

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NATIONALISM:
COMFORT WOMEN MOVEMENT AND NARRATIVES OF NATION IN POST-
DEMOCRATIZATION KOREA, 1988-2007

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of a political process of nationalist discourses in post-democratization South Korea. It traces the changes in the nationalist discourses formed around the ‘comfort women’ issue after the democratization from 1988 to 2007, focusing on discursive strategies of the movement and media reports. Despite a surfeit studies of nationalism concerning its formation and the conflicts of different ethnic groups between the nation-states or within a multi-ethnic nation, little research has been reported on the dynamics of nationalist discourses from different social groups after a robust nationalism settled in relatively homogeneous nation-states. By illuminating changes of the monopolized state-centered nationalist narratives established during the 1960s and 70s into diversified narratives of the Korean nation emerged after the democratization movements in the 1980s, this dissertation highlights the role of social movements in providing a moral ground for the nationalized people to challenge the official narrative of a nation. The frame analysis on the statements released on the Wednesday Demonstration by the comfort women movement illustrates the dynamic process of the movements’ strategies, working with the official narrative of Korean nation. It also explores the interaction between the movement and larger society by analyzing the reports on the ‘comfort women’ issue in the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Hankyoreh*. It concludes that the Korean nationalism after democratization is not merely made by the state or political elites, but a result of the constant struggle of different political and social agents in the society. The official narrative of the Korean nation, which is state-centered, patriarchal and prioritizing the economic values and efficiency, has been constantly modified as various social movements, particularly the comfort women movement, after the democratization. The movement engages in (re)constructing the nationalist identity with a communitarian nationalist discursive strategy, based more on the universal value and can be expanded to transnational sympathy.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMSRW	Association of Major Superiors of Religious Women in Korea
APHEN	Asia Peace and History Education Network
APWV	Association for the Pacific War Victims
AWF	Asia Women's Fund
EFD	<i>Ewha</i> Friends of Democracy
CHTJ	Center for Historical Truth and Justice
CWCNW	Catholic Women's Community that Opens New World
CWPCRK	National Association of Christian Women of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea
DCFH	Daegu Citizen Forum for <i>Halmuni</i>
EWU	<i>Ewha</i> Womans [women's] University
FKI	Federation of Korean Industries
GAPCK	General Assembly of Presbyterian Church in Korea
GECNCK	Gender Equality Council of the National Council of Churches in Korea
IKHS	Institute for Korean Historical Studies
IRCA	Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities
JWCTU	Japan Women's Christian Temperance Union
KABVA	Korean Atomic Bombs Victim Association
KACWWM	Korean Association of Christian Women for Women <i>Minjung</i>
KAWT	Korean Association of Women Theologian
KCI	Korea <i>Chongsindae</i> 's Institute
KCIA	Korean Central Intelligence Agency
KCWU	Korea Church Women United
KLA	Korean Liberation Association
KMC	Korea Mother's Corps

KPF	Korea Parent Federation
KTEWU	Korean Teachers and Education Worker's Union
KWAU	Korean Women's Association United
KWHL	Korea Women's Hot Line
KWL	Korean Women Link
MCFH	<i>Machangjin</i> [Masan, Changwon, and Jinhae] Citizen Forum for <i>Halmuni</i>
NIS	National Intelligence Services
NWA	National Women's Alliance
PCK	Presbyterian Church in Korea
PROK	Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea
RRK	Revised Romanization of Korean
SNU	Seoul National University
TGCFH	<i>Tongyeong Geoje</i> Citizen Forum for Halmuni
WBWA	Won-Buddhist Women's Association
WMCKM	National Association of Women's Missionary Councils of the Korean Methodist Church
WMP	Women Making Peace
WSKM	National Association of Women Staffs of the Korean Methodist Church
WSPCK	National Association of Women Staffs of the Presbyterian Church of Korea
WSPROK	National Association of Women Staffs of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea

A NOTE TO READERS

Instead of using the McCune-Reischauer system that is commonly used for romanization of Korean in the field of Korean study, I will use the Revised Romanization of Korean (RRK) designed and proclaimed by the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism in 2000. It may be confusing to people who are familiar with the old system, but I decided to choose the RRK over the McCune-Reischauer, not only because it is lot simpler but because it will be gradually changed to the RRK as all Korean name of the institutions and places have been and will be appeared in this way. The old system has so many breves and apostrophes that it is not only difficult to learn but also needs a lot of skills to use even after learning it. Although it is devised by an American missionary and an American Japanese Studies scholar (George M. McCune and Edwin O. Reischauer), helped by some renowned Korean linguists in 1939 and is known to express most similar pronunciations to Korean, this system has long been used as a minimal intellectual threshold, a skill for those who produce and circulate the knowledge of Korean Studies.

Of course, neither of the two romanizations accurately expresses the Korean sound, and a person who has not learned neither system cannot immediately read them as what it is supposed to be read. If both methods do not reflect the correct phoneme, the system that is concise and easier to understand would be more efficient. As the Chinese romanization system is converged into the pinyin system from the various systems, including the Wade-Giles and the Yale, and the Japanese Romanization system into the Hepburn style from Nihon-shiki and Kunrei-shiki, the recent development in romanization in East Asian languages prefers the simplicity. Even though the new systems in Chinese and Japanese were initially opposed for a variety of reasons, as long as the new systems are simple and easy enough, it can prevent the confusion that comes with using different Romanization systems. Therefore, it would be much more useful in the long run to use the simpler and unified system than to use the inconvenient old system only because it was made first and the Korean studies experts are familiar with it.

While names of places and institutions are romanized in official documents and media reports with the RRK since the system was made, persistently using McCune-Reischauer system only in scholarly work will generate more confusion. It is good news that more and more researchers are using the RRK but many of the important journals regarding Korean studies still require the old system.

There will be some exception in this dissertation. I will use the commonly accepted Romanization for well-known person's names to avoid unnecessary confusion. For instance, when I denote the former president of Korea, I will use "Park Chung-hee" instead of "Bak Jeonghui."

Second, for Korean and Japanese names, I will follow the orders used in Korea and Japan: last name first, except the names are already well-known in the West or the person herself/himself prefers other way around.

Third, otherwise noted, “Korea” or “South Korea” indicates the Republic of Korea. “North Korea” denotes the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea.

Fourth, as many researchers, journalists and activists do, I will use the term ‘comfort women’ with single quotation mark as a general term to denote the victims of the Japanese military comfort system at the end of World War II. Activists and scholars agreed upon using the term comfort women with single quotation marks to make sure the writer understands the euphemistic nature of the term. ‘Comfort women’ is translated from the Japanese word *ianfu*, the official term to denote the women who worked for so-called comfort stations in wartime battlefields. *Ian* means ‘comfort’ and *fu* often connotes women who have jobs. The Japanese term can be translated to ‘women who provide comfort’. In Japan and Korea, the term comfort women, is a euphemism for prostitution, especially the prostitution around the military base.

In South Korea, the term ‘comfort women’ have been expressed for a long time in two words: *wianbu* and *jeongsindae*. In addition to these two terms, there have been multiple variations: For the variation from *wianbu*, there have been *ilbon-gun wianbu* [comfort women for the Japanese Army], *gun wiangu* [military comfort women], *jonggun wianbu* [military servicing comfort women], etc., and for the variation from *jeongsindae*, there have been *yeoja jeongsindae* [female volunteer corps], *geunro jeongsindae* [labor volunteer corps], *yeoseong geunro jeongsindae* [women voluntary labor corps], etc. In the writings regarding comfort women, all variations are often translated merely as comfort women. I will translate each word into corresponding words to show the subtle nuances the original documents have. Firstly, I will strictly differentiate the term *jeongsindae*, *wianbu*, and *seongnoye* in the original text, by translating each term as volunteer corps, comfort women, and sex slave. Sometimes, I will use the Korean terms as they are. Secondly, when *jeongsindae* or *wianbu* is used in varied forms as I suggested above, I will include those attached words in the English translation. In many of the journalistic articles, documentary films, academic journals and books dealing with ‘comfort women’ issue, they often pay little attention to this difference in the original text, which lead to create a total lost in translation.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The “Final and Irreversible” Agreement on the Comfort Women Issue

On December 28, 2015, the foreign ministers of the Republic of Korea and Japan announced together that they had reached a historic agreement on the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue.¹ This consensus was so sudden that most experts had not foreseen it though the negotiation between the two governments had started several months ago.² The confrontation over history between Korea and Japan, which was regarded as one of the stumbling blocks in the US East Asian strategy to establish a frontline of alliances with Japan and Korea against China, Russia, and North Korea, seemed to have entered a new phase with this dramatic settlement between the two governments. However, contrary to the expectations of the US government as well as the Korean and Japanese governments, it was clear that the Korean victims, as well as the opinion of a majority of the Korean public, did not welcome this agreement from the moment it was announced.³ The response to the agreement in Korea has been divided to say the least. Except for

¹ How to call the young women and girls who were forced to serve sexually for the Japanese soldiers during the Asian Pacific War has been itself a political struggle among the activists and scholars of various political perspectives. The term *ianfu*, or comfort women, has been used to refer to these victims in Japan but some activists in Japan for the victims began to use the term *seidorei*, or sexual slave, since the term *ianfu* is too euphemistic. In Korea, the term *jeongsindae*, which is translated from the Japanese term *daishintai*, originally coined to describe young girls drafted for the ammunition industry at the end of the Pacific War, was often used to refer to these young women and girls until the early 1990s, but the term *wianbu*, which is translated from the term *ianfu*, began to be used more frequently when the movement for comfort women victims started to emerge. There has been a lot of debate for the proper term and scholars and activists have agreed on this term through various international conferences. Whether in English or Korean, the scholars and activists agreed to use the term comfort women, or *wianbu*, with single quotation mark to refer to the victims to show that the term itself has a euphemistic connotation. Media also use this term to refer to the victims. Others prefer the term sex slave (*seidorei* in Japanese and *seongnoye* in Korean), over the commonly used term. In this dissertation, I will also use the term comfort women with the single quotation mark to denote the victims. In chapter 5, I will discuss more about the debate around the terms.

² Until the sudden announcement of the agreement, Korean president Park Geun-hye, intentionally ignored Shinzo Abe to express that she was not happy with the way in which Japan treated the historical issues. “Korean Comfort Women Agreement Is a Triumph for Japan and the US,” *the Guardian*, Dec 28, 2015.

³ For example, Gallup Korea, in a survey conducted in the first week of January 2016, about the pros or cons of the comfort women agreement, found that 54 percent of respondents said the agreement was wrong, while 26 percent said it was good. On the relocation of the Statue of Peace, 17 percent said it is acceptable to

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was the leading government agency in negotiating the agreement, the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, which came to be responsible for administering the money from the Japanese government, and some right wing social organizations,⁴ most of the media and the public condemned it for being a one-sided and humiliating agreement that did not consider the victims. They criticized the Korean government for selling the victims' dignity for only 1 billion yen because the victims had demanded not only compensation but a proper apology from the Japanese government, a thorough investigation, punishment of those responsible, teaching about the original crime in public schools and the building of monuments for the victims. When it was announced that the agreement included the Korean government's promise to demolish the Statue of Peace⁵ in front of the Japanese Embassy and Consulates, hundreds of people, led by college students, voluntarily gathered to protect the statues. These people have guarded the statues by turns for more than a year since then. Even after the impeachment bill passed in the National Assembly because of the scandal that Park Geun-hye, who was the president at the time of the agreement, received bribes from most of

relocate it if the Japanese government agreed and 72 percent said it not acceptable regardless of the Japanese government's agreement. On the renegotiation of the agreement, 58 percent answered that it should be renegotiated while 28 percent answered it should not be renegotiated (Gallup Korea Daily Opinion, the 1st week of January 2016).

⁴ For example, the Korea Parents Federation and the Korea Mothers' Corps, organizations allegedly funded by the Federation of Korean Industry, the organization of Korea's biggest conglomerates, or *chaebol*, and allegedly connected with the KCIA, immediately staged pro-agreement demonstration near the Japanese embassy.

⁵ The Statue of Peace (*Pyeonghwabi*), also known as the Comfort Women Statue or *Sonyeosang* [statue of a girl] in Korean, is a bronze statue representing tens of thousands of Korean young girls who were forced into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers during World War II. The statue, a sculpture made of copper on a granite base, is a life-sized girl in a Korean traditional dress for commoners sitting on a chair with the shadow of an old woman thrown on the bottom of it. There is also an empty chair next to it. A small bird sits on the girl's shoulder and a white butterfly is engraved on the chest of the shadow of the granny. It is known that the empty chair next to the girl not only symbolizes the victims that no longer exist in the world, but also is made for the spectators to sit on and sympathize with the victims. Although there were similar memorial monuments before this, the first statue was erected on November 14, 2011, on the 1,000th Wednesday Demonstration (weekly demonstration beginning from January 8, 1992 to protest the comfort women issue in front of the Japanese Embassy every week). Several dozen other statues were also put up in various places in Korea and in foreign countries. According to the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slave by Japan, there are now 34 statues nationwide in Korea. For the Korean Council, it is also one of the most important mission to build the statues overseas. Currently, there are two Statue of Peace in the US and one in Canada. There are eight more similar monuments in the world. Except for one in Okinawa, Japan, however, all seven of the other monuments are in the US.

Korea's large conglomerates through her confidante, influential politicians of the opposition party claimed that the agreement was among the worst decisions Park's administration made. This sentiment is regarded as reflecting widespread public opinion.

This poses a big question to the existing understanding that the historical problems between Korea and Japan are caused by the two governments mobilizing their populace with nationalistic emotions (Kim 2010b; Kim 1997; Garon 1997; Ryu 2007; Nozaki 2002; Moon 2005; Choi 2000). Why did this agreement deepen the existing resentment between Korea and Japan rather than dissolve it? Why do most Korean people reject the idea that the agreement ultimately serves the interest of Korea to open a bright future for Korea-Japan relations as the governments of the US, Japan and Korea believe, but think that the agreement is nothing but a humiliation not only for the victims but for all Koreans? Despite the 40 years of silence by comfort women victims in the patriarchal nationalist Korean society, how did many Koreans begin to perceive it as a problem not only of the Korean nation but also of the women who were made to suffer by a repressive state or empire?

The 'comfort women' issue and the redress movement are useful to show how Korean nationalism and Korean identity have changed since democratization. Since the 'comfort women' issue has become one of the most important elements of the nationalist narrative that constitutes Korean identity, any attempt that has been made to resolve the historical conflict without examining how national identity is structured is likely to fail. However, both the Korean and Japanese politicians and officials who led the agreement, and the US government, which pressed for such an agreement, have so far viewed the conflict as being over the historical issues in East Asia, resulting in the politicians' mobilization of nationalism to gain advantages to their political positions in domestic politics, and therefore they seem to have thought that the political negotiations by the leaders of the countries could solve such problems. As the diversification of society has deepened after the democratization, the state cannot monopolize values any more in Korean society.

The announcement of the agreement of the two governments and the reaction in Korean society showed how the American plan to build the front of alliances in East Asia was moving toward an unexpected direction by at least officially reconciling Korea and Japan. Instead of

releasing signed documents, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries announced slightly different versions of the agreement at the same time. The Japanese foreign minister, Fumio Kishida declared on behalf of the Government of Japan,

(1) The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective.

As Prime Minister of Japan, Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

(2) The Government of Japan has been sincerely dealing with this issue. Building on such experience, the Government of Japan will now take measures to heal psychological wounds of all former comfort women through its budget. To be more specific, it has been decided that the Government of the ROK establish a foundation for the purpose of providing support for the former comfort women, that its funds be contributed by the Government of Japan as a one-time contribution through its budget, and that projects for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort women be carried out under the cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the ROK.

(3) While stating the above, the Government of Japan confirms that this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement, on the premise that the Government will steadily implement the measures specified in (2) above.

In addition, together with the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Government of Japan will refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations.⁶

The above statement includes acknowledgement of the “involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time,” in the issue of comfort women, the apology from the Prime Minister Abe, and establishment of a foundation funded by the Government of Japan to compensate the survivors. At a glance, it seems that the Japanese government has accepted three very important demands among the seven from the comfort women redress movements.⁷ However, many people

⁶ “Full Text of Announcement on comfort women Issue by Japanese, South Korean Foreign Ministers,” *The Japan Times*, December 28, 2015

⁷ Those seven demands are 1. Acknowledge the war crime; 2. Reveal the truth in its entirety about the crimes of military sexual slavery; 3. Make an official apology; 4. Make legal reparations; 5. Punish those responsible for the war crime; 6. Accurately record the crime in history textbooks; 7. Erect a memorial for the victims of

in Korea including the victims, feminist scholars, movement activists, and media expressed their intention to reject the agreement immediately. The most important cause of their anger was the fact that the governments of the two countries had never listened to the voices of the victims while they made the agreement but only regarded them as mere objects of compensation.

The comfort women survivors reacted furiously to the agreement. In a meeting between the vice foreign minister of Korea and some comfort women survivors, one of the survivors, Lee Yong-su, condemned the vice minister, saying that “at least, the Korean government should have told the survivors what the agreement will be.” She continues, “the apology was not even a formal one in front of the reporters made by Abe himself, he needs to legally apologize.” She asked, “why does the statue even matter? The Statue of Peace is the symbol of history, built with the donations of our people.”⁸ The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council), the leading movement organization on behalf of comfort women survivors, also denounced the agreement, criticizing it as a “diplomatic collusion that totally betrayed comfort women survivors and the people in Korea.”⁹ The Korean Council also complained that the apology was not proper, the establishment of a foundation to compensate the survivors was not a legal resolution of the issue, the relocation of the statue cannot be the subject of discussion by governments because it was built by the people, and the Korean government had no power to agree on ‘comfort women’ issue “finally and irreversibly.”

The Korean Council points out that “the statement lacks the acknowledgment of the fact that the colonial government and its military had committed a systematic crime.”¹⁰ The comfort

the military sexual slavery and establish a historical museum. These demands have rarely changed since the beginning of the 1st Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul for comfort women, held on January 8, 1992. Among these 7 demands, the agreement seemed to respond to no. 1, no. 3 and no. 4.

⁸ “Comfort women *halmony*, protest to vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “why didn’t you consult with us beforehand?” SBS, December 29, 2015.

⁹ “Korean Council, “KOR-JPN Agreement, A Diplomatic Allusion Betrays Survivors, and Korean people,”” *The Chosun Ilbo*, December 28, 2015.

¹⁰ Official statement from the Korean Council regarding the agreement on comfort women issue, retrieved from https://www.womenandwar.net/contents/board/normal/normalView.nx?page_str_menu=2301&action_flag=&search_field=&search_word=&page_no=0&bbs_seq=14431&passwd=&board_type=&board_title=&grade=&title=&secret=&user_nm=&attach_nm=®_dt=&thumbnail=&content= on January 6, 2016.

women groups have argued that the Japanese government was directly involved in the forced draft of ‘comfort women’ and the operation and management of the comfort stations. They particularly think that if the Japanese government does not admit the coercion, they do not fully acknowledge the involvement. Like the victims, the Korean Council maintains that the apology was not appropriate. They continue that “the apology was not directly made by the Prime Minister himself as the official representative of the government but was read by a diplomatic representative and it is unclear to whom he was actually apologizing. Hence, it is hard to believe if it was a sincere apology.”¹¹

As the victims and the redress movements clearly demand the legal reparation as the acknowledgment of a war crime, they believe that the establishment of a fund by the Korean government and Japanese government’s contribution to the fund is not the proper means of legal reparation. The Japanese government agreed that it would contribute 1 billion yen (\$8.3 million) to the fund. The reparations are neither appropriate nor ‘legal’ according to the Korean Council.

In addition, the announcement specified that Korean government will be responsible for establishing the foundation, despite the fact that Japanese government must be actively involved in follow-up initiatives, including acknowledgement of its criminal responsibilities and legal reparations. It appears that Japan will pass the future responsibilities on to the government of the victims’ country after simply paying off the money.¹²

What was more annoying for the Korean Council is that the Japanese government not only showed no intention to build a memorial but boldly requested the Korean government to relocate the Statue of Peace from in front of the Japanese Embassy. The Council castigated the Korean government for agreeing to the relocation or removal of the statue despite the fact that it had no right to relocate or remove it since it was not built by the government but by members of civil society through private fund-raising.

¹¹ Official statement from the Korean Council regarding the agreement on comfort women issue.

¹² Official statement from the Korean Council regarding the agreement on comfort women issue. English translation from <http://koreareport2.blogspot.com/2015/12/a-statement-by-korean-ngo-on-korea.html>.

What is more interesting is that the public opinion in Korea on the agreement was hostile. Some pro-government media reports shortly after the announcement of the agreement praised it as a historic effort to improve the Japan-Korea relationship, but most media were critical of it.¹³ After Japanese Prime Minister Abe's remark that "there will be no more apology on the 'comfort women' issue from now on," right after the announcement of the agreement¹⁴ and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs insistence on (re) moving the Statue of Peace in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul were reported¹⁵, in many online communities in Korea, people lamented that "everything about the 'comfort women' was sold at 1 billion yen." Leaders of the opposition parties also released statements to oppose and condemn the Korean government and the President.

Most importantly, the phrase that "the issue is resolved finally and irreversibly" was also questionable. Even though most victims did not approve the agreement, the final and irrevocable resolution declared in the announcement made it very difficult for the individual victims to raise their concerns about the 'comfort women' issue in the future. However, the Korean government cannot be the one who can make an agreement on the 'comfort women' issue "finally and irreversibly." This is why the leader of the largest opposition party, Moon Jae-in, suggested soon after the agreement creating a national fund, equivalent to the amount of money that would be given by Japan, and to refuse the agreement and show that the money is not the issue.

¹³ According to the survey conducted by *JoongAng Daily*, 53.7% were not satisfied with the agreement, while 35.6% were satisfied. As for the question whether the agreement will be final and irreversible, 58.3% disapproved and 37.3% approved. And to the two questions, whether Korean government should work on the removal of the Statue of Peace and whether the Abe's apology was sincere, more than 70% people answered no and only less than 20% people answered yes. But only 47.9% disapproved the Korean government's view that Japan acknowledged legal responsibility whereas 47.6% approved. "Whether Japanese Government Acknowledged Legal Responsibility....47.6% vs. 47.9%, Public Opinion Mixed," *JoongAng Daily*, January 5, 2016. It should be mentioned that the title of the article misrepresents the survey result. Most of the answers to the questions say that many more people disapprove the agreement, and only a mixed result is found only in the case of one question. But the editor of the conservative newspaper put the misleading title on the article. For example, in a survey conducted by the Gallop Korea, people who think Japan did not apologize is 72% and who think Japan apologized is 19%. "72% Korean, 'Japan Did Not Apologize for Comfort Women,'" *Herald Business*, January 8, 2016.

¹⁴ "Abe, 'Apology on Comfort Women Issue Ends on the 28th,'" *The Hankyoreh*, December 30, 2015.

¹⁵ "Japanese Media, 'Moving the Statue of Peace is the Condition for 1 Billion Yen, Korean Government Denies,'" *The Kyunghayng Shinmun*, December 30; "Japanese Chief Secretary of Cabinet, 'Korean Government Will Deal with the Moving the Statue of Peace,'" *The Kyunghayng Shinmun*, December 30.

On the other hand, the Foreign minister of the Republic of Korea, Yun Byung Se, states the terms as follows:

- (1) The Government of the Republic of Korea values the Government of Japan's announcement and efforts made by the Government of Japan in the lead-up to the issuance of the announcement and confirms, together with the Government of Japan, that the issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement, on the premise that the Government of Japan will steadily implement the measures specified in 1. (2) above. The Government of the Republic of Korea will cooperate in the implementation of the Government of Japan's measures.
- (2) The Government of the Republic of Korea acknowledges the fact that the Government of Japan is concerned about the statue built in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul from the viewpoint of preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, and will strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through taking measures such as consulting with related organizations about possible ways of addressing this issue.
- (3) The Government of the Republic of Korea, together with the Government of Japan, will refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations, on the premise that the Government of Japan will steadily implement the measures it announced.¹⁶

The Korean foreign minister confirms that the agreement is “resolved finally and irreversibly,” if the Japanese government keeps the promise to provide money to the funds for ‘comfort women’. Strangely enough, the foreign minister also mentions that the Korean government “will strive to solve the issue” of the “statue built in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul.” This was also criticized in Korea too. In return for the money of 1 billion yen, the Korean government made a promise that it will not only officially resolve any problems related to the ‘comfort women’ issue, but also will take care of the issue of the Statue of the Peace, which, built in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul by private Korean citizens, is making the Japanese government uncomfortable. Soon after, the comfort women groups began to raise a fund of 10 billion won (equivalent about to 1 billion yen) to support victims and to return the money from Japan. As I mentioned above, many young people have gathered for more than a year and are guarding the

¹⁶ “Full Text of Announcement on comfort women Issue by Japanese, South Korean Foreign Ministers,” *The Japan Times*, December 28, 2015

Statue of the Peace because they are worried that the Korean government might forcibly demolish the statue in front of the Japanese embassy.

Conservative social organizations began to condemn the Korean Council and urged the survivors to accept the agreement. On January 4, 2016, the so-called Mother's Corps and few other women's right wing organizations gathered in front of the office of the Korean Council and demonstrated, holding a placard, which read, "Let's inherit a stronger country to our descendants by accepting the apology from the Japanese Prime Minister Abe." Under this was a sentence in smaller print which read, "elders [the victims], please forgive them. our family was forcibly drafted as workers too [during the colonial period]."¹⁷ Since the announcement of this agreement, the Wednesday Demonstration, the rally for comfort women victims held on every Wednesday for more than 20 years in front of the Japanese Embassy suddenly got the spotlight again. Several dozen times more people than usual gathered in the Demonstration to express opposition to this unexpectedly announced agreement. One of the most radical conservative organizations, the Korea Parent Federation of the Republic of Korea (KPF), gathered in front of the Statue of Peace, where the 1212th Wednesday Demonstration was just held. The Federation condemned both the Korean Council and the Japanese government.¹⁸ They accused the Japanese government of insulting the Korean people by throwing money instead of a genuine apology. At the same time, they praised President Park Geun-hye, saying that the agreement was not only a courageous decision for future national interests but also a diplomatic victory that no previous government could ever dared to attempt. On the other hand, they denounced the Korean Council as an organization run by pro-North Korean people. Their demonstration climaxed when they tore up Imperial Japan's flags. Two people wearing masks of the Japanese Prime Ministers, Shinzo Abe and Kishi Nobusuke, made big bows to the Statue of Peace as gestures of apology and pretended to be beaten with sticks by a crowd of people.

It should be mentioned that these conservative groups, or at least the people in the government who have mobilized these conservative groups to speak on behalf of the

¹⁷ "Mother's Corps Appears in front of the Korean Council, "Now Forgive Japan," *Oh My News*, January 4, 2016.

¹⁸ "Park Geun-hye Did Well but Abe is a Bad Man? A Strange Wednesday Demonstration of the Korea Parent Federation," *Oh My News*, January 6, 2016.

government, differ in the concept of nation shared by other people. Roughly speaking, many who oppose the agreement think that resolving the pain and suffering of the Korean people from the past is protecting the pride of the Korean nation and maintaining its dignity, while conservative groups and the government believe that even though some of the victims suffered for the sake of the Korean state, they must endure for the greater national interest. Thus, Korean nationalism is expressed in different ways depending on how they “make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds” them.

In Japan, however, both conservatives and progressives were against the agreement. Conservatives were furious about the retreat of the Abe cabinet in admitting the Japanese military engagement in the wartime comfort stations, while progressives criticized that not only were the acknowledgment and apology done in an inappropriate manner, but also acknowledged that the Statue of Peace cannot be relocated or demolished.

Upon the announcement of this agreement, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, released a welcoming comment on it.

We welcome today’s announcement by the Governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea that they have reached an agreement regarding the sensitive historical legacy issue of “comfort women.” They have made clear that by implementing this agreement they will “finally and irreversibly” resolve this issue. We believe this agreement will promote healing and help to improve relations between two of the United States’ most important allies. We applaud the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea for having the courage and vision to reach this agreement, and we call on the international community to support it. We look forward to continuing to work with both countries on regional and global issues, including advancing our economic ties and security cooperation.¹⁹

The US government did not hide its satisfaction on the agreement especially when the secretary, John Kerry, made it clear that the agreement was made “finally and irreversibly” and it will “promote healing and help to improve relations between two of the United States’ most important allies.”

¹⁹ Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/12/250874.htm> on January 6 2016.

The US government has expressed impatience and frustration with the conflict over historical issues between Korea and Japan. For example, the US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Wendy R. Sherman, in her remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on February 27, 2015, stated that,

Of course, nationalist feelings can still be exploited, and it's not hard for a political leader anywhere to earn cheap applause by vilifying a former enemy. But such provocations produce paralysis, not progress. To move ahead, we have to see beyond what was to envision what might be. And in thinking about the possibilities, we don't have to look far for a cautionary tale of a country that has allowed itself to be trapped by its own history.²⁰

While she emphasizes how China, Japan, and Korea are important in the foreign policy of the Obama administration, she harshly criticizes the politicians in China and Korea for “vilifying a former enemy,” for no reason, she believes, then, “to earn cheap applause.” For the US officials, conflict over historical issues in East Asia is hardened by the politicians in the countries and it is an obstruction to the US attempt to build East Asian order. Faced with the rise of China, one of the urgent issues for US foreign policy has been to build a strong front in East Asia led by Japan and Korea. Better relations between Japan and Korea, as longtime allies of the US, are the precondition. Sherman's statement, therefore, was understood, at least by the Korean government, as a warning sign to the Korean government and then president Park Geun-hye, who had shown a stubborn position toward Japan on the history issue.²¹

Indeed, the point made by Sherman is not entirely wrong. As many researchers point out, East Asian leaders have used historical issues to draw more support from domestic politics. Since anti-Japanese sentiments are widely shared in Korean society due to colonial rule, politicians who are faced with dropping support or who are not popular, often tend to be tempted to utilize nationalist sentiment to bolster their support or build their reputations. But Sherman's view is

²⁰ Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2015/238035.htm> on January 6 2016.

²¹ “Vice Minister Jo Taeyong, “Statement of Wendy Sherman is not light”...will confirm the US government's position on the matter,” *The Chosun Ilbo*, March 2, 2015; “America's Frustration with South Korea: A recent State Department speech has revealed Washington's impatience over South Korea-Japan relations,” *The Diplomat*, March 10, 2015.

also based on false assumptions about East Asian politics, and most importantly, on the naive belief that East Asian nationalism will be governed only by the right or wrong judgment of political leaders. Moreover, given the situation that most of the conservative politicians in Korea tend to be highly dependent on the US, the pressure of US officials tends to force Korean political leaders, regardless of the principle of universal human rights and justice, to make a choice to obtain “cheap recognition” of the United States, compromising the historical context and deepening the conflict caused by the historical issue.

1.2 ‘Comfort Women’ Issue and the Process of Korean Nationalism

The different reactions surrounding the agreement on ‘comfort women’ issue show the perplexing relations between the ‘comfort women’ issue and the process of post-colonial Korean nationalism. It uncovers the dynamics of the politics of nationalism, collective memory, media and civil society in South Korea.

Korean nationalism is not stagnant or homogeneous but a processual product of struggle between diverse groups both inside and outside of Korean society. For example, the Japanese government wished to conclude the ‘comfort women’ issue and to remove the symbol of this issue from their sight. Before the agreement, Park Geun-hye administration, which had a very hard position on the issue of historical issues with Japan in order to win a “cheap applause” from Korean people, immediately changed its position and decided to make an agreement, believing that will ease the discomfort of Washington. Some Koreans think that solving the issue of ‘comfort women’ is necessary to recover national self-esteem, while others think it is necessary to promote universal human rights in Korean society. Others think that victims should accept the apology from Japan for Korea's national interest, whether the agreement is appropriate or not. Because the Korean nation is one of the most homogeneous in the world, scholars studying Korean nationalism tend to think that Korean nationalism is also homogenous and fundamentally unchanged. But as Olick argues, “nations are not entities that develop; they are practices that occur, institutional arrangements that are continually enacted and reenacted (2003, 5).” Even in a society composed of a most homogeneous nation, the nationalism that enacts the nation

continues to be challenged by different groups within society.

As we have seen in the example of the ‘comfort women’ agreement between Korea and Japan, the issue of ‘comfort women’ is one of the most important process of collective memories in Korean society. Issues such as the ‘comfort women’ agreement reveal the various fissures hidden under nationalism. As some pioneering collective memory studies have shown, it also shows that “how memory makers don’t always succeed in creating the images they want and in having them understood in the ways they intended. Social actors are often caught in webs of meaning they themselves participate in creating, though not in ways they necessarily could have predicted” (Olick 2003, 7). In the recent brouhaha regarding the ‘comfort women’ issue in South Korea, we can observe the conflict between the various groups located somewhere on the spectrum from the persistent patriarchal, state-centered, and chauvinist nationalism and to the counter-narrative nationalism emphasizing human rights, freedom and peace.

If we keep track of the historical issues in South Korea, centering on the ‘comfort women’ issue in general and how the discourse of Korean nationalism, which is the basis of such views, has been changed, it will help to understand how social groups, governments, and media have competed so far over the Korean identity. It will also challenge the existing view that the Korean nationalist discourse is not only fixed and essentially unchanged, but also has been formed, distributed, and reproduced mainly by elite groups and nations.

First, contrary to the premise of the criticism of the Korean government by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy R. Sherman, the history issues in East Asia are not created and supported solely by politicians. It may be argued as Sherman points out, the problem becomes more difficult to solve when politicians use historical issues to get “cheap applause.” But conflicts over existing historical issues cannot be solved simply by the leading politicians, once the people widely shares the problem. In fact, as we are witnessing, immature sutures only make matters worse. If, as some critics argue, it is true that victims were abused simply for nationalistic agendas when the ‘comfort women’ issue was politicized in Korea, and the voices of the victims were buried in the patriarchal grand discourse of the nation, more people should welcome the agreement because it was claimed to be made for the greater interest of Korea. But the process of collective memory, the way in which colonial experiences and

interpretations of such experiences are interpreted, has led many people to sympathize with the victims' agonies rather than the promise of national interests and future prosperity.

Since the politics of East Asia were relatively more authoritarian than those in the West, studies of East Asian nationalism and collective memory, including South Korea, have concentrated on how government and elites create collective memories and are reinforced through diverse state apparatuses. Indeed, centralized and authoritarian East Asian countries have maintained a variety of institutions that can penetrate the nation's agenda deep into the daily lives of ordinary people. It is an indispensable element in analyzing East Asian countries' nationalism and collective memories in society.

For example, He (2007) and Seo (2008a) emphasize the instrumentalization of history by the Chinese state and the elites. While these studies explain how and when state and state elites are instrumentalizing historical issues, it is unclear what the role of civil society is when these "elite myths" or collective memories are implemented in society. Garon (1997) focuses on "social management" in Japan, which examines the government that "devoted considerable resources to managing not only the economy but society itself" from the 1900s to the 1970s. It shows the state power penetrated into daily lives, not only the organization of the village and school but also control of the mind through various family policy. Ryu (2007) and Nozaki (2002) analyzes Japanese politicians' view on Yasukuni and history textbook. They also emphasize that the rising conservatism in Japanese political elites intended to improve the "level of patriotism among Japanese youth" (Ryu 2007, 714) and the power of the relatively small group of right-wing nationalists, "forming the core of the dominant power bloc, and thereby having significant influence over state policy" (Nozaki 2002, 619). Moon (2005) traces how military dictatorship formed militarized Korean nationalism and imposed it in various state apparatus, such as general conscription, local residents' assembly and organizing skilled labor in heavy industry. Even though she emphasizes the trajectory of less-nationalized women's citizenship in Korea to show alternative nationalization, she seems to describe that both the masculine trajectory of male citizenship and that of less-nationalized women's citizenship are the outcome of the militarized state policy and only discuss briefly the dynamics of the nationalist discourse and practices in the women's movement. Other studies on Korean nationalism also focus on how state and state apparatus work on nation-building and its maintenance but there has been a little discussion on

how those state operations interact with the various social groups in society.

On the other hand, recent studies on nationalism in East Asian countries seek to grasp the role of civil society and the interaction between the various groups in society (Kim 2014a; Lee 2010b; Seraphim 2006; Chou 2003; Piper and Uhlin 2004; Gallicchio 2007; Gries 2005; Igarashi 2000). These studies have in common that they focus more on nationalistic discourse as a place to generate meaning than on nationalist discourse as a tool to serve the interests of the dominant group. For example, Gries (2005) argues that anti-Japanese sentiment in China cannot be reduced to instrumentalization of the state or state elites. Gries points out that the “5,000 thousand years of Civilization” and “Century of Humiliation” of the Chinese nation is “central to the contested and evolving meaning of being “Chinese” today” (2005, 108). He shows how these two key elements of China's national discourse have changed qualitatively over time, showing how the popular sentiment of the “Century of Humiliation” sets the limits for Chinese elites to make policy for Japan. Igarashi (2000) explores not only the state narrative on war but also various cultural discourses on war that shape the identity of postwar Japan. Igarashi shows how postwar Japan “was related to the sense of loss and how in turn this sense motivated its cultural productions” (2000, 12). Just as the lost war becomes a traumatic memory for the Japanese, the experience of colonialism and the Korean War has worked for Korean identity as traumatic memories. Seraphim (2006) also focuses on the various social organizations that have engaged in the discourses on war memories in Japan. These studies show that even under the authoritarian regime, various groups in a society keep seeking to provide plausible explanations and narratives on their own identity, by making diverse cultural products and the products, which are sometimes different from the official narrative of nation or state provided by state and state elites.

Second, the issue of ‘comfort women’ cannot be confined to the Korean and Japanese governments, nor is it simply attributed to victims and perpetrators. Of course, when the ‘comfort women’ issue is addressed, it is essential that victims of the wartime comfort system should be considered first and that their voices should be heard first. However, in the Korean society, the issue of ‘comfort women’ has become a very important element of the identity of Koreans and has created a kind of shared reaction pattern. For example, when someone refers to ‘comfort women’ as disregarding their victims, ignoring their suffering, or otherwise referring to them in ways other than what people generally accept, they will face extremely sharp and

collective hysterical reactions. For example, one of the top actresses once was known to be publishing a nude photo book on the theme of ‘comfort women’. Since then, she had to get off at all other projects – movies, TV shows, and CF – and until recently, she has not been able to get an important role in show business. A professor of economic history at a prominent national university, and a key member of the conservatism group, New Right, commented on the TV debate program that some of the ‘comfort women’ at the time of World War II had worked as professional prostitutes, while he was debating with a lawmaker. He had to visit the House of Sharing where the victims of the ‘comfort women’ live and beg forgiveness. Even after more than a decade, he is remembered as a person who called ‘comfort women’ by prostitutes in the Korean internet communities. A scholar who wrote similar things – that not all ‘comfort women’ were forced to be dragged out of their homes and some were professional prostitutes – in her book that the Japanese government should actively resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue was sued by the victims and the court banned publication because her book was defamatory. As seen in these cases, the ‘comfort women’ issue has become a very dangerous theme in Korean society.

The ‘comfort women’ issue, which first began to be politicized by victims and civic groups in the early 90s, has long held its own position in Korean nationalist discourse, so even if the state and conservative elites try to change that interpretation, it is not only difficult but also becomes a subject that easily backfires.

Abe’s comment on the apology and the pressure from the Japanese government after the agreement definitely provoked the anger of many Koreans but President Park’s statement, saying I “wish the survivors and Korean people understand the agreement in terms of the improvement of Korea-Japan relations and in a broader view,” made the feeling worse.²² The elite politicians and officials still consider the ‘comfort women’ victims as an object that can be sacrificed on behalf of the development of Korea, the majority of people and media cannot accept that they should be the victims again. Considering the fact that the ‘comfort women’ issue would be

²² It reminded many people of the tragic personal history of Park, who lost her parents by two assassination attempts. Right after Park’s statement was released, one of the most read mentions on the statement was that “only if you can forgive Mun Se-gwang and Kim Jae-gyu in broader view.” Park’s mother died from a bullet wound during the Mun Se-gwang’s assassination attempt of his father Park Chunghee and the former president Park was killed by the bullets fired by one of his closest right-hand man Kim Jae-gyu, who was the chief of the Korean Central Information Agency at that time in a private meeting.

discussed in Korean society only after 1991, when a survivor dared to testify that she was a former ‘comfort women’ during World War II, the change of public sentiment toward ‘comfort women’ is remarkable.

Now, the ‘comfort women’ issue is not only the instrument that the politician who needs support from the population would like to play with but often fails but is also the mnemonic symbol for Koreans to realize the contradictions of coloniality.

1.3 Nationalism as Discourse and Political Process

This dissertation is a study of the political process of nationalism in post-democratization South Korea. Until very recently, studies on Korean nationalism rarely dealt with the political process, which focuses on how groups or the people engage in the creation, circulation, and dissemination of nationalism, how official nationalism and counter nationalism interact, or how nationalist discourses are transformed and influenced by the various agents in society, but predominantly focus on static aspects of nationalism, that is how it was formed (Schmid 2003; Kim 1989), what the character of it is (Shin 2006), and how it is different from other nationalisms. In other words, studies on Korean nationalism tend to only focus on the official narrative of Korean nationalism, forged by the state and elites but not the dynamics of different nationalist discourses created by people and groups in society.²³ This study traces the political process of nationalism as a result of constant struggle among state, media and social organizations. In order to examine the political process of Korean nationalism, this dissertation emphasizes the role of social movements related to historical issues after democratization, since the post-democratization social movements reflect the emergence of new subjects and their strategies of how such subjects compete to build a democratic society and how to challenge the hegemonic official nationalist discourse.

I suggest that the concept of nationalism as a discourse, rather than nationalism as a fixed and homogeneous entity, as Özkirimli (2005) offers,²⁴ helps us to understand Korean nationalism

²³ There are some exceptions. See Jung (2010)

²⁴ He is not the first one to suggest conceptualizing nationalism as discourse. See Calhoun (1997); Finlayson (1998); and Suny (2001). For similar approach to nationalism though the authors do not explicitly use the

better. Özkirimli suggests that “nationalism is a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us” (Özkirimli 2005, 30). First, the framework of nationalism as discourse can guide us around some difficult dilemmas when we deal with Korean nationalism. The most practical problem in dealing with Korean nationalism might be the fact that many newly emerged conservative groups in Korean society do not think that they are nationalist. However, if we understand that the nationalist discourse engages in most of the social debates regarding the proper nation and state, every political actor, even one who does not think of oneself as a nationalist, is often deeply engaged with the nationalist discourse. Korean conservatives, however, do not fall into this category. In one sense, they are practically nationalist because, as they argue, they denounce the dominant nationalist perspective and culture, while they emphasize their pride in the [nation] state, condemn heterogeneous elements in the [nation] state and promote a linear development. This will be discussed further in a later part of this dissertation. Suffice it to say at this moment, that the framework of nationalism as discourse lets us analyze the commonality and differences of the competing nationalist discourses in Korean society. Secondly, seeing nationalism as political process will provide the tools to analyze nationalism as discourse. Because, when nationalism operates as discourse, it “divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them,’” “hegemonizes,” “naturalizes itself,” and “operates through institutions” (Özkirimli 2005, 32-33), it should be analyzed asking who are the actors, what changed and remained in the discourse to understand the operation and characteristics of nationalism.

Much of the emphasis here will focus on two ways that Korean nationalism operates as discourse: hegemonization and naturalization. Symbols and cultural structures are constantly being re-appropriated by the dominant social groups as well as resistance groups in the society as Herzfeld (1997) well illustrates, using the term ‘structured nostalgia’. When a nation-state is successfully constructed with the help of various institutions, or a state apparatus and a certain kind of nationhood is successfully imposed on the population, the shared nationhood not only becomes characteristic of the nation at a certain time but also keeps being reaffirmed, recreated and appropriated by various actors in the society over time. The most well established version of

term “nationalism as discourse,” see also Herzfeld (1997) and Brubaker (2004).

Korean nationalism seems to have been successfully imposed on the population during the 1970's by Park Chung-hee's developmentalism.

Park Chung-hee and his regime successfully utilized the state institutions, such as education, general conscription, and state-led campaigns and movements,²⁵ to appropriate existing nationalist discourse, providing the core of the Korean nationalist narrative. The resistance against various dictatorships during the 70s and 80s also successively created a counter-narrative of the Korean nation, largely based in reaction to the narrative created by the government. The most striking and crucial difference between these two nationalist discourses may lie on their different emphasis on the ideal members of a state (or Korean society). Following the founders of Korean nationalist discourse and their successors throughout history until the 70s, the Park regime expressed in various forms of media that their political goal is to create good *gukmin* or people of a state.²⁶ On the other hand, resisting students and activists during the democratization movements, created the term *minjung*, or mass/people. It is suggested as the subject of the movements that can change Korean society while it also denotes the identity of the people who had suffered from the authorities, aristocrats, or foreign powers.²⁷ As democratization and globalization were increasingly developed in the 90s in South Korea, and with the emergence of various movements that wanted to compete in the nationalist discourse, the movements tried to find a more appealing term that was also different from *gukmin* and *minjung*. The most commonly shared term by the movements after the 1990s to denote the subject of the social change has been *simin* or citizen.²⁸ I argue that while *minjung* in the resistance nationalist discourse became a useful counter discourse against official *gukmin*, the emergence of social movements related to history issues, which seem to root in nationalist

²⁵ For how Park Chung-hee regime and following regimes could successfully impose militarized version of Korean modernization to Korean people, see Moon (2005).

²⁶ *Gukmin* is one of the heavily used terms in social science and everyday use of language but it is difficult to translate to English. The literal meaning of the word is "people of a state," since *guk* means state/country and *min* is people, but many argue that in its usage, the meaning has some affinity with *subjects* [that are subjected to a king, dynasty, or country].

²⁷ For how the idea of *minjung* is created, reproduced, and operated see Wells (1995); Abelmann (1996); and Lee (2007a)

²⁸ The term *gukmin* and *simin* are often used interchangeably in everyday usages, some movement groups intentionally distinguish two terms to make sure of their political agenda.

discourse, made it possible to create different route for both nationalisms.

The concept post-nation-state nationalism also needs to be explained. As Seol and Seo (2014) point out, the idea of nation after the establishment of “well-constructed traditions of homogenous ethnic identity – Japan, Greece, and Korea” is rarely studied. The reason why the research does not focus on the changes of the idea of nation results from the fact that studies usually focus on *state* rather than *nation*.

Though Korean nationalism has been one of the most studied themes in history, sociology, political science, and anthropology focusing on Korea, there is a lack of studies to systemically explain the mechanism of the process of Korean nationalism. Rather, the majority of studies often create some stereotypical and contradictory understanding of Korean nationalism. On the one hand, essentialization and reification of Korean nationalism, which partly comes from the orientalist perspective and partly from the internalized nationalist view, seem to force them to conclude that Korean nationalism as a whole has some unchanging characters that we can study.

1.4 Myths of Korean Nationalism

The debate on Korean nationalism is too broad and varied. In this section, I will introduce some myths on Korean nationalism commonly shared in Korean society and in the field of Korean nationalism studies and suggest that if we read Korean nationalism with the concept of nationalism as discourse many problematic views can be overcome.

1.4.1 Historical continuity

As Herzfeld (1997) indicates, “nationalism treats national identity as a system of absolute values, in which the relativism of ethnic shifters has been transformed into a set of reified eternal verities” (42). Korea is no exception, rather it is one of the most prominent examples where this naturalization of nation and nationalism works well at the state level. For many scholars of

nationalism, the Korean nation is one of the most homogeneous nations in the world (Hobsbawm 1990). The co-opting of this fact into a more systematic belief is more intriguing than the claim of homogeneity itself. For example, Korean history textbooks teach that the history of the Korean nation starts from the *Gojoseon* that was believed to have been established about 5,000 years ago, by King *Dan-gun* (or *Tan'gun*), a mythical figure first recorded in the *Samgukyusa* [Memorabilia of Three Kingdom], a compiled book of folklore, legends and history of Three Kingdoms, written in the *Goryeo* dynasty.

The attempt to write a history of the Korean nation in terms of modern nationalism began with the end of the *Joseon* dynasty, in the early 20th century. Beginning with Shin Chaeho's *Doksa Shinron* (1908), based on a bellicose nationalist discourse, so that now many people uncritically believe the history of the Korean nation as written, so that it begins with the *Dan-gun* myth – it is argued that this mythical world really existed on the Korean peninsula and is supported by various physical evidence – followed by the Ancient Kingdoms (or Proto Three Kingdoms), Three Kingdoms, Unified *Shilla* (or North and South States), Later Three Kingdoms, *Goryeo*, *Joseon*, the colonial period, division and, finally, the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Many studies outside Korea point out that the pre-modern nation is different from what the Korean nation is now, still everyday conversations and communications on the web and even in academic discussions people seem to uncritically naturalize the Korean nation and take the continuity of the Korean nation for granted. Only a very few people in South Korea, seem to be able to raise questions about the chronology of the Korean nation. Other analyses of the history of the Korean nation, naturally, made in consideration of criticism from the modernist view of nationalism, argue that the Korean nation begins at least from the *Goryeo* dynasty, considering the facts that it was the first unified dynasty in the Korean peninsula, and that during *Goryeo*, history books beginning with *Dan-gun* were written and the political community with its homogeneous national composition has remained until now (Choi 1993).

To discuss the chronology of the formation of the Korean nation is not a task that this dissertation will tackle. It might be sufficed to say, following Özkirimli, that it is impossible for a nation to exist before the modern nationalism emerged, because “a modern nationality is only possible within the modern discourse of nationalism” (2005, 31). In other words, all the pre-modern communities, however similar they might be to the modern nation, cannot be called a

nation because the idea and discourse that define the nation are not yet formed. Confucian scholars in the *Joseon* dynasty, for example, might think of themselves as a broader community that shared Confucian morality, subjects of the dynasty and needing to serve the dynasty's ancestors and the gods of heaven (*jongmyosajik*), or as members of a kinship or scholastic community that their families or colleagues belong to, but never regarded themselves as citizens that share the same rights and duties with fellow citizens including farmers and slaves. A farmer in the *Joseon* dynasty did not either regard himself as part of the people, that is as belonging to a nation-state, but as a loyal subject of the dynasty or a member of an agrarian community or village.²⁹

An intriguing question that needs to be considered in terms of the interest of this dissertation is why most people believe the common nationalist story. In the dissertation, I will focus on the effects of this strong belief on the Korean nation's historic continuity. Not because the Korean nation actually has an unbroken history starting 5,000 years ago, but because Korean people do not question the belief that the Korean nation has this unbroken history, the narrative of the Korean nation can embrace the 'comfort women' issue and it has consisted the core of the Korean national identity.

1.4.2 Korean Nationalism is Formed by the State and Elites

Whether one is nationalist or anti-nationalist, students of Korean nationalism can only rely on the documents and works produced by government and intellectuals to understand Korean nationalism, especially its early period. In what way and how kings, emperors, presidents, government officers, politicians, historians, revolutionaries, and new media expressed nationalist values is the subject of many studies (Kim 2000; Kim 1989; Schmid 2003). This inevitably leads to a certain belief that Korean nationalism is and only can be formed by the state and state elites.

Whether one is a critic or defender of Korean nationalism, or is rather neutral to it and just studies it as intellectual history, most of the studies on Korean nationalism focus not on the

²⁹ Cf. uibyeong

everyday nationalist discourse but only on the official narrative or intellectuals' writings. This seems to be true especially for the formative period of nationalism. Before most of the people in a nation are nationalized, it is impossible to form nationalist discourse at the societal level. Of course, the timing, when most of the people in a nation are introduced to a nationalist discourse, may be more difficult to determine but it is enough to say that some major changes in the society, for example the expansion of printed media (Anderson 2006), adaptation of general education, military conscription (Moon 2005), experience of war (Eksteins 1989), democratization, or globalization all play a role. The critics of Korean nationalism tend to believe that the state apparatus that can impose its nationalism successfully reproduces the patriarchal, militaristic and even a fascistic Korean nationalism (Moon 2005; Lim 2000; Park 2005; Shin 2003).

As I will discuss further below, Korean nationalism, as other nationalisms, are not just formed by the ideas of a handful of people. Of course, without the universal education system and mass media, not only nationalism but also national sentiment can only be obtained by everyday experiences. The reproduction of the discourse by which an individual is an element in a capitalist society and a loyal member of a nation works with the state apparatus (Althusser 2006). The relentless engagements of people with the discourse is also important in the process of nationalism. As people often do not agree on "what nation does and what nation should be" especially in a democratized society, people who do not like the dominant idea of nationalism have to persuade other people with their idea of nation. Whereas people in a multiethnic society tend to challenge the dominant national discourse with the justification of rights as an equal citizen, people in a more ethnically homogeneous society tend to challenge the conventional interpretation of history.³⁰ Rewriting history is to discover a new subject. As Duara indicates, modern history always uses the nation-state as the subject of its narrative, history of x is aiming to create x as subject, as it is clear in instances like the history of women, history of workers, or history of African Americans.

³⁰ Of course, this cannot be clearly distinguishable. In most cases, these two tendencies are intermingled.

1.4.3 Korean nationalism has not changed in essence

Many of the critical studies on Korean nationalism seem to share the common presupposition that Korean nationalism has not changed much in essence since it has formed. Many of the historical studies and intellectual histories of Korean nationalism try to find the root and the core of Korean nationalism. For example, Park (2005) traces the vulgar social-Darwinist world view of Koreans back to the early modernist intellectuals in the so-called enlightenment period (the late 19th century *Joseon*).

For example, Seol and Seo (2014) point out that, while there are abundant studies on the democratic consolidation, “few have discussed how the notion of Japaneseness, Koreanness, or Greekness has itself been transformed through the processes of democratic consolidation that, on the institutional level, creates entirely different forms of identity politics” (8). The large scale of societal changes, such as globalization and democratization, and the actors newly emerged in the transformed conditions often bring about changes in the dominant ideology: the narrative of their identities or nationalism. Oppressed identities or subjects can easily pour into the process of democratization or democratic consolidation and the state, media and social groups that are engaging in the circulation of identities need to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the dominant or official narrative to accommodate or systemically exclude the new identities.

1.4.4 Korean nationalism is an obstacle in creating rational citizens

The narrative is somewhat familiar. Korean nationalism is too militaristic, patriarchal, and fascistic too promote democratic values in society. It is right in many aspects. For example, we can still find a significant number of social organizations – even including many organizations of social movements – governed by, maintaining and reproducing almost the same way as the military. Globalization and the economic crisis seem to deepen this tendency. Low income and irregular employees are mostly the victims of this kind of discipline and punishment. Also, patriarchal discrimination and violence are often seen in similar settings. Many witnesses would agree that Koreans generally are not tolerant of differences.

This is also related to the civic/ethnic nationalism discussion. As many point out, the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism is based on a Eurocentric idea of development. Also, it naturally indicates that civic nationalism is something good and ethnic nationalism is something bad. Terms such as calm, individual, equality, rational and legal are associated with “civic” nationalism, and others such as passion, collective, irrational, and mass with “ethnic” nationalism. The danger of nationalism comes from this dark side of the “ethnic” nationalism.

Indeed, this is the case for most of the nationalisms in the world. Modern nationalism is foremost a political ideology that practices the politics of conformity. This tendency is reinforced when it is realized and reified in the real world.

1.5 History and Nationhood after Globalization and Democratization

Contrary to some people’s expectations and predictions,³¹ history is flourishing everywhere more than ever and so is nationalism in the age of globalization.³² As Manuel Castells points out, “the age of globalization is also the age of nationalist resurgence, expressed both in the challenge to established nation-states and in the widespread (re)construction of identity on the basis of nationality” (1997, 27). Though he is here discussing the sub-national identities created against the multiethnic states or “nations without a state” (32-50), it is also true in “established nation-states” where strong and homogeneous ethnic identity includes the majority of population. For example, Seol and Seo (2014) investigate the changes of Korean nationhood after democratization and globalization. They well illustrate that the national identity of Korea had to adjust into homogeneous identity into a hierarchical nationhood. Özkirimli (2005) also disprove the argument that national identity will be weakened in globalization:

³¹ The most well-known version is Fukuyama (1992) but Marxist view on the world communist community is also similar Hegelian version of the “end of history.” These optimistic expectations are betrayed by unprecedented economic polarizations (Piketty 2014) and the outbreak of the territorial disputes among communist countries (Anderson 2006).

³² The collective memory studies, which are became most heated field in social science and humanity in recent 20 years, reflect these phenomena (Olick and Robinson 1998).

However, it is not clear why this [globalization] should be seen as a threat to nationalism. Most of the demands for cultural recognition are also instances of nationalism, perhaps on a smaller scale, and stripped of the territorial component. The culture that needs to be recognized is in most cases an 'ethnic' or 'national' one. Hence demands for public recognition of cultural distinctiveness may be a threat to majority nationalism, but certainly not to nationalism *per se*, as the groups that seek recognition draw on the same discourse to frame their demands. (6)

In short, whether it is “established nation-states,” or multiethnic states, majority national identity as well as other “ethnic” or “national” identities have to adjust to the changes brought by globalization. In reality, most of the conflicts between nationalisms throughout the world are provoked by sub-national groups in a multiethnic state, as we have witnessed in many cases in various places in Africa, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and in North America. Thus, a significant number of studies show that emergence of new national identities is increasing, as the new identities come to be incongruent with the current forms of the nation state. But little is known about “challenge” and “(re)construction” of nationalism in relatively homogeneous nation states that are mostly found in East Asia.

Even though the number of conflicts over history issues in East Asia has significantly increased in recent decades, they are rarely understood as a “challenge” and “(re)construction” of new forms of identity. Rather, as Kristof (1998), a renowned journalist, sees it, the tensions in the region are almost always to be understood as the expression of national identities and their collision. Also, East Asian countries’ well known strong states with strong ethnic nationalism tend to emphasize the strong state rather than the dynamics between state and other political actors in the process of the politicization of nationalism. On the contrary, if we closely look at the “history wars,” not among the East Asian countries but also among the social groups in Korea, it will be clearer that the history issues have been uncovered, disseminated, and problematized by social movements after governments set the frame. Those groups are very far from state-led unitary groups based on exclusive ethnic nationalism but rather are self-organized and alliance groups based on inclusive ethnic nationalism.

The dissertation explores a way in which we can understand these newly emerging

nationalist movements in South Korea and the challenges and changes produced by them. What changes can be made by social movements in a hegemonized ethnic nationalism in a relatively homogeneous nation state? Do we need another theoretical frame to understand them? How is it possible that some of the social movements came to be associated with universal values, such as human rights, women's rights, and peace, while they still maintain strong ethnic or national orientation? Is there any pattern or specific characters in these changes? What elements of the movements can help a group to develop such ideas? What is the impact of social movements on broader nationalist discourses? These are the questions that this dissertation wants to find answers for.

This dissertation explores the political development of post-nation-state nationalism in South Korea. The first object of this dissertation is to overcome the conventional understanding of Korean nationalism. Korean nationalism is often conceived as "ethnic nationalism" (Shin 2006). The many stereotypes that are generated from the conventional dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism are also attached to it. Korean nationalism is commonly thought of as a state-led, unitary, and exclusive nationalism, which "maintained its patriarchic/masculine nature through the constant militarization of everyday life" (Seol and Seo 2014, 11).³³ While I am not totally disagreeing with this conventional understanding, I need to point out that something else is also happening in this strong ethnic nationalism with the democratization of South Korea in the age of globalization. For example, I would argue that Korean nationalism is a result of the constant struggle of different political and social agents in society. Their strategies of appropriation of reified nationalist discourses are varied. Broadly speaking, the state generally wants to embrace all members of the population or create an internal enemy to unite the majority of people, while social movement organizations seek to create broader supports among the people. Also, the concept of the people that different groups want to create is also diverse. These different goals are reflected in the usage of the nationalist discourse in the process of nationalist discourses.

The dissertation also aims to provide some useful framework to analyze ethnic nationalism. Opposing to the conventional dichotomy that is widely used to analyze different

³³ See also Shin and Robinson (1999); Shin (2006); Moon (1998, 2005).

types of nationalisms, there have been various suggestions to substitute the old dichotomy. Rogers Brubaker made one of the promising suggestions. To resolve analytic and normative ambiguities, he proposes to use terms “*state-framed* and *counter-state* understanding of nationhood” (Brubaker 1999, 67), instead of using conventional civic and ethnic nationalism. These typological categories, however, also have problems. Like many other studies on nationalism, these categories also came out from the multiethnic states. If we try to apply these categories to Korea or other states that homogeneous ethnic nationalism is well established, one would immediately be at a loss which nationalist discourse is “state-framed” and which are “counter-state.” As we will see in the comfort women movement case, it is difficult to say some discourses are related to “state-framed” and the discourses generated from the movement groups are “counter-state.” It is more like there are some elements in the discourses generated from the movement groups, which are “state-framed” and there also some elements in the same discourses, which are “counter-state.” As it is difficult to find ethnic or civic element separately in any nationalist discourse, it is difficult to divide the nationalist discourse into “state-framed” and “counter –state.”

It emphasizes the competent and contingent nature of nationalism. Instead of using these typological categories, I would rather argue that all the nationalist discourse share part of both characteristics of traditional civic and ethnic nationalism. I would frame this confrontation in the nationalism as the contention between people and citizen. Whereas some nationalist discourses more focus on creating people, that is collective identity as part of an organic nation, others emphasize more on individualities and rights of the bearers of this identity. In Korean nationalism, both the desires of cultivating *gukmin*, *minjung* and *simin* can be understood as to more focus on people as collective identity, whereas the challenges from other social movements have made some fissures in it and sometimes focus more on creating citizen.

The dissertation ultimately seeks to understand the impacts of discourses of social movements strategically designed to appeal to more people, to broader nationalist discourse. Social movements have been understood as one of the most important driving forces that changes the world since the late 60’s in social science. Most of the studies on social movements, however, devoted to understanding how they could arise and how they became successful, and rarely to understand the impacts on broader society. Classical social movement theories, such as

political opportunity (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977; Kriesi et al. 1992; McAdam 1999), resource mobilization and political process (McCarthy and Zald 1977), social network (Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, and Eklund-Olson 1980; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Diani 1997; Diani and Bison 2004), strategies and tactics (McAdam 1983; McAdam et al. 2005; Levitsky 2007), and etc., are all centered on the question of how a movement could start and success.³⁴ To understand the changes made in Korean nationalist discourse and the role of social movements in these changes, it is important to develop a way to analyze the impact. Here, I will utilize existing theories but in little bit different way. Framing process, for example, is a good tool to evaluate the impacts that a social movement made to broader discourse.

The dissertation is to expect to provide novel understanding of ethnic nationalism as discourse and as process. Korean nationalism and the challenges it faces are somewhat different from those of most of the nation states that are consist of multi-ethnic or multi-national groups. But the recent challenges to and (re)construction of nationalism in South Korea also presents useful understanding of recent changes in nationalism in general. So far, ethnic identity or national identity are believed to be the only driving forces to challenge and (re)construct existing nation state and nationalism, but as it is clearly shown in Korean case, aspiration to some universal values mixed with ethnic nationalist sentiment is also one of the important driving forces that gives pressure to existing nation state and nationalism to change.

The dissertation is expected to contribute to nationalism, social movements, and collective memory studies by combining two unrelated field: social movements and nationalism. In the field of nationalism and collective memory, social movements are rarely the object of studies. It is only studied in the field in terms of that the questioning social movements reflect existing nationalism or collective memory. Also in the field of social movements, the impacts of the movements are rarely studied largely because lack of the method to measure the impacts.³⁵ The dissertation, on the contrary, highlights the role of social movements as one of the most

³⁴ More recent studies on social movements, especially framing process (Snow and Benford 1988; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Snow et al. 1986) and collective identity (Mueller 1994; Klandermans 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992) afford more focus on the social movements' impact on the people who are participating or mobilized (whether one is mobilized as participant or audience).

³⁵ Andrews (2004) is an exception.

important actors in creating, maintain and changing nationalist discourse and collective memory. It also tries to assess the impacts of the social movements unto broader nationalist discourse.

Finally, it also sheds a new light on understanding Korean nationalism. Most of the studies on Korean nationalism are centered on the formational period. Only a handful of studies have focused on the recent changes of Korean nationalism (Seol and Seo 2014; Jung 2010). One of the most influential studies on Korean nationalism (Shin 2006), however, provides some misunderstanding and stereotypes of Korean nationalism. This study can contribute to offer more balanced understanding of Korean nationalism and recent changes of it, along with the development of social movements.

1.6 Case

Among various forms of history-related social movement organizations, the dissertation will focus on two prominent groups, which are called the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slave by Japan (hereafter the Korean Council) and Textbook Forum (henceforth TF). After introducing background of emergence of general history-related social movement groups, I will mention why these particular groups were chosen and what the implication of it is.

