Situational Appropriateness in Global Politics:

A *Yijing* Correlative Theory of Infinite Games

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For my parents.

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These years of working on a Chinese theory of international relations have been most enjoyable, meaningful, and exciting. I was blessed with generous assistance from wonderful teachers and institutions during my doctoral research and writing. Within such a unique context of my social relations, and particular places and times at this age of China's second rise, I have been unable to avoid selecting and persisting such a seemingly ambitious but situationally appropriate topic.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation develops an understanding of the potential for China's changing cultural role in global politics, its leadership potential rooted in aspects of ancient Chinese philosophy and culture of which even China itself is not clearly aware. Based upon Roger Ames's East-West comparative approach to interpreting China on its own terms, and associated philosophical comparisons between correlativity (*huxi*) and rationality, I construct my non-western Global Process-Relational Theory (GPRT).

Using Confucian conceptions of human relations regarding appropriateness relative to circumstances and tendencies (*xing*) to change with circumstances, I develop a Confucian decision-making model of "situational appropriateness" (*shizhong*) in roles and relations, and ground it in an *Yijing* philosophical tradition that developed independently of Anglo-European/Indo-European traditions. I then use such a "correlative" choices model associated with conceptions of human moral cultivation to develop a world scenario of infinite games, *he er bu tong* (harmony with differences and diversities) of *tianxia* (a world of correlations).

This focus is in sharp contrast with Western tendencies to focus on rational choice, abstract principles, and universal values. To further strengthen my comparison and construction, I employ Carse's distinction between finite games (zero-sum games having a definite ending) and infinite games (interaction without end, continuing a more interesting play), and Kasulis's distinction between external (competitive, rule-based) and internal (holistic, intimate) relations. Moreover, I use my GPRT-Ames-Carse-Kasulis framework to reformulate Morgenthau's six principles of political realism through a more constructivist-like interpretation of political relationships.

INTRODUCTION

1. Humans, Relations, and Games

One of the most fundamental philosophical questions is how humans are related. Relationship is significant to political philosophy. In today's world, whether we can successfully deal with global security problems, no matter traditional or non-traditional, depends on how we look at human relations.[1]

There are two basic conceptions of humans and their relations. Correspondingly, "there are at least two kinds of games."[2] One conception is the foundation of individualism: Human beings, which can only be externally connected through contracts or principles of responsibilities and rights, are fictionally viewed as isolated atomistic and discrete entities. Thereafter, human relations are imagined as fundamentally external.[3] Procedure and retribution play a definitive role in the artificial construct of human community within this contractarian ideology. "Community is not the natural state of and for human beings, but only the artificial construct of otherwise discrete individuals."[4] Further, games of players within external relations could be called finite.[5] Rules of a finite game are the externally defined contractual terms by which the players, often superficially assumed as both identical

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[1] One could take a species perspective as evolutionary biology does, a cultural perspective as anthropology does, a language group as linguistics does, a social systems perspective as sociology does, even a spiritual ontology as religions do. However, from a political science perspective, I contend that individuals contain in their worldviews the ideas that filter (interpret) "reality" and thus constitute their decision-making logic, roughly analogous to computer software in relation to computers. Easton took a similar view of political decision-making in his famous model linking demands and supports to policy through leaders' decision-making processes.

[2] See Carse, James P. *Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1987, p.3. It was Roger Ames who first (and on various occasions) cited Carse's comparative theory of games in order to introduce Confucian role ethics beyond foundational liberal individualism, and anticipate an alternative world cultural order. For details, see Ames, Roger T., "Recovering a Confucian Conception of Human Nature: A Challenge to the Ideology of Individualism." Acta Koreana (2017) Vol. 20 no.1.

[3] For more details about external and internal relations, see Chapter 2. I paraphrase and summarize Thomas P. Kasulis's comparative theory about internal and external relations. Also see Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

[4] Ames, Roger T., "Introduction to the Chinese Translation" of his book *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. I translate this introduction into Chinese. See Ames, Roger T., Rujia Juese Lunli Xue: Yitao Tese Lunlixue Cihui (*Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*), trans. B. Hammer, C. Tian, et al., Jinan: Shandong People's Publisher, 2017, P.1-5.

[5] See Carse, op. cit., p. 6.

and equal, can agree who has won after competition. Traditional IR (international relations) theory including realism and liberalism is apparently on the basis of this kind of conception of human relations, more or less criticized by contemporary IR scholars through methods of constructivism and other post-modern approaches.

According to the other conception, human being is viewed as a process of "becoming" human[6] through moral cultivation of one's family, community, and its particular roles and relations that one lives. Association is a fact of and for human beings. Family is a governing metaphor.[7] While a family member is required to think and feel as if he/she was others (empathy, an affective form of moral imagination),[8] "a thriving, family-based community derives from continuing familial patterns of effective communicating."[9] Thereafter, human relations are internally defined as correlative and interdependent. A philosophical abstraction of internal relations is the Chinese *yin-yang taiji* diagram in which *yin* and *yang* are mutually inclusive, supportive, complementary, constitutive, resonating with each other, and even penetrating or transforming into each other.

In this dissertation, I would like to introduce a traditional Chinese conception of human relations as a foundation of constructing today's Chinese IR theory, a part of non-Western IR theory as an alternative to traditional West-centric IR arguments. Human games within internal relations could be called infinite.[10] As "Confucianism is nothing more than a sustained attempt 'to family' lived human experience,"[11] infinite game is played for the purpose of continuing a more interesting play. Infinite

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[6] *Cheng ren* 成人, or "becoming relationally virtuosic"(*cheng ren* 成仁), See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, pp. 87-88, p.126.
[7] See ibid, p.96.
[8] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002 ,pp.39-40. As Kasulis also points out, "Emotionalism is the enemy of reason. This is a valuable way of construing rationality, but it has inherent limitations. Many of life's most anguishing decisions are not resolvable on logical and empirical grounds alone."
[9] See Ames, op. cit., p.10.
[10] See Carse, op. cit., p. 8.
[11] See ibid, p.98.

game players regard their wins and losses within a larger field of continuing play that extends beyond the finite game, zero-sum game, prisoner dilemma, or winner-take-all politics, as family members constantly improve their interpersonal intimacy through sharing their innermost thoughts, motives, and feelings with others, so as to achieve a level of familial accord of each other's inner dynamics. This sense of family extends, through social relations, to whole communities, and eventually nationalities and global relations. Further, it implies an infinite game to both compete and cooperate with the end of maintaining not necessarily particular existing relations but rather the field of relations that comprise the whole network of relations, conceivably the global system.

This dissertation is mainly aimed at constructing a new theory of international relations, deserving of the name, "Global Process-Relational Theory" (GPRT) grounded in Chinese philosophical thinking from the *Yijing* (Book of Changes). The central question in the dissertation is whether and if so, how, it is possible to apply the insights of ancient Chinese philosophy usefully (as articulated in the *Yijing*) to solving a theoretical question about constructing a Chinese-style international relations theory. There has been an important discussion among some scholars (Buzan,[12] Callahan,[13] Johnston,[14] Feng,[15] Qin,[16] Yan,[17] Hui,[18] and so on) as to whether there is or can be a Chinese theory of international relations (a Non-Western IR Theory), or even whether that is an important question, not to mention whether answers can usefully be applied to international politics or global issues such as

[12] Amitav Acharya and Barry *Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory : Perspectives on and Beyo*nd Asia. London: New York: Routledge, 2010.

[13] Callahan, William A. Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations. Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.

[14] Johnston, Alastair I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.

[15] Feng, Huiyun. *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War*, *Asian Security Studies*. London: New York: Routledge, 2007.

[16] Qin, Yaqing, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*. London ; New York: Routledge 2010.

[17] Yan, Xuetong, Daniel Bell, Zhe Sun, and Edmund Ryden. *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011.

[18] Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

potable water, food distribution, clean energy for mass mobility, financial stability, security dilemma and so on. All in all, "our world is very much in need of an intellectual, scientific, and spiritual vision that can draw many different people into a mutually beneficial conversation, while still stimulating further exploration and challenge."[19] Then at the age of China's rise, which has aroused much attention, can we anticipate a new framework of Chinese IR theory produced on the basis of the reemergence of Chinese traditional culture and development of Chinese philosophy?

2. Global Predicaments, Cultural Changes, and Confucianism

Alongside undeniably positive effects of globalization, there have come enormous challenges such as widening gaps of wealth, resource use, planetary-scale climate changes, environmental degradation, accentuated likelihoods of global pandemics, high risk fuel extraction and power, and financial, economic and political crises here and there. These predicaments are no longer constrained by national boundaries. Crises often have global reach and even affect everyone regardless of nationality. Moreover, these challenges cannot be met and solved by individual nations. At the same time, however, the growth dynamics of the "global informational capitalism" and "network society" are fueled by the multiplication and magnification of differences, which urge respect for different civilizations or individual voices. However, there is an apparent absence of a robust global culture of open, respectful, inclusive, and creative deliberation. From a Chinese perspective this is due to low correlativity, that is, inadequate "adaptive leadership"[20] because of thinking in terms of external relations (prior agreements, treaties, dominance relations) rather than in terms of what is becoming useful and can become real through improved mutual understanding and brand new reciprocal relations.

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[19] See See Mesle, C. Robert. *Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead*. Templeton Foundation Press, 2008. p. 10.

[20] See Heifetz, R., Grashow, Alexander, & Linsky, Martin. *The Practice of Adaptive Leadership Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World*. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Press, 2009.

There is growing awareness of the limits of Western IR theory writ at global scale. In contemporary academic rationale, the modern nation-state system has still been popularly accepted as the basic international system. Correspondingly, the nation-state, alleged as equal with each other on the surface, is assumed as the biggest and highest polity in the international system. International theory, therefore, is generally a kind of game theory between nation states, dealing with the maximization of national interests or strategies for balancing power, rather than a theory from the perspective of a more global context. Within the nation-state system, maxims such as "Might is right" and "No virtue like necessity" contrast sharply with international organizations attempting to mitigate the cruelty of international conflicts. The United Nations and its predecessor the League of Nations, reflecting the Kantian ideals, failed to effectively solve problems of so-called world anarchy; and owing to many challenges of the new waves of globalization, the degree of conflicts within this system has been intensified rather than mitigated in some areas such as the Middle East and northern Africa.

Facing with the relevant theoretical deep end, Martin Wight raised his ironical question "Why Is There No International Theory?"[21] There is the corollary recognition of needs to consider alternatives to traditional IR theories that inform much of contemporary national policy-making and interrelations. China's growth in the background of Asian development is producing various profound transformations in the world's order. This reconfiguration of economic and political dominance nevertheless opens possibilities for cultural changes, which challenge an elite world cultural order. Challenges might be posed from, for example, religious traditions like Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, or from the perspectives of indigenous peoples. But Evidence is that many

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[21] In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight ed. , *Diplomatic Investigations*, 1966, pp. 17-34. Originally published as "Why is there no [good!] International Theory?" *International Relations*, April 1960 2, pp. 35-48.

anticipate that Confucian culture can make valuable contributions to the articulation of a new emerging world order, given the cultural resources offered by Confucianism with human-centered religiousness.[22]

Efforts have been made to explore critically the meaning and value of Chinese culture in a newly emerging world order in this dissertation. When we look for the cultural resources necessary to respond to the global predicament, primary among them are resources suited to replacing the familiar competitive pattern of individual actors pursing their own self-interests with a pattern of players strengthening possibilities for coordination across national, ethnic and religious boundaries. Confucian culture, originated from the *Yijing*, celebrates the relational values of deference and interdependence. That is, relationally-constituted persons are to be understood as embedded in and nurtured by unique, transactional patterns of relations—a conception of person that contrasts rather starkly with the more familiar model of discrete individuals associated with liberal democracy. For Confucius it would seem that the solution to global predicaments, or especially the path to conflict resolution, is to transcend the intellectual and motivational framework of finite game within which the participants compete with each other by seriously considering the much larger space-time environment in which they are embedded (the "ten thousand events" worldview).

3. Purposes for the Dissertation

(1) The first purpose for this dissertation is to introduce a new philosophical approach (Roger Ames's East-West comparative approach) for the construction of a Chinese school of International Relations (IR). I will criticize old attempts at constructing Chinese IR theories. And

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[22] Roger Ames tries to show that "the symbiotic and coterminous relationship between achieved personal worth within the flourishing family, and the profoundly human-centered (indeed, 'a-theistic') religiosity that makes this Confucianism (felt) 'religiousness' a significant, world-affirming alternative to the more familiar Abrahamic, God-centered 'religions.'" For more details, see Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p. xiv.

then I will construct my theory on an appropriate philosophy for China and world politics, especially the *Yijing* and core concepts embedded in it such as correlative cosmology, correlative thinking, role ethics, distinct Chinese style of languages and discourse. I will also draw on ancient Chinese texts and common sense experience, and the comparative philosophy methodologies of Roger Ames, David Hall, Thomas Kasulis, Henry Rosemont, Jr.,and Chenshan Tian and so on.

(2) By comparing my theory with Western counterparts (different schools and approaches), my theory will serve as a bridge for communications between Chinese scholars and their Western colleagues. Most importantly, it brings about a basic interpretive context for understanding Chinese strategic culture, a way to interpret Chinese thinking and ethics on its own terms, rather than putting China into a certain Western epistemological framework as many people have, from Matteo Ricci to contemporary IR theorists both inside and outside China.

(3) To lay out or present my Chinese theory of IR, I will detail (a) the kinds of roles which Confucian traditions play in shaping Chinese ancient foreign policy, (b) the kinds of Chinese philosophical visions which exist of alternative world futures, and (c) what kinds of ethics China can bring about to world society. One of the most important events in today's era is China's "rise."[23] Many people are thinking about Chinese foreign policy and Chinese visions for the world future, and also the future of US-China relations. Of course, there are many reasons for today's Chinese foreign policy and the "competitive cooperation" (or "cooperative competition") characterizing US-China relations. Absent from these considerations, however, are serious deliberations on the importance of the various roles played by Chinese traditional culture. I focus on Chinese philosophy and history to provide a fundamental interpretive context for modeling

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[23] "Rise" is a Western concept; I would call it reemergence.

China and its foreign policies.

(4) To construct my Chinese International Relations Theory (CIRT), or Global Process-Relational Theory (GPRT) as a non-Western theory, I hope to bring about a number of alternative approaches for today's global problems such as security dilemma.[24] Given the fact that the main stream of IRT fails to solve many such global problems, a Chinese theory of global relations and processes should be of interest.

4. Methods and Skills: Interpreting China on Its Own Terms

Chinese academia appears to have had no clear theoretical presentation on international relations. In his article "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" Yaqing Qin, argues that "the distinct feature of original theory is that it contains core assumptions that are not commensurable with core assumptions in another distinct theory. If the core component is different, then it can be a distinct research program or meta-theory or paradigm." And such kind of original theory "is yet to emerge in China though....there is a great potential for a Chinese school of IRT."[25] Currently, several other leading Chinese scholars such as Xuetong Yan,[26] and Huiyun Feng,[27] are trying to approach it. However, following Ames's arguments on translating Chinese philosophy,[28] I argue that they are taking inappropriate methods when they use Chinese ancient texts to construct their theories, since none of them pay enough attention to language differences and structural differences behind, between the Anglo-European cultures and the Chinese philosophical tradition that has developed independently of Europe. Therefore, in various degrees at different levels, they misconstrue and

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[24] The term was coined by John H. Herz. See Herz, John H., "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157- 80.

[25] Yaqing, Qin, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory*. Routledge 2010, pp. 27- 8.

[26] Xuetong Yan et al., *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).

[27] Huiyun Feng, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War*, *Asian Security Studies* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007).

[28] See the paragraph after next.

misinterpret the Chinese world view by Westernization of Chinese vocabulary, and *vice versa*. Their work might result in more or less misunderstandings between readers from two different cultural traditions, without benefiting the Western readers by paving a way to China and solving philosophical crises of their own cultures on the one hand, and *vice versa* on the other hand.

In order to construct my GPRT with an interpretive context necessary to read Chinese philosophical texts on their own terms, Roger Ames's East-West comparative approach to the traditional Chinese canonical texts will be introduced into theoretic construction in my specific field of academic study. Currently, on the one hand, many Western scholars of IRT, such as Barry Buzan,[29] William A Callahan,[30] and Alastair Ian Johnston[31] are looking for Chinese scholars to work together or work independently to develop Chinese theories based on the marginalized Chinese philosophies and histories. However, how to discover philosophies and histories really in China is a big problem for their theories to be truly non-Western without remaining entrapped in a certain type of **Orientalist** discourse. On the other hand, indigenous scholars are swinging from copying to constructing. However, they are facing the problems of writing non-Western politics in English, namely, avoiding self-colonization through indigenization of Western theories or imposition of Western structure on Chinese philosophical tradition. As the role of the philosopher is not just to analyze, but also to provide better tools for analysis, my role is not just to construct a theory, but also to introduce better philosophical tools to IR studies. In order to break down the tyranny of structures and disciplinary boundaries that deploy exclusionary discursive practices, in particular, to pave a new way to China studies, this dissertation pays much attention on non-traditional sinological and

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[29]Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan. Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia. London ; New York: Routledge, 2010.

[30] Callahan, William A. Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations. Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.

[31]Johnston, Alastair I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995

philosophical methods to establish an interpretive **context** necessary to *read Chinese texts on their own terms.*

Roger Ames summarized his philosophical methods in his numerous articles such as "Thinking through Comparisons---Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding,"[32] "Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism: A Dialogue,"[33] and "Making a Text One's Own: Reflections on Reading Chinese Philosophy Properly."[34] Tan Xiaoli, a visiting professor from China and I also interviewed Ames about translating Chinese philosophy.[35] Roger Ames' guiding thread is that ancient Chinese culture must be understood in correlative terms where Western culture has emphasized transcendence with dualism.

Among Western scholars in the field of Chinese philosophy, there is an academic group who believes that there is a structural difference (distinctly different cosmological assumptions) between the Anglo-European cultures and the Chinese philosophical tradition that has developed independently of Europe. The strand of correlative thinking of Chinese tradition David Hall and Roger Ames have explored along the line of Marcel Granet, Joseph Needham, Claude Levi-Strauss, Nathan Silvin, A.C. Graham, etc. may best be expressed in one character, "correlativity," namely "continuity through change" (in plain terms, processual and relational). Among the group members, Chinese scholars such as Junyi Tang, Dongsun Zhang, Chung-ying Cheng, and Chenshan Tian share similar views. This group of philosophers has employed the terminology including "*yin-yang* cosmology," "the *yin-yang* way of thinking," "*bianzheng siwei*," and "correlative thinking," etc. to

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[32] In *Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons*, ed. Stephen Durrant, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002,pp. 93-110.

[33] In *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 30:3&4 (September/December 2003), pp. 403-17.

[34] "把文本变成自己的：原原本本地阅读中国哲学之反思" (Making a Text One's Own: Reflections on Reading Chinese Philosophy Properly) 跨文化對話叢刊 Transcultural Dialogue 22, "Special Issue on Global Research on Confucianism." Reprinted in Boston Confucianism, ed.Huang Wansheng, Harvard-Yenching/Jiangsu Educational Press, 2008.

[35] See Tan, Xiaoli and Tianyuan, Huang. "Translating Chinese philosophy on its own terms: an interview with Professor Roger T. Ames" in *Asia Pacific Translation and Intercultural Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015,pp.139-49.

characterize the Chinese style of thinking, which differs from the Western analytical thinking with dualism and linear causality.

This dissertation relies on Roger Ames's East-West comparative approach to the traditional canonical texts. Based on Roger Ames' arguments on methods, I pick up a neo-pragmatic criterion, a language of focus and field (contextualizing Chinese vocabulary to avoid essentialism and reductionism, see Table 1) for translating Chinese Philosophy (also leave the Chinese characters and the Pinyin Romanization of Chinese vocabulary within the texts), and Whitehead's Process Philosophy (possibly a Western philosophical theory similar to the *Yijing*'s style of processual thinking) as a Western reference. I also cited process philosophers such as Bernard Loomer and Robert Mesle's illustrations about "unilateral power" and "relational power"[36] in Chapter 2. Moreover, in order to interpret correlativity as compared with rationality, the most significant term within this dissertation, I paraphrase and summarize Thomas P. Kasulis's comparative theory about internal and external relations.[37] Kasulis's book on philosophy and cultural difference explores these two essentially different ways of relating, which facilitates my comparative interpretation of correlativity and rationality. Further, when I discuss about world scenarios, I paraphrase and summarize James Carse's theory of finite-infinite game difference,[38] as applied to interpret the tendency to be exclusive or more inclusive in international relations.

Table 1: Language of Focus and Field

Substance language	Language of focus and field
A word defined by discreteness, objectivity, and permanence	A word characterized by continuity, process, and becoming
A referential language of discrete objects	A deferential language of processes and events
Linear causality, reducing all relations to those	Complex correlative field of spontaneous,

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[36] See Loomer, Bernard, "Two Conceptions of Power," Criterion 15, no.1 Winter 1976, pp.7-29.
    Also see Also see Mesle, C. Robert. *Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead*. West Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008.
[37] Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.
[38] Carse, James P. *Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2002.

of external actions	transactional relationships
Goals of clarity, univelocity, and stipulated definition prized by vocabularies of substance, quantity, and discreteness	The poetic allusiveness of Chinese philosophical discourse

Source: Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, pp.5-8.

Table 2: Terminology of Roger Ames's Comparison between Two Philosophical Traditions

Two Traditions	Anglo-European/ Indo-European	Chinese
Transcendence	Judeo-Christian God	
	Plato's Demiourgos	
Ways of thinking	second problematic thinking	first problematic thinking
	causal	process thinking; correlative
	Linear and one way road	
	rational	correlative thinking
	logocentrism	
	analytical thinking	analogical thinking
	metaphysical	
	dualisms	
World Views	teleology	upward spiral direction
	cosmos	acosmos, world of ten thousand processes and events
	boundaries	no boundaries
	totality, wholeness	
	ordered	chaotic
	cosmogony	acosmogony
	cosmology	acosmology
	transcendental aims	no governing purpose
	sustaining principle	
	single-ordered world	
	order over chaos	
	Priority to rest and permanence	primary of change and becoming
		world as such
	One behind many	indivisibility of one and many[39]
Origins of the Universe	linear teleology	
	beginning	fetal beginning
	beginning and end	no beginning, no end, the notion is problematic
	external agency	causes are resident as things' conditions
		acosmism
	unifying principles	
	a priori	
	monism	pluralism

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[39] Originally coined by Junyi Tang. For Ames and Tian's arguments on it, see
http://en.yiduobufen.com/index.php/index/work/p/1.html.

Two Traditions	Anglo-European/ Indo-European	Chinese
	Being	*dao*
	absolutism	
	external and initial creative act	
	Transcendental Agent	
	Transcendental Deity	
	causal agency	
Language forms	language of presence	language of process, correlativity
	causal language	correlative language
	conceptual language	analogous language
	univocal meaning	literal language
		aesthetic language
How to get knowledge	analytical	analogical, analogous
		analogical ordering
	pattern	
	logical tendencies	analogical tendencies
	reason, reasoning	
	dualisms	
	Ontology	
	ontological	historical
	epistemology	
	Logos (account, structure)	
	logical	
	Nomos (law)	
	Nous (mind, rational agency)	
	Arche (origin, source, principle)	
	unity	uniqueness
	unity over peculiarity	
	universalism	

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5. Philosophical Vicissitude and Research Perspective

This is a dissertation which deals with both the West and China, and both old and new. We must

illustrate its philosophical background and research perspective at the beginning. As Roger Ames and

David Hall has stipulated and endorsed since 1987, the definition of strict philosophical or theological *transcendence* is "an independent and superordinate principle A originates, determines, and sustains B, where the reverse is not the case."[40] To be concrete, "In a transcendental or metaphysical cosmogony, the originative and determinative principle——the Abrahamic God or Plato's Forms——stands independent of its creature and, as an external source, imposes a preassigned design on chaos."[41] Briefly speaking, God transcends the world (that is, God is independent of the world, unaffected by the world) but the world does not transcend God. A variety of dualisms such as reality/appearance, good/evil, God/world, soul/body, knowledge/opinion, theory/practice, form/matter, reason/emotion, and essence/attribute share the similar forms of relationships. This *dualistic* thinking exerts enormous influences over the traditional decision-making model.

To the contrary, Confucian human-centered religiousness makes much less appeal to a transcendent deity.[42] In spite of the Japanese inappropriate coinage of the term for "religion" as 宗教 (Ch. *zongjiao*, literally "the teachings of the ancestral temple and the extended family" in which this family locus of religiousness is its primary reference),[43] "it is a human-centered religiousness (unlike the more familiar Abrahamic, God-centered 'religion' with its worship model that 'defers to the ultimate meaning of some temporally prior, independent, external agency') that emerges through conscientious attention to refining the human experience through achieved propriety in our roles and relations."[44] Said another way, Confucianism (perhaps a kind of secular humanism[45]) is a *zongjiao*

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[40] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.212.
[41] See ibid, p.231.
[42] Although there were some creation stories with sense of transcendence in prehistoric Han Chinese myths and legends, they have not fully developed into an Abrahamic style, God-centered "religion" in China.
[43] Liu, Lydia H. *Translingual Practices: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity: China, 1900-1937*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1995 , pp. 299-301.
[44] Ames, op. cit., p.237.
[45] "It is the cultivation, attainment, and contribution of this unique personal worth to the cosmos that become one's primary warrant for the intense sense of belonging that is the substance of felt religiousness." p.xiv, ibid.

