁴

Deng's declaration showed his original aim on reform. He wanted to strengthen the socialist party-state by introducing a commodity economy and Western technology, rather than to replace socialism by capitalism or something else.

Deng and the reformers tried to explain their goal and to demonstrate their legitimacy for building a more powerful socialist country. But their reform ideas and policies did not reach consensus at the beginning, but encountered very strong resistance. The policy of Household Productive Responsibility in agriculture was attacked as 'the restoration of capitalism'. Many people, especially the conservative party cadres, complained that China had deviated from the socialist road. Along with the forward drive of the reform, two questions became more critical: what is the legitimacy of the reform and 'open door' policies, and how far can China go in adapting Western techniques and still call itself socialist. It seemed imperative to answer both questions, and give a theoretical explanation to legitimize reform and the 'open door' policies.

To answer both questions and maintain a balance among different factions in the party, Deng gradually evolved a clear vision of his pragmatic sense: in order for any transformation to be successful, socialism must have Chinese characteristics, and Marxism-Leninism must be integrated with the Chinese reality. In the Twelfth Congress of the CCP, Deng claimed:

We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own, and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics

⁴⁴ Deng Xiaoping, '目前的形势和任务' (The Present Situation and the Tasks), talk of January 16, 1980 at a conference of cadres convened by the center. In 邓小平文选 (*Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping*), p. 216.

- that is a basic conclusion we have reached after summing up long historical experience.⁴⁵

It would be naive to think that Deng just wanted to rationalize his 'socialist planned commodity economy' as the result of integrating the universal truth of Marxism with the Chinese situation. Moreover, Deng's formulation, 'building socialism with Chinese characteristics', was also a product of CCP's political culture. It had more complicated implications.

In CCP's politics, the party leaders got used to implementing their control by centralized management and the manipulation of appropriate formulations: in Schoenhals' phrase, 'doing things with words'.⁴⁶ When the CCP carried out a new policy or a campaign, a formulation usually was approved first by the top leaders. This formulation was not only a slogan, a principle of the new policy, but also a practical guide. It was "a powerful tool of political manipulation" (Schoenhals, 1992: 11). The trick of this political culture was that the explanation of the formulation was flexible. Sometimes a formulation had only one clear meaning, sometimes it could be bent in a number of directions. For party leaders, a 'policy-wise extremely sophisticated formulation' was not 'one of those where if it's not this then it's that, if it's not white then it's black.'⁴⁷

Deng's concept could be regarded as a 'sophisticated' formulation which is politically useful and very flexible. At an earlier stage of the reform, this concept could be

⁴⁵ Deng Xiaoping, 'An Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CCP (September 1, 1982). See *Deng Xiaoping, Speeches and Writings*. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1984) pp. 85-90.

⁴⁶ For a meticulous description on the political culture of the CCP, see Schoenhals's book, *Doing Things With Words in Chinese Politics*. (Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California, 1992)

⁴⁷ Zhu Houze, former director of the CCP Central Propaganda Department, "'权且不出'是个发明创造" ('Urge not to publish' is an Innovation), 文摘报 (*Digest Newspaper*), 1986: 329, p. 4.

aligned with Chinese characteristics, to silence the conservatives who complained that the reform would deviate from socialism. Later, when the reform went forward for political modification and started to challenge the Party's power, the emphasis of this concept was switched to socialism, meaning not capitalism. The emphasis on socialism became an excuse for political pressure upon radical reformers who had departed from socialism. Such a formulation could also be used internationally. It was a warning signal to those inside and outside China who hoped the country would become a capitalist state.

Since Deng's formulation was considered 'scientific' and 'universal', it soon became the credo for the party and state. Deng was given the title 'Chief Architect of the Reform.' All Deng's reform ideas and policies were framed into a new theory: building socialism with China's characteristics. The formulation was highly praised as the main contribution of Deng to China's socialist revolution and construction. An internal document quoted a Politburo member as saying: "We use Deng's thought to summarize the historical experience of our socialist period; it will also lead us down the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics."⁴⁸ The political report of the Party Congress on October 25, 1987, was titled "Advance Along the Road to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics".⁴⁹ In 1992, the Fourteenth National Congress of the CCP decided to arm the whole party with this theory.⁵⁰

Based on the above brief description and on the background, one may outline the intrinsic political implication of the formulation: to remain socialist is believed to be

⁴⁸ 文汇报 (*Wen Wei Po*, A Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong), March 21, 1992. Quoted from Lam (1995), p. 37.

⁴⁹ *Beijing Review*. 45 (Nov. 1987), pp. 37-42.

⁵⁰ Ding Guangen, director of the Propaganda Department of CCP, 'A Speech at a Meeting on Journalistic Work of *People's Daily*.' In *China's Radio and TV Yearbook, 1992-93*, p. 4.

connected with increased productivity. The party engaged in reform because it clearly realized that economic success would reinforce its power, but poverty would undermine its rule. While the leaders contemplated Western technology and a capitalist economic system, they were not willing to give up socialism. So the formulation was just a euphemism for inserting a commodity economy into a political environment dominated by what Deng called the immutable 'four cardinal principles'. Deng told the former United States Secretary of State George Shultz in 1987, "Only the socialist system can fundamentally solve the problem of poverty (in China). That's why we cannot tolerate people who oppose socialism... Socialist construction is impossible without the CCP leadership".⁵¹

Furthermore, the reform for the CCP, was not only an economic reconstruction, but a political competition with Western capitalism. It made a clear announcement:

To build a socialism which is superior to capitalism, first we must build a socialism which is free from poverty. At present, we are still practicing socialism, but only when we have reached the level of medium developed countries in the middle of the next century will we be able to declare that our socialism is superior to capitalism and that we are practicing genuine socialism.⁵²

By keeping this standpoint in mind, it will be easier to understand why the party so eagerly promoted economic development. Even after the 1989 violent crackdown, the hard-liners never reverted to a closed door policy on the economic front. At the same time, they also did not show any flexibility on their political monopoly and instead made more effort to "strengthen and improve ideological and political works."⁵³

⁵¹ Cited in Lam (1995), *China after Deng*. p. xv.

⁵² 'Zhao on Reform and Anti-bourgeois Liberalization,' *Beijing Review*. 29 (July, 1987), p. 14.

⁵³ 解放军报 (*The People's Liberation Army Daily*), July 25, 1993.

As Deng's formulation became clearer, the party extended it to all fields of reform. For broadcasting, a concept evolved: building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics. Unlike the original meaning of its parental formulation on promoting reform, the broadcasting version of the concept was created originally for the converse reason -to legitimize the Party's continued control of broadcasting. It is important to clarify this difference by tracing its roots and delving into its political implications.

2) The Concept of 'Building Socialist Broadcasting with Chinese Characteristics'

At the initial stage of the reform, CCP's leaders had no ideas about broadcasting reform. Even the Chief of Party's Propaganda Department, Hu Yaobang, was unclear. Hu said in 1979,

I am not very clear about the task of broadcasting... The general requirement for broadcasting, I think, is to bring the revolutionary ideal, the Party's policy and purpose, scientific knowledge, and spiritual enjoyment together. But it does not mean that every day, every picture must carry political content, so we should no longer argue which should be put first, politics or entertainment. We should think of a new concept.⁵⁴

The Secretariat of the Party discussed the broadcasting issue at its 93rd meeting in 1981. According to the notice issued from this meeting, the Party "does not know much about broadcasting: How important is it? How backward is the broadcasting in our country compared to other developed countries? In order to catch up with the present development of industrial countries, how much time and money will be spent, and what

⁵⁴ Hu Yaobang, director of the Propaganda Department of CCP in 1979, 'A Speech at the National Meeting on TV Programming,' August 26. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, p. 25. Hu later became the General Secretary of the Party and was forced to resign after the student democratic movement in 1987.

steps should we adopt? How is our broadcasting system different from the capitalist one"?⁵⁵ Even though so many questions were awaiting answers, one thing was never doubtful -- the Party claimed in the Notice: "Our broadcasting should be distinct from capitalist and Eastern European [communist] countries. Although we are backward in technology, the content of our programming should be better than theirs". Hu stressed to the leaders of the Department of Propaganda of the CCP, the Department of Culture and the CBBA, "Our TV broadcasting should have an essential difference with capitalism".⁵⁶

Deng Liqun, another top leader in charge of ideological work within the CCP, gave a speech at the National Conference of Broadcasting in 1983: "Our radio and TV are socialist broadcasting...the character of our radio and TV is that they belong to the state. Their task is to serve socialism. All radio and TV, from top to bottom, are led by the Party".⁵⁷

Along with the reform, there were ominous signs of ideological confusion, economic imbalance, social unrest, moral degeneration and widespread corruption. The CCP increasingly realized that "broadcasting is an important way to create 'socialist spiritual civilization', to propagate the Party line and policy, and to promote the stability and unity of the state".⁵⁸ After Deng's 'building socialism with China's characteristics' was identified as a formulation of the reform, it was applied to broadcasting and the concept of 'building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics' was logically formed.

⁵⁵ On March 19, 1981, the Secretariat of CCP held its 93rd meeting to discuss the work of the CBBA, and then issued a notice about the decision made in this meeting. See the Secretariat of the CCP, 'A Notice on the Work of CBBA', in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, pp. 42-43.

⁵⁶ 'Comrade Hu Yaobang Talk about the Development of TV,' May 17, 1981, in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1. p. 44

⁵⁷ Deng Liqun, A member of the Central Committee and former Chief of Propaganda Department after Hu, 'A Speech at the Conference of National Broadcasting Work,' April 9, 1983. *Ibid.* pp. 83-85.

⁵⁸ See note 54 on last page.

This concept was first articulated by the CCP's Central Committee in 1983. At that time, China's broadcasting had been showing a great impetus in development. The Party had launched the (urban) economic-structural reform in its Twelfth Congress in 1982. According to the spirit of this congress and some special requirements from the Central Committee of the CCP, the Ministry of Radio and TV held the Eleventh Broadcasting Conference in April 1983 in Beijing to discuss the reform policy and development strategy of broadcasting.

Based on this conference, the Party's Committee of the ministry drafted *An Outline Report on Broadcasting Work*, and submitted it to the Central Committee of the CCP on September 23, 1983. One month later, the Party's Central Committee issued *A Notice to Approve and Transfer [this] Report*.⁵⁹ This notice contained very detailed comments and requirements on broadcasting work, and was distributed to all party committees throughout the country. It has been regarded as a key document of China's broadcasting policy. The Party defined the essential role of broadcasting in the notice:

Radio and television are the most powerful modern tools of educating and inspiring all the Party, all the army, and all nationalities in the country to build socialist material civilization and spiritual civilization. They are also two of the most effective tools for the Party and government to link the masses.

As an official definition of China's broadcasting, this statement indicated the character, task, and target audience of broadcasting, and highlighted the propaganda function.

Besides the definition and other contents, the Notice asked broadcasting personnel to make great efforts in 'building socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics'.

⁵⁹ The Notice was issued on October 26, 1983. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, pp. 96-112.

According to the CCP, this concept was not only a reflection of its broadcasting experiences during the past forty-three years,⁶⁰ but also an endorsement of a new departure. Consequently, it became the ultimate aim of broadcasting reform as well as the foothold of all broadcasting policy-making. It was revered as a 'sacred cow'. Dozens of researchers and broadcasting officials tried to give a comprehensive explanation of this concept. A task force was organized by CCTV to develop 'a socialist TV theory with Chinese characteristics.'⁶¹ All these works attempted to identify and demonstrate the characteristics of China's socialist broadcasting.

3) The Components and Implications of the Concept

Taken literally, the concept emphasized two points. First of all, China's broadcasting is a socialist system, distinguished from a capitalist one. Secondly, this system is built in concord with China's socialist situation, not by copying other systems. On the surface, there was nothing wrong with this concept. But two following questions may be more crucial: what does socialism mean, and what is China's situation. In short, what are the real implications of this concept? We may find answers by referring to the previous practice of China's broadcasting and summarizing the main points of view in the publications.⁶² The main characteristics of socialist broadcasting can be listed as follows:

⁶⁰ According to the official publishing, the CCP initiated its first radio station on December 30, 1940 in Yanan - a red revolutionary base area. See *China Today: Radio and Television*, Book One. p. 15.

⁶¹ CCTV, 电视研究 (*Television Research*), 1995: 5, p. 75.

⁶² This summary is mainly paraphrased from two articles: (a) Zhao Shuifu, 'The Principle and the Character: The Preliminary Summing-up of Theory and Practice on Building Socialist Broadcasting with Chinese Characteristics.' See 广播电视决策研究文集 (*The Collective Works of the Research on Broadcasting Policy Decision*), Vol. 2, (Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press, 1992) pp. 127-129. (b) Fang Wen, "Several Questions Concerning 'Building Socialist Broadcasting with Chinese Characteristics'." In 广播电视决策参考 (*The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*), 1993:10, pp. 28-33.

Ownership. Broadcasting facilities--including stations, network transmission lines, and productive centers and studio equipment--all are owned by the government. Very few are operated collectively, such as in some universities, industrial communities, and remote areas that have internal community wire-linked radio or cable TV systems. They are operated under the licensing regulations and the Party's directives.

The network structure. Four levels of governments - state, provinces, cities and counties-- share the duty of developing its broadcasting systems. The state supports the central stations (radio and TV) and national transmitting network which convey central signals to each province. Each province is responsible for building its own TV stations and transmission network for its cities and counties. Then the cities or counties relay two higher levels of programming to their residents. If cities or counties have their own production centers, they can open their own channel(s). But they are required to transmit central programs first, and could not scramble the channel source with Central programs. The whole network was connected by a microwave system before 1984. After the first geostationary telecommunication satellite, "STW-1" was launched in April 1984, more and more ground stations for the satellite have been set up across the country to receive the central programs.⁶³

Administration. The administrative form is also parallel to four levels of the governments. Management is directed by the government broadcasting bureaus in each administrative level under the leadership of party committees. All broadcasting systems must obey the leadership of the Party so as to safeguard the socialist character of broadcasting. The broadcasting administration unifies the program production and

⁶³ *China Today: Radio and Television*, Book Two, p. 4.

transmitting network. This format is helpful for developing TV systems and fulfilling their propaganda task.

Functions. The mission of China's broadcasting is to effectively propagate the Party's and state's assignments, and to educate and promote the people to do their best in these assignments. The system has been built to serve this purpose. It is a synthetic, multiple, inter-dependent network for propagating the party's goal and assignments. This network combines central and local, urban and rural, air and wire, and can serve for domestic and international propaganda. The administrative bodies at four levels are also propaganda organs. They fulfill the routine act of censorship.

Program criteria. The broadcasting program must conform to China's cultural, moral, and aesthetic standard defined by the Party, and must assist national unity and political stability. At all events, every program must conform to the Party's propaganda guideline. In terms of foreign programming, the principle is "selecting the refined and discarding the crude" (去其糟粕, 取其精华).

What do these characteristics display? How can we explain and evaluate this system? We need to refer to the integrative model to detect the Party's world view and beliefs to get answer.

The capitalist model of broadcasting leaves station ownership and operation open to free enterprise, namely it stresses information and entertainment. The socialist model retains ownership and control within the machinery of the central government and insists on the function of propaganda.

Compared to capitalist broadcasting systems, the major problem for traditional socialist media under party-state ownership is that, as Curran states, they "are conceived of as instruments for promoting the public goods as defined by the state and the party which embody the collective interest of the masses. This gives rise to...seriously restricted freedom of expression" (1986: 123). Broadcasting in China has been defined as a propaganda instrument. It features political indoctrination, the principles of mass mobilization, and mass persuasion as insulation against emotional arousal, extreme simplification and radical politicization.

To understand the concrete implications of the concept, it is necessary to explore the principles and implements of media policy. The following chapter will demonstrate how the Party insists upon retaining its traditional principles, and how the Party defends them in facing the challenges caused by the momentum of reform.

III. THE PRINCIPLES AND RESTRICTIONS OF BROADCASTING REFORM

Deng's formulation was symbolized by the reform and 'open door' policies. This chapter examines how these two policies were implemented in broadcasting so as to uncover the spirit of 'building Chinese style broadcasting'. The first section of this chapter will focus on two cardinal principles: the Party's propaganda tool and its absolute leadership. The following two sections will detail the party's restrictions on broadcasting reform. The delineation will show what efforts were made to stifle the momentum of the reform and to minimize the 'open door' policy.

3.1. The Principles of the Party's Broadcasting Policy

The CCP's principle on mass media was directly copied from the Soviet communist approach which controls the media more tightly than any other authoritarian regime. Two cardinal principles play a pivotal role in its media policy: the media are a propaganda tool, and the absolute leadership of the party. Both were carried out not only in the organizational meaning, but also in the day-to-day news censorship.

During the reform, the Party still held fast to these two principles to ensure that broadcasts continually served as its 'mouthpiece'. Zhang Xiangshan, the director of the CBBA, gave a speech at a TV news symposium on March 15, 1979, saying: "TV should be the same as our newspapers and radio. It is the apparatus of Party opinion. It must propagate in its entirety Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, and propagate the Party's political line, principles and policies".⁶⁴ At the Second National Conference of TV Programming in June 1980, he stressed, "We must establish that TV is a propaganda tool first. A TV station is a news agency other than a type of cinema or theater. The latter conception had been criticized many times by our party".⁶⁵ And on another occasion, he said, "Our radio and TV are news propaganda tools. They have proletarian characteristics and are led by the Party. They are also an educational tool for the people and the masses".⁶⁶

The definition of broadcasting as the Party's propaganda organ remains the orthodoxy of the Party's media theory. Another well-known declaration of such principles was made by Hu Yaobang in 1985. He reiterated the party's position that mass media had to be the 'mouthpiece' of the party. Journalists must speak strictly on behalf of the Party and government. The main task of Party journalism was simply "to arouse the broadest masses of people to strive for the realization of the idea of the Party with one heart and one mind" (Appendix 2, p. 153). This is a summation of the Party's media principles over the course of many years.

⁶⁴ Zhang Xiangshan, in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 1, p. 185.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁶⁶ Zhang Xiangshan, 'A report at the Tenth Conference of National Broadcasting Work,' Oct. 7, 1980. In *ibid.*, p. 350.

In concrete terms, the Party ensures its leadership by institutional control. China's broadcasting system is controlled by two administrative systems. The MRTF is the governmental body in charge of the technological, financial and routine administrative affairs; The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP and its local offices direct the programming content and topics. The administration of broadcasting is broken into four levels described in Figure 4 (on the next page).


The first order divisions are under direct control of the central government in Beijing. The second order includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 3 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai). The other two lower levels, cities and counties, are administered by lower or sub-government supervision. All radio and TV stations are operated within this institutional framework. As part of the Party's propaganda system, they are required to carry out the Party's propaganda assignments and meet its objectives. As *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), the official newspaper of the Central Committee of CCP, summed it up:

Journalists must follow the Party Central Committee and propagate the Party's guidelines and policies: broadcasting run by the Party and the people; a serious attitude toward work; steadfast discipline; and obedience to Party leadership".⁶⁷

There was a pretense in this statement regarding who runs broadcasting. It was yet to be seen whether the Party or the people have control over broadcasting. Disregarding this pretense, the prime principle of the media was defined quite clearly. Journalists must be unquestionably loyal to the Party. They must not only be capable newspaper reporters, but also must be specialists in ideology, technical experts, and adroit politicians. Their level of

⁶⁷ *People's Daily*, December 12, 1983, p. 3.

Figure 4. The Control of Broadcasting in China



Legend: —> There is direct leadership from higher to lower levels.
> Without direct leadership, but professional guidance.

Source: Compiled by author.

political indoctrination must be high enough to ensure that they can accurately interpret and carry through the current party line in all of their journalistic activities. In fact, Chinese broadcasting has been used to mobilize the population, to control information, and to indoctrinate and raise the level of political consciousness in the Chinese people. The ultimate goal of the media is to promote the goals and values designed by the Party, and to serve the Party.

Although the Party tried to hold this principle during the reform, the reform momentum defied it and challenged it from time to time. As Rosenbaum observed: China has gone through repeated circles of reform and retrenchment since the Third Plenum. Each circle 'reflected the changing balance between radical and conservative reformers within the leadership, ended with a conservative backlash against alleged 'excesses'' (1992: 22). Broadcasting reform also followed such a course. Here I would like to provide some evidence that concentrates on the two most permanent policies: the reform and the 'open door' policies.

3.2. The Restrictions of the Journalistic Reform

Chapter Two introduced broadcasting reform, which started with journalistic practices. The impulse of economic reform and complementary political reform encouraged broadcasting personnel to disengage themselves from being purely tools of the party. They promoted radio and TV to become professional *mass* media: report news from

around the world, convey economic information, provide practical knowledge, and entertain the audience. In fact, except in some forbidden areas such as in criticizing the government or supporting dissidents, the news coverage became much broader. CCTV's newscast had increased from two times each day in 1984⁶⁸ to twelve times in 1993.⁶⁹ Public affair programs based on more audience concerns rather than propaganda concerns were developed. China's broadcasters were trying to keep close contact with their audiences.

But journalistic reform never went beyond the restrictions of the Party's principles. The Party leaders wanted journalistic reform only in *safe* areas, such as news effectiveness, writing styles, and program patterns. All this reform could not affect the Party's basic principles. During the reform, the Party stressed several times its absolute control over broadcasting.⁷⁰ The conflict over critical news could be seen as the most clear evidence of its control.

Since the 1950s, the CCP had banned press criticism against the Party committee at equal administrative levels. This meant that a provincial newspaper could not criticize the provincial Party committee, and the national newspaper could not criticize the Central Committee. The Party rule indicated that "any public criticism will be regarded as opposing the Party committee" (Gan, 1994: 49). This discipline was also applied to broadcasting. In reality, this rule had been extended. Neither the committees and government nor committee members and mass organizations, could be criticized.

⁶⁸ In 1984, CCTV initiated 'Midday Newscast', added to its evening newscast. See *China Today: Radio and Television*, Book two, p. 33.

⁶⁹ Luo Qin, 'General Review on CCTV in 1993.' See *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1994, p. 80,

⁷⁰ Such kind of statements can be found very often in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*.

When the reform sprang up, some reporters attempted to break this rule. On September 12, 1979, CCTV ran a news item which criticized the "car-using privilege". This news filmed many government-owned cars parking in front of shopping centers,⁷¹ so as to reveal some leaders and their families using governmental cars for private shopping. After this news was broadcast, more than one thousand viewers wrote letters to CCTV to support this report. The significance of this report is that not only did the cars disappear from the parking lots in front of shopping centers, but also many critical news items appeared in radio and TV programming. Most of them targeted the bureaucracy and cadre's privileges, while some even dared to discuss political issues (Guo, 1991: 163-165).

This trend caused the Party to become alert. CCP issued a new ruling in January 1981: *The Guiding Principles about Present Newspaper and Broadcasting Propaganda*.⁷² This document stressed that the mass media must do their best to propagate the 'Four Cardinal Principles',⁷³ and must not convey ideas and opinions that may shake or harm the prestige of the Party and Central Committee. "All these media are the Party's propaganda organ", the guiding document said, "They should obey the Party discipline. All their political opinions must be in concordance with the guidelines of the Central Committee without any preconditions. It is not allowed to express any opinions against the Party line and policies".⁷⁴

This guidance reclaimed the party's leadership and attempted to muzzle media criticism. But this Guiding Principle, it seems, was not powerful enough to block

⁷¹ At that time, there were almost no privately owned cars in China.

⁷² See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*. Vol. 1, pp. 34-41.

⁷³ See page 3 and Note 3 for a detailed description about the 'Four cardinal principles'.

⁷⁴ The Central Committee of CCP, 'The Guiding Principles about Present Newspaper and Broadcasting Propaganda.' See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*. Vol. 1, pp. 36-39.

journalistic reform trends. Some journalists were still keen to present critical news. One month later, some government officials complained that "broadcasting explored scandals every day, criticizing the bureaucracy, claiming corruption and making many other negative reports that misinform people about the reform and the Party, and give a false impression that the government at every level has been full of unhealthy tendencies".⁷⁵ Accordingly, a party leader from the Central Committee required the CBBA to review the news programs aired in the previous two months so as to calculate the proportion of critical news. The result showed that only 6.5 percent of news items were critical. Zhang Xiangshan, the director of the CBBA, reported this result in a meeting and explained that the Party officials were under the impression that it was much more prevalent than its exact proportion. He said, "the total proportion of critical news does not reach 10 percent, but sometimes three critical reports were edited into one newscast program. Since they are so dense, that seemed too much. In fact, there was no critical news during 11 days in November." Anyway, Zhang called attention to this phenomenon in order to reduce the number of 'critical' reports.⁷⁶

Another instance also presented the restriction of journalistic reform. In 1980, some broadcasters suggested changing the mode of newscast from a pre-recorded-tape format⁷⁷ to direct live broadcasting by the anchors, in order to improve the news effectiveness.⁷⁸ But many years have passed, and the main newscast still remains in the

⁷⁵ CBBA, 'A briefing of the Symposium held by CBBA for Implementing Party Committee's Guiding Principles', February 24, 1981. In *ibid*, Vol. 2, pp. 11-14.

⁷⁶ *ibid*.

⁷⁷ At that time, the entire TV programming, including the segments where the anchorpersons are featured, was videotaped and edited before being transmitted.

⁷⁸ See Note 20 on page 24 of this thesis.

pre-recorded mode, because the news must be previewed by the chief editors, directors of news departments, or chairpersons of broadcasting stations. For CCTV, some important news items were previewed by the minister in charge of propaganda work in MRTF. The Party emphasized many times to these officials the need to censor broadcasting news.

