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PATTERNS OF FOREIGN POLICY AMONG
THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1946-1966

by

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Master of Letters in the Faculty of
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INTRODUCTION

Relations between the United States and Latin America have long been analysed in terms of the inter-American system. A great number of studies in the structure and operation of this system have been written, and they, in their turn, have served to define a particular approach to the study of international politics in the Americas. Basically this approach concentrates on the relations of the United States with Latin American countries at the expense of relations between Latin American countries themselves. So that while there are many studies of United States relations with any particular Latin American state there are virtually none of relations between Latin American states. Yet, it is apparent that to some extent the Latin American states do interact among themselves, and that the consequences of such interaction could well be the development of sub-systems within the Latin American sub-system. If such sub-systems exist they could well have a considerable, if/

if not a decisive influence on the development of the inter-American system. The identification of sub-systems within the Latin American sub-system is therefore both a necessary and a neglected task.

Sustaining this need for 'identification' are current developments in international relations theory. The division of the subject into contending rather than complementary partial approaches, foreign policy analysis and systems analysis, was perhaps necessary at first, but now constitutes a major limitation on further understanding. In particular, theory has only taken note of, rather than directly sought to explain, major theories of contemporary international politics centering around the emergence of the Third World. Where analysis in this direction has been undertaken many old concepts such as 'spheres of influence', 'hierarchy' and 'intervention' have had to be revised and 'new' areas of focus created. One of the most promising of these has been the 'region' and various approaches from a theoretical and a comparative viewpoint have recently/

recently been made.¹ The tentative findings from these studies so far suggest that 'local' factors strongly influence foreign policies in the Third World. Such a conclusion clearly warrants testing against the reality of Latin America, especially as there is no agreement as to whether Latin America is one or many regions with one or many distinctive sets of international politics.

The assumption on which this study is based, then, is that it is both meaningful and necessary to view the foreign policies of Latin American states from a regional perspective. Within Latin America one area in particular - the Caribbean basin - appears especially worthy of attention as it has, more than any other area, been at the centre of contemporary inter-American politics. Consequently, the approach of this study is to focus/

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1. See, in particular, Louis J. Cantori and Stephen L. Spiegel The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 1970) and Jorge I. Domínguez "Mice that do Not Roar: Some Aspects of International Politics in the World's Peripheries" International Organization, Vol.25, No.2., 1971.

focus on the Caribbean with the aim of illustrating the regional foreign policies of its states from a variety of aspects and at a number of levels. To this end, the study is organised in three major sections corresponding to particular areas of argument and interest. Thus, the major task of Part One is to show that from the Caribbean area in general it is possible to identify a region in particular. The major task of Part Two is to provide a brief and basic description of patterns of political interaction between states in this region. And the major task of Part Three is to introduce the question of 'system' and then to further describe and account for the nature of international politics in the region. Finally, in the Conclusions, a few generalisations are offered and some particular cases discussed.

P A R T O N E

THE CARIBBEAN AS A REGION:

GENERAL INDICATORS, PARTICULAR INDICATORS
AND DEFINITION

THE CARIBBEAN AS A REGION:

GENERAL INDICATORS, PARTICULAR INDICATORS AND DEFINITION.

The emphasis in international relations research has been at either the independent state level - foreign policy research; or at the level of the international system as a whole-bi-polarity, multi-polarity, etc. An intermediate level has generally been ignored.¹

A major problem of the intermediate level is to specify what it is! Is it groupings of States based on geography, military alliance, economic alliance, political performance in the international system, socio-cultural similarities, recent history, etc? Examples, some being based on only one and others on more than one of the above criteria, are to/

1. This is particularly marked in respect of the Third World. Some major exceptions are the following:-

L. Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System", World Politics, Vol.10., No.2., 1958.

L.W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.12., No.3., 1968.

M. Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies, The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia", World Politics, Vol.15., No.1., 1963.

T. Hodgkin, "The New West Africa State System", University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol.31., No.1., 1961.

G. Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies, The Case of South-east Asia", International Relations, Vol.2., 1961.

W. Zartmann, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations", International Organization, Vol.21., No.3., 1967.

to be found in the international system.²

What has generally been accepted is the existence of Latin America as a region at the intermediate level.³ However, political scientists interested in the region are often led to pessimism as regards establishing a meaningful understanding other than one based on the study of the separate political process of each state.⁴ Here Binder's remark that "the burden of proof that an area exists rests with the area specialist"⁵ becomes significant. Taking up this point, this section seeks to establish that a Caribbean region exists as a particularly marked sub-region, within Latin America; moreover, that for purposes of understanding its international relations it can be treated as a region proper. It does this by moving from the general indicators of a Caribbean area to the particular indicators of a Caribbean region - these indicators being used to define the region fairly rigidly.

-
2. Military Alliance - N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., Warsaw Pact, Rio Treaty.
Economic Alliance - E.E.C., C.O.M.E.C.O.N., L.A.F.T.A., E.F.T.A.
Political Performance - the Western Bloc, the Eastern Bloc, the O.A.S., the O.A.U., the states at the non-aligned conferences.
Socio-cultural - the Arab States, Latin America.
Recent History - the Commonwealth, the Federations of the West Indies, and of Malaysia.
 3. A universal example of this is the recognition of Latin America as a region within the U.N. as provided for under Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter
 4. See, for example: J.D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics", Journal of Politics Vol.28., No.1., 1966.
 5. Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System", p.410.

The General Indicators of the Caribbean Area

The inter-American system has primarily been seen as relations between the United States and the countries of Latin America rather than one of wider interaction between the countries in the system. By wider interaction I mean the relations between the Latin American states themselves exclusive of those with the United States. If the Latin American states have occasionally exhibited 'bloc' tendencies vis-à-vis the United States they retain significant differences amongst themselves. That these differences may fall into patterns is revealed by two studies of the area. Both, using different methodologies, arrive at a somewhat similar conclusion - that there is enough evidence to venture the existence of a Caribbean area.

Galtung, Mora and Schwartzmann base their study on social stratification variables. They find four levels which in descending order are:

1. the World level of Great Powers,
2. the inter-American system with the United States as Class 1,
3. the Latin American Level with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile in superior positions, and
4. the possibility of a Central American level with Costa Rica and Cuba in superior positions.⁶

6. Johan Galtung, Manuel Mora y Arayo, Simon Schwartzmann, "El Sistema Latinoamerica de Naciones: un Analisis Estructural", America Latina Ano 9. No.1 p.84.

Russett bases his study, over several time periods, on five criteria of a socio-cultural, political, economic and geographical nature. He finds that Latin America in the 1950's possessed many of the attributes of an international sub-system and that this was particularly marked in respect of Central America and Gran Colombia considered together from the rest of Latin America, but that this coherence began to fall away in the early 1960's. While considering the Central American states and the other continental states bordering the Caribbean to be a core group he does not consider them to constitute a sub-system by themselves.⁷

Apart from the obvious factor of geographic proximity the other criteria that Russett uses, when used by others, often define the particular characteristics of the Caribbean area.

Vekemans and Segundo use a socio-economic typology to place the greater number of countries in the Caribbean area in two groups. One group consists of El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. The other group consists of Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Panama. For Latin America as a whole, six groups were needed.⁸

Martz recognises the similarity of the political process within/

-
7. Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A study in political ecology. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. 1967) pp.175-176.
 8. Vekemans and Segundo, "Essay of a socio-economic typology of Latin American countries" in E. de Vries and J. Medina Echavarría (ed), Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America (Paris: UNESCO, 1963).

within the six states of the Central American Isthmus, and Peterson in respect of four of them - Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.⁹

Haas and Schmitter note that the chances of moving towards economic and political integration are greater in the C.A.C.M. than in L.A.F.T.A.¹⁰

More importantly, however, the United States and the states of Latin America have seen the Caribbean as a special area.

The O.A.S. has three times considered the Caribbean area as being a particular political problem. Firstly in respect of the study undertaken by the I.A.P.C. in 1949 on the general Caribbean situation. Secondly through the action of the Provisional Organ of Consultation in 1950 in appointing an Investigating Committee to consider "the abnormal conditions prevailing in the Caribbean area". Thirdly to consider "the grave situation that existed in the region of the Caribbean" the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers was called in 1959.

The United States as the major external power in the Caribbean has/

-
9. J.D. Martz, Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press 1959) and R. Peterson, "Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua" in Burnett and Johnson (ed) Political Forces in Latin America (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc. 1968).
 10. E.B. Haas and P.C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America". International Organization, Vol.18, No.4. 1964.

has pursued a specific Caribbean policy.¹¹

Finally, the existence of conferences and publications dealing exclusively with the Caribbean area indicate an academic awareness of its existence as a region.¹²

Given that the above are indicators of a Caribbean area, other than one of geography, the area nevertheless remains ill-defined. It could be as large as the geographic unit of the Caribbean itself, that is, at present, twenty sovereign states physically present and interacted - four of which, Great Britain, France, The Netherlands and the United States, are essentially external to the region.¹³ Or it could be very small and fragmented, e.g. the Central American Republics by themselves, the ex-British Colonies by themselves/

11. The literature on this policy is beginning to be extensive, and although there is often considerable disagreement over emphasis on aspects of policy, its general lines have been sketched out in J. Lloyd Meacham, A Survey of United States - Latin American Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1965) Chpt.10.

12. The 17 volumes of the Caribbean Conference Series - Reports of Seminars held at the University of Florida 1951-1967. The Caribbean Scholars Conferences sponsored by the University of Puerto Rico and its quarterly "Caribbean Studies". More narrowly, the quarterly "Social and Economic Studies" of the University of the West Indies.

13. By external is meant a state which does not, by reason of its geographical presence, have to be involved in the area. In this sense the United States, with a coastline open to Caribbean influence, is clearly less external than the 3 European states. Nevertheless, the crucial distinction remains - it does not have to be involved in the area but chooses to be so for other reasons, e.g. political and strategic.

themselves, etc. However, by introducing the idea of a core group defined by particular indications as well as by being brief and realistic about the recent history of the area a well defined region can be shown to exist which I refer to as the Caribbean region.

Recent history has shown the declining interest of the three external European states, vis-à-vis the United States. The European states are now merely marginal in the sense that they have particular interests with individual states as such rather than a general interest in the overall area. Although all three states retain considerable economic interests in the area it is largely confined to their respective colonies and ex-colonies and not to the whole area.¹⁴ At the same time they maintain, at best, only token military forces in the area designed to meet problems within their own colonies and ex-colonies and not in the area as a whole.¹⁵ These factors are reflected in the changing political relationship which is increasingly one of 'influence' related to a 'style' of internal government rather than a more pervasive one of control at all levels.¹⁶

-
14. The rôle which these 3 countries play in the economies of their ex-colonies or present colonies, is well summarised in Sir Harold Mitchell, Caribbean Patterns: (Edinburgh and London: W.R. Chambers Ltd. 1967).
15. France - a total services strength of 2,500 made up of marines, naval and air units.
Netherlands - an infantry battallion, naval and air units.
Great Britain - a company of infantry and a naval squadron.
See David Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America: (London: The Institute of Strategic Studies: Adelphi Papers No.34, 1967) p.19.
16. See Mitchell, Caribbean Patterns and also his Europe in the Caribbean: The Policies of Gt. Britain, France and the Netherlands toward their West Indian Territories in the 20th Century: (Edinburgh and London: W.R. Chambers Ltd., 1965).

This has been shown most clearly by the participation of the ex-British colonies, Guyana excepted, in the O.A.S. The American interest is increasing and the United States is replacing the European states as the major external influence. So whilst the 3 European states retain an interest in the area, it is a declining one. For this reason the impact of these states on the overall area is limited and can generally be discounted - they do not form part of the region as I define it!

The decline of the British involvement in the area has resulted in the creation of four new states since 1962 - Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados. The decision to end the study in mid-1966 reflects this by aiming at removing Guyana and Barbados from consideration as neither were independent before mid-1966. This leaves Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as independent states in the Caribbean over a four year period. Because both these states are not too dissimilar from the majority of other states in the area they qualify for inclusion on the basis of a common setting, but at the same time their participation for only a very short period creates problems as to how they should be handled. For this reason and because of their recent history differing from other states in the area, and the effect this had in the immediate post-independence period, I have isolated Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago from the other states and treat both of them in a separate section which focuses on the response in the Caribbean region to their participation in regional politics.

This/

This leaves the United States and the following twelve Latin American states - Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. With reference only to the Latin American states a number of characteristics appear to be common to the majority of these states. The use of these common characteristics as the necessary criteria for any state to be said to belong to the region helps both to define a fairly tight region as well as to throw light on its functioning. The common characteristics act as definers of the core group other than the more usual one of "system type activity" as it is not the existence of a system which is to be proved but only the existence of a region.

The necessary criteria are fourfold:

1. The importance of the United States as the largest state to be considered by any 'regional state' decision makers before formulating foreign policy.
2. The smallness of the size of states and the problems created by this for the 'regional state' decision makers. In particular the problem created by the inability of any single state to control, or significantly alter, the immediate environment in which it operates.
3. The 'regional state' as economically underdeveloped, characterised by dependence upon an undiversified economy and foreign trade for economic growth.
4. The frequency of internal political instability and the rôle of personality and the armed forces in the political life of the 'regional state'.

These four necessary criteria are examined in the four following sections and the centrality or marginality of the twelve Latin American states to these criteria, in my opinion, is established.

The Particular Indicators of the Caribbean Region.

The Preponderance of the United States.¹⁷

The external power of the United States in the region by virtue of its military, economic and political interests is not comparable to the resources of any single state or alliance of states in the region. The result is that the United States is, in the last resort, the major regulator of inter-state political action in the region.¹⁸

The Military Interest

"The strategic importance of the Caribbean to the world, to Latin America and to the United States continues unabated both in total peace and/

-
17. The purpose of this section is not to spell out in detail the United States policy to the region, but to show the magnitude of its stake there, particularly in the economic and military spheres.
18. In some respects this is the case for all the states of Latin America as Carlos A. Astiz points out when he says that the United States rôle "constitutes at the present time the most important external limitation to the political processes involved in the making of foreign policy in the nations of Latin America". Whilst agreeing with Astiz, I wish to emphasise the point in respect of the Caribbean. See his "The Latin American Countries in the International System" in Carlos A. Astiz (ed) Latin American International Relations (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame

and in total war. The control of the Caribbean and of the Panama Canal remains of paramount importance to the United States. Control is particularly vital during war....

The Caribbean remains a crossroad of the world and a lifeline for all of Latin America". 19

Weight has been given to this statement in three ways:-

1. By the United States maintaining sizeable armed forces in the region.
2. By the United States involving itself intimately with the structure and training of the armed forces in the region, and
3. By the United States initiating and supporting military agreements and regional defence arrangements with, and between, various states in the region.

1. Total United States armed forces in the Caribbean region are around the 20,000-23,000 mark.²⁰

They are concentrated mainly in the Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico with bases in use at Guantanamo, Cuba and until recently/

-
19. R.H. del Mar, "Strategic Characteristics of the Caribbean" in Wilgus (ed) The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role, (Gainesville, Fla: University of Florida 1967) p.155. R.H. del Mar was a former director of the inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C.
 20. Edwin Lieuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America. (Ohio State University Press; The Social Science Program of the Merham Center for Education in National Security: The Ohio State University: Pamphlet Series No.4, April 1966), p.10.

recently Chaguaramas, Trinidad.²¹

The United States also has military missions in most of the countries amounting to 282 personnel in 1965.²² As there are officially only Military Aid and Assistance Groups and Military Aid Program training teams in the countries south of Panama - apart from troops accredited to diplomatic missions - the great majority of United States armed forces in Latin America are in the vicinity of the Caribbean.

If it is remembered, as the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 showed, that in times of emergency United States force levels in the Caribbean can be multiplied rapidly by flying in troops from United States military installations, the ability of the United States to intervene militarily in any state in the Caribbean is not in doubt.²³

By contrast, the size of the armed forces of other states in the area are small.

TABLE ONE /

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21. The Guantanamo base has a permanent garrison of 3,000 men which can be reinforced up to a level of 7,000 in times of emergency. The Trinidad base was fully vacated 1.10.1971.
22. Deuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America. There are no military missions in Mexico, Cuba or Haiti. Table 1, page 14.
23. The United States had more than 20,000 troops in the Dominican Republic within days of the initial landing.

TABLE ONE

Armed Forces in the Caribbean*

| | <u>Total Armed Forces</u> |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Colombia | 63,000 |
| Costa Rica (para-military force) | 1,200 |
| Cuba | 121,000 |
| Dominican Republic | 19,300 |
| El Salvador | 5,630 |
| Guatemala | 9,000 |
| Haiti | 5,500 |
| Honduras | 4,725 |
| Mexico | 68,500 |
| Nicaragua | 7,100 |
| Panama (para-military force) | 3,400 |
| Venezuela | 30,500 |

* Figures as at 1.1.1967.

Source: Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America, pp.12-19

Only Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela keep force levels above those kept by the United States in the Caribbean at any one time. Panama and Costa Rica do not have regularly constituted armed forces as normally considered. Although the figures show possibilities of military intervention by some of the states against other states effective action against the United States is ruled out. To state the obvious, in conventional terms the states of the area are dependent upon the non-intervention/

non-intervention of the United States in the military sphere.²⁴

2. "Until about 1960 military assistance programs for Latin America were oriented towards hemisphere defense. As it became clear that there was no threat of significant overt external aggression against Latin America emphasis shifted to internal capabilities for use against Communist inspired subversion or covert aggression aid to civic-action projects designed to promote stability and strengthen internal economies".²⁵

This shift of emphasis is clearly indicated in the increase in military aid to states in the area.

TABLE TWO /

-
24. Cuba may be the exception to this insofar as there is a risk of intervention against the United States by the U.S.S.R. Also, guerrilla warfare may upset the calculations.
25. Statement by United States Defense Secretary, Robert S. McNamara - House Subcommittee on Appropriations. Hearings Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for 1964. 88th Congress: 1st Session: May, 1963, Part 2 - cited in Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power. (Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1966), p.49, Note 11.

TABLE TWO

Defence Expenditure and United States
Military Aid in the Caribbean

| | Defence Expenditure 1965 \$ Million | Mil. Eqpt Grant Aid FY 1965 \$ Million | Mil. Eqpt Grant Aid 1950-65 \$ Million |
|--------------------|--|---|---|
| Colombia | 69 | 5.7 | 51.3 |
| Costa Rica | 2.3 | 0.2 | 1.5 |
| Cuba | 214 | - | 5.5 |
| Dominican Republic | 34 | 1.2 | 10.9 |
| El Salvador | 10 | 0.8 | 3.4 |
| Guatemala | 13 | 1.5 | 8.1 |
| Haiti | 7 | - | 0.2 |
| Honduras | 6.2 | 0.7 | 3.7 |
| Mexico | 153 | 0.2 | 1.1 |
| Nicaragua | 9 | 1.2 | 6.9 |
| Panama | 0.6 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
| Venezuela | 172 | 1.3 | 4.4 |

Source: Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America
 Table 1. p.21, Table 3, p.23.

For Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, the grant aided military equipment from the United States represents between 8percent to 13 percent of the defence expenditure for 1965, for Panama it is 33 per cent. Much military equipment is also purchased from the United States/

United States outside the grant aid program.²⁶

The United States has played an equivalent and increasing role in respect of training. This has been of two types. By far the greatest stress has been on the purely professional military training of armed forces as 'specialists in violence'. This has been pursued mainly at the United States Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone.²⁷ Training courses, taught in Spanish, are in all aspects of internal security problems in Latin America. At the same time its graduates familiarise themselves with American military doctrine and terminology as well as American military equipment.²⁸

Between 1949-1964, 11,467 students from the Caribbean area graduated through the school.

TABLE THREE /

-
26. Lieuwen estimates this at \$1,023,322,000 from 1950-1965 for Latin America as a whole,. See his The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America, p.15
 27. Before 1.7.1963 known as the Army Caribbean School in Panama.
 28. Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America, p.4.

TABLE THREE

Number of Graduates from the
United States Army School of the Americas
in the Caribbean, 1949-1964 Inclusive

| | |
|--------------------|-------|
| Colombia | 1,366 |
| Costa Rica | 1,639 |
| Cuba | 291 |
| Dominican Republic | 233 |
| El Salvador | 358 |
| Guatemala | 958 |
| Haiti | 50 |
| Honduras | 810 |
| Mexico | 178 |
| Nicaragua | 2,969 |
| Panama | 1,420 |
| Venezuela | 1,195 |

Source: Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, p.145

This represents 70 percent of the Latin American students.²⁹ More striking is the fact that 8,154, or approximately 50 percent were from Central America. Given the relatively small size of their armed forces it means a significant amount of United States influence.³⁰ /

29. The total for all Latin American students, 1949-1964 is 16,343. Also 9,876 United States students graduated. Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, p.145

influence.³⁰

The other type of training has been in the Military Civic Action programmes. Military Civic Action has been defined officially in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage as -

"the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populations at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social developments which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas)" 31

Designed as a doctrine related to the prevention of insurgency, it has had a varying impact on the area.

TABLE FOUR /

-
30. The United States also supports a number of other training programmes, but given the major rôle of the army in the armed forces of the Caribbean area consideration of these programmes does not add very much to the overall picture.
31. Cited in Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power. p.6

TABLE FOUR

Outlay by United States for Civic Action
in the Caribbean

| | <u>1962-1964</u> <u>\$ Thousands</u> | <u>1966</u> <u>\$ Thousands</u> |
|--------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| Colombia | 4,462 | 696 |
| Costa Rica | 247 | Less than \$500 |
| Dominican Republic | 1,344 | 122 |
| El Salvador | 850 | 65 |
| Guatemala | 2,077 | 343 |
| Honduras | 308 | 71 |
| Mexico | - | 20 |
| Nicaragua | 59 | - |
| Panama | 2 | 22 |
| Venezuela | 23 | 59 |

Source: Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America; Table 3 p.23, and Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, Table 7, p.239.

Relatively large amounts of money have been spent only in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala - states where the army has always played an important rôle in the political process. Guatemala was the first country to receive a Civic Action Military Training Team in November, 1960. Military Civic Action has been less significant in Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela.

3. The United States bilateral military arrangements with states in the area are numerous enough and far reaching enough to ensure substantial influence.³²

TABLE FIVE

United States Military Arrangements
in the Caribbean*

| | <u>Mission Agreement (Army, Air, Navy).</u> | <u>Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement</u> | <u>Internal Security Note</u> |
|--------------------|---|--|-------------------------------|
| Colombia | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Costa Rica | Yes | - | Yes |
| Dominican Republic | Yes | Yes | - |
| El Salvador | Yes | - | Yes |
| Guatemala | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Haiti | - | Yes | - |
| Honduras | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Nicaragua | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panama | Yes | - | - |
| Venezuela | Yes | - | - |

*Mexico has a Joint-Mexican-United States Military Commission.

The Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Cuba has been repudiated by Cuba.

Source: Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power. Table I, p.34

32. For the texts of two such arrangements, one with Honduras on the 20.5.1954 and the other with Nicaragua., on 19.11.1953 see Appendix A and Appendix B respectively in Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger. Revised edition 1965).

More significant has been the United States promotion of regional military arrangements with Central America which are outside existing O.A.S. arrangements. A series of conferences on Civic Action have been held with delegations from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama attending.³³ The specific military aspects have been organised within the C.A.D.C. which is an organ of O.D.E.C.A. The structure of the C.A.D.C. is such that the United States has control at all levels.³⁴

Summary:

The Caribbean area remains for the United States one of prime strategic importance. The United States national security interest is defended not only by its own armed forces stationed in the area, but also by its ability to influence, and in large measure, control the armed forces of the majority of states in the area. The control is achieved by the presence of United States personell at all levels and in all fields. This close involvement has had its effect by limiting the manoeuvrability of a majority of the area states in the international system. In the military sense these states cannot use their power to influence events in the international system without prior United States support unless they wish to break away completely from the United States with all that this would imply for the state's continued viability.

33. The first conference was held in 1962. Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, p.134

34. See John Saxe-Fernandez, "The Central American Defence Council and Pax Americana" in Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi (eds) Latin American Radicalism (New York: Vintage Books 1969) pp.91-95.

The Economic Interest

The economic interests that the United States has in Latin America are well known but they are not of the same magnitude throughout the continent. The countries of South America generally have considerable economic ties with countries in Europe as well as with the United States whereas those in the Caribbean region have ties almost exclusively with the United States. The result is a marked dependence of the economies of the Caribbean region upon the United States. The extent of this dependence can be shown in two ways:

1. by considering the United States as a market for exports from the Caribbean region, and
2. by considering the United States as a supplier of goods and capital investment to the Caribbean region.

1. Latin America produces for export. The clearest indication of this is that it exports well over 15 percent of its output which is a very high proportion - the corresponding percentage for the United States is about 5 percent.³⁵ For some states of the Caribbean area exports as a percentage of the Gross National Product are considerable.

TABLE SIX /

35. F. Benham and H.A. Holley, A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America. (London: Oxford University Press, 1960) p.6.

TABLE SIX

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN
AREA'S EXPORT EARNINGS TO GROSS
NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1957
(% Millions)

| | <u>G.N.P.</u> | <u>Exports</u> | <u>Exports as % of G.N.P.</u> |
|--------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| Colombia | 2,370 | 520 | 21.9 |
| Costa Rica | 401 | 83 | 20.7 |
| Cuba | 2,800 | 845 | 30.2 |
| Dominican Republic | 656 | 161 | 24.5 |
| El Salvador | 612 | 138 | 22.5 |
| Guatemala | 645 | 114 | 17.7 |
| Haiti | 245 | 34 | 13.9 |
| Honduras | 344 | 65 | 18.9 |
| Mexico | 8,320 | 727 | 8.7 |
| Nicaragua | 282 | 64 | 22.7 |
| Panama | 300 | 64 | 21.3 |
| Venezuela | 6,416 | 2,366 | 36.9 |

Source: John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, (New York: Collier Books, Revised Edition 1965) Table 2. p.29.

Differences in the position of the countries is shown clearly. Mexico is by far the most self-sufficient and the export dependence of the economies of Venezuela and Cuba is apparent. That for the Caribbean area an enormous proportion of these exports goes to the United States is shown in the following table which compares the imports that the United States takes from the area with the total that the area produces for export.

TABLE SEVEN

Total Amount of Exports and Amount of Exports taken by the United States from the Caribbean Area -- \$ millions

| | 1950 | | 1960 | |
|--------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| | Total Exports (fob) | Imports* by U.S. | Total Exports (fob) | Imports* by U.S. |
| Colombia | 395.6 | 313.1 | 465.0 | 299.3 |
| Costa Rica | 55.6 | 24.6 | 86.0 | 34.9 |
| Cuba | 642.0 | 406.4 | 617.0 | 357.3 |
| Dominican Republic | 86.8 | 37.8 | 180.0 | 110.5 |
| El Salvador | 68.4 | 51.0 | 117.0 | 32.2 |
| Guatemala | 67.6 | 53.7 | 119.0 | 58.7 |
| Haiti | 38.6 | 23.0 | 33.0 | 18.2 |
| Honduras | 21.5 | 20.2 | 64.0 | 33.6 |
| Mexico | 465.5 | 315.4 | 763.0 | 443.3 |
| Nicaragua | 26.6 | 19.5 | 56.0 | 20.8 |
| Panama | 10.6 | 9.7 | 27.0 | 24.1 |
| Venezuela | 1224.1 | 323.7 | 2432.0 | 947.7 |

* fob country of origin.

Source: Figures for total exports for 1950 and 1960 from, respectively, U.N. Statistical Year Book 1953, Table 151 and U.N. Statistical Year Book 1963, Table 158, both published by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, New York. Figures of United States imports 1950 and 1960 from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962. (U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Census) Table 1218.

Although the figures show a general trend away from the United States it was, in 1960, still the market for 50 percent or more of exports from Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, /

Haiti, Honduras, Mexico and Panama. For Venezuela the sale of oil to the United States has increased the importance of the United States as a market. Overall, the increase in value of trade illustrates the continuing importance of this trade to both the United States and the countries of the Caribbean area.³⁶

The trade is particularly valuable for the United States in that it contributes directly to the development of its industrial sector.

"In 1965 Mexico alone supplied a third of the United States imports of graphite, three-quarters of imports of fluospor, a quarter of imports of barium and two-thirds of imports of sulphur. The Caribbean region as a whole supplied half of the United States sodium chloride imports, 22 percent of iron ore and concentrates, practically all bauxite imports, 27 percent of zinc ores, 38 percent of crude petroleum, 77 percent of naphtha, all jet fuel imports, 85 percent of other fuel imports..... This is a very impressive list".³⁷

It is certainly impressive if the national security interests of the United States in this trade is considered. Many of the /

36. To some extent 1950 has to be regarded as a 'freak year' as buying by the United States was heavy due to the Korean War. The figures had previously been lower.

37. Juan D. Sanchez, "Resources of the Caribbean" in Wilgus (ed) The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Rôle, p.45.

the above products are vital to the United States defence industry and are on the lists of strategic materials.³⁸

The value of trade by the United States with the Caribbean is increasing not only in money terms, approaching three billion dollars worth of imports by the United States in 1965, but also for its contribution to the industrial growth and national security of the United States. Whilst tropical agricultural produce remains very important - the value of green coffee exports to the United States in 1965 was \$1,058 million representing 42 percent of its coffee imports - there has been a widening of the variety of exports from the area thereby indicating that the picture of the area as just a supplier of tropical agricultural products is rather dated.³⁹ Nevertheless, these exports still all maintain the character of primary products embodying mostly local labour and resources which clearly marks the area as dependent upon exports, particularly to the United States. This dependence upon the United States varies from a "banana republic" type, as in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, where a state sells mainly one commodity to one market and relies on the shipping and other facilities provided by a few companies owned by the 'market' country to the sophisticated type illustrated by Mexico and Venezuela where, apart from normal commercial considerations, the internal policy of the United States Government/

38. For a discussion of the importance of such materials to the United States defence planners, see Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969), pp.50-54.

39. Figures for coffee exports from Juan D. Sanchez, "Resources of the Caribbean", Table 4, p.50.

Government is important in determining the size and the necessity of the market.

2. The Caribbean area is an important market for United States goods, mainly machinery, transport equipment and other manufactured products. Although there has been a decline in the proportion of United States imports to the total imports of the area these still remain large -- over 50 percent in 1960 and nearly 2.9 billion dollars by value in 1965.⁴⁰

TABLE EIGHT /

40. Whilst this is only a small amount of the United States total and hence replaceable it must be remembered that the area has traditionally been one where United States goods are favourably received. In this sense selling there, is easier than selling anywhere else.

TABLE EIGHT

Total Amount of Imports and Amount of Imports
from the United States for the Caribbean
Area - \$ millions

| | 1950 | | 1960 | |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | Total Imports (cif) | Exports by U.S. (fob) | Total Imports (cif) | Exports by U.S. (fob) |
| Colombia | 364.7 | 232.1 | 519.0 | 246.1 |
| Costa Rica | 46.0 | 27.1 | 110.0 | 44.0 |
| Cuba | 514.9* | 461.4 | 808.0* | 223.7 |
| Dominican Republic | 43.6* | 42.1 | 87.0 | 41.4 |
| El Salvador | 48.3 | 32.6 | 122.0 | 42.4 |
| Guatemala | 71.2 | 44.0 | 138.0 | 62.9 |
| Haiti | 37.9 | 25.3 | 36.0 | 25.1 |
| Honduras | 34.1* | 23.9 | 72.0* | 34.5 |
| Mexico | 508.9 | 519.5 | 1186.0 | 819.6 |
| Nicaragua | 24.7* | 18.8 | 72.0 | 29.6 |
| Panama | 61.1* | 111.7 | 109.0* | 88.9 |
| Venezuela | 595.5* | 401.2 | 1060.0* | 551.1 |

* Figures fob; Cuban figure is for 1958 (1960)

Source: Figures for total imports for 1950 and 1960 from, respectively, U.N. Statistical Year Book, 1953, Table 151 and U.N. Statistical Year Book, 1963, Table 158. Figures of United States exports 1950 and 1960 from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962, Table 1218.

These figures show clearly that proximity is an important factor - the nearer the United States the greater the proportion of supplies bought from the United States. During the 1950's for Mexico this was over 80 percent, of its imports, and for Cuba and the Dominican Republic about 70 percent.⁴¹ /

percent.⁴¹ Inasmuch as the majority of the countries in the area remain slow in developing an industrial base, the future of large United States exports to the area remains guaranteed.

The need for large and sustained capital investment in Latin America is obvious. Previously much of this capital investment has come from the United States and has been both public and private. The public sector being of two types - one being investment by way of the United State's government's economic assistance programmes and the other by way of its international economic assistance programmes.

The value of private long term direct investment in the Caribbean area has increased from 60 percent of the total for Latin America in 1950 to 68 percent in 1960.

TABLE NINE /

41. Benham and Holley, A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America, p.62

TABLE NINE

United States Long Term Private Direct
Investment in the Caribbean Area
(\$ millions)

| | <u>1950</u> | <u>1960</u> |
|---|-------------|----------------|
| Colombia | 193 | 424 |
| Cuba | 642 | 956 (estimate) |
| Mexico | 414 | 795 |
| Venezuela | 993 | 2569 |
| Central America, and Haiti and the Dominican Republic | 432 | 891* |

* figures listed as for Central America and the West Indies

Source: Figures for 1950 from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1960, (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census) Table 1170 and for 1960 from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963, (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census), Table 1193.

The importance of the Venezuelan investment is apparent - one-third of all private United States investment in Latin America is in this country. Moreover, the profits from this investment are over 50 percent of all the profits from Latin America. However, the proportion of United States investment in Central America to its investment in Latin America/

America has dropped - Guatemala from 2.4% in 1950 to 1.6% in 1960; Costa Rica from 1.3% to 0.7% and Honduras from 1.4% to 1.3% in the same period. Nevertheless, for the countries concerned these investments remain considerable, representing in Guatemala and Costa Rica about 15% of the Gross National Product and about 30% in Honduras.⁴²

The immediate future of United States private investment in the area remains guaranteed by the United States government which has always considered that the vested interests of its citizens are inseparably intertwined with the security of the nation. As such the United States has attempted to promote the role of private capital in the social and economic development of Latin America and has seen in this a way of exerting political pressure upon Latin American governments. That private United States capital has become an important facet of the United States government's policy to Latin America has been pointed out by the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress which in its report concluded that private capital contributes to stability,

"(a) by supporting the rise and vitality of a solid, articulate middle class made up of managers, property owners and small capitalists; and (b) by providing a bulwark in support of individual freedom against the rise of arbitrary power /

42. Figures from Table 26 of C.W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc. 1967).

power, an ever-present risk under a
'controlled economy'".⁴³

When much of this private capital comes from the United States its influence is considerable, and extends to the internal, as well as external policies of Latin American governments who need to actively encourage United States private direct investment. Anderson has pointed this out by showing the relevance of political attitudes to development in Latin America and has noted that political conservatism by itself is not enough to attract capital. He concludes that

"development strategies in the postwar period, and the flow of foreign support was, at least, not paradoxical. Policies designed to encourage foreign investment, and governments emphasizing public programmes with a technical assistance component did receive such support."⁴⁴

Whilst the early 1960's saw caution among private United States investors in Latin America -- in 1962 there was a disinvestment of \$32 million -- the attitude of the United States government changed dramatically. From 1946 to 1960 public investment in Latin America ran at about \$250 million annually yet from 1961 to 1965 a total of \$5,348 million was invested -- over a billion dollars annually. In 1962 the United States made available \$1,365.7 million in grants and credits, /

43. United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships. Private Investment in Latin America, (25.5.1964).

44. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, Chpt.11, particularly pp.346-348.

credits, including military, to Latin America of which about one-third went to the Caribbean area. The distribution of this is given in Table Ten.

TABLE TEN

Grants and Credits from the United States
to the Caribbean Area, 1962

| | <u>Million</u> <u>F.Y. 1962</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| Colombia | 81.8 |
| Costa Rica | 10.4 |
| Dominican Republic | 36.8 |
| El Salvador | 23.8 |
| Guatemala | 10.6 |
| Haiti | 8.0 |
| Honduras | 4.6 |
| Mexico | 142.4 |
| Nicaragua | 14.7 |
| Panama | 25.5 |
| Venezuela | 76.0 |

Source: J. Lloyd Mechem, A Survey of United States - Latin American Relations, Table 7.

The money has generally been made available as loans rather than grants - the figure of loans to grants has been about 2 : 1. Moreover, the loans have generally been tied to the purchase of United States goods and the Alliance for Progress has done little to change this pattern.⁴⁵ As such/

45. How this is reflected in the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Alliance for Progress is shown by Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, pp.266-267.

such, the increase of United States public assistance to Latin America has meant an increased stake in the region and further dependence of Latin America upon the United States. The Caribbean Area does not seem to have warranted any special attention by the United States government in respect of aid but has reflected the rest of Latin America.⁴⁶ The size of the United States public investment in the Caribbean area since World War Two is given below - it excludes Cuba.

TABLE ELEVEN

United States Public Investment in the
Caribbean Area*

| | January, 1946 to June 30, 1965 <u>\$ Million</u> |
|------------------------------------|---|
| AID and predecessor agencies | 1,077 |
| Social Progress Trust Fund | 254 |
| Food for Peace | 356 |
| Export-Import Bank long term loans | 1,220 |
| Other U.S. Economic Programmes | 286 |
| <u>Total Economic</u> | 3,193 |
| Military | 231 |
| <u>Total Economic and Military</u> | 3,424 |
| of which - Loans | 2,316 |
| - Grants | 1,108 |

* Includes a small element of the 'European Caribbean'

46. This has been generally to select key countries for development - in 1964, for example, two thirds of total development lending was confined to Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Central American countries.

Table Eleven

Source: Juan D. Sanchez "Resources of the Caribbean".
Table 6, page 51.

"In addition to its own economic assistance programme, the United States is the major contributor to a variety of international agencies, which have supplied an average of \$750 million for Latin American economic assistance since 1961. Well over half of this amount comes from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (where U.S. subscriptions are 30 percent) and the Inter-American Development Bank (where U.S. subscriptions to 1965 were 43 percent). In the fiscal year 1965, of Latin America's total of \$830 million in economic assistance provided by international agencies, \$250 million was provided by I.D.B. and \$200 million by I.B.R.D. On March 24th, 1965, the United States contributed \$750 million to increase the resources of The Fund for Special Operations of the I.D.B."⁴⁷

A Caribbean area perspective on this is shown in Table Twelve.

TABLE TWELVE /

47. Heuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America, p.21

TABLE TWELVE

Amounts made available, \$ million, by the
Major International Lending Organisations
to the Caribbean Area*

| | January, 1946 to June, 1965 \$ million |
|--|---|
| World Bank | 1265 |
| International Development Association | 49 |
| International Finance Corporation | 32 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | 278 |
| U.N. Technical Assistance Programs | 39 |
| U.N. Special Fund | 51 |

* excludes Cuba, but inclusive small amounts
to "European Caribbean".

Source: Juan D. Sanchez, "Resources of the
Caribbean", Table 9, page 53.

The proportion of the contribution by the United States to the international agencies, plus the amounts loaned to the Caribbean area, which are significant in terms of the size of the majority of the Caribbean economies, has clearly been to create a further area of financial dependence upon the United States.⁴⁸

48. The political implications of this type of dependence, and its operation in respect of Latin America is to be found in Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.) 1971.

Summary:

The overall pattern of United States economic relations with the Caribbean area has not changed significantly since World War Two. Whilst there have been some modifications within the pattern the economy of the Caribbean area still has a marked dependence upon the United States as a market and as a supplier of imports and capital. Whilst the Caribbean area exports to the United States are now more diversified and the volume and value of this trade have increased, the stress on primary products has been mentioned. That the United States has supported this pattern by showing no real desire to change the contents of trade - much of it still based on tropical agricultural products - is illustrated, for example, by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which

"in a section ostensibly designed to benefit the tropical countries, the United States provided for the possibility of removing completely the trade barriers to various imports from these countries. But the coverage of the provision was limited to raw commodities and unprocessed goods. And this provision, which ostensibly was designed to favour the poor countries turns out to be a device for keeping them active in raw commodity production and suppressing their manufactures." 49

By such a government regulation the United States not only/

49. Wendell C. Gordon, The Political Economy of Latin America, (New York: Columbia University Press 1965) p.315

only safeguards its own high-cost industries from competition but also guarantees an overseas market for their consumption. And if the Caribbean area is only a small part of the United States market it has nevertheless been considered a fairly secure part.⁵⁰

The same holds true for United States investments, private and government, which if not large, except for Venezuela and Mexico, are favourably treated. Central America is noted for this as a United States government report makes clear

"Restrictions on the extent to which foreigners or foreign owned enterprises may engage in business; or on the kinds of business enterprises they may undertake, are minor in Central America and are not serious limiting factors for U.S. investors."⁵¹

To attract the foreign capital, at present necessary for development, states in the area have to adopt internal and external policies favourable to the United States.⁵²

The/

50. Cuba provided only a temporary reverse noticeable mainly in the area of United States private investment flows to Latin America and this has often been overstated as is pointed out by Leland L. Johnson "United States Private Investment in Latin America Since the Rise of Castro". Inter-American Economic Affairs. Vol.18, No.3., 1964.

51. U.S. Department of Commerce, Investment in Central America: basic information for U.S. businessmen. (Washington D.C. 1956) p.6.

52. An example of this is provided by the problem the Honduras Agricultural Reform, 1962, created for both the United Fruit Co. and the United States Congress. See "We have the Sovereign Right to Protect our Investors Abroad" - A Case and a Commentary" from the 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record 1962 in Marvin D. Bernstein (ed), Foreign Investment in Latin American: Cases and Attitudes. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1966)

The end result is a neo-colonialist situation distorting both capital importer and capital exporter.⁵³ Given the reluctance of the majority of élites in the Caribbean area to change the social and political constraints holding back development by domestic capital the continuance of this relationship is assured.⁵⁴ Within the Caribbean area, as in the rest of Latin America, increases in United States private investments and the major economic commitments of the United States government will mean a strengthening of this neo-colonial relationship rather than a weakening. As Plank has noted:

"All of these states (the Caribbean area except for Cuba) are increasingly dependent upon the U.S. and Canada for whatever economic well-being they can achieve and for whatever social and political benefits they can derive from that economic well-being. North America is their market; increasingly North America is their provider...." ⁵⁵

The Political Interest

This section will not attempt to spell out in detail United States policy towards the Caribbean area as I deal /

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53. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, La Ideología Norteamericana Sobre Inversiones Extranjeras (Mexico: Escuela Nacional de Economía: Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas, 1955). See, in particular, pp.172-177.
54. These constraints are enumerated in Chapter 14 of Gordon, The Political Economy of Latin America.
55. John N. Plank "Neighbourly Relations in the Caribbean" in Wilgus (ed) The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Rôle, p.168.

deal with this later; but rather to establish the image that the United States has of the area and then to indicate the general pattern of its foreign policy towards the area.

Halle has noted, in his book on American Foreign Policy, that

"Foreign policy addresses itself to the external world as legend, to the external world that men create in their imagination" -- and that the legend -- "is generally composed of.....fallacies".⁵⁶

A large amount of the antagonisms that have manifested themselves in inter-American relations have been attributed to the "fallacies" in the "legend".⁵⁷ The "fallacies" would appear to be well entrenched in respect of the Caribbean area. Within the United States the image of the mass of ordinary people remains very crude. The United States government has also misunderstood events within the area as its mishandling of the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961, has clearly shown.⁵⁸

What is interesting is the concept of the persistent "general" image that the Caribbean area has presented over/

56. Louis J. Halle, American Foreign Policy: Theory and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1960) pp.318, 326. Halle was a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

57. See, in particular, Book One of Milton S. Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America, (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc. 1963). Dr. M. Eisenhower was formerly Personal Representative of President Eisenhower and held the rank of Special Ambassador to Latin America.

