The Dissertation Committee for Sohyun Choi Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Anatomy of Emotions in Politics: The Role of Discrete Emotions in Political Information Search and Participation

Committee:

Natalie J. Stroud, Supervisor

Anita Vangelisti

Sharon Jarvis Hardesty

Thomas Johnson

Anatomy of Emotions in Politics: The Role of Discrete Emotions in Political Information Search and Participation

by

Sohyun Choi

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2018

Dedication

For ordinary people who laugh and cry over the fate of the nation.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank the following individuals for their contributions. Dr. Natalie (Talia) Stroud, thank you for your guidance, supervision, mentorship, and endless patience. Throughout this process you have constantly challenged me and made me a better scholar. I could not imagine finishing the project without your guidance and support. Dr. Anita Vangelisti, thank you for your insights, advice, and heart-warming encouragements. You have constantly inspired me to be a critical and well-rounded thinker, asking the toughest and thought-provoking questions. Dr. Sharon Jarvis, thank you for nurturing my intellectual curiosity and helping me develop my critical thinking. You added many practical insights in to the project and helped me ask interesting questions that went beyond the dissertation. Dr. Thomas Johnson, thank you for challenging me and providing a counterbalance to my work. Your big-picture approach as well as academic meticulousness pushed me to produce a well-balanced output.

In addition to my committee I also need to thank several people for their advice or help with my dissertation. I would like to thank my family, especially my mom and dad, for their endless love, support, and care for me. My dear friend, Evan Larsen, helped me tremendously with the design of the online study in this study and I thank him for his willingness to always say "yes" to my requests. Dr. Tiffany Whittaker helped me with the statistical analysis. Lastly, I owe a lot to my dearest friends in Austin, Jonathan Yim, Julia Kim, Chihao Chen, Tracy Zhang, Yiwei Wang, and many others, who always cheered me and uplifted me whenever I felt down or frustrated in this long journey. I would like to thank them with all my heart for their care and support.

Anatomy of Emotions in Politics: The Role of Discrete Emotions in Political Information Search and Participation

Sohyun Choi, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2018

Supervisor: Natalie J. Stroud

Discrete emotions in response to politics have increasingly been examined. However, there has been a negativity bias where scholars have been primarily focusing on discrete negative emotions. Despite documented evidence of their distinctiveness in cognitive psychology, discrete positive emotions, such as enthusiasm, hope, and pride, have received little to no attention from communication scholars and political scientists. Drawing from appraisal theories, this dissertation advances our knowledge about the different constructs of discrete emotions, especially positive emotions, and their effects on information search and political participation.

I answered two main questions in this research: First, how different are enthusiasm, hope, and pride from one another in terms of their constructs of appraisal components? Second, to what extent do discrete positive and negative emotions result in differential effects on people's information seeking and political participation?

I employed a multi-methodological approach to analyze the cognitive constructs and effects of discrete emotions. First, I executed an online survey to find out which appraisal components predict each positive emotion. The confirmatory factor analysis captured three different sets of cognitive appraisal dimensions for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Second, I conducted an online experiment to test the varying effects of six discrete

emotions on participants' information seeking behavior and their intentions to participate in eight political activities. I investigated the differential effects for three positive emotions and three negative emotions.

This research uncovers that enthusiasm, hope, and pride, prevalent positive emotions in the political realm, are different from one another in regard to their cognitive appraisal constructs. Moreover, the dynamics among emotions, information seeking, and participation intentions are found to vary across discrete emotions with the same valance in several instances.

The dissertation sheds light on different profiles of discrete emotions as well as their varying effects on people's political life. The closer look at the role of discrete emotions in politics increases our chance to better democracy as citizens become more aware of their own emotions enacted by the media, politicians, parties, and can thus make conscious decisions about exercising their rights as a citizenry.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

On November 7, 2012, President Obama said in his victory speech, "I have never been more hopeful about America. And I ask you to sustain that hope. I'm not talking about blind optimism, the kind of hope that just ignores the enormity of the tasks ahead or the roadblocks that stand in our path. I'm not talking about the wishful idealism that allows us to just sit on the sidelines or shirk from a fight. I have always believed that hope is that stubborn thing inside us that insists, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that something better awaits us so long as we have the courage to keep reaching, to keep working, to keep fighting." In 2008, running as a first-time presidential candidate, he had used the same sentence, "hope is not blind optimism," throughout the campaign. The use of the rhetoric of hope arguably contributed to Obama's success in galvanizing underrepresented populations such as African-Americans and in increasing voter turnout, especially among young voters. The hopeful tone of the campaign also may explain its' fundraising successes, especially from individual donors (Luo, 2008).

While giving his inaugural address on January 13, 2013, President Obama addressed the enthusiastic crowd by saying "they (the oath Obama spoke) are the words of citizens and they represent our greatest hope." Throughout the address, he urged Congressional leaders and fellow citizens to unite despite their differences to achieve a better future (Baker, 2013). As scholars have analyzed, President Obama was noticeable for his talent in using the rhetoric of positivism to mobilize the public (Civettini, 2011; Escobar, 2011; Gould, 2011). Escobar (2011) analyzed the Obama phenomenon, saying "Obama succeeded in galvanizing a collective emotional 'us'… He elicited powerful emotions and turned himself into the receptacle for the mobilizing energy projected by the means of communication" (p. 124). As Escobar acknowledged, what follows emotional

1

speeches and remarks is the electorate's reactions. As scholars have suggested, emotions evoked by political events, leaders, and issues can prompt citizens to engage in political life (e.g., Civettini, 2011; Engelken-Jorge, 2011).

In this dissertation, I aim to focus on the role of emotions in political information seeking and participation. The subject carries increasingly important social and political implications. As the political landscape grows more contentious and uncivil, it leads to heightened emotional reactions from the general public (Gervais, 2014; Hasell & Weeks, 2016). These reactions can be positive, in response to likeminded ideas and people, and negative, in response to oppositional ideas and people. Research on the effect of citizens' emotional experiences in the political sphere deserves more attention as feeling and expressing emotion is basic human nature (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Ost; 2004). Looking into how ordinary citizens are affected by their emotions (either consciously or unconsciously) in their journey as citizens warrants further investigation.

In the sense, how emotions in politicians' words, media soundbites, and/or everyday political talk guide the political process and shape our political culture has always been a matter of interest for political scientists and sociologists. Academic accounts of political emotions, however, have been far from complete in answering questions like: 'What is a political emotion?' 'What do emotions do in the political arena?' 'How do different emotions affect politicians' and voters' decision-making, thus shaping our political surroundings?'

One of the reasons that emotion studies in the political realm have not been holistic enough is a lopsided emphasis on reason over emotion, and a bias toward cognition instead of emotion-cognition relations (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001). The bias toward rationalistic or dualistic approaches, which separate emotion from reason, made it difficult to study emotions systematically (Ost, 2004). In short, emotions have been treated as

irrational or problematic occurrences that need to be tackled or suppressed. Perceived to be evasive and ephemeral in terms of their causes and effects, emotions were less subject to a systematic academic approach (Goodwin et al., 2001). Engelken-Jorge (2011) maintains that the marginalization of emotions only gets worse as emotions are conceived of "as insufficiently tangible and not subjectable to quantification" (p. 21).

Emotions, however, are an inescapable everyday issue for political elites as well as the mass public (Ost, 2004). Throughout history, political elites and leaders have recognized that without the mobilization of emotions, efficient governing is almost impossible and they have looked for ways to incorporate emotions into politics and governing process (Ost, 2004). In particular, Richards (2004) argues that as the contemporary political spheres are increasingly infused with popular culture, political discourse gets highly emotionalized and politicians strategically diffuse affective states into the public's mind using various emotional appeals. In turn, emotionality functions as a sensational and efficient way to agitate the public, to mobilize or demobilize voters, and to maintain the momentum behind certain political narratives for which media and elites advocate. Recently, identifying the "emotional deficit in contemporary political communications" as "a lack of crafted, sustained attention to the emotional needs of the audience," Richards (2004) maintains that "political communications research has begun to register the growing importance of the affective dimensions of politics" (p. 342-345).

Despite the increased attention to the influence of emotions in political spheres, there has been little research on the distinct effects of various emotions. As a more nuanced approach to discrete emotions would benefit our holistic understanding of the emotion dynamics in the political world, in this dissertation, I aim to explicate the construct of discrete emotions and investigate the influence of various emotions on political cognition and behavior.

3

CONCEPTUALIZING EMOTIONS

Even though emotions have made a successful comeback in academia, there have been challenges in defining, classifying, and measuring emotions (Engelken-Jorge, 2011). Without knowing the appropriate framework for integrating emotions into political analysis, it is difficult to understand emotions' role in politics. Regarding the framework, scholars have approached emotions using different conceptualization; two major approaches being the dimensional and discrete emotion frameworks (e.g., Lazarus; 1991; Russell, 1980). Although which conceptual framework should be privileged over the other is not a settled question, in disciplines like political science and communication, researchers increasingly have taken a discrete emotion approach, which emphasizes the unique effects of individual emotions, over a dimensional approach, which emphasizes grouping emotions into categories such as positive or negative (Nabi, 2010; Scherer, 1999). I take a similar approach, the discrete emotion model, in this dissertation, but focus on a set of emotions that have received little academic attention – such as pride, hope, and disgust – and contrast them with emotions that have been more studied – such as anger and anxiety.

COGNITIVE APPRAISALS OF POLITICAL EVENTS

Citizens are awash in emotion-evoking messages from partisan news media and political elites that are designed to win over the electorate on a daily basis. Politicians and elites are savvy enough to use emotions to engage and mobilize the public. Emotions are an important component of political movements (Goodwin et al., 2001). On the one hand, as seen in the Obama phenomenon in 2008, positive emotions can inspire citizens to partake in politics by suspending disbelief in governments and political leaders, which Gould (2011) referred to as "desiring politics" (p. 155). On the other hand, incivility and

negativity in politics are powerful enough to draw negative emotional reactions from voters that can influence participation in various types of political activities (Mutz, 2007).

Some (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) argue that different emotional experiences can be attributed to the cognitive evaluation of the environment where people experience different stimuli. Put differently, emotion carries a cognitive component in it (Nussbaum, 2001). Nussbaum (2001), in her discussion of the intelligence of emotions, argues that "emotions carry a cognitive component of their own, and embody our deepest thoughts." That is to say, emotions may have a connection to decision-making and other cognitive judgement processes. Recognizing the cognitive component of emotions, a critical question is "how emotion can transfer itself to actual political decision making" (Sandry, 2011, p. 137). Sandry maintains that emotion remains important for political communicators as "it stirs the conscience and can lead to enduring political activity" (p. 139).

Following this line of reasoning, I contend that cognitive evaluations or appraisals of political events, issues, or candidates play a key role in affecting which discrete emotion people experience, which is the key argument of cognitive appraisal theories. For example, in the Clinton-Trump election in 2016, the Trump campaign emphasized the importance of immigration reform and proposed to construct a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border to keep undocumented immigrants from entering the country. The campaign message not only evoked anger from Mexicans and Mexican immigrants in the U.S., but also faced widespread opposition from American citizens (Suls, 2017). People reasoned that the suggested action was an insult and threat to Mexican people and that it would be the U.S. government who would eventually pay the cost of building the wall (Cordoba, 2017; Woody, 2017). Here, anger resulted from people's cognitive appraisal of the situation.

On the positive side, during political events like presidential inaugurations, people perceive and experience positive emotions like hope and enthusiasm as the inaugural address by the president is crafted to evoke positive feelings from the electorate and make them envision the brighter future. In short, people do not feel emotions as a blank slate, but recognize and evaluate cognitive determinants, which in turn cause specific emotional reactions (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996; Scherer, 1999). It is important to understand the situations that give rise to different emotions because discrete emotions, experienced as a consequence of political events or in regard to issues and candidates, may influence the political information or sources to which people turn and whether people decide to engage in political activities.

COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTS AND EFFECTS OF DISCRETE EMOTIONS

As the attention to discrete emotions and their distinct causes and effects has increased, political scientists started to turn to discrete negative emotions like anger, fear, and anxiety (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Weber, 2013). To this point, the emotion literature in political communication and political psychology has focused disproportionately on negative emotions like anger and fear. Due to more subtle differences in their causes and effects, research on positive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm, hope, pride, or contentment) has been quite limited both in quantity and quality. The lack of attention to the role of discrete positive emotions is surprising. Despite the experience of positive emotions in politics, systematic examinations of their effects on the citizenry are often overlooked as a deciding factor in inducing citizens' political activities. Instead, citizens' negative experiences and sentiments toward issues and candidates have received more attention, perhaps in part because conflicts and cacophony get more coverage by media and opinion leaders (Groeling, 2010). As we experience elections and governmental events, however, positive

and negative emotions often co-exist or co-occur. According to Civettini (2011), despite the increased distrust of government and heightened cynicism towards politics, citizens tend to hold positive, future-oriented perceptions that make them believe that the future would get better.

Even though positive emotional effects on behavior (i.e., learning, civic engagement) have been documented (Fredrickson, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000), the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on information seeking and political behaviors have received little attention. Instead, scholars have treated a set of different positive emotions as a single, positive emotion (e.g., Brader, 2006b; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011). As Verhulst and Lizotte (2011) acknowledge, the dimensional framework has dominated political research on positive political emotions. Although other scholars have stretched their efforts to go beyond the dimensional model when studying discrete negative emotions and their influences on information processing and judgments (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010), there is a void in understanding the differential effects of discrete emotions, especially discrete positive ones.

The primary focus of the dissertation is the classification of discrete positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) and their differential effects on political information seeking and participation. However, this dissertation also engages three discrete negative emotions, including a less explored discrete negative emotion (i.e., disgust) and commonly explored negative emotions (i.e., anger and anxiety), to benchmark the effects of positive emotions on information search and participatory behaviors.

To do so, first I set up a study to find out and specify distinctive appraisal processes for discrete emotions. I specifically look into the experiences of three positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) in a political context by administering an online survey

where I ask participants about their appraisal processes and experiences of positive emotions during the 2016 presidential campaign. Next, to investigate the effects of discrete emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, pride, anger, anxiety, and disgust), I administer an online experiment, using a non-probability sample, in which the effect of each discrete emotion is isolated and differentiated from that of other emotions. Both studies investigate people's emotional experiences during the 2016 presidential election.

Thus far, we know almost nothing about how discrete positive emotions work in real-life politics. Previous studies have assumed that all emotions with positive valence tend to encourage citizens' engagement in politics as they signal no perceived threat in the environment, thus facilitating the continuation of current behaviors (Brader, 2005; Fredrickson, 2001; Isen, 1999; Marcus et al., 2000). However, when looking closer at the dimension of positive valence, incongruent findings regarding the impact of positive emotions on participation can be identified across studies that tend to collapse different positive emotions into a single positive emotion scale (e.g., see Brader, 2005, 2006b; Weber, 2013). Thus, the role of discrete emotions in political learning and participation needs to be differentiated and is worthy of further academic investigation. This is precisely what I intend to do in the project.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

There are two main questions that guide this research project. First, how distinct are discrete positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) in terms of their cognitive constructs? Second, to what extent do discrete emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, pride, anger, anxiety, and disgust) affect political information seeking and intentions to participate? The following six chapters aim to answer the questions.

Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the discrete emotion approach and compares it to the dimensional approach. This chapter recognizes a deficit in research on discrete positive emotions and discusses the importance of studying the distinct effects of positive emotions in the political world. Then I present appraisal theories as a theoretical backdrop for examining different appraisal determinants of discrete positive emotions. Three positive emotions of interest – enthusiasm, hope, and pride – are reviewed. I draw from previous literature allowing me to identify possible cognitive constructs of each emotion that will later guide the study. I do not aim to study appraisal determinants of discrete negative emotions here because the current literature in political psychology has already studied and established the differences among discrete negative emotions, such as anger, fear, and anxiety (Nabi, 2002; Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009a; Weber, 2013).

Chapter 3 presents what we know about the effect of discrete emotions with both positive and negative valence on political information seeking and participation behaviors by reviewing literature on both positive and negative emotions. Relevant theories are discussed to build the theoretical framework of the investigation (i.e., affective intelligence, expectancy violation theories, and emotional rescue model). The chapter focuses on predicting the dynamics amongst six discrete emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, pride, anger, anxiety, and disgust) and information seeking/political engagement.

Chapter 4 details the multi-methodological approach of the dissertation. First, I conducted an online survey to find out how different the three positive emotions are from one another and whether there are different sets of appraisal determinants for the three emotions. Second, I fielded an online experiment to examine the differential effects of six discrete emotions on citizens' political information seeking behaviors and intentions to

engage in political activities. I used a different prompt to induce each emotion and designed a mock Internet news site to track the amount and direction of people's information search.

Chapter 5 reveals the results of the online survey to confirm the different appraisal constructs of three positive emotions. Grounded on the proposed sets of cognitive items, each appraisal determinant is measured and tested for validity. Then, by conducting confirmatory factor analyses, I address the problem of co-occurrence of three emotions in the study and propose the best fitting appraisal constructs for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. The findings show that three positive emotions have different sets of appraisal dimensions that best predict each emotion.

Chapter 6 presents the findings of an experiment explicating the differential effects of six discrete emotions on information search and participation intention. In terms of information search, I focus on how much information (more or less) and the type of information (pro-attitudinal, counter-attitudinal, or non-political) people seek under a specific emotional state. The results show that a few discrete emotions pose a differential impact on information seeking pattern and/or political activities. The dynamics between emotion, information search, and participation is further discussed in light of previous literature.

Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by placing the overall results in the context of the emotion studies in politics. I emphasize the importance of discrete emotional approach to the electorate and political system by illustrating how discrete emotions shape individuals' political behaviors. Moreover, I discuss possible avenues for future research.

This dissertation aims to push the boundary of understanding the role of emotions in politics by asking how citizens experience different emotions grounded in cognitive appraisal processes (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1999). Studying a wide range of discrete emotions and how they affect the political life of citizens and shape our political reality

should be a staple in getting in-depth knowledge of contemporary political communication. As acknowledged in the introduction, the rational and cognitive role that emotions play in politics have been overlooked. This dissertation hopes to fill the gap.

Chapter 2: Discrete Emotions

The topic of emotions has attracted researchers from communication, psychology, neurology, sociology, physiology, and philosophy. This has made emotions research rich in its depth and breadth; however, it also has made the subject evasive. Part of the challenge in defining emotions comes from their inherent complexity. Emotions vary not only on dimensions such as intensity, duration, and valence, but also on the functions served by the experience of emotion and on whether emotion is directed toward one's self or others (Metts & Planalp, 2011).

Discussing what constitutes emotion, cognitive psychologists identify how emotions are generated, experienced, and evaluated. Ortony et al. (1990) analyze several components of emotions: somatic, cognitive, and motivational components. First, the somatic component is bodily changes due to the automatic evaluation of inputs, such as sweating or flushing. Second, the cognitive component refers to the evaluative dimensions that influence emotional experiences. In other words, an object, situation, or other type of stimulus requires people to process and evaluate its relationship with, or impact on, their wellbeing. Depending on how people evaluate the stimuli, people experience different emotions. For instance, people may experience fear in response to a threat deemed unfamiliar and relevant to their well-being (e.g., spotting a snake in one's bed). However, they may not feel any emotion as they consider a threat familiar but irrelevant to their well-being (e.g., Americans' hearing news about earthquakes in Japan). Lastly, there is a motivational component of emotions, which is inclinations or urges to act or not. The motivational force makes people inclined to behave in a way that helps to relieve or maintain the emotions they experience. If people experience fear, the fear will motivate them to get rid of the source of the threat (e.g., move away from a snake).

Also using a cognitive approach to emotions, Lazarus (1991) looks into the relationship between emotion and cognition and identifies that the experience of emotions is a result of cognitive evaluations of a given stimuli or environment. He says that emotions are one of the strongest motivational forces for people to adopt new goals or respond to a changing environment. Despite varying degrees of expertise and foci of studies, cognitive psychologists generally agree that emotions carry a cognitive component (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990). Drawing from these ideas, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to find the links among emotions, information processing, and political behavior. Even though there has been an enormous effort to explicate these relationships, questions regarding the psychological effects of emotions and the impact of emotions on behavior remain and are worth continued examination, particularly with respect to positive emotions, as I will detail shortly.

DIMENSIONAL VS. DISCRETE EMOTION MODEL

One of the unsettled questions in cognitive science and psychology has been how to define emotions and classify different emotions. The issue of how to approach and conceptualize emotions is crucial to clarify because conceptual definitions influence methodological decisions. Clarity in both conceptual and methodological domains yields greater opportunity for systematic research on emotions within and across multiple disciplines. To address this issue, I first review two opposing perspectives on theorizing emotions, the dimensional approach and the discrete emotion approach. There seems to be no definitive consensus that discrete emotion models should be preferred to or outperform dimensional models (Engelken-Jorge, Ibarra Güell, & Moreno del Río, 2011). As explained in the following section, however, this dissertation aligns more closely with a discrete emotion approach.

Dimensional Models

Dimensional models of emotions can be traced back to philosophical theorists such as Hobbes and Spinoza. Philosophers used to categorize emotions based on their valence, distinguishing positive emotions from negative ones (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Russell & Carroll, 1999). Dimensional models (e.g., circumplex model by Russell, 1980) conceptualize and categorize different emotions on limited sets of continuums and usually take the valence of emotions into account. Going beyond the valence-only model, dimensional models also may consider other dimensions such as action tendency (approach-avoidance), arousal (high-low), and control. On the dimension of action tendency, anger has an approach tendency resulting in action-oriented behaviors, whereas fear has an avoidance tendency leading people to withdraw (Nabi, 2002). The arousal dimension explains the intensity of emotional experiences. Some emotions like enthusiasm are high-arousal emotions whereas others like compassion or depression are low-arousal emotions. The control dimension indicates that different emotions denote varying levels of perceived control over emotional stimuli or environments. For example, a feeling of hope indicates less control whereas a feeling of pride gives people a sense of control over the situation (Shiota, 2003; Tong, 2007).

Differences in the dimensions used by investigators exist. Dimensional models make an assumption that experiences and motivations of different emotions are not distinct from each other, but fall along continuums (Russell, 1980). Following the logic, if anxious individuals get more aroused, they can experience anger or more extreme, negative emotions than anxiety. Even though there is no agreement on the nature and number of dimensions that are needed in dimensional models, the approaches are generally concerned with valence, action tendency, and arousal dimensions that characterize and distinguish among different emotions. Also, theorists have used a few basic emotions that are central

to dimensional models and act as anchoring points, such as anger and sadness (Izard, 2007; Russell & Barrett, 1999).

Dimensional approaches have been critiqued in several ways. First, treating different emotions which share the same valence, such as anger and anxiety, as homogenous is problematic (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Nabi, 2010), and does not allow scholars to predict the distinct causes and effects of each discrete emotion. For instance, even though both anger and anxiety have the same negative valance, they are found to have distinct elicitors and consequences. Anger can be experienced when facing a familiar threat and promotes an approach tendency, whereas anxiety can be experienced when facing an unfamiliar threat and promotes an avoidance tendency (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Nabi, 2002). Thus, we need distinct cognitive explanations other than the varying levels of valence or arousal to explain how emotions such as depression, frustration, fear, and anxiety are elicited and experienced.

Second, scholars have continued to reveal that the commonly agreed-upon dimensions underlying dimensional models (e.g., valence, arousal, and action tendency) cannot accurately distinguish each emotion (Clore & Ortony, 2008; Izard, 2007, 2009; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Scholars stipulate that the experience or expression of emotion is not as continuous or seamless as the dimensional models suggest. For instance, following the continuous dimension of arousal, anxious (less intense) people should grow to feel fear (more intense) if a threat gets larger. However, in reality people who feel anxious by perceiving a threat in an environment may grow to feel frustration or depression as the threat gets more realistic or as different causes are perceived. Thus, the arousal dimension cannot fully explain or predict whether anxious people grow fearful, frustrated, or depressed as the perceived threat grows.

15

Third, even though the dimensions (e.g., valence and arousal) of emotion are usually assumed to be orthogonal, many studies demonstrate non-orthogonality (Abelson et al., 1982, Marcus et al., 2000). On the two orthogonal dimensions, arousal and valence, for example, serenity can be considered as low arousal and moderately pleasant emotion, and enthusiasm can be regarded as highly pleasant and high arousal emotion. However, previous emotion studies often conflated the valence dimension with other dimensions like arousal or control (e.g., Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). Marcus et al. (2006) argue that valence is correlated rather than orthogonal to the dimension of arousal, saying that "the failure to take the dynamic character of non-orthogonality into account is a serious problem for any study that focuses on just one dimension of emotion, as in the valence model" (p. 35). As result of the accumulated academic effort, appraisal theories (Izard, 2007, 2009; Lazarus, 1991, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), the functional neuroscience perspective (Huddy et al., 2007; LeDoux, 1989), and the cognitive functional model (Nabi, 2002) – discrete models to which I turn shortly – increasingly have been substituted for the dimension-based approaches.

Discrete Emotion Models

Over time, psychologists have dealt with discrete political emotions, differentiating emotions with the same valence, such as anger, fear, sadness, guilt, and shame, to identify whether each emotion affects people differently. Nabi (2003, 2010), in her defense of emphasizing discrete emotions in communication research, argues that a clearly focused and defined set of discrete emotions is the most useful approach as it is precise in prediction. She suggests that the beauty of the discrete emotion model is that it incorporates the dimensional perspective in the way that valence and intensity are evaluated, but goes

much further by capturing the additional elements that provide nuanced explanations for human behavior.

Appraisal theories argue that particular emotions, such as joy, anxiety, sadness, hostility, guilt, pride, and contentment, should be considered distinct in that they are assumed to be unique emotional experiences that stem from different causes (e.g. Barrett, 2006; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984). Discrete emotion models posit that each emotion has a distinct pathway which shows why it is felt (activation), how it is felt (somatic arousal), how it affects cognitive processing of stimuli and the environment, which appraisal might follow, and how it translates into behavior. Thus, discrete models assume that even though some emotions share the same valence, they work in different ways. For example, feeling anger promotes approach tendencies while feeling fear promotes avoidance tendencies despite the fact that they have the same valence.

Discrete emotion studies suggest that the experiences of emotions can be explained and predicted on the basis of people's cognitive interpretation of an emotion-inducing environment (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1996). This is the central tenet of appraisal theories, which contends that "emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a person's subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event on a number of dimensions or criteria" (Scherer, 1999, p. 637). The term "appraisal" was first coined by Magda Arnold (1960), who used the term to explain the elicitation of different emotions. Support for appraisal theories has been found in several studies (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). These studies show that each emotion has a specific appraisal pattern, and that appraisal-emotion relationships are generally consistent across cultures. In other words, people use different sets of evaluative criteria, and their judgments of emotional events or stimuli would eventually determine which emotions

might occur or be experienced. The dimensions people use to evaluate the stimuli or environment are called appraisal components/determinants (Frijda, 1987; Manstead & Tetlock, 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1996; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), appraisal profiles/variables (Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989), or cognitive dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Appraisal components make discrete emotions more useful when studying the distinct effects of each emotion in communication contexts.

There are limitations to the discrete emotions models, however. The fundamental premise that discrete emotions show patterns of predetermined, neurobiological, and expressive responses has not been consistently confirmed (Larsen, Bernston, Poehlmann, Ito, & Cocioppo, 2008; Metts & Planalp, 2011). This is because under a wide range of social interactions and various communicative contexts, one discrete emotion is likely to merge with complicated cognitive activities, generating more complex emotions, such as pride, guilt, or embarrassment. Emotion scholars say that complex emotions, unlike basic emotions such as anger, fear, or disgust, can be identified by and are experienced with more complicated cognitive activities beyond physiological reactions or somatic expressions (e.g., Solomon, 2008; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Pride, for example, is a complex emotion as it can be experienced when people who are feeling happy engage in self-evaluation of one's own achievement compared to others', which is identified as a complex and conscious cognitive process (Lewis, 2008; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). As complex emotions need advanced thinking and conscious evaluations of emotional stimuli in relation to the environment, it is challenging to study and find out consistent appraisal patterns and responses of complex emotions compared to those of basic emotions that are directly related to basic survival skills (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989, 2008). Even though discrete emotion models may not fully explain the experience of or reactions from complex

18

emotions like pride and shame, they are better at identifying multiple cognitive appraisal determinants as well as taking into account situational evaluations of various emotions.

DISCRETE POSITIVE & NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

Discrete emotional models have yielded an extensive amount of literature on different effects of discrete emotions in various disciplines. It is worth noting, however, that there is a clear negativity bias in terms of the prevalence of emotion studies (Barrett, 2006; Tong, 2007; Verhulst & Lizotte, 2011). In other words, discrete emotions with negative valence have received much more attention than discrete positive emotions in empirical studies. In the section, I briefly discuss the models and findings regarding both discrete positive and negative emotions, drawing a conclusion that we need more research on discrete positive emotions.

Scholars adopting discrete emotion models argue that people encounter different kinds of negative stimuli and respond differently under the conditions of uncertain risk (anxiety) and known threat (aversion) (e.g., Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000). Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001), for example, demonstrate that anger and fear are associated with different patterns of risk assessment: fear is related to loss of control thus leading to pessimistic perspectives, whereas anger is attributed to blame and thus related to more optimistic views. Dealing with the same negative emotions, Nabi (2002) also proposes the cognitive functional model (CFM), a model distinguishing among discrete negative emotions (i.e., anger, fear).

Recent research on positive emotions has contributed to the literature on discrete positive emotions. Several studies indicate that positive emotions are a heterogeneous set of emotions with positive valence (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). The prediction and experience of one positive emotion follows a different cognitive

process from that of another positive emotion, and specific positive emotions have unique qualities and consequences. So far, there is much literature studying the differential influence of discrete negative emotions on information processing and subsequent political outcomes. Verhulst and Lizotte (2011) acknowledge that "the majority of the work on discrete emotions has focused on the disparate impact of different negative emotions" (p. 83). Most work on discrete positive emotions, however, remains inconclusive (Barrett, 2006). Little research has looked at the differential impacts of discrete positive emotions on information processing and cognitive reasoning.

One reason why positive emotions may have been featured less frequently in past research is simply that they are harder to study. The pathways showing how different positive emotions lead to distinct thought-action responses (e.g., information processing or retention) are harder to identify than those of negative emotions. Appraisal theorists have generally found that positive emotions are less cognitively distinct than negative ones (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). As negative emotions lead to clearer action tendencies, this translates into clear and reliable results in a lab setting. Further, the effect of positive emotions tends to be less distinct, making the observation and operationalization more challenging (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). In other words, it is easier to find the distinct and large effects of discrete negative emotions as the effect size is usually greater than that of discrete positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2008; Fredrickson & Losada, 2005).

Another reason for the lower level of attention to discrete positive emotions is that positive emotions initiate a broader range of thoughts and actions, so it is more likely that the effect of one positive emotion will trigger another positive emotion, making it difficult to study the distinct effect of one positive emotion (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). For example, the experience of interest could lead to thoughts about new challenges, leading

20

quickly to experiences of both pride and excitement. For these reasons, researchers who wish to study positive emotions may suffer from procedural difficulties (e.g., building measures), smaller effect sizes, and less distinct outcomes. However, this should not be taken to mean that positive emotions are less important and it should not hinder efforts to study discrete positive emotions.

Despite these challenges, discrete emotion models propose that different positive emotions should have distinct thought–action procedures, or appraisal components based on how people evaluate the environment and their physiological reactions. The fact that different positive emotions co-occur does not mean that they do not have distinct constructs or effects. To elaborate, evidence shows that positive emotions tend to co-occur with each other more often than negative emotions do (e.g., Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). According to the affect transfer and associative network theories (e.g., Forgas, 1999), one specific emotion might trigger another positive emotion, since associative networks have been reinforced based on the valence of related events of emotional stimuli. Barrett et al. (2001), for example, found that the average inter-correlations between positive emotions (i.e., happiness, joy, enthusiasm, and amusement) was .74, whereas that for the negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, shame, nervousness, and guilt) was .33 in a study where participants rated their daily experiences on a series of positive and negative emotions. However, high correlations among positive emotions do not necessarily mean that they share the same appraisal or cognitive components or have the same effects on cognition and behavior (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008).

One way to find strong and consistent differential effects across positive emotions is to build valid and reliable measures. Emotion scholars have had a hard time differentiating and classifying discrete positive emotions (see Isen, 1999 for review). Complex emotions like hope and pride are hard to detect as they do not trigger noticeable

physiological symptoms, such as increased heart rate and sweaty palms, which can be related to emotional experiences. Appraisal theorists usually have looked into cognitive constructs of emotions to determine whether certain emotions of interest have been experienced. These cognitive appraisal components have been used to classify discrete positive emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Appraisal components of emotions refer to a set of specific evaluative dimensions of emotional experiences with which people process an object, stimulus, or environment that evokes various emotions in people. For instance, using the components of controllability and pleasantness, a person feels frustration when the situation seems highly unpleasant and seems uncontrollable (Frijda, 1987). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) also argue that emotional experiences can be differentiated by and associated with distinct patterns of cognitive appraisal. Specifically, using uncertainty and attention as appraisal criteria, people experience surprise when a situation draws more attention and the future seems to be uncertain (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Appraisal theorists have postulated different sets of criteria to explain discrete emotions. Based on different sets of cognitive appraisal components, emotion scholars have evaluated emotion-inducing environments and subsequent emotional responses (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1984, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Drawing from appraisal theories, this dissertation will look to define the circumstances that give rise to discrete positive emotions.

One limitation is that appraisal studies have not fully explored or agreed on a unique set of appraisal components for each positive emotion (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Tong, 2007). Further, the appraisal components evaluated in prior research were found to be inconsistent or less reliable predictors of specific positive emotions than desired. To date, classification accuracy rates (both for positive and negative emotions) vary from 30 to 50 percent depending on the dimensions used and emotions analyzed in different studies.

For example, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) identified six appraisal components (i.e., pleasantness, anticipated effort, self-other responsibility, control, certainty, and attention) to classify 15 different emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, anger, boredom, challenge, interest, hope, frustration, contempt, disgust, surprise, pride, shame, and guilt), and the classification accuracy rate was around 42.1 percent. Frijda et al. (1989) used 13 appraisal variables to classify 32 emotions (both positive and negative) with a 43.2 percent accuracy rate. Most recently, Tong (2007) used 17 cognitive dimensions to classify 14 different positive emotions (including hope and pride, but not enthusiasm) with a 45.5 percent accuracy rate. Across the studies, not only the nature and number of appraisal components used but also the type and number of emotions studied have not been identical, thus it is challenging to identify the best set of appraisal components to classify positive emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Tong, 2007). Across the studies, however, the hypothesis that subtle emotion distinctions reflect differences in their appraisal variables receives support.

Moreover, it is worth noting that there are many distinct appraisal components about which past studies have theorized, but have not examined yet. For example, hope is posited to be related to perceiving a positive side of the future (Lazarus, 1991); pride could be related to perceived superiority of oneself over others (Tesser & Collins, 1988); humility could be a perceived weakness in oneself (Tangney, 2002); contentment is posited as perceived autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000); and compassion could be measured with the dimension of identification with others (Cassell, 2002). Typically, these appraisal components have been used to theoretically conceptualize each emotion, but have not been measured or studied to find out the empirical links between appraisal components and emotions.

In sum, numerous independent lines of research not only indicate that positive emotions generally serve important adaptive functions, but also suggest that each positive

emotion is unique and different from other positive emotions (the discrete emotion model). Yet, previous studies have not produced strong findings about the effects of discrete positive emotions, especially their idiosyncratic influences. Second, recent literature indicates that cognitive appraisal components are central to differentiating discrete positive emotions and practical measures to identify whether people experience different emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, appraisal components of positive emotions have been neither comprehensively examined nor found to be sensitive enough to differentiate various positive emotions (Tong, 2007).

It is important to note clearly that I will focus on understanding the appraisal dimensions of positive emotions (enthusiasm, pride, and hope), and not those of negative emotions (anger, anxiety, and disgust) that will feature in the next chapter. So far, scholars have looked at discrete negative emotions in relation to their appraisals, effects, and motivation (DeBell, 2016; Nabi, 2002; Redlawsk et al., 2010; Roseman & Smith, 2001) which highlights why and how they are different from each other. Discrete negative emotions like fear, anxiety, or anger have been explicated extensively in light of their appraisals in the political contexts by drawing from appraisal theories (see Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; MacKuen et al., 2010; Nabi. 2003; Valetino et al., 2011), whereas past literature on political emotion has not taken into account distinct appraisals of positive emotions. Thus, I do not investigate the appraisal profiles of discrete negative emotions as it is already established notion that negative emotions are discrete in terms of their appraisals in politics.

In the dissertation, drawing from the past findings of appraisal studies of positive emotions, I intend to identify a set of appraisal components that can best explain specific positive emotions. To date, cognitive psychologists have focused on either identifying a specific set of appraisal dimensions which explain various emotions or studying the

discriminant power of them without applying the findings to particular contexts. In this study, however, the appraisal components of discrete positive emotions will be examined in terms of their applicability to a particular context, which is politics. This is the key way in which this dissertation expands beyond prior literature, which has tended not to focus on a particular context. But particular contexts – like politics – may improve the ability to discriminate among the emotions and reveal clearer appraisal dimensions. Experiencing various positive emotions in political contexts, such as elections, campaigns, and rallies, is expected to be quite different from feeling positive in everyday life since engaging in politics is a unique social experience that may involve different appraisals of the political environment or social change and its relations with oneself.

