

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATION AND REORGANIZATION OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: A STORY OF NETWORK
PRACTICE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

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To my father, Hiroshi Iida, in celebration of the ultimate optimism.

And to my son, Yohji Eduard Iida, in celebration of the universal humanity.

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ABSTRACT

Article 9 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution is one of the few constitutional laws that “forever renounces war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute” (the first clause). What makes the article even more progressive is the second clause, which further renounces the right to maintain “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential” and the right of belligerency of the state. Famous for this “peace clause”, the Japanese constitution has remained contested ever since its establishment, but has resisted challenges in the National Diet and the courts for seventy years. After the massive protest cycles of the 1960s to early 1970s, protest activity in Japan declined, and there was no major protest mobilization over this issue for several decades. Suddenly in 2004, however, a new movement called the Article 9 Association (*Kyūjō no kai*) emerged, and grew rapidly to encompass over 7,500 chapters across Japan and abroad. What led to this new social movement and how and why did it grow so rapidly after such a long period of quiescence? This dissertation examines these puzzles using social movement concepts and theories.

The study accepts as its foundation McAdam’s political process framework (1982) to understand how the longstanding contentious issue re-emerged as a new social movement under new political and social conditions in the 2000s. This is a movement that re-emerged after a long period of abeyance (Whittier 1997; Crossley and Taylor 2015), and to understand the movement’s emergence and rapid rise under these new conditions, it uses the perspective that social movements are network structures (Diani and McAdam 2003).

In examining closely how the Article 9 Association re-mobilized old networks and created new ones, the study not only demonstrates that the life of social movements may

continue across protest cycles through network practices, but also contributes a more relational understanding to social movement theories of movement continuity. It thus proposes what is understood as ‘continuity’ through certain actors’ maintenance efforts may be understood as infinite processes of network formation and reorganization of social movements-as-networks.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution of Japan is one of the few constitutional laws in the world that “forever renounces war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute” (the first clause). What makes the article even more progressive is the second clause, which further renounces the right to maintain “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential” and the right of belligerency of the state. The Japanese constitution famous for this special “peace clause” has remained contested ever since its establishment, but resisted challenges in the National Diet and in the courts for seventy years. After the massive protest cycles of the 1960s to early 1970s, protest activity in Japan declined, and there was no major protest mobilization over this issue for several decades. Suddenly in 2004, however, a new movement called the Article 9 Association (*Kyūjō no kai*) emerged, and grew very rapidly to encompass over 7,500 chapters across Japan and abroad. What led to this new social movement and how and why did it grow so rapidly after such a long period of quiescence? This dissertation examines these puzzles using social movement theories.

The Initial Appeal

On June 10, 2004, a group of seven men and two women, all prominent intellectuals in Japan, held a press conference to announce the establishment of “the Article 9 Association (*Kyūjō no kai*).” “An appeal from the Article 9 Association” stated:

The Japanese constitution now faces a great challenge.

Through the use of weapons reaching the cruelty of the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Second World War claimed over fifty million lives. As a result, the citizens of the world learned the lesson that resorting to force should never be an option, even for the purpose of resolving international disputes.

Bearing an enormous responsibility for having continuously pursued a war of invasion, Japan decided to work towards realizing this global vision, and thus established a constitution including Article Nine which stipulated the renunciation of war and of military force.

Yet today, half a century later, the movement to “revise” the Japanese constitution, and Article Nine in particular, has risen to the forefront with an unprecedented scale and intensity. The proponents of that movement intend for Japan to follow the United States and change into a “war-waging country.” For that reason, they [want to] authorize the use of the right to collective self-defense, dispatch the Japanese Self Defense Forces overseas, allow their use of force, and commit other such actions that, for all intents and purposes, violate the restrictions of the constitution. Moreover, they are trying to do away with such important measures and policies as the three non-nuclear principles and the ban on arms exports. Finally, in order to raise children to become leaders of a “war-waging country,” they are trying to change the Fundamental Law of Education. This essentially alters the state of the nation that the Japanese constitution has aimed to achieve, threatening to convert Japan from a country that strives to resolve

conflicts without military force to a nation that prioritizes military action above all else. We cannot allow that conversion to occur.

The United States' attack on Iraq and the morass of the occupation that followed makes it clearer to us day by day that the resolution of conflict through force is unrealistic. The use of force only results in robbing a country and its people of their livelihood and of their happiness. Since the 1990s, armed interventions by major nations into regional conflicts have also failed to result in effective resolutions. That is why, in such places as Europe and Southeast Asia, efforts are being strengthened to create regional frameworks that can help to resolve conflicts through diplomacy and dialogue.

Today, as we question our path in the 21st century based on the lessons of the 20th, the importance of grounding diplomacy on Article Nine emerges with renewed clarity. To call the dispatch of Self Defense Forces into countries that do not welcome it an "international contribution" is nothing more than arrogance.

Based on Article Nine, Japan needs to develop ties of friendship and cooperation with the peoples of Asia and other regions, and change a diplomatic stance that only prioritizes a military alliance with the United States. Japan must play an active role in the tide of world history by exercising its autonomy and acting in a pragmatic manner. It is precisely because of Article Nine that Japan can engage its partner nations in peaceful diplomacy while respecting their various positions, and collaborate with them in the fields of economy, culture, science and technology.

In order to join hands with all peace-seeking citizens of the globe, we feel that we must strive to shine the light of Article Nine upon this turbulent world. To that end, each and every citizen, as sovereign members of this country, needs to personally adopt the Japanese constitution, with its Article Nine, and reaffirm their belief in it through their daily actions. This is a responsibility that the sovereign members share for the future state of their country. Thus, in the interest of a peaceful future for Japan and the world, we would like to appeal to each and every citizen to come together for the protection of the Japanese constitution: You must begin making every possible effort to thwart these attempts at “constitutional revision,” and you must begin today.

The appeal was signed by Inoue Hisashi (author), Umebara Takeshi (philosopher), Ōe Kenzaburō (author), Okudaira Yasuhiro (constitution scholar), Oda Makoto (author), Katō Shūichi (critic), Sawachi Hisae (author), Tsurumi Shunsuke (philosopher), and Miki Mutsuko (UN Women’s Society) (last names are placed first as it is customary in Japan).

As soon as the appeal was published, it created a great sensation, resulting in voluntary formation of more than 3,000 grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association across the country within the first year. The number then reached 7,528 in the next several years and remains constant up to this day. While this phenomenon exhibits the high level of significance of the Japanese constitution Article 9 to the people in Japan, those who are unfamiliar with the article and its true worth would naturally wonder why so many Japanese people want to mount such a movement to fight against the revision attempt.

Together with the preamble, Article 9 represents the spirit of the current constitution of Japan, which was established in 1946 based on the people's sincere reflection upon wartime atrocities. Article 9 was not a result of a temporary swell of emotion or a simple brand pushed by the Occupation, but a fruit of the more general efforts of the human race to establish world peace, which has continued since Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (1795) (Yamamuro 2007). Numerous historical accounts have made evident that the pacifist thoughts that yielded Article 9 also existed previously in Japan (Horio 2016, Yamamuro 2007, Kawakami 2006, Kawai 2004, Takemae 2002, Sasaki 1997, Ienaga 1974, MacArthur 1964, Shidehara 1951, Nakae 1887).

Despite the global significance of the article that renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute, it has also been the source of domestic conflicts between those who claimed the necessity of force to maintain peace and who believed that the reality is quite otherwise and that peace is eventually achievable only by abolishing the military. The 2004 appeal of the Article 9 Association is clearly written from the perspective of those who believe peace can only be maintained by renouncing military force, in the face of the political steps taken by the Japanese government, which promoted the revision of Article 9 based on their already bankrupt (yet still popular) claim that the constitution was forced on Japan by the Allied Occupation.

Domestically in Japan, there is a great deal of debate among constitutional scholars about whether or not Japan's maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces (hereafter "the SDF") infringes Article 9 (Yanase 2016). Yamauchi Toshihiro, representing the view of most Japanese constitutional scholars of the previous generation, maintains that this constitutional article pursues absolute pacifism without a military (Yamauchi 1992). Many scholars in the field of law and politics support this basic position (Tsujimura 2000, Watanabe 2009, Urata 2012). Yamauchi

proposes the idea of constitutional pacifism and argues that Article 9 requires complete demilitarization and permits only an unarmed defense. He continues to criticize not only the recent decision of the Japanese government but also its interpretation that allows the existence of the SDF (Yamauchi 2015). A majority of scholars still interprets Japan's decision to maintain the SDF under Article 9 as unconstitutional (Nihon hōdō kenshō kikō 2016). On the other hand, Hasebe Yasuo, a leading constitutional scholar who views the SDF as constitutional, explains that there are two types of legal norms: 'rules' that provide answers to specific problems and 'principles' that operate to guide solutions in a certain direction. In Hasebe's view, Article 9 is not a rule but a principle, and that "maintaining the minimum force necessary for self-defense is thought to be permissible under the present constitution, and moreover, consistent with the fundamental idea of constitutionalism" (Hasebe 2006:4). Even Hasebe, however, holds that the right to collective defense is impossible to be interpreted as constitutional.

Aside from constitutional scholars, some Japanese experts in the field of national security and international relations suggest that discussion over constitutional amendment should consider more practical consequences of operating the SDF under Article 9. The constitutionality of the SDF is an important question; however, it is equally urgent to look more seriously at the reality of SDF operations. Moreover, the meaning of "self-defense" has changed since the end of the Cold War. Isezaki, for instance, explains that it is unlikely that the world's most powerful countries (i.e. the permanent members of the United Nations (hereafter the "UN") Security Council, including the United States, England, France, Russia, and China) would fight a war in the traditional sense, because international law has developed to the extent that the world does not support any invasive war. A nation under the UN regulation could conduct an armed attack on other nation only for self-defense. Indeed, as the former Prime Minister of Japan Yoshida

Shigeru once stated, “All war is self-defense,” and a country can commit offensive acts of war as long as it can justify the action (Isezaki 2015:647). In any rate, an offensive country must justify that its use of force was for self-defense. Moreover, the so-called “enemy” of the international society today is increasingly non-state, and borderless in many senses—for instance, the Islamic State, a militant group that follows a fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam and has committed a number of terrorist attacks, has been successful in recruiting internationally through the Internet, and participants gather under their title of ‘justice’ beyond religion. Furthermore, Japan is still an “enemy country” by the UN Security Council decision. The UN charter allows members of the UN and its regional security council to impose military sanctions when an “enemy country” reacted against decisions made after the war or moved to reestablish an invasive policy (Chapter VIII, Article 53). Could any war of “self-defense” be an option for Japan under such a condition? In this context, for Japan to name China an “enemy” at the national level discussion is nothing more than nonsense.

As many have also pointed out, if one seriously considers Japan’s national security, the existence of fifty-four nuclear reactors all along its coastal line should be the most pressing concern, and prevention of terrorist attacks on them must be the priority. Thus, from the viewpoint of national security and conflict resolution experts, the mainstream discussion lacks a serious sense of crisis. This line of discussion suggests more effective utilization of the SDF to play a mediator role in resolving international conflicts (Isezaki 2015). On the other hand, Yanagisawa Kyōji, a former top officer of the Ministry of Defense who decided to send the SDF to Iraq, has reflected on that decision since. He reports that he was unable to think beyond the option to send the SDF abroad at that time, and proposes that we could think more seriously of the option not to send the SDF outside Japan and contribute to international society with

something other than military force (Yanagisawa 2015). Thus, more grounded discussion about the role of the SDF in relation to the constitution is seeking a new perspective for the future, where Japan could take a more active, peaceful leadership in the global society.

From the outsider's perspective, American popular writer Ian Buruma asserts that the Occupation's legacy had some "profound defects" on Japan: Buruma views that the Japanese pacifist constitution as one of such defects, which left Japan with "a total dependency on others to defend [itself]" (2004:152). He claims that this is the cause that kept right-wing revanchism alive and polarized opinion on the constitution, where there should have been consensus.

Buruma seems to underestimate, however, the extent of Japanese involvement in the process of drawing up the constitution. The process involved a number of Japanese citizens, including not only experts of constitutional law, but also citizens groups who compiled their own constitutional drafts to be publicly presented and considered in the national discussion (Yamamuro 2007).

Politicians and bureaucrats were also heavily invested in the process and were quite proud of the final outcome (Satō 2016). In fact, moreover, as we will see in the following chapters, Japanese public opinion about the constitution is not as polarized as Buruma seems to think. At a minimum, the Japanese including the revisionists accepted the constitution, and even the contest over interpretation of Article 9 does not always mean an objection to its high ideal of pacifism. If there is a sharp disagreement over the constitution, it is between the Japanese people and the central government. "Right-wing revanchism" was kept alive because the view is actually shared by the central government, which in turn gives those right wing groups a voice, while downplaying the demand for better compensation for both domestic and foreign victims of the country's wartime aggression, and even the basic rights of the Japanese people that are stipulated

in the current constitution. This position of the central government under the Liberal Democratic Party is clear in the party's draft amendment of the constitution published in 2012.

In fact, from the viewpoint of comparative constitutions, McElwain and Winkler (2015) found that the LDP's 2012 draft reduced civil rights in comparison to the current Japanese Constitution, while introducing no significant change to political institutions. Using the full data set housed by the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009), the study has shown that the LDP draft does not fix the issue that is making the current Japanese Constitution an international outlier (institutional vagueness), but reduces its progressive character that is on a par with today's standard. This suggests that the LDP draft, despite its ostensible reason for the need of constitutional revision that the constitution is outdated, does not even "update" the constitution. Clearly, the true aim of the LDP draft is to eliminate Article 9 and to make Japan once again a "normal," militarized country.

Views like Buruma's suggest affinity with the so-called "normal country" framework that basically assumes that a military is necessary for maintaining national security (and even world peace) and that a country is independent (therefore "normal") only if it has a military. However, the idea of Article 9, and the sensibility of the Japanese people who have deeply adopted the constitutional article by their own choosing, poses a fundamental question to such assumptions.

Discussions regarding Article 9 are political. They tend to be ideological, but also need to be more practical and grounded in reality, for truly peaceful purposes. In this sense, the dispute surrounding Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is a microcosm of the global struggle about war and peace. It is clear in the above appeal that the movement of the Article 9 Association is mounted consciously on the realization that their movement means more than a

domestic political fight. Moreover, as this dissertation will make clear, those who responded enthusiastically to the appeal were also aware of the historical significance of this struggle to protect Article 9.

Purposes of the Study

Today, over a decade after the formation of the Article 9 Association in 2004, Japan has come closer than ever before to actually revising the constitution for the first time in 70 years. To join forces with the Article 9 Association, new opposition movements have been mounted to fight this attempt. Given that the issue at hand concerns the Japanese military, the result of the present struggle will also impact heavily on the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

More importantly for the dissertation, the movement of the Article 9 Association is also a suitable subject for a sociological study of social movements, because it provides a theoretical platform to improve sociological understanding of social movement continuity from the perspective of social networks. It accepts as its foundation the political process approach to social movements (McAdam 1982), which views social movements as arising out of longstanding grievances that only come to the fore when changing social, economic, and political conditions present a new political opportunity or threat that in turn becomes the basis for social movement mobilization. Most students of social movements would agree that networks are important in social movements, and that social movements are likely to be rooted in existing social networks. Through more recent studies in which networks have become the very focus of analysis, many social movement scholars now regard network processes as the very core of social movements (Diani and McAdam 2003, Diani and Bison 2004). In that sense, this study of how the network structure of the Article 9 Association developed is also a contribution to the

basic sociological study of social organization and the creation of social institutions, which often begin as social movements and then may become more institutionalized.

The Article 9 Association is a vast network, and it is rooted in social networks created through previous mobilizations. However, the Article 9 Association would not have been able to create such a large-scale movement if it was simply rooted in existing social networks, especially in the case of Japan where social movements were historically divided into two or more factions. Moreover, contentious social movements were in abeyance (Taylor 1989, Whittier 1997) for three decades in the country, staying virtually “invisible” (Steinhoff 2015) to the general public despite their continuous activity. Given this context, it is important to ask not only what kind of social networks the Article 9 Association is rooted in, but also how these social networks have created the present form of the Article 9 Association. To answer these questions, the dissertation studies the Article 9 Association as a large and complex horizontal network. It investigates the processes through which the Article 9 Association was created, the ways in which grassroots chapters were organized and maintained, and how different chapters were connected to each other as well as to the original Article 9 Association.

The dissertation will reveal that the Article 9 Association is rooted in the social networks accumulated by the 1960s political generation that emerged in the opposition movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty. Surviving the abeyance period that followed the original protest cycle, many of these activists have been playing leadership roles in various social movements in Japan. These activists also have borne the consequences of the serious schisms that afflicted their past movements. When the nine figures announced their “Appeal from the Article 9 Association” to the Japanese public in 2004, constitutional revision was felt as an impending crisis, much as it is today in the mid-2010s. The 1946 Constitution of Japan remains the most fundamental legal

foothold for democratic citizenship for all people in Japan. The constitution that requires approval of the super majority of both Houses, as well as achieving a majority of the national referendum for its amendment, as stated in Article 96. Hence, gaining majority support for its cause was a practical goal for the Article 9 Association. For this purpose, overcoming the major conflicts that remain within the 1960s political generation, which still is the major force of Japanese social movements today, was an urgent problem for the movement.

Therefore, the present study will first find out about past conflicts within the 1960s political generation, and the ways in which participants in the Article 9 Association would overcome these conflicts. In so doing, the study shows the concrete ways in which the Article 9 Association has achieved its present form of a vast and horizontal network, and explains why this was essential for reactivating the entire sector of social movements of the country.

Given the significance of Article 9 that marked a milestone in the global efforts toward outlawing of war, and that only the Japanese people are able to protect the article, reactivation and continuation of social movements in Japan has a general importance in order to continue the historical process toward world peace. Indeed, it was eventually the power of American citizens movements that actualized the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or officially General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Yamamuro 2007:184-194). Clearly, the present struggle to protect Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is a descendant of such previous movements in the United States and elsewhere. Thus, the present study is based on the conviction that social movements do make differences in reality, and their continuation is essentially important for the healthy development of our society.

Composition of the Study

For these purposes, the dissertation delivers the following chapters: building on the social movement literature about protest cycles and social networks, Chapter II sets the theoretical framework of the study, and lays out a set of research questions the dissertation will address. In so doing, it explains why the study needs to look at the Article 9 Association. It also describes the research design.

Chapter III presents the historical backdrop of the emergence and development of the Article 9 Association. Building on a historical overview of the effect that Cold War politics had on the Japanese left and its peace movements, the chapter focuses on the political process in Japan since the 1960s, through which contentious social movements were divided in the country, and how this resulted in the long period of abeyance that followed. In so doing, it also explains why Article 9 came to have additional symbolic significance as the linchpin of the peace constitution when a new political threat to Article 9 led to the creation of the association to mobilize opposition to its revision. It then introduces the rise of the new generation of social movements in the 2010s, which emerged after the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami in March 2011, and how this new generation began to be engaged in positive discussion about the constitution and democracy.

Chapter IV describes the processes of formation of the Article 9 Association in detail. It will show how the original Article 9 Association was formed; how so many citizen groups had come to become grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association; and how quickly the original Article 9 Association became the “headquarters” of the nationwide network of the several thousands of Article 9 Associations. In other words, it will show the processes through which local leadership groups took shape, how these local networks expanded to become local

grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association, and how these chapters attached themselves to the original group of nine intellectuals. Similar processes will be observed with other types of grassroots chapters, such as occupation-based and workplace-based chapters, reflecting the innovative ways that the association expanded its network by building on existing social ties of various types. The chapter also describes the major types of activities these grassroots chapters conduct, and explains how these chapters get connected to each other to compose the grassroots-level networks of the Article 9 Association.

Chapter V discusses the “clearinghouse chapters” of the Article 9 Association. “Clearinghouse chapters” are chapters that facilitate and maintain networks of grassroots chapters (Steinhoff 2003). They often regard themselves as independent chapters as well. Clearinghouse chapters now exist in the majority of prefectures of Japan, and major industries such as mass media also have them. This chapter looks at six prefectural clearinghouse chapters chosen by theoretical sampling. Each of these clearinghouse chapters strives to overcome a different type of the conflicts that were created in the course of past movements such as the student movements in the 1960s and 1970s and the labor movements in the 1980s, all of which are part of the historical legacy of the 1960s political generation. My analyses are focused on the ways in which each chapter overcomes these conflicts, and in so doing, the chapter underscores that participants in the Article 9 Association movement are consciously creating a massive new network beyond the existing groups by bridging the cleavages between them. In this sense, the clearinghouse chapters are an innovative device for the Article 9 Association movement to successfully transform the old, divided movements into a new unified network. The objectives and activities of clearinghouse chapters are embedded in unique histories, local social movement organizations, and other resources available in their respective local areas. Thus, the participants

concentrated their energy to bridge the past gaps and expand their networks in their respective locations. Together, these six cases draw the framework of the network built by the 1960s political generation in Japan today. Moreover, this analysis contributes to theoretical and empirical understanding of the role of such clearinghouse groups, which are widely used in Japanese social movements and also occur in other countries but have rarely been studied in depth.

Chapter VI analyzes the major functions of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association in the first few years of its activity. The headquarters constitutes the symbolic and charismatic leadership, and is the intelligence of the movement. While representing the entire network of the Article 9 Association at the national level, the headquarters provides the movement slogans and goals, as well as the latest information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing changes in politics in relation to their activities. The headquarters hosts the national exchange meetings and publishes newsletters and digital mail magazines in order to encourage communications among grassroots chapters and strengthen their horizontal connections. It also publishes booklets that recorded its constitutional seminar series to promote constitutional literacy among the general public. As will be shown in the way in which it dealt with the 2011 triple disaster in northeastern Japan, the headquarters responds quickly to salient issues that arise occasionally and keeps the movement relevant to the changing circumstances, each time through serious reflection on its roles and purposes in relation to social reality. This character of the headquarters, as well as the adaptability of grassroots chapters that compose the network of the Article 9 Association, has been essential for the movement to make new connections to create a broader coalition in recent years.

Chapter VII begins with highlighting the first achievement of the Article 9 Association.

Drawing on the political process framework, the chapter describes how the development of the Article 9 Association network coincided with the reversal of public opinion on Article 9, which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet in 2007, and eventually the fall of the LDP government in 2009. The chapter then explains how the Article 9 Association dealt with the new political threat caused by the 2011 triple disaster and resultant comeback of the LDP government under Abe, who has been insisting on revising Article 9. The chapter also shows that the headquarters is a coalition of some of the most connected leaders: each of the nine founders possesses unique personal and professional backgrounds and the group does not necessarily share views on matters other than Article 9 and the constitution. The secretariat, moreover, is composed of not only socially and politically active university professors with different expertise, but also the leaders of two different social movement groups that had kept their distance before joining the Article 9 Association. As much as its adaptability, this character of the headquarters was also essential in the Association's development, not only for it to reactivate social movements in Japan, but also for it to claim high centrality within the broader movement in later years, thereby laying the foundation for its constitutional movement to continue beyond its original cycle of protest.

Chapter VIII discusses the new political process after the triple disaster in March 2011 destabilized the society and led to the emergence of a new generation of activists. In so doing, the chapter deals with a remaining question: 'continuity' of the Article 9 Association in the new generation. While the Article 9 Association has created its vast network with real impact in politics, the movement has been missing younger participants. Those who became active in the new anti-nuclear movements did not automatically connect to the Article 9 Association that deals with the constitution and Article 9. It did not take too long, however, for these younger activists

to realize that the issues they faced are interrelated, and in fact derive from the same root cause: violation of the constitution by the government. As they stood together in front of the Diet building for a shared purpose, the old and new generations started to develop mutual trust, and to collaborate in creating events and establishing new groups and organizations.

In conclusion, Chapter IX revisits the major arguments this dissertation makes, summarizes its theoretical contributions, and discusses its further implications. Based on the close investigation of the processes through which the Article 9 Association was created, organized, maintained, and expanded, the dissertation explicates how a large scale social movement with a real impact in politics could be mounted even after a long period of abeyance. The dissertation contributes to sociological study of social movements as it expands our understanding of social movement continuity by demonstrating that social movements can continue beyond cycles of protest, even without direct successors: as the Article 9 Association substantiates, social movements are network processes, which can ‘continue’ not only by maintaining their vigor and by leaving resources, but also through laying the foundation (i.e. overcoming carried-on problems and strengthening connections between different actors to increase impact) upon which future movements can develop.

CHAPTER II.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Life of Social Movements: Political Process, Cycles of Protest, and Abeyance Structure

In his classic study, Doug McAdam has shown that “any complete model of social insurgency should offer the researcher a framework for analyzing the entire process of movement development rather than a particular phase (e.g., the emergence of social protest) of that process” (1982:36). Some studies have since been conducted to look at the dynamics of social movements after their initial emergence, and concluded that most social movements have a cyclical life rather than a simple linear life, with clear points of birth and death (Isserman 1987; Rupp and Taylor 1987; McAdam 1988; Tarrow 1989, 1994; Taylor 1989; Koopmans 1993; Meyer 1993; Tilly 1995; Whittier 1995). Verta Taylor in her study of social movement continuity, for example, explained, “movements do not die, but scale down and retrench to adapt to changes in the political climate” (1989:772). Taylor concluded that the survival of the first wave women’s movement during the unfavorable political climate that followed was due mainly to the strong long-term commitment of individual members. Its survivors were re-discovered by second wave feminists a generation later. Similarly, Nancy Whittier (1997) analyzed the women’s movement, and proposed generational processes that interact with organizational factors and political opportunity structures to shape movement continuity and change. Drawing on sociological theories about political generations and cohort replacement (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Braungart and Braungart 1984; DeMartini 1985, 1992; Schneider 1988), Whittier’s study found that social movements change in part through the entry of new recruits, while collective

identity maintained by the long-time participants was the most significant internal factor for movement continuity.

These studies, however, do not specify what they mean by “continuity” of social movements. The traditional view of social movements assumes a movement to have a single or multiple fixed subjects who conduct the given movement. If maintenance of collective identity were the most important factor for movement continuity, moreover, it would be natural to assume that “continuity” of social movement through protest “cycles” and “waves” would hardly be sustained when the long-term committed members of a particular movement reach an advanced age and become incapable of carrying on their movement. Therefore, for continuation of social movements, it is presumed necessary for movements to recruit new members into given social movement organizations, and this demands tremendous efforts and resources on the part of recruiters, as shown by the vast literature on movement recruitment (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1988). Studies also have found, however, that different political generations are unlikely to share the same collective identity due to their different socio-political and historical experience, which makes recruiting participants from a younger generation much more difficult than recruitment within the same generation—In fact, Whittier (1997) documented that generations can differ by just a couple of years.

Crossley and Taylor (2015) recently extended Taylor’s original framework of abeyance structure and explained how the existence of “free spaces” such as educational institutions, expanded collective identity, and new elements in the tactical repertoire (i.e. use of the Internet) signal the abeyance status of a given movement that might otherwise be regarded as having already ended. Examining feminist mobilizations among college students in the United States in recent years, the study found that feminist collective identity has diffused widely to other areas

of contention. While cohesive collective identity was still found among movement participants, the study also noted that feminist collective identity was expanded through the abeyance structure. This made the new generation of feminist mobilization more inclusive, and helped the feminist movement to continue after the original waves of protest.

This dissertation does not dispute the significance of collective identity to the general development of social movements. Instead, it looks at the life of social movements from the perspective that social movements are fundamentally organized as network processes, which emphasizes the changing nature of social movements. Frame alignment theory (Snow et al. 1986, Snow and Benford 1988) that emphasizes interactive and communicative processes of movement participation, helps in understanding these concrete processes. Thus, the present study sheds new light on the processes of social movement continuity and recruitment.

The Roles of Networks in Social Movements

Networks as Independent and Dependent Variables for Mobilization

Social movement studies traditionally looked at networks as an important *resource* for mobilization. Since the 1970s, scholars have examined a number of cases to identify recruitment strategies employed by different types of movements, and found that movement participants are often recruited through activists' social network ties that are both private and public, such as personal friends, relatives, colleagues, and neighbors. One of the most important studies in this line of scholarship is Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson's 1980 study. Building on the previously established assumption that recruitment cannot occur without prior contact between a recruitment agent and a potential participant, Snow et al. examined the microstructural process of recruitment to identify "the conditions under which various recruitment techniques are more or

less successful” (Snow et al. 1980:787). They reemphasized the salience of social networks as a recruitment avenue, and argued that “the reason why some rather than other individuals join a movement once they have been introduced to it can be explained in large part by their structural availability” (1980:792). That is to say,

[I]ndividuals who join social movements share the kinds of demographic and social characteristics that allow them to follow their interests and/or engage in exploratory behavior to greater extent than individuals who are bound to existing lines of action by such extraneous commitment as spouse, children, debts, job, and occupational reputation (1980:794).

Consequently, the extent of participation required for movements explains the venue of recruitment: “Movements which do not require exclusive participation by their members in movement activities will attract members primarily from among extra-movement interpersonal associations and networks, rather than from public places (1980:796). The study thus showed that “the mobilization process in general and the recruitment process in particular are likely to vary significantly with changes in organizational structure” of social movements. Snow et al. thus concluded, “microstructural variables are of equal, and perhaps greater, importance than dispositional susceptibilities in the determination of differential recruitment” (1980:798). As such, studies of recruitment strategies helped us to understand the role of networks as an important independent variable in mobilization of social movements.

