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Policing Globalization: The Imperial Origins of International Police Cooperation

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**Policing Globalization: The Imperial Origins of International Police
Cooperation**

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Policing Globalization: The Imperial Origins of International Police Cooperation

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This thesis studies the early history of international police cooperation and international crime control. It argues that the British Empire played an active and often decisive role in this history by encouraging the development of international police organizations, such as Interpol. Additionally, it contends that Britain's support for these organizations was based in large part on the country's experience policing its Empire. The effort to reform colonial police brought British police in regular contact with police throughout the world, and led to exchanges of philosophies and technologies between the international and colonial spheres. During the aftermath of the Second World War, the reforming zeal of Britain's imperial police was translated into several foreign police missions in occupied Europe and elsewhere. The British police involved in these missions attempted to encourage the development of civilian, unarmed policing with little reference to local circumstances. The failure of these missions, combined with the development of several colonial emergencies, caused Britain to abandon their forward foreign policy with regard to policing. In this vacuum, the United States emerged as the leading force in international law enforcement, though without Britain's emphasis on civilian style policing and pursuit of cooperation with other countries.

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Introduction

In 2010, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published a report entitled *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*.¹ The report took stock of developments in transnational crime since the end of the Cold War and included chapters on arms smuggling, counterfeiting, cybercrime, and high seas piracy as well as drug and human trafficking. It revealed that transnational crime had “reached macro-economic proportions,” with illicit goods being produced in one country, trafficked across another and sold in a third.² The global underworld, the report continued, “has become inextricably linked to the global economy...through the illicit trade of legal products (like natural resources), or the use of established banking, trade and communication networks...that are moving growing amounts of illicit goods.”³ Transnational crime had become “one of the world’s most sophisticated and profitable businesses,” with just over a billion in profits from arms trafficking and cybercrime, \$3 billion in annual profit from human trafficking, \$10 billion in profit from counterfeit goods, and over \$100 billion in annual profit from drug trafficking.⁴ UN Drug Czar Antonio Maria Costa argued in his summary of the report that national responses to the problem were not sufficient and that “states have to look beyond borders to protect their sovereignty.”⁵

¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *The globalization of crime: a transnational organized crime threat assessment* (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010).

² *Ibid.*, ii.

³ *Ibid.*, ii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ii. Summary of profits on pp. 16 – 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iii.

Lost in Costa's analysis, and indeed in much of the report, is the fact that national governments have long been aware of the need "to look beyond borders" with regard to crime. Indeed, the issue of tracking criminals across borders is as old as crime itself. The "hue and cry" has been used in one form or another since the development of ancient cities, and the policing of piracy and smuggling between states has existed since the Roman Empire. Yet it was not until the nineteenth century that an effort was made to establish this sort of policing on a regular basis. The nineteenth century is often credited by social scientists as marking the beginning of globalization because it featured several technological (railroad, steamship, and telegraph) and political (global empires) innovations that increased the amount and intensity of global connections.⁶ Much like other historical actors, criminals took advantage of these innovations to expand their economic and geographical horizons. By the end of the century the nations of the world found that they were fighting the same types of crimes perpetrated by the same criminals. For many nations this discovery came shortly after the initial development of domestic police institutions. It became apparent that these new institutions would need to adapt in order to meet the emerging threat.

Though the need for change was evident there was little consensus on what form it should take. Many states in Europe, for instance, tried to deal with international crime unilaterally, pursuing criminals in other countries using their own national police forces.

⁶ For this project, I am using the definition of globalization provided by A.G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (New York: Norton, 2002), 19: "[Globalization is] a process that transforms economic, political, social, and cultural relationships across countries, regions, and continents by spreading them more broadly, making them more intense, and increasing their velocity."

This method, however, quickly proved untenable as countries began to object to such incursions on the basis of national sovereignty. Concerned nations responded by attempting to foster international cooperation between the police institutions of various countries. Early efforts in this regard included the exchange of dossiers prior to international events such as World's Fairs, or after particularly egregious events such as an anarchist bombing or assassination.

By the first decade of the twentieth century it became evident that such cooperation needed to have a more permanent standing if it was to have any chance of successfully combating international crime. This realization led to several international conferences, but, beyond a handful of informal extradition agreements, these meetings failed to produce anything lasting. The situation changed, however, following the First World War. The immediate post-war period found countries not only grappling with traditional problems such as international anarchy and smuggling, but also with emerging problems such as “white slavery” (sex trafficking) and counterfeiting. Though the actual prevalence of these crimes remained – as they do today – in doubt, they nevertheless encouraged the establishment of a number of international policing bodies, including the International Police Conference and the International Criminal Police Commission (the precursor to Interpol). These organizations were designed to facilitate the exchange of information between member nations, allowing police to cut through red tape in their pursuit of criminals.

Despite the proliferation of these organizations during the interwar period, few of these groups survived the Second World War. Interpol, the standard bearer for this

movement, emerged from the conflict with a tainted reputation after falling into Nazi hands in 1938. Though reconstituted after the war, Interpol encountered trouble in a world divided by Cold War ideologies. The organization's position was further complicated in the 1970s by a public confrontation with the Church of Scientology over Interpol's role in the legal case against L. Ron Hubbard. In addition, the last quarter of the twentieth century saw the establishment of several rival police organizations – including Europol, TREVI and UNPOL – designed to make up for Interpol's shortcomings. Though Interpol still grabs headlines by issuing red notices for prominent suspects such as Julian Assange or Roman Polanski, the agency's public profile masks serious flaws in its operation. Current Interpol director Ronald Noble, for instance, was recently brought to tears on American television while describing his frustration with Interpol's lack of use by member nations, particularly the United States.⁷ While Noble had done much to improve the reputation of the organization, it is still common for the group's headquarters in Lyon to be referred to as a vacation resort where police officers go to chase wine, women and song rather than counterfeits, terrorists and traffickers.

It is clear, given the human and financial toll of transnational crime, that international police cooperation is a topic worth serious study. Though the subject often falls prey to sensationalist media, political scientists and sociologists have gone a long way in giving the current debate on this issue a more rigorous grounding.⁸ It is the argument of

⁷ Ira Rosen, "The Man From Interpol," Narr. Steve Kroft. *Sixty Minutes*. CBS. October 7, 2007. [Complete segment and transcript available online:

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/04/60minutes/main3330289.shtml>]

⁸ Malcolm Anderson, *Policing the world: Interpol and the politics of international police co-operation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ethan Avram Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State

this dissertation, however, that the issue would benefit from a new historical analysis into its origins. Why did the struggle against transnational crime lead to the formation of international police organizations? Why were these organizations successful during the interwar period, yet now face mounting criticism and claims of uselessness? What about their interwar operations made them successful? Why did Interpol emerge as the leading group in international policing and why was it one of the few organizations to survive the Second World War?

This dissertation attempts to answer these questions by studying the early history of international policing and international police organizations, such as Interpol. It focuses on the United Kingdom's relationship with these efforts and contends that Britain played the leading role in the success of international policing during this period. This thesis will argue that Britain's support for international policing derived from the country's desire to spread its own policing methods across the world and through its own colonial empire. Furthermore, this thesis will contend that while Britain's support for international police organizations allowed these bodies to flourish before the Second World War, Britain's postwar decline led to the withering of these groups under the unilateral policies of the United States.

University Press, 1993); Mark Findlay, *The globalization of crime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Nadelmann and Peter Andreas, *Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control In international Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Ben Bowling and James W. E. Sheptycki, *Global Policing* (Sage Publications Ltd, 2012).

EXISTING LITERATURE

Though historical literature offers a treasure of material on crime and policing at the national level, there has been relatively little effort to extend these histories beyond national boundaries. Early books on international policing focused almost exclusively on the work of Interpol. These books were written primarily by journalists, and were filled with un-cited, sensationalist accounts of crime cases that played upon a Cold War audience's eagerness to read Ian Fleming-like stories of international intrigue. The prime example of this sort of work is A.J. Forrest's book *Interpol* released in 1955.⁹ The US edition of this book features a cover that could have been pulled directly from a spy novel – an Interpol agent chases a criminal, holding a satchel filled with marijuana leaves and syringes, through the Paris airport. “By radio, phone and streamlined office work,” the publishers of *Interpol* write, agents of the international crime fighting organization meet the murderer “off the plane at Marseilles” and confiscate “the drug-packed cigarettes...from the sleazy tramper scurrying through Panama.”¹⁰ Like any other book on crime designed for popular consumption, Forrest's book is filled with photographs of crime scenes and mug shots. Similarly, like any good popular spy book, it fetishizes the technology of both police and criminal, featuring descriptions and pictures of hidden surveillance cameras as well as examples of counterfeit art and currency.

⁹ A. J. Forrest, *Interpol* (London: A. Wingate, 1955).

¹⁰ Forrest, back cover. Though written by the publishers, this quote best exemplifies the contents of Forrest's book as a whole.

Striking a similar vein to Forrest's book is Tom Tullet's *Inside Interpol*.¹¹ As the title suggests, Tullet's book benefits from true insider access: he was a close friend of Sir Richard Jackson, a top officer in the London Metropolitan Police who served as president of Interpol from 1960 to 1963. Though the book lacks references and never refers to officers or criminals by their real names, Tullet's book is obviously based on actual case files that can be verified today through archival work or by reading back issues of Interpol's official journals.¹² Although the reader can feel confident in the veracity of the anecdotal stories within Tullet's book, they are still subjected to a prose with a novelistic sheen. When describing Interpol's headquarters in France, Tullet remarks on the beauty of the organization's secretaries, women who are "too attractive to deal with crime."¹³ Readers are also offered idealized descriptions of the operations of the organization. For example, in a passage that could be pulled from a travel brochure, Tullet writes that "a smartly dressed detective in New York may well initiate an Interpol inquiry which will be handled later by a coloured policeman wearing bush-shirt and shorts and working in the heat of the jungle; [similarly] a crime committed in sunny South American can be pursued in Canada by a fur-clad 'Mountie' driving a sledge over ice and snow."¹⁴

In addition to Forrest and Tullet, there appeared at this time a series of memoirs from police that had firsthand experience with the organization. These books tended to give the organization a more firm grounding in reality, though flights of exaggeration were not

¹¹ Tom Tullett, *Inside Interpol* (New York: Walker, 1965).

¹² For instance, Tullet discusses the case of the pigeon blackmailer of the Rhineland, a favorite topic of discussion of early Interpol leader Florent Louwage of Belgium.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 33–34.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 182.

uncommon. Swedish police officer Harry Söderman's *Policeman's Lot* was one of the few books written by someone that had participated in the organization from its very early years.¹⁵ Söderman's work featured a history of the organization that would continue to be referenced by subsequent writers, with very minor alterations, for the next 20 years. This history described the genesis of the organization in a 1914 international conference in Monaco at which the creation of a formal international police body was first discussed. After the First World War, this discussion led to the creation of the International Criminal Police Commission, or ICPC, in Vienna in 1923. Vienna played host to the group, Söderman contends, because of the city's significant police archive and criminal laboratory as well as Austria's concern with the proliferation of counterfeiters and displaced people that resulted from the breakup of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Söderman goes on to describe how the organization, after struggling to gain recognition and members in the 1920s, found its footing in the 1930s.

Interpol's rising prestige, however, was cut short in 1938 as a result of the Anschluss. Nazi Germany, which had tried and failed to take over the organization earlier in the 1930s, moved Interpol and its archives to Berlin, where it essentially remained defunct during the Second World War. Söderman concludes by relating how the organization was reestablished in 1948 by a group of five senior police officers, including Söderman, Florent Louwage of Belgium and Sir Ronald Howe of the Metropolitan Police. Ronald Howe's memoirs, *The Pursuit of Crime*, featured a rather long final chapter on the

¹⁵ Harry Söderman, *Policeman's Lot: A Criminologist's Gallery of Friends and Felons* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1956).

organization in which he argued that Interpol remained a viable organization in spite of the Nazi takeover because it was one of the few international police initiatives that politicians had yet to get their hands on.¹⁶

Although these police memoirs were the first works to provide a history of Interpol, they often followed their journalist counterparts in embellishing the actual work of the organization. If one were to read these books by journalists and retired police without any reference to subsequent works they would probably be left with the impression that Interpol was a supra-national police force with near unlimited power and reach, instead of an information clearing house without even the power to arrest suspects. Interpol itself did little officially at this time to correct this perception. Marcel Sicot, who served as the organization's general secretary throughout most of the 1950s, did produce a dispassionate overview of Interpol's internal operations in 1961, but unlike the works of Forrest, Tullet, and Howe, it was never translated into another language from the original French.¹⁷ Recent writers Mathieu Deflem, Ethan Nadelmann and Peter Andreas have argued that Interpol, and police in general, saw little need to correct the perception of the organization because it supported the idea that international police organizations were merely the direct result of rising crime, rather than political gambits or moral agendas emanating from member nations. The lack of official definition certainly helped to feed the fictional portrayals of Interpol that appeared during the 1960s, including the American television series "The Man

¹⁶ Ronald Howe, *The pursuit of crime*. (London: A. Barker, 1961); The previously mentioned Sir Richard Jackson also wrote memoirs, but they only briefly discussed his international work: Richard Levfric Jackson, *Occupied with Crime*, 1st ed. in the U. S. A. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967).

¹⁷ Marcel Sicot, *A la barre de l'Interpol*. (Paris: Les Productions de Paris, 1961).

from Interpol,” the French radio show “The Dossiers of Interpol,” as well as the countless representations of the agency in spy novels and films.

While these fictional representations undoubtedly helped to keep the organization in the public’s imagination, they also provided fodder for the Church of Scientology’s attack on Interpol. This attack is important to understand because it was responsible for much of the literature on the organization produced during the 1970s. The origins of this attack lie in the movements of the Church during the 1960s.¹⁸ Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard moved his Church’s headquarters to Sussex, England in 1960, ostensibly to spread the religion but also to avoid an impending investigation by the United States government on the basis of tax evasion. Hubbard had previous connections, of a sort, to England, having been a leading member of the California branch of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, which followed the spiritual teachings of Aleister Crowley. His expulsion from the group for embezzlement was followed shortly thereafter by the publication of *Dianetics*, a theoretical work that forms the basis of the Church of Scientology. From its new headquarters in England, the Church of Scientology began to spread into continental Europe. In 1968, West German police, concerned about the opening of Scientology auditing centers in their country, requested information on the organization from Interpol. Interpol had yet to create a dossier on the Church, and thus asked the London Metropolitan Police (the Met) to develop one for the benefit of the entire organization.¹⁹

¹⁸ Most of the information for this section regarding the Church of Scientology is drawn from Hugh B. Urban, *The Church of Scientology: A History of a New Religion* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

¹⁹ This correspondence between Interpol and the Met, as well as most of the documents relating to the subsequent controversy, can be found in the following file: “The Church of Scientology, the Hubbard Association of Scientologists International, and associated organisations: Police enquiries, reports and

The Met, using their own surveillance records as well as reports collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), finished this profile on Scientology in 1969, after which it was circulated to Interpol member nations. The Met's profile portrayed the Church as an organization that used the trappings of religion to avoid taxation on what was essentially a massive confidence scam. The report described the Church's auditing process as essentially a brain-washing technique that primed the potential member for financial exploitation. As the report details, "the organization caters to the inadequate. The promise of enhanced mental awareness appears to appeal to those already affected by mental instability, unhappiness and uncertainty." In the eyes of the Met, the Church's auditing process was little more than a street level confidence trick, referring to the Church's auditing machine, "the E-meter," as nothing more than "a electric meter held in a wooden box [that] has two terminals each of which is attached at the end of a electrode which is a steel or tin can resembling and sometimes actually being, a soup can... The E-meter would appear to be no more than a powerful gimmick for controlling [initiates] and developing in them a sense of awe and submission to a dependency upon the organization." The report ended by saying that "the authorities in this country are extremely concerned about the organization...scientology is socially harmful; it alienates members of families from each other and attributes squalid and disgraceful motives to all who oppose it. Its authoritarian principles and practices are a potential menace to the personality and well-being of those so deluded as to become its followers."²⁰

correspondence; actions brought against Metropolitan Police; information material provided by the Church of Scientology." 1954-1983, MEPO 2/10283/1, National Archives, Kew [Hereafter NA].

²⁰ MEPO 2/10283/1.

The Church, well aware of its negative perception among national governments, had established an internal security bureau, referred to as the Guardian's Office, in 1966 under the leadership of L. Ron Hubbard's wife, Mary Sue.²¹ Though it was designed primarily to police members of the Church, the Guardian's Office also administered counter-surveillance projects. Beginning in the 1970s, the Guardian's Office planted Church members as employees in several "enemy organizations," mostly notably the American Medical Association, the Better Business Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service as well as several equivalent bodies in foreign countries. This initiative, codenamed Operation Snow White, led to the theft and destruction of hundreds of thousands of government documents relating to the Church of Scientology before it was discovered by the US government in 1977.²²

Though it has never been confirmed, it is more than likely that this operation also resulted in the public release of the Met's profile of the Church of Scientology in West Germany in 1973. The release of this damning document led to a swift response by the Church, which filed suit against Interpol and the Metropolitan Police in German court. The Church followed this by organizing a propaganda campaign against Interpol that attacked the organization as a tool of totalitarianism, emphasizing in particular the organization's Nazi past.²³ The early wave of this attack featured short newspaper articles and pamphlets that offered surviving photographs of Nazi run Interpol conferences during the Second

²¹ Urban, *The Church of Scientology*, 110.

²² *Ibid.*, 167.

²³ S.A. Barram, "Interpol Unmasked," *The American Zionist*, March/April 1975; "Interpol is spy threat-minister," *Scottish Daily News*, April 8, 1975; Calif. Church of Scientology Los Angeles, *Interpol, private group, public menace: a police organization involved in criminal activities*. (Los Angeles, CA: Church of Scientology, 1990).

World War. Subsequent attacks became more sophisticated, coming in the form of nonfiction publications that claimed to provide an unbiased discussion of Interpol's historical and contemporary operation. In his 1976 book, *The Secret World of Interpol*, author Omar Garrison argued that Interpol maintains an "Orwellian dream"²⁴ of establishing "a dossier-based dictatorship"²⁵ that will bring an end to civil liberties around the world. In a more measured approach, authors Trevor Meldal-Johnsen and Vaughn Young write that Interpol has the opportunity to become an effective organization, but it must first curb its despotic lust for information and surveillance of even average civilians.²⁶

Scientology's attack on Interpol could not have come at a worse time for the police group. The 1970s began with a drawn out debate in the United Nations concerning Interpol's status as an official NGO. This was followed by Senate hearings in the United States in 1976 and 1978 – partly inspired by Scientologist propaganda – that questioned the legality of Interpol's operation as well as its benefits for America. Interpol, led by Secretary General Jean Népote, attempted to fight against these storms by opening its doors to a new series of journalist investigators including Michael Fooner, Iris Noble, Peter Lee, and Fenton Bresler.²⁷ The researched approach of these writers helped to counter some of the

²⁴ Omar V Garrison, *The secret world of Interpol* (New York: Ralston-Pilot, 1976), 229.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 231.

²⁶ Trevor Meldal-Johnsen and Vaughn Young, *The Interpol connection: an inquiry into the International Criminal Police Organization* (New York: Dial Press, 1979).

²⁷ Michael Fooner, *Interpol; the Inside Story of the International Crime-Fighting Organization* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co, 1973); Michael Fooner, *Interpol: Issues in World Crime and International Criminal Justice*, Criminal Justice and Public Safety (New York: Plenum Press, 1989); Iris Noble, *Interpol, International Crime Fighter*, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Peter G Lee, *Interpol* (New York: Stein and Day, 1976); Fenton S Bresler, *Interpol* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992); Jean Népote also wrote his own essay on the organization's history included in Philip John Stead, *Pioneers in policing* (Montclair, N.J.: McGraw-Hill; Patterson Smith Pub. Corp., 1977).

more ridiculous arguments emanating from the Church of Scientology. Fenton Bresler's work, in particular, has real lasting worth for historians, as it contains an in depth discussion of Interpol's still missing interwar and Second World War archives.²⁸

Serious scholarly work on Interpol and international police cooperation more generally emerged in the 1980s and was driven primarily by political scientists and sociologists.²⁹ A notable work in this category includes Malcolm Anderson's *Policing the World*, which contains a few chapters of history on Interpol before moving forward into an analysis of the present day. Similarly, sociologist Ethan Nadelmann's independent work, along with his cooperative work with Peter Andreas, places the history of Interpol within the context of America's unilateral approach to international law enforcement during the second half of the 20th century.³⁰ Outright historical work on international policing, to the extent that it exists, tends to focus on comparisons between national policing institutions rather than on cooperation between those institutions.³¹

Exceptions, however, do exist – most notably Richard Bach Jensen's article on the International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898. In this article, Jensen argues that

²⁸ Bresler, *Interpol*, 97.

²⁹ Malcolm Anderson, *Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-operation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Dilip K. Das and Daniel J. Koenig, *International police cooperation: a world perspective* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001); R.I. Mawby, ed., *Policing Across the World: Issues for the Twenty-First Century* (London: UCL Press, 1999); William F. McDonald, ed., *Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village* (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Pub. Co., 1997).

³⁰ Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders*; Andreas and Nadelmann, *Policing the Globe*.

³¹ Gerald Blaney, ed., *Policing Interwar Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985); Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, eds., *Policing Western Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); Barry Godfrey, Clive Emsley and Graeme Dunstall, eds., *Comparative histories of crime* (Cullompton: Willan, 2003); Hsi-huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (Cambridge: University Press, 1992); Mark Mazower, ed., *The policing of politics in the twentieth century* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1997).

international police cooperation developed out of a desire to fight politically motivated international criminals, namely bomb throwing anarchists and revolutionary socialists.³² Though unpublished, the Ph.D. dissertation of Richard Johnson offers a similar argument, using the overseas activities of Czarists Russia's secret police as the primary example.³³ Also providing important insight is criminologist Cyrille Fijnaut, who has written several essays on the history of international police cooperation that concentrate on the influence of the Netherlands and the European Union after the Second World War.³⁴

Building on this work, sociologist Mathieu Deflem has provided a theoretical analysis of Interpol's history using Max Weber's theories regarding bureaucratization.³⁵ Deflem argues that the impetus for international policing developed in German states during the mid to late 19th century, as police searched for ways to increase their professional status within the modern state structure. German historian Jens Jäger has developed work that considers Interpol's history within the context of international criminal justice organizations and journals that emerged in Imperial Germany, paying particular attention to the use of photography in the official cataloguing of criminal records.³⁶ More recently,

³² Richard Bach Jensen, "The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1981): 323-347.

³³ Richard Jerome Johnson, "The Okhrana abroad, 1885-1917: a study in international police cooperation", Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University, 1970.

³⁴ Cyrille Fijnaut and R. Hermans, eds., *Police cooperation in Europe* (Lochem: Van den Brink, 1987); Fijnaut, *The Internationalization of police cooperation in Western Europe* (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1993); Fijnaut, ed., *The impact of World War II on policing in north-west Europe* (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2004).

³⁵ Mathieu Deflem, "Bureaucratization and Social Control: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation," *Law & Society Review*, Vol. 34, No. 3, (2000): 739-778 AND *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

³⁶ Jens Jäger, "International Police Cooperation and the Associations for the Fight Against White Slavery," *Paedagogica Historica* 38, no. 2-3 (2002): 565-579; Jens Jäger, *Verfolgung durch Verwaltung: internationales Verbrechen und internationale Polizeikooperation 1880-1933* (Konstanz: UVK, Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 2006).

historian Paul Knepper released two volumes on the history of international crime, which briefly discuss international police cooperation as it pertained to the work of international political interest groups and the League of Nations.³⁷

The existing literature on international police cooperation has left us with a clear sense of present developments and at least the beginnings of a historical interpretation, but significant questions remain. For instance, why did the effort against international crime take the form of international police organizations and why did these organizations form at the particular moment that they did? Was it all, as Jensen argues, a matter of stopping political criminals or were there other factors involved? While political crimes certainly played a role in the development of international policing bodies, most of these organizations were forbidden by their members from dealing with political crime. What role then did more mundane, economically motivated crime play? Furthermore, why did Interpol capture the attention of police and the international community over similar organizations, in particular the International Police Conference? What were the successes and failures of these groups, and how do their trials compare to the efforts of dealing with international crime today? Finally, given that most histories on crime and policing deal with European countries alone, what role did non-European states or European colonial possessions play in these developments?³⁸

³⁷ Paul Knepper, *The invention of international crime: a global issue in the making, 1881-1914* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Paul Knepper, *International crime in the 20th century: The League of Nations era, 1919-1939* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

³⁸ Mathieu Deflem and Ethan Nadelmann's works include discussions of the United States, a discussion that this dissertation will add to. The work of Paul Gootenberg and Julia Rodriguez consider South America's involvement in international crime, though with little reference to international police organizations: Paul Gootenberg, *Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug* (The University of North

APPROACH AND ARGUMENT

This thesis attempts to provide answers to these questions by considering the British Empire's involvement with international police cooperation from the interwar period through decolonization. Britain was a prominent member in all of the major international police organizations from their inception. The Empire sent delegates to the annual meetings of these groups and served as the host nation for conferences organized by the International Police Conference and the International Criminal Police Commission. In addition, many British police officers served on the governing bodies of these associations as well as the editorial boards that maintained each organization's official journal. Thus, using British archival sources, we can see the motivations that drove the creation of these organizations as well as the problems that they faced during their lifespans.

My hypothesis is that Britain's encouragement of international policing was based in large part on the experience of policing its empire. Though still a small subject, imperial policing has received increasing attention over the past two decades, especially from historians David Anderson and David Killingray.³⁹ Their edited volumes have provided a way to compare and contrast the experience of policing between different colonies. More recently, historians Georgina Sinclair and Chris Williams have begun to explore the relationship between the policing of imperial and metropolitan Britain, describing in

Carolina Press, 2009); Julia Emilia Rodriguez, "Encoding the criminal: criminology and the science of 'social defense' in modernizing Argentina (1880-1921)", Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia, 2000.

³⁹ David Anderson and David Killingray, eds., *Policing the Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991) and *Policing and Decolonisation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

particular how the pressures of empire encouraged the exchange of policing techniques and personnel between colonies as well as between the colonies and the metropole.⁴⁰

This thesis attempts to build upon this work by connecting the history of imperial exchanges to wider international developments.⁴¹ Indeed, the effort to cooperate on policing within the British Empire in many ways preceded and paralleled the effort to coordinate policing globally. As this dissertation shows, several officials, both within Britain and in the colonies, attempted to establish an imperial police association during the interwar period that could not only fight crime within the British Empire, but also coordinate with international bodies to fight crime globally. Additionally, several of the British officers that participated in international police organizations were veterans of one or more colonial police departments. These colonial veterans were more aware than anyone else of the expanding reach of criminals. Like other colonial officials tasked with running the Empire, colonial police were acutely aware of the need for the center state to relinquish some power to the periphery in order for the policing of transnational offenders to be effective. The means to control crime is a critical aspect of national sovereignty and the legitimization of government, but in a globalized world it becomes impossible for a single

⁴⁰ Georgina Sinclair, “‘Get into a Crack Force and Earn \pounds 20 a Month and All Found...’: The Influence of the Palestine Police Upon Colonial Policing 1922–1948 1,” *European Review of History: Revue Europeenne D’histoire* 13, no. 1 (2006): 49–65; Georgina Sinclair, *At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945–80* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Georgina Sinclair, “The ‘Irish’ policeman and the Empire: Influencing the Policing of the British Empire–Commonwealth,” *Irish Historical Studies* 36, no. 142 (2008): 173–187; Georgina Sinclair and Chris A. Williams, “‘Home and Away’: The Cross-Fertilisation Between ‘Colonial’ and ‘British’ Policing, 1921–85,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35, no. 2 (2007): 221–238.

⁴¹ Clive Emsley and Georgina Sinclair have recently released work that points in this direction: Clive Emsley, “Marketing the Brand: Exporting British Police Models 1829–1950,” *Policing* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 43–54; Georgina Sinclair, “Exporting the UK Police ‘Brand’: The RUC-PSNI and the International Policing Agenda,” *Policing* 6, no. 1 (2012): 55–66.

state to control all the variations of crime within its borders without help from the outside. I argue that colonial police veterans carried this notion of devolved sovereignty with them to their work in international policing.

I believe that this imperial perspective is critical not only because of how it encouraged British participation in international policing, but how it influenced international police cooperation as a whole. I contend that Britain, inspired by empire, provided much of the early impetus for international policing and helped the organizations involved in this effort achieve a near global reach. Furthermore, I believe that it was Britain's, and specifically the London Metropolitan Police's, support of this movement that helped it avoid policing controversial political crimes and kept it going during the so-called end of globalization in the 1930s, even to the point of convincing other nations to remain in Interpol despite the Nazi takeover in 1938. Of course, there was nothing altruistic about this support. As the world's preeminent economic and military power during this time, Britain had the most to lose from global crime and thus had the most to gain from efforts to make the policing of that crime more effective. Furthermore, British police and politicians were convinced that their police were the best in the world, and believed that converting other territories to their policing model offered the best means of maintaining international security. This is not to argue that Britain pursued imperialism with regard to criminal justice, but that the country's own self-interest and hubris led them to try to globalize the fight against crime.

As shown by several historians of empire and globalization, the British Empire was the source for a wide assortment of international and transnational initiatives.⁴² I believe that it is time to consider international policing as one of those initiatives. Britain's police – motivated by their country's vulnerability to international crime, armed with their experience policing empire and convinced of the superiority of their own model of policing – worked to promote and sustain law enforcement cooperation in the international community. In addition, Britain's waning as an international power following the Second World War helps to explain why international policing faltered, as the postwar period found British internationalism replaced by America's unilateral approach to law enforcement, seen most clearly in the current wars on drugs and terror.

DISSERTATION OUTLINE

Chapter One provides a history of police cooperation prior to the creation of formal organizations from the perspective of the British Empire. It shows that while Britain remained hesitant of formal cooperation during the 19th century, the country nevertheless led many policing efforts around the globe. Chapter Two considers Britain's early interest in international policing as it pertained to empire. This chapter concentrates on the career of colonial police officer Herbert Dowbiggin, whose tours of colonial police departments during the interwar period helped to establish Britain's subsequent international agenda

⁴² Frank Trentmann, Philippa Levine, and Kevin Grant, *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, C.1880-1950* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 2009).

regarding policing. Chapter Three discusses British influence on Interpol using the records of the Metropolitan Police, the primary liaison service between the British Empire and the organization. In particular, this chapter follows the career of Norman Kendal, the director of the Met's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) during the interwar period. It explains why, through Kendal's influence, Interpol came to prominence instead of the American led International Police Conference. Chapter Four considers international policing during the Second World War. It discusses the Nazi takeover of Interpol as well as the wartime cooperation between American and British police. Chapter Five studies the highpoint of Britain's influence on international policing during the immediate postwar period. Specifically, it describes Britain's failed efforts to export its policing methods abroad to Germany and other occupied territories after the Second World War. In addition, this chapter discusses Britain's role in reestablishing Interpol through the work of Met police officer Ronald Howe. Chapter Six shows how Britain's influence on international police work declined starting in the late 1940s, as the country began to concentrate manpower and funding on policing colonial emergencies. The conclusion provides a discussion of Britain's international policing work with reference to America's war on crime, as well as offer some general concluding remarks on the dissertation as a whole.

Chapter One: The New Police and the World, 1829 – 1922

Prior to the 19th century, law enforcers rarely considered events outside of their own neighborhood, let alone their own country. When crime occurred, the criminal was often personally known by the watchman, and he could rely on his contacts in the community to quickly apprehend the offender. Yet with the advent of modern forms of transportation in the early 19th century, these ancient assurances disappeared. Steamships and railroads offered criminals a means of quick and permanent escape, while the general increase in population offered them anonymity. This development affected Britain as much as any other country. But whereas most countries considered these problems from a national viewpoint, Britain's overseas possessions required the country to take an international perspective.

Initially, these overseas possessions provided an easy means to manage the problem of travelling criminals through transportation. Yet as the practice of transportation waned in the 1840s, Britain was forced to establish professional police forces that could manage the occurrence of modern crime as well as recidivism. Unlike other countries, however, Britain attempted to meet this challenge using a model of policing based on civilian cooperation and an unarmed constabulary. The commitment to this style of policing initially made cooperation with foreign police departments difficult. As the 19th century wore on, however, Britain found itself adopting more foreign elements into their policing model, almost to the point of being indistinguishable from their overseas counterparts. Simultaneously, Britain's policing of the empire began to undergo a shift away from

violent, military policing toward a more British style model. This shift resulted from not only the drive for a civilizing mission in the colonies, but also from a desire to uphold British prestige with regard to policing throughout the world.

THE INTERNATIONAL WORK OF THE NEW POLICE

From the outset, British policing was constructed with an eye to the wider world. Indeed, there was little ground for agreement in 1829 amongst British ministers regarding what roles Robert Peel's New Police should perform, but there was always agreement on what he should not be: continental.¹ The 30 years preceding the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act saw the steady spread across Europe of the French style gendarmerie, thanks in large part to Napoleon's campaigns.² This style of police, in British eyes, was a standing army in all but name, which left most of the police work to mounted soldiers in the countryside.³ The repressive nature of the gendarmerie was later built upon during the Concert of Europe with the development of plainclothes police and spies, designed to protect conservative continental monarchs against revolution.⁴ In an attempt to avoid any association with continental police, British Police were required to wear blue uniforms and to go armed with only a truncheon.

¹ Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

² Michael Broers, *Napoleon's Other War: Bandits, Rebels and Their Pursuers in the Age of Revolutions* (Peter Lang, 2010). Also useful in this regard is Broers work on French imperialism in Italy.

³ Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*.

⁴ Donald Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police*. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968).

Despite these attempts to avoid the continental model, the Metropolitan Police faced heavy criticism – including claims of espionage – from the population. There was certainly some basis for these fears. Though garbed in blue and without a weapon, many of the early members of the Met came from military backgrounds.⁵ This recruitment resulted not only from necessity but also precedent. While serving as Secretary of Ireland in 1814, Robert Peel created his first police force, the Irish Peace Preservation Force, from former soldiers.⁶ The early formation of the Met also adopted the Irish practice of having their police patrol outside of their home districts so that they policed only strangers. Adding to the suspicion of the new police was the fact that most patrols focused on working class neighborhoods, where “Peelers” monitored not only bars and gambling houses but also trade union meetings.⁷ As a result of these practices a series of bloody anti-police riots occurred throughout the 1840s, and despite the precautions of Robert Peel, Bobbies were often compared to continental or Irish gendarmes.⁸ Many openly wondered if the new police were any better than the previous system of night watchmen and thief-takers.⁹

The reputation of the Bobby began to change, however, in 1848.¹⁰ The continent’s “Year of Revolution” saw a series of revolts violently put down by government repressions

⁵ Michael Brogden, “An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and the Origins of the Professional Police,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 15, no. 2 (1987): 179–208.

⁶ Clive Emsley, *The Great British Bobby: A History of British Policing from 1829 to the Present* (London: Quercus, 2009), 99.

⁷ Richard Storch, “The Plague of Blue Locusts,” *International Review of Social History* 20, no. 01 (1975): 66.

⁸ Stanley Palmer, *Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

⁹ Elaine A Reynolds, *Before the bobbies: the night watch and police reform in metropolitan London, 1720-1830* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).

¹⁰ Clive Emsley, “The English Bobby: An Indulgent Tradition,” in *Myths of the English*, ed. Porter, Roy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 118.

often carried out by police. Britain, in contrast, found its own potential Chartist revolution handled by the police with a relatively small amount of violence, allowing the state to prosper like never before. This new appreciation – or at least acceptance – of the Bobby was solidified during the 1851 Great Exhibition in Hyde Park.¹¹ While the Great Exhibition is seen today as a watermark in the development of industrial technology, at the time it was seen as an opportunity for dangerous revolutionaries to strike a deathblow to modern civilization.¹² Continental visitors arrived to the exhibition in a state of mind not at all dissimilar from those visiting London for the 2012 Olympics: seeing potential revolutionaries and terrorists around every corner. The Home Office bought into this fear as well, forcing Metropolitan Police Commissioner Richard Mayne to share his position with Captain William Hay of the British Army a few months before the exhibition.

Yet the exhibition, with Mayne directing security, passed off without incident, confirming to Britain and to the rest of the world that even in this tumultuous period a nation could maintain itself, and with an unarmed police no less. Mayne managed this feat thanks in large part to the presence of dozens of provincial British and foreign police officers as well as interpreters.¹³ The foreign police at the Exhibition came primarily from France and the German states, but also included officers from America and Russia. The

¹¹ Bernard Porter, *Plots and Paranoia: a History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 87.

¹² Jeffrey A Auerbach ed., *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008).

¹³ “Arrangements: Foreign Police,” 1851, MEPO 2/92, NA.

Metropolitan Police reported only eight cases of pick pocketing and ten cases of pilfering during the fair, but all the stolen property was recovered.¹⁴

Foreign ministers and police were amazed that Britain survived this event without even the semblance of a political or internal espionage service.¹⁵ Met Commissioner Richard Mayne, however, viewed political policing as both unnecessary and potentially dangerous, and as a result the force contained only 8 plain clothes detectives by 1851. Mayne attempted to placate the visiting leaders of continental countries by inviting foreign detectives to shadow the Met during the Exhibition.¹⁶ Many of these continental detectives used this invitation as a means to spy on political refugees that had fled Europe in the wake of 1848. Though France had spied on Royalist refugees in Britain since the late eighteenth century, the fallout from 1848 led to a substantial increase in the number of Europeans seeking asylum in London.¹⁷

For the most part, Britain resisted foreign police requests regarding this population, even as it swelled with several high profile anarchists and socialists during the 1860s and 1870s. The basis for this resistance rested on the notion that Britain was a liberal state, and its police did not investigate political matters, particularly those concerning foreign countries. In fact, many in Britain believed that political policing would actually encourage

¹⁴ Clive Emsley, *The English Police: A Political and Social History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 41.

¹⁵ Porter, *Plots and Paranoia*, 88.

¹⁶ "Arrangements: Foreign Police," November 1851, MEPO 2/91, NA; "Arrangements: Foreign Police," 1851, MEPO 2/92, NA.

¹⁷ James Joll, *The Anarchists* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); Hermia Oliver, *The International Anarchist Movement in Late Victorian England* (London; Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983).

rebellious activity.¹⁸ The resistance of British police, however, did not prevent foreign police departments from trying to monitor their expatriate population themselves. France and Italy maintained close watch over their expatriate anarchists and socialists in London from the 1870s until the First World War.¹⁹ France, in particular, worked to follow those that participated in or helped to support the Paris Commune in 1871.²⁰ Perhaps the most notorious foreign power in this regard was the Russian Okhrana, which deployed dozens of detectives in Russian immigrant communities in Paris, Berlin, and London.²¹ Though the Okhrana was largely unsuccessful in brokering a liaison with Scotland Yard, they often used this rejection by British police to encourage other foreign police to show up the Met by demonstrating their own “professional competence.”²²

Britain’s opposition to policing anarchism, and politics in general, began to waiver in the late 19th century. This change in policy resulted from the development of Fenian terrorism in the 1880s.²³ Fenian attacks led the Metropolitan Police to establish the Special Irish Branch (later changed to the Special Branch) in 1883, a development that was quickly replicated in provincial forces throughout Britain.²⁴ Although these branches were

¹⁸ Bernard Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State : The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch before the First World War* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1991), 3.

¹⁹ Howard C Payne and Henry Grosshans, “The Exiled Revolutionaries and the French Political Police in the 1850’s,” *The American Historical Review* 68, no. 4 (1963): 954–973; Pietro Di Paola, “The Spies Who Came in from the Heat: The International Surveillance of the Anarchists in London,” *European History Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (2007): 189–215.

²⁰ Richard Bach Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 123.

²¹ Richard Jerome Johnson, “The Okhrana Abroad, 1885-1917 : A Study in International Police Cooperation,” 1975.

²² *Ibid.*, 78.

²³ Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State*, 37.

²⁴ Rupert Allason, *The Branch : A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, 1883-1983* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1983).

specifically tasked with espionage and plainclothes policing, early Special Branch officers often retained their negative opinion of policing politics, and as a result relied on paying informants rather than conducting fieldwork themselves. When British detectives did conduct fieldwork, they often ruined their disguise by questioning suspects directly instead of gleaning information from open conversation. Yet as bombing attacks and disturbances continued, British police adopted a more continental approach and opinion of detective work.

The creation of the Met's Special Branch helped to establish the force as an imperial police department, rather than one simply tasked with policing London.²⁵ The Fenian campaign led Special Branch detectives to maintain contact with police in Ireland and America, and also required them to serve as body guards for the Royal Family and members of the government during public events or tours abroad. Special Branch's imperial work would expand further in the Edwardian period, when the department cooperated with the Indian Office to maintain surveillance on potential Indian revolutionaries living in Britain.²⁶ Much of this surveillance centered on fears – held by Indian Viceroy George Curzon among others – that Russian agents living in London were attempting to inspire Indian students at Oxford and Cambridge to return home to their country to lead a revolt. Special Branch later extended this work to the United States and Canada, where they

²⁵ Emsley, *The English Police*, 81.

²⁶ Richard J Popplewell, *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924*, Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Nicholas Owen, "The Soft Heart of the British Empire: Indian Radicals in Edwardian London," *Past & Present* 220, no. 1 (August 1, 2013): 143–184.

encouraged local police to monitor and sometimes violently suppress the activities of the Ghadar Party.

This move toward political policing was generally supported by the British public, which demonstrated a growing acceptance of plainclothes police work through the popularity of Sherlock Holmes.²⁷ Even though Conan Doyle's stories often portrayed the Metropolitan Police as bumbling fools, the British public nevertheless developed an expectation that British police were practicing the same methods of professional deduction pursued by Sherlock and other fictional detectives. Conan Doyle's stories also helped to establish in the minds of the British public that the need for plainclothes and political policing originated from the development of foreign criminality in Britain. Early Holmes novels featured copious references to American criminality in particular, including the Ku Klux Klan, Mormon polygamy, and the devious habits of Irene Adler.²⁸ It is also perhaps unsurprising in the context of Fenian bombings that Holmes' greatest nemesis is a man with an Irish surname, Moriarty.

While the fear of foreign criminality helped to encourage the first moves toward political policing in Britain, this same fear helped to solidify and extend the already existing structures of political policing in Europe. States throughout the continent rushed to develop new means to understand and control foreign populations. Important milestones in this era included Cesare Lombroso's work on the biology of the "born criminal" as well as

²⁷ Haia Shpayer-Makov, *The Ascent of the Detective: Police Sleuths in Victorian and Edwardian England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

²⁸ Ronald R. Thomas, *Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).

Alphonse Bertillon's application of anthropometry to criminal records.²⁹ The focus throughout this work remained on foreign criminal bodies, rather than on the incidence of crime itself, with many experts claiming that particular classes and races were predisposed to crime.³⁰

Unsurprisingly, the European police at the forefront of this new technology of identification tended to be concerned with border control or ports. Their work helped to establish the first personal identification papers that preceded the passport.³¹ The development of identification papers created a means through which police from different countries could communicate and exchange criminal information using similar technologies of description. This exchange was particularly fruitful among German States prior to unification. In 1851, several of these states formed a police union that exchanged crime notices and warrants by way of a printed magazine.³² This union and other forms of cooperation initially targeted select groups – particularly Gypsies and poor migrant workers – though later expanded to include anarchists and political activists.

²⁹ Mary Gibson, *Born to Crime : Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of Biological Criminology* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002); Henry T. F Rhodes, *Alphonse Bertillon, Father of Scientific Detection* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956).

³⁰ Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration : A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Richard F Wetzell, *Inventing the Criminal: A History of German Criminology, 1880-1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

³¹ John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport : Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jane Caplan and John Torpey, *Documenting Individual Identity : The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

³² Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 50.

ANARCHISM AND WHITE SLAVERY

Though British police and criminologists tended to disagree with the continental perception of criminal biology, they nevertheless moved toward cooperation with continental police by the end of the 19th century.³³ This cooperation was based on the concern with anarchism and the sex trade, referred to at the time as white slavery. While the actual incidence of anarchist crime remained low throughout the 19th century, a series of stupendous anarchist attacks in the 1890s – the period of “propaganda by deed” – resulted in a general call for action. These attacks included a series of bombings in Paris (1892-1894)³⁴ and the attempted bombing of the Greenwich Observatory (1894) as well as the assassinations of President Marie Carnot of France (1894), Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Canovas (1897), and the Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1898).³⁵ In addition to these successful attacks, there were also dozens of attempted attacks, including one on King Humbert of Italy in 1897.³⁶ Although these assassinations and bombings were largely the work of individuals, journalists encouraged European governments to believe that the attacks were perpetrated by an international anarchist conspiracy.³⁷

As a result of this apprehension, Italy convened an Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome in 1898 to promote a coordinate response to the crisis. France, Germany, and Russia eagerly supported this venture, though Britain hesitated. They sent delegates to this

³³ Neil Davie, *Tracing the Criminal : The Rise of Scientific Criminology in Britain, 1860-1918* (Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2005).

³⁴ John M Merriman, *The Dynamite Club : How a Bombing in Fin-de-Siècle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009).

³⁵ R. B. Jensen, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, no. 2 (January 1, 1981): 325-347.

³⁶ Humbert would eventually be killed by an anarchist assassin in 1900.

³⁷ Jensen, 324.

meeting only at the last minute, and only after being assured that the conference would not result in a binding treaty. Delegates at the Conference met from November 24 to December 21 1898, and though they developed no binding treaties, the delegates did agree on a set of working practices to attempt to control the anarchist menace. In particular, the attendees agreed to push for the criminalization of the possession explosives, membership in anarchist associations, and producing anarchist propaganda.³⁸ Representatives also agreed to encourage their states to make the death penalty the standard punishment for all assassins of heads of state. Despite his country's early hesitation to join the conference, British Ambassador Philip Currie ended the conference by presenting a long speech that outlined his support for new legislation against anarchist criminals. Specifically, he promised that Britain would allow for the quick extradition of any anarchist in Britain found to be plotting against another nation, and would also work to suppress anarchist literature emanating from London.³⁹

While Currie's promises never led to any new bills or acts, they did encourage European states and their police to believe that Britain would be more open to cooperation with regard to criminal justice in the future. Indeed, the Conference attendees included several police chiefs from throughout Europe who agreed at the meeting to forward to each other monthly lists of deported immigrants.⁴⁰ Although the resulting lists from this agreement tended to be incomplete, the British participation in their circulation

³⁸ Jensen, 328.

³⁹ Jensen, 329.

⁴⁰ Jensen, 332.

demonstrated a dramatic change from precedent.⁴¹ The Met's Special Branch also showed an increasing willingness after the Rome Conference to work with foreign intelligence bureaus – including the Russian Okhrana – operating in London to track potential terrorists.⁴² Special Branch officers and regular Bobbies began to shed their earlier reservations about political policing, especially when it came to investigating the endless rumors of German spy rings that flooded the Edwardian age.

While most of the cooperation between British and foreign police on anarchism remained secret, the campaign to combat the sex trade led to publically sanctioned cooperation between British police and their overseas counterparts. Much like the campaign against anarchism, the effort against the sex trade in turn of the century Europe resulted from sensational journalism, most of which emanated from Britain. Indeed, W.T. Stead's series of articles on "The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon," which appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1885, is commonly seen as the starting point for the panic over prostitution and "white slavery." The perception during this panic was that women were being duped by dishonest foreigners (typically Jewish) to become prostitutes.⁴³ Although this type of induction into prostitution was rare, the idea fit well with the Victorian image of the "fallen woman" as well as the belief that international travel through empire inevitably imperiled women and morality in general.⁴⁴ The common depiction of pimps in

⁴¹ Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State*, 122.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 144.

⁴³ Edward Bristow, *Prostitution and Prejudice: The Jewish Fight against White Slavery, 1870-1939* (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), 25.

⁴⁴ Stefan Petrow, *Policing Morals: The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office, 1870-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

this trade as Jewish also satisfied the idea of criminal biology and global conspiracies regarding crime.⁴⁵

As a result of these characteristics, the sex trade became the basis for several international pressure groups, including Josephine Butler's International Abolitionist Federation, Constance Rothschild's Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women, and William Coote's National Vigilance Association, which included W.T. Stead as a member of the board of directors. These British directed organizations used the personal fortunes and political connections of several wealthy philanthropists to agitate police throughout Europe to improve the safety of international travel for women, and to closely monitor border crossings, ports, and rail stations.⁴⁶ The National Vigilance Association, in particular, developed a set of local branches in several countries throughout the world to investigate prostitution and bring cases of slavery or obscenity to the attention of police.

The police – British and foreign alike – often felt dragooned into this work, but nevertheless developed a working relationship with these organizations, often relying on pressure groups to pursue prosecution of court cases.⁴⁷ In addition, the issue of white slavery also gave police, especially in Europe, an opportunity to cooperate with one another without facing the same criticism and resistance they encountered while trying to police

⁴⁵ Michael Berkowitz, *The Crime of My Very Existence : Nazism and the Myth of Jewish Criminality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Paul Knepper, "'Jewish Trafficking' and London Jews in the Age of Migration," *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 6, no. 3 (2007): 239–256.