Filling the Gap by Identifying Appraisals of Discrete Positive Emotions

In this section, appraisal theories on emotion are reviewed on the basis of their exploration of positive emotions. The evaluative processing of emotion-inducing stimuli results in different emotions and the dimensions of emotional experiences (e.g., anticipated effort/obstacle, controllability, agency, novelty) can vary across different emotions (Scherer, 1999). One of the main proponents of appraisal theories, Lazarus (1991), argues that the qualities of emotions (e.g., valence, intensity) are determined a priori by the antecedent event evoking emotion. People process and evaluate a given situation either consciously or unconsciously. The emotion-accompanying evaluative processes and the interactive cognition-emotion dynamics lead to different adaptive strategies such as relying on heuristics or motivated reasoning (Lazarus, 1991).

The link between emotions and cognitions has been demonstrated in prior work. Frijda (1987, 1989) reveals a strong relationship between emotions and cognitive structures by demonstrating that words referring to the same emotional state are intuitively felt to

have similar meaning and to closely correspond with appraisal components (i.e., the clusters of different emotional states obtained from a mood adjective checklist composed of 231 words that were considered applicable to emotions). Shame, guilt, and regret, for example, were predicted by self-agency dimension, and a set of positive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm, romantic love, and happiness) corresponded with a high arousal state. The strong correlations found in the study show the similarities between emotional states and their appraisal components.

Roseman (1984, 1996) identifies appraisal determinants of discrete emotions in experiments that test how different appraisals of a situation determine one's emotional responses. Based on five different appraisal components (motivational state, situational state, certainty, legitimacy, and agency/control), a range of different emotions were found to be linked. Roseman (1984) argues that feelings of pleasantness/unpleasantness are a function of two appraisals: appraisals of what one wants (i.e., motivational state) in relation to what one has (i.e., situational state). In a sense, emotions resulting from attaining a goal are different from those resulting from securing what one already has. Likewise, the unpleasant feeling of a noxious event is different from the feeling of loss. Using the dimension of legitimacy, Roseman identifies different emotions, such as anger, guilt, shame, and pride, based on whether the (good or bad) outcome is deserved or undeserved. In short, each appraisal component had a significant effect on emotions, and certain combinations of appraisals were predictive of different emotional experiences (Roseman, 1984, 1996).

Tong (2007) proposes new appraisal components based on research on positive emotions. Based on his dimensions, the positive emotions appear to be just as distinct from one another as the negative emotions. He adopts some of the dimensions from Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) analysis of appraisal components and identifies some dimensions (e.g.,

effort, pleasantness, moral violation, and mastery) that have greater discriminatory power than other appraisal variables. Throughout the extensive analysis, Tong (2007) concludes that seventeen cognitive dimensions are effective at classifying fourteen different positive emotions (e.g., amusement, challenge, compassion, hope, humility, pride, and interest).

This dissertation reviews appraisal theories because appraisal components are usually the tools that emotion scholars use to differentiate positive emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). They provide a way in which discrete positive emotions with different causes and consequences can be well differentiated. The takeaway from appraisal studies is that some appraisal components do a better job differentiating discrete emotions than others. The use of accurate and highly predictive cognitive appraisal components increases the validity of differentiating and identifying discrete positive emotions of interest. Considering the goal of the dissertation, which is to find the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on information processing and political participation, a first objective of this study is to identify a set of appraisal components to differentiate among three positive emotions in the context of politics: enthusiasm, hope, and pride.

Discussion of Enthusiasm, Hope, and Pride

In the section, I discuss the three positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) that my dissertation aims to study. The reason why I chose these three emotions is that they have not been systematically studied as discrete emotions in the political domain, yet they have potentially important effects on information processing and political participation. Enthusiasm is shown to be a highly action-oriented emotion, thus carries many implications in the political realm (Frijda et al., 1989; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Marcus et al., 2000). Of the three positive emotions, enthusiasm has been studied most

frequently (Brader, 2005, 2006b; Marcus et al., 1993, 2000, 2006). Pride and hope, studied less often, are noticeable political emotions in terms of their connection to agency and certain arousal states (Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011; Frijda et al., 1989). Recently, some attention was paid to studying the effect of hope in politics because President Barack Obama often used the term (e.g., Escobar, 2011; Civettini, 2011). Hope is one of the most referenced emotions in the political rhetoric to galvanize the electorate (Gould, 2011), but studies show that hopeful people usually perceive the agency in the circumstances, not within themselves (Frijda et al., 1989; Tong, 2007). Pride, on the other hand, is found to be more self-oriented in terms of agency than hope (Frijda et al, 1989; Tangney, 1999). People who experience pride toward a political candidate, issue, or event tend to be more certain about the future than hopeful people (i.e., past studies show that pride is more strongly related to the certainty component than hope), and this may result in meaningful differences in political activities (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Lastly, Frijda et al. (1989) suggest that both hope and pride show the sign of hyperactivism, such as feeling excited or exuberant. These three emotions have been referenced frequently in the psychology discipline in terms of their cognitive implications for behavior (Tong, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004), however, they have received far less attention in political studies.

In order to fill the gap, I take an appraisal-based approach to differentiate hope, pride, and enthusiasm in the political domain. Even though enthusiasm has been included in some studies, political scholars have not differentiated enthusiasm from other discrete positive emotions like pride or hope (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000). Studying the effect of enthusiasm, political scholars have taken a dimensional approach by treating enthusiasm as the opposite dimension of different negative emotions, such as anger and anxiety. The reason why discrete positive emotions, especially pride and hope, have been featured disproportionately in political studies despite their importance in cognitive and social

psychology is intuitive: Pride and hope are complex emotions (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995) and the constructs have not been fully explored, thus making them hard to operationalize in political contexts.

The few studies that have been done addressing these emotions have adopted qualitative approaches to discuss the importance they carry in politics (with exception of enthusiasm). For example, Snyder's (1994, 2000) work on hope discusses its implications for politics, however, there have been no further studies of which I am aware that extend the discussion on hope in politics. Thus, the objective of this section is to develop conceptualizations of the three emotions based on cognitive psychology literature looking at the positive emotions. This provides the groundwork for meaningfully differentiating among the three emotional responses.

Enthusiasm

According to the semantic analysis by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989), enthusiasm can be defined as a "strong desire to do things" (p. 113). They conceptualize enthusiasm as an emotional desire that functions to motivate behaviors to achieve goals. Weber (2013) shows that happiness, hope, and optimism load on an enthusiasm dimension and explains that these positive emotions can be derived from conceiving or achieving future goals. Shiota (2003), compiling a taxonomy of positive emotion words, differentiates enthusiasm from other positive emotions, such as contentment, hope, and pride. Shiota uses the term enthusiasm to refer to the emotion felt when the environment signals an imminent increase in resources. Thus, people experience enthusiasm when perceiving a goal to be achievable or noticing possible improvement in available resources like money, food, or shelter, which are indications of an enhanced possibility of goal achievement.

In general, positive emotions like joy, contentment, and happiness activate approach tendencies which facilitate a continuation of action since there is no perceived threat or risk involved in the environment (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) also consider enthusiasm an approach emotion, signaling the body that the continuation of a current behavior is safe and appropriate (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntsonconti, 1999; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001). As an emotional state, enthusiasm is a moderate- to high-arousal emotion, where people become motivated to expend effort and continue current behaviors (i.e., approach tendency) in order to pursue and acquire potential rewards (Fredrickson, 1998). Also, enthusiastic people are more prone to respond to positive events and behave proactively when they perceive increased opportunities for resource acquisition than non-enthusiastic people (Shiota, 2003). In sum, enthusiasm can be constructed as a cognitive process that invites the recognition of resource acquisition, experience of heightened pleasantness, and display of strong desirability (e.g., action tendency) to achieve a goal (Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003).

Measures and findings

There are some controversies around whether enthusiasm is a discrete emotion or not, and this disagreement is partially attributable to different measures of enthusiasm (e.g., Barrett, 1989). Even though enthusiasm has been conceptually differentiated from pride and hope in cognitive psychology, others treat enthusiasm as representing all emotions with positive valence. Barrett (1989), for example, examining different positive emotions, combined measures of enthusiasm (enthusiastic, excited, lively, and energetic) with measures of happiness (happy, delighted, joyful, and cheerful) to assess positively-valenced emotional states. Moreover, many political science scholars have combined discrete positive emotions (e.g., pride, joy, hope, enthusiasm) together to create one positive emotion scale and this makes it hard to predict the distinct cause and effect of

different positive emotions (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001; Brader, Groenendyk, & Valentino, 2010; Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Just et al., 2015; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Weber, 2013).

Enthusiasm has been measured in different ways. Although enthusiasm is one of the most studied positive emotions in the political science literature, the measures past research has adopted were mostly grounded in a dimensional approach (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). For instance, studies only use a single item (e.g., how often do you feel enthusiastic toward a candidate? Has a candidate ever made you feel enthusiastic?) or combine a battery of positive emotion questions asking about the frequency of feeling hopeful/proud/enthusiastic to create an enthusiasm measure (Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2009b).

Regarding the manipulation of enthusiasm, Weber (2013) examines the exposure to enthusiasm-inducing ads in experiments and asks questions regarding participants' emotional state (i.e., happiness, hope, optimism) to ensure that the manipulation induces enthusiasm. Valentino and colleagues (2008, 2011), on the other hand, use open-ended prompts asking participants to recall enthusiasm-inducing events, and based on a semantic analysis, they measure how enthusiastic the participants felt. Hereby, I argue that the previous measurement in political research has a very limited ability to find out the distinctive cognitive components of different positive emotions (i.e., under which circumstances people experience enthusiasm, hope, or pride) and this makes it harder for researchers to study discrete positive emotions and their differential effects in politics.

In contrast, cognitive psychologists have differentiated enthusiasm from others positive emotions by examining its appraisal components (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003) and the dissertation follows the discrete emotion approach to study the different constructs of enthusiasm, hope, and pride. As the main goal of the chapter is to differentiate

discrete positive emotions based on their appraisal components, I use a set of cognitive appraisal items (e.g., Were you in control of what was happening? Did you want to avoid the situation? And Did you understand what was going on?) to ensure that certain appraisal components are predictive of the intended emotion like enthusiasm.

To date, however, the literature has rarely examined appraisal components of enthusiasm as a distinct emotional state, and this limits the accuracy of current predictors of enthusiasm. Frijda et al.'s (1989) study is one exception and they found that enthusiasm was positively related to and predicted by the following appraisal components: valence (pleasantness), clarity of situation, personal relevance (importance), agency (both self and other), and action tendency (approach). In other words, enthusiasm is a highly pleasant, action-oriented, and personally-relevant emotion, and people who experience enthusiasm tend to be certain about what is going on in a situation and perceive that they and/or others are in control of what happens in the environment.

Given the scarcity of studies examining the appraisal components of enthusiasm (for an exception, see Frijda et al., 1989), this dissertation will be exploratory rather than confirmatory in its analysis of the appraisal components predicting enthusiasm. The appraisal components examined in the dissertation include not only those that have been identified previously (i.e., valence, agency, clarity, action tendency), but also new ideas like the recognition of resource acquisition drawn from the existing literature (e.g., Shiota, 2003).

Pride

Another frequently identified positive emotion is pride. Most of the literature on pride is from developmental psychology, but the emotion has been highly neglected in other disciplines (Tangney, 1999). Based on their semantic analysis of different emotions,

Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) define pride as "happiness with self as a result of a high opinion of self in relation to others" (p. 120). Lazarus (1991) notes that pride occurs when a valued achievement is accredited to oneself or to significant others. Mascolo and Fischer (1995) explain that pride can be experienced when one "appraises the self as having responsibility for accomplishing a socially valued outcome or being a socially valued person" (p. 65). In this sense, feeling pride can lead to approach tendencies as it encourages future behavior by making people think highly of themselves as well as by calling attention to possible future accomplishments (Frijda et al., 1989; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995; Tong, 2007).

It is worth noting that pride is quite different from happiness or joy. The pleasant impression of pride is caused by the idea that one has achieved or accomplished something significant, and the impression in turn causes another idea, which Hume described as an idea of the self (Lewis, 2008; Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007). Pride, in other words, cannot be experienced with the feeling or sensation alone, but is identified with cognitive processes such as self-reflection (Solomon, 2008; Tangney, 1999). Basic emotions, such as happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust, can arise as a result of unconscious appraisals, and they can be experienced for no specific reason (Izard, 2009; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996). Complex emotions like pride, however, depend on conscious appraisals that relate to our own perception of the relationships between self and others (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989, 2008). Complex emotions usually hinge on cognitive abilities and develop later in life after learning and understanding the concept of self. Thus, what is called self-conscious evaluative emotions cannot occur until elaborate cognitive processes have occurred (Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992). As most emotion theorists suggest, a recognized self or awareness of self is a prerequisite for emotions, such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, and pride (Lewis, 1992, 2008; Stipek et al., 1992; Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta,

2005). In short, pride is usually derived from positive self-evaluation or self-esteem with respect to one's valuable achievement.

Lastly, pride is an example of intergroup emotions which can be defined as "emotions that arise when people identify with a social group and respond emotionally to events or objects that impinge on the group" (Smith & Mackie, 2008, p. 428). Smith and Mackie propose intergroup emotions theory, explaining that certain emotions arise in intergroup situations where people build a psychological connection to a particular group. In an intergroup environment, social comparison, competition, and conflict between different groups can become so salient that it will lead ingroup members to experience social emotions such as pride and shame. For instance, strong partisans may experience collective pride or shame based on the result of elections or polls about preferred candidates (Smith & Mackie, 2008).

Pride serves social functions as the emotion evolves in a social context and should be beneficial for a person's social survival or adaptation (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Pride can be an individual response to a positive evaluation of a specific action, thought, or phenomenon. Here, the object that makes people feel proud is specific and related to a particular behavior. Thus, when feeling pride, people focus on their actions that make them proud and the specific focus allows for future action. In sum, pride can be constructed as a cognitive process connected to achieving something valuable, evaluating self-other relations (on the achievement), and feeling mastery from positive self-regard.

Measures and findings

Most of the literature looking into pride uses self-reported measures to identify pride and related experiences as cognitive psychologists acknowledge that pride, being cognitively complex and consciously felt, usually has no physiological symptoms (Tangney, 1999). Experiencing pride signifies that one is doing well; a person who feels

proud of one's achievement perceives that he out-performs others on a task or in terms of attributes (Lewis, 1993; Tesser & Collins, 1988). Further, people experience pride not just about individual achievements, but also about the achievements of their significant others, such as family and partners.

Most scholars have relied on the cognitive appraisal components of pride when deciding whether it is experienced. Tong (2007) demonstrates that pride is positively related to the following appraisal components: pleasantness (valence), feeling of mastery resulting from achieving something desirable and important, clarity of the situation, and social appropriateness (Tong, 2007). Speaking of the social appropriateness component, pride functioning as a social emotion can shed light on the fact that people experience pride when evaluating that it is socially appropriate to feel what they feel in intergroup contexts (i.e., achieving something others have not achieved). Frijda and colleagues (1989) also reveal that pride is positively predicted by pleasantness, clarity, importance, and self-agency appraisal components, and leads to a feeling of exuberance. Like enthusiasm, pride is a highly pleasant and personally important (relevant) emotion. Unlike enthusiasm, pride is more cognitively oriented, accompanied with feelings of achievement and increased self-esteem. Also, people who experience pride tend to be certain about what is going on in a situation, and perceive that they have control over what happens in the environment. Because of the complexity of the experience of pride, however, the study of pride so far received little attention (Lewis, 2008). To my knowledge, there is no literature looking into pride as a discrete emotion and studying its effect in political contexts. However, we can hypothesize numerous political situations where people experience pride, such as when they identify with a leading party in an election. This dissertation thus examines pride as it relates to political information seeking and behavior.

Hope

Reading (2004) defines hope as a "pleasurable subjective state that arises when individuals expect that a desired future goal is realistically achievable, and that expectation energizes them to initiate activities they believe will help them attain it" (p. 5). Putting emphasis on a cognitive aspect, Snyder (1989) defines hope as "goal-directed thinking, in which people appraise their capacity to produce workable routes to goals, along with their potential to initiate and sustain movement via a pathway" (p.143). Snyder (1994) continues that hope is the combination of "mental willpower and waypower for goals" (p. 11). According to the literature, people who have high waypower can seek alternative ways to achieve a goal if the projected pathway is blocked (Snyder, 1994). Drahos (2004) conceptualizes hope as "a forward looking emotion" and "an important psychological resource for dealing with an uncertain and depressing fate" (p. 21).

From the aforementioned definitions and literature on hope, I derive three central components to construct the concept of hope: goal, pathway, and agency. Goal is something perceived to be desirable and achievable to exert effort to obtain it. The presence of a goal is a prerequisite to experiencing hope. Pathways are possible routes to achieve a goal, including goal-directed thinking and activities (Snyder, 2000). Agency gives individuals a sense of efficacy and optimism, providing a psychological basis for individuals to feel hopeful, as Reading (2004) specifies that hope energizes people to voluntarily initiate activities to attain desired goals. In other words, being hopeful is a common affective state of thinking in relation to one's goal and goal-oriented behaviors (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Shiota, 2003; Snyder, 2000). In sum, hope can be constructed as a cognitive process that invites a series of actions: setting a concrete goal, finding pathways to achieve the goal, and tapping one's willpower (agency) to move forward or to overcome potential barriers (Snyder, 2000).

Hope is different from enthusiasm such in hope may stem from negatively perceived circumstances as well as from positive circumstances depending on individuals' ability to imagine a positive future outcome, whereas enthusiasm is usually felt under positively perceived circumstances (Shiota, 2003). Hope is similar to pride in that both emotions are more closely intertwined with cognition than other emotions like enthusiasm. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) categorize hope and pride as complex emotions, which require more developed cognitive processing and evaluations of the environment. Likewise, Just et al. (2007) describe hope as one of "the most cognitively integrated emotions" (p. 234). However, hope is distinct from pride in that hope can be experienced when individuals perceive that the future is unclear and anticipated effort is projected to help with attaining goals whereas pride is positively related to the clarity of the situation and does not pose a clear indication of the level of effort (Tong, 2007).

Measures and findings

There have been few scales designed to measure hope. Snyder explores the significance of hope in his books, *The Psychology of Hope* (1994) and *Handbook of Hope* (2000), and develops a measure for the construct; however, the measure is more tailored to measure people's tendency to feel hopeful as a trait, not as an emotional state. Instead of adopting the trait-like hope scale, this dissertation measures hope as an emotional state relying on cognitive appraisal determinants of hope. Appraisal theorists have used different sets of appraisal components to measure and differentiate hope from other positive emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). The analysis of appraisal components concludes that hope is positively related to the dimension of anticipated effort and negatively associated with the dimension of clarity of the situation, which means that when feeling hopeful, people expect to expend effort to attain their goals and feel uncertain about the situation and what will happen in the future (Frijda et al., 1989; Just et al., 2007). In a

sense, hope is less pleasant than other positive emotions like pride and enthusiasm on the valence dimension because it may signal a possible obstacle for attaining goals, sometimes resulting in a lack of motivation and a feeling of helplessness (Baumeister, Fabor, & Wallace, 1999; Frijda et al., 1989). Also, in terms of agency, hopeful people are found to perceive that circumstances or forces beyond their control are controlling the situation (Tong, 2007), which is quite different from the expectations by Snyder (2000) or Reading (2004).

Looking specifically at the effects of hope in the political domain, little research has been conducted. One of the reasons why political hope has been studied only at the surface level is that scholars do not have an agreed-upon way to study hope systematically. As outlined briefly, the conceptualization of hope is quite vague. There is some critical and qualitative literature looking into the use of hope in the political domain. Civettini (2011), for instance, discusses Obama's rhetoric of hope and how Obama used hope as a rhetorical tool. He remarks that the way Obama cultivated a rhetoric of hope made it easier for the American people to see pathways to achieve goals and to believe the goals are attainable. The Obama phenomenon particularly punctuates the ever-increasing attention to a politics of hope by showing its effective, and potentially abusive (as it could be misleading), power over voters (Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011).

Very few quantitative studies on the role of hope in political judgement and other political contexts are available. Just et al. (2007) reveal that hope and enthusiasm are distinct emotions. They find that only hope increased during the 1996 election campaign for Clinton using a national representative sample, whereas enthusiasm decreased. Also, hope was found to be the most important emotion in determining vote choice and candidate preferences at the end of political campaigns. Importantly, the findings shed light on the reason why two different emotions, enthusiasm and hope, are not easily distinguishable,

especially at the end of campaigns as Just and colleagues argue that toward the end of the campaigns, hope and enthusiasm become mixed "because by that time the future is now" (Just et al., 2007, p. 252). In other words, people who felt hopeful at the beginning of election campaigns may grow increasingly enthusiastic about their own party or candidate over time, but it does not necessarily mean that hopeful individuals always experience enthusiasm at the same time. Feeling hope can be replaced with feeling enthusiasm, and the two emotions may not always co-occur.

SUMMARY

Based on the review of the literature on discrete positive emotions, a tentative conclusion can be drawn: There are no agreed-upon or well-defined constructs of the three positive emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Yet by drawing from psychology, political science, and communication, this dissertation has offered distinct conceptual understandings of each of these three emotions. Enthusiasm can be considered as a basic emotion whereas hope and pride are more cognitively complex. Enthusiasm is conceptualized as a strong emotional desire that occurs when one's goal is likely to be attainable. Hope and pride require more complex cognitive processing of a given situation, object, and environment than enthusiasm does. Hope and pride are distinct in terms of their appraisal components like pleasantness, certainty (clarity), and agency. Hope is perceived as a less pleasant and less certain emotion than pride is, and hopeful people tend to see agency in the circumstances whereas proud people think that they are in control of what is happening.

Mainly the differences among the three emotions derive from how individuals perceive and evaluate a given situation (Shiota, 2003; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007), and this leads to the first fundamental question asked in the dissertation: How

different or similar are enthusiasm, hope, and pride? By creating an accurate and more agreed-upon taxonomy, it will be possible to study these emotions and their political consequences. This leads to the next question of the dissertation which will be discussed in the following chapter: Do they have differential effects on political information processing and behavior? Given the importance of emotional life in politics, the demand for building distinct constructs for these positive emotions seems quite urgent.

Drawing from appraisal studies, a different set of appraisal components can be tentatively identified for each emotion even though the composition of the set is not definitive and open to further examination: Enthusiasm can be predicted by pleasantness (high), agency (self & others), certainty, resource acquisition, and action tendency (Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003). Hope can be specified with the pleasantness (low), agency (circumstance), certainty, change, action tendency, and anticipated effort dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). Lastly, pride may require evaluative dimensions like pleasantness (high), agency (self), certainty, mastery, social appropriateness, and positive self-regard (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tong, 2007).

Without knowing the constructs associated with each positive emotion, any test of emotional effects on information processing and participation stands on shaky ground. Thus, I first examine the differences and similarities among enthusiasm, hope, and pride, building on appraisal theories. It should be noted that there are good reasons to expect that the three emotions are correlated with one another and tend to trigger each other (Barrett et al., 2001; Fredrickson, 2008). According to affect transfer theory, one discrete positive emotion may trigger the feeling of another positive emotion tapping associative networks in human brain (Forgas, 1999). Yet each is hypothesized to have a distinct set of appraisal components. Thus, I posit the first research question and hypothesis:

RQ1: Which appraisal components best predict enthusiasm, hope, and pride?

H1: Each emotion – enthusiasm, hope, and pride – will display a different set of appraisal components.

Drawing from appraisal theories and emotion studies in psychology, this dissertation will build measures to explicate the relationships between these three positive emotions and political outcomes to be discussed next. To address the hypothesis and research question proposed in this chapter, I design and execute an online survey and the methodology will be discussed in Chapter 4. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, I will review the literature on the relationships between discrete emotions, information search, and participatory activities in politics.

Chapter 3: Effects of Emotions on Information Processing and Participation

It has been shown repeatedly that there is an inseparable link between cognition and emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Isen, 1999; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Zajonc, 1984). Even though literature investigating the link does not always align in terms of the details of the relationship, such as the direction, cause, primacy, and outcomes, most agree with the notion of the interdependence between cognition and emotion. This basic premise is the fundamental framework within which this dissertation investigates the effects of emotions. Although a number of studies, models, and theories explicating the relationship between emotion and cognition are available, how discrete emotions influence information processing and political behavior remains largely unknown. Especially, the competing findings on the effects of positive emotions on information processing and participation only make the need to investigate these effects more urgent (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001, 2005; Isen et al., 1984; Mackie & Worth, 1989).

This chapter addresses the void in the literature on the effects of discrete emotions on information processing and participatory activities. Despite the lack of a perfectly fitting theoretical framework, a few theories and models shed light on how discrete emotions might affect individuals' information processing and behavior. Beyond investigating the effects of discrete positive emotions, I also include three discrete negative emotions in order to advance the literature. Current literature has looked into the effects of discrete negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear) in the political context, however, did not present consistent picture of their effects (Brader, 2005; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013). Thus, including the negative ones into the study contributes the literature by showcasing their effects.

In this chapter, I discuss the most relevant theories and models, which highlight the dynamics between discrete emotions and cognitive processes. To organize the theories and models, I will discuss: (1) the automaticity of affect, drawing from the dual-process model, which explains how emotions may prime people to process information in a particular way, and (2) specific theories that elaborate affective information processing in political contexts, including affective intelligence theory and expectancy violation theory. Next, for the purpose of differentiating the effects within discrete positive and discrete negative emotions, I will first discuss the effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on information search and participation, then move on to discuss those of two discrete negative emotions, anger and anxiety. Finally, the chapter will introduce a novel negative emotion into the study, which is disgust, and discuss its potentially unique effect compared to anger and anxiety. The chapter will end with the implications of the theories and models and the discussion of how positive as well as negative emotions can influence information processing and political participation.

PATHWAYS OF AFFECTIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING

In general, people have tendencies to maintain their good mood or emotions (Isen & Patrick, 1983). Specifically, enthusiastic, proud, or hopeful people do not want to be disturbed by unforeseen negative stimuli. This is the basic expectation when we think of information processing under positive emotional states. In this section, I explain the mechanisms behind affect-driven information processing. Affect-driven information processing refers to the phenomenon wherein the valence of initially felt affect biases information processing (Lodge & Taber, 2013).

Scholars have exerted effort to identify the pathways of affect-driven information processing, showing how people are primed by emotions, investigating whether

information processing and seeking is affect-congruent or incongruent, and examining which processing strategies are more vulnerable to emotion effects. For instance, people feeling positive emotions tend to process information to maintain their positive affect, such as looking for positively-valenced (affect-congruent) information or positively evaluating information. In a series of empirical studies, Forgas and colleagues (1984, 1994) have shown that people experiencing happy and sad emotions are likely to engage in affect-congruent information processing, judgements, and recall. Happy individuals identify more positive behaviors whereas sad individuals tend to be more critical towards themselves and others (Forgas et al., 1984, 1994). In an experiment, Erison et al. (2014) found an affect priming effect wherein people who are unconsciously primed with positive stimuli construct more positive judgements of a given issue than people who are not primed.

Research on affectively motivated information processing suggests that predispositions and other contextual cues (affect-congruent vs. -incongruent stimuli) are important in predicting how emotion affects political information processing and seeking (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). Differences in initial dispositions (e.g., level of prior knowledge, partisanship, and held stereotypes) may influence people's information seeking behavior under certain emotional states. Isbell, Burns, and James (2004), for example, find that happy people are more inclined to seek out confirmatory information which aligns with their held stereotypes than sad people.

Only a few theories and frameworks explain the possible dynamics of information processing under various discrete emotions. In the next section, three models are discussed to explicate how different emotions may influence information processing and seeking behaviors: automaticity of affect, affective intelligence theory, and expectancy violation theory. All of the frameworks are particularly interested in explaining possible relations between emotions and information processing strategies.

The Automaticity of Affect (Dual-process Model)

Affect-motivated information processing can be triggered by the automaticity of affect. The automaticity of affect derives from hardwired, automated emotional networks in the brain. The automaticity, or primacy, of affect has been contested for many years (e.g., Zajonc, 1980, 1984). Following the dual-process model of thinking, Lodge and colleagues (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Lodge, Taber, & Weber, 2006) confirm that affective primes can automatically activate the cognitive appraisal of a given stimuli and subsequent processing of information (i.e., automaticity of affect). The dual-process model explains that people use two distinct processing systems (i.e., fast and slow thinking) when encountering stimuli depending on their stereotypes, past experiences, intuition, current mood, exposure to primes, affect heuristics (e.g., likes and dislikes), and cognitive load (Davidson, Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2003; Forgas, 2001; Kahneman, 2011).

The model frequently has been adopted by political scholars to explain automated affective processing (e.g., Lodge, Taber, & Weber, 2006). The automaticity of affect means that people use fast, unconscious, intuitive, and effortless processing under certain affective states, such as feeling ecstatic. Importantly, an implicit, unconscious, and automated process can be spurred by an immediate, real-time emotional response to a stimulus that one cannot control or consciously influence (Scherer, 1984). Automated affective processing, also called fast thinking, usually generates impressions, feelings, and inclinations. When the reactions are endorsed by slow and effortful thinking process, also called slow thinking, they become attitudes, beliefs, and intentions (Kahneman, 2011).[1]

---

[1] The dual-process model, also dubbed fast- or slow-thinking, has been discussed in terms of using either heuristics or a systematic approach to processing information. One similarity between the dual process model and my work is that affect or the use of certain emotions (such as enthusiasm or anger) usually promotes people to turn to heuristics due to their predetermined or hardwired affective tag attached to stimuli. However, it should be noted that not all the use of affective cue promotes fast thinking or reliance on heuristics. As mentioned, people who are feeling sad or anxious process information more effortfully by taking a systematic approach. In and of itself, using heuristics does not and should not always translate to

In general, research on the dual-process model suggests that happy people are more likely to engage in fast and automated information processing when they are given congruent information than when given incongruent information, whereas sad or depressed people tend to process information more objectively and extensively (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Kahneman, 2011). Grounded on the dual-process model, Lodge and Taber (2005, 2013) argue that as people build their attitudes or preferences for a political object, such as a candidate, party, or issue, their preferences or attitudes become hardwired in their minds with affective responses. For instance, if an individual has developed a pro-immigration attitude, he will automatically evaluate a piece of information supporting anti-immigration policy unfavorably without going through effortful information processing, or if a person already likes a certain candidate, she will automatically respond favorably to the candidate-related news without giving a second thought to it.

Following the logic of automaticity of affect, the evaluations of political information can be constantly interrupted and influenced by affective heuristics attached to information, which automatically evoke affectively motivated processing (Lodge & Taber, 2005, 2013). According to Lodge and Taber (2013), the affect-primed implicit response merely reflects "affect stored directly with a memory object" (p. 5). Affect-driven implicit responses are more prevalent among strong partisans and political sophisticates since they have built a stronger attachment or priori to a political object (candidate, issue, or party), thus affect is more easily accessible when cueing information is presented (Lodge & Taber, 2013). Although the automaticity of affect cannot predict the exact pathways from emotions to information processing and beyond, it explains that people can be primed by emotions in ways that affect information processing.

---

affectively-motivated or affect-driven information processing, and systematic processing does not always exclude affect-driven information processing.

Affective Intelligence and Expectancy Violation Theories

The previous section explains how affect-congruent or incongruent information processing might occur. In the following section, I discuss theories that adopt the above reasoning, but further develop ways in which discrete positive emotions could affect information processing. Affective intelligence theory and expectancy violation theory provide a partial picture of how discrete positive emotions could influence information processing in political contexts.

In reconciling the relationship between affect and cognition, political scientists have analyzed how affect influences political responses. Drawing from neurophysiological data which support two distinctive pathways of emotional responses in the brain (Gray, 1981, 1987), Marcus and colleagues propose affective intelligence theory (AIT), which suggests that affective states (e.g., enthusiasm, anxiety) provide people with different contextual cues through the activation of two distinct modes of affective information processing. One is the dispositional system in which people rely on habitual routes and preexisting experiences, and the other, called the surveillance system, evokes more thorough information processing in which people consciously register stimuli in a new environment (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus at el., 2000). Marcus and his colleagues draw a sharp line between two emotional dimensions, enthusiasm-depression and anxiety-calmness, arguing that people in an anxious state (the opposite of calmness or safety) are likely to engage in avoidance behaviors. They perceive a stimulus or situation as threatening and consider alternative outcomes through the activation of the surveillance system. Alternatively, the state of enthusiasm (the opposite of feeling depressed) promotes an approach tendency and increases the propensity for people to use previous habits and heuristics through the activation of the dispositional system.

According to AIT, complacent and enthusiastic voters heavily rely on peripheral cues and past beliefs, such as partisanship, whereas anxious voters deliberatively process political information by tapping candidates' policy stance or other qualities (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000). Although Marcus et al. (1993, 2000) use a dimensional approach with anxiety and enthusiasm as two anchor points, what they propose through affective intelligence theory moves beyond typical valence models of emotion. Their theory corresponds well with the dual-process model as the model proposes that feeling positive emotions leads to heuristic processing, while other emotions prompt more thorough processing.

There are several limitations of AIT when predicting the distinct pathways of information processing under the discrete positive emotions under investigation in this project (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride). First, Marcus and his colleagues (1999, 2000, 2011) created one composite measure of enthusiasm by standardizing scores on three discrete emotions, hope, pride, and sympathy. Even though the authors differentiated enthusiasm from negative emotions, they take a dimensional approach and treat enthusiasm as an overarching positive emotion that promotes overall approach tendencies. Thus, the pathways of information processing under each positive emotion, which is the main interest of the dissertation, cannot be differentiated or predicted separately.

Moreover, research testing the affective intelligence framework shows only partial support for the rationale of the theory. Undertaking an empirical effort to validate the premise of affective intelligence model, Ladd and Lenz (2008, 2011) challenge the assumptions of AIT by demonstrating that anxiety improves voters' decision-making through routes other than those proposed by AIT. They argue that it is not the emotion, anxiety, which leads people to rely on the surveillance system, but the evaluations of candidates and parties that causes people to evaluate policy preference or candidates'

qualities. In their alternative model, emotions and party/candidate evaluations are correlated and both have an impact on information seeking behavior. In other words, they find not only the affect transfer effect wherein people's emotions influence candidate evaluations but also evidence of the endogeneity of affect wherein candidate evaluations also lead to the experience of anxiety and enthusiasm (Ladd & Lenz, 2008, 2011). They argue that published experimental tests of AIT are very rare, and this should be interpreted as there is a need for the specification of affective intelligence model (Ladd & Lenz, 2011).

Despite these limitations, several follow-up studies adopt the AIT framework and add depth to the predictions of AIT. MacKuen et al. (2010), for example, present a more detailed picture by including more contextual information. Investigating the relationships between discrete emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm) and the direction of information search, they demonstrate that enthusiasm generally limits people's information search when the given information is congruent with their issue or policy position. However, when it comes to future intent, enthusiastic people are more willing to seek out challenging information with a desire to learn more about the opposing side whereas angry people are less inclined to seek challenging information (MacKuen et al., 2010). Thus, not only anxiety but enthusiasm can activate surveillance system depending on the valence of information provided.

Grounded in AIT, others demonstrate that the activation of the surveillance or dispositional system depends not on the two emotions (i.e., anxiety and enthusiasm), but on the experience of in-group or out-group emotions based on partisanship (Johnston, Lavine, & Woodson, 2015). Johnston, Lavine, and Woodson (2015) propose using expectancy violation theory (EVT) to look at whether anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm facilitate either deliberative or retractive (partisan) thinking depending on people's expectations about in-group and out-group parties or candidates. In other words, how

people act does not depend on which emotions they experience, but on how the felt emotions violate their expectancy toward certain objects (e.g., candidate, party). For instance, if people experience enthusiasm toward the opposing candidate or feel anxiety toward their preferred candidate, this violates their expectations, and in turn heightens deliberative reasoning and suppresses partisan thinking. On the other hand, expectancy confirming emotions, such as experiencing anxiety toward the other party's candidate, have the reverse effects.

EVT agrees with AIT that anxiety sometimes promotes deliberation and enthusiasm and anger sometimes promote reflexive partisanship wherein people rely on heuristics or previous beliefs, but diverges from AIT in the claim that the way each discrete emotion promotes either deliberative or partisan reasoning is necessarily related to people's partisan expectations. When positive emotions (enthusiasm) are associated with in-party objects and negative emotions (anxiety, anger) are associated with out-party objects, heuristic judgment is more likely and this can suppress people's information seeking behaviors. For instance, anxiety toward the out-party candidate functioned in the way that is similar to enthusiasm toward the in-party candidate, leading to increased partisan voting and decreased issue-based voting. Thus, to more accurately predict the effects of discrete emotions on political learning and behavior, people's partisanship as well as the direction of their information search (challenging or reassuring) should be taken into account.

The AIT and EVT are some of the very few models that can explain and predict the effects of enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety. The predictions made by AIT and EVT regarding the effect of positive emotions on information processing dovetail well with each other. According to AIT (Marcus et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010), people in an enthusiastic state are likely to rely on heuristics and held beliefs or attitudes and limit their information search as long as the information they process seems congruent with their priors. Moreover,

according to EVT (Johnston et al., 2015), when people feel enthusiastic towards the opposing side (thus, become less enthusiastic and more ambivalent), people become more prone to be effortful information processers extending information search. Even though the theories do not cover discrete positive emotions, such as hope and pride, their predictions regarding information processing under enthusiasm can be partially adopted to meet the goal of the dissertation.