Since the 1990s, scholars have begun to pay attention to networks as an *outcome* of mobilization activities, regarding networks as a dependent variable of social movements. In

dialogue with the scholarship on social movement outcomes that has been struggling to identify and measure movements' 'success' due largely to its focus on macro-level changes in values, beliefs, and lifestyles, Mario Diani proposed to adopt a meso-level perspective to assess social movement outcomes and focus on "changes in the structural location of movement actors (individuals and/or organizations) in broader social networks"(1997:129). As the position that an actor occupies in social networks is related to the level of impact that the actor could exercise, the impact of a movement can be assessed by the relative centrality of its components in given social networks. More importantly, in Diani's conception, network ties that are counted as social capital do not necessarily imply the presence of collective identity; they are, however, based on sentiments of mutual trust and recognition among the actors involved (1997:130). This conceptualization of network is important because it expands our scope for the identification of network ties present in social movements that are often looser than what we normally conceptualize as collective identity. The concept of collective identity (Melucci 1995, Whittier 1997) is a very important aspect of our theoretical understanding of social movements. It refers to the social and emotional level of personal commitment that is created through social movement activity and motivates continued participation. Hence, when existing low-level social ties are mobilized through the creation of a specific social movement network that carries out collective activities, those shared activities develop and display evidence of collective identity.

Networks at Different Levels of Mobilization

In more recent years, social networks have finally become the very focus of social movement studies, and social movements are reconceived as "complex and highly heterogeneous network structures" (Diani and McAdam 2003:1). To examine networks as the process central to

social movement dynamics rather than ‘playing a role’ in mobilization, it is worth paying attention to the function of networks at different levels. For the sake of clarity, I follow Diani’s categorization and present my understanding of the working of networks at three theoretical levels at which networks may form: *individuals*, *organizations*, and *collectivities and events*), although the actual dynamics of network formation may occur across these levels.

Working of Networks at the Individual Level

Individual actors in social movements can be categorized into activists, protagonists, antagonists, and audiences (potential constituencies) (Hunt et al. 1994), and these actors are typically linked through both private and public ties well before collective actions develop. Individuals may also be connected through indirect ties without direct, face-to-face interaction, through their joint involvement in activities and events (Diani 2003:7). The extent to which such indirect ties as “exposure to the same media (whether ‘traditional’ or ‘computer-based’) may represent a social network link,” and the extent to which “shared cognitive and cultural spaces” can be regarded as sources of links is much debated in the current scholarship of social networks analysis. Whether these different kinds of ties operate differently, and what kinds of ties such as strong or weak, direct or indirect, should matter more than others are also being debated.

Although much of these discussions are currently ongoing, most studies that looked at the individual level of mobilization were interested in the ways in which involvement in networks affects individual behavior. For example, in her study of Swiss political organizations, Florence Passy (2003) examined network mechanism at the individual level and distinguished the functions of social networks in the individual participation process as *socialization functions* (which create an initial disposition to participate), *structural-connection functions* (which

generate structural and practical opportunities for involvement), and *decision-shaping functions* (which affect the ultimate decision to take part in movements) (Passy 2003:30-41). Helmut Anheier's study on early Nazi activists revealed that the community embeddedness of actors positively influenced their chances of becoming active in promoting collective action and organizational growth (Anheier 2003). In these studies, networks were mainly treated as independent variables, although they paid more attention to the network dynamics compared with the conventional recruitment literature.

Working of Networks at the Organizational Level

Between the levels of *individual* and *collectivities and events*, the function of networks at the organizational level is quite ambiguous. Clearly, the function of networks at the organizational level is closely intertwined with the individual level dynamics, because in reality organizations are linked by individual members. It is important to note, however, that these individuals who connect different organizations are often leaders (e.g. corporate managers, CEOs, union representatives, local elites/bosses etc.) of organizations. Unlike individual non-leader members of organizations, leaders are not only responsible for their own behavior but are responsible for the behavior of their organizations, and therefore tend to act differently from non-leader individuals.

Nevertheless, the social network ties possessed by leaders are an important resource for their organizations, and those leaders who are high in social capital are more likely to be able to bring their organizations toward the central position within the network in which the organization find itself. Thus, treating networks as both independent and dependent variables, scholars in the field asked questions such as “what are the traits of nodes that account for

individual SMOs' centrality or marginality in a network? How do preexisting ties—both organizational and between leaders...affect chances of new alliances to develop, or the location of specific organizations in a broader organizational field?" According to Diani, "Answers to these questions also predict influence in the larger political system and attitudes towards collaboration with external actors" (Diani 2003:11).

Working of Networks at the Collectives and Events Level

The function of networks at the *collectives and events* level is a relatively new terrain in the field. Although networks at the collectives and events level also involve both individual and organizational actors as the organizational level does, it is conceptually and empirically important to distinguish this level from other two levels of analysis, because events are dynamic places of interactions between two or more actors of any level, thus irreducible to the behaviors of individuals or organizations. The application of a network perspective at the level of collectives and events could generate important insights on the processes of identity construction. Diani argued:

Events are linked to each other through innumerable mechanisms. Organizations operate as ties by promoting and/or participating in multiple events; individual activities operate in the same way; thirdly, events may be linked through symbolic means, that is, by representations that underline continuity between what could otherwise be largely independent and disconnected events (2003:12).

Because events are the place of interactions, they are at the same time generative and transformative. Through interactions with other participants, actors can enhance and reproduce pre-existing networks and at the same time experience transformative situations, thus constructing new identities and connections that potentially lead to new movements. At this level of observation and analysis, it is possible to reformulate networks as “multiple, cross-cutting sets of relations sustained by conversational dynamics within social settings” (Mische 2003:259). In this formulation, networks allow movement actors to go beyond the local boundaries and “break the limits of densely knit groups and relate to much broader sets of prospective allies” (Diani 2003:17).

The precise mechanisms that characterize the process of network construction and reproduction in social movements have only begun to be explored by a handful of researchers (Mische and Pattison 2000; Mische 2003, 2008) who have been in dialogue with more formal social network analyses as well as the cultural approach to both network analysis and social movement studies. Diani argued that “viewing movements as a distinctive type of social networks may reorient social movement analysis and help better specifying the relation between movements and related phenomena such as coalitions, solidarity campaigns, and political organizations” (2003:17). In doing so, looking at the function of networks at the level of collectives and events may be the most fruitful endeavor, mainly because it allows researchers to transcend the heavily organization-centered current scholarship of social movements.

Finally, Diani called for more attention to the following points for the development of an integrated approach: 1) recognition of the duality of network processes as a precondition to appropriate multilevel investigations; 2) attention to the network processes connecting events, activities, and ideas, and not only to those linking individuals or organizations; 3) recognition of

the multiplicity of networks potentially linking different actors or events; 4) attention to the time dimension in network processes; 5) recognition of the value of current approaches to social movements in the investigation of homophily processes (2003:318). Thinking in terms of networks has become routine for students of social movements in more recent years, partly due to the universal usage of Internet communication technologies. In fact, two international peer-reviewed journals that specialize in social movement studies published special issues on networks in 2014, showing the high level of interest on the topic in the field.

Research Questions: Social Networks and Social Movement Continuity

Drawing on the theories and concepts discussed above, this dissertation explores the emergence and development of the Article 9 Association as a social movement network, and answers the following research questions: First, how and why did the initial Article 9 Association emerge, and the appeal published by this particular group bring about such a quick expansion of the network of a constitutional movement in the early 2000s (three decades after the end of the “political season” in the 1960s and 1970s); and who created these several thousand grassroots chapters and how?—In other words, what kind of social networks is the Article 9 Association rooted in, and how have these social networks created the present form of the Article 9 Association? Second, how did the Article 9 Association develop as a movement and a network, during and after the initial years of its explosive expansion? To put it more concretely, what were the processes through which grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association were created, organized, and maintained; and how are different chapters connected to each other as well as to the original Article 9 Association? Lastly, what role does this network play in the new coalition

for constitutional government in the 2010s, and what does the answer to this question suggest about social movement continuity?

Research Methods: Participant Observation and Interviews

Ethnographic field research is widely regarded as an appropriate method to conduct a process-based study of social movements (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 2008; Diani and McAdam 2003; Staggenborg 2008; McAdam and Tarrow 2011). My field research involved participant observation and semi-structured in-depth interviews in selected local chapters and the headquarters of the Article 9 Association. The main research was conducted between September 2011 and May 2012 in Japan, and follow-up research between November 2012 and October 2016.

My primary field site was in the Tokyo metropolitan area, where over 2,000 grassroots chapters are located. For participant observation, I attended various activities initiated by the Article 9 Association's headquarter and various grassroots chapters in different local areas including Tokyo, Kanagawa, Fukushima, Miyagi, Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Okinawa. The local areas were selected for specific reasons: Tokyo metropolitan area, including Kanagawa, is the center of Japanese politics and Tokyo alone has over nine hundred grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association; Fukushima and Miyagi are the areas most devastated by the 3.11 disaster; Miyagi and Kyoto have unique histories of social activism and are strongholds of the progressive camp in Japan; Hiroshima is one of the two cities where atomic bombs were dropped at the end of the World War II, and the location where national peace rallies are held in every August; and finally, in Okinawa there also is a strong tradition of peace movements due to its unique history—the island experienced very tragic land fighting during the WWII and was under

American occupation until its reversion to Japan in 1972, and today it still bears most of the burden caused by the large presence of American military bases.

For my interviews, I used a snowball sampling method, beginning with a key informant in each location who was introduced either by someone from the headquarters or by another interviewee. Semi-structured in-depth interviews (Silverman and Marvasti 2008) were conducted with sixty-five participants from at least twenty-five different chapters (“at least” because many of the interviewees have multiple memberships). The method of semi-structured in-depth interviews is suited to my purpose, because the method allows my interviews to be focused and open-ended at the same time. The length of each interview was between one and a half to two hours. The interview guide and the list of interviews are in the Appendix.

Data Analysis

The primary forms of my data are field notes, interview transcripts, and publications by the Article 9 Association (from both the headquarters and grassroots chapters) including the newsletters. For data analysis, I used NVivo primarily for narrative analyses, and adopt the frameworks of network analysis in making causal claims. I used Gephi for graphic presentation of the network of the Article 9 Association. These approaches are particularly suited in order to look at the transformative processes of social movement continuity.

CHAPTER III.
POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE 1960S GENERATION IN JAPANESE SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS

This dissertation argues that the Article 9 Association movement was built on the contentious activism in the 1960s and 1970s in Japan, which was mounted to oppose the US-Japan Security Treaty, and on the networks built by the survivors of these movements during the abeyance period that followed. These old networks, however, needed to transform, in order to create a new movement called the Article 9 Association, mainly because of their divided origin. Therefore, to appreciate the significance of the Article 9 Association requires understanding the historical backdrop of the emergence and development of the movement, and the changes in Japanese politics since the 1960s in particular.

Following an overview of the historical processes through which three competing groups within the Japanese Left (the communists, the socialists, and non-partisan actors) were generated in the 1950s, this chapter presents the political process (McAdam 1982) through which contentious social movements were divided, and how this resulted in the long period of abeyance that followed. In so doing, it also explains why the focal point of the attempts to change the constitution always centered on Article 9, which thus came to have additional symbolic significance as the linchpin of the peace constitution. It then introduces the rise of the new generation of social movements in the 2010s, which emerged after the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami in March 2011, and how this new generation has begun to be engaged in the positive discussion about the constitution and democracy.

The Cold War Politics and the Japanese Left

As the Cold War tensions spread from Europe to East Asia in the early 1950s, a mass-based peace movement also started to develop in Japan. The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 triggered an important change in the occupation policy that had previously been aiming to democratize and demilitarize Japan. To make Japan useful to its Cold War efforts, the US-led occupation forces ordered the creation of a de fact Japanese military under the title of National Police Reserve in July 1951, which subsequently became the Self-Defense Forces. Four months later, the Japanese government signed a bilateral security treaty with the United States, and thereby committed the country formally to supporting the US Cold War effort in East Asia.

Although this development placed Japan in a similar position in the international system to that of its Western European counterparts, according to Carlile (2005), what was distinctive about the Japanese situation was the balance of forces within the labor movement:

In contrast to the continuing centrality of the communists in France and Italy, the JCP [Japanese Communist Party] had lost by the middle of 1950 its capacity to influence mainstream politics, thereby clearing a “space” for some other political force to mobilize protests of Japan’s incorporation into the US containment framework. In the Japanese context, it was the left socialists who took on this role. The prominence of the left socialists and the left-socialist viewpoint during this critical period left a long-lasting stamp on the organizational characteristics, the balance of ideological orientation, and the political and economic roles of the Japanese movement for decades to come (Carlile 2005:173).

Although it was also the communists and prominent communist and noncommunist intellectuals who provided the initial impetus for peace movement activism in Japan as in Western Europe, the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter “the JCP”) was going through a fierce internal struggle in the 1950s over the party line. As the “mainstream” faction at that time led by Tokuda Kyūichi forced the disastrous violent revolutionary line and many rank-and-file members followed what was supposed to be a legitimate central decision, the party suffered a tremendous loss of popular support. The internal struggle continued for several years until the “anti-mainstream” faction led by Miyamoto Kenji finally restored order and the cornered “mainstream” faction fled to Beijing, where it had built a foothold previously. The JCP under Miyamoto, who initiated the self-independent (*jishu dokuritsu*) line, gradually recovered some popular support and legitimacy in Japanese society. Nonetheless, this series of events in the 1950s impacted negatively on the party’s public image, leaving the source of trouble for the future. Much later in the 1990s, the former Soviet Union’s newly released secret documents revealed that Tokuda and his aides had been maintaining secret communication with Moscow that tried to control the JCP (Fuwa 1993). This, combined with the Red Purge sweeping the whole country in the early 1950s, left the JCP incapable of taking any important role within the Japanese left, even when the international communist movement was gearing up for its World Peace Congress in Paris.

This created an opening for the Japan Socialist Party (hereafter “the JSP”) to become “the ostensible political voice of the working masses” (Carlile 2005:176) and there was keen interest in what position the JSP would take. Prior to the Cold War militarization in East Asia, the JSP, despite the fierce infighting between the left and right factions, was united on its “three

principles of peace”: an “all around” peace treaty (with agreement of all parties, including the Communists); a policy of permanent neutrality; and opposition to the maintenance of foreign bases on Japanese soil. However, the Korean War changed the situation. At its 1951 convention, the left faction proposed “four principles of peace,” which added opposition to the new issue of rearmament to the original three principles. Against this, the right faction proposed to accept a partial peace treaty, a limited rearmament for defensive purposes, and through this an alignment of the party with the forces supporting the US-led anti-communist alliance internationally. Eventually, the four principles of peace were adopted by a majority vote. The left faction gained a plurality in the executive committee, and the left-socialist Suzuki Mosaburō was elected to be party chairman.

The left faction of the labor federation Sōhyō, the largest organizational supporter of the JSP, played an active role in this contest, thereby inviting the same conflict into own organization. Following the contest over adoption of the JSP’s four principles of peace, the federation was split over its affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (hereafter “the ICFTU”), which had declared unqualified support for the United States in the Korean conflict and for the partial peace treaty. Although the left faction managed to avoid the ICFTU membership bid to gain the required two-thirds majority, the bitter conflict escalated thereafter, and reached a climax in the JSP extraordinary convention held on October 23 and 24, 1951. In the convention where the JSP aimed to iron out a compromise in order to form the party’s policy for the upcoming Diet vote on the ratification of the peace and security treaties, these two factions generated overt conflict. As the result, the JSP was split into two separate organizations, the Right Socialist Party and the Left Socialist Party. The party remained divided

until 1955. Sōhyō, in which the left faction maintained the majority, retained close ties to the Left Socialist Party (Carlile 2005: 176-180).

Virtually all left socialists in Sōhyō and the Left Socialist Party were supportive of the notion that they were part of a neutralist third force independent of the Cold War's two camps. Therefore, it was extremely controversial when Takano Minoru, a prominent leader of Sōhyō's left socialists, put forward the idea that on the international scene advancing "peace forces" were reversing the trend toward bipolar conflict and included the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China among these forces. Takano justified his intention that "It is my view that those who make an effort toward peace at a given point in time are a peace force at that point of time. To the extent that the Soviet Union is advocating an armistice in Korea, it is a peace force" (quoted in Carlile 2005:189). This was, however, hard to stomach even for the left socialists, whose priority was to maintain neutrality. Nevertheless, Carlile (2005:195) analyzes,

One of the most important legacies of the Takano years was infusion of the values and modalities of positive neutralism into the ethos of the Japanese labor movement... The somewhat differing nuance of the Cold War conflict in the Asian region when compared to that in Europe meant that the neutralist appeal resonated more widely and deeply in Japan. Furthermore, the peace issue became salient in Japan when the Communist Party and its affiliated wing of labor movement had virtually disappeared from the scene. Peace and neutrality thus became a socialist rather than a communist cause and, as a consequence, was free (relatively but not completely) of the antinationalist baggage that association with the Communists had in Western Europe.

Thus, in spite of the JCP's peaceful self-image as the only political party in Japan overtly opposed against the Japanese imperialism and its invasive wars, due mainly to its own past missteps and dictatorial dominance of the international communist movement by the USSR and PRC, the party had to tolerate its marginal position in the Japanese left for decades to come. The JCP nonetheless maintained absolute minimum support even under repeated crises, and gradually expanded its influence within the Japanese left and social movement sector.

Along with the Socialists and the Communists, non-partisan actors have also been an important part of the postwar Japanese social movements. Distinguishing themselves from partisan actors, they had come to call themselves "citizens" and their activism "citizens movements." The group was not, of course, monolithic or homogeneous. It included many of those who walked away from political parties and labor unions due to ideological disagreements, but also those who were disillusioned by repeated infighting over issues that did not seem to be critical for the ultimate purpose to be achieved. Indeed, strategic moves of parties and labor unions to increase their political influence could seem to be a long detour, especially for peace movements. For those who could not care less about ideological and formal organizational competition but wanted to do something about problems they could see, moreover, it was necessary to organize their spontaneity into actions for the given end. These groups included a wide range of groups from work place cultural circles to local women's groups (Sasaki-Uemura 2001). The emergence of these hundreds of autonomous and heterogeneous "citizen" groups in the 1950s was critical for the massive protest mobilization against the US-Japan Security Treaty in the 1960s, but also for the postwar Japanese social movements in general.

The use of the term “citizen” (*shimin* in Japanese) in social movement context was a new and innovative development at that time, when social movements were often associated with senseless “mass” and “proletariats” and “people” who were to be led by more able elites. “Citizen” therefore was a new identity for the Japanese people who were no longer “subjects” as they had been in imperial Japan. Intellectuals also provided theoretical debate through which the ethos of citizenship was instilled into these new political actors. The historian Wesley Sasaki-Uemura (2001:32) noted:

...the debates over subjectivity throughout the 1950s show that many progressive writers and intellectuals were dissatisfied with the constraints of Marxist orthodoxy, both as far as their own cultural production was concerned and in terms of social actions needed to produce a democratic revolution. The subjectivity theorists wanted to move away from a notion of class as absolutely determinate and to give more weight to the individual as the agent of history. They also focused on instilling the heart or spirit of democracy in people’s lives, because Japan had already gained the superficial external forms, the formal institutions of democracy, while retaining prewar figures and prewar lines of authority within those forms...Ironically, citizen movement theorists gained a wide audience because of their higher social status at the same time that they, in effect, sought to demote their own elite authority by advocating everyone’s equivalence as citizens.

Given these intellectual backdrops, along with their antipathy to the left political parties' central control, citizen movement groups tended toward egalitarian organization and consensus decision-making. As these groups also saw democracy as an active process, they constantly adapted their theory to actual political praxis. Thus, the notion of the citizen was always indeterminate to a certain degree. This indeterminacy, however, was what made citizen movements a viable alternative for those who could not identify with the industrial working class or Marxist ideology (Sasaki-Uemura 2001: 32-34).

Students were also an important part of this generation of activists. They were significant, among other reasons, because they took the most direct (sometimes violent) actions in the anti Security Treaty protest demonstrations, and this had come to compose a major part of public image about the protest movement. As we have discussed above, the protest movement in the 1960s and on was a nationwide movement with many different actors, and student groups were part of it.

It is important to note, however, in contrast to the more reasonable early 1960s student protests, the late 1960s protests became much more violent. The late 1960s protests were initially mobilized to prepare for 1970 revision of the Security Treaty, but also incorporated a wide range of other issues, from opposition to the Vietnam War to environmental pollution. Fierce factional competitions among student activists throughout the process eventually gave birth to so-called Zenkyōtō movement that paralyzed college campuses in 1968-1969. As the result, while leaders of the earlier movement were accepted as social leaders—hired by government and major corporations, and went on to careers as leading intellectuals, the later generation was excluded from mainstream society and totally marginalized. It was the late 1960s when the New Left movements cloned the old left organizational model and produced numerous different

hierarchical organizations that competed with each other, and also battled the police (Steinhoff 2012).

Due mainly to these latter groups' dramatic actions and high exposure to mass media, an impression was generated that the protest movement is about militant student activists. Along with the public discourse repeatedly emphasized by the central government that the anti-Security Treaty protestors were a violent mob controlled by the Communist Party and Moscow, it further impressed the ordinary Japanese that social movements are dangerous and that the Communists are violent. More importantly to the present study, those who experienced this era of massive mobilization as students compose a large part of the Article 9 Association movement. For this generation, political participation has thus become a significant part of their identity.

Nevertheless, despite their clear ideological differences, the Communists, the Socialists, and non-partisan citizen and student activists in Japan shared serious concern for the fate of their newly gained constitutional democracy, and wanted to protect the rights it provided them. No one in these groups wanted to repeat the same mistake that led to the war. From their viewpoint, the repressive central government was violating their new rights by forcing the Security Treaty without democratic procedure, as though bringing the prewar authoritarian state back in Japan. Thus, the both practical and symbolic pivot for their struggles against the reactionary government was the Japanese Constitution, and in particular, Article 9.

The 1960s Generation and History of the Divided Movements

Postwar Japanese history was essentially characterized by the so-called "Peace Constitution" with its peace clause Article 9, and its contradiction to the real state of the country's military capacity developed under the US-Japan Security Treaty. Article 9 reads:

(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Despite this constitutional restriction, Japan's de-facto military, the Self-Defense Force (hereafter "the SDF") has grown to have the third biggest budget for any nation to spend on its military (Port 2010). Nevertheless, despite its massive destructive potential, the SDF has been put to use only for peaceful operations for more than sixty years since its establishment in 1954, because Article 9 limits its operational capacity.

The United States and the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) that occupied Japan from 1945 to 1952 was also the source of the peace constitution since its Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur supported the idea of Article 9 submitted by Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō (Horio 2016). Nevertheless, the Joint Japan-US Security Treaty, which specified the mutual military defense obligations of the two nations and institutionalized the stationing of U.S. military forces on Japanese territory for such military defense, has always been prioritized. When the Security Treaty was going to be signed in 1960, the issue at stake was whether Japan would have a treaty above the supreme law of the land and accept the semi-permanent presence of a foreign military, or stay on track to become a truly peaceful state without war potential. No matter the extent to which the people were informed of the concrete

articles of the treaty, the massive anti-Security Treaty demonstrations with tens of thousands of participants were clear evidence that the Japanese people did not want to accept such a treaty. Eventually, the treaty was signed by the Japanese Diet in the absence of boycotting minority parties, and has been enforced ever since (Packard 1966). As the result, the majority of prefectures of Japan have facilities of the US forces. In Okinawa, moreover, the American occupation continued until 1972, and even today, about ten percent of its area is used for the American bases. As the anti-Security Treaty movement developed into an unprecedented scale of anti-government and anti-United States movement, it gave birth to a great number of activists who would remain active even after the end of the “political season” in early 1970s. In social movement terms, this long decade of the 1960s can be described as a major protest cycle.

While this generation of activists has maintained its contentious character since, the political soil of Japan was particularly divisive for social movements to grow. This was due not only to the vertical structure of the entire Japanese society (Nakane 1967), which prevented more formal organizations (i.e. labor unions and political parties) from cooperating and facilitated divisions along political alignment when schisms occurred (Aspinall 2003, Wang 2008), but also that the ruling government had learned a serious lesson from the previous movements. Changes in political alignment since the 1960s tell a lot about how the ruling power brought divisions into threatening movements by dividing opposition parties, making full use of the vertical structure of the society.

The massive political contention supported strong opposition parties in the 1960s through the 1970s. During this period, the Japanese Socialist Party (hereafter “the JSP”) and the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter “the JCP”) presented a united front called *Shakyō kyōtō*. Although hardly imaginable from its unity with the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter “the

LDP”) in the government today, the Clean Government Party (hereafter “the CGP”) was also a part of the progressive alignment at that time. As a result, a majority of local communities in Japan were under progressive governments.

This started to change in the late 1970s as the JSP started to pursue the new line to cooperate with the CGP and the Democratic Socialist Party (hereafter “the DSP”). Concurrently, the labor federation Sōhyō, which was the largest supporter of the JSP at that time, was turning to corporatism, further changing the situation within the JSP. Eventually, the loss of the candidate supported by the JSP and JCP in the Tokyo governor election in 1979 triggered the change of the situation also in local politics, leading to the cancellation of the united front between the two parties. The JSP and CGP then made a new arrangement called *Shakō gōi* (the JSP-CGP Agreement), which clearly excluded the JCP from the new agreement (The Japanese Socialist Party 1980, Shinbun Akahata 2007).

Although the purpose of the new agreement was to counter the LDP, the loss of the new united front in the general election in 1980 deepened the disagreement between the JSP and the DSP, while the CGP had started to approach to the LDP. This led eventually to the cooperation among the LDP, CGP, and DSP in later years.

Along with these developments, labor movements were reorganizing to create a new federation in the late 1980s, leading to the dissolution of Sōhyō and creation of Rengō in 1989. As Rengō explicitly excluded the communists from its new “united front,” the communists were forced to form their own federation called Zenrōren. This resulted in schisms within the entire labor movement sector in Japan (Wang 2008). These political fights directly affected more formal social movement organizations in the country as well.

As the disagreement between the JSP and CGP over Japan's participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation became irreconcilable, the Shakō Agreement collapsed in 1992. The JSP lost again in the general election in the following year; however, the LDP and other opposition parties did not gain a majority either. The Japanese Socialist Party, Clean Government Party, and Democratic Socialist Party thus joined forces with new parties formed by those who broke away from the LDP such as Japan New Party and Sakigake, and formed the non-LDP government in 1994 with Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, for the first time since 1955.

Transformation of the Socialist Party and the Loss of the Largest Opposition Party

This government did not last even for a year, however. Although the JSP was part of the coalition government at first, it broke away from it as the other parties in the government formed a faction unfavorable to the JSP. Utilizing this opportunity, the LDP approached the JSP, inviting socialist Murayama Tomiichi to become Prime Minister. As the LDP succeeded to win over the JSP and Sakigake, the three parties made a coalition government. While Prime Minister Murayama became famous for his speech on Japan's wartime aggressions in Asia in which he made an official apology to the victims, the JSP transformed its fundamental character during his term: The JSP changed its attitude toward the US-Japan Security Treaty from opposition to acceptance, and toward the SDF from unconstitutional to constitutional. This meant the practical disappearance of the largest opposition party.

Naturally, the transformation of the JSP was not welcomed by the supporters of its previous line. In 1996, the JSP fell apart, although a small part of it remained as the Social Democratic Party (hereafter the SDP). The rest of the original JSP and breakaways from too

many short-lived parties, including major figures like Hatoyama Yukio and Ozawa Ichirō eventually came together to form the new largest opposition party called the Democratic Party of Japan (hereafter “the DPJ”). Nevertheless, combined with the exclusion of the JCP from the alignment within the left, the decline of the largest opposition party that had maintained the political equilibrium to the ruling LDP impacted heavily on the direction of Japanese politics, allowing it to move sharply toward the right.

Divided Social Movements in Abeyance

Casting a sideway glance at the political fights among political parties and labor unions, citizens movements were largely in abeyance from the 1980s to 1990s. It did not mean, however, that there was no civil society in Japan except the neighborhood associations (Pekkanen 2006), nor that contentious social movements were all domesticated (Avenell 2009). Contentious movements were embedded deeply in the Japanese civil society, and became “invisible” to the general public (Steinhoff 2014), while staying active throughout these years. Meanwhile, these groups and individual activists were producing countless publications about social movements and activism that they were part of. Yet social movements were sort of taboo subject for Japanese academics, and virtually no university had such course as “seminar in social movements” until recently (Nishikido 2008, Tanaka 2014, Yamada 2014, Takahashi and SEALDs 2015, Nakano 2016). The Ohara Institute for Social Research is an academic institution that has continued to research mainly labor issues since 1919. It is still hard to find a sociology program in Japan where students learn Marx even as a very basic of the classical theory of the field, although it is normally taught in economics. To my knowledge, there is just one Japanese scholar who recently started to teach a graduate seminar on social movements at Tokyo

University, and he is a former student of Charles Tilly at Columbia (and he studies Latin American movements, not Japanese movements). Indeed, there are a number of Japanese social movement scholars. However, they tend to study environmental movements which remained a relatively safe topic during the abeyance period. Thus, social movements in Japan were also in abeyance as an academic subject. As a result, studying social movements requires a researcher to rely heavily on the literature written in English.

