



Pliny on Cicero and Oratory: Self-Fashioning in the Public Eye

Author(s): Andrew M. Riggsby

Source: *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 116, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 123-135

Published by: [The Johns Hopkins University Press](http://www.jhu.edu/)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/295505>

Accessed: 16-06-2015 15:49 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The American Journal of Philology*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

PLINY ON CICERO AND ORATORY: SELF-FASHIONING IN THE PUBLIC EYE

The argument presented here follows a peculiar trajectory which it will be best to trace at the start. It begins with the examination of an anecdote in a letter in which the younger Pliny discusses the modifications (in particular, abridgment) Cicero may have made to his speeches for publication. I suggest that Pliny's claims are based not on significant evidence beyond what is still extant, but on a set of questionable inferences. These inferences are in turn explained as motivated by the interaction of two principles of Pliny's self-presentation: the concept of the orator as engaged public figure (and certain stylistic consequences of this view), and Pliny's *aemulatio* with Cicero. Finally, I speculate on possible political motivation for these stances adopted by Pliny.

Evidence for the extent and character of revision in Cicero's published speeches is weak and scattered. One of the clearest testimonia is Pliny's letter 1.20.6–8, which claims that the speeches appeared in substantially abridged form. Many scholars have accepted the essence of this letter as true, with or without occasional reservations.¹ The present argument adopts a somewhat different approach.

(6) Haec ille multaque alia, quae a me in eandem sententiam solent dici, ut est in disputando incomprehensibilis et lubricus, ita eludit ut contendat hos ipsos, quorum orationibus nitar, pauciora dixisse quam ediderint. (7) Ego contra puto. Testes sunt multae multorum orationes et Ciceronis pro Murena pro Vareno, in quibus brevis et nuda quasi subscriptio quorundam criminum solis titulis indicatur. Ex his apparet illum permulta dixisse, cum ederet omisisse. (8) Idem pro Cluentio ait se totam causam uetere instituto solum perorasse, et pro C. Cornelio quadriduo egisse, ne dubitare possimus, quae per plures dies (ut necesse erat) latius dixerit, postea recisa ac repurgata in unum librum grandem quidem unum tamen coartasse.

That man went so far in dodging these and many other things which usually I say to this effect (since he is slippery and hard to catch in an

¹The most recent examples are Kirby (*Rhetoric* 164–70) and favorable remarks on this point by an otherwise unenthusiastic reviewer (Berry, 198); the passage is given serious consideration at least as early as Humbert (*Plaidoyers écrits* 264). More neutral are Stroh (*Taxis und Taktik* 38) and Classen (*Recht, Rhetorik* 4).

argument) that he claimed that the very men on whose orations I rely said less than they published. I think otherwise. Witnesses of this are many speeches by many authors including Cicero's *Pro Murena* and *Pro Vareno*, in which a brief and bare description of certain crimes is indicated by rubrics (*titulis*) alone. From these it is clear that he said many things, and left out many when he published. The same man says that he spoke the whole case for Cluentius alone by the ancient custom, and pled for C. Cornelius over four days, so that we cannot doubt that what he said more fully over several days (as was necessary), he later fit together into one large but unitary volume after trimming and cleaning it up.

First it will be useful to review and document more fully two details of Pliny's argument which have been noted before, but not fully appreciated. Consider the first argument he makes (7). The highlighted phrases *testes sunt* and *ex his apparet* show that Pliny has not compared published versions to transcripts or even consulted earlier authorities who had made such a comparison; rather, he is making inferences from the published texts alone. Furthermore, we still have *Pro Murena*, and it still contains the rubric which stands in place of an actual argument (the *titulus*) that Pliny mentions, so his letter is of limited independent value.² The situation is the same in the following section: *idem pro Cluentio ait se . . . et pro C. Cornelio* and *ne dubitare possim* again indicate Pliny's inference. In fact, the one source we have who was in a position to make an actual comparison, Cornelius Nepos, claims *Pro Cornelio* was an accurate reproduction of the delivered oration: *Refert enim Cornelius Nepos se praesente iisdem paene uerbis, quibus edita est, eam pro Cornelio, seditioso tribuno, defensionem peroratam*, "For Cornelius Nepos says that in his presence [Cicero] spoke the defense of Cornelius, the seditious tribune, with nearly the same words as were published" (ad Jerome 23.365M = *Vita Ciceronis* fr. 2 Peter). This confirms that the Ciceronian texts cited are the basis for Pliny's inference, not illustrations of a fact of which he has independent knowledge. And again in the cases of *Pro Cluentio* and *Pro Cornelio*, we already possess independent sources for the relevant information. *Pro Cluentio* is extant, and, while *Pro Cornelio* is lost, Asconius (62.3–4C) preserves the

