

Collective Responsibility & the International Community in the Rwandan Genocide: "The Blame Game"

Overview:

This lesson looks at various international organizations and sovereign states and their action or inaction during the Rwandan Genocide. Students, in groups, analyze primary and secondary source documents and determine what, if any, responsibility or blame should be assigned to the various parties. Students should have some prior knowledge about the Rwandan Genocide from previous class work, readings, and/or videos. This lesson is best implemented as a culminating activity after a unit on Rwanda, Genocide, the International System, and/or the United Nations.

This lesson is geared for advanced level high school students and adult learners. It also can act as a learning tool for teachers who may not have significant background on the Rwandan Genocide. Having said that, the author has successfully used fewer documents that were modified for students in middle school. Teachers are encouraged to do the same to make things accessible for their specific students and circumstances.

A final note: There is a vast number of sources on Rwanda from personal accounts of survivors, perpetrators, and witnesses to documents from governments and organizations, many having been released at the 20 year anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. What has been collected here offers teachers a starting point in addressing the role of the international community in one of the 20th century's worst crimes against humanity.

Essential Questions:

- Am I my brother's or sister's keeper?
- When should the international community intervene in a sovereign nation?
- To what extent is the international community to blame for not stopping the genocide in Rwanda?\

Primary Concepts:

- **Human Rights**
- Multiple Perspectives
- Personal & Collective Responsibility

Lesson Objectives:

From Previous Lessons:

- ESWBAT Locate Rwanda on a map.
- ESWBAT Identify the two ethnic groups involved in the Rwandan Genocide.
- ESWBAT Determine and explain ~10 key events in the history of Rwanda.
- ESWBAT Define genocide.
- ESWBAT Determine which of the Eight Stages of Genocide fit the case in Rwanda.
- ESWBAT Identify the key players in the Rwandan Genocide. -Specifically: Hutu, Tutsi, Rwandan National Army (FAR), Interahamwe, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), U.N. Headquarters
- ESWBAT Describe what happened during the 100 days of genocide in Rwanda.

For this lesson:

ESWBAT Explain the role of the international community in the Rwandan Genocide. -Specifically: Belgium, France, United States, United Nations, Non-government Organizations (NGO's), Media (New York Times)

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- ESWBAT Create and defend arguments supporting or criticizing the role of various groups of the international community.
- ESWBAT Determine the amount of responsibility or blame (in the form of a percent) for each group and justify the choice.
- ESWBAT Work collaboratively in a group.
- ESWBAT Participate in a civic discussion where different points of view are listened to and responded to with respect.
- ESWBAT Reflect on personal and collective responsibility.

Materials/Sources:

*See specific list of documents below.

LESSON

Introduction/Attention Getter:

- 1. Pose the question: Are we our brother's or sister's keeper? What responsibility do we have for the safety and care of family? Friends? Neighbors? Others? How wide is our circle of responsibility? Have students do a Quick Write defending their response.
- 2. Read aloud to the class the following Introduction from a Human Rights Watch report on the causes and responses to the Rwandan Genocide (1999). http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-01.htm

Ask students to record questions and/or ideas that stand out to them as you read aloud.

- 3. Allow students to reflect in silence for 1-3 minutes to think about what was read and/or to write a reaction
- 4. Have students Think-Pair-Share. Ask pairs to share what they discussed.

*Depending on time and what was done previously in class, this would be a good place to watch a short video on what happened in Rwanda for those 100 days in 1994. See suggestions below.

5. Tell students that they will be placed into groups representing the international community. Their task will be to read carefully the primary and secondary documents to determine what role their assigned group played during the genocide in Rwanda and to assess the level of responsibility or blame on all groups.

*As stated above, there is a vast number of documents on the Rwandan Genocide. Even what is collected here is much more than most classrooms would have time to study. Teachers need to review the documents and choose which ones will meet their learning objectives and the needs of their students. The documents are annotated which should help teachers make the necessary choices. In addition, the most important documents from each group is listed at the top of the page.

Lesson Sequence:

- 1. Arrange the room so that students are in groups of 3-4.
- 2. Prepare folders with readings from each of the groups listed below. Depending on student age and/or ability level, as well as time constraints, teacher may wish to underline/highlight key segments from the readings and/or have students read fewer documents. It is also recommended to provide a "need to know" vocabulary.

Groups representing the International Community:

1. Belgium

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- 2. France
- 3. General Dallaire, Force Commander for UNAMIR (Canadian)
- 4. United Nations (Security Council & Peacekeeping Operations)
- 5. Media: New York Times
- 6. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)
- 7. United States

Additional Options:

Groups representing forces within Rwanda (but not provided in this lesson)

- Akazu (Hutu Elite)
- Rwandan Government Forces (RGF, Hutu)
- Kangura Magazine (Hutu Power)
- RTLM (Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, Hutu Power)
- Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, Tutsi)
- Rwandan People, Hutu & Tutsi

Groups representing the United States (for a focus on U.S. policy only.)

