and

OPTIMAL STOPPING
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A theory of discrete-time optimal stopping is presented within the more general framework of countably additive gambling theory. In particular, offered here is a substitute for a fundamental theorem of optimal stopping due to Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund.

Key words: gambling, optimal strategies, optimal stopping, probability, dynamic programming, decision theory.
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Introduction: This paper offers a substitute for what is perhaps the most fundamental theorem of The Theory of Optimal Stopping by Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund, namely [3, Theorem 4.10]. From the point of view of this paper, optimal stopping problems are special gambling problems, namely those associated with stop-or-go gambling houses. In such a house there is, at each fortune $f$, at most one gamble $\alpha(f)$ other than the trivial one-point, Dirac delta measure, $\delta(f)$, which may or may not be available. A basic question is to determine those strategies, if any, which are optimal for stop-or-go problems.

Suppose that $u(f)$ is the utility of the fortune $f$ and that $W(f)$ is the supremum over all strategies $\sigma$ available at $f$ of the utility of $\sigma$. If $\sigma$ stagnates at $f$, that is, if $\sigma$ uses $\delta(f)$ forever, then the utility of $\sigma$ is taken to be $u(f)$. Plainly, then, if $f$ is inadequate, that is, if $u(f)<W(f)$, it is not optimal to stagnate at $f$. Nor can a strategy $\sigma$ be persistently optimal, that is, be conditionally optimal given every partial history $p=\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$, if, after any $p$ for which $f_{n}$ is inadequate, $\sigma$ then stagnates at $f_{n}$. Other strategies, too, are easily seen not to be optimal. In particular, if $\Gamma$ is a gambling house, $\gamma \in \Gamma(f)$ and $\gamma W<W(f)$, then no strategy which employs $Y$ initially can be optimal at $f$. Nor can a strategy be persistently optimal if after any $p=\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ for which $f_{n}=f$ it then employs $\gamma$.

A strategy which avoids the two non-optimal modes of behavior described above will be called promising. A fundamental problem for conventional stop-or-go problems is to determine whether every promising strategy is persistently optimal and, if not, what additional condition is necessary.

A Markov kernel $\gamma$ for which $\gamma(f) \in \Gamma(f)$ for every $f$ is a $\Gamma$-selector. Let $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ be that strategy whose initial gamble is $\gamma(f)$ and which, after the
partial history $\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ employs $\gamma\left(f_{n}\right)$, and call $\gamma^{\infty}$ a stationary family of strategies.

As is implied by Theorem 3 below, all stationary families of promising strategies are indeed optimal for conventional stop-or-go problems if $u$ is bounded.

For unbounded u's additional difficulties are encountered. First, two natural methods--henceforth to be called the "gambling" and the "conventional" methods--of evaluating the worth of a strategy, which are equivalent for bounded u's [14, Theorem 2], can yield different values for unbounded u's. Second, at least for the conventional method, it is no longer enough for a stationary family of strategies to be promising for it to be optimal. A growth condition must also be imposed. For the conventional method, Siegmand [10, Theorem 4] found such a condition (domination in the sense of Lebesgue) that is sufficient, and Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund [3, Theorem 4.10] a less restrictive one (uniform integrability) which is necessary and sufficient, for a promising, stationary strategy to be optimal.

One problem encountered in studying stopping time problems, and more general gambling problems, in a countably additive framework, is that suprema of uncountably many measurable functions are encountered, and these suprema are not auto matically measurable. In the theory as presented in [11] and [3], this problem is met by considering, when necessary, essential suprema rather than suprema. The present paper concerns itself with a class of problems including, but not confined to, stop-or-go problems, in which $W$ is demonstrably measurable. Hence, the simpler and more satisfactory notion of supremum is adequate for this paper, and in particular, for Theorem 3 below.

The study of stop-or-go problems in which the so-called gambling evaluation of strategies is employed is to be included in a forthcoming paper concerned with the general topic of stationary strategies.
§1. Summary. Throughout this paper, ( $\Gamma, \mathrm{g}$ ) is a Borel measurable, invariant, gambling problem, and $W$ is the most that is achievable if only analytically measurable $\sigma$ available in $\Gamma$ are employed. (For precise definitions, see §2.)

The main purpose of this paper is to report three results: a characterization of $W$ (Theorem 1), a characterization of optimal strategies (Theorem 2), and a determination, as in Theorem 3, of all stationary families of optimal strategies for stop-or-go problems with conventional utilities, a species of gambling problem defined in $\S 7$.

These results, especially Theorems 1 and 3, were strongly influenced by similar results already in the literature. For predecessors of Theorem 1, see [11, Theorem 3.6], [5, Theorems 2.12.1, 2.14.1, and 3.3.1] and [17, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2]. Among the predecessors of Theorem 3 are [11, Theorem 3.7], [5, Theorem 3.9.5], [16, Theorem 2], and [3, Theorem 4.10].

Of more fundamental interest than $W$ is $W^{\prime}$, the most that is achievable by all strategies, including of course those which are not measurable. Left open by the present paper, however, is the basic question whether $W^{\prime}$ can exceed $W$. Under certain assumptions on ( $\Gamma, g$ ), $W^{\prime}$ is demonstrably no larger than W [12, Theorem 1], [14, Theorem 6.4]. The question whether W equals $W^{\prime}$ leads to the preliminary question whether $W^{\prime}$ is absolutely measurable. These problems have been open at least since 1960 (when the second mimeographed edition of [5] appeared), so this paper confines its attention to $W$ only.
§2. The formulation of Theorem 1, a characterization of W. Throughout this paper, ( $F, \mathcal{B}$ ) is a standard space ( $\mathbb{B}$ is the set of Borel subsets of a Borel subset $F$ of a Polish space); $P$ is the set of all countably additive probability measures defined on $\mathbb{B}$, and, as in [12], the Borel gambling house $\Gamma$ is a Borel subset of $F \times P$ such that, for each $f \in F, \Gamma(f)$, the f-section of $\Gamma$, is nonempty; the utility of a history $h=\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right)$ is an extended real number $g(h)$. It is assumed that $g$ is Borel measurable and invariant. That $g$ is invariant means $g(f h)=g(h)$ for all $f$ and all $h$ where, as in [5], $f h=\left(f, f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right)$. The product of a finite or a denumerable number of standard spaces is a standard space, as is the set of countably additive probability measures defined on the Borel subsets of a standard space ([9], Chapter II). So, for example, $F^{n}, P$, and $F \times P$ are standard spaces, as is $H=F \times F \times \ldots$.