This censorship regulation made the anchor format of newscasts impossible, even though other kinds of programs had adopted anchors and live formats, beginning in 1982.⁷⁹ The procedure of TV news production remains the same today: reporters cover events on the spot, editors then write the scripts and send the copy to 'gate-keepers.' After passing censorship, the scripts are read by announcers. Most announcers receive little journalistic training but invariably are good looking and speak Mandarin with a clear voice. This newscast format makes it difficult to insert last-minutes or even last-hour news. For example, except for some reserved news items, the deadline for the 7 p.m. newscast is usually at two o'clock.

In the mid-1980s, some provincial radio and TV stations began adopting anchors to host news magazine programs. When the party lost its control for a short period during the pro-democratic movement in 1989, some anchors expressed their own opinions on the programs. After the Tiananmen crackdown, they did not appear on the screen any more. Two famous announcers in CCTV were dismissed from the "National Hook-up" news program because, when they announced the news about the students' hunger strike demonstration, their voices were full of sympathy and anxiety, and their faces looked sad with tears in their eyes. After this nightmare, CCP tightened its censorship system so as to

⁷⁹ See 'The Working Report of the Ministry of Radio and TV in 1982,' March 1, 1983. In *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*. Vol. 2, p. 265.

prevent any inappropriate news item which might cause resistant actions. Newscasts were changed back to the tape-format.

3.3. The 'Open Door' Policy with Vigilance to the West

The 'open door' to the outside of China had been another foundation of all the reform policies. This policy brought China "out of its self-imposed isolation and towards a rapprochement with industrialized countries in the West. A drastic expansion of cultural and economic transactions between China and these countries followed" (Wu, 1985:242-243). Since the early 1980s, the People's Republic has embarked on a vast program of international trade, joint ventures, technology transfers, and capital solicitation. Up to 1992, 27,000 joint ventures, with a total worth of \$30 billion, were authorized by Beijing. By that time, foreign-financed ventures accounted for about 25 percent of China's total manufacturing exports (Gregor, 1995: 270). As mentioned above, the Party engaged in an 'open door' policy to reinforce the economic base of socialism. They hoped to import Western science and technologies without importing foreign culture and values.

In terms of broadcasting, the 'open door' not only introduced new technologies, but brought a great quantity of foreign programming into China to diversify China's TV screens. TV personnel had opportunities to gain advanced knowledge about and skills for program production. Broadcasting agencies had extended their relationship with the whole world. All of the changes created new problems for the Party's control of broadcasting.

According to the integrative model, the communication act is comprised of four components: technology, production, distribution process, and cultural content. "Absolute control ... occurs only to the possessor of all components" (Mowlana, 1990: 96). The Party leaders knew this rule very well. They initiated reform, but from the beginning, they realized that doing something technological and technical was much safer than changing something involving the whole media system. Hu, former CCP General Secretary, said:

To be sure, it is necessary earnestly learn from journalism in capitalist countries and to learn from their in writing, editing, relaying of information, their advanced technologies, and their advanced administration. However, we must not learn from their bourgeois fundamental principle of journalism work because our social systems differ.⁸⁰

For the Party, Western ideological influence threatened socialism. The Party had taken a very defensive broadcasting policy with respect to the 'open door' model.

1) The Preliminary Stage of the 'Open-door' in Broadcasting

Opening communication links between China and the world was one of the most important and helpful developments of the seventies (Bishop, 1989:95). Since the 'open door' policy began, much up-to-date technology for TV broadcasting had been adopted, changing the features of China's TV. In 1978, CCTV began to use electronic news gathering equipment (ENG), instead of using cine-cameras. Beginning in 1981, CCTV bought two movable production centers for their electronic field production (EFP). All were imported from Japan.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Hu Yaobang, 'On Our Party's Journalistic Work.' See Appendix 2 on page 151.

⁸¹ See *China Today: Radio and Television, Book Two*, p. 224.

The co-operative TV production with foreign TV organizations began in 1979. The CBBA cooperated with Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Association) to produce a full-length documentary series, *The Silk Road* which was composed of fourteen 50-minute documentaries and won great praise in both countries.⁸² The documentary was regarded as the crowning achievement of cooperation with other countries.

Although China's broadcasting had some program exchange with other countries before the reform,⁸³ there was no daily foreign TV news on the screen until 1980. Starting in that year, CCTV signed contracts with VISNEWS Limited in Britain, and United Press International Television News (UPITN) in the United States⁸⁴ to receive their international TV news through the Pacific satellite every morning. After being selected and translated, international news items were edited into the national news program. When foreign news stories appeared on domestic screens, they quickly became one of the most welcomed programs.

In general, the viewers preferred international news for several reasons. For the majority of ordinary people, they felt domestic news "contained little substance and an overdose of tidbits about conferences and foreign guests' visits. Many viewers felt the news covered only good things, never bad things" (Yu, 1990:77). Furthermore, despite

⁸² CCTV, 'A Report about the Cooperative Production of 'The Silk Road',' September 18, 1981. in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*. Vol. 2, pp. 67-71.

⁸³ China signed some radio (TV) cooperative agreements with Indonesia, Syria, Algeria, Mali, etc. between 1962-1966, and signed agreements with Japan in 1960, with Britain in 1963 for program exchange and trade. China developed cooperative relationships with foreign broadcasting agencies in 20 countries among 1953-1966. But all were stopped at the end of the 1960s when the Cultural Revolution was launched. There is a more detailed introduction in *China Today: Radio and Television*, Chapter 9: International Relationship of Radio and TV, pp. 336-338.

⁸⁴ Li Lianqing, 'A Remark at the Second National TV Program Conference, June 16, 1980. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*. Vol. 1, p. 315.

other sources of information about the outside world, television for most Chinese, as Lull describes it, is a way to get "vicarious travel" (Lull, 1991: 171). Partly for these two reasons, partly because the newscast format provides the viewer a choice between domestic and foreign news, the First National Survey of TV Viewers indicated that 41 percent of the viewers just watched TV news they were interested in.⁸⁵ Some viewers, mainly intellectuals, just turned on their TV at 7:20 to watch the international news they favored, because CCTV's prime time newscast, National Hook-up, started at seven o'clock with twenty minutes domestic news first, followed by ten minutes of international news, no matter how many important events were taking place in foreign countries. One interesting example epitomized this phenomena. On January 29, 1986, CCTV broke its convention to report the accident of the US space-craft 'Challenger' as the first news item in its National Hook-up newscast. This unusual edition caused many complaints from viewers because they still came to the TV at 7:20 p.m., therefore missing this news, which usually appeared after the domestic news (Guo, 1991: 169).

2) The Worries over Foreign Programming

There was comparatively little debate about the adoption of foreign TV news because they were cautiously 'disinfected' (Guo, 1991: 155). But the importation of TV dramas involved economic and cultural issues, as in many other countries, as well as political / ideological considerations in China. With more and more TV programs carried on domestic screens, debates on the penetration of the Western culture and ideology

⁸⁵ CCTV, 'A Report of Survey on National TV Audience.' In Chen & Er (1989), *The Perspectives on Communication Effects in China*, p. 356.

erupted. At the beginning, the debate focused on the socio-cultural effects, such as morals and violence, but later turned to politics and social values.

In 1981, CCTV scheduled an American TV series, *Carlson Guerrillas*. This drama told the story of American guerrillas during World War II. Some prisoners were organized into a guerrilla team and were sent to the rear of the German Army to destroy its military supplies. They achieved victories with limited resources and against great odds. Their special skills as robbers and thieves were their strong points. This was a light-hearted drama with some exaggeration (certainly with much violence). After a few episodes of this series were shown on TV, some criticisms were reported: this drama had a negative influence on adolescents because they imitated the actors and plots in destroying things, programming was thus seen as causing destruction and endangering public security. There were 13 children 'guerrillas' found around the country.⁸⁶ Following these reports, the Secretariat of the CCP criticized the CCTV directors, ordering them to cancel this series from the schedule and to censor TV programming every day. The CCTV had no choice but to stop the broadcasting of this series, no matter how strong the public outcry was. One viewer wrote an angry letter of protest to CCTV: "*Carlson Guerrillas* did not die in the battle with fascism, but died in your hands."⁸⁷

It was not the only case of this sort. One year later, another Japanese series was also canceled during the course of broadcasting. It told the story of a warrior's life and love. The audience, even some leaders of the local TV stations, did not understand the

⁸⁶ Li Lianqing, 'An Oral Report at the Meeting of Propaganda Department of the CCP to the Leaders Who were in Charge of Cultural and Arts Field, February 12, 1981.' in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 2, pp. 1-2.

⁸⁷ See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 2, pp. 4-5.

exact reason for this cancellation because there was no pornographic and reactionary content in this drama. They counseled the Party that it may be inappropriate to censor foreign dramas using domestic standards.⁸⁸

The controversy surrounding these dramas was just a prelude to the long term struggle against the intrusion of Western culture. Foreign films, plays, music, literature, and democratic ideas swept through China like a windstorm. The Party took them into very seriously. To inhibit the foreign audio-video products that came into China, legally or illegally, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council enacted a regulation in February 1982, titled *A Stringent Rule against Importing, Copying, Selling and Broadcasting Reactionary and Pornographic Audio-visual Products*.⁸⁹ This prohibition pointed out that "In recent years, overseas audio-visual products have come into the mainland through many channels. Many of them were pornographic, vulgar, and even reactionary." This rule strictly forbade the sale of any overseas audio-visual products on the domestic market without authorization, and stipulated that the CBBA was charged with the responsibility to censor and import foreign products for broadcasting and to govern domestic audio-visual publication and circulation. No other individuals and organizations could bring in, borrow, sell, copy, rent, broadcast, or receive overseas TV programming, including products from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.

⁸⁸ CBBA held this symposium in January 1982. The directors from 10 provincial broadcasting bureaus attended this meeting. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 2, p. 128.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, Vol. 1, pp. 46-48.

The CBBA held a meeting in order to put this prohibition into effect.⁹⁰ The meeting reconfirmed that the term 'reactionary' means 'anti-China', 'anti communist party', or 'anti-socialism' and that 'pornographic' products included a range of 'vulgar' content. Meanwhile, all TV stations, especially CCTV, had been limited in their scheduling of foreign TV programming. In 1982, CCTV only dubbed 47 foreign dramas.⁹¹ But with the rapid development of TV stations and cable channels, and increasing demands from the audience, many more programs were needed.

China was faced with a dilemma which had perplexed many developing countries, even some developed countries like Canada. It is true that technology linked up Canada as a nation. But some scholars are concerned that the space-binding technology ironically serves to undermine Canada's cultural autonomy, because Canada doesn't have a strong entertainment industry to feed content into the broadcasting network. So the sophisticated communication network became a foreign cultural conveyer (Charland, 1986). China was faced with a similar problem of fast growing hardware with a scarcity of its own program sources. The Party feared losing its "control over the total communication process ... to the outsider unless (it produced) its own message" (Mowlana, 1990: 96).

The Party realized this problem and consequently limited program imports. The MRTF enacted two regulations to reduce foreign programming. *The Censorship Standard about the Imported Overseas TV Dramas* in 1990 standardized censorship, and *The Temporary Provisions on Regulating the Importation of Overseas TV Programming* gave

⁹⁰ The meeting was held between April 7-11, 1982. The briefing of this meeting was transmitted to the whole propaganda system of the party by the Propaganda Department of the CCP. In *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 2, pp. 153-159.

⁹¹ 'A Briefing of the Meeting about the Foreign Affairs on Broadcasting, May 28, 1983.' In *ibid.*, p. 304.

time quotas to overseas TV programming.⁹² Overseas dramas scheduled in local TV could not be over 20 percent of the total drama time, reduced to 15 percent in prime time. For CCTV, the overseas dramas had to be controlled at below 10 percent of total air time, and less than 5 percent of prime time. Under this regulation, CCTV had to cut 41 percent of its imported drama in 1991. The local stations had to reduce the amount of overseas drama from 900 episodes in 1990 to 600 in 1991.⁹³

The MRTF tried to provide additional funds to improve TV productivity. But ironically, the domestic capability to produce TV programs was still far from adequate. The statistics in 1992 showed this problem (see Table 4).

Table 4. The Shortage of Domestic-Resource TV Programming

	<u>Daily Broadcasting</u>	<u>Productive Ability</u>	<u>Productive Proportion</u>
Central TV Station	49 hours	16.5 hours	1 / 3
Local TV Station	15 hours	2.5 hours	1 / 6

Source: The numbers are quoted from *Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*, 1994 : 7, p. 4.

To resolve the problem of program scarcity, there was a need to cooperate with other countries as well as to import some TV programs to fill airtime. The overseas Chinese TV programming produced in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the availability of foreign TV programming, had become a supplementary resource. At the beginning of 1994, the

⁹² From March 18 to 21, the MRTF held a national meeting to introduce the party leaders' direction of 'strict control and great cutting down overseas TV programming and films, and drafted a new regulation on overseas program importation. See *China's Broadcasting Yearbook*, 1992-93, p. 461.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

MRTF investigated 13 provincial stations and 33 city stations; in total, 887 weeks of programs were surveyed. The result showed that there were 600 weeks of overseas drama in excess of the quota, and more than 60 Hong Kong and Taiwan movies and dramas did not get a censorship permit from the Ministry.⁹⁴

3) The Fight Against Capitalist Ideology

The CCP was highly sensitive to Western culture, not only for its lax moral standards and its conception of social values, but also for its capitalist values, its political ideology and its democratic thought. The Party called the penetration of Western capitalism a 'peaceful evolution'⁹⁵ aimed to subvert socialism. Since the latter part of the 1950s, Mao Zedong had requested CCP to be on guard against Western 'peaceful evolution' and closed China's door almost completely to the West in order to block such penetration. Since then, the attitude toward Western culture became not only a cultural issue, but a serious political one too. While the party leaders had to engage in an 'open door' policy to accelerate economic development, they were still alert to Western culture. Deng Xiaoping warned that the corrosive influence of Western decadent ideology was the biggest danger in the reform and the open-door policy.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Ai Zhisheng, Minister of MRTF, 'A Speech at the National Conference on Broadcasting Propaganda Work,' Jan. 27, 1994. In *The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*, 1994: 1-2, pp. 11-17.

⁹⁵ The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, articulated this strategy in his speech in 1958, arguing that the Western world should adopt a peaceful strategy to change Communism in the Soviet Union and Mainland China. Then Kennedy became president in 1960. John F. Kennedy said in 1959 that the West ought to gradually, carefully, and peacefully approach communist nations to plant the seeds of freedom. For a more detailed introduction to this topic, refer to Tsai's article (1994), pp. 251-259.

⁹⁶ Deng's words were cited in an article written by Ai Zhisheng, Minister of MRTF, 'Insisting Two Hands Grasp, Improving Broadcasting Propaganda Work.' In *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1994, p. 21.

To prevent the penetration of Western political culture, two blatant political campaigns were launched during the 1980s. At the end of 1983, CCP launched a political campaign, named Against Spiritual Pollution. The purpose of this campaign was to resist the influence of some Western theories that were introduced in China by the intellectuals. 'Spirit pollution' includes advocating Marxist humanism, and the notion of alienation in socialist societies, accepting non-Marxist theories such as existentialism, post-modernism, structuralism, Western democratic theory, promoting liberal tendencies in the arts, and other "ugly and decadent aspects of capitalism",⁹⁷ such as women wearing long hair over the shoulder. Even Western communication theory was labeled a 'bourgeois doctrine'. The minister of MRTF condemned Western political science as pseudoscience. He railed against Lippmann's work, saying, "The famous Western critic Lippmann wrote a book, *Public Opinion*. It is regarded as an authoritative work and textbook in the West. But in my eyes, it is a deceitful book."⁹⁸ For the media, any discussion of these deviations -- including vulgar books, pornography, religious programs, rock music-- was criticized as capitalist 'spirit pollution'. The consequence of such a campaign was easy to imagine: radio programs and TV screens became dull, lacking in mass appeal and causing many voices of discontent.⁹⁹

Another political campaign, Against Bourgeois Liberalization, was launched in December 1986 to stifle the student demand for the free nomination of candidates in

⁹⁷ *Beijing Review*, 1986:40 (October 6), p. ii. Cited in James Wang (1995), *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*. p. 59.

⁹⁸ Ai Zhisheng, minister of MRTF, 'On Broadcasting Work -- A Speech at the Fifth Propaganda Cadres' Training Class held by the Propaganda Department of the CCP.' In *Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*, 1994 : 7, p. 6.

⁹⁹ This problem was mentioned and discussed in the National Broadcasting Program Meeting which was held from Nov. 21 to Dec. 3. See *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*, Vol. 2, pp. 393-420.

elections, and the increasing call for media pluralism throughout that summer. The Party defined 'bourgeois liberalization' as an idea negating the socialist system in favor of capitalism, which "would poison our youth, harm socialist stability, and disrupt our reform and open door policy".¹⁰⁰

For broadcasting, a most notable sign in the campaign was the harsh criticism of the television program *River Elegy* (河殇). This six-episode program employed the contrasting metaphors of the Yellow River, the cradle of Chinese civilization, and the blue sea, connoting openness to the West, and sharply criticized the conservatism of Chinese culture, as antithesis of modernization. The conservatives, led by the Vice President of China, Wang Zhen, were furious with this program. They launched fiery campaigns to suppress the program. Many critical articles were published in the newspapers. A critical series of articles, *One Hundred Errors of River Elegy*, was read on Beijing TV.

During the campaign, some intellectuals, who advocated the direct popular election of delegates to the National People's Congress, or openly criticized the campaign, were expelled from party membership. The campaign ended by sending troops to stop student demonstrations in many cities, and the party's General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, was forced to resign. For university students, there were two consequences of their protest: they were forced to spend more time on ideological study in campuses, and most of them were sent to do one year of manual labor in factories and on farms in the countryside upon their graduation.

However, the student movements could not be completely put down. When Hu Yaobang, a pioneer of the political reform, died in April, 1989, it quickly became an

¹⁰⁰ *Beijing Review*, 1987: 3 (January 19), p. 15.

incident that touched off a broader scope of student demonstrations. Since the student movement called for democracy and freedom, and critically questioned the government's legitimacy, they were considered the result of Western influence. Deng Xiaoping said on June 9, after the military crackdown at Tiananmen Square:

As soon as the incident exploded, it became very clear to us that their [Westerners'] two major aims of propaganda are overthrowing the Communist Party and destroying the socialist system. Their goal is to establish a bourgeois republic, totally dependent on the West.¹⁰¹

After the 1989 pro-democratic movement, the CCP took several actions to combat the penetration of Western political culture, especially in terms of restricting foreign broadcasts as tightly as possible.

4) The Technological Restrictions on Receiving Overseas Programming

Historically, the Chinese people were forbidden to receive overseas radio programming (including programs from Taiwan) before the reform. Listeners might be charged with eavesdropping on enemy radio. Under the 'open door' policy, the CCP could no longer overtly forbid people to listen to overseas radio programs, but used more powerful electronic interference to jam their signals.

After the new technologies had been introduced, satellite earth stations and private satellite antennae became more popular. The State Council issued an order (No. 129) in 1993, entitled *The Registration Rule for Receiving Facilities of Satellite Broadcasting*.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Deng Xiaoping, 'A Speech to the Military Leaders Who Fulfilled the Military Law.' In *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1990, p. 228.

¹⁰² The Premier Li Peng signed this order, which issued by the State Council of PRC on October 5, 1993. Five months later, the MRTF issued 'A Detailed Regulation for Implementing the Order.' Both documents were collected in *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1994.

This rule dealt with the production, selling, importation, installation and technological inspection of satellite TV equipment. The MRTF was assigned to fulfill all of this administrative work. There were four stringent restrictions on receiving satellite TV programming.

(a) This rule stipulated that no individual was allowed to install and use satellite facilities. Only those who lived in remote areas could use satellite dishes. Also those who could not receive domestic TV programs by air and cable could apply for a 'Permit to Receive Domestic Satellite TV Programs'.

(b) Only three kinds of institutes and places were eligible to apply for a 'Permit to Receive Overseas Satellite TV Programs': important educational or scientific research centers, journalistic institutes, and financial or trade enterprises at a high administrative rank that "really needed to receive satellite information for professional purposes."

(c) Three-star or higher class hotels which served foreigners and overseas Chinese, and specific office or apartment buildings serving this clientele could receive satellite programs for their tenants.

(d) The international satellite TV programs were forbidden from being transferred to passenger stations, stores, amusement places, TV stations, cable TV stations, community TV stations, and public antenna systems.

Under this rule, all unlicensed stores were forbidden to sell satellite receiving equipment. Anyone who wanted to buy a receiver had to get official approval first. Ordinary residents were no longer able to receive DBS TV programs. Even a professor

who taught a course on English News Writing in the Beijing Broadcasting Institute was deprived of this professional benefit.¹⁰³

It is reasonable to say that this rule involved economic considerations, pirated receiving dishes, and cultural sovereignty, but it is also obvious that the main purpose of the rule was to reduce the increasing influence of Western political culture. According to the minister of MRTF, receiving a DBS program "is a matter of sovereignty, and also a matter of resisting the corrosive influence of Western decadent ideology".¹⁰⁴ He warned that "The Western antagonistic force attempts to infiltrate us through satellite TV, [so we] must strengthen the management of it".¹⁰⁵

5) To Strengthen Propaganda Abroad

In the minds of Party leaders, "there are two kinds of war in the world: one uses firearms to kill enemies, while another attempts to win people's feelings. The latter is a propaganda war. A society that doesn't think highly of propagating itself must suffer losses."¹⁰⁶

Although the CCP has realized that China must consider world opinion in the post Cold War era, it still maintains sharp vigilance of the West. The vice-minister of MRTF said in 1994, "We have two battlegrounds to combat with the overseas broadcaster: one is at home, another is abroad. The international battle on broadcasting is very serious. The

¹⁰³ This fact was given by Xu Qinyuan, an instructor in the Department of Foreign Languages at Beijing Broadcasting Institute. She visited the Department of Journalism at Concordia University from 1995-96.

¹⁰⁴ Ai Zhisheng, the Minister of MRTF, 'On Broadcasting Work -- A Speech at the Fifth Propaganda Cadres' Training Class held by the Propaganda Department of the CCP.' In *The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*, 1994: 7, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Xie Wenqing, vice minister of MRTF, 'A Speech at the Meeting on International Propaganda Work,' August 19, 1983. in *The Selection of China's Radio and TV Documents*. Vol. 2. p. 348.

overseas broadcasters attack us using every chance".¹⁰⁷ In response, China has taken a both-sides strategy: while excluding all external media channels where it could, the CCP strengthened its own international propaganda system targeted around the world.

Actually, China's International Radio Station (CIRS), called Radio Beijing, has become one of the two biggest international radio broadcasters in the world. It uses 43 languages, and its listeners are spread over 173 countries and regions around the world. Its total international program output each day is as high as 140 hours.¹⁰⁸

Disregarding whether it was intentional or not, the Party leaders attributed the Tiananmen Square events in 1989 to the instigation of Western propaganda. After the collapse of the Eastern European Block, the US weakened its Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), but established Asia Pacific Network (APN) in 1993.¹⁰⁹ This made party leaders indignant.¹¹⁰ They turned to pay more attention to its international propaganda. They invested more money to improve the capability of program production and transmission of Radio Beijing. A new short-wave broadcasting center was constructed in 1992 and started its operation in 1995. A national conference was held in Beijing in early 1994 to deploy the Party's international propaganda work. This conference recommended putting more effort on developing China's international radio and TV service, and striving to cover the whole world at the end of this century. Before long,

¹⁰⁷ Liu Xiliang, 'A Speech at the First National Conference on International Propaganda Work.' See *The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*, 1994: 12, p. 5.

¹⁰⁸ Li Guangcai, 'A Brief Review on China's International Radio Station in 1993.' In *China's Broadcasting Yearbook*, 1994, pp. 77-78. Another biggest one is United States which broadcast about 2,000 hours per week to overseas.

¹⁰⁹ According to Richard Richter, the president of the APN, the APN devotes most of its time to the news of that particular country, such as China. APN started its program in Summer 1996. Mandarin (standard Chinese) is APN's first service. He said that the dissident group would have automatic access to the APN. See BBC: *World Media*, WM/24, June 14, 1996, pp. 19-20.

¹¹⁰ See Appendix D-2 & D-3.

CCTV implemented the creation of Channel 4 which is devoted exclusively to international TV service.

3. 4. Summary

This chapter demonstrated that, despite the fact that 'open door' policy has played a major role in the reform program, such openness has 'provoked opposition' in broadcasting policy, "thus raising questions about the degree and type of openness that China will be able to sustain over the long term" (Fewsmith, 1991: 33). In fact, the opening was restricted within the economic and technological fields. Although the Dengist reforms represent a modification of Mao's Cultural Revolution and the 'leftist' traditions, they were also forced to confront the very dilemmas that produced the communist movement and revolution in the first place. The reformers "sought to build their nation's future on a workable compromise ... between Chinese tradition and Western technology" (Dittmer, 1994: 45). Over the whole reform period, the control sometimes tightened -- as in the two political campaigns Against Spiritual Pollution and Bourgeois Liberalization. Apart from such campaigns, controls were generally looser, depending on the political atmosphere.

Now the question should be asked: is the Party's wishful thinking workable? It is obvious that economic reforms and the 'open-door' policy have damaged the orthodox ideologies. With more liberties and prosperity, there is a corresponding rise in people's

expectation of more freedom and more free choices, which may in turn raise doubts about the validity of socialism and its broadcasting policy. The two cardinal characteristics, party control and propaganda, have been queried and have encountered more and more challenges, while some new problems have also appeared. Furthermore, is it possible for the Party to isolate the broadcasting system from the great changes in the economic infrastructure and from peoples' desire for more freedom, more choices? Chapters Four and Five will examine these questions from two sides. First, how did the infrastructural changes challenge the Party's control on the broadcasting system? Second, what were the theoretical perspectives which have had impacts upon the Party's theory and practice of broadcasting.

IV. THE IMPACTS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGE

The last Chapter showed that, the reform and ‘open door’ policies made broadcasting programming more varied, more colorful, and more audience-oriented. But broadcasting reform, in general, had been implemented in a cautious way. Some important areas, including the diversity of ownership and the independence of the broadcasting enterprises, were still untouchable.