²Cf. also *tituli* at *Font.* 20 and perhaps *Cael.* 19. The latter is preserved only as a supplement in a single manuscript. Austin (*Cicero* ad loc.) rightly points out that the speech has a difficult but not incomprehensible transition between 19 and 20. Hence it is quite likely that the *titulus* was mistakenly added by a reader of the speech.

key remark about the length of the pleading. Thus Pliny's second argument is of no independent value at all.

Pliny is guessing and perhaps not even guessing well. For instance, the lack of *tituli* in most speeches might more naturally be taken as evidence that abridgment was not common. In any case Pliny thought that these arguments were worth making. It is then worthwhile to ask why he attached value to this point. The only contextual information we have is the addressee of the letter: Tacitus. The relevance of this point has been largely ignored, and in at least one case (Sherwin-White, *Letters* 100, 132) actually denied.³ Two things suggest at least some specific connection of content and addressee. First we may note that a phrase at 1.20.10 can be taken to correct a point in Tacitus. In his discussion of *breuitas* at *Dialogus* 20 (note the similarity of topic between letter and treatise), Tacitus' Aper asserts that audience tastes have changed since Cicero's day and that his own contemporaries would not have listened to five⁴ books of the *Verrines*. In his letter Pliny rightly points out that despite certain gestures at verisimilitude, the *actio secunda* was never actually delivered: *in eis etiam, quas tantum editas scimus, ut in Verrem*, "and in those which we only have as published form, as *in Verrem*." Murgia ("Pliny's Letters" 183 n. 28) has pointed out that in all of Pliny's other letters to Tacitus there is some clear connection of material and addressee; in particular several letters refer to parts of *Dialogus*. The correction falls into this pattern.

We can, moreover, connect the letter as a whole to Tacitus. The first sentence frames the letter as a debate with an anonymous interlocutor: *Frequens mihi disputatio est cum quodam docto homine et perito, cui nihil aequè in causis agendis ut breuitas placet*, "I frequently argue with a certain learned man, who is pleased by nothing in pleading cases so much as brevity." It is well known that letter 9.26 (addressed to

³Sherwin-White (*Letters* 132 ad 1 *breuitas*) says that "Pliny does not regard Tacitus as an exponent of this quality, s. 23." Two points must be made here. (1) Since there is no explicit statement about Tacitus in the letter, Sherwin-White's conclusion must assume, incorrectly, that his sympathies lie with Pliny rather than with the interlocutor. (2) As argued below, the following section suggests that Tacitus does tend to *breuitas*. Picone (*Eloquenza di Plinio* 55) does suggest it is relevant, but goes on (59) to assign Tacitus a position intermediate between those of Pliny and the anonymous interlocutor. Guillemain (*Vie littéraire* 86–87) says the interlocutor is "l'un des *subtiles magistri* blâmés par Quintilien [12.10.51]," but does not connect him to Tacitus at all.

⁴The manuscripts read V; some prefer to read VI here, referring to the entire collection, not just the *actio secunda*.

one Lupercus) begins similarly: *Dixi de quodam oratore saeculi nostri recto quidem et sano, sed parum grandi et ornato, ut opinor, apte: "nihil peccat, nisi quod nihil peccat,"* "I have often, and rightly I think, said of a certain orator of our age (correct and sound, but too little grand and ornate), 'He errs not at all unless in that he errs not at all.'" The content of the two letters is also similar. In both Pliny rejects a number of arguments for a trimmed-down style. In both he cites a number of Greek examples. But let us also consider some parallels between the two letters which have not been noted previously. Although Pliny starts 9.26 with the anonymous orator he is soon addressing his comments directly to Lupercus:

Visus es mihi in scriptis meis adnotasse quaedam ut tumida, quae ego sublimia, ut improba, quae ego audentia, ut nimia, quae ego plena arbitrabar. (9.26.5)

You seemed to me to have marked certain things in my writings as swollen, which I thought sublime, as untoward, which I thought daring, and as simply too much, which I thought merely full.

