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**Of Order and Liberty: Catholic Intellectuals in Argentina and Brazil,
1930-1980**

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**“Of Order and Liberty: Catholic Intellectuals in Argentina and Brazil,
1930-1980”**

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Dedication

To the Church and its diverse followers, who always seeing through a glass darkly (1 Cor. 13:12) strive imperfectly toward the Truth inscribed on all men's hearts (Ro. 2:15).

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Abstract

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This project challenges the historical binary of a revolutionary versus a reactionary Church through a comparative case study of right-wing Christian Democrats in Brazil and Integralist/Nationalist intellectuals in Argentina. Intellectually, the project centers on Jacques Maritain and notable Latin American figures. Such figures include Brazilians Alceu Amoroso Lima and Dom Hélder Câmara, and Argentine leaders Julio Meinvielle and Leonardo Castellani. The study will argue that these figures’ intellectual stands represented diverging paths for each country’s conservative majority, but also shaped their respective hierarchies’ reactions to key events in the Catholic and secular world: the Spanish Civil War, World War II, the Second Vatican Council. While anti-Modernists, Brazilian intellectuals came to favor pluralist and democratic solutions of Social Democracy over and above the organic (and encompassing) visions espoused by Franco’s Spain, and subsequently, the Argentine hierarchy.

This study will analyze major Catholic newspapers and journals, including *Criterio*, *Jauja*, *A Ordem*, and *O Diario de Belo Horizonte*. These sources will give the reader a glimpse into the intellectual societies and forums in which these thinkers moved, and will more clearly display the distinction mentioned above. Surprisingly, conservative Brazilian papers maintained a vigorous anti-Communist stance, but came to see the government as an oppressing force prohibiting the legitimate social actions of the Catholic faithful.

Argentine intellectuals took a much more ambivalent attitude toward democracy at best, and a more hostile one at worst. Julio Meinvielle and Leonardo Castellani from their journal *Jauja* directly challenged the Second Vatican Council, the liberal state, and the rights of left-wing dissidents. More generally, Argentine ties to Franco's Spain through the 1970s, as well as to conservative varieties of Peronism, as well as the loss of the unifying Gustavo Franceschi (editor of *Criterio*) in 1957, put the sizable democratic and reformist minority firmly outside the good graces of the hierarchy, paving the way for the Catholic purges in Argentina of the 1970s.

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Introduction: A Tale of Two Right Wings

In October 2013, Catholic and Jewish worshipers in the Cathedral of Buenos Aires holding a service remembering the Holocaust suddenly heard shouts accusing them of desecrating the space of worship.¹ The source of the disturbances was a group of right-wing Catholics disturbed that rabbis would be allowed in what they considered the most sacred space of worship in the sprawling metropolis. Groups of similar ideologies had also opposed former-archbishop Jorge Mario Bergoglio (now Pope Francis) for his openness to other religious communities, and especially, his stance toward the Jewish community in particular. This contrasted with the images of adoring throngs of Catholics, both traditionalists and progressives, on the beaches of Rio de Janeiro during Pope Francis' June 2013 trip. Furthermore, enthusiastic Brazilian bishops praised Pope Francis' new Latin American style through his focus on poverty (clear in his March 2015 authorization for the cause of Brazil's Dom Hélder Câmara) and everyday metaphors to explain complex Catholic doctrine. In contrast, the Archbishop closest to his former diocese, Hector Aguer of La Plata, kept a guarded silence, perhaps necessary because of rumors that Aguer's sympathizers had always sent concerned letters to Rome about then Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio. What factors contributed to this difference in reaction? What unifying spiritual and philosophical factors identified the Pope with the faithful of a country with a long suspicion of his native land?

¹ "Anti-Semitic Group Interrupts Event" *Buenos Aires Herald* November 13, 2013.

These modern-day divergences merely highlight the different developments, but also striking similarities, of the Brazilian and Argentine churches over the course of the mid to late Twentieth Century. Catholic militants in Argentina and Brazil during the 1930s shared a similar philosophical underpinning but diverged in their political responses to their respective authoritarian regimes. Brazilian and Argentine intellectuals demonstrated philosophical continuity in their rejection of Modernist social constructs and liberal conceptions of the “Social Contract.” That said, this work will attempt to show that a combination of opposing personalities, hierarchies, and macro-political trajectories brought these two similar groups to diametrically opposed views on authoritarianism, democracy, and the State’s responsibility to implement Catholic values. The Brazilian Catholic Right (with notable exceptions) embraced Christian Democracy as the best foil to Communism. This tolerance-centered vision of a Christian society pushed Catholic militants to use the language of development to give cover from dictatorial charges of subversion to even their more wayward leftist-brethren within the Catholic fold. This position came in spite of their original support for the authoritarian coup of 1964. Argentine Catholic militants polarized in the 1930s and 1940s, ideologically defeated the “Conciliar” reformist wing of lay intellectuals in the 1950s, and convinced the hierarchy in the 1970s and 1980s of the necessity of a hardline against non-Catholics or Catholic dissidents, especially in the nationalist coups of 1966 and 1976. Argentine Catholics’ support for Nationalist authoritarianism was not unique, but its general silence was exceptional in its extremity in South America, especially given the Church’s claim to superiority in spiritual affairs. The Brazilian Right’s final political position however,

seems ironic given the authoritarian tendencies of Imperial Brazil and the relatively weak status that non-state actors held in Brazilian political culture up through the First Republic and the early 1920s. A Brazilian Church with a history of submission and right-wing militancy ended up championing democracy. An Argentine Church that held such a high view of the Church's spiritual mission and the State's subservience condoned the actions of its priests and devoutly Catholic generals in running torture chambers. But why?

In any comparative history, a careful approach must be employed that compares countries in similar stages of development, geographic and cultural proximity (preferred but not required), and takes into account the long arch of each entities' historical trajectory.²

Macro-historical factors can help partially explain the difference in early Church formation and highlight important ironies. Argentina and Brazil, countries so close geographically, nevertheless historically diverged with regards to the formation of their national identities, their elites, and their colonial relationships. Argentina took the path of other vice-royalties of Spain, electing national independence from Spain after the Napoleonic invasions. Brazil on the other hand remained part of Portugal up through 1822, even receiving the Portuguese court, which fled the Napoleonic invasions in 1808.

The Church-State relationship in each country also diverged. Jose Murilo de Carvalho

² Citing March Bloch "Pour une histoire compare des sociétés européennes. In: *Mélange Historiques*, t. I, Paris S.E.V.P.E.N. (1963), 17- 19. , Gabriella Pellegrino Soares, "A semear horizontes: leituras literárias na formação da infância, Argentina e Brasil (1915-1954)." PhD diss., (São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 2002), 19-20. Pellegrino Soares' comparative study analyzed children's tales in Argentina and Brazil. She notes (footnote 12 pg. 19) that archival documentation on editorial policy in Argentina did not equal the amount of documentary evidence on the Brazilian side. No such problems exist in this study, as multiple major journals and weekly newspapers exist for both countries.

points out notable differences based on a colonial heritage of more religious universities. The Argentine state took a fairly detached, yet supportive, view of the Church throughout the mid-Nineteenth Century period. Even in the case of traditional Church opponents, Church-State relationships were complex. I would argue that the Argentine liberals did ascribe to a regalism that restricted the official rights of the Church, but in a more nuanced fashion than other Latin American counterparts. Liberals in Argentina did not draw exclusively on the Bourbons, but rather, on traditional notions of a “popular” Patronato. In this turn on agreements between Rome and local governments, the Pope merely recognized the principle of, not granted the right to, local and popular appointments of bishops.³ In Brazil the Church was constantly subjected to vigorous state control, which followed from its elites’ legally focused training.⁴ Other scholars such as Anthony Gill employ a cost-benefit analysis in analyzing the Church’s support for authoritarian regimes but are in many ways anachronistic and ignore long-standing intellectual debates in Catholic circles around the issue of political systems.⁵

³ See: Roberto Di Stefano, *El púlpito y la plaza: Clero, sociedad y política, de la monarquía católica a la república rosista* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores Argentina S.A, 2004), 233.

⁴ José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: A elite política imperial* 6^o edição (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011), 39-40. Carvalho argues that the Brazilian elite, because of their homogeneity of education in Coimbra, were able to escape much of the radicalization and differing opinions of their Spanish counterparts. In this sense then, the Brazilian state was “more organized, more cohesive, and perhaps more powerful.” (40). The centralization of the Catholic elite in Brazil during the 1930s would reflect this general national tendency.

⁵ See: Anthony Gill, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 96-97. Anthony Gill posits that competition from Protestants among the working class prompted episcopates like Brazil to embrace a preferential option for the poor to retain parishioners. This thesis is problematic, as most scholars agree that the serious growth of Protestantism began around the 1970s, meaning that the beginnings of serious opposition to the coup (beginning in the 1965-1967 period) preceded the serious decline in Catholic followers that Gill guesses caused said resistance. While Gill points to debates occurring in the 1950s around the rise of Protestant communities, and while newspapers did indeed condemn Protestant evangelism, religious tolerance had

Both societies however had striking similarities that draw attention to their divergences. Both countries passed through the 18th Century diffusion of Enlightenment principles, albeit in a more socially conservative form than their French counterparts. Both suffered monarchical crises due to the Napoleonic conquests as well as Iberian moves to consolidate the empire and throw off some of the more traditional protections of empire. The Brazilian society of the 18th and 19th Century relied on classic notions of social order (that often precluded modern industrialization like that of the Prussians and English) to maintain a tight-knit group of bureaucratic elites in power, even as they embraced a modernist paradigm in their pursuits of European science and philosophy.⁶ Similarly, Argentine independence leaders held a conservative vision of the 1810 May Revolution as, among other economic factors, a chance to protect traditional colonial values from the encroachment of increasing Enlightenment Bourbon Spanish governance and against a potential French conquest.⁷

These respective traditions informed the Catholic intelligencia during the mid-20th Century. On one hand, the Brazilian intellectuals found themselves influenced by their traditional support of “organic” societies and suspicion of “contractual” conceptions of

already entered into Brazilian Catholic circles by the mid-1950s, before John XXIII's endorsement. Historians cannot rule out that Catholic militants to boost their own following, overstated Protestant gains pre-1970. Gill's thesis also ignores the fact that many of the key figures to the military regime in 1964 had been integralists caught up in the social question as far back as 1930.

⁶ José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem*, 40,43. C

⁷ This viewpoint is controversial. The traditional historiography of the May Revolution has emphasized the conflict between the “imagined” criollo communities and the peninsular Spanish bureaucrats. Revisionist historians such as Enrique Díaz Araujo however, emphasize that the context around the independence movement included a conservative elite that embraced an explicit (as opposed to an implicit) social based on the Spanish monarch as opposed to the Enlightenment concepts that the Bourbons had been slowly embracing and which the Cadiz Court a year later would codify. Enrique Díaz Araujo, *Mayo Revisado* (La Plata: Editorial UCALP, 2010), 80,87,94,108.

citizen rights, something that had become much starker after the resurgence of the hierarchy post 1916. Nevertheless these intellectuals followed the lead of the US-pressured Vargas regime redemocratizing in 1945, possibly reflecting the Brazilian Church's residual tendency to seek a certain accommodation with the state.⁸ On the other hand, Argentine intellectuals, slightly more divided and isolated from democratic governance, and passing through a period of military (1943-1945) and populist (1945-1951) rule, found themselves leaning more toward the Catholic authoritarianism of the Iberian regimes. Such tendencies appropriated the discourse of the Counter-Reformation. As far back as the 17th Century, the philosopher Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), had influenced the Jesuits at the University of Cordoba and held that natural law, that is, the order of creation ordained by God, was based on concepts such as "authority" and the "social body" as the foundation for society. The Jesuit father Pedro de Ribadeneyra argued the division between the spiritual and the political did not favor the separation of Church and State per se, but rather subordinated the State to the position of enforcer of religious doctrine, which the Church interpreted.⁹ The Argentine tradition of a Church-centric Patronato, as opposed to a traditionally regalistic concept, therefore lent itself to the idea of a confessional Catholic state.¹⁰ According to the histories of the two countries

⁸ Ana Maria Koch, "Cruzada pela democracia: militantes católicos no Brasil republicano." *Revista Brasileira de História* 33, no. 66 (2013): 288.

⁹ Silvano G.A. Benito Moya, *La Universidad de Córdoba en Tiempos de Reformas (1701-1810)* 1^a Ed. (Córdoba: Centro de Estudios Históricos Prof. Carlos S.A Segreti, 2011), 332-334. Citing: Pedro de Ribadeneyra, *Príncipe Cristiano*, lib. 1, cap. XIX In: *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, tomo 60 (1868).

¹⁰ Roberto Di Stefano, "El laberinto religiosa de Juan Manuel de Rosas" *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* Vol. 63 Num. 1 (enero-junio 2006): 20. Di Stefano argues that Juan Manuel de Rosas did in fact try to implement many of the Church reforms of his liberal predecessors, but mixed these attempts with rhetoric favoring traditional Catholicism and a restoration of the various international religious orders that the Bourbons and the liberal Argentine governments of the 1820s had suppressed. Regardless, Di Stefano also

therefore, it is not surprising that the Argentine circle of intellectuals clearly had a deeper history of religious militancy than did their Brazilian counterparts, despite passing through a similar wave of Bourbon reform and Liberal isolation. Unlike in Brazil, Argentine Catholic intellectuals could count on a reservoir of regional memory and understanding that came from the early founding of local religious institutions. However, these various institutions also led to a general lack of political consensus, whereas in Brazil, Catholic elites copied the State's centralizing tendencies in mapping their own intellectual networks. This centralization helped the opinions a few particular leaders to disproportionately weigh in the public intellectual debate.

Ultimately, structural and macro-historical narratives can only explain so much however. What this paper intends to do is delve into the personalities that shaped, or failed in their attempts to shape, the Argentine and Brazilian Catholic debates over the meaning of "order" and "liberty", democracy and authoritarianism, and Communism versus its alternatives. To fill in the gaps in the comparative frame and explain the contradictions mentioned above, this study will analyze Argentina and Brazil within a global context in which their various Catholic intellectual communities reacted to important world events, such as Mexico's Cristero Rebellion, the Spanish Civil War, World War II, the Second Vatican Council and the Cold War. The study will focus on attempts by various intellectuals to either reinterpret, or double down, on traditional Catholic historical narratives. In particular, this paper will discuss the impact of one of

asserts that these reform efforts ought to neutralize Rosas' legacy as a conservative Catholic, replacing that reading with one of a leader with a "dead-end" and "contradictory" political strategy.

the leading Catholic intellectuals of the 20th Century, Jacques Maritain, a philosophically conservative Christian humanist who reinterpreted Thomistic philosophy to allow the state to weigh in on issues of morality insofar as they did not violate the conscience of the human individual.¹¹ The Brazilian Catholic elite, centralized in the think-tank Centro Dom Vital, and in the figure of Alceu Amoroso Lima from the 1930s and 1960s, came to embrace Maritain's philosophy, which provided a Catholic democratic alternative to the liberalism that they despised. In Argentina, Catholic intellectuals represented by such disparate activists as Leonardo Castellani, Julio Meinvielle, Carlos Sacheri, and Antonio Caponnetto, equated social plurality with what they saw as liberal heresy. They rejected Maritain's distinction between the person whose individual success contributed to the common good, and the individual, whose success suffered tension with the collective. Instead, a person could only thrive where virtue was fully promoted, through the confessional state which limited or eliminated errors that liberalism allegedly encouraged.¹²

Ultimately, this project does not attempt to conduct merely another reinterpretation or chronicle of the ideas of the right-wing, but will problematize some of the historical

¹¹ John Hellman, "The Opening of the Left in French Catholicism: The Role of the Personalists" *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 34 Num. 3 (Jul.-Sept. 1973): 384-386. Hellman classifies Maritain as the foundation of leftist Catholic thought, but notes that his theological conservatism caused a break with his old protégés. This break have caused many scholars to equate Christian Democracy as a conservative, or at best, middle-class accomodationist movement. Therefore, Maritain, its intellectual father, becomes a reactionary vis-à-vis the socially committed. I fundamentally disagree. Maritain maintained radical company, including Saul Alinksy during his stay in the United States, and consistently held a view that was critical of the French liberal order that Charles De Gaulle attempted to establish.

¹² These distinctions are not absolute. In Brazil conservative figures such as Gustavo Corção resisted what they saw as Alceu Lima's dangerous conversion to Communist sympathizer. In Argentina, Gustavo Franceschi, head of the leading journal *Criterio* tried to balance lay and hierarchical opinions, and did praise Christian democracy, although his version was much more ultramontane than that of Lima's.

binaries underlying much academic discourse surrounding the Catholic Church in the twentieth Century. Since the election of the Pontiff a little over two years ago, academics have taken a renewed interest in the Church, but consistent biases remain in existing scholarship. Scholars emphasize social practice, not the doctrines that influence these practices. The study of religion as a spiritual social movement, as a sort of ancient NGO still predominates existing scholarship such as in the work of Mary Roldán. In this reading, which frequently pits the popular Church against the international hierarchy, rational choice and dilemmas of individual conscience form the base of courage to resist the hierarchy and thus form the basis of resistance. In this case, conscientious objection waters “the roots of social activism in rural Colombia.”¹³ Another article in the same 2014 Latin American Studies Association journal by Margarita López Maya also chronicles the radical democratic student movement, the Copeyana Revolutionary Youth, and the group’s struggles to shift the Christian Democratic party COPEI into an increasingly participatory direction. Like so many other studies, when discussing the 1960s, the Lopez Maya study defines the Church only by its most “progressive” encyclicals, those by John XXIII and Paul VI.¹⁴ Such emphases play an invaluable role in

¹³ Mary Roldán, “Acción Cultural y Popular, Responsible Procreation, and the Roots of Social Activism in Rural Colombia” *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 49 Special Edition (2014): 32-34. She presents an interesting narrative of a progressive, population-control minded, Acción Cultural Popular, and their efforts as a religiously affiliated “responsible parenthood” organization, to establish a more gender-equal family culture in 1960s Colombia. However, this scholarship repeats a materialist vision of the Church faithful pitted against an intransigent and influential Church hierarchy while the ACPO is forced to navigate the “reasonable” agenda of birth control and their duty of obedience to the Church hierarchy.

¹⁴ Margarita López Maya, “Iglesia católica y democracia participativa y protagónica en Venezuela” *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 49 Special Edition (2014): 45-49. The author does not rely exclusively on Vatican II, but while the author alludes to a long tradition of eminent Catholic writers (the mainstays of personalist and Christian Democracy), her paradigm is situated in the “theology of rupture” that sees the Second Vatican Council as a revolutionary turning point in Church history in terms of social teaching.

correcting historical elite biases. The Second Vatican Council clarified in a pastoral sense how the Church discussed doctrine. But this view does not sufficiently recognize that for the Church, many of the concepts discussed in the pastoral documents are merely reiterations of the large body of teaching that is Church Social Teaching. In this view, discourse is merely subjective and cannot be extracted from its local context. In that sense then, attempts to impose universal religious principals are doomed to failure and are not worth studying in and of themselves.¹⁵

A view which conceives of discourse as merely contextual and subjective instead of purveying a concrete philosophical argument diminishes the study of hierarchies which are still capable of weighing in on debates, and tends to shift focuses away from the orthodox theology that has shaped social justice for at least over a century, to the populist (sometimes fringe, sometimes mainstream) movements that make varying degrees of effort to claim the politically favorable title of “Catholic.” In short, such scholarship, far from being objective, itself takes a radically anti-theological and anti-clerical stance in the name of analyzing “popular religion.”

Instead, much of my focus on the anti-Modernist reapplication of Scholastic theology (the Thomist Revival), the Christian Democracy of the 1950s, the Second Vatican Council, and their Brazilian and Argentine applications will take an explicitly theological approach. That is to say, I will attempt to wrestle with the theological ideas, not just the political structures in which they appeared. In the words of Conciliar theologians I will

¹⁵ Patrick H. Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993), 5-6. . According to Hutton’s reading, Maurice Halbwachs foreshadowed this historical subjectivism, arguing that ideas themselves only survived in the collective social context.

attempt a historical *resourcement*, a return to the texts and ideas of Catholicism itself, even as I keep in mind the sociological dimensions of these political movements (laymen vs. clergy, hierarchy vs. popular movements, political vs. spiritual etc.).¹⁶ Using a hybrid comparative and connected approach that crosses national borders, this project will first lay out the context of the Catholic world in which Argentine and Brazilian Catholics debated the major issues of liberty and order.

The first contextual chapter will further detail the justifications for my combined historiographical method within the context of Latin American intellectual histories. It will then proceed to outline in broad terms the connections between French progressive (and ironically anti-modernist) Jacques Maritain and his counterparts in Latin America. This chapter will focus on Maritain's theological distinctions insofar as they affected his political vision: First, his distinction between the autonomous individual and "integral humanism", second, his division between the sacred and profane, and third, his overall view of freedom and critiques of authoritarianism which remained consistent despite the changing political climate of the Second World War. The first chapter will briefly outline simultaneous and interlocuting Brazilian and Argentine reactions to the 1936 Spanish Civil War, the rise of the Axis powers in the 1930s, the war, and to the formation of the international order. This chapter will attempt to focus special attention on areas of the debate in which Latin American intellectuals play an autonomous, not merely a reactionary, role in European political debates as well as regional politics. One such

¹⁶ Massimo Faggioli, "Vatican II and the Church at the Margins" *Theological Studies* Vol. 74 (2013): 811.

example is Leonardo Castellani's publication in the Spanish journal *Sur* praising Jacques Maritain's intellectual abilities and theological orthodoxy (a position he would later reverse). Another such example is Dom Hélder Câmara's leadership in the Second Vatican Council of using recently developed Brazilian Church bodies as a basis for informing the Universal Church on the issue of collegial governance.¹⁷

The second chapter will discuss the origins of the Argentine Catholic community's majority support for authoritarian governments, and military regimes in particular between 1930 and 1976. A more traditionalist intellectual tradition combined with a decentralized lay-intellectual community eventually allowed for a radicalization of certain groups in the 1930s that managed, for a time, to triumph in the ideological struggle for predominance in the Argentine episcopate. Argentine integralist intellectuals did not merely serve the needs of authoritarian regimes, but surpassed these regimes in ideological purity, often accompanying begrudging support with visceral criticisms of regime failings.

The third chapter will dive into more detail about two Brazilian newspapers, *O Diário de Belo Horizonte* and *O Lutador* as well as the monthly Catholic periodical *A Ordem*.¹⁸

These newspapers approached the political tumult in Brazil from a decidedly reactionary

¹⁷ Martinho Condini, "Dom Helder Camara, Arcebispo de Olinda e Recife e O Concílio Vaticano (1962-1965), *Revista Último Andar* (ISSN 1980-8305), n. 24, (Dez. 2014).

¹⁸ There was quite a bit of overlap. Future editor for *O Lutador* Pe. Pascoal Rangel wrote in March 1966 about the liturgy. Pe. Pascoal Rangel, "Os cristãos redescobrem a Liturgia" 19 de março de 1966. Franco Montoro called for a "renovation of Democracy" citing Jacques Maritain, and describing pluralism as a "basic demand" of a democratic regime. Franco Montoro, "Renovemos a Democracia" *O Diário* 3 de abril de 1966

standpoint on some topics, but nevertheless adjusted their discourse to mirror that of an increasingly socially minded Church leadership. This led to early and surprising tensions and ironies in relationship to Brazil's 1964 military regime.

On the whole, this study, through close documentary evidence and a solid philosophical chronology, will argue for philosophical continuity where traditional accounts only account for political rupture.¹⁹ This work will emphasize the importance of ideas where others see those ideas of mere social markers for structural political process. Finally this study will illuminate a conservative alternative to both revolutionary philosophies that have divided the Catholic Church over the last forty years and the reactionary politics that has driven the Church to embrace some of the more unsavory regimes in the region.

¹⁹ Daniel H. Levine, "Democracy and the Church in Venezuela", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1976): 6-8. Not all Latin American churches experienced this continuity. The Church in Venezuela under the democratic regimes of the 1960s, started to expand their pastoral work beyond healthcare and education to other groups that tried to engage the marginalized in the society. Democratic governance granted the Church resources for these new actions while also "neutralizing" them as a potential oppositional force to the regime. Levine's study combines analysis of government and Church programs with interviews from the hierarchy to produce a balance between elite and popular viewpoints.

Chapter One: The Church in the World: The return of the Catholic Intellectual Elite

Introduction:

This project attempts to place Brazil and Argentina in unique positions vis-à-vis other Latin American Catholicism. This project considers Argentina's episcopate a reactionary body captive to its own political marginalization within the state and its own idolization of its national past. The Brazilian episcopate, which started in the same general position of political impotence, spiritual zeal, and ambition, nevertheless opened itself up to rethinking Catholicism and later became one of the world's leaders in progressive Catholic social thought. My goal in this chapter is to briefly outline the paths of other Latin American Churches to suggest general trends and also highlight the distinctiveness of the Brazilian and Argentine positions. I will consider these two countries' position towards authoritarianism and democracy through a connective approach that emphasizes individual intellectuals, their travels and their connections, as well as a broad comparative approach that traces the distinctive variations in position in key Catholic hierarchies worldwide.

Four major events most visibly tested the Church's mission locally and globally from 1930 to 1980: The Cristero Rebellion (the international controversy which notably highlighted the unity of Argentine Catholic militants and exposed differences between two prominent Brazilian intellectuals), the Spanish Civil War, World War II, and the Cold War. This first chapter will not cover each of these events equally, preferring to

primarily introduce key actors in the worldwide Church who used their considerable influence and ability to comment on world events to mold circumstances at home. Such actors include the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, who allied with traditionalists before jousting with them over the “holiness” of the Spanish Civil War. Regional actors include Alceu Amoroso Lima, the head of the Centro Dom Vital and director of *A Ordem* (the leading Catholic lay journal) and his mentor Jackson de Figueiredo, who protested the worsening conditions in secular Mexico with two distinct approaches to engaging revolution. Argentina tilted slightly more authoritarian than Brazil, featuring intransigents like Jesuit Julio Meinvielle who sustained a full attack on Maritain and the reformers of the Second Vatican Council, all the while endorsing the Spanish regime, but also the slightly more moderate (and conservative) Gustavo Franceschi, a priest who acted as a bridge between the hierarchy and the laity. World events in turn shaped these actors, who acted under certain restrictions be they revolutions, or total conflict that forced some dissenters to flee their countries and try their fortunes elsewhere. Intellectuals formed surprising and seemingly contradictory relationships as they traveled. Christian democratic authors including Maritain got the ear of Franklin Roosevelt and befriended community organizer Saul Alinsky. Alceu Lima befriended the Mexican ambassador during the Cristero Rebellion. Authoritarian, socially-minded Catholics simultaneously lauded the statesman Winston Churchill, and the military dictator Francisco Franco. This project seeks to trace the web of the Catholic intellectual class across oceans, political cultures, and time periods. Considering the ambition of this project, what tools are at the researcher’s disposal, and what traditional pitfalls must one avoid when

attempting to tease out the driving factors of regional political developments? A hybrid historical approach will help illustrate both the forest and the trees of these Catholic connections, taking into account individual intellectual thought without losing sight of its broader implications, and allowing the fine brush strokes of intellectual history to fill in the broad painting of political and institutional history with liveliness and detail.

COMPARATIVE OR CONNECTED HISTORIES? A FEW EXAMPLES AS A PROJECT GUIDE

When choosing the lens through which to view this study, several historical currents stick out, each with its own strengths and drawbacks. The comparative framework obviously jumps out as a possibility.

After all, as Maria Ligia Coelho Prado points out in her article on the comparative approach's aptness for Latin America, the countries I am analyzing appear very similar in their social structures (e.g strong concentration of the state at the beginning of the twentieth century), similar in their relationship to the institution analyzed (a weak Church marginalized by a strong liberal state), all occurring in the same general time period (1900-1930s). Furthermore, the objective of this work attempts to demonstrate a certain causal relationship between the two communities' rejection and acceptance of certain thinkers and Catholic philosophies, and their embrace or repudiation of democracy. In summary, this work deals with the large structural issues (war, economic preferences, national narratives) that might account for the contrasts between initially similar Argentine and Brazilian Catholicisms.

This project's objective, to suggest explanations for historical differences, fits well with a comparative approach. Comparative history works well analyzing macro-political

structures as Barrington Moore's attempt to show the origins of democracy and authoritarianism through an analysis of political and social alliances in Germany demonstrates. Similarly, through a rigorous comparison of both Brazil and Argentina to other Latin American countries, this study can more easily detect differences in local circumstance than if the study were to only focus on one particular case and risk falling into the trap of taking each country's national narrative at face value.²⁰ At the same time, this study, basing itself almost exclusively on the primary sources from the countries of origin, attempts to avoid the pitfall of a "globalizing" narrative in which the researcher merely classifies his or her object instead of creating an original body of knowledge. A correct comparative history instead works with a "unified problem" that illuminates rather than diminishes the connections of actors between the countries compared.²¹

Excellent examples of such studies have emerged in recent years especially from Brazilian historiographers. Maria Helena Capelato in one comparative study of Peronism and Vargas raises interesting questions about authoritarian Varguista attempts to appropriate Modernist language and structures in order to advance its state, all the while denying the mantle of a "social" revolution in the Peronist sense of the word. Such a study suggests an autonomous space for concurrent, but not completely uniform, political projects. Vargas' *Estado Novo*'s emphasis on efficiency and progress as its national goal

²⁰ Maria Ligia Coelho Prado, "Repensando a História Comparada da América Latina" *Revista de História* 153 (2^o2005), 17-18,21.

²¹ Maria Ligia Coelho Prado, "Repensando a História Comparada da América Latina, 23,30.

instead of vague notions of justice, seemed to have contributed paradoxically to its diminished appeal after Vargas' suicide, at least when compared to the strong appeal in Argentina of its populist counterpart which still holds sway over politicians both left and right.²² Similarly, José Luis Bendicho Beired compares two ideological communities, the Argentine and Brazilian right-wing. He creates his categories with care, both speaking to the unique engagement of the Brazilian right to modernity and offering Vargas' need of Brazilian Catholics over and against the Argentine democracy's indifference to their Church militants, as a plausible factor in the rise (and moderation) of the Brazilian right.²³ These two case studies suggest that the nation-state indeed plays an important (but not monopolistic) role in the development of Catholic intellectual thought from the First World War through the Second World War.

Although comparative history may be an ideal lens through which to analyze the larger political situations of the mid to late Twentieth century, such a structural approach might not be ideal for discussing specific groups and communities of people nor smaller social networks. As Bénédicte Zimmermann and Michael Werner point out, comparative history runs the risk of creating false binaries between "differences and similarities" applied to situations with many moving parts. Many failed comparisons also assume an "exterior point of view" to the compared objects, a view that would need to have the same amount

²² Maria Helena R. Capelato, *Multidões em cena. Propaganda política no varguismo e no peronismo* (Campinas: Papirus, 1998), 19 Cited in: Maria Lúcia Coelho Prado. "Repensando a História Comparada da América Latina", 25.

²³ José Luis Bendicho Beired, *Sob o signo da nova ordem: Intelectuais autoritários no Brasil e na Argentina*, (São Paulo: Loyola, 1999), 67-68.

of historical distance between the two historical events to detect a true symmetry between the objects. Instead, the authors invite the reader to consider reciprocity, exchange, and influence as primary factors in historical inquiries. Such a method, they think, might help to dissolve the notion of an objective modernity, confined by notions of national identity, which intellectuals distribute worldwide.²⁴ That is, history cannot be completely objective in this scientific sense. The researcher's travel to one place or another, preference for one place or another, geographical location, nationality, and prejudices all play a part in impeding an objectivity that would meet the aforementioned scientific standards.

Therefore historians in general might wish to abandon the notion that they can somehow objectively tease out cause and effect by "controlling the variables" when isolation of the multiple cases from one another is impossible.

Given that my project consists of both an analysis of global and national politics and the relationships between Brazilian, Argentine, and French Catholic writers, a lens that diminishes the importance of political boundaries and emphasizes mutual influence might be ideal. As Anthony Grafton relates in his overview of the "History of Ideas" genre, in-depth comparison of national intellectual movements requires both a close reading of texts-including newspapers and pamphlets which may represent elite attempts at shaping public opinion- and a deep historicizing that recognizes nuanced changes in general political thought during the period analyzed.²⁵ "Connected histories", which imply the

²⁴ Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Pensar a história cruzada: entre empiria e reflexividade." *Textos de História. Revista do Programa de Pós-graduação em História da UnB*. 11, no. 1-2 (2012): 89-91, 97, 103,111.

²⁵ Anthony Grafton, "History of Ideas: Precepts and Practice", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, January (2006) Volume 67:1: 4-5.

idea of mutual creation of ideas in a decentralized historical narrative, make the types of assumptions necessary of a rigorous intellectual history. Sanjay Subrahmanyam notes the dialogue between Mughal ruler Jalal al-Din Muhammad Ackbar and Portuguese Jesuit missionary Antônio Monserrate to demonstrate the importance of travel and fluidity in his work on Eurasia specifically the existence of a dialogue between Catholic Counter-Reformation missionaries and the various religious forces (Bhuddist and Sufi) in the Indian empire. The author also points to larger apocalyptic expectations that bridged multiple religions and shaped the dialogues between the Jesuit and the Indian King, expectations that extended from India to “the Most Catholic Monarch, Philip II of Spain.”²⁶

Connective approaches also allow symbolic dates to take on transcendent political qualities and shifting meanings. Hashim Aidi in his work on post-911 Latin-Arab solidarity points out the “tragic” significance of 1492 for Arabs, Native Americans, African-Americans and Latinos as well as a universal “backlash” on the part of these groups against the allegedly imperialist profiling of the United States government to raise the possibility that a symbol of subjugation could turn into a symbol of resistance or vice versa.²⁷ A connected approach also detects other attempts to rebuild spheres of influence within the context of global crisis. As Martin Guillemette proposed at an international conference on Latin America and the First World War, vigorous debates over world

²⁶Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected histories: notes towards a reconfiguration of early modern Eurasia." *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 03 (1997): 746-748.

²⁷ Hisham Aidi, “Let Us Be Moors: Islam, Race and "Connected Histories" *Middle East Report*, No. 229 (Winter, 2003), pp. 42-44, 51.

politics reached the pages of regional Mexican newspapers in Yucatán and Guadalajara and mixed with anti-imperialist Revolutionary discourse spurred on by the United States' entrance into the war. In a broader transatlantic history on the same time period French professor David Marcilhacy, described attempts by Spain to use its neutrality to reclaim its former philosophical influence over the Americas and strengthen Iberian ties.²⁸

Similarly, my objects of study, national Catholic newspapers and journals, lend themselves to a decentralized approach, as can be seen in other studies such as Lakshmi Subramanian's newspaper analysis of Tamil engagements with the idea of a "Greater India."²⁹ As José Elías Palti writes, the essentialism encouraged by false comparisons extends to ideas, facilitating unnecessary value judgments. A connective approach contributes to evaluating each idea's reception without passing immediate moral judgments about their "authenticity."

Normally we think of political concepts as flowing from their place of origin and influencing and "infiltrating" a host culture. The idea of infiltration, expressed often by right wing governments in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966, 1976), reinforced state power and national narratives.³⁰ The way each hierarchy conceived of "the foreign" and their itinerary of travel contributed in divergent ways to each country's "culture of

²⁸ Citing Guillemette Martin In: "Coloquio Internacional «América Latina y la Primera Guerra Mundial. Una historia conectada» México D. F., 26 y 27 de junio de 2014, 389. Citing David Marcilhacy In: Ibid. 390.

²⁹ Lakshmi Subramanian, "Tamils and Greater India: Some issues of Connected Histories" *Cultural Dynamics* 24(2-3), 160.

³⁰ Jose Elias Palti, "The Problem of 'Misplaced Ideas' Revisited: Beyond the 'History of Ideas' in Latin America" *History of Ideas: Precepts and Practice*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, January (2006) Volume 67:1: 154-155.

knowledge”, their ability to acknowledge that traditions change through “creative reception.” Even small events such academic lecturing and teaching bridge abstract ideas to larger cultural and political trends in each country.³¹ By characterizing ideas as “foreign” and clinging to romantic ideas of uniqueness, nationalists in these countries, such as Juan Manuel de Rosas, and later, and conservative Jesuit priests such as Julio Meinvielle and Leonardo Castellani, created false binaries which often favored the imported philosophies of the ruling classes and created and impeded legitimate social justice efforts based on “questionable” ideas. In Argentina, nationalists remained successful in dominating the Catholic sphere conflating authoritarian solutions with *argentinidad* and Marxism with *subversión* and “*criptojudaísmo*.” In Brazil however, the once-authoritarian Brazilian hierarchy embraced US developmental philosophies and later, edgier reformist “foreign” ideas relating to social justice.

I agree with Philippa Levine’s criticism of Connected Histories as a somewhat superfluous attempt to distance contemporary historians from the seemingly outdated comparative categories. Levine acknowledges that some comparative histories have trapped actors and societies into essentialist narratives and codified the existence of the nation-state, which in reality only began in earnest in the nineteenth century. However, she also makes a compelling case that those authors which reject “comparative” approaches do not reject basic regional categorizations, but merely attempt “a finer grained” approach to conceiving historical space. For Levine, far from codifying the

³¹Peter Burke, "Cultural history as polyphonic history." *Arbor* 186, no. 743 (2010): 483-486.

nation-state, the comparative approach can actually challenge fixed boundaries by documenting similar historical cases worldwide and locally.³²

My case fits within a proper comparative framework because the story I tell occurs within nations but is not completely subsumed by national identities. I compare between and within nations simultaneously. While national politics or institutional preferences can influence the positions of the national Episcopate position, “Catholicism” within the nations observed is not homogenous and can often find support outside their own nation and opposition within it. However, as a transnational entity, it has official politics that also lend themselves to a study that deemphasizes national boundaries. That is to say, I can both observe an “official” national position and dig further into the divides within the national churches themselves on the ways to confront the challenges of an increasingly developed, modern, and secular world.

A study by Katia Gerab Baggio offers an example of a de-Europeanized and relatively decentralized comparative history that offers a bridge between intellectual and political history. While Baggio discusses the formation of national identities saying, “national identities are affirmed in great part vis-à-vis neighbors” she nevertheless highlights Latin American agency, focusing on the intellectual and cultural motives for Brazilian travel contrasted with the European pursuits of the “exotic.” Furthermore, by focusing on Brazilian travels to neighboring countries, Baggio complicates the ethnic and national narrative of the superior European traveling to a Latin American intellectual desert.

³² Phillipa Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible” *History and Theory* 53 (October 2014), 333-337. Levine emphasized that comparative history need not be transnational, but often focuses on multiple historical trends within the same geographical region.

The author differentiates between private and public writings, personal and expert opinions.³³ Through three authors, Arthur Dias (1886-1960), Augusto Mario Caldeira Brant (1876-1968), and Luiz Amaral (who traveled to Argentina and published a book in 1927), Baggio exposes a range of 19th Century essentialist narratives such as Dias' praise of *sarmentista* progress, Brant's comparisons of La Plata and Belo Horizonte (both planned cities), and Amaral's disdain for Paraguayan backwardness, praise of Brazilian rural values, and condemnation of *porteño* cosmopolitanism and potential for social revolution. Baggio also considers realistic narratives such as Brant's accounts of Spanish idioms and travel-guide precision of various parts of both central and periphery Buenos Aires.

Despite what some may see as generalizations, Brant's critical look at the working conditions in Buenos Aires, Dias's exaltation of Argentina as a "model", and Amaral's begrudging praise of Buenos Aires' development, also offer the reader of these texts a chance to see in the authors a reflection of their own fears about Brazilian development and socialist revolt in the region.³⁴ José Beired, a comparative historian, nevertheless shows capability in conducting serious research into the connection between the intellectual and political, writing about the Iber-American Union (UIA) and the journal *La América's* importance in drawing Latin America closer to Spain under the threat of further US intervention and after years of painful history between the two countries. The

³³ Kátia Gerab Baggio, "Dos trópicos ao Prata: Viajantes brasileiros pela Argentina nas primeiras décadas do século XX", *Goiânia*, v. 13, n.2 (jul./dez. 2008): 425-427, 430-431.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 436-440, 443.

Spanish government, as a matter of “public interest” sponsored series of journals and associations to create a sense of Spanish universalism.³⁵ In a sense, I wish to emulate this hybrid journalist-historian’s approach critically documenting and recording Catholic discourse within the framework of both the Cold War, traditional Catholic suspicions of modernity, and attempts by some Catholic writers to push reform.

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BEGIN:

Social Catholicism and reform around the turn of the Twentieth Century had its roots in the Thomist revival of the late Nineteenth Century in response to the 1891 Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* in which Leo XIII declared Thomism to be a summary of Catholic doctrine. The Catholic response was not uniform, instead deciding to engage liberalism in a number of different ways from accommodation, to outright hostility, to mid-point accommodation. Mexican historian Manuel Ceballos Ramírez sees four different groups operating internationally in the revival period between 1891 and 1930. The first group, “utopian” liberal Catholics, had (even before *Rerum Navorum*) comfortably operated within the confines of the states which had restricted them. This group attempted to meld liberal Catholic ideals with a seemingly antagonistic liberal philosophy and even with the new revolutionary classes emerging at the time. This group called for a “restructuring” of the Church to deal with changing times, and considered the revolutionary classes to be

³⁵ José Luis Bendicho Beired, “O hispano-americanismo na imprensa espanhola: a trajetória de *Unión Ibero-Americana* e *Revista de las Españas* (1885-1936)” In: Beired, José Luis Bendicho, Maria Helena Capelato, Maria Ligia Coelho Prado, *Intercâmbios políticos e mediações culturais nas Américas* (São Paulo: UNESP, 2010) 13-16.

“in the backdrop of God’s plan” to make this necessity of this change apparent to more entrenched sectors of the Church.

One of the historic figureheads of this international current, French philosopher Felicité de Lamennais wrote in 1834 that the “suffering classes” had now formed movements that are based “in the same feeling: A deep solidarity with the miseries of a people who were never worried about before.” Although work remained, the philosopher called this an “immense progress.” In short, Lamennais and the Liberal philosophers showed a willingness to reengage classes of society they had shunned or feared before. But as Ceballos Ramirez points out, the loss of the Church’s temporal power, most importantly the fall of Rome in 1870, caused this group to lose favor within the broader Church, seen as “enemies” of the Church for making a pact with its strongest detractors.³⁶ As the Church lost power in the outside world, they attempted to reassert their moral power in the spiritual realm.

The other group, defined broadly as the “intransigent” group, rejected, on philosophical grounds, the compromises proposed by the “conciliation” school of thought. This group can be divided into three sectors according to Ceballos Ramírez: The traditionalists, the social wing, and the democratic wing. All of these groups rejected liberalism on ideological grounds, but they split as to the means of responding to the secularization of society. The traditionalists, based on a Counter-Reformation vision of society, believed

³⁶ Felicité de Lamennais a Charles de Coux, 10 de diciembre de 1834, en J.B Duroselle, 1951, p.37 Cited in: Manuel Ceballos Ramírez, *El catolicismo social: Un tercero en discordia: Rerum Novarum, la cuestión social y la movilización de los católicos mexicanos (1891-1911)* (D.F: El Colegio de México, 1991), 22. See also: Ibid. 24-26.

that the Church's old power structures should be restored, along with the hierarchies they had once implied. In Mexico, this position became untenable after the defeat and execution of Maximilian I in Mexico in 1867, as Monarchism was tied to this unpopular invasion. Worldwide however, Monarchism constituted a legitimate Catholic option until Pope Pius XI finally condemned in 1927 the inevitable mixing of political regimes and spirituality that such a system brought.

The social Catholics for their part embraced Leo XIII's view that Catholics must respond to the need of the hour, and decided that his encyclical provided a way to contest Socialism for the hearts and minds of the working class. A Social Catholic's means to achieve this was not necessarily the electoral democratic process. The Social Democrats emphasized a pragmatic complicity in the system. They combined the call of the Pope to attend to the working classes with the mandate to enter the public sphere. Democratic Catholics did not so much believe in the tenets of a representative republic as much as their ability to manipulate said system to "re-Christianize" society through election efforts and legislative victories. These schools divided themselves according to their different reactions to the Thomist renovation of the late Nineteenth century. This revival began in earnest in 1879 with Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* which instead of merely rejecting modernity, sought to reconcile faith and reason through a revival of the scholastic method. As the revival moved into the Twentieth Century, philosopher Jacques Maritain tried to revive scholastic thought and argued for its relevance to modern political debates. This led Maritain to the idea of a "pluralist" Christian democracy where even those philosophically opposed to Christianity had a role, as long as they contributed to the

common good. The liberals rejected Thomas Aquinas altogether in favor of conciliation with the existing government. On the other extreme, the traditionalists, represented by groups such as *Action Française*, relied on old monarchical concepts, not reinventions of medieval philosophy, to justify their claims.³⁷

Such philosophical divisions played out not just in Europe, but in the southern cone as well. As Susana Monreal points out in an article on *Rerum Novarum*, Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical had varying impact in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina based on the status of the Church in those regions. In Argentina, a more traditional Church less affected than other countries by its liberal reforms, officials such as the Archbishop of Buenos Aires protested that the encyclical gave away too much philosophical ground to modernity. In Chile, more socially oriented Catholics embraced the change in tone, while in Uruguay, the encyclical had little impact (but nevertheless a positive impact) on a severely weakened and socially oriented church.³⁸ In the Chilean Church, the Conservative Party as early as 1913 pushed some of the first notions of "Christian Democracy" that tied progress to improving working conditions and not just the prerogatives of captains of commerce.³⁹ In contrast to the Chilean *Modus Vivendi*, the Mexican *Cristero* crisis (1926-1929), in which an extremist liberal government cracked down on religious

³⁷ Ibid. 23-26, 47. See Maritain's seminal works "The Integral Human" and "Christianity and Democracy" for elaborations of these concepts.

³⁸ Susana Monreal, "Catolicismo social en el Cono Sur: Genealogía de un ideario". In: Berríos Fernando; Jorge Costadoat; Diego García, *Catolicismo social chileno: Desarrollo, crisis y actualidad* (Santiago de Chile: Centro Teológico Manuel Larraín, 2009), 29-31.