⁴⁶ Judith R. Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

⁴⁷ Paul Knepper, *The Invention of International Crime : A Global Issue in the Making, 1881-1914* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 106.

international anarchism.⁴⁸As the campaign against white slavery continued into the 20th century, police also found that their cooperation supported by international treaties. These treaties resulted from a series of international conferences on white slave traffic that began in London in 1899, with subsequent meetings held in Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Paris, and Madrid. The conferences served as a place to share reports on sex trafficking as well as a basis for various pressure groups to push for legislative change. International treaties in 1904 and 1910 provided for not only harsher penalties for traffickers, but also encouraged the exchange of criminal information between foreign police departments.⁴⁹

THE BANALITY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME

If one were to take the manuscripts on international anarchism and white slavery at face value, they would inevitably be left with the impression that turn of the century Britain was awash in unsavory foreign criminals who constantly preyed upon an unprepared population. Yet even a cursory study of relevant archives reveals that the presumed increase in international criminality at this time had little basis in fact. Indeed, even in the files of the Metropolitan Police – the force tasked with policing the “Modern Babylon” of London – the actual occurrence of international crime remained rare. When a crime occurred that did involve an international dimension, it often took a predictable, unsensational form.

⁴⁸ Jens Jäger, “International Police Co-operation and the Associations for the Fight Against White Slavery,” *Paedagogica Historica* 38, no. 2–3 (2002): 565–579.

⁴⁹ Knepper, *The Invention of International Crime*, 113; Jäger, “International Police Co-operation and the Associations for the Fight Against White Slavery,” 573–574.

The most common type of international crime dealt with by the Metropolitan Police was advance fee fraud, better known as the Spanish Prisoner Scheme.⁵⁰ In this confidence trick, the criminal contacted the victim via post offering a large sum of money, or other comparable treasure, in return for a small advance of funds that the criminal – posing as a distressed yet reputable person – could not provide because of some form of impediment (e.g. prison sentence, illness, etc.). Britain had long been a target of the Spanish Prisoner, dating back at least to the Peninsular War in the early 19th century. Waves of the scam hit the island every 20 years or so afterward, as criminals used the backdrop of successive Carlist Wars to spin tales of wrongful imprisonment, political intrigue, and hidden treasure for their victims.⁵¹ It should be noted that many of these criminals probably did not originate from Spain. In fact, as some members of the Met surmised, many of these “prisoners” were writing from England. Spain’s criminal reputation then was as much the indirect result of endemic conflict as with actual wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the fact that some of these letters originated from Spain makes the prisoner scheme one of the earliest and most enduring examples of international crime.

The success of the prisoner swindle relied as much on the victim’s sentimentality and need for emotional connection as it did on their desire for easy money. The successful prisoner, then, was someone that could combine a too-good-to-be-true offer with a compelling narrative that the victim could, literally, buy into. The series of letters sent to

⁵⁰ Foreign Office examples can be found in FO 227/8, FO 72/2027-28, FO 72/2140, FO 72/2228, and FO 371/24218.

⁵¹ Metropolitan Police post office warning regarding “Spanish Prisoner Swindle,” February 3, 1915, MEPO 3/170 NA.

Mr. Paul Webb, a Sloane Street shopkeeper, by “Luis Ramos” in 1905 offer a good example of the scam.⁵² Using above average diction and writing in a pleasant cursive, the prisoner “Luis Ramos” implores Mr. Webb to send funds to assist and protect his daughter, “a young girl of fourteen years old who is now in a Prison House.”⁵³ Ramos, drawing from recent history, explains that he was the private secretary of General Martinez Campos during “the last Cuban war,” but owing to the replacement of Campos by Valeriano Weyler – “a political adversary” – Ramos left the army and joined the rebellion on behalf of the republic. Thanks to “the greatest treason,” Ramos was “compelled to emigrate to English ground with all my property valuable £37.000.”⁵⁴ He decided to return home after the death of his wife in order to take care of his daughter Mary. Ramos tells Webb that he left for Spain after depositing his money “in a sure English Bank,” but was intercepted by the authorities upon disembarking and placed in a military prison in Barcelona. Complaining of an illness and certain that he will have “a very short and fatal end,” Ramos begged Webb to send funding that would release his daughter and his confiscated luggage, which contained the receipt for his English bank account in a secret drawer.

Webb responded to this correspondence by telegraphing Ramos’ designated intermediary, a prison chaplain named “Jean Richard,” and inquiring about the situation. This telegraph led to another Ramos letter, which reiterated his impending death as well as his fear that his daughter would surely be pursued by his political enemies if help did not

⁵² “The Spanish Prisoner Swindle,” 1905-1910, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁵³ “Luis Ramos” to Mr. Paul Webb, November 11, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

arrive soon.⁵⁵ Ramos also warned Webb not to alert authorities in Spain or Britain regarding the situation as it would put his child at risk. This second Ramos letter, however, broke the drama, as it was sent to Webb, but addressed to a Mr. Thomas McGill, no doubt another potential target for the scheme. The criminal compounded the mistake by sending the same letter, now addressed to Webb, four days later.⁵⁶ A follow up letter was sent the next week in which Ramos stated “I feel that my life is going away...I have made my will by which I name my daughter my only heiress, appointing you her guardian.”⁵⁷ Ramos concluded by saying that he would “write no more, [as] neither my head nor my hand allow it to me; I pray you to forget not my prayer and to abandon us not as we have but you to save my poor Mary of her distress.”⁵⁸

That same day, Webb received a message from “Jean Richard,” the holy agent provocateur, written with a different hand on what appears to be church stationary.⁵⁹ This letter verified the points of Ramos’ story, and encouraged Webb to act, promising that “God will protect you.”⁶⁰ After nearly a month of silence, Richard wrote again to tell Webb that “Mr. Ramos, after several days of cruel agony died yesterday of hepatitis, after approaching God and receiving the last Holy Sacraments.”⁶¹ The chaplain included in this letter a copy of Ramos’ will, his death certificate, and a Spanish newspaper notice

⁵⁵ “Luis Ramos” to Mr. Thomas McGill, November 16, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁵⁶ “Luis Ramos” to Mr. Paul Webb, November 20, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁵⁷ “Luis Ramos” to Mr. Paul Webb, November 28, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ “Jean Richard” to Mr. Paul Webb, November 28, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ “Jean Richard” to Mr. Paul Webb, December 17, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

regarding the prisoner's death.⁶² Additionally, this final letter was the first to include the total of the advance needed from Webb in order to free Mary and Ramos' luggage: £59. Webb, however, did not fall for the ruse, and reported the correspondence to the Met the following week.⁶³

In the "Ramos" letters we have all the elements of a classic Victorian drama: orphan child, faced with the death or imprisonment of parents, seeks new guardian to share large inheritance amidst the backdrop of continental political intrigue. This drama was held up by the educated content and appearance of the writing as well as a seemingly genuine collection of supporting documents. Webb's telegraph after the first letter shows that, even if he was still skeptical, he believed the correspondence could be real. The criminal, of course, squandered his chance by addressing the next letter to the wrong person. This mistake was not the worst one that "Ramos" made, however. After receiving a long and detailed "Ramos" letter addressed to Mr. William Topley, the partners of Wm. Topley & Sons wrote to Scotland Yard informing them of the correspondence and explaining that the company's namesake had been dead for over twenty years.⁶⁴ A year later, Mrs. Mary Bates brought the police a similar letter addressed to her husband, who passed away seven years prior.⁶⁵ Mr. Harry Robertson of Mincing Lane wrote the Met with another example in 1908. Robertson described that this was the fourth such letter he had received in his life, but the

⁶² Each of these documents is written in Spanish and translated for Webb by Richard in the postscript of his letter.

⁶³ "Spanish Swindle," Central Officer's Special Report, Metropolitan Police, Criminal Investigation Department, December 27, 1905, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁶⁴ S. Topley to Chief Inspector, Scotland Yard, February 24, 1906, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁶⁵ "The Spanish Swindle," Special Report, Hunter Street Station, Metropolitan Police, March 6, 1907, MEPO 3/170, NA.

first to switch his Christian and surname (Dear Robertson Harry,) and to claim familiarity through the prisoner's deceased wife (Mrs. Mary Harry) – what Robertson drolly called a “new and rather amusing” touch.⁶⁶ Other potential victims were not so amused, and went to great lengths to see that something was done. William Thomlinson, a mining executive based in British Columbia, wrote to Scotland Yard complaining about a prisoner letter and declaring that “if you are in touch with the authorities in Spain, perhaps these fakers can be caught and put to honest work, in jail.”⁶⁷

Yet for as many of Ramos' letters that missed their mark, just as many found a willing victim. “About 16th January last,” wrote Superintendent Gordon of the Stirlingshire Constabulary, “Mrs. Margaret McAllister...received letter No. 1 of the enclosures [from “Jean Richard Pbro”]...and cabled in reply that she agreed to co-operate with the writer.”⁶⁸ After receiving additional letters from Richard, “she sent a cheque for £60 payable to Jean Richard Pbro...She received letter No.7 dated 13th February in acknowledgement of the cheque; but although she immediately thereafter wrote asking for more information, she received no word.”⁶⁹ Gordon wondered if “there is a chance of getting at Jean Richard Pbro,” and that if “the Barcelona Police would act much more readily for [the Met] than for [Stirlingshire].”⁷⁰ “It seems a pity,” Gordon continued, “that there should be no way of getting at that scoundrel.”⁷¹

⁶⁶ Mr. Harry Robertson to Superintendent of the Criminal Investigation Department, Scotland Yard, August 10, 1908, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁶⁷ Wm. Thomlinson to Chief of Scotland Yard, November 9, 1911, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁶⁸ Stirlingshire Superintendent Gordon to Melville Macnaughten, Assistant Commissioner, Scotland Yard, March 12, 1906, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Gordon to Macnaughten, March 23, 1906, MEPO 3/170, NA.

A similar situation confronted George and Mary Sophia Vooght of Cricklewood, who “received a letter from a man signing himself as Alvaro de Guzman, stating he was in Prison at Murcia, Spain, undergoing twelve years imprisonment...and that he had a daughter who was in a college in Spain who he was anxious to have sent to England to be educated and to live under the care of Mr. Vooght.”⁷² Guzman claimed to be a relative of Vooght through Guzman’s deceased wife Mary. “As Mr. Vooght had a sister Mary whom he had not seen for many years,” Sergeant W. Kemp reported, “he induced his wife to write to Guzman, offering to accept the girl Amelia, and have charge of her.”⁷³ Guzman replied by requesting that Vooght send £200 to his intermediary, Chaplain Jose Roig, in order to secure the girl’s safe passage and the collection of her inheritance. Mrs. Vooght, becoming suspicious, wrote to a Magistrate in Murcia, but received a letter from Jose Roig, stating that this letter had been handed to him and that Guzman had passed away since their last exchange.⁷⁴ Roig wrote that he needed £115 to help process the passage of Guzman’s estate to his daughter and her new guardians. Mrs. Vooght responded by sending the money, but did not receive a reply. Mr. Vooght then asked a friend to write to Roig asking for an explanation. Roig replied to this letter by “stating he was in Prison for some offence he could not explain, but required £35 more to enable him to bring Amelia to England.”⁷⁵

Mrs. Vooght went to the police after this letter, at which point Sergeant Kemp “informed [her] the whole thing was a swindle and that we could not assist her, beyond

⁷² “Spanish Swindle,” Central Officers Special Report, October 29, 1909, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ There is no firm evidence that the Vooght’s criminal was our friend “Ramos,” but his modus operandi (prison, orphan, chaplain) certainly suggests this. Unfortunately, Mrs. Vooght’s letter to the Magistrate is not contained in this file.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

forwarding the documents to the British Ambassador at Madrid.”⁷⁶ The British Embassy in Madrid, when they received word of these frauds, forwarded notices on to Spanish authorities, but warned that individuals living at the local addresses used by the criminals often “turn out to be mere innocent accessories to the fraud, who can prove their ignorance of the contents of the letters sent to their address; while the real swindlers remain uncaught, and continue their correspondence under a different name.”⁷⁷ The ability of these swindlers to intercept incoming letters from marks before they reached their local destination – as was the case with Mrs. Vooght’s letter to the Magistrate of Murcia – suggests that the “prisoners” were postal employees that handled foreign deliveries.⁷⁸

While most of these criminals eluded capture, authorities were sometimes successful in foiling their correspondence campaigns. In one instance, the Spanish Ambassador to Britain, Marquis de Villalobar, sent a list of addresses of potential British victims to Metropolitan Police Commissioner Edward Henry.⁷⁹ The Met used this list to prevent at least one fraud aimed at Mr. Charles Clark, a London cycle dealer, who had already sent a positive reply to his first prisoner letter, but fortunately had not included any money.⁸⁰ On other occasions, suspicious members of the public helped the police. In 1910,

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ British Embassy Madrid to Melville Macnaghten, Metropolitan Police, January 10, 1911, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁷⁸ Again, there is a chance that these criminals could have been postal workers in Britain, but the fact that the envelopes containing these letters featured Spanish stamps and postmarks suggests otherwise. There is also the language of the letters, which feature grammatical mistakes that appear honest rather than planned.

⁷⁹ Villalobar to Henry, May 19, 1908, MEPO 3/170, NA. Henry wrote back on August 7, 1908, thanking Villalobar for his list, but lamenting that even with this information the police are often “too late to prevent loss on the part of deluded persons.”

⁸⁰ “Spanish Swindle,” Central Officer’s Special Report, Metropolitan Police, June 25, 1908, MEPO 3/170, NA.

a member of the advertising department of *The Daily News* warned police that he had received a series of strange notices for inclusion in the paper's classified section and believed they could be related to fraud.⁸¹ The Met followed up with the individuals that had placed these ads, and found that they had each received a prisoner letter that instructed them to place their reply in the newspaper. The police responded by placing warnings regarding this fraud in post offices across the country. Of course, even with these precautions and examples of self-reporting, the letters continued to arrive and those that were duped often left the incident unreported because of embarrassment.

Along with Spanish Prisoner letters, international work for police at this time involved occasional extradition cases as well as protection detail for foreign dignitaries.⁸² Though relatively rare, these cases easily caught the public's imagination, and police themselves were often eager to play up their roles in this work. Nearly all of the British police memoirs written in the first half of the twentieth century contain a section on international crime, even though most of the narratives within these sections rely on newspaper articles rather than personal experience or police case files. Many of these books adopted the trappings of hardboiled detective novels. Some of these police memoirs were even ghost-written by hardboiled novelists, like Peter Cheyney.⁸³ Yet even as these sensationalized books perpetuated the myth of international crime, they also provided

⁸¹ "Spanish Swindle," Central Officer's Special Report, Metropolitan Police, June 14, 1910, MEPO 3/170, NA.

⁸² "EXTRADITION: Procedure on Receipt of Direct Telegraphic Communications from Foreign Police to British Police Force.," August 1907, HO 45/10358/153249, NA; "EXTRADITION: Requesting Foreign Police to Trace Whereabouts of Fugitive Offenders and Keep Them under Observation.," 1908, HO 45/10401/181639, NA.

⁸³ Peter Cheyney, *"I Guarded Kings"; the Memoirs of a Political Police Officer* (New York: Hillman-Curl, 1936).

another means for police to establish their credibility to the public. People at this time assumed that international crime was rampant, and they wanted to be assured that their police were up to the task. In addition, the perpetuation of the international crime myth also gave readers a means to compare their police to those of another country. British police often played up this comparison in their memoirs to bolster the prestige of Scotland Yard and British policing in general.⁸⁴ In his book on the famous Dr. Crippen murder case, Chief Inspector Walter Dew described travelling to North America in order to capture Crippen and his mistress.⁸⁵ After arresting Crippen on board a ship in the St. Lawrence River, Dew described with pride his refusal to share information on the case with American journalist in order to “uphold the prestige of British justice and British police methods.”⁸⁶

BRITISH POLICING AND AMERICA

The prestige of “British police methods” was undoubtedly important to the British themselves, but it also held a significance for police in the United States. Through its early history, America relied on the constabulary system developed by British administrators during the 18th century to manage their criminal justice needs. Yet as the United States encountered problems related to urbanization, industrialization, and westward expansion in the 19th century, American politicians and police often looked to Britain for assistance

⁸⁴ Clive Emsley and Haia Shpayer-Makov, *Police Detectives in History, 1750-1950* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2006).

⁸⁵ Walter Dew, *I Caught Crippen: Memoirs of Ex-Chief Inspector Walter Dew, C.I.D., of Scotland Yard* (London: Blackie & son, limited, 1938).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

or expertise on how to adapt law enforcement.⁸⁷ The British influence on American policing often worked through official channels, but it also occurred through unexpected and informal means, as it did with Scottish immigrant Allan Pinkerton.

Born in Glasgow in 1819, Pinkerton was an active participant in the Chartists movement in Scotland.⁸⁸ His participation landed him into trouble with local authorities, eventually forcing him to leave his homeland for America with his family in 1842. Their passenger ship, however, wrecked in Canada, and they lost most of their possessions. Luckily for Pinkerton, he was offered help from the burgeoning Scottish community in Chicago, and found work there as a cooper. Like other new territories and states in the Midwest at the time, Illinois suffered from gangs of counterfeiters, which managed to flourish because federal laws regarding currency did not yet extend to the new territories. Pinkerton, along with other concerned businessmen in the area, worked to discover and destroy counterfeit camps in the area around Chicago beginning in 1847. Pinkerton was soon made a deputy of Kane County Illinois and later became a special agent for the Chicago post office. The focus of Pinkerton's work for the post office was the protection of remittance letters, most being sent by Scottish immigrants to their families abroad. This work required Pinkerton and his men to spy on post office employees, a practice that would become the backbone of the subsequent Pinkerton Detective Agency.

⁸⁷ Wilbur R Miller, *Cops and bobbies: police authority in New York and London, 1830-1870* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

⁸⁸ Frank Morn, *"The Eye That Never Sleeps": A History of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 19.

The problem of mail robbery pointed to a common issue faced by American law enforcement in general at the time: namely, how to ward off criminal activity in a country that was growing, both in terms of geography and population, beyond the means of the state. This issue was no more evident than in regard to railroads, which cut through multiple municipal and state jurisdictions or, in some instances, through areas with no legal structure at all. To solve this problem, a conglomeration of six Midwestern railway companies hired Pinkerton in 1855 to develop a private police force that could protect westward bound cargo. Contrary to romantic notions of railway robbers like Jesse James, most crime involving railroads was perpetrated by railway employees, particularly conductors. As a result, most of the Agency's time was spent "testing" conductors: agents posed as customers, offering conductors under the table deals for rides or for access to cargo. Pinkerton later applied this same method of testing to other industries in urbanized cities, in addition to providing spies and shock troops to combat labor strikes or riots. In this way a former Chartist became the trusted protector of America's robber barons.

Whereas Pinkerton's model of state intelligence and espionage served the interests of American industry, British police served as the primary example for law enforcement in urban America, particularly with regard to criminal identification. The late 19th century saw the birth of criminal identification and criminology, fields initially dominated by the theoretical work of Cesare Lombroso and the anthropometry system created by Alphonse Bertillon.⁸⁹ Dactyloscopy (fingerprinting), which had its origins in British India, was also

⁸⁹ Mary Gibson, *Born to crime: Cesare Lombroso and the origins of biological criminology* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002); Henry T. F Rhodes, *Alphonse Bertillon, Father of Scientific Detection* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956); Peter Becker and Richard F Wetzell, "Criminals and their scientists: the history

well known, but struggled in comparison with Bertillonage.⁹⁰ Fingerprinting offered the truest means of identification, but it lacked an effective classification system, thus inhibiting recall during investigation. Though Bertillon's system was prone to errors thanks to inaccurate physical measurements, it remained the preferred method because of its user friendly classification system based on photographs.⁹¹ Many American police departments, for instance, already used a photograph based "rogue's gallery" collection – developed by Allan Pinkerton – that shared similarities with Bertillon's system. Even after the introduction of the Fingerprint System by Edward Henry in Bengal in 1897, Bertillonage continued to predominate in police departments and prisons throughout the world, including those in Britain.

Dactyloscopy had its coming out party, of sorts, during the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis, most commonly referred to as the St. Louis World's Fair, in 1904.⁹² Edward Henry, now Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, sent Detective John Kenneth Ferrier to St. Louis to guard a display of the Crown Jewels. Ferrier, inspired by a nearby display on Bertillonage put on by the New York Prison System, set up an impromptu demonstration of Scotland Yard's fingerprint system based on the Henry

of criminology in international perspective" (New York: Cambridge University Press German Historical Institute, 2006).

⁹⁰ Chandak Sengoopta, *Imprint of the Raj: How Fingerprinting Was Born in Colonial India* (London: Macmillan, 2003); Simon A Cole, *Suspect identities: a history of fingerprinting and criminal identification* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

⁹¹ It should be noted that fingerprinting did catch on in Argentina, where Juan Vucetich used ideas cribbed from the published works of Francis Galton and Edward Henry to create his own classification system in 1891. For more on Vucetich, see Julia Emilia Rodriguez, "Encoding the criminal: criminology and the science of 'social defense' in modernizing Argentina (1880-1921)", Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia, 2000.

⁹² Donald C Dilworth and International Association of Chiefs of Police, *Identification wanted: development of the American criminal identification system, 1893-1943* (Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Management & Operations Divisions, 1977), 54–68.

model. By this time, America and most of the world was aware of Henry's system, but foreign police had difficulty understanding Henry's methods based on his cryptic written work. Ferrier, an accomplished showman, provided the necessary bridge between Henry's theories and everyday police work. On April 14, 1904, Ferrier performed a demonstration of fingerprinting using the prints of a British confidence man, Percy Ogilvie, who had been arrested a few days before by the St. Louis Police. Ferrier put on several more demonstrations over the next month for police chiefs from across the world. At the end of the fair, Ferrier was hired by Robert W. McClaughry, warden of the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, to develop a dactyloscopy center at the prison and make impressions of all the inmates. By the end of the First World War, the Federal Bureau of Criminal Identification at Leavenworth housed the largest archive of fingerprints in the world. J. Edgar Hoover, in one of his first acts as Director of the FBI, had this archive transferred to Washington in 1924. Following the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby, Hoover promoted the utility of this archive and used it as a means to push for "universal identification" – the controversial campaign to fingerprint every man, woman and child in the United States.⁹³

Along with identification, Britain also had a tremendous influence on the operation of American criminal justice overseas, particularly with regard to extradition⁹⁴ and the white slave trade. Though the United States largely avoided entering into international treaties on these subjects, America's police nevertheless remained keenly interested in

⁹³ Cole, *Suspect Identities*, 245–250.

⁹⁴ Bradley Miller, "A Carnival of Crime on Our Border?: International Law, Imperial Power, and Extradition in Canada, 1865–1883," *Canadian Historical Review* 90, no. 4 (November 1, 2009): 639–669; Katherine Unterman, "Boodle over the Border: Embezzlement and the Crisis of International Mobility, 1880–1890," *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 11, no. 02 (2012): 151–189.

British opinions on these topics and others. The crisis of white slavery proved particularly important in this regard as it launched the career of American police expert Raymond Fosdick.⁹⁵ In 1913, Fosdick, a progressive social worker in New York, was hired by John D. Rockefeller Jr. to produce a study on the police of Europe for his Bureau of Social Hygiene. Rockefeller created the Bureau in 1911 to increase pressure on policy makers to address prostitution and venereal disease. After producing several studies on prostitution, the Bureau became convinced that in order to bring a lasting change to the problem of white slavery America's police would need to be reformed to avoid their close relationship with the vice. Thus Rockefeller paid for Fosdick and his wife to tour Europe throughout 1913, visiting police in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Fosdick's resulting study, *European Police Systems*, proved to be one of the greatest advertisements for the British policing model ever written.⁹⁶ Although he believed that a nation's police was largely determined by each nation's particular character and history, Fosdick argued that the adoption of British policing would help to solve a number of social ills facing the United States. He idealized, in particular, the non-military, non-political nature of British policing, and felt that the decentralized structure of British policing offered a model for the widely dispersed American police to follow.

⁹⁵ Daryl Revoldt, *Raymond B. Fosdick: Reform, Internationalism, and the Rockefeller Foundation*, PhD diss., 1982.

⁹⁶ Raymond B Fosdick, *European Police Systems*, Publications of the Bureau of Social Hygiene (New York: The Century Co, 1915).

Though Fosdick would later back away from his recommendation of British policing for America⁹⁷, his high praise of the British model had a profound influence on police policy and studies in the United States. Most importantly, Fosdick's work influenced Berkeley Police Chief and University of California criminologist August Vollmer. Vollmer became famous for applying scientific detection and modern bureaucratic ideas to policing, and served as an adviser to police reform efforts in several major cities throughout the United States. He believed that the Metropolitan Police provided the best model for these reforms because they managed to operate without significant political interference – a problem that vexed several American departments in major cities run by political machines.⁹⁸ Vollmer called for the creation of an “American Scotland Yard” that could serve as a central department to not only direct reforms, but also to coordinate the exchange of criminal identification material between police departments throughout the country.⁹⁹ Not unlike police in Europe, Vollmer's greatest concern was with the largely anonymous, travelling criminal who could avoid capture by crossing state or national boundary lines. This view was mirrored by Raymond Fosdick, who felt that the greatest threat to modern law enforcement was the lack of cooperation and the large amount of diplomatic red tape that existed between police forces around the world.

⁹⁷ Raymond B Fosdick, *American Police Systems*, Publications of the Bureau of Social Hygiene (New York: The Century co, 1920). Fosdick concluded that British policing would not work in America because the country was too violent and because it idealized criminals too much.

⁹⁸ Gene E. Carte and Elaine H. Carte, *Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905-1932* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975).

⁹⁹ August Vollmer and Alfred E Parker, *Crime and the State Police, by August Vollmer and Alfred E. Parker*. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1935), 7.

POLICING IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGE

Police in America did very little to encourage this cooperation, primarily because the country lacked a de facto national police force to speak for the country as a whole.¹⁰⁰ The New York Police Department and the Secret Service often received international correspondence, but neither of these forces attempted to build upon this correspondence to create more permanent structures of cooperation and exchange. As police in the United States pursued domestic reform, police throughout Europe continued to pursue the idea of cooperation through a series of international conference between 1902 and 1913.¹⁰¹ The discussions at these conferences culminated at the First International Criminal Police Congress in Monaco in 1914.¹⁰² Hosted by Prince Albert of Monaco, this congress was attended by nearly two hundred delegates from twenty four countries. From the beginning, congress participants set about trying to find a way to make international police cooperation a permanent feature of European relations, and openly debated the idea of creating an international organization for that purpose.¹⁰³ Many delegates favored the idea of taking one nation's police system and making it the standard for all international cooperation. Yet this proposal elicited significant criticism, especially from the German delegation, which feared that the French system would be adopted instead of its own.¹⁰⁴ Largely as a result

¹⁰⁰ Richard Bach Jensen, "The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900-1914," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 1 (2001): 15–46.

¹⁰¹ Jensen, 346.

¹⁰² Bresler, 13.

¹⁰³ Hsi-huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 153.

¹⁰⁴ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 109.

of this conflict, the Monaco meeting led to no long-term agreement, but congress members did unanimously agree to reconvene in Bucharest in 1916.¹⁰⁵

The First World War ensured that the Bucharest meeting never occurred, but police throughout Europe emerged from the conflict committed to pursuing the ideas proposed at the Monaco conference. Indeed, the Great War worked to heighten prewar fears regarding international crime. Police and the public alike openly worried about the potential “brutalization effect” on soldiers returning from the war, as well as the return of old menaces such as international anarchism. Similarly the war encouraged concern over white slavery, which began to intersect with the developing anxiety over narcotics trafficking.¹⁰⁶ Simultaneously, the postwar period also found police better poised to take advantage of this fear of crime to promote their profession. The war witnessed a steady buildup in the surveillance power of police as well as a growing acceptance of professional policing as a necessary evil to stop the spread of bolshevism. The postwar period also offered police several models to follow with regard to international cooperation, not least of which was the League of Nations.

Of course, the League of Nations itself became an important institution in the policing of international crime during the interwar period.¹⁰⁷ British representatives at the League played a critical role in this work. The League’s first Secretary General, British diplomat Eric Drummond, named Dame Rachel Crowdy head of the League’s Social

¹⁰⁵ Bresler, 14.

¹⁰⁶ Marek Kohn, *Dope Girls* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992); Sascha Auerbach, *Race, Law, and “the Chinese Puzzle” in Imperial Britain* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

¹⁰⁷ Paul Knepper, *International Crime in the 20th Century : The League of Nations Era, 1919-1939* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Questions and Opium Trafficking departments.¹⁰⁸ Crowdy used this role to bring the agendas of various unofficial international pressure groups, such as Britain's National Vigilance Association, to the attention of world leaders throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Yet police interested in international cooperation tended to find the League's focus on trafficking in women and narcotics limiting. They felt that although these issues were important, more pressing issues – particularly anarchism, bolshevism, and counterfeiting – existed. In addition, many police began to feel that a close association with the League or other official lines of international relations could hamper the effectiveness of international police cooperation. In order to pursue their own interests and avoid diplomatic red tape, police in the interwar period would develop their own international organizations, including the International Police Conference and Interpol. These organizations will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

POLICING EMPIRE IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGE

This period of burgeoning internationalism also brought a new interest to colonial police, not only to Britain, but the wider world as well. Prior to this period, colonial policing rarely garnered much attention. This fact is remarkable because the police, perhaps more than any other group in the colonial enterprise, represented imperial rule for the colonized. Indigenous peoples rarely saw members of the Colonial Office, the Colonial Governor,

¹⁰⁸ James Barros and Eric Drummond, *Office without Power*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Daniel Gorman, "Empire, Internationalism, and the Campaign Against the Traffic in Women and Children in the 1920s," *Twentieth Century British History* 19, no. 2 (January 1, 2008): 186–216.

landlords, or politicians, but they encountered the colonial police on a daily basis. These encounters were not limited to law enforcement. Colonial police collected taxes, supervised public works, directed traffic, fought fires, oversaw court cases, delivered correspondence, provided escorts, and performed any number of other duties that either no one else wanted or no one else was around to do. Despite the fact that they served as the linchpin of empire in many colonies, particularly in the dependencies, the colonial police rarely received attention from colonial administrators unless something went wrong. Indeed, the less the official mind worried about the police, the more everyone seemed to agree that things were going well.

This absent-minded approach to colonial policing – along with the absent-mindedness of many other aspects of colonialism – came to an abrupt end during the interwar period. This change resulted from a mixture of external and internal pressures. The external pressure for change came from foreign governments, which took a renewed interest in the Empire due to its absorption of new territories under the Mandate System.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, many members of the international community assumed that empire was the breeding ground for the vices plaguing the interwar world, particularly narcotics¹¹⁰ and sex trafficking.¹¹¹ Ironically, one of the leading figures drawing connections between empire and crime was British police officer Thomas Russell, better known as Russell Pasha.

¹⁰⁹ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹¹⁰ James H Mills, *Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade, and Prohibition, 1800-1928* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); James H Mills, *Cannabis Nation: Control and Consumption in Britain, 1928-2008* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

¹¹¹ Susan Pedersen, “The Maternalist Moment in British Colonial Policy: The Controversy over ‘Child Slavery’ in Hong Kong 1917-1941,” *Past & Present*, no. 171 (2001): 161–202; Philippa Levine, “Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India,” *Journal of the History of*

Pasha's career spanned work in the Egyptian Civil Service and continued as commander of the Cairo Police after Egyptian independence in 1922.¹¹² He oversaw the creation of the Egyptian Government's Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, which collected and distributed information on narcotics traffic and traffickers. Pasha was moved to pursue this work after seeing heroin addicts going through withdrawal in prison. His goal in creating the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) was not to eliminate the production of the drug, but instead to control the trafficking of the substance. In particular, Pasha wanted to put pressure on the League of Nations to pursue opium traffickers in southern Europe and throughout the British Empire. In 1930, Pasha presented a damning report on the extent of heroin trafficking to the League of Nations' Advisory Committee on Opium. This report raised awareness of the subject throughout the League and the international policing community more broadly. This led to cooperation between Pasha's Central Narcotics Bureau and the Palestine police to destroy shipments of drugs moving from Syria. Additionally, Pasha's work encouraged an information exchange between the CNB, and the US Treasury Department's Narcotics Bureau, operated by the overactive Henry Anslinger.¹¹³

Sexuality 4, no. 4 (1994): 579–602; Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race, and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Philippa Levine, "A Multitude of Unchaste Women: Prostitution in the British Empire," *Journal of Women's History* 15, no. 4 (2004): 159-163; Barbara Metzger, "Towards an international Human Rights Regime during the Inter-War Years: The League of Nations' Combat of Traffic in Women and Children," in Frank Trentmann, Philippa Levine, and Kevin Grant, eds. *Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and Transnationalism, c. 1880-1950*, First Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

¹¹² Thomas Russell, *Egyptian Service, 1902-1946* (London: Murray, 1949).

¹¹³ H. J. Anslinger, *The Protectors: the Heroic Story of the Narcotics Agents, Citizens and Officials in Their Unending, Unsung Battles against Organized Crime in America and Abroad*. (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964); D. C. Kinder and W. O. Walker, "Stable Force in a Storm: Harry J. Anslinger and United States Narcotic Foreign Policy, 1930-1962," *The Journal of American History* 72, no. 4 (1986): 908–927; John C

This renewed interest in colonial policing from outside was matched by a new dedication to its reform from within Britain, particularly within the Colonial Office.¹¹⁴ While often portrayed as a period of despair and ennui¹¹⁵, the interwar period found the Colonial Office on an upswing, filled with ideas and optimism for the future. Colonial officials – partly inspired by the wartime experience and partly as a reaction to prewar figures such as Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Milner – worked to develop a bold, forward policy of administration. They wanted a policy that would not only deflect domestic and foreign criticism of the Empire, but also inspire self-confidence and dedicated work within Britain and the colonies.

The Colonial Office found the basic outlines for this policy in Lord Frederick Lugard's *The Dual Mandate*, a book which argued that the development of colonial territories could be achieved in a way that benefited both the rulers and the ruled.¹¹⁶ Colonial officials used Lugard's analysis to repackage prewar paternalistic notions into a new policy called "trusteeship." This policy argued that the purpose of the British Empire was to shepherd its dependencies toward eventual self-government in the distant, but not too distant, future. Additionally, this self-government would occur within the emerging

McWilliams, *The Protectors : Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1930-1962* (Newark: University of Delaware Press ; Associated University Presses, 1990).

¹¹⁴ Kenneth Robinson, *The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of British Colonial Policy between the Wars* (Oxford University Press, 1965).

¹¹⁵ Piers Brendon, *The Dark Valley: a Panorama of the 1930s* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000); R. J. Overy, *The Twilight Years: The Paradox of Britain Between the Wars* (New York: Viking, 2009); Zara Steiner, *The lights that failed: European international history, 1919-1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Zara Steiner, *The triumph of the dark: European international history, 1933-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹¹⁶ Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922).

Commonwealth of Nations – a hastily put together international organization designed to rationalize the development of nationalism and de facto independence in the Dominions. With trusteeship, then, decolonization through the Commonwealth was theoretically on the table, but it would occur on a time table that suited the Colonial Office and proceed in a manner that would allow Britain to maintain its international stature.

Colonial Office secretaries agreed that the colonial police would play an important role in this process, but there remained a lack of agreement regarding how they would contribute. The primary worry at this time was that most of the colonial police were in fact armed gendarmes, modeled on the recently reviled and disbanded Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). Though its use was largely despised by government leaders in Britain itself, the RIC model made possible the maintenance of empire in the absence of occupation soldiers through the use of arms and political surveillance.¹¹⁷ The steady expansion of the British Empire during the late 19th and early 20th centuries left little time to question the application of the Irish model, especially when the fear of a European war seemed to demand the quick and cheap establishment of law and order in the periphery.¹¹⁸ After the First World War, the colonial dedication to this semi-military model seemed to be reinforced when the RIC itself was disbanded, leading to the dispersal of RIC personnel across the empire (particularly to the Palestine Mandate).¹¹⁹ The presence of former RIC officers as well as

¹¹⁷ David Anderson and David Killingray, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

¹¹⁸ Georgina Sinclair, "The 'Irish' policeman and the Empire: Influencing the Policing of the British Empire-Commonwealth," *Irish Historical Studies* 36, no. 142 (2008): 173–187.

¹¹⁹ Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Georgina Sinclair, "'Get into a Crack Force and Earn \pounds 20 a Month and All Found...': The Influence of the Palestine Police upon Colonial Policing 1922–1948 1," *European Review of History: Revue Europeenne D'histoire* 13, no. 1 (2006): 49–65;

the military nature of most police training in the colonies meant that every force possessed the potential for another Amritsar or Bloody Sunday.¹²⁰ This fact might have comforted the imperialists of the 19th century, but for the civil servants of the interwar period – under the watchful eye of international society and filled with their own paternalistic imperatives – this fact created a sense of dread.

Though the need to reform the colonial police was evident, the Colonial Office in the immediate postwar period remained shackled to their prewar role within imperial administration.¹²¹ Generally, the members of the Colonial Office served as advisors to Colonial Governors, who developed and administered colonial policy on the spot. This meant that the Colonial Office had to rely on requests from Governors for assistance or wait for an emergency to develop in order to take direct action. So while the philosophy and desire for change existed at the imperial core, the capacity to effect that change remained largely at the colonial periphery. As a result, the Colonial Office relied on dynamic colonial administrators from the periphery, such as Lord Lugard, in order to make the policy of trusteeship into something more than a mere rhetorical device. The next chapter will discuss the career of a colonial police officer that attempted to encourage the

Georgina Sinclair and Chris A. Williams, “‘Home and Away’: The Cross-Fertilisation between ‘Colonial’ and ‘British’ Policing, 1921–85,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35, no. 2 (2007): 221–238.

¹²⁰ The British also encouraged militarized policing in the empire through the transfer of Sikh police officers throughout the Indian Ocean area, particularly Hong Kong. For more on this see Thomas R Metcalf, *Imperial Connections India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

¹²¹ Ronald Hyam, “Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in the Colonial Empire,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV*, eds. Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 257.

development of civilian policing throughout the Empire, before moving on to the international sphere.

CONCLUSION

Britain's police may have been created with an eye toward the rest of the world, but it took decades before they pursued cooperation with foreign police in a significant way. Yet even without formal cooperation, British police and others concerned with law enforcement played a significant role in patrolling the early stages of globalization – whether it was Allan Pinkerton in the American West or Dame Rachel Crowdy at the League of Nations. Throughout these interactions, however, Britons maintained a sense of superiority regarding their police in comparison with foreign departments. This conviction lingered even as the Metropolitan Police and other domestic forces adopted political policing to combat various real and perceived threats near the end of the 19th century. This sense of superiority also developed despite the widespread application of military style policing in the British Empire. As the international community turned to the issues of self-determination and security after the First World War, this paradox became more and more difficult to maintain. Thus, the interwar period would find Britain not only continuing the promotion of their model of policing abroad, but also attempting to find a way to duplicate that model in their own colonial empire.

Chapter Two: “Police quâ Police”: Herbert Dowbiggin and Colonial Policing

Recent historical scholarship on colonial policing – particularly on the Mau Mau Uprising – would suggest that the Colonial Office never found a dynamic officer to help them reform the colonial police before the era of decolonization, thus leaving the door open for new police violence in the 1940s and 1950s.¹ Yet the prevalence of the Royal Irish Constabulary model amongst imperial police departments never absolutely precluded policing along different lines. Charles Jeffries, a longtime member of the Colonial Office and author of several books on the topic, argued that the interwar period had in fact delivered a means of reform through the career and work of Sir Herbert Dowbiggin.²

As Inspector General of the Ceylon Police from 1913 to 1937, Dowbiggin established a police force that managed to maintain order while also living up to the ideal of the London Metropolitan Police. Ceylonese officers and patrolmen walked their beat, armed with only a truncheon, and never participated in military exercises. Furthermore, the force featured an advanced Criminal Investigation Department that rivaled European police departments in terms of the scientific capacity to solve crime. Dowbiggin’s success led the Ceylon Police to become a “valuable quarry from which officers were drawn to take command of other Colonial forces...in Zanzibar, Uganda, Cyprus, Gambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Trinidad, Tanganyika, Palestine, and Kenya.”³ Additionally, the Colonial Office

¹ Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).

² Charles Joseph Jeffries, *The Colonial Police*. (London: M. Parrish, 1952).

³ *Ibid.*, 38–39.

called on Dowbiggin himself to tour and report on troubled police departments in Cyprus, Palestine, and Northern Rhodesia. In this way, Jeffries wrote, a man that “only served in one Colony, and never held any central position of authority,” became synonymous during the interwar period with “the development and achievements not only of the Ceylon Police but of all the Colonial Police.”⁴

In Jeffries’ mind, and in the mind of the Colonial Office, Dowbiggin’s achievement represented the whiggish conclusion of the imperial mission as it pertained to colonial policing. The Colonial Office used Dowbiggin’s career as a model for its policy initiatives following the Second World War, which included the creation of the post of Inspector General of Colonial Police and the development of the Colonial Police Commissioner’s Conference. These initiatives, however, failed to bring about the promised transition from military to civilian policing in the colonies. Was this failure the result, as is often said, of the exigencies of empire, or was there something fundamentally wrong with these policies? Why did the Colonial Office latch onto Dowbiggin as the appropriate model for reform? Was Dowbiggin’s reputation as the Empire’s model police officer deserved? How consistent was his approach to civilian policing?

This chapter will follow Herbert Dowbiggin’s career and reveal why he became the model police officer for the British Empire during the era of trusteeship. It will provide a review of Dowbiggin’s interwar work for the Colonial Office, in particular his reports on police forces in Cyprus, Palestine, and Northern Rhodesia. It will also consider his world tours in 1935 and 1937, during which he visited police departments in China, Japan, and

⁴ Ibid., 39.

the United States as well as several British overseas possessions. This chapter will argue that Dowbiggin's insistence on civilian style policing drew from his belief that domestic and imperial policing rested on one continuum, and that what was possible in Britain was also possible in the colonies. This belief, however, did not necessarily rest on a sense of civil liberty. In Dowbiggin's view, civilian policing was preferable to the Irish model because it produced better intelligence, which could be used to preserve imperial control without resorting to violence. In addition, this chapter will contend that Dowbiggin, because of his experience in the western and non-western world, represented the first true international police officer, and that his activity on the global stage helped to establish British authority in the field of international policing cooperation. A later chapter will consider how Dowbiggin's career formed the basis of colonial police policy in the postwar era.

CEYLON

Described by fellow Ceylon Administrator Leonard Woolf as “not at all meek and mild either in word or deed,” Dowbiggin joined the Ceylon Police in 1901.⁵ He quickly rose through the ranks due to a combination of talent and disease – most of his superiors either died of fever or were forced to return home by illness.⁶ Dowbiggin took over the

⁵ Leonard Woolf, *Growing: an Autobiography of the Years 1904-1911*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 40. Leonard Woolf, intellectual and husband of Virginia, came to Ceylon as a civil servant in 1904. His first post was in Jaffna, where Dowbiggin served as superintendent of police. Woolf described Dowbiggin as a “dictatorial” bridge player that bullied the other members of the local club during games. Woolf initially irked Dowbiggin because he consistently beat the Dowbiggin at cards, but the two men eventually formed a friendly professional relationship.

⁶ A. C Dep, *A history of the Ceylon police: vol. II (1866-1913)* (Colombo: Police Amenities Fund, 1969).

police as Inspector General in 1913 at the age of 33. His appointment as Inspector General represented a significant change in two ways: he was the youngest person to ever hold the position and he replaced a long line of Inspector Generals that began their careers in the Royal Irish Constabulary.⁷ Thus, as a young, homegrown Inspector General, Dowbiggin was free to pursue his own course with regard to policing.

Dowbiggin's policing philosophy was firmly entrenched in the civil model established by the London Metropolitan Police. He stressed the idea that the police were merely a supplement to the free citizen in the pursuit of justice and that the consent of the population to policing was a necessity – no matter if the police worked in Britain or in the colonies. “The ideal to be aimed at,” Dowbiggin wrote, “is that the members of every Force should realize that they are the servants of the public; the public on their part should look upon the Police as a Force instituted to assist them, and that in many cases the Police perform duties that any reputable member of the public would voluntarily perform if he were on the scene at the time.”⁸ According to Dowbiggin, the difficulty of modern policing in both Britain and Ceylon resulted from the increased mobility of modern criminals. He surmised that village headmen in Ceylon were just as effective at stopping crime prior to the railroad as their freeman counterparts in England, yet “the development of industry and commerce” meant that these pre-modern methods of deterrence could “no longer maintain law and order amongst [an] ever-increasing and changing population.”⁹ In Dowbiggin's

⁷ G. K Pippet, *A history of the Ceylon police*. (Colombo: The Times of Ceylon Co., Ltd., 1938); A. C Dep, *A history of the Ceylon police: vol. II (1866-1913)* (Colombo: Police Amenities Fund, 1969).

⁸ H.L. Dowbiggin, “Co-operation between the Police and the Public in the Detection and Prosecution of Crime,” unpublished manuscript, “Dowbiggin (Col. H.B.L.) Papers”, n.d., MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 12-16, Rhodes House Library, Oxford [Hereafter RH].

⁹ H. L. Dowbiggin, “The Ceylon Police and Its Development,” *Police Journal* 1 (1928), 203.

mind, there was no reason why Britain should have a modern police force and Ceylon should not – both territories suffered from the same criminal ills, so both places should receive the same treatment. Without question, Dowbiggin’s views on colonial policing drew in part from his childhood split between England and Ceylon. Dowbiggin’s father, Reverend R.T. Dowbiggin, served as a missionary in Ceylon throughout most of the late 19th century. It appears that H.L. Dowbiggin, born in 1880, spent many of his early years with his family in the colony before attending Merchant Taylors’ School in England.

As Inspector General, Dowbiggin immediately set out to make over a force that had been “mainly occupied in providing Treasury and Jail guards” and doing “no real ‘police work’ in the modern sense of the word.”¹⁰ His first step was to create a Police Training School, replacing a training curriculum focused on firearms with one centered around unarmed detection and investigation. Dowbiggin’s favorite and oft-repeated maxim was that “a notebook is to the policeman what a rifle is to the soldier.”¹¹ This saying not only reflected Dowbiggin’s policing philosophy, but also pointed to the fact that most colonial police officers were in fact soldiers in all but name. The Dowbiggin collection at Rhodes House Library bears witness to his belief in this maxim: the first box of the collection is packed with dozens of pocket-size notebooks filled with daily details from walking the beat or investigating cases.¹² The Ceylon police remained armed in the sense that rifles and carbines were at every station, but police were not allowed to carry weapons on patrol.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹¹ Dowbiggin, “Report on Inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector General of the Ceylon Police,” 1926-1927, CO 67/218/3, NA.

¹² “Dowbiggin (Col. H.B.L.) Papers”, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 10, RH.

Following the overhaul of police training, Dowbiggin established a Criminal Investigation Department for the island in 1915, which housed a forensics laboratory and the colony's fingerprint and, because most of the colony was shoeless, a footprint archive.¹³ To help mitigate the problem of travelling criminals (as well as prevent the immigration of possible subversives), he required records kept of all individuals disembarking and embarking on ships in Ceylon as well as a record of all people staying at hotels, boarding houses, or rest homes.¹⁴ In order to prevent turnover in the force, Dowbiggin increased pay and housing for police of all ranks, and developed a pension fund for both retired police and widows. Finally, in an attempt to decrease future crime rates, Dowbiggin sponsored clubs for local boys that offered boxing lessons, in the hope that young men would use their fists rather than knives when violence started.

Dowbiggin's reforms were not always a complete success and Dowbiggin himself ordered police to fire on a crowd during the Sinhala-Muslim Riots of 1915.¹⁵ The name of these riots contradicts their actual cause. Though partially communal in nature, these riots resulted from an economic disagreement between Sinhalese and Muslim merchants.¹⁶ As one historian rightly noted, "religious sentiment [in Ceylon] often gave a sharp ideological focus and a cloak of respectability to sordid commercial rivalry."¹⁷ Unfortunately, Dowbiggin, along with Colonial Governor Robert Chalmers, sensed sedition in these

¹³ An example of this work can be found in "Colombo (Ceylon) Police Case: Conviction Obtained by Footprint," 1936, MEPO 2/5029, NA.

¹⁴ Dowbiggin, "The Ceylon Police and Its Development," 211.

¹⁵ Arthur C Dep, *Ceylon Police and Sinhala-Muslim Riots of 1915* (Ratmalana: Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha, 2001).

¹⁶ K. M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 475.

activities and overreacted with violent force and prison sentences.¹⁸ This overreaction, itself partly a result of wartime panic, aided the development of Sinhalese nationalism following the First World War. In addition to the riots, criminal investigation tended to lag behind the ideal set by Dowbiggin. As Leonard Woolf commented in his official diary following the arrest of a young boy for stealing a gold watch, “the methods of police investigation were a very good example of what is so frequently condemned in the report of the Indian Police Commission – investigation, nil; method, obtain a confession; result, acquittal.”¹⁹

Yet Woolf also judged that Ceylon “was the exact opposite of a ‘police state’” and life in the colony was marked by “the extraordinary absence of the use of force in everyday life and government.”²⁰ This is high praise coming from one of the great critics of empire, but it could be argued that the lack of violence in Ceylon resulted from the economic makeup of the colony as much as the police. Ceylon, often referred to as the “model” or “premier” colony, benefited from a wealth of diverse natural resources (cinnamon, tea, coffee, and rubber) that allowed the colony to maintain low levels of unemployment. The diversity of these resources meant that Ceylon could easily manage a failure to one crop, either because of natural disaster or a fall in market prices, and keep the economy afloat with other exports – an incredible luxury compared to other colonies.