- President of the United States
- Congress, Foreign Relations Committees
- U.S. Ambassador on the U.N. Security Council
- U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda
- Secretary of State/Department of State
- Secretary of Defense/Department of Defense
- Intelligence Services: CIA, NSC
- 3. Have students read through their particular group's document/s, underlining and highlighting key points. Ask students to look for any evidence of their group's role in the genocide, specifically searching for actions/inactions that impacted the outcome or the prolonging of the genocide.
- 4. Invite students to discuss amongst their group what they read.
 - What happened?
 - Is there anything they didn't understand?
 - What responsibility did their group have?
 - Should any blame be placed on their group?
 - What questions do they have for other groups in the room?
 - What blame should be placed on those other groups?
- 5. Ask students to prepare a statement or summary of their group's role in Rwanda to share with the class for the "truth round." Students must share the facts of their group. While they should not "cover up" anything, they do not have to "advertise" certain actions/inactions.
- 6. As groups "tell all" about their role in the genocide, have students take notes and/or write questions about what is presented. Only clarifying questions are allowed during this round, no arguments or blame. This may be a challenge because students often want to begin accusations.
- 7. Direct students to prepare arguments to defend or criticize each group's actions/inactions in Rwanda including their own group for the "argument round." Students should consider how much responsibility or blame to place on each group, again, including their own group.

- 8. Facilitate the discussion, reminding students of the protocols for a respectful academic conversation or Socratic seminar. Students may need several reminders as they are highly engaged in the activity.
- 9. After a significant amount of discussion and when there is an impasse or class time is running low, ask students to re-group and determine the responsibility and/or blame to be placed on each group. Have students list specific percentages and justifications for each group.
- 10. Post percentages on the board. Discuss similarities/differences. Call on group members to justify their choices. This part most likely would take place the following day.

Conclusion

- 1. Ask students to reflect as a group or individually.
 - How did you justify your choices?
 - What challenges did you face in determining percentages?
 - Would you have changed your percentages after hearing the reasoning and justifications provided by other groups? Why? How?
 - Which document/s had the most impact on your decision to assign responsibility or blame? Which carried the most weight or the least weight, why?
 - What information seemed to missing? What else would you have liked to know or been able to ask to make a better judgment?
- 2. Revisit the original question: Are we our brother's or sister's keeper? What responsibility do we have for the safety and care of family? Friends? Neighbors? Others? How wide is our circle of responsibility?

Have students look back at their Quick Write. Have their opinions changed? If so, how? In a Final Write, ask students to answer the question/s again, providing specific examples from "The Blame Game."

Assessment:

Teachers can determine what formative and summative assessments are needed for their students. Below is a list of suggested items for both types of assessment.

- Student self-assessment of collaboration and participation in academic conversation.
- Teacher observation of group collaboration.
- Teacher observation of academic conversation.
- Blame Game chart of percentages and justification for choices.
- Student Quick Write.
- Student Final Write.

Sources:

- American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, editors. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49938
- Dallaire, Roméo with Brent Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (2003). New York, NY: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2005.
- Des Forges, Allison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (1999). New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
- Genocide Archive Rwanda. http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Welcome to Genocide Archive Rwanda
- National Security Archive. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/index.htm

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- PBS *Frontline*. Ghosts of Rwanda. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/ To view, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJAuyIRfYIM
- PBS Frontline. Triumph of Evil. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/
- Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to Genocide." *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/
- Rwanda File. http://www.rwandafile.com/rtlm/list1.html
- Rwanda Stories. http://www.rwandanstories.org/index.html
- Shah, Anup. "Rwanda." Global Issues, 25 October 2006. http://www.globalissues.org/article/429/rwanda

ANNOTATED LIST OF DOCUMENTS

GROUP #1: Belgium

Most important documents: 1, 2, 5, 8, 10.

- 1) Shah, Anup. "Rwanda." Global Issues, 25 October 2006.
 This traces the role of Belgium as a colonial power in Rwanda.
 http://www.globalissues.org/article/429/rwanda
- 2) Telex from Belgian Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff (while Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Claes was in Kigali) to U.N. Belgian Delegation, 25 February 1994.

This message indicates Belgium's desire to increase the strength and/or mandate of UNAMIR especially because it would be unacceptable "to be passive witnesses to genocide." http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB/SAEBB458/docs/DOCUMENT%207%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf

3) Reply to Belgian Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff (while Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Claes was in Kigali) from U.N. Belgian Ambassador Noterdaema, 28 February 1994.

Increasing UNAMIR is not likely. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB458/docs/DOCUMENT%207%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf

- 4) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide [Reaction to Early Violence]." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

 This describes the reaction of Belgium, France, USA, and the U.N. Security Council to the outbreak of violence after the presidents' plane was shot down.

 http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
- 5) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide: Belgian Policy." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

This describes Belgium's actions to remove its troops and shut down the UNAMIR mission. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

6) American Embassy in Brussels, Belgium to U.S. Secretary of State, 8 April 1994.