The divided nature brought about another characteristic to Japanese social movements: extensive overlap in membership in social movement groups and organizations. As studies have shown, presenting a united front is the only way for the opposition to counter the power. Therefore, social movement actors must find a way to be united. Given the divided political parties and labor unions, more grounded social movements in Japan inevitably sought ways to be connected. To go around the divided parties and unions, citizen activists formed numerous small groups to tackle each of the many different yet related issues. These groups tended to be small, because it was possible to form such a group when there was a point on which people could agree to work together. Naturally, these groups looked also for a single issue on which many could agree in spite of their differences. Through working out different plans based on lessons learned on the way, they continued creating more groups with new ideas, while modifying existing groups to suit new circumstances. As the result, in Japanese civil society there are countless citizens groups with very long names that reflect exactly what issues they deal with. Many activists who have been active since the 1960s have thus come to belong to several different groups.

Regardless of the size of group or issue it deals with, all these groups, including political parties and labor unions in the left, owe their existence to the 1946 Constitution of

Japan, as the right of organization was written into it to provide previously illegal groups a legal ground. The constitution also provided clear, strong protection for all these groups that had previously been subject to repression. The groups included new religious groups and Christian groups, since religious freedom was constitutionally protected, along with academics, since academic freedom was similarly protected. The legal rights of women, along with the right to assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the right to be represented by a defense attorney in a court of law, were also written into the constitution.

Consequently, although these groups and different opposition parties did not hold the majority in the Japanese Diet either individually or collectively, for more than half a century they had regularly come together to resist any political efforts to revise the constitution, fearing that any revision would open the door to the removal of the protection their own group enjoyed. Under the LDP rule which continued since 1955, the focal point of the attempts to change the constitution always centered on Article 9. Revising the constitution requires two-thirds approval in the Diet, followed by further ratification. Despite their differences, minority parties always came together to oppose efforts to change Article 9 and prevented the LDP from obtaining a two-thirds vote that would set the revision process in motion. Thus, Article 9 came to have additional symbolic significance as the linchpin of the peace constitution.

New Challenges to the Constitution since the 2000s

Despite the continuous revision attempts led by the successive LDP governments, the Japanese constitution remained untouched for seventy years. Although the Gulf War in the 1990s reactivated the discussions on national security, there was little movement with actual impact until the Research Commission on the Constitution was established in both houses of the

National Diet of Japan in 2000. During the 1990s, in the aftermath of reorganization of labor movements in the late 1980s, there were changes also in the political parties, which created a political opportunity for new efforts to revise various aspects of the Japanese government. This commission was the result of these changed political circumstances. The situation has changed drastically since: In the following year, a month after the United States had suffered the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the Diet passed the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law which allowed Japan to offer logistical support to the United States' "war against terrorism." Enforcement of a series of emergency defense laws such as the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law followed it.

The early 2000s thus became a time for reflection for many Japanese, especially for those who perceived these new developments to be unconstitutional under Article 9. Utilizing their accumulated resources, long-standing activists were gathering forces to fight the new challenge while still in abeyance. Then, in 2004, they got the news that a new group called the Article 9 Association was formed by the nine respected intellectuals whose name any Japanese activist, left or right, would have known. The initial appeal by the founders did not specify any action to be taken by a particular group of people. Nonetheless, as we will see in the following chapters, the Article 9 Association became a vast network within a few years.

Concurrent with the development of the Article 9 Association movement, the discussion regarding national security was heating up. In 2006, the ruling LDP elected Abe Shinzō, grandson of the former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke who signed the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, as the 90th Prime Minister. A leading member of the so-called "textbook caucus" (or the Diet Members to Discuss Japanese Future and History Education) within the LDP, with close ties to an ultra-nationalist social movement organization Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), Abe was known for his persistent revisionist position toward the constitution. Although Abe

made a pledge of constitutional revision explicitly aimed at Article 9 in his term as expected, within a year after the inauguration of his government, he suddenly resigned saying that he was seriously ill. Many had pointed out that his resignation was due to the drastic decline of support for a constitutional amendment in the 2007 opinion polls. This shift in public opinion was directly reflected in the change of power balance between the ruling and opposition parties: The LDP fell from power in the 2009 national election, and the DPJ with SDP and People's New Party formed a coalition government.

The 3.11 Triple Disaster and Rise of the New Generation of Social Movements

Two years later, on March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9 with massive tsunami hit the coast of northeastern Japan, followed by an explosion of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station located in a small coastal town in Fukushima prefecture. The earthquake and Tsunami took tens of thousands of lives. More lost their families and homes. The nuclear accident also forced tens of thousands of people to evacuate their home area, without knowing when they could ever return. Evacuated farmers had to leave their livestock and pets to go wild (some were even ordered to kill their cattle). Fishermen were unable to catch fish because of the loss of the marine facilities, but also because the ocean was contaminated with radioactive substances. Such a terrible destruction of livelihood caused many otherwise unnecessary deaths including suicides. The DPJ-led coalition government had to deal with this unprecedented scale of disaster while struggling to maintain its position in the Diet. In the face of the major catastrophe, and the fear of nuclear contamination spreading across the country in particular, the government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) that runs the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were unable to satisfy the needs of those affected.

This once again reversed the course in politics, leading to a shift back to the LDP under Abe in the 2012 election. However, the return of the LDP government did not solve the problem. Far from embarking on settling the situation, the LDP government was busy trying to remove people's attention from the reality. To invite the next Olympic games to Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe in his presentation even claimed that the outflow of contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was "under control," when the newspapers were reporting the opposite situation day after day. The LDP and CGP still won the House of Councillors election in 2013, thereby controlling the majority of both Houses. The government then passed a new series of national security bills that further strengthen the US-Japan Security Treaty and demanded a "reinterpretation of the constitution" that is a clear violation of Article 9.

Meanwhile, however, the situation surrounding social movements underwent a sea change: the disaster and the fallout from it had made Japan once again a seedbed of grassroots activism. While the public discourse emphasized the significance of national unity and voluntary rescue efforts, the fear of nuclear contamination along with anger against the irresponsibility of TEPCO and the government triggered a huge increase of anti-nuclear activism nationwide. This revitalized the old anti-nuclear movements among established organizations with existing divisions, but also gave rise to the new generation of activists without fetters.

The 3.11 triple disaster awakened activism in the younger generation. That impact then spread to other areas of social problems, as those new activists began to realize that the issues they now face as their own problems are interrelated, and in fact derive from the same root cause: violation of the constitution by the government. The more recent swell of public opinion against these unpopular national security bills would have been less salient without that precondition.

These recent movements are clearly contentious and, moreover, are engaging the new generation of activists in positive discussion about the constitution and democracy. This, too, was unexpected from the previous situation where social movements were largely associated with “old men with flags.” In the process that followed, these separated generations of social movements finally started to merge. Nevertheless, as the following chapters will discuss, this recent achievement would have hardly been possible without the foundation built through the activities of the Article 9 Association.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATION: EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOVEMENT AND ITS NETWORK

This chapter describes the processes of formation of the Article 9 Association and its network in detail. It shows how so many grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association were created in a very short period of time, and how quickly the original Article 9 Association became the “headquarters” of the nationwide network of the thousands of Article 9 Associations. In other words, it will show the processes through which local leadership groups took shape, how these local networks expanded to become local grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association, and how these chapters attach themselves to the original group of nine intellectuals. Similar processes will also be observed about other types of grassroots chapters, such as occupation-based and workplace-based chapters. The chapter also describes major types of activities these grassroots chapters conduct, and explains how these chapters get connected to each other to compose the grassroots-level networks of the Article 9 Association.

The Original Article 9 Association, the Core Group

The Article 9 Association announced its establishment to the Japanese public with a press conference by the nine members in conjunction with the publication of their signed “appeal” in June 2004, calling for the people’s support for “protecting Article 9 and the constitution.” The nine members of the Article 9 Association were: Inoue Hisashi (author, 1934-2010), Katō Shūichi (critic, 1919-2008), Miki Mutsuko (UN Women’s Society and wife of the former Prime Minister Miki Takeo 1917-2012), Oda Makoto (author, 1932-2007), Ōe Kenzaburō (author,

1935-), Okudaira Yasuhiro (constitution scholar, 1929-2015), Sawachi Hisae (author, 1930-), Tsurumi Shunsuke (philosopher 1922-2015), and Umebara Takeshi (philosopher, 1925-) (listed alphabetically). To support their activities, a secretariat was also organized, staffed by Komori Yōichi (professor of modern Japanese literature at Tokyo University), Watanabe Osamu (professor emeritus of political science at Hitotsubashi University), Takada Ken (one of the most well-connected leaders of Japanese citizen movements), Kawamura Toshio (leader of Kenpō Kaigi, or Cross-fields Council for the Prevention of Constitutional Revision, an advocacy organization for promoting the 1946 Constitution of Japan), and an office staff that carries out the organizational tasks for the Article 9 Association. According to the proceedings of the initial press conference held in June 2004, Katō brought the idea to form the Article 9 Association to Komori in early spring of the year. Komori then communicated the idea to Ōe. Katō and Ōe then co-wrote the appeal, with which they invited the rest of the members to join (The Article 9 Association 2004). Many of them, however, had previous connections.

The nine founders and the members of the secretariat, with their unique backgrounds and expertise, brought varying yet partly overlapping personal networks into the Article 9 Association. Broadly speaking, all the nine founders are recognized as leading intellectuals in Japan, and many have also been renowned internationally. Tsurumi, for instance, was the founder of a journal called “Shisō no Kagaku (Science of Thoughts),” which continued from 1946 to 1996, together with his sister Tsurumi Kazuko (a former professor of sociology at Sophia University), as well as equally famous scholars such as Maruyama Masao (political scientist) and Tsuru Shigeto (economist). Tsurumi called Oda, a writer and the founder of an anti-war movement called Beheiren (Citizens’ Coalition for Peace to Vietnam) to join the Article 9 Association, as he had been sympathetic to Oda’s work. The groups for which Tsurumi and

Oda were leaders, moreover, were among the largest and most influential of the citizen movements developed since the 1950s (see Sasaki-Uemura (2001) for detailed accounts on this subject). Katō, Ōe, and Sawachi were loosely connected through their publications as writers, and each of them had a large audience. Katō, perhaps the most widely read author even among these nine eminent intellectual leaders due partly to his long run serial essays for Asahi Shinbun “Yūmōyōgo,” was also close to Komori Yōichi, sharing not only keen interests in literature, but also firsthand experiences in the Czech Incident in 1968. Inoue, a former chair of the Japan P.E.N. Club and a very popular playwright with his large audience, had also worked together with Komori sometimes prior to the formation of the Article 9 Association, for instance in a radio program on the works of Natsume Sōseki (Komori 2012, personal conversation).

Involvement of Miki was important to broaden the Association’s capacity, as she was the wife of Miki Takeo, a former Prime Minister elected from the LDP. She had worked with Ōe in opposition to the history textbook published by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform in 2001, a movement in which Komori also took part (Komori 2016, personal conversation). Umebara’s participation was also significant to make the association accessible to those who were suspicious of the other founders who were perceived to be sympathetic to Marxist thought. Like Inoue, Umebara also was a former chair of the Japan P.E.N. Club and also had a long list of co-writers as well as his own large audience. Finally, Okudaira was a preeminent scholar on the law of free expression, whose works inspired several generations of Japanese scholars as well as eminent foreign scholars such as John Dower. He was also a councilor of the Japan Civil Liberties Union. Thus, nine prominent intellectuals gathered under the name of Article 9 Association through various quality of “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) in order to protect Article 9 and the 1946 Constitution of Japan (Diagram 1):




Diagram 1. Formation of the Article 9 Association headquarters

*Node colors show roles. Blue: founders, Light blue: secretariat, Violet: groups and organizations to which each member had tie since before 2004.

**Edge colors show types of ties. Orange: personal, Pink: occupational, Green: organizational, Light blue: direct invitation to join the Article 9 Association.

The members of the secretariat also brought in the different movement organizations they had been a member of, by cooperating to establish this new Association: The chief secretary, Komori Yōichi is a literary man who enjoys a high level of admiration as a writer as well as a scholar. He is a professor of Tokyo University, a multi-lingual who grew up in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, and thus is fluent in Czech, Russian, English, and Japanese. His most famous works are on Natsume Sōseki. As the son of a mother who was a poet and a father who was an executive member of the JCP, he has also been a politically progressive man taking the leadership role in many peaceful and educational citizens movements. Like Komori, Watanabe Osamu is a professor emeritus of Hitotsubashi University who specializes in political economy. A former chief director of Japan Democratic Lawyer's Association (hereafter the "JDLA"), he is also politically progressive and associated with the JCP. Takada Ken has been a so-called neutral citizen activist, who avoided association with any political party and especially the JCP. However, he cooperated closely with Komori particularly in the opposition movement against the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in the early 2000s. He also plays a central role in organizing protest rallies against recent national security policies. Kawamura Toshio's Kenpō Kaigi, on the other hand, is literally a council for preventing constitutional revision, which has a tie to the JCP.

Thus, for the creation of the Article 9 Association, these leaders of respective fields came together to mount a single-issue movement, across the previous border that separated partisan and non-partisan movements. This was the first step for the movement of the Article 9 Association to involve a wide range of constituencies which had been protected by the Japanese constitution, as we will see in the following. In this light, the headquarters of the Article 9 Association is an achievement in its own right, as it was successful in assembling different

groups and individuals who had previously been active separately despite their shared concerns. This alone already shows the strong centripetal force of Article 9 and how intense the threat to the article may be felt by the Japanese people in the early 2000s.

Formation of the Intellectuals' Network around the Original Article 9 Association

Strong support from various individuals and groups began to gather around this core group of the Article 9 Association. Within the first year of their activity, the newsletter of the Article 9 Association listed the names of over a thousand individuals who expressed their support for the Association's cause. Some of them were groups such as "eighteen religious leaders of Kyoto" with a list of individual names, but most of these were individuals who occupy highly respected positions in the Japanese social context, such as university professors, physicians, authors, scientists, artists, actors, a chairperson of a religious establishment and so on. Clearly, the initial appeal that framed the movement's purpose specifically to combat the political threat to Article 9 effected strong resonance among their wide audience.

These published names alone do not show the connection between these individuals and groups, but they show the formation of the network ties between the headquarters of the Article 9 Association and these individuals and groups. The immediate support these intellectuals offered to the Article 9 Association suggests the strong sympathy they felt toward the Association's cause. The nine founders' leadership was a timely stimulant to the previously silent constituencies to finally take action and this created many new network ties. In the terminology of social network studies, the ties formed between the headquarters and these supporters of the Article 9 Association composed a "wheel structure"—that is, around the core group of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association, a wheel-shaped network of the intellectual strata of the

pro-Constitution population in Japan was created as shown in Diagram 2:




Diagram 2. The wheel-shaped network composed of the headquarters and first set of supporters (Report#1, N=188)

This indicates, moreover, the formation of many more clusters and wheels of potential sponsors (local leaders) surrounding the original core group, which became the “headquarter” of the Article 9 Association as the result. As this process unfolds, grassroots chapters began to be created across the country.

Formation of the Grassroots Chapters of the Article 9 Association

Many of those who participated in the creation of their own chapters of the Article 9 Association have claimed that the alliance around the single issue of “protecting Article 9 and the Japanese constitution” was exactly what they were going to do even without the establishment of the Article 9 Association. Many were on the alert already for the government’s attempt to push a constitutional revision, and were preparing to fight. Right at the moment, the initial appeal of the Article 9 Association was published, and it perfectly aligned with their sentiment. Thus, the publication of the initial appeal opened the new opportunity for these existing groups to act. The quick expansion of the network of the Article 9 Association was therefore a spontaneous development, rather than a top-down force. The voluntary formation of more than 3,000 grassroots chapters in the first year of the movement is evidence for this claim. By the time I arrived in Japan for field research in 2011, the number of grassroots chapters had reached 7,528 as shown in Table 1:




Table 1. The increase of grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association

This development was a surprise even to the members of the original Article 9 Association. According to Komori Yōichi, the chief of the secretariat of the Article 9 Association, “it was not a plan nor did we expect such a reaction from the public” (Komori 2012). The initiators of this movement did not anticipate that a large number of people would take such voluntary actions. It is also noteworthy that these grassroots chapters were created at various levels and units of the Japanese society—in local communities, workplaces, and in hobby circles as well as in university campuses. Within those chapters based on local communities, moreover, there are chapters at the levels of neighborhood, district, ward, city, and prefecture. This section describes the typical ways in which such chapters took shape, and shows that many of these chapters were created based on pre-existing social networks.

Local Chapters

Concurrent with the time period when the intellectuals’ network was forming, in many local communities people began to create their own chapters of the Article 9 Association. In any Japanese community, there are always some “local celebrities” who are well known locally for their relatively prestigious social status and continuous dedication to community organizing activities. Most of them are often acquaintances with one another. Such a circle can initiate local activity and attract participants from their community, and this was also how grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association were formed in many local communities.

An organizer of the Omuro Article 9 Association in Kyoto, a local grassroots chapter in a community with about 3,800 households, explained in our interview how their chapter was created:

At the beginning Mrs. Iwai, who was the wife of Iwai Tadakuma who was a professor of Ritsumeikan University, asked me if I wanted to join her to be a sponsor to create our chapter, and I agreed. There were only eight of us at the beginning. Since we thought that eight is too small a number, we asked around and eventually one hundred and seventy people agreed to be sponsors. Then we announced our chapter's establishment and held an inaugural event (Sato 2012).

This is a typical process for local grassroots chapter formation: at first a local celebrity who wanted to support the original Article 9 Association's cause took the initiative and gathered support from other well-known figures in their community. Then the members of this core group reached out to other like-minded people in their respective social networks. In Omuro's case, Ms. Sato was a former schoolteacher and an acquaintance of Professor Iwai, as they lived nearby and had worked together on other community activities previously. Their initial membership also included a physician, a master of a traditional craft, and a few more former schoolteachers. Retired teachers of public primary and middle schools tend to be well rooted in their local community, and their social circle also includes more ordinary residents in the neighborhood with various professions and resources.

Another local grassroots chapter called the Fujisawa Article 9 Association in Fujisawa City, Kanagawa prefecture, was also formed through a similar process. When the nine public intellectuals introduced above held their inaugural announcements in June 2004, some Fujisawa citizen's groups were preparing for an amateur theater production of "The Pearl Necklace," the story of Beate Shirota Gordon, who was a member of the Constitutional Committee of the GHQ and is credited with writing the women's rights articles in the current Constitution of Japan. The

purpose of the play was to “think about peace in order to protect it” (Shida 2012). With the establishment of the Article 9 Association, they felt that it might be possible to create their own Article 9 Association based on the relationships built through the theater project. While working for the theater project, Shida and other central members of this activity asked those who supported the project if they would also like to work on the new project together. Half a year after the theater project was successfully completed, the Fujisawa Article 9 Association was established. In Fujisawa, the core members also included local celebrities such as a well-published essayist and a former politician, but also locally active members of peace movement groups. These groups had been working together on many local issues in the past, campaigning against industrial pollution and mayoral and assembly elections for instance. Thus, in Fujisawa, there was a previously existing citizens group that played the organizer’s role, and in turn expanded its network as a chapter of the Article 9 Association.

The Nishisakae-machi Article 9 Association in Aizu-wakamatsu City, Fukushima prefecture, was created by a group of women who became friends through PTA activity when their children were in school. One of the core members was the wife of the pastor of the local Christian church and was also born in the church as a daughter of the former pastor. She and her friends had been concerned about issues such as the dispatch of the SDF abroad, and felt uneasy about the first Abe Cabinet’s attempt to revise the constitution. They asked a teacher of social studies in their children’s’ school to give them lectures on these problems. When the original Article 9 Association held its inaugural press conference, they thought that their group should also be a part of this new Association, and named their group the Nishisakae-machi Article 9 Association (Katano 2012). In a small neighborhood community like Nishisakae-machi, a traditional Christian church may play a socially central role, and this Wakamatsu Sakae-machi

Church was a rather special example even among such churches. Both the former and present pastors were actively involved in community activities, taking care of children from the neighboring high school by offering them a space for their rock band to practice and hold concerts. The church also offered English lessons and Katano, who is fluent in English, taught the class. The chapter holds its monthly meetings and study groups in the church. As a Christian church, the congregation views the teaching of peace as their basic purpose and their activities influence the local residents. Thus, Nishisakae-machi Article 9 Association was a local grassroots chapter with a special facility.

These three local cases demonstrate that in Japan there certainly are numerous tight-knit groups of people who have continuously engaged in community activities and that they may be readily available for mobilization when an opportunity arises. Here, too, we can expect the working of the lasting legacy of the numerous small movements that have proliferated since the 1950s. This is not a given, however, but an achievement of daily efforts to maintain such relationships, because movement participation is specific to the context and networks in which the rationales are developed and embellished and demands constant renewal of the motivations for participation (Snow et al. 1986:467).

While these three local grassroots chapters were created through social ties that existed prior to the Article 9 Association, there are chapters based partly on the ties generated by the Article 9 Association. A small grassroots chapter of the Article 9 Association in a local community called Ōfuna in Kanagawa prefecture is one such case. The Ōfuna Article 9 Association is one of many grassroots chapters in Kamakura City, a traditional town with many temples and historical sites. The chapter was formed after some participants in the Kamakura Article 9 Association, which was formed earlier, decided that they would like to create another

chapter on a smaller scale. A few local celebrities who live in and around the district called Ōfuna (where there is the largest terminal station in Kamakura City), such as a retired TV producer and a retired schoolteacher, as well as a few other citizen activists, who were also leaders of labor unions before retirement, took the first action. As several nationally renowned writers and scholars resided in Kamakura, the Kamakura Article 9 Association took advantage of their support and listed these figures as its sponsors. Inoue Hisashi from the headquarters was also among them.

The case of Ōfuna offers another important aspect of the grassroots chapter formation: disagreements within a chapter can generate one or more new grassroots chapters. According to a founding member of the Ōfuna chapter, the basic motivation for those who formed this local chapter was to actively promote the intention of the Article 9 Association to create chapters “all over the country” (*zenkoku tsutsu uraura*). However, it was on this very fundamental tenet of the movement where the Ōfuna group disagreed with the Kamakura chapter’s leadership, who tended to assert their prestige and dominate chapter activity and even claimed that it is enough to have one Kamakura chapter in the city (Iijima 2012). Nonetheless, the Article 9 Association is a voluntary movement without central control. All the Ōfuna group had to do was to form a new chapter on their own without formally breaking away from the Kamakura chapter. Thus, many more grassroots chapters took shape within smaller communities in the city and they were able to find the resources to create their own activities.

These examples show that grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association took shape in various places in the society based on different kinds of, both weak and strong, ties. Ties that connect members of these chapters vary in their strength, but also in their origin. In most cases, actors who had previously been active in other social settings took the initiative to create a

chapter of the Article 9 Association. These leaders, in other words, decided to reformulate their social ties into grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association. I will discuss this point more at the end of this section.

Once created, chapters developed in varying ways depending on their respective conditions: membership, their backgrounds, and their social, cultural, and political environments. What was emphasized commonly in most chapters' activities, however, was "democratic operation of all activity." A typical meeting of a chapter was open to anyone who wished to take part, including non-members, and it tended to continue longer than an hour, depending on the size of the membership. This is because an open discussion on the floor "until everyone feels right about the consensus" was an unwritten rule for the participants, a retired union leader who is now taking part in the Article 9 Association movement as a volunteer explained to me after a meeting (Asai 2012). A democratic open-floor discussion had become common in Japanese social movement activities through the past lessons that those movement actors had learned when they were active players in their respective fields, such as labor union activities in particular, but also in the "invisible civil society" (Steinhoff 2014) of the country composed of numerous small citizen movements, which try to operate on consensus through such discussion.

Activities of local chapters of the Article 9 Association include elements of the traditional social movement repertoire such as petitions and rallies, as well as a practice called "gaitō senden" (street advocating), where people stand in front of the train station or elsewhere with a microphone to publicize particular causes, passing out fliers and encouraging people to sign a petition. One activity adopted by many chapters is the "Kyū no-hi senden" (9th-day-advocacy) in which members of a chapter would stand in front of a local train station on the days with number nine (some do this only on the 9th, but others would also do it on 19th and 29th days of the month)

with signs and posters to appeal the significance of Article 9. Most times local chapters independently decide on their activities and fit them around their members' schedules. If the 'democratic operation' of a chapter is a strategy to build solidarity among participants, street demonstrations and petition drives are types of outreach activity (and participation in such activities further promotes group solidarity).

For instance, the Omuro Chapter in Kyoto, the local chapter introduced above, focused on petitions while participating in many different activities in the city. First they started to gather petition signatures by standing in front of a supermarket where many people walk by. But then they realized after a while that they see the same people repeatedly in one place. So they decided to visit each household in the district of Omuro, collecting petition signatures from all the residents of their district. All in all there are 3,800 households in Omuro. Every weekend the chapter members visited around hundred households, and it took them about two and half years to visit all of them (Sato 2012).

While gathering petitions and visiting the households in the district of Omuro, the chapter also increased the number of supporters from 170 to 250 by asking the people who signed the petition to join. Sato also explained that when they started their door-to-door petition gathering they just visited each house without any advance notice. As some households were never home, they utilized the method they had heard about at the larger events where different chapters report about their activities. One of the local chapters doing door-to-door petition gathering posts a flyer before they visit the household. Then even if they could not meet the resident in person, the resident could at least read the flyer. Thus, local chapter activities adopt useful methods from other chapters' activities to improve theirs.

After accomplishing their goal to visit all the households in their neighborhood, Omuro

Chapter continued their petition activity in a different way:

We did not think that we could ever do such a thing, but once we started, even though we rested on rainy days, we were able to continue and it was done one and half years ago...so then we have started a new activity—standing by those famous temples like Ninna-Ji and talking to people who come to sightsee and also students who are on study trips. Sometimes we get 50 petitions in an hour and other times just 12...something like that. Some students say, “What was Article 9?” But once we explain its meaning, they always sign the petition. Some teachers tell us that they are studying, then I say this is also part of study (Sato 2012).

Besides petitions, holding lecture series is a popular activity among local chapters. Local chapters often invite people with a professional expertise to give a lecture about topics around Article 9, such as war and peace, constitutional law, and recent social issues. For instance, Omuro Chapter also hosted an event called “reading the constitution (kenpo wo yomu kai)” and invited a young lawyer who edited “The Handbook for Children’s Rights (kodomo no kenri techō).” At first Sato did not know whether this person was part of the Article 9 Association, but knew that the young lawyer, collaborating with a doctor and others, had created this handbook. Thus, the activities of local chapter can bring people in related fields together and create new network ties.

The Nishi-sakaemachi Chapter in Aizu-wakamatsu held a continuing “peace exhibition” where they invited various forms of work, such as photography, to be exhibited at the church. This was one of the chapter’s main activities, together with its regular study sessions. However,

unexpected events could impact chapter activities. After the nuclear disaster in March 2011 occurred in their own prefecture, the small historic town of Aizu-Wakamatsu had quickly become a shelter for evacuees from the danger zone. Especially, the Nishi-sakaemachi church was soon filled with those evacuees. The chapter also became the center for those residents of the neighborhood concerned with the spread of the radioactive substances and soon started anti-nuclear plants activities by informing many others about the reality of Fukushima.

More broadly, the network created by the local Article 9 Associations helped evacuees who moved from disaster-affected area to other regions in Japan. An interviewee from the Nishi-sakaemachi Chapter who sought shelter in Wakayama prefecture after the nuclear disaster found many helping hands coming from the local Article 9 Association chapter in the area when she was most devastated and lonely. The local chapter invited her to a talk event to share her experience in Fukushima after the disaster, thus creating an opportunity for her to reflect on her personal experience and at the same time making an important connection between the activity of the Article 9 Association and the anti-nuclear movement at the grassroots level.

All these chapter activities with attention to small details may seem rather tedious especially from the perspective that takes activity-oriented and processual character of movement mobilization for granted. This is however what it takes for grassroots social movement groups to maintain their activities. Indeed, continuous participation in social movements requires continuous conversations and encouragement, both internal and external, and daily activities to stay involved, both emotionally and theoretically.

Occupation- and Workplace-Based Chapters

Besides local grassroots chapters, there are grassroots chapters based on occupational identity. In Kyoto, a chapter was formed around a religious community of Buddhist temples. The Higashi-Honganji Temple called for participation of the entire Otani School of Shinshu Buddhism (of which it is the head temple) in their chapter, the Buddhist Prayers for the Article 9 Association. As there are many different schools of Buddhist temples in Kyoto, it is perhaps not the only chapter of the Article 9 Association created by religious leaders. Indeed, the famous priest Arima Raitei of the Kinkakuji and Ginkakuji temples has been representing the prefectural-level chapter of the Article 9 Association in Kyoto, one of the “clearinghouse chapters” we will discuss in Chapter IV. As Arima Raitei was one of the eighteen religious leaders who sponsored the Article 9 Association upon its initial appeal in 2004, it is most likely that each of the eighteen leaders has also been working with at least one chapter of the Article 9 Association.

In our interview, a priest from the Higashi-Honganji Temple recalled that their first step was to have all priests of the Ōtani School agree to announce a clear position on Article 9 as a religious establishment. As much as each priest’s taking an individual position, the organizational will to reflect on the role of religion for peace was significant for the Ōtani School’s decision to take this action. The existence of the Ōtani School as a Buddhist organization was the foundation for this chapter; yet having such an organizational foundation did not automatically mean the formation of the chapter of the Article 9 Association: The leaders of the organization had to decide to take political action in the name of the entire Ōtani School. Similarly, for most chapters of the Article 9 Association that were formed based on previously existing organizations and groups, deciding to form a chapter means to reconfigure their original

identity, and is a great leap forward in its own right.

