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Avery Brundage and the 1936 Olympic Games

Caroline M. Solomon

A Thesis

in

The Department

of

History

Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts at  
Concordia University  
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

March 1995

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## ABSTRACT

### Avery Brundage and the 1936 Olympic Games

Caroline M. Solomon

When Hitler came to power, the Olympic Games had already been awarded to Germany. In the early phase of Nazi rule, Jews were expelled from sport clubs, making it impossible for them to train for, or participate in, the 1936 Olympics. The Amateur Athletic Union and American Olympic Committee, the organizations responsible for sending a U.S. team to Germany, were worried about the racist policies of the new regime. Despite a German pledge of non-discrimination made to the International Olympic Committee in 1933, the AAU and AOC passed resolutions making American participation contingent upon the cessation of discrimination against German-Jewish athletes. Discriminatory practices did, however, continue. Meanwhile, German officials in charge of the Games' preparations received continual pressure from Hitler to secure American presence at the Games. The boycott movement in the United States did, in the end, fail; but not because of German pressure. It failed primarily because of the personal intervention of AOC president Avery Brundage. Brundage, as well as other well-connected Olympic officials, had the opportunity to let the AAU and AOC determine American participation on the basis of an accurate assessment of the German-Jewish situation. Instead, they deliberately misled the two organizations and world public opinion by giving assurances they knew were false.

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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis discusses Avery Brundage and the 1936 Olympic Games. The major contention developed in this paper is that Avery Brundage, the president of the American Olympic Committee, along with other well-connected Olympic officials, minimized or ignored Nazi anti-Semitic practices during the pre-Olympic years, 1933 to 1936, deliberately misleading world opinion in order to secure American participation in the Berlin Olympics. Brundage was primarily responsible for defeating those who opposed sending an American team to the Games in Germany. But his actions cannot be isolated from those of the International Olympic Committee in pressing for the Games to go ahead.

Before Brundage even voiced his opinion on participation, the International Olympic Committee had held a meeting in Vienna, in June 1933, to discuss the violation of Olympic rules by the Nazi regime. The Committee was ostensibly concerned about racial discriminatory practices carried out against Jewish athletes, who were being denied membership in sports clubs, and were being prevented from training, competing and using practice fields. Such measures had been reported in newspapers as of early 1933. Committee members, then, decided to do what they considered



the appropriate thing. The International Olympic Committee requested a guarantee by German delegates that the persecution of Jewish athletes would cease. Not satisfied with only their word, Brigadier-General Charles H. Sherrill, a diplomat and an American Committee member, pressured the German delegation into making both a verbal and a written guarantee. Despite the "Vienna pledge," the American Olympic Committee and the Amateur Athletic Union, the two sports associations responsible for sending a United States team to the Olympics, were still suspicious and therefore passed a measure known as the "Kirby resolution." This resolution called for a boycott of the 1936 Games.

Hitler was anxious about American hesitation to commit a team to the Games in Germany. After the pronouncement of the Kirby resolution, the Nazi strategy was to maintain the pretence that discrimination did not exist and that Jewish athletes were free to compete for the Olympic Games. Conciliatory decrees were drawn up, stipulating the easing of restrictions on German-Jewish athletes for the pre-Olympic period only. But such decrees were theoretical, that is, they were never implemented. In addition to these measures, Hitler continually pressured the German Organizing Committee's partly-Jewish president, Dr. Theodor von Lewald, who was being used for tactical purposes, to mislead a vigilant international public.

Under the pressure of adverse world opinion, the American Olympic Committee dispatched Brundage to make an

on-the-spot investigation of the German-Jewish situation in September of 1934, the results of which would determine the Committee's decision on whether to attend the Games. Brundage had no intention of declining the German invitation to the Olympics, regardless of his findings. The Committee's president did meet with Jewish sports officials, but they were escorted by Nazi authorities who monitored the interview. Brundage presented the American Olympic Committee with a favourable but superficial review, on the basis of which the Committee voted to send a team to the Games. The Committee had not been resolute in its opposition to the Games in the first place. The Amateur Athletic Union, meanwhile, stuck to the Kirby resolution of a year earlier.

The Nazis, who had been worried about Brundage's visit and adverse opinion more generally, quickly nominated 21 Jewish candidates to the German contingent in mid-1934. They also accepted, or tolerated, a few Jewish athletes in the pre-Olympic training stages to make it seem as if the Vienna pledge was being kept. None of the Jewish candidates was selected. Though the list of nominees was published, those Americans who opposed participation in the Games remained suspicious of Nazi intentions. As American agitation continued to mount, Sherrill went to Germany for the purpose of securing at least one Jew on Germany's Olympic team. Two half-Jews, in fact, became alibis in order to give a minimum appeasement to a sensitive and alert

international public. International Olympic Committee president Comte Henri de Baillet-Latour also went to Germany under the pressure of adverse world opinion. In his response to reporters' questions about the German-Jewish situation before his trip, he was evasive, indicating his awareness of discriminatory practices against Jews.

Even though Brundage wanted the discussion of American participation to be as low-key as possible, he got caught up in a public debate over the issue. Those against participation comprised Jews, as well as Catholics and Protestants. Brundage, who became increasingly defensive during the Olympic controversy, took the position that sports must be separate from politics. To him, the Games belonged to the International Olympic Committee and not the host country. I intend to show that, in his public statements at least, Brundage insisted there was no discrimination against German Jews. Opponents who spoke out against participation, usually prominent individuals, presented arguments which were diametrically opposed to Brundage's assertions. The boycott party therefore based its statements on the premise that discrimination was prevalent. Though they never expressed it overtly, it appears the boycotters were fearful that if the United States attended the Festival, it would indicate to the world public the country's endorsement of a regime which fostered racial persecution. As the Games drew closer, the intensity with which some of the pro-participation and pro-boycott

arguments were stated increased, but the arguments themselves did not change.

At the Amateur Athletic Union convention of December 1935, the Union's members, by a slim majority, voted in favour of sending an American team to Germany. The Maccabi World Union, a leading Jewish sports federation, had recently resolved to withdraw all of its athletes from the Games. This resolution could have intensified not only the position of the boycotters, but the opposition of Amateur Athletic Union members. But the Amateur Athletic Union had represented Brundage's only real obstacle, and his tactical skills enabled him to overpower his Athletic Union opponents. I will show that Brundage had decided, even before the convention, to use his considerable influence to ensure American participation in the Berlin Olympics.

**CHAPTER 1**  
**GERMANY, 1933-1936**

**The Nuremberg Laws**

Anti-Semitic policies were enacted shortly after Hitler became chancellor on January 30, 1933. A national boycott of Jewish business took place on April 1, 1933. Jews were then purged from public office, the civil service, journalism, radio, farming, teaching, the theatre and the film industry, and shortly afterward, from professions such as law and medicine. The Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935, deprived Jews of German citizenship and civil rights, confining them to the status of subjects. The Laws also forbade marriage between Jews and Aryans and prohibited Jews from employing female Aryan servants under thirty-five years of age. By the summer of 1936, when Germany was to host the Olympic Games, the Jews had been excluded either by law or by terror from public and private employment to such an extent that at least one half of them were without means of livelihood. All over the country, too, anti-Jewish signs were posted, some not only frightful and vulgar, but soured with sick humour: "Jews Not Wanted Here," "No Jews or Dogs Here," "Jews are Uninvited Guests," "Jews, Watch Out! The Road to Palestine does not Lead through this Place," "Jews

Not Admitted," "Jews Strictly Forbidden in This Town," "Jews Enter This Place at Their Own Risk," and, at a sharp bend in the road near Ludwigshafen was a sign, "Drive Carefully! Sharp Curve! Jews 75 Miles an Hour!"<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the large-scale purging of Jews, the first concentration camps were opened within a few months of Hitler's accession. An emergency decree of February 28, 1933, gave legal sanction to arbitrary arrests and incarceration for an unlimited period of anyone suspected of hostility to the State. The purpose of the concentration camps was not only to punish enemies of the regime but, by their very existence, to terrorize the people and to deter them from ever contemplating any resistance to Nazi rule. In an attempt to make the practice respectable, the new system was described as *Schutzhaft*, or protective custody. But in fact, it allowed the thugs of the SA (*Sturmabteilung*, Storm Troopers or Brown Shirts), to give its victims a good beating and then ransom them to their relatives or friends. Sometimes the prisoners were even murdered, usually out of pure sadism and brutality. People disappeared from their homes and from the streets, often because some informer alleged that they had made a single derogatory remark about the administration or one of its members. By July 1933, some 27,000 people had been interned in 50 or so improvised detention camps. Hitler turned the concentration camps over to the control of the SS, which organized them with efficiency and ruthlessness. In them, millions of hapless

people would be done to death and millions of others subjected to debasement and torture once the regime had made its plans for the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem.<sup>2</sup>

#### How Germany Got the Games

The Olympic Games had been awarded to Germany before Nazi rule. On May 13, 1931, soon after a meeting in Barcelona, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) granted Germany the Games.<sup>3</sup> It is often forgotten, then, that the Games were originally awarded to the Weimar Republic, a democracy, not Hitler's Reich. The VIth Olympiad had also been awarded to Germany in 1916, but the Games were cancelled due to the Great War. Because of its role in the war, as well, Germany had been forbidden to participate in the Games of 1920 and 1924. Throughout the 1920s, the German Olympic Organizing Committee's secretary-general, Dr. Carl Diem, and its president, Dr. Theodor von Lewald, succeeded in getting German teams readmitted to Olympic competition in 1928 and then repeatedly presented the case for an Olympiad in Berlin. They pointed out that Germany had already been awarded the Games scheduled for 1916 and that, after all, the facilities intended for 1916 were ready for use.<sup>4</sup> Though the Germans were vying with Spain to host the Olympic Games, Diem and Lewald persuaded the IOC to hold the IVth Winter Olympiad in Garmish-Partenkirchen in Bavaria and the XIth Summer Games in Berlin for 1936. Berlin was chosen by 43 votes to 16, with eight abstentions.<sup>5</sup> Diem regarded the IOC's decision as an opportunity for Germany to restore its

reputation.<sup>6</sup>

Because of Hitler's and the Nazis' anti-Jewish obsession, it seemed doubtful whether Berlin could proceed with the organization of the Olympic Games. Commenting on the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the *Volkischer Beobachter* (the principal Nazi party organ) demanded the exclusion of Jews and Negroes from the Berlin Games.<sup>7</sup> Another anti-Jewish newspaper, *Der Stürmer* denounced the Games as "...an infamous festival dominated by the Jews."<sup>8</sup> This worried the members of the IOC to such an extent that they asked one of their German delegates, Dr. Karl Ritter von Halt, a Nazi himself, to ask Hitler's position on the Olympics even before his accession to power. Hitler gave a lukewarm response, confirming that he would not *hinder* the Olympic Games from taking place.<sup>9</sup> In 1932, Hitler had, in fact, denounced the Olympics as "...an invention of Jews and Freemasons" and "...a play inspired by Judaism which cannot possibly be put on in a Reich ruled by National Socialists."<sup>10</sup> Once Hitler acceded to power, his attitude was unchanged. The virulence of his opposition to hosting the Olympics may have been due to the racial taint of Diem and Lewald. Lewald was a *Mischling* (part-Jewish ancestry); his paternal grandmother was born a Jew. Indeed, the *Volkischer Beobachter* screamed for Lewald's dismissal from the Organizing Committee. Though Diem was not stigmatized by Jewish forebears, his wife was racially-tainted by a Jewish ancestor. Diem was also condemned because the *Deutsche*



*Hochschule für Leibesübungen* (German Sports University), which he founded in 1920 with Lewald's support, had several Jews on its faculty.<sup>11</sup> For his sins, Diem was denounced in the Nazi press as a "white Jew."<sup>12</sup>

Hitler gave his definite approval to stage the Olympics in Germany only when he became aware of the Games' political potential. On March 16, 1933, Hitler received Diem, Lewald and the Mayor of Berlin, Dr. Sahm, at the chancellory. He masked his phobia of Jews long enough to give Diem and Lewald his tentative approval to host the Games, showing polite rather than enthusiastic interest. At the meeting, Hitler announced that he welcomed the Games to Berlin and promised he would do all he could to ensure their successful presentation. The Games, he asserted, would contribute substantially to furthering understanding between nations and they would also promote the development of sport among German youth, which he considered of great importance to the welfare of the nation. Despite his verbal backing, Hitler stalled, arguing with his entourage about whether to host the Games. It was not until six months later, on October 30, that the newly appointed Minister of Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, received Hitler's definite consent. Goebbels had recognized the opportunity of the Olympic Games to impress the world with the achievements of the Third Reich and to gain German respectability.<sup>13</sup> Having seized the political value of the Games, too, Hitler issued a direct order that the "...Olympic Games had to take place in Berlin by all

means."<sup>14</sup>The directors of the Olympic festival now singled out the Games as an opportunity to persuade the critics of the National Socialists that the new Germans were working hard, playing hard, were whole-heartedly devoted to peace, and would stay that way.<sup>15</sup>