58. See my case study 'United States - Cuban Relations 1959-1961' in Part Three.

over time. This image, the creation of the various major colonial powers through its history - Spain, Britain, France, Holland and the United States - is outlined by Morse as having six component parts

- " -the Caribbean as a garden of Eden
- the Caribbean as a protectorate whose natives deserve sympathetic attention
- the Caribbean as a trading zone to be exploited by fortified commercial enclaves
- the Caribbean as a theatre for settlement and imperial expansion
- the Caribbean as a natural "mediterranean", a "danger zone" exposed to foreign attacks and posing broad strategical problems to the military mind
- the Caribbean as a compound to be carefully patrolled lest it flare up in random insurrections." 59

Whilst all six points have been noticeable in the United States attitude to the area it is with the last two component parts of the image that the United States has particularly concerned itself with since World War Two.

The major distinction between the Caribbean policy of the United States and its policy to South America would appear to be largely one of degree rather than kind.⁶⁰ As such it forms part of the general pattern of United States policy towards Latin America. This pattern has been usefully summarised by Slater as being the following /

59. Richard M. Morse, "The Caribbean - Geopolitics and Geohistory" in Lewis and Mathews (eds) Caribbean Integration, Papers on Social, Political and Economic Integration, (Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Pedras, P.R. 1967).

60. J. Lloyd Meacham, for example, claims that ".... American diplomacy has been so much concerned with the countries of the area (the Caribbean) that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that most of its major policy decisions and actions relating to Latin/

".....the primary political objective of the United States in its inter-American policy has been the maintenance or attainment of political stability in Latin America. Stability, as understood by United States policy-makers, has three dimensions: internal Latin American Political structures, interstate relations within the hemisphere, and the relationship of the hemisphere to the rest of the world. With regard to internal stability, the United States seeks to insure that no Latin American governments come to power, or remain in power, that represent a serious challenge to the security of the United States. In the context of the Cold War, of course, internal stability refers to the exclusion of communism from the hemisphere. In its intra-hemispheric dimension, stability requires the absence of serious interstate conflict. United States security can be best maintained in an atmosphere of tranquility; disturbances threaten the solidarity of the hemisphere under the leadership of the United States and may involve annoying expenditures of time, energy and resources. Finally, stability requires the insulation of the hemisphere from undesirable external political influences (Nazi, Soviet, Red Chinese) and the preservation of the hemisphere as part of the United States "sphere of influence"."⁶¹

60. (contd.)

Latin America originated in this region". See his "A Survey of United States - Latin American Relations", p.239.

61. Jerome Slater, The O.A.S. and United States Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press 1967) pp.4-5.

7-

It is clear that if United States policy is interpreted as above the Caribbean area has presented a number of serious challenges to this policy. Cuba has posed problems for the United States in the internal stability and ideological dimensions of the policy as well as threatening to upset the deterrence relationship that the United States had established in the international system. Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, in United States eyes, have both, in particular, overstepped the "internal stability" dimension and have been "intervened". Finally, the frequency of interstate conflict has often involved the United States acting both unilaterally and via the O.A.S.

When these challenges to its general hemispheric policies are coupled to the particular problems of the United States in the Caribbean area, those of geographical proximity and the Panama Canal, the area becomes one of major concern to the United States; and the magnitude of the concern has been manifested in the direct and overt intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Caribbean states as against a weaker and more indirect approach in respect of South America. Intervention appears as the persistent policy of the United States in the area. An example of this is that of a total recorded number of 79 incidents of aggression, intervention and meddling by the United States in Latin America from World War Two until mid-1965 nearly 75 percent were concerned with the Caribbean area.⁶² /

It is this readiness, willingness and ability of the United States to intervene which, in some measure, can be used to outline a "Caribbean Policy" within the wider Latin American policy. Consequently further study of the United States policy in the Caribbean area will frequently follow upon the lines of understanding the motives behind such interventions. It is also obvious that the possibility of intervention will be very important in establishing within the minds of the decision makers of the various Caribbean states the limits to which their foreign policy may be allowed to operate.

The Smallness of States and the Capability Similarities between States in the Caribbean Area: Some Implications.

The size of a state has proved to be an important factor in international relations. Although size remains an ambiguous and relative concept it is obvious that, however size is defined, the majority of the Caribbean states would be regarded as small.⁶³ Similarly obvious is that however/

62. (from overleaf) Antonio Riccardi "Breve cronología de los agresiones, intervenciones e intrusiones del imperialismo yanqui en la America Latina" Politica Internacional (La Habana: Cuba) Año 3, No.10, 1965. The wide range of events recorded e.g. from violation of air space to armed intervention, does to some extent distort the balance of the count by accenting the level of intervention and interference by the United States. Yet even if this is taken into account the trend is clear.

63. Size is, of course, multi-dimensional. Nevertheless it has generally referred to material size from which certain capabilities are derived and possibilities of actions are inferred.

however capability is defined there is a near equality of capabilities of a majority of states in the Caribbean area.⁶⁴ Smallness and equality of capabilities, when combined, have one significant implication for the international relations of the area: the inability of any single state to alter or control the immediate environment in which it operates.

The Smallness of States

Whilst the consequences of being small has received little attention within international relations the elements of a theory of behaviour of small states exists.⁶⁵

Theoretically smallness, in respect of the society and policy, means self perpetuating élites, a stress on 'particularism' rather than 'universalism' and the concomitant factionalism and personalism; and the pervasiveness and ubiquity of politics.⁶⁶ All of these observations are to be found to a marked degree within the Caribbean states.⁶⁷

Smallness in respect of economies, means great reliance on foreign trade; concentration of exports in a limited number of markets; and a small diversification of commodities produced/

65. Principally in 2 books -- Burton Benedict (ed) Problems of Smaller Territories (London: The Athlone Press 1967) and David Vital, The Inequality of States: (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1967).

66. See D.P.J. Wood "The Smaller Territories: Some Political Considerations" and Burton Benedict "Sociological Aspects of Smallness" in Benedict (ed) Problems of Smaller Territories.

67. See my section 'Internal Politics: Some major characteristics'.

* 64. Two different approaches to estimating capability and their application to the Caribbean area are discussed later in this section.

produced for export.⁶⁸ The pattern of trade and the general economic relationship established by the Caribbean states with the United States bears this out.⁶⁹

With reference to foreign policy formulation and execution the Caribbean states clearly follow the predicted theoretical behaviour pattern of small states.⁷⁰

Small states do not have the ability to staff and are unable to afford a large and universal diplomatic service. Diplomatic representation is therefore restricted to where a small state believes its major external interests lie. Generally those will be with its immediate geographical surroundings and with several or more of the major powers.⁷¹

The pattern of diplomatic relations established by the Caribbean states substantiate the theory. All have much less than universal diplomatic relations - Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Cuba have the greatest number which Haiti, Honduras and Panama have the least. Diplomatic relations/

68. See A.D. Knox "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries" in Benedict (ed) Problems of Smaller Territories; Vital, The Inequality of States, Chapter 3; and S. Kuznets "Economic Growth of Small Nations" in E.A.G. Robinson (ed) Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, (London: Macmillan, 1963).

69. See 'The Economic Interest' in my section "The Preponderance of the United States".

70. Following the analysis of Vital, The Inequality of States.

71. Ibid, pp.15-24.

relations are concentrated within the Western Hemisphere, and in particular within the immediate geographic location of the Caribbean as the table below indicates.⁷²

TABLE THIRTEEN /

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72. The total amount of diplomatic representation is as follows: Colombia - 32 embassies, 6 legations; Costa Rica - 20 diplomatic missions; Cuba - 30 embassies, 23 legations; Dominican Republic - 16 embassies, 15 legations; El Salvador - 12 embassies, 11 legations; Guatemala - 22 embassies, 2 legations; Haiti - 19 embassies, 4 legations; Honduras - 18 embassies, 2 legations; Mexico - 42 embassies, 2 legations; Nicaragua - 21 embassies, 4 legations; Panama - 24 embassies, 3 legations; Venezuela - 24 embassies, 2 legations.
Figures from Stateman's Year Books for 1960, 1961 and 1965-1966.

TABLE THIRTEEN

To Show the Diplomatic Coverage by any Caribbean State with other Caribbean States, 1960*

| | Col. | C.R. | Cb. | D.R. | El.S. | Gt. | Ht. | Hd. | Mx. | Nic. | Pan. | Ven. |
|-------|------|------|-----|------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|
| Col. | | M | E | E | L | E | L | E | E | E | E | E |
| C.R. | E | | E | O | E | E | E | E | E | E | E | L |
| Cb. | E | M | | L | E | E | E | E | E | OAS | E | E |
| D.R. | OAS | M | E | | L | E | E | O | E | O | OAS | E |
| El.S. | E | M | E | L | | E | O | E | E | E | E | L |
| Gt. | E | M | E | O | E | | L | E | E | E | E | L |
| Ht. | L | M | E | E | L | E | | O | E | O | E | E |
| Hd. | E | M | E | L | E | E | O | | E | E | E | L |
| Mx. | E | M | E | E | E | E | E | E | | E | E | E |
| Nic. | E | M | E | E | E | E | O | E | E | | E | E |
| Pan. | E | M | E | L | L | E | E | E | E | E | | E |
| Ven. | E | M | E | E | L | E | E | E | E | E | E | |

* Read vertically for a single Caribbean State's diplomatic representation with other Caribbean States and horizontally for the type of diplomatic representation accredited to any Caribbean State by other Caribbean States.

Code: E = Embassy; L = Legation; M = Mission;
 O = No Diplomatic Relations; OAS = decision to sever relations taken in accordance with OAS recommendation.

Sources: From Statesman's Year-Book, 1960, except for Colombia and Panama from Statesman's Year-Book 1961 and for Nicaragua from Statesman's Year-Book, 1965-1966.
 All published by Macmillan and Co. Ltd. London.

Finally, all have diplomatic relations with a super-power and/or one of the major powers.⁷³

A small state's foreign policy is concerned with a narrow range/

73. All maintain, for example, diplomatic relations with Great Britain.

range of problems, and wider problems are often viewed in regional terms. Lack of institutionalisation allows for a high degree of personal initiative and intuitive thinking in policy making. Often the result of this is doubt or inhibition in foreign policy making which

"Only very exceptional men with great intuitive gifts and a marked capacity and readiness for the taking of risks and for facing powerful opposition are likely to overcome...." 74

The Caribbean states exhibit a high degree of concern with internal affairs in neighbouring states. This is frequently attributed to the domination of policy making by personalities. Finally, Castro, with the new foreign policy orientation he has given Cuba, provides a good example of what Vital calls "the exceptional man".

Within the international system small states have only a small margin of safety and security; so much so that for all practical purposes nuclear warfare and large scale conventional warfare may well amount to the same thing in terms of ability to withstand attack and to recover from such an attack. 75

74. Vital, The Inequality of States, pp.24-32, 37-38.

75. Ibid, pp.58-61. Castro provides a very good example to substantiate this. In an interview with Lee Lockwood in 1965 the following conversation took place:

Lockwood: "You felt it made little difference whether Cuba was involved in a conventional war or in a thermonuclear war?"

Castro: Conventional weapons with the employment of masses of airplanes are equivalent to the use of atomic weapons. We are certain that such an aggression by the United States against our country would cost us millions of lives...." in Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel, (New York: Vintage Books, 2nd edition 1969), pp.224-225.

Confronted with this problem small states generally have two options; either to maintain a modern defence force, or to maintain a limited defence force based on a professional or citizen based standing army.⁷⁶ The first option implies considerable economic sacrifices from the population given the very high costs of modern weapons. Also high costs means an inability to develop such weapons autonomously and hence the need to buy them from abroad which in itself means less political independence and freedom of manoeuvre. The other option also means economic sacrifices and the existence of the military as an element in the social and political life of the state.⁷⁷

The Caribbean states have adopted both options. Cuba, under Castro, has closely followed the first option yet maintains a large citizen based army and a militia force. The Dominican Republic, under Trujillo, closely followed the second option.⁷⁸ But for the majority of the Caribbean states it has been a mixture of both options, i.e. essentially a third option, so that the problems of military /

76. Two other options exist and have been actively followed in the Caribbean area. One of these options is a mix of both Vital's options and the other is a negative option, i.e. no armed forces at all.

77. Vital, The Inequality of States, pp.61-68, 82-86.

78. Trujillo tried to get away from dependence upon one country for arms procurements by establishing his own limited arms factory, producing rifles, and by buying from sources in the West other than from the United States. Mexico has also tried to reduce dependence by a limited national arms programme.

military dependence in terms of weapons procurements and training from the United States co-exist with the problem of military intervention from a small semi-professionalised army.⁷⁹ Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador most closely follow this pattern. Costa Rica and Panama have been developing towards a different option, i.e. the fourth option, that of no national defence at all.

Maintaining para-military forces, mainly for internal security reasons, they both base their continued viability as nation states upon the capacity of the United States and the O.A.S. to intervene on their behalf.

Translating these factors into policy options gives a small state, in principle, a choice of three strategies:

1. a passive strategy - the state renounces freedom of choice in the external world.
2. an active strategy - the state attempts to alter the external environment to its own advantage, and
3. a defensive strategy - the state attempts to preserve the status quo using its own resources.⁸⁰

For the Caribbean states, all of which are underdeveloped, the choice is between the first two strategies. The smaller Caribbean states - in particular the Central American states - have all followed the first strategy. The United States is the cornerstone of their foreign policy/

79. See my section 'The Military Interest' in 'The Preponderance of the United States' and my section 'Militarism' in 'Internal Politics....'

80. Vital, The Inequality of States, pp.121-122.

policy and they rely upon it to maintain their political identity as actors in the international system.⁸¹ This strategy, by freeing them from the major problems of the international system, enables these states to maintain the high level of interest in regional politics which all show. To a large extent the Caribbean area represents the next most important area for policy decisions after those involving the United States. An active strategy has been followed enthusiastically by Cuba after 1959.⁸² Mexico has combined elements of both strategies.⁸³

Summary

It is clear that for the majority of the Caribbean area states the consequences of smallness cannot be overlooked. Physical size, the factor least open to change in the international system, plays an important part in determining the limits of a state's capacity to influence the functioning of the system. Effective international action is frequently confined to a small geographical area but for the Caribbean states even this limited influence is circumscribed by the presence of the United States as the hegemonial power in the area. The consequence has been, for all intents and purposes, a voluntary surrendering of sovereignty by the majority/

81. Ibid pp.183-184.

82. See Pedro Meluzá López "Con Voz y Linea Propias e Independientes" Politica Internacional (La Habana: Cuba) Primer Semestre, 1969.

83. See the section on 'The Foreign Policy of Mexico' in Carlos A. Astiz (ed) Latin American International Politics.

majority of the Caribbean area states to the United States in respect of the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. In return for this the élites in the area are able to gain support from the United States for overcoming some of the considerable internal difficulties created by smallness, e.g. access to a bigger market for trade and capital than otherwise possible; as well as guaranteeing by United States military and political support its own base of power. Such dependence, of course, brings the United States many benefits, the greatest of which is the opportunity to indicate an 'expected' behaviour pattern for these states. The alternative to individual weakness is collective strength but there have been few successful moves in this direction other than those involving the five Central American states. Such unity they have achieved has so far been very limited and fragile and appears not to have significantly altered their relationships to the United States although it has affected relationships among themselves and in the Caribbean area as a whole.⁸⁴ Foreign policy, for the majority of the Caribbean area states, thus remains determined to a significant degree by their individual smallness.

Capability Similarities between states⁸⁵

Stephen B. Jones/

84. See my case study 'The Central American Common Market as a sub-regional actor' in Part Three.

85. "Capabilities influence international relations in two ways. They can either be perceived, reacted to and taken into account by the decision-makers and therefore be seen as influencing policies; or they can limit performance or outcome of policies irrespective of whether or not these limitations were perceived/

Stephen B. Jones suggests that the basic capability of a state can be measured in terms of "area resources", "human resources" and "equipment resources".⁸⁶

By "area resources" he means the size and shape of the country, landforms, soils, climate, mineral and biological sources. The smallness of many of the states has already been referred to and some are very close in size as Column One of Table Fourteen shows. The type of underdevelopment of the area further suggests similarities of exploitation of basic resources.⁸⁷

By "human resources" he refers to size and structure of population; the social, political, economic and military systems of a country and the stock of skills, leadership and patriotism. The size of the population in many of the states is very similar as Column Two of Table Fourteen shows and/

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85. (continued) perceived by the decision-makers". Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p.11. The emphasis in this section is on the second approach.
86. Stephen B. Jones "The Power Inventory and National Strategy" in James N. Rosenau (ed) International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).
87. That is, in spite of a wide diversity of natural resources there is a certain uniformity in terms of resources selected, and methods used, for exploitation. For a geography of the area see R. West and J.P. Augelli, Middle America: Its Lands and Peoples, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1966).

TABLE FOURTEEN

Population and Area Statistics
of the Caribbean Area

| | | |
|--------------------|-----------|------------|
| Colombia | 1,138,338 | 14,443,000 |
| Costa Rica | 50,700 | 1,225,000 |
| Cuba | 114,524 | 6,933,000 |
| Dominican Republic | 48,734 | 3,098,000 |
| El Salvador | 21,393 | 2,501,000 |
| Guatemala | 108,889 | 3,886,000 |
| Haiti | 27,750 | 4,249,000 |
| Honduras | 112,088 | 1,863,362 |
| Mexico | 1,972,546 | 36,091,000 |
| Nicaragua | 148,000 | 1,526,000 |
| Panama | 74,478 | 1,109,000 |
| Venezuela | 912,050 | 7,523,000 |

Source: Juan Rodriguez Cruz, "El Caribe en Cifras" from F.M. Andic and T.S. Mathews (eds) The Caribbean in Transition (Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Pedras, P.R. 1965), Table 2, p.334.

and its structure is also very much the same.⁸⁸ The sections on 'Economic Underdevelopment', 'Internal Politics' and 'The Preponderance of the United States' suggest further similarities between a majority of the states in the area.

By "equipment resources" he refers to economic capital goods, military equipment, the material apparatus of government and its stockpiles of goods and financial credit. Various tables in the section "The Preponderance of the United States' point to similarities here also.

88. For Central America see T. Lynn Smith, "The Population of Central American Countries" in Wilgus (ed) The Caribbean: The Central American Area, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961).

Another method of measuring capability is the functional approach of the Sprouts. They suggest that capabilities can be estimated by reference to the following five functional categories: decision-making functions; means-producing functions; information-providing functions; means-utilizing functions; resistance functions.⁸⁹

By "information-providing functions" they mean ability to collect, analyze, store, recall and utilize strategies for action.⁹⁰ The 'underdevelopment' and 'smallness of states' indicators strongly influence this function as they do the "means-providing function" which is the ability to provide the instrumentalities required in order to implement the strategies adopted.

The 'internal politics' indicator strongly influences the "decision-making function" and the "means-utilizing function". By the former they mean the ability to define feasible objectives, and to combine instruments and techniques of statecraft into effective strategies for attaining objectives. The latter is the ability to employ effectively the instrumentalities that can be produced and in combinations and patterns adopted.

By /

89. Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc. 1962), pp.163-174.

90. Astiz notes that Latin American diplomatic services have particularly poor information gathering and interpretation facilities, and that consequently personal impressions, often based on guesswork, are used to make policies. See his "Latin American Countries in the International System", pp. 7-10.

By the "resistance function" they mean ability to parry demands, resist pressures, defend against attacks, and carry on under conditions of stress and catastrophe. This is influenced by all 'indicators' but particularly by 'the preponderance of the United States' indicator.

Both methods of estimating capability point to a near equality of capabilities for a majority of the states in the area insofar as differences between them, in all indicators, are not very great. The states specifically excluded from this conclusion are Mexico and Colombia, with Venezuela and Cuba at the margin.

The most significant implication of this equality of capabilities is that a state cannot, by its own efforts, guarantee its security in the area.⁹¹ It is therefore confronted, by necessity, with defining a relationship to the environment which will guarantee it security. This means, in practice, a choice between five different strategies, although no one strategy necessarily excludes the adoption of various other strategies at the same time:

1. Through an alliance with a world power which has a major interest in the area. All the states have sought this/

91. If the Caribbean area is considered as excluding the United States then undoubtedly Cuba could do this at present but the political circumstances are such that it is unlikely to be forced to do so. Before the Revolution its position was much the same as that of the other Caribbean area states.

this approach or have had it pressed upon them.⁹²

2. Through political unification to create a viable state in both the regional and international systems. Only the five Central American states have pursued this approach with any enthusiasm.⁹³

3. Through developing and operating a balance of power system. Examples of such an approach are much more common in the nineteenth century than in modern times.⁹⁴

4. Through the subversion of hostile governments in the hope of establishing a more friendly government. All the states have used this approach but some more frequently than others.⁹⁵

5. Through a policy of non-intervention in, isolation from, or strict neutrality toward, regional politics. It has been most persistently followed by Panama and indifferently by Haiti.⁹⁶

92. The major reason for this is stressed in the 'Conclusions' to this section.

93. Various facets of Central American union are considered in several case studies in Part Three.

94. Occasionally there have been times in which a 'balance of power' system seemed to be in operation. For example, at the end of 1948 ideological distinctions between Caribbean states were reflected in the limited co-operation between Cuba, Costa Rica and Guatemala counterposed against the limited co-operation between Nicaragua, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. However, such co-operation, although resembling alliances was more a brief coincidence of interests than a consciously willed outcome of foreign policy on the part of any of the states involved.

95. See my case study 'Subversive Intervention' in Part Three.

96. The low level of participation in Caribbean regional interaction of both Haiti and Panama is recorded throughout Part Two.

Conclusions: Major Implications.

At the beginning of this section it was pointed out that the combination of 'smallness' and 'equality of capability' led to the inability of any single state to alter or control the immediate environment in which it operates. Another major implication stemming from the combination of 'smallness' and 'equality of capability' is now clear and arises from the correspondence of two of the strategies open to the Caribbean area states as possible approaches to the international system. That is, insofar as the passive strategy (smallness of state) and the alliance strategy (capability similarities between states) are virtually synonymous, pressures on Caribbean decision-makers to adopt a renunciatory foreign policy will be very strong.

Economic Underdevelopment: Its Nature and Some Major Implications.

~~Economic Underdevelopment: Its Nature and Some Major Implications.~~

Major Implications.

Although Latin America is characterised by states in markedly varying degrees and kinds of underdevelopment a majority of the states in the Caribbean area correspond to a particular type of underdevelopment in that the degree and kind of their underdevelopment is very similar.

Various models of underdevelopment show the similarity in degree. Using a linear model most Caribbean states are grouped /

grouped at the 'undeveloped' and 'backward' end of the scale.⁹⁷ In terms of a growth model they are nearly all at the pre-take off stage.⁹⁸ Placed in categories based on per-capita income, growth, resource availability and use, they fit into several categories at the most.⁹⁹ An important general effect of this degree of underdevelopment has been to exaggerate further the smallness of the states by virtue of the fact that all the pressures and disabilities from which a small state suffers are in some measure enhanced if it is underdeveloped.¹⁰⁰ In the Caribbean area, extreme smallness and a high degree of underdevelopment are thus mutually reinforcing factors.

The similarity in kind of underdevelopment stems from the historical/

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97. Galbraith views economic development in this way by seeing "the countries of the world not as divided between the developed and the underdeveloped but as spread along a line representing various stages of development". See his Economic Development in Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.19.
 98. W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962). Mexico is at the take-off stage and Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela are special cases by being somewhere between the pre-take-off and take-off stages.
 99. Benjamin Higgins develops a 4 category model based upon such factors in his Economic Development: Principles, Problems and Policies (London: Constable and Co. Ltd. 1959), Chapter I and pp.21-23 in particular.
 100. An estimation of economic development frequently seems essential in defining whether a state is small or not, e.g. Vital's classification of a small state as "(a) a population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; (b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries". See his Inequality of States, p.8.

historical dominance in the area of the 'plantation economy' from which has risen a particular type of society.¹⁰¹ Now in a process of modification the economy of the area is still largely explicable by reference to it, that is to

"a simple two-sector model with a segmented, foreign directed, primary export sector setting the pace - largely in the traditional way in respect of marketing, investment financing, demand formation and technical progress".¹⁰²

The other sector comprises small public works and services combined with subsistence agriculture. This sector, generally stagnant, has been increasingly influenced by the other more dynamic sector in which it has become more or less integrated.¹⁰³ Consequently the economic history of the /

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101. The basis of this economy and society have been outlined in Charles Wagley, "Plantation America: A culture Sphere" in Vera Rubin (ed) Caribbean Studies: A Symposium (Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, 1957). Only the Eastern lowlands of Central America can strictly be said to belong to this "culture sphere" in Central America but the latifundia system, particularly in the Pacific Coast lowlands, shows a number of similarities. For this reason the notion of a "Caribbean culture sphere" can be applied to the situation in Central America, particularly as these areas have proved to be the dynamic sectors of the economies.
102. Lloyd Best "Current Development Strategy and Economic Integration in the Caribbean" in Lewis and Mathews (ed) Caribbean Integration, p.65
103. In Guatemala, for example, the Indians, generally considered in certain areas as outside the money economy by their primary reliance on subsistence agriculture, are nevertheless vitally important as seasonal labourers on the coffee, cotton, and sugar plantations. See Eduardo Galeano, Guatemala: Occupied Country (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969), pp.41-42.

the area can largely be written in terms of the dynamic sector and in particular of the response of the export sector to external demand.¹⁰⁴

The general pattern of underdevelopment created by the 'plantation economy' is evident in the similar recommendations for development and the similar problems facing their implementation.

Recommendations for the economic development of the various countries point to the need for economic planning; a better transportation system; improved standards in public health, education and administration; and a widening of the base of the economy by diversification in agriculture, by utilizing new resources and by the creation of impact substitution industries.¹⁰⁵

The recommendation for widening the base of the economy is the/

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104. Such a history is Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean: an economic history of Cuban Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press 1964) which stresses the gradual integration of the other sectors of the economy with the plantation sector and the dominance of this, from the early 20th Century onwards by the United States.
105. See, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba (United States: John Hopkins Press, 1951) Chapter 2; May and Associates, Costa Rica: A study in Economic Development (The 20th Century Fund, New York, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1952) Chapter 12; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Nicaragua (United States: John Hopkins Press 1953) Part One; Vincent Checchi and Associates, Honduras: A Problem in economic development (The 20th Century Fund, New York 1959), Chapter 10.

the most important yet the most difficult to implement, due to its political implications. To diversify agriculture a programme of land reform is necessary; yet this threatens the native political élite as well as major business interests in the United States. For the former, ownership of land has historically been the necessary base for entrance into politics which also guarantees, because of the very unequal distribution of land, its exclusiveness.¹⁰⁶ For the latter large landholdings have been claimed as initially necessary for efficient export production.¹⁰⁷ Business interests in the United States have consequently viewed land reform with alarm and have applied pressure at the government level, both in the United States and the Caribbean area, to prevent it.¹⁰⁸

The development of import substitution industries creates similar problems. For the native élite it will inevitably mean/

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106. There are, of course other bases of power than the possession of land but in the Caribbean area the historical importance of agriculture has given a special significance to the ownership of land as a means of acquiring wealth and power.
107. For example, in banana production U.F.C.O. claims four reasons for large landholdings - (a) the need for self-contained units, (b) the amount of irrigation, (c) the system of 'flood following' to control disease, (d) only about one-quarter of the land is suitable anyway. See Stacy May and Galo Plaza, The United Fruit Company in Latin America (Washington, D.C: The National Planning Association 1958), pp.82-87.
108. Detailed examples of such pressures in Guatemala are provided in Alfonso Bauer Paiz, Como opera el capital yanqui en Centroamérica (Mexico D.F: Editorial Ibero Mexicana, 1956).

mean an end to the traditional exclusiveness of politics as middle class elements and later the labour unions pressure to be admitted to the political arena.¹⁰⁹ For United States business interests it has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages centre on the creation of new lucrative investment possibilities, particularly in the C.A.C.M.¹¹⁰ The disadvantages are in the possibility of a diminishing market for United States exports in an area where it has been particularly easy to sell them.¹¹¹ Within Central America, concern over this is shown in the pressure that United States business interests have put on their government to oppose the Integrated Industries Scheme of the C.A.C.M.¹¹²

Within the states in the Caribbean area the political élites marked lack of concern over development is most clearly shown in the general absence of parties or personalities offering a policy and ideology of development.¹¹³ Where such/

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109. The 'rules' for admitting new groups to the political arena as well as the possible effects of so doing are outlined in Charles W. Anderson, "Toward a theory of Latin American Politics" in Peter G. Snow (ed) Government and Politics in Latin America: A Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1967).
 110. So far the major beneficiaries of integration are United States firms which have been quick to exploit the incentives and concessions offered them.
 111. See my earlier section "The Preponderance of the United States".
 112. See J.D. Cochrane, "United States Attitudes toward Central American Integration" in Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol.18, No.2., 1964, pp.83-84 in particular.
 113. A basic ideological approach to development is outlined by Pablo Gonzalez Casanova in "Internal and External Politics of Developing Countries" in R. Barry Farrell (ed) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

such parties or personalities appear opposition is bitter, from both the traditional land-owning élite and the army.

The native élite often combines with foreign business interests to frustrate development programmes. The recent history of the Dominican Republic provides a good example. A combination of United States business interests and a major section of the Political élite successfully hampered the formulation and administration of Bosch's development policies and kept open the idea of the sale to private interests of the state-owned expropriated Trujillo holdings upon which any development programme largely rested.¹¹⁴

The United States government also concerns itself with influencing the goals and direction of Latin American development, as the whole conception of the Alliance for Progress indicates. Within the Caribbean it has been particularly concerned with the possibilities of the C.A.C.M. and the Dominican Republic. Qualified support for Central American integration has been given but at the cost of placating United States business interests, and determining the overall operation of the C.A.C.M.¹¹⁵ A similar picture emerges with respect to the Dominican Republic.¹¹⁶

114. These holdings amounted to 65% of Dominican industry, 35% of arable land and 30% of animal husbandry. See Fred Goff and Michael Locker "The Violence of Domination: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic" in Irving Louis Horowitz et al (ed) Latin American Radicalism.

115. See J.S. Nye Jnr. "Central American Regional Integration" International Conciliation, March, 1967, pp.52-57.

116. See John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War, (New York: Doubleday and Co.Inc. 1966).

Any development programme has therefore to take into account a multitude of national and foreign interests. Hence widening the base of the economy will have international as well as national repercussions and will require approval from abroad as well as at home. Attempting development without such approval may result in intervention. Interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Guatemala in 1954 and later in the early developments of the Cuban Revolution are the clearest example of this.¹¹⁷

Another major effect of the 'plantation economy' on international relations in the Caribbean area has been to reduce to a minimum the number of contacts between states. Producing similar products for sale outside the area economic contacts within the area have been few and unimportant. The development of services, minimal and primarily associated with the export sector, has reflected this fact.¹¹⁸ Although the pattern is redressed somewhat in Central America by historical factors and that of geographic proximity greater trade and communication within the area is a very recent development.

Summary:

Economic underdevelopment in the Caribbean has then three major dimensions: /

117. See, in Part Three, the case studies of 'The Guatemalan Affair' and 'United States-Cuban Relations 1959-1961'.

118. Telephone calls to neighbouring states, e.g. Honduras and El Salvador, were routed through Miami as late as 1964. Railways in Honduras were developed only for the transport of bananas to the coast, hence the capital, Tegucigalpa, does not have a railway. As of 1966, between the capital of Haiti and that of the Dominican Republic there was no all-weather road or regular road transport services and telephone calls were routed via Miami.

1. The prevalence of a relatively high degree of underdevelopment;
2. The dominance of a single productive sector, the agricultural sector, in the economy;
3. The integration of this sector with an external developed state, the United States.

For the majority of the Caribbean area states, underdevelopment removes the possibility of any action to influence the functioning of the international system. At best all these states can hope for is to gain a measure of prestige in the system by the co-ordination of their international conduct to the value orientation of the international system.¹¹⁹

Within the region effective action is circumscribed by the particular economic relationship established by these states with the United States. With the economy tied so closely to the United States pressure can easily be brought to bear by United States government and business interests to ensure compliance with United States demands. By accommodating themselves to these demands the Caribbean area states create a situation where United States interests and their/

119. This is a general statement applying to all underdeveloped countries. See Gustavo Lagos, International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1963), Chapter 1 and pp.20-21 in particular. The Caribbean area states try to gain such prestige by verbally supporting the anti-colonial policies and the humanitarian declarations of the U.N.

their own appear to be identical.¹²⁰ This identity of interests reduces somewhat the action of the Caribbean area states in the O.A.S., as they are seen by a number of South American states as mere 'client states' of the United States. Consequently, the initiatives taken by the Caribbean states to activate the O.A.S. have sometimes been ignored.¹²¹ Similarly, the prevalence of non-democratic forms of government and refusals to fully implement various inter-American declarations have resulted in the very low prestige of these states within Latin America.¹²²

The particular type of underdevelopment in the Caribbean serves/

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120. In Nicaragua under Anastasio Somoza, Martz reports that "Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla in Washington called home for instructions more than 50 times in recent years preceding international conferences. His instructions always read the same: "co-operate fully with the delegation of the United States" Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge, p.199.
121. Ydigoras, as President of Guatemala, tried often and unsuccessfully to get the O.A.S. to adopt stronger measures against Cuba from 1960 onwards, these moves being seen by the larger states, Brazil and Mexico in particular, as emanating from the United States. Juan Jose Arevalo, a former President of Guatemala, wryly notes that in the O.A.S. "The United States delegates slip so many "suggestions" along the desks of the pre-committed that the proposals of interest to the powerful nation come as though they originated from those who speak Spanish". See his The Shark and the Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961), p.118.
122. On a subjective ranking by Latin Americans of the status of the Latin American states only Cuba and Costa Rica received high scores. The former for its defiance of the United States and the latter for its 'fairer' system of government. See 'Johan Galtung et al "El Sistema Latinoamericana de Naciones: un Análisis Estructural", pp.66-68.

serves then to focus the international relations of these states on the relationship with the United States and to restrict, because of weakness, effective international action to the strictly local geographic area where other states in similar situations may be influenced.

Internal Politics: Some major Characteristics

For all of the twelve Caribbean area states it would be very difficult to generalise meaningfully about their internal politics; Mexico, for example, is clearly very different from the rest. However, for the majority of them, and in particular the smaller states, some generalisations are possible. Their political systems can be categorised as 'traditional' or 'transitional'; and as remaining largely unintegrated and undifferentiated. The pattern of politics has basically been particularistic, ascriptive, affective and diffuse; and has been marked by instability, militarism and personalism. Finally, for one set or another of power contenders, the government has always been illegitimate and hence open to replacement by any means.

Personalism, militarism and political instability have been recurrent throughout the history of the Caribbean area and remains of considerable significance at present. Their effect on the politics of the area is discussed below.

Personalism^{123 /}

Personalism¹²³

In contrast to the decline of personalist politics in South America has been the persistence and perversiveness of personalist politics in the Caribbean area. Every facet of politics is affected by personalism.

Political issues and conflicts are frequently seen as arising because of the actions of one man rather than directly from the environment.¹²⁴ Political parties, whether traditional, modern, or ideological, tend to be organised around the political theory and personality of one man.¹²⁵ Meanwhile nearly every major election, for only the brief period of the election, sees the revival of 'established' personalist parties and the formation of new personalist parties.¹²⁶ Finally, administration, whether at/

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123. Here, personalism is defined as adherence to or opposition to a political leader on personality rather than ideological grounds. Personal, individual and family motivations are to the fore rather than support for impersonal political ideas or programmes.
124. Hence the use of assassination as a method of political change. There have been four successful assassinations of presidents - Remon of Panama in 1955, A. Somoza of Nicaragua in 1956, Castillo Armas of Guatemala in 1957 and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in 1961 - and many other attempts, successful and unsuccessful, on other political figures.
125. Traditional Parties, e.g. in Nicaragua the P.C.N. of Chamorro and the P.L.N. of the Somozas' Modern Parties, e.g. in the Dominican Republic the P.R.D. of Bosch, in Costa Rica the P.L.N. of Figueres, in Venezuela the A.D. of Betancourt and in Guatemala the P.R. of the Montenegros'.
126. A good example of an 'established' personalist party has been the P.R. of Calderon Guardia in Costa Rica.

at a national or at a local level, is personalist based.¹²⁷

Personalism adds to, and is in part responsible for, an intensely partisan politics in which "winner takes all" prevails. For a persecuted opposition the options are feeble gestures, exile or violent opposition. For the government there are the considerable privileges and financial rewards of office. The size of these gains and the difficulty of winning office in opposition tempt many governments to resort to 'continuismo'; either direct or indirect.¹²⁸

Personalism has also had a major effect on foreign policy formation. Personality has proved to be an important determinant in foreign policy decision making, and one of the few checks available on aberrant personalities is that

"a person is always a member of a group and that there is a group or organisational reality that stabilizes the reality of each of its members and acts to prevent radical/

127. Stokes says of Honduras that "personalismo might well be defined as a principle in the Honduran administrative process". See William S. Stokes, Honduras: An area study in Government. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950), p.191.

128. "Continuismo" in the sense of legal change to ensure that a president stays in office beyond the intention of the constitution under which he was elected has a long history in the area. See Russel H. Fitzgibbon "Continuismo in Central America and the Caribbean" Inter-America Quarterly, July, 1940. A recent example of direct "continuismo" is Duvalier in Haiti in 1964. Indirect "continuismo" can take two forms - "imposicion" e.g. Galvez in Honduras in 1949, or "candidato unico" e.g. Lemus in El Salvador in 1956.

radical shifts or beliefs".¹²⁹

The structure of government and personalism both tend to reduce such checks to a minimum. With the idea of executive control of policy, and in particular foreign policy, firmly established in Latin American politics, there are few institutional checks on presidential authority. Such checks as exist, legislative and/or administrative, are weakened by personalism. Foreign ministries are staffed almost wholly by followers or friends of the President.¹³⁰ These officials rely upon presidential patronage and given this, plus the effects of personalism and their prevailing values, are unlikely to be highly critical of presidential policy.¹³¹ The president sits in the middle of a communications network and decisions are frequently passed to him for resolution. He gives advice, when asked for, from a largely uncritical group. A consequence is that the personality of the president becomes a major determinant of foreign policy decision-making. The philosophy behind personalism is also likely to act as an additional pressure upon a president to pursue, as far as possible, an individual style/

129. Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co. 1968), p.431, also see Chapter 5.

130. Astiz points out that in the Latin American diplomatic service "it is proper to assume that...positions often exist (or are created) to provide attractive rewards for the faithful of limited means" in his "The Latin American Countries in the International System", p.4. Mexico, with a small professional staff in its foreign ministry, is here an exception.

131. See John P. Gillin, "The Middle Segments and Their Values" in R.D. Tomasko (ed) Latin American Politics: Studies of the Contemporary Scene (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).

style of foreign policy. Under these circumstances it is clear that foreign policy will largely be personal; and it helps explain why a great number of the presidents of Caribbean states have viewed intra-area politics as based, often to a fairly large extent, on personality likes and dislikes.¹³²

Militarism¹³³

The military continue to be an important group in the Latin American political process but as Lieuwen points out

"it is dangerous to generalize about the area as a whole, or any regional part of it, for the rôle of the military is not identical in any two countries. At one extreme is Costa Rica which abolished its army; at the other is the Dominican Republic with its absolutist military dictatorship. In between there are eighteen gradations."¹³⁴

Nevertheless, it is possible to see that in a great number of/

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132. Bosch provides a clear example of this. He says "As soon as I was elected President of the Dominican Republic Duvalier resolved to kill me -- why I have no idea. Perhaps he had a dream about me and interpreted it as an order to do away with me. Perhaps in a voodoo trance, one of his guardian spirits told him I would become his enemy." See Juan Bosch The Unfinished Experiment: democracy in the Dominican Republic, (London: Pall Mall Press 1966), p.184.
133. Militarism is here defined as "the domination of the military man over the civilian, the undue emphasis upon military demands, or any transcendence by the armed forces of "true military purposes", from John J. Johnson "The Latin American military as a politically competing group in transitional society" in John J. Johnson (ed) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.91.
134. Lieuwen Arms and Politics in Latin America, p.157

of states of the Caribbean area the military are a decisive force in politics.¹³⁵ And that with the exception of Mexico and Costa Rica all the Caribbean states have political military forces.¹³⁶

Since 1945, and with Mexico as the exception, the military have intervened at least once in every state in the Caribbean area.¹³⁷ Many different reasons have been advanced for these interventions but nearly all agree that the basis for the frequency of military intervention in the Caribbean area is the predominance of "traditional" and "transitional" social structures.¹³⁸ These structures giving the military in/

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135. The very similar typologies of Lieuwen and Wyckoff between them place the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama in a category in which the armed forces dominate politics and are prone to intervene. Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, pp.158-163 and Theodore Wyckoff "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics" in John D. Martz (ed) The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1965), pp.263-268.
136. By "political military forces" is meant a military which considers itself responsible for the definition and delegation of political authority" from Irving Louis Horowitz "The Military Elites" in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds) Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
137. Although both Nicaragua and Costa Rica have been considered as free of coup d'états since 1945, the military have intervened in both. In Nicaragua in favour of A. Somoza against the incumbent president, Arguello, in May 1947. In Costa Rica in favour of the incumbent president, Picado, against the victory of an opponent, Ulate, in the presidential elections of February, 1948.
138. See, in particular, Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America" in Snow (ed) Government and Politics in Latin America.

in the area greater influence and greater opportunity to intervene.¹³⁹

The motives for intervention have been mixed but are related mainly to internal politics rather than external politics; and more to the preservation of the status quo than to its overthrow. The military are consequently regarded as guardians of the traditional order and not, as has happened elsewhere in Latin America, as possible protagonists of change.¹⁴⁰

Once in power the military are able to govern more adequately in the Caribbean area states than they have been able to do in Latin America as a whole. The smallness of many of the states ensures that the military are quickly able to consolidate power and guarantee future compliance. Two of the greatest weaknesses of the military -- inability to administer and lack of legitimacy -- are reduced to a minimum.¹⁴¹

Military/

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139. John J. Johnson in The Military and Society in Latin America (California: Stanford University Press 1964) notes that "Historically they (armed forces) have attained the greatest influence when the masses have been apathetic, the trade unions feeble and few, and the officers themselves free to perform the relatively simple function of providing the balance of power between groups competing for political power but in essential agreement on social-economic objectives", p.257. This was clearly the position of many of the Caribbean states during the period under discussion.
140. The military in El Salvador and Venezuela have been reform minded however. Those in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Honduras have not. See Edwin Lieuwen, Generals versus Presidents (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), Chapters 3 and 5.
141. See S.E. Tiner The Man on Horseback: the role of the military in politics, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962) Chapter 3.

Military men have frequently had administrative experience in civilian government and so are familiar with civic problems and procedures.¹⁴² Political illegitimacy rather than legitimacy is the normative pattern for much of the area.¹⁴³ The military are, consequently, as acceptable as any other élite group in power and often make a case for greater acceptability by claiming to govern in the national interest rather than for particular interests.

Toward foreign policy formation the military are generally very conservative. They change very little other than the emphasis put on certain relations. In the Caribbean area this generally has meant a greater support for United States policies, particularly in the O.A.S.

Political Instability and Political Violence

Confusion often surrounds the definition of political stability or instability but however these terms are defined there is general agreement that political instability is a feature of Latin American politics.¹⁴⁴ This permanent instability being expressed mainly in "purposive political violence". Politics in the Caribbean area states can be described as very unstable and dominated by violence.

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142. In Guatemala, under Arbenz in 1954, all the 22 Departmental Governors were army officers. During the presidency of Mendez Montenegro all the Governors of the Departments were colonels.
143. See Irving Louis Horowitz, "The norm of illegitimacy: The political sociology of Latin America" in Irving Louis Horowitz et al (eds) Latin American Radicalism.
144. For a recent attempt to define political stability and instability in a general sense and then apply this to Latin America see Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change, (New York: Random House 1968), Chapters 1,2.

Of the many explanations advanced for the causes of political instability in Latin America those of Kling appear to be the most relevant to the majority of states in the Caribbean area. Summarised as general propositions, he says that

"A decisive correlation exists between the control of the economic bases of power and the real exercise of political power in Latin America. Control of the conventional economic bases of power remains relatively static.