¹⁸ Kumari Jayawardena, “Economic and Political Factors in the 1915 Riots,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 29, no. 2 (February 1, 1970): 223–233.

¹⁹ Leonard Woolf, *Diaries in Ceylon, 1908-1911: Records of a Colonial Administrator* (Dehiwala, Ceylon: Ceylon Historical Journal, 1962), 213–214.

²⁰ Woolf, *Growing: an Autobiography of the Years 1904-1911*, 92.

Even with this economic steadiness, however, the ability of Ceylonese police to manage the colony without the regular use of violence is remarkable. Much of this ability drew from the level of devotion Dowbiggin elicited from his subordinates, European and indigenous alike. J.R. Granville Bantock, who served under Dowbiggin from 1921, portrayed the Inspector General in his letters home as exceedingly popular because of the care he took with the well-being of the police and their families, particularly through increases to the force's pay and pension fund.²¹ Dowbiggin even gained the respect of subordinates, like N.P. Hadow, who felt that the Inspector General's techniques were "not always appropriate."²² "I was appointed," wrote Hadow, "and had no course ever to regret my choice because the Ceylon Police Force under the truly remarkable and outstanding Inspector General – Sir Herbert Dowbiggin – had attained a general state of expertise and cultivation of police methods." This esteem for Dowbiggin can also be seen in letters to the Inspector General from former subordinates, such as R.G.B. Spicer, who often wrote to Dowbiggin looking for advice.²³

²¹ "Papers of J.R. Granville Bantock," 1920 – 1939, MSS. Ind. Ocn. s. 287, RH. Bantock, a senior officer in the Ceylon Police, wrote often of Dowbiggin in his diaries and letters home, remarking that the Inspector General's reforms and Christmas parties made him popular with both officers and duty men.

²² "Law Enforcement XIX Uganda 2, B-MACN," n.d., MSS. Afr. s. 1784, RH.

²³ Dowbiggin's positive reputation is all the more remarkable when one considers the contents of the Oxford Development Project at Rhodes House Library. This collection, which contains the written memories of former colonial police collected during the late 1970s and early 1980s, is filled with score-settling memoirs directed at former superiors and fellow officers. Not one of these memoirs, however, takes an ill view of Dowbiggin.

CYPRUS

While Dowbiggin's personal connections made him a favorite with his fellow police, his stature in the eyes of the Colonial Office relied initially on chance. Dowbiggin's work for the Colonial Office originated with a letter from the Acting Governor of Cyprus, Reginald Popham Lobb, to Leopold Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on July 28, 1926.²⁴ Popham Lobb presided over Cyprus at a critical moment in the island's history.²⁵ The unintended prize in Greek-Turkish relations, Cyprus had been a protectorate of Britain, under Turkish suzerainty, from 1878 until 1914. The Empire annexed the territory at the beginning of the First World War and offered Cyprus to Greece in return for help during the Dardanelles campaign. Greece, however, feared wartime repercussions and refused the offer, thus leaving the door open for continued British occupation. Britain largely welcomed this occupation as Cyprus provided the Empire a further means to solidify their growing presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Turkey and Greece calmly recognized British control over the island as part of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, a move which made Cyprus "the orphan" of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.²⁶ Britain declared Cyprus a crown colony in 1925, and set out to rule over a jilted, angry, and determined population of Greek Cypriots still seeking *enosis*.

In this anxious context, Popham Lobb, acting as governor between the departure of Malcolm Stevenson and the arrival of Ronald Storrs, wrote to the Colonial Office seeking

²⁴ Popham Lobb to Amery, July 28, 1926, "Report on inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector General of the Ceylon Police," CO 67/218/3, NA.

²⁵ R. F. Holland and Diana Weston Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 182.

help. Citing a Colonial Office dispatch from 1912, Popham Lobb wrote that the Cyprus Police had not been inspected since 1911, and wondered if the government could “arrange for a senior officer from Egyptian Command to visit the Colony for that purpose or, perhaps preferably, that the Officer in command of the Police in one of the Eastern Colonies such as Ceylon or the Straits Settlement might be detailed to do so on his way to or from England.”²⁷ That Popham Lobb would have to call upon a letter from 1912 to make a request in 1926 illustrates how little consideration the colonial police, even in a potentially unstable colony like Cyprus, received from administrators. It is also no coincidence that a request for help regarding the police was made shortly after Cypriot demands for self-determination went unheeded by the international community. While there was no immediate fear of Sinn Fein style violence on the island, the growth of the *enosis* movement made it a potential future problem.²⁸ Popham Lobb’s mention of Ceylon and Malaya appears strange next to Egypt, but the suggestion, as Amery and the Colonial Office surmised, was probably made because Cyprus wanted a Police Commissioner familiar with policing an island with a mixed population.

Based on Popham Lobb’s suggestion, the Colonial Office’s search for candidates centered on senior colonial police officers that happened to be on leave in England when the letter arrived on August 12, 1926. Running an empire was often less about finding the best solution to a problem than using what was around to create the most efficient solution. Dowbiggin’s name was mentioned in only the second entry on the minute’s list, and

²⁷ Popham Lobb to Amery, July 28, 1926, “Report on inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector General of the Ceylon Police,” CO 67/218/3, NA.

²⁸ Holland and Markides, *The British and the Hellenes*, 183.

eventually rose above the other candidates, including his protégé R.G.B. Spicer, thanks to a persuasive minute by Alexander Fiddian:

I think it is either Mr. Dowbiggin or Mr. Hannigan [Inspector General of the Federated Malay States or F.M.S.]; and after carefully reading Mr. Hannigan's Promotion File (herewith) and hearing what the Ceylon Department have to say about Mr. Dowbiggin, I am strongly disposed to favour the latter, who has always been known to us as an excellent officer of Police. I daresay, too, that Ceylon conditions are a little more like those of Cyprus than are those of the F.M.S.

Fiddian furthered his case by relating a conversation he had with the future Governor of Cyprus, Ronald Storrs:

I spoke to Sir Ronald Storrs, and he said he could not propose one of the Palestine senior men going because of the relationship between [A.S.] Mavrogodato who is Deputy Inspector of Police and Prisons in Palestine, and the Island from which his family is derived, and in which he himself served in the Police up to 1913. *Moreover, the less Palestine we have in Cyprus the better...* I do not think we want a military officer. A police force, however military their functions may be, is none the less essentially a police force, and the worst of military officers is that they usually confine themselves to questions of drill and discipline. I am disposed to suggest opening negotiations with Mr. Dowbiggin at once.²⁹

The other concerned members of the Colonial Office quickly agreed, and letters were sent to Dowbiggin and the Governor of Ceylon for permission. Ceylon freed Dowbiggin's schedule and the Government of Cyprus agreed to offer the Inspector General a £50 honorarium for his work. Fiddian's minute, in addition to settling the Cyprus issue, reveals two important features of the Colonial Office's thinking with regard to policing. First, it reveals that the Colonial Office viewed the paramilitary style of policing in Palestine, recently bolstered with the transfer of former members of the Royal Irish Constabulary,

²⁹ Alexander Fiddian, Minute, August 18, 1926, "Report on inspection of the Police Force by the Inspector General of the Ceylon Police," CO 67/218/3, NA. Original emphasis. Dowbiggin, through his report on the Mandate, was eventually responsible for replacing Marvorgordato with his pupil R.G.B. Spicer as head of the Palestine Police.

with concern and did not want to see that form of policing spread to other colonies. Second, it shows a desire to begin to remove the military burden from the colonial police through reform. With Dowbiggin, the Colonial Office had a well-respected expert that could help them achieve both goals.

Dowbiggin conducted his inspection of Cyprus from November 4th to 11th 1926.³⁰ His tour of the island included visits to the training depot, the Chief Commandant's headquarters, the Central Prison, a farm for juvenile offenders, and the headquarters of three districts (Nicosia, Larnaka, and Limassol) as well as the out-stations for each of these districts. Dowbiggin wanted to visit the headquarters of all six districts in Cyprus, but the limit of his travel allowance meant that he could only stop at a few of the districts. His tour included visits with district commissioners, constables, judges, advocates, and local villagers.

In his report, Dowbiggin remarked on his surprise at the level of development on the island. "One imagines," he wrote, "that a colony within a week's journey of London is likely to be more advanced than Colonies far more distant."³¹ He discovered on Cyprus, however, an island without a daily newspaper and with large tracts of land only available through camel, donkey, or mule as transportation. This low level of development meant the government often relied on the police to work in place of regular infrastructure. "The Cyprus Police," Dowbiggin wrote, "are responsible for the counting of sheep, pigs, and goats for taxation purposes. They are responsible for the collection and destruction of rats'

³⁰ H.L. Dowbiggin, "Cyprus Military Police. Inspection, November 1926," CO 67/218/3, NA. Dowbiggin completed his report from Port Said, Egypt on November 16.

³¹ Herbert Dowbiggin, Report on Cyprus Police, CO 67/218/3, NA, 2.

tails, bats and sparrows' eggs... 70,000 letters were delivered by hand by the Police in 1925 in the villages for the District Commissioners. Food samples are obtained and sent to the Government Analyst by the Police. The Police are responsible for the supervision of rural constables, and the Police act as the local Fire Brigade.”³²

Dowbiggin understood that necessity often required this work, but he stressed that in order for this to be an effective police department, officers would have to be divested of these extra duties. In particular, he said that police should be freed from escorting tax collectors, serving as orderlies for the court system, and working as telephone operators. Furthermore, he opined that someone should relieve the seven police officers that served as local barbers, saying “it is clearly undesirable that a trained policeman should spend his day hair-cutting.”³³ Dowbiggin argued that “the policeman is picked on account of his good physique and good character, and he is trained to be tactful and considerate in his dealings with the public. To employ a policeman on a duty such as that of a telephone operator, which does not require a man of outstanding good physique, or in the carrying of papers from one room to another, is bound to result in the deterioration of the man.”³⁴ On the other hand, he concluded, it was in some ways “a tribute to the efficiency of the Force that they were called upon to undertake all these duties. It would appear that whenever there was a new job to be done the Police were called in.”³⁵

³² Ibid., 5-6.

³³ Ibid., 7.

³⁴ Ibid., 7-8.

³⁵ Ibid., 8.

Dowbiggin worried that if the Cyprus police were not allowed to concentrate on their police duties the island would be unable to deal with the new forms of criminality sweeping the globe. “I was informed,” he wrote, “that the criminal has not yet taken to moving from one District to another, and the travelling criminal who practices fraud and lives on cheating by moving from place to place, where he is not known, or does not yet exist...If, as means of communication in the Island improve, the travelling criminal becomes a nuisance, it may be necessary to start a separate C.I.D. Branch which will study and record the modus operandi adopted by criminals, and be responsible for recording and notifying all Districts concerned of the movements and modus operandi adopted by travelling criminals.”³⁶ Dowbiggin also recommended that officers carry a notebook as a way to manage without a tradition investigation department: “The notebook is to the Policeman what his rifle is to the soldier. It is as useless for the Policeman to be at the scene of crime or accident without a notebook as it is for the soldier to go into action without his rifle....It is impossible for a Police Officer to rely on his memory when reporting the number of a motor car concerned in an offense and it is dangerous for a Police Officer to attempt to remember the exact words used by a person on arrest or the statement of a dying man.”³⁷ Dowbiggin suggested that this work be supplemented by visits from outside experts from Britain and surrounding colonies to deliver lectures or courses on modern police techniques. Additionally, he stressed that an allowance needed to be set up so that young officers could attend Metropolitan Police training courses in England while on leave.

³⁶ Ibid., 23.

³⁷ Ibid., 59.

These officers should then be able to share their knowledge in a new local police journal, which could also be used to encourage esprit amongst the force.

Dowbiggin's report eased the minds of many in Cyprus and the Colonial Office. He found the Cyprus Police to be, on the whole, capable and willing. All that was needed was encouragement along appropriate lines of development in the coming years. Amery and Popham Lobb received the report with enthusiasm, but the Commandant of Cyprus Police, A.E. Gallagher, worried over the cost of some of Dowbiggin's proposals, particularly the allowance for officers to attend Metropolitan Police courses in England.³⁸ Amery, however, writing to Governor Ronald Storrs the following year, reiterated his desire to see Dowbiggin's recommendations carried out, and stated that allowances would be available for officers to attend courses at the Met as well as to take instruction in Greek and Turkish.³⁹ Dowbiggin's report contained little to help the police deal with *enosis* and political violence⁴⁰, but this fact was seen by the Colonial Office as a positive. As Popham Lobb, a former administrator of St. Vincent, put it, "[Dowbiggin's] visit shows the value of periodical inspections of colonial Police Forces by trained Police officers as opposed to those carried out by military officers purely from the standpoint of home defence, as in the West Indian colonies. Similar inspections in those and other colonies would do much to raise the standard of the local *Police quâ Police*."⁴¹ The tenor of Dowbiggin's report was what made it useful to a Colonial Office looking to make changes.

³⁸ Gallagher to Amery, November 24, 1926, CO 67/218/3, NA.

³⁹ Amery to Storrs, April 8, 1927, CO 67/218/3, NA.

⁴⁰ Indeed, the coming years would see a marked escalation in both, leading to the Greek Cypriot riot of 1931, which resulted in the destruction of the Government House in Nicosia.

⁴¹ Popham Lobb to Amery, November 29, 1926, CO 67/218/3, NA. Emphasis added.

PALESTINE

Dowbiggin's mission to Palestine in 1930 served as part of the Colonial Office's response to the 1929 Wailing Wall Riots. The riots, which resulted partly from competition over the religious site and partly from the general increase of Jewish immigration to Palestine, found Arabs attacking Jewish communities in Jerusalem as well as settlements in Hebron and Jaffa. The police charged with reestablishing order often found themselves shorthanded, as many Arab and Jewish officers avoided the riots because of personal loyalties.⁴² The Shaw Commission, tasked with reviewing the riots, recommended the reorganization of the police under the guidance of a senior colonial police officer.⁴³ Dowbiggin was chosen not only for his past work in Cyprus, but also because of his experience policing a colonial population with a dangerous mixture of political, racial, and religious differences.⁴⁴

The 1929 riots came after several years of relative quiet in the Mandate. This quiet allowed Palestine High Commissioner Herbert Plumer to disband the gendarmerie and dismiss the remaining military forces in 1926. Plumer's decision fell in line with the general downsizing of ground forces in the Middle East in favor of regional policing using

⁴² E. H Horne, *A Job Well Done: A History of the Palestine Police Force, 1920-1948* (Lewes: Book Guild, 2003), 159.

⁴³ Gad Kroizer, "From Dowbiggin to Tegart: Revolutionary Change in the Colonial Police in Palestine During the 1930s," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no. 2 (2004): 115–133., 118

⁴⁴ Horne, 160.

contingents of the Royal Air Force.⁴⁵ This policy, combined with the ineptitude of the police during the riots, forced Britain to send troops from Egypt and Malta to quell the uprising.⁴⁶ Plumer's dismissal of both the military and paramilitary arms of Palestine's security forces was motivated not only by economy, but also by a desire to build a force along civilian lines.⁴⁷ The Wailing Wall Riots revealed the weaknesses of this approach, but the Dowbiggin mission clearly represented a commitment on the part of the Colonial Office to make the civilian model work in Palestine. Indeed, if the Government wanted a military solution to the problem, they would have sent in anyone other than Dowbiggin.

Dowbiggin's report, however, made clear that the civilian model would need immediate assistance from the British military in order to survive. He argued that until a political solution developed, Palestine would need two battalions of British infantry, two companies of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, a squadron of the Royal Air Force, and three sections of Armored Cars.⁴⁸ He stressed that this measure would be a temporary solution to a problem that could only be solved by a constitutional resolution. Furthermore, he argued that the police should remain outside of any political dealings between the Government and the divided sides. "A Police Officer," Dowbiggin wrote, "should not concern himself with politics, but should concentrate his energies on maintaining good

⁴⁵ Martin Kolinsky, "Reorganization of the Palestine Police After the Riots of 1929," *Studies in Zionism* 10, no. 2 (1989): 156; Martin Kolinsky, *Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, 1928-35*, Studies in Military and Strategic History (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, in association with King's College, London, 1993). Kolinsky's work provides an excellent discussion of the technical side of Dowbiggin's report. The current discussion of the report will focus on the report with relation to Dowbiggin's general philosophy of policing.

⁴⁶ Kroizer, "From Dowbiggin to Tegart," 117.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁴⁸ Herbert Dowbiggin, Report on the Palestine police force by Mr. H.L. Dowbiggin, C.M.G., 1930, CO 935/4/2, NA, 10.

order amongst the different classes he is called upon to serve and do his duty amongst them as he finds them.”⁴⁹

In addition to military support, Dowbiggin believed the police needed regular drilling in riot procedure. To make his point, Dowbiggin drew parallels between the 1929 Palestine Riots and the riots in Ceylon in 1915. Though the 1915 riots occurred because “Moors had, by successful business methods and by their industry, undercut the Sinhalese tradesmen,” Sinhalese leaders cried that “the Moors were attacking the Temples.” He contended that it was impossible “to prevent and to deal with riots [like this] in a country such as Palestine, where the religious cry can be raised at a moment’s notice, unless there is adequate force on the spot.”⁵⁰ The danger of quick escalation, Dowbiggin argued, necessitated that every police officer should memorize and be thoroughly trained in the protocol for riot control because officers were not always going to have a superior on hand to defer to. He argued that the Palestine police, as well as all police in the empire, should have access to a standardized book on the subject and suggested that the Ceylon book on maintaining public safety could be used as a basis for this new book.⁵¹

As with Cyprus, however, Dowbiggin did not spend his entire report in criticism of the local police. “To expect the Palestinian Police at the present time,” he wrote, “to prevent and impartially to deal with racial disturbances is, in my opinion, asking the impossible of them.”⁵² He felt that the Palestine Police deserved more leeway than other forces because

⁴⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 11.

⁵¹ Ibid., 25.

⁵² Ibid., 10.

it was, at that time, “the youngest, if not the youngest, Police Force in the world.”⁵³ “The Metropolitan Police Force,” Dowbiggin wrote, “has been in existence for 101 years, the Ceylon Police for 65 years. It would be easy to mention a list of things which are being done in other Forces, but which are not yet being done in Palestine. Merely to criticize would not be helpful. Full allowances must be made for the difficulties under which the Force has been evolved, and for the strain which the members of the Force have been through in recent times.”⁵⁴ Again, Dowbiggin always consider the British police and colonial police on the same plane, as though each force rested on different levels of the same evolutionary chain.

In spite of the Palestine force’s failings, Dowbiggin argued against the idea of importing police from outside the Mandate to supplement the local police:

If it is agreed that it is a Police Force which is now required in Palestine, the Force must largely be composed of the people of the country. The main object of a Police Force is to collect and communicate intelligence, to prevent crime and a breach of the peace so far as is possible by getting information in good time and taking steps to prevent trouble arising, to detect crime when it occurs, and prosecute the offenders in a Court of Law. This is a duty which only be done by Police. It cannot be done by troops or by a body of men known as "Police," who rely entirely on their rifles to keep order. If there are different nationalities amongst the general population of the country, then there must be representatives of each of these nationalities in the Police Force. Unless the Police Force is largely composed of men corresponding in nationality with the different nationalities occupying the country, it will be almost impossible to get information of what is going on or is likely to happen, to identify offenders, to get witnesses to come forward when a crime has been committed, to trace stolen property, to trace absconders and generally to bring offenders to justice.⁵⁵

⁵³ Ibid., 36.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 38.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 52.

To bring foreign officers to Palestine, no matter the reason, would defeat the entire purpose of a civilian style police, in Dowbiggin's eyes. To be effective, either in preventing insurrection or stopping crime, the police needed to be drawn from the local population.⁵⁶ To illustrate his point further, Dowbiggin conjectured that if "a body of most highly trained and intelligent German Police were brought to London...the public would regard them much as they would regard a foreign army introduced to maintain order. The public would have nothing to do with them and the Force would fail for want of public support."⁵⁷ Dowbiggin did, however, believe that the common tactic of policing strangers should be maintained, and recommended that Arab and Jewish police should not be allowed to serve in their home district until after 10 years of service. He also reiterated that police work required cooperation between the public, courts, and the police, but that this process would take time. "The London Police," Dowbiggin wrote, "have a reputation of being the best Police Force in the world. They are, and why? I submit that it is not due entirely to the fact that they have the best public in the world to deal with, the most law-abiding public with a wonderful sense of proportion and a keen sense of humour, and the best Magistrates in the world before whom they take their cases? I venture to submit that it is the combination of all three that makes for good order in London."⁵⁸ Dowbiggin firmly believed that this type

⁵⁶ Douglas Duff, an RIC veteran serving in Palestine, shared Dowbiggin's opinion on this point. In his memoirs, Duff argued that the problem for British police in Palestine was that they insulated themselves "in a closed atmosphere of 'Englishness'" rather than engaging with the local population. Furthermore, the Palestinian subordinates told their British superiors "things he liked to hear, and he seldom had any clear notion of the incessant *Faszad* they waged behind his back." Duff found that the lack of closeness between the British and Palestinians often resulted in a dearth of local intelligence, which led to the use of torture. His remarkably candid memoir includes an explicit description of a variation of waterboarding used in Palestine. See Douglas Valder Duff, *Bailing with a Teaspoon* (J.Long, 1953).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 52-53.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 160.

of good order was attainable in Palestine, and argued, along racialist lines, that there was “enough good material” in the Mandate to make a solid police force. “The Jew,” he contended, “is intelligent above the average. As a general rule it would be harder to find men of good physique amongst the Jews than amongst the Arabs...I consider the material at hand in Palestine is good and much better than the material available in many districts in India, in Ceylon, and I imagine better than that available as a general rule in Africa.”⁵⁹

Dowbiggin stressed, as with his report on Cyprus, the need for the progressive training of all police officers. In particular, he recommended that police should be encouraged as much as possible to develop knowledge through museum visits and instruction on wireless technology. He also recommended that instructors of the new force should be allowed to visit training centers in Ceylon so that they could learn how to train a force composed of multiple nationalities.⁶⁰ He felt that if Arab and Jewish police could live together, it would serve as an example for the rest of the country. Like in Cyprus, Dowbiggin believed that the sharing of policing knowledge and techniques was critical to the sustained success of the force:

Weekly Police Orders issued by the Commandant should include a note or report on any case or point of special interest which has come to notice in the investigation of crime, and any new method of dealing with traffic or preventing crime which has proved successful, so that all may profit by the experience gained. Members of the Force may be encouraged to send up to the Commandant any new and interesting point in a case which has come to their notice in the course of an investigation which should be brought to the notice of other officers...A Police officer who has in the course of his work come across some interesting and new idea gives his knowledge to the rest of the Force in exactly the same way as a Medical man who has made a new discovery or discovers a new way of carrying

⁵⁹ Ibid., 55.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 79.

out an operation makes his knowledge known to other medical men by means of the British Medical Journal.⁶¹

This type of professionalism would undoubtedly seem rudimentary or taken for granted by the average London Bobby, but in the colonial context this type of work was unheard of. Additionally, Dowbiggin encouraged the Palestine police to consult *Police Journal*, the most well know professional journal for police in Britain. “In this journal,” Dowbiggin advertised, “the latest methods in Police Forces all over the world in the prevention and detection of crime, the control of traffic as well as professional criticisms of present day methods and the views of scientific authorities on criminal cases are made available to Police officers throughout the world and prove to be of the greatest assistance in promoting professional keenness and in keeping a Police Force up to date.”⁶² The basis for these suggestions, of course, was to bring the Palestine police up to the level of the rest of Britain’s police. By keeping Palestinian police in close contact with their domestic counterparts, Dowbiggin hoped the younger force would gain “some of the good qualities of impartiality, courage, tact, courtesy, and good nature which go to make the ideal Policeman.”⁶³

Dowbiggin wagered that the ideal Policeman for Palestine would need to be an expert at collecting and communicating intelligence, especially when the next riot was a matter of when not if. To this end it was important that intelligence gathering be done by locals because they could read the unspoken opinion of citizens through body language and

⁶¹ Ibid., 80.

⁶² Ibid., 80.

⁶³ Ibid., 129.

general atmosphere. “A Police officer,” Dowbiggin wrote, “who has a knack of getting information and who has a flair for seeing what people are ‘thinking’ and not necessarily waiting to hear what they are ‘saying,’ may in these few minutes be able to bring on the spot a force of military or British police who may just make all the difference.”⁶⁴ He reiterated his dictum that “a notebook is to the Policeman what a rifle is to the soldier,” and further recommended that the Palestine Police should pay rewards for good record keeping amongst the force, and draw these rewards from the account used to pay police informants. Dowbiggin hoped to encourage better policing in Palestine, but also looked to make sure that development occurred under British rule.

The type of information Dowbiggin suggested the Palestine Police collect reminds one more of MI5 than the Metropolitan Police. Indeed, his oft repeated phrase regarding notebooks should not be confused with a nonviolent, “pen is mightier than the sword” approach. He wanted all conversations, even supposedly carefree ones, recorded, and he wanted officers to question men coming off of patrol to reveal what information they received that day. This information would also be repeated at weekly instructional classes, so that officers could teach patrolmen how to process and digest the intelligence they received off the street. The point of this exercise was to prevent an intelligence drought before it occurred. To supplement this record keeping, Dowbiggin encouraged the force to keep up with police journals, books on crime and policing, and, most importantly, attend conferences relating to investigation and policing. Even though Dowbiggin’s recommendations regarding information gathering reeked of political policing, he wanted

⁶⁴ Ibid., 145.

the investigation portion of their work to be conducted with the gloves on. In particular, he worried over the continuation of Ottoman police tactics. “In Turkish times,” Dowbiggin wrote, “did not the ‘investigation’ start when there was a prisoner in custody? I do not gather that in Turkish times the Police looked for finger prints on the scene of crime or that they were trained to look for circumstantial evidence. Was it not a case of ‘beating up’ to get evidence as to who committed a crime and then relying on the confession of the prisoner, which was possibly obtained by similar means? Are we satisfied that the methods which the Turks adopted are methods which can be carried out under a British Administration? If the answer is “no” what have we given the Palestinian police to fall back on in place of the Turkish methods?”⁶⁵

In his conclusion, Dowbiggin reasoned if Britain succeeded in Palestine, they would enjoy increased stability and stature throughout the Middle East. The key to this success would be preventing riots, and preventing riots meant that the police needed the right people in the right positions, particularly in the CID. “The position as I found it,” he wrote, “was that here was a country in which there is always the possibility of a riot breaking out any time. If a riot did break out the consequences might, on account of the acute racial feeling which exists, be more serious in Palestine than almost anywhere else in the world. A country which the eyes of the world are on.”⁶⁶ He reiterated his belief that local police could be relied upon, but that these police needed better intelligence support than they had received in the past. Dowbiggin laid the blame for this lack of support

⁶⁵ Ibid., 151.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 207.

squarely at the feet of the head of the Criminal Investigation Department, Joseph Broadhurst. “All they need,” Dowbiggin argued, “is accurate information in time to enable them to take up positions which will, it is hoped, have the necessary deterrent effect and prevent trouble. The Officer to whom the Government of Palestine, the people of the country, the troops and the Police Force are entitled to look for a word of warning, namely, the head of the Criminal Investigation Branch, cannot speak a word of Arabic....In my opinion the payment of a sum of £884 10s. a year in pay and allowances to Mr. Broadhurst is a waste of public funds.”⁶⁷ Dowbiggin’s tirade against Broadhurst went on to include his inappropriate use of police funds for travel as well as his generally lax approach to intelligence work, especially his failure to look after the seizure of propaganda and the deportation of aliens. To prevent this sort of abuse in the future, Dowbiggin encouraged the Government to coordinate with village headmen, as was done in Ceylon, and to use them as an outside check on police to make sure they were keeping up with all assignments and not abusing their power. “The village Headman,” Dowbiggin said, in a line reminiscent of Lugard, “is one of the most important members of the ‘team’ responsible for maintaining law and order,” and he encouraged the government or the police department to decorate these allies with gifts and medals to build up their loyalty.⁶⁸

To oversee the application of his recommendations, Dowbiggin urged that his protégé R.G.B. Spicer be made head of the Palestine Police. Spicer joined the Ceylon police in 1909 and served under Dowbiggin, with a wartime interlude of 3 years, until

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 252.

1925.⁶⁹ Spicer was then poached by the Kenyan Police, which he served for five years as commissioner, overseeing the creation of the colony's Criminal Investigation Department.⁷⁰ With regard to Palestine, "Sir Herbert Dowbiggin was [Spicer's] 'Moses the Master' and his report [on Palestine] the 'Police Bible.'"⁷¹ Taking over in July 1931, Spicer set about following Dowbiggin's holy scripture nearly to the letter, paying particular attention to the CID. His force managed to foil several terrorist plots and avoid a major revolt until the Arab Uprising in 1936.

This revolt led the Government to call on Charles Tegart, veteran of the Calcutta Police and counterinsurgency expert, to conduct another review of the Palestine Police and make recommendations on reform. Tegart reinstated much of the old military style to the police, and topped off his reforms with the construction of dozens of fortified police stations, the so-called Tegart forts, which were designed to reinforce key position as well as relieve the housing crisis for police officers.⁷² Even Tegart's reforms, however, were no match for the tide of history, and further changes came to the police following the 1945 Jewish Rebellion and the subsequent work of the United Resistance Movement. There is little question that, even in 1929, Palestine represented a hopeless situation for the British Mandate. This hopelessness, however, makes the Colonial Office decision to rely on Dowbiggin for advice all the more remarkable.

⁶⁹ Colin Imray and H. V. F. Winestone, *Policeman in Palestine: memories of the early years* (Devon: E. Gaskell, 1995). Imray was Spicer's protégé, and his book works as a biography of Spicer's time as head of the Palestine Police.

⁷⁰ Horne, *A Job Well Done*, 164.

⁷¹ Ch. Arlosoroff, *Yoman Yerushalayim* (Tel Aviv, 1953), 8., quoted from Gad Kroizer, "From Dowbiggin to Tegart," 122.

⁷² Kroizer, "From Dowbiggin to Tegart," 129.

1935 WORLD TOUR

Dowbiggin viewed law enforcement as a combined enterprise that required the cooperation of police around the world. As his constant harping on progressive training and communication demonstrated, he endeavored at all times to participate in the growing, world-wide discussion on policing and policing techniques. This desire is confirmed by Dowbiggin's 1935 leave, when he went on what amounted to a tour of the world's police.⁷³ This tour was much more than a joyride – he both visited the police in each stop, and wrote reports on their condition and practices. His goal was to build up awareness among British police – in both the empire and in Britain – about developments in policing in other countries. He was particularly interested to learn the ways police around the world were dealing with new forms of crime or police work: cocaine trafficking, communist insurgency, traffic management, wireless radio, and cinema censorship.

Through this tour, Dowbiggin helped to build up the growing informal, fraternity of police officers participating in international work. Certainly, the work of international police bodies remained an important venue for these sorts of connections, but it was the work of British officers – whose careers often straddled between the western and the non-western world – that made the most significant contribution to the development of a truly international body of police officers and creating a regime of international crime control. Dowbiggin hoped that his tour would make for both lasting contacts between police as well

⁷³ "Dowbiggin (Col. H.B.L.) Papers.", Box 2, OCN.s. 11, RH.

as increase the institutional capacity of imperial policing. He sent copies of his reports to his Ceylon subordinate J.R. Bantock as well as R.G. B. Spicer in Palestine.

Dowbiggin's tour began in Penang in the Malaya Straits on March 28, 1935, where he found a colony with similar problems to Ceylon. Police in Penang were responsible for a large, mixed population made up of Chinese, Malays, and Sikhs. His tour reports also included travelogue material that contained discussion of the colony's social life, sports, and traffic. As with his formal reports on Cyprus and Palestine, Dowbiggin's tour files contained a substantial review of the police. These reviews detailed the state of the force's buildings, arms, uniforms, and, of course, their training. It pleased Dowbiggin to learn that Penang had developed a Criminal Investigation Department, complete with a finance account to pay off informants, as well as a fingerprint exchange program with Kuala Lumpur. Dowbiggin also noted that Penang was responsible for censoring films for the whole of Malaya. Dowbiggin's tour of Malaya continued in Singapore, where he worried over the firearm training for members of the police. The force was trained in the use of handguns because local gangs used these weapons, but Dowbiggin believed that the crime rate was too low, and the use of handguns too dangerous, to warrant this training. Dowbiggin also expressed concern with the buildup of Chinese criminals in the city, as the old tactic of merely deporting these criminals back to China no longer worked because most were born in Malaya.

Dowbiggin's next stop, Hong Kong, also left him worried over the use of firearms. The whole of the Hong Kong force was trained in the use of revolvers, and shootouts with criminals were so common that police there had developed a periscope pistol with which

to fire over corners and over the top of walls. The main cause of crime in Hong Kong, as Dowbiggin discovered, was criminal activity by local merchantmen – a fact that necessitated the employment of sailors and prostitutes as informants. Additionally, Hong Kong police had been quick to adopt wireless radio, particularly for harbor work, as a means to combat off shore piracy and opium smuggling.⁷⁴

His tour continued in Shanghai, where the force included British, Russian, Japanese, Sikh, and Chinese officers.⁷⁵ Dowbiggin was most impressed by the Chinese officers, particularly what he viewed as the stronger and more rugged northern Chinese (a racist interpretation he first showed in Palestine). Dowbiggin also remarked on the high rate of firearm use in the city and the force in general, which unfortunately necessitated that the police mark their bullets in order to identify who shot whom after a gunfight. Additionally, the police maintained a cartridge bureau that kept shell casings for every licensed pistol or revolver in the area of the International Settlement. Though the police force struck Dowbiggin as particularly capable, he remarked that law enforcement in the city was hampered by the legal realities of the international settlement, which allowed each national contingent to maintain their own court system and to try their criminals in their own jurisdiction.

The one area that Dowbiggin visited that included no discussion of police was Japan, where he toured the cities of Kobe, Nara, Kyoto, Tokyo, and Yokohama. This fact probably resulted from his unfamiliarity with the language and the lack of contacts between

⁷⁴ Dowbiggin reported that the Hong Kong Police confiscated over 3,000 pounds of illegal opium in 1934.

⁷⁵ For more on the Shanghai police during this period, see Robert A. Bickers, *Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai* (London: Allen Lane, 2003).

Japanese police and other national forces. His writing on Japan reads more like a travelogue, in which the penny-pinching Inspector General celebrated the cheapness of the food and hotels as well as the cleanliness of the houses and roads. Dowbiggin continued his journey in Honolulu, where he marveled at the local department's use of technology and their technique of mapping crimes, of which burglary and sexual offenses predominated. In Honolulu, Dowbiggin discussed police administration with W.A. Gabrielson, a police officer from the Berkeley Police Department that had been sent to Hawaii three years prior to help build the force. Not unlike members of a formal police conference, Gabrielson provided Dowbiggin with local material, including the department's prison report for 1935. In return, Dowbiggin sent Gabrielson Ceylon's police reviews for 1934 and 1935 as well as the department's Finger Print collection form.

Perhaps the most important stop in Dowbiggin's 1935 tour came with his visit to Berkeley, California. There Dowbiggin met August Vollmer, the doyen of American police studies and criminology. The longtime head of the Berkeley Police Department, Vollmer led the modernization of American policing through his prolific writing as well as his courses on criminal justice at the University of California. He was the most well-known police officer in the United States next to J. Edgar Hoover. In Vollmer, Dowbiggin found "the best man I have ever spoken to on Police work,"⁷⁶ and spent the entire day of April 30, 1935 in his company. Vollmer shared several reports and books with Dowbiggin for his force in Ceylon as well as with C.T. Symons at Scotland Yard. Vollmer reviewed with

⁷⁶ Herbert Dowbiggin, "Sir Herbert Dowbiggin's Notes on Police Forces Visited by Him in 1935," Box 2, OCN.s. 11, RH, 76.

Dowbiggin his syllabi for courses at Berkeley, a fact that the training obsessed Dowbiggin greatly enjoyed. The meeting seemed to have made an impression on Vollmer as well, as his 1935 book, *Crime and the State Police*, includes a section on policing methods in Ceylon.⁷⁷

Dowbiggin's spent a great deal of time in his report on comparisons between American and British policing. This habit fell in line with other British police, who looked to America for advice on controlling gangs and motor bandits.⁷⁸ The Inspector General marveled at the American use of technology, particularly their advanced wireless communication system, their scientific crime laboratories, the lie detector, and, perhaps most impressive to a British police officer, their experience with traffic control – a subject he expanded upon in his later trips to San Francisco and Los Angeles. On the other hand, Dowbiggin felt that American police were too hamstrung by politics, particularly because higher level officers were either voted to their post or given their position by political appointment. This presence of politics, he argued, prevented the same level of esprit found in British or Colonial forces.⁷⁹ Most distressing for Dowbiggin, however, was the manifest sentimentality of the American public toward criminals. Indeed, the year before

⁷⁷ August Vollmer and Alfred E Parker, *Crime and the State Police*, by August Vollmer and Alfred E. Parker. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1935).

⁷⁸ Andrew Davies, "Glasgow's 'Reign of Terror': Street Gangs, Racketeering and Intimidation in the 1920s and 1930s," *Contemporary British History* 21, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 405–427; Andrew Davies, "The Scottish Chicago?: From 'Hooligans' to 'Gangsters' in Inter-War Glasgow," *Cultural and Social History* 4, no. 4 (2007): 511–527.

⁷⁹ Of course, a common complaint of police officers lower on the totem pole than Dowbiggin was that the seniority system of British policing hurt esprit because deserving officers were prevented from promotion as well as prevented from movement around the empire. This issue was part of a general crisis of imperial administration during the interwar period, and was behind much of the Colonial Office's policies regarding recruitment and unification.

Dowbiggin's tour witnessed the crime sprees of Bonny and Clyde as well as John Dillinger and Charles "Pretty Boy" Floyd.

After travelling through the Panama Canal Zone, Dowbiggin landed in Havana, Cuba. In Havana he found police using a modified version of the Henry fingerprinting system to great success. From Havana, Dowbiggin travelled to New York, where the Inspector met with Commissioner Lewis Valentine and the department's training instructor, who shared with Dowbiggin Henry Söderman's most recent work on police investigation. Of particular interest in New York for Dowbiggin was the NYPD's special branch division, which had expanded recently due to the growth of the local communist party and the search for the Lindbergh baby. Based on a recommendation from August Vollmer, Dowbiggin travelled by plane to Boston, where he met with Massachusetts State Traffic Engineer Clarence Taylor. Taylor, a protégé of Vollmer, developed traffic policy and routines in Boston that became influential in the creation of national motor vehicle policy in the 1940s. From Boston, Dowbiggin travelled to Washington D.C. to visit the FBI, a place he naively believed was the only police department in the United States clear of any political influence. As with most British police, Dowbiggin was less interested in the cases of the FBI than he was with the department's filing system – he made detailed notes of how the force collected and collated information, even going so far as to describe the Bureau's filing covers and boxes. His meeting with J. Edgar Hoover saw the two swapping arrest stories. Hoover, never to be outdone, went so far as to show Dowbiggin the arrest form for John Dillinger, and gave the Inspector General a large collection of pamphlets as he left.

His journey to Chicago found Dowbiggin again marveling at America's technological prowess in the form of the lie detector: "the U.S.A. are amazingly imaginative and ingenious in the way of machinery and mechanical appliances. This is where they are most ahead of us. For example, look at Edison and Ford. This is the type of genius [the] U.S.A. produces. So that whereas we are satisfied in watching a person's face they want to see a mechanical record of it. That is about what it comes to. The only great advantage of the Polygraph that I can see is the moral effect caused to a person on whom it is fitted. It takes some time to fit and get going and there must be more moral effect in this than just putting a person in a chair and asking him questions right away."⁸⁰ In Chicago, Dowbiggin also came across the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* as well as the *American Journal of Police Science*, which he encouraged Ceylon to subscribe to. In Detroit he again commented on American technology, discussing in particular that Detroit was the first police department in the world to develop wireless between cars and headquarters in 1928.

After Detroit, Dowbiggin quickly made his way through Niagara Falls, Toronto (where he took in a baseball game), Montreal, and Quebec City before landing in England. In London, Dowbiggin compared his report on American traffic advancements with the report produced by H. Alker Tripp in 1934. Tripp, Assistant Commissioner of the Met and head of the Traffic Department, had visited New York, Chicago, Montreal, Detroit, and

⁸⁰ Herbert Dowbiggin, "Sir Herbert Dowbiggin's Notes on Police Forces Visited by Him in 1935," Box 2, OCN.s. 11, RH, 228.

Boston in 1934 to study American traffic management.⁸¹ Dowbiggin agreed with much of Tripp's report, and quoted him when he said that "Until Peel made the change in 1829 we showed extreme slowness in recognizing that Liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organized gangs of thieves. We are now equally slow in realizing that liberty does not consist in the right to kill and to be killed on the road." Dowbiggin sent Tripp's report, along with several other papers and pamphlets, back to Ceylon and to Spicer in Palestine. While at the Met, Dowbiggin met with the force's wireless department and encouraged them to visit the United States to study their system. Furthermore, he visited with H. Battley, the head of the Met's Criminal Records Office, to show him what he had learned about American filing techniques and systems.

1937 WORLD TOUR AND NORTHERN RHODESIA

Dowbiggin's 1937 tour began with a request from Northern Rhodesia for a police review. The tour took him through Madras, Rangoon, and Burma. In Zanzibar, he met with Inspector General A.I. Sheringham, a former subordinate from Ceylon. Across the bay, Dowbiggin visited with former subordinates W. Duncan and A.E. Hooper, both working for the Dar Es Salam Police. After arriving in Rhodesia, Dowbiggin spent 11 days at police headquarters in Lusaka, and then inspected all police stations, posts, and offices in the territory – including 9 of the colony's prisons. His report continued in the tradition of his

⁸¹ "Visit by Mr. H. Alker Tripp (Assistant Commissioner, Traffic Department) to the United States of America to Study Traffic Conditions and Control," 1934-1935, MEPO 2/5937, NA.

reports regarding Cyprus and Palestine.⁸² The problems facing Northern Rhodesia were both greater and less than the issues facing Cyprus and Palestine. Northern Rhodesia had to worry less about crime, but it did have trouble with communication due to poor infrastructure, above all telegraphic communication outside of the colonies main industrial district around the copper belt and its attached rail lines. To deal with this problem, Dowbiggin recommended the construction of aerodromes to supply outlying districts and to provide backup for regional forces within 5 ½ hours of Lusaka.

The major feature of Northern Rhodesia at this time, and throughout most of the twentieth century, was the difference between life along the colony's Copper Belt and in the hinterlands. In the "Tribal Area," law was carried out by native authorities, with limited advice from District Commissioners and District Officers. Dowbiggin warned, however, that "we live in a quickly changing world and it is not safe to assume that this happy state of affairs will last forever and that in outlying districts there never will be occasion for recourse to armed resistance or force."⁸³ Dowbiggin also argued that the Copper Belt police needed reforming:

The Police Force required in such areas are not the type of police employed in some undeveloped colonies...in other words, a semi-military force...What is required in this part of Northern Rhodesia is a civil police force trained to act through individual Constables. Every Constable in such a force should be able to record in his note-book the number, colour, and description of a car that has been involved in an accident or has been used in a case of crime. He should be able to record a dying statement, the statement of a witness, the description of property lost or stolen and of an absconder. He should be trained to speak on the telephone, to direct a person asking the way to some particular house or street, to render first aid and to rescue persons from drowning. He should have a good knowledge of the criminals

⁸² "Police Department: Report on Northern Rhodesia Police by Sir H Dowbiggin," 1937, CO 795/88/2, NA.

⁸³ Herbert Dowbiggin, Report on The Northern Rhodesia Police, CO 795/88/2, NA, 84.

living in his area and of the most dangerous travelling criminals whom he may at any time find in his district.⁸⁴

This statement amounts to a thesis on Dowbiggin's ideas of civilian policing as well as a statement on what was appropriate for that particular part of the colony because it was civilized. Dowbiggin encouraged the continuation of separate policing between the tribal areas and the Copper Belt because they were in essence two different countries. Again, as advised by Dowbiggin, what was needed was a clear delineation of roles between police and soldiers: "...the training necessary for a man to become an efficient policeman is very much a whole-time occupation. To try and train a man to be a soldier as well as a policeman means that the time available for training him to be a policeman will be seriously curtailed and the result will be that the man turns out to be an inefficient policeman and a bad soldier."⁸⁵

Despite these general declarations in favor of civilian style policing, Dowbiggin's recommendations also included more political policing than in previous reports: "the C.I.D. should be definitely charged with the duty of getting information in advance and, in addition to keeping the Government, the Police and the Military informed of what is likely to happen, they should themselves take all possible steps to prevent a disturbance by seizing seditious pamphlets, searching and raiding, on a Sear Warrant, places where seditious pamphlets or inflammatory propaganda are being printed or published."⁸⁶ Prevention,

⁸⁴ Ibid., 87.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 89.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 90.

rather than repression after the fact, was the goal, but in many ways this prevention included tactics that were just as violent and repressive as crackdowns after a riot.

Dowbiggin spared Northern Rhodesian police some of his harshest criticism because they had yet to be trained. As in Palestine, he argued that training was all that was needed because the local police, including indigenous detectives and patrolmen, showed potential. Most of the European members of the force had served previously in South Africa or had come directly from Britain. In noting the European contingent of the force, Dowbiggin remarked if the officer had attended training courses or visited English police forces while on leave. As with his other reports, Dowbiggin included his remonstrations on notebooks and proper training as well as encouraging progressive training through publication subscriptions, museum visits, and conference attendance.

Dowbiggin placed the blame for the Northern Rhodesian police's lack of training at the feet of the resident Commissioner, who had failed to make the police into either an effective military or police force. He argued that the Commissioner had avoided criticism up until his tour because he was living off the past reputation of the colony's Military Company. Having seen demonstrations of firearm training, Dowbiggin concluded that few of the police knew how to properly use their weapons. He contended that it would be at least 10 years before the police force was up to standard. Yet he remained positive: "the Force is at present suffering from an inferiority complex. They are a young body; they have had bad teething pains, but there is not reason at all why they should not develop into a Force which is capable of meeting its responsibilities."⁸⁷ Dowbiggin was in Northern

⁸⁷ Ibid., 406.

Rhodesia for three months, conducting his survey and compiling his report. As usual, his report ran long, and led to complaining on the part of Northern Rhodesian stenographers assigned to help: “I worked,” reported H.D. Eastwood, “as many as ten hours overtime some days, and consider the average time for the five weeks during which Sir Herbert was actually writing his Report, spent by me out of office hours of this work, was 6 hours a day, the total for five weeks being 210 hours overtime.”⁸⁸

After completing his report, Dowbiggin continued his tour in South Africa and then travelled to Australia, where he visited with police in Adelaide, Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney.⁸⁹ In New Zealand, Dowbiggin, an avid hiker, lost track of policing and spent his report discussing the glazier he scaled. He then traveled to Fiji and Samoa, before returning to Honolulu, where he wondered at the ethnic harmony of the islands as compared with Palestine. From Honolulu, he moved to Los Angeles and Seattle before visiting with Canadian Mounted Police officers in Vancouver. After a brief spell of hiking around Lake Louise, Dowbiggin travelled to Ottawa and the headquarters of the Mounted Police.

CONCLUSION

The reliance on Herbert Dowbiggin by the Colonial Office during the interwar period reveals a desire on the part of colonial administration to make civilian policing a reality in the colonial context. It is also telling that the Colonial Office sent Dowbiggin to

⁸⁸ “Police Department: Payment of Bonuses to Staff Helping with Sir H Dowbiggin’s Report,” 1937, CO 795/88/3, NA.

⁸⁹ Herbert Dowbiggin, “H.L.D. Tour 1937 – Brief notes on places visited,” Box 3, OCN.s. 12-16, RH.

troublesome territories like Cyprus and Palestine. This shows the depth of the Official Mind's commitment to civilian policing, but it also shows an assumption of British rule in the foreseeable future – no one was under the assumption that police reform along Dowbiggin's lines would be quick and easy. The Inspector General certainly agreed with this idea by recommending civilian policing not only to put a better face on imperialism but also to better maintain control. Dowbiggin, for his part, saw his reports as a means to not only argue for reform, but also to encourage colonial police, as well as their British counterparts, to extend their horizons to the international scene. His world tours in 1935 and 1937 represent perhaps the first world tour of police that included both western and non-western destinations. Dowbiggin's reports from these journeys essentially represent a snapshot of world policing during the 1930s. His enthusiasm for policing as well as his reputation among his fellow officers made him a key asset in the Colonial Office's plans regarding policing.

Chapter Three: The Kendal Version: Britain and International Police Cooperation, 1922 – 1937

Through his reports for the Colonial Office and his tours of foreign police departments, Herbert Dowbiggin operated in many ways as an unofficial ambassador for British policing. His visits to police around the world created channels for the exchange of criminal justice information and expertise that lasted long after his retirement. Yet British police were also intimately involved in the more official manifestations of global law enforcement during this period, specifically international police associations. Organizations such as the International Police Conference (IPC) and the International Criminal Police Commission (Interpol) called attention to the threat posed by international criminals, and encouraged the exchange of information and technology between police forces.