³⁹ Ana Maria Stiven, "Cuestión social" y Catolicismo social: De la nación oligárquica a la nación democrática" In: Ibid. 62-63. These critiques however paled in comparison to critiques of the socialist ideologies that Catholic papers such as *La Revista Católica* condemned for destabilizing the social order. Morality, not economics, played a central role in worker discontents. Spiritual examples of austerity, thought the social school, ought to bring workers back into the fold (Ibid.67).

expression, galvanized Catholics in the southern cone region to reconsider Catholicism's place in their own societies.

As Miranda Lida argues in her essay on the Cristero rebellion in a world context, Argentina in particular, the popular nature of the rebellion acted as a catalyst for Catholic militancy in areas like Buenos Aires. The transnational effect of the Mexican repression and rebellion would foreshadow European debates over the Spanish Civil War. Argentine Catholics used the Mexican state persecutions to rally the faithful around the Virgin of Guadalupe, as seen by the increase in pilgrims during the 1920s. These localized actions complemented the larger internationally oriented Eucharistic congresses. These catalysts of activism contradicted Weberian sociological hypothesis that religion suffered at the hands of Liberal bureaucratic thinking. Instead, modernity mixed with traditional Catholicism in cities like Buenos Aires to stimulate an intellectual and social hybrid that granted the Church a higher profile in the 1930s than it had enjoyed at the turn of the century.

The Church used the Mexican case to update their methods of resistance in the largely hostile Argentine political environment and created media outlets and papers such as *La América del Sud* (1876-1880), *La Unión* (1881-1889), *La voz de la Iglesia* (1882-1911) and *El Pueblo* (founded in 1900) to compete with the larger liberal press. After the release of the Encyclical *Quas Primas* (1925) however, Argentine Catholics lost interest in engaging with the liberal tradition instead turning to more traditional forms of support such as masses for religious freedom. The Argentine Church also hoped that these events

would bestow upon them the glow of religious fervor, timing them to coincide with important ecclesial appointments.⁴⁰

As this paper will mention in future chapters, in Brazil the picture remained more complicated however. As Marcelo Timotheo da Costa points out in the same volume, both the leading figure of the Brazilian right, Jackson de Figueiredo and his protégé, modernist literary critic-turned-convert Alceu Amoroso Lima, would deplore the actions of Mexico's Calles government's repression of the Church. But while de Figueiredo saw the inevitable damnation of the Mexican state, Alceu Lima saw potential in the shared educational background of some of its representatives.⁴¹ This difference of opinion came to the fore in a private correspondence in May 1928 when Alceu Lima asked Jackson de Figueiredo to publish an article he had translated which apparently portrayed Russian Communism in a balanced, if not exactly sympathetic, light. Jackson responded by praising the article's style, but seriously questioning its substance:

I'm returning the article about Russia. I've read all of it and it's very admirable....But *A Ordem* could not possibly publish it. It's a defense of what's going on there. And to the Alceu of today I ask, why publish it in *O Jornal*? Why take to our urban masses the suggestions of an apologist-or almost that- of the Russian Revolution?

⁴⁰Miranda Lida, "La Cuestión mexicana en el catolicismo argentino de la década de 1920" In: Jean Meyer, *Las Naciones Frente Al Conflicto Religioso en México* (D.F: CIDE, 2010), 247-249, 250, 253-254.

⁴¹ See: Marcelo Timotheo da Costa, "La espada y el arado: El conflicto religioso en México y la intelectualidad católica brasileña, los casos de Jackson de Figueiredo y Alceu Amoroso Lima". Ch. 4 In: Jean Meyer, *Las Naciones Frente Al Conflicto Religioso en México* (D.F: CIDE, 2010), 88-90.

I'm sending you two or three more chapters of my mess, those that I found copies of in the bookstore. Is it worth it for you to waste time in reading that which I'm not even sure if I'll publish?⁴²

Alceu Lima backed down saying that he would not attempt to publish it and that publishing for the sake of publishing was no longer a goal he held dear. However, he did go on to provide an elaborate defense of his motives that incorporated much of de Figueiredo's language if merely to defuse it. Lima saw a basic advantage in "knowing the enemy [addressing in his reply letter both the Mexican and Russian Revolutions]" not as a straw-man, but as a philosophy with competing and legitimate claims which could steal away the working classes if left to fester unanswered:

[The desire to publish] is only because it seems convenient to me for us to know the center from which the greatest threat to our civilization emanates.

This could be a defect that I should correct myself of, but I have a passion to see from the inside the point of view of my adversaries. Perhaps it is a weakness, a habit of seeing all truths as points of view, but there it is.

Bringing this article to the attention of a certain audience, I would hope

⁴² « Devolvo-lhe o artigo sobre a Rússia. Li-o todo, e é admirável...Mas A Ordem não poderia publicá-lo. É uma apologia do que vai por lá. E ao Alceu de hoje, pergunto, para que publicá-lo n Jornal? Para que levar á nossa pobre massa urbana as sugestões de um apologista—o quase- da Rússia revolucionária. Pensa nisto. Envio-lhe mais dois ou três capítulos do meu delírio os que achar copiados na Livraria. Valerá mesmo a pena que você esteja a perder tempo a ler o que eu mesmo não sei se jamais publicarei? » Jackson de Figueiredo to Alceu Lima May 7 (8?), 1928. In: João Etienne Filho, *Alceu Amoroso Lima, Jackson de Figueiredo: Correspondência, harmonia dos contrastes, (1919-1929)* (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras, 1992), 89.

that this audience would be in the necessary state of mind to know what is going on there, the force of that, and the necessity of defense, not in the appearances of purely exterior measures that only defend the concrete, but in the soul, in the depths, in the very essence of our civilization...Look, neither Russia nor Mexico are abstract phenomena. We have to look at them as Joseph de Maistre looked at the French Revolution. I was just reading a few days ago the *Considerations on France* and all that it says about the French Revolution applies to the Russian Revolution...All of this led me to translate this article and to imagine that certain lines could fit in a journal like *A Ordem*, which fears no type of truth, as long as it defends the truth.⁴³

⁴³ Alceu Lima to Jackson de Figueiredo, May 8, 1928. In: João Etienne Filho, *Alceu Amoroso Lima, Jackson de Figueiredo: Correspondência, harmonia dos contrastes, (1919-1929)*, 89-91. Full quote: « É [o desejo de publicar] apenas porque me parece concorrer para conhecermos melhor o foco de onde irradia a maior ameaça contra a nossa civilização. Será talvez um defeito de que me deva corrigir, mas tenho a paixão de ver, por dentro, o ponto de vista de meus adversários. Será um pouco de fraqueza, hábito de olhar todas as verdades como pontos de vista, mas é. Levando esse artigo ao conhecimento de um certo público, eu desejaria que esse público estivesse em condições de ver o que há por lá, a força que há naquilo e a necessidade de defesa não na aparência de medidas puramente exteriores que só defendem o concreto, mas sim na alma, no fundo, na própria essência da nossa civilização... Essa casca [da decadência de nossa civilização] portanto, ao primeiro golpe sério, leva a breca como levou na Rússia, como levou no México. Ora, nem Rússia nem o México são fenômenos efêmeros. E preciso olhar para eles como Joseph de Maistre olhava para a Revolução Francesa. Ainda há dias eu tomei das *Considerações sobre a França* e tudo o que ele diz da R.F aplica á R.R. Nós devemos olhar para esta, *de dentro*, do fundo vendo a importância fundamental que ela tem no mundo moderno como Joseph de Maistre considerou a Revolução Francesa...É preciso portanto. Estudá-lo profundamente como elemento espiritual que é, e não simples ameaça social. Tudo isso é o que me levou a traduzir esse artigo e a imaginar que trechos dele poderiam caber numa revista como *A Ordem*, que não teme qualquer espécie de verdade, desde que defende a verdade.»

This correspondence brings forth several interesting observations: First that the two authors read world philosophy extensively, not confining themselves to the debates occurring in Western Europe or Brazil. Second, Mexico and Russia constituted sister revolutions for the two, with the mother of all revolutions being the French uprising of 1792.

Third, Alceu Lima's dialogue philosophy constituted a minority within the Catholic social network. Part of the Catholic militants' sensitivity came from the timing of the Cristero unrest itself. The wars started five years after the founding of the journal *A Ordem* and four years after the founding of the *Centro Dom Vital*. Generally, Catholic militants, who had just made progress through a successful détente with the liberal government after decades of isolation under the First Republic, were fearful of a secular backlash. Forcefully invoking Calles and Lenin by name, the 1930 election that eventually brought Getulio Vargas to power, conservative militants warned that the opposing party's victory would eventually lead to totalitarian revolutions.⁴⁴

Therefore, in an indirect way, even among the less radicalized Brazilian Catholic elite, the *Cristero Wars* put an end to the language of reconciliation and accommodation, instead vindicating the most radical Catholics who advocated the path of no negotiation with the modernist state.⁴⁵ Despite these trends, a New Theology with its roots in a

⁴⁴ Marcelo Timotheo da Costa, "La espada y el arado: El conflicto religioso en México y la intelectualidad católica brasileña, los casos de Jackson de Figueiredo y Alceu Amoroso Lima". Ch. 4 In: Jean Meyer, *Las Naciones Frente Al Conflicto Religioso en México*. 85-88.

⁴⁵Ironically, these polemics did not necessarily have the backing of the Church hierarchy, which tended to focus on concordats, or specific agreements, even with hostile states such as Revolutionary Mexico. The Church encouraged religious moderation, and in certain countries with a strong secular political tradition like Chile, protests in favor of the Cristeros took on a more spiritual, prayerful, tone, than that of outright

radical Christian Humanism reminiscent of John Henry Newman, would slowly sow the seeds of potential reform, or at least allowable dissent, in Rome. Abandoning the purely intellectual arguments of previous Thomist scholars, these “personalists” would focus on contextualizing theology and social activity contrasted with the earlier Royalist emphasis on doctrinal purity. This ideology, less developed than its counterpart, would have to toe a fine line to ensure that its philosophy both remained socially progressive and that it dodged the anti-clerical vision of the ascendant revolutionary thinkers inspired by Karl Marx’s materialism. These authors would place a premium on a diminished philosophical rigor and a heightened intuition attuned to the political feelings of the day.⁴⁶ Jacques Maritain would soon take the mantle of its philosophical standard-bearer.

JACQUES MARITAIN: THE CATHOLIC ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

Jacques Maritain was born in 1882 to Paul Maritain and Geneviève Favre. He was an unlikely figure to become the Catholic standard-bearer for updated Thomistic thought. He was born into a Protestant household, attended the elite high school Lycée Henri-IV, which while having a Catholic heritage was immersed in the secular milieu of its time, and later the Sorbonne (to which the high school was related as a preparatory school). As Bernard Doering points out, his mother was a very good friend of the liberal Catholic essayist Charles Péguy and his grandfather was a founder of the Third Republic, fruit of a revolutionary secular political system that hardly exuded Catholic values. He also

condemnation of the Calles government. See: Stephen J.C. Andes, *The Vatican & Catholic Activism in Mexico & Chile: The Politics of Transnational Catholicism, 1920-1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 71,121.

⁴⁶ John Hellman, "The Opening to the Left in French Catholicism: The Role of the Personalists." *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1973): 382-383.

married Raissa, a Jew, and befriended a defender of the Jewish role in the plan of salvation, Léon Bloy.⁴⁷

However, Maritain cannot be classified as a progressive in the modern sense. He quickly fell under the influence of Father Humbert Clerrisac, a reactionary who later became his confessor. In the early years after his conversion in 1906, Maritain uncritically took the advice of these confessors, and even in later years stretched to defend their thinking.

Doering highlights a particular letter in which Maritain wrestled with his mentor's attempts to justify an authoritarian political solution that would bring even the Vatican to censure the French Catholic fringe:

But what could Father Clérissac have been thinking...? Here is how I explain it to myself: the restoration of the monarchy seemed to Father Clérissac indispensable to the restoration of the Church in our society; in his eyes, the monarchy alone was able to reestablish the Church in the fullness of its rights. He noted with horror all that the Church had been forced to abandon in fact or to leave...since the revolution...he recognized the source of the blows struck against the notions of hierarchy, and order, which are essential to the life of the Church, and he placed the Church above all else; hence he detested Democracy as an evil...he knew the dangers which at that particular time "Modernism" posed to the dogmatic teaching of the faith.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Bernard E. Doering, *Jacques Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals*, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),7.

⁴⁸ Doering quoting Maritain on Father Clérissac. In: *Ibid.* 11. Doering also wrote in 2003 responding to an *America* article on the Catholic Church's eventual agreement with Hitler during the war to maintain

However, Maritain's orthodoxy, not his progressivism, would cause him to oppose the political solutions Maurras offered. For Maritain, as articles published in the 1920s for the *La Revue Universelle* would show, saw that Maurras and extreme liberalism drew from the same well: Positivism.⁴⁹ Politicized Catholics and anti-clerical zealots drew, in Maritain's vision, from the same sort of individualistic Darwinism and positivism that rejected the very dignity of the human person in exchange for setting up idols to concrete political philosophies. In his 1938 lecture "Integral Humanism and the Crisis of Modern Times" Maritain separates Enlightenment reason from the sanctified reason of the gospel, taking materialist philosophies head on:

Instead of a development of man and reason in continuity with the Gospel, people demand such a development from pure reason apart from the Gospel. And for human life, for the concrete movement of history, this means real and serious amputations.

Prayer, divine love, supra-rational truths, the idea of sin and of grace, the evangelical beatitudes, the necessity of asceticism, of contemplation, of the way of the Cross,-all this is either put in parenthesis or is once for all denied. In the concrete government of human life, reason is isolated from the supra-rational.⁵⁰

institutional silence in exchange for limited autonomy. Doering blamed such an agreement not on racist sentiments of the Pope (Doering used the Maurras censorship as counter-evidence to this charge), but rather a "conception of the church as a perfect society, the protection of whose institution and organization was the principle duty of the hierarchy." Doering, quoting a French colleague, went on to blame this same mentality for the sex abuse scandal and for the imbalanced emphasis on cultural social issues in the US Church hierarchy when compared to discussions over social issues. Bernard Doering, "Ambiguity (Letter to the Editor)" *America*, September 15, 2003.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 21.

⁵⁰ Jacques Maritain, "Integral Humanism and the Crisis of Modern Times" Ch.1 In: *Scholasticism and Politics* 3rd Ed. (London: Bles, 1954), 3.

Maritain, in a moment of Catholic triumphalism, scorned Kierkegaard and an “archaic and reactive” Barth. He saw the two of the leading neo-orthodox theologians of the early Twentieth Century as studying the themes of the “intelligence which comes from the serpent” as well as trying to resurrect a “primitive reformation” to achieve “purification by reversion to the past.” To him, these “noble” forms of thought only belied the emptiness of liberal promise, “of lying optimism and illusory moralities” to which the working class demands radical solutions to rid society of “the liberty which starves workmen and burns the stacks of grain.”⁵¹ Over and against this liberally-imbued Protestant philosophy, Maritain proposed his vision of a plural society based on anti-liberal, but pluralistic, Christian values, that held on to universal truths while progressing into an uncharted future.

In opposition to this bleak picture, Maritain presented Christian Humanism, which emphasized a spiritual “person” instead of a utilitarian “individual” as the proper base for reason, as the way to “re-make anthropology” and rediscover the “dignification” of the individual through its openness to the world of the divine and superrational.”⁵² Maritain seemed further down in the essay to earn his reputation as the “Red Christian”, giving due credit to a materialist Communism that wished to replace the Christian message with another universalizing message, no matter how unsustainable. Maritain saved his harshest criticism a generalized racist ideology “which sets itself against Christianity by rejecting

⁵¹ Ibid. 4-6.

⁵²Ibid. 9.

all universalism, and by breaking even the natural unity of the human family, so as to impose the hegemony of a so-called higher racial essence.”

Maritain affirmed that while Communism triumphed through the legitimate demands of an ill-informed working class, that racism, which also “detested” capitalism, conquered through pure war helped along by the “strong privileged interests blindly anxious to safeguard their own position.” In contrast to both of these systems, Maritain proposed an “integral” system that would attend to workers’ rights and dignity as well as “substitute for bourgeois civilization, and for an economic system based on the fecundity of money....” His new temporal order entailed “not a collectivistic economy, but a ‘personalistic’ civilization and a ‘personalistic’ economy, through which would stream a temporal refraction of the truths of the Gospel.” In a more secular sense, Maritain hoped for a spiritual transformation, a “profound renewal of the interior energies of conscience.”

⁵³ In short, Maritain wanted to channel individual autonomy through a Scholastic moral framework. Rather than a radically autonomous moral agent, he envisioned a society made up of individuals that would look out not only for their material interests, but the collective spiritual interests of the larger body politic.

Maritain did however maintain some vestiges of traditional thought and even anti-Semitism. Despite marrying a Jewish convert, Maritain wrote in 1921 that a Jewish race that rejected Christ as their savior, necessarily played “a fatal role of subversion” because their spiritually just inclinations towards justice turned toward a warped “messianic”

⁵³ Ibid. 17-18.

political vision.⁵⁴ Argentine author Julio Meinvielle, later one of the strongest critics of Jacques Maritain, would sustain and support a similar, but less charitable line of attack against the Jewish populations well into the 1960s. Far from attributing the “Jewish Problem” to misguided good intentions, in the prologue to Meinvielle’s book *The Jew in the Mystery of History*, right wing Catholic historian Antonio Capponnetto asserted that the Jew was a threat to civilization. He further argued that the Jewish race “with Satanic hate seek[s] the destruction of Christian civilization...take[s] the goods of Christians...how they exterminate them...when they can.”⁵⁵ Meinvielle attempted to avoid the label of racism and anti-Semitism, the former explicitly condemned by the Vatican in the 1930s by changing the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael. Instead of the traditional interpretation of Ishmael as the father of the adversarial tribes of Canaan, he came instead to represent the “carnal” unconverted Jew pitted against the perfected “converted” Jew who represented the blessed line of Jacob. Meinvielle perpetuates a perverse “Jewish exceptionalism” or Jewish abnormality that lent itself to absolutist rhetoric. To him the Jew that converted excelled in Christian virtues above other Christians. Those who rejected Christ also excelled...in the arts of depravity.⁵⁶ Putting Maritain’s 1921 essay side by side with Meinvielle’s theologically-based anti-Semitism,

⁵⁴ Bernard Doering quoting Jacques Maritain, “A Propos de la Question Juive,” *Le Mystere d’Israel* (1965), 305f. In: “The Origin and Development of Maritain’s Idea of the Chosen People” In: Robert Royal, *Jacques Maritain and the Jews* (South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 27.

⁵⁵ Antonio Capponnetto, *El judio en el misterio de la historia* 6to Edición (Buenos Aires: Theorica, 1982), 18.

⁵⁶ Julio Meinvielle, *Ibid.*, 28-31.

the similarity of the reasoning is surprising (given Maritain's personal connections to Judaism) even if his political solutions were less draconian than Meinvielle's.

Rabbi Leon Klenicki called Maritain's condescending attitude "triumphalism at its best." He drew little solace from Maritain's categorization of Christianity as "the overflowing fullness and the supernatural realization of Judaism."⁵⁷ Rabbi Klenicki attributes Maritain's supercessionist attitude to a conflation of the Jewish conception of growing holiness through daily works with salvation through works.⁵⁸ Maritain's mistake may have seemed benign, but the mistaken assumption that modern Judaism was obsessed with its own laws and society at the cost of mercy had endured centuries. The seeming condemnation of Jewish "works-based" attitudes by Paul of Tarsus and the writers of the four gospels, had created many societal tensions between the confessional states of the past and their Jewish minorities. Often the stereotype of works-based religious obsession and segregation allowed Christian rulers more concerned with their financial debts to justify their hatred of the Jewish populations on scriptural and common law grounds. Maritain's early views toward Jewish populations was problematic, but his separation of the sacred and profane would allow him to avoid the political implications of such analysis. Ultimately, his personal relationships overrode this reading and tended to moderate his philosophy more generally.

⁵⁷Rabbi Leon Klenicki, Quoting Jacques Maritain, *A Christian Looks at the Jewish Question*, reprint edition (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 23-24. In: "Jacques Maritain's Vision of Judaism and Anti-Semitism" In: Robert Royal, *Jacques Maritain and the Jews*, 73.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 74-83.

Maritain did, however, surprise in the company he kept. From 1924 onward, Doering observed, Maritain often mingled with scholars focused on the East, such as Louis Massignon and Olivier Lacombe from China and India, and unorthodox philosophers such as Russian Nicolas Berdyaev. This created suspicion, if not direct outrage, on the part of the defenders of the Western classical tradition. These connections must have hurt nationalist friends such as Bernanos Massis, who, in 1924 was on the cusp of writing *A Defense of the West*, but Maritain was no relativist. Maritain's pluralism dovetailed with his belief that the universal message of Christ leant itself to pluralism, and that a "political materialism" that saw the Church mainly as the guardian of the social order stood at odds with a Church whose mission was "to dispense to men supernatural truth and the means to eternal life and which confers on her the right to intervene in temporal affairs."⁵⁹

By the 1930s, Maritain would ease his position on the Jewish question as well, bucking his former Catholic mentors and becoming a vigorous critic of political and racial anti-Semitism deeming such antiquated ideas incompatible with the "New Christendom" that he envisioned. Maintaining his distinction between Christian spirituality and Jewish materiality, Maritain nevertheless tweaked his previous essays in response to charges by other intellectuals that the Jews' natural task was to subvert Christian civilization.

Maritain instead put the Jewish nation squarely on the side of the divine:

⁵⁹ Doering, *Maritain and the French Catholic Intellectuals*, 24. Doering quoting Maritain, *Ibid.* 27.

As a foreign body, as an activating ferment introduced in the mass, it will not leave the world at rest; it prevents it from sleeping, it teaches the world to be discontented and restless as long as it does not possess God; it stimulates the movement of history.⁶⁰

Even if he did call Jewish populations “restless” instead of “subversive,” Maritain maintained problematic racial distinctions. The Jewish question would haunt Maritain not just for its implications on race, but also on politics. If the Jewish people became a symbol of worldly justice and human rights, then their (justified for some) rejection naturally became a symbol of an authoritarianism that fundamentally debased (or preserved) the human dignity and social harmony. Maritain would circumvent his essentialization of the Jews by saying the state should tolerate even the theoretically subversive (Jews, Communists etc.). But other Catholics would not make such concessions. Nevertheless, Maritain’s critics, his subtle shift on the Jewish question, and his contrarian positions on two important “Catholic” wars would transform him into the symbol of a naïve compromiser, or more dangerous, a willing tool of those factions (Freemasonry, Judaism, and Protestantism) that wished to destroy the witness of the one true church, from within if possible. The first such parting of the waters for Jacques Maritain would start with the Spanish Civil War.

⁶⁰ Doering quoting Jacques Maritain, *Question de conscience*, 65. In: “The Origin and Development of Maritain’s Idea of the Chosen People” In: Robert Royal, *Jacques Maritain and the Jews*, 31-32.

CATHOLICS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: A GLOBAL AND LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

The Spanish Civil War of the 1930s in which General Francisco Franco battled the Spanish Republic in an attempt to restore the Bourbon monarchy to the throne galvanized Catholics enthralled with the idea of authoritarianism and corporatism. Economics and an upper-middle class fear of economic and political anarchy fueled the conflict. After their electoral victories, the Popular Front pushed a series of reforms which the right saw as anti-military. Amid general strikes on the part of various anarchist and labor groups, assassinations of right wing figures such as politician José Calvo Sotelo, prior plans for a coup against the Spanish Republic came to a head. Franco's forces made quick work of Republican forces, but regions such as Catalonia and Basque, which would become centers of *franquista* repression, remained beyond the military's reach.⁶¹

Many Catholic writers believed that such a war needed to be won at all costs. However, a minority group of Catholics rejected a take-no-prisoners approach to the question of Communism and wondered if conservative Catholics might just have become too politicized for the gospel. This opinion, just like anti-Communism, also found favor at the Vatican with Pius XI's 1926 condemnation of the monarchist militant French Catholic group *Action Française* for their putting utilitarian political militancy over spiritual necessity. The polarized politics of the 1930s however, gave the group a second wind and democratically minded progressives suddenly felt themselves on the defensive.

⁶¹ Andrew Forrest, *The Spanish Civil War (Questions and Analysis in History)*, (London: Routledge, 2000), 36.

In Europe, English and French Catholics watched with alarm as news of possible Communist infiltration of the Spanish government spread. The Church in the previous decades had established a policy of accommodation, causing uncertainty to activists concerned with stopping the “Red menace” and at the same time respecting the rights of a secular state to self-governance.⁶² In Argentina, horror stories of Church persecution and martyrdom under the Republican government as well as conservative anxiety over general social unrest, allowed Catholics to quickly draw red lines when speaking about the Civil War. As the narrative went, Franco and the military had come to restore order to a chaotic Spanish body politic. Julio Meinvielle wrote in 1937 regarding the Spanish Civil War, that Franco, “a most illustrious *caudillo*,” had put an end to the Popular Front (he asserted that the conservative government won by half a million votes), led by the “masonic” government of Portela Valladares, and stopped the Jewish-led “third blow” against an already defunct Christendom, Communism, from spreading.⁶³ *Criterio* in Argentina echoed Meinvielle’s sentiments, putting the Spanish Civil War in the context of a spiritual struggle against modernity itself: “Our state is no longer a skeptical state, nor is it a people that rests,” it asserted. “Our state rejects Rousseauian skepticism. It knows that truth and justice are permanent categories of reason, and not arbitrary

⁶² James Flint, “‘Must God Go Fascist?’: English Catholic Opinion and the Spanish Civil War.” *Church history* 56, no. 03 (1987): 365-67. Although Catholic observers of the coming Spanish conflict expressed doubts about intervention, the English Jesuits, as in the United States and Argentina, would wholeheartedly support the military option (Ibid.,368).

⁶³ Julio Meinvielle, *¿Qué saldrá de la España que sangra?* (Buenos Aires: Asociación de los jóvenes de la Acción Católica, 1937), 6-8.

decisions of the will. Our state knows, as does the people, the truth of God and the Truth of Spain.”⁶⁴

Not only did Spain possess the truth in many nationalists’ opinions, it represented an ideal of nationhood that had the blessing of the Holy Trinity itself, based on medieval corporatism, starting from the home, building up through local communities, to the nation-state itself. As Toledo Archbishop, Cardinal Dr. D. Isidro Gomá y Tomás wrote in the Argentine journal *Criterio* near the end of the war with the triumph of the Franco regime:

And the country is Spain... [a]nd we are sons of our fathers, in our organic being and our education. We are sons of the Fatherland which is no more than an extension and amplifying of the paternal home where we receive the fullness of our natural life...as such, man through the demand of his very nature, is tied threefold: To God, to his parents, and to the Fatherland.⁶⁵

Gustavo Franceschi, edited *Criterio*, the leading journal at the time, building bridges between lay people and the hierarchy, pluralist Catholics and those with more

⁶⁴ «Nuestro Estado no es ya un Estado escéptico, como no lo es tampoco el pueblo que descansa. Nuestro Estado rechaza el sofisma roussoniano y sabe que la verdad y la justicia son categorías permanentes de la razón y no son decisiones arbitrarias de la voluntad. Nuestro Estado conoce, como conoce el pueblo, la verdad de Dios y la verdad de España.» “El ser o no ser de España”, *Criterio*, Año XI N.º 532, 12 de mayo de 1938.

⁶⁵ «Y la Patria es España... Y somos hijos de la Patria, que no es más que una prolongación y una ampliación del hogar paterno donde recibimos la plenitud de nuestra vida natural... así el hombre por exigencia de su misma naturaleza está atado con triple vínculo: a Dios, a sus padres y a la Patria.» “Catolicismo y Patria (Carta del Cardenal Arzobispo de Toledo, Mons. Dr. D. Isidro Gomá y Tomás)” *Criterio*, Abril 20 de 1939 Año XII N.º 581.

authoritarian tendencies. Born in Paris in 1881, and came to Argentina in 1886 at the age of five. In 1904, at the age of 23, he was ordained a priest after his studies in the Seminary of Buenos Aires. He participated in the early Catholic movements in Argentina such as Father Federico Grote's Workers' Circles which attempted to stave off socialism through an emphasis on improving workers' conditions and educating them in the faith.⁶⁶ This emphasis on workers' rights was in line with the traditions of Leo XIII and Pius XI, although supporting the workers did not necessarily preclude support for the Franco regime.

Pressed between three authoritarian options, Franceschi chose what he saw as the most Catholic of the options. Franceschi most strongly rejected what he saw as Nazism's pagan influences and German resistance to Catholic values, as demonstrated by the German government's refusal to allow Catholics to attend the 1934 Eucharistic Congress in Budapest.⁶⁷ *Criterio* allowed a pro-Spanish position to flourish, considering Franco as a viable alternative to the various authoritarian governments and infinitely preferable to Communism. Most Argentine Catholic scholars were either Fascist or Fascist sympathizers, even as they rejected some

In Brazil meanwhile, Alceu Lima's *A Ordem* took a slight more cautious, if still supportive, tone toward the Fascist advances. The journal pointed to the Republic's importance to Russia as a justification for throwing its lot behind the Franco regime. The journal did show slight reserve however, presenting itself as a neutral observer that had

⁶⁶ Sylvia Saítta y Luis Alberto Romero, "Gustavo Franceschi" *Página 12*, 23 de febrero de 2006.

⁶⁷ Gustavo Franceschi, "Catolicismo y nacional-socialismo" *Criterio*, Año XI N° 541, 14 de julio de 1938.

suspicions regarding both sides. Quoting *El Heraldo*'s comments on Russia's "heroic" support of the war, without which the Republic would have fallen long before, the author settles accounts:

These declarations [from *El Heraldo* praising Russia's continuing backing] are of the utmost importance for evaluating the nature of the Spanish struggle. No one can ignore that there we find regular troops of the fascist armies that even the so-called totalitarian governments have confessed as their contribution to the Spanish Civil War. We cannot lose sight of the fact however, that the intervention of Russia into the internal affairs of the Spanish people could not be easily tolerated by countries that had everything to lose with the expansion, in their backyards, of the revolutionary Kremlin at the service of Moscow's ambitions.⁶⁸

The author continued, adding that between the two powers, Communism and Fascism, the latter offered some positive qualities:

The so called authoritarian states offer an attractive perspective in their renewing politics: The actual desire to organize the nation on the foundations of Corporatism. In this particular aspect, one of these countries that deserves a closer look is Portugal, because more than the others, it reserves for individual liberty and initiative a sliver of autonomy in the constructing of its economy. Already a

⁶⁸«Estas declarações são da maxima importancia para avaliar-se do carater da luta na Espanha. Ninguém ignora que ali se batem tropas regulares de exercitos fascistas que os propios Governos de paises ditos totalitários têm confessado sua contribuição para alimentar a guerra civil na Espanha. Não se perca de vista, porém que a intromissão da Russia soviética na política interna do povo espanhol, não podia ser facilmente tolerada por paises que tinham tudo a perder com a expansão, em suas visinhanças, da política revolucionária do Komintern a serviço das ambições de Moscou.» Registro, "Os acontecimento na Espanha", *A Ordem*, Outubro de 1937, 87.

project about a work contract between factory workers and industry leaders has begun in the Portuguese press.⁶⁹

In short, even Lima, who seemed more open to dialogue Russian leftists almost ten years before, showed a predilection for Fascist governments, especially the Iberian variety.

Citing a free-ranging debate over whether wages should be universal by profession, or remain based on individual merit, perhaps Lima believed that the Catholic and organic principles underlying these societies would check their more destructive impulses.

Support for Franco against the “international Communist conspiracy” then, seemed to be the uniform Catholic position.

However, several issues arose that complicated the salvific language of Falangist saviors and Republican villains. The Basque region was heavily Catholic, yet also on the side of the Republicans.⁷⁰ Progressive intellectuals such as Jacques Maritain, and even more conservative writers like Bernanos Massis, began to wonder whether this anomaly might not prove an important point about mainstream Catholics’ distance from on-the-ground realities of the peasants and workers. From their point of view, Pius XI had warned about

⁶⁹ «Os chamados Estados totalitários oferecem uma perspectiva atraente na sua política renovadora: o empenho de organizar a nação sobre as bases do corporativismo. Neste particular um dos países que merecem ser observado de perto é Portugal, porque mais do que os outros reserva á iniciativa particular e á liberdade individual uma parcela de autonomia, na reforma do aparelhoamento da sua economia. Agora mesmo está em discussão na imprensa portuguesa, um projeto de contrato de trabalho entre os operários da industria de cortumes e os respetivos patrões.»Ibid., 88.

⁷⁰ Such a position went back to the separate visions of society between the Spanish Nationalists and the Basques during the Carlist uprisings. The Basques supported the Republic because said government would, in theory, preserve the Basques’ racial autonomy. For context on this as well as an excellent history on popular religion, See: William A. Christian, *Visionaries: The Spanish Republic and the Reign of Christ* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996), 25.

the dangers of a working class.⁷¹ If progressive Catholic intellectuals could find justification in the words of tradition for their more nuanced take on the topic du jour, then perhaps they could avoid Vatican censure.

Indeed, Pius XI had written at the beginning of the decade, in his encyclical on working conditions *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) that those who called themselves the most loyal Catholics impeded implementation of Catholic social reforms called on by his predecessor Leo XIII, instead taking an allegorical approach to the commands of Rome to improve the lot of the workers. The Pope divided the world into two classes, those with abundant wealth, and the workers crushed under “new industrial developments” and the richer classes who “thought it in their abundant riches the result of inevitable economic laws” and thus that any other form of wealth redistribution other than “supporting the poor through charity alone” to be a violation of the natural order of things. In the Pope’s vision, reforming priests, despite broad social consensus and Vatican support, and wedged between the social extremes of revolution and indifference, found resistance from the upper echelons of society, and even Catholics themselves:

However, in spite of such great agreement, there were some who were not a little disturbed; and so it happened that the teaching of Leo XIII, so noble and lofty and so utterly new to worldly ears, was held suspect by some, *even among Catholics, and to certain ones it even gave offense*. For it boldly attacked and overturned the idols of Liberalism, *ignored long-standing prejudices*, and was in advance of its

⁷¹ Bernard Doering, “Jacques Maritain and the Spanish Civil War” *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 1982): 490.

time beyond all expectation, so that the *slow of heart* disdained to study this *new social philosophy* and the timid feared to scale so lofty a height. There were some also who stood, indeed, in awe at its splendor, but regarded it as a kind of *imaginary ideal of perfection* more desirable than attainable [Italics mine].⁷²

These papal words, only a few years before the heated debates of the mid-1930s, seemed to give progressives the leverage they needed to argue for nuance. Jacques Maritain, the leader of the French dissent to the *franquistas*, wrote a series of essays in which he put economic justice first and foremost among Catholic priorities. He argued that if the Church did not deal with the full range of human problems and remained distant, that workers would quickly confuse Catholicism automatically with a reactionary philosophy. The French review *Sept* echoed these sentiments when writing in response to a lack of social reforms on the part of the right in 1934. The French journal asked skeptically, “Will such misunderstandings [mistaking Catholicism for reactionary politics] appear again and will religion once more fall victim to political and social deviations? Our Spanish friends have the duty to do everything possible to avoid such a situation.”⁷³

Another editorial from the same magazine also sought comfort in the arguments of Pius XI, arguing that Catholic workers who voted for the socialist party did not entirely lack basis, but rather they were “so miserable, so drenched with humiliation and social suffering that they are ready for anything . . . to escape their fate.” The author urged the

⁷² Pope Pius XI, “Quadragesimo Anno” *Vatican City*, May 15, 1931, Section 14. http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html. Link accessed January 10, 2014.

⁷³ Doering, “Jacques Maritain and the Spanish Civil War”: 493. Also: J. Lassaigue, “L'Espagne sera-t-elle fasciste!” *Sept*, 21 April 1934, In: *Ibid.* 493-494

Catholic intelligencia to not only fight a war but to win the hearts and minds of “Catholics without hope” denying those who would destroy the Church the opportunity to exploit “a pretext for believing that the Church shares that [society’s] indifference.”⁷⁴

The progressive position grew even more defensible as it moved from the level of abstract warning to that of practical, and cruel, reality. The bombing of the city of Guernica, made famous by Pablo Picasso’s painting, not only incited the rage of Spanish Republicans and U.S. backers, but drew a strong rebuke from the progressive Catholic community, which saw in the bombings a disproportionate and unnecessary use of force against a civilian population, and a Catholic one to boot. In a joint statement “For the Basque People”, intellectuals like Maritain, François Mauriac, and Emmanuel Mounier, compared the indifferent or self-righteous Catholics who supported the bombing as retribution “Pharisees” who would have passed by the injured man on the road in Jesus’ parable. Instead, the Church was supposed to “bend over their wounds” without “should haves.” Sounding a final alarm, the writers invoked Jesus’ farewell speech in John: “One of the branches is threatened with destruction and the whole vine is suffering.”⁷⁵ The call for Christian unity and charity in the midst of political divisions seemed simple enough, and indeed this argument staved off conservative attempts to achieve a Vatican condemnation similar to that of Charles Maurras a decade before. However, the Catholic world did not find itself in a position to embrace pluralist democracy just yet.

⁷⁴ *Scrutator*, Sept, 19 October 1934. In: *Ibid.* 494.

⁷⁵ *Sept*, 28 May 1937, In: *Ibid.*, 501

Maritain went on the offensive as the primary intellectual combatant for the progressive Catholic cause. In a March 1937 article in the French journal *Espirit*, which he helped found, but would later part ways with, Maritain directed the blame for the rise of Socialism at those who had abandoned the working class, calling on Catholics to “live with the people” in order to emulate what had made socialism so effective while correcting its errors.⁷⁶ In an April 1937 article in the Spanish journal *Sur* he highlighted working class problems in Spain as some of the most severe of Europe.⁷⁷ In June 1937, Maritain wrote one of his only reflections on the Spanish Civil War, taking on the notion of a Holy War, conceding that war was sometimes necessary, but that to kill in the name of Christ (instead of, for example, under one’s obligation to the state) was a sacrilege. Maritain condemned the burning of churches and execution of priests, but also the use of Muslim mercenaries to put down the revolt. Alluding to another principle of Just War arguing that stopping one evil should not bring about another evil, Maritain exclaimed, “A man who does not believe in God might think: after all this is the price of a return to order and one crime deserves another. A man who believes in God knows that there is no worse disorder. It is as if the bones of Christ, which the executioners could not touch, were broken on the Cross by Christian.”

Following his overall trend of distancing current political solutions from a strict Scholasticism of the 12th and 13th Century, Maritain even questioned the “impurity” of

⁷⁶ Jacques Maritain in *Espirit*, 5, 1 March 1937 In: Doering, 505

⁷⁷ J. Maritain "De la guerre sainte," *La Nouvelle revue française*, 49 (1 July 1937), 34, footnote #2. IN: *Ibid* (Doering), 502.

the Crusades. Although Church history had generally regarded them as a true holy war, Maritain asked whether God had truly willed such atrocities in the name of regaining the Holy Land. Maritain rather argued that religious disputes had become by the 1930s accidental, not intrinsic to the nature of war.⁷⁸ For Maritain then, because war consisted of a conglomerate of interests, economic, territorial, and political, and often crossed within and outside of religious groups, the notion of a “sanctified” conflict was necessarily a contradiction in terms. The continuing European crisis of which the Spanish Civil War was a symptom, which would deepen during World War II, forced Jacques Maritain into self-imposed exile in 1940 in North America, where he already had experience lecturing in Toronto’s Medieval Institute and Princeton University. The problems of the war would unfortunately follow him and other prominent Catholic intellectuals across the Atlantic Ocean.

Jacques Maritain in the U.S and Catholic Reactions to the Spanish Civil War and World War II:

The US environment in which Maritain arrived for his lectureship at Princeton University (1941-1942) portended a long struggle to convince his religious compatriots to embrace the vision he had fought so hard for in Europe. As J. David Valaik chronicles, prior to Maritain’s arrival, Catholic magazines had taken firm stances for the Spanish revolutionaries. The Jesuit magazine *America* accused the Spanish republicans of being Communists in disguise and preferred the risks of an excessive fascist regime to the

⁷⁸ J. Maritain, "De la guerre sainte," *La Nouvelle revue française*, 49 (1 July 1937), pp. 22, 30, 32. In: *Ibid.*, 508-509.

known horrors of the Communist regime. Their editor Francis X. Talbot, under the influence of the Pro-Franco intellectuals of the day, felt so strongly about this stance that he rescinded a verbal agreement with the editor of *Commonweal* to remain neutral on the war itself even as both sides condemned the Republicans' ruthless treatment of religious communities.

The Commonweal and its editor George N. Shuster, followed Maritain and Pius XI's lead however, prioritizing outreach to the working class as a legitimate concern that should temper any Catholic consideration of the potential right-wing government that could replace the Republic.⁷⁹ While Shuster viewed Franco's movement as an "anti-worker" invasion, the majority of the Catholic laity, the hierarchy, and Catholic publications sided with the Jesuits in considering the civil war "a life or death struggle" for the soul of Catholicism in Spain. *Commonweal*, under pressure from its readership, briefly joined other newspapers such as the Holy Cross' *Ave Maria* which identified Franco with the great liberators of the Eighteenth Century (among them, ironically Touissant L'Overture, an Enlightenment leader of the Haitian slave revolts). *Ave Maria* even went as far as to draw parallels between Christ and Franco, a common tactic of Fascists, asking "Was not Christ a divine rebel?" This question, an almost taunting rebuke of Maritain's distinction between the sacred and secular described in his treatise on holy war, also stood in opposition to the pacifism which undergirded the *Catholic Worker's* critique of Franco's advances.

⁷⁹ J. David Valaik, "American Catholic Dissenters and the Spanish Civil War", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 53, No.4 (Jan., 1968): 539.

Franco's support for Nazism and anti-Semitism also raised serious concerns among Catholics who had taken Pius XI's condemnation of racism to heart.⁸⁰ In 1938, two years before his arrival, three major newspapers, Denver's *The Register*, Boston's *Pilot*, and the *Catholic's Digest* attacked Maritain as both deliberately uninformed of Republican atrocities, and condescending in an alleged preference to maintain French security against a German threat over the preservation of his fellow churchmen. Intellectuals such as Henry Palmer, however, sympathized with Maritain's pacifist approach. Palmer's condemnation of a sword-cross alliance in Spain along with a change of editorial staff at *Commonweal* that reflected a more neutral stance, made the terrain more hospitable to Maritain in 1940.⁸¹ The conflict in the United States showed just how contentious the debate over Communism and Fascism had become in the world's largest democracy. Ironically, bitter pushback to Maritain's ideas would have their roots in the country that would soon become fascism's primary opponent, showing just how fluid boundaries really were regarding the flow of ideas, and just how malleable national identities were at this point in time.

Maritain and other progressive Catholics vigorously supported the resistance to Adolf Hitler and the French collaborationists from their exile. But significant differences between Maritain and the Free French movement would demonstrate that Maritain leaned more toward the role of a philosopher than a pragmatic politician. Although he would later develop a substantiated view of governance that melded liberal pluralistic values

⁸⁰ Ibid., 540-542,544.

⁸¹ Ibid. 545, 547, 550-551.

with Natural Law theory, during WWII, Maritain's philosophy led him to react more than to construct his own vision.

As John Hellman writes in an important article on Maritain's time in exile in the United States, Maritain differed with allies such as Yvonne Simon and their unequivocal support of general Charles De Gaulle's Free French Movement, which had set up an exile government in London after the fall of France to the Nazis, and the French government's decision to collaborate with the invaders. While Simon saw romantic figures of resistance against tyranny, Maritain maintained a more accusative, skeptical, approach. Far from distancing him from tough political choices, Maritain's conception of the common good often led him to take politically inconvenient positions. Maritain put the burden of governance squarely on the shoulders of the French (he said the French middle class had "gotten the government they deserved" in the collaborationists), and thus, prioritized an organic democratic growth that would strengthen the entire French body politic. Maritain did not eschew politics in favor of a purely abstract theology, even in exile. He appealed, leveraging his friendship, to US President Franklin Roosevelt, asking the president to declare the rather isolationist nation in favor of the French cause. However, showing his philosophical conviction in correspondences with Simon, he rejected De Gaulle's authoritarian nationalist sentiments as well as his anti-British, anti-US xenophobia, which in Maritain's view only hurt France's resistance efforts.⁸²

⁸² John Hellman, "The Anti-Democratic Impulse in Catholicism: Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon, and Charles de

Yves Simon denounced the “de-Christinazation” of the West accomplished not by the Communist powers as his opponents had feared, but rather by the “soft” authoritarian governments in France and Italy that gave sanction to the resentful political philosophy of the Nazi regime. He wrote to Maritain in 1944 that the Catholic bore responsibilities “immediately behind that of the Nazis” by encouraging anti-Communist propaganda that only reinforced class-resentments and a sense of entitlement on the part of those that had composed the old governments of the occupied countries. Maritain shared these sentiments, but unlike Simon, let them separate him from the Free French movement itself. Maritain wrote DeGaulle in 1942 slightly before his falling out with the French general that France’s working class could not work independently, but rather needed brave leaders that would foster a system “*more* profoundly and *more* truly democratic, more fervent for liberty, for justice and fraternity, more truly republican than that of the old liberalism.”⁸³ Maritain then, did not want a Thomism of the past, but a radical transformation of political and spiritual society itself.

Maritain considered radical solutions to the world problems of racism and working class alienation, aligning himself morally behind the rough American community organizer Saul Alinsky, who made himself famous and feared through the disruption of the social order and direct public challenges to those in power. Maritain also identified Eduardo Frei, a Chilean politician that would receive US support in later presidential runs, as another figure capable of bringing about his ambiguous state based on Natural Law and

Gaulle during World War II,” 33 *Journal of Church & State*, 453 (1991): 455. See also: Maritain to Simon, 13 April 1943, In: *Ibid.* 468.