However, whether the Party realized it or not, the economic reform and ‘open door’ policies undermined their control on broadcasting. In this chapter, I want to broaden my discussion on China's social and economic changes under the reform so as to illustrate how the infrastructural changes challenged the orthodox broadcasting policy. I then wish to identify what policies the party adopted that contradicted the general reform trend.

4.1. The Decentralized Infrastructure and the Highly Monopolized Media

Fundamentally speaking, China's reform can be characterized as economic decentralization. This trend not only occurred in ownership, but extended to the whole economic system, including leasing land to farmers instead of having communes,

decentralizing economic decision making, deregulating prices and the labor market, allowing material incentives, and enacting managerial reform.¹¹¹ The Eighth National People's Congress modified China's Constitution. The words in the 1982 Constitution that referred to a planned economy have been replaced by the words 'socialist market economy'.¹¹²

The Decentralization of the Economic Infrastructure

The abolition of the commune system and the implementation of rural household responsibility encouraged the rapid growth of rural enterprises. Urban economic reform adopted various forms of the 'productive responsibility' system, such as experimentation with shareholding, and developed a significant individual service economy.

The decentralization in the economy includes two parts. For the state-owned enterprises, with the power of decision-making came certain features from the government to the enterprises themselves. Some elements of private property, private profit, and competition had been introduced into the state enterprise, such as the responsibility to pay for any mistakes made, receiving rewards for success, and even share holding. For the collective and privately-owned enterprises, both became more and more independent in their respective economic activities. It also permitted greater decentralization of the regional economy as local governments were given greater power in planning, finance and

¹¹¹ For a detailed analysis, see Ogden, S. (1995), *China's Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture*, pp. 90-97.

¹¹² The 1992 Constitution can be found from Wang, J. (1995), *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, Appendix A. pp. 320-342.

foreign trade. The whole course of economic development was accompanied by a recognition of its 'relative autonomy'.

In brief, all these reforms "inevitably involve an effort to bring market forces to bear and a consequent de-emphasis of planning" (Fewsmith, 1991: 33). Fewer and fewer goods passed through the hands of government. In 1978, about 700 kinds of producer goods had been recognized by the state plan. In 1991, that number was below 20. It was estimated at the end of the 1980s that almost 56 per cent of all industrial inputs and almost 40 percent of output were bought and sold outside the state plan, reflecting their market prices (Gregor, 1995: 270).

Early in the 1990s, it had become evident to the leaders that efficiency and productivity required allowing "all matters that can be better carried out by private enterprise...to be left to private hands which should be encouraged and fully protected by liberal laws".¹¹³ As Womack concluded, "the overall characteristic of the reform program was decontrol" (1991: 80).

The Decentralization of Broadcasting Institutions

The trend of decentralization was also embodied in media institutions. There has been a bewildering variety of specialized publications of all types.¹¹⁴ Collective-owned newspapers appeared, such as the *World Economic Herald*, published in Shanghai before

¹¹³ See discussion in Seven N.S. Cheung, *Will China Go Capitalist?* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1986).

¹¹⁴ According to *People's Daily*, 56.7 per cent of China's 1,777 registered newspapers have started publication since 1978, a total of 1,008 new titles in less than five years; from 1980 to 1990, the number of magazine titles has grown from 900 to 6,005. See *People's Daily*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. 3; and Sep. 3, 1990, p. 4.

the Tiananmen suppression. In terms of broadcasting, the institutional decentralization was evident. Besides the tremendous growth of radio and TV stations as mentioned above (pp.24-25), the stereotype of one local administrative government with one station was also broken up. Several stations in the same administrative level, especially at the provincial level, were created. Since they operated within the same municipality and served the same territory, they had to show some distinctive features to compete with each other.

In China, there was only one radio, and one TV station for each province or each city until the mid-1980s. All radio stations were titled with [provincial or city's name] People's Radio Station. So the people' stations were known as the official stations. Each station used to have two or three wave-bands. Each band concentrated on a certain kind of program. For example, Beijing People's Radio Station had three bands: the first provided news and public affairs services, the second dispensed music and service programs, and the third was filled with educational courses. This operational style was called 'functional division with several frequencies in one station', or simply named a 'comprehensive station'.

With the growing number of audiences and increasing demand for economic information during the reform, the second and third bands' programs attracted more and more listeners. In addition to the consideration of working efficiency, it became necessary for these functional bands to operate independently. At the end of 1986, the second band of Zhujiang Radio evolved into *Zhujiang Economic Radio Station*. A so-called economic

station meant that it provided listeners with more economic information, operated as a commercial enterprise, but avoided the word 'commercial' in its title.

In the following years, more 'economic' radio stations appeared throughout the country. By 1993, there were 51 economic radio stations running in the information market.¹¹⁵ Some other specific service stations then were created, such as music stations, English stations, sports stations, and so on. These stations were affiliates of their parent stations - People's stations - but they had separate business accounts and had to support themselves. This format in which one parental station owned a series of affiliated stations was called a 'series station'. The motives of this reform were to exploit the resource of the frequency, to provide more specific and more detailed programs, and to attract larger audiences so as to gain better financial success.

Television took on a different form of decentralization. Starting from the late 1980s, a second or even third independent station was created within one province or one major city. They were not only launched by broadcasting institutes, but by other government agencies, such as educational administrations. Shanghai, China's biggest city, had only one TV station for more than thirty years. At the end of 1992, Shanghai Cable TV was launched. During 1993, the Shanghai Oriental TV Station and a Verbal-TV information Center started operation. In the following year, on February 27, Shanghai Instructive TV went on the air.¹¹⁶ In 1994, five TV stations operated in Shanghai.

¹¹⁵ See Li Xiangyang, vice director of the Broadcasting Bureau in Jiangsu Province, 'Toward Business: The Trend of China's Broadcasting Development', 中国广播电视学刊 (*Journal of China's Radio and Television*), 1994 : 2, p. 4.

¹¹⁶ Zhuang Ya, 'The Reform and Exploitation on Channel Fourteen of Shanghai TV'. In 广播电视研究 (*Radio and TV Research*), 1994 : 2, p. 47.

The reform created additional stations in one city, which brought more choices for the audience, as well as parallel competition into coinciding TV markets. But such institutional decentralization caused problems for the Party monopoly on the mass media, not only on the managerial level, but also on program censorship. The conservative leaders were worried that the scramble for viewer ratings would cause imperfections in the propaganda instrument, and have repeatedly asserted their leadership on the media. In a speech at a journalistic seminar, the General Secretary of CCP, Jiang Zemin, appointed after the Tiananmen event, warned:

The turmoil and rebellion (in Tiananmen)...shows how much harm and what tremendous losses will be caused if something goes wrong with media and propaganda work, if the propaganda machine is not in the hand of genuine Marxists."¹¹⁷

The Party expected to maintain the social unity and stability by tightening control on mass media. Therefore, several regulations and rules have been issued to emphasize the propaganda discipline, to ensure the high centralization of the broadcasting system. Among them, three were frequently stressed.

1) The Central Station's Programs must be Transferred

With the growing number of radio and TV stations, central TV had to face more competition with local stations, not only in regard to their programs but also in relation to their resources. When local stations had no additional channels to transmit central programs, they attempted to broadcast their own source programs as a priority. Neither Central TV stations nor the MRTF could control them as before.

¹¹⁷ See Note 6 on page 5 of this thesis.

This local autonomy was frustrated at the end of 1993 when the Propaganda Department of CCP and MRTF issued an order¹¹⁸ that all local broadcasting systems "must remain a special channel to completely relay the central station's first channel programming". The order claimed:

The central (radio and TV) stations are the mouthpieces of the Party, of the government, and of the people. The central stations also have important responsibilities to propagate the Party's [political] line, the principles, and the policies decided by the Central Committee.

So, the local broadcasting systems, including radio and TV stations, relay stations, and cable TV "must maintain the specific channel to completely transmit the first channel programs of central radio and TV. They could not insert their own programs and advertisements when the central program is being relayed." But local stations argued that they had to air their own programs and advertisements first because they were established and financially supported locally, and could not get any benefit from transmitting central programs, even its advertising. Therefore, this order was often ignored in practice.¹¹⁹

2) State Ownership must not Waiver

The regime insisted that broadcasting had to remain under state-ownership no matter how far decentralization penetrated in the economic system. This principle had been stressed through the reform. The MRTF received a directive from the Central Committee of CCP which said that the cooperative investment with foreigners could not be applied in the ideological field.

¹¹⁸ 'A Notice to Local Radio and TV Stations to Completely Relay Central Radio and Central TV Programming.' See *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1994, p. 242.

¹¹⁹ Guo Zhenzhi, 'China Broadcasting: Toward the Market Economy'. Beijing Broadcasting Institute: *China-Canada Communication Research*, 1994: 1&2, p. 11.

In 1994 some local leaders within broadcasting considered that transnational satellite programs were a huge exploitable market with high profit potential. They suggested opening the market to allow families to buy antenna dishes. But later they were told by the Minister of MRTF that "the Central Committee of CCP took a firm attitude [in opposition to this suggestion]".¹²⁰ The State Council issued *Order No. 129* in 1993 to restrict the reception of overseas DBS TV programs. So far, there are no privately owned or cooperative broadcasting institutions allowed.

3) Journalists must Conform to the Political Line of the CCP

Since broadcasting has always been regarded as a 'vital part of ideology', media personnel are employed by government. An appointment of senior editor had to be approved by a CCP committee and even the Central Organizational Department (Su, 1994: 84). All journalists are propagandists, and must share unanimously the opinions of the Central Committee of the Party, in both mind and political opinion.

Unlike other fields, where this requirement only applied to party members, every one in the 'propaganda front' was expected to obey the principle of 'unanimity of thought' (思想一致). This principle is concerned not only with unity, but with the integrated or monistic character of the social order. To the Party, only one voice can make the state the source of doctrine and of moral values for society as a whole. So 'keeping unanimity of thought with the Central Committee' was emphasized through the reform period and fulfilled as a stringent discipline within the media. Neglecting this rule might elicit serious punishment. The clearest evidence of this fact was that a large number of chief or general

¹²⁰ See Note 104 on page 73.

editors were dismissed after the Tiananmen repression. For example, two chief editors of the News Department at CCTV were removed. One led a reporting team to Tiananmen to report the student demonstration without the permission from the Central Committee. Another was indignant with the Party's ban on reporting the student demonstration. He wrote on the blackboard in the newsroom: "News should respect history [by reporting the facts] and stand on objectivity and fairness."

It is obvious from the above description that, the highly monopolized media was clearly antagonistic to the decentralized economic system and 'open door' policy. The economic decentralization encouraged people to require more autonomy in their political lives. The increasing freedom conversely caused the government to assert more control on the media. Especially after the June suppression in 1989, the censorship of international mail was reimposed, fax ties were cut, places were put under surveillance, and the Chinese-language VOA and BBC broadcasts were electronically jammed (Dittmer, 1994: 158). However, such repression caused unremitting resistance of the people. Discussion of the free press has become more and more contentions during recent years.

4.2. The Unitary Media and the Emancipatory Audience

The goal of the party in centralizing broadcasting was no secret -- to ensure the absolute control of news outlets. The party had strict discipline for broadcasters. Any news item or topic on the radio and TV had to be approved by the chief editor(s) who

knew more about high-level decisions than did the writers. The editors could try to anticipate the reaction of their leaders as they performed their daily tasks of censorship and self-censorship.

When the Party launched a political campaign, the authorities arrived at a consensus about a 'correct' political agenda first. Then the various media had to relay this information more or less in unison. The broadcasting report became, in most cases, just a final confirmation of authoritative judgments. The Party never allowed the media to carry different opinions disputing their political decisions; nor did it encourage different broadcasting outlets to compete with each other in the discovery of 'news'. To do so, in the Party's view, might confuse the people and give rise to 'chaos' (亂)(Dittmer, 1994: 116).

Subjectively, after many years of political campaign, the Party desired public unity and consensus so as to create a stable social environment for economic construction. Any information that might mar this consensus would best remain private. What the public could and could not know was decided by high authorities.

In practice, the Party had developed a series of distinctive standards to filter news. The most subtle one was called 'the olds [rather than news] and news blackout'. The 'olds' meant to intentionally delay reporting news, such as natural disasters or criminal offenses. The 'news blackout' referred to a wide range of information that was not appropriate to expose to the public, such as intraparty struggles, political instability, maneuvers over succession, infighting over control of the army, and so forth. All this news could not be reported without the approval of the Party leaders.

For instance, the media had always been forbidden to leak any news about the controversies and factional struggles between top Party leaders. The people could only know the mistakes of failed leaders after they had been removed. If some news was divulged about a Party leader, the broadcaster had to receive permission from the higher leaders before airing it. All news that was leaked to the public by unofficial sources, was called 'alley news' (Tsou, 1991: 283), which meant that such news 'from the street' might not be true, might simply be a rumor, and therefore must be rejected.

This standard on news selection evolved into a strange phenomenon: news of important PRC political events was often broken by foreign media. The most well-known example was that the arrest of the 'Gang of Four' was first announced by a British News Agency dispatch. China reported it almost one month later. The 1986 student demonstration story was broken by the VOA (Liu, 1990: 95). Even the news about Deng Xiaoping's death in February 1997, was also first exposed by Hong Kong and Japanese news outlets.

Professor Gan, a Marxist theorist on journalism within the Party, realized that this regulation forced all mass media throughout the country to unify along propaganda lines, and made many news reports untimely or delayed. This is exactly "in violation of the laws of journalism" (Gan, 1994: 44).

The only exception to such uniformity happened in the spring of 1989. This was an abnormal time for media personnel. When the student movement burst on the scene, the media could not get definite directions from their leaders because there were divergent views concerning this movement in the Politburo of the Central Committee. For instance,

the directors of CCTV wondered whether or not this event could be exposed on the national network. They tried to get a directive from the minister of MRTF, but they were told to wait for an answer from the Central Committee. After waiting for several days, the directors of CCTV held a meeting and made a collective decision: this event was so important, and should be reported. If exposing this event was a mistake, they would be considered responsible collectively.¹²¹ Later, evidence proved that their anxiety was realistic. After hard-line conservatives occupied the dominant position, they initiated a campaign to weed out all the party members who joined the resistance, and who did not listen to them.

Except for this short period, the emphasis of the news service is always placed primarily upon the needs of the Party and of politics. This makes for another contradiction: on the one hand, propaganda manipulates the news service and requires a high level of uniformity of political information; on the other hand, the economic reform and 'open door' policies have permitted different *private* activities on a far greater scope, and also exerted a powerful influence on the public's communication behavior. Since the quality of TV sets had improved and the diversity of programming had been encouraged, Chinese viewers have consequently become more sophisticated. They are more interested in acquiring information and knowledge, and their expectations have grown greater.

In recent years, more and more Chinese have shown their dissatisfaction with the media's one-voice propaganda overtone because it isolates the political life of the state from them, and does not meet their information needs. According to a survey in 1986, 38 percent of viewers said that their principal motive to watch TV was for the enriching

¹²¹ I learned this fact from a personal interview with a director of CCTV in 1989.

knowledge it provided, 34 percent to learn about domestic and international current affairs. Only 22 percent of the viewers watched TV for entertainment.¹²² Many of them have tried to seek alternative channels that could provide information on what happens domestically and internationally. The new technologies of communication provide a possibility for the Chinese to turn to foreign broadcasts for domestic news coverage.

In China, there was an increasing number of people turning to overseas' media because they had found that overseas programming provided much more of the domestic information they wanted to learn. A survey, conducted at Beijing in 1990, indicated that more than 10 percent of Beijing residents listened to overseas radio programs very often. They could receive programs from at least 15 overseas stations, including RCI and those from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Among these stations, VOA had the largest group of listeners; 10.6 percent of Beijing residents, about 1.3 million people, reported that they listened to VOA's programs. The estimated total number of VOA's listeners in China is as many as 100 million.¹²³

This number increased while the nation was involved in political crises. For instance, during the Tiananmen Square event in 1989, many people swarmed to short-wave radio services to listen to overseas reports. During the weeks of the crisis, ten-band short wave radio receivers were sold out in many cities.

¹²² CCTV, 'A Report of the Survey on TV Viewers in Beijing'. In Chen & Er (eds.), *The Perspectives on Communication Effects in China*. pp. 379-380.

¹²³ Jin Wenxiong, 'A Comparative Study on the Influence of Overseas Radio and TV in China'. See *The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*, 1993: 10, p. 17.

From 1990 on, DBS has become another source for receiving overseas broadcasts. In just a few years, 11 million families have set up private satellite antennae.¹²⁴ Although their antennae had to be removed after state's order No. 129, as I mentioned above,¹²⁵ the people's appetite for information could not be inhibited.

4.3. From Full Politicization to Semi-commercialization

The transformation from a state planned economy into a 'commodity economy' stimulated entrepreneurship across the nation in many forms, from the 'peasants who get rich first' to those who have pioneered in industry and commerce. The Chinese people left remote and relatively abstract political goals to the Party, to seek material gain and dive into the 'great wave of the commodity economy' (下海).

Broadcasting institutions were also encouraged to plunge into the marketplace. They become a complex system maintaining the political mission while operating as a business. This transition may be identified as a move from full politicization to semi-commercialization, and has three aspects: the financial source became varied; broadcasting advertising grew; and broadcasting institutions turned to profit-sensitive.

1) The Financial Policy was Adjusted

¹²⁴ 参考消息 (*The Reference News Daily*), Feb. 25, 1993. Cited in Hu Zhengrong, 'Challenge and Opportunity: Our Policy on Satellite Television'. See *The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*. 1993: 9, p. 9.

¹²⁵ For the introduction about this Order, please refer page 71-73 of this thesis.

The whole broadcasting network, including all radio and TV institutions were state-owned, and have been financed by direct government grants since their birth. There were neither license fees and direct charges for radio and television institutes, no fees collected from their audience.

The government funds are composed of two parts: investments in building stations or networks, and subsidies to broadcasting agencies. During the reform, not only did the central investment to the three levels of local broadcasting systems¹²⁶ become less and less, but the portion of government subsidies had also been diminished continually.

Since the reform revived commercial structure and orientation, media agencies, with a few exceptions, became more and more self-sustaining, even though they still remained state-owned. Starting in 1984, the government introduced a so-called 'contracting out' policy which meant that the amount of government subsidy was frozen at that year's level, with no hope for more in the remaining contract years. If the government fund was not enough, broadcasting agencies could not attempt to seek more money from the government. Instead, they had to find other substitute sources by doing their own business. If a broadcasting agency gained more money than its allotted expenses, it could keep that for business development or employee benefits.

For instance, the government allocated 360 million RMB yuan subsidies, roughly 45 million US dollars, to the MRTF in 1984. After ten years of development, this amount of subsidy accounted for just 30 percent of the ministry's total spending, 1.1 billions RMB yuan, roughly 137 million US dollars.¹²⁷ The other 70 percent had to be sought by the

¹²⁶ Please refer to the illustration in Figure 4 on page 54 of this thesis.

¹²⁷ The major exchange rate between RMB and US\$ during the reform are listed below: (1 US\$ buys RMB)

ministry itself.¹²⁸ Under this circumstance, broadcasting agencies were spurred to seek their own financial sources, and consequently became profit-sensitive. Although most of their revenue was earned from advertising airtime, many kinds of pay-services were initiated to make money, such as 'pay-information', 'pay-airtime', and even 'pay-report'.

2) *Broadcasting Advertising Grew*

Advertising has been one of the fastest growing industries in China since it was re-established in 1978. Broadcasting played the most important part in the development of China's advertising industry.

Since Mao Zedong dismantled the market economy in China, and "material incentive" was deemed 'counterrevolutionary', there had been no market based information before the reform. Advertising as a commercial activity was not allowed for the media that were regarded as the Party's tool. A professor in the Journalism Department of Fudan University, Wang Zhong, raised the question of whether the news had acquired commodity characteristics as well as political characteristics during the 1950s. He was convicted as a 'rightist' in 1959, and sent to a labor camp for almost twenty years.¹²⁹

The reappearance of media advertising started in Shanghai, the most commercialized metropolitan city which had some commercial radio stations between the

<u>Year</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1994</u>
Rate	1.53	1.93	2.80	3.72	4.72	5.22	5.75	8.45

Source: *International Financial Statistic Yearbook*, 1995. Washington: International Monetary Fund, p. 293.

¹²⁸ He Doncai, Vice Minister of MRTF, 'A Speech at the Symposium on Financial Work.' In *The Reference for Broadcasting Policy-making*. 1994: 4, p. 8.

¹²⁹ Zhong Peizhang, 'Preface', in Sun Xupei, *新闻学新论 (The New Perspectives on Journalism)*, p. vii.

1920s-40s. Shanghai People's Radio Station aired an ad in late 1978, while Shanghai TV broadcast its first advertisement in early 1979. At that time, such practices were not permitted by the government. But after permission for media advertisement were issued in late 1979, media advertising expanded tremendously. The average growth of advertising revenue for the period 1983-1993 was as high as 50 percent, and there was a remarkable 98% growth over the year in 1993. The total advertising turnover, according to official statistics,¹³⁰ reached an amount as high as 13,4 billion Chinese Yuan (equivalent to 1.6 billion US dollars). Television, newspapers, advertising companies and radio are the major advertising media in China, in that order. TV became the most popular advertising medium in 1991 when it earned the highest revenue, one billion Chinese yuan, and has remained in the first position. Up until 1993, TV advertising contributed over one third of the total expenditures to the ad industry.

While advertising and other business income have become the main sources for maintaining the station's operations, government funds have become a small portion in the financial budget of broadcasting institutes. Shanghai is a typical example of this kind of change. The ratio of government funds and business income has changed dramatically (see Table 5).

Table 5. The Changing Ratio of Advertising Revenue and Government Funds in the Shanghai Broadcasting System

Fiscal Year	1979	1983	1984	1986	1991
Business Revenue	1	1	1	1.18	5.5
Government Funds	7.58	2.74	1	1	1

Source: All these figures are cited from Guo Zhenzhi, 'Broadcasting within Marketing Economy.' See 新闻与传播研究 (*Journalism and Communication Research*), 1994: 3, p. 6.

¹³⁰ Fan L. P., 'Advertising in China, 1993'. See 中国广告 (*China's Advertising*), 1994: 3, pp. 4-8.

Table 5 presents that the ratio between business revenue and government funds had changed conversely. This is a common trend for the whole broadcasting systems. In Fujian province, two thirds of broadcasting funds came from business. The average broadcasting revenue during 1984-91 in Hunan province was 29 percent higher than the average government subsidies. CCTV revenue in 1994 was RMB 760 million yuan, for CPBS it was RMB 49 million, and for CIBS 2 million (Guo, 1994: pp. 6-7).

3) Institutions became Increasingly Profit-sensitive

While sources of money varied, broadcasting institutions became increasingly profit-sensitive. They had to develop an expanded range of subject matter to exploit commercially. The competition between different stations and different media was formed tentatively. In searching for interesting material, stations began to air sensational reports and lurid descriptions of crimes; the TV screen became more violent; the entertainment programs adopted popular Western, Hong Kong and Taiwan program styles and formats, and so on. Some journalists have gone so far as to take cash or gifts for reporting. They extort money from state-owned enterprises by threatening to write negative stories in 'Internal Reference'¹³¹ that were sent to party leaders. Some journalists work for companies and borrow cars, housing, mobile telephones, and other items for their personal use. Such unhealthy phenomenon was called journalistic corruption, and has become more serious in recent years.¹³²

¹³¹ There is a description of this kind report on page 17 of this thesis.

¹³² According to Xinhua News Agency, the General Secretary of CCP gave a speech in January 1997 which called on journalists to 'strictly follow professional ethics and firmly oppose 'paid news''. The Propaganda Department of the Party, the MRTF, and the Press and Publication Administration issued a set of regulations banning 'paid news'. Reuter, newsrelease, Jan. 24, 1997. see Appendix D-8.

4) *The Implication of Semi-commercialization*

Self-support, growing advertising, and profit orientation have made China's broadcasting more commercial. But what do I mean by semi-commercialization? First, broadcasting commercialization has always been under the monopoly of the state. The ownership of broadcasting agencies and facilities was not diversified, not privately owned. Second, the Party did not allow broadcasting activity to be fully commercialized; the bottom line is to admit the commodity factors in broadcasting so as to release the financial burden of the state. The minister of MRTF stressed:

Spiritual [cultural] products have a commodity factor, but [we] cannot carry them in commercialization. The fundamental character of broadcasting is as the mouthpiece of the Party, of the people, as the bridge to connect the masses to the Party, as the effective tool to build the socialist spiritual civilization.¹³³

This is to say, China's broadcasting had to maintain its political missions to serve the Party while it evolved into the market economy to serve its customers (audience), or in other words, supporting themselves economically but not speaking for themselves independently. Such character is vividly described by the metaphor 'one servant and two masters' (一仆二主) (Polumbaum, 1989).

This phenomenon of semi-commercialization may be recognized as one of the truly distinguishing characteristics of China's socialist broadcasting. The problem consequently has emerged that, sometimes these two masters (the Party and the audience) are not in concordance; sometimes they are even antagonistic.

Curry summarized different approaches on media reform, most of them emphasized public interest, convenience, and necessity, against political and commercial

¹³³ See Note 98 on page 69 of this thesis.

intervention in news production (1986). These are ideal goals for the broadcasting reform. But China took the wrong direction. Its broadcasting reform was still confused due to its orientation and character.