While the actual incidence of international crime during this period remained a matter of debate, the world's police were nevertheless eager to participate in these sorts of organizations. The motivation behind this participation, of course, varied from country to country. Police in Austria, home of Interpol, were largely inspired by what they saw as a genuine rise in international crime. The successor states in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, saw these organizations as a means to help professionalize recently created forces as well as a new venue to establish their countries as members of the international community. The architects of the IPC in the United States hoped that their organization, through contact with centralized justice systems in Europe, would inspire individual state police forces in America to cooperate.

British police, on the whole, believed that the rate of international crime fell well below the levels imagined by Austria, but they worried greatly over future trends. In particular, they worried over the application of technology (for example the automobile, the telephone, and photography) to criminal work, and they believed that foreign police forces could help them adapt their methods to meet this new threat.¹ They also felt that working with other countries could provide them with a better means of classifying and recording criminal activity, which would lead to higher clearance rates and lower levels of recidivism. International police groups, then, provided British police with the means to keep abreast of developments in crime and criminology, giving them the tools to reform and update a system they considered to be antiquated.

International police organizations, for their part, were eager to court British participation because of the reputation for excellence of the Bobby – a perception that relied mostly on fictional portrayals rather than actual performance.² British police, particularly members of the London Metropolitan Police, were only too happy to accept this association with excellence, even though they worried constantly over their own backwardness with regard to technology. Additionally, foreign police felt that Britain’s formal and informal presence in the wider world could give international police organizations the appearance of global reach as well as the ability to draw in members from outside Europe and North America.

¹ Clive Emsley, “‘Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren’t Any Motors?’ The Law, the Police and the Regulation of Motor Traffic in England, 1900–1939,” *The Historical Journal* 36, no. 02 (1993): 357–81.

² Sherlock Holmes was often brought up with reference to British policing at meetings of Interpol, though these references often omitted, or forgot, that Holmes was not a member of the police and often showed up the Bobbies tasked with assisting him.

Because Britain lacked a centralized police system – thus leaving it without a national police force – the country’s relationship with these international police bodies was managed by the London Metropolitan Police (Met). The Met, of course, was already regarded at home and abroad as the de facto national police force for Britain, even though this idea had no basis in law. As described in Chapter One, however, the Met had a long record of international responsibilities. The force offered not only a natural option for representation in international organizations but also a body of officers experienced with international and imperial work.

This chapter will consider Britain’s involvement with formal international police organizations during the interwar period. It will show that Britain made meaningful contributions to the development of international crime control, and argue that most of this work was accomplished by a small, but influential group of Metropolitan Police officers. In particular, the chapter will describe the work of Met officer Norman Kendal, who helped encourage the United States to work with Interpol and also helped to establish Interpol as the main body for international police cooperation instead of the International Police Conference.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE CONFERENCE

The apparent rise in international crime during the early 1920s led many police to call for the establishment of international police organizations. The most important organizations to come out of this period were the International Police Conference, established in 1922, and the International Criminal Police Commission, established in

1923. While Interpol could claim a history going back to the prewar era, the International Police Conference was an upstart. Founded at a meeting of the National Police Conference of the United States of America (NPC), the International Police Conference was the brainchild of New York Police Commissioner Richard Enright. The NPC included police chiefs from hundreds of cities in the United States as well as a small number of representatives from Canada, Mexico, and Latin America. Enright, however, had global pretensions, and used a personal tour of Europe in 1922 to campaign for foreign participation in his organization.

Writing to Metropolitan Police Commissioner William Horwood, Enright declared that “the suppression of criminality is not only a city, State, or National concern, but it is in fact a matter of international concern...It is the earnest wish of the responsible officers of every department which I have visited at home or abroad that an efficient and sympathetic system of co-operation be immediately established between the Police Departments all over the world.”³ “The forthcoming Police Conference at New York,” Enright advertised, “will go far towards establishing an entente cordiale which will make for greater efficiency and a co-ordination of police work throughout the world.”⁴ Horwood took the idea of attending the conference to the Home Office, stating that while the cost would be significant it was nevertheless “most desirable that considerably more liaison should exist between the Police Forces in this country and those of America, and this would

³ Richard Enright to William Horwood, July 12, 1922, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

⁴ Ibid.

no doubt be effected by a representative of this force attending the Conference in New York.”⁵

The Home Office selected Major General Llewellyn Atcherley, the country’s Inspector General of Constabulary, to attend the conference as Britain’s representative.⁶ Other foreign countries represented at the conference included Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, and Germany. The conference program reflected the general concerns of police worldwide during this time period. Topics for discussion included industrial conflict, drug trafficking, vehicle traffic control, and criminal identification. Atcherley himself delivered a paper on identification based on *modus operandi*.⁷ The discussion raised by these topics, particularly drug trafficking, led to a resolution to rechristen the NPC as the International Police Conference.⁸ According to Atcherley’s report, this new organization would promote standardization in police procedure across the world, encourage cooperation between national police forces, and work to establish “an efficient method of distributing information regarding the movements of known criminals from place to place.”⁹

Atcherley reported that he did not volunteer British membership in this new venture because he wanted to confer with the Home Office. He wrote, however, that the delegates from Canada and South America, as well as those from Belgium and Denmark, pledged

⁵ Horwood to Under Secretary of State, Home Office, July 14, 1922, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

⁶ National Police Conference, *Proceedings of the National Police Conference* (The Conference, Bureau of Printing, Police Dept., 1921), 259.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 488.

⁹ L.W. Atcherley, “Memorandum on National Police Conference, New York, September, 1922,” December 4, 1922, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

their “whole-hearted support” for the new scheme.¹⁰ Though Atcherley lacked this level of enthusiasm, he did recommend future British participation. “New developments,” Atcherley remarked, “are constantly arising which affect numbers and efficiency of Forces concerned. This visit will have provided a greater sense of proportion in regard to the risks and requirements of the future in many aspects of Police work, and by a wider experience of general condition elsewhere to assist in a judgment of the best solution of our own particular difficulties.”¹¹

After considering Atcherley’s report and fielding his assistant commissioners for advice, William Horwood wrote to the Home Office arguing for continued participation in Enright’s organization.¹² Horwood, like Atcherley, expressed skepticism regarding the feasibility and usefulness of the organization, but concluded that he did “not think it would be advisable for [Britain] to remain outside any international conference on Police matters.”¹³ “We have our prestige to uphold,” Horwood declared, “and our voluntary absence from such a conference might well be criticized by other nations.”¹⁴ Horwood worried, however, that the International Police Conference would “tend to develop into an organization which will eventually endeavor to codify and draft International Criminal Law.”¹⁵ He was particularly concerned over attempts by the conference to standardize vehicle driving on the right-hand side of the road.

¹⁰ Ibid., 10.

¹¹ Ibid., 10.

¹² Horwood to Home Office, January 30, 1923, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Horwood himself attended the 1923 meeting of the International Police Conference.¹⁶ The meeting saw members discuss drug trafficking, traffic control, extradition, and distant identification. Horwood felt, in general, that no progress could be made on international work as long as American police remained so disorganized. “In my opinion,” Horwood wrote, “the real origin of the Conference was the chaotic state of American Police work generally. This is due to the absence of any central police department for the country as a whole, the existence of State laws which differ so widely and the varying form which Police administration takes in the different States. Even if it were possible to arrive at agreements on questions of international importance, America...before she could carry out her own undertaking, would have to reduce her internal Police organization to something approaching order.”¹⁷

Horwood also remained skeptical of the effectiveness of any such international work, with or without America. He judged that if problems such as alien control, drug trafficking, and extradition were “to be treated as international and taken up as of world wide importance, it is for public opinion to move the respective Governments to take the necessary steps to introduce legislation and to attempt uniformity and co-ordination of procedure internationally, presumably through the League of Nations or some such body.”¹⁸ Moreover, Horwood felt that it would be too difficult for the organization to

¹⁶ Horwood to Home Office, June 7, 1923, MEPO 3/2477, NA. This letter contains Horwood’s report on the proceedings.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

standardize police work “between countries whose laws, habits, temperaments, and standards of civilization differ so widely.”¹⁹

Despite these reservations, Horwood recommended continued participation – on the part of the Met and British police more generally – because of political considerations. “I felt,” Horwood admitted, “that I had little to learn [at the conference], but was conscious that the American and other delegates looked upon the Chief of the London Police as the representative of the centre of the British Empire, and as such, in a position not so much to learn, as to impart knowledge to others and help in the difficulties of those Police Chiefs less fortunately situated.”²⁰ In particular, many delegates looked to the Met for assistance and understanding on the international narcotics trade, which many American police still associated with British India.²¹ Horwood remarked that several participants told him that the presence of the London Metropolitan Police at the meeting “raised the status of the Conference.”²²

The high opinion of British policing led Richard Enright to attempt to hold the 1927 meeting of the conference in London. Writing to British Consul General Harry Armstrong in New York, Enright argued that “London is splendidly situated with respect to transportation, and we would doubtless have a much larger and more representative

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

²¹ “Police: International Police Conference: Resolution That Drug Addicts Be Kept in Custody Indefinitely,” 1923, HO 144/22315, NA. Horwood was accosted at the 1923 IPC meeting by Dr. Carleton Simon, a Special Deputy Police Commissioner of the NYPD concerned with narcotics. Simon blamed Britain for encouraging the distribution of narcotics throughout the United States from India. Horwood reported that this view was not shared by the rest of the conference, and that Simon was largely ignored because he was a Special Deputy rather than an actual police officer.

²² Horwood to Home Office, June 7, 1923, MEPO 3/2477, NA, 9.

conference in that city than in any other place in Europe.”²³ Enright, now the former Chief of Police in New York, said that the International Police Conference would pay for the conference, and told Armstrong that his colleague Barron Collier was sailing for London to present the idea to William Horwood and the Home Office.

Collier, whom Horwood had met at the 1923 conference, was a powerful advertising tycoon fascinated with policing and international crime.²⁴ According to Armstrong, Collier “found the funds that Mr. Enright had at his disposal for entertainment and celebrations [at his conferences].”²⁵ This relationship “incurred a good deal of odium” because Enright returned the favor by granting Collier the title of Deputy Commissioner (complete with badge) and allowing the tycoon several privileges, including the ability to drive his “motor through the streets [of New York]...without regard to traffic regulations.”²⁶ Ronald Howe, a member of the Met that came into contact with Collier in the 1930s, judged that the title of Deputy Commissioner gave Collier “more pleasure than any of his financial triumphs” because beneath his advertising millions “there was a policeman struggling to get through.”²⁷

After learning of Enright’s plan and Collier’s impending visit, Armstrong contacted a local New York police expert, H.W. Marsh, to enquire about the current state of the International Police Conference as well as Enright’s standing amongst American police

²³ Richard Enright to Sir Harry Gloster Armstrong, July 7, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

²⁴ Ethan Avram Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 91.

²⁵ Harry Armstrong to William Horwood, July 8, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ronald Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*. (London: A. Barker, 1961), 127.

more generally. Marsh wrote to the director of the Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover on the subject, and forwarded this correspondence to Armstrong. Hoover believed that the end of Enright's reign as head of the NYPD meant that his organization "had practically passed into oblivion" and that the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) now represented the only such body in America.²⁸ Hoover stated that "[Enright] has almost been forgotten by the law enforcement officials in the United States, and it would certainly be most unfortunate for his organization to be revived or recognized by the foreign police authorities."²⁹ He went on to declare that the United States intended to ease the method of cooperation with foreign police departments by making the Bureau of Investigation the clearing house for international cooperation.

Viewing Enright and his organization as a potential threat to this plan, Hoover suggested that Marsh present negative articles on Enright from newspapers in New York to foreign police considering cooperation with the IPC. In an ironic twist, he wanted foreign police to know in particular that the NYPD had to "forcibly bring back to Police Headquarters many papers and documents which Enright had taken with him and which did not belong to him."³⁰ Hoover, however, had little need to fear competition from Enright and his cohort. After receiving word of Collier's impending visit, Horwood declared that

²⁸ J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. H.W. Marsh, July 19, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA. Established in 1893 as the National Chiefs of Police Union, the IACP organized several international conferences during the early 20th century, though these conferences rarely included police outside of the United States. During the interwar period, the IACP fell under the sway of the FBI, becoming the basis for J. Edgar Hoover's attempt to standardize the collection of criminal statistics at the national level. For more information, see Ethan Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders*.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

the idea of a London conference would “be turned down with a heavy hand.”³¹ Collier left the Met empty handed and resolved – based on a suggestion from the Home Office – to try to hold the conference in Paris instead.³²

Britain’s relationship with the International Police Conference showed that the country was interested in international criminal justice, but not on the basis proposed by the Americans. In particular, they did not want to be involved in an organization with supranational intentions, such as the standardization of criminal law or traffic control proposed by Enright. This preference did not represent a lack of enthusiasm for cooperation, but instead showed a desire to focus on the possible rather than reach for the unattainable. Britain wanted an organization that was truly international, and not a mislabeled association focused primarily on North America. Finally, British police sought an international police organization that was serious. The juvenile antics of Enright and Collier – along with what Horwood considered to be the joyride nature of their conferences – led the Metropolitan Police and other foreign police departments to avoid the IPC and search for an alternative.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE COMMISSION (INTERPOL)

The alternative that emerged was the International Criminal Police Commission, an organization founded at an International Criminal Police Congress in Vienna in 1923. This congress was called by Johann Schober, Austria’s former Chancellor and a longtime

³¹ William Horwood to Harry Armstrong, July 20, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

³² Barron Collier to A.L. Dixon, Home Office, October 29, 1927, MEPO 3/2477, NA.

member of the Vienna police. Schober envisioned the congress as the successor to the prewar congress held in Monaco in 1914, but he made sure that this new meeting did not disperse until the congress members agreed on a formal international body. The resulting organization included representatives from 20 countries as well as a body of administrative officers from Vienna. Interpol was designed to facilitate the fight against crime between member countries through communication, rather than proposing supranational changes to international law. The members of Interpol would communicate through a common correspondence and telegraphic code, which would be maintained by members of the Viennese police. Though the organization forbid the policing of political crime, many of the early representatives of the group were the heads of political police divisions, and there is some reason to believe that some informal information exchange on communist subversives occurred.³³

Britain played an important role in the informal discussions that led up to the founding of Interpol. In particular, Sir Basil Thomson, the head of the Metropolitan Police's Criminal Investigation Department and Special Branch, had worked with Dutch police officer M.C. van Houten in 1919 to hold a police congress as part of League of Nations.³⁴ This work, however, fell apart in 1921 when Thomson was forced to resign his post at the Met by British Prime Minister Lloyd George. Thomson's departure left Britain

³³ Cyrille Fijnaut, "The International Criminal Police Commission and the Fight Against Communism, 1923-1945," in *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives*, ed. Mark Mazower (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997), 111.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

without a representative at Schober's 1923 congress, though the Home Office confirmed Britain's membership in Interpol at the group's second meeting in 1926.

The first regular British representative to Interpol was Leonard Dunning, the former Chief Constable of Liverpool, who attended the organization's 1927 conference in Amsterdam.³⁵ The Home Office selected Dunning because William Horwood (no doubt still discouraged by his meeting with the International Police Conference) refused to send a representative from the Met.³⁶ Dunning was asked "to report whether British attendance at [these] meetings is likely to have any practical value."³⁷ "I say at once," Dunning answered, "that it has, and that, so far as this meeting at all events is concerned, [Horwood's] description of a joy-ride does not apply."³⁸ The meeting did not compare to the conferences organized by Richard Enright, which "were organized mainly at the expense of wealthy citizens, who, for reasons of which I know nothing, put large sums of money at his disposal for the purpose."³⁹ "The Commission," Dunning wrote, "met from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. on each of three days, [and] the discussions were earnest and thorough," while the conference meals were "simple affairs."⁴⁰ Even the conference photograph, in Dunning's estimate, managed to suggest "business rather than pleasure."⁴¹

³⁵ "9th Meeting of Commission in Amsterdam July 1927: Reports and Resolutions," 1928-1929, MEPO 3/2046, NA.

³⁶ Norman Kendal, Minute, June 16, 1932, "9th Meeting of Commission in Rome 1932: Reports and Resolutions," 1932-1933, MEPO 3/2042, NA. Several writers claim British attendance at earlier meetings of the conference (1924 Vienna, 1926 Vienna, 1926 Berlin), but this author has seen no reference to those meetings in Met files or in the reports for subsequent conferences attended by Kendal.

³⁷ Leonard Dunning, "International Criminal Police Commission," July 18, 1927, MEPO 3/2046, NA.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

“For years,” Dunning summarized, “we have recognized the importance of bringing our many separate police forces to pool their resources and to cultivate the friendly relations which will encourage common action. It is equally important that the same ideas should govern the relations between the police of the different European countries.”⁴² For their part, Dunning reported that European countries had long hoped for and valued the inclusion of Britain in the proceedings.⁴³ Dunning also negated fears that the organization hoped to become a supranational organization, writing that Interpol “does not aim at influencing legislation, nor does it seek to touch matters which are more properly approached through diplomatic channels.”⁴⁴ Dunning encouraged a continuation of British participation in Interpol, and recommended further that the country would be better represented by an officer from the Criminal Investigation Department of the Metropolitan Police. In particular, Dunning suggested that “greater advantage might have been gained by somebody knowing German and better able to follow spoken French than I am. The interpreter attached to me was not a policeman and missed the point of many technical expressions.”⁴⁵ Dunning’s recommendation led the Met to select Norman Kendal, a member and eventual head of the Met’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID), to attend the 1928 meeting of the commission in Berne, Switzerland.⁴⁶

⁴² Ibid., 2.

⁴³ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁶ In 1928, Kendal served as the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the CID under Trevor Bigham. He would later replace Bingham as the head of the CID in 1931.

Kendal's work with Interpol as well as other international associations during the interwar period would make him into the de facto foreign minister for British policing. A product of Oriel College Oxford, Kendal worked the Northern Circuit after being called to the Bar in 1906. He served in the 5th Cheshire Regiment during the First World War, and, after suffering an injury in combat, took up a position with the Ministry of National Service in 1917. Following the war, Kendal gained employment as the Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Met's CID. Kendal was part of a new wave of officers at the Met during the interwar period. His appointment represented a move away from the old practice of promoting assistant commissioners from within the department, a habit that often led to score settling and infighting. The selection of educated men like Kendal also helped to build the professionalism and scientific capacity of the CID. His work at the CID relied heavily on his law background, as he spent most of his time reviewing case files for the strength of evidence before sending them on to the Director of Public Prosecution.

Kendal was ideal for liaising with international police bodies, not only because of his education and position within the CID, but also because of his experience working as the Met's representative to the National Vigilance Association's International Bureau.⁴⁷ This Bureau, established in 1899, functioned as the directing body for the organization's overseas research into the trafficking of women and children. It organized conferences between associated national committees in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.⁴⁸ The Bureau, along with the various

⁴⁷ "FL 192 International Bureau", 4IBS/1/1. Women's Library, London Metropolitan University.

⁴⁸ Annie Baker, "International Bureau for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children," June, 1922. MEPO 3/1005, NA.

national committees, put pressure on governments in those countries to coordinate information on trafficking collected through the surveillance of ports and railway stations as well as information gleaned from prostitutes themselves. In addition, the Bureau sometimes oversaw the repatriation of foreign prostitutes to their country of origin. After an interruption during the First World War, the International Bureau began to reestablish itself during the early 1920s. The group, which featured a veritable Who's Who of British elite, met in the Jerusalem Chamber of Westminster Abbey. Kendal's involvement with the organization began in 1922, when he was called in to sit in the place of Metropolitan Police Commissioner William Horwood.⁴⁹

Kendal's position in the Bureau gave him the opportunity to work with an international organization and encouraged him to think globally with regard to crime. His place on the board exposed him to the group's reports from research teams about the proliferation and nature of global trafficking and prostitution. Kendal also served as the Bureau's representative for the 1924 International Conference for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children at Graz, Austria.⁵⁰ He spoke at this conference on the spread of obscene publications and the use of women police for international work. The International Bureau also worked closely with the Advisory Commission on Women and Child Slavery at Geneva, giving Kendal early exposure in dealing with the League of Nations. Much of Kendal's regular work for the CID, of course, included incidences of

⁴⁹ International Bureau Secretary Annie Baker to William Horwood, May 5, 1922. MEPO 3/1005, NA.

⁵⁰ "6th International Congress for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children Held at Gratz, Austria from 18th to 21st September 1924 Attended by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Crime," 1924, MEPO 2/2472, NA.

international crime. These cases could include requests for information from foreign police officers⁵¹, the extradition of foreign criminals⁵², the investigation of illegal smuggling into London⁵³, or murder on the high seas.⁵⁴ Though Kendal himself often expressed doubts as to the rise in this crime as well as the threat it posed, he did believe that the establishment of a formal organization would help streamline correspondence and dossier exchange when these cases occurred.⁵⁵

In his report on Interpol's Berne conference to Scotland Yard, Kendal stated that the main items of concern to the commission were the use of wireless, the methods of combating international criminals, and the question of the expenses and management of the organization.⁵⁶ "As to the wireless waves," Kendal wrote, "it soon became obvious that nobody except the Germans and ourselves had any Police owned wireless stations of any importance."⁵⁷ The subcommittee agreed that "the wave length allocated in the International Radiotelegraph Convention...[of] 3000 – 8000 metres was not likely to be of much use as apart from the prohibitive expense no police owned wireless sets [that] would be able to send messages on so long a wave."⁵⁸ On the issue of international criminals, the

⁵¹ "Need for Warrant in a Criminal Case Where New York Requested Assistance by Cablegram Regarding George Maxwell and Mrs Allan Ryan: Statement of Marconi Company's Position," 1923, MEPO 3/1173, NA.

⁵² "William Wood Brown Arrested at Edinburgh for Fraud and Larceny in Belgium: Extradited to Antwerp and Sentenced for 'Abuse of Trust and Forgery'," 1923-1924, MEPO 3/1174, NA.

⁵³ "Saccharine Smuggling: Various Methods Used and Details of Trafficking Between Rotterdam and United Kingdom," 1925-1927, MEPO 3/470, NA.

⁵⁴ "Murder of Louis FISHER by Mary Josephine WAITS on Board 'S.S. American Trader' on the High Seas on 5 August 1927," 1927, MEPO 3/474, NA.

⁵⁵ "5th Meeting of Commission in Berne 1928: Reports and Resolutions," 1928, MEPO 3/2045, NA.

⁵⁶ "Resolutions Passed at Meetings with Reports by British Delegates," 1928-1938, MEPO 3/2067, NA.

⁵⁷ Kendal report on 1928 meeting, MEPO 3/2067, NA.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

sub-committee decided “that all countries should be invited to send particulars of international criminals of importance with their finger prints to Vienna, [with] Vienna to undertake to distribute information about them to the subscribing countries.”⁵⁹

Kendal emphasized to the subcommittee that this system, however “must not be allowed in any way to affect direct communication between one country and another country upon matters as to which it was obvious that such other country must be interested.”⁶⁰ In other words, the Commission’s exchange system should never be a hindrance to direct communication between individual police officers from concerning countries. “I made it clear,” Kendal wrote, “that from our point of view the problem was not nearly so difficult or important as from the point of view of other European States, but I said that as the majority of countries were obviously in favour of the establishment of an international bureau Great Britain was prepared to do everything possible to assist.”⁶¹ Kendal concluded that the meeting was, on the whole, a success, but complained that “there was far too much paper distributed.”⁶² “Masses of memoranda,” he wrote, “were handed round, most of them running to 20 or 30 pages.” Outside of the regular sessions, the conference included visits to a local Swiss penitentiary and the headquarters of the Berne Police. Kendal recommended that London should be suggested as a possible meeting place for the commission in 1929 or 1930.⁶³

⁵⁹ Ibid., 2

⁶⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

⁶² Ibid., 4.

⁶³ Ibid., 5.

While the Met and the Home Office were not quite ready to host one of the commission's conferences, they did encourage Kendal's attendance at future meetings. The next meeting of Interpol, held in Vienna in 1930, saw Kendal elected as a Vice President of the Commission.⁶⁴ One of the determining factors in Kendal's selection as a Vice President included the ongoing international status of the Commission vis-à-vis the League of Nations. "There was a good deal of discussion," wrote Kendal, "as to the relations between the Commission and the Advisory Committees of the League of Nations, most of the members being very strongly of the opinion that the Advisory Committees ought to ask the Commission to send a representative to give them information upon any questions vitally affecting the Police."⁶⁵ Kendal, along with Florent Louwage of Belgium, urged that the Commission limit the number of contacts within the group's directory to only the most important individuals at the country's central headquarters.⁶⁶ Kendal, however, reiterated the need for British participation. "Whilst the discussions at the meetings are largely academic," Kendal wrote, "I felt more certain than ever that we cannot possibly afford to stand out. Practically every European country is represented and in the vast majority of cases represented by persons of position and intelligence, who quite realise that the real value of these Conferences lies in getting to know one's opposite number, and who also realise that the enthusiasts at Vienna must be gently but firmly restrained from producing too much unnecessary paper."⁶⁷ Following from this point, Kendal repeated that "there was

⁶⁴ "6th Meeting of Commission in Vienna 1930: Reports and Resolutions," 1929-1930, MEPO 3/2043, NA.

⁶⁵ Norman Kendal, "International Police Commission – Vienna 1930," MEPO 3/2043, NA, 1.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

considerable complaint as to the amount of paper which had been prepared for each delegate. I was greeted with a pile of foolscap about three inches high.”⁶⁸

Kendal’s attendance at the 1930 conference was extended on the suggestion of the Home Office to allow the Assistant Commissioner time to acquire “personal knowledge of the methods employed by the Vienna police.”⁶⁹ Thus after the conference, Kendal proceeded on a tour of police forces in Vienna, Dresden, and Berlin. His report closely resembled Dowbiggin’s tour reports and reports for the Colonial Office.⁷⁰ It showed an interest in all police operations, but most particularly with regard to record keeping and traffic work. Kendal was impressed by the buildings and office space available to the Viennese police, but wondered how much the department really needed the amenities. In particular, he felt that the curriculum of the Police Training School, which featured lectures from local university professors, dealt with subjects that were “too scientific, theoretical and advanced to be of great practical value.”⁷¹ Kendal’s report reviewed the department’s communication, training, and transportation divisions. He spent the most time discussing Vienna’s criminal records office, which served as the basis for Interpol’s operations. Kendal, however, was not impressed by their system, stating that the records were maintained on similar lines to the Met’s Criminal Records Office. The one major difference between the two offices was the inclusion of a stolen property index in Vienna. Additionally, Kendal remarked that Vienna’s wireless headquarters was “little if any bigger

⁶⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁹ Home Office to Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, January 22, 1930, MEPO 3/2043, NA.

⁷⁰ “Sir Norman Kendal’s Report on Visit to Police Forces in Vienna, Dresden and Berlin,” 1930, MEPO 3/2036, NA.

⁷¹ Ibid., 2.

than ours here.”⁷² This revelation undoubtedly gave Kendal assurance that the London Met, and British police more generally, were not so far behind their continental counterparts with regard to technology as they assumed.

Kendal spent his only day in Dresden touring the local department’s Criminal Investigation Department. Similar to the Met, this department was led by a lawyer with a university degree. The Dresden CID was keenly interested in handwriting, and kept up an extensive collection of handwriting examples through collection from local prisons. Kendal was extremely impressed with Dresden’s photographic department, stating that it was “more up to date than that in Vienna and infinitely better equipped than our department here.”⁷³ In Berlin, he found a department that was organized and run on a system almost exactly the same as the Met. In particular, the Berlin CID used the Henry system of fingerprinting, with the only difference in data collection being that the Berlin police also collected the palm prints for burglars and hotel thieves. “The wireless installations in Berlin,” Kendal wrote, were “almost staggering. There is a very large series of wireless rooms at headquarters and the head of each of the six uniform districts has a wireless for sending and receiving.”⁷⁴ “The messages are dispatched from headquarters but all provincial or international messages are dispatched from their large station at Adlershof, which is over 20 kilometres outside of Berlin. At this station there are really big masts and a very powerful apparatus worked by electricity. In reserve there is a large oil engine

⁷² *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

capable of working the dynamos in case the electric current should be cut off. This station alone cost nearly half a million marks.”⁷⁵

Kendal also reported that the Berlin police headquarters had been fitted with a Lorenz picture sending and receiving machine, and that the department had also experimented with a Fultograph (an ancestor to the modern fax machine) but found that it useless.⁷⁶ Though German and Austrian police were confident that the technology should be adopted and used, Kendal remained skeptical. “On occasion,” Kendal wrote, “the quick transmission of a portrait would be useful, but I cannot help feeling that, having regard to the expense, to the improvements which are being made and to the other means of rapid communication available, this matter is not one in which any hurried steps need be taken.”⁷⁷ While the Berlin police appeared quite advanced in some respects, they also lagged behind the British in others. For instance, the Berlin Police did not have mobile wireless units, which were forbidden by a provision in the Treaty of Versailles.

In his concluding remarks, Kendal argued that continental police were given more resources, space, and generally more training than officers at the Met. Yet he maintained that much of this funding and space was wasted, particularly the photography department, which had better technology and methods than the Met, but could claim no better clearance rate than Scotland Yard. Kendal believed that this fact resulted from the alternative, political purpose for much of this technology. “It is obvious,” Kendal wrote, “that the

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷⁶ For more on the early history of fax machines, see Jonathan Coopersmith, “Facsimile’s False Starts,” *IEEE Spectrum*, February (1993): 46-49.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

amount of money spent on wireless installations could not possibly be justified, except for the fact that at the back of their mind all the time is the fear of political trouble. They believe it necessary to have a complete reserve method of communication in case the telegraph and telephone should be tampered with. In the meantime they are making use of their systems for purposes of criminal investigation and urging other countries to adopt wireless for police work.”⁷⁸ The fear of political crime or uprising would become a familiar trope in Austrian and German relations with the Met and with Interpol during the interwar period. This fear led, according to Kendal, to “too many officials and far too much paper work...[they] think it worthwhile to undertake work which is of little, if any, practical use in most cases, in the hope that it will turn out to be very important occasionally.”⁷⁹

Kendal attended a second Interpol event in 1930, the International Police Congress in Antwerp.⁸⁰ He reported that this conference continued the general discussion regarding wireless usage, dangerous drugs, extradition, and the classification of criminals.⁸¹ On the subject of wireless, Kendal told the Commission that Britain’s Post Office “had agreed, with a number of foreign Post Offices, that three wave lengths would be allowed for the use of the Police if the Police applied for them.”⁸² Britain and Germany led the way in terms of wireless technology, and most of Interpol’s correspondence during the 1930s

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

⁸⁰ “3rd International Police Congress in Antwerp 1930: Reports and Resolutions,” 1930-1931, MEPO 3/2060, NA.

⁸¹ Norman Kendal, Memorandum on International Police Congress at Antwerp, 1930, MEPO 3/2067, NA, 1.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 2-3.

ended up passing through networks controlled by one or both of these countries, even if the correspondence did not directly concern them.

While the work of the commission expanded and moved forward during the Antwerp Congress, Kendal reported with dismay that the proceedings were interrupted by the intrusion of the International Police Conference. “Mr. Enright’s European representative [Captain Curt Szekessy],” Kendal wrote, “was present at the meetings of the Congress and attempted without success to attend the meetings of the Commission.”⁸³ Szekessy, described by Kendal as “a melodramatic figure, [a] Hungarian who speaks American and lives in Paris with an alleged Countess,” also served as Police Chief of Everglades City, located in (Barron) Collier County, Florida.⁸⁴ His goal at Interpol’s conference was to encourage cooperation, or perhaps amalgamation with, the IPC. Kendal wrote that the Antwerp Congress “adopted a resolution to the effect that any application from Mr. Enright or his friends must come through the diplomatic channel and must state specifically whether the members of the organization were serving Police Officers or not before it could be considered at all by the Commission.”⁸⁵ He also judged that “with the exception of Monsieur [Florent] Louwage of Belgium [there was] the strongest feeling amongst members of the Commission against having anything to do with Mr. Enright.”⁸⁶

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁴ Collier first visited the Everglades in 1911 and, after falling in love with the area’s natural beauty, began buying up large tracts of land in the region, both to develop and to preserve. He became the namesake for Collier County after loaning the State of Florida money to complete the Tamiami Trail. Gail Clement, “Everglades Biographies – Barron Gift Collier,” *Reclaiming the Everglades: South Florida’s Natural History, 1884 to 1934*, Everglades Digital Library, Florida International University: <http://everglades.fiu.edu/reclaim/bios/collier.htm>.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

Unfortunately for the members of the commission, the IPC's push for cooperation only continued with the next meeting of Interpol at the Sorbonne in Paris in September 1931.⁸⁷ Collier spent the summer of 1931 campaigning for the inclusion of the IPC in the Interpol's conference program, suggesting that the two organizations should consider combining the two groups.⁸⁸ Interpol responded to this application by suggesting that a subcommittee made up of members from each organization should be created to explore future cooperation, but declared that Interpol would "maintain its independent position."⁸⁹ Not satisfied with this answer, Collier and the IPC revealed in August 1931 – barely a month before Interpol's conference – that they would hold their own annual meeting at the Sorbonne at the same time in rooms not already reserved by Interpol. "This meeting," advertised the secretary of the IPC, "offers each of those attending unusual opportunity to take part in the most interesting and instructive series of discussion on police affairs ever before scheduled."⁹⁰ Interpol, obviously flummoxed by this turn of events, contacted members again to reiterate that the organization would consider a subcommittee meeting between the two groups, but would not allow either the conferences or the organizations to merge.⁹¹

Collier, doubling down on the coup attempt, wrote to Kendal at the beginning of September inviting him and Met Commissioner Lord Byng to attend the IPC conference at

⁸⁷ "8th Meeting of Commission in Paris 1931: Correspondence on International Police Information Bureau," 1931-1938, MEPO 3/2050, NA; "8th Meeting of Commission in Paris 1931: Reports and Resolutions," 1931-1933, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁸⁸ Barron Collier to Johann Schober, President of the International Criminal Police Commission, May 22, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁸⁹ Oskar Dressler to Members of ICPC (Interpol), July 1, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁹⁰ Robert B. Fentress to Norman Kendal, August 15, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁹¹ Oskar Dressler to Norman Kendal, August 28, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

his expense, and added that he had already reserved rooms for the two men at the Hotel George V.⁹² Unbeknownst to Kendal, this letter had been preceded by a message to the Home Office from IPC President John O'Brien, Chief Inspector of New York City, asking the Home Secretary to designate Kendal and Byng as official representatives of the IPC conference because they had been "assigned important parts in a most comprehensive three day program."⁹³ Additionally, Curt Szekessy wrote a separate letter to Lord Byng stating that the IPC had "no desire to intrude in anyway in the proceedings of [Interpol] or detract the representatives of Europe members of the Commission from their duty towards the Commission," but requested that Byng "designate one or two members of your staff as representatives for the International Police Conference."⁹⁴

This correspondence forced Kendal to write a memorandum for the Home Office to explain the situation, which stressed that he had never given the IPC authority to use his name or the Commissioner's.⁹⁵ Kendal mused, based on the IPC's behavior, that "their idea, quite obviously, is to try to amalgamate with and overwhelm [Interpol]."⁹⁶ He reported, however, that Interpol "will proceed according to plan, quite separately from the meetings of this so called International Conference and that the Commission proposes to carry out its own programme and not to allow its members to be wafted away on various sub-committees to the Conference."⁹⁷

⁹² Barron Collier to Norman Kendal, September 11, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA. Collier signed this letter "Barron Collier, Special Deputy Police Commissioner." Additionally, Collier was, by this time, also listed on IPC correspondence as the organization's "Finance Commissioner."

⁹³ John O'Brien to Secretary of State, September 8, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁹⁴ Captain Curt Szekessy to Sir Julian Byng, September 14, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁹⁵ Norman Kendal, Memorandum, September 24, 1931, MEPO 3/2044, NA.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Despite the IPC's ham-fisted approach, Interpol's proposed subcommittee between the two organizations did materialize at the Paris meeting. Referred to as "The European-American Contact Committee," the subcommittee included Interpol representatives from Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, and H.G.F. Archer (Kendal's deputy in the CID) from the Met. The IPC contingent featured police commissioners from Detroit, New York, and Montreal. The subcommittee agreed that "efficient co-operation has become absolutely necessary between the criminal police authorities of all nations, considering the increasing extension of international trafficking which has increased the danger resulting from the rapid displacements from one continent to the other of international criminals."⁹⁸ On these grounds, the subcommittee decided that the two groups should exchange information on criminals arrested in America or Europe, but Interpol remained adamant that they were not interested in the amalgamation of the two groups. Archer reported that the Belgium representative, Florent Louwage, continued to support the idea of joining the two organizations, but as in 1930, he remained the lone enthusiast for union in Interpol.

Hoping that the Paris subcommittee finally settled the problem, Norman Kendal attended the 1932 meeting of Interpol in Rome.⁹⁹ Kendal discovered, however, that Interpol Secretary Oskar Dressler "had weakly invited three Americans to attend as a delegation from the American International Police Conference."¹⁰⁰ Their presence, Kendal wrote, caused "a great deal of trouble and argument, in theory they were not allowed to attend the

⁹⁸ H.G.F. Archer, Conference report, MEPO 3/2044, NA, 2.

⁹⁹ "9th Meeting of Commission in Rome 1932: Reports and Resolutions"; "9th Meeting of Commission in Rome: Correspondence on Disputed Wording of Resolution," 1932-1933, MEPO 3/2051, NA.

¹⁰⁰ Norman Kendal, Memorandum of 9th meeting of I.C.P.C., November 14, 1932, MEPO 3/2042, NA.

meetings, in practice they generally managed to be there. They had secured the support of the Belgian and French representatives; on the other hand, the German, Dutch and Scandinavian representatives – particularly the Germans and Dutch – were very angry that the Americans should have been invited to Rome at all. The result was an extremely embarrassing position in which [Florent Louwage of Belgium] kept trying to achieve recognition for the Americans, whilst the German most politely protested.”¹⁰¹ This protest, as had been shown in the previous year’s conference, rested on the fact that the American organization was seen as unofficial and unprofessional. As Amsterdam Police Commissioner K.H. Broekhoff explained to Kendal, “it is not possible for us to act with private societies regarding police cooperation. I do not think there are countries where such a thing is really possible...So as soon as an official American representative enters [Interpol] or gets into touch with [Interpol], the affair will be in order.”¹⁰² The Dutch police, according to Broekhoff, could not work with Americans “assisted with funds, of which we do not know the source...[and] who desire to break in upon us.”¹⁰³

To help manage the situation, Kendal was made chairman of a new subcommittee at the Rome meeting designed to find a solution to the problem once and for all. “The only result” of this committee, however, “was that the members of the sub-Committee agreed to differ.”¹⁰⁴ Kendal met with the American delegation after the subcommittee concluded and told them that “the first thing for them to do was to approach the American Government

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁰² Broekhoff to Kendal, December 21, 1932, MEPO 3/2051, NA.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Norman Kendal, Memorandum of 9th meeting of I.C.P.C., November 14, 1932, MEPO 3/2042, NA , 2.

to appoint some responsible Police Officer as the official American representative [of Interpol].”¹⁰⁵ Commissioner Rutledge of Detroit told Kendal, however, “that there had been great difficulties and jealousies in America between the various associations of Police Chiefs,” and that the government would only nominate a representative after these rival associations had settled their differences or amalgamated.¹⁰⁶

The success of Interpol lay in the fact that the organization created connections between national police forces – or equivalent departments in capital cities – that did not require intervention by official diplomats. Indeed, as Kendal argued, “the only real value of the meetings is the personal relations with the head of the C.I.D. of the various countries.”¹⁰⁷ Even though Interpol’s technology for sharing information remained in its infancy and the organization had yet to agree on what actually constituted an “international crime,” the individual members of the organization found the group useful because of the personal connections it fostered, connections that were largely free from bureaucratic red tape.

The efforts of the International Police Conference, on the other hand, failed because the organization proposed changes to international law, which promised the intrusion of diplomats, and because the organization’s main representative, the United States, did not have a single police force to speak for their entire country. Though most European countries did not have a national police force, they did present a stable set of de facto national forces, such as the London Met and the French Sûreté, which contained police

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁷ Norman Kendal, Minute, June 16, 1932, MEPO 3/2042, NA.

officers with international experience. America, conversely, presented European police with a confusing rivalry between police departments in major cities as well as between federal agencies such as the FBI. Adding to these issues was the brash manner in which the IPC attempted to graft their organization onto connections already established by Interpol.

Of course, even Interpol sometimes faltered. At the 1932 conference in Rome, for instance, a problem developed with the size of conference delegations after the Italian government, hoping to make a good impression on the organization, invited, in the words of Kendal, seemingly every “flunkey and minor official” available. The Rome conference led to something of a delegation arms race, with the French, German, and Swedish representatives all competing to have the largest entourages. Kendal reported that the 1935 Conference in Copenhagen could have been mistaken for a “travelling circus,” with the Germans boasting a contingent of 12 delegates and the French arriving with 9.¹⁰⁸ The Swedes, however, were unable to keep up and had decided to cut their delegation down to two before supporting Kendal’s motion calling for an attendance cap.

Interpol also struggled at times with overactive representatives who tended to steer official communications and conference programs to tailor their own strange obsessions. The best examples of this sort of problem were the annual reports given by Viennese police officer and Interpol Secretary, Oskar Dressler, in a panel he referred to as “Interesting

¹⁰⁸ “11th Meeting of Commission in Copenhagen 1935: Reports and Resolutions,” 1935, MEPO 3/2040, NA.

criminal cases.”¹⁰⁹ Some memorable crimes in Dressler’s report included the attempt to see if fingerprints could be lifted from spiritual bodies or ghosts. Another interesting case was the Pigeon Blackmailer of the Rhineland, who used his collection of carrier pigeons to send threats to local officials. In order to combat this menace, German police had the victim release the bird into the air while the police followed the animal using a biplane. The pilot was able to find the location of the criminal and return later to make the arrest on the ground. Unfortunately, there was no word as to whether or not the pigeons faced charges as well.

In spite of these issues, the Met persisted with the organization, even when Norman Kendal was unable to attend the meeting. In 1934, Ronald Howe, Kendal’s deputy in the CID, attended the meeting in Vienna.¹¹⁰ Much like Kendal, Howe found that the regular sessions of commission produced little result.¹¹¹ Howe reported that most of the discussion included issues that did not concern Britain, in particular the gypsy problem and drug trafficking. “At no time,” Howe wrote, “except for the election of officers, was any matter put to the vote. Whenever the feeling of the meeting was obviously hostile to any proposal it was immediately shelved.”¹¹² Not unlike Kendal, however, Howe felt that the best part of the conference was during “informal gatherings” where the most useful discussion of

¹⁰⁹ “3rd International Police Congress in Antwerp 1930: Reports and Resolutions,” 1930-1931, MEPO 3/2060, NA.

¹¹⁰ “10th Meeting of Commission in Vienna 1934: Reports and Resolutions,” 1933-1935, MEPO 3/2041, NA.

¹¹¹ Ronald Howe, “Tenth Meeting of the International Criminal Police Commission held in Vienna from the 17th-21st September, 1934,” October 3, 1934, MEPO 3/2041, NA.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

police matters took place and where he found the attendees “very intelligent, obviously efficient in their work and ready for discussion at any time of the day or night.”¹¹³

Howe’s visit to the 1934 conference included a tour of police departments in Vienna, Lausanne, Lyon, and Dresden.¹¹⁴ In Vienna, Howe toured the police laboratory and museum, the University of Vienna’s laboratory, and the Austrian Bankers Association’s laboratory for counterfeit currency.¹¹⁵ Howe’s report mirrored Kendal’s previous tour, marveling in particular at Vienna’s ability with photography. Howe was similarly impressed with the University’s collection of criminological exhibits, which included poaching and housebreaking tools, examples of illegal publications, devices to make forged documents and counterfeit currency, and tools used for escaping prison. Howe was much less impressed in his visits to Lusanne and Lyon, where he found the standard of scientific detection and training much lower compared to Austria and Britain. Howe concluded by saying that “except in the theory of training and the method of marshaling facts and exhibits for purposes of training, I do not think we are inferior to any of the forces I visited.”¹¹⁶

The 1935 meeting of Interpol in Copenhagen saw a great deal of discussion on police wireless as well as the identification and classification of criminals.¹¹⁷ After a session on the portrait-parle, Kendal reported that “the general opinion was that all police

¹¹³ Ibid., 2.

¹¹⁴ “Mr Ronald Howe’s Report on Visit to Police Forces in Vienna, Lausanne, Lyons and Dresden,” 1934, MEPO 3/2037, NA.

¹¹⁵ Ronald Howe, “Note on Scientific Aids to Detection of Crime in Vienna, Dresden, Lausanne and Lyon,” MEPO 3/2037, NA, 1.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 7.

¹¹⁷ “11th Meeting of Commission in Copenhagen 1935: Reports and Resolutions.”

officers all over the world were nothing like as good as they should be either at describing people themselves or at assisting witnesses and others to describe people to them.”¹¹⁸ At Copenhagen, Kendal put forward London as a future host for an Interpol conference. This idea was received with excitement, and 1936 was initially proposed as the date. Kendal learned, however, from the Yugoslavia representative that he had just been given permission from his foreign minister to host the conference in Belgrade in 1936, stating furthermore that there was great difficulty in gaining the invitation and he thought it impossible to get a similar invitation for the next year. Kendal, as a result, proposed to have the London conference moved to 1937 and for Belgrade to host in 1936.

The major work of the Belgrade conference carried on from the ideas sparked at the 1935 conference in Copenhagen, namely, how to revise and modernize information exchange regarding criminal identification through Bertillon’s system.¹¹⁹ “Practically every representative,” Kendal wrote, “except the French and Belgian, was of [the] opinion that the whole of the Bertillon system was unnecessarily elaborate.”¹²⁰ The elaborate nature of the conference proceedings itself also worried some members, as the Yugoslav government pulled out all the stops for the conference. There were a series of fieldtrips which acted as little more than propaganda for the government as well as the presentation of national honors to the heads of the organization, with Kendal receiving the Order of St. Sava. “There was a great deal of talk,” said Kendal, “as to the future of the Commission

¹¹⁸ Norman Kendal, Report, July 24, 1935, MEPO 3/2040, NA.

¹¹⁹ “12th Meeting of Commission in Belgrade 1936: Reports and Resolutions,” 1935-1936, MEPO 3/2038, NA.

¹²⁰ Norman Kendal, Report on Belgrade Conference, July 15, 1936, MEPO 3/2038, NA.

and the danger of allowing it to denigrate into a joy ride in which far too many hangers-on, who were not really interested in the work, would be allowed to participate.”¹²¹ Kendal wrote that many members of the commission, particularly the delegates from Norway, Sweden and Denmark, suggested that “as the meeting is to be held in London next year, [Kendal] should take the initiative in trying to bring the Commission back to earth and make it once again, as it was originally intended to be, a simple round table conference of the heads of the ‘Criminal Police’ of the various European countries.”¹²² “They felt,” Kendal wrote, “and I agree with them, that matters had been allowed to drift by the Austrians.”¹²³

Kendal believed that much of these problems could be traced back to “advent of the Nazi regime in Germany.”¹²⁴ “The Germans,” he wrote “have been sending a representative accompanied by a whole train of satellites...As a result, the French, instead of being represented by one individual as had always been the case before, produced a delegation of six. This rivalry is obviously most desirable, and the Scandinavians felt that in any event, they would not compete.”¹²⁵ Additionally, Kendal judged that the Nazi presence at the conference encouraged the intrusion of politics in the association. “There is no doubt at all,” he reported, “that the German delegations have been sent with a view to impress the other representatives and to advertise the merits of those at present politically in power in Germany. The result was that the chief German delegate, whenever he spoke

¹²¹ Ibid., 3.

¹²² Ibid., 3.

¹²³ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 3.

instead of confining himself to the police side of the subject, took the opportunity of delivering a harangue which was primarily political.”¹²⁶ On a similar point, Kendal also declared that “the wearing of uniform by any officer should be barred...it arose because the Germans insisted on attending the formal opening and any formal function...in uniform.”¹²⁷ Kendal believed that the London meeting “would help to make the Commission once again a simple meeting for the exchange of views between the various heads of the ‘Criminal Police’ and to prevent it from degenerating into a travelling circus.”¹²⁸

Kendal’s “simple meeting” opened in London in the home of the Civil Service Commission at 6 Burlington Gardens on June 7, 1937. In his opening remarks at the conference, Interpol director Michael Skubl acknowledged Britain’s importance to the organization and to policing in general by declaring that “hardly any other capital in the world can give us a better frame than the Metropolis of Scotland Yard,” and that the meeting “in the Mecca of the police” represented the “destiny” of the organization.¹²⁹ The record of the conference proceedings found the organization spending less time arguing over the size of delegations and more time discussing the actual incidence of international crime. The London conference saw the specifics of exchange and cooperation worked out on issues ranging from counterfeit securities, a simplified version of the “portrait parle,” and the method of transmitting fingerprint formulas using telegraphy. The conference also

¹²⁶ Ibid., 3-4.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁹ “13th Meeting of Commission in London 1937: Reports and Resolutions”, 1935-1937, MEPO 3/2039, NA.

avoided even the hint of a joy-ride. Extracurricular meetings were held at sober locations including the Royal Tournament at Olympia, the Metropolitan Police College at Hendon, and Lancaster House at St. James' Palace.