⁸³ Simon to Maritain, 9 August 1944, In: *Ibid.*, 468. Maritain to de Gaulle, March 21, 1942, In: *Ibid.* 463

secular pluralism.⁸⁴ Maritain did not include his friend Roosevelt in that list of leaders of a defunct system. His time in the U.S., as well as influencing the U.S. Catholic debate had influenced his Thomism. Writing in 1942 in the midst of World War II, Maritain took a restrictive view of the state in spiritual matters, but an expansive view of the state's prerogative in practical affairs. Following traditional Catholic doctrine, for him law did not follow from a merely positive consensus of the majority, but rather from immutable principles:

The State, may, under defined circumstances, require a mathematician to teach mathematics, and a philosopher to teach philosophy: these are functions of the social body. But the State may not oblige a philosopher or a mathematician to adopt a philosophical or mathematical doctrine, because these depend solely and exclusively on truth...the secrets of the heart and the free act as such, the universe of moral truths, the right of conscience to listen to God and to make its way to him-none of these things, in either the natural or the supernatural order, may be touched by the State of fall into its clutches. It is true that law binds in conscience, but this is because it is law only if it is just and if promulgated by legitimate

⁸⁴ Bernard E. Doering. "Jacques Maritain and His Two Authentic Revolutionaries". In Kennedy, Leonard A. *Thomistic Papers Vol. III*, (Houstoun:Center for Thomistic Studies, 1987),93. [http://www.u.arizona.edu/~aversa/modernism/Maritain%20and%20His%20Two%20Authentic%20Revolutionaries%20\(Thomistic%20Papers%20III\).pdf](http://www.u.arizona.edu/~aversa/modernism/Maritain%20and%20His%20Two%20Authentic%20Revolutionaries%20(Thomistic%20Papers%20III).pdf). Linked accessed January 19, 2014. See also: Doering, Bernard. "The Philosopher and the Provocateur: The Correspondence of Jacques Maritain and Saul Alinsky." (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,1994).

authority, and not because the State of the majority would be the rule of conscience.[citation?]

Maritain argued that while the state reserved the rights to impose punishments it could not “reform the judgment of [one’s] conscience” and impose “its own judgments of good and evil...or impose any religious faith whatsoever” without resorting to “means of psychological poisoning, organized by lies and terror.”⁸⁵ On Thomist grounds, Maritain justified the separation of Church and State and laid the groundwork for a radical renovation in Catholic thinking on religious freedom. Maritain also maintained a central tenet of Christian Democracy, that man’s spiritual development lay at the heart of social reform, but that mere spirituality led to a dead faith. This view of Christian Democracy can be found in the philosophy of San Alberto Hurtado, a Chilean Jesuit, and a contemporary of Maritain’s in the 1930s and 1940s. He gave a talk in Rancagua Cathedral in October of 1943 pondering: “All of this is necessary [wealth redistribution, union organization, an education plan], but [reform] presupposes the reform of spirits. Reform society or man? Begin with man to transform society.”⁸⁶

In short, authoritarianism, Communist or Fascist, denied truth by denying the dignity and *autonomy* of the individual. Communism of the Stalinist variety wished to homogenize

⁸⁵ Joseph W Evans. and Leo R. Ward *The Social and Political Writings of Jacques Maritain: A selection*, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), 40-41. Translated from: Jacques Maritain, *Les droits de l’homme et la loi naturelle* (New York: Editions de la Maison Francaise, 1942), pp. 84-138

⁸⁶ In: Samuel Fernández, “¿Reformar al individuo o reformar a la sociedad? Un punto central en el desarrollo cronológico del pensamiento social de San Alberto Hurtado” In: Fernando Barríos, *Catolicismo social chileno*, 146. For an online version See: http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0049-34492008000200020&lng=en&nrm=iso&ignore=.html. Accessed April 25, 2014.

all classes and indoctrinate workers to engender loyalty to the state. Fascism wished, in a parallel way, to hoist the idol of traditional national values, religious and cultural, upon the conscience of unwilling dissenters. For this reason, both systems were doomed to failure. History ended up proving Maritain's assumptions of totalitarian failures and the societal strife the transitions would cause correct. With the end of the War, the world, and the Catholic Church in general was left struggling to pick up the pieces of a broken old order and bracing for a new one highlighted by the Cold War.

THE COLD WAR BEGINS: DIVISION, REFORM, AND CONFLICT

“All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in
the words "Ich bin ein Berliner!"- John F. Kennedy, June 26, 1963

The words above highlighted exactly the reversed role Russia now played in the postwar U.S. imagination. While the United States had always regarded the Soviet Union with suspicion, the war had allowed a brief interlude in which democracy considered Communism a necessarily evil-and therefore ally-against the Fascist forces that threatened U.S. interests around the globe. However, Russian-US animosity soon showed through. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the quick Japanese surrender ensured that Russia would advance no further than Manchuria. Furthermore, the 1950 Korean War pitted the Soviet's northern proxy against the US backed UN proxies and Southern government. The Brazilian journal *A Ordem* took note of the conflict, using much of the apocalyptic language that had surrounded the Spanish Civil War: Tales of burning churches, loss of property, and the destruction of crucifixes and other sacred

objects in a “satanic rage.”⁸⁷ The Korean conflict also served as a juxtaposition to an absolutist pacifist mindset, and served to reveal the discrepancies in liberal philosophies. In a criticism of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and long a compatriot of Mohandas Gandhi, *A Ordem* points out numerous differences between the two: Belief in material progress vs. the anti-materialism of Gandhi, a liberal sexual ethic compared to Gandhi’s call for abstinence, the prime minister’s admiration for socialism contrasted with Gandhi’s spiritualized ethic. The journal, which favored the Western Europeans over the Soviet Union, criticized Nehru’s partial application of non-violence at home even while he demanded a halt to the UN-backed conflict in Korea.⁸⁸ As these articles show, Catholics in Latin America showed a keen interest in other regions of the world and the Cold War’s effect on the world’s balance of power. The Brazilian intellectuals showed a general affinity for the actions of Western European democracies, while Argentine intellectuals seemed to show a more non-aligned approach toward US presence in the region. The US was not an omnipotent actor, but was a significant one. Generally, Christian Democracy⁸⁹, and democracy in general, received a boost in the 1940s and 1950s as the Fascist option declined and the United States saw it as a sort of hedge against Communism.⁹⁰ In general, the United States did fear both right wing and

⁸⁷ *Registro*, “O catolicismo na Corêia” *A Ordem* março-abril de 1951, 86.

⁸⁸ *Registro*, “Nehru” *A Ordem* junho de 1951, 68.

⁸⁹ Christian Democracy, drawing in traditions of electoral politics in Catholic social circles from the nineteenth century attempted to achieve a Catholic moral sense through the ballot box. See: Kalyvas, Stathis N. *The rise of Christian democracy in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁹⁰ John Hellman, “The Opening of the Left in French Catholicism: The Role of the Personalists” *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 34 Num. 3 (Jul.-Sept. 1973): 384-386. Hellman classifies Maritain as the foundation of leftist Catholic thought, but notes that his theological conservatism caused a break with his old protégés. This break have caused many scholars to see Christian Democracy as a conservative, or at

left wing popular reform. In Argentina, the 1943 that had brought the GOU junta to power and general Juan Domingo Peron into the position of the Secretary of Labor, had eventually evolved into a populist democratic movement that unnerved the United States enough for their own ambassador in the region to issue a “blue book” alleging direct connections between Peron and the defunct Nazi regime. From the left, the United States feared military leaders who instituted sweeping reforms threatening US interests. Catholic allies that had shown affinity toward the United States in the past continued that support.

Jacques Maritain, the French ambassador to the Vatican and a founding influence on the United Nations in the years immediately following the war (1945-1948) melded Thomist conceptions of a harmonious state based on Natural Law with U.S democratic principles. He pushed for reforms at the Vatican and even influenced the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights. His influence on world affairs should not have been a surprise. In his *The Rights of Man and the Natural Law (Les droits de l’homme et la loi naturelle)*, Maritain tied the Natural Law directly to Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (of speech, worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear) saying they “correspond to yearnings of the Law of Nations which demand to be fulfilled by positive law and by an

best, middle-class accomodationist movement in Latin American politics, a formal democratic method to stifle real social action. Therefore, Maritain, its intellectual father, becomes a reactionary vis-à-vis the socially committed. I fundamentally disagree. Maritain maintained radical company, including Saul Alinsky during his stay in the United States, and consistently held a view that was critical of the French liberal order that Charles De Gaulle attempted to establish.

economic and political organization of the civilized world.”⁹¹ Given the glowing language linking Roosevelt to one of Maritain’s own guiding principles, his participation in the organization which Roosevelt built, and in which his widow Eleanor Roosevelt now participated, should not have come as a surprise.

In contrast to Maritain’s idealism about democracy’s inherent ability to restrain the selfish tendencies of the middle class, the United States showed a certain ambivalence to these ideals. Fearing the spread of Communism in Latin America, the United States opposed populist governments, often giving nods to local dictators in order to protect corporate economic interests.⁹² As the Cold War heated up after the Cuban Revolution, democratic allies that had been ignored in preceding decades suddenly seemed more appealing to the U.S. Realpolitik drove even the United States’ support for one of Maritain’s closest Christian Democratic allies. Fearing populist leader Salvador Allende’s rise in Chile, the United States supported the Christian Democratic candidate Eduardo Frei in the 1964 Chilean elections, an election he eventually won. Frei, proved to be a far

⁹¹ Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward *The Social and Political Writings of Jacques Maritain*, 37.

⁹²In Guatemala, the United States performed their first covert operation of the Cold War. In 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered PBSUCCESS against the populist regime of Guatemalan general Jacobo Arbenz after years of rumors about the Communists serving in his government and a fateful interception of armaments from Czechoslovakia. The latter incident united the media and the Congress in putting the general’s ouster at the top of the political agenda. Ironically, the US government would later maintain a wait and see approach to Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro, later to become its most ardent adversary. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon thought that Castro was at worst “naïve about Communism” if not even democratic. Michael Grow, *US presidents and Latin American interventions: pursuing regime change in the Cold War* (Topeka:University Press of Kansas, 2008), 17,25-26, 37-38.

from being a radical right-wing leader, instead Frei led a series of literacy campaigns with radical education theorist Paulo Freire which mixed Christian Democratic politics with Freire's ideas about cultural liberation through a community's design of their own education.⁹³ The United States supported center-left democracy based on stimulating economic development not to swat Communist mosquitos, but to drain the swamp of inequalities that made Communist growth.

Unlike Maritain, some Catholic hierarchies gladly reaped the benefits (for the elites) of US economic ties without ascribing to its political philosophy. Ideologically, conservative Catholic writers shared liberal writers' disdain for what they saw as soulless US imperialism.⁹⁴ Catholic writers would also express severe doubts about the United States' conception of democracy, holding to traditional Catholic teachings that came into direct conflict with the individualist and liberal ideas of their northern neighbor. Debates over land reform in late 1940s Guatemala provides an early, and surprisingly developed, example of this skepticism. Only two to three years after the war, when the United States' power seemed immeasurable, the conservative Guatemalan Church held to their "third-way" philosophical position despite their reliance upon US economic ties.

⁹³ For details on specific CIA operations see: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20040925/docs.htm#245>. Link accessed January 13, 2015. Better: Richard Immerman's, *The CIA in Guatemala*.

For elaboration on these literacy campaign efforts, see: Andrew J. Kirkendall, "Paulo Freire, Eduardo Frei, Literacy Training and the Politics of Consciousness Raising in Chile, 1964 to 1970," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36, no. 04 (2004): 687-717.

⁹⁴ The vitriol with which Catholic writers talk about the U.S' intervention in Vietnam echoes liberal nationalists' Jose Marti's critiques of the U.S in *Nuestra America* and Rodo's depiction of the U.S as Caliban in *Ariel*.

In a text on land reform and its relationship to Communism at the end of May 1947, *Accion Social Cristiana*'s (the most prominent Catholic magazine in the country) editorial board recognized the connection between poverty and the Communist appeal, calling poverty the "gangrene that rots and corrupts countries." The author warns readers of other techniques such as unnecessary wars that eat up a country's treasury, as well as inflation, high taxes that stifle business and "imped[e] the formation of the reserves which assure progressive development" leading to the "rupture of the relations between the patron class and the workers." The author warns against "heavy bureaucracies" that stifle entrepreneurial growth. Apparently this disruptive process of "socialization" is best brought about by land reform. The editorial does not blame unequal land distribution, but a bad distribution of workers "lack of attendance at work...vices...and the destruction of the principles of moral responsibility in the patron class...the breakdown of respectful discipline and respect in the workers because of the effect of propaganda in the countryside." The author warns that adding a redistribution (presumably of a socialist nature) would cause the "chaos" that the communists need to "impose their detestable way of life. God help us!"⁹⁵

This view reflected the dilemma that Church leaders, in Guatemala and across Latin America, faced in their relationship to the United States. Generally, the liberalism that the

⁹⁵ Editorial, "El comunismo y la Reforma Agraria" *Acción Social Cristiana*, 29 de Mayo de 1947.

US promoted (and Maritain found so useful) was anathema to the very notion of the common good and the Catholic dominance sought by social Catholics. The United States after all was a product of the Enlightenment experiment in popular (albeit representative and restricted) sovereignty, fused with French deist ideas and materialist economic theories. Catholics tended to hold a healthy suspicion of the free markets as a breeding ground for the inequalities that gave rise to Communism. Therefore, the Church generally emphasized moral tenets, not material solutions. The article repudiates the worker's slothfulness, but also the owner's loss of *noblesse oblige*. This feudal concept, combined with a priority on the human person as the center instead of economic structures and analysis, stood at the heart of the Catholic critique, even as the Cold War made clerics choose between the "two sides of the coin" that Leo XIII had condemned.

Guatemala represented a Christian Democratic paradox. While Maritain's stay in the United States strengthened his pluralistic vision, in this land so close to the United States, Franco's Spain still offered the brightest beacon of hope for a Christian society. Some authors, such as José Calderón Salazar, claimed that a libertarian right was as dangerous as a communist left, that capitalism only existed in an uneasy alliance, the lesser of two evils. Salazar exempted Franco from the category of the "right" because of his alleged pursuit of the common good. The right, defined as the capitalist extremists that were protesting against Franco at the time constitute a "tyranny" that "dictates" the terms of the common good. Some authors went as far as to claim that the authoritarian ruler represented an "authentic" democracy that brought order and stability to the population

and expressed the deepest wishes of the Catholic majority, even if the Spanish Basque population didn't quite see it that way. One writer, Alfonso Junco, gave Franco a particularly glowing review, distinguishing between formal and authentic democracy decades before the US's own ambassador would make his famous distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian." Franco eschewed an "opportunistic attitude" instead opting for "democracy insofar as it is authentic and deep [as opposed to "formal or sophistic" democracy]." The author argued that Franco emphasized "spontaneity" over the coopting for the masses, and echoing Alceu Lima's view on Portugal in the 1930s, Junco praised the Spain of the 1940s for supporting "productive capacity... particularly with its emphasis on individual initiative."⁹⁶ The conservatively minded Guatemalan Catholic Church of the 1950s embraced the language of democracy as it applied to economic principles, but in the social sphere, embraced the reactionary Democratic Social Catholicism of the 1930s.

Broadly speaking, the Catholic Church, a multi-state actor in world affairs, seemed free to take a none-of-the-above approach to the United States' foreign policy in the region, supporting the U.S. only when larger geopolitical forces pushed it to. All told, the positions of the early Cold War Catholic Churches reveal a complex relationship to the events unfolding, and the government actors, of the region. On one hand, the Catholic Church during the 1950s drew clear lines separating Catholicism and Communism. On

⁹⁶Alfonso Junco, "Franco y la Democracia" *Acción Social Cristiana* 28 de marzo de 1946. See also: José Calderón Salazar, "La derecha: Otro Peligro", *Acción Social Cristiana* 8 de mayo 1947.

the other hand, the economic development and social justice that served as hallmarks of modernity threatened to blur these lines altogether. The Church's charge seemed therefore, to wrestle with the possibility of yet again engaging a world that presumed a Church without answers. The Catholic Church responded to this challenge by calling for the second Ecumenical Council in less than one hundred years in Rome, setting the stage for either reform or retrenchment.

THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL: RECEPTIONS AND REACTIONS

In 1960, Pope John XXIII announced the preparations for a new council. Though surprising, the Council presented an opportunity for both reformist and traditionalist wings of the Catholic Church. For progressives, the Council opened the door for reengaging Modernity, the rationalist philosophies that the Church had originally condemned as materialistic and devoid of God. For traditionalists, the Council offered an opportunity to resolve the unfinished business of the First Vatican Council which had been cut short by invasion. Specifically, the Second Vatican Council, in light of two world wars, allowed traditionalists to point to the failures of fictitious modern models such as the modern nation state and condemn with more moral backing the racial scientist ideas that had provided the base for Nazi ideology.

Modernity's failings were not all that traditionalists could count on however. In the lead up to the Council, the Roman Curia, and specifically the Holy Office (now the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) guided both the preparatory documents and

the discussion committees. The bishops expected a speedy ratification of the preparatory documents, and a final condemnation of what they saw as festering heresies. However, the traditionalists did not anticipate John XXIII's desire to "open" the doors of the Church to "let in the air." Nor did they anticipate one of his harsher descriptions of old Scholastic philosophers as "these prophets of doom." As if echoing Maritain's 1940s criticisms of DeGaulle's Free French Movement, the Pope insisted on "a new order of relations" that had been lacking in previous generations due to an overly narrow view of theology that did not take into account early (and lively) Patristic debates. Through "a return to the sources", the Pope encouraged theologians to recognize new possibilities in theological development and its place in the longer tradition of back-and-forth debates between the Church fathers.⁹⁷

Gaudium et Spes (*The Church in the Modern World*), an apostolic constitution, and therefore the highest category of decree in the Church, developed a "new humanism" which, through powers of observation (much like Leo XIII's careful response to the rise of Socialism), allowed the Church to condemn religious fundamentalists who had pitted science against reason, while offering a standard theological narrative of "sin and grace" that affirmed God as the center, as opposed to the adversary, of individual human achievement. Another document, *Dignitatis Humanae* stirred even more controversy, as it expanded Maritain's warning that the state could not dictate religious doctrines into a

⁹⁷ Joseph A. Komonchak, "The encounter between Catholicism and liberalism, 78-79.

general call for religious freedom. Besides resetting the relationship between the monotheistic religions, the document also quoted the parable of the wheat and the chafe, implying, against previous pastoral interpretations, that error, or “competing truth claims” could exist simultaneously while preserving the common good.

This assumption caused consternation among anti-Modernist bishops, especially France’s Lefébvre. Lefébvre’s Society of St. Pius X, would later quarrel with Pope John Paul II leading to “schismatic actions.” Divisions, regional and theological, further fueled tensions. From a Continental philosophical perspective, liberalism meant the exclusion and suppression of religion, something Catholics feared. From a US-English standpoint, formal separation of Church and State existed to allow room for religious debate to flourish.

Two main lines of theology, Thomism and “patristic” theologians with their ground in St. Augustine, generally dominated the debate. Thomist scholars at the council focused less on a repudiation of the world than an understanding of it on its own terms. This attitude reflected Aquinas’ desire to meld Thirteenth Century secular philosophy with his understanding of the gospel. Aristotelian influences perhaps allowed Thomists to attribute failures in the modern world to ignorance rather than base malevolence, whereas Augustinians, while right in their return to complex patristic debates, tended towards more dualistic visions of man’s relationship with the world.⁹⁸ A closer look at these divisions allow the reader to quickly see Maritain’s influence on the Council. A Thomist

⁹⁸ Ibid. 80-81, 84-87. The Society of St. Pius X has not been officially declared “schismatic” since Lefebvre and his four followers were legitimately ordained. However, they committed “schismatic actions” in the subsequent ordaining of priests not approved by the Pope himself.

scholar versed in the Anglo-Saxon tradition from his time in exile, and positioned at the highest levels of the Vatican bureaucracy for a time, Maritain with his “New Christendom’s” simultaneous embrace of pluralism and rejection of an atomized modernity, had served as the blueprint for a Council that would have worldwide repercussion. A return to patristic sources allowed Church leaders new methods of historicizing theological concepts, and expanded debates beyond time-tested Scholastic syllogisms.

Latin America, as much as any other region, would struggle with these concepts in a local way. On one hand (surprisingly), Argentine Jesuit Julio Meinvielle argued for a theology *of continuity* with regards to the Declaration on Religious Freedom, arguing that such a document represented a reaffirmation of the right to conscience in the traditional sense, but that modernity, with its “intellectual anarchy” necessitated a different type of language, affirming man’s inherent self-worth in a mechanistic age. Meinvielle argued that the Council merely attempted to clarify “secondary rights” such as freedom of religion and liberty generally speaking, so that humans would more easily claim their “primary” right: To serve God in truth.⁹⁹ On the other end of the divide, as Phillip Berryman explains in his 1980s work on Central American Liberation Theology, the region’s clergy started to move beyond even the popularly based grace of the Council, a grace based in the hope for progress to that of “a world of poverty, end even misery,

⁹⁹ Julio Meinvielle, *La declaración conciliar sobre la libertad religiosa y la doctrina tradicional* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoría, 1966),6-7. This position is surprising because Meinvielle so often positioned himself against Conciliar reformers especially on the issue of religious tolerance.

which the efforts at ‘development’ were proving unable to change.” Those countries like Brazil and Colombia in his vision, failed to recognize this trend, and therefore liberation theology failed in those areas even while it succeeded during revolutionary governments like that of the 1979 Sandanistas.¹⁰⁰ In the late 1940s, a prelate from Rio de Janeiro, Dom Hélder Câmara, and then head of Brazilian Catholic Action (ACB), was already pushing for the strengthening of the Church’s relationship to the poor. He also lobbied the Vatican for a more collegial spirit that led to the founding of the first national conference, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) in 1952. Like Maritain, Câmara saw a disordered list of priorities on the part of the traditional clergy. For Câmara, this position constituted a political transformation that had begun to read *Integral Humanism* (1936) per the recommendation of Alceu Lima. Echoing Maritain’s skepticism of the middle class, he questioned “the Pharisaic [attitude] of determining that we the bourgeois represent social order and virtue and that Communists embody disorder, disequilibrium and disenchantment, and the forces of evil...we have our own faults and sins [...] because we cover up social injustices with generous and spectacular offerings.”¹⁰¹ Câmara believed that combatting poverty would root out the atheist Communism that conservative colleagues so feared, pushing, instead for an all-out assault on atheism,

¹⁰⁰ Phillip Berryman, *The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984), 25-27.

¹⁰¹ Quoting Helder Câmara In: Nelson Piletti; Walter Praxedes, *Dom Hélder Câmara: Entre o Poder e a Profecia*, p.158. In: Martinho Condini, “Dom Hélder Câmara: Modelo de esperança na caminhada para a paz e justiça social” (Diss. de Mestrado, PUC-SP, 2004), 81. See also: Ibid. 80-82.

social programs that would bring the freshness of the gospel to the downtrodden that viewed the Church with indifference, if not outright skepticism.¹⁰²

His colleagues resisted his vision as well as close ties to the questionable governments of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart. Câmara's participation in many of the government's social action programs moved his fellow clerics to label him a Communist, and the Vatican was forced, in the middle of the Second Vatican Council, to reassign him to the Northeast. In the halls of Rome though, Hélder Câmara remained extremely effective, helping author "the Pact of the Catacombs" which admonished the "deficiencies in the life of the poor" and encouraged priests to abandon the regal, almost pharisaical lifestyle, and live in the "ordinary way of our parishioners", increasing vocations by "sharing the worker life and the work [itself]."¹⁰³

Dom Hélder Câmara reflected the Council's acknowledgement of other philosophies and its willingness to at least engage with all parts of the modern world stating that he had "special love" for "atheists in name [that are nevertheless] Christian in practice." Câmara's "work of evangelization" had a specific name: Developmentalism. For Câmara, seeing the "disfigured face" of Christ was not sufficient if Christian followers found themselves unable to see the potential glorified Christ in the worker "pulled out of underdevelopment."¹⁰⁴ Dom Hélder Câmara did not represent the break from the

¹⁰² Martinho Condini, "Dom Hélder Câmara, Arcebispo de Olanda e Recife, e o Segundo Concílio Vaticano", 70-71.

¹⁰³ Ibid. 72 citing Kloppenburg, 1966, p. 526-528, 73-74.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 76 citing Oliveira, 2000, 91,95.

hierarchy of the Church that his radical supporters or reactionary critics hold up as their banner of support or opposition to the Brazilian Church's resistance of the 1964 military regime. Rather, he remained consistent with a Christian Democratic idea of engagement with the common man, and working class in particular. Such an engagement came from Maritain's philosophy with which he was familiar, and was in step with Eduardo Frei in Chile, whose government in 1963 would condemn the 1966 Oganía coup in Argentina. As *O Diário*'s foreign correspondent Newton Carlos would report, beyond condemning authoritarian coups, Frei's government would also be open to "dialogue" with political opponents, "even the Communists with whom he competed for the Chilean masses."¹⁰⁵ This line of thought had represented an influential, but minority, view in previous eras (the Spanish Civil War and World War II as we have seen), but saw itself codified in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.

Divisions over the means to development (social or economic) extended to reproductive rights. Even after the Council's definitive end, the Argentine and Brazilian Church's divisions showed regarding Pope Paul V's 1968 pastoral letter on birth control, *Humana Vitae*. In Argentina, a social consensus between an anti-imperialist left, a traditionalist hierarchy, in the midst of a population decrease paved the way for a swift acceptance by large sectors of Argentine society of the pastoral letter.¹⁰⁶ In Brazil, the hierarchy

¹⁰⁵ Newton Carlos, "Denúncia de Golpe no Chile" *Diário* 31 de julho de 1966.

¹⁰⁶ Karina A Felitti. "La Iglesia Católica y el control de la natalidad en tiempos del Concilio: la recepción de la encíclica" *Humanae vitae* (1968) en Argentina." *Anuario IEHS: Instituto de Estudios histórico sociales* 22 (2007): 349-372. To see a constructive critiques of the Episcopate's reception of *Humanae Vitae* and its relationship to Paul VI's letter on social justice *Populorum Progresso* See: Radrizzani, Juan

attempted to impose, with only moderate success, a unified Catholic face upon receiving the news of the letter's publication. However, Brazilian Catholics' openness to world influence allowed for a vigorous debate surrounding the pastoral letter itself, and echoed the dilemma for Catholics across the globe.

The Brazilian daily *O Lutador* ran an article covering a petition by seventeen couples of the Paulist associates who considered that the encyclical would only add to the economic and social pressures facing working families, and indirectly, encroach upon the privacy of the individual. All the while, the couples claimed faithfulness to the Catholic Church and condemned governments that attempted to impose birth control upon its citizens.¹⁰⁷ So controversial was that letter that the paper ran an editorial on the same page stating that covering news did not mean an endorsement of the views expressed in the story, but rather, that the story merely showed an informative purpose. However, the Brazilian paper questioned whether the Brazilian hierarchy, which was concerned with social issues, fully backed the Pope despite their supportive statements, signaling one area of agreement with the Costa military regime.¹⁰⁸

F., and Osvaldo Domingo Santagada. "Humanae vitae." *Teología: revista de la Facultad de Teología de la Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina* 14 (1969): 7-9. Felitti argues in another essay on reproductive rights in Latin America that even many left-leaning nationalist Latin American intellectuals considered forced birth control campaigns a form of Western colonialism. Similarly, during the 1960s and 1970s, Argentina's population was actually below acceptable rates. See: Karina Felitti, "Planificación familiar en la Argentina de las décadas 1960 y 1970: ¿un caso original en América Latina?." *Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos* (2012): 158-162.

¹⁰⁷ "Dezessete casais Paulistas enviaram carta ao Papa sobre a 'Humanae Vitae'", *O Lutador* 29 de setembro de 1968.

¹⁰⁸ "Pra começo de conversa" Ibid. See also: "A Encíclica" *O Lutador*, 18 de agosto de 1968. See also: "O Governo brasileiro se solidariza com o Papa na questão do controle da natalidade" *O Lutador* 1 de setembro de 1968.

In both countries, the question of birth control became a matter of national pride and development. On one hand, Argentine intellectuals and church officials saw in the Pope's restriction of birth control, a viable incentive for national growth in a time of stagnation, whereas their Brazilian counterparts saw birth control as a way of attaining greater economic equality for the poor and reaching stages of development similar to those of the "central" countries. In each case, theology mixed heavily with the economy and often the theological converged with the practical. The Brazilians for their part, continued the social tradition begun in the 1940s, only to turn the "correct belief-correct action" sequence on its head. Praxis, the foundation of the nascent Liberation Theology, would come to dominate the Brazilian seen as a more direct form of developmentalism.

CONCLUSION:

A proper analysis of intellectual flows in the Catholic world shows that the elites of each country did not merely impart or receive knowledge from Europe, but rather, were forced through their travels, correspondences, and even periods of exile, to deal with complex local realities and relationships that challenged easy theories that demonized one faction and lauded the other. Catholic intellectuals from all over the world observed hotbeds of Catholic resistance to secular regimes attempting to squash religious freedom. A look at the Nineteenth Century shows a stark divide between those who wished to adapt to an increasingly militant liberalism and those that wished to construct a "Catholic option" in the public sphere. But even this latter "intransigent" group suffered divisions in its reaction to secularization. Christian Democrats, based in the personalist Catholic

tradition, showed a certain amount of flexibility in their definitions of political truths and on notions of tolerance. Social Catholics, while sharing many of these critiques, nevertheless held to a firm “third-way” option that excluded both revolutionary and liberal philosophies from their governing models.

Three periods, the Cristero Rebellion, the Spanish Civil War, and World War II, provided early tests for Christian Democracy and Social Catholicism, with the latter, in the absence of a truly Royalist option, finding favor among the majority of authoritarian writers and the Church hierarchy. Figures such as Jacques Maritain turned theological certainties on their head. Maritain’s friendship with radicals who expressed indifference or outright distaste for religious doctrine in part suggests a certain hesitance surrounding political dogmas even as the French philosopher repeatedly side-stepped traditionalist charges of heresy.

In the Post-war period, US interests would complement and collide with Catholic social ideologies. The Guatemalan Church would embrace the United States’ economic aid and anti-Communism, while rejecting the superpower’s emphasis on the liberal free market, instead doubling down on Spanish corporativism. The Chilean Church, which had always placed a premium on social action tied to political parties. These prelates would eventually find its lay solution in the form of Eduardo Frei, who had Maritain’s philosophical backing, and the United States’ tacit endorsement as a champion of economic development and a bulwark against revolutionary alternatives embodied in Popular Front candidate Salvador Allende.

The Brazilian Church, commonly associated with the Cuban Revolution and its brand of revolutionary Christianity by its more conservative critics, opted for robust social action that stayed at least an arm's length away from the *castrista* personalism that so infuriated Social Catholic bishops on the Island. Furthermore, independent intellectuals separated over approach as much as substance. Jackson de Figueiredo and Alceu Lima developed subtle, but key difference in their approach to liberalism (polemic vs. dialogue) that would eventually dispose Lima towards a conciliatory tone in the Post-World War II decades. On the other hand, the continuing influence of figures like Castellani and Meinvielle in Argentina, and the failure of the democratic intellectuals such as *Criterio* editor Jorge Maria Mejia, to bring their international reputation to bear in order to win local disputes, would lead to an enduring conservative intransigence that allowed military governments to flourish unchallenged by the Church.¹⁰⁹

The following chapters of this thesis will outline in greater detail the trajectories of Church/State relations in Argentina and Brazil to more fully account for the difference in each Episcopate's engagement with their respective authoritarian governments. These chapters will focus on specific journals, newspapers, and thinkers, and their responses to international events of Catholic significance. They will also wrestle with larger questions around each country's integration of its Catholic wing, and how such integration or

¹⁰⁹ Mejia was involved in both IDO-C and the review *Concilium* the progressive Catholic review that included Hans Kung and Joseph Ratzinger among its staff. The Pope, disillusioned with the progressive turn of the journal, would later leave it to form *Communio*, a more moderate version of the journal. Carlos Sacheri harshly criticized Mejia for these international associations. See: José A. Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad, 1955-1966* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica de Argentina, 2006), 176- 178.

marginalization affected each respective community's internal conflicts and their ability to respond to world events.

Chapter Two: “A Country of Jauja”: Authoritarian Catholics in Argentina 1930-1980

INTRODUCTION:

On March 13, 2013, Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio became the first Latin American pope. Questions immediately surfaced regarding his role during the dictatorship, accusations of complicity, and rebuttals claiming that he had assisted in guiding an underground railroad of sorts of political refugees to Europe. His apparent conflicts with two disappeared priests under his charge, Francisco Jalics and Father Orlando Yorio, highlighted the divisions that ravaged the Church during that time period, and with the complicity of many in the hierarchy, decimated its social wing. The horrors of the Dirty War have polarized society’s reading of the Church. Activists such as Emilio Mignone accused the Church of being at best silent, and at worst complicit. Sociological historian María Soledad Catoggio takes a different tact, emphasizing the internal conflicts and contradictions within a Church split by the various social upheavals of the day. Catoggio notes that the Montoneros, one of the main guerrilla groups, started a correspondence with John Paul II while nationalist priest Leonardo Castellani uses his connections with Argentine dictator Jorge Rafael Videla to free Argentine writer Haroldo Conti. Shifting political circumstances pitted reformers against revolutionaries and authoritarians against the reformers. To challenge a simplistic narrative of collaboration, Catoggio points to the successes of personal interventions on behalf of disappeared priests and on notable failures of direct denouncements. Denouncements did not strengthen the Church’s hand, all the while endangering and killing several key leaders in the Church such as La Rioja’s

Enrique Angelelli, and Neuquen's Jaime de Nevares.¹¹⁰ However, both of these views fail to present a complete theological and political view from within the Church itself, instead tracing its reforms in relationship to secular political politics. This political debate centers upon Church complicity or resistance to this authoritarian regime as a primarily political maneuver, for example: the Montoneros as resisters, and the privileged hierarchy as the dictatorship's loyal stooges).

In short, these political historians discard Catholic ideas as an independent epistemology, instead trying to see the bishops mainly as power brokers whose theology takes a second place to worldly survival. Catholic intellectuals, especially from the nationalist wing, present a challenge this narrative. In the first place, intellectuals maintain a certain amount of autonomy, bringing discomfort to ecclesial and secular authorities alike.

Argentine Church historian José Zanca identifies three unique levels of Catholic intellectuals: Religious, disciplinary, and political. Zanca also divides the Church during the early and mid-twentieth century between the hierarchy, the clergy, and the laity, in a descending order of power and influence.¹¹¹ In this chapter, I will outline the various currents of Argentine Catholicism centered around its reaction to the Spanish Civil War, and the Second Vatican Council. Catholic activists such as Emilio Mignone (one of the main proponents of the "complicit vs. persecuted" Church dichotomy, was a Catholic who pushed a renovating vision of the Catholic Church, one that at the same time

¹¹⁰ María Soledad Catoggio, "Argentine Catholicism During the Last Military Dictatorship: Unresolved Tensions and Tragic Outcomes" *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies* Vol. 22:2 (Jun.2013): 139, 148,14

¹¹¹ José A. Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad, 1955-1966* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica de Argentina, 2006),13,33.

proposed a break in the traditional relationship between the Church and the state. On the other side of the Catholic divide stood the old guard that, with the backing of the hierarchy, rejected the conclusions of the Second Vatican Council and mocked the Council's main contributors. Bridging the divide for a time before the council was Gustavo Franceschi, editor of Argentina's main Catholic journal *Critério*. Franceschi's view wavered between the traditional corporatist viewpoint he had inherited from the 1930s with the Christian Democratic position he was forced to accept after the war. This divide showed that Catholic Nationalists and their opponents, far from retreating from a corrupt world, and leaving it to the military, threw themselves heavily into politics. But while Catholics of all stripes sought a way out of the liberal wilderness, they valued the exaltation of Catholic values as their first priority. Catholic Nationalists often navigated their own issues with the military dictatorships that checkered Argentina's twentieth Century, considering the regimes too close to traditional liberal structures (too sensitive to foreign investment and international opinion) to deserve Catholics' full support, but better than the "Marxist conspiracy" and incompetent democratic structures that constantly threatened "the Fatherland."¹¹² This chapter will first trace Argentine liberal and conservative relationships to the Church from the interwar period (1918-1930), through the buildup to the Spanish Civil War and World War II and the (1930-1945). During this latter time period, Catholic intellectuals broached a particular system, fascism, as a vehicle for applying religious ideas to politics, but even this philosophy

¹¹² See: Jorge Saborido, "El nacionalismo argentino en los años de plomo: la revista *Cabildo* y el proceso de reorganización nacional (1976-1983)", *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 62, 1, enero-junio, 235-270, Sevilla (España), 2005.

presented challenges to a Catholicism concerned with reducing the state's role in religious affairs even as Catholics attempted to influence the state.

Second, the argument will also deal with the fragmentation of the Argentine Catholic intellectual establishment during the Peronist era (1946-1955) and simultaneously, the democratic transition and Conciliar period (1945-1966). Lastly, and third, the paper will attempt to explain the ideological triumphs of more radical elements of the Church during Argentina's series of coups and near-civil wars (1969-1983) despite a brief Catholic-Liberal détente immediately following the 1955 coup against General Juan Domingo Perón. For closer analysis I will focus on the work of Leonardo Castellani, a Jesuit priest that simultaneously invited scorn from his immediate colleagues and the international Catholic community, and praise and protection from the Argentine bishops and intellectuals such as the fascist and anti-Semitic priest Julio Meinville. Following his trajectory as editor of his own journal, *Jauja*, this paper can offer concrete details that can paint a more exact picture of Argentine reactionaries than those offered through macrohistory or sociological analytical binaries.

As a necessary contextual preamble, this paper will outline both *unitario* (with regalistic tendencies toward the Church) and federalist historical (more traditionalist Catholic, but also paternalistic toward the Argentine state) narratives comparing with them with the social and subaltern histories currently gaining prominence among Argentine scholars.¹¹³

¹¹³ For a summary of liberal historian and President Bartolomé Mitre's historiography see: Reviewed Work: *Bartolome Mitre, Historian of the Americas* by John L. Robinson Review by: John Lynch *Journal of Latin American Studies* Vol. 17, No. 1 (May, 1985): 263. See: Bartolomé Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano* (Buenos Aires: [La Librería de la Victoria] Imprensa de Mayo, 1859). See also: Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Conflictos y armonías de las razas en América* (Buenos Aires: S. Ostwald, 1883). For an

Comparing a nuanced reality to the narratives constructed by liberals and their revisionist counterparts regarding international affairs and domestic heroes, this paper will be able to critically highlight the Church's specific historical discourse, and stake out the uniqueness of the Argentine Church's position. Such an approach ultimately highlights the theological, rather than merely political, questions that drove these intellectuals.

CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS

“Varón que quedaste en la historia entrando a la gloria tu vida patriota, ejemplo fue tu vida recta sembrando respecto a tu alrededor. Los hombres con sus conveniencias trataron una con seña tu imagen borrar, más sólo así consiguieron que el pueblo conozca la justa verdad.”- Rimoldo Fraga, “El Restaurador yo te canto”¹¹⁴

The polarization that the introduction indicates took place within the context of a historiographical battle to determine the heart of the nation: Classical liberals who exalted elite democracy as the ultimate vehicle, and those that revived Spanish monarchism and Argentina's revived conservative hero, Nineteenth Century governor of Buenos Aires Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835-1952). This particular historiography, Argentina's neutrality during the war, the hierarchy's rejection of the Vatican II reforms, and the chaos surrounding the growing violence at the end of the Isabel Peron government, all opened

example of Federalist revisionist historiography see: José María Rosas, *La caída de Rosas* (Buenos Aires: 2. ed., Colección Política e historia, 1968). For subaltern historiography see: Windus, Astrid. "El afroporteño en la historiografía argentina: algunas consideraciones críticas," *Trabajos y comunicaciones* No. 28-29(2003): 9-41. See also: Ricardo D. Salvatore, *Wandering Payasanos: State Order and Subaltern Experience in Buenos Aires During the Rosas Era* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003)

¹¹⁴ “Man who made his place in history, your patriotic life entering into glory, your straight life was an example, sowing seeds of respect all around you. Men with their own agendas desired to blot out your name, but trying that they only made the country know the righteous truth].
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WP4tzMv46E>.

the way for a traditional sounding, but innovative and radical way for reconceiving Catholicism.

Nineteenth-Century liberals in Argentina prided themselves on developing, among other things, the Sarmientine idea of civilization and barbarism, barbarism being associated with the traditional Catholic Church. However, they generally took a moderate position regarding the Church. Anti-clerical measures such as those developed in 19th Century Guatemala and Colombia did not come to fruition in Argentina. Instead, a modest *modus vivendi* between liberals and the Church forestalled conflict. This relative stability is shown in the 1853 Constitution which states “El Gobierno federal sostiene el culto católico apostólico romano,” [*The Federal Government sustains the Roman Catholic religion*]. This relationship has continued to survive, even through the 1994 reform, which went as far as to abolish the Catholic religion as a test for public office.¹¹⁵ This being said, the state was not passive regarding the church.¹¹⁶ Not all liberal advances projected benign intent. The Argentine Church was unable to halt liberal reformist agitation that began when the first constitutional president Bernardino Rivadavia pushed for state control of the church, its personnel, and its property.¹¹⁷ However, these reforms,

¹¹⁵Artículo II de la Constitución argentina, (1994).

¹¹⁶ For more information on the Bourbon reforms and their effects on colonial Argentina, see: Roberto Di Stefano, "Entre Dios y el César: el clero secular rioplatense de las reformas borbónicas a la Revolución de Independencia." *Latin American research review* (2000): 130-159. To see the gradual development of secularization based in the reforms and the late development of the Argentine Church, see: Roberto Di Stefano, "Lay Patronage and the Development of Ecclesiastical Property in Spanish America: The Case of Buenos Aires, 1700–1900." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 93, no. 1 (2013): 67-98.

¹¹⁷John J. Kennedy, *Catholicism, Nationalism, and Democracy in Argentina*, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958), p.19.

unlike ones in Twentieth Century Mexico, did not punish the Church; they merely deepened the church's dependence on the state without addressing the Church as a moral institution.

Historically, the Church had remained divided since the revolution in its response to liberalism and the Church's role in society. Father Isidoro Guerra of Buenos Aires, a traditionalist Dominican scholastic supported the liberal-backed independence movement. Father Mariano Medrano, a liberal who lauded the Enlightenment's unorthodox scientific advances, criticized Rivadavia's attacks on Church property, warning they could hurt non-state institutions that relied on the Church for assistance.¹¹⁸ The adaptability and ambiguity of the church's status might explain some of its ability to avoid a complete break from the state.

But Medrano had real basis for concern in protesting against the vacuum the state would leave through the expropriation of Church property. Since the colonial era, the Church had been influential in education and politics, but by the time the Constitution was ratified the national attitude had shifted toward partly sidelining the church's influence, fearing that its power base might impede the formation of a national identity.

Government officials did not exclude it per se, but reinforced the idea of the Church as a social, not overtly political, institution. In short, the church has an uncertain, but not uncomfortable status within the Argentine polity. This ambiguous tension continued into

¹¹⁸ Karl Schmitt, "The Clergy and the Enlightenment in Latin America", *The Americas* Vol.15 No.4 (Apr. 1959): p.388.

the mid-twentieth century. US historian John J. Kennedy wrote about the Church's ambiguous social limbo in 1958:

“The major question that may be asked here is: ‘Does Argentina have an official religion?’ Most Argentines would immediately reply in the negative. They would maintain that Article 2 of the Constitution provides ‘support’ for the Catholic religion without making it the official religion of the state. The decision of the 1853 convention was definitely to ‘support’ and not to ‘profess’ Catholicism on the part of the State. In this respect the 1853 decision was a deliberate departure from earlier constitutional essays, notably those of 1819 and 1826, which had expressly recognized Catholicism as the state religion.”¹¹⁹

Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1868-1874), a prominent leader of the Argentine liberal tradition critiqued by the Rosista populists and Catholic traditionalists, was not anti-clerical as much as he was personally dismissive of any religion that tried to usurp the power of the state. Sarmiento personally showed suspicion towards what he saw as religious superstition. Influenced by his uncle Fray José de Oro, a doctor and priest, he contrasted religious dogma with the technical scientific advances of modern medicine. He was, however, willing to accept a moral role for the church so long as it did not interfere politically with the liberal agenda. His insistence that priests only enter politics under the conditions that they endorse liberal civic morality gave Sarmiento a mixed view of priest

¹¹⁹ Ibid.,12.

Pedro Ignacio de Castro Barros, whose mix of politics and his religious duties to be an unacceptable distortion of true Catholic teaching.¹²⁰

On the other side of the ideological divide stood Buenos Aires governor Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835-1852), who styled himself a popular leader of the masses (with especially strong support among Afro-Argentines) and also a defender of the traditional perks of the Church. Many of his actions during the Restoration earned him the praise of the Church hierarchy. He banned books that contradicted the moral doctrines of the church, did away with the religious tolerance laws, and returning much of the church property to the orders that had lost them during the Liberal regimes (dating back to the 1820's). Such actions for a time pleased a church reeling from previous reforms. The porteño bishops' classification of Rosas as "the definitive protector" of the church therefore should not puzzle scholars. However, not all that Rosas did reflected the best interests of the Church. Rosas still saw the church as the "bureaucratic arm of the state", and thus intervened its everyday functioning.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Roberto Di Stefano and Loris Zanatta, *Historia de la iglesia argentina: Desde la conquista hasta fines del siglo XX*, (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo S.A 2000), 247-248. After pushing for independence in the Tucuman Congress in 1816, Castro Barros went into exile declaring himself neither Federalist nor Unitarian (the conservatives and liberals of Argentina). He finally moved to Uruguay, and then Chile, to dedicate himself exclusively to his priestly duties. To see a summary of his political life, see: "Castro Barros un riojano que dejó su alma por la Patria y murió en el exilio" *El Independiente (Archivo)*. http://www.elindependiente.com.ar/papel/hoy/archivo/noticias_v.asp?204151. Accessed October 18, 2014.

¹²¹ Roberto Di Stefano and Loris Zanatta, *Historia de la iglesia argentina* (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo Mondadori, 2000) 235-237 quoting monseñor Madrano writing to Rio de Janeiro.

Rosas even challenged the supreme head of the universal church, annulling papal letters in Buenos Aires that were not properly approved by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.¹²²

Traditional types of *patronato* relationship, in which the state purportedly serves the interests of the Catholic Church in “restoring” them to prominence, came, in the eyes of some historians, at a cost of the church’s loss of legitimacy. The review of papal statements constitutes only one example of a *patronato* that in reality leans regalistic.