EFFECTS OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION SEARCH

Although there has been a bias toward studying negative emotions (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008), research is beginning to provide a better understanding of positive emotions. However, there are competing explanations regarding the influence of positive emotions on information seeking behavior. Some argue that by triggering approach behavior and increasing interest, positive emotions promote creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, 1999), increased cognitive resources (Fredrickson, 2001), and exploration for the purpose of learning (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). For example, Fredrickson and Losada (2005) assume that positive emotions encourage people to consider a wide range of information and broaden their cognitive repertoires. A series of studies done by Isen and colleagues confirm that positive emotions encourage people to be integrative and open to new information, leading to better adaptive strategies like hopeful thinking (Isen & Daubman, 1984).

Contrary to the positive effects, it also has been found that people who experience positive emotions (e.g., enthusiasm) are less likely to process information carefully. The explanation of the negative effect of positive emotions argues for cognitive depletion under positive emotional states. Mackie and Worth (1989) propose that positive affective states erode individuals' cognitive capacity which results in longer time and more effort to

51

examine information. Martin and colleagues (1993) demonstrate that positive affect diminishes people's motivation to process information effortfully. AIT (Marcus et al., 2000) agrees that enthusiastic people are less accurate information processors as they become no longer motivated to expand their information search since there is no novel threat perceived in the environment. Thus, happy people are prone to rely on heuristics, such as previous beliefs or partisanship, when making political judgments. The reasoning has been confirmed in some psychological studies as well (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002).

A third line of reasoning proposes a different story. Mood maintenance theory (Isen & Patrick, 1983) posits that people in positive affective states (i.e., feeling elated) want to maintain their good feelings. This leads people to adopt different information processing strategies depending on the situation. People in positive emotional states are more willing to take a risk when the expected loss is perceived to be small (low risk), and less willing to take a risk when the loss is perceived to be large than people in neutral affective states (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983). Thus, depending on the level of perceived risk in a situation, happy people engage in different information processing strategies to maintain their positive emotions.

On the basis of appraisal theories, there is reason to believe that there will be some variability in information processing behaviors influenced by different positive emotions as the causes as well as appraisal components of one emotion are different from those of other positive emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). If Marcus and colleagues' argument about positive emotional responses is supported, discrete positive emotions should decrease the amount of information sought in general. However, there are competing research findings, some demonstrating increased cognitive attention as well as the tendency to be open to new information (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Isen, 1987, 1999). For instance, using a longitudinal panel survey, Just et

al. (2007) found that hope can increase political interest and lead to information seeking, such as watching the party conventions or network TV news. Given the lack of a consistent theoretical or empirical rationale, it is hard to pose directional hypotheses about the effects of the discrete positive emotions on the amount of information seeking. Thus, I propose the following non-directional hypothesis:

    H2: (a) Enthusiastic, (b) proud, and (c) hopeful individuals will seek out different amounts of information compared to those not experiencing these emotions.

Not only the amount of information sought but also the direction of information seeking under each emotion is a focus of the dissertation. In other words, without a clear picture of the dynamics of emotions in selective exposure, the goal of finding out distinct roles of discrete emotions in information seeking and participation might be half-achieved. Selective exposure research suggests that a partisan response to different types of information may occur under different emotional states (e.g., Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009a; Wojcieszak, Bimber, Feldman, & Stroud, 2016).

According to mood management theory, people who are experiencing positive emotions are more likely to seek partisan information aligned with their partisan beliefs to maintain their mood (e.g., Zillmann & Bryant, 1985; Zillmann, 1988). Just and colleagues (2007) also suggested that feeling hope biases information search strategies, making people seek only congenial information to stay hopeful. Based on expectancy violation theory, positive emotions felt toward in-group members are expected to facilitate retractive or partisan thinking, leading people to seek confirming information. MacKuen et al. (2010) also confirmed the general tendency of enthusiastic individuals seeking out less information. Although Jonas, Graupmann, and Frey (2006) proposed that mood regulation affects information search, suggesting that people in a good mood are more willing to engage with attitude-dissonant information than those experiencing a bad mood, this is

about the future intention, not about the actual information search.. These findings shed light on the fact that affect-driven information seeking is biased toward prior beliefs and attitudes. Thus, not the emotional experience itself but the context of emotional experience (ingroup vs. outgroup) will decide the direction of information search. More specifically, I set forward the following hypothesis about the relationship between the positive emotions and the direction of information search.

> **H3:** Individuals who experience (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) pride toward ingroup members will seek out more confirming information than non-confirming information compared to those not experiencing these emotions.

The differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on information processing, however, have not been examined by existing literature. Thus, for exploratory purposes, I will examine whether discrete positive emotions affect information processing differently. Maybe there are differences in the effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on the amount and direction (confirming vs. non-confirming) of information sought. For instance, a study found that hope is a stronger predictor of stimulating attention to campaign-related information than enthusiasm (Just et al., 2007), a difference that also could be found between pride and other positive emotions. This may be because hopeful people are more uncertain about the situation than people experiencing pride or enthusiasm, thus want to seek out more information to relieve the anxiety from uncertainty. Also, as pride being predicted by positive self-regard and having control over what is happening (self-agency), proud people may be more selective and choose even more reinforcing information than enthusiastic or hopeful individuals. Therefore, I propose studying the differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride in a systematic way with the following research question:

RQ2: How do enthusiasm, hope, and pride affect information seeking behaviors in terms of (a) the amount (more or less) and (b) direction (confirming or non-confirming) of information sought?

EFFECTS OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As reviewed in this section, psychological literature suggests that the interactions between emotion and cognition can stimulate political participation. However, the underlying interplay between emotion and cognition in politics is not well understood. Only after fully understanding the interactions between emotional arousals and various cognitive processes can political participation be predicted. When it comes to the impact of discrete emotions on political participation, the findings are usually centered on negative emotions (mainly anger and anxiety). Further, studies have found that negative emotions have stronger effects than positive emotions on participation (Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2008, 2011; Weber, 2013). When looking into the mechanisms through which different positive emotions could result in political engagement, the dynamics and size of the effects are far from uniform.

Feelings of enthusiasm, especially toward a preferred party or candidate, are thought to mobilize individuals as enthusiasm is closely tied to the disposition system and facilitates an approach tendency, reinforcing party loyalties and prior preferences (Marcus et al., 2000). Logically, enthusiasts of a certain political cause, actor, or party may build an affective attachment to their party or candidate, which in turn increases mental proximity to and involvement in politics (Sandvoss, 2012). In one experiment, participants induced to feel positive emotions made faster decisions and spent less time going back over materials they had already considered compared to those induced to feel negative emotions (Isen & Means, 1983). Following the logic, enthusiasm should facilitate action because it

encourages reliance on heuristic processing rather than reconsideration of one's behavioral strategy (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Marcus et al., 2000). Grounded on AIT, for instance, some have found that enthusiasm boosts political interest and intentions to vote or volunteer in campaigns more than anxiety or anger does (Brader, 2005, 2006b). The positive behavioral implications of positive emotions have been supported by other studies as well. Frijda et al. (1989) demonstrate that enthusiasm scores high on the action tendency dimension, meaning that people experiencing enthusiasm are likely to take actions regarding their goals. Regarding the action tendency of hope, Just and colleagues (2007) suggest that if individuals feel hopeful about a candidate, they adjust their information search strategy to strengthen their positive appraisal of the candidate and the increased congruency plays a role in motivating people to cast their ballots. Cognitive scholars also generally agree that positive emotions like enthusiasm have broad motivational power and trigger approach tendencies (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Shiota, 2003).

The findings do not always support this idea, however. Cho (2013) finds that feeling enthusiasm toward a favored candidate does not increase the frequency of discussion, participation, or efficacy. Weber (2013) also concludes that enthusiasm was unrelated to interest in politics and that it decreased participation in politics, discussion about politics, and efficacy.

Groenendyk and Banks (2014) try to reconcile the different results by proposing the emotional rescue model. They demonstrate that both enthusiasm and anger mediate the relationship between party identification and political participation. They suggest that strong partisans are more likely to respond to political stimuli with enthusiasm and anger than weak partisans or independents. The strength of party affiliation stimulates different levels of participation (e.g., rally, talk, and donate) via the activation of enthusiasm and

anger and reinforces party-oriented behaviors, such as collective partisan thinking and other forms of participation. In the sense, different findings on the effects of positive emotions on political participation may be due to the interaction effect of the strength of partisanship in a way that strong partisans tend to react more strongly under positive emotions than others. However, the effect of partisanship strength is only applicable to two emotions, enthusiasm and anger, which are the emotions of high arousal (Izard, 1992; Russell, 1980), and one of them (i.e., enthusiasm) is treated only in regard to its positive valence using the dimensional approach (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014). The current project does not consider the interaction effect of individuals' partisanship strength, but includes it as one of the control variables, since it examines not only enthusiasm but also low arousal, complex emotions like pride and hope.

Although some prior work has been done, our understanding of how different positive emotions lead to political participation seems far from complete. The accumulated empirical findings regarding enthusiasm are not clear-cut. Moreover, there is almost no empirical data showing the effects of hope and pride on political participation. This leaves a huge gap in the current political literature on the relationship between emotion and participation.

Theories like affective intelligence (Marcus et al., 2000) suggest that enthusiastic, proud, and/or hopeful individuals are inclined to exhibit approach tendencies to political objects. It is not yet clear, however, whether enthusiasm, pride, and hope will have different effects on participation. Based on appraisal theories and related findings on appraisal components of discrete positive emotions, enthusiasm has been found to be more action-oriented than hope or pride, and hope has been documented as a goal-oriented emotion which helps people to seek out the pathways to reach goals (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). Thus, it is possible that enthusiasm has a larger effect

on participation than pride or hope and that hope is more mobilizing pride. As for the effects of positive emotions on participation, I am interested in identifying differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on political participation. Thus, I ask a research question about the direct effects of three emotions on political participation, and propose the following hypothesis:

H4: Individuals experiencing discrete positive emotions – (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) pride - are more likely to participate in politics than those who are not.

RQ3: Are there differences among enthusiasm, hope, and pride in how they influence political participation?

Researchers connecting emotions to political participation have mentioned that information search, spurred by emotional experiences, may influence political participation (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Lodge & Taber, 2005; Marcus et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2009b, 2011). As of yet, however, they have not tested how different information seeking behaviors mediate the relations between positive emotions and participation. The amount (more or less) and direction (attitude-confirming or non-confirming) of information seeking can influence participation. Selectivity literature, for instance, confirms that selective exposure to attitude-confirming information increases political participation whereas non-directional information seeking behaviors may reduce the level of participation (e.g., Stroud, 2011).

Adding to this literature, this dissertation analyzes the indirect effects of discrete positive emotions on political participation mediated by information seeking. As the mediation process from positive emotions to information processing to participation has not been studied and has little theoretical grounding, I raise the following research question:

RQ4: Do different patterns of information seeking in terms of (a) amount and (b) direction mediate the relationship between the three positive emotions (enthusiasm, pride, and hope) and political participation?

EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION PROCESSING AND PARTICIPATION

Discrete Negative Emotions: Anger, Anxiety, and Disgust

Unlike the scarcity of past literature on discrete positive emotions in politics, a substantial amount of research exists about the role of discrete negative emotions in political information seeking and processing (e.g., Johnston et al., 2015; MacKuen at al., 2010; Weber, 2013). As mentioned, the negativity bias in political emotion studies has been prevalent in the past few decades as scholars have focused on discrete negative emotions such as anger and anxiety, but not as much as on positive emotions. Yet there is still a need to examine negative emotions in politics in terms of their consequences and effects. The findings of the studies which looked into the relationship between discrete negative emotion and information seeking are abundant in quantity but are far from uniform in terms of what they found (e.g., Nabi, 1999; Valentino et al., 2009b). Following from the affective intelligence and expectancy violation theories by Marcus et al. (2000) and Johnston et al. (2015), I examine three discrete negative emotions, which are anger, anxiety, and disgust. In this section, I will review the research findings on these three negative emotions in terms of their effects, especially in relation to information seeking and participation behaviors in politics.

Anger, Anxiety, and Information Seeking

Anger and anxiety have different roles in politics. Along the lines of research on affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2000) and the cognitive functional model (Nabi, 2002), a wide range of research has focused on the impact of negative emotions like

anger and anxiety, suggesting that they have distinct influences on information processing (Civettini & Redlawsk, 2009; Feldman & Huddy, 2005; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007). Anger and anxiety may both be brought up from appraisals of an unpleasant incident; however, anger differs from anxiety in that it is associated with a sense of certainty and familiarity about how a situation will unfold, whereas anxiety is closely associated with uncertainty and unfamiliarity (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). The differences may be attributable to variation of feelings of certainty or sense of control that individuals experience under different affective states and the feelings of certainty likely linger and carry over to influence subsequent information processing (Isbell, Ottati, & Burns, 2006; Storbeck & Clore, 2007).

The dynamics between anxiety and information processing have been studied extensively. The novelty of information can induce a sense of threat and anxiety, and subsequently spur respondents to be more engaged in rational decision-making processes since prior habits cannot give any cues about how to deal with the information. Moreover, the uncertainty of new situations yields emotions like anxiety and fear under which people will be more careful in information processing and political learning can be by-product from the processes (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al, 2000; Nabi, 2002; Nabi, 2003). In terms of the quantity of information search, scholars found that anxiety promotes information seeking (Brader, 2005, 2006; Redlawsk et al., 2007; Valentino et al. 2008). When it comes to the quality of information processing, even when the total time of information search remains same, anxiety might increase in-depth search and boost learning (Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, & White, 2006; Valentino et al., 2008). However, Civettini and Redlawsk (2009) found no evidence of anxiety enhancing information recall better than other emotions.

Anger is also a frequently studied emotion in politics. Evidence shows that anger has somewhat different effects on information seeking behavior (e.g., Nabi, 2002; MacKuen et al., 2010). Anger can lead people to be unresponsive or unsusceptible to new or counter-attitudinal political information (Groenendyk, 2011). In terms of the quantity of information seeking, Valentino et al. (2008) found that anger decreases the time spent on information search. More specifically, Redlawsk et al. (2007) showed that inconsistency between an individual's position and a preferred candidate's position evoked anger and this reduced people's motivation to search for the candidate-related information. Also, MacKuen et al. (2010) revealed that anger reduces the amount of new information sought and increases the likelihood of committing to preconceived notions and positions. Overall, political scholars agree with the notion that anxiety promotes deliberation through increased attention to new information and extended search whereas anger may cast people away from the kind of deliberation democracy might require (Groenendyk, 2011; Marcus et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al, 2008).

The majority of research findings about the role of discrete negative emotions in political information seeking aligns well, although not perfectly, with one another, thus based on the review of literature, I propose the following research question and hypotheses after controlling for external variables such as partisanship.

H5a: People experiencing anxiety will seek out more information in term of number of articles and reading time than those who are not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group).

H5b: People experiencing anger will seek out less information in terms of number of articles and reading time than those who are not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group).

People may choose certain types of information based on their affective states (Lodge & Taber, 2005). As briefly discussed, Jonas and his colleagues find that people try to manage or regulate their mood by choosing attitude-supporting or disconfirming information (Jonas et al., 2006). They proposed that the mood regulation function of information selectivity might be inherent in cognitive dissonance reduction processes in which people try to manage their mental discomfort by selecting the information they are exposed to, since the affective quality of information, either consonant or dissonant, has the ability to influence mood (Jonas et al., 2006). Taber and Lodge (2006) also suggested people experiencing negative emotions are more likely to have confirmation biases and choose attitude-consonant information whereas people with positive affective states are more willing to check out the attitude-dissonant information. Studying the impact of conflict and agony frames of news leads, Zillmann and colleagues show that conflict and agony frames, which may evoke anger and/or anxiety, significantly enhanced the likelihood of selective exposure to pro-attitudinal articles (Zillmann, Lei, Knobloch, & Callison, 2004).

Speaking of the finding on discrete negative emotions and information selectivity, AIT suggests that anxiety promotes exposure to counter-attitudinal information via the surveillance route whereas anger enhances exposure to pro-attitudinal information via the dispositional system (Marcus et al., 2000). Evidence backs this theoretical expectation. For instance, MacKuen et al. (2010) revealed that anger (i.e., aversion) decreases the likelihood of searching counter-attitudinal information (i.e., number of pages viewed and future intent) while anxiety has a substantial effect on people's disconfirming information search and willingness to compromise their own views on certain topics. Weeks (2015) recently examined the effects of anger and anxiety on partisan or motivated information processing. Even though Weeks (2015) did not directly measure the amount or direction of information

search, he found out that anger promoted partisan way of information processing while anxiety helped people process information in a more balanced way.

Despite a vast amount of research on selective exposure and the role of emotions in political judgment (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2013; Wojcieszak et al., 2016), the connection between negative emotions and information selectivity is still not clear. It may involve a lot of possible variables, such as information utility, candidate evaluations, or group cues (e.g., Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Ladd & Lenz, 2011). For instance, Valentino and his colleagues (2009a) looked into information utility as a moderator of selective exposure under different emotional states and found that unless people regard incongruent information as useful to cope with a possible threat, anxiety increases the selective exposure. The finding may not actually dispel AIT by Marcus and colleagues (2000), but suggests that information utility may counteract of the effect of anxiety on selective information seeking. Based on the current literature on emotion and selective exposure, I present the following hypotheses and RQ:

H6a: People experiencing anxiety will seek out more counter-attitudinal information than those experiencing anger or no emotion (i.e., control group).

H6b: People experiencing anger will seek out more pro-attitudinal information than those experiencing anxiety or no-emotion (i.e., control group).

While H6a and H6b hypothesize that anxiety leads to balanced information search and that anger leads to unbalanced information search (i.e., selective exposure), we do not know much about their differing effects on selective avoidance, where people seek out reduced amount of information that are disconfirming or counter-attitudinal. Thus, I ask the following research question:

RQ5: How do anger and anxiety differ from each other in affecting people's information seeking behavior in terms of direction (i.e., selective avoidance)?

Anger, Anxiety, and Political Participation

With few exceptions, scholars have found that negative emotions have a greater impact on people's participatory behaviors than positive emotions (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2009b, 2011; Weber, 2013). However, when it comes to comparing the levels of action tendency across discrete negative emotions like anger and anxiety, the current literature presents a mixed picture. According to the cognitive functional model (Nabi, 2002), anger promotes action by triggering the approach tendency whereas fear or anxiety activates the avoidance tendency. However, AIT suggests that both anxiety and anger can spur political participation by tapping into different neurophysiological routes. Anxiety can be mobilizing through the activation of surveillance system as people perceive unfamiliar threats and seek out alternative ways to achieve their goal, while anger can facilitate action by activating heuristics and dispositional traits (Marcus et al., 1993, 2000).

Supporting the rationale of AIT, Brader (2005, 2006b), in his experimental analysis, found the mobilizing effect of anxiety, but to a much lesser degree than Marcus and colleagues (2000) suggested. Even though anxiety-evoking ads had a positive impact on intended participation, it was not as much as enthusiasm-evoking ads did. In the study, people who were exposed to the anxiety-eliciting ads showed a willingness to work for the campaign and a belief in the importance of voting.

Emotion scholars generally agree that anger has a more consistent and powerful impact on a range of participatory behaviors than anxiety does (e.g., Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013). For example, Valentino et al. (2011) used multiple methods to distinguish between the effects of anger and anxiety on political participation. Using cross-sectional data, they found anger significantly and consistently triggers participation whereas anxiety affects participatory behaviors inconsistently. Specifically, anxiety carried positive effects on less costly forms of participation, such as talking to others, displaying a bumper sticker,

or wearing a campaign button, but sometimes showed demobilizing effects on other costly forms of participatory behaviors, such as donating money, attending rallies/protests, or volunteering for a campaign (Valentino et al., 2011). Interestingly, they found the interaction effect between resources people possess and feelings of anger (not anxiety) on the level of increased participatory behaviors.

In addition, Valentino and colleagues (2009b) and Weber (2013) also revealed that the experience of anger helps people build participatory habits by tapping into a sense of political interest and efficacy. Anger can make people politically active via enhanced perceptions of self-control (Weber, 2013), and participation, in turn, leads to increased levels of interest and efficacy (Valentino et al., 2009b). Last but not least, examining the relationship between U.S. government monitoring of citizens' legal activities and individuals' political engagement, Best and Krueger (2011) demonstrated that while anger is associated with increased political activity, anxiety is negatively associated with participation.

However, in a recent experimental study, Lu and Myrick (2016) revealed that anger led to cheap participation intent, but not to costly intentions, whereas anxiety had a marginally significant impact on costly participation (e.g., donation, volunteering) but not on cheap participation intent (e.g., sharing/talking with others).

In sum, anxiety and anger seem to have divergent effects on political participation. Groenendyk (2011) suggested that the differing effects of anxiety can be explained by the use of different methodologies and measurements. For instance, Brader (2006b) and Valentino et al. (2008, 2011) manipulated emotions like anxiety through an experiment, while Marcus et al. (2000) relied on survey data. In terms of measurement, while Brader (2005, 2006b) directly induced emotions using campaign ads, Marcus et al. (2000) and MacKuen et al. (2010) operationalized anxiety by combining measures of anxiety and

anger. Speaking of its consequences, anxiety causes divergent effects on different levels of participatory behaviors. For example, anxiety is shown to enhance cognitive attentiveness (Brader, 2005, 2006b; Hutchings et al., 2006; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Redlawsk et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2008, 2009a), while it also discourages costly behaviors due to its risk aversion tendency (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001).

Based on the review of literature, I propose the following hypotheses and a research question regarding anger, anxiety, and participation:

H7a: Anxiety will have a smaller impact on political engagement than anger, affecting only cheap forms of political participation intent.

H7b: Anger will have a greater impact on political engagement than anxiety, affecting both cheap and costly forms of political participation intent.

Here, drawing on past literature on political participation (Lu & Myrick, 2016; Valentino et al., 2011; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), I look into five different types of costly activities (i.e., voting, attending a rally, volunteering for a campaign, donating money, and contacting a candidate or campaign) and three different kinds of cheap activities (i.e., wearing a campaign button, displaying a bumper sticker, and putting up a yard sign). While H7a and H7b are proposed to find out the differential effects between anxiety and anger on either costly or cheap forms of political activities, RQ6 asks if there is any differing effect between the two emotions on participation intentions regardless of the perceived cost of political activities, such as general participation intention. Thus, RQ6 is posed as follows:

RQ6: How do anger and anxiety differ from each other in affecting people's participation intent?

Researchers often examined the mediating role of emotions while making sense of the relationship between information seeking behaviors and political participation (e.g., Lu & Myrick, 2016; Wojcieszak et al., 2016). However, the way in which different information seeking patterns mediate the relationships between discrete negative emotions and participation are understudied. Based on the selective exposure literature, it can be assumed that individuals' information search, which is affected by negative emotional experiences, in turn, influences political activities (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Stroud, 2011; Taber & Lodge, 2005; Valentino et al., 2009a). Contributing to the literature, the dissertation examines the indirect effects of discrete negative emotions on political participation mediated by distinct information seeking pattern. Thus, I raise the following research question:

RQ7: Do different patterns of information seeking in terms of the (a) amount and (b) direction mediate the relationship between the discrete negative emotions (anger, anxiety) and political participation?

Unexplored Emotion: Disgust and its Impact on Information Seeking and Participation

Besides anger and anxiety, the current study also includes a less studied emotion on the negative side: disgust. Disgust is one of the most basic emotions people experience in their daily lives even without conscious appraisal processes, and is closely related to survival and adaptation (Izard, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Disgust is an easily experienced emotion in political contexts like political advertising, elections, and other campaigns (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 2007).   However, there is a very limited amount of literature on the effect of disgust on information processing and political participation (Olatunji & Sawchuk,

2005). Considering the pervasiveness of disgust experience, the lack of academic inquiry is surprising, thus calls for attention.

Disgust has rarely been studied in political contexts and is frequently confounded with anger or fear (DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 2007). It is empirically difficult to disentangle disgust from the others as they correlate and co-occur with one another (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Jamali, & Shahbaztabar, 2017). However, appraisal theorists have argued that disgust is distinct from other negative emotions like anger in terms of their appraisals (e.g., Lazarus, 1991). Briefly discussing the differences, disgust is different from anger as it promotes an avoidance tendency whereas anger evokes an approach tendency (Lazarus, 1991; Nabi, 2002). Anxiety also motivates flight and avoid, but disgust, unlike anxiety, attracts attention and leads to further elaboration of an offending object (Woolf, 2007). More specifically, disgust is found to be a strong motivator of avoidance behavior, increasing physical activity and information seeking (Woolf, 2007). Englis (1990) also argued that disgust has a lingering effect and is more memorable than other negative emotions. In this sense, disgust is considered to be effective in a persuasive context like health promotion (DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 2007).

Specifically, the category of moral disgust seems highly applicable to political studies, as it is usually the case where people feel morally, not physically, disgusted by politics or politicians. Scholars argue that the experience of moral disgust not only motivates behavior but sets social norms of rightness and wrongness (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014; Looy, 2004). Emotional reactions like disgust can be the best predictors of people's moral evaluations (Haidt & Hersch, 2001). For instance, when people feel disgusted with tobacco companies or other commercial industries like pharmaceutics, weaponry, or oil drilling, they usually think it is immoral to do what they do, such as killing people or harming human health, animals, or nature.

In the political context, people also experience disgust often as finding out about political leaders' wrongdoings such as bribery, sexual misconduct, or lobbying. In the sense, when people feel morally disgusted toward politicians, partisan bickering, or politics in general, they are motivated to act to stop, reject, or avoid the disgust-evoking object (DeBell, 2016). Particularly, DeBell (2016) found that when politics elicits anger and it continues, the constant vitriol can turn into disgust, which, in turn, causes an avoidance of politics or rejection of the entire system in general. In the sense, it can be assumed that if people constantly experience disgust or feel highly disgusted by politicians or politics in general, people can avoid political activities such as voting or following news on the media in general.

Looking into the physiology of feeling negative emotions like disgust can be another way to predict the effect of disgust on information seeking or participatory behaviors. It can be assumed that the increased physiological reactions from experiences of disgust can be a predictor of increased physical activity. For instance, Gruszczynski, Balzer, Jacobs, Smith, and Hibbing (2013) showed that individuals' high-physiological arousal tendency correlates with political participation, using electrodermal activities. Specifically, they demonstrated that increased physiological measures of arousal and attention significantly and positively affected political participation (Gruszczynski, Balzer, Jacobs, Smith, & Hibbing, 2013). Their finding alludes to the possibility that negative emotions like disgust, especially considering the fact that disgust is more closely associated to physiological reactions than other complex emotions like shame or guilt, have an impact on people's physical activities (Lazarus, 1991).

Due to the lack of literature on disgust in the political realm, it is hard to predict the impact of disgust on information seeking and participation. Low intensity experiences of disgust may lead to an increased action tendency and arouse interest (Englis, 1990; Woolf,

2007), while high intensity experiences of disgust may deter people from taking any action, leading people to avoid politics in general (DeBell, 2016). In general, political scholars agree that disgust is an emotion with an aversion and avoidance tendency (DeBell, 2016, Marcus et al., 2000). Based on this literature, I propose the following non-directional hypotheses and RQs:

H8a: Individuals experiencing disgust will seek out a different amount of information compared to those not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group).

H8b: Individuals experiencing disgust will differ in their intentions to participate in politics compared to those not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group).

RQ8: How does disgust differ from anger or anxiety in terms of its impact on information seeking (i.e., amount, direction)?

RQ9: How does disgust differ from anger or anxiety in terms of its impact on political participation (i.e., intention)?

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I went over the current literature on the effect of discrete emotions on people's information search and participation behaviors. Overall, the current state of the literature on political emotions has very limited ability to specify how discrete positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) affect information processing and political participation. Although a few theories predict how different emotions (e.g., anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm) lead to distinctive cognitive processes, such as affective intelligence theory and expectancy violation theory, they only partially explain how discrete positive emotions could affect information processing and are vulnerable to alternative explanations.

Acknowledging a noticeable gap in our understanding of the discrete emotional effects on information processing and participation, only general predictions about the effects of discrete positive emotions have been made. To find out more about the differential effects of discrete positive emotions, I proposed a set of research questions on the relationships among discrete positive emotions, information search, and participation intention in politics. Overall, hope, pride, and enthusiasm may influence information seeking behaviors, and they may have a positive impact on political activities depending on the valence and amount of information people are receiving.

In contrast to positive emotions, there has been a significant amount of research looking at the effects of discrete negative emotions on information seeking and participation. Theories of affective intelligence and expectancy violation predict the different pathways from discrete negative emotions to information search and to participation. However, the current state of literature is far from reaching a consensus about how negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, or disgust) affect information search and participation intentions. Thus, I proposed research questions to find out their differential effects on information search in terms of direction (e.g., pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal) and political activities in terms of cost (i.e., cheap v. costly activities).

To answer the research questions and hypotheses proposed in the chapter, I designed and executed an online experiment, as detailed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Method

To study how different enthusiasm, hope, and pride are in terms of appraisal components, I conducted an online survey. To investigate (a) whether discrete positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, and pride) and negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and disgust) have differential effects on (a) information seeking behaviors and (b) participation intentions, I conducted an online experiment. These studies are outlined below, each with a discussion of how the study addresses the research questions and hypotheses posed earlier.

APPRAISAL DETERMINANTS OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS: STUDY 1 (SURVEY)

First, research has examined whether emotional experiences – enthusiasm, hope, and pride – can be explained by certain appraisal determinants, such as anticipated effort, valence, and clarity. An online survey was administered to identify different cognitive appraisal determinants for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Drawing from appraisal theories, different appraisal components were identified and selected to best measure each emotion. As appraisal theorists lack a general consensus on how many and which set of appraisal determinants best represent enthusiasm, hope, and pride, the purpose of the analysis is exploratory rather than confirmatory. I relied on previous analyses of the cognitive determinants of discrete positive emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Shiota, 2003; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Frijda et al. (1989) and Shiota (2003) studied enthusiasm, which has been nearly missed in the cognitive psychology literature, and helped to determine the dimensions (e.g., resource acquisition) of the understudied emotion. They shed light on the potential dimensions of enthusiasm by suggesting its theoretical foundation. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) and Tong (2007) studied a wide range of emotions (e.g., joy, awe, challenge, romantic love, serenity) including hope

and pride, measuring the emotions using different sets of cognitive dimensions. Tong's (2007) work is particularly noteworthy because it compares and contrasts the different measures of positive emotions developed by his predecessors using discriminant analyses. As the present study only examines three emotions, enthusiasm, hope, and pride, instead of using all the dimensions used by Tong (2007) and others, I only include the most relevant and discriminant dimensions predicting the three in order to create a parsimonious model which explains the three positive emotions. This study advances Tong's (2007) work on positive emotions since not only it includes enthusiasm in the study, but also identifies and tests additional appraisal dimensions (e.g., action tendency, resource acquisition) to differentiate the three emotions. Also, most importantly, this study is the first attempt at studying the different appraisal dimensions of the three emotions in the political context. The proposed model is shown in Figure 1.

No political research to date has directly examined appraisal constructs of political emotional experiences. I extend upon scholarship on political psychology (MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011) as well as the studies of positive discrete emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer, 1982; Shiota, 2003) to design this study.

Participants

One hundred sixty-nine participants were recruited considering the fact that at least five cases are required to estimate one parameter in the model (Bentler, 1989; Bentler & Chou, 1987, also see Figure 1), and the proposed model has 30 parameters to be estimated. All of the participants in this study were recruited using the communication research system of a large Southwestern university and they received credit counted toward their classes for their participation. Participants ranged in age from 18- to 25-years-old ($M = 20.5$, $SD = 1.24$). Approximately 50.9% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 5.9%

as African American or Black, 22.9% as Hispanic or Latino, 15.3% as Asian American, 3.5% as multiracial, and 1.2% identified as other races or ethnicities. About 78.2% of the participants identified as women and 21.2% as men. In total, 61.2% of the sample had completed at least high school and 11.8% finished 2-year college. When it comes to political ideology, approximately 62.9% of the sample identified as liberal, 32.4% as conservative, and 4.1% identified as independent.

Figure 1. The proposed model of confirmatory factor analysis of positive emotions and their appraisal components

Procedure

After agreeing to participate in the study, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three emotion-inducing conditions in which they were asked to recall and describe in

writing personal experiences of one positive emotion (i.e., enthusiasm, hope, or pride). Different subjects were asked to perform this task in such a way that equal numbers of responses were obtained for each of the three emotional states. To induce different emotions, I relied on the recall method of emotional experience (e.g., imagining or reliving concrete situations in which people have felt a certain emotion strongly) which has been used by many emotion scholars from cognitive psychology and political science (e.g., Bower 1981; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007; Valentino et al., 2008, 2011).

The recall method was used for several reasons. First, the primary benefit of the recall instruction method is that it is one of the best and well-received practices to isolate discrete emotions and induce each of them independently. Considering the tendency of co-occurrence among the positive emotions found in the literature (Barrett et al., 2001, Tong & Jia, 2017), certain emotional stimuli like music, video clips, or news articles are likely to induce unintended emotions across subjects. A key reason for this is that emotional responses depend not only on the features of such stimuli, but also on how individuals evaluate the stimuli in relation to their past experiences or situations (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). For example, a hope-inducing video clip may simultaneously elicit joy in some people, enthusiasm in others, and a mix of both emotions in still others. Second, this technique can reliably generate the specific emotional response of interest across subjects by prompting them to focus explicitly on a certain subject, person, or situation with or in which they experienced the particular emotion strongly, and can provide consistent results compared to other emotion-inducing methods (Tong, 2007).

Specifically, the following instruction was given: "Please recall and describe a time when you felt (enthusiasm/hope/pride) during the 2016 presidential campaign. Examples of things that have made some people feel (enthusiastic/hopeful/proud) are statements and

speeches given by the candidates during party conventions or debates. Recall as many details of the incident as you can. Try and remember as vividly as you can what this (enthusiasm/hope/pride) situation was like. When you have this memory clearly in mind, answer these questions. First, describe this (enthusiasm/hope/pride) experience. Second, what happened in this situation to make you feel (enthusiasm/hope/pride)? Third, what did it feel like to be feeling (enthusiasm/hope/pride)? Describe it as if you are describing to a person who has never felt (enthusiasm/hope/pride) so that the person will know what it feels like. Please take a few minutes to write down your answer."

After each description, participants filled out a questionnaire that assessed their cognitive appraisals and perceptions of that specific experience. The participants were asked to rate each appraisal item, using the recalled episode as the reference, on a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 (Definitely yes) to 5 (Definitely not). Also, they were told that if any item was not applicable to the recalled episode in question, they should indicate 0 signifying 'not relevant.' For instance, after describing an emotional episode, they were asked questions like "how pleasant was this situation?" and "did you think that the circumstances would get better?" The appraisal items asked in the three emotion conditions were selected following the rationale explained below. Then the participants answered questions on demographics and political orientations.

Selection of Appraisal Components

Every positive emotion has a set of core appraisal components that differentiate it from other emotions (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1982). Instead of using all the cognitive appraisal components identified in the past research on discrete positive emotions, I considered each of the three emotions individually and only retained appraisal components that were found to be highly relevant to hope, pride, and/or enthusiasm based on the

76

findings of appraisal literature and other related works (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Shiota, 2003; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Snyder, 2000).

I trimmed down the cognitive appraisal components for the three emotions for the following reasons: First, appraisal theorists propose varying sets of appraisal components and not every appraisal component is relevant to or works well to differentiate enthusiasm, hope, and pride (see, for example, Frijda et al., 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For instance, Tong (2007) identified 17 dimensions to differentiate 14 positive emotions but concluded that some dimensions should only be relevant to one, or maybe two, emotions. Past studies shed light on the fact that not every appraisal component is necessary or relevant to measure emotional experiences, thus I only draw on the most relevant and reliable appraisal components from the past studies. Second, including too many appraisal components would make the analyses and interpretation unwieldy and require an unattainable sample size for the study. Lastly, since the purpose of the analyses was to confirm the discriminatory power of previously explored or identified appraisal components, I selectively chose the most reliable and relevant appraisal components which best explained or classified hope, pride, and enthusiasm. For enthusiasm, there is very limited research on its appraisal components (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), thus, I explored and included new appraisal components (i.e., resource acquisition) based on the theoretical literature and developed a set of cognitive items to measure the cognitive patterns of experiencing enthusiasm.

Given that I aimed to document cognitive patterns of enthusiasm, hope, and pride, and to uncover the appraisal variables that strongly differentiate them, I opted for ten appraisal dimensions which were meant to include the important components studied previously (see Table 1) and hypothesized that the three emotions would be indicated by different sets of appraisal dimensions (see Figure 1 and Table 2). The ten appraisal

dimensions include the following: Pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, agency (self/others/circumstances), self-regard, expected change, mastery, action tendency, social appropriateness, and resource acquisition. The conceptualization of each of the ten appraisal dimensions follows below. In terms of making up each appraisal dimension (see Table 1), I followed the groupings of cognitive appraisal items for each appraisal dimension by Tong (2007) and Smith and Ellsworth (1985) which were shown to be reliable and accurate measures based on factor analyses. The action tendency component and its items were adapted from the work by Frijda et al. (1989) and I created the resource acquisition component based on the literature (Shiota, 2003).

A few dimensions (i.e., pleasantness, agency, certainty) are included to predict all three emotions. Importantly, pleasantness and action tendency dimensions are included to predict all three emotions since they have been theorized to be the most basic and foundational dimensions to differentiate emotions. However, this does not mean that enthusiasm, hope, and pride have all the same levels of pleasantness or action tendency. Literature has shown that pride and enthusiasm are perceived as much more pleasant than hope (e.g., Shiota, 2003), and that enthusiasm has a higher level of action tendency than hope or pride (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). Hope is a less certain emotion than pride or enthusiasm (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000). Differentiating the three in terms of these common dimensions is also needed as they are expected to show different levels of dimensions even though they share the dimensions as fundamental components.