1.6.1 Emergence of history-related social movements

1.6.1.1 Definition

The term, “history-related social movements” is not common.³⁶ I use the term because I believe these specific movements and their organizations are largely relevant to challenges and

³⁶ For example, in the Encyclopedia of Korean Associations (NGO Times and Civic Movement Communication Center 2006), which aggregates the basic information of 23,017 Korean non-government organizations, there is no category called, “history” or “history-related” among its 11 categories and 40 sub-categories. This category is not the part of the ICNPO (the International Classification of Nonprofit Organization) either, which is widely used for studying NPOs. Many of the organizations in question in this dissertation, either fall into education (APHN), academic (APHN), women (Korean Council), culture, human rights (Korean Council), or peace (APHN), unification and nation.

(re)constructing nationalist discourse in South Korea. By the term “history-related social movements,” I mean social movements that are broadly engaging in the rewrite or correct the history of Korea and/or neighboring country.³⁷ These movements and organizations are sharing the twofold ideas of reinterpretation of history for better life: one of these groups is more focusing on history itself, while the others are more focusing on the persons or victims of the past. This includes but is not limited to both progressive the Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activists (henceforth IRCA) and reactive TF, a group of people that argue to revise Korean history textbooks because they are too contaminated by the ethnic-nationalist view, the movement groups, acting against Japanese history textbook revision, such as Asia Peace and History Network (APHN) or the victims’ right advocacy groups such as the Korean Council.

1.6.1.2 *Society matters*

History first became an international issue in East Asia, when the Ministry of Education of Japan announced they will revise school textbook’s account on World War II in 1982.³⁸ The first response was definitely a state-led, based on the fact that among the number of article on this issue. There were no indications of any types of reaction from society, except one report that a Chinese restaurant owner decided to refuse to take any Japanese customer until the problem is resolved.³⁹ Figure 1 below, however, clearly shows that the number of reactions from society outnumbers those from the government in the 90’s and 2000’s. The “shifting opportunities and constraints,” or democratization of South Korea, enabled the members of society to express their frustrations and anxiety.⁴⁰ With the increasing number of protests from society, there also are

³⁷ Many pure academic organizations on history, therefore, are not in question in the dissertation, in spite of their activity could bring about some significant changes in nationalism.

³⁸ Los Angeles Times, “Japan’s Textbook Changes on World War II Spark Asian Furor,” Jul 29, 1982.

³⁹ For weeks, *Donga Ilbo* dealt with this issue, sparing significant part of its space. Among these abundant reports on the issue for weeks, I could only find this article, mentioning of reaction from individual or groups from the society. All other articles are about the reactions from government personnel, government as entity, political figures, or in-depth analysis on revised Japanese textbook. *Donga Ilbo*, “No Japanese are allowed,” Jul 22, 1982.

⁴⁰ It is also important to points out that political opportunity does not “have a singular and deterministic effect on social movement”

increasing numbers of statements and claims based on nationalist sentiments, since the issues are involved around history, which is the backbone of nationalism. The analysis on these increased voices from society would help us to understand the changes of and challenge to nationalist discourse.




Figure 1 Number of all articles includes the words ‘comfort women’ in New York Times, Washington Post, and LA Times⁴¹

1.6.1.3 *Minjung movements and centrality of history issue*

It is worth to point out that democratization movements in South Korea is heavily engaged with the creation of new understanding of historical past. The scholars on student movements in the 80’s often emphasize this centrality of historiography in democratization movements. For example, Abelmann points out that “in the South Korean community of dissent, memory was imagined as a personal resource or collective repository that could mobilize people. Easily naturalized as an objective, neutral repository of the past, memory was posed against official histories that were edited by the hands of those with interests” (1996, 20). Lee argues that this

⁴¹ “Protests from civil society” includes the various types of protests organized and performed by individuals or movement groups, such as 1) expression of protests, 2) report, declaration, or threat of future activity 3) meeting or conference, 5) demonstration, 6) damaging Japanese property, 7) injuring Japanese, 8) initiation of publicity campaign, Legal action, and Boycott. “Protests from governments” includes 1) summoning ambassador, 2) expression of protests, and 3) legislative actions.

“postcolonial phenomenon” is resulted from “a crisis of historical subjectivity,” which led intellectuals and students “to critically reevaluate and reinterpret major events in Korean history” (2007, 2). Majority of the people who engaged in history-related social movements in the 90’s and 2000’s are people who were part of the process.⁴² The reevaluation and reinterpretation of the past events are largely the part of the process to create different subjects to protest against government or to devote their life to create better world. Korean nationalism might be based on unitary ethnicity but it might be also based on different types of subjectivities created by the different groups of people.

1.6.2 History related movements

The dissertation focuses on, but not limited to, two major movements and movement groups to analyze the changes of framing and the strategies. These are most prominent groups working on history issues related to neighboring countries and Korea. Also, I would examine a reactive movement, criticizing the ethnic nationalism centered Korean history and the movements based on that and arguing to revise new Korean history textbook that emphasizes the importance of economic development and protection from communism.

1.6.2.1 comfort women Movement

The Korean Council is known as the central group for advocating the rights of former ‘comfort women,’ since the issue was first emerged as a social movement in the early 1990’s. It was established on November 16, 1990, as a coalition of individuals and 36 women’s groups mostly affiliated to Christian churches.⁴³ The founding figures of the Korean Council, Yoon Jung-ok and

⁴² comfort women movement was begun by upper-middle class university professors, but the staffs and members of the member organizations are largely from this tradition.

⁴³ In the 70s to 80s, church played important role both in labor and student movements. The harsh repression from the government to any kind of social movements made movement groups disguised with church organizations. While the organizations expanded, many of the groups under church themselves also became to play important role in the democratization process. This can explain the close relation of comfort women movement as well as other women’s movement with the church organizations. (Interview with Yoon Meehyang, Aug, 2008). See Koo (2001) and Lee (2007a) on the role of Church in labor and student

Lee Hyo-jae, are regarded as the first generation of the women’s movement in South Korea.⁴⁴

Affiliation	Name of the member organizations
Protestant church	National Association of Women’s Missionary Councils of the Korean Methodist Church (WMCKM)
	National Association of Women Staffs of the Korean Methodist Church (WSKM)
	Korean Association of Christian Women for Women <i>Minjung</i> (KACWWM)
	Women Church (WC)
	National Association of Women Staffs of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (WSPCROK)
	National Association of Christian Women of the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (CWPCROK)
	National Association of Women Staffs of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (WSPCK)
	Korea Church Women United (KCWU)
	Gender Equality Council of the National Council of Churches in Korea (GECNCK)
	Korean Association of Women Theologian (KAWT)
Catholic Church	Catholic Women’s Community that Opens New World (CWCNW)
	Association of Major Superiors of Religious Women in Korea (AMSRW)
Won-Buddhist	Won-Buddhist Women’s Association (WBWA)
Women’s movement	Ewha Friends of Democracy (EFD)
	National Women’s Alliance (NWA)
	Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU)
	Korean Women Link (KWL)
Peace movement	Korea Women’s Hot Line (KWHL)
	Women Making Peace (WMP)

Table 1 Affiliation of the member organizations in the Korean Council

Initially, the council began with an effort to find the historical trace of former ‘comfort women’ by an English literature professor, Yoon Jung-ok, at Ewha Womans University [*sic*]. She organized a group to place pressure to Korean and Japanese government to resolve ‘comfort

movement.

⁴⁴ Both are professor at Ewha Womans University [*sic*] in Seoul. Ewha Womans University is the first and most precious women’s university in South Korea. Especially, Lee, as a first-generation feminist sociologist, is regarded the pioneer of the feminist studies in South Korea.

women' issue, couple of weeks before then-president Roh Taewoo visited Japan. It was on August 14, 1991 when the first testimony from former 'comfort women' was publicized the issue itself became to be known and the Korean Council became the center of the scene.

In 2017, the Korean Council is consisted of nineteen social organizations (see Table 1). Though all of them are women's groups, ten are affiliated with protestant churches, two are Catholic Church, four are women's movement groups, one is peace movement group, one is Buddhist group and the last one is a student movement group. Though there have been some changes in the composition of the member organizations in the Korean Council, one thing has not been changed that the ideological spectrum of the member organization is wide. Protestant churches, especially Presbyterian churches, in South Korea are well known for its conservative position. It is also familiar to Koreans that most of the extreme right wing remarks are often delivered by the ministers of the protestant churches. On the other hand, some of the groups in the organization are somewhat too progressive compared to other groups. All the representatives of member organizations participate in the general assembly that decides most of the plans and goals for movement. The leaders and the staffs of the Korean Council, therefore, had to facilitate the agreements on the plans and goals of the movements before they begin any activities to persuade general population and even the international audiences. By the way, most of the group's projects, events, and operations are undertaken by the executive committee.

The Korean Council usually engages with three main projects. First, it seeks to get influence over the Japanese government to change its policy towards the 'comfort women' issue. The Wednesday Demonstrations weekly held in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul and other international events, including the organization of Asia Women's Network, International Tribune for Women, and networking with the other countries' legislative bodies, can be categorized to this. Second, it supports and helps 'comfort women' survivors. Whereas some of them are taken care of in the civil institutions, a sort of nursing home, like the famous House of Sharing, majority of them are scattered over the Korea and are living by themselves.⁴⁵ The Korean Council also organizes local supporting groups for 'comfort women' survivors to assist survivors without anyone who can take care of them. Third, the Korean Council also is operating

⁴⁵ It is well known that only few of them have family and most of them have no family.

the War and Women's Human Rights museum.

The Wednesday Demonstration is crucially important to understand the success of the comfort women movement. The Demonstration began on Jan 8, 1992, when any of the organizers of the movement didn't know that it would last for more than 20 years. The demands made at the Demonstration were rarely accomplished but it became the center of the movements. Various people from different places can gather at this site every week and share opinions, statements, supports and sympathy. As it lasts more, it became more important. In terms of my study, it also has produced large volumes of statements released at every Wednesday Demonstration. Though not all the statements can be found, large part of them were compiled and published in a book and keep uploaded on their website. They are great documents that show the changes of the discursive strategies that Korean Council has been taken.

1.6.2.2 Anti-revision of Japanese History Textbook Movement

APHN was established in 2001 when a Japanese conservative group published a new history textbook, contains the many controversial issues in April 2001. The leading figures of the group were the scholars, school teachers, and movement leaders, mostly have worked with or in the Korean Council. The Network also a coalition group but the number of member groups was much bigger than the Korean Council. It was consisted of more than 90 civil society organizations, ranging from Korean Confederation of Trade Union to some of the nationalist groups. The main goal of this group was to impede the approval of the Japanese Minister of Education on the conservative history textbook in question and adopting it to local Board of Education. As their efforts in 2001 turned out successful, they quickly added more goals. First, the group became to more focus on peace movement. As its network was expanded to Japan and China, the group's aim expanded to construct environment toward peace in East Asia. Second, the group organized the international writing groups to write an alternative history textbook that can be accepted by all the East Asian countries and published it in three languages. Third, they also organized Youth History Camp for Peace in Asia to let young people share their different perspectives on history and make a space for understanding each other.

1.6.2.3 Reactionary Movement

From the early 2000's, group of scholars and activists argues that the Korean history textbook, especially textbook on modern and contemporary history is extremely biased by nationalist perspective. They also suggest that they write a well-balanced modern and contemporary history textbook that appropriately reflect the glory of the nation achieved by prominent people. This group formed an organization, called Textbook Forum, and there were few similar organizations created around same time. They are called "New Right" movements. Not only did they differentiate themselves from the existing Korean conservative, claiming that they were Advanced Forces, but they also opposed the groups represented by 386, which had been in political power at the time, for being obsessed with leftist and nationalist ideology. The New Right groups would disagree with such criticism, but it has been pointed out that their logical structures are similar to those of Japanese right-wing politicians since the New Right began to emerge. In other words, even though they implicitly abhor to the ethnic nationalism from the ideological repulsion of North Koreans, they are one of strong nationalists as they regard South Korea as a nation-state and the economic development of the state as such as the best value.

Other far-right organizations were also established in the mid-2000s. Korea Parent Federation (KPF) is established in 2005. By using "parent" in the name of the organization, the group appeals to Confucian morality to blatantly to honor their parents. They argue that because young people in Korea who do not have memories of war and poverty are destroying the country by following a leftist ideology and North Korea, they had to stand on the street to protect the country from the reckless young people.

1.7 Structure of the Chapters

The dissertation will explore the changes of the narrative of the Korean nation focusing on the nationalist discourse of the 'comfort women' issue.

Chapter 2 will briefly sketch the theoretical framework for thinking about Korean nationalism from a different angle. Although there has been a great deal of theoretical development in nationalism studies and social movements studies, the studies on Korean

nationalism and social movements can embrace such developments only so far. In this chapter, I will consider how one can adapt theoretical developments to study Korean social movements and nationalism and suggest alternative typology to understand the various nationalist discourses in a relatively homogeneous nation state.

Chapter 3 will introduce methodology. First, it discusses the methodological problems in studying Korean nationalism. Second, I will discuss how frame analysis and discourse analysis will be used to understand the transformation of the discursive strategies of the comfort women movement and their impact on the larger nationalist discourse.

Chapter 4 will explore the proto-type narrative of the contemporary Korean nation. The 1960s are the time that the Korean state came to be firmly established thanks to the development of a state apparatus that could compel and mobilize people for the deep structuring of society. With the enhancement of the state apparatus, it became possible to impose the state ideology. As recent cultural studies on the 1960s Korean literature indicates, the narrative of the Korean nation that the state tried to impose on its people and the counter-hegemonic narrative of Korean nation from the student movements that first formed in the process of the 4.19 student movements, in the process of the anti-Korea-Japan Conference movements and in the process of various other anti-government movements are strikingly similar. Many of the reoccurring themes of Korean nationalism and the narrative of the Korean nation started from this period when the official narrative and the counter-hegemonic narrative were still not divided.

In chapter 5, I will discuss the confusion in the terms to denote the ‘comfort women’ in Korea before I begin to analyze the discursive strategies of the movement’s groups and its impact on the larger Korean nationalist discourse. Whereas the terms ‘comfort women’ and military sexual slavery are widely used in English to denote military ‘comfort women’, the terms *Jeongsindae* [voluntary corps] and *wianbu* [comfort women] have been interchangeably used to denote historical ‘comfort women’ in Korea. Contrary to the many critics’ claim that the mixed usage of both terms reflects the nationalist tactics in the comfort women movement, I will argue that those usages only reflects the collective misunderstanding of the wartime comfort system. Also, I will add that the pertinence of using the term *jeongsindae* to denote ‘comfort women’ is done by the conservative media rather than the movement groups for ‘comfort women’.

In chapter 6, I will analyze the discursive strategies of the ‘comfort women’ movement groups from their statements released during the Wednesday Demonstration for 20 years, using frame analysis and critical discourse analysis. Though not every statement remains to be analyzed, the vast amount of the statements over the years will help us understand the intention and changes of the discursive strategies of the movement. Since every statement in each Wednesday Demonstration is written by a different host member organization of the Korean Council, it also shows how nationalist discourse and other challenging counter national discourse are negotiating, transforming and appropriating each other.

In chapter 7, I will analyze the news articles on the *Chosun* and the *Hankyoreh* to explore the impact of the movement’s discursive strategies on larger nationalist discourse as it appeared in the media. Since the two newspapers have their own political agenda, the strategies of the comfort women movement are not always directly channeled through the media. This will illustrate how the different nationalist agendas and other challenging political schemes are interacting in articles in national newspapers.

As the counter-hegemonic narratives of the Korean nation became greatly influential on the official narrative, especially with the democratization under the more progressive presidents, while the conservatives have tried to regain control over the discourses on the Korean nation and history. The most significant movements were the New Rights and the Text Forum. In chapter 8, the strategies and the deviance of these movements will be introduced and analyzed.

CHAPTER 2. Communitarian Nationalism and the Role of Social Movements

There are increasing numbers of studies of the contentions over the history issue in East Asia. Most of the studies concerning the strong nationalist sentiment encouraged by the state and state elites. This has been the perspective not only of the experts on this issue and the policy makers related to it, whether they are outsiders or insiders of the countries, but also the political leaders who have mobilized this sentiment for their political goals in the East Asian countries. This perspective often relies on the idea that non-Western nationalism based on ethnicity and passion can be sometimes dangerous because it can lead to unreasonable conflict between the ethnic groups. As we have seen in the case of the agreement of the ‘comfort women’ issue, however, the conflict over the history issue in East Asia is not just the conflict among the different nation states. The people do not always follow the nationalist agenda set by the government but even among the different people in a country have different idea and interpretations on the history issue. As the theories of nationalism have developed, it cannot help but focusing on the increasing ethnic conflicts which brought horrendous violence among the ethnic groups, the studies of nationalism is almost always about the ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic state or the animosity between the nation-states. Even in Korea, Japan or Greece, where a nation-state is consisted of relatively homogeneous ethnic group, however, the political struggle between the groups over the interpretation of the ideal nation or of how they “make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds” them happens all the time. In this chapter, I will try to suggest a alternative typology of nationalist discourse that can overcome the prejudices that created by the influential ethnic and civic nationalism and can provide the tool for understanding the dynamics of nationalist discourses in a relatively homogeneous nation-state.

2.1 Conundrum of Korean Nationalism: Is Korean Nationalism Civic or Ethnic?

Experts on the culture, history, and politics of Korea and East Asia would mostly agree that Korea has a strong ethnic nationalism (Shin 2006), whether it is South or North (Armstrong 2003; Hart 1999), before the Japanese annexation of Korea (Schmid 2000, 2003; Duncan 1998) and during the Japanese colonial rule (Em 1999), through the state apparatus (Moon 2005), even in the student movements (Abelmann 1996; Lee 2007a; Grinker 1998) and labor movements

(Koo 2001) that lead to Korean democratization. Ethnic nationalism has been expressed and maintained by the Korean legal system even in ways that discriminate against foreigners, migrant workers, adoptees, and expatriates (Kim 2015a). This seems to be because Korean intellectuals, especially historians, accepted ethnic nationalism before Japan colonized *Joseon* in 1910 even before a nation-state had been formed in the Korean peninsula.⁴⁶ This ethnic nationalism, which began with the belief that Koreans are descendants of the mythical King *Dan-gun*,⁴⁷ continued in the Korean peninsula and abroad through the independence movements during the colonial period. After liberation, the subjects taught in school, including history, social studies, Korean, as well as morals, based on ethnic nationalism were incorporated into a formal curriculum. Many cultural products based on ethnic nationalism - songs, novels, movies, radio shows, TV programs, and plays - were created. Nationalist researchers also pay attention to the unique homogeneity of the Korean nation and the robust ethnic nationalism that arose from it.⁴⁸ A comprehensive study of Korean nationalism (Shin 2006) most recently defined Korean nationalism as ethnic nationalism.

Critical researchers on Korean nationalism argue that the state-centered nationalism of Korea was formed from social Darwinism which was most influential when Koreans first studied Western ideas and the pre-modern notion of state (Park 2005). Some assert that such state-

⁴⁶ For example, Sin Chae-ho, who is regarded as the father of Korean historians, was well known for his existentialist historical view. For Sin Chae-ho and his creation of Korean nation, see Em (1999). Since it was published, Kim (1989) provides the most extensive development of the nationalist idea in the late *Joseon* dynasty. For the growth of modern ideas in intellectual society in the same period, see Schmid (2003). Not only official history in Korea but also many dissident historians have shared this ethnic nationalist view and some continue to do so.

⁴⁷ *Dan-gun* has been believed to have established ancient *Joseon*, dating back to 2,333 BC. According to *Samgukyusa*, one of the oldest history books written in the 13th century, the god of heaven, *Hwanin*, decided to send one of his sons, *Hwanwoong*, to *Backdu* mountain with 3,000 followers and the gods of wind, rain and cloud. A tiger and a bear visited *Hwanwoong* and asked him to change them into humans. *Hwanwoong* gave them cloves of garlic and bundles of mugwort, saying they would become humans if they could feed themselves only with the garlic and mugwort for 100 days in a cave. Only the bear could obey and became a beautiful woman. She became the wife of *Hwanwoong* and their first son, *Dan-gun*, later became the founder of ancient *Joseon*. Until 1961, the Republic of Korea officially used *Dan-gi*, which begins from 2,333 BC, to number years. “The descendants of *Dan-gun*” is still used as the most obvious expression that the North and the South are connected to each other.

⁴⁸ Hobsbawm (1990, 66) points out this homogeneity. Many of the Korean nationalism and discourses around unification assumes this homogeneity. On the discourse on unification, see Grinker (1998).

centered nationalism is reinforced from the Park Chung-hee era by militarily styled organizations, such as schools under the mandatory education system, the conscript army, factories organized and managed by nearly military discipline, *Bansanghoe* (neighborhood associations) and the *Saemaedul* Movement, social organizations at every level of society (Moon 2005). Others argue that even the dissident movements are not exceptional in this militaristic culture and organizing method (Lim 1999, 2000, 2004). Another criticism of ethnic nationalism arises from the view represented by the so-called New Right and spoken of approvingly by the mainstream media, that Korean history and political tradition stand against Korean liberal democracy. This tends to grant legitimacy to North Korea, which shares blood with the South, but was excessively influenced by leftist ethnic nationalism during the democratization. It is clear that the major criticism of nationalist researchers is directed toward the state, elites and intellectuals who have created a powerful state-centered, exclusive, and militaristic nationalism. On the other hand, the New Right and conservative mainstream media appear to not be interested in criticizing state-centered nationalism but only seem particularly critical of the ethnic nationalism that feels affinity to North Korea. In other words, anti-nationalist researchers criticize the fact that Korean nationalism centered on the state rather than universal values, such as freedom, equality, and human rights, and that the people should be sacrificed — especially in their economic plight — for the values proposed by the state while the New Right, which emerged in the 2000s, and mainstream journalism criticize the progressive camp that puts the value of the nation first over anything else. Although almost all of these anti-nationalist researchers not only oppose state-centered nationalism but oppose nationalism itself, some of the South Korean leftist nationalist groups criticized by the mainstream media and New Right have more emphasis on universal values than unconditional ethnic nationalism. At this point, can we define Korean nationalism as ethnic nationalism or civil nationalism?

The question whether Korean nationalism is ethnic or civic was intensified when the New Right emerged in the early 2000s and the conservative media began calling anyone who opposed them and the ruling class a leftist nationalist who denies liberal democracy.⁴⁹ The New Right labelled themselves as “the advancement group” (*seonjinhwa group*), positioning themselves

⁴⁹ The introduction of New Right in conservative media was begun by *Donga Ilbo*, providing the New Right's idea and blue print for the future in a series of columns.

between the failed populist democratic camp and the past-oriented and statist “old right.”⁵⁰ They claim that they adhere to the market economy and democracy while they criticize contemporary government leaders as being like North Korea in that they try to reach out to the public directly, ignoring laws and institutions. They also differentiate themselves from the “old right,” which has long been regarded as symbol of “privilege, corruption, irrationality, opacity, favoritism, and collusive link between politics and business.”⁵¹ They claim that they are a liberal and future-oriented right whereas the old right is stagnant and past-oriented. One of the most impressive activities of the New Right is their attack on the progressive or democratic camp for their anachronistic [ethnic] nation-centered view of history. They think this nationalist view of history is dangerous for Korean society. First, the nation-first view of history can easily make Koreans have a negative view of their own history. Since nationalist tend to give credit only to the politicians and intellectuals who helped to try to build unified nation, they often disparage most of political leaders and intellectuals who collaborated during the colonial period or who tried to build an independent South Korea as they made North Korea as an enemy after the liberation. New Right believes that nationalists do not appreciate the achievement of Korean political leaders, the founders of the Republic of Korea, who relentlessly had tried to defend the independence and liberal-democracy from the threats of North Korean communists, and the leaders like Park Chung-hee who had accomplished the great task of economic development. Second, the same view can lead to blindly worshipping the value of North Korea in its efforts to preserve its self-reliant nationhood. According to them, these so-called *minjung* historical perspectives, widely shared by progressive and democratic groups, condemn the great former presidents of Korean history who have protected liberal democracy against the communists’ threats and built the foundation for the prosperity that present-day Koreans enjoy. In other words, they criticize that the nationalist or *minjung* view of history as being insufficiently critical of North Korea because it shares blood ties with the South, while it is too critical of the past leaders

⁵⁰ Sin Jiho, “Future should be led by Liberalism,” *Donga Ilbo*, Nov. 22, 2004. It is not surprising that Sin used the term “advancement group,” which reminds us leftist term “vanguard” (*jeonmi*) since many leaders, including Sin, who launched the New Right were former leaders of student movements in the 1980s, mostly in the National Liberty camp. Most terms, tactics and rhetoric that the New Right uses, therefore, can be seen as appropriation of those of student movements.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, *Donga Ilbo*, Nov. 22, 2004.

who have defended liberal democracy and enabled economic prosperity despite their failure to achieve national unification. Thus, although the New Right seems to have a greater estimation of liberal democracy and the market economy, in fact it values anti-communism and economic development over anything else. Greed seems to be the ideology that captures New Right. They are state-centered nationalists to the degree that they need a state to achieve the economic prosperity that only the state can. But a correct view of history is only possible if people recognize the full importance of the leaders that have made it possible.

Even though this reappearance of nationalism or conservatism after globalization is not a unique phenomenon, as it is seen in the emergence of Tea Party in the US, the National Front in Europe, and the reemergence of nationalist discourses in other East Asian countries, Korea's New Right is distinct in that it promotes state-centered nationalism while they strongly oppose to ethnic nationalism and claim they are promoting liberal democracy. First, the so-called “new right” seems oblivious of the fact that they largely share the ideas of nationalist discourses elsewhere. This is partly related to the fact that nationalism is misunderstood and used in a variety of ways in Korea, according to how the concept of nationalism is translated into Korean. Nationalism was first translated as “*minjokjuui*” (*mizokushugi* in Japanese, *minzuzhuyi* in Chinese) when Japanese intellectuals first learned Western ideas. The term was used to refer to nationalism in Chinese literary culture. “*Minjok*” (*minzoku* in Japanese, *minzu* in Chinese), however, has been used to refer to a community that shares cultural commonality, such as blood, language, custom, or religion. For Korean (and Japanese and Chinese), the term “*minjok*” itself and its cognates, therefore, can hardly bear the meaning of citizens sharing the same legal and political duties and rights or the members of a nation-state. Of course, in scholarship the multifaceted sense of the original term for nationality and nationalism is well understood, but in general usage, its civic aspect is often overlooked. People can deny that they are nationalists when they are not talking about the ethnic aspects of Korea, even when emphasizing the peculiarities and superiority of Korea, just as typical nationalists do. The peculiarity and superiority of Korea that they praise seems to be not in Koreans but in the Korean state and the leaders of the state. It should also be mentioned that the difference between the official nationalist discourse and the counter-hegemonic discourse in Korea may be much smaller than what people commonly think. They may differ as to whether they prefer ethnic Korea or the

Korean state. However, they both agree to reify the nation as a group, acknowledge its particularity, and confirm the superiority of the group over individuals.

Is Korean nationalism civic or ethnic? Before we answer this question, it is once again worth emphasizing that there is a state-oriented nationalism such as the New Right, as we have seen. The existing dichotomy of civil and ethnic nationalism seems to be inappropriate to explain and analyze this nationalism of Korea. I will discuss below how to go beyond this civil and ethnic nationalism.

2.2 Beyond Civic vs. Ethnic Nationalism

As we have seen, nationalism in Korea can exist without emphasizing ethnic nationality. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the state-centered nationalism of Korea is free from ethnic exclusiveness. There is no evidence that South Korean state-centered nationalists have a less hard line on social issues related to ethnic identities such as migrant workers, overseas adoption, and migrant marriages than others. In this section, we will discuss what typology is appropriate for analyzing and evaluating competing nationalisms in Korean society, which is known to consist of a relative homogeneity.

2.2.1 Civic vs. Ethnic Nationalism

Various ethnic conflicts over territory, political power, religion and historical issues in Eastern Europe, Africa and East Asia have often been thought of as alternative version of the Western European model of civic nationalism. In civic nationalism, “the nation is defined in terms of a shared commitment to the public institutions of the state and civil society” (Özirimli 2005, 23). Regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, language, religion, etc., civic nationalism only needs the “shared commitment to the public institution.” As it is based on the social contract, entering and leaving citizenship is relatively free. By contrast, ethnic nationalism “emphasizes common descent and cultural sameness” (Özirimli 2005, 23) The exclusiveness of nationalism often comes from this cultural sameness. Also in this case, “membership in the nation is not a matter of

will.” However, many scholars of nationalism argue that the distinction between civil nationalism and ethnic nationalism is theoretically and empirically inadequate and point out the distinction is often used with “a neo-orientalist flavor” to “the invocation of a dubious series of linked oppositions – between universalism and particularism, inclusion and exclusion, civility and violence, reason and passion, modern tolerance and ancient hatreds, transnational integration and nationalist disintegration, civic nationhood and ethnic nationalism” (Yack 1999; Shulman 2002; Brubaker 1999). Most studies written in English also tend to regard conflicts over historical issues in East Asia as phenomena originating from this ethnic nationalism, that is, irrational and incomprehensible.

From the time when Hans Kohn first proposed the distinction of Western and Eastern forms of nationalism (Kohn 1944), this dichotomy has been incorporated into the works of many scholars of nationalism under slightly different names. The existence of a conservative press that supports blind allegiance to the state or the extreme exclusiveness of Korean nationalism can easily lead to the conclusion that Korean nationalism is an ethnic nationalism based on exclusive group membership. But as I already pointed out, Korean nationalism cannot be seen only as ethnic nationalism based on exclusiveness. For example, Shin argues that there is a need to overcome essentialism when we see ethnic nationalism. He also points out “the complex use of ethnic nationalism” is not well understood, largely because most of the studies on nationalism are “primarily based on the multiethnic states” (Shin 2006, 15). If we admit that nationalism, as well as other social ideologies, is an idea that is competing ceaselessly in society and seeking hegemony in society, we need to study the diverse nationalisms in a relatively homogeneous nation-state like Korea to see how they are competing with each other and how the contents of nationalism in a social group change over time. For example, while in a well-developed democratic society the study of how a particular group or various groups in a society compete through various ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism, feminism, and socialism is a very natural field of social science research, it is to be presupposed that the nationalism of a nation state is relatively stable contents, and its political goals and social influences do not change that much.

History-related social movements, such as the comfort women movement, the Japanese history textbook movement, the anti-Yasukuni movements or the protecting *Dokdo* movement in

South Korea are often criticized by scholars and activists for their emphasis on ethnic nationalism. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that the comfort women movement has been active for more than 20 years and has now changed its discourse by appealing to universal values, such as “universalism, inclusion, civility, reason, modern tolerance, and transnational integration” (Brubaker 1996, 56) and is working towards building peace in East Asia, rather than advocating victims with ethnic nationalism.

Remembering the hundreds of women who were infringed human rights in the ongoing history of the war, we let out our 800th shout. In January 1992, our first step, which began with a small cry, reached today over 16 years. The Wednesday Demonstration now becomes a place of live history education and is being reborn as a ground for solidarity for those who desire human rights and peace. The Wednesday Demonstration itself is a history of peace that made by the survivors and many people who have come together to be strong supporters for the recovery of honor and the realization of justice regardless of the age, gender, and nationality.⁵²

As it is shown in the statement above, from the 800th Wednesday Demonstration, the members of the movement groups are appealing to universal values in a civil way rather than exclusive Koreanness in a violent way. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that they have completely taken on a new language apart from ethnic nationalism. It is enough to point out here that there is a limit to understanding these changes as altering existing dichotomous ways of thinking.

2.2.2 State-framed vs. Counter-state nationalism

Brubaker (1999) is also very critical of the use of the conventional dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism. He argues that it is both analytically and normatively ambiguous and

⁵² The statement for the 800th Wednesday Demonstration (Feb 13, 2008) by Participants for Regular Wednesday Demonstration for Resolving the ‘comfort women’ for Japanese Military Issue, translated from the Women and War website (the official website of Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan).
<http://www.womenandwar.net/bbs/index.php?tbl=M026&cat=&mode=V&id=197&SN=0&SK=subject&S W=800> (retrieved April 5, 2010).

proposes a less ambiguous alternative. That is distinction between *state-framed* and *counter-state* understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism (Brubaker 1999, 64). Though it may be clear that this distinction is also “based on the multiethnic states,” since he uses this dichotomy to distinguish the notion of a cultural definition of nation from a territorial and state-centered definition of nation. He implies that the former seems to refer to sub-national groups and the latter to refer to the dominant ethnic group in a state in a real setting. Although this is a typology meant to distinguish nationalism in a multi-ethnic society, it seems to be possible to use it to analyze a country mostly composed of a single ethnic group such as Korea or Japan. Some scholars of Japanese nationalism, for example, point out that sometimes ethnic nationalism plays a role in criticizing the state (Doak 1996; Takekawa 2007). In other words, Japanese nationalism can be divided into the nationalism of those who align their identities with the state, and the nationalism of those who do not. Brubaker’s typology seems to fit better in this case than a civic and ethnic dichotomy. Brubaker’s typology helps to distinguish nationalism that emerges upward in society from official nationalism, whether it is in a multi-ethnic or single ethnic society. *State-framed* nationalism, in that case, refers to the nationalism that is forged by the state and people who identify themselves with the state. On the other hand, *counter-state* nationalism arises in society and often competes against official nationalism. It might be difficult to identify these two since *state-framed* nationalism maintains the ideological state apparatus that implements its disciplines and practices to society.⁵³

2.2.3 Community-oriented and value-oriented nationalism

As we have seen above, there are various problems in the distinction between civil and ethnic nationalism. First, this distinction is used almost as a neo-Orientalist view: behind the term civic, there is a series of meanings derived from Western Europe, contracts, and universal values, whereas behind the term "ethnic," there is a series of meanings such as irrationality, passion, and exclusiveness. Second, the use of this distinction makes it difficult to understand the specific nationalism which emphasizes social contracts and institutional relations, while blindly

⁵³ For ideological state apparatus, see Althusser (2006).

demanding allegiance to the state and denying the ethnic characteristics of the nation.

To avoid these problems, I suggest the use of the terms community-oriented and value-oriented nationalism in place of the civil and ethnic distinction. Community-oriented nationalism indicates a nationalism which emphasizes, above all, the allegiance to the state or the ethnic community. Value-oriented nationalism emphasizes what is good to pursue in the community rather than loyalty to the community, and imagines the community as a place to realize more universal values. This distinction seems useful because not all ethnic nationalism prefers loyalty to the community, and not all Western nationalism sees the nation as a forum for realizing and discussing the universal good. For example, many liberal theorists argue that liberalism needs 'ethical communities'. As Kymlicka puts it, "liberal justice requires a sense of community: a sense that citizens belong together in a single country, should govern themselves collectively, and should feel solidarity towards each other" (2002, 254). It can be applied to any other ideology. Certain values, whether freedom, democracy, human rights, women's right, laborers' right, equality, etc., need a sense of community. It should not be limited to a single country, but, in the age of the nation-state, a nation-state can provide adequate 'ethical communities' for promoting values and ideas.

Still, this dichotomy has some limitation, too. The official nationalisms of Korea or Japan, countries that have strong community-oriented nationalisms, sometimes need to be distinguished from nationalisms not framed by the state or state elites but framed by the people who oppose the official nationalism like the nationalisms of Catalans, Basques, Flemish, Scots, Welsh, Corsicans, Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, Québécois, Sami, Inuit, Maori, and American Indians. Both nationalisms presuppose allegiance to the communities to which their identity belongs in preference to other values. The former community is a nation state, while the latter rejects allegiance to the nation state in favor of its own ethnic national community. By solving these problems, is it possible to make a typology that can explain various nationalisms more easily?

2.2.4 Alternative typology

Here, I propose a typology (presented in tabular form below), which combines Brubaker's state-framed nationalism and counter-nationalism and community-oriented nationalism and value-oriented nationalism, and which can be presented as a framework for analyzing the various types of nationalism both in multi-ethnic and single ethnic societies.

	State-framed nationalism	Counter-state nationalism
Community-oriented nationalism	State-centered nationalism (militarism, fascism, right wing movements)	Substate nationalism (national minorities, Indigenous)
Value-oriented nationalism	Institutional nationalism (liberal nationalism)	Communitarian nationalism (Movement groups based on universal values in a national community)

Table 2 Alternative typology of nationalism

There are nationalisms that are framed by state and people who identify themselves with the state and require the allegiance to the legal community. The Korean New Right or the tendency of the mainstream Korean media can be categorized under this *state-centered* nationalism. Militarism or fascism can be also categorized in this way. State-centered nationalism, in which the official narrative is framed by state or state elites, recognizes the role of the state as the sole legitimate institution that can improve the welfare of the community. In this case, the members of communities should not recognize their differences and should serve the state as a whole for the benefit of the state. From this point of view, the right-wing movement in democratic society, which is emerging today, should also be regarded as state-centered nationalism. Participants in this right-wing nationalist movement often identify themselves as the legitimate owners of the nation-state. The current government, they claim, does not serve the interests of the true owners of the state, which is the ethnic or racial majority in a nation-state. Because the government rejects its role as an ethnic state, they believe that they themselves obliged to maintain society more purely by disadvantaging minorities. They are also state-centered nationalists in this regard.

Less totalitarian nationalism framed by the indigenous or national minorities can be categorized as *substate* nationalism. *Substate* nationalism is the nationalism that seeks to promote national minorities or indigenous people's welfare to challenge the larger society's dominant nationalist culture. Usually these are not as totalitarian as state-centered nationalism since they have no or very little apparatus to control the state. But "they often seek to use the

same tools that the majority uses to promote this nation-building – e.g. they seek control over the language and curriculum of schooling in their region of the country, the language of government employment, the requirements of immigration and naturalization, and the drawing of internal boundaries” (Kymlicka 2002, 350).

Another category is the *institutional* nationalism, which is framed by the state and state elites and emphasizes a legal framework as the place for realizing the common good. As long as it does not claim the priority of allegiance to the community over other values, it can be categorized as *institutional* nationalism. It should be pointed out that the character of a nation's nationalism is not necessarily defined through one of these categories, but that the categories here can be picked up and moved at any time.

The last category is *communitarian* nationalism which is useful for explaining the nationalism based on historical issue-related social movements including the comfort women movement in Korea. *Communitarian* nationalism emerges voluntarily in society, competing with, rivaling, and struggling with official nationalism and other nationalisms in broader society. The ethnic community tends to be conceived as an ethical community, a place to share and realize specific values. It uses the term “communitarian” similarly to the assertion of communitarians that the ethnic community becomes a community as a forum for communal values to be expressed.

These four categories are designed to better explain the nationalisms that are difficult to classify by the existing classification system, including the ethnic-civic dichotomy but not limited to it, among the different nationalisms. It is more like an ideal type in that it reflects the existing nationalism. It should also be remembered that specific nationalisms are constantly moving between these types, as nationalism is fluid, competitive and always changing in its nature. So, what should we consider the theoretical framework we need to understand Korean nationalism?

2.3 Theoretical Framework for Studying Korean Nationalism

This chapter will explore the possibility of creating a new theoretical framework to understand the political process of post-nation-state nationalism in South Korea. As I discussed above, most of the studies of nationalism, especially of Korean nationalism, tend to assume that nationalism is created, distributed, and affirmed by the state or state elites. They seem to believe that the nationalism of one country hardly changes because the state apparatus constantly reproduces the existing nationalism. However, nationalism, even the nationalism of the post-nation-state, is a political process among various political and social agents. Korean nationalism should also be considered as one of the better examples of such phenomena rather than an exception. Especially with democratization and globalization, as society has changed rapidly, the dominant narrative of nation and nationalism has not always been successful to bring all the people together.⁵⁴ The necessity to renegotiate nationalist discourses has increased as a means of embracing emerging identities and alleviating threats to authority. Various groups within a society as well as state and state elites participate in the production, circulation, and transformation of such dominant national discourse. They participate in these competitions by appropriating, expanding, twisting, reducing, and repeating the dominant discourse.

Though the narrative of the nation keeps changing, the reason why it seems not to be changed might be due to the element called “structural nostalgia,” coined by Herzfeld (1996). Different groups in a society try to appropriate nationalist discourses largely shared and adhered to by the society. I will argue that even the opposing groups in society can share many aspects of nationalist discourse since both parties tend to appropriate nationalist discourses largely shared by the population.

Traditionally, nationalism scholars are inclined to categorize existing nationalism into civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Instead of using this prejudicial dichotomy, I would

⁵⁴ There remains not only the problem of accommodating migrant workers and children with different skin color due to increasing marriage migration, but also the problem of how to integrate the poorer and especially the younger generation who have sufficient education and passion but nevertheless fail in the job market. Those younger generation emerged due to the rapidly growing gap between the poor and the rich, the second largest gap next to the US, which has resulted from the globalization.

argue that any nationalism and nationalist discourse has both characteristics but should be understood by what elements they are emphasizing. It is even more beneficial to see what kind of ideal human beings a particular nationalist discourse is trying to make. It is more useful to understand nationalism in a successfully formed nation, such as East Asian countries. For example, when we see the two terms, *gukmin*, which is a form of people in the official nationalism that is created and protected by the Korean government and elites, and *minjung*, which is the creation of various movements during the democratization, the former seems to be characterized as civic nationalism because it can make perfect sense without any ethnic connotation, as we see in the usage of the “new right” case, and the latter as ethnic nationalism. But these two terms, in contrast, can be understood in the opposite way, considering the values that were promoted by the two.

Instead of using this dichotomy, the dissertation tries to understand the nationalist discourse with two different analyses. First, it analyzes what each discourse thinks of the idea of a “state of emergency.” Giorgio Agamben points out that “state of emergency,” once conceptualized as being decided by a sovereign by Carl Schmitt, is more and more internalized in the modern legal system in democratic society (1998). The nationalist discourse as a collective presentation of sovereignty also defines what “state of emergency” should be. The differences between the discourses help to understand the characteristics of each discourse. Also, as many frame analysis theorists argue, this manifestation of “state of emergency” also could be interpreted as “diagnosis framings,” since it diagnoses the current situation that needs certain kinds of movements or nationalist discourse. Second, it also views that the ideal people that each discourse wants to create. *Gukmin*, *minjung*, *simin* are the three types of people whose creation was the goal respectively of the state, democratization movements, and civil movements after democratization. The analysis of these terms can also help to understand the characteristics of each discourse and the impact of the social movements on the official nationalist discourse.

I will also highlight the role of social movements in the political process of nationalist discourse. I will first examine the theories of social movements and recent developments that focus on culture and identity in social movements. Then I will discuss the relations of history and nationalism and emphasize that the tradition and development of social movements in South Korea largely depend on providing alternative historical narratives. Though many actors in

dissident movements in South Korean seem to be subsumed in official historical narrative, and it prevents possibility of alternative visions, the participants in the movements do not just accept the official history but create an alternative discursive space that enables them to transform the official narrative itself.

Conventional frame, civic and ethnic nationalism that are widely used to analyze different nationalisms, are not appropriate categories to apprehend ethnic nationalism in a relatively homogeneous state. After examining some alternatives suggested to substitute for civic and ethnic nationalism, I will argue that a two-dimensional typology – *state-framed* vs. *counter-state* and *state-centered* vs. *value-centered* – will be useful to understand different types of nationalism. The issues around theories of social movements will also be discussed. First, I suggest the need to change our definition of successive movements. Instead of seeing the achievements of movements' goal or transformational changes in society as successive movements, I would argue that to focus on the changes that movements brought is important.

In the second part of the chapter, I will discuss the limitations of the social movements' literatures and suggest some ways in which we can deal with the impact of social movements on broader society, especially on broader nationalist discourse. The changes of framing and the differences in organization structure will be useful to analyze the impact of the social movements on the broader discursive changes.

In the third part, I will discuss the problems of the “strong state” and “contentious society,” which became to defining words for Korean state and society (Koo 1993a). The images underlying these defining words present a state that is united, unified and consistent and a society that is composed of different groups against government. These are not wrong images but could be misleading images. I will argue that both society and state are not united and consistent, and we need to analyze the changes of both state and society.

2.4 Framework for Korean Nationalism

2.4.1 Social movements and nationalism

What is the relation between social movements and nationalism? In earlier studies on nationalism or social movements, the relation between the two, and especially the impacts of social movements on nationalist discourse, is rarely considered. In the scholarship of nationalism, social movements are barely seen as driving forces of producing changes in the discourse of nationalism, since either the primordial view or constructionist view tends to contend that nationalism is generally formed by state or state elites, whether it has deep historical and cultural roots or is intentionally created and is coincidentally congruent with modern state form.⁵⁵ As many nationalism scholars agree that nationalism is an ongoing project in any given modern society, led by the competition between the different groups in the society (Duara 1995; Kymlicka 2002, 338-365; Özkirimli 2005; Shin 2006), it seems important to identify the influential actors and elements in the process. Social movements and organizations that challenge the codes of society (Melucci 1996) would be a good candidate to help understanding the changes of nationalist discourse. The questions raised in studies on social movements, however, are mainly involved with how a movement could arise and become successful, and nationalism is often regarded as a mere political opportunity, if it is considered at all, to form the basis of a social movement.⁵⁶ As Kenneth Andrews points out, even though the impact of a social movement is apparently relevant to the important question of “movement efficacy,” there is a “limited amount of systematic research on outcomes” (2001, 71).

This study of history-related social movements and the changes of nationalist discourse in South Korea examines social movements and their impacts on the broader discourses that once shaped them. In order to answer the broader question of the relation between social movements and nationalism and to provide a different understanding of ethnic nationalism in South Korea,

⁵⁵ For the primordial understanding of nationalism, see Smith (1996, 2008) and for the constructionist or modernist view of nationalism, see Gellner (1983); Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983); Hobsbawm (1990); Anderson (2006). For recent developments and issues in studies on nationalism, see Özkirimli (2005).

⁵⁶ For the recent developments and issues in studies on social movements, see Tarrow (1998); Walder (2009).

this dissertation explores changes of nationalist discourse and collective memories along with the varying strategies and framing process of history-related social movements in appropriating and challenging nationalism from 1987 to 2007. Seeing history-related social movements as important actors that not only appropriate but also challenge dominant nationalist discourse, this dissertation offers systemic analysis of the formation of nationalist discourse that influenced and shaped the *state-framed* as well as the *counter-state* historical narrative, the framing processes and strategy of history-related groups after democratization, and the impacts of the framing and strategies of movements on official historical narrative and collective memories represented in media. The data for analysis include the news articles on history issues from 1987 to 2007 from two South Korean newspapers, respectively representing progressive and conservative views, in-depth interviews with the leaders and members of movement groups, political statements including pamphlets, leaflets, booklets and reports published by movements on- and off-line, and government documents and school textbooks. Discourse analysis and contents analysis of the news articles will be the main method to analyze the changes of nationalist discourse and framing process.

According to the famous “strong state and contentious society” (Koo 1993b) view, the strong state mobilizes people, with state apparatus itself utilizing nationalism, and the groups that share different identities – including workers, students, women, the poor, and citizens, but nationalists, who can generally be counted on for obedience to the strong state, are often omitted while the fact that most of these various groups that shared different identities also share nationalist sentiment is rarely mentioned – are struggling against the strong state (Koo 1993b, 2001).

This largely shared view veils a few things. First, theoretically, by assuming nationalism is an entity, which does not change, and by limiting the state and state elites as producers of this ideology, it fails to understand fluid, progressive, and transforming aspects of nationalism.⁵⁷ In a society like Korea where the influence of nationalism is so omnipotent, however, nationalism does not only function for totalizing and brain washing the people, as some argue (Lim 2000, 2004; Kwon 2000). It should be noted that nationalism also becomes a locus of struggle where

⁵⁷ For nationalism as process or project, see Brubaker (2004) and Olick (2003)

various social groups, including the state, can participate and pursue their vision of a preferable society. The struggles are often between state and society (or among societies). But struggles inside different groups of society are often ignored. These struggles happen when the subgroups within the groups try to get legitimacy over the dominant subgroups or other groups in society. Second, by assuming the different social groups, which are struggling against the state, are integrated entities, which steadily pursue their goals over time, it becomes easy to romanticize the social groups rather than understand their way of accommodation to and intervention in hegemonic discourses, which are sometimes appropriated or subsumed as competing views.

Study of historical issues and related social movements in South Korea, I believe, can overcome these problems. As it became clear when they were criticized by other leftist or feminist groups, these movements have been often understood as cases where nationalist discourse subdued progressive elements and therefore the possibilities of progress in Korean society couldn't be realized in the face of a hegemonic patriarchal and statist nationalist discourse (Soh 2003; Yang 1998; Ueno 2004; Moon 1999). On the other hand, the connection between this interpretation and the fact that these movements quite successfully internationalized once national issues, utilizing the forces and elements of globalization, is often blurred. At the same time, the fact that the issues – criticism against patriarchal militarism and the introduction of feminist and pacifist views – raised by these movement groups added into the nationalist discourse of South Korea is often ignored too. In other words, this will help in understanding the changes of Korean society and overcoming the two problems – the problems due to the view that sees nationalism and individual social movements as consistent entities. Duara (1995) argues that modern historiography, which sees the nation as the subject of its narrative, subsumes every other competing narrative as it writes a linear and teleological history. The case of Korea, too, shows that many people who write history also strengthen nationalism and subsume alternative narratives, but it also shows that the discourses that are competing in the nationalist discourses sometimes add some elements that can even dismantle the core nationalist discourse. It is the reason why we need to study changes of discursive strategies of movement-organizations, centering on historical issues, and the effects of these changes to the larger society for better understanding of nationalism and its characteristics in Korean society.

2.4.2 Culture, Identity, and Social Movements

From the beginning of academic attention to the social movements, they were often connected with deviance, irrationality, and horror (Tarrow 1998, 10; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 2). When mainstream social scientists, who are mostly functionalists, in the US in the 1950s, studied it, social movements were regarded as deviant actions, occurring outside normal and stable society, motivated by grievance against the majority (Kornhauser 1959).

Changes that occurred in the world and the US affected the approach to social movements in the academy. The 1960s can be said to have been an era of revolution. Though they were not successful in creating a full-blown revolution, all the resistance movements within society – student movements and the emergence of new social movements in Europe, the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement, and student protests on campuses in the US – made young scholars re-conceptualize social movements. As actual participants or close observers of these movements, young scholars in the 1960s rejected older theories of social movements and built their own theories, influenced by rational choice theory and neo-Marxism.

The crucial transformation was to understand the participants of movements as rational actors, who are seeking a channel of their voices but have limited resources. Resource mobilization theory is credited with effecting this crucial transformation, and it is still influential in the social movement scholarship (McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1977). With the development of resource mobilization theory, social movement studies became one of the mainstream trends in sociology.

The emergence and development of new social movements in Europe and America enabled researchers and thinkers on social movements to move in a new direction since the participants in new social movements were very different from activists in regard to their social status and the nature of the demands. Instead of demanding economic or social rights, the activists in new social movements were seeking identity and recognition. Also, emerging umbrella social movement groups were formed as initial organizations, which could be developed to transnational movements groups. Scholars begin to question other aspects of mobilization in terms of identity, meaning and emotion, using various methods developed in other fields of social science, especially framing analysis (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford

1988; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Melucci 1995; Klandermans 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992).

Snow and Benford, for example, pay attention to the production of meaning by social movements: “movements function as carriers and transmitters of mobilizing beliefs and ideas, to be sure; but they are also actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers” (1988, 198). Though their research questions were still asking how a movement can successfully mobilize and had not yet developed to scrutinize the interaction between movements and larger society, these new sets of questions opened up a possibility to understand the dynamics of social movements and larger society.

Alberto Melucci (1996) contributes significantly in the sense that he provides a useful understanding of social movements for researchers on social movements. He declares that social movements in complex society are “prophets,” for they create fissures in the society and reveal what will appear in the future. For example, civil rights movements showed us that a current society that didn’t allow equal civil rights for all members of the society will become a society that socially opposes racial discrimination and highly regards equal opportunity and equity in the future. The emergence of the gay rights movement and radical statements on gay marriage tell us that those demands will become obsolete sometime in the future because those would be regarded as natural rights in the future. Therefore, we can detect the changes that are happening or the possibilities of the changes that will occur in the future by examining the emergence of a movement, and the changes that occurred in their discursive strategies.

2.4.3 Centrality of History in Social Movements in South Korea

History is the backbone of nationalism. Most recent social scientists would contend that nationalism is an identity, produced by the process of modernization in relation with industrialization and disseminated by mass media (Hobsbawm 1990; Gellner 1983; Anderson 2006). Narrativized history is collective memory of a national community that creates depth in this identity and binds members of this community. As collective memory scholars, following Halbwachs (1992, 82), point out, people acquire memory from society. Among competing

memories created by different groups or individuals of society, history is the finalized and official collective memory, endorsed by the state or the majority of people in society (Hutton 1993). Even though history is “written by people in the present for particular purposes, and the selection and interpretation of ‘sources’ are always arbitrary” (Olick and Robinson 1998, 110).

Collective memory studies tend to analyze the site and narrative of public memory. Monuments, museums, national symbols, rites and ceremony, and history are all artifacts to promote specific identities that a community needs. Logically, those who believe that those artifacts ultimately contribute to the ruling class want to reveal the fabricated nature of the artifacts. National history, for example, is regarded as an imaginary narrative by some Marxists.

In the process of democratization in Korea, the Marx-Leninist camp – the so-called People Democracy sect, or PD – tend to believe historical materialism and criticize the competing nationalist camp – the so-called National Liberation, or NL – because they romanticize the nation and neglect to see more urgent class contradictions. Even though these two camps show contradictory positions in many political issues in Korea, in some way, they both shared and created the collective identity called *minjung*, which is based on a radical interpretation of Korean history. Where the official history of Korea had been the history of the dynasty and the rulers, the history of *minjung*, which the student movement and the democratization movement of the 1980s created together, is a history of common people who suffered and oppressed through different rulers and emphasizes;.., . ㅁ ㅁ ; the pain that inflicted by those rulers, and how they fight, organize and create a new world against such oppressions and dominations.

Abelmann (1996) well illustrates that the creation of alternative historical narrative using memory was extremely crucial in Korean dissident groups’ successful mobilization. The *mijung*, or “common people,” narrative begins with rediscovery of subjugated classes that suffered from a harsh environment and oppression from above throughout Korean history. They identified all the suffering people with this *Minjung*. This new framing was followed by the discovery of folk culture – rites, songs, performance, music, and even martial arts – and the implementation of them into the rites of the movements during demonstrations and the movements’ own events (Koo 2001; Abelmann 1996; Lee 2007a).

In the South Korean community of dissent, memory was imagined as a personal resource or collective repository that could mobilize people. Easily naturalized as an objective, neutral repository of the past, memory was posed against official histories that were edited by the hands of those with interest (Abelmann 1996, 20).

Along the struggle against dictatorship, the strategy taken up by Korean dissidents was to bring forth memories of oppressed people and create an alternative narrative that can resist dominant history. In other words,

It is helpful, then, to think about 1980s activism as the crossroads of competing narratives or models of mobilization and of competing memories. The activist is situated within multiple discourses and fashions an identity out of these; thus, her activism cannot be theorized, periodized, or understood without attention to these discourses (Abelmann 1996, 21).

Lee (2002, 2007a) also illustrates how these competing narratives are reproduced in everyday practices in student movement groups in South Korea and shows how it creates a counter-hegemonic space. More importantly, Lee locates the *minjung* movement in “a widespread anxiety among intellectuals and university students that modern Korean history was a history of failure, that the Korean people were not the subjects of their own history” (2007, 2). This ongoing rewriting and reevaluating of the past became the common culture for Korean dissident groups.

This tendency is obvious in the anti-Japanese history textbook movement and comfort women movement, where the motivation was similar too. A large part of the people who initially participated in the movements came directly from nationalist student groups in both cases, even though later the participants were supplied from various dissident groups – religious, feminists, environmentalist, and peace-activist.

It is also important to see that both movements are umbrella organizations. Since both organizations are alliances of various social movements or NGOs, there can be some ideological tension even inside the organizations. The organizations had two stages in accomplishing their

movements' goals: they first needed them to be endorsed by the member groups and then to mobilize and gain support from mass society outside. The statements, strategies, and activities of these organizations, therefore, are the outcomes of negotiations and competitions between the ideas of sub-groups, even though their decision-making structures are highly centralized compared to other groups engaging with similar issues.

2.4.4 Conformist or dissident nationalism?

As we witness our world today, there are increasing numbers of new reactionary movements in various societies – whether they are democratic or authoritarian. These groups often become the main actors in ethnic or racial violation and the oppression of or opposition to migrants. These reactionary movements are often connected with nationalism and are dangerous and threatening.

History related movements in South Korea are at times understood as such reactionary movements, when they use frames that appeal to nationalist sentiment. Feminists and conservative scholars in Japan used to criticize the nationalist nature of the comfort women movement in particular (Hata 2007; Moon 2002; Moon 1999; Soh 2007; Ueno 2004). These criticisms may be valid in the initial period of the movements, but the change of circumstance, and the change of some of the characteristics of these movements, opens room to reevaluate those criticisms.

The most interesting changes that occurred in history related movements came about through engagement with scholars, especially those who had a very critical view towards their nationalist orientation. Many feminists who criticized the nationalist views of the comfort women movement later engaged in the decision-making process of their organizations. Peace activists and a scholar whose expertise is in cultural studies, joined the textbook movements. Aside from the ethical question of scholars' direct engagement in her/his research object, the engagement from various progressive scholars made the movements gradually transform in their strategies and framings.

Partly because of these engagements, partly because of their original disposition, and

most importantly, partly because of their organizational structure, the ‘comfort women’ organizations avoided becoming right wing nationalist groups. As I mentioned above, because these groups are umbrella groups, their movement’s goals, strategies, and framings must keep being endorsed by the member groups. In this process, many of the right-wing groups were separated from the organization, due to their exclusiveness that cannot be accepted by other groups. This might be the reason why the organizations moved towards more universal values – peace, human rights, and feminism -- in the progress of the movements.

Doak (1997)’s account of Japanese nationalism sheds a new light on studying nationalism in a society dominated by strong ethnic nationalism. Unlike the common understanding that nationalism aims to produce conformist subjects, Doak shows that postwar Japanese “liberal” governments still maintain a nationalist disposition. The competition between the groups in society was not between liberal and statist, but between liberal nationalists and statist nationalists. Takekawa (2007) also shows similar characteristics of Japanese nationalist discourse. Unlike the common knowledge that *Yomiuri Daily* is conservative, and *Asahi* is liberal, his analysis of New Years’ editorial shows that both newspapers use nationalist terminology and sentiments, while their competition is to control the hegemonic position in nationalist discourse.

These transformations of the movements lead us to the study of history related movements in South Korea. If we contend that nationalism is rather a process, we need to analyze the changes of nationalism and find out which elements or actors are central to the changes. And we need to find out if the transformation of the nature of the movements affects society at large. This explains why history related social movements in South Korea are important to the understanding of the characteristics of Korean nationalism and its reaction to changing conditions.

2.5 Theories of Social Movements: How to Analyze the Impact of Social Movements on Larger Society?

As already mentioned, even though the study of social movements is an increasingly growing

field, the study of impacts or outcomes of the movements is a surprisingly neglected area. The reason, I believe, is twofold. First, it is related to understanding of what are the successful movements and what are not. Studies on social movements, as Sidney Tarrow points out, started with the theories of Marx and Engels who saw social structure as the most important factor for collective actions or social movements (1998, 11). For them, a successful movement follows the changes in the relations of production and leads to revolution. This traditional concept of movements and their impact amounting to a radical change in society still influences the imagination and expectation of successful movements. In many cases, a movement that failed to reach or achieve a tangible outcome, was not regarded to be successful. The French Revolution, the American Civil Rights Movement, Korean Democratization, and labor movements are all successful movements since all of them produced significant changes that they originally aimed to fulfill, while the Anti-globalization protests at Seattle in 1999 is not recognized as a successful movement since it failed to prevent globalization. This leads to the second reason why there are only few studies on impacts or outcome of movements. Since there are only a few movements that have succeeded in human history, most people's concern regarding social movements are focused on how a movement can be successful and under what condition a movement can arise. So-called "resource mobilization theories" are an outcome of this phenomena.⁵⁸

We need to measure the success of movements in a different way. As Andrews (2004) and others point out, there are many underlying problems to analyzing the outcomes or impacts of movements in regard to success. Melucci's explanation of social movements, I believe, is extremely useful in rethinking or re-conceptualizing the meaning of success in movements. Melucci argues that movements "signal a deep transformation in the logic and the processes that guide complex society" (1996, 1). What would be the most important aspects of movements' impact? We might think that the immediate goals set by the movements are the easiest and the crucial factor in evaluating the success of a movement. But others might think that the "deep transformation in the logic and the processes" of the society is most crucial in the long run. To evaluate "deep transformation in the logic and the processes" of the society, we first need to discern the things that can make the discourses used in the movements special. Those things

⁵⁸ For the studies that are asking these type of questions, see McCarthy and Zald (1977); McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996); Jenkins and Perrow (1977); Piven and Cloward (1977); and Kriesi et al. (1992).

might be the precursor of the changes that will happen in the near future, and our job is to sense what those changes will be.

The framing process and organizational structures are good examples of understanding these changes. For example, Snow et al. (1986) suggest a useful tool to use in analyzing the changes in the discursive strategies of a movement. Diagnosis, prognosis, and motivational framings are not only applicable to understanding the changing discursive strategies of Korean history-related movements but are also useful for analyzing how much changes made by movements were accepted both in media and also by organizations.

Keck and Sikkink highlight the emergence of transnational movements and their importance, and an increasing amount of research is focusing on these types of movements. The Korean Council and some other history related movement organizations are transnational movement groups. Keck and Sikkink (1998), however, analyze the effects of transnational movements in their international setting, which can be summarized as a “boomerang effect.” Especially as many organizations suffering from government oppression are seeking a way to put pressure on their governments, and one of the most effective ways is to connect to international organizations or create a coalition with other organizations around the world. In my view, there is another important aspect to this transnational setting. As we have seen in the Korean cases, the movements had to revise some of their main claims, or the way they articulate their problems, since the conventional claims and articulations they had before they became part of a transnational network became obsolete. Many of the nationalist claims, statements, and articulations drastically changed after the organizations began to connect to other groups outside Korea. Therefore, this organizational structure – whether a movement is coalition of groups or a transnational group – can be used as a tool to understand the changes of discursive strategy.

2.6 Reading Korean Nationalism

Before discussing the theoretical framework to deal with the changes and political process of Korean nationalism, I will examine why most studies of Korean nationalism were doomed to fail in providing a scientific explanation by closely reading Shin (2006), which is the first book-

length study on Korean nationalism, embracing recent theories of nationalism.

2.6.1 Reification of Korean nationalism

A number of scholars, journalists, and activists have expressed discontent over the existing explanations of Korean nationalism.⁵⁹ As many surveys tell and students of Korean nationalism know, the majority of studies of Korean nationalism, especially those written by Korean authors⁶⁰, and the majority of people who believe themselves Korean, presuppose a so-called primordial, or rather perennial, view of the Korean nation.⁶¹ For many thinkers, activists, politicians, and even communists in the late *Joseon* dynasty and in the colonial period, creating a nation state was the vital and urgent political goal for keeping up with the West and to become modernized and so survive in the tumultuous *fin-de-siècle*.⁶² Along with many other terms used in social science and philosophy, the term nation, or *minjok*, became be naturalized and reified through historical discourse and the most powerful word in everyday life as well as in politics and academy. This tendency still withstands changes in many of aspects of life in Korea – school textbook, mass media, and popular culture – and even studies of nationalism also have a tendency to impose the primordial view of Korean nation. In other words, for social scientists, most of the data on Korean nationalism is significantly biased.

⁵⁹ There have been growing demands in South Korea from academic and societal groups. Though it did not attract mainstream scholarship, there were attempts to dismantle dominant nationalist views in Korean literature, history, and political science from the late 90's (Cho and Lee 2000; Lim 2000, 1999; Kwon 2000; Shin 2003). The demand from conservative groups, the so-called New Right, began to emerge with the establishment of the Liberty Union in 2004 and the publication of Park, et al (2006). These groups and conservative mainstream media argued that nationalist history textbook has misled the students to despise their country so they need to create new history that is free from distortion and uncontaminated by leftist nationalist views.

⁶⁰ Many fundamental studies of Korean nationalism presuppose the Korean nation as given and show how the people of the Korean nation try to accomplish the nationalist political goal, exposing the incongruence of nation and state. See Kim (1989); Lee (1963).

⁶¹ The difference between primordial and perennial views on nationalism, see Smith (2010).

⁶² Andre Schmidt pinpoints the beginning of this tendency from 1895 when the Sino-Japanese War ended, when he says, “a disparate group of intellectuals, reformers, and publicists made the nation the premier subject of intellectual exchange for the first time in the peninsula’s history” (2003, 3)

Shin (2006) is the first book-length research of Korean nationalism and largely embraces the research from constructionists' works challenging this tendency. But the outcome is rather disappointing. It clearly shows how the reification of the Korean nation undermines work on nationalism largely based on constructionist views. As Lee (2010a) points out, his book is theoretically eclectic and uses historical evidence in a flawed way. In this section, I will first provide a critical reading of Shin (2006) and argue that his theoretical framework cannot succeed because he merely combines various contradicting theories. Then, I will point out some problematic interpretations and methods that he employs. Lastly, I will suggest an alternative perspective on Korean nationalism.