The Film-People's Article 9 Association is a chapter composed of people who work in the film industry. The Film and Theater Workers' Union is the foundational organization of this chapter. The chapter members also include several famous film and animation directors. Their chapter events usually show a film related to peace and other social issues, and discuss it together with the audience. The members of the union who are skilled and experienced in organizational works often take initiative in creating these events.

Schoolteachers also formed chapters of the Article 9 Association in many schools. Many of these chapters were formed across the existing boundary between the two major teachers' unions in Japan with different political affiliation. Furthermore, these chapters also involved teachers who were non-union members. Like other labor unions in Japan, Japanese teachers' unions were split into two following the schism of the national labor federation in 1989 (Aspinal 2001). However, in the local settings teachers who formally belonged to different unions worked together to overcome issues that had immediate impact on their daily life as schoolteachers (Wang 2008). From these experiences, teachers built the basis on which they could mount collaborative activities, and this became the foundation for them to form the workplace-based chapters of the Article 9 Association. These teachers' grassroots chapters in schools in turn consists a network of teachers' Article 9 Associations at city and prefectural levels as well. As such, organizational level of network processes are inseparable and at the same time distinctive from individual level processes.

How did they manage to put aside many conflicts in order to create a chapter beyond existing boundaries? What motivates these members of organizations to participate in the Article 9 Association, when many of them probably had other conflicting interests or responsibilities?

These are the examples where we can clearly see the success of the association's initial appeal that framed its issue explicitly focused *only* to Article 9 without linking it to other issues that created divisions in the past. As we will see in the following chapter, the initial appeal also called for *personal* participation from *individual* Japanese as the sovereign who is entrusted to protect Article 9. This further guaranteed participation without fetters that were caused in the past (and would have caused in the future) by affiliations to particular groups or parties. Participation from every level of the society shows clearly that these framing efforts did pay off.

University Chapters

Chapters of the Article 9 Association also exist on university campuses. In some cases professors took an initiative then their students found the activity interesting, and they worked together, but in other cases students created their own chapter independently. There also were universities where separate chapters of professors and students coexist. In the case of Chūō University, for instance, the reason why there were separate chapters was that professors were reluctant to work together with students: An interviewee who teaches at the university explained that some professors did not wish to get involved in student activism, which “tended to get overly heated up” (Konno 2012), a comment that stems from the legacy of the 1960s student movement. At Keiō University, on the other hand, there was only a student chapter called TAP (Talk About Peace) 9. As of 2012, thirteen students from Keiō University, but also four from other universities such as Waseda and Yokohama City Universities were participating in TAP9. This example shows that students who want to participate in the Article 9 Association could take part in a chapter in other universities than their own.

Creating a student chapter on university campuses could face challenges and it is not so

easy for students to do so. Often, such a challenge comes from the university itself: A member of TAP9 explained that the authorities of Keiō University were not quite friendly to their activities:

We must be officially recognized by the University as a “circle” to get a permission to post flyers on bulletins on campus, and to use classrooms for our activities such as meetings and events like lectures. Since our chapter is not approved as a circle yet, we cannot post our flyers. We ask some of our professors who are sympathetic to our cause when we want to use classrooms (Fujita 2012).

At the International Christian University (ICU), there was also a student chapter. Although there was no professor’s chapter at the ICU, the student chapter invited some professors to be sponsors (Shima 2011). A founding member of this chapter explained that they decided to create their own chapter after participating in an event called Peace Night Nine, which was organized by the Tokyo Students’ Article 9 Association, a clearinghouse chapter with students from several different universities in Tokyo.

According to a member of TAP9 at Keiō University, there also were student chapters at Waseda, Meiji, Aoyama, Wakō, Tōyō, and Tokyo Universities, and members of these chapters take part in the Tokyo Students’ Article 9 Association. There was also a chapter at the ward level, such as Chiyoda Students’ Article 9 Association in Chiyoda Ward in central Tokyo, with students from Nihon University and the college of science and engineering at Chūō University. Thus, students take part in the Article 9 Association fluidly, some by creating their own chapters on campuses, and others by participating in another university’s chapter, or by simply jumping in to a clearinghouse chapter as a student without particular chapter membership when they do not

have enough resources to do otherwise.

Through my interviews, it also became evident that most students who take leadership in creating chapters of the Article 9 Association on their campuses have been active in other social activities. Six out of nine student interviewees were members of Minsei, or the Democratic Youth League of Japan, a youth organization affiliated with the JCP. Nonetheless, according to one of them, “Minsei is not just a group of good friends” and being part of Minsei is not the only reason why they are actively participating in the Article 9 Association. A trigger for this student to take part in the Article 9 Association was the words of an atomic bomb survivor, whom she met through the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, who told her that hers was the last generation who would be listening to their experiences in person. This made her think about how her generation could continue to tell their stories to the next generation (Iseki 2012). A professor at Chūō University, who was also active in Minsei when he was younger, also commented “not all Minsei members would be interested in the Article 9 Association” (Konno 2012).

A student interviewee who was not a member of Minsei, on the other hand, reflected that what got her interested in social problems was an English essay class at her cram school for university entrance examinations. In this class, she had the chance to watch documentary films on various social problems such as wars, nuclear power plants, and poverty. In teaching how to assemble thoughts into an English essay, her teacher taught her that she must be critical of things that she sees and hears. Once she was accepted to university, she met her upperclassman who had attended the same clam school, and who was taking charge of the Article 9 Association chapter on campus at that time. Soon she became active in the chapter and organized events that “would be attractive to students.” Her chapter invited lecturers such as Takatō Naoko, a

humanitarian activist specializes in Iraq, through whom she and her colleagues became keenly interested in human rights problems in Iraq. With Takatō's assistance, they held a Skype meeting with university students in Iraq, thus befriending "real people in Iraq who lived in war, which totally changed [their] perspectives on the matter" (Fujita 2012). After the 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, their chapter invited Iida Tetsunari, the director of the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies, to discuss the issue of the nuclear plant. She felt that the Article 9 Association was the reason for the development of her network:

Without being active in the Article 9 Association, I would not have acquired so many personal connections, or been interested in so many social problems...I feel the responsibility to work on these issues as a person who had the chance to know about them. As for our chapter of the Article 9 Association, I think its existence is meaningful in its own right. I'm graduating soon, so am telling my underclass students "don't let it disappear at least." (Fujita 2012)

This shows that being active in a social activities or being a member of a pre-existing organization are not necessary preconditions for younger people to take part in the Article 9 Association, although those who have previous experiences and resources are better situated to get connected to a new activity through existing ties. Nevertheless, to take part in a new movement, an individual with existing ties to social movements must decide at one point whether she wants to reconfigure the ties and her position, and reformulate them to be suited to the new opportunity.

Hobby-Based Chapters

There are also chapters of the Article 9 Association created based on hobbies. According to the Article 9 Association's newsletter, there are hobby-based chapters such as the Article 9 Association for People Who Enjoy Mountain Climbing and the Article 9 Association for Fishing Lovers. I also met a member of a chapter called Quilt for Article 9, who is also a member of a local grassroots chapter in her neighborhood and also a volunteer member of the clearinghouse chapter in Kanagawa prefecture. In my fieldwork, I interviewed a member of a chapter based on the members' common interest in film. Most members of this chapter lived in one local area, but it was clearly a hobby-based chapter and the main activity of the chapter is to watch movies the members like, as an entrance to think about peace.

Another hobby-based chapter was formed among a group of friends. My interviewee from one of such chapters explained how their group created a chapter of the Article 9 Association:

We were a group of old friends, who used to talk about random things about the past. In about 25 or 26 years ago, however, we decided to talk about much more meaningful things, like our experiences during the wartime, or problems we would encounter as retirees...and what we can do about it. So we first started a study group called Yamaneko-ken Shinpojium (Symposium at the Mountain Cat's House) with about 20 to 30 friends. Later, when we got to know about the appeal of the Article 9 Association, we decided to form K9MP (Kenpō 9jo Message Project). (Mabuchi 2012)

In this statement, it is clear that existing groups of friends and hobby buddies were consciously turned into chapters of the Article 9 Association.

Thus, the multilayered and sometimes overlapping construction of grassroots chapters presents a web-like structure that cuts across Japanese society. The seemingly sudden mobilization at every level of the society is a curious phenomenon and one would ask why, and also how, this sort of explosive development could be possible at all. The key to answer this question is the preexisting citizens groups and their personal networks that had dotted the country yet were embedded deeply inside the civil society. Many such groups of people decided to turn their personal networks at different levels into chapters of the Article 9 Association. In local communities, socially active members reconfigured their personal networks and took the initiative to form a chapter; religious leaders reflected on the role of religion in the society and expressed their support for the peace constitution with Article 9 by creating chapters of the Article 9 Association under the name of their denominations; labor unions decided to re-pronounce their support for the constitution and the Article 9 and create a new collectivity beyond their union boundaries to form a chapter; in universities, professors and students reorganized their colleagues into chapters of the Article 9 Association; and groups of friends and hobby buddies decided to extend the purpose of their groups and form a place for social and political discussions, calling it a chapter of the Article 9 Association. Participants' reconfiguring existing ties is therefore a key process through which the very extensive network of the Article 9 Association was created in such a short span of time. Active decision made by leaders of existing groups and organizations was the very first step in this process.

Formation of the Ties between Chapters through Events

Once formed, these grassroots chapters gradually extended their network ties, starting from neighboring chapters and then to more distant chapters. The Article 9 Association expanded its network primarily through the participants' social networks. In Japan as well as elsewhere, those who are active in social activities tend to belong to more than one social group or organization. Since this has been especially true within the left in Japan, a person who has become a member of a chapter of the Article 9 Association is very likely to get involved in more chapters, and ends up belonging to chapters with different styles and membership backgrounds. Such a person who moves between different chapters, moreover, becomes a broker between these chapters (Burt 2005). That is to say, regardless of the level of the individual's awareness, by participating in different chapters, she provides information about the other chapters and plays the role of a carrier of outside resources. Thus, grassroots chapters naturally form network ties through shared personnel.

Grassroots chapters also form network ties by cooperating to organize events, and by participating in other chapters' activities as guests. Sometimes, neighboring chapters try to use each other's resources to hold a larger action, for instance, to host a film-screening event. As compared with more convenient activities such as petitions a chapter could do with a few people in any given place, events like film-screening require more time and resources for preparation: they need to reserve a reasonably sized hall which meets their limited budget, advertise it, sell tickets, and organize the screening event itself, such as the front desk, spaces for fund-raising goods, seating for the audience, and volunteers to staff each table. Japanese activists are generally experienced in this kind of activities (see Steinhoff 2015 for a similar setting).

To realize these larger events, local chapters exchange their resources. Some activities

require extended connection to a specialist. A chapter may or may not have such a connection. In such cases, they try to reach out to necessary resources by themselves if possible, but otherwise they could utilize the resources that another chapter may have. Of course, for this, they need to know someone from other chapter who has such a connection. Sometimes, even when they did not know about anyone with the resource they wanted, another chapter's event announcement could alert them to exactly what they wanted. If they participate in these events hosted by another chapter, they can make new connections and thus their network can be expanded. Such opportunity allows the chapter the chance in the future to make their own event utilizing the newly gained resources.

For example, a grassroots chapter called the Article 9 Association Along the Enoden Railway, held a film-screening event working together with neighboring chapters with overlapping membership. In another time, this chapter also realized a tour to the war heritage sites in their neighborhood. To do the latter event, the chapter found someone from another chapter who is knowledgeable about war heritage in the region to guide their tour. Ōfuna Chapter, which is located in Kamakura-city where there is an Enoden Railway terminal, participated in the film-screening event that the Enoden Railway Chapter hosted by helping them to sell tickets but also joining the screening as part of the audience. In turn, when the Ōfuna chapter hosted another film-screening event, the members of the Enoden Railway Chapter came to help. This type of collaborative relationship develops between local chapters over time, and it sometimes gives birth to a new chapter, as some participants in these events hope to create their own chapter in their neighborhood. Such a collaborative relationship is also a channel through which ideas are transmitted: the idea to create a chapter along a particular railway came originally from the Article 9 Association Along Inokashira Line in Tokyo. Further, some

members of Ōfuna chapter decided to form the Article 9 Association Along Negishi Line after they had collaborated with the Enoden Railway chapter, in which members of several different grassroots chapters who live along the JR Negishi Line assembled as a chapter.

They also form ties with geographically more distant chapters through participating in larger events such as the prefectural level events hosted by clearinghouse chapters in their area (see Chapter IV), as well as the national-level conferences hosted by the headquarters of the Article 9 Association, which will be discussed in more details in Chapter V. The national exchange meetings held by the headquarter serves as a platform where grassroots chapters share their experiences and encourage one another to create a more vigorous movement. Through this event, countless ties between grassroots chapters and the headquarters are formed, and more interactions take place after the event.

They also find lecturers for their study group on different problems, who is usually invited through a personal tie to a member of the particular chapter, and this lecturer could be a channel for a new connection with an otherwise distant chapter and other resources. Local chapters that are geographically close by and workplace-based chapters with shared interests are likely to communicate directly and more closely, often co-hosting events with a related theme. As the headquarters created a list of “guest lecturers” who could offer professional guidance on their respective fields such as constitutional law, political economy, peace literature, and so on, grassroots chapters can request the headquarters to dispatch a lecturer they wish to have for their particular events. The headquarters then contacts the requested lecturer to schedule the event. Once the deal is made, the chapter would reserve a location and start advertising for the lecture, making flyers and distributing it through their unique channels. The chapter normally can use this service with a relatively small honorarium and transportation fee paid directly for the

lecturer, as this is a service for which the lecturers have volunteered their time.

It is also noteworthy that, in the cases of the Omuro chapter in Kyoto and the Enoden Railway and Ōfuna chapters in Kanagawa, retired schoolteachers were active participants. In fact, many local chapters of the Article 9 Association have former schoolteachers among their core membership. Retired primary and middle school teachers especially possess more local ties as compared with those who worked for corporations who tend not to have developed close connections in their neighborhood while they were working. The locally embedded networks of former schoolteachers who are often leaders of grassroots chapters are helpful for the purpose of local chapters, which is to spread the support for Article 9 and the Japanese constitution at the grassroots level.




Diagram 3. A local network of grassroots chapters in Kanagawa prefecture

*Node colors show types of chapters. Green: grassroots chapter, Purple: clearinghouse chapter. Edge colors show types of ties. Red: events, Blue: membership overlap (brokerage).

Thus, grassroots chapters get connected with one another through ties between persons, through shared organizational resources prepared by the headquarters, as well as through events. These processes, which are happening at different analytical levels, are in reality overlapped and intertwined. By closely looking at the courses of tie formation among grassroots chapters, this chapter showed the processes in which the Article 9 Association expanded as an entity, and what kinds of groups and organizations served as the foundations for this Association to create more than 7,500 grassroots chapters across Japan. The chapter also showed that a grassroots chapter of the Article 9 Association might be a new face of a preexisting group, which turned itself into a chapter of the Article 9 Association by reconfiguring its existing network ties and highlighting a specific one of many identities held by the group members. Nevertheless, these outcomes are the result of continuous emotional as well as theoretical exchanges among movement participants, for most cases since before the formation of the Article 9 Association.

CHAPTER V. THE CLEARINGHOUSE CHAPTERS

Within the movement of the Article 9 Association, once chapters are created at a given level or unit of community, regardless of the type of chapters, more chapters are created both in smaller and larger units of the society around the first chapters. That is, when grassroots chapters are created in many cities of a prefecture, members of these chapters tend to start exchanging information and organizing activities. To make communication more effective, then, they create a chapter at the prefectural level. The primary role of this prefectural level chapter is to facilitate communication among grassroots chapters in their prefecture; in so doing, it also helps the activities of the Article 9 Association to reach the smallest unit of the society to the districts and neighborhood levels. It is also important to note that prefectural level chapters do not ‘unify’ grassroots chapters; rather, they try to maintain horizontal relationships between grassroots chapters. Prefectural level chapters have functions of “clearinghouse organizations” (Steinhoff 2003); however, many of these chapters also have their own activities and budget like grassroots chapters. Nevertheless, since the main function of prefectural level chapters is to facilitate communications and collaborations among grassroots chapters in their respective prefectures, this dissertation calls them “clearinghouse chapters.”

There were clearinghouse chapters in all the local areas where I conducted my field research. When I went to a new place, I generally went through the organizers of these clearinghouse chapters, to whom I was referred by Komori Yōichi at the headquarters secretariat. Then, these organizers were able to refer me to persons who lead grassroots chapters. At times members of grassroots chapters whom I interviewed also referred me to an organizer of a

clearinghouse chapter. In the similar way to local grassroots chapters and clearinghouse chapters, occupation-based chapters in particular industries, such as mass media (including television, newspapers, advertising, and movie and theater), education, and civil engineering and construction industries, also created their own chapters at both local and prefectural levels.

This chapter looks at six concrete cases of these clearinghouse chapters. Each of the six cases presents the operation of a particular clearinghouse chapter, and the purpose of their unique activities as a part of Article 9 Association movements. The objectives and activities of each clearinghouse chapter are embedded in unique histories, social movement organizations, and other resources available in their respective geographical and professional areas. Cases to be presented here were chosen theoretically based on such backgrounds. Nonetheless, these different chapters are fundamentally rooted in the common history of Japanese social movements that had been particularly divisive.

I argue that overcoming this negative legacy that still haunts the development of social movements in Japan today is an unspoken yet clear objective, especially for those who participate in the Article 9 Association movement. The analytical focus of the present chapter is therefore the disagreements found in Japanese social movements to be overcome: Virtually all these disagreements were generated in social movements to which the political generation that now engages in the Article 9 Association were once committed. Moreover, the Japanese constitution requires a national referendum and the majority of voters to approve its amendment. Overcoming such past conflicts among the supporters of the constitution therefore becomes a practical and even necessary aim for this movement, in order to thwart the revision attempt. Thus, in this chapter, the analytical focus is not only on the past conflicts, but also on the mediating actions that different clearinghouse chapters carry out.

The Kanagawa Network

The core members of Kanagawa Association for Article 9 (hereafter the “Kanagawa Network”) are lawyers and former union leaders who live and work in Kanagawa prefecture. However, the lawyers who work together in this chapter possess different political orientations—some are more supportive of the JCP, and others the former JSP, which has already been dissolved yet its supporters still sympathize with the smaller SDP. This composition of the core membership shows that the Kanagawa Network aims to overcome the traditional boundary between the communists and the socialists, which has been dividing Japanese social movements since the immediate post World War period. The lawyers who take initiative for this chapter are well aware of their differences, and purposefully work together in order to overcome this historical gap. The core members including volunteer staff also share this common purpose (Iijima 2012, personal conversation). Because of their experience with organizational work, previous leaders of labor unions tend to volunteer for the secretariat positions of the chapter. Those former union leaders who have chosen to take part in citizens’ movements after retirement are well trained not only in negotiating personnel matters, but also in treating different political orientations and preferences fairly, so that they do not collide in any fatal way. The case of Kanagawa exhibits most typically the goal of this generation of activists, and perhaps of the Article 9 Association—that is, to bridge the division between the socialist and communist camps within the left. This is indeed the major problem that former union leaders and lawyers who worked together with these unionists have been facing continuously throughout their careers, and they believe that this is one of the most critical causes that prevented their movements from

having a real impact in politics. They believe that resolving this problem would promote social change.

The Kanagawa Network has relatively younger lawyers. Among them are a fifty year old and another in his late thirties. Both joined the Article 9 Association through Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom—an association of lawyers that has strong ties not only with the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, but also with various democratic citizens groups in Japan. Lawyers from this organization initiate most of the clearinghouse chapters of the Article 9 Association, which suggests the effectiveness of organizational ties in recruitment and intergenerational continuity of social movements. More generally, however, the younger generation does not differentiate these camps as clearly as the older generation does. Rather, a younger Japanese would not appreciate any of these factions. To their sensibility these groups are just the same kind of people: “professional citizens” (Mori 2012, personal conversation). Nevertheless, the conflict between the socialist and communist camps remains the main gap for the 1960s generation that now engages in the Article 9 Association movement, and this gap is still the main factor that prevents the Japanese progressives from conducting unified political movements.

Aside from these lawyers and former union leaders, the volunteer members of the Kanagawa Network secretariat also include more “ordinary citizens with no political affiliation” (Nakano 2011). When I attended the Kanagawa Network’s monthly meeting that was open to public, Nakano, who is a housewife and a volunteer member of the chapter’s secretariat, invited me to join a group going for dinner after the meeting. Besides Nakano, a young man (in his late twenties) who works for a law firm, and myself, others at the dinner were lawyers and former union leaders who are core members of the chapter. At the dinner, Nakano sat next to me and

mentioned a few times that she is an “ordinary housewife” and that it is important for people like her to be part of such activity as the Article 9 Association. In our interview on the later day, Nakano explained that one of the reasons she decided to participate in the Article 9 Association was that she “did not want people to think the Article 9 Association was organized by a particular political party” (Nakano 2011). Negishi, another volunteer member whom I interviewed, also commented in our interview that she sometimes felt uneasy to work with these “bengoshi sensei” (literal translation is “lawyer-teachers,” “sensei” after a proper noun is often used to lightly ridicule someone with authority and to emphasize one’s humble status as compared to the other side) and other “experienced people,” because she herself is just an “ordinary participant without much experience in social activity, although [she] did have a membership to the union at [her] former workplace” (Negishi 2012). It was unclear in Negishi’s statement whether she had any party affiliation, but it was clear that the organizational character of the chapter made her feel slight discomfort. She took part in the Kanagawa Network because the local grassroots chapter she first participated was too small to continue regular activity and she wanted to work with more people. Besides the local chapter and the network, she also sewed the clause of Article 9 into huge quilts in various languages as a part of the activity of another grassroots chapter, Quilt for Article 9.

Thus, the Kanagawa Network chapter involved participants with somewhat different backgrounds, and the leaders of the chapter were well aware of it. A former union leader who now volunteers as a secretariat member of the Kanagawa Network, emphasized the importance of “taking time to discuss until everyone feels right about the final consensus” (Asai 2012). Still, participants like Negishi may not feel completely at home. This example helps to understand how much care it takes to organize a chapter of the Article 9 Association. This example makes it

clear, moreover, that these participants decided to participate in the Article 9 Association because of their strong conviction that this movement matters, and that their personal contribution is essential for the movement to succeed. These two cases above were clear instances where the association's framing that appealed to the worth of individuals as the proud sovereign who is entrusted to protect Article 9 that in turn promote world peace paid off. And by "taking time to discuss until everyone feels right about the final consensus" in their organizational procedures, chapters of the association strive to embody the democratic spirit of the initial appeal published in 2004.

At the organizational level, participants' different interpretations of the association's approach to create a horizontal network caused some conflicts. When forming the Kanagawa Network was being discussed, there was a heated debate and even strong opposition against the plan. It was objection to creating a prefectural level chapter, based on concern about creating an "upper level organization" above the existing grassroots chapters. The concern was understandable given the past experiences of Japanese social movements, where most social organizations maintained a vertical structure that discouraged horizontal cooperation between social groups with similar status. However, the supporters of the plan to create a prefectural level chapter argued that the purpose of creating a prefectural level chapter was just the opposite: it was not to oversee or to unify them, but to facilitate communications between grassroots chapters. Eventually, the opinion that regards this clearinghouse chapter as beneficial gained more support and, as we see today, this strategy has also been used in many other areas across Japan.

As described in Chapter III, neighboring grassroots chapters cooperate through shared resources. The clearinghouse chapter provides grassroots chapters with information about more

distant chapters through email news and monthly open meetings. Further, the clearinghouse chapter organizes larger event with the cooperation of grassroots chapters, such as summer festivals in public parks and lectures in a big prefectural hall inviting eminent speakers. These larger scale events are also more visible to the general public than smaller events that grassroots chapters alone could organize, and thus serve as a bigger opportunity to reach out to broader audiences.

A clearinghouse chapter like this also functions as a channel between the grassroots chapters and the headquarters. When the headquarters hold the annual national conferences, the headquarters advertises the event through their email newsletter, but also through the clearinghouse chapters. In turn, each chapter (either grassroots or clearinghouse) collects the list of participants and applies to the headquarters directly. Without such a facility as a clearinghouse chapter, the headquarters would need to assemble numerous applications that comes from individual participants separately each time when it tries to organize a national level meeting. This system also functions as a safety measure for national level events, as accepting applications only through a chapter of the Article 9 Association screens out potential threats to the events. Clearinghouse chapters therefore seem to be a practical facility for better organizing a nationwide movement like the Article 9 Association. So far there seems to be no complaint filed about a clearinghouse chapter trying to control grassroots chapters.

The Hiroshima Network

Similar to the case of Kanagawa and many others, a lawyer from Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom plays the role of the secretary general for the networking chapter of Hiroshima, the Article 9 Association Hiroshima Network (hereafter “the Hiroshima Network”).

As of August 2011, the Hiroshima Network is composed of a total of 87 grassroots chapters, which includes three “area center” chapters, 26 occupation-based chapters, 38 local chapters, 15 workplace chapters, 4 hobby-based chapters, and the Hiroshima Network itself as a chapter.

What is most unique about this network is that it includes another constitutional movement called the “Association for Article Number 9” (Dai-kyūjō no kai), which is said to be associated with Chūkaku-ha, a rather controversial faction in the Japanese social movement sector with origins in the radical new left of the 1960s. However, Dai-kyūjō no kai in Hiroshima seemed to have been rather neutral in terms of political orientation, and willing to cooperate with different groups that shared common purposes. In my interview, the secretary general of the Hiroshima Network clearly pointed out about this aspect of Hiroshima’s peace movement including the Article 9 Association, and stated that “the Communists, the Socialists, and the New Socialists work together in Hiroshima” (Iguchi 2012). Each of these parties and also individual participants involved in this network have long-standing careers in social activism in their respective fields, such as education and union activities in big-name media companies and newspapers, as well as citizens movements. These actors eventually brought their experiences and resources into the movement of the Article 9 Association through creating different grassroots chapters.

Prior to the formation of the Hiroshima Network in April 2007, and even before September 2004 when the first grassroots chapter of the Article 9 Association was created in Hiroshima, there was a history of constitutional movements with collaboration among various peace movement organizations in the prefecture. The establishment of the Research Commission on the Constitution in 2000 in the National Diet triggered this collaborative movement and the “Hiroshima Watch” was formed in November 2001. This group sent representatives to the

Committee's public hearings in Nagoya and Hiroshima in the following few years, and advocated for the cause to support the constitution in various ways. Once the current headquarters of the Article 9 Association held its inaugural press conference, these movements began to gather under the name of the Article 9 Association, and the first grassroots chapter in Hiroshima, the Asa-minami Ward Pensioners' Article 9 Association, was created in September 2004. This chapter also has a tie to the Pensioners' Union with its own nationwide network. Within the following year, 16 grassroots chapters were formed in Hiroshima, and as noted above, the number of grassroots chapters in the prefecture had increased to 87 by 2011 and remains more or less the same since then.

When I attended the Hiroshima Network's committee meeting in April 2012, several participants commented personally to me that they could put various differences aside and act collectively because Lawyer Iguchi is at the center of this network. As we will see in the cases of other prefectures, lawyers tend to play a mediating role between previously conflicting groups. Sasaki, a long-standing member of the Dai-kyūjō no kai who is also a well-connected citizen activist, whispered to me about another core member of the Hiroshima network chapter Ishino, saying that she is a communist party member, a clear indication that Sasaki herself is not a communist party member. Also in our interview she spoke highly of Takada Ken, a member of the Article 9 Association headquarters secretariat, who is also a long-standing leader of citizens' movements in Japan without any party affiliation. Clearly, this shows her preference and pride in being a citizen activist who does not affiliate with any political party, and has slight distrust toward political parties and those who affiliate with them. This is an identity strongly held by many citizen activists who participate in the Article 9 Association, and the Association deals

with this sentiment with special care. This sensitivity makes the Article 9 Association capable of mounting such a large scale “single-issue coalition” in Japan.

As much as it is organizational effort, it is also participants’ personal effort to work together with others who come from different areas of activities. Sasaki, who whispered to me about Ishino that she is a communist party member, has actually been working with her as participants of the Hiroshima Network, and came to dinner after the meeting, sharing a bottle of shōchu (Japanese liquor distilled from wheat) named “Kyūjō” (Article 9) with other people including Ishino. When I asked Sasaki if she would also be available for an interview before I leave town, she was first hesitant because Ishino has agreed to meet with me before her and suggested that they could meet at the same coffee shop to save my time. However, she eventually decided to meet with me and came rather early to the meeting place. When she arrived, I was still interviewing Ishino and the topic was about her personal story about how she moved to Hiroshima and started working as a preschool teacher. As she listened to Ishino’s story, she looked as though she was feeling differently about Ishino and commented in a sympathetic tone that she did not know at all that Ishino had such a background. Ishino brought many materials to show me her activities as the head of a preschool where there is also a chapter of the Article 9 Association, and shared many episodes with me while Sasaki was also listening. It was clear that Ishino has been doing everything to pass on peaceful society to children, while working together with their parents and her younger colleagues. When Ishino’s interview ended, our interview smoothly turned to Sasaki, and Ishino stayed until the end. Ishino was also listening carefully to Sasaki’s story, and was commenting sympathetically whenever she was surprised by Sasaki’s personal experiences as a former elementary school teacher and a citizen activist, and how she has recently been concentrating her energy to create a new network. It seemed clear to me that

they did not know about each other so well before this. Nonetheless, they had been working together, and the interview was perhaps an opportunity for them to develop a connection beyond their different backgrounds.