Because of the colonial nature of the Latin American economies an exceptional economic premium attaches to the control of the apparatus of government as a dynamic base for power. Whereas the conventional bases of power effectively restrict mobility in economic status, control of government provides an unusually dynamic route to wealth and power. Thus the contrast between the stable character of the conventional economic bases of power and the shifting, unconventional position of government provokes intense and violent competition for control of government as a means of acquiring and expanding a base of wealth and power. In the vocabulary of mathematics chronic political instability is a function of the contradiction between the realities of a colonial economy and the political requirements of legal sovereignty among the Latin American states.¹⁴⁵
(Emphasis in the original).

145. Merle Kling "Toward a theory of power and political instability in Latin America" in Martz (ed) The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics, p.138.

In the Caribbean area this "intense and violent competition" for political power is reflected by the frequency with which violence has been the major factor in the change of presidents or juntas. From 1946 to 1965 there were twenty-seven such changes and only Mexico was free from executive change by violence.¹⁴⁶

TABIE FIFTEEN

To show the successful use of violence in the
Caribbean area to effect changes of
Presidents or Juntas -
January 1946 - December 1965

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Colombia | June 1953, May 1957. |
| Costa Rica | March-May, 1948. |
| Cuba | March 1952, January, 1959 (protracted) |
| Dominican Republic | May 1961-January 1962, September, 1963, April-May 1965. |
| El Salvador | December 1948, October, 1960 January, 1961. |
| Guatemala | June 1954, July, 1957, October, 1957, March, 1963. |
| Haiti | January, 1946, May 1950, December 1956-October 1957. |
| Honduras | October 1956, October, 1963. |
| Mexico | None |
| Nicaragua | May 1947, September, 1956. |
| Panama | November 1949, May 1951, January, 1955. |
| Venezuela | November, 1948, January 1958. |

146. Violence is here taken to mean all changes of presidents or juntas occasioned directly by the threat of violence or the use of violence.

For the twenty-seven successful attempts there were many more unsuccessful attempts but accurate figures for these are difficult to come by.¹⁴⁷ An approximation of the total general amount of political violence can be gained however by using the figures collected by Eckstein on internal wars. Using the New York Times Index for the period 1946-1959, he records for the area, a total of 386 cases of equivocal and unequivocal political violence.¹⁴⁸

TABEE SIXTEEN

To show the total extent of political violence in the Caribbean area: 1946-1959

| | <u>Unequivocal</u> | <u>Equivocal and Unequivocal</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| Colombia | 42 | 47 |
| Costa Rica | 16 | 19 |
| Cuba | 80 | 100 |
| Dominican Republic | 2 | 6 |
| El Salvador | 4 | 9 |
| Guatemala | 32 | 45 |
| Haiti | 32 | 40 |
| Honduras | 10 | 11 |
| Mexico | 27 | 28 |
| Nicaragua | 13 | 16 |
| Panama | 23 | 29 |
| Venezuela | 26 | 36 |

Source: Harry Eckstein Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation, cited in Merle Kling "Violence and Politics in Latin America", p.196.

- 147. Arevalo, as President of Guatemala from 1946-1951 admits to 17 uprisings - others say there were many more. The incidence of isolated acts of political violence directed mainly towards the government was certainly high.
- 148. By 'unequivocal violence' Eckstein means warfare, turmoil, rioting, terrorism, mutiny and coups; by 'equivocal violence' plots, administrative action.

These figures clearly show that throughout the Caribbean area political violence is frequent, especially in the bigger states. But paradoxically political violence, less frequent in the smaller states, is more likely to end in a successful change of leadership as a comparison with Table Fifteen establishes. Here the use of violence is effective; it is also regarded as legitimate. The best indication of this is in its institutionalisation. Stokes, for example, distinguishes between seven types of political violence, all of which can be located in the politics of the smaller Caribbean area states since World War Two.¹⁴⁹ To this can be added the rights of asylum and tradition of exile for participants in unsuccessful insurrections which are a marked feature of Central American politics in particular. Guerilla warfare, although non-institutionalised, can also be added to the list, since it is based on advocacy of violence as the necessary condition for political change. This 'structured' violence is further reinforced by a culture of political violence, formed elsewhere in Latin America, but very noticeable in the Caribbean area.¹⁵⁰

Summary

Rosenau has drawn attention to the inadequacy of viewing the internal politics and external politics of a state as separate from each other and instead has stressed their inter-relatedness.¹⁵¹ /

149. The seven types are caudillismo, golpe de estado, cuartelazo, revolution, imposición, continuismo, candidato unico. William S. Stokes "Violence as a power factor in Latin America" in Mertz (ed) The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics.

150. See Merle Kling "Violence and Politics in Latin America" in Irving Louis Horowitz et al (eds) Latin American Radicalism.

relatedness.¹⁵¹ From this it follows that the major characteristics of internal politics become very important determinants of a state's external policy. Rosenau further suggests that the external behaviour of states is generally explicable by reference to five variables which he calls the idiosyncratic, role, government, societal and systemic.¹⁵² Adopting Rosenau's argument and his classification, the purpose of this section has been to stress the importance of the idiosyncratic, societal and governmental variables as against the role variable for understanding politics in the Caribbean area.¹⁵³ Of particular importance, as outlined by the paragraphs on personalism is the idiosyncratic variable. As Rosenau points out this variable can be of considerable significance when the holder of high office is frequently important in both the national and international system and is largely responsible for delineating the boundaries between them. In these circumstances the nature of the recruitment and socialisation of such officials becomes an important determinant of policy.¹⁵⁴ In the Caribbean area heads of state are important in both the national and international /

151. James N. Rosenau "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (ed) Approaches to Comparative and International Politics.

152. Ibid, pp.42-43

153. The societal variable is stressed further in the section "Economic Underdevelopment: Its Nature and some Major Implications" and the systemic variable in the sections "The Preponderance of the United States" and "The Smallness of States and the Capability Similarities between States in the Caribbean Area: Some Implications".

154. James N. Rosenau "Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World" in James N. Rosenau (ed) Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p.13.

international system and the nature of the recruitment and socialisation is powerfully affected by the mix of governmental and societal variables as reflected in personalism as an ideology, militarism, political instability and political violence which all tend to reinforce and to emphasise the idiosyncratic variable. A reflection of this fact is seen in the explanation of much of Caribbean area politics solely by reference to this variable.¹⁵⁵ This ignores however the other important variables, particularly the systemic, which must be taken into account for any meaningful explanation of the politics of the area.¹⁵⁶

The Region Defined

Using only material contained in the previous section 'The Particular Indicators of the Caribbean Region' it is now possible to identify a region and within this a core group of states.

The theory behind the identification of the region is that the material contained in the previous section points to an 'ideal type' in every 'particular indicator', and from the sum of these 'ideal types' it is possible to envisage a 'typical' Caribbean state. The relationship of every state in /

155. Popular books on the area are particularly prone to do this, e.g. Colin Rickards Caribbean Power (London: Dobson Books Ltd. 1963); a similar approach has also been suggested for serious research, e.g. Frederick E. Kidder "Hemispheric Role of the Caribbean Political Leaders: A Bibliography of Current Biography" in Wilgus (ed) The Caribbean: Its Hemispheric Role.

156. On the point of the systemic variable see the section "Some Explanations of the Interaction Patterns in the Region 1948-1964" in Part Two.

in the Caribbean area to this 'typical' state can therefore be assessed by reference to its relationship to every particular indicator. Those states approximating most closely to the 'typical' state are considered as the core group of the region. Those approximating closely to the 'typical' state as being in the region. Those approximating only partially or not at all are excluded.

To identify both the region and the core group I have drawn up a chart which indicates every state's relation to a 'particular indicator' as either positive or negative -- shown by a tick and cross respectively. Where a state's relation to the indicator may be qualified I have added a question mark. For a state to belong to the region it must register as positive on every one of the four 'particular indicators'. Conversely if it registers as negative in any one of these 'particular indicators' I exclude it from the region. However, a state registering as negative in any one of the divisions into which the 'particular indicators' are divided is not necessarily excluded from the region but it is excluded from the core group. Also excluded from the core group, but not from the region, is any state registering a qualified positive in any of the 'particular indicators' or one of their divisions. I have made no attempt to rank or assign weights to any 'particular indicator' or to its divisions.

TABLE SEVENTEEN /

TABLE SEVENTEEN

To determine a region and core group from particular indicators

| STATE | THE PARTICULAR | | | | INDICATORS | | | | The Region Defined | | |
|--------------------|--|----------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| | The Preponderance of the United States | | Size | | Under-Development | | Internal Political Characteristics | | | | |
| | Military | Economic | Political | Smallness | Capabilities | Degree | Kind | Personalism | | Militarism | Instability and Violence |
| COLOMBIA | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X | X | X ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ✓ | E |
| COSTA RICA | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | R |
| CUBA | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ? | ✓ ? | ✓ | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | R |
| DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| EL SALVADOR | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| GUATEMALA | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| HAITI | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| HONDURAS | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| MEXICO | X ? | ✓ ? | ✓ ? | X | X | X | X | X ? | X | ✓ ? | E |
| NICARAGUA | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| PANAMA | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | G.G. |
| VENEZUELA | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ ? | ? | X | X | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | E |

Code
 C.G. = Core Group
 R = Region
 E = Excluded

By registering a positive in every 'particular indicator' or division of an indicator the following seven states constitute the core group of the region - the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.

Costa Rica and Cuba qualify for inclusion in the region by registering as positive, albeit qualified, in every 'particular indicator'.

Excluded from the region are Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela although Venezuela can, in many respects, be said to be a Caribbean state.

A brief look at Venezuela's, Colombia's and Mexico's historical attitudes towards the Caribbean area as visible by their respective foreign policies also point to their exclusion from the region.

Venezuela's foreign policy most closely approximates to that of a 'Caribbean state' in respect of frequent involvement in intra-area politics combined with a firm alliance with the United States. Involvement in the Caribbean area was particularly high under the regime of Betancourt when Venezuela had a number of foreign relations problems with both the Dominican Republic and Cuba.¹⁵⁷ At the same time it/

157. a short summary of both disputes is in Robert J. Alexander The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: a profile of the regime of Romolo Betancourt (New Brunswick, N.J. Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp.143-146.

it was particularly concerned with the ending of colonialism in the Caribbean.¹⁵⁸ However, unlike many of the other states in the area, its Caribbean policy has not always been in accord with the United States and differences have arisen.¹⁵⁹ Also, unlike many of the states in the area, it has wider contacts in the international system.¹⁶⁰ This relative independence from the United States has been reflected in the international system by the invitations sent to Venezuela to participate in the two 1961 conferences of the 'uncommitted' states. Its dependence on the United States and its support of the United States is reflected in Venezuela's final decision, reached only after much controversy, not to attend. Consequently Venezuela's position in respect of its foreign policy is difficult to define. Whilst peripheral to the region it is also involved, in a wide sense, with the region. But because it is only peripheral to the region I have decided to exclude it from consideration.

The anomalous position of Venezuela to the Caribbean region is not shared by either Colombia or Mexico. Their respective /

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158. Representatives from the colonial West Indies were invited to the second conference of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom in 1960, for which the Venezuelan Government was both host and prime mover.
159. Such differences have been evident in the O.A.S. where Venezuela has been critical of United States policies, particularly in respect of United States attitudes at the Sixth and Tenth Meetings of the Foreign Ministers.
160. Venezuelan initiative and contact with Arab countries was behind the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1960. The functioning of this organization has also led it into formal contact with the Soviet Union.

respective foreign policies clearly show very little attention to the area.

For Colombia involvement in the Caribbean area has centred around the question of Panama. With the creation of an independent Panama in 1903 a source of direct involvement ceased.¹⁶¹ Instead, involvement in the area now stemmed from its relationship with the United States and revolved around how the United States viewed the question of the defence of the Panama Canal. Due to this very indirect involvement in the Caribbean area Colombia has shown little interest in the affairs of the independent Caribbean area states. Such interest as is shown is particularly insignificant when compared to the interest in her immediate neighbours - Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador.¹⁶²

For Mexico the Caribbean area has also been of little significance. It has never threatened her security and any desire of Mexico to establish hegemony over the area has been limited by powerful external states - principally Great Britain and the United States. Consequently Mexico has turned her back on the Caribbean.

"Her Central-American policy of strict non-intervention is coupled with one of strictly ignoring this region. The /

161. By this is meant direct political involvement arising from geography, i.e. border disputes. The fact that seven of Colombia's nineteen departments border the Caribbean and that in these departments are several major Caribbean cities, e.g. Barranquilla - population 499,000, Santa Marta - population 105,000 does not seem to have resulted in Colombia showing particular concern with developments in the Caribbean.

162. Since World War Two, this interest has taken the form of promoting 'Grancolombianismo' which is the promotion of cultural and commercial interchange, and of diplomatic co-operation, with /

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The great problems which have developed on her own doorstep have not elicited any positive action on her part. She has done little to put an end to colonialism aside from declarations, which are more theoretical than real, usually put forward at inter-American meetings."¹⁶³

Having identified the existence of a region in the Caribbean it is now possible to shift the focus of the study on to the question of systems. That is, whether the nine states comprising the region form a system, or systems, in their own right, or if the region is only part of a much larger system. To begin to answer this question the next major section focuses on the pattern of interaction among these nine states.

162. (continued) with neighbouring countries.
See W.O. Galbraith Colombia: A general survey (London: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 1966), Chapter 15.

163. Francisco Cuevas Cancino, "The Foreign Policy of Mexico" in J.E. Black and K.W. Thompson (eds) Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) p.658.

PART TWO

THE PATTERN OF INTERACTION IN THE
CARIBBEAN REGION: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

THE PATTERN OF INTERACTION IN
THE CARIBBEAN REGION: A
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH.

The purpose of Part Two is to establish the overall pattern of interaction in the region by the use of quantitative data over time. Essentially a brief commentary on the region, it provides information on the general level and nature of interaction in the region and whether this changes over time; and on the contribution to the general level and nature of interaction of groups of states and whether this changes over time. An explanation of some of the patterns of interaction is then given by testing some hypotheses from 'small group theory' which may also hold for the 'abstract' international system.

The Data: Source and Method

The source of the data is the Hispanic American Report from October 1948 to September 1964 inclusive.¹ I feel justified in using this as the source for the following reasons:

1. Its coverage of politics and economics in the nine states of the Caribbean region is the best available source of information on the region next to the daily newspapers of each individual state.
2. Its basis as a scholarly report ensures that its reporting of politics is not confined just to the sensational but also includes the unsensational. It thus provides a greater reflection of reality than any other interested outside source, for example, the New York Times.

1. Published in 17 volumes by the Institute of Hispanic American and Luso Brazilian Studies at Stanford University, California, 1948-1964.

3. Its coverage of politics and economics month by month for each state of the Caribbean region allows for the recording of most of the major interactions between states. It is particularly useful in locating fairly accurately any significant change in intensity, direction or type of interaction.

The method adopted to collect the data was based on an evaluation of the monthly report on each of the nine states. If the report indicated any action from one state directed specifically towards any other states in the region this was noted and placed into the category of either friendly actions - co-operation, or hostile actions - conflict.²

The/

-
2. For example, for August 1951, in the Caribbean region the Hispanic American Report contains the following reports related to interaction in the region.

- (1) That after 3 years of negotiations the Nicaraguan government returns to Costa Rica the 3 planes flown to Nicaragua during the 1948 civil war in Costa Rica.
- (2) That Haiti denounces the privileged role of Cuba in the United States sugar market.
- (3) That the Dominican Republic denounces the privileged role of Cuba in the United States sugar market and warns the Cuban government of the dangers of continuing to aid anti-Trujillo exiles.

These 3 reports were coded as follows:

| | | | | |
|--------------|---|--------------------|--------|------------|
| Co-operation | - | Nicaragua | —————> | Costa Rica |
| Conflict | - | Haiti | —————> | Cuba |
| | - | Dominican Republic | —————> | Cuba |

Although collection of the data included two-way coding, i.e. a state was coded as to whether it was a recipient or transmitter of interaction, the analysis throughout Part Two does not utilise this information but concentrates on the fact that interaction has occurred. The tables containing the data on the number of interactions between states are in the Appendix.

The majority of actions so categorised were governmental in origin rather than non-governmental. This emphasis upon governmental actions is based on two considerations. One is the relatively greater importance in international relations of governments compared to any other organisation or individual. The other was the difficulty of locating any non-governmental action as specifically hostile or friendly. The data represent primarily then, with one exception, a record of the quantity and nature of actions that various governments in the region directed towards other governments in the region from October 1948 to September 1964 inclusive.

The one exception made is on the recording of governmental actions related to the programme of unity in Central America. There are, I believe, two reasons for excluding such interactions. Firstly, the particular nature and functioning of the Central American unity programme since World War Two allows it to be treated as largely distinct from the general pattern of politics in the region. Secondly, that frequently these governmental actions have been at an indirect rather than at a direct level and hence difficult to assess. Consequently it should be remembered that levels of interaction between Central American states are higher than the data indicates.³

3. For an indication of the level of interaction among Central American states in respect of the 'union' programme based upon the Hispanic American Report and using similar techniques see J.S. Nye "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement" International Organization. Vol.22., No.4., 1968, pp.873-874.

The Level and Nature of Interaction in the
Caribbean Region 1948-1964

Over the whole time period of fifteen years a total of one thousand and forty-six interactions have been recorded. The amount and type of this interaction in any one year is shown by Diagram One.

What is immediately apparent from this diagram is the dramatic increase in interactions from 1959 through to 1964. One reason for this increase is in the nature of the material itself. The quality of the Hispanic American Report improved in 1959 and subsequently so the greater number of interactions recorded is partly a reflection of a more comprehensive coverage. However, this by itself is insufficient to explain all of such an increase which is explicable only in terms of the real increase in intra-Caribbean interaction from 1959 onwards.

This increase in interactions suggests that an approach to analysis of the data would be to treat it in two sections - pre 1959 and post 1959 - particularly since a division of the data at this point would result in two sets of almost equal numbers of interactions - five hundred and twenty-four interactions pre 1959 and five hundred and twenty-two interactions post 1959. Such a division would also appear warranted in terms of a number of historically observable changes in the pattern of politics in the region from 1959 onwards.⁴ /


4. Particularly significant historically observable changes in this period have been the formulation by the United States of a new Latin American policy and the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, both of which took effect in 1959.

TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERACTIONS BY YEAR AMONG STATES
IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION 1948-1964

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

CONFLICT

CO-OPERATION



onwards. Consequently, for some purposes I have chosen to divide the data into two time periods. Period One extends from October 1948 to December 1958 and Period Two from January 1959 to September 1964.

On the basis of this division into periods the data reveal a change of emphasis in interaction from a position where conflict interactions were only marginally predominant in Period One - 234 co-operation interactions to 290 conflict interactions - to where it is clearly predominant in Period Two - 184 co-operation interactions to 334 conflict interactions. Hence, over time, the trend within the region has been away from co-operation and towards conflict. This is particularly noticeable from 1959 onwards when it can be shown that previous to this year co-operation interactions had exceeded conflict interactions in four separate years but that after 1959 conflict interactions always predominate.⁵

The position of any state in the level of interaction remains fairly constant over time. This can be demonstrated by ranking the nine states in accordance with their total individual interaction in the two time periods. Only in the cases of Cuba - a change from sixth in Period One to first in period Two, and the Dominican Republic - from second in Period One to sixth in Period Two, - is there any significant change.⁶ /

5. See Diagram One.

6. The effect of this switch by Cuba and the Dominican Republic on regional interaction is taken up later.

change.

TABLE EIGHTEEN

Ranks of the Regional States by Interaction
in the Two Time Periods

| PERIOD ONE | | | PERIOD TWO | | |
|------------------|---------------|------|------------|---------------|------------------|
| No. Interactions | State | Rank | Rank | State | No. Interactions |
| 98 | Nicaragua | 1 | 1 | Cuba | 125 |
| 93 | Dom. Republic | 2 | 2 | Nicaragua | 70 |
| 73 | Guatemala | 3 | 3 | Guatemala | 62 |
| 70 | Costa Rica | 4 | 4 | Honduras | 61 |
| 54 | Honduras | 5 | 5 | Costa Rica | 55 |
| 50 | Cuba | 6 | 6 | Dom. Republic | 53 |
| 48 | El Salvador | 7 | 7 | El Salvador | 42 |
| 26 | Haiti | 8 | 8 | Panama | 31 |
| 12 | Panama | 9 | 9 | Haiti | 23 |

This consistent level of interaction by most states can be considered as indicating the existence of a hierarchy of states within the region. The adoption of such a hierarchy as valid is very useful in examining any particular state's interaction within the region as it then becomes possible to make generalisations about their behaviour over the whole time period. Consequently I have placed all the nine states into three groups dependent upon interaction levels. In Group One - high level interaction - are Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Group Two - middle level interaction - are Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador /

El Salvador. In Group Three - low level interaction - are Haiti and Panama.⁷

Further examination of interaction within the region proceeds on the basis of these three groups with the patterns presented as a set of findings so that comparison between them is easier.

The Interaction Pattern of Group One.

Together the four states of Group One account for 60% of the total interactions over the whole time period. Of this amount 68% were conflict interactions and 32% were co-operation interactions. In both time periods the amount of interaction remains constant at 60% in Period One and 59% in Period Two. Of these amounts 63% were conflict interactions in Period One and 73% were conflict interactions in Period Two. Alongside this increase in conflict was a decrease in the number of co-operation interactions from 115 in Period One to 84 in Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern within Group One: 55% of the interactions of Group One within the region are with itself.

Interactions/

-
7. In choosing three groups with unequal numbers of participants an element of bias can be introduced in the sense that a group of four has more chance of external and internal interactions than a group of three, and a group of three has more than a group of two. However, an elimination of this bias by expressing the proportion of actual interactions during the time periods covered as ratio to the proportion of potential interactions during the time periods covered does not appear to significantly invalidate trends based on a straight comparison of absolute figures. Given this plus the suggestive rather than exhaustive nature of the exercise the mathematics of this section are therefore based on absolute figures shown directly from tables in the Appendix.

Interactions within the group are conflict dominant with 260 conflict interactions clearly predominating over the 80 co-operation interactions. The division of the interactions into two time periods reveals no increase or decrease of interaction within the group over time, there being 170 interactions in Period One and 170 interactions in Period Two. Although there is no increase or decrease in interaction there is increased conflict within the group. In Period One there were 120 conflict interactions to 50 co-operation interactions and in Period Two 140 conflict interactions to 30 co-operation interactions.

The Interaction Pattern with Group Two: 34% of the interactions of Group One within the region are with Group Two. Interactions with Group Two, show a slight preponderance of conflict, at 116 conflict interactions to 101 co-operation interactions. The division of interactions into the two time periods reveals there is a small decrease in interaction from Period One at 116 interactions to Period Two at 101 interactions. This decrease in total interactions is marked by a small increase of co-operation interactions from 49 in Period One to 52 in Period Two, and a greater increase of conflict interactions from 52 in Period One to 64 in Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern with Group Three: 11% of the interactions of Group One within the region are with Group Three. Interactions with Group Three are conflict dominant, at 49 conflict interactions to 18 co-operation interactions. The division of interactions into the two time periods reveals there is a fairly substantial increase in interactions from Period One at 28 interactions to Period Two at 39 interactions. This increase in total interactions is marked by a similar /

similar substantial increase in conflict interactions from 15 in Period One to 34 in Period Two with a correspondingly large drop in co-operation interactions from 13 in Period One to 5 in Period Two.

Summary: The four states of Group One dominate interaction within the region but are as likely to be interacting with themselves as to be interacting with the other two groups. Conflict interactions are dominant with a high probability of these occurring within the Group and with Group Three, particularly in Period Two. Interaction with Group Two is more balanced but here also conflict interactions are increasing at the expense of decreasing total interaction. Overall then, the states of Group One contribute considerably to the high level of conflict within the region and are particularly responsible for the increase in conflict from Period One to Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern of Group Two

Together the three states of Group Two account for 31% of the total interactions over the whole time period. Of this amount 55% were co-operation interactions and 45% were conflict interactions. When the level and type of interactions of Period One are compared to Period Two only a slight decrease in interaction is evident - from 33% in Period One to 30% in Period Two. Whilst this is reflected in a similar slight percentage decrease in the amount of co-operation interactions from 56% in Period One to 54% in Period Two the number of conflict interactions did not increase - from 76 in Period One to 73 in Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern within Group Two: 28% of the interactions of Group Two within the region are with itself. Interactions within the group are co-operation dominant with 64 co-operation interactions clearly predominating over the 28 conflict interactions. The division of interactions into the two time periods reveals that there is a small decrease in interaction from Period One at 50 interactions to Period Two at 42 interactions.⁸ This small decrease in total interactions is marked by a small increase in conflict interactions from 12 in Period One to 16 in Period Two, and a correspondingly greater decrease in co-operation interactions from 38 in Period One to 20 in Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern with Group One: 66% of the interactions of Group Two within the region are with Group One. (For details of the level and type of interaction refer to the set of findings on the interaction pattern of Group One with Group Two).

The Interaction Pattern with Group Three: 6% of the interactions of Group Two within the region are with Group Three. Interactions with Group Three are co-operation dominant, at 16 co-operation interactions to 5 conflict interactions. The division of interactions into the two time periods reveals there is a fairly substantial increase in interaction from /

8. As the 3 states of Group Two are all involved in the programme of unity in Central America interaction figures are higher, particularly in Period Two when the programme really got going, than the above figures indicate. Overall then interaction, in reality, would be higher in Period Two than in Period One and also more likely to be co-operative than conflictive. For a confirmation of this see J.S. Nye "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement", pp.873-874.

from Period One at 6 interactions to Period Two at 15 interactions. This increase in interaction is marked by an increase in both co-operation interactions, from 6 in Period One to 10 in Period Two, and by the appearance of conflict interactions from nil in Period One to 5 in Period Two.

Summary: The three states of Group Two are twice as likely to be interacting with Group One than with themselves and Group Three. Co-operation interactions are dominant within the Group, less so with Group Three and more or less balanced with conflict interactions with Group One. Whilst there has been an increase in interaction with Group Three from Period One to Period Two the small percentage of total interaction with Group Three has been insufficient to offset the drop in interaction with Group One and within the Group itself which occurs in the same time period. Although there are indications of Group Two following the trend toward conflict they are very weak and the probability is as much a reduction of interaction by Group Two as a drastic change of type of interaction.⁹ Overall then, the states of Group Two are mainly responsible for the promotion of co-operation within the region but a small declining total interaction prevents them from offsetting the increase in conflict from Period One to Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern of Group Three

Together/

9. This trend is made even weaker by the absence of consideration of the co-operation dominant Central American 'union' programme.

Together the two states of Group Three account for 9% of the total interaction over the whole time period. Of this amount 59% were conflict interactions and 41% co-operation interactions. There is an increase of interaction from Period One to Period Two and the general trend of an increase in conflict interaction is followed with 15 conflict interactions in Period One rising to 39 conflict interactions in Period Two.

The Interaction Pattern within Group Three: 4% of the interactions of Group Three within the region are with itself, and those are all co-operation interactions confined to Period One.

The Interaction Pattern with Group One: 73% of the interactions of Group Three within the region are with Group One. (For details of the level and type of interaction refer to the set of findings on the interaction pattern of Group One with Group Three).

The Interaction Pattern with Group Two: 23% of the interactions of Group Three within the region are with Group Two. (For details of the level and type of interaction refer to the set of findings on the interaction pattern of Group Two with Group Three.)

Summary: The two states of Group Three are only weakly involved with other states in the region and when they do interact with them this is more likely to be with Group One than with Group Two or themselves. The strong links with Group /

Group One when interaction occurs would seem to be a partial answer to the increase in interaction in Period Two resulting in a change of type of interaction from co-operation dominant in Period One to conflict dominant in Period Two. Overall then, the states of Group Three are of little significance to the region and certainly have no possibility of influencing the pattern of interaction in the region.

Conclusions

Both the level and the nature of interaction have changed over time but this has not resulted in a marked change of interaction patterns in the region. In the three 'groups' I have identified, the patterns have been relatively stable with only slight modifications resulting from the increased interaction in Period Two being noticeable. Thus, essentially, Group One has remained dominant in the region and has been the major source of conflict and Group Two has remained subordinate but has been the most important source of co-operation. Only in the case of Group Three, marginal to the region at any rate, has a pattern changed over time through increased interaction.

These findings appear to indicate that although the international politics of the region are regarded by most political commentators as 'unstable' there are patterns of interaction which, by being relatively persistent through time, serve to promote a certain stability in the area. Further, such regular interaction in both intensity, direction and style indicates the possibility of the existence of 'systemic relations' in the region.

Taking note of these conclusions, the next section gives some explanations of the interaction patterns outlined above.

Some Explanations of the Interaction Patterns
in the Caribbean Region 1948-1964

In a paper presented to a conference on international relations in 1966 Johan Galtung puts forward the idea that the sociology of small groups is useful for the study of international relations.¹⁰ In particular Galtung draws attention to the idea that not only 'concrete' international interaction (the interaction between persons actively conducting international relations) but also the 'abstract' international system can be understood in terms of the sociology of small groups.¹¹ To underline this point he then gives examples of a number of hypotheses from small group theory which could also hold for international relations.¹²

This approach to international relations seems to me both useful and challenging. Useful in that, if valid, it could possibly offer some partial explanations for the patterns of interaction I have outlined in the previous section/

10. Johan Galtung, "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations: A Study in Isomorphism" in Morton A. Kaplan (ed) New Approaches to International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press 1968), pp.270-278.

11. Ibid, pp.277-278

12. Ibid, pp.279-293.

section and challenging in that the Caribbean region as I have defined it in Part One is practically identical to a 'small group' of nations as Galtung defines it so inviting the testing of his hypotheses. Consequently, I accept his basic idea that the sociology of small groups can be used as a model for understanding international relations and proceed along the lines of testing some of his hypotheses against the data I have collected. Out of the many hypotheses he advances I have chosen three in particular - the hypotheses relating to rank and interaction, to conflict and polarisation, and to consonance. But before going on to examine these three hypotheses I first briefly outline

Galtung's reasons for using the sociology of small groups to study the international 'abstract' system and his conception of the 'ideal' small group of nations.

The Sociology of Small Groups as a Model

Galtung puts forward four main arguments to substantiate the use of small group theory in international relations:

- "1. Small groups and international systems can be regarded as isomorphic with the simple correspondences....(individuals to nations and interaction to interaction)because usually relatively few nations interact together, which justifies the use of the word "small". Moreover, the international system has a relatively low level of organisation which justifies the use of the word "group".

2. /

- "2. Small group theory gives a theory of interaction in its most naked form, stripped of all extra connotations....
3. Small group theory is empirically rather well established since it can draw on common sense insights, laboratory experiments, surveys, etc. as data....
4. Small group theory has not only well established propositions but also a relatively high level of theoretical integration of them at least as compared to other branches of sociology. This means that isomorphisms, once imputed and established, will be relatively rich in the sense of involving many relations between the elements".¹³

The Definition of a Small Group of Nations

After pointing out that the method of isomorphism is meaningful only if a small group is conceived of as a model of a similarly organised subsystem Galtung defines a small group of nations as

"Anything from two to the maximum number of nations that can be kept cognitively present at the same time (twenty is much too high, perhaps not more than ten, or seven); all nations can interact with all other nations (but not necessarily equally much with all other nations); there is consensus both within and outside the group as to which nations belong to it and the pattern is extended through time. There is no assumption to the effect that relations are positive or friendly. The interaction patterns may take on all values/

13. Ibid, pp.277-278.

values from extremely positive through indifference to extremely negative, but the net balance will usually have to be positive unless the group is forced to stay together, as in the case when nations crystallise into geographically contiguous and immobile states. Thus, a small group of nations is neither the same as an alliance (which is a military organization of nations with a specific aim) nor the same as a trade area (which is an economic organization) nor the same as a federation (which is a political organization of nations) - it is a much more primitive unit with much less structure".¹⁴ (emphasis in the original)

It should be apparent that the Caribbean region as defined earlier approximates very closely to Galtung's small group of nations. The similarity is especially marked in respect of size, nature, and level of interaction, and here the dominance of negative interaction can be attributed to the geographical factor. Only in the case of 'consensus both within and outside the group' is there a possible area of disagreement. Overall, however, the Caribbean region can clearly be regarded as a small group of nations.

Hypothesis One: Rank and Interaction

In small group theory there is a relationship between rank and interaction which should also hold at the international level /

14. Ibid, pp.279-280.

level.¹⁵ The main findings of this relationship are:

- "1. The higher the rank, the more interaction received and emitted.
2. The more equal the rank between two, the higher the interaction.
3. There is more interaction from high to low than from low to high.
4. These rankings are highly correlated with -
 - (a) the number of acts received by the units,
 - (b) the number of acts received by the units from a given unit,
 - (c) the number of acts sent by the units,
 - (d) the number of acts sent by the units to a given unit". 16

Although data on direction of interaction has been collected only the first two findings have been considered. Omission of tests of the last two findings have been for two reasons. Firstly, much of the data on interaction was ambiguous in that although transmitted by one state it was often reacted to by several states. The decision as to which state was the/

15. Galtung mentions that one reason why this may not hold is due to what he terms "the formal norm of reciprocity". This norm rests on the formal equality in international law of sovereign states. Hence a state establishing diplomatic relations with another state may expect this to be reciprocated. Consequently there will be interaction across ranks based on considerations other than the rank of the state itself. However, often the lower rank states will not reciprocate diplomatic relations, as has already been noted, for reasons of economy. This leaves then the original hypothesis as largely vindicated, i.e. there will be more interaction between high ranking states than between low ranking states, Ibid, pp.289-290.

16. Ibid, p.288

the original target or was the major receiver of such interaction was thus frequently dependent on intuitive criteria. With several states transmitting actions and several reacting to such actions intuitive criteria entered the assessment even further. Obviously then, any conclusions based on such coding would be distorted, at least partially, by the highly subjective evaluation of interaction. Secondly, to anticipate the conclusions, the test of the first two findings of the hypothesis were so unsatisfactory as not to invite any further consideration of the last two findings.

Before testing the first two findings however, a ranking of the states in the Caribbean has to be undertaken. In deciding the ranks of states Galtung talks of both 'ascribed' and 'achieved' properties of states as determinants.¹⁷

Fortunately elsewhere Galtung has undertaken a rank ordering of all the twenty states of Latin America along these lines and has assigned to the nine Caribbean states the following ranks - 20 counts as high:-

Cuba 18; Costa Rica 11; Panama 9; The Dominican Republic 5; El Salvador 4; Guatemala and Nicaragua 2 each; Haiti and Honduras 1 each;¹⁸ Adopting this rank ordering and assigning my own ranks for the Caribbean only, i.e. 1 to 9 with 1 as high, the following rank ordering is produced:

Cuba 1; Costa Rica 2; Panama 3; The Dominican Republic 4; El Salvador 5; Guatemala 6.5; Nicaragua 6.5; Honduras 8.5; Haiti 8.5.

17. An 'ascribed' property is one handed from one generation to the next unchanged, i.e. size and location. An 'achieved' property is the achievement of the present generation e.g. present history, Ibid. pp.285-286.

18. Johan Galtung et al. "El Sistema Latinoamericana de Naciones: Un Analisis Estructural" pp.64-68. For my comments on this ranking see Footnote 28.

Here Cuba is the 'leader' state, Costa Rica and Panama are 'central' and the rest are 'underdog' states.

Test of Hypothesis 1.

This hypothesis postulates that the higher the rank of a state the greater is its interaction. For the Caribbean over the whole time period this hypothesis holds only very weakly as Table Nineteen indicates.

TABLE NINETEEN

| 1 State | 2 Galtung's Ranks (Modified) | 3 Total Interactions Recorded | 4 Ranks by Interaction |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| Cuba | 1 | 175 | 1 |
| Costa Rica | 2 | 125 | 5 |
| Panama | 3 | 43 | 9 |
| Dominican Republic | 4 | 146 | 3 |
| El Salvador | 5 | 90 | 7 |
| Guatemala | 6.5 | 135 | 4 |
| Nicaragua | 6.5 | 168 | 2 |
| Honduras | 8.5 | 115 | 6 |
| Haiti | 8.5 | 49 | 8 |

A rank correlation co-efficient of +0.31 between Galtung's ranks (modified) in Column 2 (the hypothesised position of each state by its contribution to the total interaction level) and the ranks in Column 4 (actual position of each state by its contribution to the total interaction level) confirms this/

this weak relationship. Division into the two time periods further shows that the hypothesis does not hold at all in Period One - a rank correlation co-efficient of -0.06 , and holds scarcely at all in Period Two - a rank correlation co-efficient of $+0.21$.¹⁹ Clearly then there is, at first sight, little connection between rank and interaction in the Caribbean.

To some extent this weak relationship between rank and interaction in the region can be explained as a matter of methodology. Whereas my interactions are mainly governmental - foreign policy - Galtung has indicated that the type of interaction he would measure is the amount of communication, commerce etc. - international relations - the use of which appears to establish a much stronger relationship between rank and interaction.²⁰ Consequently the hypothesis cannot be entirely disproved or indicated in this particular case. Nevertheless, certain comments can be made which serve to point out a limitation of the hypothesis.

This limitation stems from Galtung's understanding and use of rank. The criteria he uses to assess the rank of a state and the use he makes of rank to postulate amounts of interaction leads easily into an inference of the foreign policy of a state of the type: A interacts more with B than with/

19. The difference between these 2 rank correlation co-efficients is not significant as most of it can be explained away by the shift in rank, determined by level of interaction, of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, from ranks at odds with those of Galtung's in Period One to ranks approaching more closely to Galtung's in Period Two.

20. See Johan Galtung et al "El Sistema Latinoamericana de Naciones: Un Analisis Estructural".

with C and hence the foreign policy of A will be more concerned with B than with C.²¹ To infer this, however, is to be in error as the Sprouts, in their writings on capability analysis have pointed out:

"It is utterly meaningless to speak of capabilities in the abstract. Capability is always capability to do something, to bring about or perpetuate some state of affairs. Policy assumptions may be left implicit. But, unless some set of ends and means is envisaged, no calculation is possible, no inventory of environmental factors has any significance."²²

This means that, by itself, the establishment of a relationship between rank and interaction for any particular state or group of states can say nothing about the actual policies of these states unless some attempt at defining ends and means is undertaken.

This limitation has its use, however, in this particular case, in pointing out and emphasising a general aspect of international politics in the region. Namely that the difference between/

21. As stated earlier rank is assessed on both 'ascribed' and 'achieved' properties. In practice Galtung has chosen the following ten variables as indications of rank:

1. Size - comprising the 3 variables of size of area, of population, of G.N.P.
 2. Distribution of wealth - comprising the 3 variables of G.N.P. per capita, rate of illiteracy, daily newspapers per person.
 3. Social structure - comprising the 3 variables of percentage of population in middle and upper class, percentage urbanised, percentage active in agriculture.
 4. Race - percentage of population in the white race.
- Ibid, pp.64-68.

between the weak relationship between rank and interaction (my data) compared to that between rank and interaction (Galtung's data) indicates the importance of non-tangible factors in relations between states. Relations between governments in the region are not just purely a reflection of commerce and other such allied interests but are also a reflection of other factors such as personality likes and dislikes and ideological differences. These factors in themselves may act to limit or increase interaction as the case may be.

Test of Hypothesis 2

This hypothesis postulates that the more equal the rank between two states, the higher the interaction. For the Caribbean over the whole time period this hypothesis does not hold as Table Twenty and Table Twentyone demonstrate.

In Table Twenty the hypothesised interaction pattern of each state is set out and compared with the actual interaction pattern of each state. For example, Cuba is hypothesised as having the most interaction with Costa Rica and Panama and the least interaction with Honduras and Haiti, columns 2 and 4 respectively. In reality it has the highest interaction with the Dominican Republic and Guatemala and the lowest interaction with Haiti and El Salvador, Columns 3 and 5 respectively.

TABLE TWENTY /

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22. Harold and Margaret Sprout "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics" in James N. Rosenau (ed) International Politics and Foreign Policy - p.117.

TABLE TWENTY

| 1 State | 2 Hypothetical Highest | 3 Actual Highest* | 4 Hypothetical Lowest | 5 Actual Lowest** |
|--------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Cuba | C.R. Pan. | D.R. Gt. | Hd. Ht. | El S. Ht. |
| Costa Rica | Cuba Pan. | Nic. Cuba, Pan. | Hd. Ht. | Ht. El S. |
| Panama | C.R. D.R. | Cuba C.R. | Hd. Ht. | Hd. D.R., Hd, Ht. |
| Dominican Republic | Pan. El S. | Cuba Ht. | Hd. Ht. | El S, Pan. Hd. |
| Guatemala | Nic. El S, Hd, Ht. | Cuba El S. | C.R. Cuba | Ht. Pan. |
| Nicaragua | Gt. El S, Hd, Ht. | C.R. Hd. | Cuba C.R. | Ht. Pan. D.R. |
| Honduras | Gt. Nic. Ht. | Nic. El S. | Cuba C.R. | Pan. Ht. |
| Haiti | Gt. Nic. Hd. | D.R. Cuba | Cuba C.R. | Gt. Hd., El. S. |

* The state with the actual highest interaction is listed first

** The state with the actual lowest interaction is listed first

In Table Twentyone the number of times the hypothesised interaction level of a state corresponds with the actual interaction level is recorded in Sections A and B. And in Sections C and D is recorded the number of times the actual interaction level of a state is totally at variance with its hypothesised interaction level. The case of El Salvador provides an example. Using Table Twenty it can be seen that only in the case of Guatemala and Haiti does the hypothesised interaction level correspond to the actual interaction/

actual interaction level. These facts are recorded in the Table under El Salvador in Sections A and B respectively. At the same time Table Twenty shows that the Dominican Republic which is hypothetically supposed to have a high level of interaction with El Salvador in reality has a very low level of interaction with it. This fact is recorded in the Table under El Salvador in Section C.

TABLE TWENTY--ONE

| Sections | | S T A T E S | | | | | | | | |
|----------|--|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|------|------|-----|-----|------------|
| | | Cb. | CR. | Pan | DR. | El S | Gt. | Nic | Hd. | Ht. |
| A | No. times HML corresponds with AM1 and AM2 | | Cb. Pan | CR. | | Gt. | EL S | Hd | Nic | |
| B | No. times HLL corresponds with AL1 and AL2 | Ht. | Ht. | Hd. Ht. | Hd. | Ht. | | | | |
| C | No. times HML corresponds with AL1 and AL2 | | | DR. | Pan EL S | DR. | | Ht. | Ht. | Hd. Gt. |
| D | No. times HLL corresponds with AM1 and AM2 | | | | Ht. | | Cb. | CR. | | Cb. |

Code: HML stands for Hypothetical most likely interaction.
 HLL stands for Hypothetical least likely interaction
 AM1 stands for Actual most interaction
 AM2 stands for next actual most interaction
 AL1 stands for Actual least interaction
 AL2 stands for Actual next least interaction.

Comparison of Sections A and B with Sections C and D clearly shows that the number of times the actual situation is at total variance with the hypothesised situation (3 and 4 below) is nearly equivalent to the number of times the actual situation is the hypothesised situation (1 and 2 below).

| | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|-----|----------------|-------------|---|---|
| 1. | Number of times | HML | coincides with | AM1 and AM2 | = | 7 |
| 2. | " | " | " | HLL | " | " |
| 3. | " | " | " | HML | " | " |
| 4. | " | " | " | HLL | " | " |

This amounts to a refutation of the hypothesis for the Caribbean region, as a state in the region is as likely to interact with a state of very unequal rank as it is with one of near equal rank. Division into the two time periods shows the same conclusion holds for both Period One and Period Two.²³

One possible explanation why rank is here such a poor indicator of interaction in the Caribbean has to do with the significant influence geography can have in international relations. This point has been recognised by Galtung in his rank-interaction analysis of Latin America when he comments that, for the smaller states of Latin America in particular, the influence of geography is "constant and significant".²⁴ It seems appropriate then to determine exactly what influence geography has on interaction in the Caribbean.