Conceptualization of Ten Appraisal Components

Pleasantness

The component of pleasantness indicates the level of perceived pleasantness or unpleasantness of a situation where people experience emotions. Appraisal literature

generally assumes that the environment where people feel positively-valenced emotions is perceived as pleasant and positive (Fredrickson, 2001; Tong & Jia, 2017), however, not every positive emotion is equally rated on the level of pleasantness. Positive emotions like hope and challenge can be rated low or even negatively depending on the perceived uncertainty and threats in a situation (Tong, 2007).

Anticipated Effort

The dimension of anticipated effort concerns the perceived amount of effort needed to deal with either potential or present obstacles or problems in an emotional experience (Tong, 2008). The component is one of the classic appraisal dimensions adopted and studied by many appraisal scholars (Ellsworth & Smith, 1987; Tong, 2007). Positive emotions like challenge and hope can score high on the dimension as the emotional experience is believed to make people expect some obstacles along the pathway to attaining a goal.

Certainty

The certainty dimension explains how well or confidently people feel that they know what happens in a situation that leads to a certain emotional experience. If the situation is perceived as uncertain, people usually feel unsure of what is happening and cannot understand or predict what will happen in the moment. As mentioned, hope is believed to score lower than pride on the certainty dimension (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Agency (self/other/circumstance)

The agency dimension can be identified by asking what people think about the cause of an event or happening and also by asking how people feel about the controllability of the situation. If people think a situation or event can be attributed to themselves, and feel they have a control over the situation, agency is perceived to be in themselves. If people think the cause of the situation or happening is not themselves, but other people or

circumstances, and feel that they do not have control over the situation, agency is believed to be in others or the circumstances of the situation.

Self-Regard (Self-worth)

The self-regard appraisal estimates how worthy people think of themselves. Thus, if situation makes people doubt their opinions, beliefs, or goals, it could lower people's self-regard or self-worth (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). It is possible that people feeling positive emotions tend to regard themselves more highly than those experiencing negative emotions, but it is not always the case. Angry people may regard themselves more highly than happy individuals as the high level of self-regard could contribute to their emotional experience (e.g., since they regard themselves highly, they can be easily offended by others).

Change

The change component estimates the extent to which there is a high or low possibility for positive change in an environment or situation. If people expect positive change, the situation can be rated highly. The dimension is found to be correlated with the dimension of agency or certainty; the more agency or control people have in themselves, the more they perceive that positive change is possible (Tong & Jia, 2017)

Mastery

The mastery dimension concerns the perception where one sees oneself as competent in getting things done (i.e., goal attainment), and is conceptualized as whether people feel that they can achieve something in the situation they are in, or achievement could result from the situation (Tong, 2007). If the situation seems rewarding or satisfying either psychologically or physically, people feel increased mastery. Also, if the situation increases people's prospect of possible gains (e.g., job, monetary reward, or other goals), their mastery level is expected to increase.

Action Tendency

The dimension of action tendency has not been frequently adopted by appraisal theorists to predict or explain discrete positive emotions, possibly because positive emotions carry smaller effects on people's action than negative ones (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008). Nonetheless, I adapt and include it in the study based on Frijda and colleagues' (1989) research on positive emotions. Frijda et al. (1989) define action tendency as "individuals' readiness to engage in or disengage from interaction with some goal object in some particular fashion" (p. 213). The interaction can be in any form of physiological change or physical movement, such as getting excited, shouting, jumping, talking to others, partially motivated by the approach or avoidance tendencies (Frijda, 1987; Scherer, 1984).

Social Appropriateness

The appraisal of the social appropriateness component estimates how appropriate one thinks it is to feel and act on certain emotions in the context with others (Tangney, 1999; Tesser & Collins, 1988). The appraisal is also one of the least studied since it takes into account interpersonal relationships as well as social reflection one may have during an emotional experience (Tong, 2007). People may feel less proud if feeling or acting on an emotion deemed less socially desirable or acceptable, such as one celebrating his achievement while a close friend is going through hardship. The dimension is believed to predict the experience of pride in social settings (Tong, 2007).

Resource Acquisition

The last appraisal component included in the study to predict the experiences of enthusiasm, hope, and pride is resource acquisition. Due to scant literature studying enthusiasm as a discrete emotion, a new appraisal dimension was needed. Shiota (2003) suggests that the experience of enthusiasm engages the perception where people see a possibility of having an increased amount of resources to attain their goals. Thus, the

appraisal of resource acquisition may be closely related to goal achievement, positive change, mastery, and pleasantness.

Drawing from appraisal studies, the following three different sets of appraisal components are identified for each emotion for the model construction (see Figure 1 and Table 2): Enthusiasm can be predicted by high level of pleasantness, agency (self & others), high level of certainty, resource acquisition, and high level of action tendency (Frijda et al., 1989). Hope can be specified with the low or negative level of pleasantness, agency (circumstance), low level of certainty, change, low level of action tendency, and anticipated effort dimensions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). Lastly, pride may require evaluative dimensions like pleasantness (high), agency (self), certainty, mastery, social appropriateness, and positive self-regard (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007).

Table 1. The groupings of cognitive items for ten appraisal dimensions (Cognitive items under each appraisal component)

Cognitive items under each appraisal component
1. Pleasantness 　　Was this situation pleasant? 　　Was the situation enjoyable? 　　Was this situation unpleasant? 　　Did you try to think about something else that would make you feel good in the situation? 　　Was any person hurt in this situation? 　　Did you feel cheated or wronged in the situation?
2. Anticipated effort 　　Was the situation cognitively challenging to process? 　　Did you feel that this situation required you to expend effort (mental or physical)? 　　Did you feel that you needed to exert yourself to deal with this situation? 　　Did you pay close attention to this situation?

(Table 1 continued)

Did you notice any problem that had to be solved before you could get what you wanted?

Did you project that there would be obstacles between you and what you wanted?

3. Certainty

Were you certain about what made you feel that way?

Did you understand the situation well?

Were you certain about the situation?

Were you confused about what was happening in the situation?

Did you know most of what you needed to know in the situation?

Were there many things you did not know about the situation?

4. Agency (self, others, circumstances)

Self

Did you feel that you were in control of the situation?

Did you cause what happened in the situation?

Others

Did you feel that someone else was controlling the situation?

Did someone else cause what happened in the situation?

Circumstances

Did you feel that circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control caused the situation?

Did circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control cause what happened in the situation?

5. Self-Regard

Did your self-esteem decrease in the situation?

Did the situation make you see yourself in a negative way?

Did you see yourself as someone who could change for the better?

Did the situation undermine your goals/needs/desires?

Did the situation make you doubt your opinions/beliefs?

Did you actually feel or obtain something that you deserved?

6. Change

Did you feel that you could do something to change or improve the situation?

Did you expect that your circumstances would get better?

Did you feel that there was nothing much you could do to change circumstances?

Did you think that other people could do something to make the situation better?

7. Mastery

(Table 1 continued)

Did you expect to achieve something you desired (e.g., goals, needs) in the situation?

Did you actually feel or obtain something that made you feel good?

Did you fulfill duties/obligations that ought to be fulfilled?

Was the situation potentially rewarding?

Did your expectations of what you could achieve decrease?

8. Action tendency

Did you want to talk about the situation with someone else?

Did you feel like making any kind of immediate actions in the situation?

Did you want to stay close to the situation?

Did you want to stay away from the situation?

Did you feel excited, aroused, or restless?

Did you want to talk, move, jump, laugh, shout, or undertake things?

9. Social appropriateness

Was it appropriate to feel what you felt?

Was it inappropriate to feel what you felt?

Do you think people who are important to you would feel the same as you about the situation?

Do you think other people would feel the same as you about the situation?

Do you think other people think that it was appropriate for you to feel what you felt?

If you did something well in the situation (if not, select "not relevant"), was it due to other people?

10. Resource acquisition

Did your expectations of what you could achieve increase in the situation?

Did you recognize any possible increase in resources to achieve any of your goals/needs?

Did the situation make it easier for you to achieve any of your goals/needs?

Did the situation make it harder for you to achieve any of your goals/needs?

Did you feel a sense of achievement in the situation?

Table 2. The appraisal dimensions of enthusiasm, hope, and pride

Emotion	Appraisal dimension
Enthusiasm	Pleasantness
	Action tendency
	Certainty
	Agency (self & others)
	Resource acquisition
Hope	Pleasantness (negative)
	Action tendency
	Certainty (negative)
	Agency (circumstances)
	Anticipated effort
	Change
Pride	Pleasantness
	Certainty
	Agency (self & others)
	Mastery
	Positive self-regard
	Social appropriateness

The results of the first study, which aims to classify the three positive emotions using distinct sets of appraisal dimensions, would ensure that I am actually testing three discrete emotional constructs of enthusiasm, hope, and pride and their differential effects in a political context. Since the current literature has not only established that anger, anxiety, and disgust are different from one another in terms of their appraisal dimensions (Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Nabi, 1999, 2002), but also shown empirical evidence for their differential effects (Johnston et al., 2015; MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013), I did not test the appraisal composites of negative emotions.

DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS ON INFORMATION SEEKING AND PARTICIPATION: STUDY 2 (EXPERIMENT)

Testing the effect of discrete positive and negative emotions on information seeking behavior has merit in the context of appraisal studies on discrete political emotions. A lack of scholarly consensus on the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on information seeking and participation led me to pose RQ2 through RQ4 and H2 through H4 and to design an online experiment that would help answer the questions. I also posed RQ5 through RQ9 and H5 to H8 to further investigate the differential effects of discrete negative emotions on information search and participatory activities in politics (see Figure 2 for the theoretical model). The experiment was conducted between April and May in 2017.

Figure 2. The theoretical model specification of emotion, information seeking, and participation (intention)

Participants

A total of 387 subjects were recruited (the reasoning behind the sample size is explained under the plan of analysis). All the subjects in the experiment were recruited using Amazon.com's crowd sourcing website, Mechanical Turk (Mturk.com). Although participants sampled using Mturk are not representative, they are more diverse than student samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Also, the study findings using Mturk samples are found to be comparable or similar to those of the same political experiments using different samples (Bersinsky et al., 2012), even though Mturk subjects tend to exhibit a high level of attention to political surveys (Clifford & Jerit, 2012). Since the study I conducted was an experiment rather than survey requiring a representative sample, the sample using Mturk.com was acceptable. Participants who completed the experiment were compensated with $1.00 upon completing the study.

After cleaning and dropping ineligible data (e.g., not finished answers, invalid answers),[2] the size of each emotion group is as follows: (1) the control (no emotion) group had 66, (2) enthusiasm condition had 46, (3) hope condition had 58, (4) pride condition had 58, (5) anger condition had 53, (6) anxiety group had 51, and (7) disgust group had 55 of participants. Participants ranged in age from 19- to 73-years-old ($M = 37.8$, $SD = 12.3$). Approximately 71.7% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 5.6% as African American or Black, 5.6% as Hispanic or Latino, 12.4% as Asian or Asian American, 1.7% as multi-racial, and 3% identified as other races or ethnicities. About 52.4% of the

---

2 The original raw data set had 405 participants instead of 387. After removing the incomplete or unfinished answers (n = 10), 395 participants were retained. Then, I removed 8 more due to the following reasons: 1) Not following the instruction for emotion manipulation (e.g., writing down random answers to get compensation), 2) clearly indicating the emotional experience which participants were asked to describe was not applicable to their own experience (e.g., saying "honestly, I did not feel hopeful at all during the campaign"), and 3) the amount of information seeking was shown to be outliers (i.e., SD was greater than 4 from the mean). Even though this practice may theoretically have an effect on the randomization, negatively influencing the experimental protocol, the overall number of described incidents (n = 8) was very small, and the additional analyses with the dataset (n = 395) showed that the findings in the study still held up.

participants identified as men and 47.6% as women. Approximately 19.7% of the sample had completed at high school and 54.1% finished 2-year or 4-year college. Participants reported their yearly household income; approximately 30.9% earned $0 – $39,999, 44.28% earned $40,000 – $79,999, and 24.9% earned $80,000 or more. When it comes to political ideology, approximately 61.8% of the sample identified as liberal, 38.2% as conservative. Since the study aimed to collect the data on how discrete positive or negative emotions affect information seeking and participation, participants were required to have political party affiliation, being either a Democrat or Republican, in that way they can feel either positive or negative toward one of the two political parties, the Democratic or Republican Party.

Procedure

Before the emotional manipulation, participants were asked about their partisanship, political interest, political efficacy, and the candidates for whom they voted in the 2016 presidential election. Then subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six emotion conditions or to a control group. To induce an emotional state, subjects were asked to recall and write about something that caused them to experience a specific emotion. Similar manipulations have been used in past political studies (Isbell et al., 2006; Valentino et al., 2011).

Subjects were given the following emotion-manipulating task:

"Now I would like you to describe a moment during the 2016 presidential campaign when your preferred party made you feel (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ angry/ anxious/ disgusted). Examples could be statements and speeches given by a candidate during debates, party conventions, or campaigns. Please recall as many details of the incident as you can and remember as vividly as you can what this situation was like. When you have

this memory clearly in mind, answer these questions. First, describe this experience. Second, what happened in this situation to make you feel (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ angry/ anxious/ disgusted)? Third, what did it feel like to be (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ angry/ anxious/ disgusted)? Describe it as if you are describing to a person who has never felt (enthusiastic/ hopeful/ proud/ angry/ anxious/ disgusted) so that the person will know what it feels like. Take a few minutes to write down your answer. The length of your answer should be at least 400 characters to be approved for the reward."

To give a better understanding of the manipulation of each emotion, a random response from each emotional condition is presented below. In the enthusiasm condition, one said that "First I was thinking about how the Democratic Party would be the first to put in a female president. I felt enthusiastic because you were going to see history made in America by having the first female to serve as president of the country and the free world. It felt great the closer it came to election day, and I was very enthusiastic when election day finally came. The enthusiasm was something that I have not felt before on election day since President Obama became the first President of color in the United States of America."

In the hope condition, one gave the following response: "I felt hopeful at the presidential debates when Trump said he was going to change Obamacare. It gave me hope that things could get better in this country. It felt very promising to have that kind of hope that things could improve. I also felt hope because Trump would always say God Bless and reference God in his speeches and we need a leader who has a strong faith in God. That gives the best feeling of hope because we need a leader who will guide us."

In the pride condition, one respondent described the moment as follows: "I was proud of the first debate between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton. After watching some messy and contentious and downright petty debates between Republican candidates, it was nice to hear a debate focused on actual issues and not mudslinging. Whenever candidates

lower themselves to simply insulting each other instead of talking about what's concerning the country and its citizens (for whom they work for, regardless of whether they forget), it's an insult to the intelligence of the citizenry and a total lack of respect for the offices for which they are running. But that first primary debate between Bernie and Hillary exemplified what we should be seeing as we consider the candidates, and it made me feel proud not only because it set a good example, but because the intelligent debate actually made me feel more involved with the process, like they were giving me something to consider, and I felt like an important part of the process."

In the anger condition, one gave the following response: "In the first debate where Donald Trump was interrupting Hillary Clinton and saying "Wrong, wrong, wrong," I was angry with Donald and with his lack of respect toward Hillary and toward the moderator, and the spread of rumors that were not true. I did not like his attitude. I do not know why the Republican Party chose him. Also, I was angry with all the racist comments to the Mexican emigrants and all the things about the Mexican wall."

In the anxiety condition, one respondent described the moment as follows: "The moment the Republican Party selected their candidate to represent them, it just sent a chill down my spine. At the time, it felt unrealistic that Clinton would lose the election, but there was that thought she might when leaks started coming out. Trump's campaign and promises felt like the United States taking several steps backwards when it came to just freedom. The idea of making Mexico pay for a wall was just insane. Here we are in 2017 and my anxiety is just even worst when Trump is meeting with foreign leaders and him dealing with foreign policy from Syria to North Korea. He can just start a war just like that without congressional approval."

In the disgust condition, one response described the experience as follows: "I didn't follow their campaign closely, as I am not much into politics, but the first thing that I

remember at this moment is my impression about the Democrats, which was that they actually worried more about situations outside the U.S. For example, most of the world wanted the Democratic Party to win because they were more appropriate to other countries than to ours. Why would somebody care for the democracy of Kosovo? Kosovo was a Serbian country, and I don't see any reason why the Democrats would try to help Kosovo. And many other countries. I was disgusted when I noticed that they would rather work harder for foreign countries than for ours."

Lastly, in the control condition, respondents were asked to write down about something they usually do before going to bed. The prompt read as follows: "Now I would like you to describe what you usually do right before you go to bed on a normal day. Examples could be reading a book, checking social media accounts, or drinking a cup of tea. Please recall as many details of your everyday night routine. When you are ready, answer these questions. First, describe what you usually do before going to bed. Second, describe how that helps you fall asleep every night. Take a few minutes to write down your answer. The length of your answer should be at least 400 characters be approved for the reward."

For instance, one respondent in the control condition answered as follows: "Right before bed, I do the following: I check my email to make sure that everything was replied to and completed before I go to bed. I check my bank account balances and make notes of what bills/expenses are coming up for the following day. I get my outfit out and ready for the next day. I get my son's outfit out and ready for the next day. I catch up on current events using several news outlet apps on my phone. I check social media mediums such as Instagram, Snapchat, Facebook, and Twitter. I make sure that I have a meal plan for the following day. I watch an episode of a show I may have stored on my DVR. Lastly, I write down what I need to do for the week to remain productive."

Once completing the emotion manipulation procedure, subjects were asked to read news articles on a mock new website which contained 12 news articles, and then to answer questions about their intentions to engage in eight different forms of political behavior.

Manipulation Check (Emotion Measure)

A manipulation check was performed to make sure the emotion manipulation was successful. First, to test whether or not the manipulation was effective, two graduate students who are very familiar with content analysis coded the presence of intended emotions in the open-ended responses, whether present (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Coders could easily identify the dominant emotion expressed in each response with intercoder agreement exceeding 98% for all six emotion conditions. For each of six emotion conditions, all of the responses were coded by both coders. Table 3 shows a satisfactory intercoder reliability measures in terms of both percentage agreement and Krippendorff's alpha.[3] However, while the intended emotion occurred most strongly in each condition, there were a significant amount of responses that expressed more than one emotion (See Table 3). Especially, under the enthusiasm condition, more than 20% of the responses expressed hope and/or pride simultaneously. Enthusiasm was also detected under the hope and pride conditions at the ratios of 12 to 14%. Under the disgust condition, anger was detected in approximately 14% of the responses. Further, a noticeable amount of anxiety was expressed in either the anger or disgust condition.

---

3 According to Krippendorff (2004), the alpha estimate .67 and above is considered sufficient for exploratory research and the estimates in Table 3 show acceptable intercoder reliability being very close to the threshold. Also, Krippendorff's alpha takes into account the balanced frequency of each category (i.e., 0 = absent, 1 = present) in a coding unit (i.e., each emotion) when calculating the alpha (2004). In the experiment, the study was designed to ask participants to feel an intended emotion (coded as 1), and the non-presence of the intended emotion (in this case, coded as 0) negatively distorted the alpha measure. Thus, the estimated alpha (.66) does not invalidate the reliability of coding since the experiment is designed to induce an emotion in each emotional condition.

One respondent, for example, expressed both anxiety and anger in the anxiety condition, saying the following: "A moment when the Democratic Party made me feel anxious during the 2016 election was when they were talking about women's rights to have an abortion. They spoke about how an unborn child is not a person, that it has no rights and is only a fetus. The thing that made me feel anxious is the idea that a living being is not a person and has no rights. I also think there was a bit of anger that caused the anxiety. I was mad that democrats thought abortion is okay. Because I didn't have an outlet for the anger at that moment, the anger developed into anxiety. It was devastating to me that people could think that way. Being anxious felt like I was out of control. My chest felt tight and I was restless. I couldn't get my mind off of abortion. My thoughts were racing and I was helpless in that moment."

While these deviations from a perfectly independent induction are not ideal, high tendency of emotion co-occurrence is the nature of emotion manipulation when it comes to discrete emotions like enthusiasm or disgust (e.g., Forgas, 1999; Fredrickson & Branigan; 2005, Tong & Jia, 2017). Despite the noticeable rates of co-occurrence of emotions, the intended emotion occurred clearly in the respective condition across all groups.

Table 3. Intercoder reliability and descriptive statistics of emotion co-occurrence
 (Percentage)

	Enthusiasm	Hope	Pride	Anger	Anxiety	Disgust
Intercoder agreement (%)	98%	98%	100%	100%	98%	100%
Krippendorff's alpha	.66	.66	1.00	1.00	.66	1.00
Emotion co-occurrence	23.9%	20.7%	12.1%	13.2%	13.7%	14.5%

Measure of Information Search

After the emotional manipulation, participants were asked to look at a mock news website and decide which articles they want to read based on the headlines and pictures only. To examine the effects of discrete positive and negative emotions on information seeking in terms of amount and direction, I designed a news website containing twelve different news articles, including four articles obviously favoring the Republican Party, four articles obviously favoring the Democratic Party, and four other non-political articles unrelated to politics or parties (e.g., weather, technology, or economy). Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the news website designed for the study. The display and order of 12 news articles on the mock news page was randomized for every view and participants could only see the photos and title leads of news articles before they clicked on any articles. Descriptive statistics on participants' news reading time and direction can be found in Chapter 6 when discussing findings.[4]

---

4 Descriptive statistics about participants' news reading time and direction are presented in the later part of the dissertation. For positive emotion groups, Table 8 shows the descriptive data of news reading time (i.e., median, IQR) across three positive emotion and control groups; Table 10 shows the means and SEs of the number of articles read by participants across the groups; Table 12 presents the means and SEs of pre-attitudinal reading time across the groups. For negative emotion groups, Table 18 shows the descriptive data of news reading time (i.e., median, IQR) across three negative emotion and control groups; Table 20 shows the means and SEs of the number of articles read by participants across the groups; Lastly, Table 22 presents the means and SEs of pre-attitudinal reading time across the groups.

Figure 3. News website: Displaying 12 confirming, challenging, and miscellaneous
stories

Rather than relying on self-reported news consumption or intention to seek information, the experiment simulates an information seeking environment to monitor actual information consumption (Gadarian & Albertson, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2011). In this controlled condition, subjects could choose news stories which they find interesting (ranging from 0 up to 12 stories) and spend as much or as little time browsing the site and reading news stories, and behavioral measures were collected and recorded unobtrusively. The main advantage of this design is that the researcher does not need to make assumptions about the type or content of information that subjects read and does not have to rely on self-report data on information seeking behaviors or intentions. Valentino and colleagues (2008, 2009a) also utilized a similar type of design to test the effects of different emotions on information search in a campaign.

Pretest of News Leads and Articles

News headlines presented on the news site were selected and adapted from outlets such as *the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Washington Post,* and *Newsweek,* making sure that the valence of news headlines sounded partisan (except for the miscellaneous articles). The source of each article (e.g., *The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, USA Today*) was not shown to participants so that source recognition does not influence information-seeking behaviors. Each article (headline and content) could be considered as confirming, challenging, or balanced with respect to the participants' attitude towards the candidates. To ensure that the headlines be perceived as either confirming, challenging, or neutral to the participants' partisan leaning, I ran two pre-tests of the news headlines and articles.

The levels of perceived partisan leaning and interestingness of the news headlines and articles were tested over two online surveys using Mechanical Turk. The first test was conducted between February 24th and 25th 2017 with 112 participants. The participants ranged in age from 21 to 70-years-old ($M = 36.7$, $SD = 12.03$) and 39.3% of the participants identified as women and 60.7% as men. Approximately 57% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 3.6% as African-American or Black, 7.1% as Hispanic or Latino, 25% as Asian-American, and 7.2% identified as other races. Approximately 12.5% of the sample had completed at least high school and 58.1% finished college. More than half of them identified as liberal (53.6%), 32.1% as conservative, and 14.3% as independent. The survey asked participants how they perceived the interestingness and partisan leaning of 12 news articles and their headlines. Every participant was compensated with 70 cents for their participation.

Since not every news article and its headline yielded the expected partisan leaning (either pro-Democratic or pro-Republican) and interest levels, I conducted the second

survey in which 14 news articles and their headlines were tested. Some of the 14 news articles were edited from the first test and others were newly adopted from multiple news outlets for the test. The second test was conducted on March 20th, 2017 and had 113 participants who were recruited on Mechanical Turk again. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 69-years-old ($M = 34.2$, $SD = 11.51$) and 36.3% of the participants identified as women and 63.7% as men. Approximately 55% of the sample identified as White/Caucasian, 9.7% as African-American or Black, 6.2% as Hispanic or Latino, 25.7% as Asian-American, and 3.6% identified as other races. Approximately 9% of the sample had completed at least high school and 70% had a college degree. 58.4% of the sample identified as liberal, 26.5% as conservative, and 15% as independent. Each participant was compensated with 60 cents for their participation.

Based on the results of two pre-tests of news articles, I selected the 12 most fitting articles for the study; four pro-Democratic, four pro-Republican, and four non-political (miscellaneous) news articles (see Appendix A). The level of perceived interestingness of 12 articles was tested and moderated to be equally interesting (see Table 4 for the pretest results of 12 news articles). To minimize the impact of the use of photographs on article choice, all twelve articles had the same sized-photo next to the headlines. The appearances or colors of the photos were not too distinctive from one another, ensuring that none of them drew more or less attention from readers. Lastly, the length of 12 articles was similar (see Table 4).

Table 4. Perceived interest & partisan leaning of news articles

Categories	Title leads	Partisan leaning (SD)	Perceived interest (SD)	Number of words
Pro-Democratic articles	GOP and White House Lost Big on Health Care	5.22 (1.50)	3.03 (1.10)	228
	Democratic Party's Image More Positive Than GOP's	5.25 (1.78)	3.17 (1.28)	220
	Donations pour into help Elizabeth Warren after Senate rebuke	5.08 (1.43)	3.01 (1.20)	185
	Key Democrats target President Trump on ethics	5.10 (1.53)	3.47 (1.24)	257
Pro-Republican articles	Sanders Finally Blames Establishment Dems for Trump Victory	2.84 (1.56)	3.23 (1.16)	265
	Republicans unveil new bill to replace Obamacare	3.07 (1.63)	3.36 (1.01)	230
	Americans grew more positive toward GOP's Obamacare Replacement	2.92 (1.63)	3.02 (1.19)	230
	Pew Research: Republicans More Knowledgeable Than Democrats	2.21 (1.59)	2.88 (1.24)	180
Non-political articles	Rock 'n' roll pioneer Chuck Berry dies at 90	4.03 (.79)	2.93 (1.25)	254
	Fire near Boulder, Colorado, may be Human-Caused	4.03 (.17)	3.04 (1.11)	244
	More than 50 percent of California Still in a Drought	4.02 (1.38)	2.91 (1.05)	244
	After Short-Lived Tenure, Uber President Quits Amid Company Turmoil	4.08 (.74)	2.87 (1.11)	227

*Note:

Scale of Partisan leaning: from very much pro-Republican (1) to neutral (4), to very much pro-Democratic (7)
Scale of Perceived interest: from not interesting at all (1) to extremely interesting (5)

Information Search Measures

When it comes to information search on the mock news site, subjects were given the following instruction: "In the following, you will be directed to an online news website. Please browse through to gain an impression of the articles. Please read what you find interesting, just as you normally would. There is no assigned number of articles that you should read, and you don't have to read the articles as a whole. So, you can read as many or as few articles as you want. When you are done browsing and reading, click on the next button below, then a questionnaire will upload automatically. You will not be tested on the contents of the articles."

To make sure that participants had a chance to browse the news page, I mandated them to spend at least two minutes on the site. Participants were given unlimited time to browse and read any of 12 news stories and were able to opt out of reading if they wanted to stop. The total number and valence (either congenial or non-congenial to their partisan affiliation) of articles read as well as the time spent on each news story were recorded using a tracking program.

Dependent Variable Measures

Intent to participate

After finishing the information search task, participants were asked about their intentions to participate in different forms of political activities. Forms of political participation included eight items of cheap and costly political activities: 1) Wear a campaign button, 2) display a bumper sticker, 3) put up a yard sign, 4) attend a rally for

campaign or candidate, 5) vote for a candidate, 6) donate money to campaign, 7) volunteer for candidates' campaign, and 8) contact a candidate or campaign staffs. The measures of political participation were drawn and adapted from past political literature (e.g., Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). For costly participatory activities, based on past literature (e.g., Valentino et al., 2011; Verba et al., 1995), I measured: (1) voting in the 2018 midterm (intent), (2) volunteering for a campaign or candidate, (3) donating money, (4) attending a rally, and (5) contact a candidate or campaign staffs. For cheap forms of participation, I included the following variables: (6) wearing a campaign button, (7) display a bumper sticker, and (8) put up a yard sign. The participant's intent to perform each activity was measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 (extremely unlikely). For the descriptive statistics, see Tables 13 and 23.

Other Variable Measures

The following variables were included and measured in my analysis to check the random assignment of the experiment: Demographic information (i.e., age, gender, race/ethnicity, annual household income, education level, religious affiliation, and marital status), general interest in politics, party affiliation (Democrat or Republican), strength of partisan affiliation (strong or weak), political efficacy, and general efficacy. Based on the methodological outline discussed here, I turn to report the results of the survey in Chapter 5 and the experiment in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5. Construct of Discrete Positive Emotions: Enthusiasm, Hope, and Pride

In the cognitive psychology and emotion studies literatures, there is abundant evidence indicating that the various positive emotions people experience, such as pride, serenity, and hope, have different constructs, and thus have different effects on behaviors like information search (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). However, it comes as a surprise that there has been a void of studies on discrete positive emotions in political research. In the political realm, people experience a wide range of emotions with both positive and negative valence. Even though some studies have discussed the differential effects of negative emotions, mainly anger and anxiety, on individuals' political activities (e.g., Valentino et al., 2011), most of the political studies have treated a range of discrete positive emotions as a single emotion with positive valence (e.g., Brader, 2006b; MacKuen et al., 2010). High correlations and blurred conceptual boundaries among positive emotions in political contexts are possible reasons why these emotions are difficult to study separately (Barrett, 2006; Just et al., 2007), but a recent study in cognitive psychology alludes to another reason for a void of discrete positive emotion studies in politics. Tong and Jia (2017) recently discussed the co-occurrence of discrete positive emotions (e.g., awe, hope, joy, pride, and surprise) and their shared appraisal dimensions.   Due to the overlap of appraisal dimensions that discrete positive emotions comprise, some of them are highly likely to occur simultaneously. The high co-occurrence of discrete positive emotions makes it difficult for researchers to differentiate them from one another and even renders the study of their differential effects in politics difficult.

This study takes an exploratory step in political studies as it investigates the makeup of three discrete positive emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride. The investigation of the

constructs of discrete positive emotions is a needed step to explicate how similar or different positive emotions are to or from one another as they in turn may affect behavior. Thus, the main goal of the first study is to identify three different sets of appraisal dimensions (or determinants/ components) of three emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine the validity and reliability of the appraisal dimension measures used in the study. This is important since some of the cognitive appraisal dimension measures have not been tested before and were developed by the author based on the literature, thus calling for examination. The present analyses include reliability tests and principal components factor analyses. Second, I discuss the results of ANOVAs to look at whether levels of any appraisal dimension differ across three emotion groups. Then, most importantly, I test the three-emotion model presented in the previous chapter (Figure 1). To do so, I conduct a series of confirmatory factor analyses and examine the model fit using covariance structure modeling. This is important as it directly addresses RQ1 and H1, and the model can explain when and why people experience different positive emotions. Lastly, based on the results, I briefly discuss the importance and limitations of the first study.

PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE APPRAISAL ITEMS

Before answering the RQ1, which asks about the appraisal dimensions that best predict the three positive emotions, I test whether the cognitive items under each appraisal dimension are reliable and valid measurements of the ten proposed appraisal dimensions in Table 1 from Chapter 4. Thus, before proceeding to test the proposed model, the groupings of cognitive items under each appraisal dimension were tested using principal component analysis (PCA) for their factor loadings.

Table 5 shows the reliability measure of each appraisal dimension scale (i.e., Cronbach's alpha) and factor loadings (i.e., PCA) for each cognitive item under the appraisal dimensions. Based on the factor analyses, principal components of ten dimensions (e.g., self-regard, effort) were extracted using orthogonal rotations (i.e., varimax) to avoid overestimating the loadings. To calculate the factor loadings for each appraisal dimension, I used the component matrix before the rotation for the stricter interpretations (Pituch & Stevens, 2016). To enhance the internal consistency of the appraisal dimension measures, items with low item-total correlations (< .30) were removed (denoted with * in Table 5). Note that this procedure is generally recommended and accepted as conventional in the fields of social science (Cristobal, Flavián, & Guinaliu, 2007; De Vaus, 2002). The items with factor loading coefficients of .30 or less in absolute values (denoted with ** in Table 5) were also omitted as researchers typically consider variables with factor loadings of at least .30 as worthy of consideration in the interpretation (Bryant & Yarnold; 1995; Pituch & Stevens, 2016).

Table 5. Reliability and factor analysis of cognitive appraisal items

Cognitive items under each appraisal dimension	Loadings
1. Pleasantness (α = .86)	
Was the situation pleasant?	.871
Was the situation enjoyable?	.798
Was the situation unpleasant?	.792
Did you feel cheated or wronged in the situation?	.779
Was any person hurt (physically or emotionally) in the situation?	.654
Did you try to think about something else that would make you feel good in the situation?	.485
2. Anticipated effort (α = .74)	
Did you need to exert yourself to deal with the situation?	.781

(Table 5 continued)

Did the situation require you to expend mental/physical effort?	.776
Was the situation cognitively challenging to process?	.696
Did you notice any problem that had to be solved before you could get what you wanted?	.632
Did you project that there would be obstacles between you and what you wanted?	.579
Did you pay close attention to this situation? (*)	.318

3. Certainty (α = .75)

Did you understand the situation well?	.865
Were you certain about the situation?	.817
Did you know most of what you needed to know in the situation?	.762
Were you certain about what made you feel that way?	.690
Were you confused about what was happening in the situation?	.552
Were there many things you did not know about the situation?	.331

4. Agency (self, others, and/or circumstances)

Self (α = .76)

Did you feel that you were in control of what was happening?	.868
Did you cause what happened?	.868

Others (α = .83)

Did you feel that someone else was controlling what was happening?	.903
Did someone else cause what happened?	.903

Circumstances (α = .90)

Did you feel that circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control were controlling what was happening?	.943
Did circumstances or forces beyond anyone's control cause what happened?	.943

5. Self-Regard (α = .69)

Did the situation make you doubt your own opinions/beliefs?	.829
Did the situation make you see yourself in a negative way?	.782
Did the situation undermine your goals/needs/desires?	.702
Did your self-esteem increase in the situation?	.550
Did you see yourself as someone who could change for the better?	.453
Did you actually feel or obtain something you deserved? (*)	.420

6. Change (α = .70)

Did you expect that your circumstances would get better?	.817

(Table 5 continued)

Did you think that other people could do something to make the situation better?	.780
Did you think you could do something to change or improve the situation?	.744
Did you feel that there was nothing much you could do to change the circumstances? (*)	.327

7. Mastery (α = .77)

Was the situation potentially rewarding?	.838
Did you actually feel or obtain something that made you feel good?	.785
Did you expect to achieve something you desired (e.g., goals, needs) in the situation?	.776
Did you fulfill duties/obligations that ought to be fulfilled?	.668
Did your expectations of what you could achieve decrease? (*/**)	.068

8. Resource acquisition (α = .79)

Did the situation make it easier for you to achieve any of your goals/needs?	.822
Did you feel a sense of achievement in the situation?	.819
Did your expectations of what you could achieve increase in the situation?	.802
Did you recognize any possible increase in resources to achieve any of your goals/needs?	.727
Did the situation make it harder for you to achieve any of your goals/needs? (*/**)	.295

9. Action tendency (α = .75)

Did you want to remain close to the situation?	.760
Did you feel excited, aroused, or restless?	.729
Did you want to talk about the situation with someone else?	.674
Did you want to talk, move, jump, laugh, shout, or undertake things?	.665
Did you want to stay away from the situation?	.665
Did you feel like making any kind of immediate actions in the situation?	.513

10. Social Appropriateness (α = .76)

Do you think other people think that it was appropriate for you to feel what you felt?	.784

(Table 5 continued)

Do you think other people would feel the same as you about the situation?	.742
Do you think people who are important to you would feel the same as you about the situation?	.714
Was it appropriate to feel what you felt?	.705
Was it inappropriate to feel what you felt? (*)	.392
If you did something well in the situation (if not, select "not relevant"), was it due to other people? (*)	.347

Note: (*) denotes the items with item-total correlations less than .30, and (**) denotes the items with factor loadings less than .30. All the items with these denotations were omitted from the scale. Cronbach's alphas reported here exclude the deleted items.
The analyses in Table 5 show that the final measures of appraisal dimensions are reliable, based on the Cronbach's alpha, and yield ten distinct constructs. I removed the responses indicating "not relevant" from the analysis.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON APPRAISAL DIMENSIONS ACROSS THREE EMOTIONS

Even though it was hypothesized that the three positive emotions are predicted by different sets of appraisal dimension (H1), a series of ANOVA tests are done to see if the levels of appraisal dimension across three emotions differ. It is important to note that the argument here is not that hope, pride, and enthusiasm are different from one another on every single appraisal examined here. The primary purpose of the chapter is not to find out the discriminant power of each appraisal dimension. However, identifying more or less discernible or discriminating appraisal components for the three emotions could help to differentiate enthusiasm, hope, and pride on each appraisal examined in the study. Thus, to find out whether the three positive emotions can be differentiated on an individual appraisal dimension, a series of one-way ANOVAs across the three emotion groups were conducted, one for each dimension. The results of F tests indicate that the three emotions are not significantly different from one another on any of the dimensions ($p > .05$ for each analysis, see Table 6).

