Copyright

by

Joshua Charles Orme

2018

The Report Committee for Joshua Charles Orme

Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Report:

The Foundations of a Nation:

Framing Pakistan from 1940-1971 through International Relations Theory and Postcolonialism

APPROVED BY

SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

<div style="border-top:1px solid #000;"></div>

Syed A Hyder, Supervisor

<div style="border-top:1px solid #000;"></div>

Robert L Hutchings

The Foundations of a Nation:

Framing Pakistan from 1940-1971 through
International Relations Theory and Postcolonialism

by

Joshua Charles Orme

Report

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degrees of

Master of Arts

And

Master of Global Policy Studies

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2018

Dedication

For my parents, Ed and Sue, who through their courage and convictions laid the foundation for my interest in the world and ensured an enduring affection for the people, culture, and country of Pakistan.

Acknowledgements

Abstract

The Foundations of a Nation:

Framing Pakistan from 1940-1971 through
International Relations Theory and Postcolonialism

Joshua Charles Orme, MA/MGPS

The University of Texas at Austin, 2018

Supervisor: Syed A Hyder

This paper explores the emerging integration of international relations theory with postcolonial scholarship and uses Pakistan's state formation and history as a case study. It is argued that international relations theory privileges European experiences and history, which results in inaccurate assumptions about the outcomes of colonialism and origins of postcolonial independence. Pakistan's unique development as a state founded on ideology and build out of an imperial/colonial system offers an opportunity for destabilizing Eurocentrism in international studies. Rather than favoring a singular outcome or conclusion, this paper demonstrates the plurality necessary for an inclusive historical analysis of state-power.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

This report attempts to engage with existing discourse on International Relations (IR) Theory in the context of both postcolonial theoretical critiques and the geopolitical realities of a postcolonial world. IR theory can extend its depth with useful insights from new inter-disciplinary intersections with history, anthropology, sociology, and even comparative literature. Many of these fields have seen significant intellectual expansion from postcolonial, feminist, or Marxist critiques. Similarly, IR theory is being expanded through timely criticism and alternative methodology stemming from the aforementioned intellectual spaces. IR theory has long been associated with a specifically North American academic model but, as global institutions (from the "non-West") and a more diverse body of theorists and practioners enter the discipline, there has been an insistence on new forms of IR that allow for more inclusive approaches and more contextual understanding of world history and international relations.

In this vein, I will explore Pakistan's specific history as a nation-state particularly the colonial legacy, anti-colonial aspirations, and postcolonial linkages that intermingle in the process of Pakistan's state formation. This analysis of Pakistan's position as a postcolonial state is not intended to develop a comprehensive theory of state identity. Additionally, there is no objective in this report to see the experience of Pakistan forced entirely into existing IR theoretical frameworks. Rather, Pakistan's process of state-formation between 1940 (when it was clearly conceptualized) to 1971 (when it was divided into two independent states) will function as an example of evaluating statehood

within a framework of IR theory that is sympathetic to postcolonialism's intellectual

contributions to the wider academic community.

Chapter 2: International Relations Theory in a Postcolonial Framework

EUROCENTRICISM IN IR THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS

In IR theory, the state is the central building-block for analysis. Students of international relations have, for decades, envisioned the world in terms of great powers, the balancing and "bandwagon-ing" of coalitions, and the threats of rising powers along with a plethora of further jargon and concepts. Much of these models and theories come to us today in the intellectual and historical traditions of Western Europe and the academic institutions of the United States. Historically, the court of Versailles, the Treaty of Westphalia, and the Enlightenment are privileged as the hegemonic basis for invoking the nation-state and IR.[1] Similarly, it is the American foreign policy experience of the 20th century that dominates the discipline's additional focus. IR maintains a subsequently normative Eurocentrism that universalizes and elevates Western history above the experience of the rest of the world.[2] As a result, there is movement within the discipline to intentionally develop a more inclusive approach to IR.

Amitav Acharya provides a notable alternative that, while acknowledging colonial and Eurocentric linkages with IR, does not take a view that existing theories are inherently invalid.[3] Rather, he points to the need for IR to struggle more with potential blind spots and gaps. For instance, otherwise parsimonious theories do not question the

---

[1]Navid Pourmokhtari, "A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: The Contradictory legacy of a 'West-Centric' Discipline". Third World Quarterly 34:10, (2013) 1767-1793.

[2]Kamran Matin. "Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism". European Journal of International Relations, 2011.

[3]Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds". International Studies Quarterly 58, no.4 (2014): 647-659

nature of the state in serious ways or identify sufficiently the impact of global interactions such as colonialism. With deeper consideration for such issues, national interests, the parlance of decision-making for international relations, may take on a less 'one-size-fits-all' approach. Acharya's specific model is identified as "Global IR", which he describes as a "project [that] transcends the distinction between West and non-West" and as an "aspiration for greater inclusiveness and diversity in [the] discipline."[4] Global IR would in this context challenge the exceptionalism accorded to European/Western states and the universalizing norm of agency singularly embedded in the state.

A particular feature of note in IR theory challenged by a "Global IR" is the use of history within IR. This can be approached on two levels – first, there is a narrative in IR based on a Hobbesian logic of the relationship between individual and the state that describes power in a non-historical way; and second, there is a question of selective attention to historical events placing European experience superior to a more global understanding. On the former point, Sanjay Seth describes IR's relationship with history as "unimportant if the defining feature of the international order is considered to be the transhistorical fact of anarchy."[5] While this reading of IR's interaction with history may be somewhat hyperbolic, the perspective of IR does establish a normative view of history on an international-political level that is fairly static. In addition, this leads to selectivity in reading history for IR's purposes - perhaps most dramatically captured by the attention given to the Treaty of Westphalia. This historical event takes a prime place in IR as the

---

[4]Archaya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds," 649

[5]Sanjay Seth, "Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40(1), (2011)167–183. DOI: 10.1177/0305829811412325

moment in which state sovereignty is permanently affixed and subsequently normalized under imperial colonialism.[6] More broadly, there is an emphasis placed on European historical events as exemplars and the determinate case studies. For example, the French Revolution figures as a predominate case for Enlightenment values and expanding democratization. Yet the coterminous Haitian Revolution is typically ignored despite its unprecedented success as a slave revolt.[7] In more classical historical examples, the Roman Empire's control of the Mediterranean becomes the norm of hegemonic power rather than the less coercive Indian Ocean trade and tributary system.[8] To rectify these exclusions, IR needs to incorporate historical understanding from a broader set of sources in order to achieve a more global perspective.