#### The Takeover of the Organizing Committee

In 1933, the Nazi State assumed control of the German Olympic Organizing Committee. Lewald formed the *Organisationskomitee*, for both the Winter and Summer Olympic Games, on January 24, six days before the Nazi takeover.<sup>16</sup> The Organizing Committee of the host nation is supposed to be independent from government influence or control. The Olympic code states that the National Olympic Committee (here, the German Olympic Committee) - and therefore the Organizing Committee - should be free of direct political influence. In an effort, therefore, to ensure the proper arrangement of the Games, Lewald did not include any high-ranking Nazis. From the beginning, however, the Home Office, which had always controlled sport, tried to gain influence over the Organizing Committee. A conflict thus arose between the Organizing Committee, which defended its right as an independent body, and the Home Office. In October of 1934, this tension led the Home Office to draw up a legal document, signed by Lewald, which stipulated that the German Olympic Committee would assume control of the Organizing Committee:<sup>17</sup>

One could not change the status of the Organizing Committee as an independent non-profit organization as this would give those abroad, who customarily slander Germany, the chance to say that an independent organization was no longer possible...The Organizing Committee should therefore maintain to the *outside* [sic] its independent position with the right of communication with the International Olympic Committee. *Inside*, however, it was acting as agents of the German Olympic Committee and therefore legally bound by directions from this body.<sup>18</sup>

However, the German Olympic Committee was, in turn, headed by Captain Hans von Tschammer und Osten who, as the *Reichssportführer* (Reich sport leader or director), held the rank of an Under Secretary of State for Sports in the Home Office. By signing this document, Lewald and Diem could no longer act as free agents, and they, as well as the Organizing Committee as a whole, were forced to follow orders issued by the Nazi state.<sup>19</sup>

#### The Expulsion of Jewish Athletes from Sports Clubs

Before 1933, Jewish athletes had enjoyed the freedom of competing, training, and the general use of sports clubs and facilities in Germany. Until then, the majority of Jewish sportsmen and sportswomen belonged to German sports clubs with only a minority of German Jews enrolled in entirely Jewish sports associations. There was no need for special Jewish leagues and most clubs had at their disposal, as did everybody else, the use of municipal and other facilities. Before the imposition of the racial laws, some 40,000 Jews (out of a total population of 500,000, that is, less than one percent of the total population of Germany) belonged to

250 clubs. Two of the most important clubs were the *Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten* (Reichs Association of Jewish Front-line soldiers), later called the *Sportbund Schild*, and the *Deutscher Makkabi-Kreis*, which belonged to the Maccabi World Union, an international organization of Jewish sports clubs.<sup>20</sup>

Shortly after Hitler's accession to power, the expulsion of Jews from sports organizations and facilities began. Within two years of the imposition of the racial laws, Jews were barred from all sports clubs, competition, and both private and public training fields. All the German sporting associations were merged into, and subsumed by, the Reich Federal Sports Association. This takeover was part of the *Gleichschaltung* (coordination, forceful bringing into line, or elimination of the opposition) of the Reich. Pressure was maintained to make it impossible, either physically or psychologically, for Jews to train and compete. The discrimination was deliberate, relentless and frequently articulated in public by members of the Nazi administration. The first blow was struck on April 1, 1933, when the German Boxing Federation forbade Jewish boxers or referees to take part in German championship contests. Then on June 2, 1933, the new Nazi Reichsminister of Education, Dr. Bernhard Rust, announced that Jewish citizens were to be excluded from youth and health organizations, and the facilities of such bodies were to be closed to them. Thereafter, many towns and communities started to exclude

Jews from public sports facilities.<sup>21</sup>After July 1933, Jews could no longer be lifeguards in Breslau, and in time, all swimming resorts were off-limits to Jews "...for their own protection."<sup>22</sup>By the autumn of 1933, competition with "Aryans" was forbidden. Though legally Jews might train and compete with other Jews using their separate facilities, the police harassed Jewish clubs and sports grounds so that they had, in effect, nowhere to train, and could not even compete among themselves without molestation. Then, in December 1933, the *Jewish Chronicle* in London reported that all Jewish sports organizations in Germany, with the exception of the *Makkabi* and *Schild*, had been disbanded. But even these were dissolved in time by Bavarian officials. Nazi authorities also broke the international links of sports organizations, including those of the *Makkabi*. Compounding social restriction, in Bavaria, many German sports facilities, such as the ice stadium and the ski resort, had signs saying "Jews Not Wanted" or "Jews: Your Entry is Forbidden!"<sup>23</sup>

It is generally assumed that anti-Jewish measures in sport were the result of the deliberate policies instituted by Reich authorities. But discrimination against Jews in sport was as much the consequence of actions initiated by over-zealous sport functionaries in various federations as of governmental orders and directives. The central Nazi sport leadership gave virtual freedom to expel Jews from clubs and federations.<sup>24</sup>An American dispatch noted that "The

Reichskommissar for Sport, von Tschammer und Osten, issued an instruction to all sport associations in Germany, giving them a free hand to decide for themselves whether or not non-Aryans may be accepted as members."<sup>25</sup>The existence of one Jewish grandparent, for instance, was sufficient for some officials to expel members who had served a club for 40 years and more.<sup>26</sup>

Growing opposition to racial discrimination against Jewish athletes led the Nazis to develop policies strictly for theoretical and tactical purposes. Acutely aware of a discerning international public and fearful of losing the opportunity to host the Olympic Games, the Nazis felt pressured into easing, for the time being, restrictions against Jewish sportsmen and sportswomen. *Reichssportführer* von Tschammer und Osten arranged for the establishment of a "Reichs Committee of the Jewish Gymnastics and Sports Clubs". This gesture was intended to indicate to foreign countries that the preparation of the Jews for the Olympiad was under the protection of the Reich. The declared toleration of Jewish sports organizations was especially important in Bavaria, because it was the future site of the Winter Olympics.<sup>27</sup>Under a decree of March 20, 1934, of the commanding officer of the Bavarian political police, Reinhard Heydrich, the Reichs Association of Jewish Front-line soldiers and its sports organization were to be "...allowed to operate again, with some restrictions, however."<sup>28</sup>At the same time, the police did not object to

"...the founding of general Jewish gymnastics and sports clubs."<sup>29</sup>It is significant, too, that while on June 21, 1935, the freedom of German-Jewish organizations to hold assemblies was heavily restricted by the Bavarian police, "...the assemblies of members of sports organizations and sports events" were specifically excluded from this prohibition.<sup>30</sup>Two decrees of the political police, dated September 1, 1935, reveal most clearly the cautious approach of German authorities toward Jewish sports organizations:<sup>31</sup>

Not to stop the frictionless wind-up of the preparations for the Olympics, and to gag the Jewish agitation from abroad, the Makkabi-organizations and the sports clubs of the Reichs Association for Jewish Front-line Soldiers in Bavaria are allowed to practice until the Olympics of 1936....A general regulation for Jewish sports will come out after the end of the Olympics.<sup>32</sup>

The second decree, which addressed Jewish athletes in general, not just those in sports clubs, provided for the temporary admission of Jewish athletes, first suggested in "...the regulations for the sports of Jews and other non-Aryans" by the *Reichssportführer* in July 1934.<sup>33</sup>These regulations allowed Jews to organize in clubs, to take part in competitions and to train on public facilities. However, the decree was neither published nor implemented.<sup>34</sup>

**CHAPTER 2**  
**THE 1933 VIENNA PLEDGE**

**Avery Brundage**

Brundage was reticent about his origins. He did disclose to interviewers and to editors some information about his family and his childhood, and his life before he attended University, but he said remarkably little, and his reluctance was intentional. Avery Brundage was born in Detroit on September 28, 1887. His father, Charles, was a stonecutter from Campbelltown, New York, and his mother, Minnie Lloyd Brundage, came from Buffalo. An older brother died in infancy and a younger brother, Chester, was born November 7, 1891. Avery was orphaned at the age of 11 and brought up by his aunts and uncles. He attended Sherwood Public School, then R.T. Crane Manual Training School where he took up sports, including football, baseball, basketball, and track and field events. In 1905, Brundage attended the University of Illinois where he earned a first-class degree in civil engineering. After graduation, he was voted three times the Amateur all-round Champion of America. He became a very rich self-made man based on a career in the construction business, after he had founded his own company in 1915.<sup>1</sup>



Before undertaking a career, he had competed in the 1912 Stockholm Olympics and came sixth in the decathlon which was taken by the great American Indian, Jim Thorpe. When it was learned that Thorpe had played bush-league professional baseball in 1909 and 1910, his medals were taken from him and his name wiped from official record books. In the long and sincere campaign of American sportswriters to restore the medals to Thorpe, Brundage was an influential judge, adamant about the upholding of the principles of amateurism. Like most bureaucrats of international amateur sport, Brundage was convinced that the founder of the modern Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who throughout his life made eloquent pronouncements in favour of purity in athletics, was a genius and a saint. He thus worked closely with the Baron to promote amateurism.<sup>2</sup>

In 1930, Brundage was elected president of the American Olympic Committee (AOC). For years he had the backing of the National Collegiate Athletic Association and Amateur Athletic Union (AAU). Under his leadership, disputes within the world of American amateur sport waned and the conscious moral separation of American amateur athletics from professional sport became greater than similar gaps in any other sporting nation. To American sports journalists, the organizational isolation of amateur sport from professional sports has seemed artificial and, in many cases, hypocritical. Brundage personified much of the rigidity and

false cleanliness of American amateurism and obliged the sportswriters by occasional rudeness and pious pronouncements that were both provocative and newsworthy. Even with his involvement in the amateur-professional debate, it was only during the preparation of the 1936 Olympic Games that Avery Brundage first assumed major controversial prominence.<sup>3</sup>

#### The IOC and the Vienna Pledge

At the International Olympic Committee's annual meeting in Vienna in 1933, which took place from June 7 to 9, its members discussed whether the Olympic rules, which recognize the equality of all races and faiths, would be observed by Nazi Germany.<sup>4</sup> In March 1933, the American press was the first to alert international public opinion about the imposition of Nazi racial policies against German Jews.<sup>5</sup> Suggestions that discrimination was prevalent in Germany were reported in August issues of the *New York Times*. The *Times* announced, for instance, that Jewish sport organizations were denied use of all special facilities, a report based on the edict of Bernhard Rust (the Reichsminister of Education). Therefore, everyone had read reports that Jews were the object of persecution, both in sports and daily life.<sup>6</sup> On June 7, the President of the IOC, Comte Henri de Baillet-Latour, officially asked the German delegates - Lewald, Karl Ritter von Halt, Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin - if they would guarantee the observance of the articles in the Olympic Charter relating

to two issues: (1) the admission qualifications of participants, namely, Jewish athletes and (2) the Organizing Committee.<sup>7</sup> First, it appeared as if the IOC was alarmed by the persecution of Jews, in general, and of Jewish athletes, in particular. Since Jews were being barred from practice and sports clubs, whose members alone had access to the Olympic trials, Jews were, of course, being barred from the trial of the German team. The issue the Committee addressed was thus the right of German Jews to try out for their national team. Second, the IOC was ostensibly concerned that rules relating to the Organizing Committee had been violated as a result of a shocking incident which had occurred on June 2, 1933: the threatened dismissal of Lewald from his post as president of the Organizing Committee.<sup>8</sup> Even though it appears the Nazis had not expressly threatened him, Diem, whose personal position was endangered as well, was also clinging to the Organizing Committee as secretary-general.