A mapping from one standard space to another is analytically measurable or $G$-measurable, for short, if the inverse image of every Borel set is in the sigma-field generated by the analytic sets. In conformance with a notion given in [1], a strategy $\sigma$ is analytically measurable or G-measurable if $\sigma_{0} \in P$ and every $\sigma_{n}$ is analytically measurable from $F^{n}$ to $P$. (Terms such as "strategy" and symbols such as " $\sigma_{n}$ " which are frequently used in [5] will not be defined here.) Each C-measurable $\sigma$ determines, as usual, by the theorem of Ionescu Tulcea (Proposition V-1-1, [8]), a countably additive probability measure, say $m(\sigma)$, defined on the Borel subsets of $H$. Let $\Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ be the set of all $\mathrm{m}(\sigma)$ as $\sigma$ ranges over all $\mathcal{C}$-measurable strategies available in $\Gamma$ at $f$. Often, $m(\sigma)$ will simply be designated by $\sigma$. Thus ' $\sigma$ ' refers
sometimes to a strategy and sometimes to its distribution, a harmless ambiguity.
In some previous papers, [12], [13], and [14], attention was restricted to a subfamily of the $\mathbb{C}$-measurable strategies, namely, the Borel, or B-measurable, strategies. This restriction is somewhat unsatisfactory for, as mentioned in [13], there exist Borel houses in which no B-measurable strategies are available. Furthermore, as can easily be seen, if there are $\mathbb{B}$-measurable strategies available, then the set $\Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ of their distributions is the same whether $\sigma$ ranges over B-measurable or $\mathbb{C}$-measurable strategies available at $f$. This explains why here, as in [1], it is the full class of all Q-measurable $\sigma$ which is of primary interest.

Assume henceforth that, for all C -measurable $\sigma$ available in $\Gamma, \int \mathrm{g} \mathrm{d} \sigma$, or $\sigma g$ for short, is well-defined, possibly $-\infty$, but strictly less than $+\infty$.

Introduce the optimal return function, thus.
(2.1) $W(f)=\sup \left\{\sigma g: \sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)\right\}$,
and assume throughout this paper that $W$ is everywhere finite. Of course, $W$ is the most the gambler can achieve if he employs nothing but analytically measurable strategies.

Associated with any extended real-valued function Q--in particular W--defined on $F$, are the functions $Q_{1}, Q_{2}, \ldots, Q^{*}$, and $Q_{*}$ defined for all $h=\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right) \in H$, thus.

$$
\begin{align*}
Q_{n}(h) & =Q\left(f_{n}\right) \text { for } n=1,2, \ldots,  \tag{2.2}\\
Q^{*} & =\lim _{n} \sup Q_{n} \\
Q_{*} & =\lim _{n} \inf Q_{n}
\end{align*}
$$

If, for all Q-measurable $\sigma$ available in $\Gamma$ for which $\sigma g$ is finite, the integral $\sigma Q^{*}$ exists and
(2.3) $\quad \sigma Q^{*} \geq \sigma$,
then $Q \quad \Gamma$-dominates, or, more briefly, dominates, $g$.
For each $\sigma$, let $T(\sigma)$ be the collection of all $\sigma$-stopping times, that is, Bore mappings $t$ from $H$ to the positive integers with $+\infty$ adjoined such that the event $[t<+\infty]$ has $\sigma$-probability one and, for every $n$, the event $[t \leq n]$ is measurable with respect to the first $n$ coordinates of $H$. For $t \in T(\sigma)$ and $h=\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right)$, set

$$
Q_{t}(h)=Q\left(f_{t(h)}\right)
$$

when $t(h)<\infty$. Say that $Q$ is excessive (for $\Gamma$ ) if, for all $f \in F$, all $\sigma \epsilon \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$, and all $t \in T(\sigma), \quad \sigma\left(Q_{t}\right)$ exists and
(2.4) $\quad \sigma Q_{t} \leq Q(f)$.

The characterization of $W$ can now be given.

Theorem 1. $W$ is the smallest $Q$-measurable function which is excessive and dominates g .

The proof is given in $\$ 4$.
§3. Regular supermartingales. Let $Q$ be an extended real-valued, $\mathbb{Q}$-measurable function defined on $F$ and let $\sigma$ be an $G$-measurable strategy. If the expectation $\sigma Q_{t}$ exists for each $t \in T(\sigma)$, then the collection $\left\{\sigma Q_{t}, t \in T(\sigma)\right\}$ becomes a net when $T(\sigma)$ is given its natural partial ordering, so

$$
\lim _{t} \sup \sigma Q_{t}=\inf \sup _{t \geq s} \sigma Q_{t}
$$

is well-defined as is the $\lim _{t}$ sup

Lemma 3.1. Each of the following inequalities holds whenever the expectations occurring in it exist:
(3.1) $\quad \lim _{t} \inf \sigma Q_{t} \leq \sigma Q_{*} \leq \sigma Q^{*} \leq \lim _{t} \sup \sigma Q_{t}$.