Summary

The analysis in this chapter revealed the unbalanced development between economic decentralization and ideological totalitarianism and its manifestation in the broadcasting system. I attempted to show that many new policies have been constructed to intervene in the process of broadcasting reform. As a gate of the Party's ideological stronghold, broadcasting is experiencing a powerful impact from economic reform. Although the Party has tenaciously defended this stronghold, the decentralization of media institutions, the demands from emancipatory audience, and the increasing commercial sector, are all undermining the infrastructure of this stronghold. If economic changes can be regarded as an external power challenging the orthodoxy of the Party's broadcasting policy, then we can also say the reform has stimulated an internal impetus within broadcasting to review the theory and practice of this orthodoxy. In fact, the reform practice has caused a series of challenges to broadcasting theory, too. The following chapter turns to these theoretical debates and presents my response to them.

V. THE CHALLENGE OF THE REFORM TO THE PARTY'S THEORY AND PRACTICE IN BROADCASTING

The CCP's media theory has been formed by a mixture of the Marxist-Leninist propaganda tradition, the personal experience of Mao Zedong and his closest associates, and China's specific culture and media history. This chapter will concentrate on the theoretical base of the Party's media theory, the application of and extremism of this orthodoxy, and the reform challenges to it. The analysis in the following four sections will provide evidence for three main points.

First, the broadcasting tradition drew many assumptions and practices from the Party's press which is based on the Soviet communist doctrine, the CCP developed Leninism into its press theory and journalistic practice and has dogmatized it as a sacred and inviolable territory.

Second, economic and especially political reform has exposed the Party's media theory to both questions and crises. I will explain the context and the nature of the CCP's broadcasting theory, especially focusing on the political principles that underpin this theory and therefore determine the features of the broadcasting system.

Finally, by exploring the specific operations and functions of mass media in China, as well as its effectiveness and problems, it will be shown that broadcasting is not external

to or merely reflective of the relations of the whole social field in which it operates. Broadcasting can be used as an extension of political power by rulers to manipulate the ruled.

Through the analysis in this chapter, I try to examine China's case in relation to existing communication theory so as to discover specific patterns of broadcasting process and effects and their significance to ongoing research.

5.1. The Theoretical Puzzles and Debates

Since the 1980s, the reform has prompted more thoughtful persons to revive the old questions which could not easily be discussed before the reform, for example: the function of journalism, the conflict between the 'party-orientation and people-orientation of the media'. . These questions were raised because of the impossibility for the Party media to 'whole-heartedly serve the people' while obeying and following the Party. Some new terminologies raised by the Party were also queried, such as the notions of 'accumulated news authenticity', and 'canalizing public opinion in the correct direction'.¹³⁵ All these issues were very controversial, some causing life-and-death conflicts between intellectuals and the Party's ideological guards. But first , I will consider an overview of the Party's media theory.

¹³⁵ Gan's article provides a general view on these debates. See Gan Xifen, 'Debates Contribute to the development of the Journalistic Science'. *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 44: 3, pp. 38-51.

1) *The Theoretical Base of the CCP's Media Theory*

Historically, the Party's media theory has its theoretical roots: it flows directly from Soviet doctrine, including its Leninist-Stalinist theory¹³⁶, control pattern, newsworthiness definition, etc. All highlight the effective manipulation and methods of coercion and persuasion (Inkeles, 1962: 135). In Marx's literature, which fully developed the analysis of capitalism, the press was considered 'a central element of the superstructure that the ruling classes erected as their literary, political, and ideological mechanism for maintaining power' (Altschull, 1984: 92).

Lenin was one of the most significant founders of the Bolshevik newspapers. He asserted that the proletarian masses lacked in two indispensable qualities: class consciousness and organization.¹³⁷ He felt that a working-class movement which was restricted to trade unions must of necessity lack the coherence, direction, and purpose to lead the masses toward the revolutionary goal of overthrowing the old order and building a new society. So he asserted that the essential class consciousness, a revolutionary consciousness, "could only be brought to them from without." (Lenin, *Selected Works*, II: 53). Here the *without*, Lenin implied, meant a revolutionary party. Lenin declared that the working-class must be pushed from the outside, and stressed "We professional revolutionaries must continue, and will continue, this kind of 'pushing,' and a hundred times more forcibly than we have done hitherto" (Lenin, *Selected Works* II: 137). When he

¹³⁶ There are a number of studies on Lenin and the Bolshevik model of media. e.g. Alex Inkeles (1962), *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*; Mark W. Hopkins: *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* (New York: Pegasus, 1970); Wilber Schramm (1973), "The Soviet Communist Theory of the Press"; and Altschull H., *Agents of Power* (1984), Chapter 5: pp. 85-104

¹³⁷ Lenin, 'What is to be done?' in Fineberg J. (ed.) *Selected Works*, II, (New York: International Publisher, 1935-1939), pp. 53-56

spoke of this pushing, he meant teaching the fundamentals of Marxism to the masses (ibid: 136-137). Lenin's revolutionary party assigned itself the role of teacher, guide, and leader, and had to influence the psychology of the masses and win them over to its side. Thus, Lenin, and later Stalin, frequently spoke of the press, the radio, and other forms of mass communication as a 'tool' or 'instrument' in the hands of the party, and as a 'driving belt' between the party and the masses. The basic slogan provided by Lenin (1901) and quoted in all Chinese discussions of the press states:

But the role of the paper...is not confined solely to the spreading of ideas, to political education, and to procuring political allies. A paper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer.¹³⁸

Here, Lenin identified the newspaper as having three roles: collective propagandist, collective agitator, and collective organizer. From Lenin's perspective, the task of communist revolutionaries was primarily to achieve consciousness themselves and transmit it via education to the proletariat. Therefore, one of propaganda's most important tasks is to play a major role in the process of proletarian revolution through mobilizing the masses. He was convinced that the communist party had to control all means of communication. It must lead, not follow, public opinion. (I will discuss how this strategy caused the crisis of credibility to communist propaganda in Section Three of this Chapter.) The party's propaganda must be exhaustive, differentiated, and entirely controlled by a centralized propaganda apparatus.

¹³⁸ Lenin, 'Where to Begin?' , May 1901. In *Collective Works, IV, The ISKRA Period (1900-1920)* (Book 1), (New York: International Publisher, 1927), p. 114.

Since the foundation of the CCP in the 1920s, the Chinese Communists have been examining the perspective of Leninist journalism, and have adhered to Lenin's model in their revolutionary practices. Whether mobilizing masses or organizing the party, communist leaders must rely on propaganda. "There are two kinds of political tasks," a leading Chinese Communist theorist said: "one is the task of propaganda and education, and the other is the task of organization."¹³⁹ The functions of the media were to organize the masses, and mobilize the entire population in the attainment of the goals set by the Party. Such a task demands that responsibility for and control of the media of communication must be concentrated in the hands of the Party.

Based on these principles, the Party developed a more complex, practical journalism theory and a well-organized propaganda system. First of all, the media were viewed as a major social force that must be harnessed and adapted to facilitate attainment of the Party's defined goals. Since it is the Party that represents what is in conformity with the interests of the people and what strengthens the socialist system, it is the Party's right to dominate the media.

Secondly, the media were defined as an instrument of popular education, a tool for the 'communist upbringing' of the masses, to "provide the guidance for works in accordance with the Party's line and policies".¹⁴⁰ The media became a channel of communication between the Party and the masses, rather than being chiefly an information conveyer, a public forum to facilitate or improve the free exchange of ideas among men, and a source of amusement or a means of recreation for the population. The role of the

¹³⁹ Ai Ssu-chi, quoted in Frederick T.C. Yu, 'Communications and Politics in Communist China'. In Pye (ed.) *Communications and Political Development*, (N. J. Princeton University Press, 1963) pp. 261-262.

¹⁴⁰ Hu Yaobang, *On The Party's Journalistic Work*. See *Appendix B*, p.147.

media in respect to the audience becomes that of educator, director, or even judge. As the Party declared:

The purpose of cultural activities is to enhance the people's socialist consciousness and foster communist ethics and love for the motherland so as to work for the cause of socialism and help bring up a new generation.¹⁴¹

Thirdly, there is rarely any mention of how news and news events should be treated, but social processes are treated as news and regarded as being newsworthy.

Among major news items is the process called socialist construction, that is, the general effort to build up Chinese socialism.

The collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe shocked the leaders of the CCP. They saw it as a result of the West's 'peaceful evolution' strategy. Therefore, they did not think that the disintegration of the Soviet Union meant the end of the Cold War, but made China become a major target of Western powers. The Party leaders worried that 'bourgeois ideologies' might undermine the socialist system. They attempted to reinforce ideological control to maintain the identity and status of the vanguard Party. Since it is comparatively difficult to control all publications, broadcasting, as the most popular media, was defended as the last fortress.

2) The Theoretical Debates

It may be understandable to apply Marxist-Leninist principles of media to organizing people against class enemies during a revolutionary war. But Chinese society has changed profoundly since the Party seized power, especially in the reform era. Economic development has become an overwhelming task for the nation.

¹⁴¹ *Beijing Review*, Vol. 24: 41 (Oct. 12, 1981), 9.

Under these circumstances, the CCP could not find theoretical and political legitimacy simply in Marxist-Leninist texts. The pragmatic reformers realized that classical Marxist theory would no longer solve China's problems in the reform era. They declared in the *People's Daily*: "We cannot expect the writings of Marx and Lenin written in their time to solve *all* (italic mine) of our present problems."¹⁴² The party chief Hu Yaobang asserted that "Marxism is not an immutable rigid dogma." In order to develop Marxism, its "outdated theories must be rejected," and "the latest achievements of all humanity must be incorporated into it."¹⁴³

These suggestions supported the liberally inclined intellectuals to break up the boundary of orthodox ideology, and opened up the debate over theory in every field. The Marxist economists took the position that the classic Marxist model offered no ready answers to the problems of China's new socialist world, and instead advocated the study of bourgeois economic theories such as monetarism and Keynesian economics to take the place of Marxist models. The ideological debate became even more pronounced in the communication field. Three issues were most critical: the attitude toward Marxism, the question of the press being responsive to the Party or to the people, and news value.

What Attitude toward Marxism could be Acceptable

The Party declared 'seeking truth from the fact,' when the reform was brewing. But it was just performed in the economic reform. The core of its ideology still adhered to the 'truth' of Marxism, as believed before.

¹⁴² *People's Daily*, Dec. 7, 1984, p. 1.

¹⁴³ *Beijing Review*, 26 (August 30, 1985), p. 26.

In fact, some intellectuals have found in the Party's inherited ideology some fundamental axioms or postulates on which it could rebuild, from the ground up, a new theoretical edifice. A young theorist on media research quoted Engels' words: "socialist science cannot exist without freedom of development,"¹⁴⁴ to question the Party's political restriction on the definition of media. Gan's words represent some common points made by China's intellectuals and reformists: "The theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are the products of their historical circumstances; they are therefore not immune to historical conditioning. Some of their specific postulates may have been made absolutely by changes of historical conditions... Marxism should be innovative, must constantly face new challenges, and make concrete analysis of all new things" (Gan, 1994: 51).

Most often, critics of communication theory attack the 'party tool' principle. A more challenging criticism advocated the ideas of the young Marx and Engels, who were then in favor of the free press and against Russian military censorship, saying that these ideas should be used as guidelines for the Chinese-style socialist journalism (Sun, 1993: 54).

Should the Mass Media be the Party's Mouthpiece or People's Mouthpiece

One of the crucial points of 'socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics' as defined by the Party is that, "as far as its most fundamental characteristic is concerned, the party's journalism is the party's mouthpiece." Only by doing so can the media serve

¹⁴⁴ *The Complete Works of Marx and Engels* (马克思、恩格斯全集), Vol. 38, p. 88. Cited in Sun Xupei, *The New Perspectives on Journalism*, p. 59.

people best, because the party represents the fundamental interests of the majority of the people.¹⁴⁵

When the communist government came to power, the question of media policy seemed simple. Following the Party's revolutionary line was an indubitable discipline. But since then, reform has stimulated an ongoing opposition to this discipline. A number of articles have challenged it and argued that, despite what the Party said that they represent the fundamental interests of the majority of people, the Party's policies had been erroneous sometimes. On those occasions, it was not desirable that mass media should follow the Party. Unfortunately, such erroneous policies have been applied many times, such as the campaign 'Against Rightists', the 'Great Leaps Forward',¹⁴⁶ especially the disturbance of the Cultural Revolution which saw millions of people killed and countless cases of injustice and mistrials.

Past experiences show that, the principle that the media must be the Party's mouthpiece, was completely meaningless. Conversely, the media should, in the face of the Party's errors or deceits, give warning signals and express opposition to the Party's misguided policy. It seems logical that "if the Party really wants to fill the void left by the Cultural Revolution, it would be desirable to put forward some intermediate vision"(Schram, 1984: 36).

From the Libertarian point of view, the media should act as a watchdog in society, should maintain a distance with the ruling power because "only by maintaining this distance can media institutions comment critically on the exercise of institutionalized

¹⁴⁵ See Appendix B on page 151 of this thesis.

¹⁴⁶ There is a detailed introduction about party's mass campaigns in Fredrick T.C. Yu, *Mass Persuasion in Communist China*. (New York: Praeger, 1964)

political power" (Thompson, 1990: 261). Laws and regulations were created to protect media institutions and limit interventions from political power, and to ensure that the media serves the people, or at least, "to stand between the government and the people" (Tuchman, 1978: 161). In journalistic practice, the principle of the libertarian approach advocated 'objective reporting' which led to change of the press from opinion journal to information medium. It also stresses 'balancing opinions' which require the media to become a spectator rather than a participant in the controversies of the day (Siebert, 1973: 60). All these principles have been accepted by every democratic society. Even though these principles have shown "limited value" in developed countries today (Thompson, 1990: 18), they may offer useful implications for the Party's media theory.

But in contemporary China, the Party attempts to maintain its power through its media monopoly and ideological control. So far, there has not been any sign from the Party that it will reassess its theory of mass media (Tsou, 1991: 278). If a journalist wishes to make a political statement, it has to be very cautious indeed. Most journalists do not dare to put forward opinions, do not dare to discuss problems, do not dare to articulate the critical voice of the people.

Can Public Opinion be Canalized Away from Its Main Stream

When Chinese leaders reviewed the Tiananmen events, they concluded that the main reason the pro-democratic movement took place and spread out to the whole country was that the media misdirected the people. They soon initiated a new terminology: *canalizing public opinion in the correct direction* (坚持正确的舆论导向). According

to the regime, the mass media had falsified the events at Tiananmen Square and attempted to mislead public opinion. So the Party called upon the media to canalize public opinion in a correct direction approved by the Party. During the Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work, Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CCP stressed:

Correctly canalizing public opinion under the guidance of the party's basic line is a very important work in the party's propaganda and ideological front... Radio and TV networks are found everywhere and influence people's thoughts and acts anytime. To correctly canalize public opinion can make people unite together with one heart, with vigorous spirit... In the great cause of building a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, our propaganda and ideological work must play an important role by ensuring people's thought and canalizing public opinion to support reform.¹⁴⁷

He pointed out the purpose of 'canalizing public opinion along correct direction'. But he did not say when and why the media needed to do so. It becomes necessary only when there is no concurrence between the Party and public opinion. It is a euphemism for requiring the media to speak what the party wants to say, and to neglect the main stream of public opinion.

The 'agenda setting' approach to mass media testifies to the fact that the news media have the power to shape their audience's opinions on topics about which they are ignorant, but we have not learned about how media can sway existing public opinions in the main stream of the social agenda. So the only means of the Party's terminology is, to stifle differing opinion by media autocracy.

Let us leave behind at which level the party's canalizing tactics can work effectively; the party's theoretical base also stands on Lenin's assertion that the working

¹⁴⁷ Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of CCP, 'A Speech about the Propaganda and Ideological Work at the Party's National Propaganda Meeting', Jan. 24, 1994. In *China's Radio and TV Yearbook*, 1994, pp. 2-4.

class needs to be indoctrinated with the correct consciousness, and it still places the audience in a passive position. In this conception, "public opinion becomes 'artificial' and biased: it will be keyed to a part over the whole" (Alexander, 1981: 25). This concept is still based on authoritarian principles which conceives that a few men hold the truth and direct their followers. In other words, the truth is centered near the center of power (Siebert, 1973: 2). It neglects the fact that most Chinese have become more sophisticated, more critical of the Party's propaganda strategy. The main stream of public opinion has turned towards obtaining democratization and the freedom of the press against the authoritarian state. People express their opinions through different available channels. During the summer of 1991, subtly antigovernment T-shirts appeared on the street. One quotes Mao's slogan 'Fear neither hardship nor death', but adds 'And I'm not afraid of you'. Another repeats 'Be an honest man' over and over, skewing the characters so that they also depict collapsing elderly men. Such T-shirts were soon declared 'unhealthy' and banned.¹⁴⁸

The aim of the Party to stress 'correct' guidance is no secret. The postleaders of Tiananmen wanted to regain control of the media. But in reality, the Party's media practice found itself in a tight corner, and its propaganda usefulness was limited by doubts among the Chinese people. The following two sections will give a brief analysis of these two problems.

¹⁴⁸ Nicholas Kristof 'Even Gloomy T-shirts Fall under Censorship,' *New York Times*, July 29, 1991. pp. B1-B2. Cited in Dreyer, *China's Political System*. p. 352.

5.2. The Biased Frame: Pre-determined Quota and News Selection

For a long time, the Party's control permeated the whole process of communication and took many forms. When Mowlana and Wilson explain their integrated approach, they divide the communication process into four components: technology, production, distribution, and cultural content. Absolute control, they argue, "occurs only to the possessor of all four components. In the absence of a single actor controlling all four components, effective control of a system will fall to the possessor of certain of the components before others" (1990: 96).

The CCP realized this principle and asserted its absolute control on all four sectors. I have discussed in preceding chapters its control on technology (e.g., the forbidden use of satellite antennae), production (e.g., the rule of previewing and censorship), and distribution (e.g., the priority of central program transformation). Now the analysis focuses on its control of news selection. I will not deal much with the objectivity of a single news item. Instead, the argument will consider news as frame¹⁴⁹ to explore how broadcasting news in China was ideologically constructed. The frame, according to Goffman, is "the principle of organization which governs events -- at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in them" (1974: 10-11).

As the Party's mouthpiece and a political component of the Party itself, China's broadcasting has specific standards on news selection. The most clear example is that the Party requires the coverage of newscasts on successful aspects of the economic reform and positive features of the government must always have greater weight than negative

¹⁴⁹ Erving, Goffman. *Frame Analysis*, 1974. Cited in Gaye Tuchman, *Making News*. (1978) p. 192.

features. In fact, 80 percent of total reporting must be devoted to `positive news'¹⁵⁰ (sanguine or optimistic reporting), such as the Party's achievements, economic development, communist heroes or working models. Contrarily, all negative stories, such as those on natural disasters, social problems, criminal news, and critical reports, must be restricted to below 20 percent of the total. This quota, according to the Party, will lead news reports to meet the `essential authenticity' which implies that the socialist system is theoretically superior to the capitalist one. The news as a whole must exhibit this advantage.

It is true that all news is selective. The collection, compilation, and distribution of news in any society is subject to many potentially distorting pressures, including the `bottom line of time', advertisers, governments, and editorial bias. But this is not to say that there are neither professional rules nor basic requirements on fair, accurate, and balanced reports, or that media institutions can willfully determine the quota on certain kinds of reports. Rather, many theorists and practitioners of journalism have developed scientific methods to define and avoid bias, such as the distinction between `objective' and `objectifying', (Altschull, 1984: 126), the report from both sides, and the four `strategic procedures' separating facts from feelings (Tuchman, 1978). All attempts to reduce the intentional, or even unintentional bias in the news report. Some may argue, Western news stories stress deviance and social problems, "to be pejorative, as celebratory, seeking out sensationalism, scandal, the bizarre (man bites dog)" (Dittmer, 1994: 113). It is true that Western news cannot reproduce the exact features of the Western world, but its focus is

¹⁵⁰ See Appendix B on page 159 of this thesis.

on the events that occur randomly, its major motive is to serve human interests other than to serve the pre-determined quota.

By contrast, Chinese news has its underlined purpose and subjective criteria. It must always sing the Party's praises and define its mainstream as the exposition of socialist advantages. Journalists have to seek news according to the party's dictate to meet the predetermined proportion. A comparative analysis of television stories in a week across 8 countries, including China's CCTV, has delineated the different economic news structures in respective countries (see Table 6).

Table 6. Portrayal of Economic Topics in Television News (in percentages)

	China	United States	Japan	West Germany	Italy
Economic themes					
Problem	1	8	8	25	13
Solution	11	0	3	14	0
Both	4	0	5	8	5
Neither	9	0	0	0	2
(N=)	(112)	(52)	(38)	(36)	(63)
Home economic shown as					
Strong	15	8	0	6	0
Weak	0	23	13	28	18
Neither	43	54	33	44	50
Both	2	8	0	0	0
(N=)	(53)	(13)	(15)	(18)	(22)

Source: Joseph Straubhaar etc., 'What Makes News: Western, Socialist, and Third-World Television Newscasts Compared in Eight Countries'. In Felipe Korzenny and Stella T. Toomey, *Mass Media Effects Across Cultures*, Vol. 16 (1992), Cali.: Sage Publication. p.101.

Note: This Table selects only five countries for comparison. The original study includes eight countries, the other three being: India, Colombia, and the former USSR.

Within economic stories, Western news themes reflect problems more than solutions in the population, health and food issues, and tend to question whether the overall economy is strong or weak. In contrast, China's news themes emphasize solutions and strength.

During the 1980s, China was in transition from a command economy to a commodity economy. There were many problems awaiting solutions, such as inflation, corruption, unemployment, and so on. Although the home economy was growing fast, the per-capita income was still very low (see Table 7). But within the news structure shown in Table 6, a major proportion of these problems seemed to be solved; the home economy had become strong in China. In contrast, the West seemed weaker than China.

Table 7. A Comparison of Gross Domestic Income Per Capita Between China and Developed Countries During Chinese Reform (US\$)

	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992
China	140	160	180	220	260	300	330	380
Japan	15,160	15,730	16,520	17,470	19,100	10,990	22,730	23,890
OECD	13,840	14,090	14,070	14,950	15,840	16,900	17,620	17,870
U. S.	17,040	16,820	16,450	17,770	18,200	19,040	19,380	19,370

Source: World Bank: *World Tables*, 1992, pp. 6 & 8; 1994, p. 9 (The Johns Hopkins University Press).

Note: This Table is abstracted from the source.

The pre-determined news framework suggests that, to the Party, news must focus on one thing: the process of socialism. If a news item is not favorable to this principle, it should not be broadcast. Instances demonstrating this situation are easily obtainable. I just highlight two here: one concerning foreign countries, the other, domestic affairs.

When Deng Xiaoping visited the United States and Japan in 1979, the CCTV photography team produced two documentaries: *Japan Today* and *Visiting a Worker's Family in America*. Both of them were criticized for 'prettifying capitalism' because "they showed too much of the good condition of people's lives in capitalist countries, and neglected to expose the gap between the rich and poor. It is easy to misunderstand that capitalism is better than socialism."¹⁵¹ So, these two documentaries run counter to the Party's philosophy: that socialist system is superior.

Another example may be more typical. To fulfill its economic goal, the Party realized that the education of youth was the key to creating effective labor and scientists. But one of the weaknesses in the educational system was the low status of teachers. Their wages were the lowest at the early stage of the reform. The Party called upon the people to value teachers and to improve their living conditions. The slogan 'respecting teachers and emphasizing education' appeared everywhere. In 1980, CCTV reported a typical fact that, an elementary school teacher lived with ten family members in one room. The gist of this program called for the improvement of educators' living conditions. It was in keeping with the Party's policy, but the Party claimed that the program intended to incite the masses because the problem this news exposed could not be resolved in the short term.

Even a quick glance at the news frame of China's broadcasting reveals that the news is selected on biased preconditions. This criterion, in reality, has caused serious problems for the news, and is made evident in the plunging credibility of the media.

¹⁵¹ See Note 75 on page 58 of this thesis. p. 20.

5.3. An Aggregating Effect: From the Party's 'Magic Bullet' to People's 'Oppositional Decoding'

The development of studies in mass communication effects has largely been a matter of the displacement of the 'hypodermic' model in favor of a more situational approach. When we view today's more sophisticated audience theory, we may think that the early 'magic bullet' theory seemed naive and simple. But we cannot deny that, in certain periods of its history, mass media were exactly able to master public opinion and to sway the masses toward the point of view desired by the communicator. The great power of mass media was not only verified by wartime propaganda, both during World War I in America and World War II in Germany, but also testified to by the socialist propaganda in China.

The CCP has made full use of mass media in an attempt to coordinate the efforts of its one billion inhabitants to attain socialist goals. In the past decades, numerous political campaigns and mass mobilizations have been launched to promote government policies in the name of the CCP and agitated a large number of Chinese citizens to participate in several political campaigns.

The whole approach of the Party's communication theory is exactly the same as the 'magic bullet' theory. It is based on the view that control of information input can structure the individual's perception, and media indoctrination can decide people's values, beliefs, and behaviors toward what the Party desired. Unfortunately, this was true in China for a long time in the past. The mass media were used effectively as a 'tool of proletarian dictatorship.'

Broadcasting was expected to be the voice of the Party and of the government. It must follow the Party line instantly. When the Party carried out various political campaigns, mass media had to disseminate the Party's radical line. Then, when the Party corrected the wrongs, the media quickly changed to the Party's new position. Consequently, mass media have been known for their changing tone. The changes have always coincided with the political climate of the particular time.

A well-known instance of such changing tone in the reform period is the propaganda on 'getting rich'. According to the Party, the purpose of reform is 'to make the people prosperous.'¹⁵² Deng said when 'household agriculture' policy spread in the countryside, "to get rich in a socialist society means prosperity."¹⁵³ China's media carried a large number of reports about 'rich peasants'. For example, when a family's annual income increased to ten thousand yuan (about \$3,000), this family was called a 'ten thousand yuan household'. In the first half of the 1980s, the 'ten thousand yuan household' models were reported every day and were praised as a successful instance in implementing the policies of the Third Plenum.¹⁵⁴ But not long after, the policy that encouraged people to 'get rich' led to polarization, with the rich pitted against the poor, and criticism began to mount. Subsequently, the propaganda changed tone to emphasize that there were only a handful of rich households and they had to face business risks.