An additional implication of the Eurocentric nature of IR is the possibility of questioning and destabilizing the normative nature of the state. This is particularly true when considering the historical reality of colonialism as undercutting the sanctity of state sovereignty upheld in IR.[9] IR's concept of the modern state is inextricably linked with state development in Western Europe predicated by the capacity provided through colonialism. Post-World War II, this continuation of statehood norms places the plethora of new states who achieved independence at constant inferiority to Western counterparts despite their obvious disadvantage and exploitation. These states further did have the opportunity to subsequently develop a colonial network for their own capital

[6]Pourmokhtari, "A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR," 1782

[7]Zeynep Gulsah Capan, "Decolonising International Relations", Third World Quarterly 38:1 (2017): 1-15. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100

[8]Archarya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds," 653.

[9]Pourmokhtari, "A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR," 1767.

development. A Global IR theory should be able to both engage with the state as a unit of analysis and destabilize IR's assumptions about state-power particularly in a postcolonial context.

ADDING POSTCOLONIAL THEORY TO IR

The intellectual work for a "Global IR" has been set a significant foundation in postcolonial theory, which is also known as postcolonialism. Postcolonial in this theoretical space should not be confused with merely the chronological and historical moment of official cessation of colonial territory holding. Rather, postcolonial theory can be described more as a perspective for situating knowledge within a holistic context.[10] Furthermore, postcolonialism should not be viewed as a homogeneous or monolithic intellectual activity as scholars working in this space have vastly different approaches and purposes. Postcolonial theory expands the scholarly vantage point by adding "the dissatisfaction of the Third World with its condition of existence…the challenge and rejection of Eurocentric narratives and exposure of what they misrepresent or erase."[11] Postcolonial theory begins intellectually in the space of literary analysis along with the school of poststructuralism, which itself has extensive diversity. Both postcolonialism and poststructuralism offer critiques of IR particularly with respective to the violence of

---

[10]Charlotte Epstein, "The Postcolonial Perspective: An Introduction," *International Theory* 6, no. 2 (2014): 294–311. doi:10.1017/S1752971914000219.
[11]Seifudein Adem, "Ali A. Mazrui, the Postcolonial Theorist," African Studies Review, Volume 57, Number 1, (April 2014): 135-152

colonialism that is typically masked.[12] Scholars of postcolonialism have thus consistently positioned their contributions toward the 'global' or the 'international' not merely the narrowly defined region or discipline in which they ostensibly work.

In fact, many efforts to bridge the apparent divide between even postcolonial literary studies and IR have been considered. This literature often invokes the words of Philip Darby who claimed that "imaginative literature and analysis in international relations do not inhabit different worlds; they overlap and even intertwine — or at least they should."[13] Darby's contribution to the integration of postcolonialism and IR goes further with his explicit calls for internationalizing the postcolonial movement. He identifies that postcolonial theory has high applicability and practical value for IR for recasting the global North/South division and recapturing the power of political movements.[14] From here, we can move into how specific postcolonial scholarship has shaped intellectual discourse and its particular attention to South Asia global position.

From a postcolonial perspective, India and Bangladesh dominate the scholarship on South Asia. These studies do however offer critical advancements applicable to Pakistan for our consideration of the nation-state in a postcolonial context. This intellectual space is particularly and appropriately tied to the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective, a grouping of scholars whose work on postcolonialism has sparked a

---

[12]Alina, Sajed, "The Post Always Rings Twice? The Algerian War, Poststructuralism and the Postcolonial in IR Theory." *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 1 (2012): 141–63. doi:10.1017/S0260210510001567.

[13]Philip Darby, *The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading between International Relations and Postcolonialism,* London: Cassel 1998.

[14]Philip Darby, "Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Volume 33, Number 1 (2004): 1-34.

major transformation in the humanities and, to a degree, the social sciences since the 1980s. Adopting the term "subaltern" from Antonio Gramsci, postcolonial scholars have used the term generally to refer to the marginalized and forgotten people of society and those specifically left out of historical narratives. However, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose article "Can the Subaltern Speak?" has establish dominant precedent for this topic, clarifies that 'subaltern' is not merely a substitute for the oppressed but rather indicative of persons and groups of people who have no (as opposed to limited) access to hegemonic centers of power or knowledge production.[15] Thus, Spivak is, by definition, correct to conclude that the subaltern cannot speak as they are utterly excluded. Implicit to this concept is the diffused impact of state-power, of which the formal hierarchy affects life and livelihood in dramatic different ways for the state's ostensible subjects and citizens.

The Subaltern Studies Collective builds on Spivak's intellectual work and expands this narrative of discourse against a hegemonic power by attempting to speak on behalf of the subaltern. This process includes alternative readings of history that more deeply investigate colonial sources to elucidate the decision-making of the excluded people and using unorthodox material such as literature to fill in historical gaps. These scholars, the so-called "subalternists", have sufficient critics but they have had an unquestioning and likely lasting influence on historical analysis, which is most applicable

---

[15]Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. Basingstoke: Macmillian Education, 1988.

for this project.[16] For the purposes of this report, I will review the three leading contributors and founders of the Collective – Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Partha Chatterjee.

Ranajit Guha's historical work focusing on India is seen by many as a starting point for the postcolonial study exemplified by the subalternists. Particularly in his book, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Guha illustrates a logic of consciousness within history for the marginalized by reading between the lines of official histories and documents spanning over one hundred years.[17] Guha attempts to capture a mirror image of these colonial and imperial narratives to expose the rational of the peasant movements and uprisings that occur across the Indian subcontinent from the 18th century to 1900.