Proof: For each $n$, there is a Borel measurable function $\tilde{Q}_{n}(h)=\tilde{Q}_{n}\left(f_{n}\right)$ which equals $Q_{n}(h) \sigma$-almost surely, for analytic sets are universally measurable [7, III.24]. The final inequality holds for the $\tilde{Q}_{n}$ [15, Theorem. 1], and, hence, for the $Q_{n}$ as well. The first inequality is equivalent to the final one, and the middle one is obvious.

If $\varphi$ is a function with domain $H$ and $p=\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$, then, as in [5], $\varphi p$ is that function on $H$ whose value at $h^{\prime}=\left(f_{1}^{\prime}, f_{2}^{\prime}, \ldots\right)$ is $\varphi\left(\mathrm{ph}^{\prime}\right)=\varphi\left(\mathrm{f}_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{n}}, \mathrm{f}_{1}^{\prime}, \mathrm{f}_{2}^{\prime}, \ldots\right)$. If, in addition, $\varphi$ is extended realvalued and $\sigma \varphi$ exists, then $\sigma[p](\varphi p)$, or $\sigma(\varphi \mid p)$ for short, is a version of the conditional expectation of $\varphi$ given $p$ under $\sigma$. Consequently, for each $\sigma$-stopping time $t$,
(3.2) $\quad \int \varphi \mathrm{d} \sigma=\int \sigma\left(\left.\varphi\right|_{\mathrm{t}}(\mathrm{h})\right) \mathrm{d} \sigma(\mathrm{h})$
where $p_{t}(h)=p_{n}(h)=\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ when $t(h)=n[8$, Prop. III.2.1].
The sequence $\left\{Q_{n}\right\}$ is a regular supermartingale under $\sigma$ if, for $s$, $t \in T(\sigma)$ and $s \leq t, \sigma Q_{t}$ exists and the inequality
(3.3) $\quad \sigma\left(Q_{t} \mid P_{s}(h)\right) \leq Q_{s}(h)$
holds $\sigma$-almost surely. The next lemma includes a criterion for almost sure convergence which is similar to that of Dvoretzky [6].

Lemma 3.2. Each of the following conditions implies its successor.
(a) $\left\{Q_{n}\right\}$ is a regular supermartingale under $\sigma$.
(b) $\sigma Q_{s} \geq \sigma Q_{t}$ whenever $s \leq t \in T(\sigma)$.
(c) The net $\left\{\sigma_{t}, t \in T(\sigma)\right\}$ converges.
(d) The equality $\sigma Q^{*}=\sigma Q_{*}$ holds if both expectations occurring in it are well-defined.
(e) $\left\{Q_{n}\right\}$ converges $\sigma$-almost surely if $\sigma Q^{*}$ and $\sigma Q_{*}$ are finite.

Proof: To see that (a) implies (b), integrate with respect to $\sigma$ in (3.3) and use (3.2). Obvious1y, (b) implies (c). Lemma 3.1 applies to show (c) implies (d). The final implication is trivial.

Here is a lemma which indicates why the study of gambling problems leads to an interest in regular supermartingales.

Lemma 3.3. If $Q$ is excessive for $\Gamma$, then $\left\{Q_{n}\right\}$ is a regular supermartingale under every $\sigma$ available in $\Gamma$.

Proof: Let $s \leq t \in T(\sigma)$. If $s(h)=t(h)$, then (3.3) obviously holds with equality. So suppose $t(h)>s(h)=n$. Set $p=p_{s}(h)=\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ and define $t[p]\left(h^{\prime}\right)=t\left(p h^{\prime}\right)-n$ for all $h^{\prime} \in H$. Then for $\sigma$-almost every $p$,

$$
\sigma\left(Q_{t} \mid p\right)=\sigma[p]\left(Q_{t} p\right)=\sigma[p]\left(Q_{t}[p]\right) \leq Q\left(f_{n}\right)=Q_{s}(h)
$$

The first equality is by definition of $\sigma\left(Q_{t} \mid p\right)$; the second holds because $Q_{t} P=Q_{t[p]}$; the inequality is by the excessiveness of $Q$ together with the facts that $\sigma[p] \in \Gamma^{\infty}\left(f_{n}\right)$ and $t[p] \in T(\sigma[p]) \quad \sigma$-almost surely.
§4. Proof of Theorem 1. What must first be shown is that $W$ is Q-measurable. To this end, let $P(H)$ be the Borel set of countably additive probability measures defined on the Borel subsets of $H$, and let $\Gamma^{\infty}$ be the subset of $F \times P(H)$ such that, for each $f$, the f-section of $\Gamma^{\infty}$ is $\Gamma^{\infty}(\mathrm{f})$.

Lemma 4.1. $\Gamma^{\infty}$ is a Borel subset of $F \times P(H)$.

Proof: By a theorem of Mackey and von Neumann [1, Prop. 15], there is an G-measurable mapping $\gamma$ from $F$ to $P=P(F)$ such that $\gamma(f) \in \Gamma(f)$ for all f. The argument given for [13, Theorem 2.1] now applies and completes the proof.

Lemma 4.2. The set of $\sigma \in P(H)$ such that $\int g d \sigma$ exists is a Borel set, and, when restricted to this set, the map $\sigma \rightarrow \int \mathrm{g} \mathrm{d} \sigma$ is Borel measurable.

Proof: For non-negative $g$, the conclusion holds in view of the lemma in [14]. Since any $g$ is the difference of two non-negative $g$ 's, the conclusion for general $g$ easily follows.

Preparations have now been made to establish the first part of Theorem 1:

Lemma 4.3. $W$ is $C$-measurable. Indeed, for each real number $r$, the event $(W>r)$ is an analytic subset of $F$.

Proof: The set $(W>r)$ is the projection onto $F$ of the set, $S$, of all ( $f, \sigma$ ) such that $\sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ and $\sigma g>r$. Of course, $S$ is a Borel set by Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. So ( $\mathrm{W}>\mathrm{r}$ ) is analytic.