(宗教) with human-centered "religiousness," but it is not a God-centered "religion." The *zongjiao* (宗教) is not identical with "religion." Moreover and similarly, Western interpreters are encouraged, by scholars such as Angus Graham and Roger Ames allowing Chinese tradition to speak for itself, to be wary about their preconceptions that such concepts as *Tian* "Heaven" and *Dao* "Way" must have the transcendence of their own ultimate principles by which to explain the "ten thousand processes and events" in the Chinese cosmos or a transcendent origin from which they derive.[46] Therefore, Chinese terms such as *tian* (天) and *dao* (道) are encouraged to be reinterpreted respectively as "what our world is and how it is" and "the proper way" instead of *Tian* "Heaven" (The God of the Bible is often referred to metonymically as "Heaven") and *Dao* "Way."[47]

Transitions of a, b, and c within Figure 1 represent my dissertation's philosophical background, which was summarized based upon seminars of Roger Ames and Tian Chenshan (in Beijing Foreign Language University, Dec. 2015).

Transition a: There are at least **two philosophical Wests**. One is before the 20th century: As A.N. Whitehead suggested, "Western philosophy is for the most part a series of footnotes to Plato." The dominant quest for universal ground to thought and value began with Plato's Forms and continued through Aristotle's fourfold causality, the medieval and scholastic notion of God, the Renaissance and Enlightenment's universal application of mathematics, and the twentieth century's emphasis on formal logic.[48] The second begins with late 19th and early 20th century pragmatism, existentialism, hermeneutics, and continues with mid- to late 20th century structuralism, post-

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[46] Ibid, p.212. Cf. Graham, Angus C. *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990, p. 287.

[47] See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001 ,pp.63-4, pp.79-80. For more details about reinterpretations of Chinese terms such as *cheng* (诚), *dao* (道), *de* (德), *he*(和), *jiao*(教), *junzi*(君子), *li*(礼), *ming*(命), *qi*(气), *qing*(情), *ren*(仁), *shan*(善), *sheng*(圣), *shengren*(圣人), *tian*(天), *wu*(物), *xiao*(孝), *xin*(心), *xing*(性), *yi*(义), *zhi*(智), *zhong*(中), *zhongyong*(中庸), see Glossary of Key Terms, ibid, pp.61-87.

[48] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.15.

structuralism, and postmodernism, which collectively are rejections of the philosophical ground of common sense within the Western philosophical traditions such as metaphysical realism, formalism, transcendentalism, and a variety of dualisms such as reality/appearance, good/evil, God/world, soul/body, knowledge/opinion, theory/practice, form/matter, reason/emotion, essence/attribute, and so on.

The Platonic way of thinking has become a shared target of the 20th century revolution within Western philosophical narratives. However, Plato's way of organizing the human experience has exerted significant influence on Euro-American cultural narrative. Although there is an internal critique within the 20th century Western philosophy classroom, the West outside the classroom still tends to be indebted to Platonism today.

As David Hall and Roger Ames argue that a notion of transcendence in various guises has been a recurrent and dominant feature since the inception of classical Western philosophy. And one obvious signal of transcendence is the inventory of dualisms (dualism: a kind of metaphysics which assumes that opposites exist as independent entities, each with its own ontological integrity[49]) which are derived from a notion of transcendence, where one element in the dualism has ontological priority over the other.[50] And even though postmodernism poses a challenge to modernism and rejects the One Ontology and transcendent origin or principles, at the same time it celebrates the idea of multiple and simultaneous ontologies at its heart.

Transition b: Confucianism views humans as correlatively interdependent; and individuals are never independent of each other, never autonomous in the strictest sense of discreteness, never bound together by a transcendental force or natural law, and inseparable in the sense of correlativity and

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[49] See ibid, p.100.
[50] See Ames, Roger T. "Meaning as Imaging: Prolegomena to A Confucian Epistemology," in *Culture and Modernity：East-West Philosophic Perspective*, ed. by Eloot Deutsch. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1991, pp.227-8.

continuity. As Robin Wang summarizes, there are seven forms of correlative relationship[51]:

(a) Contradiction and opposition;
(b) Interdependence;
(c) Mutual inclusion;
(d) Interaction or resonance;
(e) Complementarity or mutual support;
(f) Change and transformation;
(g) Transforming into each other or penetrating into each other.

The *yin-yang* correlative thinking exerts enormous influences over traditional Chinese decision-making. However, nowadays, more and more Chinese, lacking cultural vigilance regarding structural differences between China and the West, have been Westernized, superficially accepting Western terminology or actually accepting Western values such as individualistic ideology with dualist thinking.

Transition c: Conversations between the West and China: The theoretical construction of this dissertation is based on Confucianism conversing with the new trends of Western thought emerging from mutual approaching scenarios. The Western philosophical revolution against "ontology" (the "science of Being", and the reality/appearance distinction) opens and anticipates a productive conversation with Confucianism with "an 'a-theistic' human-centered religiousness—a religiousness without appeal to an independent, transcendent Deity as the source of order."[52] Contemporary genetics, social psychology, sociology and for that matter political science are a lot closer to the Chinese correlative paradigm than dualist thinking.

Meanwhile, the thinking of the early philosophers of China might well correspond to the efforts of some postmodernists after the failure of modernism in the sense of global predicaments, that failure being the collapsing of belief in universal assertions of values and principles. The *Yijing*'s

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[51] See Wang, Robin R. *Yinyang: the Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002,pp. 8-12.
[52] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.55.

correlative worldview, thinking modality, and value systems lend Confucianism the capacity of responding to issues of modernity and the various problems troubling mankind in the postmodern era. This provides people with alternative perspectives to understanding their way ahead in a new world.

Figure 1: The West (Anglo- European/Indo-European) and China: Old and New

Note: A, b, and c are above-mentioned transitions. This figure was originally used by Chenshan Tian in his lecture notes. Axial Age is a term coined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), characterizing the period from about the 8th to the 3rd century BC. In the Western world, Axial Age included the rise of Platonism, which would later become a major influence throughout both Christianity and secular thought during the middle Ages and into the Renaissance. In China, Confucianism and Daoism also arose during this era. There are three philosophical processes within this *imaginary* graph. As to Transition "a" with an up arrow, just image: the West was a single-ordered world like a circular cone ruled by universal principles from the top to the ground. This circular cone of ideology presumably has been weakened (shifts to dotted lines) nowadays. As to Transition "b", just image: a traditional China symbolized by a *yin-yang Taiji* diagram has been weakened and westernized in a certain way. Nevertheless, an unshaded triangle on the right representing contemporary China is still weaker to a certain extent in the sense of transcendence than the shaded triangle on the left representing contemporary West. As to Transition "c", just image: philosophically, the postmodern West is getting closer and closer to the traditional China. Transition "c" serves as a basis for our communication between China and West.

6. My Attitudes & Strategies for Cross-culture Comparisons

(1) Harmony but not without differences (*he er bu tong*): harmony with creative tensions. Uncovering differences between Chinese and Western philosophical traditions brings about a basis for dialogues and exchanges between two different civilizations. In other words, the purpose of

cultural comparison is not to see conflicts or contradictions as misinterpreted from a dualistic perspective of cultural chauvinism. In order to promote diversity of theories and perspectives in the discipline of International Relations, I start to uncover what these hidden or neglected differences of **world views**, **ways of thinking**, and **political values** (see Table 5 in Chapter 1) are; differences which if understood and assimilated would enable really constructive dialogues and thereafter avoid clashes among civilizations. In this dissertation, Chinese world view and way of thinking are respectively named as **correlative *yinyang* acosmology** and **correlative thinking.** On the basis of such a comparison between Chinese and the Western philosophical traditions, I develop my IR theory: GPRT, with Chinese philosophical characteristics.

(2) "Pervasive or general" rather than "universal": Although I am using "global," I am not seeking a universal theory since universalism does not exist within Chinese philosophy. "Chinese culture is not shaped by any appeal to universal categories defining human nature and establishing "the unity of mankind."[53] Harmony in a *he er bu tong*（harmony but not without differences) world is the vision of Global Process-Relational Theory. In order to illustrate the conception of Confucian harmony and Confucian attitudes towards cultural exchange, I would like to cite two comparative philosophers as follows. Roger Ames once pointed out,[54]

> Confucian harmonious order is an invariably negotiated, emergent, and provisional harmony contingent upon those many elements that constitute it; it is neither rigidly linear nor disciplined toward some given end. Confucian harmony (he) although consummatory is not expressible in the language of conformity, completion, perfection, or closure. It is a continuing aesthetic achievement made possible through *ars contextualis*, "the art of optimal contextualizing within one's roles and relations." Such achieved harmony is most appropriately expressible in the aesthetic language of elegance, complexity, intensity, balance, disclosure, efficacy, integrity, and so on. Without appeal to some originative principle and the linear teleology that comes with it, the world has no grand preassigned design; its governing purpose is a localized and temporalized self-sufficiency--- a

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[53] See Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 90.
[54] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.84.

collaboration among the participating elements to make the most out of each situation. This then is the meaning of Confucian harmony (he).

As Daniel A. Bell pointed out in the foreword to Li's book, "Westerners tend to think of harmony as synonymous with conformity and uniformity, but Li shows that this view is fundamentally mistaken," Li Chengyang make central argument of his book of *The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony* as follows,

> Contrary to a common view in the West, Confucian harmony is not mere agreement but has to be achieved and maintained with creative tension. Under the influence of a Weberian reading of Confucianism as "adjustment" to a world with an underlying fixed cosmic order, Confucian harmony has been systematically misinterpreted in the West and in contemporary China as presupposing a fixed grand scheme of things that pre-exists in the world to which humanity has to conform.[55]

(3) A generalization with exceptions: "A generalization is not the same as a universal qualifier,"[56] and "Generalities always have qualifications or exceptions."[57] This dissertation focuses on two distinctively different basic ideologies of humans and their relations and games, while there have been a great amount of similarities between Chinese and Western daily lives. Moreover, the contrast between Chinese (summarized by the *Yijing*) and the Western (Anglo-European/Indo-European) philosophies and theories are a generalization with exceptions: For example, as to International Relations Theory, in Chapter 5, I mainly use Table 9 to summarize theories and perspectives into four major conceptions as pillars, compared with four terms of my GPRT in Table 10. I mention some exceptions as notes after Table 9.

There is no China and West dualism or dichotomy in this dissertation, since it is unlikely that any culture is ever a very perfect example of "either…or…" However, as Roger Ames points out, "While it is always dangerous to make generalizations about complex cultural epochs and traditions,

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[55] See Li, Chenyang., The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony. London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p.1.
[56] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.8.
[57] See ibid, p.11.

it is even more dangerous not to...The differences between the classical Chinese world view and those classical Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian assumptions that dominate and ground Western traditions are fundamental."[58] "Generalizations come first; then, with further study, one discovers the exceptions, the nuances, and the qualifications. Without the generalization, however, people cannot proceed in their quest for understanding any more than they can use most databases without first defining the fields of entry."[59] Generalization is a common, necessary, and inevitable aspect of our learning.[60] Therefore, the major question of this dissertation is not about the exceptions,[61] but whether my contrast does indeed catch the main drift of the cultural and relevant theoretical differences. Thereafter, I take the following comparative strategy:

(4) Wholesale and retail analogies & associative and contrastive analogies: This dissertation does not select one philosopher or one theory or perspective as a basis for comparisons. According to Roger Ames,[62] who does not select one philosopher as a basis for cultural comparisons, all comparisons must be retail (partial, and on specific issues) rather than wholesale, and can be both associative and contrastive. When comparing different theories and perspectives, this dissertation needs to be analogically retail and piecemeal rather than working in whole cloth so that we can see from many different references to Chinese ancient philosophy and also the analogies can be productive of both associations and contrasts.

For example, Whitehead's Process Philosophy[63] can be used as a Western reference only marginally and for specific issues, while Dewey is a much more successful representative of process

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[58] See Ames, Roger T., *Sun-Tzu The Art of Warfare*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1993,p.45.
[59] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002,pp.7-8.
[60] Ibid.
[61] In this dissertation, I still spend a small amount of time dealing with exceptions.
[62] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011,p.38.
[63] Whitehead is a failed process thinker, wanting to think process while maintaining his hold on transcendence (primordial nature of god and eternal objects).

thinking, whose vocabulary (see Table 3) can be a reference for Confucian terms. For another example, I pay most attention to Morgenthau's six principles of political **realism** of international relations; however, I also make **partial** comparisons, both associative and contrastive, between other Western IR theories and my Global Process-Relational Theory.

Table 3: Deweyan Vocabulary as Reference

Confucian vocabulary	Deweyan vocabulary as a reference
道 *dao*	experience
和 *he*	consummatory experience, democracy
仁 *ren*	personality, individuality, and equality
礼 *li*	religiousness[64]
人性 *renxing*	processual human nature

Source: p.384, Ames, Roger T. "*Ruxue yu duwei de shiyong zhuyi* 儒学与杜威的实用主义：一种对话" ("Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism: A Dialogue) in *He er bu tong: zhongxi zhexue de huitong* 和而不同: 中西哲学的会通 (Seeking Harmony not Sameness": Comparative Philosophy and East-west Understanding). Beijing: Peking University Press, 2009.

7. Ambiguous Concepts

There are four important ambiguous concepts in my dissertation. Since it is a multi-disciplinary work, I first want people from both philosophy and political science backgrounds to understand each other's meaning when reading a concept. In the following chapters I will use the following four terms as interpreted below: rationalism, realism, idealism, and anarchy.

Table 4: Ambiguous Concepts: Different Meanings within Philosophy and IR

	Philosophy/ **political philosophy**	**International Relations/** **Foreign Policy**
rationalism	**Rational thinking** is a modality of causal thinking about ***extrinsic*** relatedness of things. Rational thought generally requires its users to accept a range of unexamined, or at best unproven, assumptions that then predetermine the conclusions that can be reached logically with deductive	**1. The Rational Choices Model of Decision-making**: A rational actor tends to make short-term and small-scale decisions for maximizing his/her interests as final goals of economy, politics, and social life, minimizing his/her costs at the same time, after considering facts available, alternative choices, possible gains and losses, and also weighing benefits and costs, and opportunities and risks. Realists and most policymakers begin with the rational model, in which foreign

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[64] Confucian religiousness is characterized by "the symbiotic continuity between the natural and cultural context and the human experience"(*tianren heyi* 天人合一), "distinguishing Confucian familial and communal reverence from Abrahamic God-inspired worship." See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.92.

	Philosophy/ political philosophy	International Relations/ Foreign Policy

	rigor.
	From the 17th century rationality began to marginalize **spiritual**, **emotional**, **intuitional**, **intentional** (**will**), and **experiential** inquiry, hence was further associated with a peculiarly "**linear**" or "**single-track**" mindset.
	
	Rationalism believes that reality is knowable independently of experience through innate ideas, while **empiricism** believes that all we know is dependent on sense data derived from experience.
	
	In politics, Rationalism, since the Enlightenment, has historically emphasized a "politics of reason" centered upon **rational choice**, utilitarianism, secularism, and irreligion.
	
	Three important characteristics of modernism[65] are *rationalism*, **individualism**,
	and *universalism. Modernism is a rational ideology. Modern society is represented by human reason.*
		policy is conceived of as actions chosen by the **national government** that maximize its strategic goals and objectives. The state is assumed to be a **unitary** actor (Once a decision is made, the state speaks and acts with one voice.) with established goals, a set of options, and an algorithm for deciding which option best meets its goals.
		2. Rationalism as a paradigm: Rationality also refers to a way of understanding within the Anglo-European/Indo-European tradition, originating from ancient Greek Cosmology. Most of the mainstream western theories and perspectives on international politics take a **rationalist paradigm** for theoretical constructions.
		    As to realism, research on **nation-states** within the **anarchical** international system tends to be dominated by rational actor models which shun subjective elements such as world views, ways of thinking process, and political values of leaders, in favor of objective facts available, seeking essential meanings through definitions and **causal logic**, although substantial literature exists critical of this approach (cf. Stoessinger, Janis, and Allison and Zelikow)…
		    The Fourth Great Debate (between "rationalists" and "reflectivists") was started by Robert Keohane in an International Studies Association debate in 1988 and can be considered an epistemological debate, about how we can know 'things'. Rationalist approaches include such approaches as neo-realism, and neo-liberalism/neo-liberal institutionalism. Reflectivist approaches include such approaches as constructivism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and Critical Theory. Reflectivism is a broad umbrella label, used primarily in International Relations theory, for a range of theoretical approaches which oppose **rational-choice** accounts of social phenomena and **substantialism**, **atomism**, and **positivism** more generally.
		3. The conception of Rationalism in politics is also seen as the midpoint in the three main traditional viewpoints of realism embodied by Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, rationalism (or internationalism) by Hugo Grotius, and universalism or revolutionism by Immanuel Kant. Rationalists believe that through the existence of international organizations and international laws, the international system

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[65] I am referring mostly to the philosophical modernism of the West.

	Philosophy/ political philosophy	International Relations/ Foreign Policy
		is less anarchic than Realists claim. According to such **rationalism**, "since all men partake of **reason**, they must sooner or later meet on that common ground, discovering that their conflicts …can all be solved by a rational formula acceptable to all."[66] "This philosophy recognizes only two forces determining the historic process: reason, and unreason as its counterpart."[67] "Except for ignorance and emotion, human **reason** would solve international conflicts as easily and as rationally as it has solved so many problems in the natural sciences."[68] Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980) criticized such rationalistic philosophy bearing "an 'historical optimism' that was rooted in the Utopian belief that human beings could always master any problem.
realism	Reality exists independently of observers.	Realism, as both informally and formally espoused by such famous thinkers as Niccolò Machiavelli (1449–1516), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Hans Morgenthau, holds that in the anarchic system that is international relations one value above all others explains the actions of states, that value being the pursuit of power. World politics is driven by competitive self-interest.
idealism	Reality is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed. Ideas are the only reality.	Idealism is a theory of international relations deeply rooted in Western liberal traditions. Unlike political realists, idealists see human nature as essentially altruistic and human beings as capable of other interests beyond selfish needs for power. The idealist seeks to use it toward the project of building an international community that will replace the anarchy that rules the international system. The most famous idealist thinker may be Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who in 1795 produced his short essay on international relations titled Perpetual Peace.
anarchy	Anarchy refers to a state of lawlessness and disorder. Anarchy is a Greek word that means "no ruler" (archy=ruler, an=no). It is a state that exists in the absence of an organized government or authority.	There is no world government acting with police powers.

[66] See Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973, pp.43-4.
[67] See Morgenthau, Hans. Scientific Man vs Power Politics. University of Chicago Press, 1946,p.38.
[68] See Morgenthau, op. cit.,p.44.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE *YIJING* TO GLOBAL POLITICS

In this chapter, I introduce philosophy of the ancient Chinese book "*Yijing*" (otherwise known as "*I-Ching*," the *Book of Changes*, also known as the Chinese ancient "*Bible*") into the discussion of global politics, through interpreting two key *Yijing* terms of correlativity (*huxi* 互系) and situational appropriateness (*shizhong* 时中), occupying special places in my theory.

1.1 *Yijing*: the Living Water Source of Chinese Philosophy

The *Yijing* is an ancient Chinese classic that dates back at least two thousand years. There is a commentary on the *Yijing* that is attributed to Confucius. The *Yijing* has been called head of the five Confucian Classics, head of the cluster of classics in Chinese intellectual history, or "the living water source of the endless flow of Chinese philosophy,"[69] just like the snow-covered Geladandong, the main peak of the Tanggula mountains, where the Tuotuohe River, the headwater of the Yangtze River (*Changjiang*, "Long River"), originates from. The *Yijing* provides not only a primordial strand of philosophy of *dao* for most of the schools of thought in the Chinese tradition, but also a summary of *yin-yang* correlative cosmology that is shared by most classical Chinese thinkers such as Confucians, Taoists, Legalists, Mohists, and Militarists (*Bingjia* 兵家） and so on, who generally believe that the religious, natural, and cultural context and the human experience are continuous and mutually entailing.[70]

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[69] According to Chung-ying Cheng, Founding President of the International Society for the I'Ching (ISIC), "Zhouyi de xingcheng shi zhongguo zhexue siwei de yuantouhuoshui 周易的形成是中国哲学思维的源头活水." See Cheng, Chung-ying, Yixue Bentilun (易学本体论 Theory of Benti in the Philosophy of *Yijing*), Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006, p.1.

[70] Compared to the disagreements among schools of thought in the Chinese tradition, the differences between the classical Chinese world view and those classical Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian assumptions that dominate and ground Western traditions are much more fundamental, as I cite Roger Ames in the Introduction of this dissertation.

However, the *Yijing* philosophy including the Chinese *yin-yang* correlative worldview of *tianxia* (all in a world of correlations) has not been paid enough attention by modern policy makers or strategic thinkers, especially political realists of international relations. The Yijing contains most of the fundamental principles in the world, including the correlative relationship between yin and yang, or two opposing forces, which themselves include polarities such as bright and dark, moving and static, weak and strong, hidden and visible, and so forth. When applied to human society, the relations between different polities are also in the network of such changes and interactions. This ancient book as a philosophical expression of tradition and transformation of the world is not just a divination text as it is usually interpreted, as the book contains philosophical thinking on the cosmos and its development. As it talks about nature, human, and civilization, it can readily be used to illuminate global politics even in the 21st Century. For example, based on the *Yijing*, Reg Little, an Australian diplomat for 25 years, working in Japan, Laos, the United Nations (New York), and China, also summarized four principles for policy makers:

> Change and resilience is a constant concern of the mature and thoughtful.
> Internal and external balance of opposites is key to all development.
> Considered and diverse reflection should guide decision making.
> Tradition is best respected in designing change and modernization.[71]

In this dissertation, I develop my project on Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory to chiefly make the *Yijing* into policy consideration as non-western efforts to systematize and theorize the Confucian worldview, mode of thinking, and values. To be specific, the *Yijing* frames a Chinese multi-tiered, comprehensive perspective on global problem-solving in this globalized world. I argue that many elements (e.g., *yin-yang* correlativity 阴阳互系, situational appropriateness 时中, *renxing* 人性, *tianxia* 天下, harmony not without differences 和而不同) in the *Yijing* related to

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[71] Little, Reg. A Confucian-Daoist Millennium. Berkeley, CA: Connor Court Publishing, 2006, p. 160.

diplomatic relations can be theorized and integrated into narratives for shaping the future of global dynamics, to optimize flexibility and self-regenerative character of human relations.

1. 2 The *Yijing* and Correlativity

The central concept of this dissertation is *huxi* (互系), translated as—correlativity. If we were to choose just one English word to characterize the Chinese way of thinking, making decisions, and producing knowledge, that word would be "correlativity" (continuity through change, or in plain terms, processual and relational), which inevitably renders a diversified harmonious culture other than a certain unified "Me" culture. My dissertation identifies correlativity as a clear style of thinking formulated in the *Yijing*, which has had a powerful influence on Chinese ancient understanding of world order.

In ancient Chinese philosophy, correlativity presents an image of two things being tied to each other, each of which constitutes continuity with the other, and being seen associated with a change from one thing into the other and/or transforming into yet something[72] else. *Huxi* (correlativity) consists of three key ideas in the *Yijing*: polarity, continuity, and change. In the *Yijing* the world is viewed as a world of correlations (of any type, loose or tight, multilevel, multidimensional, multifold, and multicategory[73]). In such a world, as Hall and Ames point out, there is no element or aspect that in the strictest sense transcends the rest: Every element is related to one another, and all elements are correlative.[74] I attempt to identify correlativity as a clear style of thinking (or philosophy), a style which is distinctly Chinese, but not necessarily uniquely Chinese. Formulated in Chinese ancient philosophical literature such as the *Yijing*, it has a powerful influence on Chinese

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[72] Even the term "something" implies a tendency to think in terms of essences (substance ontology vs. procedural meta-physics).

[73] See Tian, Chenshan. *Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005,p.27.

[74] See Hall, David L., Roger T. Ames, and Confucius. *Thinking through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, p.18.

decision-makers and intellectuals in their understanding of global politics. I expect that such a tradition can become a basis for a global theory, distinct from the Anglo-European/Indo-European tradition with a strong sense of rationality that is a basis of contemporary International Relations Theory.

