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BRITISH EMPLOYERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
WELFARE, c. 1880 - 1920: AN INDUSTRIAL AND REGIONAL
COMPARISON.

Thesis presented by

Joseph Leslie Melling, B. Sc.

As part of the requirement for the award of the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University
of Glasgow.

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Glasgow

(June 1980)

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
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Summary of Thesis

There has been no systematic study of the welfare provisions made by British employers for their workers in the decades, 1880-1920. Research suggests that such an omission leaves an important gap in both economic and social history, and that welfare activities were of considerable significance in the development of British industry. One of the most fundamental problems concerns the discovery of an appropriate definition and method of analysis of this form of welfare. Industrial welfare is seen principally as a relationship between the employer and his employees. The major formative influences on its development within industry were the production and market conditions in which firms operated, and the industrial relations which emerged in particular trades and industries. The comparison of firms within one sector, and of different sectors within a regional economy demonstrate the extensive experience of welfare activities in these years. Comparison of regions illustrates both the complexity of factors affecting the development of welfare services - influencing their qualitative character as well as quantitative scope - and the common themes which appear in quite distinct occupations. This pattern is confirmed by an examination of welfare in its broader social and political context. The agencies of growth and administration varied from the heterogeneous mass of friendly societies to the highly specific and tightly-organised employers' associations. Their welfare commitments tended to reflect the more general functions and priorities of the organisations concerned. The social context of much welfare investment is revealed by an examination of local community relations, and the ways in which welfare reinforced the images as well as material substance of local life. Such images form only part of the diverse and fluid ideology of industrial welfare, which was carried by currents ranging from scientific management and technical expertise to political philosophy and religious belief. All of these forces are evident in the interaction of employers' welfare and state social policy, with private provisions shaping both employers' attitudes and government legislation during these decades of rapid economic change and shifting social relations. It is in this light that we must locate the development of industrial welfare over the period.

Preface and acknowledgements

There are many individuals and institutions who provided valuable assistance during the period of study in which this research was undertaken, and the following acknowledgements do not exhaust the list of debts I owe to others.

Dr. Roy Hay first suggested the area of research and provided the initial encouragement for its adoption, as well as many stimulating insights during the early stages of the work.

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Other individuals contributed their criticisms and insights, including H.F. Moorhouse, Alastair Reid and Alan Macgregor. Archival and library staff also deserve particular mention. Michael Moss and Arnott Wilson at Glasgow University Archives offered their advice as well as expertise; Richard Dell and his Strathclyde Regional Archives assistants were always considerate in dealing with my enquiries, as were Ian Grant and Jack Sime at the Scottish Record Office. Outside Scotland, Mr. Collison and the archivists at Leeds City Archives were as helpful as Mr. Morrish and Miss Radford at Brotherton Library, Special Collections. Library staff at Glasgow University, Leeds University, Bradford University, Exeter University and the National Library of Scotland all deserve my thanks. Special regards and appreciation to Miss Manchester of Baillies Library, Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow who put her wide-ranging knowledge at my disposal.

Much of this research would have been impossible without the active help and sympathetic support of many individual firms and employers' organisations. Employers such as Templetons Carpets and City Saw Mills were willing to share their knowledge of internal developments, whilst others permitted me to consult their records at specific archives. Among the associations, Bradford Chamber of Commerce allowed access at their offices, whilst Mr. Duncan and Mrs. Campbell proved eager to assist at

the Glasgow Chamber in George Square. The Clyde Shipbuilders' Association allowed me to consult their extensive Scottish records, and the Scottish Engineering Employers' Federation gave me generous facilities when visiting their Glasgow offices. In particular, I wish to thank Mr. Dalglish - the archivist at the latter association - for his encouragement and unfailing courtesy. The National Coal Board had deposited various records at archives in Scotland and Yorkshire, without making special conditions as to access, as had British Rail and British Steel.

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Chapter One: Introductory chapter.

The problems of definition and method in the historical study of industrial welfare development.

There can be few aspects of economic activity as significant and as neglected as the provision of industrial welfare services by British employers. In the 1960s it was estimated that over half of the total working population in Britain, or 6.5 million people, were covered by an occupational sick pay scheme.¹ At approximately the same time it was calculated that almost two thirds of all U.K. employees were eligible for membership of an occupational pension fund, and the numbers were still rising.² A survey conducted in the previous decade indicated that the British record was unremarkable by European standards, with a comparison of ten countries revealing an impressive array of social security services, direct benefits and subsidised facilities with the private and public sectors of the advanced economies.³ Taking an even broader perspective, it became clear that countries as distinct as Australia, Britain and the United States, possessed private schemes which recorded annual contributions equivalent to a sizeable proportion of statutory provisions and receipts.⁴ By the 1970s it had become clear that private welfare provision, inside and outside of industry, was an increasingly important factor in the era of the 'welfare state', and one recognised by government in such legislation as the new Pensions Act in Britain.⁵

Yet despite the acknowledged significance of this range of activities in both economy and society, there has been very little systematic investigation of their extent and implications. In particular, the origins and growth of private industrial welfare have not formed the basis of any major historical study in Britain, although there have been pioneering contributions in Germany and the U.S.A. during the last two decades.⁶ Even then, such works have usually adopted a somewhat fragmentary and episodic approach, situating the period of 'welfare capitalism' in the decades before 1940.⁷ Very few accounts

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1. Ministry of Labour, Sick Pay Schemes: Report of a Committee of the National Joint Advisory Council HMSO (1964), Para. 14, p5.
 2. Third Survey by Government Actuary, Occupational Pension Schemes HMSO (1968), Para. 24, p8.

trace the evolution of industrial welfare into the post-War years, or the links between welfare provision and management strategy. Within this limited literature, there remains considerable disagreement over the precise origins and function of such services, with some authorities portraying welfare as another relic of paternalistic traditions,¹ whilst other writers characterise industrial provisions as an element in 'the modern bureaucratic work structure'.²

The inadequacy of such sweeping generalisations becomes clear when confronted with evidence of employee benefits as early as the 18th century,³ planned industrial villages from the dawn of industrialisation,⁴ and sustained welfare schemes during and after the industrial revolution.⁵ At the same time, it is difficult to deny that such arrangements have been increasingly fashioned to meet the requirements of modern management, and constitute one aspect of the corporate economy.⁶

It could be argued, therefore, that there are problems not merely in the reconstruction of empirical materials but also serious considerations of interpretation and method to take into account when reviewing the secondary sources. This point can be illustrated by a brief survey of existing literature relating to the study of industrial welfare in Britain. Given

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3. International Labour Office (I.L.O.), 'Non-Obligatory Benefits Provided by European Employers in 1955' International Labour Review LXXVII (1958), pp555-58, and passim.
 4. I.L.O., 'Cost of Non-Statutory Social Security Schemes' I.L.R. LXXVIII (1958), Table XIV, p403.
 5. See The Times 28.4.1976, for a detailed report and discussion of this legislation.
 6. G. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism University of Chicago Press (1967), and E.C. McCreary, 'Social welfare and business: the Krupp welfare programme, 1860-1914' Business History Review XLII (1968), are just two examples.
 7. See S.D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 University of Chicago Press (1976), is one recent interpretation.
 1. A.G.P. Elliot, 'Company Welfare Benefits' in G.L. Reid & D.J. Robertson (ed.), Fringe Benefits, Labour Costs and Social Security Allen & Unwin (1965) London, p300.
 2. A. Fox, Man Mismanagement Hutchinson (1974) London, p58-59.
 3. J. Press, 'The Collapse of a Contributory Pension Scheme: The Merchant Seamen's Fund, 1747-1851' Journal Transport History V No.2 (1979), pp91-104, for example.

the ideological complexion of such writing, it is essential to emphasise the authorship of materials and the historical context in which they emerged. Indeed, the appearance of studies on industrial welfare itself marks an important stage in the growth of the movement and the objectives of its leaders.

The earliest and most influential works on such welfare were written by employers, managers and industrial administration experts from the late-19th century onwards. Sick and accident funds occupied a prominent place in these practical manuals and treatises,¹ although it was Cadbury and Lever, amongst others, who really popularised the arguments for welfare in labour management.² Later theorists drew upon the growing body of scientific and pseudo-scientific experiments on the physiological and psychological responses to production, but many of these fundamental assumptions concerning the role and needs of labour remained.³ The more spurious investigations attempted to fuse the contentious principles of scientific management with a crude mechanical account of human psychology, with welfare perceived as an appendix to a rigid incentives system.⁴ Overall, we can characterise the writings which emanate from this tradition as 'managerialist', with the basic assumption that welfare should be geared to management perceptions of labour needs and that industrial services should reinforce managerial controls.⁵

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4. W.A. Eden, 'Harewood Village: An Eighteenth Century "Housing Scheme" ' Town Planning Review XIII No.3 (1929), pp181-84.
 5. S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management Pelican (1968) London, pp205-47, and passim.
 6. C.f. P.A. Baran & P.M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital Pelican (1966) London, p55, and passim for serious underestimation of this.
 1. F. Smith, Workshop Management: A Manual for Masters and Men Wyman (1878) London, Chapters X-XI, for example.
 2. E. Cadbury, 'Some Principles of Industrial Organisation..' Sociological Review VII No.2 (1914), for some principles.
 3. G.E. Toogood, The Principles of Industrial Administration Brown (1917) London, p42, and passim.
 4. F.S. Lee, The Human Machine and Industrial Efficiency Longmans Green (1919) New York & London, Chapter XIII, for example.
 5. R.R. Hopkins, Handbook of Industrial Welfare Pitman (1955) London, p14 & 16: 'Responsibility for formulating and operating a welfare policy belongs to management...it is a responsibility of the central welfare officer or department to apply controls..', shows this theme continued until very recently.

Such contributions have been primarily written in the light of practical problems of management, rather than as monographs in social science. The work of researchers such as John Lee do approach academic rigour, although even they were primarily framed as providing basic principles of management science.¹ Similar criticisms could be made of the studies by Proud and Walton during the First World War,² and even the efforts of the University-based welfare trainees.³ Indeed, a fundamental theme in the writings of administrative theorists since at least the time of Bentham, has been the necessity for effective industrial direction.⁴ Those academics considering the subject of industrial welfare have usually, either explicitly or implicitly, adopted a similar position.

Perhaps a more lasting impact was made in the Universities establishing courses and professional credibility for those engaged in the administration of industrial welfare, and thereby facilitating the creation of a profession-based literature on the development of benefits.⁵ From the period of the Bourneville and York Conferences on welfare work, before the First World War, there had arisen a distinct movement for professional status and even independent discretion amongst the full-time workers.⁶ Along with the call for professional autonomy, frequently went an emphasis on the involvement of the industrial employees in the foundation and operation of benefit schemes. Thus the account of the 'welfare movement' one derives from such writings reflect a current within that movement, and an image of what welfare should seek to achieve, rather than an accurate portrayal of its actual development.⁷

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1. J. Lee, The Principles of Industrial Welfare Pitman (1924) London, pp38-39, 55-58, and passim.
 2. E.D. Proud, Welfare Work Bell (1916) London; C. Walton, Welfare study - what it is Maclure & Macdonald (1917) Glasgow, pp7-11, for discussion of 'human factor', etc.
 4. L.J. Hume, 'Jeremy Bentham on Industrial Management' Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research XXII No.1 (1970), pp14-15.
 5. G. Shann, 'The Philosophy of Welfare Work' Welfare Work VII No.78 (1926, originally 1910), p106, 110, etc., for example.
 3. H. Cashmore, The Possibilities of Industrial Welfare Work as a New Profession for Women Gordon & Sons (1917) Bristol.
 6. E.D. Newcomb, 'Industrial Welfare Work in Great Britain' I.L.R. V (1922), pp554-55.

Subject to rather different influences of professional bias were the inspectors and civil servants who noted the spread of industrial welfare practices in their official reports and government enquiries. The conscientious activities of such administrators often extended beyond their departments (whether the Factory or Mines Departments, or the other organs of state), as did those of the Registrars of Friendly Societies in the late 19th century.¹ They were primarily concerned to carefully document the extent of welfare provisions, and to elucidate the principles around which both public and private services revolved.² Such functionaries tended to share the professionals' insistence on the need for the willing co-operation of industrial workers in benefit schemes,³ but were equally determined to implement the new 'scientific' studies of efficient management conducted during the early 20th century.⁴ From their testimonies we also receive a coloured vision of welfare, with the more acceptable face of both welfare and industry encouraged and any conflicts (particularly those which threatened managerial order), usually portrayed as regressive.⁵ Although we can establish a more balanced picture of welfare growth, it is only on rare occasions that employers are directly criticised for their lack of initiative or treatment of labour.

Thus any review of the fragmented and uneven secondary sources which provide the basis for detailed investigation, should illustrate the problems in the way of such research. There are not only distinct emphases and distortions between the groups chiefly responsible for much of the literature, but also a more profound bias towards an image of the industrial order which ultimately derives from management and administration -- whether in industry or in government. Even professional and official reservations fail to take into account the crucial perspective in industrial

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7. See A.O. Martin, Welfare at Work Batsford (1967) London, pp36-45, and passim, for a recent example of professional guidance.
 1. E.W. Brabrook, Provident Societies and Industrial Welfare (1898) London, is one important contribution by a Registrar of Friendly Societies.
 2. See Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for 1920 Cmd.1403 (1921), particularly p81-82, for example.
 3. Particularly true of Health of Munition Workers' Committee during First War. See Welfare Supervision Cd.8151 (1916), p4.

welfare: namely, the different motives of employers funding these provisions and the responses of those for whom the services were designed. Only occasionally do such sources give insights into the very real resistance which employers encountered when attempting to introduce welfare in certain sections of industry, and the bitter conflicts that sometimes resulted from welfare supervision.¹ Whilst the underlying assumptions continued to favour management objectives, there was no critical assessment of how these could be sustained through welfare and how employers were attempting to deploy different strategies of welfarism.

At least part of the blame for our limited understanding of welfare development must be laid on business historians who have neglected this area of employers' activities. Although there have been impressive refinements of the 'structural' approach to business evolution,² there remain very few histories of management growth since the 19th century.³ Those accounts of personnel management suffer from many similar flaws as the standard view of industrial welfare, frequently being written by authors with a professional interest in management training.⁴

Similarly, the important studies of industrial relations and employers' associations which have arisen since the time of the Donovan Commission, have given us a better understanding of managerial and organisational labour policies.⁵ Yet very little is said about industrial welfare, with the significant exception of writers such as Wigham, Gospel and Hay.⁶ The latter has also contributed to a growing literature dealing with the political and social history of British employers, which is vital background for any detailed analysis of welfare innovations.⁷

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4. Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research Cd.8336 (1916), pp41-42, for note on industrial welfare research of Proud and others.
 5. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1913 Cd.7491 (1914), p70, for example; see also Welfare and Welfare Supervision in Factories HMSO (1919, 1931), for widely circulated pamphlet on welfare administration.
 1. W.B. Owen, 'Welfare Work Among Men' Welfare Work I (1920), p166.
 2. A.D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure M.I.T. Press (1961) Mass.
 3. S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management Pelican (1969);
L. Hannah, 'Managerial Innovation and the Rise of the Large-Scale Company in Interwar Britain' Economic History Review XXVII (1974).
 4. F.H.C. Brook, Personnel Management and Welfare Burke (1952) London;
c.f. J. Child, British Management Thought Macmillan (1969) London.

The main disadvantages of this work for our purposes, is the very uneven attention given to industrial welfare, and the degree to which both private and public schemes have been affected by the economic conditions prevailing in industry.¹ Attention has been generally confined to a small number of large and powerful employers or business leaders, who are inevitably unrepresentative of the broad mass of employers and whose opinions often differed from the lesser men around them. Such industrial magnates and the organisations' leadership also tended to operate nearer to central government, and their activities contrast quite sharply with local provincial industrialists.² Moreover, the examination of political and social movements amongst businessmen has also been generally carried out by researchers reluctant to confront major theoretical problems in analysing social relations and who therefore slip into a conventional framework of explanation.³

It is precisely this atheoretical and fragmented approach to the history of employer activities, that accounts for the compartmentalised and disjointed picture of industrial welfare development since the 19th century. The conservative bias of such an approach, with its avoidance of any discussion of fundamental interests and antagonisms in economy and society, remains one of the major obstacles to any reappraisal of the role of welfare in industrial management. Any fresh discussion must therefore begin with the basic theoretical analysis of productive relations, and then attempt some definition of

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5. V.G. Munns and W.E.J. McCarthy, Employers' Associations Royal Commission Research Papers No.7 (1967) HMSO; see also work of Fox, Child and Bain cited elsewhere.
 6. E. Wigham, The Power to Manage: A History of the Engineering Employers' Federation Macmillan (1973) London; H.F. Gospel, "Employer Organizations: Their Growth and Function in the British System of Industrial Relations, 1918-1939" Ph.D. Thesis (L.S.E. 1973); J.R. Hay, 'Government policy towards labour in Britain, 1900-14: some further considerations' Journal of Scottish Labour History Society X (1976).
 7. R. Hay, 'Employers and social policy in Britain: the evolution of welfare legislation, 1905-14' Social History II No.4 (January 1977); see also A.R. Illersic, Parliament of Commerce Macmillan (1960) London, and K.D. Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History Macmillan (1974) London.
 1. H.F. Gospel, 'Employers' Labour Policy..' Business History XXI No.2 (July 1979), pp180-95, is one exception.

industrial welfare - an important but little-discussed aspect of welfare evolution.

This study departs from the orthodox surveys of welfare development in focusing on the basic Marxist distinction between forces and relations of production.¹ Capitalist production is characterised by contradictions and conflicts which make accumulation and control central features of organised output.² In the period of monopoly capitalism the need for greater accumulation and tighter control of labour was originally expressed in a series of innovations which Braverman identified as 'scientific management'.³ This element of conscious manipulation and the deliberate creation of managerial hierarchies has also been stressed (to the point of exaggeration), by Marglin's account of management during and after industrialisation.⁴

At the same time that capital required labour's subordination within the labour or work process, the nature of the market economy - particularly in the earlier stages of industrial growth - meant that labour demand was not constant over long periods. Thus the securing of an adequate labour supply outside the workplace, and the achievement of efficiency and discipline inside, was limited by dislocations of market conditions as well as by the active resistance of labour itself. Even if increasing supervision and management control offset the disadvantages of suppressing creative initiative in the labour process, and even if organised and spontaneous resistance was contained, there was still the problem of shifting market demand and structural changes within the economy itself. Therefore the quest for control continues along with capitalist production, and many of the initiatives

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2. See R. Gray, 'Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain' in J. Blöomfield (ed.), Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party Lawrence & Wishart (1977) London, for some discussion of local capital.
 3. G. Alderman, 'The National Free Labour Association...' International Review of Social History XXI No.3 (1976), is one example.
 1. M. Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism Routledge (1948, 1967 ed) London, p7, and passim.
 2. E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory Merlin (1968) London, pp170-71, 174-75, and passim.
 3. H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital Monthly Review Press (1974) New York, p90, and passim.
 4. S.A. Marglin, 'What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production' Review Radical Political Econom

intended to increase output and rates of exploitation, only provoked fresh conflicts which challenged management authority.

It follows that we must define and situate industrial welfare within this general context of capitalist production and hierarchical management. Previous attempts to deal with the connotations of the term 'welfare state', have usually been influenced by the implicit valuation and moral imperatives of 'welfare'.¹ Even if Titmuss accurately diagnoses the difficulties of assuming welfare services do in fact benefit everyone, he drifts into a very loose and generalised description of what welfare comprises.²

The cruder histories of industrial welfare growth offer only a bland optimistic definition, which indeed assumes that simple description of services and the assurance that they assisted employees, is sufficient.³ Sophisticated statistical surveys conducted in the 1950s were very conscious of recent welfare state advances, and tended to define private industrial services only in relation to legislative enactments.⁴ One study adopted the criteria of legal obligation to describe 'non-obligatory benefits', although these were then divided into facilities approximating to official provisions or 'direct benefits'.⁵ There were also qualifications as to the term of administration, the agencies involved in distribution, and various other considerations.⁶

It would seem that industrial welfare is more satisfactorily seen in relation to production, rather than as an appendage of a monolithic welfare state. One conclusive reason being the prior existence of employee benefits and their successful operation in a period when government made no equivalent provision, and when such concepts as 'social security' were still to be developed. This is not to say that the empirical

4. VI No.2 (1974), pp34-35, 46, 50, etc.

1. See A. Briggs, 'The History of Changing Approaches to Social Welfare' in E.W. Martin (ed.), Comparative Development in Social Welfare Allen & Unwin (1972) London, particularly p10-11.

2. R.M. Titmuss, Essays on 'the Welfare State' Allen & Unwin (1969) London, pp26-27, 50-51.

3. W.H. Watkinson, 'How Welfare Began: Historical Survey...' in Blaney Thomas (ed.), Welfare in Industry Caxton (1949) London, pp9-10, 14.

4. I.L.O., loc. cit. LXXVIII (1958).

content of these services can be overlooked, or the explicit motivation of the employers disregarded. One serious deficiency already emphasised, is the lack of empirical studies of either such benefits or the intentions of their architects. Yet the evidence of welfare schemes and the variations of services and apparent purpose, must be balanced by a critical recognition of the objective functions of these amenities.

In rather crude terms it can be suggested that each welfare service is designed, or functions, to meet the basic labour requirements of the employer: namely, supply, efficiency and discipline. The way in which these needs are conceived and the methods by which they can be secured, will depend upon a wide range of different conditions. Those services intended as and fulfilling the requirement for supply of manpower and creation of immediate labour markets, may be characterised as 'infrastructural' facilities. Benefits and provisions geared to improving efficiency and output, can be term 'efficiency-orientated', and may include a range of items from physical facilities to incentive amenities. Innovations which are primarily framed to sustain or improve the discipline and control of the workforce, may be seen as 'strategic' welfare services.

It should be immediately clear that these distinctions can refer only to those fundamental tendencies discernable within welfare provisions, rather than any absolute qualities inherent in them. The concept of 'efficiency', for example, is as firmly rooted in bourgeois ideology as that of 'discipline', and neither can be taken as a valuation shared by all those engaged in production. Similarly, the intentions of the employer in building houses or approving discretionary payments to supervisory employees, may be quite distinct, but housing might be utilised to enforce discipline whilst personal rewards could improve the supply of key grades or raise output. We must always qualify our definitions of what constitutes industrial welfare by reference to the content of the services, the objectives of the management, and the observable consequences within production. Employers were

5. I.L.O., LXXVII (1958), pp554-55.

6. Ibid.; I.L.O., LXXVIII (1958), p389.

only able to perceive labour actions according to their own ideological assumptions, and were only equipped to control labour within the terms of the contractual relationship entailed in the payment of wages.¹ Therefore in depicting the evolution of industrial welfare, it is important to emphasise limits of bourgeois perceptions both in assessing their effectiveness within a historical context and in appraising such concepts as 'labour efficiency' in our analysis of economic change. Otherwise there is a danger of adopting the language of managerialist welfare employers, however critical we may be of their activities in practice.

Having suggested that welfare services generally are introduced in accordance with the employer's perceptions of economic labour requirements, it is useful to underline the basis of industrial relations. The wage contract remains the most significant element in even the most impressive welfarist enterprises, and operates more as a supplement to such payment rather than as a real alternative. Even if welfare was generated by altruistic motives, and even if it succeeded (as it was often intended to do) in moralising this relationship, the essential character of that unequal bargain remained unchanged. The welfare relationship reflected rather than superseded this inequality, inserting personal services into the hierarchical organisation of management and thereby sustaining business influence.

Beyond the problems of constructing an adequate definition of welfare, there remains the question of whether industrial welfare belongs to a particular stage of capitalist development. Most standard accounts of economic development, orthodox or radical, say very little about welfare.² Brandes argues that American welfare capitalism was a response to the rapid and unregulated growth during industrialisation, bridging the possessive and aggressive individualism of the 19th century with the modern corporate bureaucracies of the New Deal era.³ Even in the American context this appears a highly contentious argument (given the extent of private schemes in the 1950s-60s), and is

1. The gradual relaxation of Master and Servant legislation and the abolition of Trucking are fully discussed in the thesis.

2. Baran & Sweezy, op. cit., p63, for example.

3. Brandes, op. cit. p146-47

certainly not an accurate reflection of the British experience. The problem arises once again from perceiving business welfare only in terms of subsequent (and unforeseen) developments within the state, rather than treating industrial services as distinct phenomenon which emerged from the conscious activities and choices of employers at different periods.

This line of argument also tends to imply that welfarism is an integrated and homogeneous movement, which manifests itself in predictable forms of provision. Yet the most cursory examination of amenities indicates that the housing and trucking investments during the industrial revolution were very different from the efficient personnel facilities of post-1945. Indeed, it seems probable that during an initial stage of industrialisation there will be an emphasis on infrastructural provisions, later shifting to more efficiency-orientated amenities as competition for the products increase, or to strategic benefits as industrial relations deteriorate and change. Moreover, each of these stages will depend upon particular productive and market conditions, as well as upon the balance of forces within the labour process and the industry as a whole. The scope for improving efficiency through welfare will be affected by the responses of the workforce as well as the resources of capital. There is always the risk that welfare will prove too costly, will be ineffective, or will itself provoke a deterioration in relations. The overall qualitative change from heavy infrastructural in, say, housing and drainage, to a stress on canteens or profit-bonuses, will only occur in particular instances when conditions favour the transition.

The other main point to note is the continuing qualitative differences within welfare provision, and the sharp distinction to be made between employers favouring basic subsidised facilities such as meals or recreational pursuits, to the progressives advocating incorporative profit-sharing and co-partnership arrangements. Although it may be possible to suggest explanations for alternative approaches to welfarism, over time and in distinct industries and areas, the diversities even between similar firms must raise questions about valid generalisation. It also highlights the importance of personal initiative and such non-economic factors as social philosophy or political connexion.

Rather than positing a general drift from 'paternalistic' welfare to more economic and then co-operative schemes, as some authorities do,¹ it is preferable to keep this differentiation in view. There were always powerful economic considerations in benefit schemes, and always the specific conditions of each enterprise and its industrial relations to consider. This factors continued despite increasing urbanisation and self-help organisation, with a change in focus by employers to fresh questions of efficiency and labour control. Their responses diverged according to their resources and the managerial initiatives they were able to devise within plants and trades.

Finally, if we are to construct a model of welfare evolution which can be applied within a historical context of British industrial growth, it is essential to recognise the wider changes occurring in the organisation of production itself. The rise of systematic management can be dated from the final decades of the 19th century, although in some sectors there had been advances much earlier.² Welfare innovations were an important current in this refinement of management controls, and were themselves increasingly planned and graded in accordance with more modern 'personnel' theories. At the same time, however, employers retained a pragmatic and often personal style of management which treated the more elaborate versions of 'scientific' and personnel management, with equal scepticism. Whilst employers began to accept the need for professionalism in management (including labour organisation), they were not noticeable for their radical reforms before the Second World War.³

Having indicated some tentative themes in the development of industrial welfare, there remain the problems of period, method and sampling techniques. It is assumed that employers were ultimately responsible for the introduction of welfare schemes in industry, and that any survey must explore their motives and initiatives rather than the responses of labour to understand the spread of such schemes. One important

1. I.L.O., 'The International Development of the Industrial Welfare or Personnel Movement' I.L.R. X (1924), pp48-58, for example.

2. B.F. Duckham, 'The Emergence of the Professional Manager in the Scottish Coal Industry..' Business History Review XLIII (1969).

3. Hannah, loc. cit., (1974).

period for both economic and organisational changes appears to have been the decades between 1880 and 1920. Technical innovations were complemented by changes in the scale and structure of many leading concerns, as well as the growth in sophistication of management.¹ These changes did not create the modern 'corporate' economy in Britain, which arose from the interwar period,² but they did signify a fresh response to problems of competitive production and labour management by British employers. It is to that era which we must look for the transition from personal to professional management control in large sections of the economy, and the growth of industry-wide collective bargaining amongst employers. Both contributed to the changing character of labour relations which was evident in this period, and the attitudes of employers to problems of labour resistance and control.

These trends were very unevenly developed across both industries and areas, as well as having often a quite distinct chronology within particular sectors of the capitalist economy. It is advisable to adopt a broadly comparative approach to industrial changes, therefore, which can trace the pattern of welfare innovation in alternative firms and occupations. The difficulties of any long-term comparative analysis are well known, and the identification of key variables makes any dynamic comparison very complex.³ At the same time, studies such as those by Erikson have shown how fruitful such research can prove, and scholars have recently advocated its adoption for studies of industrial relations between sectors as well as between countries.⁴

This comparative approach can be extended beyond an enterprise or industry examination, to the contrast of quite distinct geographical and economic regions. The advantages and difficulties confronting any such work, and the theoretical debates involved in defining such regions are again well known to economists.

1. D.S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development C.U.P. (1969), pp302-07, for example.
2. See L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy Methuen (1976) London, chapter 2 for discussion of developments before 1914.
3. S. Thrupp, 'The Role of Comparison in the Development of Economic Theory' Journal of Economic History XVII No.4 (1957), p555, for exa
4. C.K. Erkson, Steel and Hosiery C.U.P. (1959)

Unless the economic historian attempts to chart regional growth and variations, as well as technical or sector changes, we receive a distorted impression of monolithic national industries which bear very little resemblance to the variegated reality.¹ Such factors as labour and housing markets need to be viewed in local and regional contexts, as do the supply and demand conditions of many industries. If it is correct to assume that the structure and labour requirements of different trades will create distinctive welfare provisions, then presumably regions dominated by a specific range of industries and skills will do likewise. Similarly, if there are marked regional differences within industries, then these may also have some bearing on the style of welfare pursued.²

Not should the comparative method be restricted to consideration of merely economic factors and industrial relations within or between regions. Palmer has pointed out that the 'efficiency' crusade in the U.S.A. took on the character of a social movement amongst employers, and scientific management should be viewed in the broader context of bourgeois hegemony within both economy and civil society.³ Similarly, business welfare was shaped by a range of factors outside of the labour process or immediate management hierarchy. Among these the agencies of industrial benefits were of real significance, particularly in the actual administrative character of welfare. Employers were able to call upon an increasing number of bodies as state reforms generated a host of insurance mutuels, legal advisers and allied expertise. Particularly prominent as initiators and promoters of strategic welfare arrangements were the employers' organisations marshalled against the advancing claims of labour after 1880. Quite different were the great numbers of friendly societies sponsored by employers although often run by employees inside their works. The comparison

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1. H.W. Broude, 'The Significance of Regional Studies for the Elaboration of National Economic History' Journal Economic History XX (1960), p593, for this point.
 2. See E.H. Hunt, Regional Wage Variations in Britain 1850-1914 O.U.P. (1973), concluding chapter, for discussion.
 3. B. Palmer, 'Class, Conception and Conflict: The Thrust for Efficiency, Managerial Views of Labor and the Working Class Rebellion, 1903-22' Review Radical Political Economics (1975), pp33-35, 39-41, 44.

of agencies and tendency for associations to favour inter-firm district schemes with strategic implications, suggests that sensitivity in our delineation of 'welfare' is equally crucial outside the enterprise. Such terms as paternalism or benevolence, do not begin to encompass the different levels at which both employers and welfare operate.

Another dimension in the administration of services outside the confines of the individual concern, was the scope given by some employers for facilities within the local area or 'community'. In the earliest days of industrialisation, when capitalists were often responsible for the erection of public sanitation and utilities as well as housing, then such welfare commitments were virtually forced upon them.¹ These duties were often sustained and extended during the mid-19th century, although it is true that speculative building reduced their housing burdens in many cases. During the later decades of the century, employers seem to have displayed an increasing awareness of wider social problems, as well as responding to local needs.² The work of such men as Booth and Rowntree should be seen partly as the response of an articulate business community to increasing tensions and perennial problems, rather than simply the individual missions of enlightened social reformers.³

One consequence of this increasing awareness of dangerous social ills, which was sharpened by the experiences of the 1880s and 1890s, was the increased activity of employers and managers inside and outside their enterprises. Such commitments ranged from endowing working men's institutes and clubs, to the institution of relief funds, to the work within voluntary organisations and official bodies like Charity Organisation Society and Poor Law. The funding of religious, educational and recreational amenities by employers should be seen in this light, rather than as expressions of philanthropy detached from any worldly concerns. Preservation of social bonds in the

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1. See J.R. Hume & J. Butt, 'Muirkirk 1786-1802: The creation of a Scottish industrial community' Scottish Historical Review XLV. (1966); and Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp231-42, for examples.
 2. J. Brown, "Ideas concerning social policy and their influence on legislation in Great Britain, 1902-11" Ph.D. Thesis (London, 1964), pp55-56, 127-28, for some background on business attitudes.
 3. See Hay, *loc. cit.*, (1977), for similar argument.

locality was one way in which employers could fulfill their ideals of the stable community and also ensure a framework for the operation of local labour markets. Welfare institutes structured the leisure activities of those in employ, whilst pensions or relief funds (including benefits given by sponsored friendly societies), could keep intact a labour force out of work. Thus many of the issues occupying social reformers at a national level were encountered and dealt with by many businessmen within the local area.

The concept of the contented community drew upon the ideology of the garden city current during these decades, just as employers were influenced by the growing literature and debate on the 'condition of England' during the late 19th century. The spreading ideology of industrial welfare was neither insulated from such diverse pressures nor was it internally consistent over a period of time. At its most coherent, welfare ideology formed part of the 'human factor' movement in industry and management theory. This movement constituted a parallel theme to the better-known campaign for scientific and systematic management in Britain.¹ Its principles were simply the recognition of the human dimension within the labour process, and the favouring of schemes which reduced labour resistance by improving working conditions and enhancing workers' participation in low levels of management or administration.²

The highly pragmatic way in which employers and managers continued to operate, however, shows that any rigid separation of principles or activities is likely to distort the real picture. One difficulty with such classifications as 'paternalist' or 'liberal' or 'enlightened', is that such terms refer more to a style or vision of administrative authority than to specific schemes or principles. There were certainly variations between the traditionalist and autocratic projects of some paternalists, and those implementing rationalist managerial welfare architects.³

1. See A. Pugh, 'Science Applied to Industry: The Human Factor' Journal Institute Industrial Psychology II No.8 (1924-25), for an example of interaction of these movements.

2. See E. Cadbury, loc. cit. (1914), as one example of trend.

3. N.P. Gilman, A Dividend to Labour: A Study of Employers' Welfare Institutions Houghton Mifflin (1899) New York, for a discussion; A. Ascher, 'Baron von Stumm, advocate of Feudal Capitalism'

These differed again from the more radical progressives who strongly favoured employee participation in both welfare and the enterprise, sometimes to the extent of worker directors and co-partnership.¹ Yet it is equally clear that some of the most progressive experimenters were the staunchest defenders of managerial prerogatives against the claims of trade unionism and genuine co-operative control of schemes.² Even highly cohesive groups such as the Quaker employers, who combined moral fervour with material efficiency, changed markedly in their welfare philosophy over the decades after 1900.³ Less self-conscious businessmen were unlikely to adhere to an unchanging doctrine of welfare ideas and practice where such articulate pioneers failed. There continued to be a variety of opinions on what were the important elements in the 'human factor', and a shifting set of welfare strategies which drew upon and coloured wider business ideology.

One theme shared by management theorists and social reformers was the need for national efficiency, with the influential government pamphlet on welfare observing in 1919-20:⁴

Welfare work has a wider importance... than its contribution to industrial efficiency. From the point of view of the Nation as a whole, the several branches of welfare work have an important bearing on the national health.

The impact of such ideological fragments on actual state policy, must be regarded as more limited than some historians have suggested.⁵ Much more appealing is the argument that the common objectives of private and public welfare services have been given far too little attention.⁶ Certainly, it is impossible

3. Journal Central European Affairs XXII (1962), pp271-74, for one example of neo-feudal paternalism.

1. See the case of Thomson in chapter five below.

2. S. Pollard & J. Turner, 'Profit-Sharing and Autocracy: T.C. Taylor and Co. of Batley' Business History XVIII (1976), for example.

3. J. Child, 'Quaker Employers and Industrial Relations' Sociological Review XII (1964), pp293-96, and passim.

4. Welfare and Welfare Supervision, op. cit., p4.

5. G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency Blackwell (1971) Oxford, for example.

6. See J.R. Hay, The Development of the British Welfare State 1880-1978 Arnold (1978) London, for a limited exploration.

to fully explain the complexion of business welfare evolution unless some reference is made to the character of social policy during this and later periods. Unless research can demonstrate the particular areas where state and employers divided or shared responsibilities for specific services, then we will continue to operate with highly artificial abstractions of what constitutes 'welfare' - or indeed, what constitutes the economy and state. The regions of welfare provision were not necessarily distinct, any more than the state inevitably reflected or reinforced the functioning of the capitalist economy.¹ Rather, the state comprised the arena in which such conflicts - between agencies and ideologies as well as between interested groups - were expressed and resolved.

In order to achieve some insight into the degree of negotiation and concession which welfare innovation involved, it is necessary to examine the responses of employers and businessmen to a host of legislation which touched their economic interests directly and indirectly. The levels at which they did respond increased over time, with the moral force of agitations (whether of the Attwood or Cobden variety), exchanged for systematic discussion with both Parliament and civil service. Here the full complexity of hegemony becomes evident, as business groups balanced local support of private organisations in civil society (such as the autonomous friendly societies), against the economic imperatives and tactical considerations evident in their dealings with the central government. Welfare formed a significant aspect of such negotiation and its evolution indicated the complexity of accommodation reached. There was no simple transition from voluntary to legal welfare, or from private to statutory burdens, but a mutual stimulus towards alternative arrangements.

This discussion of working definitions, periodisation, suitable methods and key areas of focus, leaves us with the problem of which employers to study and the basis for sampling different enterprises. The question here is not so much whether such Marshallian concepts as the 'representative firm' are a valid approach, but whether the empirical data ever allows a truly

1. C.f. I. Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State Macmillan (1979) London, pp44-46, and passim, for a somewhat schematic analysis.

representative sample of firms to emerge.¹ Since only the larger and better-organised of employers compile and preserve detailed business records, and only those which survive and allow access to their sources are within the researcher's grasp, there is an almost inevitable bias against the smaller and less successful enterprise. There is very little way of knowing, for example, whether the small employer was more generous and devoted more of his resources to welfare than his larger rival. Again, it is very difficult to assess (even where detailed sources do survive), whether welfare helped or hindered the progress of a business and the efficiency of its labour force.

These data and sampling problems can be partly overcome by the scope for comparisons within a batch of large concerns, or by relative comparison of medium and very large firms. Moreover, one of the key arguments must revolve around the relationship between economic domination (measured by, say, market share) and industrial leadership in welfarism. If there are important links between major trends such as growth in scale, technical innovation and managerial innovations,² then we might expect these to also affect the scope of welfare provision.

Secondly, it is quite futile to complain of the absence of detailed accounts for measuring labour efficiency or workforce morale, when the employer himself could not or would not compile such records. Only the most advanced businessmen, such as Cadbury at Bourneville, had begun to register annual labour turnover and absenteeism due to ill-health or fatigue. This in itself formed an important chapter in management techniques, along with systematic cost-accounting and workshop organisation.³ What we are dealing with are the everyday perceptions and practical experiences of employers only dimly aware of cruder orthodoxies and innocent of the more rigorous management principles. These practical observations may have been limited or mistaken, but they were the only basis for welfare investments in very many cases.

Thirdly, it is as important to trace the qualitative differences in welfare between businesses, as to measure any quantitative

1. L. Robbins, 'The Representative Firm' Economic Journal XXXVIII (1928), pp387-91, and passim for a critique.

change in facilities between the size or structure of individual companies. It would seem likely that whatever the respective resources ploughed into services, the larger units would possess a more carefully organised, graded and managerialist type of scheme than the small plant. With the growth in scale and changes in hierarchical organisation, as well as within the labour process itself through technology or manning, industrial relations and the shape of welfare would alter considerably. Not only would a company canteen and restaurant become feasible, but the segregation of grades and sexes would also appear a rational reinforcement of workplace hierarchies.

Thus whilst the samples which one can obtain are less than scientific, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the limitation of sources is itself without significance or that very useful conclusions can't be reached on the basis of available materials. Generally, there has been a strong emphasis on business and association records in the survey, combined with government reports, official publications and such printed data as newspapers and specialist journals. Very little study has been made of political papers and the response of labour to welfare schemes has only been mentioned where it affects the employers' initiatives.

Finally, some brief outline of the chapters with the industries and regions chosen must suffice as a general guide to the thesis itself. Since there has been a great amount of attention paid to the lighter consumer industries, which arguably formed part of Britain's second wave of industrialisation during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, these have been largely excluded on the grounds that the welfare activities of prominent employers in many such trades have already been identified.¹ For the purposes of the research, the term 'industrial employer' covers mainly mining and manufacturing industries with a limited number of services included also. There is no survey of financial, commercial, or sea-going services, nor is there any discussion of state civil service as an employer - even though the last

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2. Hannah, 'Managerial Innovation..' loc. cit., p256 and passim.
 3. See L.H. Jenks, 'Early Phases of the Management Movement' Administrative Science Quarterly V (1960); for a discussion.
 1. Child, loc. cit.; S. Yeo, Religion and Voluntary Organisation in Crisis (1976) London, for study of Huntley & Palmers, as example.

two sectors mentioned were amongst the most impressive of early welfare innovators.¹ Most of the trades and firms were grouped in the heavy industries and in areas of the country far-removed from the idyllic settings of Bourneville or Port Sunlight, and there can be little complaint that the study is biased towards known progressive occupations.

The chapter on shipbuilding attempts to isolate those economic factors which contributed to the growth of industrial benefits, and the restrictions which the structure of the labour force placed upon such initiatives. Since the construction of iron and steel vessels served as the mainspring of industrial progress after 1870, it is not surprising that acute labour shortages in specific skills were frequently experienced. One method of resolving long-term problems was to construct housing and other amenities to attract artisans into particular areas of the Clyde district. It is only from a detailed investigation of business conditions that the alternatives facing employers and the motives for the welfare solution become apparent.

The assessment of industrial relations and welfare responses likewise requires a thorough knowledge of the basis of conflict and negotiation in different trades, revolving around the different issues of labour control. In comparing shipbuilding with the related but distinct sector of engineering, it is possible to explain the similar facilities devised in each trade and the particular emphasis given to supervision in both industries. In each case managerial and association strategies played a crucial role in promoting the more sophisticated schemes seen before and during the First World War.

Whereas heavy engineering and shipbuilding are sufficiently alike to create overlaps in welfare ideas and practices, the survey of quite different sectors in the west Scotland regional economy indicates that welfarism was not confined to certain trades or employers. What does emerge from the detailed comparison of iron and steel, railways, light industries and retailing, is the degree of qualitative variation in provision and administration across trades. Welfare was fitted not merely to the labour requirements of the firms but also to the values which these businessmen wished to promote.

1. J. Press, 'The merchant seamen's fund, 1747-1851' Journal of Transport History V No.2 (1979), for example.

The selection of suitable regions for comparison is more difficult: there is always as much to contrast as to compare in any areas complex enough to possess a variety of internal markets and attain a considerable degree of autonomy within the national economy. Comparing regions which are perhaps too alike, such as coalmining regions of South Wales and Fife, are of limited value given the dominance of one industry. The contrast between the South West of England and industrial Lancashire, on the other hand, offers too few points of contact. Consequently the west of Scotland is compared with the West Riding conurbation of Leeds and Bradford, and the most obvious sectors deployed in the study. It certainly seems possible that the growth of industrial welfare would follow the broad contours of economic development, from early labour supplies and housing projects to the later schemes devised by the organisations of employers.

The following chapters adopt the thematic approach partly discussed earlier, with a comparison of the agencies of welfare in both regions and the trends in recruitment to alternative schemes. This is followed by an exploration of the 'communities' created or sustained by business welfare in quite distinct areas of the country, and the competing efforts of different groups within the locality. Particular attention is given to the transformation of property relations and the spread of protests such as rent strikes before 1920. The ideology of employers' welfare is discussed with reference to particular 'types' of employers, and the shifts within the welfare movement discussed. Finally, there is a general comparison of the different responses of businessmen to state welfare in these decades, and the formulation of private schemes at both company and association levels.

At each stage of the discussion there is an effort to balance sufficient empirical detail with arguments capable of broader application. A summary of the main conclusions is given in the final chapter.

Chapter Two: Economic factors and the development of industrial welfare: an examination of one industry.

Industrial welfare provided by firms in the Clyde Shipbuilding Industry.

The examination of any economic activity must begin with the analysis of production itself, distinguishing the particular mode of production from the stage reached by the forces of production.¹ The capitalist mode of production involves not only the appropriation of nature and natural resources, but also the exploitation of labour-power by capitalist employers.² By progressive division of labour and its utilisation along with various labour-saving devices, manufacturing is made more efficient.³ Yet it took the introduction of decentralised power sources and technical innovation of machine tools to secure the transition from Manufacturing to Modern Industry, and the subsequent construction of a modern industrial economy.⁴

There is an important relationship of course, between the progress of productive forces and market conditions. As various economists from the time of Adam Smith have noted, the division of labour (and the associated improvements in technique) depends upon the extent of the market.⁵ Since the ability to produce largely shapes the limits of demand, there is a general relationship between market demand, division of labour and volume of production.⁶

In exploring the progress of the whole economy, we can isolate a number of major themes: differentiation (or disintegration), specialisation, and convergence of technology. Young and Stigler have noted the tendency for production to become disintegrated as particular firms concentrated on peculiar products, once the

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1. Karl Marx, Capital I [Trans. and ed. by Moore & Aveling] Glaiser (1912) London p378.
 2. Ibid., p156-7; G. Stedman Jones, 'Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution' New Left Review XC (1975), p49-50.
 3. A. Allyn Young, 'Increasing Returns and Economic Progress' Economic Journal XXXVIII (1928), p530.
 4. Nathan Rosenberg, 'Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry; 1840-1910' Journal of Economic History XXIII (1963), p423; Marx, op. cit., p378.
 5. Young, loc. cit., p539.

market for such products had been established.¹ Specialisation of production is an adjunct of this differentiation, with whole enterprises and groups of workers now specialised in the production of certain goods previously made by general manufacturers.² Such specialisation is at least partly countered by a contrary tendency, that of increasing technological convergence and diffusion of particular methods amongst a range of trades.³

Besides these necessary variations in the progress of distinct industries, and the contrary tendencies towards differentiation and integration in production - as well as between specialisation and convergence in the methods of production - there are also absolute contradictions.⁴ These arise partly from the antagonisms inherent in the mode of production, with its reduction of labour to a commodity form,⁵ and partly from the competitive organisation of production.⁶ This is frequently expressed in the disequilibrium of market demand and the coincidence of high production and underconsumption.

Such general patterns of development can only provide the basis for understanding some features of industrialisation, and further analysis of the labour process within each specific industry is still necessary. Although the Marshallian distinction between internal and external economies to the firm, and the focus upon the firm as the basis of an industry, may be untenable as an explanation of economic change,⁷ it is still important to distinguish between those trends affecting the economy as a whole and those shaping particular industries or individual enterprises. The expansion and growth of an industry, and its average profitability, will be reflected in the varying patterns of

6. Ibid.

1. Ibid., p537; George Stigler, 'The Division of Labour is Limited by the Extent of the Market' Journal of Political Economy LXIX p189-90.

2. Young, loc. cit., p539.

3. Rosenberg, loc. cit., p422-25.

4. Marx, op. cit., p493.

5. Ibid., p165; Brighton Labour Process Group, 'The Capitalist Labour Process' Capital and Class I (1976), p3-4.

6. Marx, op. cit.

7. Stigler, loc. cit., p187; Rosenberg, loc. cit., p422.

investment, profitability, concentration and innovation within individual business units. The scale and structure of the firm, its methods of production, its management organisation, and its particular location and marketing channels, can vary very substantially within even specialised trades.

Thus, in examining the development of industrial welfare in Britain (or any other country) there are a wide variety of possible factors to consider. We must concentrate primarily upon the employer-labour relationship within the capitalist mode of production, since it is for the labourer and with a view to the labour market that the welfare is largely designed. The capitalist labour process demands not only the supply of value-producing (and therefore efficient) labour, but also its control in a setting of antagonistic social relations.¹

Having established the nature of the labour contract, attention can be given to broad changes in the whole economy and general developments in different industries. The market conditions of each industry will, as indicated above, shape the technology and division of labour within that sector. But since industrial welfare is usually provided by the individual enterprise or plant, variations in the position of that firm must be considered. There will be differences of approach between firms as well as between trades, although the nature and cause of this diversity is still questionable.

There has been little systematic study of industrial welfare in Britain, but Mathias gives a useful summary of the standard arguments concerning the origins and significance of late-19th century welfare provision.² He makes a sharp distinction between the traditional heavy industries and the 'new industries' based on consumer demand, writing that:³

in their own industries little pressure came from labour against technical change, and wage rates tended to be above average. Moreover, the prosperity of these new industries was not much involved in export markets...so that the minds of the employers was not as obsessed with the fear of low-cost production abroad.

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1. Marx, *op. cit.*, p423-4, 518-19; E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism' Past and Present XXXVIII p80.
 2. Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation Methuen (1969) London.
 3. Ibid., p375.

Although Mathias gives no sustained account of his argument, the comments suggest that he sees technical change, female labour, high wages, and managerial initiatives being fostered by a safe domestic market and the absence of organised opposition.

There are a number of weaknesses in this account, despite the superficial attraction of a contrast between 'old' and 'new' industries. Firstly, the argument is unspecific as to the relative importance of different factors and the particular markets referred to. The chemical manufacturers, for example, were often soap producers and yet were also exporters. Secondly, Mathias seems to be generalising on the basis of a few well-known examples. Perhaps the most credible case for welfarism in a domestic industry, that of the gas industry, is not mentioned. Thirdly, there is no real attempt to take account of the considerable qualitative and quantitative divisions within welfare provision - from the colliery housing row to the profit-sharing scheme. The fact that substantial industrial welfare was necessary in the coal industry substantially weakens the argument. Fourthly, there is little sense of welfare evolving over a period of time and in accordance with changing market and industrial conditions. Even Rowntree and Lever had their formative and creative periods of industrial welfare, in accordance with their needs.

The following discussion also emphasises the importance of market conditions and market size in welfare development, but places these in the context of trends discernible within one industry. Patterns of specialisation, differentiation and technological convergence are linked to the distribution of productive units, and the arguments for a growing concentration of manufacturing. Within the firm, there are four themes which need emphasis: the location of the enterprise, the technology and methods of production, the scale and structure of the firm, and the organisation of production (including the physical conditions of production). Particular attention must be given to the workforce - its age and sex, its skills, and its remuneration. For it is with the supply, efficiency and discipline of the workers that the employer is really concerned in the provision of the various services.

Industrial welfare and economic factors: a model of development.

The provision of industrial welfare will largely reflect the economic development of particular industries and firms operating in those industries. Formative influences will appear at both general and specific levels in the activities of the enterprise, indicating the responses of employers to productive forces and market conditions. The most basic consideration of employers must be the regulation and command of the labour market, and industrial welfare is designed primarily to achieve this end.¹ With the specialisation, differentiation and convergence of distinct industries, these labour needs will change over time although all employers share a common need for the supply, efficiency and discipline of labour.

The major influences on welfare will therefore be the main considerations of labour needs as perceived by different employers. These needs will be shaped by the geographical location of the productive units, the physical conditions of the industry, the techniques and working methods used, the different market conditions facing the employers (including various commodity markets and alternative labour markets), the costs of transport, the rates of wages, and other conditions impinging on the labour market. The ability of the individual employer to respond to his labour needs will likewise depend upon a number of factors. Available resources, profitability, investment trends, future competition (in goods and labour), the capital-labour ratio of the industry, productivity of labour, etc. The decision to invest precious resources in welfare projects will be assessed only after careful consideration of likely costs and benefits to the enterprise.

This assumes a capitalist rationale in the undertaking of his business on the part of the employer, but recognises the limitations of his subjective perceptions and the fallibility of business calculations and predictions. There will also be those qualitative differences in the form of industrial welfare provided, referred to in the previous chapter. Only where municipal provisions and housing amenities are deficient

1. E.D. Proud, Welfare Work Bell (1916), p83.

should we expect large-scale investment in infrastructural welfare services, such as housing, for example.

Within the limits of these qualifications, certain patterns of welfare activity can be suggested. A distinction is made between long-term welfare investment in capital projects, and short-term welfare expenditure on current services. It is likely that large scale projects will only be undertaken where serious labour market difficulties exist, and where resources permit such investment. Only the larger firm could envisage a move to an isolated location without community facilities, since transport and/or building costs would necessitate substantial overheads. Again, it is likely that the expansion of the firm (or its integration of other activities) would demand increased investment. Certain firms might solve the labour requirement by increasing the capital ratio, whilst others might provide the necessary housing or facilities as part of capital investment. Here the relationship between different market conditions is clear: in the absence of adequate housing provision by the private property market, the employer might meet his labour market requirements (directly dependant on market conditions for his products), by entering the housing market himself.

The physical conditions of production as well as the location of the firm must also figure. The explosives factory or chemical works may be required to find isolated locations, but any hazardous occupation (mining, railways, foundries) may find it worthwhile and efficient to institute improved working conditions and various accident services. The point is not to isolate a 'pure' welfare service, but to indicate the variety of services which went under the name of welfare.

The techniques of production, and the skills of the workforce will also have a direct bearing on the labour needs of the employer. These needs will be strategic (i.e. concerned with discipline) as well as solely economic, and the employer may be concerned with diluting skills as well as reducing the labour costs of his establishment. Welfare may be provided on a selective basis, for certain grades of the workforce, in order to facilitate control of these and other grades. Such regulation of the labour force was especially vital in periods

of rapid technical change, when the established skills of the workforce were being eroded and transformed by new methods of manufacturing and new patterns of work organisation.

Insofar as we can detect general themes in the growth of industries and economy, with the mutual stimulus of productive forces and market forces, we can also trace trends in welfare provision. The progress of industry implies certain improvements in the technology, organisation and control of production. Yet this progress involves the periodic de-stabilisation of settled methods, and dislocates production in various fields.¹ We can therefore view economic development in terms of contrary tendencies: between vertical disintegration and integration, between specialised manufacture and technological convergence, between concentration of resources and the fragmentation of competitive units, between the dilution of older expertise and skills and the creation of fresh skills. So whilst there may be long-term continuities in the advance of techniques, concentration, and expert knowledge, their practical implementation involves serious discontinuities for both employers and workmen.

Similar points can be made about the development of industrial welfare, which is directly affected by these contrary movements. Not only do changing conditions prescribe the fresh labour needs of the industry and the employers, but they also determine the scope of welfare response. With the spread of industrialisation and urbanisation, there was less pressure on employers to provide infrastructural services for their employees, but specific labour needs encouraged others in furnishing other services. The fact that labour needs were changing, meant that employers required both stability and mobility in their workforce. On one side

1. Marx, *op. cit.*, p344-5, 349-50, 493, etc., for discussion; Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital Monthly Review Press (1974) New York, p383-4; Young, *loc. cit.*, p533: '...the counter forces which are continually defeating the forces which make for economic equilibrium are more pervasive and more deeply rooted...Every important advance in the organisation of production...involves the fruits of scientific progress to industry, alters the conditions of industrial activity and initiates responses elsewhere in the industrial structure which in turn have an unsettling affect.'; C.f. Joseph Schumpeter, 'The Instability of Capitalism' Economic Journal XXXVIII (1928), p378-82, for an analysis of instability through innovation.

there was the need for a ready pool of adequate labour, and on the other the desire to shed labour according to fresh situations. The growth in scale and sophistication of an enterprise would undoubtedly achieve economies of scale and facilitate improved organisation of production. Yet there would also be problems of direct supervision and of adjusting to market demand. The managerial functions of organisation and labour regulation were therefore increased with the progress of industry, the growth in technology and scale necessitating division of labour at higher levels of the workforce.¹ This was again reflected in the provisions for and by those controlling industry, with staff administering as well as receiving welfare benefits.²

These observations lead to the hypothesis that industrial welfare is more likely to be provided by an advanced industry and a progressive firm than by a contracting industry and uncompetitive or declining enterprise. For if the spread of technology, the growth in scale, the evolution of management, and the increasing division of labour, are likely to lead to fresh problems of co-ordination and control, then we would expect the more advanced firms or trades to provide welfare and to administer it more systematically. Those firms which are expanding most rapidly and advancing most quickly would have particular labour requirements, and it is likely that welfare would be a serious consideration.

This hypothesis must be tempered by precisely the same considerations referred to earlier, namely, the contrary forces of development in the economy and particular industries and the possibility of innovations actually reducing the labour requirements of a firm (by increasing the capital-labour ratio).³

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1. P.L. Payne, British Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Macmillan (1974) London, p15.
 2. Ibid.; R. Blackburn, 'The New Capitalism' in (ed.), Ideology in Social Science Fontana (1975), p171, for discussion of some of the implications of managerialism and welfare provision.
 3. Of course, here again, industrial welfare might be provided on the basis of severance payments, pensions, and nominal employment.

The economic and geographic expansion of a firm may not be associated with technical changes, and an uncompetitive trade may be characterised by its labour-intensive methods and its increasing labour-capital ratio. Yet even the progressive firm with the shrinking labour force and the conservative company with relatively little capital investment, will see welfare as a calculable investment which has costs and benefits in regulating labour. The progressive firm may use welfare to facilitate changes, as the South Metropolitan did,¹ whilst the conservative employer may be exploiting an abundance of cheap labour with welfare. Here we are dealing with the fallibility of business foresight and motivation which, as Schumpeter insisted, is a key factor in economic decisions.²

This hypothesis is very different from that posed by Mathias. Rather than insisting on the peculiar conditions of certain 'new' industries, there is an emphasis on control of the labour market as moulded by the progressive division of labour and the advance of productive forces. Those industries and firms expanding more rapidly and with more resources were more likely to experience peculiar labour needs, and were better placed to utilise welfare as an instrument to improve the supply, efficiency and discipline of the workforce. It is true that many of the newer consumer industries were in this position but they were neither unique in their conditions nor uniform in their provisions. Their situation encouraged certain provisions - especially those concerned with hygiene and health - which were of little relevance in a coalmine or machine shop. In the latter there was a greater interest in efficient supervision and basic safety regulations by the employer, hence welfare was fashioned to meet quite different needs.³

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1. J. Melling, 'Industrial Strife and Business Welfare Philosophy...' Business History XXI No.2 (1979).
 2. Schumpeter, loc. cit., p380-2: 'There is, first, the "entrepreneurial" function as distinct from the mere "managerial" function ...the nature of which only shows up within the process of innovation....The process of innovation in industry by the agency of entrepreneurs supplies the key to all the phenomena of capital and credit.'
 3. E.T. Kelly (ed.), Welfare Work in Industry Welfare Workers' Institute/Pitman (1925) London, p3: 'The particular form which welfare work will take in a given firm depends largely on the size and

These arguments may be tested by reference to one of the heavy industries, which was not well-known for its welfare provision or for a history of stable industrial relations. The following discussion of the shipbuilding industry on Clydeside focuses upon the three themes: technology and methods of production; scale, structure and the distribution of productive units (usually firms); and the management and organisation of production.

The Clydeside shipbuilding industry: major features and development.

The development of the British shipbuilding industry can be explained largely in terms of favourable market conditions and the advantages of specialisation and technological convergence which shipbuilders derived from their own and other trades. Access to a large and growing market of mercantile marine and naval vessels in the years 1860-1880 allowed to British yards to achieve the supremacy they never lost before 1914.¹ With British mercantile tonnage comprising over one third of world marine afloat, and with British yards supplying 99% of this, the shipbuilders had an early advantage which their specialisation and expertise allowed them to exploit to the full.²

This specialisation of production took three forms: specialised building to order for customers who still demanded on personal specifications and customised vessels; specialisation between regions in particular kinds of vessels and orders; and specialisation

3. 'nature of the business. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it would be impossible to draw up a standardized scheme which would be suitable for all factories or even for different classes of factories...Nearly all successful welfare schemes have been the result of spontaneous growth from within the factory of business house itself.'

1. Sidney Pollard, 'British and World Shipbuilding, 1890-1914: A Study in Comparative Costs' Journal of Economic History XVII No.3 (1959), p444: 'The competitive advantage of British shipyards had its origins in the period 1860-1880, when no other major country save America...had the iron, steel, and engineering capacity to build modern steamers on a large scale. The advantage continued to 1914 because of three factors: access to a large market, which provided the opportunity for specialization, the full use of fixed capital, and external economies; the cheap supplies of the industry's raw materials...; and the skill and experience of management and men.'

2. Ibid., p428-32.

between firms in supplying particular kinds of ships.¹ Thus, Britain enjoyed the dual advantage of a highly competitive industry large enough to meet the bulk of world demand, whilst particular sectors specialised to such a degree that individual orders and particular vessels were the province of specific yards.² The division of labour between firms was facilitated by the extent of the market.³

The fluid state of shipbuilding in the mid-19th century allowed many entrepreneurs to contemplate a transfer of resources from engineering to shipbuilding,⁴ but with the disintegration of different trades and the specialisation in specific areas of construction this became less feasible.⁵ With the changeover from sail to steam, and from wood to iron and steel, the methods of production in shipbuilding also began to change quite dramatically.⁶ Ironworking techniques were quickly adapted to the arrival of steel in the 1880s, the latter having greater ductility, tensile strength and elasticity.⁷

These changes in the methods of production involved the erosion of the control which the woodworking trades had hitherto possessed over ship construction, with their peculiar customs of work organisation and payments systems.⁸ The resistance to change amongst the Thames wood trades (particularly the powerful Shipwrights), encouraged the movement of the industry to other rivers and Northern ports where raw materials were more accessible and labour was more flexible.⁹ The protean iron trades, epitomised in the arrival of the "black squad" in the shipyards, flourished in the unorganised areas of Tyneside, Clydeside and Belfast as the Thames slid into decline.¹⁰

This pattern of innovation, specialisation and relocation in the industry also had serious implications for the distribution

1. Sidney Pollard, "The Economic History of British Shipbuilding" Ph.D. Thesis (L.S.E., 1951), p75, 85: 'The output of British yards since 1870 consisted of a great variety of ships, and few yards could build them all. As soon as ships began to differ not only in size but also in general features and became specialised for certain specific duties, shipbuilders began to specialise too.... The high degree of specialisation achieved in this country was almost unique.'; Pollard, *loc. cit.*, p433.
2. P.L. Robertson, "The Management of Manpower in British Shipbuilding, 1870-1914..." Ph.D. Thesis (Wisconsin, 1972), p38-40, 47-9.
3. *Ibid.*, p130: 'Since most vessels were custom-built, there was little scope for techniques of mass production.'

of production between firms in the industry. With the transition from sail to steam and from timber to iron, the costs of the product and the means of financing its construction altered considerably.¹ The gangs of shipwrights and handicraftsmen who had laid the keel and constructed the wooden ships with basic tools, usually owned by themselves, were replaced by capitalist entrepreneurs who possessed sufficient capital to establish a shipyard and manufacture such a costly product as an iron steamship.² Subsequent increases in the size and sophistication of vessels, and the increasing differentiation of production processes, encouraged larger firms and a concentration of capital.³

At the same time, the contrary tendencies towards large-scale

4. 'Private Diaries of W.B. Nielson', UGD 10 5/1, p17 says of 1844 that: 'Seeing the number of railways that were being made in Scotland, and everything for them got in England I was determined to try to get some of the work for Scotland.'; and of 1852-3: 'I engaged James Reid, who was a draughtsman at Caird...as my foreman - he had no experience in locomotive work - but I had not yet decided to abandon the idea of ship building and marine work...'. Many shipbuilders did of course originate in engineering firms.
5. Robertson; op. cit., p222.
6. Pollard, op. cit., p500.
7. William S. Cormack, "An Economic History of Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering" Ph.D. Thesis (Glasgow, 1930), p150-51.
8. Pollard, op. cit., p141-2.
9. Sidney Pollard, 'The Decline of Shipbuilding on the Thames' Economic History Review III (1950-51), p81.
10. Ibid., p74-6.
1. Pollard, op. cit., p55, quotes Thompson to the effect: "With the coming of iron shipbuilding, the terms Shipbuilder, Ship, Shipyard and Shipowner, took on a new meaning. The Shipbuilder from being a working shipwright with a few hundred pounds, became a principal in a big industry." Also p62, for eclipse of the limited scope for self-made craftsmen to become employers in 19th century.
2. Robertson, op. cit., p62.
3. Ibid., p89-90, indicates the close ties between market demand, increasing capitalisation and growing mechanisation (particularly after 1870). Robertson notes that three factors affected the investment decisions of shipbuilders: '(1) the increasing size and complexity of vessels and (2) the resulting increase in differentiation, both of which worked towards greater use of capital equipment; and (3) the severity of the shipbuilding cycle which made yard owners wary of investing more than was absolutely necessary.'; Cormack, op. cit., p125.

production and increasing mechanisation on one side, and towards specialisation and differentiation on the other, ensured the survival of both handicraft methods of production and the fragmentation of business enterprise. In 1913 there were still over one hundred shipbuilding firms in Britain, with annual outputs ranging from 120 gross tons to almost 108,000 gross tons.¹ There was certainly a long-term trend towards greater output, with over half of British yards producing more than 20,000 g.t. by the outbreak of War and with the ten largest firms having about 40% of the market in the decade before 1914.² But the industry continued to be dominated by family firms, often specialising in one branch of the market and drawing upon little outside capital for their expansion.³ Thus we can say that the aggregate size of the shipbuilding firm was growing, but the structure and distribution of the enterprises remained fragmentary and uneven.

Similar points can be made on the organisation and management of production in the various shipyards, which was complicated by the integration and overlap of shipbuilding with engineering and boilermaking, as well as by the differentiation of trades and processes in the industry.⁴ The key problems of management were those of co-ordinating and controlling a heterogeneous workforce in a workplace and a labour process which did not lend itself to linear organisation or easy supervision.⁵ Growth in scale and sophistication of business structure meant the refinement of management techniques in many industries,⁶ but in shipbuilding these techniques had to be adapted to the peculiar needs of a highly complex productive process controlled by a large number of family firms.

Consequently there were important, if necessarily more limited, developments in shipyard management and organisation in the later 19th century, with employers often learning from the significant

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1. Robertson, op. cit., p46.
 2. Ibid., p46-47.
 3. Pollard, op. cit., p56-63.
 4. A.L. Bowley and G. Wood, 'The Statistics of Wages...X. Engineering and Shipbuilding..' Journal of Royal Statistical Society LXVII pt.i (March 1905), p104-5, 108, for a discussion of complexities.
 5. Robertson, op. cit., p120.

innovations in the more mechanised engineering shops which were attached to their yards or situated nearby.¹ The most important developments were the phasing out of older sub-contract systems, such as those operated on the Thames, and their replacement by more modern piecework arrangements and (subsequently) schemes of premium bonus or incentive payments.² Transition from the gang system also involved the evolution of a tighter managerial hierarchy, reflected in the growth of supervisory divisions - as between Yard Manager, Head Foreman and Underforeman - in shipbuilding work.³ Indeed, the appearance of technical, clerical and supervisory staff was itself another aspect of the increasing division of labour within the industry as a whole.⁴

The production of ships therefore presents a major example of increasing division of labour based upon favourable market conditions, which allowed the spread of technology, the increase of scale and refinement of structure, and the improvement in management and organisation of the industry. Yet these same market conditions were so eccentric, and the shipbuilding trade cycle so erratic, that they also prescribed limits for change and innovation.⁵ With violent oscillations between prosperity and depression, employers recognised the dangers of excessive mechanisation which would leave them with large overheads and fixed costs in slack periods. They also realised

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6. William Clarke, 'Industrial Essay' in G.B. Shaw (ed.), Fabian Essays in Socialism Scott (1899) London, p85: 'Finding it easier and more rational to combine with others of his class in a large undertaking, [the employer] has now abdicated his position of overseer, has put in a salaried manager to perform his work for him...It was inevitable that this differentiation of manager and capitalist should arise. It is part of the process of capitalist evolution due to machine industry...and hence has arisen the Joint Stock Company...The manager's business is to earn for his employers the largest dividend possible...'
 1. Pollard, op. cit., p134-5.
 2. Ibid.; Robertson, op. cit., p2-3, 29-30, for discussion of management difficulties.
 3. J. Melling, ' "Non-Commissioned Officers" - British employers and their supervisory workers, 1880-1920', forthcoming, for a full discussion of this.
 4. Pollard, op. cit., p137-8.
 5. Robertson, op. cit., p3-4, 13.

the importance of hand crafts and expert skill in meeting the specialised requirements of their customers.¹ The high productivity of British workmen, which was well above that of American and German shipyard employees at the turn of the century, was a further reason for faith in established practices.² Not only did the shipyards have less scope for rapid innovation, but there was little pressure from market conditions to force changes before 1914.

The Clydeside shipbuilding industry: origins and development.

Clydeside was rather an unlikely setting for the iron shipbuilding industry, despite its rise to world prominence as a centre of vessel production. The river was shallow and poorly dredged, with early shipbuilding largely confined to the deeper firth with its sheltered lochs.³ John Scotts had been established at Greenock as early as 1711, but in the west of Scotland as a whole the building of ships remained an unimportant activity in the early 19th century.⁴ It was only with the arrival of the steam engine and the utilisation of iron fabrication that the region, with its plentiful supplies of coal, iron and unskilled labour, rose to prominence.⁵ Although timber and sailpower continued to be important well into the 19th century, by the 1840s the iron steamships were gaining supremacy and the Clyde was firmly established as the mainstay of the new industry.⁶ Again, whilst the numbers of wooden vessels were still much greater than iron ships in the 1860s, the tonnage was roughly equivalent.⁷

The methods of production on Clydeside were largely responsible for its success in shipbuilding, with the men acquiring fresh ironworking skills as their masters devised increasingly efficient marine engines - culminating in the triple and quadruple-expansion engines of the 1870s - and methods of designing steel ships.⁸

1. Pollard, loc. cit. (1957), p435-6.

2. Ibid., p438-43.

3. Cormack, op. cit., p2.

4. Ibid., p27-8, 40.

5. Ibid., p150-51.

6. A. Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland RKP (1975) London p127, shows Clyde tonnage rising from 17.6 in 1830s to 81.4 in 1840s and 798.4 in 1860s, i.e. 24% to 66% of British output.

The years 1875-1913 were therefore marked by the growing importance of steam-propelled steel ships, with the Clyde producing 757,000 tons (or one third) of British tonnage in 1913.¹ As national output more than doubled, the Clyde yards retained a firm grasp on their share of the market.² Yards such as Elders of Govan led the way in the introduction of mild steel plates for hulls and boilers, quickly followed by others throughout the country.³ Napier's famous yard produced not only first-rate vessels but also some of the most eminent marine engineers, whilst Elders possessed such brilliant naval architects and designers as William Pearce.

Many of these early inventors and innovators had begun as foremen in the firms of others, frequently paying for the privilege of learning their crafts, and derived many of their ideas from the practices of the workmen building the vessels from the keel upwards. The latter were only gradually organised into trade societies, led by the Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders, although the nature of production ensured the proliferation of crafts and sectional identities in the yards throughout the 19th century.⁴

The scale of production in Scotland also gave the northern shipbuilders something of an advantage, since the Scottish yards employed more men on average than those in England.⁵ By 1870 the five leading Clyde firms employed between 2,300 and 3,600 men each, whilst there were sixteen firms with over 800 employees.⁶ In 1885 Fairfields was described as "without doubt the leading shipbuilding establishment in the world", having eleven berths and employing 7,000 at prosperous periods, whilst Thomsons of

7. Cormack, op. cit., p68 gives Strang's figures of 55 iron and 617 wooden vessels in 1851, 219 iron and 740 wooden vessels in 1862.
8. Ibid., p150: 'The modern era in shipbuilding may be taken as covering the period subsequent to 1875, and it was ushered in by two important changes: one, the invention of the triple expansion engine for marine purposes, and the other the replacement of iron by steel as a constructional material for ships.'
1. Slaven, op. cit., p178-9. As early as 1884 almost 134,000 tons (or 45% of total) built on Clydeside were of steel, as against the national average of 15%.
2. Robertson, op. cit., p38, for national figures.
3. Cormack, op. cit., p152-3.

Clydebank were expanding to fifty acres and Dennys were doubling their productive capacity to produce a possible maximum of 60,000 tons per annum.¹ Many firms (including Fairfields) were also prompted to become limited companies, private or public, as their scale and resources grew and their capital needs expanded. The majority of Clydeside concerns continued to operate as fairly small and very competitive firms, but there were definite signs of moves towards vertical integration and market domination amongst the larger companies.²

Reforms were also apparent in the organisation and management of the Clyde yards, usually led by the larger or second-rank firms which were also strong advocates of technical innovation.³ These appeared in three forms: the tightening up of time and work discipline, including the separation of regular hours and overtime; the introduction of piecework payments on a calculated basis amongst many shipbuilding trades - including such 'white squad' workers as joiners; and the strict division of responsibility amongst the technical, managerial and supervisory employees at the shipyards. Progressive employers such as Elders and Dennys were especially careful to regulate the hours and conditions under which their men worked, and even centralised and ordered their clerical offices to 'remedy the Nonsense likely to occur from every man's doing what is good in his own eyes.'⁵ Any unnecessary waste of time, effort and materials was rooted out and the methods of payment and supervision were ordered on a regular basis to reduce the margin

4. Pollard, op. cit., p139.

5. Cormack, op. cit., p72: 'Scottish yards though fewer in number than those of England and Wales, employed more workers.'

6. Ibid., p194. See Appendix I, for figures on yards and their output and employment.

1. Robertson, op. cit., p67-71.

2. Slaven, op. cit., p182. Slaven notes that there were 43 firms operating on Clydeside in 1870 and 38 in 1913, with some yards 'taking steps to minimise competition.'

3. Jotting Books of William Denny, Book II (22.12.1869-1.12.1870). Entry 9.3.1870. Denny toured Elders at Govan and noted: 'All their frames, plating and rivetting done by piece work. It is a wonderful establishment...'

4. Ibid., Entry 24.2.1870. After a 'maniac of a joiner' had criticised the existing system of work, Denny's decided to introduce piecework. William Denny added: 'My opinion is that the joiners humbug their work more than any men.'

for wastage and error in the calculation of business costs.¹ With the increasing size of the ships built by such employers and the growth of their yards, such meticulous attention to detail and supervision was all the more necessary. The most successful enterprises were more than centres of technical excellence: they were also the best organised and regulated establishments on the riverside. Not only were their production arrangements efficient, but their marketing channels were also effective.² Many of the larger yards had close contacts with armaments manufacturers,³ whilst others - such as Dennys - were linked to commercial shipping firms, which helped to ease the violent waves of market demand.⁴

Clydeside shipbuilders and the provision of industrial welfare.

In order to assess the real significance of industrial welfare in the Clyde shipbuilding industry, it is necessary to relate its development to that of the industry as a whole as well as to the specific labour needs of individual firms. In many instances it might seem that welfare provisions are primarily determined by locational factors, but these are in themselves only expressions of the proximity to labour markets and the geographical or physical development of the industry itself. Therefore it is intended to select a number of shipbuilding firms which are situated in quite distinct areas of the riverside, and to compare their changing labour needs with the development of the industry in the region. It is assumed that the most significant aspects of economic development are those already

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5. Ibid., January 1870; 9.3.1870: 'Called Uncle Tom's attention to the general waste of service bolts.'
 1. Ibid.
 2. P.L. Payne, 'Rationality and Personality: Mergers in the Scottish Iron and Steel Industry, 1916-1936' Business History XIX, No.2 (1977), gives account of mergers between shipbuilding and steel; H.W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry Longmans Green (1907) London, p40-50, for ties between larger firms.
 3. J.D. Scott, Vickers Weidenfeld and Nicolson (1962) London, p46-60; B.M. White, "The Inevitable Ship" M.A. Undergraduate Diss. (Glasgow, 1974), p1-2.
 4. P.L. Robertson, 'Shipping and Shipbuilding: The Case of William Denny and Brothers' Business History XVI, No.1 (1974), p37: 'Between 1844 and 1914 the Denny partners were connected at one time or another with at least nineteen shipping companies and on occasion operated vessels themselves.'

outlined, and that welfare will reflect the methods of production, scale and structure of the firms, and the organisation and management of the workforce. Above all, provisions should illustrate the connection between market forces and productive forces in a rapidly expanding industry.

The pattern of shipbuilding growth on Clydeside suggests that certain problems of location and labour mobility would arise, besides the overriding necessity to train and adapt a workforce in the skills of the shipyard trades. Due to the difficulties of navigating a shallow river, especially for the larger vessels, the best-placed yards were those at the firth around Port Glasgow and Greenock.¹ After the repeated widening of the river by the Clyde Trustees and the improvement of facilities, shipbuilders approached near to the city itself with yards as far up river as Pointhouse. In 1873 an Act of Parliament provided for the Graving Dock at Govan, and by the later decades of the century as many as 23 yards were situated within the immediate burghs around Glasgow.² Besides the advantages of a large pool of labour, the builders could be within reach of the great bulk of engineering workshops on Clydeside which clustered around the city and which provided many of the products assembled in the shipyard.³ As the available space was soaked up by the growth of the conurbation, shipbuilders found increasing pressures as they sought to extend their yards for the larger berths and deeper water necessary to launch steel ships.⁴ Hence the departure of Thomsons to Clydebank, the arrival of Stephens at Linthouse and Beardmores at Dalmuir, and the belated advent of Yarrow's

1. Cormack, op. cit., p179-80.

2. Ibid., p192: 'Nearly four miles of quayside and over 75 miles of water were available for vessels at the harbour.'

3. Ibid., p180; Pollard, op. cit., p54: 'Shipbuilding is essentially an assembling industry, building up its products from components supplied by outside firms, rather than working up one raw material into a variety of products.'

4. Cormack, op. cit., p180. Cormack adds about Thomsons: 'For a time the employees were greatly inconvenienced, as the supply of houses in the locality was inadequate and as yet there was no railway from the city.' See below for details.

on the riverside at Scotstoun.

This dispersal of the industry away from the centre of Glasgow naturally caused some difficulties of re-location, and of attracting labour from the city to man the isolated shipyards. Only the larger and better-equipped firms could contemplate such a transfer of activities, and it was these concerns which were generally advocates of progressive management techniques and technical innovation. They were also more likely to adopt welfare amenities as a method of solving their labour problems and sustaining their broader policies. The following survey examines a small but significant number of Clydeside firms, situated at Dumbarton, Clydebank, Govan, Linthouse, Polmadie, Scotstoun, Pointhouse and Dalmuir. In each case there were some services provided, although the nature and extent of these depended on a variety of factors. The firms are taken in turn because of the particular problems which each faced within the years 1870-1920. At the same time, the major changes which armaments building and (ultimately) wartime production brought to the industry as a whole, is clearly reflected in their individual experiences.

The partnership of William Dennys and Bros., was founded at Dumbarton in 1844 and from the outset 'the firm had a reputation for employing the most advanced technology'.¹ Dennys remained a staunch family firm from its inception to its decline and closure in the 20th century, with its fortunes being consolidated in the later 19th century by Peter Denny and William Denny III. The latter was not only a strong captain of industry but was also involved in the trials of steel-built steamers at the Leven Shipyard - which represented total assets of almost £137,000 in 1859.² With interests in such ventures as the Irrawaddy Flotilla Co., Dennys were able to market their specialised flat-bottomed river boats fairly easily and in the years 1880-1913 sold £20.3 million of orders to firms in which they had shareholdings.³ Although there is less evidence towards vertical integration in the control of assets, such as those developed by Harland & Wolff, Lithgows and John Browns, Dennys were quick to recognise the advantages of secure marketing arrangements.⁴

1. Robertson, loc. cit. (1974), p37.

2. Ibid. p38-9.

In scale and structure, therefore, the firm was substantial rather than massive and employed perhaps 900 men by 1870. The new Leven Shipyard was set up in 1864 and a period of rapid expansion occurred in the decade 1875-85, with a new 950' tidal basin added and 'the arrangement of the shops entirely changed'.¹ By the later date the firm was employing between 2,000 and 3,000 men and could claim supremacy in the Dumbarton area as the main employer.²

The technology and working methods adopted in the yard were progressive, although the pattern of innovation was uneven between the trades and 'would almost require to be considered departmentally'.³ Archibald Denny identified five key areas of work in the 1900s: the fabrication trades such as the rivetters, whose 'skill' actually consisted in hard manual labour; the iron fitters who fashioned and framed the vessels and added the 'skin plating, decks, etc.'; the changes in template work were more considerable; then there were the woodworking trades; and finally, the finishing trades such as plumbing, painting and upholstery.⁴ Denny admitted that machinery had led to increased production and improvement in individual productivity, but 'the changes are so slowly introduced that they affect only a few men at a time'.⁵ This confirmed the testimony of John Scott of Greenock in 1886, who had insisted on the generally beneficial affects of the technical innovations, and of J. Price of Palmer's North East yard who noted that mechanisation had 'succeeded in bringing down steadily the cost of labour per ton of the dead weight carrying capacity'.⁶ There were thus important changes at leading shipyards, but they affected the different trades at varying times and were gradual rather than abruptly initiated.⁷

3. Ibid., p42-3.

4. Ibid., p47.

1. Cormack, op. cit., p67.

2. Ibid.

3. Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Appendices to Evidence: Written Replies from Employers to Certain Economic Questions. Appx. XV (Archibald Denny). Answer No.1.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., Answer No.3, p23.

6. Third Volume of the Report of the Commission appointed to Inquire into the Depression of Trade and Industry C. 4797 (1886), Evidence

These technical innovations were often carried against the resistance of the men, but they appear to have aided the growth in productivity at the Leven yard before 1906.

It was in the organisation and management of production and of the work process, however, that the Dennys seem to have excelled. William Denny III rose early enough to check on the arrival of his workmen, and noted 'the very irregular way in which a great number of our men come into work - Told the timekeepers that the letter of the rules must be observed'.¹ Denny insisted on strict rules and regulations as a basis for work-discipline as well as the efficient co-ordination of management routines and costing of materials.² His greatest achievements were the introduction of yard rules and his imposition of piece work amongst the woodworking employees, with Archibald Denny observing that Leven was 'the only yard in which the carpenters and joiners work on piece work'.³ Incentives were also provided in the form of the unprecedented 'Awards Committee' set up by William Denny, which rewarded any inventive ideas proposed by the craftsmen themselves. This flourished in the early years of its operation, with workmen suggesting improvements to cranes, ventilation, and other devices.⁴

Industrial welfare at the Leven Yard emerged out of such practical considerations on the part of the employers, after their arrival at the new location in 1864. When the facilities were nearing completion in 1867, Dennys 'laid off a certain

6. of John Scott, Q11,977-12,016. Scott dismissed the idea that the trade depression could be attributable to wages; Evidence of J. Price Q 10,972-973: 'it is due to the application of machinery, and to the performance of a large amount of work done by machinery which was otherwise done by hand.'
7. Appendices to Evidence, op. cit., Appx. XV: Answer No.2, where Denny notes that 'all round' skill was being replaced gradually by 'special mechanised skill'. His figures in Table (C), appear to show that the productivity of men per ton rose from 13.5 tons - 16.5 tons in 1875-84, to 15.0 tons - 16.8 tons in 1895-1906.
1. William Denny, 'Yard Diaries/Private Jotting Books': 2.8.1869.
2. A.B. Bruce, The Life of William Denny Hodder & Stoughton (1889) London, p86-9;

'Yard Diaries...'. 14.8.1869: 'I. Rankine informed me today that there were grave suspicions of fellows climbing over walls into their work and also of stuff being handed out of the yard.'
3. Appendices..., op. cit., Answer No.9, p24.

portion of the ground immediately to the east of the yard for workmen's dwellings'.¹ In view of the weakness of the local building societies, and the acute need of the firm for skilled labour, the Dennys assisted their workmen to purchase the dwellings at a low rate of interest. Archibald Denny added in a manner that gives some insight into the close links between welfare investment and economic progress:²

In this way a town of almost 4,500 inhabitants has been built up, the houses being almost entirely owned by the workmen. The yard has been developed from our side in the same way, our savings having been put into additional plant and increased facilities, which, again, have reflected upon the men's earnings.

The Dennys saw themselves and their employees involved in an economic and social partnership which brought benefits to the firm and the local community of craftsmen. This benevolence of the employers was impressed upon the workmen in the mortgage bond agreement drawn up by the firm.³

These records indicate that mortgage loans were advanced to twenty workmen in the first instance, varying from £200 to £600 (repayable at £23-£34 p.a.), and it is likely that at least some of these men used the resources to construct their own dwellings.⁴ There were also a second series of accounts which specify eighteen brick cottages, priced about £130 each, in the Clyde St. area. These were almost all occupied by skilled tradesmen and foremen, particularly carpenters, joiners and engineers, with three foremen amongst the woodworking trades.⁵ Some workers seem to have used the opportunity to make a speculative investment, whilst one of the joiner foremen (Rankine, the man probably referred to by William

4. Minutes of the Leven Shipyard Awards Committee, Minute Book No.2 (Nov. 1884 - Dec. 1893); Claim no. 191, for example. In December 1884 the Committee reported that they had 'very great pleasure in referring to the marked success of the Scheme during the present year', when £280 was expended in Awards.

1. Appendices..., Answer No.9, p24.

2. Ibid.

3. 'Workmen's Housing Ledger' UGD 3 26/5: Bond Agreement stating, that 5% interest is stipulated but that Dennys will accept 3% 'so long as said instalments are regularly paid'.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Denny) completely repaid the £400 he owed the firm by 1872.¹ These ventures appear to have been only the tip of housing involvement by the firm, for in 1882 the shipbuilders laid out 27 acres of streets and building plots which they 'sold to our men for the purpose of building houses for themselves'. The large area adjoining the yard was quickly covered with terraces, flats and even self-contained cottages costing £300-£400 'handsome and commodious dwelling-houses'.² According to Archibald Denny, this project continued down to the 1900s with Dumbarton growing to a town of 4,500 people based on the prosperity of the yard. and the 'joint efforts of employers and employed'.³

Nor was housing confined to the skilled tradesmen and foremen, since the elastic regulation of partnership finances meant that the firm could allocate its funds as it wished. Dean of Guild records show housing provided for Mrs. Alexander and Mr. James Denny at the pleasant suburb of Oxhill, well away from the noise and sight of the shipyard machinery.⁴ There were also substantial alterations to the Manager's House at Glasgow Rd, near the Yard gates in 1894.⁵

The Dennys also held an interest in Dennystoun Forge, and after Arthur Wedgwood was appointed as Manager in 1886, he owned and controlled properties (including shops) at Dumbarton probably on behalf of the firm.⁶ Whether such houses were for Forge workers or not, this indicates that welfare involvement flowed through the parent concern into the controlled subsidiaries. It is difficult to assess the extent of the capital welfare investment which the Dennys made over the years 1864-1914 given the limits of data, but it cannot have been inconsiderable during the years of most rapid expansion from 1870 to 1895.

Besides housing commitments, there was the Leven Shipyard Accident Fund which was established by William III and registered as a Friendly Society. Denny's biographer suggests that the

1. Ibid., the actual sum was £398, of which Rankine paid £160 in the first year.

2. Appendices..., op. cit., Answer No.9, p24.

3. Ibid.

4. Dumbarton Dean of Guild, Plans Submitted in 1893-4. (Located at Council Offices, Crosslet): Annotated Plans, dated 3.12.1894, 25.3.1895.

Accident Fund was 'projected by the workmen, included all of them as members and managed by a certain number of foremen selected by the firm with as many more workmen elected by the members'.¹ With the Dennys contributing half of the funds from 1880, made up partly of fines levied on the men for infringement of yard rules, the L.S.A.F. served both as a channel of communication and as a bulwark of managerial authority.² After the passing of the Employers' Liability Act in 1880 it also became a useful alternative to legal action, with the Dennys declining to join 'any Employers Insurance Association' and operating accident payments of a voluntary basis.³ The Accident Fund's later Rule Book makes it clear that the intention of the body was to contract the workmen out of the Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation legislation and to operate compensation of a friendly society basis.⁴

These welfare arrangements were formalised after the First World War, with the appointment of a Welfare Supervisor in 1919 and the introduction of staff pensions from 1926. Dennys were amongst the strongest supporters of the welfare movement during the War, and gave a sympathetic hearing to Robert Hyde's projects for a welfare campaign in the era of Reconstruction.⁵

Besides their concern with housing, accidents and working conditions, Dennys were also consistent advocates of improved technical education with William III awarding a scholarship to the local School of Art.⁶ Whilst the family firm recognised the vital importance of handicraft skills and the need for early apprenticeship, they were also anxious that this should be placed under the aegis of the employers and that the beneficial

5. Ibid., Plan 2.7.1894.
6. Dennystoun Forge Co., Private Letter Book of A. Wedwood (1886-90) UGD 32 3/2.
1. Bruce, op. cit., p90.
2. Ibid., p85.
3. Ibid., p91.
4. Leven Shipyard Accident Fund Rule Book (1924), p1.
5. Elizabeth Sidney, The Industrial Society Pub. Society (1969) London, p5-6.
6. Bruce, op. cit.

moral influence of education should not be lost.¹ Indeed, the firm thought it owed its prosperity to the exceptional intelligence and general sobriety of its skilled tradesmen.² William Denny III launched his Public Library Scheme for both workmen and community in the early 1870s, although most employees showed little interest.³

The social relations between employers and workmen were improved by the regular soirees held at the shipyard, though the special occasions given to clerical and supervisory staff could only heighten the distance between them and the rank and file of manual tradesmen.⁴ This element of strategic separation and control runs throughout much of that welfare primarily concerned with the provision of local infrastructure and the improvement of efficiency, illustrating the close links between the supply, efficiency and discipline of labour in Dennys' welfare schemes. As the firm expanded in size and improved its technology and organisation, so these amenities became mutually reinforcing as well as assisting the enterprise in securing continued growth.

The three Clydebank firms of J. & G. Thomson, Clydebank Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., and John Brown Ltd., can be considered together since they succeeded each other in control of the yard and assets at the waterfront. The partnership of James and George Thomson led to their opening the Clydebank Foundry at Glasgow in 1846, which was extended to Govan in 1851 where they began shipbuilding and marine engineering operations. In 1871 the Clyde Trustees submitted their plans for the new graving dock at Govan, and the firm took their 1,800 workforce to a new site between Dalmuir and Yoker.⁵ Thomsons were followed there in 1883

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1. Appendices..., op. cit., Answer No.8, p23. Archibald Denny remarked that 'the control of parents over their children seems to be much less than it was 30 or 40 years ago'; P.L. Robertson, 'Technical Education in the British Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Industries, 1863-1914' Economic History Review XXVII No.2 (1974), p227: 'In all, technical education for skilled workmen was deemed beneficial because it discouraged vandalism, promoted moral strength...as well as giving him a better grasp of his job...it helped to inculcate habits of good conduct.'
 2. Appendices..., op. cit., Answer No.9, p24.
 3. William Denny, 'Common Place Book', March 1873.
 4. Ibid., 'Private Jotting Books' 30.12.1869, for men's soiree.
 5. White, op. cit., p23-5; Cormack, op. cit., p194.

by the Singer Sewing Machine Co. (previously at Bridgeton), and then by Beardmores at Dalmuir in 1905. Although there was a large number of skilled workers living in Clydebank within a few years of Thomsons' arrival (over 1,000 people lived at the burgh centre by 1873), thousands of skilled and unskilled workers continued to flow into the town long after the 1870s.¹ As late as 1915 it was estimated that as many as 16,000 workmen travelled to Clydebank every day from areas all over Glasgow and the West of Scotland.² At the same time the burgh was itself expanding until by the 1920s it held almost 50,000 inhabitants, and was clearly distinct from Glasgow.

The land upon which the Thomsons settled had been purchased by the Clyde Trust from the Hamiltons in 1855, or at least 4.4 acres of it, although the latter retained the right to dispose of the 'river side ground for graving docks and shipbuilding'.³ In 1871 they sold further land to George Thomson Snr.'s widow, consisting of thirty acres with 1,225' of frontage, for £8,412.⁴ There were obvious labour supply problems in such an isolated area, but the yard was successfully established and continued to grow through the 1880s. The partners were probably assisted by the contacts with Cunard, and their specialisation in areas of naval work such as torpedo boats.⁵

In 1890 the partnership was dissolved and the Clydebank Shipbuilding and Engineering Company set up, with a nominal share capital of £250,000 and capital assets valued at £350,852 in its first year of trading.⁶ Control of the private limited company remained firmly in the hands of the Thomson family, led by J.R. and G.P. Thomson, who held the great bulk of the shares.⁷ The sons of the respective founders became Managing Director and Works Manager, although they were joined on the board by three other members of the firm.⁸

The scale and structure of the firm continued to develop

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1. White, op. cit., p25: 'In the beginning it was an isolated community'.
 2. The implications are discussed in J. Melling, 'Employers, Labour and the Glasgow Housing Market, 1880-1920' S.S.R.C. Conf. Paper (1978)
 3. The Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Company Limited, 'Title Deeds of Works and Workmen's Houses'. S.R.O. (Courtesy of Mr. J. Syme), p1-3.
 4. Ibid., p9-11. Map diagrams at p19 and p36.

during the 1890s, real assets reaching £426,000 in 1896 and £584,000 by 1899.¹ Between 1885 and 1895 the yard added a new fitting-out basin to its seven building slips and attached engine works, and its fifty-acre site now embraced new larger shops for the various engineering activities.²

The technology and organisation of Thomsons was clearly progressing in pace with the growing size of the works, and in 1899 there were a large number of modern torpedo boats (Thomson's speciality) as well as merchant vessels to be seen on the slipways.³ Technology and working methods had to advance to a certain degree to keep up with the sophistication and complexity of design and the new types of fittings and materials required.⁴ Improved organisation was necessitated by the size of the yard and the increasing annual investment, as indicated below:

Table I: New capital investment at C.S.E.Co., 1893-99.

<u>Year</u>	<u>New investment (£)</u>
1893	34,500
1894	?
1895	30,000
1896	28,700
1897	65,000
1898	75,500
1899	125,000

Source: C.S.E.Co., Annual General Meetings in Minutes, and Balance Sheets.

This new investment was ploughed into increasing mechanisation and

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5. 'Title Deeds of Works...', p45, describes Robert Thomson as the 'resident engineer at Liverpool for the Cunard Company' in 1872; Clydebank Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., 'Estimated Profit on Work in Progress, 1899' shows that they were constructing three large naval vessels (one for Japan), and eight torpedo boat destroyers (three for stock), and seven merchant ships.
 6. C.S.E.Co. Ltd., Minute Book No.1: 30.8.1890; 16.12.1890; 31.3.1891.
 7. Ibid., Minutes: 16.12.1890.
 8. Ibid., they were A.S. McClelland, Donald, and Donaldson.
 1. Ibid., Minutes: 31.3.1896; 1899.
 2. Cormack, op. cit., p70-71.
 3. C.S.E.A. Ltd, 'Estimated Profit on Work in Progress at 31st March 1899'.
 4. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development C.U.P. (1969), p302-6, for discussion of these inter-relationships at a much more general level.

improved facilities at the Clydebank yard, despite the danger of overcapacity and burdensome overheads during periods of depression. In fact, the profitability figures for the firm during the 1890s suggests that only in one year did they suffer from this predicament:

Table II: Profitability at the C.S.E.Co., 1891-99.*

Year	Gross Profit	Net Profit
1891	61,000	41,500
1892	82,500	61,000
1893	60,500	37,250
1894	<u>Loss</u> 51,000	<u>Loss</u> 44,250
1895	47,000	24,500
1896	111,250	86,400
1897	163,550	135,150
1898	176,800	139,500
1899	152,200	115,250

Source: A.G.M. Meetings and Balance Sheets in Minutes, op. cit.

*As in Table I, the figures are rounded slightly.

Even if we take into account the incidence of trade depression from 1893-96, and the 'home boom' of the later 1890s, the acceleration in profitability is still remarkable. The average profit for the first three years shown is £46,583 as against an average of £129,966 for the last three - an expansion of 2.78:1.

Thus from being a Govan firm with a moderately successful engineering and shipbuilding interest, the Thomson concern had grown to a large and very profitable venture. Such a transformation would not have been possible without its initial investment in sufficient housing to accommodate its key staff at the new yard, with feu contracts for four streets and two blocks of tenements entered into by 1882-83.¹ The deed stated that Thomsons should erect 'substantial buildings to consist of shops and dwelling houses', at Clydebank and to maintain and uphold these 'in good tenantable condition'.² There were to be no shops for alcoholic liquor, or any works which would cause 'noxious nauseous or disagreeable' odours, though the feuers were concerned with feu-rent than public health.³ By 1885 the plans were well in progress and a fresh contract

1. 'Title Deeds of Works...', op. cit., p65-66 and Map at p75. Contract dated 8.3.1883.

2. Ibid., p67.

3. Ibid., p67-69. The firm was also responsible for road upkeep, etc.

described the construction of a series of houses and a substantial villa fronting on the river, the latter presumably for management.¹ In that year the Thomsons acquired over 5,000 square yards of ground and committed themselves to building 'at least three tenements of dwelling houses', which were specified as being of a good standard.²

It would seem that at least three tenements were erected, since by 1891 the valuation of housing was given in the capital accounts as £22,750. The property and rent was as follows:

Table III: Housing investment and rental yield at C.S.E.Co., 1891-99.

Year	Val. of Houses	Deprec.	Gross Add.	Rental Inc.	Profit
1891	22,750	550	Nil	2,231	?
1892	22,200	Nil	"	?	?
1893	21,650	"	"	1,044	90
1894	21,650	"	"	?	?
1895	21,650	785	"	583	44
1896	21,010	Nil	"	?	?
1897	21,650	"	"	?	?
1898	17,158	"	"	?	?
1899	27,360 (Dumb.Rd) 5,500 (Union Pl.)	"	4,226	?	?

Source: Minutes and Balance Sheets, op. cit.

These figures indicate that Thomsons had sufficient housing to accommodate a skeleton staff of key employees by the 1890s, and that their main objective in providing company dwellings was not to make profits (although they clearly broke even) but to sustain these workers nearby.

By 1896 it was suggested that further tenements might be needed, and the directors decided to offer a plot of vacant ground to speculative builders,³ intimating that liberal terms

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1. Ibid., p78, and Map at p89.
 2. Ibid., p91-3. Contract 2.7.1885, which stated that: 'The said tenements shall contain houses of not less than one room and kitchen and no dwelling house shall be let for the purpose of being occupied by more than one family and no house or other erections shall be erected on the back ground.'
 3. Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Minutes: 25.2.1896. The directors reviewed the 'advisability of erecting some tenements of workmen's houses', indicating that in this year of growing prosperity they were experiencing some labour shortages.

and assistance would be given to approved builders'.¹ In May 1897 the firm purchased another 25 acres of ground on the south-west side of Dumbarton Rd,² and in August two local builders expressed interest in vacant ground facing on to the Road.³ At this point the special case of the works foremen was noted, and enquiries were made as to their housing on a separate plot of ground.⁴

By 1899 the housing property therefore consisted on three groups: Dumbarton Rd. dwellings, Union Place tenements, and Clydebank Cottage, valued at almost £33,000 in all. The Surveyor's Report at the sale of the company in 1899 described one of the fifteen Dumbarton Rd tenements as 'almost new...a most substantial building',⁵ and in general the housing was of good quality. Although the housing cannot be depicted as a major investment concern of the company, in 1898-99 it represented as much as 3.5% of new capital investment.

There was also a good deal of current welfare expenditure at Thomsons and the Clydebank Company, although it was mainly operated on a discretionary basis at the direction of management. There were occasional grants to individual employees, small scholarships for technical education, and various funeral benefits.⁶ They can be set against net profits as follows:

Table IV: Current welfare expenditure at C.S.E.Co., 1893-99.

Year	Net Profits	Welfare Expd.	Accident Fd.	Grat.	Funerals
1893	37,250	330.3.0	30	-	-
1894	<u>L</u> 44,250	?	?	?	?
1895	24,500	154.0.6	-	201	-
1896	86,400	483.7.8	-	-	-
1897	135,150	?	-	15	-
1898	139,500	?	40	-	-
1898	115,250	606.13.8	-	-	2.17.6

Source: Minutes and Balance Sheets, op. cit.

1. Ibid., 10.3.1896.
2. 'Title Deeds...', op. cit., p105-117. Contract dated 11.5.1897.
3. Minutes: 24.8.1897.
4. Ibid.: '..to make enquiry as to the price of ground forming farm-steading east of yard gate with the view of the erection of houses suitable for foremen.'
5. C.S.E.Co., 'Surveyor's Report' (1899). The Surveyor catalogued four three-storey tenements at Union Place as 'substantial buildings'.
6. 'Appendices' to Balance Sheets.

Although the amounts spent on such provisions were small (being only equivalent to 0.89% of net profit in 1893), they do appear to vary with the profitability of the concern. The figures for the Accident Fund appear small because this body was used as a supplement rather than a substitute for private insurance against legal liability, and the premiums were costly.¹

If we set the expenditure on welfare against the various wages paid by the company, then its real significance is illustrated.

Table V: Wages and current welfare expenditure at C.S.E.Co., 1893-99.

Year	Wages No.2*	General Wages No.2*	Tot.	Increase	Welfare
1893	14,427	2,245	16,672		330
1894	13,706	2,542	16,247	D 424	?
1895	18,232	2,370	20,603	4,355	154
1896	20,392	2,489	22,881	2,278	483
1897	?	?	?	?	?
1898	28,448	3,183	31,631	?	?
1899	34,232	3,397	37,629	5,998	606

Source: Balance Sheets, op. cit.

*Wages No.2 includes some supervisory grades of worker, and technical staff. General Wages No.2 includes some ancillary workers.

Besides giving an interesting insight into the movement of wages against investment and profits, the figures suggest that current welfare moved forward in line with wages expenditure and represented the equivalent of perhaps 1.5% of total wages.

This current expenditure was more concerned with general efficiency and stability than with labour supply as such, and the special provisions made for foremen shows how strategic considerations of discipline also figured in the calculations.² Supervisors received the privileges of holidays, outings and sick pay, as well as higher wages and more secure employment than the men they overlooked at Clydebank.³ These strategic considerations may also have weighed in the Clydebank Company's support of technical education at Glasgow University and elsewhere.⁴

1. Ibid., the premiums were: 1895 - £141; 1898 - £348; 1899 - £1,668. The last year shows the impact of the Workmen's Compensation Act on claims and premiums. Compare the Denny experience.

2. 'Balance Sheets..', op. cit.

3. Ibid. See chapter three for a discussion in context of general pattern of industrial relations.

4. Minutes: 24.3.1896, for subscription of £105 to Prof. Biles.

The purchase of the Clydebank firm by John Brown's of Sheffield in 1899, signifies a new departure in vertical integration as well as reflecting the changing technology and organisation of the industry as a whole. Brown's had founded its Atlas Works in 1846 for the production of steel and by the 1890s had invested large amounts of capital in forging plant to manufacture the Krupp armour used in battleships.¹ The steelmasters needed to find some direct outlet for the sale of these reinforced plates, as did other large armaments firms like Vickers and Cammells, and like them it chose to diversify into shipbuilding to secure its market.²

The Thomson firm had proved its worth by completing H.M.S. Terrible for the Navy in fourteen months during the mid-1890s, and was by 1899 'one of the best equipped and most successful shipyards and engineering works in the United Kingdom'.³ At the same time that Brown's were bidding for Clydebank, they acquired the Rotheram Main pits in South Yorkshire - thereby taking vertical integration a stage backwards.⁴ By the end of the decade Brown's had purchased the shipyard and works for £923,255 and sent in Dunlop to represent the Sheffield interests.⁵ Brown's further strengthened their position by exchanging shares with Thomas Firth of Sheffield (another steel firm), and taking over the concern by acquiring 87.5% of Firth shares. By 1906 the share capital of the Brown parent stood at £2.2 million, and its works employed over 16,000 men.⁶

This bond between coal, steel, shipbuilding and armaments continued to grow in importance down to the outbreak of War, with Brown's Cammell Laird, and Fairfields, setting up the Coventry Ordnance Works to strengthen their hold on the arms

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1. C. Erikson, British Industrialists: Steel and Hosiery C.U.P. (1959), p208; Sir Allan Grant, Steel and Ships: The History of John Brown's Joseph (1950) London, p36-7.
 2. Ibid., p37; H.W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry Longmans (1907) London, p43-5.
 3. Grant, op. cit., p37, 40-44.
 4. Macrosty, op. cit., p43-5, shows that the coal interests were gradually acquired by Ellis of John Brown's from 1870.
 5. Ibid.; Grant, op. cit., p37.
 6. Macrosty, op. cit.

market and the naval race.¹ In the latter they were unsuccessful, given the reluctance of the Admiralty to place Dreadnought orders with them, and this created serious difficulties for Cammel Laird's although Brown's stood firm.² Though their bid to oust Armstrongs and Vickers from their supreme position in the manufacture of weapons had failed, the partners remained hopeful of future success.

The initial profitability of John Brown's seemed to confirm the wisdom of their move into shipbuilding, although profits stabilised at rather less than the boom figures of 1900-01.³ Figures for capital investment and additions suggest that the Clydebank yard was being improved and mechanised in the decade before 1914, and that changes in the scale and structure of the firm was reflected in improved production and organisation. They are as follows:

Table VI: General trends in investment at John Brown's, 1904-1919.

Year	Shipb Mach	E.W. Mach	Boil Mach	Gen Eq.	Dock	Rail	Total
1904	6,698	10,664	5,499	623	60	2,800	26,284
1905	9,355	16,687	2,557	27,677	148	91	56,515
1906	3,969	8,491	845	41,614	12,799	6	67,724
1907	958	3,273	6,639	32,036	17,059	-	54,964
1908	118	5,245	-	1,260	3,765	-	10,388
1909	2,535	849	-	-	6,316	-	9,700
1910	449	4,777	-	1,316	-	-	6,542
1911	43,029	15,211	398	3,955	544	5,654	68,791
1912	17,736	418	9,522	-	26,763	5,672	60,111
1913	8,828	1,819	-	-	-	48	10,695
1914	-	112	-	-	-	-	112
1915	-	2,486	-	-	-	-	2,486
1916	22,480	17,659	2,047	1,827	-	-	44,013
1917	37,448	17,001	450	4,934	-	-	59,833
1918	1	10	11	1,835	-	179	2,036
1919	12,056	-	-	-	-	1,151	13,207

Source: 'Capital Additions' in John Brown, Balance Sheets: UCS 1.

1. P. Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments Dover (1936) New York, p458-60.
2. Ibid., p459. Admiral Bacon quoted: "If they tendered for a man-of-war they had to obtain their armaments from either Vickers or Armstrong, who were rivals. They therefore started the Coventry Ordnance Works."
3. Macrosty, op. cit., p44. Profits given as: 1900-01 - £440,393; 1902-03 - £185,750; 1905-06 - £223,881. The author does not specify whether these are gross or net, or for whole company of just Sheffield branch.

What is particularly noticeable is the amount of equipment channelled into the shipyard and docks, with very large sums spent on machinery, rather than into the engine shops as the period progresses. Investment as a whole would seem to follow the fluctuations in the shipbuilding cycle, although peaks were reached around 1906 and 1911.¹

These innovations in machinery and shifts in investment were complemented by a radical managerial policy on manning and organisation. As John Brown's told their fellow employers in 1902, they insisted on management control over the interchangeability of trades and the classification of work:²

at Clydebank they had no demarcation list, and would admit none. They had customs and practices which they as far as possible followed but they reserved the right to put on at the time the class of men they desired.

Such an approach meant the breach of any tight craft control of new work (such as that constantly arising as naval vessels changed their design and equipment), and the strengthening of management power in dealing with questions of machinery and dilution of skills - with which demarcation disputes were closely bound up.³ This came to a head during the First World War, as Brown's advocated the progressive dilution of riveters and the shipbuilding employers pressed for displacement of tradesmen.⁴

In this transition of the Clydebank shipyard from a leading local firm to a subsidiary of a nationally-integrated company, industrial welfare played an important part. Despite the building activities of the previous two decades, John Brown's arrived at Clydebank to discover a labour shortage due to housing difficulties. With the continued growth of the enterprise such problems could only become more acute, and in 1902 the Board were approached by a local builder interested in developing

1. J. Cunnison and J.B.S. Gilfillan (ed.), The Third Statistical Account of Scotland: Glasgow Collins (1958) Glasgow, p204-5 and passim. for movements of Clyde shipbuilding cycle.
2. North West Engineering 'Trades' Employers Association, Minutes: 8.7.1902.
3. See chapter three for a discussion.
4. Ibid.

vacant ground attached to the yard.¹ After rejecting his offer, the directors struck upon the idea of buying up his land and of constructing cottages upon it. The main group catered for in this project were the Principal Foremen at the yard, who were differentiated from the working Underforemen and were responsible for the overall organisation of each trade.² Thus, it was felt to be important that these supervisory staff should occupy company dwellings near their work and as Brown's tenants.

After discussing the question of costs and the agency for the construction of houses, the directors resolved to proceed with the foremen's cottage and alterations to the Manager's house.³ Estimates varied between £3,634 and £7,874, and eventually they decided to erect eleven cottages plus alterations costing in all £8,267 by 1904.⁴ This provided the company with a core of experienced and committed supervisors who would not be attracted away by the greater convenience and facilities at Govan or Glasgow.

Yet this phase of building did little to ease the general shortage of housing at Clydebank, which was to become critical during the War. Brown's attempted a variety of schemes, from special workmen's trains and travel passes to the payment of travelling time, but to little avail. By 1914 the shortage of the key ironworking trades for able journeymen was serious enough for the Shipyard Manager to draft a special Memorandum, with reference to the 'question of Housing accommodation in Clydebank for Workmen and Foremen' and he urged on the directors 'the necessity of the company taking up the matter'.⁵ The problem affected not only operating costs but also the competition of the concern in the vital area of naval construction, which usually

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1. John Brown & Co., Minute Book UCS 1 1/13. Minutes: 22.10.1902.
 2. Ibid: 19.11.1902 - 23.12.1902. A scheme was submitted 'relative to building cottages for Principal Foremen.'
 3. Ibid.: 23.12.1902 - 18.2.1903, 18.3.1903. At last date the estimates were submitted.
 4. John Brown, 'Progress Report No.10' in UCS 1, gives a variety of figures though building probably proceeded on initial estimate of £6,700; Minutes: 18.3.1903; 'Capital Additions' account in the Balance Sheets.
 5. John Brown & Co., "Memorandum on the Shortage of Ironworkers" UCS 1 23/3. Written by the Shipyard Manager, Bell.

specified delivery dates and penalties for those yards which failed to meet the deadlines. As Bell explained in his report:¹

"As regards the Ironworkers, we seem able to get altogether from 2,400 to 2,500 men, but cannot exceed it owing to constant wastage of men leaving us to Govan, Dumbarton and Partick, where they can live near their work; if we could only have kept our numbers at 10% above this... we should not only keep on the right side of the line in our Shipyard Charges...but also we could come nearer to the Government delivery requirements...At present every available house in Clydebank is occupied and rents are from 10% to 20% dearer than in Govan. The building trade is at present stagnant, and there is nothing for it but to arrange with a Builder ourselves."

After weighing up the pressures of Labour market and housing market, the author suggested that the company must provide the infrastructure for a steady pool of labour.

The estimates presented with the Memorandum envisaged four separate developments (at Braemar Terrace, Kirkland Place, Railway St. and Whitecrook), consisting of 112 dwellings at an estimated total cost of £71,575 and a rate of return from rents of 4% - 5%.² It was expected that a 50% mortgage could be secured and that the building contractors would forward part of the investment themselves, although being financed largely by Brown's.³ Whereas the dwellings built in 1902-04 were subsidised from the outset, anticipated returns from the new building project would cover the interest charges and enable the shipbuilders to break even.

Before any real progress could be made, however, the War broke out and this deferred building operations whilst making the need for accommodation all the more urgent.⁴ Having lost their normal control of the labour market (as the shortage of labour affected all employers and each bid for available tradesmen), the shipbuilding firms found their attempts to introduce machinery and tighter work organisation seriously hindered by the powerful craft societies. The objectives of technical innovation, increase in scale of operations, and centralised management organisation,

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., figures attached to the Memorandum. Note that Braemar Terrace appears to be foremen's houses. The individual cost of the dwellings was estimated at £1,500.

3. Ibid. The firm decided to push ahead with the accommodation for tradesmen and defer the special provisions for the Underforemen for the present time.

4. Melling, op. cit.

were now focused upon the dilution question, as the employers sought to impose machine tools and interchangeability of trades upon the tradesmen. Provision of housing had moved from being an economic advantage: it was now a strategic necessity. As the John Brown management put it in a letter to the Ministry of Munitions in October 1916:¹

"With reference to the extension of dilution which is really one of the most pressing problems of the day, we have found ourselves very handicapped indeed in the development of pneumatic rivetting...As we found it impossible to initiate pneumatic rivetting in those Works with local labour, we looked elsewhere for suitable recruits...these men would only come North on the strict assurance that we could put up houses for them..."

The state responded to these production needs of the employers by not only passing the Munitions Act of 1915, with its provisions for legal coercion, but also by allowing employers to write off part of their building cost against Excess Profits duties.²

This encouraged firms such as John Brown's to make quite heavy housing investments, as indicated below:

Table VII: Housing projects at John Brown's, 1914-1919.

Year	Gen Prop. Ext*	Dumb. Rd	Whitecrk	Clyde St	Foremen	Tot.
1914	-	-	-	-	-	-
1915	500	-	-	-	-	500
1916 ⁺	13,187	-	23	20,469	5,957	39,636
1917	8,843	26,420	3,198	2,713	4,000	45,174
1918	542	17,913	9,274	5,319	2,468	35,516
1919	13,632	4,217	-	768	-	18,617

Source: John Brown's, 'Capital Additions', op. cit.

*General works property and ground given for comparison.

+No investment occurred until the last month in the financial year.

Whereas the directors had shown a certain hesitance about a full-scale housing project in 1914, costing £71,500, the experiences of War convinced them of the wisdom of welfare investment and they spent almost £140,000 in the three years 1916-19. Of this almost £12,500 (or about 9% of whole) went on housing for the foremen mentioned in the Bell Memorandum of 1914.

When we set housing against other forms of capital investment at Clydebank, then the housing schemes assume real financial significance during the War years. This must be acknowledged even

1. Letter from John Brown & Co. [Copy unsigned] to Ministry of Munitions, 25.10.1916 in UCS 1-22/4.

2. See chapter nine.

When we take into account the peculiar conditions of the War years, and the failure of firms to depreciate capital stock for purposes of tax allowance at the close of hostilities. From 1904 the trend of capital investment at John Brown's was as follows:

Table VIII: Capital investment and housing at Clydebank, 1904-19.

Year	Gen. Prop. *	Housing	Ratio %	Gen Cap Inv.	Housing as %
1904	13,696	8,885	64.8	39,980	22.2
1905	18,407	180	0.97	74,922	0.24
1906	12,180	402	3.3	79,907	0.5
1907	10,312	62	0.6	65,276	0.09
1908	71	16	22.5	10,460	0.15
1909	-	-	-	9,754	-
1910	734	-	-	7,458	-
1911	59,387	-	-	128,178	-
1912	33,840	-	-	93,952	-
1913	5,982	-	-	16,678	-
1914	-	-	-	112	-
1915	500	-	-	15,848	-
1916	39,636	26,443	66.7	83,650	31.6
1917	45,174	36,331	80.4	105,006	34.59
1918	35,516	34,974	98.4	37,507	93.2
1919	18,617	4,985	26.7	31,824	15.6
Total	294,052	112,284	38.0	800,512	14.0 (Mean)

Source: John Brown, 'Capital Additions' op. cit.

*This includes housing property.

This gives no more than a general outline of the housing component within the investment policies of a rapidly growing concern, with housing being as much as 21% of gross capital additions in those years when some housing investment was recorded.

One means of testing the affects of this welfare investment, as well as investigating the general efficiency of the enterprise, is to examine the profitability trends.¹ These would at least give some indication of the wisdom of the employer's investment policy in general, and his welfare investment in particular. From the careful deliberations of the John Brown management, it seems that

1. This whole area is, of course, problematic. It could be that firms are profitable in spite of welfare rather than because of it, or that high wages are much more conducive to efficiency and effort than is welfare benefit. At a second stage of analysis we are examining the employer's perceptions of sound investment, rather than the objective impact of welfare, and inadequate information (for both employer and historian) may prevent any tangible conclusion. Three alternatives seem possible: a) the employer sees welfare as a rational investment in terms of improving labour supply, efficiency

the more organised and efficient shipbuilders (who were also the larger and more progressive firms) calculated their investments with a clear appreciation of costs and benefits.

Unfortunately, the balance sheets with profit and loss figures do not appear to have survived at John Brown's, but some general impression of profitability is given by the Stock Exchange Gazette.¹ This reveals that the share capital of the company rose from £1.52 million to £2.5 million during the purchase of Clydebank,² and again expanded to £4.0 million in 1907.³

Table IX: Dividends, reserves and sums forward at John Brown's, 1901-14.

Year	Ord. Div. (%)	Carried Fwd.* (£)	Reserve Fd.
1895-6	7.50		
1896-7	7.50		
1897-8	6.66		
1898-9	10.00		
1899-1900	10.00		
1900-01	20.00	30,205	
1901-02	15.00		
1902-03	10.00	73,888	521,000 ⁺
1903-04	8.33		
1904-05	8.33		
1905-06	10.00		
1906-07	10.00	62,732	225,000
1907-08	10.00		
1908-09	7.50	65,388	225,000
1909-10	7.50		
1910-11	7.50	73,477	225,000
1911-12	7.50		
1912-13	7.50	87,102	225,000
1913-14	10.00		225,000
1914-15	2.50 <u>Int.</u> ⁷	97,420	225,000

Sources: UGD 4/16, 4/17, 4/19, 4/20, 4/22, 4/24, 4/25, 4/26.⁴

1. and discipline; b) that employers expect to lose in one respect (e.g. subsidising foremen's houses), but gain in others (increased loyalty and effectiveness); c) that the employer sees benefits as a form of deferred wage, which may reduce the wage demands of his employees. Profitability figures indicate the employer's scope for welfare investment and expenditure, but not his motivation.
1. The Stock Exchange Gazette UGD 14 4.
2. Ibid., UGD 14 4/16 (1901), p1497.
3. Ibid., 4/20 (1909), p1348-9. This consisted of 2,250,000 £1 Ordinary shares and 175,000 £10 Preference shares.
4. Note that 'Carried Forward' is to March of the previous year; and that Reserve Fund for 1902-03, includes £296,000 of premiums. The dividend for 1914-15 is an interim dividend only.

The general impression given is that John Brown's experienced considerable profitability in the years 1898-1903, improving their fortunes after absorbing Clydebank, but that the peaks of 1901, 1907 and 1913, were surrounded by less prosperous times.¹ It is incontestable that these years were ones of rapid growth and expansion for the yard, with the firm possessing a capacity of perhaps 100,000 tons by 1919 (just behind the giant Lithgow and Harland & Wolff enterprises),² and with horizontal as well as vertical integration in the industry,³ yet there were only moderate rewards for the employer's before 1913. This would seem to be attributable more to the firm's marketing difficulties,⁴ and to the shadow of over-capacity already falling across the industry, than to production problems as such. All of these troubles were forgotten in the heat of Wartime production, when the whole riverside was working at full stretch and the profits accruing to the armaments and shipbuilding manufacturers were swelling to unprecedented heights.

The other welfare provisions at Clydebank followed these trends in investment and profitability, with accident and medical services, dining, recreation and educational facilities, and various savings and awards schemes in operation by the end of the War. Medical services had been administered by a Works Doctor, employed on a part-time basis since the Thomson days, and on his death in 1909 the directors agreed his sons 'should be appointed as Medical Officers of the Works, at an annual salary of £400'.⁵ With the growing scale of the works and the increasing number of men employed, the Board clearly thought it time to formalise provisions. There were also regular donations to various local hospitals, occasionally amounting to as much as £500 in one year and supported by annual subscriptions.⁶ The

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1. Robertson, op. cit., p53 also notes impact of demand factors and prices: '...because the price of new ships was influenced most strongly by factors on the demand side, shipbuilders often went through periods of "profitless prosperity"...This created a paradoxical situation in which the best years in terms of tonnage constructed were among the worst for shipbuilders' profits..'
 2. A. Slaven, 'A Shipyard in Depression: John Browns of Clydebank, 1919-1938' Business History XIX No.3 (1977), p192.
 3. P.L. Payne, loc. cit. (1977), p162-66; UGD 4/21, op. cit., p1293.
 4. C.f. Robertson, op. cit., p46.

expenditure on the Western Infirmary's extension fund alone, came to £2,750 in these years - donations often being given in conjunction with other leading firms.¹ Various other subscriptions came to almost £600 in the years 1902-15, with Clydebank as well as Glasgow institutions benefiting.² Given the frequent accidents that occurred at Clydebank - perhaps due to the pressures for increased production and recruitment of fresh labour - these facilities helped the firm to cope with its growing pains.

There does not seem to have been any formal Accident Fund at the shipyard or engine works, however, with the directors deciding between mutual insurance and individual liability.³ The management set up the Workmen's Compensation Fund after the passage of the 1897 legislation, to cover legal claims and costs, which was distinguished 'from the Company's general business' and consisted of Consol investments.⁴ The credit balance of £2,352 in 1901 indicates that this was an effective means of meeting accident costs.⁵

Dining, recreation and dining facilities were also geared to meeting the production requirements of the firm. When the company provided housing for its Principal Foremen in 1902, it also estimated that if they were 'dining in the yard as is customary in similar works', then the cost would be £350 per annum.⁶ This would have cost the firm £5,600 at steady costs up to 1918, which the directors appeared happy to pay. It was only with the coming of the War itself that provision for the wider body of workmen was contemplated.⁷ John Brown's were more progressive than most in this respect, and in 1915-16 they assisted a local purveying contractor in the establishment of a 'large Workmen's Restaurant adjacent to Shipyard Gate...to the

5. John Brown, Minutes, op.cit.: 11.12.1909.

6. Ibid.: 21.12.1906, 19.10.1910, etc.

1. Ibid.: 28.9.1908, 30.8.1916.

2. Ibid.: 17.4.1902, 22.9.1909, 26.1.1914, 27.5.1910, 24.8.1915.
The total given was £585 to these minor recipients.

3. Ibid.: 27.7.1900.

4. Ibid.: 18.10.1901.

5. Ibid.: 20.11.1901.

6. 'Progress Report No.10' (1902), op. cit.

7. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Investigations of Worker's Food... Cd. 8798 (1917), for example.

extent of £2000 at 4% interest'.¹ This would have the desired effects on wellbeing and efficiency which the Liquor Control Board and the Health of Munition Workers Committee were working for at this period.²

The owners and managers were similarly pragmatic in their policies on educational and recreational services for the workmen and the local community. In 1913 a Roman Catholic canon applied for assistance in the construction of a school at Clydebank, and Brown's decided that 'in view of the fact that the building of such schools is done more economically by the Roman Catholics and this puts a smaller burden on the Company, as ratepayers', they should subscribe £50.³ More specifically, there were grants to Glasgow Technical College (including a company scholarship for evening classes), which would improve the ability as well as moral fibre of the apprentices.⁴ Recreation for the workmen was also considered an object worthy of the directors' attention, as when in 1907 a local clergymen requested the use of company property in 'the building of a Hall for the social improvement of workmen' at Clydebank. The employers agreed to a limited tenure and a temporary building which might be removed if the firm required to reoccupy the land.⁵

There were also a variety of informal and discretionary provisions and awards, such as the pensions given to the officials, technical and clerical staff of the firm.⁶ Loyal and faithful servants to the company such as Euphemia Neil, 'an old servant of the Clydebank Co.', also came within the benevolence of the Board.⁷ More intriguing is the case of Mrs. J.R. Thomson, who was given assistance in 1903 'in view of her destitute circumstances', who had been abandoned by the former owners.⁸

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1. Minutes: 27.5.1915.
 2. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Report on Industrial Canteens Cd. 8133 (1915), Para.5, p4.
 3. Minutes: 25.6.1913.
 4. Ibid.: 18.10.1899 - 22.2.1912.
 5. Ibid.: 15.5.1907.
 6. Ibid.: 20.1.1915.
 7. Ibid.: 18.12.1903.
 8. Ibid. The directors assisted her 'without in any way recognising a right to claim on the Company'.

Many of these arrangements appear to have been formalised as a consequence of the War, and the Brown's welfare initiatives culminated in the appointment of J. Atherton as a welfare supervisor 'who was a pioneer in this important activity'.¹

Thereafter John Brown's were amongst the large number of major firms supporting the post-war welfare movement. By 1919 their total welfare expenditure (both capital investment and current expenditure) amounted to £129,184 for all the various internal schemes, and another £19,028 for assorted external activities - including unemployment relief for the locale.² Set against new capital investment in these years of growth, it can be seen that welfare services amounted to the equivalent of 18.5% of investment. Whilst acknowledging the limited and special circumstances in which these provisions were frequently made, it remains clear that welfare formed a significant item in expenditure and an important factor in the expansion of a major company.

Having examined three firms at Clydebank, we can compare their experiences with those of John Elder's and the Fairfield Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. at Govan. The origins of the Fairfield yard lay far back in steam shipbuilding history, with Henry Bell having work with the Napiers on fitting out his "Comet" in 1811 and David Napier's son, Robert, later setting up a yard at Govan.³ On arriving at the burgh, the latter appointed John Elder as manager of the Engine Works, although he 'knew little or nothing of shipbuilding except from an engineering point of view' at that time.⁴ To remedy this deficiency Napier appointed the gifted William Denny as naval architect, who instructed James R. Napier in design and draughtsmanship before leaving after a few years to set up the Dumbarton partnership.⁵ John Elder organised and managed the Lancefield and Vulcan works at Govan with his son as chief draughtsman (until 1852), and J.R. Napier

1. Grant, op. cit., p54.

2. Minutes: 18.12.1908, where the directors agree to company giving an amount 'equal to that subscribed weekly by the Workmen in the Shipyard and Engine Works'.

3. Edward Morris, The Life of Henry Bell Blackie (1844) Glasgow, p83; James Napier, Life of Robert Napier Blackwood (1904) Glasgow, p19-21.

as the shipyard manager.¹

At this point Randolph Elder was founding a firm which took over the previous Napier yard at Govan, and was joined by the young John Elder until his death in 1869. When this occurred the Napier's own shipyard manager, William Pearce (who had risen to this position from his brilliant career at the naval dockyards in London) was taken into partnership in the new firm of John Elder set up in 1869.² By that time the Govan yard was a sizeable establishment, having launched a total of 106 vessels and 81,326 tons in the years since 1852, and the quantity of work executed in 1868-9 shows 'that the business had in fact become one of the greatest of its kind in the world'.³

Under William Pearce's leadership the haemorrhage of talent at Napier's was clear, with Shepherd and then Gracie moving to the Fairfield yard. After the engine works was set up at the yard, the firm became one of the largest employers in the district and Pearce's contacts with the Admiralty eased the passage of the new venture.⁴ The tonnage launched to 1907 and the value of work completed illustrates the progress of the yard:

Table IXb: Tonnage launched and orders at the Fairfield Yard, 1881-1907.

Year	Tonn. Launched	Value of Work (£)	Value per ton
1881-5	138,903 (27,781)*	1,063,303	7.65
1891-5	86,680 (17,336)	619,919	7.15
1896-1900	123,888 (24,778)	847,432	6.84
1901-05	142,715 (28,543)	1,035,314	7.25
1906	20,043 (20,043)	1,194,903	59.6 (11.92) ⁺
1907	48,020 (48,020)	1,320,342	27.49 (5.5)

Source: Fairfield and Co. Pub. Fairfield S.E.Co. (1909) Glasgow.

*Figures in parantheses are annual mean.

+Figures as divided by five.

4. Ibid., p149-51.

5. Ibid.

1. Ibid., p149-51; W.J. Macquorn Rankine, A Memoir of John Elder Blackwood (1871) Edinburgh, p3, claims that Elder left Napier's in 1852 only after serious losses on one vessel.

2. Napier, op. cit., p183, 187-8.

3. Rankine, op. cit., p53.

4. Napier, op. cit., p188-9.

The capital assets of the firm in 1878 amounted to over one third of a million pounds, plus another quarter of a million in stocks and debts owed. By this point Fairfield was by far the largest of the company's plants, as indicated below:

Table X: Capital assets of Elder & Co., 1878.

Plant	Item	Total Worth (£)
Centre St.	Ground	3,522
	Buildings	6,703
	Machinery	500
		10,725
Dale St.	Machinery	500
		500
Fairfield	Ground	61,922
	Buildings	54,720
	River Bank	871
	Machinery	134,471
	Works	16,282
	Docks	34,165
	Patterns	593
Tools	33,672	
		336,696
		347,921
Debts owing, stocks, cash in hand		271,677
		619,598

Source: John Elder & Co., 'Balance Sheet, 1878' (MS).