After their interviews ended, as she walked with me to the station, Sasaki told me that the day I attended their meeting was the first time the only young member (in his thirties) of the Hiroshima Network joined their dinner after the meeting. Sasaki said to me, “it was your power. I wonder if there is anyone like you in Hiroshima,” and handed me her business card. Sasaki’s comment shows that the longstanding activists are anxious about having few young participants in their activity, and that they are uncertain of why this has been the case. In both the Article 9 Association and the Association for Article Number 9, a common problem is how to achieve intergenerational succession. They both struggle to recruit younger members. This is also true in most grassroots chapters within Hiroshima as well as in other local areas. Whenever I visited any chapter of the Article 9 Association, grassroots or network, the problem of recruiting younger members was always on the list of discussion topics. This was also true in the national exchange meetings hosted by the headquarters. Such a discussion is always an open-ended one, and offers no specific solution. When I attended the meeting of the Hiroshima Network chapter, the reports made during the meeting were mostly about the fact that there are only older members, which was identified as the main reason for their grassroots chapter being unable to hold an “enjoyable” event as it might otherwise. They were all very concerned about their movement being hardly recognized by younger people, and many were losing confidence because of this reality. As we will also discuss in the case of Okinawa, just being a city with very strong memory of the war does not create an environment where everyone cares about peace or participates in social movements.

The Miyagi Network

Major groups and organizations in a local civil society tend to provide the locus of the formation of the Article 9 Association chapter. In the case of Miyagi, the two pillars of the Miyagi Constitution Article 9 Association (hereafter the “Miyagi Network”) are Seikyō (The Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union, hereafter “JCCU”) and local educators.

In Miyagi prefecture, JCCU enjoys a very high membership—sixty percent of the households in the prefecture are members of it. JCCU is one of the earliest consumers’ organizations formed by Japanese citizens who wished to improve their quality of life (LeBlanc 1999). The organization’s primary activity evolves around providing the members with a support system for different needs such as food safety and co-operative health insurance. Since its purpose is protection of consumers’ benefit as opposed to benefiting corporations, JCCU may be considered a form of social movement organization. In fact, JCCU operates its own think tank called the Citizen Sector Policy Organization, which publishes a quarterly titled *Social Movements* that deal with wide variety of issues essential to life and social justice, with more emphasis on food safety and consumption. As the earliest consumers’ co-op in the country, JCCU also has a large network of local branches and their membership, which potentially becomes a strong organizational foundation for nationwide movement mobilization. Nonetheless, this Miyagi Network was the only one of the six clearinghouse chapters of the Article 9 Association I observed where JCCU played the central role (see Nishikido (2008) on the case of alternative energy projects that started in Hokkaidō). In fact, the office of the Miyagi Network is located inside the local JCCU office in Sendai city, and the person who is in charge of this JCCU office also played a central role as vice-chief of the chapter secretariat.

Including JCCU, several preexisting groups were the foundation of the Miyagi Network. A professor emeritus of agricultural policy at Tohoku University, who served as the chief secretary of the Miyagi Network, spoke about its prehistory:

It was before the Iraq War, when the New Guideline (related to the US-Japan Security Treaty) was an issue. At that time there were three different groups that were working on the problem in Miyagi. First is the Miyagi Network Against War Policy, for which I was one of the four representatives. This was a group composed of about fifty-five or fifty-six groups, centering labor unions. This group did not appeal too widely, so they approached the groups supporting the constitution in the prefecture, such as Kenpō Kaigi, Miyagi Peace Center for the Constitution, and a lawyers' group called the Citizen's Committee to Protect the Constitution, as well as JCCU Miyagi whose purpose is "to protect peace and people's living." However, these groups were divided into smaller groups due to their association with different political parties. So, we tried to create a new, a "Five Group Network" in December 2003 with five representatives. We then tried to make it even more inclusive in order to establish this Miyagi Constitution Article 9 Association in December 2004, with 21 sponsors. By now we have more than 160 sponsors...the unique color of Miyagi Network is that it is a group of individuals who came together exclusively to protect Article 9. (Kawano 2012)

Thus, the founding members of the Miyagi Network paid very careful attention to avoid introducing the relationship to political parties when they created the list of sponsors. When they

created this list, the occupational status of sponsors was noted with special care so that there would be no indication of particular political affiliation. Moreover, they did not include union leaders in the list. The chief secretary commented on this point:

We had gotten some criticism that this way of doing things is following the logic of exclusion. But we had to appeal to 1,950,000 voters. We thought such a criticism would disappear once the movement spread. (Kawano 2012)

Local educators and citizens who are particularly interested in educational problems in their prefecture also take a central role in this chapter. An interviewee has been working locally on educational issues since the campaign against the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education, which concluded in 2006 (Wang 2008). Besides the Miyagi Prefecture Article 9 Association, this individual also participates in citizen groups such as the Miyagi Citizens for Democratic Education, Izumi Park Town Article 9 Association, the Miyagi Women's Article 9 Association, Miyagi Research Center for Education and Culture, and the Citizens Network for Protecting Children from the Harm of Radiation and the Transformation from Nuclear Plants to Natural Energy. Through these various activities, she has been cooperating with Komori Yōichi, who was a core organizer of the movement against changing the Fundamental Law of Education when they were fighting the issue in the early 2000s. This suggests that the history of collaborations between these citizen groups that compose the Miyagi Network and the organizers of the Article 9 Association go back further than, or at least were concurrent with, the Article 9 Association's formation in June 2004.

Just as the case of the individual above exemplifies, all the members of the Article 9 Association whom I interviewed, including the three from Miyagi, were members of more than one Article 9 Association chapter or other related citizen groups. As mentioned earlier, a clearinghouse chapter of the Article 9 Association is often composed of several groups or organizations. Moreover, each of these organizations could involve several more subgroups. When Miyagi JCCU took the initiative to form the Miyagi Network, the leaders of the union first had preparatory discussions among the JCCU Liaison Conference, the University Co-op, the School Co-op, the Ai Co-op (a local consumers' co-op in Sendai city, which is now a member of JCCU), and the Medical Co-op. The Miyagi Network also involves other established civil society organizations including the Public Workers' Union and the Miyagi Peace Center for the Constitution, as well as groups of women, shopkeepers, and schoolteachers.

Thus, under the name of the Miyagi Network, JCCU, various civil society organizations, and local intellectuals and citizens who decided to act against the threats to democratic education and peace came together. This clearinghouse chapter emphasizes particularly its “non-sect” policy in order for these groups with a variety of orientations to cooperate. Nonetheless, the case of the Miyagi Network also demonstrates that the Article 9 Association as a whole is a network of multiple social movement organizations and groups of concerned citizens that have existed previously, and these groups decided at one point to turn themselves into chapters of the Article 9 Association by reformulating their network ties.

The Miyagi Network is not an exception, however, in terms of the lack of direct successors. The core membership is also mostly in their sixties and seventies. My interviewees did tell me, however, that a new member in her thirties who has been doing some social activities previously, just joined the committee. They commented that it is most important to attract

younger people to their movement, but younger people do not seem to know or even care about the problem of constitutional revision. This younger person also told one of my interviewees that she knows many young people who care about the issue and social problems in general, but they are interested in NPO and NGO types of activities rather than so-called “citizens movements.” Nonetheless, the Miyagi Network presented a case where many citizens groups and movement organizations collaborate in the local activities of the Article 9 Association, with some developing ties to younger generation.

The Kyoto Network

So far we have examined three networking chapters, each of them trying to overcome previously created conflicts in Japanese social movements: In Kanagawa, the main gap being dealt with was the one between the communists and socialists. In Hiroshima, it was the gap between political party affiliated activists and so-called citizen activists, as well as the one between supporters of different political organizations including a group with a tie to a New Left group. In Miyagi, political identities of participants were underplayed in order not only to reach out to more general audience, but also for different citizens groups to work together under the name of the Article 9 Association. In the case of Kyoto, we observe the effort to go beyond all these gaps, and to overcome another most easily overlooked source of conflict, which exists between *individual* participants and *group* participants.

The Kyoto Association for the Constitution Article 9 (hereafter the “Kyoto Network”) is a clearinghouse chapter in which at least sixty-one grassroots chapters take part. The committee was composed of several representatives from various types of grassroots chapters, as well as the secretariat of the clearinghouse chapter composed of a few full-time volunteers. It held monthly

meetings to discuss organizational matters, such as holding events and collecting reports from recent activities of their membership. They also discussed recent and future activities of grassroots chapters where they took leadership. Concerns and problems were shared so that they could look for solutions collectively.

Some of the grassroots chapters in this clearinghouse chapter were based on labor unions and local cells of political parties, while others were based on citizens groups with common interests such as film. There was also an individual who took part only when the chapter held poster design competition. In other words, working together in this network were people with different backgrounds with rather conflicting preferences in activity styles: they were retired members of various labor unions that were formally rivals, as well as former union leaders who believed in the strength of organizations in mobilization; and citizens movement activists who disliked “dōin gata” (“membership-based mobilization” as opposed to “voluntary participation”) and preferred to act as individuals.

The secretary-general of the Kyoto Network, who was also a lawyer and a member of Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom, explained the latter difference, which was between the two types of activism:

For instance...you were there when someone used the word “dōin-gata” last night, weren’t you? People who mostly work in citizens movements are very critical of organizations that decide their policy collectively and mobilize their membership. They think that individuals’ voluntary will is the most important thing to really expand citizens movements and a movement would never develop without prioritizing this. This is correct from one aspect. But then there are people

who do things with groups such as labor unions, discussing among members, and only if the group reaches a consensus that this particular issue is significant, will this be communicated to the membership and a movement mounted. (Ogiwara 2012)

Ogiwara also explained how he and his colleagues have been working to bridge this gap within Kyoto's social movement sector ever since he first started as a lawyer more than two decades ago. Especially in relation to the above statement, Ogiwara pointed out the importance of "organizational ways of making movements" that were often criticized by citizen movement activists for being too "organizational" and sometimes even "lacking individual will":

The organizational style of participation is actually very important, too. Isn't it quite typical for a citizen movement to be very active at one moment, like the anti-nuclear movement? This is indeed very important, too, but still on the other hand, each organization discusses democratically and reaches a consensus that it is an important issue, and then makes a move...individual participants tend to be aware of things, but also have to have conditions...for example, you need to be able to attend a meeting at a particular time. As for an organization, they first position the issue, and if it were considered important, someone would be assigned to this particular task. But for citizen movement participants, they can come anytime and be gone anytime. So [if you want to be part of a movement as an individual] you need to make quite an effort to just attend a meeting. How long can this really last? It is not easy. (Ogiwara 2012)

Based on the efforts of many social movement participants who worked to bridge the various gaps and differences between the respective methods and styles of social movement organizations and participants, the Kyoto Network began to take its present shape. Two organizations became the basis of the Kyoto Network: The organization started as Kenpō 50 Forum and then continued as the Kyoto Netto (Ogiwara 2012). Through managing these organizations sequentially, the organizers worked out their methods of participation. In Kenpō 50 Forum, the unit of those who were invited to participate was an individual but not a group. This was a device to encourage more participation from individuals who do not have any organizational and group affiliation. These organizers found previously that there were conflicts amongst movement participants that were caused by their methods of participation, specifically due to the differences between individual-based and group-based participation. Both Kenpō 50 and Kyoto Netto were first open only to individual-based participation. However, based on the trust built through their activities, they were able to open it gradually to both individual and group participation. Thus, the Kyoto Network that is open to all types of participants was built on the previous achievements through detailed adjustment of methods, such as participatory methods (individual or group) and styles of events that they mount. In this way, even an individual participant who takes part only in one event where she takes leadership in a poster design competition can find her place in the Article 9 Association movement. Similarly, a participant from the local cell of a political party can attend the monthly committee meeting as a party representative. Together, they can appeal to more general audiences.

The Okinawa Network

With its unique post-World War II history, it is not surprising that Okinawa's Article 9 Association had its basis in their strong peace movement organizations. In Okinawa, the organization equivalent to the other prefectures' clearinghouse chapter is built on the Okinawa Council for the Spread of the Constitution, or Kenpō fukyū kyōgi-kai in Japanese (hereafter "the OCSC"), that has been active since before the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Believing that the Japanese Constitution had not yet been realized for the people of Okinawa during the American Occupation from 1945 to 1972, their activity involved campaigning for enlightenment about the Japanese Constitution. For activists in Okinawa, therefore, an activity like the Article 9 Association was not totally a new thing. Rather, advocating for Article 9 was a major part of their activity even before the reversion.

Due to this unique history, Okinawa also has a different composition of political parties from most other prefectures. It has a local political party called the Okinawa People's Party and the divisions between major national political parties observed in the main islands are not as strong in the Okinawa's local context. This structure served as the foundation in the making of the "All Okinawa" coalition that was realized in the three successive elections in 2015: the Nago City mayoral election, Okinawa governor's election, and the national election for the House of Representatives, in which the All Okinawa candidates defeated the LDP candidates.

In terms of organizational composition, the Okinawa Network has a lot in common with others. The secretariat is run by a full-time official and several lawyers who are members of Japan Lawyer's Association for Freedom. The experience of reversion in the 1970s may be why the participants of the Article 9 Association in Okinawa is about ten years younger in average as

compared with the counterpart in the Japanese main islands. Even in Okinawa where two-thirds of the land is occupied by the US military bases, social movements struggle to find successors. It is also true in the case of Okinawa that most successors of the social movement come through schools and workplaces—namely the University of Ryukyus and the Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom. Several young people who are currently involved in the Article 9 Association and the OCSC’s activities in Okinawa are students and former students of Takara Tetsumi, a professor at the University of Ryukyus Graduate School of Law, who is also the present chair of the OCSC secretariat. According to my interviewees who were attending Professor Takara’s seminar at the time of our interviews, however, they were not particularly interested in issues surrounding the constitution before they started to attend the seminar, although they have heard from their grandparents about their wartime experiences. One interviewee from Futenma, where a US base is located, remembered that she believed that her school had air conditioners in classrooms thanks to the US bases, and did not wonder why they had two layers of windows, yet she sometimes could not hear lectures because of the noise of aircraft that fly over their school (Higa 2012).

At the center of the effort to organize these different aspects of the Okinawa Network, there is a full-time staff member of the secretariat. Originally from Kanagawa prefecture, she had worked at the secretariat of the well-known case of the “Ienaga textbook trial,” in which Ienaga Saburō, an author of a Japanese history textbook, sued the state of Japan, claiming that the screening of school textbooks by the Ministry of Education was unconstitutional. After the conclusion of the Ienaga trial, she married and moved to Okinawa, and started working for the OCSC. During my visit in Naha, the capital city of Okinawa prefecture, she took me to an Izakaya (small Japanese style bar) where we had more casual conversations about our personal

backgrounds and my study. When the topic touched on the locations I visited for research and I mentioned that Hiroshima was one of them, she suddenly asked if I met Sasaki, the citizen activist I interviewed in the city. To my surprise, they were old acquaintances, and she expressed her high opinion of Sasaki by saying, “she is good, you know?” She also knew and had a high opinion about the only fulltime staff member of the headquarters from her previous involvement in different movements in the main island. Similarly, moreover, some lawyers who work in the secretariat of the Okinawa Network moved to Okinawa from other prefectures for various reasons. Besides Takara, core members of the Okinawa Network also included natives of Okinawa who have been active since the reversion movement. Thus, in the Okinawa Network, actors from Okinawa and the Japanese main island cooperate, making the chapter a tie between these often disconnected parts of the country.

One of my interviewees from Okinawa pointed out a difference between the characters of activists from Okinawa and the main island of Japan: When Okinawans make a movement, “they don’t get too intense like the people from the main island.” And he continued, with a grin, “When we want to get rid of the US bases that existed on the island for sixty years, we are prepared to fight for another sixty years. So it can’t last if we get too enthusiastic” (Takayoshi 2012). Even though Okinawa and Japan are so different not only historically and politically, but also culturally, Article 9 is a common ideal, for its realization they could work together.

The Fukushima Network

The network of the Article 9 Association in Fukushima was also based on previously established networks in the local communities, namely the network of citizens’ organizations dealing with issues such as peace and social welfare, labor unions in various industries, and the

local cells of the JCP. In this sense, the Article 9 Association activity in the prefecture had been similar to many other local areas otherwise.

After the triple disaster in March 2011, however, the character and the role of the Article 9 Association in Fukushima were forced to change. While dealing with their own losses of membership after the disaster, the Fukushima Prefecture Article 9 Association (hereafter the “Fukushima Network”) edited a book called “Appeals from Fukushima (Fukushima wa uttaeru),” which is a collection of journals written by the members of grassroots chapters in Fukushima about their personal experiences and difficulties they faced after the disaster. The Fukushima Network had a booth to sell this book at the Article 9 Association’s national exchange meeting (see Chapter V) in 2012, where the vice chief secretary of the Fukushima Network was also invited to give a talk in the main program.

Through the headquarter secretariat’s arrangement, I was assigned to help the Fukushima Network booth to sell the book *Appeals from Fukushima*. While working at the booth, I was introduced to the core members of the chapter and their friends who came to buy the book. The chief and vice chief of the secretariat are both retired professors of the University of Fukushima, and some other members also had ties to the university. I asked the vice chair if they would be available for an interview, and if it would be possible for me to visit him in Fukushima. He looked at me, paused for the moment, and responded that “well, I would of course welcome you to visit me otherwise, but you seem to be rather young. I am from Tokyo originally, and come back often to see my son’s family here” (Makita 2012). It was clear from the context of our conversation that he was concerned that the radiation level in Fukushima was too high for a relatively young woman to visit the city, and suggested to meet in Tokyo instead.

The members of the Fukushima Network secretariat, the vice chief in particular who was most mobile and suited for the role of an advocate, became very busy afterwards being invited to events organized by grassroots chapters in different local areas. So our interview did not happen, but I was able to invite him as a speaker to an event of a local Article 9 Association in my neighborhood, and personally conversed about the Fukushima Network as well as about the situation in Fukushima more generally. Many grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association at that time were also engaging in the question of how to understand and deal with the nuclear plant problem in relation to the constitution. Chapter V discusses in more detail how in this process the Article 9 Association expanded its scope, and at the same time developed a new framing that connected itself to the anti-nuclear movements.

More broadly, the nationwide network of the Article 9 Association contributed to help the disaster-affected members in unexpected ways. For instance, the networks that have been created through the activity of the Article 9 Association helped the members and their families who had been evacuated to other parts of Japan reconnect with one another (see Chapter V). In another place, an evacuee from Fukushima who was active in her own area was supported in the new location by grassroots chapters in that area (see Chapter III). The continuous activity of a grassroots chapter in Fukushima also helped various types of anti-nuclear movements in the prefecture after the disaster, and this exchange later developed a group that brought the demands of the disaster-affected people into court.

This section presented six prefectural level clearinghouse chapters and demonstrated that each chapter presents a unique pattern of how the local Article 9 Association could be organized. This underscores that the Article 9 Association could take many different forms as a voluntary

participatory activity. Yet it also demonstrated that there is a pattern common to all these clearinghouse chapters: From these cases, it is clear that the present achievement is built on the accumulation and the history of social movement activities in the respective prefectures. Indeed, creating such an extensive network in such a brief period of time was possible only through the mobilization of existing social groups and their networks.

Clearly, the organizational structure of the Article 9 Association reflects the forms of network ties that existed among various movement actors in Japan prior to the association's formation. Every part of the association's operations also requires extensive knowhow and organizational skills from the participants, and especially from the leadership at all levels, from national to grassroots. Only professional citizenry with ample experiences in socio-political activities, in both organizational and citizens movements, would be able to lead such an ordered form of mobilization. This cohort of activists, facing the repeated schisms between two political camps that occurred during the period when they were in charge of labor unions and citizen groups, have been attempting to build a bridge between the different political affiliations, namely between socialist and communist camps. Another gap this cohort has been trying to bridge, especially since the significant decline of labor in the late 1980s, was between labor and citizens movements. And more recently, as discussed above with the case of Kyoto, the gap between groups and individual participation styles have been dealt with. To overcome these major conflicts, participants of the Article 9 Association movements needed to become conscious of these conflicts at one point. They then needed to find out what were the gaps to be filled and worked on, which often required them to be more supportive of the 'weaker' side and prioritize their preferences. Through working together, they may find out about misunderstandings to be talked over, or differences that would better be accepted as is. Based on such a foundation,

common goals and purposes would be confirmed, helping different actors to work together on areas of agreement. Sometimes, as discussed in the case of Kyoto, letting differences play an active role rather than underplaying them brings a positive solution for different actors to utilize their strength to achieve a common goal. Thus, the Article 9 Association served as an important platform for all these efforts to play out, helping the 1960s generation of activists to overcome existing conflicts that were created in their own past movements. Diagram 4 captures a partial picture of what this network looks like:




Diagram 4. The network of the Article 9 Association described in Chapter IV and V
 *Node colors show types of chapters: Light blue is the headquarters; Green is local-based chapters; Blue is workplace/occupation-based chapters; Yellow is university chapters; and Pink is hobby-based chapters. (Small nodes are grassroots, and large are clearinghouse chapters.)
 **Purple nodes are external organizations with ties to respective chapters.
 **Edge colors show types of ties: Light blue is ties between the headquarters and chapters created via membership to the Article 9 Association; Yellow, Purple, Green, Pink are ties through events; Blue, Gray, and Light green are ties through membership overlap.

Nonetheless, the generation gap remains: For the younger generation, even for those who are inside of these traditional movements, the older movements seemed to have become too “professional”—that is, inaccessible and outmoded. Thus, the major gap for this new generation to overcome exists between these “professionals” and others who are “amateur” to social movements (Matsuda 2012). In this field of struggle, the “professionals” often means the left party and associated activists, and the “amateurs” includes various types who are neither affiliates of particular political factions nor constituencies of pre-existing citizen groups (thus “independent” individuals). This third field of struggle is important to explore in order to understand the intergenerational disconnection in social movements. Having said that, the development in the 2010s sheds a new light on the question of continuity in social movements. The following chapters discuss this point by looking at the processes through which the Article 9 Association transcends its original generation, as it merges with the new and broader coalition.

CHAPTER VI.

THE HEADQUARTERS

When we nine started as the founders, what was clear was that we just wanted to express our will as persons who are concerned about the present and future of the constitution and democracy. I said at the inaugural press conference, however, if many people contribute their voice toward the constitution and democracy from their respective places in response to our voice, at the place where these voices meet, we would like to set our initial Article 9 Association and direct traffic. (The Article 9 Association 2006:12)

Ōe Kenzaburō thus made his point on the role of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association. Since then, an unexpectedly large number of voices have been contributed from all over the country (and even from overseas). These voices were quickly concentrated in many different forms of grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association. The initial Article 9 Association soon became the center of a large network of the Article 9 Associations at many levels, and started to “direct traffic,” as Ōe expected.

This chapter discusses below how it “directs traffic,” mainly by providing lecturers and organizing the national exchange meetings, and by making public appeals when they meet critical situations. Through these means, moreover, the headquarters functions as a symbolic and charismatic leadership, but also as the intelligence of the movement: It provides the movement slogans and goals, as well as current information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing

changes in politics in relation to their activities. Thus, it keeps grassroots participants motivated and encouraged, while representing the entire network at the national level.

Promoting Constitutional Literacy

Providing Lecturers

One of the main roles of the headquarters in the Article 9 Association movement is to provide lectures. In order to promote constitutional literacy among the general public, the headquarters has been holding a series of lecture meetings and publishing transcriptions of these meetings in booklet format. It has also prepared a list of lecturers and made them available for grassroots chapters that want to hold their own lecture and study meetings. Most of those listed have volunteered to give lectures on the constitution and current events. Grassroots chapters can of course find a lecturer for their meetings who is not on the list, but the initial list must have been useful for those chapters to find someone readily available to meet their needs.

Lecture Meetings and The Article 9 Association's Constitutional Seminar Series

The headquarters has also been hosting its own series of lectures (Kōen-kai). The inaugural lecture was held on July 24, 2004 when a thousand people attended. A year later, 95,000 people attended the 2005 meeting in Ariake Coliseum. The headquarters then initiated the Article 9 Association's Constitutional Seminar series, which held ten lectures from 2006 to 2010. While the first two lectures established the original purpose of the Article 9 Association to mount a movement to protect Article 9, the seminar series provided an extended scope for the Article 9 Association and its constitutional movement.

The Article 9 Association's Constitutional Seminar was a series of lectures that discussed the significance of the 1946 Constitution of Japan from many different angles. At each event, one of the nine founders of the Article 9 Association and an expert from a different field, such as literature, mass media, religion, university, or civic movements gave speeches, which were transcribed and published in a booklet format. Clearly, this seminar series was designed to attract not only members of the grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association, but also the general public. Among the guest speakers were Arima Raitei (the chief priest of the Ginkaku-ji and Kinkaku-ji Temples in Kyoto), Ikeda Kayoko (a well-known translator of German literature), Myōchin Miki (newspaper reporter), Teruoka Yoshiko (university professor), Yuasa Makoto (civic activist who organized the "Haken-mura" in 2008), Arthur Binard (writer), Katō Taichi (writer of children's books), Hiraoka Takashi (former Mayor of Hiroshima city), and Takatō Naoko (humanitarian activist specializes in Iraq). The guest speakers were invited to present their activities and how they are deeply related to the constitution, especially to Article 9, but also to other articles such as Article 13 (the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) and Article 25 (the right to maintain standards of wholesome and cultured living). These speeches and the booklets educate listeners and readers about how the Japanese constitution protects our everyday life, and also how the ideal represented in Article 9 is shaping the peaceful image of Japan not only domestically but also internationally.

Creating and Maintaining the Movement Network

Besides promoting constitutional literacy among the general public, the headquarters has also been publishing regular newsletters and organizing national exchange meetings in order to

connect the movement participants (including the initial sponsors and secretariat members) and help them learn from each other.

The Newsletters and Mail News

Publication of the newsletters was one of the first activities the secretariat of the Article 9 Association headquarters undertook. Together with the national exchange meetings, it has been an important tool for the headquarters to communicate its ideas with the grassroots chapters. Later the secretariat also began to publish an online magazine. While the newsletters literally carry “news” and “letters” from the headquarters addressed to the movement community, the digital mail magazine is more focused on advertising upcoming events hosted by the headquarters and its publications. Grassroots chapters can also announce their upcoming events through both media. In this sense, these two media are interactive communications. This is a mechanism through which grassroots chapters stay informed of other chapters’ activities on a regular basis, and the network of the Article 9 Association is maintained.

The newsletters and digital mail magazine also carry analyses of the current political situation surrounding Article 9 and the constitution. When there is an important issue of concern to the entire Article 9 Association movement and actions are necessary, concrete suggestions for tackling the issue are included. Issues considered urgent for the entire Article 9 Association community are first highlighted in newsletters, and then discussed in the programs of the national exchange meetings.

For instance, the suggestion to create grassroots chapters in school district units appeared some times in the newsletters, and the topic has always been given special attention in the discussions in the exchange meetings. This project was deemed important for the purpose of the

Article 9 Association, which aimed to create a movement truly rooted in the Japanese society and thus strived to create grassroots chapters in ‘every corner of the society.’ To make it more easily understandable in Japanese social context, the Association promoted the phrase “to create a chapter in every ‘school district’.” In fact, there is a grassroots chapter named “West Gifu Middle School District Article 9 Association,” whose activity was introduced in newsletter No. 220 (Article 9 Association 2015). Except such an obvious case, however, it is difficult to know whether a particular grassroots chapter was created based on school district because titles of grassroots chapters rarely say it. Nevertheless, many grassroots chapters have been created in social communities with considerable face-to-face interactions among members.

Besides such projects the headquarters promoted as a goal of the movement, the newsletters also communicated its directions in special circumstances. The newsletters published in the months after the triple disaster in March 2011 constantly carried articles on grassroots chapter activities to help the disaster-affected areas. The newsletter published on July 20, 2011, moreover, introduced an appeal published by the Fukushima Network on July 11, 2011. In the article titled “In facing the ‘massive man-made disaster’ at the Fukushima Daiini Nuclear Reactor,” the Fukushima Network stated:

We as the Fukushima Prefecture Article 9 Association express our sincere condolences for the victims of the East Kantō Great Earthquake, and also like to express our sympathy for those who have been put in difficult situations due to the earthquake, Tsunami, and the nuclear accident.

Especially regarding the ‘massive man-made disaster’ of the nuclear reactor, there is no way we could dismiss this as a matter outside the purpose of

establishing our prefectural chapter, as if we are bystanders. We have been close to those who have been evacuated due to the nuclear accident no Japanese had ever have experienced, whose daily lives were destroyed and thus living in a terrible condition, with feeling terrified about the harm of radiation to their lives and health day and night. Many members of the Article 9 Association in Fukushima are also affected. We as a local chapter cannot look away from this tragic reality.

This is not all. There is something in common between the ravages of a war and the ‘massive man-made disaster’ of the nuclear plant at the very fundamental level, as they both encroach the “right to a peaceful existence,” that is, the “right to live in peace, away from fear and deficiency,” which is the basis of the Japanese Constitution Article 9. Moreover, the communities of those who benefit from nuclear plants who dashed for the nuclear plant line promoting the “safety myth” and those revisionists who scheme to make Japan once again “a country which can go to war” are connected by a thick subterranean stem, rooting in the same soil. For now, based on these situations, we the Fukushima Article 9 Association are determined to do everything for realizing the following demands.