Rosas often contested Rome in its appointments of bishops in Buenos Aires, and unlike Sarmiento, prioritized politicizing the church itself. Priests would preach sermons denouncing his opposition. More amiable however to traditional *patronato* arrangements, he used his armed forces to suppress clergy suspected of resistance to traditional church doctrine. This type of close church-state collaboration should raise concerns among Church historians today about Rosas’ legacy. A question remains about the wisdom of painting Rosas’ legacy as a Catholic one, if he once more subjugated the Church to the prerogatives of the state, merely tacking on a few additional benefits.¹²³

Argentine historian Ricardo Salvatore paints a mixed picture of *rosista* repression, working class popularity, and Catholic traditionalism. Liberals characterized Rosas’ government as an all-encompassing “tyranny” that imposed “chromatic uniformity” on its subjects by mandating the use of Federalist clothing, by relying on corporal punishment

¹²²José Maria-Ghio, *La iglesia en la política argentina*, (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007), 23.
http://books.google.com/books?id=JtWYjwGGu8oC&printsec=frontcover&dq=José+MariaGhio,+La+iglesia+en+la+pol%C3%ADtica+argentina&source=bl&ots=S3fCVZHLyV&sig=urftPhoV8FEZQPVRhfujUcQ QBQs&hl=en&ei=JNv9TZfAFo6FtgfLia3fBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

¹²³John J. Kennedy, *Catholicism, Nationalism, and Democracy in Argentina*, 60-61

for crimes such as desertion, and its encouragement of religious festivals. Its use of violent spectacle also garnered it the caricature of Spanish “barbarism” by *unitario* critics. Federalist derision of cosmopolitan sophistication as “effeminate and pretentious” only reinforced *unitario* prejudice.¹²⁴ Regarding his politics of religion, Rosas solidified liberal charges of tyranny by the ritual “Judas” burnings. In these appropriations of Catholic anti-Semitic religious narratives, the crowd burned images dressed in French style and *unitario* colors after the *unitarios*’ “journalistic propaganda” has been exposed by the actor. The actor associates the mercantile class with the ultimate betrayal of the system of Christ.¹²⁵ As late as the eve before *unitario* caudillo Justo José de Urquiza was to defeat him at the battle of Caseros, Rosas premiered a play of Pedro Lacasa, *El entierro del loco traidor, salvaje unitario Urquiza* in which the violent plebes participate in the beheading of an Urquiza effigy which is later dragged out into the street, combining the private and the public in an attempt to dissuade possible deserters.¹²⁶ Such artistic spectacles only strengthened the Liberals’ animosity toward an authoritarian church and reinforced their disdain for religious politics.

However, attempts to clean up Rosas’ image dominated the 1960-1980s. Manuel Galvéz and Antonio Caponetto led the way in portraying Rosas neither as a dictator nor a usurper of Church power, but an obedient, ultramontane ruler. As historian Tulio Halperin Donghi summarized in *Criterio* during the 1970s, Rosas’ conservative ideology conflated

¹²⁴ Ricardo D. Salvatore, *Wandering Payasanos: State Order and Subaltern Experience in Buenos Aires During the Rosas Era* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 132, 150, 234

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 364-365

¹²⁶ Brenda G. Werth *Theatre, Performance, and Memory Politics in Argentina* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 109-110

foreign inventions, philosophies, and economic intervention with liberalism, with him as its detractor.¹²⁷ One article by revisionist historian Antonio Caponnetto drove home more firmly the effort to distinguish between liberal regalism and the regulation that Rosas imposed upon the Argentine Church:

The logical solution, we insist, would have been to elaborate on the nature of regalism, to distinguish its various meanings and historical expressions, and to understand that rosista Regalism in particular had certain characteristics that set it apart ... from that which today we could consider and condemn as a persecution of the Church...it was a Catholic state, confessional and militant...it pushed policies inspired by respect for the Natural Order....one thing is the state of the Austrians and Hapsburgs, and Rosas here, and another the Bourbon state, that of Carlos III, of Rivadavia project...the Reform...[that] was brought about in the spirit of the “Anti-Church”.¹²⁸

More neutral authors in recent years balanced the historiography penned by Rosas’ liberal rivals.¹²⁹ Many of the Liberals’ charges turned out to be either exaggerated or

¹²⁷Tulio Halperín Donghi, “Estudios crecientes sobre el pensamiento político de Rosas”, *Criterio*, 25 de marzo 1976, Año XLIX N° 1736

¹²⁸ Antonio Caponnetto, “Recensión bibliográfica a *Samarina de Berra, Silvia. Un Pueblo se debate: proyecto eclesial o poder temporal. La Iglesia durante los gobiernos de Rosas. Buenos Aires, Guadalupe, 1988*”. En *Historiografía Rioplatense*, n. 4, Buenos Aires, Instituto Bibliográfico Antonio Zinny, 207-208. Lo lógico, insistimos, hubiera sido ahondar en la naturaleza del regalismo, distinguir sus distintas acepciones y expresiones históricas, y entender que el particular regalismo rosista tuvo características propias que lo alejan...de lo que hoy podríamos considerar y condenar como una persecución de la Iglesia...era un Estado Católico, Confesional y de Fe Militante...llevó adelante en la Argentina una política inspirada en el respeto al Orden Natural...una cosa es el Estado de los Austrias y Augsburgos, y aquí el de Rosas, y otra el de los Borbones, el de Carlos III o el ensayo de Rivadavia...la Reforma... [que] se llevó a cabo con el espíritu de la Anti-Iglesia.”

¹²⁹ Historians, filmmakers, and authors such as Sarmiento have characterized Rosas as an iron-fisted dictator. Twentieth Century author Jonathan Brown claims that Rosas was responsible for the development

disingenuous. Analyzing the working class, one is able to see the fissures in the Rosista system.¹³⁰ What's more, Rosas' "tyranny" and strict laws were in large part a continuation and enforcement of previous laws from former governments, including those of political adversary and predecessor Rivadavia. To enforce these laws, Rosas increased the size of local judicial systems to keep up with the growing populations.¹³¹ Ironically then, this subaltern look at the federalist regime also detracts from Revisionist narratives of Rosas as the "Restorer" of the laws, since he was, in reality, implementing the statutes of the government which Rosas' defenders abhorred. Furthermore, a subaltern perspective might lead historians to rate the idea of a rosista Catholic society, organic and harmonious, as dubious at best. Families, normally the foundational unit of the organic state hailed by traditionalists, became a bulwark against the worst abuses, and a negotiating tool for peons to address grievances against their commanders.¹³² This society then, hardly shown as an example of Catholic benevolence.

Despite their historical limitations, the idyllic and dystopian visions of Rosas point to a strange dialogue between Catholic militancy and the Liberals. To the casual observer, the

of state terrorism in Argentina , Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina 2nd Ed.* (Facts on File, 2010), 126. The claim that Rosas was primarily responsible for developing the mechanisms for state terror, even in Buenos Aires Spanish repression of the Afro-Argentines in response to the Haitian rebellion. For elaboration on one particularly harsh incident, the 1795 French Conspiracy, See: Lyman Johnson, *Workshop of Revolution: Plebeian Buenos Aires and the Atlantic World, 1776–1810* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011), xi,149

¹³⁰Ricardo D. Salvatore, *Wandering Payasanos*, 133, 151. Salvatore complicates the liberal image of an omnipotent dictator drowning society in a sea of red also did not hold up upon further scrutiny. Officers noted only 52% of arrested suspects wearing some kind of federalist symbol. Many plebes would even change clothes while crossing the border, demonstrating to some extent the casualness with which the population regarded Rosas' ideology.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 165

¹³² *Ibid.* 300-303

dichotomy between unitarios and federalists may seem stark, but on closer examination, they actually held many similar basic principles of moral decency in common. They would carry an idealized vision of Argentina (which boasted of an uneasy ideological unity) from the Enlightenment into the liberal scientific age.

LIBERAL AND NATIONALIST ARGENTINA: CONVERGENCES AND CONTRASTS

Rosas may have defended the gauchos and the popular Afro-Argentine classes, but neither conservatives nor liberals had tolerance for the indigenous populations. Liberals and nationalists agreed at the beginning of the State formation process that racial mixing represented an impediment to national development. As historian Federico Finchelstein points out in his work detailing the roots of Argentine fascism, liberals like Sarmiento in 1844 and Julio Argentino Roca, Argentina's first modern president in 1879, eagerly encouraged the "cleansing" of the "repugna[nt]" native populations. Even the Liberals' adversaries, the conservative nationalists saw Roca's campaign in the desert as a "republican triumph" of Western Christian civilization over a barbaric frontier. While conservatives distrusted foreign influence, liberals saw the nation as underdeveloped, and immigration presented a cure and path for development. Indian extermination also represented a step forward in its European Positivist "laboratory of progress" that seemed to fly in the face of the Universalist metaphysical trends of the Argentine constitution.¹³³

¹³³ Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina*, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 15-16. The transition from classical liberal ideologies to "scientific" liberalism marks an attempt by Argentine liberals to further adopt the ideas of French philosopher Augusto Comte, who claimed that for a nation to reach its full potential, it must be capable of breaking out of the absolute restrictions of Natural Law and universal principles to deal with the "technical" issues faced by each country on its path to development, the end goal of all moral codes in the Positivist (third) stage of development.

Neither accidental nor intentional ideological convergences between liberals and fascists should not surprise modern historians. Many of the intellectuals that formed the first right-wing, but secular, Nationalist circles came from socialist and anarchist circles as well as a “multi-class” cross-section of religious and military figures. Finchelstein points to one author during the 20th Century, Leopoldo Lugones, as the best example of this contradictory relationship. Lugones, a famed literary critic, rejected Social Democracy in favor of revolutionary solutions characterized by “liberal nationalism,” an authoritarian form of government espoused by his close friend, General Roca. Lugones remained suspicious of an invasion from “foreign leftists” and internal democratic enemies, and proposed “the sword” that divided freedom from hierarchy as the most plausible solution to this threat.

However, many Nationalists diverged from this hybrid scientific-nationalist view, drawing on Spanish ideas of an avowedly Catholic republic to maintain order. Federico Ibarra advocated an anti-liberal approach that attempted to undermine liberal democracy. But nationalists also recognized that the roots of governance lay in the joining of Church and State. As Donoso Cortes pointed out, “The Sovereign is like God: either it is one, or does not exist...It is indivisible and incommunicable.” Wishing for a return to the Spanish colonial era, Nationalists nevertheless rejected the idea of a nationalism of return, claiming to preserve Spanish traditions in a more complete way than the liberalized Spain of the 1812 Constitution.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Ibid. 19-21, 24. Also: Ibid., 22 quoting Donoso Cortes In: Juan Donoso Cortes, *Ensayo sobre el Catolicismo, el Liberalismo, y el socialism* (Madrid: Imprenta de La Publicidad, 1851) ,202.

Nationalism in Argentina was a revolt against what it saw as the “international monetary order” and did not support business conservatism. This “international order,” in the minds of the Nationalists, is based in the Jewish religion, and is not only economically, but also religiously contrasted with the ideal Catholic State. Catholic Nationalist authors such as David Nuñez classified this type of “correct” anti-Semitism.¹³⁵ Nationalism’s populists strand, which developed alongside its Fascist school of thought also has its roots in the 1930s and is summarized by this quote in *Combate*, a Nationalist journal of the same time period as Castellani, Meinville, and Franceschi were writing:

“Most of the political adversaries of nationalism consider it a conservative movement...whose aspiration is to ensure the establishment of a social class while abandoning the people that produce.” Nevertheless the nationalist movement did favor social improvement since “the capitalist system operating in this country and in most of the world’s nations is...unjust and inhuman.”¹³⁶

Journals like *Nueva República* and *Combate* bridged the gap between the secular and the religious right wing in a way that helped pave the way for the development of Catholic forms of exclusion and versions of national identity. Often, these papers, unlike Catholic Nationalists, embraced the populism of the Yrigoyen administration considering the Radical leader “the true expression of the Argentine caudillo.” Despite this difference,

¹³⁵ “Hay varias clases de antisemitismo: Económico, sociológico, político, religioso y moral. Es lícito aun obligatorio el antisemitismo económico, contra la dura y intolerable dictadura del dinero ejercida por la Banca internacional judía.” Pro. Dr. David Nuñez, *¿En qué quedamos? ¿Son o no son deicidas los judios?*, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Presencia en el mundo 1967),15.

¹³⁶Alberto Spektorowski, *The Orgins of Argentina’s Revolution of the Right*, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press,2003), 138 quoting “El nacionalismo aspira a una mayor justicia social”, *Combate*, May 15, 1935.

these secular nationalists shared with Catholics a general disdain for Anglo-Saxon, and particularly Great Britain's, materialism, accusing the seafaring nation, along with local elites, of an international monetary conspiracy against the Argentine nation.¹³⁷ Because of their emphasis on *hispanidad* and exclusive national identity, as opposed to the liberal project of immigration or the international pre-Soviet Marxist perspective, these intellectuals were primed to make the transition to accept state formation as a sacred project.

CATHOLIC NATIONALISM: BEGINNINGS

Argentine Catholic Nationalism, started by lay intellectuals in the inter-war period (1914-1939), developed in response to the crisis of modernity caused by the First World War. The movement centered initially on university issues such as tuition and exam regulations and later moved to the wider issue of how to create a "Catholic Renaissance" focused on "high" culture and the formation of elites. It also rejected the economic populism of Radical president Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922, 1928-1930).¹³⁸ These intellectuals had middle class backgrounds and waged their battle for national renewal through private education. No one Catholic group or center represented the movement, due to the marginalization of Catholics in the early 20th Century and the variety of competing political ideologies at the time. The first Catholic University founded by Luis Duprat

¹³⁷ José Luis Bendicho Beired, *Sob o signo da nova ordem: Intelectuais autoritários no Brasil e na Argentina*, (São Paulo: História Social, USP: Edições Loyola, 1999), p.57-58

¹³⁸ Fernando J. Devoto, "Los proyectos de un grupo de intelectuales católicos argentinos entre las dos guerras", In: Carlos Altamirano: *Historia de los intelectuales en América Latina: Los avatares de la "ciudad letrada" en el siglo XX* Vol. II (Buenos Aires: Katz, 2010), 351,357

was opened in 1910, but later closed because of its inability to receive national accreditation. It was later replaced by the Catholic Cultural Centers of the 1920s and 1930s.¹³⁹ These intellectuals had escaped from the working class action arena into which Catholics had been pigeon-holed at the beginning of the 20th Century to move into the influential educational circles long dominated by liberal elites. Precisely because of the affinity between nationalist “hispanidad”, anti-Liberal authors such as Leopoldo Lugones and Catholic writers, society began to associate most types of nationalism with Catholicism, even if nationalism also encompassed secular, non-theological visions of nativist fervor.

Catholic thinkers did, however, stand out from the rest. Julio Meinvielle based his idea of governance on an anti-materialist embrace of Natural Law. For him, the state could not interfere in the spiritual salvation of individual humans, but bore the responsibility for establishing the necessary order to allow citizens to see the everyday functioning of society through a “supernatural” framework. Meinvielle harshly criticized democracy because of its tendency to divide the sovereign, throw governance into the hands of the popular classes, and lead to moral relativism. He did however, consider the possibility of a democracy in which all worked toward the common good as an acceptable form of government. Adherence to Natural Law, not popular support or bureaucratic solutions, determined the legitimacy of the government. In this context that meant tying ideas of divine sanction to the authoritarian solutions developing during the late 1920s and 1930s.

¹³⁹ José Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad*, 88.

Popular sovereignty came into play only if rulers respected the customs and traditions of the people. A true sovereign would draw back from the temptation to create an illegitimate government based on abstract, foreign, universal ideas.¹⁴⁰ These intellectuals, disenchanted with the cultural detachment of the radical left, saw in Catholic Social teaching a deeper, more authentic and local elaboration on the principles of counter-culture and anti-establishment fervor that they had experienced in their previous ideologies.

Because of this increasingly social, corporatist, and anti-liberal outlook, Catholic thinkers had a special relationship with Franco's Fascism of the Spanish Civil War.¹⁴¹ Catholic Nationalism also had a close relationship with the Fascist movements of the late 1920s and early 1930s, but did not consider Fascism and Nationalism synonymous. In a 1928 edition of *Criterio*, the leading Catholic periodical in Argentina, Manuel Galvez, a militant Catholic writer and revisionist historian, gave his interpretation of the events sweeping across Europe, mainly, the rise of Fascism and Communism. Galvez claimed that dictatorship was distinctly "Latin", inherently anti-Jewish and intrinsically tied to Catholicism while the ideologies "subverting" the Argentine identity, such as Communism, Capitalism, and materialism in general are foreign (as in the time of Rosas).¹⁴² Nationalists did not have problems with conflating the state's aims with those

¹⁴⁰Juan Fernando Segovia, "La legitimidad entre la teología y la política. Reflexiones sobre el orden político católico en Meinvielle y Castellani (1930-1950)" *Anales de la Fundación Francisco Elías de Tejada* 10 (2004): 85-88, 90-92.

¹⁴¹ The following section draws on my previous article detailing Catholic Fascism and the dictatorship. Travis Knoll, "Catholic Fascism: Liberation from Democracy" *COLA Research Journal* Vol.2:1 (2012)

¹⁴²Manuel Galvez, "Interpretación de las dictaduras", *Criterio Año I-Numero 32, October 11, 1928.*

of Catholicism, going as far as to call military service “a vocation”, a hard life of self-sacrifice, where the only admonition would be to avoid ambition and endure hardship for the purpose of advancing both the will of God and the welfare of the state (which is similar to that of one’s family). God and country were one love.¹⁴³ The soldier, at the time considered an ideal citizen, realized there were two truths: God’s truth and the state’s truth. The state lost legitimacy however, if it began to contradict God’s law. The truths had to be defended against opposing ideologies that would threaten God and country. This conflation of State and God and the fear of Enlightenment ideologies were shared by both Argentine and Spanish nationalists.¹⁴⁴

Order was an important concept in Nationalism, which is why Fascism may have appealed to many clergy during the 1930s as a legitimate way of combating the breakdown of traditional social and political structures, a breakdown which resulted in chaos similar to Rousseau’s “State of Nature.” Unlike Rousseau however, Catholic Nationalists believed, in accordance with Thomistic thinking, that nature is inherently ordered, and that maintaining this natural order is of the utmost importance no matter what social situation the country is in. Maintaining order is a custodial duty and a responsibility given directly by God, a responsibility to protect the country as one protects the family itself.¹⁴⁵ Fascism gave an answer to the crisis of national instability and moral decay, as Galvez pointed out, Benito Mussolini once again gave the Church a

¹⁴³Hermenegildo Tocagni, “La Vocación Militar”, *Criterio*, 1 de noviembre de 1928.

¹⁴⁴“El ser o no ser de España” *Criterio*, 12 de mayo de 1938.

¹⁴⁵Cesar A. Romano,, “La República Patriótica a la Unidad de Destino”, *El Objectivo*, Año VII N°11, 5 de Julio de 2007, 5

place at the table through its emphasis on religious education and general rules against immorality.¹⁴⁶

However, although Nationalists embraced Fascism, it was, in their conception, only a temporary means toward a more ideal end.¹⁴⁷ Nationalists were wary of association with a broad trans-national movement that was not in line with Catholic teaching on the place of God in society and the importance of orthodox teachings underpinning the government. Franceschi, as editor of *Criterio* during the rise of Fascism during the 1930s, thoroughly rejected Nazism for its racially based pagan ideology and its denial of some of the Church's fundamental rights (i.e the ability to attend a Eucharistic conference), although he said this did not preclude the Church having diplomatic relations with the Nazi state.¹⁴⁸ For Franceschi, the means should not be confused with the ends, the means being fascism and the ends being the restoration of the Church to its proper position of power. In short, nationalism was not analogous with Spanish Catholic Fascism, and despite sharing much of the fascist vision, stood on its own philosophically.¹⁴⁹ Insofar as international Fascism served the purposes of the Church's restoration of temporal and moral power, it was a legitimate means, but when Fascism's strands deemphasized the Church they became illegitimate, so far as to be as objectionable as democracy as a

¹⁴⁶ Manuel Galv3ez, "Interpretaci3n de las dictaduras", *Criterio*, 11 de octubre de 1928. Galvez warns however that dictatorships are only a "transitive" stage on a return path to "Roman principles" and "the essential and moral teachings of the Catholic Church."

¹⁴⁷Ibid. Note 20.

¹⁴⁸Gustavo Franceschi, "Nacional-socialismo", *Criterio*, A3o XI N3 541, el 14 de Julio, 1938

¹⁴⁹Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), p.121.

vehicle for a new Catholic state. Franceschi wrote: “¿Cuál es la posición del totalitarismo? *No dice que Dios no existe, sino que afirma que Dios soy yo. Yo, es decir el estado.*” [What is the [ideological] position of totalitarianism? It does not say that God does not exist, but affirms, “*I am God*”, *I that is, the State.*]¹⁵⁰ And although Catholic Nationalism attempted to emphasize nationalist Argentine culture through authoritarian means, Franceschi insisted that this in itself is not enough, that to see cultural identity as the final end was to make the same error as classical liberalism that is, seeing the Church as a social tool instead of recognizing its supernatural and divine mission.¹⁵¹

However, Franceschi acted as not only a buffer between correct and incorrect authoritarianism, but also a bridge between Catholics on two sides of a philosophical divide. The question of whether a spiritual state should be uniform and confessionally Catholic, or universally Christian and plural, dominated theological debates. These theological divides spilled over into the very political pitfalls of the Spanish Civil War discussed in earlier chapters. The two sides of the Argentine debate over liberty and order, between which Franceschi represented a bridge, stretched back to the early debates over how to receive Maritain in Argentina amid world debates on authoritarianism and the Spanish Civil War.¹⁵² More specifically, this divide dates back to the publication of

¹⁵⁰Gustavo Franceschi, “Totalitarismo o liberalismo” *Criterio*, Año XII N° 582, 27 de abril 1939

¹⁵¹Ibid. See also: Federico Finchelstein, *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy*, (Durham:Duke University Press: 2009), p.137.

¹⁵² For more background on intellectual debates surrounding the Spanish Civil War and its impact in Argentina See:
Raquel Macciuci, “La Guerra civil española en la revista *Sur*” *Socio histórica*, n° 15-16 (2004): 29-63.

the publication of Jacques Maritain's *Integral Humanism* in 1936¹⁵³, which criticized a 19th Century collaboration between Church and state, called for the State to play a part in the forming of human consciences, and permitted pluralism within a Catholic framework that rejected Modernists excesses. At first, Maritain's positions found resonance with Catholic militants that ran aground of a complacent Catholic hierarchy. These young militants of the 1930s saw the pact between the Church and the state as a betrayal of Catholic values, and were glad that Maritain's work presented space for maneuvering within the Church. However, Maritain would also break with Nationalist intellectuals over the Pope's 1927 condemnation of *Action Française* which proposed a return to strict adherence to Natural Law and Catholic rule.

Maritain, basing himself in St. Thomas of Aquinas, rejected Modernism as a whole, but argued that St. Thomas Aquinas was "the saint of the *intelligentia*." He proposed that Catholic militants could not revive the Middle Ages *per se* and should instead consider how to preach classical Catholic values in a Modernist setting.¹⁵⁴ Liberal Catholics responded positively. Agosto J. Durelli cites Maritain in his article for the liberal journal *Sur* praising Maritain's supposed lack of partisanship in spiritual affairs. Quoting Maritain directly, Durelli highlights Maritain's shift from the merely political to the spiritual arguing that the Gospel does not compel one to follow a party but "to learn with intimacy the word of God." This intimacy argued Maritain and Durelli, would stop "The

¹⁵³ The Spanish edition was first published in Spanish in 1940 in Santiago de Chile.

¹⁵⁴ José Zanca, *Cristianos antifascistas: Conflictos en la cultura católica argentina* (Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2013), 38-48, 50-51.

good from calling down the fire of God upon the bad” and should cause devout Catholics to think of Christ’s death for his enemies instead of a God that would command them to kill for him. Similarly, Durelli slammed French poet Paul Claudel for his criticism of Maritain’s social theory. When Claudel mentioned European social democracies as examples of why structural change was not necessary, Durelli jumped in: “And here we see that the author is a fan of the most bourgeois Protestant nations on the planet.”¹⁵⁵

As the introduction of Maritain at the University of Córdoba October 6, 1936 (during his larger Latin American tour) by philosopher Alfredo Fraguero showed, many Argentine scholars warmly welcomed Jacques Maritain. They lauded his philosophical rigor and also his social conviction. They found his encompassing views refreshing, especially his rejection of the use of the scientific method as an *ethical* tool, and his updating of a living versus an “archeological” Thomism.¹⁵⁶

Not all intellectuals agreed however. According to another Córdoba philosopher Fernando Martínez Paz, Leopoldo Lugones, called democracy a “cadaver” and was willing to write against the failure of the “bourgeois democracy.” Charles Maurras’ dialectic according to Paz “seduced” many of Argentina’s Catholic intellectuals into taking authoritarian positions due to their healthy skepticism of participatory processes.

The problem according to Maritain lay in the fact that governments that were involved in

¹⁵⁵ Citing Maritain’s *Questions de Conscience*. In: Agosto J. Durelli, “El Cristianismo y El Reposo” *Sur Año XI* (Septiembre de 1939): 74-76. The author also chronicled a debate between Maritain and Claudel involving Maritain’s emphasis on social justice and possible social revolution. Claudel believed that such issues could be handled within the confines of the state. (Ibid. 76-80).

¹⁵⁶ Alfredo Fraguero, *Jacques Maritain en la Universidad de Córdoba: Octubre 1º. De 1936* (Córdoba: Imprensa de la Universidad, 1937), 7-8,14.

pure action are not worried about human dignity (Pius XI's criticism of Action Francaise). Paz believed that Maritain opened up a way to a "Catholic political integralism" a "second liberation" that constituted a "true metaphysics."¹⁵⁷

According to Paz, while Maritain did not rule on the Spanish Civil war as just or unjust defense on the part of the Franco regime (as mentioned in an earlier chapter he eschewed such categories as an unfair mixing of the profane and sacred). Instead, Maritain criticized the Spanish Civil War for creating a savior-like mentality that denied the balance between "force, justice, and civil friendship. For Maritain there was a contradiction in attempting to construct the kingdom of God on "political realism and hate" and allowing that liberty "open the way to dictatorships." He also took issue with the classification of the Spanish Civil War as a "holy war" saying that the term was anachronistic in a time in which the "sacred" was clearly separated from the "profane."¹⁵⁸

Further angering Catholic anti-Semitic intellectuals, Maritain defended the Jews as a "mystery" and condemned what he saw as apologists for the Nazi regime. He saw complicity in those who saw the Jews as "the source of all evil" even when Catholic nationalists did not necessarily agree with the Nazis' racist suppositions.¹⁵⁹

Despite a vocal minority in support of Maritain, Catholic Nationalists, who constituted the majority of intellectuals at this time, rejected both Italian and German Fascism, but were clear that Spain provided the ultimate model for how to combine God and Country

¹⁵⁷ Fernando Martínez Paz, *Maritain Política e Ideología: Revolución cristiana en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nahuel, 1966), 74-77.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 118-119.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 121-123.

and elevate the state to a level “second only to the Holy Trinity.”¹⁶⁰ Spain’s determination, not only to root out insurgency, but also to root out the ideologies underpinning these insurgencies (such as democracy), presented a model the Nationalists themselves wished to emulate. In fact, so attached were the two countries, that when Franco passed away, many nationalists looked to the Spanish transition to democracy as a parallel of the troubled Argentine democracy of Isabel Perón and a portent for the triumph of liberalism, a wave that must be stopped.¹⁶¹

CATHOLIC NATIONALISTS AND PERONISTS: FRIENDS OR FOES?

“Y como siempre daremos un grito de corazón...por este gran argentino que se supo conquistar a la gran masa del pueblo combatiendo al capital.”
Hugo de Carril “La marcha peronista”

Catholic attitudes toward Peronism were mixed at best and hostile at worst. Catholics had enthusiastically supported the 1943 coup that brought the United Officers’ Group (GOU), a military clique, to power with Perón as Secretary of Labor. Gustavo Franceschi mixed both God and country, claiming “God is criollo in other words, Divine providence cares for us much more than we deserve. The army saved us definitively from the [prior] situation: The military revolution put a stop to the social Revolution.”¹⁶² Fear of the

¹⁶⁰To see an example of common ideas shared between the Spanish and Argentine nationalists see “Catolicismo y la Patria”, *Criterio*, Abril 20 de 1939 Año XII N.º 581. This combination of Religion and country, and the concept of the State as the vehicle for religion are found in some editions of the “Marcha Real” (the Spanish national anthem), which proclaims: “Triunfa España! Los yunques y las ruedas cantan al compás del *himno de la fe* (*italics added*).”

¹⁶¹Jorge Saborido, “La España ha sido condenado”, UNLP Facultad de Cs. Humanas, *Anuario N°6 el 2 de septiembre, 2004*, 117-129.

¹⁶²Gustavo Franceschi, *Criterio* 797, 10 de junio de 1943, p.129 In: Susana Bianchi, *Catolicismo y Peronismo: Religión y Política en la Argentina: 1943-1955* (Tandil: Instituto de Estudios Históricos-Sociales “Prof. Juan Carlos Grosso”, 2001), 13.

social classes had influenced Catholic thinkers to favor traditional authoritarian hierarchies since the Russian Revolution of 1917, but by the 1940s Catholic writers were not as marginal as they had been in 1930. Catholics formed part of a broad alliance formed with other sectors of the society, including the trade unions, who hoped to do away with electoral fraud. For the unions this corruption impeded their access to fundamental workers' rights, and for a struggling Radical party in the 1930s, the corruption stalled their electoral return to power. The Church however thought of its own interests, lauding the abolishing of political parties and the mandating of religious education in December 1943. For the first time since the Revolution of 1930, a government would actually follow through with a Catholic agenda through official state mechanisms such as censorship and official state propaganda to “re-christianize” Argentina and through corporatist structures promote class harmony. Class harmony would prevent the poor’s “temptation” towards Communism.¹⁶³

During his tenure as the GOUs Secretary of Labor, Peron saw commonality with the social mandate of the Church laid out in the Papal letter *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931). He especially honed in on income inequality which brought “great harm” to “the common good or social justice” to which the encyclical alluded. Perón emphasized the Catholic concept of class harmony through his guarantee that private industry would receive “nothing but recognition” if it provided a living wage to workers. Peron, promised

¹⁶³ Susana Bianchi, *Catolicismo y Peronismo: Religión y Política en la Argentina: 1943-1955*, (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Estudios Históricos, 2001) 15, 25, 52.

workers that the government would ensure the vigorous enforcement of clear and fair laws in exchange for non-violence.

In religious matters, Peron also attempted to placate the religious hierarchy. In 1946 Argentina became the only country to formally file a request with the Vatican asking for a formal declaration of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary (which would be declared dogma only in 1952).¹⁶⁴ These types of petitions and other external forms of Catholic devotion initially drew moderate praise for him from some prelates.

Catholics had much to admire in his agenda. In one sense, the 1950 “Twenty truths of *justicialismo* [Peronism]” coincided with fundamental elements of Catholic social teaching, especially its rejection of political ends for those of the common good (Article 9), the subjugation of capitalism to the general welfare (Article 16) and national unity without class conflict (Article 11).¹⁶⁵ Peron also identified with classic Platonic conceptions of society valuing “order, harmony, [and] proportion” saying that all of these led to” justice....the first rule of antiquity converted into political practice.”¹⁶⁶ Peron’s corporatist political structure, which came from his background in the GOU coup of 1943, emphasizing the nation and hierarchy, appealed to Catholic thinkers. The opposition, with the exception of the anti-liberal Catholic right, sharply criticized Peron’s rhetoric as “anti-enlightenment” and irrational.

¹⁶⁴ Citing Pius XI. In: Ibid, 65. Citing Juan D. Perón In: *Obras Completas*, Volumen VII, Tomo 1, p.124 In: Ibid. 67. On the filing of the Assumption dogma request see: Ibid. 85.

¹⁶⁵ “Las veinte verdades del justicialismo, leídas por Juan Domingo Perón desde los balcones de la casa de gobierno el 17 de octubre de 1950” *Biblioteca Escolar de Documentos Digitales*, http://archivohistorico.educ.ar/sites/default/files/VI_47.pdf. Accessed October 20, 2014.

¹⁶⁶ Escuela Superior Peronista, *Temas de Doctrina: Materias fundamentales, básicas y complementarias*, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Peronista, 1955), p.155, 122.

Despite criticisms from traditional liberals, Perón embraced Catholic morals because they moderated “hedonist” consumption and encouraged a selfless national identity. Laws Perón implemented limiting the working hours for women were not so much “humanitarian” as reinforcements of Gálvez’s earlier traditional vision of the domestic family. Nationalist intellectual José Figuerola’s warning about the “inorganic” masses complimented Perón’s idea of a country of harmonious class relations.

Despite some consensus on general social structures, there were sharp differences between Perón and middle-class Catholics. First, as Catholic Church historian Austin Ivereigh suggests, even in 1945 after years of anti-liberal militancy and unity, Catholic politics in Argentina was not uniform. Argentine Christian Democrats, aided by Jacques Maritain, lobbied the Vatican against an allegedly totalitarian Peron arguing that he merely used the Church for political purposes. Second, Ivereigh argues that Peron drew suspicion by nature of his background: a non-religious colonel who entered into a *civil*, not sacramental, marriage with a famous actress, Eva Duarte. Because of this initial suspicion, Ivereigh argues, Perón adeptly walked a political tightrope in his relationship with the Church, fusing Enlightenment ideas of civil religion with key concessions on education, workers’ rights, and promoting “Hispanic” identities.¹⁶⁷ Perón did not adopt the overt anti-Semitism (to be discussed later in the chapter) of Meinvielle or Leonardo Castellani, Jesuit priests with authoritarian tendencies. Instead Peronists tended to talk in

¹⁶⁷ Austin Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina, 1810-1960* (Oxford: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 147-148, 153-154. Peron was to abandon a Church-based governing altogether in order to shore up his base among secular unionists. Ivereigh’s observation reinforces my reading that much of the Catholic opposition to Peron in his later governments was class based. (157-158).

terms of class and speculative “vendepatrias”¹⁶⁸ In keeping with the movement’s focus on class and inequality, some of Perón’s supporters, such as left-wing populist Juan José Hernandez Arregui, who was sympathetic to Nationalist anti-liberal tendencies, blamed Jews for economic instability and domination of the financial system and blamed them for not joining nationalist movements such as Peronism. Following in the tradition of nationalists that had connected Jews with anarchism and the lower class prostitutes, Arregui connected Jews with the Communist and Socialist parties. Despite some philosophical differences, convergences led to a tacit alliance between Nationalism and Peronism, especially on the issue of religious education, mandated in Perón’s 1949 constitution.¹⁶⁹

The coup of 1943 had also previously opened the way to reigniting the private school debate, and later on in 1949, Perón would mandate religious education. Despite this educational triumph however, many Catholic intellectuals saw Perón’s educational style and even his “religious hour” as “routine” and encouraging of low teaching standards.¹⁷⁰ However, Eva Perón, in keeping with Catholic mores, called for female compliance with a paternalistic system calling for “more homes, and for that more women to fulfill well

¹⁶⁸Eduardo Elena, *Dignifying Argentina: Peronism, Citizenship and Mass Consumption* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 61,65,68,70, 97, 135-137, 159. Such a convergence between Catholics and Perón occurred at the 1949 Primero Congreso de Filosofía in Mendoza, Argentina which also featured future Catholic metaphysician Alberto Caturelli. There Perón reaffirmed his “third way” which criticized both liberalism and communism. Hugo Alberto Klappenbach, "Filosofía y política en el Primer Congreso Argentino de Filosofía." *Fundamentos en humanidades* 1 (2000): 34.

¹⁶⁹ Paul Lewis, *Guerillas and Generals: The Dirty War in Argentina* (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 27

¹⁷⁰ Jose Zanca, *Los intelectuales catolicos y el fin de la cristiandad, 1955-1966*, 89.

their destiny and mission”¹⁷¹ Eva Perón’s push for the feminist vote attempted to balance the obvious contradictions of her actress background with the requirements of the Catholic hierarchy by presenting herself as a channel of her husband’s political project. Eva Perón emphasized the need for women to influence their nation, but put first priority on the home, a “traditional and Catholic” Christian home that would avoid “unscrupulous” and “anti-Argentine” behavior.¹⁷² However, facing significant middle-class opposition at home, Eva Perón looked abroad. Her visit to Spain and the Vatican only highlighted *justicialismo*’s need to find international moral backing for their programs at home. By this measure Eva had moderate success, gaining the Cross of Isabel the Catholic from Franco, but only a routine audience with the Pope upon her visit to Rome. However, her return from Europe made her ambitious. The Eva Perón Foundation continued however to mix traditionalism with political militancy. So far, despite skepticism, the Peronists continued to walk the tight-rope of pacifying the Catholic and social wings of their parties.

Although spiritual advisers like Peronist priest Hernán Benítez helped oversee religious aspects of Eva Perón’s outreach, the politics of social justice would eventually trump the Church, encroach on traditionally Catholic areas of action, and sideline religious authorities. Distinguishing between “alms” and “justice” Eva Perón would come to take

¹⁷¹Escuela Superior Peronista, *Temas de Doctrina: Materias fundamentales, básicas y complementarias*, 187-188.

¹⁷² Eva Perón, Discurso pronunciado el 26 de febrero de 1947 en la residencia presidencial de Olivos, por L.R.A Radio del Estado y la Red Argentina de Radiodifusión; *Discursos Completos*, Vol. I, 1946-1948, 58. In: Lila Caimari, *Perón y la iglesia católica: Religión, estado y sociedad en la Argentina 1933-1955* 2^o Edición (Buenos Aires: Emecé Historia, 2010), 219.

on a “messianic” image that would over time contradict and eventually exclude her former Catholic discourse. Some sectors would start to compare her image to that of the Virgin Mary, although her social work also gave her a “redemptive” aura of a saint. This “Madonna of the Meek” worked with Perón to coopt traditional religious festivals, such as Christmas itself, to give these old symbols a new Peronist meaning. After her death, followers would claim miraculous cures done in her name and would exalt “Peronist Christianity” as a superior pragmatic form of the faith than dogma and vertical hierarchies.¹⁷³ Eva Perón, in short, had coopted the discourse that had given her husband’s government initial legitimacy but had also thrown overboard those dogmas which had condemned her previous life, and the lives of the poor that could not meet the hierarchy’s high bar of social acceptability.

After years of intermediate strain, this Peronist-Church social consensus began a clean break after Eva Perón’s death. The Catholic world remained divided over how much legitimacy to grant the Peronist movement. Cardinal Copello and Monsignor DeCarlo of Resistencia, Chaco supported the first lady and actively supported the Foundation, but others such as Franceschi and bishop Miguel de Andrea, resented Peronist appropriations of Catholic social doctrine and traditionally Catholic social products such as single women’s shelters.¹⁷⁴ Catholics also opposed Perón’s policies on divorce and prostitution.

¹⁷³ Lila Caimari, *Perón y la iglesia católica: Religión, estado y sociedad en la Argentina 1933-1955*, 225, 227-229, 234.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 239-241.

As Donna Guy writes in her work on the sex trade, Protestant anti-trafficking groups accused Argentina, a Catholic nation, of exactly the opposite stance. In fact, the legalization of the sex trade would become a major sticking point between Perón and middle class Catholic intellectuals. Originally, this confusion stemmed from the diverging opinions within the Church itself. On one side stood the Catholic hierarchy. Those supporting legalization consisted of local Argentine officials, many anti-hierarchical, who adopted a “pragmatic” reading on St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas accepted prostitution as a lesser evil that would stave off public depravity. Others saw it as a remedy to a graver social taboo, homosexuality.¹⁷⁵ The tradition in which municipal governments and some local churches would often “look the other way” on the issue of legal *bordellos* (whore houses) exemplified this view. President Perón followed in this tradition as well using the intense fear surrounding homosexuality in the military to justify prostitution as a tool to save the nation and the family but, Catholic Nationalists, tied to middle class rationales about public morality and order, bitterly resisted Perón’s efforts to legalize prostitution (noting as well that his second wife Eva Duarte de Perón had affairs to scale the social ladder in her acting career). In fact, *Criterio*, by then Argentina’s leading Catholic weekly led by polemicist and priest Gustavo Franceschi, condemned what they saw as a misguided interpretation of church teaching by proponents of legalized *bordellos*.¹⁷⁶ Despite sectors of support, most mainstream

¹⁷⁵ Donna Guy, *Sex and Danger in Buenos Aires: Prostitution, Family, and Nation in Argentina* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 13-14

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 180-181, 202.

Catholic intellectuals saw the legalization of prostitution as a beginning of a slide into societal decay.

Franceschi also took issue with the Professional Associations law (Decree 23.852).

Franceschi supported the right to unionize, seeing unions as actualized versions of the guilds that he claimed worked so well during the Middle Ages, but that the revolutionaries in France outlawed through the 1791 *Le Chapelier* law. For Franceschi, bourgeois capitalism running through international markets had created great inequalities (which he credited Marx for being “somewhat right” for criticizing). Furthermore, capitalism dismantled the classic systems and social barriers that would have kept ordinary men protected from the forces of international competition. Pointing to the Encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*, Franceschi asserted that the Catholic Church held the right to associate according to profession was a basic human right not subject to popular whims or votes. Nevertheless, he criticizes the Professionals Law for its concentration of power in the hands of the Secretary of Labor and Budgets (*Secretario de Trabajo e Previsión*). The government achieved this concentration by mandating that each profession be represented as a branch in only in one union, and through only one representative of that branch. Franceschi argued that this sort of corporatism, with only one representative determining the interests of each union, stripped away the power of the unions themselves in exchange for government access.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Gustavo Franceschi, “Un decreto inaceptable” *Criterio*, 13 de diciembre de 1945, 557-559. An important historiographical debate swarms around the Independence and autonomy of the Peronist movement. On one hand Gino Germani writes that Peronism offered a safe-haven for new workers, and

For Franceschi then, the central premise of the Perón government did not only imply anti-democratic tendencies, as Perón's liberal adversaries had constantly warned. Rather, Perón's main tenet of working organization signaled for Franceschi a stark move away from the individual autonomy of the human person. Such dignity did not come from an Enlightenment sense of reason, but immutable Divine Law. In Franceschi's view, Perón had exchanged the wage slavery of the Enlightenment for the worker's captivity to an all-powerful state.

Catholic thinkers such as Pedro Ivanissevich had difficulty embracing the Peronist emphasis on a working class with the same right to consumption as the rest of society. Although his review *Revista Argentina* tried to meld Catholic middle class thought with the Peronist project, its emphasis on education of the working class as a way to "eliminate" the identity of the *cabecita negra* (Eva Perón's endearing term for the working poor) did not mesh with the valorization of working class identities epitomized by the Eva Perón Foundation.¹⁷⁸ By 1955, the last year of Perón's reign, the disdain that Catholic middle class clergy and intellectuals had for the "uncontrollable" masses is palpable. The ecclesial-Peronist conflict which led to the burning of several churches as well as Perón's forbidding of a number of religious processions and expulsion of priests in response to Catholic advances his monopoly on unions further heightened tensions.¹⁷⁹

grew out of the chaos of the swift change from rural to urban life. (See: Gino Germani, "Clases populares y democracia representativa en América Latina." *Desarrollo económico* (1962): 23-43.). Juan Carlos Torres however argues that workers, far from manipulated neophytes, rather demonstrated pragmatic political resolve in making a mutually beneficial pact with the Peronist government. Juan Carlos Torre, "Interpretando (una vez más) los orígenes del peronismo." *Desarrollo Económico* (1989): 527.

¹⁷⁸ Eduardo Elena, *Dignifying Argentina*, 181

¹⁷⁹ Paul Lewis, *Guerillas and Generals*, 8

At this juncture, Franceschi wrote encouraging Catholics to stand up for their faith and calling the working class Peronist activists involved in the riots “street urchins” and “peddlers of every type of immorality” that “incite violence...trusting in impunity [and thus] multiplying every act of impunity.” Speaking of the fires, Franceschi sarcastically feigns pity mocking “I think about those bands of arsoners. Poor souls!” He continues, “Where do they come from? Who exploits them? I know them because I have been a prison chaplain and I have concerned myself with the neediest homes.”¹⁸⁰ The dichotomy between poor and rich, cultured and barbaric, orderly and chaotic, would continue. Perón would ferment a “revolutionary” attitude, advising his supporters to “heroically resist” *Revolución Libertadora* and subsequent governments through a series of small and isolated actions to make the country ungovernable and pave the way for his return.¹⁸¹

Despite Catholics as a whole welcoming the downfall of the “Argentine caudillo” some members of the community showed a favorable attitude toward Peronism without Perón. For them, the strongman may have pushed the limits of state power, but his original teachings had hierarchical authoritarian roots, and Perón’s policies had addressed working class problems such as wages and working hours long ignored by the liberal

¹⁸⁰ Gustavo J. Franceschi, “A la luz de los incendios” *Criterio* 14 de julio de 1955. «Pienso en esas bandas de incendiarios. ¡Pobres! ¿De dónde salen? ¿Quiénes los explotan? Los conozco, porque he sido capellán de cárcel y porque me he ocupado de los hogares menesterosos. En cada ciudad de alguna importancia existe un bajo fondo compuesto de tenebrosos, redoblneros, rateros, carteristas, hombres de avería, estafadores, vendedores de estupefacientes e inmorales de toda categoría. Si alguna circunstancia les permite emplear libremente sus mañas, si hay quienes lo incitan y al mismo tiempo les aseguran la libertad, todas esas gentes se lanzan a la aventura, y fiadas en la impunidad multiplican los actos de delincuencia.»

¹⁸¹ Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Working Class 1946-1976* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 79

government, and even the then-current government of Pedro Eugenio Aramburu. One such leader, Augusto Rodríguez Larreta, criticized the government for not attending to workers' rights and too often using overly harsh means to crush dissent. He also shook off accusations that such criticisms of the government made him a suspected Peronist sympathizer, pointing to the "fifty days of peace" during the government of Catholic Nationalist general Eduardo Lonardi. Asked if he equated his pro-working class attitude with Peronist populism, and if he had said he was a "Peronist and proud of it" he said both yes and no:

It's false [to accuse me of saying that]. [Saying that] would have been hypocritical, when, considering Perón a declared enemy of his own people, I was a constant opponent of his governing method for twelve years. What I said in the Plaza Italia is that I was not Peronist [but that] if being on the side of social justice, economic independence and political sovereignty [made me a Peronist], then yes I was Peronist and very proud of it.¹⁸²

Another recognized author José María de Estrada, author of *The Nationalist Legacy (El legado del nacionalismo)* also supported Peronism's earlier Catholic influence without endorsing the exiled general that had created so much strife for the church in his last years in power:

¹⁸²“Un discurso discutido” *Azul y Blanco* 18 de julio de 1956. « Es falso. Hubiera sido una hipocresía, cuando, precisamente por considerar a Perón un enemigo declarado de parte de su pueblo, fui, durante doce años opositor permanente a sus métodos de gobierno. Lo que dije en Plaza Italia es que no era peronista, si serlo significaba ser partidario de La justicia social, de la independencia económica y de la soberanía política, entonces sí que era peronista y con gran honor de serlo.»