106

Table 6. Descriptive statistics (means, SEs) and results of ANOVA predicting the appraisal dimensions across three emotion groups

Appraisal dimension	Enthusiasm	Hope	Pride	F(2, 166)	Sig.
Pleasantness	2.52 (.12)	2.52 (.13)	2.55 (.11)	.307	.736
Anticipated effort	2.97 (.09)	2.90 (.11)	2.91 (.10)	.180	.836
Certainty	2.44 (.10)	2.19 (.09)	2.34 (.09)	1.785	.171
Agency (self)	3.60 (.13)	3.50 (.13)	3.51 (.16)	.143	.867
Agency (others)	2.70 (.13)	2.63 (.15)	2.28 (.13)	2.616	.076
Agency (circumstances)	2.70 (.13)	2.64 (.15)	2.28 (.13)	2.376	.096
Self-regard	2.31 (.09)	2.26 (.09)	2.27 (.09)	.070	.933
Change	2.81 (.12)	2.61 (.10)	2.75 (.11)	.821	.442
Mastery	2.45 (.11)	2.56 (.11)	2.48 (.11)	.236	.790
Resource acquisition	2.70 (.09)	2.66 (.11)	2.57 (.10)	.474	.623
Action tendency	2.49 (.10)	2.66 (.11)	2.58 (.11)	.681	.508
Social appropriateness	2.29 (.08)	2.19 (.09)	2.17 (.08)	.551	.578

Note: The items for each appraisal dimension were measured on five-point scales ranged from 1 (Definitely yes) to 5 (Definitely not).

The non-significant ANOVA results in Table 6 may be explained in terms of the high correlation and co-occurrence among hope, pride, and enthusiasm, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In term of co-occurrence, prior studies on

appraisal theories (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Tong & Jia, 2017) show that even though discrete emotions with the same positive valence co-occur, they are different. For instance, Tong and Jia (2017) examined the appraisal-positive emotion relationships and argued that as positive emotions and some appraisals correlate significantly, the emotions' overlap on relevant appraisal dimensions was highly predictive of their co-occurrence even after the pleasantness dimension was excluded. Following the same logic, hope, pride, and enthusiasm can overlap on a range of appraisals, and non-significant ANOVA results may indicate that the emotions may have co-occurred within the participants. Thus, the non-significant results of ANOVAs do not mean that the three emotions are not distinct from one another.

Also, recall that study participants were asked to recall a particular emotion-inducing event. The situations that they recalled, however, could have led them to feel several different emotions simultaneously considering the high co-occurrence in the data (see Table 3). Also, even though participants did not verbally report other emotions they had felt in the situation described, it is still possible that they had felt other emotions but did not explicitly report them. This is consistent with literature showing a general tendency of co-occurrence amongst positive emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Forgas, 1999; Tong & Jia, 2017). To the extent that this may have occurred, there appears to be no differences amongst those who were asked to recall situations that led to feeling pride, enthusiasm, or hope. Yet depending on the combinations of the emotions people experienced, there may be meaningful distinctions. The factor analysis in the next section addresses this idea.

Specifically, participants who were asked to recall a pride-evoking situation could or may have experienced enthusiasm simultaneously, reflecting the high co-occurrence and correlation between the two emotions ($r = .96, p < .001$). Subsequently, the incidents where subjects experienced more than one positive emotion were similarly rated on several

appraisal dimensions across three emotion groups, resulting in non-significant ANOVA results. Thus, regardless of the emotion condition (hope, pride, or enthusiasm), people may show similar levels of mastery (for enthusiasm, $M = 2.45$, $SE = .11$; for pride, $M = 2.48$, $SE = .11$; see Table 6) or self-agency (for hope, $M = 3.50$, $SE = .13$; for pride, $M = 3.51$, $SE = .16$). Just because they show similar levels of self-agency, mastery, certainty, and/or other appraisals, however, it cannot and should not be argued that the experience of one positive emotion is identical to that of another positive emotion. In short, the non-significant ANOVA results do not mean that the emotions are not distinct from one another.

Moreover, what is important is that not every appraisal examined here is predictive of the three emotions. Considering the tendency of high co-occurrence and correlation among the three emotions within the study participants, an alternative approach is needed to differentiate the emotions in terms of their appraisal constructs because the distinction of three emotion groups using ANOVA is no longer enough after taking into account the co-occurrence of three emotions. In the sense, to find out the unique sets of appraisal dimensions of the three emotions, I will turn to confirmatory factor analysis using the three emotions as latent variables.

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THREE-EMOTION MODEL

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to identify a set of appraisal components that can explain a significant amount of variance in enthusiasm, hope, and pride, using structural equation modeling. Mplus7 was used to conduct a CFA of the retained appraisal dimensions ($N = 169$ participants). Before conducting the CFA, I calculated the two-tailed correlations and standard deviations for all appraisal dimensions in the model (see Table 7). Overall model fit was determined using a chi-square test as well as both absolute fit and incremental fit indices. Due to problems with relying solely on the

chi-square tests, the absolute model fit was assessed using the RMSEA as well as the SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 1995, 1999). Further, incremental model fit was determined using the CFI. Acceptable fit was determined based on the recommendations by Schreiber et al. (2009) and Weston and Gore (2006) – specifically the adequate fit included CFI values greater than .90 to .95, RMSEA values less than .06 to .08, and SRMR values less than .08 to .10.

Table 7. Bivariate correlations between appraisal dimensions

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	SD
1 MAS	1												.82
2 APP	.30**	1											.65
3 REG	.51**	.35**	1										.67
4 EFF	.23**	.11	.05	1									.74
5 CER	.27**	.33**	.41**	.05	1								.69
6 A_S	.09	-.13	-.02	.08	.03	1							1.05
7 A_O	.15	.26**	.19*	.16*	.17*	-.25	1						1.06
8 A_C	-.13	.02	-.08	.05	-.22*	.14	.12	1					1.09
9 PLS	.27**	.19*	.44**	-.27*	.39**	.12	-.07	-.11	1				.91
10 RES	.48**	.20**	.49**	.18*	.30**	.18*	.11	-.02	.44**	1			.74
11 ACT	.41**	.25**	.44**	.13	.41**	.03	.22**	-.06	.40**	.49**	1		.79
12 CHG	.28**	.17*	.41**	.39**	.23**	.19*	.18*	.08	.11	.37**	.35**	1	.84

Note: Two-tailed correlations are reported with * denoting p < .05 and ** denoting p < .01. Abbreviation was used to indicate as follows: MAS; Mastery, APP; (Social)

Appropriateness, REG; Self-regard, EFF; Anticipated effort, CER; Certainty, A_S; Agency (self), A_O; Agency (other), A_C; Agency (circumstance), PLS; Pleasantness, RES; Resource acquisition, ACT; Action tendency, CHG; Change.

In order to evaluate the three-factor model with the appraisal dimensions, the three latent factors (hope, enthusiasm, and pride) were allowed to correlate with one another and each appraisal dimension was predicted by the set of cognitive items tested in the previous section (see Table 5).[5] The results of the CFA (Figure 4), however, did not yield adequate model fit indices (χ^2 = 106.42, p < .05, CFI= .864, SRMR= .079, RMSEA= .091, 90% confidence interval [.069, .114], see Figure 4). The residual variance in the agency in circumstances dimension was approximately 99 percent (p < .001), meaning that the proportion of variance explained in the dimension by hope is less than 1 percent, and hope was not significantly predicted by the agency (circumstance) dimension as theorized (p = .49). Thus, I decided to drop agency in circumstance from the model.

---

5 All cognitive items were first standardized within participants and then averaged to form their respective appraisal dimensions. The standardization of each item helps to address the possible problem of multicollinearity among the appraisal dimensions.

Figure 4. Theoretical CFA model (with agency self, other, and circumstance) of three discrete emotions with factor loadings, correlations, and residual variances

Another CFA was done with agency in self and others only. Once again, the results of the CFA with agency in self and other dimensions returned poor model fit indices (χ^2 = 79.47, $p < .05$, CFI = .897, SRMR = .072, RMSEA = .089, 90% confidence interval [.064, .115]). The model was respecified using Wald and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to obtain the best model fit. The final selection of the model was determined following the aforementioned model fit criteria as well as for better interpretability of the factors, which are hope, pride, and enthusiasm here (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Although the model modification or re-specification process may seem arbitrary, a model specification search is considered necessary, thus a common practice in social science, if the process results in an interpretable model that fits the data well (MacCallum, 1983).

The Wald test indicated that dropping two non-significant parameters, hope by action tendency (B = -.056, SE = .107, p = .605), and pride by certainty (B = .369, SE =

.348, p = .290), did not hurt the model fit as the p values associated with the chi-square difference tests were larger than .05 for all the comparisons (for hope by action tendency, $\Delta \chi^2$ = 3.290, Δdf = 1, p > .05; for pride by certainty, $\Delta \chi^2$ = 2.176, Δdf = 1, p > .05). I excluded these two non-significant parameters for two additional reasons. First, out of all hypothesized parameters in the model, the data only supported a limited set of appraisals and parameters, and the re-specification could improve the parsimony of the theorized model (MacCallum, 1983). Second, the current literature on appraisal theories does not provide definite guideline in terms of the appraisal determinants of hope and pride, thus as long as the modification makes theoretical sense, changes could be made to the original model.

There are theoretical reasons to remove the hope by action tendency parameter. First of all, hope was hypothesized to be action-oriented because scholars have assumed that all positive emotions lead to increased action tendency (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011), however, no one has empirically tested and/or confirmed the action dimension of hope as a discrete emotion in political contexts. Secondly, in a theoretical sense, hope is categorized as a cognitively-oriented emotion, which requires more complex processing and evaluations of the environment (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). The expected, but not found, positive relationship between hope and action tendency may be an indication that hope requires enhanced cognitive activities, and may lead people to be psychologically taxed, thus less action-oriented (see Frijda et al., 1989; Just et al., 2007).

When it comes to dropping the pride by certainty parameter, there are theoretical reasons to do so as well. Even though pride is positively related to certainty according to cognitive scholars (e.g., Tong, 2007), considering the specificity (e.g., high uncertainty and uncontrollability) of political events like a presidential election, it is reasonable to think that people may have felt quite uncertain about what was really going on even though they

experienced pride during events like presidential debates and primaries. Thus, I conclude that feeling pride in everyday situations may be quite different from experiencing pride in politics, and exclude the certainty dimension predicting pride in the model.

The LM test also indicated that adding two parameters, allowing enthusiasm to be predicted by change, and hope to be predicted by agency in others, improved the model fit significantly (for enthusiasm by change, $\Delta \chi^2 = 20.689$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p < .01$; for hope by agency (others), $\Delta \chi^2 = 7.484$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p < .01$). The addition of both parameters makes theoretical sense for the following reasons. First, enthusiasm has rarely been studied as a discrete emotion in political contexts so far, thus adding new appraisal dimension, change, can be desirable and necessary to confirm the appraisal construct of enthusiasm. Further, enthusiasm can be experienced when people expect a positive change to happen in the future. Support for this idea comes from the correlations between change and other appraisal dimensions (see Table 7), especially with resource acquisition ($r = .37$, $p < .01$), certainty ($r = .23$, $p < .01$), and action tendency ($r = .35$, $p < .01$). Enthusiasm can be theorized to be positively related to change dimension as enthusiastic people see a possibility of resource acquisition, are highly certain, and thus action-oriented. Secondly, when it comes to hope, the emotion is frequently debated in terms of the agency appraisal dimension (see Reading, 2004; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). I hypothesized that hopeful people feel in control of the overall situation following Tong's (2007) appraisal study, but the circumstances, in the case of political hope, can include other people or agencies like politicians, interest groups, and party leaders in the study.

Based on the specifications made to the theoretical model (Figure 4), the modified model was tested using CFA and the results yielded satisfactory model fit indices ($\chi^2 = 51.521$, $p < .05$, CFI = .960, SRMR = .049, RMSEA = .055, 90% confidence interval [.019, .084], see Figure 5 for the final estimates of all parameters).

Two parameters, hope by certainty and pride by pleasantness, did not load significantly ($p > .05$). However, based on the chi-square difference tests, I concluded that dropping the parameters did not either help the model fit or make sense theoretically, thus the parameters were retained in the model for better interpretability of variance in the variables (i.e., appraisal dimensions) and factors (three emotions). Factor loadings, correlations among three factors, and error variances are reported in the final model (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Final CFA model of three discrete emotions with factor loadings, correlations, and residual variances

To answer the RQ1, three different sets of appraisal dimensions were identified and tested for enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Enthusiasm was best predicted by pleasantness (positive), agency (self & others), certainty, change, resource acquisition, and action tendency. The result of the CFA does not perfectly, but does closely resemble what was

hypothesized from previous appraisal studies on the emotion (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989, see Table 2). When it comes to the model prediction, when enthusiasm is induced or experienced, people are likely to feel highly pleasant ($B = 1.51$, $SE = .55$, $p < .01$), engage in action ($B = .66$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$), perceive the increase in resources for their goal ($B = .71$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$), and have more agency in self ($B = 2.22$, $SE = .97$, $p < .05$) but not in others ($B = -1.56$, $SE = .71$, $p < .05$). Lastly, people feel certain ($B = .58$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$) and perceive a positive change in an enthusiasm-evoking situation ($B = .42$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$).

Hope was hypothesized to be specified with six appraisal dimensions: pleasantness (negative), agency (circumstances), certainty, change, action tendency, and anticipated effort (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Snyder, 2000; Tong, 2007). However, the result shows that only four out of the six appraisal dimensions, excluding certainty and action tendency, explain the experience of hope. I dropped the action tendency dimension for the aforementioned reasons but the certainty dimension was retained in the model; certainty is negatively, and non-significantly, related to hope. People who feel hopeful about a political event are likely to perceive a positive change ($B = .41$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$), but expect to expend their effort to reach future goals ($B = .71$, $SE = .80$, $p < .001$), and thus perceive the situation unpleasant ($B = -.67$, $SE = .11$, $p < .001$). They tend to think that other people, not themselves, are in control of the situation ($B = .28$, $SE = .10$, $p < .01$). It may seem counterintuitive that hope is negatively predicted by pleasantness. Yet because people feel uncertain and the situation seems to require their future effort, this may lead people to perceive the situation as unpleasant. This does not mean that hope is unpleasant, but means that the situation where people experience hope seems unpleasant. Although hope was hypothesized to be positively related to agency in circumstance, the result indicated that

116

the relationship between hope and the dimension (i.e., agency in circumstances) did not attain significance ($B = .06$, $SE = .10$, $p > .05$).

Lastly, pride was theorized to be explained by the following dimensions: pleasantness (positive), agency (self & others), certainty, mastery, social appropriateness, and positive self-regard (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). Only four out of six dimensions, excluding pleasantness and certainty, explained the experience of pride. As discussed previously, the certainty dimension path was excluded from the model for better model fit and parsimony, but the pleasantness dimension path was retained for better interpretability of the emotion and the dimension is theoretically fundamental to explain emotions with positive valance like pride (Frijda et al., 1989; Tong, 2007). When it comes to the experience of pride in politics, people may have less self-agency ($B = -2.15$, $SE = .98$, $p < .05$) since the emotion is usually evoked by other agents (e.g., candidate, political party, or interest group) especially during political campaigns and elections. Supporting the logic, pride was positively predicted by agency in others ($B = 1.75$, $SE = .71$, $p < .05$). Also, people in a proud emotional state were likely to perceive themselves positively ($B = .75$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$), feel a sense of mastery or achievement ($B = .61$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$), and think that they deserve (or it is socially appropriate for them) to feel proud in the situation ($B = .45$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$).

Even though the proposed theoretical model was modified based on the findings of study 1, RQ1 was answered: the different sets of appraisal dimensions predicted enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Thus, H1, which proposed that each of the three positive emotions would display a different set of appraisal dimensions, was supported by the results of the study.

117

CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

There has been some research on the cognitive appraisals of discrete positive emotions. However, cognitive scholars and appraisal theorists have mainly focused on discrete negative emotions and argued that appraisal dimensions other than valence (pleasantness) should be examined to better explain people's experience of various emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2007). The present study takes an appraisal-oriented approach to explain the experiences of enthusiasm, hope, and pride in the context of political campaigns. The results provide supporting evidence showing that the three emotions are different in terms of their appraisal profiles. Some appraisal dimensions (e.g., change, effort, self-regard) worked better than others in predicting the experience of three emotions. Considering the non-significant results of the ANOVA tests (Table 6), each appraisal dimension examined here may not be discriminant factors of the three emotions. However, the results cannot or should not be directly translated to the conclusion that the three emotions are not distinct from one another. The purpose of current study is to find out whether different appraisal constructs measure (i.e., the different sets of appraisal dimension explaining each emotion) each of the three emotions, not to prove that the three emotions can be differentiated on each appraisal dimension.

Considering the high correlations among enthusiasm, hope, and pride, especially between enthusiasm and pride ($r = .96$, $p < .001$, see Figure 5), it is very likely that participants in the study experienced more than one positive emotion in the moment they described in the study. For example, one may have felt hopeful and proud at the same time after he watched his candidate's performance during a debate. Although the survey asked subjects to describe only one of the three emotional experiences, people may have still felt the combination of different emotions and/or failed to differentiate between the different emotion experiences. Future research should expand the analysis to come up with more

118

differentiating questions, or stronger manipulations of discrete emotions to capture the idiosyncrasy of individual emotions regardless of the context where people experience emotions.

Also, even though the measure of the appraisal dimensions used in the study was examined in terms of its validity and reliability, the selection of relevant appraisal dimensions was a bit arbitrary despite being backed by literature. When it comes to the selection of different appraisal dimensions/determinants, scholars have used quite arbitrary criteria to pick the appraisal dimensions. For example, Tong (2007) combined and analyzed different sets of cognitive appraisal items and their respective appraisal dimensions (e.g., Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and concluded that 17 dimensions have more discriminant power than a 6-dimensional model. Even though including more appraisal dimensions usually leads to more variance explained in emotions and their experience, the predictive power or classification accuracy of different sets of appraisals varies depending on individual emotions. For instance, Tong's (2007) analysis of 17 appraisals explained approximately 23% of variance in hope but Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) six appraisal dimensions explained 41% of variance in hope. Likewise, the effort dimension was shown to be a significant predictor of hope but was not predictive of other emotions in the current study. Thus, future research on the appraisal-emotion relation should investigate more accurate but well-applicable sets of appraisals to study discrete positive emotions.

Lastly but importantly, although the model specification or modification process has been adopted as a common practice in applications of structural equation modeling in the social science literature (MacCallum, 1986), it should be noted that the present analysis is not free from theoretical and practical limitations in terms of the application of model re-specification. The critical issue here is that the modified model is data-driven to an

extent, not backed by prior hypotheses. As a result, the analysis is no longer confirmatory, but rather exploratory, as the final model derived from the specification practice has not been confirmed in a theoretical sense. In the sense, the results in the study and the model's goodness of fit and substantive meaning should be evaluated with caution as the model's validity and replicability are open to question. Moreover, the final model proposed here should be cross-validated before any validity can be claimed (Cliff, 1983; MacCallum, 1986; Saris et al., 2009).

Despite the limitations discussed, the current analysis is a valuable addition to political communication research and appraisal studies. It is the first attempt of which I am aware to apply the theoretical framework of appraisal theories to a political context. Even though emotions have been one of the main foci of political research, discrete positive emotions, such as hope and pride, have never been tested or studied in regard to their appraisal profiles. Most of the findings from the study support appraisal theories, including the prediction of each positive emotion by the proposed set of appraisal components; however, some of the findings shed light on the uniqueness of emotional experience in political contexts. For example, unlike the pride experienced in interpersonal settings, political pride can be experienced without feeling agency in one's self and without the assumed high-level of pleasantness in the situation. Also, the feeling of pride in a political context like a competitive election is a less certain experience than the feeling of the same emotion in an interpersonal context.

In sum, even though emotional experiences are regarded as universal across cultures and individuals (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 2007), they can have some variability in terms of the context of emotion experience. In this sense, not only does the study examine the distinct appraisal constructs of discrete positive emotions, but it also deepens our understanding of the appraisal profiles of the three emotions in the political

context by modifying and adding new dimensions, such as resource acquisition and action tendency, to explain the experience of certain emotions. Even though the final model requires further examination, the findings can guide future studies on emotions in politics and be extended to study emotion effects.

Chapter 6. Effects of Discrete Emotions on Information Seeking and Participation

Current academic discussions about emotions in the political realm have mainly focused on one notion: their effects. In modern democratic societies where active and deliberate participation in public affairs is a goal advocated by many political theorists, political scholars have been interested in finding ways to better inform, educate, and engage citizens (Brader, 2005; MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). Tapping into citizens' emotions could be a viable solution as emotions act as a fundamental drive for people to act, learn, and get involved in various political activities (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Lodge et al., 2006).

However, academic discussions about emotion effects in politics have been limited to a few discrete negative emotions, such as anger, fear, and anxiety (Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2001; Verhulst & Lizotte, 2011). Meanwhile scholars have usually treated different positive emotions as a one-dimensional emotion which has positive valence without taking into consideration various cognitive constructs of positive emotions, such as variability in action tendency, agency, certainty, and change. For instance, Marcus et al. (2000) argued that positive emotions like enthusiasm, hope, and pride motivate people to be less effortful and less accurate information processors since they may feel complacent about the situation they are in, thus do not extend their search to seek out new information or better alternatives. Brader (2006b) discussed enthusiasm as increasing people's political interest as well as participation in political activities. However, this only explains part of the complicated relationship between discrete positive emotions and people's behaviors in politics.

Importantly, the previous chapter of the dissertation showed that positive emotions in the political context (enthusiasm, hope, and pride) have different constructs and

dimensions which shed light on their differences. The examination of different sets of cognitive constructs or appraisal dimensions of discrete positive emotions lays out the theoretical guidance and foundation for scholars to study the differential effects of positive emotions in political research. Guided by the findings from the previous chapter, this chapter analyzes the linkage between discrete positive emotions and their effects in politics in terms of information seeking and political engagement. Not only that, the study also examines of the effects of three discrete negative emotions (anxiety, anger, and disgust) on information seeking and participatory behaviors to advance the literature on political psychology.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the three positive emotions are investigated regarding the way they affect individuals' information seeking behaviors. Information search was measured in terms of its amount (reading time and number of articles people read) and direction (either pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal). The results are discussed addressing the between-group differences in information search patterns. Second, the effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on a range of political activities are analyzed. Eight different political activities are discussed in terms of people's intentions to engage in the activities depending on the emotional state. Third, the differential effects of three negative emotions (anxiety, anger, and disgust) on information seeking behavior (e.g., amount, direction) are examined and compared. Then, I turn to the differing dynamics between the three negative emotions and participants' participation intention. Lastly, I wrap up the chapter by discussing the implications and limitations of the study.

EFFECTS OF DISCRETE POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION SEEKING

The second study was to find out whether the discrete positive emotions had differential effects on information seeking and political participation. The results of cross-

tabulation and ANOVA for manipulation check of random assignment confirmed that no significant difference existed across four conditions on demographic attributes (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, annual household income, level of education, marital status) and political orientation variables including party affiliation, strength of partisanship, political interest, and political efficacy.[6]

H2 was tested to find out whether (a) enthusiastic, (b) proud, and (c) hopeful individuals seek out different amounts of information compared to those not manipulated to experience these emotions in the experiment. In the analysis, the following variables were examined as dependent variables; (1) time spent reading pro-Democratic news, (2) time spent reading pro-Republican news, (3) time spent reading non-political news, (4) time spent reading either pro-Democratic or pro-Republican news (i.e., partisan news), and (5) total time spent reading all the news.

Due to the violation of normality assumption (i.e., normal distribution of error terms) in the data across the five dependent variables, I conducted the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) for the variables and reported the nonparametric test results instead with medians and interquartile ranges for each group. The results of Kruskal-Wallis test show that there are no emotion effects on people's reading time of pro-Republican news, non-political news, or total news articles (see Table 8). Reading times of four different news variables (i.e., pro-Republican, non-political, partisan, and total news reading time) in the control group were not different from those in the three emotion groups. However, there were significant differences across the emotional conditions in the

---

6 The results of manipulation checks for random assignment: Age ($F[3, 224] = .326$, $p = .807$); gender ($F[3, 224] = 2.501$, $p = .060$); ethnicity ($\chi2 [15] = 12.316$, $p = .655$); household income ($F[3, 224] = 1.214$, $p = .305$); education ($F[3, 224] = .580$, $p = .629$); marital status ($\chi2[12] = 5.743$, $p = .928$); party affiliation ($F[3, 224] = .850$, $p = .468$); partisan strength ($\chi2 [3] = .441$, $p = .604$); political interest ($F[3, 224] = 1.500$, $p = .215$; political efficacy ($F[3, 224] = 1.841$, $p = .140$).

amounts of the time people spent reading pro-Democratic news articles (χ^2 (3) = 7.967, p < .05). Based on the results of pairwise comparisons using Mann-Whitney U test (see Table 9), the following differences were found: People in the enthusiasm condition spent more time reading pro-Democratic news than people in the pride group (p < .05) and people in the pride condition spent less time reading pro-Democratic news than those in the control condition (p < .05). Other between-groups differences did not reach the statistical significance. Thus, the results only partially supported H2 in regard to seeking out pro-Democratic news.

Table 8. Descriptive statistics (medians, IQRs) and effects of positive emotions on news reading time (in seconds)

Dependent variable	No emotion	Enthusia-sm	Hope	Pride	χ^2 (3)	Sig.
Pro-Democratic reading (D)	18 (52)	14 (38)	0 (36)	0 (31)	7.967	.047
Pro-Republican reading (R)	13 (70)	2 (54)	16 (57)	15 (56)	.683	.877
Non-political reading (N)	22 (52)	21 (83)	1 (37)	18 (46)	1.249	.741
Partisan reading (D plus R)	67.50 (140.25)	52 (107.50)	36.50 (104.50)	50.50 (98.75)	1.860	.602
Total reading (D plus R plus N)	99.50 (155)	88 (156)	88 (127.25)	83.50 (203.25)	1.669	.644

Note: The normality assumption was violated across all variables in the data. Thus, the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) was conducted for the variables, and the nonparametric test results were reported instead.

Table 9. Pairwise comparisons of pro-Democratic article reading time (Mann-Whitney U test)

(I) Emotion	(J) Emotion	*M* Rank Difference (I-J)	Mann-Whitney U	Sig.
Enthusiasm	No emotion	-.73	1498.00	.904
	Hope	9.06	1101.50	.113
	Pride	12.28*	1019.00	.029
Hope	No emotion	-10.12	1601.50	.102
	Enthusiasm	-9.06	1101.50	.113
	Pride	4.28	1558.00	.451
Pride	No emotion	-14.26*	1474.00	.020
	Enthusiasm	-12.28*	1019.00	.029
	Hope	-4.28	1558.00	.451

* denotes *p* < .05.

I also examined the number of news articles each participant read in the experiments as dependent variables. A series of univariate ANOVAs were used with four different dependent variables: (1) number of pro-Democratic news articles read, (2) number of pro-Republican news articles read, (3) number of non-political news articles read, and (4) total sum of news articles read (see Table 10). There were no significant emotion effects on the numbers of pro-Republican, non-political, and total news articles read across four conditions. However, the emotional condition made a marginally significant difference in the number of pro-Democratic news articles read across groups (F[3, 224] = 2.338, p < .10).

Table 10. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of positive emotions on between-groups news reading (number of articles read)

Dependent Variable (Number of articles)	No emotion	Enthusi asm	Hope	Pride	F(3, 224)	Sig.
Pro-Democratic articles	.95 (.10)	.87 (.12)	.69 (.11)	.57 (.11)	2.338	.074
Pro-Republican articles	.92 (.11)	.83 (.13)	.81 (.12)	.83 (.12)	.291	.832
Non-political articles	.62 (.09)	.54 (.11)	.56 (.10)	.47 (.10)	.418	.740
Total # of articles	2.50 (.19)	2.24 (.23)	2.07 (.20)	1.86 (.21)	1.770	.154

The assumptions of equal variance did not seem to be violated as the *p*-values associated with Levene's tests were greater than .05 (for pro-Democratic articles, p = .472; for pro-Republican articles, *p* = .127; for non-political articles, *p* = .129; and for total number of articles, *p* = .199). The estimated means of four different groups were used to compare the effects of emotions on the numbers of pro-Democratic news articles people read across groups. Tukey's post-hoc tests revealed that only the comparison between the control and pride groups reached the marginally significant level, showing people in the control condition read more pro-Democratic articles than those in the pride condition (*p* < .10, see Table 11). In sum, discrete positive emotion effects on the between-groups differences in the number of pro-Democratic news articles people read were marginally significant, and only between the pride and control groups. Thus, H2 received minimal support in the analysis.

Table 11. Pairwise comparisons of the number of pro-Democratic articles read across
         groups

Dependent variable	(I) Emotion	(J) Emotion	M Difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% CI	
						Lower	Upper
Number of pro-Democratic articles	No emotion	Enthusiasm	.085	.166	.957	-.35	.52
		Hope	.248	.156	.388	-.16	.65
		Pride	.386[+]	.156	.067	-.02	.79
	Enthusiasm	No emotion	-.085	.166	.957	-.52	.35
		Hope	.163	.171	.778	-.28	.61
		Pride	.301	.171	.297	-.14	.74
	Hope	No emotion	-.248	.156	.388	-.65	.16
		Enthusiasm	-.163	.171	.778	-.61	.28
		Pride	.138	.161	.827	-.28	.55
	Pride	No emotion	-.386[+]	.156	.067	-.79	.02
		Enthusiasm	-.301	.171	.297	-.74	.14
		Hope	-.138	.161	.827	-.55	.28

+ denotes $p < .10$.

It is worth noting that pride carries a larger negative impact on pro-Democratic news search than either no emotion or enthusiasm does (see Table 9 and 11). There seems to be no relevant literature supporting the finding on a negative impact of pride on information seeking, especially only for pro-Democratic news search. Since pride is experienced when one feels self-fulfilled for a valuable achievement, leading one's self-esteem to increase (Lazarus, 1991; Mascolo & Fischer, 1995), this may result in temporal decrease in cognitive attention to new information as people feel complacent with themselves and the situation, which is supported by the first study of this project. However, this still cannot explain why the effect is only detected in seeking pro-Democratic articles, leaving the puzzle unsolved.

H3 hypothesized that individuals who experience (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) pride toward ingroup members will seek out more confirming information (vs. non-confirming information) compared to those not experiencing these emotions. To test the hypothesis, I considered two different dependent variables: (1) the direction of news reading (if the subject read both pro- and counter-attitudinal news, it was coded 0; if only pro-attitudinal news was read, coded 1; and if only counter-attitudinal news was read, coded -1) and (2) the reading time of pro-attitudinal news. Pro-attitudinal news reading was calculated by subtracting pro-Republican news reading time from pro-Democratic news reading time for Democrats and by subtracting pro-Democratic news reading time from pro-Republican news reading time for Republicans.

Examining the direction of news reading (i.e., pro- vs. counter-attitudinal reading) across different groups, subjects in the positive emotion conditions were not found to be significantly different from those in the control group in their news reading direction ($F[3, 224] = .814$, $p > .05$) nor in pro-attitudinal news reading time ($F[3, 224] = 1.288$, $p > .05$) (see Table 12). The assumptions of equal variance of the dependent variables were not violated as the p values associated with Levene's tests were greater than .05 (for pro-attitudinal reading time, $p = .374$; for reading direction, $p = .511$). Also, none of the between-groups comparisons reached the statistical significance. Thus, H3 was not supported.

Table 12. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of positive emotions on between-groups news reading (direction)

Dependent variable	No emotion	Enthusia- sm	Hope	Pride	F(3, 224)	Sig.
Pro-attitudinal reading time	38.09 (39.53)	13.87 (47.34)	52.44 (42.02)	10.86 (42.64)	1.288	.732
Direction of news reading	.09 (.08)	.13 (.10)	.01 (.09)	.09 (.09)	.814	.517

Note: Due to the violation of normality assumption in the data, I conducted the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis) for the dependent variable, pro-attitudinal reading time. The result showed no difference in the significant level, and I reported the nonparametric test result here, instead of that of ANOVA.

H2 and H3 hypothesized about the differences in news reading behaviors between positive emotion groups and control group, whereas RQ2 asked about the differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on information seeking behaviors in terms of amount (both reading time and number of articles read) and direction (i.e., pro- or counter-attitudinal) in general. In terms of the amount of news reading, the between-groups emotion effects were found only in the time people spent on reading pro-Democratic news articles. Other amounts of news reading time (i.e., non-political, pro-Republican, and total reading) were not different across the groups of positive emotions (hope, pride, or enthusiasm). The results of pairwise comparison shows that individuals who experienced enthusiasm spent significantly longer time reading pro-Democratic news than those who experienced pride (see Table 9). In regard to the direction of news reading, three discrete positive emotions (hope, pride, and enthusiasm) did not have any differential univariate effects on pro-attitudinal news reading time nor on news reading direction.

EFFECTS OF DISCRETE POSITIVE EMOTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

An analysis of the differential effects of discrete positive emotions on a range of political activities has been missing in political research. Scholars have generally agreed that emotions with positive valence increase the likelihood of political participation because of the assumed action tendency in positive emotions especially the one with strong positive valence such as enthusiasm (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000).

To answer RQ3, I compared the between-groups intentions to engage in eight different forms of political activities from voting to campaigning. Before discussing the results of a series of ANOVAs, descriptive statistics across groups regarding the subjects' intention to participate in eight different kinds of political activities are briefly discussed (see Table 13).[7]

Table 13. Descriptive statistics of standardized intentions of political activities across groups

Political activities (intention)		N	Mean	SD	SE	95% CI for Mean	
						Lower	Upper
Vote in the 2018 midterm election	No emotion	66	.005	.841	.104	-.201	.212
	Enthusiasm	46	.054	1.084	.160	-.268	.376
	Hope	58	.037	1.104	.144	-.251	.324
	Pride	58	-.088	1.033	.136	-.360	.184
	Total	228	.000	1.007	.067	-.132	.131
Volunteer	No emotion	66	.000	.939	.116	-.231	.230
	Enthusiasm	46	.078	1.046	.154	-.233	.388
	Hope	58	.134	1.057	.138	-.141	.410
	Pride	58	-.173	.980	.129	-.431	.084

---

7 Intentions to engage in eight different political activities were measured on the Likert scale of 1 to 7, using the question "how likely are you willing to engage in the following activity?" And answers were recorded as follows: (1) Extremely likely; (2) Moderately likely; (3) Slightly likely; (4) Neutral; (5) Slightly unlikely; (6) Moderately unlikely; and (7) Extremely unlikely. Then, all the scores were standardized using the grand mean of each variable in the sample. Thus, the lower the score, the higher intention participants show.

		N	Mean	SD	SE	Lower	Upper
	Total	228	.006	1.002	.066	-.124	.137
	No emotion	66	-.016	.934	.115	-.246	.213
	Enthusiasm	46	.110	.985	.145	-.183	.402
Donate money	Hope	58	.087	1.101	.143	-.199	.374
	Pride	58	-.193	.968	.127	-.448	.061
	Total	228	-.009	.998	.066	-.139	.121
	No emotion	66	-.033	.972	.120	-.271	.206
Contact	Enthusiasm	46	.023	1.006	.148	-.276	.321
candidates,	Hope	58	.249	1.042	.136	-.023	.520
campaign staffs	Pride	58	-.223	.951	.125	-.473	.027
	Total	228	.003	1.000	.066	-.127	.133
	No emotion	66	.039	.968	.119	-.199	.277
	Enthusiasm	46	.200	.985	.145	-.093	.492
Wear a campaign	Hope	58	.023	1.057	.138	-.253	.298
button	Pride	58	-.240	.978	.128	-.497	.017
	Total	228	-.004	1.003	.066	-.134	.127
	No emotion	66	.060	.994	.122	-.185	.304
	Enthusiasm	46	.004	.955	.141	-.280	.287
Attend a rally	Hope	58	.287	1.105	.144	-.001	.575
	Pride	58	-.358	.849	.112	-.581	-.134
	Total	228	.001	1.004	.066	-.129	.132
	No emotion	66	-.026	.988	.122	-.268	.217
	Enthusiasm	46	.176	.998	.147	-.120	.473
Put up a yard sign	Hope	58	.022	1.071	.139	-.258	.301
	Pride	58	-.178	.937	.123	-.424	.068
	Total	228	-.011	1.000	.066	-.142	.119
	No emotion	66	-.071	.979	.121	-.312	.169
	Enthusiasm	46	.186	1.008	.149	-.113	.486
Post a bumper	Hope	58	.238	1.011	.132	-.025	.502
sticker	Pride	58	-.324	.931	.122	-.569	-.080
	Total	228	-.004	1.000	.066	-.134	.126

Note. Intention to participate in political activities was measured on the scale of 1 (Extremely likely) to 7 (Extremely unlikely). Standardized score was used was for all variables across groups. The lower score indicates the higher intention to participate in the described political activities.