23. Period One

| | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|-----|----------------|-------------|---|---|
| 1. | Number of times | HML | coincides with | AM1 and AM2 | = | 5 |
| 2. | " | " | " | HLL | " | " |
| 3. | " | " | " | HML | " | " |
| 4. | " | " | " | HLL | " | " |

Period 2

| | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|-----|----------------|-------------|---|---|
| 1. | Number of times | HML | coincides with | AM1 and AM2 | = | 6 |
| 2. | " | " | " | HLL | " | " |
| 3. | " | " | " | HML | " | " |
| 4. | " | " | " | HLL | " | " |

24. Johan Galtung et al "El Sistema Latinoamericana de Naciones: Un Analisis Estructural"., p.78.

In this particular case it seems to me that the best way to assess such an influence is to hypothesise a relationship between geography and interaction and then to see whether it holds for the region. Such a hypothesis, if proved true, would help account for the failure of Hypothesis 2 to explain adequately interaction in the region as it would offer an alternative, and possibly conflicting, guide to interaction.

The hypothesis is that the level of interaction varies with geographic distance being highest with neighbouring states and lowest with distant states.²⁵ The test of this hypothesis for the Caribbean region over the whole time period is set out in Table Twenty-Two, which compares the hypothesised interaction pattern of each state with its actual interaction pattern.

In Table Twenty-two the region is divided into two major geographic zones - the Greater Antilles (Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic) and Central America (including Panama). For Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic the Greater Antilles is the immediate zone and for the six mainland states Central America is the immediate zone. Within each zone some states are immediate neighbours, i.e. they share/

25. In formulating this hypothesis I am aware of certain limiting factors, for example, that in most under-developed countries the élite are quite clearly in control of foreign policy and that, for them, distance is often a minimal barrier. Although this undoubtedly does hold for the Caribbean region the uncontrolled migration of peasants has, in itself, been a major source of international politics, aggravating, in particular relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and El Salvador and Honduras. For Haiti-Dominican Republic, see Jesus de Galindez, La Era de Trujillo: Un Estudio Casuístico de dictadura hispano-americano (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Del Pacifico, S.A. 1962) pp.372-381 and for El Salvador-Honduras see Marco Virgilio Carías "Análisis sobre el conflicto entre Honduras y El Salvador" pp.577-579 and Obdulio Nunfio "Radiografía de la guerra del fútbol o de las cien horas" pp.664-668, both in Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 32, No.3., 1970. On this evidence geography appears, at least intuitively as a variable

share common borders. The hypothesised interaction pattern is that a state will interact most frequently with its immediate neighbour (represented by Figure 1 in Column 2), next most frequently with its immediate zone (represented by Figure 2 in Column 4) and least frequently with the other zone (represented by Figure 3 in column 6). The actual interaction pattern is also represented by 1, 2 and 3, with 1 being the highest level of interaction, 2 the next highest level of interaction, and 3 the lowest level of interaction.²⁶

TABLE TWENTY-TWO

| STATE | Immediate Neighbours | | Immediate Zone | | Other Zone | |
|------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| | Hypo- thetical | Actual | Hypo- thetical | Actual | Hypo- thetical | Actual |
| Cuba | - | - | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Haiti | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Dom. Rep. | 1 | 2½ | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2½ |
| Guatemala | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| El Sal. | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Honduras | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Nicaragua | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Costa Rica | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Panama | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |

26. For 1 to be in Column 3 it had to fulfil two conditions: (a) account for 50% plus of the interaction in the immediate zone, but only if (b) the immediate zone itself accounted for at least 50% plus of the interaction in the region as a whole. For 1 to be in Column 5, it had to account for at least 50% plus of the interaction as a whole (included in this figure is the interaction of immediate neighbours). For 1 to be in Column 7 it had to account for 50% plus of interaction in the region as a whole.

The table shows the considerable influence of geography on interaction in the region. Only in the case of Cuba and the Dominican Republic is the hypothesised interaction at variance with the actual interaction. However, a division into the two time periods shows its influence is actually in decline.²⁷

Geography, by itself, is a fairly reliable guide to interaction in the Caribbean. It is also a very significant force exerting a considerable influence on the direction and level of interaction in the region. This is particularly so prior to 1959. After this date its influence weakens suggesting that the continued distortion of rank-interaction patterns may well be due to new factors or to a shift of emphasis in the old, or both. Again, the influence of non-environmental factors are probably crucial in accounting for this.

Summary

From my data it is clear that rank is not a very reliable guide to interaction in the Caribbean. Whilst some of this unreliability can be attributed to differences in the type of interaction measured, much more can, I think, be attributed to rank.²⁸ The criteria Galtung adopts to assess rank/

27. In Period One the only deviant state is the Dominican Republic. In Period Two there are four deviant states -- Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Panama.

28. Intuitively, Galtung's rank ordering of states appears to me to reflect reality except that he has assessed Panama too high and Guatemala too low. In this respect Galtung's subjective test of his own objectively defined rank order is suspect. Based solely on students assessing the importance of Latin/

rank are objective criteria, providing a measure of the ability of a state to act. Interaction patterns based on these criteria are strongly influenced by geography which can, and does, in the Caribbean, distort them considerably. Indeed, geography, by itself, is a better guide to interaction in the region than is rank. However, Galtung's criteria, even accounting for the influence of geography, are not enough to explain or predict interaction in the Caribbean. The failure of rank and geography to explain interaction in Period Two is an example of this. Other criteria are needed, essentially subjective, which will explain a state's willingness to act as well as its ability to act. Only by reference to such criteria - for the Caribbean ideology and personality differences - as well as to objective criteria, can behaviour such as the Dominican Republic's, in both time periods, or Cuba's in Period Two, be explained or predicted.

Hypothesis Two: Conflict and Polarisation

Galtung adopts as relevant to small group theory the finding from general conflict theory which postulates that conflicts polarise interaction, i.e. create positive interaction within/

28. (continued) Latin American states to other Latin American states this test reflects, I think, the bias of students as a group. If conducted in late 1965, as it may well have been, it would reflect student approval of Panama's militant anti-United States stand over the Canal in 1964 (hence a high assessment of Panama) and student disapproval of the military coup and subsequent repressive right-wing military government in Guatemala from 1963 (hence a low assessment of Guatemala). Taking these considerations into account perhaps the subjective test was more subjective than it should have been.

within the bloc and negative interaction between blocs.²⁹
The increase in conflict from marginal predominance over co-operation in Period One to clear predominance over co-operation in Period Two provides an opportunity to test this finding by seeing whether this increase in conflict results in polarisation along the lines suggested by Galtung.

The test is based on the widely held belief that the Cuban Revolution was solely responsible for much of the conflict in the Caribbean from 1959 onwards. If this is true then, according to the finding, the following should be the situation in Period Two:

- (a) Cuba isolated and interacting negatively with the other states in the region, and
- (b) the other eight Caribbean states interacting negatively with Cuba and positively among themselves.

This situation, as the ideal situation, is compared to the actual situation to see whether it holds true.

It is clear that the distinction made between interaction in Period One and interaction in Period Two is crucial to the testing of this finding as it necessarily involves comparing the situation prior to 1959 with that after it. To compare the two periods, four correlations, which set out the/

29. Johan Galtung "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations: A Study in Isomorphism" pp.274-275, 280. The assumption is made throughout that Galtung's positive and negative interactions are equivalent to my co-operation and conflict interactions.

the changing nature of interaction within and between each period, are used.³⁰ The belief that Cuba acted as the agent of change, i.e. is responsible for any differences in interaction patterns, is then tested.

The Four Correlations

1. A correlation coefficient of +0.67 between co-operation and conflict in Period One indicates a strong relationship between the two types of interaction for this period. It points to the special feature of interaction in this period which is the dominance of mixed balanced interaction between states. Mixed in that states are likely to be both in conflict and in co-operation with one another; balanced because this pattern creates almost equal amounts of co-operation and conflict interactions. The interaction pattern between Honduras and Nicaragua is a good example of this.³¹

2. A correlation co-efficient of +0.19 between co-operation and conflict in Period Two indicates a weak relationship between/

30. Each correlation co-efficient is based upon the absolute figures for co-operation and conflict in each time period, for each state, expressed as a percentage. For example, the interaction pattern of Costa Rica in Period One:

| | | Cb. | D.R. | El S. | Gt. | Ht. | Hd. | Nic. | Pan. |
|----------|-----------|-----|------|-------|-----|-----|-----|------|------|
| Absclute | Co-opern. | 0 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 15 | 5 |
| % | Co-opern. | 0 | 5.5 | 22.2 | 8.3 | 0 | 8.3 | 41.6 | 13.8 |
| Absolute | Conflict | 1 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 |
| % | Conflict | 2.9 | 20.5 | 2.9 | 5.8 | 0 | 0 | 67.0 | 0 |

Each correlation is therefore based on 72 pairs of numbers.

31. See Appendix Table Two.

between the two types of interaction for this period. It points to the special feature of interaction in this period which is the dominance of single unbalanced interaction between states. Single in that states are likely to be either in co-operation or in conflict with one another. Unbalanced because such a pattern allows for one type of interaction to predominate, in this case, conflict. The interaction pattern between Haiti and the rest of the region is a particularly good example of this.³²

3. A correlation coefficient of +0.57 between co-operation in Period One and co-operation in Period Two indicates the fairly strong relationship between the co-operation patterns in both periods. In particular, it points to the persistence over time, of many of the co-operation patterns between states. Thus a state co-operation with another state in Period One is quite likely to be co-operating with the same state in Period Two. The interaction pattern between Guatemala and El Salvador is a good example of this.³³

4. A correlation coefficient of +0.27 between conflict in Period One and conflict in Period Two indicates the weak relationship between the conflict patterns of both periods. It points to the development, over time, of many new conflict patterns between states. Thus, a state in conflict with another state in Period One is not very likely to be in conflict with the same state, to the same degree, in Period Two. /

32. See Appendix, Table Four.

33. See Appendix, Tables Two and Four.

Two. The interaction patterns between the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, and between Panama and Cuba, are particularly good examples of this.³⁴

The most important finding to emerge from the above set of correlations is that the interaction pattern does change significantly from Period One to Period Two. Mixed interaction gives way to single interaction and balanced interaction to unbalanced interaction.³⁵ However, this change is not as thorough as it first seems, and affects only the conflict pattern between states to any marked degree. The co-operation pattern between states remains, to some extent at least, unchanged.

Bearing these findings in mind it is now possible to see whether they are in any way dependent on the interaction of Cuba in the region.

Cuba as the Agent of Change

The test of this involves reconsidering interaction in the region but this time without Cuba. In this case reconsidering interaction means calculating Correlations 3 and 4 above without Cuba, and comparing the new correlation coefficients to the previous correlation coefficients.³⁶ If the/

34. See Appendix, Tables Two and Four

35. I do not intend to discuss, at this point, the causes of 'mixed balanced' and 'single^{un}balanced' interaction. The possible causes of both patterns is discussed in Part Three.

36. Each new correlation coefficient is therefore based on 56 pairs of numbers and not 72 pairs as before.

the correlation coefficients are markedly different the interaction patterns will have altered significantly - hence Cuba is of considerable importance in bringing about change. But if the correlation coefficients are nearly the same the interaction patterns will remain largely unaltered - hence Cuba is of no great importance in their formation. The new correlation coefficients are set out as A and B immediately below:

A. A correlation coefficient of +0.62 between co-operation in Period One and co-operation in Period Two is nearly the same as the correlation coefficient of +0.57 in Correlation 3 above. Pointing to no great change in interaction patterns between the states the new correlation coefficient shows that the contention that Cuba has forced positive co-operation between states is false. Instead, indications are that with the co-operation pattern among states remaining the same through time, co-operation probably depends on factors which are independent of parts of the political process.

B. A correlation coefficient of +0.61 between conflict in Period One and conflict in Period Two is markedly different from the correlation coefficient of +0.27 in Correlation 4 above. The interaction of Cuba in the region has acted to change considerably the pattern of negative interaction between states. The contention, that Cuba is isolated, acting negatively with the other states in the region, and in some measure is responsible for much of the conflict in the region, is /

is thus supported.³⁷ However, at the same time, the correlation coefficient of +0.61 indicates that, apart from interaction with Cuba, the patterns of conflict between states remain persistent over time.

Whilst Cuba has had some impact on the patterns of interaction between states in Period Two it is easy to overestimate its extent. Cuba has not, for example, forced new patterns of co-operation between states. Neither, if its own interaction is set aside, has it radically changed patterns of conflict between states. All this seems to suggest that to hold Cuba responsible for all that has happened in the region from 1959 onwards is nonsense. The impact of the Cuban Revolution on international politics in the region has not been minimal, but neither has it been paramount.

Summary:

The increase in conflict from marginal predominance over co-operation in Period One to clear predominance over co-operation in Period Two should have led, if Galtung's supposition is correct, to polarisation in the region. Yet, evidence of polarisation is very weak. For example, whilst there is polarisation in the sense that interaction between Cuba and the rest of the region is both predominantly negative and/

37. I use the words "and in some measure is responsible for" as my data do not allow me to give direction of interaction with any degree of certainty. This prevents me from saying that Cuba is 'responsible' for much of the conflict in the region if by 'responsible' I mean it is the transmitter of such interaction. Frequently Cuba was the recipient of such interaction. (The overwhelming preponderance of my data on direction points to Cuba as a receiver rather than a transmitter of interaction.)

and very high it has not resulted in the expected re-organisation of interaction patterns between states. Instead the co-operation patterns between states remain much the same as before. And even though changes in the overall conflict pattern can be traced to Cuba the pattern of conflict between other states remains relatively unchanged.

To talk of polarisation developing from increased conflict in the Caribbean is, strictly speaking, not true. Increased conflict has led only to a qualitatively different type of interaction being the norm in Period Two as against Period One, i.e. the change from 'mixed balanced' to 'single unbalanced' interaction, and not to a correspondingly radical alteration of the existing interaction patterns between states. This emphasises a previous point - that although the international politics of the region are considered by many observers to be unstable there is, in fact, a fair degree of stability. States have interests vis-à-vis other states which are not likely to be changed over-night. In other words 'system type' variables are more likely to account for interaction in this case than are 'idiosyncratic type' variables.³⁸

Hypothesis Three: Consonance

The idea of consonance is derived from the adoption into small group theory of the mathematical theory of balance.
As/

38. This is following Rosenau's classification in his "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy". See my 'Summary' to 'Internal Politics: Some Major Characteristics' in 'Part One'.

As an approach to the study of interaction between states it is not new, having been previously applied by Harary in his structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East.³⁹ Essentially it involves representing all interaction between states as a number of structures which, because balanced structures have a greater stability than unbalanced structures, will tend toward balance over time. Galtung illustrates what is meant by a balanced structure by quoting a traditional Arab saying


"the friend of my friend is my friend,
the friend of my enemy is my enemy,
the enemy of my friend is my enemy,
and the enemy of my enemy is my friend".⁴⁰

If there are no balanced structures

"then forces towards this state will arise. Either the dynamic characters will change, or the relations will be changed through action or through cognitive reorganisation. If a change is not possible the state of imbalance will produce tension."⁴¹

39. Frank Harary "Structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5., No.2., 1961.

40. Johan Galtung, "Small Group Theory and the Theory of International Relations: A Study in Isomorphism", p.282. The four situations within the saying can be represented diagrammatically as four balanced structures in the following manner. (The order of diagrams corresponds to the order of situations in the saying).



41. Frank Harary "A structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956", p.168.

I propose to test the idea of consonance as it applies to the Caribbean region in two ways. Firstly, to see whether following the increase in conflict from Period One to Period Two, with its hypothesised polarisation, there are a greater number of balanced structures than before. Secondly, to examine the part played by Cuba and the Dominican Republic, whose interaction changes radically from Period One to Period Two, in the development of new structures in the region. Before attempting this however a small methodological problem has to be solved.

Harary makes the point that relations between states are not only negative or positive, they may also be indifferent.⁴²


A glance at the interaction tables in the Appendix shows that a large number of relations between states in the Caribbean are characterised by indifference. Also, as I have pointed out in the test of the hypothesis on 'conflict and polarisation', relations between the states can be characterised as 'mixed balanced' i.e. there is an almost equal amount of conflict and co-operation interactions between states. If an adequate test of the theory of consonance as it applies to the Caribbean is to be attempted both 'indifferent' and 'mixed' relations between states will have to be incorporated into the theory.

The incorporation of these relationships into the theory increases the range of possible structures. It has led to a small increase in the number of balanced structures and a larger increase in the number of unbalanced structures. At the same time it has allowed for the development of a semi-balanced structure.

42. Ibid, pp.167-168.

Instead of two balanced structures there are now four.


These are represented in the following diagrams:



As can be seen Structures 3 and 4 'incorporate the 'indifferent' relationship between states. Both are considered balanced because either there is no relationship at all, Structure 3, or only a bilateral relationship, Structure 4. Therefore, within the structure there is no great pressure for change. They are fairly stable.

The incorporation of 'mixed' relationships between states has caused the increase in unbalanced structures. 'Mixed' relationships are unstable as they can easily be converted into either predominantly co-operation or conflict relations by only a small shift of emphasis in one or both of the relationships. Within the structure there is great pressure for change to reach stability. Consequently any structure, with one exception, which includes a 'mixed' relationship is unbalanced. The exception is Structure 4 as here it is obvious that a shift of emphasis will not in itself unbalance the structure.

There are two semi-balanced structures. These are represented in the following diagrams.



Both/

Both are considered semi-balanced as there appears to be no great pressure for change. Further, action upon the 'indifferent' relationship to change it is as likely to be positive as negative. In this case the action will have the effect of balancing the structure, i.e. changing Structure 5 to Structure 1 and Structure 6 to Structure 2. But the important point to note is that there is no great need for such action in the first place.

This incorporation of the 'indifferent' and 'mixed' relationships between states now makes it possible to represent all the interaction data as a number of structures. To do this all interaction data for each time period is coded as 'indifferent', 'positive', 'negative' or 'mixed' according to the following system:

| <u>Co-operation Interaction</u> | | <u>Conflict Interaction</u> | |
|--|-------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| <u>Relationship</u> | <u>Number of Interactions</u> | <u>Relationship</u> | <u>Number of Interactions</u> |
| Indifferent | Nil or 1 | Indifferent | Nil or 1 |
| Positive(low) | 2 - 7 | Negative (low) | 2 - 9 |
| Positive(high) | 8 and above | Negative(high) | 10 and above |
| Mixed - Low positive/low neg. - High positive/high neg. | | Mixed - Low neg/low positiv - High neg/high " | |

All the relationships between the nine states of the region are then represented by 84 structures for each time period, each structure being a triad. Analysis of changes in the region is then based on the changing nature of the structures from Period One to Period Two.

The Tendency Towards Balance

The increase in intensity of interaction from Period One to Period Two, and the change of emphasis into conflict dominant interaction should be reflected in the changing nature of the structures over time. Specifically, it should have led to an increase in the number of balanced structures as the development of polarisation in the region forces new patterns of relations on states. The extent to which this is borne out by the actual situation is set out below:

| <u>Nature of Structures</u> | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| <u>Period One:</u> | | |
| Balanced - 30 | Semi-balanced - 3 | Unbalanced - 51 |
| <u>Period Two:</u> | | |
| Balanced - 35 | Semi-balanced - 14 | Unbalanced - 35 |

Over time there has been a tendency towards balance but this is reflected mainly in the substantial increase in the number of semi-balanced structures rather than the small increase in balanced structures. This indicates that there have been only moderate changes in the nature of structures. Closer analysis shows that the changes have largely been confined to the breakdown of mixed relations into either co-operation or conflict relations.⁴³ This has led to the partial balancing of structures which, because of the mixed relationship, were previously unbalanced. Overall then the effect of increased conflict in Period Two has not been to promote an extensive balancing/

43. This confirms the theory that in an unbalanced structure the weakest relationship, in this case the mixed relationship, will change in order to balance the structure, Ibid, p.178.

balancing of previously unbalanced structures but rather, through the slight modification of patterns of relations, to promote the partial balancing of previously unbalanced structures.

Cuba and the Dominican Republic

Cuba and the Dominican Republic are unique in the region in experiencing radical changes in the level of interaction from Period One to Period Two. It therefore seems appropriate to examine the effect this has had on each state as reflected by the part it plays in promoting the overall tendency towards balance.

Each is involved in 28 structures. The changing nature of these structures is set out below:

| | | <u>Balanced</u> | <u>Semi-Balanced</u> | <u>Unbalanced</u> |
|-----------|------------|-----------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| CUBA | Period One | 11 | 1 | 16 |
| | Period Two | 6 | 10 | 12 |
| DOM. REP. | Period One | 8 | 0 | 20 |
| | Period Two | 10 | 5 | 13 |

In the case of Cuba the situation is confused and far-reaching. There has been a change in the nature of three-quarters of the structures. This change has involved a reverse trend of the unbalancing and semi-balancing of previously balanced structures as well as the overall trend towards balancing and semi-balancing of previously balanced structures. Apart from the fact that nearly all changes can be attributed to the development of conflict relations between states there is no particular pattern to the changes.

In the case of the Dominican Republic the situation is much clearer. There has been a change in the nature of only half the structures. This change has been along with the general tendency towards balance, and nearly all changes can be attributed to the breakdown of mixed relations between states into conflict relations.

Whereas the Dominican Republic conforms to the overall tendency towards balance, Cuba does not.⁴⁴ This fact can be accounted for by the differences in levels of interaction. In the case of Cuba the increase in interaction has had a disturbing effect on the region whilst in the case of the Dominican Republic the decrease in interaction has tended towards correcting a previously disturbing involvement. Consequently, whilst nature of interaction is important the level of interaction also has important consequences for the nature of structures.

Summary

The application of the theory of consonance to the specific conditions of the Caribbean region has not been particularly rewarding. To some extent the absence of strict polarisation in the region may account for this.⁴⁵ It has allowed many diverse structures to develop in both time periods which have tended to reduce much of the predictive value of the theory. Nevertheless/

44. But the Dominican Republic goes against the theory by maintaining unchanged through time a large number of unbalanced structures.

45. Harary bases his analysis of the Middle East on the nature of polarity. Ibid, pp.166-167.

Nevertheless, parts of the theory do apply in practice. There is a tendency towards balance, even if only weakly so, and unbalanced structures are generally transformed into balanced structures by a change in the weakest relationship between states. Changes in the level of interaction of individual states has an effect on the structures of the region but not in any particular manner. The final conclusion is not to reject the hypothesis as such, but to question its usefulness as regards interpretation of the situation in the Caribbean.

Conclusions

The tests of the three hypotheses point to two main conclusions. Firstly, that small group theory as a model for international relations is, in the case of the Caribbean, of limited value. Secondly, that although there is an unresolved question as regards system versus sub-system determination in the Caribbean there is more support for the former than the latter.

Small group theory as a predictive model for international relations in the Caribbean has failed. For all three hypotheses the real situation is at variance, to a marked degree, from the hypothesised situation. This reduces the value of small group theory, in the context of the Caribbean at any rate, to the status of a heuristic model. In this capacity it does have some value as a plausible reference point from which to begin analysis.

The/

The evidence for system determination derives from the stability of interaction patterns over time. At a superficial level much changes, which conceals the fact that at a deeper level very little changes. Thus, changes in the nature and level of interaction have only a marginal effect. And trends, such as the one towards conflict and polarisation, or the one towards balance, are comparatively weak. This suggests that among all the variables affecting external relations in the region, the systemic variable is the most powerful.⁴⁶ Yet, as the test of Hypothesis One has established, there is a place for variables other than those that are environmentally imposed upon decision makers. Because of this all that can be said is that, on balance, there is an emphasis on system rather than sub-system determinations.

The Quantitative Approach: Summary and Comment

In adopting a quantitative approach to international politics there is always the general danger of claiming too much for the data, and the particular danger of discovering something that is not really there.⁴⁷ Very much aware of this I will reserve my conclusions until later and offer, at this stage, only a brief summary and a tentative comment.

46. i.e. as against idiosyncratic, rôle, governmental and societal variables. This follows, of course, the classification scheme of Rosenau in "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", pp.42-43.

47. The scope and the limitations of the approach are discussed fully by Arthur Lee Burns in "Quantitative Approaches to International Politics" in Morton A. Kaplan (ed) New Approaches to International Relations.

The major points emerging from this approach are best presented as a number of findings. These are given immediately below in order of appearance in the text.

1. Over time there is an increase in interaction.
2. Over time there is an increase in conflict.
3. The combination of (1) and (2) points to a division of the region into two distinctive time periods, in each of which the interaction pattern is different. Period One is from October 1948 to December 1958 and Period Two from January 1959 to October, 1964.
4. Over time, with the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, states in the region maintain consistent levels of interaction. This indicates the existence of a hierarchy of states in the region. Division of this hierarchy, on the basis of levels of interaction, into three groups of states enables generalisations about their behaviour, over time, to be made. Group One consists of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Group Two of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. Group Three of Haiti and Panama.
5. (a) Group One 'sets the style' of interaction in the region. It dominates interaction, contributes considerably to the high level of conflict, and is particularly responsible for the increase in conflict from Period One to Period Two.

(b) Group Two is mainly responsible for the promotion of co-operation in the region but because of a declining total interaction, has been unable to offset the increase in conflict by Group One.

(c) Group Three has little significance in the region and follows the 'style' set by Group One.
6. In all three Groups both the level and the nature of interaction have changed over time but the patterns of interaction have been only slightly modified.

7. A plausible case can be made for using small group theory to explain international relations in the Caribbean.
8. That the hypothesis 'the higher the rank the greater the interaction' when the rank ordering of states is determined by criteria of an 'economic development type' is not a reliable guide to interaction in the region. Neither is geography a guide to interaction though it is more reliable than rank. This points to the need for a consideration of subjective criteria in addition to objective criteria, when predicting levels of interaction.
9. There is little evidence of polarisation in the region developing as a result of increased conflict. Whilst increased interaction has led to a qualitatively different type of interaction being the norm in Period Two as against Period One, i.e. the change from 'mixed balanced' to 'single unbalanced' interaction, it has not led to a corresponding radical alteration of existing interaction patterns.
10. Changes in the interaction patterns from Period One to Period Two cannot be attributed, either wholly or in large measure, to the interaction pattern of Cuba.
11. The adoption of a structural analysis of interaction in the region points to a tendency towards balance and hence to increasing stability of interaction patterns. In Period Two the interaction pattern of the Dominican Republic supported this tendency whilst that of Cuba acted against it.
12. The use of small group theory to explain and predict international relations in the Caribbean has proved less successful than anticipated. Its value is strictly limited to that of an heuristic model.
13. In the region system determination has the edge over sub-system determination.
14. /

14. Although there are a great number of irregularities in interaction there is, despite this, a persistence of interaction patterns through time. This makes for a greater stability in the region than is apparent to most observers.

Compared to other more orthodox approaches to international politics in the region, this approach has stressed the stability of interaction patterns and the complex mix of factors creating such patterns. It has thrown doubt on the type of analysis which regards co-operation and conflict in the region as dependent on personality and/or ideology,⁴⁸ and has supported the type of analysis which recognises the importance of geography, economics, etc in addition to personality and ideology.⁴⁹ It has stressed continuity as well as crisis in the region when all too often in the past only the crisis has been recognised.⁵⁰ Perhaps the greatest justification for this approach has been in the recognition of these particular points.

48. This type of analysis is the basis of J. Lloyd Meham's chapter on the Caribbean in his The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), Chapter 13.

49. For example, see J.S. Nye "Central American Regional Integration".

50. Throughout the writings on the region's international politics there are frequent references to it as "the storm centre of the Americas" and as "highly unstable"; studies of the region have reflected this by being 'conflict' oriented.

P A R T T H R E E

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CARIBBEAN
1946--1966: THE CARIBBEAN REGION AS A
 PENETRATED SUBORDINATE STATE SYSTEM

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CARIBBEAN
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PENETRATED SUBORDINATE STATE SYSTEM

The main purpose of Part Three is to provide a qualitative explanation of political interaction in the Caribbean.

That is, by description and analysis it seeks to deepen the inquiry into political interaction in the Caribbean whilst at the same time attempting to avoid becoming primarily an historical account of such interaction.

Consequently the method is to integrate the information in Part One and to develop the information in Part Two in the following manner:

1. By means of a framework in which political interaction is intelligible. The framework suggested is that of the Penetrated Subordinate State System.
2. By means of case studies which focus on specific points relating to the structure and functioning of such a system. These studies will highlight key aspects of political interaction rather than total political interaction and will be organised in two sections corresponding to the earlier division of political interaction into two time periods. Section B will, therefore, focus on international politics in the region from 1946 to 1958 and Section C on international politics in the region from 1959 to 1966.

The major sources of the various case studies comprising Part Three are gathered in the Appendix under the headings of the various case studies and are numbered in accordance with their appearance in each study.

A. FRAMEWORK: THE CARIBBEAN REGION AS A
PENETRATED SUBORDINATE STATE SYSTEM

The Caribbean Region as a Subordinate
State System

At the moment there is no consensus on what constitutes the characteristics of an international sub-system.¹ For example, whilst Modelski has stressed the geographic concept Haas stresses the societal concept.² To some extent Brecher bridges both viewpoints by his observation that a subordinate system is both a political and a geographic concept.³ Because of this, and because Brecher's concept of the subordinate system involves 'the state' as the basic unit I have followed his definition rather than any other.

Brecher considers that the concept of the subordinate state system requires six conditions:

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1. See Chapter 1 of Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A study in political ecology.
2. Modelski states that "the conditions governing the existence of a regional sub-system are only two: the presence of a cluster of small powers, and their geographical and physical propinquity". See his "International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of South East Asia", p.151. Haas thinks that "An international system may be defined as an aggregation of politically autonomous and semi-autonomous societal systems; any subset of such entities thus constitutes an international sub-system". See Michael Haas "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity", American Political Science Review, Vol.64, No.1., 1970, p.100.
3. Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia", p.220.

1. limited scope, primary stress on the geographic region,
2. at least three actors,
3. together these are recognised as a distinct community,
4. members identify themselves as such,
5. units of 'power' are relatively inferior to those in the dominant system, and
6. changes in the Dominant system have greater effect on the Subordinate system than vice versa.⁴

All these conditions are met within the Caribbean region as I have defined it in Part One.⁵ The first two conditions obviously so and the last two conditions clearly so if the Dominant system is taken to be the inter-American system. The evidence for meeting condition 3 and 4, however, is less apparent and so I have set it out below. For condition 3, it rests on the fact that the Caribbean has been considered by the United States as a distinct region within the Latin American sub-system; and that within the Latin American sub-system states have several times designated the region as 'a special area'. The policy of the United States towards the Caribbean, as compared to South America, has marked it as a region in which particular interests are involved which call for, in their turn, particular responses.⁶ Consequently within United States policy-making circles the Caribbean/

4. Ibid.

5. See my section 'The Region Defined' in Part One.

6. See my section 'The Preponderance of the United States' in Part One.

Caribbean has been regarded and continues to be regarded, as a specific 'issue area'.⁷ In the Latin American subsystem South American governments have recommended action, and initiated action, which would deal specifically with the Caribbean region. A concrete example of this is the convocation, on the recommendation of the governments of Brazil, Chile, Peru and the United States, of the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to consider "the grave situation which existed in the Caribbean region".

For condition 4 there is very little ^{surface}/evidence; for example, all institutional expressions of awareness are essentially specific and have been greater or less than the region as I have defined it.⁸ Nevertheless a great number of states in the region have, by their actions, expressed an awareness of the region. As the politics of 'interventionism' demonstrate they have specifically designed their foreign policies to have an impact upon the domestic policies of other states in the region.⁹ And although it is true that some states in the region are less involved in this type of politics than are/

7. For example, throughout the 1950's there were periodic meetings of the U.S. ambassadors to the region to discuss the problems of the region, and to adopt common policies as regards the region. And in 1967 it was revealed that President Johnson had called for a major study of the political and economic trends in the Caribbean basin.

8. At the level of less than the region, there are now a host of organisations which have been set up as a result of 'spill over' from the C.A.C.M. At the level of 'greater than the region' are a few economic organisations such as 'Fedcame' which looks after the interests of the coffee growers in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean.

9. See my study of 'Subversive Intervention'.

are others its effect has been universal. Thus no state has escaped the problem of contending with organised groups of exiles who, with the overt or covert support of one or more states in the region, have frequently attempted to seize power by insurrectionary or guerrilla warfare. The continual existence of such serious challenges to governments has served to focus the attention of individual state decision-makers on other states in the region. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this attention is in the pattern of diplomatic relations in the region. Given that small states have diplomatic representation only where they believe their major external interests lie, the fact that for most Caribbean states a considerable proportion of their total diplomatic representation is restricted to the Caribbean region indicates the importance of the region for the states within it.¹⁰

The Caribbean Region as a Penetrated Political System

Professor Rosenau's concept of a 'penetrated political system' is particularly relevant to Latin American countries.¹¹ It can be used, for example, to explain both the politics of underdevelopment and the persistence of Cold War politics in Latin America.¹² For understanding politics in the Caribbean region/

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10. See Table 13 in my section on 'The Smallness of States and the Capability Similarities between States in the Caribbean Area: Some Implications'.
 11. Astiz discusses the validity of the concept for Latin America in his "The Latin American Countries in the International System", pp.10-12.
 12. As a contributing factor to the politics of underdevelopment in Douglas A. Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics" in Rosenau (ed) Linkage Politics. As the main factor in the persistence of Cold War politics in Espantaco, "The Latin American Crisis" and its External Framework" in Astiz (ed) Latin American International Politics, pp.18-36.

region it is crucial.

A penetrated political system is one where boundaries between systems are indistinct. As Rosenau points out

"in certain respects national political systems now permeate, as well as depend on each other and that their functioning now embraces actors who are not formally members of the system. These non-members not only exert influence upon national systems but actually participate in the processes through which such systems allocate values, co-ordinate goal directed efforts, and legitimately employ coercion. They not only engage in bargaining with the system but they actually bargain within the system, taking positions on behalf of one/^{OF}another of its components. Most important, the participation of non-members of the society in value allocative and goal-attainment processes is accepted both by its officialdom and its citizenry, so that the decisions to which non-members contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate than are those in which they do not participate. Such external penetration may not always be gladly accepted by the officials and citizens of a society, but what renders decisions legitimate and authoritative is that they are felt to be binding, irrespective of whether they are accepted regretfully or willingly".¹³

This description provides a neat summary of the character of/

13. James N. Rosenau "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", pp.63-64.

of United States-Caribbean relations. Examples of the United States participation in the "value allocative and goal attainment processes" of Caribbean states are numerous and prove that penetration is at all levels and in virtually every sphere of activity.¹⁴

The general effect is that while penetration varies from state to state and over time the essential image of the region remains constant - that of a deep "deep South" of the United States.

The Caribbean Region as a Penetrated Subordinate State System

The Caribbean as a penetrated subordinate state system is a synthesis of the two previous concepts of the region. It does not alter the essence of these concepts but adds an extra dimension to them relating to the particular manner in which the system is subordinated. Subordinate to the inter-American system as a whole it is intimately related to the Latin American sub-system, and so in some ways, subordinate to this system. At the same time, and as a result of penetration, it is subordinate to the United States system. It is therefore not surprising that insofar as there are differences in the inter-American sub-system these are reflected in a particularly acute way within the Caribbean. But not all developments in the region can be related to this state of affairs. Indeed many of the issues in the region/

14. See, in particular, my case study of 'United States-Dominican Republic Relations 1959-1966'.

region appear as specifically Caribbean! In studying the region as a subordinate system it is therefore very important to distinguish between situations of 'a regional type' and these which are, essentially, external. In this way questions relating to the degree of independence of a Caribbean subordinate system from the major divisions of the inter-American system can be answered.¹⁵

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15. With respect to the Caribbean a similar approach has already been suggested by V.A. Lewis and A.W. Singham when they ask if the system is "maintained predominantly by external pressure - that is, where the coherence of the elements of the sub-system is in the main the consequence of their separate integration with a unit external to their immediate environment" or if it is one "which, in spite of a certain sub-systemic dependency, sufficient crucial elements exist and are continually engaged in reciprocal interaction, as to ensure a state of coherence or integration that is 'independent' of external pressures". See their "Integration, Domination and the Small State System: the Caribbean" in S. Lewis and T.G. Matthews (eds) Caribbean Integration, p.123.

B. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CARIBBEAN 1946-1958

The pattern of international politics in the Caribbean from 1946 to 1958 can be understood by reference to four factors which in differing combinations underlay the majority of co-operation and conflict in the region. These factors are 'Inclusiveness'; 'Subversive Intervention'; 'National Interest' and 'The Rôle of the United States'. Fully defined later each factor will, in this section, be the subject of one or more case studies; the approach being to focus on specific situations in which one factor can be seen to be dominant. It is therefore important to recognise that each case study is only a partial study, i.e. is developed insofar as it illuminates one particular factor, and that in practice any political interaction would have developed from a combination of factors. Such an 'indivisibility' of political interaction is especially relevant to a consideration of 'The Rôle of the United States' for, given United States preponderance, a United States presence was felt in practically every interaction. Clearly then, a full treatment of United States policy in the region can only be gauged by reference to comments on United States actions in the case studies which are not primarily concerned with United States policy as well as the study which is. For this reason consideration of 'The Rôle of the United States' is left until last. The order of the appearance of the other factors has no significance.

Inclusiveness/

Inclusiveness

A special feature of international politics in the region in this period is its 'inclusiveness'. By this I mean, principally, two inter-related points. Firstly, that there is a wide range of effective participation; and secondly that there is a lack of boundaries. Individuals, organised groups, governments and inter-government organisations all interact with one another, and can, either singly or in combination, decisively influence the international politics of the region. Making for the development of very complex and diverse interaction patterns the following case studies show two such patterns. The first case study, that of the formation of the C.A.C.M. shows 'inclusiveness' leading to the development of a factor which later had a decisive impact on the international politics of the region. The second case study, that of the conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, shows 'inclusiveness' as a complex of widely differentiated actors determining international politics in a type of situation which was by no means uncommon at the time.

The formation of the C.A.C.M.

The early development of the C.A.C.M. provides a good example of a unique pattern of 'inclusiveness' involving essentially non-political external and internal actors. The main actors were E.C.L.A.; Central American 'technicos'; and to a lesser extent Central American business and industrial interests.

The period from 1951 to 1958 is generally considered as the formative period of the C.A.C.M. Its greatest significance was in defining and implementing the functional approach to integration rather than any other. Above all it sought to separate economic integration from political integration.¹

As the external actor in the integration programme the rôle of E.C.L.A. has been considerable. Laying down the basis of the programme in Resolution 9 of the 4th Session of E.C.L.A. in June, 1951, it arranged meetings and provided both financial and technical assistance throughout the remainder of this period. Publishing a number of feasibility studies it was particularly concerned in avoiding problems with political implications and was therefore forced into promoting a very functional approach towards integration.² The culmination of its work was in the preparation of the two major treaties, adopted in June, 1958, initiating the beginning of 'real' Central American integration.³

1. The wisdom of such a policy was doubted in 1966 by the man most responsible for the integration programme, the Secretary General of S.I.E.C.A., who felt that the 'technicos' had come near to the end of the development of the economic integration programme unless they received active political support.
2. The lengths it sought to go to in avoiding politics is illustrated by the fact that until 1959, and then only after a request from El Salvador, there was no study analysing the benefits and adverse effects economic integration could expect to have on the economy of any individual country. Considering the importance of developing policies ensuring a fairly balanced distribution of benefits and losses in all involved states, during the integration process, this is no less than astonishing.
3. These two treaties were the Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration and the Convention on Integrated Industries. The influence of E.C.L.A. is particularly noticeable in the latter.

Implementing the policies of E.C.L.A. in Central America, were a small group of highly influential 'technicos', mainly economists, upon whom the success of the integration programme largely rests. It was from this group that the original integration idea came, and it was this group that decided, at the 4th Session of E.C.L.A. to set up the Central American Committee on Economic Co-operation to promote integration.⁴ Successfully warding off attempts by the Central American foreign ministers to include them in O.D.E.C.A. then just being formed, the functional approach to integration was adopted as being prudent as well as practicable. Throughout the 1950's the Central American Committee on Economic Co-operation sought to avoid politics by advancing non-controversial proposals such as the one for a school of public administration.⁵ Overall this non-political approach was quite successful. Figures has stated that

"the Central American and integration ideas were fashionable; we did not think it would amount to much; and it was important to/

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4. It was the representatives of the 5 Central American states to the 3rd Session of E.C.L.A., 1950, who first advanced the integration idea. In the 4th Session as representatives, were Jorge Sol of El Salvador, Enrique Delgado of Nicaragua, and Manuel Noriego Morales of Guatemala, all of whom considered themselves economists favourable to the integration idea as well as Ministers of Economy of their respective states.
 5. In the years 1954-1955, which were marked by intense political activity and tension in Central America, the Committee continued meeting, but informally, so avoiding hostile political comment.

to keep the economists happy. If I trusted the man I would sign his declaration."⁶

Economic integration also proceeded via individual states as the 'technicos' implemented a whole series of bilateral treaties freeing trade between Central American states.⁷ Proceeding in these ways by 1958 the idea of integration had become acceptable and was beginning to receive support.⁸

A measure of lukewarm support came from business and industrial circles. Given the personal ties of many of the 'technicos' with this group, as well as the frequent multiple rôle playing of the 'technicos'; business and industrial circles were certainly in a position to know about and take advantage of schemes for integration.⁹ For example, hesitation by the 'technicos' over the question of Panamanian participation in the integration scheme appears/

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6. Nye "Central American Regional Integration", p.28. This free hand policy for the 'technicos' was also followed by Anastaso Somoza of Nicaragua and Villeda Morales of Honduras.
 7. 1951 - El Salvador and Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala,
1955 - El Salvador and Costa Rica, Guatemala and Costa Rica,
1956 - Honduras and Guatemala
1957 - El Salvador and Honduras.
 8. Significantly, it was in this year that the indifference of the United States to the 'Common Market idea' changed into support following the visit to the area by Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower,. In a speech in El Salvador, Dr. Eisenhower spoke out strongly in favour of developing a common market.
 9. Due to the practice of changing the entire administration every time a new government takes office, many 'technicos' have been employed as both businessmen and as government officials several times. A number of them have also served in the various international organisations.

appears to have been reinforced by the objection of business interests.¹⁰ Finally, the declining prices of coffee, bananas and cotton from 1955 onwards must have stimulated business interests to look for alternative sources of profit.

The Conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua

The conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1948-1949 and 1955 provide a good example of a repeated pattern of 'inclusiveness'. In both conflicts the main actors were the same two presidents, as individuals and as heads of government; an organised group of exiles, and the O.A.S.

The same two presidents were Jose Figueres of Costa Rica and Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. The personal enmity and ideological difference of the two men is generally held to be the basic cause of the conflict. Whilst I would not disagree with this an important distinction should be made between personal enmity as Somoza's main motive for conflict and ideological difference as Figueres'. If a distinction between presidential authority as 'individual' and as 'derived from government' is adopted Somoza's behaviour is understandable primarily in terms of the former and Figueres' as the latter.¹¹

10. Objections were focussed on Panama's higher labour costs and lower tariff rates, and its special relationship with the United States.