Then near the end it again becomes clear that the addressee is opposed to the position that Pliny has been advocating:

Exspecto ut quaedam ex hac epistula . . . isdem notis quibus ea de quibus scribo, confodias. (9.26.13)

I expect that you will mark up certain things from this letter with the same marks by which you note those things about which I am writing.

Finally Pliny closes with a comment in which his letter is evaluated precisely in terms of the issues which it has itself raised:

Intellego enim me, dum veniam prioribus peto, in illa ipsa, quae adnotaveras, incidisse. (l.c.)

For I understand that I, while I am seeking pardon for my earlier errors, have fallen into those very things which you had noted.

Returning to 1.20, we see that the assimilation of the sentiments of addressee and the anonymous learned man is less obvious, but is fairly clear in the penultimate section:

Haec est adhuc sententia mea, quam mutabo, si dissenseris tu; sed plane, cur dissentias, explices rogo. Quamuis enim cedere auctoritati tuae debeam, rectius tamen arbitror in tanta re ratione quam auctoritate superari.
(1.20.24)

This is my current thinking, which I will change, if you dissent; but I ask you to explain clearly why you dissent. For although I ought to yield to your authority, I think nevertheless that I would be overcome more rightly in so great a matter by reason than by authority.

The request for specific arguments seems to imply that Pliny anticipates disagreement. The final joke of the letter also uses the strategy of analyzing the words of the discussion in terms of the categories that they describe:

Proinde si non errare uideor, id ipsum quam uoles breui epistula, sed tamen scribe (confirmaris enim iudicium meum); si errare, longissimam para!
(1.20.25)

So if I seem to be right, write this in as short a letter as you wish (but write!), for you will confirm my judgment; if I am wrong, produce a long one!

(One might also note in this connection that 1.20 is far the longest letter of the first book.)⁵

In letter 9.26, the use of the *quidam orator* is clearly a rhetorical figure which allows polite disagreement with the addressee. The close similarity of form suggests that the *quidam doctus homo* of 1.20 is a manifestation of the same rhetorical figure. Thus we may take the letter as a whole as directed against positions that Tacitus had advocated or at least advanced. The general pattern of references in book 1 of the *Epistles* as well as the more precise reference to the issue of the *Verrines* suggests that Tacitus' *Dialogus* is a major target of Pliny's rhetoric.⁶

⁵Gamberini (*Stylistic Theory* 145–53) notes Pliny's usual preference for writing short letters.

⁶Of course, the specific argument presented by Pliny does not occur in the extant portions of *Dialogus*. It might appear in a missing section, although no known lacuna seems particularly promising. More likely the point would have emerged in subsequent letters or discussion. That the claim of Ciceronian *breuitas* contradicts remarks made in *Dialogus* should not bother us; the work itself adopts a number of mutually exclusive

We have now identified this letter not as a general statement of literary principle, but as a specific response to a set of arguments attributable to a particular individual. Why does Pliny choose to stake out a position here, and why does he describe the matter as important (*in tanta re*, 1.20.24)? To answer this question we turn to the political implications of the stylistic issues. The arguments he makes in this letter about the value to be attached to *breuitas* are essentially the same as those used by Cicero against the so-called Atticists.⁷ I give Cicero's version at length since it is more explicit and so will clarify Pliny's reasoning. These "Atticists" (however few or many they may have been) favored a minimalist style. Cicero argued that this style was both impractical and an oversimplification of the model of Attic oratory. This is not an arbitrary aesthetic judgment but is rooted in political considerations. Cicero is trying to maintain the traditional centrality of oratorical persuasion in Roman culture. The need to persuade different audiences on topics of varying gravity requires a variety of styles. This is seen most clearly in *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*.⁸ At section 9 of that work Lysias' use of the *tenuis* style is connected to the fact that his

positions, and Pliny describes his anonymous adversary as *incomprehensibilis et lubricus* (1.20.6).