When we remember that John Brown's purchased the very profitable Thomson yard at Clydebank in the boom year of 1899 for £923,255, then the large scale and substantial assets of Elder's becomes apparent. By 1885 this firm was described as "without doubt the leading shipbuilding establishment in the world" and possessed eleven separate launching berths at the Fairfield riverside.¹

What is remarkable about the figures is not just the rapid growth of the enterprise, but also the large proportion of machinery held at Fairfield and the ownership of substantial tools by the company (10.0% of capital assets there in 1878). This reflects the progressive technology of the employers, with John Elder's pioneering the use of mild steel plates in 1877-78

1. Robertson, *op. cit.*, p69.

and thereby leading a whole new trend in shipbuilding and boilermaking during the 1880s.¹

Elder also established a powerful management policy at Govan, refusing to recognise the ordinances of the craft societies and yet retaining a sensitive awareness of the human needs of his workmen. The firm was amongst those founding the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers' Association during the 1860s, with William Pearce representing the company interests as a minority shareholder and progressive shipyard manager.² After the formation of the new company in 1869-70, Pearce held 16% of ordinary shares (Ure having 58% and Jamieson 26%), but continued to dominate the running of the enterprise with his progressive policies. This provoked the opposition of the shipyard trades, with Pearce informing his fellow-employers during the 1872 rivetters' strike that:³

..he could state on the authority of one of his foremen who was present at a meeting of Rivetters...that Messrs. John Elder and Co. and Messrs. Barclay Curle and Co. should be selected to be "beared" (attacked).

At the same time, both John Elder and William Pearce won the respect of their tradesmen by their involvement in the economic and civil condition of their workmen. Like William Denny III, they received widespread tributes from the workmen on their death and statues were raised in their honour.⁴

These trends in scale, investment, technology and management continued after the death of Sir William Pearce in 1889 and the foundation of the new Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. The contacts with the Admiralty remained important, with E.T. D'Eyncourt moving to Fairfields after serving Armstrong-Vickers and later acting as Director of Naval Construction.⁵ This pattern encouraged the Coventry Ordnance venture and the contacts with Cammell Lairds, who held 50% of Fairfield Ordinary shares by 1910, although the directors were anxious to relinquish

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1. Cormack, op. cit., p152-3.
 2. Clyde Shipbuilders' and Engineers' Association, Minutes: 14.5.1866.
 3. Ibid., 7.4.1872.
 4. Rankine, op. cit., Appx. X, p78-9; Sir William Pearce's statue still stands at Govan Cross, having been raised by public subscription amongst working population.
 5. Scott, op. cit., p91.

their holdings in Coventry before the outbreak of War.¹

The limited success of the latter appears to have dampened Fairfield's profitability before 1914, although it remained a very successful shipyard with a high degree of capital investment:

Table XI: Capital additions and profits at Fairfield S.E.Co., 1890-1918.

Year	Capital Adds.	Deprec.	Profit*	Carried Fwd. +
1890	57,492	5%	67,670	
1891	19,838	"	67,332	2,817
1892	64,536	"	66,772	2,759
1893	19,090	"	19,754	1,900
1894	9	"	'L' 36,754	1,150
1895	4,638	"	37,857	1,138
1896	8,665	"	78,374	2,534
1897	7,278	"	78,165	1,677
1898	79,414	"	115,513	2,753
1899	22,832	16,450	104,754	18,371
1900	8,305	36,035	105,771	15,780
1901	1,950	29,746	96,820	6,276
1902	33,359	23,955	165,352	2,040
1903	53,150	22,683	180,728	20,647
1904	6,696	32,092	170,213	12,545
1905	21,041	30,950	146,780	41,360
1906	32,038	29,920	176,952	4,245
1907	48,175	19,700	189,509	19,700
1908	1,640	26,532	113,794	11,350
1909	1,452	37,800	150,039	672
1910	6,822	37,320	125,754 ^o	33,595
1911	28,880	21,680	150,078	30,084
1912	6,405	-	48,675	70,048
1913	12,675	7,500	91,553	4,825
1914	?	-	46,553	16,878
1915	?	Inc.Prof. [@]	100,644	5,802
1916	?	"	107,046	24,744
1917	?	"	139,306	32,271
1918	?	"	160,047	58,156

Source: Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Balance Sheets (Printed), UCS 2 5/1-28. S.R.A.

*Profit is calculated before interest deductions.

+Amount carried forward from previous year, which is included in profit. Deduction of this figure would give trading profit.

'L' In 1894 the firm lost £90,000 on Cunard contract, which was made good by shareholders.

^o In 1910 the profit figure includes reserves from mortgage debent.

[@] After 1915 depreciation figure was included in profit.

1. Stock Exchange Gazette, (1910) UGD 14 4/21, p1293; Fairfield, Minutes. By that period Cammell Laird was in serious difficulties and the Coventry was making losses.

It can be seen that the years 1890-92, were an early peak and that profits improved rapidly 1897-1900 with a boom period stretching almost unbroken from 1902-1911. Capital investment was also markedly high in 1892, 1898, 1903 and 1907, although it declined relatively thereafter. Investment seems to have been stimulated by the boom conditions and the high profits after 1897, though efficient capacity seems to have been reached within a decade. Both profits and investment fell off sharply after 1911, with the loss of £21,373 on trading in 1912 being only translated into a profit by the large amounts carried forward. Like John Brown's, Fairfields were able to reap massive profits from Wartime production, with an aggregate profitability of £126,760 for the years 1915-18, as against £84,215 for the years 1911-14.¹

Welfare investment played a much lesser, but still significant, part in the fortunes of the Elder and Fairfield concerns than in those at Clydebank. The major difference lay in the location of the firms and their relative infrastructure, with Govan being a long-established independent burgh of Glasgow with its own facilities and local government since the early 19th century.² Most of the housing in Govan and Fairfield appears to have been constructed in the 1870s and 1880s, at the time of Fairfield's own rapid expansion.³ At that time there were plenty of speculative builders like Andrew Simpson ready to finance tenements in Elderpark St. and elsewhere - at least before the City of Glasgow Bank crash of 1878-9.⁴ There was thus less pressure upon employers to provide housing, although John Elder's may have provided some of the land upon which the buildings were erected.⁵ The only application which the firm itself made to the Dean of Guild was for a new pattern shop project in the 1870s,⁶ and during the building boom of the early 1900s speculative firms were constructing dwellings almost next to the shipyard walls.⁷

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1. This includes the boom year of 1911 of course. If that was left, then the average for the three years 1912-14 would be £62,260.
 2. Melling, *op. cit.* p3-9.
 3. Fairfield was itself a separate ward from both Govan and Linthouse, and continued to be so after the annexation of Govan by the City in 1912.
 4. Govan Dean of Guild, 1870: Refs. 240-300, for example. S.R.A.

It may well be that Elder's found indirect incentives, such as land on favourable terms or advances of loans to the small-scale builders, sufficient where the entrepreneurial spirit was lacking amongst the speculators. The firm was certainly interested enough in the principle of company housing to visit the Denny cottages in 1870, along with William Denny III.¹

In return Denny seems to have taken the idea for a shipyard accident fund from John Elder, who decided to formalise the arrangements for mutual benefit at his yard and engine works (which together employed 4,000 by 1870) as its workforce expanded. Rankine's account suggests the blend of benevolence and self-help which is apparent in many employers' schemes:²

Mr. Elder took a strong and friendly interest in their comfort and wellbeing, and was regarded by them with corresponding respect and gratitude as an employer who was just and kind, as well as able. Amongst other acts of his for their benefit, he promoted, about half a year before his lamented death, the establishment of an accident fund, by undertaking to contribute to it in each month a sum equal to that which the workmen should raise...amongst themselves...It is managed by a committee partly appointed by the firm from amongst the foremen, partly elected by the workmen.

The Fund levied 1d on workers earning under 10s per week, 2d on those under £1, and 3d on those over £1, with a total of £3,926 each subscribed by the workmen and the firm in the first ten years of its operation.³ By 1880 the donations had grown to £555 per annum., but in that year the passage of the Employer's Liability Act discouraged the directors from continuing the scheme and the men operated alone until 1885-6, when they too abandoned the project. Figures in the accounts indicate that the Fund was highly successful in balancing the alimnt claims against incoming resources, but that the support of the company was vital to its survival. The burden of doubled subscriptions

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5. S. Damer, 'Property Relations and Class Relations in Victorian Glasgow' Discussion Papers in Economic and Social Research No.16 Glasgow University (July 1976), p7. Damer's evidence is frequently less than convincing, and of dubious origin.
 6. Govan Dean of Guild, op. cit.: Ref. 101.
 7. Ibid.: Ref. 350-90.
 1. Private Jotting Books of William Denny, op. cit.: 6.1.1870.
 2. Rankine, op. cit., p53.

proved too much for the workmen who had also to cope with the periodic fluctuations of the shipbuilding cycle:

Table XII: Accident Fund provisions at John Elder's, 1871-86.

Year	A.F. Subscript. (£)	Aliment	Doctor	Ins. Pr.	Claims
1871	456 + 456	822			
1872	337 + 337	747			
1873	345 + 345	721			
1874	373 + 373	827			
1875	442 + 442	743			
1876	330 + 330	656			
1877	324 + 324	742			
1878	449 + 449	926			
1879	314 + 314	664			
1880	555 + 555	1,025			
1881	950	1,100	181		
1882	968	837	139		
1883	1,047	983	112	400	350
1884	775	799	106	400	350
1885	355	359	65	300	260
1886	-			300	260
Totals	8,021 3,926	11,952	603	1,400	1,220

Source: 'File on Fairfield Accident Fund' UCS 2 7/18.

Although the firm withdrew from the scheme in 1880, and saved a considerable amount of money by paying legal claims as against increasing subscriptions, they agreed to continue providing medical services such as 'first dressing' at accidents and cabs to hospital. This also kept down claims costs since fatalities could cost the firm itself a considerable amount,¹ and the 2s per cent. premium might then rise.²

With the founding of the new Fairfield Company in 1889, headed by Sir W.G. Pearce and with Shepherd and Gracie continuing the progressive technical and managerial policies of the previous Pearce, the commitment to industrial welfare continued. Amongst the stated objectives of the new venture were the intention to:³

"establish and maintain...benefit societies and clubs
or otherwise to provide for the material or moral welfare

3. 'File on Accident Fund' UCS 2 7/18.
1. *Ibid.*, 'Employer's Liability A/C Sheet'. Of the three fatalities in 1884 the victims' dependants received £124, £160, and £13; in 1885 there were another five claims and settlements out of court.
2. If £400 is roughly 0.1% of wages then latter amount to £400,000 or perhaps average of £100 p.a. for 4,000 employees mentioned by Rankine. If we

"of persons...in the employment of the Company...and generally to establish, manage, subscribe to or otherwise aid...hospital dispensaries.../etc./."

In its accident arrangements the firm continued to insure with a private company, until in 1901 it joined the Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation Limited - an employers' mutual run on commercial lines.¹

At the same time, Fairfields did make very large donations to the Western Infirmary and other institutions which regularly applied for assistance.² From references in the minutes, it seems that the yard operated a 'bed allocation' system whereby it was guaranteed a certain number of beds for its sick and injured employees in return for its generous donations of funds. Such infirmaries as the Victoria Infirmary also elected both employers and workmen on to its board of management as a recognition of their support and a means of co-ordinating voluntaryist efforts in the city.

Fairfields were also strong advocates of technical education for their workmen, following the tradition of the Elders (Mrs. John Elder having founded a chair of engineering in memory of her husband as well as laying Elder Park and Library). Glasgow Technical College received £500 in 1900, as well as Glasgow University's Physical Chemistry Laboratory in 1903-04.³ There were also donations to the Institute of Naval Architects in 1913, of which Sir William Pearce had been a member and which Denny's also supported.⁴

There were also various 'external' donations such as to the Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund in 1908,⁵ and to the Ibrox Disaster

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2. Rankine. If we assume much higher wages for staff and various ancillary/oncost grades then this would appear about right, i.e. 30s - 35s for craftsmen. See A.L. Bowley and G.H. Wood, 'Engineering and Shipbuilding. C. Statements of Wages..' XII. Jour. Roy. Stat. Society LXVIII, Pt.iii (1905), p576-79, 'Table 3.'
 3. The Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Memorandum and Articles of Association: Memorandum, Para 2, (p). UCS 2.
 1. Fairfield Company; Minutes: 13.6.1900, 1.7.1901.
 2. Ibid.: 14.3.1903.
 3. Ibid.: 8.2.1900; 1901; 1904.
 4. Denny Dumbarton, 1844-1932 Pub. E.J. Burrow for firm (1932) London, p82; Robertson, loc. cit. (1975).
 5. Fairfield, Minutes: 13.11.1908, when the directors gave £200.

Fund in 1902. The latter exercise in benevolence has a deeper significance for the local community insofar as most of the shipbuilding trades were dominated by firm Protestants, Orangeism and Free Masonry being prevalent amongst the Boilermakers and the formen particularly, and Govan was itself a firm Conservative area after the election of William Pearce as its M.P. in 1880.¹

These various provisions for accidents and facilities for housing at Govan, did not prevent the serious deterioration in both industry relations and the supply of accommodation in the yard and the local area. The profit figures for the years after 1911 suggest that there were problems of production and efficiency as well as of over-capacity at the Fairfield yard, with tensions amongst the supervisors and workmen in the coppersmith, shipwright and rivetting areas of work.² This unrest was to culminate in the major struggles of 1915 at the yard, but the seeds were already germinating in the pre-War years.

In a number of respects the coming of War marked a much more decisive break in the fortunes of Fairfields and its welfare provisions than was the case at John Brown's or Denny's. This is indicated in the following figures for profitability, 1914-17.

Table XIII: Profits at Fairfields, 1913-1917.⁴

Year	Profit*	Deprec.	Reserve	Fees, etc.	Divs.	Fwd.
1913-14	46,553	-		2,000	38,750	5,803
1914-15	94,842	78,422	81,500 ⁺	3,400	18,750	24,744
1915-16	83,296	62,210	35,000 ⁺	2,275	18,750 [•]	27,271
1916-17	139,306		15,000	2,400	25,000	58,186

Sources: Tabulated from Minutes, *op. cit.*: 30.10.1914; 7.10.-15.10.1915; 11.8.1916, 17.10.1916, 31.10.1916; 31.10.1917 - 21.12.1917.

* Gross profit which included the sums forward.

+ In 1915 £80,000 of this was Excess Profits reserve; and in 1916 £20,000 was specified as Income Tax reserve.

• Interest and first debenture total of £38,750 in 1916 - with £68,296 actually available.

1. The Baillie, (Nov, 1880), commented on his election that: 'the Sim Tappartis of the Glasgow Liberal Association...are not to have things entirely their own way.' See also chapter seven.
2. See chapter three below for a full discussion of the importance of industrial relations upon the development of industrial welfare in the Clyde shipbuilding industry.
3. C.f. Table XI, above.

Although the profits improved sharply in 1914-15, production problems were again apparent at the yard in 1915 as troubles flared up over demarcation and the Munitions Act. By December the directors sent a formal notification to management that they viewed:¹

with great concern the recent repeated failure to maintain dates stated for progress and completion of contracts of which the position now reported in respect to H.M.S. "Renown" and delay in delivery of H.M.S. "Mischief" are glaring examples and instructed that the Works Manager be specially instructed of this Minute.

During 1915-16 the management and officials of the firm collaborated with state representatives in eliminating some of the more obvious difficulties in the works, with the result that the directors could note the 'very large volume of work which had been turned out of the Establishment during the past year and especially to the rapid completion of H.M.S. "Renown"'.²

This increased efficiency and profitability was reflected in the growing expansion of the yard, with £8,500 spent on submarine berths in 1914 and £14,000 on the vacant ground held by the Pearce Trustees near the yard.³ By the end of 1917 the company asked the Ministry of Munitions to discount 50% of the £164,259 spent on buildings and £164,418 on plant since the munitions work began.⁴ Although the Ministry exacted considerable sums in Excess Profits Duty during 1915 (against the bitter complaints of the directors),⁵ the firm was able to avoid further deprecations by seeking professional and legal advice.⁶

The expansion of the yard and its drive for improved efficiency and better labour regulation, also resulted in a reconsideration of the company's welfare policy. Most immediate and urgent was the question of labour supply, with thousands flooding out of

1. Fairfield, Minutes, op. cit. UCS 2 1/3: 15.12.1915.
2. Ibid.: 31.10.1916. The directors congratulated themselves and the management on this result.
3. Ibid.: 17.11.1914; 14.9.1915 - 15.12.1915.
4. Ibid. UCS 2 1/4: 21.12.1917. They were allowed 40.5 and 53.0 per cent. respectively.
5. Ibid.: 11.8.1916. £116,648 was assessed to June 1915.
6. Ibid.: 30.10.1917, when £100 was granted to P. Rintone C.A., for 'special services rendered in connection with the Munitions Levy and Excess Profits adjustments...', for example.

the area and the industry in the recruitment drives of 1914-15, and shortage of skilled labour becoming acute soon after the escalation of war production. In March 1915 the Board considered the 'question of House Accommodation for workmen', and enquiries made as to the purchase of tenements or erection of bungalows by the firm.¹ These proved to be unsatisfactory and the chairman was left to:

negotiate for the temporary use of the Pearce Institute or a portion of it for the accommodation of Workmen during the present pressure for War Work and..an expenditure not exceeding £10,000 be authorised for the purpose of accommodation.

This move seems to have eased the immediate problems, but in 1917 the firm was caught between the needs of expansion and the problems of labour supply when it purchased three tenements for £5,000 at Reid St. It was decided to use the buildings to improve the east end of the shipyard, although it is unlikely that they could have been demolished given the regulations of the Rent Restriction Act of November 1915.²

One of the most critical developments during these years was the introduction of female dilutees to engine shops such as those at Fairfields. In March 1916 the engine works manager, Cleghorn, reported on a meeting with the Dilution Commissioners and it was agreed to request the Ministry of Munitions 'to reimburse the Company for the cost of a building proposed to be erected for female labour at an estimated cost of £4,000.'³ Without such facilities female dilution was not possible under the Munitions Act, and the subsequent increase in production and profits would have been unimaginable.

At the same meeting the shipyard manager, Macmillan, submitted plans and particulars for the erection of a proposed canteen which had been stipulated by the Liquor Traffic Control Board.⁴ After

1. Ibid.: 26.3.1915.

2. Ibid.: 26.6.1917 - 3.8.1917. The final price was £1,550 plus cost of ground, coming to a total of £6,000. For the origins and impact of Rent Restriction Act see Melling, op. cit.

3. Ibid.: 3.3.1916.

4. Ibid.

full consideration of the projected costs and the purposes of the facilities:¹

the general scheme of a Canteen at a cost of about £10,000 was approved...with a request for reimbursement of the cost and failing reimbursement of the full amount it was agreed to proceed on the basis of the Company bearing up to one half of the estimated cost.

Within two months the estimates had risen to £16,000, but the firm decided to proceed with the amenities without further guarantees from the Ministry.²

Within the Munitions establishment itself, the Health of Munition Workers Committee had been co-operating with the Central Control Board in advocating the restriction of alcoholic consumption and the introduction of health canteens to improve the health and efficiency of the workforce. As the Committee put it in 1915:³

This then is the problem - to supply suitable food at a low price for large numbers of persons at specified times. The modern progress of factory management reveals a variety of efforts...But by far the most hopeful enterprise has been the establishment by employers of Industrial Canteens, or workpeople's dining-rooms in or near the factory itself.

Both the Committee and Fairfields themselves realised the major improvements in time-keeping and efficiency which such amenities could provide, at a period when there were constant complaints regarding the drunkenness and output of the workmen.⁴ In 1917 the company developed the canteen management into a joint-control exercise, with a committee of employees assuming its administration.⁵

Besides these fresh initiatives, Fairfields continued their support of the local infirmaries, at both Govan and Glasgow.⁶ In 1916 the directors granted another £1,000 to the Western and Royal, after Gracie had reviewed the 'advantages derived from it by the employees at Fairfield'.⁷ There were also the funds established for the benefit of employees serving in the forces, with a donation of £250 to the War Emergency Committee for its

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.: 12.5.1916.

3. Cd. 8133 (1915), op. cit., Para.5, p4.

4. Minutes: 26.3.1915, reflecting employers' campaign to close the 'public houses for the duration of the present war'.

5. Minutes: 14.9.1917.

6. Ibid.: 25.1.1916.

efforts on behalf of the Fairfield workmen in 1917.¹ In the same year there was a disaster fund, quite common in shipbuilding as well as coalmining, set up after the loss of a submarine during trials at the Gareloch.²

Whilst it would be inaccurate to suggest that all of this welfare investment and expenditure derived from the immediate productive needs of the firm, it is clear that the quest for industrial and national efficiency was the major motivation in the provision of services at Fairfields. The growth and expansion of the firm with its new technology had laid the foundations for success in the 1860s and both Elder and Pearce recognised the need for effective management in order to carry these changes through. By the 1900s the company continued to grow whilst strengthening its vertical and horizontal integration of resources, despite the serious setbacks at Coventry Ordnance.³ Just before the War tensions and difficulties at the shipyard led to problems of inefficient production and falling profits which were only resolved after a year of full War production. In these developments industrial welfare served to secure a steady flow of labour whilst reinforcing management authority in its dealings with the workmen. During the War the services were provided by mutual organisation of state and employers, and were of significance in the improvement in production and profitability from 1914 onwards.

Although standing in the next neighbourhood to Fairfields, Alexander Stephens of Linthouse had quite distinct approaches to labour management and industrial welfare. Stephens were never to be amongst the giants of shipbuilding and marine engineering, being in the second rank of builders and only a lesser engineering enterprise.⁴ Yet Stephens were already a large firm by 1870 when they moved from Kelvinaugh to Linthouse on the south side of the Clyde, and during the First World War they were to become

7. Ibid.: 11.8.1916, 15.9.1916, 13.12.1916.

1. Ibid.: 13.12.1917. The sum was given 'having regard to the good work done in caring for the relatives of Fairfield workmen'.

2. Ibid.: 14.2.1917. The company gave sums ranging from £300 to £1,000 each to the six workmen amongst the thirty dead, 'apart from any compensation payable'.

3. They were already, of course, both shipbuilders and marine engineers of the first rank. It was A.C. Kirk's triple-expansion engine in

an important employer and an immensely lucrative company, with profits rivalling those of the very largest yards.

The firm had been established as a partnership in 1842 and specialised in smaller vessels at its Kelvinaugh establishment, which employed perhaps one thousand men by 1870.¹ Like the majority of shipbuilders, Stephens remained a family firm throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries,² although in 1899 the enterprise became a limited company.³ The dynasty remained very much in control, led by John, A.E., and F.J. Stephen as directors of the new board. This control of shareholding was protected by the articles of association, and in 1908 (whilst appointing two officials to the board) the firm decided that they should not 'invite the public to subscribe' to their growing operations.⁴

Originally the share capital of the concern stood at £350,000 with John S. Stephen and his fellow directors holding 37% of the issue and other family members another 28.5%.⁵ Such was the growth of the yard after 1911 that fresh issues were made to the extent of £132,000 by 1918.⁶ Although it remained behind the Russells, Fairfields, John Browns and Dennys, Stephens had built up an impressive business with strong local ties.

Behind this advance in scale and structure of the company lay the increased investment and progressive technology policies of Stephens. As the directors informed the shareholders in 1907:⁷

No care has been spared in securing that the work in all departments should be completed in the most efficient and economical way; and for this object considerable additions have been made to plant by the purchase of machines of the most modern and approved construction.

This aim of technical innovation and improved working methods seems

3. in "Propontis" and another vessel that had made Elders' name during the 1870s. Cormack, op. cit., p159.
4. See Appx. I for figures on scale, labour force and tonnage launched on the Clyde.
1. Cormack, op. cit., p194.
2. Pollard, op. cit., p56.
3. This was on the death of Alexander Stephen himself.
4. Alexander Stephen & Co., Articles of Association, Para.11; Stephen & Co., Minutes: 27.1.1908 - 22.5.1908.
5. Ibid.: note that John Jnr. married Mary Templeton and the latter family also held over £100,000 in shares.
6. Ibid.: 29.7.1918.

to have stemmed from renewed energy amongst the partners and the younger generation of Stephens during the 1890s. It was certainly reinforced after Alexander's death in 1899, and in 1910-11 the Linthouse yard fitted out a new experimental tank and spent over £7,000 on new machinery.¹ Then in 1913 new roadways were built across the shipyard which 'should soon repay their cost by the economy and efficiency derived from the quicker transit of materials', and the following year another £6,000 was expended on new machinery.²

This trend was somewhat discouraged during the War, since there was an added incentive to run down existing plant and equipment which allowed firms to rebuild their yards later when tax allowances could be claimed:³

the probability of having to make heavy payments under the Excess Profits Acts [means that] the Directors consider it most advisable to consume the resources of the Company as much as possible.

Thus, in 1917-18 the Stephens added another 30,000 square feet to their works whilst at the same time spending relatively little on buildings and machinery.⁴ At the same time the firm developed its Repair Works (a particular specialism of the Stephens), to cope with the large number of vessels damaged during the U-Boat onslaught of 1916-17.⁵

Coupled with this growth in scale and progress of technical innovation-investment, went a firm method of management and organisation at the Stephen yards. Old William Stephen had established good relations with his craftsmen at the Kelvinaugh works,⁶ although he had been bitterly opposed by the shipwrights during the 1840s and had determined to 'make fuller use of apprentices and foremen' after his experiences in the 1846 strike.⁷ Thereafter the Stephens made a sharp distinction between the handicraft tradesmen and the men who employed them, whilst

7. Ibid.: Annual General Meeting, 8.7.1907.

1. Ibid.: 12.7.1911.

2. Ibid.: 9.7.1913 - 7.7.1914.

3. Ibid.: 3.11.1916.

4. Ibid.: 31.7.1918.

5. See Table XV below.

6. A Shipbuilding History: Alexander Stephen & Co. Ltd., 1750-1932
Pub. E.J. Burrow for firm (1933) London, p16.

7. Ibid., p27.

retaining a respect for their skills and independence.¹ With a small yard such as Kelvinaugh it was still possible to enjoy personal contact with the tradesmen, although this became more difficult after the move to Linthouse and the formation of the company.²

Alexander Stephen recognised this change and was amongst those pressing for a separate and stronger employers' association, becoming the first President of the Clyde Shipbuilders' Association in 1889.³ During the serious apprenticeship dispute of 1892-3 Stephen insisted on a hard front from the employers, insisting that an attempt 'by any section of men, for their own aggrandizement to secure by exclusive methods a monopoly of a particular trade is more than an injustice to employers - it is a conspiracy against society.'⁴ The same toughness was evident in the rivetters strikes of 1889 and that by ironworkers in 1894, Stephens suggesting a lockout of all the shipyard trades on the latter occasion.⁵ Matters were again coming to a head before the outbreak of War, as the Stephens sought to push through their improvements and make large profits whilst the men were pressing for wage rises. In 1912-14 the directors were complaining that the 'supply of labour has not been equal to the demand with the result that workmen have been more exacting in their requirements. Stoppages of work have been frequent...'⁶ This unrest and dissatisfaction continued after the outbreak of War, as the management sought to accelerate production and intensify working methods, and the Stephens noted in 1915 that 'instead of being relaxed at a time like the present' the tradesmen were pushing for increases.⁷

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1. J.L. Carvel, Stephens of Linthouse, 1750-1950 Pub. Company (1950) Glasgow, p39.
 2. Ibid., p40.
 3. 'Diaries of F.J. Stephen' UGD 4 9/1-3: 10.6.1889. The C.S.A. was formed against the background of the rivetters' strike, noted at 30.5.1889.
 4. Alexander Stephen & Sons, Minutes (1892-4): 25.10.1892 for Circular Letter of Association; Letter Book (7.1.1892-18.5.1893) V UGD 4 1/22: letter 25.12.1892. Stephens added: 'Entire freedom in this respect is a vital matter, absolutely necessary of the Shipbuilding industry is to survive in this country..'
 5. Minutes: 11.6.1894; Stephens were also foremost in the 1897 dispute amongst engineers - 'Scribbling Diary' of Alex. Stephen UGD 4 8/1: Fairplay article of 18.11.1897 criticised 1.12.1897.

The following figures show the trends in investment during these critical years, as the firm moved from being a localised and specialised yard to a major profit-making establishment.¹

Table XIV: Investment at Stephens & Sons, 1901-1919.

Year	Ground and Buildings			Machinery		
	Valuation	Additions	Depr.	Valuation	Additions	Depr.
1901	111,454	-		64,919	-	
1902	111,971	517*		65,530	611 ⁺	
1903	112,049	78*		69,788	4,258 ⁺	
1904	123,014	10,965*		68,334	-1,454 ⁺	
1905	123,014	-		70,069	1,735 ⁺	
1906	123,689	675*		70,689	629 ⁺	
1907	127,766	4,077*		74,513	3,824 ⁺	
1908	130,139	2,373		80,546	6,034 ⁺	
1909	134,731	4,592		78,014	1,892	4,424
1910	135,601	869		77,499	1,841	2,355
1911	137,043	1,442		80,603	7,518	4,415
1912	138,881	1,839		85,331	10,622	5,893
1913	145,030	6,449		85,166	5,279	5,444
1914	174,483	31,154	2,000	84,487	5,880	6,559
1915	178,163	5,680	2,000	86,435	9,634	7,686
1916	212,473	36,645	2,335	84,484	11,014	12,965
1917	213,360	2,824	2,667	79,471	7,659	12,672
1918	216,889	5,955	2,696	85,672	18,764	11,892
1919	264,158	50,046	2,777	112,201	40,918	14,388

Source: Alexander Stephen & Sons, 'Annual Balance Sheets', 1901-1919.

- * This figure has been calculated for present table. These are gross additions minus an estimated depreciation of 1.17% p.a.
 + These are net additions. Gross addition would be affected by an estimated 6% depreciation (based on experience of 1909-14), or 5.93% on machinery.

It can be seen that substantial additions of ground and buildings were made in 1904 and 1914-19, as the Linthouse works expanded beyond its original base. Machinery investment was already large, valuation being equivalent to 58% of basic plant (ground/buildings) in 1902,

6. Minutes: 2.7.1912; also 9.7.1913 - 7.7.1914, where directors complain of 'the continual raising of fresh difficulties by the men', and that 'the men have been very difficult to handle and are not turning out anything like the amount of work they ought to do.'

7. Ibid.: 5.8.1915. At the same meeting of shareholders a record profit of £115,500 was announced.

1. See Table XVI for figures on profits at Stephens.

and with substantial additions in 1907-08, and from 1911 onwards. The drive towards mechanisation was being clearly affected by a long-term strategy of refitting the works after the War, and in 1918-19 there were major additions to both ground and equipment at Linthouse.

Similar patterns are discernable at the Repair Works, which was run as a separate works from the shipyard as such, although figures for valuation of tools show that additions were being made here from the early years of the War.

Table XV: Investment at Stephen's Repair Works, 1912-19.

Year	Building	Plant	Tools	Patterns	Total	Inc/Dec*	Tot.Val. ⁺
1912	2,748	4,458	1,439	38	8,683		33,734
1913	2,748	4,289	1,752	32	8,821	+ 1.6	52,049
1914	2,749	4,075	1,946	23	8,523	- 3.4	55,938
1915	2,403	4,158	2,009	20	8,590	+ 0.8	59,621
1916	2,283	3,698	2,409	20	8,410	- 2.0	92,814
1917	2,272	3,711	3,578	19	9,580	+ 2.0	116,261
1918	2,502	3,438	5,032	-	10,972	+12.7	209,115
1919	3,241	3,618	6,256	819 ^o	13,115	+19.5	108,848

Source: 'Balance Sheets', op. cit., 1912-19.

- * Increase and decrease represented as a percentage.
- + Total valuation of the Repair Works, which includes work in progress, materials, stock, etc. Valuations for 1906-11 were: £7,868; £15,365; £26,016; £25,347; and £31,657.
- o This addition was actually a steam wagon.

The increasing figures for tools after 1916 in the Repair Works, as well as the trend in capital investment in the yard itself, suggests that Stephens were taking advantage of the dilution campaign from 1916 to introduce hydraulic, pneumatic and electrical machine tools as well as to improve their general equipment. Machine tools had been spreading since the 1890s in shipbuilding, with Dennys experimenting with them in 1898 and various Upper Clyde yards testing them in the 1900s.¹ During the shipping crisis of the War, renewed efforts were made to introduce them in Clyde shipbuilding with progressives like Stephens being strong advocates of machinery as well as tight organisation in the work process.

The fruits of the Stephens' efforts were seen in the rising profits of the concern, which boomed at the turn of the century

1. Pollard, op. cit., p392-6. Pollard writes: 'Generally, for the thirty years following 1866 the mechanical equipment in the shipyards was enlarged and perfected, but remained on the lines of the inventions of the sixties...In the late nineties the change in equipment was more fundamental...'

and rose again steadily after 1911. Unprecedented fortunes were made in 1917-19, for which three years the profits averaged £284,323 as against £39,130 for the years 1912-14.

Table XVI: Profitability at Alexander Stephens, 1909-19.

Year	Profit*	S.R.Fd	O.R.Fd	Divs.	Fwd.
1901	11,082	1,500	-	9,359	-
1902	49,995	45,000	10,000	30,670	4,825
1903	50,380	5,000	10,000	30,670	4,710
1904	29,599	1,000	-	12,778	15,821
1905	4,251	-	-	4,088	163
1906	4,581	-	-	4,088	493
1907	12,713	-	-	9,200	2,813
1908	31,450	700	-	10,487	20,263
1909	23,232	700	-	10,528	12,004
1910	14,641	600	-	9,160	4,801
1911	29,119	-	-	17,980	10,729
1912	37,661	-	-	25,297	12,364
1913	33,788	-	-	29,930	7,858
1914	45,941	-	10,000	26,316	7,625
1915	111,526	-	40,000	27,063	31,006
1916	66,344	-	-	?	44,423
1917	247,000	-	-	20,790	226,210 ⁺
1918	311,251	-	-	28,935	274,815 ⁺
1919	294,717	-	-	?	?

Source: 'Balance Sheets', op. cit.

* This figure includes sums forward but is distinguished from 'gross profit' as classified in 1911-15. Latter figures were: £38,000; £44,729; £40,274; £48,003; £115,517 for then.

+ From this sum must be taken Excess Profits Tax, which was calculated as £152,472 for 1917-18 alone.

If we compare profits with authorised share capital of £350,000 before 1911, then the profits were very reasonable (being 14.4% of capital in 1903). By 1918 the profit was as much as 64.5% of share capital, indicating the scope for Excess Profits duties.

In their successful development as a shipbuilding enterprise, the Stephens provided a variety of welfare facilities at both Kelvinaugh and Linthouse. After setting up the new firm in 1842-44, the Stephens allowed their workmen to set up a genuine co-operative store in their yard administered by a 'Working Men's Association' and to operate rent-free.¹ In an age when the company store was common and the Truck legislation of the 1860s was still to arrive, this gesture appears as an enlightened exercise in labour relations.

1. Carvel, op. cit., p40.

After the transfer of activities to Linthouse the most immediate requirement was for a steady labour supply, and some housing accommodation for the thousand workmen employed. Stephens originally purchased thirty acres, two thirds of which was taken up with the shipyard and engineering shops and the remainder laid out for housing and possible expansion.¹

Although it is known that Stephens built tenements such as Linthouse Buildings (standing at the present Yard gates), there is very little documentation of construction by the partners.²

Later evidence from the First World War rent strikes indicates that Stephens owned many of the good-quality houses standing in nearby Stephen Drive, Kennedy Drive and Hutton Drive, where only affluent artisans and supervisory or clerical and technical employees could afford to live.³ It seems likely that Stephens either undertook the building themselves or let out their ground on favourable terms to prospective builders who would meet their requirements. Since few builders were large enough to construct whole streets of uniform tenements and single houses, the former seems more likely.⁴

Another early development at Linthouse was the provision of a substantial works canteen which was 'one of the first if not the first, of its kind on the Clyde', where workers could purchase hot meals and drinks.⁵ This formed part of the partners' drive for efficiency and punctuality which had been evident at the previous yard. By gaining their co-operation and goodwill the men were persuaded into regular habits and 'other shipbuilders found it difficult to understand how he obtained so much work from his men'.⁶

The awareness of production needs also lay behind the Stephens' involvement in both local and technical education provision, with Alexander Stephen acting as the first Chairman of Govan School

1. Ibid., p156-7.
2. Oral History Transcripts: Tr. No.1 (14.8.1978), p1-2.; Tr. No.6 (23.8.1978), p12.
3. Ibid.: Tr. No.4 (17.8.1978), p4.
4. See chapter seven. Stephens were described as large property owners in 1915, although other landlords were known to have held dwellings in Hutton Drive. See Melling, op. cit.
5. Carvel, op. cit.
6. Ibid., p15.

Board and granting £1,000 in bursaries for local boys and apprentices.¹ He was also first Chairman of Glasgow Technical College from 1887, and regularly gave donations to Glasgow University's Engineering Laboratory.² As Stephen commented at a launch in his new yard:³

"On the Thames people cannot understand how Clyde Shipbuilders are so successful. One of the principal causes of this success is that the general intelligence and education of the workmen far exceed their brethren in England."

These interests, partly motivated by the Stephens' powerful religious convictions, were continued after the death of Alexander into the new century.

The firm's policy on accidents and disasters displayed the same qualities of enlightened self-interest and responsible concern evident in other areas. In 1892 the partners decided to improve safety on scaffolding after mention was made of 'the Capital made in court cases about workmen readily mistaking other pieces of planking for proper ones'.⁴ In the same year the firm contested a compensation award and its reversal in the Court of Session was a point 'now decided, it is believed, for the first time in Scotland'.⁵ Stephens were willing to settle out of court but equally determined to quash excessive claims by handling their liability themselves.⁶

Such settlements were readily made after the alarming "Daphne" disaster of 1883 when the completed ship slid down the slipway only to capsize and sink with numerous workmen trapped inside. The Official Report by Sir E.J. Reed was a serious indictment of Stephens' methods of calculating stability and the precautions offered at launching.⁷ After the Glasgow Trades Council set up a fighting fund to contest liability and damages,⁸ Stephens hastened to offer compensation and support the fund (which became a disaster relief fund) which stood at £28,600 by late 1883.⁹

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1. Ibid., p88. Carvel notes that Stephen was the 'supporter of any movement designed to increase the educational facilities of the community and improve the mental and moral equipment of the families who had to supply the needs of industry and commerce.'
 2. 'Scribbling Diaries of Alexander Stephen', op. cit.: 1897.
 3. Quoted in Carvel, op. cit., p63; Pollard, op. cit., p114-18 for gradual advance of technical education after support by such shipbuilders as Denny.

There were also a number of provisions for the leisure and recreation of the workmen and staff at the firm. The new works at Linthouse were inaugurated with a great soiree at Glasgow's city chambers with eleven hundred people present.¹ Each year there were Xmas parties held for staff and foremen at the yard, where such toasts as "Success to A. Stephen and Sons" were given and the guests presented gifts to the family.² By such means the employers could maintain some contact with their workmen whilst segregating staff from manual tradesmen.

Such services are mentioned, and others suggested, at the formation of the new company in 1899-1900, when the directors included a 'welfare clause' in the Memorandum of Association.³ The welfare initiative at Linthouse received considerable momentum during the First World War as the Ministry of Munitions pressed for dilution in the shipyards - with the complete support of the Stephen family.⁴ In order to accommodate the proposed influx of female labour the directors had already agreed to provide facilities and reported that:⁵

suitable premises have been erected and equipped for their comfort, and a women's supervisor has been appointed to look after their welfare generally. So far the results have proved quite satisfactory.

The introduction of female labour would enable employers to utilise the machine tools which had been developed since the

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4. Alexander Stephen, Minutes: 2.2.1892.
 5. Ibid.: 22.11.1892 - 17.1.1893.
 6. Ibid.: 11.6.1894, for example. Here the partners granted an award to a 'deserving' individual who had 'avoided even asking assistance, the case was regarded as deserving of sympathy'.
 7. 'Report of Sir E.J. Reed on the "Daphne" Disaster' at UGD 4 18/4, p9: "Were I to regard this Clyde disaster in the abstract, or to make my own sense of what is right and safe at ship launches my only standard, I should certainly say that before launching the "Daphne", with so many men and such loose material on board, the builders should...have calculated the initial stability, and...materially altered the conditions of the launch."
 8. 'Stephen Scrap Book' UGD 4 18/3: Cuttings from Glasgow Herald 18.11.1883 - 26.11.1883.
 9. Ibid.
 1. Carvel, op. cit., p63.
 2. 'Alexander Stephen's Scribbling Diaries', op. cit.: 20.1.1888. On 18.1.1888 the staff and foremen presented a wedding gift to Alexander's daughter.

1890s as well as giving the management greater control of shipyard organisation and direction of the work process. Thus the employers welcomed female dilution as 'an interesting departure and one which will have far-reaching results'.¹

The culmination of Linthouse's welfare developments came with the introduction of a Welfare Department in Spring 1918, the directors confiding that 'good results are hoped for in this direction'.² According to a later account in the firm's house magazine, a 'meeting of selected men' was called in March 1918 to discuss the practicability of a Welfare Committee which should administer the services and act as a channel of communication and participation. It should be:³

the recognised official body to deal with all complaints and grievances relating to working conditions, and to make suggestions and recommendations to the Firm as to how these grievances could be removed - in fine, to be a constant channel of harmonious communication between employer and employed.

The style and constitution of the proposed Committee was as significant as its duties, being clearly influenced by the 'Committee movement' in industry,⁴ and the spread of militancy. Its President

3. Alexander Stephen & Sons, Memorandum of Association; Para. (w) - (x): 'To provide for the welfare of persons in the employment of the Company, or formerly in their employment, and the widows and children of such persons, and others dependant...by granting money or pensions, providing or subscribing to...sick or benefit clubs or societies...To establish and support...institutions or conveniences calculated to benefit persons employed by the Company.'
4. Alexander Stephen, Minutes: A.G.M. 3.11.1916, when the directors noted: 'The Ministry of Munitions, in its endeavour to obtain the necessary output of war materials, while at the same time releasing as many men possible for the forces, put forward a scheme for the Dilution of Labour by the introduction of women workers [in the shipyards]. Thus scheme has our hearty support.'
5. Ibid.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.: A.G.M., 31.7.1918.
3. The Linthouse Magazine Vol.I No.3 (March 1920). For an account of the founding of this journal and its implications for welfare, see below.
4. C.R. Borland, 'The Committee Movement in Industry' Welfare Work IX No.102 (June 1928), p99-100, for an account.

was appointed by the firm and its Secretary on company payroll, with six staff foremen as representatives of management, as well as two staff observers and sixteen elected workmen.¹

Whilst these fresh reforms were being drafted, the Stephens continued the more traditional services at Linthouse and provided further relief for those employees serving in the War. It is likely that allowances were given on rents in company housing, income from the latter being £636 in 1919,² particularly as Govan was so badly affected by early rent increases. The War Relief Fund shows that employees on active service were assisted with their rents in private housing, and this Fund remained an important aspect of welfare until it was wound up in April 1920.

Table XVII: Alexander Stephen's, War Relief Fund, 1916-21.

<u>Income</u>	<u>Amount (£)</u>
Workmen, Foremen and Officials	13,994
Firm's Donations	171
Interest accruing	185
<u>Outgoings</u>	<u>14,450</u>
Rents (whole and part)	5,753
Allowances	7,304
Special grants	276
Xmas boxes	810
P.o.W. Parcels	9
Presentation	90
Miscellaneous	106
	<u>14,348</u>

Source: The Linthouse Magazine, op. cit.

Since the firm itself gave only 1.2% of the fund, it is likely that this was operated autonomously by the workmen and that Stephens provided their rent allowances independantly. The directors did purchase War Loan stock on behalf of its employees, with sums rising from £3,476 to £4,113 in 1918-19,³ as well as various other savings schemes operated at 5% interest for workers saving.⁴

1. Ibid. The elected workmen and foremen were to join in appointing the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee.
2. 'Balance Sheet' (1919). If we assumed an average rent of 5s.0d per week (a common figure for good housing), then £636 p.a. income would represent 49 or 50 houses - provided all were paying rent.
3. Ibid., 1917-1919.
4. Stephens of Linthouse, op. cit., p163.

Recreation and leisure were also financed out of the massive War profits which Stephens made, Cressy Hall being acquired as a boys club in 1917 and Coila Park in 1920 - complete with elaborate games facilities.¹ These innovations were detailed in the house magazine, another product of the Reconstruction era which reinforced the work of the welfare department as well as promoting a favourable image of private enterprise in its columns.² The works medical officer was a regular contributor, with his advice on physical health and efficiency at work, which would ensure that workers were 'profitable to themselves and others'.

The evolution of welfare services at Alex. Stephens is in many ways an archetypal case for welfare development in general. Stephens expanded and grew from a small family concern to a hugely profitable company in the years 1870-1920, specialising in certain areas of production (such as repair work) whilst utilising the benefits of technological convergence. Their investment policies indicate that they were eager to improve the methods of working and organisation of the yard as well as to find means of further dividing labour. Their labour policy displays the same combination of a respect for established and successful practices, together with a determination to assert managerial prerogatives at both a district and a firm level. Welfare can be said to have moved from being primarily 'infrastructural' in purpose during the 1870s (when the labour force was being built up) to being efficiency-orientated and strategic in purpose by the end of Wartime production. Although it may not have been as important in terms of capital investment as it became at John Brown's, Beardmores and other firms, the significance of industrial welfare in the progress of the concern is unquestionable.

The following section deals with three firms which were quite different from those above in various respects, the concerns of Alley & MacLellan, K. & J. Inglis and Alfred Yarrow being of

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1. Ibid., p158-9; The Linthouse Magazine, op. cit., (Sept. 1920).
 2. Ibid., (June 1920). One article on "The Facts About High Prices", advised its readers: 'The capitalists of today have not got too much money. They have too little...The main thing is to secure a higher percentage of production so that we can maintain our better standards of living...the only solution of the problem is efficiency.'

more recent origin as Clyde shipbuilders and known rather more for their marine engineering than for shipbuilding as such (though this is less true of Yarrow's). They were also rather smaller in scale than those surveyed above, at least until the First World War. There is thus scope for some comparison of their growth and welfare priorities, although the materials available are more limited and less useful.

Alley and MacLellan formed a partnership in 1875, specialising in high-speed marine engines at their Polmadie works - to which they moved within five years of setting up business. By 1904 the firm had manufactured and sold over seven thousand single-expansion engines and had begun full production on compound and triple-expansion types.¹ Alley and MacLellan also competed with specialists such as Weirs in the highly competitive field of steering-gear production, having fitted out 2,500 vessels by the same date.² Having laid out their 'dry land' shipyard at Polmadie, the partners also experimented with pre-fabricated vessels and parts and launched between one and five thousand tons in 1905.³

Having kept abreast of the rapid innovations that were seen in engineering design and technique during this period, Stephen Alley was succeeded on his death in 1898 by the progressive young S. Evans Alley.⁴ After committing the firm to the production of steam waggons and 'lurries', Alley using the designing skills of Simpson to quickly capture part of the market. At this point the partnership was transformed into a limited concern, with the senior partner MacLellan retiring from active participation in the management of the company.⁵

Having gained complete control, S.E. Alley combined a policy of rapid technological development and increasing expansion with a strong determination to implement modern organisation and labour control at the works. This had its costs as well as its benefits and the directors reported to the A.G.M. in 1906, that:⁶

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1. J. Hughes and A. Thomas, 'The Sentinel': A History of the Sentinel Waggon Works (1969) London, p35.
 2. Ibid., p23.
 3. See Appx. I. In 1905 Alley & MacLellan were ranked 27th out of 44 recognised shipbuilders on the Clyde by the Glasgow Herald.
 4. Hughes and Thomas, op. cit., p49.

The amount of work was considerably greater than for any recent year, but the output was less than expected, principally on account of the strike of Patternmakers, which lasted for six months.

In response to the pressures placed upon relations by this hectic pace of production, the partners maintained a solid phalanx of devoted workmen who were rewarded for their loyalty by increased responsibilities. As the young managing director informed his shareholders in 1910:¹

..the largest proportion of the staff had been in the service of the [firm]...for many years; most of the foremen had been promoted from the ranks..

Such support was to be vital as the enterprise shifted its base from marine engineering and shipbuilding to waggon production, against a background of conflicts. In 1914 Alley remarked upon the 'feeling of unrest in the Engineering Trade generally', and thought the firm might have a difficult period.² The next year he decided upon a clean break from Glasgow, and purchased the Shrewsbury site which was to become the home of the firm.- after the sale of Polmadie for a very good price to William Beardmore of Parkhead.³

Being a fairly small concern in a very competitive market, Alley and MacLellan could not afford the luxury of elaborate welfare or of a public conscience. When requested to donate to municipal causes such as voluntary hospitals, the directors were noticeably reticent and in 1914 instructed that:⁴

With regard to the [Hospital] Committee endeavouring to arrange for a supply of radium for Glasgow and district it was directed that no donation be given.

Even in the matter of technical education, from which the enterprise could hope to benefit in the longer term, the employers were reluctant to assist - refusing an application from the Institute

5. Ibid., p49-50.

6. Alley and MacLellan Ltd., Minutes (Vol.1): 11.3.1906. A.G.M.

1. Ibid.: A.G.M. 1910.

2. Ibid.: 17.3.1914.

3. Hughes and Thomas, op. cit., p120; see chapter three for account of Beardmores.

4. Minutes: 8.6.1914. This can be compared with the generous periodic donations from the larger shipbuilding firms.

of Engineers and Shipbuilders in 1907.¹

As might be expected of a progressive engineering firm, the major considerations of the employers were strategic and efficiency-orientated. In 1903 Alley joined the Iron Trades Employers' Insurance Association, to protect themselves against liability under the 1880-1897 legislation.² By 1909 they were dissatisfied with the premiums but decided not to show an example of breaking away', out of their:³

desire to preserve the unity of the Employer's Federation in all its branches, in view of the good service which the Federation renders to the Employers generally.

Similar considerations motivated his support of the Federation's Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society, with Alley pressing six of his engineering foremen into the organisation during 1907.⁴

The coming of war was to have a profound impact not only upon the fortunes of Stephen Alley, but also on his attitude to industrial welfare. This was partly necessitated by the move to Shrewsbury, a fifty-acre site outside the town on which Alley planned to build a model housing estate after taking about fifty skilled workers down with him from Glasgow.⁵ Yet these facilities went far beyond the minimum necessary for labour supply, and must be seen as a major welfare project foreshadowing that at Corby.⁶

An important influence upon Alley during the War was Robert Hyde, who occupied part of the office space which the Sentinel Company established in London for its English venture. Alley became a staunch supporter of Hyde's Industrial Welfare Society after its foundation in 1918-19, and a convert to the latter's ideas on efficiency and welfare administration.⁷ Thereafter the Sentinel established a system of works clubs, a house magazine and various other projects at the new plant as well

1. Ibid.: 18.6.1907.

2. Ibid.: 14.9.1903.

3. Ibid.: 11.1.1909. This was in the same period that Stephen Alley and his directors were aware of increasing unrest.

4. Ibid.: 9.9.1907. This incident, and the F.M.B.S. itself, is discussed in the next chapter.

5. Hughes and Thomas, op. cit., p120.

6. Ibid., p127.

7. E. Sidney, op. cit., p5. Sidney says of Hyde that, 'amongst the first of the friends he bound to the Association was Stephen

as the centrally-heated model houses.¹

Stephen Alley's move from being an advanced technologist and managerialist employer to a firm advocate of industrial services illustrates the dramatic impact of the Wartime economy. Through the experiences of total war such employers came to recognise the practical economies to be gain from welfare, in terms of increasing efficiency and stability amongst the workforce. It also indicates the purposes and functions of welfare in containing growing industrial militancy, since Alley remained a committed defender of managerial power and capitalist authority.

The firm of Anthony and John Inglis was established at the Pointhouse yard, far up the Clyde, in 1867 after the two brothers formed a partnership to manufacture marine engines and smaller ships. It is possible that the brothers employed 1,700 men within three years of this date, although the firm was never to reach the first rank of shipbuilders and only approached the top group of marine engineers in the period 1876-1914.² By 1897 they still employed about 2,000 men in the boom of that year,³ and by 1905 were placed only 38th in a table of 44 Clyde shipbuilding firms.⁴

Like many of his colleagues and competitors, Dr. John Inglis (who led the firm in the 1870s), was bitterly opposed to unions which limited his managerial powers and is a good example of classical entrepreneurship. Murphy noted that it was:⁵

easy to see that he chafes under the restrictions trade unionism puts upon his actions as an employer of labour and [he] despises the judgement which dictates the restrictive policy.

The previous firm had been involved in the setting up of the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers' Association in 1866, along with numerous other concerns, and the family remained deeply suspicious

7. 'Alley, Managing Director of the Sentinel Wagon Works Ltd. Alley was looking for London offices at the time Robert Hyde was setting up his association and his first contribution to Hyde's work was to take offices sufficient for both himself and the new organisation.'

1. Hughes and Thomas, op. cit., p128.

2. Cormack, op. cit., p194-200. The partnership followed on a firm.

3. J.S. Murphy, Captains of Industry (1902) Glasgow, p83.

4. See Appx. I.

of union power in the shipyards.¹ Indeed, Inglis informed his audience at a Glasgow Philosophical Society meeting that the foundation of trade unions meant 'the correlative must be... a group of employers combined with more or less compactness'.²

Although there is very little material on the firm, it appears that A. & J. Inglis were not notable welfarists and bitterly opposed state intervention in industry. At a meeting of Glasgow's Civil Society he gave a lecture professing 'pure individualism and profoundly despises that politic tenderness... which gave birth to the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897'.³ If this attitude was reflected in Inglis's dealings with their workmen then it seems unlikely they provided many facilities.

There are four related factors to consider in the absence of welfare at shipyards such as Pointhouse. In the first place, the location of the works was such that a ready supply of labour was available at Partick and Glasgow with an elaborate system of municipal services ready to hand. Secondly, the smaller scale and lesser growth of the concern meant that a move to Clydebank or Scotstoun was unnecessary. Thirdly, although the Inglis's were dynamic in their opposition to trade unionism (and would therefore have probably favoured strategic services), they were apparently less effective organisers of production and would not have faced difficulties of growth and rationalisation in the same spirit as the more successful firms. Finally, the limitation of resources and presence of competition before 1914 would have precluded widespread involvement in such 'external' facilities as Fairfields and John Browns favoured.

The arrival of Alfred Yarrow & Co. in 1906, provides an epilogue to the long decline of the Thames as a shipbuilding centre and as the source of shipbuilding traditions. After 1867 Yarrow's

5. Murphy, op. cit., p83-4.

1. C.S.E.A., Minutes: 14.5.1866. S.R.A. TD 241. Amongst those present were: C. Randolph, J. Elder, G. Thomson, J. & A. Inglis, O.G. Lownie, W. Tait, D. Tod, W. Simons, J. Hamilton, R. Curle, C. Connel, S. Alley, W.M. Neilson and A. Stephen.

2. Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow XXV, p170-81.

3. Murphy, op. cit.

Poplar yard had specialised in steam launches and high-speed vessels, drawing upon the growing affluence of Victorian society as well as the naval orders of the Admiralty.¹ The firm became highly advanced in its design and technical expertise during these years, and the yard continued to prosper despite the collapse of many surrounding works. Its management policies were also formed during the declining years of Thameside, as warring trades sought to protect their control over areas of shipyard work. Yarrows effectively broke the Shipwrights hold over its work process by such tactics as housing blacklegs in a floating barge during the great 1889 troubles on London's dockside.²

The major incentives to finally migrate to Scotstoun during the 1900s, seem to have been locational and entrepreneurial advantages. At one time Yarrows could escape the blight of economic decline and the depredations of Poplarist socialism,³ as well as continuing their geographical expansion on much cheaper ground. Whereas the firm had paid £100 per acre p.a. in ground rent at London, they were able to buy land at £50 an acre on Clydeside.⁴ After their arrival Yarrows maintained contacts with the Admiralty and were soon able to stand amongst the top ten shipbuilders and marine engineers before the outbreak of War.⁵

Yarrows continued their 'managerialist' and anti-union activities in Scotland, promoting piece work and bonus systems as well as favouring management discretion in allocating work. This created unrest amongst the woodworking trades which finally erupted in 1918, after the Joiners Society informed the Shipbuilders' Association that:⁶

..the firm was forcing the men to work on bonus against their will...the Society was prepared to fight the question with the whole strength of the Union (127,000) behind them. ...the Society had no antipathy against the firm but against the bonus system which their Joiners worked...Messrs Yarrow

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1. Pollard, loc. cit. (1950-51), p84.
 2. K.D. Brown, Essays in Anti-Labour History: Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain Macmillan (1974) London, passim.
 3. Pollard, loc. cit.
 4. Cormack, op. cit., p83.
 5. Ibid., p202-3 for marine engineering table.
 6. Clyde Shipbuilders' Association, Minutes: 4.9.1918.

came from London to Glasgow as a "black listed" or "Non-Union" firm...all the men in the shop were not asked to work bonus nor were they all put on the system, it being given only to a favoured few...

By this time Yarrows had clearly become unpopular amongst the local societies, particularly the white squads and woodworking trades, as they sought to improve output and individual productivity.

Industrial welfare played a key role in the transfer of operations from Poplar to Scotstoun, and in the continuing success of the firm on Clydeside. Having built up an expert and devoted workforce at the Thames, with generations of craft experience,¹ Alfred Yarrow decided to import three hundred key employees to his new yard.² Within the first few years of operations the firm built 350 brick cottages for the workmen, since there were few dwellings nearby the yard and the London trades disliked the tenements at Whiteinch and Glasgow.³

It is difficult to estimate the cost of these cottages since they were built in a particular style, but John Brown's ample foremen's cottages cost about £640 each in 1902-04 and it seems unlikely that similar dwellings could be constructed for less than £500 each.⁴ Even if we assume that the cheapest cottages cost no more than £250 each, then this programme still involved the company in a total investment of £87,500. This rivals the building at Clydebank in 1904-19, which amounted to over £112,000, by John Brown's.

In keeping with his progressive views on science and technology, Alfred Yarrow was a powerful supporter of technical education at London and Glasgow. Having argued for the introduction of college 'sandwich' courses for apprentices and technical staff, Yarrow foresaw the time when technical education would provide the basis for future innovations giving British industries "an advance such as we have not had for a good many years".⁵ The more disciplinary

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1. Cormack, op. cit., p128: 'assuredly engineering ability did run in families, generation after generation of which took up the work...'
 2. A. Borthwick, Alfred Yarrow and Company (1965) Glasgow, p81.
 3. Personal letter of Sir Eric Yarrow (November 1976) to present author, with additional notes.
 4. This would mean £500 x 350 = £175,000.
 5. Robertson, loc. cit. (1975), p229 quotes Yarrow.

aspects of technical education would not be lost on such employers as Yarrows, who faced apprenticeship disruptions on Clydeside as well as in Poplar.¹

Yarrows also promoted the cause of hospitals and other voluntary institutions in Scotland, with substantial donations by generations of shipbuilders.² Since Scotstoun was rather nearer to Glasgow than the independant burgh of Clydebank, there was less scope for public duties within the immediate area although a handful of large employers (including Albion Motors) did dominate local life as businessmen and landlords.³

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that any study of industrial welfare must be prefaced by a consideration of the general character of production under private capital. More particularly, it is possible to distinguish between the technical advance of industry and the relationships to which the market economy gave rise. Thus the progressive division of labour within and between sectors of industry - which underlay the major advances in production - had social as well as economic implications during these years as is apparent from the examination of shipbuilding trades.⁴ Although it may be possible to isolate the continuing labour needs facing the employer, namely supply, efficiency and discipline, these innovations implied frequent changes in the character and scale of labour markets. Industrial welfare reflected these broader trends within industry, as well as the cyclical fluctuations affecting production.

Whilst recognising the peculiarities of the shipbuilding industry and the uneven progress of change across even one sector, it is possible to identify the three themes of growth in scale and business structure, increasing technical innovation, and improved management organisation in the shipyards. The survival of handicraft techniques were significant and even

1. Robertson, loc. cit., p229; see P.A. Ryan, ' "Poplarism" 1894-1930' in P. Thane (ed.), The Origins of British Social Policy Croom Helm (1978) London, p56-62, for broad background to area.

2. Borthwick, op. cit., p29, for Sir Harold Yarrow.

3. Albion set up their own internal welfare scheme in the 1920s.

4. E. Ames and N. Rosenberg, 'The Progressive Division and

crucial in the continued competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry, yet there were being increasingly circumscribed by changes in the organisation of the firm and of production itself. The acceleration of innovations after the 1890s was punctuated and forestalled by the restrictive customs and practices of the workforce, which (given the favourable market situation and levels of profitability) produced only limited conflicts before 1914.

It is in this context of significant, though controlled, innovations and general expansion that we locate the development of industrial welfare in shipbuilding. Contrary to what certain writers have suggested, welfare was neither confined to 'newer' consumer industries with a domestic market, nor was it seen only among unorganised female labour. It would appear that growth in production and output, with the consequent increased demand for labour of varying kinds (especially skilled artisans), was the major stimulant to welfare investment. As employers sought to secure control over local labour markets, finding that their location and scale made access more difficult, so they resorted to incentives beyond the wage contract. Their motives were strongly coloured by the current changes in techniques and management, and the anxiety to ensure co-operation in the projects for mechanisation and dilution of skills. The fact that large well-established and 'managerialist' concerns such as Dennys, Fairfields, Hendersons and Stephens were also prominent welfarists is more than coincidence. These employers were ready to use their massive resources to finance not only housing projects and canteens, but foremen's clubs and local institutes within sight of the shipyards. When business was prosperous and capital investment growing, so also was labour organisation and strength, hence the movement of welfare investment and expenditure alongside general investment and profitability can be seen as a support for management authority as well as a response to labour requirements.⁴

4. 'Specialization of Industries' Journal of Development Studies I No.4 (July 1965), especially p366.

1. See chapter three on industrial relations below.

This raises another important point concerning the qualitative as well as quantitative differences in welfare commitments between firms in the industry. Different kinds of welfare scheme was promoted in different situations, there being perhaps a general shift towards more efficiency-oriented and strategic welfare provisions by those firms operating within an adequate infrastructure of housing and social amenities. The scope for welfare innovation, like the opportunities for general management changes, depended very much on the attitude and organisation of the workforce in individual firms and across the trades. This was even more true of the critical war years than of the decades preceding that conflict.

Only by considering the industrial relations within the shipbuilding industry, and preferably by comparing these with another section of British industry, can we evaluate the significance of conflict and conciliation in the development of industrial welfare. The following chapter compares and contrasts the relations in the shipyards with those created in the connected (but distinct) engineering trades in the decades after 1880.

Chapter Three: Industrial relations and the developmen of industrial welfare: a comparison of two industries.

Industrial welfare provided by employers in the Clyde engineering and shipbuilding industries.

Although there has been no sustained account of the growth of industrial welfare and its formation under certain industrial conditions, there are a number of ways in which welfare has been characterised. So Mathias continues his discussion of services in the 'new' industries, by attempting to relate specific management policies with welfare provisions. He says of these employers, that they:¹

..usually remained firm paternal autocrats as far as control of their business was concerned...they bitterly opposed any attempt to usurp management responsibilities and they hated the new political affiliations of the trade unions.

Mathias goes on to stress the sharp contrast between such enlightened employers operating in an expanding market and with profit margins secure, and the world of the coalowners who faced both sharp competition and powerful industrial unions.²

Other studies have used very similar terms to describe the activities of 19th century coalmasters, however, with one study of the Fitzwilliam collieries depicting the owners as 'archeypal paternalists' who opposed trade unionism whilst protecting their workers against want and deprivation.³ Such accounts indicate the deficiencies of our definitions as much as the limitations of previous research. The term 'paternalism', for example, is employed to denote different aspects of both welfare and industrial relations. It has been used to characterise the simple provision of non-monetary benefits, although more often it is associated with a particular method of administration or style of management.⁴ Whilst it may be more correctly defined as a system of traditional authority, paternalism is often taken as a signifier or personal relations and direct contact between employer and employee. The analogies and metaphors of political activity used in business studies, also tend to obscure as much as they elucidate.

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1. Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation Methuen (1969) London, p374-5.
 2. Ibid., p375.
 3. Graham Mee, 'Employer:Employee Relationships in the Industrial Revolution: The Fitzwilliam Collieries' in Sidney Pollard and

Whilst it may be a useful hypothesis to suggest that welfarist employers will insist upon a unitary management ideology, with authority in the hands of a strong individual, it cannot explain the complexities of industrial relations or welfare provisions. We must begin with the productive forces outlined in the previous chapter, and investigate the degree to which they affected particular industries and individual firms. This will lead into a discussion of the labour force and the industrial relations in these trades and the organisations of both employers and labour to defend their respective interests.¹

It is arguable that very specific analysis of welfare provisions in distinct industries will give a far clearer explanation of welfare development than generalisations about 'paternalistic' employers. Just as welfare provisions are not associated with any one type of industry, neither are they determined by any one set of circumstances. We must take into account the activities and resistance of the workforce as well as the initiatives of the employers, and their responses to changes in market conditions and patterns of production. These developments can be distinguished at the levels of general economic activity, changes within one industry and shifts within particular firms. Although one of the features of heavy industries in these years was the increasing organisation and consolidation of capital and labour, there still remained important differences within and between firms in the same industry. As in the previous chapter, the central theme in any discussion of industrial development must be the contrast between contrary trends. On one side there were moves towards consolidation and integration of interests, whilst on the other there were continuing divisions and fragmentations. This was apparent not merely in the progress of production, but also in

3. Colin Holmes (ed.), Essays in the Economic and Social History of South Yorkshire Sheffield Metropolitan Council (1977) Sheffield, p48, 56.

4. Ibid., p53. See chapter eight for discussion of implications of paternalism.

1. Problems of sampling and representative firms are discussed below.

what Marx referred to as the socialisation of productive relations.¹

These contrary tendencies will also be reflected in the development of industrial welfare, which was primarily designed to facilitate the development of business enterprise. The requirements of labour supply, efficiency and discipline will vary according to the situation of the industry, although the tenor of industrial relations will affect the emphasis given to the services. Using a fairly general model of welfare, it is possible to see certain services as concerned with the strategic needs of the employer, i.e. primarily with the instillation and maintenance of labour discipline. These could take the form of differential benefits to supervisory staff and management, or of an anti-union benefit scheme. The function of the service depended a great deal on the context in which it was provided, and a welfare project was often rendered 'strategic' by the growth of industrial conflict.

The capacity of management to introduce an overtly strategic welfare scheme will be largely shaped by the strength of labour organisation in a given market situation. This unionisation will be affected by a great many circumstances, including the structure, sex and skills of the workforce itself. The employer's calculation of welfare costs and benefits will therefore be based on material conditions of organisation and conflict, as well as the productive forces underlying these factors.

This is a key point in that capitalist production must achieve the subjection of labour to the work process, as well as sustaining private ownership of production.² There must always be the problem of control of labour as well as control of production, and management must take responsibility for the regulation of the labour force as well as the co-ordination of the different elements of production.³ Maintaining a frontier of control was to become crucial as unionisation spread and the debate over 'managerial prerogatives' gathered momentum.⁴

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1. Karl Marx, Capital I [Trans. Moore & Aveling], Glaiser (1912) London, p378, 423-4, etc.
 2. Tony Elger, 'Valorisation and "Deskilling"...' Capital and Class VII (1979), p63-4.
 3. Sidney Pollard, 'Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution'

Whilst welfare may assume real significance in this struggle for control in industry, it will rarely become a central issue in its own right. We should appraise its importance therefore, by locating it within the relations and conflicts of different industries at a particular point in time. The major issues and disputes occurring at the time of welfare provision must be considered if we are to gauge its importance to the employers concerned.

Economic development, industrial relations and welfare schemes.

The previous chapter indicated the ways in which technology, scale and organisation could be linked together at both macro and micro levels. Division of labour, the key to economic progress and increasing returns, is largely determined by the extent of the market. Economic development consists in the advance in technical innovations, the improved organisation of production and the concentration of resources which permit certain economies of scale.

Technology is of particular importance in that it affects the division of labour and the structure of the workforce so directly. The history of technology has seen a long-term shift from adaptable labour with specialised machines, to specialised labour with adaptable machines.¹ This development has been matched by changes in the organisation of production, which has moved (in the most advanced industries) from the diffuse organisation of the handicraftsmen to the regulation of machine production, culminating in the assembly line and sophisticated process production.² Such changes have usually entailed much greater scope for direct management control of the workforce as well as more effective co-ordination of production.³

These innovations have had a profound impact upon the division

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3. Economic History Review XVI (1963), p270; E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism' Past and Present XXXVIII (1967), p80.
 4. Carter L. Goodrich, The Frontier of Control: A Study in British Workshop Politics (1920) Pluto (1975 reprint) London, p56
 1. Edward Ames & Nathan Rosenberg, 'The Progressive Division and Specialisation of Industries' Journal of Development Studies Vol. I No.4 (July 1965), p370-71 especially.
 2. H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital M.R.P. (1974) New York; R. Blauner, Alienation and Freedom University of Chicago (1964),

of labour and the status of skill in industry. There are a variety of ways in which skill may be defined analytically, but it is best summarised against its opposites. Thus skill is manual dexterity versus incapacity, complexity of performance versus simplicity, multiplicity versus specificity, generality versus speciality.¹ Yet this refers really to the execution of manual skills rather than its manifold aspects,² and skill must take into consideration: a) the planning and preparation of the work; b) the organisation and control of the work process; c) the execution of the work. Within the capitalist mode of production, the emphasis upon control takes a particular form, namely in the management and supervision of the labour force as well as the subject of their labour.³

Taking the development of industry as a whole, it is clear that the increasing application of technology and fresh divisions of labour have result in a qualitative and quantitative shift in skills. Manufacturing industry has seen the gradual elimination of traditional handicraft skills, and their replacement by machine skills and process skills as labour becomes more specialised and machines less specialised.⁴ This division of labour has not entailed the degrading of all former skills, but rather the upgrading and regrading of some alongside the degrading of others.⁵ The overall structure of the labour force may change as groups of workers are replaced by machines and move into different sectors of the economy. There is a likelihood that the corresponding increase in sophistication of machinery and organisation will lead to expansion of higher technical and non-manual grades to deal with the new complexities of production.⁶

There will also be changes in investment patterns and in the organisation of production as the capital:labour ratio increases

2. chapter 1; etc.

3. Braverman, op. cit., p86; L. Urwick & E. Brech, The Making of Scientific Management Vol. II (1945), p168, and passim.

4. C.f. Ames & Rosenberg, loc. cit., p367: 'We shall define the skill of a group as the average number of activities its members perform; and we shall take the reciprocal of this number as an index of specialisation.'

2. C.G. Renold, 'The Nature and Present Position of Skill...' Economic Journal XXXVIII (1928), p593 on skill versus manual dexterity.

3. Ibid., p594-5: 'the reducing of manufacture to mass production

and there is pressure on the employer to maximise returns by efficient organisation of men and machines, especially where market conditions favour capital-intensive production and larger scale of output.¹ Increasing mechanisation and standardisation of production encouraged larger firms, and the pressures of investment and competition suggested a more efficient organisation of production was necessary.²

There is thus an important connection between the increasing pace of technical innovation, the increasing scale of productive units, and the improvement in management organisation and control.³ Given the constraints of the capitalist mode of production (as opposed to the technical constraints of production in general), these developments could not occur without considerable antagonisms within the work process. New forms of supervision and control were devised to deal with problems of labour subjection, including payments systems and bonus incentives.⁴

Resistance to these innovations came from labour not merely because of the increasing work-load and intensification of effort which new methods of production often entailed, but also because of the cultural traditions created by labour to defend its own forms of control over the work process within a given historical situation.⁵ These customs and traditions were facilitated not only by the formation of trade societies and clubs, but also by the slow and uneven pace of economic change in many sectors of the British economy.⁶ Thus, we must envisage skill as being defined materially and historically by the actions of the

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3. 'involves the development of an organisation of control, with a refinement of clerical methods, that introduces large new fields of skill.'
 4. Ames & Rosenberg, loc. cit., p370.
 5. J.A. Fraser, 'Mechanization and Skill' Journal of National Institute of Industrial Psychology V No.8 (Oct. 1931), p443 - Fraser relies on Rowe and Renold.
 6. A.L. Bowley & G.H. Wood, 'The Effects of Mechanisation' Journal of Royal Statistical Society (1906), p178-79 especially.
 1. Keith Burgess, 'Technological Change and the 1852 Lock-Out in the British Engineering Industry' International Review of Social History XIV (1969), p222-27 especially.
 2. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus Cambridge University Press (1969), p302. This refers to a later but similar period than Burgess.
 3. L.H. Jenks, 'Early Phases of the Management Movement' Administrative

skilled men themselves as well as by their employers, and by later academic studies of skill components.¹

With the increase in technical innovation and organisation, the management's ability to control the labour process expanded and labour's job control decreased commensurately. This entailed a loss of skill which could only be offset by greater organisation amongst the workmen in a variety of industries.² Definitions of skill came to stand for different things, with craftsmen insisting on membership of trade society as a hallmark of skill and their employers arguing for a flexible and open approach to skill which effectively allowed management to decide job allocation and therefore work status.³

In examining the structure of the labour force in any industry - the skill, sex, age and remuneration of the workers - we must keep these various factors in view. There were certain objective trends in the development of productive forces during the nineteenth century, such as the improvement in technology, work organisation and scale of production, but there are also subjective controls and subjective resistance to consider.⁴

The development of industrial welfare must be considered in

3. Science Quarterly V (1960), p423. Jenks criticises the view that scientific management simply 'arrived' at the turn of the century.
4. Edward Cadbury, Experiments in Industrial Organization (1912) London, p68-91; J. Goldmark, Fatigue and Efficiency Russell Sage (1912) New York, p194; etc.
5. E.J. Hobsbawm, 'Custom, Wages and Work-Load' in Labouring Men Wiedenfeld & Nicolson (1971) London, p351; Elger, loc. cit., p62-3 criticism of Braverman for neglecting this aspect.
6. Raphael Samuel, 'Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology' History Workshop Journal III (1977), p8-9 and passim; Blauner, op. cit., also makes this point on uneven development.
1. T.H. Pear, 'The Nature of Skill' Journal of National Institute of Industrial Psychology IV (1928-29), p194-5, for example.
2. John H. Goldthorpe, 'Technical Organization as a Factor in Supervisor-Worker Conflict...' British Journal of Sociology X No.3 (1959), p214 for job control in coal industry; John Foster, Class Struggle in the Industrial Revolution Methuen (1977) London, p225-27 for discussion on critical importance of skill and job control.
3. History of the Ministry of Munitions HMSO (1921) IV, pt.iv, p76 for this point; Hobsbawm, loc. cit., p351.
4. Goodrich, op. cit., p56: 'The real frontier, like most lines in industry, is more a matter of accepted custom than of precisely stated principle.'

the same light. Those firms which were expanding most rapidly in scale, technology and management techniques, tended to be those favouring industrial welfare. They were also the firms most likely to favour opposition from organised labour, since their scale created problems of communication,¹ their fervent advocacy of technical improvement often entailed the destruction of established skills,² and their tighter management organisation also provoked resistance.³ Welfare was therefore likely to have some strategic elements, even where the overt purpose of the services was not itself strategic.

The conditions of production and the nature of the workforce also placed objective restraints on the scope for welfare investment and expenditure. Where a large number of men were employed relative to capital, as in the coalmining industry, the cost of employee services would also be greater. When their wages were reasonably high already, the marginal incentives of welfare services would be reduced since the workmen could afford many of these provisions themselves.⁴ Where the firm was operating in difficult market conditions, as in competitive export markets, there would be much less flexibility when dealing with workmen.

Just as important was the opposition to welfare benefits amongst the labour force, particularly amongst the 'independant artisans' in skilled trades. This opposition would increase rather than decline in periods of conflict, when any obvious attempt to manipulate welfare created distrust and unrest.⁵ In this situation welfare would exacerbate rather than alleviate unrest and restore discipline. There is thus no simple pattern of provision nor any predictable impact on relations, given the considerable differences between industries and trades at different periods of time.

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1. William Clarke, 'Industrial Essay' in G.B. Shaw (ed.), Fabian Essays in Socialism Walter Scott (1889) London, p85: 'The old personal relations between the workers and the employer is gone: instead there remains merely the cash nexus.'
 2. Samuel, loc. cit., p8 notes even 'when machinery was eventually installed, the struggle to control it remained unresolved'.
 3. See chapter two.
 4. C.G. Hanson, 'Craft Unions, Welfare Benefits, and the Case for

The following comparison of two industries is intended to test the argument that the different structure of two industries gives rise to a different pattern of industrial relations, and that this will lead to a particular form of welfare provision. It is possible that quite distinct industries have less in common with each other than often thought, and that this gives rise to a particularist and sectionalist organisation of production with distinct experiences of industrial relations.¹ If that is so, then we should expect markedly different forms of welfare provision. On the other hand, if the similarities of innovation and relations are more pronounced than the differences we should anticipate rather similar patterns of provision. The following section discusses engineering and shipbuilding as case studies in industrial relations and welfare provision.

Engineering and Shipbuilding: economic development and workforce.

The engineering and shipbuilding industries are an interesting case of two distinct industries which can be contrasted in their development as well as related in their products. They were producing very different commodities in many cases, with the engineering industry itself fragmented into many trades and specialisms.² It is possible to contrast them in terms of productive units, in the pace of technological development, and in the organisation of production or the work process.

Engineering developed during the industrial revolution, when millwright engineers were called upon to manufacture the machinery which was to drive other machines.³ Thus it was from the first involved in the building of producer goods rather than consumer

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4. 'Trade Union Law Reform, 1867-75' Economic History Review XXVIII (1975); and 'Reply' to Musson and Thane in XXIX No.4 (1976).
 5. Lady Hugh Bell, At the Works: A Study of a Manufacturing Town Edward Arnold (1907) London. Lady Bell noted with some surprise that the ironworkers were reluctant to subscribe to their employers' funds; see also below.
 1. Alastair Reid, 'Politics and Economics in the formation of the British working class...' Social History III, 3 (1978), p359-60, for example.
 2. G.D.H. Cole, Trade Unionism and Munitions Oxford University Press (1923), p13: 'Although it is common to speak loosely of the "engineering industry", and even of the "engineering and shipbuilding industry", the occupations embraced under the name "engineering" form in reality not a single and well-defined industry, but a group of more or less closely related industries, and have

goods, with a great deal of specialisms and differentiations of production. Being called upon to meet the precise specifications of the customers and with very particular measurements used, the early engineering industry was necessarily dominated by a great number of small-scale firms.¹ This was true of the most advanced section of producer-good engineering, the production of machine tools themselves.² Only gradually did Maudsley, Whitworth and others introduce certain standardised measurements and methods of manufacturing these tools, the two trends being closely related.³ The tendencies towards differentiation of processes, specialisation of production and technological convergence only gradually facilitated larger scale as the benefits of technical innovation in an expanding market came to be recognised.⁴ After 1830 the diffusion of machine tools enabled larger firms to compete more effectively as they increased investment and their capital:labour ratio.⁵

There was something of a plateau in the mid-19th century, but after 1870 the engineering firms renewed their efforts to improve standardisation, interchangeability of parts and long-run batches of production.⁶ Amongst the leaders in this respect, as in the 1840s, were such machine-tool manufacturers as Langs of Johnstone.⁷ Such were the market conditions for the great variety of products manufactured by engineering firms, that specialisation and small scale continued to characterise the industry although there were a few large firms (such as Hibbert and Platt, later Mather and Platt), able to dominate whole areas of engineering.⁸

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2. 'ramifications extending into almost every form of production and service.'
 3. Burgess, loc. cit., p215.
 1. Ames & Rosenberg, loc. cit., p364: 'As a result of this market constraint the capital goods industries are characterised by (1) a large number of firms, (2) small average size of firms, (3) a highly heterogeneous output, and (4) small production batches.'
 2. A.E. Musson, 'Joseph Whitworth and the Growth of Mass-Production Engineering' Business History XVII No.2 (1975), p117.
 3. Ibid., p127-9.
 4. Burgess, loc. cit., p222-23.
 5. Ibid., p225.
 6. S.B. Saul, 'The Market and the Development of the Mechanical Engineering'

Market conditions had clearly been crucial in the progress of the industry, with the engineering employers becoming increasingly aware of foreign competition during the late 19th century.¹ On one side there was clear scope for further mechanisation and division of labour in the industry, whilst on the other there were foreign nations threatening to invade the markets already secured by British engineers. Standardisation of parts and improvement of existing techniques would facilitate technological convergence whilst increasing output for these employers.

These innovations were reflected in the structure and skills of the workforce, with the handicraft millwrights finding that their customary status and their market position was diminished by the spread of machinery and standardisation.² Their all-round skills and general command of manufacturing techniques made them a hindrance to change despite their invaluable role in the creation of the industry. With new branches of engineering proliferating and machine tools brought in to cut metal at precise standard degrees, they were generally upgraded to a foreman's role and supervised the efforts of more specialised men using the new tools.³

After the 1870s there were renewed pressures on the craft skills as new tools and fresh division of labour occurred, the machinists now using more sophisticated machines which were simpler to operate once the job was set up. The craftsmen were now divided in those who were capable of setting up work - a highly skilled minority - and those who were given the task of

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6. 'Engineering Industries in Britain, 1860-1914' Economic History Review XX (1967), p120.
 7. S.B. Saul, 'The Machine Tool Industry in Britain to 1914' Business History X (1968), p29.
 8. Burgess, loc. cit., p227; P.W. Kingsford, 'Sir William Mather - Pioneers of Modern Management, 5' The Manager (June 1957), p460-65.
 1. Sir Benjamin Browne, Selected Papers on Social and Economic Questions Cambridge University Press (1918), p50-51 says of the employers in 1897, that they felt 'that in the face of ever-increasing foreign competition, anything which caused a substantial increase in the cost of engineering manufacture would be a fatal blow.'
 2. Burgess, loc. cit., p216.
 3. Ibid., p229-30 where Fairbairn quoted.

executing the work.¹ There were also lesser grades of machine men or 'handy men' who claimed no formal training but possessed the necessary experience to operate the machines (although not to 'work the tools').² As in the 1840s it was only the highest skilled men who could expect to overlook the whole job and rise to the position of foreman.³

The pattern of development in the shipbuilding industry was markedly different from that in engineering, although the shipbuilders possessed the same qualities as manufacturers of producer goods built to certain specifications.⁴ Being an assembling industry rather than a purely manufacturing trade, shipbuilding drew upon a wide range of products and skills in its production process. This was indicated in the diversity of interests amongst the employers as well as the heterogeneity of the tradesmen.⁵

Such was the organisation of the work process and the physical nature of production that hand skills survived after the transition from timber to metal shipbuilding.⁶ Woodworking machinery actually advanced more rapidly than that in use with metal before 1850,⁷ although the unionisation of the shipwrights prevented the dilution of their skills to any great extent.⁸ Thereafter the imperatives of market conditions and specialisation of products allowed shipbuilding to draw upon the practices of other sectors (thereby reaping many advantages of technological convergence), whilst changing techniques only very gradually.⁹

During the 19th century the number of trades employed in shipbuilding expanded in accordance with the growing sophistication of vessels and the separation of production processes, without any

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1. Dearle's Industrial Training (1914) quoted in B. Waites, 'The Effects of the First World War...' Scottish Labour History Society Journal XII (Feb. 1978), p23: "...craftsmanship and skill as it was understood at the end of the last century is dying out, but...new types of skilled men are emerging...The old division of craftsman and labourer has been transformed in part into a division between the highly skilled machine 'setters up' and machinists...".
 2. Barbara Drake, Women in the Engineering Trades George Allen & Unwin (1917) London.
 3. Ibid., p10-11.
 4. Sidney Pollard, "The Economic History of British Shipbuilding" Ph.D. Thesis (L.S.E., 1951), p75, 54.

radical alteration in the proportion of total skilled men to unskilled men employed.¹ Although the numbers of ironworking trades boomed after 1850, they settled into trade status by 1870 and their position was virtually unchallenged by machinery until the late 1890s.²

Technical development was accelerated after 1900 and the proportion of machinists and lesser skills did increase, along with the amount of pneumatic, hydraulic and electrical equipment used in production.³ But market conditions remained highly favourable to specialised construction and craft methods before 1914, with control of the work process staying in society hands.⁴ There was to be no major confrontation and defeat of the tradesmen as there was in engineering during 1897.⁵

There were important advances in the scale of firms and the organisation of production during these decades, with shipyards expanding in size and improving their organisation during the later decades of the century. Whereas specialisation in engineering allowed many small shops to survive, in shipbuilding there was a growing demand for larger vessels designed for specific tasks. Vertical disintegration continued but this did not entail

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5. North West Engineering Trades Employers' Association: 2.6.1910, inform the Clyde Shipbuilders' Association: 'that other sections of the Trade, e.g. Electrical, Land Engineering, Toolmakers, etc., who are distinct from Marine Engineers - were employed in the district..'
 6. Pollard, op. cit., p50-54, 139.
 7. William S. Cormack, "An Economic History of Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering" Ph.D. Thesis (Glasgow, 1930), p70-1.
 8. Pollard, op. cit., p141-2.
 9. Paul L. Robertson, "The Management of Manpower in British Shipbuilding 1870-1914.." Ph.D. Thesis (Wisconsin, 1972), p13.
 1. Pollard, op. cit., p141, gives figures for 1892-1913. These suggest that as much as $\frac{2}{3}$ of workforce was skilled in 1892.
 2. Ibid., p140: 'The proportion of skilled to unskilled labour remained fairly constant from 1870 to 1900'.
 3. Robertson, op. cit., p99-103, 130-31.
 4. Pollard, op. cit., p140-1 for diverse experience of machinery disputes and gradual recognition of machine men as fully skilled and absorption in trade societies.
 5. Ibid., p194 for great 1910 struggle of Boilermakers - over wages, not mechanisation.

small scale of production or limitation on vertical integration of steel, shipbuilding and marine engineering in many firms.¹

There were thus considerable differences in the experiences of employers and workers occupied in the two industries during the years 1880-1920. The pace of technical innovation, growth in scale, and management organisation of production varied quite markedly, as well as the composition and organisation of the workforce. Yet it is apparent that progress was seen in each of these respects, particularly after 1900, by both sectors and that the employees were being affected by similar innovations even if the pace and extent varied.

This is also evident from an examination of industrial relations and major disputes during these decades. Although the emphasis differed considerably, the conflicts focused upon fundamentally similar issues and principles. This was underlined by the integration of marine engineering, boilermaking and shipbuilding operations within one plant, as many shipbuilders sought to assist technological convergence with their own initiatives.

The situation changed quite dramatically with the outbreak of the First World War, as the movements towards technical innovation, growth in scale and integration, and management organisation of production, were accelerated under duress. Engineering was far more directly affected than shipbuilding, and when duress did arrive in the yards (from late 1916 onwards), it was to consist of rather different processes than the importation of female workers. Yet the Wartime struggles were again centred on similar questions and the problems they posed for management were remarkably alike - as is evidenced by the co-operation of engineering and shipbuilding employers in dealing with major disputes and with the same grades of men.

In examining the industrial relations of the two industries we must keep these contrary tendencies in view: there were broad long-term trends which affected the industries mutually and tended to consolidate their experiences, whilst on the other hand there were differences in industrial structure, pace of technical change, rate of rationalisation, etc., which drew the industries (and their workforces) apart. In the midst of such divergent currents, the employers were seeking to maintain their

interests and authority against the claims of their employees, for however complex and fragmented these industrial conflicts appeared, the antagonism of owners and workers remains the dominant theme.

Industrial relations and conflicts in engineering and shipbuilding.

Glasgow's engineering industry had received its initial impetus from the growth of textiles, mining and iron trades in the west of Scotland, although it was for marine engineering that the region was to become famous.¹ The great diversity of the engineering industry was apparent from the very different firms making textile machinery at Paisley, sugar-making machinery at Glasgow, locomotive engines at Springburn, machine tools at Johnstone, marine engines along the Clyde, and general mechanical products all over the Glasgow area. The coming of triple-expansion engines and steam turbines in the last three decades of the century provided the basis for a new phase of development,² but they did not replace the great variety of products made around the city.

Market competition in almost all of these fields continued to increase before 1914, with the North West Engineers Association (the local employers' body) drawing attention 'to the serious competition with Foreign Nations, particularly Germany and America', in 1910.³ There was also the internal competition with the North East Coast to consider, particularly since the latter was the major rival for large shipbuilding orders as well as marine engines.

To meet the pressures of market competition and labour unionisation more effectively, the engineering firms joined the Clyde Shipbuilders' and Engineers' Association at its formation

1. David Bremner, The Industries of Scotland... (1869) David & Charles (1969 reprint) London, p132: 'In making steam-engines, mill-work, and general machinery the engineers of Scotland have acquired considerable repute...As soon as the demand for steam-vessels arose, they were ready to supply the motive power, and in that particular branch of work they have no superiors.'
2. Bruce Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland Batsford (1977) London, p176-77; A. Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland Routledge & Kegan Paul (1975) London, p163.
3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 28.2.1910. The question arose when the A.S.E. demanded 53 Hours in 1910.

in 1865-6 after wages and hours questions arose.¹ The engineers and shipbuilders fought the 55 Hours demand in 1866,² but the Association fell into disarray during the 1870s until being reorganised as the Upper and Lower District Associations in 1885-6.³ By the 1890s the employers had decided that their diverse trade interests would be better served by independent organisations, and the North West Engineers formed their association apart from the Clyde Shipbuilders.⁴

The disputes with which the Associations were designed to cope can be conveniently grouped under five headings: disputes over entry to the industry and market controls; questions of wages, hours and conditions - including methods of payment; machinery and manning issues, including control of tools; conflicts over job control and trade rights over areas of work; and direct confrontations between managerial authority (including labour controls) and organised labour. These may be considered briefly for the period up to 1914, and then together as issues arising during the Wartime transformation of production.

By the later decades of the 19th century, the skilled craft unions were learning the rules of bargaining under market conditions,⁵ and were ready to press their case as soon as trade improved.⁶ Although it is very difficult to calculate earnings as opposed to wage rates in the engineering and shipbuilding trades,⁷ the maximum or 'majority' rate of 35s-36s for skilled engineers at Johnstone held in 1901.⁸ By 1911 the A.S.E. in the Clyde district claimed that the rates 'were lower than in other large engineering centres', and that exertion was greater.⁹ Perhaps the major problem as far as the employers were concerned, was the recurrent unrest as a consequence of separate rates amongst the engineering trades and they pressed for common movement of rates to avoid

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1. C.f. Eric Wigham, The Power to Manage: A History of the Engineering Employers' Federation Macmillan (1973) London, says the C.S.E.A. was only formed during 1866 dispute.
 2. C.S.E.A. Minutes: 18.5.1866.
 3. Ibid.: 29.4.1886.
 4. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: Vol. 1, dates from 1896, but Associations separate from 1889. See 'Diaries of F.J. Stephen' UGD 4 9/1: 30.5.1889.
 5. Hobwbawm, op. cit., p350-51.
 6. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 1.5.1907, for example. The A.S.E. told

each trade following and leaping over the advances made to others.¹

Perhaps more significant were the conflicts which emerged over the spread and the operation of piece rates, which were always more important in shipbuilding centres.² Employers were pressing for piecework in the engineering shops since this improved productivity,³ but the natural fear of the workmen was the persistent erosion of the basic rate as a means of intensifying exploitation without commensurate rewards.⁴ This problem was accentuated by the propagation of new premium bonus and incentive systems by such managerialist employers as Rowan Thomson and Weir.⁵ In 1901 the Cathcart firm of Weirs was commended for its efforts in "the direction of standardisation, the use of automatic and semi-automatic tools, and the premium system of labour payment",⁶ but there was bitter opposition to the system and to the determined policies of the Taylorist Weir management.⁷ Such disputes continued up to the outbreak of War as more employers sought to introduce incentive systems based on individual output rather than collective trade standards and methods of work.⁸

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6. the employers that: 'the state and prospects in the Engineering Industry in the Clyde District are bright: that they are unable to supply Fitters, Turners and Machinemen asked for by Employers... that the cost of living... had increased by at least 15%... they look forward confidently to twelve months of uninterrupted prosperity.'
 7. A.L. Bowley and G.H. Wood, 'Engineering and Shipbuilding..Statements of Wages...in Shipbuilding and Engineering Centres' Journal of Royal Statistical Society LXVIII (Sept. 1905), p564.
 8. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 21.8.1901; see also Minutes: 8.3.1898, when employers claim that wages were 'beyond the highest point hithero reached in this district'.
 9. Ibid.: 15.3.1911.
 1. Ibid.: 10.4.1911: 'a suggestion was made that the wages of all classes of workmen in the Engineering Industry should fluctuate simultaneously and thus avoid the necessity of dealing individually with the various Societies on wages questions', at 'private discussion' this point was made.
 2. Bowley and Wood, loc. cit., p120, 564.
 3. David F. Schloss, Methods of Industrial Remuneration Williams & Northgate (1898) London, p163, 168-9, etc.
 4. Drake, op. cit., p19.
 5. Sir W. Rowan Thomson, The Premium Bonus System McCorquodale (1919) London, p9, 81.

The question of entry to the engineering trades raised the key problem of labour market controls, since the supply of journeymen to the trade was a vital factor in the control of skills. As early as 1869 the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers' Association emphasised the importance of members 'having in their works such a number of apprentices as would insure a sufficient and regular supply of journeymen for the future'.¹ This question only grew in importance as employers pressed through their innovations against trade resistance, until in 1892 the A.S.E. tightened up its rules on apprenticeship ratios and thereby precipitated a major dispute. It was during this dispute that Alexander Stephen and other marine engineering concerns insisted on managerial prerogatives and the crushing of any 'conspiracy' of the men.²

Some of the more managerialist employers were in favour of tightening up apprenticeship controls, but under management surveillance,³ and as late as 1916 the employers were still reiterating the 'personal' relationship between them and apprentices.⁴

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6. Engineering quoted in W.J. Reader, The Weir Group Routledge and Kegan Paul (1971) London, p29.
 7. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 13.1.1899. The A.S.E. delegation reported that there was unrest over: 'Piecework and Bonus Systems in several Shops, and particularly that of G & J Weir Ltd, and that the chief ground of complaint was that the men were prevented from bargaining collectively'.
 8. Ibid.: 29.12.1910, when the Boilermakers' Society forbids its Rankin & Blackmore members from working piecework 'on all jobs except flanging'.
 1. C.S.E.A. Minutes: 26.1.1869.
 2. Alexander Stephen's 'Letter Book' No.V (1892-3), Letter to the National Federation of Shipbuilders' and Engineers 25.10.1892 in UGD 4 1/22, p667-68: "We agree with the Federation's proposal to state to Mr Knight that the proposals referred to regarding the the employment of Apprentices (or rather the restriction of such employment) will not be entertained but we think that you should add that the restriction formerly consented to must now be rescinded."; see chapter two also.
 3. Paul L. Robertson, 'Technical Education in the British Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Industries, 1863-1914' Economic History Review XXVII No.2 (1974), p224-5.
 4. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 13.3.1916, "on questions relating to Apprentices the Society cannot be recognised: That the relationship which exists between Employers and their apprentices is a personal one... It is considered most undesirable in matters affecting apprenticeship, to depart...from such an important principle."

There were similar troubles over the introduction of unskilled men and women into the trade, but the numbers of females were negligible before 1915 and the unskilled question really touched upon manning and machinery rather than entry as such.¹

Machinery was to become the major issue in engineering disputes towards the end of the nineteenth century, as employers sought to implement innovations in machine tools.² This culminated in the great confrontation of 1897, in which the Clyde employers played a prominent part despite the London origins of the conflict.³ This vigilance proved necessary, since as early as 1899 the national Federation was circularising its constituent Associations upon the actions of various unions 'to evade or act contrary to the conditions of management', and urged watchfulness against 'insidious encroachments'.⁴

These unions included the Boilermakers' Society as well as the engineering bodies,⁵ although it was mainly the latter who were affected by mechanisation and the placing of handymen on turret lathes at Weirs, Langs and elsewhere.⁶ The A.S.E. displayed considerable deference after the 1898 defeat, as was evident in dealing with the Weir issue a decade afterwards,⁷ but the groundswell of resistance was apparent just before the outbreak of War.⁸ This militancy could be only strengthened by Weir's blithe dismissal of A.S.E. claims against his firm,⁹ and by the persistent attempts to employ handymen in working the tools at various plants.¹⁰

Closely related to manning questions were those involving demarcation and trade claims over particular aspects of work, which was another matter raised during the 1897-8 stoppages.¹¹ Basically, the engineering craftsmen were concerned that their

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1. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, Appx.I, for figures on female employment. Females constituted 10.4% of employees in metals (i.e. 170,000), but only 1.5% in marine engineering and less than 0.25% in shipbuilding in 1914.
 2. Keith Burgess, The Origins of British Industrial Relations Croom Helm (1975) London, p61, etc.
 3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 4.4.1898. President Dunlop noted that: 'the past year had been one of very great strife, and the Engineering Trade had passed through a grave crisis, but on examining the results which had been obtained, there was reason for congratulation. He... impressed upon Members the necessity of keeping those results constantly before them so that none of the advantages gained should be lost.'

claims over certain areas of trade work should not be lost to the Boilermakers, Patternmakers and other societies. Only by constantly reasserting their position could trade customs (still very important and the basis of modern 'custom and practice') be renewed, and control over new work be established.¹ As with other conflicts, both employers and trade union officials were seeking to stabilise negotiations by centralised procedures and agreements before 1914.²

All of the above conflicts (concerning wages, hours, conditions; entry and apprenticeship; machinery and manning; demarcation), involved issues of managerial prerogatives to some degree. But there were struggles which arose from management control or supervisory authority as such. As employers pushed for greater mechanisation and rationalisation of their works, they came to recognise the crucial importance of efficient and effective

4. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 31.7.1899.
5. Ibid.: 30.5.1900 - 22.6.1900; 2.9.1902. On the latter date the Association noted that this question of machinery in boilermaking affected the 'general principle of freedom to Employers in the management of their Works'.
6. Ibid.: 24.12.1903, on the 'intimidation of the machinemen at Paisley; Reader, op. cit., p14, for links of Langs and Weirs.
7. Ibid.: 5.5.1908, when A.S.E. officials 'admitted the right of the Employers...to appoint the workman they considered best qualified to work machines, but...urged that the firm should have given a skilled turner the opportunity of manipulating the machine'.
8. Ibid.: 21.6.1910 - 2.2.1912. At latter date the resolution was passed that "...there should be no surrender or sacrifice of the Employers' rights and discretion as to the manning of machines and the employment of handymen generally...".
9. Ibid.: 3.5.1912, for comments of J.R. Richmond; 15.1.1914, for firm's comment that eight automatic machines were now in use and 'they feared that in about 3 months, 200 men may have to be discharged for causes other than the introduction of machines'.
10. Ibid., for reports of Reid Gear troubles.
11. Browne, op. cit., p103, on demarcation disputes.
1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 7.11.1911, when the A.S.E. were in dispute with the Sheet Iron Workers and the employers called the District Delegate of the former to them 'impressing...the seriousness of the recent stoppage of work'.
2. Ibid.: 5.7.1910, for report of Federation initiatives, 'with a view to the adoption of a General Demarcation Agreement'.

management in the works. Hence Benjamin Browne identified the cause of the great 1897-8 conflict as not one involving technology as much as managerial prerogatives.¹

In seeking to sustain and extend management authority, the employers were faced with a number of alternative strategies. They could increase the membership and solidarity of their associations, which they did with considerable success before 1914.² Secondly, they might attempt to develop negotiating machinery with the union officials and thus ensure effective control of rank and file members.³ This was again followed before the War, although there was always the danger of union power outstripping attempts at incorporation.⁴ Thirdly, the employers might employ such instruments as Discharge and Enquiry Notes to tighten market controls over the workmen and thereby enhance local management power.⁵ Such efforts were noticeable before 1912, with the engineering firms arguing that such notes were an ordinary facet of industrial administration.⁶

Yet each of these strategies could only operate at a general district level through the agency of the Association, and did not relieve individual firms of their specific problems.⁷ For the implementation of key changes the employers depended upon their own managers and foremen. In engineering it was the foreman who demanded respect as a leading craftsman organising the work, and

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1. Browne, op. cit., p68: 'what really in the eyes of the employers, had paved the way for, and led up to the great struggle, was the claim to interference in the management of the works.'
 2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 13.4.1900, 22.3.1901, 1.5.1907 - 18.12.1907, etc., for new recruits in Association, especially from shipbuilders such as Stephens, Dennys, Coventry Ordnance, etc.
 3. Browne, op. cit., p47-8; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 2.5.1913.
 4. Ibid.: 19.6.1914, for example.
 5. Ibid.: 10.2.1898 - 5.12.1898; Burgess, op. cit., p58-9.
 6. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 1.6.1909 - 3.8.1909. On latter date they claimed: 'the System was an ordinary act of administration not calling for discussion with the Unions. It had been in operation in Shipyards for almost three years, and it had recently been decided by Engineering Employers to extend it to Engineering Shops.'
 7. Ibid.: 27.2.1904, for example when Mo-Car Syndicate uses the National Labour Bureau in its struggle against union; see chapter six for discussion of agencies of welfare.

it was he who directly controlled the work process on behalf of the employer.¹ The Clyde engineers and shipbuilders recognised this in the 1860s, when they decided to lock out 55 Hours campaigners, but to still employ foremen and underforemen.² After the conflict the C.S.E.A, resolved to extricate their supervisors from the craft societies, as well as insulate their apprentices against unionisation.³

The matter came to the fore again during the great troubles of the 1890s, when it was found that many supervisors sided with their trades and were even persuading craftsmen into joining societies rather than maintaining their employers' interests.⁴ Since the foremen were themselves being affected by changes in technology, intrusion of new payment systems, management organisation of production, and the growth in scale and sophistication of business, their reactions are understandable. Their loyalty was essential to the operation of the firm and the industry, and yet the very changes which they were responsible for implementing were transforming their traditional role in industry. Similar ambiguities were evident in their arbitration of disputes over machinery and demarcation rights, since they were expected to balance craft loyalties against their employers' overall interests.⁵

The case of foremen illustrates the crucial problem facing engineering employers in these years: that of control. Entry to the industry and apprenticeship involved market control, hours and payments involved formal control of employment and effort, machinery questions involved control of tools and implements of production, demarcation involved control of the areas of work, and authority disputes involved the real subjection of labour in the work process and in industry as a whole.

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1. Goodrich, *op. cit.*, p117: 'promotion to the position of foreman or to other grades whose duties involve direct supervision is very close to the center of the problem [of control]. The immediate issues of control arise in contact with the foreman's authority; the method of his selection is a pivotal issue.'
 2. C.S.E.A. Minutes: 18.5.1866.
 3. *Ibid.*: 30.8.1866: 'The following New Rule as to Foremen was passed:
- Members of the Association shall not employ as regular Foremen members of any Trade Union, or Society, or Combination, having for its object the controlling of labour, or which interferes between Employer and Employed.'

The First World War saw an acceleration of disputes and an exacerbation of the problems of control. There were also important changes in the agencies of control - affecting the control of labour as well as the control of production - as the state assumed overall responsibility for the output of the munitions establishments on Clydeside and elsewhere.¹ Even those conflicts concerned with increases in wages now assumed dangerous proportions, and the dilution process itself fused the previously disparate issues of trade resistance into a coherent campaign.

Questions of wages and payments arose in January-June 1914, well before the outbreak of War, as 32 unions presented a demand to the North West Engineers for increased wages and a 48 Hour week.² Although the employers firmly opposed the latter demand, the larger firms were favourable to some reduction of hours.³ Amidst a powerful recruitment drive and an assault on the smaller engineering societies,⁴ the A.S.E. gave notice that it would make a claim of 2d Hour increase.⁵ This movement continued despite the outbreak of War in August 1914,⁶ and culminated in the February 1915 campaign and strike.⁷

The dilution process was bound to provoke large scale unrest in the engineering industry, since it involved a rapid advancement of those tendencies which the craft societies had been resisting in the pre-War period and which labour shortages gave them the power to reverse during the War.⁸ Yet the fact remains that the employers and government were not only able to implement dilution very effectively after 1915, but they also extended the amount of

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4. C.S.A. Minutes: 20.5.1896; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 10.2.1898 - 18.5.1898.
 5. Ibid., 10.11.1911, when the Mechanics Foreman stated that 'the Mechanics made fixed joints only. The Sheet Iron Workers did the work originally..'
 1. W.R. Scott & R. Cunnison, The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War Oxford University Press (1924), p74-5 for Clydeside production; James Hinton, The First Shop Stewards' Movement George Allen & Unwin (1973) London, p109, etc.
 2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 15.6.1914.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.: 3.7.1914. Report of Brodie's article in A.S.E. Journal.
 5. Humbert Wolfe, Labour Supply and Regulation Oxford University Press (1923), p116.
 6. N.W.E.T.E.A.: 24.8.1914.
 7. Ibid.: 19.1.1915 - 30.3.1915.

piecework undertaken by skilled men and lesser grades.¹

They were able to do this largely because of divisions amongst the craftsmen and the determined execution of state authority during 1916.² Whereas the variety of political and industrial organisations representing the tradesmen were attempting to secure control over the work process for the societies,³ the employers and officials were determined that no such concessions should be made in the management of the works or the economy.⁴

Even so, it is unlikely that dilution would have been so successful had it implied a variety of benefits and ambiguous advantages for the workers themselves. The skilled men were usually upgraded to some setting up position where they did not actually become supervisors.⁵ Lesser skills such as machinists were placed on higher work and given the responsibility of training the dilutees in machine skills.⁶ Every grade had the opportunity to earn high incomes from the piecework and premium bonus systems operated - often leading to anomalies between the tradesmen and the lower grades.⁷

Having lost control of the supply of fresh labour to the industry through dilution, the craftsmen also found that the control over machinery and over areas of work were breached as Wartime production progressed.⁸ When the tradesmen refused to supervise the work of dilutees or when they refused to work on piece rates, they quickly discovered that the employers would

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8. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p74: 'Dilution involved four things which are interdependant - the subdivision of processes, the installation of specialised machinery, the upgrading of existing labour, and the introduction of new labour.'
 1. Ibid., V pt.i, p122-23.
 2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 6.12.1915, Paterson and Gramond's meeting with Clyde employers; Hinton, op. cit., p144-45; and Iain McLean, "Labour in Clydeside Politics, 1914-1922" (Oxon, 1971), p54, for divisions of militants and Johnstone craft conservatives.
 3. Forward 1.1.1916; History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p112; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 21.1.1916, etc.
 4. Ibid.: 21.1.1916: 'no further conditions could be agreed to locally precedent to the introduction of dilution and...the Government could not agree to hand over to any Committee the arrangements for labour dilution. It was the intention of the Government to introduce the dilution scheme in every shop...'
 5. Ibid.: 13.3.1916, etc.
 6. Ibid.: 13.3.1916 - 16.8.1916, etc.

promote machinists and lesser grades to supervisory positions thereby lessening society control still further.¹

Engineering shops ensured that the incoming grades would not ally with the recalcitrant artisans by enabling them to earn high wages under premium bonus,² and granting privileges to ambitious individuals. The female shell workers were kept well away from the societies, and the consequent danger of organisation under craft aegis.³ When Kirkwood and his colleagues attempted to organise the Parkhead dilutees, they precipitated the crisis of March 1916 and their own exile from Glasgow.⁴

Given the defeat of the craftsmen and the tacit acquiescence of females and semi-skilled in the dilution programme, the only other groups which might pose a threat to expanding production were the apprentices and the intermediate grades. The challenge from the younger workers was easily crushed in 1916, following the dilution crisis in engineering.⁵ The technical, clerical and supervisory grades proved more difficult to control after their differentials were eroded and they began to organise in Autumn 1916.⁶ Foremen in particular were aggrieved at the extra burdens of Wartime production, with long hours and the duties of state control wearing on their relations with the men.⁷

It was not until the end of 1918 that some semblance of concord and loyalty was restored in many firms, and it was necessary to call upon state assistance in this sensitive period of negotiation.⁸ Indeed the foremen had come to represent the state's control of production, and formed the most immediate

7. Ibid.: 18.2.1916, -16.8.1916, etc; History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.i, p170 where Churchill quoted.

8. Drake, op. cit., p35; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 9.1.1917, etc.

1. N.W.E.T.E.A./C.S.A. Minutes: 28.8.1917. Letter of employer says of tradesmen: "They now see willing men with less mechanical training employed, as supervisors for example in positions which they themselves might have occupied, had they not been debarred by their restrictive practices and their reluctance to accept dilution..."; also N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 13.3.1916 for promotion.

2. Ibid.: 5.2.1917, for Beardmore's comment on P.B.System; etc.

3. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p117, V pt.ii, p11; Drake, op. cit., p32-33, etc; McLean, op. cit., p97.

4. H.E.R. Highton, 'Report on the Clyde District' (August 1916) in Drake, op. cit., p129.

5. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 13.3.1916 - 20.4.1916.

layer of state authority in the economy, hence the official concern over the deterioration of their position and morale.¹

Thus we can portray the major conflicts in the engineering industry as the response of organised labour to the unprecedented acceleration of innovations in technology, division of labour, organisation of production, and labour control during the War years. Yet as both employers and officials realised, dilution was nothing new in itself but rather an extension of those developments which had been firmly established before the War.² The disputes revolved around the same basic issues and these were in themselves but different aspects of the struggle for industrial control. Conflicts over payments, labour supply, machinery and manning, demarcation and authority were crystallised in the dilution struggles but they did not spring from Wartime conditions as such. The ground for each had been lain before 1914 in the efforts by such progressive employers as Weir and Rowan Thomson to improve the control of labour as well as its productivity.³

Industrial relations in the Clydeside shipbuilding industry were shaped by similar developments in the structure, technology and organisation of production. Yet their consequences were very different, since specialisation of product and improvements in technology meant that the shipbuilders could borrow skills utilised elsewhere whilst continuing the handicraft traditions

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6. Ibid.: 22.9.1916, 20.3.1917 - 27.3.1917, 25.7.1917 - 29.8.1917, etc.
 7. Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Lynden Macassey, Report on the Clyde Munition Workers (1915) Cd. 8136, Para.8 p4; Report of the Commission of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest: Scotland Cd. 8669 (1917) Para.6 p4; etc.
 8. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 30.7.1918, 12.8.1918 - 10.9.1918, etc.
 1. Cd. 8669, op. cit.; George Sayers Bain, The Growth of White Collar Unionism Oxford University Press (1970), p126, etc. for background.
 2. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.i, p123: 'Employers were predisposed to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the war changes in methods of production. The belief was general among them that payment by results was the most effective stimulus to exertion; their effort for a generation before the war had been in the main to extend such systems, and that the extension had gone no further was due entirely to the opposition of the unions.'
 3. J.R. Richmond, Some Aspects of Labour in the Engineering Industries (1917) in UGD 102 3/10, p6 for summary of position: 'The position just before the outbreak of the war was that...inroads on the power of management had become so serious that, had the war not intervened, the autumn of 1914 would probably have seen an industrial disturbance of the first magnitude.'

of the industry.¹ Market conditions allowed and encouraged shipbuilders to rely upon labour-intensive production with the skilled trades reinforced rather than displaced by the progress of the industry before 1900.² Rather than diluting the crafts and dividing labour, therefore, technical change had relatively little impact upon skilled men.

In comparison to engineering the shipbuilding industry had a very high proportion of skilled to unskilled men before the 1890s, as well as a much greater diversity of trades involved in the work process.³ The pace of technical change was more gradual and more ambiguous in its affects, although there were pressures to accelerate innovations in machine tools from the 1890s onwards.⁴ What struck the shipyard visitor around the turn of the century, therefore, was not the signs of mechanisation and dissection of production into linear stages, but the great diversity of handicraftsmen-wielding tools designed to cope with very specific areas of construction in a specialised way - in the completion of a custom-built product. Bowley and Wood listed as many as thirty distinct trades which might be involved in the launching of a vessel around 1905.⁵ There were also the overlapping occupations between marine engineering shops, boilermaking shops, foundries and electrical works to consider in any tabulation of those contributing to the completed ship.

Similar points can be made about the other trends noted in the previous chapter, namely, the moves towards larger scale and more sophisticated structure of firm, and the tendencies of the shipyards to improve the organisation and management of their labour process. Whilst it is undeniable that important changes were occurring in these directions, the survival of family firms and the traditional methods of yard lay-out and labour management

1. Pollard, op. cit., p139-41, on trades.
2. Paul L. Robertson, 'Demarcation Disputes in British Shipbuilding Before 1914' International Review of Social History XX (1975), p226-27.
3. Pollard, op. cit., p141 Table 11. Note that the proportion of semi-skilled men was growing after the 1880s; Bowley & Wood, loc. cit., p576-77 for diversity.
4. Robertson, op. cit., p92, 98-103, for machanisation.
5. Bowley & Wood, loc. cit., Table 3: Angle iron smiths; Angle iron smiths' strikers; platers; rivetters; caulkers; holders-up; drillers and hole-cutters; shipsmiths; ship smiths' strikers; shipwrights;

were also in evidence before 1914.¹ There were obvious limitations on rationalisation of production given the nodal distribution of work around the growing vessel and the confinement of much machinery to the powered hand-tools wielded by mobile individuals. In place of this limited control over men and machinery, the employers were forced to rely upon various incentive systems, ranging from the older sub-contract and squad arrangements to the piecework and later premium payments.²

Thus it is to be expected that the particular forms which industrial relations and industrial conflict will take in shipbuilding, will differ quite markedly from those in engineering. At the same time, the overall trends towards greater division of labour, mechanisation and organisation were evident in each sector. The question remains whether the pattern of disputes in the years 1880-1920 resembled those in engineering, which shared its labour and its technology with shipbuilding and yet differed in fundamental respects. Attention is given to the various types of disputes before 1914 and then to the Wartime experiences of the industry.

The close dependance of engineering and shipbuilding on Clydeside was well appreciated by the employers themselves, since a downturn in construction was inevitably reflected in the engineers' order books.³ One of the major reasons for the increasing attraction of naval orders was their cushioning affect upon depressions in both sectors of the regional economy.⁴ These violent oscillations also served to discourage extensive investment in machinery and plant which would prove costly overheads in slack periods.⁵

5. joiners; sailmakers; sawyers; sawmillers'; helpers; labourers; engineers; fitters; turners; patternmakers; brassmoulders; brass-finishers; coppersmiths; machinemen; painters; plumbers; riggers; blockmakers; cabinetmakers; boatbuilders; red-leaders.

1. Pollard, op. cit., p56; Robertson, op. cit., p62.

2. Schloss, op. cit., p163; Robertson, loc. cit. (1974), p234.

3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 31.12.1907.

4. Ibid.: 19.10.1903: 'there is no improvement in trade...Were it not for special shipbuilding work now in hand on the Clyde, this falling off would be much accentuated'.

5. Robertson, op. cit., p89-90; Pollard, loc. cit. (1959-60), p437.

Disputes over wages, hours and payments systems were particularly complex in shipbuilding, due to the great multiplicity of trades and the overlap with other industries and occupations. So prevalent were these conflicts that the employers sought to stabilise negotiations procedures, which would formalise the various customs and practices of the yards.¹ These moves were supported by societies such as the Joiners who wished to equalise wage fluctuations for their members dispersed in different sectors.² The powerful Boilermakers' Society opposed any restricting standardisation of rates as well as long-term agreements, and improved their position by refusing to enter an arrangement similar to that negotiated at York by the A.S.E.³

Payments systems were equally complex, with the gradual eclipse of the old London sub-contract arrangements organised by the Shipwrights and the emergence of new piecework systems after the mid-19th century.⁴ Piece rates came to represent a major component of shipyard wages by the 1900s,⁵ although the trades were sharply divided in their reception of the system.⁶ In general, the white squads of woodworking trades opposed the system whereas the black squads - led by the Boilermakers - were its supporters.⁷ The major difference seems to have been that the latter were strong enough to prevent its abuse and hence to operate variations of sub-contract and piecework to their own advantage.⁸

By the 1900s the employers were introducing new forms of payment systems, such as premium bonus, which gave the management a stronger hold over work effort.⁹ Thereafter the unions were striving to restrict the spread of payments by results and on occasions the Boilermakers' Society opposed the introduction of piecework at all.¹⁰ Progressive managerialists such as Dennys and Scotts of Greenock were anxious to crush any

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1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 2.8.1898 - 3.10.1905 for various customs; 2.11.1911 for attempts to centralise and formalise negotiations.
 2. Ibid.: 10.4.1911. These were private discussions between the employers and union officials.
 3. Ibid.: 7.2.1911 - 15.3.1911; 16.5.1911 for settlement of A.S.E. wage claims.
 4. Pollard, op. cit., p143-44; Robertson, loc. cit. (1975), p224-25.
 5. Bowley & Wood, loc. cit., p120; C.f. p143-44.

resistance to premium bonus, but the Boilermakers remained firm in their conviction that rates were being cut to intensify efforts alongside the introduction of machinery.¹

Struggles were also frequent over the entry of apprentices and journeymen to the trades, especially in view of the rapid changes which were affecting the industry after 1860.² The older apprenticeship provisions were eroded as the shipwrights declined in favour of ironworking trades, although the latter soon realised the tactical significance of restricting the apprenticeship ratio.³ During the 1860s and the 1890s the issue was to be almost as important in shipyards as engineering shops, with Clyde associations warning employers against encroachments by the societies.⁴ Even where the scope for technical displacement of skills was limited, shipbuilders could always dilute the trades with untrained labour in the form of apprentices or 'improvers'.⁵

Mechanisation was to become a major source of controversy in the shipbuilding industry only after the 1897 dispute in which the engineers were heavily defeated. By 1900 the Boilermakers' Society were facing challenges to their control of machine tools in both land shops and shipyards.⁶ In 1902 Scotts of Greenock were testing new pneumatic tools and President Dunlop informed the Association that:⁷

[He] felt strongly that it would be a serious matter to

6. Pollard, op. cit., p177.

7. Ibid.: 'The trades which worked successfully on the piece rate system were the boilermakers and the sail-makers'. Pollard also notes that all of the engineering trades opposed the system.

8. Ibid., p177-78; Robertson, op. cit., p125.

9. Pollard, op. cit., p198.

10. C.S.A./N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 17.12.1900. The Society told the employers that 'they cannot force their Members to work piecework, and that the men concerned had decided against doing piecework where it had not hitherto been worked'.

1. Ibid.: 24.8.1910.

2. Pollard, op. cit., p115-16.

3. Ibid., p146-7.

4. C.S.E.A. Minutes: 26.1.1869.

5. Pollard, op. cit., p116; Robertson, loc. cit. (1974), p224-25.

6. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 30.5.1900 for Ewing & Lawson case; at 22.6.1900 the employers expressed concern about the 'general principle of

makers of boilers if the working of these Tools were in Shipyards given to the Members of the Boilermakers' Society. ...The experience of his firm and his observations elsewhere had convinced him that good and economical work could be done by unskilled workmen with pneumatic tools and their adoption afforded Employers an excellent opportunity of doing their work by workmen, not members of the Boilermakers' Society.

Not only were the tradesmen striving to maintain control of the power tools, but they found that using the machinery involved increased exertion and higher productivity.¹ This applied to caulking and shipyard work as much as to that performed in the boilersshops.²

Perhaps the most notorious form of dispute which afflicted the shipbuilding industry in these years, was that concerned with the demarcation of trade rights and areas of craft work.³ There appears to have been a much greater propensity for serious disputes to occur between the A.S.E. and other societies, and in those firms which were noted for their firm management policies.⁴ In fact, these disputes were usually inextricably bound up with other questions such as machinery or management control, as in the 1911 Dalnair incident.⁵ When the crafts proposed to settle such conflicts by arbitration amongst themselves, as at Fairfields in 1904, both the firms and their Association were unhesitating in their opposition.⁶ At the same time, these incessant squabbles were costly and the employers generally attempted to construct centralised machinery for settling the questions before 1914.⁷

Direct challenges to managerial authority were common to both engineering and shipbuilding, hence the strong support given by the shipyard employers during the 1897 struggle and the growing numbers of firms prepared to joined the regional trade associations.⁸ As the larger and more progressive firms

6. freedom to Employers in the management of their Works'.

7. Ibid.: 2.9.1902.

1. Ibid.: 7.7.1913. Hill noted: 'work in Boilersshops was becoming more laborious and did not admit of comparison with that of other trades...owing to the speeding up and the introduction of improved machinery the men were now turning out more work than in the past..'

2. Ibid.: 30.1.1901, for Fairfield caulkers.

3. Pollard, loc. cit. (1950); Robertson, loc. cit. (1975), p222-23.

4. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 21.11.1900 - 16.12.1900.

pressed for mechanisation, rationalisation and new payment systems, so labour resistance to tighter management spread. This was evident in the Enquiry Note unrest of the pre-War years, with widespread protests against the system - which was used to isolate and victimise militant apprentices as well as workmen - until they were finally abandoned in 1912.¹

As in the engineering industry, the foremen were caught in the middle of these struggles and possessed an even stronger craft basis in the shipyards than in the machine shops. Whereas in the latter foremen were already being recognised more as general organisers than working artisans,² the slower pace of technical change and sharper trade sectionalism in shipbuilding gave them a more pronounced craft identity.³ This had been evident in the 1860s when the transition to modern iron shipbuilding was taking place, with tensions between traditional practices and fresh innovations. Employers sought to replace the older contract system with sub-contracting to independent agents or to foremen in their own employ, provoking the hostility of their craftsmen.⁴ They were also given charge of the young apprentices coming into the trade, hence possessing a hold over training and craft expertise.⁵

Whilst the employers generally secured this changeover to

5. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 22.8.1911; also 5.7.1910 for conflicts at Scotts of Greenock over battleship work.
6. Ibid.: 1.12.1903 - 17.12.1903; 17.12.1904, "the Fairfield Company be authorised to employ on the work in question the men they consider most suitable...the Company will be supported by the Associations."
7. Ibid.: 5.7.1910. There is strong evidence that most demarcation unrest emanated from the rank and file, e.g. 7.11.1911, and was directed against management rather than other trades, e.g. 26.12.1911.
8. C.f. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 3.8.1897, for action of Fairfields.
1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 21.3.1911, 4.5.1911 - 15.2.1912.
2. Drake, op. cit., p10: 'the foreman or supervisor tends to be only a second-rate craftsman and develops other qualities as "organiser". An all-round knowledge is still required in general engineering shops...'; C.f. W.F. Watson, 'The Human Factor in Foremen' Journal of National Institute of Industrial Psychology VII (1933), p64.
3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 30.6.1899, for case at Muir & Houston.
4. Pollard, op. cit., p143-44.
5. Ibid., p144-45.

modern contracting and payments, the ambiguities in the foreman's role remained. Only the best craftsmen could assume responsibility for organising their trades in the yard, and these men generally retained their society membership. This was countered by the shipbuilders' careful selection of head foremen, amongst whom unionisation was discouraged and who enjoyed the privileges of secure employment in a notoriously unpredictable industry.¹ Underforemen could be left as union members during the fairly stable years 1870-1900, when there were few changes to threaten the craft trades.

During the 1890s troubles were again growing and reports arrived of skilled workers approaching their foremen privately on matters affecting manning levels,² with the Boilermakers seeking to align at least the underforemen against the masters.³ Things came to a head just before the outbreak of War as the Fairfield Coppersmiths struck against the non-membership of an underforemen and the dismissal of another who was in the Society.⁴ Although the renegade foreman eventually joined the Coppersmiths, they refused to accept him as a full foreman unless he relinquished his right to use the tools.⁵ The workmen were persuaded to acknowledge managerial directives on this, but there were clear signs of the unrest that was to break out in 1915.

Just as industrial change had been more muted in shipbuilding than in engineering before the War, so the dilution process and the subsequent changes were to be less dramatic and qualitatively different during the War years. The demand for labour actually fell during the War in shipbuilding,⁶ and there was little demand for untrained diluted labour at all.⁷ Yet there was a similar coalescence of demands and grievances from 1915 onwards, with issues brought together in a powerful trade resistance to

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1. Pollard, *op. cit.*, p145-6: '...apprentices were frequently the only hands kept on, under the supervision of the foremen, in periods of depression.'
 2. C.S.A. Minutes: 6.7.1900. The Association ruled that 'such communications should not, on any occasion, be addressed by the Society's District Officials to Foremen...Employers cannot permit their Foremen to obey a summons [to a union meeting].'
 3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 8.9.1908.
 4. *Ibid.*: 20.2.1912.

for the implementation of dilution.¹ The employers urged the Dilution Commissioners in Scotland to "go ahead with dilution in Shipyards immediately" in Spring 1916,² but they were amongst the staunchest opponents of the labour transfer schemes and to the operation of Circular L.2 affecting female employment.³ It was clear that the shipbuilders regarded females as a valuable expedient, but they were unwilling to pay them equivalent wages to the men they displaced.

The employers hoped to make use of Wartime opportunities to greatly extend mechanisation of their yards under management (rather than society) control.⁴ Due to the strength of the assorted unions, the government was persuaded to negotiate local dilution agreements with the trade societies.⁵ This entailed 'an extensive system of upgrading of semi-skilled men and interchanging skilled men', but also machine tools under trade controls.⁶ Hence the struggle of the skilled workers to prevent unregulated division of their labour was largely successful despite the concessions they made.⁷

Amongst those concessions demanded by the employers were the

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5. C.S.A. Minutes: 20.3.1917, 24.9.1918; 25.10.1918 - 29.10.1918; History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.i, p121 for evidence that 60% of workers on piece; Hinton, op. cit., p89.
 6. C.S.A. Minutes: 4.9.1918.
 7. Ibid.: 24.9.1918, for project of employers to call up strikers for military service.
 8. Ibid.: 25.10.1915, joint resolution of C.S.A. and N.W.E.T.E.A.
 9. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p95.
 1. C.S.A. Minutes: 29.5.1916, complaints of Dilution Commissioners to employers that there were 'no fewer than four bodies already dealing with the question'.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.: 21.7.1916 - 27.7.1916, 13.12.1916; 30.8.1916, 13.12.1916, 15.2.1917 - latter dates for employers on L.2.
 4. Ibid.: 3.7.1916. On meeting the Commissioners, the shipbuilders referred to 'the position of the Societies...and the importance of maintaining that the introduction of Pneumatic Tool Plant will not be regarded as an innovation to be given up on the termination of the War.'
 5. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p135.
 6. Ibid.
 7. C.S.A. Minutes: 7.5.1918, where Shipwrights note that they were 'the only Shipyard trade which had been diluted'.

the destruction of craft controls and to state coercion.

The presence of the state authorities was evident in the first wages campaigns of the War, as the 2d Hour campaign affected the shipyard production as well as engineering.¹ Scarcity of labour encouraged many employers to offer special bonuses and allowances to their tradesmen, since the actual rates of pay were being eroded by inflationary rises in the cost of living.² Although the employers managed to quell the unrest of 1915, the creation of numerous anomalies during 1916 and 1917 only served to provoke further troubles.³ By 1918 there were a wide number of trades demanding advances in recognition of their efforts and concessions to dilution.⁴

Just as contentious was the spread of piecework and premium bonus systems, with workers at Dalmuir and Yarrow's especially restless over the payments by results.⁵ At the latter's Scotstoun works the men insisted on a 'plain time rate system' by 1918, with joiners leading the resistance.⁶ Clearly the drive by shipbuilders to accelerate production through incentives had worsened relations by the end of the War.⁷

Disputes over entry to the trade, manning and machinery, and demarcation rights were concentrated in the resistance to the dilution programme from 1916. Despite their anxieties to import female labour during the War,⁸ there were objective limits on the division of labour and the standardisation of equipment and processes in the industry.⁹ These limits were only reinforced by the frequent conflicts between the government agencies responsible

5. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 28.2.1912. The Coppermiths stated that they were 'quite agreeable to recognise Donaldson as a Foreman if he was made a Member of the staff and did not require to work habitually with tools.../But/ Donaldson took sets...and on his return to the shop worked like an ordinary workman and lifted his ticket and was paid for Overtime...the men refused to obey Donaldson and did not recognise him as a Foreman...the discontent of the workmen had existed for some years and that it was now coming to a crisis.'

6. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p38.

7. Ibid. Appx.I for figures.

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 20.2.1915.

2. C.S.A. Minutes: 30.8.1915; History... IV pt.iv, p128 for wages.

3. Ibid.: 25.6.1917 - 25.7.1917; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 4.7.1917.

4. C.S.A. Minutes: 16.1.1918 - 5.2.1918, 5.8.1918 - 1.10.1918, etc.

abrogation of all 'demarcation restrictions...at the discretion of the management',¹ and the free interchangeability of labour on jobs within the shipyard.² In fact, demarcation disputes were specifically mentioned as a reason for state intervention in controlling the labour market, as they were 'becoming too numerous and acute'.³ By maintaining their separate identities against trade encroachments, the shipyard societies could present a solid phalanx of resistance and thereby secure craft interests were taken into account when dilution was enforced.⁴

Disputes with authority took on a different form during the War years, since the state had now assumed overall responsibility for production targets. The labour market was regulated by Munitions legislation, with its system of leaving certificates and controls.⁵ It is not surprising that these, reminiscent as they were of the shipbuilders' Discharge Notes, should have led to the major crisis of Summer 1915 at Fairfield's yard in Govan.⁶ When these were replaced in 1917 - against the vehement protests of the shipbuilders - the yards introduced their old system of Notes again,⁷ as well as tightening their discretion in Trade Card issue.⁸

At the centre of these changes and the resultant disputes was the foreman, who were themselves criticised as a cause of unrest and dissatisfaction amongst the workmen.⁹ Despite the ambiguous attitude of the societies towards the supervisors, the foremen were placed in charge of dilution administration through the Yard Committees appointed by employers and workmen.¹⁰ Once again the foreman was expected to balance craft and capitalist interests during the difficult transition period.