As *dao* is fully expressed in one sentence in the *Yijing*: a *yin* and a *yang* exemplify *dao*,[75] the salient feature of the *Yijing* philosophy is that the complementary and contradictory interactions of the two basic elements of a polarity like *yin-yang* constitute the forces, and produce change. With no transcendence, every element is relative to every other and all elements are thus "correlative." Each particular is both self-determinate and determined by every other. An explanation of relationships requires a contexualist interpretation of the world in which events are strictly interdependent. "Polarity" implies a relationship of two events, each constituting a necessary condition for the other. *Yin* always suggests becoming-yang, and *vice versa*. Any two events constantly alternate each another, change into each other, exchange with each other, and displace each other, and so on.

To be concrete, there is no sense of dualism and transcendence (associated with ancient Greek Cosmology) in *Yijing* philosophy. The sky, earth, and ten thousand events mutually correlate with each other. It is interactions of the two basic elements of a polarity like *yin-yang* that constitute the forces, and produce change. The Confucian "polarity" implies a relationship of two events for example, each of which constitutes a necessary condition for the other. Each particular element is both self-determinate and determined by every other particular element. A polar explanation of relationships requires a contextualist interpretation of the world in which events are strictly

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[75] The Chinese original is "*Yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao* 一阴一阳之谓道" *Yijing*, Xici I, ch. 5.

interdependent.[76] Such correlative polar metaphysics precludes all dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such as self/other, identity, human nature, nation-state, and anarchy, which often appear in the Western international relations theory. Instead of concepts such as international, human nature, nation-state, and anarchy, I use correlative terms such as —global, *renxing* (human tendency), *tianxia* (all under the sky literally, or all in a world of correlations), and harmony with differences (*he er bu tong*) to construct my theory, which reflects Chinese correlative *yinyang* cosmology.[77] Thus, a correlative thinking and scheme of contextualization replaced ontological and dualistic assumptions that have accompanied Western concepts.

To understand correlativity in Chinese tradition, we may look to a Chinese theory in the field of architecture, i.e. *Tixing Huanjing Lun* (体形环境论 Theory of Planning Physical Environment), founded by Liang Sich eng. Liang Sicheng (梁思成 Liang Ssu-ch'eng, 1901–1972) was the son of Liang Chaotic (1873-1929), a well-known Chinese political thinker in the late Bing Dynasty. Liang Sich eng returned to China from the United States after studying at the University of Pennsylvania. He was recognized as the "Father of Modern Chinese Architecture." Liang was the founder of the Architecture Department of Northeastern University in 1928 and Tsingyuan University in 1946. He was the Chinese representative in the Design Board of the United Nations headquarters in New York. Liang's *Tixing Huanjing Lun* is a very good example of **correlativity**:

> In recent years, people in the field of architecture, have realized that during the past years, the notions of building are misleading. Thanks to some leading thinkers' efforts to advocate, new trends of architecture have been accepted. The basic purpose of these trends of thoughts is to build architecture

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[76] According to Roger Ames, the art of —contextualizing can be illustrated by an analogy of —the relationship that exists between any particular note in a symphonic performance and the symphony as a whole. There is a sense in which the value and meaning of each note can only be understood within the context of the entire symphony. In these terms, then, each note has the entire symphony implicate within it. At the same time, the symphony is only available through one note at a time as particular perspectives on the symphony…Ames, Roger. *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1993, p.69.

[77] Strictly speaking, Chinese correlative *yinyang* cosmology is an acosmology, in which "a-" as a prefix means negative or not. David Hall and Roger Ames used "acosmology" in their book of *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.

For more details about the meanings of cosmology and acosmology, also see Table 5.

with its physical environment suitable for "heartrending" (身心)[78] of humans who live or work in it. With this purpose as a guiding principle, the notion of building has changed completely. The old-generation architects only paid attention to the building itself, while forgetting the collateral relationship between the building and the surrounding ecology. Moreover, most of the many-storied buildings were designed for high ranking officials, and factory plants were only good for the bourgeoisie, while many aspects of ordinary people's daily life were forgotten. In addition, most designers only took into account the building itself, while forgetting all the furniture inside the building, and even the constitutive relationship between daily utensils and human life and work. In other words, the range of so-called 'building' should be expanded now: rather than just a house, it must include the ecology for human "heartrending." In other words, the so-called "physical environment" is a living ecology, including something as small as a desk lamb and an ink slab, or a cup and a dish, and as big as even an entire city, or even more the networks of cities in an area, and as extensive as culture, politics, business... for human life and work, which is an appropriate stage for all above-mentioned collateral and constitutive aspects as research objects of the Theory of Planning Physical Environment. The Tsingyuan University's architecture curriculum is designed to fulfill such a goal to meet the requirements of the Theory of Planning Physical Environment.[79]

My comments: Liang's Theory of Planning Physical Environment is based on *fengshui* (风水), an ancient Chinese philosophy which develops a dynamic system to deal with the issue of harmonizing human existence with the surrounding environment, and which can be traced back to the correlative cosmology of the *yijing*. In the correlative cosmology, nothing in isolation, all is in a state of unbroken continuity. Liang's Theory of Planning Physical Environment stands as an alternative to some Western modernist perspectives rooted in analytic thinking which often is used to examine components of phenomena in isolation. For Liang, starting from **discreteness** is replaced with recognition that buildings are **intrinsically** connected with life, work, the environment, and concomitant relations with economics, culture, politics and so on. In sum, based upon Kabulis's theory on Intimacy or Integrity,[80] I would further argue that Liang thoroughly enthrones a

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[78] According to Roger Ames, Chinese tradition is "eventful" rather than "essential," so gerunds are better than nouns for translating Chinese concepts. Moreover, it is better understood as a qualitative disclosure of a continuous, holistic experience rather than the integration of disparate things. See Ames, Roger. "'Bodyheartminding': Reconceiving the Inner Self and the Outer World in the Language of Holographic Focus and Field" in Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2015, 10 (2), pp.167-80.

[79] Excerpted from Wu Liangyong's book *Renju Huanjing Kexue Daolun* (人居环境科学导论 *Introduction to Sciences of Human Settlements*), Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press, 2001, pp.155-6. Wu Liangyong was Assistant to Liang Sicheng in Tsinghua University. I translated this paragraph into English.

[80] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002 ,p.101.

metaphysical framework of "ecology" ("Eco" from the Greek for "home," an interdependent system from which nothing can be separated) like Figure 11 (Internally Related Whole with Interdependence and Overlapping Relations), in place of "environment" ("surrounding") implying a metaphysical framework like Figure 11 (Externally Related Whole Consisting of Atomistic and Discrete Entities). Liang's theoretical construction is on the basis of Chinese correlative worldview, of which Traditional Chinese Medicine also lends itself to an exploration.[81]

In this Chapter, I start from theorizing the *yijing*'s world views, ways of thinking, and political values. I also go deeper to explore the differences between Chinese and Western **world views**, **ways of thinking,** and (political) **values** behind IRT and my GPRT. As this inquiry processes, we will witness the unfolding of two different orientations constructed by both sides in understanding the world and acting with it.

Table 5: World Views, Ways of Thinking, and Political Values behind IRT and GRT

	Anglo-European/Ido-European	*Yijing*
World view	Cosmology Cosmogony Cosmos: the totality of things constitutes a single-ordered world/ the **antithesis** between Chaos (nonrational, unprincipled, anarchic, and lawless) and Cosmos[82] **What?** A transcendental Being[83]	acosmology (**a natural cosmology**) acosmogony "acosmos": Absence of belief in a single-ordered world and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order / world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events mutually **correlating** with each other: *ziran* (self-so-ing, self-do-ing), auto-creativity **How?** One *yin* and one *yang* are called *ado* (一阴一阳之

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[81] See Ames, Roger. *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011,pp.56-61.

[82] See Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, pp.3-12.

[83] While the Western philosophical tradition prioritizes the question of "what," the Chinese side maintains a "how-priority attitude." So with no separation between phenomena and ontological foundations, the Chinese cosmological question is like "*How* should our world hang together?" To the contrary, the Western side tends to focus on metaphysical and ontological questions: "*What* is the One behind the many?" or "*What* is the Being behind the beings?" Therefore, questions like "What is *Dao*?" might be non-indigenous. For more on Chinese cosmogony, see "Thinking through Comparisons---Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding," in *Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons*, ed. Stephen Durrant. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002, pp.98.

	Anglo-European/Ido-European	***Yijing***
	Transcendentalism, absolutism and dualism **Substance ontology** Priority to rest and permanence	谓道): *Yin-yang* correlativitism: continuity through change in the relations between persons and among the myriad of things and events between the earth and the sky. **Ontology of events** within **process**: absence of ontological assertions that there is some underlying substratum-essentialism/ no superordinate (One standing independent of the world ordered as its efficient cause) Primary of change and becoming
Mode of thinking	**Rational thinking** Causal thinking/ linear and single-track thinking/ analytic thinking/ Logo-centrism **Individualism** other than holism (Part and whole: atomism and holism)	**Correlative thinking** correlative thinking (**including rational thinking**)/process thinking/ analogical thinking/ full account of context **Focus and field**[84]: a **holographic** understanding of world systems; recognition that each and every unique phenomenon is continuous with every other phenomenon within one's own field of experience. Fico and fields or "ecologically situated events" and their "environments": intrinsic and constitutive nature of relations. For any individual person: **field** could be as small as a family and as big and extensive as an entire world society, or universe.
Values	"God"-oriented values Truth, Good and Beauty Human beings as most fundamentally	*ado*-focused "values" the continuity between the natural context and the human experience *hong* "**being appropriate or not**" *he* "**harmony of differences**" , "**Harmony but not without differences**"

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[84]   What David Hall and Roger Ames refer to as a "**focus and field**" model is a model in which an individual is considered as relative rather than absolute, that is, as within a network of relationships that can change fundamentally as well as superficially. The self as a focus is on "correlativity" or interrelatedness, interdependence, appropriateness. See Hall, David L., Roger T. Ames, and Confucius. *Thinking through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, P.237.

	Anglo-European/Ido-European	*Yijing*
	free, rational, and self-interested **autonomous individuals**[85]	**The social and interrelated persons**, basically as comembers of human communities where freedom is not a given, but achieved in the company of others[86]
	"individual happiness"/ **Competition**	appropriate and pleasant relationships/ mutual help, the idea of "friendship first, contest secondary"
	Either individualism **or** collectivism (dichotomy between selfishness and altruism; Individualism associated with autonomy, equality, rationality, freedom) Individual interest as final goal of economy, politics, and social life, capitalism, expansion…/ **Modern liberal theories of individualism** Government and corporations: extended concepts of the individual.	**Both** individualism **and** collectivism (**Mutualism**) The self as a focus is on "correlativity" or interrelatedness, interdependence, appropriateness (*hong*). Actions are expected to be properly and **particularly situated within roles and relations**/ Pursuit for appropriateness fitting within the **specific** circumstances. **Confucian role ethics** **Why is the Confucian politics a fico/fields structure?** No transcendental One; no absolute principles No competition （infinite game） No dualisms but continuity and correlation; the individual as correlative and a continuity with any other individuals Not the individual, but the correlations of a person with other persons, group, community or *Dian/di*.

Cf. Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.

1.3 Situational Appropriateness：Decision-making according to the *Yijing*

The *Yijing* includes 384 *yao* symbolic hexagram lines. Each y*ao* tells people in one specific

situation how one can seek propitiousness (*ji* 吉) and avoid un*propitiousness* (*xiong* 凶). The *Yijing*

does not teach one rational skills in becoming a self-interest maximizer, because maximization of individual self-interests is not necessarily considered as propitiousness (*ji* 吉) on the basis of proper focus and equilibrium (*zhong* 中, or translated as appropriateness) from perspectives of long-term tendency and large-scale context. The example of prisoner's dilemma does illustrate this point.

This way of thinking about appropriateness and specific situations is called *shi-hong* (时中 **situational appropriateness**, or translated as appropriately timed focus and equilibrium), which is the central idea of the *Book of Changes*,[87] telling us about how to seek propitiousness and avoid un*propitiousness (qu hi bi xiong* 趋吉避凶*)* fitting within specific circumstances, as **time changes** and circumstance varies.

The Confucian way of acting or decision-making (Correlative Choices Model as I further defined in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5) is directed at *shi-zhong* (situational appropriateness) and further harmony through equilibrium. That is, when the cultivated person exercises *zhong* (or more precisely, situational appropriateness 时中), "which is adjusted to fit specific time and situation, he is in harmony with the rest of the world through equilibrium."[88] *Shi-zhong* (situational appropriateness) and harmony are considered as a correlative *yin-yang* paring: "Without *zhong*, harmony cannot be achieved; without harmony,*zhong* is pointless."[89]

As Li Chechnyan points out, "'*shi* 时' in '*shi-zhong*' here means '*he shi* 合时' or '*ying shi* 应 时,' namely 'opportune' or 'appropriately timed'…When the situation is right and a favorable tendency is formed, one should seize the opportunity and forge ahead. Good timing takes place in the entire context of an action."[90] Since "*zhong* 中" "takes into consideration multiple factors in a

[87] See *Yijing*, Chapter 4, Menggua, Tuan zhuan. The Chinese original is from "Meng, heng. Yi heng xing, shizhong ye 蒙，亨。以亨行，时中也."
[88] See Li, Chenyang., The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony. London and New York: Routledge, 2014 ,pp.79-80.
[89] See ibid, p.86.
[90] See ibid, p.79.

specific situation, including timing,"[91] the Confucian moral perspective of situational appropriateness values situational "responsiveness" within particular roles and relations, instead of **universal principles** of rights and "responsibilities." To be concrete, correlative actors should take full account of context or *qu shi* (tendency, advantage, and context), make a never-ending environmental scanning to identify contingencies, correlations and correspondences as well as coherence and processes, and also make constant adjustments to the whole environment so that one is not left unprepared for the unwanted surprises that often accompany simplistic rationalist certainties. "Harmony implies being well adjusted and balanced."[92]

Zhong stands for (taking) the unright, unbiased, and balanced way, (making) the right choice, or (doing) the right thing, which actually goes over the finite game's logic of wins and losses. To be more concrete, actions are required to be **appropriate** (y*i* 义), which means **doing what is fitting in a proper and in a fitting manner**, given the specific **situation**. Within a tradition in which person is viewed as irreducibly social, and the "I" and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing,[93] an actor thus is required to accommodate the **interests of all concerned**, rather than being **only self-interested** (*li* 利), and at the same time required to take into account of **both means and ends**, and also both longer term and larger scale.

Appropriateness (y*i* 义) **and self-interest** (*li* 利) are also considered as a correlative *yin-yang* paring. Chinese people tend to consider both y*i* 义 and *li* 利, and take a appropriately timed way (a way to **situational appropriateness**) in order to pursuit holistic **harmony** (*he*). **Appropriate interest** (y*i-li* 义利, balance between appropriateness and self-interest) is generally viewed as

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[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid, p.80.
[93] See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p. 84.

propitiousness (*ji* 吉) in the *yijing*. Strictly speaking, *Book of Changes* is an incomplete translation of the "*Yijing*," since the "*Yijing*" not only literally means *Book of* "*Changes*," but also tells people about what should be "unchanged": (situational) **appropriateness**. All timely actions of changes should be taken to pursuit (situational) appropriateness; otherwise actions might be unright, biased, or unbalanced, and certainly un*propitious.*

CHAPTER 2: CORRELATIVITY VS. RATIONALITY:

RELATIONS AND GAMES

This chapter further interprets "correlativity," the central term of this dissertation, in three ways. First, I compare correlativity with its Western counterpart, rationality. Second, I interpret correlativity based on paraphrase and summarization of Thomas P. Kasulis's comparative theory about internal and external relations.[94] Third, based upon Roger Ames's philosophical comparison between Mencius (372-289 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE), I take "human tendency", which is my starting point of sage-*tianxia*-harmony connectional framework in Chapter 5, as an example to illustrate correlative or processual understanding of "human nature," one of the most important topics of international theory and also a common starting point shared by many social theories.

2.1 Correlativity vs. Rationality

Correlativity, the central concept of my dissertation, will be compared with rationality as developed in the European family of cultures (see Table 5 and 10). Explicitly, my study is also an experimental project providing a comparative study of **rationality** here mainly referring to **rational thinking** (way of thinking), **rational choices model** in foreign policy decision-making(way of acting), and **rationalism** as a major **paradigm** in the construction of International Relations Theory (way of understanding). As shown in Table 5 and 10, I compare rationality with **correlativity** mainly referring to **correlative thinking**, "**correlative**" **choices model**, and "**correlativism**" **as a Chinese paradigm** in my construction of Global Relations Theory.

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[94] Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

First, I try to compare two modes of thinking, **rational thinking** and **correlative thinking**, and the world views behind them and political values after them (see Table 5). Distinct from correlative thinking, **rational thinking is a modality of causal, linear and single-track thinking, originating from ancient Greek Cosmology**. Within Chinese *Yijing* tradition, because of absence of belief in a single-ordered world and One standing independent of the world ordered as its efficient cause, and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order, the world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events are considered as mutually **correlating** with each other. It should be noted that **correlative thinking** is distinctly Chinese but not necessarily uniquely Chinese and it is a kind of Peircian abduction--detective sleuthing and medical diagnostics in which you are looking for productive correlations. It is a holistic approach that includes giving reasons and patterns of coherence--whatever we might take as a definition of rationality. [95] The rational logic is causal, while the other is correlative logic. In other words, individuality (therefore, discreteness) and relationality (therefore, continuity) are entry points of the two types of logics. The interpretation here is more or less abstract. It can be recognized that in one concrete decision-making situation there may be both correlative thinking and rational thinking.

Second, I compare how a **rational actor** makes decisions with how a **correlative actor** within a **focus and field** model[96] does. A rational actor tends to make short-term and small-scale decisions for maximizing his/her interests as final goals of economy, politics, and social life, minimizing his/her costs at the same time, after considering facts available, alternative choices, possible gains

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[95] This discussion is based on personal communication with Roger Ames.
[96]   What David Hall and Roger Ames refer to as a "focus and field" model is a model in which an individual is considered as relative rather than absolute, that is, as within a network of relationships that can change fundamentally as well as superficially. The self as a focus is on "correlativity" or interrelatedness, interdependence, appropriateness.
See Hall, David L., Roger T. Ames, and Confucius. Thinking through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, p.237.

and losses, and also weighing benefits and costs, and opportunities and risks. Rational choices model is consistent with individualism and utilitarianism, associated with dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such as human nature, autonomy, equality, and freedom. It can be argued that corporations and even national government are extended concepts of the individual. As shown in Table 10 in Chapter 5, according to international relations theories, methods for nation-state in anarchy to maximize national interests are mainly collective security/mutual assistance, balance of power, self-help, and institution–cooperative interaction *between states*, and so on.

As a **correlative actor**, a person envisions him/herself in their multiplicity of relations and roles they live, their organizational contexts, and their larger significance in the natural and human environment. There are a numerous ancient Chinese texts showing the importance of changing circumstances on human actions. For example, "The key and defining idea in *Sun-tze: The Art of Warfare* is **shi**: manipulating circumstances to create a strategic advantage as an alternative to the commitment of brute force."[97] Therefore and furthermore, actions are expected to be properly and particularly situated within roles and relations, pursuing for appropriateness fitting within the specific circumstances, as time changes and as circumstance varies. He/she must be prepared for the art of contextualizing and take full account of qu-shi (long-term tendency and large-scale context, correlating with short-term and small-scale facts available). A never-ending environmental scanning to identify contingencies, correlations and correspondences as well as coherence and processes, and constant adjustments to the whole environment are required especially in a globalized era full of uncertainties.

In other words, quantitatively, a **correlative actor**'s decisions might be thus longer-term and

[97] See Sun, Bin, D. C. Lau, and Roger T. Ames. *Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare: A Translation of the Classic Chinese Work of Philosophy and Strategy*, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003, p. 86.

larger-scale, as compared with what a typical rational actor makes[98]; and qualitatively, the actions are required to be **appropriate** (*yi*), which means **doing what is fitting in a proper and in a fitting manner**, given the specific **situation**. Within a tradition in which person is irreducibly social, and the "I" and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing,[99] a correlative actor thus is required to accommodate the **interests of all concerned**, rather than being **only self-interested** (*li*) , and at the same time required to take into account of **both means and ends**. That is to say, **appropriateness and self-interest** are considered as correlative polar *yin* and *yang*, similar to the cases of **means** and **ends**, or collectivism and individualism. **Appropriate interest** (*yi−li,* balance between appropriateness and self-interest), or **mutualism** (balance between collectivism and individualism) are valuable in the Chinese model of decision-making. It is widely accepted that Chinese people tend to consider both inseparable sides of *yin* and *yang* and take a balanced way (*zhong*) in order to pursuit holistic **harmony** (*he*).

2.2 Internal Relations/External Relations

For purposes of exposition it may be useful to draw such a sharp contrast, because there is the advantage for exposition purposes to contrast extreme forms of correlative vs. rational decision making as two "actor models." These actor models are used as shorthand for making clear the differences in terms of their theoretical and practical implications.

The differences between correlativity and rationality could be approximately interpreted through the doctrines of internal and external relations, which have been discussed in detail by Thomas P. Kasulis.[100] Internal relations are always holistic and thus inclusive of context; external

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[98] When I made such a comparison in terms of term and scale, I was inspired by Richard Chadwick's article (when it was a working paper) on "Fraud and Deceit, or a Failure of American Political and Social Sciences: Towards a Theory About the Impact of Banking on the Rise and Fall of Civilizations," in International Relations and Diplomacy, October 2014, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.639-54.

[99] See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p. 84.

[100] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002.

relations are often reductionistic, and thus limited in context. The pervasiveness of substance

ontology that goes back to Aristotle gives privilege to a imaged world of "nouns" or "objects" that

are externally related. The doctrine of internal relation compared with external relation is constructed

by comparative philosophers such as Thomas P. Kasulis in order to remind Westerners of the very

possibility of another ideology of human relations, and its influence over some other cultural

traditions. Before such academic efforts to indicate cultural disparities, human beings are fictionally

viewed as isolated atomistic and discrete individuals, and it has been taken for granted that

individuals can only be related extrinsically. It is the same with rationalistic paradigm dominant in

traditional orientations in theorizing inter"national" relations or constructing inter"national" relations

theory (as shown in Table 9 in Chapter 5). As Kasulis points out, "If we could…focus on what is not

normally emphasized in our culture, we might be able to attain quite suddenly a glimpse into the

other culture."[101]

Then what is the concrete meaning of internal relationship to replace external relationship?

According to Thomas Kasulis holding internal relationship in esteem, there are many examples[102]:

Engagement and compassion may replace detachment and charity. Interconnectedness may replace

autonomy. Situational responsiveness may replace dogmas of responsibility.[103] The common ground

shared among adversaries may be even discovered. Overlapping and interdependent identities may

be paid much more attentions to because the success of one is considered as interdependent with all

others. "Think globally; act locally" may be replaced by "think locally; act globally" since the universal

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[101] See Ibid, p.22.

[102] See Kasulis, Thomas P., "The Mosaic and the Jigsaw Puzzle：How It All Fits Together" in ed. Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock, *Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press and East-West Philosophers' Conference, 2015, p. 47.

[103] According to Kasulis's observations, "in very general terms, Japanese tend to raise their children to be responsive (coordinating oneself to the behavior and concerns of others), Americans to be responsible (to act freely within defined limits); the Japanese to be situational, the Americans to be rule-governed; the Japanese to value an affective intuition, the Americans to value cognitive "objectivity"; and so forth. See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.4.

model for what is best for everyone everywhere must be replaced by true engagement involving listening and learning and encouraging localized creativity and innovation instead of the application of a preconceived master plan.

Moreover, the corresponding two ways of thinking might be rational thinking and correlative thinking. The corresponding two notions of power might be unilateral power and relational power. Thereafter, the corresponding two ways of gaming might be infinite game and finite game[104](as shown in the following tables). Of course, there are also two distinctive types of "security" concepts. In other words, Confucius doesn't see human struggle in terms of winners and losers but rather in terms that transcend the conflict. This goes beyond the "either-or, neither-nor, both-and" logics (as shown in the following tables). In practice, a correlative approach might ask, for example, how can we arrange our affairs so that the basic needs we all have in common, can be achieved through *cooperative* competition, or competitive cooperation, rather than *adversarial* competition, *or conflict*?

To be specific, the relatedness defining of the Confucian worldview is intrinsic and constitutive (correlation), instead of extrinsic as shown in a world of substances. Namely, Chinese "guanxi" is a notion of internal relation. "The readers should expect to find in classical Chinese texts a more **relational** focus; not a concern to describe how things are in themselves, but how they stand in relation to something else at particular times."[105] **Correlation** is diagrammed by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr.[106] as:

[104] See Carse, James P. *Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1987.

[105] See Confucius, Roger T. Ames, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.. *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. 1st trade pbk. ed, Classics of Ancient China. New York: Ballantine Books, 1999, p.23.

[106] See ibid, p.24.

Figure 2: Internal Relation (Correlation)
Source: Cf. Kasulis, op. cit, p.37 and p.59.

As Figure 2 shows, the internal relation is part of the relatents (both A and B) themselves. In an internal relation, the relatents are interdependent instead of independent. For example, "my intimate relations (internal rather than external) are more than connections I have made; they are actually part of what I am or have become."[107] That is to say, my roles and relations are constitutive (correlation).