One, To avoid crisis to the lives and living of the citizen of our prefecture and to recover the violated human rights and their daily lives without a moment’s delay. Especially, to carry out an immediate action to protect the lives and health of those who are vulnerable to radiation exposure such as children. One, An immediate and complete compensation for the damages suffered by the citizen of our prefecture, which were caused by the TEPCO and the state. One, To adhere

and materialize the basic principle suggested by the Prefectural Study Committee for Reconstruction Vision, “For making a safe, secure, and continuously developable society without depending on the nuclear power.” One, An objective examination of the historical processes that led to the nuclear accident, and a thorough investigation of where the social responsibility lay. The Fukushima Article 9 Association, sticking to the basic of our activities to protect and activate Article 9, would also like to take action in cooperation with those groups inside and outside the prefecture who share the same will, in order to achieve above aims. We expect that the Article 9 Associations in the prefecture also develop close relations with one another, and organize inventive activities, in order to realize these aims. Lastly, we desire that return of those affected to their homeland, and reconstruction of the affected Article 9 Associations will be realized as soon as possible. (The Article 9 Association 2011)

Carrying this entire article in the newsletter shows that the headquarters not only respected but also was willing to mobilize the entire network of the Article 9 Association in dealing with the nuclear plant problem. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the Association thus began to broaden its scope while still focused on Article 9. The contents of the national exchange meetings show the development.

The National Exchange Meetings

The direction shown in the newsletters are then confirmed in the national exchange meetings. If the newsletters are the devices for daily communication for the participants of the

Article 9 Association movement, the national exchange meetings are the once-in-a-while event for them to exchange their experiences and renew their motivations to continue their daily activities. It is also an opportunity for them to confirm the significance of their movement but also to gain new insights to place their everyday efforts in the broader social and political context.

The headquarters hosted the first national exchange meeting of the Article 9 Association two years after its inauguration in June 10, 2006, at Nippon Seinenkan. By that time there were 5,174 grassroots chapters of the Association across Japan, from which 1,550 people from 832 grassroots chapters attended the conference. The oldest participant was 91 years old, and the youngest was 14 (The Article 9 Association 2006:116). Since this year, the headquarters continued to host the national exchange meeting annually to the third meeting in 2008. It then stopped for a few years until 2011.

The 2006 national exchange meeting was organized in the following way: the first half presented eight out of the nine founders of the Article 9 Association, as well as a few reports from grassroots participants. Each person made a short speech. From the founders, Katō Shūichi pinpointed the purpose of the meeting:

Japan is coming to the crossroads, where Article 9 is at the center. In short, one way leads to war, another leads to peace...If we take the [latter] way...we would be able to save human rights, and even to promote it...So we formed the Article 9 Association two years ago. Since before, Japan had a situation with two characteristics. First...regarding Article 9...within the Diet, revisionists had the majority. But they did not outside the Diet...In any case, there has been a very big

gap between the Diet and the people. Second, what was going on the side of citizens, that is, among those people who want to protect Article 9... to begin with, Japan always had thriving citizens movements...but their weak point was that they did not have horizontal connections. Before we started the Article 9 Association, there were reminders of scattered, small and big citizens movements...so, in a sense, we announced the appeal to help making a horizontal connection that is not a centralized power. Now we have it...then what should be done? Let us strengthen the horizontal connections. It is necessary for those who share the same purpose to know what the neighboring village is doing. It is the purpose of today's meeting. (The Article 9 Association 2006:6-7)

Clearly, the headquarters held the national exchange meeting in order to strengthen the connections between grassroots chapters that were quickly expanding at that time, by providing the opportunity for the participants to share their experiences. Katō's speech also reconfirmed that the purpose of the Article 9 Association is to protect Article 9. In Kato's speech, it was also evident that the Article 9 Association was formed to "provide a horizontal connections without centralized power." The second half of the program embodied this spirit of the movement:

For the second half the participants were divided into eleven groups, to fit the size and number of rooms available at the meeting place, and are small enough so that most participants can briefly introduce their activities in order to exchange their experiences. In these groups there were participants from different types and levels of chapters: Different kinds of grassroots chapters mingled together without being differentiated according to types or levels of their chapters. Hundreds of participants reported their activities in these small group sessions. In a

group session, for instance, a participant reported how he started his Article 9 Association chapter with just one other person, and now his chapter has four members (The Article 9 Association 2006: 94). In another group a report was made on a chapter in Asakusa, a traditional shopping and entertainment district of Tokyo. The group that created this chapter has a long history that goes back to the prewar period, which called itself “Tengu-kō” (It literally means “the long-nosed goblin’s lecture”—the Tengu appears as an object of mountain worship in the Japanese legends) (The Article 9 Association 2006:103). These contrasting cases demonstrate that the Article 9 Association can be joined by anyone and can take any form, and they are treated equally. The first national exchange meeting was experimental, as much as they were significant for concentrating the energy of this quickly developing movement network.

As a nationwide network with participants with a variety of professional expertise, moreover, the Article 9 Association is resourceful in conducting large-scale activities such as film production: Around the time when the third meeting was held in 2008, the Film People’s Article 9 Association had created the film titled “the Blue Sky of Japan,” on the life of constitutional scholar Suzuki Yasuzō and his journey in drafting the 1946 Japanese Constitution. This is partly an effort to refute a typical revisionist view of the Japanese Constitution as an American imposition. Through the exchange in the group sessions in the 2008 meeting, it became clear that many grassroots chapters were working in their respective places on the screening of this film. This is an example that even a large project like making of a film is possible for the members of the Article 9 Association because there is the professional filmmakers’ chapter, but also that such a non-profit film made by volunteers in a chapter can be screened and watched by the thousands of grassroots chapters and their members. Through working on such a project, neighboring grassroots chapters are able to cooperate and create and

strengthen their ties. In turn, the experiences can be shared in the national exchange meetings, and stimulate those chapters who also want to try the screening project in their areas as well.

As participants in the national meetings exchanged their unique stories, they seemed to develop shared purposes to advance their movement. Speech presentations in the program often related to themes that the headquarters regards as important in order to advance their movement. In the fourth meeting held in 2011, for instance, the problem of nuclear plants was certainly the central issue. Besides, the experiences shared in the meeting included: how to expand the impact of their actions on the larger population, how to win the approval from the majority for the petition supporting the constitution, and how to advance their tactics to create a grassroots chapter in each middle school district and then eventually in each primary school district. The program was also introducing such long-standing issues as Okinawa's continuing struggle under the presence of the U.S. military bases and how to cooperate as the Article 9 Association in this problem. In theoretical terms, this is the event-level dynamics of networks, which is a "multiple, cross-cutting sets of relations sustained by conversational dynamics within social settings" (Mische 2003:259). In this formulation, participants of the Article 9 Association went beyond the local boundaries to "break the limit of densely knit groups and relate to much broader sets of prospective allies" (Diani 2003:17).

The Regional Exchange Meetings

The headquarters has also been encouraging the grassroots chapters to hold the "block exchange meetings." In general, blocks are regions of Japan that combine several prefectures, such as Tōhoku (North East), Hokuetsu (North West), Kantō (Central East), Kinki (Central West), Chūgoku (Middle West), Kyūshū, and Shikoku. Hokkaidō and Okinawa are often

considered separate regions because of their size and geographic isolation, but Okinawa sometimes is included in the Kyūshū region. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the networking chapters promote ties among grassroots chapters within a prefecture. Likewise, working together to hold regional exchange meetings promotes ties among the chapters within the same area. This shows that the headquarters is a furious promoter of networking: it encourages grassroots chapters to create and strengthen ties at all levels of the movement network. The network of the Article 9 Association is thus expanded and extended, and ties are strengthened in all possible levels and units of the Japanese society.

Having looked at the major activities of the headquarters, it is noticeable that the Article 9 Association's activities are essentially experimental. The national exchange meetings and the constitutional seminar series seem to be held when possible but not regularly. The newsletters and the digital mail news have been published frequently but not exactly at regular intervals. Each activity seems to be organized when necessary with available resources. Grassroots chapter activities also show the same character.

Nonetheless, each of the headquarters' activities has clear objectives: Through promoting constitutional literacy by hosting the constitutional seminars and other lecture series open to the general public, the headquarters strives to enlighten the public with the significance of Article 9. At the same time, it works to expand and maintain the growing network of grassroots chapters through constant publications of the newsletters and digital mail news. Through the national exchange meetings, it provides the participants the opportunity to strengthen their horizontal connections. Thus, the headquarters functions as a symbolic and charismatic leadership, and is the intelligence of the movement: It provides the movement slogans and goals, as well as current

information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing changes in politics in relation to their activities. It keeps grassroots participants motivated and encouraged, while representing the entire network at the national level. It also responds quickly to salient issues that arise occasionally and keep the movement relevant to the changing circumstances, each time through serious reflection on its roles and purposes in relation to the social reality.

In these first few years of its activity, the Article 9 Association dealt with a critical sociopolitical juncture for the Japanese society. As Kato explained in his speech at the 2006 national exchange meeting, Japan at that time was at the crossroad, where Article 9 was at the center—One way leads to war, and another leads to peace. Meanwhile, the number of grassroots chapters increased constantly: It counted 3,026 in 2005, 5,174 in 2006, and then 6,734 in 2007. What did the expansion of the Article 9 Association's network produce? We will see in the following chapter the significant outcome of the everyday activities of these several thousands of grassroots chapters as well as of the headquarters.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST WATERSHED, AND THE NEW THREAT

Reversal of Public Opinion on Article 9, Abe's Resignation, and Regime Change

The year 2007 marked the first watershed in the movement of the Article 9 Association. Two months prior to the second national exchange meeting held in November 24, 2007, Abe Shinzō had resigned Prime Minister, saying that he was seriously ill. At the opening of the meeting, Komori Yōichi made a victorious speech, with a new suggestion for their thriving movement:

On September 12, all of the sudden, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō resigned.

On November 2, suddenly, Prime Minister Fukuda and Chairman Ozawa from the DPJ held a conference and made a bold statement that they would make a great coalition. Then on November 4, Chairman Ozawa resigned for its failure...

dwelling in every one of these events, indeed, is the great power of accumulation of your grassroots activities since the establishment of the Article 9 Association three years ago...All the opinion polls conducted by the newspapers and other media published on May 3 this year, which was the 60th anniversary of the enactment of the constitution, reported that those who thought it is better not to change Article 9 was the majority. This is one of the powers that made Abe Shinzō's government to fall. However, at this point, the opinion is only to keep Article 9. We need to make one more step forward, so that the opinion will say it must not be changed, and utilize Article 9, really make use of it, so that the

persuasion for the possibility of concrete realization of peace will begin from this country. We steering committee members prepared for today's meeting to set it as a starting point of such a new movement. (The Article 9 Association 2007:4)

As of 2007, there were 6,734 grassroots chapters across Japan, and participants gathered from all 47 prefectures of the country. The speeches of the founders in this meeting also show that they were enjoying the first fruit of their movement, and shared their personal reflections on the past three years since the association's formation, and how to proceed to the next stage. Okudaira Yasuhiro, while reflecting on his own learning experiences through participating in the Article 9 Association, suggested that their movement should stay focused to crush the revision attempt:

As Mr. Komori has just mentioned, the essence of the Article 9 Association is to protect and utilize Article 9, but it is also inevitable to meet an unexpected event like change of the government sometimes, as the issue of constitutional revision is located in the context of shifting political circumstances...it may influence our directions and preparation for the future. Nevertheless, the political change this time comes mainly from the side of ruling classes, and we could set our position regardless of whatever the ruling classes' situation is...moreover, we could also understand that this political change would not cause any big change to the conservative system's general direction toward constitutional revision, even if it might influence their timeline...so let's say, we go our way...we can only do our best to knock down that gross outrage called constitutional revision, by staying on

our original line, with our reasons, by our force, to put it forward with conviction.

(The Article 9 Association 2007:5)

Katō Shūichi reflected on the difference between “to protect” and “to utilize” the constitution, and suggested that their movement also “utilize” the constitution in addition to “protect” it. Ōe Kenzaburō shared his recent experience in court where he was a defendant—he was sued by the bereaved family of a commander who took charge of the Japanese Imperial Army in the battle in Okinawa because of his book *Okinawa Note*, in which he described how the people in Okinawa were forced to commit suicide by the Army at the end of the land fighting in Okinawa during the Asia-Pacific War—and pointed to the significance of Article 13 (which secures the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) of the Japanese Constitution along with Article 9. Sawachi Hisae and Tsurumi Shunsuke shared their memories of Oda Makoto who passed away in July of the year, making the point to carry on his goal (The Article 9 Association 2007:8-17).

In 2008, the movement of the Article 9 Association was still on the rise: the number of grassroots chapters reached 7,294, and this was an increase of 493 from a year earlier. Meanwhile, public opinion toward amendment of Article 9 was reversing: on April 8, 2008, the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, a right leaning national newspaper, reported that the result of its national opinion poll showed that the number of those who think “it is better not to revise the constitution” exceeded the number of those who think that “it is better to reform the constitution” for the first time in fifteen years, although the difference was just one percent (42 for and 43 against revision). The same newspaper had also reported a year earlier, on April 6, 2007, that its opinion poll found that the number of those who think that “it is better not to revise the

constitution” had been increasing three years in a row since 2005, while the number of those who think that “it is better to reform the constitution” had been decreasing. Komori Yōichi reported this news in his opening speech for the 2008 meeting, emphasizing that this change in public opinion coincided with the process of the formation and expansion of the network of the Article 9 Association and their daily efforts to influence public opinion (the Article 9 Association 2008: 4).

On the other hand, the opinion polls conducted by another national newspaper Asahi Shinbun showed that the number of those who think Japan should keep Article 9 had decreasing steadily from 2001-2006, while those who think Japan should amend Article 9 was increasing. Then, this current stopped in 2006, and reversed course, showing a drastic shift in public opinion on Article 9 as shown in Table 2:




Table 2. The change in public opinion on Article 9 (Source: Asahi Shinbun Kikuzō II Visual 2001-2016)

The percentage of those who want to keep Article 9 recovered to 66% by 2008, coinciding with the Yomiuri Shinbun's report on the reversal of public opinion on constitutional revision. The table also shows that the opinion to keep Article 9 dipped again in 2012, and then went back up. I will explain in the next section why there was this second dip.

Yamada and Kim (2016) found that opinion poll results on collective self-defense issue differ depending on how many options are offered as answers to questionnaires. They compared two questionnaires, one presenting two options of 'approve' and 'disapprove' and the other with three options, splitting the option of 'approve' into two answers presenting different means of approving the use of the right to collective self-defense. As a result, more respondents chose 'approve' when the option was split into two. This result shows that option-splitting expands the respondents' range of perception and psychological availability, which in turn raises the selection rate.

There seems no bias in the result presented above that was caused by this "option-splitting effects," as both Yomiuri and Asahi Shinbuns provided equal number of options for answers to their questionnaires about revisions of constitution and Article 9. In fact, these questionnaires reveal that those who support constitutional amendment do not necessarily want to revise Article 9. Rather, some respondents were open to constitutional amendments for reasons other than to change Article 9, and see the need for more rights to be stipulated into the constitution. These series of opinion polls conducted by these two national newspapers basically suggest that Japanese people are open to discussion for constitutional amendment as long as it is to improve their rights, and they would like to keep Article 9. If an amendment must involve changing Article 9, however, they would rather not to touch the constitution.

The result could be analyzed that support for the constitution increases when the central government tries to force an amendment, as Abe Shinzō and his cabinet did in their first term (2006-2007). This suggests that the Japanese people attach great importance to democratic processes and do not wish an amendment without consensus. This then implies the opinion poll could have shown a milder change if the central government was less forceful and Abe did not assert so overtly his wish to change Article 9, even if the Article 9 Association did not exist. To begin with, however, the Article 9 Association was formed in reaction to the central government's overt attempt to launch an offensive against the constitution and Article 9 through the establishment of the Research Commission on the Constitution in 2000. If the attitude of the government was the central cause to change the public opinion, support for the constitution and Article 9 should increase soon after 2000, without waiting the emergence of the Article 9 Association in 2004. On the contrary, however, Table 2 shows that support for Article 9 was decreasing since 2001, and it is only after 2007 this trend had reversed. As stated in Komori's report on 2007 Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll, moreover, support for the constitution started to increase since 2005. Thus, it is more precise to understand that the opinion poll could have shown a milder change if the Article 9 Association movement did not emerge, even when the government acted in the same way. All the timings of events and factual progress presented here, however, suggests rather strongly that it is the emergence and expansion of the Article 9 Association that brought about these changes in the public opinion.

Thus, the Article 9 Association did impact public opinion: it contributed to stop the sharp drop in the number of those who wanted to keep Article 9 which continued in the early 2000s, and succeeded in recovering the support for Article 9 almost to the level it enjoyed prior to 2001.

Clearly, this change in the public opinion led to the 2007 resignation of Prime Minister Abe who had made a pledge to revise the constitution in his term.

As public support for Article 9 sharply increased in the following years, moreover, the Liberal Democratic Party fell from power and the Democratic Party of Japan formed the government in 2009. As this new government was cautious in its dealing with the issue of constitutional amendment, the threat to Article 9 had been temporarily removed. The Article 9 Association was practically dormant for a few years since, until the triple disaster in the spring of 2011 marked the beginning of a new stage in the Article 9 Association movement.

Responding to the 3.11 Triple Disaster: Expansion of the Movement Scope

On March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9 with massive tsunami hit the coast of northeastern Japan. An explosion of the nuclear power station in a small coastal town in Fukushima prefecture followed the already catastrophic natural disaster. This triple disaster shook Japan to its core. The earthquake and Tsunami took tens of thousands of lives. More lost their families and homes. The nuclear accident also forced tens of thousands of people to evacuate their home area, without knowing when they could ever return. Evacuated farmers had to leave their livestock and pets to go wild (some were even ordered to kill their cattle). Fishermen were unable to catch fish because of the loss of the marine facilities, but also because the ocean was contaminated with radioactive substances. Such a terrible destruction of livelihood caused many otherwise unnecessary deaths including suicides. The DPJ-led coalition government, under Prime Minister Kan Naoto who had taken over Hatoyama Yukio who was forced to resign after his bold declaration to remove the US bases from Okinawa, had to deal with this unprecedented scale of disaster, while struggling to maintain its position in the Diet. In

the face of the major catastrophe, and the fear of nuclear contamination spreading across the country in particular, the government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) that runs the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were unable to satisfy the needs of those affected.

This situation brought about a significant change in public opinion on Article 9: In 2011, the support for Article 9 dropped from 67% to 59% since year before, and then to 43% in the following year (see Table 2). Since the triple disaster, the central issue temporarily shifted from constitutional revision to national recuperation. Amid the massive relief and support efforts of the whole country, rescue operation of the SDF was perceived as helpful and this promoted the image of the SDF as a necessary system for national safety. This was an important factor for the change in public opinion, as attempts to revise Article 9 always involve promotion of the SDF. In fact, a similar phenomenon was observed after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. It can also be read as a reflection of the declining support for the DPJ government, and the recovery of the LDP paradigm, which promotes the SDF as a military force.

Thus, the 3.11 disaster caused a major shift in the political and social context of Japanese society that in turn created a new political threat/opportunity within which new social mobilization arose. For the first month after the disaster, a depressively silent atmosphere surrounded Japanese society as though the people had lost their sense of direction, while rescue efforts by the SDF and local firemen were broadcast continuously to promote national unity toward a quick recovery. Gradually, however, those who felt such a situation was incongruous started to express their discontent. The first demonstration suddenly appeared in a local area called Kōenji in Tokyo in April 10, 2011. Surprisingly to many, the demonstration was organized by a group of people in their late thirties to early forties, instead of sixties and

seventies. Moreover, the demonstration staged rock bands on a big truck, leading the queue of more than a thousand of people throughout the course. This “Stop the Nuclear Power Station!!!!” demonstration hosted by now famous *Shirōto no ran* (Amateur’s Riot) was followed by numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations that were organized by different groups of the younger generation. Among these groups, there were people who later organized the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes, or *Hangenren*, that has been holding the weekly rally in front of the Prime Minister’s official residence continuously since March 2012 (see also Chapter VIII).

The triple disaster also struck many members of the grassroots chapters in Fukushima, Miyagi, and other affected areas. This called for the reactivation of the Article 9 Association and its fourth national exchange meeting. The disaster made the participants of the Article 9 Association movement rethink their position, especially the adequacy of their “one issue joint struggle” under the slogan of protecting Article 9. Participants of the Article 9 Association movement tackled difficult questions personally as well as collectively: How does the nuclear plant problem relate to Article 9 and the Constitution? How should the Article 9 Association deal with the problem? Is it right to deal with this problem as the Article 9 Association at all? A large part of the fourth meeting, which was held on November 19, 2011, was spent on these new questions.

The program had many reports from the grassroots chapters that had been dealing with these issues, as well as from those who had been directly affected by the tsunami and nuclear accident. Naturally, speeches of the founders also addressed the event and how it is related to Article 9 and the constitution. Ōe spoke directly on this theme in a talk entitled “the Culture of the Constitution and ‘Fukushima’”:

Underlying [the culture of the constitution] are what the Japanese had done in Asia, experienced such a devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Tokyo was also burnt...Most importantly, the Japanese people became the first to experience the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the suffering of the survivors still continues today. This fact itself makes the unique character of our postwar culture, which we think should never repeat it...Today, however, a big question is posed to the essence of the culture. The question asks, whether we truly remember the principle which...made this constitution inevitable. The question comes from 'Fukushima.' It asks, there were 'Hiroshima' and then 'Nagasaki,' and now there is 'Fukushima'... 'Fukushima' was not caused by an atomic attack from a foreign country. But children in 'Fukushima' were forced to live with a broad and deep anxiety without knowing what would happen to them in twenty or thirty years, due to internal exposure to radiation. This is what the Japanese carried on our shoulders by having the nuclear plants coexist with the culture of the constitution. Facing this, based on our present culture of the constitution, how could the Japanese start over, to lead it to a fundamental change? We must examine this as the culture, which we ourselves created based on the present constitution, show it to the world, and, above all, reconsider it as something to pass on to our children's generation. For this, we must do everything we can to keep the damage in Fukushima minimal, and to never repeat it in this country where are many nuclear plants. We must connect it practically to our clear attitude. And all of you, who live in many different places confirming this as a constitutional problem, would be reconfirming such thoughts together. I feel the

significance of this gathering more strongly than ever. (The Article 9 Association 2011: 2-5)

The topic of the 3.11 disaster was discussed in virtually all group sessions. The report given by the chief secretary of the Miyagi Onagawa Article 9 Association shows the extent to which the disaster impacted the membership of the chapter: 830 out of 10,000 residents of Onagawa city had lost their lives on that day. Among them were more than 20 members of the reporter's chapter, including the vice chair of the chapter (The Article 9 Association 2011:16). Many of the survivors, including the reporter himself, had lost their houses and were living in temporary housing. There also were many who took shelter with relatives in other prefectures.

Under such a circumstance, the network created through the activities of the Article 9 Association functioned unexpectedly as a safety net. A speaker from Sōma, one of the cities most severely affected by the nuclear accident in Fukushima prefecture, reported that the network built through the activities of the Article 9 Association helped the evacuees to recover contact with each other. The communication between the members of his chapter was lost at once, due to the forced evacuation after the explosion of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Reactor. By gathering personal contact information shared among the chapter members one by one after some months of the separation, they were finally able to find each other and resume contacts. This effort was started by one man who was a member of a local grassroots chapter called the Odaka Article 9 Association in Fukushima prefecture. Three months after settling in his shelter in Saitama prefecture, he and his wife started to call the phone numbers that were in their mobile phones. They collected their friends' new addresses and made a newsletter with greetings, asking, "how are you folks from Kawafusa?" This mail encouraged the evacuees tremendously;

in turn those who received this newsletter by mail sent their digital photos and the contact information of their friends who are also from the town, some with stamps and money so that they could contribute to the publication of more newsletters. This touching story caught the mass media's attention: It was picked up first with one newspaper, then a national TV station, and eventually introduced in the NHK world news to be broadcasted in 120 countries (The Article 9 Association 2011:31-33). This case demonstrates the significance of these locally embedded and well-connected human networks—when disaster strikes our communities, these networks are most necessary for the people who are affected and in need of help and assistance. Where the communities are strong, people's life chances are better (Aldrich and Meyer 2014).

Undoubtedly, the 2011 national exchange meeting set the tone that the problem of nuclear power stations is closely related to the constitution and that the Article 9 Association should deal with the issue as their own problem. In fact, Ōe and Sawachi from the headquarters were already active in the new anti-nuclear movement at this point. Many grassroots chapters were also starting to hold anti-nuclear events in their own areas. Thus, the Article 9 Association had started to expand the scope of its movement while still focused on Article 9.

Collaborating with the Revisionists against the New National Security Bills

As public opinion on Article 9 foretold, the year 2011 became the last year of the short-lived DPJ government. Clearly, the Japanese people were not satisfied with the government's dealing with the 3.11 triple disaster, and it fell from power in the 2012 national election. Instead, however, the LDP came back in power to form the second Abe cabinet. A change of the government happened, once again, when public opinion on Article 9 was reversed: in 2012, 44% thought Article 9 should be amended, while 43% wanted to keep it (see Table 2).

This meant the new challenge for the Article 9 Association, as the formation of the second Abe cabinet revived the issue of constitutional revision. The Article 9 Association was facing the renewed effort to revise the constitution with fewer resources at the national level, despite its many chapters. Four out of the nine founders, including Katō Shūichi, Oda Makoto, Inoue Hisashi, and Miki Mutsuko had passed away by that time and Tsurumi Shunsuke was seriously ill. The four remaining founders, Ōe Kenzaburō, Sawachi Hisae, Okudaira Yasuhiro, and Umebara Takeshi, were also getting older, although they were still active and Ōe and Sawachi had been playing central roles in the new anti-nuclear movement. The participants in many grassroots chapters were also aging. The headquarters had to concentrate all its efforts to mobilize new resources outside the original network in order to advance its movement to prevent revision of the constitution.

Showing the initiatives to deal with the new circumstances, the headquarters held a press conference and announced a new appeal titled “Let us voice our opposition to create ‘the war-waging country’ by exercising the right to collective defense” on October 7, 2013. The newsletter carried it on the following day:

The Japanese constitution is now facing a great trial. This is because Prime Minister Abe, while persisting on constitutional revision by calling it his “historical mission,” has started a runaway move toward ‘the war-waging country’ by changing the constitutional interpretation of the exercise of the right to collective defense, which has been perceived as “unacceptable” under successive cabinets.

Clearly, exercising the right to collective defense, which allows Japan to

participate in wars abroad together with the United States even when Japan was not a subject of an armed attack, is a great deviation from the interpretation of the successive government which limited “self defense” to the “minimum and necessary scope.” Moreover, it regards the US-Japan Security Treaty as “a public property for the stability and prosperity of the whole world” (Ministry of Defense, The Interim Report on the Examination of the Ways Defense Capacity Ought To Be). This is not to create a system to defend Japan or the United States, but to make armed interventions in any region and country in the world possible.

This is an attempt to make it possible to revise the constitution which ought to be approved by the super majority in the both Houses in the Diet and majority of the national referendum just by a cabinet decision. For this purpose, the government has even replaced the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, who has long been supporting the interpretation of the constitution that regarded exercise of the right to collective defense as unconstitutional. This is nothing but the modus operandi Vice Prime Minister Asō admired and wanted to learn from: the way in which the Nazis stopped the Weimar Constitution. This pulls down constitutionalism from its basis, which we never are able to accept.

This is not all. The Abe cabinet is intensifying its aggressive character to change the Self-Defense Force into military to fight in wars, by removing all the restrictions to use of force abroad, and by revising the National Defense Program Guidelines to include “the function of the Marines” and “the capability to attack enemy’s strategic bases.”

It is also setting foot on its plan to create ‘the war-waging country.’ The

Abe cabinet has already been planning to submit new bills, such as “the Secret Protection Act” (officially the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets) which conceals information related to defense and diplomacy from the people and concentrate great authority to the Prime Minister, and establishment of the Japanese version of the National Safety Council and other related bills, to the extraordinary session of the Diet. The LDP’s “A Basic Law on National Security” not only aims to prioritize these national security policies in “the fields of education, scientific technology, transportation, communication, and other areas of internal affairs” in order to “preserve and cultivate” munitions industry, but also requires cooperation to these policies as an “obligation of the nation.” If we accept this, the contents of the revision of Article 9 in “The Draft for an Amendment of the Japanese Constitution” published by the LDP in last April will mostly be realized without touching the text of the constitution.

Moreover, the current situation is piled with other problems such as the nuclear accident in Fukushima, irresponsibility and abandonment of people who were affected by the accident, and exporting of nuclear plants.