11. By this I mean that Somoza thought primarily in terms of power as 'personal' and not as a 'system'. That is he had no quarrel with Costa Rica as a democracy, witness the friendly, if distant relations, between Somoza and Ulate during the latter's administration of Costa Rica from 1949-1953, but only with Figueres as President of/

As the precipitating factor of both conflicts was the invasion of Costa Rica from Nicaragua by an organized group of exiles, however, the involvement of this group, as a separate actor in the conflicts differed in 1955 compared to 1948-1949. In effect, the 1948-1949 conflict was a continuation of the 1948 Civil War in Costa Rica. Failure of the Calderonistas in Costa Rica to rise in support of the invading exile forces and the prompt intervention of the O.A.S., rather than a withdrawal of what was only limited support from Somoza, constituted the main reasons for exile forces abandoning the struggle. In the 1955 conflict, a more serious affair, the rôle of the invading exiles, was more closely tied to the strategy of the Somoza regime. Without the political 'capital' of a recent revolt and a deposed government to trade upon the exile forces were dependent upon Somoza for political and military support.¹² Once in Costa Rica the necessity of Nicaragua as a base was vital. The decision of Somoza to co-operate with the O.A.S. in finding a peaceful solution was therefore a betrayal.¹³ It was just as important, in forcing/

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11. (continued) of Costa Rica. Figueres, and his immediate supporters however, viewed politics as a system. That is they objected to personal power and nepotism wherever it existed, as under Trujillo in the Dominican Republic as much as under Somoza in Nicaragua, and sought to replace it with their version of democracy. Somoza suffered the most from this policy by being the most geographically accessible.
 12. With a widespread patronage system operating at all levels of the administration it is safe to assume that a number of supporters, hence beneficiaries, of the Picado Government -- (the government immediately preceding the Civil War) would either be without jobs or be facing such prospects in the near future. The incentive for these forces to join the invading exiles, or to agitate on their behalf, must have been great.
 13. This was, in all probability, the reason for the renewal of hostility by a small group of exiles on/

forcing the exile forces to abandon the struggle as the prompt intervention of the O.A.S. - this time openly in support of the Figueres government, and the stiff resistance from hastily mobilized Costa Rican 'volunteer' forces. Abandoning the struggle in 1948-1949 the exile leadership recognised the failure of a rebellion. In abandoning the struggle in 1955 they recognised the failure of an invasion.

In both conflicts the O.A.S., as a separate actor, was used for the same purposes and proceeded essentially in the same way.¹⁴ On both occasions it was able to secure a cessation of the hostilities by elimination of the actor immediately responsible for the conflict, which was also the weakest actor, by refusing to recognise the invading exile group as a power contender. Its main method of achieving this was to guarantee the viability of the Costa Rican government and to open a line of 'mediated' communication between the other two main actors, Somoza and the Figueres government, who were also, in large measure, responsible for the conflict.

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13. (continued) on February 4th after they, along with the others, had effectively abandoned the fight on January 26th.
14. That is, (1) It reacted quickly to the situation by sending an 'on-the-spot' investigation and conciliation team, (2) It acted to preserve the existence of the Costa Rican government, (3) It recommended settlement of the conflict within the existing framework of inter-American law. The rôle of the United States in promoting this action is often disguised by claims that the United States subordinated its policy to that of the O.A.S. What should be recognised instead is how closely the O.A.S. action corresponds to U.S. policy aims which were to keep both Figueres and Somoza in power. The determination of the United States to support Figueres had always been consistent. In 1948 it had refused to supply arms to the Picado government, then facing the threat of an internal revolt led by Figueres. In July 1954, when relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua were very strained, it had sent observers from its military mission in Managua to accompany/

Insofar as the O.A.S. was unable to alter the behaviour or attitude of these two actors it was unable to secure a firm guarantee of future peace.¹⁵ Nevertheless the 1955 conflict dampened the enthusiasm of Figueres and his supporters regarding the desirability of creating a democracy in Nicaragua.¹⁶ Similarly, Somoza's attitude became more flexible and with his assassination on the 21st September 1956 future harmony between the two states became more likely.

Both patterns illustrate the extent to which international politics in the region was often developed outside the official government foreign policy-making machinery. Although direct access to government decision-makers was generally available for those local élite and foreign interests who wanted/

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14. (continued) accompany the Nicaraguan forces as they moved towards the Costa Rican frontier, and next month, sent on a goodwill mission, six C-47 planes to San Jose. Action by the United States in the O.A.S. once conflict broke out, left the O.A.S. as in no doubt of the willingness of the United States to supply arms to Figueres if only the O.A.S. agreed. When they did on the 16th January, four P-51's were promptly despatched. On the other side the provision of high-powered medical attention by the United States government to Somoza, following his fatal wounding in 1956, and later remarks by President Eisenhower on the good character of Somoza, can be seen as a token of the support the United States government gave him despite widespread indignation of this in the rest of Latin America.
 15. Peace, as established in the Pact of Amity, 21.2.1949, and in the Agreement Between the Governments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in Compliance with Article 4 of the Pact of Amity 9.1.1956, aimed only at the prevention of further exile groups forming. It did nothing to solve basic differences between the men.
 16. The Figueres government reduced the volume of hostile propaganda directed at Nicaragua and became less tolerant of anti-Somoza exiles.

wanted to influence the foreign policy of a national government this was not the only option open. A course of action outside a national government could be as successful in achieving desired ends. It is therefore not surprising that much of the international politics of the region followed this course. But because such action was extra-governmental, confined to small groups of actors, and involved a great deal of intrigue, it remains largely undocumented.¹⁷ Furthermore such action was often limited in scope and aimed at fulfilling only limited ends. Creating confusion without often effecting any change it was persistent and widespread, and was a major factor in creating the image of unstable international politics as the norm of the region.¹⁸

17. It is primarily through biographies or memoirs that such information comes to light. One particular example shows this well. Ydigoras Fuentes, a former president of Guatemala, reveals in his memoirs that whilst in exile in 1954 "A former executive of the United Fruit Company, now retired, Mr. Walter Turnbull, came to see me with two gentlemen whom he introduced as agents of the C.I.A. They said that I was a popular figure in Guatemala and that they wanted to lend their assistance to overthrow Arbenz. When I asked their conditions for the assistance I found them unacceptable. Among other things, I was to promise to favour the United Fruit Company and the International Railways of Central America; to destroy the railroad workers' labour union; to suspend claims against Great Britain for the Belize territory; to establish a strong-arm government, on the style of Ubico". See his My War with Communism (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963), pp.49-50. Another colourful account of plots in the Caribbean is to be found in Arturo R. Espaillet Trujillo: The Last Caesar (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1963). As Secretary for State for Security in the last years of the Trujillo government Espaillet was involved in preparing much of the plotting and intrigue in the Caribbean during these years.

18. In reality, as I have demonstrated in Part Two, /

Subversive Intervention

Intervention was the most persistent form of political interaction between Caribbean States in this period.¹⁹ Of all types of intervention the most frequent and universal was subversive intervention, here defined as

"acts for which a government is responsible, intended or likely to ferment aggression against a state, or revolution within a state".²⁰

The case study, for example, focuses on subversive intervention as the major cause and main manifestation of conflict between certain Caribbean states from 1947-1950; a 'state of affairs' which was to be repeated again at the end of the 1950's and which directly led to the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the O.A.S. at Santiago, Chile, in 1959.

The universality of subversive intervention can largely be explained by reference to the specific characteristics of the region, viz preponderance of the United States, characteristics/

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18. (continued) Two, political interaction between states in the region is more stable than it first seems.
 19. Intervention is considered as "any action beginning with deliberate or remediable interaction among nations, that significantly affects the public internal realm of another sovereign state and which stops short of aggressive crossing of international frontiers". Manfred Halpern, "The Morality and Politics of Intervention" in James N. Rosenau (ed), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) p.252. In this period the most frequent techniques of intervention between Caribbean states were diplomatic interference in internal affairs, clandestine political action, demonstrations of force and subversion.
 20. Quincy Wright, "Subversive Intervention", American Journal of International Law Vol.54, No.3., 1960, p.551.

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characteristics of internal politics, economic under-
development, smallness and equality of capabilities.²¹

The major aim of United States policy in the Caribbean is to maintain preponderance and for this political stability is seen as essential.²² A very necessary condition of this political stability is the absence of inter-state conflict. Given the readiness of the United States to intervene in the region this condition effectively rules out war, considered as politics by other means, as a policy option open to any Caribbean state decision-maker. The 'area of manoeuvre' for the external relations of Caribbean states is thus seriously reduced. A consequence of this has been the development of subversive intervention as an acceptable and analogous alternative to war. Acceptable in that, by being covert and hence not easily regulated by the United States, subversion allows some 'freedom of manoeuvre' to a Caribbean state decision-maker.²³ Analogous in that the principal objective of subversion in the Caribbean /

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21. These specific characteristics were earlier advanced in Part One as the four particular indicators of the region. For a full discussion of these characteristics see Part One.
 22. For a discussion of the major elements of United States policy in this period see "The Rôle of the United States 1946-1958".
 23. When it can, the United States operates within this 'area of manoeuvre' in order that subversion is not directly counter to its policy in the region. These operations generally take the form of controlling through bureaucratic methods, such as the granting of import/export licences and Customs seizure, the flow of arms from United States companies to various groups of political exiles and to states. See George Thayer, The War Business (London: Paladin 1970) Chapters 2, 3, 4.

Caribbean has been the replacement of one government for another by means of externally directed force.²⁴

Subversive intervention has thus acted as a partial substitute for war but this, in its turn, has been a contributing factor to recurrent crises in the international politics of the region.²⁵

The major characteristics of internal politics - personalism militarism, the persistence of political instability and a tradition of political violence - favour the use of subversion. Personalism, with its stress on an individual as a source of politics, is particularly responsive to subversion which may, in this case, be either positive or negative. Positive subversion takes the form of support for a major opposition leader of another state with the intention of installing him at some future date as head of government of that state.²⁶ Negative subversion is the assassination or deposition of the head of government, or leading/

24. War can be defined in a number of ways and fought for a number of reasons. Here it is simply considered as armed and organised conflict to achieve definable objectives and/or resolve conflicts.

25. Absence of war, and subversive intervention as a partial substitute for war means that in certain cases political differences remain unresolved or only partially resolved. The effect of this is to leave a comparatively easily activated reservoir of possible future points of contention and conflict.

26. Characteristics of personalism such as authority, loyalty and patronage dovetail with some of the essential elements of subversion such as the element of risk, the need for secrecy, and the involvement of only a few persons in key decisions, to enhance greatly the chances of developing successful subversion.

leading political personalities, of another state with the intention of creating a political crisis. Clearly positive subversion, implying some form of control over the outcome is better than negative subversion where the final outcome cannot be predicted.²⁷ In recognition of this most personalist based subversion in the Caribbean has been positive subversion.²⁸ Militarism allows for subversion directed at the 'area of distrust' between civilian and military sectors of society. Such subversion generally takes the form of playing one sector off against another by the use of rumour and innuendo. Finally, political instability and the tradition of political violence legitimises subversion as a method of political change. Providing that some attention has been paid to nationalism the external origin of political change is normally not regarded as a sufficient reason to disqualify such change.²⁹ Subversion is a relatively cheap method /

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27. This control, however, is very weak for once the subversive element is in power external dependence ceases. Such control therefore takes the form of the expected enacting of promises (which may be broken) and of influence (which may be rejected). Consequently the only safe policy for the state originally promoting subversion is to develop uncertainty by beginning the process again. The adoption of this policy by Caribbean states is another factor accounting for the recurrent crises of the region.
28. Resort to assassination as the only major technique of subversion has generally been 'a final solution' used only after positive subversion has failed, e.g. the Dominican Republic-Venezuela conflict 1959-1960. A similar practice has been followed by the United States in respect of the Dominican Republic 1960-1961, and more recently in Cuba.
29. The organisation of a subversive movement by a government which aimed at placing its own nationals in key positions in a future government of another state would probably not be tolerated.

method of attaining foreign policy objectives. It is therefore a particularly suitable policy for underdeveloped states which cannot afford to maintain the necessary means of attaining objectives in other ways, for example through the use of military force derived from the possession of large well equipped armed forces, or through 'leverage' as a result of economic aid. In this period all the Caribbean states were underdeveloped and government revenue was limited.³⁰ The result was an emphasis on subversion as a practicable, and possibly effective, foreign policy means.

Smallness has also been a factor encouraging subversion. The strategy of subversion aiming at key political figures is particularly appropriate to small states as the key individuals are relatively few in number. Another consequence of smallness is the tendency for political power to be concentrated in one place, usually the capital city. Hence subversion needs only be geographically limited in scope for it to succeed. In the Caribbean these two strategies were combined to develop a pattern of subversion based upon the key political figures in the capital city.³¹

A further source of subversion is the relative equality of capabilities/

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30. On the formal traditional instruments of foreign policy - the foreign service and the armed forces - all the Caribbean states except for Cuba and the Dominican Republic sent less than \$10 million a year.
31. This pattern of subversion is very close to, in form, the coup d'état and, like the coup d'état, is generally supportive of the status quo. Its antithesis is guerrilla warfare.

capabilities between the states of the Caribbean. Two major methods of increasing capabilities, war and internal development, are ruled out. War, because of the equality of capabilities may not be successful and is, at any rate, restricted by the preponderance of the United States. Internal development, because of the features which act to inhibit the processes of internal development - export dependence, political instability and smallness of size - cannot easily or quickly be remedied so making difficult any rapid increase in capability of a single Caribbean state vis-à-vis any other Caribbean state.³² In these circumstances positive subversion aimed at promoting friendly relations becomes a means of temporarily increasing capability.

From the multiplicity of factors generating subversive intervention as a regional phenomena techniques of subversion have developed which are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually opposed. It is therefore not surprising to see subversive intervention frequently employed in Caribbean international politics.³³ /

32. From this it follows that the only way for a Caribbean state to increase capability rapidly is through the external environment. The most favoured method of achieving this is by importing arms, generally from the United States, occasionally from Western Europe, and in times of crisis from 'friendly' Caribbean states. This means that the United States government in particular is especially able to influence the military capability of a Caribbean state. Both the Guatemalan Affair 1954, and the Cuban Crisis, 1962, show that the United States government attaches great importance to the maintenance of this influence.

politics.³³ To some extent this has led to its recognition as a specifically Caribbean pattern of interaction, one that is unique to the Caribbean by being different and distinct from patterns of interaction among other states in the inter-American system.³⁴ The case study, which focuses on the years 1947-1950, illustrates this Caribbean pattern of interaction in operation.

Subversive Intervention in the Caribbean 1947-1950

On January 6th, 1950, the O.A.S. Council met to consider a request from Haiti that the Organ of Consultation be convoked in respect of "a series of flagrant acts of intervention" by the Dominican Republic which threatened "the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and the political independence" of Haiti. At the same meeting the Dominican Republic rejected the Haitian charges and itself requested the convocation of the Organ of Consultation in order that steps could be taken to remedy "the abnormal conditions prevailing in the Caribbean/

33. To some extent the pattern of 'mixed balanced interaction' previously noted in Part Two as characteristic of this period is explained by subversive intervention. (See Part Two - The Four Correlations). The pattern is established in the following way: State A is involved in subversion in State B and when B discovers this it complains to A - hence conflict. The reaction of A is generally to deny, and then suppress, such subversion - hence co-operation. As a means of countering A however, B frequently begins subversion of A, so beginning the process again.

34. The only similar pattern of interaction in South America is between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay where the Argentinian and Brazilian governments tolerate, largely through being unable to control, the 'invasions' from their frontier regions into Paraguay by various groups of Paraguayan exiles.

Caribbean area". Agreeing to the requests of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic the O.A.S. Council established itself as a Provisional Organ of Consultation and appointed an Investigating Committee to examine the numerous and contradictory 'facts' presented by Haiti and the Dominican Republic to substantiate their claims of intervention.

On March 13th, 1950, the Report of the Investigating Committee was submitted to the Provisional Organ of Consultation. From the Report, which covered in detail the conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic during 1949, and the situation in the Caribbean 1947-1949 one point in particular was very apparent. This was the complexity of subversive intervention in the region. Related to this, and as a further point, was the difficulty found by the Investigating Committee in recommending any real solution to the problem, of intervention in the region.

The complexity of subversive intervention was a reflection of two inter-related points; the diversity of techniques of intervention and the special relationship of Caribbean governments to subversive movements.

An idea of the diversity of techniques of intervention can be gained by drawing examples of intervention from the dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic during 1949. These are listed below together with a brief reference, in brackets, to the situation to which they refer.

1. - /

1. - Permitting political exiles to use a government associated radio station to incite revolt in another state. (Use of the Dominican radio station 'La Voz Dominicana' by Haitian exiles Roland and Viau to incite revolt in Haiti in June and November, 1949).
2. - Circulation of externally printed propaganda within a state, the purpose of which is to advocate unconstitutional means of replacing the incumbent government of that state. (Leaflets inciting rebellion and signed by Roland which circulated in Haiti in November, 1949).
3. - Frequent contact between exile groups in one state with the opposition in another state the purpose of which is to promote subversion, such contact being assisted and encouraged by government officials of the exiles' host state. (Meetings during 1949, with the help of Dominican officials, between Dupuy, Haitian opposition and Roland, exiled in the Dominican Republic, at which plans for subversion in Haiti were formulated.)
4. - Use of the diplomatic corps to finance opposition groups. (A sum of \$2,000 given by Rafael Oscar de Maya, First Secretary of the Dominican Embassy in Haiti to Dupuy in November, 1949).
5. - Supply of arms and ammunition to opposition groups in a state by an external state, or to exile groups by the host state, the purpose of which is to facilitate the overthrow/

overthrow of another government. (Delivery of weapons to Dupuy in the Dominican Republic in December, 1949).

6. - The promotion by one state of assassination and arson in another state the purpose of which is to precipitate a political crisis in that state. (Plot by Dupuy and others to assassinate high officials of the Haitian government and start fires in Port-au-Prince in order to create panic in the city.)
7. - Permitting within one state the assembly and military training of an armed group of political exiles whose purpose is the invasion of another state. (Plan by Roland to cross into Haiti from the Dominican Republic at the end of December, 1949, at the head of an armed group of exiles with the intention of taking over the Haitian government.)

The special relationship of Caribbean governments to subversive movements stems primarily from 'inclusiveness'.³⁵ This feature introduces complexity into subversion by permitting groups of political exiles to establish a semi-autonomous relationship with the host government. Such a relationship is particularly obvious in the case of the two attempted invasions of the Dominican Republic.

The/

35. For a discussion of the concept of 'inclusiveness' and how it operates in the case of exile groups see my section 'Inclusiveness -- The conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua'.

The first attempt, known as Cayo Confites, was much the more ambitious. In preparation throughout 1947 the invasion force, when assembled at Cayo Confites, Cuba, in September, 1947, numbered over one thousand armed men, twelve aircraft and three vessels. The equipping and training of this force was openly tolerated by the Cuban government. A Cuban government minister, José Manuel Aleman, and a high government official, Manolo Castro, were intimately involved in preparing the invasion and to this end channelled funds into the invasion from the Cuban Department of Education. Juan Bosch, Juan Rodríguez García, and Miguel Angel Ramírez, all Dominican exiles in Cuba and the major organisers of the invasion, were friendly with key persons in the Cuban élite through whom they had direct access to high officials of the Cuban government. Such close identification of the Cuban government with the aims of the invasion brought protests from the Dominican Republic on July 23rd 1947, but this, and subsequent protests, were ignored by the Cuban government. Less easy to ignore was the mounting pressure from the United States government to break up the invasion and finally, albeit reluctantly, the Cuban government succumbed to this by moving against the invasion force on September 28th, 1947.³⁶

The second attempt, known as Iuperón, was staged from Guatemala in June 1949. Persons prominent in Cayo Confites, such as Bosch and Angel Ramírez were again in leadership positions/³⁷

36. Trujillo finally protested about the expedition through the O.A.S. and although the United States State Department was anti-Trujillo at the time it responded in his favour. Truman ordered his chief of staff, General Eisenhower, to summon his Cuban opposite number, General Pérez Damera, and to demand the expedition be stopped.

positions.³⁷ The invasion plan was based on the use of six aircraft which the Guatemalan government were equipping at the military air base of San Jose de Guatemala. The Guatemalan government also provided the invasion forces with a limited amount of arms and was intimately involved in preparation for the launching of the invasion. Once under way bad planning and lack of awareness of the true situation in the Dominican Republic, among other things, contributed to the dismal failure of the invasion.

These two invasion attempts were prepared with the collusion of the Cuban and Guatemalan governments but because of this they should not be seen as merely an expression of the foreign policy of these governments. Rather, preparations for the invasions were tolerated because they corresponded with the foreign policies of the host governments, and were furthered insofar as they were not directly inimical to the interests of these governments.³⁸ The exile groups thus often operated with a degree of autonomy -- a situation frequently underpinned by the active participation of high officials of the host government who could make available parts of the government machinery without the consent of the government as a whole.³⁹ Occasionally such exile groups were so small they could operate/

37. A prominent organizer of Luperón was Eufemio Fernández, a Cuban who until May 1949 was the Chief of the Cuban Secret Police -- the ideal position from which to conduct a clandestine operation with or without the knowledge of the Cuban government.

38. When the activities of a group of exiles were inimical to a government they were suppressed, e.g. Cayo Confites, 1947; the disbandment of the Caribbean Legion in Costa Rica, 1949; the suppression of the activities of Costa Rican exiles in Nicaragua, 1955.

39. On October 2nd, 1947, José Miguel Alemán was censured by the Cuban Senate for his part in Cayo Confites.

operate without the knowledge of the host government and in invading another Caribbean state could seriously disturb relations between the host state and the invaded state.⁴⁰ In any situation groups of exiles could therefore be either dependent, quasi-independent, or independent actors thus making it very difficult to associate with certainty any one government with any particular group of exiles or act of a group of exiles.

This complexity of subversive intervention was reflected in the five draft resolutions submitted by the Investigating Committee to the Provisional Organ of Consultation. For example, in the particular case of the conflicts between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, the Investigating committee recognised that satisfactory solutions could be found only if each case was treated individually and accordingly recommended that a Special Committee for the Caribbean be set up to promote the settlement of these conflicts on such a basis.⁴¹ At the same time complexity was a factor in determining that the recommendations of the Investigating Committee on the general situation in the Caribbean were reduced to the lowest common denominator, in this case to stressing the importance of Caribbean states abiding by the norms of inter-American law, /

40. Such occurrences were frequent in Central America where Honduras, because of its geographical position and the weakness of the government in the countryside, was used as the spring-board country more often than any other.

41. Modelling itself on the work of the Inter-American Peace Committee the Special Committee considered that its prime function was to provide 'good offices' and to press for settlement. It was thus concerned, above all, to promote settlement on a bi-lateral basis taking into account the specific characteristics of each case.

law, especially as it related to non-intervention.⁴² In approving the draft resolutions of the Investigating Committee the O.A.S. was therefore able to secure a short term settlement among certain states in the Caribbean but was unable to develop this or to suggest any means of ensuring a long-term settlement of the problem in the region as a whole.

Overall, the practice of subversive intervention generated tension and mistrust among Caribbean states as each state remained uncertain of any other state's real intentions. Many observers have seen the basis of such subversion primarily in ideological terms, i.e. democracy v dictatorship, and legal terms, i.e. the non-adherence by Caribbean states to the norms of inter-American law.⁴³ But this view, at best is only half the picture. Thus whilst it is true that ideology motivated some exile groups, many more were based on opportunism, organised on personalist lines, and operated for a variety of purposes depending on the particular relationship with the host government. More importantly the ideological view ignores the environmental factors that, by themselves, encouraged and sustained subversion as an effective politics within the Caribbean /

42. Of equal importance to 'complexity' in reaching this solution was the internal politics of the O.A.S. Always fearful of United States power the Latin American states were not prepared in this particular case to sacrifice the cherished principle of non-intervention for the ill-defined principle of representative democracy.

43. See, for example, J. Lloyd Meacham, The United States and Inter-American Security 1889-1960, Chapter 13; Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (London: Oxford University Press 1966), pp.223-229; Jerome Slater, The O.A.S. and United States Foreign Policy, pp.77-83.

Caribbean as a whole. The legal view similarly neglects environmental factors by ignoring them; hence prescriptions for curing subversive intervention based on adherence to inter-American law were bound to fail as long as environmental conditions remained unchanged.⁴⁴

National Interest

Much of the international politics in the Caribbean during this period can be considered as 'spontaneous' and 'reactive'.⁴⁵ However, there are certain aspects of state behaviour which appear to be 'purposive' and to be rooted in some conception of what is generally termed 'national interest'. Despite its limitations it therefore seems useful to adopt the concept of national interest which here is defined in two ways as 'what is best for a national society' and 'as the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts'.⁴⁶ Both these definitions have suggested the case studies. The 'what is best' is reflected in the first study, that of the immediate causes of the Honduras-Nicaragua border dispute/

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44. Of importance to note here is that this fact was recognised and articulated by Cuba alone among the American states when in 1959, at the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the O.A.S., the Cuban delegate, Raul Roa, pointed out that underdevelopment was the root cause of tension and instability in the Caribbean. See Quinta Reunion de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores: Actos y Documentos, (O.E.A. Ser.F/iii.5.) (español), 3rd Plenary Session, Dec. 39.
45. What I term 'spontaneous international politics' is closely linked to my concept of 'inclusiveness', i.e. is a consequence of 'inclusiveness' and is best illustrated by my section in Inclusiveness. What I term 'reactive' international politics is closely linked to the Caribbean as a penetrated system with a common environment and is best illustrated by my section on The Role of the United States 1946-1958. The interplay of both types of international politics is a theme of my section on Subversive Intervention.
46. For these definitions and a discussion on national interest see Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Macmillan, 1970), Chapter 1, passim.

dispute of 1957, in which national interest is shown as the generator of conflict and crisis. The 'general and continuing ends' is reflected in the second study, that of the different attitudes of Panama and El Salvador to unity in Central America, which is an evaluation of national interest as a determinant of long standing policies of involvement (El Salvador) and indifference (Panama) to Central America.

The Honduras-Nicaragua Border Dispute 1957*

The Honduras-Nicaragua border dispute had a long history as a continuing point of contention between the two countries. Size was a factor inhibiting any easily negotiated settlement, the disputed area being some seven thousand square miles whilst at the same time the limited strategic and economic value of the area, in 1955 an isolated population of about four thousand only marginally integrated in the money economy, ensured that the problem rarely became urgent. Supposedly definitively settled by a judgment in favour of Honduras in 1906 the later Nicaraguan rejection of this judgment led to a situation in which, for the first half of the 20th Century Honduras accepted the fact of Nicaraguan involvement in part of the area provided it was not explicit whilst insisting on its non-negotiable legal right to the whole of the disputed area.^{47/}

47. So that even though Nicaraguan administration and economic exploitation of lumber in the Coco River area extended some way into the territory claimed by Honduras most Honduran protests were confined to the status of the whole of the claimed area and were, for example, over incidents such as the publication of maps and calendars in Nicaragua showing the disputed area as belonging to Nicaragua.

* The major sources from which this case study is derived are listed in the Appendix under 'Case Studies - The Honduras-Nicaragua Border Dispute, 1957'.

area. The immediate cause of the conflict of 1957 was the recognition by the governing military junta of Honduras that this situation could not be perpetuated except at the expense of Honduras.

The most important factor behind this re-appraisal was the possibility of a major change in the economic value of the area. Although no oil had yet been found a geological survey by the Honduran Petrol Company in 1955 had been considered favourable enough for drilling to begin in the Caratasca Lagoon area by 1956. The decision of the company to bring in heavier equipment to drill a second well in the vicinity of the first in early 1956 sparked off a period of oil speculation, in Nicaragua as well as in Honduras.⁴⁸

For both Honduras and Nicaragua oil meant government revenue but more importantly, in the case of Honduras, it also promised economic development and less reliance on bananas and U.F.C.O.⁴⁹ These considerations became increasingly powerful during 1956 as first U.F.C.O. postponed further expansion in Honduras and then the discredited and conservative government of Lozano was replaced by a mildly innovating military /

48. A new mining law covering oil was drafted by Nicaragua in 1956 and later in the year the Waterford Oil Company of New Orleans, which had a large concession from the Nicaraguan government for exploitation along the Atlantic sea-board, began geological surveys near and in the disputed area.

49. In the 1951-1955 period U.F.C.O. contributed an average of \$35 million a year to the Honduras economy. See Stacy May and Galo Plaza, The United Fruit Company in Latin America (National Planning Association 1958), P.158.

military junta. The beginning of the Suez Canal crisis in October, 1956, with its subsequent emphasis on Western oil production operated as a further stimulus for action.⁵⁰ In these circumstances it is not surprising that the new Honduras government decided that in the interest of Honduras some revision of the existing status quo as it applied to the disputed area was both urgent and necessary.

The first moves in this direction came on 21st February 1957 when, by Decree 52, the Honduran government created the new department of Gracias a Dios which, for the first time, administratively organised all the disputed area claimed by Honduras.⁵¹ On February 26th, Nicaragua protested this move as making the dispute more difficult to settle. In March, amid increasing public support for its policy, the Honduran government answered this by proceeding to appoint officials to the political organisation of the new department. At the end of April Honduras was claiming violation of its territory by Nicaraguan armed forces and on May 1st open fighting broke out.⁵² Following requests from both Honduras and Nicaragua the O.A.S. Council met and on May 2nd resolved to turn itself into a Provisional Organ of Consultation and to /

50. As a direct result of the Suez Canal crisis from October 1956 to March 1957 there was a 73 percent decline in oil shipments from the Middle East which was largely compensated for by increased production in the Western Hemisphere.

51. Prior to this only in part of the claimed area, the Patuca Valley, did Honduras wield de facto authority.

52. Although both Honduras and Nicaragua mobilised reserves the scale of fighting was very limited lasting only a few days and with just a few hundred troops and several aircraft involved.

to appoint an Investigating Committee. By May 5th, the Investigating Committee had secured a cease-fire and by May 10th arranged for troop withdrawals along zones of contact in much of the disputed area. On May 17th the Investigating Committee was reconstituted as an Ad Hoc Committee which, by July 21st, had effected a final agreement by Honduras and Nicaragua to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice, the decision of this court to be binding and requiring immediate compliance.

The crisis with Nicaragua and the subsequent intervention of the O.A.S. make sense if they are seen as deliberately planned by the Honduras government. The reasoning is as follows: The promise of oil made the problem of the disputed area one of urgency for the Honduras government, for if oil were discovered the economic value of the disputed area would increase and correspondingly the chances of a 'no compromise on the 1906 award' settlement with Nicaragua would diminish.⁵³ Permanent military occupation of the disputed area by Honduras was ruled out through lack of capability and, in any case, meant the risk of war with Nicaragua.⁵⁴ On the other hand Honduras had an asset in its excellent legal case for rightful/

53. From 1906 onwards Nicaragua had been willing to settle the dispute by compromise but this approach was always rejected by Honduras as calling into doubt the validity of the 1906 award.

54. In terms of immediate military superiority, i.e. troops available for immediate combat, Nicaragua had an estimated 2:1 advantage over Honduras. In a war lasting more than a few weeks Honduras was, therefore, increasingly at a disadvantage.

rightful possession of the disputed area.⁵⁵ For Honduras a sound strategy was therefore one which minimised its lack of capability but maximised its legal claim, and at the same time forced compulsory arbitration of the dispute on Nicaragua before oil was discovered. Unable to force arbitration on Nicaragua by its own efforts, Honduras enlisted the aid of the O.A.S. by first precipitating the conflict through provocative unilateral action and then inviting the O.A.S. to intervene and to find a settlement.⁵⁶ In so doing it banked heavily on a repetition of the previous practice of the O.A.S. when dealing with crises, which was to arrange an immediate cessation of open hostilities - for Honduras this would compensate for its military weakness vis-à-vis Nicaragua, and then to recommend settlement by law - thus giving the advantage to Honduras through its legal claim to the disputed area. Action by the O.A.S. confirmed Honduras' expectations. On the above interpretation of the dispute it is quite obvious that a conception by the military junta of the national interest of Honduras was paramount both in precipitating the conflict and in contriving the resolution.

El Salvador, Panama and Central American Union* /

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55. The history and basis of the Honduran claim as set out by the Honduras government is summarised in the pamphlet Honduras has a Definite and Settled Boundary with Nicaragua (Telueigalpa, June 1957).
56. This explains why from 21st February 1957, Honduras deliberately escalated the dispute; why it quickly brought to the attention of the O.A.S. Council on April 30th, the relatively minor incursion by Nicaraguan troops into territory claimed by Honduras when previously such incursions had been ignored; and why, once the O.A.S. Council had involved itself as a Provisional Organ of Consultation Honduras officially announced on May 3rd that all fighting had stopped.

El Salvador, Panama and Central American Union*

During the 1950's El Salvador's vigorous championing of the union of Central America contrasted radically with the studied indifference of Panama. At the base of these differing attitudes, however, was a common concern with the probable effects of union on the development of the country and a shared awareness of the influence of history. In other words national interest, as it was being interpreted in the present and had been interpreted in the past, was a major determinant of the attitude of both states.

For the elite of El Salvador union in Central America was seen as part of the answer to the pressing problem of economic development without social or political change.⁵⁷

To develop union by working through its foreign ministry and through O.D.E.C.A. therefore became a major priority of the Salvadoran government and, over time, resulted in the close identification of El Salvador with the direction, maintenance and furthering of the union programme; so close, in fact, that Salvadoran foreign policy in Central America and the development of union became virtually synonymous. This led, in/

* The major sources from which this case study is derived are listed in the Appendix under 'Case Studies - El Salvador, Panama and Central American Union'.

57. A programme of industrialisation was seen as providing the rest of the answer. The complementary nature of union and industrialisation was a major theme of economic studies on El Salvador during this period.

in its turn, to the manipulation of O.D.E.C.A. by the Salvadoran government in order that O.D.E.C.A.'s policies should reflect Salvadoran interests. One particularly obvious example of this was the question of the free movement of Central American citizens between Central American states. With a high population density and a rising rate of population growth yet with virtually no cultivable land left uncultivated and only an embryonic industrial base the government of El Salvador was faced with a large and growing population problem.⁵⁸ A partial solution to this was envisaged in the encouragement of emigration from El Salvador to other less densely populated parts of Central America but for this to be feasible a policy on free movement of labour in Central America had to be forthcoming.⁵⁹ To this end El Salvador worked in O.D.E.C.A. for discussions and decisions on the free movement question,⁶⁰ and followed up one initiative with another /

58. The density of population per square mile in 1958 was 298 persons overall, and 191 persons in rural areas. The population growth rate of 1.3 percent per annum, 1940-1950, had increased to 3.6 percent per annum, 1958-1961. In 1950 nearly 75 percent of the land was in farms, 60 percent of it under pasture or cultivation, and nearly 20 percent in mountains, forests and sub-marginal land. In 1956 about 13 percent of the economically active population worked in manufacturing and construction.

59. Density of population elsewhere in Central America was: Guatemala - 84; Costa Rica - 55; Honduras - 42; Nicaragua - 26. All figures per square mile and for mid 1958.

60. For example, the Ministers of the Interior of O.D.E.C.A. met, early in 1957, to discuss the free movement question and resolved, among other things, to recommend that the respective internal laws of each state be amended to allow Central Americans to take up residence in any state.

another despite the hostility of some Central American states.⁶¹ The use of San Salvador as the headquarters of O.D.E.C.A. and the principal meeting place for most of the conferences, etc. on economic integration further enabled the Salvadoran government to influence union, particularly as it consistently supported the functionalist approach in both philosophy and action.⁶² By late 1959, as the behaviour of the Salvadoran government during the crisis over the election of a new Secretary General for O.D.E.C.A. clearly showed, El Salvador had come to regard O.D.E.C.A. at least inasmuch as it was a tangible expression of the aspirations of union, as indispensable.⁶³

For the élite of Panama, union with Central America was seen as an alternative to the maintenance and expansion of its/

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61. Much of the hostility between Honduras and El Salvador revolved around the large scale illegal immigration into Honduras by Salvadoreans. A similar, but less sizeable movement of Central Americans into Costa Rica following the abolition of visa regulations in 1957, led Costa Rica in May 1959, to unilaterally suspend the 1957 agreement.
 62. The functional approach was basic to the Salvadoran concept of union. Thus at the very beginning, i.e. at the founding of O.D.E.C.A. in October, 1951, El Salvador had argued for gradualism and against Nicaragua's concept of immediate political union. At the same time, through initiatives such as the signing of the free trade treaties with other Central American states, it had encouraged the development of the necessary economic framework for closer union.
 63. In support of O.D.E.C.A. the Salvadoran government was active diplomatically to secure an acceptable new Secretary General and to devise an interim arrangement whereby O.D.E.C.A. would temporarily function without a Secretary General. At the same time it provided practical financial help to O.D.E.C.A. by being the only state to pay its quota for 1959 in full, by paying the rent on the O.D.E.C.A. buildings in San Salvador, and the wages of the O.D.E.C.A. staff for December, 1959.

its special relationship with the United States.⁶⁴

Consequently some consideration was given to the question of union with Central America but in this period every Panamanian administration, on economic and political grounds, ended up favouring closer ties with the United States rather than any other course of action.⁶⁵ In the case of Central America the economic grounds for ruling out full Panamanian participation in the schemes for economic integration were based, in large measure, on the fact that it would mean a revision of the preferential trade agreements with the United States, the end of the Colon Free Port, and the levelling up of Panamanian tariffs to match the high Central American levels.⁶⁶ By way of a contrast a decision to concentrate on a revision of the relationship with the United/

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64. A third alternative existed in the form of union with Gran Colombia. The promise of an economic confederation of Gran Colombia involving Panama, Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador had led Panama to join with these states in signing an agreement at Quito in July 1948 in which all four states pledged themselves to achieve a measure of economic union by co-ordination. However, no further progress was made and the agreement subsequently sunk into obscurity.
 65. This held true even for the Remon administration which was, in many ways, different from other Panamanian administrations. Thus, the open verbal support given to Central American union by Remon during his 1952 tour of Central America as president-elect of Panama was quickly superseded and then paled to insignificance when compared to the time and energy spent on his negotiations with the United States for a new Canal contract.
 66. A further factor was the fear by business interests of the effects of competition with Guatemala and El Salvador due to the high labour costs of Panama and its peripheral geographic location to the centres of Central American economic activity. Paradoxically this fear was mirrored in reverse by Guatemala and El Salvador who felt that Panama would attract loan capital more easily because of its skilled labour force and its position on a major world trade route.

United States, whilst difficult, meant only a simple transfer of resources and/or revenues within the existing economic structure.⁶⁷ In brief, whereas integration with Central America meant immediate adverse consequences offset by only a promise of future marginal benefits, an expansion of the relationship with the United States was certain to provide immediate benefits with a minimum disruption of the economy. Given the business ethics prevailing in Panama there was no question that continuing the links with the United States would be the preferred course of action.⁶⁸ Politics reinforced this preference. With corruption and graft an integral part of the Panamanian political process any major economic decision had political implications insofar as it reflected on the opportunities for such practices. And, on balance, it appeared that economic integration with Central America offered far less opportunity for graft and corruption than an expansion of the relationship with the United States.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, despite all these factors operating against Panamanian participation in Central American economic integration, the theme of union persisted, with /

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67. i.e. more money to Panama from the Canal Zone. Approximately one third of all Panamanian revenues derived from the Zone.
68. In Panama, both the habits of commerce - this being the major form of local capitalist enterprise - and the Latin American entrepreneur's emphasis on immediate self-interest combined to discourage development oriented economic thinking focusing on the long-term.
69. One of the most lucrative aspects of the relationship with the United States was the opportunities it presented for drug smuggling. Drugs for the Far East and the Andean countries of South America were obtained from ships passing through the Panama Canal and then were introduced into the United States via the substantial flow of United States personnel to/

with the result that Panama, on a number of different occasions, sent observers to the various conferences dealing with one or other aspect of Central American union.⁷⁰

Moreover, at some of these conferences the Panamanian presence turned into Panamanian participation, albeit at the minimum level of membership of 'common service' type organisations.⁷¹ However, such participation by its very nature and infrequency, only served to point out that for Panama it was very much the United States first and the United States foremost.⁷²

Supporting El Salvador's and Panama's differing evaluations of Central American union were strong historical tendencies. Thus, El Salvador, involved in most of the previous attempts at union, could refer to this tradition to justify policy and mobilise support for its attempts at constructing a working union of Central American states. Similarly, Panama could/

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69. (continued) to and from Panama. Thus the higher the flow of United States personnel the greater the opportunities for smuggling. Such activities were not wholly confined to professional criminal groups but frequently represented an acceptable sideline for many of Panama's élite.
70. For example, observers were sent to the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of O.D.E.C.A. the Meetings of the Central American Committee for Economic Co-operation, and the Meetings of Central American Defence Ministers.
71. It helped form the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama in 1951, the Committee of Education of Central America and Panama in 1955, and the Central American Association of Inter-Municipal Co-operation in 1958.
72. Determining to some degree, of course, the low level of involvement of Panama in the Caribbean region as a whole. See Table 1 in Part Two.

could use its long association with the United States to argue for a continuation and expansion of this relationship, and, at the same time, point out that the lessons on sovereignty drawn from this relationship justified caution in respect of participation in Central American union.

These two case studies have focussed on a rather narrow definition of the national interest by equating it to the economic interest of the respective élites of Honduras, El Salvador and Panama. In so doing it has illustrated that some foreign policy has been formulated with reference to a rational choice of alternatives in the light of received and projected goals which are, in a sense, akin to a conception of national interest. That is, it has drawn attention to the fact that Caribbean governments may enter regional politics to attain recognisable objectives through orthodox foreign policy procedures.

The Rôle of the United States 1946-1958

The distinction between the South American and the Caribbean policy of the United States government largely rests on the greater readiness, willingness and ability of the United States to intervene in the Caribbean than in/

in South America.⁷³ A study of a specific intervention in this period therefore provides an authentic example of the United States Caribbean policy. The Guatemalan Affair, as the most dramatic and comprehensive intervention in this period, provides the most appropriate study.

The Guatemalan Affair*

In the Guatemalan Affair the year 1953 was critical. At the beginning of the year concern by the United States government over the way the Guatemalan Revolution was developing had, by the end of the year, crystallised into a decision that the Arbenz government must go.⁷⁴ An examination of the major developments involving Guatemala in 1953 therefore provides an indication of what were regarded by the United States decision-makers as 'unacceptable' developments in the Caribbean region.

73. See my sub-section "The Political Interest" in the section 'The Preponderance of the United States' in Part One, cited hereafter as 'The Political Interest'.

74. It was at the end of 1953 that:

1. The C.I.A. began approaching anti-Arbenz political exiles in Central America offering them aid and the tacit support of the United States government, for any invasion or rebellion against Arbenz;

2. Speeches by leading United States officials began linking the Guatemalan Revolution with 'international Communism';

3. The United States government moved to include on the agenda of the Tenth Inter-American Conference consideration of an interventionist oriented resolution on 'The Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics'.

* The major sources from which this case study is derived are listed in the Appendix under 'Case Studies - The Guatemalan Affair'.

At the centre of Guatemalan politics in 1953 was the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1952. Previously only peripheral to the Revolution agrarian reform was chosen by Arbenz as the means to carry the Revolution into the economic sphere.⁷⁵ In so doing a confrontation with powerful United States economic interests, primarily U.F.C.O., was inevitable.⁷⁶ In February, 1953, such a confrontation took place when the Guatemalan government moved against U.F.C.O. by expropriating some 220,000 acres of its Pacific Coast lands in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law. In defence of its interests U.F.C.O. turned to the United States government where it had every expectation that its case would be heard sympathetically and aid would be offered.⁷⁷ Accepting U.F.C.O.'s arguments the United States government began to act on its behalf, but at this stage not openly. Only when it became clear that the Guatemalan government was determined to press forward with implementing the Agrarian Reform Law did the United States government publicly begin to support U.F.C.O.⁷⁸ /

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75. Under Arevalo the Revolution had been primarily 'political' in that it had established and defended freedom of political thought and expression provided that it was of a 'democratic' persuasion, but had not sought to change the economic and social base of the country.
76. At the time U.F.C.O. owned some 461,000 acres in Guatemala of which over 80 percent was uncultivated. As the agrarian reform was, if properly implemented, aimed at uncultivated lands and agricultural units above 667 acres, U.F.C.O. was bound to be affected.
77. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, was a stockholder and long-time corporation counsel for U.F.C.O.; Allan Dulles Director of the C.I.A. had been a President of U.F.C.O.; John Moore Cabot, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was a large stockholder.