A logic of peasant insurgency has historically been ignored in favor of views that lower class agitation is "spontaneous" or part of a grander conspiracy orchestrated outside the peasantry or merely as an extreme form of criminality. In lieu of this narrative, Guha is able to articulate peasant agency into a clear political voice and as a nascent movement to up-end the world's power structure within a semi-feudal society under colonial rule. Insurgent peasants can be seen across this period of Indian history negating society's dividing lines either from appropriation, destruction, or other subversive actions. A critical feature of Guha's analysis is regularly comparing peasant insurgency in colonial India with similar uprisings in Europe. Guha's examples range

---

[16]For a recent critique with ample evidence of the far-reaching impact of the Subaltern Studies Collective, see Vivek Chibber, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, 2013

[17]Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

from the Medieval period to contemporary events predominantly in England, France, Germany, and Russia. While a comparison to Europe was not essential, it is a useful method to illustrate the common experience and response of the subaltern across the world. Overall, Guha's framing of peasant insurgency as the "site for two rival cognitions to meet and define each other negatively" allows for a broadly applicable pattern for subaltern studies.

In the scope of postcolonial studies, *Elementary Aspects* was fundamental in changing a paradigm that has been replicated about the spontaneity and emotion of the peasantry. But this project carries further weight particularly in the subcontinent, where colonial power had blithely dismissed the very existence of "history" in the region.[18] Instead, Guha lays a foundation for a greater degree of subaltern historical credibility. While eminently readable, Guha's work is a challenge to normative thinking and textbook historiography of this region and time period. Critically, he is also able to demonstrate how this new paradigm provides a framework for continuing projects of understanding peasant movements and the subaltern beyond his spatial and temporal parameters including the present. This methodology of history expands the scope of subjects to bring forward and claim the agency of the subaltern in a decisive fashion. While Guha expresses his interest in the political process of turning over hierarchies in our own time, his framework is appropriately open-ended as his reader is compelled to look for deeper understanding rather than a teleological utopia.

---

[18]Karl Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India," *New York Daily Tribune*, August 8, 1853.

The second Subaltern Studies writer of note here is Dipesh Chakrabarty whose work *Provincializing Europe* adds an important global dynamic to the collective.[19] Chakrabarty's study attempts to rethink two core elements of Europe's claim to modernity – the teleological history (or "historicism") supporting Europe's ascent to power and the hegemonic capacity to dismiss non-European actions as non-political. For clarification, historicism in historical analysis establishes a normative mode of development where history, especially for a nation or a people group, occurs in a linear fashion and presumes the European experience is a model to follow. Within this establishment of European preeminence, Chakrabarty notes the importance of political power, which is withheld in name from peasant revolts (shown by Guha above) and from cultural elites in colonial structures who are not afforded such authority. The overall crux of Chakrabarty's argument, like Archaya's concept of Global IR, is not to dismiss European thought whole-sale but rather to acknowledge that Europe's position is "indispensable and inadequate." However, in this necessary but insufficient role, European thinkers, such as Marx, can be utilized by the Global South to adjust discourse on development and in turn reduce the pedestal placed under Europe's experience. In doing so, Europe would be "provincialized" rather than universalized. Chakrabarty's challenge to other scholars is ultimately to search out the plurality present in the world particularly through historical analysis that is not predestined by Europe's past.

---

[19]Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Finally, for this section, Partha Chatterjee's work *The Nation and its Fragments* presents a postcolonial view of nationalism that both builds on and critiques Benedict Anderson's ground-breaking work.[20] In many ways, the "imagined community" that Anderson described as the basis for nationalism is very much alive in Chatterjee's writing.[21] The depth of Chatterjee's analysis into the literary and cultural life of colonial Bengal is a testament to the intricacies on which national identity and community are based. However, like his Collective colleagues, Chatterjee pushes back against the presence of any homogenous theory. Instead, nationalism and national identity can be viewed as a multi-layered negotiation between members of a community, some more acceptable than others, and each with contested and overlapping narratives. Within this discourse, the scholar can identify "fragments" that disrupt the historicism of more linear nationalist narratives.

In conjunction with postcolonial scholars attempting bridge the discipline with IR, the Subaltern Studies Collective, as represented by Guha, Chakrabarty, and Chatterjee, offers a different perspective on the national and international. It is a methodology of analyzing history with an appreciation for what has previously been underrepresented and questioning the normative path one expects for individuals and states. In a postcolonial framework, these norms are not simply disregarded or dismissed. Rather, the expectations created by an imperial and colonial legacy can be challenged through the experience of

[20]Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

[21]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York: Verso, 1983

the non-West and the anti-colonial aspirations contested within former colonial states. In this vein, we should turn to Pakistan specifically.

PAKISTAN AS A CASE STUDY FOR INTEGRATING THEORIES

In this intellectual space of postcolonialism and IR, I intend, in this report, to outline the development of the state of Pakistan from its early imaginings into its significant governing and territorial challenges. Pakistan is positioned ideally for such a case study – it exhibits fascinating questions for the classical international relations theorist with its critical geographical position between China, India, and the Middle East and ongoing domestic political tensions ranging from ethnic divisions and civil-military power-sharing struggles. Additionally, from a postcolonial perspective, Pakistan illustrates very clearly the mystique of statehood in the modern world. Born out of the dissolution of the British Dominion of India, Pakistan's political founders articulated a rallying call for statehood not on the basis of ethnic or linguistic unity, but the common culture shared by Muslims in British Indian territory. The community was claimed to be a nation within a nation – a minority group with a powerful unifying identity and surrounded by the majority Hindu Indian population. This complicating factor of religious identity is all too easily dismissed and misrepresented without the nuance of postcolonial theory.

Pakistan is, however, often neglected from both theoretical frameworks. Certainly, security professionals have developed certain interest in Pakistan's geopolitical importance (typically colored by an exclusively Western and American point-of-view

however) but the current policy-maker leaning to simply label Pakistan a "failed state" is less than robust analysis. On the postcolonial scholarship side, while colonial Bengal has been a significant focus of the Subaltern Studies Collective, Pakistan has been featured in a limited capacity. This report will attempt to consider Pakistan's history from a postcolonial perspective without the exclusive focus on American security goals in the region.