As was shown by Strauch [12], W need not be Borel measurable.
The purpose of the next three lemmas is to prove that $W$ is excessive.
Let $\varepsilon \geq 0$. A strategy $\sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ is e-optimal at $f$ if $\sigma g \geq W(f)-\varepsilon$. Call $\bar{\sigma}$ an $C$-measurable family of $\varepsilon$-optimal strategies if $\bar{\sigma}$ is an Q-measurable mapping from $F$ to $P(H)$ such that for all $f, \bar{\sigma}(f)$ is e-optimal.

Lemma 4.4. For every $\varepsilon>0$, there is an $\mathcal{C}$-measurable family $\bar{\sigma}$ of $\varepsilon$-optimal strategies.

Proof: For every integer $n$, let

$$
A_{n}=\left\{(f, \sigma): \sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f) \text { and } \sigma g>n \in\right\}
$$

That $A_{n}$ is Bore1 is clear from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. Let $\pi$ be the projection mapping, $\pi(f, \sigma)=f$ and notice that $\pi\left(A_{n}\right)=\{f: W(f)>n \epsilon\}$. By [1, Prop. 15], there is an $Q$-measurable map $\bar{\sigma}_{n}: \pi\left(A_{n}\right) \rightarrow P(H)$ such that $\left(f, \bar{\sigma}_{n}(f)\right) \in A_{n}$ for all $f \in \Pi\left(A_{n}\right)$. Define $\bar{\sigma}(f)$ to equal $\bar{\sigma}_{n}(f)$ when $(n+1) \varepsilon \geq W(f)>n \in$. As is easily verified, $\bar{\sigma}$ is an $C$-measurable family of $\varepsilon$-optimal strategies.

Let $I(g)$ be the collection of $Q$-measurable $\sigma$ for which $\sigma g$ exists.

Lemma 4.5. Each of the following conditions on $g$ implies its successor.
(a) $g$ is invariant.
(b) $g p=g$ for all $p$.
(c) $\sigma(\mathrm{gp})=\sigma \mathrm{g}$ for all p and all $\sigma \quad \varepsilon \quad \mathrm{I}(\mathrm{gp})$.
(d) $\sigma[p] g p=\sigma[p] g$ for all $p$ and all $\sigma$ with $\sigma[p] \varepsilon I(g p)$.
(e) $\sigma g=\int \sigma\left[p_{t}(h)\right] g d \sigma(h)$ for all $\sigma \in I(g)$ and all $\sigma$-stopping times $t$.
(f) $\sigma g=\int \sigma\left[p_{n}(h)\right] g \operatorname{d}(h)$ for all $\sigma \in I(g)$ and all integers $n$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { (g) } \sigma\left[f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right] g \rightarrow g\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right) \text { with } \sigma \text {-probability } 1 \text { for all } \\
& \sigma \text { for which } g \text { has finite expectation. }
\end{aligned}
$$

If $g$ assumes only finite values, then the conditions are equivalent.

Proof: Assume (a). An induction on the length $n$ of $p=\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ establishes (b). Obviously, (b) implies (c). If (c) holds, then (c) holds with $\sigma$ replaced by $\sigma[p]$, which yields (d). That (d) implies (e) is evident in the light of (3.2). Plainly, (e) $\rightarrow$ (f). If (f) holds and $\sigma g$ is finite, then the left-hand side of (e), being the integrand in the right-hand side of (f), is a version of the conditional expectation of $g$ under $\sigma$ given $f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}$. Now: Paul Levy's martingale convergence theorem applies and yields (g). Lastly, assume $g$ has only finite values and suppose (g) holds. Fix $h=\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right)$, let $\sigma_{0}$ be $\delta\left(f_{1}\right)$, and let $\sigma_{n}\left(f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ be $\delta\left(f_{n+1}\right)$, so $\sigma$ is the one-point measure $\delta(h)$. The left-hand side of ( $g$ ) is then equal to $g\left(f_{n+1}, f_{n+2}, \ldots\right)$ and, by ( $g$ ), converges to $g\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right)$. Plainly, it then necessarily converges to $g\left(f_{2}, f_{3}, \ldots\right)$ also. So $g\left(f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\right)$ equals $g\left(f_{2}, f_{3}, \ldots\right)$, and (a) is established.

The strategies $\sigma$ and $\sigma^{\prime}$ agree prior to a stopping time $t$ if $\sigma_{0}=\sigma_{0}^{\prime}$ and $\sigma_{n}\left(p_{n}(h)\right)=\sigma_{n}^{\prime}\left(p_{n}(h)\right)$ for all $h \in H$ such that $t(h)>n$.

Lemma 4.6. For $f \in F, \sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$, and $t \in T(\sigma)$, the integral $\sigma W\left(f_{t}\right)$ exists and
(4.1) $\quad \sigma W\left(f_{t}\right)=\sup \left\{\sigma^{\prime} g: \sigma^{\prime} \in A(\sigma, t)\right\}$,
where $A(\sigma, t)$ is the set of $\sigma^{\prime}$ in $\Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ which agree with $\sigma$ prior to $t$.

Proof: Let $\varepsilon>0$, and choose $\bar{\sigma}$ as in Lemma 4.4. Let $\sigma^{\prime}$ be that element of $A(\sigma, t)$ such that $\sigma^{\prime}\left[p_{t}(h)\right]=\bar{\sigma}\left(f_{t}(h)\right)$ for $t(h)<\infty$. Calculate thus.

$$
\begin{aligned}
+\infty & >W(f) \\
& \geq \sigma^{\prime} g \\
& =\int \sigma^{\prime}\left[p_{t}(h)\right] g d \sigma(h) \\
& =\int \bar{\sigma}\left(f_{t}(h)\right) g d \sigma(h) \\
& \geq \int W\left(f_{t}(h)\right) d \sigma(h)-\epsilon
\end{aligned}
$$

This calculation demonstrates the existence of $\sigma W\left(f_{t}\right)$ and proves one of the inequalities needed to establish (4.1).