Actually, many Chinese had been aware that they were living amidst lies by the end of the 1970s when reform made reassessments of the Party's propaganda philosophy

¹⁵² The title of an article on *People's Daily*, March 19, 1984. Cited in Schram, *Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Plenum, 1978-84*, p. 62.

¹⁵³ *Beijing Review*, 38 (Sep. 8, 1986), p. 14.

¹⁵⁴ For a detailed explanation, see Schell O. *To Get Rich is Glorious: China in the 1980's* (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

possible. They started to add what they knew from experience to the official newscasts. Since they had more and more chances to learn about the outside world and its views on their country.

Since the reform, Chinese people gradually developed a critical perspective of the Party's propaganda. "The majority of audience members are sharply critical, and many of them quite cynical" (Lull, 1991: 87). Typical evidence of this reaction is that they employ a skeptical attitude, what Friedman called "the oppositional decoding" toward the media news (1994: 129). A lot of Chinese became so weary with partisan propaganda that some cynical audience decodes media propaganda to harmonize it with popular oppositional presuppositions. Chinese scholars called such a phenomenon 'converse psychology of the audience' (受众的逆反心理). The Chinese audience has learned how to seek and find hidden truths in media headlines or story juxtapositions and then make their own decoding. When the media reports concentrate on good news, such as public security, the people assume the opposite. They guess that there must be some serious security problem at this time, or the government would not pay attention to it. If they hear one story from Beijing and a different story from the Voice of America, they often assume that the truth must be somewhere in the middle (Friedman, 1994: 134).

More importantly, this decoding suggests that despite extraordinary economic growth in the post-Mao era, the Chinese remain disenchanted with their rulers. The most dramatic television footage from Tiananmen demonstrates this phenomenon. While the TV screen showed a lone man standing in front of a column of tanks refusing to allow them to advance without running him over, the CCTV commentary called him as contemptible

rebel, and argued that the footage demonstrated that the People's Liberation Army was temperate and moral -- otherwise, could a single man stop tanks? But most of the Chinese audience and others, including US president George Bush,¹⁵⁵ understood this footage in an oppositional way, they praised this young man for his courage.

Most of the broadcasting personnel realized that the credibility of their propaganda was low or very low.¹⁵⁶ The eruption of the democratic movement, or more accurately, the disagreement within the Party leaders regarding this movement, provided a temporary space for them to report the truth about this event, to work with the professionalism they had desired for a long time. Before martial law was proclaimed, the government could not completely control the mainstream media, and many journalists gave favorable reports to this movement. The coverage increased sympathy and support for the students. The people saw on CCTV scenes that were almost the same as the scenes shown on worldwide screens.

But after the hard-liners seized power, the military troops were sent to all the major media institutes. The news coverage had to turn to the side of the regime and against the mass movement. This caused thousands of journalists to participate in protests in the spring of 1989. They marched in the streets with the banner "Don't force us to lie." The protest groups appeared in front of CCTV, CPBS, Xinhua News Agency, *People's Daily*, and *Guangming Daily*. To the tune of Frere Jacques they sang, "Lying to the people, lying to the people, very strange, very strange." A favorite rhyme emerged:

¹⁵⁵ Professor James Lull told me about Bush's comments when he visited Tiananmen Square in Oct. 1989.

¹⁵⁶ A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Institute of People's University showed that 78.7 per cent of media personnel give such evaluation to the China's media. See Chen & Er, *The Perspectives on Communication Effects in China*, p. 177.

"*People's Daily* deceives the people; *Guangmin (Brightness) Daily* is not bright; *Beijing Daily* talks nonsense; CCTV turns black into white!"¹⁵⁷

While the official media could not report the true situation and events in those turbulent times, more and more Chinese turned to the alternative channels, such as loudspeakers set up by student in the Tiananmen square and campuses, or foreign broadcasters. From day to night, thousands of people stood on the road or sat down on the lawn in front of the gate of People's University in Beijing to listen to student loudspeakers.¹⁵⁸ VOA's reports were retransmitted or recorded, then printed onto paper and tacked up on street walls or poles. A number of listeners phoned VOA Call-in Shows to report local events. On June 5, a young man from Hangzhou, a middle-eastern city in China, called VOA and reported that students had lowered the flag over the provincial government building to half mast for the dead in the Tiananmen suppression. Another man in Liaonin, a north-east province of China, put a radio tuned to the VOA outside his mother's restaurant. Many passers-by stopped to listen and traffic was seriously disrupted. Both men were sentenced to prison.¹⁵⁹ There were many similar cases during that crisis. All these instances did not happen randomly; they were the inevitable reactions to the Party's media policies.

More and more ordinary Chinese knew what professional broadcasting should look like. They required the "right to purchase public knowledge" because they had paid the

¹⁵⁷ This translation was borrowed from James Lull. See *China Turned On: Television, Reform and Resistance*, p. 190.

¹⁵⁸ For a more detailed description of the reaction of the Chinese audience, see *ibid*, pp. 182-208

¹⁵⁹ Both cases are drawn from David Hess, 'The Voice of America and China'. In Chin-Chuan Lee, *China's Media, Media's China*, p.301.

durable goods tax when they bought their TV sets.¹⁶⁰ Their demands have become a key factor in changes to China's broadcasting. Market competition also encouraged broadcasters to meet the wishes of the common people in order to attract large audiences. In today's China, most people are weary of politics, and subsequently pay no attention to ideology. They have turned to material exploits. More and more individuals act in their own interest. The broadcasts have to diminish their political tone and ideological orientation as much as they can. All these changes have made it difficult for the Party's media to act in a hegemonic manner as before, and made the old "magic bullet" formula no longer workable.

Media researchers have developed much more complex models of audience' interaction with the media. Shiller states that "a great emphasis [of the active-audience] is given to the 'resistance,' 'subversion,' and 'empowerment' of the viewer." But "where this resistance and subversion of the audience lead and what effects they have on the existing structure of power remain a mystery" (1989: 149). China's case shows that the historic conditions and social contexts are important factors influencing people's responses to the media, and the meanings of programs "are constructed out of the conjuncture of the text with the socially situated reader" (Fiske, 1987: 80). As media specialists are pondering the long-term influence of mass media, the growing sophistication of the Chinese audience may demonstrate that 'accumulated media experience' (DeFleur & Dennis, 1981: 357) should be a critical factor in determining media effects, in conjunction with the description of media's power.

¹⁶⁰ In China, TV audience do not need to pay month fees.

In summing up, the Party's communication effects have shown a moving away from the audience being 'undoubtful believers' to their 'oppositional decoding'. While the new revisionism of communication theory stresses audience autonomy and assumes the audience as an active producer of meaning (Morley 1980, Fiske 1987), China's case may provide an extreme instance to support the revisionists standpoint.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Examining China's broadcasting policy during the reform period within economic and political contexts provides a far more accurate picture than does the simplistic concept of building socialism and socialist broadcasting with Chinese characteristics. In this thesis, the implications and complexities of this concept have been explored. It is impossible to come to a simple conclusion as modern China is still perplexed by confusions and controversy. But three questions seem to emerge and should be answered: Have the concepts of 'Chinese style socialism and broadcasting' been confirmed by China's (and broadcasting) reform? What is an appropriate evaluation of China's broadcasting reform? What roles will the economic forces play in promoting further changes to China's broadcasting? This Chapter will address these questions.

6.1. The Successes and Inherent Contradictions of 'Chinese-style Socialism and Broadcasting'

As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, while the concept of 'Chinese style socialism and broadcasting' was created as a creed to safeguard and legitimize the Party's political and ideological ideas and values, it also created contradictions between the

policy-makers and the people, between the Party's desires and those of the social mainstream. An assessment of China's broadcasting policy involves various criteria of success. From the Party's side, it has reached its original goal of creating a Chinese style broadcasting system in favor of its own objectives.

1) The Concrete Successes of Broadcasting Reform

Compared to the past, China's broadcasting system has made great progress during the reform era. Contrary to the unabashed commercial spirit of American broadcasting, unlike the financially strapped public service stations in many countries, China's broadcasting still fulfills its function as the Party's 'mouthpiece' while involved in the market place as a commercial enterprise.

Technologically, China's broadcasting development during the reform was a miracle. Radio and TV have become popular household items, and the programs reach more than 80 percent of the population. More advanced communication technology has been adopted in broadcasting.

Economically, China's broadcasting is doing well. It has played an important part in China's economic life not only by conveying economic information but also by its market activities. Certainly, the unitary state ownership and strict exclusion to foreign broadcasters protects it from competition, and the huge population and growing economy support broadcasting with a large audience and a lively market.

Culturally, the defense against Western culture has effectively prevented the flood

of foreign programming which has happened in many developing countries.¹⁶¹ It should be noted that the defensive policy for China emphasizes political and ideological consideration primarily, rather than cultural and sovereignty issues such as those discussed in Canada and some other Western countries. In addition, China's broadcasting has developed alternative educational channels to provide a wide range of scientific knowledge to the Chinese people.

Although China's broadcasting system has made great progress in the above aspects, it has not exceeded the boundaries designed by the Party. Broadcasting reform has been restricted within a rigidly fixed, rather than random, fashion: more changes were made in the economy than on principles of operation. As certain scholars have observed, "China's media reform has tended to be expressed in a minor way," such as in the improvement of news presentation, as mentioned above, "rather than major issues", such as the censorship system and the Party's press theory (Starck and Xu, 1983: 149). When we consider such things as human rights and political reform, such superficial reform evidently does not meet the people's expectations.

The Party firmly holds to the concept of Chinese-style socialism and broadcasting not only because the reform needs a theoretical legitimization, but also because the Party can use the defense of the 'Chinese character' to prevent reform from going too far. While the Party leaders revered the concept as a political creed throughout the reform, they did not realize or care that it contains inherent contradictions. Attempts to make practice accord with this concept have caused serious problems for Chinese society and its

¹⁶¹ For example, when the *Sesame Street* finally came to China in 1997, about 60 percent of its content was locally reproduced. See *Appendix D-14* of this thesis.

development. The concept has created confusion both on the nature of national development and in the field of broadcasting.

2) The Formulation of 'Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' Exposes Party's Misunderstanding of Modernization

In the reform era, China's leaders sought to distance themselves from the 'traditional view' that socialism is incompatible with a market economy. The real implication of 'building socialism with Chinese characteristics,' as we see, was to build an economically modernized state under politically totalitarian control. Such an objective exposes CCP's misunderstanding of modernization. It suffers from two inherent weaknesses.

First, it views only one aspect of modernization -- the material or economic aspect - to attain the goal of industrialization. Deng attempted to experiment with fundamental reforms in the flawed economic system to reduce the political crisis that might threaten the continued domination of the Communist party. He said in 1986: "...The main task of socialism is to develop the productive forces, steadily improve the life of the people and keep increasing the material wealth of society."¹⁶²

Although Deng realized the importance of economic development in maintaining social stability, he did not know that "in some instances programs of economic development... may seriously undermine such stability" (Huntington, 1968: 6). "The reformer thus has to balance changes in social-economic structure against changes in political institutions and to marry the one to the other in such a way that neither is

¹⁶² See 邓小平文选 (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*), Vol. 5, p. 134.

hampered" (ibid: 346). China's reform experiment proved that economic growth could not dissipate the social crisis and ultimately resolve the fundamental contradictions in socialist society. Otherwise, the Tiananmen massacre might not had happened in 1989.

I agree with Pelikan's argument that there are three fundamental contradictions that exist in socialist states, including China, between "the socialist ideal and the reality of its practical application, between the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population and the privileged group holding the power, between the great possibilities of economic expansion and the low standard of living of the working people" (1976:77-78). Economic development partly resolves the last contradiction, but it offers no hope for the first two. Modernization is a complex process. It involves many factors. There are two features among others that are most important: economic development and the improvement and modification of traditional political institutions. Without later improvement, China may become a *praetorian* society, which as explained by Huntington, lacks effective political institutions. In such societies, power comes in many forms and is fragmented. No agreement exists among different social groups, such as students and bureaucrats, on the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflict.¹⁶³

Second, 'Chinese style socialism' is "not at all clear what the 'socialist planned commodity economy' meant or means for political and economic actors" (Gregor, 1995: 108). A crucial problem is that there is no specific law of value on commodity production distinguishing the socialist economic system from a capitalist one. Another subsequent problem also cannot be resolved as easily as the Party assumed: that of isolating

¹⁶³ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), *passim*.

capitalistic techniques forever from the capitalistic values that are associated closely with advanced scientific development.

Even the Party has not assumed that socialism as a developmental strategy is more important than socialism as ideology; socialism has already lost its original meaning in the current policies of 'market socialism' (Ogden, 1995: 360). The leaders plainly believe that the current strategy will serve to accelerate the building of socialism. But the reform practice in the past has also revealed the increasing contradiction within the Party's policy, which lead to the social crisis marked by the Tiananmen event. The theoretical basis and some of the content of this concept must be revised to meet the mainstream of the reform and peoples' needs for information. There is little choice for the Chinese leadership except to modify the prevailing political system to better facilitate the modernization of China.

Although this effort might result in radical surgery of its orthodox theory, China should do so because the legitimization of any government actions should be in accordance with the 'public philosophy',¹⁶⁴ or democratic will. China will derive its legitimacy from the extent to which it embodies the will of its people (Huntington, 1968: 27).

3) The Dogmatic Concept of 'Building Socialist Broadcasting with Chinese Characteristics' has Become A Major Obstacle of Further Broadcasting Reform

As explained in this thesis, the concept of 'building Chinese-style broadcasting'

¹⁶⁴ Walter Lippmann defined 'Public philosophy' as "' what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently.'" See Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1955). Cited in Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society*, 1968, p. 27.

cannot be merely understood as a cultural, economic or sovereignty notion. It has been used as an excuse for political coercion by the Party.

To date, the broadcasting reform is still in evolution. The current broadcasting policy is full of contradictions and is facing increased challenges. For example, the policy of 'running broadcasting at four administrative levels' created many new local and city stations. The original purpose of establishing these stations was not aimed to avoid the concentration of ownership, but only for expanding geographical coverage of programs and the Party's voice. There was still no equal competition. Some of them aired violent programs to fill air time, or pirated programs for commercial purpose.

Since the Tiananmen suppression in the spring of 1989, the leadership has retained 'ideological work' for indoctrination and promotion of absolute loyalty to the Party role. There are increasing numbers of dissidents who were put in jail for expressing their personal opinion against the Party. Broadcasting was strengthened as a major channel for ideological supervision, and had once again resulted in more restricted license criteria for new stations.¹⁶⁵

The party rehabilitated its ideological indoctrination processes. Appendix D lists some instances of what the Party has adopted relative to broadcasting within the last year. Here are two examples:

- Western journalists were accused of having a skewed view on China, said a

¹⁶⁵ The MRTF has promulgated a new *Rule of Broadcasting Administration* in August, 1997 which required all existed broadcasting agencies to re-regist according to new rules. See *Appendix C*.

commentary in *China Daily* on Oct. 31, 1996. Foreign journalists in China were urged to learn from Edgar Snow, author of the well-known book "Red Star Over China", to write 'accurate, objective and impartial reports' about China;¹⁶⁶

- The Propaganda Department of the CCP issued an instruction in November 1996 which included eight rules to strengthen propaganda. Forbidden reports included all sensitive issues that may interfere with political and social stability; important legal suits on corruption, graft, and dissidents; and all riots, protests, demonstrations, and strikes. In addition, reports on Hong Kong must follow the Party's policy and attitude. Propaganda officials at every level must reinforce their administration and censorship.¹⁶⁷

In light of this evidence, the Party's rule seems likely to continue for a prolonged period. Broadcasting remains important both for the retention of power by the socialist bureaucratic elite, and for the modernization and political and social integration of society. (Griffith, 1979).

Can the CCP successfully maintain its autocracy on broadcasting while continuing its economic reform? The answer is clearly no. We have seen much evidence showing that the concept of 'Chinese-style socialism and broadcasting' has been challenged effectively. Despite some of the formidable obstacles in the way of broadcasting reform, several major forces may topple the Party's autocracy and eventually foster a democratic and pluralistic broadcasting system. These major forces have been examined throughout this thesis, such as technological progress, journalistic professionalization, audience requirement, and

¹⁶⁶ Snow is a American journalist who painted a sympathetic portrait of Mao Zedong and his struggling communist crusade from China during the 1930s. Snow also wrote after the forced collectivisation of land or the 'Great Leap Foward,' and claimed there were no beggars in China in the 1960s. But Chinese source say at least 30 million people died due to famine between 1958-1961. see Appendix D-4 of this thesis.

¹⁶⁷ Toronto: 世界日报 (*World Daily*), Nov. 3, 1996

financial independence. All have shaken the Party's autocratic control on broadcasting. Moreover, the disruptive forces have come not only from broadcasting itself, but also from economic reforms. Now, in the final analysis, I want to propose that the market economy will be the dynamic force to push forward further changes in broadcasting.

6.2. A Dynamic View of the Integrative Model

I have made an attempt in this thesis, not merely to criticize the broadcasting policy, but to deal with several themes or dimensions in the economic and ideological realm during the reform. What is the relation between these three orders of phenomena? Is it possible, as Chinese leaders believed, to open its door to exchange with the outside world, and to promote policies encouraging people to get rich, while insisting upon a rigid and narrow doctrinal orthodoxy (Schram, 1984: 69)?

As the integrative theory argues and as I have mentioned above, the ultimate sector to determine media nature in a society is ideology, which is a mixed system of world view, beliefs and culture. Even economic and political systems are built upon it. I have used this model to explain China's present situation. But the ideological philosophy is not unvarying, especially in a changing society. There is evidence that the Party's ideological system is experiencing many challenges. Except for some occasional factors, the economic reform will gradually affect changes in the ideological sector.


The party has partially realized that beliefs cannot fuel economic processes as Mao

had believed. So they gave up the utopian view that the class struggle, ideological persuasion and 'revolutionary transformation' of the relations of production could transform production forces (Gregor, 1995: 111). They have come to accept the commodity law of value in economic life. Ideology and propaganda have fallen by the wayside. Economic liberation has spawned a demand for civil rights and other political liberties. What these testify to is that economic forces are not always passive. They may react to ideology and play a role in changing the world view, belief and cultural systems of a society.

Bob Jessop gives a dialectic explanation of this account. He criticizes the notion of economic determination (1990: 79-103), but argues that, "Since the social relation of production have definite political and ideological conditions of existence, transformation of the economy requires a corresponding reorganization of the state and ideological relations" (1980: 71). In terms of economic force, I do not mean that economic liberalization must give rise to a democratic broadcasting system in a short period of time. However, it may play a part through a gradual and unconscious procedure. By this I mean, the integrative model which explains the economic and political system is determined by the ideological system which, in turn, determines the media system, is just a view of a static state. In the long term, some changes can also take place in ideological systems. Otherwise, we cannot explain political changes and world progress. From this protracted view, we may transform an integrative model into a dynamic relationship between media, economy and ideology. Then we can suggest what promotes such ideological changes.

The economic system can be considered a potential force promoting ideological change by undermining infrastructural bases of given ideological systems. Within this procession, economic change can indirectly affect media systems. This reactive dynamic relationship is described in Figure 5.

Figure 5. A Dynamic Integrative Model of Media and Culture



Legend: ———→ Affective direction shown by static model¹⁶⁸
→ Influence beginning from economic reform

Compiled by author.

¹⁶⁸ The static model was originally shown by Figure 1 on page 14 of this thesis.

This model shows the interactive relations among three systems. The economic system is considered an intermediate sector, so that when some change is initiated in this system, it will penetrate into the other systems. While continuing to influence the media system as in the static model, changes in the economic system may also promote corresponding modifications in the political and ideological systems.

Many writings have demonstrated that communication, economic experimentation and sociopolitical changes worked upon each other synergistically (Duncan, 1962; Golding, Murdock & Schlesinger, 1968). From a historical point of view, the development of democratic principles in government has paralleled the evolution of free enterprise in the economy. Jessop claims that the modern democratic state cannot survive in association with the free market (1990: 175), and “if the economy is to be subject to democratic rather than bureaucratic planning, political representation must be restructured to permit the introduction of functional representation and its coordination with the parliamentary system” (1980: 71). This modification may finally spread to the media system. The marketing character in operation and the commodity character in program production have brought radical changes to China’s broadcasting system. For example, financial independence will in turn help lay the groundwork for more editorial autonomy (Polumbaum, 1994: 115), and the expansion of China's media marketplace in terms of the number of outlets and variety of offerings spurred journalistic competitiveness and strengthened responsiveness to consumer demand.

In general, recourse to the market seems to signal the effective end of the orthodox

ideological system recognized by the Party, and also affects the broadcasting system. At least three major scenarios are considered as follows:

1) Economic Growth has Invented a New Information Age

The market carries certain functional requirements with it that have implications for the political system. There must be a relatively free flow of information potentially available to all participants if the market is to operate with any real efficiency. Markets, moreover, produce interests that seek expression, and organized interests attempt to influence system-relevant political decisions (Gregor, 1995: 265). The economic developments need a free flow of information and creative ideas. The Party's manipulation of information for their own interests has been undermined by the development of communication technology. While an information revolution is finally sweeping the nation, the Chinese are becoming citizens of the global village. In early 1994, there were only 21 million households with telephones. But in 1997 alone, China expects to sign on 15 million new telephone subscribers.¹⁶⁹ Deemed most politically sensitive was the popularity of fax machines, mobile phones and modems. The number of cellular phones has more than doubled every year in the mid 1990s.¹⁷⁰ While the scale of Chinese Internet use is still unclear, according to a report, more Chinese are now embracing the Internet, with 500,000 university students and 20,000 commercial users on line.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ The figures were announced by Minister of Post and Telecommunication, Wu Jichuan, reported by Xinhua News Agency and quoted in FPA news release. See Appendix D-9 of this thesis.

¹⁷⁰ In 1994 alone, there were 1.2 million new owners. 明报 (*Ming Pao*), April 28, 1994. Cited in Lam, W. *China After Deng Xiaoping*, 1995, p. 422.

¹⁷¹ AFP, news release, Jan. 15, 1997. 23:16.

This technological development is providing the growth of a non-state-controlled culture. A survey in late 1993 found that, in Guangdong province, near Hong Kong, the British Governor in Hong Kong, Chris Patten, was more popular among the residents than the provincial governor Zhu Senlin. The Propaganda Department mounted a campaign against 'vulgar' Hong Kong and Taiwan pop artists (Lam, 1995: 424-425). But it has become impossible to hold back the floodgates for long. Information is power, and the Chinese people now have more information than at any other time in history.

2) Economic Independence has Provoked the Liberalization of Media Institutions

It is clear that from the above point onwards, economic liberalization has extended through Chinese society. In recent years, the market has transformed itself to pluralism that is structurally incompatible with totalitarianism.¹⁷² In the market, things do not contain value in themselves; value is an arithmetical outcome of a collection of supplies and consumers seeking their own interests (Schudson, 1978: 121). The social and economic costs of reform are becoming prohibitive unless commensurate steps are taken to elaborate the political structure.

Through their association with the growing free-market economy, China's broadcasting institutions have increasingly realized that they have to abide by the rules of market society which are against the old partisan spirit. The competition among themselves for audience will force them, sooner or later, to reject the structures and values

¹⁷² Jan Prybyla make a such statement in *Market and Plan Under Socialism: The Bird in the Cage* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1987), 260ff. cited in Gregor, *Marxism, China, and Development*, 1995, p. 266.

of the Party elite, and to orient themselves to their audiences. All these dynamics prompt broadcast institutions to change their character from a party tool to an attendant of the consumer -- their audience. Such change is bound to strike at the root of the Party's claim on broadcasting. As Schram argues, "As for institutions, diversity prevails, and is being actively promoted, in the economic rather than in the explicitly political realm. These two domains cannot, however, be considered in isolation from one another" (1984: 78).

In recent years, despite the effort of the Party to retain control over journalism, China's broadcasting system has continued to achieve a degree of pluralism that appears to be irreversible. We have seen how it functioned as an effective nationwide mobilization network when media censorship was lifted by the moderates during the first two weeks of May 1989.

3) Economic Diversity Creates Hope for Public Broadcasting

When Curran surveys the proposals for media reform, he examines several approaches, such as neo-liberal market approaches, public service approaches, radical market approaches. Most of the approaches he discusses are for reconstructing an ideal broadcasting system, and should be used and adapted by China's broadcasting policy makers, even though they have some features that would not operate in China. Definitely, the Public Sphere approach to broadcasting stands sharply against the Party's totalitarian theory. It encourages public service broadcasting which, under the banner of balance and objectivity, "claim to carry out both functions and to do so in the name of the public. It

sees politicians untrustworthy and to be criticized. The parties are unable to expound a coherent position, but are forced to respond issue by issue."¹⁷³

Currently in China, the endeavors to modify the broadcasting mandate have been suppressed by the Party. What can be anticipated is that, the economic liberalization will erode and change totalitarian politics. In general, as long as China seeks long-term economic growth and developments, the political leadership will have to conform to the new requirements generated by the rapidly growing market-governed economy. Although the future of mainland China remains uncertain, what seems clear is that there will be systematic changes in its political system to accommodate those already manifested in its economy.

At this point, we may say that commercialization and audience orientation will be the crucial factors to disengage the government from broadcasting bit by bit. In recent years, I have seen some TV programs that are very entertaining. Round-the-clock economic news coverage on radio and television programs expose the Chinese people to a world of information and ideas they have never seen before - too numerous for the CCP to audit. In the past two decades, despite the propaganda, censorship, control, and manipulation, China's broadcasting institutions have attempted to break up the Party's boundaries, to become an instrument of truth, an information provider, and a watchdog of the society. The democracy movement has created another major motivation to destabilize the extant system. The violence of 1989, while it temporarily halted the processes of

¹⁷³ Nicholas Garnham makes a systematic exposition on Public Sphere Theory, see 'The Media and the Public Sphere'. In Peter Golding, etl. (eds.) *Communicating Politics*, pp. 37-53.

disintegration, could not stop what appeared to be an inevitable progression (Woodruff, 1990).