American Ambassador to Belgium reports how Belgium Minister for Foreign Affairs wants to change UNAMIR mission to protect politicians and/or foreign residents. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%208.pdf

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7) Belgian Ambassador to the U.N. to Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 1994.

Belgian Ambassador to the U.N. informs Minister of Foreign Affairs Claes that the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council will not change the UNAMIR mandate. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%207.pdf

8) Linda Melvern. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide. London: Zed Books, 2000.

This tells the story of Lieutenant Luc Lemaire's experience with the Belgian soldiers who were stationed at a technical school, codenamed "Beverly Hills," and what happened when the Belgian troops were removed from Rwanda. https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/melvern-betrayed.html

9) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide: The Evacuation Force." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

This describes the number of Belgian and French troops that came to rescue foreign nationals – white people – and left Rwandans behind. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

10) Letter from Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Claes to U.N. Security Council President [& similar letter to UNSG], 15 April 1994.

This is the official letter informing the U.N. Security Council and the Secretary General that Belgium will withdraw all of its troops.

 $\underline{https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1501641/footnote-187-noterdaemedoc.pdf}$

GROUP #2: France

Most important documents: 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10

- 1) President Mitterand to Advisors. Ministerial Meeting Minutes, 23 January 1991. Mitterand expresses worry over an "Anglo Front" because of the Tutsi RPF invasion from Uganda. This demonstrates a conflict between an English-speaking sphere of influence and a French-speaking sphere of influence in Africa. Specifically, which countries are influenced more by the USA or UK and which are more influenced by France can be traced to the colonial era and more recently the Cold War. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB461/docs/DOCUMENT%208%20-%20English.pdf
- 2) Memo from General Quesnot to President Mitterand, 1 July 1992.

French General Quesnot requests approval to train the Hutu army. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB461/docs/DOCUMENT%2011%20-%20English.pdf

3) African Affairs Advisor Bruno Delaye to President Mitterand, 7 April 1944.

Advisor informs the French president that the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down, and about the violence against Tutsis and Hutu moderates. He also expresses willingness to shelter Habyarimana family, who are personal friends of the French president. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB461/docs/DOCUMENT%2020%20-%20English.pdf

- 4) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide [Reaction to Early Violence]." Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

 This describes the reaction of Belgium, France, USA, and the U.N. Security Council to the outbreak of violence after the presidents' plane was shot down.

 http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
- 5) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide: The Evacuation Force." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

This explains the evacuation of foreign nationals – no Rwandans. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

6) Des Forges, Allison. "Acknowledging Genocide: French Role." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

This discusses France's relationship with the Hutu regime, the supplying of weapons both before and after the genocide, and Operation Turquoise when France sent a military force to Rwanda, but did not stop the genocide. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

- 7) U.S. Embassy in France to U.S. Department of State African Affairs, "Rwanda and France," 24 June 1994.
 - This poses the question why the Government of France (GOF) would intervene now "after two and one-half months of well publicized massacres has left many in France and abroad wondering why...." It offers reasons as the effect of the media, political considerations (i.e. elections), and loss of credibility with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Interestingly it does not mention French ties to the Hutu government leadership as a reason for intervention. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/RW53.pdf
- 8) Des Forges, Allison. "Acknowledging Genocide: Operation Turquoise." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.
 - This describes how the primary purpose of Operation Turquoise was not to save Rwandan civilians, but to stop the advance of the RPF and/or save the [Hutu] Rwandan Government Forces. The presence of French troops between both armies allowed Hutu civilians, militia, soldiers, and perpetrators of the genocide to flee to neighboring countries, especially Zaire (today's Democratic Republic of the Congo). http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
- 9) Interview with General Lafourcade by Lieutenant Colonel Dupas on Operation Turquoise, 31 March 2014?

This interview, naturally, paints a positive light on the France's Operation Turquoise. The original is in French. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/interview-du-general-lafourcade-l-operation-turquoise-au-rwanda

10) Lichfield, John. "Sarkozy Admits France's Role in Rwandan Genocide." *The Independent*, 26 February 2010.

This article summarizes President Sarkozy's visit to Rwanda. Sarkozy admits "errors," but does not apologize. He lays the blame on the international community.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sarkozy-admits-frances-role-in-rwandan-genocide-1911272.html

GROUP #3: General Dallaire, Force Commander for UNAMIR (Canadian)

Most important documents: 1, 3, 4 or 5, 8, 10, 11

1) Weekly Sitrep [Situation Report] from the Force Commander Dallaire to U.N. Headquarters [and Kofi Annan], 14 December 1993.