For the reverse inequality, let $\sigma^{\prime} є A(\sigma, t)$. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sigma^{\prime} g & =\int \sigma^{\prime}\left[p_{t}\right] g \mathrm{~d} \sigma(h) \\
& \leq \int W\left(f_{t}\right) \mathrm{d} \sigma
\end{aligned}
$$

Corollary 4.1. $W$ is excessive.

Proof: Use (2.1) and (4.1).

That $W$ dominates $g$ is established next.

Lemma 4.7. For every $G$-measurable $\sigma$ available in $\Gamma$ for which $\sigma g$ is finite finite,
(4.2) $\quad g \leq W_{*} \quad \sigma$-almost certainly.

Consequently, W dominates g.

Proof: Since $\sigma\left[f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right] \in \Gamma^{\infty}\left(f_{n}\right), \sigma\left[f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right] g \leq W\left(f_{n}\right)$, so (4.2) follows, as Lemma 4.5(g) makes evident.

Lemma 4.8. If $Q$ is excessive, and dominates $g$, then $Q \geq W$.
Proof: For $\sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
Q(f) & \geq \sup _{t \in T(\sigma)} \sigma Q\left(f_{t}\right) \\
& \geq \sigma Q^{*} \\
& \geq \sigma g .
\end{aligned}
$$

The three inequalities hold because $Q$ is excessive, by Lemma 3.1, and because $Q$ dominates $g$, respectively. Since $W(f)$ is the supremum of og over all such $\sigma, \quad Q(f) \geq W(f)$.

In view of Lemmas 4.3, 4.7, and 4.8, and Corollary 4.1, the proof of Theorem 1 is complete.

Remark. Lemma 4.8 does not require the assumption otherwise in force that $g$ is Borel measurable; it suffices that $\sigma g$ exist for all $\mathbb{C}$-measurable $\sigma$ available in $\Gamma$, for then $W$ is well-defined.
§5. A Characterization of Optimal Strategies. The $W$ which was characterized in the preceding section exists for each ( $\Gamma, g$ ). In contrast, optimal strategies need not exist. But when they do exist, they can be characterized as in Theorem 2. Assume, until the proof of Theorem 2 is completed, that $f \in \mathcal{F}$, $\sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$, and $\sigma g$ is finite.

Theorem 2. For $\sigma$ to be optimal at $f$ it is necessary and sufficient that $\sigma g=\sigma W^{*}$ and any (all) of the following three conditions be satisfied.
(a) $\sigma W^{*}=W(f)$.
(b) $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ is a uniformly integrable martingale under $\sigma$.
(c) $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ is an $L_{1}$-bounded martingale under $\sigma$ which satisfies:
(5.1) $\quad \sigma\left(W\left(f_{t}\right)\right) \geq W(f)$ for all $t \in T(\sigma)$.

To say that $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ is $L_{1}$-bounded under $\sigma$ means, of course, that for some constant $K<\infty, \int\left|W\left(f_{n}\right)\right| d \sigma \leq K$ for all $n$. The next three lemmas comprise part of the proof of Theorem 2.

Lemma 5.1. (i) $\sigma W^{*} \leq W(f)$ and, for all $n$ and $\sigma$-almost every $h$, (ii) $\sigma\left[p_{n}(h)\right] W^{*} \leq W\left(f_{n}\right)$.

Proof: The expectation $\sigma W^{*}$ exists because $\sigma g$ is finite and $W^{*} \geq g$-almost surely by Lemma 4.7. Inequality (i) now follows from Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 4.1. By Lemma $4.5(f), \quad \sigma\left[p_{n}(h)\right] g$ is finite with $\sigma$-probability one and, hence, (ii) follows from (i).

As an immediate corollary to (4.2) and Lemma 5.1(i), one obtains a part of Theorem 2.

Corollary 5.1. For $\sigma$ to be optimal at $f$ it is necessary and sufficient that
(5.2) $\sigma g=\sigma W^{*}$ and $\sigma W^{*}=W(f)$.

Lemma 5.2. If $\sigma W^{*}=W(f)$, then, for all $n$ and $\sigma$-almost all $h$, (5.3) $\quad \sigma\left[p_{n}(h)\right] W^{*}=W\left(f_{n}\right)$.

Proof: Calculate thus.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sigma W^{*} & =\int \sigma\left[p_{n}(h)\right] W^{*} d \sigma(h) \\
& \leq \int W\left(f_{n}\right) d \sigma(h) \\
& \leq W(f) \\
& =\sigma W^{*}
\end{aligned}
$$

where the first equality holds by Lemma $4.5(f)$; the first inequality is by Lemma 5.1(ii); the second inequality holds because $W$ is excessive, and the final equality is by hypothesis. (5.3) now follows with the aid of Lemma Lemma 5.1(ii).

Lemma 5.3. Conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Theorem 2 are equivalent.
Proof: Assume (a). Since $\sigma W^{*}$ is finite, $\sigma\left(W^{*} \mid f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$ is a uniformly integrable martingale, as is well-known (7, V, T18). In view of Lemmas 4.5 and 5.2, this martingale is almost certainly the same as $W\left(f_{n}\right)$. So (b) holds. That (b) implies (c) is part of standard measure theory. Suppose now that (c) holds. Since $W$ is excessive, (5.1) holds with equality and consequently, (b) too holds, as the Corollary in [4] asserts. Now
assume that $(b)$ holds. Then $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ converges $\sigma$-almost surely to $W^{*}$, and $\sigma W^{*}=\lim \sigma\left(W\left(f_{n}\right)\right.$ ). But $\sigma\left(W\left(f_{n}\right)\right)$ is independent of $n$ and equals $W(f)$. So (a) holds.