Yet the relative position of both the foremen and the other

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1. C.S.A. Minutes: 10.3.1916.
 2. Hence their outrage at the actions of shipwrights in demanding removal of joiners from trade work unless overtime given. See C.S.A. Minutes: 19.11.1917.
 3. Ibid.: 1.6.1915.
 4. Ibid.: 3.6.1918, when Fairfields have to come to an agreement with their tradesmen on questions of dilution.
 5. Wolfe, op. cit., p109-10; Hinton, op. cit., p36; for labour market controls by the state.
 6. Forward 23.5.1914 for account; History of the Ministry... I pt.iv,p40.
 7. C.S.A. Minutes: 19.6.1917.

intermediate grades deteriorated seriously during the War years, until in Autumn 1916 they joined in the various campaigns to increase their wages.¹ The value of the supervisors was evident by the frequent complaints of poaching amongst the employers,² and in 1916-17 the shipbuilders began to restore some of their staff's differentials.³ These moves were encouraged by the reports of union organisation amongst the ironworking foremen, mainly under the offices of the Boilermakers' Society.⁴ At the same time the draughtsmen and technical workers were forming their own associations to demand improvements in War Bonuses and remuneration generally.⁵ By 1918 the situation was serious enough to merit official concern, and government permission for additional allowances to the supervisors.⁶ It was apparent that if a firm frontier of control was to be maintained, then the foremen's damaged morale must be resuscitated.⁷

This comparison of industrial relations in two heavy industries on Clydeside indicates important differences as well as fundamental similarities between the trades. In each the themes of technical innovation, growth in scale and refinement of business structure, and improvement in management organisation and control, were evident. Yet the pace of these changes was often gradual and piecemeal, their impact was felt differently not only between the industries but between areas and firms within the industries, and the implications of these changes for skill and status were

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8. Ibid.: 9.10.1917; Hinton, op. cit., p248-54, for Trade Card unrest.
 9. Cd. 8669, Para.22 p9: 'A cause of unrest quoted by Union Officials was the tactless and domineering methods of some foremen towards employees.../But/ at the present time, the position of foremen is far from enviable, and they have much...to put up with...'
 10. C.S.A. Minutes: 3.6.1918, for Fairfield Agreement.
 1. Ibid.: 22.9.1916.
 2. Ibid.: 25.6.1917; see also 20.3.1917 for managers and foremen's role in drafting payments by results schemes.
 3. Ibid.: 20.3.1917.
 4. Ibid.: 4.4.1917, the employers instructed their foremen to 'refrain from attending' a meeting organised in the Lower Reaches.
 5. Ibid.: 20.7.1917, 29.8.1917, 8.10.1917.
 6. Ibid.: 30.1.1918, 12.8.1918 - 29.10.1918.
 7. H.F. Gospel, "Employer organizations: Their growth and function in the British system of Industrial Relations" Ph.D. Thesis (L.S.E. 1973), p139-40; Bain, op. cit., p126, for later developments.

frequently ambiguous and uncertain. The resistance of engineering and shipbuilding workers to these conditions and innovations was likewise uneven and fragmented, between and within these two sectors. The underlying nature of the conflicts was, however, remarkably alike: disputes revolved around questions of wages, hours and payment systems; apprenticeship and training; machinery and manning; demarcation; and challenges to authority. Each was basically concerned with control: control of effort and remuneration, of the labour market, of the implements of production, of the area worked, and the direct control of labour itself in the work process. As scale increased, technology advanced and management developed, so the struggle for control became more organised and sophisticated. Hence the rise of the employer associations, supporting individual firms as well as initiating their own campaigns for innovation and control.

Labour resistance took a number of forms, from opposition to piecework and premium bonus to attempts at organising the apprentices. But these struggles occurred at more than one level, so that actual control of the machinery could be more important than innovation itself. Demarcation disputes could assert trade control over areas of work despite management efforts to enforce interchangeability and central direction of work. Even the supervisory grades became the subjects as well as the instrument of struggles over control, as craft societies sought to preserve their trade identity and employers attempted to convert them into the loyal organisers of manual workers.

It is in this context of specific differences and basic similarities that we must locate the development of industrial welfare during these years. Welfare services reflected not only the overall expansion and growth of the industries, but also the relations of production at the workplace. The struggle for control inevitably involved welfare not only in the firm but also with the organisations constructed by employers to deal with labour resistance. There were the same limitations on welfare as a form of control as there were on other management strategies; hence the need for selective deployment of resources. Similar patterns of state intervention and arbitration also became apparent during the dilution crises, when the problem of authority was one affecting the polity as much as the economy.

Industrial welfare provisions in engineering and shipbuilding.

The previous chapters presented a model of welfare development which stressed the three basic labour requirements of employers: labour supply, efficiency, and discipline. It was argued that we can make a functional distinction between those services concerned with securing a supply of acceptable labour (infrastructural welfare), those designed to improve the efficiency of employees (efficiency-oriented welfare), and those introduced to maintain and improve the discipline of the workforce (strategic and incorporative welfare). These divisions can be approximated to specific provisions, such as housing to secure a steady pool of labour, accident and safety schemes to raise efficiency, and discretionary pensions or awards to reinforce discipline. But it is clear that these functions will depend on the specific situation in which they are introduced and the conditions under which they are administered. That is to say, we must place each service in the context of a particular firm and industry at a given point of economic development.

This is also true of the attempt to relate welfare provisions to the industrial relations of a given industry, such as this comparison of engineering and shipbuilding entails. There are certain amenities which can be identified as 'strategic' welfare services in that they are directly linked to questions of authority and control. Yet to isolate these would be to mistake a specific provision for a style of administration and to detach industrial welfare from its precise context. We must envisage the whole battery of facilities as being the product not only of economic growth and development, but also of the general fabric of industrial relations which existed at the time. Thus, in periods of intense conflict the 'infrastructural' welfare such as housing can take on a key 'strategic' role. This is evident not merely from the stated motives of the employers, but also from the discernable impact on particular groups of workers.

Those employers concerned with the strategic impact of welfare reforms were usually the larger, technologically progressive and managerially-conscious firms identified in the previous chapter. For it was they who experienced the greatest labour resistance to innovations, and they who found welfare investment a rational solution to their labour needs. These

requirements changed as technology and organisation dictated the division of old skills and the creation of new ones, and it was largely in response to these shifts (as well as the labour resistance to change) that welfare services were introduced.

It is possible to examine welfare in a number of respects and to contrast the industries in various ways. Given that the pattern of change differed in each, and that the experiences of labour also varied considerably, it is still possible to distinguish the underlying struggles over different forms of control and to relate welfare facilities to these struggles. The quality and scale of services provided by employers in the industries also differed somewhat - in keeping with the productive needs of the firms and their labour relations - but the nature and purpose of the provisions were basically the same.

The following survey takes each of the groups involved in the two industries during the decades 1880-1920, describes their role in the progress of the industry and industrial relations, and attempts to indicate the significance of welfare provisions. It will be apparent that the most rapid developments were seen in those years of greatest economic change and deepest industrial conflict. Thus the 1890s and the First World War stand out as formative periods for industrial welfare in both industries, although the departures are more dramatic (as were the economic changes) in engineering than in shipbuilding.

Amongst the groups which were in direct contact with the actual work process in the industry, and those mainly responsible for carrying any changes into effect were the supervisory workers. The foremen occupied a key role in both industries, although in engineering they were moving towards an organisational role rather more quickly than in the handcraft-dominated shipyards. Unlike the great majority of employees, foremen enjoyed the privilege of secure employment and better pay and conditions in the industries.¹

Although foremen were not usually paid for overtime worked, the evidence from Thomsons yard at Clydebank suggests that many were awarded holidays with pay, as well as being occasionally

1. This rule did not include shipyard underforemen. See below.

treated to an outing at the firm's expense.¹ Such concerns were particularly sensitive to their supervisors' needs during a period of increasing technical innovation and growing unrest amongst their engineering and shipyard workers.² As the local managements sought to strengthen their control over production and labour resistance affected mechanisation, the value of loyal foreman was clearly impressed on the progressive employers.

Particular privileges had been seen since the days of the Denny soirees, with foremen entertained by benevolent shipbuilders, but these were extended and formalised during the 1890s. The Clydebank supervisors were apparently given sick pay by their employer,³ and it was usually the foremen who were given the task of organising benefit societies amongst the workmen.⁴

Foremen were also given due recognition when housing was being constructed by the firms, although this was more confined to shipbuilding than engineering. Amongst the William Denny houseowners were foremen holding more than one dwelling,⁵ and they came into the discussion of workingmen's tenements by the Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. during 1896-7.⁶ After the takeover of the firm by John Browns the problems of labour shortages were apparently disregarded for a project which gave the principal shipyard foremen good-quality housing under the firm.⁷

This may have satisfied the head foremen, but in the decade before 1914 there were signs of unrest amongst the lower ranks, as both the housing situation and industrial relations deteriorated

1. Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co., Wages Account: 1893-99. Figures show Holidays grow from £193 p.a. to £664 p.a., in wages bill for foremen of £1,520 - £2,626.
2. Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co., Minute Book I: 7.1.1896 - 23.2.1897. On latter date the board resolved to: 'strenuously resist any attempt on the part of the Engineers to enforce that only their members should be employed to work any given machine..!'. At 25.2.1896 the firm decided to join both engineering and shipbuilding federations.
3. Wages Account, op. cit., Sick Pay goes from £92 to £220, 1893-99.
4. W.J.M. Rankine, A Memoir of John Elder Blackwood (1871) Edinburgh, p53 says of Elders Accident Fund: 'It is managed by a committee partly appointed by the firm from amongst the foremen, partly elected by the workmen'. Also Denny Fund.
5. William Denny & Co., 'Workmen's Housing Ledger' UGD 26/5.

in Clydebank. In reviewing the whole situation of the shortage of ironworkers at the yard, Bell identified housing deficiencies as the key problem but went on:¹

In addition...a question which is causing us grave concern is that of our Ironworker, Carpenter, and Joiner Underforemen. Owing to the great fluctuations in the amount of our work in the last ten or twelve years, the larger number of these men seem reluctant to throw themselves heartily on the side of their Employers on account of not knowing...when they may be disgraced and have to work as mates with the men at present under them and with whom they live in adjacent flats...The Management at Clydebank strongly recommend housing these men in...self contained flats...very near the Yard, but entirely devoted to cottages and separated by the Railway from the workingmen's tenements...These men are our non-commissioned officers and our economic production is largely dependant, especially in the Shipyard, on them.

Whilst the violent fluctuations of the 1900s may have been an important contributory factor in these disturbances, similar unrest amongst the Fairfield underforemen suggests that the causes were more deep-rooted and lay in the management policies of these ruthlessly progressive concerns. Disaffection had largely been eliminated amongst the staff foremen, but the underforemen - directly involved in the organisation and execution of work - were ripe for welfarist intervention.

Employers came gradually to recognise the need for some systematic scheme to cover foremen, and the initiative appears to have arisen in those 'modern large-scale, carefully-regimented industries where the strain of superintendance is the greatest'.² The marine engineering firms were in the forefront of the renewed federation movement of the early 1890s, leading to the establishment of the Engineering Federation.³ As the conflict between A.S.E. and employers progressed, so both sides insisted on the foremen owing allegiance to their cause.⁴

Largely out of these experiences emerged the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society organised by Colonel Dyer and the Federation leadership to extricate supervisors from the craft societies by offering them 'pension and other benefits to replace the union benefits they would sacrifice by leaving'.⁵ In 1898 the local

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1. 'Memorandum on the Shortage of Ironworkers' UCS 1 23/3.
 2. Goodrich, op. cit., p120.
 3. Wigham, op. cit., p30; Burgess, op. cit., p58.
 4. Wigham, op. cit., Appx. B. One of the Federation's stated aims

North West Association were approached to appoint 'a Foreman or Under Foreman' as one of the Society's Trustees in order that it might qualify for registration as a friendly society.¹ This took place the following year,² and at a Special General Meeting held by the Association the 'feeling of the meeting was strongly in favour of the Society, and of the desirability of Members joining'.³

The A.S.E. was quick to recognise this threat and in the North East took strong action to counter the Society campaign and to 'retain the Foremen as Members of the Union'.⁴ On the Clyde initial support was only slowly forthcoming from engineering firms, although there was a hard core of managerialist employers anxious to propagate the Society's benefits.⁵ This group included such large shipbuilding firms as Scotts and Hendersons - both known for their work with pneumatic tools and labour troubles - who wished to see every Federated firm as a F.M.B.S. member.⁶ Thereafter the Association membership felt constrained to reiterate the attractions of the friendly society, and in 1904 a minority of firms led by Richmond of Weirs, Hendersons and Jacksons attempted to force through a clause making it "compulsory for each member of the Association to become a Contributory Member" of the F.M.B.S.⁷ Although this was defeated the local Committee of the Society were commended on their efforts at improving membership by circulating the works.⁸

Many of the shipbuilding firms had been staunch supporters of the engineers' stand in 1896-7, and were facing similar difficulties with their yard foremen. In 1908 it was reported that underforemen were being called out on strike and away from

4. was 'to secure mutual support and co-operation in dealing with demands made, and action taken by workmen...including therein such questions as interference with Foremen'.

5. Ibid., p32.

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 29.11.1898.

2. Ibid.: 6.3.1899 - 13.3.1899.

3. Ibid.: 13.3.1899 - 10.4.1899. On the latter date the Association resolved that "every member should join as a Contributory Member, and should enter their Foremen as members of the Society".

4. Ibid.: 26.4.1899.

5. Ibid.: 4.10.1899, Secretary Biggart reporting that 22 Associated

jobs by their craft societies, and that employers could do little about this.¹ In 1905 the Clyde Shipbuilders' Association decided to formally affiliate itself to the Society, thereafter providing the majority of local claimants on the funds - from such notable firms as John Browns.²

The other major innovation of the Federation was the Dyer Memorial Fund, named after the American managerialist employer who led the Federation at the great lockout.³ Having been originally designed as a tribute to Dyer himself, with provisions for technical education scholarships, prizes for labour-saving devices and awards to foremen, there soon developed a power struggle within the Fund Committee.⁴ The pragmatists won the day and the funds were directed towards assisting the as yet insolvent Mutual Benefit Society,⁵ and thereafter the Committee were only anxious that it should not be sacrificed to sustain the larger body.⁶ Until the Society was able to grant awards to deserving foremen and their dependants, the Memorial Fund served this purpose for both engineering and shipbuilding firms.⁷

Initial support for both Society and Fund came from the more managerialist and strategically-minded employers in engineering and shipbuilding. The young Stephen E. Alley, who built up his

5. firms had joined the F.M.B.S. and that 6 had foremen enrolled.
6. Ibid.: 29.4.1901. At this firm the following eight firms became members: Fairfields, Barclay Curle, Napiers, J.G. Kincaid, London & Glasgow S.E. Co., John McDowell, Thos. White, A.J. Craig.
7. Ibid.: 27.4.1903 - 27.12.1904; J.R. Richmond had been President of the North West Engineers in 1902-03, see Minutes: 24.12.1902.
8. Ibid.: 27.12.1904. At this meeting the Committee uncovered its crusade to 'meet with individual Employers and their Foremen... and...evening Meetings at the Works at which the Employer and his Foremen would be present'.
1. C.S.A. Minutes: 19.4.1906 - 7.2.1908: 'in some instances Under Foremen had been withdrawn by the Societies'.
2. Ibid.: 25.10.1906. C.f. Smillie case at 2.9.1902, who was refused benefit because he was a shipyard foreman at Browns and not from the engineering departments; Ibid. 6.5.1910 for claimants.
3. C.f. Wigham, op. cit., p65-6, who writes that Fund was designed to 'make special grants to foremen - or their widows - who had been expelled from their union'.
4. Boyd, 'The Dyer Memorial Fund - A History' [Typescript]; C.f. Dyer Memorial Fund Executive Committee, Report of the Committee (1898).
5. Dyer Memorial Committee, Report of the Executive Committee (1899).
6. Ibid.

father's firm from its modest position as a marine engineering and equipment manufacturer, was reluctant to waste his capital on most applications for funds. But in 1907 the chairman of Alley & MacLellan informed his directors that:¹

six of the Engineering Department Foremen had joined the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society and mention was made by the Chairman of the advantageous hold this would give the Company on the services of these men in the event of a strike breaking out.

Not only the growing engineering concerns were ready to support the new Society, the Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Company being an early supporter and donating £100 to the Dyer Memorial Fund in 1899.² Even William Dennys of Dumbarton, with their own Shipyard Accident Fund and their tradition of personal relations with foremen, saw the advantages of dual sponsorship and became both 'a contributory member of the Staff Benefit Society and the Foreman's Mutual Benefit Society'.³

Both Society and Fund continued to advance gradually until the outbreak of War and the dilution processes began to place additional strains upon industrial supervisors.⁴ Amidst the first real signs of unrest and organisation amongst the foremen, the engineering employers reviewed the whole history of the Dyer Memorial Fund and its parent Society.⁵ They found that a large number of foremen and their widows had been assisted, and that 'applications for grants had steadily increased in numbers' since 1901.⁶ The Fund Committee required another £2,000 to capitalise the Fund at £13,500 and urged all sympathetic employers to subscribe.⁷

After the draughtsmen and technical workers joined the A.E.S.D. in considerable numbers in 1916-17, their employers took action

7. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 2.12.1901 - 31.5.1902, 11.5.1909, etc.
1. Alley and MacLellan Ltd., Minutes: 9.9.1907.
2. Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. Balance Sheets and Accounts, (1899).
3. Denny Dumbarton 1844-1932 Denny & Co. (1932) Dumbarton, p87.
4. Sidney Webb, The Works Manager To-day Longmans, Green (1917) London, p28 and passim for review of foreman's role; Alex Richardson The Manpower of the Nation "Engineering" (1916) London, p78 for testimony of progressive engineering employer and leading industrial spokesman.
5. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 30.8.1916.
6. Ibid.

to secure that 'the Draughtsmen join either the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society (the members of which must not be members of a Trade Union) or some other Approved Society in preference to the Draughtsmen's Association'.¹ The spread of unionism amongst the foremen themselves in late 1917 caused deep concern, and engineering employers made a determined effort to increase the influence of the Benefit Society.² The A.S.E. reacted by virtually outlawing the Society,³ and it was not until the post-War period that employers came to some kind of compromise with their foremen.⁴ Meanwhile the numbers of the Society continued to grow after the upsurge of militancy had quelled, and by 1921 the F.M.B.S. had over 11,000 members rising to 16,500 by 1930 and 61,000 in the 1960s.⁵ Similar opinions on supervisory unionism could still be found at that late period of industrial relations.⁶

The welfare services provided for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled males in both industries was varied if limited in its scope and impact. Most of the workmen in shipbuilding were skilled men and the majority of those in engineering were either craftsmen or machinists. As such they earned relatively high incomes, with opportunity for very large earnings on piece work in the shipyards.⁷ In both sectors the skilled men were organised in their own societies very early in the 19th century, with the Boilermakers in operation from 1832 and able to recruit the iron shipbuilders just as the Shipwrights and other bodies unionised the timber workers.⁸

Such craft societies based their strength on the benefits they were able to offer as much as the tenacity they displayed in bargaining with employers, and these friendly society provisions

7. Ibid.: 16.4.1918, when Association again assisted Fund by levy of 3d per £100 of wages paid.
1. Ibid.: 27.3.1917. They added that 'wherever possible, to get their chief draughtsmen and others holding positions of trust to join the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society'.
2. Ibid.: 18.12.1917, when Biggart reported on the 'steps taken by the Employers and the F.M.B.Society to counteract the action of the Foremen' in unions.
3. Goodrich, op. cit., p129, where the A.S.E. Journal quoted; also p131 for Richardson's comments.
4. Gospel, op. cit., p139-41; Bain, op. cit., p40-1, 154.
5. Glasgow and West of Scotland Association of Foremen Engineers

became the means of disciplining trade labour with threats of exclusion as a punishment.¹ It was this which made the foreman question such a difficult one for employers, since their working supervisors could not afford to neglect the social security which their societies gave them in periods of sickness and unemployment.

In this situation, most of the astute employers preferred to emphasise responsible conduct and mutuality amongst their workmen rather than challenge the trade benefits which they could not hope to equal. William Denny was a firm advocate of friendly societies as well as being the architect of company welfare schemes.² John Elder's Fairfield Society was designed to supplement rather than substitute the awards given by the shipyard unions, as were the early efforts of Stephens at Kelvinaugh and Linthouse.³

At the same time these firms were willing to include certain incentives in their schemes to reinforce discipline as well as to improve efficiency. So William Denny ensured that his Accident Fund should be supported by the fines which he levied upon the workmen for misconduct and transgression of Yard Rules.⁴ Stephens would only give sympathetic consideration to those

5. and Draughtsmen, Paths to Peace in Industry Association (1930), Glasgow, p19; Bain, op. cit., p57, 133, etc.
6. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Selected Written Evidence H.M.S.O. (1968), Para.200, p419-20 for attitude of Engineering Federation in 1960s.
7. Bowley & Wood, loc. cit., p120, 564: 'A very large proportion of iron shipbuilding is done on piecework..'
8. Pollard, op. cit., p159-60.
1. See chapter six on friendly societies.
2. John Ward, 'Memoir of the late William Denny' Institute of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland (26.4.1887), p269 where Denny quoted as saying that mutuality 'imports to friendly societies that degree of stability which must sooner or later attract the attention of all who take an interest...'
3. See chapter two.
4. Denny Dumbarton, op. cit., p85. In the same way, the Awards Committee with its rewards for technical innovations and labour-saving devices was introduced in the same year as the Leven Shipyard Accident Fund. See 'Awards Scheme Committee, Minute Book No.2 (1884-93), entry December 1885 for resume; Bruce, op. cit., p93-9.

injured workmen who displayed the correct deference to their dislike of court actions, and did not involve the yard in either industrial or legal disputes.

There were also numerous incidences of engineering and shipbuilding employers using such investments as housing to reinforce their management and anti-union policies. So when Yarrows moved north they brought a tight-knit group of loyal workmen who had accepted the 'free labour' initiatives of the Thames firm, and who received company housing near the yard in return.¹ When John Browns anticipated their housing programme in 1914, they clearly had both economic and strategic considerations in mind. As the dilution programme was enforced in the shipyards during Autumn 1916, the same firm found it difficult to extend pneumatic rivetting against craft control.² As they explained to the Ministry of Munitions:³

As we found it impossible to initiate pneumatic rivetting in those Works with local labour, we looked elsewhere for suitable recruits...these men would only come North on the strict assurance that we could put up houses for them.

In their determination to improve market control, and to break the 'societies' mastery of machine tools and job allocation, the directors saw housing as a practical and necessary investment. This determination was already evident earlier in 1916 when the Board had received a letter from the Munitions Ministry 'relative to a question in Parliament regarding the ejection of men from our properties at Clydebank'.⁴ Such crude coercion was frowned upon by a government drafting more subtle methods of labour control through welfare.⁵ The conflict between the two approaches

1. Sir E. Yarrow. Letter 3.11.1916.
2. Letter from John Brown & Co. to Ministry of Munitions 5.10.1916: in UCS 1 22/4: 'With reference to the extension of dilution which is really one of the most pressing problems of the day, we have found ourselves very handicapped indeed in the development of pneumatic rivetting'.
3. Ibid.
4. John Brown & Co., Minutes: 3.5.1916.
5. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.iii, p175-6, says of the Welfare Dept. that: 'It gave, and advertised, a demonstration of the application of scientific methods of labour control...This application was very imperfect, but it marked a definite step forward in methods of production in this country...'

became clear during early 1918, when employers such as John Browns were pressing for tighter state penalties against industrial militants whilst the government was relaxing its coercive policy.¹ Generally, however, employers such as Stephen Alley became converted to the utility of welfare as a form of industrial organisation and co-operation.²

This trend towards collaboration rather than coercion is reflected in the immediate post-War efforts at improving morale and maintaining discipline. One of the more significant innovations was the spread of house magazines and leisure facilities amongst industrialists. Their importance lies not just in the favourable vision of employers which they presented, but in their phrasing of industrial problems as those of 'communication' or lack of 'personal contact'. This underlies the whole movement towards 'human factor' welfare which marked these years, and which affected males as well as females. As the Linthouse Magazine put it in 1920:³

In the "old days", when the Yard was much smaller than it is today, the Partners of the Firm knew a large number of the men and their working conditions personally and could have friendly talks with them individually. This pleasant state of affairs naturally could not go on as the Yard became larger and larger in successive years, and it became evident that an intermediary would require to be found between themselves and the men.

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1. Letter from John Brown & Co. to Ministry of Munitions, February 1918 in UCS 58/1. The firm urged harsher penalties for those workmen forming trouble, and explained: 'In support of the foregoing suggestion I have to explain that the legitimate voice of any Trades' Union is drowned by the Socialist-Syndicalist element which constitutes about 15-20 per cent. of the Union. When a meeting is called to vote on any particular subject, the fanatical minority are always present en bloc...only the enactment of a penal clause is likely to have a deterrent effect on industrial "reformers"..'.
 2. E. Sidney, The Industrial Society Pub. Industrial Society (1969) London, p5, for relationship of Alley and Hyde.
 3. The Linthouse Magazine Vol.I No.3 (March 1920). See Bradley Rudin, 'Industrial Betterment and Scientific Management as Social Control, 1890-1920' Berkeley Journal of Sociology XVII, p66-67; Robert Goldman and John Wilson, 'The Rationalization of Leisure' Politics and Society VII No.2 (1977), p158-9: 'The introduction of industrial recreation programs was a strategy designed to regulate employees' labor time in the interests of higher productivity...It was an attempt to rationalize leisure for productive ends.' These give comparative American experience.

The fact that many employers only learned the advantages of welfare from Wartime production and state regulation also gives us an insight into the importance of government agencies in fostering welfare strategies. Having encountered the difficulties of labour management, the officials and experts entered into the whole question of welfare amenities and correct management during the War.¹ This resulted in state propagation of the virtues of scientific management and the necessity for combining precise labour control with the 'human factor' approach of welfare.²

The way in which these different systems of labour management and control were implemented along with welfare facilities is illustrated by the introduction of industrial canteens during the First War. By 1915 the engineering and shipbuilding employers on Clydeside were pressing for complete restriction of the sale of alcoholic liquor, and when approached by the Control Board informed the officials that they:³

heard with regret that total prohibition was not meantime contemplated. It was the considered opinion of the meeting that the establishment of canteens in or near the Works would not prove a remedy for the present evil and that except in exceptional situations there would be no real necessity for Works canteens unless under a scheme of total prohibition.

At this point the employers were attempting to force the government's

1. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Industrial Fatigue and its Causes Cd. 8213 (1916). Para.4, p9: 'The problem of scientific industrial management, dealing as it must with the human machine, is fundamentally a problem in industrial fatigue...It is therefore the problem of scientific management to discover in the interests of output and of the maintained health of the workers what are the "maximum efficiency rhythms" for the various faculties of the human machine.'; Health of Munition Workers Committee, Industrial Efficiency and Fatigue Cd. 8511 (1917) Para.5, p5: 'Any inquiry into the conditions of efficiency and also of the health of the workers must necessarily take account of the incentives which operate to increase the output and encourage resistance to fatigue'. A Taylorist model of monetary incentives is assumed.
2. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.iii, p23: 'Welfare work in factories may be considered from two points of view - from provision of good conditions for the health and happiness of the workers, and the utilisation of such provision. The first is to a great extent a question of accommodation...the second involves problems of labour management in the wide sense, and of supplying the human element, without which the most elaborate accommodation may be useless.'
3. C.S.A. Minutes: 13.6.1915.

hand on the prohibition issue, since when the voluntary organisations approached the shipbuilders on the matter they were referred to individual firms from whom 'they would no doubt receive sympathetic consideration!'.¹

So effective were the agencies in their advocacy of persuasion over coercion - for both employers and workmen² - that a large number of employers came to view the establishment of 'an effective and well-managed canteen', as an incentive to efficiency and 'greater contentment' amongst the workmen.³ The strategic purpose of the canteens in reducing anti-social habits and unproductive behaviour was more subtle and less direct than evictions of workmen from houses for the same offences: but the element of discipline and control remained.

Two other groups which must be considered in the industrial relations and welfare provisions of engineering and shipbuilding, were apprentices and young workers, on one side and female labour on the other. With the advance of technology and refinement of management organisation, the position of each group was to alter with serious implications for industrial control. This was brought sharply into focus during the dilution struggles, but the origins of these changes lay in the last decades of the previous century.

Apprentices and young workers always presented something of a threat to the market position of the skilled trades, especially as they were paid low wages, indentured to their masters and unable to form any independent union of their own.⁴ In those

1. Ibid.: 30.8.1915.

2. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.iii, p12: 'The section, in its introduction of welfare work, was deliberately educational in its methods. For this reason it refrained...from forcing non-essential improvements on reluctant employers, and from insisting on their accepting welfare supervisors against their will.'

3. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Report on Industrial Canteens Cd. 8133 (1915), Para.7, p6. The report noted the 'consensus of opinion' as to the 'substantial advantages to employers and workers following the establishment of an effective and well-managed canteen. These benefits have been...a marked improvement in the health and physical condition of the workers, a reduction in sickness, less absence and broken time, less tendency to alcoholism, and an increased efficiency and output...'

4. Pollard, op. cit., p146: 'There are signs of early organisations of the apprentices themselves; but generally it was the unions which defended their status, training, limitation of numbers and wages.'

shipbuilding and engineering areas where the craft organisation was strongest, the ratios of apprentices to journeymen was kept within strict limits but in newer regions like Clydeside the apprentices were over-abundant by the 1880s.¹ The efforts of the A.S.E. and shipyard unions to impose limits on the influx led to the major confrontation of 1892. Although there was some corrosion of the apprenticeship system before 1914, they remained important factors in the frontier of control.²

The increasing division of labour in engineering and shipbuilding operated at mental as well as manual levels in the two industries, so that technical staff and clerical workers found themselves confined to particular areas of planning and preparation as designs became more specialised.³ This entailed a growth in technical and scientific education which affected apprenticeship as well as staff grades.⁴ The larger and more successful concerns recognised the value of technical education in inculcating correct moral behaviour as well as practical expertise.⁵

Only when industrialists saw these classes as infringing their more direct interest in production did they protest at its extravagance - as during 1912 when Clyde shipbuilders saw evening continuation classes affecting squad organisation.⁶ Generally, the extension of technical education gave the employers who endowed and organised the classes, not only a means of furthering fresh techniques and practices but also the formal control of training (which the crafts had always

1. Ibid., p147. Pollard notes that on Clydeside the ratio was 21.6% of apprentices - the highest of all rivers and contrasting with 7.0% in London.
2. Goodrich, op. cit., p94. The forms of control implied by the apprenticeship were 'the limitation of numbers and a certain command over technique and training in technique'.
3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 5.6.1914. Letter from employer stating that 'many of the clerks, draughtsmen, and other oncost staff are members of, or indirectly connected with, the same families as the workmen..'
4. Sir William Beardmore, 'The Influence of Scientific Research on Industry' Iron and Steel Institute Journal (May 1916), p6-8: 'Science comes first. It is the dominant factor, because it should be the beginning of all things...all workers must make the most of appliances which scientific research and mechanical volume may place in their hands, by increasing the volume per unit of and by working full time.'

enjoyed) and actual control of apprentices for a period of time when training.

This control of apprentices became of great importance with the outbreak of War, since labour scarcities gave the younger and cheaper workers an added value to their employers. Engineering firms sought to improve recruitment of apprentices from the Highlands to cope with renewed demand, aided by the Labour Exchanges.¹ By December 1914 the new five-year apprenticeship was introduced with revised rates graded according to experience,² with early signs of unrest amongst the lads.³ It was the dilution era which brought the whole matter into view, however, as the A.S.E. sought to 'take up the position in which Apprentices are placed "under dilution schemes" and press..the whole matter of Apprentices Rates as affected by "Dilution"..'.⁴

The fears of the tradesmen were well-founded, despite the employers' dismissal of any claim to represent the young workers,⁵ since the engineering firms devised an ingenious methods of navigating state restrictions by upgrading apprentices to craft work. Under L.2 and L.3 the industrialists were restrained to pay trade rates to women employed on skilled work, but after a tactful visit from Macassey the firms concluded that they:⁶

could, to a very considerable extent, obviate the question becoming a pressing one by arranging that apprentices should be put on any class of work which was done, either in part or whole, by the tradesmen, the women in turn being put on to the work of the apprentices; in which case the only legal obligation upon firms would be to pay a minimum of 20/- per week.

This very question came up at the troubled firm of John Lang, where there had been powerful resistance in Autumn 1915 from the craftsmen, and the Associated deployed the argument they

5. Robertson, loc. cit. (1975), p225-6, 232-3.

6. C.S.A. Minutes: 29.8.1912.

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 24.11.1914, in which the officials were cautious about over-zealous support since 'On a previous occasion ...the Labour Party had raised questions in Parliament'. It was also noted that importees were given additional expenses 'through a third party' as an incentive.

2. Ibid.: 22.2.1915.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.: 13.3.1916. District Secretary Bunton raised the matter.

had carefully prepared.¹ By these means the costs of production, particularly repetitive work or divided craft work costs, could be reduced drastically.

This made it all the more important that employers retain command of their trainees, especially after the latter began to organise on the lines of the Clyde Workers' Committee. In March 1916 the 'Clyde Apprentices Central Committee' presented a number of demands for wage increases, on the basis that they were 'of more use to the state and the Employers' than the highly-paid lesser skills and unskilled men.'² Whilst admitting the existence of various anomalies between firms and grades,³ the employers went on to urge the suppression of the Committee by the state once its parent body had collapsed.⁴

Largely because of the higher earnings to be had on unskilled and machine work, large numbers of apprentices broke their indentures and agreements to join the growing numbers of untrained adolescents employed in engineering works and (to a lesser extent) shipyards.⁵ Having crushed the challenge of organised apprentices, managers still faced serious difficulties in controlling this youthful labour and it was here that welfare services were most important.⁶ As the Health of Munition Workers Committee stated in a report of late 1915:⁷

Welfare supervision is of particular importance in the case of boys, since their employment presents many features of difficulty, to which special attention must be paid, if health and efficiency are to be safeguarded and discipline maintained.

This lack of discipline was held to be an important factor in the disruption of production, and Robert Hyde (Rowntree's deputy at the Welfare Section of the Ministry of Munitions) was given special responsibility for ensuring that employers' welfare

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5. Ibid.: "...that on questions relating to Apprentices the Society cannot be recognised."
 6. Ibid.: 17.7.1916. Macassey had noted that the employers in the North East were using apprentices on craft work.
 1. Ibid.: 7.11.1916. When the Lang tradesmen complained of female dilution at low rates the employers argued that they were on jobs 'not formerly done by skilled tradesmen but by apprentices'.
 2. Ibid.: 13.3.1916. The apprentices were 'employed in the Engineering and other trades' according to their memorandum.
 3. Ibid.: 20.4.1916.
 4. Ibid. The employers informed the Commissioners that 'it would be

schemes could master the problems posed by juvenile recruitment in the diluted trades.

Hyde visited several firms on Clydeside during 1916 after first consulting the employers' association and emphasising the importance of his mission 'in connection with the question of Boy Supervision'.¹ Whilst the engineering firms were decidedly sympathetic, they objected to the unwarranted limitation of working hours under D.O.R.A. regulations - in a manner reminiscent of their policy on technical education.² Hyde's efforts were reinforced by those of the Juvenile Employment Committee of the Labour Exchange, who were energetic enough to supply firms with lads from local reformatories. These proved valuable enough for local concerns to train them and squabble over poaching of the boys in 1918.³

The other main section of workers who posed serious problems for both crafts and management in both industries were the female employees of the Clyde firms. Female labour affected control of the market, control of tools and skills, and control of the work process itself. This was of less importance in engineering and shipbuilding before 1914 since there were only 170,000 females employed in the metal industries as a whole - or a ratio of about 10:1 in favour of male workers.⁴ The proportion was much higher in trades such as textiles, clothing, food and drink,

5. 'most undesirable to recognise in any way the agitation which is being carried on amongst the Apprentices at the present time and that the apprentices should not receive any encouragement from Government Departments to repudiate the contractual obligations entered into at the commencement of their apprenticeship.'
6. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.iii, p38: ' "The welfare officer", it has been said, "owed his position to two causes. Employers complained that boys were unmanageable and that output suffered through this lack of control...The general public complained that the war had made life very difficult for boys... and that the fault lay with industrial conditions of the time." From this two-fold complaint were born boys' welfare work and the welfare officer.'
7. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Welfare Supervision Cd. 8151 (1915) Para.12, p7.
1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 17.7.1916 - 22.1.1917.
2. Ibid.: 14.9.1917.
3. Ibid.: 12.2.1918.
4. Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry Cmd. 135

paper and printing, where women formed a large minority of the workforce and even a majority.¹ There were also important differences between various metal industries as the table shows:

Table XVIII: Employment in metal industries in Britain, 1914.

Sector	Males	Females	Ratio Females	Ratio Metals
Metals	1,634,000	170,000	10.4%	100.00
Shipbuilding	417,000	1,000	0.24%	25.52
Marine Eng.	66,000	1,000	1.5%	4.00

Source: History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv Appx.I.

Although females were of greater significance in general engineering, they had clearly made little impact on marine engineering and ship construction.² Even in general engineering they were fairly limited, specialising in small repetition work such as that required by the small arm manufacturers of the Midlands.³

The War brought a certain number of changes, with 182,000 women employed in the metal trades by July 1915 - the majority being in the main sectors of metals.⁴ Thereafter the following changes occurred in the structure of the workforce:

Table XIX: Female employment in metal trades, 1915-16.

Sector	July 1915	Dec. 1915	July 1916	% Change
Iron & St.	5,995	8,400	14,865	248
Engineering	30,780	50,715	124,854	406
Elec. Eng.	16,159	20,000	23,634	146
Shipbldg	2,563	2,200	4,032	157
Small Arms	1,621	4,182	8,741	539

Source: History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv Appx.1 Table B. p146.

4. (1919) p10. Figures include following:

	Men	Women	Proportion
Metal	1,634,000	170,500	10:1
Chemical	159,000	40,000	4:1
Textile	625,000	863,000	3:4
Clothing	287,000	612,000	4:9
Food, drink, tob.	360,000	196,000	9:5
Paper & printing	261,000	147,500	5:3

1. Ibid.

2. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, Appx.I.

3. Cmd. 135, op. cit., p11, 25, etc.

4. History of the Ministry of Munitions, op. cit.

The figures indicate the upsurge in female employment during the first year of dilution was heavily concentrated in small arms and general engineering, which was to be the pattern for the rest of the War.¹

Thus we should qualify the picture of thousands of females flowing into the heavy industries - 1.195 million workers and 0.324 million females did so - by emphasising their concentration in certain areas.² The danger to the craft societies, once the females had shown their ability to displace men, was clear and recognised by them.³ Partly in response to the pressures from craft conservatives and radical leaders alike, the Government passed L.2 in October 1915 specifying equal rates for equal work.⁴ This latter point was one which was to be taken up by the women's trade unions and became a major platform by 1919.⁵

The employers soon discovered ways of avoiding the provisions of L.2 by upgrading the whole workforce and placing the amenable female labour on unskilled jobs.⁶ In fact William Weir, notorious for his Taylorist views and anti-unionism,⁷ was given charge of liaison with employers on dilution and visited the Associations in Spring 1916 to further his mission.⁸ The consequence was that 13,000 women entered Clydeside engineering shops during 1916, with their minimum wage of £1 guaranteed but employers reluctant to pay trade rates.⁹ When Order 49 was issued to tighten up the loopholes in L.2 during 1917 the engineers again complained bitterly of the restrictions this placed upon them.¹⁰

In this situation the craft societies had a number of choices, ranging from the exclusion of women altogether, to limitation of their work, to control of their union organisation. In each case

1. W.R. Scott & G. Cunnison, The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War Oxford University Press (1924); p85, say of females: 'By July 1916 the number introduced into shipbuilding, general engineering and miscellaneous..trades (exclusive of munitions) was estimated at 1,800 for Glasgow and district; and even by the end of the war, the total number of females employed in marine engineering and shipbuilding over the whole of the United Kingdom was only 31,000 or 7 per cent of the total number...'
2. History of the Ministry of Munitions VI pt.iv, p51.
3. Ibid., IV pt.iv, p117: 'The real difficulty..behind much of the opposition to dilution was the fear that by the end of the War women would have become so proficient that employers would employ them at a lower wage than, and to the exclusion of, skilled men..'
4. Ibid.; V pt.ii, p11-20.

the main concern of the trade unions was not to get the women in "but to ensure getting them out as easily as possible, and probably keeping them out as far as possible".¹ Where they could not control the entry of the women or the precise jobs on which they worked, the tradesmen were determined to control them through union organisation.

Welfare was to prove a vital instrument not only in easing the passage of female dilution, but in controlling the female labour once it arrived. For this purpose the Health of Munition Workers Committee specified a system of welfare supervision for women as well as welfare facilities.² It was felt that special attention should be given to the relations between women workers and their supervisors if effective discipline and efficiency was to be maintained.³ Certain basic amenities were laid down by the Committee,⁴ and the Dilution Commissioners were concerned that few employers had made any attempt to provide these when they arrived in early 1916.⁵

This was soon corrected by employers such as William Beardmore,

5. Report of the Committee on Women in Industry, Appendices: Summaries of Evidence, &c. Cmd. 167 (1919), p14-19 for evidence of Mary Macarthur, Clementina Black, Barbara Drake, etc.
6. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 17.7.1916 - 7.11.1916.
7. Reader, op. cit., p89 quotes a workman as telling W.D. Weir: "Increased production appears to be the dominant mainspring of all your thoughts and activities, and you never miss an opportunity of showing your bitterest antipathy to that Trade Union which has most relentlessly failed to agree to your proposals."
8. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 22.5.1916.
9. Drake, op. cit., p35.
10. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 15.2.1917, with employers arguing it would "decrease production(,) cause discontents in the shops..".
1. Askwith to Beveridge in early 1916 quoted in McLean, op. cit., p97.
2. Cd. 8151; op. cit., Para.7, p6: 'If the employment of women be properly safeguarded and wisely supervised, all may be well; but if not, the ultimate results may be far from desirable or beneficial.'
3. Ibid., Para.8, p6: '..the Committee are satisfied that the appointment of Welfare Supervisors is necessary and conducive to the preservation of good health and good behaviour..'
4. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Employment of Women Cd. 8185 (1916).
5. Hinton, op. cit., p144-45; McLean, op. cit., Ch.6 Appx. 2.

and it was at the firm's Parkhead Forge that the first troubles arose. Kirkwood and the A.S.E. were helping the National Federation of Women Workers to organise the shell shop employees, so as to ensure the protection of rates and conditions, with impressive results in Early 1916.¹ At this point Miss Jeanie Lindsay, the Parkhead Welfare Superintendent, intervened and reported the activities to the management and Beardmore.² The consequent prohibition of Kirkwood from the shell works provoked the dilution crisis of March 1916 and led ultimately to the decapitation of the Clyde Workers' Committee and the destruction of effective organisation at the female section.³ Miss Lindsay later summed up her role before a Cabinet Committee, as:⁴

- (a) In seeing to the health and well-being of the employees the welfare supervisor is thereby attaining the best possible results for the employer.
- (b) To see to their health, comfort, behaviour, tidiness; also in trying to raise their moral standard.

Learning of their advantages by experience, employers began to appoint welfare supervisors for females and boys until by 1918 there were an estimated one thousand or more supervisors employed by various firms.

Both the officials administering the controlled establishments and the employers themselves insisted on welfare supervisors being paid by the firm and under management direction.⁵ Yet their appointment was not without its problems since there frequently arose friction between welfare superintendants and production supervisors - indeed, their duties were sometimes combined in the same person despite the recommendations of the Munitions

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1. H.E.R. Highton, 'Report on the Clyde District' in Drake, op. cit. p129 refers to Parkhead as 'the most fully organised and most vigorous body of women shell-workers in the district'.
 2. McLean, op. cit., p118. McLean does not name the welfare worker.
 3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 23.3.1916 for dilution crisis.
 4. Cmd. 167, op. cit., p213.
 5. Dr. E.L. Collis at ibid., p206: 'The welfare supervisor should be directly under the works manager...The welfare supervisor should be the paid servant of the management, as it is not possible to have someone in a factory owing allegiance to someone other than the manager.' Collis had replaced Seebohm Rowntree as head of the Welfare Section of the Ministry of Munitions in 1916 after the progressive welfare employer resigned his post.

Ministry and other experts.¹ These were only gradually ironed out and remained a major source of discussion and controversy down to 1919.²

The close association of the welfare supervisors with the management, and their frequent anti-union bias, helps to account for the bitter hostility which they often aroused amongst the women workers.³ Even the supporters of welfare work had to admit the strength of anti-welfare feeling amongst both the male and female unions in areas such as Clydeside by the later years of the War.⁴ For a time it seemed that welfare workers might secure professional independence in the post-War period, but this initiative was quashed by management opposition and economic depression.⁵ So dependant were they upon managerial prerogatives and authority that the welfare superintendants might enhance labour control but they rarely failed to secure labour allegiance.⁶ Even the women workers came to organise independantly of the welfare supervisors in those areas of industry where they were concentrated.

This account of welfare provisions in engineering and shipbuilding indicates the important similarities as well as the differences between the two industries. The development of technology, scale and structure of production, organisation and management was certainly different, although there were trends towards further innovation, improved organisation and more sophisticated business structure in each industry during these years.

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1. Ibid., p207: 'The welfare supervisor should have nothing to do with production...'; Ibid., p209 (Miss Jayne of Armstrong-Whitworth): 'The question of production should not be touched by the supervisor'; etc.
 2. Ibid., p206 (A.F. Butler): 'The supervisor's duties should be well defined, otherwise there will be friction...She alone should have the power to dismiss, subject to the right to appeal to the general manager by the foreman.'
 3. Drake, op. cit., p117: 'There is also a forewoman, superintendant or "mistress" as she is variously styled, who is solely concerned with the discipline, comfort and welfare of the women.'; Webb, op. cit., p142-3, for comments of Mary Macarthur; Gertrude Tuckwell, 'Workers and Trade Unions' Welfare Work (Sept. 1921), for a first hand account.
 4. Cmd. 167, op. cit., p207 (Rose E. Squire, Dept. Principal Lady Inspector of Factories): 'With better training the welfare worker should get rid of her prejudice against trade unions...'

The structure of the labour force and the rate of change in skills and specialisms was also different, with division of labour and development of machine skills more pronounced in the engineering trades. This conservatism in shipbuilding was facilitated by conditions of production as well as market conditions and periodic trade fluctuations. These differences resulted in a distinct pattern of industrial relations within the two sectors, machinery being a more pressing issue in engineering and demarcation more prevalent in shipbuilding.

Yet the underlying principles involved in these changes and these relations were basically the same: they involved the problem of control and labour resistance to managerial control. This control operated at five distinct levels: through the labour market, through the regulation of effort and incentives, through mastery of tools and implements of production (including machinery), through control of the work area, and through the formal channels of management and supervision. With the increasing organisation both of men and employers this control took organisational as well as economic forms, and necessitated strategic decisions by unions and associations.

Industrial welfare must be located at these different levels of control - involving the struggles over technology and skills as well as the subjection of labour via 'strategic' services. Nor was this control confined to the manual workforce, but affected technical, clerical and supervisory employees as well as skilled and unskilled workers. The vital role of the foreman in each industry merited the common attention of engineers and shipbuilders, and their joint support of selective welfare provisions at the level of the firm and via the agency of their associations.

In keeping with the greater pace of change in engineering, and with the more serious conflicts there (as in 1897), the strategic role of welfare was more evident - particularly during the dilution process. The three groups which mattered most in these changes were the foremen, the apprentices and the female

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5. John Lee, The Principles of Industrial Welfare Pitman (1924) London, p67-8, says of industrial welfare: 'If we realize it as the enlightening spirit of general control we shall be able to fix our normal supervisory methods to include it'.
 6. M.P. Follett, 'The Basis of Control in Business Management' Journal

dilutees. They were catered for not merely out of the employers' desire to control labour markets and production, but because of their vulnerability to such supervision. Employers had already achieved a strong hold over male supervisors and apprentices, and were anxious to exert maximum control over female workers who had no experience of high wages, union benefits, or craft organisation.

This is not to suggest that welfare services were in themselves as important as wages, hours, or other fundamental considerations, but that welfare could strengthen the employer's position in regard to these and other key issues. It is also true that the larger and more innovative enterprises found labour resistance particularly irksome in their attempts to tighten management organisation, and it was generally these who invested heavily in substantial welfare projects. Even then the offices of the state were needed in many cases to convince employers of their own interest in facilitating welfare development, as was evident during the War years.¹

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the argument that industrial welfare was confined to certain 'new' industries with particular labour needs and stable industrial relations conducted by autocratic enterprises. The detailed comparison of engineering and shipbuilding shows that such an account, though containing elements of truth insofar as it relates to the more recently developed consumer industries, is basically incorrect. It assumes that particularly well-publicised forms of welfare, such as canteens and rest rooms for female workers in certain hygiene-conscious concerns, were the usual or sole type of benefit provided in these decades. This survey indicates that various schemes were widespread in the heavy industries, and were furnished by employers with an eye to a quite different system of industrial relations.

In order to fully understand the links between economic conditions, industrial relations and welfare activities, a detailed analysis of particular trades is required. The comparison of these two industries illustrates the underlying

6. National Institute of Industrial Psychology III No.5 (1927), 235.

1. Cmd. 167, op. cit., p205, for report of Midlands Lady Inspector.

similarities between the disputes as well as the significant differences between shipyard and workshop. Each sector of production faced the threats of technical innovation, business consolidation and integration, and management organisation, although the tempo of innovation and resistance shifted according to the balance of power within the occupations. The multifarious conflicts were also rooted in the struggle for industrial control within both industries, as employers sought to strengthen management against organised labour and its traditional practices.

Welfare initiatives were confronted with two serious obstacles: firstly, there were the sheer logistical problems of funding services for the mass of well-paid artisans and labourers; secondly, there was the active opposition of craftsmen whose own societies had long provided impressive provident benefits for their members. Even if prevailing ideology had supported the employers' desire to weaken the strength of this autonomous voluntarism - and it did not - firms would have found it extremely difficult to counter the attractions of the unions in any direct way.¹

Instead the firms concentrated upon developing their strategic hold over amenities primarily designed to improve labour supply and efficiency, such as housing and restaurants. More significantly, they concentrated their resources on such key groups as supervisors, apprentices and females, all of whom posed a real threat to the unions' command of the labour market in these industries. These efforts culminated in the rapid spread of facilities and benefits during the First World War, when the dilution programmes and the unrest they provoked created a serious challenge to the employers' authority. So grave did this resistance become, first in engineering and later in shipbuilding, that state intervention and government control of industries and welfare was required to resolve the conflicts which had their origins in the pre-War years.²

1. See I.G. Gibbon, Unemployment Insurance King & Sons (1911) London p251, for one example of strong support for voluntarism.

2. John Maclean, The War after the War: In the Light of the Elements of Working Class Economics (1917) Glasgow in UGD 102 3/23, for a perceptive critique of wartime innovations such as scientific management and welfare.

Chapter Four: The region and industrial welfare development;
a comparison of industries in the west of Scotland.

Industrial welfare provided by employers in heavy industry, locomotive transport, light industry and retailing in the west of Scotland.

The previous two chapters have shown that industrial welfare emerged during these years as the consequence of the growth in the productive forces in shipbuilding and engineering, and of the industrial relations to which this progressive development gave rise. The comparison of the two sectors also illustrated the important differences in the rate and pattern of economic progress with quite distinctive market conditions and technical innovation in each case. Employers did find their labour needs changing in accordance with technical innovation, concentration of resources, and rationalisation of organised production, but the particular forms which this took was significantly different. In keeping with the varied pattern of growth and labour relations, the welfare provisions differed somewhat, although similar principles may have underlain these variations.

It might be suggested that engineering and shipbuilding are inadequate examples given their close links and similar trades, and that the shape of industrial relations are very different in other areas of the economy. The comparison of quite dissimilar industries within one region would provide some insight into the comparative experience of these sectors as well as a general indication of how different forms of services are promoted at particular points in the region's economic history.

There are also important problems in such an approach, including the definition of a region and the distinction of diverse regional components. The difficulties in charting a geographical area of economic significance are well known,¹ and the purposes for which a region is defined will largely determine the criteria adopted.² There exist alternative models of regional analysis, including the 'nodal' model of development which stresses the links between major components rather than the supposed boundaries of the region.³

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1. C.H. Lee, Regional Economic Growth in the United Kingdom since the 1880s Allen & Unwin (1974), p1-2.
 2. H.W. Richardson, Regional Economics Wiedenfeld & Nicolson (1972) London, p230.
 3. Ibid., p227.

Certain basic distinctions can be made between the various factors, resources and industries which characterise a region, as well as between the different markets which exist within and without regions in the national economy.

These market forces clearly affect the region as a whole as well as the industries and occupations within that region, and the regionalised character of production or of demand factors form one of the major distinctions between industries and trades. Activities such as building are notoriously vulnerable to regional and local supply and demand factors, as well as having a substantial impact on the fortunes of other sectors.¹ The dependance of house-building on population flows and capital markets, and the influence of industrial employment opportunities on the local labour market and population migration, indicates the ways in which regional development is inter-related.² When we introduce the different movements and cycles in (say) trade, building, shipbuilding, and overseas investment, then the complexity of the forces affecting every region becomes apparent.³

Since labour is itself a commodity within local markets, the population of any given area must be related to other markets such as housing and capital markets.⁴ The patterns of investment in major industries may actually deprive the building industry or the potential mortgage holders of the necessary capital resources to extend its activities, and this was one of the major difficulties facing shipbuilding employers who required housing to accommodate their workforce before 1914.⁵ Thus conflicts and contradictions may appear between the contrary needs of different groups of capitalists, which welfare was partly introduced to resolve.

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1. S.B. Saul, 'House Building in England, 1890-1914' Economic History Review XV (1962), p120-23; J. Parry Lewis, Building Cycles and Britain's Growth Macmillan (1965) London, p106-7.
 2. Brinley Thomas, 'Demographic determinants of British and American building cycles, 1870-1913' in D.N. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 Princeton U.P. (1971) New Jersey, p58, for criticism of Saul's regional emphasis and dismissal of Habakkuk; C.f. H.J. Habakkuk, 'Fluctuations in House-Building in Britain and the United States' in A.R. Hall (ed.), The Export of Capital from Britain, 1870-1914 (1968), p108.
 3. A.K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1913 Cambridge University Press (1953), p123, etc.

Thus whilst this chapter focuses upon the region as an area of study, it is clearly impossible to restrict the analysis of economic forces to such a spatial terrain. There must always be some consideration of the ways in which factors as well as goods and services may flow between as well as within regions, especially in a period which saw the increasing 'perfection' of capital markets within an international economy.¹

Given the serious limitations of existing sources, and their inevitable bias towards the larger and more successful firms who possessed and retained business records, there is little attempt at a representative sample in this comparison. In any case, it is doubtful if the notion of a 'representative firm' is a valid economic concept at all.² There must always be real differences between enterprises in their management and efficiency, as well as in their specific location and access to markets.³

Rather than utilise the notion of a representative firm, it is preferable to think in terms of, a) leading firms, b) progressive firms, c) conservative firms. The fortunes of all the concerns within a certain industry will depend on the market conditions prevailing and their response to these conditions. Those firms which have greatest share and control of the market and which produce most of an industry's goods can be designated 'leading firms', although their scale will depend on a wide number of variables (including the nature of the product). Progressive firms are those which are most committed to new techniques and technology, to improvement of business structure and rate of growth, and to effective management organisation and control. These may be large firms (as in the case of John Brown's), or

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4. Keith Burgess, The Origins of British Industrial Relations Croom Helm (1975) London, p86-7; John Foster, 'How imperial London preserved its slums' Regional Research (Book Reviews) (1979), p653: 'it is necessary to consider the wider social forces which link a particular housing market to the development of society at large'.
 5. A.C. Pigou, 'Some Aspects of the Housing Problem' in S. Rowntree and A.C. Pigou, Housing: The Warburton Lectures Manchester University Press (1914), p54-55, etc., for discussion of broader problem of under-consumption and housing demand.
 1. P.L. Cottrell, British Overseas Investment in the Nineteenth Century Macmillan (1975) London, p60, etc. for impact on housing.

smaller specialist firms which could compete by disintegration of processes and the application of technology and intensive management organisation to those remaining. Conservative firms were those which continued traditional methods of production and control, perhaps dominated by a family which had operated the enterprise for generations.

It is possible to trace welfare provisions in each of these cases, although the character of the services and the manner in which they are administered will often differ. This is probably because industrial welfare reflects not only the productive needs of the concern, but also the style of management adopted. Welfare in the larger firms tends to be more formally organised than that found in smaller units, and welfare in the more progressive concerns illustrates their overriding drive for efficiency and the breach of labour resistance. Conservative employers might provide welfare facilities even though they might be relatively unaware of or uninterested in innovation and reform. But in a competitive industry they would find difficulty surviving and channelling their resources into welfare.¹

There is a reasonable case for assuming that industrial welfare expansion will be associated with economic growth, and that those firms which have greater resources or which are more technologically and managerially progressive will have the more rapid rate of growth. Since such factors as larger scale and concentration of resources demand more efficient organisation and management, then the larger firms will usually be those also

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2. Lionel Robbins, 'The Representative Firm' Economic Journal XXXVIII (1928), especially p390
 3. Ibid., p392: 'Within the various groups of factors of production employed in any branch of industry the constituent factors are unequal in efficiency...Just as units of a given supply may be produced on lands of varying efficiency, so their production may be supervised by business men of varying ability.'
 4. See chapter five for a comparison of 'leading firms' in coalmining and in cotton and woollen textiles in west of Scotland and the West Riding of Yorkshire.

favouring increased capital investment and better management of their plant and labour. These firms also experienced the more serious labour resistance to change, hence their prominence in the employers' associations and their emphasis on strategic as well as infrastructural welfare.

The following discussion notes the different complexion of the region's industries, as well as their interdependence, but stresses the similar experiences of leading firms in each sector and their common approach to welfare. This may be due to structural changes in the regional economy, as well as to the general rise in trade unionism amongst the industries, but in either case the role and experiences of the individual concern must be taken into account as well as that of the industry in which they operated.

The iron and steel industry in the west of Scotland had developed during the 18th century, Carron ironworks being established in 1759, and was to become the basis for early industrialisation.¹ Local techniques were greatly improved by Neilson's 'hot-blast' process,² but this only facilitated the exploitation of local blackband or 'wild' coal deposits.³ Foundries such as Calder and Gartsherrie boomed after 1830, with Mushet's Airdrie experiments providing further incentives for ironmakers.⁴

By the 1860s there were a fairly small number of large concerns operating, with Bairds working over fifty furnaces (sixteen at Gartsherrie), and consolidating their position by outside interests as well as horizontal integration.⁵ The Coltness Company run by the Houldsworths who transferred their fortunes from cotton textiles to iron production,⁶ and thereby helped the Scottish production figures reach over 1.2 million tons by 1870.⁷ This output was heavily concentrated in the crude pig iron section, however, and the manufacture of malleable iron only developed in the later

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1. A. Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland Routledge and Kegan Paul (1975) London, p115.
 2. Lee, op. cit., p13, refers to coal as 'one of the most influential factors in the determination of locational development...'
 3. Ibid.
 4. A. Birch, The Economic History of the British Iron and Steel Industry Frank Cass (1967) London, p172-3.
 5. Ibid., p174.
 6. Ibid., p175.

decades of the century - with little integration of pig iron and forge rolling mill processes.¹

Vertical integration was substantial between the coal producers and the pig iron manufacturers, with leading collieries combining the two stages and thereby securing an access to markets for their minerals.² These firms did not take part in the formation of the Steel Company of Scotland in 1871-2, which manufactured steel rails and then ship and boiler plates for the expanding shipbuilding industry.³ Only in the 1880s did firms such as William Beardmores, David Colvilles, and Summerlee & Mossend begin steel production on any scale, using the open hearth process and concentrating on the acid steel plates required by the shipyards. The incentive to transfer production from pig iron to the value-added steel plates was sharpened by the falling price of raw iron during the 1870s.⁴

Although the steel industry was slow to develop in many respects in the west of Scotland, the manufacturers were hardly uncharacteristic of the industry as a whole. The iron and steel industry was established as a major sector of the economy by the 1870s, employing perhaps 40% of all adult male labour employed in factories and workshops.⁵ Yet the competitive position of the industry was inferior to that of Germany and U.S.A. by the 1900s and the loss of foreign markets resulted in the slow rate of industrial growth.⁶ Domestic consumption of both iron and steel was also markedly behind that of her competitors, with overseas equipment, management and marketing all superior.⁷

There were also regional shifts in the production of steel, with Scotland's open hearth growth levelling off at 1900 and other areas (South Wales and North East) overtaking it by 1914.

7. Slaven, op. cit., p120-21.

1. Ibid., p122.

2. Ibid., p124.

3. S.G. Checkland, The Mines of Tharsis George Allen and Unwin (1967) London, p120-21 for details of Tennant interest in firm.

4. Birch, op. cit., p189: 'in terms of value, the production of the the forge, rolling mill and melting shop is much higher than the primary product.'

5. P.L. Payne, 'Iron and Steel Industry' in Derek H. Aldcroft (ed.), British Industry and the Development of Foreign Competition George Allen & Unwin (1968) London, p71-2.

6. Ibid., p75, 86-7, etc.

7. Temin quoted at ibid., p97.

this branch of steel production.¹ Burn criticises the Scottish steelmasters for their failure to successfully integrate their iron and steel plant and re-locate their plants on the riverside.² The preponderance of older firms, often dominated by older dynasties incapable of rationalisation and integration, must count in this assessment of entrepreneurial inertia before 1914.³

The coming of the First World War and booming munitions production gave a massive impetus to the industry, Colvilles expanding their production by 2.5 times costing perhaps £2.5 million.⁴ This growth was not confined to Scotland but affected the whole country,⁵ although the major development in the west of Scotland was the rapid integration of shipbuilding and steelmaking firms - a phase which was only foreshadowed by the activities of John Browns and Beardmores before 1914.⁶ By 1920 the steel works of Scotland, with the one exception of Stewart and Lloyd's Mossend works, 'was in the hands of the shipbuilders...whoever owned the Scottish steelworks, their products were almost inevitably destined for the shipyards'.⁷ This expansion had come too rapidly and owed too much to the unnatural conditions of Wartime production, with consequent problems of overcapacity and unemployment in the depressed conditions of the early 1920s.⁸

Industrial relations in the iron and steel industry reflected these changes in the conditions of production and the trades to which they gave rise. There was little effective organisation of the majority of foundry workers until the 1860s, although the Associated Society of Iron Moulders of Scotland had been active

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1. Duncan Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939 (1940) London, p336.
 2. Ibid., p274-5: 'In Scotland the form which radical change might take was clear - the establishment of a combined iron and steel plant close to the shipyards and situated on the Clyde at a point where ore could be unloaded...'
 3. Payne, loc. cit., p94; Burn; op. cit., p304.
 4. P.L. Payne, 'Rationality and Personality: A Study of Mergers in the Scottish Iron and Steel Industry, 1916-1936' Business History XIX No.2 (1977), p163-4.
 5. Burn, op. cit., p359.
 6. Payne, loc. cit. (1977), p162 for list of firms and holdings.
 7. Ibid., p166-67.
 8. Ibid. See below for Beardmores.

since the 1830s on a restricted craft basis.¹ The other trades in the iron industry waited until the Puddlers Association was set up in the 1860s, followed by blast furnace and steel iron puddlers.² Their major grievances were the tight work organisation and rigid work discipline at the plants, and the survival of various forms of Trucking.³ In a manner reminiscent of the 1852 lock-out at engineering works, their employers rejected any attempt by the men "to dictate to their employers the mode in which their work shall be conducted and what workmen they shall employ".⁴ After the defeats of the unions at Leeds in 1863 and Glasgow in 1866, the leaders finally accepted a Conciliation Board and sliding scale from 1869.⁵

Thereafter the industry developed its technology and its industrial relations on the secure basis of managerial prerogatives and stable negotiations with union officials of the Associated Iron and Steel Workers.⁶ The position of the latter was increasingly challenged by John Hodge's Steel Smelters, who won their first victory at the Steel Company of Scotland.⁷ After the failure of their attempt to destroy the threat from the A.I.S.W., the Smelters accepted the intervention of the employers Steel Ingot Makers' Association.⁸

The rise of the unions had brought into being a number of employers' associations, including the Iron Trades Employers' Association formed in 1872 as an adjunct of the engineering associations and sharing a secretary in Thomas Biggart.⁹ One of the major issues influencing the formation of the Association was unionisation amongst the foremen, with their trade journals arguing

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1. Birch, op. cit., p272.
 2. N.P. Howard, 'The Strikes and Lockouts in the Iron Industry and the Formation of the Ironworkers' Unions, 1862-1869' International Review of Social History XVIII (1974), p397.
 3. Ibid., p406-7.
 4. Ibid., p409.
 5. Ibid., p411, 426.
 6. J.H. Porter, 'Wage Bargaining under Conciliation Agreements, 1860-1914' Economic History Review XXIII (1970), p465-66, 472-4.
 7. H. Clegg, et. al., A History of British Trade Unions since 1889 Oxford University Press (1964), p205-7.
 8. Ibid., p446-8.

that 'nothing satisfactory could be done while foremen were members of trade unions'.¹ The I.T.E.A. was never really very effective and was overshadowed by such influential regional bodies such as the Scottish Ironmasters' Association, which claimed to represent the 'owners of every Blastfurnace in Scotland' by 1906.² There was a clear overlap between this latter organisation and the Scottish Pig Iron Traders, and both affiliated to the Iron and Steel Allied Trades Employers' Federation after its formation in 1906.³

One of the major functions of the S.P.I.T. was to operate a conciliation board with such moderate individuals as Cronin, who shared many of the masters' views before 1914.⁴ Little attention was given by such bodies to changes in related industries, such as the steelmaking industry, where the pace of change was rapid enough to preclude the formation of effective cartelisation in the industry.

Prominent in many of these changes and innovations was the firm of William Beardmore & Co. of Parkhead, which had been set up by Beardmore and Rigby after the former resigned as Napier's manager there.⁵ The works were transformed into an important forge for the production of malleable iron suitable for shipbuilding and marine engineering manufacture.⁶ By 1879 the Beardmore family had assumed complete control of the Parkhead Forge, which now involved engineering as well as foundry work, and by 1900 the

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9. E. Wigham, The Power to Manage Macmillan (1973) London, p27 quotes Major Hope of the Engineers as saying: "The ITEA in many districts have only honorary secretaries, being employers themselves and the whole organisation is much looser."
 1. Ibid., p17-18; Burn, op. cit., p376 on Association.
 2. Scottish Ironmasters Association, Minutes: 17.5.1906.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Scottish Pig Iron Traders Conciliation Board, S.P.I.T. Reports No.2, p38: "I am partly in accord with what the Duke of Devonshire once said to me. He said:- 'If I had my way, Mr. Cronin, I would legalize your union and would make you responsible for...all the disputes and knocking off work without notice...'. I think we are coming to that, and..even today we are taking some steps in that direction." Cronin quoted in Report.
 5. H. Hamilton, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland Oxford University Press (1932), p188; Slaven, op. cit., p129.
 6. Ibid.

firm had become 'probably the premier British supplier' of steel armour plate for naval vessels.¹ The employer's next move was into the manufacture of ordnance itself, and into the building of ships so as to take advantage of the accelerating naval race between Britain and Germany.²

Technology at Parkhead was of the latest type, with a massive 12,000 ton press imported to deal with armour production and mechanisation was also evident in the engineering shops. Beardmore was known nationally as a spokesman in favour of technical education and innovation, the former being 'in Mr. Beardmore's opinion, a sine qua non of modern industry'.³ In his speech as President of the Iron and Steel Institute, Beardmore stressed the crucial importance of technical innovation and the futility of craft resistance. He told the employers:⁴

Efficiency and economy in manufactures can do much to win and retain foreign as well as British imperial markets. This necessitates advance towards perfection of design and greater volume of output, through improvement in the mechanical means of production...unless restrictions and limitations dictated by workers' organisations are abolished, much of the gain possible to the nation due to research and experiment must be lost.

Beardmore combined this progressive investment policy with an individualistic approach to management, insisting on the personal direction of affairs despite the graded delegation of responsibility at Parkhead.

Beardmore steadfastly refused to join the North West Engineers' Association, declining their invitation once again just before the outbreak of War.⁵ He also outlawed trade unions, specifically the A.S.E., from the works during the 1900s and only allowed Kirkwood to return from exile in 1913. When he eventually did accept Kirkwood as a negotiator, it was purely on the understanding

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1. J. Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers Batsford (1975) London, p39.
 2. J.D. Scott, Vickers: A History Wiedenfeld & Nicolson (1962) London, p49: 'with their 12,000-ton hydraulic press they had placed themselves in a position second to none in Great Britain'.
 3. J.S. Murphy, Captains of Industry (1898) Glasgow, p113.
 4. Sir William Beardmore, 'The Influence of Scientific Research on Industry' Iron and Steel Institute Journal (May 1916).
 5. North West Engineering Trades Employers' Association, Minutes: 23.6.1913 - 8.8.1913. On the latter occasion it was reported that Beardmore had failed to reply to the letter.

that it should be a personal arrangement between the Parkhead management, led by Beardmore himself, and a delegation of his own employees.¹ It is significant that this resistance should have arisen amongst the well-organised engineering craftsmen rather than the foundry and forge workers, since the latter apparently accepted the rule of management without objection - possibly the affect of ingrained conciliation and stable negotiation fostered by many ironworking unions.

This style of personal management was clearly in contrast with the growing scale and sophistication of the whole enterprise, which became a limited company in 1901 with property and plant valued at almost £577,000 and another £141,625 being invested in that year alone. This rapid expansion in the wake of the 1900-01 boom cost Beardmore his sole control of the firm, for with massive liquidity problems and large debts to Vickers Ltd., the employer had to accept the 'semi-merger' of 1902 with the latter firm taking just under 50% of the shares.²

The next four years were devoted to the building up of the great Dalmuir Yard, as Beardmore transferred much machinery and equipment as well as activities from the Lancefield and Govan works of Napier to the new shipyard. Vickers assisted with formal loans of £50,000 as well as providing backing for local bank loans of 18,500 until by 1910 Vickers were beginning to fear the renewed strength of the concern.³ Whilst this fear was unfounded considering the large debts of the Beardmore firm, there was a marked tendency for steel, shipbuilding and arms firms to link together in combines and cartels before 1914.⁴ This reached its peak in the years 1914-21, as mergers and takeovers affected heavy industry and interlocking directorships

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1. Forward 21.8.1915. This organ of the Glasgow I.L.P. said of Kirkwood's return to the Forge: 'He was so successful that within a few months we were in a position to demand that none but Trade Unionists be employed at Parkhead. Our organiser was requested to put forward this claim to the firm, but the management refused to treat with anyone but a deputation of their own engineers. Bro. Kirkwood was our chief spokesman...'
 2. Scott, op. cit., 49-56. Vickers made the move 'to keep Beardmore's out of ordnance' says Scott.
 3. Ibid., p92. Letter of Albert Vickers to Sir Andrew Nobel.
 4. See chapter two and references to Macrosty.

reached fever pitch and diversification of interests transformed Beardmores into a vast conglomerate.¹ The growth of such contacts were helped by the intimate connexions which many firms possessed with government departments and the Admiralty, individuals like D'Eyncourt moving from Elswick to Fairfields and back to Elswick before joining officialdom as Director of Naval Construction in 1912.² Others such as Percy Girouard and the Caillards were prominent in both pre-War armaments construction and the great War order negotiations of the years 1914-18.³

In this respect the heavy industrialists and armaments manufacturers began to assume some of the connexions which had been established by German business leaders under the Kaisereich.⁴ The concentration of industrial interests was mirrored at the organisational level by the rise of figures as Lithgow from regional spokesman to national prominence, and the ascent of Allan M. Smith from assistant secretary at Glasgow to major Federation official and member of over thirty Government Committees at his prime.⁵

Beardmore was only gradually pulled into this constellation of major industrialists and his management, despite the rapid growth of the enterprise after 1900, remained somewhat autocratic and idiosyncratic. These qualities can be held partly responsible for the financial difficulties of the firm after the First World War, as Beardmores slipped into debt and depression with its management heavily criticised by Plender in 1926 and the head of the firm finally ousted during the financial crisis of 1928-9 when Norman launched his projects to salvage the region's heavy

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1. John M. Hay, The Beardmore-Vickers Octopus Socialist Information Bureau (1920) Glasgow p3: 'This particular group, which we have called the Beardmore-Vickers Combination, includes Armaments, Iron, Steel, Engineering, Chemicals, Explosives, Nickel, Textile, Hosiery...Financial Trusts, Insurance Companies, Shipowners, Shipbuilders, Shippers, Land and Property Owners, Banks, Railways, Harbours...etc., etc.' Hay distinguished interlocking directorships from the formal American trust.
 2. Scott, op. cit., p91.
 3. Christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years (1934) London; p89 (4.6.1915); p98-9 (21.6.1915), 104 (7.7.1915) - 'Girouard is still prone to wrangle about place and...indulged in a good deal of "high falutin" nonsense as to the big-business man's methods...'; etc.
 4. G.D. Feldman & Ulrich Nocken, 'Trade Associations and Economic Power...in the German Iron and Steel and Machine Building Industries, 1900-1933'

industries.¹ One of the key weaknesses of Beardmore's reign was his tendency to over-invest during periods of boom, resulting in an excess capacity that periodically weakened the enterprise. This is indicated in the investment figures given below:²

Table XX: Investment at William Beardmore & Co., 1901-1913.

<u>Capital Sect.</u>	<u>Purch. Price,</u>	<u>Capit. Expd 1902-10</u>	<u>Expd. 1911-13</u>	<u>Tot</u>
<u>Land</u>				
Parkhead	211,245	13,895	4,006	229,146
Mossend	-	2,000	-	2,000
Dalmuir	53,530	44,820	-	98,350
<u>Building</u>				
Parkhead	62,942	183,533	35,605	282,080
Mossend	-	24,556	3,027	27,583
Dalmuir	-	205,457	6,470	211,927
<u>Housing</u>				
Parkhead	-	5,601	500	6,101
Mossend	-	6,000	2,697	8,697
Dalmuir	-	27,103	1,860	28,693
<u>Fix Plt. & Machy.</u>				
Parkhead	481,767	703,073	179,074	1,363,914
Mossend	-	172,581	6,951	179,532
Dalmuir	-	486,609	55,475	542,084
Ex Govan & Lanef.	26,085	14,702	-	40,787
<u>Docks</u>				
Dalmuir	5,080	131,404	2,810	138,294

Source: William Beardmore & Co, 'Balance Sheets and Accounts' UGD 100 8/1

4. '1900-1933' Business History Review XLIX No.4 (1975), p417-19, etc.
See chapters six and nine below for employer associations also.
5. Addison, op. cit., p286 (18.12.1916), 544 (18.6.1918), etc.;
H.F. Gospel, 'Employer Organizations: Their Growth and Function
in the British System of Industrial Relations, 1918-1939' Ph.D.
Thesis (L.S.E., 1973), p112, 116-7, etc.
1. Payne, loc. cit. (1977), p168, 176-7.
2. The figures given are those from UGD 100 8/1-19, which run from
the first year of incorporation as a limited company (in 1901) to
1920^w. Those used are UGD 100/1-19 only - i.e only until 1919 and
not beyond.

Besides indicating the considerable expansion of what was originally an iron and steel firm into a major enterprise integration these activities with engineering and shipbuilding, the figures do show a shift of emphasis in the investment policies. In 1900 almost half of capital investment (48%) was located in the Parkhead steel rolling mill, and another 38% in the Forge department itself. By 1910 the distribution of assets and resources was such that investment and expenditure had been channeled into Mossend and Dalmuir, with the following result:

Table XXI: Distribution of total expenditure on capital goods & Purch.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Proportion of Tot. (%)</u>
Parkhead (Mill & For.)	1,662,056	48.7
Mossend (Steel wks)	205,137	6.0
Govan & Lanefld (eng)	40,787	1.2
Dalmuir (Shipyard)	954,003	28.0
Remainder (patent, etc)	545,693	16.0

Source: UGD 100 8/1-11, op. cit.

Thus the combined hold of Parkhead's Forge and Rolling Mill had fallen from 86% of the total to less than 49%, and Govan and Lancefield from 12.5% in 1900 to just over 1% in 1910. Whilst Beardmore had taken advantage of debts owed to merge the Mossend steelworks and the older Napier works into his empire, this precipitated internal financial difficulties which could only be resolved by selling almost half of total voting shares to Vickers. At the outbreak of War investment stood as follows:

Table XXII: Capital Investment at Beardmores, 1914.

<u>Capital Sector</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Pre-War Adds.</u>	<u>War Expd.</u>	<u>Depreciation</u>
Land	Parkhead	410	-	-
	Mossend	-	-	-
	Dalmuir	-	-	-
Buildings	Parkhead	11,715	2,241	6,090
	Mossend	-	-	625
	Dalmuir	1,632	173	4,896
Housing	Parkhead	-	-	138
	Mossend	-	-	202
	Dalmuir	-	-	674
Plant & Mach.	Parkhead	50,611	36,274	56,427
	Mossend	2,601	-	7,395
	Dalmuir	14,438	15,083	23,568
	Ex. Gov/Lfd.	-	-	1,475

Source: UGD 100 8/14, op. cit.

It is clear from these figures that Beardmore was undertaking major extensions at Parkhead on the eve of War, which involved large investment in new plant and machinery as well as fresh buildings being erected at both Parkhead and Dalmuir. This was as much a practical response to the returns from each sector of the enterprise, since it was apparent by the immediate pre-War years that Parkhead's profitability was saving the firm from bankruptcy caused by losses on the newer acquisitions.

Table XIII: Profits at William Beardmores, 1901-1913.

Plant	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907
Parkhd	254813	137563	155180	188835	210196	239013	183219
Gov/Lcf.	19103	2752	36719	49823	-	-	-
Dalmuir	-	-	-	-	L 3337	15319	L 24587
Mossend	-	-	-	-	-	3203	L122692
Deprec.	30000	20000	23300	30000	22275	29467	20500
Interest	5935	47491	52370	26346	74384	74120	101745
Net Prof.	257981	67500	139730	182633	133033	113916	L 91248

Plant	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
Parkhd.	128776	170586	351864	319982	570721	558366
Dalmuir	L 64195	L 47994	6835	1083	L170927	L163347
Mossend	827	4099	L 11723	38595	6860	L 16713
Deprec.	145547	41421	60038	75870	103041	102157
Interest	128592	86063	91686	81022	81426	69803
Net Prof. L.	77705	-	184230*	188132	201583	164236

Source: UGD 100, 8/1-13, op. cit.

L is loss on year's trading.

* Note that 'net profit' before 1910 is previous to Beardmore's personal commission of 7.5% on profit. Post-1910 is after commission deducted.

The figures show that Parkhead was consistently much more profitable than the new works at Dalmuir or the acquired ones at Mossend, with Dalmuir shipyard making disastrous losses on trading in the years 1905-09 and again in 1912 and 1913. Mossend was only sporadically profitable and made the staggering loss of almost £123,000 in 1907, whereas the Govan-Lancefield works (being run down) had made respectable profits in the early 1900s.

Even if we accept the argument that Vickers, Armstrongs and Coventry Ordnance managed to exclude Beardmores from lucrative ordnance and naval orders, this cannot explain the considerable profits at Parkhead (where the armour plate was made) and the dramatic failure of Dalmuir to make profits of any size even in

the boom years of 1910-11, when similar yards recorded very large gains.¹ More likely is the explanation that there were serious difficulties in production and management at the new shipyard, over which Beardmore had no personal control and upon which he could not stamp his own style of management. It is clear that whilst technology and machinery may have been of the latest kind, the organisation of production, men and marketing was sadly deficient. Expertise which had been cultivated over generations by the major yards, and which John Brown's were able to retain after their move to Clydebank, was in short supply at a shipyard where union resistance marked many of the pre-War efforts at improvement.²

Only the outbreak of War in 1914 transformed the loss-making yard and its equivalent at Mossend into hugely profitable units of the company. The growth of the firm during the four and a half years of full-scale production is evident from the capital investment figures:

Table XXIV: Investment at William Beardmores, 1915-1919.*

Capital Sector	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	Total
<u>Land</u>						
Parkhead	1720	8500	820	23220	-	34260
Mossend	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coatbridge	4000	-	-	-	-	4000
Dalmuir	-	1040 ⁺	-	-	-	1040
<u>Buildings</u>						
Parkhead	109570	125488	52584	34653	5630	327925
Mossend	2346	2345	154	-	551	4845
Coatbridge	17443	9196	18603	2665	-	47907
Dalmuir	84293	34965	57937	29904	51745	258844
<u>Housing</u>						
Parkhead	-	500	-	-	1500	2000
Mossend	-	-	-	1675	-	1675
Coatbridge	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dalmuir	18950 ^o	40610	32881	34913	37425	164779
<u>Plant/Mach.</u>						
Parkhead	499355	502168	284733	200355	24739	1511350
Mossend	11621	8626	14374	51517	5497	91635
Coatbridge	71558	10341	41274	7514	20673	151360
Dalmuir	96038	157498	89333	122176	127626	592671
<u>Docks</u>						
Dalmuir	51870	-	-	-	-	51870

Source: UGD 100 8/15-19, op. cit.

+ Credited to AC rather than adds.
 o Transferred from W.S. Estates Co.

Beardmore showed little sign of caution, or of having learned from the over-rapid expansion of the early 1900s, in his investment programme once the War began. By 1916 he had spent over a million pounds on plant and machinery at Parkhead and almost a quarter of a million on buildings. Increasing amounts were also poured into the Dalmuir shipyard, with almost £600,000 spent by 1919 on mechanisation and equipment. Meanwhile, the company had taken a plant at Coatbridge and over £200,000 was spent on the project by 1919 - encouraged by the Ministry of Munitions.

Some justification for this unprecedented expansion of the firm was found in the huge profits which Beardmores made after 1914, averaging £606,078 for the five years 1914-18.

Table XXV: Profits at William Beardmores, 1914-18.

Section	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	Mean
Parkhead	545450	590073	849759	920464	1018316	784812
Mossend L	2307	L 18366	172811	304782	202647	131913
Coatbridge	-	3069	4381	L 15710	1890	L 1592
Dalmuir	22768	101623	118840	371790	470685	208034
Aero Eng.	1540	11008	16068	11730	6900	9449
Nat. P.F.*	-	-	-	59070	-	59070
Rents	1166	940	268 ^o	1311	1451	1027
Fee/Comm.	106	238	6366	3396	146	2050
Gross Prof.	523187	688584	1233582	1656835	1702035	1160845
Inc. Tax/Int	157685	111274	146163	332645	312074	211968
Deprec.	106350	245110 ⁺	219329	186364	161734	183777
Reserves	40000	100000	260000	50000	330000	156000
Net Profit ^o	219142	232200	592994	1087826	898229	606078

Source: Tabulated from UGD 100 8/14-18.

* The National Projectile Factory was leased to Beardmore in 1917.

^o Net Profit is calculated before debiting deprec on War expd.

^o Included in the 1916 Rents is £30 feu duty for Benbow Hostel.

+ Depreciation figure for 1915 included another £143,804 above ordinary deprec. to take account of Wartime use.

These profits were not made simply because of the Government's desperation to acquire materials by generous terms, but also involved new methods and extra exertion on the part of the workmen

1. See chapter two for Fairfields and other yards.
2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 22.8.1911, when there was a bitter demarcation dispute between the Drillers (organised by Shipwrights) and the A.S.E. over drilling of holes for gun pedestals on warships. The Dalmuir management, who were affiliated to N.W.E.T.E.A. (unlike Parkhead) were less militant than the Association on this.

at both Parkhead and Dalmuir. Employers, such as Beardmore saw the War as a great opportunity to accelerate the rate of progress in their industry,¹ including the adoption of new payment systems at their works.² Shortly after the outbreak of War the Dalmuir management attempted to increase its output by introducing the premium bonus system amongst the machine shop workmen, thereby provoking the hostility of the A.S.E. District Committee - although Bunton and Brody were sympathetic to the employers case.³

After these early setbacks the firm did manage to implement the system, and its success was so great that in early 1917 Beardmores informed their fellow employers:⁴

that up to the present time the firm had been successful in getting about 1,600 men to work the Premium Bonus System and that if the Premium Bonus System were stopped they would require about 3,000 men to do the work now performed by 1,600 men on Premium Bonus.

This was only secured after the defeat of the A.S.E. shop stewards at Parkhead (led by Kirkwood) in the debacle of March 1916 when a spontaneous revolt of engineers against dictatorial management control of dilution occurred.⁵ When the deportation order on Kirkwood was lifted in May 1917, Beardmore welcomed him back with a foreman's position at the National Projectile Factory plant in Mile-End, where he was joined by Gallacher, MacManus and other A.S.E. shop stewards.⁶

Yet dilution affected the foundries as much, if not more, than the engineering shops and the shipyards of the Clyde district, with

1. Beardmore, *op. cit.* (1916): 'The industrial lessons [of the War] involve science and technics, design and manufacture, volume and economy of production, and, finally, the relation of both employer and employee to all of these'.
2. *History of the Ministry of Munitions H.M.S.O. (1923) V pt.i, p123*: 'Employers were predisposed of the opportunity afforded by the War changes in methods of production. The belief was general among them that payment by results was the most effective stimulus to exertion; their efforts for a generation before the war had been in the main to extend such systems...'
3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 22.12.1914. The Dalmuir management suggested, 'with a view to increasing the output of their machine shop, [that they] wish to start the Bonus System but although the men are willing the Society officials had stated the men would be fined if they worked on "Bonus" and suggested to the firm that they should pay enhanced rates instead.'; 28.12.1914 for Bunton and Brody.
4. *Ibid.*: 5.2.1917.
5. Iain S. McLean, "Labour in Clydeside Politics, 1914-22" D.Phil. Thesis (Oxon, 1971), p118, 128.

large increases in the numbers of females employed in iron and steel industries during 1915-16, as well as small arms and other engineering.¹ Indeed, as Colonel Lithgow explained to his fellow engineering employers in 1918, dilution had most affected those (like Beardmores) who had expanded their works during the War:²

[Those firms] who had the smallest proportion of skilled men were those who had largely extended their works since the scarcity of labour had become acute...The difficulty had been overcome by employing Unskilled and Female Labour. The Authorities had decided to allow each Management to decide as to the best method of dilution...The percentage of skilled men in Boiler Shops was less than in Marine Engineering Shops while in Foundries it was still lower.

Since organised resistance was weaker in the latter than in the engineering works and shipyards, Beardmores experienced relatively little trouble in carrying through their dilution against the Forge workers - which helps to explain the remarkable profitability of the concern over these years.

In the transformation of William Beardmores from a prosperous ironworks and steel plant, into a major integrated concern manufacturing engineering parts, steel vessels (naval and merchant), armaments and ordnance, tanks, aeroplanes and numerous other goods, welfare was to play a significant part. The firm was already technologically progressive, and with the coming of the new company in 1900-01 followed by the creation of Dalmuir shipyard, the enterprise established itself as a leading concern. Yet this transition altered Beardmores' labour requirements quite dramatically at a period when the Chairman was facing both financial and union pressures at his Parkhead base. The results from Dalmuir suggests that the labour management of the shipbuilding workers was inadequate if not inept, and this drive for efficiency and discipline as well as labour supply featured in the design of facilities at the plants.

Like many other industrialists, Beardmores engaged in local

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6. Ibid., p138; see Forward 3.10.1915, for Kirkwood's leadership of his shop stewards on the Glasgow housing issue.
 1. History of the Ministry of Munitions IV pt.iv, p146, Appx.I. This shows numbers of females increasing in iron and steel from 5,995 in July 1915 to 14,865 in July 1916 - i.e. increase of 248% over the whole industry.
 2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 24.6.1918. Lithgow was at this time an Army Colonel. He later became head of the Clyde Shipbuilders' Association and the most powerful industrialist in Scotland.

housing projects, although at its purchase by the new company in 1901 the concern held only the Chapel Terrace property (valued at £350) and Carntyre Cottage (at £174) near Parkhead.¹ This was expanded the next year with the acquisition of Auburn Place for £4,601 though at least some of these properties may have still been in the personal hands of Beardmore himself.² The fact that Parkhead invested in villas as well as terrace and cottage dwellings suggests that management accommodation was also an item in housing development.³

It was only with the take-over of Mossend iron and steel works that Beardmore & Co. became important landlords, taking 174 cottages (valued at £6,000) with the plant in 1906 and spending another £2,697 modernising them before 1914. This was more in the nature of maintaining standards than real development, and in this respect the housing followed general investment strategy affecting the works.⁴

Dalmuir was the scene of major housing investment, located as it was in a fairly isolated part of the river Clyde next to the burgh of Clydebank. The method of financing the construction was to advance sums to the various firms of builders involved in the project, whilst giving one builder overall responsibility for its completion.⁵ In this way the expanding firm spent a net total of £27,123 on the housing in the years 1905-09, furnishing good quality accommodation for the skilled workmen and foremen employed at the shipyard. Managerial or official grades were also sustained by purchases such as "The Tower" at Dalmuir, acquired for £1,900 in 1913 and possibly an incentive to the individual responsible for improving organisation at the troubled yard.

The main purpose of the new housing was undoubtedly to attract adequate labour, and the pattern of housing investment followed the general shift in emphasis and investment from Parkhead and Govan to Mossend and Dalmuir. Of the £43,761 spent on housing to

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1. These figures are taken from the Balance Sheets and Detailed Accounts attached.
 2. Some of the assets stayed with Beardmore in 1901.
 3. UGD 100 8/5-11, shows Corio Villa purchased at £1,000 in 1905 and Ardenlea for £500 in 1911.
 4. See Table XX above.
 5. Detailed estimates in UGD 100.

1913, two thirds of it went to Dalmuir (as did general investment in land and buildings), and despite the liquidity problems faced by the company at this time the housing programme was not stalled -- which indicates its importance to the enterprise. During the formative years 1902-10, housing represented two per cent. of capital investment by Beardmores, illustrating its economic necessity to the growing works.

The conditions under which this property was rented and let were also interesting, in that favoured individuals were allowed to purchase dwellings on a mortgage bond -- often for as little as £20 deposit.¹ This sale of houses may help to explain the decline in rents after 1908, when tenements were still being erected on Dumbarton Rd by the company, although the valuation of the assorted properties remained fairly constant after 1907.

Table XXVI: Properties and rental yield at Beardmores, 1903-1913.

Year	Property	Valuation	Rental	% Yield on Val.
1903	Auburn Place	4,601	252	5.5
1904	?	?	?	?
1905	A.Pl./Dalm./Duke St.	11,040	400	3.6
1906	" " "	15,319	508	3.3
1907	A.Pl./Dalmuir	29,646	1,041	3.5
1908	" "	31,809	1,021	3.2
1909	" "	31,724	785	2.5
1910	" "	31,776*	452	1.4
1911	" "	31,973*	610	1.9
1912	" "	31,024*	743	2.4
1913	" "	31,921*	645	2.0

Source: Calculated from figures at Balance Sheets, op. cit.

* These figures include depreciation.

The transactions surrounding housing did not end with these company dwellings but also involved the setting up of housing trusts by the firm. Trusts were a crucial aspect of housing finance at this time, often directed by legal firms and factors,² and the Beardmore Company seems to have held 12 villas under the 'Russell Trusteeship' and the Findlay Trust was set up to administer "The Tower" deal.

1. For example, the case of William Noble, for purchased No.6 South View from the firm for a deposit of £20.
2. See Rules of the Provident Property Investment Company (1850) in UGD 80 1/1; etc.; B. Elliot & D. McCrone, 'Landlords in Edinburgh: Some Preliminary Findings' Sociological Review XXIII No.3 (1975), for a discussion.

Then in 1914 William Beardmore took the unusual step of setting up his own property company as an autonomous concern, led by solicitors, loan company representatives and chartered accountants. The Dalmuir and West of Scotland Estates Co. Ltd., held its first meeting in July 1914 with the intention of acquiring 'land at Dalmuir from Sir Wm. Beardmore...and to erect tenements thereon'.¹ Their original share capital was put at £10,000 and the company directors intended to raise mortgages from the Public Works Loan Commission at 3½% interest over 30 years. The remainder was to be raised on a bond at the Heritable Securities and Mortgage Investment Association at Edinburgh, with a higher interest of 5½%.²

When it was established the Estates Company was merely acting with Beardmore's blessing and the directors clearly hoped to guarantee their returns by accommodating the shipyard artisans. With the outbreak of War shortly afterwards these plans were thrown into disarray, figures now showing that the cost of 33 tenements would be £45,300 and a deficit on rent was likely - Beardmore himself insisting on firm estimates before coming to any decision.³ By Spring 1915 the employer had gained new strength and confidence from the War orders, and decided to take charge of matters himself. The Dalmuir Estates directors learned that 'the Company was to be far more clearly connected with Messrs. Wm. Beardmore and Co. Ltd., than was at first anticipated'.⁴ Their sponsors had clearly decided that labour shortages and the incentives offered by the desperate Government were sufficient motivation for engaging builders directly.

By now the estimates had risen approximately 25% to £56,905 and the firm contacted individual tradesmen to begin work on the 33 tenements, divided into two standards of housing.⁵ The Estates Company applied for a loan at 4% from the Public Works

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1. The Dalmuir and West of Scotland Estates Co. Ltd., Minutes: 9.7.1914 in Minute Book No.1, UGD 100 2.
 2. Ibid. It is noticeable that, as at John Browns of Clydebank, the need to build was recognised before the outbreak of War.
 3. Ibid.: 17.9.1914 - 24.9.1914. Beardmore informed the directors that he 'would not come to any decision until he had had an opportunity of seeing the estimates...and the net revenue to be derived therefrom.'
 4. Ibid.: 13.4.1915.
 5. Ibid. Estimates here show 13 tenements at £1,495 each and 20 at £1,851 each - totalling £56,905.

Loan Board, and during April-May forwarded large sums to various builders engaged. They also lost little time in revealing the main purpose of the dwellings and with building under way the Estates directors discussed advertising the tenements to the Beardmore workers.¹ In July 1915, with the Munitions Act being passed into law, Beardmores secured a War Office loan and in view of the bond terms transferred the tenements to itself.² This loan of £150,000 was utilised in the planning and building of another 18-20 tenements on six acres at Dalmuir, with Birkmyre Scott and the Estates Co. still involved in the projects at Jellicoe St., French St. & Robert St, and Dumbarton Rd - the names serving as an inspiration to their occupants no doubt.³

These initiatives attracted the attention of the local press, preoccupied as it was with War effort and housing unrest, as well as the Government. In October 1915, The Glasgow Herald carried reports of the employers' adventures against the background of industrial resistance and rent strikes on Clydeside and elsewhere.⁴ Like many other shipbuilders, Beardmore thought it prudent to charge only moderate rents for those new houses given the prominence of his own workmen in the swelling campaign to force government restriction of rented accommodation.⁵

The housing programme proceeded slowly but by early 1917 all of the phase one tenements were constructed and occupied, and the second phase partly ready for occupation.⁶ Despite the problems encountered in finally completing this stage, Beardmore committed the Estates Company to another programme of thirty tenements costing £60,000 or an average of £2,000 each.⁷ Eventually this

1. Ibid.: 17.5.1915, when the Board discussed the question 'of now putting up a "To Let" board on the ground near the houses building and..what steps should be taken to acquaint the workmen in Messrs. Beardmore Naval Construction Works of this fact...'
2. Ibid.: 27.7.1915.
3. Ibid.: 15.12.1915, when it was reported that some of these houses were already being occupied.
4. The Glasgow Herald 16.10.1915: 'The Schemes referred to in the House of Commons on Thursday for providing housing accommodation in the areas into which there has been an influx of munitions workers apparently are the result of steps taken by employers on the Clyde and Tyne. Messrs W. Beardmore and Company, Dalmuir, have endeavoured to lessen the shortage by undertaking, through the agency of the Scotstoun Estates Company, to build 230 houses, and as a further step construct 18 tenements containing 108 houses...'

was reduced to six new tenements, and after consideration of the figures the Estates Company finally agreed to complete ten tenements as phase three of the programme.¹ Building continued after the Armistice, no doubt encouraged by Beardmore's unrestrained optimism on the length of the post-War boom, and in mid-1919 the Estates Company was still urging the completion of the last stage.² Only in 1920-21 did both steel production and tonnage launched plummet to such a degree that firms like Beardmores were left stranded with the gigantic production capacity and shortage of orders.³

Besides the impressive projects at Dalmuir, there were also housing ventures at Mossend (where Beardmores provided housing for the local authority to build 200 dwellings), as well as supporting the erection of 350 houses distributed between the Beardmore plants at Mossend, Cambuslang and Carmyle. There was also hostel accommodation at Airdrie, where female workers appear to have been housed at the Benbow Hostel.⁴ In all, the recorded investment at Beardmores makes an impressive account, even where this does not cover sponsored or peripheral projects carried on by others under company control.

Table XXVII: Housing investment at William Beardmores, 1915-1919.⁵

Year	Total Cap. Invest.	Housing Invest.	Housing as %
1915	1,428,764	18,950	1.3
1916	899,917	41,110	4.5
1917	592,693	32,881	5.5
1918	508,592	36,588	7.2
1919	275,386	38,925	14.1
Total	3,705,352	168,454	4.55 (Mean)

5. Forward 5.6.1915 - 12.6.1915, for the attitude of the large such as Fairfields, Stephens and others.
6. Dalmuir Estates Co., Minutes: 17.1.1917, there being 33 tenements in all.
7. Ibid.: 19.6.1917.
1. Ibid.: 2.8.1917, 6.3.1918, 27.6.1918. At the earliest date, the Estates Co. directors advised the projection of only 16 tenements, reduced to 6 and then raised to 10 in 1918.
2. Ibid.: 3.7.1919. Building finally ground to a halt after the raids by vandals in Autumn 1919.
3. Payne, loc. cit. (1977), p167. Payne shows steel ingot output fall from 2,074,400 tons in 1920 to 583,400 in 1921 (rising to 1,252,900 by 1923) and ships from 511,185 tons in 1921 to 175,528 in 1923.

Whilst it is necessary to remember that many firms followed a policy of under-depreciation and inadequate re-equipment during the War, and that concerns such as Beardmores could write off perhaps 50% of housing costs against Excess Profits Duty, this remains a substantial and increasing item in capital investment down to 1919.

The economic and strategic importance of housing to the company is indicated by the rental yield, which is actually reduced in 1915-16 as some tenants left for the forces and others were attracted by the offer of low rents.

Table XXVIII: Housing rents at William Beardmores, 1914-1918.

Year	New Invest.	Valuation*	Rental Yield	% Return
1914	"	30,907	1,166	3.8
1915	18,950	48,869	940	1.9
1916	41,110	89,015	268	0.3
1917	32,881	120,957	1,311	1.0
1918	34,913	156,630	1,451	0.9
Total	127,854	446,378	5,136	1.6

Source: Calculated from Balance Sheets, op. cit.

* Valuation is calculated as previous figure plus new investment and minus 2.5% depreciation. Depreciation only applies to the pre-War housing which is depreciated during the War years.

Whilst it is true that the principal purpose of this policy was to attract labour to Dalmuir and other plants, Beardmores were only interested in the right kind of labour - workers who would accept their management control and payment systems. Like Weirs and John Browns, Beardmore imported workers from elsewhere in Britain to deal with his Wartime needs thereby provoking the hostility of local employees in 1915-16.

When the Dalmuir Estates Co. were preparing to let the new tenements at Dumbarton Rd in early 1916, they directed their factors to draft 'a Missive to be revised by the Law Agents' for the letting year 1916-17 in which it was to be specified:⁴

The factors in addition to the usual conditions, to keep in view the provision to be made to Empower the factor to eject tenants [sic] who cease to be employed by Messrs. William Beardmore & Co. Ltd...

Their legal advisers counselled the Estates directors against such a provision, in view of the D.O.R.A. and Rent Restriction provisions

4. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.v, for housing.

5. Balance Sheets, op. cit.

enacted during 1915, much to the annoyance of certain Estates directors.¹

These elements of efficiency and discipline are also present in many of the other welfare services developed by Beardmores. There were elaborate canteen facilities provided at Dalmuir in 1905-8, when over £3,000 was expended on dining halls situated at both ends of the Shipyard.² Educational services were also nurtured by Beardmore, particularly that concerned with technical instruction, although the firm had to pull down the Old Kilpatrick School in 1907 (it seems) in order to extend the works.³

Medical and accident facilities were also fairly extensive, with the firm operating its own insurance and benefits scheme until the passing of the National Insurance Act in 1911, and continuing doctor's services thereafter.⁴ There were also premiums paid to the Iron Trades Employers' Insurance Association as well as state contributions and the organisation of workmen's subscriptions to local infirmaries.⁵ Workmen's Compensation costs remained by far the most significant item in Beardmores' insurance overheads down to 1914, although Beardmore himself had welcomed the legislation.⁶

With the coming of War, the investment in welfare facilities increased as Beardmores sought to accommodate the inflowing female labour as well as stabilise the male workforce. Beardmore was amongst the most fervent advocates of female dilution in the engineering works, shipyards and foundries, and hastened to introduce those amenities specified by the Dilution Commissioners after their arrival in early 1916. Thousands of pounds were spent on canteens, cloakrooms, rest rooms and the 'House for Women Workers' established at Parkhead, and the fact that expenditure continued

1. Dalmuir Estates Co., Minutes: 22.3.1916.

1. Ibid.: 27.6.1916. Sharp noted dryly that 'he was hopeful that the local law agents would charge a modified fee in the expenses not being recovered from the tenant where proceedings would have been taken in the Sheriff Court'.

2. Balance Sheets, Detailed Accounts.

3. Ibid., (1907).

4. Ibid., (1914). In 1914 Dr. Barron received £69 in fees.

5. Ibid.

6. J.S. Murphy, op. cit., 'Mr. Beardmore is deeply interested in working class questions...The latest Workmen's Compensation Act he considers a good measure..'

into the financial year 1918-19 suggests that Beardmore shared the view that Wartime innovations should not be quickly reversed in the reconstruction era.

Table XXIX: Investment in dining, recreational, and other services.

Facility	1916	1917	1918	1919	Total
Canteen/Din.R	6,241	4,734	3,965	1,706	16,646
Cloakroom	308	-	-	-	308
Rest Room	28	1,306	-	-	1,334
Women's House	-	-	150	-	150
Total	6,577	6,040	4,115	1,706	18,438

Source: Balance Sheets, op. cit.

Along with these facilities came the improvement of labour management through female welfare supervision,¹ which the Health of Munition Workers' Committee regarded as of critical importance.² Beardmore certainly shared many employers' anxieties as to the mental and moral welfare of his dilutees,³ and appointed Miss Jeanie Lindsay as the Welfare Superintendant at Parkhead where she resisted any attempts to unionise the women in her charge and sought to 'raise their moral standard'.⁴

The same Committee were also aware of the need to provide adequate welfare supervision for men and boys at the munitions factories,⁵ and this argument was continued by activists in the immediate post-War period.⁶ Beardmores provided the housing at Dalmuir for workmen, but also extended the amounts paid in fees for Workmen's Compensation and other services. The dramatic rise

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1. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.iii, p23, on the need for 'supplying the human element, without which the most elaborate accommodation may be useless'.
 2. Health of Munition Workers' Committee, Welfare Supervision Cd. 8151 (1915), Para. 5.
 3. Ibid., where one employer quoted: "Generally speaking, we consider it very essential to have a lady superintendant where female workers are employed...The duties of the Lady Superintendant here are principally:- 1. To maintain discipline in the Works, which is exceedingly necessary where mixed classes of labour are employed... A good Lady Superintendant...is, we consider, advantageous to secure good order and protect the moral welfare of the girls under her charge."
 4. War Cabinet Committee, Report of the Committee on Women in Industry: Appendices, Summaries of Evidence.. Cmd. 167 (1919), p213, para.6.
 5. Cd. 8151, op. cit. Para.12, p7.
 6. W.B. Owen, 'Welfare Work Among Men' Welfare Work I (Nov. 1920), p166.

in the expenditure on Workmen's Compensation fees can only be explained in terms of many more employees and accidents, which is doubtful in view of stable N.H.I. contributions and doctors fees, or improved provisions and allowances to workmen after 1916.

Table XXX: Medical, Insurance and Accident Provisions, 1914-19.

Service	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919
Work. Comp. Fees	17,284	22,942	22,593	62,198	46,211	24,308
N.H.I. Contrib.	4,097	6,206	8,574	2,416	10,572	3,312
Insur. Prem.	3,280	239	16	?	?	?
Subscriptions	108	-	153	214	-	-
Doctors Fees	85	62	16	55	42	28
Total	24,854	29,449	31,352	64,883	56,825	27,648

Source: Calculated from scattered figures under 'General Charges' accounts in the Balance Sheets. They are flawed by the inclusion of different accounts for certain plants, e.g. there are no N.H.I. figures given for Mossend but all 'Subscriptions' are from that works.

Beardmores were also Contributory Members of the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society and occasionally made small donations to this cause during the troubled War years.¹ Other funds were voted by the Board for use in more covert strategic projects, such as the £2,000 passed to Sir William in 1915 in order that sums might be 'allocated to certain Employees of the Company at his discretion'.² This led to Beardmore spending £850 in 1916 and another £1,321 in the following year for this worthy cause. Those foremen who had proved their loyalty to the enterprise could be rewarded along with other sturdy employees.

This review of welfare services at William Beardmores indicates the importance of such facilities to a firm which was technologically progressive, industrially integrated and autocratically managed. Indeed, welfare administration reflected the anachronisms of William Beardmore's personal control as well as the productive forces which were expanding under his direction. The integration of a strong iron and steel firm with units engaged in engineering, shipbuilding, armaments production and vehicle manufacture would not have been practicable without the infrastructural investment in housing which

1. The firm donated £53 in 1916, for example.

2. Details at Accounts, op. cit.

secured the labour supply for the great yard at Dalmuir. Welfare also reinforced management control in a period when Beardmore was pushing through technical innovations, management organisation, and incentive payment systems against union resistance. The role which welfare played was graphically demonstrated during the dilution crisis of Spring 1916 when Beardmores led the other engineering concerns in introducing female dilution under management control.

The forces of change which were launching Beardmores into the top group of industrial concerns were also transforming the pattern of industrial relations and its style of management. Although its chairman managed to retain his personal authority after 1901, the combined pressures from financial backers and craft unions led to a more formalised system of negotiations. Despite his dislike of employer associations, Dalmuir shipyard joined the C.S.A., and Beardmores finally entered the N.W.E.T.E.A., to become supporters of the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society. Beardmore's personal influence in welfare remained, with sums for discretionary awards to his loyal workmen, but the services (like management itself) gradually became more formalised and detached from his individual direction.

This is not to suggest that these provisions could guarantee efficiency or ensure labour control. The figures and experiences at Dalmuir show that the most elaborate welfare investment was coupled with disastrous shipyard losses and serious labour resistance amongst the craftsmen. Management there (probably starved of authority and initiative by Beardmore himself) could not transform its lack of organisation and profitability by calling for more welfare services. Yet when conditions did improve after 1914, welfare was to be more important than ever, and certainly reinforced the drive for efficiency and discipline at the yard as well as at Parkhead. Beardmore could afford to placate his employees with low rents and lavish canteen facilities whilst his profits averaged more than £606,000 per year over the period 1914-18. Welfare became a practical paying investment, though it also contributed to the overheads during the depressed years after 1920 when Beardmore saw control gradually slip from his hands and into those of Lithgow, Norman and others.

The locomotive transport industry in the West of Scotland also had its own forms of vertical integration and advanced management structure by the last decades of the 19th century. The large amounts of capital required to finance the railway boom of the 1830s and 1840s served to stimulate the engineering industry in Britain as well as to encourage the formation of joint-stock companies to operate the stretches of railway being laid across Britain. Railway companies were amongst the largest and most sophisticated enterprises in Britain by the 1850s, although their importance had diminished somewhat by 1900.¹ Locomotive engineering had been largely integrated with the railway operation during the later 19th century and by 1900 these concerns were building £8 million worth of locomotives every year, for their own use and export, whilst the independent engineering firms constructed only £4.5 million of rolling stock.²

Market conditions varied considerably after 1880, as foreign competition (particularly from the U.S.A.) grew and internal rivalries sharpened. The steady prosperity of the 1880s was succeeded by the depression of 1892-5, only to be followed by a boom in 1896 with 'order books bulging' at centres like the Springburn area of Glasgow.³ The natural monopolies which railway companies possessed over certain lines were reinforced by the development of restrictive agreements to eliminate wasteful competition during these years. Overall, it can be said that these trends favoured the larger firms and encouraged their moves towards technical innovation, refinement of business structure, and improvement in management organisation of both engineering and transport employees in this period.⁴

These initiatives inevitably influenced the pattern of industrial relations in both construction and transportation sectors

1. P.L. Payne, 'The Emergence of the Large-scale Company in Great Britain; 1870-1914' Economic History Review XX (1967), p521-3.
2. S.B. Saul, 'The Engineering Industries' in D.H. Aldcroft, op. cit. p132.
3. John Thomas, The Springburn Story David & Charles (1964) London, p16.
4. J.B. Jefferys, The Story of the Engineers Lawrence & Wishart (1946) London, gives an account of work in locomotive engineering; James Hinton, The First Shop Stewards' Movement George Allen & Unwin (1973) London, p338-39 gives A.S.E. membership figures at Glasgow.

of the railway industry. The locomotive engineering plants experienced many of the struggles seen in marine and mechanical engine works, although their relations were perhaps slightly more stable than in marine engineering. In any case, these skilled workers were highly prized by their employers who used their talents to build up and sustain the enterprises.¹

Industrial relations in the transportation sector was very different, with rigid hierarchies of responsibility and status maintained between different grades of manual and clerical or administrative staff. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (founded in 1871 with the help of millionaire employer Bass), faced the hostility of both employers and workmen in many firms.² Amalgamated officials built up the society on the basis of generous friendly benefits, which were essential in such a hazardous industry as railways, but could not prevent the breakaway of the elite footplate staff who formed the separate Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen in 1880 - although both were soon challenged by the General Railway Workers' Union from 1889.³ Within Scotland there was a distinct union of Railway Servants, mainly recruited from the lower grades, until they were defeated in 1890 when most members shifted to the A.S.R.S.⁴ Refusal by the employers to recognise the Society meant that there was 'no union more politically minded...than the Amalgamated Society' by the 1890s.⁵

After 1897 the climate changed with the rise of the Railway Clerks' Association and elite A.S.L.E.F. to positions of prominence in Scotland.⁶ Faced with this threat amongst the higher grades of worker, the locomotive companies allowed the creation of limited negotiating machinery and partial recognition of the unions.⁷

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1. Walter Montgomery Neilson, 'Autobiographical Notes' UGD 10 5/1, p17: 'Seeing the number of railways that were being made in Scotland, and everything for them got in England I was determined to try and get some of the work for Scotland. I engaged William Tait as Foreman over the engine department, more particularly the Railway and Locomotive departments...'; see N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes: 13, 11, 1916 "Memorandum of Association...with respect to the revision of L.2" for later comment on skills.
 2. Clegg, et. al., op. cit., p32-3.
 3. Ibid., p229-32.
 4. Ibid., p237-8.
 5. H. Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism Pelican (1971) London p116.
 6. Clegg, op. cit., p339-40.

This change was largely pressed upon the reluctant directors by state officials, particularly during the troubles of the 1900s,¹ whilst the employers themselves sought to defeat resistance by improving management organisation and re-classifying grades of employees in their concerns.² Since the skills of their employees in the transport sector depended more on job control than manual dexterity, this was clearly a crucial issue before the outbreak of War. There was much less scope for such rationalisation and control in the engineering workshops themselves, where there was a great diversity of trades as well as a high proportion of craftsmen involved in production.³

The outstanding concern in the west of Scotland was the Caledonian Railway Company, established in 1845 and operating the main line between Carlisle and Aberdeen as well as Edinburgh to Glasgow. By 1910 the company owned or operated almost 2,400 miles of track and its share capital stood at over £45 million, with a list of local notables serving as its directors.⁴ The firm possessed over 900 engines and almost 2,500 coaches by the 1900s, along with 65,000 mineral waggons (although their number was being reduced). Figures for the capital and revenue accounts between 1905 and 1910 give some indication of the large scale of the enterprise and the sums involved in operating such a massive company.

The accounts given below are those presented to the shareholders and the Stock Exchange, and the nearest approximation to profit on trading is probably the balance remaining at each year (£183,958:1909-10) though the revenue account covers receipts from traffic carried during the half years.

7. Ibid., p424-6.

1. Roger Davidson, 'The Board of Trade and Industrial Relations, 1896-1914' Historical Journal XXI No.3 (1978), p575: 'Although railway directors were prone, on most issues, to consider the interests of their shareholders before those of the public, in demanding absolute discipline from their workforce they were only too ready to plead 'concern for public safety'.'

2. Clegg, et. al., op. cit., p427.

3. R.Y. Pickering and Co. Ltd., 'Income Tax and Wage Register' shows variety of trades UGD 12 10/1: wagon builders, body makers, wagon finishers, wagon lifters, blacksmiths, forgers, furnacemen, spoke benders, asset bossers, patternmakers, hammerman, inspectors and machine men, all listed as employees of this engineering firm.

4. The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence /i.e. Gazette (1910) UGD 14 4/21, p129, 216.

Table XXXI: Capital and Revenue A/C at Caledonian Railway Co., 1905-10.

Capital Account			Revenue Account			
	Receipts	Expd.	Bal. [@]	Receipts	Expd. [*]	Div. etc ^o
05-6	70345411	72007763	1662352	2246913	1170840	1076073
05-6	70459391	72401542	1942151	2305436	1191552	1113884
06-7	71882637	72990618	1107981	2308651	1218868	1089783
06-7	72207539	73468388	1260849	2314697	1240725	1073972
07-8	72298249	73792844	1493595	2357546	1273812	1083734
07-8	72411399	74134889	1723490	2339831	1311678	1028153
08-9	72745876	74451945	1706069	2269373	1242242	1027131
08-9	72821806	74526617	1704811	2244995	1220936	1024059
09-10	73059231	74734374	1675145	2274440	1233978	1040462

Source: UGD 14 4/21, p216. Tabulated therefrom.

* This is total working expenses for the half year under review.

o Dividend balance, etc. is calculated here by adding up a total apportionment of net receipts.

@ This is always a debit balance on receipts.

The total annual dividend came to over £2 million p.a. in these years (if we include items such as interest on debenture, etc), or perhaps 4.9% return on issued share capital for 1905-6. This suggests that the Caledonian was a fairly profitable concern in the pre-War years, although its profits seem to have been falling after the boom of 1907-8 - probably assisted in their decline by the spread of industrial unrest on the railways at this time.

The growth of the firm is indicated by the rise in mileage, working stock and other items in the accounts shown during the 1900s.

Table XXXII: Trends in capital investment at C.R.Co., 1905-10.

Capital Account (Expd.)			Revenue Account (Expd.)			
	Lines	Wk. St.	Forth-Cly.Nav.	Main.	Loco.P.	C & W Repairs
05-6	38831975	7645736	3008513	215554	320198	131874
05-6	38989184	7684187	3092652	198532	339627	127477
06-7	39162942	7772268	3191499	221742	343359	125864
06-7	39480594	7830393	3322107	202887	359705	132486
07-8	39632800	7861002	3371889	217731	392804	129119
07-8	39778707	7911630	3402288	197008	425488	131420
08-9	39955274	7914563	3436294	204952	372773	135196
08-9	40020865	7837681	3446178	188832	365838	133901
09-10	40098188	7842298	3447803	220298	349169	134690

Source: UGD 14 4/21, p216, tabulated.

Both the overall valuation (and capitalisation) of the lines and working stock, and the costs of maintenance were rising in such a way that suggests quite considerable capital additions at this time.

Although the Caledonian faced competition in peripheral areas, the three major companies in the west of Scotland (C.R.Co., North British Railway, and Glasgow and South Western Railway Co.) agreed on respective spheres of influence thereby reducing market competition and eliminating unnecessary waste.¹

The Caledonian may have been a prosperous enterprise before 1914, led by such financier entrepreneurs as Sir James King and supported by members of the Denny, Houldsworth and Younger families,² but its industrial relations were deteriorating from the 1880s and again in the 1900s. The great strike of 1890 (when the Scottish Railway Servants were crushed) was followed by a period of quiescence, until the pre-War years. Amongst the most vocal of the transport grades to press their claims on the Company were the salaried clerical staff, who memorialised the management at Glasgow in 1911, complaining that:³

"Our outstanding grievance is that our salaries are inadequate to our needs and social obligations. The cost of living has considerably increased during recent years....we therefore urge that our loyal and efficient service should not only receive more recognition but should secure to us an equal social status to that enjoyed by Postal Clerks..."

The directors attempted to placate this black-coated unrest by offering new scales of pay over the next three years, but a further Memorial from the railway clerks dismissed these offers with the comment that 'both as regards methods of progress to the scale maxima and the amounts of such maxima [they] are utterly unsatisfactory'.⁴ Career prospects and mobility within the clerical occupations were now so limited that the railway grades were joining the growing ranks of organised intermediate workers before the War.⁵ This trend continued during the War as railway clerks, through the

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1. Slaven, *op. cit.*, p46.
 2. UGD 14 4/21, p129 lists directors as Sir C.B. Renshaw, E. Cox, Henry Allan (M of Breadalbane), W.J. Chrystal, Col. J.M. Denny, A.M. Gordon, H.E. Gordon, J. Hamilton Houldsworth, Sir James King... David Tod, William Younger.
 3. S.R.O. B.R. CAL 7/2 'Staff Memorandum on Salaries' (1911).
 4. S.R.O. B.R. CAL 7/4 'Staff Memorandum on Salaries' (1914).
 5. C. Watney & J.A. Little, *Industrial Warfare* Murray (1912) London, p262-3, for discussion of black-coated phenomenon; F.D. Klingender, *The Condition of Clerical Labour in Britain* Martin Lawrence (1935) London, p21, 27-32, for development of railway clerks.

Railway Clerks' Association, pressed for nine consecutive increases in salaries between 1915 and 1918.¹

Industrial welfare at the Caledonian reflected these changes in labour relations as well as the general growth and development of the concern as a large integrated company. After the 1850s a number of railway firms concentrated their manufacturing activities at large new works in the Springburn district, which was built up from a village into a large industrial centre during the 1860s and 1870s. The cost of the plant ran into hundreds of thousands of pounds, and to man the new locomotive works the company erected hundreds of workmen's dwellings in the locale. Investment is difficult to estimate, but the house rents formed part of the sundry accounts at Caledonian which oscillated between £39,000 and £51,000 in the 1900s.²

The Caledonian management attempted to use their company housing at both Motherwell and Springburn to defeat the 1890 strike amongst their transport employees, some of whom lived at Springburn with the engine works labour. After deciding to evict the strikers from company dwellings at Motherwell, the Sheriff's officer arrived at the houses only to face 20,000 pickets. The directors called for military help and evictions were carried out amidst scenes of disorder and violence.³ It was probably the danger of spreading the disaffection to engineering workers that saved Springburn occupants from a similar fate.

Another product of the physical conditions of the industry, although this time an aspect of operation rather than location, were the provisions for accident treatment and compensation. From the Company's 'Register of Accidents' it becomes clear what a hazardous industry railway transport was, and after the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 the Caledonian paid regular wages to men sick and injured in their employ.⁴ At the same time, the company

1. Ibid., p30.

2. UGD 14 4/21, p216. This figure, however, also includes transfer fees. If one assumed £30,000 p.a. from rents at £25 p.a. per house, then a figure of 1,200 dwellings is result.

3. Thomas, op. cit., p153-4.

4. B.R. CAL 4/153-4. Registers of accidents were kept from 1897 when the first Workmen's Compensation Act was passed but wages only paid on regular basis after 1906 legislation. See Register No.4.

paid only after a definite claim from its employees,¹ and seem to have particularly favoured key supervisory workers when accidents occurred at Springburn.² The exception was when major accidents, such as the Pennilee disaster of 1880, occurred and customers as well as employees injured threatened to engulf the Caledonian in bad publicity and costly court proceedings.³

Partly in response to the pressure of hazardous conditions and the need to discourage heavy compensation litigation, the Caledonian directors sponsored and encouraged the growth of friendly societies at both St. Rollox locomotive works and amongst the transport grades on their lines. Against the background of international competition and unionisation, the employers also recognised the utility of such investments in fostering good relations. Sir James King told the assembled Springburn employees in 1896 of their benefits, observing that: "You have a Friendly Society and we, the Directors, have great pleasure in subscribing somewhat liberally towards it".⁴ This fund provided sickness benefit for the members, with a total of £1,820 paid out in that year, as well as a Funeral Fund attached to the Society paying £255 in expenses during the same year.⁵

The firm continued to pay compensation and benefits for accidents on its railway, but the Caledonian Friendly Society must have helped to reduce the overheads in compensation shown below. For despite the improvement in legislation at 1906 and the sharp increase in awards shortly afterwards (in 1906-7), the figures actually stabilised at a lower level by 1909-10.

1. Ibid. In 1908, for example, the injury of Robert Morrison's foot was noted and the entry "No claim" made in the Register.
2. Ibid. One foreman was off sick and received over £20 in wages for 237 days, or £0.59 per week.
3. B.R. CAL 4/151, 'Newspaper Cuttings', etc., for some accounts of accidents as well as Accident Register.
4. B.R. CAL 4/152. Copy of speech made by Sir James King (1896).
5. Ibid. King remarked that 'in connection with Funeral expenses £255 have been expended but more money was collected than was required and a return of 11% on the money subscribed has been made to everybody. This is very good management indeed.' The latter comment could apply equally to the Society administration and the actions of the directors in investing the moneys. See Checkland, op. cit., p187-8 for King's financial interests and contacts with Tennant's chemical complex.

Table XXXIII: Compensation for accidents and losses at B.C.R., 1905-10.*

Year	Compensation paid	Total Working Exp.	Proportion (%)
1905-6	11,737	1,170,840	1.0
1905-6	13,322	1,191,552	1.12
1906-7	20,294	1,218,868	1.66
1906-7	13,610	1,240,725	1.1
1907-8	13,734	1,273,812	1.0
1907-8	14,557	1,311,678	1.1
1908-9	10,201	1,242,242	0.82
1908-9	10,557	1,220,936	0.86
1909-10	13,384	1,233,978	1.0

Source: UGD 14 4/21, p216, 'Compensation for accidents and losses'.

* This covers both passengers and staff it appears, as well as persons and goods, so variations may be due to general safety on tracks and decline in occurrence of disasters.

The payments for accidents and damage or loss (of both persons and goods) came to a significant proportion of working expenses in this period, although management reduced the amount from the high point of 1906-7 back to about one per cent. by 1910.

The Caledonian also gave individual awards to those faithful employees or were injured in their service or died after many years work. Gratuities were awarded in such cases, despite the slim chances of dependants exacting any legal liability from the concern.¹ More tangible and businesslike was the Caledonian Savings Bank, which the directors established for their employees and which King was glad 'to find largely taken advantage of' by the 1890s. At that period there was over £500,000 in deposits accumulated by the thrifty and respectable,² and by 1910 the Savings Bank held £892,718 in employees' accounts.³

The general purpose of the Savings Bank, like that of the Friendly Society at St. Rollox, was to promote loyalty and good morale amongst the large numbers employed by the company. Similarly, the great 'Caledonian soirees' (which went back to the early days of the firm at Greenock) were intended to improve relations between master and man - particularly when the workforce might not identify an individual employer amongst the directors and shareholders of the joint-stock concerns.⁴ These soirees were formalised in 1896 when King presided over the first 'St. Rollox

1. B.R. CAL 1/27, Directors Minute Book No.21 (1881-83): 14.12.1881. 'John Cairns. Husband killed 26 Nov. 1881. Mr. Macdougall reported on this case and...to give a gratuity of not over £20 in consideration of long service.'

Festival', at which the directors could indulge in 'a little social intercourse' with their workmen.¹ At these gatherings the officials could impress on their subordinates the importance of company affairs 'both as regards financial position and general efficiency', and the urgent rivalry with other local firms and with overseas competitors.² It was also in keeping with this spirit of efficiency and common endeavour that the railway yard was fitted out with a dining hall in 1885 for those who lived too far away to travel home.³

In contrast to the workshop employees, the transport staff were sharply graded into a hierarchy of administrative, clerical and operating groups - with the elite footplate workers amongst the latter. For their salaried officials the Caledonian introduced in 1881 the Officials' Guarantee Fund, which provided superannuation benefits for the managerial and clerical workers. This certainly helped to segregate the white collar grades, and reinforce their privileged status in the firm. By the 1890s this position was being eroded as the manual workers organised to demand better pay and conditions, and opportunities for advancement contracted. In 1900 the directors resolved to introduce compulsory retirement at 65 years, with superannuation awards, for every 'officer, clerk, or servant of the Company remunerated by an annual salary in contradistinction to weekly wages'.⁴

The only alternatives to this rule were continuation in the company's service, or retirement with additional benefits besides the superannuation (which involved a £9 departure allowance plus pension). Both of the latter alternatives were granted at the

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2. B.R. CAL 4/152, op. cit.
 3. UGD 14 4/21, p129, for Savings Bank figure for 1910.
 4. Thomas, op. cit., p179.
 1. B.R. CAL 4/152, op. cit. King told the assembled workmen that all served the company and public: 'Let us remember that Directors, Officers and Workmen are all servants of one great mistress, the Public, and let us try as best we can to do our best to promote the prosperity of this great Railway Company...'
 2. Ibid. C.f., those soirees organised by shipbuilding employers.
 3. Ibid.
 4. B.R. CAL 4/49, 'Salaried Staff Retirements'; B.R. CAL 1/54, Directors Minute Book No. 48 (1906-7): 11.3.1900, for account of setting up of retirement arrangement.

discretion of the management and were not administered in any standard or predictable way. This may help to explain the unrest amongst the clerks about the Fund, which had £350,201 in superannuation reserves and another £11,094 in Guarantee reserves by 1910.¹ In 1913 the railway clerks complained bitterly of the 'very small amount of claims against the Fund', despite the compulsory obligation to subscribe to the scheme. They demanded that there should be a partial redistribution of the Guarantee Fund assets, to be divided 'equitably among the contributors', as well as an improvement in benefits.² Before major changes could occur, the staff and their employers were distracted by Wartime emergencies.

Nor were these discretionary elements in welfare confined to the clerical and official grades only. Foremen were selected for favourable treatment, particularly the supervisors in the locomotive works at Motherwell and Springburn.³ These were to be a key group in the strategic initiatives by the Caledonian to introduce both munitions production and dilution at such works at St. Rollox during the First War, hence the continuation of benefits after 1914. They too were often retained on the payroll as a form of reward rather than turned out to a state pension or simple severance gratuity.⁴

The great competitor of the Caledonian Company, and slightly larger in some respects than its rival, was the North British Railway Co. The company was incorporated in 1844 and by 1910 had issued share capital of £49,145,164, many of which were owned by directors such as the Earl of Dalkeith, John Inglis, A.K. McCosh and William Whitelaw - all well-known in the Glasgow area.⁵ By that time the North British owned over 1,200 miles of track and possessed almost 900 engines (with 3,425 coaches and almost 68,000 waggons).

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1. UGD 14 4/21, p129. This indicates that superannuation fund and the Official Guarantee Fund were different entities.
 2. B.R. CAL 7/3, 'Memorial of the Officers of the Guarantee Fund' (1913).
 3. B.R. CAL 1/54, op. cit. Minutes: 1.2.1910. Samuel Cowan, 'Night Locomotive Foreman, Motherwell' was given £40 p.a. 'at the Company's pleasure'.
 4. Ibid. 1/55, Minutes: 10.1.1911.
 5. UGD 14 4/21, p183. Others included C. Carlow, H.T. Anstruther, and Sir J.M. Stirling-Maxwell.

The competition on much of this track was limited, by the Agreement of 1892 with the Caledonian, hence the enjoyment of monopoly control by North British.¹ Figures below give the general capital and revenue figures of the company.

Table XXXIV: Capital and Revenue at North British R. Co., 1905-10.

Capital Account			Revenue Account			
Receipts	Expd.	Bal. @	Receipts	Expd.*	Div, etc. ©	
1905-6	65540102	66550716	1010613	2311435	1192398	2311435
1905-6	65575586	66914888	1339300	2388173	1225338	2388173
1906-7	65819884	67579922	1760037	2382781	1250872	2382781
1906-7	65899463	68090429	2190966	2415879	1339384	2415879
1907-8	66403887	68477364	2073476	2454310	1317040	2454310
1907-8	66414022	68652582	2238560	2469116	1393754	2469116
1908-9	67793768	68769700	975932	2425459	1341675	2425459
1908-9	67795089	68890476	1095886	2434849	1334272	2434849
1909-10	67822724	69047641	1224917	2411582	1316871	2411582

Source: UGD 14 4/21, p230.

@ Debit balance.

* Total working expenses.

© Total apportionment of net receipts.

Although the capital receipts were smaller than Caledonian's, the North British enjoyed larger revenues and certainly paid out more in dividends during these years.² The figures for lines, stock and expenditure on maintenance and locomotive power give some idea of the North British position.

Table XXXV: Trends in capital investment at N.B.R. Co., 1905-10.