Chapter 3: Historical Origins and Imagining of Pakistan as a State (1940-1971)

The following section provides an overview of Pakistan's history as part of British India's independence movement, the sequence and dynamics of state leadership in the central government, and the ultimate split between East and West Pakistan in 1971. Rather than an attempt at an exhaustive history, the chronological events here are intended to provide clarity for those unfamiliar with Pakistan's early years and to provide context for the further content in this report.

1940-1947: JINNAH AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

While the constructed narrative of Pakistan and the role of the Muslim community in India historically can, and does, go back in time for centuries, 1940 functions as a clear signpost for the early imagining of Pakistan. That year, the All-India Muslim League articulated their support for the, so-called, Two Nation Theory, which identified the Muslims of India as one of two nations within the British territory in the subcontinent. The party's Lahore Resolution was a poignant line in the sand for political maneuvering between British India's political elite, which had been occurring for decades. In light of the theoretical framing established above, it is important to note that the "imagined community" of Pakistan was at this point both a religious and a political project. The national identity of Pakistan has often been framed negatively at one end of that spectrum or, more conspiratorially in modern India, as an amalgam of both. In that understanding, which is colored heavily by Western suspicion of Muslim communities, there is

functionally no difference between a religious and a political motivation in the Muslim community.[22]

However, with the intellectual guidance of postcolonialism, we must allow for a plurality of motivation in the formation of Pakistan. Surely some advocates conceived of the grand narrative of Pakistan in a spiritual manner that could be more exclusively characterized as "religious". Of course, on the other hand, there were very legitimate socio-economic considerations to be made within a community characterized externally as homogenous in shared "Muslim-ness". Political actions in a Eurocentric worldview have been decoupled from religious motivation (particularly when also linked with the working class or galvanizing the subaltern). However, this framework is based on assumptions of rational actions that are selective and singular rather than occurring simultaneously.[23] It is simply factual to state that the historical claim for the nation of Pakistan is a religious narrative. That narrative, however, should not and did not subsume or negate the presence of both a highly sophisticated elite political campaign and a mass movement further motivated by the socio-economic disaffection felt in the colonial state.

With regard to elite politics, it is inescapable in any discussion of the Partition and the founding of Pakistan to not heavily focus on the person of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Known in Pakistan as the Qaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Jinnah necessarily dominates any discussion of Pakistan's origin story. Like Mohandas Gandhi, Jinnah was educated in London in British law and returned to British India with political goals and ambition.

---

[22]Iftikhar H. Malik, *Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues of Identity in Pakistan*. London: Macmillian Press, 1999, 28.
[23]Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*

Jinnah's position within the broader narrative of Indian independence and legislative growth is an interesting personal story in its own right. His primary goal is believed to have been the establishment of an independent central Indian government with some form of confederation wherein Muslim constituencies had some protection or, ideally, parity with the non-Muslim majority. Much of Jinnah's political activity prior to the more divisive period during wartime were seen as centrist as he walked a line between the Muslim League party, which he eventually led, and the secular Indian Congress party.[24] It is however, during the complex dynamics of anti-colonial demands for independence coupled with the reality of world war, that Jinnah's political conundrum emerges clearly.

With a world war raging and Great Britain on its heels, the political structures of British India would undeniably change in the 1940s. The gradual ceding of legislative authority and creation of local assemblies would need to be structured toward new governing realities. First among those realities was the potential for an unprecedented unification of the subcontinent territory under its own rule. No previous governing entity in South Asian history could claim such territorial hegemony. Yet the colonial structure of British India was not built on unification but rather existing and created divisions. The British Raj was a patchwork of political structures interspersed with unconquered but tributary princely states including Muslim majority populations in the territories of Hyderabad and Kashmir and directly-administered Presidencies and provinces. The Muslim districts directly administered by the British - the Western frontier territories and the ethnically unified but religiously mixed Bengal in the East – who were explicitly open

---

[24]Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

to the political opportunities Jinnah faced were generally more interested in provincial autonomy.[25] For Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah's fundamental challenge was balancing the competing interests of the Muslims dispersed in minority communities throughout India with those of Muslims who controlled territories by majority population. In addition, Jinnah's characterization as politically ambitious is considered a major factor for his own goals of a Pakistan with credible weight in central government negotiations for intra-national power sharing.

In this context, Jalal's analysis of Jinnah shows a political strategy that misread the varying positions of Muslims within British India, the willingness of the Indian National Congress to suffer some territorial loss, and the urgency for departure felt by the British government. First, Jinnah's foundational goal to be recognized as the "sole spokesman" of India's Muslims with parity alongside Congress at the central government depended on gaining legitimacy from the Muslim-majority provinces as well as winning separate Muslim electorate seats in provinces with a significant Muslim minority. This process was consistently counter-productive as minority Muslims in the United Provinces (UP) had little to be common political goals with Muslims in majority provinces such as Sindh or the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

A recent and extensive critique of Jalal's work on Jinnah comes from Venkat Dhulipala. Fundamentally, Dhulipala questions both the overall vagueness of "Pakistan" that Jalal regularly identifies and the consideration that Pakistan was achieved either by

---

[25]Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*

accident or on the back of Jinnah's ambition alone.[26] Rather, "Pakistan was a symbol with substance" stemming from "debates in which political elites and the general public came together".[27] This reading of the historical narrative surrounding Pakistan is consistent with the postcolonial framework that has been discussed above regarding Subaltern Studies analysis of popular movements such as Guha's work on peasants. Pakistan as a state was systematically articulated both on secular grounds and religious ones. These considerations even stretched immediately to the international sphere with assumptions that Pakistan could and would lead a new community of Islamic nation-states taking on the mantle lost by the Turks a few decades earlier.[28] The imagining of the state of Pakistan was perhaps bold but no more irrational or accidental than any other state formation.

In addition to Jalal and Dhulipala, the national origins of Pakistan have been extensively discussed by Faisal Devji in his work comparing Pakistan's ideological founding with Jewish Zionism. Devji makes clear that by the 1940s "Muslim nationalists [had] rejected history, geography and even demography as the foundations of their political life, opting instead for an abstract idea of belonging together."[29] This rejection of the traditional criteria that have been associated with the nation-state emerged from a plurality of subject/citizen experience under the imperial structure. The logic of majority/minority populations and the logic of empire are essentially at diametric odds.