The London conference also brought final resolution to the American question with regard to international policing. Attempting to join the international club, J. Edgar Hoover, through the Department of Justice, sent a letter to the London Metropolitan Police in October 1936 suggesting that it would be useful to have an FBI officer stationed at the Met to facilitate cooperation between the two forces.¹³⁰ Metropolitan Commissioner Sir Philip Game, using a carefully worded text prepared by Kendal, responded by saying that the best course of action would be for the United States to put in an application to join Interpol. This move, of course, was partly defensive, as the Met was wary of having an American police officer nosing around Scotland Yard. On the other hand, the Met was eager to develop a closer relationship with American law enforcement. Hoover accepted Game's advice and sent one of his deputies, Major W.H. Drane Lester, to attend the London conference in order to explore American involvement in Interpol. At the conference, Lester, a former Rhodes Scholar, was invited to speak about general developments in criminology in the United States.¹³¹ His speech was a typical example of FBI propaganda from that time period, featuring anecdotes from famous cases (i.e. Dillinger, Machine Gun Kelly, etc.) and giving all the credit for the Bureau's achievements to Hoover. Despite

¹³⁰ "United States Department of Justice Proposal to Appoint Special Agent in London: Counter Suggestion That United States of America Should Join International Criminal Police Commission," 1936, MEPO 2/4990, NA.

¹³¹ W.H. Drane Lester, "Modern Trends in Criminology in the United States of America," MEPO 3/2039, NA.

Lester's blustering, the speech was well received and led to the quick processing of America's application for membership to the commission, which was ratified at the 1938 conference in Bucharest.¹³²

CONCLUSION

Britain's relationship with the IPC and Interpol showed that the country was eager for cooperation regarding criminal justice, but only along certain lines. Though the Met worried over the enthusiasm exhibited by Interpol's Austrian leadership, they appreciated the group's focus on communication between chiefs of police as well as their general avoidance of politics and supranational endeavors. Interpol's success was as much the result of its measured approach as to its central location in Europe. The IPC, conversely, offered a confusing menagerie of North American police officers that openly discussed changing international law. Furthermore, the IPC's preference for lavish conferences made the organization appear, in the eyes of British police, as "nothing but an opportunity for a glorious spree."¹³³ Although Britain avoided the IPC, they remained committed to establishing a working cooperation with the United States with regard to criminal justice. As a result, the Metropolitan Police ended up playing the critical role in both the failure of the IPC at the international level, and in the eventual application of the FBI to Interpol. The Met's position with regard to America, along with their leadership role in the

¹³² "14th Meeting of International Criminal Police Commission in Bucharest June 1938", 1937-1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹³³ Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime.*, 128.

organization's conferences and correspondence with the League of Nations, made British policing an indispensable part of the early success of Interpol. As shown by the next chapter, however, much of this work would be undone, first by the Nazi takeover of Interpol in 1938 and then by the Second World War.

Chapter Four: “A sort of agreeable madness”: Britain and International Policing during the Second World War

The Second World War is often portrayed as a period of weakness for the British Empire. In general this portrayal is accurate, but in some specific cases the Empire was never stronger than during this conflict. This is particularly the case for British policing. Though the Second World War brought an abrupt end to the international cooperation fostered by Interpol, it also provided an opportunity for the British police, perhaps for the first time since colonization, to expand beyond the borders of the home island. When Allied soldiers moved on from places like Athens, Berlin, Rome, and Vienna, it was often British police who moved in to maintain security. Though these were temporary arrangements, British police officers entered these situations with the hope of leaving a lasting impact on the way criminal justice was practiced in the occupied zones. Furthermore, the war allowed British police the opportunity to develop international cooperation with select partners, namely the United States, through both open and secret means. This chapter will review the downfall of Interpol, and describe the wartime relationship between British police and their allies. The next chapter will discuss how these wartime events and relationships encouraged the British Empire to adopt a more forward policy regarding worldwide policing during the postwar era.

THE NAZI TAKEOVER OF INTERPOL

German police officers, bedecked in Nazi uniforms, began regularly attending Interpol conferences as early as 1932, and made a concerted push to take over the organization in 1935 at the Copenhagen conference. This attempt was met with resistance from most of the other interested parties, including officers from the French National Police and the Met. The fear of encroaching Nazi influence on the organization led Norman Kendal to ban the wearing of uniforms at the 1937 conference in London, which Germany did not attend. Thus, despite the organization's desire to avoid politics as all costs, the rise of Nazi Germany threatened to bring an end to formal international police work.

This situation regarding Nazi influence on the organization came to a head on March 12, 1938, as a result of the Anschluss. Although this event appeared as a direct affront to the anti-Nazi contingent within Interpol, most members of the organization decided to take a wait and see approach to the development.¹ In an open letter to Interpol members, Dutch police officer M.C. van Houten worried that the whole organization would “be brought into danger” by the new relationship.² In a letter to Kendal, however, van Houten appeared more optimistic, arguing that despite the difficulties facing the organization, Interpol “will stand the crucial test.”³ Despite this confidence, van Houten argued that several questions should be resolved before the organization could continue,

¹ “14th Meeting of International Criminal Police Commission in Bucharest June 1938,” 1937-1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

² M.C. van Houten to Interpol members, March 29, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

³ Van Houten to Kendal, March 29, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

including whether the organization should still be based in Vienna, who would serve as president, and whether or not the 14th meeting in Bucharest should still take place.⁴

While van Houten fielded opinion on continental Europe, Kendal corresponded on the issue with Kristian Welhaven of the Oslo Police, and wrote that he felt the 14th meeting should be postponed given the uncertain situation in Vienna.⁵ In his reply to van Houten, Kendal argued that the meeting should be postponed immediately until the situation in Vienna could be determined – or until they had heard word from Interpol’s suddenly missing general secretary, Oskar Dressler. Kendal felt, repeating a common fear from the 1937 conference, that there was a real danger “that if the Germans take control they will try to use [the Commission] for propaganda purposes.”⁶ The following week Kendal mused that since there was no longer an Austrian Federal Police, there was no longer a president of the commission, which meant that a new election would be needed.⁷

Kendal learned from various contacts in early April 1938 that Dressler was indeed still free, but that the current Interpol President, Michael Skubl, had been locked up. This news found Kendal in a despondent mood. Writing to Welhaven again, he remarked that this could mean the end of the organization and wondered if the IPC would attempt to amalgamate the remaining members. “Once politics get a firm hold,” Kendal argued, “the usefulness of the Commission disappears.”⁸ The correspondence that Kendal received from Germany, while not detailed, clearly showed the future direction of the organization.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Kendal to Dr. Kristian Welhaven, March 31, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

⁶ Kendal to van Houten, March 31, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

⁷ Kendal to van Houten, April 4, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

⁸ Kendal to Welhaven, April 11, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

Continual mention was made in this correspondence that Reinhard Heydrich – a general in the SS and future architect of the “Final Solution” – was in charge of the situation, and had suspiciously been named a Vice President of Interpol only a day before the Anschluss.⁹

In the midst of this confusion, Arthur Dixon at the Home Office wrote to Kendal to tell him that Britain’s dues to Interpol were outstanding, but expressed the Home Office’s concern about paying them before knowing the future course of the organization. Dixon asked Kendal to keep him abreast of developments he learned through his network of “influential members of the Commission” and to “avoid committing the Government to any specific line of policy, or indeed to continuing its membership of the Commission if it is reconstituted on an altered basis.”¹⁰ Kendal responded a few days later to inform Dixon that the Bucharest meeting would continue as planned, but that the leadership of the commission was still unclear. He stated that he should be allowed to attend the meeting to find out exactly what was going on and to take part in an election if one was held. Kendal concluded by encouraging Dixon to pay the membership dues because “the only reason for withholding it is really political and...I am most anxious that we should be the last people to drag in politics.”¹¹

Kendal’s argument rested on wishful logic, as politics were already clearly on the table. Indeed, prior to his response to Dixon, Kendal received word from Vienna that Nazi sympathizer Otto Steinhäusl had been appointed Police President in Vienna and was thus, ipso facto, the new President of Interpol. In a letter from Steinhäusl, the new President

⁹ Arthur Nebe to van Houten, April 7, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹⁰ Dixon to Kendal, April 14, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹¹ Kendal to Dixon, April 21, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

wrote “I congratulate myself on my new position.”¹² Dressler attempted to explain away any problems with this development by arguing that Steinhäusl was Interpol’s president based on resolutions passed by the organization at the 1937 London conference.¹³ Dressler argued that Steinhäusl “went through the ‘Schober’ school” of policing, and thus represented the very best ideals of the organization.¹⁴

Kendal was clearly aware of Steinhäusl’s appointment before writing the Home Office, but he attempted to place a glossy sheen over the situation for Arthur Dixon. This demonstrates Kendal’s thinking on the situation: that Interpol was a group worth saving and not yet beyond hope. In other words, an organization worth lying for. His remarks pointed to a general hopefulness – shared by other non-German members – that the organization could continue to operate as it had prior to the Anschluss. Kendal firmly argued for a wait and see approach, hoping that things would become clear at the Bucharest conference.

In the meantime, Kendal received a reply from Welhaven, who had been busy fielding responses from the Scandinavian members of the organization.¹⁵ Welhaven thanked Kendal for helping to collect opinions and strategies before the 14th meeting, as the Scandinavian contingent worried that the Bucharest meeting could “easily become a ‘Polish Parliament’ if the members are not oriented beforehand as to each other’s views.”¹⁶ Welhaven agreed strongly with Kendal that the best course of action was to avoid politics

¹² Otto Steinhäusl to Interpol members, April 20, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹³ Oskar Dressler to Broekhoff, April 20, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Welhaven to Kendal, May 2, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹⁶ Ibid.

until things were sorted out at the meeting in Bucharest. Kendal also received word from Florent Louwage of Belgium, who agreed that things should be sorted out in person at Bucharest, where Louwage hoped they could bring an end to “the siege of the Commission after private conversations between the very active members.”¹⁷

Having collected opinions from active members of the organization, Kendal wrote again to the Home Office, assuring them that “unless the Germans adopt a non-truculent attitude there will be resignations” at the Bucharest conference.¹⁸ Anticipating the Home Office’s agreement, Kendal wrote to Dressler to tell him that he would be attending the Bucharest meeting along with his wife and daughter.¹⁹ Kendal received the go ahead from Whitehall to attend the meeting on May 19th.²⁰ That same day, Oskar Dressler sent a letter to Kendal, addressing the latter’s challenge to the new president and operation of the commission. Dressler accepted that, by the book, the new state of the commission should be put up to a vote, but considering that Interpol had already “gone beyond its original scope” the group “is strictly speaking no longer an association of individual persons, but an association of States who send their delegates.”²¹ In an ominous vision of the future, Dressler argued that “it is the States and not the persons that bear most weight, and this fact...constitutes the particular value, the special importance and, above all, the official character of the Commission.”²² This view of the commission was diametrically opposed

¹⁷ Louwage to Kendal, May 5, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹⁸ Kendal to S.J. Baker, Home Office, May 11, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

¹⁹ Kendal to Dressler, May 14, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

²⁰ Baker to Kendal, May 19, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

²¹ Dressler to Kendal, May 19, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

²² *Ibid.*, emphasis original.

to the views shared by most of the member officers, Kendal in particular. They believed that the real strength of the commission rested on the representatives involved, rather than the governments that they represented. In Dressler's view, however, this conception of the society was already in practice, even though it was "not yet fully embodied in the Regulations."²³

More distressing news came to Kendal later that week from British Consulate-General of Vienna. This letter provided a brief profile of the new Interpol president Otto Steinhäusl, who was a well-respected criminal police officer in Vienna, but was arrested in 1934 for his leadership role in the July Putsch that failed to install a Nazi regime in Vienna and led to the assassination Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss.²⁴ Though the actual manner of Dollfuss' death remained a mystery, Steinhäusl was the leader of the secret SS group that carried out the attack on the chancellery. This letter, however, did not reach the Home Office or Kendal until June 7th, the opening day of the Bucharest Conference. In the General Report on the work of Interpol since the London meeting, Dressler also reported that Michael Skubl, the pre-Anschluss President of Interpol, had retired from office. Unbeknownst to Interpol members, however, Skubl had been forced to retire and would spend the next eight years in prison for refusing to cooperate with the new Nazi regime.

The major work of the Bucharest conference concerned the attempt to draw up a standard system of passport review and creation, and the prevention of forgery. These proceedings, though focused primarily on the matter at hand, also revealed the peculiar

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ D. St. Clair Gainer to Foreign Office, May 23, 1938, MEPO 3/2072, NA.

political elements at play within the organization at the time. In his open paper, “A Study concerning Passports,” Florent Louwage provided a general overview of the past agreements and discussions at Interpol on this topic, and singled out in particular the past contributions of forgery expert J.A. Adler, now barred from Interpol because of his questionable genetic background. The commission also discussed how to uniformly describe criminals within police journals. Kendal, as usual, argued that standardization of description could be attained only in general police journals, and that all countries should decide for themselves which police journals they should subscribe to. Similarly, descriptions of criminals should only be sent to countries where the criminal could have gone to, rather than a blanket bulletin to all members of the organization.

Another panel of interest was held by Oskar Dressler and Bruno Schultz entitled “The Day of Practical Workers.” This panel was designed to address the complaints of many of the member nations, Kendal in particular, that the organization needed to be focused more on practical work – namely, direct discussion of particular criminal cases along the lines of Oskar Dressler’s own regular contribution to the conference proceedings. Dressler and Schultz called for an entire day of future conferences to be set aside solely for this purpose – in particular, the discussion of new *modus operandi*, new methods applied by police, as well as a frank and open discussion of pending cases. In order to avoid the release of any sensitive information, Dressler moved that this day of the conference should be barred to journalist and should not include any written record.

The Bucharest meeting may have begun with tension, but the conference proceedings showed the outward appearance of an organization continuing as though

nothing had happened. According to Swedish police officer Harry Söderman, “there was a feeling of great tension when the Commission convened in Bucharest, just after the *Anschluss*... First we all spent a week in Bucharest. Then there was a second week on the royal yacht, going slowly down the Danube to the Black Sea. I imagine this trip was arranged by our benevolent and astute host, [Dr. Eugen] Beanu²⁵, the head of the King Carol’s secret police, with the idea of escaping the tense proceedings of the Commission in the city. Several times events had come near to open disaster, for the patience of many of us was tested to the utmost in that first week.”²⁶ Yet, as Söderman reported, most of the bad blood between the contending members vanished by conference end: “The reconciliation among the 1938 convention’s contending parties, which Beanu hoped for, pretty well came about on the trip in the royal yacht, and how could it have been otherwise? At every meal Russian caviar was served in unlimited quantities. Champagne flowed from breakfast until late at night, beautiful gypsy singers sang melodious Transylvanian songs at all times. A bar, stocked to provide all the drinks of the entire world, was open free of charge twenty-four hours a day, and two orchestras played within earshot. In the evenings, when we arrived at small fishing towns, all the fishermen were out in their boats. Hundreds of them surrounded the ship, and in each boat there was a paper lantern and a man playing a mandolin. The effect of this on a dark night, to one standing on a ship’s bridge overlooking the black waters of the Danube, was enchanting. After a few days, one fell into a sort of agreeable madness.”²⁷ By the end of the cruise, Söderman concluded, “the situation had

²⁵ Director General of Public Security, Bucharest.

²⁶ Söderman, 379.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 380.

been glossed over, and the members were agreed to have the Commission work for another year under the old system.”²⁸

Though the Bucharest conference did much to lessen fears of Nazi corruption of Interpol, those fears reignited in December 1938 when Oskar Dressler announced that the 1939 Interpol conference would be held in Berlin from August 29 to September 8. This announcement met with little reaction from the Met, with Kendal in particular still firmly of the opinion that the Bucharest conference had proven Germany’s sincerity and that there remained no reason to doubt their continued trustworthiness. Not all members of Interpol, however, shared Kendal’s confidence. The French Sûreté, in particular, felt that the Bucharest conference was merely an attempt to encourage appeasement, giving the Nazi police time to finalize their dominance of the organization at the newly announced Berlin conference. In May, the British consulate in Paris wrote to the Foreign Office to inform the government that the French had decided not to attend the Berlin conference, but wanted to know British opinion on the matter so that the two countries could coordinate their response.²⁹ While considering this situation, Kendal received a follow-up message from Dressler which included a provisional program and asked for a confirmation of attendance.³⁰

The Foreign and Home offices sat on the issue until mid-summer, when S.J. Baker at the Home Office wrote to Kendal asking for his position on the situation.³¹ Kendal

²⁸ Ibid., 381.

²⁹ W.H.B. Mack to Central Department, Foreign Office, May 30, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

³⁰ Dressler to Kendal, June 10, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

³¹ S.J. Baker to Kendal, July 3, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

responded a week later with a long letter, arguing that it was “too early to burn our boats on the question of attending.”³² He went on to discuss the history of the idea of moving the commission elsewhere, especially the old debate about attaching the association to the League of Nations in Geneva. Kendal then reported that the opinion of the “neutral nations,” namely Holland, Scandinavia, the Balkans, and Turkey, was that Austria must be kept in charge in order for the commission to continue to endure. Kendal admitted that before the Anschluss, the Germans had attempted to introduce politics in the organization at the 1935 Copenhagen conference, and had not attended the London conference because they were not allowed to wear uniforms. Yet “at Bucharest last year the Germans were very careful to behave with the greatest circumspection.”³³ Kendal continued by saying that “nobody in uniform attended and no attempt was made to introduce at any of the meetings anything which could be described as political.”³⁴ He also reported that the work of the commission has been conducted normally, despite the Germans being in charge.

In Kendal’s estimate, the majority of the commission still supported the status quo, and that if the French measure to move the conference or the organization to another country was put to an open vote it would be defeated “by an overwhelming majority.”³⁵ He argued that “unless a state of emergency is declared here or war is declared...before the date of the meeting I must attend and see what happens. I am still the Senior Vice-President....If we do not attend it is the end of the Commission so far as we are

³² Kendal to Baker, July 10, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

concerned.”³⁶ Kendal concluded his letter with his familiar refrain that “from the very outset and at meeting after meeting I have stressed the point that politics have nothing to do with the Commission and support for this view has been unanimous. If the Germans introduce political discussions at Berlin the Commission would break up.”³⁷ In a postscript, Kendal added that “our relations with the German Police are exceedingly good,” and that “they are always prompt in replying to letters and take any amount of trouble whenever we ask them for help.”³⁸

The decision on whether or not to attend the Berlin conference, given the international climate at the time, necessitated correspondence with the Foreign Office. In a letter to Permanent Under-Secretary Alexander Cadogan, Met Commissioner Sir Philip Game asked for the Foreign Office opinion on whether they should attend the Berlin Conference.³⁹ Game reported that the French had decided not to attend the conference, given the international climate. Game, however, argued that this decision was motivated primarily by jealousy on the part of the French Police because they could not get Interpol relocated from Vienna to Geneva. “Our feeling here,” Game wrote, “is that the French action is introducing political considerations, which we have successfully helped so far to keep out. Our relations with the German police are good and we should like to be represented.”⁴⁰ Game continued that “if neither the French nor ourselves attend the meeting

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Sir Philip Game to Sir Alexander Cadogan, July 10, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

the Commission will probably die. This in itself would not be disastrous to international criminal work, though it would be rather a pity.”⁴¹

While Kendal and Game awaited a reply from the Foreign Office, Kendal contacted Florent Louwage to seek his opinion on the situation.⁴² Louwage responded a few days later, telling Kendal that he agreed that the commission should go on, and that he was attempting to convince the French to attend the meeting because only an open discussion of members could solve the commission’s problems.⁴³ Kendal himself wrote to the French representative Mondanel, pleading “I do hope that you will be able to be there. It seems to me that it would be a fatal mistake at this time to bar this meeting when we know that all the ‘neutral’ countries are going to attend and if we abstain it will most certainly be put down to political motives.”⁴⁴ Kendal went on to advertise that he was “impressed last year with the way the Germans kept politics out of the affairs of the Commission...I feel sure you will agree that nobody can suggest that he is raising any question which is not clearly connected with the general fight against criminals.”⁴⁵ “It seems to me,” Kendal concluded, “that the Germans have played the game so far as the I.C.P.C. is concerned and I sincerely hope that you will be able to be at the meeting.”⁴⁶

While Kendal and the Met waited for a response from the French, Kendal received another letter from Oskar Dressler, who asked again if he planned to attend the meeting

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Kendal to Louwage, July 18, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁴³ Louwage to Kendal, July 21, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁴⁴ Kendal to Mondanel, July 28, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

and advertising that the conference schedule would provide time for hunting and fishing.⁴⁷ Kendal responded a few days later, telling Dressler candidly that he still did not know if he would be allowed to attend, but that he looked forward to hunting and fishing, and hoped, also that his wife and daughter would be able to attend the conference as well.⁴⁸ It is clear that a large number of member nations still planned to attend the meeting. Thune Jacobsen, Chief of Police of Copenhagen, wrote to Kendal to invite him to stay in Copenhagen on his way to the Berlin conference, and said that his wife was looking forward to seeing Lady Kendal and his daughter again. Jacobsen hoped that the Berlin conference would come off because he wanted to make the commission something more than a “social discussion club into a real powerful organ.”⁴⁹

Initially, the Foreign Office was inclined to agree with Game and Kendal, and seemed convinced by Kendal’s assertion that the Germans had yet to bring politics into the organization and deserved a chance.⁵⁰ While waiting to see what the French would finally do, the Foreign Office learned that the India police has decided to send a representative to the Berlin conference (the Foreign Office was told by the Home Office that the Indian Police regarded these conferences “as a pleasant jaunt and are rather apt to resent any outside suggestions”), and that the Palestinian Police had also received an invitation, though they would likely wait for approval from the Colonial Office.⁵¹ After several more

⁴⁷ Dressler to Kendal, August 4, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁴⁸ Kendal to Dressler, August 7, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA. In a reply on August 17, Dressler reiterated his invitation and said that Kendal’s attendance “will be of the greatest importance for the Commission.”

⁴⁹ Thune Jacobsen to Kendal, July 28, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁵⁰ O.G. Sargent to Sir Philip Game, July 25, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.

⁵¹ F. K. Roberts, Minute, July 22, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.

exchanges between Kendal and the Foreign Office trying to work out a response, the British Embassy in Paris learned on August 17 that the French would not attend the conference, regardless of Britain's position.⁵² In a central office file minute regarding the situation, F.K. Roberts reported that he had "almost daily telephone conversations with Sir Norman Kendal."⁵³ Roberts reported that Kendal felt that he should attend the meeting because of German promises and because "the neutral states are hoping he will be present, and may intend to propose him as the first President of the Commission."⁵⁴ Kendal, however, left the final decision up to the Foreign Office. In a previous minute, Roberts reported that Kendal "admitted that the continuance of the activities of the Commission was not a matter of capital importance, but he naturally attaches considerable importance to the maintenance of friendly contact with the German police."⁵⁵

In his final estimate, Roberts argued that Britain could not afford to attend because the French had decided not to go, and Britain could not be seen to stand against their ally. His colleagues at the Foreign Office agreed, with one chiming in that the conference was "rather a joy-ride anyway." Roberts informed Kendal of the news from France via telephone on August 19, and encouraged Kendal not to accept Interpol's invitation on the basis of growing international tension and the need to maintain solidarity with the French.⁵⁶ Kendal wrote back to Mondanel the following week to inform him that he would not be

⁵² Michael Wright (British Embassy) to F.K. Roberts, Central Department, Foreign Office, August 17, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁵³ F.K. Roberts, Minute, August 18, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ F.K. Roberts, Minute, August 14, 1939, FO 371/23090, NA.

⁵⁶ F.K. Roberts to W.H. Cornish, August 19, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

attending the meeting.⁵⁷ He learned from W.H. Cornish at the Home Office that the Foreign Office believed that Britain should still pay dues to the organization, but wanted to wait a few weeks until international tensions had died down.⁵⁸ As it turned out, Britain would not pay these dues for another eight years.

INTERPOL DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The war brought an immediate end to British participation in Interpol, though the organization continued under German auspices until 1943. The conflict brought many former Interpol members to the United Kingdom as refugees. Many of these officials joined their governments in exile and worked on plans to reestablish control of their country if and when it was liberated from the Nazis. Some of these officials argued that the Allied countries as well as the governments in exile should reform Interpol during the war to maintain the personal connections between national police officers and, perhaps, to help control black market crime during the war. For the most part, Britain kept international relations with police to a minimum during the war, resigning them to tours of Scotland Yard and training for particular refugee officers.⁵⁹

The issue of whether or not to continue Interpol during the war came up during debates for the 1939 conference, but did not really get underway until 1940. Victor

⁵⁷ Kendal to Mondanel, August 24, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁵⁸ W.H. Cornish to Kendal, August 23, 1939, MEPO 3/2076, NA.

⁵⁹ "Visits by Allied Representatives to New Scotland Yard," 1942-1944, MEPO 2/6045, NA; "Proposed Reconstruction of Polish Police by Polish Government in Exile: Attendance at Metropolitan Police Specialist Courses of Polish Police Officers Serving with the Armed Forces," 1943-1944, MEPO 2/6049, NA; "Assistance for Uruguayan Police and Fire Services. Code 46 File 169," 1944, FO 371/38749, NA.

Altmann, former High Commissioner of Police in Vienna, wrote to Norman Kendal in August 1940 to suggest the reformation of the organization under British auspices. Altmann, who fled Austria shortly after the Anschluss, initially resettled in France, but moved to England after France's capitulation in 1940. Upon arriving in Britain, Altmann was placed in a camp for suspicious refugees, but was released after Kendal wrote a letter on his behalf. After this exchange, Altmann set about attempting to field interest in reforming Interpol in London during the war. Altmann's proposal was picked up by the exiled Yugoslav Government, which argued that "it would be a good thing to set up a rival organization in this country to that at present supposed to be functioning from Berlin with Heydrich as nominal President."⁶⁰ Kendal reported that he learned that the first Nazi president of the commission, Steinhäusl, had died in May 1941, and that the German's replaced him with Heydrich – a move that, in Kendal's eyes, made "any genuine International Police Commission on the Continent...dead as mutton."⁶¹ When approached on the topic of restarting the commission by refugee police, Kendal told his eager continental friends that the question of international policing during the war was a matter for the Foreign Office and the individual exiled governments to discuss.

Despite his attempts to pour water on the issue, Kendal continued to receive suggestions to restart the organization from the Yugoslavs and Altmann. Finally, in December 1941, Altmann sent a formal proposal to the Met to restart the organization, a proposal that included Norman Kendal as the new president of the organization.⁶²

⁶⁰ Kendal to Sir Stephen Gaselee, Foreign Office, December 12, 1941, MEPO 3/2079, NA.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Altmann to Kendal, December 29, 1941, MEPO 3/2079, NA.

Altmann's list of potential members also included delegates from each of the Allied countries in London (including the Soviet Union). Altmann also suggested that membership should include representatives from Switzerland and Sweden, "because Nazi criminals will flee to these countries after the collapse of their regime."⁶³ Altmann's proposed tasks for this new international commission included old topics such as data collection and extradition as well as war related topics such as determining the postwar handling of "Nazi criminals and Quislings" in each country.⁶⁴

Kendal thanked Altmann for his proposals and sent a copy of the letter to the Foreign Office. In his letter to Sir Stephen Gaselee, Kendal worried that Altmann's ideas were too political and that he doubted if Altmann or the other police in exile he was working with "are of really great importance."⁶⁵ He believed that given the failure of the German run Interpol as well as the ongoing war, that there was no need for a competing organization. He felt that the only reason to restart Interpol during the war was as a publicity move to "keep the spirits up of those who would be concerned."⁶⁶ Kendal guessed, however, that such an organization would only lead to a lot of unnecessary talking, and "would be certain to drift into politics."⁶⁷ He concluded that "the whole idea is much too ambitious and wholly premature."⁶⁸ Gaselee and the Foreign Office agreed with Kendal's assessment, adding that the only use of the organization would be "to give some

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Kendal to Gaselee, January 12, 1942, MEPO 3/2079, NA.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

occupation to some of the Allied police chiefs now in this country.”⁶⁹ “We should,” Gaselee continued, “only be prepared to consider it seriously if we were pressed to do so by a representative panel of the Allied Governments.”⁷⁰

Although he was not eager to see Interpol restarted during the war, Kendal felt strongly that when the organization returned it would need to bring the United States into the fold. “There were difficulties,” Kendal wrote to Gaselee, “in the past because the United States Government were never prepared officially to back any of those who were anxious to attend the meetings. Nowadays I have no doubt that they would appoint an official representative and this might be useful if the general idea is revived after the war is over.”

⁷¹ The Met and Interpol worked hard in the run up to that 1938 conference to make the FBI’s membership mean something more than just a name on a program. Interpol officers, including Florent Louwage and Oskar Dressler sent flattering letters to Hoover attempting to coax the director to come to the conference, with Louwage going so far as to declare that the world could use more Hoovers.⁷² Eugen Binau, Chief of Bucharest Police and conference host, also wrote to Hoover and advertised excursions down the Danube River that would include “angling of brook trout.”⁷³ Hoover, however, did not take the bait and did not attend the 1938 meeting. He remained, however, outwardly enthusiastic about American membership in the commission, telling a reporter that he considered international cooperation in crime “almost as necessary as local, county, state, and federal

⁶⁹ Gaselee to Kendal, January 13, 1942, MEPO 3/2079, NA.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kendal to Gaselee, January 12, 1942, MEPO 3/2079, NA.

⁷² F.E. Louwage to J. Edgar Hoover, April 1938, Bureau File 94-1-2061-144, FBI.

⁷³ Dr. Eugen Bianu to Hoover, May 3, 1938, Bureau File 94-1-2061-121X, FBI.

cooperation in the suppression of crime within the continental boundaries of the United States.”⁷⁴ Despite Hoover’s enthusiasm, the Bureau’s desire to join the commission in earnest would largely be frustrated prior to the outbreak of the war because they had been unable to get appropriations from Congress for Interpol dues.

This budgetary delay, however, would become a happy excuse in 1939, when America’s lack of payment was used by Hoover and the Bureau as an excuse to avoid conferences held during the war. This avoidance of the commission’s conference, however, did not preclude American participation with the organization. Oskar Dressler continued to send Hoover updates on the commission’s activities – including copies of conference programs and English language issues of *International Criminal Police* – as late as September 1941.⁷⁵ Many of these copies of *International Criminal Police* included request for information or apprehension from J. Edgar Hoover.⁷⁶ Indeed, it was not until December 4, 1941 that Hoover suspended all communication with Interpol, but only after discovering that the organization had been moved from Vienna to Berlin.⁷⁷

Kendal’s estimation regarding America’s willingness to participate in a new postwar versions of Interpol turned out to be accurate. During a visit to the Met by FBI officers L.A. Hince and H.M. Kimball, Sir Philip Game broached the subject of restarting Interpol after war. In a later exchange with J. Edgar Hoover, Game discussed the need for the Allies to secure Interpol’s records in order to continue the organization. “The records

⁷⁴ Hoover to Allan J. Funch, International News Service, March 25, 1938, Bureau File 94-1-2061-99, FBI.

⁷⁵ Dressler to Hoover, September 23, 1941, Bureau File 94-1-2061-201X, FBI.

⁷⁶ Warrants of Arrest, *International Criminal Police*, International Criminal Police Commission, No.2, February 25, 1941, p. 3.

⁷⁷ Hoover, “Memorandum for Division One, Division Four,” December 4, 1941, Bureau File 94-1-2061-201X, FBI.

of the Commission,” Game wrote, “although doubtless containing a considerable amount of ‘dead’ matter were exhaustive and efficiently looked after.”⁷⁸ Game also mentioned to Hoover the attempts by Altmann and the Yugoslav Government to restart the commission. Game rejected these proposals, but felt that they raised issues that the Met and the FBI should keep in mind for after the war. In particular, Game expected that the postwar period would bring an end, once and for all, to the lack of an official representative of the United States to the commission. Game hoped that “the United States government will appoint you or some senior officer of your department as their representative” to avoid the “considerable embarrassment” caused by the lack of such a representative before the war.⁷⁹ Hoover replied in November 1942, expressing his interest in the proposal, but only “when the pressure of immediate wartime problems has been reduced.”⁸⁰

WARTIME COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

Although the Met still had to convince the FBI of the usefulness of participating in Interpol, they had little trouble convincing the Americans of the need for international police cooperation more generally. Indeed, the Second World War would prove to be a fruitful period for security coordination between the United States and the British Empire. In addition to maintaining contact with the Metropolitan Police during the war, the FBI also extended their connections with Britain by establishing liaisons with MI5. Unsurprisingly,

⁷⁸ Game to Hoover, October 16, 1942, MEPO 3/2079, NA.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Hoover to Game, November 14, 1942, MEPO 3/2079 NA.

this wartime relationship saw the continuation of British frustration with American policing and security.

MI5's liaison with the FBI during the Second World War was organized through an organization called British Security Co-ordination (BSC). BSC was initially established by MI6, but came to include liaison between MI5 and the FBI because of British fears that the United States would be unprepared for German espionage and sabotage attempts. In particular, Britain feared for the safety of their consulates and shipping property in the United States and South America. MI5 was eager to work with the FBI, but leery of establishing that relationship through an organization developed by another service.

MI5's fears were well founded, as the head of BSC, Williams Stephenson, had already used his position to feed America false information regarding the presence of German spies in America. Inspired by the Zimmerman Telegram, Stephenson felt that he could urge the United States into the war with news of new conspiracies in Latin America. When British intelligence failed to turn up any evidence of these conspiracies, Stephenson made them up. His forgeries included documents proving that Bolivia was on the verge of establishing a Nazi dictatorship in South America, and German maps showing Nazi plans on how to divide up Latin America after the war.⁸¹ Though the American security community remained skeptical of these documents, President Roosevelt used them as the basis for verbal attacks against Germany in addresses to the nation in the fall of 1941.⁸²

⁸¹ British Security Coordination, *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-45* (London: St Ermin's, 1998), 277.

⁸² Christopher M Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), 102-103.

Despite MI5's concerns about Stephenson, they carried forward with BSC, primarily because the FBI felt comfortable with the organization. The Bureau worried that if MI5 attempted to create a new liaison service, it could come under the eye of the State Department, which could hold up or edit reports emanating from the United States.

MI5's work with the FBI through BSC began in a limited way in 1940. Much of this early liaison occurred under the cover of traditional international police cooperation. As they had during the interwar period, the FBI sent agents to London in order to maintain relations with the Metropolitan Police and to receive instruction in new security methods. During the war these visits came to include contact with MI5, in which MI5 provided these agents with instruction on anti-espionage and anti-sabotage techniques. In this way, coordination could be encouraged without official sanction, but this lack of official oversight could sometimes work against British interests.

In late 1940, the FBI sent agents Hugh Clegg and C.A. Hince to London to receive training in counter-espionage from MI5. After seeing these agents off, MI5 learned from the Mounted Police in Ottawa that the FBI was advertising a special course for South American police through the International Association of Chiefs of Police.⁸³ This eight week course, to be held in early 1941, would offer instruction on topics including counter espionage and sabotage, and "will include techniques used by the British police in removal of time bombs, protection of water works and gas mains, and safety of civilians during

⁸³ S.T. Wood to Brigadier O.A. Harker, February 6, 1941, KV 4/394, NA.

aerial bombardments.”⁸⁴ Moreover, the course instruction would be directed by “a special [FBI] detail sent to London to observe such police emergency procedures in that city.”⁸⁵

Guy Liddell, MI5’s head of counter-espionage, correctly assumed that this “special detail” meant Clegg and Hince. Writing to Arthur Dixon at the Home Office, Liddell worried that if the counter sabotage information, particularly bomb disposal, was imparted by Clegg and Hince to South American police it would probably reach the Germans.⁸⁶ Despite assurances from Dixon and Ronald Howe at the Met that nothing secret had been divulged, Liddell sent word to William Stephenson, via MI6, that BSC should make a “tactful warning” that the FBI not share anything learned in London to the South American police.⁸⁷ Liddell learned from MI6 the following month that Stephenson had delivered the message and that the FBI had cancelled the course.⁸⁸

Despite the cancellation of this course, both British and American interest in maintaining liaisons with South American police through international police organizations would remain strong and would go on to become a critical part of postwar international police cooperation. Indeed, BSC and MI5 supervised their own tour of British property and port facilities in South America during 1941.⁸⁹ This tour was conducted by Sir Connop Guthrie, a long time representative of British shipping in the United States. Guthrie appointed new security officers at each British Consulate in South America and

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ G.M. Liddell to A.L. Dixon, March 10, 1941, KV 4/394, NA.

⁸⁷ G.M. Liddell to Colonel Valentine Vivian, March 22, 1941, KV 4/394, NA.

⁸⁸ Vivian to Liddell, April 23, 1941, KV 4/394, NA.

⁸⁹ “Report on British Security Co-ordination in the United States of America, Part II: Security,” KV 4/447, NA, 3.

took particular care in the security preparation for British oil fields in Venezuela and Colombia, as well as bauxite stores in British Guiana.

Though MI5 avoided a potential disaster with regard to the South America course, they still fretted over the trustworthiness of the American security community. Many shared the sentiments of P.E. Ramsbotham of the Foreign Office, who declared in a memo regarding the security liaison that “Americans are notoriously indiscreet and often find difficulty in resisting the blandishments of journalists in search of copy.”⁹⁰ MI5 and the Metropolitan Police were particularly worried over the potential for German agents to enter Great Britain disguised as American technicians working as members of the Civilian Technical Corps through Lend Lease. Though they stressed to the FBI the need for these technicians to be vetted before being sent to Britain, MI5 made preparations to vet these technicians themselves on arrival. Additionally, the British placed pressure on the United States to keep an eye on longshoremen unions suspected of communist influence. These unions had agitated against American participation in the British war effort, and organized a number of strikes in 1940 and 1941.⁹¹ Though MI5 reported “only a few cases of minor sabotage” related to these strikes, they believed that these strikes represented “the greatest single act of prepared sabotage that has ever occurred.”⁹²

Despite their deep reservations regarding the capabilities of America’s security community, MI5 had no choice after Pearl Harbor but to proceed with liaison through

⁹⁰ P.E. Ramsbotham, “The Infiltration of German Agents by way of the U.S.A.,” July 15, 1941, KV 4/394, NA.

⁹¹ “Report on British Security Co-ordination in the United States of America, Part II: Security,” KV 4/447, NA, 4.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 4.

William Stephenson and BSC. According to BSC, the operation was running smoothly, but by the summer of 1942 it became apparent that something was amiss. Guy Liddell made a tour of the FBI from May 28 to July 7 1942, and reported that much of the problem resulted from a complete lack of knowledge on the part of the FBI as to what constituted counter-intelligence.⁹³ In his meetings with J. Edgar Hoover and others, Liddell discovered that the FBI had not “made any real study of the German Intelligence Service” and had not “developed any special technique for dealing with it.”⁹⁴ “Their main idea” Liddell continued, “is to act on information received and to bring spies to trial at the earliest possible moment.”⁹⁵ Liddell saw this a typical method for an organization that was “primarily a police force,” and had to compete with rival organizations for “credit in the eyes of the public.”⁹⁶ Liddell attempted to stress to FBI officials the necessity to detect and then turn enemy agents. “The Americans,” Liddell commented, “did not seem to have realized the full value and importance of building up a XX [Double Cross] agent system,” and instead took “a rather short-term unimaginative view” of counterespionage work.⁹⁷

Not all of the cooperation with America focused on the war, however. MI5 were also eager to learn from the Americans anything they could regarding threats, especially the IRA, to the British Empire emanating from the United States. Within a year of America’s entry into the war, British personnel assigned to BSC had used their position to

⁹³ Nigel West, *The Guy Liddell Diaries, Volume I: 1939-1942: MI5’s Director of Counter-Espionage in World War II* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005).

⁹⁴ Guy Liddell, “Director B’s report on the FBI,” August 1942, KV 4/394, NA.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

scour the files of the FBI and NYPD for information on IRA activity within the United States. Of particular interest for MI5 was information relating to two IRA bombs sent from New York to London and Glasgow in March 1941.⁹⁸ These devices exploded in the main Post Office of both cities, but attempts by the Met and the Glasgow police to encourage the FBI to investigate the matter turned up nothing. Though MI5's investigation through BSC did not lead to any new information, it did provide them with intelligence regarding suspected IRA members operating through Irish societies within the United States. These reports included information on the attendance of potential subversives at Irish society meetings within New York City.⁹⁹

In spite of Liddell's reservations concerning American competence in terms of counter espionage, he left his American visit with a better opinion of Stephenson and BSC. Indeed, so confident had MI5 become with Stephenson's performance, they began to look into ways to make Stephenson and BSC the coordinating body for all MI5 activities in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada and the colonies.¹⁰⁰ Stephenson's happy position working as the go between, however, came to an abrupt end in December 1942, when the FBI sent agent Arthur Thurston to London to work as the new liaison between the Bureau and the Security Service.¹⁰¹ On arrival, Thurston expressed the sentiment that the FBI was frustrated with the information, or lack thereof, that they had received from BSC, and sent Thurston to establish direct, personal liaison with MI5. In a telegram from BSC,

⁹⁸ W. Armstrong to Security Division, British Security Co-Ordination, New York, November 23, 1942, KV 4/447, NA.

⁹⁹ Security Division of British Security Co-ordination to Security Service London, February 12, 1943, KV 4/447, NA.

¹⁰⁰ Duff Cooper, "Draft Instructions to Williams Stephenson," November 2, 1942, KV 4/444, NA.

¹⁰¹ Ambassador John G. Winaut to Sir David Petrie, December 3, 1942, KV 4/395, NA.

Stephenson explained the situation as the result of “departmental jealousies” in Washington.¹⁰² Stephenson declared that there was no cause for division between BSC and the FBI, but that the FBI became resentful of BSC’s contact with other American agencies, particularly the State Department and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The “mutual antipathy,” Stephenson wrote, “between all these agencies and services has to be witnessed to be believed and it has required much tact and negotiation on our part to steer clear of trouble.”¹⁰³

As the Metropolitan Police had discovered in their dealings with the FBI through Interpol and the International Police Conference, security cooperation with the United States could be a minefield. While Britain appreciated the FBI’s effort to secure better cooperation between the two sides, they were troubled that this new initiative took BSC out of the equation. Indeed, the Thurston mission was one of only a few British policing initiatives during the war that found the Empire on the back foot. Unfortunately for the British, this new FBI tactic of sending agents abroad, instead of accepting liaison in the United States or at a distance, represented the beginning of a trend that would carry on during the postwar period.

While MI5 hoped that the arrival of Thurston might finally bring an end to their difficulties, this new liaison came with its own set of problems. In an internal review document drafted four months after Thurston’s arrival, P.E. Ramsbotham revealed that despite having “gratuitously” provided Thurston with intelligence, Thurston had supplied

¹⁰² William Stephenson to Security Service, December 14, 1942, KV 4/395, NA.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

in return only one report that MI5 found useful.¹⁰⁴ Thurston's remaining monographs, reports, and summaries were, according to Ramsbotham, "extremely scrappy and of very little value."¹⁰⁵ As a result of these issues, Ramsbotham determined that "unless Security Service has its own 'ferret' in F.B.I.'s Washington Office, our exchange with the F.B.I. will continue to be one-sided."¹⁰⁶

The "ferret" chosen for this new assignment was G.C. Denham, the former Inspector General of the Singapore Police and a close friend of MI5 director Sir David Petrie. Denham was a colleague of Petrie's in the India Police, and during the war had worked for MI5 in Singapore, Burma, and India. In a carefully worded letter, Petrie notified the American Ambassador John Winant that Denham would be sent to Washington D.C. to act as the "British counterpart of Mr. Thurston."¹⁰⁷ By sending Denham, Petrie hoped that MI5 could help reach J. Edgar Hoover's objective of securing "better and speedier exchange of information on all matters...of common interest."¹⁰⁸ In a separate letter to Hoover, Petrie advertised Denham's intelligence experience in India and China, writing that "Denham's knowledge of Intelligence matters, particularly Japanese activities, in the Far East is probably far more up-to-date and extensive than that possessed by any but a very few officers today."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ P.E. Ramsbotham, "A Brief Study of our Present and Future Relations with the F.B.I. for the guidance of Mr. Denham," May 6, 1943, KV 4/395, NA.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Sir David Petrie to Hon. John G. Winant, April 13, 1943, KV 4/206, NA.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Sir David Petrie to J. Edgar Hoover, April 21, 1943, KV 4/206, NA.

Denham's mission began in the summer of 1943, and after several weeks of work in New York and Washington, he wrote an extensive report on the situation in America to Petrie.¹¹⁰ Denham reported that the problem with liaison between MI5 and the FBI came down to a conflict in personalities caused primarily by Stephenson and BSC. He felt that many of the people that MI5 placed within BSC – including many former members of the colonial police – felt that America was simply a sideshow and were working for their pensions. Denham stressed, however, that the liaison with the FBI was worthwhile because it provided an opportunity to use the Bureau's extensive records system, which MI5 could act upon without restriction from the US court system. Though he felt J. Edgar Hoover was "undoubtedly a real personality worthy of admiration," Denham seemed to pity the FBI because of the restrictions posed on the organization by the federal government and the court system.¹¹¹ "This country," he judged, "really does not realise the necessity of dealing stringently with spies and saboteurs and the age long hostility towards the police - a very different body to the F.B.I. who have a very high standard of officer."¹¹² This hostility, Denham continued, "vents itself against the F.B.I. in the most childish and venomous way. So great is this difficulty that I fear that XX cases are not likely to be very successful in this country because the most the F.B.I. can do is to cajole. They are practically bereft of any weapon which might help them towards coercion."¹¹³

¹¹⁰ G.C. Denham to Sir David Petrie, July 8, 1943, KV 4/206, NA.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

Bureau officers revealed to Denham “that they would rather deal with XX cases in Cuba or Panama where the local police are not hindered to the same extent and are probably under [the FBI’s] thumb and in their pay.”¹¹⁴ Though he would eventually become the great boogeyman of the American left, Hoover and the FBI did not always wield this power. The leeway the FBI were given to extract information from enemy combatants, even during a war, often paled in comparison to the power exercised by even middling colonial officers in the British Empire. Hoover and the FBI’s realization of this fact became the most significant outcome of the security exchange during the Second World War because it encouraged the Bureau’s spread overseas during the postwar period.

Although it appeared that Denham’s visit would lead to better relations with the FBI, MI5 abruptly changed course at the end of July 1943 when they learned from MI6 that the Thurston mission had been a ploy by Hoover to break up British intelligence work in the Western Hemisphere.¹¹⁵ As a result, MI5 decided to stand behind William Stephenson, arguing that changing the liaison at this point would show weakness and encourage confusion. Though removed from the liaison with the FBI, Denham continued with a planned tour for MI5 in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, and British Honduras.¹¹⁶ MI5 continued to worry over potential security breaches in the Caribbean and South America, and suspected that the Germans would put more emphasis on the region after suffering heavy losses in the North Atlantic. Denham reported that the British personnel in the area could be trusted to do their work without added assistance. He concluded, however,

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Liddell, “Events leading up to the meeting of July 30th 1943,” August 10, 1943, KV 4/206, NA.

¹¹⁶ Denham to Petrie, December 5, 1943, KV 4/209, NA.

by warning that the United States intended to place additional emphasis on the region, and that the Empire would need to work hard in the postwar period to control not only communism and smuggling, but also the often destructive pursuits of its ally.

CONCLUSION

The Second World War may have brought about the destruction of Interpol, but it did not destroy international police cooperation. Even as the primary body for cooperation began to crumble, the correspondence between Kendal, van Houten, Welhaven, and others demonstrated the strength of the personal relationships between national police departments. Though the leaders of these departments worried over the future of formal cooperation, the strength of the informal ties between these police officers meant that cooperation would survive. Indeed, even during the war, British police maintained cooperative relationships with various allied governments, in particular the United States. Unfortunately, this wartime relationship with the United States and the FBI saw the continuation of difficulties experienced during the prewar period. British police and security officials continued to find America to be a confusing, vexing, but ultimately necessary partner in security. British police, however, entered the postwar period confident that they would continue to improve and perfect this coordination from a position of leadership. But as the Thurston mission revealed, Hoover and the FBI were becoming dissatisfied not only with the nature of international cooperation, but with cooperation itself. Most of the world's police entered the postwar period hoping to recreate what they had lost during the Second World War. Instead they often found themselves struggling to

manage American police missions that operated in foreign countries with or without permission.

Chapter Five: The Empire of Policing: Britain and International Policing, 1945 – 1948

The immediate postwar period found Britain attempting to build upon and take advantage of wartime developments regarding security. The destruction or weakening of many foreign police forces during the war seemed to offer an opportunity for British police to remake global security in their own image. This attempted makeover occurred on two fronts. The first involved the police missions in occupied Austria, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, and Italy. These missions were not altruistic pursuits, but instead represented a form of imperialism based upon the assumed superiority of the British model of policing. By using their colonial and domestic police as missionaries for civilian policing, the British state hoped to build a postwar world that resembled and depended upon Britain with regard to security. In this work, Britain relied heavily upon their prewar experience of educating and training police from throughout the Empire at the Metropolitan Police College at Hendon. Though limited in its scope and duration, the Hendon program gave key figures in the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, and Metropolitan Police the misplaced confidence from which they developed the occupation police missions of the postwar era.