Capital Account (Expd.)			Revenue Account (Expd.)			
Lines	Wk. St.	Steam V.	Main.	Loco.P.	C & W Repairs	
1905-6	39408047	7513013	68802	211714	335307	113557
1905-6	39627608	7541492	65696	216553	343795	124529
1906-7	39880213	7656478	66082	227155	353411	121744
1906-7	40036094	7939808	66082	225912	374442	132617
1907-8	40184674	8157464	66082	236093	389841	131177
1907-8	40296705	8213441	66082	236325	431824	139931
1908-9	40409660	8217617	66082	227296	420581	127314
1908-9	40525290	8221463	66082	241029	395640	134114
1909-10	40662010	8252501	57107	232261	407958	121125

Source: UGD 14 4/21, p230.

1. *Ibid.*, p183: 'An agreement entered into, in the early part of 1892, between the Company and the Caledonian, by which each Company is precluded for a period of twenty-five years from promoting...lines into the districts of the other.'

The figures are interesting for the similarities which they bear to the Caledonian Company, and the greater sums spent on capital equipment (as opposed to plant and lines) by the North British. This may well indicate a drive towards greater efficiency both in the manufacture and the operation of rolling stock during the 1900s, with the company able to pay out the very large dividends as a result.

Perhaps because of their more recent arrival at the Springburn area, the pattern of industrial relations at the North British was noticeably worse than those at St. Rollox. The Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Co. had opened the Cowlairs works at Springburn during the early 1860s, as a move towards integration of the manufacture and operation of locomotives, before being absorbed by the North British Company in 1865. When the directors appointed the strong managerialist, Drummond, as Superintendent of the railway yard and works at Cowlair, unrest spread rapidly.¹ In 1877 a strike broke out amongst the skilled workers and the blacklegs joined the craftsmen, Drummond used any metal workers he could find to break the trade control of production.²

Although the North British management defeated their workshop employees in 1877, they were careful not to follow Caledonian's example and attempt to evict railway workers during the great strike of 1890.³ The destruction of the Scottish Railway Servants in that year left the footplate staff, organised in A.S.L.E.F., intact and willing to challenge management initiatives in the years before the War. With their secure job control and their distribution around different yards and neighbourhoods, these grades of workers were very difficult to control effectively.

With the engineering workers resisting technical innovation and management organisation, the yard men often restless, the footplate employees difficult to control, the station employees organising in the A.S.R.S., and the clerical staff pressing for improved conditions and remuneration, North British directors found that efficient management was becoming increasingly difficult in the pre-War years. With the continued expansion of the company

2. See Table XXXI.

1. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p102: 'North British management were to prove themselves remarkably inept at handling staff matters...'

2. *Ibid.*, p123.

3. *Ibid.*, p154.

and the incentives to keep down costs in transport as well as meeting international competition in construction, there were clear signs of the tensions that culminated in the great 1912 troubles in the industry.

Industrial welfare illustrates the shift of emphasis within the company, from a concern with building up a good supply of labour and integrating the productive units of the enterprise to the preoccupation with industrial relations and management control. The same requirements of an efficient labour force remained, but the definition of what was efficient and useful changed in accordance with economic development and industrial relations.

Housing had been a necessary part of Springburn's infrastructure, and most of it was built by the railway companies during the expansion of the 1860s and 1870s. The Edinburgh and Glasgow Company had erected an impressive series of terrace housing for the workers brought into the Cowlairs yard and works during 1863.¹ Although the North British added some dwellings, this accommodation remained the basic company housing at the colony. Numbers can only be estimated, but like the Caledonian, North British revenue from rents and transfer fees moved between £43,000 and £55,000 in the 1900s - which suggests substantial housing stocks.²

Further housing projects were undertaken at the Cadder Yard, however, and the considerations weighed bear close resemblance to those at certain shipbuilding firms.³ The matter arose after the persistent complaints of the footplate staff about the hazards of travelling to the Cadder works, where they acted as pilotsmen, in 1912.⁴ The management thought the complaint reasonable and

1. *Ibid.*, p99-100: 'They were constructed in a series of spectacular terraces, set...in the Scottish baronial style...The E & G houses become known as "the blocks" and as workers dwellings they had no equal.'
2. UGD 14 4/21, p230.
3. See case of John Brown's in chapter two above.
4. B.R. NBR 8/1441, 'Proposals for Workmen's Houses at Cadder'. Letter 10.1.1912: 'Engine Drivers and Firemen employed at Cadder Yard as Pilotsmen complain about the unsatisfactory method they have to travel between Eastfield and Cadder; - they state that they run great risk to life and limb getting off and on vehicles in motion..'

reviewed the various alternatives of a motor bus and providing some housing nearby.¹ They agreed that the 'Cadder staff...would no doubt in the course of time put forward a claim for travelling time', if the bus were provided, and the responsible committee resolved that:²

..in view of the very heavy expenditure involved in all of [the schemes]...the most satisfactory solution would be for the Company to go on with a scheme for the erection of suitable dwelling houses in the neighbourhood.

The proponents of the housing scheme urged that company housing would enable the North British to 'get a better class to man Cadder Yard, and a reasonable rental should be kept in view to entice [sic] the men to stay there'.³

When the directors objected to the costs which housing would entail, the management (much more involved in the problems of administration and discipline) pressed their case even more strongly by insisting on the vital importance of Cadder in the railway network.⁴ Amongst the incentives offered by the housing scheme, was the opportunity for greater vigilance over local employees, with one letter advising that:⁵

a house be provided for the Stationmaster, who presently resides at Bishopbriggs, but if on the ground would be in a position to make surprise visits at different times during the day and night and so exercise a better supervision over the staff generally.

After the campaign by management and officials, the directors agreed to reconsider the matter in early 1914 with emphasis on the selection of a site attractive to steady workmen.⁶

The strategic aspect of company housing surfaced again in the War and post-War period, with the harassment of 'loyal' workers who refused to join in strike actions by local railwaymen and their families. After one serious case in 1919, a North British

1. Ibid., Letters 9.2.1912 - 28.2.1912.

2. Ibid., Letter 8.4.1912.

3. Ibid., Letter 18.2.1913.

4. Ibid., Letter 12.11.1913: Management noted the difficulties of 'obtaining adequate and suitable staff to carry out the work at Cadder; this is accentuated by want of housing accommodation... Cadder is one of the most important centres on the System and nothing should be left undone that will provide for the work at that Station being carried on in a satisfactory manner.'

5. Ibid., Letter 8.11.1912.

6. Ibid., Letter 16.2.1914.

foreman informed his management that (contrary to the advice of the local police superintendent), they should transfer the strikers rather than the harassed non-unionist.¹ As in the shipbuilding and textile communities, it was the women who played a prominent role in the spreading unrest and housing resistance.

Besides these housing ventures, the North British operated an impressive array of welfare services, paralleling those at the Caledonian and no doubt influenced by the consideration that welfare attracted and retained essential workmen and staff. The North British Insurance Society was administering services through its own autonomous committee by 1901, although this works friendly society continued to be sponsored by the directors.²

There were also superannuation provisions, with the total resources amounting to £225,788 by 1910 (as opposed to the £350,201 held by the Caledonian).³ This fund was almost certainly designed for the clerical and official grades, although there was no additional guarantee scheme at North British. Staff and workmen alike could take advantage of the company Savings Bank, whose deposits were invested with the firm and which held almost £532,000 by the end of the 1900s.⁴

The directors also displayed sensitivity when dealing with their black-coated employees, nourishing their status aspirations by establishing the Literary Society and the Music Society in the 1900s. The former was presided over by Christie - the Superintendent at Cowlairs in 1900 - and therefore provided the means for a little social intercourse between head managers and their clerks.⁵

1. B.R. NBR 8/1056, 'Correspondence on disturbances at Riccarton', Letter 21.10.1919: 'The more effective plan would have been to have cleared all the other four families altogether and their menfolk found employment at different centres. This would teach these wild venomous women that they cannot be allowed to disturb any community without having to pay the penalty...if Cairns is removed...it is more likely that quietness will only be restored until some other poor victim is singled out.'
2. NBR 1/226, 'Insurance Society Committee Minutes' (1901-02).
3. UGD 14 4/21, p183.
4. Ibid.
5. NBR 1/365, 'North British Railway Literary Society, Minutes' (1900-1905): 10.12.1900, for setting up of the Society; NBR 1/406, 'North British Railway Musical Society' (1882-85). The Musical Society was a heritage from the days of Drummond at Springburn.

Whilst it is difficult to construe all of these services as the consequence of the drive for efficiency and discipline, most of them were designed to promote identification with the company if not vested interests in its prosperity and good fortune. This theme runs through the speeches of the directors in the 1860s as much as in the administration of graded services which met the aspirations of clerks as well as the needs of footplate men.¹ Similarities between Caledonian and North British provisions indicate the common needs and motives of the companies in providing these facilities, and the general shift from infrastructural to efficiency-oriented and strategic objectives is apparent in both companies.

Two firms which were also connected with the locomotive industry, but which specialised in engineering and construction rather than transportation, were Neilson Reid & Co., and R.Y. Pickering of Wishaw. Neilson Reid was much the larger and more impressive undertaking, being the most important of eleven locomotive manufacturers in the Glasgow area in 1889,² and employing well over 1,000 men.³ The firm, which was combined with the Hyde Park Locomotive Co., joined Dubs, Sharp and Stewart to form the North British Locomotive Company in 1903.⁴ The latter was now the largest locomotive engineering firm in the world, well ahead of Stephenson Hawthorn and larger than the works of Caledonian and North British together.⁵ By 1910 the public company had an issued share capital of £1,750,000 and a board dominated by William Lorimer and the powerful Reid family.⁶

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1. Thomas, op. cit., p102, quotes Hodgson at amalgamation with Edinburgh and Glasgow in 1865 as saying: "We are all, from myself to the youngest clerk or porter present, alike servants of the united company and it is our duty to do the best we can for the furtherance of its interests...when promoting the company's interests he is doing that duty he is called upon to do in this world."
 2. Glasgow Post Office Directory 1888-89.
 3. Saul, loc. cit., p187. He notes that 'the largest private builders of locomotives were Neilson, Stephenson Hawthorn and Sharp Stewart'.
 4. UGD 11 12/1, The North British Locomotive Co., p10-11; Saul, loc. cit., p187-8.
 5. Ibid.
 6. UGD 14 4/21, p1332. The directors were: William Lorimer, Hugh Reid (Chief Managing), W. Lorimer Jnr.*, A.T. Reid*, John Reid, W.M.N. Reid, J.F. Robinson, J.H. Sharp*. Those * were managing directors.

Neilson Reid had been created by Walter Montgomery Neilson, who had formed a partnership with Kerr and Mitchell in 1836 with some capital borrowed from his father (James Beaumont Neilson).¹ The young Neilson had worked as an apprentice before being trained in draughtsmanship at the Hyde Park Foundry in Glasgow, and then going on to specialise in mining engineering.² After ending his partnership he set up Neilson and Co. in 1845, and then made his momentous decision to confine his manufacturing to the new locomotive engineering of the railway era.³

The Hyde Park St. factory expended throughout the 1850s,⁴ and Neilson attempted to consolidate his position by appointing Henry Dubs, a German 'in great favour and estimation by locomotive superintendants', as his manager.⁵ After the serious quarrels between the two men, James Reid (an ex-foreman of Neilson's who had been trained at Caird's yard) was contracted as the head engineer.⁶ Thereafter, Neilson gradually lost interest and control in the direct management of his works and by the 1880s the Reid family had assumed leadership of the Hyde Park concern.⁷ Hugh Reid followed James as the driving force of the engineering construction, and by 1914 the combined resources and works of the North British Locomotive Company employed 8,350 men.⁸ Above these manual employees were graded the works foremen (103), the works managers, the drawing and commercial staff, and the

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1. Thomas, op. cit., p83-4.
 2. 'Autobiographical Notes of W.M. Neilson' UGD 10 5/1, p10: 'As almost every kind of work was done in the Hyde Park Foundry I had a good opportunity of learning, and becoming a good mechanic.'
 3. Ibid., p19: 'I made up my mind that I must confine myself to some speciality, and the choice seemed to be between Marine or Locomotive Work. I found great difficulty in obtaining orders for locomotive engines - was invariably told that Glasgow was not a place for locomotive engines...my reply to this was, that if they could not be made in Glasgow and by Scotch workmen too - they would never be made by me in England.'
 4. Ibid., p28; Thomas, op. cit., p84.
 5. UGD 10 5/1, p47.
 6. Ibid., p81-2. Neilson wrote that Dubs was 'a most pig headed German and a most difficult man to get along with'; p22, 83 for Reid.
 7. UGD 14 4/21, op. cit.
 8. UGD 11 12/1, p104-9 for figures. There was one works foreman to every 81 employees at North British Locomotive in 1913.

directors and officers of the firm.¹

During the First World War the North British Locomotive was greatly extended as munitions production was undertaken, and very large numbers of females were employed on shell manufacture at the "Mons" and "Marne" works opened by the firm.² In contrast to the 8,347 males employed in 1914 there were 5,738 men and 1,781 women occupied by 1918.³ This was to be significant in both the progress of industrial relations and the pattern of welfare provision at Springburn.

Although Neilson Reid early became a limited company, Hugh Reid took over from his father as manager and leading personality of the firm and was determined to continue running it in the very individualistic manner of his predecessor. During the troubles of the 1890s, Hugh Reid declined to take his firm into the Engineering Employers' Federation or to take part in lockouts to "fight for a freedom which we already possess".⁴ This policy became less practical after the formation of the giant British Locomotive in 1903, with its eight thousand workers, but the Reid family strived to maintain their policy of good relations and effective management.⁵

Both Neilson and the Reids were ready to utilise industrial welfare to secure their labour needs, both nurturing a strong identity with the local Springburn community where their works were situated. After Walter M. Neilson had built up the Hyde Park plant with the assistance of James Reid, he left to found the Atlas works nearby and relinquished his hold to the ambitious manager.⁶ It was only after this point that Reid felt compelled to engage in a variety of community projects, living and worshipping in Springburn itself and having direct contact with his workmen.⁷

These investments included the establishment of Reid Hall and a recreational park as well as some housing in Reidhouse Street and generous bequests of parks and glasshouse amusements by the

1. UGD 11 12/1, p104-9.

2. Ibid., p34-35.

3. Ibid., p109.

4. Thomas, op. cit., p155.

5. UGD 11 12/1, p35-6, says of Wartime production that 'the relationship existing between the management and the workers was of the most cordial and friendly character, and at no time was there any interruption or hindrance..'

Reid family.¹ Perhaps largely because of the close competition with the great railway concerns and engineering rivals, each of the employers in Springburn fostered company identities within a section of the whole community.

Yet this not preclude a sensitive awareness to the problems of social relations and necessary bonds in society at large. Despite his limited attention to the minutiae of management and labour organisation, was insistent on the need for social harmony between employers and the large numbers of artisan workers which were employed at areas like Springburn. When the Rifles Volunteers movement gathered pace in Glasgow during the 1860s, he took a prominent part, urging that volunteer organisation should follow the pattern of industrial command:²

I saw that if a volunteer force should be organised, that the thousands of artisans in this country instead of being excluded from such a mission...should rather be encouraged....the artisans must be induced to enroll themselves in the voluntary forces, and my object was to induce the masters, managers, foremen and leading men in every industry to enrol themselves as officers and encourage the workmen to come out under their guidance and protection.

This emphasis upon collaborative organisations and elaborate cultural institutions and facilities appears to be particularly associated with larger employers in the industries requiring highly skilled labour, suggesting an economic dimension to the promotion of 'artisan culture' in these years.

These stable relations at Springburn were challenged as the firms faced increasing competitive and labour pressures, culminating in the munitions production of the War.³ To deal with the influx of female labour, North British Locomotive - and also the North British and Caledonian Railways⁴ - appointed 'Women's Superintendants', to supervise the welfare of the women.⁵ Insofar as many of these women appear to have come from the Springburn locale, the dilution process was perhaps not as difficult or turnover as high as in many other firms.⁶ The superintendants would certainly have discouraged

6. Thomas, op. cit., p68, 104 for lay-out of Springburn.

7. Ibid., p130-31.

1. Ibid.

2. UGD 10 5/1, p89-90.

3. UGD 11 12/1, p35-6.

the formation of women's unions under the aegis of the skilled engineers, and were partly responsible for the good industrial record at Springburn.¹

Besides the formal superintendance laid down by Munitions regulations, the North British also promoted collections for the National War Relief Funds in their works. The resources were originally directed towards those men serving overseas, and their dependants, but latterly they were directed towards meeting the specific needs of dependants whose father had been employed in the factories and workshops. The most common form of assistance, particularly important in view of high rents and housing shortages, was the rent supplement given to needy families.² Of the £28,350 collected, almost £19,000 went to rents and another £600 to family associations.

The North British Locomotive case conforms, therefore, to the general pattern of welfare services being used first to establish the enterprise in the Springburn area (and its labour markets), then to facilitate the successful integration of different units and fresh aspects of production during the years 1903-19. The emphasis was upon efficiency and discipline, although the directors recognised - as did their great local rivals - the need for a responsible autonomy in the administration of services.

Much smaller in their operations and more restricted in their manufacture of railway stock were R.Y. Pickering's of Wishaw, near Motherwell. Pickering's specialised in waggon building, founded in 1864 and claiming to be the 'oldest firm in the country engaged

4. Cmd. 167, op. cit., Appx. B, p32-5.
5. UGD 11 12/1, p107. The History of the firm notes that at the "Mons" plant there were 806 women and 275 men, but the 'foremen and Tool setters were all men..!.
6. Medical Research Council, Reports of the Industrial Fatigue Research Board. No.13 - A Statistical Study of Labour Turnover in Munition and Other Factories. H.M.S.O. (1921), p5-6 for influence of neighbourhood and foremanship on turnover.
1. UGD 11 12/1, p36: 'at no time was there any interruption or hindrance due to a dispute'.
2. Ibid., p111: 'Committees, representative of all departments, were formed in each of the Works. All cases were carefully investigated, and the funds were administered as generously as possible - payment of house rents being the most characteristic feature.'

in the trade'. By 1878 the firm was employing fourteen workmen under a foreman and John Pickering's son, growing into a limited company with issued capital of £8,000 within a decade.¹ The real period of growth and investment took place during the 1890s, as Pickering's built over 3,000 wagons a year (as well as repairing others) for export as well as domestic consumption and employing 500 men at their works. Expansion continued throughout the following decade and like Alley's Sentinel Works, Pickering's prospered during Wartime production and 'finished the war better equipped than formerly', with new foundries added.² Decline only set in after 1925, with the deceleration in overseas demand, and the firm was finally taken over by the Lithgow empire in 1938.

The workforce at Wishaw was highly skilled as well as diversified, with handicraft trades as well as machinemens and some labourers making up the 700 men employed by 1916.³ Their earnings ranged between £2.10s.0d and £3.5s.0d at this time, and cannot be regarded as very high although the injection of munitions production as such appears to have been much less than in works like Hyde Park.⁴

It was during the years of most rapid expansion, and within a short time of the conversion to limited liability and formal business organisation, that industrial welfare was introduced at Wishaw. In June 1893 a number of workmen gathered together to form a works friendly society, which was originally organised on the basis of annual renewals.⁵ The founders decided that when a man 'became a workman he should also become a member of the Society', thus enforcing a kind of mutual closed shop.⁶

From the outset the benefit club had the support of the firm and at the first meeting of the Society, the new president:⁷

expressed the feeling of Mr. Pickering Himself regarding the formation of this Society and assured the Committee that the Society would have their mutual support [*sic*].

After discussing the relative merits of different schemes, the workmen decided to take the Caledonian Railway Company's annual friendly society as the model for their rules,⁸ which were later

1. UGD 12 18/24, History of R.Y. Pickering & Co., 1864-1964.

2. Ibid.

3. UGD 12 10/1, 'Income Tax Account for Manual Workers (1916-20)'.

4. Ibid., Summer 1916 figures.

5. UGD 12 11/1, 'The Wishaw Wagon Works Friendly Society: Minutes'

printed for the benefit of the 145 workmen who paid a fortnightly contribution of 1d per share (shares costing 3d each).¹ Within a short time there were almost 170 members with over 630 shares in the Society, probably recruited from the more skilled and better paid grades of workmen.²

The benefits provided by the Wishaw club were quite impressive, with sick alimnt paid as well as funeral benefits later in the 1890s.³ But the Committee was extremely vigilant in its supervision of claims, being anxious that there should be an adequate surplus to divide up between the subscribers each year.⁴ Before any major departures were made, the Committee elected by the members deliberated each issue (even to the extent of contacting the companies upon whose constitution their own rules were based)⁵, and apprentices were only accepted after proper discussion.⁶

The impact of the body upon the claims for accidents is interesting insofar as certain cases were paid alimnt without their making any claim upon the comapny for liability.⁷ The workmen also made contributions to the local infirmaries, formalised at 4d per £1 of wages earned and 'to be deducted from the pays previous to Fair and New Year Holidays' from 1906.⁸ In 1896 the Society discussed the question of whether 'members who meet with accidents outside the sphere of their own work', were entitled to any alimnt from the funds and this - together with the evidence of joint contributions to infirmaries from employees and the Pickering owners - suggests that in some respects the Society acted as a collaborative alternative to accident litigation between employers and workmen.⁹

6. Ibid: 27.6.1893.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid: 29.6.1893. 'After some discussion on different Society's Rules, It was agreed that we adopt the Rules of the Caledonian Railway Company Yearly Friendly Society as a whole, with alterations to suit.'

1. Ibid: 9.8.1893.

2. Ibid: 21.8.1893.

3. Ibid: 27.10.1896 - 12.1.1897, for example.

4. Ibid: 9.1.1894, when Committee notes that surplus of £34 'proved the Society to have been a great success'; see 21.8.1893, for an early sign of vigilance and also 16.10.1893.

5. Ibid: 29.12.1896 - 12.1.1897, when rules discussed.

The finances of the Society were also dependant to some degree, it seems, on the goodwill and support of the Pickering management. By the late 1890s the funds of the Society had stabilised at about £250, with over 90% of income from workmen's contributions, rising as economic conditions improved and other works were admitted to the Wishaw scheme.¹ Then in 1901 the Society received donations from the 'War Fund', presumably a reference to moneys collected in aid of the Boer War,² and the Society faced collapse in 1906 when their treasurer absconded with the funds.³ At this point the Pickering office staff joined the Society and also assumed responsibility for the administration of its contributions,⁴ whilst the Society was divided into special committees such as the Benevolent Committee to improve its efficiency.⁵ This support was to be vital in the year following the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act (and also the difficulties of 1906-7), when the Society was almost insolvent.⁶ In response the leadership introduced a sliding scale of benefits and tightened their means tests still further, by intensifying surveillance of claimants.⁷

This raises the question of managerial control over the running of the body, and also the degree to which society rules and administration reinforced the workplace discipline enforced by the Pickering management. Although the presence of the employers was never obvious at the regular meetings of

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6. Ibid: 13.1.1897. This must also have touched upon industrial relations, given the strategic role of the apprentices in the conflicts of these years.
 7. Ibid: 10.1.1895 - 11.2.1895. In the latter case McLellan suffered a fractured leg.
 8. Ibid: 10.1.1906 - 27.3.1906.
 9. Ibid: 11.1.1896, 1.8.1907. In latter case 'lines' were given to the workmen for Dunoon Home.
 1. Ibid: 12.1.1898 - 11.1.1899; 10.1.1900, 29.11.1900, 10.1.1901.
 2. Ibid: 31.7.1901 - 28.8.1901.
 3. Ibid: 8.2.1906 - 9.2.1906.
 4. Ibid: 14.2.1906.
 5. Ibid: 7.2.1907.
 6. Ibid: 10.1.1908. Committee noted 'the Society has had a most unfortunate year'.
 7. Ibid: 30.9.1904 - 10.1.1906 for previous surveillance; 23.2.1909 for fresh initiatives.

the Society, its termination in 1912 showed where the real power and decisions lay. After the passing of the National Insurance Act in 1911, the question of its impact on benefits was raised - but only casually discussed - at the A.G.M. by the members.¹

A subsequent ballot and further meeting showed the great majority of members (286 to 74) in favour of continuing the scheme,² and another vote reinforced this decision (236 to 56).³ But after he had approached the management on the matter, the Secretary reported to the workmen the employer's opinion that:⁴

in view of the Insurance Act causing complications in Pay Bill they regretted they could not see their way to allow Society to be carried on under existing arrangements.

After some discussion the Committee resolved that under the circumstances it would be inadvisable to attempt to carry on the Society...

This was in contrast to the reactions at the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, after which an auditor had informed the members of the advantages they might derive from the Act but it 'was allowed to drop' after discussion.⁵ Clearly the firm was prepared to continue the society only as long as it benefited them, and when the Society Committee continued in existence during 1913 the management insisted 'on collection being distributed without delay' and the cessation of activities.⁶ Thereafter the Committee only acted to distribute the annual collections amongst the local infirmaries.⁷

Even at the height of its powers the Society was evidently concerned to reinforce management authority and nurture good relations rather than challenge its sponsors. The most direct way in which the benefit committee reinforced managerial directives was in its policy on suspended workmen. In 1907 it dealt with the

1. Ibid: 9.1.1912.

2. Ibid: 26.6.1912.

3. Ibid: 24.12.1912.

4. Ibid: 27.12.1912.

5. Ibid: 11.1.1911.

6. Ibid: 16.7.1913. This concerned the question of whether a new Committee should be elected to distribute the funds and collections, and under management pressure the old Committee went ahead.

7. Ibid: 2.7.1920, etc. See also letter sheafs enclosed.

question of an injured workmen hurt whilst on suspension from Pickering's and in the employ of a rival firm. After taking advice from the company's solicitor on the matter, the Committee resolved that either the workman had technically left the employ of Pickering's and therefore only warranted half of contributions paid in, or if he insisted that:¹

as he was not paid off from the employment of Messrs. R.Y.P.Co. but was only under suspension and was therefore still a member of the Works Society, then he committed a gross and inexcusable irregularity by working for the Glasgow Iron and Steel Co. and...has no claim.

They followed the precedent laid down here to refuse another two claims in 1909, and managed to gain A.G.M. support for this policy.² This was subsequently incorporated into the Rules of the Society, which specified that any suspended member gaining employment elsewhere was automatically disqualified from membership.³

This suspension did not merely affect disciplined workmen, but also those laid off for want of orders at the Wishaw plant. In 1909-10, for example, the Society leadership (headed by Steele) regretted that 'the state of trade during the latter part of the year had been so deplorably bad as to result in the suspension of a large number of workmen'.⁴ The consequence of the Society's ruling on benefit - if not its actual purpose - must have been to discourage the search for alternative employment and therefore retaining a ready pool of committed labour for the firm when trade improved. Those workmen suspended for bad behaviour would find not only their earnings diminish but also the benefits they might hope to enjoy from their subscriptions to an autonomous body.

The more general implications of Society administration were the discouragement of resistance to unemployment at Pickering's and also the promotion of acceptable social habits which might reinforce sober work discipline. When one claimant was found by the visiting committee to be 'under the influence of liquor' (even though it was January), he was fined one day's aliment under Society rules.⁵

1. Ibid: 5.4.1907.

2. Ibid: 16.12.1909 - 28.12.1909. New rule addition stated that; 'should any member be suspended from employment with the Company, and obtain employment elsewhere, whether temporary or otherwise, he shall immediately cease to be a member of and have no claim on the benefits of the Society'.

3. Ibid.

This survey of industrial welfare at Pickering's shows important omissions: there are no records of any housing at the Wishaw, Airdrie or Thornton works of the firm. Nor are there any elaborate dining facilities and institutes found at the larger firms. This is probably a facet of Pickering's' relatively small scale and its location within easy distance of skilled tradesmen at Wishaw and Motherwell. The firm was simply not large enough and its still quite limited labour needs could be met without recourse to extensive infrastructural services. At the same time, the rate of its growth and the dynamic policies pursued by management suggested the need for some provisions which would be both inexpensive and highly effective in supporting the business objectives of the concern. Sponsorship of the autonomous friendly society enabled Pickering's to encourage mutuality and a degree of independence amongst their skilled employees, whilst at the same time ensuring that the employer possessed the ultimate discretion in deciding the fate of the Society. The way in which it operated, if not always the original intention of its architects, served to sustain discipline and discourage departure from the firm even after suspension was meted out.

Having reviewed the progress of industrial welfare in heavy locomotive engineering and railway transport, as well as in the integrated firm of Beardmores, it is possible to contrast this with the experiences of certain leading firms in the light industrial sector of timber, paper and publishing - which were also important occupations in the west of Scotland. This raises the problem of whether divisions within a certain 'sector' of industry are more significant than those between different sectors. Tendencies within the economy, such as technological convergence or the integration of different work processes, may make these divisions less meaningful than the similarities.

Here emphasis is placed upon the market conditions facing each industry, the level of technology and mechanisation, the pattern of concentration and integration, and the changes in the structure and organisation of business under management. It is arguable that such themes and trends give rise to similar kinds of skill in the labour force, although the specific forms of occupation and management may differ between sectors and types

of industry. These general features may also create the conditions for general trends in welfare development, whilst the particular forms of welfare provision depend upon the specific conditions of the firm and its industrial context. The same may be said of the distinctions between sectors such as heavy engineering or steel and shipbuilding, and light trades which depend on similar or distinct markets. What appears to be important is the changing labour needs of the trade and the individual concern, the definition of which may depend as much upon industrial relations as economic progress.

The wood and timber trade of Glasgow was characterised by small concerns and was heavily dependant upon the Clyde shipbuilding industry for its prosperity and expansion. When the shipyards transferred their activities from almost purely woodworking and timber skills to a combination of iron and wood carving, they still demanded large amounts of the softer material from the surrounding sawmills.¹ There was also the sharply fluctuating housebuilding cycle as a demand factor, with the mills caught between these violent oscillations of launchings and lettings in Glasgow.²

Despite the intrusion of technical innovation into the timber yards, such works still depended on a considerable amount of craft skills and handiwork in the later 19th century.³ Unlike rivals such as J.B. Fraser & Co., however, Brownlees appear to have determined upon sawmilling rather than joinery and timber work, quite early in their history.⁴ By the end of the 1880s, the City Saw Mills of Brownlees was probably the largest in the Glasgow area. This entailed a much greater drive towards machine cutting in such concerns, as the voracious shipyards demanded ever greater amounts of timber.

The firm of James Brownlee had been set up during the 1850s, and its founder dominated the management until his death in 1896. By 1877 a reorganisation of the business brought into being the Brownlee partnership, and on the death of James in 1896 the enterprise was converted into a limited company. These decades

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1. J.L. Carvel, A Hundred Years in Timber: The City Saw Mills, 1849-1949 Carvel (1950) Glasgow.
 2. A.K. Cairncross, 'The Glasgow building industry, 1870-1914' Review of Economic Studies II (1934), p4-5, and passim.

were ones of growth and expansion for the firm, with improvements in the organisation of the sawmills as well as changes in the technology of sawmilling and alterations in the business structure of the enterprise. The fluctuations in demand tended to discourage too great a commitment to machinery, however, and the Brownlees were conscious of their reliance upon a steady pool of labour to sustain their production through these booms and troughs.¹

It was in this context that the Brownlees made their first venture into welfare, at least on a formalised basis. In 1877 as the firm recovered from the downturn of 1874-6 and the demand for labour rose, the new partnership established the City Saw Mills Mutual Aid Society.² This may have been due, as the company historian suggests, to a feeling on the part of James Brownlee that he was losing touch with his workmen during this period of growth and innovation.³ The same writer notes that the 'benefits were more generous than those of many friendly societies, a result made possible by the Company, which contributed £50 for every £100 subscribed by its workers'.⁴

Whilst the Society was introduced before the passing of the Employers' Liability legislation in 1880, the fact that employees faced many hazards in the sawmilling trade (and that such accidents might result in litigation where serious enough) must have weighed with the employers. There was also the point that such limited contributions from the firm gave them effective control over the solvency of the Society whilst discouraging the mutuality of trade union membership. This latter element appears in the stated objective of the Mutual Aid Society, reproduced in a later form, which states that:⁵

"This Society...has been established in order to provide

3. Carvel, op. cit., p52.

4. Ibid; see Cmd. 167, p24-25, for an account of Fraser's and the impact of dilution on their activities.

1. Carvel, op. cit., p45-6, for account of fluctuations in the industry.

2. Ibid., p145-46.

3. Ibid: 'In the early days, friendly ties bound James Brownlee to them. He felt a sense of obligation towards them...and almost the first resolve the Partners made was...to remove the fear of sickness'.

4. Ibid.

"mutual insurance, for sickness, accident or death among its members and to obviate the necessity of making collections on behalf of anyone prevented by the above causes from following his regular employment. Each member will thus in case of need be entitled to an allowance which will save him from being on the charity of his fellow workers."

The clear alternative to such a society were the benefits provided by the trade unions - presumably amongst those items listed as the 'charity' of fellow workers.

The management of the fund was in the hands of a committee elected by the workmen, but under the general guidance of the company.¹ Like the Wishaw Society of Pickering, and those at the railway concerns, the organising committee were extremely vigilant in their conduct of benefits with certain restrictive rules being apparently carried over into a revived society during the 1920s.² There was to be no malingering on the mutual's funds, and no unnecessary absence from useful work at the mills.

Unlike the Pickering body, the City Saw Mills organisation was not terminated annually and reconstituted but was a fully registered friendly society. There were some attempts in the later scheme, and probably in earlier decades also, to reduce the Committee's powers by distributing the Society assets each year.³ This was staunchly resisted by the leadership, which was in favour of steady reserves being held by the firm in its name.

The degree of control exercised over the mutual by Brownlee management is illustrated, as it is in Wishaw's case, by the manner of its cessation. All employees were strongly urged to join the Society whilst it operated, with similar supplications during the 1920s.⁴ On the passing of the National Insurance Act, however, the company reconsidered the whole position and decreed

5. The City Saw Mills, 'City Saw Mills Mutual Aid Society: Minutes' (1927-1963): Copy of Rules, Rule I; Carvel, *op. cit.*, p145-46 suggests that these were based on original rules.
1. Ibid.
2. 'City Saw Mills...' Minutes: Rule VII & VIII: "No Member, when in receipt of aliment...shall be allowed to be out of his house after seven P.M...Members of the Society are requested to report to the Committee any instance of disregard of this rule...".
3. Ibid., Minutes: 23.10.1929.
4. Ibid., Rules, Rule I: "...all employees at City Saw Mills are strongly recommended to join the Society."

that the Society should terminate, with the company taking its own share and setting it aside 'to help employees that might be in needful circumstances'.¹

It is an interesting epilogue that the Society was revived in 1927, in the wake of the General Strike and beginning the era of Mond-Turnerism in British industry. In October 1927 the firm called its employees together to report that 'on the request of several of the employees', the directors had canvassed opinion by issuing membership forms for a new Society and over 250 of these had been completed.² Once again, the firm held considerable power in the Society by holding the funds and providing the necessary administration whilst retaining its right 'to withdraw its services at any time'.³ Thereafter the firm paid out the benefits whilst also contributing (on a joint basis) to local infirmaries, which requested employee representatives on their board of management.⁴ These benefits continued into the 1960s when rising wages and substantial state provisions made them less relevant as either assistance or incentives.⁵

There were no elaborate infrastructural facilities provided by the firm, such as housing or similar amenities, since the mills were near the centre of Glasgow and the resources of the concern did not merit large-scale investments. Brownlees did introduce some recreational and leisure facilities it appears, and these were later formalised in the City Saw Mills Social Club during the years 1945-49.⁶ But overall, the main focus was upon efficiency and work discipline and this was secured - at least in the years before 1914 - by firm management and an astute welfare policy.⁷

1. Carvel, op. cit., p146.

2. 'City Saw Mills...' Minutes: 5.10.1927.

3. Ibid., Rule XVII.

4. Ibid.: 23.12.1927. See 11.4.1928 - 10.10.1928 for the finances of the new Society.

5. Ibid.: 31.3.1963.

6. Carvel, op. cit., p50.

7. 'City Saw Mills...' Minutes: 24.10.1928, 6.2.1929, 25.4.1929, for the later operation of society and impact on discipline.

In marked contrast to the saw milling trade, the printing and publishing industry was dominated by very small workshops employing highly skilled craftsmen in the compositing and typesetting trades. Technical innovation was certainly evident in the industry during the later 19th century, but mechanisation before 1900 tended to reduce apprentices rather than journeymen -- a development not unwelcome to the latter.¹ From the 1890s there was an increasing use of females on the new electric compositers, but this did not result in any dramatic rise in women employed or the serious erosion of the craftsman's traditional job control.²

An important factor in the retention of this control was the organisation of the tradesmen in the Scottish Typographical Association from 1852. In that year the A.S.E. had suffered their early defeat at the hands of the technological progressives among the employers,³ and like them the S.T.A. concentrated upon building up their reserves during the 1850s and 1860s.⁴ This pattern of stable negotiations and good relations was interrupted by the 1872 lockout of printers, after which the Association determined to improve its provident benefits as a means of consolidating its membership and restoring the acceptable face of craft unionism.⁵ The culmination of benefit provision was the introduction of the Superannuation Fund in 1890, which gave it a 'full-scale provident society',⁶ but also created the basis for further demands on rates and hours.⁷

After 1900 the pace of technical innovation and the moves towards introduction of female labour quickened, with some hand and machine compositing done by women.⁸ Generally, the unions

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1. S.G. Gillespie, A Hundred Years of Progress: The Record of the Scottish Typographical Association, 1853-1952 Maclehose (1953) Glasgow, p98-9.
 2. Ibid., p101.
 3. Keith Burgess, 'Technological Change and the 1852 Lock-Out in the British Engineering Industry' International Review of Social History XIV (1969).
 4. Gillespie, op. cit., p52-3: 'Their aim was strength through union, their purpose defensive...'
 5. Ibid., p61-7, 84-7, 179-84, etc.
 6. Ibid., p86-7. This aspect is rather exaggerated by Gillespie.
 7. Ibid., p61-7. The moves had limited success.
 8. Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry Cmd. 135 (1919), p15: '...in England and Wales, the Trade Unions...excluded

were able to maintain their vigorous craft regulation of printing and restricted women to less skilled binding, case making, stationary and box making operations.¹ With an expanding domestic market, greatly assisted by the growth in education and literacy as well as rising standards of living, there was much less pressure on the employers to divide their craft labour than in trades such as engineering.

Market conditions also favoured a high degree of specialisation between different firms, with smaller firms able to purvey quality products as well as distinct lines of goods such as atlases or educational and scriptural texts. For this kind of production the reliance upon the skills of designers and printers was almost absolute, although larger firms were anxious to use machinery in order to exploit the mass market for cheaper books and drawings.

The firm of Blackie and Sons had been founded by John Blackie Snr., born in 1782 and apprenticed to Brownlie before starting his own concern in 1826 and quickly absorbing competitors in its rise to success.² Blackies remained a completely private family firm until it was incorporated as a limited company in 1889, after decades of steady growth.³ By exploiting the opportunities to manufacture cheaper editions of religious works, school text books and atlases, followed by popular diaries and novels, Blackies were able to become one of the largest printers in Glasgow after the 1860s. This prosperity continued throughout the pre-War years, with large profits being made as a result of the combined talents of the Blackie family. One entry for the A.G.M. in 1909 indicates the fortune made from printing and publishing; when the chairman:⁴

drew attention to the fact that although there was a diminution of profits of about £3,000 as compared with the previous year, the state of the finances of the company warranted the paying of the same rate of...

8. 'women from most of the printing processes for which they were eminently suited...In Scotland, however, the processes on which women might be employed included to a limited extent composition (hand and machine).'

1. Ibid., p15.

2. UGD 61 54/1, Catalogue of W.G. Blackie & Sons. (1959), p16.

3. UGD 61 11/1, 'General Meeting Minutes (1890-1912)', Minutes: 15.5.1890.

4. Ibid: 19.5.1909.

dividend, namely 60%.

Given the prosperity and growth of the firm almost unbroken (it seems) from the 1840s, it is not surprising that Blackies were able to develop good relations with their craftsmen. As early as 1842 John Blackie received a presentation from his employees, and at the celebrations he declared that:¹

He looked on the present meeting as an illustration of that kindly feeling which ought to exist between employers and employed, and he accepted their gift with pleasure.

Given the fairly smaller numbers of tradesmen actually employed in a printing works, Blackies were able to maintain some personal contact with their staff. Bereaved and retiring employees were treated with consideration even when the pressures of growth may have precluded intimate knowledge of each case.²

This rapport with skilled labour was only maintained by considerable concessions to the typographical workers, including the recognition of a closed shop at the firm. One correspondent was informed in 1904, that:³

I saw your young friend this morning and introduced him to our Mr. Taylor, Manager of our Printing Works: but it appears that only members of the Typographical Union can be employed by us...I trust however he will be able to fall in with something in a non-union office.

Within such a firm the scope for welfare provision would naturally be circumscribed by the generous provisions of the S.T.A., which were gradually extended from 1872-90, and upon which the Association based its considerable strength in dealing with employers. It would be unlikely that printing employers could rival these benefits, and even if they wished to the inevitable reaction from the typographical workers would have made such an experiment hazardous. In keeping with their position in a domestic consumer market, and their employment of skilled workmen, the initiatives towards public works and the creation of a stable 'artisan community' would be more expected than a mutual benefit society sponsored by the firm.

1. UGD 61 27/1, Memorial Dinner for John Blackie (1842).
2. UGD 61 12/1, 'Letter Book (1890-1912)'. Letter: 9.6.1903, informed one employee that the firm would 'not look for you until after the funeral'; Letter: 7.4.1911, regretted that a partner had not been able 'to shake hands with you before you left...last week', and enclosed cash payment.
3. Ibid., Letter: 23.1.1904.

Blackies did have some company housing it appears, with an annual income from rents of £295 in the 1900s,¹ which suggests perhaps twenty or thirty dwellings near the Villapark Works of the company. There were also some subsidised catering facilities at the printing establishment, probably as an incentive to punctuality and sobriety amongst the employees.²

The concern displayed a much stronger commitment to various forms of education, which was not surprising in view of the income they accrued from extended learning. William G. Blackie was the educational genius amongst the second generation of Blackies, being himself a doctor of philosophy. William established contacts with the Hutchinson Educational Trust and St. Mungo's College, as well as being chairman of the Education Committee of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce.³ His commitment to technical education was in the interests not only of his firm's marketing arrangements but also their commitment to improved methods of production amongst the tradesmen.

The third son of James Blackie was Robert, who contributed the artistic talent to the enterprise and also 'took a special interest in all matters relating to art and art training in the city'.⁴ Robert was actively involved with the Glasgow School of Art and Institute of Fine Arts as well as the Haldane Academy, founded in honour of the great proponent of technical education and national efficiency.⁵ Doubtless the more promising of Blackie apprentices were despatched to these institutions for specialised training in fine arts or technical execution, detaching the 'artist' from the 'artisan' amongst the workforce.⁶

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1. Ibid., Letters: 28.2.1907 - 28.2.1909. The annual yield from the housing rents was approximately £295.
 2. Ibid., Letter: 28.2.1905. The cost was £29 p.a.
 3. The Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, Minutes: 13.4.1874, 15.8.1887, for Haldane Academy; Minutes: 16.1.1888 for Dr. W.G. Blackie on commercial education.
 4. W.G. Blackie, Concerning Blackie & Co., 1809-1874 Private Circ. by firm (1875) Glasgow; Agnes Blackie, Blackie and Sons, 1809-1959 Blackie (1960) Glasgow, p105-6.
 5. Ibid., p104-5.
 6. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 Penguin (1965) London, p15-16, 60, for the much broader implications on this trend.

Besides these ventures in technical education, the Blackie family were also very active in public life with John Blackie (a friend of Dr. Thomas Chalmers) participating in the lodging house movement during the 1840s and his son inaugurating the City Improvement Trust as Lord Provost in the 1860s.¹ Despite his disillusionment and defeat at the hands of the ratepayers, the Blackies continued as public benefactors as well as supporting regular institutions such as infirmaries.² This tradition culminated in the work of Dr. W.G. Blackie, who was equally sensitive to the requirements of the business community and to the physical and moral welfare of Glasgow's reading public.

The other great publishing house of Glasgow, that of William Collins and Co., was also renowned for its progressive business policies and the religious fervour of its leaders.³ By 1879 the private concern founded by William I had grown into a large printing establishment, and became a limited liability company with assets in excess of £300,000 during the same year.⁴ Despite this change the board remained dominated by members of the Collins family, led by the patriarch William II. The company was thus probably larger than Blackies, and competed in the same areas of educational and scriptural texts as well as in the manufacture of cheap diaries or notebooks. As a substantial business with an eye to mass production, the directors also favoured technical improvements and efficient organisation of work at their Glasgow plant.⁵

Industrial relations at these works were apparently good, although the style of management was in sharp contrast to that at Blackies. William II ruled both his family and his firm alike with stern authority, insisting on paternal authority and resisting the claims of unionism.⁶ It is highly unlikely that Collins could have excluded the powerful S.T.A. from his

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1. Agnes Blackie, op. cit., p92-5.
 2. UGD 61 12/1, Letter: 29.2.1908, shows figures of £443 for various donations during 1907-8.
 3. D. Keir, The House of Collins Collins (1959) Glasgow, p185 for religious terms in which William II described his business mission.
 4. Ibid., p197.
 5. Ibid., p195-96.
 6. Ibid., p199.

works, and the Collins dynasty concentrated instead on developing close contacts with their employees and on building up a 'marked pride in the business' amongst the print workers.¹

Industrial welfare formed an important element of this business policy, with services both internal and external to the workshops. At a period when the Typographical Association had not yet introduced their own elaborate benefits, the Collins tradesmen devised a friendly society which was sponsored if not initiated by their employers.² There were also the annual soirees of the publishers, which were organised by the management but from which all alcohol was excluded.³ This accorded with the strong temperance views of William II, whose own jubilee (at which 1,500 employees assembled) was celebrated and toasted with non-alcoholic beverages.

It was in the field of organised leisure and recreation that Collins were to reach local prominence, participating as they did in the institute movement of the late-19th century. After 1880 the firm began to arrange excursions for its workpeople down the Clyde, as one example of healthy enjoyment.⁴ Then in 1887 the directors completed the construction of the Collins Institute, which was a handsome sandstone building near the Candleriggs works of the company. Various amenities were provided for the honest amusement and edification of the highly literate workmen, although the temperance rule still held in the Institute.⁵

These efforts were coupled with a keen sense of civic duty amongst the prosperous publishers, and Collins took an active part in the business community and the public life of the city. William II was serving as Lord Provost when the City of Glasgow Bank collapsed in 1879, and made vigorous appeals in aid of the distressed shareholders as well as for the 4,000 unemployed in the industrial quarters.⁶ The fact that skilled artisans were so unwilling to claim unemployed relief must have gratified his

1. Ibid., p200, 225.

2. Ibid., p200.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p201.

5. Ibid., p200. Kerr says the Institute was 'believed to be the first of its kind in Scotland'.

6. S.G. Checkland, Scottish Banking - A History, 1695-1973 Collins (1975) Glasgow, p469-71, for banking crash.

sense of stable artisan respectability, which was clearly vital to the good of the whole community.¹

The contrast in management styles between Blackies and Collins, and their different welfare emphases, cannot have been solely the consequence of scale and organisational variations. Both firms occupied a similar market position, employing the same kind of workers, and sensitive to the technical requirements of their trade. Yet Collins seem to have become much more absorbed in friendly societies and the institute movement, largely as a consequence of the peculiar management philosophy displayed by their leaders. Even between leading and progressive firms there might be differences in ideology and managerial approach, with different responses to the same market and productive conditions.²

Having surveyed some selected firms in Glasgow's heavy manufacturing, railway transport and light industries, it is possible to compare these with an acknowledged commercial service trade - that of retailing. Market conditions within retailing were naturally very tight, given the relative ease of access to the industry, but Macrosty noted in 1907 the emergence of large scale concerns here as elsewhere.³ There were also variations in the different aspects of distribution and the specialism of the retailer, with grocers facing rather different competition from the large retail stores which might have grown from cabinet making or warehousing to general consumer sales.⁴ Amongst the 220 or so 'Warehousemen' listed in the Directory at Glasgow for 1889, the departmental stores stood as the aristocrats of retailing - offering personal attention and services as well as a wide range of choice in goods.⁵

1. S.R.A. L167 LK 5/521, Reports of the Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund (During the Winters of 1878-80). 'A Run Round the Ward Stations', p21-2.
2. See chapter eight on ideology below.
3. Macrosty, op. cit., p244: 'The retail trade appears to be the last stronghold of competition. No barriers beset the entrance to them, only a moderate capital is required for starting, and...a large business may grow out of small beginnings...Out of this strenuous competition the large business has developed just as it has in manufacture, economies attending on large-scale distribution as well as large-scale production.'
4. Ibid., p245, for account given by Grocer in 1906.
5. The Glasgow Post Office Directory (1888-89).

Within such luxurious conditions - for these are what departmental stores came to provide - the work process was obviously very different from that in heavy engineering or even publishing. The skills required of the staff were personal and mental rather than collective and manual, and it was the relationship with the customers which was of vital importance. Promotion was secured on the basis of individual merit and competence, with a sharply defined gradation of status and responsibility in the larger shops.

Those areas of work which were looked upon as possessing any skill (such as ironmongery, food handling and window dressing) were often dominated by males, whilst the females were given the lighter and less responsible tasks.¹ Men also tended to find promotion to the higher ranks rather than women, and were often involved in complex buying operations.

In such a situation it was very difficult to organise the workforce for collective bargaining, even in the largest of the department stores. Consequently the average wages of the shop workers, both men and women, tended to be much lower than industrial workers with one third of the males and two thirds of the females earning less than 23s per week in 1908-09.² The National Union of Shop Assistants faced serious difficulties in its attempts to unionise the commercial groups, and the ethos of personal service, deference and individual responsibility in the departmental stores ran directly counter to the notion of trade organisation.³

At the same time, there were clear pressures on the employers to improve their management organisation of stores and improve techniques of distribution. With the growth in scale of shops and the inevitable division of labour between sections of work, there were greater problems of supervision (as much in the attempt to reduce staff pilferage as for intensification of work effort). Thus, there were contrary pressures towards the common grading and the individual treatment of the shop workers, with the departmental stores embracing peculiar social values as well as sharper distinctions between staff.

1. Cmd. 135, op. cit., p18.

2. Ibid., p62-3.

3. Ibid., p62 for N.U.S.A.; Asa Briggs, Friends of the People: A Centenary History of Lewis's Batsford (1956) London, p53 for the attitude of Lewis.

Amongst the retail stores there were a select few, many taken over by the Fraser organisation later,¹ which stood out for the quality of their goods and their service. The firm of Pettigrew and Stephen became a limited company in 1905 under the direction of Sir Andrew and J.H. Pettigrew. Although the initial share capital is not indicated, the business was definitely expanding before 1914, with the turnover in 1913-14 almost £7,000 up on that of the previous year.² The Wartime period proved to be one of considerable prosperity for the concern, with satisfactory trading reported in 1915 despite shortages.³

Whilst scale and business structure were growing, the directors were also acutely aware of the need for organisation and efficiency in their enterprise, with Sir Andrew informing his shareholders in 1920 that:⁴

"We have created a business machine here of efficiency, and I am glad to say that, considering the vast amount of detail which has to be handled, things have worked out with comparative smoothness."

This management control involved personal relations with their staff on an individual basis, with even the porters treated as individual servants. When the latter organised for collective bargaining in 1915, the directors 'decided to deal with them individually rather than as a body'.⁵ The men then renewed their appeals and their cases were reviewed 'on their own merits. Varying concessions had been granted'.⁶

This approach was also favoured by Pettigrew and Stephen within the employers association - the Scottish Retail Drapers' Federation - which they joined. When in 1922 the Federation resolved to reduce staff salaries, Pettigrews thought that the 'most satisfactory method would be to review each individual case and adjust according to merit'.⁷ The overall intention of this policy was to promote

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1. See UGD 98, the House of Fraser collection.
 2. UGD 98 106/1, 'General Meetings Minute Book No.2' (1914-29), Minutes: 11.3.1914.
 3. Ibid: 13.9.1915, when 5% interim dividend was announced.
 4. Ibid: 15.4.1920.
 5. Ibid: 11.3.1915.
 6. Ibid: 6.4.1915.
 7. Ibid: 5.4.1922. C.f. the cases such as Dennys and Beardmores where employers seek to sustain individual personal relations whilst joining associations.

identification with the company as a unitary concern, in which there existed no division of interests and one common purpose. As the Chairman assured his shareholders a few weeks before the General Strike broke out:¹

"We are a big family and I am happy to say that the relationship between the management and every member is most cordial. It has always been a feature of our business and the management will use its best endeavours to maintain it, recognising that the good will and hearty co-operation of the staff form a most valuable asset."

In keeping with this general accent on personal relations and graded status, welfare services at Pettigrews combined the personal discretionary awards with such formal arrangements as staff savings banks.

The savings accounts were held with the firm, which found it necessary to restrict 'individual depositors to £250' in 1914, given the growing liability of the total amount.² Such accounts also assisted those employees sick or injured in the company's service, although the directors awarded half pay until recovery as well as being covered by the Drapers' Mutual at Glasgow.³ On occasions this benevolence was withheld when, as in the case of one porter, the firm felt they were being unduly mulcted by their ailing staff.⁴

In other situations, however, this dispensation was virtually transformed into a pension as when one man fell seriously ill in 1917, after spending over twenty years with the firm.⁵ There were also genuine retirement awards, as when Miss Ross retired in 1915.⁶ It seems that such gratuities were only made to the most senior staff, and that their continuation depended solely on the discretion of the owners. In 1916 it was decided that two employees should have their payments disallowed in view of their subsequent conduct after they left Pettigrews.⁷

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1. UGD 98 109/1, 'General Meeting Minutes' (1920-1954), Minutes: 8.4.1926.
 2. UGD 98 106/1, Minutes: 6.4.1914.
 3. Ibid: 6.5.1918.
 4. Ibid: 8.5.1916: 'The Board declined to accept responsibility as half his salary had been paid to him and also a sum of £12 in full settlement.../In/ consideration of the long time he had been in the service of the Firm...it was arranged to pay him half wages for two months...and also to intimate that his services would be no longer required.'

For the general body of the workforce, the directors were prepared to make allowances for them in unusual circumstances. During the First World War, for example, the Pettigrews resolved to utilise any surplus funds 'for members of Staff whose salaries have been broken' by the turmoil of the conflict,¹ and thereafter the firm forwarded sums to both serving and injured volunteers.² It is likely that such generosity was tempered by the consideration of maintaining the loyalty of important staff, as when the store granted 12s 6d per week to 'Mrs Cassels whose husband - the foreman upholsterer - has been called up to the Army'.³ Similar points can be made about the efforts of Pettigrews to find employment for dependants of employees, as when one woman was given a post in 'the Military Card Filing Section' of local government.⁴

There was also a strong commitment to recreational and leisure activities at the firm, with the question of expanding the existing recreation ground in 1914, and the directors deciding that 'it would be in the end more economical to build a Pavilion'.⁵ The purpose of such facilities were as much concerned with general efficiency and the public image of the enterprise as with any benevolent motive of the directors. The board found:⁶

that a Pavilion, in keeping with the reputation of the Firm for efficiency and generous treatment of the Staff would cost the sum of £220.

Such displays became an indication and advertisement of the firm's general well-being, besides its importance to the relaxation of Pettigrew staff. At the same time, the directors insisted that their workers should forego their free day off when War broke out

5. Ibid: 9.7.1917.

6. Ibid: 13.9.1915. Miss Ross was given the generous superannuation of £120.10s.0d for first year and £60 p.a. thereafter, as well as retirement gifts.

7. Ibid: 8.5.1916 - 14.12.1916. Mr. Scott had his allowance withdrawn after taking a post elsewhere and Miss Robertson was given the same pension as Miss Ross 'so long as no valid cause in the conduct of Miss Robertson necessitates...the withdrawal of this allowance.'

1. Ibid: 9.11.1914.

2. Ibid: 8.5.1916. Characteristically, the directors gave awards to dependants 'the actual allowance to be determined by the merits of each case'.

3. Ibid: 8.10.1917. She also received £3 per month.

4. Ibid: 8.4.1918.

and even passed over the annual Fair Holidays in 1916.¹ When the more mundane aspects of efficiency and output were threatened, then immediate costs were paramount in the calculations.²

In keeping with their production needs and designing techniques, the Pettigrews were also supporters of technical and fine art education in Glasgow. Besides the Fine Art Institute there were sums given to the 'Workmen Clerks and Drapers School' which trained the more able employees in administration as well as design.³ There were also donations to the local infirmaries, such as the Royal and the Western in 1916,⁴ and the family generally took an interest in the civic life of Glasgow.

After 1917 the directors were certainly more aware of social unrest, as indicated by their insurance against civil riot in 1918-20, with the board remarking on the 'unsettled state of the country generally' in the latter year.⁵ Besides distributing state literature to their employees and others in 1918, the company complained of 'trouble with strikers' at a time when their welfare services assumed more importance.⁶ The strategic aspects of this investment were clear during the General Strike itself, when the chairman could congratulate his shareholders on the 'splendidly loyal staff' at Pettigrews - a satisfactory dividend on the human investment.⁷

There are three other retailers which came until the later House of Fraser organisation, which were J. & R. Allan, Duncan's and Fraser's itself. Allans had been a private family concern until 1897 when it converted to a limited company still dominated by the Allan family.⁸ The scale was medium and the market position was reasonably secure before 1914. Duncan's Ltd. remained unlimited until the end of the War when they were prospering with 23% profits, and able to issue share capital of £28,000.⁹ The family

5. Ibid: 4.5.1914.

6. Ibid: 8.6.1914. Pavilion redecorated 3.2.1919.

1. Ibid: 7.12.1914 - 4.8.1916.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid: 8.10.1917 - 9.12.1918.

4. Ibid: 11.11.1916. Sums of 50 guineas each to Royal and Western.

5. Ibid: 9.12.1918, 3.2.1919, 30.12.1920.

6. Ibid: 3.6.1918 - 3.2.1919.

7. Ibid: 6.4.1927.

8. UGD 98 14/1, 'General Meeting Minutes' (1899-1953), Minutes: 18.12.98

still retained control of the business, until both Allans and Duncans were later taken over by the third company, Frasers. The House of Fraser Limited was incorporated in 1909 with £42,000 of assets and with the three Frasers (Hugh, John and J.A.) building up their retailing business into a thriving concern before 1914.¹

The very scanty records give no obvious indication of welfare provisions at these companies, although an alternative source from existing personnel staff suggests that there has been a long tradition of discretionary services at the House of Fraser.² This would certainly accord with the high staff standards demanded at such an exclusive department store.

Many of these concerns took part in the Scottish Drapery Corporation which was established in 1925, led by the Drapery Trust of London with £160,000 shares (32 per cent.), of the 500,000 issued. Such a marketing trust is an indication of Macrosty's insight into the development of restrictions on competition, as well as the moves towards horizontal and vertical integration (Drapery Trust purchasing a large bloc of Pettigrew & Stephens in 1925).³ Although the trust was primarily concerned with financial transactions rather than labour management, its Memorandum of Association did include a 'welfare clause' amidst the minutiae of legal regulations.⁴ This suggests that the growth in scale and emergence of market controls was not unrelated to the more sophisticated approach to welfare and labour incentives.

Three other retailers which deserve mention are Muir Simpsons, Walter Wilsons and Wood & Selbey Ltd., all of the Glasgow area. The first concern appears to have been formed as a result of amalgamations after 1889, although the triumvirate of Herbert, Kenneth and Maurice Simpson dominated the company after its incorporation in 1914. Of the initial share capital of £20,000

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9. UGD 98 61/1, Duncan's Ltd., 'A.G.M. Minutes' (1918-1951), Minutes: 28.10.1919.
 1. UGD 98 1/1, 'Hugh Fraser & Sons Ltd., 'Minutes' (1909-1937), Minutes: 8.3.1913 - 26.2.1914.
 2. Oral Evidence, Mr. Alec Patten (December 1975), House of Fraser. Mr. Patten has performed these functions for both Lord Fraser and Sir Hugh Fraser.
 3. UGD 98, The Scottish Drapery Corporation, 'Minutes' (1926-29).
 4. Ibid. 'Memorandum of Association' 3 (16).

issued by the directors, the three brothers held 5,001 shares each. Despite their initial confidence, the War affected the firm quite badly, there being 'a considerable falling off' in trade and a loss of £1,235 on the year.¹ Over the next year the company struggled to break even and it was only in 1916-17 that a profit of over £3,000 could be declared.² Unlike Pettigrew & Stephens therefore, the retailers only regained their efficiency and growth mid-way through the War and seem to have been generally less effective than some of their rivals.

This may account for the inclusion of an elaborate welfare clause in the Memorandum of Association, covering pensions and insurance as well as funds and trusts, and the limited exercise of welfare in the years 1914-18.³ The Private Journals and Ledgers indicate insurance premiums and National Insurance payments - both being rather small in 1915 - but little sign of gratuities and allowances.⁴ Being less effective than stores such as Frasers and Pettigrews, the Simpsons could less afford to expend sums in the improvement of general efficiency and morale.

The firm of Walter Wilson became a company in 1919, supported by the resources of the three Binnies as well as Arthur Wilson himself. Initial share capital stood at almost £23,000, although the stores were much more prosperous than this might suggest and directors paid almost £6,000 in Excess Profits Duty in 1919.⁵ Amidst the post-War boom Wilsons paid dividends of six and ten per cent., placing £5,000 on reserve as well as insuring their investment against 'civil commotion' in these troubled years.⁶

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1. UGD 98 93/1, Muir Simpson & Co. Ltd., 'Minutes' (1914-1947), Minutes: 21.9.1915. The year 1914-15 that is.
 2. Ibid: 14.6.1918.
 3. Ibid. 'Memorandum of Association' enclosed, '3 (11) To establish and support or aid...associations, institutions, funds, trusts, and conveniences calculated to benefit employees...and to grant pensions and allowances, and to make payments towards insurance...'
 4. UGD 98 96/1, 'Private Journal No.1' (1914-1936).
 5. UGD 98 141/1, 'Directors' Minute Book' (1919-40), Minutes: 6.11.1919.
 6. Ibid: 6.11.1919 - 15.4.1920. Latter date for dividends, etc.

The fact that Wilsons were only slightly larger than Muir Simpsons but much more effective may explain the greater evidence of industrial welfare at the concern. By 1919 there were established amenities such as a 'Staff Tea Room', as well as recreational provisions for the employees generally.¹

As at Pettigrew & Stephens, there were also discretionary allowances and awards for the favoured few although at Wilsons they were almost all confined to senior staff such as buyers.² During the 1920s there was a move towards paid leave for the older servants of the firm, and the directors were still discussing this when economic conditions were deteriorating in 1924.³ This transition from informal and discretionary favours to standard privileges probably required better trading conditions for its implementation.

The more general employees were less well attended to at Wilsons, with little evidence of sickness benefit and fatal casualties passed over to the company solicitor as a matter of course.⁴ In such a smaller enterprise only the most valuable and trustworthy members of staff merited such concern.

! Considerably larger was the partnership of Wood and Selbey, which was transformed into a limited company during 1915 - under the able control of James and John Harvey Wood.⁵ The Wood family held the great bulk of the £50,000 shares, on which there was a first interim dividend of £3,400 in 1916.⁶ Since this represented almost 7% of issued capital, the new company was obviously a profitable venture.

The organisation and management of the business seems to have revolved around the principle of incentives and rewards, with one section of the company's Memorandum providing for the material remuneration of 'officers, servants and employes of the company... out of profits'.⁷ This was devised in conjunction with, rather

1. Ibid: 15.4.1920 - 18.5.1922.
2. Ibid: 26.1.1920, for example, when Miss Waters was allocated a 'retiring allowance'; C.f. 2.5.1924, on death of male buyer.
3. Ibid: 16.5.1924.
4. Ibid: 26.1.1920.
5. UGD 98 146/1, Wood & Selbey Ltd., 'Minutes' (1915-1953), Minutes: 22.2.1915.
6. Ibid: 8.2.1916.
7. Ibid. 'Memorandum of Association' enclosed, 26.

than as an alternative to, welfare services. The previous section of the Memorandum had laid out detailed arrangements as to welfare policy, including funds for employees and public amenities.¹ The Woods reinforced these statements with the usual legal protection against accident liability and compensation.²

Given the scanty nature of these documents it is difficult to assess actual commitments to welfare expenditure, but it seems likely that they faced similar labour problems as other large retailers and would make at least a minimum concession on welfare.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to outline the growth of a regional economy in the west of Scotland, and the significance of industrial welfare in the development of the industries which contributed to that regional growth. The inter-dependence of different sectors in the region can be gauged by a comparison of heavy industries, lighter trades, transport concerns and services such as retailing. These occupations were affected both by the general flow of labour, goods and services in the region, and by the specific labour requirements of each sector. The skills demanded by the great steel mills of Beardmore were very different from the dexterity of the compositor, the responsibilities of the rail footplate workers, or the personal attentions of the retail employee.

These and other variations existed between and within the major sectors of the west Scotland economy, although it is again possible to detect the major themes of structural change, technological innovation and management organisation within the businesses surveyed. Particularly in iron and steel production and railways, there remained a handful of large employers able to utilise their economies of scale, their access to capital markets, and their scope for tighter management control, to secure a steady growth rate and the benefits of vertical integration. Even the printing and publishing trades and the large retail stores could exploit

1. Ibid., 25.

2. UGD 98 146/1, 2.1.1915.

expanding domestic markets in order to make substantial profits and improve investment and organisation.

Industrial relations in the various trades - the other fundamental influence on industrial welfare - were somewhat more complex. The highly skilled compositors and elite footplate staff were well organised by the 1890s and able to offer their own substantial benefits, whilst the iron and steel workers were slowly progressing towards effective organisation. Retailing staff were much further behind, well in the rear of even the white collar and clerical staff at the railway and industrial works. Employers in each industry were therefore able to deploy different policies and tactics in their dealings with those workpeople who presented demands.

The welfare services introduced and sponsored by the sample of firms examined reflected their business development and their labour policies in these years. Welfare appears to have occupied a significant place in the life of most enterprises surveyed, although its extent and form altered in accordance with prevailing conditions. The period of formative growth for each industry, and the physical expansion of plant and labour demands differed; from the hectic spread of railway concerns in the middle decades of the century, to the rise of steel mills and new shipyards in later years, and the steady rise of publishing and retailing throughout the late 19th and early 20th century. The scale and location of operations was also quite different, requiring massive infrastructural investment to accommodate locomotive, steelworks and shipyard workers, whilst the urbanised printers, publishers and retailers could rely on adequate housing and transport facilities at hand. In the latter case, the commitments to 'community' might be channelled (as they were with the Glasgow firms) towards civic service, public education and cultural institutions, rather than expressed in terms of housing or adequate drainage.

The contribution of industrial relations to welfare initiatives is equally complex, with many employers concerned to retain personal contact within their own concerns despite the trend towards collective bargaining and district negotiations in many of the sectors covered. Where employees were either

strongly organised or preferred to arrange their own provident benefits (as at Pickerings and Blackies), the firms were usually satisfied to sponsor works societies or shop clubs. When there was little sign of collective organisation among the majority of staff, as in retailing, then individual discretionary awards reinforced the individualist ethos of the department stores. When larger and more elaborate enterprises and management was involved, as in the railway companies, then highly formalised and graded benefits were introduced by both legislative and managerial initiative.

Throughout it may be said that employers were aware of the need to tailor their welfare provisions to the labour requirements and ethos they wished to fulfil. With the large public companies this culminated in the strict segregation of staff and workpeople, whilst in the retail stores the management sought to inculcate principles of individual effort and reward via welfare in the manual workers. It is clear that the possession of status and privilege played as vital a part in such schemes as the receipt of tangible benefits, though the railway clerks demonstrated the limits of such attractions in their demands for more equitable administration of contributory welfare.

Nor is it possible to argue that industrial benefits always produced the desired economic results, any more than they could guarantee labour docility in all situations. It may be possible to suggest that the more successful firms utilised these schemes to consolidate a strong market position, but the record of Dalmuir shows that even the heaviest programme of building and investment could do little to alleviate the serious management and production problems at the shipyard.

This outline of welfare development within one region highlights the need to take into consideration the overall pattern of regional growth, as well as the comparative experience of industries within a particular region. The following chapter extends this analysis by comparing two quite different industries within the west of Scotland and the West Riding of Yorkshire, and explores the place of industrial welfare within each.

Chapter Five: Two regions and the comparison of industrial welfare provision in each: West of Scotland and West Riding.

Industrial welfare provisions in the textiles trades and the coalmining industry of the west of Scotland and West Riding of Yorkshire.

The immediate problem which confronts any comparative study of two distinct regions is that of appraising the relative significance of different economic features. Economic developments which transcend merely regional phenomenon must be set against those aspects of intra-regional comparison discussed in the last chapter.¹ It is not just a question of delineating the main industrial activities of each area and discussing the rate of growth and patterns of change, but also of distinguishing the particular regional forms which one industry might take.

This conceptual problem leads to a more practical obstacle in the shape of inadequate remaining sources upon which to base any meaningful comparison. Sigsworth and Blackman have pointed out the degree to which generalisations about enterprise depend upon 'the fortunate chance survival of the record of firms', which may be completely unrepresentative of business activity within any given period.² Indeed, in an industry with a preponderance of private concerns, or with a heavy turnover of enterprises, or with mainly small-scale units of production, then the existence and survival of elaborate company records will make the firm - by definition - atypical and unusual.³

There is also the question of the heterogeneity of industrial occupations within any given trade and any particular area, and whether it serves any useful purpose to depict two superficially similar industries (such as cotton and woolen textiles) as either homogeneous in themselves or sufficiently close to make comparisons possible. One of the insights which a regional study provides is the amount of spatial fragmentation evident within such a complex sector as woolen textiles or engineering.⁴

This fragmentation and heterogeneity is also reflected in the

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1. H.W. Broude, 'The Significance of Regional Studies for the Elaboration of National Economic History' Journal of Economic History XX (1960), p593: 'To describe accurately the dynamics of development, we must be able to identify leading geographical sections as well as industrial sectors. We must have a tracing of the relative rates of growth between spatially differentiated areas as well as technologically distinct avenues of productive activity.'
 2. E.M. Sigsworth and J.M. Blackman, 'The Woolen and Worsted Industries' in D.H. Aldcroft, The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 George Allen & Unwin (1968) London, p128.

structure of the workforce, with its skills and expertise changing in accordance with local needs as well as broader technical innovations and organisational reforms. There were important contrasts between the composition and remuneration of the regional labour forces throughout much of the 19th century, as well as major shifts within the occupations of each area.¹ Certain industries replaced others in relative employment importance, whilst particular industries changed from skilled to unskilled labour and from male to female utilisation.² Thus, the occupational profile of a city such as Leeds could alter very substantially within the space of a half-century, and the overall shape of employment (as well as its rewards) would be largely determined by the growth of its component trades.³

The three themes outlined earlier: the scale and distribution of the productive units; the nature of technological innovation and division of labour; and the management and organisation of industry, must now be set in the regional context and against the structure and remuneration of the industrial workforce engaged in the regional economy. Within the west of Scotland, it was argued earlier, there were general trends towards greater concentration and integration of resources, improved technical methods and mechanisation of processes, and more effective management organisation of labour. These tendencies were largely the consequence of the pressures from changing market conditions (including the growing international competition), and the availability of fresh resources and markets together

3. Ibid.

4. M.T. Wild, 'The Yorkshire Wool Textile Industry' in J.G. Jenkins (ed.), The Wool Textile Industry in Great Britain Routledge and Kegan Paul (1972) London, p225-6: 'Concentration on both a local and a regional scale, together with geographical specialisation, continued as dominant themes...'; Sigworth and Blackman, loc. cit.
1. E.H. Hunt, Regional Wage Variations in Britain 1850-1914 Oxford University Press (1973), p116, for contrast of Yorkshire and Lancs.
2. C.E. Collet, 'Women's Work in Leeds' Economic Journal I (1891), p463-4, for example.
3. W.G. Rimmer, 'Leeds and its Industrial Growth: The Working Force' The Leeds Journal XXV (1954), p89-90; Collet, loc. cit., p462; etc.

with new ways of appropriating these natural and human resources. Labour resistance sometimes halted and frequently encouraged further technical change, and it was with the rise of organised labour that employers had to cope - in many cases for the first time - from the 1880s.¹ The larger and more progressive employers were usually those encountering, or more likely to encounter, the difficulties of labour management since it was they who heralded the changes in customary practices and skilled methods of working. At the same time, they also possessed the resources to meet their varying labour requirements by more efficient control of the labour market, and more effective utilisation of workers when engaged. Thus it was seen that in markedly different sectors of the regional economy, larger concerns were able to facilitate economic growth and managerial control by the adoption of welfare provisions ranging from heavy infrastructural investment to discretionary staff benefits. Particularly important were those facilities which allowed employers to strengthen their interests by the integration of processes and the adaptation of their employees to new conditions of work.

¹ In each of the sectors surveyed (steel and shipbuilding, locomotive engineering and transport, timber, paper and publishing, and retailing), the employers enjoyed a steadily expanding market and were able to respond accordingly. It might be said that in industries where market conditions were more difficult, and where regional differences perhaps more marked, the potential for change and welfare reform would be more limited. This is certainly implicit in the Mathias discussion of 'new' industries and welfare provision.² On the other hand, it is clear that many industries faced difficult conditions during the Great Depression years of 1874-1896, and that the responses of employers varied widely from sector to sector and even firm to firm. The most consistent theme running through the entrepreneurial initiatives of these decades was the attempt to intensify labour exploitation by methods which included technological innovation, further division of labour processes, displacement of male by female labour, cutting rates and introducing piecework, tighter supervision, specialisation

1. Keith Burgess, The Origins of British Industrial Relations Croom Helm (1975) London, p248-9, for example of cotton textiles.

2. Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation Methuen (1969) London, p374-75.

of production, etc. These responses were not confined to 'new' industries any more than they were to staple established trades, nor was labour organisation or resistance confined to particular sectors. In those occupations where expansion was rapid and where the labour market was tight, with supply of efficient labour difficult to attain, then we might expect welfare provision to exist. But this was itself dependant upon a whole set of variables, such as adequate capital reserves and the prospect of good returns or resultant profits, which might operate on the different trades and firms involved.

Thus, it is impossible to specify with certainty the conditions under which industrial welfare would be provided by a given employer. What appears likely is that the larger and more innovative concerns in any labour-using occupation would consider welfare as a possible object of investment and expenditure. Where the industry as a whole was growing rapidly and with changing labour needs, and enjoying comparatively favourable market conditions, then welfare would be more acceptable as both a means of securing labour and as an incentive to efficiency and discipline. In those areas where employers did not encounter such encouraging markets, they might still adopt progressive policies in order to improve their relative position within the trade and to ensure their own survival if the climate worsened. The role played by industrial welfare in such a situation would depend partly upon the position of organised labour and their reactions to management initiatives. Where unions were too strong, or their benefits too extensive, to be challenged by industrial welfare then employers were inclined to focus upon strategic groups above or alongside the workforce, thereby weakening the position of the unionised employees. Employers often found themselves caught between a well-regimented union of skilled men and the mounting pressures of market competition at home and abroad, hence the resort to industrial welfare as a means of reducing labour control.

It would be surprising therefore, if industrial services were only to be found in prospering and non-union trades rather than in many diverse areas of British industry. Even in regions which lost their prominence in the national economy, or in trades where there was a declining total employment relative to other sectors, it is likely that at least some of the vigorous survivors were

able and willing to introduce welfare either as an accompaniment to other policies or for its own sake, as a means of sustaining morale and protecting their managerial prerogatives against union encroachments.

In order to test this hypothesis it is necessary to investigate the position of more than one industry in more than one region. Two industries which are of interest for their regionalised character (that is, regional differences and concentrations), are the textiles industry and the coalmining industry. Textiles covered a great number of different trades, occupations and skills, whilst the coalmining industry was well known for its regional variations and contrasting quality of deposits. In both cases there were serious problems of retarded growth and technical backwardness during these decades, although the degree of contrast within these industries was almost as great as that between the national picture and the experiences of overseas competitors.

The comparison between the two industries is also apt insofar as there remained marked differences in the structure of the labour force as well as the rhythm of employment and earnings. There are also sharp contrasts in the growth of trade unionism in each case, though it may be said that each saw a steady increase in union membership and organisational effectiveness after the 1880s. Whereas textiles had moved from industrial colonies near water power to the urban centres in search of labour, coalmining was almost inevitably undertaken some distance away from the large urban districts as employers exhausted older seams and opened new mines.

The selection of the West Riding of Yorkshire with which to compare the west of Scotland is also an interesting and valuable exercise. Textiles in the latter region covered mainly cotton and cordage manufacture, with a good deal of dyeing and bleaching also carried out from the early days of Scotland's industrialisation. In the West Riding it was of course wool and worsted production, as well as dyeing and clothing, for which the region became famous. The workforce in each case was roughly similar by the end of the 19th century, although female labour was used much earlier in the case of Scottish manufacturing. Coalmining, on the other hand, was almost completely dominated by male workers and unlike textiles the nature of the product was very similar in the two fields of

Lanarkshire and the West of Yorkshire. Employers faced broadly similar market conditions in each case, being both inland coalfields without much access to export outlets and with medium-quality coal which varied in price according to the sharp fluctuations of the industry. The distribution of firms and the pace of technical change was also remarkably similar, though some variations in working methods did exist between and within the fields.

This regional comparison is therefore pitched at three levels: the comparison of two heterogeneous sections of the textiles industry within the two areas; a comparison of two similar fields in a very variegated coal industry; and the comparison of different concerns within these regions and industries. From this necessarily very limited discussion of these questions, it may be possible to hazard some generalisations as to the regional pattern of welfare development in the years 1880-1920.

The textiles industry and industrial relations in west Scotland.

The earliest textile manufacture of significance in the west of Scotland was that of linen, which developed as a series of specialised branches in the middle decades of the 18th century.¹ By the 1780s, linen weavers were already switching to cotton wool and by 1835 Scotland as a whole possessed 125 mills powered by water and steam, although it was markedly inferior to the North of England both in numbers and technology of mills.² This rather gradual start of the Scottish cotton masters allowed them to exploit English techniques,³ and the invention of steam engines enabled the capitalist to leaving the isolated vallies and fast-flowing streams to set up his mill 'in the midst of the people'.⁴

As Scottish mills turned to the production of heavier and coarser cloths, and competition from England increased, the employers resorted to the use of young and low-wage female labour. There was also a move towards larger scale and the employment of

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1. A. Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland Routledge and Kegan Paul (1975) London, p85.
 2. S.D. Chapman, The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution Macmillan (1972) London, p19. North of England had 934 mills.
 3. Slaven, op. cit., p86-7.
 4. David Bremner, The Industries of Scotland [1869] David & Charles (1969) Newton Abbot, p277.

larger numbers within the individual mill, the average factory holding over 15,000 spindles and 300 employees by 1871.¹ The general condition of the cotton industry before 1914 appeared to be a healthy one, with 620,000 people (or one in ten of the employed manufacturing population) engaged in a sector which still accounted for a quarter of domestic exports.²

Yet there were certain features about the British, and particularly the Scottish, industry which gave cause for some concern. When the shift to higher quality and finer yarns occurred after 1870, Britain could capture the Chinese market and remained the supplier of two thirds of world trade cotton goods, but she was becoming increasingly dependant on imperial and related markets as European and American competition tightened.³ As in the case of shipbuilding, British cotton employers were sustained by the acknowledged skills of their mule and loom operatives who worked intensively to offset the wage advantages of some other countries.⁴ At the same time, it was apparent that this reliance upon traditional skills and methods left little scope for ring spindle and automatic innovations which were seen in the U.S.A. and Germany. Employers in Lancashire responded to this situation by speeding the loom revolutions after 1870, although this gave the industry little respite from foreign manufacturers.⁵

Unlike Lancashire Scotland found it difficult to rise to the new situation after the middle decades, and by the 1890s much of the industry went into serious decline.⁶ Despite the growth in scale during the earlier period and the attempts of millowners to find new lines of manufacturing, the Scottish industry fell victim to more modern spinning techniques and to the inability of Scottish masters to implement an acceleration of machinery similar to that seen south of the border.⁷ The only

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1. Slaven, op. cit., p109. Figures based on Baine and Bremner, show shift from 10,000 spindles and 216 employees in 1851 to 15,182 spindles and 316 employees in 1871.
 2. R.E. Tyson, 'The Cotton Industry' in Aldcroft (ed.), op. cit., p100.
 3. Ibid., p102-12.
 4. Ibid., p120.
 5. Ibid., p121-3.
 6. A.J. Robertson, 'The Decline of the Scottish Cotton Industry, 1860-1914' Business History XII (1970), p121.

real exception to this decline were the cotton thread firms of Paisley who, led by Coats and Clark, entered into this important line in order to stave off impending bankruptcy.¹

Much of the problem lay in the methods of working adopted by the Scottish mills in order to cope with internal British competition. Having built their fortunes upon the low wages of female operatives, the factory owners found that their output could not be readily expanded to meet the needs of the moment. Despite the urging of the Women's Protective and Provident League, supported by the Glasgow Trades Council, the low-paid female spinners steadfastly refused to work three looms like their Lancashire counterparts. This unorganised resistance, combined with the unfashionable nature of their products, led the employers into the decline from which they seemed incapable of rousing themselves.² Given the traditions of the industry and the destruction of the independent Spinners' Union during the 1830s, the morale of employers and labour was such that dynamic innovation or re-organisation of production was very rarely seen in the late 19th century.³

Whilst cotton textiles decayed rapidly from the 1890s, other branches of the textiles and cloth processing sustained themselves and even expanded. The old woollen centres, with the exception of Aberdeen, largely died out,⁴ but carpet manufacturing grew in importance at places like Glasgow. By the 1860s James Templeton was exploiting his invention of mechanical weaving to build up a firm of 500 operatives at Greenhead - one sixth of the total carpetmaking workforce.⁵

One industry which had arisen from the processing of cotton textiles for the Indian and other markets was the turkey red dyeing trade. Bleaching was usually carried on by the mills or subsidiaries but the dyeing stage was dominated by specialised

7. Ibid., p123-4.

1. Ibid., p121.

2. Ibid., p126.

3. Bruce Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland Batsford (1977) London, p188; Slaven, op. cit., p165.

4. Lenman, op. cit., p187.

5. Bremner, op. cit., p187-9.

plants such as William Stirling's works, which employed over 12,000 people in dyeing and printing at Bremner's time.¹ Chemicals were easily supplied by such massive complexes such as Tennant's St. Rollox factory, with its large-scale production of bleaching powder and acids.²

In 1890 the firm of William Stirling combined with that of A.O.H. Ewing & Co., which had been founded in 1845, to produce the United Turkey Red Dyeing Co.³ This meant that the whole dyeing industry in the west of Scotland was carved up between the two large combines of U.T.R. and the Calico Printers' Association. The latter had been formed after an amalgamation of 46 firms throughout Britain in 1899, controlling 85% of calico printing and including 14 west of Scotland concerns in its ranks.⁴ One of the most dynamic figures in the re-organisation of the C.P.A. after 1900 was O.E. Phillippi of the Coats thread giant, and thereafter market control was almost assured to the cartel.⁵ By protecting their interests and output these units were able to avoid many of the difficulties facing other sectors of the textile trades in the area.

This security also encouraged the dyeing and printing firms to engage in a programme of technical innovation, increasing work loads and tighter management which was counterpoised to a policy of union recognition and stable negotiation. Important advances were made in the improvement of machine printing, with the co-operation of the Society of Machine Calico Printers. The degree of useful collaboration which these machinists conceded to their employers is revealed in a letter by one union official to the major concerns. He complained of the unemployment of printing workers and of the readiness of employers to mechanise or displace men without regard to the workers available,⁶ and went on:

1. Ibid., p297.

2. Chapman, op. cit., p25; S.G. Checkland, The Mines of Tharsis George Allen & Unwin (1967) London.

3. H.W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry Longmans Green (1907) London, p145-50; see UGD 13 3/1,2,3. United Turkey Red Co., 'Letters' for the links between Sterlings and Orr Ewings.

4. Macrosty, op. cit.

5. Ibid., p149.

6. UGD 13 5/12, United Turkey Red, 'Private Letters' (1907-8), Box 2: Letter of Holt 27.3.1907 reproduced in Knott's letter of 9.5.1907

Reference is also made...to the manner in which important requests from our Society have recently been dealt with by the Employers...we have good reason to believe that for every one per cent advantage the printers receive from the Employers, the Employers receive one and a half per cent advantage in return, owing perhaps in some measure to a closer supervision of the Works, but certainly owing also to a greater application of the printers to their work especially in the complicated modern style of work; a result we do not hesitate to say, of the Committee's influence upon the Members. Unfortunately this influence is being interfered with by some Works Authorities who are more zealous than they are discreet.

This indicates the pattern of relations within a trade which was undergoing innovation and rationalisation as the result of growing competition.¹ The elite Scottish Engravers amongst the workforce were well-organised and highly skilled, holding the key to market success with their delicate designs. Their employers recognised the need to pacify them by localised negotiation procedures during the 1900s.² The calico machine printers were also skilled men, and spent the early years of the new century striving to control labour supply, apprenticeship, manning levels, etc., against the encroachments of employers.³

The employers responded by creating their own associations, which could serve both trade and strategic purposes, and the two large combines of U.T.R. and C.P.A. were able to dominate the Master Calico Printers' Association,⁴ as well as joining the Manchester-based Master Engravers' Association for dealing with their specialised craftsmen.⁵ Conciliation machinery was then established in 1903, with the Federated Board regulating the number of machinists entering the trade.⁶ This was reinforced by the close personal relations between the S.M.C.P. union

6. to the U.T.R. stating: 'The Committee desire to know of a case where a printing machine is standing through a lack of printers, if an application has been made to our Society...there are over 70 machine printers in the labour market, over and above the number of printing machines.'

1. Macrosty, op. cit.

2. UGD 13 5/12, Letter of Master Engravers' Association to U.T.R. 9.12.1907, enclosing Agreement that "all negotiations in connection with Scottish matters should take place with the Scottish Secretary".

3. Ibid., Letter of John Holt of S.M.C.P. to U.T.R. 20.6.1907.

4. Ibid., 'Report of Conference, 20.4.1906'.

5. Ibid., Letter: 9.12.1907.

6. Ibid., Holt Letter of 20.6.1907.

officials like Holt and the staff of the employers' associations, with only occasional misunderstandings over individual management actions.¹ This co-operation was to pay dividends to the employers when militancy spread during the pre-War years and Holt ensured that his members took little active part in the movement.²

During the First World War the unrest continued until in 1916 there was serious danger of general strikes in the bleaching and dyeing trades over the low wages paid to employees. Sir Thomas Munro intervened to hear the complaints of the male and female workers, as well as the pleading of Scottish employers that:³

since the large Combines have amalgamated works situated in both England and Scotland, the closing of Scotch works has been even more marked, proving that under the same management it is found impossible to operate Scotch works so efficiently...

With large army contracts and the introduction of dilution in the plants, the employers were pressed into concessions by the state although this could not save the industry from many of its post-War problems.

Another area of textiles which experienced marked changes and growth in these years of cotton decline was the rope cordage and twine industry, which had its origins in the early days of Clyde shipbuilding. By 1889 there were over seventy firms registered with the Post Office in the Glasgow area alone, besides the numerous concerns operating in the hinterland of the city. Small works like that of the Forth and Clyde Ropeerie Co. were able to survive by specialisation and traditional customers, but there does seem to have been a tendency towards greater domination of the market by the larger established enterprises such as the Gourrock Ropework Co. of Port Glasgow.⁴ Such progressive employers were able to take advantage of an expanding shipbuilding industry to develop overseas links and operations - frequently in the imperial territories which the same ships supplied and defended.⁵

Many firms diversified their operations by manufacturing nets as well as taking over the cotton interests of fallen rivals or neighbours. Technical innovation was only possible amongst

1. Ibid., Holt Letter of 30.4.1906. Holt enclosed letter from his senior at central office, R.J. Smellie who had investigated the complaints of a discharged printer which said "Very probably the interview I have had with the Printer today will be the means of keeping him from giving his Employer any reason to complain in

those firms which possessed sufficient capital to mechanise such operations as net-making and to invest in new types of cordage and twine. Effective management of the largely female workforce helped to keep costs down and to eliminate the kind of resistance to change which cotton spinners and weavers found when they attempted to enforce higher work loads on the women. Indeed, the determination of many concerns to secure adequate supplies of female labour led to their situating plants or re-locating them where workers were known to be plentiful.¹

Thus, the Scottish textiles industry enjoyed very mixed fortunes both in terms of its economic performance and its labour relations during these years. The staple trades of wool, linen and jute, and cotton, were all in decline by the 1890s with only cotton thread allowing the larger concerns like J. & P. Coats to continue at Paisley.² On the other hand, the carpet manufacturing sector was thriving in the decades which saw the carpeting of the millions as living standards improved and mass-production was introduced. The chemical processing and dyeing trades also survived as larger units of production arose and technical innovation continued, although there was certainly some painful rationalisation of the industry by the combines. Cordage and twine making also managed to grow in these years with the record tonnage launched on the Clyde requiring the

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1. "the future". This was a sentiment in which Holt concurred and informed the employers of the effectiveness of such self-discipline.
 2. Ibid., Letter of Knott of Master Calico Printers to U.T.R., 15.7.1908: 'There is now in Lancashire at least a decided movement on the part of the Operatives to advance all classes of wages in the Printworks if possible. Mr Holt...however, as far as I know, is not connected with this movement.'
 3. UGD 13 4/3, U.T.R. 'Trade Disputes Ledger' (1912-16), 'Evidence of United Turkey Red' (1916), p138.
 4. W. Tyson, Rope - a history of the Hard Fibre Cordage Industry in the United Kingdom H.F.C. Institute/Wheatlands (1967) London, p116.
 5. Ibid., p124-7.
 1. UGD 42 23/3, The Gourock Ropework Co., 'Minute Book of the Partners' (1873-1920). Minutes: 20.5.1899.
 2. The large Coats empire also stretched to the Calico Printers' Association of course, under the dynamic direction of the managing director, Phillippi.

miles of rope turned out of the fibre works every week. This contrast is also evident in the industrial relations of the diverse sections, though it is true to say that the majority of employees in textiles as a whole were female, low-paid and little organised before 1914. Labour unrest in cotton textiles was evident as masters sought to increase output, and similar themes are found in the dyeing plants where there was mounting opposition to low wages and bad conditions before the War. However effective might be the union detente with management, the officials could not prevent the increasing resentment amongst the lesser skilled grades which was to erupt in the turbulent years 1913-17. In carpet making and rope manufacture the largely female employees seem to have been more passive, and the conditions were almost certainly better than in other areas of the industry around Glasgow.

The textiles industry in the West Riding of Yorkshire

Like the cotton industry, the woolen textiles trades faced serious problems of increasing competition and low prices during the 1870s. The West Riding of Yorkshire had built up its worsted production on the basis of large quantities of mixed cotton and worsted fabrics, with the 'worstedopolis' of Bradford growing rapidly from the 1840s as its power looms turned out thousands of yards.¹ During the boom of the early 1870s another 9,000 looms were added to those manufacturing worsted fabrics and the survival of small handicraft firms was encouraged in woolen production by the same conditions.²

By this period the wool textiles industry was specialised not only into woolen and worsted sections, but also in the making of yarn and tops. Besides the woolen manufacturers, the finishers, and the dyers, there were worsted spinners, worsted manufacturers, worsted combers and worsted top makers. Whilst many firms turned out mixed stuffs, there were some who produced all-wool worsteds and others who manufactured fine yarn.³

The organisation of the industry and the distribution of firms was also very complex and variegated, although it is true

1. E.M. Sigsworth, Black Dyke Mills University of Liverpool Press (1958), p75.
2. Sigsworth and Blackman, loc. cit., p131.
3. Ibid., p152, gives table.

to say that the vertically-integrated firm was much more common in woollen rather than worsted cloths.¹ In both sections of the industry the usual scale of firm was small with a preponderance of private family concerns specialising in different aspects of the trade. Largely because of this small scale and unsophisticated business structure, there was little sign of widespread technical innovation and most employers relied upon the discoveries made by the handful of textile geniuses - some of whom (like Culliffe-Lister) went on to make large fortunes in their businesses.²

These traditions did not fit the industry for the difficult conditions which obtained after 1874 when both fashions and market climate changed quite drastically. The export demand for worsteds fell off, particularly in mixed stuffs, and although domestic markets were expanding the tastes were changing with a new fashion in finer yarns. So although the absolute consumption of raw materials by the textiles trades increased 1870-1913, and showed a sharp upturn after 1905, few firms could sustain themselves in the vicissitudes of the Great Depression.³ The consequence of this uncertain climate was a very large turnover in the number of enterprises carried on after 1870. Less than 10% of textile firms weathered the whole period intact, and the casualty rate amongst the woollen manufacturers as well as worsted manufacturers, finishers and dyers was remarkable.⁴ At the same time the overall number of textile firms dropped from over 3,000 to about 1,600 in the same years, with only 276 seeing both ends of the period.⁵

The variation of fortunes within the industry should also be stressed, however, since some areas fared much worse than their neighbours. Despite their high casualty rate the worsted spinners and combers revived in numbers by 1912, with worsted manufacturers almost as effective in replacing the lost firms. But the number of woollen manufacturers and finishers was never to be as great as

1. Ibid., p138.

2. Fortunes Made in Business (1889) London.

3. Sigsworth and Blackman, loc. cit., p130.

4. Ibid. Of the 108 Finishers in 1870 only 2 survived throughout, of 134 dyers only 15 remained, of 1,572 woollen manufacturers only 139, of worsted spinners proper only 23 of 131, and of worsted manufacturers only 19 of 270 retained their identity.

5. Ibid. These figures are based on trade journals.

they were in 1870. This was partly due to the changing scale and structure of firms in the West Riding industry, with the dyers, woolen manufacturers and worsted combers and spinners prominent amongst the concerns changing to limited liability before 1912.¹ Overall, the numbers of limited companies went from 0.3 to 23.7 per cent, in the period 1870-1912 and indicates a certain business sense if not rationalisation in what was now a precarious and changing industry.

The response of the textile employers was not so much incorrect as inadequate, since the reforms made in the marketing and productive arrangements were too restricted to radically alter the fortunes of the trade. Moves towards elimination of wasteful competition were fairly effective in dyeing and wool-combing, with the Bradford Dyers' Association erected in 1898.² As Macrosty said of these combinations, the 'object is not primarily the increased efficiency of the dominant unit but the extinction of competition'.³ The serious weaknesses of even such initiatives is evident from the case of the Yorkshire Woolcombers' Association, originally set up in 1893 and reformed in 1899 only to face serious difficulties of over-capitalisation.⁴

Employers also sought to improve the productivity of their works, although the emphasis was placed upon the intensification of labour effort rather than the introduction of new methods, machinery and styles. The manufacturers in worsted goods merely tinkered with their existing machinery and methods, and modified their products in the hope of a return in fashions.⁵ Overall, they settled for a cheapening of labour by the speeding up of machinery and the substitution of female for male labour at their mills. As George Thomson of Huddersfield told the Royal Commission on Labour in 1892:⁶

1. Ibid., p152.

2. Ibid., p150.

3. Macrosty, op. cit., p123.

4. Ibid., p173-75. The author remarked that the 'career of this association was brief and inglorious'.

5. Sigsworth and Blackman, loc. cit., p142-4.

6. Royal Commission on Labour, The third Report of the Commission: Group C - Textiles Vol. I (1892) C. 6708. Evidence of George Thomson of Huddersfield, Q 7115.

Manufacturers pay the least they can get their people to work for. In times like these, lots of people you know who have families, come and work at a place, and take the wages they can get without asking anything.

These pressures resulted in a decline of employment and a stagnation of wage levels in much of the wool textile district of West Riding, with the operatives being paid less than the female cotton workers of Lancashire before 1911.¹

This relationship between increasing women participation in textiles and low wages is a complex one, with the drift of males to alternative occupations in cities like Leeds creating the vacuum into which females were drawn.² As early as 1841 textiles employed two fifths of Leeds workers, but proportionately more of its working women than its males.³ But the rapid exit of male operatives after 1891 and the growth in younger girls employed must be partly explained in terms of the conscious efforts by their masters to substitute cheaper workers.⁴ Collet's figures for woollen manufacturing ratios is symptomatic of a general trend in employment before 1880 which was accelerated thereafter.

Table XXXVI: Female employment in Leeds woollen manufacture, 1841-81.

Year	Total	Male	Female	Ratio
1841	11,919	9,356	2,563	3.6:1
1851	14,894	10,560	4,334	2.4:1
1861	14,960	10,037	4,923	2.0:1
1871	15,008	8,210	6,798	1.2:1
1881	12,239	5,457	6,782	0.8:1

Source: Collet, loc. cit., p463.

One worsted factory in Leeds was able to expand its workforce from 100 women and girls during the 1880s, but in doing so radically cut the highest earners (especially in weaving) and greatly increased those earning less than 15s and even less than 10s per week.⁵

1. Hunt, op. cit., p116. See also p165, where Hunt shows a serious change in occupational employment from wool, cotton and mines to commerce, metals and railways between 1851 and 1911.
2. Collet, loc. cit., p462: 'In Leeds...and in other places the employment of men is determined almost entirely by the demand for men's labour in other trades, and not by underselling on the part of women. Women were employed because wages were low, not vice versa...and men's labour could not be obtained at the loom at wages which would leave any margin for profit.'
3. Rimmer, loc. cit., p88.
4. Ben Turner and Henry Drew told the Royal Commission on Labour that average West Riding wages were as low as 9s and that women were increasingly employed.

This is not to suggest that the whole wool textiles industry was gripped by an inevitable downward spiral of declining markets, falling prices and low wages. Indeed, the clothing industry in cities such as Leeds was one of the most promising aspects of British industry during the late 19th century. The manufacture of ready-made clothes on a large scale was partly a result of broadening consumer markets but more the result of improvements in quality which enabled garment makers to sell their products to the more affluent groups in society.¹

Innovators began by dividing the skilled tailoring labour into five or six simpler operations under lesser trained workers, utilising Howe and Singer's inventions of sewing machines to the full.² Since the clothing and tailoring trades were highly concentrated within a small area of the West Riding, the numerous technical innovations and organisational improvements spread rapidly until the small workshop had been replaced by the larger mechanised factory, and the individual craftsman by female machinists.³ This transition was of course very gradual and affected wholesale rather than retail bespoke tailoring. The specialist tailor could still survive by catering for the particular needs of his customers, but he found it almost impossible to compete with large wholesalers in supplying clothes for the mass market.

The invasion of large numbers of females into tailoring was another aspect of the changing occupational profile in the Leeds area, with a shift from a ratio of 32 males to 1 female in 1851 to 2 females to 1 male by 1911 in tailoring.⁴ By this time the dress industry accounted for 18% of Leeds's occupied workforce, and over one third of all employed women staffed the clothing works and footwear manufactories.⁵ Their wages again varied greatly

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1. Joan Thomas, A History of the Leeds Clothing Industry Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research Papers, No.7 (1958) Hull University, p2-3: 'In the early stages, ready-made clothes was a trade in cheap clothes, the market then gradually extended up the social scale'.
 2. Ibid., p10.
 3. Ibid., p10-11, 38-9. This innovation of course favoured the larger firms: 'The industry was a new one, uninhibited by traditional techniques, and profit margins were not large enough for any firm to allow their competitors any technical advantage'.
 4. Ibid., p12.
 5. Rimmer, loc. cit., p88.

between different groups in the clothing trades, with buttoners often earning as low as 3s. 6d and machinists beginning at 10s. Above these were skilled women on binding and braiding work, earning over £1, with the small number of skilled craftsmen forming the occupational elite.¹

Industrial relations were also somewhat different from those in the woolen and worsted factories of the West Riding, since there were large numbers of Jewish workers employed at Leeds and elsewhere. The latter organised under Morris Kenter in 1888 and the Amalgamated Jewish Tailors'...Union was formed in 1893, with the Leeds Wholesale Clothiers' Union catering for gentiles after 1889.² The 1890s saw a widespread number of strikes in the clothing concerns and during 1911-16 there was a resurgence of militancy, culminating in the fusion of unions and the securing of better working conditions.³ Since it was one of the major tasks of the clothing industry to supply the armed forces, as well as colonial markets, it is hardly surprising that the employers should feel pressed to make concessions during the War years.⁴

| There are thus important parallels as well as specific differences between the experiences of west Scottish textiles and West Riding manufacture. In each case the staple industry (cotton and wool) was facing difficulties from the 1870s as market conditions worsened and employers sought to improve their productivity. There was a definite shift to female labour in each area, although this had been already a decided trend at west of Scotland, and there was also some further mechanisation and re-organisation of production. In each region there were progressive as well as retarded elements at work in textiles, with dyeing and processing surviving reasonably well in both

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1. Thomas, op. cit., p28.
 2. Ibid., p31-6; C.f. H. Glegg, et. al., A History of British Trade Unions since 1889 Oxford University Press (1964), p185-6 for the development of worsted and woolen trade unions in West Riding.
 3. Thomas, op. cit., p36. The A.U.C.O. and the Jewish Union were amalgamated.
 4. Ibid., p40-41.

areas and with thread manufacture, rope-making, and clothing all advancing as a consequence of their expanding markets and progressive techniques. Industrial relations were also broadly similar, with a growth in trade unionism during the 1880s-90s after decades of inactivity and the organisation of female as well as lesser skilled male workers. The rise of larger units of production and the combination of firms for marketing purposes also encouraged the stabilisation of relations and the creation of central conciliation machinery, which was as much a feature of the Bradford Dyers' Association as it was of the Scottish cartels.¹ Concessions were certainly extended during the War as large employers sought to meet state contracts whilst pacifying their low-wage workforce.

Industrial welfare in textiles: West of Scotland and West Riding

Given the inclement situation in which many sections of the textiles industry found themselves after 1875, it is possible to contrast the reactions of besieged firms with those in expanding trades. Neither cotton nor wool textiles could claim to be prospering in these years, especially when one compares the decades 1880-1914 with the previous period of growth and innovation. At the same time it is apparent that certain concerns managed to survive and even grow in the most difficult of conditions, usually by deploying and exploiting their labour resources much more efficiently. When the economy as a whole was suffering from retarded growth and specific industries from disastrous competition, some employers still made large fortunes and increased their entrepreneurial empire.

The problem remains to what extent did the various businesses introduce or discard, expand or contract, their welfare services in this period and to what degree did these affect their economic performance and industrial relations. Previous studies would indicate that welfare investment and expenditure tends to occur where investment is growing and where profits are healthy. That is, economic growth tends to precede rather than follow welfare, although the affects of such provision may facilitate acceleration of growth rates. If it could be shown that employers perceived

1. Macrosty, op. cit., p155 for Agreement of B.D.A. and unions.

welfare as a means of resolving their production difficulties, and that the more efficient and successful firms exploited their scope for welfare innovation, then it is reasonable to assume that industrial welfare operated on a margin of costs and benefits with some employers assuming (probably correctly) that it helped rather than hindered their market performance.

The nature of these production difficulties and the supposed improvement in position depended on a number of conditions, including the control over the work process and management's power to alter working methods. Where resistance to change is too powerful, or where the management lacks the ability to frame effective policies, it is unlikely that welfare could seriously alter the situation or that employers would attempt to implement services as an isolated strategy. Where stagnation and retardation lay across a whole industry, or when industrial conflicts figured very prominently, it is not to be expected that employers could or would design schemes to alleviate this malaise. Just as welfare could not provide a crude substitute for reasonable wages, neither could it secure success where management ineffectualness was apparent.

Within the west of Scotland textiles industry there were the following numbers of firms operating in the late 1880s at Glasgow.

Table XXXVII: Textiles manufacturers in Glasgow 1888-89.

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Number of Tradesmen</u>	<u>Proportion of Total (%)</u>
Cotton Manufact.	32	12.3
Jute Spinners	18	6.9
Carpet Manufact.	46	17.6
Dyers	63	24.1
Rope & Twine Man.	73	28.0
Felt Makers	19	7.3
Cotton Yarn Twist	6	2.3
Tweed Manufact.	4	1.5
Total	261	100.0

Source: Post Office Directory 1888-89.

This gives only the slightest indication of the relative strength of the industries involved, not merely because of the lack of any division by scale but also because of the distribution of firms throughout the whole region. These difficulties in appraising the development of the Scottish firms are compounded by the scarcity of business records, and the reliance (in this survey) on perhaps five per cent. of all concerns for an analysis of welfare growth.

Amongst the earliest and most successful textile manufacturers to establish themselves as large cotton masters were those industrialists who went in search of water power at isolation locations such as Catrine, Deanston and New Lanark. One such firm was the Finlay company which manufactured linen and rough yarn before engaging in cotton production at the turn of the 18th century. Succeeding the Buchanans at the industrial colonies of Deanston and Catrine, they were able to dominate cotton textiles along with Dale's New Lanark establishment during the early decades of the 19th century.¹

Major considerations during such a formative period was the creation and discipling of a substantial labour force, and to develop an effective managerial strategy at the plants.² This pattern of strong management was most evident at Deanston and New Lanark, with Alexander introducing a regime almost as enlightened if not quite so elaborate as Owen's famous experiments at the latter colony.³ The regimentation of the operatives and the powerful position of management was demonstrated during the great unrest of 1835 which affected Deanston as well as Glasgow.⁴ Many of these services appear to have continued, although in rather reduced form, down to the 1880s, when the regional cotton industry went through a severe crisis and when the counterpart settlement of New Lanark was brought under the direct control of the Gourrock Ropework employers.⁵

In contrast to these well-known industrial villages, most cotton firms were situated in the Bridgeton area of Glasgow or Paisley, and their fortunes reflected the overall trends and industrial relations of the trade rather more directly. One such Bridgeton enterprise was John Lean & Sons, which had been founded in Lanark but which moved to Glasgow in 1840. Leans established their position as producers of fine cotton and muslin weavers, transferring operations from hand looms to a factory during the mid-century.⁶ Gearing their output to the needs of the

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1. Slaven, op. cit., p89-90, 93.
 2. UGD 91 253, 'On the Origin of the Deanston Works'.
 3. Ibid., p5: 'His views were all of an enlightened and advanced kind, as he took an interest not only in mechanical improvements but also in improved conditions of the people...space..to the west of the works was... allotted for building dwelling houses upon...the best class of houses that had yet been built in the district for work people.'; UGD 91 143, Kilmarnock Standard.

Indian market, the firm's turnover grew from under £22,000 to over £68,000 in the short period 1855-67, with overseas sales coming to constitute the great bulk of distribution by the 1860s.¹ Despite the setback suffered in the Western Bank collapse of 1857, the firm's profitability and interest on capital also improved noticeably after 1863.² By specialising in finer yarn and focusing upon the Indian sub-continent, Leans were able to escape many of the vicissitudes which affected their neighbouring manufacturers but it does seem that greater difficulties were experienced from the 1870s onwards.

These problems were reflected in the changing tempo of industrial relations at the turn of the century, with the male tenters organising in Bridgeton to improve their position in a declining industry. During late-1907 serious disturbances occurred at Leans, and the 'services of two policemen were required' to escort non-union workers to the factory during a prolonged strike.³ This stoppage was still affecting output in early 1908, but the resistance was crushed by the employers and their leaders only taken back on humiliating terms.⁴ In 1907 Leans had joined the Scottish Textile Manufacturers' Association, and prepared to prevent any widespread unionisation amongst their hands thereafter.⁵ At the same time, the Lean directors were anxious to retain personal contact with loyal workers and wrote to one bereaved daughter of their:⁶

deep regret at the death of your father...one of the most faithful and respected men who have ever served our firm.

It is an indication of the changing character of relations that they should add their apologies for not attending his funeral.

Having a good supply of workmen nearby their Bridgeton plant (a fact of which Leans were aware),⁷ there was no great compulsion upon them

4. UGD 91 19, 'Historical Accounts of James Finlay & Co.'; UGD 91 143, Newspaper Cuttings. A newspaper article (1910) reported that 'the "riotous and idle"...were considered by Alexander as "unworthy to eat the Company's bread" ', and were dismissed in 1835 troubles.
5. Alexander Marshall Brown managed the Deanston and other Finlay plants from later decades of century until his death in 1900. See *ibid.*, and UGD 91 253.
6. A. Slaven, 'A Glasgow Firm in the Indian Market: John Lean & Sons..' *Business History Review* XLIII No.4 (1969), p500.
1. *Ibid.*, p501-05.
2. *Ibid.*, p501.
3. UGD 2 7/31, John Leans Letter Book (1906-07): 18.10.1907.

to provide company housing at Bridgeton. The Leans did cater for accidents and injuries to their workmen, and also instituted a discretionary pension scheme before the 1900s. Both of these internal services followed the general style of management at the firm, with the employers anxious to protect their legal position as well as developing a policy of individual commitments and loyalties.

The provision for accidents consisted in retaining those maimed or retarded by injury in more supervisory posts as well as paying the victims compensation under a commercial insurance scheme. Leans wrote to their insurers in 1906, for example, that one such workman had left his post:¹

and from his continued silence we presume we will have no further claim on account of his accident. To avoid suggesting a claim we asked him to sign a receipt for wages received. He was useful to us even in his disabled form in superintending our Winding Department, and from the date of his accident we paid him his full wages.

The important point here is the degree of discretionary control which Leans retained over such appointments, as well as the obvious rationale in terms of productivity and loyalty from the injured man. Such control was also apparent in the endowment of pensions on employees in recognition of their 'long and faithful service', though the benefits here were not statutorily required and were considerably more generous than those granted by the state.² Whilst it is difficult to estimate the impact of such benefits upon the productivity and passivity of the

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4. UGD 2 7/32, Letter Book (1907-08): 31.1.1908. Leans explained to a customer that; 'we have been a little handicapped in the mill by our Tenters having struck; but we are getting over the difficulty nicely'; UGD 2 7/33: 12.3.1909, for policy on returned strikers.
 5. UGD 2 7/31: 17.9.1907.
 6. Ibid., 12.8.1907.
 7. Ibid., 18.10.1907.
 1. Ibid., 23.11.1906. The fact that such supervisors were strategically important at a time when industrial unrest threatened manufacturers may also be significant.
 2. UGD 2 7/35: 20.1.1911. Leans to William Marsfale: 'we propose to put you our Pension List, and to pay you One pound per week for life in recognition of your long and faithful service. And earnestly hoping that you may be spared for many years to enjoy it.'

workforce at Leans, the fact that the employers thought it worthwhile to operate benefit schemes during these decades of economic decline and increasing industrial conflict in Scottish cotton manufacture suggests that welfare was more than an optional extra.

Similar comments can be made on the provisions of D & J Anderson of Bridgeton, which had been set up in 1822 and rose to some local prominence by 1851. The concern remained a private venture until limited liability was applied for in 1911, perhaps a surprisingly late development for a leading cotton manufacturer in Glasgow. Anderson's continued to be dominated by a fairly small circle of individuals and its gradual approach to the more sophisticated company structure may well have been reflected at the level of management and organisation. Only as the more formalised system of company responsibilities arrived were definite arrangements made to tighten overall management.

This pattern may also have been present in the provision of welfare benefits at the substantial plant of Andersons, with discretionary grants initiated during the 19th century. By 1911 there were regular 'subscriptions for Workers' Benefit', as well as various donations to such bodies as the 'Society for Education' and philanthropic grants for outings.¹ As at Leans, the employers were careful to retain such control of benefits as would strengthen the bonds of loyalty and discipline at the mills.

Whilst many of the Glasgow cotton firms were able to survive only by selling their wares in the massive Indian market, Finlays went to the extent of setting up their own subsidiary in Indian textiles based at Calcutta. The Champdany Jute Co. is only of interest for the insights which it provides into the early expansion of certain firms overseas, and shows why Finlays were better able to weather the post-1873 conditions rather better than some of their neighbours.² Particular kinds of 'welfare' benefits were central to the operation of the Champdany, since the British staff were granted various concessions for their loyal service to the Finlay subsidiary.³ This even stretched,

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1. UGD 22 8/1, Private Letter Book of D & J Anderson Ltd., List at 19.4.1911. Andersons were calico printers as well as cotton manufacturers.
 2. UGD 91 177/1, Directors' Minute Book of Champdany Jute Co.,
 3. UGD 91 178/1-6. See Letter 5.8.1903, for example.

in one case, to the care of an employee's whole family after his untimely death in the service of the firm.¹ Although this might be rather unusual as 'industrial welfare', the case does indicate the importance of specifically staff privileges within a textiles concern.

The fragmentary evidence from cotton and jute manufacturers reflects the difficulties which the regional industry was experiencing in these decades whilst suggesting that the larger and more organised concerns had developed, or were developing, quite significant benefits when a reasonable degree of prosperity was secured. Where an effective business and management system was developed - itself usually a facet of larger scale and increasing division of labour - there was perhaps a greater tendency for more formal schemes to arise. Following the trends within the industry, the large infrastructural welfare schemes (such as company housing) associated with the industrial colonies were no longer required, even if funds had been forthcoming, and benefits were largely shaped to improving efficiency and loyalty as the trade struggled to survive after the 1870s.

Another section of the textiles industry in the region was the silk manufacturing trade, with firms often bridging the weaving and dyeing processes in order to compete effectively. One such enterprise was that of Anderson and Robertson, which converted into a limited liability venture in 1895 with a fairly modest share capital of £30,000 (though this had expanded to £42,250 by 1919). The Prospectus described the firm as a successful business with 'a large and special connection' built up since 1876, whereafter the founders had set up works at Motherwell and Glemsford as well as Govan.¹ The original partners, William Anderson and George Robertson, were still 'actively engaged' in managing the concern after the company's incorporation.² According to the balance sheets of the silk makers, Anderson and Robertsons were reasonably prosperous during the 1890s and after 1910, though the first decade of the new century was disappointing except for the 1907 upturn in their fortunes. Like other textile employers they benefited from the First World War, though their profits can hardly be termed

1. UGD 29 1/1, 'Memorandum and Articles of Association for Anderson and Robertson Ltd.', Prospectus.

2. Ibid., p3.

excessive. The following table suggests the growth of the firm after 1896:

Table XXXVIII: Capital Assets, Investment and Profits at A. & R., 1896-1919

Year	Assets/Expd. Cap a/c *	Bldgs/Plant/Mach. **	Trading Profit ***
1896	54,351	17,993	3,763
1897	46,686	18,228	1,223
1898	43,571	17,960	2,681
1899	49,567	17,401	2,068
1900	53,900	17,526	1,270
1901	44,475	17,209	751
1902	39,326	17,066	1,309
1903	37,050	16,814	1,943
1904	36,672	16,765	213
1905	40,131	16,783	784
1906	34,795	16,658	- 277
1907	46,404	16,847	2,475
1908	38,741	16,646	408
1909	37,437	16,752	645
1910	38,213	16,770	921
1911	33,441	16,570	2,216
1912	38,637	15,793	2,462
1913	38,784	15,179	3,039
1914	39,084	14,770	2,961
1915	38,435	14,500	1,045
1916	40,369	14,600	3,577
1917	40,102	14,310	4,052
1918	56,922	12,300	2,883
1919	60,235	11,800	2,883

Source: UGD 29 10/1, Directors' Minute Book, MS Balance Sheets enclosed.

* This figure includes all expenditure and assets, including stocks.

** After additions and depreciation made for year.

*** Profit on year's trading and excluding balance forward.

It is noticeable that although the overall level of expenditure at the firm increased, the proportion of resources going into capital additions and new machinery must have fallen. The last five years show an average of just over £13,500 invested in plant, buildings and machinery, a decrease of almost 25% on the first five years, (24.23 per cent.). Either because demand was falling and stocks were being held, or because turnover was increasing relative to fixed investment, Anderson and Robertsons were holding less in hardware than was previously the case it seems.

Like many other private firms at this period, the two partners included in their Memorandum of Association a clause covering the welfare of their employees and declaring that one object in their formation of the company was to establish 'any contributory or non-

contributory pension or superannuation fund or life assurance or other fund', for the employees.¹ In actual fact, the limited resources and prospects of the manufacturers meant that occasional and unsystematic benefits, granted at the discretion of the directors, were far more likely than elaborate formal superannuation. This had been the practice of the partners before incorporation,² and remained so for many years. Only in the 1950s did a 'Pension and Life Assurance Scheme' emerge, followed by a 'Staff Superannuation and Life Assurance Fund', long after the death of the founders of the firm.³

If Anderson and Robertson were able to survive the difficult years after the 1870s by vigorous personal management and competence in dyeing as well as manufacturing, the cotton dyers of the west of Scotland depended on mergers and consolidation to sustain their position at the close of the nineteenth century. Dyeing and calico printing was clearly distinguished from the manufacture of cotton,⁴ and many west Scotland enterprises were able to protect their market position by specialising in the production of turkey-red dyes at locations such as the Vale of Leven.⁵ By 1897 the United Turkey Red Dyeing Co. had combined the operations of the Orr Ewings and Sterlings, with a massive share capital of £1.5 million, and in 1899 the Calico Printers' Association was launched with its 46 component firms controlling 85% of calico printing and dyeing.⁶ It included fourteen west of Scotland concerns, including Charles Todd and Higginbotham, which had possessed a share capital of £120,000 when reformed in 1890 and which was liquidated in order to merge with C.P.A. during 1899.⁷

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1. UGD 29 1/1, 'Memorandum of Association..', op. cit., 3 (r).
 2. Ibid., Note stating: 'One week's wages with William Anderson & George Robinson's best wishes for the coming year. Christmas 1889.'
 3. Brochures in ibid.
 4. M. Blaug, 'The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry during the 19th Century' Economic History Review XIII No.3 (1961), p359.
 5. S, Macintyre, 'The Little Moscows' Mimeo (1979), forthcoming.
 6. H.W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Industry Longmans, Green (1907) London, p145-49.
 7. UGD 76 1/1, 'Memorandum of Association of Charles Todd and Higginbotham'; see also 'Record of Liquidation'.

Mergers such as those embracing calico printing, with the counterpart of the Bradford Dyers' Association in wool textiles, were often inspired by the visions of men such as Phillippi of Coats,¹ but it is likely that they resulted in more managerial problems and diseconomies than they resolved.² So although we should expect greater emphasis upon economies of organisation within the larger combines, there is no guarantee that this would be secured.

The firm of A.O.H. Ewing had been established in the Vale of Leven as early as the 1840s, and after the merging of Orr Ewings and Sterlings the United Turkey Red operated major works at Alexandria, Levenbank, Dalquhurn, and minor ones at Dillichip, Milton and Cordale - all at the Vale. Their products, like those of Leans and many other Glasgow houses, were destined for the Indian market, hence their concern to keep abreast of fashion and tastes on the sub-continent and their employment of highly-skilled engavers and designers.³ Although precise figures are not available, the expansion of U.T.R. 1914 suggests that the enterprise was reasonably prosperous despite the passing of rapid growth after the 1880s.

Such growth had forced numerous problems of labour supply upon the Orr Ewings and the Christie family which succeeded them in controlling the Vale works. Like the cotton industrialists, the dyers relied upon a low-wage workforce of younger females to staff their oily houses and bleach processes, and the Orr Ewings resorted to importing young girls from the impoverished west of Ireland via a Catholic priest, writing to him in 1873:⁴

We require many such and if there are any such strong girls who would like to come here they could have constant employment at wages varying from 9/- to 13/- per week according to their ability....These three girls seem to like their work...

This advertisement may have seemed attractive to the Irish peasantry, but it seems that Orr Ewings experienced difficulties in attracting local women workers at such rates and there was a constant wastage as

1. Macrosty, op. cit., p149.
2. L. Hannah, 'Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 1880-1918' Oxford Economic Papers XXVI Pt.1 (1974), p12-13, and passim.
3. UGD 13 5/13, Letters; see also UGD 5/6, 'Minutes: Statements by Heads of Departments (1922-30)' for later developments.
4. UGD 13 1/8, 'Letters of A.O.H. Ewing & Co. (1868-90)': 19.9.1873. Letter of J. Orr Ewing to the Rev. Donaghue at Sligo.

young women became married housewives.¹ The figures below indicate the composition of the workforce at the Vale:

Table XXXIX: Employees at United Turkey Red Dyeing Co., 1907

Group	Alexandria	Levenbank	Dalquhurn
Males	827	336	325
Females	764	270	476
Females 18+	518	197	351
Unmarried	?	194	324
Married*	?	3	27
Young P 16- (M)	68	44	34
Young P 16- (F)	118	39	53
Young P 16+ (M)	43	25	33
Young P 16+ (F)	128	34	72
Over 18 (M)	715	267	258
Over 18 (F)	518	197	351

Source: UGD 13 5/12, 'Census Returns for 1907'. The figures are calculated therefrom.

* This figure includes widows.

The figures show almost equal employment of males to females (0.985:1), although in both Alexandria and Levenbank works there is an actual majority of male workers. However, the men appear to have dominated the more skilled processes of machine printing and craft work whilst the females were heavily concentrated in bleaching, dyeing and calendering (finishing). There were also a significant minority of highly skilled engravers and maintenance tradesmen around the plants, numbering almost fifty artistic craftsmen and another forty-six general artisans.² Their remuneration, boosted by overtime, was substantially above that which could be earned in the mainstream occupations.³

As one might expect, this difference in remuneration and status was reflected in the strength of union organisation amongst the Turkey Red workforce. The traditional engraving craftsmen were organised in the Scottish Engravers Union, and during the 1900s were showing signs of increasing discontent and militancy.⁴ The calico machine printers

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1. UGD 13 1/8, Letters: 21.12.1874, for wages of 9s. - 9s. 6d for oily house women.
 2. UGD 13 5/12, 'Private Letters (1907-08)': Letter of Master Engravers' Association to John Christie 18.11.1908 and 30.9.1908.
 3. UGD 13 5/12, draft of wage figures enclosed.
 4. Ibid., Letter of Master Engravers' Association to U.T.R., 9.12.1907.

were also effectively recruited into John Holt's Society of Machine Calico Printers and were only partly restrained by the 1903 provisions for a Federated Board of Machine Calico Printers.¹ The Society officials insisted on the employers' confidence in their dealings with the often recalcitrant members, and were aggrieved when unduly criticised by firms such as U.T.R.² The women at the dyeworks were almost completely unorganised until 1911 when the National Federation of Women Workers joined the Amalgamated Society of Dyers in organising the unskilled operatives at the Vale. The resultant strike was the first serious challenge to the employers since the 1870s and eventually the Board of Trade intervened to conciliate the parties.³

It appears that the impetus behind the upsurge in militancy before 1914 came not merely from the traditionally low wages and deplorable conditions to be found in the dye works,⁴ but also from the attempts of management to improve output by streamlining organisation of production and tightening discipline at the plants. As Christie insisted during the 'Colour House' strike of 1912 at Cordale:⁵

...we argue that the workers must produce colour to satisfy all the machines without extra payment where it is possible...We do not admit that the production is greatly increased; we argue that it does not, however, affect the question...Our main argument is that the Colour House hands must produce as much as they possibly can during day working hours...

This emphasis upon maximum output and managerial prerogatives also caused some unrest amongst the machine printers, with the union officials supporting the drive for increased efficiency in competitive conditions.⁶

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1. UGD 13 5/12, Letter of John Holt to U.T.R., 20.6.1907; Letter of J. Knott, 6.12.1907.
 2. Ibid., Letter of John Holt to Knott enclosed in Letter of M.E.A. to U.T.R., 30.4.1906.
 3. Macintyre, op. cit.
 4. UGD 13 1/8, Letter of Orr Ewings to analyst, 17.4.1880: 'This tarry-like substance is thrown up when [it] is mixed with a solution of chloride of magnesium and it seems to poison the hands of the men...we have had 7 or 8 men laid up...one poor fellow we had to send to the Glasgow Infirmary for amputation of one of his fingers...', for example.
 5. UGD 13 4/3, 'Trade Disputes Ledger of U.T.R. (1912-16)': 11.12.1912.
 6. UGD 13 5/12, Letter of Holt to Knott, 27.3.1907: 'for every one per cent advantage the printers receive from the Employers, the Employers have received a one and a half per cent advantage in return, owing perhaps in some cases to a closer supervision of the Works, but certainly owing also to a greater application of the printers to their work especially in the complicated modern style of work...'

Against this background of rising market competition, mergers and rationalisation, fresh managerial controls and complex union attitudes, dyeing firms such as United Turkey Red were striving to retain maximum labour controls. One of the more effective methods of regulating the local labour market was by use of the discharge line or enquiry form between employers. This system dated back to the 1870s,¹ but during the disquiet of the 1900s the Master Engravers' Association was particularly anxious that it should be strengthened.² More generally, both the Calico Printers' Association and the U.T.R. relied upon negotiated agreements and the good sense of the society officials in restraining precipitate actions amongst the employees.³

The provision of industrial welfare at the Vale of Leven followed these contours of economic growth and industrial relations quite closely. During the middle decades of the 19th century, when the dyeworks were enjoying the rapid expansion which created employment for thousands of local people, Archibald Orr Ewing constructed three substantial rows of houses with two apartments each and reasonably good drainage.⁴ This enabled the firm to attract the necessary labour and maintain a close surveillance of their activities, with tenants evicted once they lost their jobs at the dyeworks.⁵ Another important aspect of company housing was the degree of segregation and preferential treatment which characterised it, as managerial, technical and supervisory staff were found superior dwellings near the employers' residences.⁶

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1. UGD 13 1/8, Letters 25.1.1870 - 18.2.1872.
 2. UGD 13 5/12, Letter from M.E.A. and Master Printers' Association to U.T.R., 8.8.1907.
 3. Ibid., Letter of Knott of M.E.A. to U.T.R., 30.11.1908; UGD 13 4/3, p25 for copy of Bradford Dyers' Association adopted in Scotland; and Letter 19.3.1913, on developments at Burnbrae.
 4. Macintyre, op. cit.
 5. UGD 13 1/8, Letter 20.2.1879: 'We beg to inform you that we do not require your services further...you will please therefore not come back, and arrange...to remove from the house now occupied by you in the prescribed time', for example.
 6. UGD 13 5/12, Loose shettes of Voters for 1907 in Letter Box 2. Six managers, five foremen, one cashier, one clerk, one chemist, three house servants of Christie the director.

Given the hazardous conditions under which many employees operated, the Orr Ewings also developed a system of medical aid and compensation at their plants. When dyeworkers were injured at their tasks the firm followed a 'usual practice of making voluntary allowances until recovery is certified by our Medical Adviser'.¹ Fatal accidents were compensated by a moderate lump sum, although the employers generally refused to admit liability it seems,² and when accidents occurred as a result of improper or negligent conduct the concern refused any award.³

As time went on these customary practices were formalised and a proper 'Works Sick Fund' established for the various units of the U.T.R., as well as the dyers insuring themselves with a commercial company.⁴ The collective resources of the funds adequately covered the claims upon them in 1907, though Christie sought to improve safety by supporting the ambulance classes at Alexandria.⁵ When serious injuries did occur the employers had a long-standing arrangement with local infirmaries to treat the cases and could even place deserving individuals in employment at the hospitals.⁶ Even in the provision of sick aliment the supervisors did relatively better, with foremen kept on full pay for many months and another receiving a month's convalescent leave.⁷

Similar themes are evident in the provision of pensions by the turkey red dyers, with 'retiring allowances' for talented print designers, long-serving employees of the pattern room,⁸ and regular amounts to over a dozen faithful servants by the time of state Old Age Pensions.⁹

1. UGD 13 1/8, Letter 24.11.1885.
2. Ibid., August 1878.
3. Ibid., 7.7.1885, when someone hurt cleaning machines in motion.
4. UGD 13 5/12, Letter of Westminster Fire Office to U.T.R., 15.5.1907.
5. Ibid., Letter of J.R.F. Cullen 11.1.1908.
6. Ibid., 12.5.1884, when a 'widow of one of our late foremen' helped in this respect.
7. Ibid., 15.5.1876.
8. Ibid., 9.2.1884, 10.10.1900, etc.
9. Ibid., Letter 31.8.1908, for list of pensioners at various works. These ranged from 4s to 10s, but were mostly 8s - 10s.

During a period when the firm was attempting to increase efficiency and output, as well as deterring unionisation, the offer of sick pay and pensions would have the advantage of maintaining health and reducing the average age of the workforce. Although the schemes became more formalised as the U.T.R. developed a more coherent managerial system, and the individual contacts replaced by general segregation of benefits between groups, there remained a strong element of discretionary treatment and personal rewards in such services.

Elements of technical efficiency and labour regulation are present also in the provision made for education at Alexandria, with the obvious implications for broader social relations. Archibald Orr Ewing built the school at the town,¹ and in 1869 his manager corresponded with the master concerning the Works School.² There were technical education classes and evening instruction for the children attending the factory,³ as well as a specially-built Roman Catholic Chapel for the female immigrants from Ireland.⁴ Like the public hall endowed by the Orr Ewings, these amenities were the fruits of progress at the Vale, when the growing settlements required social recreation as well as housing accommodation and adequate drainage.

The significance and effectiveness of industrial welfare at the dyeing firms is difficult to gauge, particularly as both industrial and social relations in the area were under considerable strain after 1900. Yet the fact remains that turkey red dyeing increased threefold in the area from the 1880s to the outbreak of War, and despite the serious problems of competition and consolidation before 1914, the firm survived this and the pressures of Wartime production.⁵ Overall, there was probably a shift in emphasis as well as administration within

1. Macintyre, op. cit.

2. UGD 13 1/8, Letter 25.6.1869.

3. Ibid., 28.8.1871; 10.6.1869.

4. Ibid., 11.9.1873; C.f. Letter 11.12.1878.

5. J.B.S. Gilfillan & J. Moseley in R. Müller and J. Tivy (ed.), The Glasgow Region (1958) Glasgow, p181.

the Leven welfare programme, from a concern with providing basic services and accommodation to a movement for graded incentives and rewards although the fortunes of the firm and changing necessities meant that a reduction in capital outlay took place.