Though its members raised these two concerns, the IOC actually expressed little interest in clarifying them. It was only at the instigation of two of the three American members of the Committee, Brigadier-General Charles H. Sherrill and Colonel William May Garland, that the IOC threatened to remove the Games from Berlin unless Germany guaranteed both that Lewald would retain his office and that the regime would cease to discriminate against Jewish athletes.<sup>9</sup> With the consent of his government, Lewald, on

behalf of the German delegation, guaranteed that both he and Diem would maintain their positions on the Organizing Committee.<sup>10</sup> But Nazi authorities only conceded this promise to quiet an alert international public. In reality, Lewald had been given the token role of adviser to the Organizing Committee. In fact, most of the decisions concerning the Games' organization were subsequently taken by Diem.<sup>11</sup> Regarding the issue of discrimination, also with the authorization of his government, Lewald made a verbal guarantee about Jewish participation:

- 2) All the laws regulating the Olympic Games shall be observed.
- 3) In principle German Jews shall not be excluded from German Teams at the Games of the XIth Olympiad.<sup>12</sup>

Again at the incitement of the American delegates, the IOC insisted on a written guarantee from Berlin stipulating the right of German Jews to compete for Germany, even though von Halt had resisted the idea.<sup>13</sup> Once a written promise was in hand, Baillet-Latour declared that he considered "...the assurances given by the German members to be satisfactory."<sup>14</sup> So on June 9, 1933, the IOC confirmed its decision to hold the 1936 Olympic Games in Germany.<sup>15</sup> The American delegates, and Sherrill in particular, were satisfied, too. Sherrill wrote about the Vienna pledge to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise in New York:

It was a trying fight. We were six on the Executive Committee, and even my English colleagues thought we ought not to interfere in the internal arrangements of the German team. The Germans yielded slowly - very slowly. First they conceded that other nations could bring Jews. Then, after the fight was over, telephones

[sic] came from Berlin that no publication [sic] should be given to their Government's back-down on Jews, but only the vague statement that they agreed to follow our rules....Then I went at them hard, insisting that as they had expressly excluded Jews, now they must expressly declare that Jews would not even be excluded from German teams. All sorts of influence was exerted to change my American stand. Finally they yielded because they found that I had lined up the necessary votes.<sup>16</sup>

Initially, Sherrill appears to have taken a strong stand against the discrimination of German Jews. Before leaving for the Vienna conference, the diplomat had told the American public and the American Jewish Congress, "Rest assured that I shall stoutly maintain the American principle that all citizens are equal under all laws," stressing that the German Jews must be allowed to compete in Berlin.<sup>17</sup>In reply to those who argued that the German treatment of Jewish citizens was Germany's business, the *New York Times* reported that "General Sherrill rejects the argument that the whole matter is an internal question. He maintains the Olympic Games and its rules cannot be violated by the entertaining nation."<sup>18</sup>After the Vienna meeting, Sherrill thought that Germany should prove its declared intention to observe the Olympic rules, at least in a symbolic manner. In order, then, to have proof of compliance, Sherrill pressured the Germans into promising that Helene Mayer, the championship fencer from Offenbach, then living in Los Angeles, would be invited back to join the German Olympic team. Mayer had, by now, been classed as a *Mischling* (her father was Jewish) and had thus been denied membership in her fencing club.<sup>19</sup>The Germans appeared to

have kept their promise, since the *New York Times* reported on November 24, 1933, that Helene Mayer would be on the German Olympic team despite her exclusion from the Offenbach Fencing Club.<sup>20</sup>

But Nazi guarantees, written or oral, were worthless. Following the IOC's convention, *Reichssportführer* von Tschammer und Osten, who was asked for reasons for Germany's pledge, admitted openly that the concessions were purely tactical. He explained to German press reporters and sports officials that "You are probably astonished by the decision in Vienna, but we had to consider the foreign political situation. It was my duty to foster relations with foreign countries."<sup>21</sup> He also mentioned his satisfaction with the ongoing racial cleansing of German sports clubs.<sup>22</sup> Further evidence that the German resolution had absolutely no practical effect on Nazi sport policy toward Jewish athletes, as well as others, is found in a book by a certain Bruno Malitz, sport theoretician and Sport Leader of the Berlin Storm Troopers. A copy of *The Spirit of Sport in the National Socialist Ideology* (1933) was sent to every sports club in Germany, and Goebbels had it placed on the list of books that all Nazis should read. The ideas of the Nazis concerning sports were blatantly anti-internationalist and racist:<sup>23</sup>

Sport is supposed to be a link between nations, but all the sport in the world cannot cancel those shameful paragraphs in the Versailles Treaty relating to war guilt. Frenchmen, Belgians, Polaks and Jew-Niggers run on German tracks and swim in German pools...There is no room in our German land for Jewish sports leaders and

their friends infested with the Talmud, for pacifists, political Catholics, pan-Europeans and the rest. They are worse than cholera and syphilis, much worse than famine, drought and poison gas. Do we then want to have the Olympic Games in Germany? Yes, we must have them! We think they are important for international reasons. There could not be better propaganda for Germany. The difference with us will be that no private clubs or associations will name the teams in the name of Germany and put Germany to shame. The State will name the team.<sup>24</sup>

In other words, sport, in general, and the Olympics, in particular, provided the means by which the Third Reich would exact revenge on all those enemies who had benefited from Germany's defeat in the Great War, hardly a commitment to cease persecution.<sup>25</sup>

Distrustful about the Nazis' stated intention to honour the Vienna pledge, George S. Messersmith, the United States Consul General in Berlin, reported his concerns in Olympic correspondence. In an Olympic report to the State Department of the Roosevelt administration, dated June 17, 1933, Messersmith wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that Jews were barred from competition.<sup>26</sup> Although noting the German claim that Jews would be permitted on their Olympic team, Messersmith stated that this was not the Germans' real intention. He felt, moreover, that the safety of American Jews would not be guaranteed, and that a Berlin site invited racial problems during the Festival. Messersmith estimated that the American Olympic Committee would not approve of participation in such an atmosphere.

### The AAU, the AOC and American Participation

Because of reports of discrimination against German-Jewish athletes, at the annual meeting of the Amateur Athletic Union in Pittsburgh on November 20, 1933, its delegates, with but one exception, voted for a boycott of the 1936 Games.<sup>27</sup> For the convention, Gustavus Kirby, a member of the American Olympic Committee, had drafted a resolution that called for an American boycott unless German-Jewish athletes were allowed to "...train, prepare for and participate in the Olympic Games of 1936," in fact as well as in theory.<sup>28</sup> It is critical to note that the American Olympic Committee and the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States were responsible for deciding American participation in the Olympic Games. AOC and AAU approval for participation was mandatory, since IOC certification regulations required the signature of an AOC and an AAU representative on each athlete's eligibility form. The AAU, in particular, was also the national governing body of track and field, and supplied significant moral and financial support to the American Olympic entry.<sup>29</sup>

The president of the AOC, Avery Brundage, seemed, at this stage, to be against American participation. First, at a convention in Washington on November 22, 1933, at the urging of the AAU, Brundage and the AOC agreed to postpone acceptance of the German invitation.<sup>30</sup> Second, Brundage, at least publicly, acknowledged that the Kirby resolution was necessary because German officials appeared to have reneged



on their promise. His suspicion of Germany's discriminatory practices is found in a public statement, reported by the *New York Times* on April 18, 1933:

My personal, but unofficial, opinion is that the Games will not be held in any country where there will be interference with the fundamental Olympic theory of equality of all races. The Olympic protocol provides there shall be no restriction of competition because of class, color or creed.<sup>31</sup>

Privately, though, Brundage opposed the Kirby resolution. In fact, he expressed reservations about the confrontational tone of the resolution, and insisted that the AOC pass a milder version of Kirby's strong measure. Brundage and AOC secretary Frederick W. Rubien complained about the resolution to Kirby. They insisted that a resolution was not necessary. First, it would embarrass the already beleaguered German Olympic leaders. Second, it was hypocritical, given the United States' own discrimination - the color line in the South. More important, it was not certain, and even doubtful, whether Nazi authorities intended to exclude their own Jewish athletes from the Games; the Jews were over-reacting.<sup>32</sup> These complaints about the Kirby resolution indicate that Brundage was minimizing, evading and distorting racist realities. The rationale behind his tactics is that, simply stated, Brundage was committed to participation. It was therefore convenient for him to give the Germans the benefit of the doubt. In any case, he did not want to press for confirmation of his suspicions of Nazi atrocities and thereby feel compelled to decline the German invitation. He had made his April

1933 public statement in support of the measure only to calm a sharp-eyed international public. To Brundage's irritation, his press statement was misinterpreted as an official challenge to German Olympic Committee policy. In a letter to a nervous Lewald, who was in a dangerous personal position and who feared the defection of the large and prestigious American team, Brundage explained that his public statement to the press was meant only to reassure the American public upon whose good will Olympic activities depended.<sup>33</sup> Despite his opposition to the resolution to postpone participation, Brundage chose, for the time being, not to express his real attitude. What is unknown is why Brundage did not go on record from the beginning, that is, the moment the Kirby resolution was first proposed, and pronounce himself publicly in opposition to it and in favour of American participation.

Anxious about the AAU's and the AOC's November 1933 resolutions to delay participation, the Nazis ordered that the pretence be maintained, especially by the Organizing Committee, that Jews were being allowed to train and qualify for the German Olympic team. Diem's role in the Third Reich is still disputed today. H. J. Teichler has shown that Diem had a strong affinity for Nazi ideas, although he was not an anti-Semite. Richard D. Mandell has argued that Diem was not a Nazi advocate, and was actually frightened and repelled by the *Gleichschaltung* in general and its effect upon sport in particular. According to Mandell, too, the

secretary-general actually avoided Hitler in the course of all his preparations for the Games and was, then, for a long time, one of those in silent opposition.<sup>34</sup> Regardless of whether, or to what extent, he was a Nazi advocate, Diem organized the Olympic Games the way the Nazis had planned. Diem was fully aware of the breach of the Olympic rules implicit in the racial laws which excluded German Jews from the Olympic team. However, he maintained that all of his actions were in the best interest of sport and of no political significance. By claiming sport was outside the political sphere, he was thereby able to disclaim responsibility for his contribution to the staging of the Games in Germany. Diem even denied the very existence of an American boycott movement, though he knew that only a slim majority was in favour of participation.<sup>35</sup>

Lewald, on the other hand, could not hold such an aloof position. Nazi authorities had delegated him to nurture foreign ties and to promote Nazi aspirations. Lewald was only tolerated by Hitler, and was even subject to deportation to a concentration camp if he did not cooperate with Nazi authorities. Because of his endangered personal position, Lewald became frightened and submissive, continually pressured by Nazi authorities to pass on Nazi assurances that were designed to allay foreign apprehensions but which he knew were worthless. Referring to Lewald's compromised position, Consul General Messersmith warned both the State Department and the AOC that Lewald should not be

trusted because he had no independent authority:<sup>36</sup>

It must be remembered that he [Lewald] has been permitted to retain his place for specific reasons and he is no longer a free agent. He is compelled under the existing circumstances in Germany to become a willing instrument of the authorities. I may inform the Department that those who know Dr. von Lewald and who respect him as I do, have recently criticized him most severely for lending himself to this exchange of telegrams. They feel it would have been better for him to resign rather than to give an impression to foreign countries that certain things are so which he knows not to be so.<sup>37</sup>

In an interview with the *New York Times* following the IOC Executive Committee meeting held in Brussels on May 8, 1934, Lewald tried to persuade American observers of the true German-Jewish situation. After repeating the pledges made in Vienna, Lewald admitted that a number of American sports leaders were concerned about the German guarantee regarding Jewish participation on the German team.<sup>38</sup> As noted before, that promise read: "In principle German Jews shall not be excluded from German Teams at the Games of the XIth Olympiad."<sup>39</sup> Lewald told the *New York Times*:

...there has been much discussion about the phrase 'in principle.' Some critics accuse Germany of seeking to evade her commitment by stretching the meaning of that phrase. I want to say first that Germany has kept and will continue to keep that promise. Secondly, that there are and will be no qualifications or restrictions of any kind upon the admission of Jewish athletes to the German Olympic team. Thirdly, Germany in the person of Hans von Tschammer und Osten, chairman of the German Olympic Committee and head of all German sport organizations, in which capacity he represents Chancellor Hitler, is doing more than she promised. She is admitting Jewish athletes to full training and competing facilities prior to the games and she is even seeking Jewish talent with representatives of all other religions among her citizens who do not happen to belong to athletic clubs....<sup>40</sup>

Just as he had lied when he pronounced the pledge in Vienna,

Lewald lied in his press statement. In fact, in a letter to Brundage, Sherrill admitted that Lewald's interview with the *New York Times* had been a tactical scheme to quiet American opinion and, more specifically, to satisfy American Jewry. So Sherrill's commitment to secure American presence in Berlin outweighed by far his concern for German Jews.<sup>41</sup> Sherrill wrote:

I believe that I might almost dare today to send you the telegram you request in your letter of April 17th about how the Committee feels about Germany's compliance with the agreement I secured from them last June in Vienna. A very detailed statement was given our Exec. Com. [Executive Committee] by Lewald and Diem...To make assurance doubly sure, I had up from the Paris office of the 'N.Y. Times' (property of Mr. Ochs, a Jew) their Herb Matthews, and, after the close of the Ex. Com.'s afternoon session, I put him with Lewald and Diem into another room, and let him question them to his heart's content. What he reports ought to satisfy American Jewry.<sup>42</sup>

#### **Avery Brundage's Fact-Finding Tour**

Because the public perceived that Lewald's assurances in the press were merely a pretence, the AOC delegated Brundage to make an on-the-spot investigation of the status of Jewish athletes. Following Lewald's May 1934 statement to the *New York Times*, the IOC convened in Athens, from May 15 to 19, to discuss Jewish participation. At the meeting, Lord Aberdare, a British member, asked the German delegates point-blank if their government's pledge of non-discrimination was trustworthy. The IOC was satisfied with Lewald's assurances, but the AOC remained suspicious. However suspicious the AOC may have been, though, it was only under the pressure of public opinion in the United

States that the Committee arranged a fact-finding tour by Brundage. He was to inspect the German-Jewish situation in person, and to accept or reject the Olympic invitation on the spot. Brundage regarded his assignment as a tactical procedure. Before his departure, in a letter to Kirby, Brundage had observed that no one could fully survey the German situation on a brief visit, and that, in any case, as a matter of expedience, he was content to accept the original decision of the IOC to go to the Games.<sup>43</sup>In fact, in a statement published on the eve of his trip to Germany, Brundage urged the American athletes to prepare for the coming Games and stated, at least implicitly, that he expected to find the German house of sport in order.<sup>44</sup>