⁷On the actual historical extent of the Roman Atticist movement see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff ("Asianismus" 1–4) and Douglas ("M. Calidius" 241–43).

⁸There have been recent doubts about the authenticity of *OGO*; see Dihle ("Ein Spurium") and Bringman (*Untersuchungen* 256–61); for a contrasting view cf. Bickel ("Echtheit"). This question is not strictly relevant to the purpose here, as we know that *OGO* was circulating by Asconius' time (and hence well before Pliny's) under Cicero's name: *libro . . . qui Ciceronis nomine inscribitur de optimo genere oratorum*. Dihle (309) argues from parallels in Asconius and Quintilian that Asconius' phrasing shows he felt the work to be a forgery. In fact, the *nomine* formula is used of forgeries, possible forgeries, works whose authenticity had been doubted but was accepted by the writer, and unauthorized published transcripts. Without further comment (which does follow in all other cases) *Ciceronis nomine* is neutral with regard to authorship. Other features of the work, such as frequent parallels to other parts of Cicero's rhetorica, less formal style, and lack of references to it by Cicero and Quintilian, are much less suspicious if we recognize its true generic affiliations. It is less like the long dialogues such as *Brutus* and *Orator* than advisory epistles like *Q. fr.* 1.1 and *Commentariolum Petitionis* (whoever its author). This would account for *OGO*'s length, use of self-description, noncanonical status, and stylistic level, and perhaps its relatively low level of originality. See also the arguments of Hendrickson ("*De Optimo Genere*") that *OGO* is a rough draft. In any case Cicero advances similar arguments about Atticism at *Or.* 23–32, 69–72, 89–90, *Brut.* 284–91, and *Att.* 14.1a.2.

speeches were mostly private cases: *Videtur esse ieiunior, cum se ipse consulto ad minutarum causarum genera limaverit*, “He seems too spare, since he deliberately polished himself for minor cases.” Contrast the style of the Cicero’s own *Pro Milone*, which had to be more grand because of its dramatic setting amid the temples of the Forum (10). Finally, Cicero refuses to place Isocrates among the number of the greatest orators because he was removed from the actual practice of oratory: *Non enim in acie uersatur nec ferro*, “for he is not tested by battle or steel.”⁹ Political oratory requires *usus*. Hence Cicero’s preference for the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines (14, 19–23) which are embedded in a real political context.

Pliny argues that one cannot always speak briefly,¹⁰ since one needs to be able to account for varying audience judgments: *Aliud alios mouet, ac plerumque paruae res maximas trahunt. Varia sunt hominum iudicia, uariae uoluntates*, “Different things move different people, and often small things direct larger ones. Various are the judgments and intentions of men” (1.20.12). How does Pliny know this? Experience: *Adiciam quod me docuit usus, magister egregius. Frequenter egi, frequenter iudicauit, frequenter in consilio fui*, “I add what experience, an excellent master, has taught me. I have frequently pled, frequently judged, and frequently entered public council” (12; cf. 6.29.4). He has learned (in different contexts) that different hearers must be approached in different ways. The anonymous orator of letter 1.20 replaces this pragmatic standard of effectiveness with an abstract and absolute requirement of *breuitas*, apparently a Stoic position (Diogenes Laertius 7.59; cf. Cic. *Fam.* 9.22.1; Quint. 4.2.117, 12.2.25–28). This makes sense only if oratory is removed from its traditional cultural context, in which the orator is an engaged public figure. Of course, the politicality of this issue was not lost on imperial Romans. The connection is made by precisely the author who seems to have spurred Pliny’s

⁹This judgment was later echoed by Pliny (9.26.6).

¹⁰The reader may note some slippage in the argument above between *breuitas* as a characteristic of the overall length of a composition and *breuitas* as a sentential-level characteristic related to the degree of ornamentation and periodicity. While the two senses are logically distinguishable, Pliny chooses not to make that distinction in this letter. He starts by speaking (apparently) of the first sense, but by section 18 at the latest he has shifted to the second. The political issues in question apply equally well to either sense. See Gamberini (*Stylistic Theory* 30–49, 56–57 n. 6) on the slide between these two senses.

response: Tacitus. In the next to last section of *Dialogus Tacitus' Martenus* asks:

Quid enim opus est longis in senatu sentiis, cum optimi cito consentiant? . . . Quid inuidiosis et excedentibus modum defensionibus, cum clementia cognoscentis obuiam periclitantibus eat?¹¹ (*Dial.* 41.4)

For what need is there for long opinions in the Senate, when the best men come to agreement quickly? What need for invidious and excessive defenses, when the clemency of the inquisitor comes to meet those in peril?