By contrast, in an external relation, the relatents exist independently. "In a (imaged) world of substances, people or things are related extrinsically, so that when the relationship between them is dissolved, they are remaindered intact."[108] The extrinsic relatedness can be represented as follows, since an external relationship maintains the space between the relatents even as it bridges the gap between them.

Figure 3: External Relation
Source: Cf. Kasulis, op. cit, p.37 and p.59.

Discreteness (individuality) can be represented as follows in Figure 4. Human beings are fictionally viewed as isolated atomistic and discrete entities. Individual A and individual B have no

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[107] See ibid, p.37.
[108] See Confucius, Ames, and Rosemont, op. cit., p.24.

relations. For example, John and David each have a soul, and thus have individual autonomy. They can only be externally connected through contracts or principles of responsibilities and rights. Within this contractarian ideology, procedure and retribution play a definitive role in the artificial construct of human community. Therefore, with the erasure of the connecting line between A and B, each A and B exists as an unbroken and inviolate whole. To dissolve the external relationship (in Figure 3) would merely disconnect A and B, while "to dissolve an internal relationship would not merely disconnect them; it would actually transform an aspect of the relatents themselves."[109]

Figure 4: Discreteness (Individuality)

Further, it is also necessary to illustrate conceptions of "power" and "competition" when we discuss about international relations. According to Bernard Loomer, a process philosopher and theologian, "unilateral power (as compared with relational power[110]) is the capacity to influence another, to control or manipulate the human or natural environment, in order to realize one's purpose. This is the conception of power that has dominated western thought and practice from the beginning. Science is the hand-maid of this kind of power." [111] Therefore, the unilateral power or rational thinking (one-dimensional, linear, and single-track) can be represented as:

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[109] See Kasulis, op. cit., p.37 and p.59.
[110] "Two conceptions of power are defined, analyzed, compared and evaluated....Relational power, which involves the capacity both to influence and to be influenced, is the ability to sustain an internal relation." See Loomer, Bernard, "Two Conceptions of Power," Criterion 15, no.1 (Winter 1976), pp.7-29.
[111] See ibid. As Mesle's comments, "'Unilateral power' is a label applied to that traditional vision by the process philosopher and theologian Bernard Loomer." See Mesle, C. Robert. Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead. West Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008, p.66.

Figure 5: Unilateral Power or Rational Thinking

And then "competitiveness" can be thus represented as:

Figure 6: Competitiveness

Competition (for individual selfish ends, an external relation between individuals) is not in the dictionary of Confucian philosophy (less favorable to competition) emphasizing internal relation and infinite game, though today's China has to use the US's language of "competitive cooperation" or "cooperative competition," and "win-win" or "all win" to dialogue with the USA. Otherwise, the government of the latter may not be able to understand China normally assumed as a rising power. The Chinese indigenous discourse is "friendship first, contest secondary" (see **Table 5**, **Chapter 1**), which is very much close to infinite game. That is to say, competition is not highly regarded as human behaviors and psychological tendencies. Individual heroism deserves critique, since individual is not an ultimate end. This intellectual tradition based upon correlative worldview and correlative thinking has more or less become certain psychological factors in Chinese culture such as: Individual ends are inseparable from community; Harmony with nature and community is one's

first priority; A loss is sometimes happiness (seek one's spiritual happiness); Individual yielding,

modesty, tolerance, considerateness, and even self-sacrificing in helping the weak out of sympathy

are encouraged in order to cultivate harmony; No first attack, no retaliation; Never adopt first strike;

no drive of expansion of territories and cultural bounds by "national interest"; Invasions out of

nationalism would not be considered as glorious.

Table 6: Comparisons between Rationality and Correlativity through the Doctrines of Internal and External Relations

Characteristic	Rationality	Correlativity
form of Relationship[112]	**external relation**	**internal relation**
entry point of theory	individuality (discreteness): identity in isolation	relationality (continuity):identity in roles and relations
way of thinking	rational thinking	correlative thinking
type of power[113]	**unilateral power**: one way;competitive;coercive; hierarchical;closed;cultural	**relational power:** mutual relationship;multi-way; creative co-creativity; not competitive; non-coercive; non-hierarchical;open;ecological
ethical relation[114]	**ethical external relation**: universal principles or maxims/ rights and "responsibilities"	**ethical internal relation**: situational "responsiveness" within roles and relations
type of trust[115]	trust that each negotiator is **responsible** for abiding by the **contract** and will keep to their **promises** in upholding the **agreements**	Based on our overlaps, trusting my colleagues to be **responsive** more than responsible: understanding and incorporating my **intimations** into their own selves, or making my interest into our interests. Anyone's suffering is our suffering.
type of achieving global cooperation[116]	rules, **contracts**(such as trade agreements), sanctions/ responsibility and rights/ **compromise** (**contract**) bridging opposing poles	building a **consensus** (**collective perception**) as inherently shared viewpoints and **feelings** out of the overlap of opposites, leading to a strong sense of **common purpose**; "Something explicit is said only after the internally related sensing of common ground is completed."[117]
type of security concept	dualistic, independent, autonomous, atomic, unilateral, universal, static	correlative, collateral, constitutive, holographic, relational, situational, dynamic

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[112] Kasulis, op. cit., p.71.
[113] I cite, paraphrase, and summarize Robert Mesle's descriptions of "unilateral power" and "relational power." See pp.65-78. Mesle, op. cit, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
[114] Kasulis, op. cit., p.132.
[115] Kasulis, op. cit., pp.130-1.
[116] Kasulis, op. cit., p.132.
[117] Kasulis, op. cit., p.131.

Characteristic	Rationality	Correlativity
type of game[118]	**Finite game** is played in order to be won when they end. The purpose of play is to arrive at a decisive conclusion about triumph and defeat. Finite games include chess, or traditional wars, or any contest in which opponents understand the rules and agree on a winner and loser. Finite games may offer wealth and status, **power** and glory. The boundaries of contest -- date, place, and membership -- of each finite game are externally defined. The rules of a finite game are the contractual terms by which the players can agree who has won. The rules must be published before play, and the players must agree to them before the beginning of the play.	**Infinite game** is played for the purpose of continuing the play and bringing as many people as possible into the play. The rules, boundaries and participants may change, as long as the game keeps going, never allowed to come to an end. The rules are changed when the players of an infinite game agree that the play is imperiled by a finite outcome--that is, the victory of some players and the defeat of others. Infinite players regard their wins and losses in whatever finite games they play as but moments **within a larger field of continuing play that extends beyond the finite game.** That is, infinite games offer something far more subtle and far grander, because the goal is to keep everybody in play. What is your future, and mine, becomes ours. We prepare each other for co-creative surprise. A finite player seeks power; the infinite one displays self-sufficient strength. Infinite Game is not bounded by time, space, or eligibility. Infinite games are internally defined, because each play of an infinite game eliminates boundaries, it **opens to players** a new horizon of time. Finite players play **within externally defined** boundaries, while infinite players play **with internally or co-creatively defined** boundaries.
Type of harmony[119]	harmony of order externally imposed harmony with conformity: dichotomy of a single-ordered world and anarchy/ "Think globally; act locally."	harmony of better relations harmonization with auto-creative tensions and not without differences and diversities: a self-so-ing process/ "Think locally; act globally."

2.3 "Human Tendency": Thinking about Human Nature in a Correlative Way

Based upon Roger Ames's philosophical comparison between Mencius (372-289 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE), I take "human tendency" as an example to illustrate correlative understanding of"human nature." Correlative thinking in theorizing "person" precludes all dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such as self/other, identity, human nature . . . In Chinese

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[118] I paraphrase and summarize James Carse's descriptions of "finite game" and "infinite game." See Carse, James P. *Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1987.
[119] More details about harmony will be provided in Chapter 5 and 6.

processual cosmology (rather than substance ontology), correlative thinking appeals to *renxing* 人性 (human tendency)—an expression usually rendered "human nature" that is at the center of a debate that begins at least as early as Mencius and that continues down to the present day in such contemporary philosophers as Tang Junyi (1909-1978) and Mou Zongsan (1909-1995). This paragraph compares Chinese and Western traditions in order to answer: what does Mencius mean by *renxing* and how does it differ from an Aristotelian account of "human nature" (Aristotle's issue of "potentiality" *dunamis*)? This processual understanding of human nature is the foundation of Confucian human cultivation as discussed in the next paragraph, and also my starting point of sage-*tianxia*-harmony connectional framework in Chapter 5.

(1)Mencian *renxing* (human tendency) vs. human nature

Roger Ames wrote articles like "The Mencian Conception of renxing 人性：Does it Mean 'Human Nature'?"[120] and "What Ever Happened to Wisdom? Mencius and 'human becomings,'"[121] and book chapters like "Mencius and a Process Notion of Human Nature,"[122] focusing on questions about Mencian renxing and the ways of translation of renxing into English. He also deals with such questions in books such as Confucian Role Ethics: a Vocabulary[123] and *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture.*[124] I try to summarize his arguments on Mencian *xing* according to the above mentioned works as follows,

First, *xing* comes closer to "**character**," "**personality**", or "**constitution**" than what was generally understood by "nature". Thus Roger Ames uses the **Romanization** *xing* rather than any

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[120] Ames, Roger T. "The Mencian Conception of Ren xing 人性: Does it Mean 'Human Nature'?" In *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham*, ed.Henry Rosemont, Jr., La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company), 1991, pp.143-75.

[121] Asia Major, third series, volume XXI, part I, 2008, pp.45-68.

[122] Ames, Roger T. "Mencius and a Process Notion of Human Nature," in *Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations*, ed. Alan K. L. Chan, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002, pp.72-90.

[123] University of Hawaii Press, 2011.

[124] Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. *Thinking Through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York, 1987.

English equivalent. The prevailing interpretations of *xing* as "**nature**" have been inappropriately skewed in favor of what is continuous, general, and enduring about the human being at the expense of what is novel, particular, and creatively achieved. The interpretative prejudice has stressed an ahistorical "**given**."

Second, Mencian construal of *xing* as an **achievement** led to **cultural elitism**, one of the defining characteristics of classical Confucianism. For Mencius, an undeveloped human being, someone who is resolutely uneducated and uncultured is a beast, other than in any important sense "human."

Third, *xing* defined as an achievement means that "humanity" is open to profound re-visioning. In the Chinese classical tradition, there is a presupposition concerning the profound educability and createability of the human being, as is witnessed in its commitment to education and re-education with **more flexibility** and a more **creative** range.

Fourth, *xing* is the signature of participatory and contributory membership in a culturally informed **community**. The effects of environment upon one's humanity would be profound and inescapable. Success or failure in the project of becoming human would largely be a function of the quality of one's social background.

Six, in the classical Confucian tradition, this construal of *xing* as the coordination of one's unique defining conditions into some optimal relational harmony accounts for the familiar **correlativity** of the personal, social, political, and also cosmic order.

In a clearer way, Roger Ames summarizes his arguments on xing into eight points.[125] Xing is:

(a) a dynamic process which covers initial dispositions, growth, and ultimate demise;
(b) holistic, inclusive of both those psychical and physical conditions which are distinctly human;

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[125] Ames, Roger T. "The Mencian Conception of Renxing 人性: Does it Mean 'Human Nature'?" in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr., La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1991, p.165.

(c) describable in genetic terms as an emergent order which, from initial "stirrings," is cultivated by appeal to historical models to constitute oneself through enculturation as the center of a centripetal field of unique, particular, and concrete circumstances;

(d) describable in morphological terms as a relationally defined matrix of conditions;

(e) an achieved order which pursues a harmony defined through the maximization of the participating conditions;

(f) an "inspirational" rather than "aspirational" process involving an appeal to the achieved quality of historical models rather than the realization of abstract ideals or principles, and hence characterizable more in terms of "poetic" than practical or theoretical production;

(g) correlative with sociopolitical and ultimately, cosmic order;

(h) generalizable (like a surname), to identify the participation and contribution of a group of similar particulars.

(2) Aristotle's notions of actuality and potentiality

In *Metaphysics* Æ, Aristotle[126] introduces the distinction between matter and form and he connects the matter/form distinction to another key distinction that between potentiality (*dunamis*) and actuality (*entelecheia* or *energeia*). Further, Aristotle distinguishes between two different senses of the term *dunamis*. In the first sense, a *dunamis* is the *power* that a thing has to produce a change. A thing has a *dunamis* in this sense when it has within it a source of change in something else. In the second sense of *dunamis*—and it is the one in which Aristotle is mainly interested—that is conventionally translated as "potentiality." In this sense *dunamis* is related not to actuality (*energeia*). A *dunamis* in this sense is not a thing's power to produce a change but rather its capacity to be in a different and more completed state.

As he gives form priority over matter, Aristotle similarly gives actuality priority over potentiality. He argues for the priority in substance of actuality over potentiality in two ways: (a) Aristotle argues that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality. Nothing that is eternal can exist only potentially—what is eternal must be fully actual. The eternal is prior in substance to the perishable and the eternal can exist without the perishable. (b) Aristotle makes use of his notion of final causality. Things come

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[126] Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics (first published sun oct 8, 2000; substantive revision mon jun 11, 2012). See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#subcaubei

to be moved toward an end (*telos*). The actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired. Form or actuality is the end toward which natural processes are directed. Actuality is therefore a cause in more than one sense of a thing's realizing its potential. One and the same thing may be the final, formal, and efficient cause of another.

(3) After Aristotelian potentiality: human becomings and human cultivation

There is a tendency of translation to reduce *xing* to what is "given" like "nature." However, it is necessary to save the notion of "person" from an essentialist understanding of discrete "human beings." That is, *xing* cannot be reducible to what is innate and the Confucian notion of relationally constituted "human becomings" can take place of "human beings." Unfortunately, there are numerous problematic examples of *xing* being used as "starting conditions." For example, Zhang Dainian suggests that "since the sage is also a man, the *xing* that the sage has is the *xing* that all people have."[127] However, as Roger Ames critically points out,[128] the assumption here is that *xing* like *xin* (heart and mind) is a given **potential** shared by all and that the sage is simply one who successfully **actualizes** it.

As Roger Ames critically points out,[129] the application of Aristotelian potentiality/actuality distinction is **inappropriate** to theorizing human cultivation in Confucian philosophy. Such a dualistic potentiality/actuality distinction is fundamentally progressive, entailing an efficient, a formal, a final cause, and even a steady advance toward a predetermined perfection according to progressionist theories. Behind such a distinction of potentiality/actuality, there are cosmogonies

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[127] Ames, op. cit., p.165.
[128] Ames, Roger T.,*Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p.150.
[129] Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p.191.

entailing a Creator/creature dualism, making the human being the product rather than the producer.[130]

By contrast, the Mencian *xing* cannot be understood by appeal to systemic teleological models which appear to be goal-directed and thus teleological. Unlike teleology introduces a goal, decontextualizing and dehistoricizing the process, the Confucian model of humanity with more flexibility and creative range is correlative with sociopolitical order, free of any definite and specified goals. This model of "**becoming human**" is on the basis of an acosmotic tradition with a manner "in which it renders unnecessary any recourse to notions such as 'Being' or 'essence,'" and "the things of the world do not require a hierarchy of beings or essences in accordance with which they may be said to form a coherent cosmos."[131]

Conversely, the social processes in which persons are created are ignored by Aristotelian potentiality/actuality distinction. The creation of a person may be not just as simple as the growth of a seed into a plant, as sometime understood. At least, "the 'potential' for becoming human is not simply the first inklings, something inborn 'within' the person that is exclusive of family relations."[132] As Dewey points out, "persons are incomplete without a social component and develop into what they are —— individual members of groups, socially grounded selves——in the ongoing process of living in a social environment."[133] And Dewey also ushers in Lincoln as a metaphor: "Lincoln is not Lincoln independent of the circumstances of history, nor are the circumstances of history the making of Lincoln. Indeed, Lincoln is a collaboration between person and circumstances expressed as those thick habits of conduct with whom Lincoln is identified."[134]

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[130] Ibid, p.190.
[131]   Ibid, pp.194-5.
[132] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.155.
[133] Ibid, p.150. Cf. Campbell, James. Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1995, p.40.
[134] Ibid, p. 295. Cf. Dewey, John. The Essential Dewey. Vol.1, Pragmatism, Education, and Democracy, ed. Larry Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp. 223-4.

2.4 Human tendency, Human Cultivation, and Confucian Theory

This chapter compares Chinese and Western conceptional traditions of "human nature," i.e. human tendency vs. human nature. As a philosophical presupposition, traditional Western political thoughts (even before the Enlightenment) have often held that human nature is essentially self-serving and ruthless, and man is innately bad,[135] so that in the Western traditional theories there were less attention paid to notions such as human self-cultivation, social exemplary roles, and relational moral power as Chinese philosophy did.

To the contrary, in the Chinese tradition, *xing* is viewed as a pluralistic and dynamic human tendency, which leaves the similar sort of flexibility in human behavior and thinking as constructivists do in comparison with classical and neoclassical realists. Chinese conception of "human being" is actually "human becoming" in roles and relations; thus it contains possibilities of moral cultivation from xiaoren (petty person) to *junzi* (exemplary person as the role model for social interactions) to *shengren* (sage, top of *junzi*). Individuals as foci are viewed within fields of human relations as small as a family, and as big and extensive as an entire society, or *tianxia*. From the perspective of Confucian role ethics, individuality is relationally understood as an accomplishment: becoming distinguished in roles and relations.

Further, the typical Confucian scenario of the world is *tianxia* governed by worthies and sages, who are required to be moral examples with their relational moral power (*dao*, *de*, *quan* and *shi* as discussed in Chapter 3). A ruler has to be a morally distinguished leader through self-cultivation in the social environment wherein all people pursuit moral self-cultivation. The actions of rulers are required to be appropriate (*yi*), accommodating the interests of all concerned, rather than being only

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[135] Even though some thoughts of liberalism hold that human nature is essentially good and individuals are rational human beings.

self-interested (*li*). The harmonization of *tianxia* not only depends on moral cultivations of all humans, but also depends on exemplary roles of big countries or rulers above all. Even though we are still surrounded with international power politics today, we still need have more positive beliefs in "human nature" and therefore pay more attention to human moral cultivations.

On the basis of the above-mentioned conceptions of human tendency (a processual understanding of human nature), I will discuss about Confucian relational moral power (associated with Confucian human moral cultivation) in the next paragraph, and further develop in the following chapters my basic model of sage-*tianxia*-harmony connectional framework as shown in Table 8 and 6.1.

CHAPTER 3: A CHINESE VOCABULARY: POWER AND SECURITY

In this chapter, I compare and contrast the concepts of Western Realist School of International Relations with their counterparts within ancient Chinese philosophy as articulated in the *Yijing* for the construction of my new Chinese theory. In order to construct my Confucian theory in the following chapters, it is necessary to comparatively interpret a Chinese vocabulary consisting of correlative terms such as *li* (理), *huxi* (互系 correlativity), *de* (德), *quan* (权), and *shi* (势), and *an* (安), besides *renxing* (人性 human tendency) and its associated discussion about human cultivation in Chapter 2.

First, I compare the world views and ways of thinking behind the Western "Realist School" of International Relations and ancient Chinese philosophy. Second, I compare and contrast four Realist IR concepts of "reason," "rationality," "power," and "security" with its Chinese counterparts based on comparisons between two types of world views and ways of thinking. Last, I try to make a short summary about the significance of the identified differences or similarities for the construction of my theory, as I put Chinese terms of *li*, *huxi*, *de*, *quan*, *shi*, and *an* back into my entire theoretical formulation. See Figure 7 as follows,

Figure 7: Basic Structure of Comparisons and Contrasts of Terms

3. 1 Discussions on World Views, Ways of Thinking and Loci of Authority

As to why I start from discussion about two different world views, ways of thinking and loci of authority (Table 5 in Chapter 1) behind the Western "Realist School" of International Relations and ancient Chinese philosophy as articulated in the *Yijing*, I would like first to refer to what Roger Ames did ahead of his philosophical translations of numerous Chinese ancient texts such as *the Analects of Confucius*, *Dao De Jing*, Sun-Tzu's *Art of War*, and Sun Bin's *Art of Warfare*.

For example, when Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. translate the Analects of Confucius, they first attempt to describe for English readers the world as experienced by the ancient Chinese, in order to avoid cultural **reductionism** appearing in numerous translations of Chinese texts into English, which may be even more dangerous than making cultural generalizations, since underlying the grammar of the contemporary English language is a rather different "world" as they claim. To say this, they focus on different ***presuppositions*** underling discourses about the world, about beliefs, and

about attitudes, rather than trees, birds and mountains, and most everything else in China, which do not differ radically from their counterparts in the West, or concrete or specific beliefs and attitudes which may have counterparts in other cultures.

As Roger Ames and Henry Jr. Rosemont claim, "English (and other Indo-European languages) is basically *substantive* and *essentialistic*, whereas classical Chinese should be seen more as an *eventful* language."[136] And "the readers should expect to find in classical Chinese texts a more **relational** focus; not a concern to describe how things are in themselves, but how they stand in relation to something else at particular times." [137] The relatedness defining of the Confucian worldview is intrinsic and constitutive (correlation), instead of extrinsic as shown in a world of substances. **Correlation** is diagrammed by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr.[138] as shown by Figure 2 in Chapter 2. By contrast, the extrinsic relatedness can be represented by Figure 4 in Chapter 2.

Then the readers can find the point, generalized as follows: "no-thing and no-body has an *essence*," but is "temporally contextualized" and "can be defined only 'correlationally, at any given time, with differing relations holding at other times."[139] This point also implies in what way we can **define** Chinese terms such as *li* (理), *huxi* (互系 correlativity), *de* (德), *shi* (势) ,*quan* (权), and *an* (安) in the *Yijing*.

Moreover, given the space of this dissertation, I would like to use **Table 5** in **Chapter 1** to show two world views, ways of thinking and loci of authority in a more concise and clear way. And more detailed discussion and explanation about philosophical background behind Chinese and Western

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[136] See Confucius, Roger T. Ames, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.. *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. 1st trade pbk. ed, Classics of Ancient China. New York: Ballantine Books, 1999, p.20.
[137] Ibid, p.23.
[138] Ibid, p.24.
[139] Ibid, p.25.

theories can be found in the following chapters.

3.2 Discussions on Two Clusters of Concepts or Terms

Based on discussions about the world views and ways of thinking behind two clusters of concepts or terms, I will try to compare and contrast Realist IR concepts of "reason," "rationality," "power," and "security" correspondingly with Chinese terms of *li* (理), *huxi* (互系 correlativity), *de* (德), *shi* (势), *quan* (权), and *an* (安) in the *Yijing*. I prefer to discuss about "rationality" and *huxi* (互系 correlativity) ahead of others.

(1) Rationality and *Huxi* (互系 Correlativity)

Rationality is one of the most important concepts within Western IR theory, while at the same time, *huxi* (互系 correlativity) is the central term within my Chinese Global Process-Relational Theory. Considering that both rationality and correlativity have many different meanings or indications throughout history,[140] I provided my definitions of rationality and correlativity in Chapter 2 and I discuss about them from only three perspectives: my study is an experimental project providing a comparative study of rationality mainly referring to rational thinking (way of thinking), rational choices model in foreign policy decision-making (way of acting), and rationalism as a major paradigm in the construction of Realist IR Theory (way of understanding). I compare rationality with correlativity mainly referring to correlative thinking, "correlative" choices theory, and "correlativism" as a Chinese paradigm in my construction of Global Process-Relational Theory. As indicated above, rationality mainly refers to a way of thinking, a way of acting, and a way of understanding within the Anglo-European/ Indo-European tradition, originating from ancient Greek Cosmology. It should be noted that the philosophy of rationalism that Morgenthau criticized in his books has nothing to do with the rationalism which I am working on. The following are excerpts

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[140] About different meanings of rationality, also see Table 4 in the Introduction.

from Michael Williams on Morgenthau, and Morgenthau himself in different publications, to show

the consistency of Morgenthau's logic:

> The philosophy of rationalism that Morgenthau criticized in his books distinguishingly and specifically refers to "an 'historical optimism' that was rooted in the belief that human beings could always master any problem, thanks to their capacity for rationality"[141]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> or the belief held by liberalism "in the limitless power of scientific formula" for peace in politics.[142]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> And it is named by Morgenthau as "scientific utopianism" for his lack of a better term.[143]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> To be concrete, it is a "combination of rationalistic philosophy and the moral, intellectual, and political needs of the rising middle classes."[144]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> As Morgenthau points out, according to such rationalism, "since all men partake of reason, they must sooner or later meet on that common ground, discovering that their conflicts are apparent rather than real and can all be solved by a rational formula acceptable to all."[145]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> Furthermore, "this philosophy recognizes only two forces determining the historic process: reason, and unreason as its counterpart."[146]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> Therefore, "Conflicts among nations are due… to maladjustments arising from lack of understanding and to the influence of political passions. Except for ignorance and emotion, reason would solve international conflicts as easily and as rationally as it has solved so many problems in the natural sciences." [147]
> ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
> Moreover, as Morgenthau criticizes, the contemporary utopians "superimpose upon a recalcitrant reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the desire for thorough rationalization."[148]

However, based upon discussions about *presuppositions* underling discourses about the world, about

beliefs, and about attitudes, first, I would like to discuss about the two ways of thinking: Originating

from ancient Greek Cosmology and appearing in a **pervasive** manner in the Western Realist IR

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[141] See Williams, Michael C. Realism *Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.124.
[142] See Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973, p.51.
[143]   See ibid, p.43.
[144] See Morgenthau, Hans. Scientific Man vs Power Politics. University of Chicago Press, 1946, p.19.
[145] See Morgenthau, op. cit., pp.43-4.
[146] See Morgenthau, op. cit., p.38.
[147] See Morgenthau, op. cit., p.44.
[148] See Morgenthau, Hans. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade.1960-70. Praeger, 1970, p.243.

theory, **rational thinking** is a modality of basically linear and single-track causal thinking about *extrinsic* relatedness of things, while **correlative thinking** is a *holistic* modality of multilevel, multidimensional, multifold, and multicategory thinking about *intrinsic* and *constitutive* relatedness of events within process, formulated in Chinese ancient philosophical literature such as the *Yijing*.