Another section of the textiles industry which continued to thrive throughout the 19th century, thereby presenting something of a contrast to the declining cotton trade, was the manufacture of rope or hard fibre cordage. Being a centre of shipping and shipbuilding for many decades, the Clyde had an established tradition of rope production with firms such as the Port Glasgow Rope Company supplying vessels during the 18th century. In 1792 that concern was taken over by new partners and in 1800 erected a spinning mill at Port Glasgow, which helped to meet the demand for sail and other cloth during the Napoleonic Wars.¹ This venture was later was become the Gourock Ropework Company, one of the largest and most successful enterprises in the west of Scotland.

The first member of the Birkmyre family to find employment with the rope establishment began as a foreman, until joining the partnership in 1814. By the middle decades of the century, the Birkmyre family were rising to prominence in the Port Glasgow enterprise and by 1886 three Birkmyres held two thirds of the £162,000 assets.² During the later decades of the century, both company and family alike prospered on Clydeside, with Henry Birkmyre taking over such concerns as the Lanark Spinning Co. and with The Gourock growing from 1886's capital stock of £162,000 to the position in 1904 when a private limited company was formed with assets valued at almost £670,000 and a share capital of £720,000.³ By that time the original plant at Gourock and Port Glasgow had been expanded and further works at Greenock, Govan and New Lanark acquired.⁴

As well as growing in scale the Birkmyre enterprise diversified its production from rope and sailmaking to net manufacture, cotton spinning and metal twine production as markets opened in South America and the British colonial empire.⁵ The figures given below and in the

1. W. Tyson, Rope: A History of the Hard Fibre Cordage Industry in the United Kingdom H.F.C. Institute/Wheatlands (1967) London, p111-15.

2. Ibid., p120-22.

3. See Appendices on textiles.

4. Tyson, op. cit., p121-22.

5. Ibid., p124-27.

appendices indicate the overall pattern of development at the firm after 1874:

Table XL: Assets, Capital Assets, and Gross Trading Profit at The Gourock

Year	Tot. Assets *	Capital Assets **	'Annual Trading Profit'***
1874	260,867	41,401	43,500
1875	301,403	51,880	40,500
1876	323,308	68,623	30,500
1877	342,680	56,149	32,500
1878	333,723	76,705	15,000
1879	274,215	76,900	4,500
1880	287,514	73,050	30,500 ^o
1881	255,298	72,545	15,000 ^o
1882	322,889	72,550	33,915 ^o
1883	329,421	70,550	49,140 ^o
1884	289,431	71,417	28,598
1894	383,851	130,012	36,300 ⁺
1895	375,086	137,908	12,000 ⁺
1896	429,135	139,826	23,544 ⁺
1897	393,043	138,788	29,304 ⁺
1898	440,488	147,041	33,750 ⁺
1899	484,024	166,143	44,160 ⁺
1900	528,725	179,113	57,600 ⁺
1901	558,572	184,929	75,000 ⁺
1902	624,366	228,810	
1903	669,637	243,975 [@]	
1904	706,194	258,538	59,901
1905	644,895	250,064	47,417
1906	712,122	245,418	72,209
1907	802,339	242,464	58,406
1908	760,586	246,892	59,216
1909	818,704	249,359	81,863
1910	862,412	246,667	97,954
1911	844,745	249,306	97,116
1912	899,125	240,978	119,862
1913	950,767	238,782	128,784
1914	900,931	233,119	83,832
1915	883,461	232,399	98,682
1916	914,493	224,630	146,622
1917	979,064	217,178	188,422
1918	1,129,083	223,509	328,850
1919	1,115,766	218,165	312,889
1920	1,551,246	237,184	384,783

Source: UGD 42 109/1-4, The Gourock Ropework Co. Ltd., 'Accounts and Balance Sheets (1904-20)'; UGD 42 23/3, 'Minute Book of Partners (1873-1920)'.

* Total assets including shares in ships, etc., and total credits.

** Capital assets taken as all capital property and plant but minus stock, goods, rents, debts outstanding and such liquid assets.

*** This is very crude calculation before 1904 and refers to the total interest and dividends taken out by partners, after 1904 it refers to gross profit on trading.

@ After 1904 'capital assets' taken as 'Land, Works, Water, Machinery and Housing'.

^o Calculated on % dividend. + Calculated on dividends, etc.

From being a fairly substantial though not massive enterprise in the 1870s, possessing fixed capital and plant of perhaps £40,000, the concern grew quite significantly down to 1920 reaching over £1.5 millions of total assets and making gross trading profits of about one third of a million pounds for the last three years shown.

The same years saw a considerable change in the legal, economic and business structure of the Gourrock Company, as limited liability came only one year after New Lanark had been formally integrated into the Birkmyre empire. More importantly, the partners had decided in 1899 to convert the Lynedoch warehouse into a 'works for the manufacture of Binder Twins', thereby stretching their operations much further along the Clyde coast.¹ This decision was later modified when the Birkmyres discovered that their temporary use of Lynedoch as a sewing loft for manufacturing tents (in great demand during the Boer War), was so effective that the firm could devote part of its resources to this profitable line and shift binder manufacture to Port Glasgow.² The business structure had been largely shaped by the dynamic entrepreneurship of the three Birkmyre partners since the 1880s, after the retirement of Campbell from active leadership and their ousting of Johnstone.³ By 1894 the Birkmyres' predominance was assured and the Memorandum of Association a decade later only confirmed this position.⁴ Such were the pressures of rapid growth and increasing scale during the 1900s, that in 1908 the directors discussed the question of managerial organisation and were:⁵

of the opinion that it would be of advantage to appoint Managers to act under the control of the Board and of the Managing Directors. It was agreed to appoint...Managers during the pleasure of the Board...

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1. UGD 42 23/3, Minutes, 20.5.1899.
 2. Ibid., 1.6.1901: 'because of the large orders from the War Office for tents, which otherwise could not have been taken...it is intended at least for the present to continue it on this work..'
 3. Ibid., 17.5.1884. D.E. Johnstone was the son of an earlier partner who attempted to defend his control in the venture against the Birkmyres.
 4. Ibid., 17.5.1894, when Birkmyres held 66.6% of stock; UGD 42 104/10, 'Gourrock Ropework Company Memorandum and Articles of Association'.
 5. UGD 42 148/8, 'Valuation of the Works (1908-15)', enclosed "Directors' Resolution (1908)"; Hannah, loc. cit. (1974), p13-15 for emergence of managerial control in larger concerns and mergers during 1900s.

The records of the Gourrock Ropework Company show, therefore, a very successful enterprise growing rapidly during the years 1874-1920 and initiating a series of dynamic policies in the production and marketing of various goods at Port Glasgow, Greenock and New Lanark before 1908 when the directors introduced a more systematic management at their expanding plants. During this growth and prosperity, considerations of labour supply and efficiency remained of primary importance. Like the cotton spinning and textile dyeing trades, rope and twine manufacture relied heavily upon female labour, and the move to the Greenock Lynedoch works was considered necessary with 'female labour being scarce in Port Glasgow and plentiful in Greenock'.¹ Just as the Orr Ewings scoured the west coast of Ireland in their search for cheap and amenable girls to work the oily house, so the Birkmyres sought girls and women to staff the rope, twine and binder works as well as labour in the sewing lofts and net rooms operated by the Gourrock.

It is in this context of economic expansion and continuing labour needs that we must trace the development of industrial welfare at the firm after the 1870s. Although a good proportion of the females would be living at their parents' or husband's house, there were some skilled workers required to set up and supervise the production process as well as some older women working as supervisors who required accommodation. In this situation the partners thought it advisable to invest part of their resources in housing property over the three decades before 1904.

Table XLI: Housing Investment and Capital Investment at Gourrock, 1874-1904²

<u>Year</u>	<u>Capital Assets *</u>	<u>Housing Assets</u>	<u>Proportion of Total (%)</u>
1874	41,401	13,484	32.56
1875	51,880	19,570	37.72
1876	68,623	23,183	33.78
1877	56,149	22,850	40.69
1878	76,705	22,850	29.78
1879	76,900	16,850 +	21.91
1880	73,050	16,350	22.38
1881	72,545	16,300	22.46
1882	72,550	16,300	22.46
1883	70,550	15,300	21.68
1884	71,417	15,300	21.42
1894	130,012	15,650	12.03
1895	137,908	15,650	11.34
1896	139,826	16,670	11.92
1897	138,788	16,670	12.01
1898	147,041	19,610	13.33
1899	166,143	26,240	15.79
1900	179,113	28,610	15.97
1901	184,929	28,880	15.61
1902	228,810	29,280	12.79
1903	243,975	29,972	12.28

The figures suggest that housing investment as a proportion of fixed capital assets was significant throughout the years 1874 to 1904, and that at certain periods increasing housing investment followed the general trend in capital additions. Thus, during the prosperous years of the early 1870s and during the 'home boom' of 1896-1901, there were housing additions which increased its relative importance in the investments of the concern. During such periods the labour needs of the firm and the funds available for capital additions were presumably such that housing investment seemed the rational choice. The close fit between industrial expansion and housing additions is also indicated by the break down of specific properties given below:

Table XLIII: Housing Properties at Gourock Ropework Co., 1874-1904

Year	Workmen's Houses	Bay Street	Telfer's Place	Campbell St.*	Total
1874	6,122	-	-	7,362	13,484
1875	12,220	-	-	7,350	19,570
1876	15,833	1,350	-	6,000	23,183
1877	15,500	1,350	-	6,000	22,850
1878	15,500	1,350	-	6,000 ⁺	22,850
1879	15,500	1,350	-	-	16,850 ⁺
1880	15,000	1,350	-	-	16,350
1881	15,000	1,300	-	-	16,300
1882	15,000	1,300	-	-	16,300
1883	14,000	1,300	-	-	15,300
1884	14,000	1,300	-	-	15,300
1894	13,900	1,300	450	-	15,650
1895	13,900	1,300	450	-	15,650
1896	13,900	2,320	450	-	16,670
1897	13,900	2,320	450	-	16,670
1898	16,840	2,320	450	-	19,610
1899	23,470	2,320	450	-	26,240
1900	25,840	2,320	450	-	28,610
1901	26,110	2,320	450	-	28,880
1902	26,510	2,320	450	-	29,280
1903	27,202	2,320	450	-	29,972
1904	?	2,320	450	-	?

Source: UGD 42 23/3 figures, calculated therefrom.

* Campbell Street seems to comprise both a warehouse and also some house property.

+ Campbell Street included in 'works' figure after 1878 and its housing component is therefore lost.

1. UGD 42 23/3, Minutes, 20.5.1899.

2. Calculated from figures at UGD 42 23/3.

* Capital assets taken to be general fixed capital such as property, plant and machinery but excluding stocks, etc.

+ This figure is compound of various properties including Campbell St., and may be subject to modification.

As the Greenock works were established from 1899 there was a further impetus towards construction of dwellings, probably furnishing accommodation for the skilled and supervisory grades so essential to the successful launching of the plant.¹ After 1904 there was little added to the Port Glasgow workmen's houses valued at over £27,000, but in 1914 there were plans to extend the holdings at Bay Street,² and the Birkmyres continued to hold an assortment of small properties at various situations throughout the War.³ Then in 1920 the firm spent another £16,000 acquiring the 'Clunbraefoot Property', which probably included (if it was not wholly) housing.⁴

Nor was this activity confined to the Clyde ports, since the Gourock firm was also responsible for improving and reshaping the model village of New Lanark. There could be no greater testimony to the relative decline of cotton and prosperity of rope and twine than the adoption of Dale and Owen's settlement by the dynamic Birkmyres after its slow decline during the 19th century.⁵ The policies adopted by the ropemakers at New Lanark after 1903 are suggested by the following figures:

Table XLIII: Assets and Additions at New Lanark, 1903-13

Year	Sector and Assets	Additions	Deprec.	Valuation
1903	Fixed Pl. & Mach.	9,420	7,140	29,750
1903	Buildings	3,577	11,580	48,228
1913	Site value			6,880
1913	Water power			7,200
1913	Buildings			40,225
1913	Fixed Pl. & Mach.			32,020
1913	Dom. Water Supply			1,500
1913	Total			87,835

Source: UGD 42 148/48, 'Valuation of Works (1908-15)', Letter 24.12.1913 giving 1913 valuation for purposes of 1910 Finance Act.

1. George Blake, 'The Gourock' Gourock Ropework Co. (1963) Port Glasgow, p59: 'The preponderance of female labour employed by The Gourock...is one of the striking features of this type of factory work. There must always be a proportion of men on the engineering and maintenance sides, in the supervisory grades, and for the hard and skilled labour in the ropewalks.'
2. UGD 42 108/48, 'Memorandum to Property in Bay St. (Whitsun 1914)'.
3. Ibid., Letter of Gourock Co. to Maclay Ltd., August 1915.
4. UGD 42 109/4, 'Accounts and A.G.M. Papers', Accounts for 1920.
5. B.T. Danek, 'Robert Owen at New Lanark' (Typescript) in UGD 42 31/20, 'New Lanark Mill Flats Records', for work of Owen and housing.

The figures would appear to suggest a shift towards greater expenditure on capital equipment and relatively less on buildings, in a bid to ensure that net making was as profitable as possible. Whilst there was little fresh housing at this period, the Gourock firm did strive to improve the standard of sanitation and general fabric at New Lanark thereby meeting the requirements of local health authorities.¹

The impact which this accommodation had upon the finances of the firm and upon the incomes of the inhabitants, can partly be estimated by comparing rental income with profitability:

Table XLIV: Rental Income and Profits at Gourock Ropework Co., 1903-20

Year	Total Rents	New Lanark Rents	Net Trading Profit
1903	2,396	558	
1904	2,371	660	54,888
1905	1,831	637	43,581
1906	1,744	729	69,499
1907	1,706	737	55,672
1908	1,516	789	52,728
1909	1,851	735	75,702
1910	1,746	660	92,212
1911	1,538	745	91,914
1912	1,711	478	117,750
1913	1,979	626	132,841
1914	1,800	556	91,786
1915	1,699	550	108,356
1916	1,813	463	149,763
1917	?	?	184,601
1918	1,461	474	263,974
1919	2,535	314	113,950
1920	999	291	243,945

Source: UGD 42 109/1-4, 'Accounts and A.G.M. Papers'.

The steady fall of rental income from 1903 to 1908 suggests that either Gourock were selling off properties - which is not shown in accounts - or that rents were being reduced. Since profits fell after 1906 and then recovered steadily from 1909 it may be that the directors were willing to subsidise employees' rents in lean periods, or that the healthy level of general profits was such that they could afford this 'social wage' component in the outgoings. In any case, since the firm held over 300 dwelling houses it is obvious that per unit rent must have been modest and were remarkably stable during the housing shortages

1. UGD 42 105/7, Letter from Duncan Glen of Lanark Council to Gourock Co., 12.12.1903; also UGD 42 40/7.

of 1914-20, when rents actually declined in Gourock properties.

One reason for the general low level of rental income was the system of pension tenancies operated by the Birkmyres at their Port Glasgow dwellings. In a petition of 1926 against Greenock's burgh extension, the Gourock listed fourteen tenants as 'pensioners',¹ and at least some of these were taken up by older women who retired from the firm's service as widows.² This had the undoubted advantage of rewarding personal loyalty and endeavour as well as keeping such respectable employees off the Poor Rates.³

Efficiency was also promoted by the insistence upon high safety standards at the different plants, and the provision of various medical services. One long-serving employee was dismissed after more than forty years at Gourock when she was discovered cleaning a machine in motion,⁴ though the management was usually more tolerant in its methods. The following figures show the amounts spent on the various services at the ropeworks after 1904:

Table XLV: Expenditure on Medical, Insurance and Personal Services, 1905-20

<u>Year</u>	<u>Ambulance, etc.</u>	<u>Nat. Ins.</u>	<u>Subs, Pensions, Dons.</u>	<u>Net Trad. Prof</u>
1905			434	43,581
1906			444	69,499
1907			401	55,672
1908			447	52,728
1909	397		544	75,702
1910	431		542	92,212
1911			420	91,914
1912		1,077	552	117,750
1913	346	1,353	541	132,841
1914	304	1,008	488	91,786
1915	264	919	412	108,356
1916	372	808	913	149,763
1917	?	?	?	184,601
1918	400	641	860	263,974
1919	463	613	1,333	113,950
1920	694	867	1,710	243,945

Source: UGD 42 109/1-4.

Although the sums expended were by no means very great, they did represent quite a significant proportion as against net trading profits - the £941 in 1909 being over one per cent. of profit for example.

1. UGD 42 22/1, 'Petition of Gourock Ropework Co. against Burgh annexation of Port Glasgow to Greenock (1926)'.

2. Blake, op. cit., p63.

3. UGD 42 22/1, op. cit., Para. 12.

4. Blake, op. cit., p62.

When considering the possible motivation for such services as pensions and medical treatment, it is necessary to emphasise the absence of certain provisions as much as the existence of others. Although some of the housing at least went to the skilled and supervisory grades, there is little sign either of industrial unrest or of strategic welfare provision. Only in the interwar years did certain tensions and problems of communication suggest the need for a more positive managerial policy in this respect.¹ Secondly, it is clear that although the Birkmyres confined much of their welfare activity to personal discretionary amenities, there was scope within the Memorandum of Association for profit-sharing and other formalised schemes.² Nor were the employers and their managers insensitive to the value of welfare expenditure as a means of promoting the benevolent public image of the company, especially important when the ropemakers were a rising transnational enterprise.³

There were also other branches of the textiles trades in the west of Scotland which were flourishing in these years, and which also espoused welfarist principles. One industrial process which was similar in many respects to dyeing and ropemaking in the amount of skilled artistic labour required to prepare and supervise manufacture was carpet-making.⁴ The most impressive concern in the Glasgow area was that of James Templeton, where over seven hundred people were employed in 1869 - three decades after its foundation and two years after its products were exhibited at the Paris Exhibition.⁵ The original Templetons had made their fortunes and reputation by a combination of quality designs and technical innovation, with keen management of the Greehead and Mile-End works and energetic marketing overseas as well as in Britain.⁶

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1. UGD 42 104/1 Box, The Gourock Magazine No.8 (1949), quotes the 1937 issue as stating: "The success of the business depends a great deal on co-operation...in a concern such as The Gourock Ropework Co., where even the five works are more or less separate entities...'keeping in touch' is more difficult...without the retention of that personal touch there will be no real progress."
 2. UGD 42 104/10, Memorandum para.13.
 3. UGD 42 24/8, 'Correspondence with Australasia', Letter from New Zealand office to Gourock, 23.4.1936, on importance of celebrations for the employees and publicity to be gained therefrom.
 4. Bremner, op. cit., p187-9, for account of James Templetons.
 5. Ibid.
 6. UGD 90 1/1, James Templeton, 'Sales Analyses Book, London and Glasgow (1879-1910)'.

Although they remained for many years a completely private concern, Templetons grew at an impressive rate and were able to exploit the growing market for cheaper carpets woven by machines. There are few surviving records of such firms but it is known that Templetons were both active welfarists and prominent in the life of Glasgow as philanthropists and civic reformers. During the expansion of the 1880s, when Templetons were building their new Mile-End works, the firm began an accident and sickness provision scheme.¹ This was encouraged by the building disaster of 1889, when part of the works collapsed on employees injuring many women. One crippled worker was given 10s. per week for sixty years as a consequence, and others were helped by staff assigned to supervise the awards.²

Besides sickness payments, there was both a Benevolent Trust and a Provident Fund at the carpet factory, founded in 1894 and 1921 respectively.³ The Provident Fund distributed substantial payments to servants who had worked at the firm for long periods and who had demonstrated their loyalty to the family.⁴ In addition there were personal 'windfall awards' which were granted at the complete discretion of the firm to deserving individuals.⁵ Finally, Templetons operated a Factory Savings Bank from 1883, whereby the staff's resources were used in the business and paid regular interest.⁶ Besides ensuring a harmony of economic interests, this scheme provided a very useful form of liquid funds for the enterprise at a time of rapid growth.

The case of Templetons demonstrates that a formal company and managerial structure is not a necessary pre-condition for the development of formal welfare schemes. Yet the arrangements did emerge during the period of economic growth from the 1880s to the early 1920s, when the pressures for more strict organisation of the works were apparent. Moreover, the Templetons were clearly able managers in their own right as well as having a strong moral commitment (partly derived from the close connections with the Dales and Owens), to the welfare of their workers.

1. Oral History Evidence of Miss McGranachan (December 1975), Templetons Ltd.

2. *Ibid.*, case of Mrs. E. Johnstone; also 'Bad Story Book' note.

3. Templeton Benevolent Trust records at Templetons Ltd., Glasgow.

4. W. Young, Templetons & Co. Published by Templetons/Collins (1952)

5. Oral Evidence, op. cit.

6. Young, op. cit., p32.

This brief review of some textiles firms suggests the importance of economic growth and changing labour needs in the development of industrial welfare. The central theme appears to have been the domination of local labour markets, and in this respect there were strong similarities between the efforts to import girls from western Ireland and the provision of incentives for 'free labour' at Leans and elsewhere. Whilst cotton textiles, jute manufacturing and silk weaving were all facing difficulties in these years, the employers in dyeing, ropemaking and carpet production were all managing to expand their output despite the lower prices which some of them faced. It is not surprising, therefore, that there appears to be greater evidence of welfare expansion in the latter trades and amongst the more successful enterprises. The formative years for cotton and jute were the early decades of the century, when large colonies such as Deanston and Catrine were established. During the middle years of the 19th century, dyers built up the Vale of Leven into an impressive centre of cotton dyeing and finishing and it was during the 1860s and 1870s that infrastructural welfare was most pronounced. Ropemaking had been a traditional occupation of Clydeside, but it was from the 1870s that concerns such as Gourrock experienced the rapid growth that came with increasing shipbuilding tonnage, and here again heavy investment was linked to bursts of expansion. Carpet manufacturers such as Templetons were also emerging as major employers in the 1870s and 1880s, and though there was less pressure upon them to provide housing and related facilities they did promote important services particularly for the females.

Overall, it does not seem as though female employment in itself was responsible for the encouragement of welfare services and in fact the density of females in cotton and other trades largely accounts for low wages and the inflexibility of output. Here welfare was an adjunct of greater exploitation and the low-wage economy and in some senses may have operated as a substitute for better remuneration. Much of the expenditure went upon selective treatment for skilled and supervisory grades of males rather than the women they overlooked.

Within certain industries one can detect a shift in emphasis from welfare investment in heavy capital projects such as housing, to a greater concern with efficiency and discipline, although this again depended on the position and resources of the business and the imagination

of the businessman. Where the enterprise grew sufficiently to merit the creation of managerial staff and greater organisation of labour, or where the employers themselves recognised the need for effective management control, then there was a greater propensity for welfare to develop. Naturally, those trades which were expanding and those firms which enjoyed greatest prosperity had more motivation to engage in welfarism, but survivors in cotton and dyeing were also willing to countenance investment and expenditure in these directions. The effectiveness of schemes is hard to calculate, but the balance sheets usually suggest that the rationale behind welfare was usually sound.

The comparison of textiles in the west of Scotland with those textile trades in the West Riding presents three initial problems. Firstly, there is the difficulty of comparing two very different regional economies, although regional contrast as well as comparison is central to any understanding of economic development.¹ Secondly, we are dealing with two heterogeneous textiles industries rather than one industry in dissimilar regions. Thirdly, the chronology of development is different in many respects, with the Scottish cotton textiles sector in long decline from the 1870s whilst the wool textiles trade of Yorkshire revived strongly before 1914.²

Beyond these general difficulties, there is the problem of selecting some sample of representative firms which will reflect diversity of scale as well as occupation. There are some local concerns which were large and are well-known to historians for their activities (including welfare in some cases). Others were substantial enterprises which have been little studied, and very many more which were small scale concerns and which never kept or have lost their business records.³ The smaller concern was obviously more prevalent in many industries than the large business, and since records of the latter are most likely to survive we have a naturally distorted and untypical selection of concerns to study.

1. Broude, loc. cit., p593-4, passim.
2. Sigsworth and Blackman, loc. cit., p153-57.
3. Ibid., p128, for similar point.

The major problem is therefore to assess the relative significance of forces contributing to the development of industrial welfare at the regional, industrial, trade, and firm levels. So far it would seem that factors affecting the individual enterprise are, or can be, just as important as the broader industrial context and that even in declining trades certain enterprises can survive as 'leading firms' by adopting progressive technological, business and managerial policies which may well include the provision of welfare. By contrasting the largely cotton (and hard fibre) based textiles industry of the west of Scotland with the woolen based industry in the West Riding, it is possible to assess the impact of market environment as well as locational and other factors.

The following survey skirts around the hazards of defining and describing the highly complex and fragmented character of West Riding textiles and its historical development.¹ This heterogeneity and specialisation is even more pronounced than in the cotton districts of Lancashire or west Scotland,² with a marked difference between cloth makers and clothes makers, as well as between woolen and worsted branches of the industry.³

This geographical specialisation meant that peculiar locational factors must be taken into account when reviewing the policies of particular firms, and their decision to stay in one isolated area rather than moving to larger conurbations. The most famous case of an employer choosing to leave a densely populated town for a spacious site, is that of Titus Salt's departure from Bradford to Saltaire, but in this (and many other respects) Salt was only following the rationale of many rivals.

1. Wild, loc. cit., p225-26: 'An important feature of the development of the West Riding wool textiles industry during the latter half of the nineteenth century was the emergence of quite strongly differentiated geographical specializations involved in specific branches and sections of the trade...'
2. Macrosty, op. cit., p117.
3. Herbert Heaton, The Yorkshire Woolen and Worsted Industries O.U.P. (1965), p296: 'The small independant clothier never existed in the worsted industry ...The worsted manufacturer was usually a large employer, with a flock of workpeople at his command...This then was the great difference between the two branches of the cloth industry; in a woolen trade a large number of small men, in the worsted a small number of big men.'

The changes which occurred in the structure and location of the wool textiles industry in these years were spread unevenly across the different branches of the trade, as were the reforms introduced by employers to meet these challenging conditions.

Table XLVI: Businesses and Limited Liability in Wool Textiles, 1870-1912

Section	Firms 1870	Ltd Lb.	Surviving 1912*	Total 1912	Ltd Lb. 1912
Finishers	108	2	2	40	8 (20%)
Dyers	134	0	15	124	53 (47%)
Merchants	518	3	32	337	19 (5.6%)
Wool Manf.	1,572	2	139	439	153 (35%)
Wor Sp/Man.	278	1	42	184	36 (20%)
Worst Spin.	131	0	23	204	54 (26%)
Worst Man.	270	1	19	237	48 (20%)
Worst Comb.	33	0	4	53	15 (29%)
Worst T.M.	19	0	0	20	2 (10%)
Totals	3,063	9	276	1,638	388 (24%)

Source: Sigsworth and Blackman, *op. cit.*, p130, 152, calculated therefrom.

* This is total surviving from 1870 to 1912.

The total number of enterprises operating in the various branches of wool textiles was only half that of 1870 by the immediate pre-War years, and the rapid turnover of firms ensured that well under ten per cent. of businesses continued throughout these years. One response to the high casualty rate amongst the manufacturers was the emergence of the limited liability company, from being less than one per cent. of firms in 1870 they constituted almost one quarter by 1912. So although the vertically-integrated firm and the limited liability form was more prevalent in woolen rather than worsted, there was a general movement towards consolidation of enterprises and limitation of legal liability. Amongst the most dramatic examples of this trend were the various initiatives towards mergers and horizontal integration of firms engaged in one process, as in the Bradford Dyers' Association and the much less effective Woolcombers' Association.¹

Although there were significant differences between the west of Scotland and West Riding, as well as within the regional textiles trade, all of the employers shared the common need for an efficient and disciplined labour force. Just as the Finlay family and other cotton employers

1. Macrosty, *op. cit.*, p123, 171-75; Sigsworth and Blackman, *loc. cit.*, p151.

faced serious resistance amongst the operatives during the 1830s, so many of the earliest wool cloth manufacturers had to forcibly train their workpeople in regularity and obedience. Benjamin Gott and his lieutenants were well aware of the disruptive effect which unionists had upon their workforce at Leeds and Burley.¹ Amongst the most systematic antidotes to such discontents, were the rigorous apprenticeship schemes and awards introduced by Gott,² and the practice of pensions for loyal servants devised in the 1840s.³ Although his establishment closed upon his death in 1868, Gott's will provided for a host of devoted workpeople who received personal pensions and awards after his death.⁴

Whilst the Gott enterprise terminated quite naturally with its architect's own demise, there were many other woolen manufacturers which were being forced into bankruptcy by the harsh conditions of the 1870s and 1890s. Many such employers were little more than affluent handicraftsmen,⁵ but even the larger capitalists felt the pressures of falling prices, changing market demands and over-production of woolen goods.⁶ Although they did not face the disastrous slump in exports which mixed worsted producers experienced, the woolen firms were forced into consolidating their smaller units of production and increasing their output and expertise.

One firm which successfully navigated the difficult conditions of these decades was William Fison and Co., of Burley in Wharfedale, which had been operating near Leeds since the early years of the century. In 1842 the Fisons accepted the young W.E. Forster as a partner, whose business career and later political prominence bears comparison with that of his great rival, Joseph Camberlain of Birmingham.⁷ Although Forster's Quaker commitments may have strengthened the firm's commitment to industrial welfare, it seems likely that Fison was at

1. Gott Papers, BLL 193, 'Report on the Strike of 1831' (By 'J.D.'): 'Out of the 74 Weavers who were here at the reduction [of wages in] in 1826 - 56 turned out and 18 remained at work, so that only about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the turnouts were here at that time...which shows that more than half of them had either left or been discharged...So they are much addicted to change.'; E. Lipson, The History of the Woolen and Worsted Industries Frank Cass (1965) London, p176 for career of Gott.

2. BLL 193, 'Miscellaneous Records (Receipts)', entry 1847 for Edward Martin.

3. BLL 193, entry February 1947 to Catherine Schofield.

4. BLL 19, 'B. Gott Letters to B. Dixons (Correspondence with workers)'.

least equally committed to the improvement of working and social conditions amongst his workers.¹

The location of the wool staple firm in Burley appears to have encouraged the Fisons to provide company housing during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,² although by that period they had been operating for many decades. The following figures suggest the scale of Fison holdings:

Table XLVII: Housing Property at William Fison and Co. (1918)

Location	No. Houses	Valuation	Total Yield	% Return
Pleasant Row	14	235 each		
Peel Place	3	300 "		
Park Row	14	220 "		
North View	17	190 "		
Total	48	10,500	300-310	2.95%

Source: William Fison and Co., BCL 'Rents Ledger 1918-24'.

Most of the building activity for these dwellings seems to have occurred in the 1900s, when trading conditions were again favourable for the growth of wool textiles, but there were additions after 1910 so that as many as 56 houses were held before 1920 and almost 80 dwellings by 1924 when Fisons reviewed their housing policies.³

The occupants of the housing were largely workers at the firm's Greenholme Mill, although one third of the inhabitants worked elsewhere:

Table XLVIII: Occupants of Fison Housing at Greenholme (1924)

Location	Houses	Occupants	Child.	Greenholme Wk	Elsewhere*	Tot.
Iron Row	15	31	8	9	7	16
Pleasant Row	14	62	16	27	14	41
Spring Gdns	13	54	12	21	8	29
North View	17	94	26	33	18	51
Peel Place	3	21	6	10	4	14
Park Row	14	81	20	23	19	42
Greenholme	6	35	4	5	7	12
Totals	79	378	92	128	77	205

Source: *Ibid.*, 'Rents Ledger', figures calculated therefrom.

* This figure includes six 'others' of whom five were probably landladies or pension tenants.

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5. Sigsworth and Blackman, *loc. cit.*, p131.
 6. See George Thomson's evidence to Royal Commission on Labour below.
 7. Wemyss Reid, *Life of W.E. Forster* (1970 Reprint) London, 145, 165, etc.
 1. Anon., *Fortunes Made in Business* (1889) London, p391.
 2. Sigsworth and Blackman, *loc. cit.*, p153-57.
 3. See below.

The standard of the housing appears to have been relatively high, with two bedrooms, attics and cellars as well as scullery, kitchen and garden, which suggests that Fisons were ready to expend large amounts on attracting a good workforce during the growth of 1900-24.¹ This is also confirmed by the low return on capital outlay as represented in fortnightly rents against valuation, with a high peak of £316 in rents during 1918.²

The low return is partly explained by the variety of concession tenancies offered by the Burley firm, with pension and service agreements as well as standard rental and (particularly in 1920s) outright sale to tenants. As many as one third of dwellings were operated under service tenancies before 1924, and individuals like Mrs. Kelly occupied their houses as part of a pension arrangement.³ When difficult conditions began to affect Fisons seriously in the early 1920s, they were forced to sell off their properties and reduce liabilities - illustrating once again the close dependance of welfare and growth.⁴

It was during the prosperous decades of the mid-19th century and the 1880s that Fisons furnished Burley with many of their public facilities and institutions. The local public hall, library, lecture hall and church were all provided and subsidised by the employers in order that their workpeople might share in the fruits of a civilising progress.⁵ The rise of trade unionism and socialist propaganda throughout the West Riding in the 1880s and 1890s must have spurred such benevolence to fresh initiatives, and may also account for the renewed interest in company housing.

The fear of labour unrest and union militancy was certainly present in the mind of other woolen manufacturer, George Thomson of Woodhouse near Huddersfield.⁶ In 1883 there had been a major strike and lockout at the town, involving the newly-formed Huddersfield Powerloom Weavers' Association (later the West Riding Weavers' Association), thereby ending

1. Ibid., 'Mortgage Application' enclosed gives details.
2. Ibid., 2.11.1918 figures. Thereafter the figures fluctuated between £270 and £350.
3. Ibid., 'Memorandum' enclosed naming Bethsheba Kelly of Iron Row.
4. Ibid., the deposits for purchase ranging from £17 to £115.
5. Fortunes Made in Business, op. cit., p391.
6. George Thomson Papers, Notes (loose) in TZ 5 on French Revolution. See chapter eight on ideology of welfare for the contribution of Thomson and major influences upon him.

decades of fairly stable industrial relations in the West Riding.¹ Thomson himself diagnosed the ills of the wool textiles industry as arising from the spread of machinery, rapid technological change leading to overproduction and obsolescence with smaller firms hit the worst:²

That (depression) is not at all due to a falling off in the demand?

No I do not think it is...the demand is as large if not larger than ever.

-Then the fact is the industry itself is in the process of transition?

It is, and small firms are being gradually dried up and the large ones taking their place.

That is to say, capital which has been sunk in the old machinery is no longer remunerative, and it does not pay to work it?

That is so.

I suppose they cannot work it to any profit even?

That is about the case; profits are cut very close.

In response to falling prices and profits many manufacturers were eager to reduce labour costs by cutting wages, increasing work-loads and substituting female labour for male workers.³ The long-term trend towards increasing employment of women and young persons meant that low wages were prevalent by the years of the Great Depression, which sharpened the need for unionism whilst eroding its potential for development (given the slow rate of female recruitment).⁴ So highly specialised and dispersed were the firms, and so limited in their resources, scale and means of survival, that trade unionism emerged only gradually and encountered the bitter resistance of most textiles masters.⁵

It was in this context of increasing competition and industrial strife that George Thomson operated his Woodhouse factory, employing 140 people in 1892 and manufacturing 'the best class of woollen goods'.⁶ There were strong pressures during the 1870s and 1880s to save costs

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1. H. Clegg, A. Fox, A.F. Thompson, A History of British Trade Unions since 1889 Vol. I 1889-1910 O.U.P. (1964), p185.
 2. The Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence Group C Vol.I (1892) C. 6708; Evid. of George Thomson, Q 7116 - 24.
 3. W.G. Rimmer, Marsalls of Leeds: Flax Spinners 1788-1886 C.U.P. (1960), p248-49, etc.
 4. Minutes of Evidence, C. 6708, op. cit.; evidence of Ben Turner and Henry Drew of W.R.Y.P.W.A., who claimed that an average wage of 9s per week was paid.

by reducing quality, but Thomson made a conscious decision (justified in view of later sales and reputation), to concentrate upon long runs of high-quality cloth with specialist designs and weaving styles.¹

Although not a large enterprise, Woodhouse was able to give employment to over a hundred people throughout the years 1886-1914, with only a gradual contraction of employees.²

The management policy on skilled workers and mechanisation was also distinctive, with Thomson refusing to 'cheapen' labour by employing female weavers in place of males and claiming a much higher productivity as a result.³ Whilst Thomson was very keen to promote technical and artistic education, and the handicraft skills of the male weaver, he also recognised the need for progressive technical innovation and refitted the Woodhouse Mill after 1900.⁴

Actual supervision and organisation at the plant was very much in the hands of Thomson himself, and his fellow directors at the limited company. Although many of the shares were held by outsiders and his own workers, and there were even worker directors at Woodhouse, the bulk of the resources and the power lay with George Thomson himself.⁵ In sharp contrast to most of his fellow-employers, the founder of what became Woodhouse co-partnership welcomed the advent of trade unionism and allowed two union officials to sit on the board of directors.⁶

The consequence of Thomson's radical approach to management was a highly effective and competitive enterprise which possessed £17,000 in share capital and which showed a total of £7,000 in clear profit on the £250,000 of goods sold in the years 1886-95 at Woodhouse.⁷ Amidst the rapid turnover of similar concerns, the Huddersfield factory was able to completely re-equip and maintain its employees

5. J. Reynolds and K. Laybourn, 'The Emergence of the Independent Labour Party in Bradford' International Review of Social History XX No.3 (1975), p316-17.

6. Minutes of Evidence, C. 6708, op. cit.; Q 7074 - 89.

1. Thomson Collection HCL TZ 15, Manuscript Notes: 'In manufacture we require work substantial rather than rich in make; and refined, rather than splendid in design. Your goods need not be such as would catch the eye of a duchess; but they should be such as many at once secure the need, and refine the taste of a cottager.'

2. Thomson HCL TZ 7, Newspaper cutting of The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, notes that Woodhouse mill 'is not a big one. It employs over one hundred people...'

3. Minutes of Evidence, C. 6708, op. cit., Q 7152 - 53.

4. The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, op. cit.

in either work or wages, as well as showing profits beyond the handsome salary paid to Thomson as managing director.¹

Industrial welfare at Woodhouse was more than an adjunct to the effective operation of a successful wool manufacturer: it became a celebration of Thomson's vision of industrial co-partnership and Christian socialism.² As Thomson wrote in a report of 1890, describing the growth of the registered co-partnership since 1886:³

At this rate [of] progress in the position of the Society [it] will soon be secure, and Mr. Thomson and his co-partners will then be able to devote their attention to the higher aspects of associative life - provision for sickness, old age, hard times, the establishment of educational facilities, and the adoption of other means of promoting the physical, moral and intellectual improvement of the workers.

The Woodhouse partners waited until 1893 before inaugurating the Sickness and Accident Fund, on a non-contributory basis and financed out of the profits of the enterprise.⁴ If an employee was ill for a week, then a minimum wage (calculated on income and service) was paid to him and half-wages thereafter.⁵

These benefits came not from the current revenue of the Mill, but from the central administration unit of Woodhouse welfare - the Assurance and Pension Fund. Previously, accidental injuries and fatalities had been covered by awards from the firm as legal employer, but with the establishment of the Pension Fund in the early 1890s, sick pay and endowments as well as pensions were paid out of this non-contributory agency.⁶ There were a steady stream of pensioners who received about 7s. - 10s., per week, and by 1909 there had been over £2,000 paid out

5. Minutes of Evidence, C. 6708, op. cit., Q 7138 - 40, for the overall managerial power of Thomson.
6. Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, op. cit.; Minutes of Evidence C. 6708, op. cit. Q 4977, for favourable reception given to Woodhouse scheme by Downing and Gee of Power Loom Weavers' Association.
7. George Thomson, A Practical Industrial Partnership (c. 1896), in TZ 7, for figures on first decade of the enterprise's operation.
1. Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, op. cit., gives figures that machinery at Huddersfield 'has been consistently depreciated from £8,655 to £1,680.'
2. See chapter eight for a discussion of Thomson's ideas and his place in the welfare movement.
3. Thomson MS draft in TZ 5.
4. The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, op. cit.
5. A Practical Industrial Partnership, op. cit., p3.
6. The Factory Times 1907 in TZ 19.

in pensions to the loyal servants of the co-operative.¹

Another aspect of welfare was the fostering of technical and artistic education for the textile workers at Woodhouse. This corresponded with Thomson's profound belief in the Ruskinian doctrines of aesthetics and creative manual labour,² which the Huddersfield employer always insisted that he was implementing at Woodhouse.³ At the same time, Thomson was enough of a shrewd and determined businessman to recognise the needs of technical progress and labour efficiency. Although he favoured some hand loom training, he never attempted to match William Morris's initiative at The Firm and rely solely on handicraft excellence.

These facilities were in some respects merely the natural extension of the original form of the Woodhouse concern, and were rather less well-known than the radical innovations of proportional profit-sharing and industrial partnership in 1886. Thomson was already a successful manufacturer when his experiences and reading convinced him of the urgent need for a practical and ethical co-operation amongst employers and workmen.⁴ The previous well-known scheme at the Briggs's collieries had not encouraged the hopes of industrial reformers, yet Thomson found many sympathisers amongst the Christian socialists and co-operators with whom he corresponded.⁵

Profits were shared on an annual basis, with each employee able to accumulate sufficient amounts to purchase shares in the firm as well as purchasing them outright.⁶ Although the amounts (3d per £ of wages in 1892 for example), there were four-fifths of the workpeople holding shares at this time - one third of these shares being purchased by accumulated profit bonuses.⁷ This holding interest reinforced the democratic image of Woodhouse, with Thomson as managing director and flanked by a board elected from shareholders, workforce and trade unions

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1. Thomson Coll., HCL TC 63, Letter of Marquis of Ripon to Thomson, 5.6.1897, noting the 'success which has attended your Assurance and Pension Fund'; The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, op. cit. for figures.
 2. Thomson MS Notebook in TZ 1-10 Box I, "Ruskin and Labour" notes.
 3. The Spectator 17.2.1900, reprinted in Ruskin and Modern Business in TZ 7.
 4. "Ruskin and Labour" notes, op. cit.; Minutes of Evidence, C. 6708, Q 7125.
 5. TC 18, Letter of Henry Riley to Thomson, 12.2.1887.
 6. Minutes of Evidence, C. 6708, op. cit., Q 7088 - 94.
 7. Ibid., of the total value of shares (£600 - £700), £200 were accumulated in bonus.

and with outside workmen as well as Woodhouse employees numbered amongst the shareholders.

Yet if one examines the ownership and control of the co-operative, the structure of authority and management within the concern, and the implications of industrial welfare for managerial control, then it is possible to derive a very different picture of the co-partnership. In the first place, the distribution of assets and shares within the firm ensured the continuing financial hold of Thomson, who held £12,000 of the £17,000 total in loan stock after transferring the assets to Woodhouse Society.¹ Of the £5,320 held in shares only £600 were owned by various employees, another £2,843 by outside bodies or persons and the remainder by Thomson himself. Amongst the outsiders there were only one quarter who were 'really and truly workmen, apart from our own workers'.²

By virtue of his position as the major creditor of the firm and its principal shareholder, Thomson was in an overwhelmingly powerful position at the election of directors and choice of management. Even if he had not possessed this pivotal role, the constitution of the co-operative guaranteed him a life-long appointment as managing director at the handsome salary of £3,500 per annum.³ Since the profits were divided according to remuneration, Thomson could claim that since he received 'the most wages...I ought to have the largest division of the profits'.⁴ As his income was fixed well above that which even fifty of his workmen could hope to earn in one year, there seems to have been little prospect of profit-sharing leading to any substantial re-distribution of assets within the firm.⁵

1. Ibid., Q 7095.

2. Ibid., Q 7132.

3. Ibid.; C.f. Q 7098, 'Do you think that the system of profit sharing has been beneficial to the workpeople and to the employer as far as your experience is concerned? It is beneficial so far as the men are concerned from a financial point of view, but not to myself because I am the only one who gets a less remuneration for my service...!'

4. Ibid., Q 7107.

5. It is probable that the total wage bill for manual staff would not have exceeded £5,000 and was perhaps under £4,000.

This control of assets and income was inevitably reflected in the direction and management of the enterprise, supported by the Thomson constitution for the co-operative. Besides being nominated as the life-long managing director, the founder secured his position by specifying that five-sixths of the voting power was required to force his resignation.¹ Given that Thomson was the largest shareholder (with over one third of shares), that the outside shareholders included a majority of his supporters and customers, and that Thomson played a significant part in the election of fellow-directors, such a predicament could be ruled out. It is clear that Thomson controlled not only the board, but also the everyday management of Woodhouse, initiating major policies and merely consulting rather than following the elected 'Management Committee' at the Mill.² By insisting on trade union participation and membership at the works, Thomson also reduced any challenge from the officials who welcomed his schemes and supported him at board level.³

Industrial welfare operated to sustain the structure of authority within the firm in a number of important ways. Welfare administration was one area of management where the founder did allow genuine control by the employees to operate, under the direction of the elected Management Committee. Yet the terms and conditions were dictated by Thomson himself, with particular insistence that benefits should be non-contributory. For as the employer told a reporter in 1907:⁴

How could I feel free to enforce discipline by dismissal, which only occurs here..very rarely, and then for grave fault, if I had to take into consideration that the offending worker had been contributing for years to a pension scheme, and dismissal meant the forfeiture of such a benefit. It takes a great load off my mind, I can tell you, not to have that worry.

Amongst the rules of Woodhouse was the stipulation that brides should be given dowries by the co-operative of £5 - £10, but she has also to leave the firm and its women's guild.⁵ This conformed to Thomson's

1. Ibid., Q 7140.
2. Ibid., Q 7138 - 39: 'Have the directors any power in controlling the business of the Company...? Not initiation exactly, but all great changes, important orders of machinery and so on, are discussed by them'.
3. Ibid., evidence of Dowing and Gee, Q 4977.
4. The Factory Times 1907, op. cit.,
5. The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909, op. cit.: 'Married women are not employed, but each woman on getting married receives a marriage portion...A reading room and a women's guild are attached to the premises.'

own particular views on patriarchal responsibilities and the sexual division of labour in society, and went against the grain of current trends in textiles employment in West Riding.

The general affects of profit-sharing and co-partnership were rather more complex than one might conclude on the basis of favourable newspaper accounts (many inspired by Thomson himself). There seems little doubt that the workpeople did strive to eliminate waste and reduce costs as well as requiring less supervision. Mundella - himself a large employer - asked the Huddersfield master:¹

Does [profit-sharing] tend to promote economical management on the part of the workpeople, the avoidance of waste?

Yes, it reduces very largely the cost of management, because each man ultimately...becomes his or her own manager.

Whereas many other employers were intensifying supervision whilst seeking ways to increase work-loads and introduce cheaper labour, Woodhouse could reduce overheads and pay reasonable wages to stronger males. On the other hand, it seems that Thomson did face the prospect of unrest both before and after the formation of the co-partnership. There were occasional strikes at Woodhouse in the 1880s,² and after the first year's returns showed no profit for division there was decided discontent. The managing director tactfully resolved the rupture by pointing out that low wages and unemployment were much worse than small shares, and given the unpromising climate this point struck home.³

Although the radical nature of a business co-partnership may suggest that Thomson was unique, or at least highly unusual, the enterprise differed only in degree from many other ventures and similar welfare schemes. Careful examination of Woodhouse suggests that there was a clear and coherent business rationale behind most of the production and labour policies followed by Thomson. Faced with difficult and deteriorating market conditions, as well as growing labour unrest, Thomson decided to concentrate on the upper end of the market and manufacture long runs of good-quality woollen cloth. For this he

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1. Minutes of Evidence, C. 7098, op. cit., Q 7098-99.
 2. Thomson Coll., HCL Box III, Rough Manuscript Notes: 'We rarely have any strikes and I firmly believe we shall have none, when we recognise the workers claim to a voice in the control of his industrial life...during the last ten or twelve years we have...not experienced an unpleasant moment'.
 3. Minutes of Evidence, C. 7098, op. cit., Q 7110.

required a large number of skilled male workers (of which there was a surplus in the labour market), as well as modern equipment with which to compete effectively. Thereafter, Thomson's business judgement and moral commitments naturally complemented each other - even to the point of securing stable markets with the Co-operation Wholesalers' Society in Scotland and elsewhere.¹ Authority and management stayed with the founder by virtue of both property ownership and constitution, and the overall impact of industrial welfare tended to reinforce the system of self-discipline and effort incentives.² It is a fitting tribute to Thomson's combination of creative talents and business acumen that he should have seen the Woodhouse venture grow steadily before 1914 as well as himself rising to become President of the local Chamber of Commerce and Mayor of Huddersfield.

Many woolen manufacturers appear to have survived by specialising in particular areas of the market and by maintaining the flexibility inherent in greater vertical integration of production. The worsted firms, particularly those offering mixed worsted fabrics to foreign markets, suffered disastrous setbacks despite their larger scale and greater resources. The changes in fashion, falling prices and over-production of goods served to transform the prosperity of the mid-century into the decline of the 1870s and 1890s.

Amongst the most celebrated of worsted concerns was that of Fosters at Black Dyke Mills at Queensbury near Bradford.³ John Foster had successfully transformed a worsted practice based on putting out to hand-loom weavers, into a major enterprise during the 1830s.⁴ Between 1854 and 1881 the second and third stages of rapid growth occurred, with Fosters integrating processes as well as buildings in their efforts to create a steady flow from sorting and washing to combing and spinning before the final weaving.⁵ When faced with the difficulties of the 1870s and 1880s, the Queensbury masters diversified into plush manufacture as well as dye and soap production, and also promoted the growth of an autonomous engineering shop at Black Dyke.⁶

1. TC 75, Letter of Gillichrin to Thomson, 12.5.1900; TC 28, Letter of Holyoake to Thomson, 3.3.1888, enclosing cutting of Birmingham Weekly Post.

2. Factory Times 1907, op. cit.

3. Eric M. Sigsworth, Black Dyke Mills: A History Liverpool U.P. (1958), p135-37.

4. Ibid., p137-41.

5. Ibid., p170-72, 180-82.

Being also major traders in alpaca and mohair from the mid-19th century, Fosters shared the prosperity of that trade and together with Titus Salt and Mitchells, dominated the Bradford dealings.¹

The methods of management and labour utilisation at the Mills were in advance of their time and help to account for the rapid growth of the firm before 1880, although there was a trend towards greater specialisation within worsted manufacture and away from combined spinning and weaving activities such as those at Black Dyke.² By the 1890s it was clearly more difficult to compete in the traditional lines, and it seems likely that only the increasingly important financial investments in the City ensured the strength of the business during the bleak periods after 1870.³ Having achieved considerable effectiveness in the deployment of workers before the Great Depression - and made fabulous profits by doing so - there were less opportunities for radically improving efficiency later.⁴

The services and facilities provided at Queensbury followed the contours of economic growth fairly closely, although there were some qualitative differences between the provisions. In their determination to create a stable and disciplined labour force, Fosters introduced a truck shop system which kept the weavers in debt and their wages fairly low during the earlier 19th century.⁵ As Black Dyke grew in scale and prosperity, the family created most of the infrastructural services required by an industrial settlement - from housing, gas supplies and institutes to libraries, baths and mill band.⁶ By the 1880s control of the labour market was secure and most of Queensbury's buildings were standing in the shadow of the great mill, so that little further extensions were desired or needed.

6. Ibid.; p182-85.

1. Ibid., p239, 268-69.

2. Ibid., p122. Figures show overall growth of worsted workers from 77,736 in 1850 to 136,895 in 1890 but ratios for spinning, weaving and spinning/weaving go from 28%, 19% and 52% to 34%, 24% and 42%.

3. Ibid., p225-29.

4. Ibid., p226, Table I, for large profits and interest

5. Ibid., p147-50.

6. Ibid., pX-XI. See chapter seven on community below also.

The boom and expansion of the 1880s was also reflected in the fortunes of T.M. Bairstows of Craven (near Keighley), who had been operating since 1837 at the Greenroyd Mill. So impressive were the orders for worsted-spun cloth that in 1886-89 the employers decided to construct the large new Sutton Mill at Craven.¹ After the major disappointments of the 1890s, trade again revived in the decade before the outbreak of War in 1914. It seems very probable that both general investment and profitability was reasonably high in these years, particularly since the Sutton Mill must have demanded thousands of pounds.

The larger-scale welfare projects appear to date from the 1900s rather than the 1880s period of expansion, perhaps because in the earlier decade all available resources were geared towards the new mill buildings. In 1903 Bairstows spent almost £2,300 on expensive villas, presumably for the officials or management of the concern, but it was in the years 1905-13 that housing for lower employees was considerably advanced.²

Table XLIX: Housing Construction at Bairstows, 1905-13

Years	Location	No.	Total Cost
1905-06	Wighill St	8	1,750
1905-07	Bridge Rd	3	1,056
1909-10	Wighill St	9	1,968
1910	Walton St	9	2,081
1911	King Edward St	9	2,538*
1912-13	Church St	2	955
Totals		40	10,348

Source: T.M. Bairstow Coll., LCA 153-55, MS 72, 73, 75, Contractors Receipts for Housing; LCA 321, 'Nominal Ledgers' (1891 onwards).

* This is calculated from the known total cost of one house.

Even if we take the average annual expenditure between 1905 and 1913 then the sum of about £1,300 per annum is a considerable outlay, particularly as Bairstows also went to the trouble of organising the sub-contractors and advancing sums to tradesmen engaged.³ The quite marked difference in cost and standards between the housing suggests

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1. Bairstow Coll., LCA MS 188, Ref. 25, Box relating to building of new Sutton Mill.
 2. LCA MS 188, papers on housing.
 3. LCA MS 72-5, Ref. 153-55, 'Arrangements with Workmen (1866-1919)'; Letter from S. Foster, joiner, to Bairstows 20.7.1910 in ibid.

that there was a distinct grading in tenants - possibly reflecting industrial occupations at Sutton.¹ Those dwellings at Church Street and Bridge Road, with their gardens, fitted wardrobes and wrought iron gates would almost certainly be intended for the more skilled or affluent of the textile workers.²

This housing programme followed upon an earlier one, perhaps occurring during the busy 1880s, which yielded rents of £122-38 in the 1890s, and may have represented twenty or so houses.³ It is difficult to be certain as Bairstows were in the habit of offering concessionary rents to favoured employees who had earned some reward in old age.⁴ Certainly the motivation for the second phase of housing during the 1900s cannot have been rent returns since the costs such that more than 3 per cent. yield appears unlikely.⁵

Besides this significant addition to Craven housing, the Bairstows were also involved in the institute movement of the late-19th century, with its emphasis upon 'social citizenship'.⁶ In 1906-09 they built the impressive Sutton Mill Institute and Baths, which included a bar, dining room, billiard room and reading room as well as the large Bath Room attached.⁷ The architect's estimate of outlay stood at £3,962, although it is likely that further incidentals placed the total cost above £4,000.⁸ There was also an expenditure of £400 on Sutton Mill Recreation Ground in the same period (1907-08), which brought the combined outlay on housing, Institute and Recreation Ground to over £11,000 before 1914.⁹ Bairstows had clearly enough faith in their workers and their own future to invest in community facilities despite the setbacks of the previous decade.

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1. See example of Marshalls and their supervisory workers given below.
 2. LCA 153-55, MS 72-5, Receipts. Church St and Bridge Rd dwellings cost £477 and £330 each, with Wighill St, Walton St and King Edward St at £220.
 3. LCA 321, 'Nominal Ledger'. This crude estimate based on assumed average of £6.10s.0d per week.
 4. Ibid., 'By Mrs Holmes - £2', for example.
 5. This is assuming that rents were only slightly higher than those given for early 1890s.
 6. H.E. Mellors, Leisure and the Changing City Routledge and Kegan Paul (1976) London, p94 and passim.
 7. LCA Ref 27, MS 183, Bairstow Receipts (1905-12), 'Memorandum' of 6. 6.10.1908.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ibid. The recreation ground was separate from Institute.

Whilst these projects were the most impressive in terms of capital investment, there were also provisions for the illness and death of employees at Craven. During most of the nineteenth century these were administered on a personal discretionary basis, but with the rapid growth of the enterprise and the emergence of more systematic management at Bairstows they were placed on a formal footing. The Sutton Mill Sick Society dates from the construction of the new factory in the 1880s, and in 1901 it presented club ledgers with payment accounts. By 1913 the Society was keeping minutes with the Society officials - headed by James Bairstow as Honorary President and Treasurer - such as Greenwood Barrett and Robert Preston displaying loyalty to firm and society alike.¹ Although the Sick Society was a voluntary one, with almost 200 members and a small caucus of active administrators, everyone above fourteen and below fifty was encouraged to join.² The additional sources of income from donations, fines and interest meant that the body remained financially viable after 1900, with the Bairstows subscribing a regular amount of £10 per annum after 1889.³ Both this and the incidence of fines undoubtedly reinforced the managerial authority of the worsted spinners, though the employers were shrewd enough to recognise that it did not guarantee them immunity from accident liability and they responded accordingly.⁴

Besides this formal arrangement there were also occasional payments to employees on bereavement or to those on active service during the Great War.⁵ In the latter case the employers must have been reassured by the frequent expressions of thanks and the desire to return to the company's service safely.⁶ Occasional payments were also made to mill workers for the children's education at the local National School, and to such societies as the Railway Benevolent Institution although these were of less direct relevance and importance to the textile masters.⁷

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1. LCA Ref. 157, MS 178, 'Sutton Mill Sick Society Minute and Cash Books, (1901-32)'.
 2. *Ibid.*, Minutes: 19.1.1916. In 1914 (Minutes, 14.1.1914) the higher age of entry was lowered from 50 to 40 years.
 3. *Ibid.*, Cash Ledger figures. The figures for April-May 1901 show an outlay of £3.12s.3d over four weeks, but over £15 in income.
 4. LCA Ref. 321, 'Nominal Ledgers' from 1889. The ledgers show cover against insurance with a commercial enterprise.
 5. *Ibid.*, October 1891 shows payment to J. Thursden's family.
 6. LCA MS 188, 'Correspondence with soldiers'. Letter 28.12.1914 to Bairstows: 'I am looking forward to the time when I will be back again in your employ'.

Thus the case of Bairstows demonstrates the increasing importance of industrial welfare in many firms from the 1880s. Whereas Fosters had laid the foundations of the meteoric ascent during the 1830s, and had promoted welfare during the great expansion of 1840-80, Bairstows were exploiting the improved conditions of the 1880s and 1900s to carve out a share of the worsted market. Like Thomsons of Woodhouse, the Craven masters were able to utilise industrial welfare to secure their labour needs and improve their employees' commitment to the enterprise in a way that suggests welfare can assist the competitiveness of industrial production.

The conditions facing the wool and worsted combing section of the textiles industry were little better than those which decimated the finishing, worsted top making and woollen manufacturing trades in the decades after 1870.¹ One of the most successful wool combers of all time was Isaac Holden, the son of a Glasgow collier who improved the standard combing machines at one firm before joining forces with Samuel Cunliffe Lister in 1847.² Although the credit and rewards for inventing the square-motion comber was bitterly contested between the two men,³ Holden certainly provided the business genius in the foundation of mills at St. Denis, Croix and Reims in the decade after 1848.⁴ When the partnership terminated, Holden retained control of the French plants and by 1888 his works in Bradford and France constituted the 'chief firm of wool-combers now in existence'.⁵ Holden's personal income was estimated at £200,000 per year, making him one of the wealthiest men in Britain and a major influence in Liberal politics.⁶

As an employer Holden was as energetic and meticulous in his control as he was cosmopolitan in his interests and outlook. After setting up the Croix factory, Holden imported a key skeleton force of English weavers and rapidly supplemented them with French and English immigrants until a thriving colony of six thousand existed.⁷

7. 'Nominal Ledger', op. cit., entries for 1891.

1. Sigsworth and Blackman, loc. cit., p130.

2. E.M. Sigsworth, 'Sir Isaac Holden, Bt: the first comber in Europe' in N.B. Harte and K.G. Ponting (ed.), Textile History and Economic History Manchester University Press (1973), p339.

3. Ibid., p344-45.

4. Fortunes Made in Business, op. cit., p4.

5. Ibid.

The pressures of growth and his passion for politics led Holden to create a strong managerial system to control the enterprises in his absence, although he retained a personal interest in the welfare of his workers at Bradford. This concern was strengthened by his deep religious convictions and his personal connections with a variety of moral crusaders and political campaigners.¹ Consequently, Holden was a major public philanthropist as well as an industrial welfarist with an annual donation of perhaps £20,000 on various causes.²

During the 1850s and 1860s, the rapid rise of Holden's factories was made possible by positive intervention in the labour market at Yorkshire and in France. Industrial colonies complete with housing were established near large centres on the Continent, and English immigrants furnished with accommodation near their place of work. Just as important, in Holden's eyes at least, was the moral condition of his workpeople hence the construction of chapels near the mills. The woolcomber's commitment to the cause of protestantism, and to Methodism in particular, led him into supporting many schemes for the propagation of the faith here and in London.³

At his Bradford factories there was no effort spared in the 'provision made...for promoting the social and moral welfare of the workpeople',⁴ as was indicated in a number of schemes. Amongst the beneficiaries of Holden's fortune were local hospitals and infirmaries such as that at Ilkley. In return the institutions forwarded Holden admittance forms to Holden as an individual as well as his business at Bradford, to use for deserving and injured employees.⁵ The plutocrat also took a keen human interest in the condition of ailing servants and other worthy cases.⁶ As late as 1870 he was sending personal letters of thanks and assistance to employees retiring from his service at the worstedopolis of Bradford.⁷

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6. BLL Ref. III/5, 'Newspaper cuttings on death of Isaac Holden (1888)', The Star 19.12.1888 account.
 7. Fortunes Made in Business, op. cit., p40.
 1. BLL IV/2, Holden Coll., 'Papers concerning life and achievements of Isaac Holden', Bradford Observer 14.8.1897 cutting: 'The large fortune which was the result of Sir Isaac's successful business life enabled him to give princely contributions to religious, national, political, social and municipal objects.'
 2. Ibid., Observer suggests that 10% of income, which was £200,000.
 3. UBL Ref. 47, Holden Coll., 'Correspondence mainly on religious matters', Letter from Holden to Rev. George Smith 29.4.1871.

Isaac Holden provides one of the best examples of a conscientious and religiously-motivated employer who was a business success as well as local philanthropist. He stands alongside the other 'paternalistic' employers of the West Riding as a leading employer and important influence on industrial relations.¹ Yet it is possible to argue that quite different employers have been grouped together in a misleading way, and also that businessmen with conflicting views of labour have introduced rather similar welfare amenities.

This is evident from a consideration of the experiences of Titus Salt and Samuel Cunliffe-Lister, as well as their smaller rivals in the alpaca, mohair and silk and plush trades. Like Holden and Cunliffe-Lister, Salt had been deeply interested in the progress of woolcombing techniques during the 1840s, and his own fortune was based on the devising of machinery to spin alpaca and mohair efficiently.² By the time of the Great Exhibition Salt was a leading manufacturer at Bradford and wealthy enough to contemplate the transfer of all his manufacturing plant and workforce outside Bradford to a location near Shipley. Within two years the great textile mill - covering a site of $6\frac{1}{2}$ acres and able to employ three thousand operatives - had been completed, and the following two decades were occupied in fitting out Saltaire with housing and social amenities.³ By 1870 the six hundred houses completed had cost over £100,000 in investment, and in the early 1880s the figure had risen to eight hundred dwellings.⁴

In general the housing was much superior to the average accommodation at nearby Bradford, costing between £120 and £220 each to build and with

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4. Fortunes Made in Business, *op. cit.*
 5. UBL Ref. 47, op. cit., Letter from Jabez Dean to Isaac Holden, 30.2.1871: 'I may add that the firm of Messrs. Isaac Holden and Sons at Bradford have also received 5 and made use of some of them...'
 6. UBL Ref. 8/B, 'Correspondence..', Letter Shielding to Holden, 16.2.1871: 'Agreeably to your wishes I have paid to George and Elizabeth Furness the enclosed amounts...Elizabeth's health is very bad indeed...at times she is spitting blood.'
 7. UBL Ref. 47, op. cit., Letter from Isaac Holden to 'Dear John', 12.8.1870, for example.
 1. Reynolds and Laybourn, loc. cit., p316. The authors do not include Holden, and rather confusingly define 'paternalism' as associated with both small and large scale in these years.
 2. J. Reynolds, Saltaire: the village of Sir Titus Salt Bradford City Libraries (1976) Bradford, p11.
 3. W. Ashworth, 'British Industrial Villages in the Nineteenth Century' Economic History Review III No.1-3, (1950-51), p379.

sharp delineations between operatives and overlookers' houses. There were even larger dwellings for the Saltaire management, thus completing the hierarchy of authority and social rank.¹ These elaborate houses were complemented by a variety of institutions and facilities, ranging from the Congregational Church and Methodist Chapel to elementary schools, hospital dispensary, public baths, and the costly workmen's institute. The latter included rooms for art, science, concerts, committee meetings, billiards, gymnastics, and drilling as volunteers.² So organised the model village conformed to Salt's vision of the stable community, based upon social co-operation and healthful exercise of mind and body.³

Yet all of these facilities were provided by textile employers long before and well after the creation of Saltaire as a showpiece industrial village. Salt was less unusual for the originality of his services or ideas than for the comprehensive and highly efficient way in which he fused industrial and social welfare during the golden age of textiles from 1851 to 1875. In his garden city we can see the more limited and less systematic initiatives of a great many employers come to fruition, rather than the unique experiment of a visionary capitalist.

Somewhat in contrast to Salt is the case of Samuel Cunliffe-Lister, joint inventor of the square-combing machine and leading manufacturer of silk and plush at Bradford. Whereas Salt is best known for his attractive village, Cunliffe-Lister is notorious as the employer responsible for the great strike in 1891 which laid the foundations for the emergence of the Independent Labour Party during 1892.⁴ This confrontation effectively terminated the equipoise in class relations at Bradford which had been evident since the 1850s, and led to a significant change in the politics as well as the industrial relations of the area.

Cunliffe-Lister had built up his fortune during the 1840s and 1850s, when the exploitation of his 'nip' machine allowed him to cut down the woolcombing manpower by three.⁵ When his mill burnt down in 1871,

4. David Owen, English Philanthropy, 1660-1960 Macmillan (1962) London, p381; Ashworth, loc. cit., p380.

1. Reynolds, op. cit., p22.

2. Ashworth, loc. cit. Ashworth also notes the public park laid in 1871.

3. See chapter seven below for a discussion.

4. Reynolds and Laybourn, loc. cit., p327-28.

5. Sigsworth, op. cit., p40-41.

amidst booming conditions in the wool textiles trade, Lister was able to plan and finance the erection of a fine new Italianate building, standing on 'not less than eleven acres' and still dominating the Bradford skyline.¹ Its construction was a suitable testimony to the prosperity of the mid-century, and it was to be the last mill built for four decades in the town.²

During this period of rapid growth and the inauguration of the new works, the employer planned a large settlement of workpeople's dwellings surrounding the mill. There were to be 'several hundred cottages' on the western side of Manningham Mills, constructed under the aegis of the company.³ In fact, the deteriorating conditions after 1874 and the subsequent activities of speculative builders seem to have convinced the management of the wisdom of promoting construction rather than undertaking it directly themselves.⁴ The influence of the firm lives on in the names of the surrounding streets, however, and the majority of occupants were employees of the textile master.⁵

About the same time that his mills were razed by fire, Lister decided to depart from Bradford to more spacious surroundings (after occupying Lister Hall 1853-70). Previously he had thrown open his grounds to the public every Whitsun holiday,⁶ and after failing to sell the house and grounds for the inflated price of £103,000 he eventually transferred them to the Bradford Corporation for £40,000.⁷ His employees could now spend leisure time near Manningham (and their own dwellings), in the park provided rather than sitting amongst the machinery. They could also purchase such items as coal via the firm from Lister-owned collieries and tea imported from Lister's plantations.⁸

Although the four thousand workers were reasonably well catered for during the years of growth, there were obvious signs of strain by the 1880s. When the McKinley Tariff came into force during 1890, Lister

1. Fortunes Made in Business, op. cit., p80-81.

2. Reynolds, op. cit.

3. Fortunes Made in Business, op. cit., p83.

4. Letter C. McGowan to author, 7.3.1977.

5. Ibid., such as Patent, Chassum and Silk St.

6. Fortunes Made in Business, op. cit.

7. Ibid., p84-85.

8. Letter C. McGowan, op. cit.

responded by cutting wages up to one third thereby provoking strike threats and a general lockout soon followed. The conflict lasted almost five months and required troops when demonstrations against the Watch Committee occurred.¹ It is interesting that one of the key groups in the struggle were the supervisory grades, particularly the Power Loom Overlookers' Union, which supported the Bradford Labour Union.² This demonstrated the close ties between skill, supervision and organisation in wool textiles, and the dangers of ignoring this stratum's aspirations.

More generally, the case of Manningham Mills suggests that despite their different images Salt and Lister were fairly close in their policies on labour and welfare provision. Neither welcomed the rise of trade unionism and each sought to insulate their workers by a variety of welfare amenities. Secondly, the experience of Manningham Mills indicates that however elaborate the benefit schemes and however favourable the public view of an employer, employees would respond to draconian wage cuts and the deterioration of working conditions. Thirdly, the supervisory stratum figured both in the welfare schemes of Saltaire and the unrest at Bradford which shows that the skilled and overlooking grades also felt threatened by the strains on the industry and were less satisfied with their privileges. Even when retarded growth did not demand the contraction of services (as it sometimes did), there was no guarantee that welfare could offset the adverse consequences of economic deterioration.

Similar themes are apparent in the very different fortunes of two large Leeds textile enterprises after 1870, that of John Marshalls the flax spinners and John Barrans the ready-made clothing firm. During the 1820s and 1830s Marshalls had risen to become one of the most successful concerns in Leeds, making a record profit of well over £76,000 in 1836.³ Although output was to peak in the early 1840s and again in the 1860s, similar profits were not made and from 1872 Marshalls went into noticeable decline with chronic losses at Salop leading to eventual liquidation in 1884-86.⁴ Total outlay

1. Reynolds and Laybourn, loc. cit., p327-29.

2. Ibid., p329-30. See ibid., p326: '...it was the older crafts which provided substantial support and leadership for the independent movement.'

3. Rimmer, op. cit., p319-20.

4. Ibid., p307-10. See Table 12, p319-20.

reached over £270,000 in 1828 and £350,000 by 1866, with the levels of fixed and circulating capital fluctuating quite markedly in the intervening years.¹

Conservatism and inertia marked not only the Marshalls' technical operations but also their labour policy, and it was not until wages began to rise rapidly in the 1870s that they considered labour-saving mechanisation on a large scale. The firm sought to reduce costs by substituting female for male labour and allowing standards of workmanship to fall, with dismal results.² This created a situation of unrest and dissatisfaction during the 1870s, with strikes of mill girls and sympathetic actions by supervisory skilled grades.³ After the troubles of 1871-72, the younger generation of employers wrested control and attempted to enforce ruthless managerial control. They gave the ailing enterprise only a brief respite from its problems and the years 1876-81 sealed the fate of the flax spinners.⁴

The provision of industrial welfare at Marshalls followed the broad pattern of growth and relations at the Leeds and Salop mills, although the location of the plant in a well-equipped urban area clearly shaped initial decisions on labour supply. John Marshall made little attempt to compete with independent services or to regiment his workpeople in the way which industrial colonies did, and concentrated rather upon their intellectual and moral improvement by encouraging education, temperance and thrift.⁵ The firm sponsored a works friendly society, paid a doctor to attend the mills every week and arranged for a system of bed-allocation at the Leeds Infirmary.⁶

Even if these provisions were continued during the increasingly difficult years after 1870, they clearly did not deflect the attention of the operatives from wage demands not the younger employers from the sustained attack on union organisation. It could be argued that

1. Ibid., p310.

2. Ibid., p252: 'the efficiency of capital and the quality of labour declined at precisely the time improvement was needed.'

3. Ibid., p282. The younger generation traced the unrest to Temple Mills, and in particular to the foreman. They demanded the mass dismissal of all overlookers and the foreman himself.

4. Ibid., p275.

5. Ibid., p110, 105-09.

6. Ibid., p215-16.

one of the most serious shortcomings of the younger managerialists at Marshalls was their failure to cope with the labour difficulties in any other manner than outright repression. The absence of selective welfare benefits and other privileges for the skilled overlookers and foremen could explain their readiness to support the unskilled females in the resistance to the employers. If the economic climate was hardly favourable to large-scale welfare investment, it is still possible to envisage a more sensitive appraisal of shop floor aspirations. Marshalls may have stifled the direct union challenge, but their efforts hardly touched the underlying problems of low output and labour resistance. The absence of welfare was more a symptom than a cause of managerial failure, and the flexibility of the earlier decades gave way to the conflict and decline which preceded liquidation.

In sharp contrast to this story of failure and contraction, the Barran enterprise enjoyed rapid expansion during the decades after 1880. Markets were growing at home and abroad for the ready-made clothing products of the Leeds masters, as the quality of goods improved and manufacturing costs fell when mechanisation spread.¹ The value of exports rose from £3.71 million in 1881 to £8.645 million in 1913,² and Barrans were amongst the leading exporters as well as being the largest single ready-made manufacturers.³

From being a small workshop in the well-established tailoring area of the city, supplying wholesale orders to the surrounding bespoke concerns, John Barran's firm had pioneered many of the important technical and organisational innovations upon which the industry was based.⁴ Factory division of labour and cheap female labour replaced the handicraft skills of the tailors, and ranks of sewing machines were deployed in the efforts to meet large batch orders. In keeping with the general employment trends within wool textiles, the proportion of females to males increased steadily as the 32:1 male dominance of 1851 gave way to the 2:1 female superiority in tailoring by 1911 at Leeds.⁵ This substitution of labour reduced overall costs although a hierarchy of skill gradations continued to exist, headed by an elite of male workers who organised and

1. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p10.

2. *Ibid.*, p41.

3. *Ibid.*, p40, for speech of Henry Barran to Leeds Association in 1890.

4. *Ibid.*, p8-10.

5. *Ibid.*, p12. Figures based on census returns.

supervised the ranks of females. The latter could earn wages as low as 3s. 6d to 10s., although machinists on piece rates were able to boost their income by arduous efforts.¹

The earliest works of the Barrans date from the 1850s, although the major mills were added at Leeds in the period 1867-1904.² This growth culminated in the formation of a limited company at the turn of the century, with a share capital of £240,000 and £100,000 held in debenture stock.³ The management stayed firmly in the hands of the capable Barran family, led by Henry and R.H. Barran in the early decades of the new century.⁴ Under their direction the company continued to grow during the First World War, with an extra £20,000 of shares issued in 1916 and three years later the share capital was extended to £510,000.⁵ Like many other clothing firms who were in a position to supply the armed forces - and Barrans were accustomed to meeting large orders quickly - the concern made large gains from the conflict and anticipated a rapid post-War recovery.

The outlay of the enterprise was considerably greater than the share capital, standing at over one third of a million pounds in 1900. The annual figures for 1900 indicate that new purchases (including equipment and machinery it would seem), were the largest item but manufacturing wages still accounted for 22% of outlay at this point:

Table L: Outlay and Working Costs at John Barrans, 1900

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Purchases	167,065	Rents	3,062
Wages (Manufact.)	81,526	Travelling & Carr.	5,498
Wages & Salaries	9,725	Printing, Fuel	2,330
Stock	88,661	Rates, Interest,	
Travellers	2,127	Discount, Bank	10,526
Teas	275	Depreciation	668
W.G. B[arran]	500	Bad Debts	424
W.R.	52	Incidence	1,118
		Total	373,557

Source: LCA, Barran Coll., Ref. MS 3, 'Draft figures for balance sheet'.

1. Ibid., p28.
2. Patricia Hudson, The West Riding Wool Textiles Industry: A Bibliography (1974) London.
3. LCA, Barran Coll., MS 30, 'Directors and A.G.M. Minute Book (1903-14)', Minutes, 1.4.1903.
4. Ibid., MS 31, 'Directors and A.G.M. Minute Book (1914-21)', Minutes, 21.8.1916.
5. Ibid., 21.8.1916 - 19.5.1919.

The fact that non-manual wages and salaries took up another 2.6% of outlay may suggest that Barrans had developed a coherent system of management and administration before incorporation as a limited concern. Whether this was true or not, the business did show healthy profit levels before 1914, as the table below demonstrates:

Table LI: Annual Outlay and Trading Profits at Barrans, 1900-14 -

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Outlay</u>	<u>Annual Profit</u>	<u>% Proportion of P to O</u>
1900	373,556	34,845	9.3
1901	356,697	31,863	9.0
1902	357,359	35,779	10.0
1903	368,548	30,530	8.3
1904	316,147	21,341	6.75
1905	323,729	20,723	6.4
1906	342,586	21,028	6.1
1907	372,128	24,530	6.6
1908	369,600	24,769	6.7
1909	350,420	18,897	5.4
1910	340,803	18,897	5.5
1911	364,152	24,950	6.8
1912	388,135	29,267	7.5
1913	401,165	28,842	7.2
1914	419,154	26,016	6.2

Source: LCA, Barran Coll., MS 3, 'Notes relating to Financial matters', including the balance sheets of Barran firm.

The outlay figures appear to relate only to working expenses rather than capital investment (such as the acquisition of New Chorley in 1904), and give only a proximate view of business development. But it is clear that profits followed the cyclical movement of trading activities with peaks in 1900-03, 1907-08 and 1912-14. Overall level of profits fell back somewhat after 1903 when the limited company was formed, but revived from 1911. Wartime profits are difficult to assess given the absence of balance figures, but the Excess Profits Duty of over £6,000 in 1917 and the calculation of state contracts at 'expenses and about 5% profit', imply healthy Wartime returns.¹

The labour conditions and industrial relations at Barrans were probably better than at many other clothing establishments - where sweating was notorious and the employment of women allowed bad conditions to persist. When the Board of Trade came to regulate

1. LCA, Barran Coll., MS 31, op. cit., Minutes, 18.2.1918, 18.3.1918, 17.6.1918.

the wages of operatives in 1911, they found that adjustments were necessary only for the rates of those above seventeen. The following tabel shows the changes required:

Table LII: Wage Rates and Board of Trade Minima at Barrans, 1911

Age	Present Rate		B of T Minima		Additions		Age	New Rate	
	s	d	s	d	s	d		s	d
							13	4	0
14-15	5	0	4	2	-		14	5	0
15-16	7	0	6	3	-		15	7	0
16-17	9	0	8	4	-		16	9	0
17-18	11	0	11	6	0	6	17	11	6
18-19	13	0	14	7	1	7	18	14	7
19-20	15	0	17	8	2	8	19	17	8
							20	19	10
							21	20	10
							22	23	11
							23	25	0

Source: LCA, Barran Coll., MS 30, Minutes, 12.12.1911.

It should be noted that the Board of Trade recommended these minimum rates, and that the progressive Barrans adopted them voluntarily.¹

In their labour policy, Barrans were particularly careful to select the right kind of young male workers who would make up the elite of skilled workers at their factories. Individual records date from at least the 1870s,² and during the 1900s the management was insistent upon the strict supervision of these assistants by the departmental foremen who were responsible 'for the discipline of their departments'.³ As a further incentive to punctuality and good behaviour, the managers introduced graded bonuses and presents for 'every boy or youth between the ages of 15 and 21' during 1906.⁴

The supervisory grades were themselves given such priviliges as the right to purchase goods at trade price from the firm, 'for themselves and their own families' and it was a sign of supervisory ascent that foremen were granted these concessions.⁵ Their growing responsibilities are indicated in the increasing formality and coherence of management

1. MS 30, Minutes, op. cit., 15.12.1911.
2. Ibid., MS 14, 'Notes on Employees': 'June 13 1878...Arthur Jackson, Age 19...Father 14 years Tunnell and Walker...Sings in Choruses at Town Hall and Bethel Chapel. King says this man is lazy/having/worked with him.', for example.
3. MS 30, Minutes, op. cit., 31.1.1905.
4. Ibid., 9.2.1906, 'whose time, conduct and work shall have been thoroughly satisfactory'.
5. Ibid., 14.8.1903, when three foremen cutters given privilige.

directives during the 1900s, as the directors laid down guidelines on overtime working,¹ graded duties and privileges, and standard wage rates. Although the board firmly declined to accept the suggestion by the Amalgamated Union of Clothiers' Operatives in 1908, that they should adopt a district rate, by 1913 the company was tacitly accepting A.U.C.O. agreements as the basis of payment scales.² Trade unionism was not welcomed at the thriving concern, but Barrans made no real attempt to crush the collective bargaining power of their employees at this stage.

By 1914 Barrans were probably the largest and most successful ready-made wholesalers in the West Riding, and despite the restraints of competition, minimum wages and trade unionism, they continued as a profitable enterprise throughout the First World War. Industrial welfare played a significant part in this development and helps to account for the success of Barrans in industrial relations as well as market invasion.

Although they were very much urban employers, the Barran enterprise did take advantage of the rapid growth experienced at the turn of the century to invest in housing at the new Chorley Lane works. During the expansion of the First World War, when key labour was particularly valuable, they consolidated this with further acquisitions for both manual and salaried staff at Leeds. The following indicates the pattern of additions:

Table LIII: Housing Acquisitions at Barrans, 1904-20

<u>Date of Acquisition</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Average Cost</u>
10.3.1904	Bedford Place	9	1,600	177.7
26.3.1904	Clarendon Rd	1	500	500
	Chorley Lane	1	500	500
2.8.1904	Bedford Place	2	900	450
2.10.1914	Clarendon Rd	4	900	225
	Belmont Place	4	900	225
18.12.1917	Bedford Place	1	550	275
	Chorley Lane	1		
30.12.1920	Bedford Place	1	475	237.5
	Chorley Lane	1		

Source: LCA, Barran Coll., MS 10, 'List of Properties, 1904-27'.

1. Ibid., 9.2.1906, when directors decide on overtime change.

2. Ibid., 19.9.1908 - 16.4.1913.

The properties which were acquired in 1914 were transferred from the personal holding of R.H. Barran to the company,¹ and the elaborate villas purchased in 1920-21 (amounting to £4,015 of estate) were probably the reward for directors or managers who served the concern during the arduous Wartime period.² During the optimistic expansion of post-War years, Barrans contemplated a further phase of building at the Chapel Allerton grounds of Sir John Barran. An initial lay-out of £4,152 on fifteen houses (a remarkably cheap unit cost of £275), was to be followed by further stages of construction in the country setting.³ It would be in character with the general purpose of Barran project if these dwellings were restricted, in the first instance, to the supervisory and skilled grades although there is little direct reference to the occupants.

The medical services provided at Leeds also reflected the requirements of a growing business whose rapid production lines and dangerous cutting machinery made working life hazardous for the operatives. In 1908 the directors agreed to the continuation of the Workpeople's Hospital Fund making collections at their plants,⁴ as well as making direct donations to the infirmaries themselves. The latter were greatly expanded during the Great War as wounded employees returning from military service were in need of convalescence.⁵

Within the works there were direct provision for sickness and accident benefits under the Sick Societies operated with the support of the firm, but based upon employees' subscriptions and largely administered by them.⁶ The passing of the National Insurance Act in 1911 posed few financial problems for the Barrans, being more than covered by a two per cent. increase in materials sold,⁷ but did give cause for concern over the future of the private societies.⁸ These were resolved to the satisfaction of the

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1. MS 31, Minutes, op. cit., 20.7.1914.
 2. Ibid., 1921.
 3. ICA, Barran Coll., MS 3, 'Chapel Allerton Estate Plans (1920-21)'.
 4. MS 30, Minutes, op. cit., 30.3.1908.
 5. MS 31, Minutes, op. cit., 22.10.1915, 16.7.1917, 15.4.1918, etc.
 6. MS 30, op. cit., 17.6.1912.
 7. Ibid., 29.12.1911 - 15.4.1912.

directors when the company managed to deflect many of their employees from simple adherence to the Operatives' Union.¹

Elements of selective treatment existed within the medical provisions at Barrans also, since the salaried staff were granted sick pay without recourse to the Society. The provisions of the National Insurance Act threatened to upset the balance of less eligibility between work and sickness, thereby encouraging white collar malingering.² This was avoided by the calculation of benefits within the pay scales and the discounting of state payments, although a subsequent court decision at Rochdale threw them again into confusion.³

Another aspect of the drive to improve the overall efficiency and morale of their workforce was the Barrans' introduction of catering facilities at the works. Provision was made for female dining room before 1913, and in that year the board decided that the Cutting Room boys should have similar amenities. As part of an exercise in responsible administration, they also resolved:⁴

..that those making use of this dining-room should form a Committee of Management to be responsible for the proper behaviour and good conduct of the members, and the orderly working of all regulations in connection therewith.

This theme of order and discipline was continued during the First World War, when the management thought something further might be undertaken and also 'that the presence of a tactful woman would have its influence on the operatives'.⁵ Considering the serious problems of high mobility and perennial indiscipline amongst the younger workers which the heavy industries faced during the First World War, it was probably a prudent move towards avoiding similar difficulties in the hard-pressed textile trades.⁶

8. Ibid., 17.6.1912. It should be noted that the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 had cost an estimated 2/6 % on wages (less 15%) in insurance with Commercial Union; see ibid., 1.7.1907.

1. Ibid., 15.7.1912. See chapter nine on state intervention for a discussion.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 20.1.1913 - 1.11.1913.

4. Ibid., 25.8.1913.

5. Ibid., MS 31, op. cit., 20.11.1916.

6. See chapters two and three for a discussion.

Even the provision of catering and leisure services was affected by the selective grading and hierarchy within the concern. When the board were considering improving the eating amenities for their manual employees, they also noted the condition of the salaried staff and in Autumn 1917 they set up a social club at Woodhouse Square in Leeds.¹ This was to be self-supporting with the firm only paying the rent, and was intended to improve the 'educational, social and other advantage' of its members.²

General welfare conditions were also much advanced during the War, with generous allowances introduced for those on active service and payments to the dependants of injured or dead men.³ Although these were later reduced as the War was prolonged,⁴ both the allowances and the standard War bonuses lightened the burdens of those at work and abroad.⁵ Though the desire to retrieve the survivors of conflict for the future service of the firm must have figured, it is obvious that a strong strand of patriotism also motivated the welfarists.⁶ Even those on short time because of the War crises were assisted by joint contributions of capital and labour.⁷ The various projects in operation culminated in late 1916 with the appointment of a Welfare Supervisor at the main factory, charged with the supervision as well as accommodation of the many females.⁸

Yet there were also certain services which remained not only confined to the staff and supervisory grades, but which were operated on a strictly individual and discretionary basis. The granting of pensions to old and trusted servants were once such benefit, as when Lascelles retired in 1915 'after many years service as a foreman in the factory and later as a passer'.⁹

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1. MS 31, op. cit., 24.9.1917.
 2. Ibid., 17.9.1917.
 3. Ibid., 7.9.1914. The Finance Committee of the Board were given the 'weekly amount contributed on the flat rate...taking into account the normal earnings of each case..'
 4. Ibid., 17.7.1916, 21.8.1916.
 5. Ibid.; 16.11.1914, for allowances, 1.3.1915, for war bonuses to the working employees.
 6. Ibid., 3.1.1916 - 27.1.1919, for cases.
 7. Ibid., 7.9.1914, for contributions to the philanthropic fund.
 8. Ibid., 22.12.1916.
 9. Ibid., 21.6.1915.

There were also individual pensions to the faithful manual workers at the factory,¹ although these could be (and sometimes were) terminated at the will of the directors.² In other cases, the management allowed some elderly employees to work shorter hours rather than retire them altogether.³

Here lay the three themes of welfarism at the Barrans: improving general standards for the broad mass of the employees, in line with rising wages and working conditions; selective treatment for staff over the manual grades, with benefits fitted to the hierarchy of responsibility; and the continuation of individual discretion and personal reward for both staff and workers at Leeds. Although the steady growth of the enterprise and the emergence of collective bargaining placed certain strains upon management and led to a certain formalisation of relations, welfare reflected the dual tendencies towards increasing organisation and personal responsibility at the clothiers.

Conclusion

Any comparison of two regions and two industries must uncover as many contrasts as similarities, and even the regional variations within one industry must raise questions as to the appropriateness of grouping highly diverse activities under one heading. The textiles industry was not one industry but many different branches of similar productive processes, with sharp divisions between the stages as well as the fibres involved. Even cotton manufacturing was very sharply divided into the weaving and spinning sections, as well as between making and finishing. The distinction between woolen and worsted production was only one of the more important definitions in the wool textiles industry. Small scale woolen manufacturers had as little in common with large clothiers such as Barrans, as they had with worsted spinners or alpaca workers such as Foster and Salt.

When we come to set these various trades in the context of the regional economy, the differences of interest and the cross currents of economic development make it almost impossible to generalise about the experience of 'textiles' in any real way.

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1. Ibid., 9.8.1915, for case of a bridging pension.
 2. Ibid., 18.10.1915 - 20.12.1915, when one woman with thirty years service has her pension discontinued after two months.
 3. Ibid., 18.11.1918, for example.

Even the broad characterisation of a cotton-based textiles industry in west of Scotland versus a wool-based industry in West Riding, must be qualified by the large number of alternative branches (such as jute, flax, hard fibre, mohair and silk) and the relative decline of both cotton and wool as a regional occupation. There may have been important links between the trades, but the developments of 1880-1918 show how distinctive were the cyclical fluctuations and market trends affecting each sector. Whilst the cotton industry went into irreversible decline north of the border, and the mixed worsteds suffered serious damage during the Great Depression, ready-made clothing surged ahead on the basis of expanding markets and technological innovation.

In considering the various market conditions under which these very different textile manufacturers operated, of central importance must be the labour market. Given the constraints of competition, innovation, and the rise of union organisation,¹ management found their labour requirements changing over time. There was a long-term move towards the greater employment of women and juveniles, and away from the more skilled labour of males - now required only in preparation and supervision. This enabled textile masters to reduce the general level of wages and overall costs, although the dangerous implications for productivity were spelled out in the Scottish cotton case and were also emphasised by woolen manufacturers such as George Thomson.

This trend in employment also affected the pattern of industrial relations and labour unionisation within the industries, deflecting many of the early initiatives but creating the conditions for renewed attempts to recruit females into unions amongst the dyers, woolen firms, and clothing establishments. These efforts culminated in the general advances made by unions after 1910 in many of the textiles trades.

The response of textiles employers to the changing market and labour conditions were again extremely varied, but certain patterns can be suggested. Where opportunities encouraged the greater use of machinery, a large number of concerns were willing to adopt technical innovation, although this was more prevalent in conditions of growth than of contraction it appears. Whenever possible employers also took the opportunity to increase the

1. S. Pollard, 'Trade Unions and the Labour Market, 1870-1914'

work-loads and input of labour, often introducing piece rates and bonus incentives to encourage effort. It would seem that there were positive correlations between more effective management, larger scale and technical innovation, as reflected in the policies of the more successful firms surveyed.

Only by juxtaposing the two sets of factors connected with market conditions on the one side and business responses on the other, can we arrive at some appreciation of the context of industrial welfare. The evidence suggests that factors such as location and scale cannot in themselves explain the presence or absence of welfare: what is involved is the proximity to and control of local labour markets. Nor can changes in the legal and administrative structure be taken as simple indicators, particularly as family control usually remained when the legal form of the enterprise changed. What these point to is the greater degree of systematic management and coherent administration which generally involves a more rational deployment of labour. Whilst it is possible to argue for a strong correlation between a firm's (or an industry's) rate of growth and its propensity to provide welfare, this merely implies the changing situation in both labour markets and labour relations which place new strains upon employers and managers and hence suggest welfare innovation. Similarly, it is unlikely that any simple or direct correlation exists between high wages, good working conditions and welfarism in the textile industry. As already stated, the industry was a low-wage one in many districts, employing cheap female labour and increasingly anxious to reduce labour costs by substituting female for male workers. Most of the employers, from the Orr Ewings at Alexandria and The Gourock at Port Glasgow to Lister at Bradford and Barrans at Leeds, seemed ready to use welfarism to attract the female labour which would keep down overheads. Then again, the ability and readiness of these employers to pay good female wages depended to a large extent on the competitive conditions under which they operated. The fact that male skills and supervision was required, and that welfare was often provided to secure this, demolishes any suggestion that welfare was confined largely to females.

1. Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research XVII Pt.1 (1965), p99-103, for links between general market conditions, union membership and wages.

These conflicting alternatives point to another fundamental issue in our analysis of welfare: namely, the need to emphasise the qualitative as well as quantitative differences in welfare provision. In terms of quantity of services, it is apparent that welfare was neither confined to the large firms nor did it grow necessarily commensurate with the size of enterprise. For every large well-known firm providing (say) housing, there were smaller rivals also involved in similar activities.¹ Thus, whilst it is true that the larger businesses had greater resources and potential for welfare investment, we should not forget that their decision depended upon a range of factors, nor that smaller concerns could also develop facilities where they saw a calculable return. The qualitative divisions in welfare fall along three lines: first of all, there are qualitative differences in the types of welfare provided at any time, and their explicit purpose; secondly, there are different benefits for different groups of workers, with a strong element of selectivism and hierarchy evident in much of the welfare surveyed; thirdly, consideration must be given to the ways in which services are administered and the shift towards greater participation of employees noticeable from the 1860s (when Saltaire was being completed and Alexandria built up) to the 1900s. Like the forces underlying its creation, industrial welfare was a dynamic and fluid process of provision rather than a static entity.

Having made these qualifications on the complexities of both the textiles industry and industrial welfare, it is still possible to detect general patterns in welfare provision. It remains true that those firms experiencing economic growth, greater business organisation and management developments, increasing strains on labour control, greater pressures to retain a good or dominating market position, and greater scope for technical and labour changes, would have a greater propensity to introduce welfare than those who did not feel such constraints. There is also evidence to suggest that in many cases welfarism helped such firms not only

1. One of the best contrasts is that between Ackroyd and I & F Calvert of Halifax. Ashworth, *loc. cit.*, p381 for Ackroyds; UBL Ref. 56, 'Rent Ledgers of I. & F. Calvert (1886 onwards)', for the 45 houses held in 1886 by Calverts, yielding about £9 per fortnight in rents; entries for 1908 on later building.

to acquire and retain the necessary labour, but also to compete more effectively in frequently difficult market conditions. The fact that so many of the concerns were in the forefront of technical innovation, managerial organisation and labour deployment, lends weight to the view that 'leading firms' (whether large scale or managerially progressive), were amongst the most prominent welfarists. Indeed, it can be argued that industrial welfare provision was itself one facet of greater business organisation amongst employers in these years. The ideas and motives of Henry Birkmyre, George Thomson and John Barran may have been quite different, but they were each concerned with producing textiles or cordage under competitive conditions, and came to similar conclusions about the practical merits of industrial welfare. In this sense, it is a mistake to isolate individual 'pioneers' of welfarism who happen to be more vocal or celebrated than others. What they shared in common - namely, the retention and control of efficient labour - was more important than philosophical refinements.

Having considered the experiences of two different sections of a heterogeneous textiles industry, in two distinct regions, it is possible to compare these with another industry in the respective regions. Coalmining in a particularly good complementary study because of the relative homogeneity of the product, and the close similarity of the west Scotland and West Yorkshire coal areas. It may therefore be possible not only to compare and contrast the two regional dimensions of the coal industry, but to set these alongside the pattern of welfare development in the textiles industry also.

The coal industry in the west of Scotland and West Yorkshire

The growth of the coal industry during the 19th century provides one of the major chapters in Britain's economic development, with an expansion of output from little more than ten million tons in the 1780s to almost 242 million by the 1900s.¹ Rapid development continued after 1875 and down to the First World War, with a doubling of output and a growth of manpower from 535,000 to about 700,000 in 1913.² This pattern of expansion was coupled with a changing emphasis in market sales from domestic to overseas

1. Keith Burgess, The Origins of British Industrial Relations Croom Helm (1975) London, p151-52.

customers, with substantial increases in coal exports particularly by the coastal coalfields.¹

This raises the fundamental distinction within the industry between the inland and coastal deposits, with the former exporting very little of their output and consequently experiencing a lower rate of growth after 1875.² Regional and local differences within the industry were so pronounced that some writers have suggested that each field must be examined as a separate entity and the national industry as a confederation of loosely-connected components.³ Given the great variations in geological and market conditions facing each field, there must be an element of truth in this, but in many respects coal was a remarkably homogeneous product and the experiences of inland districts were generally comparable.

Besides the basic distinction in markets between inland and seaboard fields, there is also the contrast between older areas such as Lanarkshire and Staffordshire, and the more modern pits found in locations such as Fife or South Yorkshire. The last two examples indicate that rapid growth and innovation was found in the inland as well as coastal regions, and the larger collieries with deeper mines were created for home as well as export markets.⁴ These trends are reflected in the investment figures for the four decades before 1913, with such fields as South Yorkshire taking that county into greater prominence amongst the inland producers, and other older areas in marked decline.⁵

In terms of scale and legal structure of the collieries, it is true to say that there had been a decided move towards larger scale by the 1890s, with 7% of miners in collieries over 2,500 men at the inland fields. This trend continued down to 1913 when the

2. A.J. Taylor, 'The Coal Industry' in Aldcroft (ed.), op. cit., p42-3.

1. Burgess, op. cit., p153.

2. B.R. Mitchell, 'The Economic Development of the Inland Coalfields, 1870-1914' Ph.D Thesis (Cambridge, 1955), p39. Inland district output grew by 90% in 1875-1913 and coastal output by 140%.

3. Ibid., pii, 59: 'The regional characteristics of demand...were so strongly differentiated that each coalfield must be considered separately'.

4. Ibid., p113-19, for investment figures on inland districts.

5. Ibid., for the proportion of labour employed.

proportion had risen to 24%, and the mines employing less than 300 men had dropped from 20% to 7%.¹ Although there was little substantial increase in the very largest collieries, the average scale of enterprise was certainly increasing, with an average capital expenditure at inland districts rising from £50,000 to £100,000 between 1870s and 1890s.² The rapidly growing coastal regions experienced similar developments, although there again existed major differences between a field such as South Wales and (say) the Fife area of Scotland. This is not to suggest that smaller units of production were unable to survive - indeed, the three thousand collieries operating in the 1890s had shrunk to the 2,900 producing in 1923.³ What is important is that about 45% of the latter total were responsible for a mere 5% of output, and in some areas a small minority of pits were turning out the great bulk of coal.⁴

This shift towards a larger average scale in coalmining was also reflected in the changing legal and economic structure of the firms involved. There was a gradual move towards public joint stock as well as private limited companies after the 1860s, although the actual control of the enterprises and the sources of capital usually remained in the same hands.⁵ In areas like Yorkshire there was also further integration of iron and steel interests with the collieries, despite the overall decline of pig iron production in many regions.⁶ Managerial developments were also seen in these years, as the larger firms devised more effective management hierarchies thereby consolidating the important role of the colliery manager in the industry.⁷

These management methods reinforced other trends which were transforming the industry into a rather more efficient sector. Technical innovation in the form of mechanical coal-cutters, conveyor belts and electric lighting was progressing where factor prices were sufficiently high,⁸ or where diminishing marginal returns suggested their use.⁹ Changes in working methods from pillar and stall to longwall group activity, and the introduction

1. Ibid., p109.

2. Ibid.

3. E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire Pelican (1969), p189-91, for 1890s; N.K. Buxton, 'Entrepreneurial Efficiency in the British Coal Industry between the Wars' Economic History Review XXIII (1970), p489.

of shift systems were also significant departures in many fields, as was the gradual replacement of the butty master by salaried management and supervisory grades.¹

These changes, and the pressures of geological and market conditions, contributed to the changing structure of the labour force within the coal industry over these years. Coalmining faced the perennial problem of diminishing marginal returns, hence the need to employ greater numbers of oncost workers such as rippers, brushers and hauliers.² On the whole coalowners preferred to reduce the numbers of surface workers and to increase the underground oncost labour, with a relatively diminishing number of facework hewers.³ To what degree this trend was general amongst the coalfields, and what were the implications for efficiency and productivity must remain largely unanswered.⁴

Labour productivity itself involved a wide range of factors, although diminishing returns and the subsequent exertion required to mine the same proportion of coal was certainly one element in the tendency of productivity to decline after the 1880s.⁵ There is also a case for linking output of hewers to current wage levels, although money and real wage movements are needed to explain some of the fluctuations before 1914.⁶

4. Ibid., p489; C.f. Buxton's contrary argument on p481, where he states that scale not a major factor in productive efficiency in areas such as Scotland.
5. Mitchell, op. cit., p122-23.
6. Ibid., p126-27.
7. B.F. Duckham, 'The Emergence of the Professional Manager in the Scottish Coal Industry, 1760-1815' Business History Review XLIII No.1 (1969), p22-23, and passim for the early development of colliery management.
8. R. Walters, 'Labour Productivity in the South Wales Steam-Coal Industry, 1870-1914' Economic History Review XXVIII (1975), p296-97, for case where low factor prices deter mechanisation.
9. Ibid., p295, for South Wales; Mitchell, op. cit., p107, for conflicting pressures of diminishing returns, labour costs, and potential savings.
1. Mitchell, op. cit., p198-200.
2. Walters, loc. cit., p295.
3. Ibid., p283-84.
4. C.f. Mitchell, op. cit., p188, where he suggests that the proportion of hewers on inland fields increased 1873-1906.
5. Walters, loc. cit., p296, 299.
6. Ibid., p290-91.

This raises the equally complex problem of profitability in the coal industry during these decades, since profits could (and were) as much affected by prices as by the productivity of capital and labour. Although there was a dramatic increase in output and employment between 1875 and 1895, for example, profitability was disappointing and reached a nadir in the early 1890s.¹ Since labour productivity tended to fall in good years and failed to rise proportionately in bad periods, then the implications for the trade were serious.² Attempts to prevent disastrous slumps by the use of price controls and cartel agreements were of very limited scope and success.³ There were also considerable variations in the profitability of different areas, South Wales and Yorkshire recording higher returns than Staffordshire and the Midlands in the pre-War years.⁴ Whilst the whole industry suffered in periods of acute depression, this diversity of experience remained both between and within the coalfields.

The comparison of the west of Scotland and West Riding coal workings can be posed in terms of the different experiences of the Lanarkshire and West Yorkshire fields at this period. Both were well-established coalmining areas which were amongst the oldest deposits worked by the late 19th century. Scotland's mining development took its impetus from the rapid growth of ironmaking and steam power during the early decades of the century, production rising from 1.6 million tons in the 1780s to perhaps 17 million tons per annum, a century later.⁵ This overall expansion continued in both Lanarkshire and Scotland as a whole, with the former doubling its output between 1870 and 1913.⁶

Yet there were also signs of decline within the Lanarkshire section of the Scottish industry, since despite the falling share

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1. Taylor, loc. cit., p42-43: 'In the five years after 1892 the industry found itself in the throes of depression for the third time in a generation..'
 2. Walters, loc. cit., p294.
 3. Hobsbawm, op. cit., p189-91; Macrosty, op. cit., p92-93.
 4. Mitchell, op. cit., p272, where profit per ton figures range from 1s 2d for South Wales and 1s for Yorks and Warks, to 7½d for Staffs and 10½d for England and Wales as a whole.
 5. National Coal Board [McKechnie and Macgregor] A Short History of the Scottish Coal Mining Industry N.C.B. (1951), p15.

of Scotland in British output before the peak of 1913,¹ Lanarkshire's contribution to this Scottish total was also relative decline from the 1890s, when its share fell from over two thirds to barely more than half by 1920. This general trend, indicated in the following figures, must be largely explained in terms of the inevitable diminishing returns facing such an established area and the inability of Lanarkshire to reap the same fruits from an expanding export market that Fife could.²

Table L^{IV}: Scottish Coal Output and Proportion by Fields, 1880-1920

Year	Scottish Tot.	Ayrshire (%)	Lanarks (%)	Fife (%)	Midl. (%)
1880	18.3 M.Tons	17.6	64.7	12.0	5.7
1890	24.3 "	13.5	67.0	14.7	4.8
1900	33.1 "	12.7	64.1	17.8	5.4
1910	41.3 "	10.8	57.3	22.0	9.9
1920	31.5 "	12.6	53.6	22.3	11.5

Source: C.V. Lesey, 'Coal Mining' in A.K. Cairncross, The Scottish Economy C.U.P. (1954), p113.

After the high peak of 1913, coal production went into decline with Scottish deceleration again more marked and with Lanarkshire now steadily retreating from its pre-eminence.³

Whilst it is clear that Lanarkshire's descent owed much to the changing origin and character of market conditions, it would be wrong to exaggerate its deficiencies. The original working of deposits such as "hurlet coal" around Glasgow,⁴ had given way to the exploitation of better seams in the middle Clyde Valley by 1900.⁵ Nor were the western coalowners completely isolated from export markets, despite the marked reliance upon the demand of Clydeside industry to fill their order books. Of the 10.44 million tons exported from Scotland in 1913, almost four fifths came from the eastern area but as much as 2.18 million tons (21%) from the

6. Slaven, op. cit., p166: 'this achievement has to be set against a background of unsettled markets and increasing competition'.

1. W.R. Scott and J. Cunnison, The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War O.U.P. (1924), p25 suggest that in 1903-13 the U.K. production grew by 23.6% as against Scotland's 19.7%.

2. Burgess, op. cit., p158.

3. Lesey, loc. cit., p109, 111-12.

4. R.W. Dron, The Coal Fields of Scotland R.W. Smith (1921) Glasgow p21.

5. Slaven, op. cit., p167-68.

western seaboard dominated by Lanarkshire.¹

Technical innovation was another sign that the Lanarkshire masters were capable of dynamic policies during these decades. As early as 1864 the Baird company were operating their "Gartsherrie" coal cutter, the 'first chain machine ever used to cut coal'.² By 1913 over one fifth of Scottish coal was cut by the nine hundred machines in use - much of the product being carried along the 125 conveyors installed.³ This was a technological supremacy over the other fields in England and Wales that was consolidated during the 1920s and may account for the high productivity record in interwar Scotland.⁴ In terms of numbers, the western fields had the majority of cutters during the pre-War years with perhaps 20% - 25% of output from mechanised seams.⁵

Yet the distribution of firms and their respective market control indicated a great variety of experience within the Lanarkshire sector. It is true that there were a great many concerns operating fairly small collieries, but there also existed a handful of very substantial enterprises controlling iron and steel works as well as coal deposits. Further moves to concentrate production and regulate output and prices were seen in the 1900s as narrowing margins encouraged organisation.⁶ It seems to be the case that it was the larger concerns which invested in mechanisation as well as developing better management control and production deployment. This was even more true of the newer Fife field where larger firms invested heavily in the deeper pits and could ease price fluctuations by recourse to the Fife Coal Co.⁷

This diversity of experience also extended to the working methods and labour conditions in Lanarkshire, with the "stoop and room" system surviving in many parts despite the steady increase in longwall working.⁸ Payments also varied according to piece earnings as well as the current rate and the number

1. Scott and Cunnison, op. cit., p25. Note also coastal shipment figures and importance of west of Scotland.

2. National Coal Board, op. cit., p75.

3. Slaven, op. cit., p168.

4. Buxton, loc. cit., p483, argues this strongly.

5. Slaven, op. cit.

6. Macrosty, op. cit., p95-98, for United Collieries Co.

of shifts worked by the colliers.¹ The area could not be described as a high-wage one although the pressures of wartime shortages drove the daily rates up by 86%, although the actual rise in shift earnings rose by about 50% for underground men and less for surface workers.²

Such wage settlements could hardly have been envisaged without the emergence of a strong Scottish Miners' Federation in the 1890s, partly in response to the acknowledged weakness of district unions in Ayrshire, Lothians and Lanarkshire.³ The leadership of Alexander MacDonald, himself reared in the Lanarkshire area, gave the miners a valuable recognition during the difficult 1880s but from the 1890s new forms of militancy and organisation rose to challenge the coal masters.⁴

Therefore one can characterise the Lanarkshire coal mining industry as operating with fairly limited (and declining) average pit output, and facing real problems of diminishing marginal returns in these years. Unable to take great advantage of the expanding overseas markets and gearing their output to the needs of Clyde industrialists, the mineowners experienced a less rapid rate of growth than did the Fife and similar English fields. At the same time it is important to stress the progressive technical and managerial policies which are evident, particularly amongst the larger employers. The increasing use of machinery and the transition to longwall working, as well as the cyclical fluctuations and difficult working conditions, help to explain the growth of more effective union organisation amongst the miners to resist increasing work-loads and improve rates.

Like Scotland, Yorkshire participated in the rapid growth of the industry after 1870 with output virtually doubling and the number of workers increasing by over 80% in the years 1875-1905.⁵ Most of this expansion was concentrated in the more recent South Yorkshire collieries where employment rose

7. Ibid., p92-93.

8. Bremner, op. cit., p15-16.

1. Ibid., p21; Burgess, op. cit., p162.

2. Scott and Cunnison, op. cit., p47-48.

3. Burgess, op. cit., p212.

4. Raymond Challinor, Alexander MacDonald and the Miners C.P.G.B. History Pamphlet 48 (1967) London, p29; Bob Holton, British Syndicalism 1900-1914 Pluto (1976) London, p171.

from 70,000 to 164,000 (or 133%) between 1889 and 1914.¹ These collieries were of more modern design, with deeper shafts and improved output, though it was still the domestic market which consumed most of its product.²

West Yorkshire was an older and more difficult mining area, located around the Castleford, Wakefield and Pontrefract district from the boom years of 1865-75.³ Within this field there was an important shift in activity from the more westerly collieries with their shallow workings, to the 'Eastern sub-division' around Castleford where 70% of West Yorkshire coal was mined in 1913.⁴ The following figures show the output of the West Yorkshire field and its manpower in relation to the national figures:

Table LV: Coal Output of U.K. and West Yorkshire, 1875-1913

Year	U.K. Output	West Yorks.	% Proportion	W.Y. Manpower
1875	133 M.Tons			
1889		5.019 M.Tons		
1892		5.576 "		
1895	190 "	5.270 "	2.8	10,366
1904		8.961 "		
1905	236 "			28,296
1910		13.022 "		41,736
1913	287 "	15.407 "	5.36	45,884

Source: Smithson, Ibid.; Taylor, loc. cit., for crude national figures.

These approximations suggest that although rather old as a coal producing area, West Yorkshire's contribution to national output grew significantly between 1895 and 1913. Since the figures refer to those firms in the Associated collieries, the growth in membership must modify this picture, but output indicates that at least amongst the larger concerns (dominating the Association) production was rising significantly. At the same time, manpower

5. J. Evison, 'Conditions of Labour in Yorkshire Coalmines, 1870-1914' B.A. Dissert. (Birmingham, 1963), p2.

1. P. Davies, 'Syndicalism and the Yorkshire Miners, 1900-1914' M.A. (Bradford, 1977), p23.

2. Ibid.

3. O.V. Smithson, 'The Development of the West Yorkshire Coal Industry' Typescript for West Yorkshire Coalowners Association (c.1925) in Briggs Coll., MS 12.

4. Ibid., p2-4. In the Eastern sub-division 'the seams are thicker; the royalties larger; and several of the undertakings are of considerable size...'

appears to have risen quite rapidly after 1905, though the 9.94% rise in manpower 1910-13 is matched by an 18.34% rise in output. This picture of reasonably high productivity is confirmed by the fact that whereas West Yorkshire produced almost 5.4% of the nation's coal, it employed only 4.1% of its coalmining workers.¹

One explanation for this improved performance in the pre-War years may lie in the increasing mechanisation of the coalmines. In 1900 there were 83 coal-cutting machines in operation throughout the whole of Yorkshire, but by 1907 as many as 282 were being deployed to produce over three million tons of coal.² Whether or not this mechanisation helps to explain Yorkshire's ability to absorb the Eight Hours Act,³ the field was certainly progressive in its use of technical equipment from cutters to conveyors.⁴ This innovation was in line with other forms of capital investment and accounts for the dramatic rise in the amount of investment per ton of output from 1900 to 1913.⁵

These innovations and patterns of investment complemented other changes in the working methods and managerial control of the industry. Increasingly the pillar and stall or the banking system was being replaced by longwall working in both South and West Yorkshire, particularly after 1890.⁶ There was also a steady changeover in work organisation from the complex butty systems in force at some pits, to a regime based upon managerial direction and responsibility.⁷ At the same time, it is clear that certain 'managerialist' employers were prepared to enforce new waves of buttyism under their aegis when pursuing increased output after 1900.⁸ So it would be inaccurate to assume the opposition of all employers to the sub-contracting arrangements, or to suggest that buttyism represented an archaic form of work organisation.

1. C.f. Smithson, op. cit., p20, where author claims a steady output per man of 260-270 tons p.a. before 1908, falling thereafter; and Taylor, loc. cit., who shows decline from 319 tons per man in 1879-83 to 257 tons in 1908-13, see p46.
2. Evison, op. cit., p13-14, rise from 83 machines and 1.047 million tons in 1900 to 282 machines and 3.06 million tons in 1907, and 258 machines to 2.83 million tons in 1909.
3. Smithson, op. cit., p21, makes this claim.
4. Mitchell, op. cit., p12, 16.
5. Ibid., p115.
6. Ibid., p5; Evison, op. cit., p13.
7. Mitchell, op. cit., p200-01.

These fresh initiatives in capital investment, organisation and management suggest broader changes in the scale and structure of business enterprise in the industry. Whereas in 1894 there were only 7% of Yorkshire miners in collieries employing over 2,500 people, by 1913 the proportion had risen to 24%, and there was a similar move towards public company status amongst the larger concerns.¹

The sources of business capital tells us something about the markets of the local industry, since as much as 10% was provided by iron concerns, although textile firms also provided resources.² In fact, the proportion of coal consumed by iron and steel makers during 1870-1914 was steadily increasing, contrary to national trends as was the amount used by railways rather than local factories.³ At the same time, there was a steady increase in the importance of exports as well as coastwise shipments, as is shown in the shipment figures for Hull below:⁴

Table LVI: Coal Shipments via the Port of Hull, 1880-1913

<u>Year</u>	<u>W. Yorkshire Shipments</u>	<u>Index</u>
1880	562,176 Tons	100
1890	977,172 "	174
1900	2,033,250 "	361
1905	1,694,836 "	301
1910	3,722,008 "	662
1913	4,519,289 "	803

Source: Smithson, op. cit., p11 (adapted).

Whilst domestic house consumption was probably falling in these decades, the steady growth of industrial and overseas demand sustained the West Yorkshire collieries.⁵

The reasonably healthy market conditions and productivity of the Yorkshire mines largely explains the improvements in wages

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8. Evison, op. cit., p46, for controversy over buttyism in 1900.
 1. Mitchell, op. cit., p109, 139.
 2. Ibid., p126-27; ibid., p70, Mitchell states that 1.5 million tons (8% output) used in pig iron production in 1880.
 3. Ibid., p80.
 4. Smithson, op. cit., p9-11, states that by 1913 about 16 million tons (or 14%) of Yorkshire coal exported to Europe via Hull/Goole.
 5. Mitchell, op. cit., p61-70.

and working conditions which many collieries experienced during much of the period. Rapid advances came during the early 1870s, when average wages doubled only to decline rather less steeply during the decade after 1875.¹ There were steady advances during the late 1890s, again largely shaped by market conditions which pushed up prices and allowed unions to press for higher rates.² Although Yorkshire was not a low-wage area of coalmining, there remained very marked variations in the rates paid at the individual mines before the introduction of the Minimum Wage.³

Whilst it would be true to say that the coming of larger and more modern collieries was conducive to safety, the rapid growth of the workforce entailed the importation of inexperienced labour and the change to longwall working tended to encourage greater supervision and work-driving by management.⁴ Both of these factors contributed to the serious increase in accidents seen at the pits during the pre-War years.⁵ In terms of hours, it may be true that miners have a strong leisure preference during times of high wages and cut their hours,⁶ but it seems also likely that in Yorkshire they were actually working longer hours as a consequence of the Eight Hours Act and shift systems.⁷

All of these factors contributed to the industrial relations of the coalfield in these years. The increasing scale of business unit and altered legal structure, as well as the growth in supervision and managerial control, affected colliery administration in various ways.⁸ Mechanisation, changes in working methods, large influxes of fresh labour and the introduction of shifts also placed pressures upon the hewers and related workers. Although West Yorkshire experienced only gradual increases in export sales, and suffered less from competition in this area, the dependance on domestic production entailed the violent oscillations in market demand and prices which provoked many of the industrial troubles during these years.

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1. Frank Machin, The Yorkshire Miners N.U.M. (1958) Barnsley, p162-64; Evison, op. cit., p42.
 2. Taylor, loc. cit., n43, on earnings being 50% higher in 1913 than 1880 and market forces.
 3. Evison, op. cit., p42. For example the 5s at Hartshead versus 10s 2½d at Glasshoughton in 1900.
 4. Ibid., p13, 40; p22 for rise in accident rate (fatalities) from 96 in 1870s to 121 in 1900s.
 5. Ibid.

The progress of industrial relations in the West Yorkshire collieries can be seen in four stages: the massive upsurge in industrial militancy during the 1870s, and the foundation of reformed Miners' Association; the defensive period of the 1880s and the formalisation of organisations on both sides, from the united Yorkshire Miners' Association to the West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association; the bitter conflicts of the early 1890s, culminating in the 1893 lockout; and the period of increasingly stable negotiations from the late 1890s down to the War, punctuated only by the major disputes over eight hours working and minimum wages.

During the early 1870s the ailing West Yorkshire Miners' Association was revived and some attempt made to link up with the South Yorkshire equivalent to press through wage claims.¹ The increasing strength of the union was assisted by the 1872 Mines Act and the coming of checkweighmen,² and by 1873 Dixon's policies of negotiation and recognition persuaded the coal owners (led by Tennant) into regular agreements.³

After the deterioration of trading conditions in 1875, Dixon's successor (Ben Pickard) was faced with the attempts of employers to reduce wages and impose new duties on the miners - such as riddling or sorting the coal underground.⁴ With pressure being brought to bear on checkweighmen as well as union officials, the latter allied with a progressive group of employers in inaugurating the sliding scale agreement of 1879-81.⁵ Equipoise lasted only until the early 1890s when the miners won substantial advances only to encounter employers' demands for cuts during 1893, thereby provoking the great lockout and the Featherstone massacre which

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6. Walters, loc. cit., p289-90, for experience of South Wales.
 7. Mitchell, op. cit., p180, shows rise in the number of days worked after 1909.
 8. C.f. Evison, op. cit., p69, for argument that in collieries where managerial system introduced the 'discipline was satisfactory and the manager's judgement respected by the men'.
 1. Machin, op. cit., p160-62.
 2. Ibid., p175.
 3. Ibid., p174.
 4. Ibid., p246-47.
 5. Ibid., p261-64. Amongst the leading moderates were the Briggs Company and Pope and Pearson & Co.

occurred at the Ackton Hall collieries of Lord Masham under the control of A.J. Holiday.¹

After the bitterness of industrial conflict in 1893, relations were again stabilised by the efforts of employers such as Henry Currer Briggs and by officials such as Pickard and Parrott.² During 1900 there was a fresh drive to enforce a closed shop,³ and in the subsequent decade many conflicts over management prerogatives, buttyism, and working loads, but overall there was much less unrest than that seen in areas like South Wales.⁴ Perhaps the most serious challenge to the employers' authority came with the outbreak of War, when the miners' wages improved considerably but those of higher grades fell behind. By 1918 there was a strong movement - comparable to that in engineering and shipbuilding - for deputies and others to receive War Wages,⁵ and by 1919 there was a powerful union campaign amongst the managerial as well as supervisory grades.⁶

In many respects the two coalfields of Lanarkshire and West Yorkshire are eminently comparable, though in some senses they present a contrast. Both were well-established mining areas serving primarily local markets by the 1880s, and consequently saw less rapid growth than some of the export-oriented fields. Both had strong links with iron and steel interests, though the sources of capital and markets were diverse rather than uniform. Each area had a large number of fairly small-scale collieries though there were also a handful of powerful employers and a tendency for the average size of colliery to increase. Mechanisation and technical innovation was marked in each case, Scotland and Yorkshire both noted for their cutting machinery and their reasonably steady levels of productivity. Industrial relations were rather different, with Yorkshire unions establishing an effective presence before the Lanarkshire County Union, and also reaching a peak of militancy and unrest before Scotland.

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1. R.G. Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout: The Featherstone "Massacre"' International Review of Social History XXI No.3 (1975), p358, and passim.
 2. Yorkshire Post 1.9.1906, cutting in W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes, 1.9.1906.
 3. Ibid., 27.2.1900.
 4. Davies, op. cit., p107, 150, for account of syndicalism.
 5. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes, 23.7.1918.
 6. Ibid., 17.11.1919.

Any comparison of two large coalfields must raise important logistical problems, affecting not only the availability and quality of data but also the typicality or representative nature of the sample. The operation and policies of the employers' associations in the regions are discussed elsewhere,¹ and here the focus will be confined to the individual business. Given the known limitations of primary material and the variations between firms, the following survey covers only one large enterprise in each area and attempts to set these in the local context as well as making general comparisons. Their success as collieries and the important role which each played in the industrial relations of the region provides an interesting insight into the utility of industrial welfare at each location.

The Dixon Iron and Coal Company of Lanarkshire took its name from the three generations of Dixons which operated the Govan Colliery and Calder Iron Works from about 1820, establishing a business empire which rivalled that of the great industrial dynasties such as Bairds and Merry & Cunninghame.² By the mid-19th century the firm was producing over 150,000 tons of coal per annum, benefiting from the aggressive marketing policies of William Dixon II as well as the vertical integration with iron manufacturing.³ By the 1860s the Dixon business was reformed in a limited company with a share capital of £500,000, whilst extending its mining operations into the new Blantyre district.⁴

The scale of the firm was therefore very large by Scottish and Lanarkshire standards, with an output of more than 250,000 tons p.a. in the 1880s and six hundred men employed. Even in the pre-War years the 200,000 tons produced every year was well over half the Scottish average despite the rise of the large Fife collieries.⁵ After William S. Dixon's death in 1880 this large company was governed by trustees who converted the venture

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1. See chapter six on the agencies of welfare below.
 2. A. Slaven, 'Coal Mining in the West of Scotland in the Nineteenth Century: The Dixon Enterprises' B.Litt Diss (Glasgow, 1966), p108-116.
 3. Ibid., p113-14.
 4. Ibid., p116.
 5. Ibid., p117-18.

into a public limited concern during 1906. Although financial records are very scanty, the following table indicates the overall position of the company in 1909:

Table LVII: Capital, Assets and Profit at Dixons, 1909

<u>Capital</u>		
Share Capital (Issued)	950,000	
Mort. Debenture Stock	289,420	
Redemption Fund	74,753	
Reserve Funds	85,000	
		1,399,178
<u>Assets</u>		
Iron Works, Collieries,)		
Brick Works, Coke Ovens,)	926,621	
Land, Houses and Waggons)		
Utensils and stock	319,232	
Trustees for Mortgage	19,420	
Debtors	100,946	
Investment	58,743	
Cash (bank & hand)	48,764	
		1,473,726
<u>Profits</u>		
Balance Fwd.	20,537	
Profit on Year (1908-09)	61,516	
Gross Profit (after deprec.)	85,356	

Source: UGD 1 56/7 E, Dixon Coll., 'Balance Sheet and Directors Report, 28.2.1909'.

There had been a significant growth of real assets at the firm since 1905, when they totalled £1,226,180 with stocks and only £112,180 without these.¹ Thus it seems likely that investment was progressing steadily during the 1900s, at both collieries and the nearby iron works.

The profit figures also indicate that Dixons was in a fairly healthy condition before the War, gross profits being equivalent to almost 6% of total assets shown. However, profits were less impressive than those seen in the early 1900s, with an annual average of over £107,000 recorded for the years 1902-06.²

1. UGD 1 56/7 G, 'The Prospectus of William Dixon, 10.5.1906'. The prospectus shows 1905 valuation as: lands and dwelling houses - £167,120; Govan and Calder Iron Works, Workshops, Railways, etc - £680,000; collieries and minerals - £180,060; coke ovens at Wilsontown - £60,000; and railway waggons - £25,000.
2. Ibid., p3. Gross profits as follows: 1902 - £91,664; 1903 - £126,517; 1904 - £96,348; 1905 - £99,241; 1906 [six months] - £68,020. Totalling £481,790 for 4.5 years.

The reasons for the Dixon success as a coal and iron producer appear to involve high levels of productivity as well as the effective marketing of the goods. In contrast to the general pattern outlined by Taylor,¹ the coalface productivity at the Govan Colliery actually rose from the 1880s.² Besides suggesting the inadequacy of output calculations, the evidence suggests that diminishing returns forced Dixons to use greater amounts of oncost labour and this resulted in greater overall efficiency.³ The greater reliance on oncost labour points to a greater managerial initiative at the pits, and must have involved more systematic organisation of underground workers.

This management initiative was an early feature of the Dixon operations and found expression in the adoption of the longwall system from the 1830s,⁴ as well as introduction of machinery later in the century. Dixons were also aware of the need for group incentives and would change the rates paid to colliers in difficult places, rather than simply waiting upon the pressures of coal prices and labour market pressures.⁵

Another strong theme in Dixon administration was the refusal to recognise collective bargaining by union agencies or to accept the unofficial limitation of output by 'darg' at the coalface. In return for the eventual consent of the colliers to these policies, the Dixon management paid (within the constraints of market price movements) generally higher rates and the earnings of the miners were consistently higher and less erratic than those recorded for other collieries.⁶ Thus besides having an efficiency management and a secure market for about one third of the coal, Dixons benefited from the absence of output restriction and were consequently able to sell coal at better prices when 'darging' occurred through Lanarkshire.

The policy of the firm on output restriction offers a key to both industrial relations and industrial welfare at Dixons.

1. A.J. Taylor, 'Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry, 1850-1914' Economic History Review XIV (1961-62), passim.

2. Slaven, op. cit., p126-27.

3. Ibid., p127-28, 130.

4. Ibid., p119.

5. Ibid., p141-44.

6. Ibid., p158, Appx. A. p56.

Control of the local labour market and regulation of labour within the enterprise remained major concerns of management throughout the 19th century. William Dixon II had been determined to crush trade unionism at his works during the 1840s and 1850s, and the policy of free labour was formalised by the 1880s (after the eclipse of Dixon control) by the Standing Rules and Regulations of the colliery. Before accepting work each employee had to agree to terms such as:¹

That no Collier, or other Person employed, shall interfere in any manner of way with the Employer's just right of employing, retaining, and discharging such Workmen as may be considered proper, or with a Workman's right of working, and engaging to work, in the way, upon the terms, and with whom he may think best for the interest of himself and family.

This did not prevent the Govan colliers occasionally acting in unison with other groups, as during the 1880s and in 1894, but overall the works remained remarkably trouble-free.²

Control of the local labour market was a reflection of the coal owners' need for a regular supply of pliable labour, and one of the more important problems of the industry was to recruit a labour force to follow the exploitation of new seams in remote areas.³ Since the demand for labour was greatest in periods of growth and expansion, we should expect housing investment to follow the broad trend in capital investment and output.⁴

Given the close proximity of the Govan Colliery and Calder Works to built-up areas, the evidence of housing at Dixons suggests that building must have occurred before the city had spread to the workings. Many were apparently constructed in the 1840s and 1850s, and by 1873 there were 312 dwellings and houses recorded on the company's Rent Roll.⁵ What is interesting

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1. UGD 1 55/5, 'Standing Rules and Regulations which all colliers and others employed at Govan Colliery shall, by their acceptance of Employment, be bound to observe and adhere to'. Rule III.
 2. Slaven, *op. cit.* (1966), p137.
 3. P.H. White, 'Some Aspects of Urban Development by Colliery Companies, 1919-1939' The Manchester School of Economics XXIII (1955), p269-70: 'The changes in the location of the industry become greater as it grows older with a correspondingly more urgent need for a mobile labour force'.
 4. *Ibid.*, p270-71.
 5. UGD 1 55/2, 'Rent Roll of Property..(1869-80)', 1873 entries.

is the small number of miners inhabiting the houses by the 1870s, with only four definitely rented by colliers in contrast to 224 (presumably Calder) workmen.¹ This may well be explained by the departure of coal working further into Blantyre, and the migration of colliers away from Govan, but the reluctance of miners to occupy company housing must also be counted as a strong possibility.²

With the spread of mining into Rutherglen and elsewhere, the Dixon firm entered into fresh building activities during the hectic expansion of the 1870s when a further 87 properties were erected at Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Rutherglen Parishes.³ Though the company's growth was more subdued in the following two decades, building continued as another 25 houses were built at one street in Rutherglen.⁴ In most cases the rental of these and earlier dwellings ranged between £2.7s.0d and £11.4.0d, with an average rent of about £5.4s.0d for some ironworkers' houses in 1883.⁵ Although the actual building costs are not given, it is unlikely (particularly in view of rising standards amongst colliery housing),⁶ that this represented a substantial return on capital and explains the reluctance of many coal owners to provide dwellings unless essential.⁷

The suspicion that many miners avoided occupying Dixon houses, and that the concern was quite prepared to deploy its position as landlord in controlling the workforce, is reinforced by the standing rules which included the proviso that:⁸

Every person occupying a House at, or provided by, the Colliery, shall be bound to Flit or Remove from the House upon the day that he leaves, or is discharged from the employment.