2.6.2 Origins of the Korean Nation

Shin first introduces the contending views of the origins of the Korean nation, while he also introduces prominent theorists on nationalism and their arguments about the origins of the nation. He categorizes three contending ideas on the origin of the Korean nation: primordial, modernist or constructionist and the uniqueness of the Korean experience (4-6). The former two understandings of nationalism are commonly shared in nationalism scholarship, but it is suspicious when he connects Korean nationalists' views directly to a primordial view of nationalism. Though Smith analytically argues that there is a "continuation of long-standing patterns of ethnicity, build on preexisting geographic or cultural foundation" (Shin 2006, 4) as Shin summarizes, it is difficult to equate the political statements of nationalists with the term.

But the most problematic categorization is the last addition when he emphasizes that the "historical developments of premodern Korea should be taken into account in any explanation of the formation of the modern Korean nation" (7).⁶³

⁶³ This view is also problematic, since constructionist views, for example, do not all come from Western models. I can agree with Schmid's reservation on uncritical acceptance of the territoriality of nationalism, when he writes, "The *Joseon* dynasty was not a blank sheet waiting to have Western definition of space written on it. Instead, the texts from and social memories of the late *Joseon* dynasty needed to be reconfigured, even retrofitted in line with the new knowledge of the West while at the same time these understandings mediated the reception of Western discourses on space"(2003, 19).

By emphasizing this distinctiveness in Korean history, he begins to reify national identity as a separate and noninterfering entity. As he indicates (149), the idea of competing identities is adopted from Duara's "Bifurcating Linear Histories in China and India" (1995, 51-82). In this chapter, Duara criticizes assumptions shared by two representational modernists, Gellner and Anderson, that national identity is novel and ruptured from previous forms of identity. Duara argues,

Depending on the nature and scale of the oppositional term, the national self contains various smaller "others" – historical others that have effected an often uneasy reconciliation among themselves and potential others that are beginning to form their differences. (55)

As he indicates, the competing ideas within nationalism are suggestions to be picked up by a bounded national group, but it is individuals or subgroups within a larger group that have shared, overlapped and disfigured boundaries. But for Shin, the bounded group, called "Korean," is always assumed, and he describes the competition of identities as something that Koreans as a group can choose to become.

2.6.3 What Do Contentious Nations Mean?

As the constructionist view on nations and nationalism have conquered recent social science discourse, nation and nationalism as contested processes seemed to be common sense to many researchers. What this contest meant, however, is not well discussed in recent scholarship. Many of the studies on nationalism tend to do research on multi-ethnic states, and therefore, contested national identity often means that different national identities or different notions of nation are competing. Contentious nationalism, therefore, usually denotes the unbounded national identity. The boundaries and dispositions that are said to be innate in some national traits keep being questioned. This is very much a constructivist's view that denies the fixed and unchanged forms of nation.

On the contrary, Shin uses this term "contentious nationalism" in such a reified manner.

He appropriates the original term in a very eccentric way. By “contentious nationalism” he seems to mean two characteristics of Korean nationalism.

First, nation as a collective identity competes with other forms of identity from the local to the transnational (10).

First, nationalism is contentious because it was not a sole identity that defines the Korean population in the formation of the Korean nation. Pan-Asianism, class, and many other possible identities were competing for the attention of Koreans in late *Joseon* dynasty.

Second, the notion of nation is contested as well. In the process of nation building different elements operate to varying degrees depending on specific historical and political conditions (11).

He contends that Korean nationalism in the first place was not just ethnic nationalism. In the formation era, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism or particularistic nationalism and universal nationalism were contending, but because of the Japanese rule beginning from 1905, ethnic or particularistic nationalism came to be dominant in Korea (Chapter 6).

According to his logic, and unlike the common discussions on the contentious nature of nationalism, he reifies Korean ethnic groups and nationalism as a ready-made ideology that can be picked up by people, and confuses ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Anyone who wants to challenge essentialized nation might first question the boundaries of nation. Korea cannot be exempt from this question. Throughout the book, however, Shin maintains that there is a fixed and bounded group called “Korean.” Brubaker called this tendency “groupism”: “the tendency to take bounded groups as fundamental units of analysis (and basic constituents of the social world) (Brubaker 2004, 2).

The reification of nationalism and other identities is also problematic.

As a result, Koreans became familiar with modern Western ideas such as social Darwinism, civilization and enlightenment, liberalism, individualism, nationalism, imperialism, democracy, and racism. (117)

He argues that the statements above have three grounds. First, King *Kojong* promulgated the Decree of Nation Building through Education. Second, some intellectuals, including Yu Kil-chun and Soh Jaipil, published their experiences of the Western world and books on Western thoughts and practices. Third, there were growing publications of “magazines, newspapers, and school textbooks that introduced and discussed foreign language, tradition, history, art, thought, geography, and social institutions” (2006, 117). Among these three grounds, any of them can be evidence enough to tell us that “Koreans became familiar with modern Western ideas such as social Darwinism, civilization, and enlightenment...”

First, all the mentioned ideas, indeed, were contested. Most of the recent historical research on the importation of Western ideas during the late *Joseon* dynasty recognizes that there were misunderstandings, distortions, or selective appropriations of these ideas. The most glaring flaw of the book is that Shin keeps trying to prove how nationalism won over other possible identities.

2.6.4 Context of usage of language in Contents Analysis

In chapter 6, Shin performs some contentious analysis to prove the following hypotheses:

A-1) Both universalistic and particularistic elements appeared in the construction of modern nation during the period from the 1890s to the 1900s.

A-2) In the early years of the 1890s, universalistic elements dominated particularistic ones as the basis of nation.

A-3) Early dominance of universalism gradually gave way to particularism, especially after the 1905 Protectorate Treaty

Though it looks like he carefully managed data for content analysis, and the statistical results also prove the reliability of his research, but, indeed, it could be the case that content analysis is used in a flawed way. A crucial flaw can be found in his coding scheme. He analyzes the subjects of school textbooks and newspaper articles, which is similar to the quantitative newspaper analysis of earlier scholarship. He analyzes the contents of the books to determine whether each of the subjects deal with 1) Korean/traditional/indigenous; 2) Western/modern/foreign; and 3) mixed. This is very problematic in many ways. First, following Kim (2003), he assumes that there was competition between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism in the early ages of nationalism in Korea evidenced by the usage of terms such as “self,” “rights,” “civilization,” “progress,” and “equality” (Shin 2006, 118). Similarly, if a chapter dealt with U.S. presidents, he coded its figures as Western. However, the words used in this period might mean something totally different from current usage. For example, according to Chang (2002), whereas the term, “rights’ is understood as individual rights in modern context, the authors in the late *Joseon* dynasty understood that term to be more like “duty.” When they translate the term “rights” into Chinese characters, they prefer the term “*Tongyi*” (通儀), originally preferred by Fukazawa Yukichi. In other words, any of the terms mentioned above might have nothing to do with universalism or civic nationalism. As Krippendorff emphasizes, the most important elements in content analysis is to understand the context in which a word or phrase is used. If one ignores the historical contexts while performing content analysis on historical texts, this problem can easily occur.

Second, even if the words that he coded meant something similar to the meaning that we currently use, the process of inference might be flawed when he argues that a large proportion of words related to the category world/foreign indicates that the nationalism in those periods was more civic than in later history. As Chang (2002) indicates, the interests in foreign culture and institutions in *Seoyugyeonmun* indicates the desire of the intellectuals in the late *Joseon* dynasty to expand their knowledge to the unknown world, escaping from the old-world order dominated by China. But if we carefully read the contents of the texts, most of them are just lists of information. These fragments of information served to accomplish the building of National Prosperity and Military Power (*bugukgangbyeong*). In other words, the decreasing frequency of information on the foreign world could reflect changes in the character of nationalism in Korea,

but it could also mean that the curiosity about the outer world was decreasing due to the stability brought by Japanese imperialism.

2.6.5 Korean nationalism as projects

As it is shown above, most of the problems with Shin (2006) come from his reification of the Korean nation, competing ideas, and civic and ethnic elements of nationalism. In modern nation-states, as Duara indicates, national identity has a totalizing power over all other forms of identities. If we contend with Duara's argument, the statement that national identity once competed with other forms of identity explains nothing. As Lee (2010) also points out, Shin fails to prove whether all the other identities that were supposed to compete with national identity can be clearly distinguished from national identity. These identities can hardly be seen as identities shared by the mass of people. They are rather ideas that were suggested by some intellectuals to the people and that colonial institutions tried to impose on the population. These are all not necessarily differentiated from national identity, but are identities that overlapped with it or were also appropriated to the national identity to be imposed on people.

The lack of understanding of the acceptance and dissemination of ideas and terminology also created flaws in Shin's empirical research. As we've witnessed, any thoughts, ideology or religious transformation accommodate to the settled culture. The understanding of this type of cultural adjustment of ideas and different historical contexts of thoughts is crucial even to attempt empirical contents analysis.

Overall, Shin (2006) tries to gather recent outcomes produced from the studies on nationalism and applies them to the study of ethnic nationalism in Korea. As he emphasizes the distinctiveness of Korea, however, he fails to discern delicate and nuanced arguments by different nationalism theorists. Most importantly, even though he tries to embrace the works of constructionists, too often he reifies the Korean nation as well as other ideas related to Korean ethnic nationalism. Also, the most important assumptions of the constructionists – the unbounded and fluid nature of groups, culture, and identity – are not properly applied to his explanations on Korean nationalism.

Indeed, there have been increasing numbers of well-grounded studies of Korean nationalism, though they are not explicitly over-emphasizing the constructionist view. Abelmann (1996) and Lee (2007a) are good examples of showing the fluid, unbounded and contested nature of identities regarding the *minjung* narrative and nationalism. Those studies help us to understand that Korean nationalism also contains dissident aspects and that it cannot be seen as a unified, consistent and bounded entity. If there is a distinctive feature in the process of Korean nationalism, it might be the centrality of nationalism and history, to the extent even the dissidents are trying to produce, participate in and compete with a nationalist discourse.⁶⁴

The study of history related to social movements in South Korean and their engagement in nationalist discourse would help to promote this new understanding of nationalism. As Brubaker argues nation, as well as ethnicity and race, should be used in analysis “in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms” (2004, 11).

2.7 Conclusion

Because the comfort women movements have been regarded as leading to the internalization of the ‘comfort women’ issue, several attempts have been made to understand the role of the dominant groups in the movement.⁶⁵ As Lee (2010b, 48-51) points out, “there have been competitive interpretations on the discourse and issue framings of comfort women movements.” Especially in the 1990s, the academic discussion of the ‘comfort women’ issue and its

⁶⁴ To be sure, to some extent, we can say all the movements are at least partly engaging with and appropriating the production of nationalist discourse. But as these studies clearly show, the degree of participation and internalization of this nationalist sentiment cannot be easily found in other societies.

⁶⁵ For a general introduction to the Korean Council, see Yoon (2010). For the introduction to the studies on ‘comfort women’ and comfort women movements, see Lee (2010b). She provides an intensive literature review on ‘comfort women’ and the movements and carefully evaluates the comfort women movements. She argues that “comfort women movements need to be highly evaluated since it is indeed show an ‘other’ version of the way of practice of non-Western women’s movement. Comfort women movements are the good cases of showing how internal origins of feminism can emerge and practice in a non-Western post-colonial country that experienced colonialism unlike the West and another modernity different from the West and how they lead universal ‘problems’ from local problem and how they negotiate their differences to draw transnational alliance” (72-73).

movements revolved around whether it is a “women’s question” or a “nation’s question.” (49) Whereas some of the researchers and activists argued that the comfort women movement needed to be considered according to their historical particularities, that nation, women, state, and class questions are intertwined, others argued that the nationalist logic produced by some women’s studies scholars tended to extricate and appropriate the representation of the ‘comfort women’ issue from the violence against women in colonial rule and war (50).

So far, we have examined what kind of theoretical framework is needed to look at the comfort women movement and its impact on Korean social nationalism. If I may summarize roughly the works of scholars who have studied Korean nationalism, it is a strong ethnic nationalism; at the very least, it has not only maintained the state as one nation since the *Goryeo* Dynasty but also had a narrative of the origin of the nation. The foundation of modern nationalism was built by intellectuals at the end of the *Joseon* dynasty; and such nationalism has been maintained through various ideological state apparatuses since the establishment of the Republic of Korea. From these points of view, the most common presupposition is that Korean nationalism can be viewed as a strong ethnic nationalism with a primordial point of view and a nationalism conveyed from top to bottom, and a nationalism with little change after its formation.

First, defining Korean nationalism as ethnic nationalism has many misunderstandings. It falls within the framework of the distinction between ethnic nationalism and civil nationalism, one of the oldest and endless controversies in the field of nationalistic research. Second, the origin of Korean nationalism is traced back as recently as the *Goryeo* dynasty and as far back as the *Dan-gun* era. This view is a part of the modern nationalist historiography. It often ignores the fact that the nationalism of Korea is a modern phenomenon started from the encounter between Korean society and the modern era. Third, even if the national elites and intellectuals are inevitably involved in the early formation of nationalism, the role of civil society and the public in the process of strengthening, developing, and propagating nationalism when such a national state is formed cannot be explained from state and elite perspectives nor through their interests.

In this paper, I make some suggestions to overcome these existing theoretical limitations and to understand the dynamic of nationalism and especially the nationalism of Korean society.

First, it presents a new typology to overcome the problems of Eurocentrism in civil vs. ethnic nationalism.

	State-framed nationalism	Counter-state nationalism
Community-oriented nationalism	State-centered nationalism (militarism, fascism, right wing movements)	Substate nationalism (national minorities, Indigenous)
Value-oriented nationalism	Institutional nationalism (liberal nationalism)	Communitarian nationalism (Movement groups based on universal values)

Table 3 Alternative typology of nationalism

With this new typology, we can understand that both conservative nationalism, which gives highest priority to the state as community and denounces ethnic nationalism, and the nationalism which does not give unconditional loyalty to the national community and regards it as more of a source for sympathy for victims of crimes committed by state and focus more on universal values, such as human rights, liberty and equality are both different kinds of nationalism.

In this dissertation, we adopt the view of nationalism as a discourse, and after the state established an apparatus to control the entire society after the 1960s, as a discourse of official nationalism which was effectively shared by all citizens. It will be shown that after the democratization, the nationalist discourse itself became a field of ideological struggle as Korean nationalism became part of the different world views of various social forces.

CHAPTER 3. METHODS

As already mentioned, this dissertation seeks to answers to these questions. What changes can be made by social movements in a hegemonized ethnic nationalism in a relatively homogeneous nation-state? Do we need another theoretical frame to understand them? How is it possible that some of the social movements came to be associated with universal values? Is there any pattern or specific characters in these changes? What elements of movements can help a group to develop such ideas? What is the impact of social movements on broader nationalist discourse?

In chapter two, I pointed out the problems posed by the perspective set by the traditional dichotomy of civic vs. ethnic nationalism and suggested alternative typology as an alternative theoretical frame to understand the dynamics of the nationalist discourses made by the different social groups in a relatively homogeneous nation-state. In this chapter, I will explain the methods I used in this dissertation to answer the above questions.

In this dissertation, various methods have been used to understand the discursive strategies of the movement groups for ‘comfort women’ and their impacts on the larger nationalist discourse in South Korea. To understand the nationalist mindset before Korean democratization, I critically read two works of former president Park Chung-hee. To understand how the two terms, *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*, have meant in Korean media, I adopt conceptual history. For the changing discursive strategies of the comfort women movement and their impact on the larger nationalist discourse in Korea, I use frame analysis, discourse analysis, and content analysis.

In this chapter, I will briefly review the changes in the methodology used in the fields of nationalism studies and social movement studies. I will then explain why I mainly use frame analysis and content analysis for this dissertation. To summarize, I will use the frame analysis to effectively look at the changes in the discourse strategy adopted by the comfort women movement groups along 20 years of time and use the content analysis to assess the impact of such changes on the larger Korean nationalist discourse.

Since the revolution of behaviorism, quantitative research methods have dominated not only political science but most of other fields in social science. Still, some people have disagreed

with this dominance of mathematical model based on rational choice and have argued to bring back the traditional meaning of political science.⁶⁶ This controversy is continuing, but it seems that this debate is now converging on the flexible application of various methodologies to try to understand the social phenomenon in the most balanced way, rather than simply a confrontation between qualitative and quantitative methods. I also try to refer to the achievements of previous researches, minimize methodological errors, and to look at the recent changes in nationalism in Korea through the comfort women movement using multiple methodologies.

Recent studies on Korean nationalism, migration, conservatism, and social movements adopt various kinds of analytical tools to understand the strategies and changes of the discourse shared by society. While traditional studies on those fields used more conventional ways, relatively new technologies to understand the social discourse, including discourse analysis (Kim 2012, 2015b; Seol and Seo 2014), contents analysis (Shin 2006, Ch. 6; Shin 2007a; Kim 2010c), frame analysis (Shin 2007b; Kim 2012, 2015b), and network analysis (Shin 2008) are widely used to provide different perspective to the changes in social ideologies. Those recent studies help to understand the underlying logic and hierarchy of the discourse regarding nation, ethnicity, state, and ideology.

This chapter seeks first to review the methods utilized in the fields related to this dissertation. In nationalism studies, most studies employ qualitative methods, and the analyses tend to center on the state and the state elites (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Fujitani 1998; Greenfeld 1992; Anderson 2006; Winichakul 1997; Garon 1997). On the other hand, there is little research on how society accepts, appropriates, or transforms nationalism since nationalism studies often assume that the state or the state elites create nationalism and it is disseminated to the society by the mass media.⁶⁷ In other words, mainstream

⁶⁶ The *New Political Science*, for example, has been published since 1979, criticizing too much focus on quantitative research on the *American Political Science Review*. The *Perestroika Movement in the American Political Science Association* is another moment that focus the methodological pluralism. Laitin (2003) suggests “an integrated tripartite method in which narrative, statistics, and formal modeling fill in a scientific frame.”

⁶⁷ It is true that these studies are increasing in recent years. Herzfeld (1997) shows the most intriguing and theoretically deepest discussion in this kind. It shows the appropriation of the desirable nation by the different groups in the society.

nationalism studies often depict that people in the society are passively accepting, if not contaminated or brainwashed by, the nationalism made by the state or state elites. However, do people just passively accept nationalism or any particular ideology that is given by the state? How then, the almost revolutionary social changes such as the communist movement in Japan in the 1960s and the democratization movement in Korea in the 1980s could be possible in Japan and Korea, where the most repressive and centralized governments infiltrated into the realm of everyday life to make people sacrifice for the nation? If I limit the question to Korea, the nationalist worldview, which was created by a powerful nation and state elite and spread widely by mass media, education, military conscription and even by the discipline of private social organizations, could have been changed by the influence of the comfort women movement, which is also greatly influenced by the nationalist view? In other words, how does the post-nation-state nationalism change through the social movement?

It also reviews the methods used in the studies on social movements. The field of social movement, which has received much attention recently in sociology, is also a field where the most recent methodologies are widely used. Content analysis and framing analysis are the popular methods used in social movement studies since the counting of the protests on the local or national media played a larger role in the explanation of the movement opportunities. Basic content analysis occupies a significant part in social movements' scholarship. Framing analysis, heavily used in the field of social movement studies, provides the possibility to connect nationalism studies and social movement studies. Then, as an example of a questionable application of the methodology, I will reexamine the methods used in Shin (2006). It illustrates the problems that are caused by the lack of understanding of the historical background of the terms, using content analysis.

Thirdly, the data used in this dissertation will be discussed. We will briefly introduce the data gathered using the set standards and the nature of the collected data. Mostly, the data utilized in this dissertation is news articles. Also, materials such as books, pamphlets, resource books, statement collection, movement group websites, in-depth interviews, and government documents from the government website and wiki leaks were analyzed.

Finally, I will briefly introduce the methods used for this dissertation. Chapter 4, critical

reading of the books written by Park Chung-hee is mainly used to analyze the structure of the state nationalism in the 60s and 70s when almost the whole society had been organized with those nationalist ideas in Korea. To understand what kind of state-centered nationalism spread to every corner of the society before the democratization of Korea, I read the nationalist project designed by Park Chung-hee. He was a military dictator from 1961 to 1979. His two renowned books (Park 1962, 1978), were published immediately after the so-called military revolution and the *Yusin* revolution respectively. He built the legitimacy of his power, obtained by an unjust coup and fortified by hijacking the constitution, on the nationalist narrative of organic state.

In Korea, until the early and mid-nineties, the term *jeongsindae*, or volunteer corps, was used more often than the term *wianbu*, or comfort women, to refer to historical 'comfort women.' After the comfort women movements got attention from the media, two terms came to be used more and more interchangeably until the late 90s, when the fact that the two terms were referring to two different institutions during the Asian Pacific War became common knowledge. Some argue that the blending of these terms is a deliberate misuse of movement groups who have used the comfort women victims for their nationalist and political purposes. To show that such a claim is based on no ground, I will examine how the two terms have used in the Korean media since the 1930s. As Koselleck (2005) points out, this investigation is not limited to how these two concepts were used before it was politicized but also tries to show how it was defined and how the people understood the terms and made use of them in order to reveal the social and political conflicts of the time

3.1 Methods in Nationalism and Social Movement Studies

In this section, I will examine the methods used in the study of nationalism, social movements, and Korean nationalism. First, I will point out that most of the studies on nationalism are using qualitative methods and largely focus on the state and the state elites in their analysis. The changes of nationalist discourses using content analysis is a poorly studied area. Second, I introduce mainstream social movement studies and point out that many of them are comfortable with using content analysis. Regarding the connection between nationalism studies and social movement studies, I argue that framing analysis seems promising. In the last part, I introduce some studies on Korean nationalism and critically examine the content analysis used in Shin

(2006), the most recent and influential study on Korean nationalism.

3.1.1 Nationalism studies

Though the technique of content analysis began as a systemized, and well utilized in communication studies, political science and content analysis also have an affinity from the early time of the field. With the behavioral revolution in social science, content analysis soon became a hot method to pursue scientific research and many renowned political scientists, including Harold D. Lasswell (Lasswell 1927, 1938, 1941), who contributed to the development of the methods. It is interesting that many of the early studies using content analysis tend to analyze nationalism or political symbols (Martin 1936; McDiarmid 1937; Lasswell 1927). In the nation-building process, different types of symbols and physical buildings, monuments, and memorials are needed.⁶⁸ Therefore, content analysis can be a well-fitted method to understand the patterns and changes of these symbols, represented in different media.

The most important studies on nationalism, however, rarely use content analysis or any other quantitative methods. Whether authors are primordialists (Conor 1990; Smith 1996, 2009) or constructionists (Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 2006; Gellner 1983), most of the renowned scholars in nationalism adopted historical explanation or literary analysis. Since the study of nationalism is conventionally regarded as highly theoretical, this tendency is easily understandable. Also, because the most crucial question in this field is how nationalism started, this methodological imbalance looks very natural.⁶⁹ For this very reason, most of the studies on nationalism tend to focus on state or state elites – presidents, thinkers, writers, government personnel, and movement leaders. It is crucial to question whether common people in premodern political regimes had similar sentiment of membership like nationalism for the ones who want to clarify the beginning of nationalism, partly because of the lack of evidence and partly because of

⁶⁸ For this creation of national symbols – physical and nonphysical – in nation building process, see Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983); Nora (1996); and Fujitani (1998). cf. Geiser (2005) shows that these symbols are not always successfully settle with their designation.

⁶⁹ Recently, there are some attempts to adopt contents analysis to explain the changes in nationalist discourse in political level, including Polletta (2003).

their academic orientation (Smith 2008, 10), empirical studies on the discourses from the people are rare.

Thanks to the constructionist scholars on nationalism, current social science learned that nationalism is not static, but “relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated” (Brubaker 2004, 11). To understand this nature of nationalism better, current nationalism scholarship might need to add some empirical research, especially to understand the changes that occurred in nationalist discourse and the roles of different social groups in formation, transformation, and appropriation of the discourse.

3.1.2 Social movements studies

The studies on social movements grew rapidly in the 1960s with the development of rational choice and resource mobilization theory. Unlike the predecessors who see social movements as deviant actions done by some outsiders of a stable society (Kornhauser 1959), these new scholars see social movements as rational choices of the actors and asked how they can succeed. Political opportunities theory (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977; Kriesi et al. 1992), resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977), and political process theory (McAdam 1999), ask when, how and why social movements arise and are the result of this tendency. What those theorists have done were to explain the political opportunities or resources that enable people to participate in the events of social movements, they are largely dependent on empirical data and quantitative methods, including basic content analysis: they count the number of people who participated in demonstrations or the number of demonstrations reported in the newspapers.

As studies on social movements became one of the mainstream research topics in sociology, there has been a significant development in approaches and methodology. The development of cultural studies and theories on identities permeated into this field, and the fruits of communication studies are also largely used in this field. Framing analysis developed from Irving Goffman’s framing theory became one of the most effective tools to understand and analyze the discursive strategies of social movements (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994). The questions of framing analysis are similar to

those of resource mobilizing theorists: they ask how a movement can successfully mobilize people into it. Instead of focusing on the physical resources that a movement group can utilize, framing analysis emphasizes on the discursive strategies that a movement employs. According to Snow et al., “movements function as carriers and transmitters of mobilizing beliefs and ideas, to be sure; but they are also actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers” (1988, 198). Framing analysis is used for analyzing movements’ production of meaning and it can be a connector between studies on social movements and nationalism. For nationalism is most largely a shared identity in the modern state, not just social movement groups but also many of the actors in society, sometimes also including state, use nationalism to mobilize people.

3.2 Understanding Changes of Korean Nationalism

The methods used in studies on Korean nationalism are also centered on historical research mainly historical documents (Shin and Robinson 1999; Shin 2006; Choi 1998; Wells 1990; Duncan 1998; Kim 2010a; Lee 1963; Kim 1989). Like the general studies on nationalism, those studies are mostly dealing with the early period of Korean nationalism and focus on the discourse generated by state or state elites. However, one of the most problematic chapters of his book, Shin (2006, 115-134) adopts content analysis. He uses school textbook in 1890s-1900s and newspapers in 1920s-1930s to show that universalism dominates earlier Korean nationalism rather than particularism during the formation era of nationalism and this conflation of nationalism with race and ethnicity strengthens during the Japanese rule.

His attempt to use content analysis on studies of nationalism is a bold move, but it has many methodological and interpretational flaws. Krippendorff argues that content analysis is not about counting the number of words but about inferences. Shin (2006) has two flaws related to inferences. First, he does not consider the different meaning of the words in different times. Many historical and political philosophical studies teach us that many words used in late 19th century in Korea had a different meaning from current usage. In his content analysis on school textbook and newspapers in the late 19th century and early 20th century, Shin (2006) does not

consider the differences in meaning. Second, the more important and more relevant to the inferences is that the changes in the number of certain words – in this case, words related foreign words – do not necessarily mean that the characteristic of nationalism had changed. This can be called wrong inferences without enough evidence.

In my dissertation, therefore, the question is how to avoid these common mistakes when I employ content analysis and design simple and plausible plans for research. Also, I address the combination of content analysis and framing analysis to understand the changes in nationalist discourse and the role of history related social movements.

3.3 Data

For the discussion on the proto-nationalist discourse established in the 1960s and the 1970s, I analyze two books written by Park (1962, 1978).

For chapter 5, I use the articles found on the web-based news search service Naver News Library (hereafter NNL). NNL provides the original Korean news articles from 1920 to 1999 of the four newspaper companies, including the *Donga Ilbo* (established in 1920), the *Kyunghyang Shinmun* (established in 1946), the *Maeil Business Newspaper* (established in 1966), and the *Hankyoreh* (established in 1988) in pdf and plain text format. The news articles from 1920 to 1987 containing the term *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* are collected.

	Dong-a Ilbo		Kyunghayang Shinmun		Maeil Business Newspaper		Total	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
Articles including the term <i>Jeongsindae</i>	185	59	100	32	27	9	312	100
Articles including the term <i>wianbu</i>	340	49	314	45	42	6	696	100

Table 4 Articles containing the terms *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* on NNL search

Since *Dong-a Ilbo* was established more than 40 years before other newspapers, the number of

articles from *Dong-a Ilbo* is more than that of other newspapers. I analyze how the terms *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* have used in each article.

To analyze the discursive strategies of the comfort women movement groups, I mainly used the statements announced at the Wednesday Demonstration. Although it is not a complete collection, many of the statements from the first Demonstration to the 600th Demonstration is compiled on Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe (2004). Most of the statements announced at the later Demonstrations can be found at the Korean Council's website. Here are other data used in this dissertation: 1) publications include leaflets, and reports, 2) interviews with the leaders and staffs of the movement organizations⁷⁰ 3) data from related governments include Bill Information System of Korean National Assembly, Minutes of National Assembly, and Wikileaks, and 4) news coverage of public media. Most of the data was collected for the project funded by Academy of Korean Studies under the title, "Korean Civil Society and Re-emergence of Historical Memory" (AKS-2009-R63, AKS-2010-R36). During the two field trips for the project, newsletters, booklets,⁷¹ internal reports, books⁷² and other documents published by history related movements were collected. Also, thirteen interviews⁷³ with leaders and the staff of the movement organizations were conducted. The in-depth interviews were open-ended and semi-structured, one to three hours long, and were digitally recorded and transcribed.

Korea is one of the smartest countries in the world, which has the fastest internet.⁷⁴ Most of the government related documents can be easily obtained from the government websites. The minutes and the proposed bill related information can be found on the National Assembly website (<http://www.assembly.go.kr/assm/userMain/main.do>) and the Bill Information of the National Assembly (<http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/main.jsp>).

⁷⁰ Interviews usually lasted between an hour to two hours. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed.

⁷¹ The collection of the statements, internal annual reports, collection of historical materials for the public, and etc., were included in this category.

⁷² Most of the books published by the movement groups were the collections of testimonies from the 'comfort women' victims.

⁷³ Interviews with 13 former and current leaders and staffs of the groups were conducted in 2008.

⁷⁴ According to Forbes, the average internet speed of South Korea is 14Mbps in 2013, which marked the country that has world fastest internet connection speed. (<http://www.forbes.com/pictures/fhmf45fdef/the-fastest-web-on-earth/>)

News coverage from Jan 1988 to May 2008 from the two Korean newspapers, the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Hankyoreh*, which represent conservative and progressive views respectively, will be analyzed. The two decades covered in this paper almost overlap with the periods of two conservative and two progressive regimes after democratization. In this period, Korean people had to go through the economic hardship, so called IMF period, and peacefully change the political power by election but couldn't prevent the waves of neoliberalism crashed to Korean shore with rapid globalization. So, the period is the time of great changes not only in terms of the nationalist discourse but also in terms of the general social environment. I would say that there have been many changes in these decades that prepared what will come after this period. While the stratification of society has been accelerated, the conservatism has spread more rapidly and widespread, and new nationalist classifications have occurred, as well as various social identities through various stratification. However, some of the waves of change that have come along with this globalization have been created by Korean society through democratization and various social movements constantly intervening in social change. Thus, by looking at the early twenty years of these changes, we can limit the scope of the study to 20 years after democratization, since we can get more useful ideas about recent and future changes.

Because the terms conservatism and progressive in Korea is also very politically infected, it should be used with caution when used in academic works. Roughly speaking, Korean society is a conservatively biased society, so if the mainstream political power of Korea or the media is called progressive, it should be regarded as a moderate conservative position in Western Europe. Nevertheless, due to the division of Korean peninsula, the ideological front is often drawn along the stance to North Korea. The other is the position on the capital. As I will point out, the Korean nationalist discourse has priority over economic development and value for all, so freedom and democracy in Korea can often be infringed before the interests of capital, which can bring economic development. In these two respects, the forces called the conservatives in Korea and the forces called progress are generally confronted, but other social problems are less politicized in Korea. Nevertheless, in Korean society, especially in the early and mid-2000s, the word "progress" or "conservative" has become the most widely used word to distinguish political opponents. The *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Hankyoreh* that provide data in this dissertation best represent such two positions.

The news articles containing the terms “comfort women,” and “volunteer corps” were collected separately. Since the first issue of *Hankyoreh* was published on May 15, 1988, I collected the articles containing the same terms from Jan 1988 to May 14, 1988, on the *Dong-a Ilbo*. The articles on the Chosun was collected from the *Chosun Ilbo* Archive website. The articles on the *Hankyoreh* were collected on the Hankyoreh website, and the articles on *Dong-a Ilbo* were collected on the Naver News Library. 4662 articles that contain the words ‘comfort women’ or ‘volunteer corps’ in the three newspapers were compiled.⁷⁵

3.4 Sampling and Coding

3.4.1 Sampling Data

Due to the developments in digital technology, the availability of text data is rapidly increasing. Researchers who are interested in analyzing “the meanings, symbolic qualities, and expressive contents” and “the communicative roles they play in the lives of the data's sources” (Krippendorff 2004, 44) now have more chances to analyze texts systematically. The vastness of data, however, provides difficulties for the researchers at the same time. Even with the most updated data analysis software, one cannot analyze all the texts related to the research theme. Without proper research questions, theories and methods, the pure volume of the data itself can easily overwhelm a researcher. Most of the content analysis, using a vast data set, therefore, needs sampling techniques.

It is important to understand that there are crucial differences between traditional sampling techniques in statistics used in social science and those used in content analysis. As Krippendorff points out, traditional sampling theory is “a theory of representation, in the sense that the sample drawn from a population has the same distributional properties as the population”

⁷⁵ Sometimes, especially on the Chosun Ilbo Archive, the articles that contains only part of the terms were collected. For example, not only the articles containing the words ‘*wianbu*’ or ‘*jeongsindae*’ but the articles containing the words ‘*wiman*’, which means comfort or the denomination of Chinese *yuan*, or ‘*jeongsin*’, which means spirit, are collected. I carefully examine the collected articles and got rid of all the articles in the latter case.

(2004, 113). However, in content analysis, all sampling units need not be represented as aboriginal population. The only concern is that “all sampling units are *equally informative* concerning a research question” (2004, 113).

For example, this dissertation concerns the changes of nationalist discourse lead by discursive strategies of history related social movements with the responses from the media; more specifically, I want to find out how discursive strategies of history related social movements have been changed; which actor – state, movements or media – drives the changes in nationalist discourses, and which discursive strategies that social movement groups employed do or do not drive changes in public discourse on nationalism. In that case, the data (articles) I need from the media (newspapers) should contain information about nationalist discourse, social movements, and/or responses from the media on those matters. First, I limited the data to two newspapers – *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun Daily*. The two newspapers respectively represent progressive and conservative views. By choosing two ideologically contrasting newspapers, I expect to balance the ideological bias and also want to find out if the changes of nationalist discourse appear differently in the newspapers that have different ideological positions.

Next, I use sampling techniques again on the selected newspapers. For I am focusing on two organizations, respectively dealing with Japanese history textbook issues and comfort women. If I gather all the articles containing the words Japanese history textbook, and comfort women, I can expect the articles contain information about nationalist discourse on these two issues, activities and statements from the movement groups and the responses from the media. First, the articles contain the words “comfort women” (*wiwanbu*) and “Japanese history textbook” are gathered. Second, the articles containing the terms “yasukuni” and “dokdo” are also collected for future reference.

There were problems in the sampling process. Before the so-called ‘comfort women’ issue became well known to the public, the people who were forced to be sexual slaves to the Japanese military were known as ‘volunteer corps’ (*jeongsindae*). It was not until the mid-1990s that people became aware that “volunteer corps” were forced labor deployed in armament factories, and ‘comfort women’ were sexual slaves. So I found out that in the early 90s, the term “volunteer corps” is preferred in the media and it is gradually substituted for the term, “comfort

women.” So the articles containing each word were sampled respectively. Comparing this to the different sample units also tells us the change of sentiment towards the victims.⁷⁶

The samples will be analyzed using various sampling schemes combined with frame analysis. For example, the articles were coded in figures (politician – president, government figures, national congressman, local congressman, or activists) and introduced depending on whose interviews they contained.

Among the nine sampling techniques that Krippendorff suggests, including 1) random sampling, 2) systematic sampling, 3) stratified sampling, 4) varying probability sampling, 5) cluster sampling, 6) snowball sampling, 7) relevance sampling, 8) census, and 9) convenience sampling (2004, 114-121), the sampling techniques I employed are cluster and relevance sampling or purposive sampling. Cluster sampling “is the technique of choice when analysts cannot enumerate all the units of analysis but find lists of larger groups of such units, or clusters” (2004,116). Relevance sampling “aims at selecting all textual units that contribute to answering given research questions” (2004, 119). As it is shown in the examples above, these are important in better sampling. First, an analyst should have some knowledge of the data for cluster sampling. Cluster sampling is different from random sampling, and it should reflect the intention of the analyst. The analyst should understand how the original data would look like, what the possible biases that data might have are, and how he can collect the data. Second, as it was also shown in the case of coding in the example of Shin (2006) case, the analyst should have understood the historical or social background contained in the articles he will collect. This can be easily ignored in quantitative studies, but if this is not considered in the process of data collection, even though an analyst adopts a perfect statistic scheme and it has great statistic reliability, the whole research can be easily dismissed.

3.4.2 Coding

⁷⁶ For example, Soh (1998) argues that this preference on “volunteer corps” over ‘comfort women’ reflects patriarchal nature of Korean nationalism. But close examine of the change of usage of these two terms, I believe, will tell us different story.

The articles collected from the *Chosun* and *Hankyoreh* are coded for this dissertation and future research. For the future studies, I referenced the coding scheme of the monumental framing studies by Wolfsfeld (1997), but many have been adjusted to fit the ‘comfort women’ issue. The detailed coding sheet is provided in the Appendix.

3.4.3 What is the article: editorials/columns/opinions vs. reports?

Though I included the editorials and opinions in the collection, sometimes I distinguish them from the ordinary news reports. When the articles are in the column section, I consider the articles are focusing more on delivering an opinion, and all the others are regarded as focusing on delivering the fact. There are two types of the articles that focus on delivering the facts: news articles written by the reporters and the news articles from the news agency. There are four types of articles that focus more on delivering the opinion. One is editorials; others are the columns written by the reporters, columns written by the outside writers and the Letters to the Editors on the Opinion section. These four opinion-centered articles are coded separately in case it needs to be analyzed in future studies.

3.4.4 News from the News Agency

News from the news agency is usually a shorter report on the event. In Korean news media, the articles from the news agency are often rewritten by the reporters or by the desk. Although the newspapers take the same article from the same news agency, the length, tone and the focus on the articles can be different. To analyze the articles that deal with the issue directly, the articles that deal with the issue less than 50% of the time were not included in the analysis, but I will also discuss the articles from the news agency that briefly mention the ‘comfort women’ or volunteer corps.




Figure 2 Number of articles from the News Agency

The number of articles from the news agency is changing according to the that of the whole articles that include the words “comfort women” or “volunteer corps.” As it is shown in the figure below, the relative number of the articles from news agency is different from the pattern of the changes in the number of whole articles. For example, from 1991 to 1993, the number of whole articles in January 1992 is much more than June 1992 and August 1993, but the number of articles from the news agency in June 1992 is much more than January 1992 and August 1993. I will examine, why there is much more or less in the number of articles from the news agency than other articles.




Figure 3 Number of articles of whole data and articles from the news agency

Below shows the number of articles from news agency on the *Chosun* and the *Hankyoreh*. It tells that generally, the *Hankyoreh* has more articles from the news agency than the *Chosun*. However, in some months, the number of articles from the news agency on the *Chosun* exceeds that of the *Hankyoreh*. I will examine what brings this difference.




Figure 4 Number of articles from News Agency by month

3.5 Three Core Framing Tasks: Diagnostic, Prognostic, and Motivational Frames

In the field of social movement studies, which is heavily dominated by new social movements approach and resource mobilization theory, Snow and Benford opened up a way to understand the movements and the surrounding society differently with their framing theory. It suggests that movements not only “function as carriers and transmitters of mobilizing beliefs and ideas,” but also “actively engage in the production of meaning for ‘participants, antagonists and observers’” (1988, 198).” The meaning produced during the process of the movements are not static but developing. Tracing the changes of the frames during the process of the movements promises us to understand the necessary negotiations, strategies and the discursive environment surrounding movements.

For example, the comfort women movements show active engagement in many stages and levels of nationalist discourses. Their discursive strategies are one of the good examples of how a movement has affected not only the participants and supporters of it but also its antagonists and observers. To understand how they have engaged in larger nationalist discourse and what effects they created on it, the discourse of the ‘comfort women’ issue created by the related movement groups and the appropriations of it on national news media should be analyzed with particular care with ‘framing tasks’. Snow and Benford (1988, 199) provide useful tools to analyze. They are called three framing tasks: “diagnostic framing,” “prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing.” They suggest these “three core framing tasks” as follows, “(1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and (3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.”

Diagnostic framing “involves the identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality (Snow and Benford 1988, 200).” It is useful to understand the changes in the discursive strategies that were adopted by the comfort women movement groups since as the surrounding environment or the necessity of the negotiation have been changed, the “identification of the problem” has been changed on the statements delivered in the Wednesday Demonstrations as we have seen at the beginning of this chapter. It is interesting that the collection of Wednesday Demonstration statements shows the changes, expansion and internal

competitions of this framing process well. As many critics of the movements argue, it seems to hardly refute that the larger part of the comfort women movements is appropriating nationalist sentiment and often subsumed into larger nationalist discourses especially in the initial phase of the movements. However, it is also true that those phenomena are temporal and procedural. It also allows us to depict the genealogy not only of the discursive strategies of the comfort women movements but also the transformation of the larger nationalist discourses. For diagnostic framing, what or whom they are accusing and how they contextualize the atrocities are coded. The accusers began to aim at the Japanese government, but it soon expanded to the Korean government, Emperor System and militarism, Japanese right wings and even to general war and patriarchy. The atrocities were initially regarded narrowly as the crimes against Korean women [*Joseon yeoja*], and it also extended to crimes against the Korean nation, Asian women, and human rights. The relations between these framings and the orientation of the different groups in the larger coalition will be examined.

Prognostic framing aims “not only to suggest solutions to the problem but also to identify strategies, tactics, and targets (Snow and Benford 1998, 201).” Prognostic framings will be coded under the question what needs to be done. Though the Korean Council claims that they maintain the core Six Demands from the beginning, which are 1) admittance 2) investigation 3) apology 4) legal compensation 5) construction of memorial and 6) history education based on the truth,⁷⁷ various kinds of other demands were added when some fascinated or related issues occurred. For instance, sometimes they demanded that the Korean government should act as a sovereign state to resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue with the Japanese government to promote the nation’s pride. Because violence against women in war is one of their concerns, when Korean government planned to send troops to the Iraq war, they condemned both the US government and Korean government for breaking out and participating in the war. This will also be examined along with other variations.

Motivational framing shows the ideal goal of the movement group. The tendency illustrates that their goals or motives for doing this movement also expanded along with time. Initially, the motive was so narrow, and it only talks about the immediate solution of the ‘comfort

⁷⁷ Recently, they added the ‘punishment of war criminals’ to the Six Demands.

women' problem. When it developed, the motivation for the movements extended to the world peace and a better world.

CHAPTER 4. PROTO-NARRATIVE OF KOREAN NATIONALISM AND COUNTER-NATIONALISM IN THE PARK CHUNG-HEE REGIME

Unlike what is taught in Korean schools, Korean nation is a new concept created after the modern times. Modern nationalism, however, needs tradition and history to provide the historicity and continuity of the national identity. While the idea that Korean nation has more than 5,000 years of history beginning from mythical King *Dan-gun* started from the historians who wrote national history at the end of the *Joseon* dynasty, the print media and universal education made the idea shared widely. Even though the first Republic of Korea was also ruled by a strong nationalism especially robust anti-Japanese sentiment and organic concept of Korean nation and state, only after the 1960s when Park Chung-hee successfully took over the presidency through a coup and constructed Korea modeled after Manchukuo, if not Japanese Empire, the nationalist idea became the backbone of almost entire society. With the various state apparatus that mobilized people's ordinary life, state-centered official national narrative, which is based on ethnic homogeneity, organic nation and state, and the priority of economic wellbeing, became hegemony for most of Korean people. In this chapter, I will examine the logic of the official nationalist narrative that dominated Korea in the 60s and 70s to understand the condition of the newly emerged identities in the democratizations in the 80s. In the 60s and the 70s, not only Korean nation but also Korean nationalism was homogeneous because the state created various tools to imposing its official nationalist narrative to the people. However, it is ironic that even in this suppressive regime, the protestors began to adopt the same nationalist discourse that the state and state elites created. The logic and narrative of Korean nation created and imposed during this period are framed the thought not only of the supporters and followers of the strong government but also of the dissidents who fought against dictatorship. To understand the changes of the official nationalist narratives after the democratization, we need to know what the official nationalist narrative was before the different ideas of nation emerged with the democratization.

4.1 The problem with the term “nation” in the Korean context

Korean conservatives' critique of historiography in South Korea for being contaminated by the leftist and nationalist view makes sense in a way since it is true that official Korean history,

crystalized in the history textbooks approved by the government, somewhat relies upon Marxist historical materialism so that social relations are changed, along with the production relations, and Korean history is portrayed as a failed nationalist project to build a unified nation-state.⁷⁸ In general, in history textbooks, the history of Korea is divided into four stages — prehistoric times, ancient state, medieval, and modern state — which is vaguely identical to Marx’s periodization of historical stages in explaining the development of capitalist production relations: primitive communism, antique mode of production, medieval, and modern capitalism.⁷⁹ Also, according to the Korean history textbooks, the Korean nation, which undoubtedly has existed since mythical *Dan-gun* established the first *Joseon*, has failed to establish a unified modern state due to Japanese colonialism and the Korean War. Gellner’s definition of nationalism as “a political principle that the political and national unit should be congruent” is well embodied in Korean official history writings. However, these problems with Korean history were not created by young scholars with nationalistic tendencies in the 1980s; as conservative political circles have claimed since the early 2000s, but it was established in the beginning of official Korean history for the newly independent Korea, written by modern Korean historians who have learned a lot from Japanese historiography. As such, the problem of the leftist and nationalist narrative of Korean history, which was raised by major conservative politicians and media in the 2000s, is in fact a point reached when the Korean history narrative tradition is faithfully followed.

Conservatives’ critique of Korean historiography seems to go beyond that. According to them, the history of Korea has been distorted by young historians who were enormously influenced by the ideology of leftism and nationalism in the 1980s’ democratic movement, which was led by two leftist camps: PD (People’s Democracy, a broadly Marx-Leninist camp) and NL (National Liberty, a nationalist camp), depicting Korean history as the history of reactionary capitalists and of Japanese collaborators. They claim that the history of Korea is a glorious

⁷⁸ The desire to follow the steps of developed countries is the one of the most salient impetuses for historians not only in Korea but in other non-West societies. Teleological historiography, such as Marxist historical materialism, is not only to be adopted to explain Korea but to show others that Korea also had the same stages, which teleologically led to Western capitalist democracy. Nationalist historiography is in similar vain.

⁷⁹ I am not arguing that the founders of Korean history were Marxist and tried to establish a Marxist teleological view on history. Rather, they were uncritically accepting of the Western developmentalist view on history.

history of economic development on the ruins of the Korean War. They argue that history should teach the proud achievements of Korea, not the shameful errors and crimes of the past. They insist that the former presidents of Korea, who were often blamed for their dictatorship and oppression of democratic movements, should be reevaluated and the history books should teach the future generation of their commitments and wills to defend the liberal democracy of Korea against communism and to make the country prosperous. For them, there is a glorious Korean history, which is equivalent to the economic development and liberal democracy defended against communism on the one hand, and there is a self-degrading history, which focuses on the people who have protested shameful dictatorship and comprador capitalists on the other hand. This dichotomy, successfully made by conservative politicians, activists, and scholars in the most recent two decades, have powerfully framed the media and scholarship.

Unlike the recent historians, who see the fulfillment of democracy and of national unification as teleological accomplishments of Korean history, the Korean conservatives argue that the first president of the Republic of Korea, Rhee Syngman, paved the road to liberal democracy by defending it against the spread of communism and forging an alliance with the United States, and Park Chung-hee laid the foundation of a great country by promoting economic development with the successful transformation of Korea's economic policy from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to export-oriented industrialization (EOI). For them, Korean history, therefore, should not criticize Rhee Syngman for not being able to abolish the remnants of colonialism and Park Chung-hee for his dictatorship that hampered the democratization but should recognize them properly as the pioneers of the liberal democracy of Korea. Only then, they claim, can future generations precisely understand the greatness of Korea. Thus, conservatives criticize the authors of history textbooks, which do not detail such points, as pro-North Korea (*chinbuk*) or North Korea devoted (*jongbuk*) historians, who are not only ashamed of their own history by denying liberal democracy but also trying to reinforce the North Korean regime — the worst, if not the only, dictatorship in the world in the name of a nation.

There has been extensive criticism against this conservative perspective on history textbooks of Korea, which has become widespread with the initiative of conservative media since the late 1990s. The most important one is that there is neither liberalism nor democracy in the liberal democracy that Korean conservatives keep referencing. The two former presidents,

who were praised by them for laying the foundation of liberal democracy of Korea, are all widely known to suppress democracy and try to establish their own dictatorship. Rhee had to resign to 4.19, one of the most important civic movements in the history of Korea democracy, with young workers and younger students protesting the fraudulent election to extend the presidency and to exile in Hawaii, where he used to work as one of the leaders of the Korean community during the colonial period. Park Chung-hee was shot and killed by the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, who worried about the rebellions of the displaced citizens when Park strengthened the dictatorship during the *Yusin* regime. Both severely limited in freedom of speech, assembly, and association and are well known for torturing, murdering, and purging the political rivals and dissidents. It is no more a secret that the economic development of Park Chung-hee was not made under the free market economy system but by the so-called East Asian development model, which was led by the state by giving monopoly or oligopoly rights and providing tremendous benefits including taxes to selected corporations.

This chapter examines the process of the establishment of nationalism in the Park Chung-hee era as a background to the emergence of Korean nationalism-based civil movements and explores the contents of this state-centered nationalism rather than anti-liberal and anti-democratic aspects of Korean conservatism.

The nationalist historiography began in the 1960s, when the Park Chung-hee's government began to create state-centered nationalism and establish an organic nationalist state and society. The Korean nation, which was first attempted to be created in the late *Joseon* dynasty, can be said to have completed to be made with the appropriate state apparatus in the 60s when Park Chung-hee's government established militaristic and state-centered state and society, modeled by the Japanese Empire and Manchuria.⁸⁰ The so-called New Right in Korea argues that Park Chung-hee is a defender of liberal democracy against communism, a leader of enormous economic development.

At least in South Korea, those right nationalists share some distinctive characteristics. First, they are firmly rooted in anti-communism. Second, they emphasize the legitimacy of the

⁸⁰ For example, the Charter of National Education was promulgated in 1968. It is known that the Charter was greatly influenced by the Imperial Rescript on Education of Japan.

state. For them, not revealing the disgrace of state and former state leaders must be the best way to glorify their state. Third, they show unconditional support for capitalism and entrepreneurs. They seem to believe that economic development and economic values come before everything else.

One of the most important reasons why those “right nationalists” in South Korea cannot realize themselves as nationalists might be lost in transition when the term nation and nationalism are translated into Korean. The Korean term *minjok* creates confusion for people who study Korean nationalism since the term is understood somewhat differently from the West. As most of the concepts of social science used in Chinese-character-using countries, “nation” is translated by Japanese scholars. The term nation was first translated to *minzoku* by Japanese meiji intellectuals and used in all the Chinese-character-using countries (*minjok* in Korean and *minzu* in Chinese, different pronunciation but the same Chinese characters). In the practical and everyday usage of the term, however, the Korean term *minjok* often lost the big part of its meaning. It often denotes the ethnic group(s) (or sometimes political community) and not the membership of one country. It is worth mentioning that recently in Korea many people participated in debate over how to translate the terms nation and nationalism to Korean. Some people suggest that nation should not be translated to *minjok* but *gukmin* (a member of a country), while some people argue that they should use the term *neisyeon* (phonetic reading of the English word “nation” in Korean) and *naesyeoneolism* (phonetic reading of the English word “nationalism” in Korean) without translation, since they think nation and nationalism lose their full meaning when they are translated. In the linguistic custom in Chinese-character-using countries, there have been two different words to denote ethnic or political community (*minjok*) and a member of a country (*gukga*). Though it is common sense for social scientists that the term nation is ambiguous and only can have full meaning when it is attached to another word, “state” (nation-state), this ambiguity of the term became very flexibly used in Korea, especially after the conservatives tried to overturn the value of the term.

In this chapter, I will argue that this common understanding of Korean nationalism is distorted by the various actors who are participating in the competition over the hegemony of nationalist discourse in South Korea. In addition, I try to show that during the substantial process of nationalization and popularization of history education in the 1960s and 1970s, both nation-

centered nationalism and state-centered nationalism began to settle into the mainstream and official historical narrative of the Korean nation. In order to do that, I will analyze the nationalist discourses and narratives in two books written by Park Chung-hee: *Our Nation's Path* (1962) and *The Road to National Restoration* (1978). After the so-called Military Revolution, Park asserts that their coup was inevitable using the narrative of national history in crisis. Though the content and the emphasis of the narrative of the Korean nation have changed after October Yusin, which consolidated the dictatorship, his narrative of the Korean nation was crucial in reconstruction of a renewed country throughout his reign. The reason why we need to focus on his narrative of the Korean nation is that his versions of the narrative of the Korean nation provide a proto-narrative of the Korean nation both for the conservative, state-centered national narrative and the counter-national narrative.

It is probably more difficult to assess the nature of nationalism of Park Chung-hee in South Korea, where nationalism is so essentialized that an analyst hardly can separate their analyses from their valuations.⁸¹ For example, according to Jeon (2000), there is fundamental disagreement even on whether Park Chung-hee is a nationalist or not. The first group of people sees Park Chung-hee as a nationalist. Although Jeon does not make more detailed division, indeed, there can also be different perspectives of the people who think Park is a nationalist. One is to see Park's nationalism as a guiding light for the Korean nation evaluating him highly, and the other is just to view his nationalism as one kind of nationalism that can be often seen in developing countries. In Jeon's explanation, the former category can fit into Jeong and Han, and the latter into Lee. The second group suggests that Park's nationalism changed from October Yusin, and they argue that he was a nationalist before Yusin but because of either economic or political reasons, he later became anti-nationalist. The last group in Jeon's classification is the views of the most nationalist scholars, which argue that Park cannot be a nationalist because all the policies that he pursued while he reigned became obstructions for unification. Among them, it is worth mentioning Seo's analysis, which argues his ideology is more like *Gukgajuui* than *Minjokjuui*. As I mentioned earlier, this clearly shows the distinctive usage of the term in South

Korea and other Chinese-character-using cultures. Nationalism can be translated both as *gukgajuui*, which emphasizes the fascist-like state-centered nationalism, and *minjokjuui*, which emphasizes the well-being of the ethnic or fateful community. But people like Seo, who is one of the faithful nationalist historians, immediately dismisses the meaning of the other side of the ambiguous term. When he argues that Park Chung-hee is more like *gukgajuuija* rather than *minjokjuuija*, both can be translated to nationalist; he must think that a state-centered nationalist cannot be an ethnic-centered nationalist.

We also need to be careful when we deal with the terms used in a Korean context because the usages of the terms that are very familiar to social scientists are somewhat different in the Korean context. For example, while Kang (2011) analyzed Park Chung-hee's discourse on democracy, he pointed out that the term democracy is often used to embellish authoritarian rule by conservatives in South Korea as well as other authoritarian countries. He points out that the authoritarian conservative political governments in many of the non-Western countries, including South Korea, show distinctive characteristics that he calls "overlapping coexistence of dual political order" (290). It is an interesting irony that most conservative governments in non-Western societies, no matter how much the government is authoritarian, cannot dismiss democracy or explicitly promote authoritarianism. In order to gain legitimacy, the government has to use the logic that they are the protectors of democracy and authoritarian rule is just a temporary but necessary tool for accomplishing full-fledged democracy. Under this circumstance, to figure out whether Park was a nationalist or not would be futile. A similar thing can be said for nationalist discourse. The question is how he used nationalist discourse to justify his regime and how it affects later discourse, not whether he was nationalist or not.

Although the contradictions in the evaluations of Park's nationalism are surprising, we can also point out an interesting thing they share. Most of the scholars who analyze Park Chung-hee's thoughts share the assumption that nationalism itself is a good thing. This is the reason why people who think Park is a great person suggest he is a nationalist, and people who think he is just a mere dictator cannot come to the conclusion that he is a nationalist.

In this chapter I will analyze Park Chung-hee's narratives of the Korean nation before and after October Yusin and argue how they became the prototype of later Korean nationalist

discourses and how they affected the later discourses. Park needs a lot more justification of his regime than other democratically elected leaders since he usurped the presidency with a military coup. Materially, he put all the resources into economic development for legitimacy, and culturally, he tried to create a narrative based on nationalism justifying the military coup. His effort to control and monopolize the nationalist discourse in Korea, however, is seriously challenged by the voices from society that were opposed to the Japan-Korea Talk in 1965, which they believe solidified subordinate relations with Japan. Faced with the challenge, his justification based on nationalism changed the focus more to collectivities, sacrifices of privacy, and the priority of economic development.

4.2 Nations Sharing History and Destiny: Park Chung-hee's Nationalist Discourse before the Korea-Japan Treaty (1960-1964)

State-centered, totalizing, ethnic nationalist discourse is often regarded as the distinctive characteristic of Korean nationalism, and in the 60s and 70s in South Korea it was settled and spread out in society. Of course, this nationalist discourse was first formed at the turn of the century and became the backbone of Korean historiography,⁸² but it was not until Park's regime when the Korean state finally had the tangible state apparatus to make people internalize those nationalist discourses. For example, Moon (2005) argues that Korean modernity was formed with the mandatory education system, conscription, and other social mobilizations that are modeled by military organizations, such as private companies, government organized local community meetings, and *Saemaeul* Movement. Everyday practices, such as memorizing the Charter of National Education and weekly morning assembly, or so-called Patriotic Assembly, are rituals, and the principals' remarks are often encouraging patriotism. Through strict regulations they even control students' outfits and hair styles in school. Monthly neighborhood meetings that are means to inform about state policies regarding everyday lives, and for national

⁸² Korean historiography, in this sense, began with Sin Chae-ho, when he wrote *Doksa Sinron* (1908). See Em (1999). Not only nationalist history but also the critics of it also point out that the nation-building process that attempts to build Korean identity based on the Korean nation can be traced back to so-called Enlighten Movement activists (*gaehma sasanga*). See Cho (1994); Kim (1989); Park (2005).

flag descending ceremonies, every person has to stop and recite the Pledge of Allegiance wherever they are.⁸³ Those disciplines and state apparatus are clearly the descendants of Japanese Militarism, if not Japanese modernization. The idea that the state should be the guide of people's minds and the disciplines, social organizations, and state-led campaigns and rituals can be found from Meiji Japan to wartime Japan, including the Local Improvement Campaign, the Imperial Edict on Education, school assembly, etc.

Published shortly after the success of his so-called Military Revolution, this book explains why his *coup d'état* was needed in the historical context and what the state he would design and construct looks like. It is one of the most important texts to understand how the official nationalism, which dominated Korean society from the early 1960s, was represented and what it consists of. For example, Kwon and Chun (2012) point out that some books, including those by Ham (1950/1961), Lee (1962), Park (1969), and Choi (1964) represent the 1960s and “these books in common have had a shared image about the history and the ‘present’ of Korea and the Korean nation. Therefore, they become the texts for analyzing the psychological and logical structure of nationalism in the 1960s. The image and the logic in these books are the ones

⁸³ The Pledge of Allegiance was made and imposed on every school in 1972. From that time, at all school events, not only in commencement or graduation ceremonies but also in the weekly morning assembly, all the students should recite the Pledge of Allegiance in front of the national flag. In 1978, the daily national Flag Descending Ceremony began. At 6:00 pm (5:00 pm during winter) all the government buildings play the national anthem and perform the ceremony, all the people in the street should salute to the flag until the ceremony ends. Even drivers of cars should pull over their cars and get off to join the ceremony. When the military dictatorship ended and the new president took the office, the national Flag Descending Ceremony was abolished in 1989. Some Korean movies describe how this ritual was deeply internalized in Koreans' everyday lives in those days. *The Attorney* (2013) is a movie loosely based on the true story of the former president Roh Moo-hyun, who took the case of a young man, falsely accused of spying for North Korea. The case made him look at the unjust political environment during the military dictatorship and made him a famous civil rights lawyer. When the protagonist attorney Song is asked to find the son of the lady who owns and cooks for his favorite dive restaurant in his neighborhood, he has been missing for weeks. He finally finds a place set up for torturing political crime suspects in a remote part of the city. The policemen who are leading the torturing team find attorney Song snooping around and beat him up. When he takes the attorney outside the building, the national anthem is played to signal the national Flag Descending Ceremony is going on. He suddenly stops and puts his right hand on his left chest until the song ends. After he delivers a long speech on how Korea became a secured society thanks to people like him, he adds “So you, attorney, need to find a way to be patriotic!” In another movie, *Ode to My Father* (2014), the protagonist, Deoksu, suddenly stops arguing with his wife Youngja in a public park when the national anthem is played, and he salutes to the national flag. Even Youngja, who was upset, eventually joins the ceremony while she is crying with frustration. Those scenes well illustrate how nationalist sentiment permeates into people's everyday lives and how the moviemakers who experienced that era think those practices were ridiculous.

of the core 'contents' of Korean nationalism in the last century, and they have had a long-lasting impact on the public over a broad spectrum ranging from right-wing nationalism to resistant and *minjung*-centric nationalism” (277). Among these books, I will analyze the logic and the image of Park’s (1969) nationalism because not only was the content described in this book, read by people as one of the popular texts, but also it was actually infused and realized by the public through the state apparatus.

Through the 5.16 military revolution, "the possibility of the nationalist path of modern development” was raised (Kwon and Chun 2012), and despite the fact that nationalism was the driving force for mobilizing Korea's nation and civil society, the debate about the specific nationalism of Park Chung-hee is very scarce. The reason why this book is interesting from our point of view is that, unlike many contemporary Korean researchers believe — whether they support or criticize Park Chung-hee — the important themes of Korean nationalist discourse that are often found in Korean society from the 1970s through the 1980s up to now, are found in this book. The nationalism contained in this blueprint of the future state in the early 60s involves various elements that are now the roots of both state and right-wing nationalism as well as resistance or *minjung*-centric nationalism.

It begins with the rationale of the military revolution. According to him, the Korean nation now faced a tremendous crisis that they had not experienced before. Internally, or domestically, it is because of the politics that misguide people and the subjects⁸⁴ who are not intelligent enough. Externally, the communists constantly threatened to invade. In the beginning part of the book, he shows the organic and totalitarian point of view of the nation. He insists that the crisis could not be avoided because the nation as a whole has been always abandoned by the people who only care about their own or their closest groups’ interests but not about those of the nation, which shares the blood and destiny. This idea of *myeolsabonggong* (or *meishihoukou* in Japanese), which literary means annihilation of the private for the sake of the official, was not

⁸⁴ It is worth pointing out that in here and in much of the book, Park constantly uses the dynastic term “subjects” (*baekseong*) to denote the people of the Republic of Korea instead of modern terms such as people (*gukmin*) or citizens (*simin*). Though he intensively discusses democracy, liberty, and equality in the book, as the Japanese intellectuals in Meiji era, the leaders of the Japanese empire who reigned over the colonies, and even the Korean intellectuals of late Joseon and the colonial Joseon did, Park had a limited view of his people, as he used term like “subjects.”

only widely shared by the intellectuals of Japan after the Meiji period but also to the intellectuals of the Joseon in the late 19th century and even the nationalist intellectuals who resisted colonial rulers of Japan.⁸⁵ They took the idea from the Confucian scripts and appropriated it as the term of a modern nation-state that can massively mobilize the people, interpellating them as the members of the nation-state. The idea was originally for the officials or intellectuals serving for the Confucian state in ancient times but was translated to mobilize the masses in the nation-state. This idea of placing the state and community before the individuals worked very strongly in the early modern times in many East Asian countries, and it still has influence. This idea of emphasizing the community and state can be easily found in the discourse of the Japanese conservative politicians and activists despite Japanese society being through the experiences of the defeat of the war and the nuclear bombing, which created a huge gap in Japanese identity and the militant student movements in the 60s when extreme individualism and anarchism were widespread, dreaming of the transformation of the society; the same idea can be found not only in the discourses of Korean government and the government operating institutions but also in the discourses of the democratic movements until the 1980s, when the movement was most active.