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In December, 1952, the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (P.G.T.), in reality the communist party in Guatemala, was legalised. At the time very weak, it immediately set about recruiting new members and extending its rôle and influence in the government.⁷⁹ Adopting the programme approved at the party's Second Congress in December 1952, the P.G.T. began emphasising the agrarian reform question. For example, many of its members became actively involved in the National Agrarian Department, the main agency charged with implementing the Agrarian Reform Law.⁸⁰ This policy paid off in terms of membership and political influence. In just over a year the P.G.T. recruited several thousand new members. More importantly, its political influence grew, particularly with Arbenz.⁸¹

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78. In August 1953 the start of proceedings for the expropriation of a further 174,000 acres of U.F.C.O.'s land here provided the confirmation that the United States government needed, and provided, the opening for a public campaign against the Guatemalan government. Such a campaign began when John Moors Cabot in a speech on the 14th October, 1953, accused the Guatemalan government of "openly playing the Communist game".
79. In registering as a political party in December 1952 the P.G.T. claimed to have only 532 members. An estimate based on the number of delegates to the Second Congress places the figure at between 700-900.
80. Around 35 percent of the full-time employees of the National Agrarian Department were P.G.T. members.
81. In particular, Fortuny, Secretary General of the P.G.T., Gutierrez, Secretary General of the C.G.T.G. (a Communist controlled labour union of 100,000 members); and Guerra Borges, Editor of the communist newspapers, Octubre and Tribuna Popular, had frequent direct access to Arbenz. He, in his turn, often acted upon their advice.

Subject to pressures from many sides to slow down the pace of the Revolution, Arbenz began to view the P.G.T. as indispensable to his aim of preserving and furthering the Revolution. Consequently he became more and more willing to support and use the P.G.T. By the beginning of 1954 the P.G.T. were therefore clearly in a strong position but still only able to define the form of the Revolution partially, rather than to lead it.

On the 7th April, 1953, Guatemala formally withdrew from O.D.E.C.A. charging the neighbouring countries with openly supporting and aiding 'Guatemalan reactionaries' in conspiracies against the government, and engaging in a defamatory press campaign against Guatemala, by openly urging intervention in Guatemalan affairs. The other countries in O.D.E.C.A. viewed the withdrawal as an attempt by the Guatemalan government to avoid discussion of the question of communist infiltration in Central America which was on the agenda for discussion at the proposed May meeting of O.D.E.C.A.⁸² These differences of viewpoint were reflections of the strained political relations which had existed for some time between Guatemala and the other Central American states. During the remainder of 1953 these relations were to deteriorate even further as charges of subversion by Guatemala/

82. At the O.D.E.C.A. meeting of July 1953, to which Guatemala was invited to send an observer, the question of communism in Central America was discussed. Whilst the door was left open for Guatemala to re-enter O.D.E.C.A. the adoption of a firm anti-communist attitude, as set out in the Resolution of Managua, made this unlikely.

Guatemala against the other Central American states and vice versa became common.⁸³ By the end of 1953 the Guatemalan government had considered the problem serious enough to attempt to improve the national defences against both internal and external attack. Considering a new purchase of arms as basic to such an improvement, and faced with difficulties in buying arms from 'traditional' sources, i.e. the United States and Western Europe, the Guatemalan government, in January 1954, sent Major Alfonso Martinez to buy arms from Eastern Europe.⁸⁴

If these developments in Guatemala during 1953 are related to the concept of the Caribbean as a penetrated subordinate state system it is quite apparent that in effect they represented, even if unintentionally, an attempt to redefine the basis/

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83. Most of these charges were founded on a basis of fact. Guatemala was frequently accused of using its embassies to disseminate propaganda. In Panama its ambassador was declared persona non grata; in Costa Rica its ambassador was expelled; in Nicaragua its ambassador was accused of involvement in the plot to assassinate Anastasio Somoza; and a diplomat, Alfredo Chocano, was declared persona non grata by both Nicaragua and Honduras. On the other hand, other Caribbean governments were involved in actively aiding anti-Arbenz political exiles. Castillo Armas relates that he had offers of arms, base and training facilities from the Nicaraguan government; arms and substantial economic assistance from the government of the Dominican Republic; and from the government of Honduras the use of its common border with Guatemala to launch the attack into Guatemala.
84. The contention that the arms were intended primarily for uprisings in neighbouring countries is invalidated by the nature of the arms themselves, e.g. heavy cannon and anti-tank mines. These weapons were clearly meant to increase the capability of the Guatemalan army rather than to provide material for subversive movements throughout the Caribbean. Shortly after Armas took office all these weapons were sold as being virtually useless in Guatemala. See George Thayer, The War Business, pp.48-50.

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basis of the system.⁸⁵ For the Arbenz government, in endeavouring to minimise the amount of 'penetration' by the United States in both the economic and political spheres, was undermining a principal characteristic of the system and threatening to alter the structure of the system.⁸⁶ At one level, therefore, the United States government reacted to preserve the system by resorting to intervention aimed at ensuring continued 'penetration'.

At another level, however, intervention was seen as necessary to maintain the United States inter-American policy. For all these developments were also contrary to every dimension of that policy.⁸⁷ The Guatemalan government, in pressing forward with an agrarian reform which involved conflict with United States economic interests, and in allowing communist participation in government, was challenging the United States 'right' to determine the internal political structures of Latin American governments. Also, by its continued existence the Guatemalan government threatened to create serious inter-state conflict within the Caribbean region thus creating instability where the United States was particularly anxious that stability should prevail. Finally, in seeking solutions to/

85. I say 'unintentionally' as all evidence points to the fact that the Arbenz government was concerned, above all, with domestic politics. Its foreign policy was thus primarily framed to support its domestic policy rather than to influence events in the Caribbean.

86. This assumes that subordination to the United States was, in part, due to penetration.

87. This is adopting Slater's view of United States policy towards Latin America as laid out in my section 'The Political Interest'.

to its problems by co-operation with the P.G.T. and contact with Eastern Europe the Guatemalan government challenged the Monroe Doctrine which Foster Dulles, in July 1954, referred to as "the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies."⁸⁸

With the two basic reasons for strong positive action it is difficult to decide whether intervention in Guatemala was primarily to preserve the Caribbean as a penetrated subordinate system or whether it was primarily to maintain the United States inter-American policy. For example, interstate conflict in the Caribbean, by itself, had not, in the previous few years, caused the United States government to seek solutions to such conflicts by the removal of an involved government.⁸⁹ Neither, as not too dissimilar events in Bolivia at nearly the same time show, did the United States government necessarily react to expropriation and communist infiltration in a Latin American state with an 'interventionist' policy designed to replace such a government.⁹⁰ Consequently what appears decisive in determining /

88. Dulles - Radio and Television Address, June 30th 1954, in U.S. Department of State, Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala.

89. During the disputes between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for example, the United States government was anxious to maintain both involved governments. See my footnote No.16 to the case study of 'The Conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua' in my section in 'Inclusiveness'.

90. United States intervention in Bolivia was to maintain the 'Revolutionary' government of Paz Estensorro through extending economic aid. See Richard W. Patch. "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting" in Richard N. Adams et al., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1960) and Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia, (Haslemere Group Publication, 1969).

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determining United States attitudes was the fact that the Arbenz government constituted a multiple threat and challenge to inter-American policy in a region of particular significance for United States decision-makers. A successful action by the United States government would therefore entail re-affirming and re-establishing 'penetration' in the Caribbean whilst emphasising that significant, i.e. multiple, challenges to its inter-American policy would not go unheeded. Especially when they occurred in a region defined as 'vital' to United States interests. In the case of Guatemala, then, a successful action clearly predicated the removal of the Arbenz government and its replacement by one more amenable to United States influence. For the United States government 'intervention' was perceived as the only 'real' response.⁹¹

Intervention was by way of two independent, but linked, strategies. One strategy, involving the C.I.A., was essentially covert and unilateral. The other strategy, involving the O.A.S., was essentially overt and multilateral. The former strategy was emphasised, the latter was not.

In adopting and emphasising a covert unilateral strategy, the/

91. The notion of a 'real' response is here very important. The United States was, at this time, heavily involved in the politics of S.E. Asia for which it formulated, in early 1954, the 'domino theory'. Consequently, it is not too far fetched to suggest that elements of 'domino' thinking were present in the United States government's appraisal of the Guatemalan situation. Moreover, the pressing questions of S.E. Asian politics demanded a quick solution to problems 'nearer to home'.

the United States government attempted to combine two objectives. One was the greater certainty of success accompanying a unilateral action.⁹² The other was the minimisation of the effects that a unilateral action might have on the United States position within the international system.⁹³

Of these two objectives the achievement of a successful outcome was the more important. Two incidents in particular point to this fact. On June 18th, 1954, Castillo Armas and his small 'Army of Liberation' invaded Guatemala with the fact of United States participation in the invasion fairly well concealed.⁹⁴ However, when on June 22nd the invasion looked like being a failure the United States government was willing to reveal its close partisan involvement by indirectly supplying several aircraft to Armas as replacements for the two/

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92. On the whole, unilateral action has historically been more successful than multilateral action. The ability of one state to largely define the situation is, of course, a major factor in accounting for this.
93. This refers primarily to repercussions within the inter-American system and the U.N. However, in early 1954, the United States government was considering the possibility of setting up an alliance in Asia. In selling the idea to Asian states the fact of a recent unilateral intervention by the United States government might well have acted against the chances of getting such an idea accepted.
94. The Arbenz government, in its June 18th message to the President of the U.N. Security Council, could point to aggression by the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua but not by the government of the United States.

two aircraft Armas had lost early in the invasion.⁹⁵ Similarly, the flamboyant rôle of the United States Ambassador to Guatemala, John E. Peurifoy, in negotiating several changes of government in Guatemala from June 27th to July 2nd was a semi-public indication of close United States involvement.⁹⁶ Thus whilst every effort was made by the United States government to conceal its involvement in the operation - for example, by working almost exclusively through the C.I.A. - it was, nevertheless, not prepared to compromise the outcome for the sake of appearances.

The multilateral strategy adopted by the United States government had two main purposes. One was to provide a possible alternative/

95. After the 'Army of Liberation' crossed the border it penetrated only 20 miles before being contained by units of the Guatemalan army. Consequently, the only direct evidence for many 'politically active' Guatemalans that such an invasion was taking place were the raids by Armas' aircraft on Guatemalan cities. The loss of two aircraft thus represented, for Armas, a very real loss of military effectiveness and of propaganda. This was understood by Eisenhower, Allen Dulles and Foster Dulles who decided to replace the two aircraft in spite of the objections of Henry F. Holland, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, that such an action would be widely interpreted in Latin America as intervention in Guatemala's internal affairs.

96. On June 27th, Guillermo Toriello (Guatemalan Foreign Minister) visited Peurifoy and suggested the situation could be solved if a military junta, which included Arbenz, were to be formed. Peurifoy rejected this and that evening, when it became clear he had lost the support of the army, Arbenz resigned in favour of his Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Enrique Diaz. However, Diaz was unacceptable to Peurifoy, even though he was willing to outlaw the P.G.T., as he still wanted to prosecute the war against Armas. Consequently, on June 28th, Diaz was replaced by Colonel Elfege Monzon as head of a junta acceptable to Peurifoy. Talks were then arranged in San Salvador between the junta and Armas, but Armas and Monzon were unable to agree and/

alternative strategy in the event of the impossibility of developing any further an adequate unilateral strategy. The other was to ensure the success of the unilateral strategy by countering any difficulties arising from the international system as a result of unilateral action. In both cases, the key to success was the manipulation of the O.A.S.

The multilateral strategy as an alternative was pursued until the end of the Tenth Inter-American Conference in March, 1954. Prior to the Conference the United States had engaged in a propaganda campaign against Guatemala with the aim of creating a climate of opinion in the hemisphere favouring positive action, via the O.A.S. against Guatemala. At the Conference the legal basis for such action was to be provided by the adoption of the United States sponsored resolution 'Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against International Communist Intervention'. However, many difficulties surrounded the adoption of this resolution and the United States government had to agree to some/

96. (continued) and so Peurifoy flew to San Salvador to precipitate such an agreement. This was soon reached in the Pact of San Salvador on July 2nd which let Armas join the junta on the understanding that an election for chief of the junta would soon be held. Such an election was held on July 8th which Armas won and so became President.

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some concessions.⁹⁷ This had the effect of making it clear to the United States government that there would be no significant support from within the inter-American system for more meaningful direct action against Guatemala.⁹⁸ Consequently the United States government stopped developing the multilateral strategy as an alternative and instead developed it as a supporting strategy for unilateral action. Thus from April 1954 the main aim of the multilateral strategy was to ensure the success of unilateral action. This involved disguising the fact that the United States government was seeking a unilateral solution to the Guatemalan problem by keeping the problem before the O.A.S. but without stressing the need for urgent O.A.S./

97. Among the most important concessions in respect of the possibility of immediate action against Guatemala were:

1. The statement by the United States government that the purpose of the resolution was merely 'preventive' as the United States government did not, at the time, consider any existing Latin American government to be under Communist domination;

2. The amendment of a phrase in the original United States resolution. Originally, on the proof of the intervention of international communism in an American state, the United States had proposed "appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties". Under pressure from Latin American states this was amended to read "and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties". This meant that the chances of a mainly United States intervention, but under the O.A.S. banner, were much reduced.

98. The resolution was passed by a 17-1-2 vote (Guatemala against, Mexico and Argentina abstaining). But of the 17 only Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela welcomed it without any misgivings.

O.A.S. action;⁹⁹ and once the invasion was under way, using the O.A.S. to deny the Arbenz government any chance of survival through the effective involvement of the U.N. or any other actors in the international system apart from the O.A.S.¹⁰⁰

The strategies of intervention adopted by the United States government point to the desire to impose a solution in Guatemala, hence unilateral action, whilst at the same time, through the involvement of the O.A.S. to attempt to minimise the effects of such action on the inter-American system. Of these two objectives priority was given to the resolution of the situation in Guatemala. This establishes the Caribbean as the 'vital' area in the United States conception of Latin America and one to which the inter-American system of collective/

99. On May 19th Nicaragua broke diplomatic relations with Guatemala and began to sound the O.A.S. on the Guatemalan situation. However, it was not joined by the United States until early June when the arrival in Guatemala of an arms shipment from Eastern Europe had led to a shift of opinion in some Latin American states towards favouring a review of the situation in Guatemala. It was generally assumed in the O.A.S. that the United States would propose such a review, in the form of a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, at the regular meeting of the O.A.S. Council on June 16th; this was not done. On June 18th Armas invaded Guatemala. Had the United States proposed the meeting of Consultation, as was expected, the O.A.S. would have been in a far better position to take immediate action on June 19th than it proved to be.

100 The United States used the early request from the Arbenz government for action by the I-A.P.C. to argue before the U.N. Security Council, to which the Arbenz government had also appealed, that the invasion of Guatemala was already being investigated by the O.A.S. which was, in such matters, the competent regional organisation to deal with the situation. Consequently, the U.N. had no need to be involved. At the same time the United States government also delayed the calling of the O.A.S. Meeting of Consultation until July 7th although it was normal, in 'crisis' situation, for the Council of the O.A.S. to declare itself a Provisional Meeting of Consultation so that immediate action could be taken.

collective security i.e. the O.A.S. did not generally apply; particularly when, as in the case of Guatemala, United States interests were at risk.¹⁰¹

From this case study a number of points emerge which did not derive solely from the situation in Guatemala. Noticeable in other situations elsewhere in the region these points therefore form the basis of a few general observations about United States policy in the Caribbean during this period.

One of the most important is that whilst the complex interplay of United States security, economic and political interests obviously varied with each situation, the United States responded primarily to the totality of this interplay as reflected in the politics of the situation. In other words, the policy of the United States government had mainly a political base which included both economic and security factors as integral, but nevertheless subordinate.¹⁰²

With politics largely determining policy, the image that United/

101. See Anthony Maingot, "National Sovereignty, Collective Security and The Realities of Power in the Caribbean Area" in Roy Preiswerk (ed) Regionalism and the Commonwealth Caribbean. (Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1969) particularly pp.232-234.

102. This is in contrast to earlier United States policy in the region which can be seen as being in response to either economic or strategic factors. On the primacy of the economic see Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy (New York: Modern Reader Paperback, 1969). On the primacy of the strategic see J.F. Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940).

United States decision-makers had of the region assumes a special significance.¹⁰³ The most important part of this image was that which defined the Caribbean as 'vital' to United States national security for this led to an emphasis on coercive intervention as the most appropriate instrument of United States policy. For example, whereas elsewhere in Latin America an 'unacceptable' government attempting to define an independent foreign policy (e.g. in Argentina the Peron government's 'third position' until the early 1950's), or a government attempting to develop a social revolution (e.g. the Paz Estenssoro government in Bolivia from 1952 onwards) might cause concern in the United States it did not, as was the case in Guatemala, create alarm. Policy followed accordingly. For both Argentina and Bolivia the United States government projected a number of long-term policies.¹⁰⁴ But for Guatemala 'alarm' created a sense of 'urgency'. The emphasis was therefore on a quick solution and for this coercive intervention was perceived as the only 'real' response. And it also meant that intervention was more likely to be unilateral rather than multilateral.

103. The importance of images and the image of the Caribbean in the United States have been outlined in 'The Political Interest'. Two further points need to be made:

1. With the image governing United States foreign policy decision-making, rational decision-making is more difficult.

2. Variations of United States policy in the Caribbean can frequently be traced back to changes of administration, i.e. evaluation of the situation in the region varies with differing groups of decision-makers.

104. For United States policy towards Argentina, see Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina (Cambridge: Mass. Harvard University Press 1954), especially Chapters 9 and 10. For United States policy towards Bolivia, see the sources cited in footnote number 90.

Another important point is the effect of penetration. Penetration provided the effective means by which, in the normal run of events, subordination of a Caribbean state to the United States was maintained. Reliance on United States military aid and sales of surplus weapons, and the need to keep the region attractive for United States business by providing incentives, developed a 'state of mind' for decision-makers in the Caribbean states such that their controlled policy inputs into the Caribbean system tended to accord with United States interests.¹⁰⁵ Reinforcing this was the practice of all United States ambassadors in the region, some notoriously so, of involving themselves in the various policy-making processes of the state to which they were accredited.¹⁰⁶ Penetration thus provided for, and helped maintain, a system which was to some extent self-regulating and in harmony with United States interests. Consequently any extraordinary intervention by the United States/

105. The security and economic interests of the United States as constraints on Caribbean decision-makers has been outlined in my section 'The Preponderance of the United States' in 'Part One'.

106. In a remark to a United States Senate Subcommittee, Earl E.T. Smith, who was United States Ambassador to Cuba from June 1957 to January 1959, summed up this state of affairs for Cuba as one where "the American Ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the (Cuban) President", cited in Herbert L. Matthews, Castro: A Political Biography (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969), p.44. Frequently such influence was gained by establishing close personal relations with the president of the state, for example, the friendship between A. Somoza of Nicaragua and United States Ambassador Thomas Whelan in the early 1950's.

States government, for example, by using demonstrations of force or subversion, was either to offset a possible breakdown in the system or to restore the system to normal once breakdown had occurred. The most 'concrete' evidence of United States involvement in the system in this period was thus linked to 'crises' in the system.¹⁰⁷ The most frequent 'crises' were the sporadic developments of inter-state conflicts, in all of which the United States government was involved to effect a settlement, usually via the O.A.S.¹⁰⁸ Intervention by the United States therefore became linked with preserving the status quo.

The final point is the continuity of United States policy in the Caribbean.¹⁰⁹ The definition of what constitutes 'vital' may change with time and with various United States administrations/

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107. Hence the designation of the area as unstable. However, my conclusions to Part Two suggest that there are many elements of stability in the system.
108. Between 1948 and the end of 1953 the O.A.S. mediated nine interstate disputes in the Caribbean. In the mediation of each dispute the United States government was intimately involved, generally as a member of the Investigating Committee appointed by the O.A.S. Council meeting as the provisional Organ of Consultation. This presence on the Investigating Committee enabled the United States to influence the situation as regards determining who was to blame and what possible action might be taken. It should be noted that in none of these early cases was United States interests directly involved to any large degree.
109. This often stems from perceiving the region as essentially unchanged thereby encouraging the re-application of previously successful strategies. An example of a perception of the region as unchanged is provided by Dana G. Munro, a scholar and a former State Department official much concerned with the Caribbean, who begins his detailed historical study of the region by stating "The problems that confronted the United States in the Caribbean in the first two decades of the/

administrations but the concept of the region as 'vital' does not. Similarly, the range of policy options available to the United States government may vary with the situation but ultimately all options are variations of the basic policy of unilateral intervention.

Some Conclusions on International Politics in the Caribbean 1946-1958

From the analysis and description in the four preceding sections it is possible to identify two themes around which can be grouped many, but not all, of the points raised as significant for international politics in the Caribbean during this period. One theme is the political basis of much of the regional interaction. The other is the prevalence within regional interaction of extra-regional factors.

The Political Basis of Regional Interaction

A major factor accounting for the political basis of regional/

109. (continued) the twentieth century were much like the problems that confront us there today". See his Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p.vii.

regional interaction is a negative one in the sense that political interaction becomes dominant because of the absence of other major forms of interaction. For example, two of the most common forms of international interaction with political implications are trade and alliances, yet both can be shown as having little effect on Caribbean regional politics. In the case of trade this insignificance stems, quite simply, from the low level of intra-regional trade which is, in itself, a reflection of the similar underdevelopment of all Caribbean states. In the case of alliances it is a little more complex being based on the smallness and equality of capability of states in the region as it relates to the preponderance of the United States. This has led to a situation where a single state cannot impose its will upon another single state by conventional means and where, also, the existence of a state as an entity is externally guaranteed. Thus, whilst there have been the possibilities for alliances there has, in reality, been no need of them except for the brief purpose of maintaining a particular governing élite in power.

Political interaction as dominant, however, rests on grounds other than just the negative one. It is, more properly, a reflection of positive politics at the political sub-system level. Positive politics here refers to a concept of politics common throughout the Caribbean during this period: that politics was largely an end in itself which revolved around the goal of the attainment and retention of the executive decision-making power of the state./

state. In both philosophy and practice such politics was, in many ways, analogous to the politics of Renaissance Italy.¹¹⁰ So that in the Caribbean, as in Renaissance Italy, such factors as political illegitimacy, personal rule and the involvement of quasi-independent itinerant actors deeply influenced the nature of international politics. For example, political illegitimacy led to a circular and self-sustaining political interaction in that the governing élite were frequently illegitimate or branded as such, and so perceived themselves, or were in fact directly challenged from both the domestic and regional environment, principally by other office-seeking élites using extra legal means. In these circumstances governing élites felt that such challenges could only be met by similar political means. Regional interaction thus became intimately linked with the question of domestic political power. Personalism further reinforced a pattern of political interaction by providing a basis for differentiation of policies on grounds other than ideology and, as such, created the possibility of cooperation and conflict between states on purely idiosyncratic grounds. Finally, the involvement of quasi-independent itinerant actors in regional politics provided a multiplicity of sources, means and ends of interaction which, insofar as all were commonly linked by conscious participation in/

110. For the operation of the international system in Renaissance Italy, see K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1967), pp.50-59, and Winifred Franke "The Italian City-State System as an International System" in Kaplan (ed) New Approaches to International Relations (New York: St. Martins Press, 1968).

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in politics, generated, by the complexity of defining their political relationship to each other, a high level of political interaction.

What is, therefore, being suggested by the theme of the political basis of regional interaction is a tendency towards politics assuming significance as the primary determinant of regional interaction.¹¹¹ This being due, in the main, to the structure of the system in a negative sense, and the nature of the political units in the system in a positive sense.

Extra Regional Factors in Regional Interaction

The prevalence within regional interaction of extra-regional factors refers, principally, to the effect of the intrusion of the United States and the O.A.S. into the Caribbean 'system' i.e. to the fact that the conduct of regional foreign policy by Caribbean decision-makers has been externally conditioned and modified.

External conditioning was based on a perception by the Caribbean /

111. This statement is not to deny the importance of economic, strategic, and geographic factors as political determinants but to put them in a perspective. For, as has already been shown, economic interests can create regional co-operation and conflict, and geography is of value in predicting regional interaction. What is therefore meant is that the secondary rôle of such criteria stems from a situation where although they are necessary in forming a political evaluation their major effect is to act upon interaction once it has occurred rather than to be the direct source of such interaction in the first place.

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Caribbean decision-makers that their range of options was limited to those meeting the approval of the United States. Such approval was to be gained by adherence to a recognised formula the sum of which was the creation of a political environment reflecting multiple United States interests.¹¹² To achieve this political environment Caribbean decision-makers frequently co-operated with the United States seeing in this their only guarantee of office. Hence virtually every input into the Caribbean system carried with it a prior assessment of the United States response. What was created was a form of internal regulation of the region in accordance to the United States definition of what the region should be. Most evidence indicates that the United States relied quite heavily on this self-regulating process and that it firmly supported individuals and élites who proved themselves capable of operating it effectively.

As a second line of defence, that is following a breakdown of internal regulation rather than preceding it, the United States practised external modification. This was the alteration of an input into the Caribbean system by either the United States or the O.A.S. so that the input would conform either to the United States and/or to the O.A.S. practice./

112. The significant factors in the formula were:

1. the promotion of orthodox financial policies to maintain capitalism as the economic system,
2. uncritical support of the United States in the Cold War as evidenced by vigorous opposition to 'socialist' oriented movements at home and close association with the United States at the U.N. and in the O.A.S.
3. the imperative of United States national security in a vital region for which the maintenance of a degree of stability in regional inter-state relations was seen as essential.

practice. In the case of the United States modification was either unilateral or multilateral this being dependent upon the United States perception of the situation. Thus multilateral action through the medium of the O.A.S. was considered as the appropriate response to minor transgressions of the formula and unilateral action aiming at replacing the transgressor government and restoring penetration was reserved for a total transgression of the formula. What is important to note here is that such a policy was retroactive and conservative, i.e. was intervention after the event to restore equilibrium, usually to the status quo ante. A similar approach was adopted by the O.A.S. Thus, O.A.S. actions in respect of modification of inputs generally extended no further than seeking the immediate containment of a conflict between states by means of recognised and regularised processes developed within the existing framework of inter-American law.

Finally, it is clear that the effects of intrusion were not all one way. To a limited extent Caribbean decision-makers were able to use the fact of intrusion as a means of achieving ends. Thus, a Caribbean decision-maker under attack from powerful domestic sources could seek and gain United States assistance to stay in office by convincing the United States that his relationship to the formula was more favourable than his opponent's. This tactic could also be extended to the regional system in order to secure support for or against opposition groups or governments. And could be developed in respect of the O.A.S. where the regularised pattern of dealing/

dealing with international disputes in the region could be effectively utilised to aid a foreign policy end.

The Traditional Pattern

The conjunction of these two themes into a distinctive pattern of politics is, of course, specific to the period covered by this particular section. Nevertheless, aspects of both themes have historical antecedents dating at least from the beginning of the Twentieth Century.¹¹³ It is, therefore, not incorrect to refer to this pattern of interaction as the Traditional Pattern; especially as it draws attention to the particular historical factors which have generated this pattern and, at the same time, distinguishes it from the pattern of interaction developed in the region from the beginning of 1959.

113. See J. Lloyd Meacham The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 pp.171-179, 389-391 and Thomas L. Karnes The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp.183-242.

C. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
CARIBBEAN 1959-1966

The pattern of international politics in the Caribbean from 1959-1966 saw both persistence and change. Persistence was evident in the continuation of the 'traditional pattern' and is at its most obvious in two situations which had regional repercussions - United States-Cuban relations 1959-1961, and the Haiti-Dominican Republic disputes of 1963. For this reason both situations are examined by case studies, but only briefly, as the major function of the section is to consider the reasons behind, and the nature of, change. To do so is to focus on three factors: the effect of Cuba; the series of switches in the Caribbean policy of the United States; and the involvement of new actors in the system.

The effect of Cuba has clearly been dramatic, but at the same time its impact on the Caribbean has been cushioned and absorbed in such a variety of ways that its overall effect on the region is not easily isolated or assessed. Certainly, as I have already shown in Part Two, Cuba cannot be considered as the sole reason for changes after 1959 in the patterns of political interaction between states. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the Caribbean states have reacted to the Cuban Revolution, and can be distinguished from the majority of/

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of South American states by the vigour of their reaction.¹ Yet, in the final analysis, it is difficult to avoid concluding that, at least as far as the international politics of the Caribbean states is concerned, the real initiatives for dealing with Cuban Revolution have been left to the United States.² Any attempt to assess the impact of Cuba on the international politics of the Caribbean states without reference to the United States is thus virtually impossible, for, in reality, United States policy towards Cuba and that of the Caribbean states have become almost inseparable. This is not to say that the United States and the Caribbean states have always been in agreement as to policy towards Cuba but it is to recognise that differences have been marginal, generally over emphasis, and have been resolved most often in favour of the United States.³ Such a subordinate/

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1. i.e. by favouring repression at home and some form of intervention against Cuba within the O.A.S. See Kalman H. Silver's "A Hemispheric Perspective" in John Plank (ed) Cuba and the United States: Long Range Perspectives (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution 1967); Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited 1965), pp.305-322; and Playa Giron: Derrota del Imperialismo. Segundo Tomo. Reaccion Internacional. (La Habana: Ediciones Revolucion, 1962), pp.57-132.
 2. The national/international distinction is here crucial. All evidence suggests that it is the effects of Cuba within the domestic political process of each Caribbean state that have attracted the attention of Caribbean decision-makers. This has occasioned some degree of co-operation among Caribbean states, e.g. C.A.D.C. in Central America, but basically the problem has been tackled unilaterally and/or with United States assistance.
 3. For example, at the Eighth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the O.A.S. the Caribbean states were threatening to withdraw from the O.A.S. if Cuba was not expelled. Their concern at this time is, perhaps, best/

subordinate rôle accepted by the Caribbean states, as well as the total yet diffuse impact Cuba has had on the region, indicate that it is best not to consider Cuba separately but rather to consider it as it has affected specific situations in which Cuba was not necessarily a leading actor. Consequently, references to Cuba are to be found throughout the section and, in particular, in the studies of the United States rôle in the region.

As before, an adequate treatment of the United States rôle requires both a specific case study and a brief comment on the United States position in any particular issue or development; with, this time, a fuller treatment of the United States rôle, to account for the greater complexity of United States policy in this period. A focus on the United States rôle in the Dominican Republic as the case study is especially relevant since it illustrates this complexity in that not only were a variety of United States policies applied but also the relationship of these policies in respect of overall United States-Latin American relations, and the question of Cuba, can be examined from a single reference point - that of United States intervention in the Dominican polity. Particular areas of focus will be on the long-term approach/

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3. (continued) best shown by the fact that Panama, peripheral to regional interaction as I have already shown, was among the leading advocates of this course of action. Indeed, in January 1962, i.e. just prior to the Eighth Meeting, Panama's Finance Minister, Gilberto Arias, had proposed the creation of a common front against Cuba to include Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Honduras, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Panama. See Sheldon B. Liss, The Canal: Aspects of United States-Panamanian Relations (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), Chapter 5 and pp.105-106 in particular.

approach of the United States to the Caribbean; the short-term regulation of international politics in the region by a mix of multilateral and unilateral military intervention.

The involvement of new actors in the system refers specifically to the functioning of the C.A.C.M. as a sub-regional actor and the entry into the region of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as two new independent state actors. The case study of the C.A.C.M. traces the changes in international relations between the member states which are attributable to the development of the C.A.C.M.; and the study of Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago focuses on the regional aspect of their foreign policies.

The Persistence of the Traditional Pattern

The 'traditional pattern' has been analysed by reference to two major themes. The following case studies, of the dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1963, and of the United States-Cuban relations 1959-1961, are brief illustrations of both themes but with an emphasis given to the theme of 'the political basis of regional interaction' in the former study and to the theme of 'the prevalence within regional interaction of extra-regional factors' in the latter.

The Haiti-Dominican Republic Dispute, 1963

The dispute was, in essence, two crises separated by a period of tension. The first crisis ran from the 27th April to the 15th May and the second from the 5th August to the 25th September.

The immediate origin of the first crisis was the violation of the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince by members of the Haitian Public Force: yet as the crisis developed other factors became apparent, and, in the end, the crisis could be seen as one largely engineered by Juan Bosch, President of the Dominican Republic, for a number of specifically political ends. Chief among these were the immediate overthrow of President Duvalier of Haiti for personal and ideological reasons and the retention of presidential power within the Dominican Republic. To accomplish both ends Bosch needed the prompt and committed support of the O.A.S. and the United States. Such ends and actions clearly fit the 'traditional pattern'. For example, idiosyncratic factors were to the fore in Bosch's belief that Duvalier's desire to kill him had supernatural rather than political origins.⁴ Questions of political illegitimacy were involved in Bosch's decision to/

4. Bosch's character has been the subject of much unfavourable comment from North Americans in the Kennedy Administration who had come into contact with him. Variousy described as 'mercurial', 'a paranoid schizophrenic' and 'better as a short story writer than as a statesman'. It is quite clear that if their assessment is correct, that Bosch could easily imagine the most malignant intentions from Duvalier, a man whose incredible actions were more in tune with the Rome of Suetonius than with the 20th Century. (The comment on Duvalier is an observation by Graham Greene in his introduction to Diederich and Burt, Papa Doc, pp.vii-viii).

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to involve the O.A.S. and the United States.⁵ This approach also conformed to the recognised practice of increasing the possibility of a successful outcome by the temporary involvement of other interested actors.⁶ Finally, the influence in politics of quasi-independent actors was evident in Bosch's attempt to preserve his fragile domestic power base in the face of the hostility of the Dominican military.⁷

The second crisis, though not of Bosch's doing directly led to his downfall in a coup d'état on the 25th September. Behind both events as the major actor was the Dominican military; and precipitating these actions was their existence as a group with specific privileges. That is, they actively supported the two invasion attempts into Haiti by a/

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5. The actions by the O.A.S. in support of representative democracy against the Trujillo dictatorship, plus a recent verbal approval for collective action to establish representative democracy in Latin America by United States Assistant Secretary of State, Edward Martin, appeared to Bosch to give him, through his position as a democratically elected president, great advantage over Duvalier who, in 1961, had declared himself re-elected by acclamation for a further six years.
 6. The most important 'other interested actor' was the United States. Indeed, the development of the crisis by Bosch was largely determined by his expectations of support from the United States State Department which, at this time, was attempting through a variety of means to replace Duvalier. Throughout the crisis Bosch and the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, J.B. Martin, were in frequent contact.
 7. The Dominican military were able to effectively de-escalate the confrontation with Haiti by reporting to Bosch that because their trucks were in no condition to transport troops no advance into Haiti could be contemplated. This action was reinforced by the circulation/

a group of Haitian exiles led by Cantave for the same political and pecuniary reasons as they planned the coup. Thus the political end of supporting Cantave was not the overthrow of Duvalier but the overthrow of Bosch, a purpose which was seen as necessarily requiring a further confrontation with Haiti.⁸ And the pecuniary reason for supporting Cantave were the immediate benefits from providing training and weapons to Haitian exiles, and the long term gains associated with the retention of the 'system' for graft.⁹ The last point, in particular, appears to have been among the immediate causes of the coup in that Bosch had, but a few days previously, refused the military permission to proceed with the negotiation for the purchase of \$ six million worth of aircraft from Britain - a contract promising over \$ one million in commission for the Dominican Military. /

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7. (continued) circulation among Dominican army officers of a report prepared by the United States military mission in Haiti which detailed the difficulties facing a Dominican invasion of Haiti. Thus the United States was able to use the power of the Dominican military to restrain Bosch from ordering an invasion of Haiti.
 8. In view of the public statements by Bosch a renewed confrontation with Haiti would be extremely embarrassing for him, not only in the Dominican Republic, but also in his relations with the O.A.S. and the United States. Renewed confrontation would therefore provide an excuse for the coup as well as an effective cover for preparations for the coup.
 9. Immediate benefits were payments to Colonel Garrido of the Dominican Army of some \$400 a week in respect of training facilities, plus the expected lucrative business of arms sales to and from the Cantave group. Long-term benefits were the retention of the practice of commissions - generally around 10 percent - on purchases of military supplies.

Military. Also significant is that once the military had secured their immediate and long-term position by replacing Bosch with a government representing a conservative coalition of interests, a gesture of goodwill towards Duvalier was made in first disarming and then dispersing Cantave's group. Thus central to this conflict and indicative of the 'traditional pattern' were such factors as 'inclusiveness', i.e. the rôle of the Dominican military as conscious initiators of foreign policy, and 'subversive intervention', i.e. the rôle of Cantave's exile group in internal Dominican politics.

United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-1961

The majority of commentators on the Bay of Pigs has recognised similarities between it and the Guatemalan Affair. A comparative approach to both establishes the following parallels:

1. The early policies of the Castro government reflected those of the Arbenz government.¹⁰
2. The key men in the United States responsible for defining the situation as requiring intervention - President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles - were also key /

10. The Castro government (a) enacted and set in motion a far-reaching Agrarian Reform Law, (b) legalised the Communist Party and allowed its advancement within the polity and (c) became the source and focus of regional conflict insofar as it was both the recipient and creator of a large number of political exiles bent on intervention.

key men in the Guatemalan Affair.¹¹

3. The development of intervention by way of two independent but linked strategies echoed the approach to intervention in Guatemala.¹²
4. The plans for the invasion of Cuba were clearly based on repeating the formula for the invasion of Guatemala.¹³

On the whole, then, it is fair to conclude that the Bay of Pigs dramatically demonstrated the continuity of United States policy in the Caribbean. That is, in the face of certain types of development - specifically a government which constituted a multiple threat and challenge to inter-American policy in a region of particular significance for United States government decision-makers - the United States response was intervention - its aim being to restore penetration and reaffirm inter-American policy by replacing the Castro government with one more amenable to United States influence.

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11. A pattern reflected further down in the policy process in that Whiting Willauer, who as United States Ambassador to Costa Rica in 1954 had acted as regional co-ordinator of the Guatemalan Affair, was asked at the end of 1960 to constructively criticise the C.I.A. plans for the invasion of Cuba. Not surprisingly he approved them and recommended they go ahead.
 12. That is by simultaneously developing (a) a preferred overt multilateral strategy involving the O.A.S. at the highest level and (b) a covert unilateral strategy involving the C.I.A. to be used in the event of the failure of the multilateral strategy.
 13. The plan being to employ pro-United States anti-Castro Cuban exiles to use military means to force a bridgehead on Cuba into which an 'alternative' Cuban government could be flown to make an appeal for support, especially from the United States.

Other episodes of United States - Cuban Relations 1959-61 also demonstrates the continuity of United States policy. For example, among the most important points made in respect of the 'traditional pattern' was the United States reliance on self-regulation. In Cuba this system had already broken down for not only had Castro come to power without the assistance of the United States, but also, once in power, his character; the leadership of the 26th July Movement and the social structure in Cuba interacted to preclude policies other than towards development and against any form of self-regulation.¹⁴ Yet, in the face of this new situation the United States government did not respond with a new diplomacy but merely put forward the old. That is, through its ambassador, Philip W. Bonsal, it reiterated United States interests in Cuba in an attempt to persuade Castro to accommodate himself to these interests.¹⁵ And the State Department 'transmitted' a number of 'signals' varying in strength from minor non co-operation, through a variety of diplomatic/

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14. Frequently underestimated is the fact that forces stemming from the prerevolutionary social structures were such as to exert, in terms of constraints and options given to the revolutionary leadership, powerful pressures towards initiating a thorough social, economic and political revolution. On this point, see, in particular, Maurice Zeitlin "Cuba - Revolution without a Blueprint" in Irving Louis Horowitz (ed) Cuban Communism (United States: Aldine Publishing Company 1970).
15. Bonsal notes that during his meetings with Castro early in 1959 he stressed "the actual and potential value of the American investment" as a result of being aware of certain radical proposals being put to Castro. See his "Cuba, Castro and the United States" Foreign Affairs, Vol.45., No.2., 1967, p.268.

diplomatic gestures, to embargo, to reinforce Bonsal in his attempts to secure such an accommodation.¹⁶ Previously very effective in terms of persuading Caribbean decision-makers to change policies this approach did not work with Castro.¹⁷ Rather, the opposite occurred in that he became less accessible to United States reasoning and more determined in his policies. Eventually, with the failure of several more attempts at mediation in early 1960, the situation between Cuba and the United States became one in which the United States saw a form of extreme modification as the only solution.¹⁹

Policies in pursuit of this end were again modelled on the 'traditional/

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16. Minor non co-operation refers to such moves as refusing to return Cuban war criminals for trial in Cuba. Diplomatic gestures to such moves as delaying for up to three weeks the departure of Bonsal to take up his post in Cuba and recalling him for three weeks after his meeting with Castro on the 5th September, 1959. Embargo to such moves as extending the operation of the arms ban, originally developed against the Batista government, to apply to the Castro government as well.
 17. However, the approach did have an effect on members of Castro's government. The day after the United States government delivered an official note of protest on the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law, five Cabinet Ministers resigned, among them were Roberto Agramonte, Minister of State, Homberto Sorí Marin, Minister of Agriculture, and Louis Orlando Rodríguez, Minister of the Interior.
 18. After the delivery of the United States note on the Agrarian Reform Law, 11th June 1959, Bonsal had to wait until the 5th September to see Castro although he had requested to see him some six weeks before. During this period Castro manoeuvred to replace various government ministers and officials who were not fully committed to his policies, the most significant being Castro's success in forcing President Urrutia to resign on the 18th July, 1959.
 19. The United States attempted to mediate the dispute in January/

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'traditional pattern'. Modification followed the established practice of the development of interlinked twin strategies of unilateral and multilateral involvement, with the former directly leading to the Bay of Pigs and the latter to the various efforts of the United States to secure hemispheric co-operation via the O.A.S.²⁰ The multilateral efforts met with little success even though the United States government reversed a number of previous policies towards Latin America.²¹ Indeed, so unsuccessful were the United State's government's attempts to build goodwill in Latin America, or to promote an effective propaganda campaign against Cuba, that at the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the O.A.S. it was forced to abandon any conception of a firm line on Cuba and accept, instead, the Declaration of San José which carried, at best, only a limited /

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19. (continued) January 1960, through Dr. Julio Amoedo, Argentinian Ambassador to Cuba, and in March 1960, through Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Castro's Finance Minister. In February 1960 a Cuban attempt to mediate, through the good offices of Brazil, was rejected by the United States government.
 20. The multilateral strategy began with President Eisenhower's trip to Latin America in late February and early March 1960. On his return he initiated the unilateral strategy when on March 17th, the C.I.A. were ordered to begin training Cuban exiles.
 21. Moving, for example, from support of Trujillo to opposition to Trujillo and reversing, in order to do so, its position on non-intervention in the hemisphere. Contrast the speech of Herter at the Quinta Reunion de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, Actas y Documentos O.E.A./Ser.F/iii5 (español) 2nd Plenary Session Doc.36 with his speech a year later at the Sexta Reunion de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, Actas y Documentos O.E.A./ser.F/iii.6 (español) 2nd Session of the General Committee, Doc. 22.

limited and oblique condemnation of Cuba.²² Such an unequivocal rejection of United States moves signalled the go ahead for unilateral action which, as in the previous case with Guatemala, was developed covertly and pursued resolutely, especially in the closing days of the Eisenhower Administration.²³ A similar militancy, if slightly less insistent, was also the mark of the new Kennedy Administration.²⁴

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22. Even this was too much for Mexico which insisted on adding to the official record the view of its delegation that the Declaration was not in any way directed at Cuba. The Guatemalan delegation, however, felt the opposite and insisted on adding to the official record its view that stronger action against Cuba would have been warranted.
 23. Following an abortive army coup d'etat against Ydigoras in Guatemala 15th-17th November, 1960, Eisenhower, who had already decided he would support Ydigoras if necessary by moving in "without delay", sent naval units to patrol the Caribbean coast to ensure the survival of the Ydigoras government and so the training base for Cuban exiles. The reformist and mildly pro-Cuban military government in El Salvador, brought in by a coup d'etat on the 26th October, 1960, plus unrest in Nicaragua, provided a further impetus to such moves.
 24. Of those who had knowledge of the plan within the Kennedy Administration, only Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Bowles, opposed it.