This is a typical Situation Report. Dallaire complains of problems with logistics and lack of material: few vehicles, no APCs, no helicopters; poor communication; few flak jackets and other typical materials; and lack of office, food, and medical supplies.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB455/documents/DOCUMENT06.pdf

2) Daily Sitrep from the Force Commander Dallaire to U.N. Headquarters [and Kofi Annan], 11 January 1994.

One month later (and throughout the mission) Dallaire faces the same logistical problems. This Sitrep mentions that the appropriate driver's licenses are not available with the troops from Bangladesh. (Other Sitreps complained of some of the troops not being adequately trained or supplied.) http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB455/documents/DOCUMENT06.pdf

3) Dallaire to UN Headquarters. Warning Telegram, 11 January 1994.

Dallaire tells UN headquarters that a Hutu informant has provided key information: 1) plans to target Belgian soldiers which would guarantee Belgian withdrawal, 2) training of Interahamwe militia on weapons use and close combat with the probable intent of extermination, and 3) information of a major weapons cache. The informant wants protection. Dallaire requests UN go ahead. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/cable.html http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw011194.pdf (original)

- 4) Daily Sitrep from the U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) [Jean-Roger Booh-Booh] to U.N. Headquarters [and Kofi Annan], 23 February 1994.

 This Sitrep from the SRSG states that things in Kigali are "explosive." He mentions roadblocks, shootings, and grenade explosions which occurred after the assassination of two political leaders. It gives a sense of how Rwandans might respond to events, especially assassinations. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/docs/Document%2015.pdf
- 5) Daily Sitrep from the U.N. SRSG [Jean-Roger Booh-Booh] to U.N. Headquarters [and Kofi Annan], 1 March 1994.

As tensions increase, the SRSG notes that "there are rumors among the local population that this might be the first step towards armed confrontations." He goes on to say that local "businessmen stated that lot of machetes were sold in the last few days."

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/docs/Document%2017.pdf

6) Weekly Sitrep from SRSG [Jean-Roger Booh-Booh] to U.N. Headquarters [and Kofi Annan], 5 April 1994.

This Sitrep is the last weekly report before the genocide began. For that reason, it is a lengthy entry on the author's part (in other words I edited much less). This report gives a real picture of what things are like in Rwanda in early April.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/docs/Document%2019.pdf

- 7) Daily Sitrep SRSG [Jean-Roger Booh-Booh] to U.N. Headquarters [and Kofi Annan], 8 April 1994. This Sitrep describes the seriousness of the situation after the two presidents' plane was shot down. Booh-Booh mentions "chaos," "planned assassinations" which are "followed by killings of ethnic nature." http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/docs/Document%2021.pdf
- 8) Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to Genocide." Atlantic Monthly, September 2001.

This article summarizes the role of the USA and U.N. in the genocide in Rwanda. The excerpts here focus more on Dallaire and the UNAMIR mission. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/

9) Interview of General Dallaire by Ted Koppel, excerpt from A Good Man in Hell: General Romeo Dallaire and the Rwandan Genocide, 12 June 2002.

Dallaire blames the UK, France, and the USA for not "rising above self-interest." He recounts an appalling statement by an American official who equated the lives of 85,000 Rwandan lives to 1 American life. http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/a-good-man-in-hell-general-romeo-dallaire-and-the-rwanda-genocide

- 10) Dallaire from his memoir, *Shake Hands with the Devil*.

 Dallaire talks about things he could have done, how he could have gone beyond the mandate.

 Online excerpts available here: http://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/DAILLAIRE.pdf
- 11) Interview of Dallaire in PBS Frontline Ghosts of Rwanda, Fall 2003.

Dallaire places a lot of blame on himself, as Force Commander. Others might say too much, but he says, "There is no 'I'm sort of pregnant.' You either are or you aren't. And in command there is no 'sort of in command."

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html

GROUP #4: United Nations (Headquarters & Security Council)

Most important documents: 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13

- 1) U.N. Security Council, Resolution 872, 5 October 1993
 This resolution establishes the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement
- 2) U.N. Headquarters to Force Commander Dallaire, Response to "Warning Fax," 11 January 1994.

UN headquarters tells Dallaire that it cannot agree to the operation because it goes beyond the mandate (Resolution 872). In addition, the UN told Dallaire to inform the Rwandan President as the

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weapons were a violation of the Arusha peace accords. Most importantly, the UN says to avoid any action that could lead to the use of force.