The idea that every individual exists for the sake of the community, common good, shared goal, or destiny, which is very different from the pluralist idea that a society is a mere collection of the individuals, is a key concept to understand modern Korean society, if not the societies in East Asia. Of course, I am not claiming that all members of Korean society believed and acted on this idea. However, this idea was the basis of the state and its rulers at least from the establishment of the Republic of Korea until recently, and the process of the development of democracy in Korean society proceeded with such ideas being challenged throughout society. It should be also noted that I am not arguing that all the social groups that have challenged these ideas are completely free from it. Although popular culture praised generation X and declared the birth of the individual in Korean society in the 1990s, the community-oriented culture that

⁸⁵ *Meishiboukou* is not only familiar to Park but an expression he used frequently. In the application letter he sent to the Manchu Military Academy in 1939, he attached a letter written with his own blood, saying, "As a soldier of Manchukuo, for Manchukuo, more importantly for the motherland, I do not expect any glory for myself and determined to give loyalty like a dog or horse with *meishiboukou*." *Manchuria News* March 31, 1979, whole text and Korean translation is available at "It is true that Park Chung-hee wrote 'loyalty to the death' with his own blood, in an application letter to the Manchu Military Academy," *Hankyoreh*, November 5, 2009.

remains in society is still revealed in many places until recently.

Of course, this emphasis on the state or community is also found in the *ilminjuui* of Rhee,⁸⁶ who was the first president of Korea. However, the post liberation period when Rhee Syngman was the leader still cannot be considered to have a unified ideology. Rather, it was the time of struggle for creating a unified people with the enforcement of the state. Various ideological groups existed in Korean society, and the period of Syngman Rhee was a time to make such a heterogeneous social group into a common nation. The Korean War (1950-1953) was the most important occasion for creating South Koreans in South Korea and North Koreans in North Korea. Through the events such as the Bodo League massacre, which belonged more to the collective oblivion than the Korean War, Korea continued to create a nation state with a single identity. The Korean War was not just a civil war between Korean nations but also civil wars in each Korea to create its own national identity. After the end of the Korean War, there was also an ideological attempt to create a single Korea in South Korea. We can argue that until the military revolution, a violent state apparatus existed, especially during the reign of Syngman Rhee, but the ideological state apparatus did not work properly. Official nationalism that prioritized communities and state over individuals has existed before Park Chung-hee, but by the time of Park, it became possible to have state apparatus that could reproduce them continuously.

Many critical researchers of Korea claim the totalitarian attitudes within the democratization movement of the 1980s can also be understood to some extent in this context. Some claim that a kind of powerful nationalism or totalitarianism widely spreads within Korean social groups, both left and right, and in various literary works (Park 2001, 2005; Lim 2000, 2004; Shin 2003; Moon 2005). They appropriately point out that the seemingly hostile forces in Korean society, including North Korea and South Korea, the ruling class and *minjung*, the liberal democrats and North Korean followers, are run by a similar logic, influenced by Korea's unique colonial experience or the path of the modernization process beginning much earlier.

In his first book, Park Chung-hee (1962) sees the nation as a subject that develops history

⁸⁶ Shin (2006, 96-113) connects the *ilminjuui* of Rhee Syngman and *geundaehwa* of Park Chung-hee as nationalist state ideology of South Korea. Despite their differences in backgrounds and career, “both were politicians who knew how to mobilize the force of nationalism in politics and developed similar kinds of nationalism based on a popular perception of ethnic unity” (97).

and a community sharing the same destiny and emphasizing the collective dimension of the nation. He shares an understanding of the nation and nationalism that was established before and after colonization of Korea: developmental, social Darwinist, and existential nationalism.

Our Nation's Path (1962) was published three years after the so-called military revolution. In this book, he asserts why the revolution was inevitable and suggests the norms and models of the nation and state that he thinks are ideal. For the people who had lived under his regime, especially those who experienced the oppressive regime after Yusin, the argument suggested in this book might be felt, as it is full of euphemism only to justify his military coup, but the book also shows Park's more idealistic thoughts, which are somewhat different from those after Yusin. Although the idea of liberty and equality in this time is much more radical than what he said and really did later, it also contains frames of his ideology and some clues that can explain his later thoughts. In order to understand Park's era, the nature of his power, and the directionality of it, it has to be reread and analyzed again. Moreover, the ideas revealed in his books affected greatly the process of militarization of Korean society. The modernization project includes nationalization of education throughout the territory, and in the mandatory school system, his ideas on the nation and norms of the state and nation—whether it was his creation or the creation of other ideologues who helped him—affected Korean society greatly. Unfortunately, comprehensive analysis on the official ideology and counter ideology in Park's regime has not been made. Indeed, though there have been hundreds of books on Park's regime, most of the analyses or evaluations are largely dependent on their personal preference to him. For those who highly value him praise his ideology as the backbone of Korean economic development and those who badly evaluate him criticize his ideology and thought as merely means of destroying democracy and sustaining individual political desires.

When we take the preference to him aside and read his work again, we can find some interesting points of his thoughts. First is the fact that, at least in his early years in the presidency, he showed a strong belief in freedom and equality, which forms the inseparable parts of democracy. However, it should be pointed out that he didn't believe in freedom and equality exactly, though he used the terms a lot. He is rather in the tradition of Korean intellectuals, which believe that freedom and equality are the ultimate values that they should pursue, but at the same time some kind of limits or regulations are needed to operate those values in a fully functional

democracy. Since the history of the development of democracy in all countries is different, in order to understand Korean democracy, it is necessary to first understand the unique concepts of freedom and equality.

Unlike the naïve belief of many Korean conservative politicians and journalists, Park Chung-hee in this period actually shares a lot of things with the “left nationalist”: the abhorrence toward former President Syngman Rhee, an obsessed view on Korean nation and history, an emphasis on struggles against oppressive government, contempt for rapacious capitalists, and the welfare state as an ultimate goal of Korean government. Aside from robust anti-communism and superficial manifestation of protecting liberal democracy, the rhetoric and narratives that Park uses in his book are typical ways of articulating Korean history. He also uses nation and national history to justify his military coup and to point out the crisis of the national community. He begins his book with the crisis of the Korean nation.

The book begins with this sentence: “today, we need to realize that we are facing the greatest crisis that was never experienced in our history” (Park 1969, 13). The coup, or military revolution as he prefers to call it, is the outcome of necessary determination of him to overcome “the greatest crisis that was never experienced in our history.” The crisis comes internally by the corruption of the politicians and externally by the threat of communism, and the remedy for it is to realize that “all the nation shares the same blood have the same destiny” (19). This is a recurring theme in his works. National crisis can only be overcome with the realization that all the nation shares the same destiny. No one should pursue their individual interests if it is likely to harm the nation’s interest. When he emphasizes that Korean nation have “pure blood, beautiful nature sent by heaven, and incomparable culture,” (Park 1997, 30) the particularity of the Korean nation is consolidated.

The more intriguing point regarding our interest is Park’s historicization of the pursuit of freedom in Korea:

Definitely, there have been people’s movements, such as *Donghak* movement, that fought against the government, but all those struggles for freedom do not root from the current ideology of liberal democracy but from the vague consciousness of freedom..... But our nation’s spirit for freedom historically developed and emanated from the process of our nation’s

anti-Japanese struggle that was never withered under the rules of the Japanese empire.....
Therefore, it was the situation under the rules of Liberty Party that the people who were suffering from the oppression of their freedom began to start struggle again for regaining their freedom from the suppression of the government (Park 1969, 51-52)

He traces the Korean nation's struggle for freedom back to the *Donghak* movement, which also became the starting point of a counter narrative of the Korean nation or *minjung* history.⁸⁷ All the suppressions and suffering from them became fertile land for germinating the seed of freedom of the Korean nation. It is well known that the student movements in South Korea successfully created a collective identity, called *minjung*, while they provided an alternative or counter narrative of the Korean nation, which is more focused on the resistance of ordinary people against an oppressive ruling class and their suffering under that suppression. As Abelmann (1996, 27 & 262, n. 12) points out, even in the 90s, the state commemoration of *Donghak* and *minjung* movements are different. While the state tries to remember it for "its anti-Japanese legacy" and tries to minimize the "social reformist aspect," the *minjung* artists try to connect the historical events to the current resistance. But as we see from the above narrative, Park Chung-hee's emphasis on the *Donghak* movements is exactly the same point that later movements for democratization focus on. All the movements that he mentions—the *Donghak* movement, the anti-Japanese movement, and the 4.19 movement—are important exactly in the sense that they show the Korean people's spirit and longing for freedom against oppressive governments.

4.3 Challenge for Dominant Discourse on the Nation: Anti Korea-Japan Talk Movements (1964)

As I mentioned above, to justify his military coup, Park focused on economic development. The policy choice of the government to generate rapid economic development was to rebuild the Korean economy into the EOI. Park asserts that this economic development is to provide the

⁸⁷ How *Donghak* movement, or *Donghak* Peasant Revolution, came to be an "important historical juncture," and how it is represented in various counter narratives in the writings of *minjung* historian and on the arts of *minjung* artists. See Ablemann (1996, 27-35)

condition for fully developed democracy. Many experts on Korea emphasize that it was also for establishing legitimacy of the regime. Either way, to promote EOI, he needed foreign currency to build social overhead capital. After liberation from the Japanese Empire, there had been no official relations between South Korea and Japan. Both South and North governments used anti-Japanese sentiment to mobilize and bond people. In the early stage of Park's new government, however, Park's government wanted to normalize relations with Japan in exchange for money that could be used for promoting the Five-Year Plans. It also resonated with the Far East policy of the US. The US designed to share burden of security with Japan, and to do this, all the non-communist countries should get along well with Japan. Even though it was win-win for every stake holders of a capitalist camp in the Far East, the South Korean society began to be disturbed when the rumor came around that the Korean government would soon make a treaty with Japan, including large loans from Japan. For the people who experienced colonial rule and were educated with strong anti-Japanese sentiment, the treaty was unacceptable. Protests against the so-called Korea-Japan Treaty were organized, led by high school and college students. They directed their criticism at Park's "national democracy."

In the presidential election campaign in 1963, Park Chung-hee effectively utilized the slogan, "national democracy" against the opposing candidate and former president Yun Bo-seon. "National democracy" is another version of Park's democracy, sometimes expressed as "administrative democracy" or "Korean democracy," which all share the same idea that Koreans did not yet deserve to have Western democracy, so freedom and rights should be limited and restricted to develop a democratic system that fit Korean national culture. As Kang indicates, these terms clearly show that Park wanted to embellish authoritarian rule with the terms by using "democracy." In this dissertation, I want to focus on "national democracy" to examine how he defends his legitimacy using the nationalist discourse.

This challenge from society brought sudden changes in development of the Korean nationalism surrounding discourse. First, in this so-called military revolution era, when Korean society began to be militarized, the nationalist discourse, which the new government wanted to monopolize, became the battlefield of the state and society to compete over dominance on the

discourse.⁸⁸ Because it was not long after the 4.19 movements that many of the young students—high school and college students—actively participated in the movement, the leaders of the movement were still young and they soon organized against the Korean-Japan Ministers' Talk. Also, it was the early stages of the dictatorship, and government still did not fully control every corner of society, though one of the most important goals of the government was to create an educational system, not only to educate young people in school but also to educate everyone in every possible institution. The new government also tried to dominate the nationalist discourse. Park's writings and speeches in that period are full of nationalist rhetoric. Justification of the coup (or military revolution), the immediate national crisis and remedy for it, and the short-term and long-term goals of the revolutionary government were all heavily dependent on nationalist discourse. Another opportunity—which could be a great crisis for people who oppose it—funding military government to launch the Five-Year Plans, soon became to be the challenge from society.

For the dissidents, this was a time that they could successfully challenge the government monopoly over the nationalist discourse. As the appeal to democracy is returned as a blade that aims at the Park's regime, their strong dependence on nationalist discourse also created room to make fissures in the official nationalist discourse. The student movement manifested that the nation could not be monopolized by the government and, logically, any government could betray the higher interest of the nation. Though student movements in the 1960s and 1970s could not really develop their own counter narrative of the Korean nation, this attempt to challenge the monopoly gave some room for them and their successors. After that and especially after the mid-1980s, authoritarian and conservative government politicians and people fought with the various radical groups, including labor, students, farmers, and the poor, over the dominance of the nationalist discourse. For example, when Koo (2001) provides us with the dramatic narrative of the birth of Korean workers, he seems to be perplexed when he witnessed sudden decline of the labor movement in the 1990s after the great success in 1987. As he contends, the gigantic trade union's factionalism, bureaucracy, and aristocracy at the top might have affected the decline. But if we turn our eyes to ideological and identity factors, the great success of the *minjung* movement

⁸⁸ For the militarization of Korean society, see Moon (2005).

in the labor movement began to lose its centrality when some of the more nationalist sectors went extreme and the other cultural policy, such as *tamul*, invented by the state with the help of companies also shows that workers, companies, and the state all take having a hegemonic position in the nationalist discourse and practice seriously.⁸⁹ We witness the struggles between more conservative groups, including the authoritarian government and conservative non-government groups, and more progressive groups, including social, student, labor, and farmer movements, over the dominance in nationalist discourse, even though the line between these two groups are not always clear and sometimes lines can be drawn in the same groups.

Secondly, the challenge from society to the official nationalist narrative is partly responsible for the changes in the official narrative of the Korean nation. As we can witness in the changes of the emphasis in Park's narrative on the Korean nation, when more freedom, equality and peace-oriented nationalism can be no longer maintained, faced with the dismissal of official nationalist discourse, Park changed his focus from ethnic community that shares fate, freedom, and equality to self-reliance and sacrifice over the greater good. Immediately after the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Treaty and throughout the Yusin regime, the developmentalist view that yields everything else to economic development prevailed. I am not arguing that this developmentalist view of the official narrative of the Korean nation suddenly appeared in this period. Indeed, as many indicate, this euro-centric, social Darwinist, and developmentalist view of Korean nationalism has a much longer history.⁹⁰ As we can observe in the development of the nationalist discourse in Park's works, however, the developmentalist factors later became more clearly emphasized.

Thirdly, after student movements took the moral ground for the hegemony of nationalist discourse, the development in society tends to focus more on freedom, equality, will to protest, and the suffering caused by the oppressive ruling class or foreign force. Until the "new right" emerged in the mid-2000s, that type of nationalist discourse was believed to belong to the

⁸⁹ *Tamul* ideology is the state-invented educational program for workers. It is based on strong nationalism and chauvinism, which persuades workers to be the member of a great nation that has glorious past and that it is their role to sacrifice themselves to restore that glory. Many companies are known to send their workers to participate in the program (Koo 2001, 193).

⁹⁰ For the internalization of ethnic social Darwinism from the late Joseon, see Park (2005).

societal sector. It is also the time of discovery that society can dismiss and nullify the official nationalist discourse with the right time and situation. It is interesting that not until this time the rallying cry of the people came to be more nationalist. Until then, demonstration usually protested for democracy or economy. After the ‘humiliating’ Korea-Japan Talk and the following treaty, people who were opposed to the treaty began to seek real nationalism that could serve better for the interest of the Korean nation. The fissure created by the protest of “national democracy” and the frontline between the conservative government and people (or society), could be the trailer for the coming struggle between those two and others.

The protest was begun by the students. From early 1964, when the planning of the Korea-Japan meeting was reported, many high school and college students started to organize rallies against the “humiliating” Korean-Japan Talk. It was amazing not only because this was the “first event that the student movements brought popular passion together, unlike students following people’s resistance in 4.19 revolution,” as the Korean Democracy Foundation points out on its website, but also because it, and especially the Funeral for National Democracy, held at Seoul National University in May 1964, was a symbolic event that the movement explicitly manifested to refuse the state’s monopoly over the nationalist discourse. Kim Jiha, a student of Seoul National University who later became the most renowned protest poet in the 1970s, wrote the funeral address, which began, “Corpse! You died already long time ago. You have been decayed since you died. Corpse without soul! Antinational and undemocratic National Democracy!”⁹¹

For the students who could not agree to the Korea-Japan Talk, which they believed to be a treaty to subordinate Korea economically to Japan, national democracy, which the so-called revolutionary government promised to establish, could not be prolonged anymore, and the government was betraying it. “Who the heck tries to mix national economy, which already reached total bankruptcy, with the excrement of Japanese empire? Let’s conduct a funeral for so-called ‘national democracy’, who keeps lying that tying Korean, which brought back with our blood, to the subordinate iron chain that make us dependent on Japan, is modernization and self-

⁹¹ A funeral address for the funeral of anti-national and undemocratic “national democracy.” Kwon to written by Jiha Kim. Retrieved from <http://archives.kdemo.or.kr/View?pRegNo=00578390>.

reliance!”⁹² As we will see in the next section, Park does not stop repeating this claim. That is, he emphasizes that the rapid economic development, though he rarely clarifies that it was due to a great extent from a loan from Japan, enables the Korean nation to be self-reliant.

With such an absurd so-called spirit of revolution and with such a groundless face of ideology, how dare they commit themselves to policies. And promise reconstruction. They are full of humor. From where did they borrow such enormous guts, as they are talking about loan-shark, five-year [economic] plans and even participating ideological debate? The guts must come from “*Tenno heika*” (Majestic Emperor). That horribly tedious traditional charismatic character of Japanese military still remains on the bottom of the structure of Korean military and it breeds those guts as well as vanity for power. Corpse! Go back to your home! You should have gone already. Go back even if you are dead, corpse! All thirty thousand Koreans are covering your dead body with shroud. Can you hear? The voices, voices and the voices of praying for your soul. Can’t you hear the outcries of our nation that anti-communism, reconstruction, and renovation cannot be possible with your dead body and soul? Can’t you hear the lamentation? Leave! Leave without any sound! Go around and round the valley of highest mountain and never come back, corpse!⁹³

The author of the above statement dismisses national democracy because of its antinational and undemocratic nature. The reason why they manifest the death of national democracy and conduct the funeral is that they believe that the Korea-Japan Talk that they are opposed to will bring about re-subordination of Korea to Japan. It also indirectly criticizes collaboration in the colonial era. Park Chung-hee was criticized by the people opposed to the government that he served for the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria. His betrayal of his own slogan and the Korean nation, for the author of the statement, might be all from his past commitment to Japanese military. It is interesting that the statement does not deny or degrade the other policies that Park’s regime was trying to implement. He only seems to oppose the Korea-Japan Talk. As Kang (2011) points out, when people ask the authoritarian government to practice democracy as it officially promotes it under the “overlapping existence of dual political order,” it creates some room for them to ask government, which takes the nationalist discourse to justify itself, to be

⁹² “Against 5.16!” Retrieved from <http://archives.kdemo.or.kr/View?pRegNo=00578392>.

⁹³ A funeral address for the funeral of anti-national and undemocratic “national democracy.” Kwon to written by Jiha Kim. Retrieved from <http://archives.kdemo.or.kr/View?pRegNo=00578390>.

more nationalistic by indicating it is indeed antinational.

4.4 Narrative of State/Nation: Nationalist Discourse of Park Chung-hee after the Korea-Japan Treaty (1964-1979)

Almost every Korean who went to elementary school in the 70s and 80s may still be able to recite the National Charter of Education—at least the first few sentences—since school teachers often inflicted corporal punishment to the students who could not memorize the whole text by heart. It began with the famous sentence, “We have been born into this land, charged with the historic mission of regenerating the nation. This is the time for us to establish a self-reliant posture within and contribute to the common prosperity of mankind without, by revitalizing the illustrious spirit of our forefathers. We do hereby state the proper course to follow and set it up as the aim of our education.”⁹⁴ The Charter was promulgated in 1968 and was printed on the first page of every textbook used in elementary, middle, and high schools. It solemnly declares that Koreans are born with the “historic mission of regenerating the nation.” Not all the students who were forced to remember the whole text by heart may believe in the charter; the doctrine that the goals of education and individual lives are to regenerate the nation and that responsibility and duty top liberty and the right is familiar to Koreans who lived in the 70s and 80s.

Park Chung-hee succeeded in revising of the constitution in October by the so-called *Yusin* revolution, allowing the president to have permanent power, and he systematically proclaimed his spirit of *Yusin* through Park (1978), published one year before he was shot. Here, Park shows concrete ideas based on conservatism and nationalism of Korean society after he died. At first glance, Park seems to reproduce the ideology of *myeolsabongong*, like the intellectuals of the Meiji Restoration, that is to be loyal to the community and demand individual sacrifice by combining Confucianism with a modern militaristic state. In addition, he claims that he finally achieved the best development of Korean people in the period of his reign, leaning on Korean national history and narrative.

⁹⁴ Translation from Lee (1974, 17).

We have been able to record our seventies as the most significant years in our history, with all the people working hard in sweat. We have overcome the ordeals that no nation or no country had ever seen before and made a step to the march of world history. Indeed, not only has our nation opened our doors to a rewarding new history, escaping from long lasted laziness and depression but we have begun to unleash the power of our nation which have been cultivated in the 5,000-year-old tradition (Park 1978, 1).

The most dramatic part of the quote above is that not only did the Korean people gain their present prosperity by working hard, but they also had a long period of suffering that no one else had ever experienced. This argument is possible because the narrative of his development is leaning on the development model based on economic wealth, which is still found in many Korean discourses. For Park Chung-hee, and for the narrative of the restoration or regeneration of the Korean nation that he is making and shared by many Koreans until now, the pain, suffering, and darkness of the Korean nation are all reduced to economic deprivation.

How many times have you been able to say that it was the time of our nation's heyday in the long history of 5000 years? ... In some ways, our nation has lived in a harsh and unfavorable historical environment, which has prevented us to afford time to stretch our backs. There are too many people in a small land, and even without such natural resources, a thousand years have been in poverty felt like a day. It was hard to accumulate the development capacity in a difficult life in which all the family member had to cling to a small land inherited from ancestor that can allow them to barely have their lives (Park 1978, 4).

There is subtle appropriation in meaning when Park had not only to justify his usurpation in democratic society but also delayed democracy. The appropriation of the term “self-reliance” seems crucial among the other appropriations. In the earlier stage of his reign, the term “*Jarip*” seems to denote “autonomy” of a person, a nation, and a state. Democracy and other systems and institutions should be adjusted to Korean soil, and Koreans must cultivate their own autonomous system. But after the Korea-Japan Treaty, partly because the resistance from society against his

national democracy, the term “*Jarip*” increasingly means “self-reliance,” and, more specifically, economic independence from outside power. In other words, in earlier stages, whereas the meaning of the term “*jarip*” is closer to the Republican freedom, which requires freedom from outside domination, the meaning of the term “*jarip*” in later terms became “economic self-reliance.”

This idea of priority of economy that reduces all values to economic development seems to be the most powerful ideology that the Park Chung-hee era has put into Korean society. This has been the driving force behind the development of Korean society and is still very influential, combined with another important ideology, like the national community that shares blood and destiny, which contributes to the concepts of individual liberty, value, and creativity to the group to which he belongs. It is difficult to understand the ongoing debate between conservatives and progressives in Korean society about liberal democracy, which is generally promoted by conservative media and social organizations. The concepts of liberal democracy or liberalism and democracy coined by Park after the *Yusin* still seem to influence the concept of liberal democracy of many conservatives until now.

In Park (1978), he depends more on the nationalist discourse not only to justify his *Yusin* but also to provide the *raison d'état* of Korea as a nation state.

Certainly, there is a distinctive spirit and attitude of Koreans different from the Westerners as well as the similar Easterners. A rhythmic, unified, and harmonious mental culture that is difficult to find in any country is flowing down in the history and life of the nation. . . . This tradition becomes clearer when we return to the origin of our history. The founding ideology of Dan-gun, which is known as the founder of our nation, is summarized as *Hongigin-gan*, which means, in a nutshell, to help human society in general (18-19).

The myth of Dan-gun and the distinctiveness of the Korean nation is the starting point of his blueprint of *Yusin* Korea. Like the claims from the New Confucian⁹⁵, Park argues that the concepts of equality, freedom, and democracy do not come from the West, but “the values are

⁹⁵ For example, Tu (1996) or Kim (2014b).

firmly rooted in the tradition of our nation for a long time” (Park 1978, 21). And like the Meiji intellectuals, he emphasizes the Confucius values, such as loyalty and filial piety as the base love for one’s family and community.

The idea of loyalty and filial piety, therefore, is based on this deep and passionate love for the community to which one belongs. If a family is a small community of life, the state or nation is a large community of life, and the affection for these two communities is no different in its essence. It is filial piety that the love every human being has is spontaneously spewed out to the parents who are the source of our lives, and it is loyalty that it spurted toward the state which is the community of the fate and the life that we belong. Thus, a person who can love a child, honor his parents, and achieve a harmonious home can be a person who can dedicate himself to the state and nation (Park 1978, 24).

The values like equality, freedom, and democracy are not imported from the West but are the values that Koreans have had through the history. Those values are rooted in love that every human being has, and it is more harmonious than Western ones. Since Korea had very little chance to accept Western ideas directly because of the colonial rule by Japan, Western ideas and institutions should be adopted carefully to Korean soil.

The Western democratic institutions that we have accepted are their institutions that have been created and developed in the special circumstances of the Western society, steadily improving over the years solving their immediate problems. If such a Western system is transplanted directly into another country, the system will not be able to function properly, but will have many serious side effects. This becomes apparent when many of the new countries that imitate the Western democracy are faced with today's hardships and trials (Park 1978, 39).

Western political institutions cannot be implanted directly to Asian society, including Korea:

Unfortunately, most of the Asian societies, including our country, did not have the rationalism or law-abiding spirit that could finely sustain the politics of conflict and negotiation. We were so lacking in the experience of self-restraint and discipline innate in liberty, and so neglected the responsibilities and obligations associated with rights. For this reason, even the destructive

illegal acts that threaten the democratic order itself, which is the foundation of freedom, were made even under the name of freedom and democracy. In short, without national consensus as the basis of productive competition, conflict politics became prominent only in terms of the struggle, the extremist struggle became chronic, and the politics of negotiation became visible only in terms of uncompromising compromise (Park 1978, 41).

He maintains the dichotomy between the West and East. The Western political institutions are based on the politics of conflict, which is accompanied with rationalism and law-abiding spirit, but Asian politics are based on love and harmony. Without the proper rationalism and law-abiding spirit that can sustain the politics of conflict, Western political institutions directly imposed to Asian countries must go wrong. He also inherits the idea from Meiji intellectuals and intellectuals in the late Joseon dynasty, who believed that liberty needs self-restraint and discipline and that rights need responsibility and duty. Indeed, as I mentioned before, many Korean intellectuals in the late Joseon dynasty as well as many East Asian thinkers in the same period seemed to hold that freedom is self-restraint and discipline and right are responsibility and duty. Whatever values similar to liberty pre-modern East Asian society had, such as equality and right, the thinkers in the time East Asian modernity formed believed that unconstrained liberty and right could not be given to people. Rather, self-restraint, discipline, responsibility, and duty are the essence of liberty and right.

It is intriguing that he uses the concept of emergency prerogative to defend Korean democracy. South Korea, which is under the threat of communists from North Korea, cannot adopt Western democracy without being fixed. The limitations and regulations on the human rights and freedom in such an emergency are also common in Western countries, as we can see in the Civil War, the Great Depression, the Detention of Japanese in the US, and in France when it was faced with the division of public opinion over the Algerian War.

In any democratic state today, the head of state has a prerogative, which is an institutional practice developed in the process of defending democracy itself in the face of a state crisis. Even in the United States, when the crisis of judging the existence of the state came to the fore after the Civil War, the constitutional human rights provision was suspended by the president's prerogative, and tens of thousands of citizens were arrested without warrants is a well-known fact. If President Lincoln had succumbed to the fierce opposition of Congress and adhered to the

usual process that did not fit the high purpose of overcoming the national crisis and the defenses of democracy, I doubt whether the US would be able to enjoy democracy and wealth like today to be. Those who did not have a quick decision and bold action. The United States might be split into a smaller country today and the direction of world history may have changed greatly (Park 1978, 45-46).

Park seems to have wanted to establish permanency of crisis or the state of exception. Because of the threat of North Korea, the state crisis is permanent until unification. The democratic institutions that conserve the right and liberty of the people can be postponed until the crisis ends.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argue that Park Chung-hee's nationalist world view provides the roots of various nationalist discourses after the democratization of Korean society. After he succeeded in the coup in 1961, Park made the mobilization system, reaching out until the far end of Korean society, almost as if Japan had been developing as a militarist state since the Meiji era. Thus, official Korean nationalism created by him and the scholars helped him spread throughout society through such a system, repeatedly reproduced through diverse disciplines, and transformed in different ways through individual organizations within society. In the 80s, the workers in the labor movement were organized and managed under these rules, and the students in the student movement were the hardest learners and memorized the doctrines of these countries.

Park Chung-hee served as a teacher in the province during the Japanese occupation and went to Manchuria to enter the Manchu Military Academy at a relatively old age and became a Japanese military officer. It is evident that his nationalistic worldview was greatly influenced by Japan's imperialist worldview. Many social organizations and disciplines of the Park Chung-hee era, such as the National Education Charter, the patriotist morning assembly at school, the *Saemaetul* Movement, etc., also existed in the age of Japanese imperialism.

Park's worldview of thorough ethnic nationalism, explains both his coup, the restoration, and economic development in the narrative of nationalist historical development. For him, the Korean nation is the community of one blood that shares the fate. For him, the republic of Korea is the Korean nation itself. Love for parents and for their fateful community is natural. People can and should sacrifice themselves for their parents and nation. The Republic of Korea is the Korean nation. Therefore, Koreans need to sacrifice themselves for their state. This is a recurring theme that can be found not only in the Korean official ideology but also in the thoughts of the Meiji intellectuals, the official statements from the Japanese wartime politicians and officials, and North Korean ideology and textbooks (Maruyama 1963; Garon 1997; Armstrong 2003; Kim and Kim 2005).

The basic framework or narrative of the history of the Korean nation is also found in the works of Park Chung-hee. Park sees the world as a state in which the nations compete for wealth and territory, a typical Hobbesian “the struggle of all against all.” Joseon, defeated in such competition—the emergence of imperialism—is depicted as the most lazy and corrupt era by Park. The Korean people became weak, lazy, and corrupted after the Joseon Dynasty. Through Japanese imperialism, the independence of the nation was damaged. Through the Korean War, the land was ruined. After the war, under the name of freedom, political groups that think only of interest of their own have had more difficult times. Only through his revolution — the *coup d'etat* — and the October *Yusin* — the constitutional amendment that enabled him permanent presidency —, the Korean people rejuvenated for the first time.

Some interesting things in these narratives are found, which are repeated themes in both the state-centered and communitarian nationalism of Korea. In this narrative, the history of Korean people's freedom is also considered important; as they bravely conducted a revolution for freedom and rights, Korean people revolutionized the corrupt democratic and political forces. People showed the power to restore the rights and freedoms that were damaged through the *Donghak* movement or the 4.19 revolution. Though 5.16 is absent, the narrative of the democratization movement, starting with *Donghak* through 4.19 and 5.18, leading to the 1987 civil revolution, is similar.

The basic frame of thought of state-centered nationalism is also found in Park's view of

nationalism. In Park 's nationalistic narrative, the rise and fall of a nation is mainly determined by the economic poverty and prosperity. When people are poor and unable to eat, the nation is not doing well. This pattern of thought is repeated in the same way in the history of the New Right, and they also make the element of economic development a top priority in the development of Korea. Therefore, all that contributed to such development is good and all that did not contribute to such development or everything that interferes is evil.

In Park 's view of the nationalist world, many of Korea' s conservative thinking and progressive thinking can somehow be viewed as two sides of the same coin. Although progressive nationalism recognizes itself as nationalist, it has diversified and developed or stagnated since democratization. However, conservative nationalists are turning away all groups and individuals that are disturbed by it as the sole measure of the economy without being aware of themselves as nationalists.

CHAPTER 5. VOLUNTEER CORPS AND COMFORT WOMEN

Before discussing the discursive strategies of the comfort women movement groups and their impacts on larger nationalist discourse in Korea in following chapters, I should first address and examine the confusion of the term *wianbu* [comfort women] with the term *jeongsindae* [volunteer corps] in South Korea. Until the early 1990s, and to some extent even recently, the terms *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* have been used interchangeably in Korea. However, not only researchers and activists but also ordinary people interested in the issue are well aware that *jeongsindae* was the name of the organization, and its members, that exploited the labor of young girls in munition factories; whereas *wianbu* was a young girl who was sexually enslaved by the Japanese military in the battlefield of the Pacific War. If we carefully examine the usages of the terms in Korean media, we can conclude that the confusion was unintentional, contrary to the claims made by critics against comfort women movement groups in Korea. Nonetheless, the confusion over the terms *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* has effects and consequences. The reveal of *jeongsindae* recruitment in the early 1990s struck many people because preteen girls were recruited even through the school system to serve for *jeongsindae*. Given that the term *jeongsindae* was used to denote ‘comfort women’ at that time, the revelation made people realize for the first time that the recruitment of ‘comfort women’ was a systematic atrocity led by the government, and this made them furious. Still, some researchers criticize the movement groups because they intentionally stuck to the term *jeongsindae* to appeal to nationalist sentiment.

In this chapter, I will explore the usages of the terms *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* in Korean media and analyze them to show that the term *jeongsindae* had been used to denote historical ‘comfort women’ and the term *wianbu* had been used to denote prostitutes, especially in work around military bases in Korean collective memories until the early 1990s.

5.1 A story of Ikeda Masae: former elementary school teacher in colonial Joseon

It is well known that the first testimony of a ‘comfort woman’ survivor, Kim Hak-sun, was delivered on the eve of Korea’s Liberation Day, August 14, 1991, at the Korean Council. This was the beginning of a long journey for comfort women movements as well as the struggle for international recognition of the violation of the former comfort women’s rights. Many researchers and activists consent that the voice of the Japanese wartime ‘comfort women’ survivor was heard for the first time in Korea.⁹⁶ The Korean Council had looked hard for a survivor who could give testimony so the painful story of the brave former ‘comfort women’ could be printed in Korean media for Liberation Day. At least this is the official story of how the ‘comfort women’ issue became well known to the Korean people and became politicized.

People’s fury at the testimony mounted but not as much as at the story of a former Japanese elementary school teacher, Ikeda Masae, and her conscientious effort to find her former students whom she sent to the volunteer corps during the colonial period, which was reported about five months later. As <figure 6> shows, the news became sensational. The news on the testimony of the comfort woman survivor only led to about 20 articles, or fewer, in both the

⁹⁶ In the media and also in almost all the studies, the comfort women issue is believed to have been first introduced with “the first testimony” but it was not. The story of ‘comfort women’ had absolutely been a part of collective memory among Koreans and Japanese before the testimony, though there were variations. Books, novels, TV shows, movies (Sekiguchi 1990), poems, dances, plays, songs, paintings, news reports, and multimedia art works (Tomiyama and Hidane Kobo 1988) dealing with ‘comfort women’ were abundant in postwar Korea and Japan by the end of the 1980s. A significant number of them contained the testimonies of the victims too. For the “popular public memory” before the testimony, see Soh (2008, 146-172). As she points out, “dozens of books on the subject were readily available at bookstores for postwar generations, especially in Japan,” whereas “Korean-language publications, by contrast, were very few in number.” (146) Most notably, a book written by a Japanese survivor under the pseudonym Shirota Suzuko (1962) was published, a documentary film based on the Korean survivor living in Okinawa was made (Yamatani 1979), and her biography was published too (Kawada 1987). The story of another Japanese survivor Kikamaru san was also included with other survivors’ stories in Hirota (1975). Also, Senda (1973) includes the testimony of a former comfort woman, pseudonym Kim Kyeong-ae, which “went through eleven printings by 1990 and 1992, respectively,” (Soh 2008, 151) and Kim (1976) has specific details on the recruitment, operation, and agony of comfort women, though some argue that those publications are too commercialized. There are also confessions of comfort women hunters (Yoshida 1977, 1983), which became an important source for the 1996 UN report (Soh 2008, 154); see also Coomaraswamy (1996). Though the number of the books might be much less, various formats had been used to deliver the stories of comfort women in South Korea. First, there are translations from the books written in Japanese. Kim (1976) is translated into Yim (1981), Senda (1973) to Senda (1974), Yoshida (1983) to Yoshida (1989) and Kawada (1987) to Kawada (1992). In addition to that, Kim (1975) includes the comfort women cases and the novels or novellas like Yun (1982) based on the stories of Kim (1976), also well known in Korean society, as well as Heo (1989); Jeong (1989); Baek (1989). Especially in the 1980s, because more progressive artists tried to include comfort women in the so-called *minjung* narrative, various art forms dealing with comfort women were created.

Hankyoreh and the *Chosun*. In January 1992, when the story of Ikeda was reported, the number of the articles marked above 140. We can also see the number of articles on ‘comfort women’ rarely goes below 20. In other words, the ‘comfort women’ issue became an important part of the national discourse in Korea not after the testimony was given but after the Ikeda’s story was reported.




Figure 5. Number of articles including the term jeongsindae or wianbu on the Hankyoreh and the Chosun, 1989-1993

A former elementary school teacher, Ikeda Masae visited Korea to find her former students whom she sent to *jeongsindae* under order of the colonial government. She confessed that the government demanded every school to send at least six students to the volunteer corps, and she even persuaded the parents of the girls to follow the order. She visited Korea several times to find her students because she heard the girls had a difficult time in the munition factories, and she wanted to apologize. The journalists confirmed that Bangsan Elementary School had kept records showing that some of the girls were sent to the volunteer corps in 1944.⁹⁷ In interviews with Korean media, Ikeda clearly stated that *jeongsindae* is the name of the

⁹⁷ “Japan, Impressment of Volunteer Corps Even Included Elementary School Students,” the *Chosun Ilbo*, Jan 15, 1992.

organizations for forced labor in munition factories, but strangely enough, it was immediately interpreted that the Japanese colonial government ordered elementary schools to recruit preteen girls to serve in comfort stations.⁹⁸

The report about Ikeda's confession evoked strong repercussions in Korea. The fact that girls as young as twelve were recruited in *Chōngsindae* agitated Koreans. Moreover, the fact that an education institution and teachers were in the front line of the recruitment deepened the anger. (Yang 1998)⁹⁹

People involved in the revelation, including the teacher and the members of the Korean Council, knew and clearly stated that the schoolgirls were drafted for the Women Volunteer Labor Corps, though they were still not sure how many girls drafted as volunteer corps were actually drafted for comfort stations. Many people in Korea at that time thought the girls were recruited as 'comfort women' because the term *jeongsindae* had been used to denote historical 'comfort women' in Korea. The report on the recruitment of preteen schoolgirls for volunteer corps actually made the 'comfort women' issue important to the narrative of the Korean nation. Though the discussion and the discourse on 'comfort women' in Korea became prolific after this event, this renewed interest in the issue came from an issue of misconception.

Moreover, the anger was not well grounded. As Ikeda herself clearly remarked in her interview, the Japanese government gave orders to schools in colonial Joseon to send young girls to the factory and the school heads and teachers were extremely cooperative. The girls had enormous difficulties at the factories, enduring long hours of labor and hunger. As Ikeda felt

⁹⁸ For example, even in the interview with the *Chosun Ilbo*, the article is clearly mentioning that the volunteer corps was labor organization. "In a telephone interview, Ikeda said, 'I visited the students' house every afternoon to persuade the parents who begged me to send their daughters to *jeongsindae* after they graduate and selected model students who marked good grade, following the order of the educational supervising office to send 6 students. In that time the principals who sent many girls even transferred to better position but I began to feel guilty when I heard that the girls were suffering from long hour labor and hunger in munition factories when I briefly visited Japan that time.'" In "Japan, Impressment of Volunteer Corps Even Included Elementary School Students," *The Chosun Ilbo*, January 15, 1992.

⁹⁹ Yang questions why it has been completely ignored "until a Japanese person, supposedly an accomplice of colonial rule, reported the story."

guilty when she realized what she had done to her students; the recruitment also violated the young girls' rights. The girls sent to the volunteer corps suffered additionally when family, friends, or neighbors misunderstood and many believed that the volunteer corps was the same as the 'comfort women'.

Contrary to common belief at that time, the girls were not recruited as 'comfort women'; most were part of the Women Volunteer Labor Corps. At the end of the *Chosun Ilbo* article reporting the discovery of the school records, a participant in the Korean Council stated, "in that time, most of the children were drafted for the Volunteer Labor Corps (*geunro jeongsindae*), which made the girl work in the factory, but we know that some of them were conscripted later for military comfort women (*jonggun wianbu*), which made them serve as 'comfort women' (*wianbu*)." The person interviewed made it clear that the lists found in multiple elementary schools were not girls who were sexually exploited; they were girls who were forced to labor in the munition factories. For a long time after this report, however, this quote had been forgotten, at least on *Chosun Ilbo*.¹⁰⁰

The media played an important role in providing misleading ideas. For example, the *Chosun Ilbo* kept reproducing the idea that the Japanese imperial government recruited preteen schoolgirls to be exploited sexually on the battleground.¹⁰¹ Gyutae Lee, a famous columnist in the *Chosun Ilbo* beginning in 1983, also wrote a column on Elementary School Student Volunteer Corps.¹⁰²

During the Japanese Invasion of Korea (1592-98), an Italian slave trader, Carletti¹⁰³, who left a travel book on his visit to the East, wrote that he stopped at Nagasaki, Japan, bought five

¹⁰⁰ By contrast, *Hankyoreh* had many reports and interviews that clearly indicate that the Japanese former teacher and the comfort women redress groups were aware that volunteer corps and comfort women are different.

¹⁰¹ One of the most conservative leading newspapers—so-called *Chojoongdong: Chosun, Joongang, Dong-a*—*Chosun Ilbo* has had the most circulation in Korea and has been the most influential newspaper.

¹⁰² For the introduction and homage to his life as a renowned columnist, see Kim Changseok, "Yigyutaeui Jihase Deuleogada [Enter the basement of Lee Gyutae's]," *Hankyoreh* 21, May 17, 2006.

¹⁰³ He seems to mention Francesco Carletti (1573-1636) who left a book on his travel around the world (Carletti 1964).

Korean boys and girls in a human market, where the abductees from Joseon were sold. He sold them in another slave market in Goa, India. In the book, the most expensive ages were preteens, and girls are usually more expensive than boys. It implies that the Japanese who invaded Korea might have been more interested in hunting innocent laymen's girls than in the war.

The reason hunters prefer girls is simple. It was because they are viewed as pure sexual objects. They also can be assimilated to a new environment easier because their blood ties are weak. During the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea (1636), the abducted people from Joseon were sold in the slave markets in Shenyang. It was told that a person could be sold for a load of cigarettes while the one girl cost two loads of cigarettes. Girls were more expensive because they had more chances to be assimilated once they were sexually subjected while male adults tended to cry for their hometown and escape to find their families.

The volunteer corps or military 'comfort women' under Japanese Imperialism are cruel atrocities, one of the tens of the most horrible sins committed by human beings recorded in history.

According to the testimonies from the victims' grandmothers, they had to deal with more than 60 of hungry males, which makes us shudder. It is an inhumane atrocity that even the Nazis in the Jewish camp couldn't imagine.

It has been proven that the preteen girls, who were in a higher grade in the elementary schools, were taken, according to the school's own records. I cannot believe that the insult and blasphemy to our nation has permeated into the marrow. Let us read the school documents on the elementary school girls who were drafted to the volunteer corps, which emphasizes that they are right for sexual slaves, as it is commenting that she is fat as if she is about to blow out, looks cheerful and little short but still feels like matured, and she must have great patience because she has a ruddy face and broad chest.

It comes from their brutal nationhood that has not changed since the Japanese Invasion of Korea. The bright eyes of these elementary school student volunteer corps tell us that this cannot end with compensation to the victims' grandmothers, let alone an apology from the Japanese Prime Minister; to do so fires bullets into our nation's consciousness.¹⁰⁴

The news that elementary school students were recruited as volunteer corps was reported, as Lee wrote in his column. This is interesting because a renowned columnist was trying to provide historical evidence that the sexual exploitation of young girls was innate to a slavery system, if not innate to Japanese culture. It is typical in the way it presents the victim and the comfort system. First, in this column, the author does not seem to have any doubt that the volunteer corps and the 'comfort women' are one and the same. Because of this misconception, the requirements

¹⁰⁴ Gyutae Lee, "*Gukgyosaeng Jeongsindae* [Elementary students' *jeongsindae*]," *Chosun Ilbo*, January 15, 1992.

for recruiting girls, which emphasizes their health and fitness for hard labor in the factory, turns into an assessment for hard sexual services. In some cases, young girls were deceived by collectors and believed to be recruited as volunteer corps but later they realized they were being sexually exploited, but that does not mean all the girls recruited as volunteer corps were actually recruited as ‘comfort women’. Second, these reactions to the news on the recruitment of elementary school students for the volunteer corps drew significant attention from Korean society. The number of articles about the issue increased dramatically not after the first testimony was delivered but shortly after this news was revealed. The suffering that former ‘comfort women’ had experienced was again highlighted. The redress movement group for ‘comfort women’ finally got the channels to have a voice.

5.2 Naming Matters

The women now commonly called ‘comfort women’ or sex slaves by the Japanese military have been called by various names “in multiple and conflicting ways,” in accordance with who is speaking of them and what political agenda they have (Soh 2008, 31). For example, Soh (2008, 31) suggests that we need to investigate that “the competing ideologies to get at the multifarious categorical terms that various people—primarily people other than the women themselves—have deployed to symbolically represent Japan’s wartime comfort women” as shown in <Table 5>.

Soh’s categorization well suggests that the term ‘comfort women’ is the place for political struggle of different groups. Over time and by different groups, ‘comfort women’ were represented in various ways and the struggles for what ‘comfort women’ really was became the front line of the battlefield.

Nowadays, thanks to the arduous struggle of redress movement groups, the term ‘comfort women’ or sex slaves are common terms that denote historical ‘comfort women’. But as it is suggested on <Table 4>, wartime state call them “imperial gifts” and they were recorded as

“military supply” on the official military records.¹⁰⁵ The troops who were the clients of the services called them the derogated term “*pi*” or “public toilet.” Activists supporting ‘comfort women’ have tried to challenge these old perceptions and have provided new perspectives to see the operation of a comfort system as the war criminal of the state, violating the human rights of the women.

Underlying ideologies	Principal groups	Comfort system as	Symbolic representations
Fascistic paternalism	Wartime state	A system embodied a paternal state policy	Metaphor: imperial “gifts” Doctor’s classification: “military supply”
Masculinist sexism	The troops	A military version of licensed prostitution available in imperial Japan and its colonies	<i>Pi</i> (vagina in Chinese slang); public “toilet”
Feminist humanitarian	Contemporary activists	Military sexual slavery enforced by state power resulting in gross violations of women’s human rights and requiring state compensation to the survivors	“sex slaves”
Ethnic nationalism	Korean	Contemporary activists	Deceived by labor recruits called <i>chōngsindae</i>
	Japanese	Contemporary activists	Licensed “prostitution”

Table 5 Competing ideologies and the multifarious categorical terms to symbolically represent comfort women (Soh 2008, 31-33)

¹⁰⁵ Soh argues that it is not just the state but also the people who lived their lives in that period who also thought, and continue to think, like that: “This was a quite conventional lifestyle of a financially dependent woman performing her expected role as a mistress in the historical context of Japan’s masculinist sexual culture” (2008, 30).

5.3 Debate on the confusion about the terms

There are different explanations for why the Korean redress movement groups are still using the term *jeongsindae* in their organization's title. The most common explanation is that the movement redress groups' nationalist agenda appropriated the terms as well as the victims. According to Soh's categorization illustrated above, it is Japanese ethnic nationalists who are mostly opposing not only the Korean movement groups' usage of the terms but also the internationally affirmed framing to represent 'comfort women' in general. Hata (1998, 2007) is the leading Japanese conservative scholar and also one of the most active participants in anti-redress movements for 'comfort women'. He criticizes the UN's report on 'comfort women' (Coomaraswamy 1996), arguing there was no forced recruitment for them. First, Hata (1998) challenged the underlying assumption on Coomaraswamy report, which is largely relying on Yoshida (1977, 1983). After extensive research on the island of Jeju Province, Yoshida claimed he worked as a member of official recruiters for hunting as many as 1,000 young girls and women. Hata refutes Yoshida's claim as he found a local journalist's investigation on the matter, which concluded that Yoshida's story was fabricated.¹⁰⁶ Hata also argues that there was "no organized or forced recruitment" for recruiting comfort women (Hata 2007). It was written when the U.S. House of Representatives passed a so-called 'comfort women' resolution (H. Res. 121). First, he claims that "the comfort women issue is a political problem raised by forces (both domestic and foreign) with multiple, divergent agendas" (Hata 2007, 3). He sees it as a political power game. He thinks that any tactics can be used to achieve players' political goals, and the U.S. government and politicians, as well as Korean activists, are the ones imposing their political agendas on the issue. Hata also points out discrepancies among the testimonies made by one of the victims, Lee Yong-soo. In her first testimony for the Korean Council, she said she was "delighted to receive a red dress and leather shoes from a man wearing clothing resembling a uniform" and she "went along with him the right way" (Hata 2007, 10). He points out that after the first testimony, all the later testimony had more dramatic scenes, such as the detailed

¹⁰⁶ Not only Hata's effort to find evidence that Yoshida's story was fabricated, but also other supporters of the redress movement's supporting evidence proved that Yoshida's book is not reliable. See Soh (2008, 152-155) for being dismissed of Yoshida's story.

description of the uniform of the man who took her or a sword or bayonet was added. As a positivist historian, he is trying to discredit the testimony and credit only the history that can be supported by material evidence. If he finds any inconsistency in different testimonies, he cannot accept them as reliable sources. But recent historians and thinkers consent that, in spite of the inevitable inconsistencies, testimonies and private memories should be the bridge between individual and history. Hata's positivistic tendency is much clearer when he suggests that Dutch former 'comfort woman' Jan O'Herne's testimony is evidence that the Japanese military would have not tolerated forced recruitment in the brothels in the battlefield. O'Herne was forcibly taken from a Japanese internment camp in Semarang, Java, by Japanese soldiers and taken to a comfort station; when the comfort station came to light to the higher Japanese military officers, the brothel was shut down and the 11 persons in connection with it were handed down and punished in the Dutch military court. Hata insists that this shows that not only would the Japanese government not tolerate such behavior but also the matter was resolved by punishing the men related to the action (Hata 2007, 7).

This relates to Hata's third assertion, in which he holds that the U.S. military's behaviors in the Korean War and the Korean military's behaviors in the Vietnamese War were not much different from what the Japanese military did during the Pacific War.

Hata and other conservatives in Japan would agree with Soh (2006) that one of the most crucial elements in this political power game on the comfort women issue is the idea that the majority of 'comfort women' were deceived by recruiters and that they were actually recruited as volunteer corps. Soh (2006) criticizes the ethnic nationalist movement groups in the framing of comfort women as *jeongsindae* because doing so veils the different situations of individual comfort women and their subjectivities. She consents that the suffering of the victims was horrendous and the comfort system is definitely a systemic state crime, but the agency of individual comfort women should not be ignored by subsuming every victim was deceived by the recruiters.

It should also be noted that, in Soh's diagram, the most-commonly-used term, 'comfort women' is missing. She only contrasts two activists' groups: feminist humanitarians and ethnic nationalists. In her interpretation, feminist humanitarians are the ones who see comfort stations

as “military sexual slavery enforced by the state power resulting in gross violations of women’s human rights and requiring state compensation to the survivors.” They are the one who refuse the euphemistic term ‘comfort women’ and boldly adopt the new term sex slaves to call the victims. On the other hand, Korean ethnic nationalist activists spread the untruthful myth that ‘comfort women’ were deceived by labor recruits called *jeongsindae*. Soh’s explanation of the transform of the term in contemporary context is largely due to the efforts of the nationalist activists for ‘comfort women.’

But careful observation of the changes of the term to denote ‘comfort women’ in Korea tells a different story. First, it is difficult to distinguish who is a feminist humanitarian and who is an ethnic nationalist in the activists and supporters of ‘comfort women’ redress movements. Most of the activists are actually a little bit of both. For example, the first generation of the redress movement was composed of female professors about the same ages as the women drafted as ‘comfort women’. The two prominent leaders of the movements are Yun Jeong-ok and Lee Hyo-Jae, an English literature professor and a sociology professor in Ewha Women’s University, respectively. They’re regarded as the first generation leaders of the women’s movement.¹⁰⁷ The second generation consists of the leaders of the women’s movement, and many of them later became higher officers in the government in related ministries or politicians. The third generation is the activists who have worked in the organization from the beginning. They have coordinated events, dealt with government officers and the media, supported the leaders, and taken care of the victims for more than 20 years. They were the core human resources of the organization and have now become the leaders. There are also outside groups that produce the critical knowledge on the ‘comfort women’ and redress movements, but they are also part of it by giving advice and participating in or organizing various conferences and events because they are also sympathetic to it. These academic groups are mostly educated in the West, the majority of them studied in the U.S., and they are the leading figures in feminist studies in Korea. A large part of the leading groups of the movements, therefore, can be categorized as feminist humanitarians and the current leaders—the third generation—may be the only group if someone seeks to label anyone suspicious as nationalist. The statements made by the movements tell us a

¹⁰⁷ For the brief introduction of women’s studies and movements in Korea, see Hong (2013)

different story. The statements made in the initial part of the movements were written very much in a nationalist tone, but as the movements develop the nationalist voice, the statements become minimal but the humanitarian view took up from the very early stages of the movements.

As the movement progresses, many engagements in the movements from other sympathetic scholars too. Many women's studies scholars have criticized the centrality of nationalism in the movement. However, it should be noted that many of the scholars not only criticized it but also were deeply engaged in the movement. With the participation of scholars who have been critical of the nationalistic character of the movement, the movement has sought to consciously avoid using nationalist rhetoric as much as possible. More importantly, as the comfort women movement realized the importance of international solidarity to put substantial pressure on Japan, it found that appealing to universalistic and feminist values rather than nationalist narratives was more useful. The next chapter analyzes the statements in more detail.

The Korean Council has rarely used nationalist terms in their statements since around the mid-1990s. In the early 1990s, on the other hand, most statements from the Korean Council were imbued with nationalist sentiment. Various types of writings, interviews, and statements by the two pioneers in the 'comfort women' movements, Yoon Jeong-ok and Lee Hyo-Jae, were also heavily tainted with nationalism. But it should be noted that this is not because they were nationalist and had a specific nationalist agenda to accomplish; instead, it was likely because the most commonly shared sentiment in South Korea during the time was nationalistic. Comparing their statements to the expressions found in many newspapers during that time shows their ideas were not merely a repetition of the nationalist rhetoric that was largely shared among the people. Rather, we can observe they were trying to add other perspectives—the agonies of a female victim of organizational sexual exploitation and the problem of a paternalistic fascist state—to these nationalist views. In a society where nationalism is the dominant ideology, we should look at the differences that an organization expresses, not the commonalities, to determine if the organization is nationalist or not.

More important, one may suggest that the Korean usage of the term *chōngsindae* to refer to comfort women proved to be a sociopsychologically as well as a politically effective decision on the part of activists in order to highlight the deceptive and/or coercive methods used in the

recruitment of Korean comfort women. In this sense, the term *chǒngsindae* functions as a South Korean “nationalist euphemism” born out of cultural sensitivity for the survivors: it helps avoid the negative image of prostitutes evoked by the term *wianbu*. (Soh 2008, 62)

The most problematic part of Soh’s analysis is that it is unclear which nationalist movement groups distorted the ‘comfort women’ discourse. Her categorizations of the different representations of the different groups as shown in the above table, mislead people into thinking there are conflicts in the comfort women movements in Korea among the feminist humanitarian groups and the ethnic nationalist groups.

The ideological perspectives of contemporary activists are bifurcated into those fighting for and those working against the redress movement. Feminist humanitarianism is backed by the concept of “women’s rights as human rights,” which is revolutionizing the centuries-old patterns of gender discrimination in patriarchy. ... Ethnic nationalism, whether on the part of the aggressor nation or aggrieved nations, is characterized by blind emotional devotion to upholding the honor of one’s own nation at the expense of recognizing the complex history of the comfort system, straddling military prostitution and sexual slavery. (Soh 2008, 31-32)

In her book, Soh tries to create a myth that nationalist groups in the comfort women redress group have influenced the course of the movements and influenced them to build a paradigmatic narrative on comfort women. As the latter part of the dissertation will discuss, the idea that there are conflicts between feminist humanitarians and ethnic nationalists is far from true. If we look at the course of the comfort women redress movements, we can find many distinctive nationalist voices in statements and rallying words as well as a feminist humanitarian voice. This has come about not out of discord between the two groups but rather because the movements have developed in certain ways.

Second, Soh ignores the fact that to activists for ‘comfort women,’ naming is of most serious concern. Naming is important in two ways: It has been instrumental in attracting Koreans to expand support and it has been influential in gaining more international support to press the Japanese government. The central organization for comfort women redress movements, the Korean Council for Women Drafted as Sexual Slavery by the Japanese Military, uses a different

name in Korean. Its Korean name is the Korean Council for the Volunteer Corps Issue (*Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeopuihoe*), which uses the term volunteer corps in its name. Soh sees this difference as a political appropriation rather than the development of the movement; therefore, for her it is a static conflict rather than a developmental transformation. It is safe to say that an organization uses the term *jeongsindae* in its name because of collective memory rather than a deliberate strategy. Soon after the Korean Council's name was chosen, through many international and national conferences, the name of the victims was extensively discussed too. There are still discords not only between the collective memory and the newly discovered facts but also between the subjectivities of the victims and the legitimacy of the movements. At least the conflicts are not between the feminist humanitarians and nationalists.

Third, it was not nationalist activist groups that spread the myth that most of the 'comfort women' were recruited as volunteer corps. Indeed, it was caused partly by confusion and partly by the conservative media. What I call the confusion between the terms 'comfort women' and volunteer corps is a byproduct of the process of the transformation of collective memory. If anyone is to blame for disseminating the misunderstanding between 'comfort women' and volunteer corps, it is the conservative media not the activists. The activist groups were the only groups that pointed out that 'comfort women' were different from the Women's Volunteer Labor Corps and began to use the term 'comfort women' over volunteer corps, except in the name of its organizations. Even in 1992, when the revelation that Imperial Japan had drafted elementary school students into the volunteer corps—and many Koreans thought these volunteer corps were no different from the historical 'comfort women',—it was the Korean Council and the leaders of other comfort women redress movements who clearly stated that the two were different and the volunteer corps were actually forced labor mobilized during the colonial period. It was not comfort women redress movement groups but the journalists of the conservative media who misled the public.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Chung (2001) probably is a pioneer among those who claim that volunteer corps and comfort women are closely related. She casts suspicion as she claims that "the actual operating conditions of these two systems implies sufficient possibility to mix these two systems" (44). Though she seems to fail to suggest hard evidence that the two systems are closely connected, she offers interesting points regarding the issue. First, she points out, "the mobilization of the Volunteer Women's Labor Corps was not done according to the law, but rather arbitrarily by the forcing of the Governor-General. Therefore, there are many problems in classifying the Volunteer Women's Labor Corps into a clear legal mobilizing system as in Japan. Moreover, it

Of course, the criticism that the ways in which ‘comfort women’ are represented are problematic is still valid. For example, Kim (2006) critically examines the nationalist elements in the ‘comfort women’ movements. First, she criticizes the dichotomy of aggressors and victims. Comfort women movements are guided by two perspectives: discrimination against Korean nation and sexual violence against women. Especially in the early days of the movement, the statements, websites, and press conferences written and spoken in Korean were primarily aimed at gaining support through the rhetoric of the ordeal of the nation, while materials in English for the international community, the expression of sexual violence against women begin to emerge to expand solidarity with international organizations and women's movement organizations in foreign countries. Too much emphasis on national ordeals created a battleground between two nations: Korea versus Japan.

This often appears as “victims’ perspective” which believes that all Korean nation is the victim of Japanese imperialism. Of course, all the subjects of Joseon are the victim of the Japanese empire’s harsh colonial policy. But it is often ignored that there are specific “victims” in ‘comfort women’ issue ... When we stick to the perspective that ‘we all Koreans is a victim,’ there are two problems. As a subject of the resolution of the issue, the role of Korean people is getting obscure and it can fail to notice the internal differences among us. (Kim 2006, 111)

Various researchers have criticized this dichotomy of Japanese aggressors and Korean victims because it veils the fact that there were actually many Koreans involved in recruitment, operation, and even utilization of comfort women (Dudden 2008; Soh 2008).

Second, she points out that the subject of comfort women movements is distinguished between Japanese ‘comfort women’ and Korean ‘comfort women.’ In Korean society,

is true that there are many inconsistencies in differentiating Volunteer Women’s Labor Corps with ‘comfort women’ since in the way that the mobilization of Volunteer Women’s Labor Corps had a lot of similarity with that of comfort women, which official system was hidden behind the mobilization and was mostly caused by employment fraud and violence.” (45) She also points out that “as the mobilizing of the voluntary corps had spread, there was a good chance that the mobilization of comfort women squeezed in this arbitrary space. At that time, Maeil Shinbo, a pro-Japanese newspaper, numerously emphasized the fact that the Joseon people worried about the mindset against the Volunteer Women’s Labor Corps was a misunderstanding, which can be seen as evidence that such confusion was actually happening at that time.” (45).

prostitution is often criticized and excluded. The image of comfort women victims is often expressed as if they are pure and chaste Korean virgins. The discrepancy between these two images—pure virgins and prostitutes—made activists argue that ‘comfort women’ were not prostitutes, rather than challenge the criticism toward prostitutes. It also ignores that even though a large part of Japanese ‘comfort women’ went voluntarily, they were also victims of the paternalistic masculine comfort system.

Both Soh (2008) and Kim (2010) do not see the nationalist elements in the movements as developing, transforming, and changing over time, but rather see them as static characteristics of certain groups in the movement organization or of the movement group itself. The questions, however, should not be which nationalist elements prevent the movements from fulfilling something, but how the nationalism based movements have changed their characteristics and beliefs to adjust and expand their movements to different groups and audiences.

5.4 Definitions and Usages

In this dissertation, as many researchers and the media do, I will use the term ‘comfort women’ with single quotation mark as a general term to denote the victims, as is done by many researchers and the media. Even though the term itself has some problems, many agreed upon using the term comfort women with single quotation marks to make sure the writer understand the euphemistic nature of the term itself. In this section, I will briefly discuss the definition and usages of the terms that are used to denote ‘comfort women’: volunteer corps, comfort women, and sex slaves

When quoting Korean documents, I translate each word into corresponding words to show the subtle nuances of the original documents: volunteer corps for *jeongsindae*, comfort women (*wianbu*) for *wianbu* and sex slave for *seongnoye*. Sometimes, I will use the Korean terms as they are. Also, when *jeongsindae* or *wianbu* is used in varied forms with other prefixes like *yeoja jeongsindae*, *yeoja geunro jeongsindae*, *jongun wianbu*, *ilbongun wianbu*, or *gun*

wianbu, I will add those attached words in the English translation like, women volunteer corps, women labor volunteer corps, military servicing comfort women, Japanese military comfort women, or military comfort women. In many articles, documentary films, academic journals, and books dealing with the ‘comfort women’ issue, they often pay little attention to this difference in the usage, which can lead to totally different meanings by translation.

5.4.1 *Jeongsindae* or volunteer corps

Soh suggests that the term *jeongsindae* is the “Korean pronunciation of wartime imperial Japan’s officialese *tei-shin-tai*. The literal translation, ‘volunteering [*tei/jeong*] body [*shin/sin*] corps [*tai/dae*],’ conjures up the spirit of patriotic sacrifice” (2008, 57). It is the euphemistic words that the organization is to voluntarily serve their bodies to the state. She adds,

In colonial Korea, the term *Chōngsindae* was used from about early 1941 to refer to a variety of ad hoc “patriotic” organizations of students, farmers, housewives, and other ordinary citizens whose members were mobilized to support the war efforts of imperial Japan. From late 1943, however, usage tended to be limited to women’s groups (as in *yōja* [women] *chōngsindae* or *yōja kūllo* [labor] *chōngsindae*), and after the August 1944 ordinance for a Women’s Volunteer Labor Corps the term’s usage appears to have been confined to women mobilized for the war effort. (Soh 2006, 58)

This is a good summary of the usage of *jeongsindae* in the colonial period both in Japan and Korea, but some details should be corrected. First, the term *jeongsindae* is used widely to denote “storming party,” like troops in the military in the 1930s. Second, “a variety of ad hoc ‘patriotic’ organizations” of every kind used the name *jeongsindae* from the late 1930s. It seems quite a fashion to name any organizations as *jeongsindae* in this period.

The articles that include the term *jeongsindae* are found on the NNL search from 1933 when the so-called First Battle of Hopei was beginning; it is one of the battles that took place after the Manchurian Incident. In the articles that dispatch the progress of the battles around *Reha* in the inner Mongolian province, there are mentions of *cheonwon* [Korean pronunciation of

Japanese *Kawahara*] *jeongsindae*¹⁰⁹ and *honseong jeongsindae*,¹¹⁰ [*honseong* mixture] which are the main-force unit of the so-called Operation Nekka. During this time, not only the Japanese corps but also enemy Chinese corps were called *jeongsindae*.¹¹¹ In the reports on the Second Italian-Ethiopian War, *jeongsindae* is used to denote the military troops.¹¹² The reports on the Sino-Japanese War also used the term many times. In the articles using the term *jeongsindae*, the term means “storming party” or “shock troops” that led the attack in the battle.