The second front from which the British attempted to remake foreign police after the Second World War involved Interpol. Although it was an important member of Interpol during the prewar era, the postwar period found Britain pursuing an even greater role in the organization under the direction of Metropolitan Police Officer Ronald Howe. Taking over for the retired Norman Kendal, Howe was undoubtedly more eager than his predecessor for international work, but this enthusiasm tended to be based on seeking the

limelight rather than on a serious concern with global crime or police cooperation. Though Howe helped to place Britain in a greater leadership role in Interpol, the realities of the Cold War ensured that this new position was largely squandered.

This chapter will begin with a study of Hendon College in the prewar period, and continue with an analysis of each of the major occupation missions after the war. It will conclude with a discussion of the recreation of Interpol in 1946. The next chapter will discuss how this forward, international policy regarding policing was replaced in the late 1940s with a reactionary policy designed to maintain imperial control.

THE OCCUPATION MISSIONS

The most obvious example of Britain's new forward policy regarding policing was represented by the so-called Public Safety missions into occupied countries during and shortly after the Second World War. Though these missions began as an attempt to promote law and order in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, they quickly developed into the basis for British informal influence into these occupied zones. The First World War had offered an opportunity, particularly for Germany, to remake another nation's police, yet this conflict never resulted in an attempted reorganization.¹ The situation was different for the Second World War for three main reasons. First, due to the extent of destruction caused by the war, officials assumed and planned for a longer duration of occupation. Second, the horrors and atrocities perpetrated by fascists police in these regions before and during the

¹ Clive Emsley, "Marketing the Brand: Exporting British Police Models 1829–1950," *Policing* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 43–54.

conflict seemed to require an entire makeover, not only of personnel (many of which could have been implicated in war crimes), but also of the philosophical foundation of these forces. Third, the British worked to extend these missions in order to combat communist influence, both within the police forces themselves and within the general population of each occupied country.

Undoubtedly the most important and vexing of these occupation missions involved Austria and Germany. It was in these countries that the most destruction was wrought, the worst police atrocities occurred, and where the fear of communist infiltration was the greatest. British officials reasoned that it was not simply German police that needed to be reformed, it was also German policing itself. For the policing missions in former Nazi territories, Britain chose public safety branch leaders with both colonial and domestic policing experience.² For Austria, this was John Nott-Bower, and for Germany, it was G.H.R. Halland. Nott-Bower and Halland both began as officers in the Indian Police. From there, Nott-Bower joined the London Metropolitan Police, rising to the position of Assistant Commissioner by 1940 (eventually to become Commissioner of the Met in 1953), while Halland worked as head of the Lincolnshire police before becoming the first Commandant of the Metropolitan Police Training College at Hendon.³ Halland was then appointed as one of the Inspectors of Constabulary, before being called upon during the war to serve as Inspector General of the Ceylon Police. Here then were two imperial police in the truest sense of the word – they represented perhaps better than any other officers the

² Ibid.

³ Halland was also in charge of the Punjab Police Training School while in India.

varied experience within the British Empire that had become so valued by both domestic and colonial policing authorities.

Of these two, however, it was Halland in Germany who would be the most proactive in his attempt to export and establish British policing methods while in occupation.⁴ This reality was the result of three main factors. First, Nott-Bower, though committed to British police, was less of an evangelist than Halland. He was more interested in denazification than in the wholesale makeover of the Austrian police. British officials also assumed that Austria was the victim of German style policing, rather than a practitioner.⁵ Finally, British officials working in Austria had less fear of denazification and avoiding communist sympathizers because they had superior intelligence on local police. This intelligence was provided by Norman Kendal, who worked with Nott-Bower prior to his departure for the occupation force to select acceptable Austrian police from his list of former associates at Interpol.⁶

Halland, conversely, possessed little intelligence regarding local police prior to arriving in Germany. Even if Halland possessed this intelligence, however, it would have done little to dissuade him from pursuing the complete reconstruction of the German police. Along with Herbert Dowbiggin, G.H.R. Halland stood as the greatest advocate for

⁴ John E. Farquharson, "The British Occupation of Germany, 1945-46: A Badly-managed Disaster Area?," *German History*, 11:3 (October, 1993). Herbert Reinke, "The Reconstruction of Police in Post-1945 Germany," in Cyrille Fijnault (ed.), *The Impact of World War II on Policing in North-West Europe* (Leuven: University of Leuven Press); David Smith, "Trusted Servants of the Population: The Public Safety Branch and the German Police in the British Zone of Germany," in L.A. Knafla (ed.), *Policing and War in Europe: Criminal Justice History*, Vol. 16 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press).

⁵ "Visit of Austrian Police Officials to the United Kingdom. Code 130 File 10635," 1947, FO 371/64682, NA.

⁶ "Police and Gendarmerie in Austria: Review of Pre-1937 Police Force," 1944, MEPO 3/2080, NA.

British style policing in the world. Yet unlike Dowbiggin, Halland rarely showed an appreciation for on-the-ground realities that could necessitate a different model of policing. His forceful rhetoric regarding police training and organization won Halland many admirers throughout the Empire, but his dogmatic approach to policing ultimately led to disastrous consequences for the British occupation mission in Germany and elsewhere.

HALLAND AT HENDON

Before being stationed in Germany, Halland had long advocated the spread of British style policing abroad. In his capacity as Commandant of the Met's Police College at Hendon, Halland recommended the inclusion of colonial police officers in the college's student body, and also pushed for Hendon graduates to consider colonial work instead of domestic service.⁷ In these efforts, Halland mirrored the pursuits of Herbert Dowbiggin in his tours of colonial police forces in the prewar era. Halland and Dowbiggin viewed Hendon training as a way to help professionalize and demilitarize the colonial police from the top down. Additionally, both men hoped that the Metropolitan Police could be convinced to help fund and staff the training of colonial police at Hendon, thus avoiding traditional Colonial Office concerns regarding logistics and expense.

Hendon was the pet project of Metropolitan Police Commissioner Hugh Trenchard, who viewed the college as the police version of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and the centerpiece in his effort to reform the Met in the 1930s.⁸ Trenchard's tenure as

⁷ "Metropolitan Police College, Hendon," 1935-1936, CO 850/69/9, NA.

⁸ Andrew Boyle, *Trenchard*. (London: Collins, 1962).

Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1931 – 1935) saw the development of the Met's first true scientific laboratory, statistical branch, and map room. He also worked closely with Norman Kendal to eliminate corruption in the Criminal Investigation Department.⁹ Trenchard believed that the only way to make these reforms stick was to reform the Met's officer corps by way of a new training college. This college would focus on attracting university graduates to take up positions in the force, allowing Trenchard and subsequent Met commissioners to bypass or supplant the existing officer class that had risen through the ranks. Unsurprisingly, Trenchard's college was heavily criticized by the press, which viewed the college as a militarization of the Met, and by senior police officers, who felt that the college would necessarily create internal divisions within the Met between graduates of the college and old guard officers.

Trenchard was initially skeptical of including provisions for Colonial Police in his designs for the college because he felt that he already had his work cut out for him in trying to reform Scotland Yard.¹⁰ Prior to Hendon, the Metropolitan Police provided occasional courses and organized tours for colonial police officers on leave, but never offered the colonials training in a regular fashion.¹¹ A select number of colonial police received instruction at the training school for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) at Newtownards during the 1920s, but the Colonial Office always viewed this instruction as temporary and

⁹ Ibid., 640.

¹⁰ "Transfer of Junior Colonial Police Officers to the Metropolitan Police," 1933, CO 850/33/25, NA.

¹¹ "Colonial Police Officers: Instruction in Finger Prints," 1924-1936, MEPO 2/2498, NA; "Colonial, Dominion and Indian, Courses of Instruction on Metropolitan Police Administration," 1924-1926, MEPO 2/1818, NA; "Visits of Officers from Dominions and Foreign Forces: Suggested Entertainment Allowance of £100," 1930-1936, MEPO 2/2497, NA; "Training in Identifying Weapons by the Fired Bullets Arranged by Colonial and India Offices," 1932-1937, MEPO 2/4992, NA.

increasingly inappropriate. If the Colonial Office was serious about reforming the colonial police, they needed to move as far away from the Irish model of policing as possible. Although they clearly desired a better alternative than Newtownards to train colonial police, the Colonial Office did not pursue a replacement until after the RUC closed their training depot in 1932.

The first request to include colonial police at Hendon came from George Tomlinson at the Colonial Office nearly a year before the college opened.¹² In this request, Tomlinson reminded Trenchard that colonial governments “greatly appreciated...[Scotland Yard’s] ‘ad hoc’ Course in such subjects as finger-print classification and equitation,” but now wondered if the Met would be willing to take on training for the colonial police on a more permanent basis at Hendon.¹³ Tomlinson had been pushed to make this request by colonial governments in the Malaya and New Zealand, but similar requests from other colonies began to flood in as news of the college spread.¹⁴ The situation in Malaya was particularly dire, as a number of recruits to this force failed their examinations during the 1920s. Malaya, along with the other colonies, believed that a lack of prior training and seasoning lay behind these failures, and looked to the Colonial Office for a solution. Most of these colonial requests for help went to G.S.M. Hutchinson and R. D. Furse – the Colonial Office heads of Personnel and Recruitment –, but several also went to G.H.R. Halland directly at Hendon.¹⁵

¹² “Training of Police Probationers for Colonial Forces at the Metropolitan Police College,” 1933-1941, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

¹³ George Tomlinson to Hugh Trenchard, August 21, 1933, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

¹⁴ “Metropolitan Police College Courses,” 1933, CO 850/33/19, NA.

¹⁵ Major H.M. Cones, Inspector General of Police, Iraq to G.H. Halland, August 12, 1934, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

To help encourage the colonial police in considering Hendon, Halland gave a tour of the new college to members of the Colonial Office – including Tomlinson, Hutchinson, and Furse – in November 1934.¹⁶ Halland shared with his visitors his belief that the college was “destined to be one day the training school of all Police Officers in the various forces of the United Kingdom.”¹⁷ In addition, Halland stated his enthusiasm for including members of the colonial services, particularly the Dominions and India. According to Hutchinson, “Halland said that if he were the Inspector General of Police of a Province in India, he would prefer to have appointed to him an Officer who had been trained at the Metropolitan Police College rather than one trained in India.”¹⁸ Hutchinson wrote that this was “an important admission from a former Commandant of a Police training school in India.”¹⁹ Halland also encouraged the Colonial Office to propose special courses that could be taught for specific colonies, whether those courses involved learning a language or a particular method of policing important to the colony in question.

Trenchard eventually directed the managers of the college to draw up a list for the Colonial Office of potential expenses that would need to be met before accommodating colonial police at Hendon. This budget, which estimated a cost of over four hundred pounds per officer, greatly cooled the Colonial Office’s eagerness for the scheme.²⁰ Though the Colonial Office allowed for a small number of the Malaya police to attend Hendon, the

¹⁶ Major G.S.M. Hutchinson, Minute, December 14, 1934, CO 850/39/8, NA.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ “Metropolitan Police College,” 1934-1935, CO 850/39/8, NA. This cost included the student’s books and uniform, but did not include food or pay supplements. The Colonial Office estimated the all-inclusive cost of training to be well over five hundred pounds per officer.

price of this instruction led them to largely ignore requests from other colonies. When pressed on the subject, the Colonial Office argued that police in other colonies would not find Hendon courses useful. In this analysis, Colonial Office officials drew a clear division between policing the dominions and the dependencies. “I cannot help feeling,” wrote G.S.M Hutchinson, “that an eighteen months course would go far beyond the needs of a Police Officer for service in Africa. In the years to come it may well be that... a policeman will be regarded as belonging to a profession in the same way as a Doctor or a Lawyer; and that he would be required to undergo a standardized course of training before entering his profession. But such an idea would take a great many years to materialise, if it ever does.”²¹ This skepticism was shared by Colonial Office Under Secretary J.E.W. Flood, who worried about the militarized nature of colonial policing, but believed that British style policing could not be applied everywhere. “It is probable,” Flood concluded, “that Hendon might turn out a better policeman for duty in London but I should put my money on the R.U.C. [Royal Ulster Constabulary] for turning out a policeman for the backwoods of Nigeria.”²² Both Hutchinson and Flood hoped, however, that if the scheme did eventually materialize, the Colonial Office could rely on Halland, “who knows our Service, is interested in it and should prove a useful ‘buffer’ should Scotland Yard, as is very probable, put difficulties in our way when we do ask them to allow our officers to be trained at the College.”²³

The squabble over price meant that the Hendon issue remained dormant until 1937, when Sir Philip Game, who replaced Trenchard as Commissioner of the Met, offered to

²¹ Major G.S.M. Hutchinson, Minute, January 23, 1936, CO 850/69/9, NA.

²² J.E.W. Flood, Minute, February 1, 1936, CO 850/69/9, NA.

²³ Major G.S.M. Hutchinson, Minute, January 23, 1936, CO 850/69/9, NA.

accommodate colonial police at the school at a reduced rate.²⁴ In considering this new proposal, the Colonial Office requested the opinion of Herbert Dowbiggin, who believed that Hendon offered a means to improve the quantity and quality of colonial police. According to Dowbiggin, the issues of quantity and quality were connected: in order to improve the quantity of police recruits, the Colonial Office must first find a way to improve the quality of those police. The young, bright police the Colonial Office hoped to attract to colonial policing were too often put off by a service that time and again showed a preference for veteran police from Ireland or Palestine. “Sir Herbert Dowbiggin,” according to one Colonial Office minute, “got the very definite impression that the men now at Hendon who have been provisionally selected for the Colonial Police Service are inferior in quality to the men being trained with them for the Metropolitan Police. He thinks that the prospects of advancement in the Colonial Police Service should be good enough to secure for it the pick of the field available in any year, and it is his decided view (with which, he says, Lieutenant Colonel Halland agrees) that the Colonies should get the best men.”²⁵ In particular, Dowbiggin believed that the colonial police should be able to select “a certain number of men of the University Honours Degree type, who would approximate as closely as possible to their colleagues in the Administration, for the larger Colonies and particularly for Colonies where the native is becoming educated and some form of democratic government is on the horizon.”²⁶

²⁴ “Proposed Course at Hendon Police College for All Cadets Selected for the Colonial Police Service,” 1937-1938, CO 850/94/4, NA.

²⁵ Colonial Office Minute, December 14, 1937, CO 877/16/3.

²⁶ Colonial Office Minute, February 12, 1938, CO 877/16/3.

Although Dowbiggin generally preferred the well-educated and trained, he also felt that these types of officers were not appropriate for all levels of policing. According to the Colonial Office, Dowbiggin considered “that in the subordinate European ranks it is essential to have a mixture of different types. One of the first duties of a policeman is to get information. Some of this information is to be picked up in Clubs by officers, but for others you want a man who can mix freely and without suspicion in other walks of life, e.g. the pub or with the stewards on visiting ships. He would regard 5% of ‘gentlemen’ in the ranks as enough, and is convinced that a great mistake has been made in Palestine, and is still being made in Kenya, by taking too many of the public school type into the subordinate grades.”²⁷

Dowbiggin expanded upon these ideas in a lengthy letter submitted to the Colonial Office for consideration on the training issue. In this letter, Dowbiggin clearly outlined his views not only on the training of colonial police, but also police throughout the British world. Again, as with his written reports on various colonies, this letter demonstrated Dowbiggin’s insistence that colonial and domestic British police needed to be considered on the same plane, rather than as polar opposites. “The position briefly,” Dowbiggin wrote, “about Police appointment in the Higher Ranks in England, in the Dominions, in India and in the Colonies to-day is that good-will and brawn are not the only qualifications required of Police Officer. Conditions have changed very much in the last 25 years. Improved means of communication and increased facilities for so called ‘education’ throughout the world have produced a clever type of traveling criminal, traffic conditions that require control,

²⁷ Ibid.

local bodies and legally minded individuals with whom a Police Officer is required to deal. Thirty years ago an Ex-Army, Ex-Navy, or County gentleman was the type looked for when a Police Office was required.”²⁸ Dowbiggin continued by explaining why he felt it was inappropriate for college graduates to completely make up the officer corps: “I would not advise a boy of your School joining a Force such as the Hong Kong, Ceylon, etc., Police as a Non-commissioned officer for the reason that in these Forces European Non-commissioned officers are enlisted mainly to deal with soldiers and sailors, passengers passing through the Ports, etc., in a Colony for the most part peopled by natives. These Forces do not want a high proportion of Public School men. A soldier or sailor is more likely to ‘go quietly’ with and give information to a Police Officer who has himself been in the Army or Navy than to a lad of your School.”²⁹

After continued debates over price, the Colonial Office finally agreed to help support a group of nine colonial officers to attend Hendon during the 1937-38 academic year. These students included men from Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanganyika, and ranged from new cadets to existing officers.³⁰ In addition to providing a place for these students at Hendon, Halland also arranged for these students to attend language courses at the School of Oriental Studies in London.³¹ This first group proved successful, with Halland reporting that the students did “reasonably well at the College...especially in view

²⁸ Herbert Dowbiggin to Colonial Office, March 11, 1938, CO 877/16/3.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ “List of Colonial Police Officers selected to attend the Metropolitan Police College, Hendon, during 1937-38,” August 31, 1937, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

³¹ G.H.R. Halland, Police College Memo, October 2, 1937, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

of [their] preoccupation with language study.”³² The first class of colonial officers was followed in 1938 by another group that included students from Ceylon, Cyprus, and Hong Kong.³³ Unfortunately for Halland and the other supporters of this program, the college was shut down in 1939 by Commissioner Game at the beginning of the war. With Hendon closed, Halland continued to serve the Met in London until 1943, when he became Inspector General of the Ceylon Police – Herbert Dowbiggin’s old position.³⁴ Halland’s tenure in Ceylon, however, lasted only a year, as he resigned over what he saw as the militarization of the police under the guidance of the Colonial Office during the Second World War.

The attempt to include colonial police officers at Hendon College represented an important precursor for British policing missions – both within and outside the empire – in the postwar era. The Hendon scheme demonstrated that the Colonial Office was finally becoming serious about changing their approach to colonial policing – as long as someone else was willing to help with the bill. Hendon also showed that the Metropolitan Police were willing to take on the training of police outside of Britain. It represented the fulfillment, however briefly, of Dowbiggin and Halland’s belief that domestic and colonial policing could and should be seen on the same plane, rather than as distinct entities. The ability of the Met to accommodate colonials at Hendon encouraged the British government to use Met training schools and programs as a destination for foreign police officers –

³² G.H.R. Halland to Major G.S.M. Hutchinson, July 18, 1938, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

³³ G.H.R. Halland to H.G. Archer, June 14, 1938, MEPO 3/2612, NA.

³⁴ Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line : Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 30.

particularly those from occupied territories after the Second World War. What better way to advertise British policing abroad than to send foreigners to the home of British policing itself?

The planning for what would become the Public Safety missions to occupied Europe was largely overseen by one of Hendon College's first graduates, Eric St. Johnston. St. Johnston graduated at the top of his class at Hendon in 1936, and from there served as the chief constable of Oxfordshire. In 1943, St. Johnston was selected by allied command to plan the occupation force after the Normandy invasion. "I found myself," St. Johnston wrote, "in a room in Whitehall furnished simply...and on my desk a directive, 'Prepare a plan to control the civil population when the Allied Armies re-enter North West Europe' a task which was certainly a challenge...[because it] would include not only the police, but also the fire, prison, and civil defense services."³⁵ St. Johnston set about writing a lengthy operational manual for each proposed occupation mission, and also oversaw the training of the officers that would staff each force. In this work, he coordinated with a number of American police advisers, including O.W. Wilson, Dean of the School of Criminology at the University of California, Berkeley and a disciple of August Vollmer. Although this American presence was important in the planning stages of the occupation, "the Americans had very few professional police officers on whom to call for Public Safety work."³⁶ This meant that British police officers made up the majority of the occupation police in Europe, even those forces ostensibly belonging to American Civil Affairs. St. Johnston himself was

³⁵ Eric St. Johnston, *One Policeman's Story* (London: B. Rose, 1978), 91–92.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

stationed in France shortly after D Day, but found that the French police had no use for any sort of foreign police mission. Nevertheless, St. Johnston was entered into the French Legion of Honor, despite the fact “that the only valuable assistance [he] gave the French was to get their night clubs re-opened.”³⁷

The occupation missions developed by St. Johnston and allied command, however, would not be showered with honors, and they would largely fail in their attempts to convert the local population to British style policing. Indeed, Britain would remain unsuccessful in remaking their own colonial police, and it is likely they would have remained unsuccessful even if the Hendon program had continued during the war. As one of the first colonial graduates of Hendon and Uganda police officer, A.S.K. Cook, remembered, the careful instruction by Halland and the Metropolitan Police was poor preparation for life in the colonies:

Looking back, I think that attendance at the College by Colonial cadets was very worthwhile. I think it would have been still better if more time had been spent in training us in the simple but vital administration tasks encountered in running a police unit in the colonies - housing, clothing, and equipping our men, dealing with their pay, allowances, promotion, and discipline and so on. Doubtless there were differences in these matters between forces, but it occurs to me that it would have been possible to distil a course consisting of the common essentials and to teach that. Apart from anything else it would have alerted young officers, whose imaginations may have been full of romance of far-flung places, to the dull but necessary realities on which their efficiency and that of their commands would largely be based; and on which they would have to spend a part of their time the large size of which might have surprised them.³⁸

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁸ A.S.K. Cook, *Aide de Memoir, Law Enforcement, XIX Uganda 2, B-MACN, Mss. Afr. s. 1784*, Rhodes House, Oxford.

In Uganda, Cook discovered a police force with “strong echoes of a military and semi-military past, and little if any sign of the characteristics in spirit and practice of a police force which had grown out of public responsibility for law and order.”³⁹ As with many other colonial police officers, however, Cook admitted that he “was looking for a police career not in Britain but in Africa...so it did not do outrage to my principles.”⁴⁰

GERMANY

In 1945, G.H.R. Halland was named the inspector general of the Public Safety Branch (PSB) of the Civilian Control Commission for the British occupation force in Germany. He brought with him to this position much of the reform minded emphasis that drove him in his colonial police work and as the commandant of Hendon. Indeed, his zeal for reform was so great that he began preparing for his new role at PSB as early as August 1944, when he prepared a secret memo for the Foreign Office on the “Reformation of the German Police System as a Long-Term Policy.”⁴¹ Halland felt – along with many other occupation officials – that in order for Germany to become a successful postwar nation, it needed to be infused with democratic ideals. Halland contended that the reform of the police was a crucial part in that process, and he worked to create “a demilitarized, denazified, and disarmed” German police.⁴²

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ “Reformation of the German Police System. Code 18 File 108,” 1945, FO 371/46817, NA.

⁴² Smith, 145.

Halland believed this task would be difficult because of the longstanding acceptance in Germany of an armed and arbitrary police force, and his report to the Foreign Office included a *sonderweg* analysis of German policing. “The Police,” he wrote, “have long been used as one of the main agencies...for subduing the will of the people to the point where day to day compliance with the dictates of their authoritarian masters has become an habitual attitude of subservience.”⁴³ Using Raymond Fosdick’s *European Police Systems* for background, Halland argued that long historical trends led to the “extreme militarization of the German Police,” and although this “cancer” grew exponentially after 1933, “it was not purely a Nazi growth.”⁴⁴ The “roots” of this cancer, Halland contended, “go deep, and a severe and drastic operation will be required for its removal.”⁴⁵

Halland believed that the best way to remove this cancer from German policing was to transplant the very best features of British policing to the continent. These features included “the civilian status of the constable, his legal and constitutional position as a servant of the community, his quiet demeanour and helpful attitude as a guardian and protector of the public,” and, most importantly, “the safeguard against unlawful or arbitrary action on the part of the constable, more particularly in the matter of arrests and detention.”⁴⁶ Halland admitted that British principles of policing could not be “applied slavishly in all their details,” but he felt that they nevertheless “proved so successful in

⁴³ G.H.R. Halland, “Preliminary Memorandum on the Reformation of the German Police System as a Long-Term Policy,” August 25, 1944, FO 371/46817, NA, 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

[Britain] during the last hundred years or so...that they cannot at least be ignored as constituting one of the main models to be examined.”⁴⁷ Halland’s report also considered the potential reforms within American and Russian occupied zones, but felt that British policing remained the most desirable model because it managed to create a modern police force without the need for a centralized force, such as the FBI, which could easily become corrupted by politics.

Before submitting his ideas to the Foreign Office, Halland shared the initial draft of his plans for Germany with Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Philip Game, asking for severe criticism.⁴⁸ Game wrote that he felt Halland’s plan moved “a bit too fast,” and focused too much on the superstructure of the police rather than on building up the foundation of a solid force.⁴⁹ Game agreed that the real need was to “get rid of the Gestapo idea” and “third degree methods,” but he also felt “it would be wise to maintain the existing German forms of local Government, including even police, to as great extent as possible rather than force on them alien systems such as our own.”⁵⁰ “After all,” Game concluded, “the German systems have evolved from history and experience just as ours have and I have always understood that German local government, though perhaps too paternal to suit us, is very successful in Germany.”⁵¹ Despite Game’s reservations, Halland remained steadfast, arguing that he could achieve his goals if he took care to “hasten slowly.”⁵²

⁴⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁸ G.H.R. Halland to Sir Philip Game, August 26, 1944, MEPO 2/6482, NA.

⁴⁹ Sir Philip Game to G.H.R. Halland, August 29, 1944, MEPO 2/6482, NA.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² G.H.R. Halland to Sir Philip Game, September 1, 1944, MEPO 2/6482, NA.

Upon entering service in Germany in the summer of 1945, Halland started his work by breaking up the national command and centralization of German police that developed during the Nazi period. In the place of centralized control, Halland developed a decentralized model along British lines that included a mix of large city police forces with a set of regional police forces that were based on local population. Halland hoped that this work would help German police avoid being taken over by the political whims of a single, central power. In addition to decentralization, Halland took away arms from German police, though a small collection of weapons were available at police stations in case of an emergency.⁵³ According to the Public Safety Branch, “the Germans needed to be taught that police authority was to rest on respect, not to be dictated by a quasi-military force whose aggressive manner had traditionally instilled fear into the population.”⁵⁴ Along these lines, Halland also attempted to closely monitor police recruitment in the occupied zone to make sure the new German police did not contain any former military officers or Nazi party members. Because this requirement ruled out a number of qualified local candidates, PSB was forced to look far afield for experienced German police, even going as far as to recruit 200 members of the defunct international Shanghai Municipal Police.⁵⁵ Recruitment was further complicated by the fact that Halland forbid potential recruits or police from joining a union, and watched closely for any sign of communist sympathy.⁵⁶

⁵³ Smith, 147.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ G.O. Wood to A.L. Scott, September 10, 1945, FO 371/46817, NA.

⁵⁶ “Re-Organisation of the German Police. Code 18 File 2655,” 1946, FO 371/55837, NA.

Halland and PSB did their best to encourage the civilian instincts of their officers, including sending them to the London Metropolitan Police for further training and instruction.⁵⁷ This move to professionalize new German police into an international policing community fell short of including them in early postwar meetings of Interpol, despite inquiries by the Met and others.⁵⁸ Although the Met was frustrated in this regard, they were able to lend assistance to the PSB by providing a small force of CID detectives, known as the Special Enquiry Bureau, to perform investigations into serious crimes while the German police got on their feet. The most important area for investigation involved the black market, especially the suppression of trade in precious metals confiscated by the Nazis.⁵⁹ The Met added to this expert assistance by also providing a contingent of women police to recruit and train a corresponding force in Germany.⁶⁰

The idealism maintained by Halland and the rest of PSB with regard their work was quickly shattered by the realities of life in postwar Germany. Like other zones in occupied Germany, the British Zone was subject to a wave of displaced persons that often terrorized and attacked the local sedentary population. Initially, the PSB hoped that the British army could be relied upon to help maintain order and police these displaced populations without arming the police. By the autumn of 1945, however, PSB and the British military were forced to arm limited numbers of German police with carbines to help to protect the local

⁵⁷ "German Police System. Code 180 File 7590 (to Paper 12443)," 1947, FO 371/64696, NA.

⁵⁸ "German Police: International Co-Operation," 1948, FO 1049/1600, NA; "Police Co-Operation with Foreign Police Forces," 1948-1949, FO 1032/1932, NA.

⁵⁹ "Creation of a Force of Experienced Detective Officers to Investigate Crime in the British Zone of Germany," 1946-1947, MEPO 3/2614, NA.

⁶⁰ "Public Safety Officers of the Control Commission, Germany: Course on Police Duties for Women," 1946, MEPO 2/7621, NA.

population located around displaced person camps. This setback did not discourage Halland in his objective to have an unarmed German police force. He made sure that “while German police forces openly carried rifles and pistols in the other [occupied] zones...the British urged the use of truncheons and continued to support the restricted use of firearms.”⁶¹ This continued insistence on unarmed policing led to a troubling situation in the winter of 1946, when food shortages led to violent disturbances and riots throughout the British zone. These shortages not only affected the general population, but the German police themselves. In 1947, “a medical examination of 6,000 Hamburg police found 90 percent of them suffering from exhaustion because of a shortfall in rations.”⁶²

Even after he was presented with this information, however, Halland opposed raising the ration level for these police because “he believed any inequality between police rations and the general population deprived the police of their civilian status.”⁶³ Not unlike Dowbiggin, Halland believed that the community at large was as important as the police in preventing crime. Unfortunately, the population had little desire to trust Halland’s police, particularly after it was learned that his force had been lax in vetting new police for ties to the Nazi past.⁶⁴ In addition, the public balked at Halland’s attempt to divest German police of their non-policing functions – including traffic control, food inspection, institutionalization of the mentally ill, and fire prevention – in order to make them more similar to the Bobby.⁶⁵ This divestment meant that German police were no longer allowed

⁶¹ Smith, 148.

⁶² Ibid., 150.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 153.

⁶⁵ Reinke, 139 - 140.

to dispense fines and short jail terms without permission from the courts, a development which placed a great strain on the already overburdened judicial system and raised legal fees for those committing even minor offenses.⁶⁶ The aggravation of the public based on the Halland's reforms led many Germans to believe that Britain was purposefully using "fifth-rate administrators...to penalize them; they could not believe that Britain had built an Empire with such men."⁶⁷ When West Germany resumed control over their police in 1948, they removed nearly every reform instituted by Halland and the PSB.

GREECE

Greece seemed to offer Britain another opportunity to spread their methods of policing in the postwar period. The British, however, would find this opportunity just as frustrating as the mission to Germany.⁶⁸ The focus of this mission, the Greek Gendarmerie, had already undergone an extensive period of remaking during the Nazi occupation. The Gendarmerie became a vital cog in Germany's occupation force, and proved critical in its attempt to rid the country of communist influence. By the time British troops arrived to liberate Greece in late 1944, both the left and the right in the country had lost faith in the Nazified force. To this end, the Foreign Office sent a police mission under the command of Sir Charles Wickham, the former head of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, to reform the Gendarmerie

⁶⁶ Smith, 160.

⁶⁷ Farquharson, 332.

⁶⁸ Mark Mazower, "Policing the Anti-Communist State in Greece, 1922-1974," in Mark Mazower, ed., *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books).

along British lines. Wickham's staff, including 45 police officers and 6 clerical staff, began to arrive in Greece in July 1945.

The appointment of the former leader of the notorious Ulster Constabulary to the Greece mission led to considerable criticism from the public and within the government. Wickham, however, "was more sensitive than his critics realized to the dangers of a militarized police force, and did not want to create a Greek 'Black and Tan' special constabulary."⁶⁹ Instead, he hoped to create a police force that could remain police, in spite of the ongoing civil war. To aid his mission, Wickham looked for willing Metropolitan Police officers, rather than members of the Ulster Constabulary, to join the police mission. Both Wickham and the Foreign Office were aware that the open warfare between communist and non-communist forces in the country made the application of British policing difficult, but they nevertheless felt that the level of fighting made that model all the more necessary. If the British could establish a professional and impartial police, washed clean of the Nazi taint, it would represent a tremendous advertisement for the West.

Wickham's early reports on the mission featured dispiriting tales of poor training, lack of equipment, illness among the British staff, and a long list of political crimes perpetrated by the local population.⁷⁰ Ambushes of police patrols, coordinated attacks on police stations, and organized prison breaks occurred on a routine basis. While this atmosphere offered no chance to disarm the Greek police⁷¹, Wickham hoped that he could

⁶⁹ Mazower, 145.

⁷⁰ "British Police Mission to Greece. Code 19 File 75 (to Paper 2577)," 1946, FO 371/58753, NA; "British Police Mission to Greece. Code 19 File 75 (papers 8823-12427)," 1946, FO 371/58758, NA.

⁷¹ The best Wickham could manage in this regard was to replace the police carbine with a less conspicuous pistol. "British Police Mission to Greece. Code 19 File 75 (papers 5199-7891)," 1946, FO 371/58756, NA.

still encourage the new police to operate above politics. This goal, however, remained beyond the reach of even the British members of the mission, who tended to focus their efforts on the communists. As one of the seconded Metropolitan Police veterans put it, “the Communists here are a bad crowd, they seem to be all criminals and murderers, unkempt, lousy and brutal. Compared with the British model they represent the difference between the Alsatian and the Wolf. They are too near the Russian type to appeal to the London Policeman.”⁷² The British police attached to the mission did their best to avoid letting their prejudices show while training the Gendarmes, but the Gendarmerie naturally gravitated to an anti-communist stance. Indeed, Wickham and the British mission often dealt with political interference from right wing Greek politicians, who directed the Gendarmerie against the communists after the Gendarmes passed through the new British run training centers. Additionally, these politicians often ordered officers within the Gendarmerie to request transfers so that right wing police recruits could be stationed together.

Wickham attempted to mitigate political interference, but could do little to discourage the military role of the police as violence continued to increase throughout 1946.⁷³ By the end of that year, the Gendarmerie had swelled from about 14,000 men to nearly 30,000, with most of this increase coming from the old military occupation force. The Greek government, much to Wickham’s chagrin, formed these new Gendarmes into mobile patrols to attack bands of communist in the hills outside of major metropolitan areas.⁷⁴ The Gendarmerie, Wickham reported in April 1947, “is coming more and more

⁷² A.G. Ralph to Sir Philip Game, January 14, 1946, FO 371/58753, NA.

⁷³ Mazower, 145.

⁷⁴ “British Police Mission to Greece. Code 19 File 75 (papers 12616-End),” 1946, FO 371/58759, NA.

under the control of the Ministry with the Supreme Commander having little or no say in anything but routine matters... Orders are issued without proper consideration as to whether or not they can be carried out and frequently, therefore, nothing happens.”⁷⁵ Many of these mobile patrol units were under the direct control of particular Greek politicians, who used these units to eliminate communists as well as to suppress political rivals in their constituencies. This activity was largely supported and funded by advisers from the United States, which appreciated the concerns of the British police mission so long as they did not interfere with the elimination of communist forces. Wickham and the British mission could do little as they watched their trainees fight guerrillas, and police newly established concentration camps for suspected communists and their families.⁷⁶

Seemingly a glutton for punishment, Charles Wickham also conducted a brief tour of Palestine for the Colonial Office in November 1946 to help the local police find a way to maintain their professional standards in the face of increasing domestic terrorism.⁷⁷ Wickham’s report for the Colonial Office expressed the hope that “the police should do the policing and the army the fighting,” but also admitted that terrorism often required the police to assist the armed forces.⁷⁸ Not unlike Dowbiggin, Wickham believed that the best use of the police in this situation was intelligence gathering. “Police must endeavor,” Wickham argued, “to establish friendly relations with the public and obtain its respect and confidence for the public is the main source of all information.”⁷⁹ To facilitate this

⁷⁵ “Monthly Reports of the British Police Mission. Code 19 File 6057,” 1947, FO 371/67131, NA.

⁷⁶ Mazower, 146.

⁷⁷ “Police: Report by Sir Charles Wickham,” 1946 - 1947, CO 537/2269, NA.

⁷⁸ Sir Charles Wickham, “Report by Sir Charles Wickham,” December 2, 1946, CO 537/2269, NA.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

information gathering, Wickham advocated the elimination of armored patrol cars, which “performs no useful police duty” because “its crew have no contact with the public and cannot use their powers of observation.”⁸⁰ “Motorized fighting police,” he continued, “alienate the public. They resemble too closely the Gestapo and are too inclined to forget the first lesson of a policemen – civility to the public.”⁸¹ Palestine police would perhaps argue that their first lesson was to stay alive, but seemingly no amount of danger was too great to dissuade Charles Wickham. The Colonial Office kindly accepted Wickham’s report, though they noted in the very first line of an internal memorandum that the report offered “no immediate solution to the problem of terrorism.”⁸²

ETHIOPIA AND ITALY

British police from Kenya had been stationed in Ethiopia since 1942.⁸³ Their mission was to help to maintain order in the country while Haile Selassie reestablished his government following the collapse of the Italian regime. The police mission also helped to free British soldiers stationed in East Africa for more pressing campaigns elsewhere.⁸⁴ The British police in Ethiopia were under the command of former Inspector General of Ceylon, and ardent Dowbiggin disciple, P.N. Banks. From 1942 to 1946, Banks and a small cohort of East African police officers helped to train a new generation of Ethiopian police, steering

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Middle East Department, “Note on Sir Charles Wickham’s Report,” December 1946, CO 537/2269.

⁸³ “Ethiopian Police Force. Code 1 File 327,” 1946, FO 371/53469, NA.

⁸⁴ W. Robert Foran, *The Kenya Police 1887-1970* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1962).

them away from the paramilitary style of the Italian police as much as possible.⁸⁵ In addition, the British police in this mission also helped to encourage the inclusion of native police in the force, though not necessarily native Ethiopian police. A.S.K. Cook, one of the members of the British police mission, recalled that the native police “consisted of a mixture of Eritreans...and Sudanese” who helped to patrol “by vehicle, camel, horse, and mule...[areas] which it seemed had rarely, if ever, seen a police patrol before.”⁸⁶ Though outwardly a goodwill mission, this work had important strategic implications for the British. The Colonial and Foreign Offices hoped that by helping the Selassie regime, Britain could rely on Ethiopia to help manage their interests in East Africa, namely Kenya and Somaliland. Colonial officers in East Africa hoped that the new Ethiopian police could be relied upon in the postwar period to help the British maintain control over difficult indigenous populations along the border regions between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somaliland.

This hope, however, appeared to come to an abrupt end at the beginning of 1946, when Emperor Selassie alerted British officials that he was removing British police advisers from his country and replacing them with police advisers from Sweden. Sweden maintained close relations with Ethiopia throughout the prewar period, and the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, contained a relatively large Swedish expatriate community. Additionally, the neutrality of Sweden in diplomatic relations offered Selassie a way to avoid siding with either the Western or Eastern bloc, particularly with regard to the

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁸⁶ A.S.K Cook, *Aide de Memoir, Law Enforcement XIX Uganda 2, B-MACN, Mss. Afr.s. 1784, RH.*

sensitive matter of internal security. Having sheltered Selassie and his government in exile from 1936 to 1941, Britain had legitimate reasons to feel betrayed, though they showed little outward sign of disappointment. Instead the Foreign Office, driven primarily by economy, took a realist view of the situation. In the words of Egyptian Department official D.M.H. Riches, the loss of British influence on Ethiopian security was unfortunate, but the work of British police during the war “raised the [Ethiopian] Police to a good state of efficiency and we have not, in fact, failed to produce a reasonable number of officers.”⁸⁷ Furthermore, the British “organization of the Police Force has in fact contributed towards the solution of some of our permanent headaches in Ethiopia i.e. disorder on the Kenya and Somaliland frontiers has been mitigated to some extent by the organization of proper police forces in Borana and in Harar.”⁸⁸ “[There] is no reason,” Riches continued, “for saddling ourselves with a continuing responsibility for the [Ethiopian] Police, particularly when other foreigners, presumably with experience of police work, are available.”⁸⁹ This was particularly the case, Riches concluded, because “the Swedes have produced ten or twelve officers and are subsidizing them; [while] we should find it difficult to find one or two and we should certainly not be willing to pay anything towards their salaries.”⁹⁰ Though the Colonial Office worried that “Swedish officers may...give credit to biased reports of the situation on the frontiers of Ethiopia,” the Foreign Office followed Riches analysis.⁹¹

⁸⁷ D.M.H. Riches, Minute, February 4, 1946, FO 371/53469, NA.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ P.S. Scrivener to R.F.G. Sarrell, April 23, 1946, FO 371/53469, NA.

Upon hearing the Foreign Office's decision, however, Emperor Selassie experienced an abrupt change of heart, deciding in June 1946 that he wanted "to organize a police force for the whole of Ethiopia under British police officers."⁹² In particular, Selassie hoped that Ethiopia's Territorial Army could be converted into a peacetime police force under the direct control of the Emperor himself. To this end, Emperor Selassie encouraged P.N. Banks to approach the Foreign Office on the matter while Banks was on leave in London. Selassie's new offer, however, came with the stipulation that the British would pay most if not all of the costs for this new Ethiopian force. It was a shrewd gamble by Selassie, who was keenly aware of the British desire to maintain their influence in Ethiopia and East Africa more generally, though perhaps less aware of Britain's financial difficulties following the Second World War.

In presenting this new offer to the Foreign Office, however, P.N. Banks went to great lengths to avoid sugarcoating the financial implications of this proposal. He estimated that the new plan would cost the British government well over eight million pounds.⁹³ Though he was under no illusion that the Foreign Office would agree to such a scheme, Banks did suggest that Britain could maintain some influence over the situation by finding funds for supplies, equipment, and uniforms for the new Ethiopian force. Writing to the Treasury to consider this proposal, P.S. Scrivener of the Foreign Office agreed that there was no chance the country could afford a full police mission, yet he did recommend the

⁹² Addis Ababa to Foreign Office, Cypher, June 26, 1946, FO 371/53469, NA.

⁹³ P.N. Banks, "Note on a proposal to expand the Imperial Ethiopian Government Police Force to cover the whole of Ethiopia and to recruit British Police Officers to this end," November 10, 1946, FO 371/53469, NA.

support of Banks' lesser proposal.⁹⁴ "It is a British interest," Scrivener maintained, "that Ethiopia should be peacefully administered. She is surround by British-controlled territories...and we are going to pay some quarter of a million pounds sterling to our tribes on the Ethiopian borders for damages."⁹⁵ "Moreover," he continued, "with an Englishman at the head of the police...we should be able to exert a very effective influence on the Ethiopian Government." Scrivener concluded by saying that "all this will become even more pertinent when the new strategic conception of the Middle East based on Kenya becomes a reality, for then it will be absolutely essential for us to have a friendly and peaceful Ethiopia which...will command the flanks of our most important means of communication throughout the whole of our new strategic area."⁹⁶ Scrivener's arguments led the Treasury to provide some funding for equipment and uniforms, but never in the amounts prescribed.⁹⁷ Banks, however, did manage to secure a formal visit by Ethiopian police officers to the Metropolitan Police in order to view their operation and receive a small amount of training in forensics.

Britain experienced a similar degree of frustration in their attempts to extend their model of policing to Ethiopia's old enemy, Italy.⁹⁸ Foreign Office officials proposed a police mission to Italy shortly before the Potsdam Conference, arguing that such a mission would help the Italians with "the re-organization of their police forces and the general

⁹⁴ P.S. Scrivener to N.E. Young, Treasury, November 23, 1946, FO 371/53469, NA.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ "Equipment for and Reorganisation of Ethiopian Police Force. Code 1 File 829," 1945, FO 371/46085, NA.

⁹⁸ "Proposed Police Mission to Italy. Code 22 File 187," 1946, FO 371/60622, NA.

improvement of international security arrangements in Italy.”⁹⁹ Britain’s ulterior motive, of course, was to use the police mission to help Italy become “a useful member of the European comity of nations,” specifically “to look to the West rather than to the East” for direction.¹⁰⁰ The Foreign Office felt that leaving the Italian police to their own devices would risk the country falling to communism, which “would create a very serious situation on our lines of communication with the Middle East.”¹⁰¹

The Italian government expressed genuine enthusiasm for the proposal. In particular, they looked to the British to help reorganize and rehabilitate the Carabinieri, which had been used as the main suppressive force in Mussolini’s regime.¹⁰² The Italian government, however, worried that if a British police mission was announced, local communist factions in the country would demand that this mission include Russian police as well. After conferring with several police advisers, including G.H.R. Halland, the Foreign Office decided that in order to avoid drawing the Russians into the mission, the proposed police mission would be secretly attached to the British Military Mission in Italy. This backdoor approach initially proved successful, as the small British police attachment helped the Carabinieri peacefully manage municipal and national elections in Italy in 1946.¹⁰³ The Foreign Office hoped that the success of this early mission would encourage the Italian Government to “summon up sufficient courage to ask for a proper Police

⁹⁹ “Police Mission for Italy,” Secret Draft Memorandum, FO 371/60622, NA.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² “Reorganisation of the Italian Armed Forces and the ‘Carabinieri’.” Code 22 File 89 (papers 3152-End),” 1946, FO 371/60604, NA.

¹⁰³ A.D.M. Ross, “Police Mission for Italy,” June 15, 1946, FO 371/60604, NA.

Mission in which case these police officers could hive off from the Military Mission and take up an independent existence.”¹⁰⁴

Unfortunately for the British, this invitation never came, and their hopes of a long term mission quickly shrank from view. By October 1946, the British Embassy in Rome reported that the “ordinary civil police were in serious need of reorganization and toning up.”¹⁰⁵ “300 recruits,” the Embassy reported, “who had just passed out of Italian police training school had gone in a body to present their compliments to a local Communist leader.”¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, there was a growing “tendency on the part of the Italian Government to give heavy arms, such as armoured cars, to the police, which was contrary to all proper police practice and liable to turn the police force into something like a Balkan Militia with a potential political role.”¹⁰⁷ As with Ethiopia, the failure of the British government to establish a long lasting police mission to Italy led them to attempt to influence the situation by inviting Italian police officers to lectures and training at Scotland Yard.¹⁰⁸

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERPOL

As British police attempted to remake continental police forces in their own image, they also pursued a more involved, forward policy with regard to international police

¹⁰⁴ Foreign Office Brief, February 21, 1946, FO 371/60604, NA.

¹⁰⁵ British Embassy Rome to Sir Oliver Harvey, Foreign Office, October 8, 1946, FO 371/60604, NA.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ “Service and Police Missions to Italy. Code 22 File 105,” 1947, FO 371/67787, NA.

cooperation. Several attempts were made by allied governments in exile during the war to restart Interpol on some basis in London. These proposals, however, were largely put down by Norman Kendal, who felt there could be little purpose in maintaining an international organization during wartime. Yet when Kendal retired from service in February 1945, he was replaced at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) by an officer that was only too eager to see the return of the organization, Ronald Howe. In his approach to Interpol, and policing in general, Howe could not have been more different than Kendal. Eric St. Johnston, Kendal and Howe's subordinate at the CID, described Kendal as "formidable" with "penetrating eyes...[and a] grime exterior," whereas Ronald Howe "was an elegant, dapper bachelor always immaculately dressed and perfectly groomed."¹⁰⁹ Whereas Kendal was stoic and pragmatic, Howe was effusive and impatient. His energy and enthusiasm did much to jump start the reconstruction of Interpol, but this enthusiasm masked a lack of direction and purpose when the excitement of the organization wore off.

Like Kendal, Howe was an Oxford graduate that transferred to the Metropolitan Police after serving in the public prosecutor's office.¹¹⁰ He was given his post by Hugh Trenchard, a man he considered to be the greatest soldier turned civil administration since Wellington.¹¹¹ Howe's background and education fit in well with Trenchard's reform agenda, and he found himself quickly elevated within the CID. Serving as Kendal's second in command throughout the 1930s, Howe attended several Interpol events, including the

¹⁰⁹ St. Johnston, *One Policeman's Story*, 37–38.

¹¹⁰ Ronald Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*. (London: A. Barker, 1961).

¹¹¹ Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*, 20.

1934 annual conference in Vienna.¹¹² Howe's reports from these events tended to focus on the personalities involved rather than the substance of the discussions. In addition to Interpol, Howe was also the head of the 1936 Metropolitan Police tour of police departments in the United States and Canada to investigate the police use of wireless telegraphy and radio telephones. This tour included major cities, such as New York, Chicago, and Washington as well as smaller departments in Cincinnati, Kansas City, and August Vollmer's force in Berkeley, California.¹¹³ Although disappointed in the standard of education amongst American police, Howe returned from this visit enthusiastic about all things American, including their use of "extensive contact between police and criminal for the purpose of obtaining information."¹¹⁴

Though he lacked Kendal's international experience, Howe nevertheless possessed enough knowledge to pick up the issue of cooperation between the Met and other forces in the postwar period. Unsurprisingly, the initiative to reestablish police cooperation after the war came from the former leadership of Interpol. In the spring of 1945, letters addressed to Norman Kendal from Interpol leaders Florent Louwage of Belgium, Interpol's counterfeiting expert J.A. Adler, and K.H. Broekhoff of the Netherlands – with Broekhoff hoping to encourage Kendal to be the leader of the new organization.¹¹⁵ This exchange was followed shortly by a letter to Howe from Swedish police officer Harry Söderman, who

¹¹² "10th Meeting of Commission in Vienna 1934: Reports and Resolutions," 1933-1935, MEPO 3/2041, NA; "Mr Ronald Howe's Report on Visit to Police Forces in Vienna, Lausanne, Lyons and Dresden," 1934, MEPO 3/2037, NA.

¹¹³ "Visit by Mr. R. M. Howe (Deputy Assistant Commissioner) to the United States of America to Study Criminal Investigation Methods," 1936-1937, MEPO 2/5944, NA.