- [Question] Don't you believe sir that the moment has come to talk about some concrete aspects of Peronism, that is, the movement's more positive aspects, despite the false ideological direction and demagoguery with which its leaders marked it?

- [Answer] Without a doubt. As I said in my book, Peronism is still too current of a phenomenon [for us] to make a definitive judgment about its causes and motivations that determined its presence in our historical reality. The wounds inflicted then are still fresh. The harm done to the nation were more notable than the reasons-that in the beginning could have had some popular support among broad sectors of public opinion. Nevertheless, it's evident that the politician, the authentic politician, should be alert to Peronism's more positive aspects and know how to respond to popular desires. [This means] clarifying what democracy is and bettering the poorer classes.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ «Reportaje al autor de “El Legado del Nacionalismo» *Azul y Blanco*, 18 de julio de 1956. [Pregunta]- ¿No cree Ud. Que ha llegado el momento de encarar francamente algunos aspectos concretos del peronismo, esto es, lo que ese movimiento tuvo de positivo a pesar de la falsa dirección ideológica y demagógica que le imprimieron sus dirigentes? [Respuesta]-Sin duda, como digo también en mi libro, es todavía el peronismo un hecho demasiado reciente como para hacer una compulsiva definitiva de las causas que lo motivaron y que determinaron su presencia en nuestra realidad histórica. Están todavía frescas las heridas producidas entonces y resultan más notorios los males que afectaron y afectan a la nación que las razones-que en un principio pudo haber movido a aquel movimiento popular y que le valió la adhesión de un gran sector de la opinión. Sin embargo es evidente que el político, el auténtico político, debe estar, eso sí, bien alerta respecto de lo que pudo haber de positivo en el peronismo, y saber responder satisfactoriamente a los anhelos populares respecto de una clarificación de la democracia y de un mejoramiento de las clases humildes. »

This trend of separating Perón's later aggressions from his earlier pro-Catholic policies contrasted with Franceschi's zealous denouncement of working class sensibilities. These divisions did not just apply to Franceschi and Maria de Estrada. Ludovico García de Loydi claimed that Perón, not merely disgruntled followers, had deliberately set the church fires that had brought condemnation from Franceschi. Garcia de Loydi, like any good nationalist critic of an adversary, accused Perón of masonry. Others such as Mario Amadeo believed, like De Estrada, that Peronism's attending to the working class should be clearly separated from Perón's later anti-clerical push.¹⁸⁴ *Azul y Blanco* furthered this distinction. The paper chastised "the oligarchy and politicians" for repressing the demands of the workers. The article also referred favorably to the "movements of 1943 and October 1945" excusing the workers for being taken with a "caudillo." The article argued that workers' demands stand on their own, and that all sectors, from the "wrongfully labeled free unions" to the old-guard unions deserve an answer to their "just demands."¹⁸⁵ All told, Catholic opinion on the working class was not homogenous, and feelings toward the Peronists tended to correlate with feelings about the place of working class militancy in social thought.

Azul y Blanco, drawing on echoes of Perón's election rhetoric, questioned the turn of the 1955 government under Aramburu accusing it of falling under the influence of foreign interests. In one 1957 editorial, the paper criticized the government specifically for asking

¹⁸⁴ José Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad*, 53-55.

¹⁸⁵ Notas gremiales "Aspiraciones de la clase obrera" *Azul y Blanco* 11 de julio de 1956.

for military training (described as “collective intervention” in the article) from foreign countries that had acquired land, attempting to adopt foreign models of government. The article then chides “patriotic” officials for not purging these *vendepatrias* from its ranks.¹⁸⁶ Yet another editorial discussing “the crushing of Argentina” traced those who “handed the country over” to foreign interests. The article went as far back as to US ambassador Spruille Braden (1945), who had created the “blue book” in the 1946 election in an attempt to tie Perón to the Nazis and therefore influence the election in the United States’ favor. Appealing to a partially anti-Peronist readership, the author did not defend Perón. Rather, citing US author Summer Welles, compares Catholic Nationalist feeling to that of the US opposition to Roosevelt. They were glad to see Perón leave, but rallied behind many of the general’s old complaints regarding foreign intervention in domestic electoral affairs.¹⁸⁷

In summary, Perón initially counted Catholics as an important part of his constituency, partly based on anti-liberal precepts. After his rise to the presidency, the alliance turned more uneasy. While Catholics agreed with him on issues like education, they strongly disagreed on issues like prostitution and divorce. As Perón borrowed many of the symbols and rituals of the Church, tensions came to a head. Attacks against churches heightened tensions further and raised suspicions about the malleability of the working

¹⁸⁶ “El actual gobierno y su complicidad Anti-argentina: Se unieron al extranjero ‘Para humillar a la Patria’” *Azul y Blanco*, 30 de diciembre de 1957, 3.

¹⁸⁷ “Aplaudieron al Encargado del “Aplastamiento de la Argentina» *Azul y Blanco*, 18 de julio de 1956.

classes in the minds of many middle class Catholics. Other intellectual currents took a more conciliatory approach toward Perón. Many right wing Catholic intellectuals maintained a healthy distance from the person of Perón, while embracing and defending his ideas of national sovereignty and sharing his suspicion of foreign powers and international systems. Not all thinkers shared Franceschi's paternalistic view of the working classes as unruly mobs manipulated by personal charisma. Rather, drawing on Catholic social teaching dating back to the beginning of the twentieth Century, they encouraged class conscience, even as they counseled workers to reject revolution and to channel that conscience within existing political channels. However, Franceschi, far from purely decrying working class complaints, feared rather that inept or maleficent populist leaders could take those demands and resolve them in such a way as to destabilize the social harmony that he exalted.

THE JEWISH QUESTION: DIFFERING RESPONSES

For much of its history, the Argentine Catholic Church had embraced the old Spanish "blood libel" passed on by early Church fathers who saw Jesus' Jewish executioners as passing down the debt for his unjustified death. As mentioned before, early on, Rosas exploited the figure of Judas (for him the Jew per excellence) as a traitorous symbol of national subversion. As Jewish Argentine historian Federico Finchelstein writes, Julio Meinvielle ties Jews to Protestantism, Capitalism, and the Anti-Christ himself. Virgilio Filipe, thinkers such as Karl Marx (the father of Communism) and Sigmund Freud (the father of modern Psychology and thus analysis of sexuality, justified the stereotype of the revolutionary Jew.

Gustavo Franceschi also quickly tied Jews to international capitalism, arguing before World War II that their status as a people without a nation made an economic system based on international trade far more appealing to the Jewish collective. Initially, Franceschi's fear of alleged Jewish affinity towards revolution also led him to advocate turning a blind eye towards the Nazi persecution, even as he decried Nazi racism. Around the rise of the Third Reich in 1933, Franceschi reasoned that the rising anti-Semitism among German citizens responded to a "catastrophe" caused by Jews in Germany that risked spilling over into Argentina itself warning: "Let's be real: a great pogrom is no longer improbable among us."¹⁸⁸ Argentina's ambiguous position during and after the war also influenced this anti-Semitic attitude, as large groups of post-War Germans, collaborators, and sympathizers immigrated to Argentina. These groups (mainly divided between the Germans, Belgians, and Italians) did not arrive in a vacuum, instead finding already developed communities to help their transition.¹⁸⁹

However whereas writers such as Meinvielle and Castellani emphasized a strong connection between Jewishness and anti-patriotic agendas even after the horrors of the Holocaust had been revealed, by 1945, Franceschi attempted to walk back his own position on the "Jewish question." Using a post-war audience between Roman Jews and Pius XII as his starting point, Franceschi calling anti-Semitism an "intrinsic evil"

¹⁸⁸ Federico Finchelstein, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War*, 54-56. Ibid. P. 55 Quoting: Gustavo Franceschi, "Como se prepara una revolución," *Criterio*, September 14, 1933, 30. See also: "Antisemitismo," *Criterio*, December 7, 1933.

¹⁸⁹ *El impacto del nazismo en la cultura argentina: Sobre nazis y nazismo en la cultura argentina* by Ignacio Klich. Reviwed by Daniel Lvovich In: *Desarrollo Económico*, Vol. 43, No. 171 (Oct. - Dec., 2003), 496-497.

incompatible with Catholic teaching. Franceschi condemned two forms of anti-Semitism, one of physical violence and one of slander. Franceschi took on anti-Semitism and the racist determinism that laid behind it:

But if at every turn and every time that someone trips up with a distasteful action the fact that [such action] has been committed by a Jew, gradually you can put in the heads of the fools-and there are quite a few of them- the idea that the Jews, the race, the collective, are a group of sinister human beings capable of all sorts of crimes, and that this is the result of the blood that runs in their veins. From there, according to that logic, eliminating them from society becomes a social duty, to preserve it by any means [necessary], is only a step away. Such deep-seeded anti-Semitism is the gradual but effective preparation for that more violent [anti-Semitism].¹⁹⁰

Franceschi went further saying that “Christian charity” should “overcome all human prejudice” to “see in the Hebrews *our brothers* [italics mine] who we cannot hate without [being] criminals. Quoting Pius again, Franceschi reminded his readers that “Pius XII

¹⁹⁰ Gustavo Franceschi, “El anti-Semitismo” *Critério*, 6 de diciembre de 1945, 534-535. “Pero si en cada oportunidad y siempre que se tropieza con una acción reprobable se subraya que ha sido cometida por un judío, se logra paulatinamente meter en la cabeza de los incautos, -que son los más,-la idea de que *los judíos*, la raza, la colectividad, son un hato de seres nefastos capaces de todos los delitos, y que ello es producto de la sangre que llevan en las venas. De ahí a considerar que constituye un deber primario eliminarlos de la sociedad, como preservación de la misma y por cualquier medio, no hay más que un paso. Tal antisemitismo larvado es la preparación gradual pero eficaz del otro violento...“Espiritualmente somos semitas, pues invocamos a *nuestro padre* Abraham”, dijo en cierta oportunidad el Sumo Pontífice Pío XI. Si intentáremos pactar el antisemitismo, seríamos, pues, suicidas.”

said one time ‘We are spiritually Semites because we invoke our father Abraham.’”. If we practice anti-Semitism we would be committing suicide.”¹⁹¹

While such a change of heart may have fit with the times and showed a bit of political aptitude given the recent genocide uncovered, while the modern historian can still detect below the surface a tinge of apologist rhetoric and Franceschi’s undying support for the idea of a confessional Catholic state, with Spain as the prime example of magnanimous governance. Claiming that the Spanish containment and expulsion of Jews in 1492 constituted a nonviolent solution to a particular political problem Franceschi boasted “Look where you want to, you will find neither in dogma nor in moral [teachings], nor in the institutional ordering of the Church a single trace of Anti-Semitism. Christianity is not a counterpoint to Judaism, but rather the fullness of its beliefs and laws.”¹⁹²

THE DEMOCRATIC SHIFT: REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS

Argentina’s Catholic community underwent substantial development following the Fascist defeats in Europe. Catholic shifts regarding democracy’s legitimacy as a political method, and some thinkers’ (Franceschi for example) changing views on the Jewish question reflected this shift. Franceschi, who would have earlier at least tolerated any anti-Communist regime, conflated Communism with Nazi Fascism. He considered Communism to be the final stage in the 19th Century philosophy that had given rise to the “pantheistic” German right wing. Franceschi also turned from some isolationist

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid. “Búsqese cuanto se quiera, no podrá darse en el dogma, o en la moral, o en el ordenamiento institucional de la Iglesia con una sola huella de antisemitismo. No es el cristianismo una contraposición al judaísmo, sino la plenitud de su creencia y de su ley.”

Nationalist positions to embrace figures like Winston Churchill. In one editorial, he even lamented Churchill's defeat in Parliamentary elections.¹⁹³ In short, Franceschi seemed comfortable with democracy's more conservative and traditionalist variant.

However, Franceschi did not show complete comfort with popular governance, and showed some residual affinity for authoritarian solutions. Franceschi feared the masses even more than authoritarian governments however. In an editorial about the "lamentable" death of Benito Mussolini through "material circumstances outside the bounds of any natural, not just legal rules", Franceschi emphasized that the dictator's death came at the hands of "the ferocious masses." He warned the spectacle could tarnish the image of popular rule and obscure the cruelties of Mussolini's rule:

History will judge very harshly those rulers that put themselves above the law and believed that the "will to power" granted all legal powers. But the ferocious instincts unleashed in the last hours of these despicable [rulers], which seem like more vengeance than justice, may inspire pity on the part of future writers and delay the condemnation that [they or history] should impose on Mussolini's tenure.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ For the relationship between Nazism and Communism see: Gustavo Franceschi, "La política religiosa de la U.R.S.S" *Criterio* 9 de Agosto de 1945 (N° 908). For the Pro-Churchill editorial see: Gustavo Franceschi, "Las elecciones inglesas" *Criterio* 2 de agosto de 1945 (N° 907).

¹⁹⁴ Gustavo Franceschi, "Benito Mussolini" *Criterio*, 10 de mayo de 1945 (N°895). La historia deberá ser muy severa con esos gobernantes que se pusieron por encima de toda ley y creyeron que la "voluntad de potencia" otorgaba la suma de los derechos; pero los instintos ferozmente desencadenados que dan a las últimas horas de esos infelices un carácter aún más de venganza de que la justicia, son capaces de inspirar lástima a los escritores futuros, y trabar la sentencia de reprobación que lógicamente se impone ante la gestión de Mussolini.

In short, Franceschi constituted a complicated and somewhat contradictory bridge builder, disgusted by the excesses and un-Christian virtues of the authoritarian governments the Allies had just banished, but unwilling to embrace the risk that popular participatory democracy implied for Argentina and the rest of the world.

But Franceschi by 1945 did not flat out reject democracy, and defended it as legitimate, if not always preferable. Quoting Pius XII, Franceschi reminded his readers in a January editorial that democracy responded to “the needs of the moment” and did not concern itself with its “structure [and] organization” but rather with the treatment of the individual which, “far from being... a passive element in the social order is in fact, and should always be its subject, its foundation, its end.”¹⁹⁵ This quote echoed Maritain’s vision of the person as the foundation of a plural society that accepted “many forms.” Further echoing Maritain’s frustrations with merely formal democracy, Franceschi held that democracy could take many forms, either popular or monarchy. After all, a monarchy with a Parliament would, he reasoned, be as “democratic” in principle as a democracy which had transformed into an oligarchy.¹⁹⁶ If his 1945 views on democracy and the human person leaned toward Maritain, these views leaned on the personal respect he had for the philosopher, highlighting his breadth of reading, “insatiable curiosity”, and historicized theology that “captures the developments of the doctrines within the

¹⁹⁵ Gustavo Franceschi, “La alocucion de Navidad y la doctrina democratica” *Criterion* 11 de enero de 1945, 162,163.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

environment that favored their constitution.” Commenting on the Vatican’s acceptance of Jacques Maritain as French ambassador to the Holy See Franceschi commented:

The designation of Maritain [as ambassador] means that the most high ecclesial authority has no objection or reason to oppose him. Otherwise, and given that the current Foreign Minister of France, Mr. George Bidault is a Catholic of notable public action and deep personal faith, [the Pope] could have asked, in a discreet manner and before any official nomination, for another ambassador.¹⁹⁷

Franceschi went on the next month to make a Maritainian distinction between Communism and Marxism, in the process justifying the alliance of the Soviets and the other Allied Powers. He combated a notion that “confuses an accidental alliance between countries with a similarity of political doctrines between each one,” asking “Why do we fight totalitarianism?” He defined totalitarian not merely as the fascism that the Allies were fighting then, but rather any state that “depress[es] human dignity, the absorption of the whole person into the society and the denial that every man, however small, possess rights independent of the State, that he has not received from it, and that cannot be negated by governmental orders.”¹⁹⁸ In this last statement Franceschi revealed two interesting transformations. The first political transition indicates that he no longer gave

¹⁹⁷ Gustavo Franceschi, “Jacques Maritain, embajador ante la Santa Sede” *Criterio* 1 de marzo de 1945. “Significa la designación del Sr. Maritain que la más alta autoridad eclesiástica no tiene objeción alguna de principio que oponerle. De lo contrario, y puesto que el actual Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Francia, Sr. George Bidault, es católico de notoria acción pública y de honda fe personal, le habría pedido, por la vía reservada, y antes de toda designación oficial, otro embajador.”

¹⁹⁸ Gustavo Franceschi, “Democracia y Comunismo” *Criterio* 19 de abril 1945. “Su esencia consiste en la depresión de la dignidad humana, en la absorción total de la persona en la sociedad, en la negación de que todo hombre, así sea el más pequeño, posee derechos independientes del Estado, que no ha recibido de él y que no pueden ser aniquilados por disposiciones gubernamentales.”

as much weight to the idea of an organic society where humans are the parts, but rather, like Maritain, placed a value on the person *as individual* over and against the State. Second, Franceschi demonstrated that although he fervently opposed Communism, he was open to the possibility that other systems were worse. By asking why “we” fight totalitarianism and distinguishing between “accidental” alliance and political and philosophical coherence, while highlighting that Communism was against God’s purposes, Franceschi tacitly sided with the Allies on the pragmatic decision on who to fight near the end of the war. Franceschi’s moderate approach did not occur in a vacuum, but was part of a measured response to a democratic counterforce, a minority of Catholic intellectuals that argued against a literalist reading of Scholastic philosophy and for a more modern, nuanced, approach to political philosophy.

Younger Argentine thinkers in the 1950s, like Maritain before them, started to move away from and question the militant mandates of their 1930s forefathers, and started to compromise with the state. Christian Democrats began to make an impact on the hierarchy. A stark shift in priorities came on the issue, for example, of education. While previous generations had pushed for the public enforcement of Catholic values through education, Christian Democrats contented themselves with achieving the rights to act independently. With the ouster of Perón in 1955, Catholic thinker and ministry education minister Atilio Dell’Oro Maini issued decree number 6403/55, authorizing the creation of private universities in Argentina. He argued that such an authorization allowed for a plurality of voices.

Maini's argument drew fire from both sides of the political spectrum. On one side stood the classical liberal reformers. José Luís Romero, writing for *La Nación*, argued that private education represented only secret tactics to reinsert Catholic education back into the schools and that Argentina did not need to supplement public schools that already granted all students access to resources. Catholic thinker Mario Amadeo resisted the decree from the other side, arguing that Catholics deprived their children of moral instruction by allowing them to attend public school. By extension, Amadeo implied that society's duty towards moral instruction also prohibited such leniency regarding education.¹⁹⁹ However, where Amadeo's view had universal resonance in earlier years, dissenting opinions slowly moved into the mainstream.

A Catholic divide over the issue of religious and public education, unheard of in an era in which the faithful considered the hierarchy's authority unquestionable, represented what José Zanca, citing Max Weber calls the "internal secularization" of Catholics. In short, secular Catholics did not abandon their faith. Rather, they de-emphasized dogma to bring more attention to social action. This trend contrasted with the model proposed by *Rerum Novarum*, where Natural Law and Church authority sustained social action. In the traditional historiography, the intellectuals that fought for privatization instead of a national Catholic education were considered "less Catholic" facing down an "unquestionable" hierarchy which effectively controlled which political philosophies Catholics could attach their symbolic imprimatur.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ José Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad*, 90-92,102-107.

²⁰⁰ José Zanca, *Cristianos antifascistas*, 25-26, 29-31.

As mentioned previously, Catholics in the 1950s split along authoritarian and democratic lines with Franceschi acting as the bridge between the democratic and authoritarian intellectuals. Franceschi acted as this bridge because he was both a priest and head of a lay magazine. The opinions printed in his weekly magazine had the imprimatur of hierarchical legitimacy by virtue of his high profile and clerical position. For his part, Franceschi was well equipped to navigate these turbulent philosophical waters. Franceschi always remained skeptical of democracy, but had also criticized many of his contemporaries in the 1930s for trying to appropriate fascism in order to create a Catholic state that excluded diverse points of view. However, because of his death before the major reforms of the Second Vatican Council, history will be mute on how far his transition could have gone. As Zanca hypothesizes, his death possibly saved his moderate aura from many of the polarizations and dichotomies of the Conciliar and Post-Conciliar period.²⁰¹ Creating space for the new generation of 1950 and 1960s a newly progressive *Criterio* consolidated that stood for democracy and pluralism in the line of Jacques Maritain. On the other side, stood La Plata's *Revista de Teología* which opposed liberalizing trends. This ideological divide, already present during the 1950s, turned starker during the 1960s Conciliar period in which *Criterio* backed the Conciliar reforms (and Cardinal Congar in particular) and the *Revista de Teología* vigorously opposed new theological discussion.²⁰²

²⁰¹ Jose Zanca, *Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad*, . 43-45.

²⁰² Ibid.

These micro-divisions of these communities represented larger conflicts within the national church. Despite the progressive ascendancy seen during the period, the influence that authoritarian intellectuals had over the Argentine Episcopate was best exemplified in the bishops' proposals for discussion in the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s and their reaction to the Council itself. Argentina's Catholic nationalist history and its conservative ideology caused it to be one of the more conservative Episcopates regarding Church state relations and liturgical reform that it thought went too far.²⁰³ Much of this dissent was expressed through the disagreements over liturgical reforms, and to what extent the Catholic Church would be the "true church of Christianity."²⁰⁴ While the proposals of the fifty-one Argentine bishops attending the Second Vatican Council varied, high profile Argentine representatives such as Bahía Blanca bishop Jorge Mayer, Jorge Ramón Chalup of Gualeguaychú, Ramón José Castellano of Córdoba, Alfonso María Buteler of Mendoza, José Agustín Marozzi of Resistencia, agreed upon several proposals. The major concerns and proposals of the hierarchy included an official restatement of the ills of atheist materialism, Protestantism, Communism, Masonic societies, and the modernist secularization of society condemned by the First Vatican Council.²⁰⁵ The Argentine church was divided into two groups, the conservative

²⁰³ Fernando Carlos Urquiza, "Las transformaciones a la iglesia argentina: Del concilio Vaticano II a la recuperación democrática", (Universidad Nacional del Centro, 2006), p.3

²⁰⁴ Fortunato Mallimaci, "La continua critica a la modernidad: Análisis de los "Vota" de los Obispos Argentinos al Concilio Vaticano II" (Sociedad y Religión CONICET, N°10/11 1993), p.23. Ibid. Quoting Mons. Mayer, Mons. Castellano, Mons. Chalup, Mons. Buteler, Mons. Rodriguez and Olmos, Mons. Marozzi, p.15.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. Quoting Mons. Mayer, Mons. Castellano, Mons. Chalup, Mons. Buteler, Mons. Rodriguez and Olmos, Mons. Marozzi, p.15.

Nationalists who had been formed in the 1930s in the Nationalist (integralist) philosophy, and the more progressive elements of the church centered on theological and biblical studies in the various seminaries.²⁰⁶ The traditionalists held a majority, while the progressives were largely marginalized. Ironically, as the reforms were pronounced by the Council, the progressives were in a better position to act on these reforms, while the Church hierarchy, which had condemned what they saw as excesses of modernism, was left trying to figure out how to respond to the rapid reforms, reforms even more radically interpreted by the CELAM conference of 1968.²⁰⁷ To Nationalists, the splits described above represented what nationalist author and young Catholic militant Carlos Sacheri, in his book *La Iglesia Clandestina*, called “the dialectalization of the church.” Sacheri rejected creating a false dichotomy between correct tradition and necessary renovation of the Catholic Church i.e. the Council. By choosing one of the dichotomies, one had already lost the debate. In the words of Sacheri:

Such dichotomies such as “Integralism or progressivism, ‘Conservation or Renewal’, ‘Episcopal authority or Papal authority’, ‘Capitalism or Communism’ etc., do not leave room for intermediate definitions and unconsciously force the population to take positions for one possibility and against the other. The grand

²⁰⁶ Fernando Carlos Urquiza, *Las transformaciones a la iglesia argentina: Del concilio Vaticano II a la recuperación democrática*, Universidad Nacional del Centro, p.3-4. The count for the bishops in attendance at the Council comes from the Argentine Catholic News Agency. See: “Al Concilio Vaticano II asistieron 51 obispos argnetinos” *Agencia Informativa Católica Argentina* 26 de Nov. 2013. <http://www.aica.org/9600-al-concilio-vaticano-ii-asistieron-0-obispos-argentinos.html>. Link accessed April 26, 2015.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.5-7

majority... [do not realize] that all of these false dichotomies, and others like them, are *radically false*.²⁰⁸

The dichotomies expressed by Sacheri left the Nationalists feeling even more isolated and betrayed by the church's rapid change, a change that many Nationalists felt was destroying the unity of the church from within by way of modernist thinking.²⁰⁹

LEONARDO CASTELLANI: ARGENTINA'S PRIEST

Born in Reconquista Santa Fe, Argentina in 1899, Leonardo Castellani joined the Jesuits in 1918, was ordained in 1931, and studied philosophy and theology in Rome at the Pontifical Gregorian University. In 1934, he moved to Paris to get his doctorate in Psychology from the Sorbonne in 1934, and returned to Argentina in 1935. Fairly controversial due to his conflicts with more progressive superiors²¹⁰, the Jesuits expelled Castellani in 1949, but he befriended the Archbishop of Salta in 1959 and finally was granted the right to return to the priesthood in 1966. He continued to write until his death in 1981.²¹¹ Juan Fernando Segova described Leonardo Castellani, along with Julio

²⁰⁸ Carlos Sacheri, *La Iglesia Clandestina*, (5^o edición, Buenos Aires: Ediciones de Cruzamante, 1977), 56. "Tales disyunciones como 'integrismo o progresismo', 'conservación o renovación', 'poder Episcopal o autoridad papal', 'capitalismo o comunismo', etc. no dejan lugar a planteos intermedios y fuerzan psicológicamente a la gente a tomar posición a favor de una de las posibilidades y contra la otra. La inmensa mayoría...[no perciben] que todas esas antinomias y otras similares son *radicalmente falsas*."

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 15

²¹⁰ Right after his return to the priesthood, Castellani opened his journal *Jauja*. In his last editorial for that journal, he describes the great pain he felt in his "exile" from the ministry. He compares his exile to that of St. John of the Cross' Long Dark Night, and blames it on unorthodox enemies in the Church and the conciliar reforms. Castellani compared the Council reforms unfavorably to the Counterreformation lamenting the lack of heroic virtue in the bishops of the 1960s. See: Leonardo Castellani, "Directorial" *Jauja*, noviembre de 1969, 2-5.

²¹¹ Alfredo Sáenz, *El apocolipsis según Leonardo Castellani* (Pamplona: Fundación Gratis Date, 2005), 2.

Meinville, “one of the best Argentine writers, essayists, novelists, journalists, literary critics, poets, philosophers, and theologians.”

Castellani, through a series of essays, liked to work up to the abstract from practical realities, going from the theological, to the personal, all the way to the political. For Castellani though, the struggle between good and evil happened not in the political sphere per se, but in the everyday lives of human beings. His informal style, his willingness to use vulgar language to get his points across, made him controversial with some in the Church hierarchy. Nevertheless, Castellani took his job as a doctrinal gatekeeper very seriously. Scholars have a more difficult time pinning down Castellani’s philosophy than that of Meinvielle because the philosophy remains scattered throughout a series of essays, books, and novels instead of a few key works.²¹² Castellani held one theme common throughout his work: A dystopian vision of liberal Argentina. He often mocked Argentina’s system in writings and portraying its leaders as incompetent clowns controlled by a dictatorship of relativism and Jewish conspirators. In *El Nuevo gobierno de Sancho* Castellani mocked the dogmatism of a supposedly tolerant Liberalism through a scene in which government advisers must predict the results of an impending war and recite a mantra of liberal pro-democratic principles which mindlessly condemn the authoritarian principles that Castellani upheld:

²¹² Juan Fernando Segovia, "La legitimidad entre la teología y la política. Reflexiones sobre el orden político católico en Meinvielle y Castellani (1930-1950)", 98-99.

How are the speeches of dictators?-Violent-And their proceedings?-Aggressive.And their intentions? Exorbitant. And their attitudes? Intransigent. And their intentions? Criminal. And their gestures? Totalitarian.

Castellani continued after ridiculing the governor for kicking a servant:

[Question]:What does the Committee against anti-Semitism defend? [Response] Democracy. [Question] And Democracy what does it produce? [Response] Progress. [Question] And what does progress cause? [Response] Human Brotherhood above all races and religions. [Question] And Human Brotherhood above all races and religions in what is that based? [Response] The Argentine Liberal Tradition. [Question] And who said so? [Response] Sarmiento. Enough said.²¹³

Criticizing the liberal order and its godlessness, Castellani lambasted the moral legitimacy of the atomic bomb, and blasted the praise of *La Nación* columnist Enrique Larreta, who wrote after Japan's defeat "We thank God that the atomic bomb has come to the U.S.A." Leonardo Castellani criticized what he saw as the power to destroy pitted against the creative powers of the divine. He also criticized the United States for fomenting foreign cultures that replaces idyllic Spanish values:

²¹³ Leonardo Castellani, *El nuevo gobierno de Sancho 4 Ed.* (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca Dictio Vol.1), 24. «Como son los discursos de los dictadores? Violentos. Y sus procedimientos? Agresivos. Y sus pretensiones? Exorbitantes. Y sus actitudes? Intransigentes. Y sus intenciones? Criminales Y sus gestos? Totalitarios.

El Gobernador de la Insula Agatháurica dio un puntapié por equivocación a una escupidera que había dejado abandonada junto al trono el paje de guaria, y prosiguió diciendo: -Que defiende el Comité contra el Antisemitismo? -La democracia -La Democracia, que produce? -El progreso. -El progreso, qué causa? -La Fraternidad Humana, por encima de todas razas y religiones. -La Fraternidad por encima de todas razas y religiones en qué se basa? -En la Tradición Liberal Argentina. -Quién lo dijo? Sarmiento. -Basta.»

René Guénon says that modern science is demonic. In its essence it cannot be demonic, for that would be a manicheistic error; but it can be [demonic] in its direction. Science is the child of reason and is a high gift of God. However, man can abuse his gifts and most terribly the most high [gifts]. This technological know-how called *science, empiricism, and mathematics*, without wisdom, is not interested in knowing God and the soul, but rather, to know material, to master, it, to extract it... Science, channeled in a sacramental way to the denial of God and the monstrous deification of man, is maturing and turning into the Second Beast. [This beast] “puts all its power in the hands of the First Beast.” The detour of “Modern Science” that give us “marvelous and telling lies” and the miracles we ask of them, is one of the elements of this New Religion that we see forming right in front of our eyes. It takes on an outside appearance of the lamb and in its mouth [are stored] blasphemies... We’re not talking about old Roman Catholicism, which (according to Larreta) has utterly failed. We are talking about a new Christianity, made in the U.S.A, which can perfectly mix with Protestantism and Masonry.²¹⁴

²¹⁴ Leonardo Castellani, “La bomba atómica” In: Luis C. Vizcay, *Leonardo Castellani* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Culturales Argentinas, 1962), 24-25. «Dice René Guénon que la ciencia moderna es diabólica. En su esencia no puede ser diabólica, sería error de maniqueísmo; pero puede serlo en su orientación. La ciencia es hija de la razón que es un alto don de Dios. Pero el hombre puede abusar de sus dones, y más terriblemente de los más altos. A ese conocer tecnológico llamado hoy día *ciencia, empirismo y matematisismo* sin sabiduría, no le interesa ya conocer a Dios y al alma, sino conocer la materia, para dominarla exprimirla... La ciencia, orientada sacrilegamente hacia el desconocimiento de Dios y la deificación monstruosa del hombre, está madurando a convertirse en la Segunda Bestia, “que pone todo su poder en mano de la Bestia Prima”. La desviada Ciencia Moderna, que nos da “prodigios y portentos mendaces” por los milagros que le pedimos, es uno de los elementos de esa Nueva Religión que vemos formándose frente nuestro, que tiene aspecto exterior como el cordero y en su boca palabras de blasfemia... No se trata del viejo catolicismo romano, el cual (según Larreta) manifiestamente ha fracasado. Se trata de un cristianismo nuevo, made in U.S.A, que puede combinarse perfectamente en una persona con el protestantismo y la masonería.»

Castellani strongly defended the Hispanic tradition, Catholic values, and traditional Spanish laws which brought him into conflict with a man he had formerly had such kind words for, Jacques Maritain.

In 1951 during the democratic transition, in his work *So is Christ Returning or Not* [*Cristo vuelve o no vuelve*], Castellani commented on the Maritain's essay "Why we are neither Racists nor Anti-Semites." Castellani condemned the vague attacks of the French Catholic philosopher directed at "certain Spanish theologians [*ciertos teólogos españoles*]." Maritain, citing the critical report of Bartolomé de Las Casas of the Spanish treatment of indigenous races before they were declared human, accused theologians of one of many forms of racism. Castellani responded by questioning the integrity of Maritain's anonymous attack saying that it "should make one cry." Castellani mocked Maritain's international reputation saying "What disgusts us quite a bit is the Jew in service to propaganda, even if he is Christian and a philosopher... The French philosopher has left aside philosophy and is left only with the French, and not even that... What a disaster!" Castellani showed his disdain for internationalism (which he considered to be at the service of Jewish Capitalism and Communism questioning "If this is what they can call international Catholic information, we would prefer lacking it and being Catholic nationalists, or better yet, just simply Catholics. If these international Catholics have such good information, name the Spanish theologians!"²¹⁵ Castellani, as both a Hispanist and

²¹⁵ "El racismo" In: Leonardo Castellani, *¿Cristo vuelve o no vuelve?* 2° Ed. (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca Dictio, 1976), 196-197. "El que nos disgusta bastante es el judío puesto al servicio de la propaganda, aunque sea cristiano y filósofo. La Información Católica Internacional anda repartiendo un folleto de Jacques Maritain, titulado *Por qué no somos racistas ni antisemitas*. Es cosa de ponerse a llorar cuando uno

Catholic, criticized religious freedom, pluralism, and what he saw as ineffective public policy on the part of the Peronist government. In an essay titled “Small industries,”

Castellani responded to what he saw as the questions of the time:

Question: Will the [2nd] Quintenal plan fix the University?

Response: If the Blessed Mother wants it! I don’t know. What I do know is that there are philosophy professors for example-with whom you could raise the salary *two thousand and five-hundred* pesos and also by \$25,000 pesos monthly and *they won’t teach philosophy*...you can’t give what you don’t have.

Making fun of the government institutes that the populist government created Castellani dismissed hopes of development during a Peronist government:

Question: What good is the course they invented in the Humanities Institute in La Plata titled “Methodology of Teaching and Education Helping Science?”

Response: With that [type of] Science and ten cents you can take the subway from [Street] Federico Lacroze to Leandro N. Alem.

Castellani also criticized what he saw as corporatist indifference to individual professional working demands:

Question: What can you tell me about the taxi strike? Shouldn’t the municipality give in immediately?²¹⁶

lo lee....!que desastre!...si ésa es la *información católica internacional*, preferimos carecer de ella y ser católicos internacionales simplemente. Si los católicos internacionales tienen tan buena información, ¡que nombren a esos teólogos españoles!.

²¹⁶ Pregunta: ¿El plan quinquenal arreglará la Universidad? Respuesta-¡La Virgen Santísima y Nuestro Señor lo quieran! Yo no lo sé. Lo que yo sé es que hay profesores-por ejemplo, de filosofía-a quienes pueden aumentar el sueldo a *dos mil quinientos* pesos y también a 25,000 pesos mensuales, y *no van a enseñar la filosofía*...Nadie da lo que no tiene. Pregunta-¿En qué consiste y para qué sirve la asignatura

Response: By no means. Even if [the municipality] weren't right. [Giving in] would be the nefarious downfall of social authority. *“Get everything right without fail-says the duty of the noble and principles,-but if you get it wrong- keep at it, don't amend it.”* Especially when, in this case the Municipality seems to be right...But it's false what you claim that *“Perón is proposing a nationalization of the taxi industry, so similar, almost a thousand times over, to the hated Transport Corporation.”*

Castellani also dismissed pleas for religious tolerance especially of Spiritists, exclaiming that Jesus was not Spiritist. Castellani sarcastically gave the address, date and time of Jesus' endorsement of freedom of religion and pluralism that precluded religious education. He mocked such questions through an elaborate set of allusions that only seemed to befit a legitimate answer:

Question: Is it true that Jesus said: You can't impose beliefs by force, and therefore I'm against religious education in the schools?

que inventaron en el Instituto de Humanidades de La Plata, titulada: Metodología de la Práctica de la Enseñanza de la Ciencias Auxiliares de la Educación? Respuesta- Con esa ciencia y diez centavos usted puede ir en subterráneo desde Federico Lacroze a Leandro N. Alem. Pregunta- ¿Qué me dice de la huelga de los taxis? ¿No debe ceder de una vez el Municipio? Respuesta- De ninguna manera. Aunque no tuviera razón. Sería una caída funesta de la autoridad social. *“Acertar siempre y sin falla-debe el noble y principal,-pero si la acierta mal,-sostenella y no emendalla”*. Sobretudo cuando, en este caso parece que tiene razón el Municipio...Pero es falso lo que usted alega que *“Perón se propone una estatización del negocio taximétrico, parecida a la mil veces maldita Corporación de Transporte.”*

Response: Yes, it's true that Jesus said that at a three-legged table, where he was invoked by Fernando Saccone, President, and [Don] Inocencio Merlo [President of the Registry of Bahia Blanca], vice President of the Association of the Basil Scientific School [Spiritist School founded in 1917 in Buenos Aires], Spiritist Worship, Rawson 53, Buenos Aires, intersecting with [Norberto] Quirino Costa [Foreign Minister under Bartolomé Mitre], Videal, Salta 222, Canals (Cordoba), Venado Tuerto [Santa Fe city founded in 1935], Fraile Muerto [Southeast Cordoba], and Montevideo [also a Fraile Muerto there]. I'm not lying.

Question: What do you think of cottage industries?

Reply: I think that some of them deserve to be destroyed: The Costal University [In the capital city of Santa Fe], the taxi outlaws, and Spiritism for example are small industries.²¹⁷

Castellani sharply criticized what he saw as a liberal wasteland. However, Castellani praised one of liberal Argentina's principle proponents, Jorge Luis Borges, for the liberal's extraordinary writing even as he condemned the writer's heresy that "every cultured man is a theologian and faith is not indispensable." Castellani believed in neither

²¹⁷ "Las pequeñas industrias" In: Ibid. 208-209. Pregunta- ¿Es verdad que Jesús dijo: No hay que imponer por fuerza las creencias, por lo cual yo soy contrario a la enseñanza religiosa en las escuelas? Respuesta- Sí, es verdad que Jesús dijo eso en una mesa de tres patas, donde fue evocado por Fernando Saccone, presidente, y don Inocencio Merlo, vicepresidente de la Asociación Escuela Científica Basilio, Culto Espiritista, Rawson 53, Buenos Aires, con filiales en Quirino Costa, Vidal, Salta 222, Canals (Córdoba), Venado Tuerto, Fraile Muerto y Montevideo. No Miento. Pregunta- ¿Qué opina usted de la destrucción de las pequeñas industrias? Respuesta- Opino que algunas dellas merecen ser destruídas: la Universidad del Litoral, los *troperos* de taxis y el espiritismo, por ejemplo, son pequeñas industrias.

fully condemning nor fully endorsing him, but rather engaging his perceived theological heresies straight on.²¹⁸ As late as August 1936, amid the controversy surrounding Jacques Maritain's visit, Castellani wrote approvingly of the philosopher in the liberal Argentine journal *Sur*. Castellani called Maritain's worldview "profound, grounded and just. [His philosophy] is also notably opportune in Argentina." Castellani called Maritain's melding of current history with his theory of a "New Christianity" to replace the old, "full of clarity." Castellani ended diminishing his disagreements by "seeing the trees instead of [just] the leaves" and exhorting that "the latest works of Maritain are a must read."²¹⁹ Such a position towards a prominent liberal writer should drag Castellani's image out of the one-dimensional caricature that both his hagiographers and detractors draw. However, Castellani's biggest controversies would arise during his years as head of a journal.

JAUJA: CASTELLANI'S MOUTPIECE

Castellani's journal *Jauja* (1967-1969) represented his more conservative views, and a radical, but influential, Catholic fringe. In circulation in the years 1967, 1968, and 1969, critical years of the post-Conciliar period, the magazine constituted a haven for those who wished to flee the rapid reforms of the Second Vatican Council and its allegedly false dichotomies. Economically speaking, the journal continued to give voice to traditional popular and Meinvielle's anti-Semitic theory of an international Jewish conspiracy against the Argentine nation. Amancio González Paz wrote against the Alliance for

²¹⁸ Quoting Borges in "El enigma de Edward Fitzgerald, (2004): 66. In: Adur Nobile, Lucas. "Fascinación y rechazo. Borges ante los intelectuales católicos argentinos." In *VII Congreso Internacional Orbis Tertius de Teoría y Crítica Literaria*. 2009, 4-5.

²¹⁹ Leonardo Castellani, "Jacques Maritain" *Sur Año VI* (Agosto de 1936): 65-67.

Progress and International Development Bank as mere tools of the International Monetary Fund. Paz considers the IMF to be the governing body of the “Jewish assassin...not yet punished” that “fulfills [gradually] the Pories of Sion” despite the international press’ attempts to deny that such grand conspiracies existed. The author tied the hypothetical Jewish assassin to the “tragic” death of Catholic president John F. Kennedy, who died, the article implied in an almost paranoid twist, for opposing international financial monopolies. The end goal of all of this conspiring, according to the author, was to devalue the Argentine currency sufficiently to create enough poverty for social unrest. This poverty would pave the way for the entry of international Communism in the region.²²⁰

While none of these arguments should surprise the reader (and their continuity with old anti-Semitic ideas may even bore them), the author’s almost supportive lament of the “tragic” death jumps out. Given the obvious role of the United States in the direction of these financial agencies (the United States comprised of about half the world’s economy during this time), the author’s mourning of the dead president, who championed among other things a strict separation of Church and State, spoke to the strength of Kennedy’s Catholic mystique. Catholic nationalists’ willingness to employ US figures against what they saw as imperialist policies demonstrated the existence of fluid political boundaries and identities which allowed anti-US authors to separate its intellectuals, or even its defunct leader, from its grand imperial ambitions.

²²⁰ A.G.P [Amancio González Paz?], “Fondo monetario internacional” *Jauja*, enero de 1967, 8, 9.

Echoing similar critiques by Brazilian Christian Democrats regarding Johnson's intervention, Castellani's journal showered scorn upon the project, comparing democracy's project unfavorably towards both traditional colonialism and even Communist statism. Alejandro Sáez Germain, writing on the importance of ideas to the nation-state building project, criticized the US war effort in Vietnam in 1968, just as global protests from the Left heated up. Praising Hitler and Mussolini for attempting to "create a new European order," Stalin for at least fighting for the Communist ideal, Spain for reestablishing the old Spanish sense of Empire, and even the British for fighting for their view of civilization, the author called for grand ideas, "the morale of victory" to guide civilizations. For the "Yankee" lack of morals, the author lambasted the values that underpinned the US anti-Communist crusade:

The US soldiers that fight in the Vietnam area in "defense of democracy", do not feed their spirits neither with exalting war literature nor with the inflaming and powerful military prowess of some grand leader. They prefer the miniskirts of Raquel Welch, the clowns of the insipid Bob Hope and the five days of free time and eroticism in the prostitute islands prepared by the effective, and how lamentable it is, Yankee logistics. That is called the morale of defeat.

The author called the Soviet soldiers' willingness to die a "morale of victory" compared to the decadence and laziness of the US troops.²²¹ This article creates surprise not

²²¹ Alejandro Sáez Germain, "Sobre nosotros y la voluntad de suicidio de un imperio inútil" *Jauja*, Junio de 1968, 24. "Los soldados estadounidenses que combaten en el complejo Vietnam en "defensa de la

because of its predictable anti-US sentiment, but rather, the token praise it gives to the Soviet generals. In this worldview, unabashed Communism deserved respect. Liberalism, Communism in disguise, did not deserve the same admiration.

Similarly, US values and legal rules had ruined Argentina's culture by imposing outside traditions, as had the French Civil Code style, which had created by fiat, in the mind of the journals writers, synthetic laws that quickly fell into disuse without proper cultural backing. The journal offered traditional Spanish corporatism, ostensibly based on St. Thomas Aquinas as the answer to the failures of international liberal institutions.²²²

Castellani similarly mocked US religious leaders' efforts at evangelization in an almost uniform Catholic country as well as Liberal Protestantism's abandonment of Christ's fundamental teachings. Rebutting possible inroads by Protestant fundamentalists, Castellani built up the Argentines as a rational people not prone to the emotional pull of the alter call. He chided Billy Graham, who visited Buenos Aires in 1967, for his bad theology as well as poor marketing. Castellani cited an April 8, 1966 TIME article "Is God Dead" saying that the diversity of opinion represented the divisions of the "Christian atheist" Liberal protestant theologians (Thomas J. J. Altizer, William Hamilton, and Paul van Buren). Referring to Graham's emotional claim to have "talked and traveled" with

democracia", no alimentan su espíritu ni con literatura de exaltación guerrera ni con las inflamadas y poderosas arengas militares de algún gran jefe. Les agradan más las minifaldas de Raquel Welch, las payasadas del insulso Bob Hope y los cinco días de licencia extra y erótica en las islas prostibularias preparadas por la eficaz, cuanto que lamentable, logística yanqui. Eso se llama moral de derrota... Recientemente declaró Gialp, general en jefe de las fuerzas comunistas: "Nuestros soldados están dispuestos a morir. " Eso se llama moral de victoria."

²²² "Filosofía del Nacionalismo" marzo de 1969, *Jauja* Marzo de 1969, 10-11,14.

God, Castellani responds, “[W]e all believe that at a certain point, but we’ve never come to believe that we’ve played a hand of *truco* with him.”²²³ Castellani rebuked the U.S’ Protestant individualism that so many Latin American authors had come to associate with exploitation, like of philosophical rigor, and materialism.