From 1934, articles that use the term to denote civic organization are also found. An organization planned to assassinate senior statesmen and the big names in a business circle and to attack major banks in Japan, but 17 members were arrested and the plan leaked was *Saitama Jeongsindae*.¹¹³ A member of the so-called Chauvinistic Mass Party *Jeongsindae* was reported to demand a meeting with the Prime Minister at the Official Residence of Prime Minister having a Petition on him.¹¹⁴ It seems that many of the chauvinistic civil organizations adopted military term to their organizations’ name around that time.

From 1938, the term was used in these various organizations whether it was made by the Japanese government or by civilians. As the Japanese and colonial Korean society became more and more totalitarian, the military term “volunteer corps” was spreading to all kinds of social organizations. Unsatisfied politicians who wanted to establish new parties facilitated “so-called

¹⁰⁹ “Lost Track of *Cheomwon Jeongsindae*,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 4, 1933; “Advanced to Final Destination,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 7, 1933. “*Namgywan* Restored,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 13, 1933. In the article, “To Keep Pace with the Great Powers, Mechanized Corps Will Be Established,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, September 14, 1933, it says that the newly established mechanized corps will be as powerful as *cheomwon jeongsindae*.

¹¹⁰ “Main-Force Unit Enters Seungdeok,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 6, 1933. *Seungdeok* [Korean pronunciation of Chinese *Chengde*] is the capital city of *Yéalba* [Korean pronunciation of Chinese *Rebe*].

¹¹¹ “Chinese Army Organizes *Jeongsindae*,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, March 23, 1933.

¹¹² Reports on the progress of the Second Italian-Ethiopian war is quite detailed in *Dong-a Ilbo*. It introduces the activities of the Ethiopian *jeongsindae* many times, including “Ethiopian Military’s Fierce Shooting Falls Italian Bomber,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, October 6, 1935 and “Ethiopian Troops Occupied Result Italian Troops Cut off from Behind,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, October 10, 1935. There are Italian *jeongsindaes* too.

¹¹³ “Embargo Removed at 4 PM Today, Planned Assassination of Senior Statesmen and the Big Names in Business Circle Also Attacking Major Banks,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 1, 1934. “*Saitama Jeongsindae* Trial,” April 22, 1934. “Pretrial on *Jeongsindae* Begins,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 3, 1934.

¹¹⁴ “Demand Meeting with Prime Minister at the Official Residence with a Petition,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, August 6, 1935.

jeongsindae movements.”¹¹⁵ To prevent the car accidents and to clear the environment around sidewalks, ‘traffic *jeongsindae*’ was also organized by Seoul police.¹¹⁶ In an article introducing a music critique, the most renowned names in Korean classical music history were collaborators to Japanese Empire during the colonial period; the critique notes that many of the famous composers in Korean music history were member of the “distribution *jeongsindae*,” which is devoted to the distribution of “national music” that nationalizes Koreans into Japanese during the colonial period.¹¹⁷ After Liberation, the term *jeongsindae* was also used to denote the various organizations that supported the colonial government. For example, the Anti-Collaboration Committee for the Investigation of the Anti-Collaboration Act against the Korean Nation arrested a person who was the leader of the Peninsular Heroic *Jeongsindae*.¹¹⁸

Therefore, before the 1940s in colonial Joseon, the term was first used to denote the “storming party,” like troops in the military, and later it spreads to the other social organizations mostly endorsed by the state. The Women Volunteer Labor Corps is named after the various *jeongsindae* in the 1930s and 1940s. To be exact, the term should be used to denote this specific institution, but in collective memory in Korea. Though the term has been confused with *wianbu* for a long time, many people now understand that *jeongsindae* is the term for this specific Women Volunteer Labor Corps. The question of who raised this distinction and who ignored the distinction will be discussed later in the chapter.

On the other hand, ‘comfort women,’ or *wianbu* [or *ianfu* in Japanese] is widely used regarding prostitution after liberation, especially prostitution around a military base. In an article in *Kyunghyang Shinmun* in 1963, a reporter argues that the term *wianbu* made by reporters as a “respectable (?) pronoun” to denote prostitutes especially for foreign military personnel after the liberation.

¹¹⁵ “New Party Movements and the Separation of Political Circles,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 7, 1938. “Development in New Party Movements,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 9, 1938.

¹¹⁶ “Car Accident Preventing *Jeongsindae*,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, June 3, 1938.

¹¹⁷ “Seek for Unveiling Pro-Japanese music,” *Hankyoreh*, Aug 12, 1989.

¹¹⁸ “Gwon Sangro and the Other Arrested,” *the Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 16, 1946.

Wianbu: the term was replaced for the term *yanggalbo* [*yang* western *galbo* whore] and *yanggongju* [*yang* western *gongju* princess], which were used to denote the women who throw the virtues of wives or the women's chastity and serve for foreign soldiers after Aug 15 liberation.¹¹⁹

Because the Japanese word *ianfu* [the same word but different pronunciation with *wianbu*] was generally used to denote prostitutes during the colonial period, the term *wianbu* must not have been invented by Korean journalists. The above definition of *wianbu*, however, tells us that the term has been commonly used to refer to prostitutes, and especially prostitutes for foreign soldiers after liberation. There are 18 articles found on the NNL mentioning *wianbu* during the Korean War when the multi-national troops fought for South Korea.

The term was used extensively during the colonial period, and as Soh points out, the term used during the wartime “reflects the views of a paternalistic state” (Soh 2008, 69).

It referred to an adult female (*fu/bu*) who provided sexual services to “comfort and entertain” (*ian/wian*) the warrior, affording him rest and relaxation and thereby boosting his morale, which in turn enables him to fight fiercely in order to win the “sacred war.” (Soh 2008, 69)

This is why some researchers refuse to use the old term because they cannot accept the “term that defines the sexual harm done by the male as a comforting action for male” (Chung 2001, 36). This is also why many people still prefer the term sex slave or sexual slavery over the term ‘comfort women’ or ‘comfort system’.

In an article that reports the number of women who served in the entertainment industry, the term *wianbu* is used in a separate category from other similar occupations. But if we look at all usages of *wianbu* found on the NNL search during 1950-1987, it is often interchangeably used with *jeopdaebu* and *yunrakyeseong* [*yunrak* entertainment *yeoseong* women].

¹¹⁹ “The Words Invented by the Reporters,” *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, April 9, 1963.

April's statistics of the test for the STD on the bar girls [*jeopdaebu*] in Busan shows that among the 9,642 examinees, healthy ones are 6,268 and 3,374 carriers [of STD], which records 35% of all examinees. Among the examinees, there are 1,020 dancers, 5,445 *wianbus*, 1,212 bar girls [*jeopdaebu*], 1,182 secret prostitutes [*milchang*], and 783 of similar occupations.¹²⁰

Historically, when the term comfort women is mentioned in Japan and Korea, the Japanese prefer to use *jugun ianfu* [military comfort women] and Koreans used both terms, *wianbu* and *jonggun wianbu*. By the early 1990s, however, the terms *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* were interchangeably used, at least in Korea, until scholars and civic movement groups agreed to use the term 'comfort women' with single quotation marks (Chung 2001), which is most commonly used in writings on 'comfort women.'

The term sex slave was used as early as the 1970s by Kim (1976). After the redress movements were internationalized, many people questioned using the euphemism 'comfort women' and argued that the term sex slave should replace it. It became commonly used after UN reports used the term in their titles (Coomaraswamy 1996; McDougall 1998). But some of the victims in Korea do not like to be called *seongnoye*. Korean activists, media, and researchers rarely use the term, especially when they write or speak in Korean (Yoon 2010).

Some people believe that the confusion was politically motivated and maneuvered by some nationalist driven comfort women support groups. Japanese right wings have denied any involvement by the Japanese government in operating comfort systems, and therefore, they strongly believe there is no reason to apologize or repatriate the victims. In addition, the Western feminists, who believe that the suffering of 'comfort women' was horrible, also think that the comfort women redress movement, which is led by nationalists, has exploited the women who tried to the subjects who would choose their own good.

As paternalistic nationalists seemed to begin to take over the comfort women movements, the feminists sympathetic to the movement were concerned most that the nationalist agenda

¹²⁰ "The STD Carriers among Bar Girls in Busan are 3,000 out of about 6,000," *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 15, 1952.

might subsume everything the comfort women movements wanted to accomplish. As masculine nationalism took over the central part of the comfort women movement, a significant number of feminists in Korea, although sympathetic to the movement, pointed out that the nationalist agenda could subsume all other issues important to the comfort women issue. It should also be examined that the nationalist groups that led the comfort women redress movements to accomplish their nationalist agenda by representing comfort women victims as volunteer corps.

5.4.2 *Wianbu* as (military) prostitutes: threats to paternalist society

	Dong-a Ilbo		Kyunghayang Shinmun		Maeil Business Newspaper		Total	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
Articles including the term <i>wianbu</i>	340	49	314	45	42	6	696	100
<i>Wianbu</i> denotes prostitutes	320	94	306	97	41	98	676	97
<i>Wianbu</i> denotes historical comfort women	11	3	8	3	1	2	20	3

Table 6 Articles Using the Term *Wianbu*, 1950-1987 (NNL Search)

Before the 1950s, no article including the word *wianbu* is found on Naver News Library (thereafter NNL),¹²¹ but a significant number of articles using the term after 1950 appeared in the search. Among the 696 articles containing the term *wianbu*, only 20 articles used the term to denote historical comfort women and all the rest use it to denote prostitutes.

The first article appears in *Dong-a Ilbo* on May 27, 1950, and reports the situation around the borderline of North and South Korea about a month before the Korean War broke out. Though the reliability of the news can be in question because the article only conveys the announcement of the Vice Minister of Defense in a somewhat propagandist voice, it provides an important case for how the term *wianbu* was used in the 1950s in Korea. The article reports there were hundreds of protests from the patriotic compatriots (against North Korean government) in

¹²¹ Naver News Library (newslibrary.naver.com) provides the database of the original copies of four major newspaper articles (*The Kyunghyan Shinmun*, *Dong-a Ilbo*, *Hankyoreh*, and *Maeil Daily Business News*) in PDF and plain text format from 1920 to 1999.

North Korean territory, and it emphasizes,

in order to strengthen and nurture the Special Force that will lead the attack to South Korea, they mobilize people with any possible reason as they kidnap young men and conscript women as workers, care takers or even *wianbu*. They also took cows, horses, pigs and chickens. Those abuses resulted in 610 people from 86 households who lived in and around *Nojak-ri*, *Josan-ri*, and *Wonbong-ri* of *Baekhak-myeon*, *Jangdan-gun*, *Gyeonggi-do*, which is near to Thirty-eight Degree Line, came to the Southern part of Korea through the bullets from the enemies between 13:00 and 17:00 on the same day.¹²²

In this article, the term *wianbu* included in the announcement of the Vice Minister denotes the exact same function that comfort women did in the Pacific War. Whether it was intended or not, the Vice Minister ignited the collective memory on ‘comfort women’ and effectively emphasized the brutality of the North Korean government. The enemy or the Japanese Imperial Military drafted young girls and used them as ‘comfort women.’ It should be noted, however, that in this usage, the term does not mean historical ‘comfort women.’ Although the way it brings up the collective memory directly toward historical ‘comfort women,’ in this context, it is more likely to mean military prostitute. Rather, it is a drier way or, according to the ‘70s news article, a “respectable (?) pronoun” to denote military prostitutes. Whether an editor of the newspaper contemplates how the government can tax the *wianbu* around UN army campsites,¹²³ a death of a *wianbu* is reported,¹²⁴ how many *wianbu* were contracted STDs,¹²⁵ or the arrests of *wianbu* who

¹²² “Puppet Troops Try to Invade South,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, May 27, 1950.

¹²³ For example, “More Efforts Needed for Monetary Contraction,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 15, 1951.

¹²⁴ The majority of the news articles containing the term *wianbu* during 1950-1987 are reports on the murder and assault on *wianbus* and how the perpetrators, who are mostly soldiers stationed in Korea and most of them, except the time of the Korean War, were the U.S. soldiers, were treated. Like historical comfort women, the *wianbu* after the liberation, were mostly also the most precarious people in society. They have been exposed not only to danger of beating, torturing, stalking, stabbing, strangling, and raping but also to the blame they might be responsible for disseminating sexually transmitted disease, drugs, and all kinds of moral decay.

¹²⁵ The spread of sexually transmitted diseases was often associated with the corruption of sexual morality by comfort women and the need for strong regulation and mandatory testing for STDs was emphasized. It began during the Korean War in 1952, as in “The STD Carriers among Bar Girls in Busan are 3,000 out of about 6,000,” *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, May 15, 1952. It kept appearing until 1987, one year before the ‘88 Olympic Game, when the fear of AIDS spreading by *wianbu* was skyrocketing as shown in “All Workers

smuggled tax exempt goods including cigarettes and liquor,¹²⁶ *wianbu* is almost always referring to prostitutes, especially those working around the U.S. bases.

Meanwhile, only one article in the 1950s can be found on the NNL search that contains the term *wianbu* to denote historical comfort women. It was a review of a book of collected short stories by a novelist, and while the author is mentioning one of the stories, *wianbu* is mentioned.

Unbearable gruesome situation of ‘comfort women’ who were drafted as nurses, which sounded beautiful, but now called as ‘*pi*.’¹²⁷

Not much like the repeated story that ‘comfort women’ were first drafted as volunteer corps but actually worked as ‘comfort women,’ the phrase used above also deals with the deceitful nature of the recruitment of ‘comfort women.’ The two stories in the 1950s shown above tell us that, as early as the early 1950s, less than 10 years after the war, many people knew that the Japanese military took young women as ‘comfort women’, and some were explicitly deceived by the recruiters.

Yanggongju: women in prostitution, a respectable (?) pronoun for the women especially work for the US soldiers.¹²⁸

One of the articles specifically mentions military prostitutes in *Dongducheon*, where the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division was stationed. Another article reports the list of the names of those who

Receive Guests Must Test for AIDS,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, Sep 10, 1987.

¹²⁶ *Wianbus* are often targeted as the smugglers of tax exempt goods from the UN or U.S. base. For example, “US Military Goods Control Extends by September 15,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, August 22, 1959.

¹²⁷ Gwak Jongwon, “An Innate Sprit of Resistance: The Meaning of the New Tests on the Collected Short Stories by Bak Yonggu,” *Dong-a Ilbo*, April 23, 1950.

¹²⁸ *The Kyungbyang Shinmun*, “Really Funny: Transition of Slangs, Argots That Have Breath with *Minjung*,” Aug 15, 1970.

were arrested for using drugs, including some celebrities and women whose occupation was *wianbu*.

5.4.3 Collective Memory on ‘Comfort Women’

As revealed in many cases and as the collective memory of Koreans believe, there are survivors who first believed they were being recruited as *jeongsindae* but ended up finding themselves in comfort stations on the front lines in the Pacific War. At the same time, it is also true that this was not so for all cases. Women were lured in various ways. That might be why some western commentators on comfort women issue and Japanese right-wing scholars and activists argue that some of the nationalist activists intentionally disseminate the myth that the volunteer corps was actually ‘comfort women’.

Evidence shows, however, it was almost like a collective memory of post-colonial Korea that many of the young women were drafted as *jeongsindae* and later served as *wianbu* during the war. The first article stating this belief can be found as early as 1962 on NNL. On the eve of Liberation Day, an editor for the *Kyunghyang Shinmun* wrote a column recalling the exquisite agony that Koreans endured during the colonial period.

Young men were holding guns and swords in desolate Chinese wilderness, some people were working in the Manchurian plains, farmers who drafted forcefully were digging the coals in the coal mines in Kyushu, Korean virgins were drafted as *jeongsindae* and later served as *wianbu* for Japanese officers in all places over South Sea and China, young college students, so-called student-soldiers, were groaning of malaria in Borneo and Malay Peninsula.¹²⁹

Under colonial rule, many Koreans had to suffer in different parts of the world against their will. The phrase used above were repeatedly used in many articles, novels, movies, TV shows, and elsewhere for decades. The paternalistic and nationalistic phrase depicting that comfort women were “Korean virgins [who] were drafted as *jeongsindae* and later served as *wianbu*” is the

¹²⁹ “Remains of writing,” *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, August 14, 1962.

phrase heavily used after the 1990s, when the redress movements for comfort women gained attention from the media. But this was 30 years before it happened. There were no any nationalist groups that could engage in crafting the story. Rather, the phrase reflects the common belief or the collective memory of post-colonial Korea.

5.4.4 Confusion: jeongsindae as wianbu

One of the reasons why people in Korea use the term ‘wianbu’ to denote the prostitution especially around a military base is that Korean government also operated ‘comfort women’ system during the Korean War. (Park 2011)

The confusion between volunteer corps and comfort women reached its peak when two combined events occurred around the same time. Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa decided South Korea would be his first official visit abroad. The visit of a Japanese Prime Minister always stirs up the anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea. The anti-Japanese sentiment had been an essential part of Korean nationalism since the Republic of Korea was established in 1948. The first president of Korea was known to one of the leaders of the Korean independence movement from Japan. As shown in historical research on the U.S. Military Regime from 1945 to 1948 and on the Korean War, Korea was not unified enough to constitute a nation-state. North Korea was relatively better at unifying people adopting the Japanese totalitarian system. But there were many incidents that show that various political groups had different views on what should be the proper nation. There was extreme conflict between the groups.

When the first testimony by a former ‘comfort woman’ was delivered, it was not enough to garner the issue substantive attention. Only after the January 1992 interview did the issue become the center of media discourse. This was mainly due to the revelation of a former Japanese elementary school teacher, who worked in Korea during the colonial period, confessing that she helped recruit elementary school girls for volunteer corps.

5.5 Defining the victim: how the victims of sexual slavery in the military are called

However, when Soh (2008) scolds and criticizes that the “widespread perception that *chōngsindae* meant comfort women” became “a virtual historical ‘fact’” due to the “nationalist activists’ vigorous campaign,” she misleads as if the movement groups for comfort women were all incurable nationalists and most Koreans believed that *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* were one and the same. First, it is not true that “nationalist activists’ vigorous campaign since the early 1990s also has resulted in solidifying the South Korean popular belief into a virtual historical ‘fact’” (59). It is problematic to call the activists as a whole, nationalist above all. I would call the activists nationalist in terms of the fact that most Koreans are explicitly nationalist, but not because the activists were more nationalist than other Koreans. Indeed, the organizations—for example, one of the most prominent group, the Korean Council—are usually the umbrella groups or associations of groups that consist of the majority associated with the churches and other groups, including feminists, labor unions, teachers’ unions, and student organizations.¹³⁰ Also, though the activists and researchers related the movements groups belief that there were cases in forced recruitments of comfort women and that some of the victims were conscripted as *jeongsindae* and later became *wianbu*, they are also well aware that the two are totally different institutions, and they never tried to persuade people that *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* were the same. In the initial period that the comfort women issue became publicized and politicized, there was “conflation of comfort women with *chōngsindae*.” The public fury ignited by the reports that records show some elementary school students were officially recruited as *jeongsindae* caused interests in *jeongsindae* to rise. Until that time, the term *jeongsindae* was used to denote comfort women because of the “generalized Korean perception that identifies the comfort women with *chōngsindae*.” The reports, columns, and editorials on the issue became heated because people thought even elementary school students were being sent to comfort stations. However, it was revealed soon after that the recruited elementary students were being sent to the factories rather than comfort stations, but it was also true that some young women of the age of elementary school students were also sent to the comfort stations. Except the short period in 1992, the

¹³⁰ Thus, the narrative of bad nationalists who want to pursue political goals and the innocent people who cannot but follow the agenda set by the nationalists is not appropriate in this case.

distinction between *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* was more common than personal connotations of ‘comfort women’ with *jeongsindae*, which is only found in the reports and documents.¹³¹

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have looked at how the words *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* were used in the Korean media before the 1990s. There have been many controversies over the use and meaning of these terms, but there was a simple explanation if one examines the usage in Korean society before the 1990s. In its simplest terms, *jeongsindae* was used to mean historical ‘comfort women’ after liberation, and *wianbu* meant almost a prostitute, especially a prostitute working around the military bases.

The use of these terms seems to have been used in the Korean society without any doubt until such time as the ‘comfort women’ issue became more politicized and socially known. *Wianbu* has been used as a general noun since the time of Japanese imperialism to mean prostitutes around the military. When the ‘comfort women’ were recruited and after the war was over those who were taken to ‘comfort women’ were called *jeongsindae* among Koreans partly because some drafted to volunteer corps actually became ‘comfort women’ and partly because such rumors may have been a way of resistance to the recruitment of young school girls. Whatever the reason, the use of *jeongsindae* to refer to ‘comfort women’ was not contrived by some of the movement groups for their national agendas, but only reflects the usage that has been common from the very short period after the end of colonization.

¹³¹ Even Yoon Jeong-ok contributed on *Hankyoreh* to give a definition to comfort women and volunteer corps. It is also hard to believe that her intention was to solidify the confusion, based on her writings on comfort women in various media.

CHAPTER 6. WEDNESDAY DEMONSTRATION AND DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES: FRAMING ANALYSIS AND CONTENT ANALYSIS ON THE STATEMENTS

However, Japanese invasive imperialism forced the precious daughters of the Korean Peninsula to be used as merely expendables for their wars. They dragged our cherished predecessors in school, in the village wells, on the roadside, with guns and knives as if they hunted beasts. They deceived them into making money, or took them only because they embroidered morning glories on the map of Japan. Finally, they used them as the sperm spittoons for the Japanese army. For daughters of the Korean Peninsula who have believed that the chastity is more valuable than their lives, how could they express their disgrace and anger in words when even the death was not allowed?

March 3, 1993

*Women's National Association in the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea
for 60th Wednesday Demonstration*

The one thousand Wednesdays are the history of the courage of victims in denouncing war crimes, as well as hope for the world's peace advocates who have shown strong solidarity. The one thousand Wednesdays also represent persistence and tears of determination that have not withered against any kind of hardship. But as non-response from the Japanese embassy has shown, in addition to the current reality of many women's struggles amidst violence of war, our voices and calls need to go forward strongly again further than one thousand Wednesdays.

December 11, 2011

*By the participants of the 1000th Wednesday Demonstration
and the people in the world who love peace¹³²*

The two quotes above are from the statements released at the Wednesday Demonstration for 'comfort women.' There is a time difference of almost 20 years between the two. Although the goals of the rally have not changed much since the Demonstration began in January 1992, the emphasis and tone of these two statements are strikingly different. The 1993 statement above is abundant with rhetoric, logic, and sentiment of Korean nationalists. It projects the 'comfort women' victims as 'the precious daughters of the Korean Peninsula' or Korean nation, leans on the dichotomy between Japanese imperialist perpetrators versus innocent Korean girls, and emphasizes on the chastity of Korean women. Contrarily, the latter statement has almost no trace of a nationalist idea. It rather emphasizes individual determinism, solidarity, world peace and the women's suffering from the violence in the war. The victims are no longer the "precious

¹³² English version from <http://www.doam.org/index.php/projekte/menschenrechte/trostfrauen/1262-statement-1000th-wednesday-demonstration>. I made some modifications to reduce the difference with the original text.

daughters of the Korean nation,” but are the brave warriors accusing war crimes. Additionally, not only Korean victims who want to condemn Japan's colonial crime, but all those who advocates the world’s peace should be in solidarity for such brave victims. How can the statements from the same movement be dramatically changed and how has this transforming progress happened? These are the questions that this chapter attempts to answer. The answers to these questions will be the base for understanding the influence of the discursive strategies of the ‘comfort women’ movement groups to the larger nationalist discourse in Korean society.

In this chapter, I will explore how the discursive strategy of the Korean Council had been changed over the past two decades. I will use the frame analysis to analyze the statements used in Wednesday Demonstrations followed by critical discourse analysis for further analysis. Since the amount of the statements to be analyzed is vast and the tone of them has changed slightly every week, the framing analysis will be used only to every 100th statements; and discourse analysis will be used to explain the changes among the statements. I will run through statements until the time when the 800th Demonstration was held on February 13, 2008, since it is the closest Demonstration to December 31, 2007, the last day of the period covered by this dissertation.

I will first introduce what the Wednesday Demonstration is. Second, I will briefly address the questions and problems raised by other researchers on the strategies of the ‘comfort women’ movement groups. After that, I will discuss how the discursive strategy of the Korean Council has been changed over the past 20 years and attempt to explain the reasons behind it.

6.1 Wednesday Demonstration

For the consolidation and expansion of the ‘comfort women’ movements, one cannot emphasize too much the importance of the Wednesday Demonstration.¹³³ The Wednesday Demonstration, first held on January 8, 1992, is the weekly protest held in front of the Japanese Embassy in

¹³³ Ueno (1999, 97-100) points out that problematization of the ‘comfort women’ issue in Japan began only after the former ‘comfort women’ survivors, including Kim Hak-sun who gave the first testimony in Korea, filed a lawsuit to Tokyo local court, demanding the apology and individual compensation, in December 1991 but the women’s movements in South Korea from the 1980s made it possible to shift the paradigm of ‘comfort women’ issue, which was not regarded as crime’ to sexual crime committed by Japanese military.

Seoul and aims to resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue. As the Demonstration has been continued for more than 20 years, it became the best medium to effectively channel the voice of the victims and the allied people, as well as being a place where all the people interested in this issue could be gathered and allied. Current secretary general of the Korean Council, Yoon, who participated the Demonstration from the 1st Wednesday Demonstration, says that it is a “‘living museum’ and ‘the place for historical education’ for the students to see, feel and participate what they cannot learn from the school textbook” (Yoon 2011, 167).

Sometimes young white people come to the Demonstration and we ask how they knew about it. One of them told us that they knew it from the Lonely Planet. The Lonely Planet has section for the Wednesday Demonstration! Japanese Trade Union comes two times a year. Once on May Day week and another on their vacation. They always include Wednesday when they come to participate the Wednesday Demonstration. When I see them, I realize that the May day is not far away.¹³⁴

It is also a symbolic place for an international alliance not only for women’s movement but also for anti-war and human rights movements. Most importantly, it has served as a center for the ‘comfort women’ movement to devise appropriate response to the changing political situation and the most recent event associated with the issue.¹³⁵ The statements released every Wednesday Demonstration, therefore, are the most important documents that transform the history by their discursive strategies, develop the alliances domestically and internationally, change the environment around the issue, and induce the reaction of Japanese and Korean government to the activists’ demands.

¹³⁴ Interview with Kim Dong Hee, secretary of the Korean Council, on August 29, 2008 at the Learning Center, the Korean Council, Seoul.

¹³⁵ Whereas there are number of research on ‘comfort women’ movements, there are surprisingly little research on the Wednesday Demonstration. The co-representative of the Korean Council, Yoon Mee-hayng wrote the history of her organization (Yoon 2010, 2011). Also, the large part of the statements delivered at the Demonstrations are published by the Korean Council from the 1st to the 600th Demonstration (Jan 9, 1992 – Mar 17, 2004) (Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe 2004) (henceforth HJMDH). The rest of the statements can be obtained on the Korean Council website (<https://www.womenandwar.net>). As the movements for ‘comfort women’ expanded to various international alliances, the Demonstration was no more a place for nationalist voice but for diverse values converged to women’s right and peace.

The first Wednesday Demonstration was organized by the Korean Council, which was established as an alliance organization of movement groups with 36 women.¹³⁶ Since then, the Demonstration has been held on every Wednesday at the very same place for more than 20 years. The 1000th Demonstration was held on December 14, 2011, and it keeps counting. It features the longest held rally on a single theme in the world.

The first Demonstration was also the byproduct of the democratization. The Korean Council is an umbrella organization consisting of 36 women's organizations. Secretariat is the core administrative body of the Korean Council and is where the only full-time activists are working. This format of organizations allows great flexibility and resilience of the Korean Council and the Wednesday Demonstration. For example, every member organization in the Korean Council, including the secretariat, needs to host the Demonstration in turn. Though an organization might have great difficulty to manage and maintain the same demonstration for more than 20 years, for the Wednesday Demonstration, each organization only needs to host once or twice a year. It has reduced a lot of burdens involved in preparing the Demonstration.

Since each Demonstration is hosted by another member organization, the tones of the statements, which are also written by the host organizations, are varied. Obviously, the tones, rhetoric and logic of the statements change in a certain direction over time; but we can also discover that it can be dramatically different depending upon which sub-organization wrote the statement. The statements written by the secretariat tend to set the direction. The other member organizations cannot always keep pace with the vanguard secretariat. The secretariat and the leading figures of the Korean Council have faced multi negotiations. First, they need to negotiate with the member organizations. Second, they need to negotiate with the potential international alliances. Third, they need to negotiate with ordinary Koreans. According to Kim Donghui, there is little trouble when negotiating within the member groups. The statements and the changes of their tones are the results of these multi negotiations. It is one of the reasons that I used only every 100th statement to analyze. Since every 100th Demonstration is significant in meaning, most of them have been hosted by the secretariat of the Korean Council. I used the statements

¹³⁶ Some report says it is the alliance of 38 or 37 different organizations. In this dissertation, I follow the number printed on the first statement released at the first Demonstration.

written by different host member organizations to explain the changes and un-changes in their discursive strategies.

6.2 Civil Society Initiative




Figure 6. Number of protests from society and government (coded from the *Hankyoreh*).

The ‘comfort women’ issue, unlike the other social issues, is almost always led by civil society rather than the government or politicians in Korea. The discursive strategy of the movement groups is crucial not only to understand the discourse regarding the ‘comfort women’ issue but also the reactions following the government and other parts of civil society. In the literature of the conflicts over history in East Asia, many researchers seem to contend that the governments or state elites in question triggered the protests.¹³⁷ Thus, civil society or the mass

¹³⁷ As I mentioned earlier, that is the reason why most of the studies focusing on the conflict over history in East Asia deals only with the discourses of the government, legislature, politicians. Before the growth of civil society in each country, it had been true that the governments initiated the protests and pseudo-civil organizations, mostly organized by the government followed by the actions or statement of the governments. Whether it is because of the growth of the civil society or the internalization of the government agenda, the history issues in East Asia mobilize significant part of the population voluntarily express their opinions

are described at least as receptive, if it does not imply that brainwashed people are mobilized to protest. It seems true when we compare the responses of Chinese, North and South Korean governments to the announcement of the Japanese government that they revised some problematic expressions used in middle school history textbook in 1985. Following the fierce government condemnation, organized protests by the semi-government organizations arose.

However, the ‘comfort women’ issue in Korea tells a different story. The issue was discovered, discussed, and problematized by civil society and the government has been following it, if not being defensive. Figure 7 shows the number of protests leading by the civil society (movement groups or individuals) and by the Korean governments (President, government officials, and politicians) against the Japanese government.¹³⁸ As it indicates, except the short period of 2007, that the protests initiated by the civil society were preceded to those initiated by the government. Similarly, the protests on ‘comfort women’ issue in Korea are almost always led by the civil society. It is interesting because Korean government expressed very little concern about this issue except in the period when the U. S. House of Representatives passed the resolution on ‘comfort women’ in 2007.

Not just timing and numbers of the protests, but also the discourses and the framing of the issue in protests are also led by the movement groups. The Korean government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been taking a rigid position on the ‘comfort women’ issue especially in the initial part of the research period. Most of the official statements on ‘comfort women’ from the government reported in South Korean media are almost identical with the Japanese government perspective, which is that ‘comfort women’ issue cannot be the object of negotiation or lawsuit, as all the legal liabilities of the Japanese government resolved with the Korea-Japan agreement concluded in 1965. Some of the presidents seemed not to agree with the stance of the administrative, even though they could not change it.¹³⁹ It was Women's

before the government policy determined.

¹³⁸ Protests include condemnation, statement of opposition, report, declaration, threat of future activity, conference, meeting, demonstration, damaging property, injuring people, public campaign, legal action, boycott, summoning Ambassador, and legislative action. See the Appendix.

¹³⁹ The establishment of Northeast History Foundation in 2006, therefore, is a leeway that Korean government tries to deal with the problem.

organizations led by Professor Yoon Jung-ok who created the Korean Council raised the issue for the first time in the government's consistent 'comfort women' policy. They first framed the 'comfort women' were "forced draft" by Japanese government, found a survivor who can testified her agony in front of the international media and transform the redress movement to a peace movement. As we will see, the frames and the perspective on the 'comfort women' issue are pretty much set by the leading organization of the 'comfort women' movement.

6.3 Time Frame

In order to analyze the relations between the discursive strategies of 'comfort women' movements and the representation of public media on the 'comfort women' issue, we set up some time frames. Figure 2 shows the total number of articles containing the word 'comfort women' or "volunteer corps" printed on the *Chosun Ilbo* and the *Hankyoreh*, which represent the conservative and progressive views respectively,¹⁴⁰ monthly from Jan 1988 to Dec 2007.¹⁴¹ It indicates some interesting facts about the 'comfort women' issue in South Korea. First, there is extremely light coverage on the issue until a 'comfort women' survivor, Kim Hak-sun, publicly gave her first testimony on August 14, 1991. Second, not immediately after the testimony, but only after Jan 1992, the number of coverage went to the peak and the coverage on the issue became a constant issue for Korean newspapers, except 1999-2000 and 2002-2003. The massive coverage of 'comfort women' in early 1992 is actually the most powerful impetus to publicize the 'comfort women' issue. Third, it indicates that, after 1992, the coverage on 'comfort women'

¹⁴⁰ In Korea, ideological disposition seems somewhat different from other countries. In the media and real politics, people tend to use the term left and right to criticize oppositional groups but many consent that there are very little room for left in the political topography in Korea. In this dissertation, I will use the term "conservative" and "progressive" to denote two groups that have main confrontation in Korean society but that does not mean that each group is right or left in general sense.

¹⁴¹ As the term 'comfort women' and "voluntary corps" had been interchangeably used for a long time, both terms should be used to collect the articles on 'comfort women' issue. For the detailed method of collecting data, see Ch 3. Methods

issue is maintaining with a certain regularity. For example, the most of the peaks (the higher numbers than adjacent numbers) emerge in every August. It is due to the fact that August 15 is the Korean Liberation Day, which made the coverage on the ‘comfort women’ issue an indispensable item for commemorating the Liberation Day. It tells that the media, movement groups, and sometimes governments tend to use the Liberation Day as leverage for their agenda; and the peaks in August indicates that it became natural to deal with this problem automatically on this day.

Focusing on the events that generate those peaks, I examined what kind of occasions promoted the concern for and interest in the ‘comfort women’ issue. With the change of those concerns and interests, I also explored how those events were reported in South Korean media. To understand the effect of the movement group discursive strategies on larger nationalist discourse, I then analyzed the discursive strategies of the Korean Council using the statements announced in weekly Wednesday Protests with framing analysis.

To make it easier to understand the changes and transformations of representation in the ‘comfort women’ issue and related nationalist discourse during the 20-year period, I divided it into five periods, considering the frequencies of ‘comfort women’ issue appeared on the media and the changes of the subjects that led (or attempted to lead) those changes.




Figure 7. Total numbers of articles on ‘comfort women’ on *Hankyoreh* and *Chosun* (by month)




Figure 8. Numbers of articles including the term ‘comfort women’ on the *Chosun* and *Hankyoreh* by year

As shown in Figure 3, the first period was from 1988 to August 14 1991, when ‘comfort women’ discourse was not totally subsumed nor it could guide the nationalist discourse, so I would like to call it “atypical period.” In this period, many of the initial types of the representations of ‘comfort women’ is found in the media, though the majority is greatly influenced by the nationalist discourse.

Time period	Wednesday Demonstration	President
Atypical period (1988-Aug 14 1991)	Before the 1st Demonstration (88- Jan 92)	Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)
Formative period (Aug 15 1991-1994)	The 1st – the 148th 1st Demonstration (Jan 8 92) 100th Demonstration (Dec 22 94)	Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)
Failed normalization period (1995-1999)	The 149th – the 391st 201th Demonstration¹⁴² (Jan 31 96) 300th Demonstration (Feb 18 98)	Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)
Normalization period (2000-2003)	The 392nd – the 590th 400th Demonstration (Mar 1 00) 500th Demonstration (Mar 3 02)	Rho Mu-hyun (2003-2008)
Reactionary period (2004-2007)	The 591st – the 793rd 600th Demonstration (Mar 17 04) 700th Demonstration (Mar 15 06)	

Table 7. Time period: Wednesday Demonstration and the presidents in Korea

After the first testimony from a ‘comfort women’ survivor was reported in media on August 15, 1991, ‘comfort women’ discourse started to appear from 1992 to 1994. This is the second period and I named it the “formative period” of ‘comfort women’ discourse. As shown in Figure 3, the ‘comfort women’ issue burst into the Korean media in the early 1992 and was eventually calming down until 1994. It is the most important period in the ‘comfort women’ discourse since the way in which people think about ‘comfort women’ was formed in this period. Not only how to present the victims and demand the reparation but also the logic how to refuse the requests from the movement groups.

¹⁴² The statement for the 201st Wednesday Demonstration is used instead of the 200th statement because the 200th statement is missing in HJMDH (2004).

The third period was from 1995 to 1999 which I call it “the failed normalization period.” It was the time that ‘comfort women’ issue triggered the tension between the ‘comfort women’ discourse and the various nationalist ideas. It was the time that the different groups in Korean society began to reveal their differences in some nationalist agenda and implied that those differences might be concealable. It is interesting that only in 1995 and 1996, the number of articles on the Chosun exceeded those of the Hankyoreh when the Korean conservatives tried to take the initiative in the ‘comfort women’ discourse.

From 2000 to 2003, the representation of ‘comfort women’ discourse converged into the more progressive way, so I named it the “normalized period.” As Kim Dae-jung was elected as the president from the oppositional party in 1998, for the first time after Park Chung-hee took the power from his coup in 1960, many people in Korea thought that it was finally a beginning of a real democratization. The ‘correction of history,’ which was started by the former government, seemed to settle down in this period.

The last period, covering from 2004 to 2007, is the “reactionary period” when the anxiety of the conservatives backlashed to the more progressive interpretation of the history. As a President candidate from the so-called ‘democratic camp,’ Roh Mu-hyun was elected, and the people who had the power before began to attack the progressives’ perspective in history.

In the next section, I analyze the frames used in every 100th Demonstration from the 1st until the 700th. As shown in table 1, every period contained two statements. Focusing on these two statements but not limited to them, I explained how the discursive strategies had formed and changed in each of the period.

6.4 Statements and Analysis

6.4.1 Atypical Period: Before the Wednesday Demonstration (Jan 1988-Jan 1992)

First, I examined the discursive strategies of the ‘comfort women’ movement groups before the 1st Wednesday Demonstration. This period almost fell into the “atypical period” as indicated above, but not entirely the same as shown in <table 7>. Since the Demonstration began five months after the first testimony, it is more suitable to analyze the discursive strategy before the first Demonstration rather than before the first testimony.

As pointed out by Lee (2010b, 41), the ‘comfort women’ movements began to start “when a sense of responsibility for a women research, Yoon Jeong-ok met Korean Church Women United (henceforth KCWU), which had issued problems of ‘*gisaeng* tourism’ from the early 1970s.”¹⁴³ It is well known that Yoon, who was about the same age as the women who drafted for ‘comfort women’ in the Japanese colonial rule, had been bothered because she survived and received excellent education whereas many other girls of her age were rumored to suffer from the sexual exploitation during the war.¹⁴⁴ She conducted a private investigation on ‘comfort women’ in the late 1970s. She visited Japan in 1980, went to Hokkaido and Okinawa, and Hot Yai in Thailand with two members of KCWU. She met survivors from ‘comfort women,’ gathered evidence on the operation of ‘comfort women’ stations and interviewed people who were related to them.¹⁴⁵ She presented her investigation at the international

¹⁴³ Japanese men during the 1970s enjoyed so called ‘sex-tours’ in many of Asian countries. This sex industry often regarded as a good source of accumulation of the foreign exchange reserve in export-oriented South Korea and it was protected and even controlled by governments (Lie 1995, 317-321). *Gisaeng* (or *kisaeng* according to the McCune-Reischauer Romanization) was female artists/entertainers for *yangban* or royal class. In the 1970s in Korea the ‘sex tour’ for Japanese men was well known as ‘*gisaeng* tour.’ Many women in Christian organizations believed that colonial rule was prolonged as forms of ‘*gisaeng* tours.’ See Chai (1993) for connection between *Karayuki-san*, – Japanese female sex workers who worked at the outside Japan to serve Japanese men – *Chōngshindae/Jugunianfu*, foreign sexual slaves mostly from the colonies of the Japan to serve Japanese military – and *Japayuki-san* – female sex workers mostly from the territories occupied by Japan to come to Japan to serve Japanese men.

¹⁴⁴ Even when she went to a women’s university, all the 1st year students were gathered in the basement of the main building and people including the ones with military uniforms asked students to sign some documents not allowing what was written on it. She quitted her school after that fearing she might be drafted for ‘comfort women.’ After the liberation, she met people who drafted for soldiers, workers, and other various organizations but she never met women who were drafted and heard from the people who went to the war, women who drafted had to do it all night long even without having time to eat. (Yoon 2010, ch. 9)

¹⁴⁵ She reported her investigation from this visit and another visit to Rabaul, Papua New Guinea in 1989 on the Hankyoreh as four articles from January 4 to 24, titled “Professor Yoon Jeong-ok, Ewha Women’s University, Reports on the Investigation on the Traces of Revengeful Spirits of ‘comfort women.’” The title of each article and the dates that respective articles published are here: “1. Hokkaido,” January 4, 1990, “2. Okinawa, Japan,” January 9, 1990, “3. Hot Yai, Thailand,” January 1990, “4. Papua New Guinea,” January 24,

conference on “Women and Culture of Tourism” hosted by KCWU in April 1988. Her individual effort and meeting with a women’s organization prepared herself to introduce the forgotten ‘comfort women’ issue to Korea as well as the world.

Even before the establishment of the Korean Council and its first Wednesday Demonstration, KCWU was actively engaged in the ‘comfort women’ issue as early as 1988. It created “Research Committee on ‘comfort women’” in July 1988. KCWU sent letters to those people who were responsible for resolving the ‘comfort women’ issue, released public statements when Korean President and Japanese Prime Minister met or the ‘comfort women’ issue was raised in the Japanese House of the Councilors, and played most important role in establishing the Korean Council.

KCWU created some patterns in the movements with long-term influence, as now it is common to see multiple important social movement groups issue statements or organize a demonstration and demanding resolution of past history issues whenever Japanese Prime Minister or Ministers visited Korea. Before the democratization of Korea, especially when Japan announced that they would change some expressions regarding Japanese wrongdoing during World War II, as described on their middle school history textbooks, only Korean government reacted furiously against Tokyo and only some government endorsed social organizations protested it. With the democratization, the history issue between Korea and Japan became one of the hottest issues to many social movement groups. KCWU was one of the leading groups to protest the Japanese government to resolve the history issue, particularly the ‘comfort women’ issue.

Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe (2004) (henceforth HJMDH (2004)) provides not only the statements released on the Wednesday Demonstrations but also the letters and statements before the 1st Wednesday Demonstration.¹⁴⁶ In this section, therefore, I used 7

1990.

¹⁴⁶ But it also should be mentioned that large part of the statements announced during the first few years of the Demonstration is not available on HJMDH (2004). For example, there are only 37 statements are available from the 1st to the 100th Demonstration, 48 available from the 101th to the 200th, and only 30 available from the 201th to 300th. Only 13 statements are missing from 301th to 400th.

letters and statements issued by KWCU on ‘comfort women’.¹⁴⁷ The partial statements and letters that are not on HJMDH (2004) can be found as news articles reporting the protest of the movement groups.

6.4.1.1 Statement on the KQED TV documentary

One of the first reactions from any organization regarding the ‘comfort women’ issue reported in Korean media is KCWU’s reaction to a local PBS network in the U. S.¹⁴⁸ KCWU released a statement to the KQED-TV, a PBS branch in Northern California, which aired a TV Showed called *World at War*,¹⁴⁹ containing an interview of a former officer of Japanese Army, stating, “Korean ‘comfort women’ volunteered for great victory of the Japanese Empire risking their lives and slept with the soldiers to comfort them..... Who else other than Korean women can comfort young men with risking their lives by volunteering to come to the battlegrounds in the dangerous jungle?”¹⁵⁰ KCWU sent letters to the officer asking 9 questions regarding this

¹⁴⁷ These are the titles of the letters and statements: “Statements against the mention regarding ‘comfort women’ in *World on War* aired on KQED-TV on May 22 1988,” (HJMDH 2004, 457); “Women’s Position on the President Roh Tae-woo’s visit to Japan,” May 18 1990 (HJMDH 2004, 459); “Letter to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu,” Oct 17 1990 (HJMDH 2004, 460-61); “Letter to President Roh Tae-woo,” Oct 17 1990 (HJMDH 2004, 462-63); “Letter to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu II, III,” Dec 19 1990 (HJMDH 2004, 464); “Women’s Position on ‘comfort women’ Issue before the Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu’s Visit to Korea,” January 8 1991 (HJMDH 2004, 465)

¹⁴⁸ The letter to KQED is signed by the women’s organizations in several churches including the Salvation Army Korea Territory (SAKT), the Korean Methodist Church (KMC), the Lutheran Church in Korea (LCK), the Anglican Church of Korea (ACK), the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK), the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea [PCRK, more liberal Presbyterian Church organization than PCK], and Korea Evangelical Church (KEC). The letter must be written in Korean and translated into English and sent to the KQED but only Korean version of the letter is only available. At least in this version, the letter ends with the remark that “we strongly demand you to apology for your statement [in the documentary] through TV or other types of media” (457).

¹⁴⁹ As we will see it later again, the *World at War* is a documentary series, made by BBC in 1973-74. The episode that made Korean women’s movement groups upset was the 14th episode, “It’s A Lovely Day Tomorrow: Burma (1942–1944),” which deals with the long and desperate battles of Burma that the British Royal Army defeated by Japanese Army in the jungle. The issued interview was in the episode to show how Japanese Army felt and entertained themselves in the jungle whereas British Army had suffered from the condition of the jungle in Burma. The statement and letter, therefore, seemed to send not to right person and in understandable purpose.

¹⁵⁰ Translated from “Protest letter on the statement regarding ‘comfort women’ on the TV show “*World in War*,” KQED-TV, May 30 1988, HJMDH (2004, 457).

interview.¹⁵¹ In the statement, which can only be found on HJMDH (2004), the framing strategy of KCWU is full of rhetoric used by nationalists. For example, they define ‘comfort women’ (of course, they used the term ‘voluntary corps’) “as one of the most crucial policies aiming at obliteration of our nation, it is unprecedented inhumane act to forcefully draft chaste women in our land to use them as sperm spittoons” (457).¹⁵² Kim (2006) argues that the definition of the ‘comfort women’ on this statement is haunted by nationalism as the author sees the ‘women’ issues as one part of the ‘nationalist’ issue, when the statement defines the ‘comfort women’ policy as an example of the ‘obliteration of Korean nation.’ This kind of perspective, as argued, set dichotomy of Japan vs. Korea or perpetrators vs. victims, which masks the particularly precarious status of the victims who were the weakest in every dimension of social stratifications.

Although the letter was written and signed by women’s organizations, it is interesting that they are still embraced by the ‘chastity’ discourse. As Yang points out,

Chastity as a notion circulates and works in powerful ways. By applying only to the women, and thus establishing a double standard of sexual conduct, the ideal of chastity plays a critical role in regulating women’s sexuality. Chastity involves not virginity as such, but rather that there is always a proper place where female sexuality *belongs* (Yang 1998, 131).

These highly paternalistic and nationalistic terms like ‘chaste,’ ‘our land’ or ‘sperm spittoons,’ are rarely found in the recent statements written by the Korean Council; but in the late 1980s, we can observe that the women’s movement groups were still adopting almost identical rhetoric and logic used by nationalists on male subjects.

¹⁵¹ “KQED, a TV network in LA Reports Distorted Voluntary Corps, Statement and Public Letter from KCWU,” the Hankyoreh, June 1, 1988. Some facts mentioned in the report are not found on the statement. For example, there is no mention about remake of the documentary on the statement. The statement on HJMDH (2004) is more likely a letter to the Japanese former officer in the documentary.

¹⁵² This phrase, “as one of the most crucial policies aiming at eradication of our nation, it is unprecedented inhumane act to forcefully draft chaste women in our land to use them as sperm spittoons,” is repeatedly used on many statements, especially released in the first few years of the movement with a little variation.

By emphasizing the atrocities as crimes against the ‘Korean nation and its chaste women,’ the ‘comfort women’ issue also lost context outside Korea. Until the early stage of the movements, the ‘comfort women’ issue had been conceived online in the context of historical and colonial relations between Japan and Korea. Imagining the ‘comfort women’ system as a policy of controlling sexuality during the war by the Japanese militarized government or the violence against women during the war seemed impossible.

It is clear that the writers of the letter see the ‘comfort women’ issue as merely a colonial problem. The problem, as they diagnosed, is that the man who had interviewed “still was conjured up with the bad spirit of the ‘Great Japanese Empire,’ which reflects the desire of Japan’s constant distortion of history.” Their diagnosis of the problem resonates the Manichean official nationalist narrative. As we review in the later sections, many of the metaphors and synecdoche were used in this letter; for example, “chaste women of our land,” “daughters of our land,” “sperm spittoon for Japanese soldiers,” and “public bathroom of Japanese soldiers” are repeatedly used to denote the victims and to describe the crimes in the earlier days of the movements.

Definition	One of the most crucial policies aiming at the obliteration of our nation, it is an unprecedented inhumane act to forcefully draft chaste women in our land to use them as sperm spittoons
Diagnostic frame	Desire to revive the Japanese imperialism Japan’s constant distortion of history
Prognostic frame	Former Japanese military officer to apologize for his mention
Motivational frame	n/a

Table 8 Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames used on the statement on KQED TV documentary (May 30 1988)

In the letter, the authors identify themselves as “Korean Christian women, who confess Jesus Christ as our savior, and mothers who bear and raise children and proud daughters of Korean nation;” and this will become one of the important elements of ‘comfort women’ movements later. These three categories of subject, Christian, women (and mothers), and daughters (or

members) of the Korean nation, will become competing strategies of the different movement groups that have engaged in the movements.

6.4.1.2 *Statement on Hirohito's funeral*

KWCU issued a statement on the death of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito condemning that Hirohito was responsible for the war and war crimes that Japan committed and demanding Emperor Akihito and Japanese people to resolve the history issue and to eradicate the policy regulating the status of Korean-Japanese in Japan.¹⁵³ As the Korean government decided to send the Prime Minister to pay the respect for the Hirohito's funeral, various organizations protested it. Church organizations, including the Korean National Council of Churches (henceforth KNCC), KWCU, Seoul YMCA and Women Christian's Association of PCRK issued statements.¹⁵⁴ Korean Women's Association United (henceforth KWAU), which is the main organization of various women's organizations in Korea, along with various social movement groups, also released a statement arguing that it was unacceptable to send a delegation to the funeral of the war criminal King¹⁵⁵ Hirohito, and to take him as a victim of the colonial rule in his reign.¹⁵⁶

The alliances with the women's organizations other than church organizations began to act from the announcement of a statement regarding the issues related to Korean-Japan relation several days before the President Roh's visit to Japan on May 24, 1990.¹⁵⁷ The statement is important both in the history of the movements and later development of the 'comfort women'

¹⁵³ ““Japanese Government Should Apologize for the Tragedy of 200,000 Voluntary Corps, KWCU of 7 Bodies of Churches Issued a Statement on ‘Four Demands,’” the *Chosun*, Jan 24, 1989.

¹⁵⁴ “Object on Sending Delegation to Hirohito's Funeral,” the *Hankyoreh*, February 19, 1989.

¹⁵⁵ In Korea, the term Japanese Emperor (*ilbon cheonhwang*) is often avoided and all the official documents and most of the public media use the term Japanese King (*ilwang*) as a way of protesting the core political system of the colonial rule.

¹⁵⁶ “Protest against Sending PM to Hirohito's Funeral, Students and Women's Organizations Hold Demonstrations and Released Statements,” the *Hankyoreh*, February 23, 1989.

¹⁵⁷ The statement released on May 18, several days before President Roh's visit to Japan was signed by the KWCU, the KWAU, and the Council of University Women Students Representatives (CUWSR). It is the alliance of Women's organizations in Churches, Women's movements and student movements.

issue. First, the alliance of a variety of women's organizations became the backbone of the 'comfort women' movement. The expansion of the movements – individual researcher met women's organizations in the different church bodies and entered an alliance with other women's movement organization – can explain the resilience of the movements. Second, the pressure from the women's organization on the President's visit to Japan brought about chain reactions. Initiated by the women's organizations and amplified by the media, the President made an official inquiry regarding the victims of the colonial rule especially during World War II, including 'comfort women.' Later in June 1990, a member of the Japanese House of the Councilors from the socialist party, Motooka Shoji, demanded an official investigation on 'comfort women' during the budget committee session. A director of the Ministry of Labor replied to Motooka that the government cannot investigate the matter since 'comfort women' during the wartime were brought to military camp by the private operators. It generated the furious reactions from the women's organizations in Korea which wrote public letters to the Japanese Prime Minister and Korean President. The further development of the 'comfort women' issue in Japan and Korea were the reactions to the letters from the Japanese and Korean governments as well as the establishment of the Korean Council in November 1990.¹⁵⁸

The statement is important because the style, rhetoric, logic, and frames used have been taken as the original format of the ongoing statements for 24 years. For instance, the authors define 'comfort women' (though they use the term 'voluntary corps') as "the atrocious crime by Japan unprecedented in the world and the vicious infringement on human rights of women" (HJMDH 2004, 459). Unlike the definition in the former statement from KQED TV, which can be criticized as too nationalistic, the authors do not use the expressions reminding of nationalist sentiment on this letter. The hint of nationalist sentiment, however, can be found in the following sentence while they state that "as it can be seen in the *gisaeng* tourism, Japan's sexual plundering of Korean women continues" (459). It may be fair to say that, even though the women's organization in the late 1980s and the early 1990s were strongly influenced by nationalist discourse, which was dominant in Korean society in that time, they consciously tried to avoid

¹⁵⁸ Yoon (2010) provides this narrative, which is well reflected in the chronology table of movement for 'comfort women' on the Korean Council website and HJMDH (2004). Soh (2008, 63-64) also offers similar narrative.

those terms. As early as May 1990, the ‘comfort women’ movement groups intentionally phrased the term adopting human rights discourse rather than nationalist cliché attempting to describe and define ‘comfort women’.

Definition	The atrocious crime by Japan unprecedented in the world and the vicious infringement on human rights of women.
Diagnostic frame	Japan’s scheme to reinvade Korea militarily, economically and culturally Japan’s refuse to accept the responsibility of the war Precarious status of Korean-Japanese Japan’s despicable concealment of the evidence on ‘comfort women’ Korean government’s lack of autonomous in the relation with Japan
Prognostic frame	Stop the invasion Official and documented apology on the crimes Eradication of the fingerprinting of Korean-Japanese Japanese government to investigate on ‘comfort women’ and give apology Korean government to resolve ‘comfort women’, status of Korean-Japanese and war reparation with nationalist and autonomous position
Motivational frame	To restore pride of our nation and women To console the spirit of the sacrificed women

Table 9 Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames used on the statement on Emperor Hirohito’s funeral

The general tone of the statement, however, is rebuking both the Japanese and Korean governments. For the Japanese government, they argue that the recent movements of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) confirmed by the Japanese government are planning neo-militarism. As a diagnosis, they claim that Japan is now planning to invade Korea again by the military, the economy, and culture. Also, the Japanese government would not apologize for their responsibility of the war; and the status of Korean-Japanese in Japan are still precarious. Furthermore, Japan has tried to cover the evidence of the operation of ‘comfort women’ stations. The problems cannot be solved, as emphasize by them, until the Korean government can establish autonomous diplomacy with Japan. The women’s organizations provided prognosis frames, and suggest precondition of the fair diplomatic relation between Korea and Japan. First, they claim that Japan needs to stop considering invading Korea militaristically, economically, and culturally. They also demand Japanese government to publicly apologize and document it

and to eradicate the fingerprinting of Korean-Japanese. They also request Japan to stop covering up the evidence of ‘comfort women’ and to investigate and apologize. This statement suggests that ‘comfort women’ movement groups not only blame and demand Korean government but also urge the conscious Japanese people to do something to resolve the crimes that the Japanese government committed.

In the motivational frames, ‘pride’ still plays an important role. They declare that “we feel a historical responsibility to probe the truth of the ‘comfort women’ in order to revive pride of our nation and women as well as to console the spirits of bitterly sacrificed souls.” The ‘national pride’ is one of the favorite terms in nationalist discourse. Though the definition of ‘comfort women’ above refuses to use nationalist rhetoric, the whole logical structure of the statement is following nationalist discourse: if the Korean government can resolve the issues regarding colonial rule with Japan, the pride of victims and, therefore, the whole Korean nation will be restored. This is why the ‘national pride’ discourse is often dangerous. It reduces the individual sufferings and harms to abstract national pride and the national pride often comes ahead of the individual sufferings and harms.

6.4.1.3 The letter to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and President Roh

An answer of a question asked in the Japanese House of the Councilors ignited furies of the women’s organizations in South Korea. An officer of Japanese government confirmed that ‘comfort station’ was operated not by the government but by private entrepreneurs, which ignited the women’s organizations to act for the ‘comfort women’ issue. First, they wrote two letters to the Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Korean President Roh Tae-woo respectively. The definition of ‘comfort women’ on each letter is slightly different. In the letter to the Prime Minister, it states that “during the war Japan did the inhumane deed and committed sin by using many young women of Joseon as tools for taking care of the sexual desire of the Japanese soldiers deceiving and forcedly bring them” (HJMDH 2004, 460). The letter to President Roh, signed on the same day with the letter to the Japanese Prime Minister, defines the ‘comfort women’ as “one of the most atrocious policies to obliterate Korean nation, unprecedented inhumane action that forcedly drafted and walked off the women in our land to use them as tools

to comfort Japanese soldiers” (HJMDH 2004, 462). Despite the slight differences in those two definitions, it contains three similar cores to constitute the ‘comfort women’ discourse in the early stages in a nationalist sense. The first core considers that the issue is one part of the Japanese policy to obliterate the Korean nation. The second core indicates that the ‘comfort women’ were forcibly drafted and partly deceived. This core is the center of the ‘comfort women’ discourse especially in the initial stage of the movements; and many critics of the nationalist aspect of the movement groups ‘comfort women’ criticize that this core is almost fiction. The third core indicates that Korean women were used as sexual tools for the Japanese military. This core focuses on the nature of the victim which is also criticized by various commentators.

It is worth noting that in these letters, the authors intentionally used the term *wianbu* instead of *jeongsindae* to denote ‘comfort women.’ Except these letters, almost all other documents call the ‘comfort women’ *jeongsindae* around this time. They probably did this because Motooka Shoji used the term *jugun ianfu* in the House of the Councilors to denote ‘comfort women.’ This led them to distinguish *jeongsindae* from *wianbu* and confirmed the common belief that most of the ‘comfort women’ were conscripted as voluntary corps.

..... But the part of the truth [of the ‘comfort women’] are revealing thanks to some brave testimonies and the evidence left.

In them, there is a testimony from the person who are responsible for mobilization in the Patriotic Labor Service Association, stating that he conscripted Joseon women in Jeju island and Shimonoseki, following the order by the Japanese military under immediate control of the ‘emperor’ for mobilizing ‘Women Voluntary Corps of Joseon People’ to use them as ‘comfort women’.

According to the above testimony and the stories of the former ‘comfort women’, Joseon women had to work as ‘comfort women’ in the military comfort stations set up in various battlefields deceived to be conscripted as ‘women voluntary corps’ or merely as a worker or hunted like an animal while they were working on the field. If those force conscriptions were not documented as part of the total mobilization, then it is nothing but the evidence that Japanese military tried to cover up their atrocities.

According to the military doctors in that time, the management of comfort station – to set up the rules for comfort station and test for STDs – were done by the Japanese military. Above all, the ones who used the comfort stations were the Japanese soldiers and this crime should be

condemned. (HJMDH 2004, 460)

It has been confirmed that the testimony of the Japanese officer quoted in the above statement has no ground,¹⁵⁹ but the narrative suggested above are the basic structure of all other discourse around ‘comfort women’ in the early 1990s. Even if we consent that the way they recruited ‘comfort women’ was somewhat unfair, the other crucial part of the narrative – the comfort station was regulated directly by the Japanese military and most of the women were forcedly drafted –is still powerful in the ‘comfort women’ discourse.

The letters were signed by 39 women and Christian organizations, which are almost identical with the member organizations of the Korean Council. Since the letters were motivated by the official denial of the Japanese government of drafting ‘comfort women’ in the House of the Councilors, the diagnostic frames in the letters are naturally the evidence destroyed by the Japanese military, the insincere attitude of the Japanese government for the responsibility of the war, and the social prejudice against ‘comfort women.’ The prognostic frames are different in two letters but it is worth noting that the original forms of the Six Demands and the prognostic frames often used towards Korean government are all first made in these letters. On the letter to Japanese Prime Minister, we can find the first Six Demands. These Six Demands are found again on the statement released right before the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Korea on January 8, 1991, and the statement issued on the 1st Wednesday Demonstration. To President Roh, the authors of the letter presented Five Demands: “1) We should get an apology from Japan who trampled upon Korean women as military ‘comfort women’ in the name of voluntary corps. 2) The Korean government should actively seek for the truth of voluntary corps issue. 3) The

¹⁵⁹ Details of the Yoshida Seiji’s confessional book on conscription of ‘comfort women’ like “slave hunting” and how it had been debunked can be found Soh (2008, 152-155). Soh argues that the ‘comfort women’ movement groups argument that all the ‘comfort women’ were deceived as voluntary corps has no ground because it is based on Yoshida’s fiction but it is far from the true. As it is shown above, the initial period of movement Yoshida’s book played important role but when the movements are developing the activists and researchers do not dependent on his book, since there are many testimonies from the ‘comfort women’ survivors and other evidences that there were cases some ‘comfort women’ were conscripted as voluntary corps. As we will see later, only in the initial part, the movement groups emphasized it but also the leaders of the movement groups were the first people who dispute the common belief that voluntary corps are ‘comfort women’.

Korean government should build a memorial monument and do the best to get the compensation from Japan for the voluntary corps. If a victim is dead, the compensation should be granted to the bereaved family. 4) In order to achieve these, the Korean-Japanese relations that have been unfair and somewhat humiliating should be transformed to autonomous and fair diplomacy. 5) The Korean government should make Japan correct the distortion in their history in Korea and we should also write about voluntary corps in our history” (HJMDH 2004, 463).

The motivational frame of the letters is interesting. A motivational frame presents only in the letter to the Japanese Prime Minister arguing that their demands should be accepted to make “Japan become a democratic country that has true moral and free from those sins” (HJMDH 2004, 461). It shows that the nationalist frame is still strong for the leaders of the movements. As we have seen before in the initial stage of the movements until the early 1990s, motivational frames are often confined to either to revive the Korean nation or to make Japan a better nation. After the movements met the international supporters and alliances, the frames break through the nationalist imagination.

Definition	One of the most atrocious policies of the obliteration of the Korean nation, unprecedented inhumane action that forcedly drafted and detained the women in our land to use them as tools to comfort Japanese soldiers
Diagnostic frame	Japanese government’s denial on the operation of comfort stations Japan’s concealment of the evidence and unwillingness to find the truth Social prejudice on ‘comfort women’
Prognostic frame	Japanese government should admit the forcedly drafted Joseon women as military ‘comfort women’ [Japanese government should] apologize about it [Japanese government should] reveal the full account of it by itself [Japanese government should] build memorial monument for the victims [Japanese government should] compensate the survivors and the bereaved family [Japanese government should] teach it in the history education not to commit such crimes
Motivational frame	Japanese government to become democratic country that has true moral and free from the past sins

Table 10 Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames used on the letter to the Prime Minister Kaifu (Oct 17, 1990)

The Japanese government did not give any replies to their letter. The women’s movement groups sent two more letters to the Prime Minister of Japan to urge the answer to their letter. Those two letters are much shorter and simple, but the second letter, which is much longer than the first one, adds, “if you do not reply this letter we are considering to ally with the women’s organizations all over the world that are fighting for justice and human rights and to protest against Japanese government for their atrocities committed past to present” (HJMDH 2004, 464). On the letter sent to President Roh before he visited Japan (HJMDH 2004, 459), it mentions appeals to the conscience groups in Japan; and it was the first time for the movement groups ‘comfort women’ to state that they need to make an alliance with the organizations outside Korea and Japan. What they were thinking about while they wrote that letter was unknown, but the later progress of the movements confirms that their consideration on the international alliance was in the correct direction.