---

[26]Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

[27]Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*

[28]Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*

[29] Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013, 123.

As such the founders of Pakistan display significant logical inconsistencies for Devji and while articulating a "world-historical" framework for Islam as the basis of Pakistan, they ultimately belittle Islam's position by nationalizing it.[30] Devji's work exemplifies the internationalizing thrust of postcolonialism and presents Pakistan's creation as religious and political without needing to conflate the two like its original proponents.

1947-1958: NEGOTIATING STATEHOOD

Pakistan's early establishment as a state was dominated by continuing British influence, the perception of an existential threat from now sovereign India, and unstable civilian leadership. In a serious blow to Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah died in 1948 leaving a significant vacuum at the top of the country's power structure. Many leaders of the Muslim League were in fact from feudal or semi-feudal backgrounds and lacked the political and educational caliber that Jinnah had displayed.[31] Jinnah's deputy Liaquat Ali Khan assumed primary leadership of the country and the Muslim League party organization. Despite weaknesses within the Muslim League's leadership and structure, no notable opposition or clear rallying force emerged. Certainly, that reality was somewhat forced as political parties deemed too subversive such as the Communist Party of Pakistan were banned in 1954.[32] Under Khan's prime ministerial leadership, the state of Pakistan initiated the drafting of a constitution particularly following India's

---

[30] Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zion*

[31] Kunal Mukherjee, "Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy and Political Continuity in Contemporary Pakistan." *India Quarterly*, Vol 72, Issue 3, pp. 268 – 277, October 20, 2016.

[32] Kamran Asdar Ali, *Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947-1972,* I.B. Tauris, Limited, 2015

constitutional ratification in 1950. However, Liaquat Ali Khan also prioritized party politics creating tension between the central government and Pakistan's provinces, which continued to view some degree of autonomy as the ideal.[33]

Until the eventual ratification of a Pakistani constitution in 1956, Pakistan technically remained a dominion of the British Commonwealth under the authority of a Governor-General. This position was first held by Muhammed Ali Jinnah and would later transition into the role of President of Pakistan under the constitutional authority, which formally established the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The former British Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, accepted the counterpart Governor-Generalship under the new government of the Indian Union. In the view of Jinnah's personal representative, F.K Noon, this action by Lord Mountbatten was a further complication in the British role and relationship with India and Pakistan respectively.[34] Mountbatten served as the President of a joint Defense Council but could clearly be seen here as no longer unbiased.

In addition to the unprecedented level of localized violence that occurred during the Partition, the new states almost immediately initiated war over an ambiguous border. The British system of governing the Indian territory relied on division and the uncertain status of territory following official independence derived from this fact. In addition to the on-going contemporary issue of control over Jammu & Kashmir, the small Muslim-ruled state of Junagadh near Pakistan's coastal border with India proved to be a flashpoint

---

[33]Yasmin Saikia (2014) Ayub Khan and Modern Islam: Transforming Citizens and the Nation in Pakistan, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 37:2, 292-305, DOI: 10.1080/00856401.2014.889590
[34]F.O. 371-63572, "The Position of Pakistan and India", delivered by F.K. Noon to David Kelly and transferred to UK Foreign Office (Nov. 13, 1947). UK National Archives "Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan," accessed via Archives Direct, Adam Matthews Explorer on April 2, 2018.

as well. Pressure from India (including occupying troops) resulted in the Nawab of Junagadh fleeing for Karachi.[35] Subsequently, the Hindu population overwhelming voted for accession to India.[36] Kashmir, however, demonstrated more dramatically the very real capacity for open war between the two new states. The narrative of Kashmir is now well-established as thousands of armed tribesmen backed by the state of Pakistan moved into the valley of Kashmir to force the Hindu ruler to join his Muslim population with Pakistan.[37] In response, the Maharaja acceded to India and the Indian military protected the capital city of Srinagar at roughly the modern-day Line of Control. From its origins to today, Kashmir remains the defining feature of Pakistan's state concern that India seeks to destabilize and ultimately destroy their sovereignty.

In addition to the external threat and structural uncertainty in the country, Pakistan's leadership began to take the country down a new governance trajectory in this period. Under the Governor-Generalship of Ghulam Mohammed (1951) followed by Iskander Mirza (1955), the state of Pakistan was guided toward "the ascendency of the bureaucracy, bolstered by the military from the background."[38] In the context of limited political organizing, a tendency toward authoritarianism, such as military dictatorship, was exposed within the bureaucratic system of Pakistan. The persistent threat and

---

[35]F.O 371-63572, "OPDOM No.14", UK High Commissioner in India to UK Commonwealth Office (Nov. 7, 1947). UK National Archives "Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan," accessed via Archives Direct, Adam Matthews Explorer on April 2, 2018.

[36]Surabhi Nijhawan, "On this Day in 1948, the State of Junagadh Voted to Join India…" *India Times,* February 24, 2016. Accessed on April 5, 2018 at https://www.indiatimes.com/culture/who-we-are/on-this-day-in-1948-the-state-of-junagadh-voted-to-join-india-and-not-pakistan-251123.html.

[37]F.O 371-63572, "OPDOM No.14", UK High Commissioner in India to UK Commonwealth Office (Nov. 7, 1947).

[38]Hasan A. Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2000

actuality of war in the early years of Pakistan's history further explain Pakistan's affinity to military leadership. Thus, as President in 1958 (as the position of Governor-General had been replaced), Iskander Mirza elevated General Ayub Khan to a new position of "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law Administrator", which violated the existing constitution of Pakistan.[39]

1958-1971: CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE

Pakistan's troubled history with democratic governance and civil-military tensions demonstrates the competing views of domestic players on statehood and national interests. After only two years in effect, the Pakistani constitution was rendered void and national leadership came to Army General Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan took on the role of president (after ousting Iskander Mirza) and initiated guidance for the establishment of a new form of governance in Pakistan. This second constitution in 1962 emphasized the executive role of the President of Pakistan along with a national assembly. Ayub Khan particularly supported a concept of "basic democracy" within a context of believing Pakistan was unprepared for a fuller parliamentary democracy.[40] Basic democracy fundamentally followed traditional hierarchal patterns with village and district councils wherein the lower level chairmen were automatically part of the higher council. This ultimately created a functional body of "electors" to appoint the president and members

---

[39]Altaf Gauhar, "Ayub Khan's Abdication," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan., 1985): 102-131

[40]Kunal Mukherjee, "Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy and Political Continuity in Contemporary Pakistan." *India Quarterly*, Vol 72, Issue 3, pp. 268 – 277, October 20, 2016.

of the assembly. Ayub Khan's government also delineated the "units" of Pakistan – West and East (modern-day Bangladesh) – as equal entities.