A series of univariate ANOVAs were conducted using the eight different forms of activities as dependent variables. Discrete positive emotions did not affect intentions to participate in the following political activities (see Table 14): vote in the 2018 midterm election ($F[3, 224] = .234$, $p > .05$), volunteer ($F[3, 224] = 1.134$, $p > .05$), donate money ($F[3, 224] = 1.144$, $p > .05$), contact candidate or campaign staffs ($F[3, 224] = 2.483$, $p > .05$), wear a campaign button ($F[3, 224] = 1.765$, $p > .05$), and put up a yard sign ($F[3, 224] = 1.085$, $p > .05$). Also, the overall multivariate effect of discrete emotions on the general participation intention was not significant as the p value associated with Wilk's Lambda was greater than .05 ($F[24, 629.967] = 1.351$, $p > .05$).

However, univariate effects of discrete positive emotions were found significant in between-groups' intentions to engage in the following political activities (see Table 14 for results): (1) attend a rally ($F[3, 224] = 4.564$, $p < .01$) and (2) post a bumper sticker ($F[3, 224] = 3.808$, $p < .05$). The equal variance assumption was violated for one dependent variable, the intention to attend a rally, as the p value associated with Levene's test was less than .05 ($p = .002$). Thus, instead of using univariate ANOVA, I used Welch's ANOVA to address the problem of the heterogeneity of variances (Da & Quinn, 1989). The result of Welch's ANOVA still shows statistically significant differences between intentions to attend a rally across different emotions ($F[3, 121.111] = 4.629$, $p < .01$).

Table 14. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of positive emotions on political participation

Dependent Variable	No emotion	Enthusiasm	Hope	Pride	F(3, 224)	Sig.
Vote in the 2018 election	.00 (.10)	.05 (.16)	.04 (.14)	-.09 (.14)	.234	.873
Volunteer for a campaign/candidate	.00 (.12)	.08 (.15)	.13 (.14)	-.17 (.13)	1.134	.336
Donate money	-.01 (.12)	.11 (.15)	.09 (.14)	-.19 (.13)	1.144	.332
Contact candidates or campaign staffs	-.03 (.12)	.02 (.15)	.25 (.14)	-.22 (.13)	2.483	.062
Wear a campaign button	.04 (.12)	.20 (.15)	.02 (.14)	-.24 (.13)	1.765	.155
Attend a rally	.06 (.12)	.00 (.14)	.29 (.14)	-.36 (.11)	4.564	.003
Put up a yard sign	-.03 (.12)	.18 (.15)	.02 (.14)	-.18 (.12)	1.085	.356
Post a bumper sticker	.07 (.12)	.19 (.15)	.24 (.13)	-.32 (.12)	3.808	.011

Note: Subjects' scores on the measurement scale from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 (extremely unlikely) of the eight dependent variables were standardized. The result for the variable "attend a rally" was replaced by the result from Welch's ANOVA.

Between-groups comparisons of the differences in the two dependent variables are made using Tukey's post-hoc tests. For the intention to post a bumper sticker, people in the pride condition showed higher intentions to post a sticker than people in the enthusiasm condition (*SE* = .39, *M* difference = 1.04, *p* < .05) as well as than people in the hope condition (*SE* = .37, *M* difference = 1.12, *p* < .05). Since the equal variances were not assumed across groups for the intention to attend a rally, Games-Howell post-hoc test was used to make pairwise comparisons on the variable (Games & Howell, 1976). Proud people showed significantly higher levels of intention to attend a rally than hopeful people (*SE* = .35, *M* difference = 1.29, *p* < .01). Other between-groups comparisons of subjects'

participation intentions did not show any statistically significant results (see Table 15). These results answer RQ3 about the differences among the three positive emotions in their influence on political participation.

Table 15. Pairwise comparisons of the intentions to post a bumper sticker and attend a rally

Dependent variables	(I) Emotion	(J) Emotion	*M* Difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% CI Lower	Upper
Intention to post a bumper sticker	No emotion	Enthusiasm	-.522	.383	.523	-1.51	.47
		Hope	-.607	.359	.330	-1.54	.32
		Pride	.514	.359	.481	-.42	1.44
	Enthusiasm	No emotion	.522	.383	.523	-.47	1.51
		Hope	-.085	.394	.996	-1.10	.93
		Pride	1.036*	.394	.045	.02	2.05
	Hope	No emotion	.607	.359	.330	-.32	1.54
		Enthusiasm	.085	.394	.996	-.93	1.10
		Pride	1.121*	.370	.015	.16	2.08
	Pride	No emotion	-.514	.359	.481	-1.44	.42
		Enthusiasm	-1.036*	.394	.045	-2.05	-.02
		Hope	-1.121*	.370	.015	-2.08	-.16
Intention to attend a rally	No emotion	Enthusiasm	.109	.362	.991	-.84	1.05
		Hope	-.483	.368	.557	-1.44	.48
		Pride	.810+	.321	.062	-.03	1.65
	Enthusiasm	No emotion	-.109	.362	.991	-1.05	.84
		Hope	-.591	.392	.435	-1.61	.43
		Pride	.702	.349	.191	-.21	1.61
	Hope	No emotion	.483	.368	.557	-.48	1.44
		Enthusiasm	.591	.392	.435	-.43	1.61
		Pride	1.293**	.354	.002	.37	2.22
	Pride	No emotion	-.810+	.321	.062	-1.65	.03
		Enthusiasm	-.702	.349	.191	-1.61	.21
		Hope	-1.293**	.354	.002	-2.22	-.37

Based on the literature, H4 argued that individuals experiencing any of three positive emotions – (a) enthusiasm, (b) hope, or (c) pride – are more likely to participate in politics than those who are not. Examining H4, people in the control condition did not show lower levels of intention to participate in any of the eight political activities than people in the emotion groups ($p > .05$). Thus, H4 was not supported.

Lastly, RQ4 asked if different patterns of information seeking in terms of (a) amount and (b) direction mediate the relationship between the three positive emotions (enthusiasm, pride, and hope) and political participation. As the results from the previous ANOVA show, the manipulation of positive emotions was not significantly related to the direction of information search, which means there are no differing effects across enthusiasm, hope, and pride on how people seek out pro- or counter-attitudinal political information. Thus, the mediation effect was non-existent for information seeking direction.

Speaking of the amount of information search, both the reading time and number of pro-Democratic articles people read were tested as mediators in two separate regression models since the between-groups differences were shown to be statistically significant for the two (see Table 8 and 10). The results of OLS regression analyses show that the amount of information sought does not have any significant impact on the levels of intention to participate in the eight different political activities as well as the general intention to participate in politics (i.e., the average score of the eight different political activities) (see Table 16 and 17). As none of the regression coefficients for the information search were statistically significant in the eighteen different regression models predicting intended political activities after controlling for emotion effects, the mediation path where the

136

amount of information sought mediates the effects of positive emotions on the intention of political participation was not found (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Miles & Shevlin, 2001).

The non-significant mediation findings can be mainly attributed to the non-significant relationships between emotions and information seeking itself (related to RQ2) as well as the weak linkage between information search and intentions to participate in different political activities.

Table 16. The effects of information search (reading time of pro-Democratic articles) on political activities (intention)

	Coefficient (SE)								
Dependent variable	Vote in 2018	Volunteer	Donate money	Contact candidate	Wear a campaign button	Attend a rally	Put up a yard sign	Post a bumper sticker	General participation
Constant	1.934 (.197)	.137 (.183)	-2.023 (.182)	3.088 (.181)	.028 (.182)	3.939 (.243)	-.130 (.182)	4.136 (.255)	.004 (.138)
Reading time of pro-Democratic articles	.000 (.001)	-.027 (.042)	-.004 (.042)	-.017 (.042)	-.006 (.042)	.001 (.001)	.039 (.042)	.000 (.001)	-.003 (.032)
Enthusiasm	.094 (.297)	.071 (.193)	.125 (.193)	.051 (.191)	.160 (.193)	-.074 (.368)	.212 (.193)	.531 (.386)	.108 (.146)
Hope	.084 (.279)	.112 (.181)	.105 (.181)	.262 (.179)	-.015 (.181)	.515 (.344)	.065 (.181)	.615+ (.361)	.138 (.137)
Pride	-.119 (.279)	-.166 (.184)	-.185 (.183)	-.173 (.182)	-.292 (.183)	-.771* (.345)	-.130 (.183)	-.503 (.362)	-.219 (.139)
Overall model	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = .294, $p > .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = .867, $p > .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = .647, $p > .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = 1.622, $p > .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = 1.096, $p > .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = 3.648 $p < .01$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = .828 $p > .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = 2.858, $p < .05$	$F_{[4, 223]}$ = 1.533, $p > .05$
R^2	.005	.019	.014	.035	.024	.061	.018	.049	.033

$*p < .05, +p < .10.$
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent variable of interest for each model is the reading time of pro-Democratic articles.

Enthusiasm, hope, and pride variables are dummy coded. Reference group for emotion is the control group.

Table 17. The effects of information search (number of pro-Democratic articles) on political activities (intention)

	Coefficient (SE)								
Dependent variable	Vote in 2018	Volunt eer	Donate money	Contact candidat e	Wear a campaig n button	Attend a rally	Put up a yard sign	Post a bumper sticker	General participa tion
Constant	-.156 (.157)	.034 (.156)	-.033 (.156)	.070 (.155)	.002 (.156)	-.008 (.153)	-.118 (.156)	.011 (.153)	-.025 (.118)
# of pro-Democratic articles	.052 (.088)	.038 (.087)	-.001 (.087)	-.036 (.086)	.011 (.087)	.057 (.086)	.122 (.087)	-.084 (.076)	.024 (.066)
Enthusiasm	.053 (.194)	.081 (.193)	.126 (.193)	.052 (.191)	.162 (.192)	-.052 (.189)	.212 (.192)	.254 (.189)	.111 (.146)
Hope	.054 (.181)	.128 (.180)	.106 (.180)	.267 (.178)	-.011 (180)	.236 (.177)	.057 (.180)	.299 (.177)	.142 (.137)
Pride	-.130 (.183)	-.147 (.182)	-.183 (.182)	-.168 (.180)	-.287 (.182)	-.429* (.179)	-.139 (.182)	-.243 (.179)	-.215 (.138)
Overall model	$F[4, 223] = .840, p > .05$	$F[4, 223] = .824, p > .05$	$F[4, 223] = .645, p > .05$	$F[4, 223]= 1.624, p > .05$	$F[4, 223]= 1.095, p > .05$	$F[4, 223]= 3.448, p < .01$	$F[4, 223]= 1.059 p > .05$	$F[4, 223]= 3.166, p < .05$	$F[4, 223]= 1.559, p > .05$
R^2	.018	.018	.014	.035	.024	.058	.023	.054	.034

*$p < .05$, +$p < .10$.
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent variable of interest for each model is the number of pro-Democratic articles people read. Enthusiasm, hope, and pride variables are dummy coded. Reference group for emotion is the control group.

EFFECTS OF DISCRETE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ON INFORMATION SEEKING

To find out whether the discrete negative emotions had differential effects on information seeking, a series of ANOVAs were conducted. The results of cross-tabulation

and ANOVA for manipulation check of random assignment confirmed that no significant difference existed across four conditions on demographic attributes (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, annual household income, level of education, marital status) and political orientation variables including party affiliation, strength of partisanship, political interest, and political efficacy.[8]

Examining H5a and H5b, whether (a) anxiety or (b) anger has more or less impact on increasing the amount of information search compared to those not experiencing these emotions in the experiment, I include the following variables as dependent variables; (1) time spent reading pro-Democratic news, (2) time spent reading pro-Republican news, (3) time spent reading non-political news, (4) time spent reading either pro-Democratic or pro-Republican news (i.e., partisan news), and (5) total time spent reading all the news. Due to the violation of normality assumption (i.e., normal distribution of error terms) in the data for the dependent variables, pro-Republican news reading and non-political news reading, I conducted the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) for the variables. Also, if there was the violation of homogeneity of variances assumption (i.e., pro-Democratic news reading), I used the results of Welch's ANOVA instead.

The results show that there were no emotion effects on the people's reading time of pro-Democratic news, pro-Republican news, or total news articles (see Table 18). However, there were significant differences across the emotional conditions in the amounts of the time people spent reading non-political news articles (χ^2 [3] = 10.903, $p < .05$). The results of Kruskal-Wallis H test (see Table 18) showed that there was a statistically significant difference in the participants' reading time of non-political news articles

8 The results of manipulation checks for random assignment: Age (F[3, 221] = 1.731, p = .162); gender (χ^2[3] = 2.912, p = .405); ethnicity (χ^2 [15] = 14.181, p = .512); income (F[3, 221] = .426, p = .735); education (F[3, 221] = .180, p = 908); religion (χ^2 [15] = 17.623, p = .283); marital status (χ^2 [12] = 5.743, p = .928); party affiliation (χ^2 [3] = 1.705, p =.636); partisan strength (χ^2 [3] = .846, p = .301); political interest (F[3, 221] = .108, p = .956); and political efficacy (F[3, 221] = .910, p = .437).

between the emotion treatments, with a mean rank reading time of 124.54 seconds for the control group, 123.93 seconds for disgust, 101.83 seconds for anxiety, and 98.04 seconds for anger group. To compare the mean ranks between anxiety, anger, disgust and control groups, I used Mann-Whitney U tests with two independent samples (i.e., pairwise comparisons). Table 19 presents the results of pairwise comparisons, showing that the anxiety group spent less time reading non-political articles than the control group (related to H5a, proposing that anxiety will increase information seeking) and that the anger group spent less time reading non-political articles than the control group (related to H5b, proposing that anger will depress information seeking). The comparison between anxiety and anger groups did not reach the statistical significance. Thus, the results did not support H5a but partially supported H5b as it applies to reading non-political articles.

Table 18. Descriptive statistics (medians, IQRs) and effects of negative emotions on news reading time (in seconds)

Dependent variable	No emotion	Anxiety	Anger	Disgust	F(3, 221)	Sig.
Pro-Democratic reading (D) *	18 (52)	19 (82)	0 (47)	4 (44)	1.377	.254
Pro-Republican reading (R) +	13 (70)	0 (42)	8 (63)	21 (75)	4.563	.207
Non-political reading (N) +	14 (28)	3 (40)	0 (22)	12 (54)	10.903	.012
Partisan reading (D plus R)	67.50 (140.25)	51 (126)	44 (156.50)	59 (162)	.728	.536
Total reading (D plus R plus N)	99.50 (155)	70 (132)	71 (176)	89 (223)	.653	.582

(*) denotes that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated with pro-Democratic news reading (D), thus the ANOVA result for the variable was replaced with the results from Welch's ANOVA.

(+) denotes that the normality assumption was violated in the data. In case of the violation, the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis test) was conducted for the variables, and in case there were differences in significant level, the nonparametric test results were reported instead.

Table 19. Pairwise comparisons of non-political article reading time (Mann-Whitney U test)

(I) Emotion	(J) Emotion	M Rank Difference (I-J)	Mann-Whitney U	Sig.
Anxiety	No emotion	-11.72*	1346.00	.031
	Anger	1.92	1301.50	.664
	Disgust	-10.68*	1120.00	.037
Anger	No emotion	-13.95*	1339.00	.010
	Anxiety	-1.92	1301.50	.664
	Disgust	-12.33*	1124.50	.016
Disgust	No emotion	-.48	1800.50	.934
	Anxiety	10.68*	1120.00	.037
	Anger	12.33*	1124.50	.016

* denotes $p < .05$.

Additionally, I also examined the number of news articles each participant read in the experiments as dependent variables. Again, a series of univariate ANOVAs were used with four different dependent variables: (1) number of pro-Democratic news articles read, (2) number of pro-Republican news articles read, (3) number of non-political news articles read, and (4) total sum of news articles read (See Table 20). The assumptions of equal variances were violated with the numbers of pro-Republican and non-political articles read, thus the results for the variables were replaced with the results from Welch's ANOVA. There were no significant emotion effects on the number of pro-Democratic news and pro-Republican news articles read across four conditions. However, the emotional condition made a significant difference in the number of non-political news articles read across

groups (F[3, 221] = 5.090, p < .05). Also, I found a significant difference across the emotion groups in the total number of articles read (F[3, 221] = 3.539, p < .05, see Table 20).

Table 20. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of negative emotions on between-groups news reading (number of articles read)

Dependent Variable (Number of articles)	No emotion	Anxiety	Anger	Disgust	F(3, 221)	Sig.
Pro-Democratic articles	.97 (.11)	.88 (.14)	.58 (.10)	.78 (.12)	1.986	.117
Pro-Republican articles	.91 (.12)	.63 (.11)	.81 (.12)	.85 (.10)	1.101	.314
Non-political articles	.62 (.10)	.25 (.06)	.26 (.07)	.55 (.09)	5.090	.002
Total # of articles	2.50 (.23)	1.76 (.22)	1.66 (.19)	2.18 (.19)	3.539	.016

Note: The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated with the numbers of pro-Republican and non-political articles read, thus the ANOVA results for the variables was replaced with the results from Welch's ANOVA.

Comparing the main effects of emotions on the numbers of non-political articles and total articles people read across groups, the estimated marginal means across four different groups were used. Since the equal variances were not assumed across groups for the number of non-political news articles read, Games-Howell post-hoc test was used to make pairwise comparisons on the variable (see Table 21, Games & Howell, 1976). The comparisons showed that people in the control group read more non-political articles than those in anger or anxiety groups and that people in the disgust group read more than those in the anxiety or control conditions. When it comes to the total number of news articles read across groups (Table 21), people in the control group read more than those in the anger

or anxiety conditions. Other comparisons did not reach significance. Again, the results rejected H5a but partially supported H5b. The finding (H5b), angry people seek less information than people in the control group, is only applicable to searching non-political information and the total amount of article regardless of partisanship.

Table 21. Pairwise comparisons of the number of articles read across negative emotion groups

Dependent variable	(I) Emotion	(J) Emotion	M Difference (I-J)	SE	Sig.	95% CI	
						Lower	Upper
Number of non-political news articles	No emotion	Anxiety	.366*	.116	.011	.06	.67
		Anger	.357*	.122	.021	.05	.66
		Disgust	.076	.133	.941	-.22	.38
	Anxiety	No emotion	-.366*	.116	.011	-.67	-.06
		Anger	-.009	.095	1.00	-.33	.31
		Disgust	-.291*	.108	.042	-.61	.03
	Anger	No emotion	-.357*	.122	.021	-.66	-.05
		Anxiety	.009	.095	1.000	-.31	.33
		Disgust	-.281+	.115	.074	-.60	.04
	Disgust	No emotion	-.076	.133	.914	-.38	.22
		Anxiety	.291*	.108	.042	-.03	.61
		Anger	.281+	.115	.074	-.04	.60
Total number of news articles	No emotion	Anxiety	.735+	.295	.063	-.03	1.50
		Anger	.840*	.291	.022	.09	1.59
		Disgust	.318	.288	.688	-.43	1.06
	Anxiety	No emotion	-.735+	.295	.063	-1.50	.03
		Anger	.104	.310	.987	-.70	.91
		Disgust	-.417	.307	.527	-1.21	.38
	Anger	No emotion	-.840*	.291	.022	-1.59	-.09
		Anxiety	-.104	.310	.987	-.91	.70
		Disgust	-.521	.304	.319	-1.31	.27
	Disgust	No emotion	-.318	.288	.688	-1.06	.43
		Anxiety	.417	.307	.527	-.38	1.21
		Anger	.521	.304	.319	-.27	1.31

Note: * denotes $p < .05$ and + denotes $p < .10$.

Due to the violation of the equal variances assumption, Games-Howell post-hoc test was used for the number of non-political articles read. For the total number of articles, Tukey's post-hoc test was used as the equal variances were assumed.

H6 hypothesized that (a) individuals who experience anxiety will seek out more counter-attitudinal (non-confirming) information compared to those not experiencing the emotion and that (b) individuals who experience anger will seek out more pro-attitudinal (confirming) information than those not experiencing the emotion. To test the hypotheses, I considered two different dependent variables: (1) the direction of news reading (if the subject read both pro- and counter-attitudinal news, it was coded 0; if only pro-attitudinal news was read, coded 1; and if only counter-attitudinal news was read, coded -1) and (2) the reading time of pro-attitudinal news. Pro-attitudinal news reading was calculated by subtracting pro-Republican news reading time from pro-Democratic news reading time for Democrats and by subtracting pro-Democratic news reading time from pro-Republican news reading time for Republicans.

Examining the direction of news reading (i.e., pro- vs. counter-attitudinal reading) across different groups, subjects in the negative emotion conditions were not significantly different from those in the control group in their news reading direction (F[3, 221] = .136, p > .05) nor in pro-attitudinal news reading time (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ^2[3] = 1.183, p > .05, Table 22). The assumption of normality was violated for the pro-attitudinal reading time; thus, the non-parametric test results are reported instead. None of the between-groups comparisons including control v. anxiety, control v. anger, and anger v. anxiety, reached the statistical significance. Both H6a and H6b were not supported.

RQ5 asked about the differential effects of anger and anxiety on information seeking behaviors in terms of any direction (e.g., selective exposure or avoidance) in general if there is any varying impact. However, with respect to the direction of news

144

reading, the two discrete negative emotions (anger and anxiety) did not have any differential effects.

Table 22. Descriptive statistics (means, SDs) and effects of negative emotions on between-groups news reading (direction)

Dependent variable	No emotion	Anxiety	Anger	Disgust	F(3, 221)	Sig.
Pro-attitudinal reading time	38.00 (38.49)	91.41 (82.63)	29.62 (18.60)	29.81 (29.27)	1.183	.757
Direction of news reading	.09 (.07)	.04 (.08)	.11 (.09)	.09 (.08)	.136	.939

Note: Due to the violation of normality assumption in the data, I conducted the nonparametric test (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis) for the dependent variable, pro-attitudinal reading time. The result showed no difference in the significant level, and I reported the nonparametric test result here, instead of that of ANOVA.

H7a, H7b, and RQ6 ask about the differential effects of anxiety and anger on political participation intention, and for the purpose of organization, I will discuss them in the next section, under the effects of negative emotions on political participation.

Hypotheses 8a hypothesized about the effect of disgust on information seeking, proposing that people experiencing disgust will seek out different amounts of information compared to those not experiencing the emotion (i.e., control group). The results of ANOVA (see Table 18) and pairwise comparisons of emotion effects on non-political news reading time (see Table 19) show that participants who experienced disgust did not spend a different amount of time reading either partisan (pro-Democratic or pro-Republican) or non-political news articles compared to those in the control group. Thus, H8a was not supported.

145

Comparing the effect of disgust to that of anxiety or anger, however, I found a differential effect of disgust on reading non-political news articles, as disgust increased people's non-political news reading compared to anger or anxiety (see Table 19 and 21). Answering RQ8, disgust significantly increased the amount of reading time of non-political articles as individuals in the disgust condition read more non-political articles than those in the anxiety and anger conditions. However, when it comes to the effect on information search direction, disgust was found indistinguishable from anxiety or anger (see Table 22). In sum, the results suggest that both anxiety and anger reduce non-political news consumption compared to disgust or neutral emotions. As there is no evidence that anxiety or anger lead to selective exposure or avoidance, it is clear that anxiety or anger do not always lead individuals to be motivated information processors. The findings may differ from some previous research for many reasons, such as the nature of the 2016 campaign or the stimuli used in this study. The results are consistent with the idea that anger and anxiety may motivate people to veer away from general information search, such as seeking non-political news, however.

Disgust, on the other hand, seems to motivate people to seek more non-political content to curb the experience of the non-pleasant emotion or to stay away from politics in general (DeBell, 2016), as the results show that politically disgusted people read more non-political content more than those who are anxious or angry about politics. However, the analysis does not provide evidence of the distinct effect of disgust on information search direction.

EFFECTS OF DISCRETE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Scholars have generally agreed that emotions with negative valence (anger, anxiety, and fear) affect the likelihood of political participation to a varying degree because of their

146

differences in certainty, familiarity and approach-avoidance tendency (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Nabi, 2003; Marcus et al., 2000). The current study aims to take a further step by looking into discrete negative emotions by examining their differential effects on a range of intended political activities. H7a and H7b hypothesized that anger and anxiety have a differing effect on two forms of political participation; one is cheap, and the other costly forms of participation.[9]

Descriptive statistics across four different groups regarding subjects' intention to participate in eight different kinds of political activities are presented in Table 23. Note that the lower the score, the higher participants' intentions to participate were.

Table 23. Descriptive statistics of standardized intentions of political activities across negative emotion groups

Political activities (intention)		N	Mean	SD	SE	95% CI for mean	
						Lower	Upper
Vote in the 2018 midterm election	No emotion	66	-.135	.749	.092	-.319	.049
	Anxiety	51	-.094	.909	.127	-.350	.161
	Anger	53	.004	1.070	.147	-.290	.299
	Disgust	55	.245	1.230	.166	-.087	.578
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131
Volunteer	No emotion	66	.019	.912	.112	-.206	.243
	Anxiety	51	-.258	1.048	.147	-.552	.037
	Anger	53	.024	1.058	.145	-.268	.315
	Disgust	55	.194	.975	.131	-.070	.457
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131

9 Intentions to engage in eight different political activities were measured on the Likert scale of 1 to 7, using the question "how likely are you willing to engage in the following activity?" And answers were recorded as follows: (1) Extremely likely; (2) moderately likely; (3) slightly likely; (4) neutral; (5) slightly unlikely; (6) moderately unlikely; and (7) extremely unlikely.
Standardized score (ranging from negative to positive values) was used was for all eight variables across groups.

(Table 23 continued)

Donate money	No emotion	66	-.051	.897	.110	-.272	.169
	Anxiety	51	-.044	1.032	.144	-.335	.246
	Anger	53	-.021	1.054	.145	-.311	.270
	Disgust	55	.123	1.050	.142	-.161	.407
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131
Contact candidates or campaign staffs	No emotion	66	-.048	.971	.119	-.286	.191
	Anxiety	51	-.174	1.096	.154	-.483	.134
	Anger	53	.043	1.001	.138	-.233	.319
	Disgust	55	.177	.933	.126	-.075	.430
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131
Wear a campaign button	No emotion	66	.069	.946	.116	-.164	.301
	Anxiety	51	-.165	.967	.135	-.437	.107
	Anger	53	-.104	1.071	.147	-.400	.191
	Disgust	55	.171	1.014	.137	-.103	.445
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131
Attend a rally	No emotion	66	.016	.963	.119	-.221	.252
	Anxiety	51	-.092	1.029	.144	-.382	.197
	Anger	53	-.145	1.012	.139	-.423	.134
	Disgust	55	.206	.996	.134	-.063	.475
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131
Put up a yard sign	No emotion	66	-.053	.972	.120	-.292	.186
	Anxiety	51	-.048	.993	.139	-.327	.231
	Anger	53	-.176	1.072	.147	-.472	.119
	Disgust	55	.279	.936	.126	.025	.532
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131
Post a bumper sticker	No emotion	66	-.055	.945	.116	-.287	.178
	Anxiety	51	-.118	.995	.139	-.397	.162
	Anger	53	-.109	1.108	.152	-.414	.196
	Disgust	55	.280	.931	.126	.028	.531
	Total	225	.000	1.000	.067	-.131	.131

Note. Intention to participate in eight political activities was measured on the scale of 1 (Extremely likely) to 7 (Extremely unlikely). Standardized score was used was for all variables across groups. The lower score indicates the higher intention to participate in the described political activities.

To compare the between-groups intentions to engage in eight different forms of political activities from voting to campaigning, a series of ANOVAs were conducted using eight different forms of activities as dependent variables. The results (presented in Table 24) show that, contrary to the theoretical expectation, the univariate effect of discrete negative was not found on any of eight political activities: vote in the 2018 midterm election ($F[3, 221] = 1.674$, $p > .05$), volunteer ($F[3, 221] = 1.854$, $p > .05$), donate money ($F[3, 221] = .373$, $p > .05$), contact a candidate or campaign staff ($F[3, 221] = 1.178$, $p > .05$), wear a campaign button ($F[3, 221] = 1.300$, $p > .05$), attend a rally ($F[3, 221] = 1.303$, $p > .05$), put up a yard sign ($F[3, 221] = 2.105$, $p > .05$), and post a bumper sticker ($F[3, 221] = 1.969$, $p > .05$). Also, the overall multivariate effect of discrete emotions on the general participation intention was found to be non-significant as the p value associated with Wilk's Lambda was greater than .05 ($F[24, 621.266] = 1.132$, $p > .05$).

H7a and H7b were not supported as anxiety and anger did not show different effects on any of both cheap and costly political activities. Answering RQ6, how anger and anxiety differ from each other in affecting participatory activities, I did not find any significant differences of anger or anger across the activities. Turning to disgust (H8b), those in the disgust condition were no more or less likely to participate in political activities than those in the control condition. Discussing RQ9, whether disgust differs from anger or anxiety in influencing political activities, the data did not show any meaningful difference in participation intentions.

Table 24. Univariate effect of discrete negative emotions on political participation

Dependent Variable	No emotion	Anxiety	Anger	Disgust	F(3,221)	Sig.
Vote in the 2018 election*	-.14 (.09)	-.09 (.13)	.00 (.15)	.25 (.17)	1.674	.243
Volunteer	.02 (.11)	-.26 (.15)	.02 (.15)	.19 (.13)	1.854	.138
Donate money	-.05 (.11)	-.04 (.14)	-.02 (.14)	.12 (.14)	.373	.773
Contact candidates or campaign staffs	-.05 (.12)	-.17 (.15)	.04 (.14)	.18 (.13)	1.178	.319
Wear a campaign button	.07 (.12)	-.16 (.14)	-.10 (.15)	.17 (.14)	1.300	.275
Attend a rally	.02 (.12)	-.09 (.14)	-.14 (.14)	.21 (.13)	1.303	.274
Put up a yard sign	-.05 (.12)	-.05 (.14)	-.18 (.15)	.28 (.13)	2.105	.100
Post a bumper sticker	-.05 (.11)	-.12 (.14)	-.11 (.15)	.28 (.13)	1.969	.120

Note: Subjects' scores on the measurement scale (from 1 to 7) of the eight dependent variables were standardized. The smaller score indicated the higher intention to participation.
(*) denotes that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated for the variable, vote in the 2018 election, thus the ANOVA result for the variable was replaced with the result from Welch's ANOVA.

Lastly, RQ7 asked if there is any mediating effect of individuals' information search behaviors on the relationship between negative emotions and political participation intention. Since there was no meaningful association between the negative emotions and participatory activities, information search cannot be a mediator of the relationships.

As the number of non-political articles and the total number of articles read by participants were affected by the type of negative emotions they experienced (see Table 20), however, I conducted OLS regression analysis to find out if there is any impact of

information search on participatory intentions of eight different activities (Table 25 and 26). The results show that after controlling for emotion effects, the number of non-political articles people read had a significant impact on people's intention to wear a campaign button ($B = .179$, $SE = .105$, $p < .10$), display a yard sign ($B = .307$, $SE = 103$, $p < .01$) and bumper sticker ($B = .231$, $SE = 104$, $p < .05$, see Table 25). The effect was not theorized or hypothesized in the study but seems interesting. It is possible that the people who seek more information in non-political contents may be more likely or willing to engage in risk free, cheap forms of political activities, such as displaying a bumper sticker, but not in costly forms of activities, such as attending a rally or donating money. Also, this can be interpreted that individuals who do not closely follow the political news or are not interested in politics in general may still be drawn to engage in cheap forms of political activities via general information search.

Also, the total number of articles people read had a significant impact on people's intention to display a yard sign ($B = .084$, $SE = .042$, $p < .05$) and bumper sticker ($B = .077$, $SE = .042$, $p < .10$) after taking into account the effect of negative emotions (see Table 26). Even though this result does not address RQ7 in term of the mediating effects of information search, it is worth noting that the level of people's information search (only non-political and overall reading) affects some types of political activities (i.e., displaying a bumper sticker or yard sign) after controlling for the negative emotion effects.

Table 25. The effects of information search (number of non-political articles) on political
activities (intention)

	Coefficient (SE)								
Dependent variable	Vote in 2018	Volunteer	Donate money	Contact candidate	Wear a campaign button	Attend a rally	Put up a yard sign	Post a bumper sticker	General participation
Constant	-.059 (.139)	-.070 (.139)	-.159 (.140)	-.102 (.140)	-.042 (.139)	-.060 (.139)	-.244 (.136)	-.199 (.137)	-.117 (.108)
# of non-political articles	-.123 (.105)	.142 (.105)	.173 (.106)	.088 (.106)	.179+ (.105)	.122 (.106)	.307** (.103)	.231* (.104)	.140+ (.082)
Anxiety	-.004 (.189)	-.224 (.189)	.070 (.191)	-.094 (.190)	-.168 (.189)	-.063 (.190)	.118 (.186)	.022 (.188)	-.043 (.148)
Anger	.096 (.187)	.056 (.187)	.092 (.188)	.122 (.188)	-.109 (.187)	-.116 (.188)	-.013 (.184)	.028 (.185)	.019 (.146)
Disgust	.371* (.182)	.186 (.181)	.187 (.183)	.232 (.183)	.116 (.182)	.200 (.182)	.355* (.178)	.352+ (.180)	.250 (.142)
Overall model	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.600, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ =1.853, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = .948, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.056, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.707, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.314, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 3.845, $p < .001$	$F[4, 220]$ = 2.733, $p < .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 2.160, $p > .05$
R^2	.028	.033	.017	.019	.030	.023	.065	.047	.038

**$p < .01$, *$p < 0.05$, +$p < .10$.

Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent variable of interest for each model is the number of non-political news articles people read. Anxiety, anger, and disgust variables are dummy coded. Reference group is the control group.

Table 26. The effects of information search (total number of articles) on political
activities (intention)

					Coefficient (SE)				
Dependent variable	Vote in 2018	Volunteer	Donate money	Contact candidate	Wear a campaign button	Attend a rally	Put up a yard sign	Post a bumper sticker	General participation
Constant	-.010 (.162)	.071 (.162)	-.158 (.163)	-.066 (.163)	-.011 (.163)	-.036 (.163)	-.264 (.160)	-.247 (.161)	-.108 (.127)
Total # of articles	-.050 (.042)	.036 (.042)	.043 (.043)	.007 (.043)	.032 (.043)	.021 (.043)	.084* (.042)	.077+ (.042)	.031 (.033)
Anxiety	.004 (.188)	-.250 (.188)	.028 (.190)	-.121 (.189)	-.210 (.189)	-.092 (.189)	.068 (.186)	-.006 (.187)	-.071 (.147)
Anger	.098 (.187)	.036 (.187)	.066 (.189)	.096 (.188)	-.146 (.188)	-.143 (.188)	-.052 (.185)	.011 (.186)	-.004 (.146)
Disgust	.265* (.182)	.186 (.182)	.188 (.184)	.227 (.183)	.112 (.183)	.197 (.183)	.359* (.181)	.379* (.181)	.249+ (.142)
Overall model	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.606, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.569, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = .530, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = .887, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.115, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.033 $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 2.609 $p < .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 2.331, $p > .05$	$F[4, 220]$ = 1.643, $p > .05$
R^2	.028	.028	.014	.016	.020	.018	.018	.041	.029

**$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, +$p < .10$.
Note: Standardized score is used for all dependent variables in the models. Independent variable of interest for each model is total number of articles people read. Anxiety, anger, and disgust variables are dummy coded. Reference group is the control group.

CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

This chapter investigated the dynamics between discrete emotions (both positive and negative) and information search and political participation. The impact of discrete positive emotions on information seeking and participatory behaviors was examined independently to that of negative emotions. Thus, the results of the study will be discussed by differentiating the effect of positive emotions from that of negative ones here.

Research on the effect of discrete positive emotions on human behaviors like information seeking and participation has remained largely inconclusive, even though political researchers have been interested in finding effects (Barrett, 2006; Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011). The present study takes an experimental approach to investigate the differential effects of enthusiasm, hope, and pride on various political activities. The results, however, provide little evidence that the three emotions affect participation intentions differently. The differences in appraisal constructs documented in the previous chapter may not be large or powerful enough to yield varying impacts on people's information seeking behaviors or political engagement.

The linkage between discrete positive emotions and information search receives limited support. Much like the mixed results from previous research on the relationship between positive emotion and information seeking (MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011), the findings from the experiment advance complicated questions. Even though I found a differential effect between pride and enthusiasm on reading pro-Democratic news articles (the reading time of pro-Democratic articles was significantly longer for enthusiastic individuals than for those in the pride condition), the results of the chapter show that discrete positive emotions are not a definitive factor in how people seek out information in terms of amount or direction. Moreover, even though the comparisons did not reach statistical significance, the finding that people in the control group read more news articles than people in the groups of positive emotions may seem counterintuitive as some argue that positive emotions help people to engage in information-processing (Lecheler, Schuck, & Vreese, 2013; Valentino et al., 2011). The inconsistent effect of positive emotions on information search was in line with the suggestion that positive emotions lead people to be less cognitively attentive to and less motivated to process new information (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Martin et al., 1993). It can be reasoned

that individuals in the study did not want to engage in any further information search as they may have wanted to maintain their positive affective state by avoiding any new piece of information (Isen & Means, 1983; Isen & Patrick, 1983).

On a different note, contrary to the conventional belief and research findings to date, which argue that emotions with positive valence have a positive impact on political participation (e.g., Brader, 2005, 2006b; Valentino et al., 2008; Valentino et al., 2011), the experiment shows that in most categories of political activities, such as voting, volunteering, and donation, the differential effects between positive emotion and no emotion conditions on the participation intention were not significant. This can be interpreted as positive emotions may not help increase political engagement. However, the results of the present chapter can provide some evidence to support the differential effects of discrete positive emotions, as pride is better at activating intentions for some political activities (i.e., attending a rally, posting a bumper sticker) than other positive emotions. Although pride did not significantly increase participation intentions for all of the participatory acts examined, it is noteworthy that those in the pride condition had higher intentions to participate across all categories. Even though the results cannot be generalized across different political activities, this highlights the need for researchers to further examine the effects of positive emotions in the political context.