The conclusion drawn from the above scenarios is that the outcome of broadcasting reform will not be decided solely by the CCP. The elite, while affirming the importance of continued reform, appear not to know how to proceed. The system is at a critical juncture. The ability of the leadership to act in the context of an ignorant population is fading away. China's leaders, while increasingly secure as the economy continues to flourish, still fear that contending ideas may lead to political instability, perhaps anarchy or revolution.

Historically, the transfer of the mass media from authoritarian to libertarian principles could “not be accomplished overnight” but, rather during a time period of “several centuries” (Siebert, 1973: 47), The years since 1978 have been a fertile period for China's broadcasting development. Changes have undermined the political and ideological basis of the Party's broadcasting policy. The CCP has lost its ideological hegemony over society in many aspects of social life. The bird has flown out of its cage. The development of a ‘commodity economy’, the process now under way, offers hope for the Chinese people: breaking the Party's autocracy in the realm of broadcasting is just a question of time.

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Appendix A

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

- APN Asia Pacific Network (broadcasting of US)
- BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
- CBBA Central Bureau of Broadcasting Administration (before 1982)
- CCP Chinese Communist Party
- CCTV China Central Television
- CIBS China International Broadcasting Station
- CPBS Central People's Broadcasting Station
- DBS direct broadcasting satellite
- EFP electronic Field Production
- ENG electronic News Gathering
- MRTF Ministry of Radio, Television and Film (Since 1982)
- NHK Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Association)
- OECD Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (Europe)
- PRC The People's Republic of China
- RCI Radio Canada International
- RFE/RL Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
- PLA The People's Liberation Army (of China)
- RMB RenMin Bi yuan(Chinese Currency)
- UN United Nations
- VOA Voice of America

Appendix B

On the Party's Journalism Work¹

Hu Yaobang²

The question of the nature of journalism work

What in fact is the nature of our party's journalism? In its most important sense, in a word, I think it can be said that the party's journalism is the party's mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the people's government, which is led by the party, and also the mouthpiece of the people themselves. Of course, these words cannot encapsulate the entire contents and role of the party's journalism. For instance, it is a kind of tie and bridge linking the party to the masses, and also an instrument for conveying information among the people, inside and outside the party, and inside and outside the country, and so on. However, since our party serves the people wholeheartedly, and the party's work line comes from the masses and goes to the masses, for the party's journalism to be able to fully play its role as the party's mouthpiece, then this naturally includes the role of conveying information from the upper levels downward and from the lower levels upward, the role of strengthening ties between the party and the masses and reflecting the masses' cries, and the role of satisfying in every respect the masses' requirements for information. Hence, as far as its most fundamental characteristic is concerned, the party's journalism is the party's mouthpiece. This is not just a tenable position, it is an unshakeable one.

There are many journalism units in our country; I hear there are now several thousand and there are bound to be many differences between them. For instance, Liberation Army's Daily should be the mouthpiece of the Central Military Commission; Worker's Daily, China Youth Daily, and Chinese Women's News should be the mouthpiece of the all-China Federation of trade Unions, the Communist

¹ *The People's Daily* (人民日报), April 14, 1985. The English version of this article was first published in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China*, April 15, 1985. Republished as Appendix Three in the *Chinese Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 18, No. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1986), pp. 175-198.

² Hu was the General Secretary of the CCP when he gave this speech.

Youth League (CYL) Central Committee, and the All China Federation of Women; the provincial papers should be the mouthpiece of the provincial CCP committees and governments, all of them are under the unified leadership of the Central Committee, and all of them work in accordance with the line, principles, and policies of the party; and so these differences do not and should not affect the fundamental nature of their papers as the party's mouthpiece. If it weren't so, if the fundamental nature of these papers were actually affected by these differences, would they not be deviating in orientation? As for the papers of the CPPCC and the democratic parties, together with various specialised and technical journals of certain professional departments, there are some differences in the nature, and they naturally cannot all be lumped together, nor can they be called the "mouthpiece of the party". This point is also very clear. In short, the question of the fundamental nature of the party's journalism is a key question. Certain veteran comrades may be indifferent regarding this, and certain young comrades who are just starting work and lack basic training may not have a very good understanding of this basic viewpoint. We should work patiently with them, and help them to undergo a little basic training.

Recently, though discussion, everyone has held that there must be complete freedom of creation in literature and art. Can journalist copy this slogan? I think it should not simply copy it. Of course, our journalism and our literature and art should enjoy the rights of freedom granted by the socialist system and the Constitution. Certain comrades say that the liveliness and vigour of journalism in recent years are without precedent; I hold that this statement accords with the facts.

This also shows that we have already improved our leadership over journalism and respected the decision-making rights that the journalism units should have. Despite this, however, prefer to say that the nature and functions of journalism and of literature and art are after all very different. The party's journalism has to speak on behalf of the party and government and voice opinions and provide guidance for work in accordance with the party's line and policies. Although not every articles or report carries by newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting stations provides guidance, and many are only personal views and observations, the main pronouncements of the party's journalism organs and their major reports

on domestic work and foreign relations should represent the party and government and not just the editor or the reporter. Literature and art are very different. The social role that writers and artists should play is not to be the mouthpiece of the party and the government, give opinions on their behalf, and provide guidance for some work or other, but to encourage and educate the people through their individual literary and artistic creation based on in-depth observation of life, and thereby produce a subtle influence on people's souls. This role is precisely that old saying which comrade [Deng] Xiaoping often quotes--the role of "engineers of the soul". It is true that party writers will display party spirit in their own writings, and party writers and those writers who support the party's line, principles and policies will express the voice of the party in their works, but the party should at no time stipulate what this or that writer should write about. It is precisely for this reason that Comrade Hu Qili recently stressed in his speech delivered on behalf of the CCP Central Committee at the Writer's Association Congress that there is a marked individual characteristic of the writer in literary creation, that writers must to a tremendous extent bring into play their individual creativity, perception, and imagination, that they must have complete freedom in choice of subject and main theme and in expressing their own thoughts, and must have freedom of creation; in this way they can write works that are influential and truly play educational role.

Proposing freedom of creation does not mean that editorial boards of newspaper, publications, and publishing houses must publish any kind of works that the writers produce. People's freedom and rights are always inseparable from a certain degree of responsibility and obligation, and there is no freedom without responsibility or right without obligations; there are has never been such a thing as absolute freedom. This is the case in all ages and all societies and with every individuals; there are only some differences in the nature and scope of responsibilities and obligations in different ages and societies and with different individuals. In 1920 Lenin said to Zetkin when talking about the freedom of creation advocated by socialism: "In a society based on private ownership, artists produce works for the market; they need buyers. Our revolution has already removed from artists the pressure of this most senseless situation. The revolution has turned the Soviet state into a protector and appreciator of artists. Every

artists and every person who hopes to become an artist can have the right to create in freedom in accordance with his ideas, whether the results of those ideas are good or bad. In this way you will encounter excitement, experiments, and confusion. However, naturally we are communists. We absolutely cannot be in a state of inertia and allow confusion to spread at all. We must consciously strive to guide this development, and form and determine its results." Lenin said: "Art belong to the people...it must unite the masses in feeling, thought, and aspiration, and enhance them." Lenin also said: "Our workers and peasants really should enjoy better things than the circus. They have the right to enjoy true, great art. Hence, it is first necessary to institute the broadest mass education and training work. They are the soil of culture ... From it will grow truly rejuvenated and great art whose forms are regulated by its content."

It is a great pity that the extremely important ideas expressed by Lenin in this long talk have for along time not been given attention by our party and by our country's literature and art circles. This talk provides us great help in understanding the meaning of freedom of creation. Today our writers, engages in creation in a socialist country, naturally enjoy complete freedom of creation. However, our party still has the responsibility to present to them completely comradely suggestions and advice when necessary, while the socialist state has various laws and regulations regarding publishing. The editorial boards of our publications, papers, and publishing houses can also make a choice and have the right to decide whether or not to publish a work. The decision of the editorial board might not be correct, and the writer has the right to demand that it revise its decision and even to demand the reorganisation of the board, but in principle, writers can never use their own freedom to deprive the editorial; board of freedom. There is even less need to mention that the party's journalism work must be under party supervision.

Then, can the party's journalism work be placed on a par with reform of the economic structure, by saying that since the enterprises should become relatively independent commodity producers, the party's journalism departments can also be run like that? I hold that it is very imprecise to put it that way. In fact, even the reform of the economic structure is only a reform of the operational management system and not a fundamental change in the nature of the ownership system. The sole aim of invigorating the

socialist enterprises is to establish a socialist economic structure full of vitality; it is impermissible to change the nature of the socialist public ownership system. As far as operations are concerned, the Party's journalism organs of public opinion. No matter what kind of reforms we are carry out, we absolutely cannot change in the slightest the nature of the party's journalism or change the relations of this work to the party. It therefore will not do to copy in journalism certain expressions used in reform of economic structure without analysing them.

Is it for journalism to be the party's mouthpiece? Is it honourable? I hold that the clear-cut reply should be: It is very good, and it is very honourable! Our party and government regularly need to put forward in various forms important ideas to the people of the whole country and indeed to the whole world, and this requires the use of various channels, including commissioning certain departments to express these ideas. The journalism departments are an indispensable channel and department, and even the most important one.

How great an honour is it to speak on behalf of the party? Only those people with a high level of ideological and political understanding are equal to this task! Shortly after liberation, there were many people who were not qualified to become PLA fighters or party members. However, out of envy, they wore cadre uniforms in order to show that they longed to become PLA fighter or communists. Later, during the 'cultural revolution', we ruined our own image. Thus, there were people who found the Communist party not reputable. However, that was only a transient phenomenon. After setting things to rights, the party has enhanced its prestige. Now the masses at home and people abroad are willing to read our newspapers and listen to our broadcasts because, in the first place, they want to know promptly what our party's Central Committee is advocating and doing. Thus, the prestige enjoyed by the party's journalism is a result of the Central Committee's prestige and the central people's government's prestige, as well as a result of its faithful transmission of the central authorities' views.

If it does not faithfully transmit the central authorities' views or if it departs from the central authorities' views how can it have acquired the enormous prestige it enjoys today? Does this not vividly picture the relations between the party's journalism and the party?

This also indicates the differences between the journalism of our country and that capitalist countries. To be sure, it is necessary earnestly to learn from journalism in capitalist countries and to learn from their writing, editing, relaying of information, their advanced technologies, and their advanced administration. However, we must not learn from their bourgeois fundamental principle of journalism work because our social systems differ. I have heard the opinion that since there are both individual and collective enterprises, the same thing can be applied to journalism. Why can there not be different voices in our country? My answer is that it is necessary to do some political analysis. In the West, in capitalist countries, newspapers representing the official standard are generally not very popular. Thus, their newspapers usually have 'nongovernment colour' and the appearance of 'newspapers run by the people.' In fact, quite a few of those newspapers 'run by the people' are run by newspaper groups which are backed by financial groups. In our socialist motherland, the interest of the party and the government are identical with those of the people and the party's newspaper are the people's newspaper. In addition, we run newspapers by relying on the whole party and the people. This makes it possible for our party's journalism work to be grounded on a broad mass basis. This is a correct road. It is very improper if we deviate from this road and think that only those individually run or collectively run newspapers can be called 'democratic newspapers'. As for the question of different voices, it depends on the issues on which there are different voices. As regards the country's political orientation and basic policies of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council represent the people's interests. Thus, everybody will naturally and necessarily hold the same opinions on these basic issues and it would be unnatural to obstinately express 'different' voices. People's opinions on various specific issues naturally differ greatly. These different voices are frequently aired in newspapers and periodicals. Many good voices are encouraged by the party

hope they can express more. This is an indicator of the normal development of the people's democratic life in our country.

I have also heard the view that the capitalist countries are more democratic than ours and that their political systems are better than ours. Everyone knows that the capitalist countries are ruled by people representing the interests of a few exploiters, whereas our country is governed by the majority of the people and their representatives. Is it not clear which of the two systems is better and more democratic? Of course, the governments of capitalist countries also do things beneficial to the people because this is required by both the peoples and the capitalists. On the other hand, our party and government also make mistakes. This may be a result of our lack of experience or a result of the infiltration of evil-doers into the party or the government. However, all this cannot change the nature of the question at issue here. Some people are of the opinion that because of the coexistence of different opinions in capitalist countries, they are more 'democratic'. This view is not supported by in-depth analysis. In capitalist countries, two classes with conflicting fundamental interests coexist. They are the exploiting class and the exploited class. The exploiting class is made up of cliques and groups with different interests. Thus, it is only natural that their opinions differ.

In fact, even in countries where bourgeois democracy prevails, different opinions are generally not given full expression. Except in a few countries where the advanced forces are relatively more powerful, the labouring peoples and the bourgeois opposition parties with rather insignificant strength cannot easily own publishing houses and newspapers with a wide circulation, not to mention radio and television stations.

Unlike that in capitalist countries, our party's journalism is the mouthpiece of the party and the government. Our party and the state serve the people. Thus, the Party's journalism can totally represent and give expression to the voice of the broad masses of people. Being the party's mouthpiece is basically the same as giving expression to the voice of the people. Of course, it is precisely because of the different nature of the two social systems that we must make their differences clear and explicit. As regards the

tortuous historical course of the development of our party and the country, we should be able to see that if the line adopted by the central authorities is correct, things will become easier. However, if the line adopted by the central authorities is incorrect, for example, the line adopted by the central authorities during the 'cultural revolution,' things will become complicated and, under such circumstances, we cannot simply say that being the mouthpiece of the central authority is the same as giving expression to the voice of the people. However, that is only a very special exception. Even under those exceptional circumstances, problems can only be solved, in the final analysis, by relying on nothing other than the joint efforts made by the party and the people. Has this not been proven by history?

We should also be able to see that journalism does not easily become a successful mouthpiece of the party. The Central Committee of our party and the State Council do not directly air their voice every day. Their voice refers to the speeches and talks delivered by our leaders on behalf of the party and the state, and to documents. Let us take documents as an example. In the six years or more since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, the largest number of documents officially issued in a single year by the CCP Central Committee has been more than fifty. Last year, more than twenty documents were issued. The number of documents issued by the State Council is a little greater. Last year, it issued more than 170 documents, including some specific stipulations on some individual problems. We do not very frequently hear from the central authorities directly. However, news reports must be addressed to the people each day or even each hour. This requires that our news workers have a high degree of enthusiasm, initiative, creativity, and a spirit of taking responsibility independently and give full play to their initiative in their work under the correct leadership of the party. Only in this way can we unremittingly publicise, with vast quantities of facts and opinions, the views of the central authorities. Thus, journalism's role as the party's mouthpiece is fundamentally identical with its role in giving play to its enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity. It is wrong to suggest that the stress on the role of journalism as the mouthpiece of the party will lead to the restriction of enthusiasm. Of course, under certain circumstances, contradictions may occur in specific work. For example, the Party Committee may

interfere too often and its criticism may be too harsh or the news workers may violate discipline. However, these contradiction must only be resolved by improving the guidance for specific work. We must not for this reason demand that such basic problems as that of the nature of the party's journalism work should be 'free from restriction'.

Under the promise that journalism should make itself a successful mouthpiece of the party, we should vigorously encourage the enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity of journalism workers and not restrict their enthusiasm, initiative and creativity.

Still less should we ask the newspapers, radios, and television stations to resemble one another totally. Various news media, such as newspapers, radio, and news agencies, should co-ordinate their work and strengthen their co-operation and division of labour. Reports on important news and documents should be exclusively released by the Xinhua News Agency. At the same time, the other news media should strive to have their own characteristics, viewpoints, stresses, style, and outlooks in their work. In 1955, Comrade Mao Zedong wrote an article entitled "In Refutation of 'Uniformity of public Opinion'" to criticise Hu Feng. At that time, Comrade Hu Feng was considered to be a counterrevolutionary. That was a wrong judgement. The central authorities have announced Comrade Hu Feng's rehabilitation. However, in this article, Comrade Mao Zedong did a good job by pointing out that public opinion in our society is at once uniform and varied. To this day, it is still worth studying and understanding. However, the nonuniformity referred to in his article mainly refers to the situation in which both the advanced and the backward among the people freely use our newspapers, journals, and platforms to compete. He did not mention the diversity is very different from the contradiction between the advanced and backward. It must precisely be vigorously enriched and developed.

The problem of the task of journalism work

The nature of journalism work determines its tasks. What are the main tasks of the party's journalism work? They can be summed up as using a great quantity of vivid facts and speeches promptly

and accurately to spread to the whole country and the whole world the ideas of the party and government and the opinions and activities of the people in various areas. Here, we stress a great quantity, rather than a small quantity; vivid rather than dull facts and speeches; and spread them quickly and accurately rather than slowly and inaccurately. Whether a press unit has done its work well should be judged by whether it has accomplished this task well. If it has accomplished this task well, this means its work is correct. If it fails to accomplish it or to accomplish it satisfactorily, this undoubtedly means there are deviations in its work.

What is the aim of the task which our party assigns to journalism circles? The aim is to arouse the broadest masses of people to strive for the realization of the ideas of the party with one heart and one mind. In the present historical period, we promote the four modernizations program at home with one heart and one mind. Internationally, we should strengthen our mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation with the people of various countries. Just remember that just after our party was founded, we had neither newspapers nor radio. We only had a publication called *The Guide*. Later, *New Youth* became an official publication of the party. Here, we set aside this matter. The guide is a good name. It means leading the way. The first news agency of our party was Red China. This was also a good name. It expressed the goal which we intended to attain: building a socialist China based on the people's democracy rather than a China under the dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie. Just see, the guide and Red China distinctly demonstrated the nature, aim, and tasks of the journalism front of our party. With such a boldness of vision, our party's journalism entered the political arena despite extremely difficult conditions.

It is absolutely appropriate to say that since the first day of the founding of our party, working together with other fronts, the journalism front has undertaken the tasks of understanding China, transforming China, understanding the world, and transforming the world. Therefore, the nature is clear and definite, the aim is clear and definite, and the task are also clear and definite.

It is no light, easy, or simple job for our journalism front to shoulder the tasks. This is not only because the requirements themselves are not simple, but because there are not many direct voices of our CCP Central Committee and the State Council, as we mentioned above, but also because the masses very often need to undergo a process to understand and accept the ideas of our party. At the beginning,, people do not understand or they even doubt our ideas. This frequently happens. One idea is accepted. Later, with the changes of the environment, the party puts forward a new ideas. Again, people do not understand or they or they doubt it. In addition, a very small number of people might distort and oppose it , so the situation would become more complicated.

Therefore, our journalism workers should be good at conducting propaganda and explaining. Only thus can they convince the broad masses of people. We should work among the people, but march at the head of their column. It is utterly absurd to adopt the method of standing above the people and putting pressure on them. We are not allowed to do so. Lu Xun said a long time ago: To hurl abuse or utter threat is no way to fight. For many years during the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' some people relied on hurling abuse, uttering threats, bragging, and indulging in empty and stereotyped talk. They put pressure on people, made people suffer, and wielded the big stick. What was the use of doing so? At that time, they had the impudence to force the people to sing: 'The Great Cultural Revolution is good. It is good. It is truly good.' It is truly ridiculous! Of course, the 'Great Cultural Revolution ' itself was wrong. People could not be convinced no matter what kind of propaganda gimmick was employed. However, even if a thing is correct, it is not a simple and easy job to persuade people to understand it. Strenuous efforts must be made. In addition, good ideological content and a strong and skillful capability for expressing our ideas are also needed. For example, since the convening of the Third Plenary of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, the series of correct policies have produced the desired result. In particular, the production responsibility system in the rural areas has obtained results. Many foreign friends admire our success. However, very often, they do not truly understand the cause and effect of the matter. This requires that our

journalism workers use common and vivid expressions and other means to explain the matter so that people will easily understand it. It is by no means a simple thing to convince people.

Apart from the above-mentioned factors, there is one thing we should mention. In the process of implementing the correct policy and ideas of our party, we very often encounter obstructions and interference. Since the implementation of the decision on the overall economic structural reform adopted by the Third Plenary of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, the economic situation in reform is also good. However, some problems have occurred, including some unhealthy trends. These unhealthy trends disrupt the economy rather than enliven it. They undermine rather than promote reforms. In this respect, we should rely on our journalism circles and media to raise a cry of warning, to expose and criticize these unhealthy trends. Don't we say that everyone is equal before the truth? Let us discover and obey the truth, distinguish right from wrong, and differentiate between the true, the good, and the beautiful and the false, the evil, and the ugly.

In a word, we say that our party's journalism should become the mouthpiece of the party. However, this does not mean that our journalism workers can only copy the remarks that have been uttered by the central authorities. What we mean is that a wide prospect is offered for our journalism workers to carry out their correct understanding of the objective matters as long as they conform with the line and policy of the central authorities. They can give full play to their enthusiasm, initiatives, and creativity. This required that our journalism workers have a good state of mind. It is no good if they lack the spirit of working hard, fighting unswervingly, and making process. It is no good if they lack the spirit of going deep among the masses, forming ties with the masses, seeking truth, absorbing new knowledge, continuously steeling themselves, and enhancing their capability. Comrades working in journalism circles should think about Zou Taofen, an outstanding representative in the history of journalism in our country. He always felt "My knowledge is meager, and I must keep on learning while doing my work." During the white terror of the KMT reactionary rule, he shed his heart's blood in order to strive for democracy and spread the truth. As he pointed out: "I am willing to do so even if I drift from place to place, and live

under hard and dangerous conditions.” The thing he appreciated most in his life was: “My entire spirit is merged with my work.” We still remember a famous saying of Lu Xun: What I eat is grass, what I give is milk. This was his self-portrayal. This was also his good explanation of the ‘willing ox.’ The material treatment which society gave to Lu Xun was too meager, but his contributions to society were incomparably great! The fact that Lu Xun died young was obviously connected to overworking under meager material conditions. When we think of this, we believe that our comrades will correctly treat some problems and difficulties occurring in their life. In our ranks, honor belongs to those comrades who unswervingly strive for the interests of the people, and are bold in dedicating themselves to the great cause. The state of mind of being irresponsible, reluctant to make progress, muddling along, and resting content with lagging behind should be despised.

Basic requirement for the successful handling of journalism

This is also a long-standing controversial issue in journalism circles. According to traditional and accepted opinions, journalism under whatever social conditions must bear a number of necessary characteristics and must follow some general rules. When handling journalism, our proletarian party also follows these general rules by and large. How, then should we look at these ‘characteristics’ of journalism?

First, veracity, Ours is a proletarian party, so it is certain that we must ensure the veracity of our news reports and must view and describe things as they really are. We consistently stand for seeking truth from facts and guarding against any exaggeration and boastful remarks, because this goes against the very nature of the proletarian party. However, there is always a dispute over the definition of veracity. For example, what is the reality in socialist society? We hold that the mainstream of socialist society is bright and at the same time there is also a seamy side of things. We do not deny the existence of the seamy side, but it is just a nonessential side of things in socialist society. In a large country like ours, it would be very easy for someone to collect a hundred scandals each day and publish them in the newspaper if he want to

do so. These one hundred stories may be reportedly by one single newspaper with four full pages, then the newspaper could show a thoroughly dark picture of our country. Each of the stories might be true, but it would not be true to say that the stories represent the entire scene of life in socialist China.

Of course, neither would it be true if we go the other extreme and say everything in our socialist society is good and excellent and that no evil or defects exist. Therefore, we told comrades in journalistic circles last year that in general, our newspaper should give 80 percent of their space to reporting good things and achievements and give the remaining 20 percent of their space to criticizing the seamy side of things and to exposing our shortcomings. This not only conforms with the reality of our society, but will also promote party rectification.

The issue of veracity is one over which we have argued for a long time with some writers. Some writers always say that their works reflect the truth, but they fail to realize whether their works have faithfully reflected the overall situation in our society and whether these works can inspire people to create a new life or not. If a writer write something that shows no hopeful future for our society and our people, how can we say that hid works conform with the actual course of historical development and that the writer himself has faithfully performed his social duties? Here, I would like to quote a passage of Marx when he criticized the censorship order issued by the Prussian government: 'The main demonstrative form of spirit is cheerfulness and brightness, but you argue that gloominess is the sole and legal demonstrative form of spirit; toy just allow spirit to be dressed in black, but there is no black flower in nature.' Marx criticized the Prussian government's order which required all journals and newspapers to take only one color, the official color. Now, that kind of official color criticized by Marx does not exist in our country. Our party adheres to the cultural policy of letting a hundred schools of thought contend. That is, we hope for a more colorful scene in our literature, and the colors used to describe the joyful and bright new life and the struggle for this new life are certainly brilliant, bright, and gay. We should reflect both the bright and dark sides of things, but the purpose of exposing the dark side is only to educate the people to

eliminate it. We have the confidence to eliminate the dark side in our society, so we should not show gloomy feelings even when writing about the dark side.

As far as the news reports in capitalist countries are concerned, some people in our journalism circles think that they are more faithful to facts than our news reports, and that journalist in capitalist countries are more courageous than we in exposing scandals. I do not think so. For example, our present political situation is unprecedentedly stable, but newspapers and radios in the West often spread rumours on the basis of hearsay. They even said that the Chinese political situation was not stable enough and that the “Conservatives” were trying to overthrow the “pragmatists” and that the army did not obey the central authorities and so on. How can this be true. Sometimes, they issue an untrue report in a prominent place, and when they have no way to conceal their mistakes they just publish a correction in an inconspicuous place. If they spread biased opinions or rumours through commentaries, they do not even publish a correction statement. That is the so-called impartiality they advocate. Our journalists have done a great deal of serious criticism and self-criticism, but Western journalists will never to do so. Their courage to expose bad things also depends on the subjects they deal with. Western countries also need to keep some things strictly confidential, and people who betray confidential matters are also punished. Therefore, it is not true to say that the news reports in the West are more “faithful to facts” than ours.

