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**Punishment and Penal Activity: The Expansion of Legal Fines and Fees
in Texas from 1985 to 2015**

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Abstract

Punishment and Penal Activity: The Expansion of Legal Fines and Fees in Texas from 1985 to 2015

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Across the United States, legal fines and fees generate millions of dollars per year in revenue despite widening the net of criminalization and increasing penal severity for poorer individuals. Unlike in other penal policy domains, legal fines and fees represent an ambiguously defined form of punishment that has received bipartisan support.

Understudied is how legal fines and fees have become an increasingly preferred policy choice among state-level political actors. In this study, I use archival data on legal statutes and legislative sessions in Texas – home to one of the largest prison and jail system in the U.S. – to investigate the development of legal fines and fees across a 30-year period. I use insights from socio-political and legal theories to offer a comprehensive analysis of the structure of legislative policy networks and the development of legal fines and fees legislation. I demonstrate that both liberal and conservative political actors facilitated the passage of legal debt legislation. Furthermore, I consider the role of legislative testimony to show the association between testimony and the rate of

legislation on legal fines and fees. I discuss the implications of my findings for understanding how policy networks and legislative activity are related to criminal justice outcomes and are influenced by a variety of social actors. My study contributes to theoretical explanations on the roles of state actors in developing policies that become increasingly implicated in social inequalities.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The American criminal justice system has expanded markedly over the past five decades, with more than 2.2 million people incarcerated and 4.7 million people under correctional supervision (Kaeble et al. 2015). These statistics, however, underestimate the full extent of the criminal justice system's reach and impact. Court-imposed fines and fees have become an increasingly used legal instrument to both punish and hold individuals accountable. In Texas, 2015 estimates suggest that municipal courts collected \$696 million and justice courts collected \$302 million in legal fines and fees (Office of Court Administration 2015), with revenues sometimes used to supplement state and local criminal justice budgets. Disproportionately impacting poor individuals, the recent upticks in the imposition of legal fines and fees subject disadvantaged individuals to an exacting form of punishment and surveillance in which minor cost amounts become subject to financial penalties, court supervision, and in some cases, incarceration. Against this backdrop, I explore the network relationships between legislators and whether interest group testimonies shape the statutes on legal fines and fees in Texas.

Whereas recent work traces the historical origins and the contemporary consequences of legal debt for low-income individuals (Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2010), this study focuses on how and by whom legal fines and fees legislation is passed in present-day state legislatures. The ambiguity of legal statutes and the discretion of judges, clerks, and attorneys enable systems of fines and fees to operate with little accountability or supervision (Harris 2016). Beyond these street-level bureaucrats are the legislators tasked with creating the legal statutes. Despite a growing recognition that fines and fees can punish individuals beyond the intended purpose, legislators continue to propose and pass legislation that introduces new costs and increases in the dollar amounts of fines and fees (Jacobs and Helms 1999; Weaver, Hacker, and Wildeman 2014). This motivates the question, through whose political involvement have systems of legal fines and fees developed and expanded over time?

I use legislative records to construct social policy networks that link state legislators to 160 legal debt bills passed between 1985 and 2015. I use these data to identify key actors involved with the passage of legal debt legislation. Then, I incorporate archival data on the legislature, the correctional population, and the public opinion to investigate whether legislative testimony influences legal fines and fees policy. The findings underscore the incremental, but steady expansion of legal fines and fees in Texas, which is concerning for poorer individuals who may be more sensitive to potentially worse social, political, and economic outcomes. In doing so, this study extends socio-legal research by bridging scholarship on the development and consequences of criminal justice policy. Researchers have paid increasing attention to the harmful and pervasive effects of legal fines and fees with respect to the actors who enforce the law and the people who are impacted. Social network analysis and time series analysis provide important conceptual and methodological tools for illustrating the seemingly disparate links between various criminal justice actors who have cultivated a system of legal fines and fees implicated in growing racial and socioeconomic inequality.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

FACTORS AFFECTING LEGISLATION

There are theoretical reasons to suggest that the development of legal fines and fees is a byproduct of relationships and interactions among legislators and other political actors. Prior research has effectively leveraged interviews and qualitative data to reveal the effects of legal fines and fees on individuals and communities. Legal debt holders describe fines and fees as contributing to cumulative disadvantage through reduced income, limited access to opportunities and resources, and an increased likelihood of ongoing criminal justice contact (Beckett and Murakawa 2012; Katzenstein and Waller 2015). However, less is known about what precedes the imposition of fines and fees, specifically the context in which fines and fees come to exist.

The Role of Public Opinion

The process of creating and passing legislation involves a myriad of factors. Although legislators ultimately author and vote on bills, there are numerous influencing forces, which include public opinion, partisan affiliation, fiscal concerns, and interest groups. Scholarship has theorized on the nature and predictors of public opinion on criminal justice policy. There are competing sociological explanations on whether and how public opinion affects legislative outcomes. Early political science research finds support that public opinion influences public policy (Page and Shapiro 1983). In line with this work, Peter Enns (2016) finds that politicians adopted tough on crime policies as a response to the public's punitive attitudes. In other words, the punitive shift in public opinion led to a punitive shift in criminal justice policy, suggesting that politicians are perceptive to the demands of constituents. At both the federal and state level, evidence shows a positive association between public punitiveness and increases in incarceration rates, net of crime rates, income inequality, and other associated factors (Enns 2016). The evidence is incomplete, however, as its focus on the attitudes of median voters does not fully capture the public opinion of those who are most involved with the criminal justice system, namely, the poor and disadvantaged. Moreover, public opinion on crime policy is fluid, with

support for punitive policy changing over time and coexisting with support for more lenient policies (Beckett 1999).

A series of studies suggest that political elites primed the public to develop and voice punitive attitudes towards crime following the civil rights movement (Beckett 1999). Katherine Beckett (1999) examined the politicization of crime around the mid-1960s to find that state actors' claims making activities coupled with the mass media shaped public opinion on street crime and drug use. Specifically, state actors frame and politicize issues to imply necessary policy outcomes, which, in turn, mobilizes public support. One reason this is effective is that state actors have greater access to public forums and are viewed with legitimacy (Weiss 1979; Beckett 1999). Rooted in the politicization of crime were the politics of racial resentment (Murakawa 2008; Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). During the 1960s, conservative politicians merged appeals for law-and-order with racially coded language that linked racially underrepresented groups with street crime (Murakawa 2008; Murakawa and Beckett 2010). This rhetoric used racial resentment to explain the declining socioeconomic position of the white working class, thereby mobilizing their support (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). Historical accounts on the politicization of crime suggest different directions for the relationship between public opinion and political actors; however, there is a clear association between conservative political leadership and increasing punitiveness in U.S. criminal justice policy (Jacobs and Jackson 2010).