Discussing the impact of discrete negative emotions on information seeking and participation intentions, different dynamics were found across emotion groups (anxiety, anger, and disgust). Although I did not find the anticipated effect of discrete negative emotions on information search in terms of direction (i.e., selective exposure/avoidance), there was a significant, and positive, effect of disgust on the amount of non-political news reading. Disgusted participants read more non-political articles than those in the anxiety or anger conditions. This finding is partially supported by literature arguing that disgust

155

promotes an avoidance tendency, yet it is not fully explained as literature also suggests increased information search on an offending object (Woolf, 2007). Also, both angry and anxious participants read fewer non-political news and overall articles than those in the control group. The impact of discrete negative emotions on information seeking behaviors clearly complicates the literature on discrete negative emotion effects as it was argued that anxiety increases the information search and anger reduces it (H5a & H5b). That anxiety reduced the amount of information search, may be because the non-political news content did not draw interest from the participants as they felt anxiety related to the 2016 election campaign.

Contrary to what was expected, there were no differential effects of discrete negative emotions on intended political activities. This contradicts the previous literature, which argues that anger and anxiety have varying impacts on different forms of political activities (i.e., costly vs. cheap activities). That the impact was not found in the experiment could be possibly attributed to the high co-occurrences among anger, anxiety, and disgust in participants' responses (see Table 3). In other words, due to the mixed emotions (anger, anxiety, and/or disgust) people experienced in the emotion manipulation stage, the effects of each discrete one may not be well distinguished on participation intention. On top of the visibly detected, thus coded, co-occurring emotions, it is possible that participants prompted by the negative emotion induction have experienced more than one emotion than they described in the answers, and this could have contributed to the non-finding. The tendency of co-occurrences within discrete negative emotions is also supported by past literature (e.g., MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011).

Particularly, the non-distinguishable effects of anxiety, anger, and disgust in the study could be attributed to the unique campaign atmosphere of the 2016 election. For example, people's choice in 2016 was often described as choosing among 'lesser of two

156

evils' as a disdain for the other candidate being a major factor in people's candidate support (Delkic, 2016). A Pew Survey also found that majorities of Americans described themselves as "frustrated" and "disgusted" with the campaign (Pew Research Center, 2016). Given the contentious political atmosphere of the 2016 campaign, I can make assumptions that most voters experienced some combinations of negative emotions like anger, frustration, and disgust at certain points during the 2016 campaign, and that the overall negative emotional experience may have had a complicating effect on the dependent variable as participants recalling the situation where they had felt anxious, angry, or disgusted. Even if the co-occurrence explanation does not hold up, the uniqueness of the 2016 campaign might have played as a confounding variable, affecting both emotion manipulation and participation intention.

Further, the current study did not find any evidence showing the mediation effect of information seeking behavior on participation intention for either positive or negative emotions (RQ4 & RQ7). As discussed, this could be mainly because there were only minimal effects of discrete emotions (both positive and negative) on participation intentions generally. As emotions did not carry large effects on different participation intentions, the pathways from emotions to participation intentions via information seeking end up being undetectable.

Last but not least, the study advances the current literature on discrete emotion and political psychology as largely understudied emotions were included and examined. Even though the findings do not perfectly dovetail with the current literature findings in terms of information seeking and intended political participation (e.g., DeBell, 2016; Woolf, 2007), the results of the study should not be taken lightly.

The limited findings on the effects of discrete emotions on information seeking and political participation in this chapter should be taken into account when discussing the

complexity of discrete emotions and their effects. The findings of the chapter then suggest a few challenges that are central to the task of theorizing about the relationships among discrete political emotions, information search, and political participation.

First, the experiment only asked participants to recall emotional episodes during the 2016 presidential campaigns. Considering that the experience of emotions is sensitive to its context (Kim, Ford, Mauss, & Tamir, 2015), experiencing a certain emotion during an election season may be a very different experience from experiencing the same emotion in other contexts during non-election seasons. For instance, cognitive antecedents of an emotional experience during a presidential election campaign could more pressing and noticeable, thus people may be more apt to experience strong emotions like enthusiasm and disgust than other times. Moreover, the negatively charged campaign in 2016 may have prompted participant to think or feel in a biased manner since people's memories about an unusual event can cause them to perceive and process things differently (Schmidt, 2012). Thus, the findings on the effect of discrete emotions may not be generalizable beyond this particular context.

As discussed earlier, the 2016 election context poses a significant limitation as the front-runners from both parties were rated historically unfavorably by the public according to several polls (e.g., CBS News, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016). Considering the unique context of the 2016 election, it is likely that people were increasingly turned off by the candidates and campaign/election news. Even though people are generally more tuned to media outlets to get news coverage during highly salient events like presidential election, the unusual level of negativity around the 2016 election could have complicated the effect of positive emotions on participants' general information seeking and political activities. It also may have been responsible for the observed patterns with respect to negative emotions. This particularity can explain the limited findings of the study, and therefore, the

findings regarding the different levels of information seeking and participation intention may not be generalized beyond the context and topic of the 2016 presidential election. In the sense, future studies on emotion effects in politics need to expand their efforts to broaden the spectrum of political contexts of emotional episode or experience.

Lastly, in regards to the tendency of co-occurrences of discrete emotion, the method of emotion manipulation could be improved as the recall method used in the study may not be the most desirable or effective emotion-inducing method. To increase the validity of emotion manipulation as well as measurement, scholars should adopt better methods, such as Ecological Momentary Assessment where subjects are randomly asked to evaluate the most current event which engaged their attention while they were pursuing daily activities (e.g., Tong & Jia, 2017). Using this type of advanced method, scholars may collect more current and even simultaneous data in the context like political campaigning and elections that do not rely solely on subjects' memory and impression. If scholars can afford to measure emotions right at the moment (or right after) when people are experiencing them, the validity of emotion measured in a study would be significantly improved. Thus, researchers need to put a collective effort to better investigate discrete emotions independently from one another and their relations with other variables of interest like participation, learning, and attitude.

Despite the limitations discussed, the findings in the chapter significantly advance our understanding of the relationships among discrete emotions, information search, and political participation in two regards. First and foremost, the findings lead me to draw an important conclusion that not all positive emotions have the same magnitude of positive impact on information search or political participation. Some emotions work better than others in mobilizing certain behaviors, and people who do not experience a positive emotion at all may seek out more information than those who feel positive. Especially,

contrary to the common belief and findings in political literature, people in the pride condition show higher levels of participation intention in a few activities (i.e., post a bumper sticker, attend a rally) than those in the enthusiasm or hope condition. Enthusiasm has been regarded as a highly arousing emotion, which in turn leads to higher action tendency (Frijda et al., 1989; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2011). However, the comparisons of enthusiasm with other discrete emotions, hope and pride, tell us a quite different story. This finding calls for the need to include discrete positive emotions other than enthusiasm into the political discussions of emotion effects.

Second, despite the limited findings on the link between discrete emotions and information search patterns, this chapter alludes to the complexity of individuals' information seeking behavior. Maybe the differences among enthusiasm, hope, and pride, and among anxiety, anger, and disgust are not imposing or discriminating enough to make a difference in individuals' news reading patterns, especially the direction of news reading. Yet, a few interesting linkages were found between information seeking and underexplored discrete emotions, such as pride and disgust; for example, disgust increasing non-political reading relative to anger and anxiety.

It is true that people's information seeking and other behaviors are influenced and determined by many different factors beyond their emotional state, such as their interest in given subjects, level of intellectual complexity, personal relevance to topics, salience of issues, and efficacy. Considering the findings of a differential effect of positive emotions on pro-Democratic reading and that of negative emotions on non-political reading, further academic endeavors that explicate differential emotional effects grounded in cognitive appraisal theories (e.g., Lazarus 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) may help to explain why some emotions lead people to seek out more or less of different type of information. Even though the effect of different appraisal dimensions for each emotion on information

seeking was not of interest of the study in this chapter, based on the findings from the previous chapter on discrete emotions and their respective appraisals, I postulate that I could find a clearer effect of different emotions on information seeking behaviors after dissecting the effect of each emotion into the effects of different appraisals. This examination will give us an up-close look into overlapping effects between discrete emotions on information seeking and participation. For example, when looking into the effect of hope on information seeking, if I dissect the overall effect of hope into that of individual appraisals, certainty and anticipated effort, for instance, should I find that certainty leads to decreased information search and effort leads to increased information search. In this way, I may clarify that why hope does or does not carry a detectable impact on information search behavior. Thus, the present findings suggest that different cognitive-appraisal constructs of discrete emotions need to be taken into account as one of the subjects of academic investigation and concerted effort in studying information search and beyond in politics.

Thus far, I described and discussed the findings, limitations, and implications of the two studies in Chapter 5 and 6. In the final chapter, I briefly summarize the main agenda of the dissertation by turning to its theoretical backdrop, main contributions and importance, and the possible trajectory of future research.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

On November 8, 2016, the world tuned in as the U.S. presidential election unfolded, leading to an upset victory of Trump, who become the 45th president of the U.S. Supporters of Clinton and now-President Trump gathered at rallies to watch the vote count. As the night went on, Trump supporters grew more ecstatic while Clinton supporters fell into despair and disappointment. Angry Clinton fans and protesters poured out onto the streets in cities across the nation, expressing anger and resistance as shouting out the words "Not My President" (Taylor, 2016). The emotional highs and lows seemed especially dramatic and volatile around the 2016 presidential election. What perplexes me here is how exactly politics make us emotional and, in turn, mobilizes us. To date, we do not have an accurate answer to the question, and the unprecedented 2016 election makes it particularly important to study these questions in a novel context.

When political leaders use the rhetoric of positivism, the electorate has seemed to respond in some way (Cadwell, 2013). Positive emotions are very frequently referenced emotions in the political rhetoric to galvanize the electorate (Engelken-Jorge, 2011). By tapping into positive emotions, political leaders and parties have won not only hearts but votes (Brader, 2005). The general assumption in the dynamics is that positive expectations change attitudes toward the leaders and parties, thus mobilize the citizenship, or vice versa (Waterman, Jenkins, Smith, & Silva, 1999). On the other hand, the use of negativity in political campaigning or ads may have different implications. The prevalence of negativity in politics, such as negative campaigns against opposing candidates, can lead voter to be more attentive to information, more participatory, or get turned off by the politics (Brader, 2006; DeBell 2016; Valentino et al., 2011). Political scholars have been asking and

answering questions on why and/or how exactly people respond in a particular way to such emotional stimuli.

In this dissertation, I'm less concerned with how political leaders use rhetoric, and more concerned with the emotions that the public feels, some of which are inspired by political leaders' words and actions. Throughout the dissertation, I analyze emotions and their effects in politics. Doing do, I chose to focus on three positive as well as three negative emotions reflecting the growing academic interest in the role of positive emotions and all the negativity and bickering going around in contemporary politics (Groeling, 2010).

Emotions, whether positive or negative, not only permeate politics but also undergird a wide range of individuals' behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs in politics (Civettini, 2011). To get a better grasp on what emotions are, how different they are from one another, and how different emotions work in politics, I posed four main questions that guided this research: First, what are enthusiasm, hope, and pride? Second, how different are they from one another? Third, how do the three emotions affect individuals' information seeking and political participation? Lastly, how do three different negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and disgust) affect individuals' information seeking and political participation?

The answers to the questions illustrate that emotions are a powerful, yet not fully understood, tool for public learning and mobilization. In this chapter, I first show that unearthing how discrete emotions work in politics, especially regarding positive emotions, required departures from and extensions on prior literature, especially cognitive psychology. The approach significantly contributes to the fields of political communication and political psychology both conceptually and methodologically. Second, I illustrate how my main findings document the constructs of different type of positive emotions as well as the role of positive and negative emotions in politics to shape individuals' behaviors. Third,

I discuss possible avenues for future research. Finally, I conclude with the importance of emotion studies to the electorate and political system.

DEPARTING FROM APPRAISALS TO CAPTURING THEM

Beyond Valence: Discrete Emotion Model

Studying the effects of emotion has been one of many subjects of interest for political scholars. The present research drew upon research traditions and findings to study emotions and their effects, however, the approach to study emotions has usually centered on two dimensions: valence and/or arousal. With the dimension-oriented approach, the incongruency among the research findings regarding the effects of both positive and negative emotions could not be reconciled (Brader, 2005, 2006a; Valentino et al., 2011).

Recently, political researchers started to pay attention to different attributes of emotions with a discrete emotions approach (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Weber, 2013). With the new perspective of discrete emotion model, different emotions with the same valence, whether positive or negative, could be treated separately. The basic assumption of the discrete emotion model is that for an emotion to occur or be experienced, there should be antecedents which are encapsulated by what is called (cognitive) appraisal (Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Taking into account a range of cognitive appraisal components, scholars can differentiate different emotions with the same valence and predict their distinct effects based on the appraisal components. However, this approach has not been in use in political research, especially regarding positive emotions. In other words, there has been a disproportionate emphasis on studying negative emotions, such as anger, fear, and anxiety, in the field of political communication (Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011; MacKuen et al., 2010). The negativity bias in emotion studies has yielded a void in understanding of positive emotions and their impact in politics.

164

This dissertation recognizes the void and draws from the discrete emotion model, particularly previous research findings in the cognitive psychology literature. Although there are a wide range of positive emotions such as serenity, joy, or awe, I decided to prioritize three politically relevant positive emotions: enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Past research on positive emotions in politics renders justification and immediate need to study the three emotions as they (especially hope and pride) are prevalent and noticeable emotions in political contexts like elections and campaigning (e.g., Just et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Snyder, 2000), yet have never been studied in terms of their appraisal constructs.

To uncover the constructs of enthusiasm, hope, and pride, the notion of cognitive appraisal of antecedents of emotions was discussed and each positive emotion was defined in terms of its appraisal constructs. I mainly drew upon the findings on appraisal theories to identify and discriminate the unique sets of appraisals that conceptualize the three emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001; Frijda et al., 1989; Tong; 2007), but also to advance appraisal theories by proposing additional appraisal dimensions like change and resource acquisition. Finalizing the selection process of appraisal dimensions, ten most (potentially) discriminating appraisal dimensions were identified: (1) pleasantness, (2) action tendency, (3) certainty, (4) change, (5) agency, (6) anticipated effort, (7) self-regard, (8) social appropriateness, (9) mastery, and (10) resource acquisition.

Instead of using all the appraisals for all three emotions, I proposed a theoretical model (Figure 1) with the three emotions predicted by three different, yet overlapping, sets of appraisal dimensions to be as parsimonious as possible. In the model, each emotion was matched with five to six appraisal dimensions to capture the subtle nuances between different emotional experiences. This conceptual approach contributes to political literature as no study has yet measured the appraisal components of the three emotions in political

contexts. I operationalized the appraisal dimensions of the three emotions using relevant cognitive items that asked about details of the antecedents which induced one of the three emotions. Even though the conceptualizations and operationalizations of the three emotions were grounded in the literature, they were once again tested to identify whether they hold true in the political context. The findings reported in Chapter 5 illustrate the potential benefits of studying discrete positive emotions as well as the need for them to be studied separately in a political setting.

Methodological Contributions

This project not only contributes to the conceptualization of enthusiasm, hope, and pride in political contexts but also is a valuable addition to the study of political communication in two regards. First, I applied the measure of cognitive appraisal dimensions developed in cognitive psychology to assess and capture discrete emotions in politics. This is an important advance as it shows that discrete emotions are unique from one another, but when it comes to their construct and measure, each of them is universal and generalizable regardless of the context. Adopting the measures from cognitive psychology literature, and then applying them to study political emotions has seldom been executed in the political psychology research. Thus, the facts that the conceptualizations and measures (i.e., appraisal dimensions) of the three emotions held up in the current study passing its reliability and validity tests, and that the three emotions were shown to be distinct can assure the generalizability of appraisal dimension measures across different contexts including politics.

Second, I employed statistical modeling techniques, such as CFA, ANOVA, and MANOVA, to theorize the model of discrete positive emotions and their effects. Considering the fact that political scholars have never proposed or tested a model of

discrete emotions especially in relation to the dimensions of cognitive appraisals, testing and confirming the proposed theoretical model of discrete positive emotions contributes to collective knowledge in political emotions as the statistical analysis yielded a strong model fit. Importantly, future research on political emotions can borrow from the present study to advance our understanding of discrete positive emotions in politics.

The theoretical and methodological foundations of the dissertation assisted me with answering the key questions of interest; how people experience different positive emotions and what effects the discrete emotions (both positive and negative) carry on individuals' political behaviors. The answers to these questions help to uncover how different they are and why they have different effects on individuals.

FROM DISCRETE EMOTION TO PARTICIPATION

Emotion is a slippery concept as I advanced in the introduction and Chapter 2. To define and account for what exactly emotion is and how it is experienced, I relied on appraisal theories (Frijda, 1987; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; Lazarus; 1991; Scherer, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The framework of appraisal theories is an appropriate lens for the investigation of complicated dynamics of political emotions, whether it is positive or negative, as it argues that different emotional experiences can be attributed to different cognitive evaluations of antecedents or environments where people encounter different stimuli. In short, Nussbaum (2001) asserted that emotion carries a cognitive component in it. By drawing from the appraisal components of emotions, I could differentiate enthusiasm, hope, and pride. Not only do individuals experience different positive emotions depending on their appraisals of environments, but also are affected as a result of experiencing discrete positive emotions. The results in Chapter 5 paint a compelling picture of the ways in which discrete positive emotions are distinct from one

another and can have differing influence on the citizenry in terms of political engagement. As the work of identifying appraisal components is far more established for negative emotions than for positive emotions (Johnston et al., 2015; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Nabi, 2002, 2003; MacKuen at al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2011), I undertake this work only for the under-studied positive emotions.

Idiosyncrasy of Enthusiasm, Hope, and Pride

The most frequently referenced positive emotion in political literature is enthusiasm (Barrett et al., 2001; Brader et al., 2010; Engelken-Jorge et al., 2011; Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Marcus et al., 2000). By defining and measuring enthusiasm, scholars often collapse all different positive emotions without considering the differences that may result from the occurrence of other distinct positive emotions like pride. It is no doubt that enthusiastic people may also feel other emotions like pride, joy, or hope simultaneously. This tendency to experience different positive emotions at the same time has challenged and complicated researchers' efforts to study positive emotions (Just et al., 2015; Tong & Jia, 2017). The findings from the field of cognitive psychology helped me to construct the three mutually inclusive, yet different sets of appraisal dimensions predicting enthusiasm, hope, and pride. The overlap of appraisal components of the three emotions accounts for the high likelihood of co-occurrence of the three emotions (Tong & Jia, 2017) and allowed me to better construct the model predicting enthusiasm, hope, and pride.

The following sets of appraisal dimensions were identified to predict each positive emotion. Enthusiasm can be explained by pleasantness, action tendency, agency (self, not others), resource acquisition, change, and certainty. Hope can be predicted by a lack of pleasantness, anticipated effort, change, a lack of certainty, and agency (others). Lastly,

pride is found to be explained by mastery, self-regard, social appropriateness, certainty, and agency (others, not self).

Specifically, enthusiasm is experienced when a situation or incident is highly pleasant. When people notice a positive change and think the change would make it easier for them to attain desired goals or results (i.e., resource acquisition), have a control over a situation, and feel certain about the situation, they feel enthusiastic. This emotion makes people action-oriented. Feeling hopeful, on the other hand, cannot be perceived as pleasant in the same way as enthusiasm. Hope is experienced when a situation/incident is deemed to be less pleasant but there seems to be a possibility for change in the future. To achieve the desired change, people usually perceive that the situation would require them to expend effort. Hopeful people are less certain and perceive that other people are in control of the situation. Hope has been found to be more cognitively complicated than other positive emotions (Just et al., 2007), thus this may explain the low levels of pleasantness and certainty. Compared to enthusiasm and hope, pride is found to be a socially-integrated emotion which means that the emotion is usually experienced in the presence of others (Smith & Mackie, 2008). To illustrate, pride is likely to be induced when individuals perceive their deeds or behaviors are socially appropriate and desirable. In the sense, people usually sense a feeling of achievement (i.e., mastery) and this may lead to enhanced level of self-esteem. However, when it comes to the agency over the situation, people are less likely to feel like they are in control.

The identification of the three different sets of overlapping appraisal dimensions (i.e., pleasantness, agency, change, certainty) sheds light on the high correlations among the three emotions. Even though the correlations do not necessarily mean co-occurrence, it may allude to the finding that more than one positive emotion is likely to be experienced

simultaneously or that positive emotions become indistinguishable especially under salient political events like political campaigning (Just et al., 2007).

Most importantly, the confirmation of the three distinct sets of appraisal dimensions significantly contributes to and advances our collective knowledge of discrete positive emotions in politics. Understanding emotion and its dynamics in politics is such a complicated subject to entangle, thus has rendered itself conceptually and methodologically challenging. Political actors, such as parties, government leaders, and the citizenry, may all engage in this messy game partially mobilized by certain stimuli. These stimuli likely act as antecedents that result in or are carried over to different cognitive appraisals. Appraisal theorists argue that cognitive appraisal is what differentiates discrete emotions. The findings in Chapter 5 dovetail fairly well with previous research in appraisal studies, drawing a conclusion that positive emotions in the political context also can be explained and predicted with appraisal components. However, the findings should be viewed with caution as the survey results (i.e., ANOVA) did not distinguish each appraisal dimension across enthusiasm, hope, and pride. The important implication of the study is that even though positive emotions may not be distinct in terms of levels of individual appraisals, they are discrete in terms of their constructs. Importantly, the results of the study highlight the need to treat discrete emotions as latent factors rather than as observed variable in an analysis.

Moreover, one of the dissertation's key contributions to the political literature can be further discussed in light of possibly fruitful avenues for future studies. As advanced, emotion experience is contextual, and the findings from the first study suggest that feeling hopeful, proud, or enthusiastic in a political context may be different from experiencing the same emotions in other contexts. Some of the new findings went beyond the current literature of appraisal theories; such as that political pride is far more others-oriented and

less self-oriented in terms of agency than interpersonal pride, and that feeling hope or pride can be a far less pleasant experience than feeling the same emotion in other contexts. Reflecting on the findings, the importance of the context of emotion experience should be addressed, and future studies in emotion should take into account and compare distinct levels of appraisal components within the same emotion when studying cross-contextual emotion experiences.

In the context of salient political events, people are likely to experience lots of different emotions, whether positive or negative (Gould, 2011). Collapsing all the emotions together regardless of their appraisal differences only captures a partial picture. Discrete positive emotions, in this sense, should be the subject of interest for political scholars as well as psychologists. Yet, the development of more accurate sets of appraisal dimensions is very much needed to increase the explained variance in each emotion as the political emotions may be more complicated and dynamic than we expect depending on context or incident.

Discrete Emotions, Information Search, and Participation

Part of the electorate's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors should be influenced by the state of their hearts (Brader, 2005; Lodge & Taber; 2011). Uncovering how each discrete emotional state influences people's behaviors in politics, Chapter 6 discussed the dynamics among both positive and negative emotions, information search, and political participation. There were few differential effects of discrete emotions on information seeking. The lack of findings for positive emotions may be due to the following reasons: Based on the findings in Chapter 5, it is possible that (1) the differences in the appraisal dimensions across the three positive emotions were not large enough to make a difference in information search and that (2) the overlapping appraisals of the positive emotions result

in non-discriminating information search behaviors. In regard to the limited effects of both positive and negative discrete emotions, the reasons can be the following: (3) Information seeking is not only affectively driven but also cognitively oriented (Wojcieszak, Bimber, Feldman, & Stroud, 2016), thus could be influenced by a range of both known (e.g., intellectual complexity, openness) and unknown variables not included in the present analysis. (4) Significant levels of co-occurrences within both positive and negative emotions blur the unique effect of each discrete emotion. (5) Lastly, the unusual context of the 2016 election (e.g., historic unfavorable ratings of two front-runners) complicated the discrete emotion effects as people may have experienced or been exposed to an overwhelming mixture of negative emotions.

The sampling method of the two studies posed another limitation. As both studies in the dissertation adopted non-probability samples, the biased selection of the samples, especially considering the fact that both samples had more than 60% of self-identified Democrats or liberals, may have affected the results. However, to date, we do not have any empirical evidence showing that partisan affiliation affects the way people experience emotions in general or that partisans have a tendency to experience a certain discrete emotion uniquely (e.g., Democrats are more prone to feel hopeful than Republicans). The purpose of this study was not external validity, however, and the experimental protocol helps to assure the internal validity of the study.

However, the study documents that positive emotions are not always effective in promoting people's information searching behaviors as the differences in the effects between positive emotions and no emotion were not confirmed (except that no emotion works better than pride in increasing pro-Democratic news reading). This is quite contrary to the literature that argues that positive emotions increase information processing (e.g., Lecheler et al., 2013). Despite the inconsistency, the findings shed light on the possibility

that complacent or happy individuals are not accurate or willful information seekers in all contexts and that people may become willful information seekers when they are in the neutral emotional state. In everyday politics, politicians often use the rhetoric of positivism to evoke positive emotions among the electorate; the perceived positivism may lead to increased participation and some other actions but not to information search. Speaking of the effects of negative emotions, going negative while campaigning or in elections may not be the smartest option for campaign managers to choose if they want to engage the electorate, as anger and anxiety had minimal effects on political information seeking and no negative emotion had a positive impact on engaging in political activities.

The findings in Chapter 6 document that beyond the differences in demographics and major political attributes, individuals' emotional state can make a meaningful difference on their decision to engage in few political activities. Although they share the same valence, enthusiasm, hope, and pride still pose a differing impact on political activities, such as attending a political rally, posting a bumper sticker, and contacting candidates or campaign. To date, scholars have assumed and found that enthusiasm is the most action-oriented positive emotion (Hutchings et al., 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). Yet, it is quite revealing to find that pride actually has a more powerful impact on certain activities like attending a rally and posting a bumper sticker, than enthusiasm or hope.

Comparing the effect of positive emotions to that of negative emotions, some practical take-aways for political strategists or communication consultants may include the finding that the effect of overall positive emotions outperforms that of negative ones on political engagement. Specifically, pride could carry trickle-down effects to other positive emotions, especially enthusiasm, considering the high correlation ($r = .96$). It is possible that positive emotional experience can snowball to other positive emotions. Also, reflecting on what Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggested to break the spiral of political cynicism,

positive emotions (or more intriguingly, disgust, in regard to its positive effect on information search) can potentially counteract the negative effects of general cynicism prevalent in the contemporary political environment, which is particularly dampened by strategic news framing by political media outlets (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; DeBell, 2017; Woolf, 2006).

In addition, even though the current project did not reveal a link from emotions to information search to political engagement, it proposes an interesting subject for future research. With the effects of discrete emotions on information seeking and participation intention being the main interest of the second study, the very limited effects of discrete emotions is one of the reasons for finding no linkage. However, considering the positive impacts of political knowledge, information acquisition, and education on political participation documented in literature (Verba et al., 1995), people's information search behaviors in terms of both amount and direction could be a potent influencer of political engagement, thus is worth further study. Thus, we can look into the dynamics between the appraisal dimensions and information seeking/participation instead of between an emotion itself and information seeking/participation to find out which appraisal components (e.g., expected change, certainty, or agency) may lead to increased or decreased information seeking, thus to participation intention.

Linking the findings of Chapter 5 and 6 together, it implies that not every positive emotion works better than no emotion in engaging the citizenry. In specific, the findings in Chapter 6 paint a persuasive picture showing that positive emotions like hope and enthusiasm do not help engage people in politics more than no emotion. Hope can be less action-oriented mainly because of the low levels of certainty and pleasantness. Also, hope can deter people from mobilization as they find there is no agency in themselves in a situation even though they notice a possibility of change. When politicians are engaged in

hope-evoking talks, the possibility of change in the future may be projected, but it may be less likely for ordinary citizens to lead or take initiative in change as it is political leaders, not the citizenry, who have high stakes, thus are more invested in making the suggested change.

When it comes to the effect of enthusiasm, people can feel too euphoric to take an actual action. Chapter 5 discovered that enthusiasm is felt as highly pleasant. Thus, when people are in a highly pleasant state, such as feeling enthusiastic, they may be less willing to take initiative in making a change or take an action as the present already feels quite alright (e.g., mood maintenance theory). Although this hypothesis requires further investigation as the emotion is also found to score high on the action-tendency dimension (refer to the result section of Chapter 5), this could be why some studies, *but not others,* find positive effects of enthusiasm as they use a dimensional approach by collapsing hope, pride, and enthusiasm all together.

The present study brings along few additional points that deserve further examination. First, even though the differential effect of discrete emotions on people's information seeking is not as noticeable as that of the emotions from valence-focused or dimensional model, they still paint an interesting picture of how people act differently when they experience emotions like hope, pride, anxiety and/or disgust. Thus, when studying people's learning and engagement in politics, the differentiation or separation of discrete emotions should be done with more attention and academic rigor as they may show varying effects across different political activities.

Last but not the least, the serial process from feeling emotions, to information seeking, to political participation needs to be examined by including more possible paths and variables from both the affective and cognitive sides. For example, by including variables like the intensity of felt emotion or level of information attainment, the linkages

among emotions, information seeking, and participation could be better explicated. It still remains as a perplexing relationship, thus should be the main foci of future research which centers on what mediates or moderates the relationship between discrete emotion and politics, if it is not the level or direction of information people seek out.

CONCLUSION: IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING EMOTIONS IN POLITICS

During the 2016 presidential campaign, young voters expressed their enthusiasm toward the Bernie Sanders' bid for presidency by waving the sign saying *#FeelTheBern*. As he rose to be a competitive contender to Hillary Clinton, the enthusiasm eventually earned him more young votes than Trump and Clinton combined (Blake, 2016; Healy & Alcindor, 2016). The 73-year-old senator's message and speeches energized grassroots movements into massive rallies and imbued young voters with enthusiasm (Schreckinger, 2015).

On the other side of the partisan line, Trump was claiming his full credit for expanding the Republican base to include independents and even Democrats as Republicans continued to shattering turnout records in the primaries and caucuses (Dinan, 2016). Although it may be controversial, *CNN* reported in October 2016 that "Trump supporters' enthusiastic reception during campaign underscores the grassroots enthusiasm that no previous GOP nominee has conjured in years" (Collinson, 2016).

In both cases, the positive affective energy may have enabled people to see the pathways to their desired goals and believe that the goals are attainable (Civettini, 2011). The electorate not only makes sense of but also feels politics as it described by Redlawsk and colleagues (2010). The way politics makes the electorate feel has been discussed in the burgeoning fields of political psychology and communication.

176

This project punctuates the ever-increasing attention to the politics of emotions by countering claims about its effective, and potentially abusive (as it could be disguising and misleading) power over voters (Engelken-Jorgen et al., 2011). The dissertation makes clear that politics evokes discrete emotions, and they affect citizens' participatory behaviors, but only to a limited extent. Although citizens experience different types of positive and negative emotions, they played only a limited role in determining whether people engaged in politics in the context of the 2016 campaign. Finally, and importantly, the different constructs of appraisal dimensions of discrete emotions may be the reason why they do differ in influencing political learning and participation in some circumstances.

These findings in the dissertation matter for citizens, who must become more aware of their own emotions enacted by the media, politicians, parties, or the overall rhetoric of politics, to make better conscious decisions on exercising their rights as citizenry. Although I did not find persistent effects of emotions on information search and participation intentions, the fact that I did in some instances after a limited manipulation signals the need for increased citizen awareness. The results also matter for political leaders as they are trying to win over the electorate and nurture the culture of participatory democracy. And they especially matter for anyone interested in understanding political participation for the sake of democracy.

Appendix A. Twelve News Articles for Experiment

I. GOP and White House Lost Big on Health Care

Republican leaders abruptly pulled their overhaul of the nation's health-care system from the House floor on Friday, a dramatic defeat for President Trump and House Speaker Paul D. Ryan that leaves a major campaign promise unfulfilled and casts doubt on the Republican Party's ability to govern.

The decision leaves President Barack Obama's chief domestic achievement in place and raises questions about the GOP's ability to advance other high-stakes priorities, including tax reform and infrastructure spending. Ryan (R-Wis.) remains without a signature accomplishment as speaker, and the defeat undermines Trump's image as a skilled dealmaker willing to strike compromises to push his agenda forward.

In an interview with The Washington Post, Trump deflected any responsibility for the setback and instead blamed Democrats. "We couldn't get one Democratic vote," he said. "I don't blame Paul," Trump added, referring to Ryan.

Congressional leaders made clear that the bill — known as the American Health Care Act — was dead. "It's done, DOA," said Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Greg Walden (R-Ore.), who drafted much of the legislation. "This bill is dead."

It remains far from certain that Republicans, in control of the White House and both houses of Congress, will be able to credibly foist responsibility for the nation's health-care woes onto Democrats. What is certain is that Republicans continue to have difficulty turning their campaign promises into legislative action.

II. Democratic Party's Image More Positive Than GOP's

According to the latest USA Today/Gallup poll, Americans are much more positive in their assessments of the Democratic Party than of the Republican Party -- consistent with a trend Gallup has measured since April 2016. Over the past several months, the public's ratings of the Republican Party have grown slightly more negative. The vast majority of Republicans and Democrats rate their respective parties favorably, while independents have a more positive than negative view of the Democratic Party, and a more negative than positive view of the Republican Party.

The Jan. 2-4, 2017, poll finds 54% of Americans saying they have a favorable opinion of the Democratic Party, while 37% have an unfavorable opinion. Ratings of the Republican Party are much more negative, with 38% favorable and 50% unfavorable.

The public's ratings of the Republican Party have grown negative in recent months, from 44% in July 2016 to 50% in early February 2017. The current ratings are at roughly the levels seen in April 2016 and at several points in 2016. The party's unfavorable ratings are up four points since September 2016 and are now on the low end of what Gallup has measured since 2006.

Ratings of the Democratic Party have not shown much change since July 2012, with between 51% and 57% rating the party favorably over this time.

III. Americans Grew More Positive Toward GOP's Obamacare Replacement

Half of American voters agree with the Republican charge that Obamacare will collapse if it's left as is.

50 % have a favorable opinion of the Affordable Care Act, unchanged from January, while 47 % have a negative view of Obamacare.

Those are some of the findings from the latest national Fox News Poll.

According to the poll, Americans have grown more positive in their assessments of the Republican Party's plan to repeal and replace Obamacare. Over the past several weeks, the public's ratings of the GOP's congressional efforts to replace the Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare, have grown considerably more positive.

As of Jan. 2017, polling statistics showed a general negative opinion of the GOP's efforts to dismantle Obamacare; with those in favor at 26% and those against at 54%. In the latest poll, however, the ratings of the plan to replace Obamacare are more positive, with 34% favorable and 48% unfavorable.

Almost half of voters (48 %) oppose the GOP plan -- but that doesn't tell the full story. Among those against it, one in four complains it doesn't make enough changes to Obamacare.

Overall, 34 % favor the current Republican plan to repeal and replace Obamacare.   And while a majority of Republicans favors it (69 %), a sizable minority is either against it (15 %) or unsure (16 %).

The Fox News poll is based on landline and cellphone interviews with 1,008 randomly chosen registered voters nationwide and was conducted under the joint direction of Anderson Robbins Research (D) and Shaw & Company Research (R) from March 12-14, 2017.

IV. Pew Research: Republicans More Knowledgeable Than Democrats

According the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan fact tank, Republicans outperformed Democrats on a 19-question common knowledge quiz.

In a scientific survey of 1,168 adults conducted during September and October of 2016, respondents were asked not only multiple-choice questions, but also queries using maps, photographs and symbols. Among other subjects, participants identified international leaders, cabinet members, Supreme Court justices, nations on a world map, the current unemployment and poverty rates and war casualty totals.

"Republicans generally outperformed Democrats on the current knowledge quiz.   On 13 of the 19 questions, Republicans score significantly higher than Democrats and there are no questions on which Democrats did better than Republicans.   In past knowledge quizzes, partisan differences have been more muted, though Republicans often have scored somewhat higher than Democrats," John Livingston, a senior researcher at the center said.

In a 2010 Pew survey, Republicans outperformed Democrats on 10 of 12 questions, with one tie and Democrats outperforming Republicans on one of the 12.   The Pew's latest survey reconfirmed the previous result demonstrating that Republicans outperformed Democrats on every single one of 19 questions.

V. Donations Pour into Help Elizabeth Warren After Senate Rebuke

Liberal allies of Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren have collected more than $250,000 for the Democrat's re-election campaign since the Republican-led Senate voted to silence her Tuesday night.

MoveOn.org officials said more than 9,000 members stepped up to financially support Warren after the Senate's Republican leaders said she had violated Senate rules by "impugning the motives" of Sen. Jeff Sessions, the Alabama Republican who is President Trump's pick for attorney general.

Warren's objectionable act: reading aloud on the Senate floor a 1986 letter from Coretta Scott King, the widow of civil-rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., opposing Sessions' nomination to a federal judgeship. King wrote that the Alabama Republican had used his then-position as a U.S. attorney to intimidate elderly black voters.

"By standing with Elizabeth Warren, we're standing up against that kind of bigotry," MoveOn officials said in a statement Wednesday. "We're standing up for freedom of speech. And we're standing up for something else that is under threat in the age of Trump: Truth. Together, let's show that when our friends speak truth to power, a powerful movement rises to stand by their side."

VI. Sanders Finally Blames Establishment Democrats for Trump Victory

Sen. Bernie Sanders spoke at the 2017 Sister Giant Conference in Washington D.C. In his speech, he voiced his harshest criticism of the Democratic establishment since his presidential campaign.