As for the issue of veracity, there is one more point that we should pay attention to. We must be particularly prudent and careful when handing reports concerning people’s rights and wrongs and merits and demerits. We must repeatedly verify the facts and must not hastily publish this kind of report.

A few years ago, it was said that as long as the facts are basically verified, the reports could be published. Now it seems that this is not a correct standard. We must emphasize thorough verification so as to ensure faithful accounts. In particular, when we criticise people by name, we must strictly follow the relevant regulations laid down by the central authorities. This is because when somebody is criticised in a newspaper by the name, he will be disgraced in the whole country or even in the whole world, and this is more serious than criticism by an inner-party circular or by the bi-character posters during the “Cultural Revolution.” So we must be very prudent and careful and must not decide things according to our personal feelings. The practice of first

overthrowing somebody and then deciding the nature of his problems, followed during the “Cultural Revolution,” wronged a large number of good comrades. We must not forget this serious lesson that we should draw from the past.

Second, timeliness. Should we emphasize the timeliness of news reports? Yes, of course. I think it is important to ensure timeliness and high efficiency in our work. At present, we are still too slow in the handling of many things, and our work efficiency is indeed too low. Comrade Xiaoping highly appreciates the slogan “time is money.” May be this reflects his feelings. Over the past thousand of years, the Chinese people have been accustomed to a lifestyle of “beginning to work on the farms at sunrise and then going home at nightfall.” So they lack the mentality of racing against time and making every minute and second count. This is also a demonstration of our backward natural economy and the closed and stagnant social conditions. This represents a part of the heavy burden left one by history upon us and forms an obstacle to our present-day cause. You can see that the pace of our social life in many field is still slow. This can be seen in our meetings, our works, and even our way of walking. We are now shouldering the task of building modernization, but some comrades are still advancing at a slow speed like an old ox pulling a rickety cart, and they do not understand the importance of high efficiency. In our journalism work, especially the part dealing with external propaganda work, there are still many things that show our low work efficiency. Our news reports are often not ‘new’ enough, and our reports are often published far behind foreign news agencies and newspapers. This state of affairs has seriously weakened the results of our propaganda work.

Journalism work must stress its timeliness, but this does not mean that we should make a scoop on news reporting at the expense of other things. We should not confuse high efficiency in news reporting with haste in our work. When reporting some important news and major affairs, if we do not give full consideration to the arrangements and so not ask for necessary instructions from the higher authorities but go headlong into action, we will very likely cause damage to prestige of our party. Conversely, if we postpone the publication of some important things, the result may be more favourable. For example, many speeches included in the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* were made a few years before the book was published and the speeches were not

published as soon as they were made. Wasn't the publication of these speeches still big news afterward? Therefore, being efficient in reporting should not be confused with being hasty. The timing of publishing important news should be subject to the needs of political considerations. Some should be published as quickly as possible; some should be published not so quickly; and some should not be made public for a period of time. In addition, we should pay attention to the principle of confidentiality.

If we unduly emphasize the importance of timeliness and even place this point above all other principles, we may go so far as to disregard discipline and thus make mistakes.

Third, the need to make news reports more interesting and instructive. Our four modernization require rich and diverse knowledge, especially modern scientific and technological knowledge. So I agree that our newspapers and journals should introduce more modern scientific and technological knowledge to the readers; it is also necessary to introduce some historical, geographical, literacy, and business management knowledge. Not long ago, there was a passable television drama called A poem about Luo's Gods. Viewers found a number of mistakes in this drama. For example, Cao Zhi was the third son of Cao Cao, but the drama said that he was Cao Cao's second son. As the poem was written by Cao zhi after Cao Cao's death, how could Cao Cao red it, as the drama describes? If the ancient Chinese thought that the heart was an organ of thinking, how could Cao Cao pat his own head and say that his brains were not good to use? In fact, many of our works, not only literary works but also works on social and natural sciences and some news reports, show a lack of relevant knowledge. Examples can be found everywhere. This should attract our attention. Our works and newspapers must convey some knowledge and must be interesting. What if you write something that is so boring that no one wants to read it? Of course, when emphasizing the need to make the things we write more interesting and instructive, we should follow some given principles and should not go beyond the limits. We must not allow some people to spread feudal, superstitious, and decadent capitalist ideas under the guise of making things more interesting and instructive. For example, a great number of indecent tabloids have enumerated a number of cases in this regard at a meeting of the Central Secretariat. If these things are allowed to run unchecked, they will poison the minds of young people and sap the morale of the working people!

Here I would like to talk in passing about the question of spiritual pollution, because this issue, which was originally very clear, has now been confused by certain comrades. As everyone knows, ‘we cannot have spiritual pollution on the ideological front,’ and ‘the essence of spiritual pollution is to disseminate a variety of decadent and moribund ideas of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes, and to spread lack of faith in the socialist and communist cause and in the Communist party’ were proposed by comrade (Deng) Xiaoping at the Second Plenary Session of the Twelfth CCP Central Committee in September 1983, and the session unanimously agreed. Afterward a process was undergone, and Comrade Zhao Ziyang’s government work report delivered at the Second Session of the Sixth NPC in May 1984 further explained this issue. Here, I want to quote in full the two relevant passages from that report. One passage said: ‘In order to guard against and overcome the erosion caused in the new historical conditions by decadent and moribund ideas of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes, to better uphold the four basic principles, and to correctly implement the principle of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend, the First Session of the Sixth NPC held last year pointed out that bourgeois liberalization trends must be criticized in the field of ideology and culture; afterward, the third meeting of the Sixth NPC Standing Committee went further in stressing that we cannot have spiritual pollution on the ideological front.’ The other passage said: ‘acting in accordance with the principles of the State Constitution provisions and the correct policies stipulated by party and government, the departments in the field of ideology and culture have done a great deal of work in opposing and resisting spiritual pollution and achieved notable success.

‘They have curbed the sinister trend of spiritual pollution pursued by a few people in the previous period, and banned obscene publications according to law. In opposing spiritual pollution, certain inappropriate measures were taken by some places and unites because at the start we did not provide sufficient explanation on certain policy demarcation lines; but we promptly corrected this as soon as it was discovered.’ Please note, comrades, these two passages in the report were repeatedly weighed by the CCP Central Committee. There are a number of points here, as follows: First, the central authorities have consistently upheld in a clear-cut way and have never abandoned the slogans of opposing and overcoming the erosion caused by decadent and moribund

capitalist ideas. Second, the guiding principle of not having spiritual pollution on the ideological front, which was pointed out by the Comrade Xiaoping and unanimously agreed by the Central Committee plenary session, is completely correct. Third, we have spoken clearly and with propriety on the shortcomings in opposing spiritual pollution, by saying that ‘certain inappropriate measures were taken by some places and unites because at the start we did not provide sufficient explanation on certain policy demarcation lines.’ Then whom does this ‘we’ refer to? It refers to our CCP Central Committee secretariat and State Council! Comrade (Zhao) Ziyang’s report was unanimously approved by the 1984 session of the NPC, and could be regarded as a final conclusion. In fact, the CCP Central Committee had considered that as the expression ‘spiritual pollution’ was not familiar to most people, it might cause misinterpretations of various kinds at home and abroad, and this would be even more so if the word ‘eliminate’ were placed in front of it, and this in fact could not be achieved. So this expiation should be used less or not used unless absolutely necessary. However, this certainly does not mean that there is anything wrong with the principle of opposing spiritual pollution, and still less does it mean that we need not resist or oppose true spiritual pollution, that is, erosion caused by decadent and moribund exploiting-class ideas. As far as the present is concerned, should we not investigate those harmful tabloids I mentioned above? Should we allow them to poison the bodies and minds of youths and juveniles and sap the working people’s morale? For a time in the past, certain places and certain comrades inflated this issue and even investigated people’s daily life and clothing and so on. This was wrong, but the misinterpretation and distorted ideas of these people have long be corrected. The ideological front, including the journalism front, cannot go in for stuff like those indecent tabloids! Should we not resist and oppose such things when they appear? At present there are a few provinces where there are particularly large numbers of these tabloids, even having an impact on railroad passengers. how can they do this? Problem like this should mainly be solved in the thinking of the leadership and in the work of the provincial CCP committees propaganda departments, the provincial cultural departments and bureaus and certain newspaper offices; the problem should not be taken back into society and among the masses. In Short, the CCP Central Committee and the people have reached a final conclusion on the question of opposing spiritual pollution, and no party member can do as he pleases, heedless of this conclusion.!

Veracity, timeliness, knowledge, and interest, these are the demands on journalism work. However, what is our party's most important demands on journalists? I hold that it is to have a clear-cut and correct stand, clear-cut class nature and party spirit, and the scientific attitude of seeking truth from the facts. Comrade Mao Zedong said: "We take the stand of the proletariat and the masses. As far as party members are concerned, this is also to take the stand of the party and the stand of party spirit and party policies."

Comrade Mao Zedong used the words 'this is also' here to indicate that the 'party stand' was identical with the 'people's stand.' In order to uphold a correct stand in our journalism work and enable all our views and reports to truly accord with the fundamental interests of the people of the whole world, it is necessary to adopt the scientific attitude of seeking truth from facts. Such a scientific attitude does not contradict party spirit and party stand. It is precisely the requirement of party spirit. An attitude without a scientific nature is an attitude without party spirit or with imperfect party spirit. Therefore, our news should be reported only when we are sure about the matter before reporting the news. If an event takes place in the world, what should we do when other countries have reported the news and yet we do not know the inside story? We can first report the news in an objective manner and then put in our views after the facts are gradually ascertained. This should also be reported as a clear-cut stand. In short, what we fundamentally require is to uphold a clear-cut and correct proposals of the CCP Central Committee, and adhere to the scientific attitude of seeking truth from facts.

Finally, the question of personnel

Things are done by man and man is closely related to things. When ever we discuss matters, we refer to man, cadres, and the core of leadership. We have already established a contingent of around 300,000 journalists and reports. Generally speaking, this contingent is good. Naturally, apart from the journalism front, the cadres at all other fronts have made great contributions in their recent work. They have markedly improved their ideological and political level, effected a remarkable change or at least a good start in changing their work style, and strengthened their links with the people. In addition, there have been great changes in their age and educational structure. All this shows that the party's political, organisational, and cadre lines are correct.

Nevertheless, there are still many problems in our cadre ranks. Only by exerting our utmost energy, adopting more measures, and spending the necessary time can we further improve our cadre ranks and suit the needs of the developing situation.

With regard to the issue of cadres, the problem of recruiting some people for certain departments can be considered. But we should say that all our departments are overstuffed rather than understaffed. Even those places which need to recruit new people have a problem of succession of young cadres to old ones. If some cadres are not competent in their present posts, and there are other posts more suitable for them, we must try to make a transfer. Meanwhile, we must be aware that the principle and universal problem of the basic condition of our cadre ranks is none other than that of making great efforts to improve the quality of our cadres. Therefore, leading comrades of all departments should seriously take this principal matter into account. We must not only improve the quality of cadres to some extent, but also make vigorous efforts to strive to attain a marked improvement. Although some departments have laid stress on this question, the measures and results on the whole are ineffective. What kind of principle should be adopted to improve the quality of our cadre ranks? In my opinion, we should strengthen party spirit, enhance professional ability, and strengthen unity between comrades.

To strengthen party spirit means that the whole party, particularly party cadres, should wholeheartedly serve the people and serve the prosperity of the country and people.

In the past, the Chinese Communists fought bravely for China's liberation. Now they should exert their utmost to strengthen and work hard for the prosperity of the state and people. Should a party member exert his utmost energy in struggling for the prosperity of the state and people, or should he try by every means to seek personal benefit and increasing the income of his small unit? This is a matter of primary importance. What are the tasks of Communists? What should actually be proposed, opposed, allowed, and not allowed within the party? These problems should be put forward clearly in party rectification. We must speak clearly on such a major issue of principle. Naturally, by strengthening party spirit, we do not mean to repeat the past practice of bludgeoning people. To abstain from bludgeoning also does not mean to abstain from criticizing or punishing those who should be criticized or punished.

Enhancing professional ability means that should encourage people to study and improve their ability and we should be strict and fair in meting out rewards and punishment. In our party history, a number of very well-known reporters have emerged. Now we should continue to make efforts to train and foster an even larger number of fine new reporters. We should attach importance to talented people and find appropriate ways to test and evaluate the professional ability of our journalism cadres. We should be strict and fair in meting out rewards and punishment and give rewards to all the comrades who have proved to be politically and ideologically excellent and have good knowledge and skill, and who have scored achievements.

Here, I want to stress enhancing unity. This perhaps is one of the relatively outstanding problems on our journalism front and even on our entire ideological front, therefore, I should take more about it. Now a problem has emerged: Will new knots be tied before we have entirely united the old ones? There was an old saying: "Scholars tent to scorn one another." I do not want to apply this saying now, but I think that it is indeed necessary for us to be on our guard against it. I also want to say that the problem for some comrades is not that they "scorn one another," but they "scorn themselves." Scorning oneself may end up in harming oneself. A few years ago, a comrade told me that there was always studied people. Is there still this kind of people now? I very much admire Comrade Ba Jin. He is 81 years old this year, still he always says that a writer should concentrate on his work of writing. If everyone does that, rumours and gossip will find no market and the problems related to unity will be easy to solve. I think that his words are indeed very true.

Of course, what we mean by unity is not an unprincipled unity, but a unity on the basis of the party's correct line. What should we do in our comrades have some shortcomings or mistakes? We should talk heart to heart with them. Now, the CCP Central Committee calls us to carry out the four modernizations with one heart and one mind. Only by adhering to unity can we maintain a firm foothold and can we bring benefit to the party's cause. Everybody is liable to have shortcomings and commit mistakes. No one can be always absolutely correct. We should unite together and look ahead!

In conclusion, our party has already announced to the whole country and the whole world our magnificent program of struggle, namely, quadrupling our gross industrial and agricultural output value, conducting the four modernizations and building our country into a modern socialist country with a high degree of civilisation and democracy. In building such a great socialist country, we are advancing on the foundation that our predecessors have laid for us, but our achievements will be a great stride forward compared with what our predecessors have done.

We are confident in saying that as long as we really achieve this goal, it will have great repercussion on the whole world. We must work hard for the prosperity of our country and do our utmost to achieve this goal. In this contest of great historical significance, the comrades on journalism front should play the glorious role that they must and can play. This is what I expect of the comrades on the journalism front.

Appendix C.

THE RULE OF BROADCASTING ADMINISTRATION ¹

An Order of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, No. 228

Assented to 1st August, 1997 by The 61st Meeting of State Council

Signed by the Premier Li Peng on August 11, 1997

(Extraction)

PART I GENERAL (Through Clause 1 - 7)

1. This rule is formulated in order to strengthen the administration on broadcasting, to develop broadcasting, and to promote socialist spiritual civilization and material civilization.

3. Broadcasting undertakings should insist on the orientation to serve the people, to serve the socialism, and to canalizing public opinion toward correct direction.

PART II RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS (Through Clause 8 to 16)

10. Radio and television stations must be built by the governments above county administrative level. No other agency, no

individual is allowed to create radio or television station.

The state forbids foreign investment in domestic radio and television stations, forbids joint-venture or co-operative formula on radio and television station.

PART III THE TRANSMISSION NETWORKS (Through Clause 17 - 29)

PART IV RADIO AND TV PROGRAMMING (Through Clause 30 - 46)

32. Radio and television stations should improve the quality of the programs, increase the quantity of excellent programs, and must not produce and broadcast the programs carried on following contents:

- a. Endangering national unity, sovereignty and country's territorial integrity;
- b. Endangering the safety, honor and interests of the state;

¹ This document is first published in 人民日报. (*People's Daily*) on August 20, 1997, p. 5.

- c. Agitating for minority split, harming ethnic unity;
- d. Revealing state secret;
- e. Slandering or insulting others;
- f. Advocating pornographic, superstitious belief, and violence;
- g. All others forbidden by laws and administrative rules.

33. Radio and television stations should censor their programming according to the rule in clause 32 before the program are broadcast. Re-aired program should be re-censored

39. Overseas film and dramas for broadcasting must be censored and approved by the state broadcasting administrative bureau. Other kinds overseas programs must be censored and approved by the state broadcasting bureau or other agent authorized by the state broadcasting bureau.

40. The total time of overseas programs should be regulated by the state broadcasting bureau who set a proportion of overseas programming.

41. Importation and transmission of overseas broadcasting program through satellite must be approved by state broadcasting bureau.

43. The state administration bureau has right in special circumstance to make decision on stopping broadcasting, replacing program, and broadcasting appointed program.

PART V
PUNISHMENT
(Through Clause 47 - 53)

PART VI
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES
(Through Clause 54 - 55)

54. All radio and television stations, instructional stations, relay and transmitting stations, and other production agencies built prior to this rule should re-register upon above new regulations within the following six months; any of them who can not accord with this new rules will be revoked.

55. This rule come into force on September 1st, 1997.

China tries 'spiritual' campaign

Jiang seeks to balance unrestrained growth, shore up his leadership before key meeting

IAN JOHNSON
BALTIMORE SUN

BEIJING – In recent weeks, China has taken on an unreal air. Home to the world's oldest continuous civilization, the country is now being told by its leaders to get civilized.

Part of an effort to shore up President Jiang Zemin's reputation as a strong, thoughtful leader, the campaign to "Construct Spiritual Civilization" has plastered China's ancient cities and streets with enigmatic slogans such as: "Be a civilized citizen together"; "Strengthen the construction of socialist spiritual civilization"; and "The loving of our country is the primary pillar of the development of the Chinese spirit."

Although it appears at times whimsical, building "spiritual civilization" in the homeland of Confucius and Zen Buddhism is to become an official national priority this week, when the party's annual plenum is to convene in

Beijing.

The meeting of China's top leaders is expected to embrace "spiritual civilization" as a counterbalance to the country's mad-dash economic growth and all its accompanying evils. China's 1.3 billion people are to learn some civic virtues – and be reminded to toe the government line.

"The market economy is about individual interest and thus it can lead to excesses like money worship and hedonism," said Professor Luo Guojie, head of the China Morality Academy. "And over the past few years, society has been damaged by these trends."

The solution, according to Sun Ping, a top propagandist in the Beijing municipal government, is for people to "improve their moral quality, which includes their thoughts and behavior."

The movement strikes many Chinese as more than a little anachronistic, with the ruling Communist Party cranking up its rusty propaganda machine to reach a population long in-

ured to slogans.

Yet as in virtually every other campaign over the past 50 years, millions of billboards have gone up, with clean towns and clean-cut individuals held up as models. One town bans smoking and spitting, while in Shanghai an oft-lauded plumber works overtime for free.

But no one seems to be paying much attention.

"Spiritual civilization? Never heard of it," said a middle-school teacher in Beijing. "I teach Chinese language but I have never heard the term before. Does it mean anything?"

Spiritual civilization seems to mean three things: a genuine attempt to instill civic virtues in daily life; an effort to enforce discipline in economic, political and religious affairs, and a gambit by Jiang to carve out a name for himself and win more political power.

Politeness, the government hopes, is to be learned by emulating civilized

PLEASE SEE CHINA, PAGE B6

people. The government-run television news, for example, recently profiled a Beijing bus conductor who doesn't snap at people and helps them board the bus.

The government has found scores of other model citizens, most remarkable only because they do the unremarkable: they work uncomplainingly, they don't take bribes and they wash their hands after going to the bathroom.

While people are being admonished to flush the toilet after each use, they also are being warned that the government will not prop up every failing state-owned enterprise. Banks are to become accountable for profits and losses, and the currency will become convertible by the end of the decade.

Cracking down on wayward thinking is necessary because the party hasn't rectified people's thoughts in a decade, said Professor Yan Shuhan, of the Scientific Socialism Department of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party.

"The environment has changed and there is now a greater appreciation of the need to enhance the construction of spiritual civilization," Yan said. "We believe that spiritual civilization is the key to the full development of our country."

On this level, the campaign resembles an attempt to create a giant Singapore – clean, boring and ruled by one party – out of China's grubby and sometimes chaotic daily life.

On another level, however, the campaign is part of an attempt by Jiang to reinforce his position as the country's top leader. Jiang, who is stepping out from the shadow of ailing patriarch Deng Xiaoping, has identified the country's flagging morals and resistance to central-government rules as problems that he can fix.

"Deng gave China rapid economic growth and did away with communism. Jiang wants to be the person who sets the ideological tone for the country in the coming years," said a Western diplomat in Beijing. "That tone is orderliness and tidiness."

The impression is important because Jiang is trying to establish himself as a leader on par with Deng. This week's plenum will set the stage for key leadership changes next year, so spiritual civilization is a way for Jiang to show skeptical colleagues that he deserves to be China's next paramount leader.

Appendix D. 2. China Daily Tells Radio Free Asia to 'Shut up'

FPA, newsrelease 96/10/18

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Agence : FPA Numéro du communiqué : 045296 Date: 96/10/18 Heure: 00:57:01
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China Daily tells Radio Free Asia to 'shut up'

BEIJING, Oct 18 (AFP) - China's state media resumed its attacks on US-funded Radio Free Asia on Friday, accusing Washington in an editorial of using news in a "trick" to violate the political and social stability of other countries.

"Radio Free Asia had just better shut up, since the Asian people have become sick and tired of the endless harangue from America," the official China Daily said.

It said the broadcasts, modeled on Radio Free Europe, were a Cold War anachronism and aimed "to create chaos and disturbance" in target countries.

A Chinese official earlier this month criticised them for having a "strong political leaning," but the US side has defended the project as an effort to enhance Chinese people's access to information.

Technically a private corporation funded by around 10 million dollars of federal grants a year, Radio Free Asia was first suggested in the US Congress following China's 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests.

The China Daily editorial alleged that most of the network's government funding comes from the CIA, which it said had been involved in foul play around the world.

"Backed by such a dubious agency, what is Radio Free Asia to do?" it said.

The network began broadcasting in Mandarin on September 30 and has said it is being heard in Beijing and Shanghai, although its limited hours and indeterminate frequency have made it difficult to tune into.

In addition to mainland China, the radio station also plans to target Burma, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea and Vietnam. It plans to complement the US government-funded and managed Voice of America.

Radio Free Europe, which transmitted news and commentary to Eastern-bloc countries during the Cold War, continues to broadcast to former Soviet states and some Eastern and Central European countries from its headquarters in Prague.

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Appendix D. 3. *China Daily* Asks Western Scribes to be 'Objective'

FPA, newsrelease 96/10/31

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Agence : FPA Numéro du communiqué : 023682 Date: 96/10/31 Heure: 03:38:23
.....

i0209tm--p

r i China-press 10-31 0315

Chinese daily asks Western scribes to be "objective"

BEIJING, Oct 31 (AFP) - An official Chinese daily Thursday urged Western correspondents to be "objective, comprehensive, impartial" in the manner of famed American journalist Edgar Snow.

An editorial in the *China Daily* accused Western journalists of having a skewed view of a diverse and rich cultural tradition and an alien polity and imposing Occidental yardsticks on everything.

"Western journalists judge China according to their own standards which are

not appropriate due to the different social, cultural, economic and political situations of different countries," it said.

The editorial coincided with trenchant criticism in the Hong Kong press of Wednesday's 11-year jail term imposed on Chinese dissident Wang Dan, convicted by Beijing for a plethora of anti-state activities.

Foreign journalists were barred from entering the Stalinesque Beijing courtroom and threatened with expulsion by security forces when they pressed their right to cover the trial from inside.

The *China Daily* held up Edgar Snow, author of the well-known book "Red Star Over China," as the epitome of objectivity and sensitivity.

Exhorting journalists to "promote mutual understanding between different nations and different peoples in the world," the daily said Snow's reporting underwent a sea change after an assignment on the Long March between 1934-35.

It said Snow, who went to cover Communist leader Mao Zedong at his base in the caves of Yanan, "believed what he had experienced and accepted was the reality and returned (from Yanan) With a different conception."

Snow, writing after the forced collectivisation of land or the "great leap forward," had claimed there were no beggars in China in 1960. But Chinese sources say at least 30 million people died due to famine between 1958-61.

js/ach/jrb

AFP

AFP 310838 GMT 10 96

Appendix D. 4. China Urges Western Media to Study Model Reporters

Reuter, newsrelease 96/10/31

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Agence : REA Numéro du communiqué : 022186 Date: 96/10/31 Heure: 01:56:58
.....

a0152reute

u i BC-CHINA-JOURNALISTS 10-31 0443

^BC-CHINA-JOURNALISTS (SCHEDULED)@

^China urges Western media to study model reporter@

By Scott Hillis

BEIJING, Oct 31 (Reuter) - China on Thursday accused foreign journalists of biased reporting and urged them to learn from Edgar Snow, a U.S. reporter and author sympathetic to the Chinese communist cause.

Reporters from Western nations had misjudged China based on standards that did not apply to countries with different social and political systems, said a commentary in the official China Daily.

``It is common sense that news reporting...should serve the purpose of offering adequate information to the audience to help them form correct judgments on world affairs,'' the commentary said.

The commentary urged Western media to emulate Snow whose reports from China in the 1930s painted a sympathetic portrait of Mao Zedong and his struggling communist crusade.

The newspaper praised Snow for his accuracy, objectivity and impartiality in his coverage of China as it was swept up in the communist movement.

``In his reportage, Edgar Snow wrote exactly what he witnessed,'' it said. ``What the Western media are doing is the opposite of what Edgar Snow did 60 years ago.''

Most Western reporters were barred from China after the communists seized power in 1949 but Snow's personal contacts with Chairman Mao allowed him to roam much of the country unhindered.