Theorem 2 now follows from Corollary 5.1 and Lemma 5.3.

Corollary 5.2. If $\sigma$ is available in $\Gamma$ and $\sigma g$ is finite, then $W^{*}=W_{*} \sigma$-almost surely.

Proof: By Lemmas 5.1 and 4.7, the integrals $\sigma W^{*}$ and $\sigma W_{*}$ exist as finite numbers. Now use Corollary 4.1, and Lemmas 3.3 and 3.2.

To be applied in $\S 6$ is this easy consequence of (4.2) and Lemma 5.1.

Lemma 5.4. For each $f \in F$ and all $\varepsilon, \delta>0$, $\exists \sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ such that (5.4) $\quad \sigma\left(g>W^{*}-\varepsilon\right) \geq 1-\delta$.

In fact, (5.4) holds for all $\sigma$ which are $\varepsilon \delta$-optimal at $f$.

This section concludes with a result on e-optimal stationary families.

Proposition 1. Let $\varepsilon \geq 0$ and let $\gamma$ be an $\mathbb{Q}$-measurable $\Gamma$-selector. If $\gamma^{\infty}$ is an $\varepsilon$-optimal family, then, for every $f$, (i) $\gamma^{\infty}(f) g \geq \gamma^{\infty}(f) W^{*}-\epsilon$ and (ii) the process $\left\{W\left(f_{n}\right)\right\}$ is uniformly integrable under $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$. Conversely, if, for all $\mathrm{f},(\mathrm{i})$ and (ii) hold and, in addition, (iii) $\gamma(\mathrm{f}) \mathrm{W}$ $=W(f)$, then $\gamma^{\infty}$ is e-optimal.

Proof: First assume (i), (ii) and (iii) for all f. Then, $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ is a uniformly integrable martingale under $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ and, hence, $\gamma^{\infty}(f) W^{*}=W(f)$. Use (i) to conclude that $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ is $\varepsilon$-optimal.

For the other implication, assume $\gamma^{\infty}$ is everywhere $\varepsilon$-optimal and compute as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\gamma^{\infty}(f) W^{*} \geq \gamma^{\infty}(f) g \geq W(f)-\varepsilon \geq \gamma^{\infty}(f) W^{*}-\epsilon . \tag{5.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

The first inequality is by Lemma 4.7, the second is by the assumed e-optimality, and the third by Lemma 5.1. Condition (i) is now clear, and (ii) is a consequence of (5.5) and the next lemma, which applies to all Markov kernels $\gamma$.

Lemma 5.5. Let $Q: F \rightarrow R$ and $Y: F \rightarrow P$ be analytically measurable. If $Q *$ has a finite integral under every $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ and

$$
\sup _{f}\left|\gamma^{\infty}(f) Q^{*}-Q(f)\right|<\infty,
$$

then $Q\left(f_{1}\right), Q\left(f_{2}\right), \ldots$ is uniformly integrable under $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ for all $f$. Proof: Plainly, $\gamma^{\infty}\left(f_{n}\right) Q^{*}$ is a version of the conditional expectation $\gamma^{\infty}(f)\left(Q^{*} \mid f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right)$, which sequence is uniformly integrable because $Q^{*}$ has a finite $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$-integral [7, V, T 18]. Since $Q\left(f_{n}\right)$ differs from $\gamma^{\infty}\left(f_{n}\right) Q^{*}$ by at most a fixed constant, $Q\left(f_{n}\right)$ too is uniformly integrable under $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$.

Except for the special class of problems studied in §7, we do not know necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of $\varepsilon$-optimal stationary families.
§6. Conventional utilities. Throughout this section and the next, $u$ is a fixed, real-valued, Botel measurable function defined on $F$ and $g$ is specialized to be the conventional utility $u^{*}$ where $u^{*}(h)=\lim \sup u\left(f_{n}\right)$. The purpose of this section is to record several facts for Bore houses $\Gamma$ with conventional utilities $u *$.

Suppose, for the next two lemmas, that $\sigma$ is $\mathbb{C}$-measurable and $\sigma u^{*}$ is finite.

Lemma 6.1. If $\sigma$ is available in $\Gamma$, then
(6.1) $\quad \sigma\left(\lim \inf \left(W\left(f_{n}\right)-u\left(f_{n}\right)\right) \leq 0\right)=\sigma\left(W^{*}=u *\right)$.

Proof: By Lemmas 4.7 and Corollary 5.2,
(6.2) $u^{*} \leq W_{*}=W^{*}$
almost surely under $\sigma$. A routine calculation now suffices to deduce (6.1).

Lemma 6.2. For $\sigma$ in $\Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ to be optimal at $f$ it is necessary and sufficient that $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ be a uniformly integrable martingale under $\sigma$ and
(6.3) $\quad \sigma\left(\lim \inf \left(w\left(f_{n}\right)-u\left(f_{n}\right)\right) \leq 0\right)=1$.

Proof: Use (4.2), (6.1), and Theorem 2.

$$
\text { For } \varepsilon>0 \text {, define }
$$

$$
A_{\varepsilon}=\{f: u(f) \geq W(f)-\varepsilon\} \text {, and } B_{\varepsilon}=\left\{h: \exists k \ni f_{k} \in A_{\epsilon}\right\}
$$

In view of Lemma 4.3, $A_{\varepsilon}$ is analytically measurable; from which it easily follows that $B_{\epsilon}$ too is analytically measurable.

Lemma 6.3. For each $f_{\epsilon} F$ and $\epsilon, \delta>0$, there is a $\sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ such that $\sigma\left(B_{\varepsilon}\right) \geq 1-\delta$.