Hypothesis 1: Public opinion will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

The Durability of Political Partisanship

Unlike the role of public opinion, political partisanship is well understood to be a significant factor influencing policy development (Beck 2002; Kirkland 2011). Partisanship is a key signal on the nature and policy leanings of a legislator or legislative body (Christakis and

Fowler 2008). State legislatures are often understood in relation to their partisan makeup (Brace and Boyea 2008). Texas, for example, has had a Republican-dominated legislature for the past three decades, which partly informs its long-held “tough on crime” reputation (Gershowitz 2012). In the policy arena, legislators must collaborate to craft policy and vote policy into law. For state legislatures consisting largely of Republican legislators, for example, this may demand that Democratic legislators work “across the aisle,” (Fowler 2006a).

Political parties employ tactics to signal partisan commitments and appeal to voter bases (Beck 2002; Beckett and Sasson 2003). Conservative candidates have relied on political appeals to crime control candidates to win (re)election campaigns, while Democratic candidates have struggled to endorse punitive policies (Brace and Boyea 2008). Within political parties, however, there exist ideological differences that guide attitudes towards punishment and other criminal justice policy (Jacobs and Jackson 2010). In other words, Republicans and Democrats are not monoliths, but have variation in their attitudes and actions on criminal justice policies.

During legislative sessions, partisanship is consistently shown to be associated with cosponsorship and cooperation among legislators (Fowler 2006; Christakis and Fowler 2008; Kirkland 2011). Members of the same political party tend to cosponsor together and partisan tilts can influence entire policy domains (Kirkland 2011). Decisions to cosponsor and pass legislation are not only affected by relationships among legislators, but are also conditioned by the broader conversations and concerns of a given period (Kent and Carmichael 2015). Legislative sessions may be characterized by specific issues or bills most pertinent to the political landscape. The 73rd Texas legislative session in 1993, for example, focused much of its criminal justice policy on the funding and expansion of correctional facilities (Senate Research Center 1993). For comparison, the most recent legislative session (84th) focused on firearms, juvenile justice, and victims’ services (Senate Research Center 2015). In the 30-year period analyzed in this study, approaches to crime policy have varied, yet fines and fees have continued to be passed into law.

Hypothesis 2a: The proportion of Republican Legislators will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

Hypothesis 2b: Republican governorship will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

Fiscal Concerns

In recent years, as the burgeoning costs of incarceration became clearer, politicians have converged in supporting a “smart on crime” approach (Simon 2010; Page 2011). The rhetoric around crime policy has started to lean towards rehabilitation and away from punitiveness. Rehabilitation is often coupled with the notion of accountability (Goodman 2012; Cullen and Gilbert 2013). Legal fines and fees stand in stark contrast to the most severe forms of punishment, such as incarceration, which require high costs during and after incapacitation. Instead, fines and fees reflect a desire to recoup the costs of criminal justice activity while still holding individuals accountable for lawbreaking activity (Beckett and Harris 2011). In certain contexts, efforts to promote rehabilitation and accountability can become forms of social control, whereby increased supervision and mandatory socializing activities are imposed. Stuart (2016) finds that Los Angeles residents were presented with opportunities to waive fines for public misconduct by enrolling in social services.

For fiscally conservative politicians, fines and fees may be a puzzle; they are at once a form of taxation and a punishment seemingly commensurate to a given crime. How politicians come to understand and support crime policy may be related to the efforts of interest groups and their political involvement. Research has shown that certain actors may mobilize support for public policy that runs counter to a political groups’ traditional platform. In Texas, Campbell (2011) shows that legislators abandoned a traditional fiscal conservatism in favor of tough on crime legislation. Fiscally conservative legislators were convinced that expanding prisons would be less costly than not punishing violent criminals (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013). Page (2011) argues that prison officer unions in California leveraged strong political influence to challenge efforts to downsize prisons, despite the necessity to do so for lowering costs. In addition to the

influence of budgetary concerns, I anticipate that increases in the incarceration rate will contribute to increases in legal fines and fees legislation. Incarceration is a costly process for courts, prisons, and jails.

Hypothesis 3a: Budgetary concerns will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

Hypothesis 3b: The incarceration rate (per 1000) will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

Interest Groups and Testimonies

Recent work has centered interest groups in socio-legal analyses of policy formation. Adopting an organizational “fields” approach, these studies have conceptualized interest groups as actors who occupy a fluid position between legislators and the public (Page 2011; Stuart 2016; Vargas 2016). In Texas, Campbell (2011) finds that law enforcement organizations were given significant influence on politicizing and shaping tough on crime policies. Conservative legislators leveraged law enforcement organizations for political endorsements, which gave law enforcement greater legitimacy to shape public perceptions of crime. Legislators often work in isolation from the public during sessions. Law enforcement organizations and other interest groups, however, typically have direct contact with the public, and thus represent a pathway through which the communication and dissemination of political attitudes occurs (Beckett 1999; Campbell 2012). As Campbell (2011) notes, “law enforcement organizations and their members provided a vital institutional link between the state-level penal policy arena, the media, and the public.” Law enforcement groups represent one side of political spectrum on crime policy. Court organizations, nonprofit organizations, and some testifying citizens also have a close social proximity to legislators. Whereas law enforcement organizations may have a vested interest in making crime policy more punishment-oriented, nonprofits may vouch for less severe forms of sanctioning. The socio-legal literature on legal fines and fees has yet to explore these

relationships. Legal fines and fees represent a middle ground between punitiveness and leniency. Some legal statutes have stated purposes for generated revenue that include supporting victim's compensation and other public goods, thus making policies around legal fines and fees more palatable policy suggestions.

The most visible form of political engagement among interest groups is public testimony. Although state organizations cannot take official positions on legislation, public testimony is often cited in legislative memos and communications (Christakis and Fowler 2008; Campbell 2011; Carlson 2017). Agenda setting precedes the passage of legislation. Interest groups may be most impactful during this process by curating information and presenting on relevant social issues (Talbert and Potoski 2002; Carlson 2017). Similarly, politicians may relay information on social issues to interest groups in order to mobilize public sentiment and support (Campbell 2011). Research on the role and embeddedness of interest groups is needed to ascertain how the social groups not directly tasked with creating legislation manage to have significant influence over legal statutes.