¹¹⁴ Ronald Howe, Memorandum, June 17, 1936, MEPO 2/5944, NA.

¹¹⁵ K.H. Broekhoff to Norman Kendal, June 1, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

wrote regarding his concern that Interpol's archives, last deposited in Berlin, might fall into Russian hands.¹¹⁶ The fear of eastern influence on the organization was increased in December 1945, when the Czechoslovak Government wrote to the Foreign Office to suggest that Interpol be resettled in Prague.¹¹⁷ Söderman hoped that Howe could help him secure passage with the British occupation force to track down the organization's archive.

Howe responded to these requests by stating that he did not think the return of Interpol could be prepared while the war continued, but that everything was being done to track down the commission's archive.¹¹⁸ Despite this rebuff, Söderman and Louwage continued to correspond on the issue in spring 1946, hoping to collect a number of continental police officers to their cause.¹¹⁹ Söderman even went so far as to include former Interpol General Secretary, Oskar Dressler.¹²⁰ Dressler expressed his eagerness to return to his work at the commission, despite the fact that he had continued to work for the Nazi-run Interpol during the war, while most of his colleagues in Vienna languished in prison. Dressler, surprisingly, managed to avoid association with the Nazi period of the organization, though this may be due largely to the fact that his colleagues during this period garnered more attention, not least of all because of the spectacular nature of their deaths. Reinhard Heydrich was killed by the Czech resistance in 1943, Arthur Nebe was brutally murdered in 1944 for his participation in the attempted assassination of Hitler, and Kurt Daluge was executed by military tribunal in 1945.

¹¹⁶ Harry Söderman to Ronald Howe, July 17, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹¹⁷ Czechoslovak Embassy to Foreign Office, December 6, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹¹⁸ Ronald Howe to K.H. Broekhoff, July 12, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹¹⁹ Harry Söderman to Ronald Howe, March 6, 1946, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹²⁰ Oskar Dressler to Mr. Csató, February 10, 1946, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

Greater consideration for the reconstruction of Interpol began in the fall of 1945. The Home Office, working with the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, approached Howe for information on Interpol to help the new UN consider its relations with all international associations.¹²¹ Howe responded by saying that the organization “was extremely useful and now that communications by air will be far easier than ever, personal knowledge of and contact with the heads of the various detective departments of other countries will be of enormous value to us here.”¹²² This endorsement led to a meeting between Howe, the Home Office, and members of the Dutch police to discuss the restarting of the organization in October 1945. The Dutch police, unsurprisingly, argued that the new commission should be located in The Hague. Howe supported this idea, but faced resistance from the Home Office, which vaguely argued that the commission was “bound up with all sorts of other matters and that nothing can be done at the moment.”¹²³ Although they called for patience, the Home Office believed that when it was reestablished, Interpol was “likely to be in future of greater value than before the war, especially in view of air travel, in facilitating contact between the detective departments of other countries.”¹²⁴

The Home Office and Foreign Office spent the next few months squabbling over the nature of the organization, and whether or not Interpol should be attached to the United Nations.¹²⁵ The Foreign Office maintained that the organization should be attached directly to UN headquarters, while the Home Office argued, incorrectly, that Interpol was solely a

¹²¹ Philip Allen, Home Office, to Ronald Howe, September 13, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹²² Ronald Howe to Philip Allen, September 13, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹²³ Ronald Howe to Sir Harold Scott, October 23, 1945, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹²⁴ S.W. Harris, Home Office to P.S. Falla, Foreign Office, September 25, 1945, FO 371/50952, NA.

¹²⁵ “International Criminal Police Commission. Code 70 File 7726,” 1945, FO 371/50952, NA.

European organization, and thus should not be seen as a true international organization within the orbit of the United Nations. The Home Office backed the Dutch bid to host the organization at the Hague because it was convenient geographically, it had the necessary office space available, and it already maintained an international office within their Ministry of Justice.¹²⁶ “London,” they argued, “is not really suitable as the headquarters of this body, and Paris is not suitable as the French do not particularly shine at running this sort of organization.”¹²⁷ It appears that the Home Office made this argument in the hopes that the organization could remain close to Britain, yet out of French hands. Regardless of the position of British ministries, the diplomatic, red tape nightmare that drove the founders of Interpol to create their organization outside of the control of traditional government offices had come to pass under British auspices.

While Howe and the other members of the organization waited for official sanction to reconstruct the organization, Howe received word from G.H.R. Halland on the search for Interpol’s prewar archive.¹²⁸ The Public Safety team tasked with searching for the archive found – among the “files which escaped the hazards of war and occupation” – approximately 10,000 index cards that referred to subjects pursued by Interpol since it began, as well as 1,000 cards that catalogued examples of counterfeit currency and stolen objects, including jewelry and art.¹²⁹ The discovery team catalogued these files with the help of Paul Spielhagen, a member of the Berlin Criminal Police and part time worker at

¹²⁶ Philip Allen, Home Office, to P.S. Falla, Foreign Office, October 31, 1945, FO 371/50952, NA.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ G.H.R. Halland to Ronald Howe, January 7, 1946, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

¹²⁹ “Memorandum Relating to the Files of the International Police Commission by United States Member,” Allied Control Authority I.A.&C. DIV. Public Safety Committee, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

Interpol.¹³⁰ Spielhagen helped FBI agent John Condon examine the documents for files of interest to J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI. Condon believed that the files would be of interest to a new version of Interpol, but that they represented little interest to the FBI.

Although Spielhagen told the Public Safety team that these files were relatively intact, many former members of the commission continued to assume that a good portion of the prewar archive had been stolen by the Soviets or lost by some other means. In his autobiography, Harry Söderman argued that some of the commission's files were absconded out of Germany prior to the end of the war by Carlos Zindel, one of the Nazi police officers that managed the group during the war.¹³¹ According to Söderman, Zindel filled his car with Interpol documents and drove to the French headquarters in Stuttgart to give up himself and the archive. The French authorities in Stuttgart beat and harassed Zindel, leading him to commit suicide by consuming a cyanide capsule. Söderman offered no source for this fantastical story and did not say what happened to Zindel's archive, but this tale would be accepted by fellow members of the commission and repeated as gospel for decades after.

The Public Safety team responsible for Interpol's archive held the documents in Berlin, and waited to transfer the files to a new version of the commission. This team assumed that "events in Europe in the last five years make it questionable [if] the persons described in the indexes are still at large."¹³² Yet many police, including Ronald Howe,

¹³⁰ Frederick Ayer Jr. to J. Edgar Hoover, September 1, 1945, Bureau File 94-1-2061-205, FBI.

¹³¹ Harry Söderman, *Policeman's Lot: A Criminologist's Gallery of Friends and Felons* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1956), 376.

¹³² "Memorandum Relating to the Files of the International Police Commission by United States Member," Allied Control Authority I.A.&C. DIV. Public Safety Committee, MEPO 3/2081, NA.

believed that the criminals who survived the war were simply waiting to reemerge in the postwar period. As Harry Söderman described, “it was hard to believe that the steamroller of war...had left any of the prewar galaxy of international swindlers, forgers, and con men still operative. To our surprise, however, many of the old, familiar characters turned up again...the only difference was that now they had graying temples and were hard to recognize from their prewar photographs.”¹³³ In addition to the return of interwar criminals, police also feared the emergence of a new criminal class from the refugee camps in continental Europe. Ronald Howe believed that “in countries which had suffered the German occupation a new generation had grown up with an outlook based wholly on subversion and which had come to regard the police as simply the clearing house for the Gestapo...something, if not to be openly defied, then certainly to be circumvented.”¹³⁴ “Those who came from the refugee camps,” Howe concluded, “felt no allegiance to a world which had treated them so cruelly.”¹³⁵

British police, in particular, were afraid that this postwar criminality would focus on their country. According to one member of the Met’s Criminal Record Office, “not since the Crusades has Europe been inflicted with such a large moving population, many devoid of honest principles, many imbued with criminal tendencies, and most with nothing to lose. As at this period of history, the ports of the United Kingdom are unprotected by visas, this country, the gateway to the rest of the world, will be the objective to be gained by every

¹³³ Söderman, *Policeman’s Lot*, 384–385.

¹³⁴ Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*, 124.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

European embarked on a career of international crime.”¹³⁶ Sharing a similar sentiment, Ronald Howe believed that “people are seldom purified or refined by prolonged suffering, and when they lose their homes in one country it is very often a mistake to imagine that they will spend the rest of their lives working off a debt of gratitude to the country which ultimately receives them.”¹³⁷ Howe and the Met believed that postwar “Europe had become a paradise for the international crook and the black marketer,” filled with potential Harry Limes looking for opportunities abroad.¹³⁸ As was the case during the interwar period, this fear of international crime spread among police with little reference or referral to the actual occurrence of such crime. The rhetoric used to describe this threat was remarkably similar to the fear of returning soldiers in the post-First World War era. To be sure, the propagation of this fear helped to establish the necessity for policing in the postwar world. Looking at the internal debates of police at this time, however, reveals that the promotion of this fear was not shrewd propaganda, but the result of a legitimate, if unsubstantiated, conviction.

Howe and the Metropolitan Police did much to feed this fear, especially through the publication the Illustrated Circular of International Confidence Tricksters.¹³⁹ Originally released by the Met in 1935, the circular contained two parts: an introduction describing various forms of confidence crimes, and an index that included the biographies and modus operandi for known confidence men operating before the war. This circular focused, in particular, on confidence men that operated in hotels in major metropolitan areas

¹³⁶ Criminal Record Office, Report on the “Bulletin de Signalements,” January 30, 1947, MEPO 3/2824, NA.

¹³⁷ Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*, 124.

¹³⁸ Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*, 125.

¹³⁹ “Illustrated Circular (copy Dated 1947 Attached) on International Confidence Tricksters Etc: Circulated to Interpol and Dominions,” 1945-1953, MEPO 3/1896, NA.

throughout Britain and Europe. Beginning in the spring of 1946, Howe and the Met worked to update this circular with new types of crimes as well as a revised list of criminals. As part of this work, Howe corresponded with police throughout Europe, the United States, and the colonies to check if the criminals listed in the 1935 edition – under the age of 75 – were still alive and at large. This correspondence resulted in a tremendous response from foreign police departments, particularly those in Canada and Australia. These departments wrote back with detailed information including current aliases, updated fingerprints, and new photographs when available.

With this information, the Met published a new edition of the circular in 1947 and sent out copies to 566 different police forces throughout the world. At least two of these copies also went to private security firms working for Harrods Department Store in London and the American Express Company.¹⁴⁰ Along with this new circular, the Metropolitan Police entered into negotiations in 1946 with police in the Netherlands and France regarding wireless communications between their forces. Just as they did prior to the war, the Met and the French Sûreté disagreed over the appropriate frequency for these communications, but by 1947 the two sides began exchanging hundreds of notices and warrants over wireless.¹⁴¹ Thus, as they did during the prewar period, police in Britain and elsewhere did not wait for official sanction when pursuing international cooperation.

¹⁴⁰ “Illustrated Circular – (2nd. Issue.) Forces Sent To,” 1947, MEPO 3/1896, NA.

¹⁴¹ “Communications: International Criminal Police Commission,” 1946-1960, MEPO 5/485, NA; “Development of International Police Wireless: Establishment of Paris Headquarters,” 1946-1953, MEPO 3/2055, NA.

Official sanction to this work finally came in April 1946, when Florent Louwage invited the former members of Interpol to an International Conference of Criminal Police in Belgium. The British Home Office and Foreign Office begrudgingly gave Ronald Howe permission to go to this meeting, even though the Foreign Office maintained that Interpol should only meet under U.N. auspices.¹⁴² The conference met at the Palais de Justice in Brussels between June 3 and 5 1946, and included delegates from Chile, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Iran, Portugal, and Turkey. The assembled members unanimously decided to revitalize the commission with two differences: Interpol would now be based in Paris, and the President of the organization could hold his position from any member country and was no longer required to be attached to the host nation.¹⁴³ Paris was chosen as the organization's home because the French members regarded the hosting of the commission "as an honor rather than a burden," and also agreed to take up the main financial and administrative burdens for the organization.¹⁴⁴

Despite these changes, the new Interpol did maintain some continuity with the past. The leadership of the organization included prewar stalwarts Florent Louwage as President and Louis Ducloux of the French Sûreté as Secretary General. In addition, Ronald Howe was chosen as one of three Reporters General, along with Werner Müller of the Berne Police and Harry Söderman of the Stockholm Police. These five officers – Louwage, Ducloux, Howe, Müller, and Söderman – formed the organization's new executive committee. This committee worked to maintain Interpol as "an international criminal

¹⁴² "International Conference of Criminal Police at Brussels. Code 70 File 535," 1946, FO 371/57222, NA.

¹⁴³ Söderman, 384.

¹⁴⁴ Howe, *The Pursuit of Crime*, 133.

record office and a means of liaison between the police forces of the member countries,” rather than as “a body of detectives flying from continent to continent investigating crimes.”¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, this group worked to keep the organization free from the United Nations, and thus, outside the control of politicians. Summing up the views of the committee, Howe concluded that “all politicians are in a sense amateurs, and therein lies one of the main sources of the weakness of political organizations in the international field...If there is to be peace in the world it will not be something either concocted by the politicians or enforced by the military.”¹⁴⁶

Beyond the leadership committee, the commission also reappointed J.A. Adler as the head of Interpol’s counterfeit and forgery department – despite the objections of Harry Söderman, who hoped to secure this important position for himself.¹⁴⁷ Howe worked with Adler to request currency examples from the Royal Bank and Royal Mint, as well as from several Commonwealth countries. Adler, for his part, worked to track down and destroy counterfeit British bank notes circulating in postwar Europe.¹⁴⁸ Adler focused, in particular, on tracking down the famous Himmler notes, produced by Jewish forgers in concentration camps during the Second World War.¹⁴⁹ The Germans release approximately 150 million pounds of counterfeit British bank notes to neutral countries during the war in hopes of destabilizing the British economy. Most of these notes were destroyed outside the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 131.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 159.

¹⁴⁷ “Police Commission - Counterfeiting of Currency: Information Concerning International Forged Money,” 1946-1953, MEPO 3/2671, NA.

¹⁴⁸ “International Criminal Police Commission: Descriptions of Forged Bank of England Notes Published,” 1948-1949, MEPO 3/3054, NA.

¹⁴⁹ Wilhelm Hoettl, *Hitler’s Paper Weapon* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955).

primary counterfeiting camp at Ebensee, but examples of the currency continued to appear throughout the postwar period – especially in connection with Jewish efforts in Palestine. The member nations of Interpol corresponded with Adler and each other as they had before the war using telegraph. The French authorities in charge of these messages, however, decided that they should include an easy to recognize telegraphic address to help distinguish them from other telegrams. They settled on the contraction of “international police,” or INTERPOL.¹⁵⁰

Although the Brussels conference successfully brought about a new commission, the specter of new political divisions cast a shadow over the organization. Söderman reported that many of the prewar member states from Eastern Europe arrived to the Brussels meeting with new, communist representatives.¹⁵¹ While these members avoided the aggressive takeover tactics used by Nazi representatives during the interwar period, they did make it clear that they hoped the commission would reconsider its stance regarding political crime. The inclusion of eastern representatives in the commission worked not only to heighten tension within Interpol, but also complicated the relationship between the organization and the United States.

As during the interwar period, Interpol and the Met found themselves frustrated in their attempts to coax J. Edgar Hoover to join their international body. The FBI first heard of the plans to reestablish the organization from Vladeta Milicevic, a former minister in the Yugoslav government who hoped to encourage the FBI to help host the organization at

¹⁵⁰ Fenton S Bresler, *Interpol* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992), 94.

¹⁵¹ Söderman, 385.

the UN in New York.¹⁵² Milicevic claimed that Ronald Howe told him that the FBI was already working toward that end. The FBI reached Howe through the American Embassy in London and learned of the meeting planned for Belgium in the summer of 1946.¹⁵³ Howe offered to send along the formal invitation from Louwage to the Bureau if Hoover wanted to participate. Following on this exchange, Louwage himself sent a lengthy invitation to Hoover, telling the FBI director that he attached “a high importance to your presence at this meeting.”¹⁵⁴ In addition to this letter, Louwage also met with FBI agent Horton Telford in Paris to stress in person the significance he placed on the FBI’s participation in the organization. Hoover, however, replied that he could not attend because of the short notice, but he expressed his desire to receive a report of the discussions and decisions reached by the new commission.¹⁵⁵

There were three issues playing into Hoover’s decision not to send a representative to the Brussels conference. First, the FBI worried over having to pay back dues owed to the organization since American joined in 1938. The FBI struggled to secure Senate appropriations for these dues, and by the time they were secured the war had begun. Second, Hoover remained skeptical of the utility of Interpol for the United States. Although it joined the commission before the war, the FBI still viewed Interpol as a European group that could offer the Bureau little in terms of leads on criminals or technical information regarding identification. Finally, and most importantly, the FBI worried over the inclusion

¹⁵² Vladeta Milicevic to J. Edgar Hoover, March 9, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-208X, FBI.

¹⁵³ J.A. Cimperman, Legal Attache, to J. Edgar Hoover, April 12, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-210, FBI.

¹⁵⁴ Florent Louwage to J. Edgar Hoover, April 27, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-213, FBI.

¹⁵⁵ J. Edgar Hoover to Florent Louwage, May 7, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-216, FBI.

of Russia and its satellites in the organization. Although Louwage stressed that Interpol would avoid policing politics, the FBI judged that this promise was meaningless so long as communists countries were included because in those countries there was “no distinction between the political and criminal police.”¹⁵⁶ For the FBI, at least, it required “a considerable stretch of the imagination to picture Russia or any of its Balkan satellites cooperating with the Bureau in extraditing a criminal located in those countries but wanted in the United States.”¹⁵⁷

While these issues allowed Hoover to keep Interpol at arm’s length, the problem of domestic rivalry within the United States encouraged him to maintain some contact. As FBI agent H.H. Clegg warned, “if the FBI doesn’t participate as a member there is a possibility that the Secret Service, the Treasury Enforcement Agency or New York City Police might be elected to represent the United States.”¹⁵⁸ Considering the cost to remain in the commission, Clegg bluntly judged that Interpol was not “worth \$1,500 or even \$15 as far as any practical value accruing to the Bureau...[but] if there is any American police agency to be affiliated with the group obviously it should be the FBI.”¹⁵⁹ Florent Louwage, in an incredibly flattering letter to Hoover, offered the FBI a way to avoid the dues owed to Interpol, so long as the Bureau agreed to participate in the organization.¹⁶⁰ Hoover replied that he would consider this proposal, but hoped in the meantime that the

¹⁵⁶ C.H. Carson to D.M. Ladd, August 13, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-245, FBI.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ H.H. Clegg to Clyde Tolson, June 20, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-243, FBI.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Florent Louwage to J. Edgar Hoover, July 9, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-246, FBI.

commission would accept some of his articles for inclusion in Interpol's journal.¹⁶¹ The offer to function as yet another platform in Hoover's propaganda empire was not what Louwage hoped for, but given the past reluctance of the FBI with regard cooperation, it was about as much as he could have expected.

Ironically, the FBI's position regarding participation in Interpol changed in the lead up to the September 1948 meeting of the commission in Prague. Because the meeting was located in a Russian satellite and occurred in the midst of the Berlin Blockade, the FBI unsurprisingly made no attempt to attend this meeting. This sentiment was shared by the Metropolitan Police, as Ronald Howe became the only member of the executive committee to not attend the Prague conference.¹⁶² Yet it was at this moment that Interpol, frustrated with Hoover's intransigence, sent an invitation to the conference to the Secret Service and US Narcotic Bureau.¹⁶³ Though there was no chance that either of these departments would attend the Prague meeting, it sent a clear signal to Hoover and the FBI that Interpol was tired of waiting.

In addition to this ploy by Interpol, another push toward cooperation came from the US State Department. Writing the FBI in April 1948, State Department officials reported that Interpol's radio system was the only system in Paris "available for communication with Washington in case of national emergency except the French Government commercial radio-telegraph system."¹⁶⁴ Since this commercial system "would be immediately taken

¹⁶¹ J. Edgar Hoover to Florent Louwage, August 13, 1946, Bureau File 94-1-2061-249, FBI.

¹⁶² "Conference of International Criminal Police Commission in Prague. Code 12, File 5549," 1948, FO 371/71331B, NA.

¹⁶³ Legal Attache Paris to FBI, December 24, 1947, Bureau File 94-1-2061-359, FBI.

¹⁶⁴ State Department to FBI, cablegram, April 23, 1948, Bureau File 94-1-2061-397, FBI.

over [by the French] in case of invasion,” the State Department suggested that the FBI “reconsider participation in [Interpol’s] radio network to keep this possible avenue open.”¹⁶⁵ Thus, after the conclusion of the Prague conference, the FBI reversed its tone and policy toward Interpol, culminating in the Bureau’s attendance at the 1949 Interpol conference in Berne.

CONCLUSION

The immediate postwar period found British police actively pursuing opportunities to extend their influence over global security and international police cooperation. This pursuit rested upon the assumed superiority of British policing methods, and it was made possible by the general collapse of competing policing models during the Second World War. Yet even though circumstances could not have been better for this forward policy, these new endeavors were largely frustrated.

With the Public Safety missions in occupied Europe, failure rested with the inability of British police to adjust or modify their model of policing to a hostile environment. If these missions were pursued by Metropolitan Police officers alone, this failure would be relatively unremarkable. Yet these occupation forces were led and designed by decorated veterans of the colonial police service – officers who were used to dealing with the most difficult security situations. More remarkable still is that these officers continued to insist upon British style policing in occupied zones after significant disasters. The hubris of these

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

Public Safety missions was exemplified by G.H.R. Halland, who maintained – despite the near collapse of the British zone in west Germany – that “the original basic plans made for the re-organization of the German police...were sound enough; but sufficient time was not allowed for the full implementation and consolidation of these plans before control of the police was transferred.”¹⁶⁶ The presence of colonial officers in these missions points to two conclusions. First, the gap between metropolitan and colonial policing models – in the minds of practitioners – was never as far apart as they appear in retrospect. Second, the preference for Bobby style policing in these situations represented not just an altruistic pursuit, but also a fervent belief that this method of policing was the best way to maintain order – even in the most violent of circumstances.

The assumed superiority of British policing also played a role in the postwar resurrection of Interpol. Above all the other competing international policing bodies of the interwar period, it was Interpol that appealed the most to British police because of its avoidance of political crimes and supranational schemes. This preference to avoid politics, however, prevented British police from helping to guide Interpol in the postwar period as they had done before the war. This avoidance was personified by Ronald Howe, who may have been easier to get along with than Norman Kendal, but he lacked Kendal’s sense of direction and purpose with regard to international cooperation. As a result, Interpol entered its second life by drifting into the same political rocks that destroyed the prewar organization. The easy assurance with which British police entered the postwar period

¹⁶⁶ G.H.R. Halland, “The Morals and Reliability of the German Police,” July 5, 1947, FO 371/64696.

would quickly be dispelled during the 1950s through a series of colonial emergencies and the collapse of participation in Interpol due to Cold War politics.

Chapter Six: Retreat into Empire: British Policing in the World, 1948 – 1958

British police entered the immediate postwar period with grandiose ideas of remaking global security in their own image, yet these ideas soon crashed against the reality of occupied Europe and the Cold War. Adding to this failure were a series of colonial emergencies in Malaya and Kenya that forced renewed attention on colonial policing rather than international work. These emergencies largely frustrated British attempts to reform their colonial police, as local forces often abandoned high principles in favor of an iron fist. Ironically, this work was pursued in Britain under the auspices of a Labour government. Historically skeptical of police – even British domestic police – this government nevertheless found itself pursuing imperial security with a rigor never before seen.

Alongside the poor performance of Britain in Europe and Empire, the country also suffered a setback in their work with Interpol when the United States withdrew from the organization in 1950. This event, precipitated by Cold War tension, led the United States to direct their own form of international police work that largely avoided cooperation with foreign police. These new American efforts focused on the policing of politics and the suppression of communism throughout the developing world, and largely dwarfed British efforts to export their own model of policing in the same areas. The American pursuit of global criminal justice and the emergence of colonial disturbances helped to ensure that the British and their police were never again able to regain a leading role in international policing.

REMAKING THE COLONIAL POLICE¹

Postwar disturbances in the Caribbean and the Gold Coast impressed upon the Colonial Office the need to finally make good on their prewar promise to reform the colonial police. The Colonial Office hoped that such reform would not only reduce the chance for violent outbreaks in the colonies, but also increase recruitment for the perennially understaffed colonial police. Some mention was made about preparing colonies and their police for self-government, but even the postwar Labour government worked under the assumption that independence – for the majority of colonies – was a long way off. Indeed, the Colonial Office hoped that a reformed colonial police could help Britain maintain control over their possessions throughout the Cold War.

The fact that Britain wanted to maintain colonialism throughout the postwar period is unremarkable. What is remarkable is that the British proposed to maintain that control using non-violent, civilian style policing whenever possible. The origin for this thinking relied heavily on Herbert Dowbiggin's interwar tours. Dowbiggin's assumption was that civilian style policing should be encouraged not only because it would help to improve the image of the empire, but also because it was the best style of policing for gaining information. The best way to avoid a disturbance was to see the signs before it occurred. The Colonial Office would learn, however, that the establishment of this model of policing required two resources that were in short supply in the postwar empire: money and time.

¹ An excellent review of this topic can also be found in Georgina Sinclair's *At the End of the Line*.

The lack of these resources, combined with the exigencies of nationalism and the Cold War, helped to ensure that police reform often gave way to a renewed investment in military style policing throughout the empire.

A FORMAL DOWBIGGIN: THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF COLONIAL POLICE DEBATES

The weight of Herbert Dowbiggin's influence on the idea of colonial police reform can best be seen through the policies pursued by the Colonial Office in the postwar period. In their prewar attempts to encourage the development of British style policing throughout the empire, the Colonial Office had relied heavily upon Dowbiggin and his tours of colonial police forces from 1929 to 1937. Not only did Dowbiggin serve the Colonial Office through his formal reports, but he also gave his opinions and thoughts on various issues ranging from recruitment to training. Unsurprisingly, then, the postwar attempts to reform the colonial police began by considering how to encourage similar reports and advice on a permanent basis.

Dowbiggin and his tours became the basis for the Colonial Office's scheme to create an Inspector General of Colonial Police. The suggestion for this new position came during the interwar period from R.G.B. Spicer, Dowbiggin's former subordinate in Ceylon and the head of the Palestine Police. In a letter to A.C.C. Parkinson, head of the Eastern Department of the Colonial Office, Spicer argued for "the need of a coordinating head of Colonial Police Affairs at home."² In particular, Spicer wanted "somebody with real

² R.G.B. Spicer to A.C.C. Parkinson, December 24, 1932, CO 850/32/2, NA.

authority and knowledge who can co-ordinate Police organization with Colonies, who can advise on disputed matters, and who can inspect and sum up the weaknesses and strength of the multifold Forces coming under the Colonial Office.”³ Furthermore, he believed that this officer’s work should include conferences in which colonial police chiefs could attend to promote professionalization. Spicer contended that colonial police wanted “regularizing and standardizing throughout the service, we want the good points of one Force made common, and available to us all.”⁴ He concluded by suggesting that the Colonial Office already possessed the “obvious square peg for the much needed square hole,” Herbert Dowbiggin.⁵ “The Ceylon Police,” Spicer argued, “is kept alive by its Chief, he is as you know a galvanic person, gives up almost the whole of his leave to the study of Police progress at home, and pushes it out to Ceylon.”⁶

Colonial Office secretaries Charles Jeffries and George Tomlinson agreed with the need for such an officer, but also felt that it was unlikely to find funding for such a position.⁷ Jeffries and Tomlinson compared Spicer’s suggestion to the other official advisers to the Colonial Office. These positions – which included advisers for law, finance, medicine, agriculture, veterinary, education and fisheries – all received substantial pay for their work, but the Colonial Office could not yet rationalize the need for a policing adviser. Tomlinson proposed, however, that Dowbiggin might be posted “ad hoc in that capacity for a limited

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ “Unification of Colonial Police Service,” 1933, CO 850/32/2, NA.

term...to see how the post works in practice.”⁸ Tomlinson seemed to believe that they could delay the decision on the Inspector General role until Dowbiggin officially retired. Until that time, the Ceylon Police under Dowbiggin could continue to function as “the best training school that we have.”⁹ Alex Fiddian agreed with Tomlinson’s take, arguing that “it would probably be possible to obtain some use of Sir Herbert Dowbiggin’s services in advising at this Office on questions of recruitment and training without the necessity of creating a post with a high sounding title and a largish salary, which neither the Treasury nor the Colonies would want to pay.”¹⁰

Fiddian worried, however that hiring Dowbiggin might look “like a concession to that well-known newspaper stunt of ‘Here’s a good man retiring from the public service!; surely there is some post, some way in which his ripe administrative experience can be utilised and not lost to the public.’”¹¹ J.E.W. Flood shared Fiddian’s reservations, and believed that even though everyone admired Dowbiggin the scheme to hire him as an adviser might antagonize local officials within the colonies. “I venture,” he wrote “to suggest that the government of our Dependencies rest with the Governor and not with the Colonial Office. It is for the Governor to propose that his Police Force should be inspected if he thinks fit...It is not for the Colonial Office to shove Inspectors and inspections down the throat of the Governor.”¹² Additionally, Flood argued that colonial police chiefs in these regions “might take the line that an inspection pushed upon them from outside was a slur

⁸ G.J.F. Tomlinson, Minute, April 21, 1934, CO 850/54/20, NA.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Alex Fiddian, Minute, May 10, 1934, CO 850/54/20, NA.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² J.E.W. Flood, Minute, May 15, 1934, CO 850/54/20, NA.

on their capacity.”¹³ Flood surmised that much of the proposed work of the Inspector General could only be accomplished by an officer that knew the local situation. “A Police Force,” Flood contended, “more than any other kind of Colonial Department – more even than education – has to be part of the people of the country, and its value depends on its local knowledge.”¹⁴ Flood’s criticism of Spicer’s idea, however, must be considered alongside his hatred of Colonial Office work in general:

If there were no advisers here at all, Colonies would have to solve their own problems instead of pitching them at the heads of the Office, which appears to be the modern tendency and is, I suppose, inevitable from the growth of the idea that there are a lot of supermen hanging about the Colonial Office whose advice will be worth far more than that of the local head of a Department. Of course the general public has a vague idea that every mortal thing is settled from the Colonial Office and that therefore the Office is being constantly inundated with telegrams and dispatches of all kinds of trivial points giving all kinds of information...Members of Parliament continually ask questions which appear to indicate that they think that nobody can move in a Colony without the motion being reported to the Secretary of State [for the Colonies]. If that were the case, I agree that advisers would be necessary, but thank Heaven it is not the case...In fact the idea of a Police Adviser is on a par with the resolutions which we occasionally get from the shrieking sisterhoods who, leaping to the conclusion that the Colonial Office is always being asked to deal with ‘questions peculiarly affecting women,’ urge strongly that the staff of the Office should be supplemented by some intellectual virago whose only function it would be to examine everything from “the woman’s point of view.”¹⁵

While the rest of the Colonial Office “supermen” did not go to Flood’s extremes, they certainly remained hesitant in their support for the police adviser position.

The issue of a colonial police adviser remained dormant until Dowbiggin contacted Tomlinson at the Colonial Office to discuss his retirement from the Ceylon Police in

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

1935.¹⁶ Dowbiggin told Tomlinson that “he was very anxious not to find himself without employment” after retirement and was looking for opportunities in Britain. He reported that he received vague offers of employment from the Prison Commission as well as the Home Office, who offered him a post as one of the two British Inspectors of Constabulary. Dowbiggin approached the Colonial Office with this information because “he felt that if the Colonial Office wished to make use of him after his retirement he would feel morally bound to regard the C.O. as having a prior claim.”¹⁷ With Dowbiggin clearly fishing for work, Tomlinson decided to share with him that the Colonial Office had been debating for several years the idea of creating an Inspector General for Colonial Police. Tomlinson, however, felt that Dowbiggin should be encouraged to consider one of his other offers because the Colonial Office could offer only ad hoc advisory work at uncertain pay.

The issue went dormant again until the Second World War, when several colonies throughout the empire began to agitate the Colonial Office for advice on maintaining order during the emergency.¹⁸ Once again the Colonial Office trotted out the old arguments, but this time they put the issue directly to the colonies for consideration through a circular letter. This circular proved that the idea was widely supported, particularly by colonies in Africa and the West Indies. Those colonies that resisted the idea – including Ceylon, Cyprus, and Malaya – believed that “Colonial Police Forces vary so greatly, and are confronted with such different problems and local conditions, that uniformity and

¹⁶ George Tomlinson, Minute, August 13, 1935, CO 850/54/20, NA.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ “Colonial Police Service: Proposed Appointment of an Inspector General,” 1941-1945, CO 850/189/5, NA.

‘standardisation’ are impossible.”¹⁹ Despite the support for the idea, however, the Colonial Office continued to hold the line, concluding that “so many of the Colonial Police are armed, and under war conditions an Inspector-General would be able to do comparatively little useful work.”²⁰ The Colonial Office also worried about finding an appropriate candidate for the position because Dowbiggin was “now sixty-one and although...he is still very active, that is rather old for an appointment which would entail a great deal of hard travelling.”²¹ Even though this brought an end to the consideration of Dowbiggin for the position, the Colonial Office assembled a potential list of candidates to pursue after the war, including Percy Sillitoe and R.G.B. Spicer.²² In addition, the Colonial Office worked with the Metropolitan Police to provide advising to the Barbados and Jamaica police in 1944-1945.²³

Although the idea of an Inspector General failed during the war, the conflict clearly caused the Colonial Office to turn a corner on the issue. As explained by Charles Jeffries, “the war had caused general unsettlement. The traditional social structures were being seriously weakened as people gravitated from the country to the towns or from agricultural to industrial employment. The blessings of civilization can never be unmixed; they increase

¹⁹ “Note on the Propose Appointment of an Inspector-General of Colonial Police Forces,” CO 850/189/5, NA.

²⁰ Colonial Office Minute, April 25, 1941, CO 850/189/5, NA.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² “Colonial Police Service: Question of Appointing an Inspector General,” 1945-1946, CO 850/210/2, NA.

²³ “Visit by Superintendent W A Calver of the London Metropolitan Police to Carry out an Inspection of the Jamaica Police Force and Report on His Findings,” April 22, 1944, CO 137/856/2, NA; “Police Force: Report by Superintendent W.A. Calver, Metropolitan Police,” September 1945, CO 28/332/14, NA; “Visit of a Metropolitan Police Superintendent to Jamaica and Barbados to Advise on the Reorganisation of the Police Forces,” 1944, MEPO 2/6093, NA.

the opportunities for the criminal as well as for the respectable citizen. It was inevitable not only that crime should become more widespread and more difficult to prevent and detect, but that industrial disputes and inter-racial clashes should become more common than in the past.”²⁴ In addition to the general fear of crime rising in the colonies, Jeffries also added that there was a fear of “the efforts of Communists in many places to stir up and aggravate any element in a local situation which might be troublesome or dangerous to the authorities.”²⁵

1948 proved to be the critical year in rethinking colonial policing, and imperial security in general.²⁶ There were two causes for this change. First, in February 1948 riots in the Gold Coast led to violent police action against demonstrators, which in turn led to renewed calls for colonial police reform.²⁷ Second, 1948 saw the completion of the UKUSA Agreement, which provided for the sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT) between the United States and the United Kingdom.²⁸ Though ostensibly an agreement between America and Britain, the pact also came to include Commonwealth members such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as well as the colonies. The reason for this inclusion derived from the American need for intelligence gathering stations close to communist territory. Prior to the development of the satellite, Britain’s current and former colonies

²⁴ Charles Joseph Jeffries, *The Colonial Police*. (London: M. Parrish, 1952), 215–216.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 216.

²⁶ Philip Murphy, “Intelligence and Decolonization: The Life and Death of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, 1954–63,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 29, no. 2 (2001): 101–130.

²⁷ Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line : Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945-80* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 55–56.

²⁸ Philip Murphy, “Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa 1945–1965,” *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 3 (2002): 135.

offered this proximity at several points across the globe.²⁹ The necessity of these colonial listening posts contributed to America's support of British colonial rule during the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in Cyprus.³⁰ Additionally, Britain offered America a window into the thought processes of several nonaligned countries throughout the world because these countries continued to pass SIGINT via Enigma Cipher Machines. Used by Germany during the Second World War, this cipher system had been decrypted by British Intelligence during the conflict, but this achievement remained a secret until the 1970s – largely because of the continued utility of the decrypt to early Cold War SIGINT.³¹

Sparked by riots in the Gold Coast as well as growing pressure from the United States for imperial intelligence, Clement Attlee met with Commonwealth premiers in 1948 – including those from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon – to coordinate and improve security standards throughout the British world. As part of this process, the Colonial Office was brought in as a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which coordinated intelligence within Britain and with the United States. The inclusion of the Colonial Office in JIC also brought it into closer contact with MI5, which took on the role of advising colonial security agencies in order to improve intelligence collection and coordination. During the Second World War, MI5 had increased their officers throughout the empire, and also supported the wartime tours of G.C. Denham, who visited colonies throughout the Caribbean in 1943 to improve their internal security. From 1948, however, MI5 greatly

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Richard J Aldrich, *GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (London: HarperPress, 2010), 7–8.

³¹ Ibid., 149; Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire*, 2013, 151–155.

increased their imperial presence through the introduction of Security Liaison Officers (SLOs), who worked with colonial police special branches to collect intelligence.³²

In order to coordinate the work of SLOs, MI5 director and former colonial police officer Percy Sillitoe conducted dozens of tours of colonies from 1946 until 1953.³³ Sillitoe's tours of the colonies reflected a genuine need for security oversight as well as his own desire to escape the drudgery of his domestic work at MI5, a place he referred to as "the Muttonhead Institute."³⁴ As Sillitoe argued, MI5 was "becoming ever more aware that among peoples under British rule who were gradually becoming politically mature and groping towards self-government, the firebrands and malcontents – as well as the men who sincerely felt that Britain was pursuing an overbearing policy towards them – were being stirred wherever possible to rebellion and trouble-making by Communists."³⁵ Sillitoe conducted advisory trips to Egypt, Palestine, South Africa, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya. In the course of these tours, Sillitoe concluded that the colonial police were in desperate need of an expert to help "ensure first-rate local police efficiency."³⁶ Sillitoe told the Colonial Office "that it seemed to me unfortunate and illogical that while there were at the time five Inspectors of Constabulary for Britain, there was nobody at all inspecting and reporting on the police in the colonies. Colonial governors

³² Murphy, "Intelligence and Decolonization," 107–108.

³³ Percy Sillitoe, *Cloak without Dagger*. (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1955), 190–195.

³⁴ A. W Cockerill, *Sir Percy Sillitoe* (London: W.H. Allen, 1975), 185.

³⁵ Sillitoe, *Cloak without Dagger*, 190.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 191.

certainly sent in reports of their own, but that had hardly the same effect as a report by an expert in direct touch with conditions on the spot and also with the Colonial Office.”³⁷

Sillitoe’s comments, as well as the growing pressure from postwar colonial demonstrations, seemed to have finally convinced the Colonial Office that something substantial needed to be done, and in November 1948 Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones appointed William Johnson to a three year term as the first official Colonial Police Advisor.³⁸ A domestic police officer, Johnson had served in the Portsmouth Police before becoming the Chief Constable of Birmingham during the Second World War.³⁹ In 1945, he became one of the Inspectors of Constabulary, working under the Home Office. As Colonial Police Advisor, Johnson was tasked with reviewing each colonial police force to help them improve their organization, administration, and professionalism. Furthermore, Johnson was asked to help improve contact between colonial police departments as well as between the colonies and police in metropolitan Britain.⁴⁰ Johnson’s position was designed to be a civilian adviser, and the Colonial Office hoped that his advice would help to encourage civilian style policing throughout the empire. To help him in this work, the Colonial Office also hired former Met Assistant Commission George Abbiss as Johnson’s deputy. Johnson’s tour of colonial police departments, however, ended up serving as a painful reminder of the backwardness of most colonial police forces. Additionally, this

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “Inspector-General of Police: Consideration of Candidates for Post,” October 1947, CO 54/999/2, NA. Johnson’s title was later changed to Inspector General because the Colonial Office felt that it sounded more official and because they wanted the adviser to be able to wear a uniform.

³⁹ Jeffries, *The Colonial Police*, 216.

⁴⁰ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, 62.

tour helped to engender the ill will of colonial police officers, who felt that only a veteran of colonial policing could properly judge policing in the empire.⁴¹

THE TOURS OF THE W.C. JOHNSON

Johnson's tour in 1949 included Cyprus⁴², Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast⁴³, Nigeria⁴⁴, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. Most of Johnson's visits found him spending a week or more in each colony, visiting not only the main capital headquarters, but also most, if not all, of the regional police headquarters. His reports took into account the tremendous difficulties facing colonial police in each district, but also stressed the need for attention to significant issues. The most significant issue Johnson pointed to in his reports were the poor conditions of service, which he felt led colonial police to either overwork or to not work at all. These conditions included poor pay, lack of housing, lack of uniforms, and underfunded pension systems. The problem of compensation was particularly desperate because of a lack of standardization between colonial police departments. For example, an "Assistant Superintendent in Nyasaland with a commencing salary of £550 is required to accept a [promotion] scale which takes 15 years to reach a maximum of £1,000. His colleagues in Northern Rhodesia commences at £870 and reaches the maximum at five years. The duties are relatively the same and Nyasaland

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "Police Adviser's Report on Cyprus Police Force," 1949, CO 537/4982, NA.

⁴³ "Police Adviser's Report," 1949, CO 96/785/1, NA.

⁴⁴ "Report by the Police Adviser, Mr W C Johnson, on His Visit to Nigeria," 1949-1950, CO 537/5783, NA.

cannot expect to attract the best type... whilst this anomaly remains.”⁴⁵ In addition to poor pay, colonial police officers – particularly those serving in Africa – often lacked the necessary equipment to conduct their work: cars, radios, and record keeping departments. To complicate this whole matter, Johnson also discovered that police in these areas were often having to fill in for the failures of other municipal services. In Nigeria, Johnson found police “having to deal with building construction and repairs,” as well as “vehicle examination and licensing.”⁴⁶ Many colonies in Johnson’s tours also required their officers to work double duty as the local fire brigade.

Johnson’s tours also revealed that colonial intelligence gathering would be frustrated so long as the colonies lacked a functioning Criminal Investigation Department, or CID. He revealed that in many cases colonial police departments without an effective CID simply resorted to arresting and jailing a suspect without evidence or charge. Suspects in Cyprus, for instance, “have been arrested and remanded in custody up to a period of eight days where the actual evidence available has been little more than suspicion with the result that they have to be released for lack of evidence.”⁴⁷ Johnson also stressed that the general professionalism and living conditions of members of the force would need to be improved before any work could be done on developing Special Branches. “The effectiveness of practically all internal security measures,” Johnson argued, “is determined

⁴⁵ “Police Department: Report by the Inspector General of Colonial Police Mr W C Johnson,” 1950, CO 537/5893, NA.

⁴⁶ “Report by the Police Adviser, Mr W C Johnson, on His Visit to Nigeria,” 1949-1950, CO 537/5783, NA.

⁴⁷ “Police Adviser’s Report on Cyprus Police Force,” 1949, CO 537/4982, NA.

ultimately by the degree of loyalty and efficiency of the Police Force as a whole.”⁴⁸ Before you could win the hearts and minds of the colonial public, Johnson contended, the Colonial Office needed to placate the ambitions and pockets of colonial police officers.

Johnson summarized his individual reports for Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones at the end of 1949.⁴⁹ Despite his specific concerns about the policing situation in the colonies, Johnson sanguinely remarked that colonial police have a more “helpful and less aggressive” relationship with the public in recent years, and that the general tendency of these police “has been to come more and more into line with the British Police System.”⁵⁰ He admitted, however, that “taking the Service as a whole it still remains much more related to a military organisation than to that of a civilian Police Force as known in this country.”⁵¹ Furthermore, he remarked that “in the eyes of the native people the Police are still in varied degree viewed with hostility and suspicion.”⁵² To change this perception, Johnson advocated, above all, better training in police work because “if they have been trained as soldiers it is inevitable that they will act as such although wearing Police uniform.”⁵³ Although they agreed completely with Johnson’s analysis, the Colonial Office continued to despair of their ability to actually affect change on the situation because the final decision rested with Colonial Governors. “Colonial Governments,” Creech Jones argued, “were primarily responsible for their own internal security and in default of the

⁴⁸ “Report by the Police Adviser, Mr W C Johnson, on His Visit to Nigeria,” 1949-1950, CO 537/5783, NA.

⁴⁹ W.C. Johnson, “Report of the Police Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,” December 28, 1949, CO 537/5440, NA.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6.

existence of adequate forces locally, they had no choice but to rely on the Police for this purpose.”⁵⁴

Johnson continued his work for the Colonial Office in 1950 with a new tour that included colonies in the West Indies and East Africa. He spent January through April 1950 in Jamaica, British Honduras, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, Trinidad, British Guiana, Barbados, and the Bahamas. From May to September 1950, Johnson toured Kenya, Uganda⁵⁵, Tanganyika⁵⁶, Zanzibar, Mauritius⁵⁷, Northern Rhodesia⁵⁸, and Nyasaland as well as Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland. In the review of his 1950 tour, Johnson argued that the problems found in the 1949 tour were equally important to the West Indies and East Africa.⁵⁹ He continued to stress that colonies needed to improve conditions of service in order to attract and keep the best officers.⁶⁰ In particular, he encouraged the Colonial Office to help the colonies train colonial officers in Britain, and to help them secure up to date equipment, particularly for transportation and communication.

Johnson argued passionately that it was time for the colonial police to stop being seen as a secondary concern, particularly as colonies began to push for self-government. “I have become increasingly concerned,” Johnson wrote, “as to the relative status of the police

⁵⁴ “Note of a Meeting Held by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,” January 13, 1950, CO 537/5440, NA.

⁵⁵ “Police Force: Report by the Inspector General of Colonial Police, Mr W.C. Johnson,” 1950, CO 537/5856, NA.

⁵⁶ “Police Force: Report by the Inspector-General, Mr W.C. Johnson, of the Colonial Police,” 1950, CO 537/5874, NA.

⁵⁷ “Police Force: Re-Organisation,” 1950, CO 537/6104, NA.

⁵⁸ “Police Force: Report by Inspector General of Colonial Police, Mr W C Johnson,” 1950, CO 537/5900, NA.

⁵⁹ “Review of Police and Security Forces: Co-Ordination of Police Adviser’s Reports; Report for 1950,” 1950-1951, CO 537/6952, NA.

⁶⁰ W.C. Johnson, “Colonial Police Service,” February 28, 1951, CO 537/6952, NA.

vis-à-vis other Government departments and which is so very evident whenever the question of salary or pay arises...I cannot help feeling that unless and until trouble arises [the police] are regarded as one of the lower grade sections of Government employees rather than a Service which, under normal conditions, can and will make a valuable contribution to the peace and well-being of a country and, moreover, during times of disturbance is the main instrument upon which the whole community must depend for protection and security.”⁶¹ Johnson felt that this issue was pressing because “undesirable political influences,” such as communism, were beginning to make their way into the colonies. “The police,” Johnson stated, “have been and must increasingly be used as the instrument of Government to combat disruptive activities inspired and encouraged for the purpose of destroying, or at least impairing, recognized Authority.”⁶² Despite this advice, he maintained that “their use in this direction, essential as it is, must not be allowed to confuse the true purpose of a Police Force or the basic principles of policing, even though recent events may increasingly involve the use of force and of arms.”⁶³ Continuing to offer contradictions, Johnson wrote that “there may be no precise declaration of war but, for example, an exploitation of the situation in Malaya by strongly reinforcing the bandit elements and in so doing creating war conditions in fact. In such circumstances, no-one would suggest for a moment that the police should thereupon assume a civilian role...But the situation in Malaya is surely unique and I consider it would be quite wrong to determine

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

basic policy for Colonial Police Forces as a whole upon conditions in that country.”⁶⁴ Not unlike Dowbiggin in Palestine or Halland in Germany, Johnson continued to press for the maintenance of British style policing, even in the midst of serious colonial emergencies. Like these other policing experts, Johnson considered imperial and domestic policing on the same plane rather than distinct ventures. This policy would largely be followed by Johnson’s successors as Police Adviser to the Colonial Office, W.A. Muller⁶⁵ and Ivo Stourton,⁶⁶ during the 1950s.

COLONIAL POLICE TRAINING AND CONFERENCES AT RYTON-ON-DUNSMORE

In order to follow through with the recommendations from Johnson’s reports, the Colonial Office worked to employ a new scheme of training for colonial police officers at the Metropolitan Police College at Ryton-on-Dunsmore.⁶⁷ To help colonies pay for this training, the Colonial Office drew upon a £1.5 million purse provided by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945.⁶⁸ Through this grant, the Colonial Office was able to secure 50 spots at the college for prospective and current colonial police officers. While this training was primarily administered by domestic British police officers, the

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “Co-Ordination of Reports of Inspector-General of Colonial Police,” 1952, CO 968/278, NA.