Definition	During the war, Japan did inhumane deed and committed sin by using many young women of Joseon deceived and forcedly brought as tools for taking care of the sexual desire of the Japanese soldiers
Diagnostic frame	Japanese government’s denial on the operation of comfort stations Korean government’s ignorance and incompetence
Prognostic frame	we should get an apology from Japan Korean government should seek for truth on ‘comfort women’ Korean government to build a memorial monument and get compensation from Japan Korean Japanese relation should be in fair and autonomous Korean government makes Japan correct their history and Koreans also learn voluntary corps in history
Motivational frame	n/a

Table 11 Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames used on the letter to President Roh (Oct 17 1990)

6.4.1.4 *Statement on Kaifu’s visit to Korea*

Prime Minister Kaifu visited Korea to have summit talk with then President Roh on January 9, 1991. He was the third Japanese Prime Minister who visited Korea after the two countries concluded the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and Republic of Korea in 1965. With

this visit, the protest from the social organizations against Japanese Prime Minister to demand resolving the history issue became somewhat a reflexive action.¹⁶⁰ After the Korean Council was established on November 16, 1990, during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister who didn't answer their public letters, they organized a protest about the ignorance and unwillingness of the Japanese government to resolve the 'comfort women' issue. They read a statement at the Pagoda Park (currently *Tapgol* Park) and marched through *Jongno*.¹⁶¹ On the statement, 'comfort women' are defined as the "unprecedented crimes in human history committed by Japan, they were called as the 'gift' from the Japanese king to the 'emperor's army'¹⁶² and treated as 'public toilet' in the battlefield." Since the statement is the reconfirmation of the letter sent to Prime Minister Kaifu in October, the statement itself has no new information or frames. It just briefly summarizes what happened so far and urges the Prime Minister to take actions to their letters including the Six Demands. It adds their manifestation to make alliances of all the organizations that work for justice and human rights all over the world again.

The protest, however, is meaningful since it was the one of the earliest forms of the Wednesday Demonstration. Though it was not Wednesday and not in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, they began to form a demonstration with all the participating organizations. As many other demonstrations in that time, they began their rally at the Pagoda Park and

¹⁶⁰ Whereas the visit of Japanese Prime Minister or the family of the emperor routinely leads to abrupt protests from various civil organizations to demand the appropriate apology and the compensation for the victims, it was uncommon before the democratization in Korea. When the former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Korea in January 1983, we can only find a statement from the Bereaved Family of Patriot Martyrs that demands Japanese government to apologize on the invasion of Korea. "Bereaved Family of Patriot Martyrs demands concrete apology on Japan's Invasion," *Donga Ilbo*, Jan 11, 1983. Before he visited Korea again in 1986 to attend the Asian Game, the opposition party released a statement to oppose the visit and the Human Rights Commissions for Koreans in Japan of the National Council of Churches in Korea wrote a letter and handed to Japanese Embassy. As many political organizations created after the democracy, the protest against the visiting of the Japanese Prime Ministers are increasingly visible. Noboru Takeshima visited Korea twice before Kaifu did but his visit was with other important international guests in the Presidential Inauguration Ceremony and 1988 World Olympic Games. It was the first time that many social movement groups were voluntarily mobilized, protested against the visit and demanded apology for the atrocities during the colonial rule around the time Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Korea.

¹⁶¹ "Opposition to Kaifu's Visit Spreads," the Chosun, January 9, 1991; "Demands Compensation and Apology for Voluntary Corps, 8 Women's Organizations," the Hankyoreh, January 9, 1991.

¹⁶² The reason I mentioned earlier, Japanese Emperor is called as 'king' so the other term *hwanggun* [emperor's military] soon conflicted in meaning.

marched to the *Jongno*. It is only a year later, they began the current form of Wednesday Demonstration on January 9, 1992.

Definition	Unprecedented crimes in human history committed by Japan, they were called as the ‘gift’ from the Japanese king [emperor] to the ‘emperor’s army’ and treated as ‘public toilet’ in the battlefield.
Diagnostic frame	n/a
Prognostic frame	- Admittance - Apology - Investigation - Memorial monument - Compensation - Teaching in History
Motivational frame	n/a

Table 12 Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames on the statement on Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu’s visit (January 8 1990)

6.4.1.5 Conclusion

To summarize, the atypical period of the ‘comfort women’ movements is crucial in the development of the movements since it shows many potentials before the discursive strategies and frames used were developed into certain forms. Also, many of the basic features of the movements – such as the organizational form, the way to define ‘comfort women’ and describe their ordeals, the core demands to the Japanese and Korean government, and even the initial form of Wednesday Demonstration – were coined in this period.

In the above section, I briefly mentioned the discursive strategies that the movement groups adopted which can be found most often in the progress of the movements. First, the nationalist narrative and human rights narrative of the ‘comfort women’ are both found in the statements and letters of the movement groups. As shown in Table 7 above, the very typical narrative of ‘comfort women’ is made in this period, as “innocent women [girls, daughters, or grandmothers] of Joseon [or Korea] were forcedly recruited or deceived with the offers of works in voluntary corps and Japanese military used them as “sperm spittoons,” “public toilet,” or “tools to comfort sexual desire” of Japanese soldiers,” and therefore it is one of the most “atrocious crimes that was unprecedented in human [or world] history,” which was the “part of

the policy of obliterating Korean nation [*minjok malsal jeongchaek*].” This is a recurring narrative of ‘comfort women’, which can be found in many forms of discourses on ‘comfort women’. Even though it was a very early stage of the movements, when the nationalist sentiment was dominant in larger society, it is worth noting that the earlier version of the narrative of ‘comfort women’ viewing under the human rights perspective can be also found.

Definition	Nationalist narrative	Innocent women of Joseon were forcedly recruited or deceived with offers to work as voluntary corps Japanese military used them as “sperm spittoons,” “public toilet,” “tools to comfort sexual desire” of Japanese soldiers Atrocious crime that was unprecedented in human [world] history Part of the policy of obliterating Korean nation
	Human rights narrative	Unprecedented crimes in human history Infringement of human rights of women
Diagnostic Frames	Japan	Reluctance to resolve issue <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - concealment of evidence - denial of the operation of comfort stations - refusal of accepting the responsibility - constant distortion of history Revival of Japanese imperialism [militarism] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reinvasion of Korea
	Korea	Precarious Japanese-Korean relation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - lack of autonomy in diplomacy Social prejudice on ‘comfort women’ Government’s ignorance and incompetence
Prognostic frames	Japan	Six Demands: admittance, investigation, apology, compensation, building a monument, and history education Give up the imperial desire Eradication of the fingerprinting
	Korea	Resolve the issue with Japan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Be fair and autonomous in diplomacy - Seek for truth - Get compensation from Japanese government - Make Japan to correct history Build memorial monument
	Korean People	n/a
Motivational frames	Japan	To become democratic country that has true moral and free from the past sins
	Korea	To restore pride of Korean nation and women To console the spirit of the sacrificed women

Table 13. Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames that are used in the statements and letters before the 1st Wednesday Demonstration.

Second, diagnostic frames are mainly targeting the Japanese government but partly directed to the Korean government. Two main themes can be found in the diagnostic frames targeting the Japanese government: the first one is the Japanese government’s unwillingness to resolve the issue, including its concealment of evidence, denial of operation of comfort stations, refusal of accepting the responsibility and the distortion of history. The other one is concerning with the revival of imperialism in Japan. Until recently, the reluctance of the Japanese government to resolve the issue is the central target of the movement groups. It is worth pointing out that the statements and letters criticize the Korean government’s lack of autonomy in the relation with Japan. With the concern of the Japanese government’s returning to imperialism, the suspicion that Korean government is somewhat subordinated to the Japanese government is based on post-colonial sentiment.

Third, prognostic frames are formed in this period and have rarely changed over the years. The Seven Demands, including admittance, investigation, apology, compensation, building monument, and history education, were made in this period. The concern on the revival of militarism and eradication of fingerprinting of Korean-Japanese were also included in prognostic frames in this period. Additionally, they demanded Korean government to do their best to resolve the issue.

Finally, motivational frames are nationalistic, especially when the authors of the statements and letters believed that the successful movements will bring about restoration of the pride of the Korean nation. Again, those statements and letters are simultaneously based on human rights discourse, and they emphasize that the successful movements will console the spirit of the sacrificed women. Whether the statements focus on collective Korean nation or the individual victims will indicate if they appeal to Korean nation based on nationalism or more on universal human rights.

6.4.2 Formative Period: The 1st –The 148th Wednesday Demonstration (Jan/8/1992- Dec/28/1994)

The first testimony of the former ‘comfort women’ made a great turning point in the movements for ‘comfort women.’ The Korean Council sent delegates to the United Nations Human Rights Council to report and request an investigation on the ‘comfort women’ case;¹⁶³ opened a ‘hotline’ for registering the survivors and receiving any information on ‘comfort women,’¹⁶⁴ sent request to Korean government to investigate the current status of the ‘comfort women’ survivors; organized international network for ‘comfort women’ issue; held international symposium on Peace in Asia and Women’s Role in Seoul; participated in a lawsuit against the Japanese government to claim the compensation to the former Korean military, military employers and ‘comfort women’; organized national network for the lawsuit against Japan, and held the 1st Wednesday Demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy on January 8 1992. These actions happened five months after Kim Hak-sun, a ‘comfort women’ survivor, held a press conference to testify her suffering on August 14, 1991.

Until then, though many people knew about the existence of ‘comfort women,’ the detail that they went through were basically unknown. Everything existed as a rumor. It had been abstract until a victim’s voice was heard, alive. Movements for ‘comfort women’ gained immediate impetus from the demonstration. As mentioned above, they began to find more survivors, more evidence, and supporters in and outside of Korea.

Below is the statement that was read during the demonstration, which has not been changed since the letter to the Prime Minister Kaifu, sent on October 17, 1990.

We, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, today clarify below as we hold the first weekly Wednesday Demonstration from today, January 8,

¹⁶³ Expansion to transnational movement in this time was not premeditated or skillfully designed. Not knowing the UNHRC is located in Genève, they initially plan to send someone to New York. From the interview with Kim Dong Hui.

¹⁶⁴ This helped them to locate the survivors and to make it possible to document their testimonies. Also it also lead another survivors made the public testimony (Yoon 2010) and participate redress movements.

1992.

Ever since 36 women's associations officially established our organization on November 16, 1990, we keep demanding the Six Requests to the Japanese government to solve 'comfort women' issue. But the Japanese government has not offered responsible answer yet and even addresses irresponsible and reckless remarks that it is difficult to deal with. The Korean Council is furious with this reaction and declares that we will fight until the Six Requests are fully accomplished.

1. The Japanese government should admit that it drafted women of *Joseon* as 'comfort women' with force.

1. [Japanese government should] make a public apology for that.

1. [Japanese government should] reveal the details of the atrocity.

1. [Japanese government should] build memorials for the victims.

1. [Japanese government should] compensate the victims and the bereaved families.

1. [Japanese government should] educate these facts in history class in order not to repeat those wrongdoings.

January 8, 1992

Park Sun-geum, Lee Hyojae, and Yun Jeong-ok

Co-representatives of the Korean Council

The above is the full text of the statement for the 1st Wednesday Demonstration. It contains the Six Demands to the Japanese government, which were first seen in the demonstration on the eve of Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's visit to Korea (HJMDH 2004, 460-61), and still are the core demands of the movement groups. The punishment of the war criminal is added to the Demands later. The table below analyzes the frames of this historical statement. It is worth noting that the statement for the 1st Wednesday Demonstration is rather a reconfirmation of the letter sent to the Prime Minister Kaifu earlier.

Diagnostic frame	Reluctance of Japanese government to resolve the issue
Prognostic frame	Six Demands: admittance, apologize, investigation, building a memorial, compensation, and education in school
Motivational frame	Japan not to repeat the wrongdoings

Table 14 Frame Analysis on the statement for the 1st Wednesday Demonstration (January 8, 1992)

First, it is clear that the leaders of the movement initially saw that the Japanese government is the one who caused the problems; and the only one that could solve it. This comes from their view that the agonies of the victims are mainly the products of colonialism. In the initial phase of the movement, even the leaders of the movement did not seem to understand the complexity underneath the ‘comfort women’ issue and saw it in a rather simpler way. Many confessed that they learned this complexity while they were promoting the movements. This is how they recognized that the biggest problem is the unwillingness of Japanese government to provide any means of resolution. They made many attempts to link with international organizations and to make an alliance with people and organizations in other countries; but the statement did not reflex those activities yet. Instead of an appeal to alliances or the people outside in Korea or Japan, they presented themselves to fight the lonely fight against Japanese government at this time. The statement is directed only to the Japanese government.¹⁶⁵

Though it is not mentioned in the frame analysis, it is also interesting that they defined the victims as *Joseonin yeoseong*, literally means ‘the women of *Joseon* dynasty.’ At the beginning of the movement, it was obvious that the action was aiming only at the Japanese government and the speakers were only representing the Korean victims.¹⁶⁶

6.4.2.1 *Formative period*

From the first to the 100th Demonstration, many occasions and events occurred that affected the dynamics of actors surrounding the issue until the 148th Demonstration. This was the most important period of the movements.

First, after the first testimony of the ‘comfort women’ survivor, there had been many efforts to discover historical evidence on recruiting and operation of the ‘comfort stations.’

¹⁶⁵ Unlike most of the statements are ended with the name(s) of the organization that drafted each statement, this first statement is ended with the names of the co-representatives.

¹⁶⁶ Though it is not often pointed out in Korean literature, the term *Joseonin Yeoseong* also reflect dominant nationalism. It is manifestation that their strong belief in the continuity of Joseon and the Republic of Korea. Alexis Dudden (2008) points out that Korean’s unconditional assuming of this continuity has no ground in her discussion on the dokdo/takeshima issue.

Historians,¹⁶⁷ government officials,¹⁶⁸ journalists,¹⁶⁹ researchers¹⁷⁰ and activists¹⁷¹ located and uncovered many important documents that confirm the imperial Japan's engagement in the recruitment and operation of 'comfort women,' and gathered testimonies of the survivors, people who were engaged in the operational process, and the witnesses.¹⁷² A book published almost 15 years ago was rediscovered and reported as the evidence of the Japanese government's involvement in military comfort system.¹⁷³ Finding the truth about military comfort system might not be the essential part of the movement groups because the interpretation of the facts is always more important than just knowing the truth (Seo 2008b; Ueno 1999). Still, the ongoing endeavors of finding the evidence on the military comfort system have helped movement groups from providing profound ground to its utilization. The Japanese government's investigation on 'comfort women' for a year and eight months was also concluded and the results were released as the so-called "Kono statement" on August 4, 1993. The Kono statement is important in the

¹⁶⁷ Most renowned work is Yoshimi (1992). He first found official documents in the Library of the National Institute for Defense Studies that shows Japanese government directly involved in the regulation and supervising comfort system including the recruitment of 'comfort women'. "Government and Military Engaged in Voluntary Corps, First Discovery of Japan's Official Documents," the Chosun, January 12, 1992.

¹⁶⁸ "Japanese Government Forcedly Conscripted Voluntary Corps, US Official Documents Confirms It Discovered," the Chosun, December 21, 1991, reports on the US Korean Embassy's discovery of the official documents in the US National Archive. Japanese government also announced that they will investigate the operation of 'comfort women'. "Japanese Government Plan to Investigate 'Voluntary Corps, Says Chief Cabinet Secretariat Kato," the Hankyoreh, Dec 18, 1991.

¹⁶⁹ Hicks (1996)

¹⁷⁰ "Japanese Military Operates Voluntary Corps, First Discovery of a Public Document Made by US Military," the Chosun, November 29, 1991.

¹⁷¹ See Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe and Jeongsindae Yeon-guhoe (1993, 1997); Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe and Han-guk jeongsindae Yeon-guso (1999); Han-guk Jeongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe (2001); Han-guk Jeongsindae Munju Daechaek Hyeobuihoe, 2000 nyon Ilbongun Seong Noye Jeonbeom Yeoseong Gukje Beopjeong, and Han-guk Jeongsindae Yeon-guhoe (2001)

¹⁷² The activists and researchers also began to gather as many as testimonies from the survivors, and it marks the beginning of the field of feminist "oral history."

¹⁷³ In the article, "Discover of material on "Japanese Government's Engagement on Voluntary Corps," the Chosun, December 8, 1992, a correspondent in Tokyo reports that Yoshida (1977), which proves Patriotic Labor Service Association, which took charge of recruiting voluntary corps, was a branch of Japanese government. As the slavery hunting described in Yoshida (1977) has been discredited around 1992, though, many of his claims made in his book, were also discredited. Soh (2008, 152-155) discusses about Yoshida (1997; 1983) in detail and stubbornly.

history of ‘comfort women’ issue because it is the first document admitting the Japanese government’s engagement in the operation of comfort facilities.¹⁷⁴

The most dramatic truth seeking effort was that many Korean media found that Japan recruited elementary school girls as voluntary corps. As I explained above, most of the people, including the leaders of the movement groups, had believed that voluntary corps were ‘comfort women’, or more precisely, they used the term voluntary corps to denote the historical ‘comfort women’, which brought about furious anger from the people. As mentioned above, this also led criticism to the movement groups since some critics. For example, Soh (2008) argues that “one may suggest that the Korean usage of the term *chǒngshindae* to refer to ‘comfort women’ proved to be a sociopsychologically as well as a politically effective decision on the part of activists in order to highlight the deceptive and/or coercive methods used in the recruitment of Korean ‘comfort women’” (62), as if it was the activists who decided to call ‘comfort women’ as *jeongsindae* (or *chǒngshindae*).

As I examined earlier, it was not the activists who decided to use the term to refer to ‘comfort women’, but the people who used the term in that way from the 1950s. Also, critics on the activists for ‘comfort women’ often argue that it was the activists who spread the “assertion and belief that *all* Korean ‘comfort women’ were initially recruited as *chǒngshindae* and then taken to military comfort facilities” (Soh 2008, 62). However, among the 39 statements found on HJMDH (2004), which were used from the 1st to the 100th Demonstration, only one statement is asserting a similar claim that “*all* Korean ‘comfort women’ were initially recruited as *chǒngshindae* and then taken to military comfort facilities.” It was right after the ‘comfort women’ issue became sensational due to the revelation of the recruitment of elementary school student as voluntary corps, the activists who lead the movements didn’t utilize the term for their nationalist purpose.

¹⁷⁴ Though the Korean Council did not satisfy with the conclusion of the investigation because it does not reveal “who is responsible in decision making and operation, the exact scale of the comfort facilities and how they will handle the issue in the future” (HJMDH 2004, 52). The Korea Council maintains that their claim for thorough investigation on the ‘comfort women’ issue is not completed on that account. The official Japanese government’s position is still maintaining the conclusion of the Kono statement. But it is also on debate whether the “Kono statement” is admitting the use of coercion in recruitment and retention of women.

The statement with the similar assertion that all ‘comfort women’ were initially recruited as voluntary corps can be found on the statement for the 68th Wednesday Demonstration on April 28, 1993, which was hosted by the Korean Teachers and Education Worker’s Union (KTEWU).

Furthermore, as it was revealed in last year, the teacher could not even protest with their consciousness, when Japan mobilized every educational administrative organization to widely kidnap even young elementary school students to voluntary corps. Not only they could not contain it but also some of them led to assert to be Japanese loyal subject and to instigate students to go to the battlefield as soldiers and humiliating forced military ‘comfort women’ (HJMDH 2004, 41).

Only in this statement, the author implies that all the voluntary corps would finally end up with ‘comfort women’. KTEWU is one of the biggest organizations under the Korean Council; but it may not be the most important or leading organizations. Currently, all the major unions are under the Korean Council, but their direct participants seemed minimal. For instance, among the 370 statements available in HJMDH (2004), only four of them are written by the KTEWU.¹⁷⁵ It would be safe to say that KTEWU, therefore, represents the common knowledge of people who are more progressive than others, compared to the idea of the Korean Council. Except the KTEWU’s statement quoted above, all other statements in this period can hardly be considered agreeing with the idea that all the Korean ‘comfort women’ were initially recruited as voluntary corps, although most of them used the term voluntary corps to refer to ‘comfort women’.

Second, the Korean Council began to seek to connect with the other organizations, politicians, and activists, not only in Japan and South East Asia but also from international organizations, like UN and ILO. The need for international network started the initial stage of the movement. Before the first testimony, KCWU and the Japan Women’s Christian Temperance Union (henceforth JWCTU) had a loose connection to work on the ‘comfort women’ issue; and KCWU participated and organized some international conferences as a Christian organization. The motivation to launch the Korean Council was begun with the international conference hosted

¹⁷⁵ Including this statement, those are the statement for the 334th (HJMDH 2004, 206-207), for the 381th (HJMDH 2004, 252), and for the 421st (HJMDH 2004, 282).

by KCWU. During this period, Yun Jeong-ok presented her research on ‘comfort women’ to the symposium, Peace in Asia and Role of Women, held in Tokyo where the people from the women’s organizations in Japan, and South and North Korea participated on May 31 to June 1 1991. It led to the next Peace in Asia and Role of Women held in Seoul on November 26, 1991. It was the first time that the North Korean civil organizations visited the South after the division.

On the statement, as early as the statement for the 7th Wednesday Demonstration (Feb 26, 1992), the Korean Council firstly claims that it will “make alliance not only with the 36 organizations in our Council but also with all the organizations working for justice and human rights inside and outside Korea” (HJMDH 2004, 22). On August 10-11, 1992, the Korean Council organized the Asian Solidarity Forum on the ‘comfort women’ Issue with the participants from the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong and Japan. Since this forum, the ‘comfort women’ issue has been discussed as one part of women’s issues in various conferences; since then, the ‘comfort women’ issue became the main topic to deal with other issues.

One of the important outcomes of this forum was that people from different countries agreed to use the term ‘military sexual slavery by Japan’ to refer to ‘comfort women’. Although the term ‘comfort women’ and ‘sexual slave’ are interchangeably used in the literature; it was the first time that many agreed on breaking the euphemistic naming of the victims. In June 1993, the Korean Council sent delegates to a U. N. conference on Global Tribunal and Violations of Women’s Human Right. It held an Asia Women’s Forum on Military Sexual Slavery by Japan as a co-organization with the Asian Women Human Right Council in Philippines. Additionally, the Korean Council sent a proposal to investigate ‘comfort women’ issue to Human Rights Committee of the U. N. in March 1992.

The networking with other organizations inside and outside of the country is important in two ways. First, it helped the movement groups gain more media attention and outside pressure to the Japanese government. Keck and Sikkink (1998) call this “boomerang pattern of influence” – the detour of pressure that can bring about by the NGO’s connection with other international organizations (12-13). Second, as more important in terms of the concern of this dissertation, the connection with international organizations forced the movement for ‘comfort women’ to adjust their nationalist agenda. Some critics like Kim (2006) argue that movement groups for ‘comfort

women' only take the position to view the 'comfort women' issue "as sexual violence against women to appeal to the international alliance" (109).

Whatever the initial motivation was, the most commonly used sentimental, sensational, and sometimes patriarchal terms to denote the 'comfort women' victims and the atrocities regarding the military comfort system, such as "daughters (mothers, or grandmothers) of *Joseon* (or Korean nation)," "plucked flowers," "virgins of our nation," or "the cruelest atrocity perpetrated to Korean nation during the colonial period," had to be changed to appeal more people who do not share the furies from the Japanese colonial rule. Korean movement groups for 'comfort women', therefore, had to adjust themselves to three different levels: nationalism, feminism, and colonialism.

It seems that the expressions used in the initial part of the movements were heavily influenced by the nationalist discourse. It may result from the fact that the robust nation-building tools created through the Park Chung-hee regime and following military dictatorship, which made dissidents difficult to escape from the nationalist discourses. For the movement groups for 'comfort women,' however, it was not taken too long to realize how their expressions and demands were contaminated by nationalist discourse since they need to expand their movement internationally. They need to find languages that can connect their motives to be expressed through nationalist discourse that time to the more universal terms. As many point out, the 'comfort women' issue itself cannot be reduced to nationalism, feminism or nationalism. In other words, 'comfort women' issue cannot well fit neatly into any of these "-isms." For example, Yoon Meehyang admits that throughout her experiences as activists, the 'comfort women' movement have been criticized by feminists that they are too nationalistic and also criticized by nationalists that they are too feminist. They had to find a narrow common ground for many of the social movement organizations not only in Korea but also in other countries.

The statement for the 31st Wednesday Demonstration was written by the participants from six countries of the Asian Solidarity Forum. The tone, logic, and rhetoric used in this statement are very different from those used in another statement in this period. It starts with their conclusion that "as we consent that sexual enslavement and extermination of human dignity by colonial rule and war of aggression are serious, we adopt a resolution" (HJMDH 2004, 24).

The definition of ‘comfort women’ is distinctively different from those of other statements. It defines that the forced military ‘comfort women’ are “the unprecedented atrocious crimes, including systematic and organized forced recruitments, gang rapes, tortures and massacres by Japanese Fascism of the Emperor system and militaristic state power.” This is the first solution found by movement groups for ‘comfort women’ in Korea to position themselves between nationalism, colonialism, and feminism.

It still could not escape from the idea that Japan is the perpetrator; but it could successively evade from the idea that all Koreans were victims. It also shows differences in the motivational frames. Whereas other statements in this period were not successful in finding more powerful motivational frames or the goals of the movements, the alliances with other countries let the movement groups see the movements in a different angle and enabled them to device new motivational frames, which will change their direction of the movements greatly.

Two motivational frames can be found here. First, it argues that the resolving of the forced military ‘comfort women’ issue would help “to prevent another war from happening and construct peace” (HJMDH 2004, 24). This change of view impacted the movement a lot as the movement develops. The nationalist discourse strongly dominated the discourse of the ‘comfort women’ movement, as Kim points out, doomed to ignore “the various sexist customs and class discriminations existing in Korean society when ‘comfort women’ issue is being recognized as a nationalist issue to hold perpetrator countries responsible” (Kim 2006, 117). The setup of the goal to prevent war and establish peace enabled the movement groups to bear the possibility to gaze the real issue behind the nationalism.

The other motivational frames used in this statement is that Japan is the one that could solve the problems “to be a true neighbor of various countries in Asia” (HJMDH 2004, 24). The alliance and its results are found as early as this statement. It did not impact immediately other statement and discursive strategies in this period; but it set up the basic structure of the movement. Also, unlike the many critics to ‘comfort women’ movement, the non-nationalist or less-nationalist perspective to see the ‘comfort women’ issue was set up considerably early in the movement. It is worth exploring more on the development of the movement to determine

whether it was a mere strategy to expand its international support or important changes to shake the nationalist foundation.

Third, legal actions took an important role in the movements. Before the first Wednesday Demonstration, the first testifier Kim Hak-sun and others filed a lawsuit to Japanese court for the compensation for the victims of the Asian-Pacific War. Ueno (1998) recalls that this lawsuit ignited a debate on the ‘comfort women’ issue. Additional lawsuits had been filed in Japanese courts. It is the movement groups for ‘comfort women’ and the ‘comfort women’ survivors’ consistent demand that only legal admittance of the crime and legal compensation of the Japanese government can be accepted as the appropriate apology (Field 1997; Park 2000). It became much clearer that the Japanese government and civil network attempted to launch a fund to compensate the victims to avoid legal obstacles.

Fourth, the Japanese government and associations of civil organizations decided to establish a civil institution to provide compensation funding to the former victims of the “‘comfort women’.” In March 1992, not long after the ‘comfort women’ issue became popular in both Korea and Japan, the Japanese government announced that they were considering the establishment of a civil institution to help the ‘comfort women’ survivors economically. The movement groups clearly opposed the idea from the beginning since they believed it was the Japanese government’s avoidance of their legal responsibility for wartime crimes.

After only admitted that voluntary corps were forcedly drafted yielded by public opinion, [Japanese government] are not ashamed of revealing their intention to smooth out the issue by mentioning to give ‘stop-tear money’ without making any effort to investigate the truth or compensate. That was not our demand. We have not fought for getting some ‘stop-tear money.’ From the statement for the 39th Demonstration held on October 7 1992 (HJMDH 2004, 25).

In this period, the funding institution for ‘comfort women’ survivor was just an idea but became the center of the issue when the idea materialized. It made people realize that the improvement of the living standard of the ‘comfort women’ survivors should be one of the most urgent tasks. The movement groups demanded the Korean government to legalize subsidizing ‘comfort women’

survivors to make them independent from the seduction by the money that would be provided by the civil funding institution, which may pardon the legal responsibility of the Japanese government on the wartime crimes.¹⁷⁶

Lastly, the vigilance against the revival of Japanese militarism also increased in this period. Japan sent its troops to Cambodia to openly import plutonium in 1993. Many of the movement groups for ‘comfort women’ and sympathizers thought this Japanese action might be a sign of Japan to plan to break out a war again.

6.4.2.2 *The 100th Statement (Dec 22, 1993)*

The 100th statement reflects those changes mentioned above and shows us significant transformation in their discursive strategies. On the surface, the statement looks little different from the first statement, especially in the prognostic frames. It can be mentioned that the prognostic frames, though the context has been slightly changed, has been rarely modified until now. The significant changes have made in the diagnostic and more in motivational frames.

Diagnostic frame	Unresolved historical issues Incomplete investigation on the truth and legal compensation <i>JPN government’s militarism and colonial policies</i> JPN government’s attempt to provide inappropriate solution: action equivalent to compensation
Prognostic frame	Investigation and legal compensation Textbook revision Japan to admit the war crimes, including draft of ‘comfort women’ other colonial policies
Motivational frames	<i>To recover honor of the victims</i> <i>To promote the pride of Korean nation</i> <i>To create better KOR-JPN relations</i>

Table 15. Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames used on the statement for the 100th Wednesday Demonstration.

First, even with the various attempts and outcomes of the international networking, the diagnosis frames were often mixed with “colonial perspective” and more with a universal perspective. Colonial perspective can be seen when it defines the problem as “the essence of the past history issues between Korea and Japan,” but the slight changes in the phrase can be found,

¹⁷⁶ The demand for Emergency Protection of Living of the survivors is first found on the statement for the 7th Demonstration held on February 25, 1992 (HJMDH 2004, 22).

particularly when it attempts to define the ‘comfort women’ policy as “war crime committed by militaristic state power” (HJMDH 2004).

When they use the terms belonging to Korean-Japanese history, the issue becomes to attach more to the identity of the Koreans. Once the issue is situated in the context of history, it begins to interpellate Korean people to evoke other elements lying deep inside history. For example, the term used in the above phrase “policy of obliterating Korean nation,” which is familiar to most of the Koreans, contains various policies that are believed to exterminate Korean ethnicity. These policies include banning of the use of the word Korean in public space, changing Korean names to Japanese, and ritual bowing to Tokyo where the emperor stays and at the Shinto shrines. By using the terms, the speakers of the statement are not only asking resolutions for the ‘comfort women’ issue but for other colonial policies that are believed to harm the Korean nation. But the change of the term defining ‘comfort women’ policy brought the totally different picture to the movement. The tragedy will be no more of Koreans but of every woman under Japanese colony. It also can be extended to every woman under the war. The turn, which initially might intend to expand the listeners or the alliances, relocates the issue in the totally different context.

By the close reading of the motivational frames used in the statement, we can conclude that at least in the initial part of the movement, the movement leaders extensively and actively used the nationalist terms on the statements. First, it shows that the purpose of the demonstration is to promote the pride of Korean nation.

This Japanese government’s attitude only tells that Japanese government sees the victims merely as objects of pity. This directly runs counter to the recovery of the honor of victims and also is an attitude of jeering at our nation’s pride (HJMDH 2004, 68).

Interestingly, “pride” is one of the key sentiments that encourage nationalist movements and are often connected with the patriarchal attitude as we’ve seen in the episode. The project of construction of the Museum of War and Women’s Human Rights had to be altered faced with the stubborn opposition from the associations of bereaved families who are deeply concerned with

the pride of their ancestors. The nationalist terms, like “nation’s pride,” are still largely used in the statements in the several years of the beginning of the demonstration, but are decreased more rapidly in the later part of the movement.

Second, it argues that the resolution will help to promote healthy relations between Korea and Japan.

Unless Japan frankly admits its act of invasion and war crimes with appropriate actions including the compensations to the victims, we do not believe that there will be proper relations between Korea and Japan (HJMDH 2004, 68).

This reflects some burdens that the movement group would bear. It reflects that the discourse of “national interest” was so internalized even to the leaders of the ‘comfort women’ movements. They cannot help but mention the better relations between Korea and Japan in their statement.

The fact that the recovery of honor of victims included in the motivational frame is the most distinctive feature of this ‘comfort women’ movement. In many countries, movements for supporting subaltern women often forgot to hear the voices of the victimized women and it is often delivered in some other bigger frames, as the ‘comfort women’ issue often hides under the bigger nationalist concern. By bringing victims’ honor as a motive for the movement, it opens a possibility that creates some room for patriarchic nationalist sentiment largely shared by the people.

6.4.3 Failed Normalized period: The 149th – the 391st Wednesday Demonstration (1995 – 1999)

The establishment of Asian Women’s Fund shakes the movement for ‘comfort women’ at the root. As they felt the AWF as a threat, their voice against it had been stronger. To attract more support from the people in Korea, the expressions regarding the AWF were getting more nationalistic. The pattern was already found from about 1993.

Kim (2006, 114-116) criticized the Korean Council's position on the Asian Women's Fund. Although she consents that the strategy against the Asian Women's Fund is understandable, she believes that the Korean Council's blame on some survivors who received the money from the AWF created many problems. She peculiarly denounces the Korean Council's frame that compares the survivors who received money from the AWF to diabetes patients who get the sweet thing giving up their health, which she believes a deprivation of the subjectivities of the women.

While the movements had a difficult time in Korea. The International alliances had expanded splendid in this period. The UNHCR sent a special rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy, to Korea and Japan in 1994 and published Coomaraswamy (1996) in February 1996. Another report by McDougall (1998) was submitted to the U. N. ILO included the clause that military comfort system is a violation of forced labor convention in their special report in 1996, 1997 and 1999. The International Commission of Jurist held an international conference on 'Wartime Slavery – Japanese military 'comfort women' in Tokyo. In the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, the 'comfort women' issue became one of the main topics and participants devised a code of conduct on 'comfort women'.

Meanwhile, the *Chosun* reported a former 'comfort women' survivor, who lived in Cambodia and tried to shape public opinion to bring her to Korea. The woman, whose name was Hun and forgot everything about her Korean identity, was invited to Korea, and the media tried to find the relatives and families and to grant her to live the rest of her life in Korea. She found not only her family but also her memory of Korea. Later her health went bad and her homesick to Cambodia grew. She left Korea and died in a Cambodian town where she spent most of her life.

6.4.3.1 *The 201st Statement*

Since the 200th statement is missing in the Collection, the 201st statement was analyzed instead. Though the statement is one of the shortest statements, it contains most of the topics dealt in this period. In the interview with Yoon Meehyang, the co-representative of the Korean Council, she

recalled the mid-90s as the crisis for the organization.¹⁷⁷ It was largely because of the Asian Women’s Fund. The Japanese government established it in July 1995; and many renowned radical intellectuals in Japan also participated to generate a fund to compensate the victims throughout the Asian countries. For the Korean Council, this moment was very critical, since they could not agree with the way of compensation suggested by some Japanese citizens and the Japanese government. They kept demanding apology, investigation, and compensation from the Japanese government; but for them, the Asian Women’s Fund is not a government institution. The reason is that if the victims accept the offers from the Asian Women’s Fund, it will provide a chance to the Japanese government to be indulged.

Diagnostic frame	JPN government’s praise of war and reckless statements to the victims Concealment of the past crime by establishing AWF
Prognostic frame	Dissolution of AWF Admittance, investigation, apology, compensation, education, building a monument, and punishment people who are responsible
Motivational frame	<i>To contribute to the peace of Asia and World</i> <i>To get the trust from the international community</i>

Table 16. Diagnostic, prognostic, motivational frames used in the statement used for the 201st Wednesday Demonstration.

On this and other statements released during this period, the AWF became one of the main issues that the writers of the statements deeply concerned. Even though the name of the Fund was not specified, the diagnostic frames focus on the AWF when they claim that the “Japanese government tries to cover their criminal acts by a deceptive establishment National Fund of Asian Peace for Women to deal with military ‘comfort women’ crime.” The movement groups’ interpretation of the hidden intention of the Japanese government in the fund establishment is repeated in the majority of the statements during this period with little modification.

The reason why we are getting more furious is the fact that Japanese government does not stop what they are doing from June 1994 when they first announced the idea of the civil fund even though the victims and civil organizations publicly opposed it in many times. We think that is the act of ignoring and insulting the victims. We also believe that it is just a trick to hush the international public opinion to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council

¹⁷⁷ Interview.

(HJMDH 2004, 132).

It is also interesting that many of the statements in this period speak again directly to the Japanese government. The motivation frame in this statement, for example, argues that when Japanese government does what they were asked to do, “it is the only way to contribute to peace in Asia and the World and to gain trust in the international society.”

6.4.3.2 *The 300th Statement*

Another difficulty facing the movement groups was that the survivors were getting old. Many of them are dying when the movements are moving forward. The first survivor who delivered a public testimony, Kim Hak-sun died in December 1997. The 300th Wednesday Demonstration, which was held on February 18, 1998, reflects this anxiety of the Korean Council. As they commemorate the dead survivors, and as one of the motivational frames, they demand “to console the spirit of the victims.”

Diagnostic frames	JPN government’s reckless mind JPN government’s inappropriate reactions to the issue: AWF Arrogance of JPN government Incompetency of KOR government to deal with the issue
Prognostic frames	JPN government’s apology and compensation <i>Unsymmetrical KOR-JPN relations and sovereign diplomacy of KOR should be remedied</i> JPN government should stop imposing AWF JPN government should investigate
Motivational frames	<i>To make the wish of the first testifier, the late Kim Hak-sun</i> To resolve post-war compensation <i>To prevent organized sexual violence against women during the war</i>

Table 17. Diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames used in the statement for the 300th Wednesday Demonstration

Asian Women’s Fund is still an important issue in the comfort women movement. The incompetence of the Korean government is not new. From the very initial demonstration, the incompetency of Korean government is often mentioned in the statements. Interestingly in this statement, the speaker relates this incompetency to the asymmetrical Korea-Japan relations. This is also one of the typical usages of nationalism in their statement. It states that the current

situation is due to the incompetency of Korean government and this hurts the sovereignty and pride of Korea as a national state.

New topic found in this statement is the fact that the participants of the movement now historicize their movement. As the Wednesday Demonstration held weekly for seven years, the characteristic, participants, program, and atmosphere of the movements had been changed a lot. The self-realization that they are the creators of the history is getting stronger as movements develop.

More interesting events can be found in the motivational frames. For example, they began to include more humanistic motives in their statement and it is actually working. By framing their goal of movements to prevent organized sexual violence against women during the war, they could find easily the supporters from other countries and make their voices heard.

6.4.4 Normalization period: The 392nd – The 590th Wednesday Demonstration (2000 – 2003)

As the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery in December 2000 indicted the Japanese emperor for wartime sexual violence against women, the movements for 'comfort women' reached their peak. Their voices can be heard in the Wednesday Demonstrations and their demands were accepted by the Japanese government. Their frames on describing 'comfort women' are shared by a large part of the globe, and more democratic presidents who were sympathetic to the movements supported the movements as the laws permitted. However, there are also people who believe that nothing can be done especially when the Korean and Japanese governments held the 2002 World Cup together.

The Japanese government, by contrast, went the opposite direction to what was demanded by the movements for 'comfort women'. The backlash from the conservatives in Japan condemned the 'comfort women' redress movements and the international supports to them. Those conservatives also led to the rewriting of Japanese school history books that tell the

students of the Japan's power and glory; and the erasing of the shameful history including the operation of the military comfort station.

6.4.4.1 *The 400th Statement*

The 400th statement is, in its sense, very different from the former statements. The word implying nationalism is almost gone. Interestingly, putting nationalism in a list of virtues that Koreans love, the negative aspect of nationalism is somewhat resolved.¹⁷⁸ For the first time, there are dramatic changes not only in motivational frames but also in the diagnosis frames. With the help of humanitarian motivational frames, they could find new ways to understand the 'comfort women' issue. Most of the specific elements that have been defined the problems are not easily found in here; but most of the problems are expressed using universal terms. The problems are not only Japanese government's unwillingness to solve the problems, but also those problems that can be found in any arms conflicts, such as colonialism, sexism, militarism, imperialism, and patriarchies.

As the movements have normalized, the gaze of the movements groups turned toward themselves. The whole years they devoted their life are defined again as larger purposes. The movements for 'comfort women' are not anymore the movements to punish the former colonizers war crimes. All the outcomes that the movements have made so far enlightened them that they have a bigger meaning to fulfill. The statement for the 400th Demonstration shows a big turn in defining the whole movements. It is written more in teleological fashion.

As the Demonstration was held on March 1st, a national holiday commemorating the biggest independent uprising from the colonial era in 1919, some expressions were commonly used in nationalist discourse. For example, it describes 'comfort women' as follows.

When blooming daughters of Joseon, who were dragged to Japanese military 'comfort women' and their human dignity was destroyed under the forced rule by Japanese Empire, are living with inexpungible *han* in their whole life, Japan that committed it endlessly efforts to be a Great

¹⁷⁸ Still, the subject is "Korean."

Military Power by Hinomaru, Kimigayo, reckless statements on *dokdo*, and claims of nuclear armament without showing any regret (HJMDH 2004, 265).

Motivational frames in the 400th statement also show dramatic synthesis and expansion. The evolution in the motivational frames in the former statements is finally synthesized in this statement both in motivational and diagnosis frames. The goal of the Women’s International War Crime Tribunal is to illustrate their constant effort to connect to the international networks. Whenever they hold or connect to the international organizations or another network they keep using the event on their statements.

Diagnostic frames	Colonial residues in KOR society JPN government’s willingness to restore militarism <i>Sexual violence during the armed conflict</i> <i>Constant deaths of the victims</i> <i>Militarism, imperialism, sexism, and patriarchy</i>
Prognostic frames	JPN government’s apology, legal compensation, and punishment for the people who are responsible KOR government’s active role <i>WIWCT</i>
Motivational frames	<i>To educate people on the seriousness of sexual violence against women during the armed conflict</i> <i>To show Korean’s consciousness on human rights, history and nationalism and love of justice and peace</i> <i>To construct the 2000s of peace</i> <i>To recover honor and dignity of the victims</i> <i>To make the world respect women’s human rights</i> <i>To prevent the world of militarism, imperialism, sexism and patriarchy</i>

Table 18 Diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames in the statement for 400th Wednesday Demonstration (March 1, 2000)

Now, in the 500th statement, very little clue of nationalism can be found. The whole diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames seem rewritten with totally different perspective. It is interesting that the international tribunal plays a great role. As this Wednesday Demonstration keeps holding for years, one of the fascinating aspects of the movements is the attempt to give themselves an authority. Since the movement and the demonstration became a history, the confidence of the leaders of the movements leads them to declare themselves as symbolic figures in the movements.

6.4.4.2 *The 500th Statement*

Diagnostic frames	JPN government's inappropriate reaction to the issue: AWF Unwillingness to follow the decision of WIWCT KOR government's unwillingness of demanding on JPN government
Prognostic frames	Dissolution of AWF and legal compensation JPN government should follow the decision of WIWCT KOR government should demand apology and compensation to JPN government To commit our lives to depend on the victims Alliance for women, and people who work for peace and human rights
Motivational frames	<i>KOR government to protect the victims from the seduction from AWF</i> <i>To depend the honors of victims and realize justice for them</i> <i>To fulfill the legal responsibility of JPN government</i> <i>To prevent such war crimes in the world</i>

Table 19. Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames in the statement for 500th Wednesday Demonstration (March 13, 2002).

It shows striking changes compared to other statements before the 400th Wednesday Demonstration. The seemingly unavoidable setup – to define Japanese government as a sole perpetrator to ‘comfort women’ survivors – is the only hint that the movements heavily used in the nationalist discourse. Even when they strongly oppose to the AWF, they do not use the nationalist terms and expression anymore; but only to ask the Korean government to stop the Japanese counterpart.

6.4.5 Reactionary period: The 591st – the 793rd Wednesday Demonstration (2004 – 2007)

The backlash of conservatism in Japan gave motivation to the movements for ‘comfort women’ to revive. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s repetitive visit to Yasukuni shrine and Japanese conservative’s publication of history textbook became the main reason for the movement groups to fight. The experience of the international alliance helped them to find most effective and useful ways to fight with them. In July 2007, the U. S. House of the Representatives passed the so-called ‘comfort women’ resolution. Since Japan has been the crucial leader in the U. S. pacific

strategy, the pass of resolution and the criticism from the U. S. media imposed a great deal to the Japanese politicians and conservatives.

Back at home, movement groups had to deal with new kind of problem. The backlash of the conservatives was produced in Korea. The conservatives in Korea who believed that their political power was stolen by the radical progressive, began to attack the progressive's perspectives on history. According to them, the history textbook taught in schools are too left and teach young students not to be proud of their past. It is worth noting, however, in brief here that every time when the 'comfort women' issue was mentioned by these conservatives, the public opinion turned away very quickly. As the 'comfort women' narrative successively politicized and publicized among the Korean population, the nationalist interpretation on 'comfort women' became the center of the narrative of Korean nation whereas the leading movement groups have totally evaded from the nationalist narrative of 'comfort women'.

6.4.5.1 *The 600th Statement*

The 600th statement shows that the 'comfort women' movements are no longer linked to nationalist sentiment. The intriguing in this statement is that there are significant changes even in the prognostic frames. All the prognostic frames so far have been about what Japanese (or Korean) government needs to do. For the first time, the prognosis is directed toward themselves. Alliance and education begin to center the prognosis.

Diagnostic frames	JPN government's inappropriate reaction to the issue: AWF Lack of education on 'comfort women' <i>War and violation of human rights</i>
Prognostic frames	Apology and compensation from JPN government <i>Maintaining alliance and keep doing the movements</i> <i>Education on human rights and peace for future generation: with the textbooks in every country in the world</i>
Motivational frames	<i>To prevent war crimes</i> <i>To make the world without war</i>

Table 20. Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames in the statement for the 600th Wednesday Demonstration.

Nowadays, the contents of the statement are quite different from the first statement. The very simple, clear, and bilateral manifestation based on ethnic nationalism now became complex, multilayered and international. The Council extensively attempted to connect with some of the

larger international organizations like ILO and UN to legitimize their effort and gain international recognition on the ‘comfort women’ issue. Another change seems to be thinking about “boomerang effect” if we read this statement (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Once they gain recognition from the organizations, they can utilize this recognition as tools to oppress target government. An additional noteworthy element in the diagnosis frame is that they are not just utilizing international organizations to pressure the Japanese government, but also pressing the organizations by blaming their irresponsible position. Instead of using the term “sovereignty of Korean government,” they use “sovereignty of victim countries.” This can also be seen as an attempt to weaken the nationalist nature of their claim. Also, it is an attempt to create more supports from other countries. It can interpellate the people in other victim countries who are negative on their governments’ unwillingness to exercise its sovereignty. The speakers may not appeal to the nationalist sentiments of Koreans any more but now it seems that they are appealing to the nationalist sentiment in other countries.

6.4.5.2 The 700th Statement

Diagnostic frames	Militarism of Japanese and war <i>Unwillingness of Japanese government to follow the advice from the international organizations</i> <i>Irresponsible and passive position of UN and ILO</i> <i>Unwillingness of exercising sovereignty of victim countries by demanding responsibility to Japanese government and resulting silences of the victims</i>
Prognostic frames	Japanese government’s apology and compensation UN and ILO’s intervention Victim countries’ demand to Japanese government Alliance of the world citizens.
Motivational frames	<i>To realize justice for the victims</i> <i>To make the world that peace and justice are realized</i> <i>To recover the human rights of the victims</i> <i>To build an international order that respects and protects the justice and human rights</i> <i>To stop war and violence in the world</i> <i>To stop the violence against women</i>

Table 21 Diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames in the statement for the 700th Wednesday Demonstration

As we have seen in the above statements, motivational frames are the ones that have been changed most dramatically compared to others and, thus, lead the changes in other frames. In this 700th statement, the motivation is suggested in some universal values, such as justice, peace, and

human rights. Considering the fact that motivational frames are closely related to creating a collective identity, these dramatic changes in motivational frames in the statements from the Council suggest and illustrate the Council’s effort to expand their support base. Instead of using specific historical terms, which can only be understood by Koreans, they tried to use the terms related to more universal values to let more people heard.

6.4.6 The Recent Changes

6.4.6.1 The 800th Statement

Definition	
Diagnostic frame	War and violation of women’s human rights in the wars JPN government’s negligence, concealment, and distortion of truth and willingness to rewrite the history of war
Prognostic frame	<i>Understand Wednesday Dem. as “history of peace” written by the people</i> Japanese government should listen to other countries resolution Alliance <i>All the groups fond of war in the world to realize that war cannot be justified, without promoting human rights and peace and stop violation against women</i>
Motivational frames	To recover honor and realize justice for the victims To prevent suppression and suffering against women during the war To unearth the truth

Table 22 Definition of ‘comfort women’ and diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames used on the statement for the 800th Wednesday Demonstration

The 800th statement is historical in many ways. After 17 years of demonstrations on the same issue at the same place, they are trying to understand their position and regard their work as historic. For the first time, they think about their role in the history and try to be history themselves. The self-understanding and self-reflecting on who are they and what have they done so far could enable to think their Demonstration as a “history of peach” written by people. This brought a big change in prognosis frame. Now they claim that all the groups fond of war in the world should realize that war cannot be justified, without promoting human rights and peace and stop violation against women.

6.4.6.2 *The 900th Statement*

Probably reflecting their attitude toward the more conservative government, in the 900th statement their blames equally put on Korean government. The current problem is from not just what Japanese government did or would not do, but also Korean government's unwillingness to listen and liquidate the past.

The framing analysis of the statements for Wednesday Demonstration shows many interesting things in the Korean Council, which are rarely found in other studies on this movement. First, the statements clearly show that, from a certain point, the Council does not use the terms related to Korean nationalism any more. As many people criticize, the Korean Council expressed its nationalist orientation explicitly in many of the statements. This is not the end of the story. As they tried to expand their support base and to make an international network, these nationalist elements were disappearing very rapidly, and the terms related to more universal value, such as peace, stop violation against women during the war, human rights, etc., substituted those terms.

Diagnostic frame	Unresolved historical issues <i>Unwillingness of JPN and KOR governments to listen to the voices from the international community</i> No apology and admission from Japanese government <i>KOR government's unwillingness of liquidation of past debts</i>
Prognostic frame	Apology and admission from JPN government KOR government active demands to JPN government to resolve historical issues JPN government should provide legislative actions to the issue <i>KOR government to begin the diplomatic action to solve the issue</i>
Motivational frames	To build peaceful international relations in East Asia <i>To liquidate historical debt between KOR and JPN and move toward friendship</i> To recover honor and human rights of victims To correct the distorted history To resolve the 'comfort women' issue

Table 23. Definition of 'comfort women' and diagnostic, prognostic, motivational frames used on the statement for the 900th Wednesday Demonstration.

Second, most rapidly changed frames were motivational frames and the least were prognosis. This is somewhat natural because one of the reasons driving the frame change is a

desire to get more supports from the different groups in the society. To attract more people, they give them some motivation that they can empathize. That is why the motivational frames have changed dramatically along time. But more important thing might be the relations among the different frames. As there have been dramatic changes in motivational frames, the other frames also were beginning to be seen in a somewhat different way. The reinterpretations of everything began as the motivational frames have changed. Prognosis frames can hardly be changed since this is the goal of the movement groups. In this case, however, some changes in prognosis frames were detected; and those are not suggesting the new goals of the movement, but a reinterpretation of their works.

Third, these interesting changes in the statement let us think about the relations between Korean nationalism and the frames of the Korean Council. The speakers of the statements were not embarrassed to explicitly use nationalist terms in their frames. The nationalism was expressed in their statement in following ways. First, speakers sometimes directly use the notions that were largely shared by the discourse of Korean nationalism, such as *Joseon Yeoseong*, pride of Korean nation, or some specified terms that were being familiar with Koreans, such as colonial residue. These had been bugging many of the researchers or other Feminist who were sympathized with the movement. Since the powerful effects of nationalism immediately distinguish “us” and “them,” many people had to see the Council with suspicion. Second, speakers indirectly appeal to nationalist sentiment by using nationalist rhetoric or bringing some issues like sovereignty or past debt. As shown in the 900th statement, these types of nationalist appealing can appear when it needs. Third, even though the terms that are very close to nationalism disappeared, the logic sometimes reflects their nationalist orientation. For example, in the 300th, one of the motivation frames is to show Korean’s consciousness on human rights, history and nationalism, and love of justice and peace,

Contrary to the many commentators on the ‘comfort women’ movements, at least on the statements, the nationalist orientation of the Korean Council is an old story. Whatever their orientation was or are, the frames they have been used, which were totally detached from nationalism in the past decade, limit their actions and political strategy.

6.5 Conclusion

The discursive strategy of the movements for ‘comfort women’ has changed dramatically after a couple of decades. The most changes occurred in the motivational frames, which is closely related to the identity formation. In the initial stage, there was no motivational frame. In the first motivational frames, it called upon to the Japanese government, and expanded it to the Korean government, to participants and finally, and to every individual in the world who shares the desire for justice and peace. The changes and expansion of the motivational frames affected the change of diagnostic frames.

Criticism towards the movement groups that nationalist agenda haunts them may be right.¹⁷⁹ In the initial period of the movement and faced with the threat of the AWF, the movement groups depended upon the nationalist discourses and concealed the complex nature of the ‘comfort women’ issue.

A question was asked at this point. Which one is more responsible for the dominant nationalist interpretation on the ‘comfort women’ issue in Korea, is it the movement groups for ‘comfort women’ or the strong nationalist sentiment powerful and provided very little room for the members of the society to think outside it? The hegemonic nature of Korean nationalism has prevented many actors in the society from thinking outside it. There is a window that we can see what the ‘comfort women’ movements have done to that Korean nationalism. For example, Lee (2015, 48) argues that “whereas ‘comfort women’ or ‘voluntary corps’ issue had been the issue of violated women’s chastity which should not be socially discussed so far, as the laws, policies, and movements related to ‘comfort women’ issue is getting shaped, the recognition has changed

¹⁷⁹ Most well-known critic in this position is Soh (2008). She argues that the Korean movement groups and media created the fiction of all the ‘comfort women’ were initially recruited as voluntary corps. I disputed this argument in earlier chapter. Japanese conservatives also in the similar position. Korean feminists have somewhat different position that “in the representation of ‘comfort women’ issue, nationalist logic deprived and appropriated the violence against women in colony/war” (Lee 2015, 50). For these position, see Kim (2006); Kang and Yamasida (1993).

to the issue of war, human rights, and historical responsibility.” Only through the process of its movement, it can go beyond the nationalist hegemony.

The Wednesday Demonstration is the weekly protest held in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul and aims to resolve the ‘comfort women’ issue. Since the first Wednesday Demonstration held on January 8, 1992, the Demonstration has been held on every Wednesday at the very same place for more than 20 years. It features the longest held rally on a single theme in the world. The Wednesday Demonstration have been held for a long time in one place with the same theme, not only became the rallies related to the comfort women issue, but also the gathering place for everyone who can solidarize around one theme and become to constantly and freely exchange people’s thought.

The atypical period of the ‘comfort women’ movements is crucial in the development of the movements, which showed many of the basic features of the movements, such as the organizational form, the way how to define ‘comfort women’ and how to describe their ordeals, and the core demands to Japanese and Korean government. It is clear that the women who sent the protest letters are influenced significantly by nationalism. The nationalist expressions and the frames are set by those who first work on the ‘comfort women’ issue. Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames are all indicating that their assessment of problem, way to resolve the problem and the motivations are all based on nationalist idea. At the same time, however, they were also able to appeal to universal values when they define the comfort women issue.

Analysis of the Statements released during the Formative Period reveals that from the very earliest point, the comfort women movement shows some hint of moving away from nationalistic narratives, and towards to use more language of universal values. We can also find the effort to engage more with victims. Of course, this is also the time when a powerful nationalist narrative is captivating the comfort women movement. However, the claims were still within the framework of the colonial perpetrators and victims, and that the resolution of these problems is not only to undermine Japan's imperialist ambitions but also self-esteem of Korea can be regained by doing that. As the women's movement in the university became more active due to the deepening of democratization, various women's movement groups participated in the comfort women's movement and this period in which the Korean Council started to contact with

international organizations to gain international pressure. Therefore, this period can be regarded as a very important formation period in which the comfort women 's movement has become stronger and it has been able to escape from the nationalistic narrative while it expanded solidarity with foreign organizations.

Although the comfort women movement has not been able to produce a fruitful effect due to both the Japanese and Korean governments' indifference and the establishment of the AWF, the comfort women issue has become a core part of Korean identity due to the influence of the comfort women groups and the media. The creation of AWF was led by conscientious intellectuals in Japan and the active participation of citizens who sympathize with it, but it was not welcomed by the supports groups for the comfort women victims in Korea. In fact, it shows that both the beginning and the end of the solution to the problem are in the Japanese government, and that without the Japanese government's directly acknowledgement and proper apology for the involvement of the comfort women and appropriate measures followed by them, it will be difficult to solve the problem. In the meantime, the Korean media uncovered a former comfort woman who have lived in Cambodia since the war and even have forgotten Korean and showed enormous efforts to make her a Korean again. Although many media were mobilized to find her family and hometown, she could not find her family and couldn't remember where she was from. In order to make her live as a Korean again, the government, the media and people provided a place to live. Granny Hoon was homesick missing Cambodia, where she lived for a lifetime. Finally, Granny Hoon, who was sent back to where she lived, finished her life not long after she was sent back. Though the leaders of the Korean Council confessed that it was the hardest time for them to fight against the AWF during this year, they succeeded in spreading a very specific and clear standard on what would be the proper remedies, apologies, and compensation for the comfort women victims to the large part of the population.

CHAPTER 7. 'COMFORT WOMEN' MOVEMENTS AND NATIONALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

The 'comfort women' issue has been recognized internationally since the first testimony of a former 'comfort woman' survivor in the early 1990s. From the 'comfort women' movement groups in South Korea to the Secretary of State in the US,¹⁸⁰ the understanding of the comfort women issue has not varied much in different countries since then.

In general, there is hardly any dispute in the international discourse on the comfort women issue. What the great majority of the published works I discuss below have in common is the replication of the advocates' paradigmatic story line and the monolithic representation of the comfort system as sexual slavery (Soh 2008, 47).

As Soh points out, the comfort women issue has mostly been understood as "the replication of the advocates' paradigmatic story line," though it makes it difficult to understand the complex context of the issue. The 'paradigmatic story line' is also very powerful in Korea as we examined earlier. The "paradigmatic story line" on comfort women was mainly created by Korean movement groups.

The 'comfort women' issue has been regarded as one of the most important international history issues in Korea, at a level with the Yasukuni shrine, Japanese history textbook revision, and territorial rights on Dokdo.¹⁸¹ In 1982, when a Japanese newspaper reported that the

¹⁸⁰ The US State Secretary Hillary Clinton was reported to correct one of the State Department official's expression of the victims of so-called 'comfort station' during the World War II as "comfort women." "Clinton says 'comfort women' should be referred to as 'enforced sex slaves,'" in *Japan Today*, July 11, 2012.

¹⁸¹ For example, Korean media often covers a self-claimed Korean PR expert, Seo Kyoung-duk. He is obsessed with placing ads for Korea on the US media, including the New York Times, the Washington Post and even on the billboards in the Time Square. His ads for Korea deal with two themes: Korean history and Korean culture. The ads on Korean history on the US media are about "comfort women," "dokdo," "east sea (*donghae*)," "Goguryo (ancient Korean dynasty)" and "Japanese apology." The ads on Korean culture, which he has put on the US media, are about "visit Korea," "k-pop," "*hangul* (Korean alphabet)," and "Korean food," including "*kimchi*," "*makgeolli*," "*bulgogi*," and "*bibimbab*." Whereas he is highly praised in Korean media, like even one of the relatively progressive newspaper, the Kyunghyang Shinmun, summarizes his activities like this, "there are many achievements he made in the last 20 years. He made it possible to have Korean services

Japanese government ordered the replacement of the word “invaded” to “advanced” to China in history books, followed by furious protests from the neighboring countries, history issues became not only one of the critical issues in East Asian international relations but also a fundamental factor that various groups in each society struggle and compete for the ownership of collective memories. In Japan, for example, the struggle over the interpretation of imperial history reflects the competition between good and bad nationalisms (Doak 1997; Takekawa 2007). In Korea, too, history issues regarding neighboring countries have played important roles in re-forging the bond of citizenship.¹⁸²

The memory of the colonial period and the lost wars are core parts of the official narratives of East Asian countries: Chinese remember Nanjing¹⁸³, Koreans remember the colonial period and the Korean War¹⁸⁴, and Japanese remember Hiroshima.¹⁸⁵ As Renan (1996) points out “having suffering in common unifies more than joy does” (53). More importantly,

in major art museums in the world with the campaigns and to put ads on the billboard in the Time Square in New York and on New York Times” (“Seo Kyong-duk, 20 Years of PR for Korea, “Busy like a independence fighter because of Abe,” the *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, Feb 26, 2014). “But the reactions from the US media are perplexed, if not failed to understand what the ads are for. For the most well-known reaction, see “Got *Bulgogi?* The (Maybe True) Story Behind A 'New York Times' Ad,” NPR (Mar 14, 2014). Luis Clemens, the author of the NPR article, confesses that “reading the ad was disorienting — like walking into your bedroom and finding your pillow at the foot of the bed,” and “still didn't understand why the website, in addition, contains sections on comfort women and the territorial dispute between Japan and Korea over a group of small islands the Koreans call Dokdo and the Japanese Takeshima (a dispute that has extended to the Virginia state Legislature).” Anyhow, as this expert’s selection shows, the ‘comfort women’ issue became the first issue that any Korean easily comes across as one of the important historical disputes related to Korea.

¹⁸² Korea also has tension in a history issue with China. See Seo (2008a).

¹⁸³ For the Chinese remembrance of Nanjing, see Yang (1999); Eykholt (2000); Fogel (2000); Seo (2008b).

¹⁸⁴ For the discussion of history conflict in east Asia in general, see Lee (2007b); Dudden (2008); Akaha (2008). For the introduction of Yasukuni Shrine and its relation to the Japan’s past, see Breen (2008); Nelson (2003) and the discussion on the Yasukuni controversies in Japan and in East Asia, see Doak (2008); Cheung (2010); Ryu (2007).. For the textbook issue started by a Japanese school teacher Ienaga’s law suit against Japanese government, for the detail, see Caiger (1969); Ienaga (1993-1994); Nozaki (2008); Cogan and Enloe (1987) and for the justification of the Japanese history textbook reform, see Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. (1998) and the reaction from the civil society in Japan and South Korea see Choi (2000); Ilbon Gyogwaseo Barojapgi Undong Bonbu. (2003). For the Takeshima/Dokto issue and its relation to Japanese nationalism, see Bukh (2015) and for the conflict over Dokdo see Choi (2005).

¹⁸⁵ For the Japanese remembrance of Hiroshima and the lost war, see Perlman (1988); Dower (1995); Hogan (1996); Yoneyama (1999); Orr (2001); Igarashi (2000). For the different remembrance of Okinawan on war see Nelson (2008).

recent research shows how suffering is interpreted and embraced in the common narrative of nations is crucial in consolidating unity (Gallicchio 2007; Seraphim 2007; Igarashi 2000). However, the ‘comfort women’ issue has had a very difficult time fitting into the patriarchal narrative of official Korean history. It is obvious when we see that the issue has not been openly discussed and recognized in Korean society for more than 50 years. The suffering of the women during the war, on the one hand, seems to be regarded as shame rather than a common suffering for many. For example, the Korean Council had long tried to construct a ‘comfort women’ museum, or Museum of War and the Women’s Human Rights on the premise of *Seodaemun* Independence Park, which used to be a prison for political criminals during and after the colonial period and became a symbol of the agony of the Korean nation during the colonial period. Suddenly, they had to face unexpected obstruction of their project. On November 3, 2008, the Korean Liberation Association (henceforth KLA), a biggest association of bereaved families of World War II, together with similar 32 organizations announced a statement opposing the construction of the ‘comfort women’ museum at the location.

City of Seoul should immediately withdraw the grant for allowing construction of ‘comfort women’ museum at *Seodaemun* Independence Park.... The authorities at City of Seoul, who granted that permit, should repent to the martyred predecessors, and immediately withdraw and cancel the permit.¹⁸⁶

They continue,

The permit for construction of comfort women museum on the premises of Independence Park granted by City of Seoul..... [and they] should learn that it is a “defamation of glory of our martyred predecessors,” and in can only provide laughingstocks to Japan instead of something that can make them repent for what their ancestors have done.