Hypothesis 4: Testimonies will be positively associated with the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

EXPANSION OF LEGAL FINES AND FEES

Systems of a legal fines and fees reflect a disciplinary approach to poverty management (Wacquant 2009; Beckett and Western 2011; Katzenstein and Waller 2015). Holding legal debt is particularly impactful for poorer populations. Although some legal fines and fees have trivial cost amounts, the legal statutes allow for a net widening effect whereby more people become entangled with the criminal justice system for minor offenses (Beckett and Murakawa 2012; Harris 2016). Many fines and fees are associated with misdemeanor or petty crimes (Texas Appleseed 2017). Perhaps an unintended consequence, legal statutes enable agents of the criminal justice system to penalize not only minor criminal activity, but also individuals'

inability to manage debt (Weaver et al. 2014). Fines and fees make sanctions more severe. For example, the failure to appear in court for a \$60 traffic fine can result in nearly \$365 worth of added court costs and fees (Texas Appleseed 2017). The bulk of fines and fees sometimes relate to the expenses of criminal justice activities more than the crime itself. A significant contributor to the increased severity of punishments are the policy changes that raise cost amounts.

Legal fines and fees, as part of the broader carceral state, are not presented as a clearly defined set of policies up for public debate. The outcomes of legal fines and fees legislation are documented, but the underlying political roots for their expansion is not. Gottschalk (2006) argues that, within larger institutional structures, punitive penal policies were implemented with little opposition. Whereas the legal statutes on other criminal justice processes such as incarceration are more forthright in language, statutes for legal fines and fees are ambiguous and consequently more prone to discretionary imposition. There are instances in which fines and fees can be waived and/or there is a determination of indigency; however, the legal statutes are not clear. Using experimental evidence, Schram and his colleagues (2009) find that discrediting markers, much like holding legal debt, negatively influence officials' decisions to impose sanctions. Fording and his associates (2013) find that welfare sanctions reduce the growth in wage earnings among TANF recipients, regardless of race. These studies are useful for understanding the variation in how sanctions are imposed and the subsequent consequences for receiving an initial sanction.

Changes in fines and fees legislation has been steady and incremental over time. Early forms of legal fines and fees can be found in the southern U.S. states during the 1940s (Harris et al. 2010). In Texas, fines and fees have been introduced and amended during the popularity of crime control and since after. Other forms of punishment, particularly incarceration, have required omnibus legislation or large-scale changes. The system of legal fines and fees has been piecemeal, with specific fines or fees amended as part of other criminal justice or education related bills. This approach has made the growth of fines and fees more innocuous in nature, as

their impact cannot be traced to a single legislative bill or legislative session (Feeley and Simon 1992). Therefore, legislators, interest groups, and the media may have been less attentive.

Taken together, scholarship has produced detailed accounts of how legal fines and fees mark an increase of criminal justice contact and involvement. Yet, the legislative activity permitting fines and fees requires more investigation. While scholarship has explained the expansion of mass incarceration in legislation as a product of the combination of public opinion, state actors, and political rhetoric, there are few explanations for how the expansion of legal fines and fees is associated with political actors and legislative activity on the state-level. This study, however, expands the scope of inquiry to look at the legislators whose actions set the guidelines. While judges, clerks, and other legal personnel impose and enforce legal fines and fees, they rely on legal statutes to inform their decisions. State legislators directly author, sponsor, amend, and vote on bills establishing the types of legal fines and fees. Additionally, testimonies may contribute to whether a bill is supported. To better understand the expansion and persistence of legal fines and fees, it is crucial to illustrate legislative networks and assess the impact of testimony at the state-level.

Chapter 3: Data & Methods

USING STATE HISTORIES TO UNDERSTAND PENAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Research on the development of criminal justice policy in the United States has been challenged with understanding the interplay between federal-level, state-level, and local-level political structures (Lynch 2012; Campbell 2016). A distinct feature across all U.S. state governments is that there are casts of state actors that include governors, legislators, and interest groups. Moreover, state governments are directly responsible for creating criminal laws within the constitutional boundaries set forth by the federal courts. Given the rapid growth of imprisonment in the United States, a body of sociological research has examined penal policy change in the context of mass incarceration. Prior work on state-level trends in mass incarceration has contributed theoretical accounts of how penal control is complex, specifically paying attention to the dynamics and developments of both the federal government and state governments (Lynch 2012; Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013) and the conflict among competing groups for using finite resources (Page 2011; Goodman, Page, and Phelps 2015).

Insights from this literature point to differences in the causes and consequences of various penal processes. In other words, what contributes to and sustains mass incarceration in a certain state during a certain period is different from the factors that do so for arrest, probation, parole, and other forms of punishment. For example, Phelps (2016) shows that during the growth of mass incarceration from 1980 to 2000, mass probation expanded as well, but in states such as Delaware and Minnesota. Her account challenges conventional arguments that punishment was and is historically concentrated in southern states. She suggests that probation is a unique form of social control, and not an alternative to imprisonment.

In line with these theoretical perspectives, I argue that systems of legal fines and fees represent a unique arm of the carceral state. Legal fines and fees have been supported and expanded by state-level actors, but in different ways from more visible forms of punishment. The factors and forces predicting the expansions of other penal social control mechanisms, such as mass incarceration and mass probation, cannot be universally applied across states (Miller 2008).

Whereas support for mass incarceration has largely been attributed to certain social groups, such as conservatives and law enforcement organizations, legal fines and fees may have developed through broad support from those groups and groups that previously opposed mass incarceration and prison expansion.


Scholars should begin from analyzing individual state histories where different state actors exercise varying levels of influence on penal policy (Miller 2008). To date, four case studies on American states offer detailed accounts on the roles of state actors. Schoenfeld (2010) demonstrated how in Florida, prosecutors and sheriffs rallied campaigns in support of prison expansion and against their opponents who advocated using parole to reduce prison overcrowding. Her work draws attention to the paradoxical nature of court decisions for which there were long-term consequences for prison expansion. Page (2011) used ethnographic and historical data to explain how prison guard unions in California gained political power and financial backing from prison expansion to push forth an aggressive approach to corrections. The unions were successful in blocking efforts to reform “tough on crime” policies. Further, the unions backed victims’ rights groups that were then used as political allies in the conversations surrounding penal policy. Lynch (2010) used archival and interview data to investigate how Arizona, a state with a history of low incarceration rates and an unwillingness to spend on corrections, came to have one of the highest incarceration rates in the United States. In part, she argues that political elites and the media used “tough on crime” rhetoric to mobilize support. Owing to the unique history of Arizona politics, she suggests that corrections became increasingly bureaucratic, which gave the state greater capacity to imprison large numbers of people. Campbell (2011) examined the politicization of “law and order” approaches to crime in Texas. He argues that law enforcement and prosecutor organizations were effective in lobbying to lawmakers and re-positioning reform efforts to support prison expansion and the intensification of punishments. A key process through which law enforcement organizations were effective was through bill tracking and testimony.