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1. Ibid., see appendix on coalmining for details of workmen's housing in this respect.
 2. See chapter six below for the development of the housing issue in Scottish coal mining.
 3. UGD 1 55/2, op. cit., figures for 1880 showing 87 properties added at total rent yield of £715.18s.0d.
 4. UGD 56/2, 'Rent Roll of Property..(1901-02)'.
 5. Ibid.; UGD 1 55/2, op. cit., 'Names of tenants in Ironworks Houses at 21st May 1883', insert.
 6. Slaven, op. cit., (1966), p85.
 7. White, loc. cit., p270.
 8. UGD 1 55/5, op. cit., Rule II.

The bleak prospect facing any discharged miner of finding fresh accommodation for his family within hours of leaving employment must have weighed with the colliers considering any action likely to challenge management. Even in normal conditions, the company stipulated conditions of habitation which many employees might find irksome if not unacceptable.¹

Whilst housing was to a large degree a necessary investment for many colliery enterprises, many mining firms were amongst the first to provide impressive accident benefits and sickness or funeral payments.² Given the hazardous working conditions and the possibility of mining disasters, this is understandable though the precise conditions upon which benefits were administered frequently involved industrial relations as well as physical organisation. Such a conclusion is certainly strengthened by the case of the Govan Colliery Friendly and Free Labour Society founded during the 1830s. Although this was formed largely on the initiative of management, the colliers did press for the separate Funeral Fund which was introduced in 1841.³

The Govan Colliery Society continued to operate throughout the 19th century, membership being made compulsory under the Standing Rules which were still enforced during the 1880s.⁴ Enrolment in the Colliery and Iron Works Funeral Fund was likewise a condition of employment, 'unless the Managers of the Fund have objections'; and subscriptions were deducted from the pay of employees each week.⁵ These were deemed to be the voluntary associations of Govan workmen and not in contravention of the 1831 Truck Act, nor, it seems, the rigorous Act of 1896.⁶

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1. UGD 1 55/5, op. cit., Rule VII stipulates that no collier could keep a dog or fowls at company dwellings.
 2. Graham Mee, 'Employer:Employee Relationships in the Industrial Revolution: The Fitzwilliam Collieries' in S. Pollard and C. Holmes (ed.), Essays in the Economic and Social History of South Yorkshire S.Y.M.C. (1977) Sheffield, 50-52 and passim.
 3. Slaven, op. cit. (1966), p122-23.
 4. UGD 1 55/5, op. cit., Rule V.
 5. Ibid., Rule VI.
 6. Departmental Committee on the Truck Acts, Report of the Truck Committee. Vol. I.-Report and Appendices. Cd. 4442 (1908), Para.144, p59, for implications of 1896 legislation.

Besides the membership of these formal organisations, every collier was expected to contribute towards the cost of the works surgeon as well as for his tools and the price of his house coal.¹ Although the owners may have conceded certain perquisites, it is obvious that the workmen's own contributions financed most of the welfare they received.

It is equally clear that these services not only undermined those which might be provided by the County Union and hence discouraged membership, but also that the Society was always intended as an alternative company union with independent representation outlawed at Govan.² As such the provisions reinforced the determination of management to exclude restrictive practices of any kind, and they succeeded in limiting the impact of unionism to a minimum at the works. It is interesting that the Society and Funeral Fund should have been instituted in the 1840s, at a time of rapid growth and serious labour unrest, and should have been consolidated after the demise of Dixon control by the Trust management of the 1880s, thus following the broad contours of business development at the company.

The impact of welfare upon the growth and development of the colliery and iron works can only be guessed at in view of the limited material. What can be said is that Dixons remained a highly successful concern throughout the century, and its good record in productivity, management and earnings must be partly attributed to the effective supervision and control which the employers were able to exercise within and without the works. In this control the role of welfare must be considered of real significance, bridging as it did the formative years of the 1830s and '40s and the later consolidation of the firm's fortunes. Even when the Colliery closed during the difficult years surrounding the General Strike, welfare remained a key theme in management as Govan Iron Works set up its own Accident Prevention Committee in 1928 - drawing upon the energies of the iron workers to operate a more consensual welfare system.³

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1. UGD155/5, op. cit., Rule IV.
 2. Slaven, op. cit., p135-36. Where the Mines Inspector's Report for 1844 quoted; see A.P. Donajgrodzki, ' "Social Police" and the Bureaucratic Elite' in Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain Croom Helm (1977) London, p60-63 for the views of Tremenheere.

Whilst William Dixons can be characterised as major coal employers in the west of Scotland, they never attained the prominent role of leadership which the firm of Briggs and Company achieved during the final decades of the 19th century. The limited company was formed in 1865, with an authorised share capital of £450,000 (of which £247,000 was actually paid up) although the total assets of the firm probably amounted to just under a quarter of a million pounds.¹ By the end of the First World War the share capital had grown to £655,750, though the total outlay had risen to over £1 million and the value of the Whitwood Colliery stood at more than a third of this.²

This growth in scale and resources over the half-century involved acquisitions of new pits and seams - such as Whitwell Main in 1873 and Snydale in the 1890s - as well as the diversification of the concern into brickworks,³ chemicals,⁴ and gas production⁵ during the 1870s and 1880s. By operating the Yorkshire Coal and Steamship Company at Goole and Hull from the 1870s, Briggs were able to ensure a ready outlet for their product and matched financial control with an aggressive marketing policy in both good and poor times.⁶

The success of these policies was reflected in the expanding output of the Briggs collieries, with an all-time record of more than one million tons recorded in 1900 followed by the Methley Beeston and Newmarket Haigh Moor purchases in 1902-06.⁷ During 1908-10 the figure of one million tons was again exceeded and when the staple Don Pedro pit was exhausted, Water Haigh and the rich Woodlesford collieries took the average output to 1.38 million tons in 1914-19.⁸ When we consider that total Associated colliery output in West Yorkshire was only 15.4

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3. UGD 1 27/1, 'Minute Book of Accident Prevention and Safety Committee of Govan Iron Works, No.1 (1928-46)'.
 1. Briggs Collection, 'Minute Book No.1 (1865-1882)'. See the appendices on coal industry for fuller details of Briggs accounts.
 2. Ibid., see Table LVIII.
 3. Minutes: 12.11.1870 for brick company; ibid., 7.7.-25.8.1873; 1.12.98.
 4. Ibid., Annual Report of Board of Directors 1885.
 5. Ibid., 21.1.1887 - 18.3.1887. By 1892 the Methley Gas Plant was handling orders such as that for 5,000 tons of gas from Bradford Corporation; ibid., 21.1.1892.

million in the boom year of 1913, and that Dixons raised only 200,000 of Lanarkshire's 23.54 million tons in 1910, then the true scale of Briggs's dominance emerges.

Partly responsible for the continued supremacy of the Whitwood family was the determined manner in which they pursued management objectives, favouring working methods and organisation which were frequently unpopular with Yorkshire miners. During the troubled 1860s the concern introduced the butty system, which was both unusual and unwelcome amongst the workers.¹ Little serious resistance arose, however, until the 1900s as the larger mines in Yorkshire attempted to extend the system and thereby strengthened syndicalistic movements amongst the miners.² This found expression at Whitwood in the struggle amongst the men for control of the checkweighership and the controversy about buttyism.³ Walter Hargreaves, the chief management figure and adviser to the directors on labour problems, advised a strong assertion of managerial prerogatives and the extension of butty lists to the untapped Woodlesford seams:⁴

I firmly believe that we have got as far as we can without reestablishing our right to negotiate with our workmen...We have had the opening up of the principal seam boycotted for some years; no other firm in Yorkshire has been similarly crabbed, but we have reached the time when this branch of our business has to be tackled... sooner or later we must fight - nothing can stop it... What have we to gain? Everything to us - The system of work settled for your time and mine...and in my judgement a readjustment of ideas as to respective positions and responsibilities of Employers and Employed...

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6. Briggs Co., Minute Book No. 2 (1882-1900), Minutes p278, for 1893 Annual Report on marketing difficulties; Smithson, op. cit. p11, for comments on loss of Russian market after 1917.
 7. Minute Book No. 3 (1900-16), Minutes, 30.7.1902, and Annual Report for 1907, for purchases.
 8. Briggs Coll., MS 1: D.H.C. Briggs, A Merchant, A Banker, and the Coal Trade 1693-1971 Pub. firm (1972) Leeds, p12.
 1. Evison, op. cit., p46 for operation of buttyism and Whitwood; Mitchell, op. cit., p197-201 for big and little butty systems.
 2. Davies, op. cit., p31-32, for general context; Evison, op. cit.
 3. Minutes, 24.11.1909. Letter of W. Hargreaves 19.11.1909 insert, p305-11: '...we are being made the stalking-horse in a struggle for supremacy between two factions of the men. The advanced section of the Whitwood men are making an attack on the present local officials...they have ousted such men as Pickin and nearly all the old Committee, and they are now seeking to capture the

In the event the directors opted for the safer course of negotiated price lists for the fresh seams with the officials of the Yorkshire Miners' Association,¹ though the powerful influence of Hargreaves is indicated by his later ascendancy to chairmanship of the firm.²

Ascertaining such factors as investment trends, labour productivity and capital-labour ratios is rendered problematic by the deficiencies of sources but some general indications can be suggested from the balance sheets. Table LVIII shows the growth in the valuation of the collieries between the early days of limited company operation and the eight years after 1912:

Table LVIII: Outlay, Additions and Colliery Assets at Briggs, 1867-1920

Year	Total Outlay*	Cap. Adds.	Deprec.	Value of Coll.
1867	245,671	15,983	8,337	96,051
1868	268,837	22,038	8,617	109,472
1869	279,058	12,587	9,415	112,645
1870	291,190	15,890	10,107	
1871	314,839	17,624	10,448	
1913	705,744			345,129
1914	716,863			344,213
1915	740,739			354,655
1916	851,887			355,526
1917	936,184			357,252
1918	965,741			371,939
1919	1,080,981			371,297
1920	1,108,600			405,130

Source: Balance Sheets inserted in Minutes, *op. cit.*, No. 1 and 4.
See coalmining appendices for detailed figures.

* Total outlay covers all investment, expenditure and outgoings.

If we assume that the colliery valuation is a rough guide to capital assets held by the company, then it is clear that fixed capital as a proportion of total outlay probably increased in the long term.

The cost of labour relative to capital can be assessed by reference

3. 'Checkweighership and the whole machinery. It is only a grievance of such magnitude as the Butty that they could justify the turning out of their old and tried friends, and in my opinion there is no other course at work with them in the agitation.'

4. *Ibid.* Hargreaves also mentions fact that new Doncaster pits were attempting to extend butty lists without reference to union, and also the special allowances made at Whitwood for dirt-holing.

1. Minutes, 24.11.1909 - 22.12.1909. This satisfied the Y.M.A.

2. Minutes No.4 (1916-30), 16.7.1919 - 21.5.1924, for progress of Hargreaves's career within company.

to the amount of wages paid by the Briggs concern at different periods and in different market conditions. It would seem that even given the well-known 'stickiness' of wages relative to prices and profits, the proportion of wages to outlay was remarkably stable during the good years 1866-72 but rose rapidly thereafter and stabilised at a much higher level in the mixed years 1886-91.

Table LIX: Outlay and Wages at Briggs Collieries, 1866-91

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Outlay</u>	<u>Total Wages</u>	<u>% Proportion</u>
1866	211,251	48,018	22.7
1867	245,671	60,082	24.5
1868	268,837	60,679	22.6
1869	279,058	57,047	20.4
1870	291,190	61,656	21.2
1871	314,839	67,549	21.4
1872	339,783	82,173	24.2
1873	368,380	123,521	33.5
1874	415,659	167,350	40.3
1886	238,626	115,612	48.4
1887	238,424	117,728	49.4
1888	243,217	118,334	48.7
1889	246,094	118,828	48.3
1890	304,326	140,358	46.1
1891	361,824	163,654	45.2

Source: Balance Sheets, op. cit.

Whilst this tells us little about productivity and output, it seems likely that proportionately less was being spent on capital additions during the pessimistic years 1886-89 and that wages only diminished in importance as fresh optimism encouraged large additions to outlay.

Some indication of the general effectiveness and efficiency of the company during the early years of its operation is given by the figures for gross profitability.

Table LX: Outlay and Total Profits at Briggs Collieries, 1866-74

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Outlay</u>	<u>Total Profits*</u>	<u>% Proportion</u>
1866	211,251	17,881	8.5
1867	245,671	24,917	10.1
1868	268,837	23,339	8.7
1869	279,058	22,733	8.1
1870	291,190	17,570	6.0
1871	314,839	18,181	5.8
1872	339,783	28,442	8.4
1873	368,380	81,796	22.2
1874	415,659	61,211	14.7

Source: Balance Sheets, op. cit.; Sedley Taylor, Profit Sharing Routledge (188+), p120-21.

Although the profit figures of the 1873-74 were certainly exceptional, the Briggs concern remained a healthy and thriving enterprise down to 1914. Whilst operating the butty system and insisting on such practices as dirt-holing, the earnings and conditions at the mines seem to have been generally good. In order to enforce its strong management policies at the pits, the firm was increasingly prepared to enter into stable negotiations and agreements with the Y.M.A. and were able to continue expansion with a variety of incentives or bonuses to different grades of the workforce.¹

Industrial welfare development at Whitwood has been somewhat obscured by the inordinate amount of attention paid to the celebrated profit-sharing scheme devised by the Briggs during the troubled 1860s.² Yet it is possible to place this innovation within a much broader context of services and their administration, thereby doing justice to the much more sustained efforts of the employers in providing for the labour.

Housing had been provided at the collieries for some years when the West Yorkshire Miners' Association rose to challenge the power of Henry Briggs during the 1860s. His response was to evict those strikers who occupied company dwellings, replacing them with blacklegs imported from Staffordshire and elsewhere.³ With the continued growth of the concern during the 1860s, the new company committed itself to a fresh phase of building as a necessary adjunct of business expansion.⁴ Within two years Good Hope pit was established with over sixty cottages, Briggs loaning money to contractors and possibly even their own workmen to complete the dwellings.⁵ By 1871 over one hundred cottages were added to Good Hope and in the same year the directors agreed to erect another fifty at Don Pedro or Haigh Moor, depending upon

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1. Minutes, op. cit., 15.8.1912 - 27.1.1916, for example. In 1912 the managerial staff were given a bonus incentive and in 1916 staff allowed an 'income tax bonus'.
 2. Sedley Taylor, op. cit., p133: 'The experiment...attracted, from its very commencement, an extraordinary amount of public interest. ...The strong language of approval held concerning the experiment, while its success was still unimpaired, in the writings of Mill, Fawcett and Thornton, gave to it a still wider notoreity...'
 3. R.A. Church, 'Profit Sharing and Labour Relations in Nineteenth Century Britain' International Review of Social History XVI (1971) p4.

the rate of expansion and labour requirements of each.¹ Thereafter cottages were leased as well as built at locations around Loscoe, Streethouse, Whitwood and Normanton during the boom of the 1870s.² Only with the downturn after 1875 did the activities diminish, and an option to buy leased dwellings declined in 1885.³

With the improvement in trade and labour demand during the 1890s, there was renewed interest in the prospect of building with land purchased at Mexborough and further enquiries at the Streethouse area.⁴ Similarly during the boom at the turn of the century land was acquired only to be sold when conditions failed to justify construction commitments.⁵ During the peak of 1907 the board eventually agreed to consolidate their Loscoe holding by purchases, and the next year villas were taken over for colliery officials or management.⁶

Before the outbreak of War the transfer of interest and investment to the new Woodlesford seams was reflected in the £4,200 - £4,500 spent on housing 'built for Artisans' at the colliery, though the thirty cottages may well have been furnished for the key maintenance grades rather than pitmen.⁷ The four decades before 1910 had seen perhaps £30,000 expended on company housing at Briggs, which was hardly a major part of total investment but which was significant at particular periods. As trading conditions improved and the demand for colliery labour increased so the proximity to (and control of) local labour markets became a matter of key importance. With new pits opened in remote locations, the only viable solution to labour shortages at Briggs was the erection of dwellings.

This can be demonstrated by reference to the figures for the period 1867-72, before the great boom of production and yet when expansion was sufficient to encourage substantial investment.

4. Minutes, 29.11.1866. The management was instructed to 'make early arrangements for building by contract or otherwise, at least one hundred cottages; in order to obtain more hands, and increase the business of the Company'.

5. Briggs Coll, MS 6, 'Nationalisation File No.1'; Balance Sheet for 1866-67 shows £3,034 for building contracts and £1,384 as loan to workmen.

1. Minutes, 19.12.1871, 10.5.1872, 1.8.1872.

2. Ibid., 7.11.1873 - 17.11.1873, 25.3.1874, 12.8.1875.

Table LXI: Capital Investment, Additions and Housing, 1867-72

Year	Total Capit. Invest.	Capital Additions	Cottages
1867	88,405	15,983	4,418
1868	96,051	22,038	3,307
1869	109,478	12,587	3,207
1870	112,645	15,890	2,342
1871	118,428	17,624	1,545
1872	125,604	10,376	-

Source: Balance Sheets, op. cit. (Figures adapted).

When totalled the figures for investment, additions and cottages show that new additions accounted for over 14.5% of total investment, and housing 2.3% of the grand total.

Nor was housing the only heavy capital project undertaken by the company from the 1860s. When the Good Hope houses were constructed there was a new Infant School provided,¹ which possessed two large rooms and cost £360.² The directors also paid out various amounts over the following decades for reading rooms, church schools and chapels, missions, etc., with £950 expended between 1867 and 1906 in this way.³

Amongst the buildings constructed at Methley Junction which served both the specific requirements of colliery life and the wider community, was the smallpox infirmary founded by the Briggs family and maintained by the company.⁴ Another hospital was set up by the widow of Arthur Currer Briggs, again funded each year at the company's expense.⁵ These costs were supplemented by other donations to medical institutions at Leeds, Clayton and elsewhere - with large grants to Leeds Infirmary in 1901-13, continued in 1920 by a calculated subscription based on workmen

3. Ibid., 6.3.1885 - 24.7.1885.

4. Ibid., 26.4.1894 - 28.6.1894, 29.3.1895 - 24.4.1895.

5. Ibid., 24.5.1901 - 26.9.1906.

6. Ibid., 2.8.1907 - 22.12.1908.

7. Ibid., 28.4.1910 - 30.3.1911.

1. 'Nationalisation File', op. cit.

2. Minutes, op. cit., 13.3.1866; Annual Report 1867.

3. Ibid., 1867 - 1906. See appendices for details.

4. Ibid., 10.5.1872: 'the same be permanently maintained at the expense of the Company as a Cottage Hospital for the benefit of the Workpeople employed at the Colliery'.

5. Ibid., 14.8.1907. The cost was £300 - £500, p.a.

employed 'within the area covered by the Infirmary's work'.¹ This implies a direct recognition of the economic value of the hospital services if not the existence of an organised scheme for admitting sick and injured employees.

Within the Briggs pits there was the payment of a local physician 'in respect of Accidents', with the company contributing £35 and the men the remainder.² By 1910 these ad hoc payments amounted to £100 from the firm, and with a view to preventing malingering (the perennial fear of many employers), the directors were considering the consolidation of the services under one man.³ There were also the periodic formation of disaster funds to cope with calamities such as those at Stanley in 1879 and Maypole in 1908.⁴

The means by which the Briggs firm covered themselves under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 is deserving of mention, since they had figured prominently in the establishment of the Yorkshire Coal Owners Mutual Indemnity Company.⁵ Besides insuring with this employers' mutual, which had very close ties with the West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association,⁶ the directors sponsored a contracting-out scheme at their collieries in which the whole of the workforce participated.⁷ Costing as much as £3,000 in its first year of operation, the scheme was certainly expensive but a worthwhile investment according to the directors reporting in 1900:⁸

The Mutual Insurance Scheme with the workpeople has continued to give satisfaction, and, though more costly to the Company than the obligations under the Workmen's Compensation Act would have been, it has obviated much friction which might have arisen in its absence.

This apparently built upon an earlier accident fund which had operated at the Whitwood Colliery after 1880, to which some reference was made when the Mutual Accident Fund was renewed

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1. Ibid., 27.9.1901, 29.12.1910 - 30.10.1913, 21.4.1920. In 1901, Briggs donated £4,000 to medical charities, of which £3,000 went to Leeds Infirmary.
 2. Ibid., 26.11.1897.
 3. Ibid., 30.3.1910: 'with the view of preventing malingering..that we might...pay £200 per annum to a medical man to give us the whole of his professional services'.
 4. Ibid., 4.4.1879, 22.12.1908.
 5. See chapter six for this mutual and W.Y.C.O.A.

in 1904 with the Registrar of Friendly Societies.¹

With the passing of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, the basis of the contracting-out scheme was threatened. After the Briggs management offered to improve the benefits of the Mutual Insurance Scheme in 1907, the men declined to take up the opportunity and the arrangement had 'fallen through lack of support'.² Once the surplus of £540 was distributed amongst the local hospitals, the firm was operated completely under state legislation.³

Pensions were also provided by the Whitwood firm both to company officials and workmen at the collieries. Large grants to ex-directors, company engineers and office staff were made at the discretion of the board, and could be withdrawn as easily.⁴ Then in 1906 - at the same time that the second Workmen's Compensation measure was passed - the company introduced a Workmen's Pension Fund. Both workmen and employers subscribed an equal amount (up to 1d per workman per week),⁵ and the Fund continued in operation after the arrival of state pensions in 1908-09.⁶ It is interesting that the Pension Fund remained in operation throughout the 1920s, at a time when the Miners' Welfare Fund was being organised nationally, and after the 1926 strikes the directors agreed to salvage the pension finances only on condition that they exert greater control over its administration.⁷ Clearly, the strategic value of welfare benefits was not lost upon the Yorkshire coal masters.

Just as impressive was the formal superannuation scheme devised for the staff grades from 1913-14, which was introduced (appropriately enough) by the strong managerialist Hargreaves. The scheme was designed to cover undermanagers, deputies and enginewrights at the collieries, with half of the five shillings

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6. Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Departmental Committee...into the law relating to Compensation for Injuries to Workmen Vol. II Cd. 2334 (1904); evidence of A.J. Holiday, Q 5873 - 74, for links of the bodies.
 7. Minutes, op. cit., 1.7.1898; Annual Report for 1899.
 8. Ibid., Annual Report 1900.
 1. Ibid., 27.1.1904.
 2. Ibid., 22.1.1908.
 3. Ibid., 28.4.1909. See chapter nine on state intervention.

weekly subscription paid by the firm 'in lieu of an advance in wages to that extent'. The conditions governing the withdrawal of payments also ensured that the supervisory and technical grades would have little opportunity of drawing upon the resources unless in dire need.¹

The reference to pension subscriptions 'in lieu of wage advances' indicates that the scheme was introduced at a period when the intermediate grades were pressing for improved remuneration, and that welfare benefits were perceived as an attractive alternative by management. Moreover, the Briggs scheme served as a blueprint for the Mutual Benefit Society of the West Yorkshire Owners' Association, which the firm had been responsible for setting up in 1890 and in which they enjoyed considerable influence.² Not only did such schemes reinforce the managerial perquisites of the coal industry,³ but they also retarded the growth of managerial and supervisory unions amongst the non-manual grades.⁴ In many respects the Briggs and West Yorkshire schemes resembled the company unionism of Dixons, although its greater scope and effectiveness suggests parallels with the notorious company unionism of interwar South Wales.⁵ Faced with the prospect of disaffection amongst the key supervisory grades, Briggs acted swiftly to defend managerial authority and were so successful

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4. Ibid., 6.5.1903, 27.11.1913, 19.12.1918. See 23.5.1912, for grant of pension to widow of staff employee in appreciation of 'the honourable service which her husband rendered the Company'.
 5. Ibid., 24.10.1906.
 6. Ibid., 24.2.1916, when firm still subscribing 1d per week per man.
 7. Ibid., 3.3.1927. The directors agreed to contribute £500 but expressed 'a desire to have more control in fixing the amount of pension'.
 1. Ibid., 26.2.1914: 'The amount standing to the credit of members shall be only available to them in the event of leaving the Company's service; death; paying installments in respect of dwelling houses; or in such special circumstances as the Board of Management which shall be set up - may deem desirable'.
 2. Ibid., 23.11.1888, for decision of firm to leave old Masters' Association; 1.8.1889, for continuation of general alignment. See chapter six for the formation of W.Y.C.O.A.
 3. B. McCormick, 'Managerial Unionism in the Coal Industry' British Journal of Sociology XI (1960), p361.
 4. Ibid., p357: '..the resistance of the coal-owners to trade unionism among their staffs..often took the form of establishing company unions. In West Yorkshire..there was a staff mutual provident

that their scheme became the model for regional coal owners' policy on staff benefits.

It is in this context of long-term welfare development that we must set the early profit-sharing ventures at the Briggs company. The immediate setting for the celebrated experiment was the rapid deterioration of industrial relations at Whitwood during the decade before 1865.¹ Whether or not this was very conducive to the implementation of the principle,² it was the real danger that company participation would supplant trade unionism which secured the undying hostility of officials such as Dixon and Pickard.³ In a bid to improve their labour management and sustain output, the Briggs family offered to share the surplus profits with their men and allow the accumulated profit bonus to purchase shares in the concern. This achieved quite remarkable success after its 1865-66 introduction, and by 1872 the directors resolved to carry forward £5,000 to the Special Labour Bonus Fund which would guarantee payment of bonus on 'the earnings of Shareholders employed by the Company'.⁴ Yet it is arguable that even in its heyday, during the very good conditions of the early 1870s, the scheme never represented a major addition to colliers' earnings nor was it a very large part of declared profits.

It is certainly true that profit-sharing did not distract the attention of the mineworkers from pay claims during the boom years 1873-74, provoking a storm of protest at the 1874 A.G.M. and leading to a serious modification of the existing arrangements.⁵ There had been serious attacks on the scheme since at least 1870 when the directors felt called upon to defend their creation,⁶ and by 1872 relations with the union

4. 'scheme operated by the coal-owners'; C.G. Paton, 'Managerial Trade Unionism in Britain' Management Today (July 1963), p264-66 for development of British Association of Colliery Management.

5. See David Smith, 'The Struggle Against Company Unionism in the South Wales Coalfield, 1926-1939' Welsh Historical Review VI (1973), p358-59, and passim for links of owners and industrial unionism from 1927.

1. Sedley Taylor, op. cit., p135-36: 'Participation was introduced at Whitwood as a remedy for trade conflicts of extraordinary duration.'

2. Ibid.

were strained to breaking point as the company informed their employees that they should choose "between union with us and union against us".¹ On the same day that Dixon was denouncing this action by the directors at a Leeds rally, the Whitwood employers advised their employees again to 'refrain from combination' and resolved to protect the liberties of free labour at their works.²

During 1874-75 both the boom and the partnership broke, as the employers pressed for underground riddling and received an absolute refusal from their colliers.³ As the directors informed their shareholders in terminating the sharing agreement:⁴

inasmuch as those employees underground are now members of the Miners' Union, and act in all questions arising between themselves and their employers strictly under instruction from the Executive of the Union, it is evident that they are no longer prepared to recognise or carry out any special arrangement with the Company.

Although the Briggs thereby ended the bonus payments, some of the later vestiges of partnership remained for a time. From 1869 there had been elected worker directors, who were paid one guinea each meeting they attended.⁵ This continued until 1886 when, receiving only one nomination for the post, the board decided to discontinue the arrangement.⁶ Since 1882 Briggs had been very active in the Masters' Association, and the older pattern of industrial relations (if not quite the rancour of the 1855-65

3. Archibald and Henry Curren Briggs, 'Memorandum on Industrial Partnership' in Sedley Taylor, p122. The brothers deny that trade unionism was prohibited, 'although it was hoped that, as industrial partnership gave all that trades Unionism could fairly demand, the workmen would gradually substitute combination with their employers for combination against them.'
4. Minutes, op. cit., A.G.M. 19.8.1872.
5. Ibid., E.G.M. 15.6.1874, of shareholders protesting against union and individual demands; A.G.M. 24.8.1874, for modification of rules to empower directors to 'withold the whole or any part of the Bonus payable.../from/ who they may consider to have forfeited the same from misconduct..!'
6. Ibid., 29.7.1870.
1. Ibid., 19.8.1872, when the notice of 17.8.1872 quoted to this effect and discussed.
2. Machin, op. cit., p163-64; Minutes, op. cit., 19.8.1872: 'steps be taken to protect non unionists, and to prevent all intimidation by unionists.'
3. 'Memorandum on Industrial Partnership', loc. cit., p127.

period) had been re-established at the collieries.¹

Whilst it remains true that the failure of the industrial partnership marks a turning point in labour relations, its overall economic and managerial significance can be exaggerated. Table XLII indicates the limited character of the bonus payments:

Table XLIII: Wages, Profits and Profit-Sharing at Briggs, 1866-74.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Wages</u>	<u>Total Prof.</u>	<u>Dividends</u>	<u>Divd Bonus</u>	<u>Bonus Fund</u>
1866	48,018	17,881	8,800	1,800	1,800
1867	60,062	24,917	9,000	2,700	2,700
1868	60,679	23,339	9,000	3,150	3,150
1869	57,047	22,733	10,325	3,463	3,463
1870	61,656	17,570	10,431	1,740	1,740
1871	67,549	18,181	10,463	1,745	1,745
1872	82,173	28,442	10,662	5,250	5,250
1873	123,521	81,796	30,946*	14,256	14,256
1874	167,350	61,211	39,609 ⁺	6,049	6,049

Source: Sedley Taylor, op. cit., p120-21; Board of Trade (Labour Dept.), Report on Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom (1912) Cd. 6496, p42-43.

* Includes second dividend of 10%.

+ Includes second and third dividends of 3% and 2% respectively.

Whilst wages advanced over 50% in 1872-73 and a further 35.5% the following year, profits had grown 187.5% in the first year and fallen back to a 115% improvement on 1872 by 1874. Since even in the very good year of 1873, the shared bonus never amounted to much more than 17% of total profits and 11.5% of wages (and these proportions were drastically cut back after the shareholders' protests), the scepticism of many colliers² as to the equity of sharing and the advantages of shares relative to wage advances

4. Minutes, op. cit., 31.12.1874. Half-Annual Report of Directors.

5. Ibid., 29.7.1869; E.G.M. 9.8.1869.

6. Ibid., 13.8.1885 - Annual Report 1886.

1. See ibid., 23.11.1888.

2. Sedley Taylor, op. cit., p136 says of the introduction of profit sharing that: '...such an atmosphere of ingrained distrust was highly unfavourable to the effective working of the participatory principle...we find that principle from the outset regarded with suspicion by particular sections of the men.'

appear to be justified. Ultimately it was the Briggs directors who chose the issue of riddling and the time for the cessation of profit-sharing once they discovered the depth of union commitment amongst their workers.

The partnership venture was certainly a setback for the particular form of tertiary or 'incorporative' welfarism at the firm, but it is clear that it neither inaugurated nor terminated welfare activity in Whitwood. Finding that the crude coercive policies of the early 1860s - including eviction from company housing - had failed, and that profit-sharing lacked the support which could make it a viable alternative to unionism, Briggs did not withdraw from welfare commitments.¹ During the years 1896-1914 the company entered into a fresh phase of innovation, with accident benefits, sickness claims and pensions provided for both workmen and staff. Here again the support of the employees was essential if schemes such as the Mutual Accident Fund were to flourish. It is a testament to the energy and acumen of Hargreaves and the new generation of managerial welfarists that they created the conditions for staff loyalty, via the superannuation and related arrangements, in a period when the coal owners were to face the dual pressures of difficult market conditions and disaffected labour after 1918.

The survey of the Dixon and Briggs welfare provisions tell us as much about managerial initiative as about the objective economic conditions in which services might be funded. Market conditions and the distribution of market control were generally similar, with a small number of larger firms dominating the supply of medium-quality coal to local industry and households. In technology and working methods the two fields were progressive, facing as they both did the problems of diminishing returns and offsetting the weight of oncost labour, and they remained fairly safe despite the large amounts of fresh labour required during the growth years after 1875. The wages and conditions of this labour were better in Yorkshire than Lanarkshire, though the earnings at both Dixons and Briggs must be considered good. Management and supervision was strong in each case, and was reinforced by the formation of the employer associations in the 1880s, though buttyism and sub-contracting was supported at

1. Briggs Coll., MS 22, D.H.C. Briggs, Record of a Yorkshire Family (1971) Leeds. Copy of 1882 letter from workmen.

Whitwood by full managerial authority. This effectiveness and general efficiency was reflected in the figures for profitability, which remained fairly good in each colliery despite the often eccentric movement of prices and wages in the coal trade.

Industrial relations at each location were shaped by social and cultural as well as economic factors, with a stronger tradition of servitude in the older Lanarkshire field than in West Yorkshire.¹ During the 1840s Dixons had been successful in their replacement of unionism by the Free Labour Society, and the Govan Colliery remained formally non-aligned until the First World War. The West Yorkshire field developed rather later than its Scottish counterpart, but already by the 1860s Briggs were experiencing conflicts of violent bitterness. Unionism remained strong throughout the 19th century at their pits, and by the early 20th century there were signs of organisation amongst the technical, supervisory and managerial grades as well as a syndicalistic unrest amongst the colliers.

Industrial welfare reflected these contours of economic growth and labour relations at each of the coalmining firms. In each situation the proximity to, and control of, the local labour market remained a paramount consideration with the employers. Where growth was most evident, as during the early stages of mine operation and where new collieries came into production, there was a consequent pressure for additional labour in such a labour-intensive industry. Since the location of coal deposits were unpredictable and liable to be away from major centres of population, certain infrastructural services were required at each stage of fresh exploitation. Hence the growth of company housing during the middle decades of the 19th century at Dixons and Briggs, and the additions seen in the years after 1896.

It was also at the periods of most rapid growth in output, usually coincidental with upturns in the trade cycle and in employment, that labour conditions altered. At such times the changing pressures on the labour market tended to favour wage increases,² and also the growth of trade unionism amongst the

1. Alan Campbell, 'Honourable Men and Degraded Slaves...Trade Unionism in Two Lanarkshire Mining Communities, c.1830-1874' in R. Harrison, (ed.), Independant Collier Harvester (1978), p78-80 and passim.

2. Pollard, loc. cit., (1965), p100.

labour force with the possibility of further advances being secured in the short term.¹ What the individual employer experiences within his firm, local coal owners faced collectively within the local labour markets. Hence management policies will be shaped not only by underlying trends and market conditions, but also by the organisational changes in industrial relations. These changes may arise from certain economic conditions, but they can in turn react upon the market environment by limiting or releasing the supply of labour for employment.

Thus the strategic element in many of the welfare provisions must not be obscured by reference to labour supply or efficiency, even when such benefits as housing or accident pay are involved. This is apparent from a consideration of the Briggs profit-sharing venture, which was only one of many to rise in times of improving trade only to fail as a boom broke in the industry.² At the same time, the greatest strains upon the scheme came in the hectic trading of 1873-74 when employers found wage demands and sharing too much for their shareholders. Prosperity could prove as great a problem in conducting welfare expenditure as depression and disillusionment.³

It was their position as major employers and leading innovators which claimed for Dixons and Briggs a substantial influence in the formation of district labour policies. As a non-union enterprise, the Govan Colliery made only an indirect contribution to collective bargaining, but the Yorkshire firm played a major part in creating and controlling the Owners' Association. This may well explain, together with the widening difference in economic position, the varying approaches of Lanarkshire and West Yorkshire to the unionisation of their salaried grades and the reluctance of the former to devise specific welfare benefits after 1914.⁴

1. Ibid., p104, 111.

2. International Labour Office, 'Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in Great Britain' International Labour Review V (1922), p115: '...it may be said in a general way that periods of activity in the profit-sharing movement coincide roughly with (a) good employment, and (b) industrial unrest. At such times there appears to be a recurring tendency on the part of employers to resort to profit-sharing as a possible remedy for the unrest.'

3. Ibid., p115-17, for discussion; see appendix on profit-sharing in appendices below.

4. See chapter six below for a discussion of the respective policies of two coal fields.

The major economic considerations of these coalmining firms in providing industrial welfare were therefore, the command of local labour markets, the assistance of efficiency and facilitation of growth, the advance of technical innovations and improvement of management control. The particular shape which the services assumed was again largely determined by the conditions under which individual firms operated and their success in implementing management strategies.

There is little evidence that welfare was intended or administered as a crude substitute for wages or that it was strictly confined to certain grades of employees. Welfarist coal employers appear to have given average and above-average wages, and the conditions in their collieries were certainly as good as the majority of pits. This was partly a consequence of their larger scale and investment, and there does seem to be a positive correlation between large efficient concerns, organised under effective management, and the provision of particular benefits. Welfare could not guarantee success in either production or industrial relations - as the Briggs discovered in the 1870s and Dixons even earlier - but the subsequent performance of these firms suggests that it did not hinder and probably helped general efficiency.

Conclusion

Any study comparing two distinct regional economies must encounter problems of definition not only in delineating the boundaries of economic activity, but also in charting the regional diversities of 'national' industries.¹ This chapter has approached the subject by selecting one highly heterogeneous industry - that of textiles - and comparing the fortunes of Scottish cotton textiles with those of Yorkshire wool manufacture. The second industry chosen - coalmining - has a much greater uniformity of product and technique, but rather similar regional variations in quality of coal and particular methods of working. Whereas textiles are very different in the two regions, Lanarkshire mining offers numerous parallels with that of West Yorkshire.

1. E.H. Hunt, Regional Wage Variations in Britain 1850-1914 O.U.P. (1973), p129, for this point.

In examining the development of the two industries, this chapter has outlined the market conditions facing the trades and the major factors affecting business welfare commitments. Both industries were facing the challenge of increased international competition, falling prices and narrowing profit margins from the 1870s and 1880s, though coalmining and areas of textiles continued to expand their exports. The labour-intensive methods of production and consequent obstacles to increased productivity affected both the heavily male-dominated mining sector and the diversified textile labour force. Dilution of skills and cheapening of labour by female substitution had its limits, as both the case of coalmining and Scottish cottons demonstrated.

It was in this context of increasing competition (both domestic and foreign), low levels of productivity, and squeezed profit margins, that many firms responded by positive creative innovations rather than merely intensifying labour exploitation. In the West Riding wool districts, employers such as Fisons, Bairstows and Thomsons learned the lessons of the 1870s-80s by increasing technical innovation, expanding the capital and investment in their concerns, and improving management organisation. They also specialised in particular branches of the contracting industry and were much better suited than the unimaginative Scottish employers to weather the difficult times before the 1900s revival. Even in west Scotland there were the dynamic enterprises in ropemaking and carpet manufacture which took advantage of improved markets, whilst the dyeing concerns at Leven and elsewhere consolidated their position by timely amalgamations and management reorganisation. Perhaps the most fortunate of all textile trades was that of ready-made clothing, which experienced a very rapid growth in the pre-War years and allowed the rise of firms like Barrans to overshadow even the great magnates like Fosters and Holdens as well as the disappearing empires of Gott, Marshalls and Cunliffe-Lister.

The combination of relatively favourable conditions and business initiative therefore allowed certain textile employers to survive and rise to prominence during these decades, whilst others suffered terminal decline and failure. Rather similar conclusions can be reached after the brief survey of coalmining

industry in Lanarkshire and West Yorkshire, with leading firms such as Dixons and Briggs able to counter difficulties of diminishing returns and fluctuating prices by strong marketing and management organisation. Whilst technical and managerial innovations may appear limited when compared with the richer and less-unionised American or German fields, both fields and these firms had an impressive record within the British context.


As was argued in the previous chapter, industrial welfare must be explained by reference to a variety of causal factors operating at both macro and micro levels. Where an industry or trade was expanding and labour markets were consequently tight, there was undoubtedly a greater propensity of employers in textiles and mining to furnish such services as housing, travel assistance or incentive schemes. Those concerns which were among the more progressive and successful in the trades also tended to be foremost welfarists, though this depended on factors ranging from location of plant and physical conditions of production to profitability and industrial relations. These specific differences and particular policies account for the wide range of schemes and qualitative contrasts in administration.

The comparison of regions indicates that industrial relations is as significant an element in the formation of welfare at Yorkshire factories and collieries as in Scotland, with similar patterns of increased organisation among employers and labour as well as parallel conflicts over control of production. Yet it is also apparent that employers were motivated by considerations beyond the balance sheet and the disputes ledger in their provision of industrial welfare. There were obvious alternative approaches in the agencies utilised for welfare, and the community (as opposed to economic) involvement of the firms. There were also more subtle variations in the ideological perspectives of the industrialists within both regions, and the interplay between private and state provisions seen in different trades. These important qualifications in our discussion of industrial welfare form the subject of the following chapters.

BRITISH EMPLOYERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
WELFARE, c. 1880 - 1920: AN INDUSTRIAL AND REGIONAL
COMPARISON.

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Chapter 6: The agencies of industrial welfare.

Comparison of the role of employers' associations and friendly societies in the development of industrial welfare.

Introduction

The previous sections of the thesis have outlined the development of industrial welfare within the specific industries of west Scotland and the West Riding, concentrating upon the experiences of individual firms and industries in the regions. This chapter will examine the importance of the agency of industrial welfare, and the conditions under which welfare services are administered.

As suggested in the introductory chapter, it is impossible to define welfare adequately without taking into account the conditions and terms under which the services are provided and the agency by which they are administered.¹ Many of the terms associated with industrial welfare actually refer to these conditions of administration, rather than describing the facilities themselves.²

The study of industrial relations in a number of trades has shown the importance of a 'frontier of control' being preserved, as well as the significant differences which this frontier takes in various situations. Just as local labour markets cannot be reduced to purely 'economic' phenomenon, so industrial welfare cannot be seen simply in terms of calculable costs and benefits or on a Richter scale of industrial conflict.³

This is brought most sharply into view by an examination of two contrasting organisations: the employers associations, and the mass of friendly societies operating in this period. Such bodies were growing in numbers and importance towards the end of the 19th century, although neither were directly concerned with the provision of industrial facilities as such.

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1. Ramesh Mishra, 'Marx on Welfare' Sociological Review 23 (1975) p289, comments: 'Welfare, in Marx's view, cannot be established as a central social norm until communal control over conditions of work and living have been established..'
 2. N.P. Gilman, A Dividend to Labour Houghton Mifflin (1899) Boston, p64: 'Paternalism, in any rightfully objectionable sense of the word, has more reference to some of the methods of administering an insurance or pension fund...than to such a fund in itself.'
 3. Dorothea Proud, op. cit. p83, refers to systematic selection of workers by employers who have 'obtained a more or less complete command of the local labour market'.

The employers' trade organisations were largely concerned with industrial affairs, whilst the societies were technically outside the arena of industrial relations and economic issues.

It is this which gives the welfare activities of associations and friendly societies their interest and significance, for they bridged the narrow world of the individual firm and the entrepreneur, and the wider horizons of industry and civil society. They also present a real contrast, in that the aims and objectives of the employer association are very different from those of the formal friendly society. Whereas the former were necessarily dominated by employers, the influence of industrialists in the societies (although unacknowledged and underestimated) was much smaller.

Thus, in stated objectives, in function, and in personnel the two sets of organisation differed seriously and yet both were directly involved in providing welfare by the outbreak of War in 1914. Just as important as the way in which this occurred, was the relationship between this activity and the other purposes of the organisation. Since the associations were predominantly strategic in orientation, just as their individual members were on occasion,¹ we should expect their services to be primarily strategic in purpose. As the friendly societies were normally orientated towards the apolitical provision of facilities, we would expect their functions to be less obviously strategic and more concerned with the security and stability of the individual workman.

Yet we can only understand these objectives and these functions in the tangible circumstances of the period, and explain the various overlaps of function by reference to the historical development of class organisations during the 19th century. The following section attempts to outline such of these complexities and to provide a basis for comparison.

1. L. Urwick and E.F.L. Brech, op. cit. Vol. II p83, where Slater Lewis is quoted as: "A manufacturing organisation is, in a sense, an engine of warfare - industrial warfare - hence it is obvious that readiness, efficiency and perfection of organisation must receive very careful if not paramount consideration, as against the claims of profit and dividend."

Employers' associations, friendly societies and civil society.

Before discussing the distinct functions of the different organisations, it is necessary to emphasise the position which they occupied in the economy and civil society of Britain. Unlike the schemes discussed in previous chapters, those provided by friendly societies and by certain employers organisations did not operate solely within the boundaries of individual trades and enterprises.¹ Chambers of Commerce are certainly trade bodies in one sense, but they are also - as they consistently emphasised - voices of a civil community.² Friendly societies were often descended from mutual aid associations or the 'good fellowship' combinations of certain trades, but they were also responsible institutions open to respectable men.³

These points indicate the situation of the bodies on the frontier between economy and civil society, as delineated in Gramsci's writings.⁴ In Gramsci's sense, hegemony consisted of an equilibrium sustained between state and civil society,⁵ which provided a cultural milieu in which class domination was facilitated.⁶ It was the veneer of civilisation which made brute force unnecessary, and even abhorrent, in the liberal societies of the West.⁷

Therefore the liberal state did not need to rely upon the massed forces of coercion to support its every decision, when its institutions, politicians and intellectuals would create the favourable conditions for the cultural relations which overlaid stable social relations.⁸ As Gramsci himself wrote:⁹

"...the concept of the State..is usually thought of as a political society - i.e., a dictatorship or some other coercive apparatus used to control the masses in conformity with a given type of production and economy - and not as a balance between political society and civil society, by which I mean the hegemony

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1. See chapter three above for the discussion of welfare provided by the engineering and shipbuilding employers' organisations.
 2. E.W. Brabrook, Provident Societies and Industrial Welfare (1898) London p59.
 3. P.H.J.H. Gosden, Friendly Societies in England and Wales, 1815 - 1875 Manchester University Press (1961) p187-8, for status.
 4. Gwyn A. Williams, 'The Concept of "Egemonia" in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci' Journal of the History of Ideas XXI 4 (1960) p587, for a good definition.

"of one social group over the entire nation, exercised through so-called private organizations like the Church, trade unions, or schools."

By creating the cultural and social conditions for the spread of stable institutions, bourgeois society could direct attention away from the antagonisms of economic relations,¹ without ever transcending the necessary contradictions to which these relations gave rise.² The ultimate achievement of the Western bourgeoisie was the creation of a stable parliamentary system which could combine coercion and consensus in an arranged constitution of balances.³

Although many historians would reject the theoretical basis presented here, studies have indicated that Victorian society did indeed incorporate, institutionalise and thereby neutralise, such movements as Owenite co-operation.⁴ These became the institutions of civil society instead of presenting a political or ideological challenge to the existing order.⁵

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5. Lynne Lawner, 'Introduction' p42 in (ed.), Antonio Gramsci: Letters from Prison Jonathon Cape (1975) London: 'Hegemony...is pictured as an equilibrium between civil society and political society - more specifically still, as an equilibrium between "leadership" or "direction" (direzione) based on consent, and "domination" (dominazione) based on coercion in the broadest sense. A "historical bloc"...is formed only when this equilibrium exists.'
 6. Williams, loc. cit.
 7. Carl Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism Pluto (1976) London p39-48. Boggs quotes Gramsci as writing: "...in the West there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed."
 8. Letters 7.3.1932, 2.5.1932 p226 - 235 in Lawner, op. cit.
 9. Letter 7.9.1931 in Lawner, ibid. p203 - 5.
 1. Robert Gray, 'Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain' in Jon Bloomfield (ed.), Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party Lawrence and Wishart (1977) London p78: 'Hegemony should not be located in those groups which visibly exercise political and ideological leadership in society, but rather in the effects of dominant forms of political and ideological practice, the particular social relations they produce'.
 2. Robert Gray, 'Politics, Ideology and Class Struggle under Early Industrial Capitalism' Marxism Today (Dec. 1977) p369.
 3. James Joll, Gramsci Fontana (1977) p99 - 100.

This characterisation of institutions in civil society refers to the great mass of 'private' and autonomous organs which are distinct from state power, explaining stability in terms of a balance between self-regulating agencies and state control.¹

Such an analysis is particularly apposite to the study of friendly societies, although it also extends to the examination of some employer organisations. What follows is an attempt to outline the major functions of both sets of organisations and to locate their development in these decades.

Employers associations and friendly societies: functions and development, 1880 - 1920

The impulse towards the formation of an association amongst employers depended upon the situation of the actors and the type of organisation involved.² What is clear is that each organisation seeks to further the interests of its members, although the range of services and the conditions of their administration differ between groups.³

This chapter is concerned with trade associations, since civil and political bodies are discussed mainly in relation

4. Sidney Pollard, 'Nineteenth-Century Co-operation: From Community Building to Shopkeeping' in Asa Briggs and John Savile (ed.), Essays in Labour History Macmillan (1960) London p95. Pollard notes that the Rochdale initiative of 1844 'represented the first major breach with Owenism, and one that proved fatal to its ultimate ideal.'
5. P.H.J.H. Gosden, Self-Help: Voluntary Associations in the 19th Century Batsford (1973) London p180, citing Holyoake's appraisal of co-operation as self-help, he remarks that this 'was certainly true of the retail cooperative society movement during the second half of the century.'; Boggs, op. cit. p39 noted that in Gramscian terms hegemony meant 'the permeation throughout civil society - including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family - of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc.'
1. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (ed.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci Lawrence & Wishart (1971) London p12: 'What we can do for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State".'
2. V.G. Munns, 'The Functions and Organisation of Employers' Associations in Selected Industries' in V.G. Munns and W.E.J. McCarthy, Employers' Associations Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. Research Paper 7 H.M.S.O. (1967).

to state intervention in the penultimate chapter.¹ Trade associations were growing in numbers and importance during these decades, for a variety of complex reasons.² The three objectives of trade interests, bargaining position and pressure group activities seem to have been shared by most if not all of the associations.³

This consolidation of forces was never easy for many employers, and was frequently short-lived - particularly when it involved some form of trade agreement for restricting competition.⁴ As Benjamin Browne said in 1898:⁵

Until recently there was a widespread dislike to combined action amongst employers. Thirty years ago there was very little of it...Trade union aggression and socialistic legislation have forced capital to combine, and if these forces become less powerful...I believe our natural love of liberty would assert itself.

Browne emphasised that employers were resisting the forces of organised labour and an interventionist state, rather than seeking to regulate market conditions. The growth of unions, government interference, and international competition down to the First World War are all related, however, and provide the background to the boom of associations in these years.⁶

3. ibid. p5: 'The aim and object of all organisations is to serve the interests of their members. This involves the protection of the employer from the demands of organised labour, and also the protection of his interests in relation to Government, public authorities, professional bodies, suppliers of materials and customers. Local associations tend to stress the importance of protection from trade unions, but many of the national organisations regard the representation of members' interests to government and other bodies as of equal or greater importance.'
1. See Chapter 9 below for discussion. This exclusion of 'civil bodies' such as Chambers of Commerce, means that here the contrast is largely between trade associations and friendly societies.
2. H.F. Gospel, 'Employers Organizations: Their Growth and Function in the British System of Industrial Relations' Ph.D (1973) L.S.E. p27-8: 'Objectives may differ according to the economic and structural environment of an industry...in industries characterised by large firms, employers may organize to oppose trade union pressure...there may be other less obviously economic reasons for a collective employer strategy, reasons connected with the avoidance of disputes or the defence of 'managerial prerogatives' ...'.
3. L.J. Williams, 'The Coalowners of South Wales, 1873-80' Welsh History Review Vol.8 1 (1976) p76: 'The movements towards joint action were all prompted by one or more of three broad impulses'.

By 1914 there were about 1,500 trade associations and related organisations in existence, of which almost a hundred were federations or national associations.¹

This progress continued during the War, as employers became more powerful inside and outside government, and distinct national leaders began to emerge for really the first time since Cobden and Bright.² By 1918 the Federation of British Industry had been formed under Dudley Docker, and a British Commonwealth Union was also taking shape.³ There were proposals amongst the most progressive employers to fuse the negotiating functions of industry and state together, and to utilise state protection for the future growth of industry - marking the high point of the 'corporatist' movement.⁴

Most employers were content to rely upon their organisations as safeguards against unions and state control, which had been the original impetus towards association.⁵ The chapter on

4. H.W. Macrosty, op. cit. for an exaggerated account of the trust movement in these years.
5. Sir Benjamin Chapman Browne, 'Presidential Address to the North East Coast Institute of Engineers and Shipbuilders' in Browne op. cit. p71.
6. Gospel, op. cit. p16, notes that from 336 in 1895 the bodies grew to almost 1,500 by 1914; Keith Burgess, op. cit. p58; Williams, loc. cit. p79.
1. M.B. Hammond, British Labor Conditions and Legislation during the War O.U.P. (1919) p29 for details. The figures are very close to those of Gospel cited above.
2. Gospel, op. cit. p116-17, for Allan Smith; J.M. Reid, James Lithgow, Master of Work Hutchinson (1964) London for Lithgow.
3. F. Dudley Docker in S.J. Chapman, Labour and Capital After the War John Murray (1918) London p129 for Docker; Christopher Addison, Four and a Half Years (1934) London 18.6.1918 p544 for discussion. See Chapter 9 below.
4. Addison, op. cit. 'Sir Alan Smith and Vincent Caillard called on post-war orders and finance. They are promoting a British Commonwealth Union which appears to be directed to the formation of a big association of commercial and financial, industrial and labour interests...they are inclined to suggest that the proposed union should take up political issues. It appeared to be a very ambitious project. All these movements are more and more in the direction of big combinations...'
5. C.f. B.R. Mitchell, 'The Economic Development of the Inland Coalfields, 1870-1914' Ph.D (1955) Cambridge p244-45: 'The growing strength of the trade unions in the late 1880's may have had something to do with the setting up of coal owners' associations in the different coalfields, even though the latter were not negotiating bodies. Their principal purpose

engineering and shipbuilding indicated the crucial importance of the associations in industrial relations, and the same was true of sectors such as coalmining and quarrying.¹

It seems to be generally true that where labour was more highly organised, where state regulation was greatest, and where the scope for market regulation was most marked, the degree of organisation was highest. Just as these organisations emerged from and operated within the specific conditions of each trade, so the welfare services which they provided would be shaped and limited by these conditions of production and the strategies and outlook of the association leadership.² This leadership will itself form a 'dominant coalition' within the organisation, and there is a discernible pattern of progressive employers (usually large scale or second-rank firms), gaining control of the associations and pursuing 'enlightened' policies on a district or regional basis.³

If the argument for 'leading employers' is a sound one,⁴ then we should expect these firms to be influential within their respective associations and to pursue a district welfare policy. This is the argument proposed in the survey of the

5. was to try to get some uniformity in the fixing of prices..'. This illustrates the particular conditions of the mining industry as well as the narrow view of the author here - see note below.
1. West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association, Minutes: 25.3.1890. Thomas Bower spoke in favour of national federation as 'the most important movement ever taken in hand by the Colliery Owners', and he went on: 'He thought owners had now learnt that the men were very strong while in the majority of Districts owners were weak and most probably therefore they would have to fight again in the early part of next year so that it appeared to him Federation in the strongest form should be effected if the battle was then to be won.'
2. This is the case argued in Chapters 2,3 and 5 above, where a group of 'progressive' employers (defined by attitudes to technology, management and labour), are shown as presenting an effective caucus in the local associations.
3. John Child, British Management Thought Allen & Unwin (1969) London; and John Child, 'Management' in S.R. Parker, et. al. The Sociology of Industry George Allen & Unwin (1972) p130-31 for discussion of concept in regard to industrial management.
4. This argument must be qualified in view both of the importance of permanent officials, and the significance of local control. Munns, op. cit. p13 writes: 'The structure of management rests on the principle that control is ultimately vested in the membership. This means that the availability of good represent-

coal industry which is given below. Both Lanarkshire and West Yorkshire associations are examined, as well as the Coal Owners of Scotland. In each case welfare activities form a significant area of the policies undertaken, and these commitments must be seen in relation to (and reinforcing) the major concerns of the organisation.

The functions of friendly societies are both complex and fluid during much of the 19th Century, epitomising in many ways the institutions of civil society.¹ But before dealing with the more difficult problems of locating the friendly societies in society, their formal functions can be stated. Edward Brabrook, the major authority on the societies at the end of the 19th Century, wrote in 1898 that the major purposes of a society were sickness benefit, death and funeral expenses, unemployment relief, and insurance of tools.² The latter suggests the early industrial and artisan origins of many societies, with their culture of mutuality and common dependance.³

By the end of the Century, the membership of the societies

4. 'atives and the maintenance of good communications are important. Because of differences in size and interest among member firms, typical representatives are not common.' The same seems to have been true historically.
1. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks p12: 'These two levels [of civil society and political society] correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government. The functions in question are precisely organisational and connective!.
2. Brabrook, op. cit. p41-2: '(a) The relief or maintenance of the members...during sickness, old age or in widowhood...(b) Insuring money to be paid on the death...of a member, or for the funeral expenses...(c) The relief...of members when on travel in search of employment...(d) The endowment of members when on travel...(e) The assurance against loss by fire...of the tools or implements of the trade.'
3. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class PeFican (1968) p456-65. Thompson notes that the first Friendly Society Act of 1795 gave protection of funds at law for the largely artisan membership; Gosden, (1961) op. cit. p187-8 for the legal and civil status of the societies.

numbered about 4.2 million and the registered society membership constituted about half the adult male population.¹ Many of the 24,000 registered bodies were already trapped between the need to attract new members and the increasing longevity of existing subscribers, which necessitated the provision of an old age pension under the guise of extended sick benefits.²

Besides the growing numbers of friendly societies proper, there were also the industrial societies, the savings banks and the working men's club registered with the Registrar. The first additional group were largely the co-operative societies taking advantage of the legal status given by the legislation of the 1870s. Savings banks were enrolled not as friendly societies but as 'specifically authorised societies', organised for a variety of purposes and apparently including building societies.³

Working men's clubs could register under the Industrial and Provident Society Act of 1876 as 'businesses', and were defined by Brabrook as 'societies for the purposes of social intercourse, mutual happiness, mental and moral improvement, and rational recreation...'.⁴ The principal advantage of registration for them, as with the industrial societies, lay in the legal status which it gave the club.

Besides these main forms of society covered by the standard enactments, there were also 'statutory societies' formed by special Act of Parliament and peculiar to specific occupations.⁵ These were prominent in certain hazardous and controlled

1. Bentley B. Gilbert, 'The Decay of Nineteenth-Century Provident Institutions and the Coming of Old Age Pensions in Great Britain' Economic History Review XVII No.3 (1965) p552.
2. ibid. p556, 'older members could and did live on friendly society sick pay year after year'.
3. Brabrook, op. cit. p103, refers to those bodies organised "to create funds by monthly or other subscriptions to be lent out or invested for the members of the society or for their benefit". Building societies would come under this heading, as well as terminating societies - something of a contrast to the early 'community building'.
4. ibid. p99.
5. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence of Representatives of Co-operative Societies and of Various Movements, and of Public Officials (June 1893) C. 7063 I. Q1760 Ludlow to Hicks-Beach, said that numerous firms 'have got special Acts of Parliament which compel their members to subscribe to sick funds or benefit funds'.

sectors, such as railways and mining, where benefit provisions were often incorporated in the many pieces of legislation controlling the laying and operating of lines.¹ Such bodies were outside the jurisdiction of the Registrar's Office, and were able to claim independent legal status.

The final major form of society under the terms of registration were the Benevolent Societies, which provided facilities for the exercise of philanthropy in Victorian society.² These again were often linked to the disasters of the railway and mining industries, as well as more permanent provisions for their servants.³

It is in their relation to trade unions, and the influence of friendly society legislation on union attitudes and practices, that the regulations of the 1870s assume a wider significance. There had always been strong links between the benefits of mutual association, and the trade combinations organised by artisans and labourers,⁴ which continued into the 'new model' era of mid-century.⁵

During these years the friendly societies came to be regarded as the worthwhile and praiseworthy exponents of dominant values, and transformed (in the eyes of the middle classes at least) into the agencies of individual thrift, respectability and self-help.⁶ The fact that many craft societies linked friendly benefits to trade purposes helped them gain greater acceptance amongst dominant groups.⁷

1. C. 7063, *ibid.* Q1231, Brabrook stated that the railway societies were 'regulated by Special Act governing the railway...they hardly come under the class of [friendly societies]...'
2. Brabrook, *op. cit.*, p98, commented that the 'simple definition of a Benevolent Society is a society to which the members subscribe not for their own benefit but for the benefit of others. A society from which the members themselves or their families are to derive benefit cannot be registered as a benevolent society.'; Kathleen Woodroffe, From Charity to Social Work in England and the United States RKP (1962) London p20-22 for the contemporary setting of philanthropy in relation to state action.
3. John Benson, 'English Coal-Miners' Trade Union Accident Funds, 1850-1900' Economic History Review XXVIII No.3 (1975) p402 for account of assistance; see also Glasgow Post Office Directory 1888-89, for the 'Railway Benevolent Institution for the Relief of...Servants, Their Orphans, Widows and Children, When in Distressed Circumstances', etc.

During the late 1860s, the alarm at trade union 'outrages' threatened the craft societies' rather precarious privileges, with bitter attacks on even the funds of the unions.¹ The fact that union leaders were able to convince the Royal Commission on Trade Unions of their good intentions, and the readiness of many unions to register under the Friendly Society legislation of the following decade, only indicates the resilience of bourgeois hegemony at this period.²

There must be qualifications to such general characterisations, since any institution (whether a working man's club or a trade union) will only maintain stability given certain conditions.³ Although the unions might register as friendly societies, and generally administer benefits, there was no guarantee against future conflicts - even over the provisions themselves.⁴

It was partly in response to the weakening of hegemonic control, that the state was forced to intervene more deeply

4. Gosden, (1973) op. cit. p14: 'Where a majority of members of a local friendly society belonged to a single industrial occupation there was an obvious possibility that the society would become involved in industrial disputes...at times they developed into trade unions'.
5. C.f. A.E. Musson, 'Craft Unions, Welfare Benefits, and the Case for Trade Union Law Reform, 1867-75' Economic History Review XXIX No.4 (1976) p626, for a confused comment on relationship.
6. Gilbert, loc. cit. p551-2: 'Friendly societies epitomized the Victorian ideals of thrift and respectability, of individual responsibility and self-help...Friendly society membership was traditionally the badge of the artisan. It indicated that within his own level he was clubbable.'; C.f. Geoffrey Crossick, 'The Labour Aristocracy and its Values' Victorian Studies 19 (1976) p324, for a critique of institutionalised respectability.
7. C.G. Hanson, 'Craft Unions, Welfare Benefits and the Case for Trade Union Law Reform, 1867-75' Economic History Review XXVIII (1975) p245.
1. H.H. Creed and W. Williams, Handicraftsmen and Capitalists (1867) Birmingham p82; Pat Thane, 'Craft Unions, Welfare Benefits, and the Case for Trade Union Law Reform: A Comment' Economic History Review XXIX No.4 (1976) p617-19.
2. Gray, (1977) loc. cit. p369-70.
3. Sir Baldwyn Leighton (ed.), Letters and other writings of the late Edward Denison Richard Bentley (1872) London p8, Letter 4.11.1865: 'The working-man's home in great towns is such that he cannot there give himself either to study or creation. He must have a club, and till every head of a family belongs to a club, there is not much hope of the poorer artizans'.

in both economy and society during these decades.¹ This can be seen not merely as expanding the 'coercive' potential of the state, but rather as extending the boundaries of the 'ethical state' and the regulation of civil society.² The concessions made to registered friendly societies and temperate trade unions were surely of this order. They should be seen as complementing those social reforms regulating conditions of industry and providing for social needs.

The following account deals with the efforts of employers to intervene much more directly in the maintenance of economic efficiency and industrial stability by the furnishing of services and the sponsorship of 'autonomous' societies, but the principles (it is argued) are fundamentally the same. Support for an aligned society could prove the best alternative to a controlled organisation, and was often much cheaper and more flexible. Industrial strategies could be as subtle and complex as political manoeuvres, or could be as crude as a hostile and embattled leadership would permit.

Employer Associations in the coal industry: a comparison of Yorkshire and Scottish organisations.³

Employers face the dual problems of maximising profits through increased efficiency and of preventing the labour unrest which

4. Richard Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism Pluto (1971) London p43-44, quotes Gramsci as depicting the trades unions as "types of proletarian organization specific to the historical period dominated by capital. It can be maintained that they are in a certain sense an integral part of capitalist society, and have a function which is inherent in the regime of private property". This functional importance must always depend on other factors also.
1. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks p261-2, for discussion of 'interventionist' state of Bismarck and Disraeli.
2. ibid. p262-3. Gramsci notes the difference between the 'nightwatchman', the 'ethical', and the 'interventionist' state, and argues: 'We are still on the terrain of the identification of State and government...in other words of the confusion between civil society and political society. For it should be remarked that the general notion of the State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say the State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)...'.
3. For background to the coal industry and market conditions refer to Chapter 5. For study of industrial relations and the role of employer associations see Chapter 3.

any intensification of labour exploitation and workplace controls might give rise to.¹ The employer associations were concerned primarily with labour resistance organised at a district level, and were not usually involved in questions of labour supply, efficiency and discipline as they affected individual firms.² Associations were responsible for negotiating, implementing and maintaining the agreements with labour and government, and were particularly important in the handling of disputes with organised workers.³

Thus, in order to understand the associations and their welfare provisions it is essential to appreciate the pattern of industrial relations which obtained in the coalmining industry at this time. These relations were themselves the consequence of changing methods of production as well as the particular mode of production in a complex industry.⁴ Associations could not deal with the technical details of innovation, but they were prepared to treat such questions as matters of principle or 'managerial prerogative' when necessary.

The same was true of relations with the intermediate grades, who were affected by changes in production and the manpower structure of the collieries.⁵ Employers saw these groups as their personal aides, with whom they enjoyed and 'special relationship' and any interference on such matters from labour or associations alike was resented. When disaffection spread through the ranks and beyond the boundaries of individual firms, however, then the matter became an association issue.

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1. Brighton Labour Process Group, 'The Capitalist Labour Process' Capital and Class Vol.1 No.1 (1976) p3-4, for a discussion.
 2. Mitchell, op. cit. p244-45, comments that coalowners' associations were 'never wholly representative of all owners in any area...when the policy of the association came into conflict with the individual owner's conception of his interests, the latter almost always won..'
 3. Munns, op. cit. p9, suggests that this is still major function.
 4. Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution' New Left Review XC (1975) p49 for distinction; John H. Goldthorpe, 'Technical Organization as a Factor in Supervisor-Worker Conflict...' British Journal of Sociology X No. 3 (1959) for discussion of methods in coalmining.
 5. A.J. Taylor, 'Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry, 1850-1914' Economic History Review XLV (1961) p58-60 for manpower.

This was likewise the case with industrial welfare, and the groups for whom it was provided. Welfare was very much the concern of individual employers in every industry, and especially so in coalmining with its very different conditions and large numbers of individualistic owners.¹ Although larger firms were becoming more numerous and relatively more significant in the industry during the Great Depression,² the majority of collieries continued to be operated by small private concerns dominated by one or two families.³ Even during the rapid expansion of the 1870s and the 1890s, involving mergers as well as fresh initiatives by one concern, the older interests tended to be absorbed into the structure of the larger venture.⁴

Just as there were movements towards the consolidation of capital resources, and the strategic association of employers in the industry, so there was also a tendency for an association welfare policy to emerge in these districts. As in engineering and shipbuilding, there was a preoccupation with the strategic considerations of the association and for this reason the welfare policies of the organised employers reflects their 'war of position'.⁵

The services provided were inevitably selectivist and discriminatory, considerations imposed partly by the labour-intensive character of the industry and the impossibility (even financially) of covering the majority of workers.⁶

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1. Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 Univ. of Chicago Press (1976) p4, noted that businessmen in America were primarily concerned with their individual enterprise; E. Dorothea Proud, Welfare Work Bell (1916) p93: 'It should be borne in mind that the employer's first desire is for industrial efficiency; profit or loss is the measure of his success or failure.'
 2. A.J. Youngson Brown, 'The Scots Coal Industry, 1854-1886' D.Litt (1953) Aberdeen University p70; Mitchell, op. cit. p109 for the 'inland' coalfields.
 3. Mitchell, op. cit. p128-35.
 4. Youngson Brown, op. cit. p102.
 5. The phrase is taken from Gramsci, Prison Notebooks p238-9.
 6. J.R. Hay, The Development of the British Welfare State Arnold (1978) p40, quotes Macara as estimating wages as '50 per cent of the cost of production'.

Limited services were also dictated by constraints on any uniform policy in any area of policy which involved funding, and the narrow vision of the coalowners themselves.¹ Only in the light of the serious unrest after 1914 were fresh projects for ordinary colliers formulated.

The West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association and Welfare.

The West Yorkshire Association was founded in 1890 under the leadership of the progressive Henry Currer Briggs, after the previous loose association had declined from the 1860s.² Currer Briggs combined, according to a sympathetic obituary, the 'requisite business training and business instinct...with all the tact and method necessary to control a huge and important industrial concern'.³ This diplomatic finesse also allowed him to guide the new Association through the difficult struggles of the early 1890s, and to gain the respect and support of moderate Lib-Lab miners.⁴

This incorporation of moderate leaders into the fabric of stable negotiation did not prevent, however, the moves for a closed shop on the part of the union,⁵ any more than it excluded the rise of I.L.P. support and syndicalism in the coalfields.⁶ Indeed, it encouraged the growth of political consciousness amongst many miners who were disillusioned with the Liberal policies supported by employers such as Briggs.⁷

Industrial conflicts were prompted by the attempts of the employers to improve efficiency and output by a variety of methods and techniques, from the use of longwall hewing and

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1. E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire Pelican (1973) p189-91, for criticism of coalowners in light of the failure of Sir George Elliot's project.
 2. Frank Machin, The Yorkshire Miners N.U.M. (1954) Barnsley p174 for older association under leadership of moderate Robert Tennant.
 3. The Yorkshire Post cutting at W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 1.9.1906.
 4. ibid. 'Highly esteemed as he was by his own employees and by the Yorkshire Miners as a whole, he enjoyed the special confidence and regard of trade union leaders like the late Mr. Ben Pickard and Mr. Parrott.'; R.G. Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout: The Featherstone "Massacre"' International Review of Social History XXI (1975) 3 p358, for Pickard in 1893.
 5. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 27.2.1900, when the Association heard from several members that 'the Miners' Officials were endeavouring

cutting or conveying machinery to increased scale and organisation of firms which figured prominently in these innovations.¹ Amongst the more significant developments was the re-emergence of the butty system in the pits of South and West Yorkshire, being a more effective means of ensuring labour exploitation and intensive supervision from the butty masters.²

This affected the structure of control within the industry, as well as the relationship between masters and men, as greater organisation of production placed fresh strains on supervision.³ Unrest over increasing workplace control (facilitated by new working methods and mechanisation and, alternatively, by the revival of buttyism) naturally rebounded back on to the deputies and managers of the collieries.⁴ Dissatisfaction at the inexperience of incoming miners and the increasing accident rate, products of the growing labour force, also created problems for management.⁵

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5. 'to compel Colliery Owners in this district to discharge non union men unless they would become members of the Yorkshire Miners' Association'; Minutes: 8.12.1903, 15.12.1903, 8.3.1904, 25.9.1906, document the negotiation of conciliation agreements between unions and employers in West Yorkshire.
 6. Paul Davies, 'Syndicalism and the Yorkshire Miners, 1900-1914' M.A. (1977) Bradford University p31-2.
 7. ibid. p126-7, 143; Bernard Barker, 'Anatomy of Reformism: The Social and Political Ideas of the Labour Leadership in Yorkshire' International Review of Social History XVIII (1973) p19, for later developments.
 1. Mitchell, op. cit. p80, 107, 135, for discussion of Yorkshire trends and p6-8 for methods of working.
 2. David F. Schloss, Methods of Industrial Remuneration Williams and Northgate (1898) p147-8, for contemporary discussion; J. Evison, 'Conditions of Labour in Yorkshire Coalmines, 1870-1914' B.A. Dissertation (1963) Birmingham University p46, says that buttyism 'was not very widespread in the county' before 1900; Mitchell, op. cit. p196-201 for discussion of 'big' and 'little' buttyism; Machin, op. cit. p246-7 for 'riddling' issue.
 3. Evison, op. cit. p3 argues that the 'relationship of personal contact that prevailed in agriculture and the older type of mines was entirely broken down'; Goldthorpe, loc. cit. p213-17 for tensions of management.
 4. Mitchell, op. cit. p5-16, for discussion of innovations; and p200-01 for impact of butty - which Mitchell argues was small.
 5. Evison, op. cit. p22, shows that accident rate rose from 96 to 121 per annum between the 1870s and 1900s and mainly involved the younger and less experienced workers.

Whilst the miners in Yorkshire were agitating to improve their fluctuating position between 1881 and 1912,¹ the supervisory and managerial staff still depended on personal contracts and customary arrangements. Unrest amongst the intermediate grades and broke out during the First World War as clerks, deputies, technical staff and undermanagers began to organise.² The deputies went so far as to form a Deputies Association, which the coalowners ignored until it became a serious threat.³ By 1919 this wave of unionisation reached the managerial staff, and the Yorkshire Coal Owners received a letter from:⁴

..the Yorkshire Colliery Undermanagers Association applying for a meeting with this Association to discuss wages and conditions of employment...Mr. Hargreaves reminded members what had happened in the case of Deputies and suggested that a small Committee should be appointed to meet Delegates from the Undermanagers Association, after discussion this suggestion was adopted.

The employers were anxious to stop this erosion of authority and morale, before it undermined the whole pyramid of control in the coal industry.⁵ In 1920 the Association dealt with the claims of both deputies and undermanagers, although insisting that they should not bargain with other sections.⁶

It is in this context of stabilised union relations, increasing pressures of economic change, and disaffection amongst the intermediate grades, that we must trace the growth of industrial welfare in the Association. Before 1914 these initiatives were largely confined to the organisation of disaster funds such

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1. ibid. p45, notes that from 1890s the wages were regulated by M.F.G.B. bargaining and local arbitration procedures, despite the abandonment of the sliding scale in 1881.
 2. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 23.7.1918 - 28.8.1918, for application of employers to Coal Controller for concession of War Wages to colliery staffs.
 3. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 16.2.1920 for statement from deputies.
 4. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 17.11.1919.
 5. National Institute of Industrial Psychology, The Foreman: A Study of Supervision in British Industry Staples Press (1951) p15, rightly points out that: 'The foreman or supervisor in industry is at a critical level in the structure of control. Through him decisions from above have their impact...'. This was more than usually true of a work process so difficult to supervise as mining.

as that at Bolton Pit disaster in 1910, when Crawshaw and his fellow coalowners:¹

"resolved that a cheque be drawn...subject to a proper assurance being obtained that the Trust Deed for controlling the Fund will contain provision for any ultimate surplus being utilised for similar disasters at Collieries in the future."

Whilst the owners were able to exercise a good deal of control over such funds, they were not formally under the direction of the employers.²

As exercises in cultivating a sympathetic public and weakening labour organisation, the funds for those distressed by the Minimum Wage movement of 1912 were more obviously directed by the masters.³ It was made clear that the 'victims' of the strike did not include those who had anything to do with the miners.⁴

These initiatives can only be termed 'strategic' in the broadest sense of generating certain attitudes and values on the part of workers and public towards the employers. Much more

6. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 16.2.1920, when the Deputies Association presented firm demands 'including working hours under the 7 Hours Act...Mr. Hugh Smithson said the Deputies in West Yorkshire offered to work eight hours per shift permanently subject to being paid for the overtime' - c.f. Chapter 3; Minutes: 16.3.1920 when Hargreaves reminded the employers that 'the Under-managers were not a numerous class and while the result of the percentage clause operated harshly on the Owners in some cases those cases were very few'.
1. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 3.1.1911,
2. John Benson, 'Colliery Disaster Funds, 1860-1897' International Review of Social History XXIX (1974) p77-78: 'The support of... the owners of the colliery at which the disaster occurred was felt to be of particular significance...The management of the charity was also important...and overwhelmingly the funds were run by the clergy and other leading local residents.'
3. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 25.3.1912, when the conservative Warrington argued that 'during such a crisis as the Country was now grappling with, which had already brought great distress on the poorer working classes it was an appropriate occasion for the Coal Owners subscribing to the Relief Funds..'
4. ibid. In a carefull-worded statement, the Owners resolved to give one thousand guineas for "relieving distress among the women and children of the poorer working classes whose husbands and parents are out of work through no fault of their own owing to the Miners' Strike..".

explicit and substantial were the responses of the owners to the rise of white-collar unionism at their collieries.¹ After the deputies began to organise in 1917, the chairman of the West Yorkshire Association reported on a general scheme to introduce a Colliery Officials' Mutual Benefit Society, probably modelled on the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society of the Engineers' Federation.² He urged his members to 'give their serious attention to this subject' by canvassing their supervisors, and by returning any suggested amendments to the scheme.³

Little more was heard of the initiative until the colliery clerks began to organise seriously in 1918-19, and one of the employers suggested the foundation of a Colliery Clerks Union under the aegis of the Association.⁴ It then transpired that the Mutual Benefit Society had been operating since 1917, and many of the clerical staff had been encouraged to join. This created certain tensions amongst the employers when the special committee of the Association responsible for clerical affairs organised a dinner in 1919 and one employer:⁵

criticised the action of the Committee in arranging this Dinner and Meeting without reference to this Council. His own clerical staff were members of the Mutual Benefit Society formed at his Colliery and unless the proposed Clerks' Association were able to offer the same benefits his staff would not be likely to join.

After some controversy and considerable difficulty, Archer managed to persuade the employers to endorse the project and in early 1920 a conference at Castleford attracted over 400 clerks.⁶

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1. George Sayers Bain, Trade Union Growth and Recognition: With Special Reference to White-Collar Unions in Private Industry. HMSO (1967) p16-17, for some general figures and context.
 2. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 12.11.1917.
 3. ibid. 'He said the time had come for this Association to cooperate with the South Yorkshire Association in firmly establishing the Scheme'. The more modern and progressive South Yorkshire firms appear to have started the initiative.
 4. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 17.6.1919. The employer was Clarke.
 5. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 9.12.1919. Spencer was the employer here.
 6. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 15.12.1919 - 27.1.1920. The supporters of the new scheme were Archer, Rosslyn Holiday and Clarke - the latter having supported a 'client' union earlier; Alan Griffin, 'Non-Political or Company Unionism' Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History No.37 (1978) p13 for discussion of term.

This conference accepted the proposals put forward by the owners 'with one or two trifling exceptions', and soon afterwards Archer urged the Association to accept these slight modifications and 'enter as many of their Colliery Clerical Staffs as possible in the proposed benefit society'.¹ His anxieties were explained by the signs of growing militancy amongst the supervisory grades, and the employers' committee was asked to investigate the possibility of entering officials, deputies and undermanagers in the new organisation.²

Once the Colliery Staffs Benefit Society was launched, the independent unions recognised the danger and the Yorkshire Deputies' Association wrote 'alleging that the Owners were introducing a new scheme the object of which was to prevent Deputies having the right and freedom to join the Deputies Union.'³ Those clerks inside the Mutual Benefit Society also insisted on their superannuation rights and expressed 'a strong feeling' that a minimum pension of £1 per week be paid. Although this meant a direct subsidy from the employers' Reserve Fund, it was felt that the £8,000 spent was a good investment.⁴

At the same time the undermanagers were also potential recruits to the Deputies' Union, and Hargreaves was emphatic that they should be conciliated.⁵ The undermanagers were recruited into the Mutual Benefit Society as well, although their claim for preferential treatment inside the Society was firmly denied by the employers.⁶ The latter obviously felt that they could not create fresh differentials within the client union which would entail expense and possible friction.

Also in 1920 the coalowners came to terms with the facts of managerial organisation, and set up a district conference committee to deal with 'questions of mutual and common interest

1. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 16.2.1920.
2. ibid. Archer was again foremost in these moves.
3. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 16.3.1920.
4. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 29.3.1920. The full title of the fund was West Yorkshire Colliery Staffs Mutual Benefit Society.
5. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 16.3.1920: Hargreaves observed that 'the Under-Managers were not a numerous class...He..referred to the fact that the Owners Committee had been desirous of concluding an Agreement as speedily as practicable having regard to the efforts the Deputies' Association were making

to Owners and Managers'.¹ The employers seem to have accepted the value of a professional association of managers, with whom they might consult and confer.

Soon afterwards the Mining Association decided to cement this bond of interest with a scheme for managerial superannuation based on contributions from both firms and management.² The Committee of the federation reviewed the proposals and requested the local associations to:³

consider the question and approve the principle of the Scheme the final adoption of which would be a matter entirely optional for the individual Owner... Smithson explained that Managers as a whole desired something more substantial than the Benefit Society could offer.

Unfortunately for the managers, the West Yorkshire employers felt satisfied that the Colliery Staffs Society was working quite well and, although agreeing that the 'principle of superannuation was a good one', declined to participate.⁴

Whilst the Staff Benefit Society certainly attracted large numbers of clerks and supervisors, its effectiveness in stifling white collar militancy can only be assessed in general terms. Those deputies who did enrol in the Society were not reduced to uncomplaining passivity, and by mid-1921 were insisting on the freedom of negotiation within the body.⁵ After ascertaining the strength of the client organisation, Archer informed the employers that 'the number of Deputies in the Society was so great as to preclude the prospect of trouble with the Deputies Union which would probably arise if two Joint

5. 'to get Under Managers into their Association. If they were successful in this Mr. Hargreaves opinion was that a considerably larger salary would have to be paid than that provided for in the proposed Agreement'.
6. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 25.11.1920.
1. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 15.6.1920, when it was reported that there had been a joint meeting between the Central Committee of the Mining Association and the National Association of Colliery Managers, and the local committees were part of this overall framework.
2. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 6.1.1922, the contributions were to be 2.5% - 5% of salary depending on age.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
5. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 26.7.1921, when the chairman told his

Boards were working at the same time'.¹ The negotiating functions of the Staffs Benefit Society would counteract the 'strenuous efforts' of the Deputies Union to recruit more members during 1921.

By that point the movement for white collar unionism was beginning to wane after the high point of 1920 was reached, and by 1924 the clerical associations were on the defensive.² Organisations such as the C.S.M.B.S. contributed to such a decline, and in the latter year it was decided that a list of Society members be circulated to employers in order that their claims should be preferred to others when vacancies arose.³ By such considerate attention the management was able to weed out black-coated militancy in selecting loyal Society members.

Coalowners reaped the harvest of their efforts during the great struggle of 1926, when a committee of the Joint Board decided to leave practical arrangements to individual firms.⁴ By May of that year, the owners were ready to use the Benefit Society as a council of action against the manual workers and to insist on discipline through the non-manual ranks. The Association recommended that for the time being at least, the

5. Council that 'representations had been made by Collieries with a large number of Deputies in the Benefit Society that the time had come for setting up a Joint Board for the Benefit Society Deputies so that they might have a means of expressing their views to the Owners upon matters of mutual interest instead of being dragged at the heels of their Deputies Union as at present. ...After discussion the Owners Committee had promised to recommend..a Joint Board..on the same lines as the Under Managers Joint Board.' These themes of welfare provision and negotiating facilities were an important aspect of much company welfare and suggest the limitations of any 'passive' stereotype.

1. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 26.7.1921.
2. F.D. Klingender, The Condition of Clerical Labour in Britain Martin Lawrence (1935) London p53, shows National Union of Clerks retreating from a membership of 47,528 in 1920 to a mere 7,442 in 1924.
3. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 17.6.1924.
4. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 19.4.1926, when the Joint Committee considered the question of 'Clerks, Deputies and Officials, and they recommended that each Colliery should deal with those claims at their discretion, but urged that special consideration should be extended to Members of the Benefit Society'.

colliery owners should make their own provisions for each of the three groups mentioned, but these were to operate only:¹

so long as there was no forcible prevention of the services of these classes being rendered at the Pits. In the event of such forcible prevention a Meeting of the Benefit Society Executive Council would be convened to decide on the course of action...

The Chairman pointed out that interference by the Miners' Union with clerical or administrative staffs had never been recognised, and he deprecated any Member meeting Union Deputations on such subjects.

In the event, the energetic loyalty of many clerical and supervisory workers during the General Strike was one of its notable features, stretching from the main streets of London to the valleys of South Wales.²

It was also in these years that the Association became seriously involved in the 'Betterment Fund' for working and retired miners.³ In 1921 the Mines Department requested the employers to 'cooperate with the Workmen's Representatives in West Yorkshire to assist the National Committee in allocating the Fund'.⁴ The scheme continued to operate until the General Strike, but in the aftermath of that struggle there arose a bitter controversy over the deployment of the £28,000 surplus gathered. The workmen pressed for a West Yorkshire convalescent home for pit workers, whilst the owners insisted that the resources should be 'applied toward assisting schemes whose financial position had been crippled by the recent Coal Stoppage'.⁵ Conflicts and controversies clearly did not end with the arrival of benefit schemes, and the latter often became the vehicle for further struggles in the war of position.

The Lanarkshire Coal Masters Association and Welfarism

The Lanarkshire Association of coalowners was also the product of

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1. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 3.5.1926
 2. Hywel Francis, 'South Wales' in Jeffrey Skelley (ed.), The General Strike, 1926 Lawrence & Wishart (1976) p234-5.
 3. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 8.2.1921
 4. ibid. See below for more general discussion of scheme.
 5. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 11.1.1927, the £28,000 being the accrued surplus of five years' contributions from masters, government and men.

changing industrial conditions and relations during the 1880s in the Scottish coalfields.¹ After the setbacks of the previous decade, the miners gradually began to present a solid organisation under leaders like Alexander MacDonal.² Such moderates were intent on building up a strong union, however 'incorporated' they may have been in the long-term,³ and it was this evidence of organisation that forced a response from the employers.⁴

In 1886 the Lanarkshire Coal Masters' Association was set up, having 49 member firms with 68 pits by 1888, being led by Cunninghame, K. McCosh, John Austin and Robert Baird.⁵ The Association represented a definite minority opinion amongst the coalowners, failing to attract United Collieries although making recruitment drives in the 1900s.⁶ After the fresh upsurge of troubles from 1908, many new concerns joined the Lanarkshire Masters and the impetus continued down to 1913.⁷ Unrest involved social questions as well as industrial issues, and syndicalist elements were reputedly present in the troubles.⁸

During the War there were rapid advances made, after the initial depression of 1914-15,⁹ and substantial wage rises were conceded in the face of industrial militancy.¹⁰ The colliery owners were complaining of operating at a loss in 1918, and were pressing the Government to raise prices in accordance with general increases.¹¹

Amongst the most important groups to organise were the oversmen (deputies), and by 1917 the clerks, oversmen, under-managers and managers were all organising. In 1917-18 the Scottish Mine Managers' Association put forward a claim for an increase in salaries, with the owners granting as much as £75 over 1914 levels in reply.¹² Later in the year there was a further grant of £50, and the Coal Controller ruled

1. A.J. Youngson Brown, 'Trade Union Policy in the Scots Coalfield, 1855-85' Economic History Review VI (1954) p44-46, for decline in influence of unionism after 1873-4 downturn and p48-9 for subsequent development of unionism.
2. Raymond Challinor, Alexander MacDonal and the Miners C.P.G.B. History Pamphlet No.48 (1967) p12, 29; Burgess, op. cit. p212.
3. Challinor, ibid. p30, comments that the 'cleavage between leaders and rank-and-file expressed itself materially, financially and socially'.
4. Youngson Brown, loc. cit. p47 for traditional divisions between groups of owners and employers: 'That the Scots coalmasters did

that less than £100 of the advances given could be regarded as withdrawable by the owners, and the remainder was to 'be given by the Coal Owners themselves as an increase of Salary in recognition of additional work and responsibility' on their managers.¹

The oversmen and undermanagers were actively forming their own unions in the Summer of 1917 also, and by early 1918 they presented a demand for substantial increases of wages 'on account of War conditions'.² After failing to agree, the matter went to the Coal Controller himself, who 'issued friendly advice'

4. 'not trust one another and would not combine was well known'.
5. Lanarkshire Coal Masters Association (CB 8/2) Annual Report of 22.2.1888: 'In the autumn of 1886, the miners of Lanarkshire formed a strong combination to unduly force up wages, and to attain this, reduced their daily output and agreed to work only four days a week until a second advance of sixpence was obtained...Idle days were frequent, and Coal Masters were never sure of a day's work. To check this detrimental policy, a movement was set on foot to form a Coal Masters' Association for the purpose of regulating wages in accordance with the state of trade, and also to protect its members against strikes and blocks on the part of the workmen on questions of general interest'.
6. Annual Reports: 19.12.1903; 24.2.1904;
7. Annual Reports: 26.2.1908; 30.4.1913, when it was stated that 'There are now sixty Members in the Association, with an enrolled output of about twenty million tons per annum, and the Executive feel that they are now in a much better position...'
8. Bob Holton, British Syndicalism, 1900-1914 Pluto (1976) London p171: 'Throughout the spring and summer of 1914 the Scottish mining situation became increasingly tense.'
9. Annual Report: 24.2.1915, 'many Collieries for a considerable part of the year were carried on at a loss'.
10. Annual Reports: 14.3.1917; 15.4.1918, when stated that the industry was 'carried on under increasing difficulties arising out of the War which continues to be the dominating factor in the Commercial and Industrial life of the Country'.
11. Annual Reports: 24.2.1915 - 15.4.1918.
12. Annual Report: 15.4.1918, 'This increase was to be regarded as a War Wage only' according to the coalowners.
1. Annual Report: 3.3.1919.
2. Annual Report: 15.4.1918

suggesting that minimum wages for undermanagers and oversmen should be set at between £3.10.0d and £4.0.0d. The militant supervisors were dissatisfied with this settlement, and formulated fresh demands which finally resulted in substantial rises to the intermediates.¹

The colliery clerks were restless at the long-term decline in their differentials, as the wages of miners rose to 150% above the 1888 base level, and at the same meeting that the managers and undermanagers complained the owners reported that:²

The question of the salaries being paid to Colliery Clerks had also been raised by the National Union of Clerks and the Scottish Colliery Clerks' Association.

After reaching a settlement through arbitration, the clerks continued to agitate for increases to meeting the rising cost of living and they were only compelled to accept a maximum war bonus by the Committee on Production.³

This was the background of economic development and industrial relations against which welfare services were provided from the 1880s in Lanarkshire. Like the West Yorkshire Coalowners, the Lanarkshire Masters were concerned primarily with the strategic position of the employers vis a vis labour and government, although such issues as housing were to become of major political importance in this period and so demanded the attention of the association.

Whereas the Yorkshire owners provided some form of mutual accident insurance from 1890, this was revised and tightened up after the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897.⁴ In Scotland, the employers from various regional bodies formed a committee to prepare a mutual insurance association scheme in 1898, and the Lanarkshire Association remarked that:⁵

1. Annual Reports: 15.4.1918 - 3.3.1919.
2. Annual Report: 15.4.1918, the claim being for an increase of 100% on pre-war wages 'with a minimum of £4 per week for Cashiers'.
3. Annual Report: 3.3.1919.
4. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes: 11.1.1898 - 1.2.1898, when Parker Rhodes of South Yorkshire proposed that 'the Colliery Owners should provide the compensation money for non fatal accidents but that it should be payable through the Insurance Co.' Minutes: 26.4.1898 document setting up of Yorkshire Coal Owners' Mutual Indemnity Company.
5. Annual Report: 16.2.1898.

The joining of such an [Insurance] Association is optional, but it is obvious that a well considered mutual scheme, under the management of the Coal Owners themselves, is likely to be the cheapest and best mode of covering the great liability to which all will be exposed.

The Secretary of the Masters' organisation filled the same position at the insurance association, and also served on the Conciliation Board.¹

The provisions made to cover accidents can only be construed as 'welfare' if we recognise the different functions of the services and the strategic role of such provisions when administered by associations. Similar reservations must be made when discussing the Association's policies on Rescue Stations in these years. Coal masters were generally critical of state restrictions on use of explosives and hampering regulations,² but from 1908 they were considering the Home Secretary's initiatives on the setting up of such stations in Scotland.³

The special committee reporting to the Masters in 1910, did not think they should go to the expense of introducing costly equipment at special stations, but suggested that each master should provide minimum equipment for rescue operations.⁴ After the Cadder Colliery disaster of 1913, however, the Association changed its mind and from 1914 there were trained Rescue Corps employed.⁵ The incident is interesting in that it demonstrates the close co-operation of employers and state over the provision of services which would improve both safety and efficiency at the pits.⁶

The comparative safety and freedom from disasters in the Scottish mines, probably explains the infrequent references to any philanthropic ventures. After the outbreak of War, there

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1. Annual Report: 27.2.1911, the figure was Robert Baird. See section of Coal Owners of Scotland and chapter on the state for further discussion of Workmen's Compensation.
 2. Annual Reports: 31.12.1896 - 16.2.1898, for complaints of Order powers of Home Secretary concerning explosives.
 3. Annual Report: 3.7.1912.
 4. Annual Report: 30.4.1913.
 5. Annual Reports: 25.2.1914 - 24.2.1915.
 6. Youngson Brown, op. cit. p93: 'Accidents, also, interrupt work.. and a diminution in their number..is almost bound to raise productivity.'

were important joint efforts from masters and men in aid of the Red Cross and other causes, which helped the large numbers of men who left the industry for the forces.¹

What is remarkable is that there were so few provisions for either miners or intermediate grades recorded in these years. The absence of benefits for the broad mass of the workers can be explained in terms of prohibitive costs (particularly in such a competitive, labour-intensive industry as coalmining), and the resistance of unions. It is clear that the Lanarkshire Miners' County Union provided their own friendly benefits, especially funeral allowances for miners.² This does not explain the lethargy of the Association in regard to their intermediate staff, however, and the failure to take the same initiatives as those in West Yorkshire.

The probable answer is that the local Association left the matter in the hands of the national federation, as did their Yorkshire counterparts to a large degree, and we must examine the activities of the Coal Owners of Scotland if we are to understand the major developments of these years.

The Coal Owners of Scotland - welfare issues and policies

The Scottish Coal Owners' Association was already well organised by the 1890s, when it assumed responsibilities for Workmen's Compensation insurance on behalf of its members. After the passing of the legislation in 1897, the Scottish Mine Owners' Defense and Mutual Insurance Association was established to deal with compensation claims.³ The methods of dealing with accident cases could be described as reasonably fair, but they were never benevolent with employers' funds.⁴

This careful administration yielded rewards in the shape

1. Annual Report: 14.3.1917, for both recruiting and the Fund. The latter was linked to the scheme proposed by Capt. Dennis Bayley to provide Ambulance Convoys, the sums reaching £69,000 by 1918 see Annual Report: 15.4.1918.
2. Rules and Regulations of the Lanarkshire Miners' County Union (1908) Hamilton. The Union was registered under the Friendly Societies' Acts, and stated as its first object: 'To raise funds by contributions, levies, fines, donations, &c., for the purpose of mutual support, and to make provision for funeral allowances to Members'. Rules, 3. (a) p3.
3. S.M.O.D.M.I.A. Ledger of Claims: CB 20/1, etc.

of low dividends and a reasonably small expenditure on accident settlements, as indicated in the table below:

Tb. XLIII Workmen's Compensation paid by Scottish Owners, 1898-1900

Year	Total Wages		Fatal	Non-Fatal	Total (inc. LS)
	Underg.	Overgd.			
1898-99			9859	5979	17663
1899-00	3324753	1191371	10741	3753	16259

Source: Figures in Ledger CB 20/1 p52.

The amount of compensation paid actually works out at just under 0.5% of wages in the second year of its operation (0.49%), if only underground wages are taken into account. When total wages are added, then the figure is 0.36% which is a very low burden for such a hazardous and labour-intensive industry as coalmining.¹

The great fear of the employers was that their workmen might fall into malingering, thereby becoming a burden on the industry. This was also a major consideration in their opposition to the Minimum Wages Act, which the owners saw as undermining individual initiative and adding to the difficulties of supervision underground.² In their crusade against the legislation, the mineowners saw themselves as 'not only fighting for their own existence, but also in the interests of the industries which are vital to the commercial and general prosperity of the country', against the Socialistic trend towards nationalisation.³

One key element in these struggles for the nationalisation

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4. Ledger, CB 20/1, Case 798/2: 'a labourer at Douglas Colliery was crushed by a fall of clay in a cutting that was being made for washing plant. Deceased was in the employment of a Sub Contractor...and so it was considered that the Coltness Company were not liable. In any case, the deceased was unmarried, and ..had no dependants, and therefore no compensation would be payable by any party. He was buried by the Parish Council Authorities'; Case 821/2: 'a boy of 14 years of age...was fatally injured by falling among the cleaning plant while apparently sitting on a fence where he had no business to be. As it was considered that the accident thus happened outwith his employment, it was agreed to refuse compensation...but to pay the usual sum of £10 for funeral expenses.'
1. Sir Benjamin Chapman Browne, Selected Papers on Economic and Social Questions Cambridge University Press (1918) for calculation of 0.5%; C.f. Macara, quoted Hay op. cit.

of coalmining, was the increasing unrest over the housing conditions of Scottish miners which directly involved the employers as substantial owners of housing.¹ Of the total number of houses standing in the three Wards of the Lanarkshire field, almost 12% were of one apartment and another 52.5% were of two apartments - so that almost two thirds of all dwellings consisted of two rooms or less.² Despite the efforts of improvers and philanthropists, the condition of the housing was often disgraceful, although opinions differed over the major causes of degradation.³ Officials were prone to blame the individuals involved for their housing conditions,⁴ despite their strictures on the standard of fabrication in many dwellings.

Those miners agitating for an enquiry into their dwellings obviously did not share such views, and their unrest became so dangerous that the Liberal Government felt compelled to establish a Royal Commission to investigate the whole question

2. The Scottish Coal Owners, 'The Coal Crisis' (Typescript) 12.3. 12.3.1912, in CB 7/8 p9: 'The unwilling or inefficient miner would no longer have an incentive to work his best - his 6s. a day being assured to him; and it is safe to say that, human nature being what it is, a considerable number of men would do as little work as possible for the minimum wage...the effect in the end would almost certainly be that the established system of working the coal would be entirely altered, and a fixed day-wage substituted for piecework. This would have a most serious effect on the economical working of the mines...'. The prime considerations were with improving productivity and labour utilisation, in an industry difficult to supervise - given the autonomy in the labour process.
3. ibid. p14, complaining of 'a Socialistic policy having for its object the nationalisation of the mines'; See 'Minimum Wage Negotiations' in UGD 49/32, for the strategies of employers once the legislation was actually passed.
1. Report by the County Medical Officer (County of Lanark), The Housing Conditions of Miners (1910) by John T. Wilson, p10 shows that of 20,930 miners' houses, 7,242 were owned and 957 leased by owners (39.1%) and 12,099 rented from private houseowners (57.8%).
2. ibid. p16, figures were 2,358 and 10,392 in total of 19,797.
3. The Blantyre Lodging House Association Ltd., Minutes: 18.11.1909 for account of the early efforts of this benevolent effort at five per cent philanthropy.
4. Report by the County Medical Officer, op. cit. p21: 'There can be no doubt that the personal factor is by far the most important in securing a healthy home...The question of occupancy is therefore of the very utmost importance in making a dwelling

of Scottish housing conditions, an enquiry which lasted for six years and finally reported in 1917.¹ The Ballantyne Commission report veered between seeing housing conditions in the mining districts, as problems peculiar to the industry, and alternatively, of seeing them in the context of a general problem.²

The housing question became one of the major issues in the renewed drive for nationalisation during the years 1917-19, culminating in the evidence before the Sankey Commission of 1919. It was this political factor that necessitated the involvement of the national owners' association, and their desire to formulate a coherent policy on the housing question.³ Robertson for the miners used the evidence of bad housing conditions as an example of general inefficiency and irresponsibility on the part of the employers, and hence as a powerful argument in favour of state nationalisation of the mines.

The Association replied by rejecting the notion of any legal responsibility for coalowners to provide housing at all, and pointing out that Ballantyne had recommended state intervention. Therefore, the case presented by the prosecution, although

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4. 'comfortable and wholesome. The structural arrangement is no doubt a matter of great moment, but occupancy is the most powerful factor, and should never be lost sight of'.
 1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial Population in Scotland, Rural and Urban Cd. 8731 (1917), Para. 859-60, p124: '..the origin of the Commission was directly due to the representations made to the Secretary for Scotland by the Scottish Miners' Association...it was decided that the case for an investigation into the housing of miners was so overwhelming that we were directed to make special inquiry into housing in the mining districts'.
 2. ibid. Para. 860: 'The housing of miners, therefore, has a very direct and special relation to the nature of the mining industry'; C.f. Minority Report of the Commission, Para. 76 for analysis of background.
 3. Coal Owners of Scotland, CB 7 5/40, "Notes and Suggestions for the assistance of Mr. Wallace Thorneycroft in coming to a decision regarding the Policy to be followed in referring to the Housing Question..." (1919) p1-2: '..it is a case for us of washing in public the linen Robertson has been allowed to soil, or refuting Sankey's accusation of general ineptitude (which was doubtless largely influenced by Robertson), or negating the suggestion that because the Miners do not all live in good houses the mines should be Nationalised'.

intended to indict 'the private management of the mining industry is really an indictment of public management by the State of the Housing problem committed to it by express enactment...[and] a most convincing argument against Nationalisation of Industry'.¹ The employers returned to the point made by both the Lanrkshire Medical Officer and the Majority Report in 1917, that housing deficiencies were largely the result of individual neglect.² They also noted the substantial improvements which had been made in the housing stock in recent years, claiming an expenditure of £1.28 million on new housing since 1900 and demolition or improvement of 4,350 houses.³ There were also 'Institutes, Bowling Greens, and Picture Houses which have been erected for the use of the workmen', by the coalowners - as was stressed in the later propaganda of the employers.⁴

Fortunately for the owners, they were able to weather the postwar storms of criticism and militancy and to improve housing facilities at their leisure. But the events surrounding Sankey had demonstrated the ways in which a normal welfare facility of individual firms could enter the political arena and become a major issue in the industrial struggles of the period.

It was the awareness of bitter class hostility in the postwar period, that convinced officials and employers alike

1. ibid. p5-6.
2. ibid. p13-14: 'the crux of the whole housing question lies really in the education of the individual and there is absolutely no use in Coalmasters or others who provide houses going too far ahead of the requirements of the people...very little real improvement can be made in respect of housing of Miners until they and their families...pay a reasonable rent for better accommodation..'
3. Typescript on housing in CB 7 5/40; see appendices also.
4. Ennslye-Cox, 'The Housing of Miners in Scotland' Coal Owners of Scotland publication, Typescript of original and covering letter to Forrester 17.11.1925, in CB 7 5/41 (draft 18.11.1924) p1-3: 'In recent years the views of mining communities in Scotland have changed enormously for the better in connection with the housing problem...the coalowners have been fully alive to the tendencies of the times'. The draft also made the very interesting comment that housing problems were more acute because 'in many mining villages the grocer, the draper, and the baker who used to invest most of his savings in house property have been almost completely eliminated by the Co-operative Societies. The Societies have captured the trade; but they have fought shy of the responsibilities...'

of the need to initiate fresh welfare schemes and to secure labour participation in them.¹ This was essential for economic as well as political and social purposes, and industrial welfare was seen as one means of achieving increased efficiency and stability in the coal industry. As one Scottish memorandum put it:²

One important fact must supervene in order to efficiently carry to a successful issue any scheme of Welfare: Labour must be willing to give their whole hearted support to the scheme.

In view of the statement by certain Miners' Leaders that they would refuse to work the Mining Industry Bill, this important premise should not be forgotten...

Co-operation on these lines may bring about not only a state of amicability, but scientific, practical and permanent results in the conduct of the Industry, and may lead to better future relations between Mine Owners and men.

The idea for a Miners' Welfare Fund administered by a special Welfare Committee, emerged from the Coal Industry Commission under Sankey and was embodied in the Mining Act which followed the Commission's Report.³ The purpose of the scheme was to enhance the "social well-being, recreation, and conditions of living of workers", although housing was not included.⁴

Lord Chelmsford headed the Welfare Committee set up to administer the Fund over the heads of local District Committees, who would be responsible for the allocation of resources to such projects as institutes, baths, rehabilitation centres, and so on.⁵ There was therefore a strong emphasis upon the health, safety and recreation of the workforce and an attempt to provide structured leisure facilities for the miners.⁶

1. Harvay Ramsay, 'Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and Historical Perspective' Sociology Vol. 11 No.3 (1977) p485-9, for some comments on participation generally.
2. Coal Owners of Scotland, "Memorandum on the organisation of Scottish [Welfare] Scheme" in CB 7 5/42, 'Introductory'.
3. A.S. Cunninghame, 'The Mining Industry of Scotland: A Great Social Welfare Scheme' (Typescript) in CB 7 5/42.
4. ibid.
5. The Miners' Welfare Committee (Lord Chelmsford, Chairman), "Memorandum on Miners' Welfare Fund" (1920) in CB 7 5/42 p2, complained that such Committees had not yet been set up.

Just as important as the uncontroversial objects to be supported by the scheme, was the way in which it was to be administered. The five distinct groups and agencies to be involved were: the Mines Department, the Mining Association of Great Britain, the Mine Managers and Oversmen, the Mining Federation of Great Britain (union), and the Industrial Welfare Society. The Memorandum on the Scottish Scheme made it clear that the employers and officials were originally intended to have the major influence, although the need to involve labour in the administration was to become increasingly apparent.¹ The hierarchy of area boards, district boards and 'Local Pit Committees', reinforced the structure of authority at every level and ensured that the supervisory and clerical staff were given commensurate responsibilities in the scheme.²

Both the economic conditions of the postwar industry, and the climate of industrial relations, meant that the proposed targets of output (to which the revenue of the Fund was directly linked) were not reached in either 1920 or 1921.³ If the miners were to feel the full benefits of organised welfare, they would have to improve productivity quite considerably and resist the temptation to strike action.

Not only was the scheme an incentive to enhanced efficiency and improved relations, but it was also seen as a vehicle for securing a rapid return to 'normalcy' in the control of the industry. For the Scottish Memorandum emphasised that

6. Letter of Walker to Masterton 5.2.1921 in CB 7 5/42, where he lists Institutes, Reading Rooms, Swimming Baths, Recreational ground, Playing fields and bowling greens, Gymnasias, Allotments for Gardens, Bands, as objects worthy of Miners' Welfare Fund support.
1. "Memorandum on organisation of Scottish Scheme", op. cit. p1:
 - (a) Mines Department - as arbiters on questions of policy and principle,
 - (b) Mining Association - as participators in the scheme, along with Mine Managers; Overs-men; and Miners Federation,
 - (c) The Industrial Welfare Society could supply expert staff under certain financial arrangements'.
2. ibid. p2. The Memorandum suggested that the Local Pit Committees should be composed of the manager, an undermanager, one oversman, a clerk, one foreman, one tradesman and two pitmen. On the area board for Scotland there was to be a committee of four owners, six management and supervisory staff, and six representatives of the M.F.G.B.

there should be a return to voluntarism in industrial relations and that:¹

The Government should, therefore, stand clear leaving both parties to frame their own Welfare Policy, and at no time should they interfere unless invited to do so as arbitrators on questions of policy and principle. Holding - as they would - the balance of justice at all times...the Government would be maintaining their proper function in assisting both owners and men to set up a Welfare Scheme on co-operative principles and at the same time to clear away the wreckage of Government control and administration.

The involvement of Robert Hyde's Industrial Welfare Society, heavily sponsored as it was by employers such as Beardmore and Stephen Alley, would be an additional guarantee against any militants' controlling local or national committees.

There did occur a power struggle within the Miners' Welfare Fund soon after it began operation in 1921, as many miners' representatives demanded that the resources be used to assist those pitmen affected by the deepening depression and growing waves of unemployment.² After this challenge was beaten off, there was a growing tendency for moderate union officials and labour leaders to support the objectives of the Fund and to champion the efforts of the Industrial Welfare Society.³

By late 1925, there were as many as 39 local schemes in operation in Lanarkshire alone, consisting mostly of institutes, recreation amenities, and similar facilities.⁴ Industrial Welfare Society workers such as Mason, described the progress of community relations in such troubled areas as South Wales,

3. ibid. p2, estimated that if 32 million tons per annum were raised then 'the income for Welfare purposes would approximately be £133,000 per annum'; Cunninghame, loc. cit. p2, noted that output was 31.524 million tons for 1920 and would be a quarter less in 1921 because of strikes and depression.

1. "Memorandum on organisation of Scottish Scheme", op. cit.

2. Newspaper cutting, 25.10.1922 in CB 7 5/42: 'Despite the ill-advised agitation raised recently in some quarters with a view to making use of the Miners' Welfare Fund to institute a system of doles, welfare schemes financed from the Central Fund are being initiated with significant rapidity throughout the country. In this respect Scotland is leading the way'.

3. Newspaper cutting, 18.9.1922: 'The success of the Miners' Welfare Scheme had caused Mr. Frank Hodges to become a warm advocate of welfare work, as against those foolish dreamers who, as he remarked in his address at the Conference of Industrial

where participation had been extended to the sphere of the locality under the aegis of the Welfare Fund and the I.W.S.¹ The local welfare committees became exercises in responsible self-government, with management of affairs left largely in the committees' hands.²

Whilst the Coal Owners of Scotland were energetic on the questions of Workmen's Compensation insurance, miners' housing debates, and the Miners' Welfare Fund, they appear to have done comparatively little for their managerial and supervisory workers in terms of welfare provision. There are a number of possible explanations, including possible lack of initiative amongst the coalowners' leaders, but it seems that the threat of unionisation amongst the middle ranks was never as serious as in parts of England. After the upsurge of militancy in 1917-18, the colliery masters settled outstanding grievances and were more concerned with general unrest during 1920-21.³ The role given to the management and clerical staff inside the Miners' Welfare Fund, and the stabilisation of industrial relations during 1922, accounts for the decline of white collar

3. 'Welfare Supervisors at Oxford, go round looking for new worlds when they ought to be lending a hand to improve the one they inhabit...The nature of the work, and the depressing traces of bad traditions, are among the circumstances that made the coal industry a specially appropriate sphere for an organised welfare scheme.'
4. "Report by Prince" December 1925 in CB 7 5/42.
1. "Statement by C.S. Mason, South Wales Organiser of the Industrial Welfare Society" in CB 7 5/42 p2: 'In several of these mining communities, committees elected by the general consent and approval of the inhabitants have been formed for the very purpose of dealing with all matters relating to the social wellbeing, mental and moral uplift of their respective communities'.
2. Miners Welfare Fund, Notes for the Guidance of Local Committees (1937) in CB 13/6.
3. Glasgow Town Clerk, "Memorial on Miners' Strike of 1921.." D TC 6/606/1/3, p2 telegram from Lloyd George to Lord Provost of Glasgow: "I impress upon your Lordship, as Chief Magistrate of your City, the urgent necessity of taking steps...to use the proclamation recently issued in order to encourage and assist the recruiting and raising of Defence Force Units, and also...to enroll all additional specials...The troops now stationed there may at any moment be required for use elsewhere

militancy and the solid front which the owners were able to present to the miners in 1921.¹

Just as the employers and government were able to defeat the industrial challenge amidst deepening depression, so they effectively depoliticised the housing issue and ensured that the Miners' Welfare Fund would be channeled into acceptable facilities rather than used to relieve unemployment. Throughout, the role of the state was to reinforce and support the efficient operation of private industry, and to minimise the industrial conflicts which proliferated in the decade after 1911. In periods of crisis state initiatives in welfare provision were coupled with general intervention and direction, but these initiatives (even in times of bitter controversy) tended to encourage voluntaristic co-operation and agreements between masters and men rather than direct state control.²

The employers, friendly societies and industrial welfare.

Friendly societies are quite distinct from the employer associations in their origins, organisation and functions. Whereas the employer associations were wholly dominated by private firms and organised on a strategic footing, the friendly societies were collective organisations established for the mutual aid of the membership. The latter were much more autonomous in terms of formal control, and they could not directly represent the interests of employers. Even

3. "in Scotland, and the Government will rely upon yourself and the citizens of Glasgow to protect the City in this crisis."
1. In a letter to Lord Provost, 10.4.1921 in "Memorandum.." ibid., Lloyd George denied that the Defence Force was an instrument of aggression, but he urged its necessity as a "precautionary measure devised to protect the community from a menace which threatens the very roots of its existence...". There were also discussions on 12th April amongst local J.P.'s on question of Trade Disputes Act to make picketing illegal and to 'deal with the question of processions going through the streets, and also limit the debates at street corners where seditious language is used.' ibid. p8. The depth of the crisis at Glasgow is clear.
2. Letter of Baird of Lanarkshire Coal Masters to Members 17.10.1930 in CB 7 5/2, sums up relations of state and employers on issue of Eight Hours Act: 'Mr. Shinwell stated that proceedings had been instituted in a number of cases but he felt that this was an undesirable method of dealing with the matter and he hoped that as a result of consultation..overtime might be considerably reduced.'

when clubs and friendly institutions were set up by philanthropists and clergymen, they could escape the toils of bourgeois domination with remarkable success.¹

The friendly societies inhabited the terrain between civil society and the state, thereby sustaining - in many respects - the equilibrium between political and civil institutions.² Even more so than the organs of the state, such organisations displayed a distinct autonomy from the dominant interests and class control.³ Their functions could not be defined in any absolute sense, as could the functions of the employer associations, since they depended on the particular context in which they were operating as well as the particular groups controlling the organisation.

What has not been stressed sufficiently, however, is the degree to which friendly societies bridged the industries of the capitalist economy with civil society. Here the influence of employers was much more pronounced, and, because of the close links between friendly benefits and trade union functions, there was also a 'strategic' element here too. This depended on the type of provisions offered and the specific way in which the scheme was organised and registered, but there is little doubt that domination of friendly societies was much easier in industry than in civil society.

The societies can be examined in terms of objectives and provisions, status and regulations, actual control and their impact on industrial relations. Then their influence upon and changes under different legislative enactments can

1. Richard Price, 'The Workingmen's Club Movement' Victorian Studies XV (1971), for discussion of London clubs founded by Solly under temperance terms.
2. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks p12; Williams, loc. cit. p590.
3. E.P. Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English' Socialist Register (1965) p322, for general problem of autonomy; see Chapter 9 for discussion of relative autonomy in the context of state provisions and industrial welfare.

be traced, with particular reference to the experiences of the coalmining industry in these decades.

The numbers of registered societies which were associated with particular works and industries, and which were aided in some degree by the employers concerned, were very substantial.¹ E.W. Brabrook, the Registrar of Friendly Societies, was asked when giving evidence to the Royal Commission on Labour:²

The workmen contribute a certain sum? - Yes.

And the employer contributes a certain sum? - Yes, and both are put together for the purpose of creating a friendly society for the benefit of the persons employed.

And giving sick pay? - Yes, and giving sick pay.

And burial money? - Burial money, and in some very rare cases, a pension also.

Thus, amongst the 24,000 registered friendly societies enumerated by Brabrook, there were a considerable number which were acknowledged to be sponsored by their employers.³

Most of this support had to be informal and legally unrecognised, since the rules of the registered societies usually prohibited such dependence on outside individuals.⁴ The Truck Act of 1861 had outlawed many of the compulsory schemes originated by employers, although there were occurrences of such provisions as late as 1870.⁵

It was this prohibition of compulsion in any friendly society scheme, as well as the regulations on the declaration of accounts, the holding of funds, and the requirements of book keeping, that deterred so many societies from registering with the state officials.⁶ Brabrook referred to the 'very large number

1. C. 7063 I. Brabrook's evidence: Q 1277-80.

2. ibid.

3. C. 7063 I. Ludlow's evidence: Q 1834, 'Are the various provident societies, where employers contribute so much per cent. upon the contributions of the workmen for the benefits and accidents, registered under the Friendly Societies Act? - There are many such. In the Miners' Protection Societies and in almost all of them, the employers contribute something.' Ludlow had been Chief Registrar before Brabrook, and was in a good position to judge the matter.

4. ibid. Q 1838, 'the contributions of the employers for the most part are outside of the rules.', said Ludlow.

5. Gosden, op. cit. (1973) p62.

of unregistered societies', in his evidence and commented that the 1874 Royal Commission on Friendly Societies had thought that the 'unregistered societies are as large in extent as the registered societies'.¹ If this were true, then there existed a hidden mass of friendly provisions - amounting to another 24,000 schemes in all.

Many of these may have been simply smaller mutuals who had no wish to fall under the official scrutiny of the Chief Registrar, despite the privileges attached to legal status. It was apparent that many others were actually benefit schemes introduced by employers, who preserved their freedom of action by operating outside the state's cognisance. One crucial deterrent to the registration of these schemes, was the desire of many firms to operate a 'closed shop' under their friendly society. As Brabrook put it in his testimony in 1893, many employers often sought to make society contributions:²

compulsory upon all workmen who enter the employment of the Company or firm with which the society is in connexion. A rule of this kind cannot be registered for two reasons. First, it is contrary to the Friendly Societies Act, which provides that contributions are to be voluntary. Second, it is not really a rule of the society, but it is a condition of employment applicable to all persons who enter upon

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6. There appear to have been four main disincentives to register: the dislike of official valuation of accounts and resources, Q 1392, Brabrook; the strictures on the holding of society funds by employers, Q 1284, Brabrook; the prohibition of compulsion, Q 1300, Brabrook; and the dislike of 'all the bother of buying and selling stock', whereas with an unregistered society all the 'accounts of the society are kept by a mere entry in the books of the company', Q 1384, Brabrook.
1. ibid. Q 1288, 1331.
2. ibid. Q 1300; Gosden, op. cit. (1973), p62, noted that the main grievance of miners against the old pit clubs was that such clubs were regarded as 'little more than devices for withholding parts of a man's pay...the Assistant Commissioners found them to be very unpopular.'; see also Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy Penguin (1973) p287-88, for a caustic critique.

the employment.

If the schemes stayed outside the Friendly Societies Act and avoided the strictures of the Truck Act of 1861, they could still enforce such rules over their members.

Besides the provident societies (registered and unregistered), with their provisions for sickness, accidents, pensions and death, there were the other types of society referred to above. Savings schemes were often associated with a particular works or company, and among the 'measures which have been taken by employers of labour for the benefit of their workmen, Railway savings-banks deserve to be prominently mentioned'.¹ Mundella pointed out that in 'a great many works of the best employers of the country', a high rate of interest was offered by the firm to workmen depositing savings with them.² Brabrook replied that such an arrangement, whilst excellent in many ways, 'would debar the society from registry' under the 1874 legislation.³

Railway firms are particularly significant, in that they were also the architects of many statutory societies established by special Act of Parliament. Ludlow informed Hicks-Beach that such legislation could compel employees to subscribe to 'sick funds or benefit funds', established by the employers.⁴ The management of such societies lay firmly in the companies' hands in most cases, Ludlow observing that:⁵

I am not aware of any case in which the employed have a share in the management of the fund, so far as it proceeds from the employer. They may have some share in the management of their own fund, but that is all. That fund, for its stability, depends on the employers' contributions.

The regulations governing these bodies were stipulated by the special legislation secured by the firms and aided by the Parliamentary 'railway interest', without any extensive

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1. Brabrook, op. cit. p192-3.
 2. C. 7063 I. Q 1290, Mundella to Brabrook. Mundella was himself a great Whig employer with many progressive views.
 3. ibid. Q 1294.
 4. ibid. Q 1760. When asked, 'Are there not cases in which the management of it is shared between the two?', he answered, 'To a certain extent there are', ibid. Q 1766.
 5. ibid. Q 1764,

consultation between employers and their workmen.¹

It is clear that a critically important feature of many societies is the degree of direct control exercised by the employers over their administration. After the Truck Act of 1861 and the Friendly Societies legislation of 1874, this control could not be embodied in a legally-constituted society, although a great many unregistered funds appear to have operated at the discretion of the individual firms.² There were some cases in which no compulsion was necessary, and the workmen of the firm joined with employers in continuing the schemes after the Truck legislation.³ But it is probable that many firms felt constricted by state regulations and preferred to run their schemes on a discretionary basis.

Friendly schemes and industrial relations.

In the administration of any friendly welfare scheme, both the conditions of the scheme and the industrial relations of the firm and industry will be major considerations. The three requirements of the employer for labour supply, general efficiency, and adequate discipline, could often be met by the introduction of such a scheme. Even the most powerful employers had to consider, however, whether such provisions might not provoke more resentment and opposition than the benefits hoped for by the employer.

One of the most obvious considerations in establishing a benefit fund, was the restriction of labour mobility and the improvement in turnover loss.⁴ This was one of the strongest arguments against allowing the legal compulsion of contributions

1. See Chapter 4 for discussion of railway industry and its industrial relations.
2. C. 7063 I. Q 1281-3. Brabrook said, 'I am speaking more particularly just now about the societies in connection with particular works in which the relations are between the employed and the employers....to show the reason why they are not registered and the difficulties that are in the way of registering them under the present system.'
3. ibid. Q 1819, George Livesey's evidence.
4. R. Challinor, The Lancashire and Cheshire Miners Graham (1972) Newcastle p162: 'At that time most coalowners organized their own schemes...They helped to lessen the mobility of labour since movement from one mine to another meant sacrificing one's benefits'.

and justified their prohibition under the 1874 Act.¹

Secondly, the schemes (particularly where compulsory) made the direct dependence of the employees on the firm much greater. Ludlow referred to the 'feeling of fear of forfeiting benefits or rather the feeling that they are tied to the particular employment by this statutory benefit which they could forfeit if they leave it'.² This also was diminished in the case of the registered societies, although leading officials admitted that under law the employer was entitled to claim that he only intended the provisions to apply 'as long as he remains in the employment'.³

Thirdly, and most importantly, the company welfare funds tended to discourage the independent organisations of the workmen. Although the major function of trade unions was generally recognised to be the defence of their members' employment interests,⁴ the unions did operate provident benefits in many cases.⁵ Compulsory membership of an official company society forced the employees, 'virtually to throw up their own societies unless they choose to pay to two different funds at once'.⁶

All of these considerations served to create more trouble than they actually avoided in many firms, particularly when funds were crudely administered and compulsion of employees was apparent. Ludlow told the Commissioners in 1892 that the statutory societies, with their compulsory membership, were invariably a source of friction and 'the men chafe very much under that obligation'.⁷ Similar experiences were found

1. C. 7063 I. Q 1300. Brabrook thought that compulsory membership of societies, 'must therefore have a strong influence on industrial peace, inasmuch as they leave the past savings of the employed at the mercy of the employer whom he cannot afford to offend. I am far from suggesting that they are devised with a view to that result, but it flows naturally from their constitution. Registry has the effect of making the tie weaker.'
2. ibid. Q 1761, Ludlow referring specifically to the statutory societies in this instance.
3. ibid. Q 1275, '..and there seems to be no objection to a rule, therefore, that "a member ceasing to be employed at such and such a works shall cease to participate in the funds arising from the contributions of the employers as honorary members."
4. Benson, op cit. (1975) p408-10, '..the unions never considered the provision of relief to be their major concern. The primary

with pension systems in both Britain and America - that to link welfare with compulsion was to nullify the trend towards good relations and mutual co-operation.¹

This was nowhere more evident than in the British coalmining industry, where pit clubs like Dixons had been in operation since the early decades of the 19th century.² These were initially intended as crude bulwarks against the spread of trade unionism, although by the middle decades of the century they were being eroded by the regulations of the state and the growth of miners' societies.³ In place of the clubs, there emerged the movement for 'Permanent Relief Societies' at the collieries during the 1860s and 1870s.

These provident schemes covered whole areas of the country, being organised on a joint basis by the unions and the employers associations, and became a significant step in the co-operation of officials and mineowners.⁴ One of the major advantages as far as the men were concerned, was that such massive funds were able to spread the costs of local disasters and accidents across the whole area, and therefore ensure that the victims of the unsensational tragedy (which

4. 'question was invariably the labour question.'; Musson, loc. cit. p626.
5. Brabrook, op. cit. p28, asked the question, 'Is a Trade Union a provident society?' and answered, 'If a society which enables you to devote a portion of your wages towards providing for the future is a provident society, a combination which has the object of seeing that you get sufficient wages..must also be provident. Apart from this Trade Unions do, to a large extent, make provision against sickness, accident and old age.'
6. C. 7063 I. Q 1761.
7. ibid. Q 1758-60.
1. J. Luther Conant, A Critical Analysis of Industrial Pensions Systems Macmillan (1922) New York p43; 'Even if a pension succeeds in preventing men from going on strike, the fact that they have been deterred from doing so under virtual compulsion may engender an amount of ill feeling which will more than nullify any beneficial effects of the system. The use of a pension system for disciplinary purposes is..its use as...an engine of repression, oppression, or discipline.'
2. See Chapter 5 for Dixons and Briggs.
3. Gosden, op. cit. (1973) p62.
4. Challinor, op. cit. (1972) p158.

would not attract public attention and benevolence) would be adequately provided for.¹ The most famous Miners' Provident Relief Fund, that of the Northumberland and Durham district founded in 1862, had been formed as a result of the Burradon and Hartley disasters, when it 'was found that the "friendly societies" did not make sufficient provision for the liabilities arising out of such accidents'.²

The employers also benefited from the establishment of such funds, since they spread their individual and collective liability between themselves and their workmen. Whilst they pledged, in the case of Northumberland and Durham, to contribute about 20% of the funds each year, they rarely paid as much into the society.³ Thus, many employers readily wound their own schemes up in favour of such a jointly-administered system under unions and collieries.⁴ The forms of control were refined and sophisticated, but the realities of power remained very much in evidence.⁵

This aspect of the funds proved to be one of their major flaws, since the miners were providing three fourths of the resources whilst the owners enjoyed the bulk of control.⁶ Rank and file unrest was soon arising not only in Lancashire and Cheshire, but in South Wales and even the North East.⁷ Even where the 'aristocratic' hewers dominated the mining unions, unrest began to spread and in 1880-81 the Lancashire and Cheshire Fund became bound up with a series of conflicts involving general unionism and rank and file dissatisfaction with official leadership.⁸

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1. Benson, loc. cit. (1975) p401, notes that the unions often did establish 'accident insurance schemes, but that, like other friendly societies, they often reduced or terminated the benefits which they had undertaken to provide.'; Challinor, op. cit. (1972) p162, on difficulty of these funds in dealing with large scale disasters.
 2. Royal Commission on Labour, Digest of the Evidence taken before Group A Vol. 1 Mining C. 6708 - I. (1892) Precs of Steele's Evidence para. 2472-8.
 3. ibid. para. 2479-88, Steele claimed they paid only 12.5%.
 4. Challinor, op. cit. (1972) p162.
 5. Benson, loc. cit. (1975) p402-3: 'In all districts owners organized colliery insurance funds, membership of which constituted a condition of employment. The inadequacy of the protection afforded..is well known, and employers gradually

During the 1880s the permanent relief societies came under attack as both workmen and employers became disillusioned with their results, but in 1892 there were still a number of schemes in force as well as numerous societies linked to collieries, ironworks and railway establishments.¹

By that time many employers were recognising the limits of the permanent relief funds, and the need for fresh strategies of control and incorporation if they were to stabilise the labour force. As Ludlow told Hicks-Beach:²

..it appears to me that the fact of a friendly society being connected with a particular employment does not obviate trade disputes. That is proved by the case of the miners, who have very large friendly societies of their own, and nevertheless we have seen very serious labour conflicts in the mining industry...

But do you think a friendly society supported by employers in any particular industry, and confined to persons in their employment may not have the effect of preventing disputes? - I could not say...but there is the fact that you have...conflicts in the mining industry.

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5. 'turned from the formal control of insurance, exercised by means of the various types of pit club, to the more informal influence which they were able to exert in favour of voluntary thrift.'
 6. Challinor, op. cit. (1972) p155, 162-3.
 7. George L. Campbell, Miners' Insurance Funds: their Origins and Extent Short (1880) London p11. Campbell, who was Secretary of the Lancashire and Cheshire Fund, wrote: 'An attempt was made shortly after the great Abercarne disaster to found a Society in South Wales...It was supported by the most influential names, and the scheme was accepted by the masters, but it was rejected by the men. The grave mistake was made of submitting the question for decision...without making any attempt to educate the great body of men on the subject...the prejudices of the miners against anything new was overlooked.'
 8. Challinor, op. cit. (1972) p165-77; E.J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men Wiedenfeld and Nicolson (1964) p191, for some general patterns.
 1. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies (1892), Pt.D, 2 p158-69, section on Lanarkshire includes Fergushill Colliery Society, Gartsherrie Ironworks Society, Mossend Ironworks Friendly Society, Hyde Park Locomotive Works Friendly Society, etc.
 2. C. 7063 I. Q 1747-8.

The key to the development of the societies lay not merely in the pattern of industrial relations at any given point in a particular trade, but owed much to the progress of national legislation which was to completely reshape the prospects of the societies in these decades.

Legislation, friendly societies and industrial welfare.