Second, although Morgenthau criticizes the specified "rationalism"(an offshoot of liberal progressivism in the academy[149]), realists and most policymakers begin with the **rational choices** model, in which foreign policy is conceived of actions chosen by the national government (assumed as unitary state actor) that maximize its interests, as I indicated and compared with "**correlative**" **choices** model aiming at **situational appropriateness** and harmony not without differences (with an historical example of Chinese ancient Admiral Zheng He) in Chapter 5.

Third, Morgenthau and other realist school theorists take a **rationalist paradigm** for theoretical constructions. Their research on rational actor (in a nation-state-centric international system) is in favor of objective facts available, seeking essential meanings through definitions and causal logic. For example, the first one of Hans Morgenthau's famous six principles of political realism is: "Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in **human nature**, which is unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop **a rational theory** that reflects these objective laws."[150] I have discussed about the essential meanings of "human nature" and also compare it with *xing* from the perspective of Chinese correlative philosophy in Chapter 2. Human nature "as a psychobiological starting point" in Realist IR theory is "an internalized, universal, and objectifiable notion of human being" in contrast with *xing* as a historically, culturally, and socially

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[149] See Williams, Michael C. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.119.
[150] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973, pp. 4-15.

emergent definition"[151] of socially related person in Chinese correlative philosophy. "Correlativism" serves as a Chinese paradigm in my construction of Global Process-Relational Theory. A **holographic** understanding of *tianxia*, a world system of all **human becomings** ("processual" human beings) will be provided in my Global Process-Relational Theory.

(2) Reason and *Li* (理, 理性)

Although reason and *li* (理，理性) is often simply translated into each other, appeals to *li* in Chinese correlative philosophy always presuppose an art of contextualization, which is not consistent with the strict logos style of reasoning. As Tian Chenshan put it, "In the lack of an ontological mode of thinking, the act of understanding and articulating the *dao* (ways of correlation) of things cannot have an ontological reference."[152] Moreover, *li* is "performed with continuity between things, as time changes and as circumstance varies, and takes into account of the appropriateness of both means and ends."[153] In other words, *li* does not have the same meaning of "reason" and perhaps means (situational) **appropriateness** of behaviors in Chinese. People are required or expected to behave **according with *li*** (*heli* 合理).

(3) *De* 德, *Quan* 权, and *Shi* 势 (Confucian Relational Moral Power)

According to Mingst, "States are critical actors because they have power, which is the ability not only to influence others but to control outcomes so as to produce results that would not have occurred naturally." And "to realists," power is "the means by which international actors deal with each other."[154] In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes presented one of the first systematic definitions of human power. He wrote: "The Power of a Man, (to take it Universally) is his present means, to

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[151] Ames, Roger T., 1991: "The Mencian Conception of Ren xing 人性: Does it Mean 'Human Nature'？" in *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham*, ed.Henry Rosemont, Jr.. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, p.143.

[152] See Tian, Chenshan. *Chinese dialectics: from Yijing to Marxism*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005, p.175.

[153] Ibid.

[154] See Mingst, Karen *A. Essentials of International Relations*. 3rd ed. New York: Norton, 2004, p.108.

obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Original, or Instrumental."[155]

The third one of Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism is: "Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid ... Power is the control of man over man."[156] Morgenthau even argues that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim."[157]

I attempt to summarize the above mentioned three definitions into three points: first, national power is the means of nation-states as rational actors like autonomous individuals; second, power relationship is basically causal, linear, single-track, and extrinsic; third, power is essentially competing and contradictory, the same as international politics shaped by such conceptions of power. In sum, we can find a strong sense of **rational thinking** behind each concepts of power.

Confucianism is not very much interested in concrete "means" (called *qi* 器. *Qi* and *dao* 道 are within a *yin-yang* polarity. And *dao* seems more interesting to Chinese traditional scholars.) so that it may be hard to find a single and accurate word (with abstract or essential meaning, the same as what happening in a tradition of **rationality**) as a counterpart of "power" in Chinese correlative culture, if we are on the alert for cultural reductionism. Within Chinese correlative philosophy, we may only find a cluster of **correlative** or **processual** terms like *de* 德, *quan* 权, and *shi* 势, perhaps relevant to "influence" (not necessarily "power" as Morgenthau argues[158]). It may be argued that poststructuralist theorists like Foucault tend to think like Chinese: Foucault does not locate power in decision-making individuals or institutions. For him, the idea that power is the ability of A to direct

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[155] See Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.62.
[156] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973, pp. 4-15.
[157] Ibid, p. 31.
[158] Ibid, p. 33.

the action of B is too impoverished an account of what he sees as the multidirectional nature of power." Power does not operate in only a top-down manner and necessarily linked to domination.[159]

The term *de* 德 (most often simply translated as "virtue") carries the senses of "excellence," "potency," or "power," and also refers to "favor" or "bounty" extended outward, and further, the gratitude it evokes as a response.[160] Therefore, *de* is an example of Chinese-style **relational** power, which "describes the most appropriate relationship."[161] In other words, like most of Chinese terms, *de* needs to be viewed as a polarity of *yin* and *yang.* Said another way, *de* encompasses both determining agency and its effects since it constitutes social patterns of both excellence and deference. On this basis, David Hall, and Roger Ames suggests "virtuality" in the archaic sense of "having inherent virtue or power to produce effects" as their working translation of *de*.[162]

According to D. C. Lau and Roger Ames,[163] the term *quan* 权 (conventionally translated as "power," "command power," and "authority" literally), means "weighing with the lever scales." *Quan* is **dynamic** and **situational** rather than agent-centered so that *quan* is the action of decision makers' weighing a situation before making the decision, adapting to exceptional circumstances.

The term *shi* 势 (conventionally translated as "power," or "force") is not limited to the specific parties in a dispute. *Shi* is defined as "manipulating circumstances to create a strategic advantage as an alternative to the commitment of brute force."[164] It is a **holistic** "force of circumstances."[165] The classical Chinese language tends to locate an action (focus) within a situation

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[159] See Ashe, Fidelma. *Contemporary Social and Political Theory: An Introduction*. Buckingham: Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1998, pp.82-3.
[160] See Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. *Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture*. State University of New York Press, 1998, p.38.
[161] See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p.65.
[162] See Hall and Ames. , op. cit., p.39.
[163] See Sun, Bin, D. C. Lau, and Roger T. Ames. Sun Bin: *The Art of Warfare: A Translation of the Classic Chinese Work of Philosophy and Strategy*, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003, pp.64-7.
[164] Ibid, p.62.
[165] See Hall and Ames. , op. cit., p. 39.

or a process, rather than within a discrete and static unit or agency. *Shi* 势 is an important example of "field" of actions within a focus and field model. Here, perhaps the combination of *quan* 权 and *shi* 势 represents most of the Chinese decision-making process. *Shi* 势 is "situational tendency. When the situation is right and a favorable tendency is formed, one should seize the opportunity and forge ahead."

Further, if we also put *de* and *dao* (the proper way of human experience) into a focus (*de*) and field (*dao*) model (*dao-de*,道德), and look at the four terms of *dao*, *de*, *quan*, and *shi* together, we can get a more **holographic** picture of **Confucian relational "moral power**,"[166] which is dynamic, situational, and holistic.

(4) "Security" and *An* 安[167]

When it comes to the comparison between "security" and *an* 安, I provide some explorative discussions within two different philosophical traditions: Although "security" and *an* 安 is often simply translated into each other, they have different meanings and philosophical background. *An* 安 is a term within **correlative** relationship among interdependent *xin* (heart and mind) and body, self and others (or society), humans and environment, and so forth. *An* 安 is related to the term of "harmony" (with nature and community). *An* 安 is a foundation or a principle for harmony. Without *an* 安, harmony cannot be achieved; without harmony, *an* 安 is pointless. *An* 安 and harmony must be understood in the context of each other. In short, *an* 安 is much more intrinsic, constitutive, holistic, comprehensive, and dynamic than "security."

For example, the realist school of international relations pays much attention to national security and military security, while from a correlative and comprehensive perspective, research on

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[166] Cf. Cheng, Chung-ying, and Tianyuan Huang. Yijing Wenmingguan: Cong Yixue Dao Guoji Zhengzhi Xinsiwei (易经文明观：从易学到国际政治新思维 Philosophy of the Yijing: New Thinking on International Politics), Beijing: People's Oriental Publishing & Media Co. Ltd, 2017.
[167] Also see Table 6, Chapter 2.

"security" should be extended to include non-traditional security of economy, ecology, culture, and psychology of *tianxia* (all in the world of correlations), which refute understandings of security that emphasize traditional concerns such as military, territory and national sovereignty. For example, nontraditional security problems in terms of terrorism, food and water, pollution, climate change, transnational crime, investments overseas, transnational financial stability, confrontation and competition between different cultures, and even transcivilizational disputes of different visions of world's future should be also included into a holistic or holographic conception of security.

For another example, senses of security are related to views about "human nature." That is, different views about human nature lead to different psychological conditions. As I have discussed about "human nature" and *renxing* (human tendency) on the basis of a summary of Roger Ames's arguments in Chapter 2, in Confucian discourses, human relations are interdependent. Humans are inseparable from community and nature. Moreover, human nature is changeable. Therefore, I would further argue that "security" and *an* 安 can be discussed along two loci of authority: autonomous individuals vs. socially related persons,[168] or correspondingly along two loci of security: an old-fashioned zero-sum understanding of security that encourages neighbors to treat national territory disputes as central issues vs. a more positive story of economic growth, cooperation, and integration, putting aside disagreements and making suspicious neighbors into friends, more conducive to the well-being of the people and more favorable to shared prosperity of *tianxia*. In other words, it is necessary to cultivate a correlative sense of security as an alternative to the traditional conception of security in individuals and world society so as not to arouse lack of trust, suspicion, and hostility as normal cases due to "Me" culture's tendency for psychological self-isolationism and psychologically

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[168] See Rosemont, Henry, Jr., "Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons" in ed. Peter D. Hershock and Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Culture of Authority*, State University of New York Press 2006.

typecasting others as threats.

3.3 A Correlative Lesson from China's NFU Nuclear Policy: "Put Oneself in the Others' Place"

China is the only country among the NPT signers who has promised not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Unlike the U.S and Russia who often emphasize preemptive strikes to gain initiative, China renounces the first strike option.[169] China has become the first country to propose and pledge no-first-use policy (not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances) when it first gained nuclear capabilities in 1964. Moreover, the Chinese government also undertakes non-use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries. China is the only one among the five major nuclear powers to publicly declare no first use of nuclear weapons and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.[170] Further, China has kept the size of its nuclear arsenal much smaller rather than competing in an international arms race with the United States and the Soviet Union. Beijing has never engaged in a nuclear arms race with another country.[171] China's defensive nuclear policy including renunciation of a first strike option (on the basis of China's maintained ability to launch a devastating counter strike with its strategic confidence that China can survive a first strike) reduces the psychological threat posed by China to other countries.

During the Cold War, Russia boasted the world's largest inventory of nuclear warheads designed for preemptive strikes, followed by the U.S. who similarly considered the quantity of nuclear weapons it possessed as a symbol of its global leadership. Each side believes that the size of its nuclear arsenal affects one's ability to guarantee its security. The more, the better. Frustratingly, both the U.S. and Russia have fallen into the trap of a Richardson-like arms race with the logic of a

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[169] See Pande, Savita. "Chinese Nuclear Doctrine" in *IDSA Strategic Analysis*, March 2000 Vol. XXIII No. 12, http://www.idsa-india.org/an-mar00-2.html. For an overview, see https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/overview.htm.
[170] Neither UK nor France subscribe to the doctrine of "no first use," but they do claim to use them only in defense if attacked (though this might be preemptive), as does the USA.
[171] Although some Chinese people including scholars, netizens, and even officials, constantly requested for a drop of NFU policy, following the U.S. or Russian nuclear logic of preemptive strikes...

prisoner's dilemma.[172] The nuclear arms race cost both the US and Russia, and even our world too much. Their infamous, huge nuclear arsenals with meaningless abilities to destroy our planet numerous times led to not only heavy national burdens, but also to moral bankruptcy. To be specific, in the effort to build these arsenals, huge amounts of collateral damage to Russian and American populations occurred in the forms of radiation-induced illness, environmental contamination and distorted economies, as well as the costs of proxy wars that threatened the use of some of these weapons.

The lessons from a perspective of longer time and larger space are: Coercive diplomacy increases suspicion, distrust, hatred, resistance, and competition. Costs increase over time and opportunities diminish. To think like a **correlative decision-maker**, you aim to make yourself feel more secure by making your neighbors feel more secure, for only if you make your neighbors feel more secure can you yourself increase the orderliness and stability of the relationship. One's security in the context of global interdependence means no longer maximization of your own unilateral power or capacity on the basis of rationality marginalizing the subjective (for example, others' feelings or emotions) in favor of certain objective connotations. To achieve one's security, "put oneself in the others' place (*shu* 恕)," as Confucius emphasized as "the one expression that can be acted upon until the end of one's days."[173] In contrast with China's relational understanding of power and security associated with Confucian moral cultivation, the rational choice of maximizing national power of deterrence following a certain linear or single-track thinking does not always lead to *ji* (吉

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[172] See Richardson, L., *Arms and Insecurity: a Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War*, Pittsburgh: Box-wood Press, 1960 ; and Rapoport, A., and Chammah, Albert M. *Prisoner's Dilemma:a Study in Conflict and Cooperation*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.

[173] See Ames, Roger T. *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. University of Hawaii Press, 2011, pp. 194-200. As Ames pointed out, *Shu* 恕 is defined negatively as "do not impose on others what you yourself do not want."

propitiousness) as shown in the *Yijing*. The real tragedy of great power politics[174] is: Only brutal force left! No soft power! No smart power![175]

There has been evidence to show that this no-first-use nuclear policy with lower financial costs has successfully benefited China's economic development for enhancing people's livelihood. Even from a rational perspective, launching a first strike is not in China's interest; the anticipated costs outweigh the benefits. From the perspective of Confucian role ethics (a more constructivist-like interpretation of political relationships), China's exemplary role in its leading option of no-first-use and nuclear-arms-control also wins better soft power of promoting worldwide nuclear disarmament and paves an alternative way to world peace and harmony. While China's policy can be seen as a confidence-building measure, it could also be cynically interpreted as a way to morally encourage others to disarm, thus gaining power relatively. Obviously, China's morally relational nuclear policy option is an alternative to Herman Kahn style of thinking – the realist worldview trap. However, although China has persistently called on the United States to adopt a no-first-use policy, the United States has repeatedly refused these calls. Is it because of another kind of worldview? My answer is: at least partially yes.

3.4 A Short Summary

In this chapter, I articulate my comparisons and contrasts between concepts like power in Realist IR theory with a Chinese conception of "Confucian relational moral power" including terms such as *de* 德, *quan* 权, and *shi* 势 in the *Yijing*. I also made a comparative discussion on two different types

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[174] Mearsheimer contends that the tragedy in great power politics is that neither side wants the outcome policies of offensive realism. The real tragedy might be adopting the bankrupt philosophy that leads to this result, the definition of the situation that leads to the Richardson arms race and Rapoport and Chammah's prisoner's dilemma that results, in other words, in long term inappropriate decision making because of thinking dualistically rather than correlatively.

[175] Cf. Center For Strategic International Studies, Commission On Smart Power, Armitage, Richard Lee, & Nye, Joseph S. *CSIS Commission on Smart Power a smarter, more secure America*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.

of security concepts. Based upon comparative studies on "power" and "security," I provide a case analysis of China's correlative nuclear policy as compared with costs of non-correlative decisions of the US and USSR.

Rationality and *huxi* (**correlativity**) take the responsibility of logically linking the forehead discussions about the philosophical traditions (those concepts or terms belong to) with the detailed articulations of IR or GR theory. When making the comparisons and contrasts between Western concepts and Chinese terms, I return to their philosophical traditions in order to avoid cultural reductionism. I expect this kind of comparisons or contrasts of concepts and terms can bring about clearer, easier, and deeper understanding on Chinese terms and thus stronger foundations for my construction of GPRT.

Chapter 4: Correlative Epistemology: Reformulating Morgenthau's Six Principles

This Chapter introduces a cultural epistemology for comparative studies of Chinese and Western international relations (IR) theories, suggesting ways in which ancient Chinese texts, originating from the *Yijing*, help us first to reconceptualize political realism from a Confucian perspective and second formulate a "Confucian correlative epistemology" of international relations, through which this chapter reformulates and extends Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism.

Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism encourage us to think about IR theory building in terms of constructing a rational diplomacy with universal applications to anarchical world politics. However, modern critical thinkers question the preeminence of power in international affairs both in terms of the implied substantialist epistemology, and in terms of the need to be more inclusive of multiple realities such as non-state institutions and moral values. What is lacking in these critiques, however, is an alternative epistemology and worldview that locates political realism in a more comprehensive philosophical context, one more suited to an evolving family of distinctive and complexly interrelated cultures in an ever changing, global political-economic system. A "Confucian correlative epistemology" and worldview provide such an alternative. Six Confucian principles developed from Confucius's principle of the "correlation between opposites" invite a broadening of realism to include larger and longer space-time frames and value complexities.

Critics of contemporary realism have already raised many questions about realism. I hope to make a link between a growing critical perspective on international relations theory and Confucian political philosophy. Adding a Confucian perspective to its discourse could also help make the field of international relations more accessible to Chinese scholars and practitioners. I was inspired by

J. Ann Tickner's article on Hans Morgenthau's principles of political realism: a feminist reforma-tion,[176] which provides a similar comparison between Morgenthau's six principles with feminist ap-proaches. Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism represent one of the most important realist statements from which several generations of scholars in the academic field of international relations in the United States have been nourished. Morgenthau's six principles of political realism can be drawn from his book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* as follows,

> (1) Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human na-ture, which is unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these ob-jective laws. (2)The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political realism stresses the rational, objective and unemotional. (3) Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man. (4) Politi-cal realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension be-tween the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. (5)Political realism re-fuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the uni-verse. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from moral excess and po-litical folly. (6) The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere; he asks "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?" Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be com-pletely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behav-ior, "political man" must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature.[177]

In this chapter, I propose to reexamine the six principles of political realism formulated by Hans Morgenthau in his classic work Politics Among Nations. First, I shall use some ideas from East-West comparative texts to show that the way in which Morgenthau describes and explains international politics, and the prescriptions that ensue are embedded in a Western traditional perspective. Then I shall suggest some ways in which Confucian theory might help us begin to reconceptualize a world view from a correlative perspective and to formulate a Chinese epistemology of international rela-tions. Finally, I shall conclude with a Confucian reformulation of Morgenthau's six principles.

4.1 Rational Thinking vs. Correlative Thinking

[176] Tickner, J.Ann. "Hans Morgenthau's principles of political realism: a feminist reformulation," in *Gender and International Relations*, ed. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen, Newland (Indiana Univ. Press, 1991).
[177] Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 5th revised edition (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973), pp. 4-15.

I try to compare two modes of thinking, rational thinking and correlative thinking, and the world views behind them and political values after them. Distinct from correlative thinking, rational thinking is a modality of causal, linear and single-track thinking, originating from ancient Greek Cosmology. Within Chinese *Yijing* tradition, because of absence of belief in a single-ordered world and One standing independent of the world ordered as its efficient cause, and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order, the world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events are considered as mutually correlating with each other. It should be noted that correlative thinking is distinctly Chinese but not necessarily uniquely Chinese and it is a kind of Peircian abduction——detective sleuthing and medical diagnostics in which you are looking for productive correlations. It is a holistic approach that includes giving reasons and patterns of coherence——whatever we might take as a definition of rationality.

4.2 Rational Actor vs. Correlative Actor

A rational actor tends to make short-term and small-scale decisions for maximizing his/her interests as final goals of economy, politics, and social life, minimizing his/her costs at the same time, after considering facts available, alternative choices, possible gains and losses, and also weighing benefits and costs, and opportunities and risks. Rational choices theory is consistent with individualism and utilitarianism, associated with dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such as human nature, autonomy, equality, and freedom. It can be argued that corporations and even national government are extended concepts of the individual.

As a correlative actor, a person envisions him/herself in their multiplicity of relations and roles, their organizational contexts, and their larger significance in the natural and human environment. Correlative actors are context-sensitive instead of "Me" ——sensitive of egoism. There are a

numerous ancient Chinese texts showing the importance of changing circumstances on human actions. For example, the key and defining idea in *Sun-tze: The Art of Warfare* is *shi*: manipulating circumstances to create a strategic advantage as an alternative to the commitment of brute force.[178] Therefore and furthermore, actions are expected to be properly and particularly situated within roles and relations, pursuing for appropriateness fitting within the specific circumstances, as time changes and as circumstance varies. He/she must be prepared for the art of contextualizing and take full account of *qu shi* (long-term tendency and large-scale context, correlating with short-term and small-scale facts available). A never-ending environmental scanning to identify contingencies, correlations and correspondences as well as coherence and processes, and constant adjustments to the whole environment full of uncertainties are required so that one is not left unprepared for the unexpected surprises that often accompany rationalist certainties.

Therefore, qualitatively, a correlative actor is committed to doing what is appropriate for everyone in the situation (*yi*), i.e. taking under consideration the sometimes competing yet still legitimate interests of all concerned, rather than just doing what is more narrowly to self-serving personal advantage (*li*), and at the same time to taking into account appropriateness of both means and ends. Quantitatively, a correlative actor is required to extend one's range of concern and take full account of long-term tendencies and large-scale contexts, correlating with short-term and small-scale facts available. This correlative model of decision-making stands in stark contrast to that of rational realists acting in narrowly defined self-interest terms, in which the ends justify the means.

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[178] See Sun, Bin, D. C. Lau, and Roger T. Ames. Sun Bin: *The Art of Warfare: A Translation of the Classic Chinese Work of Philosophy and Strategy*, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003, p.86.

4.3 Confucian Correlative Epistemology[179]

Inspired by Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1886-1973)'s pluralistic epistemology, distinguishing both from epistemological monism and from epistemological dualism, I present a Confucian correlative epistemology as follows,

(1) The relation between our subjectivity and the external world is correlative and interactive. Sensations are not representations of external things.

(2) Unlike Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy is not a philosophy of substance. It lacks a concept of substance. Chinese philosophy tends toward process. Atomicity and continuity are viewed as two aspects of one thing.

(3) Knowledge is social and cultural. Knowledge should be seen as socially valuable and as part of culture. Even scientific knowledge is recreation other than representation. The fact that scientific knowledge may be valid across cultures does not prove that it is objective and culture-free. Culture plays a significant role in forming our knowledge and knowledge is culturally and socially determined. To talk about knowledge, we must talk about culture.

4.4 Towards a Confucian Correlative Epistemology of IR

The above-reviewed philosophical epistemology could help us to begin to formulate a Confucian correlative epistemology of international relations. Morgenthau encourages us to construct a rational outline or map that has universal applications of theory building. In contrast, Confucians in general are skeptical about the possibility of finding a universal and objective foundation for knowledge. The Confucian literature, especially the *Yijing*, also reviewed here emphasizes interdependence, ambiguity, fragility, contingency, difference, complexity, diversity, context, and process.

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[179] See Jiang, Xinyan, "Zhang Dongsun: pluralist Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy" in ed. Chung-ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*. Blackwell 2002, pp.57-81. I paraphrase and resummarize Zhang Dongsun's arguments based on Jiang's illustrations.

Confucian thinkers generally dislike dichotomization and the distancing of subject from object that goes with scientific or abstract thinking, both of which encourage a we /they attitude characteristic of international relations. Moreover, conceptual dichotomies such as objectivity vs. subjectivity, reason vs. emotion, mind vs. body, culture vs. nature, self vs. other, autonomy vs. relatedness, and knowing vs. being do not exist in Confucian texts. Instead, Confucian literature urges us to construct correlative epistemologies that value ambiguity and difference, thus encouraging inclusionary attitudes. These qualities could urge us to begin to build a human theory of international relations which contains elements of both Chinese and Western modes of thought.