Although focused on mass incarceration and imprisonment, these studies provide important theoretical and methodological tools for using state-level case studies to examine the penal policy development of other criminal justice processes. Legal fines and fees have recently garnered attention and criticism in scholarship, but their development over time is largely not understood. The expansion of legal fines and fees is not the result of clearly defined legal policies or institutional structures. Whereas mass incarceration is viewed as costly and ineffective, legal fines and fees may be viewed as cost-efficient or less punitive. While research suggests that state political structures orient and shape the debate around penal policies, more work is needed to understand which individuals and groups are more impactful in the policy arena.

THE ARGUMENT FOR STUDYING TEXAS

Texas is a suitable state to study the relationship dynamics of legislators and interest groups for expanding legal fines and fees. Widely considered a “national leader in criminal justice reform,” Texas hosts one of the largest penal populations in the United States, with 147,409 incarcerated and 318,371 under correctional supervision (Legislative Budget Board 2017). The size and scale is evident in Texas’s criminal justice budget, for which the state spends roughly 3.4 billion annually (Texas Department of Criminal Justice 2016). The history of the legal fines and fees system in Texas can be tied to convict leasing systems in which southern prisoners were charged steep fines and fees and then leased to corporations for labor (Adamson 1983). Figure 1 presents a timeline of relevant legislative activity on legal fines and fees in Texas in the past five decades.

Figure 1. Timeline of Major Legislative Activity on Legal Fines and Fees



The provisions under which legal fines and fees could be imposed were amended into Texas state law in 1965 with the authorization of the warrant fee (Code of Criminal Procedure 45.203). The warrant fee has since been increased to \$25. Notably, these bills set the guidelines for responding to unpaid legal fines and fees by allowing the use of jail time as a penalty. In 1979, the Texas Legislature passed the Crime Victims' Compensation Act to promote the involvement of crime victims in the process of apprehending criminal offenders and receiving the necessary reimbursement for expenses related to the crime. The associated fund receives revenues from state court costs, parole supervision fees, donations, subrogation, federal VOCA grants, and restitution (Legislative Budget Board 2013). In 1985, the Code of Criminal Procedure was updated to match the language used in Vernon's Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In 1998, as part of a Senate Bill 1863, the Texas Legislature authorized a program designed to assist cities and counties with the collections of legal fines and fees, titled the "Collections Improvement Program" (CIP). The program launch signified an effort to incentivize legal fines and fees collections. The CIP made more formal the processes for collecting legal fines and fees and reporting on the details of collections, such as the numbers of cases and amounts owed.

Mandating that cities with populations of 100,000 or more follow CIP standards, the program directed more attention to the imposition of legal fines and fees around 2005.

Recently, the media has cultivated widespread attention to legal fines and fees in Texas. In 2015, an investigation of courts in El Paso County brought attention to the issue of determining indigency (Taggart and Campbell 2015). In 9 of the 20 courts investigated, there was no evidence that the courts assessed whether individuals were impoverished and unable to pay legal debts. Later that year, the Texas Fair Defense Project filed a lawsuit against the city of Austin after a plaintiff was jailed for an inability to pay thousands owed in traffic tickets (Gonzales et al. v. City of Austin 2015). Conditions observed in Texas are effective for identifying the practices and legislative guidelines that effectively punish individuals, even in the absence of the local particularities seen in Ferguson and St. Louis (Department of Justice 2015), which have guided the national narrative.

The institutional arrangement of the Texas Legislature is unique (Campbell 2011). In a typical legislative session, about 6,000 bills will be proposed and about 1,200 bills will be voted into law. Legislative sessions take place every two years for a six-month period where legislators meet to propose and vote on bills. Given the infrequent nature of legislative sessions, bills passed into law have immediate and durable impacts in the years before the next session. Moreover, this may suggest that agenda setting and interest group politicking takes place over a longer period leading up to a session. Although Texas has a regressive tax structure, there has been considerable support for introducing new legal fines and fees and amending existing fines and fees to increase costs. As shown in other states (Lynch 2010), support for punitive and costly penal policy is not always at odds with a state's interests. There are currently about 143 unique criminal court costs (Slayton 2014). Legal fines and fees can be assessed at every court level within Texas, and costs can range from \$2 for indigent defense to \$133 for consolidated court costs.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To understand the development of legal fines and fees policies, my analyses draw primarily on a combination of legislative records and archival data in Texas from 1985-2015. The primary data are legislative records available from the Legislative Reference Library of Texas (<http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/>) on 16 legislation sessions from 1985-2015. I select this period based on the availability of records needed for checking validity. Prior to 1985, legislative records are less consistent in their language across different online databases. Data from the online reference library were cross-checked with physical legislative records held in the Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas at Austin. I include 160 legislative bills related to legal fines and fees in the Code of Criminal Procedure. I use the term “bill” generically to reference any piece of legislation. From the legislative records, I draw information on bill histories, legislative session characteristics, and testimony characteristics. Each legislative record includes drafts of the bill text, the legislative authors and sponsors, the legislators’ votes, the fiscal impact, and the witness lists. From the text, I can determine the (amended) cost amount of a legal fine or fee and its statutory purpose. I use data on the legislative authors and sponsors to construct social networks. I use online records from the Texas Senate, the Texas House of Representatives, three daily newspapers, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the Gallup poll to gather information on the macro-level predictors of legislation for the time series analysis.

METHODS

This study examines the Texas Legislature between 1985 and 2015 to identify the political actors involved with legal debt legislation and to assess the influence of legislative testimony. To gain analytic leverage on my research question, I employ two analytic techniques, each drawing on different subsets of the data. I conduct a social network analysis to descriptively map social ties among legislators on legal debt bills across a 30-year period. In doing so, I show that counter to social theory suggesting the actors in favor of punitive policy might favor the

expansion of fines and fees, the actors involved with fines and fees legislation are more diverse. I also test an alternate measure of centrality to assess the strength of legislator relationships. In the second stage of analysis, I employ Poisson regression to model the influence of testimonies on legal fines and fees legislation. Results demonstrate the relevance of testimony for increasing the rate of legal fines and fees legislation. Triangulating across data sources and different techniques offers insight into the interplay of various actors over time.