His reports praised the Communist Party for its sweeping reforms and later denied rumours of widespread famine in the early 1960s.

Historians now estimate more than 30 million people died as a result of famines after Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, urging farmers to abandon their fields and join the rush to make steel in backyard furnaces.

The commentary blasted the Western media for spreading the theory that China was a threat to the world while ignoring what it said were Japan's rising military ambitions.

Foreign journalists are viewed by many Chinese as spies and most come under police surveillance during their stay in China. Many foreign reporters have been expelled since 1949.

Western journalism focused mostly on negative issues such as crime, disease and political turmoil, it said.

``It has been a general practice of the Western media to look everywhere for the seamy side of society,'' it said.

Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin last month sternly told the Chinese media to toe the party line and propaganda boss Ding Guangen last week called on the media to report more positive news.

``One may ask why there have been so many disappointing reports by Western journalists,'' the commentary said.

``One clue lies in the fact that those journalists do not know what is really going on in China,'' it said.

^REUTER@

Appendix D. 5. The Propaganda Department of CCP Issues 'Eight Instructions' to Forbidden the Reports That Damage the Images of the Party and the Government

World Daily (Chinese newspaper cutting), 96/11/03

報日界世

日期星 日三月一十年六九九一

寧控傳媒

中宣部下達八項指示

要求禁止發表不利於黨和政府形象報導

一、中央社香港二日電：上個月的中共十四屆六中全會結束後，中共中央宣傳部下達了進一步控制大陸宣傳輿論的八項指示，要求傳媒禁止發表不利於黨和政府形象及不利於政局穩定的報導。

香港蘋果日報今天報導，中宣部關於進一步控制輿論的八項指示是：

一、為了統一思想，避免影響大陸穩定的政局，當前一些重大的敏感問題不得報導，例如海內外保衛釣魚台運動及海外民主運動等；

二、傳媒不得報導大陸一些牽涉面廣、影響重大的大案件，例如前中共北京市委書記陳希同案、首都鋼鐵公司周北方案等；

三、傳媒不得報導大陸各地的騷亂事件。今年以來，大陸各地發生的各類請願、上訪、遊行、示威等事件共有一萬多起，這些事件一律不准公開報導；

四、傳媒不得刊登政治異見人士的文章；

五、各級宣傳部門必須加強對報刊的審查，發現問題，及時加以處理；

六、各級宣傳部門應加強對出版機構的管理，對違反宣傳紀律的機構，應進行嚴懲處理；

七、傳媒報導香港問題時，應嚴格執行中央政策，與中央保持高度一致；

八、涉外報導不得洩漏黨和國家機密；

Appendix D. 6. China's Social Science Academy Launches Thought Purge

FPA, newsrelease 97/01/15

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Agence : FPA Numéro du communiqué : 006821 Date : 97/01/15 Heure: 01:20:00
.....

i0139tm--p

r i China-ideology 01-15 0303

China's social science academy launches thought purge

BEIJING, Jan 15 (AFP) - China's leading academy for social sciences has launched a purge against ideas which question the legitimacy of the Communist Party, the China Daily reported Wednesday.

"The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) will not allow theories and opinions that are against Marxism, the leadership of the Party and the people's

democratic dictatorship to spread unchecked," said vice president Wang Renzhi.

Researchers must adhere to "the right political, theoretical and academic orientation," he said, adding that a "large proportion" of 1995 research findings had failed to serve China's socialist construction.

The clampdown is a direct result of President Jiang Zemin's "Spiritual Civilisation" campaign, the newspaper said.

Jiang's campaign is ostensibly aimed at improving China's morality and ethics in a time of greatly expanding wealth and changes in society, but analysts say its real aim is to ensure the continuing dominance of the Communist Party and prevent the political changes that many predict will follow

the sweeping economic reforms.

Wang's tone was reminiscent of the strong political rhetoric that pervaded all facets of intellectual life during late party chairman Mao Zedong's One Hundred Flowers Campaign, when thousands were purged for anti-Party thought.

"CASS should serve the decision-making process of the Party and the government," Wang said, and then quoted the very phrase Mao used to launch the purge -- "Let one hundred flowers bloom and one hundred schools of thought contend."

China's economic freedoms have expanded dramatically since Mao's 1956 campaign and the CASS crackdown is extremely unlikely to have as far-reaching effects as its predecessors.

blh/pvh

AFP

AFP 150619 GMT 01 97

Appendix D. 7. Hong Kong's Patten Urges China to Recognize Press Freedom

Reuter, newsrelease 97/01/27

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Agence : REA Numéro du communiqué : 044453 Date: 97/01/27 Heure: 00:32:48
.....

a0042reute

u i BC-HONGKONG-PRESS 01-27 0327

^BC-HONGKONG-PRESS@

^HK's Patten urges China to recognise press freedom@

HONG KONG, Jan 27 (Reuter) - Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten, commenting on China's release of a jailed journalist, said on Monday censorship presented an even bigger threat to the press than the danger of being locked away.

Patten said he hoped the reaction of local people to the release of Hong Kong newspaper journalist Xi Yang by China last weekend would encourage Beijing to recognise the value that Hong Kong people placed on freedom.

Press freedom is one of the burning political issues in Hong Kong as the British colony's 6.3 million people prepare to revert to China's control this July 1.

Speaking at a conference of the Commonwealth Journalists Association, Patten said the effort of all those who campaigned for Xi's release over the past three years had been effective.

Patten warned of further threats to press freedom. ``In most communities a greater threat to press freedom is a less blatant attack on journalists than locking them up.

``The ways in which journalists are encouraged to write what is politically correct are rather more sinuous and subtle than that,'' Patten said.

``So self-censorship or censorship at the news editor's desk is probably more of a realistic threat in tomorrow's world -- I don't say necessarily in Hong Kong -- than handcuffs and barred windows,'' he said.

The 39-year-old Xi, who works for Hong Kong's independent Ming Pao daily newspaper, was arrested in China in 1993 for stealing state secrets after he obtained a scoop from his banking sources on China's financial policy plans.

The case shocked Hong Kong journalists. The press has grown even more jittery since then, especially when Chinese officials said last year there would be limits on press freedom after Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty.

The debate on civil rights intensified last week when a China-controlled committee unveiled plans to roll back laws on civil liberties after the sovereignty transfer.

^REUTER@

Reut00:31 01-27-97

Appendix D. 8. China Tells Journalist to Stop Demanding Money

Reuter, newsrelease 97/01/24

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Agence : REA Numéro du communiqué : 019698 Date: 97/01/24 Heure: 02:50:48
.....

a0228reute

u i BC-CHINA-JOURNALISTS 01-24 0273

^BC-CHINA-JOURNALISTS@

^China tells journalists to stop demanding money@

BEIJING, Jan 24 (Reuter) - China's propaganda mandarins have ordered journalists to stop violating socialist ethics by asking for money or gifts in return for positive reportage, state media said on Friday.

``Paid news'...has done great harm by corrupting journalists, tarnishing their reputation and affecting the nature of socialist journalism,' the Xinhua news agency said, quoting participants to a nationwide teleconference on journalistic ethics.

The Propaganda Department of the ruling Communist Party, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television and the Press and Publications Administration issued a set of regulations banning ``paid news,' Xinhua said.

The new rules ban journalists from working for companies and borrowing cars, housing, mobile telephones and pagers, the media said.

The regulations call for drawing a line between news and advertising.

Some corrupt journalists extort money from state-owned enterprises by threatening to write negative stories in classified documents read by party leaders. Ambitious officials and enterprises that badly need loans willingly pay bribes.

Journalists were urged to study carefully party leader Jiang Zemin's January 1996 speech in which he called on journalists to ``strictly follow professional ethics and firmly oppose 'paid news.'''

Jiang described journalists as ``engineers of the people's minds.''

China's communist rulers keep a tight grip on the media, which they view as a propaganda tool that must serve party interests.

Propaganda mandarins have called on journalists to back party policies and give priority to ``positive'' reporting.

^REUTER@

Reut02:49 01-24-97

Appendix D. 9. China to Get 15 Million New Phone Clients in 1997

FPA, newsrelease 97/01/27

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Agence : FPA Numéro du communiqué : 048743 Date: 97/01/27 Heure: 04:50:07
.....

i0208tm--p

r f China-telecoms 01-27 0176

China to get 15 million new phone clients in 1997

BEIJING, Jan 27 (AFP) - China expects to sign on 15 million new telephone

subscribers in 1997, boosting the national telephone availability rate to 7.4 percent, Post and Telecommunication Minister Wu Jichuan said Monday.

Capital injections into the industry will also be accelerated this year, with fixed asset investment expected to total 95 billion yuan (11.4 billion dollars), Wu was quoted as saying by the Xinhua news agency.

Meanwhile, the telephone switching capacity will increase by 17 million lines, and four million new clients will be added to the mobile phone subscription.

The telephone density rate in urban areas should hit 25 percent by the end of the year, Wu added.

China's state postal and telephone services saw turnover grow by 34.5 percent last year, while profits increased to 126.2 billion yuan.

Total telephone switching capacity stood at 100 million lines at the end of

1996, while the national telephone availability rate was 6.2 percent.

gh/djw

AFP

AFP 270949 GMT 01 97

Appendix D. 10. China Cracks Down on Books in Ideological Battle

Reuter, newsrelease 97/01/30

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Agence : REA Numéro du communiqué : 010636 Date: 97/01/30 Heure: 01:43:17
.....

a0149reute

u i BC-CHINA-BOOKS 01-30 0554

^BC-CHINA-BOOKS (SCHEDULED)^

^China cracks down on books in ideological battle@

By Jane Macartney

BEIJING, Jan 30 (Reuter) - China extended its campaign to eradicate ideas out of line with Communist Party ideology on Thursday with an order to publishers to issue more good books, no bad books and fewer mediocre books.

The directive issued at a meeting called by the China Press and Publications Administration urged a strengthening of professional ethics in China's publishing industry.

China's propaganda mandarins have been locked for several months in an authoritarian campaign to stamp out ideas that differ from party precepts, and which has been billed as a drive to promote spiritual civilisation, or civic responsibility.

"We should insist on the strategy of publishing the best books," said a directive issued by the administration.

"We must publish more good books, not publish bad books and minimise publication of mediocre books," said the directive issued in the People's Daily, mouthpiece of the Communist Party.

The new directive banned publishing houses from selling off publication codes, without which no book or magazine can be published in China, and from accepting money or other favours from authors in return for printing their works.

"We want to publish healthy, useful books that can spread knowledge," an administration official said in a telephone interview.

"For example, good books are books about science, books that you can learn from," an official of one publishing company, said, adding that writings of authors such as former Minister of Culture Wang Meng and urban novelist Wang Shuo were "good" books.

"Bad books are books that violate policy on religion, are subversive or pornographic or depict violence," the administration official said.

In recent years, pornographic and violent novels have flooded book stands, commanding an enormous market among Chinese starved of entertainment during Mao Zedong's ultra-leftist 1966-76 Cultural Revolution.

Private entrepreneurs eager to make money on the flourishing book market have sparked a flourishing sale in publication codes. Every book published in China must have a numbered code.

An official of the China Publishers' Association said bad books included those that advocated ethnic separatism -- a problem in restive Tibet and the Moslem Xinjiang region -- and books about China's leaders and which revealed state secrets.

"The publishing of too many bad books will affect our national image," the association official said.

Officials refused to reveal the titles of "bad" books named on a list of some 100 publications distributed at this week's meeting.

【本報專訊】從本月二十五日鄧小平追悼會之日開始，廣州市區內所有的有線網絡全部停止播放香港電視節目。在之前一周，只是在播放有關「六四」事件節目時才停止線路，以前也是在有關台灣問題及民運問題等當局敏感問題才作短暫中斷訊號。

此次對香港電視節目全面停播，引起市民的極大反響。不少市民致電電視台詢問原因及何時恢復訊號。

廣州有線停播港電視

得到的回答是有線電視網中轉系統發生技術故障，無法修復恢復訊號的日期。

事實上，在本月二十四日，廣州市委宣傳部已向省市電視台發出緊急通知，要求從當日凌晨開始中斷香港電視訊號，理由是在處理鄧小平追悼會期間，香港電視台出現了問題，引起中央的不滿。

據分析，中央對香港電視台不滿和深的原因主要有兩方面：一是該台對小平

一生功過時，重點提五七年反右問題及六四事件；二是這段時間香港電視台仍然播放一些搞笑電視節目，如《醉打金枝》等。

然而，有人透露這並非是完全原因。在數天之前新華社播發了廣播電影電視部的一個通知，對各地電視播放廣告節目作出了各種嚴格規定，包括不准在轉播節目當中插播當地廣告等。此舉原來

中央不滿提「六四」

針對各地轉播中央電視台節目時自播廣告導致中央電視台廣告收入流失。

但廣東省有線電視台轉播中央電視台節目時，自一九九一年起對轉播自播有線電視台轉播香港台，這種做法到一九九二年，中央只是假設關東眼線，原因是轉播香港台會帶來大批廣告收入。此次停止轉播香港電視節目，也是廣東省政府為保護轉播中央的檢查所作的回應之一。

Appendix D. 12. 'Sesame Street' to Finally Come to China

Reuter, newsrelease 97/03/12

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Agence : REA Numéro du communiqué : 031116 Date: 97/03/12 Heure: 04:42:42
.....

a0373reute

u i BC-CHINA-STREET 03-12 0458

^BC-CHINA-STREET (SCHEDULED)^

^^^Sesame Street'' to finally come to China@

By Graham Earnshaw

SHANGHAI, March 12 (Reuter) - The U.S. children's show

^^Sesame Street'' is finally coming to China after two years of delays caused by lack of a sponsor and questions over how to make it acceptably Chinese, organisers said on Wednesday.

Big Bird, one of the street's best-loved characters, was on hand at a news conference to announce the start of auditions for key performers in the Chinese series, to be produced in conjunction with Shanghai Television.

^^Sesame Street'' is a production of the Children's Television Workshop (CTW), and has been on the air since 1968, teaching children around the world how to wash their hands and count to 10.

Big Bird made an early foray into China in 1981 for a television special in which he went in search of a Chinese phoenix with the help of a young girl.

Now, he will be back in early 1998, in a series of 130 half-hour shows for which sponsorship has been promised by General Electric Co of the United States.

He will be joined by a couple of Chinese characters being created for the show including Puff Pig, a blustering vegetarian, said CTW vice-president Gregory Gettas.

Bert and Ernie and the Cookie Monster will also make appearances with Mandarin Chinese voice-overs.

^^This is a wonderful and special day for China's children,'' said the show's producer, Ye Chao.

^^But our show will be somewhat different from the U.S. 'Sesame Street'. We have done a lot of work talking to child educationalists and psychologists to produce a formula which suits the special characteristics of Chinese children,'' he said.

A local journalist asked if ^^Sesame Street'' was not a continuation of a process in which China's children are becoming ever-more enthralled by foreign cartoon characters.

^^Many of the children's programmes coming into China have a somewhat negative impact on viewers, but in terms of producing our own programmes, we find we lack some of the desirable skills and knowledge,'' Ye said. ^^That is why we are cooperating with CTW.''

He stressed that the setting and characters in the Chinese ^^Sesame Street'' would be entirely Chinese.

^^We have held many, many meetings to consider the special needs and characteristics of Chinese children,'' he said.

About 60 percent of the content will be locally produced with 40 percent being selected from an international bank of ^^Sesame Street'' material produced in a number of countries, including the United States.

^^This will be a truly Chinese production,'' Gettas said. ^^It's not just 'Sesame Street' done in the Chinese language.''

The show will be broadcast every weekday evening to Shanghai TV's audience of 100 million and will later be syndicated throughout the country.

Appendix D. 13. Beijing Says U. S. Media Unfair, but China Tough

Reuter, newsrelease 97/03/27

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Agence : REA Numéro du communiqué : 019311 Date: 97/03/27 Heure: 04:23:18
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a0302reute

u i BC-CHINA-MEDIA 03-27 0376

^BC-CHINA-MEDIA@

^Beijing says U.S. media unfair, but China tough@

BEIJING, March 27 (Reuter) - Beijing does not fear criticism by the U.S. media, but foreign reporters must try to understand China and avoid biased coverage while Chinese officials should be more open, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

In a rare signed article in the China Daily on Thursday, spokesman Cui Tiankai issued an unusually candid assessment of U.S. media coverage of China, criticising foreign reporters for bias -- and Chinese officials for inaccessibility.

``Why such a huge gap between China's realities and its portrayal in the American press?'' Cui wrote.

History and culture provided some answers, he said, citing the need for historical perspective to accurately assess China.

``To focus on a developing country like China, there is always the question of whether we should focus on what has been achieved or on what is still to be desired,'' Cui wrote.

``In other words, should we see the glass as half full or half empty,'' he said.

``Why not try to take a more dynamic point of view? Why not try to see whether the water level in the glass is rising or falling,'' he said.

U.S. reporters misunderstood China and underestimated its changes, he said.

``People in China are fed up with the negative reporting of their country and their lives by the American media,'' he said.

``Even many Americans do not approve of the way their media cover China.''

However, he did not leave the blame only on the shoulders of the foreign media, saying Chinese authorities shared responsibility for the approach in overseas coverage.

``It is true that there are still too few government spokespersons accessible to foreign reporters,'' he said.

``Official information is not always readily available.''

Most Chinese government organisations routinely turn down requests for interviews and refuse to comment on the telephone. Many regard overseas reporters as foreign spies seeking state secrets.

China did not fear criticism, Cui stressed, but was opposed to bias.

``We do not fear or hate criticism from the press,'' Cui said. ``We very much welcome it, as long as it is based on fact rather than on fabrication.

``Frankly, biased and negative coverage will harm China, but only to a minor extent,'' he said.

^REUTER@

Appendix D. 14. China Welcomes End to US 'Monopoly' on Internet

FPA, newsrelease 97/05/07

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Agence : FPA Numéro du communiqué : 043725 Date: 97/05/07 Heure: 00:38:18
.....

i0076tm--p

r f China-Internet 05-07 0304

China welcomes end to US "monopoly" on Internet

BEIJING, May 7 (AFP) - China welcomed Wednesday a proposal to end the US monopoly on Internet domain name registration as an important step towards creating a global resource.

"It is a breakthrough to end the monopoly on domain name registration," Chinese delegate Zhou Jinfeng told Xinhua on his return from a forum in Geneva which agreed to a competitive structure for the fast-growing registration system that is crucial for Web site users.

"Internet should become a global resource and only when it becomes a global resource can it be fully exploited," he added.

While national registrars, who dish out country name codes such as CN. for China, are not affected by the agreement that was reached by the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) on May 1, the commercial generic domain sector is.

The IAHC agreement seeks to end the monopoly held by the US-based Network Solutions Inc, which has a lock on doling out the suffixes .com, .org. and .net. These top level domain names are the only ones that currently exist on an international level.

"This current situation does not deal with the growing internationalisation of the Internet," said Zhou, who is a high-ranking official in the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.

Under the new proposals, another 28 registrars will be allowed to compete alongside Network Solutions Inc. and applicants will have 60 days to submit their proposals.

Registrars will be selected worldwide through lottery and seven new endings, such as .nom, .arts and .firm, will be created, allowing net users to shop around for the most competitive deal.

ChinaNet, which is China's Internet node, had more than 100,000 subscribers by the end of 1996, according to official statistics.

blh/djw

AFP 070438 GMT 05 97

Appendix D. 15. Self-censorship Threat to Hong Kong Media Freedom

Reuter. newsrelease 97/06/24

BC-HONGKONG-MEDIA _ REA _ Tue Jun 24 03:03 _ 3:20_a0222_AGENCE_

06-24 0604

Self-censorship threat to Hong Kong media freedom

By Andrew Browne

HONG KONG, June 24 (Reuter) - Jail threats and the fear of losing Beijing-backed advertising dollars are taming Hong Kong's boisterous media, one of the freest in Asia, even before the territory's handover to China, critics say.

The case of journalist Xi Yang stands as a stark warning.

A scoop he scored for the Ming Pao newspaper on Chinese interest rates and gold sales cost him three years in a mainland jail. A central bank clerk who leaked him the figures was locked away for 15 years.

Not surprisingly, Xi's media colleagues in Hong Kong are now less keen to break news on China.

Xi's conviction by a Chinese court in 1994 for stealing state secrets was a watershed for freedom of expression in Hong Kong, media analysts say. When Beijing takes over the British colony at midnight on June 30, it will inherit a more timid press, wary of Big Brother across the border.

"On the eve of the 1997 transition, support for freedom of speech and press have fallen," said a report by the Hong Kong Baptist University.

"Fear of retaliation is at a high point," it said.

"Another increasing fear is that 'authorities may monitor your conversation'."

China's communist leaders would have little reason to impose crude censorship when they take over, the critics say: self-censorship has seen to that.

"Newspapers don't have signs on the wall saying 'You Must Support Jiang Zemin'," said Tim Hamlett, a Baptist University professor, referring to China's president. "It's just understood."

"Things are soft-pedalled," said John Schidlovsky of the Freedom Forum, a U.S.-based advocacy group.

Xi was sentenced to 12 years in prison, but in a gesture to public sentiment in the colony, he was freed on parole in January after three years behind bars.

"The sentence sent a strong signal to Hong Kong journalists that aggressive reporting will not be tolerated," said Schidlovsky.

Hong Kong's future constitution, the Basic Law, offers an assurance on press freedom. But detailed rules on issues such as contempt of court and official secrets have yet to be spelled out, creating uncertainty.

Appendix D. 16. Chinese Make 'Progress' in Controlling the News

The Globe and Mail, 97/09/20

BY ROD MICKLEBURGH
China Bureau
Beijing

IT was so much easier in the old days. Reporters based in Beijing never had to worry about actually covering a national congress of the Chinese Communist Party. No one knew exactly when it started. No one knew when it was over. The only confirmation something had actually taken place were the long, turgid articles in the country's state-owned newspapers some time after delegates had left for home.

No more. Communist propagandists now "warmly welcome friends in the foreign media" whenever one of the party's huge congresses rolls around, as they do every five years or so. This year, for the first time, organizers announced ahead of time how long the congress would last. In China, this is progress.

But fun it wasn't. Although China likes to boast about opening itself up to the world, reporters here are still treated as an alien force. By the time the 15th party congress wound up this week, the frustration count of most foreign reporters was on a par with the city's stratospheric air pollution levels.

The *Globe and Mail* had trouble even before the congress began. "No good," said the stern official when I applied for credentials. My photos were black and white. A few days later, I tried once more. "No good," the same man said again. This time the photos were the wrong size. Only on my third attempt was I finally able to meet the Communist Party's rigorous photo standards.

Meanwhile, no one's mood was improved by the incomprehensible decision to set up the congress media centre in a different area of the city, far from the Great Hall of the People where the congress took place. Reporters spent hours driving back and forth across Beijing through the city's dense, slow-moving traffic.

Fortunately, most of the congress proceedings were closed to the media. How many times can one hear of the need "to hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory in order to build socialism with Chinese characteristics" without booking the next flight to Bali?

The media were allowed to attend Jiang Zemin's opening-day speech. The task of distributing English-language copies of his speech to several hundred journalists was given to two young Chinese who tried to hand them out from paper bags. The pair was immediately pinned against the wall by a frenzied crush of reporters, elbowing, clawing and pushing their way forward to get a copy perhaps several seconds ahead of their competitors.

A similar scene erupted the previous day when Hong Kong journalists stormed a table with new press releases on it like starving children fighting for a lone scrap of bread.

On the weekend, there was another precedent. Reporters were allowed to sit in on selected discussion groups debating Mr. Jiang's report. They heard the governor of Inner Mongolia tell delegates from his region how inspired he had been by it. Not long afterward, reporters saw the less-than-inspired party secretary for Inner Mongolia doze off as delegates droned on, praising Mr. Jiang.

"For 76 years, the Communist Party has kept these discussions secret. Now we finally know what goes on," a bleary-eyed British journalist said. "Nothing."

On Thursday, reporters were promised the opportunity to cover the final day of the congress, when delegates voted in new members of the central committee and decided on key amendments to the Communist Party constitution.

Instead, they spent three hours milling around in corridors outside the main auditorium while ballots were counted behind closed doors. Security guards intervened whenever anyone tried to talk to a delegate.

When they were finally ushered in, all reporters saw and heard were delegates raising their hands in unison to approve party amendments, Mr. Jiang officially closing the congress and a stirring rendition of the socialist anthem, *The Internationale*.

It was not much better yesterday. This time, reporters were promised a chance to "meet with the newly-elected members of the standing committee of the politburo of the party central committee," the most powerful body in China.

After standing crowded together for more than an hour and a half behind a rope, reporters were rewarded with a glimpse of China's new leadership hierarchy walking into the room, their introduction by Mr. Jiang and a brief statement by him.

Then they were gone. No questions allowed.

As he left, Mr. Jiang bellowed out in English: "Thank you for coming."

**Appendix D. 17. Chinese Journalists Urged to Follow Party Line, Guide
Public Opinion FPA. newsrelease 97/11/07**

SUJET	AGENCE	DATE	HEURE	DURÉE	#ITEM	TYPE	CODE
China-journalists	11-0 FPA	Fri Nov 7	04:30	:43	0283	AGENC3	FPitm--pir

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Chinese journalists urged to follow party line, guide public opinion

BEIJING, Nov 7 (AFP) - Chinese journalists were directed Thursday to follow the Communist Party line and to be "watchdogs" of the public, the official Xinhua news agency said.

"The press should keep in line with the Central Party Committee headed by Jiang Zemin, and serve the socialist cause, the people and the central task of the Party and the country," the agency quoted Ding Guangen, director of party propaganda, as saying.

He urged journalists to practice "positive reporting" to "inspire the people and bolster their confidence" as well as increase their roles as watchdogs of the public.

China's press is strictly controlled and party officials frequently direct journalists to toe the official line.

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