Pakistan under Ayub Khan, and throughout the period running up to Pakistan's division in 1971, represents a critical historical moment of redefining Islam's role in the state. In particular, the conflation of the military with Islamic virtues is particularly telling for the modern-day observer of Pakistan.[41] Ayub Khan's paternalistic approach to governance required holding up the military as an exemplar to society - for their discipline and order as well as their proficiency in defending both Islam and the state. The process of "Islamization" in Pakistan in this period would, however, not be overly parallel to more fundamentalist theological approaches in the modern-day. Rather, Ayub Khan envisioned a modern Muslim state that could meet the contemporary challenges and realities faithfully – he was more concerned with law and order than theological nuance. In a postcolonial framework, this governance style shows how Western expectations about the compatibility of democracy with Muslim communities became internalized and how the allure of "modern" order can facilitate an authoritarian's legitimacy.

Throughout this period, East Pakistan's position and credibility gradually eroded. While the administrative unit was technically granted legislative parity with the Western half, it was consistently disadvantaged within the national structure. Ayub Khan took great strides to promote economic development in Pakistan during his regime but

---

[41]Yasmin Saikia, "Ayub Khan and Modern Islam: Transforming Citizens and the Nation in Pakistan," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 37:2 (2014): 292-305, DOI: 10.1080/00856401.2014.889590

disparity in the usage of central government resources between East and West was highly apparent.[42] Additionally, in a manner reminiscent of the colonial structure it followed, civil administrators and bureaucrats in East Pakistan were dispatched from the West.[43] Most severe however, was the approach to Pakistani nationalism that ostracized the Bengali population of East Pakistan as insufficiently Muslim. Adopting normative narratives from the colonial period, Ayub Khan's government considered Bengals overly Hindu and less martial than their Punjabi or Pathan counterparts in the West.[44] In addition, Bengali food and language were considered less associated with Islam's Arab origins. Bengalis were also believed to be more susceptible to left-wing political activity, which was viewed as incompatible with Islam. As a process of legitimizing the state, Ayub Khan's strategy required an "other" to denigrate while revising the history of South Asia to imply a long-standing national identity of Pakistan found in the earliest Muslim arrivals to the region.

Ayub Khan's regime lasted until 1969, surviving a war with India in 1965, and significantly eroded intra-Pakistani unity while creating an unrealistic narrative of Pakistan's national ideals. While political dissatisfaction was rampant in East Pakistan as their participation in the central government was sidelined, West Pakistan also chafed under the undemocratic system. Unrest across the country and demands for new elections convinced Ayub Khan to establish martial law as the only remaining means to govern an

---

[42]Yasmin Saikia, "Ayub Khan and Modern Islam"
[43]Samiullah M. Koreshi, *Diplomats & Diplomacy: Story of an Era, 1947-1987*. Islamabad: Kursheed Printers, 2004
[44]Yasmin Saikia, "Ayub Khan and Modern Islam"

unruly population.[45] However, a bout of sickness that left him briefly incapacitated and growing disillusionment from his cabinet led to a bloodless coup. Army General Yahya Khan took his place as the new martial law administrator promising new elections. The return of a real election to Pakistan demonstrated just how unstable the East-West dynamic of Pakistan had become.

After the Awami League from East Pakistan gained an electoral majority, Yahya Khan refused to establish the national assembly. While the Eastern province rioted in response, Pakistani soldiers were mobilized to unleash terror and violence on Bengali civilians. Ultimately, after India's military intervention and the ignoble surrender of over 90,000 Pakistani troops, Bangladesh declared independence.[46] Both modern Pakistan and Bangladesh retain and repress the traumatic memories of 1971.[47] The image of a moral virtuous Islamic state had been shattered. West Pakistan continued forward under the civilian leadership of Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto, whose political party had won the majority of votes in what remained of the country. This historical overview concludes at this point in time but the cycle of military intervention and contentious elections has been Pakistan's norm into the present.

---

[45]Altaf Gauhar, "Ayub Khan's Abdication," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan., 1985): 102-131
[46]Altaf Gauhar, "Ayub Khan's Abdication"
[47]Yasmin Saikia, "Ayub Khan and Modern Islam"

Chapter 4: State-power through Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy

The development of state-power is typically constituted through government institutions and emerging from a structure of colonial bureaucratic authority, Pakistan's state-power was demonstrated through centralized bureaucracy. In order to view the domestic establishment of government entities both from a postcolonial perspective and as applicable to IR, this section of the report will discuss the specific emergence of the Pakistani Foreign Service and the effort to establish state legitimacy within the international system.

THE FORMATION OF THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN SERVICE

The pre-independence Indian Civil Service only began accepting local candidates for the Political Service (focused on the international relations between the British Raj and India's Princely States) in the late 1930s.[48] By the time of Partition in 1947, there were thus limited numbers of these proto-diplomats available for the new bureaucracies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the new countries. Pakistan was somewhat slower than India in transitioning to an independent Foreign Service though record of the transition of power illustrates that chaos abounded. Phillips Talbot, an American observer in the period, describes the "bifurcation in 70 days of this government of 400 million people" and the division of even the most mundane of office supplies created logistical

---

[48]Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, ed. "Developing Diplomats", Policy Research Project Report, The University of Texas at Austin (2017): 98

nightmares.[49] The division of personnel was only more hectic and fraught with political challenges.