The Role of the United States 1959-1966

The policy of the United States in the Caribbean during this period has been, above all, a response to developments in Cuba. Nowhere is this more apparent than in United States attitudes towards the Dominican Republic from 1960 onwards where concern with preventing another Cuba has resulted in massive United States intervention into every aspect of Dominican life.²⁵ Paralleled to a lesser degree in all other states of the Caribbean except, of course, Cuba after 1961, what was new in the Dominican intervention was not the fact of United States intervention but the aims, style and degree of intervention. For example, whilst previous interventions, as in Guatemala, 1954, were in favour of the status quo and by traditional means, the intervention in the Dominican Republic, at least initially, (1960-1963) was by novel means and in favour of limited changes. Another distinction is that whilst intervention in Guatemala was relatively simple, brief, limited and successful, in the Dominican Republic it was complex, long, extensive and, arguably, unsuccessful. The effect of Cuba has therefore been/

25. Howard J. Wiarda, in a recent book on the Dominican Republic, has pointed out that United States intervention has been so significant that "the question must be raised of just how extensive Dominican sovereignty over its own affairs is. At times, it is difficult to determine whether the U.S. Embassy or Dominican officials are actually formulating the policies and making the decisions". See his The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition. (London: Pall Mall Press 1969) p.213.

been not to change the basis of United States policy, but only its tone.²⁶

Further support for the essentially unchanged basis of United States policies in the Caribbean is apparent if the effects of innovations introduced into the United States - Latin American Policy by the second Eisenhower Administration and taken up and expanded by the Kennedy Administration, are considered. Overall, the major thrust of such innovations has been towards an increased commitment of United States resources to Latin America which has, in its turn, led to further involvement by the United States in Latin American politics.²⁷ This trend has been transmitted into the Caribbean by way of the integration of the United States Caribbean policy into the general posture of United States Latin American policy, but, because of the already high degree of United States penetration into Caribbean politics, its effect has been muted. That is, the innovations have enlarged/

26. The most unequivocal statement supporting this comes from John N. Plank, a former State Department official, who intimates that future overt large scale United States interventions may be necessary in Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala and Panama. See his "The Caribbean: Intervention, When and How", Foreign Affairs, Vol.44., No.1., 1965.

27. The extent to which any Latin American polity has become further penetrated by the United States is obviously dependent on the specific characteristics of each polity. It is, however, important to recognise that the general characteristics of all Latin American politics, irrespective of levels of economic development, are such as to make them particularly responsive to external factors. The indications are that the United States innovations, by their very nature, have served to increase such responsiveness particularly as it relates to representatives of United States Embassies and the United States/

enlarged rather than revised previous United States policy. In only one instance, that modification now preceded rather than followed any breakdown of the system, can any real reversal of United States policy be detected, and this stemmed, of course, primarily from the particular problems facing the United States Caribbean policy by the continuation of the Cuban Revolution as a potentially destabilising factor in the region and not from the general posture of United States Latin American policy. Again, certain United States policies in the Dominican Republic during this period provide a particularly good example of the relatively minor changes United States innovations brought about, as well as pointing out that enlargement of penetration created confusion and contradiction among particular United States strategies.

During this period, United States policy was directed by three different administrations. The confusions and contradictions of United States policy in the Caribbean arising from the scale of penetration were thus further exaggerated by the different use each president made of the governmental decision-making structure and by the different perceptions of each president and his advisers as to what was happening in/

27. (continued) States supported international agencies. See Douglas A. Chalmers "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics"; Teresa Hayter Aid as Imperialism; and R. Harrison Wagner United States Policy Toward Latin America, (Stanford: University Press 1970), Chapter 8, particularly p.203.

in the region. For example, characteristics of the Kennedy Administration's Caribbean policy - innovation and urgency, and characteristics of the Johnson Administration's Caribbean policy - "inelastic insistence", can, in some measure, be attributed to the shift of the centre of policy-making for Latin America from the White House to the State Department.²⁸ Other internal United States factors such as the enormous lobby on Cuba also exerted a constant influence on United States policy formation. Thus, as in the previous period, the political basis of United States policy tended to be emphasised although, unlike before, the direct intrusion of the Cold War into the region served to exaggerate the importance of the security factor. Especially from 1964 onwards this led to the political and military dimensions of United States Latin American policy being stressed relative to the economic and social dimensions. The military intervention of the United States into the Dominican Republic in 1965 demonstrates this most clearly.

A case study of United States policy to the Dominican Republic can, obviously, provide only a partial picture of United States policy in this period. Many factors other than/

28. That is, different actors perception of the Caribbean situation and how to respond to it were brought into play. Under Kennedy, United States Latin American policy was generally directed from the White House, particularly by Goodwin and Schlesinger, whereas under Johnson, his Special Assistant on Latin American Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann, favoured a conservative approach and greater reliance on the State Department. See John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, pp.262-263, 279-280, 414.

than the Cuban Revolution precipitated changes in United States policy to Latin America.²⁹ Also there is evidence that United States policy in the Caribbean recognised, to some extent, the distinctiveness of each state in the region.³⁰ Nevertheless, such a study does illustrate the major aspects of United States policy in the Caribbean during this period in all its diversity and does focus on what the United States government unquestionably regarded as one of the 'key' states in the region.

United States - Dominican Republic Relations 1959-1966

At the end of 1958 relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic were cool but not strained. During 1959 no improvement took place despite the emergence of the Dominican Republic as the Caribbean government most bitterly denouncing Castro and events in Cuba. Then, from the beginning of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration launched a strategy aimed at inducing changes in the Dominican/

29. Among the most important were:-

1. the poor economic performance of Latin American states between 1955-1960 which, when coupled with a developing interest by the Soviet Union in the area, served to put the United States at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

2. In 1958 - the attacks on Nixon in Caracas; the proposals of Kubitschek for an Operation Pan America; the report of Milton Eisenhower after a visit to Central America, all of which pointed to widespread discontent in Latin America and the need of social reforms to alleviate it. See Robert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere: Perspectives on United States-Latin American Relations, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967); R. Harrison Wagner United States Policy Toward Latin America.

30. What is meant by this is that within the general posture of United States policy in the Caribbean a degree/

Dominican polity. The first move was a three hour meeting with Trujillo by Senator George Smathers and special asiss-
tant to State and Defense, William Pawley, in which Trujillo
was pressed to resign and permit free elections in order to
facilitate a smooth transition to democracy.³¹ Trujillo's
refusal was followed by the State Department's announcement
at the end of February that from June military aid to the
Dominican Republic would cease. And by the Secretary of
State, Christian Herter's clear reference in March to
Trujillo as a dictator.³² Trujillo's reply to these moves
was a counter aimed at asserting maximum pressure on the
Administration to relax its militant policy towards him.
Relying on a carefully built Congressional base to exert
direct pressure in Washington, informal agreements were
sought with Cuba and Eastern Europe as a means of exerting
indirect pressure.³³ These moves, however, came to nothing,
and the United States continued its policy of steadily
increasing /

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30. (continued) degree of flexibility was apparent at the operational level of policy within each state, i.e. the 'means' were not wholly directed by the 'ends'.
31. Pawley and Smathers were old friends of Trujillo. The decision to send them as negotiators plus the nature of their mission, was therefore a clear indicator to Trujillo that times had changed.
32. In this speech Herter also referred to Nicaragua and Paraguay as dictatorships. Later, however, a clarification was issued in which it was stressed that Nicaragua was making progress towards democracy. The trend of United States policy in the Caribbean was thus made fairly explicit.
33. Given the visit of Mikoyan to Cuba in February in which an agreement was signed whereby the Soviet Union would lend \$100 million to Cuba and buy five million tons of Cuban sugar from 1960-1964, the counter adopted by Trujillo was, at the time, among the strongest which could have been made.

increasing pressures. To this end the United States ambassador, Joseph S. Farland was instructed to make contact with the growing Dominican 'underground',. Finally, Farland left the Dominican Republic in May - an unequivocal demonstration of withdrawal of United States support.³⁴

By this time other United States moves for action against the Dominican Republic and Cuba had met with success. Two reports of the Inter-American Peace Committee, by revising the non-intervention principle as inapplicable in certain circumstances, had prepared the way for the possibility of effective multilateral action.³⁵ The opportunity for such action was then presented with the failure of the Dominican directed assassination attempt on Betancourt and the subsequent call by the Venezuelan government for O.A.S. action against Dominican "intervention and aggression". The United States, previously supporting Venezuela in its dispute with the Dominican Republic, now actively ranged itself behind Venezuela to ensure that the O.A.S. investigation of the assassination attempt would lead to concrete O.A.S. action. /

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34. Farland had been recalled in March and was recalled again on May 6th. He returned on May 22nd but was made unwelcome. In June he was appointed Ambassador to Panama.
35. In the Special Report on the Relationship between Violations of Human Rights or the Non-Exercise of Representative Democracy and the Political Tensions that affect the Peace of the Hemisphere and Report to the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (on the violation of human rights in the Dominican Republic and tensions in the Caribbean). This latter report was vociferously denounced by the Dominican Republic. See Here is our Answer (Ciudad Trujillo, 1960).

action. When the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the O.A.S. met in August, however, differences between the United States and Venezuela emerged. Whereas Venezuela requested the immediate imposition of sanctions the United States attitude was that sanctions should only be applied following the failure of a prior attempt at modifying the Dominican polity in the direction of representative democracy. As Slater has pointed out, behind this United States attitude were the experiences of the Cuban Revolution.

"Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to _____", was the implicit assumption, and Washington wanted to insure it could help fill in the blank".³⁶

The United States proposals, however, were rejected as too interventionist, whereupon the United States then backed the Venezuelan proposals which were passed unanimously and required all O.A.S. member states to partially interrupt economic relations and to suspend diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic.³⁷ If not exactly the O.A.S. decision the United States wanted, it was, nevertheless, fully exploited by the Eisenhower Administration to further its Dominican policy. Thus it was cited as the reason behind the executive decision of imposing a fee of two cents/

36. Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p.7.

37. As has been frequently observed, Herter's proposals were developed with as much an eye to future action against Cuba as present action against the Dominican Republic. Their rejection was thus, to some extent, a reflection of the sympathetic support the Cuban Revolution enjoyed in Latin America, especially among the larger states.

cents per pound on Dominican sugar - a move which effectively neutralised Trujillo's base of support in Congress.³⁸ And then, in December, was developed when, against much opposition in the O.A.S., the United States, argued for the necessity of further sanctions, this time on oil and oil products, trucks and spare parts.³⁹

The mix of multilateral and unilateral pressures developed by the Eisenhower Administration were continued by the Kennedy Administration during 1961.⁴⁰ Robert Murphy, a State Department 'trouble shooter', was sent to the Dominican Republic in mid-April in a new attempt to persuade Trujillo to permit a degree of liberalisation.⁴¹ The failure of this mission again clearly identified Trujillo as the major obstacle to United States policy, a fact which appears/

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- 38. This resulted in a loss of \$22,750,000 for the Dominican Republic - the expected premium accruing from the transference of the bulk of Cuba's sugar quota to the Dominican Republic. The allocation of the sugar quota was a Congressional prerogative.
 - 39. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and more significantly, Paraguay, Guatemala and Haiti abstained from voting on the measure. The uncharacteristic opposition of the latter 3 states to the United States move demonstrates, quite clearly, their fear that United States policy was aimed at providing a basis for further intervention, possibly, given the nature of their domestic regimes, against them.
 - 40. The incoming Kennedy Administration gave the Trujillo lobbyists another chance to influence United States policy. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., head of the new Task Force on Latin America, Chester Bowles, and Joseph Kennedy, the influential father of John Kennedy, were approached in an effort to rescind the sugar tax.
 - 41. The timing of this mission as coincidental with the Bay of Pigs suggests that it was as much an 'offshoot' of United States-Cuban policy as a new United States initiative towards the Dominican Republic.

appears to have been appreciated by high-ranking members of the Dominican elite who, on May 30th, carried through Trujillo's assassination.⁴² With Trujillo gone, however, no changes in United States policy were immediately apparent, even though Balaguer, the nominal president, took some steps towards the liberalisation of the Dominican polity. Then, in early September, the Dominican question was reviewed. John Bartlow Martin was personally sent by Kennedy to study the situation in the Dominican Republic and deLesseps Morrison, the United States Ambassador to the O.A.S. was instructed, whilst he was in the Dominican Republic, as a member of the 'sanctions' subcommittee of the O.A.S. to meet Balaguer to press for further liberalisation. The separate reports of Martin and Morrison concurred in concluding that Balaguer and 'Ramfis' Trujillo were doing little to press for real changes in the Dominican polity and that, because of this, the best policy was to negotiate the 'Trujillo machine' out of power and out of the country, replacing it with a broad based provisional government until free elections, under O.A.S. supervision, could be held. Their recommendations were accepted and adopted as policy from the beginning of October. In doing so the United States government began to move from the mix of multilateral and unilateral pressures as the basis of its/

42. There is general agreement that the C.I.A. were involved in some capacity or another, probably along the lines of possessing foreknowledge of the plot but taking no action to prevent its development.

its strategy into an emphasis on the latter only - a move most dramatically illustrated in mid-November by the ostentatious deployment of a United States naval task force three miles off Santo Domingo as a show of strength designed to deter the threat of a re-establishment of dictatorship occasioned by the return to the Dominican Republic of leading members of the Trujillo family.⁴³

The final moves in ensuring the non breakdown of order in the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's assassination thus became one of decreasing O.A.S. participation and increasing United States unilateral direction of events.⁴⁴ This was to remain the basis of all subsequent United States policies in the Dominican Republic.

For most of 1962 and 1963 John Bartlow Martin was United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. His "exhaustive" account of the period in Overtaken by Events demonstrates that, above all, he was preoccupied with three problems: communism in the Dominican Republic, protection of United States economic interests, and setting up institutions capable of effecting controlled transformations in the Dominican economy and polity. All three problems were centrally related to one major concern - the prevention of the Dominican Republic becoming another Cuba.⁴⁵ /

43. The task force of eight ships and 1,800 marines, remained in Dominican waters for some time after the Trujillo family had left. Its presence was translated into Dominican politics by the broadening of the government to include the U.C.N., the 'civic-patriotic' political party which the United States had fostered as the major opposition to the Trujillo 'machine'.

44. Prosecuting the Dominican case in the O.A.S. had become increasingly difficult for the United States
so/

Martin's attitude to communism in the Dominican Republic has been described as "obsessive". Such a judgment has been based on an evaluation of his policy of seeking the harrassment and expulsion of communists even though he recognised the few who were active had no real chance of operating effectively in Dominican politics.⁴⁶ As a 'firm' approach it was fully endorsed by the Kennedy Administration as the translation into the Dominican context of the United State's government's general 'over-reaction' policy towards communism in the Caribbean. Martin's "obsession" was thus in accord with the essence of United States policy and was sustained by that policy. This 'over-reaction' or 'play safe' policy was based on two considerations. Firstly, the conviction of United States policy makers that communists were, in Latin America, making headway at the expense of the United States.⁴⁷

Secondly/

44. (continued) so that even without the October policy shift there would have been difficulty in maintaining let alone, expanding, the existing O.A.S. Commitment. The O.A.S. vote to lift sanction on January 4th, 1962 was, excepting for Cuba's abstention, unanimous.
45. An example of how much this association between Cuba and the Dominican Republic had entered the Kennedy Administration's thinking is the story that, as Martin left the President's office after accepting the post of Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Kennedy referred to him as the Earl E.T. Smith of his Administration.
46. According to a C.I.A. report made available to Martin there were "not more than one hundred well-trained, fully-committed and fully-disciplined" Dominican communists, and these were split between the P.S.P. (Soviet-oriented), M.P.D. (China-oriented) and Fourteenth of June Movement (Cuba-oriented).
47. See Rollie Poppino International Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement 1917-1963, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

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Secondly, and more importantly, that the 'example' effect of the Cuban Revolution in the Caribbean, especially that part of it relating to guerrilla warfare as a strategy, was a major destabilising element in regional politics. For if the Cuban 'model' was particularly appropriate in South America, where it led to a spontaneous outburst of Fidelista guerrilla movements, then it was even more so in the Caribbean where the existing political environment had created and legitimised the exile group - a political unit which could easily adapt guerrilla warfare to its purposes.⁴⁸ The immediate United States response to guerrilla warfare as a tactic in the Caribbean was therefore the projection of a policy of closer control over the region. Surveillance of all 'leftist' political activists in the region was increased as was the patrolling by the United States navy.⁴⁹ Above this, policy makers, quite often at high levels, concerned themselves with the existing or potential threat posed by what were only very small groups of communists or communist sympathisers.⁵⁰ Later, as counter-insurgency training became/

48. Here it is important to recognise that until the almost complete destruction of the armed forces of Castro's 26th July movement on the 5th December, 1956 only 3 days after the original landing in Cuba, the practice of the Movement had more in common with other exile groups in the region than with the accepted notion of the guerrilla group. Only later, after the circumstances consequent upon this defeat had been absorbed and a renewed effort based on the Sierra Maestra begun, did the guerrilla character of the Movement become obvious. See Ernesto Che Guevara, Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War (London: George Allen and Unwin limited 1968).

49. An example of this are the events immediately following Trujillo's assassination. Bosch in The Unfinished Experiment, p.4., relates that on hearing news of the assassination, a decision was taken to call a meeting in Costa Rica of the leadership of his party, the P.R.D. However, only two, who happened to hold United States/

became increasingly a feature of the various national armies in the region, the United States sense of urgency passed. However, as the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was to show, an exaggerated fear of communism remained a powerful conditioning factor for policy.

Martin's attitude regarding United States economic interests is best described as conservative. For example, on one hand Martin opposed, as being against the interests of the United States the proposals of George Walker, a lobbyist for the Businessman's Council on International Understanding that he should try to persuade the Council of State to sell the confiscated Trujillo properties to private investors.⁵¹ On the other hand, Martin did nothing to advance United States/

49. (continued) States passports and Miolan, travelling via Panama to Costa Rica, actually arrived. The rest ran foul of a ruling forbidding airline offices to book passages for Dominicans in the Caribbean area until the situation in the Dominican Republic was settled. At the same time a United States Navy task force, composed of nearly forty ships patrolled the Dominican coast ready either to intervene in the Dominican Republic or to prevent interventions from any other source.
50. Morrison in Latin American Mission pp.113-117, relates that at a meeting in early September, 1961, at which, among others, were President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of State Bob Woodward, Richard Bissel of the C.I.A. and himself, a great deal of discussion took place in respect of policy towards only twelve communists in the Dominican Republic. Eventually it was decided that Morrison was personally to seek a meeting with Balaguer and inform him that Kennedy viewed the expulsion of all twelve communists as a priority matter.
51. Martin argued that "If Americans bought them, we would be accused of having sent the fleet to throw the Trujillos out in order to get our hands on their properties". Overtaken by Events, p.116.

States interests among the rural poor by pressing for an acceleration of the Alliance for Progress type land reform, based on these properties, which was the declared policy of both the Council of State and the Bosch government.⁵² This concern with protection of the status quo became particularly apparent as the Bosch government took office and promulgated a Constitution containing an indirect attack, in parts, on the private but not the social function of property.⁵³ Immediately denounced by United States business interests and a major part of the Dominican elite Martin acted as a high-level spokesman for these interests by pressing Bosch for changes in the Constitution. Fully behind him in this was the State Department which had already become alarmed by Bosch's efforts to cancel an oil refinery contract with Standard Oil of New Jersey and to rescind the sugar contracts negotiated between United States companies and the Council of State.⁵⁴ Martin's actions were thus again/

52. In the 3 years, 1962-1965, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform distributed land to only 3,070 families.

53. Chiefly in: Article 19 - the principle of profit sharing by workers in agricultural and industrial enterprises; Article 23 - the prohibition of large landholdings; Article 25 - the restriction of the right of foreigners to acquire Dominican Land; and Article 28 - the requirement that landholders sell that portion of their lands above a maximum fixed by law, excess holdings to be distributed to the landless peasantry.

54. After prolonged negotiations the Standard Oil contract was quietly dropped. The sugar contracts, however, were honoured, partly because the United States government threatened to invoke the Hickenlooper amendment which would end United States aid.

again well within the framework of 'Washington approved' Caribbean policy. The real nature of this policy is apparent in Martin's comment on Bosch's success in obtaining a \$150 million credit from Europe. Although vitally necessary for the economic development of the Dominican Republic, and raised in Europe partly because of difficulties met in trying to raise it in the United States, Martin was distressed that the provisions of the repayment of the loan were such that

"we might have to come in with virtually no-interest loans which would not help us economically" and that "generators and everything else needed for the dams would be bought in Europe - sales which should have been ours".⁵⁵

The third major area of concern for Martin was the establishment of institutions necessary for economic development along capitalist lines and political development towards representative democracy. To accomplish this thousands of United States technicians were recruited and brought to work in the Dominican Republic at all levels of its administration.⁵⁶ In particular, United States personnel were responsible for establishing a host of specialised institutions, such as the National Planning Board, the Industrial Development Corporation, the State Sugar Council, the National Confederation of Free/

55. Martin, Overtaken by Events, p.370. The loan was to build the Tavera Dam on the Rio Yaque del Norte, a power plant at Puerto Plata, a waterworks in the capital, and another dam.

56. So many, in fact, that at the beginning of 1962 a housing shortage developed.

Free Workers (trade union), and the Inter-American Centre for Social Studies (research and planning). Added to this were, the Peace Corps (160 in September 1963) and A.I.D. officials (who made available from March 1962 to September 1963 some \$84 million - the highest per capita aid to any Latin American country at the time.) Not surprisingly, however, much as he tried, Martin could do little to coordinate these efforts, and contradictions and confusion were apparent everywhere, even with particular agency programmes.⁵⁷ Significantly, following the coup d'état on September 25th, 1963, and the poor economic performance of the Dominican Republic during this year, the whole basis of the United States programme was brought into question and subsequently scaled down. Prior to the coup, however, there were few doubts, especially as to the "showcase for democracy" ideal as the goal for planning.⁵⁸

It/

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57. the C.I.A. for example, was simultaneously channelling funds to two rival peasant unions. To the National Federation of Peasant Brotherhoods via the Inter-American Centre for Social Studies, and to the National Confederation of Free Workers via the Regional Inter-American Labour Organisation. The effect was to split the Dominican labour movement making, according to Martin, communist infiltration easier and labour-management relations more difficult.
58. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp.769-773. The choice of the Dominican Republic for such an exercise was, of course, based on the need to demonstrate that in what Washington considered as two remarkably similar countries the Alliance for Progress offered a better model for development than the Cuban Revolution.

It is this commitment to the idea of success which largely explains the Kennedy Administration's immediate response to the coup. Prestige was at stake and so the early moves were directed towards displaying maximum displeasure with the new Dominican government - Martin was recalled, as were the heads of the A.I.D. and M.A.A.G. missions; and recognition withheld.⁵⁹ Beyond this, however, the Administration had no fixed policy, with the result that from the beginning it was susceptible to arguments from other branches of the government that some form of accommodation with the Triumvirate could be reached. The early firm approach was fleetingly strengthened by the coup d'état in Honduras on October 3rd, but soon after, against a background of unsuccessful diplomacy by the United States, the feeling that to delay settlement was against United States interests gathered momentum.⁶⁰ By mid-October the onus for settlement had been firmly fixed on the Administration which, given the extraordinary intransigence of the Triumvirate, inevitably meant/

59. At the time no real attempt was made to save Bosch although subsequent negotiations with the Triumvirate focused, in part, upon formulae involving the inclusion of elements from the P.R.D. The United States government was thus basically dissatisfied with Bosch and not with the type of policies his party represented, although of course, aspects of P.R.D. policy were opposed by the United States.

60. Delaying settlement was seen as generating instability by inviting other political groups to oppose the Triumvirate, perhaps in a violent manner leading, inevitably, to either the emergence of a Castro oriented government or to a Trujillo 'type' military regime. Kennedy was certainly very worried about armed resistance to the Triumvirate.

meant a fall back from the original position.⁶¹ Indeed, in less than a month from this point the original demands, including the central one of 'constitutionality' had been set aside for the inconclusive commitment of the Triumvirate to hold free elections within a year.⁶² Recognition, on the basis of such an understanding, was eventually granted on December 14th.

For the next sixteen months the United States government played a less flamboyant, but still appreciable, rôle in Dominican politics. The new United States Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, continued to involve himself in Dominican politics, but not as closely as Martin. The A.I.D. and M.A.A.G. missions began operating again, although the involvement of United States technicians in 'institution building' was run down. Offsetting this, however, was the expanding rôle of United States business which, encouraged by the shelving of the 1963 Constitution and the I.M.F. approved austerity programme of the Triumvirate, sharply increased investment.⁶³ After four years of intensive involvement/

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61. A measure of this intransigence is that after one particular session of meddling by the United States charge d'affaires in Santo Domingo, the Triumvirate officially complained to the O.A.S. about his behaviour, labelling it "intervention".
 62. The acceptability of a settlement on these lines was made public by Kennedy in a press conference on November 14th.
 63. During the seven months of the Bosch government some \$64 million in private investment flowed into the Dominican Republic; in the first nine months of the Triumvirate some \$75 million. An additional factor stimulating this flow was the renewed emphasis by the Johnson Administration on the rôle of private United States capital in development in Latin America - a rôle dramatised in the Dominican Republic by the activities of Peter Nehemkis, who has also justified a policy of more private capital for Latin America in his book Latin America: Myth and Reality (New York: Mentor Books, Revised Edition, 1965).

involvement in Dominican affairs the United States government was thus returning to policies characteristic of its rôle in the Dominican Republic before the advent of Castro, although now, of course, modified in accordance with experience learned from the Cuban Revolution. In this brief period, as Lowenthal has pointed out, the United States government was trying

"to treat the Dominican Republic as one of the very many nations with economic and political problems; which would not become a matter for priority attention in Washington unless American security appeared directly to be threatened."⁶⁴

On April 24th, 1965, a section of the Dominican armed forces favouring the return of Bosch staged a coup d'état.⁶⁵ Not wholly successfully executed, this move precipitated the Dominican crisis and the subsequent military intervention by the United States - at the peak, on May 17th, over 22,000 United States troops were in Santo Domingo with a further 10,000 aboard an off-shore 'task force'. Quite clearly then, the Johnson Administration had perceived American security to have been threatened. Precisely how such security was threatened has since become the subject of extended debate among commentators from which has arisen a/

64. Lowenthal, "The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background to Intervention", p.54.

65. I have adopted the normal procedure of referring to those supporting the coup as 'constitutionalists' and those opposing the coup as 'loyalists'.

consensus that the official reasons given for intervention - to protect American lives and property and to forestall a communist takeover - are at best only half-true.⁶⁶ Almost equal to this consensus, however, has been the disensus among these commentators as to the real reasons for intervention.⁶⁷ With so much disagreement, and also so many contradictions in official policy, any assessment must at the moment remain tentative. Yet, at the same time, it is possible to detect, both at the time of the immediate intervention and in the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Provisional government of Hector García Godoy, a degree of consistency in United States policy, although, of necessity, this can be seen at only a very general level. Such a 'general' policy seems to have been concerned with the following points:

1. To prevent a communist take-over: This became the major official reason for intervention with Johnson's statement on May 2nd that

"What began as a popular democratic revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of Communist Conspirators.... /

66. The official case is set out in Martin, Overtaken by Events, Part Four; Jay Mallin, Caribbean Crisis (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc. 1965); and Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, Dominican Action - 1965: Intervention or Co-operation, (Washington D.C.: 1965) Nearly all other published work in book form on the intervention is highly critical of the United States.

67. See, in particular, the interpretations of Slater, Intervention and Negotiation; Draper, "The Dominican Revolt"; and Goff and Locker "The Violence of Domination: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic".

Conspirators....Our goal, in keeping with the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere".⁶⁸

Very apparent, however, is that right from the beginning fear of such a take-over constituted an important part of United States policy. The day after the coup the military attaches of the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo were urging the chiefs of the armed forces to resist the 'constitutionalists' and using, as their main argument for such a course of action, the possibility of the present chaos or a future 'constitutionalist' government as creating the conditions for a communist take-over. William Connett, Chargé d'affaires in Bennett's absence, took up this theme the next day, i.e. the 26th April, when his cables to Washington began including references to the existence of a serious threat of a communist take-over, a situation possibly requiring the use of United States armed forces.⁶⁹ Bennett arrived/

68. "Statement by President Johnson, May 2nd" cited in Goff and Locker "The Violence of Domination: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic", p.278.

69. Connett, who had been in the Dominican Republic only five and a half months was responsible with C.I.A. Chief E.N. Terrell, for all the early 'on the spot' definitions of the situation. The accuracy of such 'definitions' was not helped by the absence of eleven members of the MAAG group, also Bennett had left on the 23rd April. Obviously, with so many away, Washington was unprepared for the coup. As such, within Washington, an early assessment of the coup was left to the top officials most concerned with the region, i.e. Under Secretary of State, Thomas Mann, and Kennedy M. Crockett, Chief of the State Department's Bureau of Caribbean Affairs. Mann, in particular/

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arrived back in Santo Domingo on the 27th April and immediately met all the major leaders of the 'constitutionalists', they having come to see him to seek mediation. His argument, which presumably reflected Washington's thinking in that he had been briefed only a short while before, was that the P.R.D. had been infiltrated by communists, that "bearded men" on television had been "spouting pure Castroism" and that their cause was hopeless. With no chance of United States support the 'constitutionalist' leadership split with some abandoning the fight and others returning to it convinced of United States 'bad faith'. Indeed, among those continuing the fight, this rejection by Bennett proved decisive by forcing them to rely on themselves rather than external support. Renewed efforts were therefore made and by late afternoon on the 28th April the 'constitutionalists' had gained the initiative and were on the offensive. At this point Bennett cabled Washington requesting

"armed intervention which goes beyond the mere protection of Americans" to "prevent another Cuba".⁷⁰

69. (continued) particular appears to have been haunted by the Cuban and Guatemalan 'models' (he had been appointed deputy chief of the United States mission in Guatemala after the overthrow of Arbenz) and to have 'defined the situation' with reference to them. The importance of 'models' in the minds of key decision-makers in this type of situation, with reference to the Caribbean, is to be found in Herbert S. Dinerstein, Intervention Against Communism, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967).

70. Martin, Overtaken by Events, pp.656-657

Johnson acted on this by ordering United States armed forces into Santo Domingo - the first arriving almost immediately. As Senator Fulbright, who has held secret Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the intervention, has said of the events of this period

"On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of Communism rather than danger to American lives was his (Johnson's) prime reason for recommending military intervention".⁷¹

2. To maintain the Dominican military: Immediately before the cable requesting intervention to prevent another Cuba Bennett sent a cable pointing out that the commanders of the armed forces resisting the coup were demoralised and their men unwilling to contemplate further action. The initial United States policy of the encouragement of 'loyalist' elements in the Dominican armed forces to resist the coup had thus met a serious set-back. More importantly, however, the basis of this challenge - the distribution of arms to civilians - presented the opportunity for United States decision-makers to draw parallels with the last few weeks of the Cuban Revolutionary War and with the Guatemalan Affair. The former in terms of the easy victory of a civilian militia over a collapsing army and the latter in terms of the key rôle of the army as the decisive internal factor affecting the outcome of intervention. External aid aimed to prevent a possible future radical restructuring of the Dominican military following on from the loss of their/

71. Quoted in Draper, "The Dominican Crisis", p.50.

their 'monopoly of violence' plus the necessity for action before it was too late for the Dominican military to be of any value in co-ordinating their action with United States policy, thus became to be seen as necessary.⁷²

It constituted a further reason for immediate intervention. Various actions by the United States armed forces once they were in Santo Domingo confirm this supportive rôle. Following hard on the Marine landings to protect the United States Embassy units of the 82nd Airborne landed at San Isidro, the military base providing most of the 'loyalist' armed forces, thereby acting as a powerful morale booster to the 'loyalist' officers. More than this the Airborne proceeded to occupy the area around the Duarte bridge, previously the major area of fighting and now the main line of thrust into the 'constitutionalist' zone.⁷³ At the same time United States Marines established an International Security Zone which, when extended on May 3rd, divided the 'constitutionalist' zone into two and cut off the main body of the 'constitutionalists' from the countryside. Finally, when on May 14th, the reconstituted 'loyalist' forces broke the /

72. Although no certainty can be attached to the exact numbers of the armed forces on both sides at this time, it would appear that, at least from the beginning of May, the 'constitutionalists' had 1,800 regular troops including officers and men and some 4,000 civilian fighters. The Loyalists, commanded by Wessin y Wessin, had some 1,500 in the Army, 900 in the Air Force, plus part of the Navy and the Police.

73. Between the 26th-28th April some 2,000 had died in the fighting, mainly in this area.

the cease-fire agreement to 'clean-up' the weaker of the two 'constitutionalist' zones the United States did not intervene.⁷⁴ Providing political, and later logistical and strategic support to the 'loyalists', United States policy prior to and immediately after the intervention was thus far from neutral, even though the Johnson Administration was claiming this to be the case.

3. To guarantee stability through a legitimate but flexible government: From the 25th-27th April, when the situation in Santo Domingo was still fluid, the 'constitutionalists' contacted the United States on five separate occasions to ask them to mediate with the 'loyalists' - each request was turned down. Further, the United States did not contact Bosch until May 1st even though on the 25th April it had become clear that those staging the coup, plus popular feeling in Santo Domingo, favoured his return as president. Determining this attitude of the United States was, of course, the fear that the 'constitutionalists' would be unable to successfully counter the communists, especially if Bosch returned.⁷⁵ However, even when the fear of a communist/

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74. Whether or not United States troops actively helped the 'loyalist' forces at this time is still disputed. What is certain is that the United States did nothing to stop the extensive preparations for this attack, i.e. movement of tanks by sea from San Isidro to Haina, fresh troops drafted into Santo Domingo from San Cristobal, and substantial movement of 'loyalist' troops within Santo Domingo itself. Once the attack was under way, 'loyalist' forces were allowed to freely pass through United States lines.
75. In contact with special representatives of the Johnson Administration from May 1st-3rd Bosch made repeated requests for an aircraft to take him to Santo Domingo - all were flatly rejected.

communist take-over had been averted by the direct military intervention of the United States the concern with the 'risk' of Bosch continued. Thus when the United States opened a line of communication with him and Caamaño in an attempt to find a political settlement via the 'constitutionalists' the talks revolved around alternatives to Bosch. Eventually, on the 15th May, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to President Johnson, and Bosch agreed to the Guzmán formula whereby in return for Bosch dropping his earlier demands for an immediate withdrawal of United States armed forces, Antonio Guzmán, a leader of the moderate wing of the P.R.D. would serve out the rest of Bosch's term under the provisions of the 1963 Constitution. This plan, however, proved unacceptable to the 'loyalists' as they felt it to be, in essence, a victory to the 'constitutionalists'.⁷⁶ At this point Guzmán also 'stuck', refusing to contemplate the deportation or detention of communists and leading 'constitutionalists' as being forbidden by the 1963 Constitution under which he was to govern. On May 24th/

76. The 'loyalists' were now represented by the Government of National Reconstruction led by Antonio Imbert. The exact purpose of the United States in setting up this government and then supporting it financially - some \$21 million during May-June - are unclear unless it was simply a device aimed at pressurising the 'constitutionalists' into making concessions. If this were so then it probably failed as the 'constitutionalists' refused to negotiate with it, citing the character of Imbert as the reason. The 'constitutionalists' position was thus strengthened and not weakened by this move. Later, as the Imbert government failed to gain support among the Dominican people and then began resisting United States direction, Washington took the decision to exclude it from any real involvement in a final settlement.

24th talks finally broke down. As Draper has pointed out, the Guzmán formula foundered on the fact that

"the proposed Guzmán government was expected to do the United States bidding even before it was formed."⁷⁷

After a further three months of complex negotiations, conducted mainly by Ellsworth Bunker, the United States Ambassador to the O.A.S. but also involving in a complementary role the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the O.A.S. a more flexible government was finally found in the acceptance by the 'constitutionalists' and 'loyalists' of a compromise and interim government headed by García Godoy.⁷⁸ The United States had thus, at last, been able to construct a government it could hope to control, something clearly that would not have been the case by supporting a 'loyalist' or 'constitutionalist' government as the solution to the problem.⁷⁹ /

77. Draper, "The Dominican Crisis", p.63

78. Bunker had a dual rôle at this time as both chief negotiator for the United States and as the representative of the United States on the O.A.S. appointed Ad Hoc Committee (the other two representatives on this committee were Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil and Ramón de Clairmont Dueños of El Salvador). The United States was therefore at the centre of the negotiations - a factor allowing it, via access to greater flows of information and the ability to block or approve various initiatives, disproportionate control over the outcome of the negotiations.

79. Once the García Godoy government was established the United States supported it fully. On the 6th September it guaranteed it militarily when General Palmer, Commander of the United States contingent of the Inter-American Peace Force, told his troops they were no longer 'neutral' but there to support the García Godoy government. United States economic assistance was stepped up so that between July 1st 1965 and June 30th 1966, the Dominican Republic received the highest per capita economic aid from the United States/

problem. Moreover, insofar as it had O.A.S. approval the Garcia Godoy government also had a degree of legitimacy.⁸⁰

Although these three points were the major ones relating to intervention two others need brief consideration:

Vietnam and domestic political considerations. The problem of Vietnam certainly preoccupied the highest decision-makers in the United States government at this time, and there is strong evidence that Johnson, at least, linked the crisis in the Dominican Republic with that in Vietnam.⁸¹

What, at any rate, is certainly true is that Johnson took the critical decision for the military intervention in the Dominican Republic immediately after leaving a policy-making meeting on Vietnam. More important than Vietnam, however, /

79. (continued) States to any Latin American country - \$32.1 compared to \$13.4 for Chile, the nearest rival. Co-ordinating the United States programme was a greatly increased embassy staff "rivalling only the one in Saigon for size and multiplicity of operations. As in Vietnam of the Diem era, a U.S. counterpart was appointed for every major Dominican official". Richard J. Barnett Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World, (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p.177.

80. Throughout, the rôle of the O.A.S. was peripheral. The unwillingness of the Latin Americans, as a group, to challenge the United States violation of the non intervention norm of the inter-American system resulted, very early on, in conflict between Latin American states which, in its turn, served to reduce the possibility of any effective independent O.A.S. action contrary to United States interests. Ultimately the O.A.S. was left to 'rubber stamp' United States initiatives without any enthusiasm. Significantly, although every Latin American state was asked to contribute troops to the Inter-American Peace Force, only seven did so, even though the resolution to establish such a 'Force' had been approved by a 14-5-1 vote (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay voted against, Venezuela abstained). The states contributing to the/

however, were domestic political considerations. Martin puts this very well when he says

"Aside from the danger to U.S. lives, aside from the question of whether a Communist-dominated government would truly have threatened our national security, I think we could not permit it on the simple ground that public opinion in the United States would not have tolerated a second Cuba in the Caribbean".⁸²

Johnson has been quoted as remarking, at the time of the intervention:

"When I do what I am about to do, there'll be a lot of people in this hemisphere I can't live with, but if I don't do it, there'll be a lot of people in this country I can't live with".⁸³

Two/

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80. (continued) the 'Force' were Brazil (1,115); Costa Rica (21); El Salvador (3-General Staff Officers); United States (10,900); Honduras (250); Nicaragua (164); Paraguay (183). Figures for troops as of 3-7-1965.
81. Arriving in Washington on April 30th, Martin saw Johnson who stated that he did not intend "to sit here with my hands tied and let Castro take that island. What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?" Martin, Overtaken by Events, p.661. A focus on the internal policy-making process at the time of the intervention indicates that Secretary of State, Rusk, and Secretary of Defense, McNamara, played very minor rôles, both being concerned with Vietnam. See Draper "The Dominican Intervention Reconsidered", pp.9-15.
82. Martin, Overtaken by Events, p.739
83. Charles Roberts, L.B.J.'s Inner Circle, p.205 cited in Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, p.199

Two central actors in the intervention thus felt impelled to act, at least in some part, because of domestic factors. Also, as Goff and Locker have demonstrated, United States economic interests in the Dominican Republic were well represented in the upper echelons of the United States government.⁸⁴ The risk of taking no action in the Dominican Republic therefore carried with it the probability of significant domestic repercussions, irrespective of whether this was right or not.

United States policy to the Dominican Republic during this period was, quite clearly, multi-dimensional. Various strategies were applied ranging from multilateral co-operation via the O.A.S. to unilateral military intervention. Policy switched from support of conservative governments to support of a reformist government and then back again. According to circumstances in the Dominican Republic itself, and Latin America as a whole, the United States intervened to a greater or lesser extent in Dominican politics. Yet, as different as these approaches may have been in practice, they all stemmed from one common belief held as 'axiomatic' in every administration - that there could be no second Cuba /

84. "The Violence of Domination: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic", pp.280-283. This is not to imply economic interests as determinate but it is to recognise that the sugar corporations had been among the first, for obvious reasons, to oppose Castro. With the Johnson Administration possessing the benefit of hindsight, suggestions from representatives of sugar corporations, and in particular from those holding government jobs, that the Dominican Republic was 'another Cuba in the making' were bound to be heeded rather than rejected.

Cuba in the Caribbean. Anticipatory and/or retroactive regulation of the regional environment with which the Dominican polity interacted, plus the more traditional close association with Dominican affairs, being seen as necessary to prevent such a situation developing.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ACTORS

The emergence of new actors within an international system as from the environment in which an international system operates is generally held to be a probable source of system change.⁸⁵ Here this proposition is examined in the light of the emergence from within the system of the C.A.C.M. as a sub-regional actor, and the emergence from the environment of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as two new independent state actors possessing 'regional attributes'. In the case study of the C.A.C.M. the focus will be on whether it can truly be considered a sub-regional actor, and, if so, to what extent it has affected international politics in the region. In the case study of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago the focus will firstly be on their 'regional potential', and then on their evolving foreign policies in respect of the other Caribbean states.

The C.A.C.M. as a Sub-Regional Actor

The signing of the General Treaty on Central American Integration on the 13th December, 1960, by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, greatly accelerated the process of economic integration in Central America. Within/

85. See, for example, Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), Chapter 2, particularly p.36; and P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (London: Longman, 1971, Chapter 11.

Within five years there was a 316 percent increase in regional trade - from \$32,675,000 in 1960 to \$135,976,000 in 1965 - which began, at least partially to offset Central American dependence on world markets.⁸⁶ Providing crucial support to this expansion was the institutionalisation of the integration programme in S.I.E.C.A., for this organ, more than any other, promoted the numerous conferences covering every aspect of Central American life thereby generating a Central American 'awareness'. Moreover, these conferences were themselves frequently institutionalised in one form or another so that by 1965 not only were Central American governments participants in the integration programme, but also such interest groups as the Federation of Central American Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of Central American Associations and Chambers of Industry. The political repercussions of this rapid increase of Central American interaction was felt most strongly in ODECA - the regional organisation for political integration. Thus following a re-examination of ODECA's rôle in the early sixties a new Charter was adopted at the end of 1962 in which the processes of economic and political integration were seen as being closely linked, with political integration to be stimulated by institutional innovations and changes /

86. Intra-Central American imports increased from 6.4 percent of total trade in 1960 to 18.4 percent of total trade in 1966. Exports to the rest of the world were reduced from 92.4 percent of total trade in 1960 to 80.8 percent of total trade in 1965.

changes modelled on the C.A.C.M.⁸⁷ Panama also responded to the increased Central American interaction by expanding its involvement in regional common service organisations and then, in 1963, by applying for "association" with the C.A.C.M.⁸⁸ Beyond the region such purposive activity resulted in technical assistance and aid being offered, principally by the United States which by early 1966 had funded more than \$83 million in support of the integration programme.

This growth of the C.A.C.M. has, however, had less effect on Central American politics than might be thought. Political decision-makers at the national level have developed a regional response in only a few areas, the most noticeable/

87. Whereas the 1951 Charter of San Salvador establishing O.D.E.C.A. saw the goal of O.D.E.C.A. as largely 'the union of five parts of one whole' the goal of the revised O.D.E.C.A. was the achievement of an 'economic-political community'. Among the means to achieve this were annual instead of biennial conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, increased powers to the Secretary-General, and a new organ, the Executive Council, to meet weekly and be responsible for direction and co-ordination of policy. See Salo Engel "The New Charter of the Organisation of Central American States" American Journal of International Law, Vol.58, No.1., 1964, and Salo Engel, "The New O.D.E.C.A." American Journal of International Law, Vol.60, No.4., 1966.