The status of both friendly societies and trade unions had been firmly established in the 1870s, and was not to be revised until the Taff Vale controversy of the 1900s.¹ Liability for accidents was extended quite drastically by the innovations of the intervening years, however, affecting the benefit functions of the better-organised societies. The overall trend was towards the supersession of purely private functions by state intervention, and the incorporation of autonomous institutions within the framework of state regulation.²

The passage of the Employers' Liability Act of 1880, with its provision for contracting out of the legislation, followed an increasingly vocal campaign for the clarification of the law on questions of accident liability.³ Contemporary observers thought the desire for industrial peace and stable relations was a major factor in the employers' tacit support for the measure, offering a safety net of minimum provisions whilst permitting private schemes to continue where the members wished to contract out.⁴

Yet the Act had the very opposite effect in the coal trade, where unionists had been complaining of the employers' reluctance to meet their obligations in the permanent relief funds.⁵ In Lancashire and Cheshire there occurred "the most serious dispute of its kind ever known in the coal trade of the district", when the owners demanded that their workmen

1. Royal Commission on Labour, Evidence of Group C, Vol. iii. C. 6894 - XI. (1892) Q 26835-40, for evidence of George Livesey during the 1889-90 crisis and criticism of trade unions.
2. See Chapter 9 for an analysis.
3. Lord Shand, The Liability of Employers: A System of Insurance By the Mutual Contribution of Masters and Workmen the Best Provision for Accidents, Glasgow Juridical Society (1879) Edinburgh p28-29. Shand cited the German example and argued: 'The facts now stated are sufficient to show that insurance against accidents, on the footing of joint contributions by

contract out of the Liability Act, or end their employment at the pits.¹ Similar conflicts were seen in West Yorkshire later, which alarmed the conservative press as well as mobilising the men.² As a result of these disputes, many schemes were abandoned whilst others still survived on a partial basis, depending on the nature of the industry and local conditions.³

The status of the friendly societies and the employers' schemes was not seriously affected by the 1880 measure, since by gaining the consent of their workmen the firms could simply escape from legal obligations. It was the Workmen's Compensation legislation of 1897 that stipulated provisions on par with state minima, and placed the supervision of the 'Certified' contracted-out schemes under the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies.⁴ The Act stipulated that there should be an aggregate parity of provisions between state and private schemes, although the discretion of the Registrar in this matter was very wide.⁵

By inserting a contracting out clause in the final Bill, Ridley and his colleagues in Cabinet resisted the pressures of the unions to end the private schemes and gave the employers considerable control over benefits.⁶ In many cases the 'new' certified societies were merely long-established bodies which applied for legal registration, and they included district as well as works' societies.⁷ Provisions were often improved

3. 'masters and workmen, may be practically carried out wither by what are called Friendly Societies, or by payment of premiums to public companies. I do not profess to say which is the preferable plan, though I believe the former will probably be found to be the best...it should be a condition that every workman joining an employment should become a member of the society and contribute.'

4. H.M. Lynd, England in the Eighteen Eighties Macmillan (1965) London. Speyer quoted at p159, noted that employers were willing to fund schemes outside and inside Act "to acquire security for the continuance of amicable relations".

5. C. 6708 - I. Q 2749-90, 2516/50. Steele noted that since 1880 there had been a marked falling off in contributions from coalowners, and that the 'pretext for the owners not subscribing is that they are now liable by law'.

1. Challinor, op. cit. (1972) p164-7.

by the employers before certification of the schemes, which embraced 'a general system of life assurance for the assurance against death by accident, a general system of sick payments, the provision against disablement by accident, a general system of pensions or of medical reliefs for the benefits of the Act generally'.¹

There was a direct link with the employer associations, in that the high premiums asked by commercial firms encouraged employers to form mutuals or 'provident associations of employers', to cover the risks of Workmen's Compensation once it had passed.² Such duties were often assumed by the associations, many 'certified' schemes actually consisting of joint payments by employers and workmen to accident insurance concerns which would cover them against injury.³ The policies taken out by the firms in this connection, varied from minimum coverage against accidents (which varied little from the situation where no agreed scheme existed),

2. C. 7063 I. Q 1828, Ludlow's evidence on West Yorkshire; Lynd, op. cit. p158, where The Economist is quoted.
3. Lynd, ibid. quotes The Annual Register as observing that there were many cases where "large employers of labour in the manufacturing districts, the masters and men by mutual consent contracted themselves out of the Act, and continued their former relations"; C.f. Brabrook, op. cit. p131, refers to 'the long standing conviction that contracting-out would place them at a disadvantage...has led them in some branches of industry to look with coldness upon proposals for mutual schemes.'
4. Brabrook, ibid. p124-6; 'No scheme can be certified which contains an obligation upon the workmen to join it as a condition of hiring.'
5. ibid. p21.
6. W.C. Mallalieu, 'Joseph Chamberlain and Workmen's Compensation' Journal of Economic History X (1940) p45-7, '..this "revolutionary" act had not been demanded by labor leaders...they opposed compulsory insurance as "against the interests of trade (unions) and friendly societies"...Broadhurst..asserted that to allow "contracting out" would be "to strike at the roots of trade unionism"...'.
7. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies (1904) Pt.A p16, included 'Blaydon District Industrial and Provident Society's Accident Fund' as a certified scheme.
1. Brabrook, op. cit. p124-5.

to special additional benefits given under more generous policies by the mutuals and the commercials.¹ Thus, even those provisions which consisted of insurance can be characterised as welfarist in this sense.

The affect of the 1897 legislation was to stimulate the certification of many schemes, reaching a peak in 1904-05, but thereafter their numbers declined - probably reflecting the incursion of further legislation as much as disillusionment with existing arrangements.²

Tb. XLIV Certified Schemes under Workmen's Compensation, 1898-1911

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Amount paid in court settlements</u>
1893	-	-	9,418
1898	-	-	16,858
1904-5	87	118,000	
1907	50	103,000	
1908		65,000	
1910			2,700,000
1911			3,000,000
1912		70,500	

Source: Columns 1 and 2 from Reports of Registrar of Friendly Societies and from the Labour Department of the Board of Trade, Annual Abstracts of Labour Statistics - 5th, 6th, 11th, 16th. Column 3 from latter.

The figures are selected only to show the general pattern of growth and decline in the schemes and their membership.

It is clear that the certified schemes reached a peak in

2. ibid. p123-4.

3. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies (1904) p17, referred to 'those whose benefits are guaranteed to be paid in full by the employers, and those whose benefits have been reinsured with Accident Insurance Companies, the employers undertaking to provide a certain proportion of the premiums and the workmen on their part undertaking on their part to subscribe the remaining amount to cover reinsurance..'.
1. J.R. Hay, 'Employers' welfare initiatives' pp11, Houbton-Norman research note (1977).

2. See Chapter 9 for employers' opinions on further legislation.

1904-5, as the benefits of certification became apparent. By 1907-08 the second Workmen's Compensation Act had passed, and the amount of litigation in court had also expanded greatly. The prospect of receiving good settlements and the readiness of employees' to sue their employers helped to account for the decline of the schemes, which had been of particular importance in coalmining and railway operation.¹

This decline also reflects the growing organisation of these sectors, and the ability of the coalminers' unions to take up legal affairs - partly because they were being attacked so seriously by the judiciary itself.² Workmen were no longer prepared to accept the terms of the liability contract any more than the wage contract, as beyond negotiation and challenge.

This latter point emphasises the limitations as well as the significance of these schemes, since it is clear that they could never be an absolute security against dissatisfaction and unrest and were not insulated from the general struggles and conflicts of the period. In certain cases the schemes could lead to a deterioration of relations, or as Ludlow said:³

Then in your opinion instead of improving the relations between employer and employed such funds directly injure the relations..? - I think they have a very strong tendency to do so unless there is the most perfect confidence between employer and employed, they can be made beneficial, but not otherwise.

Where the instruments of control became too obvious, where the interests of the employers too naked, then there was a distinct tendency - particularly marked in well-organised trades - for

1. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies (1904) p17-19 shows that of the total membership of 118,000, the mining firms had 54,000 members (45.7%) and the railway companies another 41,000 (34.7%).
2. This may itself be linked to the emergence of such rank and file movements as syndicalism and shop stewards' committees. Challinor, op. cit. p177, noted that during 1880-81 disputes the Leigh miners' movement organised on basis of court action against employers in accident cases.
3. C. 7063.I. Q 1763. Ludlow again had the coalmining industry chiefly in mind when making the comments.

the workmen to resist the schemes and assert their interests in direct opposition to their employers.

Conclusion

This chapter has compared the role of employers' associations and friendly societies in the provision and administration of industrial welfare. The type of scheme favoured and the conditions of operation were strongly influenced by the purposes and priorities of each organisation. Employers' associations were primarily concerned with the defence of business interests against organised labour, and as such geared welfare benefits to wider strategic needs such as the bolstering of managerial prerogatives and the loyalty of staff. The area of administration was naturally wider than the individual firm, and their contacts with national federations also shaped the welfare objectives of regional associations.

The friendly societies were an altogether more amorphous mass of bodies which were formed by a host of different groups and with varying objectives in view. Besides the 24,000 registered societies which were usually operated by workmen and with the proviso of voluntary membership, there were perhaps as many unregistered bodies which were not covered by the legislation of 1874-1896. These included thousands of unregistered shop clubs and works societies which depended on individual firms and particular employers for their continued existence. Firms such as Pickerings of Wishaw or Brownlees of Glasgow, would sponsor such autonomous schemes by offering annual donations and even acting as treasurers of the societies, thereby ensuring the continued discretion of management in the fortunes of the societies.

Although there were considerable differences in the sphere and conditions of operation between associations and friendly clubs, it is possible to see both as agencies of industrial control as well as benefit provision. This similarity of function is underlined by the application of the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society for registration, and the actual registration of shipyard schemes such as Dennys. The very autonomy of the clubs was a source of reassurance to the more liberal and progressive employers who wished to secure

their employees' active participation in welfare arrangements. The way in which associations and societies could operate in close proximity to each other is illustrated by the coalmining examples, where permanent relief societies were promoted by employers and the Miners' Welfare Fund supported by both owners and government after 1919.

The impact of state intervention and Parliamentary reforms on association and friendly benefits is complicated by the diversity of legislation and the tendency for voluntary action to be incorporated within the framework of state schemes such as Workmen's Compensation and National Insurance. Overall, it would seem that the pressures of unionisation and management control led to an extension of welfare benefits offered by the employers' associations and the formal shop clubs, although their functions were redefined and in many respects superseded by public provisions. There emerged the familiar two-tier system of state benefits administered (with the assistance of associations and approved societies) for the many, and non-statutory privileges extended to particular groups or favoured individuals. On the one side employers were encouraged to promote voluntary schemes and maximum participation in accordance with productive and strategic needs, whilst on the other it seemed more sensible to direct their organised energies towards catering for key groups and facilitating friendly schemes only indirectly.

This survey of alternative agencies is necessarily fragmentary and incomplete, but it does imply that a much more profound change in the relationship between industry and government during these decades. If we accept that friendly societies occupied a key place in Victorian civil society, then their gradual incorporation within the social services state suggests a shift in the basis of hegemony from voluntary negotiation to state co-ordination and direction.¹

1. Gramsci, Notebooks op. cit., p263, for argument on the changing form of state in accordance with economic order and social relations.

Chapter Seven: Employers and the development of industrial welfare in the locality.

A comparison of the provision of welfare services in local areas by different firms and contrasting industries.

The previous chapter argued for a definition of industrial welfare which depended as much upon the material conditions under which it was provided, and the agency involved, as upon any abstract criteria. This chapter seeks to extend the argument by exploring the ways in which various services were provided outwith the factory gates and even outside direct employer control. Whereas the study of employer associations and friendly societies indicates the close links between industry, civil society, and the state, any survey of extra-mural welfare services illustrates the importance of employers' social responsibilities in the immediate locality.

In attempting to delineate the 'structure' of the locality, the familiar problems of method, language and historical analysis are very evident.¹ This is particularly so in urban studies, because of the debates over structuralism,² the complexities of urban history and urban sociology,³ and the attempts to impose cultural patterns on a spatial unit.⁴ Whether or not we accept the importance of language, communication, and codes in historical explanation, it is undeniable that ideas, imagery and values are a key part of any society as well as any historical account of that society.⁵

The implications of language and terminology for our

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1. E.P. Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English' Socialist Register (1965) Merlin London p349-50: 'A model is a metaphor of historical process.... [But] the moment at which a model is made explicit it begins to petrify into axioms..'
 2. M. Lane, 'The Structuralist Method' in M. Lane (ed.), Structuralism: A Reader Jonathon Cape (1970) London p13-14; W.G. Runciman, 'What is Structuralism?' British Journal of Sociology Vol.20 (1969) p255: 'Every historical explanation has implicit reference to structure; every structural explanation has implicit reference to origin and function'; E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and other essays Merlin (1978) London p206, etc.; Robbie Gray, 'E.P. Thompson, History and Communist Politics' Marxism Today (June 1979) p183-4.
 3. Lynn H. Lees, 'The Study of Cities and the Study of Social

study of employers' relationships with other social groups in the locality are graphically demonstrated by the usage (both then and since) of such terms as 'paternalism', 'urbanism', and 'community'. Since each of these concepts has been used when referring to the methods of administering industrial welfare, some brief discussion of each is desirable. For until we understand the ways in which language is utilised, we can never fully appreciate the divisions between ideal and reality in the scope of welfare.

The connotations of the term 'paternalism' are manifold, although its origins seem to lie in the political writings of the 17th Century.¹ Sociologists attempting a synchronic definition of the term, and usually relying upon the work of Weber in investigating the problem of authority, present paternalism as a moralisation of power relations which create dependance and deference on the part of subordinates.² This analysis stresses the contradictory aspects of traditional authority, with its need to foster both identification and differentiation.³

Besides the obvious limitations on such an ahistorical definition, the difficulties of understanding paternalism

3. 'Processes: Two Directions in Recent Urban History' Journal of Social History Vol.7 No.3 (Spring 1974) p333: 'A portrayal of the whole urban landscape requires not only attention to sharpness of outline and novel detail but also to mass and proportion..' Lees goes on to use both literary image and philosophical concept of 'structure' in an overlapping way; Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach (Trans. by Sheridan) Edward Arnold (1976) London p81, for critique of urban sociology as the 'confusion between the connotation of a certain ecological form and the assignment of a specific cultural content'.
4. Castells, ibid.; J.R. Mellors, Urban Sociology in an Urbanised Society Routledge & Kegan Paul (1977) London p178, for discussion of the classical definition by Tönnies.
5. Harold Rosen, 'Language and Class...' History Workshop Pamphlet Falling Wall Press (1972) Bristol p6-7, for language and cultural domination; Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Working-Class Culture and Working-Class Politics in London, 1870-1900: Notes on the Remaking of a Working Class' Journal of Social History Vol.7 No.4 (Spring 1974) p463-4: 'The working class 'civilization' because it was hidden away and removed from it. The imagery of this language and the situation which it represented was itself a novel product of the Victorian period.'

are compounded by frequent confusions over its scope and its interchangeability with other terms. The term 'patriarchal' has been used by sociologists and social historians, as denoting something very similar and yet more narrowly associated with male domination than paternalism.¹ Words such as 'patronage' have also been linked to both rural and urban control, political and non-political manipulation.² Then again, the classicist term 'patrician' has recently been revived by Thompson to characterise a whole milieu and style of hierarchical control in both government and society.³ This is perhaps the most serious weakness of the concepts, that their range of application varies from the description of an era to the attitudes of a small group in a locale.⁴

Certain common elements do seem to appear from these studies of paternalism, however, which can be summarised as: the moralisation of authority and political control; the creation of a bond or relationship which requires the recognition of rights by superordinate as well as deference

1. Thomas Hobbes, 'Of Commonwealth' in Leviathan Penguin (1967) Pt. II, Chapter 20 p253; C.f. Howard Newby, et. al., Property Paternalism and Power Hutchinson (1978) London p326-7, for discussion of Lockean notions of property and paternalism.
2. Newby, et. al., op. cit. p28-9.
3. Howard Newby, 'The Deferential Dialectic' Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol.17 (1975) p139-43.
1. Leonore Davidoff, 'Mastered for Life: Servant and Wife in Victorian and Edwardian England' Journal of Social History Vol.7 No.4 (Spring 1974) p407-9, 418-22.
2. L.B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III O.U.P. (1957); J.H. Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century Pelican (1969) p41.
3. E.P. Thompson, 'Patrician Society, Plebian Culture' Journal of Social History Vol.7 No.4 (Spring 1974) p382-3, for confusing criticism of 'paternalism' and then use of term almost interchangeably with 'patrician'; C.f. Newby, et. al., op. cit. p29: 'The exercise of traditional authority thus involves not so much an exchange as the management of the social hierarchy..'
4. Nicholas Paine Gilman, A Dividend to Labor Houghton, Mifflin & Co. (1899) Boston p64: 'The political history and constitution of Germany and certain traits of the national character have favoured the large manifestation among employers of the patriarchal spirit which looks upon the body of workpeople as a family and the head of the industry as a true hausvater.' For international comparisons!

in the subordinates; and the notion of payments and rewards by means other than monetary exchange.¹ Of course, the ideas and the practices of 'paternalism' must be located historically as well as analytically, the changing conditions of production underlying shifts in practice and perception.²

Another element often attached to the term paternalism, is that of specifically local domination and control, and this is also present in much of the literature on urbanism.³ Historians have discussed rural popular movements in terms of property holdings and property relations, although stressing the need for tangible criteria to assess such local 'domination'.⁴ Similar difficulties are encountered when discussing urban control, whether in the industrial villages of the industrial revolution, the coalmining centres of the late 19th Century, or the more populous small towns which still exist today.⁵

It would appear that we must see urban control in terms of both the formal institutions of regulation - such as the police and local government - and in the sense of cultural or moral control by a variety of private institutions and values.⁶ Various authors have noted the predominantly local character of much state power, as well as the local forms of cultural hegemony in these years.⁷ Such provisions did not, and could not, preclude the possibility of an alternative culture emerging amongst the working class, but

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1. E.P. Thompson, loc. cit. (1974) p384-5, argues that non-monetary perquisites 'favoured paternal social control because they appeared simultaneously as economic and as social relations'; Davidoff, loc. cit. (1974) p408, for discussion of cash payments and paternal control.
 2. Thompson, ibid. p387: 'So far from a confident patriarchal society, the eighteenth century sees the old paternalism at a point of crisis.'
 3. G.M. Norris, 'Industrial Paternalist Capitalism and Local Labour Markets' Sociology (1977) Draft p7: 'The use of the words localities and communities is significant here, for paternalism will only be found as a locally based form.'; Newby, et. al. op. cit. p195: ' "Localism" has., largely replaced "community" (though the latter always subsumed the former) as an ideology..'
 4. E.J. Hobsbawm and George Rude, Captain Swing Penguin (1969)

such cultural domination did provide a reasonably safe passage through the urban terrain for the respectable citizen.¹

There are similar problems in examining urban protest, as there are in defining paternalism since structure and structuralism is once more prominent amongst the studies of such movements.² Critics of this approach have rightly noted the scope for creative bureaucracy and administrative change, outwith the direct pressures which an urban movement may exert upon society.³ This qualification to the study of local government control, is to be an important one for the later survey of employer activities.

All of these themes are germane to the controversy over the third concept of local control, that of 'community'. There are innumerable usages of this concept, most of them without an articulation or precise definition. Sociological usages appear to fall into the three streams of community studies, community critics and occupational community surveys.

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4. London p151-2, for discussinn of monopoly and oligarchy villages at the time of the industrial revolution.
 5. Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management Pelican (1965) p234; Robert S. Moore, 'Religion as a Source of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society' in Martin Bulmer (ed.), Working-Class Images of Society S.S.R.C./RKP Direct Editions (1975) p38; Harold Perkin, 'The Development of Modern Glosop' in A.H. Birch (ed.), Small Town Politics O.U.P. (1960) p21; Howard Newby, 'Paternalism and Capitalism: A Re-examination of the Size Effect' in Richard Scase (ed.), Class, Cleavage and Control: Studies in Industrial Society George Allen & Unwin (1977) London p60.
 6. R.D. Storch, The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline and Popular Culture in Northern England, 1850-1880 Journal of Social History Vol.9 No.4 (Summer 1976) p485-7, for discussion of cultural surveillance.
 7. Laurence Gomme, Principles of Local Government Constable (1897) London p1-2; Storch, loc. cit. p481; Robert Gray, 'Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain' in Jon Bloomfield (ed.), Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party Lawrence & Wishart (1977) London p79: 'the local character of much State power - including such key coercive organs as the police and the poor law...make the composition of the central State apparatus a misleading guide [to hegemony].'
 1. Stedman Jones, loc. cit. (1974) p471; Peter Bailey, ' "Will the Real Bill Banks Please Stand Up?" Towards a Role Analysis of Mid-Victorian Working-Class Respectability' Journal of Social History Vol.12 No.3 (Spring 1979) p346.

Community studies have varying degrees of precision and qualification,¹ although later works point out the strong traces of romanticism in early studies.² Most recent surveys emphasise the significance of dominant imagery and moral prescription in any concept of community as well as popularly held notions of 'the community'.³

Critics of the classical community studies emphasise the imprecision of the term, and argue strongly for a notion of 'locality' with its institutions and social networks defined in more neutral ways.⁴ This view is shared by researchers into small-town capitalism,⁵ as well as critics of 'community' and 'urban' sociology.⁶

The theorists associated with the 'occupational community' sociology, following Lockwood's seminal article,⁷ have been subject to similar criticisms as the classicists. Bulmer has stressed the limitations of working class 'images', and its distinction from consciousness.⁸ Cousins and Brown have suggested that the key elements of Lockwood's 'work-based social group', are inadequate and that a 'styles of life' analysis is preferable for shipbuilding workers.⁹ They go on

2. Castells, op. cit., is the best example.
3. C.G. Pickvance, 'On the Study of Urban Social Movements' Sociological Review Vol. XXIII (1975) p32-3, for a critique of Marxist structuralism: '...it is taken as axiomatic within this approach that authorities will not grant changes which threaten the stability of the mode of production'.
1. Ronald Frankenberg, Communities in Britain: Social Life in Town and Country Pelican (1966) London p238: 'All communities are societies, but not all societies are communities.'; Colin Bell and Howard Newby, Community Studies George Allen & Unwin (1971) London p52.
2. Bell and Newby, ibid. p22-27, 29; and p53, for discussion.
3. Newby, et. al., op. cit. p190-91, notes community as a vocational ideal of landowners seeking to create a 'greedy institution' of the village.
4. M. Stacey, 'The Myth of Community Studies' British Journal of Sociology Vol.20 (1969) p136-7.
5. Eric Batstone, 'Deference and the Ethos of Small-Town Capitalism' in Martin Bulmer (ed.), op. cit. p125.
6. Bell and Newby, op. cit. p52: 'The emphasis for the sociologist, then, should not be on geographical, demographic or economic indicators but on changing social relations.'

to emphasise both the divisions within the 'traditional proletariat', and the pragmatic application of different values and roles according to different situations.¹

Although there is some controversy over the terms in sociological circles, this is matched by the profusion and confusion of uses by historians. These range from a voluntaristic vision of working class community, to a community of class in some works.² Elsewhere, there is an unspecified notion of urban communities, related to the imagery and values of different classes.³

Besides these difficulties of definition, there is also the serious problem of the language of community as it was used in the years 1880-1920. The term 'business community' has been applied to employers themselves, without any rigorous investigation of its actual usage or its analytical value.⁴ Contemporary management literature often uses the term to signify the interests of society and the state, which transcend the narrow sectionalism of class conflict.⁵ On other occasions, similar works suggest that the 'community'

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7. David Lockwood, 'Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society' Sociological Review Vol.14 No.3 (1966).
 8. Martin Bulmer, 'Introduction' in Martin Bulmer (ed.), op. cit. p5-6: 'The relationship between unorganised images and organised consciousness is complex and ramified, and the one should not be assimilated to the other..'
 9. Jim Cousins and Richard Brown, 'Patterns of Paradox: Shipbuilding Workers' Images of Society' in Bulmer (ed.), ibid. p65-66.
 1. ibid. p55-56, 78-9; C.f. Bailey, loc. cit. p339-43, for discussion in terms of 'respectability'.
 2. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class Pelican (1968) Harmondsworth p457: 'The working-class community of the early nineteenth century was the product neither of paternalism nor of Methodism, but in a high degree of conscious working-class endeavour...the traditions of the trade union and the friendly society, with their emphasis upon self-discipline and community purpose...'; C.f. p469, reference to 'the new working-class community..'
 3. Stedman Jones, loc. cit. p490: 'In working-class districts..the multiplicity of occupations, the separation of home from workplace and the overcrowding and impermanence of apartments, made any stable community life very difficult.'; Bailey, loc. cit. p339, argues that historians have achieved a sharper focus on the notion of respectability where 'they have reconstructed something of the experience of distinct communities or sub-cultures of working-class respectability.'

signifies the locality in which the firm is situated and the responsibility which the employer has to his workers.¹ It seems clear that the language, imagery and perceptions of the 'community' differed according to the specific context and situation in which it was used. Just as working class groups created and translated imagery to fit the occasion and the shifting consciousness of their class, so the employers and management thinkers applied notions such as 'community' in selective ways. Like respectability, the vision of community was as much a moral prescription and an ideological construct, as it was any description of social relations.²

Given these various criticisms of paternalism, urbanism and community, it is possible to construct a model of the 'locality', and the ways in which industrial welfare might reinforce the employers' position. The criteria upon which this model is grounded are as follows: the relations of production, including market relations between capital and labour; the relations of consumption, including the property and housing relations of the area; the private organisations and institutions of the locale, including philanthropic and religious bodies; the cultural and ideological relations of

4. H.D. Peiter,, 'Institutions and Attitudes: The Consolidation of the Business Community in Bourgeois France, 1880-1914' Journal of Social History Vol.9 No.4. (Summer 1976) p544: 'Business spokesmen had adopted ambitious new goals...to generate a sense of common purpose within the patronal community. Businessmen tried consciously to educate other businessmen to a more lively appreciation of the national importance of their economic and social functions.' Additional confusions will arise in that the 'patronal' or employer functions, can be linked to 'patronage' and paternalism very easily.
5. Oliver Sheldon, The Philosophy of Management Pitman (1923) London p73-5, 81, 151-61, 162: 'If..we recognise that the State is the representative of the ultimate sovereignty of the community, which it is the purpose of industry to serve, it seems both logical and right that it should wield the final power in the settlement of the division of the proceeds of industry.'
1. Lee K. Frankel and Alexander Fleisher, The Human Factor in Industry Macmillan (1920) New York p260-2.
2. There were of course conflicts within as well as between groups over social values and loyalties. See Thompson, op. cit. (1968) p463.

any given area, particularly with regard to the dominant values of the distinct classes; and finally, the institutions of local government and the state.

It is arguable that such criteria will both elucidate the relations between industrialists and workers within a given area, as well as complement a broader view of economy, civil society, and the state. We can see the operation of hegemony not only in the introduction of police surveillance and state agencies such as the Board of Guardians, but also in the fostering and reinforcing of peculiar local relations and localist imagery.¹ These values do not float above material relations, but are embedded within the contractual agreements which overlie both productive and property relations.² Yet there are significant differences between distinctive types of localities, rooted as they are in different types of production and consumption.

There are also variations in the number and size of firms controlling a particular area, which may lead to certain patterns of voting behaviour, religious affinity, and forms of deference.³ Even within the same type of locality, there will be significant differences in the styles of control adopted by dominant groups.

Whilst outlining the ways in which specific trades differ from others, it can be argued that employers provide similar kinds of services in similar physical situations, and that their objectives and social policies are broadly related. The following survey attempts to show that a comparison of coalmining, textiles and shipbuilding firms will illustrate the main themes of welfare activity common to different trades, as well as the respects in which industrial structure dictates certain approaches

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1. Newby, et al., op. cit. p284-5: 'the production of social imagery is a dynamic process contained within the confines of a hegemonic system of core beliefs...and which pervades the social construction of reality.'
 2. Mary Couper and Timothy Brindley, 'Housing Classes and Housing Values' Sociological Review Vol.23 No.3 (1975) p567, for a critique of Rex and discussion of housing and ideology.
 3. Stedman Jones, loc. cit. p482-3, after Pelling; Robert S. Moore, Pitmen, Preachers and Politics - the Effects of Methodism in a Durham Mining Community C.U.P. (1974) p92; Batstone, loc. cit. p125-7.

peculiar to individual industries and concerns.

Comparison of coalmining, textiles and shipbuilding localities.

The activities of employers within the local area, can be classified according to the sphere of operation and scope of the facilities, or the types of provision made, or the control of these services. Whilst it is necessary to concentrate upon those services which originate with and meet the needs of the firm, some reference must be made to the areas of civil society and state agency in which the employers were prominent. For it is only by recognising the links between the requirements of the enterprise, and the role of the entrepreneur in the private organisations and official bodies of the locale, that we can gain a true appreciation of employer activities.¹

The description of the services which the employers provided is more simple than an explanation of their functions. Naturally the main interest of the employer has always been with the internal efficiency of the individual firm, although there was a growing recognition of the influence of non-industrial factors upon the workers' performance and morale.² Most important were those services securing and sustaining an efficient labour force: providing for housing accommodation, health and hygiene of the workers, transportation, recreation and leisure, and the education and religion of the employees.³

Each of these services could be, and often were, provided

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1. Sheldon, op. cit. p88: 'Industry cannot deny ideals if the weight of the community supports them...Management, therefore, is concerned with the local interpretation of communal ties.'; C.f. Bailey, loc. cit. p483, who notes that the 'initiatives of the police authorities in these areas of course cannot be viewed apart from the attitudes, prejudices, and momentary reformist enthusiasms of the municipalities, magistrates, and local elites who employed them.'
 2. Frankel and Fleisher, op. cit. p260: 'All the community facilities surrounding an individual affect not only his physical well-being and consequent productivity but his entire outlook. The house in which he lives, the store at which his wife buys supplies, the schools...the facilities for recreation, all play a part...'

solely at the expense of the individual firm. The overlap between the recognised needs of the plant and involvement in 'community' facilities is already apparent.¹ Employers were seeking to secure a steady pool of labour for their works, and one way was to provide those infrastructural amenities which would attract and satisfy the workforce.² They could only operate within the confines of market forces, however, even when attempting to exert greater control over the particular labour market feeding their enterprise. Only those firms and trades expanding rapidly enough to merit such capital projects were prepared to invest in community welfare on any substantial scale.

At the same time, there were problems of labour efficiency and discipline common to different kinds of industry, and extra-mural welfare offered a means of improving morale whilst nurturing acceptable values and respectable ideals.³ This was clear in the recreation and leisure initiatives of the employers, or the 'institute movement' amongst many employers in the last decades of the 19th Century.⁴ Employers were concerned not merely to establish the 'social bonds' described by the term paternalism, but also to rationalise and integrate the leisure time of their employees.⁵

It is in this context of labour needs, market forces, social unrest, and the rationalisation of recreational initiatives, that we can locate the activities of the different employers in these years. The comparison of

3. Health of Munition Workers' Committee, Ministry of Munitions: Final Report of the Committee, Industrial Health and Efficiency Cd. 9065 (1918) Para. 1499, p113: 'The problems connected with the welfare of the worker outside the factory may be roughly grouped under four heads:- (a) The recruitment of suitable workers; (b) Housing accommodation and transit; (c) Sickness and other personal questions; and (d) Leisure.'
1. E. Dorothea Proud, Welfare Work G. Bell (1916) London p83, on the concern with controlling the local labour market.
2. Lady Hugh Bell, At the Works: A Study of a Manufacturing Town Edward Arnold (1907) London p2-3: '...all this means that there springs into existence a community of a preordained kind, the members of which must live near their work.'

three distinct industries will allow a survey of such themes as recreation, and the degree to which the employers' vision of a new harmony was realised in particular areas.

The coalmining industry is notable for the strength of its local traditions, and the isolation of its local communities. In Scotland, these patterns were coloured by the heritage of the bondsman laws and the importance of the housing question during the 19th Century.¹ There were a number of coalfields as close to Glasgow as Gorbals, which substantial deposits remaining in mid-century,² and here the prevalence of company housing was much less than in distant parts of the Lanarkshire field.

Besides the traditions of tied housing, and the isolation of the pitheads, speculative builders were discouraged from investment by the uncertainties of the coal seams and the short life of even a stable colliery.³ It was the harsh realities of economic survival and the search for an adequate labour force, rather than any religious or moral commitment to an ethical paternalism,

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3. Bradley Rudin, 'Industrial Betterment and Scientific Management as Social Control, 1890-1920' Berkeley Journal of Sociology XVII (1972-3) p66-67: 'In essence, the attempt was to build an alternative to working class culture...the leaders of the industrial reform movement wanted social control much more than social justice.'
 4. Richard D. Storch, 'The Problem of Working-class Leisure: Some Roots of Middle-class Moral Reform..' in A.P. Donajgrodzki (ed.), Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain Croom Helm (1976) p139, for general discussion.
 5. Robert Goldman and John Wilson, 'The Rationalization of Leisure' Politics and Society Vol.7 No.2 (1977) p162, for American employers' welfare movement; Sheldon, op. cit. p94: 'Leisure, however, is not a purely internal matter of administration. It is rather that period of every man's life to which the community looks for that service which is no less essential than material service in the factory.'
 1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial Population in Scotland: Rural and Urban Cd. 8731 (1917) Para. 861, p124: 'In such an industry it was to be expected that customs should become too firmly rooted to be easily changed. Where fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers..can be counted in the history of the same local industry, tradition naturally becomes a governing factor in the life of the villages...In the early days of the industry the "tied house" predominated.

which dictated the housing initiatives of the coalowners.¹
 The following tables indicate the extent of their presence
 in the provision of housing by 1910, a decade before
 housing was to become a major issue at the Sankey hearings.²

Table XXV. Scale and constitution of Lanarkshire Coalfield (1910)³

District of Field	Acreage	Population	Parishes	Mines*
Upper Ward	327,000	43,000	20	20
Middle Ward	186,628	198,000	14	145
Lower Ward	26,591	55,000	5	15

Source: Report of County Medical Officer, op. cit. p57, 97, 215.

Although the Upper Ward is largest in terms of acreage, population and parishes, in only six of the twenty parishes were mines in operation.⁴ There were, moreover, only 4,981 persons employed in the Upper Ward mines - as opposed to 47,043 in the Middle Ward and 3,473 in the Lower Ward.⁵ So the Middle Ward was by far the most important in terms of the industry, although its acreage

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1. 'In certain localities it continues to predominate... [and] it is still, in the minds of some communities, a relic of the bondage days.'
 2. S.R.A. DTC 6/469: 'Memorandum on Coal in Glasgow Green and Gorbals, 1857-71', notes that seven seams with 882,000 tons plus another 347,000 tons still to be got.
 3. County of Lanark, Report by the County Medical Officer: The Housing Conditions of Miners (1910) Glasgow p38: 'It should be remembered that the life of a mine on an average does not exceed thirty years. It is therefore necessary that the mine owner should so arrange the rentals that the sinking fund will wipe off the debt within that period.'
 1. C.f. Moore, op. cit. p81: 'Locally the owners showed concern for their people... Not only were the villagers Peases' employees, they were their tenants.'
 2. See Chapters 5 and 6, above.
 3. Report by the County Medical Officer, op. cit. These figures are tabulated from those given by the Medical Officer's Report, based on owners' returns. Alternative number of mines given by Mines Inspector was 24, 163, 15, respectively.
 4. ibid. p57, being Crawford, Carnwath, Carluke, Carmichael, Douglas and Lesmahagow.
 5. ibid. p57, 98, 215. Alternative employees figures of 4,507, 46,094, and 3,082 respectively are given.

covered was much less than the Upper Ward. The following figures indicate the dispersal of miners in the different parishes, and their relative size.

TABLE XVI Occupied Houses in Lanarkshire Ward Parishes.

Ward	Parish	Occup. Houses	Small T. & Villages
Upper	Biggar	150	1
	Carluke	2,133	6
	Carmichael	273	1
	Carnwath	1,243	8
	Carstairs	403	3
	Covington & Thankerton	116	1
	Crawford	456	3
	Crawfordjohn	157	2
	Culter	102	1
	Dolphinton	51	1
	Doigles	553	4
	Dunsmyre	35	1
	Leminton	71	1
	Lanark	506	5 (inc. New Lanark)
	Lesmahagow	2,420	21
	Libberton	98	2
	Pettinain	52	8
	Symington	131	1
	Walston	59	1
Wistan	109	1	
<u>Total</u>		9,118 (6,805 + 2,313)	72: <u>Figures</u> for villages and scattered rural dwellings respectively.
Middle	Avondale	1,393	1
	East Kilbride	981	3
	Glasford	343	2
	Stonehouse	850	2
	Blantyre	3,197	3
	Bothwell	10,161	20
	Cambuslang	4,659	2
	Cambusnathan	2,822	9
	Dalserg	3,618	13
	Dalziel	315	4
	Hamilton	1,390	8
	New Monkland	2,607	30
Old Monkland	3,328	10	
Shotts	3,074	11	
<u>Total</u>		38,738 (34,920 + 3,818)	108
Lower	Glasgow*	6,765	15
	Cadder	2,658	16
	Rutherglen	820	5
	Carmunnock	190	1
	Govan	67	2
<u>Total</u>		10,390 (10,114 + 276)	39

Source: Tabulated and calculated from figures at County Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. pp 98, 209-10, 242.

*Barony Parish.

The table shows that the great majority of people in the mining districts live in small towns and villages, with a substantial minority actually inhabiting remote and scattered housing in rural areas.

The following table gives the proportion of housing owned by employers, and that rented privately by miners, on the field:

Table XLVII Tenure of Housing Occupied By Coalminers in Lanarks.

Parish	Employers' Hous.*	Miners' Rented	Total	Ward Tot	% OM	
Crawford	11	1	78	90	446	20.2
Carnwath	275	3	247	525	1,236	42.5
Carluke	178	35	337	550	2,129	25.8
Carmichael	155	4	9	168	278	60.4
Douglas	58	1	92	151	558	27.5
Lesmahagow	244	46	552	842	2,343	35.9
Other	-	-	3	3	2,028	0.3
Total	708	90	1,318	2,329	9,010	25.8
Avondale	-	-	39	39	1,348	2.9
East Kilbride	-	-	26	26	944	2.7
Glasford	-	2	48	50	339	14.7
Stonehouse	-	32	180	212	852	24.9
Blantyre	568	17	1,289	1,874	3,193	58.7
Bothwell	2,285	32	2,407	4,724	9,846	48.0
Cambuslang	532	12	1,049	1,593	4,611	34.5
Cambusnethan	551	30	448	1,029	2,848	36.1
Dalserf	491	299	1,432	2,222	3,604	61.7
Dalziel	184	1	14	199	351	57.7
Hamilton	901	8	158	1,067	1,363	78.3
New Monkland	562	39	673	1,274	2,630	48.4
Old Monkland	423	6	1,008	1,437	3,331	43.1
Shotts	529	96	993	1,618	3,067	52.7
Total	6,288	574	9,764	17,364	38,327	45.3
Glasgow	12	-	1,039	1,051	6,799	15.4
Cadder	276	2	143	421	2,602	16.2
Rutherglen	-	-	86	92	735	12.5
Carmunnoch & Govan	-	-	-	-	254	
Total	294	2	1,268	1,564	10,390	15.0

Source: Figures calculated from County Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. pp 59, 100, 216.

*The figures for ownership and leasing are compounded here. Other figures are also altered slightly for evenness.

It can be seen that in each Ward, the proportion of housing occupied by miners was substantial, being over 45% in the key Middle Ward. Of those houses occupied by miners, the significance of employer dwellings was also marked - being 30%, 36% and 19% in the Upper, Middle and Lower Wards respectively.

The standards and size of these dwellings always varied considerably between localities, although the housing in the oldest mining areas seems to have been amongst the worst in Scotland by the First World War.¹ The new building being undertaken in the different districts still included a diminishing number of one-apartment houses, although the bulk of building in the decade before 1909 consisted mainly of two and three-apartment housing.²

From the evidence presented by the Coal Owners' of Scotland before the Sankey Commission in 1919, it would seem that housing conditions were gradually improved in the troubled decade 1909-19, when housing became a major source of industrial unrest in the coalfields.³ In the years 1899-1919, the employers claimed to have spent £1,280,330 on new housing, another £140,990 on reconstruction, and £771,081 on upkeep and repairs.⁴ The following table shows the size of housing owned by Scottish coalmasters.

Table XI, VIII Housing Owned by Scottish Coalowners, 1909-1918.

Year	One Apart.	Two Apart.	Three Apart.	Total
1909	3,346	15,084	3,281	21,711
1910	3,286	15,284	3,320	21,890
1911	3,268	15,250	3,413	21,931
1912	3,257	15,458	3,487	22,202
1913	3,357	16,223	3,646	23,226
1914	3,291	16,553	3,831	23,675
1915	3,213	16,898	3,906	24,017
1916	3,186	17,020	3,981	24,187
1917	3,257	17,178	4,027	24,462
1918	3,302	17,626	4,135	25,063

Source: Coal Owners of Scotland, CB 7 5/40. Memorandum dated 31.3.1919.

The Lanark Medical Officer agrees with the reiterations of the

1. County of Lanark Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. p64, notes of one leadmining village that: "The situation and construction of the Miners' dwellings are, as a rule, not in accordance with modern requirements"; Report of the Royal Commission... Cd. 8731 Para 28, p5: 'The "Miners' Row" of inferior class is often a dreary and featureless place...The houses vary greatly in construction, but a large number are of two types. The older is either a "single-end" or "but-and-ben" according as it has one or two rooms...while in the worst houses in the West of Scotland, the only place for storage of coal is below the bed.'

coalowners, that the rents charged for their dwellings were very reasonable and compared well with private accommodation.¹ What is remarkable about these figures is that rents were kept fairly steady whilst improvements were carried out, and as the older houses were replaced so the total housing stock of the Coal Owners actually grew. Whilst in 1909 there were over 15% one-apartment dwellings, 69% of two-apartments and 15% three-apartments, by 1918 the ratio in an expanded housing stock had shifted to 13%, 70% and 16.5% respectively. Yet the average annual rentals were as follows:²

One Apartment Dwellings	4	17	3
Two Apartment Dwellings	8	5	-
Three Apartment Dwellings	11	4	-
Total Average	8	5	7

These compare very well with those charged in shipbuilding areas, as detailed below.

Despite these incentives and advantages, there was strong resistance to company housing amongst many colliers:³

I understand that, notwithstanding these favourable rentals, there is a strong disposition on the part of the miners to live in towns and villages, and not in colonies at the mines. There seems to be a feeling among many miners that they

2. County of Lanark Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. p60, shows that for the Upper Ward the new building was as follows:

Year	1 Apt.	2 Apt.	3 Apt.	4 Apt.	5 Apt. +	Total
1901	-	87	20	39	-	146
1902	25	70	22	44	41	202
1903	23	79	23	22	25	172
1904	15	37	40	19	25	136
1905	18	38	30	12	47	145
1906	11	30	62	25	37	165
1907	10	56	49	22	28	165
1908	33	88	35	21	17	194
1909	6	30	25	8	19	88
Total	141	515	306	212	239	1,413

3. Cd. 8731, Paras. 1932, 2223-30, for Commission's own account of the industrial troubles which led to its formation.
4. Coal Owners of Scotland, CB 7 5/40, for figures.
1. County of Lanark Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. p38.
2. Coal Owners of Scotland, CB 7 5/40, 'Returns on Housing Owned'.

are more independent when not living in what are called "masters' houses".

Besides reflecting the opinions of other observers on the dislike of suffocating paternalism,¹ this testimony sheds some light on the concentration of employer housing. Where the employees could find alternative accommodation, there was little demand for company housing and correspondingly little incentive on the part of coalowners to provide it.

Such evidence, and the widespread unrest amongst the miners on the housing question, should temper any vision of a benevolent paternalism.² Housing was provided at reasonable rents by the masters, who often dominated whole villages and small towns, but the motives and the calculations were primarily economic.

This is not to suggest that substantial recreational facilities were absent amongst the colliery villages of Lanarkshire. One observer noted that:³

Throughout the Middle Ward District it is not uncommon to find in mining villages accommodation provided by the employers for recreation. Reading rooms, billiard room, with lavatory arrangements, are frequently met with, but in some localities in recent years buildings of an elaborate character have been erected by parties interested in promoting the welfare of the community.

At the villages of Quarter, Newmains, Caldercruix, and elsewhere, the coal and iron employers established workmen's institutes, whilst at Hamilton Palace Mine there were parks, bowling greens and a football ground surrounding the 458 company houses.⁴

From the evidence it seems that the larger, expanding and more prosperous collieries, were those taking part in the

3. County of Lanark Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. p38.

1. Gilman, op. cit. p177, 206; Frankel and Fleisher, op. cit., p271: 'If the housing scheme does not yield a return on the investment, it becomes charity, and may easily develop into paternalism.' ; Cd. 9065 Para. 461, p102 where an employer quoted: "The North Country workers are more independent in spirit and advanced in thought than Southerners, and strongly resent any suggestion of patronage or interference with their liberties...".

2. Cd. 8731 Para. 1938; see also, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest: Report of Commissioners for Scotland (No. 8 Division) Cd. 8669 (1917) Para. 8; Frankel and Fleisher, op. cit. p262: 'there is also a direct relation between labour

institute movement of these years, just as it was they who provided the larger and more modern housing for their miners. Only in certain conditions could the employers afford the luxury of a moral conscience, and only when the foreseeable benefits justified the costs of 'paternalism'.¹

Other facilities for hygiene and health, such as pit-head baths, became more common before 1914, and in some cases the owners provided educational and religious services also - although there was not the same forms of particularistic Methodism and Dissent as in many English villages.²

These amenities were all the more important in view of the changes occurring within many localities, as the shopkeeping class saw its position eroded by the spread of the Co-operatives and their savings transferred from the traditional investment in housing.³ One of the strongest social bonds (and barriers) between employers and workmen had been removed, as well a major source of housing finance eliminated. The services provided by owners can be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to re-establish stable relations amidst the rising tide of industrial militancy. This movement culminated in the immediate post-War years, with the founding of the Miners' Welfare Fund - financed by owners, employees, and the state.⁴ As many of its exponents were anxious to point out, the Fund allowed for the responsible autonomy

2. 'unrest and bad housing..'. .

3. County of Lanark Medical Officer's Report, op. cit. p213.

4. ibid. p114-15. The Hamilton Palace Colliery was owned by the Bent Colliery Co. Ltd., of Bothwell and employed a total of 1,205 people. Of these, 965 lived in company housing at Bothwell Haugh and 240 in rented dwellings around the area: 'The mine-owner's houses situated at Bothwell Haugh number 458. This is one of the largest mining villages or colonies in the district...Walls have damp-proof courses, floors ventilated, scavenged by owners...'. .

1. C.f. Moore, op. cit. p92, for similar point.

2. Pollard, op. cit. (1968) p237; Moore, op. cit. p81.

3. Coal Owners of Scotland, CB 7 5/41 Typescript (18.11.1924) p1-3: 'What has made the housing problem more acute in recent years... is the fact that in many mining villages the grocer, the draper, and the baker who used to invest most of his savings in house property have been almost completely eliminated by the Co-operative Societies.'

of the local 'community leaders' in the administration of the services and the moral improvement of the inhabitants.¹

What is significant is that the employers, officials and trade union sympathisers, were attempting to project their vision of the 'community' upon the mining villages against the militant leadership of the rank and file miners in these years. The projects for healthy enjoyment and uplifting self-improvement catered for an image of the new garden city amongst the slag heaps.² Implicit in this welfare ideal, is an even broader notion of 'community' - the community of interests between capital, labour and the state, who combined to foster the schemes.³

The textiles industry of the west of Scotland and the West Riding, bear certain resemblances to the colliery firms, in that a large number of industrialists were also situated in fairly remote areas near sources of power or materials. Like the coalowners these concerns were compelled to provide certain facilities in order to attract manpower, particularly during the industrial revolution.⁴

Many of the textile settlements are described in Chapter 5 above, although the activities of The Gourock, United Turkey Red, Fisons, and Bairstows deserve further mention. In each case the firms involved actually extended their 'community' activities in the decades 1880-1920, although the impetus for attracting labour had long passed. These employers were now concerned, it seems, with maintaining social order and assuaging the rise of industrial unrest, by

4. See Chapter Six above for a discussion of the Fund.

1. Coal Owners of Scotland, CB 7 5/42, 'Statement by C.S. Mason, South Wales Organiser of the Industrial Welfare Society', p2: 'I would like to bring to your notice the manner in which the whole problem of social development has been dealt with in certain Mining Villages...In several of these mining communities, committees elected by the general consent and approval of the inhabitants have been formed for the very purpose of investigating and dealing with all matters relating to the social wellbeing, mental and moral uplift of their respective communities.'

2. C.f. Rudin, loc. cit. p66-67, for American parallels.

3. Emile Zola, Germinal Penguin (1972) p215. Hennebeau tells the agitator Etienne: "The Company watches over its men like Providence, and you are wrong to threaten it."

providing facilities which formalised the identification of the firm with the locality.

The case of The Gourock's intervention at New Lanark is interesting both for its insights into this model community, and for the contrast of ideals between early Owenism and business enlightenment. In the days of Robert Owen, the social life of New Lanark was transformed by the ideas of this dynamic individual who instituted a 'careful control of the physical conditions and moral climate both in the mills themselves and in the village they supported'.¹ With the improved facilities and unprecedented management care and control lavished on the local settlement, Owen could reinforce morale and work-discipline with social codes and commitments.² Although less adept at practical management than their messiah, Owen's followers embraced his millenarian vision of the true community in their settlements around Britain.³

After Owen's departure from New Lanark, the buildings were again allowed to fall into disrepair until in 1881 it was taken over by Henry Birkmyre of The Gourock firm.⁴ By that point the early millenarianism had been replaced by a variety of conventional religious practices, with the resident missionary appointed by the cotton spinning employers.⁵ When the Lanark Spinning Co. moved to cut off this support for religious services, Birkmyre was petitioned by the minister and congregation to reconsider and he finally ceded them the use of the old Gaelic chapel on the fourth floor of the mill itself.⁶ By 1914 the

4. Pollard, op. cit. (1968) p240-41.

1. A.J. Robertson, 'Robert Owen, Cotton Spinner: New Lanark, 1800-1825' in Sidney Pollard and John Salt (ed.), Robert Owen: Prophet of the Poor Macmillan (1966) London p149.

2. ibid. p152.

3. R.G. Garnett, 'Robert Owen and the Community Experiments' in Pollard and Salt, ibid. p39-40; E.P. Thompson, op. cit. (1968) p858-61, passim.

4. B.T. Danek, 'Robert Owen at New Lanark' (Typescript history) in UGD 42 31/20 p9-10, notes that many of houses had originally been constructed by David Dale but 'had been allowed to fall into disrepair' until salvaged by Owen.

new Presbytery minister had arrived and was again pleading with the Birkmyres for support and the restoration of the 'former relationship between the proprietors of the mills and the village church'. The Presbytery added that since the 1870s:¹

the Mission has materially strengthened its hold upon the religious community in the village...
[and] has at the present time a Communion Roll of two hundred and twenty three.

As well as renewing the support for organised religion in New Lanark, the Birkmyres also improved the sanitation and condition of the housing by 1903.² There were also the medical services, consisting of a visiting physician and nurse, for the inhabitants of New Lanark - with over 1,700 visits noted for the one year 1903-04.³

This concern for New Lanark only mirrored the activities of the Birkmyres in Port Glasgow itself, with Henry II assuming the responsibilities of dominant employer, Provost of the Burgh, member of the School Board and founder of Clune Park United Presbyterian Church.⁴ The close identification with and control of the township, led the Birkmyres to oppose the Greenock Burgh extension proposals of the 1920s. The Gourrock claimed that they employed nearly 2,000 people and that:⁵

It has always been the policy of your Petitioners and other employers of labour to provide work for their work people in Port Glasgow even at a loss rather than the work people should have recourse for subsistence to the dole or to the Parish Council.

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5. Gourrock Ropework Co., Letter of David Dalglish to Rev. T. Little, 21.9.1876 in UGD 42 105/7-8: '..the terms upon which Mr. Walker wishes a Missionary appointed here are that he is to be missionary to all the Villagers irrespective of sect, creed, or denomination, and that he is not to visit Established Church people only, but everyone that will receive him. He is not to proselytise, but to endeavour to get the people to attend some Evangelical Church, and especially the Aged and Infirm...he will devote 3 or 4 hours every day to visitation from house to house.'
 6. Letter of Little to Henry Birkmyre in UGD 42 105/7; and Petition of villagers at ibid.; Letters of 1.7.1890, 24.2.1896, 27.2.1896, ibid.
 1. Letter of Presbytery to John Nicol of New Lanark mills 25.7.1914 in UGD 42 105/7.
 2. Letter of Duncan Glen to G.R.C. 12.12.1903 in UGD 42 105/7.

Since the local employers were prominent on the Parish authorities, as well as in other agencies of social policy, they were acutely aware of the costs of such services - in both financial and human terms.

Similar patterns of local activity can be traced in the case of the United Turkey Red Co., under the Orr Ewings and the Christies. The dyeworks dominated the Vale of Leven, with its 20,000 inhabitants and five connected settlements, even more than the Birkmyres dominated Port Glasgow.¹ After the Calico Printers' Association and the U.T.R., carved up the Vale's production between them, the consolidation of textiles industry was complete.

The three main dimensions of working class segregation within the Vale, were: the division between male and female workers, with only a minority of adult women working in the chemical plant and 'oily house'; the divisions between the skilled and the unskilled workers; and the religious divide between the Irish and the native Scots.²

As against these divisions within the local settlements, there was a strong tradition of social intervention amongst the family firms of the Vale - led by the Christies of the United Turkey Red. The arrival of the large combinations in textile dyeing, and the advent of engineering in the

3. Helen Sinclair MacDonald, 'New Lanark Medical Report' (1903-04) in UGD 42 2/2: '1714 Visits were paid at the patients' homes during the year, plus the visits by the locium tenere, during the three weeks that the resident doctor was away on holidays. Five consultations were held. Twenty births occurred. Nine deaths occurred...No serious accident occurred during the year.'
4. George Blake, 'The Gourock' Pub. by Company (1963) Port Glasgow p53, for description of Henry Birkmyre II's activities.
5. 'Petition of Gourock Ropework Co. against Burgh annexation of Port Glasgow to Greenock' (1926) UGD 42 22/1. The petitioners added that: '...owing to the policy of the employers of labour in providing work for the inhabitants and to the careful and prudent method adopted by the Parish Council the sums expended on Poor Relief during recent years has been comparatively small.'
1. Stuart MacIntyre, 'Forms of Authority in the Vale of Leven, c.1900-1939' University of Stirling Paper (April 1978); and 'Unemployment Policy in the Vale of Leven, 1918-1939' University of Glasgow, S.S.R.C. Conference Paper (May 1978) p1-3. Both of these papers are unpublished.
2. ibid.; see also Chapter 5 above.

Vale after 1906, both indicated the broader changes in the economy which were to transform local relations at Alexandria and elsewhere.

Evidence of increasing friction in local industry is apparent from the Disputes Ledger of the U.T.R., with militancy spreading amongst the women as well as the semi-skilled machinists.¹ Trade union officials were under pressure both from the employers, introducing more stringent supervision and high work-loads, and from their own membership.² This continued until in 1914-16, there was a massive upsurge in militancy with the workmen stating at one conference in 1916, that:³

The wages of the employees for whom we plead are the lowest in Scotland, and the time has now arrived when nothing short of a revolution in rates of wages is required...

The workers are not willing that the present state of affairs shall last, and failing some more satisfactory treatment than has been given in the past, the workers must be allowed to use what weapons lie in their hands to secure the most elementary justice - the right to live a decent life.

Those social bonds which had been strengthened by the provision of company housing,⁴ selective benefits for supervisory workers,⁵ arrangements with local infirmaries for the treatment of employees,⁶ educational provisions,⁷ and religious services, were gradually being eroded by the economic forces which was changing British industry as a whole.

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1. United Turkey Red, Trades Disputes Ledger (1912-1916) UGD 13 4/3.
 2. Private Letters Book, UGD 13 5/12: Letter of Holt to Scottish Master Calico Printers in Knott's Letter of 9.5.1907: "...we have good reason to believe that for every one per cent advantage the printers receive from the Employers, the Employers have received one and a half per cent in return, owing perhaps in some measure to a closer supervision of the Works, but certainly owing also to a greater application of the printers to their work especially in the complicated modern style of work; a result...of the Committee's influence upon the Members."
 3. December 1916 Arbitration by Sir Thomas Munro, copy in UGD 13 4/3 p129-34.
 4. A.O.H. Orr Ewing & Co., Letter Book (1868-1890) UGD 13 1/8, for notice of eviction by letter of 20.2.1879 to tenant.
 5. Private Letters of U.T.R. (1907-08) in Box 2, UGD 13 5/12.
 6. UGD 13 5/12, Letter 12.5.1884 for example - case of foreman's wife applying for post.

The impressive services provided by the employers, and their main phase of community activities, belongs to the major period of economic expansion during the 1860s and 1870s, when both firms and industry prospered. These were continued and even extended in the 1880s, but the rise of competition and the necessity for consolidation was undermining stable relations by the 1900s.

One of the strongest bonds consisted in local religious institutions, although there were divisions between sects. Like the Birkmyres, Christie found it advisable to adopt a flexible latitudinarianism in his dealings with the churches - supporting the Catholic Chapel for the Irish girls immigrating to staff the mills, and avoiding sectional bias.¹ The management at Turkey Red was apparently sympathetic to the literature of the United Free Church, and their 'Committee on Social Problems' which operated in areas such as Alexandria.²

The elaborate network of services built up in the years of prosperity and growth were incapable of either preventing the relative decline of the industry and its wage rates, or stemming the growth of industrial and social unrest which culminated in the widespread strike action of 1906-16 in Alexandria. Like many coalmining villages, these settlements saw the older 'paternal' bonds of the masters eaten away by competition, unemployment and consolidated organisation of

7. UGD 13 4/8: Letter of Alexandria manager to schoolmaster of 25.6.1869, referring to 'the conversation...I had with you some time ago as to the possibility of the Firm and the School Committee resolving to have a Certified Teacher for the Works School..'
1. UGD 13 1/8: Letter of management to Fr. Donaghue of Sligo, 11.9.1873: '..we have a flourishing Catholic Chapel under the able care of Dr. Fox.'; C.f. Letter of 11.12.1878 to missionary: '..we are not favourable to giving missionary support to any Denomination'.
2. UGD 13 5/12, Printed Circular by Drummond of United Free Church to Local Committees, instructing them to; "...learn from local conditions, and elicit...information as to the conditions of labour within the bounds of the Presbytery; the housing of the workers, and what influence, if any, labour questions exert on the attitude of masters of men to the Church....In conference with employers and workmen...they should enquire into chronic

both capital and labour in the decades after 1900.¹

In contrast to both the Birkmyres and the Christies, the firm of Fison and Co. had one very active politician and one socially active employer as partners in Burley. W.E. Forster preferred to plead the cause of education and reform amongst the patricians of the Liberal Party, whilst Fison concerned himself with local affairs and immediate problems of 'paternalism'.² Besides having a number of houses at Burley, the employers were anxious to foster the image of paternal benevolence, or as one contemporary put it:³

A sort of paternal care is exercised over the inhabitants by the firm, Mr William Fison being almost looked upon as the "father of the village". He is regarded as the chief arbitrator in all matters of difficulty that crop up in Burley...

The concern of the employers for 'the social well-being of the people in conjunction with their business connection', led to a strong tradition of mutual respect and regard for duties which is found in many such localities.⁴

Such feelings were reinforced by the impressive buildings of Burley, with Fisons providing a large public hall for the village supplied with periodicals, a lecture hall and 'a respectable library'.⁵ Fisons joined the growing number of employers participating in the institute movement of the late-19th Century, which fashioned suitable recreational pastimes for employees having more 'idle time' on their hands than previously.⁶

Even more impressive were the efforts of the firm of

2. 'or general occasions of misunderstanding between employers and employed.'
1. C.f. Moore, op. cit. p92, says of paternalism that: 'It was possible to put these attitudes into practice in a period of relative prosperity...But when trade declined severely and continuously..the burden of maintaining the relationship became unbearable to the men.'
2. Wemyss Reid, The Life of W.E. Forster (1970 Reprint) London p145, for Forster's interest in 'the social politics of the time'.
3. Fortunes Made in Business (3 Vols) London (1889) Vol.I p391.
4. ibid. p410. The author commented that; 'through all the long partnership there has existed between employers and employed a bond of sympathy and mutuality..'

T. & M. Bairstow, of Craven near Keighley. Besides the forty or so cottages held at the village, the firm encouraged membership of the Yorkshire Penny Bank by granting awards to its employees on active service.¹ In 1906-09, the employers crowned their municipal involvement with the construction of the Sutton Mill Institute at Baths, costing over £4,000.² The Institute included a dining room, billiard room, reading room and Bath Room, as well as (significantly) a bar.³ Although anxious to foster respectable habits and temperate behaviour amongst the local labouring class, the employers probably recognised the disadvantages of trying to instill the extreme temperance which the Collins Institute of Glasgow demanded.

In keeping with many employers vision of useful and practical knowledge, the firm also provided scholarships for the promising children of Sutton Mill workers and made grants to the Sutton National School.⁴ At a time when competitive conditions in the woolen textiles trade were improving only gradually after 1897, it is a testimony to the efficiency and enlightened views of these manufacturers that they were prepared to expend such sums on recreation.

Other projects, such as Foster's Black Dyke Mills and Titus Salt's projects at Shipley, are much better known and excellently documented.⁵ But it should be emphasised that their activities were only an elaboration

5. ibid. p591.
6. H.E. Mellors, Leisure and the Changing City Routledge and Kegan Paul (1976) London p94; Philip Corrigan and Valerie Gillespie, 'Class struggle, social literacy and idle time...' Mimeo (August 1975) p5-6, for discussion of this concept in broader context.
1. Bairstow Collection, MS 188: Letter 28.12.1914 in Nominal Ledger.
2. MS 183, Ref 27: Receipts, 1905-1912.
3. MS 183, 'Memorandum on Sutton Mill Institute' 6.10.1908.
4. MS 188, Nominal Ledger figures.
5. Eric M. Sigsworth, Black Dyke Mills Liverpool University Press (1958) p xi, pp143-4, 147-50, 180-2; Jack Reynolds, Saltaire - the Village of Sir Titus Salt Bradford Libraries (1976) p11-22; W. Ashworth, 'British Industrial Villages in the Nineteenth Century' Economic History Review III No.1-3 (1950-1) p379-80.

of developments which had been a feature both of early industrialisation, and of the period of capitalist maturity and consolidation. The fresh initiatives of the late-19th Century were responses to renewed growth as they affected particular firms in different trades, and to the changing vision of order on the broader horizon of class relations. Even where the employers had little direct experience of social unrest and industrial militancy, they could read in their papers of violent confrontations in nearby towns.¹

The coalmining and textiles industries provide an excellent basis for a comparison with those shipbuilding concerns of Clydeside which became heavily involved in the provision of social services. For the market forces which weighed upon the minds and actions of the coalmasters and textile employers, were very evident in the activities of the shipbuilders. Largely because of the uneven and erratic development of the Glasgow building industry - itself a product of various local difficulties and distorted urban expansion under estate developers - the local employers found themselves committed to housing during the later decades of the 19th Century.² Glasgow never developed a really adequate system of housing construction, and was hindered rather than assisted by the proliferation of regulations, legal and professional barriers which property developers had to overcome before appointing the small firms of master builders and specialist tradesmen to carry out the necessary construction work on their

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1. Bradford Chamber of Commerce: Minutes. Cutting from Bradford Argus of 23.3.1912 on Chamber's A.G.M. of 22.3.1912, when the employer Oddy stated that the Miner's strike was 'very largely due to the influence of the extreme men who were working in the socialist movement...That was synicalism - that was what was at the bottom of the coal strike today..'; Minutes: 27.5.1913, when Robinson discusses Carter's strike and made 'a firm and solemn protest against the state of lawlessness which existed in Bradford that day...It was a state of terrorism and the police protection was inadequate. If the town was not able to protect them the Authorities should communicate with the Home Office', etc.
 2. J. Kellett, 'Property Speculation and the Building of Glasgow, 1780-1830' Scottish Journal of Political Economy Vol.8 (1961) pp 212, 217, 221-4, for an account of the speculators.

lands.¹

The peculiar nature of Glasgow's housing development, and the intricacies of its housing market, were to have serious implications for the local relations between employers and workmen.² In areas where company housing was important, then the relations of production between employers and workmen were overlaid with all the force and legality of property relations also.³ Secondly, the small scale nature of speculative building and its financing led to a highly-fragmented pattern of property relations, with factors, solicitors and financial institutions figuring alongside the archetypal petite bourgeois investors in the ownership and management of housing property.⁴ In both cases the employer was vulnerable to tenant unrest, for he might precipitate discontent amongst his hands through high rents or suffer the consequences of friction between landlords, factors and tenants by wage demands or localised class conflicts.

So although property relations formed the basis of local controls outside the factory gates, the power of the factor had to be reinforced by an array of laws and institutions. The three most important organs of local government at this time were the local courts and magistracy (Sheriffs in Scotland), the Police Commissions of each burgh area, and the Parish authorities.⁵ Also of real significance were the School Boards, various improvement committees, and Ward Committees of the different areas. In the older burghs of Glasgow, which still retained

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1. ibid. p230, for account of David Laurie's ill-fated adventure in the Gorbals area of Glasgow.
 2. Glasgow's housing development is discussed in my 'Clydeside Housing and the Evolution of State Rent Controls' in Housing, Social Policy and the State Croom Helm (1979) forthcoming.
 3. Newby, et. al., op. cit. p337-8, for discussion of housing as an element in relations of production, reproduction and consumption on lines similar to Castells.
 4. B. Elliot and D. McCrone, 'Landlords in Edinburgh: Some Preliminary Findings' Sociological Review Vol.23 No.3 (1975) p557-8, for the parallel case of Edinburgh in 19th Century.
 5. M.A. Simpson, 'Middle Class Housing and the Growth of Suburban

their independence from the City Corporation until the end of the 19th Century (and even up to 1912), there were an assortment of institutions from the Provostship down to local bailiffs.

These offices of the state were reinforced by the various pillars of civil society, some of them enjoying a semi-official existence and others completely autonomous 'private' organisations. One of the most impressive and effective institutions was the Church of Scotland, and its alternative rivals. Contemporary observers testified to the extent which Presbyterianism had eaten into the character of the 'respectable' workman, surviving as a moral code long after its theological doctrines had waned.¹ The austerities of John Knox were alleviated and crudified after the 1870s by the influx of Belfast shipbuilding workers, with their garish celebrations of Orangeism as well as Freemasonry.²

Just as important in its influence upon working class character was the Glasgow Savings Bank which existed, so Lord Provost Shaw told its members in 1909, 'primarily for the benefit of the respectable working classes - that class upon which the stability and permanence of the body politic so largely depended'.³ The worthies of local government and Glasgow University clearly felt they were renewing those social bonds of duty and obligation by helping the working class attain a degree of respectability and an interest in the rights of property.

In times of stress and unemployment, the employers could support the distress and relief funds and reassure

5. 'Communities in the 'West End' of Glasgow, 1830-1914' B.Litt Thesis (1970) University of Glasgow. Map 5 for description of the Hillhead Police Burgh and its 'civilisation' from 1869.
1. James Hamilton Muir, Glasgow in 1901 William Hodge (1901) Edinburgh p199, says of the Protestant workman: 'He is a radical and Calvinist by inheritance and tradition, and though his active interest in Calvinism may have abated, its principles still control his conduct.'
2. Harry McShane and Joan Smith, Harry McShane: No Mean Fighter Pluto (1978) London, Chapters 1-2 for account of religion.
3. The Annual Reports of the Glasgow Savings Bank Report of A.G.M. 22.12.1909, p4.

themselves that most of the applicants were Irishmen or else emaciated 'respectable looking women'.¹ Given the extreme fluctuations of the shipbuilding cycle and the great uncertainties of employment at periods of depression, it is something of a tribute to their independence that the tradesmen generally refused to join the Fund queues.²

More specifically, there were organisations such as the Partick Civic Guild, set up in another period of distress (1907) in order to deal with the chronic needs of the poorest sections of the locality.³ This body recognised from the outset that the operation of the Scottish Poor Law, with its refusal of relief to the able-bodied, was completely inadequate for dealing with widespread unemployment.⁴ Like the Charity Organisation Society, though perhaps with greater scepticism as to the utility of the Poor Laws, it attempted to reform the system from within as well as by legislation and to introduce a necessary element of discretion and local knowledge into the expertise of administration.

What is significant about all such institutions and associations, is the common interest in projecting an image of the stable and harmonious community. In 1913 the Partick Civic Guild declared its object to be, the attaining for Partick:⁵

"the highest possible state of social well-being, by cultivating in its citizens a livelier sense of their duties to each other arising out of their privileges as members of the same community...and

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1. Reports of the Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund, During the Winters of 1878-80 Aird & Coghill (1879-80) Glasgow: Ref. G.C.A. L167, LK 5/521. See 'A Run Round the Ward Stations' p21-22.
 2. ibid.; Robert Tressell, The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists Panther-Granada (1965) London p334, for a comment.
 3. Partick Civic Guild Collection, Minute Book (1907-15): Report of the Third District Committee for 1908, 30.9.1908: 'This is a large labouring population, and the need is practically "chronic".'
 4. ibid. Pamphlet on Objectives of the Guild at 27.12.1907, p2: "We must face the plain and bold fact, after a long experience, that the present Poor Law System is ineffective. It treats destitution and disability as isolated facts without any regard

"by seeking to eliminate all conditions unfavourable to the progressive development of the civic community."

The speakers at the annual meetings of the Glasgow Savings Bank voiced similar sentiments, characterising the city, the nation, and even the economy, as one unified community - albeit deriving from the strength and moral fibre of individual effort.¹

The dominant ideas about 'community' could therefore stretch from a vision of the nation state which transcended all sectional interests, to the immediate locale which bound the local citizens in a collective responsibility for themselves. The borders of such a local community were mapped out as much by cultural institutions and values as by the pattern of property and productive relations or the organs of the state.

Those working class groups standing on the other end of the wage contract and the letting agreement did not necessarily assimilate and reproduce these dominant values in any simple way. Indeed, the experiences of the housing deprivations of Victorian Glasgow confirmed the unequal ownership of property and the existence of a class structure for many tenants.² Dislike of landlords and factors was not confined to the Irish or those sunk in ignorance and vice, however much contemporaries might suggest it was.³ The evaluation of housing quality, as well as the identification with certain housing areas,

4. "to their cause. It treats in precisely the same way the decent and the disreputable."
5. ibid. Preface to the A.G.M. Report of 1913; C.f. Annual Report of Civic Guild for 1920, noting of the schemes for workers' control in industry "will depend on whether or not the whole community and not only a section benefits by it...Any scheme for social benefit must embrace the whole community." This is national citizenship and community as opposed to local.
1. Annual Reports... Report for 1907: A.G.M. 24.12.1907. Professor George Adam Smith told the attenders: 'After all, whatever kind of economy may be considered best for a community to be governed by, it is upon the individual moral habits that the welfare of the city and the nation must depend.'
2. Elliot and McCrone, loc. cit. p542.
3. Professor William Smart, The Housing Problem and the Municipality University of Glasgow Free Lectures (1902) Glasgow p8.

could obviously differ between classes and groups as much as the material relation in which each group stood to the landlord.¹

Similar reservations can be made in delineating the various 'occupational communities' which existed on Clydeside at this time. Criticisms can be made of the model proposed for the 'traditional community' of the proletariat, both for its simplistic view of class imagery and its neglect of internal sectionalism and divisions.² Whilst accepting these points, much contemporary evidence suggests that there were significant divisions between different strata and occupations in the localities of Glasgow.

We can only appreciate the fluidity and resilience of these 'occupational communities' if we keep these fundamental contradictions in mind. The key component of the local area was of course the local labour market, providing employers with the necessary commodity for the operation of their plants and shipyards. Within this labour market there were always tensions between the need of employers for labour supply on the one hand, and for labour mobility on the other.³ This was particularly marked in industries such as shipbuilding, with their violently oscillating trade cycles and their high degree of labour mobility.⁴

Divisions between distinct grades of the workforce, if not between different trades at the yards, are apparent

1. Couper and Brindley, loc. cit. p566-67.
2. Thompson, op. cit. p463, for divisions and conflict with any 'community'; Cousins and Brown, loc. cit. p55-6 for critique of Lockwood.
3. W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment, A Problem of Industry Longmans Green (1909 & 1930) London p86-7: 'Given indeed a number of distinct centres of irregular work...the following dilemma is reached - either men will stick to one centre or they will move freely from one to another. With the former alternative, chance will be diminished but friction will be at a maximum. With the second, friction will be diminished but chance at a maximum...it will also exclude the formation of local and personal connections and preferences.'
4. Sidney Pollard, 'The Economic History of British Shipbuilding' Ph.D Thesis (1951) University of London (L.S.E.) p181-9. Pollard discusses the rapid evacuation of housing.

from contemporary testimonies on the housing of the working class in Glasgow. Bruce Glasier, a leading Glasgow socialist, told the Presbytery Commission on Housing in 1891 that the worst-housed groups were the Irish Catholics. They were not 'craftsmen and...their fathers had no trade union before them'.¹ The Protestant artisans lived in a different class of housing,² and often in quite distinct geographical neighbourhoods,³ from the Irish labourers and unskilled Highland immigrants.⁴

These sectional and religious divisions were reinforced by common ties of kinship, and by membership of organisations such as Orange and Masonic Lodges in the strongly Protestant areas of Partick and Govan. The chaotic and disruptive industrial growth of the earlier decades gradually gave way to a more stable situation in the 1880s and 1890s - possibly assisted by the extension of domestic leisure and increasing division of gainful and housework employment.⁵

Whilst such developments were making for the fragmentation of working class life, there were certain trends and organisations which created a greater degree of cohesion and class consciousness. Besides the local Trades Councils, and the district organisations of the powerful trade unions in these areas, there were political organisations launched by radicals and socialists in these years.⁶

Even where working class groups did not form and direct organisations themselves, they fought for control of such institutions as the Parish authorities, the School Boards

1. The Report of the Commission on the Housing of the Poor, In relation to the Social Condition Presbytery of Glasgow Pub. Maclehose (1891) Glasgow p22-23.
2. Peter Fyfe, Report of the Sanitary Inspector of Glasgow on the Proposed Relaxation of Building Regulations (November 1916) S.R.A. Ref: D TC 8/19/8 p7-8: 'The question of the provision of houses for artisans and their families, and people of equal status, is differentiated from the same question in connection with that class of our population which is beneath them in the social order, and who are usually designated under the term "the poorer classes" or "the poorest classes"...considerations of a strict and severe economy do not bulk so largely in the problem of suitably housing them as they do in respect of the class of casual and other unskilled labourers beneath them.'
3. Oral History Evidence: Transcript No.3 (17.8.1978) J. McFarlane p3.
4. Oral History Evidence: Transcript 6 (23.8.1978) M. Cordiner p9-12.

and the Ward Committees of the burghs.¹ The latter were particularly important in mobilising the forces of the local tenants, as well as being the platform for local socialist agitation on key issues such as housing.² It was also from such local bases that prominent trade union leaders, such as Harry Hopkins, could bring pressure bear on the local School Board (in defence of John Maclean) and the local press.³

This evidence from local organisations and institutions illustrates the artificiality of describing any one 'working class community', or even one type of community. It is apparent that the forces making up the different locales, were fluid, dynamic and contradictory, rather than static and uniform. Besides the complex operation of economic and social forces within a given area, there were a variety of institutions and organisations controlled by conflicting groups and interests. The dominant interests were maintaining bourgeois hegemony only by constantly projecting their images of 'community' upon an, often reluctant, resident working class.⁴ This creation of the community mythology, partly derived from romantic conservatism and landed ideology,⁵ could only be sustained by directing popular feeling against outsiders (such as the Irish) and could never be all-embracing.⁶

It is in this context that we must locate the activities and the ideas of the local employers, particularly where (as in the case of shipbuilding firms) they dominated whole areas of the urban landscape. Employers were prominent in the division of labour, often figured in

5. Stedman Jones, loc. cit. p485-7, argues this case.

6. William Martin Haddow, Socialism in Scotland - Its Rise and Progress Pub. by I.L.P. in Scotland at Reformers' Bookstall (c.1920) Glasgow.

1. John Lindsay, 'Notes prepared by the Town Clerk for Lord Provost Stevenson' (30.3.1912) S.R.A. Ref: TC D 6/606/1/43 and TC D 6/606/12/16 p3-4, for discussion of Ward Committees.

2. G.B. Esskemont, 'Notes on Ward Committees' City Chamberlain's Office (16.2.1954) S.R.A. Ref: TC D 6/606/12/16. Includes Glasgow Corporation Minute of 18.4.1913 on Ward Committees, and that of 4.6.1914; McShane and Smith, op. cit. p28.

3. The Govan Ward Committee, Minutes of the Govan Ward Committee: First Ward (1903-09) S.R.A. Ref: TD 90/2. Minutes 29.3.1904 - 26.4.1904; 18.10.1904; 5.10.1905 - 3.10.1907; 29.9.1909.

local property relations, were key members of the state authorities, and supported many of those 'private' institutions of civil society which gave the notion of citizenship greater substance.

Dennys of Dumbarton saw themselves as not merely providing employment and services for the town, but also participating in its civil progress by schemes such as the housing of workmen and the erection of the Denny Institute in the civic centre.¹ When William Denny III supported his workmen's friendly societies, he was conscious of fostering an agency for social co-operation within the 'community' as well as industry.²

The same spirit led his son, Archibald Denny, to take the leading part in the Dumbarton Social Union, with its Benevolent Committee for those in distress. As the President of the Social Union, Denny came to 'be looked upon in our midst as the leader in things pertaining to the social well being of the community'.³

Whilst Dumbarton was comparatively insulated from other main areas of population, and the involvement of the largest employers with the town understandable, it is important to stress the whole conurbation of Clydeside

4. Newby, et. al., op. cit. p284: '...the production of social imagery is a dynamic process contained within the confines of a hegemonic system of core beliefs which constitute the ontological foundations of both the imposition of dominant ideologies and the construction of social imagery.'
5. David J.V. Jones, 'Crime, Protest and Community in 19th Century Wales' Llafur Vol.1 No.3 (May 1974) p10.
6. D.J.V. Jones, ' "A Dead Loss to the Community". The Criminal Vagrant in mid-Nineteenth-Century Wales' Welsh Historical Review Vol.8 No.3 (1977) pp313, 327-31, for similar analysis.
1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress: Answers to Questions sent to Employers Appx. XV Archibald Denny Answer ix p24; Denny Dumbarton 1844-1932 Burrow (1933) London p16.
2. A.B. Bruce, The Life of William Denny Hodder & Stoughton (1889) London p92: "It is the expression and reiteration of this which imports to friendly societies that degree of stability... [which] attracts the attention of all who take a deep interest in the more important concerns of our country."
3. Papers of Peter Denny, UGD 3 28/11: Scrapbook No.5, Dumbarton Herald 14.12.1904; C.f. Report of the Royal Commission... Answer VIII.

was really a ribbon of connecting localities, each dominated by its own labour markets and major employers. The areas around the shipyard were overshadowed by the larger vessels rising above the yard walls, and found it easier to identify with the product than elsewhere.¹

This is exemplified by the case of the firms operating at Govan and Linthouse, near the centre of the city, but on the south side of the Clyde. The Stephen family had been operating on the Clyde since the 18th Century, and brought their traditional attitudes as well as their trade to Linthouse in the early 1870s. Alexander Stephen was a staunch puritan and Free Churchman, following his forbears,² and he became the first Chairman of Govan School Board after his arrival.³ Alexander subscribed to Govan Parish Established Church, and gave freely of his time to Church, Home Missions, and the Penny Savings Bank.⁴

The Stephens as a family took a strong personal interest in their workmen, and were bitterly opposed to the rise of powerful trade unions in the shipyards.⁵ They attempted to reinforce this traditionalism in industry with their strong commitment to such elaborate facilities as the recreation ground and the pavilion at Coila Park, financed by the firm for the benefit of the surrounding 'community'.

The neighbouring yard down the river from Linthouse,

1. J.L. Carvel, Stephens of Linthouse, 1750-1950 Pub. by Stephens (1950) Glasgow p63, Alexander Stephen quoted as saying in 1870: "I do not know how it is that the shipbuilding trade has become such a public business...that a launch is a matter in which the community takes an interest..".
2. Alexander Stephen & Co. Ltd: A Shipbuilding History, 1750-1932 E.J. Burrow (1932) London (Private Circ.) p14-16.
3. Carvel, op. cit., p88-89.
4. Alexander Stephen & Co., Scribbling Diaries of Alexander Stephen (MS) UGD 4 8/4-40. No.1: 5.1.1880; 12.1.1880; 3.2.1880 - 24.2.1880; 19.4.1886 - 16.1.1888. Stephen wrote of the Glasgow Savings Bank: 'It is the most successful savings bank in the kingdom...I seldom see any of the Shipbuilders of the Clyde at meetings...having for their object the good of the working class, and few if any take anything to do with the Welfare of the Citizens of Glasgow or the community.'. Stephen also gave support to the Kyrle Society for the housing of the poorer classes.
5. Diary of F.J. Stephen, No.2 (1888) UGD 4 9/2; 19.1.1889 entry on death of a workman; UGD 4 8/39: 15.10.1897-18.11.1897, and entry in Fairplay.

were John Elders (later Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co.) of Govan. In many respects the succeeding dynasties of Elders and Pearces at the yard, constitute the archetypal paternalist employer. John Elder had worked with great success at Napier's yard and eventually set up his own concern at the Fairfield bankside. After his death his widow endowed the John Elder Infirmary, Elder Park and Elder Public Library with some of the large fortune her husband had made.¹

William Pearce greatly advanced the fortunes of the business founded by Elder, and also assumed the responsibilities of the largest employer in Govan. He served as Police Commissioner in Govan before being elected to Parliament as the Conservative representative of the burgh, and died as a baronet in 1889.²

Some years after his death, in the early 1900s, his family completed the elaborate and costly Pearce Institute which still dominates Govan. It was perhaps the final monument to the strong ties between Christian employers and Protestant workmen, linked by their common belief in a peculiar form of respectability as well as their common interests in the shipyards.³

However strong the cultural domination or 'direction' of the local bourgeois interests, and these interests ranged from the large industrialists to the small shopkeepers, and from the small houseowner to the powerful factor, these could not control the movement of market forces. The very relations of production and property bonds which formed the basis of the locality, could also

1. W.J. Macquorn Rankine, A Memoir of John Elder Blackwood (1871) Edinburgh p53; Appendix X p78-9, is letter of workmen to Mrs. Elder on his death in 1869, mourning "the loss of the most benevolent of employers and the most generous of masters - the community the loss of the enterprising and important supporter - the benevolent and the Christian that material aid which enabled them to make provision for the needy - the erring restrained and advised towards a new life."
2. The statue commemorating Sir William Pearce's achievements, raised by public subscription, still stands at Govan Cross; C.f. UGD 4 8/1-40, for views of Liberal Alexander Stephen, entries of 5.4.1886-8.4.1886; 24.12.1888 - 27.12.1888. Stephen remained a Liberal but disagreed with Gladstone's Home Rule policy.

create major problems for the effective control of industry and the legitimization of property rights within a given area.¹ This led to serious tensions in the 'urban system', as it has been called by some writers.²

After the housing boom of 1896-1904 in Glasgow, there were three factors which operated to create a major housing problem by 1915. The low returns from housing, and the high rates of interest (especially after the Boer War) led to the virtual cessation of housebuilding for working class tenants after 1905-6.³ Secondly, the underlying problems of underconsumption in housing meant that the mass of poverty in Britain was acting as a drag upon the whole building industry.⁴ Thirdly, the falling real incomes and the violent fluctuations in employment levels before 1914 ensured that overcrowding would continue to be the major housing blight - despite the existence of housing 'surpluses' and empty dwellings.⁵

The factors involved in this situation were complex, but the immediate affects on the working class neighbourhoods were apparent long before the outbreak of War. Those occupational, sectional and sectarian divisions which were largely reinforced by settlement patterns and distinctive life-styles,⁶ were gradually eroded by the spreading deprivations and the stagnant living standards of these years.⁷

It was precisely upon the housing issue that the different working class organisations, as well as the

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3. McShane and Smith, op. cit. for an account of Masonic foremen, and Orange craftsmen; Oral History Evidence: Transcript No.2 Elizabeth and Mary McNab (14.8.1978) p2-3, for an account of religion and foremen in Govan.
 1. Melling, loc. cit. (1979) for a fuller discussion.
 2. Castells, op. cit.; Pickvance, loc. cit. p32-3, for a critique.
 3. Report of the Commission on the Housing of the Poor... (1891) p16-17.
 4. A.C. Pigou, 'Some Aspects of the Housing Problem' in S. Rowntree and A.C. Pigou Lectures on Housing Manchester University Press (1914) p54-5; John Butt, 'Working-class Housing in Glasgow 1851-1914' in S.D. Chapman (ed.), The History of Working Class Housing David & Charles (1971) Newton Abbot.

different spheres of working class life, could unite. As Andrew M'Bride, the rent strike leader and prominent campaigner for Wheatley's £8 Cottages Scheme in the Glasgow I.L.P., told the later Committee of Enquiry:¹

"They recognised that as private speculators had practically ceased building, and that as many houses were admitted to be unfit for human habitation, we felt that we were in easy reach of a famine in housing..".

The culmination of this agitation was the Glasgow rent strike of 1915, which saw the lower-middle class property owners squeezed between the rising bond interest on one side and resisting tenants on the other.²

As the observers and participants in the strike kept emphasising, it artisan areas of Glasgow rather than the slum wards which led the revolt and its leaders included the lower-middle class as well as manual workers and housewives.³ As The Bulletin put it in September 1915:⁴

They occupy tenement houses of a very good class, though small, consisting of one, two, and in a few cases three apartments....The large majority of the

5. John Butt, 'Working Class Housing in Glasgow, 1900-1939' in Ian MacDougall (ed.), Essays in Scottish Labour History John Robertson (1978) Edinburgh. Mimeo draft chapter p6.
6. R.Q. Gray, 'Styles of Life, the "Labour Aristocracy" and Class Relations in late-19th Century Edinburgh' International Review of Social History XVIII Pt.3 (1973); Cousins and Brown, loc. cit. p66, for discussion of 'styles of life'; Couper and Brindley, loc. cit. p566, for somewhat similar discussion.
7. The Voice of Labour 18.1.1907: 'In the ugly, mean, and squalid districts of the Metropolis and the large provincial towns of the Empire...Overworked and out-of-work - the aristocracy of Labour - swells upon a pound a week - the fringe of Labour, who are living from hand to mouth...All are in the grip of a merciless class of landlords.'; Forward 1.12.1915, for a less exaggerated account.
1. Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Circumstances Connected with the alleged Rental Increases in the Rental of Small Dwelling-Houses in Scotland: Minutes of Evidence Cd. 8154 (1916) Q 586.
2. Joseph Melling 'The Glasgow Rent Strike and Clydeside Labour - Some Problems of Interpretation' Journal of the Scottish Labour History Society No.13 (May 1979); and 'The Glasgow Rent Strike' pp89 (June 1978) Mimeo.
3. Forward 23.1.1915.
4. The Bulletin 29.9.1915.

tenants are of the respectable artisan type - skilled workers employed in the local shipyards and engineering shops.

The demonstrations of women around Glasgow were also described as 'of the respectable working class',¹ and it was a point insisted upon by the I.L.P. leadership that the main body of the strikers came from 'the better-class working localities'.²

It was this sense of respectability that gave the strikers their strength, and which posed such a threat to the traditional bonds of urban society. For whilst challenging the fundamental tenets of property rights, legal contract, and dominant values, the strikers insisted that they were law-abiding, respectable and patriotic citizens.³ By retranslating the customary principles of respectability into terms which threatened the whole fabric of property relations and industrial production, the tenants created their own counter-hegemony.⁴ Despite the warnings of the propertied interests and their press, the state was eventually forced to concede substantial concessions to the tenants.⁵

Three elements of the rents struggle deserve particular emphasis: the role of women, the notion of 'community' developed during the campaigns, and the responses of the employers. Whereas the increasing domestication of family life during the later Victorian years had led to greater stabilisation of women's roles, the deteriorating housing conditions created a fresh form of working class

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1. Glasgow Herald 8.10.1915.
 2. Minutes of Evidence, op. cit. Q 586 - 9. Evidence of M'Bride.
 3. Glasgow Herald 13.10.1915. Report of Rosslyn Mitchell's speech at trial of rent strikers: "These increases charged since the beginning of the war had been imposed not only upon ordinary citizens but upon men who at the present moment were engaged on work of the utmost importance to the nation....They were not working for the proprietors of their houses. They were working for the purpose of turning out munitions."
 4. Forward 13.11.1915. W.C. Anderson's article: 'The Glasgow tenants had learned one quite sound lesson. They have discovered, thanks mainly to the teaching of the Labour men in Glasgow, that Governments help those who help themselves. Accept injustice meekly, and nothing will be done; resist it strongly and everything else will be added unto you.'
 5. The Glasgow Advertiser and Property Circular 19.10.1915.

consciousness and militancy.¹ A number of women's organisations, from the Women's Social and Political Union to the Women's Labour League and the Women's Co-operative Guild, began to campaign on the housing question.² Mary Laird, Helen Crawford, Mrs. Ferguson, and many others saw the possibility of mobilising respectable working class housewives on their domestic working conditions - namely, the houses in which they lived and bore children.³

Largely out of this women's housing movement arose an articulated vision of 'community', which developed a simultaneous ethical and class analysis of society. As Mary Laird, founder of the Glasgow Women's Housing Association, put it in early 1915:⁴

The single apartment or room and kitchen does not permit of the growth and expansion of those domestic and social virtues upon which the welfare of the community depends...And when we think of the strength of character, and moral stamina of the working class as a whole, we may well be proud of the class from which we spring.

During the rent strike this image of the working class community became a community for itself, as well as a community in itself, and stretched out to embrace the whole class in the minds of

1. Forward 1.1.1915. Speech of Mary Laird to the I.L.P. Housing Conference at Glasgow: "When we believe that the foundation of the moral structure is laid upon the women, how, then can we expect the best possible results while we continue to house our young working class families in one and two apartment houses?"
2. Forward 16.1.1915. Letter on W.L.L. from B/en S/haw: 'Housing is, above all, a woman's question...If every ill-housed woman who cherishes a housing ambition can be brought to demand it fiercely and collectively, then its realisation will be assured.'; Forward 13.1.1914. For the "No Vote, No Rent" strategy developed by Sylvia Pankhurst's East End Suffragists of London.
3. Partick and Maryhill Press 19.5.1915; and Glasgow Herald 15.11.1915, for accounts of speeches by Helen Crawford. The latter paper gives her as proclaiming: "All who were taking part in the demonstration were showing their solidarity. They were asking not for money, not for charity; they were asking for justice... She respected all laws that were just and fair, but she did not ask them to respect the law which allowed increases in rents to be enforced at the present juncture." This retranslation of the popular notion of 'legality' and justice was crucial.
4. Forward 9.1.1915.

many leaders and trade unionists involved in the strike movement.¹ The dominant notions of the 'community's interest', or the 'local community' had been rejected for an interpretation of community in strong class terms. Identification with one's neighbours and fellow workers within the immediate locale, became a prelude to a broader class movement which demanded the end of gross rent exploitation and state coercion.

The responses of the employers to this disruption of the stable community were complex and varied.² Amongst the first and most persistent areas of unrest were the streets of Linthouse around Stephens shipyard. This was well-known as a very good-quality housing area, which accommodated the clerical and supervisory workers as well as the well-paid skilled tradesmen of the area.³ The agitations in Govan and Linthouse had been pronounced since the passing of the House Letting and Rating Act of 1911, and the local Labour Representation Committee, Ward Committees, and Govan Tenants Defence Association had all been actively campaigning on the question of rents since that time.⁴

The industrialists of the area were caught between the attacks on propertied interests in housing - in which they often shared - and the prospect of serious munitions unrest. This was brought nearer during July-September, when the Govan Trades Council took up the cause of the Coppermiths and Shipwrights prosecuted under the Munitions Act at Fairfields, and the resistance to state coercion fused with the opposition to landlords in the whole district.⁵

Firms such as Harland and Wolff were distinctly

1. Forward 9.10.1915. Letter of Kirkwood and the Parkhead shop stewards to Glasgow Corporation of 3.10.1915 reprinted: 'They wish to make it perfectly clear that they would regard evictions as an attack on the working class, which called for the most vigorous and extreme reply, and on which might have the most disastrous consequences...If the nation is to have an adequate supply of the munitions of war, the workers must have adequate healthy housing accommodation.'
2. Joseph Melling, 'Employers, Labour and the Glasgow Housing Market' S.S.R.C. Conference Paper (May 1978) Glasgow.
3. Oral History Evidence: Transcript No.4 (17.8.1978) Andrew MacMahon p4; Transcript No.1, op. cit. p2.
4. Ref: TD 90/2. Minutes: 29.9.1909; Govan Press 29.10.1915 - 12.11.1915; Minutes of Evidence, op. cit. Q 795 - 98, David Wardley.

sympathetic to the strikers, although they were also shrewd enough to recognise the necessity of deflecting any unpopularity away from themselves.¹

By Autumn 1915, most employers were advocating either outright state suppression of the labour unrest or else substantial concessions on the social questions, whilst leaving industry guarded against unrest.² It was apparent by October-November, that a major crisis of state control had arrived and that real reforms of the rent system were required.³

After the passage of Long's Rent Restriction Bill, state and employers gradually restored the hegemony corroded during the rents movement. The controls introduced to accomplish this end took four forms: physical coercion and legalistic oppression; general social control by legislative reform; industrial regulation and provisions; and fresh moral controls. It was essential not merely to restore the respect for legal authority and property relations, but also to refurbish the traditional image of the state as the arbitrator of conflicting interests - as the embodiment of general 'community' interests as well as the reformer of specific and localised problems facing communities.

Physical coercion and legal prosecution followed the substantial concessions of the Rent Act as soon as January-March 1916, when the Dilution Commissioners arrived to enforce deskilling and to deport the Clyde

5. Govan Press 10.9.1915. Shows that of the fifteen shipwrights prosecuted at Glasgow Munitions Tribunal, fourteen were from the immediate area of Fairfield, Govan and Linthouse.
1. Letters between tenants' committees and Dickinson of Harland and Wolff, later reprinted in Forward 5.6.1915. Dickinson declared himself "very pleased to hear that the tenants of the Govan district purpose refusing to pay these increased rents and we sympathise entirely with them." This followed a rumour that the firm were prepared to take over houses if recalcitrant tenants were evicted by local factors.
2. See Chapters 2 - 3, for discussion.
3. Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith, The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (ed.) Lawrence & Wishart (1971) London p210: "These situations of conflict between "represented and representatives" reverberate out from the terrain of the parties...throughout the State organism...In every country the process is different although

Workers' Committee and shop stewards who resisted the dilution programme.¹

Social legislation, industrial regulation and moral controls took a great many forms, but one key area was the provision of industrial welfare services in the locale.¹ Although the Health of Munitions Workers Committee at the Ministry of Munitions, was primarily concerned with the health and efficiency of the workers inside the factory gates, they also became involved in 'extra-mural' problems.² This followed upon the activities of the Liquor Traffic Control Board in 1915, and the prescriptions of early H.M.W.C. Memoranda.³

These reports, and the prescriptions which they offered, openly espoused a consensus view of the 'community', and of local 'communities' or their needs.⁴ It was argued that sobriety amongst the working class was necessary in wartime, since alcoholism 'must necessarily affect the industrial classes as much as, if not, indeed, more than the other sections of the community'.⁵ This was seen as part of a general programme for policing the locale, since:⁶

To bring large numbers of young people into any locality must increase the difficulty of maintaining public order and good behaviour at all times...Women patrols have been found very useful working in co-operation with the Police.

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3. 'the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class's hegemony...A "crisis of authority" is spoken of; this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the State.'
 1. Melling, loc. cit. (May 1979).
 2. History of the Ministry of Munitions: Vol.V Pt.III, Chapter iii: 'Welfare Outside the Factory' pp 52-67.
 3. Health of Munition Workers Committee, Memorandum No.2: Welfare Supervision Cd. 8151 (1915) p3; Memorandum No.3: Report on Industrial Canteens Cd. 8133 (1915) Para. 7 p6.
 4. Cd. 9065. Para.465, p105. Hilda's Cashmore's work cited to affect that Welfare Supervisors must have: "(e) A conception of the right relation between the life of the factory with all its agencies for good, and the life of the community, the inter-action of each upon the other. This involves a serious study of the social structure of the community.'
 5. Cd. 9065. Para. 531, p119.
 6. Cd. 9065. Para. 529, p119.

Great emphasis was placed in the reports and the writings of welfare experts, on the role of women. It was not only that women were increasingly involved in the war effort, and were historically protected by state legislation. They were also seen as the foundation of the family and of stable bourgeois society - an image which had been fractured during the struggles of 1911-1915, as women mobilised in the home and on the political front. Only by restoring this madonna of social stability, could the dominant cultural values be renewed. As the Final Report of the Health of Munitions Workers Committee put it:¹

In considering the conditions of employment of women workers as compared with those of men, the Committee have recognised that account must be taken not only of physiological differences but also of those contributions which women alone can make to the welfare of the community. Upon the womanhood of the country most largely rests the privilege first of creating and maintaining a wholesome family life, and secondly, of developing the higher influences of social life - both methods of primary and vital importance to the nation.

This theme continued in the housing policy adopted towards female importees, and the hostelling of them in large settlements together. The morals as much as the wellbeing of the girls were scrutinised, despite the fierce resistance of some women to this regimentation.² It was in this area of surveillance that the female workers objected most strongly to welfare supervision, as recognised by the Committee itself.³

1. Cd. 9065. Para. 83, p20.
2. Cd. 9065. Para. 502, p113: 'Only normally healthy, clean and wholesome-minded women and girls should be exported. - In some cases...women of bad character have been associated in lodgings or hostels with respectable women and girls.'
3. Cd. 9065. Para. 544, p115. The Report noted the unpopularity of hostels, because 'girls dislike the idea of living in large communities'. Here the term 'communities' was used in its original sense of a closed order of people, as in monastery; Para. 515, p116 of Report recommended that the inmates should be allowed as 'much freedom as is compatible with good order', adding that: 'the inmates are independent workers not living under any community rule.' C.f. attitudes of the women munitions workers in Chapter 3.

This new moral order was all the more necessary as women began to organise on the shop floor of munitions workers whilst others were involved in local tenant associations and I.L.P. bodies.¹ Amidst the rising challenge to institutions and dominant values, extra-mural welfare formed one part of the attempts to recreate social as well as industrial stability.²

Conclusion

This chapter has evaluated the role of industrial welfare beyond the confines of the business enterprise, and its contribution to the local 'community'. So many services, including the creation of a housing infrastructure for the firm's labour market, committed the employer to local intervention that it is impossible to appraise the importance of welfare without recognising this aspect. The fact that a market relationship underlay such activities suggests the need to see community or locality primarily in terms of social relations rather than physical environment or institutions. The latter, like the elaborate park or institute laid by the conscientious employer, merely marked the boundaries and expressed the quality of class relations in these decades.³

In their search for a stable social order many employers financed such projects as recreation grounds or public parks, contributing to the institute movement of the late 19th century and even attempting to nurture respectable values and ideas in their workmen. Even before the 'garden city' proposals of Howard became popular in the 1900s, manufacturers such as Collins, Christie, Salt, Cunliffe-Lister and many others were funding projects which improved the habits and morale of their employees. These efforts became all the more important as urbanisation spread to previously isolated localities and fresh political organisations - headed by the I.L.P. - arose

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1. D. Thom, "Women Munitions Workers at Woolwich Arsenal in the 1914-18 War" M.A. Thesis (Warwick, 1975), particularly p106-08, 119-22.
 2. Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison [ed. L. Lawner] J. Cape (1975) London, p226-28 Letter 7.3.1932, for more general argument on morality and state control.
 3. C.R. Friedrichs, 'Capitalism, Mobility and Class Formation...' Past and Present LXIX (1975), p24-25, for comparative example.

to undermine traditional authority and establish working class control of industrial districts.

These conflicts culminated in the upheavals of the years 1911-20, more particularly during the housing unrest in mining and munitions areas. To some extent employers were insulated against open attacks because of the complexity of industrial and property relations in most areas, and were careful to distance themselves from unpopular landlords wherever possible. Yet it remains true that there was an increasing fusion of workplace and social demands in cities such as Glasgow and Leeds, where rent strikes followed the First World War and industrial unrest.

In this respect the progress of state involvement in industrial and extra-mural services during and after the War, gives some indication of class relations. In previous decades employers' welfare had extended relations into local life, encouraged respectability and facilitated habits of self-help and temperance. The erosion of these social bonds and values is reflected in the official reports written during the War. Government support took three main forms: firstly, there was the close regulation of liquor traffic and other unacceptable habits; secondly, there was positive assistance to those firms seeking to improve local amenities and housing, whilst the state regulated the rents and construction of private dwellings; thirdly, the government assumed responsibility for the control of whole industries and the conditions of work and welfare within them.

After the crises of the immediate post-War period had passed and class relations were stabilised, there was a change in the role of the government from direct intervention to general supervision. This is reflected as much in the housing policies of the 1920s as in the decontrol of the mining industry and the creation of such schemes as the Miners Welfare Fund. Even if the coalowners stood little chance of recreating the stable communities of the 19th century, the governments of the 1920s were determined to adopt a neutral position in the restoration of private control.

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Chapter eight: The Ideology of Industrial Welfare.

Employers and the development of a business welfare philosophy -
a comparison of different welfare initiatives and ideas.

The attempt to survey those ideas associated with the development of industrial welfare in Britain, raises a number of serious conceptual and analytical problems only touched upon in the introductory chapter. For with the investigation of 'ideas' we move from the level of material conditions and tangible relations, to that of concepts, attitudes, values and beliefs. Questions of motivation as well as evaluation are involved, affecting observers as well as actors and commentators as well as participants.¹

Although it may be possible to make useful analytical distinctions between scientific investigation, social theory, general ideology, and practical activity, it is very difficult to sustain such rigid distinctions in the social sciences.² Each of these areas constitutes a social as well as an intellectual activity, and the way in which they are formulated will be as much influenced by the social context as the way in which they are implemented. The relationship between science and society, between technology and industry, is no more neutral than the relationship between the factory master and the handloom weaver.³

Previous chapters have emphasised the links between the material conditions of welfare, within the capitalist mode of production, and the various factors of production. Emphasis has been placed upon the capitalist labour process and the various forms of industrial relations within distinct industries. The agencies of welfare and the 'community' scope for industrial services suggested that the conditions and context in which facilities are provided strongly affect their purpose and functions. This section follows earlier chapters in stressing the complexities within the industrial welfare movements, as much as the inter-relationships between

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1. Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Trans: Rodney Livingstone) Merlin (1971) p112-16.
 2. Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Social Science: Readings in critical social theory Fontana (1972) p9-11.
 3. E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism' Past and Present No. 38 (1967) p80-94.

different streams of development.

If we are to understand the general patterns of ideology evident in these decades, we must first distinguish the material conditions of the mode of production, and the relations to which these give rise, from the perceptions of that mode.¹ The development and application of science takes place within this mode, and marks the transition from manufacturing to full industrial capitalism.² Ideology can be distinguished from both the specific mode and methods of production, and from the everyday consciousness of those engaged in them.³

It is important to note that natural science, as well as the social sciences, derived from as well as contributing to the dominant ideology of the manufacturing and industrial epochs.⁴ Within Britain, the most powerful influences upon bourgeois ideology were probably religion, political economy, natural science, and liberal political theory.⁵ The relationship between ideas and production, as well as between intellectuals and capitalists, was never as simple and direct as suggested by Marx, but in general the intellectuals moulded a vision of the world and of society that reflected dominant interests.⁶ The continuing importance of religion, albeit in different forms and with a dissenting emphasis amongst the early manufacturers and middle classes, illustrates the 'uneven' nature of ideological development and the role of tradition in the maintenance of authority.⁷

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1. Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution' New Left Review XC (1975) p49, says of the capitalist mode: 'It is a specific mode of appropriation of the product and a specific mode of appropriation of nature. In other words, it embodies a double relation, a specific form of ownership of the means of production and a specific form of control over the labour process.' This dichotomy of labour and nature needs to be stressed in relation to the implementation of technology.
 2. Karl Marx, Capital I (Trans. Moore and Aveling) Glaiisher (1912) London p366: 'In manufacture, the revolution in the mode of production begins with the labour-power, in modern industry it begins with the instruments of labour.'
 3. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology: Part One Lawrence and Wishart (1970) London p47.

Similar comments can be made about the rise of the social sciences during the 19th century, influenced as it was by the methods of the natural sciences as well as the concern with defining the social 'problems' of industrial society.¹ Besides the formalisation of technical sciences, such as engineering and design, into academic disciplines over the later decades of the century, there were the new sciences of psychology, sociology, and anthropology.²

All of these trends have a direct bearing upon the way both contemporaries and subsequent commentators look at the problems of production and industrial management. For it was in the decades 1880 to 1920, that there emerged a substantial body of writing on the questions of management, output, organisation, and industrial relations.³ Many streams contributed to the expansion of management theory, from the concern with cost accounting and clerical work, to the increasing specialisation of tasks within the firm,

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4. Marx, Capital I p359: 'Political economy, which as an independent science, first sprang into being during the period of manufacture, views the social division of labour only from the standpoint of manufacture...'
 5. E.P. Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English' Socialist Register (1965) p331-6. Thompson says of political economy, that 'This was a far more systematic, highly structured ideology than is to be found in purely political or philosophical areas... Adam Smith brought to the economic functions of the state the same jealousy which Locke had shown to its political functions..'
 6. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci Lawrence and Wishart (1971) p12: 'The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society..'
 7. Talcott Parsons (ed.), Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization Free Press (1964) New York p341, for a discussion in broad historical terms.
 1. H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society MacGibbon and Kee (1967) London p41, for eventual revolt against positivism.
 2. T.B. Bottomore, Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature George Allen and Unwin (1972) London p31.
 3. L.H. Jenks, 'Early Phases of the Management Movement' Administrative Science Quarterly V (1960) p440, says of new 'industrial engineers' that they 'were preoccupied with obtaining from their employers the authority to manage, and from their professional colleagues the recognition that theirs was a legitimate activity.'

the growing interest in science, and the awareness of new methods for increasing productivity.¹

Each of these factors owed something to the broader changes in market conditions, the structure of the economy, and the division of labour within the mode of production.² Previous methods of production were found to use time as well as labour inadequately, and there appears to have been a general move towards new means of remunerating labour as much as new ways of dividing work tasks.³ In this sense, management theories were merely explicating and logically extending the everyday practices of the more astute employers.⁴

Whilst recognising the formative influences upon the growth of management thought, it is necessary to distinguish between management theory, management 'ideology', and managerial practice in these decades. Even more importantly, it is essential to emphasise the limitations on managerial growth and on managerial theory in this period, with a minority of employers affected by formal division of ownership and control and even fewer influenced by the writings of theorists.⁵ Although there was a growing interest in managerial methods, encouraged by the economic conditions of the time, it would be inaccurate to suggest that many employers articulated their attitudes and activities in any ordered way.

Those writers who did publish literature on management were obviously untypical, and frequently not involved in

1. L. Urwick and E.F.L. Brech, The Making of Scientific Management Vol. II British Management Trust (1945) London p170, see the rise of scientific management as 'the logical outcome of the machine economy'.
2. The Committee of Industry and Trade, Survey of Industrial Relations HMSO (1926) p61-2, for figures on changing structure of the economy 1881-1921.
3. David F. Schloss, Methods of Industrial Remuneration Williams and Northgate (1898) London p67.
4. Jenks, loc. cit. p423: 'The suggestion..that the protean manifestations of the management movement sprang full-grown from the brain of Frederick W. Taylor...is quite unwarranted...the ground had already been well prepared by 1910..'; C.f. Urwick and Brech, Vol. I op. cit. p169.
5. John Child, British Management Thought George Allen & Unwin (1969) London p35, '...any idea of comprehensively managing the worker had captured the attention of but a few and very exceptional employers in the years to 1914.'

industrial production at all. When the contributors were engaged in some practical activity, their strong commitment to a particular cause makes their work a problematic guide to contemporary developments and innovations.¹ By relying upon their testimony, even though important employers are included in their number, we are given a very distorted picture of progress in industry and management.

What is required, therefore, is a critical insight into the actual innovations of the period, together with an examination of both management pioneers and management literature in the context of very general changes. It is not suggested that the majority of businessmen looked much beyond their balance sheets and production or wages data, but the very compilation of such accounts marked an advance in business techniques and it was through the pressures of business life that many came to recognise the implications of management policies.²

Employers and the development of management theories.

Whilst the genesis of modern management can be traced back to the early days of the industrial revolution,³ the four decades after 1880 saw the extension of management organisation and increasing claims for a 'scientific' approach to management.⁴ Many writers were anxious to apply the findings of physiology, psychology and sociology to the practice of management, although there were divisions on the value of such 'experiments' from the outset.⁵

The three most important strands in the management movement, were probably; the scientific study of human labour and methods devised for increasing output; the formulation of new principles of production organisation and the 'science' of industrial administration; and the introduction of fresh

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1. Josephine Goldmark, Fatigue and Efficiency Russell Sage (1912) New York p94, for example: 'The responsibilities assumed by scientific management involve a new conception of every business. It replaces empiricism by predetermination of results; the haphazard of the mechanic by the engineer's application of scientific laws'.
 2. Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 Univ. of Chicago Press (1976) p4, for similar statement.

perspectives on the psychological needs of the individual and of working groups in industry.

The work of Frederick W. Taylor and his 'scientific management' disciples, should clearly be seen as the culmination rather than the origins of a new departure in management thinking.¹ There had been important studies by Cadbury and others of worker behaviour and performance, long before Taylorism became common currency.² Key aspects of Taylorism, such as functional foremanship, had been under review in American and British journals since the 1880s, and attracted the attention of technical progressives like Rowan and Weir.³

A major theme in the refinement of managerial theory had been the focus upon efficient deployment and utilisation of resources, which eventually expanded into the science of industrial administration under Lee and others.⁴ This school borrowed from sociology as well as psychology, though its main emphasis was upon efficient bureaucratic administration of enterprises in a supposedly neutral manner.⁵ With the Institute of Industrial Administration founded in 1922, the practice as well as the theory of the functional organisation was advanced considerably.⁶

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3. Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management: A Study in the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain Penguin (1968) London; Baron F. Duckham, 'The Emergence of the Professional Manager in the Scottish Coal Industry, 1760-1815' Business History Review XLIII No.1 (1969), etc.
 4. Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management Harper (1947) New Jersey p36, and passim.
 5. Edward Cadbury, 'Some Principles of Industrial Organisation: The Case For and Against Scientific Management' Sociological Review VII No.2 (1914) p105.
 1. Urwick and Brech Vol. II, op. cit. p168, argue that 'it is impossible to understand the significance of the other pioneers or the subsequent development of management thought if Taylor is regarded as an isolated inventor.'
 2. Edward Cadbury, Experiments in Industrial Organization Longmans, Green (1912) London p74-5, for data collected at Cadburys on productivity, performance and discipline.
 3. Jenks, loc. cit. p426-9.
 4. Child, op. cit. p60, 83.
 5. See Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy Free Press (1964) New York Chapters IX-X for modern critique.

The third major strand owed much to the development of social psychology, as well as the practical experience of operating production under the rigid stringencies of 'scientific' management. Even physiologists quickly recognised the damaging affects of Taylorism on morale and discipline in the labour process, and the need for a subtler approach.¹ The significance of the 'human factor' in industry was being appreciated from the 1880s, and by the outbreak of War there were many contrasting its benefits with the potential dangers of scientific management.² By 1920 the considerations of human needs were being absorbed into new studies of 'labour administration' and enlightened management.³

What is apparent from all of this literature is the concern with the dual problems of accumulation and legitimation. On the one hand, the theorists were anxious to improve productivity by intensive control of the labour process and by rigorous supervision of each department.⁴ It was clear that such methods, even where they were practicable, tended to exacerbate labour tensions and to provoke resistance to increased appropriation.⁵ The problem of control and supervision had been occupying management thinkers since the 1880s, influenced partly by the military experiences of contemporary warfare, but there were clear limits on the regimentation of workers which were becoming increasingly organised.⁶ The problem

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6. David Silverman, The Theory of Organizations Heinemann (1970) London, for a critique of whole sociological tradition of organisations - especially p85.
 1. F.S. Lee, The Human Machine and Industrial Efficiency Longmans, Green (1919) p95, for serious critique of Taylorism.
 2. Jenks, loc. cit. p437, comments that a 'surprising number of engineers saw both managers and men not only as instruments of production but also as human beings with...unfulfilled needs.'; Cadbury, loc. cit. p105; G.D.H. Cole, 'Scientific Management' Sociological Review VII No.2 (1914) p119, compared Taylorism with the eugenics movement.
 3. Lee K. Frankel and Alexander Fleisher, The Human Factor in Industry Mcamillan (1920) New York p326-7.
 4. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital Monthly Review Press (1974) New York p90, for recent analysis of Taylorism.
 5. J.A. Hobson, 'Scientific Management' Sociological Review VI No.3 (July 1913) p198-9, and passim.

control became the more complex problem of legitimation and rule through the partial consensus of an organised and articulate workforce.¹ Only by combining militaristic leadership with a human understanding of capacities and needs, could the manager achieve the levels of output required by the employers.²

Employers and the literature of industrial welfare.

It would be an exaggeration to say that a coherent theory of industrial welfare had emerged in management literature by the First World War. Studies of industrial welfare were usually set in terms of the growing appreciation of the 'living capital' and 'human factor' element in business.³ Indeed, the concept of 'welfare work' dates only from the end of the 19th century, and was defined in a number of different ways.⁴

One of the major difficulties with the 'theory' of industrial welfare, is the changing usage of terms and the attempts of numerous writers to give welfare services a respectable historical pedigree - which usually involved rewriting the history of company provisions.⁵ Amongst the supposed 'pioneers' of the newly discovered 'movement', were employers as different as Robert Owen and Thomas Brassey.⁶ Writers were anxious to point out the philanthropic concerns of such visionaries, and the importance of a paternalistic concern for their employees long before the public and state became aware of their responsibilities to the working man.⁷

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6. Jenks, loc. cit. p443, for influence of Emerson's militaristic writings on early management thought.
 1. Child, op. cit. p83-4, for discussion of leadership and legitimation problems. Child writes that, the 'development of the "science of industrial administration" had a further legitimatory function for the acceptance and maintenance of managerial authority'; Braverman, op. cit. p113-19, for control.
 2. Sidney Webb, The Works Manager To-day Longmans, Green (1917) London p103-4: '..just as it is the business of the company officers of an army, not only to follow the general directions of the general, but also to raise to the highest point the achievement of their men, so it is a supremely important function of the manager...to develop the utmost productive efficiency of his staff...The future progress of the professional manager...to the scientific industrial administrator, is, indeed, bound up with this progressive development of technique - managerial technique, not mechanical.'

The literature on industrial welfare, like that upon modern management, was heavily coloured by the position and the commitments of the various writers therefore.¹ The latter divide into four major groups: there were the advocates and propagandists of management, who saw industrial welfare as a useful balance to the 'scientific' school; there were the professional welfare workers and industrial administrators who had a professional as well as intellectual commitment to the spread of welfarism; there were the officials and experts of central government, particularly after 1914, who were willing to advocate welfare as a means of improving efficiency and tempering industrial militancy; and finally, there were the writings of leading employers - such as Cadbury, Rowntree, Lever, amongst others - supporting industrial welfare as

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3. J. Shield Nicholson, Strikes and Social Problems Black (1896) London p108, for discussion of 'Living Capital'; Cadbury, op. cit. pxvii; George Edson Toogood, The Principles of Industrial Administration Brown (1917) London p19: 'The time..is coming when the industrial administrator, whether as statesman, employer, labour leader, or manager, will have to be more closely acquainted with the scientific aspects of his work, especially as regards the human factor.'
 4. E. Dorothea Proud, Welfare Work George Bell (1916) London p170, for a definition of main aspects of welfare work.
 5. E.T. Kelly and M.L. Haskins, 'Foundations of Industrial Welfare' Economica Vol.I No.2 (1922) p121, for an example.
 6. Frankel and Fleisher, op. cit. p8-12. Robert Owen is depicted as the 'Father of Labor Administration'; C.f. Urwick and Brech, op. cit. Vol. I, for thirteen pioneers.
 7. Kelly and Haskins, loc. cit. p119: 'Welfare Work had its origin in the minds of a few philanthropic employers...Like other movements, which have at length become more or less permanent institutions of society, it has developed in a piecemeal fashion, beginning in these tentative efforts on the part of individual employers and working its way toward a larger ideal.' - a typical idealist inversion of development.
 1. Child, op. cit., is probably the best survey of management thought although Urwick and Brech is also indispensable; Jenks, loc. cit. p437, commented of the development of the 'human factor' movement and social psychology, that: 'No discipline seemed to be available to further a scientific approach to "the human factor", and at this point engineers [i.e. industrial organisation experts] generally appealed to elements of the universalistic ethic...'

an 'enlightened' approach to efficient management and improved productivity.

Each of these contributors had their own image of the new harmony to be derived from welfare, but three themes are common to much of the literature. The first was that welfare should yield tangible returns to employers, management and labour.¹ The second, and this was stressed particularly by the literate employers, was that welfare must be linked to good working conditions, high wages and reasonably short hours.² The third, was that welfare should be more of a co-operative venture than an exercise in paternalistic domination by the employer - this being stressed particularly in the decade of militancy from 1911 to 1921.³

In this sense, the welfare movement was not insulated from but was rather a part of, the broader shifts within industry towards greater utilisation of labour and more professional management control of labour.⁴ Just as the more astute employers and managers were concerned with the key problems of supervision, selection of workers, organisation of production, and legitimation of authority, so those involved with welfare increasingly saw their facilities as meeting this principal needs.⁵ The basic requirements of labour supply, efficiency and discipline, were presented in a variety of permutations, but it seems clear that the

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1. Ministry of Reconstruction, Scientific Business Management HMSO (1919) p1: 'The prosperity of an industry and of every man concerned in it is intimately bound up with the efficiency of management...the welfare of the worker is not only a vital matter for the community, but also from the point of view of the employer a matter of expediency.'
 2. Proud, op. cit. p138; Cadbury, op. cit. p264: 'Welfare work must be regarded as something outside the general organization of the factory, but as a vital part of factory organization, and it should be shared by all...'
 3. Mary M. Niven, 'The Beginnings of the Institute' Journal of the Institute of Personnel Management Vol.29 (March 1957) p32; Cadbury, loc. cit. p106; Kelly and Haskins, loc. cit. p130-31.
 4. C.f. Child, op. cit. p48, 50, 80, where Child suggests that the moves to participation were distinct from welfare and from management leadership.
 5. Proud, op. cit. p83: 'The selection of workers according to the work they are able to do is carried out most systematically by

these were the overriding concerns of the 'human factor' and welfarist literature.¹

Such writers usually posed the problem of labour efficiency and control in technical and moral or humanistic terms, which covered the need for 'responsible autonomy' as well as the direct supervision.² In fact, most employers and experts recognised the dangers of a suffocating paternalism, as well as the advantages of positive identification with the firm.³ Besides criticising the disadvantages of paternalism at the York conferences,⁴ the welfare experts recognised that both scientific management and excessive welfare supervision could lead to considerable expense. Dorothea Proud wrote that:⁵

To be able to dispense with supervision altogether is a veritable triumph, and it augurs well for the discipline of a factory and the quality of work done therein. The expense of watching workers at their work is an important item in the cost of production; some seek to eliminate it by making fear the taskmaster - fear of..starvation. But fear saps the strength of the workers, and defeats the ends it was meant to promote.

Proud went on to point out that those employers fostering recreation programmes, were intending to 'eliminate the expense of watching

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5. 'certain employers who have a more or less complete command of the local labour market...All employers adopt some sort of rough physical standard...but this is amplified and made more or less scientific..'
 1. Hugo Munsterberg, Psychology and Industrial Efficiency Constable (1913) London p17; Braverman, op. cit. p143, for a discussion.
 2. Andy Friedman, 'Responsible Autonomy Versus Direct Control Over the Labour Process' Capital and Class Vol.1 No.1 (1976) p48, for an analysis in terms of modern car industry.
 3. Cadbury, loc. cit. p107: 'It is not merely a question of preventing the workmen breaking the rules and regulations, but of inducing them to take a positive interest in the welfare of the business, and making them feel that their work and personality count..'; Kelly and Haskins, loc. cit. p122, on difference between 'superficial' and 'fundamental' conceptions of welfare.
 4. M.M. Niven, Personnel Management 1913-63 Institute of Personnel Management (1967) London p33, for account of 1913 Conference, where: 'The second problem [discussed] was that of the "danger of sapping the independence and initiative of the employees by too paternal methods of betterment"..'.
 5. Proud, op. cit. p188.

by strengthening the characters of the workers'. This view clearly fitted in with current values of artisan independence as well as being good economics.¹

Thus, the literature of industrial welfare indicates the degree to which those writing were influenced by contemporary cultural and ideological values as well as the experiences of costs and organisation in industry. This was particularly true of those employers who contributed to the debate on efficient management, and who recognised the cost-benefit analysis required before welfare schemes could be counted a success. Although the growth of natural and social sciences provided new avenues for the appropriation of nature and of labour, there were serious difficulties in applying this uncritically to questions of labour supervision and control. Finally, it is clear that these contributors and outstanding employers were (by definition) untypical of the broad mass of business men, and that their ideologies were moulded by a wide variety of factors.

Employers and the ideology of industrial welfare.

It is unlikely that many employers had read, still less agreed with, the theories propounded by wealthy magnates such as Lever, Rowntree and Cadbury.² Their resources did not permit or justify the precise calculations of labour turnover, costs of supervision, organisational efficiency and general productivity, which the largest firms were attempting. Nor could they afford the time and effort involved in publicising those schemes they might introduce - if only because it reduced

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1. See Child, op. cit. p36, for leading employers. It is interesting that Mather & Platt, who had been the technological progressives of 1851-2, should have 'in 1893 conducted a pioneer experiment into fatigue and hours of work'.
 2. N.P. Gilman, A Dividend to Labor: A Study of Employers' Welfare Institutions Houghton (1899) Boston p2; 'The employer of labor at the present time might complain that he is much exposed to philanthropists....When he is reminded of the millionaires in his own industry who have erected hospitals, free libraries, or model villages, he can allege truly that...he has not yet received a due compensation for his arduous labor of superintendence.'; David Brody, 'The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism' in John Braeman, et al. (ed.), Change and Continuity in Twentieth Century America Ohio State University Press (1968) Akron p161; 'Welfare capitalism...was...a minority phenomenon, limited to the large prosperous firms'.

their competitive position and gave their rivals a considerable advantage in costs.¹

Yet it would be a serious distortion of history to suggest that the majority of employers did not experience and contribute to the development of the dominant ideology in Britain.² Ideology was never uniform, largely because of the overlap of aristocratic and bourgeois domination,³ and was never simply in the domain of a mature intelligentsia.⁴ Indeed, ideology never could reflect interests in a simple way or project the values and beliefs of any one social grouping.⁵ Even where 'deference' operated, it was the product rather than the cause of social stability and can never be seen as a process simply of domination.⁶

In this sense, it is artificial to isolate a 'welfare' ideology, or even a 'managerial' ideology, from the broad streams of intellectual and cultural development which were flowing in Victorian Britain. To those influences of political economy, religion, natural sciences, and liberalism, can be added those of gentility, respectability, professionalism, and the whole gamut of beliefs and prejudices which ran from monarchism to chauvinism and from Disraeli to Smiles.⁷ Employers were influenced by their background and beliefs as well as their balance sheets and management problems, and their experiences and practices contributed to the literature of heroic industrial

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1. Proud, op. cit. p138, for problems facing the 'high wage' employers in Britain; Child, op. cit. p35, on limits of welfarism.
 2. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology p64-5, for ideas of the ruling class, but C.f. distinction of ideologists.
 3. Karl Marx, New York Daily Tribune 21.8.1852 in T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy Penguin (1974) Harmondsworth: 'It is evident what a distastefully heterogeneous mixture the character of the British Whigs must turn out to be: Feudalists, who are at the same time Malthusians, moneylenders with feudal prejudices, aristocrats without point of honour, Bourgeois without industrial activity...progressists with fanatical Conservatism..'
 4. Tom Nairn, 'The English Working Class' in Robin Blackburn, op. cit. p192-4; E.P. Thompson, loc. cit. (1965) p312-3, for a critique.
 5. R.Q. Gray, 'Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain' in Jon Blomfield (ed.) Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party Lawrence & Wishart (1977) London p83: 'Ideology is the "lived relation between men and their world", and in a differentiated social

exploits besides filling the growing number of trade papers and newspaper supplements.¹

Employers may have certain general interests in common, but they certainly did not share the same beliefs on many questions, and these divisions appear in their welfare philosophies. Whilst it is essential to escape from the toils of entrepreneurial isolation in examining these ideals,² it is also necessary to illustrate the substantial differences on the welfare question.

From the practices and the literature of industrial welfare, it is possible to identify three broad currents in the ideology of welfare. These are the attitudes and beliefs of those employers actually engaging in industrial welfare of some kind, as opposed to (probably the majority) those firms who did not. The distinctions imply a conscious philosophy, or at least notion, of industrial welfare which many employers providing services perhaps did not possess.³ Moreover, it is unlikely that these currents were so distinct that no convergence took place, or that any employers constituted an 'ideal type' of welfarist who epitomised the beliefs of a large following. Rather, these streams can be seen as general tendencies within the welfare movement which distinguished different conceptions of welfare

5. 'formation can never be uniform.'
6. See Howard Newby, 'The Deferential Dialectic' Comparative Studies in Society and History 17 (1975) p145-6, for searching criticism of whole use of term 'deference' and its historical origins; Gramsci, Prison Notebooks p12, for distinction of 'direction' and 'domination' in hegemony and ideology.
7. Daniel Duman, 'The Creation and Diffusion of a Professional Ideology in Nineteenth Century England' Sociological Review Vol. 27 No.1 (1979), for discussion of 'gentleman' ethic in professions and critique of Perkin; Geoffrey Crossick, 'The Labour Aristocracy and its Values' Victorian Studies 19 (1976) p306-9, for similar ambiguities of the problem of 'respectability'.
1. Benjamin Browne, most of whose publications were actually in trade journals and supplements, stated in 1898: "I feel I must speak to you on the subject I have been compelled to devote so much of my time of late years, namely the human element in our works... the relationship between the employer and the workman.." in Browne, op. cit. p60.
2. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia Kegan Paul, Trench & Trubner London (1948) p81: 'If we confine our observations to the mental processes which take place in the individual and regard him as the only possible bearer of ideologies, we shall never grasp in

and the role it might play in industrial and social relations. These visions were influenced not only by the growth of natural sciences, and other changes in a largely Liberal ideology, but by the continuing force of tradition and conservatism.¹

The changes taking place in the activities of the state during these years, from nightwatchman to the 'ethical' or caring state, and the interventionist state,² had a profound impact on both intellectuals and employers alike.³ It was this which was described alternatively as the 'new Liberalism' and the 'new Toryism' of social policy.⁴ The powerful tides of political economy, religion, liberalism and the natural sciences changed course in the late 19th century, as the growth of state intervention brought new commitments and alignments.⁵

Employers assumed a variety of positions vis a vis state policies, which were not necessarily consistent (in strict philosophical terms) with their personal welfare activities. Some of the most committed welfarists were opposed to a large degree of state involvement, whilst others with few overheads welcomed state responsibility.⁶ Many saw the government agencies as providing a minimum provision or safety net, whilst the employers might go well above this.

With these qualifications in mind, it is possible to discern three distinct alignments in the welfare movement, embracing the beliefs of traditionalism, rationalism and radicalism in management.⁷ These were more themes in the

2. 'in its totality the structure of the intellectual world belonging to a group in a given historical situation.'
3. Kelly and Haskins, loc. cit. p119, 'many examples of welfare work carried on under other names, and even disclaiming the title, are to be found.'
1. Mannheim, op. cit. p84: '..those strata which represent the prevailing social and intellectual order will experience as reality that structure of relationships of which they are the bearers...'
2. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks p261-2.
3. J.R. Rodman, 'Introduction' to T.H. Green, Political Theory Appleton-Century-Crofts (1964) New York p1: 'As a reformer of practical Liberal thinking, Green laid out one of the main lines of development from the upper-class "Nightwatchman State" of the mid-19th century..'

progress of industrial welfare and welfare thought, rather than as separate entities and they refer to a conception of welfare administration as much as welfare provision.