Until 1960, British nationals remained in the broadly defined bureaucracy of the Civil Service of Pakistan and many replacements were elite migrants into Pakistan rather than locals of the provinces themselves. [50] One such migrant to Pakistan (from Agra in today's Indian state of Uttar Pradesh), Samiullah Koreshi, an eventual ambassador for Pakistan, details in his memoir joining the Pakistani Foreign Service in 1949.[51] Following the British colonial system that India also maintains, the Pakistani Foreign Service pulled top candidates from the wider civil service examination. Another early entrant and eventual ambassador was Iqbal Akhund, who like Koreshi had completed the entrance process for a provincial level civil service position before being called to international duty the same year.[52] Akhund and Koreshi highlight two paths for developing expertise in a colonial-style bureaucracy as the former studied diplomacy with US and UK counterparts as well as French in Paris while the later completed formal graduate study at Tufts University. Not until 1981 did Pakistan establish its own Foreign Service Academy for diplomatic training.[53]

Pakistan, at this stage, faced a particular bureaucratic challenge of a non-contiguous state. East and West Pakistan, of course, were separated by thousands of miles

[49]Phillips Talbot, *An American Witness to India's Partition*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007, 316
[50]Naureen Nazar and Ghulam Murtaza Khoso, "Impact of Colonial Rule on Civil Services of Pakistan," *British Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies,* 1(2), 2014, 9.
[51]Samiullah M. Koreshi, *Diplomats & Diplomacy*
[52]Iqbal Akhund, *Memoirs of a Bystander: A Life in Diplomacy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997,
[53]Foreign Service Academy of Pakistan, "Foreign Service of Pakistan," accessed on April 2, 2018
http://www.fsa.gov.pk/fsp.htm

of Indian territory. Koreshi notes the low representation of Bengalis in the "superior" civil services, which included the top domestic authorities within East Bengal and the Foreign Service. Rather than attempting credible solutions to this challenge, which would become a serious grievance and not just a logistical problem, Pakistan's government continually emphasized the West. The language, appearance and culture of the West dominated the internal and external presentation of the nation's legitimacy.

At the early stage of Pakistan's foreign service, the top leadership of the country was invested in the budding agency. Koreshi describes a visit by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and his wife to Tufts University as they personally checked in on the small handful of Pakistani students there to advance the country's capacity. Liaquat Ali Khan's wife even served as Ambassador in The Hague where Iqbal Akhund notes the "privilege of serving" her. In India, the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru took a similar command and interest in foreign affairs demonstrating a keen understanding across the South Asian region of the credibility that comes in the international system from robust diplomatic presence.[54] Even prior to the formal establishment of Pakistan, British Foreign Office officials note meeting with leading members of the Muslim League who were already discussing Pakistan's international representation. Months before independence, the British were notified of that Pakistan would "need its own representatives in foreign capitals" and were "disinclined to share a United Kingdom High Commissioner with

---

[54]Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, ed. "Developing Diplomats"

Hindustan."[55] Muslims in South Asia had observed the lessons of the international system from the British closely and now Pakistan would compete at the West's own game.

PAKISTAN'S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY

Pakistan's demands for charting its own course in the international system is somewhat undercut by the foreign policy the country displayed between 1947 and 1971. Muhammed Ali Jinnah demonstrated a strong interest in adding American political and economic investment to continued relationship with the UK.[56] On one hand, we can read this movement as a rational decision in an IR framework wherein a weak state seeks a stronger benefactor. And from a postcolonial perspective, Muslim leaders in British India had advocated for support of the colonial state as a means for socio-economic advantages and this internalized dynamic of Western superiority manifested in Pakistan's foreign policy. In either reading, Pakistan's leaders have consistently assumed that a great power will bolster their position. Clearly, the United States has provided this role including in the period discussed herein. However, Pakistan has always been underwhelmed by the aid and support offered from the United States given a belief in its position as a "pivot of the world."[57]

---

[55]F.O. 371-63551, "Diplomatic Relations with Pakistan", UK High Commissioner in India to UK Commonwealth Office (Jun. 20, 1947). UK National Archives "Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan," accessed via Archives Direct, Adam Matthews Explorer on April 2, 2018.

[56]Husain Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013

[57]Husain Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions*

Pakistan's early foray into the international system suggests an approach based on flawed assumptions. First, Pakistan's leaders expected to be a highly desired partner in the on-going global tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This turned out to be only partially true and to a much lesser extent than what been hoped. Second, a vision of pan-Islam guided efforts to reach out to other Muslim-majority counties. Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia were viewed as the most favored partners initially. The emphasis on religious commonality however was delivered at a moment in time when anti-imperialism, not religiosity, was the prevailing force in the postcolonial states. Turkey's Ataturk-inspired leaders were committed to a secularist state and were turned off by the emphatic presentation of Muslim unity from Pakistan's representatives.[58] President Nasser of Egypt and President Sukarno of Indonesia saw greater international opportunity in partnership with India particularly with the stable hand of Jawaharlal Nehru in command.[59] Together at the Bandung Conference in 1955, their erstwhile efforts for unity among former colonial states was an international objective superseding Pakistan's offer. Though Pakistan participated in such multilateral organizations, bilateral relationships on the basis of religion alone were left wanting.

Like foreign policy in every country, Pakistan's position in the international system was linked to its domestic realities. Of particular relevance, the Pakistani state maintained a disdainful attitude toward communism and yet found a formidable ally in

[58]F.O. 371-63572, "Dispatch No.298," Report by David Kelly (Nov. 13, 1947). UK National Archives "Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan," accessed via Archives Direct, Adam Matthews Explorer on April 2, 2018.
[59]Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reapprisal*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

the newly established Communist state of China.[60] The Communist Party of Pakistan was never particularly well-organized and after being banned from political activity, CPP leaders were efficiently imprisoned, tortured, and executed by both civilian and military governments.[61] After the CPP, both the Awami League and the People's Party of Pakistan (PPP), who won majorities in East and West Pakistan respectively in the contested 1970 elections, invoked leftist political rhetoric that was viewed as highly destabilizing by the central military authority. And yet, Pakistan became a firm friend with China in an example of international opportunism despite its lofty ideals about Islam and governance. Pakistan's reliance on states with greater international power has been a two-sided game between the United States and China since the beginning. In both cases, survival against India and the maintenance of order at home appears to be the objective.