Jauja also rejected the reforming trends of the Second Vatican Council calling for an opening towards modernity. H.I Giuliano rejected what he saw as a “total war” of the internal enemies of the Church against its tradition, waged by Jesuits such as Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955).²²⁴ The idea of a developing God and developing theology that implied universality threatened the Church’s exclusive claims to truth. He focused on Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini of Milan, who had argued that external and internal forces threatened the “riches” of its liturgical traditions. Guiliano chides Maritain for his refutation of a “Christian civilization” and his acceptance of Marxists and embrace of certain liberal principles in the name of tolerance.²²⁵ In the same issue, the journal reviews Julio Meinvielle’s book critiquing Maritain. The review described the work as “old wine” that gains [quality] with time.” The review praises Meinvielle’s struggle with the “talented” French theologian, but turned around heaping scorn upon Maritain noting “he was not so bright before becoming a reformer.” Echoing Sacheri’s disdain for dichotomies, the journal took offense at the very term “New Christianity” as implying a

²²³ Leonardo Castellani, “La nueva Didaje, Ha muerto Dios?” 18-20 Feb. 1967, 18-19.

²²⁴ Teilhard de Chardin, 1881-1951, was a semi-universalist Jesuit priest censored by the Vatican for his views that the world was developing toward one unified conscience. He has since entered the mainstream. See: Teilhard de Chardin, *The phenomenon of man*, (London: Collins, 1959).

²²⁵ H.L Giuliano, “Un nuevo Conciliarismo en la Historia de la Iglesia” *Jauja*, Enero, Febrero, Marzo de 1968, 36-39.

rupture with “the Old.” For the journal, this dichotomy paved the way for the terms “pre” and “post” Conciliar which only further divided the body of Christ. The author implied support of Charles Maurras, the founder of Action Française, by criticizing Maritain’s 1930 rupture with the group.²²⁶ Castellani’s anti-Conciliar allies found strange allies among some of the Conciliar fathers themselves. Julio Meinvielle wrote critically of Karl Rahner asking if he was the “famous” and “successful” theologian that others had claimed him to be, or if he merely continues the old gnostic tradition of humanity’s progressive and subjective progression toward truth. Liberals, and the press specifically, “who [drank] up [his works] with the jealousy of Beelzebub” used Rahner’s theology to argue for all sorts of doctrinal changes in Church teaching. Meinvielle found common cause with theologian Hans Urs Von Balthasar. Meinvielle shrewdly pointed out Balthasar’s uneasiness with Rahner’s proposed theological reforms, which the Conciliar father warns “could break the continuity of Christianity as it has been understood until now.”²²⁷

The journal may have criticized the Church’s present leaders, but it did not lack heroes, even those condemned by the church. *Jauja* allowed for high praise of the right wing fringe, praising the Falangist founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera. One article literally

²²⁶ A review of “De Lammenais a Maritain” by Julio Meinvielle *Jauja*, Enero, Febrero, Marzo de 1968, 56.

²²⁷ Quoting Hans Urs von Balthasar. *Cordula oder der Ernstfal; Einsiedeln*, Johannes Verlag, 1966. Fue traducido al español bajo el título de “Seriedad con las cosas” (Córdula o el caso auténtico). In: Julio Meinvielle, “Rahner, ¿teólogo católico o gnóstico” *Jauja*, abril de 1969, 15.

spells out Primo de Rivera's "imitation of Christ" with high rhetoric that would have disturbed many moderates in the Vatican:

Justice and Harmony" is the saying of José Antonio and the Falange. They testified to it with their blood. At thirty-three years old Christ died. At thirty-three years old José Antonio died. Christ's public and heroic life was three years as were José Antonio's last [three years]. Christ offered himself as a sheep before the slaughterer. From the beginning of his public life, José Antonio offered his: "We have sacrificed ourselves," he said in his first presentation. An iniquitous trial crucified Christ. An iniquitous trial executed José Antonio by firing squad.²²⁸

As for every saint's ability to imitate Christ, the author made clear that the Spanish leader rose to the top as far as saintly behavior was concerned saying "some might object: 'You have forgotten the Popes.' I have not forgotten them [in this comparison]."

There is no doubt that José Antonio was one of Christ's elect. [He was] in favor of *hispanidad*, Christianity, Civilization, and Culture. Father Castellani has said that he is "one of the kindest figures in all of history. A hero worthy of Homer's

²²⁸ Hilario Lafuente (Industrial Engineer), "Primo de Rivera y la empresa" *Jauja*, mayo de 1959, 7. "Justicia y Armonía" es el lema de José Antonio y de la Falange; y lo testimoniaron con su sangre. A los treinta y tres años murió Cristo, a los treinta y tres años murió José Antonio. Tres años de vida pública y heroica fueron los de Cristo, tres años de vida pública y heroica fueron los últimos de José Antonio. Como oveja que va al matadero se ofreció Cristo, desde el comienzo de su vida pública ofreció su vida José Antonio: "nosotros nos sacrificaremos" dijo en su primera presentación. Un juicio inicuo crucificó a Cristo, un juicio inicuo fusiló a José Antonio." (7)

[poems] (if Homer's heroes had been Christians)." Love was José Antonio's motivator. Love, Country, Bread, and Justice.²²⁹

Castellani and his journal also showed an enthusiasm for Rosas, who they saw as a great statesman intentionally erased or diminished in the history books. In his editorial in August 1968, Castellani contested the notion that a good country can be ruled by "one hundred years of tyranny." Decrying the rise of liberalism, Castellani referred to Rosas' defeat in 1852 at Caseros as "the grand national defeat" that led to "bribery, ignorance...idiocy" and "cretinization."²³⁰ In November 1968, comparing Rosas to the grand French monarchy and aristocrats, the "governments of the best," Adolfo Dante Loss condemned the incapable liberal merchants that took over after independence. Saying that Argentines understand how a Platonic governing of capable elites works, the author lamented, "Oh how we miss you Juan Manuel de Rosas."²³¹ Castellani also inserted himself into historiographical debates of his era, commenting on Rosas' biographies and histories of the French intervention by Federico Ibarguren, J.M. Rosas, Gabriel Puentes, and García Lupo. At one point, Castellani showed a certain frustration with the uncharitable view Mexican historian Carlos Pereyra took towards Rosas. Castellani chafed at what he saw as the apparent contradiction that Rosas was "not a statesman" but still "a wonderful organizer." Castellani claimed that if Rosas could not

²²⁹ Ibid. «No hay duda que José Antonio es un elegido de Cristo en favor de España, de la Hispanidad, de la Cristiandad, de la Civilización y de la Cultura. El Padre Castellani ha dicho de él que es "Una de las figuras más simpáticas de toda la historia; un homérica; (si los héroes de Homero hubiesen sido cristianos)". El Amor fue el móvil de José Antonio. El Amor, la Patria, el Pan y la Justicia.»

²³⁰ Leonardo Castellani, "Directorial" *Jauja*, Agosto de 1968, 2-4.

²³¹ Adolfo Dante Loss, "El Otro Baudelaire" *Jauja*, Noviembre de 1968, 9.

achieve the status of a great statesman then “we’ve never had one in our history...that’s our great punishment.”

Castellani also invoked religious explanations for Argentina’s political malaise and instability: “Enlightenment, liberalism, progressivism, and now ‘democratism.’” In his view, Argentina’s philosophical “heresy” had come from Spain, which had ironically accepted dangerous doctrines (Castellani might have pointed to Bourbon absolutism and the 1812 Constitution). Castellani deemed these “far worse” than the Protestant teachings of Luther and Calvin the Spanish had so wisely rejected in the 1500s.²³² Luis Soler Cañas approached the restoration of Rosas from a literary perspective Soler Cañas focused his article on a poem by John Mansfield who wrote about the Argentine leader when he arrived in Buenos Aires 1878. He described the poem that resulted, *Rosas*, an important “historical, critical or artistic [contribution] about Rosas [which] has had the most circulation in the world, however that which [also] is practically unknown to us.” Mansfield’s “spontane[ous] and preci[se]” tragic poems with epic landscapes reminded Soler Cañas of Shakespeare and Poe.²³³ Such cultural praise for the work of a British poet reminds historians that Rosas spent his exile years in England, and that even Catholic Nationalists looked beyond their borders for praise of their heroes ignored at home. While Castellani showed enthusiasm about Hispanic culture and governance at the theoretical level, by 1969 he had grown fairly pessimistic regarding the 1966 coup that

²³² Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” *Jauja*, abril de 1969, 3-5.

²³³ Luis Soler Cañas, “Primeras Imágenes de Don Juan Manuel de Rosas en la poesía del siglo XX” *Jauja*, febrero de 1967, 16.

had brought Oganía to power with a promise to return traditional Hispanic values.

Castellani criticized the *Revolución Argentina* saying it is a revolution “in name only.”

He speculated that a real “National Revolution” would be based on a monarchy, or at least a life president, elected indirectly by the governors of the different provinces.

Following the classic corporatist model of representation by social profession, Castellani also suggested that Parliament should not be divided by region, but by five major social interest groups: Labor, National Defense, Religion, the intellectual class, and then last of all, geographical region. These interests together would form “a grand political team” that would check the excesses of a possible tyranny.²³⁴

Specifically, he criticized the Revolution for implementing top-down laws that stripped individual families of education choices and ignored “national customs.” Castellani argued for pragmatism, arguing that state education decrees that tried to “create new customs” would not “catch on.” In his critique, Castellani combined the philosophical and the practical, rejecting public schools (which dated back to Napoleon’s monopoly of education) as mere “communist” factories. “[T]he worst [scenario] is not an irreligious school, but an ineffective one” he wrote. Such a factory creates an “explosive animal that produces if it’s tame, and revolts if it’s mad.”²³⁵ Still others in Castellani’s circle such as Bruno Jacolvella took direct aim at the traditional Nationalism for pushing elite ideologies and cultural agendas such as education and international idealism instead of

²³⁴ Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” *Jauja*, octubre de 1969, 5-6.

²³⁵ Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” *Jauja* mayo de 1969, 3.

focusing on the needs of the working class and the day-to-day dignity of its citizens.²³⁶ Such critiques should not surprise readers, as Oganía had at one time constituted one of the moderate *azules* of the government, and may have been less than enthusiastic about supporting Catholic Nationalists exclusively despite their initial optimism.

CONCLUSION: CABILDO AND THE COUP OF 1976

As Argentina entered the 1970s, the chaos of the Peronist period ushered in a new wave of clerical and guerrilla radicalism. On one side stood the Catholic-inspired Montoneros and the Ernesto Guevara inspired People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). On the other side fought right-wing paramilitary groups and traditionalist trade unions that awaited the return of Juan Domingo Perón to reestablish the socially conservative, but worker friendly, state discussed earlier in this chapter. Lamentably, the tenure of Perón's proxy government (Héctor La Cárpora served as Perón's hand-picked president in 1973), and his Perón did not provide the stability nor the ideological certitudes that his followers expected. His death, and the unstable rule of his second wife Isabel Perón, eventually further polarized Argentine society. This polarization swept up (even further) Catholic militants, who called for drastic measures in order to return to what they saw as normalcy. The social consensus that rejected social instability, paved the way for the

²³⁶ Bruno Jacolvella, "Desnacionalización del Nacionalismo o el Revisionismo Revisado" *Jauja*, Enero, Febrero Marzo de 1968, 25.

“Process of National Reorganization” which lasted from 1976-1983 and cost the lives (or disappearances) of 19,000-30,000 Argentines.

Before the disturbances of the 1970s, as José Zanca pointed out in his work, Catholic democrats played an important role in the disputes over the Second Vatican Council. They constituted a substantial minority of religious thought, especially in the area of social action in the poorer areas of Argentina. Thus, historians would be negligent to ignore them in evaluating how the Argentine church arrived to its present day centrist position. However, during the crucial time period of the coup, this school of thought lost out because it did not have the backing of the Church hierarchy, which had stuck with the “safe” option of a loyal priesthood with a top-down structure and a military that would enforce Catholic values. But after their drawn out victory during the Conciliar period, how did the Nationalist leaders actually respond to the 1976 coup, considered now to be the bloodiest in Argentine history? Did the most effective campaign against “subversion” and progressive values that even reached into the Church itself actually please them? Yes and no. The Catholic trajectory tracks through the stages of elite middle-class literary Catholicism, Spanish Fascism, conservative Catholic alternative democracies, and the reactionary theology of the anti-Conciliar hierarchy. As such, Catholic Nationalists were well positioned to both accept the anti-Communist justifications the military government offered for taking power, but were equally positioned to be disillusioned and call for more radical action than the “market-liberal” dictatorship would allow.

Surprisingly, Nationalist leaders even today say they “resisted” the military dictatorship’s economic policy. Many times this statement misses an important distinction between

resistance and right wing criticism. Right wing Catholics' claims that they "opposed" the dictatorship on economic and ideological grounds (from the right) conveniently gives Nationalists a way in their own minds of skirting around the military's unpopular economic policies and failed military campaign even if they readily embrace the disappearance of 19,000-30,000 Argentine citizens. Nationalists, however, do have the fog of war that at least partially obscures the historical certitude on their rationale for supporting the *Proceso*'s worst excesses. The regime was avowedly anti-Marxist, made traditional Catholic values the center of its moral justification for the armed coup, and spoke the language of God and Country by appealing to the "two pillars" of Argentine identity, Church and Military.²³⁷

According to Catholic Nationalism, a coup was licit to prevent anarchy, tyranny, or a disruption of the natural order.²³⁸ However, there is evidence of some friction between the dictatorship in its actions, and in the Catholic Nationalist ideology that it tried to appease for ideological cover. After *Criterio* became more moderate in the wake of the death of Franceschi in 1957²³⁹, the Catholic Nationalists movement had no one single consistent arena to express the arguments they had put forward in 1930 with nationalism and fascism at its height. In 1973 however, *Cabildo: Contra el caos* began to circulate. *Cabildo* continued the anti-capitalist, anti-Marxist rhetoric of Franceschi's *Criterio*,

²³⁷ Mark J. Osiel, "Constructing Subversion in Argentina's Dirty War", *Representations*, No. 75 (Summer, 2001), p.121.

²³⁸ "Historia Argentina: Una Entrevista con Antonio Camponetto" *La Hora de Juan Cruz, el 29 de septiembre, 2011*. <http://lahoradejuancruz.blogspot.com/2010/09/historia-argentina-entrevista-al-dr.html>.

²³⁹ In an editorial on March 11, 1976, *Criterio* expressed its opposition to the impending coup claiming that all democratic options had not been exhausted at that point. This denotes a clear departure from the editorial stance of Franceschi.

adding the accusation of an international financial conspiracy to its pages. *Cabildo* shows its suspicion of international news sources through its responses to a *New York Times* article petitioning for the freeing of a political prisoner Jacobo Timerman. *The New York Times* is labeled a “Marxist super-capitalist” newspaper, hijacked by the Argentine exile community attempting to unduly influence the government. On the covers of the 1976 *Cabildo* editions one sees conflation of Jewishness with subversion.²⁴⁰ *Cabildo*, in its first publications in 1973, was against the flailing, but democratically elected government of Isabel Perón, which they believed was ineffective and an example of democracy at its worst. Due to her ineffectiveness at controlling the various guerrilla groups, these organizations effectively targeted prominent Catholics for assassination, such as the shooting of Carlos Sacheri, one of the main Catholic Nationalist activists at the time.²⁴¹ Thus, *Cabildo* only increased their criticism of Isabel Perón, the political system, and the idea of democracy itself. Her adviser José López Rega, was even more despised for his centralization of power.²⁴² Their criticism of López Rega eventually led to their being

²⁴⁰“Algo para recordar”, *Cabildo* n° 14, 2da.ép.marzo 1978, p.13. For the anti-Semitism distinction See: Quoting Antonio Caponnetto (responding to a reporter’s question regarding the concept of Jews as a “Radical Synagogue”): “Con los judios tenemos una enemistad teológica. Sabemos con nuestro Señor que son ‘los hijos del padre de la mentira’...que éste gobierno es el gobierno con mayor número de judíos que se recuerde...pero no sé si conforman una ‘sinagoga’ porque dentro de todo el término connota sacralidad. Mas bien un ‘trust’ impio,deprecador, usurero y corrosivo del alma Cristiana y argentina...el problema no es el sionismo a secas, sino en tanto y en cuanto éste es una expression y un fruto descartado del judaísmo. Hay una cuestión política sin duda, y económica y social, pero en el fondo...palpita una cuestión teológica.” Antonio Caponnetto, *Del proceso a de la Rúa: Una Mirada nacionalista sobre 25 años de política argentina 1986-Presente*, Vol.II (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Hispanidad, 2001), p.410-411. For the conflation See: Cover, *Cabildo*, 2da Epoca Abril 1977 Año I-N°7; Cover, *Cabildo*, 2da Epoca Nov. 1977 Año II N°-11

²⁴¹ “Carlos Alberto Sacheri: Martir de Cristo y de La Patria,” *Cabildo*, Enero 1975, Año II-N°21, p.18,19.

²⁴²Vicente Gonzalo Massot, “El estado soy yo”, *Cabildo*, Febero de 1975, Año II-N°22, p.7

shut down in 1975, until they were able to reopen under the new Junta Militar.²⁴³ When the journal reopened, it continued to criticize Videla, considered a moderate when compared to the rest of his junta, from the right. *Cabildo* was censured and sued due to this editorial for “slander” against the dictatorship, that is, assuming that the dictatorship was perhaps not as Catholic or Nationalist as they professed.²⁴⁴

This being said, the resistance of the Nationalists to the Videla regime, and the consequences of this opposition, can definitely be overstated. Nationalists rejected, and to this day reject, the very idea of human rights as “the new myth of a decadent civilization that itself threatens to be a violation of true personal and national dignity.”²⁴⁵

For Antonio Caponnetto²⁴⁶, the editor of *Cabildo*, and most Argentine Catholic Nationalists, “human rights” is only an extension of “Masonic and communist ideologies” that had been consistently condemned throughout modern history.

Caponnetto argued in short that natural law, not rights constructed by human standards, should define the dignity that a human being deserved. For this reason, Nationalists supported the military when it dismissed human rights, and criticized it when it appeared

²⁴³*Cabildo*, 2da. Epoca- Año I-Nº 1 Agosto 1976, p.13.

²⁴⁴*Cabildo* nº 14, 2da.ép.marzo 1978, p.5

²⁴⁵Antonio Caponnetto, *Del proceso a de la Rúa: Una Mirada nacionalista sobre 25 años de política argentina 1975-1986*, Vol.I (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Hispanidad, 2001), 57.

²⁴⁶ Caponnetto is the revisionist historian mentioned earlier in this paper. He continues to be a fierce critic of the centrist wing of the Church to this day, questioning for example the legitimacy of the Conclave that brought Jorge Mario Bergoglio to the throne of Peter. He argued that while the Holy Spirit was present, and the authorities were legitimate, that a lack of prudence might have led the Cardinals to ignore the moves of the Holy Spirit, therefore electing a candidate God might not have in fact preferred. See:

<http://nacionalismo-catolico-juan-bautista.blogspot.com/2013/03/antonio-caponnetto-sobre-el-pontificado.html>. Date accessed: March 30, 2015.

to give in to international pressure to enforce human rights.²⁴⁷ The magazine consistently praised the military's performance on the battlefield while condemning what it saw as equivocation and attempts at moderation in areas such as the regulation of education and the freedom of religion. In one case, the magazine criticized the dictatorship's reversal on letting Jehovah's Witnesses practice their religion. According to the nationalists, this sect undermined the two basic pillars of the state: God and military vocation. To allow a sect to practice their errant religion would be to undermine the very foundations of society that provide *stability* against the divisiveness of *subversive* ideas pleasing with the government that "[m]ore than ever, it is necessary to defend to the death the principle of national unity, a unity that can only come from [the roots] given to us by the Hispanic-Catholic tradition."²⁴⁸ Therefore, the Church and the militants it supported were hardly "complicit" in the passive sense. Right wing militants in the torture chambers during the Dirty War followed in a long tradition of anti-Northern sentiment, a disdain for the rule of law in the liberal sense, and a religious conviction that transcended simple questions of economic instability or mere public order. This religious fervor showed itself literally in sharp disputes and parodies of international progressive Catholic figures and the tenets of Liberal governance. Disputes and disagreements with Jacques Maritain and his idea of a confessional Catholic tolerance and a building of a "New" Catholic republic to replace a Middle Ages Catholic utopia, facilitated the cold-blooded "accidental" deaths of the

²⁴⁷ Ibid. p.29-34

²⁴⁸ "La subversion que también debe combatirse: Un fallo lamentable", *Cabildo 2da epoca Año I n°9* Agosto 1977,p.42. «Nunca como ahora es necesario defender a muerte el principio de la unidad nacional que no puede ser otra que la que nos viene dada por la Tradición Católica e Hispánica.»

progressive Church leaders mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. The length of time that Nationalists criticized from the margins of power does not prove the correctness of their ideas, but might speak to the sincerity of their hearts. For Nationalists that had passed, the ghosts of the past had nothing to do with the photos with no bodies to match them, but rather, the failure to pull “the Clandestine Church” permanently from the shadows of a tepid Vatican leadership, despite their willingness to stain both the sword and the cross with the blood of the unworthy.

Chapter Three: Liberty through Order: Tracing Brazilian Catholic Exceptionalism, 1930-1970

The previous chapter laid out Argentina's clear preference for authoritarian solutions to political problems, especially working class problems that sowed distrust in high ranking military officials. Such ideological polarization, and the Argentine church's closeness with military officials, created an environment which left little room for compromise or concessions. How did the Brazilian Church, which also had a strong right wing Catholic movement, respond to the government's democratic and dictatorial projects? This chapter attempts to trace the complex relationship between the Catholic press and various government institutions in the midst of various stages of authoritarian rule. In the first example of such a relationship, intellectuals during the *Estado Novo* (1937-1945) divided tasks within the state apparatus. Some journals achieved collaboration by defining cultural issues around the state project while others merely further developed the ideas of the biggest journals.²⁴⁹ Whether Catholics related to the regime of Getúlio Vargas, or considered themselves an independent center of power, the Catholic press would appropriate Vargas' model. The *Centro Dom Vital* would serve as the center of Catholic lay-thought in Brazil, with other journals and weeklies acting as intermediaries and interpreters. Scott Mainwaring divides the Church into two periods in the "long" 20th

²⁴⁹ To read more on the cooptation of elites in general during the *Estado Novo* see: Monica Pimenta Velloso, "Uma configuração do campo intelectual" Ch.3 In: Gomes, Ângela Maria Castro, Mônica Pimenta Velloso, and Lucia Lippi Oliveira, *Estado Novo: ideologia e poder* (Rio de Janeiro:Zahar, 1982), 76-77.

Century. From 1891 with the separation of Church and state to 1910, the Church focused on internal affairs, while from 1916-1945 the Church actively engaged in politics to enforce its agenda. Mainwaring also notes three different types of Catholic: The modernizing Catholic who wanted to make the gospel more accessible, the traditionalists who believed in creating a confessional Catholic state, and progressives who emphasized social justice as a main priority.²⁵⁰ *A Ordem* housed all three types of these intellectuals during its golden years (1930-1960). However, Catholic newspapers and journals did not share the same organizational structure as the handpicked cultural journals of the *Estado Novo*. As the reader will see later on, papers and journals often cited each other for reinforcement and diffusion. Constant citation signified the universal importance and renown of intellectuals such as Alceu Lima and Church leaders such as Archbishop Dom Hélder Câmara. However, even early on, major centers of Catholic thought attempted to compile special sections that reinforced their case against modernity through local examples of religious victories won, Communist threats rising or foiled, or new intellectual breakthroughs in philosophy and theology. While a shift in editorial policy in one journal did not mean an instant shift in a corresponding regional media outlet, my research has encountered significant consistency across major Brazilian literary platforms despite what other scholars claim about the political inconsistency of centers such as the

²⁵⁰ Scott Mainwaring, *Igreja Católica e Política no Brasil, 1916-1985* (São Paulo: Editoria brasileira, 1986), 47,56-57.

Centro Dom Vital.²⁵¹ In short, while others argue that a change in political position constitutes a philosophical rupture, I argue that philosophical consistencies weigh more than those changes, which occurred pushed by new observations, especially regarding how intellectuals viewed authoritarianism after the Second World War. Such philosophical consistency, even in the face of changing political realities, gave the intellectuals from the Christian democratic tradition the flexibility to maintain their categories of analysis, even as the writers many times categorize or rethought how specific actors fit into them.

José Luis Bendicho Beired especially addresses the role of state formation in shaping Catholic thought. In the case of interwar Brazil and Argentina, Brazilian intellectuals' ability to create mutual interests with the state and the Argentines' inability to do the same during an anti-clerical Radical government reasonably account for the difference in the groups' respective moderation or radicalization.²⁵² Roberto Romano, suggests that a "flexible and autonomous" Church discourse may break through the usual binary analyses that color Church historiography. His theologically oriented approach recognizes that "unquestionable notions," such as the Church's complete subservience to oppressive state ideologies, weaken historical analysis and avoid larger philosophical issues. Traditional historical methodologies fail to take into account the Church's

²⁵¹ Leandro Luiz Cordeiro, "Alceu Amoroso Lima e as posturas políticas na Igreja Católica Brasileira (1930-1950)" *PhD diss., Dissertação de mestrado em história* (Maringá: Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2008), 157.

²⁵² José Luis Bendicho Beired, *Sob o signo da nova ordem: Intelectuais autoritários no Brasil e na Argentina*, (São Paulo: Loyola, 1999), 67-68.

theological basis in hierarchy as well as its historical memory as a “church always reforming.” In short, social analyses alone miss the obvious: The stated mission of the Church as a real motivation for its actors even on the political stage. This mission often came into conflict with the ruling elites in Brazil. Although it took a defensive posture towards Republican ideas for the sake of its own existence, the Catholic community developed “intellectual vanguards” of its own even as it relied on the state to help push through many of its social programs.²⁵³ Other scholars such as Marcelo Ridenti have pointed to Popular Action and the Catholic University Youth (JUC) as examples of groups that challenged the Church hierarchy’s emphasis on the spiritual at the expense of practice in the 1950s and 1960s in the lead up to the Council. The author traces Maritain’s influence upon these figures arguing that before the Cuban Revolution, the groups sought a balance between sluggish consumerism and statist Communism using Maritain’s “historical ideal.” Maritain’s vision eschewed the idea that an idyllic medieval past was retrievable, but nevertheless employed Thomism and scholastic views of the Human Person to critique two concepts Maritain considered toxic to the human condition. Ironically, this anti-hierarchical group employed a vision later fully embraced by the Church at the Second Vatican Council, formed the initial basis for the JUC’s activism. The group split between a Maritainian wing and a more personalist wing consisting of Mounier and Jesuit progressive Teilhard de Chardin. Nevertheless, all of

²⁵³ Roberto Romano, *Brasil: Igreja Contra Estado: Crítica ao populismo católico* (São Paulo: Kairos Livraria e Editora LTDA, 1979), 11-15.

these groups maintained a tie to sociological priest Louis-Joseph Lebret who influenced both Lima and Camara, the two monoliths of Brazilian Catholicism.²⁵⁴

I will trace the period of “Rechristianization” and then liberalization from 1930-1964 and also by looking at the reach of progressive intellectuals like Alceu Lima and the hierarchy’s support for the Conciliar reforms. I will also argue that Alceu Lima had a disproportionate influence even in the local Catholic press of Minas Gerais, the center for conservative Catholic militancy in Brazil during this time period.²⁵⁵ Tracing this period in tandem with the different trajectories conservative and liberal authors should highlight the Brazilian Church’s principled stance in Brazil regarding human rights. This stance, especially the voices of the Northeastern Bishops, against the state’s excesses made the Church appear to be “one of the few institutions capable of confronting the state [and]...appear like the defender of human rights *per excellence*.”²⁵⁶

PRECURSORS TO LIBERTY: CONTEXTUALIZING THE BRAZILIAN CHURCH’S INTELLECTUAL TRADITION

The state of the Brazilian Church starting from the late 19th Century mirrors the “church under siege” faced by the Argentines. The Brazilian Church gave little ground to those clergy considered reactionaries, quickly allowing moderate measures such as the

²⁵⁴ Marcelo Ridenti, “Ação Popular: cristianismo e marxismo.” In: Marcelo Ridenti & Daniel Aarão Reis, *História do marxismo no Brasil* (Campinas: UNICAMP, 2002), 216, 219-222.

²⁵⁵ For a history of the early militancy in Minas Gerais, See: Henrique Cristiano José Matos, *Um estudo histórico sobre o catolicismo militante em Minas, entre 1922 e 1936*, (Belo Horizonte: Editora O Lutador, 1990).

²⁵⁶ Roberto Romano, *Brasil: Igreja Contra Estado: Crítica ao populismo católico*, 28, 45-46.

separation of church and state, civil marriage, lay cemeteries and Non-Catholic public education. Such a vision appeared even during the Imperial period, where Dom Pedro II, an admirer of the Enlightenment, considered Catholicism useful for maintaining social stability without encroaching upon the king's political dominance. In fact, liberal elites saw a privatized, apolitical, and spiritualized church as a political asset. William de Souza Martins considered the Vatican's condemnation of modernity a "divorce" from the world, which encourages a separation of the spiritual and the political.²⁵⁷ Brazil's previous monarchical structure had nonetheless set up the return of Catholic intellectuals in an important way. As Brazilianist historian Dain Borges notes, while the Imperial government often burdened Church officials with the paternalistic requirements of the *Padroado* (approval of Bishops and control of the circulations of ecclesial letters etc.), they trained seminarians during the mid-1800s that would later go on to become some of the few political activists in the country at the time. The government decided to break the hold of traditional religious orders but also to incentivize newer, and well-educated groups into the country. This included the Jesuits who had suffered during the Bourbon expulsion. Anti-clerical sentiment softened in the midst of debates on the abolition of the slave trade, but eventually returned with the coup and the founding of the Republic in

²⁵⁷William de Souza Martins, "Igreja e Estado no Brasil oitocentista: um diálogo com La Iglesia católica y la formación del Estado-nación en América Latina en el siglo XIX. El caso colombiano, de Luis Javier Ortiz Mesa" *Almanack. Guarulhos*, n.06, (2º semestre de 2013): 27, 29.

1889 as well as in reaction to various millenarian movements which played into a state narrative of Catholic subversion.²⁵⁸

Catholic intellectuals, reacting to the growth of other political and cultural movements in the 1920s that attempted to fill the void and solve Brazil's national crises, affirmed the primacy of spiritual matters over political and social matters.²⁵⁹ In this regard, during the late 1920s, Jackson de Figueiredo, the founder of the Centro Dom Vital and the journal *A Ordem* was a man, as Francisco Iglesias describes him, "possessed by his ideas and living them frenetically." He would take up the call to bring about a "restoration" of order in Brazil. His attitudes reflected a larger European disillusionment with the failures of Liberalism and the rise of Communism in the interwar period. Figueiredo saw liberalism as antithetical to the common good, and as willing to aid the middle class, but unwilling to regulate it when necessary. From his religious point of view, the Middle Ages served as a Golden Age to be recovered, much like thinkers of the Renaissance valued Antiquity.²⁶⁰ Contrary to much of the historical consensus however, I argue the theological division between a spiritualized Church and a political world drew not from Platonic and monastic traditions of fleeing the world, but was itself a political tactic of elite Catholic intellectuals to discredit existing secular philosophies.

²⁵⁸ "Catholic Vanguards in Brazil," in *Local Church, Global Church: Catholic Activism in Latin America from Rerum Novarum to Vatican II*, edited by Stephen J.C. Andes and Julia G. Young [forthcoming, Catholic University of America Press, 2015], 5-6,8,11.

²⁵⁹ Leandro Luiz Cordeiro, "Alceu Amoroso Lima e as posturas políticas da Igreja católica no Brasil, 1930-1950", 28

²⁶⁰ Francisco Iglesias, *Historia e Ideologia* (São Paulo: Editora Perpectiva, 1969), 109-114,115.

Catholics' abrupt entrance into full-fledged militancy in the 1920s and 1930s fomented radical and often authoritarian positions. Militancy was, as noted in previous chapter, in the Monarchist reactionaries and later in the Fascist ideologies circulating during the 1930s. Such ideologies led sometimes to selective readings. As Lorena Madruga Monteiro points out in her article on Maritain in Brazil, Jesuit groups in Rio Grande do Sul took only the early anti-Modernist writings of Maritain into account when evaluating the author. While they typically admired his reinterpretation of Thomism, their anti-Communism obscured Maritain's shift toward a Christian democracy that would allow for dialogue with the Communist.²⁶¹ Because of the authoritarian reception of even pluralist European authors, Brazilian Catholic authoritarianism is often associated with racism and all types of European fascism. In its centralization of society within the state and limits of basic freedom, a Church-backed authoritarian regime can be perceived today as overlapping with the worst trends of the 1930s. Historical proximity and similar myopic visions (anti-Semitism and a focus on national traditional values) lend Nationalist regimes to comparisons to the racist and "blood-pure" policies of the Third Reich and the all-encompassing Italian Fascism of Mussolini. However, such an association would not just be an error of degree, but of fundamental substance. Even Catholic authoritarianism was diametrically opposed to the fundamental tenets of the Third Reich and suspicious of Mussolini's statist influences. Contrasting with these regimes, Catholic authoritarians find their specific identity. Regarding Germany, during the early years of the 1930s,

²⁶¹ Lorena Madruga Monteiro; André Drumond, "A democracia na obra de Jacques Maritain e sua recepção pelos círculos católicos brasileiros" *Revista do Núcleo de Pós-Graduação Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais* Nº 18 (Universidade Federal de Sergipe, 2011): 67-68.

Catholics walked a delicate line regarding Hitler rise and his treatment of the Jews with the Nuremberg laws. In *A Ordem*, some authors, such as Osorio Lopes, wrote that Hitler's 1932 response to the Jewish question was both historical and proportionate, but that the Church had resisted efforts to pin Jews into racial stereotypes:

The Anti-Semitic proposal of Hitler is not too much when we remember how Jews were processed in the country of Hidenburg. In the 18th Century, the Jews exercised great influence there, supported by the emperor Fredrich II. But the popular reaction did not take long, with all of its collage of assaults and all kinds of incidents...In the 14th Century the same scenes, and the same repudiations of the unsaved. [But] The bishop of Ausburg demanded them for his diocese and the Archbishop of Mayença gave powers to a Jew to negotiate with his companions the conditions of [the bishop's] reinstallation into the diocese that he oversaw.²⁶²

Lopes sympathized with the opposition to Jewish philosophers, like Moyses Mendelsohn, who had the audacity to challenge local sovereigns and quickly rise the social and economic latter, however the Catholic Church remained suspicious of the nationalist

²⁶² Osorio Lopes, "Judaismo e anti-judaismo na Alemanha" *A Ordem* junho de 1932. "A proposito do anti-semitismo de Hitler não é demais recordarmos como se processou a penetração judaica na pátria de Hindenburg. Já no século XVIII os judeus exerciam infleuncia alli, amparados pelo imperador Frederico II. Mas a reacção popular não tardou, com todo seu cortejo de attenados, conflictos e incidentes de toda ordem...No século XIV verificam-se as mesmas scenas, o mesmo repudios aos condemnados. O bispo de Ausburg reclamou-os para a sua diocese e o arcebispo de Mayença deu poderes a um judeu para negociar com os seus correligionarios as condições da sua reinstallação na archidioese que superintendia."

race-based politics of Hitler, which the author traced back to the liberal tradition of German Chancellor Otto Van Bismarck. The Church, he writes “recognizes no religion based on race... [and] abhors all notions of a national Church. Catholic means universal.” Lopes concluded by ridiculing Hitler’s plan to make the two major newspapers, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Berliner Tageblatt* write in Hebrew, but also ends with the image of “prophetic rabbis” conspiring against Hitler’s political cause.²⁶³ Clearly for Lopes, Hitler’s blatant racism was out of bounds. Nevertheless, a product of his time, Lopes seemed unable to shake the stereotypes that filled the pages of anti-Semitic literature and concocted the Pories of Sion. In another instance of xenophobia, Newton Cavalcanti, a military official, particularly took issue with the “foreign tutelage” (many times a substitute for ‘Jewish’) that the “savagely and bloody” Communist followers adored at expense of God and the Fatherland.²⁶⁴ *O Diário*, a Catholic newspaper which will be analyzed later in this work, took a directly anti-Semitic tone in one scathing editorial, tying Communism and Carlos Prestes the “Horseman of the Apocalypse” directly to “Jewish capitalism of the exploiters of misery” for which “the grieving virgins yell their accusations.” The editorial laments the death of government officials likening it to the original sin of Cain, a “stigmatizing stain.” He accuses the “monied executioners” and the so-called “Horsemen of Hope [the alleged name the Communists used for Carlos

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Discurso pronunciado pelo general Newton Cavacanti em romaria ao Cemitério São João Batista. *Boletim do Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio*, n. 38, p. V’VII, out. 1937. In: Eliana Dutra, *O Ardil Totalitário: Imaginário político no Brasil dos anos de 1930* 2da Ed. (Belo Horizonte, Editora UFMG, 2012), 56.

Prestes]” of commanding their followers to “kill, slaughter, rob, and rape.”²⁶⁵

Nevertheless, anti-Semitism in Brazil never quite had the traction that its Argentine counterpart, in part because of the relatively moderate influence of *A Ordem* which, because of the centralization discussed earlier, dominated Brazilian Catholic discourse.

Although anti-Semitism reached the pages of *A Ordem*, saying the journal endorsed this position might be a mistake. Instead, the review acted as a forum that housed wide-ranging and often contradictory points of view. Intellectuals such as Júlio Sá, who while rejecting Communism, embraced an overturning of the political and economic order that worked toward the perfection of man. The only condition for this revolution was that the change be based on the social teachings of the church. For this reason Sá criticized Hitler, who had put himself and German paganism above God and made himself, the Fuhuer, the center of cosmic meaning. Sá did not have much more use for Mussolini than Hitler, accusing him of a Romanesque cult of personality which also bordered on the pagan.²⁶⁶ Much of this moderation had to do with Alceu Lima’s leadership at the helm.

Alceu Lima enjoyed a variety of influences in his early academic life. Lima studied in the Ginásio Nacional and the College de France giving him prolonged exposure to modernist Brazilian intellectuals such as Graça Aranha. Despite this upbringing, Alceu Lima detected a “melancholy of his generation” which rested on dependence upon Europe, and

²⁶⁵ “O Cavaleiro do apocalipse”. *O Diário de Belo Horizonte*, p.4,6 mar. 1936. (Editorial). In: Eliana Dutra, *O Ardil Totalitário*, 56.

²⁶⁶ Rodrigues, Cândido Moreira, *A Ordem: uma revista de intelectuais católicos (1934-1945)* (Belo Horizonte:Autêntica, 2005), 160-61.

a dissatisfaction with intellectuals that did not reach European standards of achievement.²⁶⁷ During the time of the Brazilian Catholic revival, intellectuals longed for the Middle Ages, a time of reason, a time before materialism, before individualism, before the “liberal bourgeoisie.” Worldwide, an anti-modernist Maritain was updating the pre-Capitalist utopias of J. de Maistre, Bonald, and Donoso Cortés.²⁶⁸ Alceu Lima, too, shows the Middle Ages nostalgia typical for the Catholic revival period. In his work *Adeuses á Disponibilidade*, Lima compares the mission of Brazilian Catholics to the glorious conquests of Christendom past:

A crusade never done before in Brazil! A Crusade of servants for the Return of Christ that was like that...of the 13th Century, only governed this crusade of adolescents by the clarity of conscience now formed from a faith that does not just trust in the heart to guide itself. ²⁶⁹

Alceu Lima, disillusioned by his training and on fire through his conversion in 1928, emphasized the seemingly obvious political solutions that hierarchical authoritarian governments presented. He joined the ranks of the Catholic right fresh off the fervor of

²⁶⁷ José Raimundo Batista Bechelaine, *Ética e política na Obra de Alceu Amoroso Lima*, Unedited Dissertation (Roma: Pontifícia Universitas Gregoriana Facultas Philosophiae, 1989), pp.35-36.

²⁶⁸ Alexandre José Gonçalves Costa, *Teologia e política: A Ordem e a actualização do discurso político-social católico no Brasil, 1931-1958* (Dissertation: UNICAMP, 2010), 30.

²⁶⁹ Tristão de Athyde, *Adeus Á Disponibilidade*, Rio de Janeiro (1969, Editora Agir) ‘Tentativa de Intenário’, p.22 “Uma cruzada como nunca se fez no Brasil outro igual! Uma cruzada dos moços pela volta ao Cristo, como foi aquela...do século XIII, apenas governada esta cruzada de adolescentes pela lucidez de consciência já formadas, de uma fé que não confia apenas no coração para se guiar.”

conversion. His dramatic change from modernist literary critic meant that much like Jacques Maritain, during his early years, he towed the intransigent anti-Communist line in an increasingly polarized Brazil. For Alceu Lima, then Tristão de Athayde, the government had a responsibility to expose the Communist threat, the “enemy within.” According to Brazilian historian Eliana Dutra, Lima was even willing to create a “hidden and omnipresent enemy” for the sake of national unity. Lima during this period drew inspiration from Vargas, his patron who lamented the “forces of evil and hate...casting a shadow over the friendly spirit of our land and people.”²⁷⁰ As director of the Catholic Electoral League during the 1930s, Lima also pushed for politicians at the local, state, and national level that would emphasize religious education and resist the legalization of divorce at all costs.²⁷¹ However, Alceu Lima did not officially integrate into the state apparatus and became wary of the Church’s closeness to the Vargas regime. As his emphasis on liberty, and the idea of pardon (he would later cite Hannah Arendt as a major influence regarding its political applications) show, he remained sanguine about the role of the state in every day affairs. At a base level, like Arendt, Lima believed in the ability not of mere political action, but of interpersonal communication, what he would call “the dialogue culture” between educated adversaries that, while all opposite sides of a fundamental divide, shared the virtues of charity and a love of the common good.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Eliana Dutra, *O Ardil Totalitário*, 44. Discurso de Getúlio Vargas á Nação brasileira, 1 jan. 1936 *Boletim do Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio*, n. 17, jan. 1936. In: *Ibid.* 45.

²⁷¹ Lira Neto, *Getúlio: Do governo provisório á ditadura do Estado Novo (1930-1945)*, 143.

²⁷² Carneiro Junior, Renato Augusto. "Amor em tempos de ressentimento: Alceu Amoroso Lima, política e resistência á ditadura militar de 1964" *PhD Dissertation* (Curitiba: UFPR, 2011), 5, 12.

Despite his openness, Lima strongly rejected Communism itself. Lima warned against considering Socialism a mere economic system with which one could compromise, instead considering it to be an integrated philosophy inconsistent with Christianity. In Lima's mind, resistance to totalitarian Communism should constitute the pinnacle of Catholic thought. Lima was equally skeptical of the Nazis however. In 1938, he eviscerated the regime which he saw to be based on the same liberal modernity that challenged the humanist precepts of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist revival of Jacques Maritain. Such a philosophy, based on 19th century Positivism and racial eugenics, flew in the face of integral Catholic thought.²⁷³ Lima's condemnation of totalitarian Communism would eventually flip towards a broader condemnation of authoritarian regimes. His philosophy would not change, but rather mature to see the dangers behind systems he had once advocated.

During the 1930s, Alceu Amoroso Lima, was, besides editor of *A Ordem*, one of the key leaders of the Brazilian Catholic laity, president of the Catholic Election League (LEC), and director of the Centro Dom Vital. Through his position, he influenced Brazilian Catholic intellectuals at *A Ordem* to show continuing reserve towards Hitler. They showed skepticism to the rising secular right in Germany that Lopes had shown on his ambiguous analysis of the Jewish question. In a published transcript of his October 1935 talk at the Brazilian Military School, Alceu Lima at once debunks the notion that

²⁷³ Ibid. 172,182.

Socialism is compatible with Christianity simply because it claims to liberate the poor. “If this was the case, we would all be socialist” quips the author. Instead he considers socialism and its continuation of historical materialism to be merely a continuation of the past century’s liberalism. More interestingly however, he lumps Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, and Lenin in the same category of authoritarian men who were molding history in contradiction to Socialism’s claim to rational historic development.²⁷⁴ Before Hitler’s rise, *A Ordem’s Registro*, a bulletin highlighting political events from around the world already considered Hitler’s rise to be “a terrible threat to Continental peace” on a par with the continuing violence in Mexico. Such instability, the journal feared, only opened more doors for the Communist threat.²⁷⁵ Early on, like Maritain in France, the intellectuals at *A Ordem* saw little daylight between the racist and materialist totalitarianism of Fascism and Communism respectively. They opposed Fascism on the ground that its violence would not only debase the dignity of man, but open the way for another competing evil.

Despite the journal’s criticism of authoritarian governments abroad however, these writers were immersed, for better or worse, in their own domestic version of corporatist authoritarianism. In 1930, the general Getúlio Vargas lost an election, asked for military intervention, and in 1932, solidified his executive power with a successful campaign against the powerful republican state of São Paulo. In 1937, he established what would become known as the *Estado Novo*, an authoritarian state that would emphasize

²⁷⁴ Alceu Amoroso Lima “O socialismo” *A Ordem*, janeiro de 1936, 62,73.

²⁷⁵ *Registro, A Ordem* setembro de 1932, 227

industrialization, workers' rights, and a new sense of national identity. Historian Boris Fausto describes this Brazilian state as "authoritarian" and "modernizing." It was neither fascist (it repressed the Brazilian Integralist Party [PIB]) nor traditionalist (it emphasized economic development as a key pillar of its government). Vargas did however draw on the fascist idea of an "organic state" which represented special interests within the organization of the state. Following (incompletely) the Italian model of absorbing outside bureaucracies, Vargas absorbed the Federal Council of International Commerce (CFCE) and created the Technical Council on Economics and Finances (CTEF) which subsumed many formerly independent financial, industrial, and commercial leaders. Vargas limited his embrace of authoritarian tendencies, however, and played the Good Neighbor in regional affairs such as the 1932 Paraguayan-Bolivian Chaco War. Vargas navigated the lead up to World War II by blasting liberalism (to the applause of Germany and Italy), prohibiting foreign languages (which targeted southern Brazilian German communities) and maintaining cordial relations with Franklin Roosevelt. Finally though, Brazil's economic ties, fortified through free-trade agreements, would trump ideological convictions.²⁷⁶ While Fausto emphasizes the Estado Novo's practical side, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira links the Vargas regime to the ideologically diverse revolutions in Japan (1868), Mexico (1910) and Turkey (1924). For Pereira (and I suspect many of the intellectuals that decided to integrate into the regime), Vargas represented a break from the coffee-producing bourgeoisie liberal order. In Pereira's reading of Vargas, minds like

²⁷⁶ Boris Fausto, *Getúlio Vargas: O poder e o sorriso* (São Paulo: Companhia de Letras, 2013), 90-93, 95-99.