Proof: Plainly, $B_{\varepsilon} \supseteq\left(u^{*}>W^{*}-\varepsilon\right)$. Now use Lemma 5.3.

An examination of the proof of Lemma 6.3 reveals that it is applicable to various other $g ' s$, for instance, to $\bar{u}$ and $u_{*}$ where:

$$
\bar{u}(h)=\lim \sup \frac{u\left(f_{1}\right)+\ldots+u\left(f_{n}\right)}{n} ; u_{*}(h)=\lim \inf u\left(f_{n}\right)
$$

However, this is in contrast to Lemma 6.2 which would be false were $g$ equal to either $\bar{u}$ or $u_{*}$, as Example 7.3 shows.

Suppose $\gamma$ is an $\mathcal{G}$-measurable $\Gamma$-selector, and define

$$
\begin{align*}
Q_{\varepsilon}(f) & =1 \text { for } f \in A_{\epsilon},  \tag{6.4}\\
& =\gamma^{\infty}(f)\left(B_{\varepsilon}\right) \text { for } f \in F-A_{\varepsilon} .
\end{align*}
$$

Lemma 6.4. Each $Q_{\epsilon}$ is universally measurable, and

$$
\text { (6.5) } \quad \gamma(f) Q_{\varepsilon}=Q_{\varepsilon}(f) \quad \text { for } f \in F-A_{\epsilon}
$$

Proof: Let $B_{\varepsilon}^{n}$ be the event that, for some $k \leq n, f_{k} \in A_{\varepsilon}$, and let $Q_{\varepsilon}^{n}(f)=\gamma^{\infty}(f)\left(B_{\varepsilon}^{n}\right)$. As [1, Cor. 41] implies, each $Q_{\varepsilon}^{n}$ is universally measurable. Therefore, so is $\lim _{n} Q_{\epsilon}^{n}$. Since this limit agrees with $Q_{\varepsilon}$ on $F-A_{\varepsilon}, Q_{\varepsilon}$ is also universally measurable. It is now simple to verify (6.5).

Lemma 6.5. For any $\varepsilon>0$ for which $Q_{\varepsilon}$ is excessive for $\Gamma, Q_{\varepsilon} \equiv 1$ and (6.6) $\quad \gamma^{\infty}(f)\left(\underline{\lim }\left(W\left(f_{n}\right)-u\left(f_{n}\right)\right) \leq \varepsilon\right)=1$, for all f. Consequently, for any such $\varepsilon, \gamma^{\infty}(f)\left(u^{*} \geq W_{*}-\varepsilon\right)=1$.

Proof: Consider a new gambling problem ( $\Gamma^{L}, v^{*}$ ) where $\Gamma^{L}$ is the leavable closure of $\Gamma$, that is, $\Gamma^{L}(f)=\Gamma(f) U\{\delta(f)\}$ for all $f$, and where $v$ is the indicator function of $A_{\epsilon}$. Because $Q_{\varepsilon}$ is excessive for $\Gamma$, it is also excessive for $\Gamma^{L}$. Obviously, $Q_{\varepsilon} \geq v$. So $Q_{\varepsilon}^{*} \geq v^{*}$; that is, $Q_{\varepsilon}$ dominates $v^{*}$. By Lemma 4.8 and the remark which follows it, $W^{L}$, the optimal return function for $\left(\Gamma^{L}, v^{*}\right)$, is we11-defined and $Q_{\epsilon} \geq W^{L}$. Thus, to show $Q_{\epsilon} \equiv 1$, it suffices to show $W^{L} \equiv 1$. Let $f \in F, \delta>0$ and, by Lemma 6.3, choose $\sigma \in \Gamma^{\infty}(f)$ such that $\sigma\left(B_{\varepsilon}\right) \geq 1-\delta$. Define $\sigma^{\prime}$ to be that strategy which agrees with $\sigma$ prior to the time of first entrance into $A$ and which then stagnates. Calculate thus: $W^{L}(f) \geq \sigma^{\prime} v^{*}=\sigma^{\prime}\left(B_{\varepsilon}\right) \geq 1-\delta$. This completes the proof that $Q_{\varepsilon} \equiv 1$. As is now easily seen, for example, with the help of [2, Exercise 9, Chapter 5], for every $f$, the $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$-probability that $f_{k} \in A_{\varepsilon}$ for infinitely many $k$ is 1 . This completes the proof of (6.6).
§7. Stop-or-go houses with a conventional utility. In this final section, u and the utility $g=u^{*}$ are as in $\S 6$, but $\Gamma$ is now specialized to be a Borel stop-or-go house, that is,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Gamma(f) & =\{\alpha(f), \delta(f)\} & & \text { for } f \in D \\
& =\{\alpha(f)\} & & \text { for } f \in F-D
\end{aligned}
$$

where $D$ is a Borel subset of $F$, possibly equal to $F$, and $\alpha$ is a Borel mapping from $F$ to P. Plainly, the mapping $f \rightarrow \delta(f)$ is a continuous and, hence, Borel mapping from $F$ to $p$. The graphs of the Borel mappings $\alpha$ and $\delta$ are Borel subsets of $F \times P$ [9, Theorem I.3.3]; so their union, namely $\Gamma$, is also.

Let $\gamma$ be an $Q$-measurable $\Gamma$-selector. The associated stationary family $\gamma^{\infty}$ is called promising if (i) $\gamma(f)=\delta(f)$ implies $u(f)=W(f)$ and, (ii) for all $f, \gamma(f) W=W(f)$.

Lemma 7.1. If $\gamma$ agrees with $\alpha$ on $F-A_{\varepsilon}$, in particular, if $\gamma^{\infty}$ is promising, then $Q_{\epsilon}$ is excessive for $\Gamma$, where $Q_{\epsilon}$ is defined in (6.4).