There is no longer a need for extensive oratory, because there is no longer a need for oratory at all.

I contend that because of Pliny's professed *aemulatio* of Cicero, the political aspects of the stylistic issue extend to Pliny as well. Pliny, as is well known, is proud of his *aemulatio* of Cicero in oratory both in terms of oratorical style and of self-definition as, first and foremost, an orator: 1.5.12 *Respondi . . . potuisse honorificum existimari. Est enim . . . mihi cum Cicerone aemulatio*, "I replied that it could be thought a mark of honor, for I have a rivalry with Cicero"; also 1.2.4, 9.26.8.¹² But the imitation extends beyond literature:¹³ Pliny is successfully urged to follow Cicero's model in supporting poets (3.15.1) and is congratulated for following Cicero in the augurate (4.8.4). In the latter case Pliny

¹¹ Pliny expresses a similar sentiment more positively at 6.22.2. The required style of speaking in the *consilium principis* (i.e., *carptim et κεφαλαῖον*, "summarily") is described *quo genere ueritas statim ostenditur*, "in which style the truth is immediately apparent."

¹² On the centrality of oratory to Pliny's self-presentation see Weische ("Plinius d. J." 381–82).

¹³ *Contra* Winniczuk ("Pliniusz Młodszy"), who insists the parallels are purely oratorical. To judge from the Latin summary of his Polish article, he seems to emphasize actual differences in career and circumstance and so to miss the importance of *aemulatio* with Cicero to Pliny's self-representation. Similarly Norden (*Kunstprosa* 319 n. 1) and Guillemain (*Vie littéraire* 69). Picone (*Eloquenza di Plinio* 154) takes a broader view of the scope of emulation, emphasizing the ethical aspect. See also Suster ("De Plinio"), who emphasizes verbal and figural parallels between *Pro Marcello* and *Panegyricus*, and Weische ("Plinius d. J."). It is true—as Gamberini (*Stylistic Theory* passim) points out—that many of the principles Pliny adopts from Cicero (or elsewhere) can also be found in his teacher Quintilian. Again, this is not relevant here, since the issue is not so much Pliny's actual similarity to Cicero as his use of Cicero as a figure in self-representation.

accepts the parallels in literary efforts and in offices and wishes he could also share in Cicero's *ingenium* (4.8.5):

Te quidem, ut scribis, ob hoc maxime delectat auguratus meus, quod M. Tullius augur fuit. Laetaris enim quod honoribus eius insistam, quem aemulari in studiis cupio. Sed utinam ut sacerdotium idem, ut consulatum multo etiam iuuenior quam ille sum consecutus, ita senex saltem ingenium eius aliqua ex parte adsequi possim! (Ep. 4.8.4–5)

My augurate pleases you most on this account (as you say), because Cicero was augur. For you rejoice because I pursue the offices of a man whom I hope to rival in my studies. As I have achieved my priesthood at the same age, and the consulate at a younger age than that one, so may I in old age be able to achieve some part of his talent!

These cases also show that the Ciceronian model is imposed on Pliny from without as well as from within. And even when the description of Pliny's poetry is put in terms of neoterics like Catullus and Calvus, its ultimate authorization derives from Cicero (7.4; 5.3.5). In practice we may also note Pliny's publication of speeches and letters which (at least superficially) follow the Ciceronian, rather than Senecan, model.¹⁴ We have also seen above that he follows Cicero's line on Atticism quite closely. Within the text of the *Epistulae* the figure of Cicero takes on a peculiar importance. When presented with a Ciceronian *exemplum* from outside, Pliny must either accede (as above, 3.15.1, 4.8.4), concede his inability to follow (as we shall see below, 9.2.2), or deny the historicity of the example (as in 1.20). In no case does he simply dismiss the example as not authoritative, nor (and this is most important) does he ever attempt to appeal to an alternative authority.