Most of all, the Western liberal notion of rational economic man, an individualist and a welfare maximizer, similar to the image of rational political man on which realism has based its theoretical investigations, does not make any sense in the Chinese correlative world view where the individual is seen as individual acting within social relations. If we combine this view of human behaviour with Confucian holistic perspective which stresses the interdependence of all things, including nature and humans, it may help us begin to think from a more global perspective, which appreciates cultural diversity but at the same time recognizes a growing interdependence, which makes anachronistic the exclusionary thinking fostered by the political logic of nation state system. Chinese correlative world view and processual thinking all point us in the direction of an appreciation of interbecoming of polities, a way of thinking that has been sadly lacking in the history of international relations.

I am not going to argue that Morgenthau is incorrect in his portrayal of the international system. I do believe, however, that it is a partial description of international politics. I share with other critics of realism the view that, in a world with sea changes, we must begin to search for modes of behavior different from those prescribed by Morgenthau. We need to transcend the particular concern of Hans

Morgenthau over international warfare, considering that nation state, the primary unit (constitutive element) of the international system for Morgenthau and other realists, is no longer able to deal with an increasingly pluralistic array of problems ranging from nuclear weapons to economic interdependence to environmental degradation. Then could Confucianism make a contribution to international relations theory by constructing an alternative perspective on international politics that might help us to search for more appropriate solutions to these interdependent global problems?

4.5 Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: a Confucian Reformulation and Extension[180]

Drawing on the above explorations, this conclusion will present a Confucian reformulation and extension of Morgenthau's six principles of political realism of international relations, which might help us to think global politics differently in a Confucian way. I conclude this chapter with my six principles of Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory as an alternative opinion to contemporary international theory:

(1) A Confucian perspective believes that objectivity is culturally defined and supposedly "objective" laws of unchanging human nature are based on a dualistic and essentialist understanding of human nature. **Human nature** is viewed as a pluralistic and dynamic **human tendency**; it contains moral elements of self-cultivation. Therefore, individuality is relationally understood as an accomplishment: becoming distinguished in relations.

(2) A Confucian macroscopical, comprehensive, and holistic perspective believes that in the era of globalization the primary unit of the world system is *tianxia* (all in a world of correlations), rather than nation-state. The national interest cannot be separated from **the interest of *tianxia***. Therefore, national interest cannot be defined only in terms of national **power** any longer. The national **interest**

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[180] I was inspired by J.Ann Tickner's article on Hans Morgenthau's principles of political realism: a feminist reformation, which provides a similar comparison between Morgenthau's six principles with feminist approaches.

demands all-win or at least cooperative rather than zero sum solutions to a number of global problems such as nuclear proliferation, financial crises, and global warming. Considering about military, economic and environmental security in interdependent concepts suggests the need of new efforts that seek to achieve mutually beneficial, rather than zero sum, ends.

(3) Power as domination and control is socially and culturally constructed. A **unilateral** understanding of power would ignore the possibility of **relational power**.

(4) A Confucian correlative perspective rejects the possibility of separating morality from global politics, while recognizing all political action has moral importance. Moreover, the Confucian moral perspective of **"situational appropriateness"** values situational "responsiveness" within roles and relations, instead of **universal principles** of rights and "responsibilities."

(5) Based on fully recognizing the moral aspirations of particular cultures, a Confucian perspective seeks to pursue good relationship instead of seeking mere moral agreements. Building a consensus (collective **perception**) as inherently shared viewpoints and **feelings** out of the overlap of opposites and **putting aside disagreements** could become the bases for de-escalating international conflicts and building harmony of *tianxia* with co-prosperity of different civilizations.

(6) A Confucian correlative perspective attaching importance to ambiguity, fragility, contingency, difference, complexity, diversity, context, and process, denies the realist autonomy of the political in the rational theory, associated with a **particular** culture, since disciplinary efforts to abstract a so-called "political man" and construct a **chaotic** and conflictual nation-state system are on the basis of **partial** and **dualistic** thinking and **exclusionary** attitudes.

Table 7: Critiques of the Six Principles of Morgenthan's Political Realism & Six Principles of Confucian Global Theory

Six Principles	Morgenthau's International Theory of Political Realism	Confucian Global Theory & Critique of Morgenthau
(1) Human Nature & Theory	"Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in **human nature**, which is unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop **a rational (and unemotional) theory** that reflects these objective laws."	A Confucian perspective believes that objectivity is culturally defined and supposedly 'objective' laws of unchanging human nature are based on a dualistic and essentialist understanding of human nature. **Human nature** is viewed as a pluralistic and dynamic **human tendency**; it contains moral elements of self-cultivation. Therefore, individuality is relationally understood as an accomplishment: becoming distinguished in relations.
(2) Unit, Interest & power	"The main signpost of political realism is the concept of **interest** defined in terms of **power** which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political realism stresses the rational, objective and unemotional."	A Confucian macroscopical, comprehensive, and holistic perspective believes that in the era of globalization the primary unit of the world system is *tianxia* (all in a world of correlations), rather than nation-state. The national interest cannot be separated from **the interest of *tianxia***. Therefore, national interest cannot be defined only in terms of national **power** any longer. The national **interest** demands all-win or at least co-operative rather than zero sum solutions to a number of global problems such as nuclear wars, financial crises, and global warming.
(3) Power	"Realism assumes that interest defined as **power** is an objective category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the **control** of man over man."	Power as domination and control is socially and culturally constructed. A **unilateral** understanding of power would ignore the possibility of **relational power**.
(4) Morality & politics	"Political realism is aware of the **moral** significance of political action. It is also aware of the **tension** between the moral command and the requirements of **successful** political action."	A Confucian correlative perspective rejects the possibility of separating morality from global politics, while recognizing all political action has moral importance. The Confucian moral perspective of **"situational appropriateness"** values situational

Six Principles	Morgenthau's International Theory of Political Realism	Confucian Global Theory & Critique of Morgenthau
		"responsiveness" within roles and relations, instead of **universal principles** of rights and "responsibilities."
(5) National interest & Universal Morality	"Political realism refuses to identify the **moral aspirations of a particular nation** with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of **interest** defined in terms of **power** that saves us from moral excess and political folly."	Based on fully recognizing the moral aspirations of particular cultures, a Confucian perspective seeks to pursue good relationship instead of seeking mere moral agreements. Building a consensus (collective **perception**) as inherently shared viewpoints and **feelings** out of the overlap of opposites and **putting aside disagreements** could become the bases for de-escalating international conflicts and building harmony of *tianxia* with co-prosperity of different civilizations.
(6) Political Man & Theory	"The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere; he asks 'How does this policy affect the power of the nation?' Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but **'political man' would be a beast**, for he would be **completely lacking in moral restraints**. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behavior, 'political man' must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature."	A Confucian correlative perspective attaching importance to ambiguity, fragility, contingency, difference, complexity, diversity, context, and process, denies the realist autonomy of the political in the rational theory, associated with a **particular** culture, since disciplinary efforts to abstract a so-called "political man" and construct a **chaotic** and conflictual nation-state system are on the basis of **partial** and **dualistic** thinking and **exclusionary** attitudes.

To construct this Confucian theoretical alternative is not to deny the validity of Morgenthau's work. But adding a Confucian perspective to the epistemology of international relations is a stage through which we must pass if we are to think about constructing a non-Western theoretical framework which goes beyond traditional realist perspective. Such inclusionary thinking is becoming imperative in a world in which the technology of war and a fragile natural environment threaten human existence.

CHAPTER 5: CHINESE IR: THINKING AND PRACTICING IN A DIFFERENT WAY

Chapter 4 presents a Confucian reformulation of Morgenthau's six principles of political realism of international relations, which might more clearly help us to think international politics differently in a Confucian way. Further in this chapter, traditional and contemporary Western international relations theory (such as classical realism and neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism, Marxism, the English School) and more modern perspectives on these theories such as critical theory, constuctivism, and postmodernism will be compared with *Yijing* concepts and the proposed GPRT worldview in general.

In the first part of this chapter, a summation of IRT (especially Rationalistic theories) and a critical review on four pillars of IRT, namely, **rationality** (rationalist epistemology), **human nature**, **nation-state** (the basic unit of the "international" system), **and anarchy** will be provided in Table 8 and 9. Correspondingly, four pillars of my GPRT, namely, **correlativity**, **human tendency,** *tianxia*, and **harmony** will be comparatively discussed based on the *Yijing* texts and correlative terms such as *dao*, *de*, *he*, *junzi*, *shengren*, *tian*, and *xing* in Table 9. In the second part of this chapter, I compare and contrast Realism and Liberalism with Chinese Global Process-Relational Theory based upon **Confucian (Decision-Making) Model of Situational Appropriateness in Roles and Relations.** In the third part of this chapter, I compare and contrast Chinese Global Process-Relational Theory with Constructivism. In the last part of this chapter, I discussed about how Chinese correlative actors like Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) as an example of Confucian *wangdao* foreign policy decision-makers and practitioners, shaped ancient order of the world, in order to partially answer two questions: What are the contributions of the *Yijing*'s style of thinking to global politics? How to get out of security

dilemmas?

5.1 Beyond Rationality: Correlativity

Question is: can we think international relations differently in a correlative way? To switch back to my dissertation in the academic field of international relations, I attempt to identify correlativity as a clear style of thinking (or philosophy), a style which is distinctly Chinese but not necessarily uniquely Chinese. It was formulated in Chinese ancient philosophical literature such as the *Yijing*, and has a powerful influence on Chinese decision-makers and intellectuals in their understanding of global politics. The correlative model for decision making stands in stark contrast to that of rational realists acting in narrowly defined self-interest terms. The entry point of the correlative model is relationality, other than individuality. Relationality other than individuality can be another intriguing way of expressing this theory of correlativity. I expect such a tradition can be a basis for a unified global process-relational theory, distinct from the Anglo-European/Indo-European tradition with a strong sense of rationality, which is the basis of contemporary International Relations Theory. Along the lines shown in figure 1, I develop my research from the Chinese world view to a Chinese theory:


Figure 8: Basic Structure of Comparisons between the West and China

There is no sense of dualism and transcendence (associated with ancient Greek Cosmology) in

Yijing philosophy. The sky, earth, and ten thousand events mutually **correlate** with each other. It is interactions of the two basic elements of a polarity like *yin-yang* that constitute the forces, and produce change. The Confucian "polarity" implies a relationship of two events for example, each of which constitutes a necessary condition for the other. Each particular element is both self-determinate and determined by every other particular element. A "polar" explanation of relationships requires a **contextualist** interpretation of the world in which events are strictly interdependent. [181] Such correlative polar metaphysics precludes all dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such as self/other, identity, human nature, nation-state, and anarchy, which often appear in the Western International relations Theory. Instead of concepts such as "**international**," **human nature**, **nation-state**, and **anarchy**, I whereupon use correlative terms such as "**global**," *renxing* (human tendency), *tianxia* (all under the sky literarily, or all in the world of correlations), and **harmony with differences** (*he er bu tong*) to construct my theory, which reflects the Chinese **correlative *yinyang* acosmology.** Thus, a correlative thinking and scheme of contextualization replaced ontological and dualistic assumptions that have accompanied Western concepts.

Further, most of the mainstream western theories and perspectives on international politics take a **rationalist paradigm** for theoretical constructions. As to Realism, research on a state as a rational actor shuns subjective elements such as world views, ways of thinking process, and political values of leaders, in favor of objective facts available, seeking essential meanings through definitions and causal logic. "**Correlativism**"works as **a Chinese paradigm** in my construction of Global Process-Relational Theory. Chinese thinkers are content with the appeal to "examples" to provide explanatory accounts. There was no hard and fast distinction between "objective" and "subjective" connotations. Moreover, the precision is not in conception, but in correlativity and full message of

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[181] According to Roger Ames, the art of "contextualizing" can be illustrated by an analogy of "the relationship that exists between any particular note in a symphonic performance and the symphony as a whole. There is a sense in which the value and meaning of each note can only be understood within the context of the entire symphony. In these terms, then, each note has the entire symphony implicate within it. At the same time, the symphony is only available through one note at a time as particular perspectives on the symphony…"Ames, Roger . *Sun-Tzu The Art of Warfare.* New York, NY: Bal-lantine Books, 1993, p. 69.

the clustered images. Similarly, an individual or a state is viewed **within roles and relations**. Within a focus and field model, for any individual person as a focus, the field could be as small as a family and as big and extensive as an entire society, or even universe. Similarly, a polity as a focus is always considered as within *tianxia* (all in the world) as a field. In the next chapter, a holographic[182] understanding of world systems of human becomings and tianxia will be provided in my Global Process-Relational Theory.

I **summarize** traditional and contemporary Western international relations theory (especially rationalistic theories) and more modern perspectives on these theories within the following 2-page table. And I also compare them with my global process-relational theory at the end of the table. According to my summarization, one can find that most of the mainstream theories and perspectives share in common four theoretical pillars, namely, rationality (rationalist paradigm), human nature, nation-state (the basic unit of the "international" system), and anarchy (distinct from the GPRT), even though there are many different views among themselves.

Table 8: Western International Relations Theory vs. Global Process-Relational Theory: An Overall Comparison

	Approaches	Major concepts	Basic unit	Basic model	Paradigm
Real-ism	Classical Realism (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes)	state of nature, human nature, power, balance of power	state	power –state – international politics	rationalism
	Traditional Realism (Carr, Morgenthau)	human nature, power, balance of power, state	state	power –state – international politics	rationalism
	Structural Realism (Waltz)	anarchy, self-help, power, balance of power, security	state/ great power	power –system – international politics	rationalism/ structuralism
	Offensive Realism (Mearsheimer)	anarchy, self-help, power maximization,	great power	power –state – international politics	rationalism

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	Approaches	Major concepts	Basic unit	Basic model	Paradigm
		revisionist state			
	Defensive Realism (Waltz, Evera, Jevis, and Glaser, etc.)	anarchy, self-help, Survival, Power, balance of power	state	power – system – international politics	rationalism
	Neo-classical Realism (Schweller, wohlforth, christens, and Zakaria, etc.)	anarchy, self-help, national interest, power, domestic structure	state/ domestic structure	power – state and domestic – international politics	rationalism
Liberal-ism	Classical liberalism (Grotius, Locke, Kant, Bentham, Smith)	anarchy/ **harmony** of interests	state	Free trade/ republic/ international markets /social exchange – international politics	rationalism
	Liberal idealism (Wilson, Hobson)	anarchy/ common interests (collective security/ mutual assistance)	state	law (international/ domestic) – international politics	rationalism/ legalism
	Liberal institutionalism (Haas, Keohane, Krasner, Nye, etc.)	anarchy/ **harmony** of interests	sub-state/ international organization	privatization / international organization – cooperative *interaction* between states	rationalism/ functionalism
	Neo-Liberal institutionalism (Keohane)	anarchy/ uncertainty	state	institution – cooperative *interaction* between states	rationalism/ institutionalism
Wendt's Constructivism		anarchy, Idea, structure, culture	state	shared ideas– roles and structure – international politics	Constructivism / social identity
English School (Bull, Wight, Buzan, etc.)		anarchy/ shared norms, values and interests	international society-state	shared norms, values and interests – international politics	rationalism/ identity
New Marxism (Wallerstein, Cardoso, Frank, etc.)		world history	world system-class	productivity– international politics	historical materialism
Chinese School: Global Process-Relational Theory (Huang)		*Renxing* (human tendency) *yi li* (appropriate interest) *shizhong* (situational appropriateness) *he* (harmony thru equilibrium)	*tianxia* (all under the sky literarily, or all in the world of correlations)	*shengren* (sage) –Confucian relational power (*dao*, *de*, *quan*, *shi*) –*tianxia* –harmony with differences	Correlativitism / focus and field

Note: a. In chapter 4 I present a Confucian reformulation of Morgenthau's six principles of political **realism** of international relations, which might more clearly help us to think international politics differently in a Confucian way. b.

Even though Confucianism shares more in common with Reflexive theories such as critical theory (Robert Cox) and postmodernism (Foucault: power-knowledge; Derrida, deconstruction: double-reading), most of the reflexive theories cannot avoid sense of **essentialism**, which does not appear in Chinese-style texts.

The next step: Four pillars of IRT within **Table 8**, namely, **rationality** (rationalist epistemology), **human nature**, **nation-state** (the basic unit of the "international" system), **and anarchy**, will be compared with four pillars of my GPRT, namely, **correlativity**, *renxing* (**human tendency**), *tianxia* **(all in the world),** and **harmony**, which reflect typical Chinese world view, way of thinking, and political values in the *Yijing*.

Table 9: Four Theoretical Pillars of IRT vs. Four Theoretical Pillars of GPRT

	Comparison: Four theoretical pillars				Theoretical Development Background
I R T	Rationality 1. Rational actor: nation state in anarchy 2. Aim: maximizing national interests 3. Tools: collective security /mutual assistance, balance of power, self-help, institution–cooperative interaction between states 4.**Rational Choices Model** (foreign policy): individualism & utilitarianism / from "economic man" to "political man" / **facts available/ short time** 5. Ontology: substantialism 6. Epistemology：positivism 7. Methodology: atomism/ holism 8. Causal and linear thinking 9. Rational thought generally requires its users to accept a range of unexamined, or at best unproven, assumptions that then predetermine the conclusions that can be reached logically with deductive rigor. From the 17th century rationality began to marginalize spirit, emotion, intuition, will, experience, and so on.	**Paradigm: Rationalism**			Modernism Internationali-zation Westernization **Substance ontology** The **substance ontology** of early Greece thus establishes a doctrine of **external** relations among discrete "things" that each has their **essential** integrity.
		human nature **An essential understanding of person**: "self" as essence/ **(Essentialism/ Transcendentalism)** 1.Individual absoluteness. 2.Human beings: As a philosophical presupposition, traditional western political thoughts (even before the Enlightenment) had often held that human nature is essentially self-serving and ruthless, and man is innately bad (Liberalism holds that human nature is basically good and individuals are rational human beings).	**nation-state** The basic and primary unit of international system and world politics; The major perspective from which world politics studied. States behave as individuals do, pursuing their own national interests like individuals or rational actors.	**Anarchy** Individual sovereignty with an anarchic logic: self/ other dualistic competition. (**Liberal harmony** is based on rationalism of the eighteenth century Enlightenment with a preference for an optimistic view of human nature, and individual freedom and autonomy assumed to be realized by democracy, market capitalism, and free trade. And Liberalism places money power in the hands of private interests.)	
G P	Correlativity **1. Focus and field**: a holographic understanding of world systems;	**Paradigm: Correlativitism**			Postmodernism Globalization Easternization Nietzsche's
		renxing (human tendency）	*tianxia* (all in the	**Confucian Harmony**	

R T				
a recognition that each and every unique phenomenon is continuous with every other phenomenon within one's own field of experience. A focus is on "correlativity" (or interrelatedness, interdependence), rather than an individual from nowhere. Actions are expected to be properly and particularly situated within roles and relations/ Pursuit for appropriateness fitting within the specific circumstances. Foci and fields or "ecologically situated events" and their "environments": intrinsic and constitutive nature of relations. This focus/field model contrasts with both positivist and idealist models. 2. **Correlative thinking:** a. absence of belief in a single-ordered world and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order b. ziran (self-so-ing, self-do-ing), auto-creativity, ten-thousand things mutually entailing each other c. absence of ontological assertions that there is some underlying substratum-essentialism 3. **"Correlative" Choices Model** (foreign policy)[183]: the art of contextualization: a. Full account of context or *qu shi* (tendency, advantage, and context) b. A never-ending environmental scanning to identify	A relational understanding of person: "self"as ongoing process/ *ziran*(自然 self-so-ing); auto-creativity 1. Individual relativeness: for any individual person as a focus, field could be as small as a family and as big and extensive as an entire society, or universe. 2. Human becomings: "Individuality" as an accomplishment: becoming distinguished in relations. 3. Self-cultivation of individuals – preeminently that of rulers and ministers. The ruler has to be a morally distinguished leader through self-cultivation in the social environment wherein all people pursue self-cultivation. 4.Appropriate interest: The actions of the ruler are required to be appropriate (*yi*) and accommodate the interests of all	world) The basic and primary unit of world politics is **more macroscopical, comprehensive and holistic**. A "*tianxia* family" (*tianxia yijia*) is a metaphor for the entire world. Traditional Chinese view of the world is a world without a sense of sovereignty idea, but only with the relative distance and relationships. A typical Confucian scenario of global system is *tianxia* governed by worthies or sages, who are required to be moral examples. We can look at the world as a whole and think of the interests of all in a more macroscopical, comprehensive, and holistic way	Belief in achieving global harmony though human joint efforts. And especially the vital role of big countries as good moral examples has much to do with the future of the world. Whether the world is chaotic primarily depends on the vital role of big countries. **Confucian Har-mony:** 1. The art of combining and blending two or more foodstuffs so that they mu-tually enhance one another without losing their distinctive flavors. 2. Harmony is distinguished from mere agree-ment by defining it in terms of eliciting the opti-mum contribu-tion of each par-ticular to its con-text. Without appeal to some origina-	attack on the rational ethos/ And movements such as Process philosophy, Postmodernism, and the new pragmatism **Processual metaphysics** The **processual metaphysics** as it is expressed in the "Great Tradition" commentary on the *Book of Changes* and as it is implicit in the early Confucian texts treats phenomenon as conterminous events that are constituted by their internal relations.

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[183] Or called as Confucian "Rational" Choices Model by Prof. Richard Chadwick.

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contingencies, correlations and correspondences as well as coherence and processes. c. Constant adjustments to the whole environment full of uncertainties. Aim: Situational Appropriateness and Harmony not without Differences 4. **Correlativity and rationality**: The *Yijing* uses divination to spread amongst all levels of society practices of thought and reflection that contrast with the Western rationality. Correlative thinking is a kind of Peircian abduction--detective sleuthing and medical diagnostics in which you are looking for productive correlations. It is a holistic approach that includes giving reasons and patterns of coherence--whatever we might take as a definition of rationality.	concerned, rather than being only self-interested (*li*). 5. We can have more positive belief in human tendency and therefore pay more attention to the moral cultivation of humans (even though we are still surrounded with international power politics).	(even though we are living in a world system of nation-states).	tive principle and the linear teleology that comes with it, the world has no grand pre-assigned design. 3. Since Confucian harmony is not seeking mere agreement but pursuing good relationship between different civilizations, it is still different from opinions of people like Kant and Leibniz.

In sum, a theory of Confucian harmony pursues constructive dialogues, benefits reciprocal exchanges, and rejects clashes among civilizations. *Renxing*, *tianxia*, and Confucian harmony are three important pillars of my theory. In order to avoid misinterpreting these three terms and the relevant Chinese texts, we need start from interpreting **correlativity** (also see Table 5 in Chapter 1) as the first and most important pillar of my theory, which is different from **rationality** as the basis for assumptions of human nature, nation-state, and anarchy within the Western theoretical tradition.

5.2 Beyond Realism and Liberalism: Confucian Model of Situational Appropriateness in Roles and Relations

Realism seeks maximization of individual nations' interests based on short-term and small-scale considerations of concrete situations. Realist scenario of international relations is a finite game (anarchy), while Confucian theory aiming at an infinite game of world politics, pursuits **appropriateness**, i.e. , accommodating the interests of all concerned and at the same time taking into account of both means and ends, together with both longer term and larger scale, other than just maximization of individual nations' interests. Moreover, Confucian appropriateness in roles and relations is very much **situational**, different from liberalism emphasizing universal values. That is to say, although Confucian theory looks like liberalism in the sense of their common opposition to realism, the pursuit of appropriateness is not based on universal principles but the concrete human roles and relations. Correlative model of human tendency, *tianxia*, and harmony is pragmatic other than idealistic. In this narrow sense, compared with liberalism promoting universal values, Confucian logic is even closer to the realists' pragmatic thinking. It is its unique central consideration of appropriateness that intervenes to correct any deviations of Confucian logic.

Liberalism promotes universal values and eternal principles in order to transfer international relations from finite game to infinite game (just imaging a single-ordered world ruled by universal principles and values), while Confucian theory also aiming at infinite game (just imaging harmonization process with auto-creative tensions and not without differences), which pursuits *situational appropriateness* other than abstract dogmas, is based on the political logic of "thinking locally, acting globally"[184] for global governance. That is to say, the value framework of Confucian

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[184] See Kasulis, Thomas P., "The Mosaic and the Jigsaw Puzzle：How It All Fits Together" in ed. Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock, *Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press and East-West Philosophers' Conference, 2015, p. 39.

correlative model is situationally specific and particular, should not be universalized ideally. In this narrow sense, Confucian logic is very much close to the political realist way of pragmatic thinking, which rejects universal values and at least bases its decision-making process on concrete and specific situations.