88. For Panama's role in Central America during this period see Felix Fernandez Shaw, Panama y sus relaciones centroamericanas (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica 1964).

noticeable being communism, where co-ordination of foreign policy in the O.A.S. and in the U.N. with respect to Cold War politics was paralleled by co-ordination of internal policy to counter guerrilla warfare.⁸⁹ In other areas consensus was virtually non-existent except in the broadest sense of seeing the C.A.C.M. as necessary for economic development - this to proceed with as little political authority being delegated from the national level as possible.⁹⁰ Indeed, it is these two factors - nationalism and a limited view of the purpose of the C.A.C.M. - which have, more than any others, retarded the process of integration and restricted the ability of the C.A.C.M. to operate as a sub-regional actor. A focus on the attitude of Costa Rica to 'union' in Central America and the question of the Convention on Integrated Industries illustrates this particularly well.

Costa Rica has expressed a more cautious attitude towards 'union' than any other Central American state,⁹¹ citing, among/

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89. Co-ordination of foreign policy on the issue of communism preceded the development of the C.A.C.M. and therefore cannot be attributed to the C.A.C.M. What can, however, at least in part, is the ease with which co-ordination was able to develop after 1961 in the field of internal security, although, of course, the 'threat' of Cuba and the interest of the United States in promoting such co-ordination were of greater importance. See John Saxe-Fernández "The Central American Defence Council and Pax Americana".
90. Illustrated most strikingly by the fact that leading participants in the integration programme have differing opinions about when political union will be achieved - in 25 years according to Trabaino, Secretary General of O.D.E.C.A., but in 70-80 years, according to Luis Somoza, President of Nicaragua.
91. 'Isolationism' has been a constant theme of Costa Rica's history. Of the 25 conferences held on the question of 'union' from 1842-1951, Costa Rica /

among other factors, that the period of transition was not long enough, that it would lose its industrial development policy, and that the economies of the Central American countries were competitive, not complementary. Costa Rica refused to take part in the negotiations for the 1960 General Treaty and delayed ratification of the Treaty until 23 September, 1963, when it became clear that it would lose more by staying apart from, than by joining, the C.A.C.M.⁹² A long period of delay also preceded the ratification of the new Charter of ODECA.⁹³ Particularly important here was the widespread belief of Costa Ricans that their politics were different from and superior to those of the other Central American countries and Panama.⁹⁴ Uncertain benefits flowing from the C.A.C.M. (due, in part, to distance from the focal point of economic integration - the Gulf of Fonseca),/

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91. (continued) Costa Rica participated in just one-third whereas El Salvador and Honduras participated in nearly every one and Guatemala and Nicaragua in just a few less. T.L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, pp.247-249
92. Other important reasons for the changed position in 1963 were (a) deteriorating market prices of agricultural products as a spur for re-evaluating 'pastoralism' as the basis for economic development, and (b) the return of a 'pro-market' administration in the presidential election of 1962.
93. Ratification being on the 30th March, 1965, as compared to Guatemala - July 19th, 1963, El Salvador and Honduras - August 23rd 1963, and Nicaragua - November, 19th, 1963.
94. See Daniel Goldrich Sons of the Establishment: elite youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. 1966); James L. Busey Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (University of Colorado Studies: Series in Political Science No.2., University of Colorado Press, 1962), and James L. Busey "Foundations of Political Contrast: Costa Rica and Nicaragua" in R.D. Tomosek (ed) Latin American Politics.

Fonseca), plus an attitude of political distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest of Central America have thus served to perpetuate the traditional cautious approach and to provide the basis for a willingness to take unilateral action to defend Costa Rican interests even if such actions were contrary to the law or the spirit of the integration programme. A further desire for the assertion of national identity by avoiding too close an association with Central America has been Costa Rican activity in promoting an extension of the integration programme to Panama, and then to the Caribbean as a whole.⁹⁵ This policy was quite clearly linked to offsetting the two major disadvantages set out above by spreading the benefits of economic integration over a wider area and by introducing other 'democratic' two-party oriented politics into negotiations for political union.

The Convention on Integrated Industries has been another source of contention. Originally drafted in 1958 to 'balance' development it was ratified only after considerable delay. In 1966 Honduras was still maintaining a negative attitude on the grounds that it would receive fewer benefits from participation than would the other Central American states. Determining this attitude was a perception by Honduran decision-makers, in part borne out by/

95. For example, Daniel Oduber, Costa Rica's foreign minister, spoke in favour of Caribbean countries joining the C.A.C.M. when on a visit to Jamaica in 1963.

by the facts, that Honduras was gaining the least from economic integration. So that, for example, while intra-Central American trade had increased enormously from 1960-1965 this had been more rapid in industrial products, where Honduras was weak, than in agricultural products, where Honduras was strong.⁹⁶ Reinforcing this uneven pattern was the common external tariff which operated against Honduras by making it pay higher prices for regionally produced industrial goods than it had previously paid for the same goods from the United States. Less, but still significant opposition to the 'scheme' came from El Salvador, this time from the opposite perspective that dispersal of industry throughout Central America would undermine its position as the major Central American producer and trader in industrial goods. The same fear also motivated its opposition, with Guatemala, to Panamanian entry into the C.A.C.M.

A further crucial factor operating against the Integrated Industries scheme has been the opposition of the United States government on the grounds that the scheme was unnecessary, likely to be arbitrary, and would create monopolies.⁹⁷ /

96. A 532 percent increase in industrial goods, from \$15,500,000 to \$98,000,000 as compared to a 108 percent increase in agricultural products, from \$15,872,000 to \$33,000,000.

97. Profitability of United States investment in the region was also almost certainly a factor. As a report submitted to A.I.D. in 1963 by the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration pointed out "On the basis of profit data given to the researchers by various companies we would say that/

monopolies.⁹⁷ Such direct opposition to integration in Central America was, however, the exception and throughout this period United States policy to 'union' in Central America could be more properly characterised as one of 'guarded support'. Thus a focus on regional integration - by 1966 the Regional Office of Central America and Panama was as large as any of the country missions - was counter-balanced by a continued emphasis on bilateral aid.⁹⁸ Similarly, financial support of regional organisations contrasted with the limited pressures towards increasing their effectiveness.⁹⁹ In short, United States policy acted to reinforce divisions as well as to promote 'union' in Central America.

What emerges is the fact that economic integration has not, by itself, been sufficient to establish the C.A.C.M. as anything more than a marginal sub-regional actor. As well as promoting co-operation the C.A.C.M. can also be seen as having enhanced the possibility of conflict by creating /

97. (continued) that returns of 30 percent on net worth are fairly typical. This figure is further reinforced by the generally accepted rule of thumb that an investment should pay back within three years. It is not too unusual to find companies with returns up to 75 percent and 100 percent of net worth". Cited in John F. McCamant, Development Assistance in Central America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p.281.

98. From 1961-1965 some \$300 million was given in bilateral aid.

99. In 1965 O.D.E.C.A. received 60 percent of its budget from the United States but employed only 10 persons. Behind this, of course, was the desire of the United States to retain the O.A.S. as an instrument of its foreign policy by ensuring that the five 'favourable' votes of the Central American states were not reduced to less than that number by the growth of O.D.E.C.A. to a point where formalisation of arrangements between it and the O.A.S. was required.

creating new areas of contention.¹⁰⁰ Regional economic development has not substituted for national development, as is shown by the costly improvements to Pacific Ports by Guatemala and Honduras even though adequate ports already existed in El Salvador and Nicaragua; and by the retention of the right of each state to have an oil refinery. In other fields economic integration has not been allowed to proceed at all, so that although by 1966 the uniform external tariff had been extended to 98 percent of all items in the tariff schedule, the remaining two percent represented thirty percent of total imports and between twentyfive percent to fortyfive percent of custom revenue. As Gary Wynia has pointed out, the effect of this has not been to create 'spill-over' but 'spill-around', i.e. no real political authority has been given but a multiplicity of functional agencies have been created.¹⁰¹ Consequently, it is not surprising that national politics in Central America have largely ignored the C.A.C.M.¹⁰² And that international/

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100. The case of uneven development within the C.A.C.M. as a stimulator of conflict is made by Vincent Cable, "The 'Football War' and the Central American Common Market" International Affairs, Vol.45, No.4., 1969.
101. Gary W. Wynia, "Central American Integration: The Paradox of Success". International Organisation, Vol. 24, No.2., 1970.
102. The C.A.C.M. was not, for example, an issue of the 1966 presidential elections in Costa Rica and Guatemala. See John Yochelson, "What Price Political Stability? The 1966 Presidential Campaign in Costa Rica". Public and International Affairs, Vol. 5., No.1., 1967; J.W. Sloan, "The 1966 Presidential Election in Guatemala" Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol.22, No.2., 1968; and K.F. Johnson, The Guatemalan Presidential Election of March 6, 1966: An Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967).

international politics in Central America and the region as a whole, as has already been established in Part Two, have been only slightly changed, mainly in intensity and not direction of interaction.

Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as 'New' State Actors

Earlier, it has been suggested that because Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were not too dissimilar from the other states of the region they qualified for inclusion on the basis of a common setting. This is particularly obvious if reference is made to size and underdevelopment. As is shown in Table Twentythree they must be considered as small states with no great capability advantages or disadvantages vis-à-vis all other states in the region except for Cuba. The strategies open for each state to follow are thus identical with the other states of the region - a situation reflected in their recent history by the continuing debate on the merits and consequences of differing types of alliances and political unions.¹⁰³ In degree and kind of underdevelopment both are analogous to the other states of the region. The historical dominance of /

103. At least as far as Trinidad and Tobago was concerned, this debate still flourished in 1968. In that year, at an address given to the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, Eric Williams referred to three radically different alternative forms of external alignment then under consideration by his government.

TABLE TWENTY-THREE

Some Regional 'Attributes' of Jamaica
and Trinidad and Tobago

| | Jamaica | Trinidad and Tobago |
|-------------------|--------------|------------------------|
| Area (Kilometres) | 10,962 | 5,128 |
| Population (1963) | 1,698,000 | 924,000 |
| G.N.P. (1965) | £810,000,000 | £618,000,000 |
| Exports f.o.b. | £220,000,000 | £403,000,000 |
| % Exports/G.N.P. | 27.2% | 65.2% |
| Armed forces | 1,500 | 1,000 |

Sources: U.N. Statistical Year Book, 1968 (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations 1969) Tables 18 and 151; Wood, Armed Forces in Central and South America Tables 1 and 2

of the plantation economy has been particularly strong and the simple two-sector model still offers an adequate explanation of their economies and indicates the same development needs as elsewhere in the region. The only two divergent factors - the significance of the extractive sector as against the agricultural sector and the existence of several major outlets for trade - are balanced by the fact that the productive sector is integrated with one or more external states.¹⁰⁴ In accordance with the criteria/

104. In Jamaica, 1962, 13 percent of the Gross Domestic Product derived from agriculture and 9 percent from mining. The figures for Trinidad and Tobago were 10 percent and 29 percent respectively. Jamaica's exports for 1960 went to Britain - 31 percent and the United States - 26 percent and Canada - 24 percent. For Trinidad and Tobago the figures were 31 percent, 20 percent and 5 percent respectively.

criteria developed to draw up Table Seventeen it is therefore possible to suggest a close approximation by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to the 'Ideal Type' for the 'particular indicators' of 'Size' and 'Under-development'.

Less obvious is the extent to which Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago correspond to the two other 'particular indicators'. With reference to the 'Internal Political Characteristics' indicated it is generally accepted that in the Commonwealth Caribbean the military remain essentially involved in politics and that political instability and violence have been inconsequential.¹⁰⁵ At the same time the importance of personalism in immediate pre-independence and post-independence politics has been recognised, particularly by Singham who argues that the colonial heritage and small size of the territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean have created, and are liable to perpetuate, personalist forms of government.¹⁰⁶ This has certainly been true of Trinidad where, since 1956, Eric Williams has been a force in shaping events. The same can also be said of Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley in Jamaica. With reference to 'The Preponderance of the United /

105. The observation on political instability and violence is a reference only to the period under review. Prior to independence, political instability and violence were a consistent feature of the colonial system, and of late political instability and violence have re-appeared in the politics of both states.

106. A.W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 323-330 passim.

United States' indicator the overall strategic and political interests of the United States in the region ensured that the limitations on the exercise of state power outlined in the military and political dimensions of this indicator would also apply to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Immediately both states gained independence the British government relinquished responsibility for their defence and emphasised that the question of external alliance now rested on arrangements between either state and the United States.¹⁰⁷ Thus from the beginning political decision-makers in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were made aware, above all, that it would be the attitude of the United States which would count in the fields of defence and foreign affairs. Significantly, within a year of independence Jamaica had signed a defence agreement with the United States and followed the general regional policy of hostility towards Cuba.¹⁰⁸ Trinidad and Tobago, however, was more cautious, partly because the already existing defence arrangements with the United States - the use of air and naval facilities at Chaguaramas - was an 'explosive' domestic issue, and partly because distance from Cuba made the question less urgent than in Jamaica. Nevertheless, in 1963 Williams went out of his way to make a strong condemnation of the Cuban experiment. These/

107. Speech of the Marquess of Lansdowne, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the House of Lords, July — 1962, cited in Hispanic American Report, Vol.15., No.7., p.615.

108. Although no diplomatic relations with Cuba were established the presence in Cuba of some 25,000 Jamaicans working mainly as field labourers meant that a Consulate was maintained.

These expressions of conformity with United States 'norms' for the region were rewarded, and underpassed, by an increasing inflow of United States private and public investment. Jamaica was the immediate beneficiary with such companies as U.F.C.O. and Kaiser Bauxite announcing expansion of their programmes, and such international agencies as A.I.D. and IMF announcing loans for development.¹⁰⁹ Trinidad and Tobago was only fractionally less quick on the uptake and by the end of 1963 substantial A.I.D. loans had been secured and Texaco was expanding its range of operations.¹¹⁰ Evolution towards an economic dependence on the United States similar to that of other states in the region was thus becoming an increasing possibility, particularly as Bustamante and Williams actively sought increasing United States investment for what has been characterised as a strategy of "industrialisation by invitation". Following the same procedure as before it is thus possible to suggest a partial approximation by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to the 'ideal type' for the 'particular indicators' of 'Internal Political Characteristics' and 'The Preponderance of the United States'.

109. In December 1962 U.F.C.O. announced a new \$2 million investment in bananas, and in May 1963, Kaiser Bauxite announced a \$10½ million expansion programme. In October 1963, for example, a credit of \$5 million from the I.M.F. - Export Import Bank was approved for Jamaica's Development Finance Corporation.

110. In May 1963 Texaco announced the move of its headquarters for Latin America from Venezuela to Trinidad, and in June 1964, opened a new \$46 million lubricating oil plant. In September 1963, for example, a United States A.I.D. grant for \$5 million was secured.

The sum of the evidence in the above two paragraphs suggests that a case can be made for claiming that from 1962-1966 Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago possessed regional, but not core, potential. The focus on the rest of this case study extends this conclusion by examining the regional aspects of their foreign policies.

The overall foreign policy of Jamaica has been static and cautious, designed to consolidate existing relations with Britain and the United States rather than seek alternatives. By way of direct contrast the overall foreign policy of Trinidad and Tobago has been dynamic and aggressive, as much designed to seek alternatives as to consolidate existing relations. As might be expected, then, Trinidad and Tobago has had a much deeper involvement in regional affairs than has Jamaica. Thus it was Trinidad and Tobago which first initiated serious moves towards co-operation with Latin America and towards co-ordination of policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Jamaica either followed on much later or remained aloof.

Trinidad's approach towards Latin America was founded on economic interest. Much of the wealth of the country derives from oil and oil refining, with Venezuela playing a major rôle as the supplier of crude oil for refining in Trinidad¹¹¹, prior to export to the United States. The importance/

111. The importance of Venezuelan oil can be gauged by pointing out that in 1961, 24.7 percent of Trinidad's total imports were from Latin America (chiefly Venezuela) as against 3.2 percent of its total exports.

importance of this Venezuelan connection meant that even before independence Williams was discussing with Venezuela such matters as delimiting territorial waters, illegal immigration, fishing, contraband and discriminatory trade practices. While after independence Williams quickly went ahead to cement relations between the two states by announcing that he would be establishing an embassy in Caracas and be visiting Venezuela at the invitation of its government. Minor disputes sometimes occurred - one broke out over fishing in May-June 1964 - but on the whole harmonious relations prevailed and in the end gestures of goodwill by Williams, such as denying the use of Trinidad as a base for Venezuelan left-wing movements, were reciprocated by the Venezuelan government, particularly by the abolition in 1965 of the 30 percent surtax imposed on products originating from the independent Commonwealth Caribbean. By 1967 relations between the two governments were on such a firm footing that a Mixed Commission was set up to study a whole range of problems associated with Trinidad's economic development in relation to Latin America.¹¹²

For Jamaica, there appeared to be no overwhelming reason why close relations should be established with any Latin American state. Trade with Latin America was negligible and /

112. Terms of reference included the preparation of Trinidad's participation in Latin America integration schemes, expansion of trade, tourism, migration and joint planning in industrialisation.

and matters relating to the care of Jamaican migrant workers in Cuba, Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama were organised mainly through the British embassies in those countries.¹¹³ Therefore, not until November 1963 did Jamaica indicate it would seek to open a diplomatic post in Latin America and not until 1966 was such a post established.¹¹⁴ Thus, as with Trinidad, economic factors directed Jamaica's policy to Latin America, although, unlike Trinidad, these were of a negative rather than a positive kind. The pattern of relations established with external powers was seen as of overwhelming importance and not to be jeopardised in any way by 'arrangements' with Latin America.¹¹⁵

This very limited and highly specific interest of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in Latin America did not go unnoticed by the Latin American states. Reaction by them to moves from Jamaica/

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113. In 1961 Jamaica sent only 0.10 percent of its total exports and received only 2.0 percent of its total imports from Latin America. Migrant Jamaican labourers occasionally became a political issue as in August 1963, when the Cuban authorities refused permission for a Jamaican team to visit Cuba to investigate allegations of maltreatment towards Jamaicans. Otherwise little was heard about them.
114. An embassy was opened in Mexico. In 1965 Jamaica had accredited diplomatic and consular relations with the following Latin American states - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama and Venezuela. This was less than Trinidad which, in the same year, had accredited diplomatic and consular relations with Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela.
115. In particular, closer 'arrangements' with Latin America were seen as acting against Jamaica's attempts to secure, following a British entry into the European Economic Community, either association with the E.E.C. or continued access to the Commonwealth preference system.

Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to join the O.A.S. were generally unfavourable and for over two years the question of their membership was 'shelved'.¹¹⁶ When finally it had to be resolved the Latin American states sought to impose stringent conditions for entry.¹¹⁷ In so doing, they asserted that their interest in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago centred around the form of internal government in the Commonwealth Caribbean states and the comprehensiveness of the collective security system in the hemisphere.¹¹⁸ Territorial disputes were an additional issue for Argentina, Guatemala and Venezuela all of whom added reservations to the Act of Washington to the effect that their assent to the Act in no way compromised or set aside their claims, respectively, to the Falkland Islands, British Honduras (Belize) and Guyana. This 'narrow' and in some senses 'nationalist' viewpoint of the Latin American states undoubtedly dampened enthusiasm for the O.A.S. in Jamaica and/

116. That is, from May 16th 1962, to November 4th 1964 the question was 'under study' by the O.A.S. Frustration at this delay is said to have created the possibility, from October 1964, of Trinidad and Tobago complaining to the U.N. that the O.A.S. was unable to fulfil its rôle as a regional organisation by failing to provide rules for the admission of new members.

117. The leading advocate of such action being Guatemala which, from early on, had mounted the most persistent and vociferous opposition to Jamaica or Trinidad joining the O.A.S.

118. By emphasising that Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter of the O.A.S. established obligations with respect to collective security in the hemisphere - an inference that Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago should also become signatories to the Rio Treaty. This viewpoint was underlined and recorded in the Act of Washington by statements from Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.

and Trinidad who saw their entry, anyhow, primarily in terms of access to inter-American aid programmes otherwise denied them. Thus it was not until 1967 that Trinidad joined the O.A.S. and not until 1969 in the case of Jamaica.

With the failure of the West Indies Federation a recent bitter memory for the leading political decision-makers of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, relations between the two states after independence were slow in developing. Trade between them was minimal so that when, in February 1963, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago agreed to exchange High Commissioners this was essentially a political act.¹¹⁹ Following this Williams again took the initiative in promoting clearer regional relations and in July, 1963, the first West Indian 'summit conference' met in Trinidad attended by the prime ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. At this conference Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago agreed to work for closer regional co-operation, but significantly, nothing had been achieved by the time the second West Indian 'summit conference' met in Jamaica in January, 1964. Here again broad resolutions were passed but no specific steps towards regional co-operation taken. Indeed, it was not until December /

119. In 1961 Jamaica sent only 2.8 percent of its total exports and received only 5.17 of its total imports from the Commonwealth Caribbean. The figures for Trinidad and Tobago were 6.8 percent and 2.26 percent respectively.

December 1965 that "an area of functional co-operation" was created with the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement between Antigua, Barbados and Guyana; and not until mid-1968 that all the major Commonwealth Caribbean states were co-operating in one regional organisation -- the Caribbean Free Trade Association.

What is quite clear is that the possession of regional potential by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago did not automatically make them participants in regional interaction. Some interest as to the nature of the relationship between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America was in evidence, but this was only of secondary importance to all interested parties. Likewise, regional co-operation among Commonwealth Caribbean states was a low priority. For Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, then, independence meant no radical break from the pattern of relations with the region established by the departing colonial power but only the modification of this pattern in accordance with the new realities of United States power. Insofar as this required membership of the O.A.S. and moves towards regional integration then Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago would comply. Otherwise their regional policy, except in a few instances, can be described as 'one of casual acknowledgment'.

The conclusion must be that neither the C.A.C.M. nor Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago had any great impact on the/

the international politics of the region during this period. Certain hopes for greater regional co-operation were raised, it is true, by their entry into regional politics, but nationalism and the previous patterns of interaction effectively braked movement in this direction. Only in those areas of mutual interest where the United States was anxious to see co-operation and/or integration develop - such as in the field of internal security - did it proceed without hindrance.¹²⁰ This again serves to focus attention on the centrality of the United States rule in the region in general, and on its attitude towards Cuba in particular. Compared to the transformation of the system wrought by this dynamic the changes induced by the C.A.C.M. and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago appear very marginal indeed.

120. Co-operation on internal security in Central America was, as has already been seen, fairly well advanced. Linton, in reviewing the regional diplomacy of the Commonwealth Caribbean from 1962-1970 comments that "It is regrettable that the closest co-operation so far is in the field of internal security - the integration of police and political security activities - integration to defend the interests of the ruling élites or of the incumbent governments". See his "Regional Diplomacy of the Commonwealth Caribbean" International Journal, Vol.26, No.2., 1971, p.417

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Some Conclusions on International Politics
in the Caribbean 1959-1966

International politics in the Caribbean from 1946-1958 have been considered as essentially an expression of two theories - the political basis of most regional interaction and the prevalence within regional interaction of extra-regional factors.¹²¹ Insofar as both theories continued to influence international politics from 1959-1966 a certain continuity as regards patterns and aspects of international politics is recognisable. However, beyond this were a number of new distinctive developments which, while not fundamentally transforming patterns of interaction, did serve to modify them. In increasing order of importance these developments can be seen as the introduction of a new dimension into regional politics by an evolving emphasis on economic development; the transformation of a major form of regional interaction following the gradual replacement of subversive intervention, by guerrilla warfare; and the extreme accentuation of the involvement of extra-regional actors as the United States extended 'penetration' to counter the intrusion of Cold War politics into the region.

From/

121. See my earlier section 'Some Conclusions on International Politics in the Caribbean, 1946-1958'.

From 1959-1966 accelerating extra-regional trade and economic co-operation in Central America, and more generally the increase in United States economic aid to Latin America under the Alliance for Progress, sharply brought into focus for all Caribbean states, the need to fully incorporate economic objectives into foreign policy. Increasing the scope of regional interaction such 'valuable' economic activity also acted as a constraint on idiosyncratic decision making in foreign policy by widening the circle of advisers each president would need before embarking on any course of action, and adding to the range and size of repercussions following any action. Greater stability and rationality in regional politics was thus indirectly encouraged. At the same time, though, chances of conflict were also enhanced as disputes over economic development became a possibility, particularly as new groups consequent upon economic development but with an ideology of nationalism entered the political process. During the early 1960's, then, the basis of far-reaching changes in Caribbean international politics was being laid, although up to 1966 these were not felt in any marked way as recognition of the economic dimension required only a limited adjustment over time within the existing decision-making process.¹²² In terms /

122. It was thus not until 1969, with the 'football war' between El Salvador and Honduras, that major conflict stemming from economic and nationalist factors broke out.

terms of overall interaction between states, economic criteria therefore supplemented rather than supplanted political criteria and intensified rather than radically altered previous patterns of interaction.

As a distinctive expression of environmental factors in the Caribbean, subversive intervention has been a consistent feature of the international politics of the region. This has led to the widespread acceptance of a view-point considering it as the single most significant factor in the creation of regional instability. Generally overstressed, such an analysis does apply, however, to brief periods, such as during 1959 when exiles and governments in the Caribbean responded to the success of Castro in Cuba by planning and launching a number of invasions. After 1959, though, there was a sudden drop in the scale of this type of activity and by the mid-1960's it was very infrequent. Replacing it, as the form of extra-legal opposition, was the model of guerrilla warfare - a change with an immediate and long-term impact on regional interaction. For whereas subversive intervention had been subject to some degree of regulation by Caribbean governments guerrilla movements operated independently of governments and without reference to the established pattern of politics among states in the region. In addition, the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare constituted a direct and total challenge to all existing élites in the region - a situation which did not arise with subversive intervention given the essentially élitist basis of this form/

form of political action in the Caribbean. The development of guerrilla warfare, in contrast to subversive intervention, thus introduced the promise of radical change in the domestic and international politics of the region. And, insofar as it gained strength to become the dominant form of extra-legal opposition, developed into a central issue. To this, elites in the Caribbean responded in three ways. First, seeing Cuba as the direct instigator of guerrilla movements in Latin America, they argued that it was necessary to go beyond the policy of the interdiction of Cuba by aiming at direct armed intervention in Cuba. Secondly, they organised among themselves, a number of meetings, formal and informal, to discuss methods of countering guerrilla warfare by joint military operations between states and tighter internal security within each state. Thirdly, they invited the United States to commit itself to greater military aid in the region in the hope of finding a military solution to the problem. In sum, then, the decline of subversive intervention and the rise of guerrilla movements in the Caribbean were closely related - the total effect being to partially alter the pattern of conflict by shifting the dynamic focus of conflict from among a few states to only one state, Cuba.¹²³

The developments outlined in the two preceding paragraphs are/

123. See my earlier section 'Hypothesis Two: Conflict and Polarisation' in Part Two.

are closely related to the third change - the accentuation of the involvement of extra-regional actors. This can be shown quite clearly if the trend of conflict within the region is analysed in terms of a scheme drawn up by Rosenau to study internal war.¹²⁴ In this he distinguishes between three types of conflict - 'personnel wars', 'authority wars', and 'structural wars' - according to the goals which the contending forces are perceived as pursuing.¹²⁵ Rosenau then goes on to demonstrate that each type of conflict generates a specific series of responses; and that with 'authority' and 'structural' conflict there is a greater likelihood of external intervention than with 'personnel' conflict.¹²⁶ Applying this analysis to the situation in the Caribbean it is particularly obvious that developments after/

124. James N. Rosenau "Internal War as an International Event" in James N. Rosenau (ed) International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

125. "Personnel wars are those which are perceived as being fought over the occupancy of existing roles in the existing structure of political authority, with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either the substructures of the society or its major domestic and foreign policies....

Authority wars are those which are perceived as being fought over the arrangement (as well as the occupancy) of the rôles in the structure of political authority, but with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either the other substructures of society or its major domestic and foreign policies....

Structural wars are those which are perceived as being not only contests over personnel and the structure of political authority, but also as struggles over other substructures of the society (such as the system of ownership, the educational system, etc.) or its major domestic and foreign policies...." Ibid, p.63

126. Ibid, pp.63-81

after 1959 directly anticipate an increase in 'authority' and 'structural' conflict (alongside a decrease in 'personnel' conflict) and that, therefore, the probable outcome is greater external intervention than before. That is, independently of the will to intervene by external actors conditions in the region inviting external intervention were being constructed.

With this, of course, must be considered the repercussions following the movement of Cuba away from the United States and towards the Soviet Union. For inasmuch as this was a development directly introducing the Soviet Union as an extra-regional state with 'concrete' Caribbean interests, i.e. insofar as the Monroe Doctrine was fundamentally challenged and the Cold War made a reality in Latin America, then so was the will of the United States to intervene in the Caribbean dramatically increased. Supporting this trend, and making it more likely, was a basic change in United States Caribbean policy. That is, the United States policy of self-regulation by Caribbean decision-makers was now judged as carrying unacceptable risks if the policy should fail. Consequently, it was set aside to be replaced by the previous 'fall back' policy of intervention as the first and only policy for the Caribbean. This meant, of necessity, some changes in the style of intervention. In addition to being retroactive intervention was now to be preventative, and in addition to being supportive of/

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of the status quo it was also, according to circumstances, to be towards promoting limited changes. It also meant, being a conscious attempt by the United States to direct the politics of the region, further penetration by the United States and allied agencies. The final result of all this was that regional international politics, more than ever, reflected the interests and the pre-occupations of the United States rather than those of the Caribbean states themselves.¹²⁷

The Evolving Pattern

While no new patterns of foreign policy fully emerged during this period to replace the 'Traditional Pattern' enough new developments occurred to suggest that the system was being transformed from within and from without. The exact direction of this transformation was not at all clear by mid-1966 but of particular note as future determinants of this were the incorporation of economic and security aspects, alongside political aspects, as a basis for regional interaction; and the lessening 'autonomy' of the region's politics as the United States, in particular, emphasised its interest in the total development of the Caribbean.

127. Thus, at the extensively publicised meeting between the Presidents of Central America, Panama and the United States - the San Jose Conference of 18.3.1963 - the United States insisted on discussing the Alliance for Progress and economic integration in Central America rather than the question of Cuba, even though all the other participants, particularly Guatemala and Nicaragua, felt that the question of Cuba should be central.

CONCLUSIONS

Kalman Silvert prefaces his summation of a number of essays treating of the present problems of the Commonwealth, European and Hispanic Caribbean with the remark:

"If it is true that only inane generalisations hold equally for the 30-odd Caribbean political units of which this book treats, it is also true that seeing each one as unique is intellectual laziness that can only impede understanding and policy decision."¹

He thus raises in a Caribbean context and for a related discipline -- comparative political analysis -- a central problem of this study. That is, to what extent can generalisations on the foreign policies of Caribbean states with respect to one another be made when it has been shown that these foreign policies are complex and diverse; depend on factors outside the region as well as within the region; and are in a process of transformation. Unsatisfactory as it is the 'best' solution appears to be the one followed by Silvert in his similar dilemma; namely to list the most significant generalisations that apply more rather than less to the area, and then proceed to comment briefly on particular individual states.

1. Kalman H. Silvert: "The Caribbean and North America" in Tad Szulc (ed) The United States and the Caribbean (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1971), p.193.

Some General Characteristics:

The first, and perhaps most significant generalisation, relates to the structure of the Caribbean as compared to South America. A point frequently made with reference to Latin American international politics is that all states operate on a rough basis of parity in terms of power, and all states are subject to United States influence.² This is true, but only at the level at which Latin America, as a region, is compared to other regions. If the focus is narrowed to within Latin America, differences are readily discernible, so that it is possible to assert confidently that only in the Caribbean region are states clearly operating with an equality of capabilities whilst simultaneously being subject to intervention from the United States in all its aspects - influence, power, force and authority. Taken singly, these two structural characteristics should have led to frequent coalition formation in the case of equality of capabilities, and the suppression of coalition formation by hierarchical tendencies in the case of hegemony. However, combined, the structural characteristics are in contradiction - hence a factor in creating tension/

2. See Carlos A. Astiz "The Latin American Countries in the International System", George I. Blanksten "Foreign Policies in Latin America" in R. Macridis (ed) Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 3rd edition 1967); Robert M. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere: Perspectives on United States-Latin American Relations Chapter 4; and Fred Parkinson "Latin American Foreign Policies" in Claudio Veliz (ed) Latin America and the Caribbean: A Handbook (London: Anthony Blond 1968).

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tension in the Caribbean. Also, they ensure that the foreign policy orientation of most Caribbean states will be similar among them yet distinct from that of the South American states, including Mexico.

The second generalisation revolves around the consequences of economic underdevelopment - a condition which asserts its own priorities on foreign policy in terms of the need for access to the markets and resources of developed countries.³ For the Caribbean this has followed a particular pattern. That is, in so far as Caribbean countries produce similar products for the same dominant market and are at an approximately equal stage of underdevelopment (thus requiring the same scale and type of 'aid' - this from primarily one 'donor' state) so does the need for differentiation among them become imperative as a means of securing favourable treatment from the 'target' state. In other words, for Caribbean states the close link between their economic underdevelopment and the United States is a source of inter-state competition in the region. It is also, quite obviously, a determining factor in strengthening the hegemony of the United States and ensuring a pro-United States orientation in any Caribbean states foreign policy.

The third generalisation concerns a particular textural feature of the Caribbean with implications for the nature of/

3. See Gustavo Lagos International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries, p.6 passim

of interaction in the region. It is, especially, a reference to the nature of the political units in the Caribbean. That is, to the fact that although real distinctions can be made between the types of political systems in the Caribbean, common to all are personalist forms of government and continuing political instability. The former directly leads to particularisation of issues and unpredictability of actions, and the latter enhances the already low adaptability (because of structural conditions) of each state to the environment. The sum of this has been an indifferent practice of diplomacy aiming at modification of state action through environmental manipulation and a strong emphasis on diplomacy focussing on the decision-making system of any Caribbean state. The foreign policies of Caribbean states have thus been expressly designed to have an impact on the domestic affairs of other states in the region. In short, interventionist politics have become the 'norm' of regional international politics and are, in theory and practice, underwritten by 'rules' - specifically those relating to the right of insurrection and the right of asylum.⁴ The end/

4. Article 175, for example, of the 1950 Constitution of El Salvador, recognised "the right of insurrection" providing that "it is not used so as to bring about the abrogation of laws". Inter-American law with respect to political asylum has been codified in the Convention on Asylum (Havana, 1928), the Convention on Political Asylum (Montevideo 1933), the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum (Caracas, 1954) and the Convention on Territorial Asylum (Caracas, 1954).

end product, inevitably, has been the encouragement of mistrust between governments and the frequent outbreak of verbal, if not actual, conflict. Periodic 'crises' are thus guaranteed.

The fourth generalisation relates to the influence of the international system by which is meant, primarily, the involvement of the United States and the O.A.S. in the Caribbean. The former is, of course, by far the most significant and has, over time, become more rather than less, pronounced. References to the Caribbean as an 'American Mediterranean' or a 'deep, "deep South"' being, in this sense, not particularly misleading. Certainly penetration by the United States of Caribbean political systems or the exercise of direct unilateral intervention, has now come to be regarded by many in the United States as 'legitimate'.⁵ The consequences are, as Lewis and Singham point out, that the United States

"is reluctant to consider the Caribbean as constituting de facto a subject of foreign policy making."⁶

Or more precisely, the ability of any Caribbean state to sustain /

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5. This is conclusively affirmed in Resolution 560 of the House of Representatives, which approved unilateral military intervention in the Western Hemisphere (The Resolution was adopted by 312-52 votes on the 20.9.1965) And in the exchanges in "We have the Sovereign Right to Protect our Investors Abroad" - "A Case and a Commentary" in Marvin D. Bernstein (ed) Foreign Investment in Latin America: Cases and Attitudes.
 6. V.A. Lewis and A.W. Singham "Integration, Domination and the Small State System: the Caribbean", p.140.

sustain a regional foreign policy is dependent on the degree of coincidence of this policy with United States interests. In other words, Caribbean decision-makers, if they are rational and if they wish their policies to succeed, must make considerable allowances for incorporating United States responses into their contemplated action. Anticipation of 'feedback' from possible O.A.S. intervention must also be taken into account. The formulation and execution of regional foreign policies is thus dependent to a marked degree on the expected and actual reactions of external (quasi-regional) actors.

Finally, a fifth generalisation can be stated by focussing within the region on a ranking of states determined by levels of regional interaction. Two points in particular stand out. One is that the level of G.N.P. is related to the level of interaction. Thus Caribbean states with a high G.N.P. have high level interaction, those with middle range G.N.P. tend to have middle range interaction, and those with low G.N.P. have a low level of interaction.⁷ The other is that the G.N.P. is related to the influence of geography - or more precisely, distance. Thus, Caribbean states with high G.N.P. are less influenced by geography as a determinant of direction and level of interaction than those with a low level of G.N.P.⁸ However, there /

7. See Table 6 and Table 18.

8. See Table 6 and Table 22.

there appears to be no direct correspondence between these two features, so that, for example, if profiles are drawn of each state's interaction in the region then the most nearly similar profiles - El Salvador and Costa Rica, and Haiti and the Dominican Republic - emphasise only one aspect - respectively, similarity of G.N.P. level and geographic adjacency. At the same time, many of those states which theoretically should show different profiles are, at points, similar. The profile of Cuba and Panama after 1958 is an example here. Consequently, it is possible to suggest, though only tentatively, that the regional foreign policy of a Caribbean state, like the foreign policies of many other states, depends in part on the economic resources it can command and the states it can reach.

Some special Characteristics:

Relative to other states in the region Cuba possesses the greatest number of attributes for emergence as the 'leader' state of the region. Of note, however, is that it has never attempted to do so - either before or after the revolution. Instead, its focus has, historically, been on Latin America as a whole, with, of late, an emphasis on the peoples of Africa and Asia as well. The challenge by the Cuban government to the hegemony of the United States in the Caribbean after 1959 is therefore an expression of a wider anti-imperialist policy in which the Caribbean is seen as one small, integral, but not very important, part.

The interest of Haiti in the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic excepted, has been minimal. A number of reasons can be advanced for this but, in particular, the different socio-economic conditions in Haiti as compared to the Hispanic Caribbean seem especially important. This has resulted, under Duvalier, in a stress on 'negritude' and the search for links with Africa rather than a focus on the Caribbean. At first by force of circumstances, and then by design, Haiti has thus remained 'outside' the region - a recipient rather than an initiator of Caribbean interaction.

Exploitation of the symbolic value of the Canal for the purpose of revision of the Canal Treaty has constituted the essence of Panama's approach to Latin America since World War Two. The support of the Caribbean states in the pursuit of this goal has been solicited (and has been forthcoming), but, for obvious reasons, Panama has concerned itself with mobilizing opinion in the larger South American states. This imbalance of interest was redressed somewhat in the early 1960's when both the Cuban Revolution and the emergence of the C.A.C.M. spelt possible changes in Panama's relations with the United States. The point to note, however, is that no genuine reorientation of foreign policy followed this so that, in effect, Panama's traditionally ambivalent attitude to South America and the Caribbean continued as before.

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The foreign policies of the other six states in the Caribbean region - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua - differ from each other in a great number of respects, yet in the final analysis, all are conditioned strongly by and, in their turn, determine the international politics of the region. They can be said to constitute the 'core' of the region so that, for them all, the Caribbean is the most important area of policy after the United States.⁹

A Final Comment

This study began with the assertion that it is meaningful and necessary to identify sub-systems within the Latin American system. If 'system' is defined in its simplest sense as

"a set of components with identifiable attributes, among which patterned relationships persist over time."¹⁰

then the final conclusion to this study must be that the Caribbean, as defined in Part One (a set of components with identifiable attributes) and as seen to interact in Part Two (among which patterned relationships persist over time) must be considered as a system. However, as Part Three shows (studies of aspects of the behaviour of states in the region) the system is limited and weak.

9. With the exception of Costa Rica all these states have also been shown to have "core attributes" with respect to the region. However, the exclusion of Haiti and Panama from this group, and the inclusion of/

Limited in the sense that systemic relations are primarily, though not exclusively, political - this beginning to change after 1959 - and weak in the sense that penetration by the United States and the inter-American system is so extensive as to severely restrict the capacity of the system for 'autonomous' action. Bearing these points in mind, however, it is still possible, in relation to Latin America as a whole, to specify that the Caribbean is a particular regional system. One to which the dominant external power, the United States, applies a distinctive policy and one in which, to a significant but not determining degree, the specific characteristics of its politics have an impact on the functioning of the inter-American system. At this point, then, I agree with Blanksten's decision that it is necessary to view Latin American foreign policies in at least two 'sets' - Middle America (the nine states of the Caribbean region as I have defined it) and South America (including Mexico), but disagree with his assertion that

"Of /

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- 9. (continued) of Costa Rica, indicate that no firm correspondence between "core attributes" and "core interaction" exists. There is though, the suggestion of a tentative relationship.
 - 10. Scott: The Functioning of the International Political System, p.27

"of the two (sets), Middle America is the more artificial and academic designation"¹¹

For, as I have endeavoured to show throughout this study, the Caribbean region, irrespective of how South America is considered is meaningful to its member states and their foreign policies, in differing degrees, reflects this fact. It follows then, that as with comparative political analysis, where for many purposes 'there is not one, but twenty, Latin Americas', then so for international political analysis, particularly comparative foreign policy, there is not one Latin American subordinate system, but several. Equally, there cannot be a comprehensive yet adequate theory of Latin American international politics unless that theory takes into account differences between Latin American states and with the defining external power as this is manifested in particular subordinate system activity.

11. Blanksten: "Foreign Policies in Latin America", p.363; Significantly one of the few books treating with contemporary United States policy towards the Caribbean basin views the same nine states as a unit. See Dexter Perkins The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, revised edition 1966).

APPENDIX I

(For Part Two)

| | | |
|--------------|---|-----------|
| TABLE ONE: | Interaction in the Caribbean | 1948-1958 |
| TABLE TWO: | Interaction in the Caribbean Co-operation and Conflict | 1948-1958 |
| TABLE THREE: | Interaction in the Caribbean | 1959-1964 |
| TABLE FOUR: | Interaction in the Caribbean Co-operation and Conflict | 1959-1964 |

TABLE FOUR

TOTAL INTERACTIONS: CO-OPERATION & CONFLICT JAN. 1959-SEPT. 1964

| | COSTA RICA | CUBA | DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | EL SALVADOR | GUATEMALA | HAITI | HONDURAS | NICARAGUA | PANAMA | |
|--------------------|------------|----------|--------------------|-------------|-----------|-------|--------------|-----------|--------|----|
| | | | | | | | CO-OPERATION | | | |
| COSTA RICA | | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 9 | |
| CUBA | 11 | | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | |
| DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | 2 | 19 | | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | |
| EL SALVADOR | 1 | 6 | 1 | | 11 | 0 | 11 | 2 | 1 | |
| GUATEMALA | 4 | 28 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 4 | 4 | 1 | |
| HAITI | 2 | 4 | 15 | 1 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| HONDURAS | 2 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 1 | | 10 | 0 | |
| NICARAGUA | 5 | 19 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 12 | | 0 | |
| PANAMA | 0 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| | | CONFLICT | | | | | | | | |
| CO-OPERATION | 184 | 28 | 18 | 9 | 26 | 27 | 0 | 31 | 30 | 15 |
| CONFLICT | 338 | 27 | 107 | 44 | 16 | 35 | 23 | 30 | 40 | 16 |

APPENDIX II

(For Part Three)

MAJOR SOURCES FOR CASE STUDIES

MAJOR SOURCES FOR CASE STUDIES

The Formation of the C.A.C.M.

Aaron Segal "Integration and Developing Countries: Some Thoughts on East Africa and Central America" in S. Lewis and T.C. Matthews Caribbean Integration Papers on Social, Political and Economic Integration (Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Pedras, P.R. 1967).

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