Chapter 4: Who Endorsed Legal Fines and Fees?

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Social network analysis of archival data is well suited to trace the historical foundations on which legislators and political actors have endorsed and authorized legal fines and fees. The use of social network analysis is not new to studies on legislation and politicians. Prior research has used legislative records from the federal government (Fowler 2006a, 2006b) and state governments (Cho and Fowler 2010) in the same manner by connecting legislators who cosponsor together. Political scientists have used social network analysis to identify the centrality of legislators in a network (Fowler 2006), examine the role of gender and ethnicity in legislators' decisions (Bratton and Rouse 2009), and analyze the significance of tie strength on legislative outcomes (Kirkland 2011). In the sociology of law, however, social network analysis has not been fully leveraged to link legislators for understanding changes to a set of criminal justice policies over time.

I offer an account of how an ambiguously defined set of criminal justice policies was endorsed and enacted in legislation. Cosponsorship is interdependent, therefore it is treated as a network. Whether viewed as signaling or positioning on an issue, theoretical perspectives on cosponsorship recognize this behavior as being driven by the strategic calculation of costs involved with cooperation (Fowler 2006). I begin by descriptively mapping the Texas Legislature activity on legal fines and fees bills across 16 legislative sessions (Figure 2). Then, I test an alternate measure of centrality to assess the strength of legislator relationships (Table 3).

Figure 2. Legislative Sponsorship Ties in the Texas Legislature, 1985-2015



Note: The figure was drawn using SocNetV, a data visualization software tool. The nodes for the top ten most connected legislators in the network are named.

Figure 2 represents the policy network of the Texas Legislature on legal fines and fees legislation, where Democrats are black circles and Republicans are white squares. Each legislator represents a node in the network. A tie is drawn between each legislator who sponsors a bill and the legislator who authored that bill. Sponsorship represents support for another legislator's bill, therefore these ties are directed and asymmetric. Larger nodes indicate higher levels of connectedness and wider ties indicate higher frequencies of sponsorship. Of the 182 total legislators in the network, there are 98 Republicans, 83 Democrats, and 1 Independent. Republican legislators more often sponsor with other Republicans; whereas Democratic legislators tend to sponsor with legislators from both parties. Given that the Texas Legislature

has been Republican-controlled for much of the time between 1985 and 2015, this suggests that Republican support is necessary to some degree for passing a bill on legal fines and fees.

Table 1 presents the network values for degree density and degree centrality. The density measure captures the level of connectivity and ties among legislators in the network (Hanneman and Riddle 2011). In other words, the higher the density of this network, the more connected that members will be with regards to communication and information exchange. The degree centrality measure denotes the level of embeddedness and significance of a legislator in the network. This measure is calculated as the total number of unique cosponsors who support each legislator. The network density is much greater in earlier legislative sessions (not shown) where fewer legislators were involved. Over time, more legislators become involved with legal fines and fees legislation in the form of sponsorships. For example, during the 69th legislative session, there were two legislators involved with the sponsoring of four different legal fines and fees bills. By contrast, there were more than 50 legislators involved with 13 different bills during the 74th legislative session.

Table 1: Texas Legislature Network Descriptive Statistics

Density	Centrality
.042	.135

Although the degree centrality measure is reliable and supported by the literature (Hanneman and Riddle 2011), it overvalues legislators who have sponsored fewer bills, but among those bills, there were more legislators involved (Fowler 2006). For example, a legislator who has sponsored one bill with 30 other legislators will have a higher degree centrality compared with a legislator who has sponsored multiple bills with fewer legislators. Therefore, I use an alternative measure more suitable to determine the strength of legislative relationships. I use Fowler’s (2005) measure of connectedness, which is a weighted closeness centrality measure, to identify the legislators most involved with legal fines and fees legislation. Compared

with degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and eigenvector centrality, the measure of connectedness uses information on the total number of cosponsors on each bill to gauge the strength of social relationships among legislators. To calculate the measure of connectedness, I begin by assuming the strength of a relationship between legislator a and legislator b on a given bill x is $1/cx$. Then, I create a binary indicator $zxab$ (1 = legislator a cosponsors on a given bill x that is authored by legislator b). Using the binary indicator, I calculate the weighted quantity of bills that are cosponsored yab which will be the sum of $zabx/cx$. Given the asymmetrical nature of sponsorship ties (i.e. ties are directive), the weights will not be symmetrical. Appendix B illustrates how weights are calculated. To find connectedness, I calculate the inverse of the average of the distances between legislator a and all other legislators: $(t - 1)/(d1j + d2j + d3j + \dots + dxj)$. Figure 3 in the appendix depicts an example of this calculation. Using information on the total number of sponsors on a bill and the total number of bills sponsored by a pair of legislators, I can capture the level of support that a legislator gives and receives (see Table 2).

Unsurprisingly, 7 of the 10 most connected legislators have served on criminal justice related committees and 8 of the 10 legislators represent highly populated districts in Texas, including Harris county. There are four Senate Democrats among the five most connected legislators. Overall, there are 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans. Based on this measure of connectedness, the most connected legislator is Senator John Whitmire, who is Chair of the Senate Criminal Justice Committee and has served in the Texas Legislature since 1973. During the period of 1985 to 2015 in this analysis, Whitmire's level of connectedness may even be underestimated. Table 2 shows the clustering of the 10 most connected legislators. Some legislators are more well connected outside of this subset of the larger network. The second most connected legislator, Senator Zaffirini, is only connected to three of the other 10 most connected legislators. While she has given support through sponsorship to many legislators, support was not always reciprocated for her authored bills. Perspectives on legal influence may have competing ideas on the levels of influence among these legislators. The legislators in this group

represent committee chairs, congressional assistants, judges, university chancellors, board of trustee members, and lobbyists. Many have won legislative seats in general elections by margins of nearly 60 percent. Wentworth and Deuell, however, were unseated by “Tea Party” candidates in 2012 and 2014, respectively.