Villa-Lobos and Gilberto Freyre had paved the way for the Vargas regime with their emphasis on tying culture to economic development through industrialization.²⁷⁷ In short, intellectual collaboration with the regime was not only inevitable, but a badge of honor. As intellectual elites integrated in the 1930s into Vargas' *Estado Novo* they softened their tones. Oliveira Vianna exemplified the public intellectual inextricably linked with the regime. Vianna rejected "liberal utopianism" arguing such concepts to be merely excuses for "unscrupulous" partisan actors to take power and work against the national interest. Instead of partisan divisions, Vianna, as a legal counsel for Vargas' Labor ministry, proposed a corporatist vision of society which "harmonized" its various sectors. As such, he pushed for unions' representation in the Parliament to counter possible liberal majorities.²⁷⁸ The Catholics were no exception, as many in the laity and the hierarchy had ties with the general from Rio Grande do Sul who made made his propaganda of uniting various, often contradicting, and sectors of Brazilian society an art. Catholic intellectuals followed the tendency of their adversaries in advocating for working class rights, but with the caveat of elite tutelage.

ALCEU LIMA: RUPTURE OR CONTINUITY?

I was not always as old as I am today and I was not as young as I am today. I like to say that I was old and turned out a boy. It's usually said that you begin [life] as an arsonist and turn out being a fireman. I flipped

²⁷⁷ Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, "Getúlio Vargas: O estadista, a nação e a democracia" In: Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos, Pedro Cezar Dutra Fonseca (orgs.), *A Era Vargas: Desenvolvimentismo, economia e sociedade* (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2012),101-105.

²⁷⁸ Lira Neto, *Getúlio: Do governo provisório á ditadura do Estado Novo (1930-1945)* 1ºEd. (São Paulo: Companhia de Letras, 2013), 143-144.

it. Perhaps this is the idea: I started out a fireman and I hope not to become an arsonist. But, in any case, some sparks I look to throw here and there.
Alceu Amoroso Lima 1983 Canal Livre²⁷⁹

Lima's idea of plural dialogue went back as far as 1929, when Alceu Lima first began at the Centro Dom Vital. Jackson de Figueiredo, his predecessor and mentor, looked down upon the Mexican regime, which at the time persecuted Catholics during the Cristero Wars, with disdain. Figueiredo believed that no dialogue could happen with a government so far lost to the ideas of revolution and liberalism, an ideology that flew in the face of his effort to "re-Christianize" Brazil.²⁸⁰ Alceu Lima also zealously defended the faith and eagerly attacked liberals, but he recognized the possibility of an "invisible Mexico" behind the atrocities committed by liberal president Plutarco Elías Calles. The Mexican ambassador Alfonso Reyes, "prudent [and] enlightened" in Lima's eyes, represented this concept well. Reyes' classical education moved him ever so slightly to a "Christian Communion" and his popularity among Lima's old companions in the Modernist movement could not have hurt his standing with the conflicted intellectual.²⁸¹ This incident and relationship shows that Lima's concept of plural dialogue had roots both in his conversion and his response to his first great international ecclesiastical crisis

²⁷⁹ «Eu nem sempre fui velho como sou hoje, e também nem sempre fui jovem como sou hoje. Costumo dizer que eu fui velho e acabo moço. Costuma-se dizer que começa-se incendiário e acaba-se bombeiro. Eu inverteria, talvez, essa idéia: comecei bombeiro, e espero não acabar incendiário. Mas, em todo o caso, algumas fagulhas eu procuro lançar por aí.»

²⁸⁰ Marcelo Timotheo da Costa, "La espada y el arado: El conflicto religioso en México y la intelectualidad católica brasileña, los casos de Jackson de Figueiredo y Alceu Amoroso Lima" In: Jean Meyer, *Las Naciones Frente Al Conflicto Religioso en México* (D.F: CIDE, 2010), 84,88

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 94,97-100.

as a Catholic. Just as Lima dialogued intensely with at least one Mexican intellectual²⁸² in the midst of a Catholic-Liberal-fueled civil war and the turbulent 1930s that followed, so he would also plea for social harmony, coexistence, and integration of the Communists (if not Communism), into the larger society in the 1960s.

Alceu Lima's political transition may have stemmed from theological and philosophical continuities, but the political change was both substantial and gradual. As the Second World War developed, and the Axis abandoned any sense of classical civilization, Alceu Lima turned on the fascist powers, instead choosing to embrace plural liberty as the ultimate political good. In his 1932 work *Política* Alceu Lima had already discussed the idea of "necessity" and "liberty" as the two essential features in individual searches for the common good, and he shared with French philosopher Jacques Maritain a healthy critique of a mechanistic modernity pitted against the soul of the human person. In his view, socialism presented a synthetic, not organic unity, one based on the dualistic vision of class struggle. The common good, on the other hand, melded various societies together into a corporate structure, a cohesive social unit.²⁸³ The transition in Alceu Lima's political philosophy constituted a shift in attitudes toward certain classes of social participants, not a change from his corporativist mindset which emphasized the human person as the foundation for society along with the family. Take for example his foreword to the Portuguese edition of *Christianity and Democracy* by Maritain at the end

²⁸² Robert Patrick Newcomb, *Nossa and Nuestra América: Inter-American Dialogues*. Vol. 52. Lafayette, IN.: Purdue University Press, 2012), 165.

²⁸³ Tristão de Athayde, *Política*, Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Catholica, 1932), 18 (citing Jacques Maritain *Trois Réformateurs*. Plon. 1925 p.28/32), 22, 28-29.

of World War II. He continued to condemn Communism and Totalitarianism, but expressed a preference for a confessional democracy that could rebrand this classic form of government with the anti-liberal label:

The grandness of this small book is precisely to show what Christianity represents for a true democracy, providing [democracy] its true roots. On the other hand, democracy also can, in this century, represent for Christianity a political instrument in defense of Liberty against the advance of Totalitarianism.²⁸⁴

Some critics reject such a turn as unsubstantial, however, seeing a reliance on Maritain's Catholic pluralism as a type of social escapism. Historians such as Alexandre José Gonçalves Costa contend that the Centro Dom Vital lost influence because of its alleged separation of the political and the social. Indeed others, such as a student who wrote to Gustavo Corção, the director of the Centro Dom Vital in 1958, complained about the Centro's irrelevance to new ideas because of its inordinate support of Alceu Lima.²⁸⁵ Arguments about Alceu Lima's irrelevance do not, however, hold up in the face of his prestigious positions and international travel. One such trip involved lectureship in New

²⁸⁴ Alceu Amoroso Lima, *Introduction: Jacques Maritain, Cristianismo e Democracia 2* ed Rio de Janeiro: (Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1945), 10-11. "A grandeza deste pequeno livro é justamente mostrar o que o Cristianismo representa para a verdadeira democracia, fornecendo-lhe as suas raízes autênticas. E, por outro lado, o que a democracia, neste século, pode representar para o Cristianismo, como instrumento político de defesa da Liberdade contra a perpetuação do Totalitarismo."

²⁸⁵ Alexandre José Gonçalves Costa, *Teologia e Política: A Ordem e a atualização do discurso político-social católico no Brasil, 1931-1958* (Dissertation: UNICAMP, 2010), 51. See also: Ibid. Note 72.

York University's "Brazilian Institute" reported in *A Ordem* in October of 1958. Ironically, the same frustrated Corção of later years had nothing but effusive praise for his director, hoping he could "give a little of our wisdom to the northern part of the Continent."²⁸⁶ Theologians such as William Timothy Cavanaugh argues that the "Neo-Christendom" which Alceu Lima espoused through his intellectual mentor Jacques Maritain actually led to corporatist ideologies. Its separation of the political and the social allowed the military regimes of Latin America an opening through which to push the Church from politics and punish those priests who decided to enter politics and sideline the church which had "disappeared itself" from the body politic.²⁸⁷ For such historians, the revolutionary church replaced this complacent church, a church for the poor replaced a church of the landed elite, and revolutionary ideologies, some of them Marxist, clashed starkly with the prevailing orthodoxies of the Vatican. In few other churches is this apparent shift more prominent than in the Brazilian church. For these historians, Alceu Lima remains only a half revolutionary, or if he is relevant at all, his activism comes through gradual enlightenment, a drastic shift in political philosophy. While historically I cannot deny that a shift in political application took place (he went from a supporter of corporatist regimes to a supporter of Christian pluralism in the course of twenty years), Alceu Lima's conception of charity which lead him to condemn both state and guerrilla violence also lead him to political action.

²⁸⁶ Notícias do Centro Dom Vital, "Viagem do Prof. Alceu Amoroso Lima" *A Ordem* outubro de 1958, 62.

²⁸⁷ William Timothy Cavanaugh, *Torture and Eucharist in Pinochet's Chile* (Dissertation: Duke University 1996), iii,xiv.

Alceu Lima and *A Ordem*'s progressive turn:

While scholars cannot deny some of *A Ordem*'s authoritarian tendencies during the Pre-War and part of the war period, the journal took a decisive and early stand for many of the policies that the Second Vatican Council would later ratify. The journal endorsed Christian Democracy, social justice and economic equality leading the way for other Catholic publications to expand on these issues. All the while, the journal maintained a fierce anti-communist line, pointing out the many failures of the Soviet Union in questions of workers' rights and religious liberty. The journal also took aim at the United States for its treatment of racial minorities at home. Alceu Lima and his writers wrote sympathetically, but not uncritically of the United States. Where did these trends come from? Did they represent a continuity or rupture with previous Catholic thinking? What external forces influenced *A Ordem*'s editorial line? How did the experience of the authors themselves influence their perspective on the solution to the Social and the Communist questions?

With the end of the war and the fall of the Fascist powers, authoritarian governments seemed even less viable than before the war (when the Church only expressed interest in certain governments such as that of Franco). As Brazilian historians Leandro Luiz Cordeiro and Rodrigues Candido point out, the post-war period represents an inversion of political momentum within the Church. Democratic ideals, once shunned, now reemerged, and proposals for using dictatorships to bolster stability and order fell into

disfavor.²⁸⁸ A pluralistic editorial stance would continue at the journal *A Ordem* throughout the 1950s, a decade which experienced the beginning of the Cold War, the rise of developmentalism, and the Cuban Revolution. Much of *Ordem's* editorial line maintained an anti-liberal tendency. Alceu Lima strictly traced the ills of mechanized modernity back to the Reformation. Back in the 1930s, Alceu Lima had suggested a return to the Natural Law as opposed to the “legal skepticism” proposed by modernist legal thinking. In Alceu Lima’s view, any law not based on objective standards of justice and the “empire of the law” risked falling into legalism due to its precarious underpinnings.²⁸⁹ Lima’s rejection of individualism in favor of collective rights would continue into the 1950s, as would his condemnation of the Protestant Reformation for throwing the floodgates open to a view that treated human beings like a cog in an industrial machine. In comparing St. Ignatius of Loyala to Martin Luther, the Alceu Lima of 1956 bore much *philosophical* if not *political* resemblance to that of the 1930s:

The radical opposition between the German reformer and the Spanish counter-Reformer in relation to dogmas is that Luther considered Dogma as a relative truth and a purely human formula of revealed truths. He did not hesitate in bringing down the spiritual patrimony of the Church and with that to introduce into religion a ferment of secularization. [These seeds] in the following centuries would turn into

²⁸⁸ Leandro Luiz Cordeiro, “Alceu Amoroso Lima e as posturas políticas da Igreja católica no Brasil”, 20.

²⁸⁹ Alceu Amoroso Lima, *Introdução ao Direito Moderno* 4ª Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Loyola, 2001), p.20

seeds of annihilation.²⁹⁰

Despite his anti-modernist continuities however, stark political differences, suppressed during the 1920s and 1930s, emerged between Alceu Lima and the philosophical legacy of the late Jackson de Figuerido, the fire-breathing intellectual giant that had started the journal. Commenting on the death of author Perillo Gomes, Alceu Lima emphasizes the criticisms that another protégé of Figuerido makes of his old mentor over his ties to reactionary philosophy. Lima quotes a 1951 letter Gomes wrote commemorating the 23rd anniversary of Figuerido's death:

We have to admit that Veuillot, De Maistre, and their people had a certain bad influence on Jackson's thought, which had not reached its peak when he died. If he had been able, as he so wanted, to take some time away from political action and give himself completely to intellectual pursuits, I have no doubt that he would have done a general revision of his work, cleansing it of so many errors that we all had in the beginning of our faith, because really our first vision of the Church was more human than divine, more political than mystical.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Alceu Amoroso Lima, "Santo Ignácio e Lutero," *A Ordem* Julho 1956 Vol. LVI, 8. "A radical oposição entre o reformador germânico e o contra-reformador espanhol, em relação aos dogmas, é que Lutero, considerando o Dogma como uma verdade relativa e como uma formulação puramente humana de verdades reveladas, não trepidou em abalar o patrimonio dogmático da Igreja e com isso introduzir na religião um fermento de desagregação, que os séculos posteriores viriam transformar em semente de aniquilamento."

²⁹¹ Alceu Amoroso Lima "Adeus, Perillo" *A Ordem* Agosto de 1952. "Mas temos de começar por admitir que Veuillot, de Maistre e sua gente fizeram um certo mal ao pensamento do Jackson e que o seu pensamento não tinha atingido o grau máximo de evolução quando morreu. Se ele tivesse podido, como tanto desejou, retirar-se por algum tempo da ação política e entregar-se de todo ao trabalho intelectual, não tenho dúvidas que teria feito uma revisão geral de sua obra, expurgando-a de uns tantos equívocos que

Alceu Lima also led the vanguard in ecumenical efforts at *A Ordem*. Years before the Council, Lima argued that Protestants, although paving the way for the Modernity he loathed, still held to the same values, and many of the same civilizational foundations as Catholics. In fact, he called on Protestants to fight the destruction of Brazilian culture. He noted that the “common enemy” Modernity had made Protestantism in comparison “not as radically separated as in the time of the great Rupture, giving hope for of a future united Christendom.”²⁹² While *A Ordem* praised French general Pétain during the war, in 1946, one Christian Democrat, Fábio Alves Ribeiro, citing Jacques Maritain, labeled him a “clerical fascist.” While warning non-Catholics not to see the divisions in political philosophy within the Church itself as disunity to recognize “that the son of God was incarnated to save all men”, and that Maritain always maintained a skeptical view toward relativism and modernity, the article warns that the spiritual must subordinate the political, protecting “the right to intervene in the temporal when the final end of man and his dignity is in danger.” “From there” said the author of the article, “Come the condemnations of political parties and social doctrines such as fascist Statism, Nazi racism, Socialism, and ‘Action Française.’”²⁹³ Brazilian readings Maritain’s message, far

foram de todos nós, no início de nossa Fé, pois a nossa primeira visão da Igreja foi mais humana do que divina, mais política do que mística.”

²⁹² Alceu Amoroso Lima, “Santo Inácio e Lutero,” *A Ordem* Julho 1956 Vol. LVI, 10.

²⁹³ For the universal theological vision of the Church, see: Fabio Alves Ribeiro “A democracia de Maritain e a Igreja” *A Ordem* Dezembro de 1946, 100-102. Interestingly enough, on page 102 of the same editorial, Ribeiro also cites the series of 1945 articles praising from Gustavo Franceschi discussed in this thesis. Apparently, Franceschi’s impression of the Holy See’s acceptance of Maritain as the French ambassador

from advocating withdrawal from the world, advocated further engagement, but based on solid spiritual principles.

GUSTAVO CORÇÃO AND THE CATHOLIC COUNTER-NARRATIVE

One prominent intellectual did not share Lima's zeal for progressive applications of Thomist principles. Gustavo Corção, originally an electronic engineer, started to read the works of Karl Marx in German as a child. After the death of his wife, he grew closer to Catholicism and to Lima in particular, and joined the Centro in 1939.²⁹⁴ Fervently anti-Communist, Corção nevertheless initially defended democracy, and criticized integralists such as Plínio Salgado for their over-emphasis on imposing "nationalism" or the political, over the common good and the spiritual ("patriotism"). From Corção's point of view, a disproportionate love of the nation led to various injustices, including the Dreyfus affair, in which a Jewish official, Alfred Dreyfus was imprisoned wrongfully on charges of treason in France. From a theological point of view, Corção saw nationalism, not racial deformity, as the reason the Jewish religious leaders killed Christ, "one man...so that the nation might be saved." Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and Perón made the list of nationalist vice, while Tiradentes and an 18th Century Polish democrat headed the list of virtuous patriots.²⁹⁵ Although Corção's ideas struck the Church as revolutionary in the 1940s, and

had international impact. For the condemnation of Pétain See: Fabio Alves Ribeiro "Maritain e a Nova Cristandade" Ibid. 108.

²⁹⁴ Alexandre José Gonçalves Costa, *Teologia e política*, 25. For full biographical summary See the corresponding footnote (16) in the Costa work.

²⁹⁵ Corção, Gustavo. *Patriotismo e nacionalismo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Presença, 1963), 9-10, 12, 14-15. See: Austen Ivereigh, *Catholicism and the Politics of Argentina*, 27, 87. This distinction between Nationalism and Patriotism is crucial. According to Austen Ivereigh, the distinction lay in a state that did not try to direct, but rather, coordinate independent members of society. Catholics such as Lima and Corção and Lima distinguished between a figure like Salazar and Franco for precisely this reason, in line with

he eagerly defended Maritain's controversial democratic pluralism, the rising progressivism of the Catholic Church disturbed Corção nonetheless, and caused a split in the Centro, with the creation of a new review, *Permanência*. Rather than launch a simply reactionary journal, Corção hoped to stem the tides of church heresies, and in the words of *O Lutador*, "conserve correct concepts, and renovate what must be renovated."²⁹⁶ His change came based on his convictions that Communists, who violated freedom of conscience in the Soviet Union, should not be accorded the same rights in democratic societies as the rest of the citizenry. Corção firmly believed that those who worked for the common good (i.e the majoritarian Catholics) were the only true heirs to a democratic society. Although Lima would compare the military coup to Nazism and Statist philosophies, Corção separated the 1964 coup from the "illegitimate" coups waged not for the defense of the country, but for self-aggrandizement and the acquisition of power. The state of emergency would also give the dictatorship the additional benefit for excusing any "eventual abuses" of power in the name of "purifying" democracy.²⁹⁷ Corção demonstrated that no one concrete definition of democracy existed. Nor did criticizing integral philosophies mean that Catholic writers had to place institutional freedom over what they saw as the welfare of society.

Catholic thinkers of their day (p.27). Integralist definitions of the two concepts also clarify them. Ivereigh again points out that that integralists considered "patriotism" and "tradition" as absolutist and Gallican concepts. Instead, they preferred "nationality" which was, contrary to patriotism, "widespread, submerged, omnipresent, violated, and now resuscitated in the hands of newly-articulate classes contesting the liberal hegemony (p.87)."

²⁹⁶ "Gustavo Corção lança revista «Permanência» para anunciar corretamente a palavra de Cristo" *O Lutador*, 8 a 15 de setembro de 1968.

²⁹⁷ Christiane Jalles de Paula, "Gustavo Corção: apóstolo da 'linha-dura'." *Revista Brasileira de História* 32, no. 63 (2012): 173-174.

Corção's attempt to create a new journal to be heard merely highlights the hegemonic reach of Alceu Lima's organization. Despite this notable defection from the Christian democratic line, however, the Church eventually sided with developmentalists and social revolutionaries, even as Catholic news outlets maintained vigilance about framing their stories in an anti-Communist light. In the final analysis, Corção's departure shows the diversity and contradictions within Christian Democracy. However, Lima's intellectual dominance also shows plural Catholicism's staying power in the region. In a twist of historical irony and a demonstration of the tightness of the Catholic community, journalist and poet Josué Montello recalled at Corção's funeral a reconciliation between the two adversaries. The exchange, recorded in Montello's diary on July 6, 1978, begins with a question from his friend Alfonso Arinos asking if Montello knew about the reconciliation:

-Alceu was in the the Church of Glory, in Largo do Machado, on his knees praying. He asked God to save the life of his son, victim of a disastrous car accident. [The son] was in critical condition. In the middle of the prayer, he promised to complete the most difficult mission that God inspired him to, so as to earn the grace he asked for. From that came the determination to visit Corção. He left and went to complete the promise. Corção was not there. Alceu sent around the block. An hour later, he went to knock on the door without knowing how the other, with all of his intransigent [attitudes] would receive him. Corção was home and wanted to know who wanted to speak with him. Alceu said his name and kept praying. The door

opened. Corção himself came out, opened his arms, and hugged Alceu tight against his chest. And the two began to cry.”

Alfonso let a moment of silence pass while Marcos was thinking, and in front of all of us finished [saying]: “God saved the son of Alceu.”²⁹⁸

ALCEU LIMA THE TROJAN HORSE: THE CATHOLIC PRESS’ DISGUISED DISSENT IN PLAIN SIGHT

Alceu Lima then, became a figure both traditional and respected and divisive.

Representing the reactionary right in the 1930s as well as Estado Novo collaborationism, his 1960s articles against the dictatorship would show he now represented democratic dissent. Historical visions (held by Ridenti and Cavanaugh) that see in Christian Democracy merely a conservative or bourgeois movement on the fence do not take into account the mainstream lay movements that risked their members to stand not for revolutionary principles, but for what they saw as the simple social doctrine of the Catholic Church that attempted to restore human dignity in the midst of instability. Alceu

²⁹⁸ Josué Montello, *Diário da noite iluminada, 1977-1985* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1994), 71. “-O Alceu estava na igreja da Glória, no Largo do Machado, de joelhos, rezando. Pedia a Deus que lhe poupasse a vida do filho, vítima de um desastre de automóvel, e que se achava em estado gravíssimo. Em meio da súplica, prometeu cumprir a mais difícil das missões que Deus lhe inspirasse, para merecer a graça que lhe pedia. Nisto lhe veio a determinação de visitar o Corção. Saiu dali, foi cumprir a promessa. O Corção não estava. Alceu ficou a rondar o quarteirão Uma hora depois, tornou a bater-lhe á porta, sem saber como o outro, com as suas intransigências, o receberia. Corção, já em casa, quis saber quem lhe queria falar. Aleu disse seu nome, e ficou rezando. A porta voltou a descerrar-se. O próprio Corção veio ao seu encontro; abriu-lhe os braços, apertou Alceu contra o peito, e os dois romperam a chorar. Alfonso deixa passar um silêncio, enquanto dom Marcos se paramenta, á vista de todos nós e conclui: -Deus popou a vida do filho do Alceu.”

Lima's continued position as the head of the Catholic Electoral League and various Catholic democracy movements, plus his vocal criticisms of what he saw as fascist tendencies, should give those historians who think Christian Democracy a lukewarm and compromising philosophy a bit of pause. Alceu Lima, far from withdrawing from politics, took authoritarianism head on in the first months of the regime. Writing on June 21, 1964 Alceu Lima issues a clarion call for freedom of the press, a warning against historical determinism, and a scathing critique of the military regime and of business as usual in politics:

Order supposes unity and variety. It supposes elemental priority and reciprocal adjustment between [the two elements]... To confuse order with social immobility, with hierarchical rigidity or with the exclusion of contradictory elements is to distort the concept in a reactionary or conservative sense, by any unilateral and subjective means... To confuse order with an authoritarian regime, with the maintaining of the social status quo, with political traditionalism or with a government of brute force is to misrepresent [Order's] very nature.²⁹⁹

O Diário, which had the audacity to publish his editorial, could try to couch this editorial

²⁹⁹ Tristão de Athyde, "Ordem e Progresso" *Diário* 21 de junho de 1964. "Ordem supõe portanto, unidade e variedade. Supõe pluralidade de elementos e ajustamento recíproco entre os mesmos... Confundir ordem com imobilidade social, com rigidez hierárquica ou com exclusão de elementos contraditórios é deturpar o conceito no sentido reaccionário ou conservador de qualquer modo unilateral e subjetivo... Confundir ordem com regime autoritário com amnutenção do statu quo social, com tradicionalismo político ou com regime de força é deturpar-lhe completamente a natureza."

in the context of a “democratic revolution” and claim that the Castelo Branco, the head of the military regime did not represent authoritarianism or the *ancien régime*. In fact, come 1965, the editorial board tried to argue for “progress” even as they argued for stability over and against the chaos of the last days of Goulart, the president that Brazil’s military overthrew.³⁰⁰ However, Alceu Lima’s early stance against the dictatorship, a dictatorship based in “mere tradition” and the language of development, in subjective truths instead of the “eternal” principles of true Catholicism, already sealed his reputation as a staunch defender of the resistance. Reflecting upon the death of Kennedy half a year before, he criticized middle-class regime opponents of land reform as “small samples of social inertia” who called themselves “disinterested” but at the same time merely looked after their own interests. He believed that this type of cynical citizen, be it the racist in Texas or the small landowner that went against their own interests in opposing land reform, constituted the true murderers of the idealist president.³⁰¹ Lima also challenged a military attitude, “the spirit of arms” saying such an attitude alone would have made the victory over Nazi pagan attitudes of the Second World War an empty one. Lima called on citizens to emphasize “love and fraternity” as the only “arms of the spirit that can combat the spirit of arms.”³⁰² Lima took further aim at the “containment” theory of the United States. In 1968, writing on their policies in Vietnam, he called the military intervention against “a country rich in moral and intellectual values, but economically poor” by “the

³⁰⁰ Editorial, “Ontem e Hoje” *Diário*, 10 de janeiro de 1965.

³⁰¹ Tristão de Athayde, “Os anti-Kennedy”, *O Diário*, 1 de maio de 1964.

³⁰² Tristão de Athayde, “As armas do espírito” *O Diário* 27 de junho de 1965.

richest country on earth” a symptom of a policy of “pharisaical technocrats” of the Cold War that lacked solidarity and human compassion.³⁰³ In fact, Alceu Lima promoted the concept of dialogue as an anti-conservative concept that allowed variety in society and opposes “isolationism and the justification of wars and Revolutions.”³⁰⁴ In case doubt remained in the reader’s mind about which revolutions he meant, the paper ran an editorial directly criticizing the regime and condemning the “dictatorial” first *Ato Institucional*:

I have disagreed consistently with the Revolution since March 31, 1964. I did not wait long, April 9 [1964] to think and say that I considered that military coup completely useless and counterproductive, capable of creating evils even worse than those against which we all complained.

Indeed, he even complained about the death of lawyer San Thiago Dentas, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Brazilian President Jânio Quadros, who died in September 1964, and the departure of Carvalho Pinto, the governor of São Paulo (1959-1963) during the Goulart presidency.³⁰⁵

³⁰³ Tristão de Athayde, “Sábios e técnicos” *O Diário*, 19 de julho de 1968.

³⁰⁴ Tristão de Athayde, “Filosofia da dialogação” *O Diário*, 9 de maio de 1965.

³⁰⁵ Tristão de Athayde, “Falsos Salvadores” *O Diário*, 20 de abril de 1966. “Tenho disacordado sistematicamente da Revolução desde o dia 31 de março de 1964. Não esperei gemeur o dia 9 de abril para pensar e dizer que considerava aquele golpe militar como totalmente inútil e contraproducente, capaz de producir males ainda maiores do que aqueles de que todos nos queixávamos.”

At a time when the editorial board of the papers in which he published praised the Democratic Revolution, Lima skeptically asked whether such attitudes not only were impractical, but non-Christian as well. Those papers willing to publish Alceu Lima during the first years of the regime showed a certain ambivalence to the new regime even as they strove to laud the policies that went along with their ideas of economic stability and order. Lima praised Dom Hélder Câmara for heading a vanguard of clergy of church reform, carefully comparing him to Father Júlio Maria, a reformer and staunch defender of political Catholicism in the first half of the century.³⁰⁶ However, this time ironically, such a compliment placed Lima firmly in the old-guard anti-Modernist democratic tradition.

OTHER SOURCES SPEAK: CONTEXTUALIZING THE *CENTRO DOM VITAL* THROUGH *O DIÁRIO DE BELO HORIZONTE* AND *O LUTADOR*

While *A Ordem* may have been recognized as the driving force behind the lay Catholic press, the journal did not represent the only venue of publication for intellectuals of the Catholic right. *O Diário*, a daily Catholic newspaper that had run since 1922 (in the early years under the title *O Horizonte*, was the most widely circulated Catholic publication in Brazil during this time period, ending publication in 1972. *O Lutador* published by the Sacramento fathers has run every ten days from 1928 to the present.³⁰⁷ Due to the sheer volume of material, and the various closing dates of these media outlets, I have focused

³⁰⁶ Evanize Martins Sydow, “Alceu Amoroso Lima e o Regime militar, 1964-1968” (Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil-CPDOC, 2007), 11

³⁰⁷ In January of this year it began to run as a monthly journal, but with increased content.

my attention on a period that would supplement *A Ordem*, closed between the years 1964-1974. These seven years encompass a critical juncture in the history of Brazilian Catholic thought and the Catholic world at large. The newspapers catch a glimpse of a democracy in crisis, economic instability, and the beginnings of military rule, filling in the gaps during *A Ordem*'s absence from the Catholic debate. The newspapers had to also negotiate the tricky matter of editorial policy that must cater both to hierarchical interests and the military regime with the power to shut the papers down. These media sources also replace *A Ordem* which closed publication between 1964 and 1974 and even before then had begun a reduced schedule. The sources are representative of the same line of Catholic thought as the Centro Dom Vital itself. Many times, the happenings of one paper will make it into the pages of another. Many times the paper of least circulation will cite those of greater circulation. So for example, *O Lutador* often cites *O Diário*, but rarely vice-versa. *O Diário* drew enough attention to warrant mention in *A Ordem* in its final years of this period for example. Although *A Ordem* ended publication, their thinkers did not stop writing and speaking.

Alceu Amoroso Lima appeared at least twice a month in *O Diário*. *O Lutador* showed more caution, not publishing Alceu Lima until several years after the coup. This section will outline points of divergence, but also the surprising unity regarding not just support of the dictatorship (to be expected in the first years of a regime) but also the surprising ways in which all of the papers indirectly criticized the regime. The papers rarely pursued direct criticism of the regime, many times allowing third actors to write on their pages, or

printing news and speeches that could subtly allow contrarian information to enter the reader's sphere of knowledge. All the while the papers would mask these criticisms with slanted commentary and editorials praising the dictatorship's repressive methods. A note of caution here: These papers also expressed a sincere desire to crush Communism, but even within that Cold War mindset, the papers differed on their methods for doing so. Some writers focused on economic development, while others focused on military repression. Coverage of the Second Vatican Council and its emphasis on religious and political liberty also served a mechanism for the papers to get past possible government censorship. The ecumenical council, an unavoidable world event they would have covered anyway, gave Church leaders a chance to expand on the divine good of fundamental freedoms without raising the suspicions of the military regime.

FAILING DEMOCRACY, THE COUP, AND THE CATHOLIC RESPONSE:

“The idealism of Roosevelt has failed. In the world, realism, ‘Communist and Anti-Communist’ has triumphed.”- Bolivar de Freitas “O Diário” March 30, 1965

O Diário showed many moderating traits in common with the rest of mainstream Brazilian Catholicism during this era. First was their unconditional support and non-stop coverage of the Second Vatican Council in their section *Documentação Católica*. This section represented what can be considered the most vanguard part of the paper. In 1963, the paper writes glowingly of John XXIII, comparing him to John the Baptist with the headline “There was a man sent by God, his name was John and he came give witness to the Light.” What's more, *Diário* headlines splashed not the words of any cardinal but

those of Belgian cardinal Leo Jozef Suenens (1904-1996), known as one of the major forces in the Council and a willing critic of Vatican bureaucracy and traditionalist Catholicism.³⁰⁸ Another moderating factor in this Catholic press was their belief in development as a legitimate counterpoint to the Communist threat. This position should not surprise in light of their relationship to John F. Kennedy, upon whose assassination they called “the Leader of Democracy.” *O Diário* not only ascribed to Kennedy’s economic theories, but saw him as a visionary akin to Julius Caesar. An editorial on November 14, 1963 the editorial board lamented “the brutality, uselessness, and absurdity” of his death in their daily column *Nossa Opinião* and compares his death to that of Julius Caesar:

This act spawned] not from a personal grudge but a political hate...not to get to the person, but get to an idea that most certainly will continue. Once Caesar was dead, Caesar’s ideas took off.

However, lest the authoritarian imagery of Caesar transfer to Kennedy, the paper affirmed that first Caesar was not “just a tyrant” but a “genius” that ably maneuvered in the Roman political environment. Secondly, the paper distinguished between Kennedy’s love of democracy and the Caesarian tendencies that abolished the Republic without implementing many of the reforms that he fought for. Kennedy had none of those

³⁰⁸ “Houve um homem enviado por Deus. Seu nome era João e veio dar testemunho á Luz” *O Diário*, 12 de novembro de 1963.

tendencies according to this article, instead he is a Catholic “statesman” that never attempted to undermine the Republic. The editorial, following the Catholic line against segregationist policies in the South, hoped that the ideas that caused Kennedy’s death could receive a boost from his status as a martyr for democracy. The death of Kennedy even unifies the paper’s mortal adversaries, the Communists, in a moment of grieving. The paper reported Krushev’s wife weeping during a half-hour visiting US Ambassador [first name] Koehler in which she signed a condolence book.³⁰⁹

Crafting these stories, the paper tried to create an impression of unity. Kennedy, and hence his idea of democracy transcended, unified, and conquered. His death shook even his arch-rivals at the negotiating table the year before. The message from the paper is clear: Democracy, and what Kennedy represented, clearly established itself as the most human alternative to the intelligent authoritarianism of Caesar, the anarchy caused by those without political and social sensibilities, and the inhumane mechanical structures of Soviet Communism. The paper attempted to use Kennedy’s departure from life to enter him into world history as an indispensable humanist, Catholic collaborator with the highest officials of the Church, and a shrewd democratic statesman, exemplifying the Catholic virtues of justice, fortitude, and prudence.

Despite the praises sung to freedom, the paper still preferred military solutions to

³⁰⁹ Editorial, “Kennedy: Lição e Bandeira” *O Diário*, 14 de novembro de 1963. For the book signing see: “Sra. Krushev chorou ao visitar o embaixador” *O Diário*, 26 de novembro de 1963.

Communism, a scourge which instilled sectarianism and betrayal, a betrayal that led to the death of democracy's leader and suddenly plunged the nation into a protracted institutional crisis. In one editorial commemorating the "discovery" of a Communist plot on November 27, 1935, another opinion article cites dissent within the ranks of the army (in favor of General Carlos Prestes) that nevertheless is suppressed by a group of officers "faithful to legality and the institutions." The paper would change its triumphalist tone however warning the "stupid" Communism had given way to an "international conspiracy" of which Brazil was a major center. The editorial attacked the government of João Goulart for not believing in the internal threat of Communism, an axis comprised of "Moscow, Peking, and Havana" that had shifted from direct wars of attack to wars of position invading the minds of those "most ill prepared" to resist.³¹⁰ The paper also recognized a third threat of personal ambition.

Around a month and a half before the coup that took Goulart from power, the relationship between the Catholic press and Goulart had grown worse. *Diário* had shifted from claiming the government was ignoring the threat to accusing it of open collaboration. deriding President Goulart as a caudillo who wished, among other things, to seek reelection, consolidate the unions under his political influence, and legalize the Communist party, a step that signaled the death knell of other countries which ran up into conflict with the United States. This dangerous combination of ambition and left-wing

³¹⁰ Editorial, "Comunismo: Ontem e Hoje" *O Diário*, 27 de novembro de 1963.

ideology could lead not only to financial bankruptcy, but to a deficit of “equilibrium and seriousness.”³¹¹ This lack of “seriousness” also extends other parts of the agenda such as land reform, where the paper repeats the frequent argument that the revolutionary reforms proposed by governments strangle “dialogue” and create enmity between a land owner and their workers.³¹²

Like the Guatemalan Church hierarchy in the months leading up to the 1954 Guatemalan coup, the Brazilian Catholic right attempted to point out what it saw as the instability of the so-called political reforms of the government, trying to paint efforts by the government to centralize power as authoritarian, and their efforts at land reform as an extension of class warfare. Eventually, Goulart’s visit to China and his alleged closeness to Cuba would signal the end for his regime, but a few months before the coup, *O Diário* still granted him “trust on credit” that he could solve the crisis of most concern to them, the inflation crisis. Unfortunately, the paper lamented that drastic measures had already been taken, and that “there were only a few hours” to avert the crisis and that such action required the “avoidance of all light and imprudent actions.” The editorial also pressured him to “give no importance” to his inexperienced advisers but rather to trust “clean sources” which would help resolve the situation.³¹³

³¹¹ Editorial, “Caudilhismo Não” *O Diário*, 13 de fevereiro de 1964.

³¹² J.C de Oliveiras Torres, “O sindicalismo rural: Revolução ou reforma” *O Diário*, o 16 de fevereiro de 1964. To maintain order, and avoid “a social convulsion” authors in *O Lutador* hold a similar position arguing for an agrarian reform such as that of Italy and the United States, which emphasizes efficient technological use of the land (developmentalism) over the state planning attempted by the Soviet Union. S.I.D, “Devagar com a reforma” *O Lutador*, 5 de maio de 1962.

³¹³ Editorial “Crédito de Confiança” *O Diário* 21 de fevereiro de 1964.

Obviously, the President did not concur with these veiled threats. He was overthrown in 1964, the generals promised to save Brazil from economic stagnation and the scourge of inflation as the middle classes and the press applauded. *Diario* specifically called for a “Cleaning Operation” (using the hygienist language that long characterized integralist and fascist ideologies) to protect the liberty of the citizens. For the newspaper, the institutions needed a deep cleaning to wash out the infection of the institutions that they had been “malevolently” brainwashed into “naively” holding Marxist ideologies with the complicity, and sometimes outright collaboration of the former government in a “massification [of the population] without precedent in our history.”³¹⁴

While we cannot be entirely sure of the range of the paper’s intent with these broad declarations, two theories are likely regarding their position towards the new regime. Much of the initial praise stemmed partly from editorial policy that favored the regime as a good business move. Distancing themselves not from just Goulart, but from all historical instability, the paper advocated for a parliamentary system in which the parties, not one man with centralized power, made decisions about the wellbeing in the country. With a tone of nostalgia, the editors noted “[i]n the Imperial Age when we had a parliamentary system, we had 40 years without revolution. During the presidential system we have had seventy years of revolutions including the current one.”³¹⁵ In 1965, the

³¹⁴ Editorial, “Apego á Lei na Defesa da Ordem” *O Diário* 4 de abril de 1964.

³¹⁵ Editorial, “Para salvar a República” *O Diário* 19 de abril de 1964.

editorial board vigorously argued against Presidential systems citing Parliamentary elections as the the stability of Brazilian politics after the suicide of Getúlio Vargas and deriding the Estado Novo as the “longest period of time without elections” in Brazilian history. Pointing to the Western democracies of Britain and Sweden, the writers implicitly asked whether Monarchy, the Parliament, and democratic freedoms couldn’t exist side by side.³¹⁶ The paper did not show immediate concern however, for when this military government would turn control over to the population again and, despite all of their talk regarding democracy, quickly accepted the government line about what a “real democracy” entailed.

For the paper, democracy came down to a simple phrase: Developmentalism. The talk of industrialization and progress prevailed among Catholic developmentalist writers. The paper also showed a special concern for the middle-class economy, quickly defining the control of inflation as the key to democratic success, economic order as freedom that goes along with the elimination of subversive tendencies. In an editorial that lauded the new president Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco’s inaugural address and the “grand civic movement of April”, the paper praised Castelo Branco for driving “extreme leftism” from power and developing political and economic morality. In another editorial months later, *Diario* laid out again the stakes of the conflict, accusing the ousted Goulart government of “taking orders from Peking” and predicting that a Communist victory in

³¹⁶ Editorial, “Debate oportuno” *O Diário*, 10 de janeiro de 1965.

Brazil would do away with the United States and Western Europe, and calling the coup a “decisive defeat” for international Communism.³¹⁷ One phrase however took on special importance. Development needed to happen side by side with workers’ rights, but could not happen during an “inflationary orgy.” Therefore, the president should follow his highest principles and get inflation under control as soon as possible.³¹⁸ Around a year later, with the government foundering, *O Diário* exclaimed that the inflationary crisis was the “fundamental test of the Revolution” and that the government’s success or failure in stopping the prices and stabilizing the economy could mean the “conquer[ing] of this fundamental hurdle or sink[ing] irreversibly.”³¹⁹

The editors pointed out what they saw as the “right track” of true restoration symbolized by the signed agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture to diversify Brazil’s exports beyond coffee. The editorial, in a change from the classical corporatist ISI model of development espoused by Dom Helder, argued that agricultural diversification weighed more heavily in Brazil’s international competition than industrialization.³²⁰ The paper praised the government for being on the “recovery” in getting inflation under 2.9% in the month of May. The editorial admitted that the cost of living was stuck at elevated levels, but justified the improvement by comparing inflation to the previous year.³²¹ The government also basked in this discourse stoking the connection between economic

³¹⁷ Editorial, “A derrota decisiva” *O Diário*, 23 de maio de 1964.

³¹⁸ Editorial, “Declaração de Princípios” *O Diário*, 17 de abril de 1964.

³¹⁹ Editorial, “Teste da Revolução” *O Diário*, 17 de fevereiro de 1965.

³²⁰ Editorial, “Rumo Certo” *O Diário*, 27 de maio de 1965.

³²¹ Editorial, “O rumo certo” *O Diário*, 5 de junho de 1965.

performance and political success with the headline “Revolução vence a inflação com progresso” [“The Revolution is conquering inflation with progress.”] a year later.³²² This preoccupation with various social interests show up in the paper’s coverage of March protests against the government by “housewives, workers, business owners, students” and “politicians.” The housewives demand lower inflation which the article claims is at 7%, the workers also wish for “God and stability”, the business owners grew concerned about prices as well. The newspaper favorably covered student protests which demanded more autonomy and a decriminalization of the National Student Union (UNE).³²³ The paper slowly started to support priests, in this case those of Guanabara, Ríó de Janeiro, in speaking out against government abuse. One such article spoke of the need to “not to collaborate with civil and military power, but to have the necessary courage to speak out against the various social injustices...and violence used against the legitimate demands of the Brazilian people.”³²⁴

The newspaper also took an authoritarian line in their clerical preferences. They lauded the “eminent” Dom Agnelo Rossi Archbishop of São Paulo (1964-1970) to the position of cardinal. This praise bolstered support for a bishop who had at best a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding allegations of government torture of student groups during the early days of the regime.³²⁵ Paul VI eventually replaced him with a more activist bishop Paulo

³²² “Revolução vence a inflação com progresso” *O Diário* 23 de março de 1966.

³²³ “Povo já organiza protesto contra política de Castelo” *O Diário* 25 de março de 1966.

³²⁴ “Os padres da GB não querem uma igreja do silêncio no Brasil” *O Diário* 20 de julho de 1968.

³²⁵ Ricardo Galhardo, “A partir de d. Paulo, mudou tudo’ diz Frei Betto sobre apoio da igreja ao golpe” *iG São Paulo*, 19 de julho de 2012. <http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/politica/2012-07-19/a-partir-de-d-paulo-mudou-tudo-diz-frei-betto-sobre-apoio-da-igreja-ao-golpe.html>. Accessed September 6, 2014.

Evarista Arns (1970-1998) allegedly because of his intransigent denial of human rights abuses in the diocese.³²⁶ Despite his checkered reputation, his appointment in the view of the editors, “clearly reminds Brazilians of their responsibilities as children of the Church.”³²⁷ The paper therefore, took the political position of the hierarchy even to the point of contradiction. With Rossi in office, the paper was glowing. But when the Pope intervened, suddenly the loyalty of the paper to the overall institution of the Church outweighed their political position locally, which officially favored the regime. Such comments as the eulogy of the demoted Archbishop, laid bare however, the contradicting interests of the Catholic press at this time.

SIGNS OF TENSION: THE CHURCH AND STATE CONFLICT IN THE CATHOLIC PRESS

Despite widespread support for military intervention, and middle class weariness of class tensions, some prominent Church officials remained wary of an overreaction by overzealous military officials. Questions about church programs had stirred controversy since before the installation of the military regime, causing the bishop of Brasilia, José Newton de Almeida Batista to affirm his “absolute support” for Catholic Action and for good measure throw in that he considered Alceu Lima, by now a controversial figure because of his progressive politics, to be incisive and completely orthodox.³²⁸ One

³²⁶ Contrary to Alceu Lima’s opinion that a “culture of dialogue” should be permitted with communists that contributed to the common good, Rossi, citing Paul VI, believed that its materialist philosophy rendered dialogue impossible. See: “D. Agnelo Rossi afirmou ser impossível o Diálogo” *O Lutador*, 31 de janeiro de 1965.

³²⁷ Editorial, “Responsabilidade”, *O Diário*, 27 de janeiro de 1965.

³²⁸ “Arcebispo de Brasilia louva Dom João: Manifesto de Ação Católica” *O Diário* 6 de março de 1964.

influential churchman, Dom Hélder Câmara, friend of Alceu Lima, and former head of CELAM and one of the lead bishops, was transferred to the diocese of Olinda and Recife shortly after the coup. “Let us not accuse them of being Communists who merely have a hunger and thirst for social justice and for the development of the country,” he warned the government on April 14, two weeks after the coup as Castelo Branco prepared to assume power. The bishop went on to say that the Northeast would not “accept the professionalization of poverty” and hoped to become “the new face of the Third World” through its development policies.³²⁹ *O Diário*’s religious correspondent Padre Paulo Fernandes would also heap praise on the “great pastor” for his various social initiatives as well as his resistance to government intimidation tactics which Hélder Câmara, according to the reporter, fended off through his close ties with the Vatican and his reputation as being “evangelical and disinterested” and representing “the Church in the middle of the people.”³³⁰ Dom Hélder Câmara maintained a moderate discourse at this stage in his career, calling on priests during the opening of the major Northeastern seminary to contribute to the “decade of development” that eschewed a “purely spiritual evangelism” that gives the impression of a faith “completely detached without life, and without strength to seek out and modify that which is wrong or absurd.” Hélder Câmara rallied both layperson and priest to participate in temporal politics and not to be afraid of the label “communist” that comes with challenging the privileges of society.³³¹ Câmara saw

³²⁹ “Dom Helder Camara defende as reformas como anseio da justiça social” *O Diário de Belo Horizonte* 14 de abril de 1964.