During his six-day tour of Berlin and Garmisch-Partenkirchen in September of 1934, Brundage, who did not speak German and was thus forced to rely on interpreters, met with representatives of Jewish sports clubs. He was never allowed to talk alone with sports officials; Nazi authorities monitored his conversations. The *Reichssportführer* and von Halt both reassured Brundage that there was no discrimination against Jewish athletes. Brundage also examined translated documents, which contained information on the theoretical, or tactical, regulations for easing restrictions on Jewish athletes and sports organizations.<sup>45</sup>Diem recorded his discussion with Brundage about these documents, which he had put together in order to satisfy not only Brundage, but a suspicious foreign public:

We showed Brundage documents indicating that the Jews are able to participate freely in sports and to train for the Olympic team. Meyerhof told us that he had offered to resign from the Berliner Sport-Club but that the resignation had not been accepted. I was seldom as proud of my club as at that moment. Brundage was visibly impressed.<sup>46</sup>

On the basis of his interviews with Jewish sports leaders and the documents, Brundage, upon his return to the United States on September 25, 1934, concluded that the German Jews were satisfied with their treatment from a sports point of view.<sup>47</sup> However, Brundage's conclusions were founded on guarded statements which came out of a controlled encounter, and on a predisposition to believe what he wanted to believe, since he had already made up his mind to accept the German invitation before he left.<sup>48</sup> Relying heavily on Brundage's casual and superficial assessment, the AOC voted the next day for participation in Berlin:

In the light of the report of Mr. Brundage and the attitude and assurances of representatives of the German government, we accept the invitation of the German Olympic Committee to the 1936 Olympic Games.<sup>49</sup>

Despite Brundage's insistence that the AAU reverse its decision to keep its athletes out of Germany, the sporting organization refused.<sup>50</sup>

#### 21 Jewish Candidates for the German Team

Nervous about Brundage's visit and the United States' resistance to commit its athletes to Germany, German officials had hastily nominated 21 Jewish athletes to the German Olympic team. At first, on June 8, 1934, *Sportführer* von Tschammer und Osten named five Jewish candidates to the

German Olympic team.<sup>51</sup> Then on June 18, the German Olympic Committee announced that it had nominated 21 Jewish athletes from *Makkabi* and *Schild* to German training camps.<sup>52</sup> The *New York Times*, which had announced the list of candidates, also reported that, by July 1935, the Nazis had continued to fulfill the Vienna pledge:

The German authorities have given a pledge that there shall be no discrimination in the selection of these [21] candidates. Accordingly, one of the camps, that at Ettlingen, devoted its last three weeks to training Jewish candidates from the Maccabean League and the League of German Jewish War Veterans [*Schild*]. This period matched the ratio borne by the number of Jews in Germany to the total German population. It was in strict accord with the letter of the German agreement with the International Olympic Committee.<sup>53</sup>

The intention of the list of 21 candidates, published in the American press, was to satisfy not only the AOC and the AAU, but also to quiet foreign observers. Indeed, only 12 days after Brundage was safely out of the way, seven of the Jewish athletes nominated for Olympic trials received formal letters from their district sports leaders saying that their performances were not good enough to qualify them for berths on the team. The remaining athletes participated in only perfunctory Olympic training camps, with poor facilities, limited coaching, and lack of any real competition. Not surprisingly, none of the nominees was selected. In his explanation to a low-level embassy official, Lewald reiterated the contents of the district letters.<sup>54</sup> In corroboration of the declaration of poor athletic performances, he provided a copy of a letter written by von Halt which stated: "The sole reason for this [the dismissal



of Jewish athletes from the list of candidates] was always the fact that no Jew was able to qualify by his ability for participation in the Olympic team."<sup>55</sup>

One of the most blatant violations of the Vienna pledge was the abrupt dismissal of Gretel Bergmann from the German team. The world-class high-jumper was indirectly refused a chance at an Olympic berth by being denied the opportunity to participate in the tryouts for the German Field Sports Championships, which were really pre-Olympic qualifying trials. Though Bergmann had equaled the German record (of 1.60 meters) prior to the pre-Olympic qualifying meets, two weeks before the beginning of the Games, she received the stunning news that she could not participate in the Games because of her *mittelmassige Leistung* (mediocre achievements). The head of the Jewish sports association in Berlin, who protested vigorously to the German Olympic Committee, was promptly put under police control and forced to report twice daily to the Gestapo because the Nazis feared that more information would be leaked to the world public. Bergmann had no choice but to emigrate. The high-jumper had been set up, and though she had had a suspicion of it at the time, her suspicion was only investigated later. Bergmann had been ordered to report to Hanover for a special training course where she shared a room with Dora Rathjen, the second choice high-jumper for the Olympic team. At the time, Bergmann told close associates that Rathjen was a boy. Two years later, Rathjen was barred from women's

sport when it was discovered that she was, indeed, a man. Rathjen admitted to being planted on the team, almost certainly to stop Bergmann from qualifying for the team.<sup>56</sup>

To counter an agitated American public which was protesting such violations of the pledge, Sherrill undertook a mission in Germany, in the summer of 1935, to obtain the inclusion of at least one Jew on the German team. Helene Mayer (the fencer) and Rudi Ball, like Mayer a half-Jew, were invited to join the team by the *Reichssportführer*. For reasons that are no longer clear, Mayer and Ball accepted the Nazis' invitation. At the time, it was believed they accepted only because their families had been threatened. At a reception in Munich on August 24, 1935, Sherrill sought in vain to reach Hitler in order to obtain another statement of assurance of the inclusion of Mayer, in particular, on the German team, since she had not yet been invited despite a German promise made two years ago. The leadership of the Reich sports administration stated that the official invitation had been sent out four times; but Helene Mayer repeatedly denied having received any invitation. Sherrill finally had a meeting with Hitler on August 28, 1935, at which he received a statement of assurance of Mayer's inclusion on the team. Rudi Ball, one of Germany's leading ice-hockey players, was also invited back from his exile in France, shortly before the beginning of the Winter Olympic Games.<sup>57</sup> According to Sherrill:

I went to Germany for the purpose of getting at least one Jew on the German Olympic team and I feel that my

job is finished. As for obstacles placed in the way of Jewish athletes or any others in trying to reach Olympic ability, I would have no more business discussing that in Germany than if the Germans attempted to discuss the Negro situation in the American South or the treatment of the Japanese in California.<sup>58</sup>

Though Sherrill was a key figure in securing Mayer's and Ball's participation, it was purely a propaganda manoeuvre. It was a tactic to silence the boycott supporters before the 1935 AAU national convention scheduled for December 1935, at which time American participation would be decided once and for all. Sherrill's intention was to side-step the major issue of persecution in Germany, as a whole, by focusing public attention on the fact that some Jews would represent Germany in the Games, thereby making it look as if Germany had fulfilled its obligations.<sup>59</sup> The General also tried to counter the American boycott movement by stating that American concern with the internal policies of Nazi Germany would provoke anti-Semitic feeling in the United States. It was a scare tactic directed at those getting in the way of committing a team to Germany, not a legitimate reason to oppose the boycott, however. Sherrill told the *New York Times*:

There is grave danger in this Olympic agitation. Consider the effect on several hundred thousand youngsters training for this contest throughout the United States, if the boycott movement gets so far that they suddenly are confronted with the fact that somebody is trying to defeat their ambition to get to Berlin and compete in the Olympic Games. We are almost certain to have a wave of anti-Semitism among those who never before gave it a thought, and who may consider that about 5,000,000 Jews in this country are using the athletes representing 120,000,000 Americans to work out something to help the German Jews. Many prominent Jews

with whom I have talked here and abroad feel the same way: that it would be overplaying the Jewish hand in America as it was overplayed in Germany before the present suppression and expulsion of the Jews were undertaken. The anti-Semitism resulting here might last for years.<sup>60</sup>

Sherrill did display early concern for the plight of the German-Jewish athletes and was influential in securing conciliatory German pledges. But his press statements indicate that he was ignoring evidence that the Germans were violating their pledge, therefore leading to a questioning of his earlier actions. He defended his pro-participation position by telling the American public that his actions were not motivated by feelings of anti-Semitism and that, if anything, he was pro-Jewish.<sup>61</sup> Still, based on his statements to the *New York Times*, it is difficult to believe that he was being sincere. It is also hard to ignore that Sherrill attended the Nuremberg Party rally of September 15, 1935 - as Hitler's guest. His attendance reveals two things. First, though it is not known what, if any, pressure Hitler put on Sherrill to attend the rally, it would be generous to interpret the diplomat's gesture as anything other than an act of anti-Semitism. Second, given Sherrill's commitment to participation, whatever impressions he had acquired there must have incited him to be all the more concerned about a perceptive international public, thus prompting him to present reassuring public reports.<sup>62</sup>

Even with the inclusion of two half-Jews, Ambassador Dodd and Consul General Messersmith were suspicious about the sudden withdrawal of the Jewish athletes from the list

of candidates for the Olympics and thus decided to take action. The Ambassador sought first-hand information about the situation of the athletes from the Jewish sports federations. Dodd first made an informal inquiry into the *Schild*, but the intimidated Jewish sportsmen refused to give him information.<sup>63</sup>In a report to the Secretary of State, dated October 11, 1935, he wrote about a secret interview with an unnamed spokesman from a sports organization who told him about open discrimination: the refusal of access to sports facilities, exclusion from contests, and the disregard of many protest letters.<sup>64</sup>Lewald responded to Dodd's suspicions by showing the Ambassador's deputy the letter from von Halt, which stated that Jewish performances were not good enough to qualify them for the Olympics.<sup>65</sup>Messersmith, meanwhile, confronted Lewald directly. In a report dated November 15, 1935, addressed to Cordell Hull, he revealed that Lewald had confessed to him, in tears, that he, Lewald, had lied when he assured Brundage and the American Olympic Committee that there was no discrimination against Jewish athletes.<sup>66</sup>Messersmith reported:

For the State Department's information, I may say that I have known Dr. von Lewald well and held him in very high regard. When I asked him what reply he had made to the [earlier inquiries of the] American Committee, he told me, with tears in his eyes, that he had replied that there was no discrimination. When, as a friend, I approached him for in this way misusing the confidence which his American friends put in him, he replied that I must know what the consequences would be to him if he had made any other reply. To this, I merely remarked that there were times, when, in order to maintain one's self-respect and the confidence of one's friends, one must accept the consequences which come from doing right.<sup>67</sup>

Despite Dodd's and Messersmith's efforts to address the problem of discrimination against Jewish athletes, the State Department remained unmoved. The reaction by the State Department was that it was in no position to become involved in the internal matters of Germany and that Dodd and Messersmith should not be critical of a friendly nation.<sup>68</sup> In other words, the State Department's mandate was to minimize the severity of the Olympic reports. The Department took the aloof stand that Dodd and Messersmith must be exaggerating and that they should just tone things down.

While the two diplomats were taking action to disclose the situation of Jewish athletes, in response to public and news media pressure, Baillet-Latour visited Germany on October 23, 1935, to examine the charges against Nazi policy. He did meet with Hitler who assured him that the charges against Germany were false.<sup>69</sup> However, Baillet-Latour's visit was a tactical move to appease a watchful international public. The Comte had only pretended to believe Hitler's intentions, so that for two years now, he had been ignoring Jewish persecution. In a declaration on November 6, 1935, he lied outright that he was convinced of the Nazis' "*bonnes intentions*":

L'entretien que j'ai eu avec le chancelier d'Allemagne ainsi que l'enquête à laquelle je me suis livré m'ont convaincu que rien ne s'oppose au maintien des Jeux de la XI<sup>e</sup> Olympiade à Berlin et à Garmisch Partenkirchen...Les conditions requises par la Charte olympique ont été respectées par le Comité olympique allemand.<sup>70</sup>

The IOC president was also planning to tour the United States in 1935, at German expense, to lecture on the merits of staging the Olympic Games in Germany in order to gather support from the public. He was, however, restrained by Brundage who wanted to keep the public discussion low-key.<sup>71</sup>

Baillet-Latour's evasive replies to the American press on the eve of his departure suggest that he was aware that Jews were being persecuted. In an interview with the *New York Times*, the Comte said that there was no ground for trying to remove the Games from Germany; everything was in order. As he said this, however, he refused to discuss at any length the specific charges against Nazi policy which had been levelled in the United States. When told that the Lake Shore Swimming Club of Chicago, before a recent match against the provisional German Olympic team in Berlin, had found the entrances to the municipal baths plastered with a slogan saying "Jews Not Wanted Here," he replied that he was not interested in the situation during the Olympics nor in past history.<sup>72</sup> When questioned about the fact that in Germany only those who had accepted Nazi ideology were permitted to win athletic contests, he answered, "...the IOC does not go into such details."<sup>73</sup> Back at the IOC's headquarters in Lausanne, he issued a statement saying that the campaign of opposition to the Games was political, based on false assertions, "...whose falsity it has been easy for me to unmask."<sup>74</sup>

Further evidence indicates that Baillet-Latour was

aware of German actions but deliberately presented a false image of the new Germany to the public. His real attitude is revealed in his reaction to an American IOC member's appeal to have the Games removed from Berlin. The third American member of the IOC (in addition to Sherrill and Garland) was Commodore Ernest Lee Jahncke. His appeal to Baillet-Latour for the withdrawal of the Games was published in the *New York Times* on November 27, 1935:

...the Nazis have consistently and persistently violated their pledges. Of this they have been convicted out of their own mouths and by the testimony of impartial and experienced American and English newspaper correspondents. It is plainly your [Baillet-Latour] duty to hold the Nazi sports authorities accountable for the violation of their pledges. Let me beseech you to seize your opportunity to take your rightful place in the history of the Olympics alongside of de Coubertin instead of Hitler.<sup>75</sup>

Upon reading the statement, Baillet-Latour simply told Jahncke that the president's duty was to implement the policy of the IOC, that is, to stage the Games in Germany; the Comte did not address the issue of the Nazis' violation of the pledge. Baillet-Latour regarded Jahncke as a traitor and, because he did not want a dissenting voice on the Committee, the IOC president asked Jahncke to resign from the Committee; Jahncke refused.<sup>76</sup> Baillet-Latour must certainly also have known about, if not read, a pamphlet entitled *Preserve the Olympic Ideal: A Statement against American Participation in the Olympic Games in Berlin* (1935), published by a body called "The Committee on Fair Play in Sports," which put together a case for boycotting the Games:



The question whether or not America should participate is now being debated through the length and breadth of this country. In the last analysis the question will have to be decided by Americans themselves. If we know them correctly, they will not permit it to be decided for them, either by the International Olympic Committee or by the American Olympic Committee.<sup>77</sup>

Furthermore, by the time Baillet-Latour visited the *Führer*, he undoubtedly knew that it was no longer feasible to have the Games removed from Germany, given their lengthy preparation time. It was certainly far too late to arrange for an acceptable staging of the Games anywhere else. As the president of the International Olympic Committee, and therefore the person ultimately responsible for deciding the location of the Olympic Games, the Comte felt that he had to, at least publicly, look as if he had done what he could to ensure that Nazi authorities, who were in charge of the preparations of the Games this time around, would keep their pledge. Therefore, even though he was aware of the persecution of Jewish athletes, Baillet-Latour had made his final decision about granting Germany the Games once the IOC had received the conciliatory pledge at the Vienna congress.

### CHAPTER 3

#### THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

##### American Public Opinion

Because of the IOC's acceptance of the 1933 Vienna pledge, some outraged Americans decided to boycott the 1936 Olympic Games. Agitation mounted most quickly in the United States, and especially in New York where there were more than two million Jews in the city. The American public sent resolutions and telegrams to public and sports authorities, and even to the Reich. Sporting organizations, in turn, urged the AOC and the AAU to secure a transfer of the Games to some other city, or to withdraw the American team. Many city councils, trade unions, and civic organizations passed resolutions against honoring the Nazi festival with an American presence. The American Jewish Congress had decided to call for a boycott in May 1933, that is, even before the Vienna convention. Many American newspapers, including all the New York dailies, opposed the preparations for choosing an American team. As of the summer of 1934, Congress was besieged by demands that the United States take action to help the Jews in Germany. The boycott movement also included many politically prominent Catholics and Protestants.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, late in the protest movement, a March

1935 Gallup poll revealed that 43% of the American public favoured a boycott of the Olympic Games.<sup>2</sup> The *Gleichschaltung*, or forced coordination of German sport, had not only entailed the control of all German sports clubs to which most Jewish athletes belonged, but had also required the forceful merging of all Catholic and Protestant sports clubs. The Catholic War Veterans and the liberal Catholic journal *Commonweal* were in favour of a boycott, as were the Protestant publication *Christian Century* and many respected Protestant spokesmen. By the time the AAU prepared for its meeting in December 1935, at which point a final decision on the question of American participation was to be reached, it had before its executive board resolutions from organizations representing memberships of 1,500,000 and petitions containing the signatures of 500,000 people who opposed the staging of the 1936 Games in Germany.<sup>3</sup>

Large United States cities became gathering places of mass meetings against American participation. Such meetings took place in New York in Madison Square Garden, which could hold 20,000. On March 6, 1934, at a mock trial held there, 22 witnesses gave evidence against Hitler and his government on the charge of committing crimes against civilization. The police turned out in strength, expecting trouble, but practically no dissent was voiced. An empty chair pointedly marked the absence of its intended occupant, Dr. Hans Luther, the German Ambassador to the United States, who had been invited to represent his country but did not dare turn

up. He had appealed to the State Department, requesting the ban of the meeting on the grounds that it would be an insult to a friendly nation, but the State Department had declined to intervene. The last mass meeting took place on December 3, 1935, just before the AAU national convention.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Avery Brundage and the Public Debate over American Participation**

Despite wanting to keep the issue low-key, Brundage became an unwilling participant in a public debate over American participation. In Brundage's view, he and the IOC were doing the appropriate thing: seeking and receiving guarantees of non-discrimination and undertaking investigations into allegations of Germany's violation of the Vienna pledge. Brundage, as well as the Committee members, were therefore not about to allow those who opposed American participation to spoil things. When American and international agitation for a boycott of the Olympics first started, Brundage and the IOC sought to justify their refusal to change sites by pointing out that the Games had been awarded originally to a democracy, the Weimar Republic, rather than to a Fascist dictatorship.<sup>5</sup> This pronouncement, however, did little to quell public opinion. Brundage was then forced to formulate more persuasive arguments in favour of participation. Though the intensity with which some of the arguments were stated increased, the same arguments by both sides - pro-participation and pro-boycott - appeared quite consistently in the American press throughout the two-

year public debate. For the most part, Brundage was the one who formulated pro-participation arguments for strategic purposes. Those who backed him by making public arguments similar to his may be considered his supporters or followers. Bear in mind that the AAU, the body that supervised the Olympic trials and whose approval was mandatory, was on record as opposed to American participation throughout the two or so years of the Olympic controversy. It is worth pointing out that Brundage had a personal reason for securing a team in Germany. In 1933, already the president of the American Olympic Committee, he had learned that he was in line for election to the IOC, too. Membership in that organization represented the summit of his aspirations, and the importance of Baillet-Latour's unqualified approval must surely have motivated him to secure American participation.<sup>6</sup>

The AOC president took four positions publicly. They consisted of his assertions that: (1) sports must be separate from politics; (2) there was no discrimination in Germany, so the Games should go ahead as planned; (3) discrimination existed in other countries, so Germany should not be attacked; and (4) the Games would promote peace and understanding in Germany. The core of Brundage's public argument was that it was necessary to keep the Olympics separate from politics. In his view, sports leaders should not interfere in Germany's political matters; these should be handled by the country's own political leaders. It

should be emphasized here that the passionate devotion to Olympism, or more specifically, the view that despite political obstacles, the Olympic Games had to go on, had been deeply impressed upon all the high-minded followers of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, including Brundage.<sup>7</sup> Colonel William May Garland (an American IOC member) advocated the separation of sports and politics. As Garland said: "As I see it, the American Olympic Committee must not become involved in racial, sociological or religious controversies of any kind."<sup>8</sup> Nothing is known about Garland's intentions when he had originally joined Sherrill in pressuring the German delegation for the Vienna pledge, or about his role more generally in the Olympic controversy. Therefore, it is unknown whether or not his statement reflects a change of allegiance, that is, from pro-boycott to pro-participation, or whether, like Brundage and Sherrill, he had been pro-participation all along. Brundage also made a public statement on the freedom of Olympics from political issues in late 1934:

Frankly, I don't think we have any business meddling in this question [of politics in Germany]. We are a sports group, organized and pledged to promote clean competition and sportsmanship. When we let politics, racial questions, religious or social disputes creep into our actions, we're in for trouble, and plenty of it.<sup>9</sup>

Brundage modified this claim by arguing that sports and politics must be separate but that, in any case, the politics in question, that is, of Nazi Germany, were not, as his opponents claimed, atrocious.<sup>10</sup>

Accordingly, a second argument devised by Brundage which emerged publicly in early 1934, was that there was no discrimination against Jews in Germany and that Germany had pledged that there would be no discrimination; therefore, the United States had no grounds for withdrawing the American Olympic team from the Games.<sup>11</sup> This argument is hardly reasonable, since it rested on the assumption that it was not up to the well-placed newspaper correspondents, who leaked reports of discrimination, the well-positioned U.S. diplomats, or the public to decide whether discrimination existed. As far as Brundage was concerned, only the IOC was responsible for determining that fact. Predictably, he argued that the Germans were keeping their promise to behave according to Olympic rules. In other words, the pro-participation party found a justification of its position in the perceived absence of overt anti-Semitism. Gustavus Kirby (AOC member), who had drawn up the November 1933 resolution against participation, now spoke in favour of Brundage's position:

I cannot help but continue to have faith and confidence in the honesty, the judgement and the powers of observation and deduction therefrom of the President of the American Olympic Committee, to whom we gave power to act for us and who still believes that there is no reason at all why we should not continue in our attitudes of willingness and desire to compete...<sup>12</sup>

Brundage developed an argument which contradicted his claim that there was no discrimination against German Jews. Discrimination existed in any given country; consequently, it was not fair to single out Germany and attack that

particular country. In other words, there should not be a double standard: one for Germany and another for all other countries. Brundage did not admit to it, but this argument was tantamount to acknowledging that discrimination actually existed in Germany. As Brundage put it:

Regardless of in what country the Olympic Games are held, there will be some group, some religion or some race that can register a protest because of the action of the government of that country, past or present.<sup>13</sup>

As well, Brundage argued from a far narrower standpoint that the United States should not judge German racist practices because it was practising discrimination against its own people. He was not referring to racism generally in the United States, but to the particular discriminatory practices of the AAU. What Brundage did was to take the issue of discrimination and turn it on its head: the AAU opposed participation on the basis of discrimination; Brundage charged that the AAU, itself, was violating protocol - it was discriminating against its own athletes by barring them from competing in the Olympic Games:

...alien agitators and their American stooges...would deny our athletes their birthright as American citizens to represent the United States in the Olympic Games of 1936 in Germany...<sup>14</sup>

A fourth argument put forth by Brundage throughout the Olympic controversy was that the celebration of Olympism in Germany would show Hitler and the Nazis the power of the Olympic ideals of brotherhood, equality and peace. According to Brundage, American participation, at the very least, would prevent further discriminatory measures against



a German-Jewish population.<sup>15</sup> Like the second public argument, this one clearly contradicts the argument that it was acceptable to hold the Games in Germany on the basis of an absence of discrimination there. Brundage could not have suggested to impress upon Nazi Germany such Olympic ideals had he genuinely thought that Germany was a peaceful nation. Apart from the flagrant contradiction, his argument is telling in another way. There is little doubt that Brundage believed in the Olympic movement as a means of promoting international peace and understanding. But his underlying intention is of more significance here. He was using the vision of the Games as a means to promote peace and understanding in an attempt to make a strong appeal to that section of the pro-boycott party which shared this outlook with him.

Another argument articulated by Brundage's followers, though not expressed by the AOC president himself, was the idea that sending a team to Germany would destroy the myth that Aryan youth was superior to the youth of other nations. An American team composed of athletes from various nationalities and religious beliefs would destroy the myth of Aryan supremacy, and it would make German youths think that the edicts of their government were not as sound as they had been led to believe.<sup>16</sup> This suggestion was offered in late 1935 by Dr. Frederick B. Robinson, the president of the City College of New York. As Robinson stated: "A strong representation of American Jewish athletes at the next

Olympic games in Berlin would gain greater glory both for our own country and for the Jewish people of the world."<sup>17</sup>

Those Americans who were against American participation in Germany used three arguments, publicly, against Brundage and his supporters. These assertions, which were diametrically opposed to pro-participation pronouncements, were the following: (1) Nazi Germany was discriminating against Jews; so the Games should either be removed from Germany or boycotted; (2) discrimination was opposed to the idea of fair play and sportsmanship; and (3) Hitler had malevolent designs to use the Games to prove the superiority of the "Aryan" race. First, Bernard S. Deutsch, president of the American Jewish Congress, opposed the staging of the Games in Germany on the basis of discrimination, the major premise of the boycotters' arguments. Deutsch requested the Executive Committee of the AOC to discuss the withdrawal of the Olympic Games from Berlin or the boycott of the Games by the United States. In a letter to the Executive Committee, Deutsch noted that all training facilities for Jews had been withdrawn and that Jewish athletes were barred from membership in sports organizations.<sup>18</sup> He made the following statement from his letter to the press: "In the five months which have elapsed since the pledge of Germany was given... the policy of the Hitler government to the Jews has become more violent and more stringent."<sup>19</sup> Emmanuel Celler, a Democrat member of the United States House of Representatives, also urged the withdrawal of the Games from

Berlin, stating that Germany could not be trusted to keep its promise of non-discrimination:

Any government that abets Jewish persecutions and which threatens daily through Dr. Goebbels to intensify anti-Jewish atrocities cannot be trusted to keep its promise not to discriminate against Jewish athletes.<sup>20</sup>

A second argument in support of a boycott, based on the first one, was that discrimination was a blow to fair play in sports. The American Jewish Congress first took this position as early as May 1933, before the Vienna conference. Explicit in the Congress' statement was an appeal to Olympic Jewish athletes to withdraw from competition:

...the discrimination against Jews in Germany is contrary to all tenets of sportsmanship, and that the strength of the teams to participate would be weakened in view of the fact that no Jew in America or in other countries could, in self-respect, undertake to appear in Germany under present conditions.<sup>21</sup>

The board of directors of the National Federation of Settlements also claimed that the discrimination against German Jews was a violation of fair play in sports, but its members made a more detailed and passionate case for non-participation. Because Jews were being prohibited from joining sports clubs and thus could not train or compete, they were so severely undermined in their preparation that they could not possibly reach their potential. Board members also urged not just Jewish athletes but athletes in general to keep out of Germany:

Here, there and everywhere, human relations are violated when the primary freedoms of speech, press, thought, association and opportunity are sacrificed to intolerance and domination. We have a stake in the issue as to whether American athletes shall take part in the Olympics at Berlin, when to do so strikes a blow

at fair play in sports. We regard this in no sense sheerly [sic] a Jewish problem. All minority groups are under the ban in Germany, whether Socialist, Democratic, Catholic, Jewish, Communist, trade union or liberal. Their athletic organizations have been disrupted. No one who differs from the Nazi mold has a fair chance to try for Olympic honors. We do not need to take the word of refugees, Gentile or Jewish, who have had to leave Germany because of political suppression or economic persecution; the official German statements carry their own condemnation. The decision to permit one German Jew to qualify [fencer Helene Mayer], announced by General Sherrill of the A.O.C., is as ridiculous a compromise as it would be to exclude all but one Irish athlete from the American contestants. In the name of the fair play and sportsmanship that our settlement clubs strive for, we urge the adult athletic organizations of the country to refrain from participating in the Olympics if they are held in Germany.<sup>22</sup>

A third argument developed by the boycotters was that Germany intended to use the Olympics in the political arena as a showplace for Nazi youth. Consequently, the United States should not involve itself in an Olympic festival which would serve to show the superiority of the Aryan race over all others.<sup>23</sup>

Although Brundage firmly believed that the Olympics should remain separate from politics, the boycotters charged that Hitler and the German Government were, in fact, playing politics with the Olympics.<sup>24</sup> Though not expressed explicitly by the boycotters, it seems they were aware that the new regime sought to use Olympic sport, or more accurately, its own youth, to indicate to the rest of the world that Aryans were physically and mentally stronger than all other nationalities, and thereby use this great accomplishment of the new Germany to gain world respectability. The use of the Olympic Games for propaganda purposes, that is, for the

promotion of the Third Reich was, of course, Hitler's only reason for hosting the Games. The boycotters and the pro-participation party thus took opposite stands: on the one hand, stay away from a nation which promoted the Aryan myth of superiority; on the other hand, go to Germany to destroy the Aryan myth of supremacy. The Olympic controversy, though, was not a debate over the most effective method to show the Nazis that their ideology of Aryan supremacy was wrong. First, this idea was never expressed explicitly by the pro-boycott party, and second, it was not endorsed by Brundage, who, after all, led his side of the public debate, so that it had secondary importance, at best, to his stated conviction of the separation of sports and politics.

The arguments formulated against participation expressed by prominent individuals in press statements do not reveal the boycotters' whole attitude. The boycott party did not only seek to prevent an American contingent from going to Germany because it feared widespread discrimination, or simply because Nazi racist practices were violating rules of fair play and sportsmanship. The underlying fear of the boycotters, which was only implicit in their public argumentation, was that if the large and prestigious United States team participated in the Games, the rest of the world would interpret American commitment in Germany as approval of a regime which promoted persecution and racial hatred against a Jewish populace, as well as other groups. It appears that the boycotters wanted to use

the Olympic Games, or more accurately the withdrawal of the American contingent, as a means to show Hitler and the Nazis that the National-Socialist ideology was misguided and evil. Refusing to send an American Olympic team to Germany would show the extent of a powerful nation's outrage at the way the German Government was treating German Jews and, by extension, would help to prevent further discrimination.

Like his opponents, though in defense of participation, Brundage assumed a moral stance. He decried the decline in international trustworthiness, thereby defending the Olympics as being above the manoeuvres of local politicians, both German and American. Unlike the passionately vocal organizers of the boycott movement, who valued the Olympic movement but could not rationalize the celebration of Olympism in Germany because of the violations of the Vienna pledge, Brundage claimed that the Olympic Games belonged to the athletes of the world and should therefore not be subject to political interference and ideologies. To him, Olympism was so important a movement that his opponents, however high-minded they claimed to be, had to be silenced, since they were placing in danger an institution that was far more important than their egos. Brundage and his supporters posed as being far above petty chauvinism, a position that did not prevent them from occasionally praising the visible accomplishments of the Nazi regime.<sup>25</sup>

In addition to his public press statements, Brundage

publicized his reasons for favouring American participation in a pamphlet entitled *Fair Play for American Athletes* (1935). In the booklet, he asked if the American athlete was to be made "...a martyr to a cause not his own," and repeated the argument about the separation of sports and politics.<sup>26</sup> He argued that American athletes should not become needlessly involved in what he referred to as "...the present Jew-Nazi altercation."<sup>27</sup> Brundage also said that "Certain Jews must now understand that they cannot use these Games as a weapon in their boycott against the Nazis."<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, since Jews and Communists were calling for a boycott, Brundage reasoned that all the boycotters were Jews or Communists.<sup>29</sup>

Accordingly, by late 1935, Brundage publicly blamed Jews for the boycott campaign. He especially accused those "...with communistic and socialistic antecedents," and regarded himself as a personal target.<sup>30</sup> As early as May 1933, the AOC president had used this explanation in a letter to Lewald. Some Olympic officials said to one another and to selected audiences that the Jews were complaining too much. But the Jews were complaining too much only according to an IOC standard of evidence as to whether their complaints were valid. Also freely circulated in IOC correspondence was the conviction that Jewish suspicions were groundless, since von Halt, who was respected by Brundage and many others, had given his word of honour that Jewish athletes were being treated equally. Not

only did Jews exalt their own political interests above the independence of amateur sport and fail to appreciate the contribution of the Olympic movement to whatever extent it had been restrained by Hitler, but also, Brundage argued with increasing irritation, Jewish protest would be counter-productive in the long run. Like Sherrill, he argued that an Olympic boycott on account of the Jews would excite dangerous, possibly uncontrollable anti-Semitic sympathies in America. Brundage claimed, moreover, that intelligent and conservative Jews, which also implied wealthy and prominent, agreed with him.<sup>31</sup>As he said on November 11, 1935: "The sober, conservative Jews in this country are very seriously concerned over present developments [concerning anti-Semitism in the United States], and they have warrant to be."<sup>32</sup>This statement was not an expression of concern for the consequences of anti-Semitism, but an argument which Brundage used in press statements against the boycotters. Brundage was even willing to cultivate anti-Semitic feeling to finance the Olympic team. Not only was Brundage well-positioned in the national and international sporting scene, but he also had financial leverage. The AOC president was chairperson of the American Finance Committee for the Olympic Games. He considered the active boycott of the Jews and Communists beneficial, since it would spark the resentment of the athletic leaders, the sportsmen, and the patriotic citizens of America and induce them to work harder, and to contribute more funds to the Games.<sup>33</sup>In a



strategy letter to his AOC executive colleagues, he calculated that "...the fact that the Jews are against us will arouse interest among thousands of people who have never subscribed before, if they are properly approached."<sup>34</sup> Brundage's clinching argument in his lengthy series of condemnations of Jews came in early 1936, when he announced that Jews had never been a significant proportion of any German Olympic team.<sup>35</sup>As Brundage stated: "The Germans report that there have been only twelve Jews on all of their previous teams."<sup>36</sup>The claim, therefore, that low Jewish representation resulted from Nazi intimidation was, according to Brundage, either ignorance or manipulation of the facts for Jewish self-aggrandizement.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to the more general public debate over American participation, a wide philosophical split had opened up between the AOC and the AAU, as well as within the AAU itself. In its failure to take an anti-Nazi stand, the AOC had, by 1935, become extremely unpopular among members of the AAU. The AAU's president, Jeremiah T. Mahoney, a former Supreme Court judge, was one of the most prominent publicists favouring an American boycott. Therefore, one side was led by Mahoney against participation, and the other faction was under the leadership of Brundage, who had once been the president of the AAU.<sup>38</sup>In response to Brundage's assertions of Nazi innocence, Judge Mahoney published a pamphlet entitled *Germany Has Violated the Olympic Code* (1935). Mahoney cited specific cases of violation, such as

the expulsion of Jews from sports clubs and from public facilities, the ban on competition between Jews and "Aryans," and the exclusion of world-class high-jumper Grete Bergmann from the Olympic team.<sup>39</sup>In his public speeches throughout the boycott campaign, Mahoney addressed the more general moral aspects of participation. Stressing the conditions in Germany, he considered them to have been "...created by the Nazi government in defiance of the rules and laws of humanity and of the spirit of sportsmanship and fair-play, and contrary to Olympian principles."<sup>40</sup>He also declared in July 1935, that "There is no room for discrimination on grounds of race, color or creed in the Olympics."<sup>41</sup>Becoming a little strong in his defense of the Games, Brundage publicly characterized Mahoney's opposition as politically motivated. He explained that Mahoney, a Roman Catholic, had ambitions to become the Mayor of New York and was thus seeking to woo Jewish voters. Brundage failed, or refused, to see that Roman Catholics had excellent reason to fear Hitler, who had made no secret of his paganism or his hatred for the church into which he had been born. Mahoney was, indeed, deeply troubled by the aggressive paganism of the Nazis.<sup>42</sup>

Brundage's defense of American participation intensified as the Games drew closer. It is inaccurate to assume that Brundage was not indifferent to the suffering of German Jews prior to the Olympic controversy. The AOC president did acknowledge allegations of Nazi discriminatory

practices in a statement to the American press (April 1933). But this pronouncement must be understood within the context of adverse world opinion. Brundage was attempting to appease a discerning world public and was therefore cautious about what he chose to pronounce. His views prior to and during the Olympic controversy are therefore not inconsistent. Instead, Brundage's indifference to the plight of the Jews grew in the face of mounting public agitation and once it had become clear that the AAU had refused to commit an American Olympic team to Germany.

Two examples illustrate that Brundage became increasingly intent on going to the Games. In 1935, he was forced to defend his position with greater urgency than he had before against the boycott advocates when they reacted with alarm to the Kurfürstendamm riots of July 15 and 19, in which Jews were physically assaulted in the streets of Berlin, and to the Nuremberg Laws.<sup>43</sup> In the AOC brochure *Fair Play for American Athletes*, Brundage stated coldly that "...the persecution of minority peoples is as old as history" and that "...the customs of other nations are not our business."<sup>44</sup>

Brundage therefore refused to acknowledge publicly the validity of the arguments of Mahoney and the pro-boycott faction within the AAU, or of the American boycotters in general. It is inconceivable that Brundage and his followers were unaware of Government-sponsored Jewish persecution, especially the Nuremberg Laws, which left no

doubt as to the state of things in Germany. Despite his claims to the contrary, trustworthy stories of religious and racial persecution continued to leak out of Germany during the time of the debate.<sup>45</sup> Brundage actually ignored racial persecution throughout the Olympic controversy, that is, even after the declaration of the racial laws of September 15, 1935. Brundage disregarded his opponents' arguments because he was unable to, or did not want to, conceive of the idea that their concerns had legitimacy. He simply refused to look at and to accept evidence of widespread discrimination in Germany.