 $\underline{https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/816324/19940111i-un-cable-from-annan.pdf}$

- 3) U.N. Security Council Resolution 909, 5 April 1994.
 - This resolution extends UNAMIR's mandate that was due to expire. UNAMIR originally was intended to assist in government power sharing and preparations for elections as part of the Arusha Accords, but deadlines were not being met.
 - http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/909(1994)
- 4) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide" [Reaction to Early Violence]. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

 This describes the reaction of Belgium, France, USA, and the U.N. Security Council to the outbreak of violence after the presidents' plane was shot down. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
- 5) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide: U.N. Obfuscation" [Muddying the Water]. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

 This describes the misrepresentation of the violence in Rwanda. Statements did not accurately characterize the violence as systematic, widespread, targeted towards Tutsis, and perpetrated by the Hutu government. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
- 6) U.N. Secretary General's Special Report (to U.N. Security Council) on UNAMIR, 20 April 1994. The Secretary General proposes (first two options then) three options for action: 1) reinforce UNAMIR to stop the violence, 2) leave a small contingent (~270) of UNAMIR personnel, or 3) withdraw UNAMIR completely which the SG does not favor. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1994/470
- 7) U.N. Security Council Resolution 912, 21 April 1994.

 This resolution alters the mandate so that UNAMIR 1) acts like an intermediary and 2) assists in humanitarian relief. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/912(1994)
- 8) United States Mission to the U.N. (USUN) to Secretary of State, "Draw-down UNAMIR and Status of Civilians," 23 April 1994.
 This message summarizes the UNAMIR draw-down, despite the protection offered to thousands of Rwandan citizens at the stadium, Hotel Mille Collines, and King Faisal Hospital. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB472/pdf/us01724.pdf
- 9) Statement by the President of the Security Council, 30 April 1994.

 This statement condemns the "wanton killings" in "areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the interim [Hutu] Government of Rwanda." The statement warns "that killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law." The statement also requests that "all States to refrain from providing arms or any military assistance to the parties to the conflict."

 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/21
- 10) New Zealand Delegation to the Security Council to the Government of New Zealand, Report on Security Council and Rwanda, 2 May 1994.

The NZ delegate summarizes the Security Council discussions over the past couple of days, especially noting how the members reached agreement on the specific wording of the Statement by the President of the Security Council. The views of each country/delegation is illuminating. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB472/pdf/nzc04395.pdf

11) U.N. Security Council Resolution 918, 17 May 1994.

This resolution alters UNAMIR's mandate somewhat. "UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defense against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief." http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/918(1994)

12) U.N. Security Council Resolution 925, 8 June 1994

This resolution finally uses stronger language: "acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda." It also expands UNAMIR: 1) increases the number of troops, and 2) extends the time frame to December 1994. This will become known as UNAMIR II. (Some call this mandate a Chapter 6.5, essentially the same as Chapter VI, but definitely not Chapter VII.) http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB472/pdf/unsres925.pdf

13) U.N. Security Council Resolution 929, 22 June 1994

This resolution approves of France's Operation Turquoise as a way to bring assistance to Rwanda quickly, before the additional troops and equipment of UNAMIR II can be deployed in Rwanda. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/260/27/PDF/N9426027.pdf?OpenElement

- 14) Interview with Iqbal Riza, Deputy of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 1995-1999? This interview was done for *Frontline* Triumph of Evil. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/riza.html
- 15) Interview with Kofi Annan, Head of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 17 February 2004 This interview was conducted for *Frontline* Ghosts of Rwanda. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/annan.html

GROUP #5: Media (New York Times)

Article Previews of 38 items published by the New York Times during the genocide.

GROUP #6: NGOs

Most important documents:

- 1) Interview with Carl Wilkens of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), 19 November 2003.
 - Wilkens explains what it was like to be the only American who chose to remain in Rwanda. He expresses the shame he felt as the international community abandoned Rwanda in its greatest time of need. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/wilkens.html
- 2) Interview with Philippe Gaillard of the International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 September 2003.
 - Gaillard speaks about his experience working with the ICRC that continued its work in Rwanda during the genocide. Gaillard and his colleagues mostly local staff were able to save 60,000-70,000 people from certain death.
 - http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/gaillard.html

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3) Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). MSF Speaks Out: Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994, April 2013.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, published a report about the organization's communications during the Rwandan Genocide. http://speakingout.msf.org/

4) Meeting with Deputy Asst. Secretary of State Bushnell and Allison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch along with Monique Mujawamariya.

Des Forges argues for several USA actions, including expanding UNAMIR force and jamming RTLM radio. Des Forges continues by reminding that 600 UNAMIR troops are located in Nairobi, Kenya only two hours away. She says "to do otherwise was morally unconscionable." http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw31.pdf

5) Meeting with Under Secretary of State [for Democracy and Global Affairs] Timothy Wirth with Jean de Courten of ICTR, 24 May 1994.