Romans had long had recourse to *exempla* in justifying particular stances, but even so Pliny's extensive and preemptive reliance on a single model from the past seems extraordinary.¹⁵ We may locate the

¹⁴That is to say, the rhetorical force of many of the letters depends on the reader's assumption (willing or otherwise) that they are directed at the addressee, rather than a general public; cf. Leach ("Politics of Self-Presentation" 36–37). As Leach points out (15–16), the issue of "authenticity" is not of importance for the issues addressed here.

¹⁵There are, of course, other models, perhaps most notably Corellius Rufus, who once claimed Pliny did nothing without his approval (4.17.8; cf. Büttler, *Geistige Welt* 85–88). But Corellius' influence seems to fade rapidly after his death (1.12.1) and with Pliny's political maturity; even before then Corellius' guidance was not absolute (9.13.6). In

need for this reliance on a single figure in the golden age of “double-speak” as recently described by Bartsch (*Actors* 63–187). The praise of emperors, especially Domitian, had made it nearly impossible to distinguish between language which was sincere or ironic or even to be sure that this remained a meaningful distinction. Pliny himself spends much of *Panegyricus* struggling with this problem, trying to prove that his speech can only be taken in one way.¹⁶ In an age of such interpretative instability, personal safety might dictate giving up one’s own identity for one from the past which was already known to be acceptable.¹⁷ As Pliny says in praise of Titinius Capito: *Scias ipsum plurimis uirtutibus abundare, qui alienas sic amat*, “You will know the man is filled with the most virtues who so loves those of others” (1.17.3). In contrast he criticizes certain youths for taking as their models neither historical figures nor living elders but themselves (8.23.3). Pliny follows his own advice by fashioning himself on the model of Cicero.¹⁸

Obviously, if the anonymous interlocutor is right about the delivery versus the publication of Cicero’s speeches, Pliny has to some extent failed in his emulation from an academic point of view.¹⁹ But the problem goes even deeper. Insistence on a minimalist style minimizes the relevance of oratory itself. Pliny himself expressed regret that the

general these other models are either attached to Pliny’s youth or are clearly secondary or both. Another advantage of a dead man as model is that it avoided a personal dependency unseemly for the Roman aristocrat; Corellius’ remark (which Pliny quotes largely to refute) is very like the freedman M. Canuleius Zosimus’ tomb inscription (*CIL* 6.9222): *Hic . . . sine uoluntate patroni nihil fecit*, “He did nothing without his patron’s approval.”

¹⁶*Contra* Leach (“Politics of Self–Presentation” 37).

¹⁷Examples of the use of *ueteres* or *antiqui* in general as exemplars include *Ep.* 1.16.3, 2.1.7, 5.14.3–4, 9.22.1, and *Pan.* 11.4.

¹⁸Pliny frequently offers himself as a model for imitation by his juniors (*Ep.* 6.6.5, 6.11.2–4, 7.11.7). This seems to be an example of the process described at *Ep.* 6.21.2 by which copies follow their models so faithfully that they eventually become models themselves.

¹⁹The potential for conflict over just what “Cicero” stands for points up the fact that Pliny’s model is a particular early second-century construct which need not correspond to either ours or Cicero’s own versions of “Cicero” (note particularly Pliny’s Cicero’s commitment to neoteric-style poetry), nor even to other possible contemporary versions. The study of such versions, or the earlier ones reflected in Quintilian or Seneca the Elder, are the topic of another essay. Similarly, the reconstruction of Catullus and the neoterics implied in Pliny would be an interesting, but again distinct, area of study.

scope of his letters, in contrast to that of Cicero's, was limited by a lack of significant subject matter:

Neque enim eadem nostra condicio quae M. Tulli, ad cuius exemplum nos uocas. Illi enim et copiosissimum ingenium et par ingenio qua uarietas rerum qua magnitudo largissime suppetebat. (9.2.2)

For I do not live under the same conditions as Cicero, to whose example you call me. For he had both overflowing talent and a variety and magnitude of topic equal to that talent.