Proof: By (6.5), $\alpha(f) Q_{\epsilon}=Q_{\epsilon}(f)$ for $f \in F-A_{\epsilon}$. For all other ( $\gamma, f$ ) with $\gamma \epsilon \Gamma(f)$, it is trivial that $\gamma_{\epsilon} \leq Q_{\epsilon}(f)$. Thus, under every available $\sigma$, the process $Q_{\varepsilon}(f), Q_{\varepsilon}\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ is a bounded supermartingale and therefore, $\sigma Q_{\epsilon}\left(f_{t}\right) \leq Q_{e}(f)$ for every $t \in T(\sigma) \quad[7, V, T 28]$.

Theorem 3. For every $\mathcal{C}$-measurable $\Gamma$-selector $\gamma$, these two conditions are equivalent.
(a) $\gamma^{\infty}$ is everywhere optimal.
(b) $\gamma^{\infty}$ is promising and $W\left(f_{1}\right), W\left(f_{2}\right), \ldots$ is uniformly integrable
under every strategy $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$.

Proof: Assume (a). By Theorem 2, $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right), \ldots$ is a uniformly integrable martingale under $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$. Plainly then $\gamma(f) W=W(f)$. To complete the proof that $\gamma^{\infty}$ is promising, let $\gamma(f)=\delta(f)$, and verify that $u(f)=\gamma^{\infty}(f) u^{*}=W(f)$. Therefore, (b) holds.

Now assume (b). By Lemmas 7.1 and 6.5, Formula (6.3) plainly holds. Furthermore, $W(f), W\left(f_{1}\right)$, ... is a martingale under $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ because $\gamma^{\infty}$ is promising. So, by Lemma 6.2, $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$ is optimal at $f$.

There exist ( $\Gamma, u^{*}$ ) for which no stationary family is optimal as Example 7.1 below illustrates, Consequently, there is interest in the possible existence of $\varepsilon$-optimal stationary families. Define

$$
\begin{align*}
\gamma_{\epsilon}(f) & =\delta(f) \text { if } u(f) \geq W(f)-\varepsilon \text { and } \delta(f) \in \Gamma(f),  \tag{7.1}\\
& =\alpha(f) \text { otherwise. }
\end{align*}
$$

Proposition 2. For each $\epsilon \geq 0$, these three conditions are equivalent:
(a) There is available an G-measurable, e-optimal stationary family.
(b) The family $\gamma_{\epsilon}^{\infty}$ is e-optimal.
(c) For every $f,\left\{W\left(f_{n}\right)\right\}$ is uniformly integrable under $Y_{\epsilon}^{\infty}(f)$.

Proof: First assume (a) and let $\gamma^{\infty}$ be an G-measurable, e-optimal stationary family. By Proposition 1 of $\S 5, \quad\left\{W\left(f_{n}\right)\right\}$ is uniformly integrable under each $\gamma^{\infty}(f)$. Since, in addition, $\gamma_{\epsilon}(f)=\gamma(f)$ whenever $\gamma_{\epsilon}(f) \neq \delta(f)$, (c) holds.
$r$ Observe that $Y_{\epsilon}(f) W=W(f)$ for $a l l f$ and, therefore, the implication
(c) $\Rightarrow$ (b) will follow from Proposition 1 once it is verified that
(7.2) $\quad \gamma_{\epsilon}^{\infty}(f)\left[u^{*} \geq W^{*}-\varepsilon\right]=1$
for all f. To check (7.2), use Lemma 7.1 to see that $Q_{\epsilon}$ is excessive and then use Lemma 6.5 together with the fact that $W^{*}=W_{*} Y_{\epsilon}^{\infty}(f)$-almost surely as follows from the martingale convergence theorem [7, V, T 17].

Since (b) obviously implies (a), the proof is complete.

Here are two examples in which $F$ is the set of nonnegative integers and $u$ is the identity function. In the first, there is no optimal stationary family and yet, for every $\varepsilon>0$, there is an $\varepsilon$-optimal stationary family. In the second, for some $\epsilon>0$, there is not even an $\varepsilon$-optimal stationary family.

Example 7.1. Let $\Gamma(0)=\{\delta(0)\}$ and, for $n>0$, let $\Gamma(n)=\{\delta(n), \alpha(n)\}$, where $\alpha(n)=\left(\frac{1}{2}+1 /(n+1)^{2}\right) \delta(2 n)+\left(\frac{1}{2}-1 /(n+1)^{2}\right) \delta(0)$.

Example 7.2. Let $\Gamma(0)=\{\delta(0)\}$ and, for $n>0$, let $\Gamma(n)=\{\delta(n), \alpha(n)\}$, where $\alpha(n)=\frac{1}{2} \delta(2 n+1)+\frac{1}{2} \delta(0)$.

The following example, noticed during a conversation with David Gilat, shows that Theorem 3 would not hold if the conventional payoff $u^{*}$ were replaced, say, by $\underline{u}$ or by $u_{*}$.

Example 7.3. Let $F=\{1,2, \ldots\} ; u(f)=1-1 / f$ for $f \in F$; $\Gamma(f)=\{\alpha(f), \delta(f)\}$ for every $f$ where $\alpha(f)=\delta(1)$ for $f>1$ and $\alpha(1)$ gives positive measure to every set of the form $\{f, f+1, \ldots\}$. If $g=\bar{u}$ or if $g=u_{*}$, then $W \equiv 1$ and the family $\alpha^{\infty}$ is promising, but not optimal. In fact, there are no optimal strategies.

Some comment on the relationship of the work in this paper to the formulation of optimal stopping problems in [3] is in section 4 of [16]. Except for measurability technicalities, the stopping problem of [3] corresponds to a leavable, stop-or-go problem with a conventional utility.

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