De Courten of ICTR says Rwanda "was the first time that ICRC has ever witnessed mass killings in such a horrific manner." He compares the slaughter to Cambodia and calls for peacekeeping forces to protect civilians. He also clearly blames the killings on the Rwandan [Hutu] Government. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw30.pdf

6) *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF). "Breaking Cycle Calls for Action at Rwandese Refugee Camps in Tanzania and Zaire." 10 November 1994.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, describe the problems at the refugee camps: security is deteriorating, the militia threaten refugees, those responsible for the genocide walk free, humanitarian aid is being diverted by the same militia/killers/perpetrators, and the camps are becoming training bases. http://speakingout.msf.org/en/node/488

GROUP #7: United States

Most important documents: 2, 6, 8, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23

1) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide [Reactions to Early Violence]." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

This describes the reaction of Belgium, France, USA, and the U.N. Security Council to the outbreak of violence after the presidents' plane was shot down. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

2) Des Forges, Allison. "Ignoring Genocide: U.S. Policy: 'Another Somalia' and Other Misconceptions." *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

This describes the "Somalia Syndrome" in which all USA actions are seen through the believed failure of what occurred in Somalia. In essence, the USA would not risk the lives of its soldiers for lost causes (and/or for Africans).

http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

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3) President Clinton, Remarks on Rwanda, 7-9 April 1994.

Statement on the Deaths of the Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi, 7 April 1994: Shocked by the deaths and "strongly condemn these actions." http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49922
Remarks & Exchange with Reporters, Marquette Hotel, Minneapolis, MN, 8 April 1994: Doing everything possible for the safety of American citizens.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49933

President's Radio Address, Oval Office, 9 April 1994: Concerned about American citizens' safety. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49938

4) Memo from Deputy Asst. Sec. of Defense for Middle East/Africa to Under Sec. of Defense Policy, 11 April, 1994.

This memo outlines the current and probable future situation in Rwanda. It was prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for his dinner with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The memo reads a bit like a crystal ball. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041194.pdf

5) President Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Evacuation of United States Citizens from Rwanda and Burundi, 12 April 1994.

Clinton informs leaders in Congress of providing marine support for the evacuation of USA citizens, and assures them that military operations won't be necessary. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49961

6) Ambassador to the United Nations Albright to Secretary of State, 12 April 1994.

This cable suggests that the role of the USA should be "taking the lead in the Security Council to authorize the evacuation of the bulk of UNAMIR." http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

7) Memo from Asst. Sec. of State for International Organization Affairs Douglas Bennet to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. "Talking Points for Phone Call to U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali on Bosnia and Rwanda," 13 April 1994.

This memo illustrates the priority of Bosnia over Rwanda. There are seven talking points on Bosnia which deal with various issues. Comparatively, there are only two talking points on Rwanda and they both deal with the withdrawal of UNAMIR. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050094.pdf

8) Discussion Paper, Rwanda. U.S. Dept. of State to U.N. Headquarters, 15 April 1994.

Talking Points for Withdrawal of UNAMIR Troops. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041594.pdf

9) Statement of Press Secretary, U.S. Dept. of State, 22 April 1994.

Asks specific Rwandan Hutu leaders to stop the violence. The only condemnation from the USA that stated specific names of leaders (i.e. perpetrators). http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw042294.pdf

10) National Intelligence Daily. CIA. 23 April, 1994.

Report calls events in Rwanda genocide. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050194.pdf

11) President Clinton, Radio Address on the Situation in Rwanda, 30 April 1994.

12) Discussion Paper Office of the Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Dept. of Defense, 1 May 1994.

Memo cautions the use of the "g-word" lest the USA would have to "do something." http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050194.pdf

13) Presidential Decision Directive PDD25, 3 May 1994.

Provides guidelines for U.S. involvement in international humanitarian efforts. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050394.pdf

14) White Paper, Department of State, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," May 1994.

This White Paper summarizes Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25) which outlines when the USA will or will not support UN peace operations. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050594.pdf

15) Memo from Under Secretary of Defense to Deputy Asst. to Pres. for National Security, "Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts," 5 May 1994.

Jamming RTLM Hate Radio would be ineffective and expensive. Memo states it would be better to assist by bringing in humanitarian supplies. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050594.pdf

16) Memo from Asst. Sec. of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck to the Acting Secretary, 9 May 1994.

After having visited East and Central Africa, Shattuck recommends expanding UNAMIR and initiating an international human rights inquiry. Shattuck stresses, "Rwanda is a test of our commitment to universal principles of human rights." He goes on to say that "the international community must demonstrate the same concern for Rwanda as we show in Bosnia lest we weaken universal standards." http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw19.pdf

17) Defense Intelligence Report, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front's Offensive," 9 May 1994.

This report shows that USA – at least the Defense Intelligence Agency – had a very clear picture of what was happening in Rwanda, and referred to the events as genocide. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB/S3/rw050994.pdf

18) Dept. of State, Memo from various assistants to the Secretary of State, "Has Genocide Occurred?" [What Terms or "Formulations" Should be Used?] 21 May 1994.