#### The Maccabi World Union Resolution

Anxious about the implementation of the Nuremberg Laws, the Maccabi World Union decided to withdraw its athletes from Olympic competition. On September 26, 1935, shortly after the publication of the Nuremberg Laws, the Maccabi World Union transmitted from London to the IOC the text of a rather vague resolution, formulated at its congress in Brünn, Czechoslovakia:<sup>46</sup>

In the light of the Jewish situation in Germany, the Maccabi World Congress requests all Olympic committees to allow the Jewish athletes not to participate in the Olympics in Germany in 1936.<sup>47</sup>

In his covering letter to the IOC president, general secretary Jacobowitz asked for understanding that "...in consideration of the present situation we cannot act in any other way."<sup>48</sup> At the suggestion of Baillet-Latour, IOC secretary Lieutenant Colonel A. Berdez replied that this

solution was in opposition to the decision of the Committee definitely to stage the XIth Olympiad in Berlin. Therefore, the wish to forward the text to the national committees could not be fulfilled.<sup>49</sup>The IOC secretary added coolly that "...the participation in a sports event is by no means compulsory."<sup>50</sup>Maccabi president Selig Brodetzky addressed another letter to Baillet-Latour on November 12, 1935, in which he stated in more explicit terms the Maccabi World Union's decision to withdraw all of its athletes from the Olympic Games:

Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous pour estimer que les Jeux olympiques ne devraient pas être mêlés à des questions politiques, quelles qu'elles soient. Mais je voudrais faire remarquer que moi-même, avec tous les autres Juifs et de nombreux non-Juifs, considérons l'état de la situation en Allemagne aujourd'hui du point de vue de l'humanité en général et de la décence sociale. Le mouvement Maccabi n'a jamais tenté de contester la décision du CIO en ce qui concerne la venue aux Jeux olympiques, mais nous exhorterons sûrement tous les sportifs juifs, pour leur propre dignité, à s'abstenir de participer à des compétitions dans un pays où il y a des discriminations sociales et où nos frères juifs sont traités avec une brutalité inouïe. En tant qu'organisation sportive nous espérons que nous comprenons le sens de 'sport' et 'sportivité'! C'est la raison pour laquelle nous ne pouvons pas, en tant que Juifs, accepter à la légère la situation créée par la tenue des Jeux olympiques en Allemagne.<sup>51</sup>

In a letter dated November 20, 1935, Baillet-Latour responded with the following statement:

Le CIO considère qu'aucun athlète ne peut être empêché de participer aux Jeux, mais il admet que personne ne peut être forcé de se rendre en Allemagne s'il ne le désire pas. Je voudrais citer ce que j'écrivais quelques jours auparavant à Mr Avery Brundage, président de l'American Olympic Association: 'Il va sans dire que le CIO, respectant la liberté individuelle de chacun, ne souhaite en aucun cas contraindre ceux - Chrétien ou Juifs - qui, pour des raisons personnelles qui les concernent manifestement

eux seuls, auraient des objections à se rendre en Allemagne'.<sup>52</sup>

In other words, according to Baillet-Latour, the question of whether to participate in the 1936 Games was no longer the responsibility of the IOC; instead, it had become a matter of personal choice. The Maccabi resolution, pertaining to the German section in particular, was reported in the *New York Times* on December 1, 1935:

The German Olympic Committee got somewhat of a shock when the German section of the Maccabee League of Jewish athletes announced officially it was withdrawing all its candidates from participation in any sort of an Olympic training course. The Maccabee League explained that since non-Aryans are deprived of citizenship they could not in any case represent Germany in the Games. Olympic requirements for competitors, the Maccabees claimed, specified that they be citizens.<sup>53</sup>

The Maccabi resolution, declared on the eve of the final decision about the question of American participation, did not dissuade Brundage from wanting to press the AAU to reverse its decision. The Maccabi World Union's decision to withdraw all of its candidates from the Olympic Games served as further evidence (in addition to press reports and the declaration of the Nuremberg Laws) that discrimination against German Jews was prevalent. Moreover, the Union's withdrawal of its athletes meant that the German Government would no longer feel pressured to add any more Jewish athletes to its Olympic team, and it could now feel more comfortable about its decision to recruit only two Jews. It was, in a way, freed from having to invite more Jewish athletes, since the Union to which they belonged would not permit them to join the German team. Therefore, the Maccabi

World Union's decision and the fact that only two Jews were on the German team could have had an important effect on world opinion, more generally, and on the AAU. Brundage was more concerned about the attitude of the athletic organization than world opinion, at least in the sense that the AAU represented his only practical obstacle to securing participation. He suspected confidently, though, that the fact that two token Jews, Helene Mayer and Rudi Ball, had joined the German team would be sufficient to persuade enough members of the AAU to vote in favour of participation.

#### The 1935 Amateur Athletic Union Convention

The final decision on the question of American participation was reached during the national convention of the AAU in New York, which took place from December 6 to 8, 1935. By this time, the public debate and American vacillation had dragged on for more than two years. One faction of the AAU, led by Brundage, favoured participation, while the other side, headed by AAU president Mahoney, advocated a boycott of the Games. It should be emphasized here that, at the time, the question among the delegates and the membership was not whether racial persecution should be approved of, but who should be believed: Brundage who denied its existence or Mahoney who said that it was rampant in the world of German sport. Following a tense three-day debate, the AAU executives (who had weighted voting rights) defeated the proposed resolution against sending an American Olympic

team to Germany by a vote of 58.25 to 55.75, or by 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  votes. The narrow majority then passed a motion in favour of sending a team to the Winter Games in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and to the Summer Games in Berlin. The resolution included a declaration that the decision was not to be construed as implying endorsement of the Nazi government.<sup>54</sup>

Brundage had used two strategies to secure American participation. First, immediately before the deciding vote, Brundage, Baillet-Latour and Sweden's Sigfrid Edstrom, president of the International Amateur Athletic Federation, had had a secret meeting. Normally, the certification of an athlete for participation in the Olympics Games required three signatures, that of the athlete, that of his or her sports federation (here the AAU), and that of the National Olympic Committee (here the AOC). The three had agreed that they would accept the applications, in this special case, without the signature of the AAU, should the AAU refuse to certify the athletes. Second, when Brundage realized that he might still lose a showdown vote, he strategically stretched the discussion through the night. By morning, he had secured several more eligible voters by telegram, which turned out to be critical in a narrow decision. Voting in his favour were Ernest Schmitz from the German Athletic Union, later arrested as a German spy, a representative of the American Turnerbund, and a representative of the professional cycling association, whose members were already



banned from taking part in the Olympic Games.<sup>55</sup> Simply put, Brundage had used his weight to secure the vote.

Brundage's manipulation of circumstances to secure American participation was blatant in two other ways. Strong evidence that Brundage was not about to allow the AAU to prevent American participation is indicated by the fact that before the December convention, he had made preparations as an emergency measure to form a rump organization, parallel with the AAU, that could hold the tryouts for the 1936 American Olympic team. Pre-Olympic trials had, in fact, begun before the AAU voted on the authorization of an American team. Furthermore, following the AAU decision, the press learned that Mahoney had resigned from his position as president of the AAU, that Brundage had been nominated for that post and almost unanimously elected, and that, having combined the offices of the AOC and the AAU, Brundage at once urged the voluntary resignation from their posts of all the officers of the organizations who were "anti-Olympic."<sup>56</sup> Though the AAU had acquiesced to Brundage's demands, it was a close vote and, consequently, he intended to wrest any lingering control from those individuals who were still opposed to American participation in Germany. Soon after the final vote of the AAU, too, Brundage was elected to the IOC, a position which served to reinforce his already considerable leverage.

## CONCLUSION

The Nazi Government eased its anti-Semitic campaign during the Winter and Summer Games, a relaxation which came to be known as the Olympic Pause. High-ranking Nazis were acutely aware that Germany was being watched by travellers for corroborating incidents of racial barbarities. They thus ordered the cessation of Jew-baiting, giving Germans constant instruction that they had been entrusted with an obligation to show the excellence of German National Socialism to the whole world and that anti-Jewish feeling and comment should be suppressed until the Olympics were over.<sup>1</sup> Nazi policy had not, of course, changed. Some incidents took place which showed that peace in the Third Reich was, in fact, illusory. On the eve of the Winter Games, for instance, Baillet-Latour was shocked to see anti-Semitic signs posted along the roads as he drove towards Garmisch. Upon his arrival, he demanded an audience with, and an explanation from, the *Führer*.<sup>2</sup> In defense of the posters, Hitler declared that he could not change "...a question of the highest importance in Germany...for a small point of Olympic protocol."<sup>3</sup> Baillet-Latour asserted that it was "...a question of the most elementary courtesy" to have the signs taken down, and threatened to call off both the

Winter and Summer Games.<sup>4</sup> After some tense exchanges, the *Führer* gave ground and agreed to have the signs removed. For most German Jews living in Germany in 1936, the Olympic fortnight was a horrifying time. A few were optimistic, believing that the sudden intense interest of the outside world would force the regime to ease racial persecution permanently, rather than just for the duration of the Festival. The majority, however, were sickened and frightened by the ease with which the Nazis had tricked visitors into thinking Germany was a civilized country. Some foreigners were greatly impressed by what they saw, apparently a happy, healthy, friendly people united under Hitler - a far different picture, they said, than they had received from reading the newspaper dispatches from Berlin. Consequently, Avery Brundage and his supporters could claim that the Festival had led to a form of truce, while his opponents could claim, with equal conviction, that the Pause had calmed the suspicions of foreign governments, thereby giving Hitler a breathing space in which to press ahead with his military plans.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after Hitler came to power, Jews, in general, and Jewish athletes, in particular, were systematically terrorized and discriminated against. Between 1933 and 1936, the pre-Olympic years, the *Gleichschaltung* imposed on sport by Hitler made it impossible, either practically or psychologically, for German-Jewish athletes to train, compete or join sports clubs in order to prepare for the

Olympic trials. From the beginning of Nazi racial policies, the *New York Times* let the world public know some of the decrees implemented against Jewish athletes.

Because of these dispatches, at the International Olympic Committee's June meeting in Vienna, the Committee's president, Comte Baillet-Latour, demanded a guarantee from the German delegates that discrimination against Jewish athletes would cease. Though it appeared as if Committee members were expressing concern, the request was more of a formality - it was only the proper thing to do. They were prepared to take Theodor Lewald's word that there was no discrimination, except that Sherrill insisted on proof of Nazi compliance by pressuring Hitler into naming at least one symbolic Jewish athlete to the German team. In fact, once the Vienna pledge was obtained, regardless of whether it would be kept, the IOC was fully committed to staging the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin and Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Hitler, too, though reticent at first, was intent on hosting the Festival. Once he realized that the Games could serve propaganda purposes, he put enormous pressure on Lewald to secure the presence of the prestigious American team.

The unwritten mandate of Avery Brundage and other Olympic officials was to minimize, evade and distort Nazi racist realities in order to secure American participation. In November 1933, the American Olympic Committee and the Amateur Athletic Union passed similar resolutions, known together as the Kirby resolution, to postpone participation

as long as discriminatory measures persisted. The AOC, though, was not as firm in its position as the AAU. In September 1934, the AOC selected Brundage to study the German-Jewish situation and to make a decision on the spot to either accept or decline the German invitation. Diem had quickly compiled the theoretical decrees by Nazi authorities on the temporary easing of restrictions against Jewish athletes to make it appear as if sportsmen and sportswomen had the freedom to prepare for the Games. Since Brundage had already made up his mind to go the Games, he returned with a positive report on the basis of which the AOC readily pronounced itself in favour of participation. It had not been the AOC's intention to undertake a serious investigation into press reports of Nazi atrocities; its members simply wanted to quell American and world opinion. Here, Brundage was two-faced. He stated publicly that he supported the Kirby resolution while, privately, he was rabid about going to the Games. What is unclear is why Brundage and, for that matter, Sherrill did not go on public record as to where they stood on American participation from the moment the issue was first raised.

In any case, because the AAU decided to stick to the Kirby resolution, Nazi authorities were still anxious about losing the American team. To show publicly, then, that the Vienna promise was being honoured, in June 1934, first five, then 21 Jewish candidates were nominated to the German Olympic team, and selection training courses for sportsmen

and sportswomen were held. The list of nominees was even published in newspapers, such as the *New York Times*. However, because the sole purpose of the publication of the list of candidates was to satisfy foreign observers, it cannot be surprising that not one of the nominees was selected. Sherrill had succeeded, after putting pressure on Hitler, in securing the inclusion of two-half Jews on the team, who had probably been threatened into accepting the German invitation. This was a strategy to take the focus off of the fact that Jewish athletes were being persecuted and, instead, to deceive the public into thinking that whatever press dispatches they were reading were false. In fact, the appointment of two *Mischlinge* to the German team made it seem as if German officials had accorded special treatment to Jewish athletes by going out of their way to welcome them.

Under the pressure of public opinion, Baillet-Latour went to Berlin and met with Hitler, who assured him that there was no discrimination in the Reich. His evasive replies to reporters of the *New York Times* on the eve of his departure and the timing of his trip (October 1935), strongly suggest that he was aware of the violation of the Vienna pledge but covered it up and that, in any event, he was too late to have the Games removed. The IOC president never made serious inquiries into the German-Jewish situation. In fact, the Comte was, except for getting the Jew-baiting signs removed, (and even this appeared to be an

issue of protocol for him), passive during the pre-Olympic years.

Beginning in 1933, a protest movement began in the United States to boycott the Olympic Games. The boycotters, who were not only Jewish but also Catholic and Protestant, were outraged at the discriminatory measures of the new regime. Brundage, who had always sought to keep the AAU's and the AOC's opposition to the Games discreet, became involved in a public debate over American participation. He offered an account of his actions, formulating pro-participation arguments which he stated to the American press. The gist of his public argument was that political issues must remain separate from the Olympics, that is, National Socialism was an internal matter; and at any rate, there was no discrimination against German Jews, so there was no reason why the Games should not go ahead as planned. Brundage used the same contradictory statement for the two or so years preceding the Games. This meant that his stand remained unchanged even after the implementation of the Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935. Though he must have known about the paradox inherent in his public assertion, he never admitted that it was illogical. The major premise of the arguments put forth by Brundage's opponents was that discrimination against Jews existed and that German pledges had been violated. It seems the boycotters were afraid that American participation would indicate to the rest of the world the United States' approval of a regime which promoted

racial hatred.

The Maccabi World Union resolution could have had a major impact on the opinion of those who opposed participation, not only on world opinion but on the AAU, whose approval was mandatory in order to commit an American team to the Olympics. Despite the resolution of the Maccabi World Union, a leading Jewish sports union, to withdraw all of its candidates from Olympic competition just a few months before the start of the Games, Brundage presumed correctly that its effect would be minimized by the fact that two Jews had been placed on the German team. His only practical obstacle was the AAU, which had been resolute in its decision to keep out of Germany. At the 1935 AAU convention, the AOC president used his weight to defeat the protesting members within the AAU and to secure American participation in the 1936 Olympiad.