5.3 Beyond Constructivism: Identity in Roles and Relations

Then what are the differences and similarities between Confucian theory and constructivism? Firstly, constructivism also aims at universal values and norms, while Confucian theory focuses on situational appropriateness in roles and relations. Secondly, constructivism is based upon individualism, while the entry point of the Confucian correlative model is relationality, rather than individuality. Thirdly, identity, a key concept of constructivism, in Confucian theory is considered as within roles and relations, rather than essentialistically defined. Fourthly, both Confucianism and constructivism pay attention to emotions or feelings, which are not viewed as distinct from knowing. Finally and particularly, Alexander Wendt's Constructivism shares rationality (rationalist paradigm) in common with most of the mainstream theories and perspectives. Wendt's Constructivism is not an exception in this sense. Wendt does not fully negate the three assumptions of rationalism (namely, states as rational actors, unitary state and state-centrism, and anarchy). He only uses notions of "shared ideas" and "three cultures of anarchy" to reform the traditional approaches of rationalism.

5.4 China and the West: Belief Dynamic Systems Resonating with Each Other


Figure 9: Belief Dynamic Systems Resonating with Each Other

When dealing with theoretical comparisons, if we treat China and the West as two belief dynamic systems of ideas relating to and resonating with each other, on the basis of historical experience of numerous ideas traveling and exchanging, we will go over the sensibility of oversimplified dichotomy between China and the West. Although there should be further research about history of ideas traveling both internally and externally from whom, where, when, and how,[185] one thing is certain nowadays: there is an overlapping theoretical area between the West and China as shown in Figure 9.

As I mentioned in Transition C in the 5th part of the Introduction, there are at least two philosophical Wests. The second West which rejects a variety of dualisms represents a 20th century epistemological revolution anticipating a productive conversation with Confucian thinking and also witnessing the rise of a variety of contemporary theories, a lot closer to the Chinese correlative paradigm than traditional dualist thinking, not only around the IR academia such as general systems

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[185] There have been several significant books about traveling ideas. For *xixue dongjian* (西学东渐 the Western learning into China), cf. Tian, Chenshan. *Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005. For *dongxue xijian* (东学西渐 Chinese Learning into the West), cf. Hobson, John M. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*. 5th printing with corrections, 2006 ed. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. For how the *Yijing* influenced Leibniz, Hegal, and Marx, cf. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics* and cf. Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilisation in China. Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 1956.

theory, Gaia hypothesis, complex theory, contingency theory, fuzzy set theory, but also within the IR academia such as New Marxism and Globalization Theory. Such modern theories share more or less conceptional similarities with the Confucian thinking; some of them have historical or logical connections with the *Yijing*; some modern ideas among them even go all the way back to the *Yijing*.

Take Globalization Theory[186] as an example: this rising IR approach (with major concepts like globality and independence, basic research units like connectivity and dynamics, basic models such as world connectivity and local-global nexus, and paradigms like critical rationality) shares mutually inspiring similarities with Confucian thinking of *tianxia* (all in a world of correlations), though its concept of "connectivity" might be more suitable in its English sense for depicting Kasulis's concept of "external relation" other than "internal relation."

5.5 Toward a Post-hegemonic IR: *Wangdao* of Foreign Policy

Question: Once we look at global predicaments through a more macroscopic, comprehensive and holistic perspective, how should we think about and find possible solutions to them in pursuit of situational appropriateness in roles and relations? After contrasting a correlative decision-maker with a rational decision-maker, we can look at two opposite examples in practice: why did the voyages of Zheng He (1371-1433) and Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) lead to different political, economic, and cultural consequences? What were the reasons for the differences of styles of Chinese and Spanish foreign policies? Though I do not view the two cases from the perspective of cultural determinism, considering two cultures developed independently at that age, I would like to provide and explore a hypothesis concerning Correlative Choices Model and Rational Choices Model for

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[186] Cf. Manfred B. Steger & Deane Neubauer. What Is Global Studies?: Theory & Practice. Routledge Ltd - M.U.A., 2016.

foreign policy decision-making in this dissertation.

Menzies described Zheng He's fleets as follows: "In every single respect——construction, cargo capacity, damage control, armament, range, communications, the ability to navigate in the trackless ocean and to repair and maintain their ships at sea for months on end---the Chinese were centuries ahead of Europe. Zheng He's fleets would have had no difficulty in destroying any fleet that crossed his path. A battle between this Chinese armada and the other natives of the world combined would have resembled one between a pack of sharks and a shoal of sprats."[187] "China could have become the great colonial power, a hundred years before the great age of European exploration and expansion. But China did not."[188] What are the reasons?

Emperor Zhu Di (1360-1424)'s foreign policy of Confucian *wangdao* (王道 literally means sage kings' *dao*), aiming at *jin yue yuan lai* (近悦远来 encouraging distant peoples to come) in the short run and *tianxia gongxiang taiping zhi fu* (天下共享太平之福 promoting common prosperity and pursuing holistic harmony globally) in the long run, mainly consisted of three concrete aspects:

(1) Economic policies of *hou wang bo lai* (厚往薄来 Economically, a big country gives more, and takes less) with mutual benefit;

(2) Political policies of *yi da shi xiao* (以大事小 Politically, a big country respects small countries and their special local needs, deepening mutual understanding and trust) with self-restraint and peaceful cooperation;

(3) Cultural policies of *you rong nai da* (有容乃大 Culturally, a big country keeps openness without self/other distinction, rejecting exclusionary attitudes, enhancing cultural exchanges, and encouraging mutual learning, so that it can become bigger) with respecting

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[187] Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America, 1st Thus. ed. , Harper Perennial, June 3, 2008, p.70.
[188] Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-1433. USA :Oxford University Press, January 9, 1997, p.20.

local customs varying from place to place and cherishing cultural diversities.

Wangdao, emphasizing the roles of big countries as good moral examples within global relations and processes, frames a Chinese-style multi-tiered, comprehensive perspective on global problem-solving in today's globalized world. *Wangdao* can be traced back to the *Yijing* philosophy including the Chinese correlative worldview of *tianxia* (all in a world of correlations) and *he er bu tong* (harmony not without differences), which has had a powerful influence on Chinese ancient understanding of world order and foreign policy decision-making.

However, *wangdao*, as one of the most important types of Confucian ancient foreign policy, has not been paid enough attention by modern policy makers and thinkers, who are familiar with the concept of "hegemony" of individual nation states. In Chinese tradition, *wangdao* is the opposite word of *badao* (霸道). *Badao* has been conventionally mistranslated as "hegemony," since *badao* is a negative word in Chinese, while the meaning of "hegemony" (often associated with political domination, not merely leadership) is not necessarily negative in English. From the history of Zheng He's voyages and Confucian foreign policy of *wangdao*, it seems that we can also find cultural roots of Chinese contemporary foreign policies such as Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence[189] and Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries,[190] which are

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[189] The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence (1954) include: 1. Mutual respect of each other's sovereignty and territories; 2. No invasion and other arm force attacks against each other; 3. No interference into each other's internal affairs; 4. Equality and mutual beneficiary; 5. Peaceful co-existence.

[190] The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries (1964) include: 1. Mutual equality and benefit. Chinese Government would not consider its assistance a one-sided granting of benefit but believe assistance is mutual; 2.No attaching of any additional conditions or requirement of privileges to providing economic assistance. Chinese government would strictly respect the sovereignty of the nations that received its assistance; 3. In order to as much as possible avoid increase the assistance-receiving nation's burden, the Chinese government's economic assistance is provided in the manner of free or low interest. Under necessary conditions, repayment of debt can be extended; 4. The purpose of Chinese Government's aids is not to create a situation in which the aid receiving country would become reliant on China but to help it to step by step get on the road of self-reliance and independence; 5. For constructive projects, in order to help other nations, China would try to make investment as less as possible so that the nation receiving China's aid may increase revenue and accumulate capital; 6. China would provide equipment and material of the best quality that it could produce and negotiate price based upon international market standard. If China fails in providing equipment and material that are unqualified and of inappropriate type, China Government would guarantee refund and change; 7. As for any technology that China provides other nations with, China guarantees that the workers of the technology receiving country will learn and fully mater the technology; 8. The experts sent by the Chinese Government will enjoy equal material treatment to those of the experts of the receiving countries. Any special demand and benefit would not be allowed.

opposed to power politics in dominance of international relations over the last few centuries.

In contrast to the Spanish short-term and small-scale policies towards peoples in America (*e.g.,* emphasis on acquiring gold, silver, and spices, irrespective of the cost in human lives and other consequences for all concerned), Chinese Confucian policies reflect a longer-term and larger-scale concern of interests of *tianxia* (all in the world including China itself): based on the philosophy of **tianxia** (also a world of correlations), "the tribute trade system saw more benefits going from China to the tribute states rather than the other way round"[191] so that China encouraged more peoples to exchanging politically, economically, and culturally (近悦远来 *jin yue yuan lai*) and also benefited from a peaceful environment for itself. I will explicitly to explore how the three aspects of his policies can be traced back to Chinese world view and correlative thinking (summarized in the *Yijing*), and *Correlative Choices Model*. A short, quick, and incomplete explanation is:

According to the Confucian correlative conception, a person is viewed as irreducibly social, and the "I" and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing,[192] a correlative actor thus is required to accommodate the **interests of all concerned**, rather than being **only self-interested** (*li*), and at the same time required to take into account appropriateness of **both means and ends**. Put another way, peoples of *tianxia* are viewed as correlated, interdependent, and in a continuum in a world as a holistic entity of correlations so that interests of a people are correlated to other people's interests. A people's interests are not viewed as absolute but relative. Furthermore, Confucian harmony is *he er bu tong* (harmony but not without differences). "Chinese culture is not shaped by any appeal to universal categories establishing 'the unity of mankind.'"[193] Cultural differences among people are

[191] Yaqing, Qin, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory,* Routledge 2010, p.36. Cf. Fairbank, John K. *China: A New History*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Fairbank, John K. and Edwin O. Reischauser. *China: Tradition and Transformation*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989.

[192] See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p. 84.

[193] See Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*.

respected and cherished because they are viewed as momentums for correlative exchange of *yin* and *yang* philosophically, bringing about holistic harmony with mutual benefits, rather than causes for clash of civilizations. Such harmony was compared with the cooking art of combining and blending two or more foodstuffs so that they mutually enhance one another without losing their distinctive flavors.[194] The role of big countries (as moral examples)[195] is also worth more detailed discussions about renxing (human tendency), human becomings, and moral cultivation from xiaoren (petty person) to *junzi* (well-cultivated exemplary person as the model for social interactions) to *shengren* (sage, top of *junzi*).

The ends of the Spanish king and Chinese emperor behind the two navigators were thereafter different. The Spanish monarch Isabella I of Castile wanted to attain more gold, silver, and spices, while the main aims[196] of Chinese Emperor Zhu Di were to recover the Sea Silk Road, abandoned during the former dynasty, and achieve *tianxia* harmony (at least a peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship between China and other peoples around the world). The well-known facts were that "the only interest of the Spanish and Portuguese was in gathering sustenance, gold and spices"[197] and Christopher Columbus's voyage was followed by colonization and racial violence. By contrast, Zheng He's fleets brought about peace to the world outside China, and promoted friendship and mutual prosperity between China and the places where he visited. Zheng He's fleets rounded up pirates[198] on the Sea Silk Road from China to Indian Ocean and diplomatically mediated many disputes among countries in this region. Moreover, Chinese fleets also aided many peoples with

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Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 90.

[194] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.275.

[195] See Chapter 2, ibid.

[196] About the aims of Zhu Di, there are many different arguments in the academic field. It can be demonstrated that the main aims are here in this article.

[197] Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America, 1st US. ed. Harper Perennial, June 3, 2008 , p.69.

[198] Such a coercive action represents a Confucian dialectic way of balancing coercion and moral education. Confucius is widely known as an educator who emphasized moral education. However, when Confucius was the legal minister of his state Lu, he also decidedly and severely sentenced Shao Zhengmao, a machinator who was a black sheep threatening the state's stability and harmony.

Chinese cargoes and ancient technology to improve productivity for their living. The king of Cochin appreciated the help from Emperor Zhu Di: "How fortunate we are that the teachings of the sages of China have benefited us. For several years now, we have had abundant harvests in our country and our people have had houses to live in, have had the bounty of the sea to eat their fill of, and enough fabrics for clothes."[199]

More importantly, Zhu Di, emperor behind Admiral Zheng He, decreed, "Let there be mutual trade at the frontier barriers in order to supply the country's needs and to encourage distant people to come (怀柔远人 huai rou yuan ren)."[200] Zheng He's fleets visited about 30 Asian and African countries from sea to intercommunicate with people in other areas. According to Menzies, the emperor's ships tried to discover and chart the entire world, and bring it into Confucian harmony through trade and foreign policy.[201] The clearest fact of Chinese foreign policy of *yi da shi xiao* (以大事小 a big country respects small countries), which can also demonstrated the success of Chinese policy of huai rou yuan ren (encouraging distant people to come), is: The king of Brunei, on the west coast of Borneo, visited China with Zheng He's fleets and was well received at court. To appreciate Zhu Di's concern with thoughtfulness, he even decided to be put to rest in China forever after his death. After his demise, "the emperor (Zhu Di) stopped official business at court for three days and assigned officials to attend to his burial."[202] Today we can still find his tomb in Nanjing, former capital of Ming Dynasty.

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[199] Cochin tablet, "Taizong Shi Lu", ch.183, quoted in Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-1433. USA :Oxford University Press, January 9, 1997, pp.145-6.
[200] Ibid, p. 88.
[201] Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America, 1st US. ed. New York: Harper Perennial,June 3, 2008, p.454. According to Levathes, the Hongwu Emperor (Zhu Di's father, 1328–1398) also "reasoned at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, it was foolish to try to support garrisons halfway around the world, so neither Zhu Di nor his successors tried." Levathes, op. cit., p.146.
[202] Levathes, op. cit., p.104.

CHAPTER 6: PAVING A WAY TO AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD FUTURE

6. 1 A Summary of Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory

Based on comparisons between correlativity and rationality, and between internal and external relations, in this dissertation I have tried to construct *a non-Western theory* (see Figure 10) on the basis of Confucian Decision-making Model of *Situational Appropriateness in Roles and Relations* (See Chapter 1 and 5), with three major terms of *renxing*, *tianxia, and* harmony not without differences to bring about an alternative scenario of infinite game (as compared with finite game in Chapter 2) for world politics from a *Yijing* philosophical tradition (see Table 5) that has developed independently of Anglo-European/Indo-European tradition.

First, as I indicated in Chapter 2, *renxing*, not equal to "human nature" in the Western context and should be translated into English as human tendency rather than "human nature" with its essentialistic meanings. Therefore, a person is viewed as a cultivation process in roles and relations and there only exists notion of relationally constituted "human becomings" instead of an essentialist understanding of discrete "human beings."[203] Notions of human tendency and human becoming are viewed as the bases of Confucian moral cultivation from *xiaoren* (petty person) to *junzi* (exemplary person as the model for social interactions) to *shengren* (sage, top of *junzi*).

Second, *Tianxia* (all under the sky literally, or all in the world of correlations) provides a more macroscopical, comprehensive and holistic view of the global system and overall interests in the era of globalization,[204] compared to the concept of "nation-state" with national interests in international

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[203] See Ames, Roger T., *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p. 88.

[204] Cf. Zhao, Tingyang. *The under-Tian System: A Philosophical Introduction of World System*. Nanjing: Jiangsu Higher Education Publisher, 2005. Since Zhao's publications about globalization and Chinese ancient term of *under-Tian* (He used a translation of 天下 as *under-Tian*, which is different from mine), there has been numerous debates and discussions among Chinese scholars.

relations theory;

Third, Confucian harmony, as an alternative scenario for world politics, is harmony (also a process of harmonization) but not without differences and diversities. This **sage-*tianxia*-harmony** connectional framework simply indicates that the world peace and prosperity depends on moral cultivation of every human being, particularly including the leading exemplary role of person or big country. This framework paying attention to human interaction and affection, or mutual learning and appreciation is different from traditional understanding of IR relying on simply material elements. There is a Confucian processual belief: everybody can become sage! It is necessary and possible if efforts to be made. Besides the above-mentioned three major terms, in Chapter 3 I also discussed about Confucian relational power (*dao* 道, *de* 德, *quan* 权, and *shi* 势) and Confucian conception of security (*an* 安, which is a foundation of Confucian harmony). Both conceptions of power and security in the Chinese sense are understood as more holographic, constitutive, and dynamic.

"There is…something new about today's political belief systems: A new global imaginary is on the rise…We are witnessing the destabilization of taken-for-granted meanings and instantiations of the national."[205] Therefore, within my GPRT, I would switch people's attention from international relations in today's world to global relations. I argue that it is called "global" rather than "international" because the Global Process-Relational Theory is based on a "correlative" world view of *tianxia* (the world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events are viewed as mutually correlating with each other; and there is continuity through change in the relations among persons, the myriad of things, and events between the earth and the sky), which provides a global perspective and more assistance in solving of many global political predicaments in the era of new globalization.

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[205] Steger, Manfred B. "Neo-isms: What's New about Ideology in the Global Age?" in *The Global Studies Journal*, VOLUME 1, 2008. http://www.globalstudiesjournal.com.

It might be helpful for us to rethink and reconstruct the Chinese tradition and develop a theoretical school of global politics consisting of the *Yijing* world view (correlative *yinyang* acosmology), way of thinking (correlative thinking), which are distinctively different from transcendentalism and dualism behind the existing mainstream international relations theories, as shown in key concepts such as rationality, human nature, nation-state, anarchy, competition, power, and security (mainly see Table 6,7,8,9,and10), providing little assistance in solving of many global issues such as potable water and food distribution, clean energy for mass mobility, financial stability, security dilemma, and so on, which are intractable to contemporary theories especially with hopeless human-essentialism, narrow state-centrism, and dogmatic universalism.

In order to do so, I base my theory on holistic and emergent terms with the primacy of vital relations (生生不息 shengsheng buxi), where relations are intrinsic and constitutive. This means that instead of "inter"national relations, Confucian Global Theory would advocate "intra"national relations—that is, relations that are viewed as coterminous and mutually defining, which reflect some of today's trends of new globalization. Furthermore, the basic unit of the world is considered as *tianxia* (all under the sky literarily, or all in the world of correlations) rejecting parochial nationalism in my theory, which is a more *macroscopical*, *comprehensive* and *holistic* term compared to the concept of nation-state in the international relations theory. From *tianxia* serving as a more correlative perspective when we look at global problems, interests of all in the world are far more inclusive than national interests with more or less sense of exclusiveness.

A summary of my Confucian Global Relations Theory:

The *Yijing*: **Correlative *yinyang* acosmology, correlative thinking**, and **Confucian role ethics**

A Correlative vocabulary from the *Yijing*:
   dao, yin-yang, ji-xiong, yi-li (appropriate interest), *shizhong* (situational appropriateness),
   li, Confucian relational power*(de, quan,* and *shi), an*
   xing, shengren (sage), *tianxia* (all in the world), *he* (harmony)

Correlative Choices Model of Decision-making: Situational Appropriateness in Roles and Relations
                    vs. rational choices model: maximizing individual interests
                    vs. universal values and abstract principles

Theoretical pillars: correlativity, *renxing* (人性 human tendency), *tianxia*(天下 all in the world), and harmony

A central idea: global harmony **with differences** (*he er bu tong*)

Method Roger Ames's East-West comparative approach

Language of focus & field (art of **contextualization**/ **harmonious correlations** of the myriad of unique details)

Perspectives Ames, Hall, Rosemont, Tian, Cheng, Whitehead, Loomer, Mesle, Kasulis, Carse, et al.

Principles   Six Principles of Confucian Global Relations Theory
                    vs. Morgenthau's six principles of political realism

Figure 10: A Summary of My Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory

What deserves to be mentioned the most is that notions such as **anarchy** and **security dilemma** are not in the vocabulary of Confucianism. It was not so much that Confucian thinkers had prepackaged answers to the same questions Western thinkers had asked, but they seemed to discuss about quite different issues. As I mentioned in Figure 8 in Chapter 5, while one side views the world as dichotomy of either anarchy (chaos) or a single-ordered world ruled by universal principles and values, the other side views the world as *he er bu tong* (和而不同 harmonization with auto-creative tensions and not without differences and diversities), a self-so-ing process with ambiguity, fragility, contingency, difference, complexity, interdependence, and diversity of *wanshi wanwu* (万事万物 ten thousand processes and events). In other words, "A 'harmony' that is effected by simply imposing external constraints as a means of enforcing order------the application of laws, edicts, principles, or

rules------is dehumanizing to the degree that it precludes personal participation and confirmation."[206]

That is: a single-ordered world (ruled by universal principles and values) without enough acceptance and tolerance of differences is not viewed as harmonious according to Confucian worldview.

6. 2 Confucian Harmonization------Think Locally; Act Globally

Confucian harmony not without differences can also be approximately depicted by Venn diagrams and through Kasulis's doctrines of internal and external relations,[207] whether the relations are person-to-person, person-to-community, nation-to-nation. In his book on *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*, Kasulis once "used the concept of intimacy as a heuristic for understanding central orientations in Japanese culture" in contrast with "the rise of philosophical modernity in the West as a transition from a medieval emphasis on intimacy to one based primarily on integrity." According to him, "The dominant culture of the modern West——that is, the culture of Western philosophical modernism starting with Descartes and culminating in eighteenth- and nineteenth- century movements like the Enlightenment and positivism" highlights a fundamental orientation toward, and emphasis on, "integrity" emphasizing "objectivity as public verifiability, external over internal relations, knowledge as ideally empty of affect," and so on, "in almost direct opposition to the emphases of intimacy" in other cultures.[208] Of course, there are many important exceptions to Kasulis's generalization for Japan and the West, but if Japan can be roughly described by intimacy and the modernist West described by integrity, then in my opinion China should be described by both integrity

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[206] SeeAmes, Roger T, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.170.

[207] See Kasulis, Thomas P., "The Mosaic and the Jigsaw Puzzle：How It All Fits Together" in ed. Roger T. Ames and Peter D. Hershock, *Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press and East-West Philosophers' Conference, 2015, pp. 30-2. Figure 11, 12, and 13 are cited from this article.
[208] See Kasulis, Thomas P. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, pp.24-5.

and intimacy. Relatively speaking, Chinese people often tend to keep their integrity (in some degree) within intimacy. As foci should be considered within fields, individuals should be viewed as within relations, and nations should be imaged within tianxia (all in the world of correlations). That is to say, the uniqueness of each focus within manifold of relations (field) gives it a greater degree of integrity than the other model. This is the logic of Confucian harmony with differences and diversities (*he er bu tong* 和而不同).

In Figure 11, the discrete parts plus their external relations constitute the whole, which consists of nearly identical atomistic pieces. It is external relations such as contracts, putative laws, rules of exchange, universal principles of rights and responsibilities, or criteria of justice that join those independent and discrete components together so as to form a imaginary single-ordered world. Otherwise, without relations externally imposed (order), then there would be merely a state of chaos (independent, unrelated things) and accordingly anarchy.


Figure 11: Externally Related Whole Consisting of Atomistic and Discrete Entities

In **Figure 12**, by contrast, the whole dependent on internal rather than external relations consists not of discrete, but adjoining entities (e.g. *wanshi wanwu* "ten thousand events" in Chinese worldview) overlapping and interpenetrating each other, just as sons, daughters, parents, grandpar-

ents, teachers, and neighbors interact with each other in an intimate and mutually constitutive manner. "The overlap of A and B, insofar as the overlap is part of each, is not a discrete part,"[209] but is holographically reflected in the whole. It is within such intimate, overlapping relations that personal cultivation is achieved. "To father", "to mother", "to brother", "to sister", and "to neighbor" serve as solid and reliable ethical injunctions, and also concrete and flexible guidelines for action, unlike rational choice and abstract principles.[210]


Figure 12: Internally Related Whole with Interdependence and Overlapping Relations

Figure 13 developed from Figure 12, is obviously a more precise description of a *holograph* which reveals the conception of Confucian harmony: Confucian vision for civilizations in the globalized world. Confucian harmonization begins from the wholeness of intimate interdependence of all of dimensions of the human experience and the recognition of the mutually constitutive nature of relationality. "If reality itself is (such) an all-inclusive whole consisting of interdependent processes, it makes little sense to speculate about which entity sets the processes in motion…such a metaphysics would probably not, therefore, have a philosophical narration of an event that brought independent, unrelated things (chaos) into external relation (order)."[211]

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[209] See ibid, p.99.
[210] See Ames, Roger T, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.168 and p.260.
[211] See Kasulis, op. cit., p.100.