An analysis was done (by INR and Legal departments) whether genocide has occurred in Rwanda and what terms officials should use. The group recommends stating the "Department's conclusion that 'acts of genocide have occurred' in Rwanda." The memo ends with a check mark on two lines of approval. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1994/9406/940610db.html

19) Executive Order 12918 – Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Rwanda and Delegating Authority with Respect to Other United Nations Arms Embargoes, 26 May 1994.

President Clinton signs an Executive Order to stop or prevent the sales of weapons to Rwanda (except for materials intended for UNAMIR). http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50242

20) Press Briefing by Christine Shelly, U.S. Dept. of State, 10 June 1994

Shelly is asked by Reuters reporter, Alan Elsner, to characterize what is happening in Rwanda, which she calls "acts of genocide." Elsner queries, "How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide?" http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1994/9406/940610db.html To view: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjJdZ0cUZFs

21) Press Briefing by Christine Shelly, U.S. Dept. of State, 16 June 1994

Shelly answers questions related to the USA delaying sending military vehicles as promised to Rwanda. She also gets into an issue (again) with Reuters reporter, Alan Elsner, regarding semantics and genocide.

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1994/9406/940616db.html

22) Press Briefing by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 15 July 1994
After Tutsi rebel forces (RPF) took control of the control, a reporter asks whether the USA will
recognize the new government. Christopher says the USA will "de-recognize" Rwanda which means
the new government is not recognized yet.
<a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59896&st=&st1="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59896&st=&st1="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59896&st=&st1=

23) President Bill Clinton, Remarks Announcing Assistance to Rwandan Refugees and an Exchange with Reporters, 22 July 1994.

Clinton announces he will aid refugees from Rwanda. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50528&st=&st1

24) President Bill Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Humanitarian Assistance for Rwandan Refugees, 1 August 1994.
Clinton explains to leaders of Congress his plan for USA troops to aid refugees who fled Rwanda. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48930

25) President Bill Clinton, Address to Genocide Survivors, Kigali, Rwanda, 25 March 1998.

Clinton spoke at Kigali Airport during 3-hour visit. Despite not specifically using the word "apology," Clinton's delivery was right on and the message was fairly well-received. This address has become known as "The Genocide Apology."

The American Presidency Project. Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley, editors. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55677

To view: http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/bill-clinton/videos/the-clinton-apology

Suggested Sources on Rwanda

Lessons

100 Days in the Land of a Thousand Hills Graphic Novel, ICTR (2014). http://41.220.139.198/Portals/0/English/News/Cartoon%20Book/ICTR%20Cartoon%20Book%202011.pd

Coexist Teachers Guide: Using Film to Support Those Who Teach to Prevent Othering & Bullying. http://upstanderproject.org/

Rwanda Overview Jigsaw Lesson.

-Covers 4 topics: Hutu/Tutsi History, Genocide, International Response, and Post-genocide. https://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/center/rwanda/lessonplan.pdf

Tugire Ubumwe: Let's Unite! Teaching Lessons on the Rwandan Genocide. U.N. Outreach Programme with artist Rupert Bazambanga. Graphic Novel.

-Tolerance education through the story of a teacher and her Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa students. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Tugire_Ubumwe.pdf

Books

Barnett, Michael. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

Berkeley, Bill. "Chapter 6: The Defendant". *The Graves are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe, and Power in the Heart of Africa*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2001.

Dallaire, Romeo with Brent Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (2003). New York, NY: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2005.

Des Forges, Allison. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (1999). New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. http://pantheon.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/

Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York, NY: Picador, 1998.

Hatzfeld, Jean. <i>The L</i> Picador, 2009.	Antelope's Strategy: Living in Rwanda After the Genocide (2007). New York, NY:
Machete S	Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (2003). New York, NY: Picador, 2005.
Life Laid	Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak (2000). New York, NY: Other Press, 2006.
Ilibagiza, Immaculee Carlsbad, CA: Hay F	with Steve Erwin. Left to Tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust. House, Inc., 2006.

Keane, Fergal. Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey (1995). New York, NY: Penguin, 1996.

Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide. London: Zed Books, 2000.

Peterson, Scott. "Part III: Rwanda: The Machete War". *Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda* (2000). New York, NY: Routledge, 2002.

Philpot, Robin. Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa: From Tragedy to Useful Imperial Fiction. Montreal, Canada: Baraka Books, 2013.

Pierce, Julian R. Speak Rwanda: A Novel. New York, NY: Picador, 1999.

Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to Genocide." *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/

. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002.

Rusesabagina, Paul with Tom Zoellner. *An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography*. New York, NY: Viking, 2006.

Reports

United Nations. <u>Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda</u>. (external link) Geneva: United Nations, 1999. (Subject File) [Find in a library near you (external link)]

Definitive report concerning actions by the United Nations in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide. Evaluates UNAMIR's mandate and resources, critiques the failure of the United Nations to prevent or intervene in the genocide, draws lessons from mistakes made, and provides recommendations for improving the response by the United Nations to future crisis situations. Contains a detailed chronology of key events in Rwanda from October 1993 through July 1994, and annexes.