Table 2: Connectedness of Texas Legislators

Rank	Legislator	Chamber
1	John Whitmire (D-15)	Senate (formerly House)
2	Judith Zaffirini (D-21)	Senate
3	Bob Deuell (R-2)	Senate
4	Kenneth Armbrister (D-18)	Senate
5	Royce West (D-23)	Senate
6	Brian McCall (R-66)	House
7	Juan Hinojosa (D-20)	Senate (formerly House)
8	Joan Huffman (R-17)	Senate
9	Jeff Wentworth (R-25)	House (formerly Senate)
10	Robert Duncan (R-28)	House (formerly Senate)

Chapter 5: Does Legislative Testimony Matter?

The previous section identified the key legislators involved with legal fines and fees bills. This stage of the analysis directs attention to the involvement of other political actors, namely, individuals who provide testimony on bills. I argue that testimonies are directly influential on legal fines and fees policy. I offer a test as to whether this influence is dependent upon changing political opportunity structures, measured by a series of covariates over time. Following the standard for analyzing event count data, I use Poisson regression to model the count of legal fines and fees bills passed (Table 4). Continuous variables are centered to their means to address multicollinearity.

MEASUREMENTS

Dependent Variable

Legislation

I compile counts on the legislative bills related to the costs paid by defendants upon conviction (Slayton 2014). A bill is counted if it fits the following criteria: 1. It is attached to a legal statute in the Code of Criminal Procedure; 2. It is a criminal court cost paid by defendants upon conviction (e.g. DNA court cost); and 3. It was amended in law between 1985 and 2015.

Independent Variables

Legislative Testimony

Presenting testimony to a legislature is a strategy used by outsiders to communicate with policy makers and influence decision-making (Weiss 1979). I focus on testimony to understand its importance for legislative outcomes. I argue that testimony is not solely a performative gesture, but an influential act on legislators' policy preferences. Testimony is the most frequently used strategy among interest groups, but less is known about the degree of influence that

testimony may have on legislative activity. Moreland-Russell and her colleagues (2015) find evidence for an “enlightenment model” where legislators rely on testimony as a source of information on relevant issues. About six percent of their sample found testimony to be the primary factor driving a change of vote or position on an issue.

I construct a count variable for legislative testimony indicating the number of testimonies provided on legal fines and fees bills during each legislation session. Each bill history contains witness lists, which include the individuals’ names and their organizations. Every individual providing testimony is given the option to deliver an oral presentation or a written statement, both of which are incorporated in the variable. Any individual who provides testimony on a single bill in both the House and the Senate is counted as having provided one testimony. I measure testimony as a variable capturing all testimonies, regardless of position. By law, state employees are not permitted to take a position in favor or in opposition to a bill, but rather must provide testimony as a resource witness with a neutral position. Most testimonies are provided by government organizations, such as police departments and courts. Therefore, any attempts to separately measure testimonies by position would underestimate the extent to which a bill is viewed favorably or not. Moreover, individuals may be more willing to provide testimony when they hold favorable attitudes towards a bill. This study is concerned with whether testimony of any kind is associated with legislative outcomes.

Political Climate

I use four different measures for the political climate. Research on criminal justice policy attitudes suggests that Republicans are more approving of punishment-oriented policies, therefore I expect that when Republicans have more control, there will be higher levels of testimonies. I use two measures to assess Republican political control, the proportion of Republican legislators (as a percentage) and whether there is an acting Republican governor (as a binary). In all legislative sessions, the proportion of Republican legislators is equal to or greater than the proportion of non-Republicans. These measures provide insight as to whether

organizations with conservative agendas, such as expanding legal fines and fees, are more willing to provide testimony when the legislature is Republican-controlled.

Attitudes and concerns over budgets are influential for which bills get considered. For example, a legislature attempting to balance a tightening budget may be less willing to consider bills that support increased spending. I use House committee and Senate committee reports on session summaries and highlights that include information on whether there were budget constraints for criminal justice spending. Specifically, this binary measure identifies whether the House or the Senate described attending to criminal justice budget concerns during a legislative session. I anticipate that a legislature managing fiscal concerns will be associated with a rise in the rate of legal fines and fees legislation.

I include a measure on the number of laws related to legal fines and fees that were passed in the previous legislative session. This lagged measure is a count of bills passed in the previous legislative session. Prior success with passing a legal fines and fees bill may hint that there are political opportunities to continue proposing similar bills.

Public Opinion

Democratic political theories contend that the strength of public opinion is a key determinant for policy change. Elected officials consistently support policies that align with the views of the public in order to stay in office. Thus, when the public opinion largely favors a policy, other factors such as legislative characteristics may become less significant. To capture the influence of public opinion, I include the percentage of people who mention “crime” as the most important issue in Gallup polls. These data are drawn from Policy Agendas, a project that collects and organizes archival data on the national political agenda and policy outcomes.

Media attention is relevant for understanding the statewide conversation around a policy issue. I calculate an index on the annual percentage of articles in the Dallas Morning News, Houston Chronicle, and Austin American Statesman devoted to legal fines and fees. These are the three most circulated daily newspapers in Texas. This measure allows for testing the

argument that variation in legal fines and fees legislation may be a function of changes in the media attention surrounding legal fines and fees, rather than due to changes in testimony activity.

Incarceration Rate

Increases in the incarcerated population may be associated with increases in legislation, as a response to rising costs. I measure this variable using data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the incarcerated population rate per 1000. I use this measure to address whether fluctuations in the incarcerated population influence legislation on legal fines and fees.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

To examine the influence of legislative testimony, I fit Poisson regression models that estimate the effects of predictors on the count of legal fines and fees laws. Poisson models are widely used for regression analysis on count data. I use the “offset” command to specify the log of the exposure time (Dean and Lawless 1987). This allows me to adjust for the opportunity there is for legal fines and fees bills to pass. The models include a logged variable for the exposure term with a coefficient value set to 1.