The boycott movement in the United States failed primarily because of the personal intervention of Avery Brundage. Brundage, as well as other well-connected Olympic officials, had the opportunity to let the AAU and the AOC determine American participation on the basis of an accurate assessment of the German-Jewish situation. Instead, they ignored the Nazis' persecution of Jewish athletes, purposely misleading the two sports associations. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to determine whether Brundage was anti-Semitic and therefore what, if any, bearing anti-Semitic sentiment had on his decision to secure American



participation. What the evidence does show is that Brundage was, if not anti-Semitic, then certainly indifferent to the fate of the Jews and considered their suffering far less important than an athletic event.

## NOTES

### CHAPTER 1

<sup>1</sup>William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 323; Richard D. Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 63-64; Duff Hart-Davis, *Hitler's Games: The 1936 Olympics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 15.

<sup>2</sup>Shirer, 374-375; Hart-Davis, 13, 16.

<sup>3</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee* (Lausanne), July 1931.

<sup>4</sup>Richard D. Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," *Sport and International Relations*, Benjamin Lowe et al., eds. (Champaign, Ill.: Stipes Publishing Company, 1978), 147 and *The Nazi Olympics*, 47; Hart-Davis, 43-44.

<sup>5</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, July 1931.

<sup>6</sup>Carl Diem, "Olympic Days of Wandering, Teaching and Learning," (1932) *The Olympic Idea: Discourses and Essays*, Carl Diem, ed. (Cologne: Carl-Diem-Institut, 1970), 63.

<sup>7</sup>Arnd Krüger, "Sieg Heil to the Most Glorious Era of German Sport: Continuity and Change in the Modern German Sports Movement," *International Journal of the History of Sport* 4, no. 1 (1987), 12.

<sup>8</sup>Quoted in William O. Johnson, *All That Glitters is Not Gold* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), 173.

<sup>9</sup>Krüger, "Sieg Heil," 12. Karl Ritter von Halt became a member of the IOC in 1929, a member of the Nazi party in 1933, then, in 1944, Hitler's last *Sportführer*.

<sup>10</sup>Quoted in Hart-Davis, 45-46.

<sup>11</sup>Allen Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 54-55; Hajo Bernett, "The Role of Jewish Sportsmen during the Olympic Games in 1936," *Physical Education and Sports in the Jewish History and Culture, Proceedings of an International*

*Seminar at Wingate Institute, July 1973*, Uriel Simri, ed. (The Wingate Institute for Physical Education and Sport, December 1973), 102; Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 68; Hart-Davis, 46.

According to Diem, among the Nazis, Lewald was referred to as the "Jew." Diem was no better off, as he attempted in 1933 and again in 1943 to become *Reichssportführer*. This shows how close he thought he was to the top of the Nazi movement and therefore that he had a poor grasp of what was politically possible for him. See Horst Ueberhorst, "The Importance of the Historians' Quarrel and the Problem of Continuity for the German History of Sport," *Journal of Sport History* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1990), 236 and Bennett 102-103.

<sup>12</sup>Quoted in Guttman, *The Olympics*, 55.

<sup>13</sup>Judith Holmes, *Olympiad 1936* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 19; Guttman, *The Olympics*, 55; Hart-Davis, 46; Johnson, 173.

<sup>14</sup>Quoted in Bennett, 91-92.

<sup>15</sup>Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 155, 317-318.

<sup>16</sup>Organisationskomitee für die XI. Olympiade, Berlin, 1936, *The XIth Olympic Games, Berlin, 1936: Official Report*, Vol. I (Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert, 1937).

<sup>17</sup>Arnd Krüger, "The 1936 Olympic Games - Berlin," *The Modern Olympics*, Peter J. Graham and Horst Ueberhorst, eds. (Cornwall, New York: Leisure Press, 1976), 169, 173.

<sup>18</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 173.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.* From 1933 to 1943, Hans von Tschammer und Osten became first *Sportkommissar*, then *Sportführer*. His duties were to impose the *Gleichschaltung* on German sport and to produce a victorious Olympic team. See Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 269.

<sup>20</sup>Paul Yogi Mayer, "Equality - Equality: Jews and Sport in Germany," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book XXV* (1980), 228; Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 67; Bennett, 88.

<sup>21</sup>Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 53, 64-67; Hart-Davis, 59-62; Bennett, 89; Mayer, 226.

<sup>22</sup>Quoted in Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 65.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*; Holmes, 17; Bennett, 89; Hart-Davis, 62; Mayer, 229.

<sup>24</sup>George Eisen, "The Voices of Sanity: American Diplomatic Reports from the 1936 Berlin Olympiad," *Journal of Sport History* 11, no. 3 (Winter 1984), 59.

<sup>25</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>Mayer, 227.

<sup>27</sup>Bennett, 89-90.

<sup>28</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 90.

<sup>29</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>32</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 89.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, 91.

## CHAPTER 2

<sup>1</sup>Allen Guttman, *The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 1-11; Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 139; Hart-Davis, 65.

<sup>2</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 139.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, September 1933.

<sup>5</sup>Françoise Hache, *Jeux Olympiques: La flamme de l'exploit* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 74.

<sup>6</sup>Jean-Marie Brohm, *Jeux Olympiques à Berlin* (Belgique: Editions Complexe, 1983), 39; D.A. Kass, "The Issue of Racism at the 1936 Olympics," *Journal of Sport History*, no. 3 (Winter 1976), 230.

<sup>7</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, September 1933. Baillet-Latour succeeded Pierre de Coubertin to the presidency of the IOC in 1925.

<sup>8</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 56; Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 138; Hart-Davis, 45, 60.

<sup>9</sup>Hart-Davis, 60. Sherrill became an IOC member in 1922.

<sup>10</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, September 1933.

<sup>11</sup>See Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 67-68 and Hart-Davis, 45, 61.

<sup>12</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, September 1933.

<sup>13</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 56.

<sup>14</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>Jean-Marie Brohm et Michel Caillat, *Les Dessous de l'olympisme* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1984), 77.

<sup>16</sup>*Preserve the Olympic Ideal: A Statement of the Case Against American Participation in the Olympic Games in Berlin* (New York: Committee on Fair Play in Sports, 1935).

<sup>17</sup>Quoted in Guttman, *The Olympics*, 56 and Wenn, 31.

<sup>18</sup>Quoted in Wenn, 31.

<sup>19</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 138; Bennett, 94.

<sup>20</sup>Kass, 224-225.

<sup>21</sup>Quoted in Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 138 and Hart-Davis, 66.

<sup>22</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 138.

<sup>23</sup>Krüger, "The 1936 Olympic Games - Berlin," 169; Hart-Davis, 63.

<sup>24</sup>Quoted in Hart-Davis, 63-64.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>26</sup>Stephen R. Wenn, "A Tale of Two Diplomats: George S. Messersmith and Charles H. Sherrill on Proposed American Participation in the 1936 Olympics," *Journal of Sport History* 16, no. 1 (Spring 1989), 32-33.

<sup>27</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 56; Hart-Davis, 63; Brohm, 50.

<sup>28</sup>Quoted in Guttman, *The Olympics*, 56.

<sup>29</sup>Wenn, 37.

<sup>30</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 138; Hart-Davis, 63.

<sup>31</sup>*New York Times*, April 18, 1933.

<sup>32</sup>Carolyn Marvin, "Avery Brundage and American Participation in the 1936 Olympic Games," *Journal of American Studies* 16, no. 1 (April 1982), 84-86; Guttman, *The Olympics*, 57.

<sup>33</sup>Marvin, 84.

<sup>34</sup>See Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 270-271 and Horst Ueberhorst, 237-238.

<sup>35</sup>Ueberhorst, 238.

<sup>36</sup>Wenn, 34, 40; Hart-Davis, 61; Eisen, 64.

<sup>37</sup>Quoted in Eisen, 64.

<sup>38</sup>Wenn, 35.

<sup>39</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, September 1933.

<sup>40</sup>*New York Times*, May 9, 1934.

<sup>41</sup>Wenn, 35-36.

<sup>42</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 36.

<sup>43</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 57; Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 140; Ueberhorst, 241; Marvin, 86-87.

<sup>44</sup>Marvin, 87.

<sup>45</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 58; Hart-Davis, 65; Bennett, 99; Brohm, 39-41.

<sup>46</sup>Quoted in Guttman, *The Olympics*, 58.

<sup>47</sup>Bennett, 99.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*; Guttman, *The Olympics*, 58.

<sup>49</sup>*New York Times*, September 27, 1934.

<sup>50</sup>David B. Kanin, *A Political History of the Olympic Games* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), 54.

<sup>51</sup>*New York Times*, June 9, 1934.

<sup>52</sup>*New York Times*, June 19, 1934.

<sup>53</sup>*New York Times*, July 26, 1935.

<sup>54</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 142; Bennett, 93; Eisen, 72-73; Mayer, 237.

<sup>55</sup>Quoted in Eisen, 71.

<sup>56</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 140; Hart-Davis, 66; Mayer 237; Eisen 72; Bennett, 93.

<sup>57</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 142; Bennett, 94-95.

<sup>58</sup>*New York Times*, October 22, 1935.

<sup>59</sup>Eisen, 70.

<sup>60</sup>*New York Times*, October 22, 1935.

<sup>61</sup>Wenn, 40-41.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 38; Bennett, 100.

<sup>63</sup>Bennett, 100; Eisen, 72.

<sup>64</sup>Bennett, 100; Eisen, 72.

<sup>65</sup>Bennett, 100-101; Eisen, 70-71.

<sup>66</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 65.

<sup>67</sup>Quoted in Eisen, 67-68.

<sup>68</sup>Hart-Davis, 39; Wenn, 40.

<sup>69</sup>Hart-Davis, 77.

<sup>70</sup>Quoted in Brohm et Caillat, 29, 78.

<sup>71</sup>Krüger, "The 1936 Olympic Games - Berlin," 171.

<sup>72</sup>Hart-Davis, 77-78.

<sup>73</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 78.

<sup>74</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>75</sup>*New York Times*, November 27, 1935.

<sup>76</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 63.

<sup>77</sup>"Introduction" in *Preserve the Olympic Ideal*.

## CHAPTER 3

<sup>1</sup>*New York Times*, May 23, 1933; Guttmann, *The Olympics*, 60; Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 142-143; Hart-Davis, 62-63; Brohm, 31, 60.

<sup>2</sup>Guttmann, *The Olympics*, 60.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*; Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 137, 142-143.

<sup>4</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 143; Hart-Davis, 64-65.

<sup>5</sup>Hart-Davis, 44.

<sup>6</sup>Marvin, 86.

<sup>7</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 137; Kanin, 53-54.

<sup>8</sup>*New York Times*, June 22, 1934.

<sup>9</sup>*New York Times*, December 8, 1934.

<sup>10</sup>Marvin, 103.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 88; Kass, 223.

<sup>12</sup>Quoted in Marvin, 88.

<sup>13</sup>*New York Times*, August 2, 1935.

<sup>14</sup>*New York Times*, December 4, 1935.

<sup>15</sup>Wenn, 43.

<sup>16</sup>Kass, 229.

<sup>17</sup>*New York Times*, October 13, 1935.

<sup>18</sup>Kass, 230-231.

<sup>19</sup>*New York Times*, October 9, 1933.

<sup>20</sup>*New York Times*, May 23, 1934.

<sup>21</sup>*New York Times*, May 31, 1933.

<sup>22</sup>*Survey* LXXI, no. 12 (December 1935), 368.

<sup>23</sup>Kass, 233.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*



<sup>25</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 137, 140, 143.

<sup>26</sup>Quoted in Guttman, *The Olympics*, 59.

<sup>27</sup>Quoted in *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup>Quoted in Johnson, 176.

<sup>29</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 59.

<sup>30</sup>Quoted in Marvin, 91.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 88-91.

<sup>32</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 89-90.

<sup>33</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 145.

<sup>34</sup>Quoted in Marvin, 90.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>36</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>Krüger, "The 1936 Olympic Games - Berlin," 170.

<sup>39</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 61.

<sup>40</sup>Quoted in Krüger, "The 1936 Olympic Games - Berlin," 171.

<sup>41</sup>*New York Times*, July 26, 1935.

<sup>42</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 60.

<sup>43</sup>Marvin, 93.

<sup>44</sup>Quoted in Johnson, 176.

<sup>45</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 140.

<sup>46</sup>Bennett, 101.

<sup>47</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>48</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 101-102.

<sup>50</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 102.

<sup>51</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, December 1935.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup>*New York Times*, December 1, 1935.

<sup>54</sup>Guttman, *The Olympics*, 61; Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 143-144; Hart-Davis, 81.

<sup>55</sup>Krüger, "The 1936 Olympic Games - Berlin," 172.

<sup>56</sup>Mandell, "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 140, 143-145.

#### CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup>William L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), 64-65; Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics*, 155; Hart-Davis, 105.

<sup>2</sup>Hart-Davis, 97.

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in "Sportsmanship and Nazi Olympism," 152.

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee*, June 1936, September 1936; Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, 65-66 and *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 322; Hart-Davis, 97, 105, 182.

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