Organization of African Unity. Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide: The Report of International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events. (external link) Addis Ababa: Organization of African Unity, 2000. (DT 450.435.O74 2000) [Find in a library near you (external link)]

Comprehensive investigation of the Rwandan genocide examining its historical roots, the Arusha peace process and roles of the Organization of African Unity, United Nations, Belgium, France, and the United States. Discusses the plight of women and children, the refugee crisis, militarized United Nations camps, regional instability, justice, reconciliation, and recommendations. Contains chapter notes and annexes.

Videos

- "A Good Man in Hell" (12 min). United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
- -Short history of the start of the genocide, pictures (blurry) during, and interview with Dallaire at the USHMM. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x6t660_a-good-man-in-hell_news

Coexist. Directed by Adam Mazo, 2010.

- -Documentary about survivors and killers living together in Rwanda.
- -Curriculum and related items at Upstander Project. http://upstanderproject.org/

Lesson Created by: Nancy Ziemer MEd University of Minnesota Park Center International Baccalaureate World School

Hotel Rwanda. Directed by Terry George, 2004.

-Feature film based on the experiences of hotel manager, Paul Rusesabagina, and the refugees at Hotel Mille Collines in Kigali.

Frontline, PBS.

-- Ghosts of Rwanda. WBGH Educational Foundation, 2004.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJAuyIRfYIM

Timeline. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html

-- Triumph of Evil. WBGH Educational Foundation, 1999.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/

-Timeline. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html Historical Chronology. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html

History Channel.

-- "Rwanda: Background to Genocide" (4 min)

-Brief history of Hutu & Tutsi, especially during colonial period (with black/white pictures). Shows the device for measuring noses and identity cards the Belgians used on Rwandans. http://www.history.com/topics/rwandan-genocide/videos/rwanda-background-to-genocide

-- "Rwanda: The World Reacts" (4 min)

-Brief history of the role of the U.N., Security Council, United States, and France, culminating in the mass exodus of refugees to Zaire (current DRC) and the then massive humanitarian effort of the international community. http://www.history.com/topics/rwandan-genocide/videos/rwanda-the-world-reacts?m=528e394da93ae&s=undefined&f=1&free=false

-- "Rwanda: Remembrance & Reconciliation" (3 min)

-Brief explanation of the difficulty of bringing together perpetrators and survivors, and the unique use of community courts. http://www.history.com/topics/rwandan-genocide/videos/rwanda-the-world-reacts?m=528e394da93ae&s=undefined&f=1&free=false

Hotel Rwanda. Directed by Terry George, 2004.

-Feature film based on the experiences of hotel manager, Paul Rusesabagina, and the refugees at Hotel Mille Collines in Kigali.

Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Romeo Dallaire. Video. Directed by Peter Raymont, 2004.

-Documentary film in which Dallaire returns to Rwanda ten years later.

Shake Hands with the Devil, Video. Directed by Roger Spottiswoode, 2007.

-Feature film based on Dallaire's book.

Sometimes in April. HBO Films, 2005.

Websites

Ethics on Film: Discussion of Hotel Rwanda. Carnegie Council.

-Great questions to accompany *Hotel Rwanda*. Many similar questions to the ones addressed in this lesson. http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/education/002/film/reviews/0004.html

Genocide Archive Rwanda.

http://genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Welcome to Genocide Archive Rwanda

Kangura Magazine

- -This is the equivalent of the Hate Radio, RTLM, except in magazine form.
- -See: Kangura #6, Hutu Ten Commandments, 12, May 1990. http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k06a.html

National Security Archive. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/index.htm

Dobbs, Michael, editor. "Inside the UN Security Council: April-July 1994." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 472. Posted June 2, 2014. nsarchiv@gwu.edu

. "Warnings of Catastrophe: French, US, UN, and Belgian Documents Foreshadow the Genocide in Rwanda 1994." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 458. Posted March 6, 2014. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB458/

Ferroggiaro, William, editor. "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction." National Security Archive. Posted August 20, 2001. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/

Freyer, Jake and Emily Willard, editors. "Sitreps Detail Rwanda's Descent into Genocide 1994." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 466. Posted April 7, 2014. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/

Genocide Documentation Project. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/genocideproject/

Siad, Arnaud, editor. "The Rwandan Crisis Seen Through the Eyes of France. Part One: Leadup to the Genocide." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 461. Posted March 20, 2014. nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Willard, Emily, editor. "The Rwanda Sitreps: Daily Pleas to New York Detail How International Failure Left Peacekeepers Ill-Equipped to Respond to Rising Violence in January 1994." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 455. Posted February 3, 2014. nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Press Briefings, 1994. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1994/index.html

Rwanda File. http://www.rwandafile.com/rtlm/list1.html

Rwanda Stories. http://www.rwandanstories.org/index.html