"Let me suggest to you, and some will disagree with me and that's okay, too. But let me suggest to you that what happened on November 8th. Trump's victory was not a victory for Trump or his ideology. It was a gross political failure of the Democratic Party," said Sanders.

Sanders called Trump a "pathological liar" with no ideology, but he believes that voters chose Trump because his platform challenges the status quo, as opposed to Clinton's, which embodied it. "There are people in this country who are hurting, and they are hurting terribly," added Sanders. "And for years they looked to the Democratic Party, which at one time was the party of working people, and they looked and they looked and they looked and they got nothing in return. And out of desperation, they turned to Donald Trump."

"The Clintons' lack of empathy to the plight of working and middle class Americans repelled voters. Furthermore, Hillary Clinton and the Democratic establishment ran her presidential campaign as though Clinton's victory was imminent. "It's her turn," was a mantra that blinded the party from reality. In the wake of Clinton's loss, the establishment has failed to accept responsibility and has resorted to casting blame on voters. The party needs to begin to turn their attention away from corporate and wealthy donors and toward the working, poor, and middle class voters that they repeatedly cast by the wayside," said Sanders in a statement.

VII. Republicans Unveil New Bill to Replace Obamacare

House Republicans introduced a newly crafted bill to repeal Obamacare's individual mandate that also aims to maintain coverage for people with pre-existing conditions and allow children to stay on their parents' plans until the age of 26.

The new measure would offer individuals refundable tax credits to purchase health insurance and restructure the country's Medicaid program so that states receive a set amount of money from the federal government every year.

House Speaker Paul Ryan said in a statement, "this bill is a plan to drive down costs, encourage competition, and give every American access to quality, affordable health insurance. It protects young adults, patients with pre-existing conditions, and provides a stable transition so that no one has the rug pulled out from under them."

After the stunning health-care fiasco when GOP abruptly withdrew the American Health Care Act on March 24, Republican leaders have teamed up with independent healthcare research firms to flesh out the details of an alternative health care plan and gauge the feasibility of a new bill.

White House spokesman Sean Spicer praised the bill's release. "Obamacare has proven to be a disaster with fewer options, inferior care, and skyrocketing costs that are crushing small business and families across America. Now, the American people are ready to turn the page," Spicer said in a statement.

Republican leaders are committed to moving forward with major tenants of the legislation and are hoping that President Trump can bring wavering members on board and get the bill across the finish line.

VIII. Key Democrats Target President Trump on Ethics

The top Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee will introduce a bill this week that would force President Trump to disclose his income, assets, and liabilities in a foreign country before he embarks on new trade negotiations.

The measure from Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden marks the latest push by Democrats on Capitol Hill and independent watchdogs to pressure the Trump administration, as they clamor for investigations into a top White House aide and search for novel ways to force the new president to disclose more information about his vast business interests and the ethics questions that have dogged him since his Jan. 20 swearing-in.

Sen. Elizabeth Warren and five other Democratic senators recently wrote to White House counsel Don McGahn, asking him to rein in possible ethics violations after top White House aide Kellyanne Conway touted Ivanka Trump's clothing line during a television interview.

Democrats face long odds of their efforts gaining much traction in a Republican-controlled Congress, but they increasingly feel emboldened by the fury of Democratic activists who have taken their protests to the streets and into congressional town hall meetings in the first weeks of the Trump administration, political observers say.

"The Democrats, driven by their supporters, are determined to inquire into all of these open questions," said Cal Jillson, a political scientist at Southern Methodist University. "There is a very broad sense among the people who are not die-hard supporters of Donald Trump that there are so many unanswered questions and so many ethical strings to be pulled, that the sweater will unravel."

IX. After Short-Lived Tenure, Uber President Quits Amid Company Turmoil

After less than a year as president of Uber, Jeff Jones is leaving the embattled ride-hailing company, Uber confirms.

"We want to thank Jeff for his six months at the company and wish him all the best," an Uber spokesperson says in a statement.

Jones, previously Target's chief marketing officer, was brought on by Kalanick last fall to boost Uber's reputation.

Though Uber has long held its reputation as an aggressive startup, the company has been battling current controversies, ranging from sexual harassment allegations to CEO Travis Kalanick's abrasive behavior.

After a video surfaced earlier this year, showing Kalanick arguing with an Uber driver, the CEO admitted he needed leadership help, and announced his search for a new chief operating officer.

While that hunt appeared to threaten Jones' role as second in command to Kalanick, in a statement to Recode, Jones simply says his leadership approach is "inconsistent" with what he saw happening at Uber. Recode first reported Jones' departure on Sunday.

Meanwhile, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick issued a note to staff: "After we announced our intention to hire a COO, Jeff came to the tough decision that he doesn't see his future at Uber."

"If you're going to leave, people do so within the first year because the pace isn't what they expected or what they're used to," said Neal Narayani, Uber's head of people analytics.

X. Rock 'n' Roll Pioneer Chuck Berry Dies at 90

Every time you see a rocker strutting the stage, slinging their guitar around and cutting loose with killer riffs, Chuck Berry's musical DNA is at work.

Berry, who died Saturday at 90 according to the St. Charles County Missouri police department, created the rock star blueprint more than 50 years ago and generations later, there's still nobody who can touch the original.

From the time Berry first hit the scene with Maybellene in 1955, he defined the sound, the swagger, the style of a rock and roll star. He was the show. And to this day, guitarists pay homage banging out his wicked licks and imitating his signature duck walk.

Berry was so energetic, charismatic and unique that he rendered moot the prevailing racial barriers of the 1950s that kept most African American musicians out of the mainstream. He had a knack for gauging what his audience liked and then giving it to them.

His virile concoction of country hillbilly guitar licks and spirited R&B was the high-test that fueled the rock and roll engine. Even being locked up in 1962-1963 couldn't keep his fire from spreading on both sides of the Atlantic. The Beatles, Rolling Stones, Beach Boys and others gained traction during that time by covering Berry songs. Even Elvis dipped into his catalog. More than 75 different artists have done Berry songs. Johnny B. Goode alone has seen at least two dozen versions.

Berry and his music were built to last. Scandals couldn't keep him down. Neither could passing fads or changing tastes. His salacious euphemisms and rebellious spirit still resonate.

XI. Fire Near Boulder, Colorado, may be Human-Caused

Firefighters made progress Sunday in battling a small wildfire that forced people to flee hundreds of homes in the mountains just outside downtown Boulder, Colorado, and authorities said they believe the blaze may have been human-caused.

Light winds pushed the flames in the wooded area a couple of miles west of Pearl Street, the shopping and dining hub in the heart of the university city. Crews partially contained the fire that had burned just over 60 acres, but officials worried that stronger gusts that could fan the flames might develop overnight.

The Boulder Office of Emergency Management said 426 homes were evacuated before dawn and residents of an additional 836 were warned to get ready to leave if conditions worsened. The evacuation orders will remain in place overnight, said Boulder County Sheriff's Cmdr. Mike Wagner.

There were no reports of injuries or damage to homes, emergency officials said. Several aircraft were dropping water and retardant on the flames, and a community center opened as an evacuation shelter.

The fire started in the Sunshine Canyon area, which is dotted with a mixture of expensive homes and rustic mountain residences.

Boulder County Sheriff's Commander Mike Wagner said the area is used by hikers and by transients for camping, leading authorities to believe the blaze was human-caused. Wagner said officials ruled out any lightning strikes or downed power lines.

Wagner said fire crews will monitor the blaze overnight and focus on full containment and mop-up on Monday.

XII. More than 50 percent of California Still in a Drought

Has this year's record rain finally ended California's epic drought? Not really.
Despite all the rain and snow in California over the last couple of months, more than half the state is still considered to be abnormally dry or worse in terms of drought conditions, according to the U.S. Drought Monitor.
A new map and graph system, which was calculated Tuesday and released Thursday, shows that nearly all of Northern California is no longer considered to be in the drought. Statewide, 43.94 percent of California is out of the drought, which is up 3.5 percent from Feb. 7 and up more than 30 percent since Nov. 15, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
The northern half of the state that gets more winter rain is drought-free, while much of the middle and southern portion is still in moderate to severe drought. Santa Barbara County, where a lake that supplies its water remains at 16 percent capacity despite rain elsewhere in the state, is still experiencing extreme drought.
Overall, 31.86 percent of the state is considered to be abnormally dry, 16.78 percent of California is considered to be in a moderate drought and 7.41 percent of the state is still considered to be in a severe drought.
Many areas of the state improved their drought statuses. More than 20 percent of California went from moderate drought on Feb. 7 to abnormally dry when the measurements were calculated Tuesday, according to the NOAA data.

References

Ann, T. (2016, November 9). Emotional highs and lows from a historic election night. *The Atlantic.* Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/11/emotional-highs-and-lows-from-a-historic-election-night/507080/

Ann, T. (2016, November 10). 'Not My President': Thousands march in protest. *The Atlantic.* Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/11/not-my-president-thousands-march-in-protest/507248/

Baker, P. (2013, January 21). Obama offers liberal vision: 'We must act.' *The New York Times.* Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/01/22/us/politics/obama-inauguration-draws-hundreds-of-thousands.html/

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,* 1173-1182.

Barrett, L. F. (2006). Emotions as natural kinds? *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6,* 260-274.

Barrett, L. F., Gross, J., Christensen, T. C., & Benvenuto, M. (2001). Knowing what you're feeling and know what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation, *Cognition and Emotion, 15,* 713-724.

Baumeister, R. F., Fabor, J. E., & Wallace, H. M. (1999). Coping and ego depletion, In C. R. Snyder (Ed.), *Coping: The psychology of what works* (pp. 50-69). New York: Oxford University Press.

Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2014). Disgust, harm, and morality in politics. *Political Psychology, 35*, 495-513. doi:10.1111/pops.12053

Best, S. J., & Krueger, B. S. (2011). Government monitoring and political participation in the united states: The distinct roles of anger and anxiety. *American Politics Research, 39*(1), 85-117. doi:10.1177/1532673X10380848

Bohner, G., & Weinerth, T. (2001). Negative affect and increase or decrease message scrutiny: The affect interpretation hypothesis. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27,* 1417-1428.

Blake, A. (2016, June 20). More young people voted for Bernie Sanders than Trump and Clinton combined – by a lot. *The Washington Post.* Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/20/more-young-people-voted-for-bernie-sanders-than-trump-and-clinton-combined-by-a-lot/?utm_term=.22e7805f876e

Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. *American Psychologist, 36,* 129-148.

Bower, G. H., & Forgas, J. P. (2000). Affect, memory, and social cognition. In E. Eich, J. F. Kihlstrom, G. Bower, J. P. Forgas, & P. M. Niedenthal (Eds.), *Cognition and Emotion.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. *American Journal of Political Science, 49,* 388-405.

Brader, T. (2006a). Affective intelligence and beyond: Next steps in research on emotion in politics. *Political Communication Report, 16,* 1-6.

Brader, T. (2006b). *Campaigning for hearts and minds: How emotional appeals in political ads work.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. (2008). What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat. *American Journal of Political Science, 52,* 959-978.

Braithwaite, J. (2004). Emancipation and hope. *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 79-98.

Braithwaite, V. (2004a). Collective hope. *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 6-15. doi:10.1177/0002716203262049

Braithwaite, V. (2004b). The hope process and social inclusion. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 128-151. doi:10.1177/0002716203262096

Brown, M. B., & Forsythe, A. B. (1974). Robust tests for the equality of variances. *Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69*, 364-367.

Bryant, F. B., & Yarnold, P. R. (1995). Principal-components analysis and exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. In L. G. Grimm & P. R. Yarnold (Eds.), *Reading and understanding multivariate statistics* (pp. 99-136). Washington, D.C: American Psychological Association.

Cacioppo, J. T., Gardner, W. L., & Berntson, G. G. (1999). The affect system has parallel and integrative processing components: Form follows function. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76*, 839–855.

Cappella, J. N., & Jamieson, K. H. (1997). *Spiral of cynicism: The press and the public good.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Chen, H., Gan, C., & Sun, P. (2017). How does political satire influence political participation? examining the role of counter- and pro-attitudinal exposure, anger, and personal issue importance. *International Journal of Communication (Online),* 3011.

Cho, J. (2013). Campaign tone, political affect, and communicative engagement. *Journal of Communication, 63*, 1130-1152. doi:10.1111/jcom.12064

Civettini, A. J. W. (2011). Barack Obama and the political science of hope. In M. Engelken-Jorge, P. Ibarra Güell & C. Moreno del Río (Eds), *Politics and emotions: The Obama phenomenon* (pp. 95-106). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-93201-9_4

Civettini, A. J. W., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2009). Voters, emotions, and memory. *Political Psychology, 30*, 125-151.

Clore, G. L., & Ortony, A. (2008). Appraisal theories: How cognition shapes affect into emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 628-642). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Collinson, S. (2016, October 13). Trump's most enthusiastic supporters stand by their man. *CNN politics*. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/13/politics/2016-election-donald-trump-crowds-rallies/index.html

Cordoba, J. (2017, January 25). Trump border wall announcement builds more resentment in Mexico. *The Wall Street Journal.* Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-border-wall-announcement-builds-more-resentment-in-mexico-1485364860

Courville, S., & Piper, N. (2004). Harnessing hope through NGO activism. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 39-61.

Cristobal, E., Flavián, C., & Guinaliu, M. (2007). Perceived e-service quality (PeSQ): Measurement validation and effects on consumer satisfaction and web site loyalty. *Managing service quality: An international journal, 17*, 317-340. doi:10.1108/09604520710744326

Day, R. W., & Quinn, G. P. (1989). Comparisons of treatments after an analysis of variance in ecology. *Ecological Monographs, 59*, 433-463. doi:10.2307/1943075

DeBell, P. A. (2016). Turning outrage into disgust: The emotional basis of democratic backsliding in Hungary. Electronic Thesis or Dissertation. Retrieved from https://etd.ohiolink.edu/

De Vaus, D. A. (2002). *Analyzing social science data*. London: SAGE.

DeYoung, C. G., Quilty, L. C., & Peterson, J. B. (2007). Between facets and domains: 10 aspects of the Big Five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93,* 880–896. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514 .93.5.880

Dinan, S. (2016, March 1). Donald Trump drives GOP's record turnout; Democrats lack enthusiasm. *The Washington Times.* Retrieved from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/1/donald-trump-drives-republican-turnout-to-record-d/

Drahos, P. (2004). Trading in public hope. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 18-38.

Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83*, 75-93. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.83.1.75

Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17*, 124-129.

Ellsworth, P. C., & Scherer, K. R. (2001). Appraisal processes in emotions. In R. J. Davidson, H. Goldsmith, & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), *Handbook of affective science* (pp. 572-595). New York: Oxford University Press.

Engelken-Jorge, M., Ibarra Güell, P., & Moreno del Río, C. (2011). *Politics and emotions: The Obama phenomenon*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-93201-9

Englis, B. G. (1990). Consumer emotional reactions to television advertising and their effects on message recall. In S. J. Agres, J. A. Edell, & T. M. Dubitsky (Eds.), *Emotion in advertising: Theoretical and practical explorations.* Westport, CT: Quorum Books.

Escobar, O. (2011). Suspending disbelief: Obama and the role of emotions in political communications. In M. Engelken-Jorge, P. Ibarra Güell & C. Moreno del Río (Eds), *Politics and emotions: The Obama phenomenon* (pp. 109-128). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-93201-9_4

Fischer A. H., & Manstead, A.S. R. (2008) Social functions of emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 456-468). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in judgements of risks and benefits. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13,* 1-17.

Forgas, J. P. (1994). The role of emotion in social judgments: An introductory review and an Affect Infusion Model. *European journal of social psychology, 24*, 1-24.

Forgas, J. P. (1999). Network theories and beyond. In T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power (Eds.), *Handbook of cognition and emotion* (pp. 591-611), New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. *American Psychologist, 56*, 218–226.

Fredrickson, B. L., & Branigan, C. (2005). Positive emotions broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoires. *Cognition and Emotion, 19,* 313–332.

Fredrickson, B. L. & Cohn, M. A. (2008). Positive emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 777-796). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Fredrickson, B. L., & Losada, M. F. (2005). Positive affect and the complex dynamics of human flourishing. *American Psychologist, 60,* 678–686.

Frijda, N. H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and action tendency. *Cognition & Emotion, 1,* 115-143.

Frijda, N. H. (1993). The place of appraisal in emotion. *Cognition & Emotion, 7,* 357-387.

Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotion action readiness. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 57,* 212-228.

Gadarian, S. K., & Albertson, B. (2014). Anxiety, immigration, and the search for information: Anxiety, immigration, and the search for information. *Political Psychology, 35*, 133-164. doi:10.1111/pops.12034

Games, P. A., & J. F. Howell. (1976). Pairwise multiple comparison procedures with unequal n's and/or variances: A Monte Carlo study. *Journal of Educational Statistics, 1,* 113-125.

Gervais, B. T. (2014). Following the news? Reception of uncivil partisan media and the use of incivility in political expression. *Political Communication, 31*, 564-583.

Glenn, B. (2010). Conservatives and American political development. *Political Science Quarterly, 125*, 611-638.

Goodwin, J., Jasper, J., & Polletta, F. (2001). Introduction: Why emotions matter. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gould, D. (2011). Desiring politics: Wanting more in the age of Obama. In M. Engelken-Jorge, P. Ibarra Güell & C. Moreno del Río (Eds), *Politics and emotions: The Obama phenomenon* (pp. 155-188). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-93201-9_4

Groeling, T. (2010). *When politicians attack! Party cohesion in the media*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Groenendyk, E. (2011). Current emotion research in political science: How emotions help democracy overcome its collective action problem. *Emotion Review, 3*, 455-463. doi:10.1177/1754073911410746

Groenendyk, E. W., & Banks, A. J. (2014). Emotional rescue: How affect helps partisans overcome collective action problems. *Political Psychology, 35*, 359-378. doi:10.1111/pops.12045

Gruszczynski, M. W., Balzer, A., Jacobs, C. M., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, J. R. (2013). The physiology of political participation. *Political Behavior, 35*, 135-152. doi:10.1007/s11109-012-9197-x

Haidt J., & Hersch M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31,* 191-221.

Hasell, A., & Week, B. E. (2016). Partisan provocation: The role of partisan news use and emotional responses in political information sharing in social media. *Human Communication Research*, *42*, 641–661,

Hawang, S. (1995). An analysis of citizen's participation in campaign activities during the 1994 gubernatorial and mayoral elections in Taiwan. *Journal of Electoral Studies, 2*, 51–76.

Healy, P., & Alcindor, Y. (2016, January 16). Hillary Clinton races to close enthusiasm gap with Bernie Sanders in Iowa. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/us/politics/hillary-clinton-bernie-sanders-supporters.html

Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1995). Evaluating model fit. In R. Hoyle (Ed.), *Structural equation modeling: Issues, concepts, and applications* (pp. 76-99). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling, 6*(1), 1-55.

Huddy, L, Feldman, S., & Cassese, E. (2007). On the distinct political effects of anxiety and anger. In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, M. MacKuen & A. N. Crigler (Eds.), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior* (pp. 201-230). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hutcherson, C. A., & Gross, J. J. (2011). The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 100*, 719-738.

Hutchings, V. L., Valentino, N. A., Philpot, T. S., & White, I. K. (2006). Racial cues in campaign news: The effects of candidate strategies on group activation and political attentiveness among African Americans. In D. Redlawsk (Ed.), *Feeling politics : Emotion in political information processing* (pp. 165-184). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9781403983114

Isbell, L. M., Ottati, V. C., & Burns, K. C. (2006). Affect and politics: Effects on judgement, processing, and information seeking. In D. P. Redlawsk (Ed.), *Feeling Politics*, (pp. 57-86). Palgrave Macmillan.

Isen, A. M. (1999). Positive affect. In T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (Eds.), *Handbook of cognition and emotion* (pp. 521-539). New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Isen, A. M., & Daubman, K. A. (1984). The influence of affect on categorization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47,* 1206–1217.

Isen, A. M., Daubman, K. A., & Nowicki, G. P. (1987). Positive affect facilitates creative problem solving. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,* 1122–1131.

Isen, A. M., & Means, B. (1983). The influence of positive affect on decision-making strategy. *Social Cognition, 2,* 18–31.

Isen, A. M., & Patrick, R. (1983). The effect of positive feelings on risk taking. *Organizational Behavior & Human Performance, 31*, 194-202.

Izard, C. E. (2007). Basic emotions, natural kinds, emotion schemas, and a new paradigm. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2*, 260-280. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00044.x

Izard, C. E. (2009). Emotion theory and research: Highlights, unanswered questions, and emerging issues. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60*, 1-25.

Izard, C.E. (1992). Basic emotions, relations among emotions, and emotion-cognition relations. *Psychological Review*, *99*, 561- 565.

Jamali, H., & Shahbaztabar, P. (2017). The effects of internet filtering on users' information-seeking behavior and emotions. *Aslib Journal of Information Management, 69,* 408-425. doi:10.1108/AJIM-12-2016-0218

Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Oatley, K. (2008). Emotions, music, and literature. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 102-113). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Oatley, K. (1989). The language of emotions: An analysis of a semantic field. *Cognition & Emotion, 3,* 81–123.

Johnston, C., Lavine, H., & Woodson, B. (2015). Emotion and political judgment: Expectancy violation and affective intelligence. *Political Research Quarterly, 68*, 474-492. doi:10.1177/1065912915593644

Just, M. R., Crigler, A. N., & Belt, T. L. (2007). Don't give up hope: Emotions, candidate appraisals, and vote. In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, A. N. Crigler & M. MacKuen (Eds.), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior* (pp. 180-201). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kim, M. Y., Ford, B. Q., Mauss, I., & Tamir, M. (2015). Knowing when to seek anger: Psychological health and context-sensitive emotional preferences. *Cognition and Emotion, 29*, 1126-1136. doi:10.1080/02699931.2014.970519

Knobloch-Westerwick, S., & Meng, J. (2009). Looking the other way: Selective exposure to attitude-consistent and counterattitudinal political information. *Communication Research, 36*, 426-448. doi:10.1177/0093650209333030

Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Lecheler, S., Schuck, A. R. T., & Vreese, d., C.H. (2013). Dealing with feelings: Positive and negative discrete emotions as mediators of news framing effects. *The European Journal of Communication Research, 38*, 189-209. doi:10.1515/commun-2013-0011

Ladd, J. M., & Lenz, G. S. (2011). Does anxiety improve voters' decision making? *Political Psychology, 32,* 347-361. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00805.x

Ladd, J. M., & Lenz, G. S. (2008). Reassessing the role of anxiety in vote choice. *Political Psychology, 29*, 275-296. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00626.x

LeDoux, J. E. (1989). Cognitive-emotional interactions in the brain. *Cognition & Emotion, 3,* 267-289.

LeDoux, J. E., & Phelps, E. A. (2000). Emotional networks in the brain. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (2nd ed., pp. 157-172). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. *Cognition & Emotion, 14,* 473-493.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81,* 146-159.

Lewis, M. (2008). Self-conscious emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 742-756). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Lewis, M. (1992). The self in self-conscious emotions. A commentary. In D. Stipek, S. Recchia, & S. McClintic (Eds.), Self-evaluation in young children*. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57*, 85–95.

Lodge, M., Taber, C. S., & Weber, C. (2006). First steps toward a dual-process accessibility model of political beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. In D. P. Redlawsk (Ed.), *Feeling Politics*, (pp. 11-30). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2013). *The rationalizing voter*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Looy, H. (2004). Embodied and embedded morality: divinity, identity, and disgust. *Zygon, 39*, 219-235.

Lu, Y., & Gall Myrick, J. (2016). Cross-cutting exposure on Facebook and political participation: Unraveling the effects of emotional responses and online incivility. *Journal of Media Psychology, 28*, 100-110. doi:10.1027/1864-1105/a000203

Lucas, R. E., & Baird, B. M. (2004). Extraversion and emotional reactivity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86,* 473–485.

Lucas, R. E., & Fujita, F. (2000). Factors influencing the relation between extraversion and pleasant affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79,* 1039–1056.

Lueck, M. A. M. (2007). Hope for a cause as cause for hope: The need for hope in environmental sociology. *The American Sociologist, 38*, 250-261. doi:10.1007/s12108-007-9017-7

Luo, M. (2008, October 19). Obama recasts the fund-raising landscape. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/us/politics/20donate.html?_r=0

MacCallum, R. (1986). Specification searches in covariance structure modeling. *Psychological Bulletin, 100,* 107-120.

Mackie, D. M., & Worth, L. T. (1989). Procession deficits and the mediation of positive affection in persuasion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 27-40.

MacKuen, M., Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & Keele, L. (2007). The third way: The theory of affective intelligence and American democracy. In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, A. N. Crigler, & M. MacKuen, *The affect effect* (pp. 124–151). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., Keele, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2010). Civic engagements: Resolute partisanship or reflective deliberation. *American Journal of Political Science, 54*, 440-458. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00440.x

Manis, M., Nelson, T. E., & Shedler, J. (1988). Stereotypes and social judgment: Extremity, assimilation, and contrast. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55*, 28–36.

Marcus, G. E., MacKuen, M., & Neuman, W. R. (2011). Parsimony and complexity: Developing and testing theories of affective intelligence. *Political Psychology, 32*, 323-336. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00806.x

Marcus, G. E., MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., & Keele, L. (2006). The measure and mismeasure of emotion. In D. P. Redlawsk (Ed.), *Feeling politics: Affect and emotion in political information processing* (pp. 31-46). New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.

Marcus, G. E., & MacKuen, M. B. (1993). Anxiety, enthusiasm and the vote: The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential campaigns. *American Political Science Review, 87,* 688-701.

Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. B. (2000*). Affective intelligence and political judgment.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Martin, L. L., Ward, D. W., Achee, J. W., & Wyer. R.S. (1993). Mood as input: People have to interpret the motivational implications of their moods. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64,* 317-326.

Mascolo, M. F., & Fischer, K. W. (1995). Developmental transformations in appraisals for pride, shame, and guilt. In J. P. Tangney, & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), *Self-conscious emotions. The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride* (pp. 64–113). New York/London: The Guilford Press.

McGeer, V. (2004). The art of good hope. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 100-127. doi:10.1177/0002716203261781

McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., Moy, P., Horowitz, E. M., Holbert, R. L., Zhang, W., et al. (1999). Understanding deliberation: The effects of discussion networks on participation in a public forum. *Communication Research, 26,* 743-774.

McMullen, M. N. (1997). Affective contrast and assimilation in counterfactual thinking. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33*, 77–100.

Miles, J., & Shevlin, M. (2001). *Applying regression & correlation: A guide for students and researchers.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Nabi, R. L. (2002). Anger, fear, uncertainty, and attitudes: A test of the cognitive-functional model. *Communication Monographs, 69,* 204-216.

Nabi, R. L. (2003). The framing effects of emotion: Can discrete emotions influence information recall and policy preference? *Communication Research, 30,* 224-247.

Nabi, R. L. (2010). The case for emphasizing discrete emotions in communication research. *Communication Monographs, 77,* 153-159.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). *Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions*. New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olatunji, B. O., & Sawchuk, C. N. (2005). Disgust: Characteristic features, social manifestations, and clinical implications. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 24*, 932-962.

Ortony, A. (2009). Affect and emotions in intelligent agents: Why and how? In J. Tao & T. Tan (Eds.), *Affective Information Processing* (pp. 11-22). New York, NY: Springer.

Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1990). *The cognitive structure of emotions*. Cambridge University Press.

Ost, D. (2004). Politics as the mobilization of anger: Emotions in movements and in power. *European Journal of Social Theory, 7,* 229-244.

Page, S. (2016, March 1). 2016 lessons so far: Trump's takeover and an enthusiasm gap. *USA Today*. Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/01/analysis-super-tuesday-trump-takeover-feelthebern-clinton-cruz-rubio-sanders/81143962/

Pettit, P. (2004). Hope and its place in mind. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 592*, 152-165. doi:10.1177/0002716203261798

Petty, R., & Cacioppo, J. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *19,* 123–181.

Pew Research Center. (2016, September 21). In their own words: Why voters support – and have concerns about Clinton and Trump. Retrieved from http://www.people-

press.org/2016/09/21/in-their-own-words-why-voters-support-and-have-concerns-about-clinton-and-trump/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=322e8ff308-Weekly_Sept_22_20169_21_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-322e8ff308-400231073

Pituch, K. A., & Stevens, J. P. (2016). *Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences: Analyses with SAS and IBM's SPSS* (6th ed.) Routledge Ltd.

Reading, A. (2004). *Hope and despair: How perceptions of the future shape human behavior.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of motivated reasoning on political decision making. *Journal of Politics, 64,* 1021-1044.

Redlawsk, D. P. (2006). Motivated reasoning, affect, and the role of memory in voter decision making. In D. P. Redlawsk (Ed.), *Feeling Politics*, (pp. 87-107). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Redlawsk, D. P., Civettini, J. W., & Emmerson, K. M. (2010). The affective tipping point: Do motivated reasoners ever "get it"? *Political Psychology, 31*, 563-593.

Redlawsk, D. P., Civettini, A. J. W., & Lau, R. R. (2007). Affective intelligence and voting: Information processing and learning in a campaign. In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, A. N. Crigler & M. MacKuen (Eds.), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior* (pp. 152–179). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Richards, B. (2004). The emotional deficit in political communication. *Political Communication, 21*, 339-352. doi:10.1080/10584600490481451

Roseman. I. J. (1984). Cognitive determinants of emotion: A structural theory. In P. Shaver (Ed.) *Review of Personality & Social Psychology, Vol. 5: Emotions, Relationships, and Health.* (pp. 11-36). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Roseman, I. J. (1996). Appraisal determinants of emotions: Constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory. *Cognition & Emotion, 10*, 241 -278.

Roseman, I. J., & Smith, C. A. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties, controversies. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, and research* (pp. 3-19). New York: Oxford University Press.

Roseman, I. J., Spindel, M. S., & Jose, P. E. (1990). Appraisals of emotion-eliciting events: Testing a theory of discrete emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59,* 899-915.

Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). *Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America.* New York: Maxwell Macmillan Publishing Company.

Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39*, 1161-1178. 10.1037/h0077714

Sandvoss, C. (2012). Enthusiasm, trust and its erosion in mediated politics: On fans of Obama and the liberal democrats. *European Journal of Communication, 27*, 68-81. doi:10.1177/0267323111435296

Scherer, K. R. (1982). Emotion as process: Function, origin and regulation. *Social Science Information, 21,* 555-570

Scherer, K. R. (1984). Emotion as a multi-component process: A model and some cross-cultural data. In P. Shaver (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology: Emotions, relationships and health* (pp. 37-63). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Scherer, K. R. (1999). Appraisal theory. In T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power (Eds.), *Handbook of cognition and emotion* (pp. 637-663). New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Schmidt, S. P. (2012). *Extraordinary memories for exceptional events.* New York: Psychology Press.

Schreckinger, B. (2015, August 19). How Bernie Sanders makes his mega-rallies. *The Politico.* Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/bernie-sanders-rallies-2016-grassroots-support-121512

Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Nah, S., Gotlieb, M. R., Hwang, H., Lee, N., et al. (2007). Campaign ads, online messaging, and participation: Extending the communication mediation model. *Journal of Communication, 57,* 676-703.

Shiota, M. N. (2003). A discrete emotion approach to dispositional positive affect. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 67,* 4161. UMI number: 3224767

Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2006). Positive emotion dispositions differentially associated with Big Five personality and attachment style. *Journal of Positive Psychology, 1,* 61-71.

Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Response mode, framing, and information processing effects in risk assessment. In R. Hogarth (Ed.), *New Directions for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science: Question Framing and Response Consistency* (pp. 21-36). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Solomon, R. C. (2008). The philosophy of emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 3-16). New York, NY: Guilford.

Smillie, L. D., DeYoung, C. G., & Hall, P. J. (2014). Clarifying the relation between extraversion and positive affect. *Journal of Personality*. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12138

Smillie, L. D., Wilt, J., Kabbani, R., Garratt, C., & Revelle, W. (2015). Quality of social experience explains the relation between extraversion and positive affect. *Emotion, 15,* 339-349. doi:10.1037/emo0000047

Smith, N. H. (2005). Hope and critical theory. *Critical Horizons, 6*, 45-61. doi:10.1163/156851605775009528

Smith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2008). Intergroup emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 102-113). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48,* 813-838.

Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1987). Patterns of appraisal and emotion related to taking an exam. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,* 475-488.

Smith, C. A., Haynes, K. N., Lazarus, R. S., & Pope, L. K. (1993). In search of the "hot" cognitions: Attributions, appraisals, and their relation to emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65,* 916-929.

Snyder, C. R. (2004). Hope theory: Rainbows in the mind. *Psychological Inquiry, 13*, 249-275.

Snyder, C. R. (2000). *Handbook of hope: Theory, measures, & applications*. United States: Academic Press.

Snyder, C. R. (1994). *The psychology of hope: You can get there from here.* The Free Press.

Snyder, C. R. (1989). Reality negotiation: From excuses to hope and beyond. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8,* 130-157.

Stets, J. E., & Turner, J. H. (2008). The sociology of emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 32-46). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Stipek, D. J., Recchia, S., & McClintic, S. (1992). Self-evaluation in young children. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57,* 23-58.

Stroud, N. J. (2011). *Niche news: The politics of news choice*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Suls, R. (2017, February 24). Most Americans continue to oppose U.S. border wall, doubt Mexico would pay for it. *Pew Research Center.* Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/24/most-americans-continue-to-oppose-u-s-border-wall-doubt-mexico-would-pay-for-it/

Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science, 50,* 755-769.

Tangney, J. P, & Fischer, K. W. (1995). *Self-conscious emotions. The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. New York/London: The Guilford Press.

Tesser, A. & Collins, J. E. (1988). Emotion in social reflection and comparison situations: Intuitive, systematic, and exploratory approaches. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55,* 695-709.

Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80,* 86–94.

Tong, E. M. W. (2007). Appraisal processes in emotional experiences. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 67,* 4161. UMI number: 3224767

Tong, E. M. W., & Jia, L. (2017). Positive emotion, appraisal, and the role of appraisal overlap in positive emotion co-occurrence. *Emotion, 17,* 40-54. doi:10.1037/emo0000203

Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Show your pride: Evidence for a discrete emotion expression. *Psychological Science, 15,* 194–197.

Tracy, J. L., Robins, R. W., & Tangney, J. P. (2007). *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research.* New York: Guilford Press.

Valentino, N. A., Banks, A. J., Hutchings, V. L, & Davis, A. K. (2009a). Selective exposure in the Internet age: The interaction between anxiety and information utility. *Political Psychology, 30,* 591-613.

Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K., & Hutchings, V. L. (2011). Election night's alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation. *Journal of Politics, 73,* 156-170.

Valentino, N., Gregorowicz, K., & Groenendyk, E. (2009b). Efficacy, emotions, and the habit of participation. *Political Behavior, 31,* 307-330.

Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L, Banks, A. J., & Davis, A. K. (2008). Is a worried citizen a good citizen? Emotions, political information seeking, and learning via the Internet. *Political Psychology, 29,* 247-273.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Verhulst, B., & Lizotte, M. (2011). The influence of affective states on the depth of information processing. In M. Engelken-Jorge, P. Ibarra Güell & C. Moreno del Río (Eds), *Politics and emotions: The Obama phenomenon* (pp. 73-94). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-531-93201-9_4

Wagner, M. (2014). Fear and anger in Great Britain: Blame assignment and emotional reactions to the financial crisis. *Political Behavior, 36,* 683-703. doi:10.1007/s11109-013-9241-5

Waterman, R. W., Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Silva, C. L. (1999). The expectations gap thesis: Public attitudes toward an incumbent president. *Journal of Politics, 61*, 944-966.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,* 1063–1070.

Weber, C. (2013). Emotions, campaigns, and political participation. *Political Research Quarterly, 66,* 414-428. doi:10.1177/1065912912449697

Weber, C. (2008). *The emotional campaign: How emotions affect political behavior and judgment.* Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY.

Wilt, J., Noftle, E. E., Fleeson, W., & Spain, J. S. (2012). The dynamic role of personality states in mediating the relationship between extraversion and positive affect. *Journal of Personality, 80,* 1205–1236.

Wojcieszak, M., Bimber, B., Feldman, L., & Stroud, N. J. (2016). Partisan news and political participation: Exploring mediated relationships. *Political Communication, 33*, 241-260. doi:10.1080/10584609.2015.1051608

Woody, C. (2017, January 25). Mexicans are lashing out at their own government over Trump's border plans. *Business Insider.* Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-response-backlash-to-trumps-wall-and-president-2017-1

Woolf, J. R. (2007). The effects of disgust eliciting persuasive messages on physical activity. *Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 67,* 4161. UMI number: 3224767

Wixted, J. T., & Mickes, L. (2010). A continuous dual-process model of remember/know judgments. *Psychological Review, 117*, 1025-1054. doi:10.1037/a0020874

Zajonc, R. B. (1984). On the primacy of affect. *American Psychologist, 39,* 117-123. 10.1037/0003-066X.39.2.117

Zillmann, D. (1988). Mood management through communication choices. *American Behavioral Scientist, 31,* 327-341.

Zillmann, D., & Bryant, J. (1985). Affect, mood, and emotion as determinants of selective exposure. In D. Zillmann & J. Bryant (Eds*.), Selective exposure to communication* (pp. 157-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Zillmann, D., Lei, C., Knobloch, S., & Callison, C. (2004). Effects of lead framing on selective exposure to Internet news reports. *Communication Research, 31,* 58-81.