¹⁸⁶*Tongil* news [Unification news], “Debate on the ‘comfort women’ museum at the Independence Park: KOREAN COUNCIL refutes that it is no shame against the opposition from the Korean Liberation Association (<http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=81193>).

The most intriguing part of the statement is that the construction will be the “defamation of glory of our martyred predecessors.” As they believe that they are the incarnation of our Korean nation they cannot bear that their (fathers’) names would be corrupted. For them, the agonies of the ‘comfort women’ were not sufferings that the Korean nation went through but only shame that cannot be proudly exhibited with the glory of the martyrdom of the mostly male patriots. Faced with this stubborn resistance from organizations of World War II veterans and their bereaved families, the Museum of War and Women’s Human Rights eventually had to change the location. The museum was opened in 2012 in a residential area about 4 miles away from the original site. This shows that even though the ‘comfort women’ issue has become the backbone of the Korean nationalist narrative, there are still many practical obstacles for it to be totally integrated into the patriarchal nationalism of Korea.

State and conservative political elites were also very cautious about giving the ‘comfort women’ issue official Recognition. Though there were some exceptions among the figures in the government and conservative party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed many times that it cannot find any international legal grounds for the Japanese government to compensate the victims of colonial rule, including the comfort women, since all the legal compensations settled with the Korea Japan Agreement concluded in 1965.

It should be pointed out at this point that the strong statements on comfort women made by allegedly conservative politicians in South Korea were largely strategic choices to overcome political disadvantages rather than prudent expression of their own political beliefs. Because of the close economic ties with Japan, the Korean government has had very little room to complain to Japan about the colonial past. That is why even when the Korean government expresses strong statements against Japan or even mobilizes people to protest on some aggressive issues raised by the members of the cabinet or the visits to Yasukuni, the official position of Korean government has rarely changed. Most of the rigid reactions and strong remarks against Japan, therefore, are for domestic purposes. In similar vein, some people argue that the Japanese conservative politicians’ remarks on colonial rule are mostly for domestic and for international ears. Hence, when the Korean government wanted to make some substantial achievements on the history

issue, it had to create a semi-governmental research institute, the Northeast Asian History Foundation¹⁸⁷ to minimize the expected diplomatic conflicts with neighboring countries. For example, many people were perplexed when then president Lee Myung-bak visited *Dokdo*, a rocky island in East Sea (Sea of Japan) that Korea occupies but the Japanese government also claims the territorial rights over it, and made strong statements against Japan and Japanese government's attitude toward resolving history issues. On his Liberation Day Memorial speech on August 15, 2012, Lee Myung-bak remarked as follows and it was his strongest remarks on the history issue.

“Particularly, the issue involving the mobilization of 'comfort women' by the imperial Japanese military goes beyond relations between Korea and Japan," he said. "It was a breach of women's rights committed during wartime as well as a violation of universal human rights and historic justice. We urge the Japanese Government to take responsible measures in this regard."¹⁸⁸

Many political commentators contended that these actions from the president who is well-known for his pro-Japanese stance were not really towards the Japanese government but towards the Koreans who were disturbed by Lee's administration's many corruption scandals. More interesting, about Lee's remarks, however, is that the phrase that he used to describe the 'comfort women' issue is almost identical to that which the movement groups for 'comfort women' have used for decades. Until then, the official position of the Korean government was that the historical issues, including the comfort women issue, are strictly confined to the relations between Korea and Japan, and only considered in terms of legal binding and compensation. Whatever the intention was hidden in Lee's remark on the 'comfort women' issue, it shows that the discursive strategy of movement groups for 'comfort women' finally won over the official government description and understanding of the historical issue.

¹⁸⁷ NAHF is founded in 2006.

¹⁸⁸Yonhap News Agency, “Lee Presses Japan to resolve ‘comfort women’ issue,” August 15, 2012 (internet edition, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/08/15/8/0301000000AEN20120815001652315F.HTML>).

The *minjung* narrative, which was formed as a counter narrative against the official nationalist narrative in the 80s also treated the comfort women issue different from the way in which the comfort women issue was treated after the 90s. Many of so-called progressive media actively introduced various cultural movements – poem, novels, *madanggeuk*, dance, etc., which were the central media of *minjung* movements and they showed that these various cultural media tried to embrace the comfort women issue in the theme of the agony of the Korean nation. In the narrative of the Korean nation, which is similar to the hero narrative – a hero goes through a glorious past, extreme agony, liberation and regaining the glory – ‘comfort women’ has existed as a symbol that apparently shows agonies of the Korean nation. The patriarchic perspective of Korean nationalism erased the memory of ‘comfort women’ victims from history until the early 1980s almost completely and had kept it only as a scar in their memory.

Therefore, the comfort women issue, as it has been reported in Korean and international media, is one crucial part of Korean nationalism, but analytically, it is more useful to understand it not as a homogeneous memory shared by every member of the society but as one of the most important issues, which might possibly get a leading role in Korean nationalist narrative so it is rather a locus of the struggle of different groups in the society. What is interesting is that, after the 90s, the dominant interpretation of the comfort women issue – not yet lead by state or state elites – suppressed other possible interpretations, it created some

Since the media reported the testimony of a ‘comfort women’ survivor and the efforts of the movement groups working for former “comfort women,” the issue became one of the core elements of the official narrative of the Korean nation. Still, the patriarchic stance of Korean nationalism represents the victims as pity and pure young girls who were brutally tainted by Japanese men, their mother or grandmother who carried all the pains and agonies of the nation, or even as a shameful past that needs to be hidden behind history. In the last two decades, however, with the engagement of activists and researchers of the movement groups, ‘comfort women’ has been changed to a symbolic entity that exposes an embarrassing part of Korean patriarchy, highlights the horror of wars, illustrates the destruction of human nature during the war, and binds people together to make a more peaceful world.

In this chapter, I explore how South Korean media have represented the ‘comfort women’ issue for 20 years after democratization to understand the changes that have occurred in the nationalist discourse in Korea. First, I will examine how the ‘comfort women’ issue has been represented over the two decades from 1987 to 2008, which can be divided into four periods. After that, I will scrutinize the discursive strategies of movement groups with framing analysis to see how they tried to engage a larger nationalist discourse. Finally, I will examine how the ‘comfort women’ issue led by movement groups has been embraced and changed in the ideological geography of South Korea by looking at the differences in the way, magnitude, rhetoric, quantities, and themes in the representation of the ‘comfort women’ issue in two Korean newspapers representing conservative and progressive perspectives.

7.1 Defining the victim: What are the victims of military sexual slavery called?

To begin with, I should start from the outlining the brief history of the words denoting the victims of sexual slavery for Japanese military, since the history of the words itself reflects the ongoing struggle of different views on Korean nation and every usage should be examined with care. Whereas there are abundant researches on the sufferings of the victims,¹⁸⁹ there are only few researches on the redress movements itself.¹⁹⁰ Without the proper understanding of the history of the terms, we can easily over-interpret the intention and the implication of the usages of the terms as Soh (2008) criticizes the “South Korean nationalist inflection” on comfort women.

¹⁸⁹ Even before the first testimony of the victim, the agony and suffering of comfort women were not unfamiliar to Japanese and Koreans. For example, in Japan, nonfiction book (Kim 1976), multimedia art works (Tomiyama and Hidane Kobo. 1988) and documentary (Sekiguchi 1990) on comfort women were available. But it was after the first testimony in 1991, the books (Jeongsindae Munje Silmu Daechaekban. 1992), movies (Byun 1995), plays and arts about comfort women thrived in Korea and Japan (Nishino 1992; Yoshimi 1992; Yamada 1992; Kokusai Jinken Kenkyukai. 1993; Takasaki 1993; Nishino 1993; Shuppansha 1993) as well as other countries who have victims and the US (Hicks 1995). The International Women’s Court in 2000 also marks as a point of the interest on the comfort women expanded to South East Asia.

¹⁹⁰ Yoon (2010) is a good introduction of the movement written by the current leader of the Korean Council. Also see Soh (1996)

After the ‘comfort women’ issue was globalized in the early 1990s, the term to denote the ‘comfort women’ victim has been changed over time. Since Coomaraswamy (1996) used the term “military sexual slavery” many women’s group sympathetic to the ‘comfort women’ redress movements have used the term “sexual slavery,” or “military sexual slavery (Chung 2001, 38).” On the other hand, most of the media in the West or English speaking people tend to use the term, “comfort women.” ‘Comfort women’ is the translation of the Japanese *ianfu* or Korean *wianbu*.¹⁹¹ The similar term, “comfort girls” can be found in the US government’s Report on the investigation of the Japanese military. In the BBC’s famous documentary series on wars, the *World at War*, made in 1974, more than a decade before the ‘comfort women’ issue was globalized, when a former Japanese Imperial Army officer talks about the “entertainment” that the officers and the enlisted men had, he also uses the term “comfort girls,” which we can infer was translated from Japanese *ianfu*.¹⁹²

In Korea, the term *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* are used interchangeably by the mid-1990s. The euphemistic term *wianbu* was not easily accepted in Korea especially by the redress movement groups. Chung (2001) explains why *wianbu* or *military wianbu* was not easily used by Korean movement groups, though many people, including people in North Korea, were already using the term.

First, the criticism that term ‘*wianbu*’ itself is made by the men’s perspective, which was raised in Japan as well as in Korea. They cannot accept the term, which defines the sexual damages inflicted by men with the action of comforting men. Some argued that it is right to use the term, ‘war slave,’ ‘sexual slavery’, which express the slavery situation of the military comfort women..... Instead, they decided to use the term *wianbu* with single quotation mark, since it seems irreversible to use the term ‘*wianbu* (Chung 2001).’

¹⁹¹*Ian* or *wivan* means “comfort” and *fu* or *bu* means “lady” or “woman”

¹⁹² “It’s Lovely Day Tomorrow (episode 14),” *The World at War* made by BBC (1974).

It was the Korean Council's International Symposium, where the above agreement was made. Since then, the term 'comfort women' is commonly used with the single (or double) quotation mark to indicate the euphemistic nature of the term.

Soh (2008) also clearly presents various representations to refer to the "comfort women and the ideologies behind them. Table I summarizes her categorization. She argues that much depends on who talks about 'comfort women'. The representation varies significantly and the underlying ideologies are also different. When the comfort system was first developed by the Imperial government of Japan, the motivation was fascistic and paternalistic to provide the stressed soldiers "comfort." That is why 'comfort women' was often represented as a "gift" from the Emperor to the military and was called degrading *pi* or "public toilet" by soldiers.

As Soh (2008) introduces how the Korean Chǒngsindae Institute [*Han-guk Jeongsindae Yeon-guso*] (henceforth KCI) and the Korean Council were established, she notes that "it is significant that the names of the two nongovernmental organizations contain the term *chǒngsindae*¹⁹³ rather than *wianbu*" (Soh 2008, 57). As she correctly notes, the reason why they initially used the term *jeongsindae* for the names of the organizations was that at that time, there was a "generalized Korean perception that identifies the comfort women with *chǒngsindae*" (57). Soh clearly explains the meaning of the term *jeongsindae* as follows:

The three-syllable term *chǒng-sin-dae* is the Korean pronunciation of wartime imperial Japan's officialese *tei-shin-tai*. The literal translation, "volunteering [*tei/chǒng*] body [*shin/sin*] corps [*tai/dae*]," conjures up the spirit of patriotic sacrifice (57).

She also provides an historical explanation that *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*, or 'comfort women' are different. According to Soh, *jeongsindae* was initially "used from about early 1941 to refer to a variety of ad hoc "patriotic" organizations of students, farmers, housewives, and other ordinary citizens whose members were mobilized to support the war efforts of imperial Japan (58)." Later, the word is limited in use to "women's group (as in *yōja* [female] *chǒngsindae* or *yoja* [sic] *küllo*

¹⁹³ This is McCune Reishauer Romanization of *jeongsindae*.

[labor] *chōngsindae*), and after the August 1944 ordinance for a Women’s Volunteer Labor Corps the term’s usage appears to have been confined to women mobilized for the war effort” (58). In short, unlike *wianbu*, or “comfort women,” *chōngsindae* is a labor mobilization for young women.

However, when she scolds and criticizes that the “widespread perception that *chōngsindae* meant comfort women,” became “a virtual historical “fact”” due to the “nationalist activist’ vigorous campaign,” she misrepresents the fact as if the movement groups for comfort women are all incurable nationalist and that most Koreans believe that *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* are the same. First, it is not true that “nationalist activists’ vigorous campaigns since the early 1990s has resulted in solidifying the South Korean popular belief into a virtual historical “fact”” (59). It is problematic to call the activists as a whole, nationalist, above all. I would too call the activists nationalist in terms of the fact that most Koreans are explicit nationalist not because the activists are exceptionally more nationalist than others. Indeed, the organizations, for example, the one of the most prominent group, the Korean Council, are usually the umbrella group or associations of groups that consist of majority that is associated with the Churches and other groups like feminists, labor unions, teacher’s union, and student organizations.¹⁹⁴ Also, though the activists and researchers related to the movement groups believe that there are cases of forced recruitment of ‘comfort women’ in that some of the victims were conscripted as *jeongsindae* and later became *wianbu*, they also well acknowledge that the two are totally different institutions and have never tried to persuade people that *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* are same. In the initial period that the comfort women issue became publicized and politicized, there was “conflation of comfort women with *chōngsindae*.” It should be noted that it was the public fury ignited by the reports that records that some elementary school students were officially recruited as *jeongsindae* that the interests in *jeongsindae* began to raise. Until that time, the term *jeongsindae* was used to denote ‘comfort women’ because of the “generalized Korean perception that identifies the comfort women with *chōngsindae*.” The reports, columns and editorials on the issue became heated since people thought even elementary school students were sent to “comfort stations.” However, it was revealed soon that the recruited elementary students were mainly sent to the

¹⁹⁴ Thus, the narrative of bad nationalists who want to pursue their political goals and the innocent people who cannot but follow the agenda set by the nationalist is not appropriate in this case.

factories rather than comfort stations but it is also true that even elementary school age students were also sent to the stations. Except the short period of 1992, the distinction between *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* is more common than personal connotations of comfort women with *jeongsindae*, which are only found in the reports and documents.¹⁹⁵

7.2 Before the 1990s: confusion between *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*

Indeed, except the early 1990s, the term *jeongsindae* was rarely confused with the term *wianbu*. Until the mid-1990s the two terms were used interchangeably. In the eyes of today, where people understand that *jeongsindae* is a forced labor system while *wianbu* is sexual slavery, it is difficult to understand why people were so confused.

There are different views on why these two terms were used interchangeably. People who are critical to the Korean redress groups and their connection to nationalism, like Soh (2008), argue that the nationalist redress groups intentionally mix the term *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*, to promote their nationalist agenda. Some people also believe that there is unproven connection between the recruitment of *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*, like Chung (2001) who argues that the confusion was natural since there were some overlapping methods used in recruiting the *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*.

One of the main purposes of the book by Soh (2008) is also to prove there was no evidence that most of the *wianbu* are actually deceived *jeongsindae*.

But careful reading about the usage of two words tells us different stories from the views above. It is evident that before 1990, the term *wianbu* was rarely used to denote the girls who labored in the comfort system during the Pacific War. In other words, *wianbu* was rarely used to refer to the historical “comfort women.”

¹⁹⁵ Even Yoon Jeong-ok contributed on *Hankyoreh* to give definition on comfort women and volunteer corps. It is also hard to believe that her intention was to increase the confusion, based on her writings on ‘comfort women’ on various media.

First, on the Naver News Library¹⁹⁶, the term *wianbu* yields no article before the 1950s. It was during the 1950s when the articles including the term *wianbu* first appeared. A *Donga Ilbo* article, on May 27, 1950, reports the events happening around the North and South border about a month before the Korean War broke out.¹⁹⁷ The credibility of the contents of the article is not totally reliable since the article only conveys exactly what the Vice Secretary of the Defense's somewhat propaganda like statements, but still it provides an important example of how *wianbu* was used at that time. In the article, it reports that there are hundreds of protests provoked by patriotic compatriots [who are against the North Korean regime], whereas North Korea took the people to use them as soldiers, workers and even as *wianbu*.

In order to strengthen and nurture the Special Force that will lead the attack to South Korea, they mobilized people with any possible reason as they kidnapped young men and conscript women as workers, care takers or even *wianbu*. They also took cows, horses, pigs, and chickens. Those abuses involved 610 people from 86 households who lived in and around *Nojak-ri*, *Josan-ri*, and *Wonbong-ri* of *Baekhak-myeon*, *Jandan-gun*, *Gyeonggi-do*, which is near the Thirty-Eight Degree Line, came to Southern part of the Korea through the bullets from the enemies were fired between 13:00 and 17:00 on the same day.

It is not clear whether it was intended or not, the Vice Secretary's story parallels to the stories that many Koreans have been told many times during the colonial time. Anyhow, it is clear that the usage of *wianbu* here, is the prostitution or providers of sexual services. It is also worth to mention that the term *wianbu* is used to emphasize the heinous nature of North Koreans.

In all other articles that include the word *wianbu*, the term always means the women who provide sexual services especially to the military but never refers to the historical "comfort women." For example, there are five articles including the word *wianbu* from 1987 on the NNL.

¹⁹⁶ Naver News Library (newslibrary.naver.com) provides the original copy of four major newspaper articles (Kyonghyang, Donga, Hankyoreh and Maeil Economy) and search from 1920 to 1999. User can read the original copy of the newspapers and the digital text. When the articles were written using Chinese characters, which was common by the 1980s, digital text also provides the Korean pronunciation, and all the articles (including the Chinese characters) can be searched with keywords.

¹⁹⁷ "Puppet Army Tries to Attack South," May 27 1950, *Donga Ilbo*.

The usages vary from referring to the US army base prostitute in *Dongducheon* and the list of the names and the jobs of the people who were arrested with the famous rockers for using drugs but not to historical “comfort women.” Chai (1993, 68) also points out that “Koreans, on the other hand, have more commonly used the term *Chōngsindae* (women’s “volunteer corps”), rather than *Chonggunwianbu* (military ‘comfort women’), to refer to the same women.” At least by 1993, when Chai wrote the article, *jeongsindae* seems a more common word to refer to the historical “comfort women.”

The articles including the word *jeongsindae* in 1988 show us, however, that the term *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* are often used interchangeably but *wianbu* is used only when there is clear context that the term is referring the historical ‘comfort women’ or the term *jeongsindae* is also used in the same articles. This tendency lasts to the mid-1990s.

The careful examination of the usages of *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*, then, tells us that both Soh (2008) and Chung (2001) are only partially right. Soh (2008) especially has some serious flaws when she deals with this issue. For example, she argues that

By stark contrast, in South Korea, where women activists first defined the Japanese comfort system as a war crime in the early 1990s, the media portray all comfort women as victims of forcible recruitment by imperial Japan’s military or police (Soh, 2008, 22).

It might be true, but only in the very early phase of the movements. Though no one actually argues that “all comfort women as victims of forcible recruitment by imperial Japan’s military or police,” she keeps pointing out that especially the ethnic nationalist movement groups are claiming that most of the comfort women were deceitfully drafted as *jeongsindae* (Soh, 2008 22; 62). Thus, she is confusing *jeongsindae* with *wianbu* when she states,

Nonetheless, Japan’s recruitment of young females from colonial Korea to support the war effort was nominally voluntary participation in the Volunteer Labor Corps. It is undeniable that Korea’s status as Japan’s colony facilitated the large-scale conscription of many young unmarried Korean women, especially those from destitute families. Further, the Korean cult of

female virginity, which strictly enforced the norm of girl's premarital chastity, unwittingly served as an important contributing factor in rendering Korean unmarried women desirable recruits in the eyes of Japanese authorities (Soh, 2008, 38).

As it is shown in the above examples of the usage of the two terms, the confusion of the two words, *jeongsindae* and *wianbu*, seems to result from the mere ignorance of the fact that the *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* were two different systems. The realization of the fact that the two systems were different can be first found in the Opinion published in *Hankyoreh*.¹⁹⁸

7.3 Atypical Period: Before the first testimony (1988- 1991)

7.3.1 Background

Since Park Chung-hee seized power in a military coup in 1961, the military dictatorship had lasted for 18 years until he was assassinated by the director of the Korean Central Intelligent Agency, Kim Jae-gyu, at a private party in one of the 'safe houses' with a few closest associates in the government and two young female entertainers including college student singer-song writer Sim Soo-bong. On the one hand, during his reign, Korean economy had grown rapidly led by a developmental state model.¹⁹⁹ On the other hand, it was one of the darkest period in terms of democratization and the development of freedom in society. The assassination, or October 26 Incident, seemed to end the October Yusin regime, which had begun in 1972 when then President Park declared himself to be a lifelong president since he believed that only he could lead and fulfill the national development and establish a new democratic state. But one of the Major Generals of the Army, Chun Doo-hwan, who successfully occupied Seoul with his Army Security Command as the Chief Investigator of the assassination, launched another coup, and prolonged the military dictatorship. Yusin, the President is elected in a so-called "stadium

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¹⁹⁹ For the understanding of the developmental state, see Johnson (1982); Cummings (1999) and Kohli (2004).

election,” where only few designated voters can vote. The National Assembly was still operating but 1/3 of members were appointed by the President himself. Students who organized anti-government demonstrations were arrested, torture and violence from authorities and deaths for unknown reasons increased.

Until Park Chung-hee took power in the 1961 coup, Korea was an agrarian country, where people could only survive with the aid of the US after the Korean War. The political system and governance established during the colonial era for 35 years were strengthened by the US military government and the conservative Rhee Syngman government. Though Rhee claimed himself as a prominent leader of the liberation movements and tried to build nation and national identity through robust anti-Japanese and anti-communist sentiment, a large part of the system and the dominant political ideology was not much different from the militarism that the Japanese imperial government tried to implant in colonial Korea. The leaders of North Korea, who claimed to build a self-reliant nation state through communism, also did similar things (Armstrong 2003).

The system utilized by Park Chung-hee who graduated from a Japanese imperial military academy in Manchuria and had experienced a nation building process was based on Japanese militarism in Manchukuo. Like Meiji Japan promulgates an Emperor’s Order on Education, sets up the national educational system, and the total revolution of individual minds through various events like mass exercise and local organizations, Park Chung-hee also adopted those approaches in Korea.²⁰⁰

In the June 1987 Democracy Movements, in which the participants varied from the radical students, workers, union and even to the office workers who had been sympathetic but not mobilized until the last moment, were successfully able to remove the military dictatorship and proclaim a new Constitution with guarantees of individual rights and for ‘democratic’ presidential and parliamentary elections. Thus, democracy now came to Korea again.²⁰¹ That’s at

²⁰⁰ How Japanese state tried to infiltrate every individual in the state, see Garon (1997). Many can find a great deal of resemblance between Japanese modernization and so-called military modernization (Moon 2005) of Korea.

²⁰¹ Korean’s first experience of a democratic state was a short period from April 1960, just after the 4.19 Revolution succeeded in kicking out President Syngman Rhee, to May 1961, when Park Chung-hee’s coup was

least what people who participated in the movements believed. Probably when the two prominent leaders of the democracy movements, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, failed to agree to make one of them the President candidate of the unified democratic group, people began to have doubts about it. Or maybe it was the time when the right hand or, the close friend in euphemistic way, was elected as President of democratic Korea. Though people succeeded in legal and institutional democratization, it was getting clearer that society and the way to organize everyday life needed to be democratized.

In terms of democratization, few changes that occurred during the democratization are worth mentioning. First, as the social movements for the democratization developed quickly during the 1980s, various social organizations and political associations emerged. They were not limited to students' and workers' organizations but can be extended to organizations of farmers, the poor, religious, and women's groups. That accelerated the emergence of various focus groups. The groups whether they were gathered by their identity, social status, or their belief, could develop their own group identity as well as *minjung* identity that bonds different social groups who were working towards Korean democracy. To promote *minjung* identity, various members in the various groups participated to develop the counter narrative of *minjung* against the official narrative of the Korean nation. That does not mean that the *minjung* narrative is totally free from the official narrative of the Korean nation or *minjung* narrative aims to demolish the official narrative. Rather the *minjung* narrative nurtured in and by the official narrative of the Korean nation. They share a great part of the narrative but since the various members who participated in creating the counter narrative are rooted in different identity groups, the depth and the width of the counter narrative keeps expanding.

Under the harsh oppression from the military government, the active movements for democratization were mobilized by college students and labor unions.²⁰² Labor movements first began with the women laborers, organized in the sweat shops in the cities, which developed into labor unions. One of the strongest union groups developed from the construction and industrial

successful, which is now called the Second Republic of South Korea. The Parliamentary System was adopted with the new Constitution,

²⁰² To understand the 80's student movements, see Lee (2007a); Abelmann (1996). To understand the labor movements in the 80s' South Korea, see Koo (2001).

complexes found in heavy industry. The actions of these workers were tremendously important to the Democratization Movements in 1987. Student movements, on the other hand, played a more important role in expanding the base of democratization movements while they developed their own discipline and culture in the various student organizations and tried to infiltrate into the nooks and corners of the society.

The concept *minjung*, which was created by the anti-government movement groups during the 70s and 80s, is the key concept as it was cementing all the different groups participating in the democratization movements and had different societal backgrounds.

After Park Chung-hee became the president, the public education system tried to mold Korean minds. For the first time in the history of the Republic of Korea, the state had enough manpower, institutions and organizing skills to impose the state apparatus run by the government. Not only the mandatory education system that teaches students with the government made textbook, but also various semi-official organizations like *bansanghoe* and *saemaeul undong* as well as the everyday rituals like national flag lowering ceremony, most of the Koreans whether one is living in the big city or in the rural area for the first time they became Koreans. Therefore, it is worth to note that most of the participants in student movements are actually the ones who successfully internalized the official narrative of Korean nation imposed by the state.²⁰³ To enter the university they needed to get a high score in the university entry exam and the high scores depend on how much they can memorize all the contents in the state made textbooks. When an obedient student enters the university, for the first time in their life, he/she will be faced with different knowledge and ideas from what they have learned in school. From that moment, students often became more radical but in most of the cases, they didn't fight for a totally different world. Their demand, in most cases, is to build better institutions or replace the dictatorship with a democratic regime in order to create politics that can better serve the Korean nation. The struggle between the different political groups in Korea has been the struggle between the different notions of nation.

²⁰³Grinker (1998)

7.3.2 The Beginning of the Beginning

As I pointed out before, it was the collective memory of Koreans remembering that young girls were drafted to volunteer corps first but later they were sent to military comfort stations at the end of Pacific War. This memory, however, had been located deep into the collective unconsciousness and so as never to be part of the main narrative of the Korean nation. It is also rare to address the individual suffering and problems that the victims had to face. The articles before 1991, therefore, show the collective memory before it enters to the narrative of nation or shows the tries or initial forms of the memory that began to enter the narrative. One of the ways that ‘comfort women’ is mentioned in the articles is that it appears as one of the agonies that Korean nation had gone through during the colonial era.




Figure 9 Total number of articles including the term ‘comfort women’ or ‘voluntary corps’ on the Chosun and the Hankyoreh (January 1, 1988 – August 14, 1991)

There are few articles containing the term ‘comfort women’ or ‘volunteer corps’ in this period compared to the other time periods studied in this dissertation. Considering the fact that there are only 20 articles dealing with ‘comfort women’ from 1950 to 1987 from three newspapers found on the NNL, however, 94 articles in the two newspapers in about 4 years is a significant increase.

As we have seen in an earlier chapter, there are several important events that were

meaningful to the comfort women issue. First, KQED's the World at War was aired on May 22 and KCWU's statement on the interview in the documentary was announced on May 30, 1988. Japanese Emperor Hirohito passed away on January 7, 1989, and the women's organizations in Korea released a statement on his responsibility for the war crimes against Koreans. President Roh visited Japan on May 24, 1990. Motooka Shoji's question to the cabinet in the House of the Councilors was made on June 1990 and KCWU sent the letter to the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of Korea on October 1990. The following letters to urge Japanese Prime Minister to answer their first letter were sent on December 1990 and March 1991. The Japanese Prime Minister visited Korea on January 9, 1991.

These important events for comfort women movements are reflected in the graph above except KCWU's letters to the Japanese Prime Minister and Korean President in October 1990 and the following letters. Around the time when the head of the Korean and Japan visits other country, the comfort women issue is mentioned much more than other occasion (March 1990 and January 1991 in above figure). Very little mention is made about the comfort women issue except the above-mentioned occasions.

Newspaper	Section	1988	1989	1990	1991	total
Chosun	editorial	0	0	4	1	5
	column	1	0	5	0	6
	opinion	0	0	0	0	0
	news agency report	0	0	3	4	7
		0	2	4	4	10
Hankyoreh	editorial	0	0	5	6	11
	column	0	2	1	0	3
	opinion	2	1	0	0	3
	news agency report	0	0	2	5	7
		5	9	6	4	24
	total	8	14	30	24	76

Table 24 Number of articles by section and year (Jan 1988 – Aug 14, 1991)

Table 23 shows the breakdowns of the number of articles by section and year in the Chosun and the

Hankyoreh. It is first broken down into editorials, columns, and opinions, which reveal the position of the authors and the news articles, which contain less opinion but more facts. The news reports are also divided on whether it is the news from the news agency or original reports from the newspaper.

In this period, there are 11 editorials, columns, and opinions in Chosun and 17 editorials, columns, and opinions in the Hankyoreh. In these articles, we can see the political position of the authors and also confirm the frames they used more easily. The only column article on the Chosun in 1988 is about the TV documentary program aired on the KQED TV in LA written by the correspondent stationed in LA area.²⁰⁴ Considering the time lapse from the broadcasting to the reaction from KCWU, we can infer that the reaction from KCWU was stirred by the column in the Chosun. It also explains that the inaccurate receiver and obscure purpose of the letter. One of the five reports in the Hankyoreh in 1988 is the report on KCWU's response to the KQED TV.²⁰⁵

7.3.2.1 *World at War on KQED TV*

Following is the full text of the article in the *Chosun*.

Recently, an American public broadcast service, KQED gave a tremendous shock to the Korean community in the US, by airing a reckless remark on the Pacific War from a Japanese, which insults Koreans.

The biggest public broadcast service in California, KQED showed a special program on World War II, *World at War* (sic.), which deals with the intense battles in the jungles of Burma in 1942, from 9 to 10 p.m. on the 22nd.

After the end of long lasted killings in the battles and when the victory of the Japanese Army was almost certain, white haired former officer of the Japanese Imperial Army, who seemed to be in his 60's appeared on the screen. Featured as a witness of the former war, he suddenly began to speak of the "voluntary corps," whom the Japanese Army brought even to the battle ground, not mentioning anything about the experiences of the battles or the introduction of the progress of the battles, which was the "purpose of the casting."

"The Korean members of the Voluntary Corps comforted and slept together with the enlisted men for the great victory of the Japanese Empire, risking their lives and volunteering to the front line," he continues, "the service of the Voluntary Corps was bolstering the morale of the soldiers who may die tomorrow." He even asked back shrugging his shoulders, "who else but Korean women would come to the rough front line in the jungle and comfort the young men?"

²⁰⁴ "Yunsu Kim, Voluntary Corps," Reporter's Notepad, the Chosun, May 25, 1988.

²⁰⁵ "LA KQED TV Reports Distorted Voluntary Corps, KCWU Sent Protest Note and Public Questionnaires," the Hankyoreh, June 1, 1988.

He finished his remarks, however, by adding that the officers including him often drank with the Geishas, who had come from Tokyo, in order to maintain their dignity.

Since the special program was on the public channel, which has high viewer rating among the American students and intellectuals, and it was aired on prime time, the Koreans, as well as many Americans in the West coast, viewed the program.

Immediately after the broadcast of the program, when many phone calls from our overseas Koreans were made to complain about the program to KQED, the vice president, Katzman explained that “we did not air the program to denounce Koreans intentionally.”

But the overseas Koreans were indignant over the televising a Japanese own reminiscent without any consideration of the background of the suffering of the Koreans on the American media, not even on the public TV.

“At least, this time, the source of the film and the intention of the broadcasting should be investigated.” “How can they disgrace Koreans, a host country for Olympic, with an absurd special program, considering they not even introduce our inherent cultural tradition which is not well known to American public.” The rumblings of discontents like these are simmering into the Korean community.

It seems to be getting deeper because American TV aired similar statements with the reckless remark from Okuno Seisuke, the former Minister of Japanese Ministry of Territory, that caused the scars on the heart of the Koreans in the US.

The American media nowadays tend to show great admiration to Japan. The carefree higher class people who wear Kimono in the house decorated Japanese potted plants are often appeared on TV shows and the special programs such as “the Great Economic Power, Japan” is also often reported.

Though Americans can freely evaluate Japanese higher than other, it may not be appropriate to degrade the third party to fortify the idea of admiring Japan.

This illustrates several intriguing points regarding the unique perspective on colonial Korea. It should be first noted that the report and following action taken by KCWU were based on some kind of misunderstanding. The program that the correspondent described as if the PBS or local KQED produced, was actually made by BBC in 1974, which predates the US show by 14 years. It was *The World at War*, a famous 26-episode documentary series on World War II. The TV show that was aired was the 14th episode, “It’s a Lovely Day Tomorrow.” Therefore, if the LA correspondent for the Chosun or the people in KCWU were upset about the content or interview in the documentary, they should have showed their dissatisfaction to the producers who made the first documentary.

The article is based on some inaccurate information. First as the reporters claim that a Japanese former Imperial Army's officer "suddenly began to speak of the "voluntary corps," whom the Japanese Army brought even to the battle ground, not mentioning anything about the experiences of the battles or the introduction of the progress of the battles, which was the "purpose of the casting." He speaks from the beginning to testify to different circumstances and the morale that Japanese Imperial Army had during the war. Second, the age of the former Imperial Army officer cannot be in his 60s. Considering the fact he was a lieutenant during the war and the average of the officers in Japanese army was not over 30, it is difficult for him to be in his 60s in 1974. It may be because the reporter couldn't think that it was made 14 years ago. The nuance of the statement he speaks about "volunteer corps" was also little bit different from what he said.

Overall, the episode deals with the war in Burma that caused great difficulty for the British Army from 1942 to 1944. The episode spared much time to describe the difficulties that the British Army had to get through in the hot, humid, and muddy jungle of Burma and contrast them to the adaptation and competence of the Japanese Imperial Army, especially in the former part of the war. Interviews from the witnesses from the war keep being inserted into the narrative of the war. It includes officers, politicians, and administrative personnel during the time. The most direct description of the situation was made by two officers in the British Army and the Japanese Imperial Army respectively: Testaments from Eddie Tomkins, the former Sergeant of the British 14th Army, describe the difficulties and horrors that the British Army had experienced from the jungle and the Japanese army. The statements from Teruo Okada, former Lieutenant of the Japanese Imperial Army, tell the easiness and the adaptation that Japanese Imperial Army could make in the same jungle. It could be criticized that the contrast between the two is based on Orientalism. All the dichotomy is assigned to the British and Japanese army, civilization vs barbarism, maladjustment vs survival, humanity vs brutality, and tries to project the Japanese Army as the unknown Other.

The statement of the former officer of the Japanese Imperial Army, certainly, is problematic. As it is clear that the producers of the documentary indicate that the comfort system is somewhat strange to the eyes of the civilized British. As to emphasize the contrast to the Japanese use of comfort women, they montage the British way to entertain soldiers, which is

sending a beautiful celebrity to the front line to show the soldiers that country does not forget them. We can assume that the way to entertain the soldiers that the Japanese Imperial Army adopted was suggested as part of illustrating how everything the Japanese Army did in that jungle was eccentric to the eyes of the British, if not Westerners. Here is what Okada said on the documentary in fluent English.

We had, what we called, the Officer's Club, where there were Japanese Geishas. There are mostly for the officer grade. For the other ranks, we had, what you might call the comfort girls. And of course, in the officer's party, we all drank. The thing was to get drunk very quickly. Sing songs, and...uh...because of the limitation of the girls, only the higher officers got them later, you see.

But the songs would be like...uh...I think the English have a song called like...uh... Romeo wane the club, one, two, three.... like this. Our songs were very similar we always one, two, three...like this, huh? It is similar in contents too.

For the enlisted men, our entertainment, uh... because only entertainment between battles or on one day's leaves and you may die next day. We don't have too much time for any lengthy entertainment. We go straight to the comfort girls. You pay your money and you come out feeling refreshed like a new man. - Silence -

Most of the comfort girls for enlisted men were... Many were Koreans, and I must say I respect all of them very much because who else come to the front line to give us the last entertainment for us, for many of us, on this earth."

The last part quoted made Korean people in LA angry, according to the reporter, and also made women's organizations back in Korea angry too. As many things get lost in translation, the article written about his interview implies that the interviewee emphasized the spontaneity of the women.

Anyhow, this marks the first women's organizations' systematic response to the comfort women issue outside Korea. From this, KCWU and other women's organizations have sensitively reacted.

It is also interesting that all the other articles in the Hankyoreh is somewhat related to creating a counter narrative of the Korean nation. The two articles found in the opinion section, for example, emphasize building national subjectivity of Korea. In a contribution, a reader argues

that the Gwangju Uprising should regain its impaired reputation as a way of correcting history that can be traced to the Gabo Peasant Movement [better known as the Donghak Peasant Movement]. The article argues that with the reinvestigation on Gwangju, he believes that the spirit of the Korean nation finds the right direction. The repetitive phrase, “men took to the forced labor and women took to the forced rape,” is also found in the article, when author argues that to punish the collaborators under the Japanese colonial rule, “jailed patriotic heroes, sent young students to the Japanese Imperialists’ battle field to construct the Great East Asia, and sent innocent blooming virgins to voluntary corps,” were not because to punish the individuals but “to convict them historically” to straighten the spirit of our nation. The other article complaints about an essay, which was in a Korean textbook, would not face the colonial reality but only expresses the author’s sentimental view that might prevent building national subjectivity. Two articles in the opinion section share a mythological narrative of the Korean nation. ‘Comfort women’ are depicted in this narrative as suffering the ordeal of the Korean nation.

7.3.3 Introduction of cultural project: embrace ‘comfort women’ into *minjung* narrative

The three articles among five found in the Hankyoreh in 1988 are about the cultural production and movements. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the attempts to embrace ‘comfort women’ into the *minjung* narrative were very common.

For example, in an article in *Donga Ilbo*, the ‘comfort women’ issue is located both in the Korean nation's official narrative and in the narrative of newly emerged female subjects.²⁰⁶ The topic of ‘comfort women’ was actually discovered by these writers and they try to re-claim their rights to be Koreans or to become the symbolic subject of Korean women who went through the unspeakable ordeals throughout the history of the Korean nation.

In 1989, six articles in the Hankyoreh introduce literatures and documentary that deal with ‘comfort women.’ One of the articles criticized books that deal with the ‘comfort women’ as only

²⁰⁶ “‘Women and Reality’ in ‘Represent the Image of Korean Women as Ordeal through Volunteer Corps to the Joys and Sorrows of Female Factory Worker,’” *Donga Ilbo*, September 7, 1989.

treating it as sensual material.²⁰⁷ The other articles are narratives about the ‘comfort women’ issue as national agonies or women’s agony. The poems of *Cha Jeongmi* and *Go Jeonghee* are meaningful in that they deal with women’s ordeal in women’s voice. The poet’s effort to describe ‘colonial’ life of women under colonial rule and ‘neo-colonial’ life has not changed much from colonial life.²⁰⁸ As she depicts the life of peddlers, house maids, female farmers, street vendors, telephone operators, building cleaners, picture brides in Hawaii and *jeongsindae*, it can be said that she is also trying to create a female version of a *minjung* narrative, it is noteworthy to point out that this is one of the early cases where women speak about their life from their perspective. Still the part that is quoted by the authors of the articles shows us the perspective of a woman who is not totally free from nationalism and keeps maintaining the superiority of the nation above feminism. In an opinion article that opposes the condolence visit to late Hirohito, the author uses ‘comfort women’ as an example of its heinous crimes. It also shows the separation of nation from the state. Three of the articles on the condolence visit to Hirohito are available, but the Feb 23rd article is important. One article is a report from returning the Southeast Women’s Conference. The other one narrates the history. The 1988 opinion articles can be comparatively analyzed.

7.3.3.1 *Hirohito’s Funeral*

Japanese Emperor Hirohito, who was on the throne during World War II passed away on January 7, 1989. Though the Tokyo War Crimes Trials did not prosecute the Emperor as a war criminal liberals in Japan and many people who lived in the Japanese colonial period criticized Hirohito as the center of Japanese militarism.²⁰⁹ Many social organizations protested over the Korean government’s decision to send the Korean Prime Minister to the funeral.²¹⁰ KCWU again and in a more organized way this time, released a statement, “The Thought on the Death of King of Japan, Hirohito, from the women in the Korean Church.”²¹¹ In the article in the Chosun, the position and the demands of

²⁰⁷ “Topics in Literature: Symbol of the Ordeals of Korean Nation Turns to Sensational Material,” the *Hankyoreh*, May 26, 1989.

²⁰⁸ “Cha Jeong-mi’s First Poetry Book, Regard Breast-Tie of Tears as Flag,” *Hankyoreh*, Aug 4, 1989.

²⁰⁹ For example, Maruyama (1963) argues that Japanese militarism has a power hierarchy from the distance measured from the Emperor.

²¹⁰ “Denunciation on Sending Prime Minister to the Hirohito’s Funeral, Youth and Women’s Organizations Continue Protests and Release Statements,” the *Hankyoreh*, February 23, 1989.

²¹¹ “Japanese government should apologize on the tragedy of 200,000 voluntary corps, KCWU, comprised of

KCWU are only introduced in detail whereas the Hankyoreh reports various protests held in different cities and places. The statement released by KCWU argues that Hirohito has responsibility for the war, since “every Japanese people participated in the war under the name of the King.” As they mention exploitation of the land of the Koreans, mobilized a 200,000 women voluntary corps and the people who were exposed during the bombing on Hiroshima as the things that Hirohito is responsible for, it shows that the ‘perpetrator vs. victims’ logic pervaded the statement.

7.3.3.2 President Roh Tae-woo’s visit to Japan

Whether the Emperor of Japan, Akihito delivers the apology for the past history when the Korean President visits Japan became the most important issue to resolve before the President’s first visit. ‘Comfort women’ is mentioned many times in many of the articles reporting and discussing the President’s visit to Japan since the ‘comfort women’ question is one of the things of ‘past history’ that the Japanese government should resolve. It was raised even before the first testimony of comfort women survivors and the following Wednesday Demonstration that helped the dissemination of information about the comfort women. Also, many articles discuss comfort women as an example of the ordeals that Koreans passed through during the colonial rule of Japan, as in the form of “men should work in Manchuria and women should serve soldiers of Imperial Army as voluntary corps.”

As we have seen, the KCWU released a statement containing the KCWU’s demands to the President but it was not reported in either newspaper. It clearly shows that the ‘comfort women’ issue is used as a tool for promoting anti-Japanese sentiment. Since the media and many movement groups framing the issue as a part of the issues between the Korean nation and Japanese nation, the statements from the people who demand the apology from the Emperor are revolving around ‘comfort women’ issue.

The articles in Chosun 1990 are somewhat entertaining. The representation of ‘comfort women’ in the Chosun often symbolizes the agonies that the Korean nation had to get through. It should be noted that there is a report of the first testimony from a former Japanese comfort woman, who also confessed that she witnessed Korean ‘comfort women’ in the battlefield, who had much more difficulties than she had.²¹² Also, before the Korean president’s visit to Japan,

7 Bodies of Church Released 4 Demands,” the Chosun, January 24, 1989.

²¹² “Massacre in a Jungle to Cover their Crimes, the First Revelation on the Truth of Korean Voluntary Corps

many government documents were discovered, which can be used as evidence of the Japanese war crimes. The reactions in Chosun is interesting that the authors of the editorials and the columns writers keep casting suspicion on Japan.²¹³ They imply that the recent discovery of evidence of Japanese war crimes and even the first testimony of a former Japanese ‘comfort women’ were part of the big plot, which displays the consciousness of some Japanese and avoids the apology from the Emperor or the compensation for the victims.

Events such as summit talks, improvement in Korea-Japan relations, or the one leader’s visit to counterpart country always become the catalyst to arouse the anti-Japanese sentiment in society and the comfort women issue. On this visit, an apology from emperor Akihito on the atrocities committed by Japan during the colonial period was expected. During this period, there were two summit talks. One was in May 1991 when Korean President Rho Tae-woo visited Japan and the other was January 1992. Also, the funeral of the Japanese Emperor in January 1989 also brought similar responses from the Korean movement groups as we have noted before.

As it is shown above, the demands for resolution over the colonial past are concentrated around the early 1990s. It was the time when various social movement groups demanded the reparation for sufferings inflicted by colonial rule and it reached a peak in January 1992 when the elementary school girl volunteer corps issue was raised when the Japanese Prime Minister planned to visit South Korea.

Second, in the progressive *Hankyoreh*, there are many uses of different art forms – plays, music, dances, poems, and novels – that are trying to incorporate ‘comfort women’ into the counter-hegemonic *minjung* narrative. Lastly, in the newly democratized society, various social movement organizations emerged and spoke out. History related movement groups are one of them and their or their initial forms of organization protested when the Korean president visited Japan or the Japanese Prime Minister announced a visit to Korea. These events recalled the collective memory that sits deep inside the Korean unconsciousness.

by a Japanese Women,” the Chosun, May 8th 1990.

²¹³ “Different Views on the Apology from the Japanese King,” the Chosun, May 15 1990. “Now it is question of our pride,” the Chosun, May 16, 1990.




Figure 10 Number of articles including 'comfort women' or 'volunteer corps' in *Chosun Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*, June 1987-August 14, 1991

Except for May 1990, the *Hankyoreh* wrote more articles containing the term 'comfort women' than *Chosun Ilbo* during this period. This is because *Hankyoreh* introduced many attempts in art embracing 'comfort women' into the *minjung* narrative before 1990. Among the 21 articles from *Dong-a Ilbo* and *Hankyoreh* from 1987 to 1989, 10 articles introduce cultural products that depict the agonies of 'comfort women'.

In this cultural representation of 'comfort women,' we can observe three distinctive tendencies. First, 'comfort women' is described as the part of the agonies that the Korean nation had to go through during the colonial period.²¹⁴ These are not new. As I examined earlier, after liberation and the democratization of Korea, 'comfort women', or 'volunteer corps' in these cases are often teamed up with labor and military forced draft of males.²¹⁵ In this framework, the 'comfort women' issue is only considered in broader national issues. For example, there is a letter to the editor in

²¹⁴The most distinctive example might be the exhibition of the agonies of 'comfort women' in national Independence Hall of Korea, opened in 1987. In "Here are Indomitable Heroic Ambition of Our Nation: Introduction of Independence Hall of Korea," *Dong-a Ilbo*, Aug 11, 1987, the exhibitions of Independence Hall of Korea are introducing. For more detailed analysis on the exhibitions of 'comfort women' in the Independence Hall of Korea, see Kim (2010b). As she points out, the exhibition in the Hall not only represent 'comfort women' issue in nationalist perspective but also exposes the paternalistic sense of chastity.

²¹⁵ In "Symbol of National Ordeals Turns Sensational Material," *Hankyoreh*, May 26, 1989, reporter bitterly criticizes three novels recently published, Baek (1989); Heo (1989) and Jeong (1989), for their commercialization of the national ordeal as those novels exploit 'comfort women' only as the sensational material.

Hankyoreh. The contributor emphasizes the ‘historical condemnation.’ As the purpose of the condemnation of Japanese war crimes – including *jeongsindae* – is not on the punishment of the individuals who committed the crimes but historical condemnation against pro-Japanese collaborators, he argues that the perpetrators of the Gwangju Uprising should be punished through the special commission and the victims should restore their honor.

Second, the representation of ‘comfort women’ is often part of the creation of the *minjung* narrative. By most common definition, *minjung* refers to everyone who suffered from the oppression of the ruling class. To emphasize the collectivities of *minjung*, it commonly denotes the collective workers, farmers and the poor, but we can also find the effort to include many oppressed people in the *minjung* category. As one of the most suffering people in modern Korean history, the ‘comfort women’ gained attention from the artists who tried to create a *minjung* narrative by their artistic work.²¹⁶

Third, some artistic representations of ‘comfort women’ focused more on victims as women rather than the Korean nation, if not Korean women.

In the *Hankyoreh*, there are two articles from the News Agency and both articles concern the mayor of Nagasaki. The mayor speaks about the responsibility of the Emperor for the war crimes during the Pacific War and seemed to stand in the middle of the debate in Japan. The first article is about the members of the Korean Victims of Nuclear Weapon (Apr 17). The second article reports the mayor’s press conference where he argues that the Emperor should offer an apology for history issues (May 20). Both articles from the News Agency reports the news from Japan and especially the politician’s views who are supportive of Korean redress groups’ position and sympathizes with Koreans and criticizes the history issues in Japan.

The representation of the ‘comfort women’ issue in this period became a proto-type of future increases of interest in the issue. These are a summary of interesting points that will latter affect representation of the ‘comfort women’ issue in the media. First, it should be mentioned

²¹⁶For example, in “Korean Culture in Transition <7> Dance: break out from idealism seek for reality,” *Hankyoreh*, June 14, 1988, many choreographers who seek to express the life of ordinary people in Korea are introduced as they are changing the dancing scene. As a dance critique evaluates the Wind Inviting Dance, one of two dances that brought dramatic impact to the recent dance scene, as ‘a real dance that *minjung* obtained,’ the dance shows the agonies of ‘comfort women’ to Gwangju Hangaeng, a Balloon Flower, is one of this kind.

that the term “*wianbu*” and “*jeongsindae*” are interchangeably used. “*Jeongsindae*” is used much more than “*wianbu*” as the term denoting the women who were sexually exploited by the Japanese military during the Pacific War. Because the terms that denote ‘comfort women’ play important roles in interpreting the ‘comfort women’ issue, we need to be aware of the meanings. Second, social organizations are emerging as they relate to ‘comfort women’. This is also related to the third feature, in which the ‘comfort women’ issue is not presented in terms of actual victims or people but rather is presented as an abstract example of various agonies that Koreans had to go through during the colonial era or of heinous crimes committed by the Japanese Empire. It is worth mentioning that social organizations that emerged in this period try to connect the victims and concrete agony to the story of the victims of nation. Fourth, we can find various attempts in culture and art to embrace ‘comfort women’ into the larger *minjung* narrative. The *minjung* narrative, which founded the identities of student movements and labor movements in the 1980s, helped with successfully forming identities of the progressive movements and developed various art forms, including novel, poem, art, music, and traditional performance arts. Those art forms gained their own maturity and have been developed to include many things, including ‘comfort women’ in their narrative.

There are 3 editorials among 15 articles. But there are also 2 articles in the section called *Manmulsang* and 2 articles in the Reporter’s Notepad. The Reporters Notepad can be viewed as an editorial written by reporters. There is an article written by an editor, which also is more the opinion of the author than news report. These 8 articles among 15 articles reflect the opinion of the newspaper company.

Among the remaining 7 articles, two of them are interviews. Among 5 news articles, three of them are from the News Agency, Yonhap, and only two articles are news reports. One article screams;

But somebody they have to apologize for the heinous crimes of letting force rule over 30 million Koreans, for drafting millions of people to mines, destroying our virgins as comfort women, some who were left in Siberia and Sakhalin under the Emperor’s name. Someone is the

one whom most Japanese admire like an idol.²¹⁷

In this editorial, the editor argues that the Emperor who is the symbol of Japanese militarism should be the one who gives an apology when President Roh visits Japan. Since the current emperor is not directly connected to the past wars, it is important to give apologies just as post war German leaders recognized the pains of Jews and the Poles. The editor also demands that the Emperor should not visit Korea. The editor also uses the expression “destroyed our virgins as comfort women” which reveals his patriarchal position that thinks that an innocent Korean female lost her virginity and got dirty.

In the other editorial, the editor of *Chosun Ilbo* questions what Korea and Japan can get from the Summit Talk, the question that cannot be seen with the veils of the apology issue. He points out the things that Korea can get from the Talk are only abstract and the only concrete thing is to get legal status for the 3rd generation of Koreans and to make it easier to get a Visa, whereas Japan can get “the export of high speed trains and the permission for Japanese cultural materials to enter Korea, which are extremely important and can leave marks economically and culturally on a whole generation.”²¹⁸

7.4 Formative Period: August 15, 1991 – December 31, 1994

This period of investigation is the time when the ‘comfort women’ issue became the center of the narrative of the Korean nation. Before August 1991, as we have seen in Figure 13, the number of articles in one month does not exceed 12. But during the latter part of 1991 and the end of 1996, the number of articles including the term ‘comfort women’ or ‘voluntary corps,’ commonly exceed 20 and in January 1992, more than 140 articles can be found in both newspapers. What brought this explosion of the interest in the issue? The official explanation of this explosion of interest in the comfort women issue is the first testimony and the compound effort of movement groups that enabled it. But as we can see in the above figure, the number of articles using the

²¹⁷ “*Ihwang Sagvaneun Heeoneotna*” [Was Emperor’s apology lie?], May 12 1990, Chosun Ilbo.

²¹⁸ “*Ijeneun Wuri Jajonsimui Munje*” [Now it is the question of our self-esteem] May 16, 1990. Chosun Ilbo.

term ‘comfort women’ are decreasing until October 1991. The explosion began around January and February 1992.




Figure 11 Total number of articles including the term 'comfort women' or 'voluntary corps' in the *Chosun* and the *Hankyoreh*, Aug 15, 1991-Dec 31, 1994

This period was also the time that various groups suggested their own ways to solve the problem: governments and civil societies of each country. The comfort women issue, which was just part of an obscured collective memory in Korea, began to exist in a certain format in this period due to the effort of the various comfort women redress movement organizations.

Newspaper	Section	1991	1992	1993	1994	total
<i>Chosun</i>	editorial	5	9	3	0	17
	opinion	0	0	0	0	0
	news agency	9	59	31	16	115
	report	15	165	93	39	312
	sum	29	233	127	55	444
<i>Hankyoreh</i>	editorial	3	15	20	2	40
	opinion	0	0	0	0	0
	news agency	9	71	26	20	126
	report	29	240	189	94	552
	sum	41	376	235	116	768
total		70	609	362	171	1212

Table 25 Number of articles by section and years (Aug 15 1991-1994)

This is also the time of solidifying of obscured collective memories while it also includes bifurcation and diversification. Broadly it is the time when the conservative version of the memory on ‘comfort women’ and progressive version of the memory on ‘comfort women’ are solidifying

7.4.1 Nationalist Fiction: All Comfort Women Were Initially Recruited as Voluntary Corps

In the earlier chapter, I examined Soh’s (2008) accusation against the comfort women movement groups in South Korea. She argues that it was movement groups that disseminated the collective memory that all the comfort women were initially recruited as voluntary corps. The usage of the ‘voluntary corps’ and ‘comfort women’ in the public media, however, shows that it was not the movement groups’ fault.

This period is the time that it was started. The confusion resulted from the collective misconception that enabled movement groups to get more support from the public. In this chapter, I will examine the role of the news media in disseminating the incorrect idea.

7.4.1.1 The Chosun vs. Hankyoreh

On the one hand, many of the columns and reports directly appeal to the nationalist sentiment that is confirming the old paternalistic and patriotic view. On the other hand, it also emphasizes that nationalism is only an outdated sentiment and people need to be more rational especially on the economic interest that the state might have. For the Hankyoreh, on the one hand, it tries to expand the *minjung* narrative of the Korean nation. On the other hand, it focuses directly on the victims and evokes sympathy for them and it also focuses on the activities of the activists and movement groups.




Figure 12 Number of articles including the term 'comfort women' or 'volunteer corps' by month (Aug 1991 – Dec 1994)

The number of articles including the word ‘comfort women’ or ‘volunteer corps’ dramatically increased in 1992. In January, the discourse on comfort women in the *Chosun Ilbo* skyrocketed. There were reasons that made this happened. First, then Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced his visit to Korea on January 16. As it has always been, the visit of the Japanese PM stirs up the latent anti-Japanese sentiment and stimulates the demand for resolution of history issues. Two separate events boosted this tendency. A young historian, Yoshimi Yoshiaki found Japanese military documentation which showed the Japanese government’s involvement in managing the ‘comfort stations’ during the war. The more galvanizing discovery during this month was that a former Japanese elementary school teacher revealed that she signed the paper to send elementary school girls to voluntary corps during the war.

There are 6 articles from editorials. We can categorize articles by columns, editorials, and news reports. Including nine editorials, there are 33 non-news reporting articles in 1992. Many of them emphasize Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s discovery. Six articles are dealing about comfort women in the National Deity in Japan since 1990.

It should be revealed in detail how many flower buds were dragged to the battle ground and played roles as sex toys for the Japanese military, and what destiny they had to meet, indeed. It has been said that 80 thousand to 200 thousand women volunteer corps followed the military, 80% among them were Korean women and astonishingly most of the Korean women were massacred at the end of World War II by the Japanese military.

The typical nationalistic portrayals of describing – the victims as the “buds,” their agonies as tragedies of Korean nation under the Japanese colonial rule, or the damage being particularly harsh to the Koreans – can be seen often in this period and keep being reproduced. Turn the issue into the will of the Japanese government: if state vs. State cannot be done individual vs. State could work.²¹⁹

It has been the conservatives’ position that an apology may not be needed but Japan has to provide more substantial economic reparation. This view is very closely related to the position of the state in the settlement of the comfort women issue, which was discussed at the very beginning. This view, on the one hand, is that ideas from the era of developmentism that constitute a necessary part of the nation for those who can sacrifice everything for the development of the nation, It is deeply connected with the perspective of being a separatist.

What is interesting about this period is that a conspiracy theory has been raised in relation to this past history problem. Some conservative journalist even claimed that Japan designed the whole situation to diffuse the Koreans.²²⁰ Others have argued that Korea should be more criticized than Japan. As it has shown, few exchanges of the summit talks do not resolve the history issue between the two countries. Though it is because Japan that does not admit their atrocities during the war, Korea also should be blamed since the Koreans who neglect to investigate. We are more to be blamed.²²¹

It suggests the prerequisite conditions for creating an Asian Regional Security Institution.

²¹⁹“Make a period mark on the ‘volunteer corps’ issue,” January 13, 1992.

²²⁰ “Do not mislead with apology,” January 17, 1992.

²²¹“Regret on the Korean-Japan Summit Talk,” January 18,1992.

The resolution of history issues with neighboring countries is important as the first step to build political trust.²²² Criticizing Japan's grudging attitude toward resolving the comfort women issue helps little. It points out that first Japan does not admit that the government was involved in the management of the comfort system and cannot say what the Japanese government will do for the victims.²²³

We must keep emphasizing the Korean government investigation that revealed that Japanese government involvement in recruiting comfort women. The expressions, "as the massacre of the Polish military officers was revealed as the atrocity of Stalin, it should be now accepted that the inconceivable crime of Japanese authority was the rape of our volunteer corps' girls."

"What we demand is complete self-reflection, repentance and the recovery of morality for those which dared to hunt the daughters of the neighboring nation with arms and made them sacrifices for their animal like sexual lust."²²⁴ It is interesting in its interpretation of colonial relations and partnership.²²⁵

7.4.1.2 Columns

The columns suggest that there are three things to be considered as the Japanese PM Miyazawa visits to Korea. First, he points out the visit will promote friendly relations between Korea and Japan. But he doesn't forget to add that the improvement of relations between Japan and North Korea might harm the relations between Japan and South Korea.

Colonial context: the author mentions *Joseonchaekrayk*, and emphasizes that the alliance with Japan is important. But that ignores the entire history of colonialism. It is also not clear which nation will benefit more from good relations with Japan.

²²² "Prerequisites for Security Institution," July 6, 1992.

²²³ "Grudging Admittance of Volunteer Corps," July 8, 1992

²²⁴ "What Japanese Authority Did," August 3, 1992.

²²⁵ "Korea Japan Relations at the 47th Year of Liberation," August 15, 1992.

The interesting perspective that this author has is that when he writes about the relations to Japan, he appears completely oblivious to the colonial history. He talks about the relationship as if two countries are absolutely equal. This might reflect a conservative's perspective on international relations.²²⁶

It shows how the belief that the volunteer corps as comfort women was strong. Lee dares to write that "When the Japanese military leaders created this women corps, which will serve Japanese soldiers' sexual desire, they must have had in mind this *deishintai*. So the name, which is same pronunciation but different Chinese letter, must come up with their mind."

Even though he reviewed the evidential documents he would not change his belief that all volunteer corps are historical 'comfort women'.²²⁷ He lists examples where governments indemnified foreign people who suffered from actions done by the members of governments. He also points out that Japanese Americans who were interned during World War II in the US have been indemnified by the US so the Japanese government also consider providing reparation to Koreans who suffered during the war.

It clearly shows that there are no clear distinctions between nationality and ethnicity in the common mind of Koreans.²²⁸ There are two ways to deal with Japan: national sentiment and actual interest. National sentiment: volunteer corps vs. actual interest: the transfer of technical knowhow and adjustment of the adverse trade balance.

Conspiracy theory: Japanese government determined that Koreans are only interested in the history issues (volunteer corps and the Korean culture as the root of Japanese culture). The Japanese PM only apologized and visited Gyeongju to assuage the anti-Japanese sentiment but never cooperated by giving economic help.²²⁹ Also, in line with the other editorials and columns. Shouldn't have focused on the history issue but the economic issue.²³⁰

²²⁶ Sin Hei-seok, "Some Words for Miyazawa's Visit to Korea," January 14, 1992.

²²⁷ "Thoughts on Volunteer Corps" Lee Gyu-tae Corner, Jan 16, 1992 Chosun Ilbo.

²²⁸ "Japan's Human Bond" January 17, 1992.

²²⁹ "Time to Change the Way of Trade with Japan," January 19, 1992.

²³⁰ A Monologue of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lee January 19, 1992.

Volunteer corps was just mentioned to express Korean people’s frustration on the historic materials, which were discovered recently but not enough to reveal the whole picture of the ‘comfort system’.²³¹

He points out that books on visiting North Korea are booming in Japan and sees the colonizer’s eye in the phenomena. North Korea, once regarded as a socialist paradise for many Japanese is now degraded as one of the most backward countries in the world. For Japanese, South Korea is dominated by the political turmoil and inflation and North Korea is dominated by a dictatorship and hardship in food. South Koreans do not uncritically adopt the colonizer’s eye when they view North Korea.²³²

7.5 Failed Normalization of ‘comfort women’ issue: 1995-1999




Figure 13 Total number of articles including the term ‘comfort women’ or ‘voluntary corps’ in Failed

²³¹ “Russian Gift Diplomacy,” February 10, 1992.

²³² Heeyoung Song, “Travel Books on North Korea Booms in Japan,” *Chosun Ilbo*, May 24, 1992.

7.5.1 AWF and Korean Council

After the Asian Women's Fund announced that some of the 'comfort women' survivors received money from them on January 11, 1997, and Korean government and the 'comfort women' redress groups made it clear that the rest of the survivors do not want any compensation from the Asian Women's Fund but only demand the proper apology from the responsible person and legal compensation from the Japanese government, the resolution of the comfort women issue between the Korean victims and the Japanese government seemed stuck.

After a survivor who received the money appeared in the news media, the Korean Council went through great difficulty. In the interview with the news media, the former comfort women who received money from the AWF blamed the Korean Council, saying that she never got any money other than the government subsidy. Many people blamed the Korean Council once they heard the news since people believed that there had been numerous fundraising to help former comfort women survivors but, according to the one who got the money from the AWF, the Korean Council never delivered the money to the survivors. Also, there had been rumor that the ones who got the money from the AWF would not be able to get the government subsidy and the public fund funded by the Korean Council.

7.5.2 Grannie Hun Story

In January 1997, the Korean media reported about a former comfort woman, who was stranded in a small town in Cambodia since the Pacific War ended. The only thing that the Korean media uncovered was that Hun was her name and she was Korean. She even forgot what her real name was. Her story began to fascinate Koreans.

The *Chosun* tried to do many things to reconnect this former 'comfort women' as a proper Korean citizen but it simply failed since she preferred to live in Cambodia with friends and family rather than in the Fatherland. Most of the myths about 'comfort women' survivors were dismissed with her departure back to Cambodia. But it also revealed the desire of the groups who felt anxious from the successful challenge of the 'comfort women' issue to the

official narrative of Korean nation.




Figure 14 Number of articles in the Hankyoreh and the Chosun by month (1995-1999)

As the above figure illustrates, from January 1997 to May 1998, the Chosun produced more articles including the term ‘comfort women’ than the *Hankyoreh*, as Hun’s story is introduced. Except for some brief periods, it was the only time that the *Chosun* produced more articles mentioning comfort women than the *Hankyoreh*.

7.6 Normalization: Women’s Tribunal and Japanese history textbook (2000-2003)




Figure 15. Number of articles including the term ‘comfort women’ or ‘voluntary corps’ by month (2000-2003)

For the first time in Korean history, the conservative party lost in two consecutive Presidential elections. One of the common reasons given for the loss was that the younger generation does not share the same values and history that the older generation does. The history textbook became a central target in understanding this. As reactionary history writing groups are emerging in Korean media and society, almost similar concerns were already being raised in Japan. As the conservative actively engages in the debate on the subjects that might undermine the pride of Japanese, they also wrote the textbook of their own to provide a proud history of their past.