In the prewar period, the Japanese people had the bitter experience to be gradually dragged into the quagmire of aggressive wars, being deprived of all means for resistance. However, today the Japanese people are the sovereign who has the highest power to deal with the national policy, but also has the Japanese Constitution with Article 9 to boast to the world, which was created based on the lessons learned from the aggressive war. Now, let us hold hands on the single point to protect the Japanese Constitution and stand up for the action to surround

the Abe Cabinet who walks away from the lessons of history with the public opinion from the grassroots level, and prevent its runaway. (The Article 9 Association 2013, the Newsletter No. 176)

Just as this appeal had warned, the bills to establish a National Security Council passed the House of Representatives on November 7, 2013, and the discussion moved on to the House of Councillors. On the same day, the Secrets Protection Act (commonly known in English as the State Secrets Act) was also submitted to the House of Representatives. At the end of the year, the latter bill was forcefully passed into law. Building on the analysis of the current situation as published in the appeal above, the fifth national exchange meeting held on November 16, 2013, tackled this problem squarely. The program of the meeting also showed that the struggle of the Article 9 Association had entered a new phase. At the opening speech of the meeting, Komori Yōichi explained the purpose of the new national security bills submitted by the Abe cabinet:

To establish the National Security Council means more than just a creation of a new council. This council is in fact a national organ that enables the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Defense Minister, and the Foreign Minister alone to decide about Japan's national policy on foreign and security issues. In short, it is an organ that decides on everything about military actions. Naturally, it will share military information with the United States. In their logic, this is the reason why the Secrets Protection Act is necessary. Once this bill is passed, there will be more bills with much more complete picture regarding the national security. Then, once they've gotten all together, by the cabinet decision

alone, the Self-Defense Force will be enabled to use military force abroad, and we will be heading straight to a “the war-waging country.” This is what is meant by “tolerating to exercise the right of collective self defense”...now, everything depends on whether we would be able to accurately understand what is going on day by day, and turn it into words based on the appeal of the Article 9 Association published on October 7th, 2013, and to communicate this word of the Article 9 Association to as many Japanese people as possible (The Article 9 Association 2013:4)

Komori thus explained the situation for the participants of the meeting, calling for prompt and accurate communicative actions at the grassroots level of the Article 9 Association in order to repel the situation. In their speeches, three of the remaining founders, Ōe Kenzaburō, Sawachi Hisae, and Okudaira Yasuhiro, also discussed the urgency of the current political circumstances. Okudaira pinpointed:

The Secrets Protection Act...basically, we should never pass it. Passing it will invite a disaster. If we pass it, from the viewpoint of the constitutional revision, it would mean that the inner moat is filled. This is the purpose of the bill...So this is not a kind of problem to fix here or there, but it has a symbolic meaning...We must stand firm here, and bury it. We can only concentrate much more on this [bill]...let’s fight against it! (The Article 9 Association 2013:5-8)

Following Okudaira, Sawachi also criticized the Secrets Protection Act:

I have read the entire articles of the Secrets Protection Act. It did not make sense after many times of reading. It says “for special use,” but nothing is specified. The penalty for someone who committed in any way to a leak of secret information would be ten years or five years’ imprisonment, or ten million or five million yen. I’ve never heard of such an unlimited law that can do anything...The essence of this bill is that, Japan volunteers to take the role which the United States wants Japan to do.

Sawachi also discussed the government attempt to revise the Article 96:

How can the constitution be amended? The constitution requires the super majority of the both Houses of Representatives and Councilors’ agreement, in order to proceed to a national referendum. This is Article 96. And the national referendum requires a majority vote [to amend the constitution]. A national referendum has never been called even once, in the 68 years since the end of World War II. So they’ve come up with this idea of changing Article 96...The government wants to ignore the Japanese people’s attachment to Article 9. They want to make the procedure to change the constitution easier. But they’ve seen the spread of something seems to be citizens movement and noticed that it is not so easy. So the government thought that it could go around the constitution by watering it down...And now, when I think of what the government is trying to do by creating such a law as the Secrets Protection Act, I think it is only reasonable

to fight against this reactionary government. (The Article 9 Association 2013:9-10)

In her speech, Sawachi also made connections between the current crisis of constitution and the government's irresponsible handling of problems of American military bases in Okinawa and the nuclear plants in Fukushima. Throughout her speech, she made a point that her firsthand experience as a fourteen years old patriotic girl whose entire family was abandoned in Manchuria by the imperial Japan made her totally distrustful of the state. She met the moment when "the state, military, and everything related to them disappeared completely." (2013:12) Since then, she believes that a nation can only exist with the people who compose it, and that the rights of individuals are most significant.

Following Sawachi, Ōe made a speech about "the most fundamental morals" we must protect:

I would like to speak of two French words. First is "libre examen," which means to examine freely. This is the most important word of French renaissance...the cultural core of the human attitude in the sixteenth century...was this spirit of free examination. My teacher, Kazuo Watanabe, once spoke of it... "If you thought that the state of the particular era, and the ways of the particular country and society were inhumane, you should examine them thoroughly and change them. This is the most humane way of living. This is the fundamental essence to live as a human." I agreed completely... Another French expression I would like to show...an expression used by a writer called Milan Kundera... "What we must

do. There is only one thing those who are currently alive must do...that is, to pass on this world we currently live in to the next generation without destroying it. That is our fundamental moral"... in French used by Kundera, "la moral de l'essentiel." We must protect this fundamental moral. To turn this world into a place where next generation cannot live in with radioactive substances is against the fundamental moral as a human being. How do we protect our constitution now? In the tension felt in today's international situation, how do we protect our future using the current constitution? That is what we have reconfirmed today in our meeting. (The Article 9 Association 2013:13-15)

In his speech, Ōe also made connections between the problems of the constitutional revision and nuclear plants, pointing out that revising Article 9 and maintaining nuclear plants are both against the fundamental human morality. Thus, Komori and three remaining founders of the Article 9 Association made a strong point on why the Article 9 Association must tackle the Secrets Protection Act and other new national security bills.

These discussions were followed by a symposium on the "right to collective defense and the constitution" chaired by Watanabe Osamu, professor emeritus of political science at Hitotsubashi University and a member of the Article 9 Association secretariat. The other invited participants were Urata Ichirō, professor of constitutional law at Meiji University, and Yanagisawa Kyōji, former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary. Urata is a constitutional scholar who opposes constitutional revision, and Yanagisawa is a former elite officer in the Defense Ministry who took charge of dispatching the SDF to Iraq in the 2000s. This shows a new

important direction for the movement of the Article 9 Association: cooperation with those who takes different positions regarding the constitution and Article 9.

As this symposium has shown, both supporters of the constitution and advocates of revision found the forceful approach of the government unacceptable. Especially the government's attempt to skip the legal processes for revising the constitution by rewriting Article 96, which requires an approval of the super majority of the both houses of the National Diet and majority of a national referendum to amend the constitution, angered even those who believed in the necessity of constitutional reform. The Abe Cabinet revealed this plan as soon as it had won more than two-third of the seats in the National Diet with the LDP and CGP together in 2012 House of Representative election. To their surprise, however, against this move of the government, thirty-six academics in the fields of law and politics, including Kobayashi Setsu, a professor of law at Keiō University and a well-known revisionist, formed The Article '96' Association on May 8, 2013. With Higuchi Yōichi, a professor of constitutional law at Tokyo University as the representative, the thirty-six founders of this new organization included those who are also participants of the Article 9 Association movement such as Yamaguchi Jirō, a professor of political science at the Hōsei University, who formed a chapter in Hokkaidō University before he moved to Hōsei, but also Okudaira Yasuhiro, Komori Yōichi, and Watanabe Osamu from the headquarters. From the title of this new organization, moreover, it is clear that the Article 9 Association was an inspiration for its formation. Both revisionists and supporters of the constitution understood the current political circumstances as “the crisis of the rule of law,” and began to take a positive attitude toward collaborations under this new realization. The founding appeal of the Article 96 Association stated:

Revision of the Constitution Article 96, by which the procedure of a constitutional amendment is stipulated, is going to be an issue of this coming House of Councilor election in summer.

It is required to gain the support of the super majority of both houses of the Diet to propose a constitutional amendment, but the government wants to change it so that only majority is required. It is clear that this move of the LDP and its surroundings is for making an amendment of the fundamental principle of the constitution, such as the preamble which holds up the government by “the people’s solemn trust” as an “universal principle of human race”; Article 9 which lays down pacifism; as well as Article 13 which shows the foundation of human rights by stipulating the value of individual, easier.

Especially, whether we would be able to protect Article 96 is not only the matter of technical procedure, but is a serious problem that directly relates to the constitutionalism, which makes a constitution that restricts power. Prime Minister Abe and his friends say that, loosening the necessary condition for constitutional amendment will allow more frequent national referendum and thus this is a reform to strengthen people’s power. But this is a trick. To enable less people to touch the constitution will only unjustly strengthen the power of politicians...To loosen the restriction for constitutional amendment provided by Article 96 by using Article 96 itself means a challenge against the very reason of the existence of constitution.

We understand that the logic used for an amendment of Article 96 is a runaway of those who won, only by chance, the majority in the last national

election [which was ruled unconstitutional], which ignores the reason of the existence of constitution, and to interfere the people's rightful use of their right to amend the constitution, and therefore we call for an opposition movement against it. Toward the coming House of Councilors election, we broadly call for your participation in this voice against a revision of Article 96.

The thirty-six founders of The Article 96 Association signed this appeal published on May 23, 2013. The current of broader collaboration has been continuing to grow under the third Abe Cabinet that finally brought the right of collective defense on the table of discussion at the National Diet.

The “Coup d'état” and the Article 9 Association

As the Abe Cabinet pressed the national security bills to enable the country's participation in wars abroad, a more collaborative atmosphere to protect the constitution has been forming. The government's attempt in 2013 to revise Article 96 had come to a deadlock due to the unexpectedly powerful counterattack from the newly formed Article 96 Association that held up the cause of “constitutionalism.” On July 1, 2014, however, a cabinet decision was made to permit exercising the right of collective defense. Most constitutional scholars pointed out that this was a violation of the constitution, and a group called the Save Constitutional Democracy Japan (hereafter “the SCDJ”) was formed in opposition to the cabinet decision. Sixty-seven academics are co-founders of this group, and as of August 2016, it has 2,250 sponsors with various occupations, varying from musician to university professors. Many also claimed this action was a “coup d'état” by the government from a legal viewpoint. Against such “non-

constitutional” (Ishikawa 2015:58-69) actions of the government, more previously silent segments of the society started to act. A students’ group called SEALDs (Students Emergency Act for Liberal Democracy) and a mothers’ group called “Mama no kai” (or “Mothers Against Wars,” hereafter “the MAW”) under the slogan “We will not let anyone’s child get killed” attracted the most media attention. Scholars also formed another group called Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-related Laws (hereafter “the ASOSL”), with overlapping membership with the Article 96 Association and the SCDJ. As of August 2016, it has 14,297 academics and 32,246 citizens sponsors.

To join forces with these growing movements, traditionally separated movement organizations and political parties on the left finally came together. Watanabe Osamu from the headquarters revealed how this could be realized in his lecture at the Kamakura Article 9 Association in Kanagawa prefecture, on November 21, 2015:

For the first time in fifty-five years since the struggle against the US-Japan Security Treaty, cooperation between movement organizations was realized as the United Steering Committee (Sougakari kōdō jikkō iinkai, hereafter “Sougakari”). How is this so epoch-making? Whatever effort was made, the DPJ and JCP could not cooperate. The SDP and JCP could not, either. Not to mention labor unions such as Rengō, Zenrōren, and Zenrōkyō. So, this time, since those sweetened bean pastes seemed unable to come together, it wrapped them all together with a big manjū skin (manjū is a kind of Japanese-style bun usually stuffed with sweetened bean paste). This is Sougakari. First, there is a steering committee called “Anti-War Committee of 1000.” Mr. Fukuyama, one of the co-

representatives of the Rengō Peace Forum, is a member of this group. There is also “Cooperative Center for Protecting and Utilizing the Constitution.” Zenrōren and the JCP are official members of this center. Finally, there is “Steering Committee Against Destruction of the Constitution Article 9 through Interpretations,” of which more than hundred citizens groups are members. These three groups work together as one steering committee. In this activity, by the strong initiative of the [Rengō] Peace Forum, the DPJ came out to fight against the war bill. The JCP was already in. The SDP acted within this steering committee. Thus, the SDP, JCP, and DPJ were able to cooperate for the first time. This was indeed the fruit of much effort. (Kamakura Article 9 Association 2016:5-6)

The five groups, the SCDJ, SEALDs, MAW, ASOSL, and Sougakari, eventually formed Civil Alliance for Peace and Democracy (hereafter “the CAPD”), in order to unite the forces that demand abolition of the national security laws and restoration of constitutionalism.

These developments in the mid-2010s surrounding the constitution are once again urging the Article 9 Association to get back to the basics of their movement. The headquarters has welcomed Ozawa Ryūichi, a professor of law at the Jikei Medical College, as an addition to the secretariat, in order to strengthen the actual working unit. While holding several press conferences at the National Diet, the headquarters published an appeal on November 13, 2015, calling for a focused campaign:

Many have stood up for various actions to fight against the war bill [the national security bills]...Facing the problem to abolish the war bill which is a violation of Article 9, let us resume our campaigns and study sessions targeting all the people in all places. Let us also hold out for putting forward our effort to expand our movement in each local area and field, utilizing the collaborative circle we have cultivated through our campaign against the war bill. It is also important to support each other and exchange with the neighboring chapters so that your activities will be revitalized. Let us actively take part in movements that are important for the purpose of protecting Article 9, such as the petition campaign to abolish the war bill and the movement against building the new U.S. base in Okinawa. Let us participate as the Article 9 Association in rallies on these issues that will be held in various local areas. (The Article 9 Association 2015)

This, together with the discussions in 2013 national exchange meeting, shows that the Article 9 Association has been expanding to related issues in this new situation while still squarely focused on the threat to Article 9 and mobilizing their huge audience for the broader fight. Grassroots chapters acted in cooperation with this appeal and began mounting new activities tackling squarely the security bills, noting that this is a decisive point in their struggle to protect the constitution and Article 9. In the newsletter published on November 1st, 2013, for instance, the Nerima Article 9 Association in Tokyo reported that eight new grassroots chapters were formed in their area, and that these new chapters held film screening of *The Blue Sky of Japan*, in which more than 120 people participated (The Article 9 Association 2015, Newsletter No.220). Some grassroots chapters organized public lectures on the issue of national security,

inviting experts such as Magosaki Ukeru, a former chief of the Foreign Ministry Intelligence and Analysis Service. Others organized smaller gatherings to listen to members' personal wartime experiences and to discuss about the security bills. As such, countless grassroots activities were conducted nationwide as a part of the broader fight against the new national security bill. With Sawachi Hisae's leadership, moreover, participants of the Article 9 Association and also others who support the cause started a new demonstration to hold up a placard that says "We will not tolerate Abe politics," calligraphy of which was done by Kaneko Tōta, a famous haiku poet, on the third of every month. The first of these demonstrations was held on November 2015, in numerous locations across the country. Some activities of the Article 9 Association are thus intertwined with various related activities, and making distinction is becoming more difficult as the issue of constitutional revision grows into the concern of the broader citizens and their coalition movement (Diagram 5):




Diagram 5. Development of new coalition network surrounding the headquarters 2011-2015

*The dark green node represents the new anti-nuclear movement since 2011, with numerous group and individual participants; the purple node represents the network of Article 96 Association with 36 founders and other supporters since 2013; the olive green node represents the Save Constitutional Democracy Japan since 2014; the violet node represents SEALDs (Students emergency Action for Liberal Democracy); the pink node represents the Mothers Against Wars; the light green node represents the Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-related Laws; the light blue node represents Sougakari; and the yellow node represents Civil Alliance for Peace and Democracy since 2015.

**The blue edges are ties between members of the headquarters; the dark green edges are ties created through anti-nuclear events since 2011; the pink edges are ties through shared membership; the purple edges are ties created through membership to the Article 96 Association since 2013; the olive green edge shows Komori's membership to the SCDJ since 2014; the light green edges show Komori and Watanabe's membership to the ASOSL; the orange edges are ties created through events against the National Security Bills; the light blue edge shows Takada's personal involvement in Sougakari steering committee; and the red ties show alliance among the SCDJ, SEALDs, MAW, ASOSL, and Sougakari since 2015.

Coinciding with these expanded activities of the Article 9 Association since 2011, moreover, public opinion on Article 9 have once again recovered from 43% in 2012 to 68% in 2016 (see Table 2). According to the opinion poll conducted by the Kyōdō News in 2016, moreover, 75% answered that Article 9 was the reason Japan did not use force abroad for 71 years since the end of war, whereas only 22% answered that there was no correlation. Further, in the same survey, 55% were against constitutional revision under Abe and his government (Tokyo Shinbun October 29, 2016). It is clear in these numbers that most Japanese people have high confidence in the role of Article 9 to keep their country from participating in wars abroad, and that they wish to maintain the present state of their country.

As it engages in these activities, the headquarters spontaneously began merging with the new and broader coalition, which is inseparable from movement spillover processes:

... '[S]ocial movement spillover' can be understood as a problem of bounding networks and porous network boundaries. Meyer and Whittier (1994) define social movement spillover where movements' boundaries become indistinct as they address themselves to overlapping policies and overlapping participants or potential participants. Krinsky (2007) suggests that cases of spillover and coalitions be understood together, on a continuum from uncoordinated to fully coordinated action, and from the kind of coalitions that develop through shared claim-making and those that develop through shared organizational, purposive activity. What counts is not just the presence of a tie, but its content and its patterns. (Krinsky and Crossley 2014:8)

Through such processes, the Article 9 Association, which was a coalition of some of the most connected leaders in Japanese social movements today, was able not only to adapt to the changing political situation, but also to claim a high centrality in the new coalition movement at its formative stage.

Nonetheless, this was possible eventually as the result of the endless mediating efforts at all levels of the network, which have continued since decades before the formation of the Article 9 Association in 2004. Each of these continuous efforts was accumulated and accelerated given the most suitable platform called the Article 9 Association. By concentrating their effort on overcoming the conflicts within the supporters of the constitution and Article 9, participants of the Article 9 Association movement laid the foundation for the new, broader coalition movements to develop in later years.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATION IN THE NEW GENERATION

Building on the network of the 1960s political generation, participants of the Article 9 Association have created its vast network with real impact in politics. On the other hand, the movement has been missing younger participants (except those students with some ties to Minsei), although reaching the younger generation has always been a major objective for the Article 9 Association. Even though the triple disaster in March 2011 awakened activism in many of the younger generation, those who became active in the new anti-nuclear movements did not automatically connect to the Article 9 Association that deals with the constitution and Article 9.

However, the situation has started to change in recent years. As these younger activists hang around the Diet building longer, and think more seriously about how to change politics, they began to take in other problems than the nuclear power, such as social security cutback and constitutional revision. It did not take too long for them to realize that issues they face now as their own problem are interrelated, and in fact derive from the same root cause: violation of the constitution by the government. Once the issue of national security became salient, these rallies to oppose their respective issues started to surround the Diet building with the sense that they are all dealing with constitutional problems. As they stood together for a shared purpose, moreover, the old and new generations started to develop mutual trust, and to collaborate in creating events and establishing new groups and organizations.

Emergence of the New Generation of Activists after March 2011

To most observers of Japanese society, the new anti-nuclear movement that started after March 2011 was a sudden surge of social movement activity. Indeed, it was the largest of a few clearly ‘visible’ contentious movements in the last decades. This new anti-nuclear movement was able to attract younger participants from the start; rather, the movement was started and maintained by relatively younger people in thirties and forties, which is about the age of the children of the 1960s generation, who are now in their sixties and seventies.

When I arrived in Japan for fieldwork in September 2011, the new anti-nuclear movement was quickly developing. There still was a sort of feverish atmosphere surrounding the issue, apart from the quietly ongoing political moves to change the constitution and Article 9. The government was still under the DPJ-led coalition at that time, and the political priority was also of course the national recuperation. Naturally, the new anti-nuclear movement developed into a single-issue struggle for some citizens groups.

There were numerous activities against the nuclear plants and the dealing of the government with it. After a while, the Friday Protest, which was organized by the group called Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes, or *Hangenren*, which has been held every Friday night in front of the Prime Minister’s official residence continuously since March 2012, became the locus of the new movement, in which all generation of individuals could participate. Participants of the Article 9 Association also took part individually in these rallies. This Friday Protest, and some other major activities organized by the people around *Hangenren*, had a clearly different style from the older movements: most notably, they staged live music performance on a truck to lead demonstrations, followed by fashionably dressed participants holding eye-catching signs and placards (not flags), and instruments to make sounds. Young parents also took their children to

walk with them in these demonstrations. In short, they were much more stylish and approachable from the viewpoint of the younger generation as compared with conventional demonstrations. Even though it was for a short while, a series of these demonstrations were held in central Tokyo such as Shibuya and Shinjuku where young people like to stroll. Together with the salience of the issue itself, this changed the people's perception of demonstrations and social movements, especially in the eyes of younger Japanese.

Besides the Friday Protest and other demonstrations uniquely organized by the new generation, longstanding activists with some of the well-known leaders also organized large central rallies on the issue. Ōe Kenzaburō and Sawachi Hisae from the Article 9 Association headquarters were among them. At first, mostly traditional social movement groups and organizations participated in these events. As *Hangenren* grew into a large coalition organization with many citizens groups, its leadership started to collaborate with these more formal movements. Their largest rally attracted more than sixty thousand participants.

Through these collaborations, the new generation of activists began to merge with the older generation. When the opposition campaign against restarting the Ōi Nuclear Reactor in Fukui prefecture was at its peak in July 2012, more than a few times I came across tweets posted by young people thanking the older people for rallying during the daytime when they are working or attending school, and saying that they will take their place starting from evening.

Political Process since the Return of the LDP Government

As noted earlier, the LDP returned to power in 2012 and the second Abe cabinet was formed. While the opposition movement against the nuclear plants was in full swing and the issue was at a standstill, the government proceeded with its plan to introduce a radical change to

Japan. The ruling LDP, together with the CGP, then took the majority of both Houses by winning the House of Councilors elections in 2013, which allowed them to bring the new series of national security bills.

The second Abe cabinet proposed the Secret Protection Act to the Security Council in October 2013 for its approval. The Article 9 Association held a press conference and announced an appeal to oppose these new attempts of to create “the war-waging country” even before this proposal and articulated the problems of these new national security bills and widely called for a prompt action to fight this attempt (see Chapter VII). Nevertheless, the bill was soon submitted to the Diet, and passed on December 6th in the same year. Despite its significance and strong resistance by the opposition parties in the Committee on Judicial Affairs in the Diet, the bill was passed very quickly and forcefully. On the other hand, reaction to oppose the bill outside the Diet came rather slowly, only mounting large rallies when the bill was about to pass.

The year 2013 also introduced a new channel of political participation for the Japanese: the lifting of the ban on the usage of the Internet in electoral campaigns. This set up a new environment for the generation of so-called “digital natives.” As though announcing the beginning of a new era, the opposition actions did not stop even after the bill became a law, and a new students group called SASPL (Students Against Secrets Protection Law) was organized specifically to oppose and demand the abolition of the law. As the government continued to bring the series of national security bills, this students’ group was reorganized into SEALDs in 2015, with its new, broader purpose focused on opposing the national security bills. This group then started to provide a platform for many different individuals and groups of people to cooperate, creating another locus of activism. Their style partly followed *Hangenren*, in its use

of music in demonstrations and the weekly rally in front of the National Diet building, where participants can make free speeches.

While many participants of the new anti-nuclear movements explicitly differentiated themselves from older activists and their movements, SEALDs was open to more general cooperation: In its rallies, many prominent scholars who founded the Article 96 Association, ASOSL, and SCDJ also participated and made speeches, which was said to be like “a weekly lecture series in front of the Diet building.” The scholars’ groups such as the ASOSL also published supportive comments on SEALDs in mass media. As this new movement against the national security bills developed a single voice that called for cooperation among the opposition parties to remove the LDP-CGP government under Abe cabinet from power, Diet members of opposition parties also started to participate in these rallies. Some have claimed that this was the first movement in Japanese history where students and scholars collaborated on one issue to create a united front. Concurrently, SEALDs Kansai, Tōkai, Tōhoku, and Ryūkyū were formed and actively pursued cooperation among different movement groups in their respective local areas, while emphasizing the importance of using their own words in expressing opinions on the issue.

Before dawn on the morning of September 19, 2015, the national security bills passed the Diet. In the afternoon of the same day, the JCP published an announcement to propose a formation of the “people’s coalition government,” calling for general cooperation in the upcoming national election among the opposition parties. This surprised most observers of Japanese politics, since the JCP had previously been rather persistent in fielding its own candidates wherever possible. At the same time, the proposal encouraged many of those who were disappointed by the passing of the national security bills despite their efforts, as well as

longstanding activists who always wanted to present a united front. This accelerated the discussion among the opposition parties, but also various social movement organizations, and eventually, an agreement was reached among four opposition parties including the JCP, SDP, the People's Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends (subsequently the Liberal Party), and the new Democratic Party that was formed by the former DPJ and the Japan Innovation Party, to cooperate for the House of Councillors' election in July 2016. SEALDs and other citizens groups, Mothers Against War in particular, played a central role in publicizing this new project.

Finally, coalition candidates were fielded in all thirty-two single seat districts in the election, and they won in eleven districts. This was an important achievement, since in the previous election there were only two victories of the opposition candidates in the single seat districts. Moreover, in five out of six single seat districts in the Tōhoku area where people suffered the 3.11 triple disaster and its aftermath, the coalition candidates defeated former LDP Diet members. Okinawa, where the people's all-out fight against construction of the new U.S. base in Henoko has been ongoing, also elected the coalition candidate, thereby eliminating LDP candidates from all electoral districts in the prefecture. Moreover, the ones who lost in Fukushima and Okinawa were former members of the Abe cabinet. The general outcome of the election was yet another victory of the ruling LDP and CGP. Nevertheless, through presenting a united front, the people's coalition has developed and expanded to an unprecedented scale, involving all generations of veteran and 'amateur' activists.

The Article 9 Association in the New Generation

The contribution of the Article 9 Association was essential to the growth of this new broader coalition that emerged in the 2010s: the Association's effort to overcome the past

conflicts within the left, and later to connect to the liberals with different views on the constitutional amendment, laid a groundwork for the new development. Moreover, members of the headquarters were directly involved in the formation of both the new anti-nuclear movement (Ōe, Sawachi, and Takada) and the broader coalition movement for the constitutional government (Komori, Takada, Watanabe, and Okudaira). Komori and Takada have been especially indispensable brokers for the new coalition (see Diagram 5). The Article 9 Association was thus in the background throughout the recent mobilization processes. This provides strong evidence of high centrality of the Association in today's social movement sector in Japan.

This recent process has ended for the time being, with the partial success of the united front in the House of Councilors election in July 2016. The unfinished project must go on, however, as SEALDs stated upon its dissolution on August 15, 2016, the 71st anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War. This apparently odd decision of SEALDs to disband is actually a conscious action and can be understood as a new tactic for Japanese social movements. To the new generation of activists, forming a new group for one particular issue and disbanding it upon the conclusion of its intended project is a way to avoid making the same mistake that their predecessors made. In their eyes, past social movements went on for too long and some groups expanded to unnecessarily large scale only to become inflexible organizations, which as the result prolonged the life of irresponsible government. Their critical reflection upon the past movements made the younger generation try not only to keep their activity flexible, but also to make it more diffused into the public space. In so doing, former members of SEALDs would also continue engaging with public issues as 'individuals'—*not* as a member of a group—who think and act independently. The decision of SEALDs to disband at this timing should therefore be

understood as an effort to make Japanese society a more active and engaging in the public sphere, but also to keep their individual selves responsible to their own actions.

To protect the constitution and Article 9, the Article 9 Association would continue its daily activity with even stronger conviction. Indeed, the association held the sixth national exchange meeting in September 2016, and announced that it has formed a new managing committee (*sewanin-kai*), in order to strengthen the actual working unit and to take over the roles played by the founders when necessary (and possible). The committee is composed of twelve members of a slightly younger cohort (in their fifties and sixties), who come from various fields (seven academics, an economic analyst, a journalist, a humanitarian activist, an interpreter, and a lawyer), and have been actively involved in the Article 9 Association movement (the Article 9 Association 2016, the Newsletter No. 251). It is still unlikely for the association to recruit too many younger members. Even so, the network created by the association has already become the basis of the new movements. Moreover, the purpose of the Article 9 Association has become the purpose of the new coalition, and of the young activists who gathered under the name of SEALDs as well as the mothers with small children who formed the MAW. The parting music video message of SEALDs, matched to rap music, embodied the continuation of the Article 9 Association's constitutional movement in the new generation:

In prayers, on 8.15

I put hands together, at Chidorigafuchi*

I am in my thought, in the glaring darkness

The death of the predecessors of this land

Cannot see the determined look just yet

Looking in front, started walking, since then
Different scenes, experienced, and thanked
The worrier who searched for the unfulfilled
Must have wished, spoken, and fought,
For the life and peace in front of him

It has reached here
Like a glacier that could break down if left alone,
Fragile yet firm, his will has been taken over
The value that stood for as long as 71 years
“No War” the two words inscribed on the grave post
Gave birth to the modern Samurai who strides in battlefields unarmed
The name is Article 9

We are still in the dream
Living in the dream, like praying, like praying
Always doing the right thing
Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors

We are still in the dream
Living in the dream, like praying, like praying
Always doing the right thing

Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors

Rising up, we are SEALDs

Mass with no name, on the street

Standing alone

To reconstruct the basement of the rotten nation

Individuals' words, thoughts, embodiment of the constitution

We don't want ABE's revision

This is not a Re-Action, but Action

Just to succeed the drama since the end of war

Affirmation of life, simple and pure

We won't end as awakened students' riot

We will preserve, overcoming the feeling of living in another age

Rather than a strategy or plan,

It's more like drawing a dream like Martin Luther King

We will live in the continuation of the dream of the dead

And I have a dream

Only solid future in front of my eyes

Possibility for children, on this island

Finished? Then we just start, once again

We are still in the dream

Living in the dream, like praying, like praying

Always doing the right thing

Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors

We are still in the dream

Living in the dream, like praying, like praying

Always doing the right thing

Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors

Yo, attention at once

71 years since the war

From present to future

Nothing changes

Human beings dream

That comes true after their death

We are SEALDs

(* Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery is a memorial for unidentified war dead of the Second World War, located near the Imperial Palace and Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.)