⁶⁶ “Hong Kong: Report on Inspections of Hong Kong Police by Deputy Inspector General of Colonial Police,” 1954 1953, CO 1023/106, NA; “Reports of Inspector General of Colonial Police,” 1955-1956, CO 1030/168, NA.

⁶⁷ “Review of Colonial Police and Security Forces: Co-Ordination of Police Adviser’s Reports; Report to Minister by Secretary of State,” 1949-1950, CO 537/5439, NA. Courses were also held at Hendon and Bramshill.

⁶⁸ Arthur Creech Jones, Circular Telegram, “Colonial Police Service – Training at the Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore,” September 15, 1949, CO 537/5439, NA.

commandant of the College, P.D.W. Dunn, encouraged the Colonial Office and William Johnson to look for a veteran colonial police officer, who would serve as the Director of Colonial Studies, to teach veteran colonial police and candidates particular courses that applied to their work.⁶⁹ This move was necessary, as Johnson put it, because “there are some aspects of policing peculiar to the Colonial Service not covered and for which we must make provision if the best use is to be made of the courses for our purposes.”⁷⁰

Thus, in addition to receiving training in finger printing and traffic control, colonial police officers also received a substantial amount of riot training from the War Office’s School of Infantry Training.⁷¹ This riot control training made it clear that the instructions were only to be relied upon in case of an actual emergency, but they also included a conspiratorial element.⁷² “Before the war,” Colonial Studies Director F. Wallace argued, “most riots in the British Colonial territories had their roots in either religious intolerance or unpopular legislation. These were usually comparatively simple matters to deal with...Nowadays, however, Colonial civil disturbances follow another pattern that of the calculated embarrassment of the local Government by persons of conflicting political ideologies. The direction of such disturbances may well emanate from outside the particular territory, may be part of a larger pattern, and one frequently disguised as a local issue.”⁷³ Though most colonial police would be unable to pick up on “conflicting political

⁶⁹ P.D.W. Dunn, “The Training of Students from the Colonial Police Forces,” November 23, 1949, CO 877/43/1, NA.

⁷⁰ W.C. Johnson, *Minute*, January 1, 1950, CO 877/43/1, NA.

⁷¹ Colonial Office Circular, “Memorandum on Specialized Courses of Training for Colonial Police Officers Available in the United Kingdom during 1952,” December 20, 1951, CO 877/42/3, NA.

⁷² F. Wallace, *Malayan Police*, Director of Colonial Police Studies, “Riot Drill Procedure for Colonial Police,” CO 968/269, NA.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1.

ideologies,” they were encouraged to believe that “his Government is whole-heartedly behind him.”⁷⁴ Wallace, nevertheless, emphasized the use of minimum force in dispersing riots, as automatic weapons were “not compatible with...the Common Law of England.”⁷⁵

The influence of this training on colonial policing is questionable, particularly as colonial emergencies during the 1950s made it more difficult for colonial governments to spare their officers.⁷⁶ Additionally, even when colonial police could attend the courses, it was not always clear that the training was imparting the desired British tradition on the police. Home Office files reveal that course instructors complained about colonial police segregating themselves from the majority of Ryton students. Many domestic officers and trainees felt “that some Colonial policemen show little interest in our Statute law or the details of our organisation, [and] they overlook the main aim, which is to propagate the ideals and character of the British policeman and his relationship to the public.”⁷⁷ For their part, many colonial police and trainees found these courses useless. M.C. Manby, who served in Singapore, Malaya, and Kenya, felt that the course gave him “an illuminating view of the English police which even then felt itself perversely misunderstood and was I thought, out of tune and losing touch with its public...I felt...that the directing authorities considered that the colonial policemen on the course were not worth listening to, or even perhaps capable of talking about, anything more than Riot Drill.”⁷⁸ Striking a similar note was R.A.F. Viggor, veteran of the Uganda police, who argued that the “courses in the U.K.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁶ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, 65.

⁷⁷ Home Office Minute, October 24, 1960, HO 287/120, NA.

⁷⁸ M.C. Manby, Aide de Memoir, Law Enforcement X, Kenya 3, CR-MA, MSS. Afr.s.1784, RH.

had, in my view, two disadvantages at a time when there was a requirement to select and train a considerable number of local officers in a fairly short time scale, namely: 1. The limited relevance of part of the syllabus, in particular that of the Police College to conditions in Uganda. The limited education and in some cases intellect of many of the students increased their difficulty in relating what they had been taught to local police work. 2. the limited number of vacancies on these courses.”⁷⁹ Viggor went on to argue that “it was not appreciated by all officers that the African policeman, unlike his UK counterpart, would not work as an individual, conscientiously without close supervision backed by a system of discipline which enabled suitable punishment and be administered without delay for minor or comparatively minor infractions. Such a system was regarded by many officers as ‘military’ and inappropriate for a civil police force.”⁸⁰

The Colonial Office hoped to smooth out some of the differences between domestic and colonial police through a series of conferences between colonial police commissioners at Ryton and Bramshill, held between 1951 and 1960.⁸¹ These conferences provided a place to discuss the reports by the Inspector General as well as an opportunity for colonial commissioners and their officers to receive training on everything from forensics to traffic regulation. In addition, the conferences were designed to promote discussion between colonies on police work in “‘cold war’ conditions and in the event of a major war.”⁸² The

⁷⁹ R.A.F. Viggor, Aide de Memoir, Law Enforcement XX, Uganda 3, Maco-W, MSS. Afr.s.1784, RH.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ “Conference of Colonial Police Commissioner 1951: Comments from Colonial Governments on the Recommendations”, CO 968/283, NA; “Record of the Second Conference of Commissioners of Colonial Police Forces”, 1954, CO 885/124, NA; “Record of the Third Conference of Commissioners of Police”, 1957, CO 885/133, NA; “Record of the Fourth Conference of Commissioners of Police”, 1960, CO 885/139, NA.

⁸² J.C. Morgan to G.R. Curtis, February 19, 1951, CO 537/6939, NA.

idea for the conferences developed out of William Johnson's tours, though they may also have owed something to police in Canada. In the midst of Johnson's second tour in 1950, a proposal arrived at the Colonial Office from Leon Lambert, Deputy Director of the Quebec Provincial Police, to establish a Commonwealth Police Association for Commonwealth countries and those colonies still within the empire.⁸³ Lambert's proposal reached the Colonial Office through the Home Office, and invitations were also sent to police in Australia, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Martinique, New Zealand, Pakistan, and South Africa. Though the Colonial Office agreed that the idea had some merit, Johnson and the other members of the office concerned with policing concluded that the proposal would cost too much and could damage relations within the commonwealth.

The first conference of colonial police commissioners featured police from the Bahamas, Cyprus, the Gold Coast, Gambia, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaya, Mauritius, North Borneo, Sarawak, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, Tanganyika, Trinidad, Sudan, and Uganda.⁸⁴ The geographical distribution of these colonies made this police conference not simply a colonial policing event, but, as argued by Home Secretary James Chuter-Ede, a "global" policing conference.⁸⁵ On the advice of Charles Jeffries, Chuter-Ede delivered the opening remarks of the conference, which stressed the need for colonial commissioners to address "the internal canker of communist inspired subversion and

⁸³ "Commonwealth Police Association," 1950, CO 537/5446, NA; "POLICE: Proposals to Set up International Police Association and Commonwealth Police Association," 1949-1951, HO 45/25265, NA.

⁸⁴ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, 65; "Conference of Commissioners of Police April 1951: Members of the Conference," 1951, CO 537/6942, NA.

⁸⁵ "Conference of Commissioners of Police April 1951: Speech by Secretary of State," 1951, CO 537/6941, NA.

treachery” throughout the colonies.⁸⁶ The emphasis on internal security was shared by those colonial officers attending the conference. For instance, police from Malaya and Sierra Leone wanted discussion of military aid for civilian forces and riot procedure, while Kenya proposed talk on the use of “sickening gas.”⁸⁷ Kenya Police Commissioner M.S. O’Rourke bluntly declared, “I believe the objection [against sickening gas] arises principally from mawkishly sentimental reasons and not real humanitarian ones, for of course there can be no argument as to which is more humane, the sick stomach or the bullet in the belly.”⁸⁸

Yet even in the midst of this discussion regarding communism, rioting, and tear gas, the members of the conference and the Colonial Office still called on colonial police forces to press toward the ideal of British policing. This emphasis was seen most clearly in the conference’s discussion of how to police colonies “at the later stages of colonial constitutional development.”⁸⁹ Charles Jeffries chaired a working party to consider the issue in the run up to the 1954 conference. This working party felt that while sufficient efforts were being made to improve colonial police, there remained a strong concern that these improvements would not be finished before “constitutional advance.”⁹⁰ “So long as a Colonial police force remains under the direct control of a Governor,” the working party contended, “British tradition and public opinion provide a safeguard against improper use

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ “List of Items Suggested for the Agenda,” CO 968/284, NA.

⁸⁸ M.S. O’Rourke to Colonial Office, March 26, 1952, CO 537/7623, NA.

⁸⁹ “Colonial Office Working Party on the Position of Police Forces in the Later Stages of Constitutional Development,” 1953-1954, CO 1037/2, NA; “Preparations for Colonial Police Commissioners Conference of 1954,” 1951-1953, CO 968/284, NA.

⁹⁰ Charles Jeffries, “Report of the Working Party on the Position of the Police in the Later Stages of Colonial Constitutional Development,” April 22, 1953, CO 968/284, NA.

of the force.”⁹¹ Yet, as the colonies developed, “that official will in process of time be replaced by a local politician, who will find the Police Force as an instrument in his hands which he may use properly (by United Kingdom standards) or of which, either from temptation or desire, he may not be able to resist the improper use for the ends of his own party or even himself.”⁹² Jeffries and the working party worried that without some constitutional safeguard to keep police out of politics, the various colonial forces could become time bombs waiting to go off after the British departed.

Despite this fear, however, the Colonial Office remained surprisingly sanguine about their ability to reform the police before departure. Indeed, though they worried that the situation in Malaya could arise elsewhere, the Colonial Office nevertheless felt that it would remain an “abnormal” situation.⁹³ No one embodied this optimism regarding colonial security more than Charles Jeffries, who publicly promoted the police reform movement in his book *The Colonial Police*, which was published shortly after the first meeting of colonial police commissioners. In this book, Jeffries stated his belief that there were three overlapping phases of colonial policing beginning with the establishment of law and order by the military, followed by a semi-military constabulary, and concluding with the development of a civilian police force. Dowbiggin’s Ceylon was the only colony to undergo all three stages, but Jeffries contended that the Ceylon experience could be duplicated elsewhere. An early proponent of the policy of trusteeship, Jeffries believed that

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 1.

⁹³ “Record of the Conference of Colonial Commissioners of Police,” 1951, CO 885/119, NA.

the betterment of empire for both the rulers and the ruled was part of Britain's general mission as a great Christian nation.

ARTHUR YOUNG AND KENYA

Unfortunately for Jeffries and the Colonial Office, these prosaic declarations regarding the progress of the colonial police arrived in the midst of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya.⁹⁴ The response of the Kenya Police, in concert with the King's African Rifles, to this uprising established new lows for British imperialism, and exposed the failed transition of colonial police forces to a British model. Under "emergency regulations," the Kenya Police participated in an undeclared war against Mau Mau insurgents while also establishing a brutal system of interrogation, torture, and imprisonment for Kikuyu suspected of being sympathizers to the uprisings. In their work to suppress the local population, Kenyan Police relied heavily on elements of the hearts-and-minds campaign waged by Field Marshal Gerald Templer in Malaya.⁹⁵ This influence was first initiated by Thomas Askwith, who was sent by Kenya's Governor Evelyn Baring to study the operation of Malayan detention camps in 1953.⁹⁶ Askwith's subsequent policies, however, caused the situation in Kenya to deteriorate even further, and led to the appointment of another Malayan veteran, Arthur Young, as commissioner of the Kenya Police.

⁹⁴ David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005); Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).

⁹⁵ T. N Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁹⁶ Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, 103.

For those invested in reforming the colonial police, Arthur Young seemed to represent the ideal commissioner for Kenya. A veteran of several domestic police services, including the London Metropolitan Police, Young rose to become Chief Constable of the City of London Police in 1949 before being loaned out on temporary assignments to aid colonial police services in crisis.⁹⁷ His selection for work in the colonies resulted from his high reputation among domestic police officers as well as his stint as a police adviser for the Allied Control Commission in occupied Italy from 1943 to 1945. Young's first temporary assignment came in the Gold Coast in September 1951, where he advised police after the disturbances of 1948. From there Young was named Commissioner of the Malayan Police in 1952, and worked closely with Templer to institute the hearts-and-minds philosophy. Throughout these tours, Young upheld the ideal of British policing, believing that there were "four fundamental principles...to democratic police service."

The recommendations which are contained in my report are based on the four fundamental principles which I consider are indispensable to a democratic police service. (a) the organization and purpose of the police should be to provide a service rather than a force. (b) The police should by their efficiency merit the respect, and by their humanity deserve the esteem, of the public. (c) The police should enjoy freedom from political and all other forms of external influence since only in such independence can they exercise that impartiality which is necessary to justice and to the protection of the rights of individuals. (d) The police should receive pay and conditions of service which signify the value of their services to the public, and appreciate the special qualities required of a policeman, as well as the exacting moral responsibilities and physical demands which his office imposes upon him.⁹⁸

Though Young admitted that British policing could not "be prescribed or produced by appropriate organisation or technical efficiency alone," he nevertheless declared that "the

⁹⁷ "Papers of Sir Arthur Edwin Young," 1954 1951, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 486, RH; Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, 72.

⁹⁸ Arthur Young, "Report on the Gold Coast Police, 1951," Gold Coast, 1951, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 486, RH.

underlying principles of a police service in a democratic state are constant and universal.”⁹⁹ Nearly all of his policies on the ground in the Gold Coast and Malaya prescribed a careful study – if not outright mimicry – of police procedure in the United Kingdom.

The extent to which this advice was actually followed, however, was questionable.¹⁰⁰ While working with the Gold Coast Escort Police, Young suggested that “instead of whacking people over the head with our riot sticks it would be much better, and, I think, more effective if you exercised tact and forbearance and did all you could to persuade the crowds to conform with your requirements.” Upon leaving the Gold Coast, the Escort Police presented Young “with two riot sticks – one labelled ‘Tact’ and the other ‘Forbearance’” and promised to employ tact and forbearance in their future work.¹⁰¹ Young’s advice often appeared naïve and overly earnest, even for the early 1950s. In Malaya, he required police to wear “a badge of friendship,” featuring two clasped hands next to the words “ready to serve,” hoping to build up a closer relationship between the police and the public. Young revealed in his memoir for the Oxford Records Project that he thought of the idea for the badge from watching *The Wizard of Oz* “in which a dejected lion was transformed into a brave and spirited one by being awarded a medal for courage.”¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, 73.

¹⁰¹ Arthur Young, “The Gold Coast Police,” Gold Coast 1951 continued, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 486, RH. Although it appears that European officers did not take his message seriously, Young reported that in subsequent discussions with Ghana Police at Interpol conferences he learned they still studied his report on the Gold Coast Police, and referred to it as their “Police Magna Carta.”

¹⁰² Arthur Young, “Narrative Report, 1967,” Malaya Police, 1952-53, Part III, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 486, RH, 20-21.

While Young's work in the Gold Coast and Malaya won him international recognition, his efforts in Kenya would be brief and ineffective. Arriving in November 1954, Young discovered a colonial state totally under the control of the local settler population, which was completely opposed to any reform to their police state.¹⁰³ The settlers argued for this repressive system because of the threat to European lives, but Young, who had nearly been killed several times in Malaya, judged that the danger to Europeans in Kenya to be "unbelievably small...[while] the Africans themselves suffered much more grievously."¹⁰⁴ Whereas the government of Kenya hoped that Young would immediately install the reforms he used in Malaya, Young felt that he could make no progress until charges of police violence were investigated and punished. To proceed with these investigations, the Commissioner argued that he needed to secure the independence of the police and its internal rule from the Kenyan government.

Young, however, found his moves in this direction blocked by Governor Evelyn Baring and Baring's secretary, Richard Turnbull, who argued that "the logic of [Young's] case was all very well but that his knowledge and experience of East Africa assured him that the time for such reforms had not yet come and that it was still very far away."¹⁰⁵ After repeated attempts to present police atrocities to Baring and the Kenyan Government, Young submitted his resignation at the end of 1954. In his initial report of the resignation to the Colonial Office, Young openly discussed the violence perpetrated by police as well as the problems relating to the independence of the police from the government. When he

¹⁰³ Arthur Young, "Narrative, 1954," Kenya Police, 1954, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 486, RH.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

returned to London in January 1955, however, Young was forced by Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd to revise his report to take out all reference to police brutality and torture.¹⁰⁶ Lennox-Boyd assumed that the release of Young's unedited report would not only bring down Evelyn Baring, but the Colonial Secretary himself.

Bound by the Official Secrets Act, Arthur Young was unable to divulge the extent of atrocities in Kenya, though he did attempt to impress the severity of the situation upon the 1954 meeting of colonial police commissioners, which he addressed in July 1954. Even in the midst of this disaster, however, the members of the conference continued to offer appeals to the importance of democratic policing. Without a sense of irony, "the Conference recognized that it was most important for police to establish friendly and frequent contacts with the public, particularly children and old people...so that the confidence thus engendered in the public would serve to counteract their traditional feeling of resentment towards the police as being the strong arm of the imperialist power."¹⁰⁷ By the third meeting of the conference in 1957, however, the tide had turned against these sorts of declarations. The program for this conference clearly showed the loss of enthusiasm and forward thinking seen in earlier conferences. Yet instead of blaming the nature of colonial policing for the loss of this momentum, the members of the conference tended to blame indigenous police. The move toward "localization" led many officers at this conference to complain that "while it was everywhere desirable to produce an effective civil constabulary, the material available for recruitment in a number of territories was of so low

¹⁰⁶ Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*, 278.

¹⁰⁷ Record of the Second Conference of Commissioners of Colonial Police Forces, p 5, 1954, CO 885/124, NA.

a quality that there was very little chance of achieving this object until educational and social standards had improved throughout the community, which would take a very long time.”¹⁰⁸

This argument for the continued necessity for European police also received support outside of the Colonial Office, as seen by Gerald Templer’s report to the Cabinet in 1955.¹⁰⁹ Asked by the Cabinet to review imperial security, Templer produced a wide ranging report of the Empire’s military, police, and security services strength.¹¹⁰ Though he allowed for the development of self-government in several colonies, Templer nevertheless argued of the continued necessity of British presence in the emerging commonwealth to head off the spread of communism. To this end, he stressed the reform and demilitarization of the police. Templer, following the recommendations of the Inspector General of Colonial Police, argued for the establishment of a police department in the Colonial Office, with two additional deputy inspector generals of Colonial Police. Additionally, he called for better pay, better housing, and better promotion rates in order to recruit the best talent. Yet Templer stipulated that the capital for this reform would have to come from the British Government, as Colonial Governors could only be led by money.¹¹¹ This money would never materialize, and Britain was left to make haphazard eleventh hour transitions to indigenous policing throughout the period of decolonization.

¹⁰⁸ “Record of the Third Conference of Commissioners of Police,” 1957, CO 885/133, NA.

¹⁰⁹ Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 145.

¹¹⁰ General Sir Gerald Templer, “Report on Colonial Security,” April 23, 1955, CAB 129/76/39, NA.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

THE COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

As Britain struggled to reform policing in empire, they also fought to maintain police cooperation with foreign countries. Similar to imperial reform initiatives, however, this effort largely failed due to politics. In particular, the careful cultivation of the United States as a member of Interpol came to a sudden end in 1950, and helped to damage the functioning of international police cooperation for another decade. This event resulted from Cold War political divisions as well as personal animosity between the FBI and members of Interpol's executive committee. The failure of Britain and the other leading nations of Interpol to keep the United States within their organization would contribute to America's pursuit of unilateral criminal justice initiatives during the 1950s.

The beginning of the divide between the FBI and Interpol came in April 1949, when ten Czech nationals left their country on two stolen commercial airplanes and flew to the American zone of occupied Germany to seek asylum.¹¹² In April 1950, the Prague Police issued warrants for the arrest of these individuals on the basis of stealing the aircraft and for "endangering the lives of the passengers on board the planes."¹¹³ After some hesitation, Interpol agreed to circulate these warrants issued by Czech authorities to the members of their organization in May 1950. Interpol's Secretary General, Louis Ducloux, argued that the warrants needed to be circulated because the individuals involved committed a "common law crime" – a crime recognized as a crime by all members of the organization – by stealing the two aircraft. The FBI, which knew of the location of the offenders, refused

¹¹² Mathieu Deflem, *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 203.

¹¹³ Louis Ducloux to Harry Söderman, July 3, 1950, FO 370/2123, NA.

to comply with the warrant, stating that the accused were political refugees and not criminals.

Along with the issue of the Czech refugees, the FBI's relationship with Interpol encountered further difficulty at the group's 19th General Meeting in June 1950 at the Hague. The FBI was represented at this meeting by their Paris Legal Attaché Jack West, who hoped to receive a further explanation regarding the decision to circulate the warrants for the Czech refugees.¹¹⁴ He left this meeting, however, with the firm opinion that the FBI needed to withdraw from the organization. This conviction had less to do with the controversy over the Czech refugees than with personal differences between West and members of Interpol's executive committee. In his report on the conference to J. Edgar Hoover, West revealed that the trouble started as soon as he registered at the conference. At the registration desk, he not only learned that the American delegation at the conference included the head of the U.S. Secret Service, U.E. Baughman, but that Baughman's name appeared before West's on the conference program. When he approached Jean Nepote, Interpol's assistant Secretary General, on the issue, Nepote claimed that participants were listed alphabetically. When this turned out not to be true, Nepote blamed the Dutch organizers of the conference. West learned, however, from the Dutch representative to the conference that Nepote was responsible for writing the program. At the conference reception, West noted with distain that Baughman was "surrounded by a number of [Interpol] officials. Camera flash bulbs popped steadily and after each shot there was jostling and maneuvering on the part of the delegates so that those who had not been

¹¹⁴ Jack West to J. Edgar Hoover, June 22, 1950, Bureau File 94-1-2061-727, FBI.

photographed with the Chief of the Secret Service might have the opportunity. [Interpol] officials and delegates seemed delighted to have such an important personality among them.”¹¹⁵

In addition to the Baughman kerfuffle, West also reported a disagreement with Interpol General Reporter Harry Söderman. At the first plenary session of the conference, West reported that Söderman “brusquely informed” him that he was adding two American police experts to the United States’ list of representatives to Interpol as technical advisers. Söderman asked West to send a cable to the FBI to advise on the matter before making a formal announcement. West learned, however, that the two presumed experts had already taken up their positions at the conference. He refused to send the cable to Washington, arguing that the FBI was the only recognized US representative to the organization and would designate their own technical advisers on an as needed basis. West surmised that Söderman’s insistence on appointing these two advisers to the commission stemmed from their assistance in revising Söderman’s book, *Modern Criminal Investigations*.¹¹⁶

Along with their disagreement over the advisers at the conference, Söderman and West also exchanged barbs earlier that year at a dinner with Louis Ducloux and former Legal Attaché Horton R. Telford in Paris.¹¹⁷ At this dinner, Söderman – who had spent several months as a technical instructor at the New York Police Department – openly shared with West his criticism of the FBI, including Hoover’s propaganda and the political nature of the Bureau’s work. West concluded that Söderman’s hatred of the FBI was the

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 5.

result of his time with the NYPD, which provided Söderman with financial assistance in the preparation of his book. West believed that Söderman's support for the NYPD and his advancement of the two police advisers represented "a concrete example of how [Interpol] is used by its officials to further their own personal interests."¹¹⁸ On the basis of his interactions with Söderman and Nepote, as well as the issue of the Czech refugees, West recommended that Hoover resign from the commission. West believed that the FBI could still liaise with other countries, and "enjoy the fruits of membership in [Interpol] without financial obligations or the hazards of entangling commitments."¹¹⁹

Hoover briefly debated the issue with his executive council before sending a resignation letter to Interpol President Florent Louwage in July 1950. Hoover argued that the Bureau's membership in Interpol did not "justify the financial outlay involved," and felt that the commission could rely upon a close relationship from other US agencies or departments in the absence of the FBI.¹²⁰ Hoover added that "the FBI were also surprised to notice what is apparently a change in the policy of the I.C.P.C. with regard to non-involvement in political matters."¹²¹ Reminding Louwage of the warrants for the Czech defectors, the FBI director stated that these "individuals [were] wanted by another government on obviously political charges although the circulars indicated that the apprehensions were desired for vaguely described criminal charges."¹²² Hoover concluded

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 13.

¹²⁰ J. Edgar Hoover to Florent Louwage, July 18, 1950, MEPO 2/8715, NA.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

that “the issuance of such notices may well open the door to the use of the Commission for purposes other than those provided for in its statutes.”¹²³

The London Metropolitan Police remained surprisingly quiet on this issue until after Hoover’s resignation. Whereas Norman Kendal had successfully shepherded the United States into international cooperation, Ronald Howe took a hands off approach to the postwar rift between the FBI and Interpol. Writing to Howe on the issue, Harry Söderman felt that the problem related to the “communist hysteria in the U.S.” which allowed Hoover to build up “a formidable fortress to defend himself if some superior would ask for the reason for his resignation.”¹²⁴ Söderman called on Howe to write to Hoover because he was “the only man who may be able to put things straight again.”¹²⁵ Howe, however, felt that he could not convince Hoover to reconsider, believing that such a move would be “wasting our breath.”¹²⁶ He recommended instead that the Executive Committee of Interpol consider asking another American police agency, perhaps the New York Police Department, to join. Howe admitted the idea was not ideal, but continued to believe that “we must have some American representative with us.”¹²⁷

In the midst of these discussions, Florent Louwage travelled to Washington in order to convince the FBI to reconsider.¹²⁸ During this meeting, Louwage claimed that the decision regarding the Czech refugees had been made by Louis Ducloux alone, and without

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Harry Söderman to Ronald Howe, October 2, 1950, MEPO 2/8715, NA.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ronald Howe to Harry Söderman, December 12, 1950, MEPO 2/8715, NA.

¹²⁷ Ronald Howe to Harry Söderman, November 14, 1950, MEPO 2/8715, NA.

¹²⁸ H.H. Clegg to J. Edgar Hoover, September 19, 1950, Bureau File 94-1-2061-755, FBI.

reference to the other members of the Executive Committee. He also blamed Söderman for stepping out of line by appointing the two technical advisers to the Commission, and promised that Louis Ducloux and Ronald Howe “would see to it that Söderman was not re-elected to any position in [Interpol].” With regard to the membership fees, Louwage said “the Bureau could not pay any fee or only \$30.00 or \$300.00” because they wanted the Bureau’s membership above all.¹²⁹ The FBI maintained that the membership fee, whatever it was, was not the issue, though FBI Agent Hugh Clegg added that “it seemed strange that [Interpol] executives were meeting at various expensive spas in Europe instead of conserving the funds.”¹³⁰ The Bureau remained firm on their commitment to leave the organization, and Louwage returned to Europe empty-handed.

The members of Interpol’s Executive Committee met in Copenhagen in February 1951 to discuss this issue as well as the upcoming general meeting in Lisbon.¹³¹ At this meeting, Ducloux continued to argue that the reasons for Hoover’s withdrawal from the origination were “debatable” and suspected the real reason for the FBI leaving the organization was because of expense. Ducloux felt that “the expense of the American yearly contribution is more than offset by the activities engaged in by the [Interpol] in the fight against the counterfeiting of dollars.”¹³² The committee also discussed the possibility of including either the U.S. Secret Service or Harry Anslinger’s Narcotics Bureau as possible replacements for the FBI, but both organizations had declined official

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ “Executive Committee: Report of Meeting at Copenhagen 19 to 21 Feb. 1951,” 1950-1951, MEPO 2/8716, NA.

¹³² Interpol General Secretariat, “Meeting of the Executive Committee at Copenhagen, Report,” March 1, 1951, MEPO 2/8716, NA, 2.

membership. As a result, Louwage stated that the Czechoslovak case had devastated Interpol's relationship with the United States, and that "in the future, even if they appeared to be covered by the implications of Common Law, requests concerning facts of a political character should be refused by [Interpol]."¹³³

Despite Hoover's reservations, however, Ronald Howe and the Met continued their support of the organization, and advised the Foreign Office to maintain British membership. The Foreign Office expressed their approval, saying that even though "the Commission has once been used in an attempt to secure the return of political refugees is not sufficient reason for this country ceasing to participate in its activities."¹³⁴ Part of the reason for Howe's enthusiasm was the fact that Louis Ducloux was replaced as Secretary General for the commission by Marcel Sicot in June 1951. Howe believed that Ducloux's departure would mean that no further political crimes would be offered up to the rest of the commission for consideration. Although Sicot avoided political crimes, he pursued several policies which upset British police. In particular, under Sicot, Interpol briefly worked to become an intergovernmental organization (IGO) instead of a non-governmental organization (NGO) in the eyes of the United Nations.¹³⁵ Howe, the Met, and the Foreign Office resisted this project, as they believed that making the organization a meeting of sovereign states rather than police officials would bring politics into the equation.

¹³³ Ibid., 3

¹³⁴ S.H. Gellatly to S.J. Baker, October 25, 1951, FO 370/2123, NA.

¹³⁵ "International Criminal Police Commission (Interpol): Revision of Statutes," 1955-1957, HO 287/452, NA.

Along with their efforts to resist the move to IGO status, the Met also worked to discourage colonial and Commonwealth police from joining the organization. This effort reflected the postwar policies of the Colonial Office, which hoped to keep the colonies and Commonwealth countries under the influence of the British state. After the establishment of the office of Inspector General, for instance, the Colonial Office discontinued support for individual colonial police officers to attend meetings of Interpol, preferring instead to send the Inspector General of Colonial Police as the sole representative of the British Empire. This approach was partly encouraged by Interpol's statutes, which stated that "only sovereign states or autonomous countries [could] be members" of the organization.¹³⁶ This decision meant that British Colonies could only work with Interpol through either Scotland Yard or the Inspector General of Colonial Police.

This situation, however, did not completely discourage all colonial police eager for international cooperation. In March 1957, Singapore put forward a proposal to establish a regional Interpol headquarters in the colony to help to control crime in the Straits, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia (Burma, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Thailand).¹³⁷ The Colonial Office attempted to head off this proposal by arguing that this regional office would not be legal under Interpol's constitution. Additionally they argued that that this new office would include a number of countries which they "felt could not be trusted with confidential information."¹³⁸ In particular, the Colonial Office expressed concern with

¹³⁶ Secretary of State for the Colonies, "International Criminal Police Commission," Circular Dispatch, July 29, 1953, CO 968/268, NA.

¹³⁷ "Establishment of Regional Headquarters for INTERPOL in Singapore," 1957-1958, CO 1037/94, NA.

¹³⁸ T.C. Green to I.H.T.J. Stourton, Colonial Office, May 6, 1957, CO 1037/94, NA.

Burma and Thailand, where they suspected local police of colluding with drug traffickers. The Colonial Office, however, was not entirely against the idea of some sort of Interpol office within a British colony, as such a station could help bring newly independent Asian countries into the Western fold, perhaps preventing them from joining an emerging Afro-Asian bloc. Interpol, for their part, worried that the new regional office, would “mean duplication of records, staff and accommodation...and perhaps some loss in efficiency in dealing with more than one Region.”¹³⁹ Interpol’s leadership also worried that a regional office in Singapore might encourage new member countries in the Middle East and South America to push for their own regional centers.

Despite the trepidation of the Colonial Office and Interpol, the bloc of concerned countries, led by Singapore, pushed forward with their proposal, hoping to include it for discussion by Interpol’s general assembly at the 1957 Lisbon conference.¹⁴⁰ This final push was only put down after a private meeting between the Singapore bloc and Interpol leadership in Paris, during which Interpol agreed to extend wireless communications to Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the organization agreed that any new Interpol facilities in Southeast Asia would be staffed by local officers rather than Europeans.¹⁴¹

The lengths to which the Singapore bloc were willing to go in order to be included in Interpol’s future shows the continued enthusiasm of the colonial police for international police work. That this plan was so firmly rejected by both Interpol and the Colonial Office

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ N.G. Morris, Commissioner of Police Singapore, to International Criminal Police Organization, May 24, 1957, CO 1037/94, NA.

¹⁴¹ D.A. Greenhill, Commissioner General Singapore, to J.D. Hennings, Colonial Office, July 12, 1957, CO 1037/94, NA.

shows how much international police cooperation had change since its origins in the interwar period. Whereas the interwar period often saw metropolitan police following the initiatives of colonials with regard to cooperation and the exchange of technical knowledge, the postwar period found metropolitan forces taking advantage of those initiatives to pursue their own political motives. Much like other international movements of the interwar period, the pursuit of international police cooperation and crime control became an avenue used by the British and others to defend imperialist policies and Cold War agendas.

America's abuse of international policing during the 1950s and 1960s is a well-worn topic in the historiography of the Cold War.¹⁴² CIA and FBI funded instruction programs for police from the developing world played a role in the creation of brutal police states in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Yet Britain also attempted to create similar programs during the postwar period until emergencies within their existing empire forced them to redirect resources. The most important of these missions occurred in Colombia between 1948 and 1952¹⁴³, but British police also advised local forces in Lebanon¹⁴⁴ and Thailand.¹⁴⁵ In each of these instances British police worked to combat leftist elements to protect conservative, and often brutal, regimes. Although eager to continue this work into

¹⁴² Ethan Avram Nadelmann, *Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); Peter Andreas, *Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control Ininternational Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*, *New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies* (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century*, *Culture, Politics, and the Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).

¹⁴³ Clive Emsley, "Marketing the Brand: Exporting British Police Models 1829–1950," *Policing* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 11.

¹⁴⁴ "Anti-Communist Measures in the Lebanon. Provision of a British Police Adviser. Code 88, File 1015," 1949, FO 371/75319, NA.

¹⁴⁵ "Law and Order: Relations with Siam; Assistance for Siamese Police," 1949, CO 537/4756, NA.

the 1950s, Britain found it increasingly difficult to spare police officers for these missions because of colonial crises. While the police missions to Lebanon and Thailand could rely partly on nearby colonial police, the mission to Colombia was manned primarily by a group of retired police officers scraped together at the last minute.¹⁴⁶ The deficit of available personnel, combined with a general lack of funding, limited British efforts to influence policing throughout the developing world during the 1950s and 1960s. The lack of British presence in this field helped to open the way for a series of American policing missions, particularly in Asia and South America.

CONCLUSION

The postwar period initially seemed an era of promise for British policing ventures abroad. Not only would Britain help to establish democratic policing in Continental Europe, but they would finally reform the woefully backwards colonial police. Yet by the late 1940s, the plans to remake Europe had gone astray, and the hopes to mend imperial policing were on their way there. These missions appeared to have the best intentions, but their execution relied on underfunded police as well as a slavish dedication to a model of policing that rarely functioned outside of Britain itself. In a similar way, British hopes to mend and strengthen democratic policing through Interpol also suffered a tremendous loss with the withdrawal of the United States in 1950. Though Interpol would continue to thrive under the direction of the French Sûreté, it never enjoyed the same influence that it experience

¹⁴⁶ “Internal Affairs in Colombia. Provision of British Police and Other Advisers. Code 11, File 1641,” 1949, FO 371/74691, NA.

during the interwar period because it lacked close relations with the United States and the United Nations. And while America would rejoin the organization in 1960, it returned after spending the previous decade promoting repressive policing and surveillance throughout the developing world.

Conclusion

In September 1949, Sergeant Arthur Troop of the Lincolnshire Constabulary decided to create an international organization.¹ Calling it the “International Police Association,” Troop hoped that his organization would “link together through a sense of service and friendship, all serving and retired police officers, irrespective of rank, sex, race, colour, language, or religion.”² Though he envisioned the organization as primarily a goodwill service, Troop hoped that it could eventually host conferences, publish journals, and even maintain a library to support international police cooperation. Troop used his department’s directory to send leaflets about his organization to dozens of police departments in Britain, and several more around the world. He reported that his scheme received support “from almost every corner of the British Isles, and from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Holland, Gold Coast, Kenya, and elsewhere.”³

Upon seeing Troop’s advertisements regarding the organization, the Home Office wrote to Troop’s commanding officer at the Lincolnshire Constabulary, R.H. Fooks, to see if the advertisements were legitimate or some sort of scam. Fooks reported that the advertisements were indeed genuine, and that Troop was a member of the force. Although Troop conducted his work for the International Police Association during off hours, Fook felt that his subordinate did not understand the amount of work that would be involved with

¹ “POLICE: Proposals to Set up International Police Association and Commonwealth Police Association,” 1949-1951, HO 45/25265, NA.

² Arthur Troop and Alfred Fisher, “International Police Association,” HO 45/25265, NA.

³ Arthur Troop, “International Police Association,” Extract from “Police Chronicle”, October 7, 1949, HO 45/25265, NA.

running an organization, let alone an international one.⁴ Yet Fook felt that “nothing short of a definite order from me that Troop should forthwith desist from his activities would have served to stifle his enthusiasm.”⁵

The Home Office felt satisfied that the association was a “purely unofficial venture” that seemed “to be doing little more than arranging good-will correspondence with police officers and organizations abroad and fixing up facilities for cheap holidays for policemen in continental countries.”⁶ Other official police bodies, however, were convinced that Troop was up to something. The Chief Constables Association of England and Wales, for instance, wondered if the new organization could be “a vehicle capable of subtle subversive activity,” and forwarded their concerns to MI5.⁷ The Security Service responded by appealing to the Home Office for information, forcing the Home Office to reassure the counterespionage group that there was “no suggestion that the organizers...have any ulterior motive.”⁸

Although the International Police Association was cleared of subversive activity, the British Government remained concerned that group would reach for official recognition from foreign governments. This fear was realized in September 1950, when the National Federation of Belgian Police Forces invited International Police Association representative and City of London Police constable Herbert Godwin to their 50th Anniversary Congress.⁹

⁴ R.H. Fook to S.H.E. Burley, Home Office, September 9, 1949, HO 45/25265, NA.

⁵ R.H. Fook to K.A.L. Parker, Home Office, August 9, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

⁶ S.J. Baker, Home Office to W.W. Thornton, June 30, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

⁷ Extract from the Minutes of the No.8 District Conferences of Chief Constables' Association of England and Wales, June 21, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

⁸ Home Office Minute, August 2, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

⁹ Herbert Godwin, “P.C.’s visit to Antwerp (Belgium),” September 27, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

In Godwin's report on the Congress to the City of London Police, the lowly constable described how he was received like a foreign dignitary, staying at a "first class hotel" and provided with 800 Francs to cover his expenses.¹⁰ At the conference itself, Godwin discovered that he had been named the delegate for all of Great Britain, and that despite attendance by police from other countries, the Union Jack was the only flag other than the Belgian Tricolors decorating the conference venue. During the conference proceedings, the collected assembly unanimously passed a motion to support the development of the International Police Association.

As part of the closing ceremonies, Godwin delivered a speech – simultaneously translated into Flemish by a police officer from Bruges – thanking the congress for their support for the International Police Association, and expressing his hope that the association could one day develop into "a world wide Federation of Police Forces to safeguard the Rights and Privileges which we justly earn in our everlasting war against crime and the criminal."¹¹ Godwin followed this congenial statement, however, with a curiously offensive conclusion, in which he stated his hope that police in Belgium might one day attain the "happy status" enjoyed by British Police.¹² Godwin believed that British Police, unlike their continental counterparts, had passed through the period of being considered "a necessary evil" by the general public, and now stood "as Guide, Counsellor and friend" to "every peace loving citizen."¹³ Upon receiving a copy of Godwin's report,

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Herbert Godwin, "Copy of Final Speech to Belgian Police Congress," September 27, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

the Home Office worried that he had given European police an inflated impression of the International Police Association, but were thankful that “Godwin expressed no objectionable opinions” in his remarks to the congress.¹⁴

Despite the Home Office’s attempts to discourage Troop and his associates, the International Police Association continued to grow as an unofficial body for police around the world. In addition to hosting international conferences and holiday tours, the association began a scholarship whereby member police could visit the United Kingdom to study British policing.¹⁵ The group also created an international youth camp for the children of member police located at Gimborn Castle in Germany. By the early 1970s, the organization boasted a membership of over 100,000 police and retired police, making it the largest international police organization in terms of individual members in the world.¹⁶ Though the organization never influenced policy in the same way as Interpol or the International Police Conference, the International Police Association was granted consultative status by the United Nations in 1967 for its work as a goodwill organization. Troop himself was awarded a British Empire Medal in 1965, though the Home Office still judged that his organization “could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be described as serving a necessary purpose.”¹⁷

The International Police Association may have not received government backing, but the beliefs that animated this organization closely resemble those that drove Britain’s

¹⁴ Home Office Minute, October 31, 1950, HO 45/25265, NA.

¹⁵ “International Police Association: Congress to Be Held in Blackpool in 1964,” 1962-1964, HO 287/531, NA.

¹⁶ “International Police Association: Acceptance by HRH The Duchess of Kent of Invitation to Perform Opening,” 1973-1975, HO 290/86, NA.

¹⁷ Home Office Minute, February 5, 1963, HO 287/531, NA.

work with official forms of international policing. Although it was largely designed to be a Rotary International for police officers, Troop's organization nevertheless shared a conviction with official bodies that the world needed police cooperation on a global scale. Similarly, the group's effort to provide scholarships for police training represented a belief that police needed professionalization in order to meet challenges posed by modern criminals. Finally, the International Police Association's Lincolnshire origins pointed not only to the enthusiasm of British police for international work, but also to the assumption that British police were inherently superior to their foreign counterparts – even if they were no name Police Constables like Herbert Godwin.

As this dissertation has shown, British hubris with regard to policing caused them to avoid the early versions of international police cooperation during the 19th century. Yet the perceived increase in international crime – represented most clearly by the panics over bomb-throwing terrorism and white slavery – eventually drove the country to join European efforts to control the menace. European police, for their part, clearly desired this connection to Britain because of the international prestige and assumed technical proficiency of Scotland Yard. American police possessed some of this same desire for connection to Britain, as evidenced by the work of Raymond Fosdick and August Vollmer. British police during this period remained skeptical of the utility of international police cooperation, but they never showed any hesitation in taking on the mantra of “the best police in the world” or the “Mecca of policing.”

While the early phase of international police cooperation largely found the world pursuing Britain, the interwar period found the Empire beginning to engage with the

movement, but only on terms it could accept. In this way, the Metropolitan Police, through the work of Norman Kendal, played a decisive role in the elevation of Interpol over Enright and Collier's International Police Conference. This development resulted from Kendal and Met's desire for police cooperation that was free from politics, free from supranational policies, and most of all, free from joyriding. Indeed, Kendal's personal commitment to Interpol was so strong that it found him defending – almost to the start of the war – the Met's relationship with the organization after the Nazi takeover. And though Britain did not support the continuation of the organization during the Second World War, it played a leading role in the postwar reconstruction of Interpol through Ronald Howe.

Simultaneous to this work with international police organizations, Britain also oversaw the reform of its colonial police forces. Although this reform has typically been regarded only within the realm of imperial history, this dissertation has shown that this work occurred within and interacted with an international context. Indeed, the main agent behind the colonial police reform movement, Herbert Dowbiggin, operated under the assumption that there was no distinction between policing a colonial environment and policing elsewhere in the world. Dowbiggin insisted that colonial police were capable of civilian, British style policing without needing to resort to violence or support from the armed forces. At the same time, Dowbiggin's insistence on civilian policing rested not only on a desire to reform colonial police, but also developed from a conviction that British style policing produced the best information to maintain imperial control.

Dowbiggin's unofficial reforming efforts eventually influenced official police missions during the postwar period. These missions – including Britain's occupation work

and the tours of the Inspector General of Colonial Police – found the Empire pursuing a forward policy with regard to policing that looked to actively spread British style policing around the globe. British police often presented these missions as altruistic endeavors to encourage democratic principles, but they frequently included significant repressive elements. These elements can be seen, for instance, in the encouragement of anticommunist principles during the occupations of Germany and Greece, or the recommendations regarding Special Branch work in the reports of the Inspector General of Colonial Police.

Yet even in the midst of these calculated political endeavors, one cannot completely discount the notion that British police experts meant what they said when they proposed civilian police reforms. Indeed, the dogmatic commitment of G.H.R. Halland to civilian style policing nearly led to the collapse of the British occupation of Germany. In a similar way, Arthur Young naively designed friendship badges for Malayan Police based on the Wizard of Oz despite several attempts on his life by insurgents. Thus there was at least some genuine effort to encourage the velvet glove instead of the iron fist with regard to police missions and colonial law enforcement.

Too often, however, these projects failed because of a lack of funding, a lack of time, or local resistance. Many rank and file police were as frustrated as Halland and Young with this failure. Geoffrey Morton, a veteran of the Palestine and Nyasaland Police, wrote in 1957 “what a pity it is that in almost every colonial territory no effort is made to build up an efficient and contended police force until an emergency arises. When that happens the powers that be suddenly wake up to the fact that the police force is the most important

section of the whole government.”¹⁸ Striking a similar chord was Christopher Harwich of the Uganda Police Force, who felt that it was an “anomaly that the police, generally considered the eyes and ears, and, when required, the strong arm of government, are refused the least facilities to gain the confidence and co-operation of the public.”¹⁹ Peter Wynn Norris, also of Uganda, appeared more optimistic about Britain’s efforts, claiming that “there was a time when the British Police tradition applied to the policing of some of the larger townships. Patrols were generally unarmed except for a standard British Police type truncheon.”²⁰ But Norris also worried about the British legacy in Uganda, saying that whereas in the colonial period “a corporal and three constables could go out to tackle serious cattle raiding in Karamoja and arrest and bring to trial law-breakers, a post-independence approach was to send several companies of the military armed with automatic weapons.”²¹ Norris admitted that he did not know if the British “legacy was the right legacy,” and supposed that the policing that “was right for Devon [England] need not be right for the West Nile.”²²

One is left to wonder what difference these democratic efforts, particularly in the colonies, might have made had they received the resources they needed. Would the world, for instance, need to have waited until the 21st century to know the truth about the repression of Mau Mau if Arthur Young had been supported in his work in Kenya? It is

¹⁸ Geoffrey J Morton, *Just the Job; Some Experiences of a Colonial Policeman*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957), 242.

¹⁹ Christopher Harwich, *Red Dust: Memories of the Uganda Police* (London: Vincent Stuart, 1961), 153.

²⁰ Peter Wynn Norris, Aide de Memoir, Law Enforcement XX, Uganda 3, Maco-W, MSS. Afr. s. 1784, RH.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

easy to criticize the foolish way officers like Halland and Young pursued democratic reform, but it is hard to argue that theirs was not the sort of foolishness that most would want to see in their police.

It was too often the wrong sort of foolishness that plagued Interpol during the postwar period. Although Ronald Howe and the Met played an important role in rebuilding the organization after the Second World War, they did little to help steer Interpol away from political issues during the Cold War. Admittedly, this failure was largely out of British hands because the organization spent this period dominated by French police. In addition, the United States and the FBI seemed bent on pursuing unilateral policies with regard to international criminal justice with or without a political excuse. Yet these problems persisted even when a Metropolitan Police officer, Richard Jackson, assumed the leadership of Interpol in 1960.²³ His three year tenure did see the return of the United States to Interpol, but also witnessed new politically based divisions, particularly over the inclusion of Israel in the organization.²⁴ This issue also played into Interpol's struggles with policing terrorism, a struggle that eventually encouraged member nations to develop their own international police organizations such as TREVI (1975) and Europol (1999).

While British police have historically argued against the mixing of politics with international policing, the advent of The Troubles from the late 1960s and Al-Qaeda in the 2000s brought about a clear change in this approach. This new approach, however, developed largely without consulting established international organizations such as

²³ Richard Levfric Jackson, *Occupied with Crime* (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1967).

²⁴ "Refusal of Visas for Pakistan for Delegates from Israel Attending Meeting of International Criminal Police Organisation Held in Lahore. Code VR File 1642," 1959, FO 371/142396, NA.

Interpol, and instead relied upon close coordination with select allies, particularly the United States. It is ironic that international police associations flourished in a period when the perception of international crime was greater than the occurrence, but now struggle in an age where the threat of this criminality is all too real.

Britain now appears far more eager to build up the capabilities of their domestic police than with encouraging cooperation with foreign forces. Indeed, the international crime that saw a lessening of international police cooperation also witnessed the steady buildup in the repressive power of British security through surveillance services like CCTV and GCHQ. This transition can perhaps best be observed by considering the policing of two international events. Whereas the world marveled at Britain's New Police at the Great Exhibition of 1851, it expressed concerns over the country's use of soldiers²⁵ and rooftop rockets²⁶ to secure the 2012 Summer Olympics in London. Long gone are the days in which British police could argue they possessed a different model for law enforcement than other countries. In a world seemingly filled with school shootings, bombs on trains, and planes as bombs, there is little reason to believe that they will ever do so again.

²⁵ Robert Booth and Nick Hopkins, "London 2012 Olympics: G4S failure prompt further military depoloyment," *The Guardian*, July 24, 2012. Accessed July 24, 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/24/london-2012-olympics-g4s-military>.

²⁶ Robert Booth, "London Rooftops to carry missiles during Olympic Games," *The Guardian*, April 29, 2012. Accessed July 2, 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2012/apr/29/london-rooftops-missiles-olympic-games>.

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Vita

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This dissertation was typed by Robert David Whitaker.