Furthermore, within such a correlative web of relations constituting each polity and event, each part of the whole is unique because of its specific interrelatedness with its adjoining parts. Confucian conception of world harmony is characterized by the combination of uniqueness and interchangeability of variety of parts within a holographic whole (*tianxia*: an interdependent system of all things), which cannot be reduced to merely the sum of its identical atomistic units. That is to say, "Nothing happens unilaterally and in isolation,"[212] and relational differences and processes can make the entire *tianxia* community more meaningful, robust, flourishing, and creative. Such as *tianxia* community can be further described according to Kasulis[213]: the holographic whole and the parts are in an internal, intimate, interdependent, and mutually constitutive relationship: the whole contains the part as much as the part contains the whole. Each part can only be understood as reflective of the whole, while the whole pattern can be found within any of the individual circles A, B, C, and so forth since the whole is in every overlapping part. One cannot be understood without the other. Therefore, mutual learning, mutual understanding, and mutual appreciating among civilizations on the basis of recognition of each other's uniqueness and importance can make a more peaceful, robust, creative, and colorful world.

When engaging in geopolitics, Confucian policy-makers need pay more attention to the uniqueness, interchangeability, and complexity of local situations besides the holographically related whole, instead of understanding global phenomena as discrete parts identical in essence and able to be managed by imposing transcultural or universal models, principles, or values that might often ignore local differences. That is to say, Confucian thinkers prefer specific examples within concrete cultural, social, historical contexts to universal models, just as the *Yijing* does show 384 *yao*

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[212] See Ames, op. cit., p.71.
[213] See Kasulis, op. cit., pp.95-9.

symbolic hexagram lines with 384 particular situations and relevant countermeasures. Therefore, Confucian thinkers prefer "think locally; act globally" to "think globally; act locally." In other words, any efficacious plan prepared for global governance must adequately respect and consider differences among communities, races, nations, civilizations, and so on.


Figure 13: Holographically Related Whole: Confucian Harmonization

In sum, with the dominance of traditional mode of globalization gradually *withdrawing from the historical stage* in the direction of polarization of the poor and rich, demoralization, "clash of civilization," and devastation of environment, it is time to rethink about patterns of globalization. That is: Globalization is not necessarily a bad thing. The real question is this: how to understand and treat differences among humans, and how to achieve harmony of human relations in this globalized world? Figure 11 and Figure 13 reveal two scenarios of the globalized world: Figure 11 indicates a traditional conception of harmony as synonymous with uniformity and conformity, i.e., an imaginary single-ordered world, while Figure 13 emphasizes an alternative conception of harmonization with differences, complexity, diversity, inclusiveness, and auto-creativity (as roughly *discussed through the example of Zheng He,* earlier in 5.4) of wanshi wanwu (万事万物 ten thousand processes and events). Figure 13 can also be used to represent "intra"national relations or global relations,

compared with international relations (as shown in Figure 11), as illustrated at the beginning of this chapter.

6. 3 Confucian Understanding of Guanxi and *Mianzi*

The entry point of Confucian logic is relationality other than individuality (discreteness). Chinese guanxi (关系) is internal, constitutive relations. It is relations, but a particular kind in a world that gives privilege to (vital) relationality. "In such a world constituted of unique individuals located within a dynamic matrix of roles and relationships, the performance of these roles and relationships can only be effectively driven by the giving and the receiving of deference"[214] or *mianzi* (面子 face value), which requires a holistic, empathetic, or even spontaneous responsiveness (on the basis of "an affective inquiry—a knowing through feeling—that requires a weighing of circumstances with empathy and concern") to specific needs of others and specific circumstances.[215]

An interesting question: Did Confucian relationality necessarily lead to corruptions, as widely believed? Or let me put it like this: what type of relations does Confucianism promote? Confucianism tells people about what are appropriate relationships. Intimate human relation is favorable, but human relations are not employable for individual end. Confucian philosophy is opposed to inappropriate use of relationship for (maximization of) individual self-interests without accommodating interests of all concerned, without taking into account of both means and ends, without comprehensive considerations of *larger and longer space-time complexities*. That is, Confucian ethics is against a process in which *healthy* friendship turns into unhealthy relations, or

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[214] Ames, Roger T, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.200.
[215] Ibid, pp.194-9.

family relations turn into individual's wealth or political status, or in which others turn into one's short-term tool for achieving his/her goals. There should be necessary punishments of individuals who are inhumane and immoral, chasing profits and turning out to be demoralizing.

In other words, Confucian philosophy developed on the basis of emphasis on appropriateness (situational), i.e., balancing between the interests of all concerned and self-interests. Confucianism provides us with a perspective of looking at human relations through awareness of situational appropriateness. Simply speaking, the directions of beneficial, virtuous, and *healthy r*elations should be generally mutual, rather than unilateral. Situational awareness without concern about appropriateness is very easy to fall into the trap of rational maximization of self-interests, as shown by many Chinese individuals who did just as 100% self-interest maximizers. In turn, without a reformulation of realism into a larger and longer frame (infinite game), realism is just realism. How important human cultivation is!

To be concrete, it is not encouraged to use one's natural relations as tools to achieve one side's individual interests or extend one side's ideologies. For example, corruption in today's Chinese society happens often because of misuse of family relations. Originally, the relations between family members are not artificial, but natural. People should learn within their family relations during their childhood as a starting point of endless human self-cultivation how to become a virtuous human benefiting his or her community. However, some corrupt elements may use their relatives as networks for bribery and *murky* conspiracy. Similarly, pyramid schemes, created by Lee Mytinger and William Casselberry, founders of NutrilleProducts, are based on the logic of turning healthy social relations into individual self-interests. Charles Ponzi (1882-1949)'s pyramid scheme was one of the most infamous ones in human history. Anti-Pyramid Promotional Scheme Act of 2003 now

exists in the USA. However, pyramid schemes got into Japan, Taiwan, and mainland China. This kind of promotion has flourished in Mainland China for more than 10 years, which led to the invidious alienation of family relations and friendship.

6.4 Interpreting China's Rise and its Influence over the World Order

How does China's rise affect the world order? There have been numerous books and articles from perspectives of economics, politics, and culture, published around the topic of China's rise and its implications to world order (e.g., Goldstein,[216] Guo,[217] Kang,[218] Lampton,[219] Shambaugh,[220] and Sutter.[221] This is a topic inviting mainly interpretations rather than just objective answers, since it has been very hard for people to get objective answers. One obvious reason is the influence of China's rise is multi-dimensional and long-term so that few people can describe it in a objectively comprehensive way; A second reason is that China's rise is distinctive from the rises of Western powers like Portugal, Spain, Holland, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States of America, because China belongs to a centuries-old tradition of philosophy and language that has developed independently of Europe. I would **emphasize** that philosophies are very significantly influential over the historical processes, or even more influential than material elements in some particular situations or at certain particular moments. Among all the possible factors, worldviews, modality of thinking, traditional virtues, and cultural and moral values will play fundamental roles in

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[216] Goldstein, Avery. *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security*, Studies in Asian Security. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005.
[217] Sujian. *China's "Peaceful Rise" In the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.
[218] Kang, David C. *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
[219] Lampton, David M. *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
[220] Shambaugh, David L. *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
[221] Sutter, Robert G. *China's Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2006. & *China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

determining the direction of social change.

In order to show how an important role in making people's behaviors philosophies and cultures can play, I also want to indicate a more interesting phenomenon: if you ask Chinese people an either/or question and invite a "yes" or "no" response, it is basically not as easy as for Westerners to pick up a "yes" or "no." You may at large get an answer such as "it depends… (on particular situations)," "hard to say (at this moment)," "if…then", and "when…" This kind of answers can be traced back to Chinese *yin-yang* correlative thinking in pursuit of situational appropriateness, and perhaps ontology of events and processual metaphysics, distinctive from Western substance ontology.

Inspired by Samuel P. Huntington, more and more Chinese scholars and students (including me) are interpreting international politics from the perspective of cultures or civilizations, though 99% of them criticized Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations". This dissertation argues that as its unique culture and historical experience shape its purposes and means, China will take a distinctive way to shape the world's order as I attempt to indicate in chapter 5 by an example of Admiral Zheng He (1371－1433). We can find how a correlative actor, like Zheng He, makes decisions to pursuit harmony with differences of *tianxia* (a world of correlations). Although I can't aver that today's rising China will take the similar purposes and means of Zheng He to shape the order of the world, but I believe: among all the possible factors, correlative worldviews, modality of thinking, traditional values in the *Yijing* will still play fundamental roles in determining the direction of China's changes, which are arousing many temporary suspicions.

6.5 Obstacles to Confucian Correlative Approach[222]

What are the obstacles to a Confucian correlative approach to restructuring our worldview with the

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[222] This discussion is based on personal communication with Richard Chadwick in 2016.

goal in mind of transcending global predicament, especially the security dilemma? In its search for a vision of its role in the international system, China may be limited by beliefs that grew out of history challenges to its existence. For example:

(1) Unfortunately because of many cultural reasons such as cultural reductionism and Orientalism (more or less existing in the above-mentioned authors' publications) and so on, there have been and will be a great many misunderstandings about how China's rise shapes the world order. We can hardly expect the myths of China can be broken up very soon. One of my aims has been written a dissertation starting from comparisons between Anglo-European/Indo-European and Chinese world views and ways of thinking is to erase cultural reductionism and Orientalism, which are obstacles on the road to a clearer China.

As an example of reductionism, Mr. Zheng, Bijian, former Vice President of CCP central party school, first ushered in the concept of "peaceful rise"[223] to present China's will to develop peacefully, without fully consideration of special meanings of "rise" in Western culture. The rise of China is just the "peaceful rejuvenation or revival of China," rather than obtaining anything inappropriate, from the perspective of Chinese. However, the English word "rise" (maybe *jueqi* in Chinese, however, *jueqi* does not entail the historical and cultural background of "rise" ）can imply a negative connotation of a threat to the existing international order. Westerners mainly remembered history of the "rise" of Germany or Japan and its military challenge to the world order. Consequently, "rise" was considered definitely not "peaceful" by many Western people. Political realist theorists, like John Mearsheimer,[224] even assert that China's rise brings about an inevitable conflict within the existing international system and a challenge to the US hegemony as the rise of German empire did.

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[223] Zheng, Bijian. "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status", *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (5). 2005, pp.38-48.
[224] Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton, 2001.

Thereafter, former Chinese President Hu Jintao had to change his policy of "peaceful rise" into "peaceful development" in order to avoid confusion. However, "development" is also a word that some people of the "Third World" countries do not favor. It is just a case of cultural reductionism, which reflects that international communications without understanding about the other side's history and culture led to more troubles. There have been many similar cultural obstacles on China's road to the international arena.

This is the most important question since it is about the application of my theory. In my dissertation, I discussed about how Chinese correlative actors shaped the order of the world with an example of Admiral Zheng He. My line of thinking is to explain relatively typical ancient cases to find the Chinese traditional cultural elements, which can be applied to explain the contemporary international relations throughout readers' own imagination.

(2) China's past as the object of attacks by its neighbors to the north and to the west, as well as from off shore. Such attacks scared a country's people and its leaders' collective consciousness. Such scars were rooted in a strong sense of national fear for survival within the 19th or 20th century international jungle full of zero-sum game, power politics, colonism, nationalism, hegemonism, and imperialism, which gave rise to Chinese patriotism, perhaps easy to turn into nationalism with strong realist concern over geopolitical affairs, that both unites people to fight for a stronger nation, and perhaps justifies hatred of its former enemies or rational choices of maximization of national interests.

More seriously, the modern history of national humiliation had made Chinese people more or less lose their cultural confidence in Confucianism and fall into discourses of a variety of ideologies imported from the West such as social evolutionism (including social Darwinism), materialism, individualism, liberalism, nationalism, and political realism. If this ideological complex makes it

susceptible to military adventurism rationalized as defense and amplifies egocentric ambition of economic expansionism or cultural conservatism, to transcend this complex——in its extreme form, megalomaniacal——a Confucian correlative perspective of *tianxia* may be vital to encourage.

(3) Moreover, China's sudden rise to power, faster indeed than the USA's rise, has the short term advantages created by sudden wealth, power, prestige, and technical skill, but disadvantages in its weak cultural and institutional adaptation resulting in confused policies aimed at export led growth but resulting in a politically unstable peasant migrant work force, increasing national debt, various financial bubbles, and serious environmental problems. These are serious challenges opening China up to the classical "overreach" syndrome. Just as many former emerging countries, so too will China be faced with such challenges. To cope with these difficulties for its second rise,[225] China will need to thoroughly redirect its energies with a vision that at its core must be of a correlative, Confucian nature. Confucian correlative reasoning aimed at larger visions of a peaceful, prosperous, powerful, balanced, and principled China may provide an antidote.

All in all, I have to leave more than three questions that this dissertation cannot fully answer: whether Chinese people can really pay enough attention to the value of their own tradition; whether the world can understand Chinese tradition; whether Chinese can be able to promote their ancient values?

6.6 US-China Relations and the New World Order[226]

What are the options for China and the U.S. in re-positioning themselves in the new world order? As a rising power (a dynamic emerging power), China can be a challenger, or a responsible stake holder within the existing world order; as an established power (a global hegemon), the US can be a

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[225] Cf. Hsiung, James C. China into its second rise myths, puzzles, paradoxes, and challenge to theory. Singapore: World Scientific, 2012.
[226] This paragraph is based on personal communication with Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok and his seminar on Chinese foreign policy and US-China relations (2014).

defender of hegemony, an enemy of China, or try to be friendlier to China. There seems to be not too many options. However, since US-China relations involve almost all of the important issues from economic development of each country to the recovery and stability of global economy, and from handling regional and international security issues to global challenges, US-China relations are glutted with policy options of competition and cooperation multi-dimensionally at the same time. Given this situation, in the near future the relationship between the two powers might be a new type of "not friends, and not enemies, but more communications." Each of them cannot afford not to understand the other multi-dimensionally.

This dissertation aimed at improving cultural communication between the two civilizations. I hope that within the near future, both China as the rising power and the US as the established world ruler can achieve mutual understandings of each other's different world views and ways of thinking, in order to accommodate each other. However, before both giants finish re-positioning themselves in the new world order, we will still witness the process of waxing and waning of their relations. But one thing is certain: China is expected to be more active in communicating with the U.S. and expressing its intentions, since China's failing to communicate with the world, especially with the U.S. due to reductionism and Orientalism, has put China's intentions under suspicion. If Chinese thinkers know more about the evolution of Western philosophy compared with Chinese philosophy, and especially structural differences between China and the West, they may find how to express China as many attempts made to do so in this dissertation. I also expect that more American young policymakers can learn more about philosophies of other civilizations. Anyway, learning more about others is very important before effective communication, as Confucius once said, "do not worry that others fail to understand you; worry about you fail to understand others."

All in all, "the vast Pacific Ocean has ample space for China and the United States,"[227] since the

wisdom of the *Yijing*, especially hexagrams such as *qian* (谦 modesty), *tongren* (同人 relationship),

and *dayou* (大有 prosperity), can be remedies for the competitions

between the US and China. Admittedly, there are many differences between China and the

US, but as long as both US and China respect each other's major concerns and jointly manage

differences and maintain peace, then common interests will be far out way than the

differences that both sides might have. As Chung-ying Cheng and I pointed out in our latest book

written in Chinese, according to the *Yijing*, "The (future) US-China relations can be

not only reciprocal and complementary, but also mutually stimulating and motivating…The

US and China can make common advance in future's cooperation on the basis of mutual

understanding, mutual demonstration, and mutual improvement."[228]

6.7 Chinese Initiatives: From "Belt and Road" to "a Global Community with Shared Future"

As I mentioned in Chapter 5, cultural roots of Chinese contemporary foreign policies such as

Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence and Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical As-

sistance to Other Countries[229] may be found from the history of Zheng He's peaceful voyages imple-

menting Confucian foreign policy of *wangdao*. Today new Chinese President Xi Jinping consistently

emphasizing "a Global Community with Shared Future" on the basis of "win-win cooperation

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[227] As Xi Jinping stated in a *Washington Post* interview during Xi-Obama summit. See Billo, Andrew, and *Yan Shufen.* "Tiger, Tiger: Can the US and China 'Live Harmoniously'?" http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/tiger-tiger-can-us-and-china-live-harmoniously. 2012/2/22.

[228] See Cheng, Chung-ying, and Tianyuan Huang. Yijing Wenmingguan: Cong Yixue Dao Guoji Zhengzhi Xinsiwei (易经文明观：从易学到国际政治新思维 Philosophy of the Yijing: New Thinking on InternationalPolitics), Beijing: People's Oriental Publishing & Media Co. Ltd, 2017, pp.192-3.

[229] See footnotes 191 and 192.

and co-construction and sharing"[230] has been taking wisdom of Zheng He (rather than Alfred Thayer Mahan) to interact with the post-financial crisis world.

As Admiral Zheng He (and Emperor Zhu Di behind him) recovered the Sea Silk Road in 15th century, Chinese President Xi Jinping is in practice promoting today's global cooperative program of jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (a modern version of the ancient Silk Road), with five international cooperation priorities of enhancing interconnection and intercommunication (hulian hutong 互联互通), including "policy coordination," "facilities con-nectivity," "unimpeded trade," "financial integration," and "people-to-people bonds," which is an open, pluralistic, inclusive, and flexible global initiative instead of a closed, uniform, exclusive, and awkward alliance.

I pick up seven key points (as follows) from the Action Plan on the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative[231]issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (with State Council authoriza-tion). Obviously, even though today's international politics is still filled with discourses of finite game (zero-sum game with a definitive ending) which people may be already tired of; Confucian correlative conception of infinite game (interaction without end, jointly continuing a more interesting play) exerts tremendous influence over Chinese initiatives of global cooperation today:

> (1) The Belt and Road Initiative carries forward "the Silk Road Spirit – 'peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.'"
> (2) "The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It

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[230] Since China first proposed the concept of "building a global community with shared destiny" in late 2012, it has gone on to shape China's approach to global governance.This Chinese concept was incorporated into a UN resolution in 2017. The 55th UN Commission for Social Development(CSocD) approved the resolution "Social dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa's Development" by consensus, which calls for more support for Africa's economic and social development by embracing the spirit of "building a human community with shared destiny." "According to Ross Terrill, a research associate at Harvard University's Fairbank Center, China's global governance idea focusing on the goal of building 'a community of shared future for all humankind' has shown the country's strategic thoughts on long-term development of bilateral ties between China and other countries, and has injected new impetus into the effort to establish a new world order."

For more details about this concept, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/20/c_136142216.htm.
[231] See "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road," http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html, 2015/03/28.

upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence…It advocates tolerance among civilizations, respects the paths and modes of development chosen by different countries, and supports dialogues among different civilizations on the principles of seeking common ground while shelving differences and drawing on each other's strengths, so that all countries can coexist in peace for common prosperity."

(3) "The Initiative covers, but is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international and regional organizations for engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit wider areas."

(4) The initiative "should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road."

(5) The initiative "accommodates the interests and concerns of all parties involved, and seeks a conjunction of interests and the 'biggest common denominator' for cooperation so as to give full play to the wisdom and creativity, strengths and potentials of all parties."

(6) "China is committed to shouldering more responsibilities and obligations within its capabilities, and making greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind."

(7) "We welcome companies from all countries to invest in China, and encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction in other countries along the Belt and Road, and make industrial investments there. We support localized operation and management of Chinese companies to boost the local economy, increase local employment, improve local livelihoods, and take social responsibilities in protecting local biodiversity and eco-environment."

Conversations with African people show: So far, so good. China's efforts have been largely welcomed by African people. For example, an African scholar majoring in International Business in Honolulu told me in a very simple way on November 10th, 2017: "China is popular in Africa because China not only takes, but also gives. And long-term trust is everything." Further, based upon my Confucian infinite-game theorization as a non-Western effort, I would anticipate: if China can promote a new type of globalization with a strategy of harmonization of relations (instead of externally imposed order), and with a Confucian-role-ethical understanding of equality with differences (instead of superficial sameness), there will be on the rise a fourth type of globalism——"reciprocal globalism"——on the basis of Confucius's expression of "put oneself in the others' place (shu 恕)."[232] Therefore, this is also a period in which the globalization theory including what were called

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[232] See footnote 175. As Ames pointed out, *Shu* 恕 is defined negatively as "do not impose on others what you yourself do not want."

market globalism, justice globalism, and Jihadist globalism (versus imperial globalism) by Manfred B. Steger[233] can be enriched according to China's own experience of its second rise in this new era of St.

At the very beginning both **President** Barack Obama and **President** Donald Trump held a cautious attitude toward the China-proposed Belt and Road initiative, since they were suspicious of the motives behind the initiative, which is widely seen as a realist tool to maximize China's national influence globally. However, Donald **Trump, who has been endlessly emphasizing American national interests and associated economic protectionism in this globalized age of post-financial crisis, finally decided to** take this win-win opportunity and send delegates led by Matt Pottinger, Special Assistant to the President and senior director for East Asia of National Security Council of the White House, to attend the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation on May 14 and 15, 2017.

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[233] See Steger, Manfred B.Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First Century. 3rd ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

GLOSSARY

an 安 feeling safe

badao 霸道 hegemony with brutal force

bingjia 兵家 Militarists

cheng ren 成人 becoming human

cheng ren 成仁 becoming relationally virtuosic

Changjing 长江 "Long River," the Yangtze River

dayou 大有 prosperity

dao 道 experience, ways of correlation, the proper way

de 德 excellence, potency, or power, and favor or bounty extended outward with the gratitude as a response

dao-de 道德 Confucian role ethics

dongxue xijian 东学西渐 Chinese Learning into the West

fengshui 风水 an ancient Chinese philosophy which develops a dynamic system to deal with the issue of harmonizing human existence with the surrounding environment

guanxi 关系 Chinese internal and constitutive relations

he er bu tong 和而不同 harmonization with auto-creative tensions and not without differences and diversities

he er bu tong: zhongxi zhexue de huitong 和而不同：中西哲学的会通 Seeking Harmony not Sameness: Comparative Philosophy and East-West Understanding

heli 合理 according with li (situational appropriateness)

he shi 合时 opportune or appropriately timed

hou wang bo lai 厚往薄来 Economically, a big country gives more, and takes less

huxi 互系 correlativity

ji 吉 propitiousness

jiao 教 instructing and transforming

jin yue yuan lai 近悦远来 encouraging distant peoples to come

junzi 君子 exemplary person

li 理 situational appropriateness

lixing 理性 situational awareness of appropriateness

li 利 self-interest

li 礼 religiousness, the expression of propriety through one's roles and relations

Meng, heng. Yi heng xing, shizhong ye 蒙，亨。以亨行，时中也

mianzi 面子 face value

qi 器 means

qian 谦 modesty

qing 情 feelings

qu ji bi xiong 趋吉避凶 seek propitiousness and avoid unpropitiousness

quan 权 weighing a situation before making a decision, adapting to circumstances

Renju Huanjing Kexue Daolun 人居环境科学导论 Introduction to Sciences of Human Settlements

renxing 人性 human tendency

Ruxue yu duwei de shiyong zhuyi: yizhong duihua 儒学与杜威的实用主义：一种对话 Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism: A Dialogue

shengren 圣人 sage, top of *junzi*

shizhong 时中 situational appropriateness

shi 势 Manipulating circumstances to create a strategic advantage of situational tendency as an alternative to the commitment of brute force

shengsheng buxi 生生不息 creative creativity, the primacy of vital relations

shenxin 身心 bodyheartminding

shun 恕 put oneself in the others' place

tian 天 sky, both what our world is and how it is

tianren heyi 天人合一 the continuity between the religious, natural, and cultural context and the human experience

tianxia 天下 all under the sky, all of the world, a world of correlations, all in a/the world of correlations

tianxia yijia 天下一家 a *tianxia* family

tianxia gongxiang taiping zhi fu 天下共享太平之福 promoting common prosperity and pursuing holistic harmony globally

Tixing Huanjing Lun 体形环境论 Theory of Planning Physical Environment

tongren 同人 relationship

you rong nai da 有容乃大 Culturally, a big country keeps openness without self/other distinction, rejecting exclusionary attitudes, enhancing cultural exchanges, and encouraging mutual learning, so that it can become bigger

wangdao 王道 sage kings' dao

wanshi wanwu 万事万物 ten thousand processes and events

xiao 孝 family concern

xiaoren 小人 petty person

xixue dongjian 西学东渐 the Western learning into China

xin 心 heart and mind

xing 性 tendency

xiong 凶 unpropitiousness

yi-li 义利 appropriate interest, or balance between appropriateness and self-interest

Yixue Bentilun 易学本体论 Theory of Benti in the Philosophy of Yijing

Yijing Wenmingguan: Cong Yixue Dao Guoji Zhengzhi Xinsiwei 易经文明观：从易学到国际政治新思维 Philosophy of the Yijing: New thinking on international politics

yin-yang huxi 阴阳互系 yin-yang correlativity

Yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一阴一阳之谓道 One yin and one yang are called dao

ying shi 应时 opportune or appropriately timed

yi 义 appropriateness

yi da shi xiao 以大事小 Politically, a big country respects small countries and their special local needs, deepening mutual understanding and trust

zhong 中 appropriateness, situational appropriateness

Zhouyi de xingcheng shi zhongguo zhexue siwei de yuantouhuoshui 周易的形成是中国哲学思维的源头活水 The *Yijing* is the living water source of the endless flow of Chinese philosophy

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