I conducted exploratory analyses of the data to check for over-dispersion and multicollinearity among the covariates (Dean and Lawless 1987). Over-dispersion may lead to an underestimation of the standard errors. There was no evidence of over-dispersion in the event count variables, indicating that the variances of the event counts were not larger than their means. There was substantial multicollinearity among covariates, therefore, I center all continuous variables to their means. Analyses were computed using STATA MP. Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Independent Variables

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Testimonies*	0	0.73	1							
Number of Laws*	0	9.30	0.25	1						
% of Newspaper Articles*	0	0.44	0.55	-.04	1					
% Crime is Most Important*	0	1.31	0.11	0.14	0.21	1				
Incarceration Rate per 1000*	0	11.40	0.88	0.12	-.11	0.81	1			
Republican Governor	0.7	0.52	0.09	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.12	1		
% Republicans in Legislature*	0	0.09	-.22	0.32	0.10	0.44	0.45	0.63	1	
Fiscal Concern	0.65	0.51	0.33	0.44	0.11	-.04	0.31	0.55	0.34	1

Note: Variables denoted with an asterisk are lagged one legislative session and centered to their means. Means are set to zero. n = 17

RESULTS

Table 4 presents results for the relationships between the rate of legislation and the covariates. Models 2, 3, and 4 separately introduce a variable designed to capture the influence of the political climate. In all four models, testimonies have a significant positive effect on legislation, which is evidence in support of Hypothesis 4. This indicates that as the number of prior testimonies increases by a standard deviation over the mean, the rate of legislation increases. The coefficient for testimonies is .081 in Model 1. This indicates that the rate of legal fines and fees legislation increases by 6 percent as the number of legislative testimonies increases by one standard deviation above the mean. I arrive at this estimate through a two-step process. First, I calculate the product of the coefficient and the standard deviation for testimonies ($0.081 * 0.73 = 0.05913$). Second, I find the exponential value to rescale the impact ($\text{Exp}[0.05913] = 1.06$).

The number of existing legal fines and fees laws is statistically significant in Model 1 and in Model 4. The coefficients in both models indicate a 7 percent increase in the rate of legal fines and fees legislation. This finding suggests that the passage of legislation does contribute to

increases in legislation in later sessions. As more laws become enacted, legislative activity around amending, introducing, or eliminating prior statutes becomes more frequent.

Both public opinion and media attention show no significant effects of legislation, providing no evidence to support Hypothesis 1. Regarding public opinion, this is in accordance with theoretical explanations that legislators are not always responsive to the public. Conversely, this may indicate that legislators view legal fines and fees as separate from the public's conceptions of criminal justice policy. Public concern over crime may be tied to ideas of public safety and victimization that are distant from legal fines and fees. Media attention, measured by an index of daily newspaper coverage, may have focused more on other criminal justice policy issues unrelated to legal fines and fees. In earlier years, the public discourse on criminal justice was less pronounced. The effects remained insignificant with using a different measure that included national newspapers, such as *The New York Times* (results not shown). The influence of the incarceration rate is not statistically significant in the models, suggesting no support for Hypothesis 3b.

In Model 2 and Model 3, indicators for Republican control of the legislature are included. For both measures, having a Republican governor in power and the percentage of seats filled by Republican legislators, the effects are not significant on legal fines and fees legislation, providing no evidence to support Hypothesis 2. This is consistent with findings from the previous section because legal fines and fees legislation is not predominantly mobilized by Republicans, therefore having either political party in power may have a similar influence.

In Model 4, the effect for fiscal concern is significant and positive, suggesting that legislative sessions characterized by budgetary concerns increase the rate of legal fines and fees legislation. The coefficient indicates that the rate of legal fines and fees legislation increases 25 percent during legislative sessions characterized by fiscal concern. This is in accordance with Hypothesis 3a and is consistent with the view that legal fines and fees are one avenue through which criminal justice system costs can be recouped. Although research and policy analysis suggest that there are long-term costs associated with the increased imposition of fines and fees,

policymakers may be more supportive of these policies for being a more immediate response to perceived fiscal constraints. Moreover, there may be fewer criminal justice policy alternatives that offer to reduce costs.

Table 4: Legal Fines and Fees Legislation in Texas, 1985-2015

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Testimonies (t – 1)	.081*	.072*	.082*	.086*
Number of Legal Fines and Fees Laws (t – 1)	.009*	.008	.008	.008*
Percent of Newspaper Articles (t – 1)	-.221	-.204	-.220	-.224
Percent Crime is Most Important (t – 1)	-.003	-.001	-.001	-.002
Incarceration Rate per 1000 (t – 1)	.102	.114	.112	.119
Republican Governor		.283		
Percent of Republicans in Legislature			-.223	
Fiscal Concern				.489*
Constant	-3.66***	-3.68***	-3.68***	-3.67**
Pseudo R-square	.48	.49	.48	.48
Log Likelihood	-108.9	-105.7	-105.9	-107.8

* = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$.

Poisson regression models produce estimates using standard robust errors

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

The role of state social actors in expanding legislation on legal fines and fees is a consequential, yet understudied process. This study bridged the literatures on legislative networks and legal fines and fees to understand who contributed to an ambiguously defined set of laws and policies that disproportionately affect poorer justice-involved individuals. Further, it assessed whether and to what extent legislative testimony was associated with the laws. To examine the development of legal debt legislation in Texas, I constructed and analyzed the Texas Legislature as a policy network across a 30-year period. To summarize, there is a mix of Democratic and Republican legislators involved with authoring and sponsoring legal debt legislation. Using event count data, I find evidence for some, but not all, of my hypotheses. Legislative testimony, prior legislative bills, and fiscal concerns were positively associated with the passage of legal fines and fees legislation. From these findings, two themes emerge.

The development of legal fines and fees statutes was a bipartisan effort over time. There is growing attention to the social and economic failings of legal fines and fees, and one assumption is that conservative lawmakers would be more invested in expanding these laws. In Texas, however, Democrats were no less tied to the legislation on legal fines and fees than Republicans. The findings do not necessarily suggest either political party dominated the input on legal debt legislation; however, support for legal fines and fees was a collaborative process. Scholarship on partisanship and criminal justice policy typically suggests that conservatives show greater support for punishment-oriented policies. The discourse, however, has been concerned with imprisonment as the primary social and economic development in criminal justice. Incarceration and prison expansion were heavily politicized issues leveraged by conservatives as solutions to concerns over public safety. Legal fines and fees, in theory, are a less punitive response to crime. Individuals are mandated to pay the costs associated with criminal justice activities. The logic of fines and fees satisfies the concerns of both political parties. As both a response to criminality, by holding individuals accountable, and to budget

concerns, by recouping the cost of criminal justice activities, legal fines and fees are palatable to both political parties. In recent years, the rhetoric on criminal justice policy has shifted towards a “smart-on-crime” approach (Simon 2010). Whether and how this different approach to criminal justice addresses the consequences of using legal fines and fees to punish more individuals and punish more severely is an open question.