Figure 16 Number of articles in the Chosun and the Hankyoreh by month (2000-2003)

7.7 Reactionary Period: Bifurcation and the US House of Representative’s ‘Comfort Women’ Resolution

In the debate on the new history book in Japan, whether the middle school student history textbook should mention ‘comfort women’ was one of the main topics of the debate. The articles published during 2004 and 2005 are mostly about this newly approved conservative Japanese history textbook.




Figure 17 Number of articles including the term ‘comfort women’ and ‘voluntary corps’ by month (2004-2007)

The period that is examined in this chapter is one when the ‘comfort women’ issue finally became the issue of global politics.




Figure 18 Number of articles in the Chosun and the Hankyoreh by month (2004-2007)

It is interesting that *Chosun Ilbo* did not respond much to the Japanese textbook issue and the blunt statements from the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in 2005, but when the so-called resolution for ‘comfort women’ was passed in the US House of Representatives, it produces a significant number of articles.

Newspaper	Section	2004	2005	2006	2007	total
Chosun	editorial	4	8	2	18	32
	opinion	12	1	2	23	38
	news agency	3	5	1	2	11
	report	78	79	43	136	336
	sum	97	93	48	179	417
Hankyoreh	editorial	6	14	4	13	37
	opinion	15	20	8	21	64
	news agency	5	12	6	17	40
	report	119	204	88	169	580
	sum	145	250	106	220	721
	total	242	343	154	399	1138

Table 26 Number of articles by section and year (2004-2007)

It is also interesting that the number of articles are greater in in the first part of 2007, but there are only a few articles on the front page.

7.7.1.1 *Textbook Forum*

On October 21, 2004, several social scientists, mostly known as the members of the New Right, and others from civil organizations for education, gathered at Yonsei University, South Korea, to prepare for the launching of a private research group, called Textbook Forum. Other senior groups including a renowned Emeritus History professor, retired chancellor of the Education University, and the members of other conservative civic organizations, such as Liberty Union, Social Responsibility of Christianity, the Council of Elementary, Middle and High School Principals declared that they will also join the Forum. The Forum will be launched to provide a balanced perspective on history and also aims to publish a new history textbook that is free from “unbalanced” view on history. Newly elected representative of the Forum, Park Hyo Chong, the

professor of the Department of Ethics Education in Seoul National University,²³³ stated that “the purpose of our Forum is to correct ‘unbalanced view on history’ and present a balanced view on history,” because he and other members of the Forum shares the criticism that was recently raised about one of the history textbooks. The high school textbook, *Modern and Contemporary History*, published by *Geumseong*, describes the history after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in a very negative and critical way whereas it describes the history after the establishment of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea relatively neutral and friendly.”²³⁴

The Forum was officially established on January 25, 2005. In their prospectus, they point out, “according to the textbooks and reference books in the middle school and high school, our future generation are learning that Republic of Korea is wrongly born and having trouble with development,” and they argue even though “the Republic of Korea should be proud itself for having accomplished ‘mission impossible’ by any standard.” It continues, “in the textbooks... we cannot find our efforts to establish, preserve, and nurture our state nor our portrait of enhancing our quality of life by toiling night and day. There are only dictatorship, oppression, and dire contradiction of capitalism.” It adds the question, “until when does our next generation have to wear the cloth with the scarlet letters on it?” They believe that Korean history, especially modern and contemporary history, is contaminated by a self-degrading perspective which is the result from an (ethnic) nation-centered or *minjung*- perspective on history. But they also argue that what they pursue is not a mere glorification of the past.

There is difference between the ‘old boy’s’ self-boasting and the Textbook Forum’s consistent assertion that Korea’s history is proud on the whole though there might be some shameful moments. It is not the coercive and high handed self-boasting story, claiming “Dude! We lived

²³³ Since the Japanese colonial rule, the Ethics became the one of the important subjects taught in public school. The contents of the Ethics is also greatly influenced from colonial education, which emphasize the traditional moral, such as filial piety, loyalty to the state, sacrifice oneself to larger good, and etc. It is interesting that North Korea also emphasizes the Ethics education in public education. The contents of *Communist Ethics* are very similar to South Korean Ethics textbook, except that the North Korean textbook also praises their leaders and communist values and condemns Western capitalism as imperialism. Until recently, Korean government published Korean, Korean history and Ethics textbook and all the elementary, middle, and high school, whether it is public or private, have to use that government published textbooks in the class.

²³⁴ “We correct the left-leaning textbook on modern Korean history,” Dong-a Ilbo, Dec 27, 2004.

our life so industriously like that. So you have to respect us!” And it is not the nagging or grumbles that new generation does not understand the sacrifices and achievements of the ‘old boy.’ This is nothing but a message from intellectual loyalty that we have to understand where the moral values that consists identity as a citizen of the Republic of Korea is and where the root of our lives ‘correctly’ or ‘accurately’ is. (Park et al. 2006, 13)

By differentiating themselves from the ‘old right’ (or ‘old boy’ in above passage), they clarify their object of writing a new history: understanding “where the moral values that exist give identity as a citizen of the Republic of Korea are and where the root of our lives ‘correctly’ or ‘accurately’ is. In other words, they think the current process that government employs to create a national identity of South Korea has some problems, so they want to revise it to be effective.

This chapter primarily aims to analyze the content of the *Alternative Textbooks: Modern and Contemporary History* and the intentions of the authors, Textbook Forum. This will help to understand why history plays an important role in the political realm. Begun by the political campaign as the New Right movement, this Alternative Textbook shows why sanitizing history is so important especially for countries like Korea where historical and moral education have played a great role in making modern national identity.

How did this conservative historiography begin to emerge in Korean public discourse? What is the difference in their new writing of modern and contemporary history? How effectively do or do not they overcome the nationalist’s way of writing history? What is the limit of this effort of sanitizing history and where does that limit come from? These are the questions that this paper wants to answer.

7.7.1.2 *Narrativity of Historiography*

Recent studies on nationalism have shown that writing history itself plays a great role in nationalism. For example, Duara (1995) suggests that national history is the key factor in the formation of national identity.

My principal argument is that national history secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time. This reified history

derives from the linear, teleological model of Enlightenment History – which I designate with a capital H to distinguish it from other modes of figuring the past. (Duara 1995, 4)

There are many ways to write about the past and among them linear, teleological national history is a new approach to writing history. Not only did the Chinese intellectuals, that were analyzed in Duara (1995), but also, other East Asian countries tried to construct their own national history in that manner. As Tanaka (2004) points out, for the intellectuals who felt that their history was far beyond the general progress of the history, it is crucial to ‘discover’ their past and locate it on the linear narrative of history. The adoption of the Gregorian calendar, therefore, was a significant moment for Japanese intellectuals in writing their history. Discovering the past and museumization of their presumed dangerous past, in other words, selection of the past to fit it into the narration of history, is the key factor in building modernity for latecomers like Japan. Before Korea was annexed by Japan, Korean intellectuals also tried to narrate their history on the linear and teleological line. Schmid (2002) effectively shows how media like newspapers and historians tried to construct new Korean national history before Korea was colonized.

In the writing of narrative linear and teleological national history, therefore, it can be said to be a part of modernity, as Duara (1995, 20) argues ‘that if History is the mode of being, the condition which enables modernity as possible, the nation-state is the agency, the subject of History which will realize modernity.’ It should be pointed out that, in this writing of history, it is the ‘nation-state’ that becomes the subject of the history. All other past events, if they are not serving the narrative of national history, should be forgotten. So the process that one narrative becomes the official history is contested. Therefore, even though the authors of the Alternative Textbook argue that this new writing of history is different from the former textbooks because they are writing the history based on the facts rather than selective appropriation of the facts (Park et al. 2006), it should be understood as the conservative’s effort to retake the hegemony in writing history after democratization.

This positivist view on history, which claims that their history is not for other ideologies but only for the historical fact itself, is also the part of creating modern national identity, in other

words, of nationalism²³⁵, as far as the nation-state is the subject of their History. Apparently, as Duara points out, the underlying assumption of this history writing is very Hegelian. Duara (1995, 17) argues that ‘the telos of History – the structure governing its progress – is the unfolding self-awareness of Spirit which is Reason.’

It is also interesting that while analyzing the narrative for this Alternative Textbook to recall that White (1980) even argues that all the forms of writing history are narrativization. Not like the example of *Annals of Saint Gall*. In that article, the Textbook clearly has a narrative, the narrative of successive economic development or ‘modernization’ in their term. The analysis of the Textbook, therefore, can help one understand the emerging way or strategy for retaking hegemony by New Right in South Korea.

The table of contents of the Textbook contains six chapters, and a supplementary chapter on North Korea and an appendix. The titles of each chapter are The Perspective on Modern and Contemporary History, the Fetal Movement of Modern Society and Loss of Sovereignty, Japanese Colonial Rule and the Developing of the Independence Movement, Liberation and the Construction of Nation State, Modernization Revolution, and Authoritarian Politics, and Looking for Advancement, respectively. This table of contents tells us that the narrative of the Alternative Textbook is about the modernization and advancement of the nation.

The first chapter consists of two sections. In the first section, the purpose and the perspective of the book are explained. First, it says that ‘the (South) Koreans are living under a Liberal Democratic institution (Textbook Forum 2008, 14).’ As the Constitution of the Republic of Korea declares that ‘all citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth,’ the authors emphasize that the Republic of Korea is a democratic state that guarantees equality under the law, personal liberty, and freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, and association (Textbook Forum 2008, 14). As one of the authors complained the authors of the old textbooks placed too much emphasizes on the struggles for democratization instead of the institutions of democracy (Park 2006, 62), the Textbook emphasizes more on the institutions rather than

²³⁵ Therefore, Duara (1995, 16) argues that ‘rescuing history from the nation’ is significant to understand ‘dynamic, multiple, and contested nature of historical identity.’ To understand different appropriation of the same historical fact by different groups of people would be one way to do this job.

struggles for democratization.

Even though the Textbook asked a main question ‘how can substantial institutionalization of democracy take forty years to establish after the foundation of the state whereas the state can be established in a relatively short period (Textbook Forum 2008, 15),’

1. How does *minjung* ideology successfully offer a new national identity after democratization. And how does the New Right understand this.
2. The necessity of building a new national identity based on civic nationalism and efforts to escape from ethnic nationalism.
3. The content of the new identity of Korea. Overwhelming developmentalism through writing history

7.7.1.3 *Civic versus Ethnic Nationalism*

To think about what is the subject of their history is another effective way to understand this emerging strategy on the history. As I pointed out above, one of their clear manifestation on the *raison d'être* is to overcome the nation-centric perspective on Korean history. The main author of the Textbook argues that “the authors of the Modern and Contemporary Textbook overly emphasize the ‘history of the division’ and the ‘legitimacy of the unification’ as much as we can call it a compulsion (Park 2006, 39).”

7.7.1.4 *Narrative for Liberal Democracy and Free Market Economy without Liberalism*

As I suggested above, two main assumptions of this Alternative Textbook are that they clearly divide ethnic and civic nationalism to promote South Korean identity and they believe the identity should be constructed on the fact that South Korea is based on Liberal Democracy and a Free Market Economy (Textbook Forum 2008, 5-6).

These two characteristics of South Korean society seem obvious, especially when they make compare them to the One-Party Dictatorship and (failed) Planned Economy of North Korea. Partly because this book is a history textbook, however, it is hard to find what the definition of “Liberal Democracy” and “Free Market Economy” are that the authors of this book

have in mind. In this final chapter, I will analyze the content of the book to find out what Liberal Democracy and Free Market Economy mean in the textbook and suggest what their ideal goal in society is.

7.8 Conclusion

Korean nationalism might be based on unitary ethnicity but it might be also based on different types of subjectivities created by the different groups of people. As we have seen, in the atypical period, there is little difference among the reports from conservative and progressive media as well as the statements released by the comfort women movement. It is also interesting that there are different attempts to embrace comfort women issue into their own narrative of Korean nation. More progressive media and the people who worked in the various types of democratization movements tried to embrace the comfort women story into the *minjung* narrative. While they were incorporated into the larger *minjung* narrative, the comfort women issue and comfort women survivors can be viewed in different angle. It is the agony of the weakest in the society. Women's movement groups and the women artists also tried to embrace the issue into their narrative of women in Korean society. It became the history of oppressed women not just the suffering of Korean nation. All those different attempts to incorporate comfort women story into their dissident narrative of Korean nation were almost failed. Once this issue gets inside the discourse of patriarchal nationalism, however, it becomes a monster that can no longer be stopped as we have seen in the case of Ikeda Masae.

As we have seen in this chapter, the Korean nationalism is not a static discourse. Korean nationalism is a result of the constant struggle of different political and social agents in society. Even in the conservative groups and in the progressive groups, the position to the comfort women issue and the view on Korean nation regarding it is not the same. For some patriarchal nationalist, comfort women issue is a dark side of Korean nation, so it should be hidden because it is too shame. For some comfort women issue could be the chance for Korean state to embrace all the suffering Koreans throughout the world due to the colonial experience. For some comfort

women issue is a vexing story for a Korean and they need to revenge against Japan. The Korean national identity regarding the comfort women issue has been evolved and modified with those different positions and narratives.

During the long reign of dictatorship, the Korean state constructed a strong social organization of reproductive system not only for the state lead economic system but also for the state led ideological system, modeled on the Japanese militarism. All of society – village, school, factory, company, and even the religious institutions – was organized as military organizations.²³⁶ Not only the organizational structure but also the disciplinary tools were taken from the military organizations.²³⁷ Even the dissident groups were also organized in similar manner. In the developing of everything era in the 1970s and 1980s, those military mimicking institutions were the most advanced and effective ones for most of the people. No other ways of organizing social institutions were known to people and they were almost impossible to be imposed even though one knew of different ways.

Longing for democratization was not diminished under those circumstances. People learned to find out new ways to build institutions, rules, and society. Faced with the nation omnipresent even in everyday lives, the dissidents successively created a counter identity to fight the overpowering nation-state.²³⁸ Before people tasted the fruit of democratization, many found that the reflections of themselves appeared in the mirror looked very like the figure that they had hated so much.²³⁹ The comfort women movement, in spite of many of its trials and errors, can be a starting point to discuss how a social movement organization can deal with hegemonic discourse. The analysis in this chapter and in the entire dissertation is an attempt to articulate those processes.

During the time when ‘comfort women’ survivors couldn’t tell anyone what they had experienced during the war, the collective memory in South Korea thought voluntary corps were the historic ‘comfort women’. The investigation of the usage of two terms confirms that not long

²³⁶This reorganization of whole society happened in both Koreas. See Armstrong (2003); Moon (2005)

²³⁷Some call it ‘molding minds’ (Garon 1997), others call it ‘mass dictatorship’ (Lim 2004).

²³⁸See Abelmann (1996); Lee (2007a); Koo (2001).

²³⁹For this line of criticism on the dissidents, see Lim (2000)

after the liberation and until the democratization in Korea, the term ‘comfort women’ had referred to those who often work around military bases, and the term ‘voluntary corps’ had referred to the historic ‘comfort women’.

As democratic movements progressed not only various organizations emerged but also different individual and collective identities that were not allowed and even not realized turned up. Though *minjung* played a significant role in creating a counter hegemonic identity during the democratization in Korea, there grew other types of identities around the *minjung* identity: students, workers, Christians, women, Marxists, nationalists, and even liberals. In the initial period of the comfort women movements, even before the Korean Council was established, the first testimony of comfort women survivors was delivered, the Wednesday Demonstration started and even before the difference between voluntary corps and comfort women was not in common, we saw that there were many attempts to embrace ‘comfort women’ in the various narratives of different collective identity by diverse artists, novelist, dancers, poets, and movie directors. In the initial period of the movements, we can find both nationalist and feminist description and definition of the issue in the statements.

As various media began to show interest in the comfort women issue after the former comfort women delivered testimony about what she experienced during the war, the movement for comfort women was finally launched.

CHAPTER 8 REACTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND STATE-CENTERED NATIONALISM

On April 16, 2014, the *Sewol* Ferry, which had departed a day before from the Port of Incheon and headed to *Jeju* island, sank in south-west part in the West Sea of South Korea drowning more than 300 passengers out of 476 on board. Most passengers who sank with the ferry were *Danwon* High School students, who were on the field trip to *Jeju*.²⁴⁰ People watched the sinking ship on TV in real time and were shocked by the fact that no one, except the captain, crew, and a few people who managed to escape from the vessel by themselves, was rescued. The rest of the people, who followed the public announcement on the ship to stay still and wait for rescue, were left in the sinking vessel. Since then, many people have questioned why the government rescue team could not or would not do anything to save people inside the boat while it seemed clear that they had enough time to do so. When the silent rallies against the government negligence in the rescue gradually dwindled, one of the popular slogans remained: “stay still.” Like Korean society, leaders and participants of the rallies thought the innocent people followed the order of the captain to stay still were doomed to die whereas the leaders who gave the order were saved.

The incident created a political crisis to the Park Geun-hye administration. In the 18th 2012 Presidential Election, Park received the majority votes for the first time after Korea resumed the direct election in 1987 after long suffering of military dictatorship.²⁴¹ She also became the first female president of Korea. The result of the election produced different reactions from society. Some people believed that it was a failure and shameful for the democratic Korea, since it gave a landslide victory to a daughter of the former strongman Park

²⁴⁰ By November 11, 2014, when the Korean government announced the end of the search, 295 bodies were found in and around the vessel and 9 were still missing. The report says that there were 325 sophomore students and 14 teachers from *Danwon* High School, 104 general guests and 33 crews on board. 250 students and 11 teachers were found dead or still missing.

²⁴¹ Park Geun-hye, who obtained 51.6% of the votes in the 18th 2012 presidential election, became the first female president in the history of the Republic of Korea. After the major revision in the Constitution that includes the change from indirect presidential election to direct in 1987, there have been 6 presidential elections. The percentages of the votes that each president got are as follows: Rho Tae-woo (1987), 36.6%; Kim Young-sam (1992), 42%; Kim Dae-Jung (1997) 40.3%; Rho Moo-hyun (2002), 48.9%; and Lee Myung-bak (2007) 48.6%.

Chung-hee, while others did not hide their relief from the fear that progressive and unprepared politicians might resume the power that the conservatives regained after the so-called the “lost 10 years” of progressive presidencies from 1998 to 2007. Whatever the evaluation of the result, one can hardly deny that it marked the return and consolidation of conservatism in the South Korean political landscape.²⁴² But disappointments and criticisms from the public, however, increased as people learned that none of the government emergency systems worked to save the people on the ferry. The Park Geun-hye administration hesitantly put forward some counter-plans to appease the fury of the people. Then Prime Minister, Chung Hong-won’s announcement of resignation over the tragic incident was one of them. However, soon after the Blue House nominated Moon Chang-keuk, a former journalist and chief editor of conservative *Joongang Daily*, as the next Prime Minister, it was not only so-called progressive media that questioned whether he was fit for the job.

The question on his appropriateness for the job is intriguing in a post-colonial context, especially because of Moon’s attitude to and interpretation of colonial history. He was known as one of the extreme conservatives. Even before the Personnel Hearing, the voices opposed to his nomination increased. It started with a KBS report revealing some of the conservative ideas in his public lectures and columns. The report drew immediate reactions from other media and the people.²⁴³ The most offensive statement of his lectures to many people were the quotes from a special lecture/sermon delivered at one of the mega churches in Korea, *Onnuri Community Church*. In the lecture, he stated, “Japanese colonial rule on Korea is the will of God because

²⁴² Or it can be described as a prolonged dictatorship using pseudo-democracy as Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) suggest. Though the Korean political system is not usually regarded as dictatorship after democratization, the apparatus that conservative regimes tend to utilize according to Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) is increasingly common in Korea too. Even after the direct presidential electoral system established by the democratization in 1987, the opposition party could not win election until 1998. Two so-called civil presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Muhyun, were elected and in the wake of the global economic crisis; presidential candidates from the conservative party won two consecutive elections. For example, after the result of the Korean election was released, the LA Times describes the return of conservatism in East Asia. “Both Koreas soon will be governed by the progeny of Cold War strongmen. China is in the hands of the son of one of Mao Tse-tung’s revolutionary comrades. The incoming prime minister of Japan is a long-standing hawk and the grandson of one of Japan’s war cabinet leaders.” in “Hawkish Leaders Take over in N. Asia,” LA Times, Dec 23, 2012 (internet edition, <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/23/world/la-fg-asia-nationalism-20121223> retrieved on Aug 1 2014).

²⁴³ “Moon Chang-keuk’s Statement, “Japanese Rule is God’s Will” Upsets” KBS News 9, June 11, 2014.

Koreans had been too lazy to do something during the 500 years of *Joseon* dynasty,” and continues, “after careful thought over the issue, I realized that the division of Korea was also God’s will because if it had not happened, Korea must become a communist country.” His mention in another lecture at the Seoul National University that Japan does not need to apologize for the ‘comfort women’²⁴⁴ issue, reported in other news media, fanned the flames of public anger. The criticism and opposition to his nomination quickly became serious. As intense pressures from various social groups and individuals, including “comfort women” survivors and their groups, built up against the government decision based on his remarks reported in the KBS news and other media – the nominee finally decided to resign.

The ‘comfort women’ issue does not exist only with respect to the Korea-Japan relationship or as a movement to gain redress for the victims, but it also plays an important role in everyday politics in South Korea. As is shown by this case, there are different interpretations of comfort women even in Korean society and the interpretation of the issue is often at the heart of the struggle between people who have different political positions. It also shows that the smallest groups of the elite might have a different interpretation of colonial history from the rest of the people and what seems to be the dominant interpretation of the colonial history and the comfort women issue. Whereas many other former and later prime minister candidates and other candidates for higher government offices in this regime had worse records of crimes or bribery, Mon Chang-keuk was the first candidate who resigned before the Personnel Hearing, surrendering to the strong public opinion. The interpretation of history sometimes has greater power than people thought.

On June 24, at the press conference announcing his resignation, instead of apologizing, Moon argued that he determined to step down because he did not want to become a burden to the president. He never admitted that his statements which upset many people were wrong. But only implied that his nomination created more conflict in society and threatened the president. He

²⁴⁴ Soh (2008) defines ‘Comfort women’ as follows, “an English translation of the Japanese euphemism *ianfu*, refers to the tens of thousands of young women and girls of various ethnic and national backgrounds who were pressed into sexual servitude during the Asia Pacific War that began with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and ended with Japan’s defeat in 1945. Estimates of the total number of Japan’s comfort women range between 50,00 and 200,00. Though these included small numbers of Japanese, Korean women constituted the great majority” (Soh 2008, xii)

insisted that his resignation was not followed the right procedure. Since he always believed in freedom and democracy, Moon insisted he had a right to attend the Personnel Hearing that is the part of the appointment process guaranteed by the law. Finally, he announced that the government recently confirmed that his grandfather was an independence movement activist, who allegedly gave his life for the Korean nation against Japanese colonial rule in the 1920s.²⁴⁵ The reaction to his resignation was twofold. The majority of the media welcomed it, while some of the conservative media supported his position. Though many people couldn't understand why he was so furious and why he mentioned that his grandfather was a martyr of the independence movement, many reported that his resignation was justified since he was too pro-Japanese to become a Prime Minister. His statement on "comfort women" particularly upset people. It was reported that, in his class in a university, he even argued many times that Japan does not need to apologize for the comfort women issue because Korea had already become a great country which does not need to consider the comfort women issue, but only extreme anti-Japanese sentiment prevent that. Some of the former 'comfort women' were standing in the front line in the demonstrations against his nomination and said it was not acceptable for such a man to be a Prime Minister. By contrast, conservative media that supported him argued that he was sacrificed again in a cruel witch hunting. MBC²⁴⁶ broadcasted the unedited version of the Moon's lecture/sermon in a debate TV show, excerpts of which had become the source of opposition after it was quoted in the previously mentioned KBS news show. It is believed that the show was made to counter the KBS report by airing unedited lecture/sermon to the public to minimize the distortion that may have come from a loss of context for the quotes. On a column on *Dong-a Ilbo*, editor Kim Sundeok praises the measure taken by the MBC while she criticizes the KBS. She argues that the KBS report was distorted since it omitted other parts of the statement, including "God gave us suffering and then opened a way out for us to train our nation."²⁴⁷ The tone of the other reactions was very different from this. After watching the

²⁴⁵ As we will see in the later part of the dissertation, there are many repeated themes that are easily found in the conservative narrative of Korean history in this press conference. So-called Liberal-Democracy and the "rule of law" are the common elements often mentioned in these narratives.

²⁴⁶ MBC had been criticized for its biased news reports after the pro government CEOs were appointed since President Lee Myung-bak.

²⁴⁷ "KBS report on Moon Chang-keuk Put 'Mad Cow Disease Propaganda' to Shame," Kim Sundeok

unedited version of his lecture, many confessed that the whole point that Moon made seemed no different at all. How can we explain these contrasting reactions to the same contents?

The differences in perspective between these two groups may be explained as “hostile media phenomenon” (Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985) since there are two different groups that have different political positions and both think that the media are definitely biased in favor of the opposed group. However, this is not the whole story. More importantly, this case shows that the different perspectives on Korean history and the question of what the Korean nation should properly be become the important axis of political conflict in Korean society. The discontent that led to the crisis of the Park administration was profoundly rooted in the disappointment with the incompetence of the government. The resistance and expression of disapproval directly toward the government was limited. But when the government’s solutions came to revolve around issues related history, the voice against the decision became loud.

This case makes evident many things that have not been revealed in the discourse of Korean nationalism. First, in contrast to the common belief that the Korean nation and nationalism are extremely homogeneous, it clearly shows that there are at least two distinctive groups who take different positions on the interpretation of Korean history. In other words, Koreans do not agree on “what the nation does or what it should mean” (Duara 1995, 3). Since a number of studies have found that the conventional right-left distinction might not fully explain the conflicts in Korean society, the conflict over the nomination of a Prime Minister discussed above shows that the social and political conflicts in Korea are often generated along the line of the interpretations on history or “what the nation does or what it should mean.” Apparently, in regard to the narrative of the Korean nation, there are at least two distinct groups who have different opinions on “what the nation does or what it should man.” One group affirms the history of the Korean nation before Japanese rule as it autonomously developed the sprouts of democracy, capitalism and modernity; condemns the Japanese oppression, including the so-called comfort system during the colonial period, which they believe obstructed Korean’s own moment to develop its own modernity; and questions the legitimacy of some founding fathers of the Republic of Korea concerning their dependency on foreign power as well as harsh treatment

Column, *Dong-a Ilbo*, June 22, 2014.

of the Independence activists. The other group, in contrast, condemns Korean history before colonial rule for its laziness (“too lazy to do something during 500 years of dynasty”), incompetence and ignorance; affirms Japanese colonial rule believing it brought civilization and diligence (as opposed to laziness) for the Korean people; and glorifies the establishment of the Republic of Korea, which they believe, defends the people of South Korea from communism and lets them be economically prosperous.

This also raises an interesting question about theories of nationalism. The field of nationalism studies, which is largely based on multi-national countries or on the conflicts among nations, often assumes that each nation has its own nationalism. In a multi-national or multi-ethnic society, there will be competition and conflicts between different nations or ethnicities. The possibility of contestations inside a nation has not been considered significant. Also, when a national history or nationalism finally wins out in competition with other alternative narratives of a nation, it is often assumed that the triumphant national history secures dominance in the national narrative. But the political process of Korean nationalism, which I explored in this dissertation, shows us that even after a national history is established in a relatively homogeneous nation, the competition among the groups who have different ideas on the ideal nation never stops. The Korean nation might be homogeneous but its nationalism is not. To understand this political process of nationalism, it is useful to conceptualize nationalism as discourse. Özkirimli (2005) suggests an alternative definition of nationalism, nationalism as discourse: “*nationalism is a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us*” (30). In other words, the evidence of Korea shows that there are two distinctively different groups of people in the “way of seeing and interpreting the world.” If one wants to understand, therefore, nationalism in a society, the first thing needed is to examine how different groups of people “make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds” them.

This hints that in Korean nationalism there may be irreparable fissures that national history cannot secure. Duara (1995) argues that “national history secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time” (4) and it has been influential in current studies on nationalism. However, this should not be understood that any national history can successfully secure all the existing identities and alternative

narratives. In reality, it is rather opposite. As national history keeps trying to secure and usually it seems successfully to do this, there are always competing narratives and ideas that challenge to the dominating national history. As I suggested above, in many societies including Korea, the national history often becomes the very loci of the struggles of opposite groups. Stronger group pushes its agenda and own perspectives on national history, the more distance created between the groups. In a multi-national society, for example, the dominant nation or ethnicity imposes their desirable view to the larger society and other sub nations or minor ethnicity become isolated from the dominant national history. The changes in the US history are a good example of it. History was first written with the perspective of white male but as other groups in society, including different ethnic groups, gender, and sexual orientations, voice their desirable nation, the narrative of indigenous people, African Americans, and different gender gradually added to the official narrative of the US history. I will examine how these fissures first emerged in the course of movement for democracy and later in the course of other nationalist movements, including comfort women movement.

Second, it also suggests that, in the political process of South Korea, the power of memory often plays a crucial role in creating social conflicts and even resolutions of them but in somewhat incomprehensible way. The attitude toward the comfort women issue and the interpretation of history, especially the history of the colonial period are increasingly becoming important. As we can see in the case, when the history issue became the center of the conflict in the course of politics in South Korea, the other issues, in this case, the Prime Minister candidate's view on other policy or on current government, does not matter anymore. The history issue and the nationalism as "way of seeing and interpreting the world," may not be the center of the everyday political process, when it became one, the power of it seems greater than we think. Also, the logic of the process is not well comprehended. Though the power and influence of the conservative is strong enough to win presidential election, take majority seats in the National Assembly, and be backed by steadfast supporters entrenched in society, the pressure from the public that are not happy with some remarks regarding history and Japanese colonial rule finally make the nominee resigned. It hints that nationalism as discourse in a society works as if it is hegemony as Frederic Jameson defined in a society. Majority of people may share some common ground and belief in nationalist discourse, something that is too sensitive to touch, though it may

be not congruent with the official or dominant nationalist narrative. Indeed, since Korean Prime Minister is only a symbolic figure and has very little legal authority, most of the nominated persons usually can pass the confirmation Hearing except only few cases. It was the first time for the Prime Minister Nominee to step down because public opinion deteriorated.

Third, it also identifies the main political actors that are usually engaged in the production, reproduction, and transformation of Korean nationalism. In this case, the Korean government, conservative and progressive media, and social movement groups including the so-called ‘comfort women’ survivors are the prominent actors. They all actively play and struggle over each other. After democratization and faced with the wave globalization, the government cannot enjoy its privilege of monopoly in creating, controlling and appropriating the nationalist discourse any more. Like the various social organizations, which try to negotiate their agenda with the broader society to expand their movements, the government also became to negotiate with various groups in the society. In the South Korean context, media also play important roles in creating, controlling and appropriating of nationalist discourse. It makes the picture more difficult to read. The dynamics of these actors are analyzed in the dissertation by focusing on the discursive strategy of the comfort women movement group, which reflects a “frame of reference that structures the world around Korean,” and its impact on general narrative of Korean nation.

In this dissertation, I explored this struggle over the nationalist discourse in South Korea focusing on the comfort women issue. By close analysis of different players in circulation of nationalist discourse regarding the history issues, the dissertation offers an alternative understanding of development of Korean nationalism. Korean nationalism is not static, top-bottom, but the outcome of ongoing contestation at least since the democratization period.

8.1 Textbook War

In recent decades, the struggle over historiography in South Korea has been deepened and does not seem to end soon. The most notable example is that a high school history textbook, written

by so-called “new-right”²⁴⁸ authors, published by *Gyohak* publishing, has been publicly criticized on its unbalanced descriptions and evaluations on the people and events in the colonial period and the military dictatorship era.²⁴⁹ Although conservative politicians and the media showed enthusiastic support for the textbook, most of the high schools decided not to adopt it, and even the few schools that have decided to do it had to retract the decision,²⁵⁰ after they faced fierce opposition from the public.²⁵¹ After the conservatives’ clear defeat in the “textbook war,” the Ministry of Education immediately announced that the government is considering to re-establish a new unit “dedicated to editing textbooks approved for middle and high schools,” which follows the criticisms from various parts from society, doubting that the plan implies to restore the power of the government to write one and only history textbook as it had been until 2002.²⁵²

The struggle was not that clear and visible until the major conservative Korean media

²⁴⁸ So called “new right” emerged when former members of radical nationalist student movement groups lead to organize the Alliance of Liberalism in 2004. It was fervently backed by the major conservative newspapers and the Textbook Forum is soon established to make more balanced history textbook. Their collective effort finally produces this new history textbook after 10 years passed that Forum is established.

²⁴⁹ Many critics of the textbook largely share the idea that it idealizes military dictatorship and colonial rule of Japan, while it gives high praise on the economic development. “Korea locked in war over history textbook,” *The Korea Times*, 9. 16. 2013. (http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/12/180_142911.html). Many also points out that not only the political bias of the textbook is problematic, but there are unmistakable omissions of simple facts and seemingly plagiarized even the incorrect facts from the right wing blogs and books.

²⁵⁰ Only 8 high schools in South Korea first announced to adopt the new *Gyohak* textbook but with the fierce reaction from society all the school has to change the decision later.

²⁵¹ There was telephoning, writing on the bulletin boards of schools’ websites, protesting in front of the school and signing petitions to the schools that adopted the *Gyohak* textbook. Students of the schools that decided to adopt also actively opposed to the decisions. In an article, titled “Left-leaning historical view disallows textbook diversity,” *Dong-A Ilbo*, 1. 14. 2014. (from the English online edition, <http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2014010612268>), Dong-A Ilbo, one of the leading conservative newspapers and well known supporters of the textbook, calls it a problem that “this unprecedented boycott against a certain textbook” is “not the autonomous judgment of each school.” It even argues that “the statement of the Association for Contemporary Korean History on Sunday, which says that “pushing (schools) to withdraw the adoption of *Gyohak* textbook through methods such as protesting demonstrations, audit request and threat of public sentiment is beyond the freedom of expressing one’s opinions and at the risk of violating the constitution,” is convincing. Definitely, there are the appropriations of meaning of democracy and “autonomous judgment” in their argument but I will discuss it later in this dissertation.

²⁵² “History Wars Becoming Full-blown,” *The Korean Times*, 1. 10. 2014. (https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/culture/2014/01/142_149560.html)

began to promote a soon-will-be-published scholarly edited book, *Haebang Jeonhusaui Jaeinsik* [new understanding of the history before and after the Korean liberation] (hereafter *Jaeinsik*) in 2006 and to emphasize its historical and political implication.²⁵³ The title of the book is evidently aiming the famous book, *Haebang Jeonhusaui Insik* [understanding of the history before and after the Korean liberation] (hereafter *Insik*), which is widely believed to affect the college students who actively participated in the movements for democratization in the 80's and 90's. As Lee (2002, 151-152) well illustrates, the reproduction system of the student movements in South Korea has changed along with the so-called "liberalization" of the campus and it developed around the "*hakhoe*" (students' academy-oriented groups affiliated with departments) from the mid 80's. The most important purpose of the *hakhoe* education is to let the students learn new things about their society that never be taught in school. Reading new books, such as *Insik* in the *hakhoe*, often play great roles for obedient students in transition. Roy Grinker puts it as follows:

It is necessary, at the outset, to emphasize how remarkable it is that students have been able to dissent at all. It is not easy to be admitted into a university in south Korea, especially into universities in Seoul. University students have gotten to the university because they performed extremely well on their elementary-, middle, and high -school exams, exams that require a very comprehensive and detailed knowledge and memorization of the content of state-sponsored schoolbooks (Grinker 1998, 170).

Because the student movements in South Korea are notorious for their militant fervor,²⁵⁴ it is often forgotten that the Korean university students were the most obedient followers of the norms and values approved by Korean society until they end up with participating the movements. With the Confucian cultural legacy, which exceedingly regards higher education,

²⁵³ Many indicate that the struggle actually began when the Dae Jung Kim government changed the government compiled textbook system to government approval system. Some of the law makers from conservative party point out that the many of the textbooks, published after government approval system is launched, are left leaning and too nationalist. Professors, politicians, journalist, and pastors, who shared the similar perspective on the history textbooks, established an organization to create a new history textbook with correct and balanced perspective.

²⁵⁴ Definitely, the student movements in South Korea were less militant compare to other militant movements. Though Molotov cocktails and stones were commonly used in most of the rallies in the 80s up to mid 90s, those are often used for defensive purpose only.

many people in Korean society believed that it guarantees personal success when one can be admitted to top universities and/or pass the examinations for higher government office, which had been true until the late 90s, when social mobilization became stagnant, due to the economy crisis. The standardized test made and operated by the government had been the only tool to get admission to the universities. All the students, therefore, need to study “very comprehensive and detailed knowledge and memorization of the content of state-sponsored schoolbooks.” History is the core of this state textbook system. For the students who went to Korean high school until the 1990s, history outside the school textbook was almost impossible to access.

Most of them could first gain access to histories written with different perspectives after they enter the university. The student organizations, whether it is movement based or not, and the social science bookstores near the campus were the places where they can get the resources. Reading the Korean or world history books written with Marxist, Leninist, nationalist, or liberal perspectives are often eye opening experiences for most of the students. Those books were largely used for the various study groups organized by students. Still, even the non-government-produced history books often shared the fundamental assumptions of official Korean nationalism: the Korean nation has been and will be homogeneous and eternal, and the Korean nation has to create its own unitary nation-state. But they also reveal the facts that were by and large omitted in the school textbook and can make readers question it. The questions were often about suspicious behaviors of the nationally applauded figures during the colonial era and the role of the United States, which has been believed to be the eternal friend and savior, in division of Korea and the creating the situation in favor of Japan to annex Korea. In other words, according to the revisionist analysis of US foreign policy, colonization, division of nation and following war in Korea could be the result of the rational choice of the US, which thinks about nothing but its own national interest; according to the nationalist view, there is ample evidence of the fact that the majority of great politicians, artists, and entrepreneurs of Korea might collaborate with the Japanese colonial government in ways to hurt their fellow people, rather than protest; and according to Marxist-Leninist view of Korean history, the Korean leaders merely served the interests of their own and the foreign capital, conspiring with the comprador capital, in the capitalist world order, that was led by those big powers. *Insik* has been believed to be the one of the most popular and foundational books that is responsible for dissemination of

these perspective,²⁵⁵ as Han Youngwoo summarizes the influence of *Insik* in his introductory article on the publication of *Jaesik* that, “after first volume was published in 1979, continually being printed to the sixth volume, *Insik* has disseminated left revisionist view on Korean history into academics and ordinary readers.”²⁵⁶

8.1.1 Backlash from the Conservative

Therefore, it is natural response that many of the major conservative Korean media highly praised *Jaesik*. The title of the *Jaesik* directly challenges the famous book for the people who attended university in the 80s and 90s. Though the title could be made only to serve the marketing goals of the publisher,²⁵⁷ it obviously attracted the conservative media, which had been longing for new types of historiography that can challenge the history written by leftist historians, as it is clearly expressed on *Chosun Ilbo* that “a new book which is “correcting the flaws and bias’ of this book [*Insik*].”²⁵⁸ They seem to believe that the democratic transition of the political regime is heavily owing to the democratic, if not leftist, education, which enabled the students to participate in the movements. There was fear that the history textbook, which emphasize the importance of nation and unification, economic justice, and revealing collaborate behaviors of Korean heroes.

In the introduction, the editor clarifies the problems of the historians’ perspective, represented especially well in the *Insik*, they are so “leaning toward nationalism that almost all history of Korea is written with nationalist perspective.” “Too nationalist” has become the magic

²⁵⁵ This is even the belief that conservative media are account for. *Insik* is hard to be seen as well-organized and thematically united volumes. Rather, it compiles different articles written by different persons, in their political view, social status, and academic depth. The *Insik* includes articles written by so-called non-institutional scholars or *Jaeya* scholars, graduate students – most of them later became renowned political scientists or historians, foreign scholars as well as renowned university professors mostly critical to the mainstream historiography.

²⁵⁶ “Pulbication of *Haebangjeonbusani Jaesik*; Correcting the Left-Leaning History,” *Chosun Ilbo*, 2. 8. 2006. (<http://www.chosun.com/culture/news/200602/200602080482.html>)

²⁵⁷ Actually, many of the contributors both contribute their articles both to *Insik* and *Jaesik*. They immediately refused to the politicization of the books, as conservative media framed.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. *Chosun Ilbo*.

word for Korean conservatives. For them, reckless nationalism is always dangerous since it blinds people to see the flaws and injustice in North Korea, which threatens the security not only of South Korea but also of East Asia. Also, reckless nationalism praises the autonomy of nation and ignores complex international relations around Koreas. The result is praising North Korea for being autonomous from the big powers and degrading South Korean leaders for being too dependent on the super powers. The editors of *Jaeinsik* argue that now is the time to rewrite Korean history with a more balanced perspective and theoretical tools to adjust the distortion. It is a crucial turning point in Korean nationalism. Until the emergence of “new right” and *Jaeinsik*, nationalism enjoyed its dominant ideological position. The conservative almost successfully turn the positive connotation in the term nationalism into something negative. After there have been many attempts to solidify this upside down of the meaning. Conservative media and politicians blame left nationalism for covering human rights violations in North Korea, disseminating negative image of great conglomerates, and its robust anti-USA sentiment. Now no one would be surprised to see the statement that “left nationalism in Korea is undermining the fundamentals of the Republic of Korea by adopting uncritical nationalism and applying it to Korean history.”

So when the New York Times condemned both Japanese and South Korean leaders on their push “to have high school history textbooks in their countries rewritten to reflect their political views” on its editorial,²⁵⁹ it seems appropriate that it points out that the nature of history wars both in Japan and Korea are fundamentally identical. But it overlooked the fact that this political distortion of the history textbook was not just begun from and by President Geun-hye Park or Prime Minister Abe but was created by more conservative sects in political realm in both countries from the time when the societies began to challenge the official national narrative. The effort to make their own history more “proud” already began from the early 1980s, which follows immediate oppositions from the neighboring countries, and the effort reached its peak when conservative politicians and scholars organize a non-government institution, devoting to create more “balanced and glorifying” history book in the mid-2000s, during the time when Koizumi was the Prime Minister in Japan. In Korea, too, when the longtime opposing party first became to the ruling party in Korean history and change government compile textbook system

²⁵⁹ “Politicians and Textbooks,” *The New York Times*, 1. 13. 2014.
(<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/opinion/politicians-and-textbooks.html? r=0>)

into government approval system, conservative politicians and movement leaders raised questions on the newly adopted textbooks under government approval system, arguing that most of the textbooks were written by former student activists and there are many distortions and unbalanced descriptions and evaluations on the former regimes. In the mid-2000s, the Alliance for Textbook was also organized in South Korea and it tried to write a “balanced” textbook and get approval by the government. *Gyohak* textbook is the result of it.

This struggle over history between conservative and democratic groups in Korea, which is almost identical to that of Japan, makes it possible for many people who have studied Korea and the people who think they knew well about Korean nationalism to raise questions. From when and why did the fissure emerged on nationalism and historical consciousness in Korea (and Japan), where many people believed that it is consist of more homogeneous nation than any other and which has been criticized of its exclusive nationalism not only from the outside but also from the inside? How has this fissure developed and will be developed? In other words, how has Korean nationalism after the nation-state developed and will change? These are the questions that this dissertation seeks to provide answers. Not like common belief, Korean nationalism is not homogeneous, static and formed from above. Rather, Korean nationalism has been the hegemonic loci where state and various societal groups compete over the domination, especially after the democratization.

8.2 Pride of State, Victory of Development

It should be noted that the historical narrative that the Korean New Rights try to impose in the Korean education system is not free from nationalism. It might be free from ethnic nationalism, as they argue, but the historical narrative they are delineate is much more nationalistic, in a sense that their priority is not individual freedom, degree of democracy, or the egalitarian values but the utilitarian development of the state. For them, increasing sum of the utility of Korea wins everything.

For example, in the introduction of the Alternative Textbook: Modern History of Korea (2008) published prior to the *Gyohak* textbook, the authors say that the purpose of this book is to

“fairly introduce a lot of facts if possible” (Textbook Forum 2008, 5). The emphasis on the facts reflects its positivistic view on history and on the fairness is to express the will to avoid “nation-centered” perspective on history. Rather than Korean nation [*uri minjok*], the authors see the Korean [*han-gugin*] as the subject of history. It is still not clear whether Korean is ethnicity or membership of the Korean state, though the authors argue that “by doing that, the history of the past 130 years has changed to the history of the ordinary people who have been longing for freedom and human rights, and have tried to improve their social and economic status” (5). With the positivistic perspective and non-nationalist view on history, it focuses on “the historical process of the birth of the Republic of Korea” (6). Since the existing history textbooks do not “deal with how precious the Republic of Korea is and what have achieved through 60 years from the establishment of the state” (7), the authors will focus on the birth of the state and fairly deal with the achievement that the state fulfilled.

It is interesting to note that the authors of the Alternative Textbook inherit the important parts of nationalistic discourse that Park made in some way. They do not accept the narrative of Korean nation as an ethnic community but they share the idea with Park Chung-hee that the state or the Republic of Korea is the most important and the only community that Korean can be loyal. For them, the Republic of Korea is synonym to liberal democracy and liberal market economy.

Finally, in this book, we have devoted a special affection to the historical process of the birth of the Republic of Korea. It is because this state is based on liberal democracy and liberal market economy, which is adequate, the most adequate to promote the people’s life to be free and abundant. This state is not made out of nothing. It is the state made out of the efforts of the pioneers since the Korean Enlightenment.

This is reactionary movement backed by the conservative media in Korea. As the conservative party lost in the President election in 1997 and again in 2002, they thought the reason why they lost was because of the political orientation of younger generation, who were educated after the democratization. The more progressive interpretation of the modern history based on the nationalism by the radical history teachers who participated in the democratization movement in the 1980s was taught in school and some conservative thought they need to prevent the younger generation learning those kinds of radical idea from school.

Instead of promoting nationalist values, the so-called New Right emphasizes the Republic of Korea, liberal democracy and the economic development. Even though they seem to support liberal idea and promote democracy while they highlight the liberal democracy, it should be noted that the term liberal democracy is more a reified idea rather than the literal meaning of it. It is possible because they prioritize the economic development to everything else. The dictatorship and the oppression of liberty can be understandable as long as people's economic well-being is increased. It seems to reflect the Neoliberal idea which was very popular in that moment but it also has root in the nationalist idea paved by Park Chung-hee as we examined before.

This utilitarian idea of nation cannot help but conflicting with the comfort women movement. First, it seems the conflict between the positivistic view and the nationalist view on history. Like the right-wing positivist historians in Japan, the New Right in Korea points out that there are many unproven problems in the comfort women movement hugely based on the testimony of survivors. Like the feminist scholars, the New Right also indicates that the Japanese perpetrator vs. Korean victim can no longer work because there were many Koreans also involved in the recruitment and operation of comfort system.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism of the Republic of Korea has been criticized for being one of the most exclusive and discriminative nationalisms. The ethnic nationalism of Korea became widespread throughout society in the 1960s and 70s. Because Korean nation is relatively homogenous and the content of nationalism is exclusive and hostile to former colonizer, the conflict over history issue in East Asia often understood as one of the dangerous non-Western type nationalisms that is encouraged by the state and political elites. With the theoretical tools to understand the ethnic conflicts among the different nation-states or in the multi-ethnic nation, it is difficult to understand the process of nationalism in a relatively homogeneous nation-state, like Korea. Those are rarely understood as “challenge” and “(re)construction” of new forms of identity.

Alternative typology that can understand the different nationalist discourses emerged in a relatively homogeneous nation-state shed a new light to the process of nationalist discourse in Korean society around the comfort women issue. With the alternative typology, we can think about the nationalism based on the voluntary social organization and appeal to universal values rather than the values set by the community. The official narrative of Korean nation, which is state-centered, patriarchal and prioritizes the economic values and efficiency, has constantly modified as various social movements, especially the comfort women movement, after the democratization, engaged in (re)constructing the nationalist identity with a communitarian nationalist discursive strategy, which are based more on the universal value and can be expanded to transnational sympathy.

The comfort women movement has transformed its discursive strategies from ethnic nationalism to universal values, such as human rights, women’s rights, and peace. Though it began with nationalist resentment towards former colonial power and the patriarchal sympathy for the victims, it disseminated the idea that the comfort women victims are not only the victims of the colonial rule but also the victims of violence against women during the war and the victims of patriarchy and militarism. This turn enabled movement groups to expand the Korean nationalist discourse to the sympathetic not only to the victims of own patriarchal state but also victims abroad suffered from the atrocities done by Korean state. The alliance with the prostitution around the US bases in Korea and with the victims of the Vietnamese war suffered

by the Korean military. So far, ethnic identity or national identity are believed to be the only driving forces to challenge and (re)construct existing nation state, but as is shown in Korean case, aspiration to some universal values mixed with ethnic nationalist sentiment is also one of the important driving forces that gives pressure to existing nationalism to change.

Faced with the comfort women issue, which is important parts of the Korean identity, various groups in society including the state, compete over the idea of how they “make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds” them. There have been many attempts for different social groups to incorporate the comfort women issue in their narrative of Korean nation or alternative identities. Democratic movement groups began to embrace the issue to their *minjung* narrative, women’s movement also tried to create history of Korean women including the agonies of ‘comfort women’. Patriarchal patriots took the comfort women issue aside since they thought it disgrace the honor of their male patriots. New Right scholars tried to show that how much flaw the nationalist historians have had, using the comfort women issue.

I have examined what kind of theoretical framework is needed to look at the comfort women movement and its impact on Korean social nationalism. If I summarize roughly the works of the scholars who studied Korean nationalism, it is a strong ethnic nationalism; at the very least, it has not only maintained as a state of one nation since the *Goryeo* Dynasty but also had a narrative of the origin of the nation; foundation of modern nationalism was built by the intellectuals at the end of *Joseon* dynasty; and such nationalism has been maintained through various ideological state apparatuses since the establishment of the Republic of Korea. From these points of views, the most common presupposition is that Korean nationalism is viewed as a strong ethnic nationalism with primordial point of view and a nationalism conveyed from top to bottom, and a nationalism with little change after its formation.

	State-framed nationalism	Counter-state nationalism
Community-oriented nationalism	State-centered nationalism (militarism, fascism, right wing movements)	Substate nationalism (national minorities, Indigenous)
Value-oriented nationalism	Institutional nationalism (liberal nationalism)	Communitarian nationalism (Movement groups based on

With this new typology, we can understand that both the conservative nationalism, which gives

highest priority to the state as community and denounce ethnic nationalism, and the nationalism, which does not give unconditional loyalty to the national community and regard it as more of a source for sympathy for victims of crimes committed by state and focus more on universal values, such as human rights, liberty and equality are all different kinds of nationalism.

In this dissertation, I maintained the view of nationalism as a discourse, and after the state established state apparatus to control the entire society after the 1960s, official nationalism, which was effectively shared by all citizens. It showed that after the democratization, nationalist discourse itself became a field of ideological struggle as the Korean nationalism became the part of different world view of various social forces.

I also argued that Park Chung-hee's nationalist world view provides the roots of various nationalist discourses after the democratization of Korean society and analyzed what it was. After he succeeded in the coup in 1961, Park made the mobilization system, reaching out until the far end of the Korean society, almost as if Japan was developing as a militarist state since the Meiji era. Thus, official Korean nationalism created by him and his brains spread throughout society through such a system, repeatedly reproduced through diverse disciplines, and transformed in different ways through individual organizations within society. In the 80s, the workers in the labor movement were organized and managed under these rules, and the students in the student movement were the hardest learners and memorize doctrines of these countries.

Park Chung-hee served as a teacher in the province during the Japanese occupation and went to Manchuria to enter the Manchu Military Academy at a relatively old age and became a Japanese military officer. It is evident that his nationalistic worldview was greatly influenced by Japan's imperialist worldview. Many social organizations and disciplines of the Park Chung-hee era, such as the National Education Charter, the patriotist morning assembly at school, the Saemaoul Movement, etc., also existed in the age of Japanese imperialism.

Park's worldview, the view of thorough ethnic nationalism, explains both his coup, the restoration, and economic development in the narrative of nationalist historical development. To Park, Chung-hee, the Korean nation is the community of destiny divided by blood. And for him, the republic of Korea, the state, is the Korean nation itself. Therefore, it becomes possible to make the logic that all Koreans should sacrifice to the state for the rebirth of the Korean nation.

The narrative, which became the basic framework of the history of the Korean nation, is also found in the works of Park Chung-hee. Park sees the world as a state in which the nations compete for wealth and territory, a typical Hobbesian “the struggle of all against all.” Joseon, defeated in such competition – the emergence of imperialism – is depicted as the most lazy and corrupt era by Park Chung-hee. The Korean people, who had been plunged with their large territories in the past, became weak, lazy and corrupt after the Joseon Dynasty. Through the Japanese imperialism, the independence of the nation was damaged. Through the Korean War, the land was ruined. After the war, under the name of freedom, political groups that think only of interest of their own have had more difficult times. Only through his revolution - the *coup d'etat* - the October *Yusin* – the constitutional amendment that enabled him permanent presidency – the Korean people were rejuvenated for the first time.

Some of the interesting things in these narratives are found, which are repeated themes in both the state-centered and communitarian nationalism of Korea. In this narrative, the history of Korean people's freedom is also considered important, as he bravely conducted a revolution for freedom and rights, Korean people revolutionized the corrupt democratic and political forces. People showed the power to restore the rights and freedoms that were damaged through the *Donghak* movement or the 4.19 revolution. Though 5.16 is absent, but the narrative of the democratization movement, starting with *Donghak*, through 4.19 and 5.18, leading to the 1987's civil revolution, is similar.

The basic frame of thought of national-centered nationalism is also found in Park's view of nationalism. In Park 's nationalistic narrative, the rise and fall of a nation is mainly determined by the most economic poverty and prosperity. When people are poor and unable to eat, the nation is not doing well. These patten of thought is repeated in the same way in the history of the New Right, and they also make the element of economic development as a top priority in the development of Kora. Therefore, all that contributed to such development is good and all that did not contribute to such development or everything that interferes is evil.

In Park 's view of the nationalist world, many of Korea' s conservative thinking and progressive thinking can somehow be viewed as both sides of the coin. Although progressive nationalism recognizes itself as nationalist, it has diversified and developed or stagnated since

democratization. However, conservative nationalists are turning all groups and individuals that are disturbed by it as the sole measure of the economy without being aware of themselves as nationalists.

In chapter 5, I have looked at how the words *jeongsindae* and *wianbu* were used in Korean media before the 1990s. There have been many controversies over the use and meaning of this term, but it was a very simple matter to look at the usage in Korean society before the 1990s. In its simplest terms, *jeongsindae* was used to mean almost historical comfort women after liberation, and *wianbu* meant almost a prostitute, especially a prostitute working around the army.

The use of these terms seems to have been used in the Korean society without any doubt until the comfort women issue became politicized and socially known. *Wianbu* has been used as a general noun since the time of Japanese imperialism, which means prostitutes around the military. And when the comfort women were recruited and after the war was over, those who were taken to ‘comfort women’ were called *jeongsindae* among Koreans partly because some of them drafted to voluntary corps were actually became comfort women and partly because such rumors may have been made as a way of resistance to the recruitment of young school girls. Whatever the reason, the use of *jeongsindae* to refer to comfort women was not contrived by some of the movement groups for their national agendas, but only reflecting the usage that has been used from the very short period after the end of colonization.

The discursive strategy of the movements for comfort women has changed dramatically in a couple of decades. The most changes occurred in motivational frames, which is closely related to the formation of the identity. In the initial stage, there were no motivational frames. First, it called upon to the Japanese government, expanded to the Korean government, to participants and finally to every people in the world who shares the desire for justice and peace. The changes and expansion of the motivational frames affect the change of diagnostic frames.

Criticism towards the movement groups that nationalist agenda haunts them may be right.²⁶⁰ In the initial period of the movement and faced with the threat of the AWF, the

²⁶⁰ Most well-known critic in this position is Soh (2008). She argues that the Korean movement groups and media created the fiction of all the comfort women were initially recruited as voluntary corps. I disputed this

movement groups depended upon nationalist discourses and concealed the complex nature of comfort women issue.

Which is more responsible for the dominant nationalist interpretation on the comfort women issue in Korea? Is it the movement groups for comfort women or is it the strong nationalist sentiment already powerful and provided very little room for the members of the society to think outside it? The hegemonic nature of Korean nationalism has prevented many actors in the society from thinking outside of it. There is the window that we can see what the comfort women movements have done to Korean nationalism. For example, Lee (2015, 48) argues that “whereas ‘comfort women’ or ‘voluntary corps’ issue had been the issue of violated women’s chastity which should not be socially discussed so far, as the laws, policies, and movements related to ‘comfort women’ issue is getting shaped, the recognition of has changed to the issue of war, human rights, and historical responsibility.” Only through the process of its movement, it can go beyond the nationalist hegemony.

During the long reign of dictatorship, the Korean state constructed a strong social organization of reproductive system not only for the state-led economic system but also for the state led ideological system, modeled by the Japanese militarism. All society – village, school, factory, company, and even the religious institutions – was organized as military organization.²⁶¹ Not only the organizational structure but also the disciplinary tools were taken from the military organizations.²⁶² Even the dissident groups were also organized in similar logic. In the developing of everything era in the 1970s and 1980s, those military mimicking institutions are most advanced and effective one for most of the people. No other ways of organizing social institution were known to people and were almost impossible to impose even though one knew the different ways.

Longing for democratization was not diminished under those environments. People

argument in earlier chapter. Japanese conservatives also in the similar position. Korean feminists have somewhat different position that “in the representation of ‘comfort women’ issue, nationalist logic deprived and appropriated the violence against women in colony/war” (Lee 2015, 50). For these position, see Kim (2006); Kang and Yamasida (1993).

²⁶¹ This reorganization of whole society happened in both Koreas. See Armstrong (2003); Moon (2005)

²⁶² Some call it ‘molding minds’ (Garon 1997), others call it ‘mass dictatorship’ (Lim 2004).

learned to find out new ways to build institutions, rules, and society. Faced with the massive nation omnipresent even in everyday lives, the dissents successively created counter identity to fight the overpowering nation-state.²⁶³ Before people tasted the fruit of democratization, many found that the reflections of themselves appeared in the mirror looked very like the figure that they have hated so much.²⁶⁴ The comfort women movement, in spite of many of its trials and errors, can be a start point to discuss how a social movement organization can deal with the hegemonic discourse. The analysis in this chapter and whole dissertation is an attempt to articulate those processes.

During the time when ‘comfort women’ survivors couldn’t tell anyone what they had experienced during the war, the collective memory in South Korea thought voluntary corps were the historic ‘comfort women’. The investigation of the usage of two terms confirms that not long after the liberation and until the democratization in Korea, the term ‘comfort women’ had referred to prostitutes more often working around military bases, and the term ‘voluntary corps’ had referred to the historic ‘comfort women’.

As democratic movements progressed not only various organizations emerged but also different individual and collective identities that were not allowed and even not realized turned up. Though *minjung* has played a central role in creating a counter hegemonic identity during the democratization in Korea, there grew other types of identities around the *minjung* identity: students, workers, Christians, women, Marxists, nationalists, and even liberals. In the initial period of comfort women movements, even before the Korean Council was established, the first testimony of comfort women survivor was delivered, the Wednesday Demonstration started and even before the difference between voluntary corps and comfort women is not a common sense, we saw that there were many attempts to embrace ‘comfort women’ in the various narratives of different collective identities by diverse artists, novelist, dancers, poets and movie directors. In the initial period of the movements, we can find the both nationalist and feminist description and definition of the issue on the statements.

As media began to show interest in the comfort women issue after the former comfort

²⁶³ See Abelman (1996); Lee (2007a); Koo (2001).

²⁶⁴ For this line of criticism on the dissidents, see Lim (2000)

women delivered testimony what she experienced during the war, the movement for comfort women finally launched.

Another change is reactionary. Of course, this reactionary state-centered nationalism was not created by directly responding to the comfort women's movement, but the comfort women issue became the most difficult and sensitive issue to deal with for this reactionary groups. It is worthwhile to point out that the time when the New Right's view on history has begun to matter was begun with a commenting on comfort women that they were prostitutes by a renowned economist of New Right on a TV debate. Of course, if we look at such a process, the issue of comfort women is one of the most important strains that weave the Korean society and it can be seen as an ideology like religious belief. However, on the one hand, when Korean politicians and the media were in a disadvantageous situation, these historical issues were also used as means of escaping the crisis.

. In conclusion, if we look at the relationship between the comfort women movement and the Korean nationalism discourse, even in Korean society, which is known to be composed of a relatively single nation and is believed by the members of the community that has a very strong exclusive and racial nationalism, nationalism is constantly reexamined and evolving in various directions. Therefore, various issues that constitute nationalism, including the issue of comfort women, are central to the identity of Koreans, and it is therefore very difficult to use them for political reasons.

The changes and impacts of the comfort women 's discourse in Korean society have the advantage of being extended to other studies. For example, how the Japanese, Chinese, and American media deal with these historical issues and how discourse strategies of historical movement organizations in Korea are introduced and accepted when translated into other languages and if it is analyzed, it could provide a more useful analysis of how the United States, which is deeply involved in East Asia and East Asia, has dealt with historical problems and how they can develop.

APPENDIX: Coding Sheet

1. Article publication year
2. Article publication month
3. Article publication date (ex. January 9, 1994-1994-01-09)
4. Article start page number
5. Name of the author
6. Background of the author
 - 1) Journalist
 - 2) Scholars
 - 3) Experts
 - 4) Activists
 - 5) Government officials
 - 6) General Reader
7. Ethnicity of the author (infer from the last name of the author) – only apply for Ed/O
 - 1) Western
 - 2) Japanese
 - 3) Chinese
 - 4) Korean
 - 5) Other
8. Number of words in article
9. Number of words related to the issue in article
10. Is there a direct quote within the article from a government official?
 - 1) US
 - 2) Japan
 - 3) China
 - 4) Korea
11. Is the name of the official cited?
 - 1) US
 - 2) Japan
 - 3) China
 - 4) Korea
12. Is there a reaction of the opposition in the article?
 - 1) No
 - 2) Yes
13. Which personalities appear in the article?
 - 1) US President
 - 2) US Secretary of the State
 - 3) US Secretaries of other department
 - 4) US politician
 - 5) US state politician
 - 6) Japanese Prime Minister
 - 7) Japanese Foreign Minister
 - 8) Japanese other Minister

- 9) Japanese politician
 - 10) Japanese local politician
 - 11) Chinese Prime Minister/President
 - 12) Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs
 - 13) Chinese other Minister
 - 14) Chinese politician
 - 15) Chinese local politician
 - 16) Korean President
 - 17) Korean Foreign Minister
 - 18) Korean other Ministers
 - 19) Korean politicians
 - 20) Korean local politicians
14. The general topic of the headline is?
- 1) Comfort Women
 - 2) Japanese textbook revision
 - 3) Yasukuni
 - 4) Takeshima/Dokdo
 - 5) others
15. Overall position of the article
- 1) Critical to Japan
 - 2) Leaning to Japan
 - 3) neutral
16. Which position is introduced in the article?
- 1) US
 - 2) Japan
 - 3) China
 - 4) Korea

Questions 17-29 refer specifically to articles having to do with protest groups

- 17. Name of first group mentioned in article (see list of groups)
 - 18. Name of second group mentioned in article.
 - 19. Name of third group mentioned in article.
 - 20. Name of fourth group mentioned in article.
 - 21. Name of fifth group mentioned in article.
 - 22. Name of sixth group mentioned in article
 - 23. Name of seventh group mentioned in article.
24. The Place of the events
- 1) US
 - 2) Japan
 - 3) China
 - 4) Korea
25. Type of activity described in article
- 1) Article does not describe actual protest (go to question 18)
 - 2) Expression of protest (e.g., condemnation, statement of opposition)
 - 3) Report, declaration, or threat of future activity

- 4) Meeting or conference
 - 5) Demonstration
 - 6) Damage Japanese property
 - 7) Injuring Japanese
 - 8) Initiation of publicity campaign
26. Level of violence of actions.
- 1) No signs of violence
 - 2) Legal but aggressive acts
 - 3) Self-injury
 - 4) Protest which includes physical clash with police or army
 - 5) Property damage to Japanese
 - 6) Injuring Japan
 - 7) Others
27. Context of protest.
- 1) No specific context is noted
 - 2) Japanese politician's blatant action or speech
 - 3) Summit talk
 - 4) Japanese textbook revision
 - 5) Ceremony related to WWII
 - 6) Other
28. Is there a direct quote from protesters?
- 1) No
 - 2) Yes
29. Is the name of the protester quoted?
- 1) No
 - 2) Yes

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