The ASOSL published a statement on the achievement of SEALDs, on August 8, 2016, entitled “The Seven Fruits of SEALDs that We Succeed.” In summary, the ASOSL pointed out that: (1) SEALDs activated a citizens movement based on the “consciousness as the sovereign,” and in so doing, it reformed democracy in Japan; (2) Its activity, in building solidarity between individuals who respect one another, embodied the constitutionalism. This was the result of the intelligence, sensibility, and courage of the members who “think, judge, and act in solitary”; (3) Pacifism was revitalized as what is based on reflection on the past, present efforts, and hope for the future through speeches in which they spin their thoughts of peace into their own words; (4) It has built communicative relationship between citizens and the opposition parties, and thus realized a joint struggle among the opposition parties in the last House of Councillors election, which was deemed impossible previously; (5) It showed that a joint struggle could make a good game if it was supported by citizens, even in the single seat districts; (6) It started cooperation between students and scholars across Japan, as SEALDs was active nationwide and cooperated with other local students and citizens groups; (7) It not only protected constitutionalism, but also showed a guiding principle to develop it.

The ASOSL then concluded that they would continue the action based on the respect for different characters of one another, in order to realize the politics that defend the dignity of individuals. Thus, the collaboration between students and scholars has developed through the joint struggle, and as the result, some of the core members of SEALDs and the ASOSL have formed a think tank called Re-DEMOS in order to make policy proposals. The opposition parties also agreed to continue on their joint struggle in the upcoming House of Representative election. These are a few clear indications that this new project will continue. Clearly, furthermore,

another important purpose of the Article 9 Association, to create a horizontal network of various social movement actors in Japan, has been succeeded by the new generation.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCLUSIONS

The present dissertation began with a sociological puzzle that stems from the seventy years of contest over the 1946 Constitution of Japan and its “peace clause” Article 9. The Japanese constitution famous for this special peace clause has remained contested ever since its establishment, but resisted challenges in the National Diet and in the courts for seventy years. After the massive protest cycles of the 1960s to early 1970s, protest activity in Japan declined, and there was no major protest mobilization over this issue for several decades. Suddenly in 2004, however, a new movement called the Article 9 Association (*Kyūjō no kai*) emerged, and grew very rapidly to encompass over 7,500 chapters across Japan and abroad. What led to this new social movement and how and why did it grow so rapidly after such a long period of quiescence? The dissertation was set to solve these puzzles by using contemporary social movement theories and concepts. Namely, it drew on the literature about political process, protest cycles, and social networks, and explored the development of the Article 9 Association as a social movement network. The frame alignment theory was also utilized in order to explain the dynamic aspect of social psychology of participation.

It accepted as its foundation the political process approach to social movements (McAdam 1982), which views social movements as arising out of longstanding grievances that only come to the fore when changing social, economic, and political conditions present a new political opportunity or threat that in turn becomes the basis for social movement mobilization: In the early 2000s, the nine founders of the Article 9 Association responded to the political threat posed by the establishment of the Research Commission on the Constitution in both houses of

the National Diet, by publishing the 2004 appeal that in turn produced the massive social movement network within very short period of time. Within the first three years of the activity, the number of the association's grassroots chapters grew constantly by thousands of increase every year, and reached 6,734 by 2007. Through their activities in these years, moreover, the movement succeeded in reversing the public attitude on Article 9. This eventually led to the resignation of Abe Shinzō, who aimed specifically to revise Article 9, and his first cabinet in 2007. After this first watershed, the Article 9 Association continued to thrive, increasing the number of grassroots chapters to 7,443 by 2009. Meanwhile, the public opinion for keeping Article 9 recovered the majority and to almost the level prior to the establishment of the Research Commission on the Constitution. These changes contributed to the falling of the LDP government in 2009 for the first time since 1993, which marked an important accomplishment of the Article 9 Association as a social movement. Since the new DPJ government and its biggest supporter the labor federation Rengō were less interested in changing the constitution and Article 9, the initial threat to the movement had gone.

On March 11, 2011, the earthquake of magnitude 9 hit the coast of northeastern Japan, and massive tsunami and the nuclear explosion in Fukushima followed it. This shook Japan to its core, and destabilized the entire society. While national recuperation was the highest priority and the SDF's rescue efforts were welcomed, the approval rate of the DPJ government was dropping sharply. This eventually brought the LDP and Abe back to power in the 2012 election, posing a new political threat to the Article 9 Association. By that time, five out of nine founders of the association had passed away. It thus faced this new threat with less resource at the national level, despite its many chapters. As the 3.11 triple disaster destabilized the entire Japanese society, however, it also opened a political opportunity for new mobilizations to arise: In fact, new actors

emerged from the younger generations as the new anti-nuclear movements. The triple disaster also struck many members of the Article 9 Association's grassroots chapters in Fukushima, Miyagi, and other affected areas. This called for the national exchange meeting for the first time since 2008, where the Article 9 Association collectively confirmed that the issue of nuclear power station is a constitutional problem, and to mobilize their massive network to deal with it. Thus, the Article 9 Association began to expand the scope of its movement, leading it further expanding its network in later years in fighting the new national security bills.

While contextualizing the development of the Article 9 Association in the political process, the study also addressed the question of why the initial Article 9 Association appeal published by a particular group brought about an apparently sudden mobilization, and a very quick expansion of the network of a constitutional movement in the early 2000s; and how and by whom these several thousand grassroots chapters were created. To answer these questions, it adopted process-based approach, and closely investigated the social networks the Article 9 Association is rooted in, and the ways in which these social networks created the present form of the Article 9 Association.

The research then revealed that the network of the Article 9 Association is rooted in the 1960 political generation, which emerged originally in the opposition movement against the US-Japan Security Treaty. Since the end of the 'political season' in the 1970s, however, Japanese social movements have never been able to mount a large-scale movement with a real impact in politics. Chapter III explained the political process from the 1950s to early 2010s, and argued that the weakness of Japanese social movements was the result of the historical divisions within the left, which stemmed originally from the Cold War politics introduced to Japan in the 1950s, but then had become decisive through the destruction of the progressive alignment that started in

the late 1970s. It was necessary to understand this historical backdrop in order to appreciate the significance of the Article 9 Association.

Given the context, Chapter IV explored how the vast, horizontal network of the Article 9 Association became possible at all. The chapter found that many activists who have been active since the 1960s and their groups decided at one point to turn themselves into grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association. The process was not, however, a simple remobilization of existing groups. Instead, the process was a multifold of active decisions and continuous mediating actions conducted by the movement participants, in order to overcome the past conflicts: in the process, they reworked their social ties and reformulated their groups with new purposes, and named these new groups as their own chapters of the Article 9 Association. This was the process that enabled the Article 9 Association to create such an extensive network within a short period of time. Then, the network of the Article 9 Association developed and further expanded through the ties that were already accumulated by the same generation of activists, much of it had been in abeyance prior to the political threat/opportunity emerged in the early 2000s. Later, the network expanded also through the ties created in their activities as a part of the Article 9 Association.

By looking at the concrete processes through which grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association were created, organized, and maintained, the present study has shown that the movement participants' continuous mediating efforts at all (individual, organizational, and event) levels made this vast network possible. Chapter IV showed this process at the grassroots level, and Chapter V showed it at the prefectural level, by examining the six clearinghouse chapters of Kanagawa, Hiroshima, Miyagi, Kyoto, Okinawa, and Fukushima Networks.

Chapter V described each of these clearinghouse chapters strove to overcome a different type of the conflicts that afflicted the 1960 political generation: The Kanagawa Network dealt

with the gap between the communists and socialists. The Hiroshima Network dealt with the gap between political party affiliated activists and so-called citizen activists, as well as the one between supporters of different political organizations including a group with a tie to a New Left group. In the Miyagi Network, political identities of participants were underplayed, in order not only to reach out to more general audience, but also for different citizens groups to work together under the name of the Article 9 Association. The Kyoto Network made the effort to go beyond all these gaps, and to overcome another most easily overlooked source of conflict, which existed between individual participants and group participants. The objectives and activities of these clearinghouse chapters are embedded in unique histories, local social movement organizations, and other resources available in their respective local areas. Thus, the participants concentrated their energy to bridge the past gaps and expand their networks in their respective locations. Together, these six cases drew the framework of the network built by the 1960s political generation in Japan today. Moreover, this analysis contributed to theoretical and empirical understanding of the role of such clearinghouse groups, which are widely used in Japanese social movements and also occur in other countries but have rarely been studied in depth.

By focusing its analysis on the ways in which each chapter overcomes these conflicts, Chapters IV and V underscored that participants in the Article 9 Association movement were consciously creating a massive new network beyond the existing groups by bridging the cleavages between them. To bridge these various cleavages, participants of the Article 9 Association movements needed to become conscious of them at one point. They then needed to find out what were the gaps to be filled and worked on. Often, this required them to be more supportive of the ‘weaker’ side and prioritize their preferences. Through working together, they would find out about misunderstandings to be talked over, or differences that would better be

accepted as is. Based on such a foundation, common goals and purposes would be confirmed, helping different actors to work together on areas of agreement. As much as it was organizational efforts, it was also the participants' personal efforts to go beyond their different backgrounds. Sometimes, as discussed in the case of Kyoto, letting differences play an active role rather than underplaying them brings a positive solution for different actors to utilize their strength to achieve a common goal. Thus, the Article 9 Association served as an important platform for all these efforts to play out, helping the 1960s generation of activists to overcome existing conflicts that were created in their own past movements. As George Herbert Mead put it, "The appearance of...different interests in the forum of reflection [leads to] the reconstruction of the social world, and the consequent appearance of the new self and that answers to the new object" (1964:149). The movements' emphasis on local level, small scale activities made in possible.

"Overcoming" conflicts, moreover, sometimes meant leaving differences as they are and finding one single point where people with differences could work together. To begin with, the Article 9 Association did not question participants' views on anything else but Article 9. Small ideological differences were put aside consciously, while areas of agreement were emphasized and promoted in daily activities. Such positive flexibility was also a learned tactic for the 1960s political generation, and actually the key for the Article 9 Association to achieve its present form of a horizontal network: The initial appeal of the association that framed the issue very specifically focused on *only* Article 9, and emphasized the power of *individual* Japanese as the sovereign to *personally* adopt Article 9 produced this flexibility, and motivated general participation at every level of the society. This was also essential for the Article 9 Association to play a fundamental role in reactivating the entire sector of social movements of the country—in fact, the student movements in the 1960s was much criticized for some extreme cases in which

some participants used violence against their own members who were deemed disloyal to the group. Arguably, this was the result of excessive fear of disagreement that stemmed from inordinate demand for group cohesion. Indeed, “The rational resolution of problem-situations—a matter of action—requires capacities for prudential reasoning and practical judgment, which the pragmatists (beginning with Dewey) termed ‘intelligence’” (Emirbayer 1997:310).

The new and younger activists who took part in the reactivation process in the mid-2010s spontaneously introduced further sophistication to the Japanese participatory politics, by upholding mutual respect to differences in their new constitutional movement. This attitude resonates very well with the spirit of the Article 9 Association’s initial appeal, and it eventually came through as the key to realize the historical coalition among the previously conflicting parties in opposition. The true driving forces of this coalition, moreover, are citizen and student groups that demanded opposition parties to form a united front. Given the different identities that separated these actors so deeply since the 1950s, the significance of the present development to the Japanese political history cannot be emphasized enough.

Chapter V also dealt with two special cases of Okinawa and Fukushima: The case of Okinawa exhibited the historical difference between the island and Japanese main islands. In this context, the Okinawa Network may have been a platform itself, where the participants from two places work together, and, as the result, cast a bridge between them. For their co-existence, realization of the ideal of Article 9 may be the ultimate purpose. The triple disaster in March 2011 made the Fukushima Network to play the role of another platform, where the activities of the Article 9 Association interacted with the anti-nuclear movement. Through the process, the Article 9 Association started to expand its scope to the related problems and to reframe its movement toward a broader fight, while still focusing squarely on Article 9. Each clearinghouse

chapter thus presented a unique pattern of how a local Article 9 Association could be organized and what activities it could conduct. Nevertheless, the chapter also made clear that each of these chapters achieved its present form based on the accumulation and the history of social movement activities in the respective local areas, which continued since before the formation of the Article 9 Association.

Chapter VI analyzed the major functions of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association in the first few years of its activity. The headquarters constitutes the symbolic and charismatic leadership, and is the intelligence of the movement. While representing the entire network of the Article 9 Association at the national level, the headquarters provided the movement slogans and goals, as well as latest information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing changes in politics in relation to their activities. To encourage communications among grassroots chapters and strengthen their horizontal connections, the headquarters also hosted the national exchange meetings and published newsletters and digital mail magazines frequently. It also published booklets that recorded its constitutional seminar series to promote constitutional literacy among general public. As exemplified by its reaction to the triple disaster in March 2011, the headquarters also responded quickly to salient issues that arose occasionally and kept the movement relevant to the changing circumstances, each time through serious reflection on its roles and purposes in relation to the social reality. This character of the headquarters, as well as the adaptability of grassroots chapters that compose the network of the Article 9 Association, was essential for the movement to make new connections to create the broader coalition in later years.

Chapter VII began with highlighting the first achievement of the Article 9 Association. Utilizing the political process framework, the chapter described how the development of the

Article 9 Association network coincided with the reversal of public opinion on Article 9, which led to the resignation of Abe and his cabinet in 2007, and to eventually the falling of the LDP government in 2009. The chapter then explained how the Article 9 Association dealt with the new political threat caused by the 3.11 triple disaster and resultant comeback of the LDP government under Abe who has been insisting on revising Article 9.

The chapter also showed that the headquarters was a coalition of some of the most connected leaders: each of the nine founders possessed unique personal and professional backgrounds and the group did not necessarily share views on matters other than Article 9 and the constitution. The secretariat, moreover, was composed of not only socially and politically active university professors with different expertise, but also the leaders of two different social movement groups who had kept distance before joining the Article 9 Association. As much as its adaptability, this connected character of the headquarters was also essential in the Association's development, not only for it to reactivate social movements in Japan, but also for it to claim high centrality within the broader movement in later years, thereby laying the foundation for its constitutional movement to continue beyond its original cycle of protest.

Having described the political process in which the Article 9 Association produced significant differences that impacted public attitudes regarding Article 9 and the constitution, Chapter VIII turned the focus once again to the political process in the 2010s, to present the emergence of the new generation of activists in renewed appreciation. In so doing, the chapter dealt with a remaining question: 'continuity' of the Article 9 Association in the new generation. With the introduction of "the Internet election" as a new channel of political participation, the new macrocultural environment was set up for the rise of new social movement actors. Yet, the Article 9 Association has been missing younger participants, and it is still unlikely for the

Association to recruit too many younger members without fundamentally altering its character. Nevertheless, the chapter argued that the contribution of the Article 9 Association was essential to the new broader coalition that emerged in the mid-2010s. The Association's efforts to overcome the past conflicts within the left, and later to connect to the liberals with different views on the constitutional amendment, laid the groundwork for the new development. As also discussed in Chapter VII, members of the headquarters were directly involved in the formation of both the new anti-nuclear movement and the broader coalition movement for constitutional government: In the formation of the new coalition, moreover, Komori and Takada from the headquarters were indispensable brokers. This provides strong evidence of high centrality of the Article 9 Association in today's social movement sector in Japan. The network of the Article 9 Association has already become a part of the new coalition movement. In turn, cooperation between the older and younger generations in the broader context helped the Association to deliver its purpose in the new generation. Eventually, and most significantly, the purpose of the Article 9 Association, to protect and promote Article 9 and the constitution, has become the purpose of the new movement for constitutional government.

Theoretical Contributions

Network Practice and Social Movement Continuity

The present study used the political process approach (McAdam 1982) that focuses on why social movements emerge when they do to understand how this longstanding contentious issue re-emerged as a new social movement under new political and social conditions in the 2000s. This was a movement that re-emerged after a long period of abeyance (Whittier 1997, Crossley and Taylor 2015). The key to understand its rapid rise under these new conditions of

political threat was to use the perspective that social movements are network structures (Diani and McAdam 2003), and to examine closely how the Article 9 Association re-mobilized old networks and created new ones.

By examining the network processes of the Article 9 Association, the study has shown that the lives of social movements may continue beyond cycles of protest, from which a generation of social movements originates: In the Article 9 Association, the social networks of the 1960s political generation were remobilized after three decades of abeyance; through the process of remobilization, the existing social networks were transformed into a new movement. This new movement in turn provided a platform for the generation of activists to overcome its past problems. Furthermore, this process created for the movement a path to transcend the protest cycle it originated from, and to reclaim its life in the new generation.

To understand social movement continuity in this new way required adopting a process-based approach, and the viewpoints of social network analysis, as they helped to shift the study's attention from continuity of a particular social movement as a group or organization: The traditional view of social movements assumed a movement to have fixed subjects who conduct the given movement, and focused analyses on cultural forms such as 'identities' and 'frames' instead of "how these forms are shaped, deployed, and reformulated in conversation" (Mische 2003). This view of social movements assumed that continuity of social movements could hardly be maintained when the long-term committed members of a particular movement reached an advanced age and became incapable of carrying on their movement. As the result, it was presumed necessary for social movements to recruit new, younger members into given social movement groups or organizations. However, studies have also found that different political generations are unlikely to share the same collective identity due to their different socio-political

and historical experience, which means recruiting participants from a younger generation is even more difficult than recruitment within the same generation.

Although McAdam's concept of political process encouraged researchers to analyze "the entire process of movement development rather than a particular phase" (1982:36), the fixed view of social movements limited the scope of studies. In spite of the fact that the concept of "protest cycle" suggested cyclical lives of social movements, moreover, studies hardly looked beyond the processes after movement contraction and abeyance period (Taylor 1989). If this was not because of an unspoken presumption that it would be impossible for social movements to continue beyond their original protest cycles, it still was assumed that social movements would not continue without recruiting new members into those groups that maintain given movements. Only recently, research on the American feminist movement has presented evidence that social movements can continue over time due to expansion of their basic collective identity and its diffusion through abeyance structures (Crossley and Taylor 2015). The movement can thus continue to grow and change well into another generation.

By closely investigating the Article 9 Association and its network processes in particular, this dissertation has also demonstrated that social movements may continue beyond cycles of protest, even without direct successors of given movement groups or organizations. By showing how the network structure of the Article 9 Association developed, moreover, this study also contributed to the basic sociological study of social organization and the creation of social institutions, which often begin as social movements and then may become more institutionalized. If the American feminist movement is the case of movement continuity through diffusion and spillover of collective identity where institutionalized "free spaces" serve as a system for ideas to be transmitted among similar groups, the Japanese constitutional movement is the case of

movement continuity through network practices, in which real persons struggle in their everyday lives, face to face, to make communication possible among those with different backgrounds.

Relational Understanding of Movement Continuity

The processes of network formation and expansion we have observed in the Article 9 Association movement, moreover, contribute a more relational understanding to the theories of social movement continuity. It was clear in my observation that participants of the Article 9 Association have been working hard to overcome the previous divisions. They had learned lessons from their past failures, that they competed over small differences, trying to dominate the already limited oppositional space, instead of expanding it by working together. In the present movement, they are doing exactly the opposite. At the ground level of their activities, participants of the Article 9 Association were freer to disagree in comparison to previous settings, as they operate as basically autonomous small groups of their own. These independent groups and individuals are nevertheless working together as one movement, and as part of the processes of new network formation. Throughout these processes, therefore, traits of the network (ties of network) were constantly changing. Consequently, traits of participants (nodes of network) were also changing to varying degree, given their autonomy in the movement, as their network expand and meet and involve new others in multiple settings.

This study supports the views that conceptualize social movements as networks instead of groups, and that movements belong to connections between people rather than people. This does not necessarily suggest that networks can persist independent from people or that people are easily replaceable. It still matters who is in the network, because social networks are maintained by real persons with different priorities (although these actors also change for many reasons,

including their ties to others). At the ground level, people keep connections because they can work with each other. The Article 9 Association was able to involve all kinds of actors precisely because it was a network, which could provide a common ground where differences were respected.

There was no guarantee that the past divisions would be overcome. Indeed (as the late Peter Manicas used to say in his graduate seminar on sociological theory at the University of Hawaii at Manoa), “it could have been different.” Often, when presented with a common enemy, groups will not unite. The 1960s political generation in Japan is the living witness of this truth. It is a common story that liberals and radicals distance themselves from each other in some kind of competition instead of uniting over commonalities. That is also understandable as “identity”—liberals and radicals are just different—but again, it is more precise to be understood in relational terms: There is a limited space for opposition, and competitions drive them apart instead of together. Such fracturing happened in the 1960s Japan, but it did not happen in the 2000s. The present dissertation demonstrated why: Divisions in the Japanese left that used to be understood in terms of identities were overcome through a reorganization of networks. This was done, moreover, through the working of real people’s hard-earned “intelligence” (Dewey 1980). On that foundation, furthermore, new generations of social movements are developing.

Thus, we understand now that the life of social movements as networks can *transcend* protest cycles. What was understood in the traditional sense as “continuity” through certain people’s endless efforts to maintain their vigor and resources (i.e. legacies, histories, know-how, lessons, collective identities, and network ties) may now be understood as infinite processes of network formation and reorganization of social movements-as-networks. Through such processes, united, social movements can increase impact and expand the oppositional space.

APPENDIX I.
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Basic Questions: For all interviewees

Part 1. Participants' background

- a. How old were you when you first started to take part in the Article 9 Association?
- b. What were you doing before you got involved in the activities of the Article 9 Association? (probe for additional demographic background information if it does not come out in this general inquiry)
- c. Tell me about your typical week before you joined the Association.

Part 2. Routes of recruitment and patterns of involvement

- a. How did you begin to participate in the activities of the Article 9 Association?
- b. How did you decide to join this particular chapter?
- c. If you have been participating in more than one chapter, which chapters are they? What do you do with each chapter?
- d. If you hold any position or have any office in the chapter (or the Association), what do you do? How much time do you spend on it?
- e. How active have you been as a member of the Association and/or your chapter? What sorts of things have you done as a member of the Article 9 Association? How many hours do you spend a week for the Association/chapter activity?
- f. Where does your activity in this group fit into the rest of your life? Tell me about your work and leisure life. What do you do for a living? What do you do for leisure?

With whom do you maintain regular contact (e.g. neighbors, colleagues from work, people from hobby circles etc.)? Tell me about your typical week.

Part 3. Participation in chapter activities

- a. What are regular meetings like? What are the purposes of regular meetings? How often do you have meetings? How are they organized?
- b. How do you stay in contact with other chapter members? How often do you talk to each other? What media do you use the most?
- c. What activities has your chapter done so far?
- d. What kinds of chapter activities do you like to attend, and which ones are you less likely to participate in?
- e. What was the last activity of your chapter? Did you attend the event? Tell me about the event you last attended. How many people attended to the event? Were they mostly the chapter members or were there any new people? About What was the general age range of the participants? About what proportion were men and women?
- f. If your chapter has ever held public events (e.g. lectures, film screening, study meetings etc.) Did anyone who was not a chapter member participate? Who were they? How did they come to the event? Did they say anything about the event? Did they come back for later events?

Part 4. Participation in extra-chapter activities

- a. Have you participated in any demonstrations or larger scale meetings of the Association? If you have, which ones?

- b. How many of such events have you attended in the past year?
- c. Tell me about the last occasion you participated in a larger scale event of the Association. Did you go as part of a group from the chapter? If not, did you go by yourself or did you take anyone with you? With whom did you go together? (probe for additional information depending on what event the interviewee participated)

Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants

- a. Think about the last time you came to the chapter office or a meeting. What did you do on that occasion? Was that typical? If not, think of a more typical occasion and tell me about that.
- b. Who did you talk to on that occasion? Were there other people there that you did not talk to? Was that occasion typical? If not, think of a more typical occasion and tell me about that.
- c. Do you talk to your chapter members outside the chapter? If you do, think about the last time you did and tell me about that. Was that typical? If not, think of a more typical occasion and tell me about that.
- d. Do you interact with members of other chapters? In what kinds of occasion? Tell me about the last time you did that.

Part 6. Experiences of recruiting

- a. Do you talk about the Article 9 Association outside your activity as a member of the Association or your chapter? With whom? What do you talk about? When was the last time you did that? Tell me about it. About how often do you do that?

- b. Have you invited anyone to the activities related to the Article 9 Association? Who are they? What happened afterwards? When was the last time you did that? Tell me about it.
- c. About how often have you brought someone to an Article 9 Association activity? Have any of those people come back to other events or joined the group afterwards?

Supplement Questions I: For interviewees who is older than age 60 and belong to a chapter most of whose membership is older than age 50

Supplement to Part 3. Participation in chapter activities

- a. Are you or your chapter generally satisfied with the age and gender composition of the membership? If not, how would you like it to be? Has your chapter been thinking about this issue, and how have they thought about it?
- b. If your chapter has few younger (35 and under) members, can you remember if any young people have attended any of your activities? If they did, how did the young person happen to come to the event? How did you or others interact with the younger person? Did the person come to any subsequent events?
- c. If your chapter has a handful of younger members, when and how did they come to participate? Who brought them? How did your group encourage them to participate? What do you feel the younger people contribute to the group? Have you noticed any change in the organization after the younger members came in?

Supplement to Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants

- a. Have you ever worked together with those who are much younger than yourself in any activity of the Article 9 Association? In what occasion? Tell me about last time you did that. What did you do? How did you feel about it? Did it have any impact on your activity?

Supplement Questions II: For interviewee who is younger than age 35 and belongs to a chapter where most members are older than age 50

Supplement to Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants

- a. How do you relate to the older members of your chapter?
- b. Have you wanted to change anything? Have you actually tried to do that? If you have, what happened?

Supplement Questions III: For interviewees younger than age 35 and belong to a chapter whose most membership is younger than age 35

Supplement to Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants

- b. Are you or your chapter generally satisfied with the age and gender composition of the membership? If not, how would you like it to be? Has your chapter been thinking about this issue, and how have they thought about it?
- c. Have you ever worked together with those who are much older than yourself in any activity of the Article 9 Association? In what occasion? Tell me about last time you

did that. What did you do? How did you feel about it? Did it have any impact on your activity?

APPENDIX II.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

December 16, 2011 at a meeting room on Tokyo University Hongo Campus

December 19, 2011 at Tully's Coffee near Yokohama Station

December 20, 2011 at the interviewee's house

December 22, 2011 at Kanagawa Social Welfare Center

December 22, 2011 at the office of Kanagawa Network

December 26, 2011 at Tully's Coffee near Yokohama Station

December 26, 2011 at Tully's Coffee near Yokohama Station

January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church

January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church

January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church

January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church

January 7, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church

January 13, 2012 at the interviewee's house

January 13, 2012 at the interviewee's house

January 13, 2012 at the interviewee's house

January 19, 2012 at a coffee shop near Tokyu Hiyoshi Station

February 1, 2012 at the office of Kenpō Kaigi

February 4, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station

February 10, 2012 at the interviewee's house

February 15, 2012 at a coffee shop near Kōenji Station

February 15, 2012 at Tully's Coffee near Yokohama Station

February 17, 2012 at the interviewee's office on Chūō University Tama Campus

February 20, 2012 at a coffee shop near Yūrakuchō Station

February 24, 2012 at Conceal Café in Shibuya

February 24, 2012 at a bar near Asagaya Station

March 8, 2012 at a coffee shop near Kanda Station

March 9, 2012 at a coffee shop near Toritsu-kasei Station

March 9, 2012 at a coffee shop near Toritsu-kasei Station

March 14, 2012 at Hekkorodani near Mutsuai Station

March 17, 2012 at a café near Kōenji Station

March 17, 2012 at a coffee shop near Shibuya Station

March 23, 2012 at Tully's Coffee near Yokohama Station

March 27, 2012 at the office of Film and Theater Workers' Union

March 27, 2012 at the office of Film and Theater Workers' Union

April 5, 2012 at the office of interviewee

April 6, 2012 at a coffee shop near Hiroshima Station

April 6, 2012 at a coffee shop near Hiroshima Station

April 9, 2012 at the office of Miyagi Network

April 9, 2012 at the office of Miyagi Network

April 9, 2012 at the office of Miyagi Network

April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network

April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network

April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network

April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network

April 13, 2012 at the Ritsumeikan University Peace Museum

April 13, 2012 at the cafeteria on Bukkyo University Campus

April 13, 2012 at the interviewee's office

April 14, 2012 at the meeting room in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Hall in Kyoto

April 18, 2012 at the interviewee's office

April 23, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station

May 3, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station

May 14, 2012 at a restaurant in Naha, Okinawa

May 14, 2012 at a restaurant in Naha, Okinawa

May 14, 2012 at a restaurant in Naha, Okinawa

May 15, 2012 on the University of Ryukyus campus

May 15, 2012 on the University of Ryukyus campus

May 15, 2012 on the University of Ryukyus campus

May 15, 2012 at the Haebaru Culture Center

May 16, 2012 at the office of OCSC

May 17, 2012 at a restaurant in a shopping center in Futenma

May 18, 2012 at the interviewee's office

May 23, 2012 at a coffee shop in Shinjuku

May 29, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station

May 29, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station

May 30, 2012 at Starbucks Coffee near Fujisawa Station

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