Within this cursory view of Pakistan's early foreign policy, we can find threads of the colonial legacy intact. Colonial methods of administrative and the militarism extolled among the ethnic communities that became Pakistan dominate the national identity. This extended outward in the form of primarily seeking allies who could offer military support despite desperate needs elsewhere in society. Like many countries in the so-called Third World, Pakistan accepted the narrative of centralized state control and sought out like-minded partners. Pakistan's foreign policy in this period is characterized by muddling

---

[60] Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan: Diplomacy on an Entente Cordiale*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974.
[61]Kamran Asdar Ali, *Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947-1972*, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015.

along trying to participate in an international system that had been constructed on the exclusion of non-Western people for centuries.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The social and political experience of Pakistan over the thirty years described here can demonstrate the need for postcolonialism with IR theory. Without recognizing the cost of colonialism, scholars of international studies can fail to understand the motivations and perspectives of much of the world. Further, scholarly work that informs government action can mislead through misperception and cause untold ripple effects in the international system. Global assumptions about modern development and national capacity can also be challenged with a historical perspective that acknowledges that European development through imperialism and colonialism cannot be the norm. Pakistan's emergence as a state and the series of domestic and international decisions made by its government can be considered deeply flawed, even tragic. But in addition to specific failings of leaders or movements, the context of Pakistan's existence as a state was conditioned on a global system of exploitation and an intellectual structure conceived in Western superiority. In the spirit of plurality advocated by a postcolonial framework, Pakistan can be an example both of the systematic barriers in the international system for postcolonial states and an important case-study for national self-sabotage.

Bibliography

Acharya, Amitav. "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds,"
    International Studies Quarterly 58, no.4 (2014): 647-659

Adem, Seifudein. "Ali A. Mazrui, the Postcolonial Theorist." *African Studies Review*,
    Volume 57, No. 1 (April 2014): 135-152

Akhund, Iqbal. *Memoirs of a Bystander: A Life in Diplomacy*. Karachi: Oxford
    University Press, 1997.

Ali, Kamran Asdar. *Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947-1972*.
    New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015.

Amin, Shahid M. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reapprisal*. Oxford: Oxford University
    Press, 2000.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
    Nationalism*. New York: Verso, 1983

Brodie, Henry, et al. *South Asia in the World Today*, Edited by Phillips Talbot. Chicago:
    University of Chicago Press, 1950.

Capan, Zeynep Gulsah. "Decolonising International Relations?" *Third
    World Quarterly*, 38:1, (2017): 1-15. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical
    Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*.
    Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Darby, Philip. *The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading between International Relations and
    Postcolonialism*, London: Cassel 1998.

Devji, Faisal. *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
    University Press, 2013.

Dhulipala, Venkat. *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for
    Pakistan in Late Colonial North India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
    2015.

Epstein, Charlotte. "The Postcolonial Perspective: an Introduction." *International Theory*, 6, No.2 (2014): 294-311. doi:10.1017/S1752971914000219

UK Foreign Office. F.O. 371-63572, 63561, & 63562. National Archives "Foreign Office Files for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan," (1947-1969): accessed via Archives Direct, Adam Matthews Explorer on April 2, 2018.

Gauhar, Altaf. "Ayub Khan's Abdication," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (Jan., 1985): 102-131

Gill, Sadiq A. *Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Emergence of Pakistan, 1940-1947*. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1990.

Guha, Ranajit. *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Haqqani, Husain. *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.

Hutchings, Robert and Jeremi Suri, ed. "Developing Diplomats," Policy Research Project Report, The University of Texas at Austin (2017): https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/62371/prp_194-developing_diplomats-2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y

Jalal, Ayesha. *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Jalalzai, Musa Khan. *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Sectarian Impacts on Diplomacy*. Lahore: Dua Publications, 2000.

Koreshi, Samiullah M. *Diplomats & Diplomacy: Story of an Era, 1947-1987*. Islamabad: Kursheed Printers, 2004.

Malik, Iftikhar H. *Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues of Identity in Pakistan*. London: Macmillian Press, 1999.

Marker, Jamsheed. *Quiet Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador of Pakistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Marx, Karl. "The Future Results of British Rule in India." *New York Daily Tribune*, August 8, 1853. https://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1853/07/22.htm

Mukherjee, Kunal. "Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy and Political Continuity in
           Contemporary Pakistan." *India Quarterly*, Vol 72, Issue 3, pp. 268 – 277, October
           20, 2016. https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/10.1177/0974928416656498

Nazar, Naureen and Ghulam Murtaza Khoso. "Impact of Colonial Rule on Civil Services
           of Pakistan," *British Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies,* 1(2), 2014, 1-14.

Owen, Catherine, John Heathershaw, and Igor Savin. "How postcolonial is post-Western
           IR? Mimicry and mētis in the international politics of Russia and Central Asia,"
           Review of International Studies, Vol. 44, part 2 (October 25, 2017): 279–300.
           doi:10.1017/S0260210517000523

Pourmokhtari, Navid. "A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: The
           Contradictory legacy of a 'West-Centric' Discipline." *Third World Quarterly*
           34:10, (2013): 1767-1793. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.851888

Rizvi, H. A. *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*. New York: Palgrave Publishers,
           2000.

Sajed, Alina. "The post always rings twice? The Algerian War, poststructuralism and the
           postcolonial in IR theory." *Review of International Studies*, 38, (January 27,
           2011): 141–163. doi:10.1017/S0260210510001567

Seth, Sanjay. "Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations."
           Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40(1), (2011)167–183. DOI:
           10.1177/0305829811412325

Shah, Mehtab Ali. *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-
           1994*. London: I.B. Taurus, 1997.

Singh, Jaswant and S.P. Bhatia. *Conflict and Diplomacy: US and the Birth of Bangladesh
           – Pakistan Divides*. New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2008.

Syed, Anwar Hussain. *China & Pakistan: Diplomacy on an Entente Cordiale*. Amherst:
           University of Massachusetts Press, 1974.

Talbot, Phillips. *An American Witness to India's Partition*. New Delhi: Sage
           Publications, 2007.

Tremonte, Colleen M and Linda Racioppi. "At the Interstices: Postcolonial Literary
           Studies Meets International Relations," *Pedagogy*, Volume 8, Issue 1, Winter
           2008, 43-73.