In an early letter Pliny had expressed a similar sense of loss without a specific reference to Cicero:

Haec tibi scripsi, primum ut aliquid noui scriberem, deinde ut non nunquam de re publica loquerer, cuius materiae nobis quanto rarior quam ueteribus occasio, tanto minus omittenda est. (3.20.10)

I wrote these things to you, first to write something new, second to take the opportunity to speak of the republic, and, to the extent that we have less occasion for this than the ancients, we must not pass our opportunities by.

Here literary changes are explicitly linked to the decreased opportunity of significant public discourse. For both Cicero and Pliny the orator's claim to fame is to be an engaged public figure. Tacitus' stylistic arguments minimize the size of Cicero's oratory and thereby undermine its claim to significant public engagement. Pliny responds by reiterating Cicero's *amplitudo* and so defending Cicero's and his own relevance.²⁰

ANDREW M. RIGGSBY

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

²⁰I thank Shadi Bartsch, Matt Roller, and Victoria Wohl for their many helpful suggestions. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the University of California, Berkeley, and at the 1992 meeting of the American Philological Association in Chicago. I thank those audiences as well.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Michael. "Hortensius' Speech in Defense of Verres." *Phoenix* 20 (1976) 46–53.
- Austin, R. G., ed. with commentary. *Cicero: Pro M. Caelio Oratio*. 3d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.
- Bartsch, Shadi. *Actors in the Audience: Theatricality and Doublespeak from Nero to Hadrian*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Berry, D. H. Review of *The Rhetoric of Cicero's Pro Cluentio*, by John Kirby. *JRS* 81 (1991) 197–98.
- Bickel, Ernst. "Die Echtheit von Cic., *De Opt. gen. or.*" *RhM* 98 (1955) 288.
- Bringman, Klaus. *Untersuchungen zum späten Cicero*. Hypomnemata 29. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971.
- Bütler, Hans–Peter. *Die geistige Welt des jüngern Plinius: Studien zur Thematik seiner Briefe*. Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften, n.s. 2R, 28. Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1970.
- Classen, Carl. *Recht, Rhetorik, Politik: Untersuchungen zu Ciceros rhetorischer Strategie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985.
- Dihle, Albrecht. "Ein Spurious unter den rhetorischen Werken Ciceros." *Hermes* 83 (1955) 303–14.
- Douglas, Alan. "M. Calidius and the Atticists." *CQ*, n.s. 5 (1955) 241–47.
- Gamberini, Federico. *Stylistic Theory and Practice in the Younger Pliny*. New York: Olms, 1983.
- Guillemin, Anne–Marie. *Pline et la vie littéraire de son temps*. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1929.
- Hendrickson, George. "Cicero *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*." *AJP* 47 (1926) 109–23.
- Humbert, Jules. *Les plaidoyers écrits et les plaidoiries réelles de Cicéron*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925.
- Kirby, John. *The Rhetoric of Cicero's Pro Cluentio*. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1990.
- Leach, Eleanor. "The Politics of Self–Presentation: Pliny's Letters and Roman Portrait Sculpture." *CA* 9 (1990) 14–39, with unpaginated plates following.
- Murgia, Charles. "Pliny's Letters and the Dialogus." *HSCP* 89 (1985) 171–206.
- Norden, Eduard. *Die antike Kunstprosa*. 5th ed. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958. First published 1915.
- Picone, Giusto. *L'eloquenza di Plinio: teoria e prassi*. Palermo: Palumbo, 1978.
- Sherwin–White, Adrian. *The Letters of Pliny*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
- Stroh, Wilfried. *Taxis und Taktik: die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros Gerichtsreden*. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1975.
- Suster, G. "Die Plinio Ciceronis Imitatore." *RFIC* 18 (1890) 74–86.

- Weische, Alfons. "Plinius d. J. und Cicero: Untersuchungen zur römischen Epistolographie in Republik und Kaiserzeit." *ANRW* II.33.1 (1989) 375–86.
- Wilamowitz–Moellendorff, Ulrich von. "Asianismus und Atticismus." *Hermes* 35 (1900) 1–52.
- Winniczuk, L. "Czy Pliniusz Młodszy Usiłował Násładować Cyclerona?" *Meander* 37 (1982) 85–97.