³³⁰ Pe. Paulo Fernandes, “Dom Helder” *O Diário*, 23 de maio de 1965.

³³¹ “Dom Helder Câmara convoca atenção para o Nordeste” *O Diário*, 23 de maio de 1965.

development as a social obligation, not merely as a key to macroeconomic stability. Câmara expressed the idea of a “Church for the Third World” and his seminary would teach about the limits to private property under Church law, Scripture’s view on the rich, and the way to start a “dialogue between the developed Brazil and the Brazil in development.”³³²

Many times, running stories on the Church hierarchy exposed the simmering conflict between Church officials and the government that would boil over in later years. On August 18, 1965, the auxiliary bishop of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Cândido Padim gave a rather sarcastic speech in which he flatly denied accusations that Brazilian Catholic Action had been infiltrated by “Marxist tendencies.” He shielded the Brazilian Church’s social philosophy behind the spirit of the Conciliar reforms being debated at the time and the social injustices that even the highest ranking members of the Catholic Church recognized at the time:

I can’t stop myself from protesting against the frivolous accusations brought indiscriminately against this apostolic movement. The charge of Marxist infiltration in their ranks would only hold water if there was the use of some element obviously related to said political school of thought and at the same time if it were brought in to some sector of Catholic Action. Or if some publication of Catholic Action expressly defended Marxist doctrine. Look, until now I have received no indication

³³² “A Igreja e o ‘Terceiro Mundo’”, *O Diário*, 26 de maio de 1965.

of names or official texts that fit that hypothesis... Frequently, accusations don't even present a method for determining which positions can be considered actually Marxist. In an era in which even Pope John XXIII has been accused by people of little intelligence of spreading Marxist ideologies, it's not admirable that Catholics, faithful to their spiritual head, suffer the same fate.³³³

The paper showed its own ambivalence towards government policy by running an entire speech laying bare the shortcomings of the Brazilian wealth distribution. *O Diário* however could balance out the bishops' more direct criticisms or warnings by framing them in terms of the paper's line and government terminology. One such opportunity sprang from a campaign Hélder headed to alleviate the slums in Recife from the floods and attempt to relocate the endangered residents. At one point Hélder Câmara declared "Combatting poverty does not help without incentives for industrialization."³³⁴ On one hand, the editors spoke of development as if inflation and monetary policy were of chief importance, but on the other continually allowed space for a more pointed social message to reach its readership. At the same time, certain speeches of even controversial figures

³³³ "Bispo desfaz calúnias contra Ação Católica" *O Diário*, 18 de abril de 1964. "[N]ão posso deixar de protestar contra as acusações levianas que têm sido levantadas indiscriminadamente em relação a várias setores desse movimento apostólico. A acusação de infiltração marxista em suas fileiras só teria cabimento se houvesse a invocação de algum elemento manifestamente filiado a tal corrente política e que no mesmo tempo estivesse inscrito em algum setor da Ação Católica. Ou então se alguma publicação da Ação Católica defendesse expressamente a doutrina marxista. Ora, até hoje não recebi indicação de nomes ou de textos oficiais que pudessem ser enquadrados nessa hipótese...Frequentemente, as acusações nem se acham em condições de demonstrar cientificamente que posições podem ser consideradas realmente marxistas. Numa época em que até o Papa João XXIII tem sido acusado por pessoas de curta inteligência de propagar idéias marxistas, não será de admirar que católicos fiéis ao seu chefe espiritual sofrem a mesma sorte."

³³⁴ "Nova campanha de D. Helder no Recife" *O Diário*, 4 de julho de 1965.

still left room for the paper to frame social justice issues in traditionalist conceptions of industrial development and urbanization as opposed to radical wealth distribution and social revolution.

Despite these conflicts, the paper tried to hew to both the line of the government and the increasingly vocal Church hierarchy. By placing everything within a social instead of a partisan materialist context, both Church leaders and the editors that published them could claim reasonable doubt when labeled as Communist, not pointing to Marx, but rather to Leo XIII and John Kennedy, the old developmentalist and social heroes of Catholicism.

THE STRUGGLE ‘IN THE MIDDLE’: *O LUTADOR* SOUNDS OFF AGAINST NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM

O Lutador, a lesser known paper from Belo Horizonte still runs out of a small publishing house in the *Planalto* of Belo Horizonte, every 10 days offering its commentary on Catholic issues around the globe from the perspective of the “middle way” democratic populism that so often dominated Catholic thought in the past. This paper, less frequent than *O Diário* focuses almost exclusively on news through a philosophical and editorial lens. As such, it provides an excellent source for zooming out and viewing the conservative Brazilian reaction to the Conciliar period in more depth. The advantage of a weekly such as this rests in the easy detection of shifts in ideas and editorial policy that a daily paper cannot highlight.

The paper began through the work of the *Sacramentino* fathers and sisters. Belgian priest

Júlio Maria, born in 1878 and was admitted to the Missionaries of the Sacred Family in 1902 at the age of 25. He was ordained in 1908 where he was a superior at a seminary in Whacken, Belgium for two years in 1912. Júlio Maria had always had an affinity for the press, and newspapers in particular as a way of countering “bad press with good press.” In that idea he had the support of northeastern bishops such as Dom Santino who wrote that unlike bad books, newspapers carelessly written by the laity “find its way into the hands of everyone...It takes its place of honor; exposed to the curiosities of every visitor; it generates the subjects of family discussions....”³³⁵

O Lutador during the planning years of the Council exalted moderation as its guiding principle. Having witnessed the horrors of nationalist ideologies unfolding, it took the line of the *Centro Dom Vital* and other Catholic press in vigorously condemning materialist philosophies:

We all know that the most difficult position to hold is that of balance, to not veer off to the extremes that are so often invoked. Virtue is in the center. [W]e condemn all excess. The great secret is to learn to always keep things in perspective.

But this “moderation” came with a catch. The nationalist philosophies condemned by *O*

³³⁵ Lustosa, Oscar de Figueiredo (org), *Os bispos do Brasil e a imprensa*, (São Paulo, Loyola, CEPEHIB, 1983). In: Riolando Azzí, *A Igreja no Brasil: Da apologética à renovação pastoral: A actuação do Padre Júlio Maria e das Irmãs Sacramentinas de Nossa Senhora (1912-1944)*(Belo Horizonte: Editora O Lutador, 1991), 12-14,22-23.

Lutador had little to do with the evils of those leaders from the right who exalted the nation above God, or revived pagan philosophies, those nationalisms so feared by Alceu Lima. The adversary of the day, worthy of the condemnable title of “Nationalist” came from one particular extreme of the spectrum: The left. The paper exalted the nationalism that “defends the national patrimony” and condemned the nationalism that “disturbs the peaceful coexistence and friendly collaboration of the American nations” handing over Brazil and the rest of Latin America to “Russian imperialism.” This imperialism and “Marxist intellectual thinking” had infected “a group of the most high-ranking officials in the government” wreaking havoc on “free education [i.e religious education]” and brainwashing the Brazilian youth in Socialist ideology.³³⁶ Such a stance in 1960, at the beginning of the Jânio Quadros regime, the paper had already warned of a Communist conspiracy. This certainty left no room for the type of flexibility that *O Diário* had demonstrated on the issue of inflation even as late as 1963. *O Lutador* already presumed that the party in power was infiltrated, and fully aware of the Communist influence in its ranks. Such an assumption rendered dialogue improbable.

But in another sense, *O Lutador* saw the conflict through the lens of the transcendent, divine history, and classic theological debates. A theological worldview shaped the paper’s coverage of every issue from international affairs, to the electoral system, to

³³⁶ “A Igreja e os nacionalismos” *O Lutador*, 10 de janeiro de 1960. Sabe-se que a posição mais melindrosa e difícil é o equilíbrio. Não pender para os extremos que em geral se tocam. A virtude está no meio. Todo excesso é condenável. O grande segredo, pois é saber guardar as devidas proporções.”

issues as pragmatic as education. Republishing an article from *A Cruz* the paper makes clear that the danger of these philosophies goes beyond mere economic systems and realpolitik claiming that “Russia is not Communist...nor the US Capitalist. The fight is between liberty and coercion, between spirituality and materialism.” Quoting the US Conference of Catholic bishops, the paper makes clear that the US does not receive a free pass on its economic policies. The bishops, according to the article point out that the US cannot “live a materialist life and at the same time preach openly to the whole world about the supremacy of the spirit of God’s law.” The article divides strongly between “East and West” the “material and spiritual” saying that in the East, like Brazil, “the soul does not count” and the population erroneously believes that social questions will solve moral crises. Catholic writers believed that Christians had a moral duty to enter politics “for the reconstruction of the Fatherland” that “reform had to be the work of Christians.”

Participation did not mean cooptation however, as a coalition with either materialist party, the free markets or statist communism constituted “treason to our Christian tradition.”³³⁷ In an ironic commentary on international affairs, the paper mocked Communism’s claim to equality calling it “a peace of the impotent weak man subjugated by the strong...Hungary is at peace.”³³⁸ Condemning what they saw as a Communist plot to pass “The Basic Guidelines and Fundamentals of Education in Brazil,” the editorial wrote that standardizing education really constitutes an anticlerical measure, and

³³⁷ P. Dutra, “O cristão e o temporal” *O Lutador*, 17 de maio de 1964.

³³⁸ Citando “Paz e Liberdade” *A Cruz*, In:*O Lutador*, 31 de janeiro de 1960.

that private schooling had performed equally well. In short, that the Church and family, the cells of society, could perform the functions of education more cost-effectively than the public schools themselves. The larger issue, however, boiled down once again to a plot to “gradually implant Communism” which like Nazism “can never bear fruit in [Brazil’s] climate rich with patriotism and liberty....”³³⁹ However, Catholic writers from the interior of Minas such as Vitalino de Miranda of Senador Firmino, also heavily criticized this allegedly rich democratic climate of suffocating at the hands of partisan narrowness and candidates who showed “indifference to the Church and to Christian principles.”

The paper also disbelieved the assurances of the parties that the reform allowed for true freedom of religious conscience. Specifically religious figures like Frei Pio lamented the “decay” of Brazil, as represented by the sinful former capital of Rio de Janeiro, which despite Christians’ best efforts had become God-forsaken.³⁴⁰ Despite this decline in certain parts of the country, the editorial page unequivocally praised the dialogue electoral processes created. This dialogue, along with institutions protected the “public order.” Writers like P.J.B blame democratic regimes’ complacency for the rise of Communist Cuba.³⁴¹ Despite this however, the paper still argued “Democracy is this. It is good despite all the troubles. The worst democracy is better than the best

³³⁹ “Liberdad ou absolutismo” *O Lutador*, 15 de maio de 1960.

³⁴⁰ Vitalino Carneiro de Miranda, “Católicos e a política nacional: A lei eleitoral” *O Lutador*, 19 de junho de 1960. See also: Frei Pio S.D.N, “O pudor en declino” *O Lutador* 26 de junho de 1960.

³⁴¹ P.J.B, “O comunismo ameaça a América” *O Lutador* 6 de novembro de 1960.

dictatorship.”³⁴² Another October editorial praised incoming president Jânio Quadros for his moderate speech, but warned that a president supporting “dictatorships and leftists” would be “disastrous” for the country. Insofar as the president supported social justice efforts and measures for the poor, “that is what the Church always wants.”³⁴³ The message was clear: *O Lutador* despised the current system especially for its increasing attacks on the Church’s world view and hegemony. But for the sake of political participation, they still felt obliged to support democracy.

However, when it came to the participation of other religious groups in the body politic, some religions were more equal than others. Writing about a Protestant complaint about the lack of representation at the inauguration of Brasilia, “Zé do Povo” mocked the “closed” doors of the Protestant Church, reaffirms the unique value of the Church within society as the majoritarian religion and mocked that he cannot “imagine how the program would be if all of the religions floating around in Brazil were invited to conduct their own rites. They say that just the Protestants divided themselves into at least 503 sects.”³⁴⁴

Commenting on a Billy Graham crusade to Brazil, Father Arlindo Vileira, the conservative priest that had challenged Jacques Maritain and represented the reactionary

³⁴² Nossa Opinião, “A democracia é isto” *O Lutador*, 16 de outubro de 1960. Some actors go further than mere resignation to democracy. Certain bishops such as D. Correa of Caratinga supported parties as “a group of people that see the common good achieved through a certain end.” Condemning a “one party system” as only partially representative, the paper also deflected criticisms of the system by noting that democracy allows those critiques while Communism, Fascism and Nazism would not have. See: D. Corrêa, “Viva a democracia” *O Lutador*, 8 a 13 de julho de 1962.

³⁴³ Nossa Opinião, “A fala do Presidente eleito” *O Lutador*, 30 de outubro de 1960.

³⁴⁴ Zé do Povo, “Democracia, Religião, Brasília” *O Lutador*, 26 de junho de 1960.

Brazilian right, challenged Graham's popularity by ridiculing the "exorbitant" cost of his tours and the low retention rate of his conversions (35 out of dozens of thousands that attended the Crusades):

One [London attendee] told a Catholic priest. It's like a cup of beer. Billy Graham is the foam; you all have the substance... That just shows with all evidence that souls can't be saved with millions of dollars, but with prayer and sacrifice.³⁴⁵

The father's emphasis on money versus results, and salvation versus materialism, follows both the paper's emphasis on transcendental warfare and its disdain for Protestant methods of conversion. In summary, the Church remained expectant about the process of renovation within the Church, but also skeptical regarding secular political society's ability or willingness to show due deference to Catholicism and its traditional prerogatives in civil society. *O Lutador* during this period argued for a condescending approach towards Protestants, who had traditionally been associated with Liberal and anti-clerical regimes. The Protestants may have preached the same Christ, but the Catholics like Vieira, who joined the spiritual and the material, questioned whether an alliance could possibly function if Catholics were to maintain their integrity, and as important, their monopoly.

³⁴⁵ Pe. Arlindo Vieira, "O pregador Batista Billy Graham", *O Lutador*, 16 de outubro de 1960. "Um deles dizia em Londres a um padre católico: «É mais ou menos um copo de cerveja Graham é a espuma; vós tendes a substância»... Isso mostra com toda a avidência que as almas não se salvam com milhões de dólares, mas com a oração e o sacrifício."

Communism's legalization threatened both the country's Catholic majority and democracy. As José Eugênio Corrêa wrote in 1962, "Legalized Communism is Communism in progress...it can work, grow, and dominate!" Warning about Communism's threat to the popular rule, the writer continues "[Communism] will never enter into any free popular acceptance. Communism can only conquer by force allied with betrayal, at which it's an incomparable master." Deriding Communism as a "deformed minority" forcing its philosophy on a "Catholic country [i.e majority rule]."³⁴⁶

The Catholic press was democratic out of convenience, not trusting the average voters to reject Communism outright at the ballot booth. Instead, Catholicism, like Confucius' North Star, should serve as an unchallenged example and an unquestioned assumption for society. Communism did not allow freedom for Catholics in Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Russia, so why should it be given a voice in Brazil? More progressive forces might call this proposed restrictiveness intolerant, but Father Glauco Vinicio Coimbra rejected a false tolerance of error. "God is the only moral break...Tolerance is not an absolute, it can be a virtue, but also weakness." The author goes on to say that fake tolerance allows for the "profanation of the name of Christ and Mary", robbery, and salacious literature such as *A Carne* by Júlio Ribeiro (1845-1890) which because of its erotic themes and treatment of divorce should not be read by any "chaste youth."³⁴⁷

³⁴⁶ D. José Eugênio Carrêa, "Os comunistas vão fazer que democratizam o partido-para legalzá-lo" 18 de fevereiro de 1962.

³⁴⁷ Father Glauco Vinicio Coimbra, "Mais um sinal de alarme" *O Lutador*, 4 de março de 1962,

The image of a decaying society dominated by a cabal of Communists oppressing a group of ignorant students and youth would continue up until the 1964 Coup, as Catholic groups grew disaffected with the Quadros, and later the Goulart governments.³⁴⁸ When the coup finally came, one writer Frei Vicente gave a full throated endorsement of the new regime that came from the “national uprising” and the change of government in accordance with his Thomistic view of society³⁴⁹: “They all united: As brothers. As sons of the Lnd of the Holy Cross. And they consolidated themselves into one block. Without racial, class, or party discrimination.”³⁵⁰

A few months later, the paper expounded on the previous crisis and demands of the middle class to explain their initial support of the government. Such an explanation seemed necessary, because of the paper’s emphatic statements about the democratic system beforehand, especially its affirmation that despite the flaws in the democratic system, that it was the worst, but also the only workable system. The paper, reprinting an editorial from *Jornal do Brasil*, excused its own change of position by citing the will of the people to stop the “rank extremism” with extraordinary measures. The quote “Only a

³⁴⁸ The paper *O Lutador* in 1962 had already distinguished between a “democratic” military intervention and “dictatorial” intent. In theory the paper condemned both ends of the spectrum. Referring to the coup that took Frondizi from power, Catholics condemned in theory both the extreme right and left, but practically speaking saw Communism as the main form of Totalitarianism and thus gave the military’s of the region the benefit of the doubt. See: S.I.D, “Mania de extremismo” *O Lutador*, 13 a 20 de maio de 1962.

³⁴⁹ Thomistic views of organic society should not in this instance be confused with a statist or corporatist perspective, which the paper explicitly warned against. For the writers of *O Lutador*, statism of this kind led to “drastic socialism” through its tutelage of all non-State institutions. See: “Perigro do Estatismo” *O Lutador* 10 de janeiro de 1965.

³⁵⁰ Frei Vicente, “Viva a Democracia!” *O Lutador*, 26 de abril de 1964. “Uniram-se todos: Como irmãos. Como filhos da Terra de Santa Cruz. E consolidaram-se num único blóco: Sem distinção de côr. Sem distinção de categoria social, E sem distinção de Partidos.”

dictatorship to save the country!” summed up the popular phrase the press needed to wash its hands of having to explain an about face, if not on their social philosophy, at least the institutional prescriptions they had once held in such high regard. Going further, the author compares the “order” of the dictatorship to the “anarchy” and “abyss” of the previous government. Drawing on the concept of the common good, and the society as a body, the author emphasizes the “candor” replacing “private dishonesty.”³⁵¹ Another editorial blamed the international pressure Brazilians were facing on the cabal of “International Communism” that would “never forgive” Brazil for stopping their sinister plans in its tracks.³⁵² One editorial went further than these conspiratorial notions. In the editorial board’s “congratulations” to the regime, they find one fault, that of weakness. Despite the “euphoria” the job of seeking out “dishonest” subversives who would return to their “interrupted” work of dismantling society remained incomplete:

If there are complaints, they are against the lack of repressive action on the part of the authorities who are recognized as just and humane...How many were saved, when they deserved to be punished for the mischief they caused?

The editorial defended the Church against “misunderstanding” caused by the confusion in the minds of authorities relating to Catholic involvement in social justice movements.

The editorial admits that some laypersons and priests collaborated actively with “the

³⁵¹ G. Cerqueira, “A revolução continua” *O Lutador* 21 de junho de 1964.

³⁵² APLA, “A Revolução brasileira no exterior” *O Lutador*, 08 de novembro de 1964.

deposed government” but that the “Church, Catholic Action, and the Youth Workers’ Movement [JOC] are not compromised.” Supporting the government seemed to be a top priority in this piece however, as the paper reminded the readers that not agreeing with the War Minister would be “lamentable.”³⁵³ Like *O Diario*, which had labeled Vargas and the subsequent governments authoritarian, another editorial lauded Castelo Branco for his moderation, saying that the Revolution allowed for freedom of the press never permitted under the Department of the Press and Propaganda (DIPS in Portuguese) of Getúlio Vargas. More interestingly, however, the author once again described a free country as one “free from the Communist virus and the corruption that allowed [it] to grow.”³⁵⁴

The Catholic press, despite its fear of subversion, questioned social realities. Speaking of the mineral riches of Brazil and the excessive profits of the dairy industry, F.F Pereira da Cunha criticized “overly ambitious economic groups” that read the paper and “put [it] on the table” while ignoring the poor. The author praised, optimistically, “clear eyed” government officials battling the big economic groups (which the author does not name) and said that “revolt and an entourage of unhappiness invade the home” when a father cannot provide for his family to eat.³⁵⁵ As Michael Lowy observes, the Movement for Base Education drew on Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, which taught

³⁵³ Editorial, “Méritos e mazelas da Revolução” *O Lutador*, 5 de julho de 1964. “Se há queixas, é contra a timidez e a falta de ação repressiva das autoridades reconhecidamente justas e humanas...Quantas foram poupados, quando mereciam ter sido castigados pelas tropelias praticadas!”

³⁵⁴ “Nem da direita, nem da esquerda” *O Lutador*, 12 á 19 de julho de 1964.

³⁵⁵ F.F Pereira da Cunha, “Ouro para o Brasil e feijão para o prato do pobre” *O Lutador*, 8 de agosto de 1964.

peasants to participate in forming their own historical narratives within Brazilian society. *O Diario*'s article constituted one more example of the gradual turn of mainstream Catholicism against the regime, and toward supporting groups that just a year or two before, they had marginalized completely out of fear of a "Communist coup" in Brazil.³⁵⁶ In a story that *O Lutador* transcribed from *O Diario*, the Church attempted to collaborate with the government when possible, signing an agreement with the Ministry of Education and Culture to strengthen the Base Education Movement (MEB), started in 1961 by the National Brazilian Bishop's Conference, in the Northeast. The organization focused primarily the literacy campaigns. Both the government minister, Flávio de Lacerda and Dom Avelar Brandão Vilela of Teresina agreed on the group's usefulness. A change to the civil code also allowed the Bishops more control over the Movement so as to protect it from the charges of Communism that came with its mission to the poor.³⁵⁷ In return, President Branco attempted to show that he "respected and heard" the voice of the conference, and his Minister of War attempted to stay on good terms even with those priests with conflicting ideas so that a conflict would not "pit the Church against the Revolution."³⁵⁸ Such moves show a complex relationship the Church had with the government. This religious institution was not merely a spiritual wing of the national

³⁵⁶ Michael Lowy, *The War of the Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America* (New York, London: Verso, 1996), 84-85. This background calls into question a unidirectional state and suggests that even the dictatorship needed a certain amount of legitimacy and was willing to pay a moderate price to avoid serious Church conflict.

³⁵⁷ "Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil: Continuará com a «Educação de Base»" *O Lutador* 12 á 19 de julho de 1964. See also: "Os Bispos do Brasil declaram sobre novo Código Civil e o 'MEB'" *O Lutador*, 4 de dezembro de 1966.

³⁵⁸ Pe. J. Batista, "Manifesto dos Bispos do Brasil", *Ibid.*

government, but was instead a relevant negotiating partner with it. Such agreements demonstrate the pragmatism the Church often sought in such situations, but the moves also provided the Church a certain degree of protection from accusations of Communism. After all, the government would have a difficult time arguing with the seal of one of their own departments.

O Lutador developed an economic focus to accompany its theological outlook. Pinta da Silva wrote in June that price increases were sapping the ability of businesses to generate jobs and were hollowing the stimulus efforts of the government.³⁵⁹ From the weekly's viewpoint, the Russians started the Cold War to impede the Western European economy and individualist liberal capitalism. Brazil, in their eyes, constituted Khrushchev's "top down" test run to disguise Communism in the highest levels of the Goulart government. To counter this allegedly nefarious effort, a "democratic revolution" had to take place to defeat the *castrista* Maoist-influenced guerrillas. The paper counted their dismantlement as "the most important event in the Cold War."³⁶⁰ In another September editorial the paper talks about the necessity of a "revolution against the cost of living" threatening that complacency could lead the new government to be toppled "by the people." One moralistic proposal to this problem was the reduction of "exorbitant" salaries of the wealthy, import restrictions, and "administrative seriousness." The author shows optimism, saying the situation is nothing like those of old union bosses who "spoke in the

³⁵⁹ Rey Pinta da Silva, "A necessidade de conter a inflação" *O Lutador*, 14 de junho de 1964.

³⁶⁰ Flávio Meur, "A guerra fria na América Latina" 23 de agosto de 1964.

name of subversion, of his stomach, and his comfort.” The stakes could not be higher for the citizenry, as once the economic concerns of the people were brought under control, “the rest [i.e the end of subversion, communism, social unrest] would come like a charm.”³⁶¹ Another editorial by Father Casemiro Campos blamed the “misery” of the lowest level workers for planting “seeds of subversion” and hoped that free high school education with night classes “geared toward our economic reality” could stem the tide of ideological warfare.³⁶² At the end of the day, economics trumped the social, both as the roots problems behind subversion, and the main solutions to the Communist threat.

But by 1965, *O Lutador* also demonstrated some of the tell-tale signs of double allegiances. Although traditional editorials ran on Communism’s threat to the individual, polemics against other religious sects such as Spiritism, and a paternalistic view of Protestants, the paper started covering the workings of Dom Hélder Câmara in his inaugural speech of the Northeastern seminary in Recife.³⁶³ Much of the paper’s reporting focused on the signing of a new document with bishop Jorge Marcos de Oliveira of Santo Andrés, São Paulo calling for the development of the north. The paper lauded them as the new pair, “Gregory VII and Ambrose” who would intercede on the part of the starving masses (“causing an uprising in the homes”) before the

³⁶¹ “Revolução contra o aumento dos preços” *O Lutador*, 6 de setembro de 1964. Writer Décio Dutra asked for an “explanation” from the President as to the delays in dealing with reforms and the economic crisis. See: Décio Dutra, “Revolução cristã” *O Lutador*, 8 de novembro de 1964.

³⁶² Pe. Casemiro Campos, “Sementes de subversão” *O Lutador*, 16 de julho de 1967.

³⁶³ “Diferença entre comunismo e catolicismo” *O Lutador*, 9 de maio de 1965. See also: Bertrand de Margerie “Reencarnação ou Ressurreição?” *O Lutador*, 9 de maio de 1964. See also: E. Molice, “A igreja que dialoga” *O Lutador*, 11 de abril de 1965.

government.³⁶⁴ The figures of Gregory and Ambrose, two giants of religious freedom, and both prelates who challenged their respective emperors in a high profile defense of the faith, perhaps signaled a shift in the paper's glowing opinion of the government. Perhaps these ancient but symbolic figures also served to stake out the paper's increasingly social, and "accompanying" stance. The initial honeymoon period had worn off, and the new government had proved less than efficient in dealing with the crisis. *O Lutador* seemed to fight a two front war at this point however. Its writers refused to abandon clear teachings on Communism and continued to hammer home a hard line, especially when dealing with errant Church members. Responding to general charges that the Church could be moving in a progressive direction, Father Glauco V. Coimbra seemed defensive:

No, [subversion] in the Church no. In some unfaithful members yes. Those that despise any sort of authority; for those who [think] the worst sin of the Church is being a hierarchy. They even attempt to convince society that Christ did not institute such a hierarchical community.³⁶⁵

The editors, as they had always done, endowed the fight versus Communism with a new

³⁶⁴ "Dom Hélder, Arcebispo de Olinda e D. Jorge, Bispo de Santo André, assinaram documentos que poderiam mudar o face do Brasil" *O Lutador*, 1 de agosto de 1965.

³⁶⁵ Pe. Glauco V. Coimbra, "Liberalismo na Igreja" *O Lutador* 19 de junho de 1966. "Na Igreja não. Em alguns membros inféis, sim. Naqueles que abominam qualquer espécie de autoridade. Para os quais o maior pecado da Igreja é o de ser hierárquica. E até se esforça para convencer a sociedade de que Cristo não instituiu uma tal sociedade hierárquica."

universalizing humanistic discourse. The Soviet Union was only a symptom of the three great enemies of the Church: The World, the Devil, and the Flesh, to be combatted by the three remaining virtues of St. Paul's famous Cor. 13 passage: Faith, hope, and charity (love). An article against the "modern enemies" of the faith including those women "without modesty" influenced by the "press, movies, radio television, and shameless interests" that incentivized licentiousness in Brazilian society.³⁶⁶

Even as the paper held to officially acceptable social questions, they started reporting on activism that strayed from the area of social justice to that of outright criticism. *O Lutador* published a challenging speech before the State Assembly of Minas Gerais by Alceu Amoroso Lima, the "eminent" Catholic intellectual who condemned an "armed" mentality that amounted to "Collective robbery from a hungry world." Calling for a redistribution of wealth and a beginning to a "social revolution", Lima called on the Church to leave its "attack or defense" mentality to live "in the midst, at the service, and at the side of all men of goodwill against alienation. [Especially] the alienation of underdevelopment." While this language preaching charity was not new to Catholics, the controversial line came earlier when Alceu Lima warned against creeds and instead promised to work with "all men of good will, be they Protestants, Spiritists, Communists, or Atheists."³⁶⁷ In another story, the introduction praised Lima for a "homogenous

³⁶⁶ "Os inimigos modernos do Catolicismo" *O Lutador*, 28 de agosto de 1966.

³⁶⁷ Antônio Otaviano e Antônio Nilso, "Alceu Amoroso Lima na assembléia Legislativa de Minas" *O Lutador*, 17 de setembro de 1967.

evolution” that maintained his “inner coherence with Christianity” while “placing the gospel in the circumstances.” Calling him “an unmatched man of our times” the paper argued his message of peace would not fit well with the guerrillas’ message of salvation through armed struggle. Lima, warning of a “Third World War” criticized the violence advocated by Communist manifestos, arguing that armed force to end colonialism in the Western Hemisphere would only reinforce the most reactionary governments of the region through “the greatest consolidation of the military mentality and to the fanaticism of the ‘rights’, like we have seen here since 1964.”³⁶⁸ Two interesting questions rise from this article: Why did the state assembly, which had been one of the leading proponents of the coup, allow Alceu Lima, a known critic of the dictatorship to address the assembly? Second, why did a paper with a consistent editorial line that emphasized the unity between the government and the Church favorably cover a critic known for his divisive statements against the dictatorship? These statements were hardly Communist. That said, charges of “fanaticism” from the mouth of an eminent Catholic intellectual did not coincide with the paper’s apparent attempt to portray unity with the military government on economic and social justice matters.

The paper would move further in the direction of openness, publishing the comments of a French journalist, Henri Fesquet, from *Le Monde* asking the Church to be open to rational critiques of its tradition. Rejecting the vision of an “angelic” or “glorious” Church, the

³⁶⁸ “Tristão de Ataíde: «As guerrilhas representariam em nossos países sul-americanos o melhor pretexto para consolidar o militarismo»”, *O Lutador*, 18 de fevereiro de 1968.

journalist asked the readers to see the “wheat and the chaff” as well as the “smiles and frowns” of the Church without disillusionment. He criticized the Church for taking sides in social conflicts especially in the times that the Church “not on the side of the poor.” The author praised the Church however for giving women’s dignity, claiming “Christianity basically created human love.”³⁶⁹ In January of 1968, the paper also sought to distance the Church from purely middle class interests, running an excerpt from the book of J. Fernando Carneiro, a leading Catholic writer at the Centro Dom Vital, defender of democracy, and critic of authoritarianism during World War II. The introduction of the author acknowledged the controversy Carneiro aroused on the right wing of the Church “exactly like what happens today with men like Dom Hélder Câmara and Tristão de Ataíde.” The article went on to say that Carneiro’s seminal work *Catolicismo, Revolução e Reações* was “unjustly” forgotten and begins with an excerpt about the “biggest scandal” of the church. The Church’s problem lay in “the loss of the working class” to revolutionary movements because of the “social incomprehension of some Catholics that contributes to this historical paradox.”³⁷⁰ In one sense, this article represented a continuity of the editorial line. After all, Jacques Maritain as well as Pius XI, had lamented the loss of the working class, and praised Leo XIII’s courage in facing the social question. From another angle, though, this article represented yet another departure from an editorial policy that gives heightened importance to financial stability

³⁶⁹ “Um grade jornalista católico do «Le Monde»: «Tomara que a Igreja dê o exemplo da coragem intelectual e não resiste em estimular á crítica racional de sua tradição»” *O Lutador*, 12 a 19 de novembro de 1967.

³⁷⁰ Citing J. Fernando Carneiro, “«Compete ao intelectual católico descobrir e denunciar a manobra que quer ligar a Igreja á ordem social burguesa»”. *O Lutador* 7 de janeiro de 1968.

and the macroeconomic concerns of the middle class. To allude to Carneiro's controversy also highlights the paper's own coverage of the controversies surrounding those figures that then pushed for a social, if not Communist, revolution. Furthermore, the editorial board, commenting on a Conference statement criticizing economic inequality and the arrest of several dissident priests, put theology and the Church before the opinions of economists. Alleging that the economists that would later criticize the statement "praised it and therefore did not understand it" the editors dismissed criticisms of the Church's renewed political interest as "subversive", calling them "useful idiots" uninformed of Catholic social doctrine. The writers reaffirmed their rights of participation in the economic debate, claiming that economists comment on pastoral affairs frequently and that "the development of a country is not a simply economic matter" but has to do with "human, cultural, moral, psychosocial, and religious aspects...."³⁷¹ By 1969 *O Lutador's* outspokenness had moderated a bit, although Alceu Lima's exploits, from his acceptance into the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, and the publication of his new book *Violência ou Não* [Violence or No?] an anthology of his then-50 years of literary and political criticism. The paper also ran ecumenical articles commenting on Cardinal Suenens' call to be more attentive to the various factions within the Church-such as the conflict between the laymen and the hierarchy, as well as the various "particular churches", and even a small article on the ecumenical Taizé community's gift bible to the

³⁷¹ Editorial, "O manifesto dos bispos e os economistas" *O Lutador*, 14 de janeiro de 1968. For context see also: "«O desenvolvimento econômico não é tema privativo de economistas, porque diz respeito também à justiça social e ao em comum»." Ibid.

National Conference of Bishops.³⁷² The paper still showed its solidarity with the Church when the matter of guerillas came up however, standing behind Bishop Rossi after he received a death threat and a bomb exploded outside the episcopal palace at the beginning of August, calling his alleged calmness during the situation “a fruit of the gospel.”³⁷³ After the splendidly militant year of 1968, the paper seemed to struggle to find its bearings amidst the rising polarization that closed the decade of reform and “Revolution” in Brazil. Nevertheless, the paper resisted the pull to one side or the other.

CONCLUSION:

The Catholic Church in Brazil began in much the same anticlerical dilemma as other Latin American governments with strong liberal governments. However, mild state improvements during the Imperial period, coupled with its ability to mobilize a circle of highly centralized intellectuals allowed the Church to develop a moderate political wing with basic ideological coherence. Because the Church came under fire during the regime “of Order”, this ideology did not find its authority in material domination *per se* but rather, in its prophetic and theological mission. This mission sometimes tolerated the status quo, but also ran the risk of challenging it directly. What readers saw from *O Diario* and *O Lutador* was a general chronological and ideological consistency that leaned toward a skeptical trial period for the dictatorship in 1964, a full turn towards

³⁷² “Tristão de Ataíde admitido como «Sócio Estrangeiro» no Instituto de França” *O Lutador*, 9 de fevereiro de 1969. See also: “Tristão de Athayde tem homenagem e lança livro” *O Lutador*, 13 de julho de 1969. See also: “Cardeal Suenens prega unidade na diversidade” *Ibid.*. See also: “Protestantes de Taizé fazem doação de Bíblia ecumênica aos bispos do Brasil” *O Lutador*, 13 de abril de 1969.

³⁷³ “Terrorismo não aterroriza Cardeal” *O Lutador* 31 de agosto de 1969.

social justice near the end of the Council in 1965, and full on criticism from both papers by 1968. Each paper maintained its anti-Communist rhetoric, and praised the free-market and fiscally conservative monetary policies of the government placing them high on the Church's social agenda. On the other hand, the voice given to recognized and critical authors such as Lima, gave the papers ways to implement subtle, but constant critical commentary regarding the regime's defects and government skirmishes with the Church. The papers embraced, as far as they were able, the social solutions offered by left-wing groups such as the JOC and MEB. These papers indeed tacked conservative in their discourse, but clearly sympathized with a moderate left-wing ideology which they allowed to run on their pages. Instead of exclusively advocating for the "cleaning up" of subversion, the papers recognized the errors of some individuals, but asked that the organizations be spared from the dissent of the few. All in all, the right wing press represented here, by the majority of the hierarchy, and a substantial part of the laity remains both developmentalist and corporatist. These media outlets expressed at once truly democratic ideas as well as overly-eager-to-please governmental placations in economic affairs. This study argues that this double role, not a rupture or sudden transformation, accounted for the Brazilian Church's democratic inclination, the same political tendency that pushed the Justice and Peace Commission of the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo to resist the silencing of Leonardo Boff in 1985. As José Oscar Beozzo highlights, the Brazilian church, hierarchy and all, had played a crucial role in the twenty-year dictatorship in circumventing censorship and providing refuge to dissenters. These hierarchical figures were not all radicals of Boff's persuasion, but rather, careful

practitioners of democratic values that pushed them to defend even the edgier theologians in their ranks.³⁷⁴ Except for notable exceptions, Church figures leaned neither left, nor right, nor towards Latin American nationalists. The Brazilian Catholics had encountered their exception in the no-man's land of classic social justice and economic development, in the crossfire of the military and the guerrillas.

³⁷⁴ Pe. José Oscar Beozzo, *A Igreja do Brasil: De João XXIII a João II de Dedellín a Santo Domingo* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994), 239-241. According to Beozzo's account, the CNBB and the Doctrinal Office in Brazil saw Boff's potential silencing in 1984 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith as a violation of the principle of subsidiarity (pg. 240), a relatively traditional concept in Catholic social teaching. Following the actual silencing on April 26, 1985, the Bishops once again expressed their displeasure at both the silencing itself and the proceedings leading up to it (p.244-255). In other more general parts of the anthology, Beozzo condemns "external and internal forces" for stopping the advancement of the Brazilian Church: Landowners, industry, and the U.S, as well as certain bishops such as Lopes Trujillo (president in 1972), the Vatican, and bishops such as Angelo Rossi (pg. 208-211). As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Pope took issue with Rossi, who was too close to the regime, and replaced him with Arns. Beozzo gives due credit there.

Conclusion:

Through an analysis of newspaper sources, theological texts, and secondary scholarly work on the relationship between the Church and the Argentine and Brazilian dictatorships, this work has found notable similarities and stark differences between the Catholic intelligentsia in each country. In a global context, the Church both tried to utilize and combat the ideas of Modernity. In one sense, they appropriated the administrative ability of bureaucracies, but also condemned their lack of humanity. The Vatican both condemned the absolutism of the liberal and totalitarian state, and centralized control of the faith in the Papacy and Bishops' conferences.

The global context in which Argentine and Brazilian Catholic militancy grew was caught between Catholic rebirth and the zenith of radical liberalism. The repression of the Catholic Church in Mexico during the 1920s seemed far removed from Argentina and Brazil, but events in Mexico tested the tolerance and commitment of Catholic writers in those countries. Argentine writers saw the Catholic resistance in Mexico as an inspiration for their project. Two prominent Brazilian writers Jackson de Figueiredo and Alceu Lima concurred, although they fundamentally disagreed about how far Catholics should go to engage anti-clerical states. The former believed that the representatives of liberal states precluded dialogue due to their unsalvageable positions. Alceu Lima, even in his more conservative years, disagreed, believing that a cultured classical education, civility, and dialogue could bridge adversaries even in the midst of persecution.

Jacques Maritain, who originally embraced ultramontane discourse with conversionary zeal, eventually inched toward a more plural application of his political philosophy as he

aged. His marriage phased out what triumphalist attitudes he originally held toward Judaism. He became disillusioned with his mentors' focus on reactionary politics and followed the Vatican's lead in condemning ultra-right wing militants. However, he broke from mainstream Catholicism in condemning the seemingly Catholic Spanish uprising in 1936. He condemned what he saw as the mixture of Scholastic theology with nationalist militarism. In particular, he condemned what he saw as the Falangist hypocrisy in bombing the heavily Catholic Basque area.³⁷⁵ This philosophical shift did not constitute a rupture in philosophical vision as his adversaries accused, but rather a continuation of his distaste for an over-politicization of the spiritual (i.e. "Holy War"). He also maintained a healthy skepticism about Communism and its effects on the human person, although many of his strongest words came on the issue of racism and a bourgeoisie which protected its own economic interests and made an idol of capitalism. Intellectuals like Julio Meinvielle and Alceu Lima embraced the "cultural" authoritarianism of the Franco and Salazar regimes.³⁷⁶ When Maritain moved to the United States, he radicalized politically, developing a relationship with Saul Alinsky in Chicago (he lectured at the University of Chicago), and condemning what he saw as the liberal bourgeois order that Charles De Gaulle and the Free French Movement represented. He befriended Roosevelt and came to see US democracy as an ideal political expression of Catholicism.

³⁷⁵ Maritain was already well known in the United States because the debate over the Spanish Civil War had also engulfed the US Catholic community as well, with *Commonweal* as the main voice of criticism against the Falangists and *America* supporting Franco.

³⁷⁶ Alceu Lima wrote against Franco and supported Salazar because of what he saw as a tolerance for basic liberties in the latter's regime.

As the US entered the Cold War, the Catholic Church developed a complex relationship with the United States. On one hand, some episcopal conferences saw the United States as a bulwark against Communism, on the other hand, even conservative Catholics, such as Leonardo Castellani in Argentina saw the United States as merely a materialist power in the region. As the Second Vatican Council arrived, the US influence in Latin America became less relevant to the Catholic intelligentsia, which started to wrestle with questions of how to apply its large body of social teaching to its local surroundings. Developmental language became an important part of the hierarchy's discourse in Brazil. Such language emphasized that material poverty needed to be combatted as a spiritual, as well as a practical issue. Some in the Catholic laity reacted against these changes, eventually coming to suspect Catholic groups who emphasized social justice of subversive tendencies. Intellectuals such as Gustavo Corção rebelled against what they saw as the over-emphasis on Church personality in the figures of Hélder Câmara and Lima, insisting that the new emphasis on material progress and economic justice without a theological basis was leading many Catholic youth groups astray.

In Argentina, a different tension existed. The militants of the 1930s came from an anti-State, anti-democratic Catholicism that exalted the role of the military in checking the alleged corruption of democratic governance. A Christian Democratic minority existed as a substantial minority, and they welcomed Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain to Argentina in 1936 as a philosopher that could bury the "archeological Thomism" of traditional Scholasticism. But thinkers like Julio Meinvielle disagreed, taking the side of the French Catholic right, and accusing Maritain, like his Jesuit counterpart De Chardin, of

Universalist heresy. Despite his training at the Sorbonne, and his earlier friendship with Maritain, Leonardo Castellani's disgust with Argentina's inept system, as well as his anti-Semitism, would turn him away from the man he formerly admired. On a larger level, militants of the 1930s, instead of turning their anti-modernist tendencies against the ills of society, instead entrenched themselves on the minority side at the Council, which wished to ratify the pronouncements of the First Vatican Council, but without the theological innovations that took place at the pastoral level. This group, far more consolidated in Argentina (the 1930s militants had not abandoned their integralist politics, unlike figures like Lima and Camara in Brazil), presented a challenge to the next generation of "social justice" Catholic thinkers. The latter lacked the intellectual gravitas or will to fully transition from their counterparts during this time period, and thus remained as a minority within the Church. Without the cover of the hierarchy, left-wing groups would not only be harassed by the dictatorship, but rather, by traditionalist bishops within the hierarchy.

In Brazil the situation was quite different. Alceu Lima, since World War II, had turned toward Maritain's conception of Catholic pluralism possibly, as he would later reveal in 1966, because he had met Maritain in Buenos Aires in 1936 and been thoroughly impressed.³⁷⁷ Lima had become increasingly skeptical of the middle-class protection of its economic interests which spawned authoritarianism, which in his mind, spawned chaos and a breakdown in civic debate and advancement. While traditional papers such as *O Diario de Belo Horizonte* and *O Lutador* initially took positions of support vis-a-vis the

³⁷⁷ Tristão de Athyde, "Encontro com Maritain" *O Diário* 31 de julho de 1966.

military regime, their support quickly turned to skepticism as the regime failed to deliver on its economic promises and as it stepped up charges of subversion against certain activist Catholic groups. Of note in these two mainstream, center-right papers, is the moral protection these papers give to groups like Educational Base Movement (MEB), Catholic Youth Worker's Movement (JOC), and several endangered or controversial priests in Brazil. The glowing coverage of the Second Vatican Council, and Dom Hélder Câmara in particular, showed a paper divided between its loyalty to a middle-class economic program (they had supported the 1954 Guatemala Coup), and its commitment to defend the Church hierarchy even at costs to its own ideology. While the paper did favorably cover reactionary bishops from districts like Sao Paulo, such coverage was rare. On the whole, we see the difference in the Argentine Episcopate and CNBB's treatment of the development and social questions even before a "theology of liberation" had been formed. A more centralized structure had allowed for figures like Câmara and Lima to more fully control the Catholic debate in times of transition and steer the Church in a more progressive direction than that of their Argentine counterparts. Even in right-wing media, Lima was praised for his fight on behalf of human dignity and his condemnation of the violence that authoritarianism (and the corresponding guerrilla movements) had brought down upon Brazil's citizenry. Far from being "a fireman turned arsonist" as Lima joked in his 1980 interview for Canal Livre, he was rather a ship navigating the complicated waters of the political sphere anchored by his "dialogist" philosophy.

This study cannot claim to be an exhaustive study of even the majority of Catholic thinking in these countries. Other papers such as that run by TPF, and the Catholic papers of Rio de

Janeiro need to be examined with closer scrutiny than I was able to give in this paper. Similarly, other scholarly sources such as *Moenia*, *El Verbo*, *Cruz y Fierro*, and *Azul y Blanco*, and even *Criterio* during its progressive years, which were at best alluded to in this dissertation, could shed light on an incredibly complex tapestry of Catholic thought in a rather fragmented Argentine religious scene.

This work focused on the victors in each country's ideological debate, but fruitful inquiry would also try to connect and contrast the fates of forgotten Catholics-reactionary in Brazil, and progressive in Argentina- that also shaped the modern Catholicism of those countries (the Catholic University of Córdoba (UCC) is now, for example, a center for the study of international relations and gender theory). However, what this paper has done successfully, is muddy the national narrative of *why* the Argentine Church opted for a radically rightist option, and *why* Brazil ended up being a leading example of a region where the Church successfully faced down the dictatorship. In short, if the reader sees that reactionaries opposed, on principle, many of the failures of modern liberalism that spawned liberation theology, causing the reader to see new bridges between the extremes that bypass "the squishy middle", then this work will have fulfilled its task.

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