Legislative testimony matters. It is associated with a 6 percent increase in the passage of legal fines and fees legislation. Preparing and presenting testimony is a strategic form of communicating with lawmakers to influence policy preferences and decisions. Many policy issues are brought to the attention of legislators through testimony. An alternative explanation for the positive effect may be that organizations and individuals offer testimony for bills that are likely to pass. Another explanation is that testimony has an indirect effect by providing information and arguments used by legislators during floor debates, where policy decisions are determined. Future research can be done to assess these ideas and examine for whom testimony is more effective, based on personal characteristics of the testifiers and the legislators.

The implications of this study for the socio-legal literature are significant. By demonstrating the diversity of legislators involved with legal fines and fees legislation, my work contributes a starting point for using descriptive and quantitative methods to study state-level legislative bodies. My account suggests that the broader political climate in a state does not determine policy outcomes. Moreover, my study suggests that changes in the political environment can, but do not always, structure the attainability of goals and outcomes for certain actors. The efforts by Democratic legislators to authorize legal fines and fees bills were not stifled by being part of a Republican-heavy legislature. There may be increases in legislative testimony when social actors’ goals align with the political structures. Deeper analysis on the contents of interactions and behaviors among state actors would be necessary to build our understanding on legislative outcomes.

Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners are considering new ways of addressing legal fines and fees (Beckett and Harris 2011; Ruback 2011; Marsh and Gerrick 2015). In 2014, The

Office of Court Administration (OCA) conducted an assessment on the use of legal fines and fees in Texas. This assessment was mandated by Senate Bill 1908 in preparation for the 84th legislative session. The report marked the first comprehensive analysis of the size, scale, and purpose of legal fines and fees in Texas (Slayton 2014). The OCA examined whether legal statutes on fines and fees were necessary to achieve their stated statutory purposes. Findings showed numerous legal fines and fees lacking stated statutory purposes. The researchers identified 14 costs with unclear statutory purposes and 4 costs that were unnecessary to achieve their statutory purposes (Slayton 2014). Moreover, the collections from certain legal fines and fees were found to not be reliably used for criminal justice-related purposes.

The findings were used in consultation with 26 local government representatives including attorneys, district and county clerks, non-profit government groups, and judicial associations to provide recommendations to the Texas Legislature. Table 5 in the appendix includes the names and represented organizations in attendance. Members of this group have provided testimony on legal fines and fees bills in the past. Being invited to consult on policy recommendations is a sign of influence. It remains an empirical question whether the act of providing testimony builds credibility that can lead to gaining more influence.

There are limitations in this study that can guide future directions. Failed bills were omitted from the analyses due to inconsistencies in the available information. The data used for analyses incorporated full information on bill histories, which for failed bills, are short and abrupt depending on the stage at which the bill died. For example, a bill may only be considered in the House before receiving too few votes to be passed to the Senate for further consideration. This bill would likely not have been heard in testimony nor would it have received legislator support. Some failed bills reemerge and find success in later legislative sessions. First, because of data limitations, I am not able to examine bills related to legal fines and fees that failed to pass. Legislative efforts may have been proposed to decrease or eliminate certain legal fines and fees. The failure of these efforts may point to weaker legislative influence among its authors and

sponsors or stronger legislative influence among its opponents. Future studies can use archival and qualitative methods to investigate failed bills as negative cases.

This study is specific to Texas, an outlier state on many criminal justice procedures and outcomes. Although partisanship was not directly associated with legal fines and fees legislation in Texas, states with balanced or liberal-leaning legislatures may have different trajectories. Moreover, macro-level structural differences, such as economic conditions and crime rates, will affect legislators' objectives. As scholars have argued, the conditions observed in each state are unique and relatively incomparable to other states. Although, there are certain states, like Texas, that are viewed as national models for criminal justice policy. Other state legislatures may choose to adopt similar policies and practices. Future studies can explore other states, such as Louisiana or New York, where legislatures and interest groups may behave differently with approaches to legal fines and fees. The Oklahoma legislature, for example, has recently approved numerous pieces of legislation aimed at diminishing the penalties for owing legal debt and expanding the opportunities for repayment.

A review of the witness lists shows that judicial and prosecutorial organizations provided favorable testimonies on legislation that introduced or increased legal fines and fees. The few testimonies in opposition were provided by progressive organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union. As Gottschalk (2006) argues, the desires of certain groups to achieve policy goals does not necessarily translate into success. Deeper investigation into oral and written testimony transcripts and records can be used to examine the variety of institutional, political, and structural factors that facilitate or block interest groups to help understand when and under what circumstances opposition to legal fines and fees is weaker or more effective.

Through an examination of the Texas Legislature, my study contributes a novel socio-legal perspective on penal policy developments. Legal fines and fees in Texas have developed as a seemingly innocuous set of policies focused on accountability and cost-savings. Prior work has examined the consequences of legal fines and fees, whereas this study investigated the legal development over time in a state legislature. By investigating legal records on fines and fees in

Texas, my analyses offer unique information for theoretical models explaining the roles of state actors in developing public policies that are implicated in widespread social inequalities.

Appendix

Figure 3. Example for Calculating Weighted Sponsorship Distance




Table 5. Local Government Representatives Consulted by OCA, 2014

Name	Organization
Jim Allison	County Judges and Commissioners Association
Bob Bass	County Judges and Commissioners Association
Steve Bresnen	El Paso County
Michelle Brinkman	Travis County District Clerk
Loretta Cammack	Nacogdoches County District Clerk
Robby Chapman	Texas Municipal Court Training Center
Hon. David Cobos	Justice of the Peace and Constables Association
Patricia Cummings	Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association
John Dahill	Conference of Urban Counties
Rob Daniel	Texas Justice Court Training Center
Richard Dulany	Bexar County Public Defender
Shannon Edmonds	Texas District and County Attorneys Association
Nanette Forbes	Texas Association of Counties
Laura Garcia	Texas Association of Counties
Marc Hamlin	Brazos County District Clerk
Jim Huggler	Attorney, Tyler
Teresa Kiel	Guadalupe County Clerk
David R. Lee	Attorney, Houston
Hon. Greg Magee	Texas Justice Court Judges Association
Cynthia Mitchell	Denton County Clerk
Carl Reynolds	Council of State Governments
Joshua Tackett	Navarro County District Clerk
Ryan Turner	Texas Municipal Court Education Center
Laura Weiser	Texas Center for the Judiciary
Caroline Woodburn	Potter County District Clerk
Bryan Zubay	Texas Fair Defense Project

Source: Adapted from Office of Court Administration, 2014.

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