The traditionalist approach to welfare is often characterised as 'paternalistic' or benevolent management,¹ although it really concerns a specific conception of authority in the firm.² Paternalism can itself be defined as a stable system of authority based on respect for traditional duties and responsibilities.³ Generally, this vision of welfare saw the services as only one part of the firm's social responsibilities to its workforce, emphasising a unitary vision of relations and an organic approach to management.⁴ The traditionalist employer was often an autocratic leader of a family firm, which frequently excluded the possibility of an independent union and where the discretionary provision of services underlined the personal bonds of the employer and his workmen. There was an explicit attempt to present the relations

4. Herbert Spencer, The Man versus The State Williams & Northgate (1886) London p16: 'Standing as it does for coercion by the State versus the freedom of the individual, Toryism remains Toryism...whether the Tory has egotistical or altruistic motives for using State power to restrict the liberty of the citizen.'; C.f. T.H. Green, 'Political Obligation' in Rodman (ed.), op. cit. p105.
5. Neil Seldon, 'Laissez Faire as Dogma: The Liberty and Property Defence League, 1882-1914' in K.D. Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History Macmillan (1974) London p232: 'The league's world view was an amalgam of laissez faire economic ideas, the philosophic views of positivism, and the Whig political fear of democracy. Its brand of Spencerian positivism served as an ideology which extolled the industrial technocrat...As an ethical system it harmonised the doctrines of evolution..science, liberty, efficiency and progress.'
6. S.E. Koss, Radical Plutocrat: A Life of Sir John Brunner C.U.P. (1970) p38: 'The employer, as Brunner saw him, was the custodian of moral and material well-being among his men, and by far the most effective instrument in the community for social betterment. For this reason he opposed parliamentary legislation..'
7. These terms are used in a neutral sense, as defined below.
1. V.H. Vroom and E.L. Deci, (ed.), Management and Motivation Penguin (1970) Harmondsworth p11-13, for discussion of the paternalistic, scientific management, and participatory approaches to management.
2. Newby, loc. cit. p146: 'specifically deference is the form of social interaction which occurs in situations involving the exercise of traditional authority.'

of production as moral bonds under a paternal administration.¹

The second conception of business welfare can also be attributed to a broad philosophy of management, namely the rational approach.² Rationalists were those employers concerned with introducing scientific, bureaucratic and administrative principles into business operations, and with devising systems of incentives, selection and promotion to enhance efficiency and preserve authority. Here the main purpose of welfare can be seen as promoting the growth of the enterprise and being linked to individual rewards or the general wellbeing of the labour force. Unlike the paternalists, the rational employers were often willing to recognise autonomous societies and unions, and were wary of suffocating their independence by doing too much.³

The third type of welfarism can be described as radical, despite the similar difficulties in providing a precise

3. Howard Newby, 'Paternalism and Capitalism: A Re-examination of the Size Effect' in Richard Scase (ed.), Class, Cleavage and Control: Studies in Industrial Society Allen & Unwin (1977) London p63-4: 'In English society the customary term for traditional authority has been "paternalism", encompassing the various types of traditional authority...paternalism has been the idiom in which has been expressed the processes of legitimation by tradition of the hierarchical nature of English society.'; Peter Searby, 'Paternalism, Disturbance and Parliamentary Reform, 1819-1832' International Review of Social History XXII pt.2 (1977) p198-223, for discussion.
4. See Alan Fox, 'Managerial ideology and labour relations' British Journal of Industrial Relations 4 (1966) p369, for discussion; Browne, op. cit. p68.
1. Geoff Norris, 'Industrial Paternalist Capitalism and Local Labour Markets' Sociology (1978) p4 (draft): 'Paternalist forms of social organisation in Britain are those in which economic and political power is stabilised through the legitimating ideology of traditionalism.'
2. C.f. Vroom and Deci, op. cit. p13, on Taylorist motivation for people in organizations.
3. Child, op. cit. p37, for discussion of paternalism and welfare; Gilman, op. cit. p362, for critique of 'extreme paternalism' and recognition of doing too much.

definition of an ambiguous term.¹ The radical employer was much more concerned with the participation of the employees in his schemes, perceiving the need to achieve legitimacy by sharing a degree of control and accepting the claims of the workforce to administering their welfare projects. This was in keeping with the broader moves towards greater participation in management, although it was shared by very few employers before 1914.² Welfare became a means of exchanging views, particularly in the era of works committees, and an important channel of communication to management.

It is important to stress that these distinctions do not apply to the content of welfare services, as much as the conditions of administration.³ They present the employers' vision of these conditions rather than any objective description of power relations, and they cannot be associated with any one political philosophy or religious creed.⁴ Religion might be a formative influence upon labour management, but it rarely dictated the overall business policies and capitalist investment. Welfare might supplement enterprise, but it could not replace it as the main purpose of the firm any more than ideology could replace class interest as the major material force in welfare development.⁵

Each of these three schools of thought had their followers amongst the welfare employers, although it is possible to trace a shift within the welfare movement from the more

1. H.V. Emy, Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892-1914. C.U.P. (1973) p47, for difficulty of definition in political context.
2. Vroom and Deci, op. cit. p15-17, for discussion of 'management by objectives' in a modern context.
3. Gilman, op. cit. p64: 'Paternalism, in any rightfully objectionable sense of the word, has more reference to some of the methods of administering an insurance or pension fund...than to such a fund itself.'
4. John Child, 'Quaker Employers and Industrial Relations' Sociological Review 12 (1964) p300, on the picture of 'the Quaker employer near the turn of the century is that of a benevolent paternalistic control..'; A.J. Robertson, 'Robert Owen, Cotton Spinner: New Lanark 1800-1825' in S. Pollard and J. Salt (ed.), Robert Owen - Prophet of the Poor Macmillan (1964) p150: 'It would be wrong to regard New Lanark under

authoritarian and traditionalist schemes and visions, to a more liberal participatory ideology reaching a climax in the years 1911-1919.¹ As suggested in earlier chapters, welfare projects depended on a wide range of economic and social factors, although there were broader movements of organisation that affected capital and labour. The shift in emphasis between ideas and approaches must be seen in the same light.

The traditionalist employers included in their ranks such employers as Beardmores and Dixons,² with their insistence upon personal loyalties and managerial authority unhampered by union organisation. They were unusual to the extent that 'paternalism' was almost impossible in such well-organised trades as engineering and shipbuilding or coalmining.³ Such policies were more common in the less organised trades such as those where females predominated or where depressed conditions weakened the hold of unions. One of the great paradoxes of the traditionalist employer lay in the large scale of firms able to provide services, along with the emphasis upon personal contact and duty.⁴

4. 'Owen...as anything but a sternly paternalistic foundation... the "social welfare" aspect of Owen's labour management policy does not, in practice appear to have differed a great deal from the practices adopted by the owners..of some other establishments'; Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 Penguin (1965) London p43, also; Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management Penguin (1968) London p237, etc., etc. All show different links between beliefs and 'paternalism'.
5. Asa Briggs, Social Thought and Social Action: A Study of the Work of Seebohm Rowntree Longmans, Green (1961) London p225: 'Within the business structure Rowntree was a shrewd businessman who made strategic decisions...he could not shirk responsibilities.'; Stephen Yeo, Religion and Voluntary Organisation in Crisis Croom Helm (1976) London p90, refers to 'the long hours and the intermittently ruthless and always paternal industrial relations' at Huntley and Palmers in Reading.
1. Child, op. cit. p34-6, 48; Niven, op. cit. p33.
2. See Chapters 4-5, and Chapter 7 on Community.
3. Gilman, op. cit. p177: notes that in 'the labor world of England he finds a different sentiment from that prevailing in France or Germany. "Paternalism", or anything that savours of paternalism is far less agreeable to the English workman than to the French or German operative.'
4. D.H. Lawrence, Women in Love Penguin (1975) p173, description

Amongst the best examples of traditionalist employers are some of the coalowning firms of Yorkshire, with their rural settings and isolated existence - frequently continuing the customs of landed society.¹ Colliery owners such as Earl Fitzwilliam eschewed the new coal associations, combining a strong anti-union policy with a belief 'that owners and men were welded together by mutual interest in the well-being of the colliery'.² In an age of growing unionism, such figures were to become the economic dinosaurs of a ruthlessly competitive industry.³

The Briggs experiment in West Yorkshire was in part a response to the failure of attempts to crush the miners' unions, which had involved eviction of colliers from company housing.⁴ In response to the bitter industrial warfare of 1855-1865, Henry Briggs proposed the scheme of profit sharing described in Chapter Five.⁵ Although the scheme can be regarded as progressive in its general principle of sharing dividends, in its exclusion of unionism and emphasis upon moral duty, it was profoundly authoritarian. Such provisions

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4. of Thomas Crich: 'Every year Mr. Crich gave a more or less public water party on the lake...it pleased the father, as being the only occasion when he could gather some of the people of the district together...with him. For he loved to give pleasure to his dependants..'
1. John Evison, 'Conditions of Labour in Yorkshire Coalmines, 1870-1914' B.A. Dissert. (1963) Birmingham University, p59; D.H. Lawrence, op. cit. p241-2, on Crichton's concern for 'the welfare of the people. He was a large employer of labour, he was a great mine owner.'; C.f. S.G. Checkland, 'Cultural Factors and British Business Men, 1815-1914' in K. Nakagawa (ed.), Social Order and the Entrepreneur University of Tokyo Press (1977) p68: 'The idealistic business man did not want a relationship with his workers similar to the old paternalism of the countryside.'
2. Evison, op. cit. p68-70.
3. ibid. p16-17.
4. R.A. Church, 'Profit Sharing and Labour Relations in the 19th Century' International Review of Social History XVI (1971) p4.
5. Sedley Taylor, Profit Sharing Between Capital and Labour Kegan Paul, Trench (1884) London p135-6: 'Participation was introduced at Whitwood as a remedy for trade conflicts of extraordinary duration...Evidence of the hatred and distrust felt by the colliers towards their employer during this period is preserved to us in the words...of a miner examined by the Royal Commission.'

attempted not only to supplant trade unions, but to 'restore' traditional loyalties and bonds which had never really existed at Whitwood. There was therefore a strong emphasis upon personal Christian duty amongst the early co-partnership movement, or as Judge Thomas Hughes wrote to Archibald and Henry Curren Briggs in 1870:¹

"Devote yourselves to it on a large scale - no man in these days can devote himself to a more needed or a more Christian work - I have always looked on you two since our first meet/ing/ in 1865 as the Peter and Paul of the New Gospel, of which I have been a kind of demi-John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness without converts though with more clothing than he of Jordan.

....I have had two grand fights about Whitwood, with Lord Granville and Moffatt - both large colliery owners. They said...we hadn't done as well as we pretended."

Despite the collapse of the profit-sharing scheme in 1874, the efforts of the Briggs family in the local communities indicate another element of the traditionalist ideology.² For it is a key feature of traditionalism that the employer should recognise the social responsibilities which he has to his employees, beyond the mere contractual obligation of wages.³

There is some difficulty in identifying classical traditionalists by these years, since more and more of the larger firms were coming to terms with organised labour and the new market conditions of the Great Depression. One firm which was firmly authoritarian in labour policy, whilst being economically progressive was T. Cooke Taylor of

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1. The Briggs Collection: MS 3 (Letters and Correspondence), Letter of Thomas Hughes to Archibald and Henry Curren Briggs: 27.1.1870
 2. D.H. Curren Briggs, The Record of a Yorkshire Family, MS 22 in Briggs Collection (1971) Leeds p7. Copy of a letter from workmen to Mrs. Henry Curren Briggs on death of her husband in 1882: "As a friend we can all testify to his unwearied care for our moral and intellectual welfare: monuments whether as schools, reading rooms or other kindred institutions being everywhere in our midst."; See Chapter 7 above for a full discussion of community welfare.
 3. C.f. Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology: An Enquiry into certain Aspects of Modern Business Ideology George Allen & Unwin (1969) London p166-67, for distinction of laissez faire, enlightened interest, and social responsibility themes in modern ideology: 'Both the Long-Term-Company-Interest and the Social Responsibility sets...emphasize that the businessman must be directly concerned with the social consequences of his actions.'

Batley, near the West Riding town of Huddersfield. They were also profit-sharers but like many other architects of sharing and partership schemes,¹ the firm linked distribution of profits with concentration of power.²

Given the structure of authority within the enterprise, it is not surprising that whilst the firm and its profits grew from under £1,000 in 1898 to almost £300,000 by 1920, the directors ensured that as little as possible should go to their working shareholders and bonus recipients.³

Whilst the firm made super War-profits, its largely unorganised workers saw their wages lagging behind and increases paid in War Loans rather than weekly pay. However, the amounts paid into the Workers' Benefit and Sick Fund did increase from £2,500 to £14,000 in the decade after 1903, perhaps another indication of 'deferred wages' presented as philanthropy. The moral dimension of welfare, not necessarily associated with religious conviction, was very evident in the Cooke Taylor case and others.⁴

Those manufacturers who can be identified as primarily 'rationalist' in their approach to welfare, tended to favour efficient management administration and more bureaucratic organisation than the traditionalists. Here welfare facilities were envisaged as an aid to functional administration, particularly efficiency and morale.⁵

Whilst religion was often a strong element in the pursuit of an industrial order, it was usually the religion of Dissent amongst the progressive manufacturers which recognised the free expression of the workforce.⁶

1. Edward Bristow, 'Profit Sharing and Co-Partnership Schemes..' in K.D. Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History Macmillan (1974) London p268: 'While many, if not all, profit sharers did battle with the trade unions, most of the leading advocates of the reform were active anti-socialists and offered industrial participation as an alternative to spoilation.'
2. S. Pollard and J. Turner, 'Profit Sharing and Autocracy: T.C. Taylor and Co. of Batley' Business History XVIII (1976) p11.
3. ibid. p22-3, for profitability figures: 'There was one method of distributing the surplus, even under existing rules, which gave maximum benefit to the Taylor family and the top executives and minimum benefit to the workforce...This method was used to the hilt.' The method was fresh share issues.

Such employers saw no inconsistency between religious convictions and the pursuit of efficiency through welfare, any more than they saw between ethics and urban politics.¹ In many cases the Dissenters combined an opposition to tradition in business, with political and intellectual struggles against a traditionalist society.² The earliest examples of employers' activities in social politics were perhaps the Quaker brewers, and the Anglican Tory-Radicals, but by the mid-19th Century there were the 'new model' employers who supported high wages, good conditions, and the recognition of trade unions.³ Large business men like Samuel Morley were able to rationalise their concerns by welfare schemes, as well as welcoming the political civilisation of the artisans.⁴

Largely because of their religious and business connexions, the rationalist employers were frequently Liberals in their general outlook, although there were few ready to welcome the New Unionism of the 1890s.⁵ These employers favoured meritocratic promotion and professional management in most cases, but this was firmly rooted in a hierarchical division

4. ibid. p11: 'there was the human feeling of empathy with his workers, the other side, as it were, of the charity medal: the benefits derived by the recipient, as distinct from those derived by the donor'; Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State Macmillan (1973) London p17, for early Tory Radicals.
5. Proud, op. cit. p215: 'The employer's economic interest in his workmen as producers...has practically forced upon him the provision - directly or by subsidy - of technical education.'; Cadbury, op. cit. p267, on 'the wide field of experiment open to scientific and enlightened manufacturers..'
6. E.P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons Edward Arnold (1973) London p2; Asa Briggs, History of Birmingham: Volume II, Borough and City, 1865-1938 O.U.P. (1952) p1-2; Briggs, op. cit. (1961) p7, for letter of Claude Rowntree to young Seebohm.
1. W.P. Jolly, Lord Leverhulme: A Biography Constable (1976) London p33, comments that Cadburys were 'pioneers of industrial welfare, the first firm in Birmingham to introduce a half-day holiday on Saturday. There was a strong religious background to their business'.
2. Koss, op. cit. p36; Peter Fraser, 'The Liberal Unionist Alliance: Chamberlain, Hartington and the Conservatives, 1886-1904' Economic History Review (1962) p53, for Forster; Dennis Judd, Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain Hamish Hamilton (1977) London p22, for Chamberlain and industrial welfare.

of labour and authority which made for efficiency and social justice.¹

The best example of the rationalist employer amongst those surveyed is probably William Denny III, of Denny Bros. of Dumbarton. From the outset Denny was concerned with problems of labour management and efficiency, working himself until 10.p.m. and often arriving back before six in the morning - where he noticed 'the very irregular way in which a great number of our men come into work'.² Denny not only tightened up timekeeping, but also introduced piece rates for joiners after noting that 'the joiners humbug their work more than any men'.³ The firm also reduced the patronage of their foremen in fixing contracts at the yard, and generally extended management control.⁴

During his most creative period of the 1870s - 1880s, William Denny introduced three labour schemes which must be seen together. First, he tightened up the system of fines and penalties which the skilled workmen had to pay for breaches of discipline. Secondly, he introduced the Awards Scheme, which rewarded workmen for labour-saving innovations.⁵ Thirdly, he built up the Leven Shipyard

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3. Royden Harrison, Before the Socialists Routledge & Kegan Paul (1965) London p5, 37.
 4. E. Hodder, The Life of Samuel Morley Hodder & Stoughton (1887) London p187-8. Hodder observes that Morley 'not only lived abreast of the times, but in advance of them; his views were broad and liberal, and so it was that under his management the old order changed.' Hodder describes the pension scheme which was paid to old hands by Morley, and which helped the enterprise strengthen the labour force.
 5. Child, op. cit. p36-7; Joseph Melling, 'New Unionism and New Welfarism...' Business History, forthcoming.
 1. Child, loc. cit. (1964) p300. Child argues that the Quaker employer 'had a regard for industrial efficiency as a social duty'.
 2. Denny Collection, Private Jotting Books of William Denny: No.1 26.8.1869; noted 14.8.1869, that 'Rankine informed me today that there were grave suspicions of fellows climbing over walls into their work and also of stuff being handed out of the yard.'
 3. Private Jotting Books: No.2 24.2.1870.
 4. David F. Schloss, Methods of Industrial Remuneration Williams & Northgate (1898) London p161-2, for discussion of Dennys.

Accident Fund Society, which was originally 'projected by the workmen included all of them as members and is managed by a certain number of foremen selected by the firm with as many more workmen elected by the members'.¹ By contributing the fines to the Accident Fund, and ensuring that every invention of the men was rewarded, the firm ensured that the health, efficiency and discipline of the workforce was secured under mutually reinforcing schemes.²

Long before the management literature of the 1920s, Denny recognised the importance of personal leadership and direct contact with his men, declaring that:³

"It is an article of my social faith that education, culture, and talent are given to superior men in order that these superior men may be the bonds of union to Society, hasps of strong iron to band its elements together, and that such men should live and move in the midst of the masses...and keep in close and constant touch with them."

For this reason Denny objected to limited liability ventures staffed by impersonal management, favouring personal as well as administrative authority in enterprise. This remained true of labour policy at Dumbarton, although Denny later joined the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society and introduced a formal Welfare Supervisor in the years 1917-1919.⁴ That is to say, the vision of welfare remained one of an aid to good government in industry and a reward for trust and loyalty.⁵

There were also 'rationalist' employers amongst the supporters of scientific management, despite the distinctive

5. Leven Shipyard Awards Committee; Minute Book No.2 (1884-1893), Claim No. 191, for example.
1. A.B. Bruce, Life of William Denny Hodder & Stoughton (1889) London p90.
2. ibid. p84, Supt. Inspector of Factories Report (1881) quoted: "The purposes of all these rules are simple and few: to increase the efficiency of the yard and the men's interest in that efficiency; to raise the tone of the yard...to help in times of accident, and generally to promote kindly feelings between our men and ourselves." Denny had written thus to the Inspector.
3. ibid. quoted p247. Denny added that: "I am trying to teach my two boys that the prime meaning of honour is fulfilled social responsibility..".
4. Denny Dumbarton 1844-1932 Dennys Ltd. (1952) London p84; Denny Collection, Papers of Peter Denny: Letter 4.12.1923, for the appointment of Supervisor.

objectives of the two patterns of labour management.¹ Although many employers disliked Taylorism, and many Taylorists disliked welfarism,² there were increasing numbers ready to embrace both during the years up to 1920.³ Rationalism was able to absorb such currents since it was patently clear that the maximum control desired by the 'scientific' employers was not possible without the legitimating element of welfare.⁴

The third major welfare ideology can be characterised as radicalism, involving a vision of co-operative industrial relations as well as participatory management.⁵ Such views obviously change over time, from the period when Brassey wrote Co-operative Production to the point when Rowntree argued that employees should "have a share in determining matters which are of real consequence...".⁶ In other words, there was a general shift of opinion amongst employers towards great participation of workers and this affected the shape and administration of welfare as well as the pattern of industrial relations.⁷

Yet throughout the decades 1880-1920, there was a persistent theme of radicalism which envisaged participation in welfare as a step towards joint control of industry. Radical employers went beyond the rational view of industry, perceiving workers as autonomous individuals, and presented managerial power as dependant upon the active support of the workforce. The only qualification to the radical schemes, was the private ownership of property remained

5. The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Replies from Employers: Appendix XV, Archibald Denny p24: "We are proud to think that we have an exceptionally intelligent staff of workmen...they are sober and well-doing as a body...".
1. C.f. Daniel Nelson and Stuart Campbell, 'Taylorism Versus Welfare Work in American Industry' Business History Review 46 (1972) p4: 'Thus welfare work, like Taylorism, aimed at reducing costs and conflict by improving the workers' performance. Despite this similarity of objectives, there was no effort to combine the two movements before World War I.'
2. Checkland, loc. cit. p72, for reactions to professionalism.
3. Toogood, op. cit. p42; Proud, op. cit. p92.
4. Scientific Business Management p4, on the 'dual influence in successful control.'

sacrosanct and the legal disposition of this was unchanged.¹

Such a general description does little justice to the great complexities of individual radicals, or the different contexts in which they were operating.² Contrary to what some writers have suggested, the ideology of welfarism was not disseminated from the great minds of the movement but arose from the everyday experiences and activities of rank and file employers.³ It was here that ideology was most potent for it became the guiding principles for a wide range of schemes which fulfilled the material needs of the enterprise as well as the relations between employers and wider society.⁴ The letters, journals, speeches and articles of Benjamin Browne, Beardmore, William Denny, T.C. Taylor, and Henry Barran, suggest that the concept of the 'human factor' in business emerged from the industrial and cultural experiences of numerous business men.⁵

This is nowhere more evident than in the work of George Thomson of Huddersfield, who is almost unknown for his work in the industrial welfare movement.

5. Vroom and Deci, op. cit. p15-16: 'One of the basic elements of the different theories of participative management is the integration of the planning and the doing...A second common element is the reduction of the use of authority as a means of control..'
6. Thomas Brassey, 'Co-operative Production' Contemporary Review (July 1874); Child, loc. cit. p301, Seebohm Rowntree quoted.
7. Harvie Ramsay, 'Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and Historical Perspective' Sociology Vol.11 No.3 (Sept. 1977) p486-7, for background; Kelly and Haskins, loc. cit. p119: 'It must be realised that welfare work to-day is a very different thing from that of twenty years ago. It has grown and altered out of all recognition.'
1. Child, loc. cit. p301-2, for views of some Quakers that property rights be alienated also.
2. Lynne Lawner (Trans. ed.), Antonio Gramsci: Letters from Prison Jonathon Cape (1975) London p227, Letter 7.3.1932: 'As I said, in each individual and in various cultural strata, many extremely complex levels must be distinguished.'
3. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society Wiedenfeld and Nicolson (1969) London p46, quotes Raymond Aron as arguing that a study of employers showed they had "most often no political conceptions". An alternative to this 'end of ideology' view

George Thomson established his scheme of profit sharing and co-partnership at a time when most observers were sceptical of their practical success, in the aftermath of the Briggs project. The circumstances of the textile trade could hardly have been less propitious, with serious casualties amongst the smaller firms in woolen and worsted production,¹ and with worsening industrial troubles culminating in the great Huddersfield lock-out of 1883 and the Manningham struggle a decade later.² Indeed, the background of serious economic depression and the mounting industrial unrest seem to have convinced Thomson of the need for a new social order. He wrote in a draft speech:³

I have collected a vast number of influential opinions all concerning as that something must be done to avert a catastrophe to which the horrors of the French Rev/olution/ would pale. I need not give to him /details/ who know/s/ and feels the increasing difficulties which with advancing civilisation surround the rank and file of labour.

This vision of the 'great industrial war' searing British society never left Thomson, who frequently returned to the theme in his writings and public utterances.⁴

Thomson's firm was a small one, employing about 140 people in 1892 and only just over a hundred in 1909,⁵ although unlike his competitors Thomson refused to displace male by female

3. This one which stresses the seminal contributions of leading pioneers - the 'great man' view of welfare.
4. Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship Penguin (1971) London p336-7, wrote in her diary: 'Public opinion, whether social or political, observes the actions of a responsible employer in the open light of day. Willingly or unwillingly, he must interpose his brains and his capital between groups of workers on the one hand, and the great mass of conscienceless consumers on the other.'
5. Pollard and Turner, loc. cit. p11, where Taylor is quoted as saying, "We want to consider not only the machinery, but the human factor..".
1. E.M. Sigsworth and J.M. Blackman, 'The Woolen and Worsted Industries' in Derek H. Aldcroft (ed.), The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914 George Allen & Unwin (1968) London p131; See Chapter 5 above.
2. The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909 in Thomson Collection, MS TZ 7: "...the old established firm of W. Thomson and Sons Ltd...was transformed into a partnership in 1886, three years after the big lockout in that town..".
3. Rough notes in Thomson's handwriting in TZ 5.

weavers and he took the extraordinary step of abolishing piece rates and intensive supervision at Woodhouse Mills.¹ The head of the firm believed that the economic strategy resulted in improved productivity and better morale at the mills, coupled as it was with a policy of high wages and unemployment maintenance.²

Thomson's marketing and production policies displayed the same ingenuity, based as they were on specialisation in high-quality goods with stable markets and with a secure contract from the Co-operative Wholssalers.³ The skills of his weavers was one of Thomson's greatest assets in this respect,⁴ although he also pursued a vigorous programme of re-equipping and mechanising the plant.⁵

The welfare provisions and sharing arrangements at Woodhouse were both very impressive, constituting a model co-partnership which went far beyond the Whitwood scheme.⁶ Its architect conceived of welfare as one of the more elevated objectives of his project, writing that:⁷

At this rate of progress in the position of the Society [it] will soon be secure, and Mr. Thomson and his co-partners will then be able to devote their attention to the higher aspects of associative life - provision for sickness, old age, hard times, the establishment of educational facilities, and the adoption of other means for promoting the physical, moral, and intellectual improvement of the workers.

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4. Loose manuscript notes (unclassified) in Thomson Collection, Box 2: 'As we are in the midst of a great industrial war and on the eve of its extension into another branch, it may be interesting to recall the substance of Ruskin's reply to a request.. that he should write more to and for workmen and workwomen..'
 5. Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909; The Royal Commission on Labour, Group C, Textiles... Minutes of Evidence C.-6795, Q 7121-4 in George Thomson's evidence: 'Then the fact is that the industry itself is in the process of transition? - It is, and the small firms are being gradually dried up and the large ones taking their place.'
 1. Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909: "A few years after its establishment as a profit-sharing society, Mr. Thomson and his co-directors initiated a proposal the carrying out of which has made the workpeople more contented and happy at their work...They abolished all piece rates and put every man and woman on weekly rates. They have no overtime...There is no driving."
 2. C.-6795, Q 7152-3: 'What effect does this have upon your power of production? - I think our men weavers will do more than women.But do you think economically you are on the right side in

The basic provision made at Woodhouse was in the form of an insurance fund, introduced before 1886 and joined by an accident and sickness scheme in 1893 - as described in Thomson's Practical Industrial Partnership.¹

What is remarkable about Thomson's experiment, is the degree to which his social philosophy met the immediate needs of the enterprise, and the way in which the radical ideology of partnership masked the realities of economic power at the Huddersfield concern. Whilst it is clear that Woodhouse represented a much more thoroughgoing attempt at industrial co-operation than most ventures, it is equally

2. 'in pursuing the present policy of employing a large proportion of men instead of women? - Yes, I think we are.'; The Factory Times (1907) cutting in TZ 19, notes that Thomson paid his male weavers 24s a week and females 18s, the employer adding: 'But, of course we cannot go very much above the average in the district. If we did, I should not only get the employers against me, but the workers outside. Indeed, I have often been asked what right I have to pay the workers here better than they are paid elsewhere'.
3. The Birmingham Weekly Post 3.3.1888, in letter of Holyoake to George Thomson in TC 28. The Post stated that: "The old firm has an English and foreign repute for producing only honest work, its principle being excellence before cheapness."
4. The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909: "The concern, like other firms, has had to get machinery; since its commencement it has changed all its looms, and to keep abreast of the times has introduced all the most improved methods of cloth manufacture. This has meant expenditure of much capital, and although the machinery is of the latest stamp, it has been consistently depreciated from £8,655 to £1,680."
5. ibid.; C.f. William Morris to Robert Thompson 24.7.1884 in Asa Briggs (ed.), William Morris - Selected Writings and Designs Pelican (1962) London p137: '..we cannot turn our people back into Catholic English peasants and guild craftsmen..'
6. Letter of Henry Riley to George Thomson 14.2.1887 in TC 18: 'I felt that at the time of Mr. Briggs' scheme, nothing c/oul/d have been more thoroughly worked out, on sounder principles or tried on more limitable ground, and yet it did not succeed. That is no reason why with wider experience and further trials success cannot be attained at last.'
7. Manuscript draft for 1890 Report of Woodhouse Partnership, in TZ 5.
1. Letter of H.H.D. Acland to Thomson 9.11.1886 TC 13: 'I think the idea of having an accident fund is most important...it is unfortunate that we have hithero left the Insurance question so much outside our Cooperative work.'; George Thomson, A Practical Industrial Partnership in TZ 7.

apparent that the bulk of the resources and power remained in the hands of its founder.

George Thomson is probably best described as a Christian Socialist, although his ideas derived from Owen as much as Carlyle and from Marx as well as Ruskin. There is in his writing a complex fusion of Utopian fervour and practical insights, which allowed the co-operative to find acceptance in the intellectual circles of the co-partnership movement whilst surviving in the ruthlessly competitive world of textile manufactures. The major elements in the philosophy of Thomson were a powerful belief in the work and writings of Ruskin (and before him Carlyle), a mystical vision of Christian duty and grace through good works, an abiding interest in the writings of Utopian socialists, and a reasoned support of the Co-operative movement in general.

There were few more dedicated disciples of the work of John Ruskin than George Thomson, who was enthralled as a young man by The Stones of Venice and wrote that after his study of Ruskin he longed:¹

..for an opportunity of putting into practice the principles I had imbibed and the only practical way of applying them and lifting our industries out [of] the deplorable condition which no thoughtful man denies, was a system of industrial partnership which while giving to each worker a more direct interest in the result of his labour, should conciliate the next most important factor in all business, the buyer...

Thomson recognised that Ruskin's philosophy could provide an economic and industrial code of behaviour as well as a general social outlook.² From the aesthetics of his master, the manufacturer could envisage the socialisation of production under a system of handicraft expertise and a respect for quality.³ As Thomson himself wrote:⁴

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1. William Thomson Note Book, "Ruskin and Labour" in Box 2 of Thomson Collection.
 2. Manuscript Notes in TZ 3: 'But the application of Ruskin's Gospel of Art do not stop with these general counsels of benevolence. They furnish a system of economics as well as a standard of morals and a code of social duty. Ruskin's Political Economy - alternately adopted and abused - follows immediately and vitally from his art teaching.'
 3. George Thomson in The Spectator 17.2.1900 reprinted in Ruskin and Modern Business in Thomson Collection, Box 2: '..Mr. Ruskin's

For the lesson which Ruskin teaches us is that art is the expression of man's pleasure in labour; that it is possible for a man to rejoice in his work... It is merely the degradation of the operative into a machine, more than any other Evil of the times, [which] is leading the mass of the nations everywhere into vain, incoherent, disastrous struggles for a freedom of which they cannot explain the nature to themselves.

Recognition from the Ruskinians came to Thomson during the 1880s, after Thomson was enrolled in the Guild during 1884 and became a Trustee and Master of the Guild later.¹ Ruskin sent his admirer a much-treasured letter during his last years at Coniston, commending the 'momentous and absolutely foundational step taken by you' at Huddersfield.²

Both men shared a profound religious conviction, with Thomson as eager in his quotes from the New Testament as from Uato this last.³ On occasions these reflections assumed a Tennysonian mysticism,⁴ greatly aided by the frequent urgings of true believers such as the irrepressible Thomas Hughes.⁵ In such moods Thomson saw the ideal of service and leadership in much more poetic terms than even Rowntree, and recalling Blatchford more than Cadbury.⁶

Despite the attacks on organised religion from contemporary socialists, Thomson respected the works of Owen, Marx and Proudhon amongst others and always considered himself an ethical socialist.⁷ He opposed the use of violence as unChristian, but remained a supporter of

3. 'work in economics, while recognised by professed economic thinkers, has been taken up by eager and intelligent businessmen with the happiest results.'
4. "Ruskin and Labour" Notes.
1. Birmingham Weekly Post 3.3.1888 in TC 28; Andreas Finn, 'Ruskin's Museum of the Guild of St. George' Southern Arts (May 1973) p11; Personal letter to myself from J.A. Edwards, University of Reading Archivist 13.12.1977.
2. Letter of John Ruskin to George Thomson reprinted in Ruskin and Modern Business. The thinker added that, 'in the establishment of these relations with your workmen, I may perhaps live yet to see "the pleasure of the Lord prosper in your hand."
3. Letter of Vansittart Neale to Thomson 8.4.1890 TC 41. Neale told Thomson that Woodhouse embodied 'the sermon on the mount, and other similar letters not the woes pronounced by Jesus against the Pharisees that have been the life of Christianity.'

'ethical' or 'compromise' socialism throughout his life.¹
 Among his firmest supporters were the progressive
 clergymen, such as the Bishop of Ripon, and in publication
 Thomson recognised his debt to the Christian Socialists:²

You are aware that there are many kinds of socialism;
 but the socialism accepted by the bishops is taken
 [to be that]...which affirms that "the central aim
 of socialism is to terminate the divorce of the
 workers from the natural sources of subsistence and
 culture"; a definition I think we can all accept.

The textile master always insisted that his socialism was
 constructive, ethical and evolutionary - offering a genuine
 alternative to the cash nexus and the outbreak of revolution.³
 By beginning with Woodhouse he hoped to colonise capitalism
 and convince others by the example of new harmony in industry.⁴

It was this dedication and practical experience which
 allowed Thomson to bridge the welfare and Co-operative

4. Manuscript Notes in TZ 3: 'Bare dreamer or idealist and practical worker. The problem of all Time is how to apply to new social and industrial life the unchangeable principles of Christ.'
5. Letter of Thomas Hughes to George Thomson 21.1.1891 TC 46: 'I do most heartily congratulate and thank you and your stalwart crew for having given us so bright a sample of true fellow-work in a time when it was never more needed. As to my pessimism, it is only local, or departmental - my faith in the future of Christ's Gospel as to Industry was never clearer and stronger, and if we in England can't carry the torch alight other nations will. Your example and success will probably turn the scale..'
6. Manuscript Notes in TZ 5: 'And that is what Co-operation really is, at its best. It is the crystallization of the idea of self-sacrifice into a fact. We must look to the future, we must lose ourselves in working for others that we find ourselves.'
7. Printed Notes in TZ 10: 'Karl Marx truly states that machinery never creates any new value, its whole purpose being to produce the former amount of wealth by employment of less labour; they are all labour saving machines, and are rarely introduced to the public under any other pretext.'
1. Printed Speech of Thomson in TZ 5 p6: 'I plead before you today for a system of industry which does not fear the name of socialism, and which recognises the truth of democracy, and not seeking to establish a new order of things through violence, but an economy which teaches nations to desire and labour for things which lead to life; and which teaches them to scorn and destroy the things which lead to destruction.'; C.f. William Morris in Briggs (ed.), op. cit. p158-9: 'The word Revolution, which we Socialists are so often forced to use, has a terrible sound in most people's ears.'
2. Printed Notes in TZ 6.
3. Manuscript Notes in TZ 11; for a variation of high-wage economics

movements during the last decades of the 19th Century, forming part of the intellectual opposition to the 'business co-operators' within the latter movement.¹ Fellow travellers such as Vaughan Nash, Greenwood and Hughes were constantly urging Thomson to adopt a more militant position within the Congress which was 'leavened with the lower middle class' and drifting towards inactivity.² The major force for conservatism was the Wholesale interest, who were 'edging over more and more to the devil's side' according to Hughes.³

Such tactics showed little sensitivity to the economic prospects of Woodhouse, which depended for 60% of its business on the Wholesalers in Scotland and elsewhere and Hughes was much aggrieved when Thomson reached a compromise with the vested interests of the Congress.⁴ This merely indicates Thomson's determination to survive in a world not bound by the polemics of Christian scripture and co-operation so beloved by Hughes and his associates.⁵

This sense of realpolitik is also reflected in the structure of authority within the Woodhouse Co-operative

3. when the employer argued that, 'the improvement of the condition of the wage earning class, [would] thus open a market for the consumption of our production far more permanent and satisfactory in its ultimate results than the schemes of socialists and anarchists...I stand before you as a member of a Socialist propaganda bent on combating the despairs of the destructive socialism by this hope of construction..'
4. Manuscript Notes in T% 10: where Thomson argues for 'the development of a system of industry [and] really practical socialism which shall remove the temptation of the Capitalist and Employer to use every energy in the accumulation of wealth...there is a socialism which is voluntary and that is Cooperative production..'
1. Letter of Vaughan Nash to Thomson 21.7.1887 TC 25: 'The fight between Cooperation of the "eat and grow rich" kind and the real cooperation, of fine responsible workers must have some fresh vigour...The establishment of such undertakings as yours seems to me to mark the time which the fight must take by bringing into prominence these two conflicting elements in the movement.'
2. Letter of Thomas Hughes to Thomson 10.1.1887 TC 17: 'You are quite right as to where the clog on the wheel of Co-operation pinches...The Wholesale Society is leavened with the lower middle class of whom you speak...we shall have to take the gloves off with them..'
3. Letter of Thomas Hughes to Thomson 21.1.1891 TC 46: '..I own to looking for a troubled and angry crisis before long, ending

itself, which remained under the firm control of Thomson despite being registered with the Registrar of Friendly Societies. The three-tiered system of Board of Directors, Management Committee and the Sick Pay Committee, gave the administration of welfare to the employees but the real power to the employer.¹ The main reason for this was the distribution of shares between a wide variety of groups, including the Scottish Wholesalers. Since it required five sixths of the voting power to displace Thomson as Managing Director, it was very difficult to envisage any radical change even if the moral support for Thomson amongst the workpeople had declined.²

At the same time, the firm was a union closed shop, in contrast to many other 'co-partnerships',³ and members of the operatives union sat on the Woodhouse board along with two of the workpeople.⁴ This seems to have made for its popularity amongst the employees and union officials alike, helping Thomson to weather the periods of depression and controversy at Huddersfield without serious challenge to his power.⁵

3. 'in a big schism...after the next Congress mean to do all I can to expose the treason of the Wholesale and depose Mitchell and Co...'
4. Letter of Thomas Hughes to Thomson 28.1.1896 TC 60: '..you are in with the Wholesale even into Banking with them...can it be that you are driven to make friends of the Mammon of Unrighteousness? I hope not for they will not "receive you into everlasting habitations"...'
5. Edward Bristow, loc. cit. p271-3, for discussion of the Labour Association led by Williams, Greening, Vivian and Maddison: 'In 1902, with nothing to lose, the Labour Association changed its name to the Labour Co-Partnership Association in order to make itself more appealing to employers.'
1. The Factory Times (1907) in TZ 19: 'The Management Committee is elected by and from all the shareholders, investors and workers combined. But the committee which manages the assurance and pension fund is elected by and from the workpeople solely.'
2. C.-6795, Q 7138-40, for excellent insight into authority.
3. C.f. Royal Commission on Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Cd. 5066 (1910) Q 83173 - 74. Evidence of George Livesey: 'They get no advantage from belonging to a trade union. We recognise no union.'
4. C.-6795, Q 4972-77. Evidence of Downing and Gee;

Thus Woodhouse represented a curious blend of consensus and control, with Thomson implementing the doctrines of Christian Socialism whilst retaining a substantial amount of the shares and loan stock as well as receiving the generous salary of £3,500 per annum. As the largest 'wage earner', Thomson also received the largest slice of the profit dividends paid at 3d in £1 wages.¹ Although his firm was governed by a co-operative constitution, the realities of power ensured his continuation at the head of the enterprise.

At both an intellectual and a practical level, George Thomson had his critics. The most effective of them all was that other romantic Utopian, William Morris, who declined an invitation to speak at Woodhouse.² Despite sharing some of Thomson's Ruskinian visions, Morris was astute enough to distinguish between the aesthetic ideal and the material realities of capitalist production.³ He wrote to George Thomson soon after the co-operative was established in 1886:⁴

In the first place no amount of (so called) Cooperation or profit sharing that is possible will prove to be a solution of the labour question as long as land is owned in severalty and Capital is the property of individuals....Then secondly, since the only way of reconciling the interests of Capital and labour is to get rid not of the Capitalists personally, but of their office,

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4. The Sunday Chronicle 7.3.1909: 'They are mostly trade unionists, from Mr. Thomson down to the newest weaver...The people are everyone shareholders...and two of the directors, in addition to Mr. Thomson are workers in the ordinary grades of employment. The Textile Union...are also honoured by two of their number being directors.'
 5. Letter of Gullichrin to Thomson 4.2.1902 TC 78: 'The badness of trade has left a strong mark in your mills; and the clearing element in it is the willingness of the men to meet the bad times resolutely and honestly..'
 1. C.-6795, Q 7088, 7090-94, 7107. Thomson told the Commissioners; 'I get the most wages, and consequently I ought to have the largest division of the profits, but it would be the same proportion..'
 2. H.M. Hyndman, The Evolution of Revolution Hyndman Literary Trust (1912, 1920) London p270, Hyndman wrote that Owenist co-operation was derided 'later by Engels as Utopian Socialism. It was Utopian only in the sense that Owen appreciated...what we today

ceaseless contest is a necessary condition...and it is only by means of this contest, the perpetual antagonism of the classes, that the peace to come can be brought about.

Unlike John Stuart Mill and other sympathisers, Morris saw the dangers of profit sharing and co-partnership being used as a strategy for deferring future change rather than transforming the system by example.¹ Perhaps even more crucially, Morris recognised the dangers of making capitalism function more effectively by spreading its rewards and burdens, thereby legitimating a whole way of life.² Morris wrote:³

A class, like every other organism, strives to live; it cannot live when its functions cease, it therefore struggles tooth and nail for the continuance of its functions and cannot help doing so. One of the most effective means of fighting for existence of the capitalist class is the attempt at widening the basis of monopoly, getting as many monopolists as possible; the creation of a new middle class thrust in between the rich and the proletariat has become a necessity for the new monopolist class: the cooperative movement as it has developed is being used as part of this attempt...it is only those who are well aware of the incompleteness of the so called cooperative scheme who

2. 'are only just beginning..to understand..'
3. William Morris (ed.), 'Preface' to John Ruskin, The Nature of Gothic George Allen (1899) London & Orpington p ix - x, on the nature of politics in Ruskin's artistic criticism; C.f. John Ruskin, 'The Future of England' in The Crown of Wild Olive (1897) London Para. 132, p147, for more incisive vision of Ruskin and also 'Traffic' - originally 1866 Lecture to Bradford business men.
4. Letter from William Morris to Thomson 12.9.1887.
1. C.f. Letter of John Stuart Mill to Thomas Hughes 5.5.1860, in Briggs Collection, MS 3: '..The admission of the workpeople to a participation in the profits of a concern managed by individual capitalists, though not the best or final form of co-operation is often the most practicable, and that the coexistence of various modes of co-operation is one of the best securities for the beneficial working of them all.'
2. Raymond Williams, op. cit. p117-18, 145, and p232: 'Coleridge, Southey, Carlyle, Ruskin, and, in effect, Arnold, may be seen to have been working, above all, in the attempt to make 'class' into 'function'. It was the absence of any consistent relation between class and function which was the gravamen of their criticism of the new industrial society.'; p145 for a specific critique of Ruskin's "felicitous fulfilment of function."
3. Letter 12.9.1887. Morris added, 'So you see my difficulty is that I should have to come as an uncompromising socialist amongst you who are trying to work a compromise..'

are true 7 socialists...

There could be no clearer indictment of the whole co-partnership movement, since this vision of broadening the base of capitalism was actually extolled by friends and admirers of George Thomson, from Henry Riley to Andrew Carnegie.¹

The architect of Woodhouse could not admit that his 'compromise socialism' in fact preserved the rights of unequal property and the realities of managerial authority, however broad the basis of consent.

This review of Thomson's work does not suggest that such experiments were at all common, or that every provincial employer was as articulate and outspoken about his welfare schemes. Indeed, it is the radical quality of his ideas and his ability to express them as well as implement them which makes Thomson in some ways unique.² Yet Thomson stood only on the extreme verge of the radical welfarists, and some of his views were shared by a great many other employers. After all, Thomson was President of the local Chamber of Commerce for a period and eventually went to Parliament to plead the cause of Old Age Pensions at a time when Chamberlain's initiatives seem to have collapsed.

Even if it was true of earlier decades that the industrialists cared little for the condition of their workers, it is obvious that by the 1880s more and more employers were coming to recognise the economic and

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1. Letter of Henry Riley to Thomson 12.2.1887:TC 18: 'All the attempts I have seen in cooperative production pure and simple have appeared to me fallacious - benevolent, hopeful, trustful, but not thoroughly businesslike...Still I hope we shall gradually bring capital and labour nearer together in one way or another, perhaps not in one and the same person, but each labourer becoming a capitalist as well as labourer, and so understanding the relations of both.'; Letter of Andrew Carnegie (at Skibo Castle) to Thomson 2.7.1903 TC 80: 'I am deeply interested in the Pamphlet you have sent me. It certainly carries Union of Labour and Capital to its ultimate - Every workman a Capitalist!'. Carnegie added on a temperate note, 'ideal this but few concerns would be established on it and succeed.'
 2. The Factory Times (1907): 'Both as a manufacturer and an employer Mr. Thomson is unique.'

social unrest sweeping their towns, required a fresh response in industry.¹ Few employers were willing to embrace the co-operative ideology to the extent which Thomson did, and even fewer to share the amount of formal power and legal authority which he did, but the content of his welfare schemes and the provisions for consultation differed little from a wide range of other concerns. This disjuncture between image and reality at Woodhouse was in part due to Thomson's own curious personality, fusing idealism and practicality, but it was also a facet of an ideology that presented industrial relations in co-operative terms.² Precisely the same is true of many other ideologies held by employers, which allow them to perceive their enterprise as an agency of benevolence - especially where it involved the provision of welfare facilities.

The experience at Woodhouse indicates the difficulties of categorising the ideas and outlook of even one employer, for Thomson took as much (if not more) from the critics of Victorian bourgeois society as he did from its supporters. He followed Ruskin in attacking the tenets of political economy, and the misguided application of new technology, as well as drawing upon the traditions of Christianity and liberalism.³ At the same time, Thomson was deeply opposed to violent social change and the deposition of the employers as a class, apparently preferring the anodyne formulations of the Copartnership Association

1. Frederick Engels, The Condition of the English Working Class Panther ed. (1969) p301-2: 'I have never seen a class so deeply demoralised, so incurably debased by selfishness, so corroded within, so incapable of progress, as the English bourgeoisie... It is utterly indifferent to the English bourgeois whether his working-men starve or not, if only he makes money...and what brings no money is nonsense, unpractical, idealistic bosh... he insists, as Carlyle says, that 'Cash payment is the only nexus between man and man.'; C.f. D.A. Hunt, 'The Socialisation of Heirs in Family Firms' M.Sc Thesis (1973) University of Bradford p17, for a comment on portrayal of employers.
2. Mannheim, op. cit. p71: 'Ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents.'
3. Of course Liberalism was itself changing in these years. See John Roach, 'Liberalism and the Victorian Intelligentsia' in Peter Stansky (ed.), The Victorian Revolution New Viewpoints (1973) New York p352, for contrast of 'New' and 'Old' Liberalism.

to the criticisms of William Morris. If it can be said that classical political economists refused to accommodate such inconvenient realities as unemployment,¹ more radical thinkers like Thomson also hesitated to carry through a full scale critique of capitalist production.²

Conclusion

This survey of employers' ideology and welfare theories in the decades before 1920 indicates the complexities of business thought and social action at this period. Rather than forming a coherent set of consistent principles and ideas, industrial welfare philosophy was inspired by almost as wide a range of arguments as that of social reform. Given their roles and responsibilities in society and politics as well as industry, it was inevitable that businessmen should derive some of their thought from cultural influences such as religious belief and political values. Even within the sphere of industry and commerce they were assailed by new technical and scientific methods as well as management innovations and rationale, which had to be assimilated to more traditional concepts of political economy and sound business practice.

In order to fully appreciate the impressions made on employer ideology, we must take into account such broad economic and social changes as those outlined in previous chapters. The most immediate considerations were of course economic ones, and the large prosperous capitalist at the head of a growing concern within an expanding trade might respond more favourably to welfare arguments than the smaller employer squeezed between contracting markets and falling profits. Yet employers within similar positions often responded quite differently to their situation and to the arguments for increased welfare. Groups of employers bound by family, kinship, religion or politics might find more in common than manufacturers operating within the same trade.

Having stressed the heterogeneous nature of the welfare movement and the ideological influences upon it, there are still distinctions to be made between the three broad currents

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1. J.F. Harris, Unemployment and Politics O.U.P. (1972), p1-2, for exclusion of unemployment from classical theory until 1880s.
 2. Thomson Coll., TZ 15, Manuscript Notes for Thomson's rather peculiar view of unemployment.

of thought. Firstly, there were those authoritarian welfarists such as Dixons or Beardmores, who conceived of industrial services as the reward for loyalty and diligence on the part of servants who had little autonomous organisation. Then there were rationalists who promoted welfare as part of a coherent managerial philosophy which included good wages and conditions as well as adequate facilities and incentives. Thirdly, there were such radical employers as Thomson who favoured the active participation of their workers in welfare provision. Partly because of their ideological orientation, the rationalist and radical welfare leaders tended to have strong views on social and industrial reform.¹ This helps to account for the seminal contributions of such employers as Booth and Rowntree, and the important writings of Lever and Cadbury.²

This illustrates another fundamental theme in welfare thought: namely, the recognition that welfare involved a relationship rather than just an improvement in physical efficiency. It is upon their presentation of this relationship that the philosophies differ, with authoritarian paternalists demanding deferential commitments, whilst rationalists and radicals argued for greater autonomy on the part of the 'human factor' in business. At a more basic level, these differences implied significant variations in the administration of services and the control of benefits.

It should be remembered that most employers failed to articulate their views as clearly as the above distinctions suggest, and that the numerical majority of businessmen were indifferent if not hostile to the spread of new ideas in this and other directions.³ What is equally evident, however, is that larger employers were more likely to be welfarists and it was to them that most social reformers looked for a lead

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1. D. Bouchier, 'Radical Ideologies' Sociology II No. 1 (1977), p62 for this point on radicalism.
 2. See J. Brown, "Ideas Concerning Social Policy and their Influence on Legislation in Britain, 1902-11" (London, 1964), p291, for relationship of radical employers such as Rowntree with leading politicians.
 3. Checkland, loc. cit., p72, for business conservatism in industry.

in improving industrial conditions.¹ These employers were far more numerous and influential than even the Webbs assumed, and included firms which had previously stood against trade union development and concessions to organised labour.² It was not so much the vocal self-proclaimed pioneers of welfare - such as the Levers and Cadburys - that we must read in the examination of the origins and development of welfare ideology, but the large number of leading employers across the industrial spectrum who put their ideas into practice at local level.³

Throughout these decades there continued to exist considerable differences in welfare philosophy among employers. The moves towards more advanced business practices, technical expertise, and progressive management, tended to strengthen the position of the rationalists. The growth in industrial unrest and demands for workshop control in the decade after 1910 also fortified those welfarists who argued for greater participation in industrial administration. It is between these alternate positions, and the growing professionalism of welfare work itself, that we must trace the rapid growth of industrial welfare before 1920.

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1. S. & B. Webb, Problems of Modern Industry Longmans (1898) London p149-51, for argument on large scale and improvements.
 2. P.W. Kingsford, 'Pioneers of Modern Management: Sir William Mather' The Manager (June 1957), p460, for example.
 3. B. Bosanquet (ed.), Aspects of the Social Problem Macmillan (1895) London, p10-11. Bosanquet argued that better than any political initiative 'is the work of a successful employer of labour who has a decently human relation to his employees.'

Chapter Nine: The Politics of Industrial Welfare: employers industrial welfare and the evolution of social policy.

The attitudes and initiatives of employers in response to state social policy: firms and associations in west Scotland and the West Riding.

The previous chapters have surveyed the role of economic factors and industrial relations in the development of industrial welfare, and the institutional, community and ideological context of this development. The present chapter is concerned with the links between the provision of welfare services by employers, and the growth of government intervention in the decades after 1880. Any such study must begin with a discussion of definitions and their scope. The complexities of the subject have been suggested in preceding examples, where it was shown that employers' welfare was subject to an array of competing influences - there being no more one 'ideology' of welfare than one method of administering it, and that subjective initiatives as well as objective conditions must be taken into consideration when appraising its expansion.

The problem of definition appears at both the conceptual and the practical levels, raising questions as to the theoretical parameters of welfare as well as the empirical charting of their extent and evolution.¹ Not only are there familiar difficulties of moral or ethical connotations associated with the term 'welfare',² but also contrasting evaluations of the provisions made.³ The introduction of services and reforms involved a struggle of ideals as well as interests, with conflicting groups striving to impress their images as well as their presence upon the facilities administered.⁴ The passage of social legislation brought these conflicts most clearly into view, though they also occurred (as has been shown) at the level of non-statutory benefit schemes.

It is necessary, therefore, not to exaggerate the different spheres of private and public provisions either in formulation

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1. G.A. Johnstone, 'Social Work and Labour Legislation' International Labour Review XVI No.3 (Oct.1927), p449, for definition problem.
 2. R. Titmuss, 'The limits of the Welfare State' New Left Review XXVII (1964), p33; Johnstone, loc. cit., p453.
 3. J. Carrier and I. Kendall, 'The Development of Welfare States:

or implementation of social services. The boundaries of both are elastic and fluid rather than rigidly set,¹ and there are areas where the provisions overlap as well as facilities peculiar to private or public agencies.² Rather than arguing for a compartmentalised view of welfare evolution, where the state progressively supersedes private initiative,³ it is more useful to trace the economic and social conditions from which both emerge at particular periods.

Just as earlier chapters outlined the different factors involved in industrial welfare, and the distinct levels at which the provisions can be located, so any study of employers' response to state policies must encompass the different avenues of business behaviour and the variety of situations in which state activity was encountered by employers. There is no reason to assume that the employers will express precisely the same views at different places - and the paramount considerations in the board room may differ quite significantly from those when serving on the local Board of Guardians or when giving evidence to a Royal Commission.⁴ Equally important in shaping employers' attitudes was the character of the Victorian state and the changes (both in form and scope) which it underwent before 1914.⁵ It is clear that not only was the state assuming greater responsibilities for industrial and social conditions after 1880, but also that the degree of employer control over the organs of government remained very limited.⁶ They were certainly more influential at the local rather than national level - and

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3. 'The Production of Plausible Accounts' Journal of Social Policy VI No.3 (1977), p272-73. The problems affect both contemporary and historical accounts of welfarism, of course.
 4. J.R. Hay, The Development of the British Welfare State, 1880-1975 Arnold (1978) London, p4-9.
 1. Paul Chu, 'The Modern Approach to Industrial Welfare' International Labour Review LXXI (1955), p561, for this point.
 2. Johnston, loc. cit., p470: 'Social work and labour legislation are like intersecting circles, each of which contains an area common to both and an area peculiar to itself.'
 3. Ibid., p456.
 4. Roy Hay, 'Employers and social policy in Britain: the evolution of welfare legislation, 1905-14' Social History III No.4 (1977) p441, for contrary assumption.

the local aspects of state authority remained very important throughout the century - but they could hardly be described as the dominant group within the political elite.¹ Even those businessmen in the House of Commons, a minority of the total interests represented,² tended to be dominated by financial and merchant interests or railway contractors and brewers rather than heavy industrialists as such.³

The experiences of the 1840s had suggested that key measures of social reform were often passed by an alliance of landed interests, radicals, working class movements and a section of employers,⁴ and were frequently opposed by other industrialists.⁵ Alone the employers were neither the wealthiest group in Victorian Britain, nor were they likely to exert a major creative influence on government.⁶ As the President of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce informed his members in 1902:⁷

Has it occurred to you, gentlemen, that all the great commercial community in Britain - the manufacturers, shipowners, merchants, and mercantile men of this country, acting in unison and with a common object could not by their own voices return one member to the House of Commons...It is apparent that politically, the commercial classes are a wholly negligible quantity and likely to be dealt with accordingly.

Although this greatly exaggerated the impotence of the business community, since it was estimated as early as the 1840s that the 'railway interest' in the Commons controlled about eighty M.P.s,⁸ it remains a testament to the widespread feeling among employers that they enjoyed less power than their value to society merited.⁹

Here lie some of the elements in the explanation of employer attitudes to both private and public benefit schemes during the

5. R. Mishra, Society and Social Welfare: Theoretical Perspectives On Welfare Macmillan (1977) London, p92; I. Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State Macmillan (1979) London, p2-3; for recent discussions of government growth.
6. P. Anderson, 'Origins of the present crisis' New Left Review XXIII (1964), p32.
1. R. Gray, 'Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain' in J. Bloomfield (ed.), Papers on Class, Hegemony and Party Lawrence and Wishart (1977) London, p79, for local character of state power; T. Nairn, 'The British Political Elite' New Left Review XXIII (1964), p20-21, etc., for discussion of industrialists.

decades after 1880. Employers as a group were neither homogeneous in their interests and organisations nor were affected equally by social reforms. They formed a broad coalition with the financial and merchant or commercial interests in the business community, but could not claim to be the wealthiest or most influential within the ruling class. Although significant elements in the localised organs of the state, industrial employers failed to dominate the major areas of central government and its constituent groups.¹ Their increasing association in trade bodies and pressure groups illustrates rather than countering the argument for limited political effectiveness, and suggests the increasing realisation of their impotence by employers.

Not only were employers' ability to respond to state initiatives changing, but the forces underlying these changes were affecting enterprise and government simultaneously. The economic conditions and shifting industrial relations which provided the formative conditions for employers' welfarism, were also pressing the state into enquiries and commitments (particularly in industries such as mining) which altered the nature of intervention in 'social' questions as well as

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2. J.A. Thomas, The House of Commons 1832-1901: A Study of its Economic and Functional Character University of Wales Press (1939) Cardiff, p13-15, Table I-II.
 3. E. Halevy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour Barnes & Noble (1961) London, p15-16. Halevy claims 244 business M.P.s out of the 670 Members in 1895.
 4. K. Marx, Capital Vol.I (Trans. Moore & Aveling) Glazier (1912) London, p269, for Ten Hours Movement and reforms; U. Henriques, Before the Welfare State Longman (1979) London, p73.
 5. Ibid., p86; A. Wilson and H. Levy, Workmen's Compensation Vol.I O.U.P. (1939), p22-23.
 6. W.D. Rubinstein, 'Wealth, Elites and Class Structure of Modern Britain' Past and Present LXXVI (1977); p102.
 7. Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, Minutes of the Chamber Annual Address of President Dick to Members, 20.1.1902.
 8. Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p29. The reference was to Lord Campbell's speech in introducing his 1846 liability bill.
 9. President Dick, loc. cit., added that: 'In view of the taxes paid by the commercial classes, of their education, intelligence and practical experience of affairs, and their stake in the Empire, this position is surely anomalous and unjustifiable.'
 1. T. Bottomore and M. Rubel (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings...

its extent. The situation facing many industrial communities, with increasing housing and employment difficulties experienced before 1914 also necessitated further state involvement. Agencies and voluntary organisations as diverse as friendly societies and trade associations were also persuaded into welcoming further state involvement in problems which they could not resolve unaided. Moreover, the ideological underpinnings of classical political economy and liberal individualism were being revised in a way that paralleled the progress from traditionalism to rationalism within the industrial welfare movement. These currents in their turn reflected the broader reformation of class relations, and the gravitation of the state into civil society. The basis of bourgeois hegemony was shifting after 1880,¹ and stable equilibria between economy, civil society and the state could only be sustained via greater government intervention in industry and society.² This transition naturally affected the position of social classes vis a vis the state itself, as well as to each other, and an adjustment in the capacity of the government to 'arbitrate' between interests and claims.³

Thus employers were only one group, albeit an important one, in the calibrations of class relations during these decades and the growth of state intervention. They were subject to the same forces making for broader changes, experiencing these currents at different levels and responding according to their perceptions of their long-term as well as immediate interests.

These perceptions were almost inevitably coloured by the material environment in which the employers operated, with

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1. Penuin (1964), p161, for Marx's analysis of Whiggism.
 1. Lynne Lawner (Trans. & ed.), Antonio Gramsci: Letters from Prison Cape (1975) London, p42, for definition of hegemony. See also chapter seven above.
 2. P. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci' New Left Review C (1976-77), p34-35, for insistence that civil society in Gramscian (as opposed to Marxian) sense does not include economic relations; Gray, loc. cit., p78, for analysis of hegemony as primarily the reproduction of social relations in favour of bourgeois interests.
 3. N. Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State..' New Left Review XCV (1976), p74 and passim for discussion of whole complex question.

factors ranging from the long-term health of the industry and the ratio of capital to labour in work processes to the prevailing market conditions and the opportunity for passing on additional overheads, likely to determine attitudes.¹ There were also divisions within trades on state initiatives, frequently between the larger and more managerialist firms which were able to assimilate the reforms fairly quickly and the small (often less competitive) enterprises operating on a narrower margin of profit and efficiency. Where the weight of economic interest and rational argument was evenly balanced, the evidence and consequence of industrial conflict often tipped the scales for or against intervention.

The attitudes and activities of the employers were also moulded by the broad chronology of legislation after 1880, as well as by the tactical and strategic manoeuvres which accompanied the formulation, passage and implementation of specific legislative measures. As regards the latter, it is sufficient here to note the pressures which industrial and commercial groups could bring to bear upon the framing of Parliamentary bills at drafting, reading and committee stages as well as rearguard action in the Lords. Once passed the government depended heavily upon employers' co-operation to implement innovations,² hence the compromises between state bureaucracy (central and local) and businessmen seen at all levels.

The general chronology of social legislation between 1880 and 1920 is too complex to be given detailed attention, but in terms of important contributions to industrial welfare four main periods can be suggested. The first stretched from the passage of the Employers' Liability Act in 1880 to the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, only one year after the important Truck Act of the Salisbury Government. There followed the years up to the second major Compensation Act of 1906, during which period passed the Factory, Shop Clubs, and Unemployed Workmen Acts of 1900-1905. Thirdly came the major era of Liberal welfare reforms from 1906-14, which transformed the state

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1. C.f. Hay, loc. cit. (1977), p440-41, for an alternative model.
 2. Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p22-23 for effective opposition to implementation of Factory Acts.

social services from being based largely on the Poor Law to being funded by contributions and taxation - and claimed as of right.¹ The fourth period covers the years of total warfare and the Reconstruction initiatives of 1918-20, when the state became itself directly involved in the organisation of economy and industrial production thereby obtaining the power to introduce far-reaching reforms in conditions and services.² Within four decades employers had seen state regulation grow from limited regulation of the working conditions and hours of employees, mostly affecting the 'unfree agents' of the workforce, to a battery of controls which stipulated the provision of welfare as well as the maintenance of minimum standards.

The following comparison of firms and associations within different trades, and of Chambers of Commerce at the major centres of Glasgow, Leeds and Bradford, casts as much light on the complexity of attitudes and responses within one organisation, as it does upon the sharp recognition of their interests by employers. Nevertheless, it is a plausible hypothesis that in periods of expansion and prosperity the employers would tend to look more favourably upon both private and state schemes than in harder times. Where the larger, more managerialist and most progressive enterprises held sway in local associations we should also anticipate a more positive attitude to industrial and social reforms. The strength of this support would depend as much upon the principles of each measure as upon the wider climate of business opinion, and the restrictions which it placed upon personal endeavour. In particular many of the welfarist employers were anxious that official provisions should not completely supersede private benefits, and that the control of services should not fall into unsympathetic hands such as trade unions. The policies and struggles of the employers were conducted at more than one level, therefore, and were largely contingent upon the circumstances of each particular

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1. J.R. Hay, The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms, 1906-14 Macmillan (1975) London, is an excellent survey of the literature.
 2. See chapters two and three above for particularly heavy impact of state intervention in munitions production.

reform movement with its strategies and manoeuvres.¹

The role of the participants in these movements differed quite significantly, according to their function and status. Whereas the majority of firms and trade associations had few pretensions to a disinterested position, the Chambers of Commerce claimed to represent the business community as a whole and even to consult the 'national' economic interest in their campaigns. Given that they had to balance competing interests within their ranks as well as consider the future prosperity of whole cities, there was some truth in the argument.

Firms and Associations in west of Scotland heavy industry

Amongst the most important groups in the creation of what is, in many respects, the mythology of industrial welfare were the Factory Inspectorate. From their annual reports emerges a vision not only of a particular kind of welfare, but also of certain types of employers who pioneered welfare services. This is conveyed despite the methodical manner in which details of schemes and experiments are documented, since it is only certain amenities which are included as acceptable welfare - usually the improvement of working, dining and recreational conditions for female employees.² Although the Inspectorate constantly stressed the pre-War initiatives of a wide range of employers, the fact that the Lady Inspector contributed most of the details on welfare ensured that certain trades were over-represented and consumer industries were certainly given excessive attention due to the well-publicised work of Cadbury and others.³ The fact that women and juveniles were historically protected by state legislation as 'unfree agents' certainly encouraged a sensitive treatment of staff by some employers, thereby raising general standards in the healthy industries, should not obscure the poor conditions still prevailing in many occupations or the alternative provisions

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1. See Anderson, loc. cit. (1976-77), p8-11, for a discussion of the important Gramscian distinction between 'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of position' in class relations and civil society. This may elucidate employer responses to state welfare.
 2. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1911 Cd. 6239 (1912), p159, for example. Miss Anderson mentions breweries, textiles, carpets, chocolate, business and certain metals.

made for male and salaried grades of employees in a wide range of industries.¹

Rather similar qualifications should be made when assessing the different provinces of private welfare and state legislation. Although the increasing expertise of welfare workers and management (itself a product of these decades), allowed greater precision in delineating areas of activity,² ambiguities persisted throughout the period.³ It is possible to outline the major concerns of state social policy,⁴ or alternatively of labour legislation,⁵ but both emerged from an accretion of reforms and modifications rather than as rational programmes. It is particularly in the field of welfare that the links between the maintenance of conditions and the provision of services are strongest, as are the connections between labour legislation - affecting all kinds of matters - and social security. The advocates of employers' welfare constantly insisted that the protection of working conditions and adequate remuneration must be the basis of any benefit scheme,⁶ as well as pressing for legislation to establish minimum standards in all trades.⁷

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3. Ibid., p46, for report of the Birmingham Lady Inspector on the importance of Bourneville example for Midlands.
 1. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector for Factories and Workshops for the Year 1913 Cd. 7491 (1914), p70: 'Employers are initiating reforms not only as outstanding individuals and firms, but are beginning to do so at last by associated action and effort.'
 2. Elizabeth D. Newcomb, 'Industrial Welfare Work in Great Britain' International Labour Review V (1922), p553, for W.W.A. definition covering services for physical well-being, full use of potential abilities in job allocation, and 'means for the development of all his faculties'; C.f. Chu, loc. cit., p566-67.
 3. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1918 Cmd. 340 (1919), p28, for distinction between 'the state of welfare..of the persons concerned...and the particular measures...adopted to bring about that state of welfare..'
 4. Johnston, loc. cit., p461-62, for ten major areas of labour legislation; Henriques, op. cit., p256, for identification of traditional main areas of social reform in 19th century.
 5. Johnston, loc. cit. It is noticeable that these categories do not include such matters as protection of unions, trade disputes and arbitration.
 6. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1916 Cd. 8570 (1917), p8-9: 'Indeed, without the general ground work of minimum national requirements in regard to fundamentals...it is impossible to imagine any satisfactory

For these reasons it is not only necessary to place employers' welfare in the context of changing state regulations, but also to refer to the broader pattern of social and labour legislation which affected industry and its benefit schemes only indirectly. It was apparent to those groups involved in such schemes that welfare was changing in accordance with a whole sequence of movements and measures, and that employers were resorting to (and abandoning on occasion) welfare in response to a whole multitude of pressures over which they had limited control. By illustrating the formative influences it may be possible to set welfare against the wider contours of economic development and class relations. For if one can characterise industrial welfare as primarily concerned with the creation of a stable working environment,¹ it is also possible to identify the main function of state social policy as the reproduction of conditions in which the capitalist economy could operate.²

At least some of these conflicting pressures are reflected in the reactions of Scottish industrialists to the progress of social policy in this period. Given the relatively labour-intensive character of the shipbuilding, heavy engineering and coalmining occupations, it is to be expected that these employers should express reservations about legislation which would add to the burden of labour costs and possibly hinder their competitive position in world markets. Not only were wages a substantial proportion of total costs, but the male workers aspired to a skilled status with remuneration well above that of unskilled or female employees in other

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6. 'superstructure of individual "welfare" for the workers.'
 7. Ibid.; Johnston, loc. cit., p465; Chu, loc. cit., p566.
 1. Briggs, op. cit., p128-29, quotes Rowntree to the effect that: "I think we may define Welfare work as the provision of an environment which will enable everyone to be and to do his best."
 2. See C. Jones and A. Novak, 'The Welfare State' Unpublished D.P.E.G. Paper (Durham, 1975), p5, for extract from New Review article of 1893. Also general discussion on functions of welfare; c.f. J.H. Goldthorpe, 'The Development of Social Policy in England, 1800-1914' Transactions of Fifth World Congress of Sociology IV (1964) I.S.A., p48, for criticism of functional accounts.

trades. Thus the costs of accident compensation, sick pay or other benefits, would tend to be higher than in many other industries.

It was with respect to Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation that many shipbuilding and engineering employers felt their interest threatened, and the need for greater organisation and articulation of business opinion in order to influence state action.¹ Individual firms were rather unwilling to commit themselves on such issues after their associations formulated policies,² though it was the shipyard or workshop which ultimately faced the financial and legal consequences of legislation.³ Within the trade associations it is possible to trace the formation of distinct groups of employers - usually the larger and more managerialist concerns - who occupied key committees and moulded the collective responses of the organisation to state initiatives.⁴

Both shipbuilding and engineering interests were strongly represented in the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers' Association before the departure of the engineers in 1892.⁵ As early as 1876 the principle of Employers' Liability was attacked by the body, and repeated three years later.⁶ The preference for voluntarism over state intervention was reflected in the influential trade journal Engineering,⁷ although the latter took a more flexible and enlightened view of the final measure in 1880 than did many employers.⁸

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1. Letter of Dr. John Inglis to The Times (13.11.1911) reprinted in Engineering 17.11.1911, argued: 'Amid the sound and fury of discussion on the National Insurance Bill one may listen in vain throughout the debate for a single word in the interests of the employer of labour...Much of the recent legislation which touches the industries of the country tends to hamper and impede production, increase costs, and lessen the gross amount from which all wages and profits are derived.'
 2. UCS 1/1, Thomson and Co. (C.S.E.Co.), Minutes 15.12.1896. After request for views from Sir A.B. Forward in 1896, 'it was considered advisable not to answer same.'
 3. Ibid., 1, John Brown and Co., Minutes 27.7.1900, for provisions against Workmen's Compensation.
 4. See chapters five and six. This is particularly apparent in case of West Yorkshire Coal Owners.
 5. Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers Association (C.S.E.A.), Minutes, 1865 - 29.4.1886, for organisation of Association.

The actual implications of the 1880 Act were much less serious than many employers feared, proposed as it was by the 'new model employer' Brassey, and generally accepted by railway companies whose statutory societies were largely unaffected.¹ Even where special exclusion did not exist, employers could always persuade their workmen to contract out of the coverage provided by the Act either by providing alternative arrangements or by sheer coercion in making contracting out a condition of employment.² Despite the obvious defects of the law during the 1880s, the Select Committee of 1886 headed by Brassey, vindicated its encouragement of voluntary effort and the consequent stimulus given to provident societies.³

The movement from Employers' Liability to Workmen's Compensation proved to be a laborious one, not merely because of the opposition from employers but also because of divided opinion amongst trade unions and friendly societies as well as complex political manoeuvrings at Westminster.⁴ Trade unions and provident societies were as determined to protect their friendly functions as the employers were to preserve contracting out and the shop clubs which operated at their works.⁵ It was this which the Select Committee claimed to have discovered, and the schemes were welcomed as an exercise in mutual co-operation between capital and labour.⁶

After the efforts of Labour representatives in Parliament during the late 1880s, the first major attempt to formulate a Workmen's Compensation Bill came with Asquith's measure in 1893 during Gladstone's fourth ministry.⁷ The debates are

6. Ibid., 4.7.1876 - 22.4.1879.

7. Engineering 13.2.1880, warned that, 'both employer and employed had better try to make some material arrangement...rather than wait for the distant date when uncertain or imperfect legislation may attempt to settle a question..!'

8. Ibid., 18.6.1880 - 3.9.1880. The editorial welcomed the 'legally just and also necessary' Act, though disliking the exclusion of mutuals and noting that the 'masters of many interests have been dead against it.'

1. Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p38; R. Harrison, Before the Socialists Routledge (1965), Chapter One for 'new models'.

2. Ibid., p46-47, 54. In 1881-82 the case of Giffiths v Earl of Dudley had established the legality of contracting out.

3. D.G. Hanes, The First British Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 Yale University Press (1968) New Haven, p34-35;

equally famous for Joseph Chamberlain's interventions and enunciation of later Compensation principles, as for Asquith's insistence upon shifting the burden of proof for negligence from workman to employer and seriously curtailing the use of 'common employment' as a defence by business interests.¹

The legislative initiatives of 1888-93 raised comparatively little interest amongst the shipbuilding and engineering firms of the Clyde, although vigilance was maintained via designated committees at their Associations.² Within four years Joseph Chamberlain commanded theirs and most employers' attention with his own Compensation measure.³ Having already secured the support of large influential employers within the House of Commons, including shipbuilders such as G.W. Wolff and J.M. Denny along with engineers like Sir William Arrol and Thomas Richardson, Chamberlain felt confident of success.⁴ Even where opposition existed this could be confined within limits which would not endanger the measure or the ministry.⁵

The resistance of employers in heavy industry and transport was also minimised by the retention of the contracting out clause in the Bill introduced by White Ridley, although on

3. Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p52, quote Committee that: "a useful stimulus has been given to the establishment of provident funds and associations..".
4. Hanes, op. cit., p59-64, and passim.
5. Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p54-55, for opposition of trade unions and friendly societies to compulsory insurance as early as 1888. See also chapter six above for friendly societies.
6. Hanes, op. cit., p35-36.
7. J.L. Cohen, Workmen's Compensation in Great Britain "Post Magazine" Pub. (1923) London, p92-93.
1. Ibid.; Hanes, op. cit., p61; Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p59.
2. C.S.A. Minutes, op. cit., 1892-93; the shipbuilders left the previous C.S.E.A. in 1892.
3. See D. Judd, Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain Hamish Hamilton (1977) London, p23, and passim for Birmingham background of Chamberlain; Hanes, op. cit., p100-101 for 1897 measure.
4. Joseph Chamberlain Papers (B.C.L.), JC 6/3/3/18, 'Memorandum on Workmen's Accident Compensation' (1897), Cabinet Memoranda 7, Appx. 1 for list of 7 large employers and 18 business M.P.s.
5. Ibid., p2. Chamberlain said of the sympathetic Unionist business M.P.s that their 'support should be quite sufficient to prevent

terms of at least equal parity with legislative provision,¹ and his assurance that the Government was anxious to promote rather than discourage voluntary arrangements.² The North West Engineers responded to the passage of the measure by urging the national Federation to "appoint a strong Committee" to consider the whole matter,³ although by 1901 the same Association was in favour of the Act's extension to outworkers employed by engineering establishments.⁴

Despite the hopes of Ridley and the energetic activities of many welfarist employers, the Workmen's Compensation Act did have an adverse affect on particular areas of industrial welfare. Previous to its passage there were a large number of accident benefit schemes operated jointly by employers and workmen on an informal as well as a formal basis.⁵ These were worst hit by the termination of compulsory contracting out,⁶ although autonomous friendly societies administered by the workmen and possibly sponsored by the employers continued to flourish.⁷ There were also the officially-registered Certified Schemes, which covered almost 130,000 workmen by 1903, whereby firms and workmen agreed to administer alternative arrangements which were usually much more beneficial than statutory provisions.⁸ Despite the resistance of many trade unions to any such schemes, they were strongly supported by both employers and officials during the 1900s.⁹ There was some decline in importance after 1906, but there remained a hard core of coalmining and railway employers who preferred

5. 'any dangerous opposition on the part of employers outside the House, although some objection must be expected until the practical working of the scheme is understood.'; see also JC 6/3/3/20 'Memorandum..', (1897), for same memoranda with different appendices.

1. Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p65; Cohen, op. cit., p93 for account.
2. Engineering 21.5.1897, for an account of Matthew White Ridley's speech.
3. North West Engineering Trades Employers' Association (N.W.E.T. E.A.), Minutes, 12.2.1898.
4. Ibid., 1.11.1901.
5. Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation (Home Office), Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into the Law relating to Compensation for Injuries to Workmen Vol. I Cd. 2208 (1904), Para. 56, p23.

to retain these rather costly arrangements rather than face litigation and friction with their employees.¹

After the Report of the Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation in 1904, there followed the second major Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 which 'made a great advance on its predecessors' and further strengthened the employee's position in a wider number of trades.² The larger and more efficient of the shipbuilders and engineers were again prepared to accept the measure, although the implications for smaller firms were probably the most serious.³ Speakers on behalf of the latter, who included Chamberlain as well as Montgomery, stressed the difficulties created and the Birmingham interest pressed for broader state insurance.⁴ This plea was echoed by leading shipbuilders and engineers themselves in 1909, when the spectre of state unemployment insurance detached from Workmen's Compensation brought anxieties about costs and malingering,⁵ but in 1906 the Association members seemed content to cover their legal liabilities either by provident schemes or commercial and mutual insurance - or both.⁶

Further legislation which affected the accident benefit and provident schemes of employers were the Truck Acts and the Shop

6. Ibid., 'We think that the evidence has shown that its operation has been largely to put an end to those societies for accident compensation which previously were supported by the joint contributions of employers and workmen.'; Para. 57, p24, also.
7. Ibid., Para. 60, p24.
8. Ibid., Para. 272, p103-04: '..it would appear the workmen derived from these schemes a full equivalent for the £214,636 which they contributed'; see also chapter six above.
9. Ibid., Para. 273-74, p104: 'We are fully satisfied that the majority..of the claims advanced in support of these schemes are..well-founded..'; C.f., ibid., for workmen's objections.
1. Ibid., Para. 57, p24; Para. 271, p102-03; Para. 272, p103; see chapter six above.
2. Engineering 31.1.1908: 'The new Act in effect sweeps away the old Acts, and in their stead sets up the universal legal right to compensation for injuries received in the course of..employment.'
3. B. Chapman Browne, Selected Papers on Social and Economic Questions C.U.P. (1918), p83.
4. Parliamentary Debates (4th Series) Vol. CIV Col. 548 (1906), speech of Montgomery reprinted in Carlton Hayes, British Social Politics Ginn & Co. (1913) Boston, p41-43; ibid., p38-39, for speech of Dilke in reply to Chamberlain.

Clubs Act of 1902, as well as (in a more indirect sense) the Friendly Societies Act of 1896. The Truck Acts had been in operation since the 1830s but as late as the 1890s it was still uncertain whether compulsory payments for welfare services constituted trucking.¹ Despite the legislation of 1896, when both Truck and Friendly Society measures were passed, this ambiguity continued until the introduction of the Shop Clubs Act of 1902.²

The range of schemes and societies which this legislation affected covered much of the territory of industrial welfare, from sick clubs and accident benefits to pension funds and thrift associations.³ Whilst this Act reduced the cruder coercion which employers brought to bear on workmen, their sponsorship of the work societies ensured that pressures remained upon the employees - often via foremen - to enrol in these bodies after 1902.⁴ Such acquiescence allowed the firm to deduct the weekly subscriptions from wages before payment, which often caused bitter protests by union officials.⁵

Partly because the craft societies that dominated the engineering and shipbuilding trades were so proficient in the administration of compulsory benefits themselves, shop clubs were never as prevalent there as in some other industries.⁶ Where many firms had provided benefits, as in the North East,

5. Memo of Deputation of C.S.A. and N.W.E.T.E.A. to Board of Trade (1909), PRO LAB 2/211/LE 500, reproduced in Hay, op. cit., (1978) p36-37.
6. C.S.A. Minutes, 29.11.1906, when Association discussed the position with Iron Trades Insurance Association; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 20.9.1907 for discussions and reply to Scotts of Greenock; A. Young, Industrial Injuries (1958), p69-71, for details of 1907 Employers' Liability Insurance Companies Act.
1. Departmental Committee on the Truck Acts, Report of the Truck Committee Vol.I Cd. 4442 (1908), Para. 144, p59.
2. Ibid., Para. 145, p60: 'That Act enacts that it shall be an offence for an employer to make it a condition of employment that a workman shall join a shop club or thrift club, unless... registered under the Friendly Societies Act 1896..'
3. Ibid., Para. 146, p60.
4. Ibid., Para. 148, p60: '..though membership is nominally not compulsory, we have no doubt that there is a great deal of indirect compulsion which the law cannot touch.'
5. Ibid., Para. 147, p60; ibid., Para. 150, p62, for conclusion of Committee that deductions from pay be made illegal.

the impact of the Workmen's Compensation Act led to their relative decline after 1898,¹ and deductions from pay was apparently a rare occurrence by 1908.²

These developments may well explain the lack of interest shown at the two Clyde associations in the important shifts of law. Their collective energies were focused upon the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society and similar strategic projects, as the employers sought to counter the appeal of craft society benefits amongst their supervisors.³ Although the Benefit Society operated within the regulations of the Friendly Society Registry, its ambiguous status reflected the position of its membership who occupied (economically and legally) the border between masters and servants in industry.⁴ Even the critical Truck Committee of 1908 was unlikely to interfere in such a sensitive issue as supervisory authority, however sceptical they might be about more prosaic schemes.⁵

Benefit funds were still very much a feature of industry, although in varying forms and guises, when the controversy over Sickness and Unemployment Insurance arose during the years 1909-11. The journal Engineering recognised the close links between Workmen's Compensation and sickness insurance, stressing the need to avoid making the convalescing man more eligible than his working counterparts thereby encouraging malingering.⁶ Like many of the employers themselves, the editorial supported the ethical principle of sickness insurance

6. Rosemary Hutt, 'Trade Unions as Friendly Societies, 1912-1952' Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research VII No.1 (1955), p81 for compulsion and tendency of welfare subscriptions to diminish once union compulsion removed.
1. Cd. 2208, op. cit., Para. 58, p24, where Robinson 'speaking on behalf of the employers engaged in the Engineering, Shipbuilding and Ship-repairing trade on the North-East Coast' quoted as stating this.
2. Cd. 4442, op. cit., Para. 148, p61, for evidence of Siemens and his firm to this effect.
3. C.S.A. and N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 20.5.1896 - 14.8.1907. See chapter three above.
4. Hanes, op. cit., p20-21, for importance of foremen in legal aspects of Employers' Liability.
5. Cd. 4442, op. cit., Para. 60, p25: 'We cordially agree with much that has been said as to the part that supervision and moral influence should play in the maintenance of order in a large works. These must be the basis of any effective system of discipline..'

but warned of the economic dangers to industry and trade.¹ It was in respect to Unemployment Insurance that such papers were noticeably more progressive than the manufacturers though each shared the anxieties about possible malingering.²

Journals and trade associations also agreed upon the vital importance of deciding in which way the legislation should be administered. For under Clause 11 of the proposed Bill, it was stipulated that compensation and sickness claims should be sanctioned by an 'approved society' or local Health Committee.³ It is impossible to understand the heat generated by this principle or the struggles which continued to take place after the passage of the Act.⁴ Before the First World War the proportion of trade union funds, and particularly the craft society resources, devoted to friendly activities was much greater than it has been since.⁵ Many trade unions were themselves registered as friendly societies, although conversely bodies such as the great Orders could not exercise trade union functions.⁶ It was only by creating generous benefits that trade unionism maintained its effectiveness in sectors such as railway transport, where the employers had early devised authoritarian welfare schemes much resented by union officials.⁷ Under the terms of the National Insurance Bill such unions could apply to administer state funds and in co-operation with

6. Engineering 21.7.1911.

1. Ibid., where the editorial supports sickness insurance 'from the ethical point of view'.

2. Ibid.: 'Hitherto the payment of a lump sum has been an effective antidote to malingering, as, with the compensation sum to his credit, there was a strong inducement for the workmen to resume his weekly earnings..'

3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 12.6.1911: 'That Clause 11 providing that the consent of an approved Society (or local Health Committee) is necessary to lump sum settlements of compensation is very strongly resented.'

4. Hay, loc. cit. (1978), p120-21, gives a brief discussion with partial acknowledgement to present writer.

5. Hutt, loc. cit., p70-71 for proportions - as much as 28% of total expenditure in 1912-17 went on friendly benefits; ibid., p78-79 for greater importance of skilled craft unions.

6. See chapter six for discussion of this point.

7. Hutt, loc. cit., p81, for case of A.S.L.E.F. and N.U.R.

local officials might pay out benefits to their members as approved societies.

It was on these grounds of cost and administration that the shipbuilding and engineering employers fought against particular sections of the Bill. The Parliamentary Committee of the North West Engineers, without waiting for the members to fully express their views, proposed the resolution:¹

"That the rate of contribution imposed on the Employer is unduly heavy...the legislation of recent years had imposed a serious burden upon the Trade.../and/ the expenses of such a scheme should be shared more equitably by those interested."

Their trade journal expressed similar doubts about its equitability although was equally sensitive to the fears that National Insurance would be used to break strikes expressed by unions.² Complaints as to the burdens imposed on employers by National Insurance was not confined to Association chambers, as many local firms expressed their bitterness to shareholders and government alike.³

Criticisms of the status given to approved societies, and the scope for trade unions to qualify as approved bodies, was also widespread. Engineering suggested that Labour Exchanges rather than approved societies be made the medium of payment, since utilising the latter would:⁴

assist in maintaining the sinews of such industrial warfare as in, under present-day militant unionism, more and more becoming the chief function of these combinations of workers.

Against such a background of industrial unrest, argued the employers side, it was vital that the state should maintain a neutral position and arbitrate between the sides rather than

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 12.6.1911. Resolution on National Insurance Bill, copy forwarded to Board of Trade.
2. Engineering 21.7.1911, where it was estimated that within four years National Insurance would cost £23.31 million per annum, of which the employers would be contributing £10 million; ibid., 3.11.1911, for views on strikes and payments.
3. UGD Alexander Stephen & Sons, Minutes, 2.7.1912 (A.G.M.): 'Employers of labour have also felt that the legislation of the past few years have tended to hamper trade and to operate seriously to their disadvantage...The latest instance of this being the passing last year of the National Insurance Act which ...places a further heavy burden on Employers without any tangible benefit accruing so far as they are concerned.'
4. Engineering 3.11.1911.

delegating its legislative authority to local committees upon which trade union officials would exercise a major influence.¹

The North West resolution emphasised this point:²

"That Trade Unions providing Strike Pay should not be associated in any way with Sickness or Unemployment Benefits...If the Union is permitted to intervene [in compensation cases] considerable delay must take place ...it is believed that consent would frequently be withheld, necessitating resort to the Court..".

Given the rising number of cases under Workmen's Compensation Acts of 1897-1906, the employers clearly feared that trade unions would assume increasing control of the administrative and judicial machinery for sickness and accidents as well as unemployment.³

Despite the protests of these and many other associations, the Insurance legislation passed very quickly and the attention of the employers focused upon its implementation at the local level.⁴ The Labour Exchanges were willing to assume the duties of administering the scheme on behalf of employers,⁵ and there quickly developed a mutual interest in regulating the local labour market and protecting the Unemployment Fund against the workshy.⁶ By early 1914 the Clyde Shipbuilders formally gave their support in 'assisting to prevent exploitation of Unemployment Benefit, as when dull times come on, should the Fund be exhausted there is a danger of increase in the contributions'.⁷ The engineering employers were even more astute in their mobilisation of influence and after pressing for a postponement of the Bill, they considered ways of defending their interests against the deprivations of claimants and

1. Ibid., 21.7.1911: 'It will at once be recognised that we have here a method of strengthening the power of the trade union against the masters. They can scarcely be recognised as disinterested parties, and yet all the powers of arbitrators are conferred on them..'
2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 12.6.1911.
3. Home Office, Statistics of Compensation and of Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906...During the Year 1911 Cd. 6493 (1912), p12, for increases of 1909-11; ibid., p17-21 for detailed figures.
4. C.S.A. Minutes, 13.5.1912.
5. Ibid., Letter of Dennys to C.S.A. on offer of the Exchanges to take "the whole trouble of working the Act off our shoulders".

commercial insurance companies.¹ The firm of White engineering proposed a common defence fund for defending employers against renewed compensation actions, and went on to suggest that:²

it would be advantageous to form a Friendly Society on lines similar to the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society to induce workmen to obtain the benefits of the Insurance Act through such a Society rather than through a Trades Union.

Secretary Biggart also reported the activities of a Committee of Scottish Employers to secure concessions in the working of the Act though defiance of statutes was ruled out.³ It is unlikely that the Engineers' Association did attempt a fully fledged mutual society, given the strength of militant feeling in the A.S.E. after 1907, but it seems that individual firms did encourage workmen to enrol in acceptable approved societies operated as autonomous shop clubs.⁴ In Spring 1912 the national Federation circularised local associations on the question of 'employers existing provident clubs or funds' and requested particulars on any schemes established which registered as Approved Societies.⁵ The North West Association replied that they considered this within 'the discretion of the individual firm', rather than the association as such.⁶ Nevertheless, the Association was involved within a few months of this pronouncement when striking apprentices were denied N.H.I. contributions after joining the A.S.E. by their employers.⁷ The collective policy was to refuse negotiations with the society and to inform the Federation of the gravity of the

6. Ibid., 15.1.1914. The local Exchange Supervisor complained of local employers hiring 'large numbers of men, who at the moment of engagement are actually receiving State Unemployment Benefit' and the agreement that 'it is desirable that there should be much closer co-operation between the Labour Exchanges and Shipbuilders'.

7. Ibid., 2.2.1914.

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 28.2.1912.

2. Ibid. Letter of White Engineering Co.

3. Ibid., 'The feeling of the Committee was against defying the Act.'

4. Cd. 4442, op. cit., Para. 148, p61, for existence of shop clubs in 1908 and their support by employers such as Browne

5. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 3.5.1912.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 14.8.1912. The Association ruled that 'no anxiety should be evinced on the part of the Employers to have the Apprentices return to work'. See chapter three above for background.

situation for managerial prerogatives.¹

The National Insurance scheme had been in operation barely two years when the outbreak of War threw the whole administration out of gear.² After the initial shock of Wartime panic the high levels of employment enabled the Insurance Fund to grow whilst strengthening the movement for extension of its coverage beyond the original trades.³ Both employers and officials ultimately supported this development, culminating in the Insurance Act of 1920.⁴

The progress of Workmen's Compensation and National Insurance also illuminates the important role played by Labour Exchanges in welfare management, besides their broader functions in enhancing the co-ordination and control of labour markets.⁵ Here lay one of the crucial if least acknowledged links between private industrial and state welfare: the economic and social need for labour market controls. The Chamberlain Circular of 1886 had marked a fresh departure in unemployment policy which only came to fruition in the first decade of the new century, with the Conservatives making hesitant steps towards an overhaul of the Poor Law machinery in 1905.⁶

Both shipbuilders and engineers gave a qualified support to the movement setting up Labour Exchanges, although pressing for more direct control over their administration. During 1911 the C.S.A. appointed key members to the Advisory Trade Committee on the Exchanges and to the Committee on Juvenile Employment, the latter touching upon issues such as apprenticeship and technical education in the district.⁷ With the passing of National Insurance, these bonds became much stronger and there were regular consultations between employers and local officials on a wide range of subjects.⁸

1. Ibid., 23.9.1912.

2. Sir W. Beveridge, 'Unemployment Insurance in the War and After' in War and Insurance O.U.P. (1922), p229.

3. Ibid., p238.

4. Ibid., p240. This followed a report by a Committee of the National Industrial Conference assembled in 1919.

5. Ibid., p229-30; W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry Longmans, Green (1909/30 ed.) London, p1-3, for problem of labour markets.

Whereas most of the legislation referred to above affected the tangible benefit schemes and amount paid by employers to private and state benefits, much government legislation was concerned with the regulation of working conditions, hours and remuneration.¹ Indeed, it was often claimed that the maintenance of physical comfort and well-being in the workplace was the most fundamental aspect of welfarism.² Amongst the first and more significant ventures in state intervention was the protection of females and children under the Factory Acts, which not only enforced a standard minimum in working conditions but also brought into being the highly influential Factory Inspectorate.³ By the First World War this highly articulate body of professionals were claiming the credit for encouraging private efforts as well as state improvements in the field of industrial welfare.⁴

Scottish manufacturers were amongst the most hostile critics of the early factory movement, particularly in the textiles industry which was most directly threatened.⁵ By the 1880s the stability and prosperity of Clyde heavy industry enabled the masters to take a rather more enlightened view, and there was only limited discussion of measures which really affected factories and workshops. When in 1903 the government proposed to extend the provisions of the important 1901 Act to cover boilershops and shipyards, however, there was considerable criticism from both associations. They opposed the legislation

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6. K.D. Brown, 'Conflict in Early British Welfare Policy: The Case of the Unemployed Workmen's Bill of 1905' Journal of Modern History XLIII No.4 (1971), p627, and passim. Brown's overall account remains rather unconvincing.
 7. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 7.2.1911 - 27.2.1911. The members were Bow and Gilchrist, and Mavor and Yarrow respectively; C.f. C.S.A. Minutes, 23.5.1910, note of S.E.F. resolution to 'leave the engagement of workmen through the Exchanges to the discretion of individual employers.
 8. C.S.A. Minutes, 13.5.1912 - 15.1.1914.
 1. Johnston, loc. cit., p461-62, where hours of work, industrial health, special protection of women and children, and inspection comprise four of ten major areas of labour legislation.
 2. Newcomb, loc. cit., p553, for Welfare Workers' Association definition.
 3. C.f. Ursula R.Q. Henriques, 'An early factory inspector: James Stuart of Dunearn' Scottish Historical Review L No.149 (1971),

as objectionable, especially insofar as it 'might be used as a means to equalise prices when other conditions are not equal'.¹ The next year both bodies pressed for the exclusion of docks and engineering works having water frontages' from the Act, presumably from a reluctance to countenance the additional accident costs and safety facilities.² It might be mentioned that in very different circumstances other employers were ready to welcome legislative and legal intervention in order to protect markets and equalise conditions between manufacturers.³

Thus the relations between employers and the state on the eve of War were rather slender if growing in importance. Since the turn of the century there had been a joint Consultative Committee of engineers and shipbuilders with the Board of Trade,⁴ although co-operation with the Board had deteriorated by 1911.⁵ The long-term objective of employers, articulated during the 1890s, of securing a department (or even ministry) of commerce within the Board of Trade was still far off realisation in 1914 despite the co-operation at local level with an increasing number of state agencies.⁶

One possible reason for the rather limited influence which the shipbuilders and engineers seemed able to bring upon government, was their lack of interest in many areas of social policy besides those which directly affected their trade. Although the Engineering Federation had instructed its local constituents to set up Parliamentary Committees in 1908, the employers were still unwilling to waste their energies and

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3. especially p25, p29-31, for corrective to an over-sympathetic treatment of Factory Inspectorate however.
 4. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1917 Cd. 9108 (1918), p11.
 5. J.T. Ward, 'The Factory Reform Movement in Scotland' Scottish Historical Review XLI (1962), p101, 105; c.f. p108, for comment of operatives on certain "humane and benevolent masters".
 1. C.S.A. Minutes, 15.4.1903; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 24.4.1903.
 2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 19.12.1904.
 3. C.W. McCurdy, 'American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875-1890' Journal of Economic History XXXVIII No.3 (1978), p637-41, for some aspects of pressure from employers such as Singer.
 4. C.S.A. Minutes, 30.5.1895 - 12.6.1895, for origins of Technical Committee; ibid., 25.2.1896, for response of Ritchie; N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 1.11.1901, for resurrection of Commt.

resources on broader issues. One example of this narrowing focus was the response of the industrialists to the coming of Old Age Pensions. As early as 1892 Joseph Chamberlain, partly influenced by Blackley and Booth, had advocated state pensions and co-operation with the hostile friendly societies.¹ The Royal Commission on the Aged Poor had reported in 1895, largely reaffirming Chamberlain's arguments on the thriftiness and dignity of the respectable working classes,² although pressing more for a humanisation of the Poor Law and closer ties between industrial needs and social services.³ Having considered the perennial problem of labour market controls, the Commission supported the autonomous efforts of the societies as well as stressing the importance of employers' schemes.⁴ Despite the lethargy of the Commission and the reluctance of some societies to welcome pensions, Liberal victory in 1906 paved the way for their introduction in 1908 - without requiring any direct contributions from employers.⁵

To the larger employers, who tended to dominate trade associations in heavy industry, the financing of pensions from taxation was preferable to a charge per employee within the firm. Hence the resistance to pensions amongst the smaller manufacturers and the lack of support for such a policy from

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5. N.W.E.T.F.A. Minutes, 7.2.1911, for circular of Federation advising against communication 'either by correspondence or to investigators' of the Board of Trade.
 6. Report of speech of Dr. J. Inglis in Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow XXV (1894), pp170-81: "experience has shown the hopelessness of attempts to get our 'national palaver' to take up [industrial] questions of this sort as matters of public policy"; c.f. Engineering 17.11.1911, for Inglis letter.
 1. J.H. Treble, 'The Attitudes of Friendly Societies Towards the Movement in Great Britain for State Pensions' International Review of Social History XV (1970), p274-75; see chapter six.
 2. General Report of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor (1895) Para. 33-34, p xv.
 3. Ibid., Para. 66.
 4. Ibid., Para. 239: 'The migratory population of large towns is, we fear, very difficult to reach, but the balance of evidence [suggests]...that working men in any regular employment can make provision in friendly societies..'; Para. 293, for comments on pensions as deferred pay for industrial rather than social service when 'provided by the employer'.
 5. R.S. Churchill, Winston Churchill: The Young Statesman 1901-14 Heinemann (1967) London, p263, 302.

the large concerns within the associations.¹ This failure to condemn certain measures may be read as a tacit, if grudging, acceptance of reforms and relied upon the Employers' Parliamentary Council to defend their general interests in such matters.²

Thus the policies and influence of the engineering and shipbuilding employers on the eve of War were often complex where they were not vague and imprecise. The associations were primarily concerned with collective trading interests and labour questions, preoccupations which were reflected in their dealings with government. Whilst the directorate were anxious to maintain voluntary provisions and funds, they perceived these to be mainly within the discretion of the individual firm except where (as in the case of the approved societies) they touched upon strategic issues of industrial relations. Though the bodies can hardly be described as interventionists or collectivists when reviewing social policy, they were prepared to welcome legislation on employers' liability and compensation, factory measures and sickness insurance where they unified or consolidated previous practices and clarified questions which encouraged litigation. Moreover, the pressures upon government did not stop at the Committee stage of legislation but went on through the implementation and in the increasing contacts with state bureaucracy. It is clear that during this period welfare was changing not only in scale but in scope, and private schemes were being remoulded in accordance with changing conditions and the provision of statutory minima. Therefore it is inaccurate to suggest, as the Factory Inspectors sometimes did, that welfare was a continuum of increasingly enlightened services by conscientious employers responding to recognised needs.³

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1. T.W. Rodgers, 'Employers' Organisations, Social Policies and Social Politics, 1897-1926' Unpublished Paper at Manchester Conference on Social Policy (Sept. 1976), p4.
 2. Halevy, op. cit., p255-56, for origins of E.P.C. in 1895 under the chairmanship of the Earl of Wemyss.
 3. Cd. 7491 (Report for 1913), op. cit., p100, refers - for example - to 'the marked growth of employers' share of welfare work in industrial life as evidenced by the increasing number of delegates to the Annual Conference of Welfare Workers..'; Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1917 Cd. 9108, p17. Both sections of the Reports were written by Miss Anderson the Principal Lady Inspector.

In some respects the private schemes of employers were almost certainly being superseded by those of the state, whilst those funds which continued to operate were regulated more closely by the various Compensation, Friendly Society and Truck Acts passed before 1914. Only by allowing the workmen greater autonomy in the control of these societies could employers secure their continuation, and this was even true of client unions such as the Foremen's Benefit Society. Thus, the functions and characteristics as well as the boundaries of industrial welfare were shifting in accordance with state provisions. Over the organs of the state employers could exercise only a limited control, and were constantly struggling with organised labour inside as well as outside government administration to protect the 'neutrality' of groups and institutions which might fall under the influence of labour.¹

It is difficult to overstate the impact which the First World War had upon industrial relations and production, and via them upon industrial welfare. Although there were clear links between management authority, state control, labour organisation and industrial welfare in the pre-War years, it was the pressure of Wartime production which telescoped these developments into the space of months rather than decades. As one informed observer commented in 1919:²

The vital change which this war has wrought is in the sudden shaking together of isolated movements into the beginnings of a co-ordinated, associated effort, and in the bringing to birth of a wider general perception of the value of sustained application of method, science, and above all imagination, to the socially constructive reforms called for in industrial life.

The independant questions of peacetime, such as technical and scientific education, production innovation, management organisation and the provision of welfare were now fused in the drive for

1. Engineering 21.7.1911, for example, argued: 'The legislature ought in every way to promote the interests of the industry, and these can only be advanced by encouraging friendly intercourse and the recognition of mutual responsibility by co-operation and consultation...that co-operation between master and man essential to the peaceful pursuit of industry.'
2. Cmd. 340 (Report for 1918), op. cit., p28; c.f. ibid., p.v: 'Few questions affecting the industrial worker have been brought more prominently forward during the war than that of Welfare. Long before 1914 there had been an increasing desire on the part of enlightened individual employers to improve..conditions..'

improved efficiency and greater labour control.¹ By a variety of measures, particularly the emergency Orders, the Memoranda of the Munition Workers' Committee, the Welfare Department of the Ministry of Munitions, and the important Police, Factories, (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1916, the state intervened far more directly in the regulation of employment and working conditions.² The government not only maintained minimum standards for the traditionally unfree agents of women and juveniles,³ but also controlled the employment of males and made a major contribution to management organisation by funding the scientific and industrial research during the War years.⁴

The close connection between managerial prerogatives and state authority is epitomised in the abiding concern with supervisory powers and organisation throughout the War.⁵ Factory Inspectors had hailed the spread of female welfare supervisors before the conflict as a major advance in business administration of the human factor,⁶ and the emphasis upon grew with the difficulties experienced in disciplining and training recruits to the controlled industries.⁷

At the same time the resistance to both intensified supervision and extended welfare benefits demonstrated the limitations of innovation in such industries as engineering and shipbuilding, and the need (as far as industrialists were concerned) for the incorporation of the workforce into some aspects of management

1. Health of Munition Workers' Committee, Welfare Supervision Cd. 8151 (1916), p2. See chapters two and three above also.
2. Cmd. 340, op. cit., p.v; ibid., p.iii for the importance of the 1916 Police, Factories Act.
3. Cd. 8570 (Report for 1916) op. cit., p3, for background of facilities for females which 'has long been recognised by the Factory Department'; ibid., p8, for Wartime developments; Cd. 9108 (Report for 1917), op. cit., p10, for progress to 1917; Health of Munition Workers' Committee, Juvenile Employment Cd. 8362 (1916), Para. 18, p6, for transitions in boy employment.
4. Privy Council Committee for Scientific and Industrial Research, Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research VIII (1916), p42; Health of Munition Workers' Committee, Industrial Fatigue and its Causes Cd. 8213 (1916), Para. 17, p11, for the comment on Committee on the future use of research to 'the science of management.'
5. Cd. 9108, op. cit., p13-14: 'there is seen a tendency to develop the duties of superintendants and welfare supervisors in a managerial direction...skilled supervision of the technical conditions

administration.¹ Whilst it is untenable to portray Whitleyism as simply a functional response to the rise of militant trade unionism, there is little doubt that the spirit of participation permeated through welfare experiments as the 'true' meaning of the human factor in business.²

The engineering and shipbuilding employers were, because of their vital importance to munitions production, one of the groups most directly affected by government control and the renewed protection of the workforce. Here the divisions between different areas of social policy: between the direct control of the labour market, the regulation of working conditions, hours and wages, and the physical coercion of recalcitrant employees were most transparent.³ In their desire to maximise output within the shortest possible time, the state agencies were less concerned with the prerogatives of either management or labour than hitherto.

Under the constraints of state control and labour unrest, the engineering and shipbuilding employers were willing and even anxious to see the extension of government regulations. They welcomed the advent of the Central Control Board dealing with liquor sales, only arguing for a stricter regime of prohibition to accompany the spread of industrial canteens and healthy recreation.⁴ The Police, Factories Act of 1916 was accepted with hardly a voice raised in dissension, and the Orders prescribing the facilities needed for female

5. 'of welfare leading to enhanced physical, moral and mental fitness of workers, is going to play a large part in "management" of the future.' See chapter three above for supervisory problems.
6. Cd. 6239 (Report for 1911), op. cit., p159; Cd. 7491 (Report for 1913), op. cit., p100-101, for supervision of clubs also.
7. Cd. 8570, op. cit., p8-10, on supervisors and state as well as employers' authority; Cmd. 340, op. cit., p44, for welfare as 'an integral part of the general management'.
1. Ibid., p43, for resistance; Newcomb, loc. cit., p566-68, for entrenched hostility of unions to industrial welfare before and during War.
2. Ibid., p560-61, for Whitleyism and welfare; H. Chellew, Human and Industrial Efficiency University of London Press (1919), p149-50, for contrast of scientific and welfare management.
3. History of the Ministry of Munitions (1922) V pt.iii, p175-76; see chapter three for a detailed discussion.
4. C.S.A. Minutes, 13.6.1915 - 30.8.1915.

employment at workshops and yards.¹ Whereas before the War such a rapid extension of regulations would have provoked bitter protests, the opportunity for making large profits on government contracts and the ability to write off parts of welfare expenditure against Excess Profits Duty convinced many employers of the practicality of the facilities.

At the same time it is important to realise that the government hesitated to enforce any but the most essential conditions upon the employers, and preferred to persuade and educate the firms into a broader perspective.² Where the Welfare Department of the Ministry encroached too obviously upon management territory, the associations resisted official interference without hesitation.³

Moreover, the First World War involved not only considerable changes in state authority but also shifts in the relationship between employers and the state, and the institutional framework by which these relations were conducted. The government finally considered re-organising the Board of Trade, with a Department of Commerce and Industry, along lines long advocated by large associations such as those on Clydeside.⁴ Numerous committees and consultations were set up in the later part of the War, culminating in the Joint Industrial Conference of 1919 which discussed (among other things) basic conditions in industry and state welfare benefits.⁵ Thus the evolution of industrial

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1. C.f. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 5.4.1917, complaining that Order 49 meant that the opportunities for deducting costs of welfare supervision from orders were diminishing.
 2. History of the Ministry of Munitions V pt.iii, p12; c.f. Cmd. 340, op. cit., p.v: 'But it is not by the enforcement of Orders and compulsory requirements alone that steady advance is made.'
 3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 5.4.1917. Various firms complained about the excessively attentive visits of Miss Hamilton, and one suggested that 'the employers should oppose attempts to establish State Officials in new positions'.
 4. Board of Trade, Memorandum with Respect to the Re-Organisation of the Board of Trade Cd. 8912 (1918), especially Para. 6, p3.
 5. Industrial Conference, Report of Provisional Joint Committee... of Industrial Conference..1919 Cmd. 501 (1920), p14-15, for summary of initial recommendations.

welfare in the years 1914-20 was shaped by the economic conditions and the institutional environment as well as the diverse social movements of the period, taking impressions from the closer links of state and employers as much as from the pressures of Wartime production.¹

In contrasting the experiences of Clyde engineers and shipbuilders with those of the Lanarkshire coal masters, it is important to underline the quite different productive and market conditions in which the latter were operating. One leading employer estimated that wages represented fully two thirds of operating costs in collieries, and any legislation proposing a levy on workers employed would obviously have serious consequences for the industry.² On the other hand, mining was an occupation notorious for its unhealthy and hazardous working conditions and one with a long history of state regulation and supervision.³ The antagonism of the owners to this progressive interference tended to vary with the erratic trading conditions as well as the scope of the measures concerned.

The Lanarkshire Coal Masters' Association was formed in 1886-1887 following the upsurge of trade union activity in the field, and resistance to unionism remained its *raison d'être* despite occasional attempts at output restriction agreements.⁴ From the early 1890s the Association also fought the mounting campaign for restriction of adult hours in mines, and pointed out to the Royal Commission on Labour the 'injury likely to result to the workmen and to the trade of the country from a limitation of the output of coal'.⁵ After the long struggles of the previous decade, the Liberal administration introduced the Eight Hours Bill in 1908 - the first real legislation to limit the hours of adult males in Britain - against the fierce opposition of the Lanarkshire and other masters' associations, which sought to mobilise the whole business community against the measure.⁶

1. Chu, loc. cit., p504, for broader argument that the 'nature and extent of the services...tend to vary not only with the degree of industrial development but also with the social structure and institutional environment'.
2. Sir Charles Macara, Recollections p217, quoted in Hay, op. cit. (1978), p40.
3. Henriques, op. cit., p108-09.

Once the measure was passed disputes continued over its implementation,¹ and the masters were not dismayed by their previous defeats in fighting the concessions in the Minimum Wage Bill of 1912.² Once the latter was passed, the coal owners joined with the Pig Iron Traders in ensuring that the enforcement of the legislation would favour the masters much more strongly than the terms of the Act suggested.³ Thus it is apparent that the regulation of conditions, hours and wages of labour by government was a process negotiated at different stages with the employers bargaining well after legislation passed Parliament.⁴

The Lanarkshire Masters were also disturbed at the coming of Workmen's Compensation, understandably given the frequency of accidents and diminishing returns at coalfields such as theirs.⁵ After its passage they commented on the efforts of the Parliamentary Joint Committee which had lobbied Salisbury and Chamberlain on the question, and though the Prime Minister accepted some modifications:⁶

the Act still contains many provisions which are distinctly objectionable and likely to lead to much litigation, which, it was hoped, such a measure would have minimised.

In response to the increased liabilities which employers now faced the masters joined with others in forming the Mutual Insurance Association of Scottish Coal Owners, and the Secretary of the L.C.M.A. (Robert Baird) became chairman of the new venture.⁷ The affect of the Act was also to discourage the continuation of employers' schemes and autonomous friendly societies, which had previously flourished in the collieries (although with very

4. Lanarkshire Coal Masters' Association (L.C.M.A.), Annual Reports SRO CB 8/2, Annual Report 22.2.1888; A.R. 28.2.1906, for attempt at output control.
5. CB 8/2, A.R. 24.2.1892.
6. Ibid., 26.2.1908. The Association canvassed opinion of 'all the Chambers of Commerce in the country, and to Associations of Employers who are large consumers of coal, which..may result in strong opposition being made to any Bill..'. The Association distinguished between measure demanded by Miners and government's.
1. Ibid., A.R. 23.2.1910.
2. See Parliamentary Debates XXXV No.25 (1912), Cl. 1714; ibid., No. 27, Cl. 2081, for contrasting speeches of Asquith and Balfour on this legislation.

limited support from the owners) in Scotland.¹ This move only reinforced the trend towards employers' mutuals in the coal and iron trades at this period.²

The Lanarkshire owners were equally sceptical about the value of the National Insurance Act, although the regional body seems to have left matters more to the Coal Owners of Scotland by this date.³ Once the measure became law the L.C.M.A. did co-operate with the Miners' Federation in improving services such as medical attention for the wives and dependants of workmen, paid for by deductions from wages and dependant upon the arrangements of employers in this respect.⁴

Whilst the coal industry, and its iron and steel connections, was not as directly affected by Wartime production and dilution schemes as were engineering and shipbuilding trades, output came to be as closely controlled (if not more so) by government by the end of hostilities.⁵ As such there was considerable

3. Scottish Iron Masters' Association, Minutes (1899-1917), SRA: Minutes, 29.5.1906, for co-operation with Baird in opposition to Eight Hours Act; *ibid.*, 4.3.1908, for protest that the Bill if 'passed into law would inevitably cause the most serious injury to the Iron and Steel Industries'; *ibid.*, 1912-13 for strategies against Smillie and Scottish Miners.
4. S.I.A. Minutes, 'Explanatory Memorandum on the Iron and Steel and Allied Trades Employers' Federation of Great Britain' (1906) for formation of Parliamentary pressure group; *ibid.*, 17.5.1906.
5. See chapter five above for discussion of coal industry.
6. L.C.M.A. A.R., 16.2.1898, the Act placed 'another heavy financial burden upon Colliery Owners'.
7. Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation, Minutes of Evidence... Vol. II (Minutes of Evidence with Index) Cd. 2334 (1904), Evidence of Robert Baird Q 6187 - 190. The venture was called the Scottish Mineowners' Defence and Mutual Assurance Association Ltd.
1. *Ibid.*, Q 6232 - 235. Baird commented that there were no certified Schemes and the friendly societies were traditionally the independent organisations of the men; L.C.M.A. A.R., 11.2.1898 stressed that membership was optional but strongly recommended.
2. E. Wigham, The Power to Manage Macmillan (1973), p12-20, for Iron Trades Employers' Insurance Association; Geoffrey Drage, The Labour Problem (1896) London, p136 for growth of mutuals and particular case of I.T.E.A. as the 'first institution of this kind'.
3. See below for C.O.S. survey.
4. L.C.M.A. A.R., 30.4.1913; c.f. Hay, op. cit. (1978), p40.

pressure from unions and officials to improve the conditions and services in the industry, as well as to yield concessions and elements of control to workmen.¹ In such a situation the employers felt the need for greater organisation and solidarity as government commissions questioned their practices, hence the growing importance of the Scottish association as the spokesman for their collective interests.²

The Coal Owners of Scotland was formed in the 1890s partly in response to the increasing amount of legislation which touched the industry directly or indirectly. After 1898 the Scottish body helped to administer the Mutual Insurance Association, and ensured that claims (and premiums) were kept down to a fraction of wage costs.³

Like the Lanarkshire body, the C.O.S. resisted what they regarded as undue discrimination against the industry and extravagant concessions to the miners' unions. Their opposition to the Minimum Wage Bill, for example, was justified in terms ranging from the discouragement of malingering and output restriction to the defence of property against 'a Socialistic policy having for its object the nationalisation of the mines'.⁴ Observers as well as participants in these pre-War struggles emphasised the class antagonism implicit in the campaigns for state regulation of hours and wages, and the growing support for nationalisation in some areas.⁵

One of the most serious grievances, already discussed above,⁶ lay in the housing conditions of the Scottish miners which led ultimately to the appointment of the Royal Commission on Housing in 1912.⁷ This movement of protest was subdued but not stifled by the outbreak of War, and again became a major issue during

5. L.C.M.A. A.R., 15.4.1918, for complaints of owners.
1. Ibid., especially A.R., 3.3.1919 for hostility; C.R. Borland, 'The Committee Movement in Industry' Welfare Work (June, 1928), p99, for overall development of committees.
2. L.C.M.A. A.R., 15.4.1918, when the proposals for an Industrial Committee had been proposed to the Owners of Scotland.
3. Coal Owners of Scotland SRO CB 20/1, Register of Accident Cases.
4. Ibid., Memorandum on 'The Coal Crisis' (12.3.1912) in CB 7 8, p14.
5. Parliamentary Debates XXXV No.27 (1912) Cl. 2080-82, Balfour making precisely this point.

the sitting of the Sankey Commission in 1919.¹ Only with difficulty did the Association extricate itself from the bitter criticisms levelled by the unions on this point, and thereafter the masters were careful to improve the substance as well as the image of miners' housing in Scotland.²

The case of housing provides a good opportunity to compare the attitudes of shipbuilding and engineering employers with those of colliery owners, and their respective policies on state intervention. On Clydeside as well as in Lanarkshire's colliery villages there were definite signs that the last years of peace saw a deterioration in class relations and an erosion of the fabric of community life within specific areas. This was the consequence not only of increasing pressures upon housing stock and rent levels in locales such as Govan and Partick, but also of mounting industrial tensions and the emergence of new political forces (particularly the I.L.P.) in the struggle for control of local institutions.³

It was largely in response to the escalation of industrial and social conflicts, more particularly in the mining industry, that the government felt compelled to intervene in a wide range of areas before 1914 and again after 1918. Whilst the state had entered the complex field of housing provision only very tentatively in 1890-1909, the mounting tensions were such that industrialists supported and even demanded further government commitments in the years 1914-19. They not only took advantage of the Public Works Loan Board to help finance their own ventures, but insisted that the Ministry of Health and other

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6. See chapters six and seven above for employers associations and development of coalmining communities in these years.
 7. Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial Population in Scotland, Rural and Urban Cd. 8731 (1917), Para. 859-60, p124, for Commission's account of its origins.
 1. C.O.S. CB 7 5/40, "Notes and Suggestions...as regards the Policy to be followed in...the Housing Question.." (1919).
 2. P.H. White, 'Some Aspects of Urban Development by Colliery Companies, 1919-1939' Manchester School of Economics XXIII (1955), p275-77, and passim for subsequent building; C.O.S., The Other Side of the Miner's Life (1936), for sympathetic review of these developments.
 3. This is the argument followed in chapter seven above; see also J. Melling 'The Glasgow rent strike..' Scottish Labour History

agencies fill the gap left by the contraction of lower middle class investment in housing.¹

So although there was no collective activity in housing amongst the coal masters, the emergence of the housing question as a strategic issue and the prospect of full state control in industrial as well as social questions led them to favour a particular form of intervention. Yet in this respect, as in the fields of friendly provisions and pension benefits, social policy provided a minimum to meet the most pressing needs and allowed the continuation of employers' ventures in welfare just as it ensured capitalist control of industry.

The Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and Social Politics

Whereas such trade associations as those of engineers, shipbuilders and coal owners were almost inevitably concerned with legislation which affected their industries, the Chambers of Commerce provided the most authentic and influential voice of local business communities as a whole. Glasgow's Chamber of Commerce was amongst the oldest and respected chambers in Britain, having been founded in 1783 when the commercial and trading interests predominated in the city.² Although it could not hope to fulfill the needs of individual trades, the Chamber remained a prestigious body - acknowledging the power of the employer associations by granting fifteen of them ex officio membership of its governing Board in 1908.³ Amongst the latter were the shipbuilding, steelmaking and coalmining interests which dominated the regional economy by the turn of the century.⁴

The relative influence of such chambers with central government is somewhat uncertain, though it is significant that Glasgow Chamber claimed an advisory and consultative rather than executive

3. History Society Journal XIII (1979).

1. White, loc. cit., p276, for Board; see also case of Beardmores in chapter four above, for use of Board in 1913-14; C.O.S. CB 7 5/41, Typescript (18.11.1924), p1-3 for demise of petite bourgeois.

2. George Stewart, The Progress of Glasgow...During the Last Century (From the records of Glasgow Chamber of Commerce) Private Circ. (1883) Glasgow, p1-2. Stewart claimed that since 1883 the body had 'discussed every public question...and..largely influenced the legislation of the time.'

3. Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, Minutes of Chamber, 20.1.1908.

role for the business interests of the city. As President M'Arly told his members in 1910:¹

I must acknowledge that our representations to the various State Departments have, as before, received the recognition and consideration they merited, our functions are advisory, and while not claiming that our Chambers of Commerce influence to any real degree the commercial policy of the country, still, we are the means of drawing together the commercial community and the executive government.

The Chamber joined with the associations in pressing for more permanent consultative machinery between business and government, and never tired of emphasising the virtues which 'practical men' in industry and commerce possessed.

Given the heavy industrial base to the regional economy, the preoccupation of the Glasgow Chamber with measures affecting conditions and hours in factories and mines as well as liability and compensation for accidents is understandable. Yet the members were also deeply concerned with the broader problems of labour legislation and social policy, and it is this breadth of vision along with flexibility of opinion - possibly reflecting the wider interests represented at meetings - which distinguishes Chamber from association proceedings.

Factory legislation was a matter of keen discussion during the 1870s, with Mundella's Bill of 1872 and the successful measure of 1874 both criticised as unnecessary.² By the middle of the 'eighties the Chamber was pushing for a reversal of certain provisions and resisted the Bill brought in by Sir Henry James in 1891.³ On the other hand, the leadership refused to support the campaign for a repeal of Factory legislation in 1895, merely opposing the fresh restrictions proposed in 1896.⁴ Similarly its policy was 'generally averse' to Henderson's Sweated Industries proposal of 1908, and here the textile interest may have swayed opinion, but did little to pursue its opponent.⁵

4. Ibid., 20.1.1908, for conflicting duties of Colville and Dixon on Chamber and Coal Masters' Association.

1. Ibid., Annual Report 1909 & Presidential Address, 17.1.1910.

2. Ibid., 13.5.1872.

3. Ibid., 11.1.1886 - 21.2.1891.

4. Ibid., 21.1.1895 - 20.1.1896.

5. Ibid., 20.1.1908.

The Chamber showed itself significantly more progressive when dealing with Mines Regulation legislation, reviewing Cardiff Chamber's scheme for voluntary provisions and accident benefits in 1871,¹ and approving of the 1887 Bill investigated by Glasgow's Home Affairs Committee.² The production and consumption of coal in the area was sufficient to ensure the Chamber's opposition to the Eight Hours movement, and though the final Act secured peace in the trade it was still being condemned in 1910.³

Employers' Liability was being actively debated by the Chamber from 1878 when Donaldson's Bill was followed by Brassey's and the Government's measure, the latter being favoured by the Glasgow businessmen. The Chamber was anxious that a moderate measure should be passed since it was 'exceedingly desirable that some measure should be framed, likely to settle definitely the question of Employers' liability'.⁴ Once introduced the same body was determined to defend the contracting out clause in the law and objected to Burt's 1885 proposal to 'take away the freedom which Employers and Employees presently enjoy' in this respect.⁵ They went on to suggest that in any litigation the presence and amount of benefits provided within the firm should be taken into account - a clear recognition of the significance of shop clubs and other schemes.⁶ For similar reasons the members expressed reservations about Asquith's intentions in 1893, although there was a narrow vote (6 to 5) in the Committee and contrary advice from Alexander Cross M.P. when the Chamber backed the Lords rejection of the Bill.⁷

By 1897 the Glasgow directorate had recognised the inevitability of further Compensation reform and moved strongly in favour of comprehensive insurance funded by the state:⁸

..if it is right that workmen should be compensated for injury by pure accident, this should be done by the State, not by the individual in whose employment

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1. Ibid., 8.5.1871. Cardiff suggested an insertion in the 1871 Bill to levy a compulsory rate on landowners, coalowners and workmen.
 2. Ibid., 11.7.1887.
 3. Ibid., 20.1.1908 - 17.1.1910. President M'Arly referred to the 'disastrous effect on output' which the measure had.
 4. Ibid., 13.5.1878.
 5. Ibid., 18.1.1886.

the accident has chanced to occur...Provision should be made for the permanent appointment and payment by the Government of medical practitioners as recognised examiners in connection with all claims for accidents.

When faced with the prospect of mounting costs and considerable burdens placed upon particular trades and firms, many employers were prepared to welcome state intervention in industrial questions.

The Chamber seems to have ultimately accepted the necessity for Workmen's Compensation, but found the subsequent Bill of Herbert Gladstone (in 1906) too great an extension of previous legislation 'considering how relatively short a time it was since the principle of compensation had been introduced'.¹

It seems that like other organisations the Chamber varied and shifted over issues like Compensation, developing strategies and tactics in accordance with external circumstances and internal divisions rather than having simply one policy on the question.

This was also the case with the reception of the National Insurance Bill, a programme of reform which divided the business community throughout the country. Even the progressive Chamber at Birmingham resolved that it would impose a heavy burden on industry,² and Glasgow assembled an impressive deputation 'representative of the Manufacturing and Commercial interests' to attend Lloyd George.³ Along with the other members of the Association of Chambers of Commerce, Glasgow supported the

6. Ibid., Glasgow Chamber's petition against the innovation noted that in determining compensation a court 'should take into consideration the value of any payment or contribution made by the Employer, to or for the Employee..or to any Insurance or Compensation Fund..'
7. Ibid., 15.1.1894.
8. Ibid., 'Representation of the Glasgow Chamber..' (16.6.1897) in Minutes; c.f. Speech of Montgomery in Commons in 1906, Parliamentary Debates 155 (1906) Cl. 548, in Hayes, op. cit. p41-43, on demand of smaller employers for state scheme.
1. Chamber Minutes, 21.1.1907.
2. C.f. J.R. Hay, 'The British Business Community, Social Insurance and the German Example' Unpublished Berlin Conference Paper (December 1978), p14-15, for progressive stand of Birmingham which Hay credits with major significance; Hay, loc. cit. (1977) p441 also.
3. Chamber Minutes, 14.8.1911.

Dublin resolution calling for a delay in the Bill's passage, 'to allow of more mature consideration' and the platform which gave qualified support to the legislation whilst criticising its practical implementation.¹ Despite these expressions of concern and consternation the Asquith government pushed through the measure amidst protests from employers and business men.²

Although the Finance Act of 1909 affected industry and employment less directly than Workmen's Compensation and National Insurance, the Chamber's position as the spokesman on broader questions made it the natural forum of industrial opinion. At an extraordinary general meeting in Glasgow, 'an overwhelming majority' of the membership condemned the People's Budget as inequitable and financially unsound, involving serious injury to trade and industry.³ During the subsequent constitutional crisis the Chamber even encouraged the Lords' resistance, arguing that the Bill rather than their opposition was unconstitutional.⁴ Only on rare occasions was such economic Adullamism apparent, reflecting the general concordance and co-operation of objectives between business and government.

One area in which employers were anxious to exert influence and avoid alienating officials was that of labour legislation dealing with disputes and trade unionism. Just as in social policy the employers were caught between their desire to protect private interests and schemes, and the recognition of political necessities, so in labour legislation they shifted between the defence of managerial prerogatives and the acceptance of increasing state regulation in union matters. There was not only variation of strategy according to the situation and diversity of opinion amongst the shifting balance of interests,

1. Ibid., 11.9.1911. Resolution of Association of Chambers of Commerce reprinted: "...while fully alive to the advantages intended to be gained by the Health Section of the National Insurance Bill, [the A.C.C.] views with great anxiety the heavy burden imposed thereby upon production...It also feels that the provisions relating to Unemployment relieve merely the evils without removing the cause thereof..."; c.f. Sydney Buxton speech Parliamentary Debates 5th Series 20 (1911), Cl. 179.
2. C.f. Hay, loc. cit. (1977), p453-44 for slightly different emphasis in interpretation of these developments.
3. Chamber Minutes, 17.6.1909.
4. Ibid., 8.11.1909.

but also quite distinct long-term objectives which were not coincidental.

Glasgow Chamber's approaches to labour legislation took three main forms: support for the principle of arbitration and conciliation, resistance to militant unionism and approval of such judicial discrimination as Taff Vale, and opposition to the Liberal Trade Disputes Act. London Chamber actually led moves to press government into appointing a Labour Conciliation Committee 'for the adjustment of Labour Disputes', in the troubled year 1889.¹ Glasgow followed the next year by passing a resolution in favour of boards of conciliation and arbitration, after the experiences of the serious railway strike at the city.² Again in 1896 the Chamber cited the example of the iron and steel industry where reductions of wages had been accomplished without strikes or lock-outs.³

Whilst advocating the spread of conciliation and arbitration the Chamber was hostile to the attempts to reverse Taff Vale, urging M.P.s to destroy the attempts made in 1902 to that effect.⁴ They likewise attacked Dilke's Bill of 1906 for its protection of unions against tortious acts conducted by members, seeing that 'there is no adequate reason why Trade Unions or other Associations should be exempted.'⁵ This argument was reiterated by President Dunlop during the worsening industrial conflicts of 1911, when he called attention to the 'personal violence used and damage done to property by workmen on strike' and the abuse of peaceful picketing.⁶

It is only by recognising the importance of these conflicts and measures that we can appreciate the significance of the

1. Ibid., 13.1.1890.
2. Ibid., 19.1.1891 - 18.1.1892. According to the Annual Report of latter date, Alexander Cross M.P. had suggested petitioning Parliament 'to pass a short Act to prevent such lamentable occurrences...'
3. Ibid., 18.1.1897; c.f. Scottish Pig Iron Traders, Conciliation Board Minutes (Printed) No. 2, p38, for comments on Cronin on Duke of Devonshire's advice; Scottish Ironmasters' Association, Minutes, op. cit., 17.5.1906 for activities in Parliament.
4. Chamber Minutes, 17.1.1903, for letters to M.P.s.
5. Ibid., 21.1.1907.
6. Ibid., 14.8.1911.

later struggles over shop clubs, certified schemes and approved societies.¹ Although it may be true that in the longer term the incorporation of trade unions into the administration of state insurance served to strengthen civil society, employers could be forgiven for fearing the increase of their power and influence in the immediate context of the years 1910-14.² They perceived the need to contain the threat of both organised labour and 'socialistic' legislation by a combination of private initiative and public endeavour. The fact that Chambers such as Glasgow eventually accepted even the most radical measures once passed should not obscure the force of their opposition to certain reforms. Rather, this indicates that ultimately the employers had more in common with the government - and too much at stake to threaten its legitimate duties - than with a labour movement which expressed reservations about both private and state welfare in this period.³

Firms and Associations in the West Riding of Yorkshire

Given the similarity in views and policies between the trade associations and the Chamber of Commerce in the Glasgow area, it is safe to assume that the latter - whilst taking a rather broader perspective - reflected the influence of heavy industry within the regional economy. The emphasis within those trades of particular kinds of welfare, such as heavy infrastructural building programmes and strategic schemes such as the Foremen's Mutual Society, coupled with the existence of benefits among the well organised workmen ensured certain responses to state reforms. The main considerations of the employers were those of market and trading prospects, calculation of tangible costs and benefits,

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1. E. Halevy, The Rule of Democracy (1905-14) Benn (1961 ed.) London p359-61 for a useful account of provisions of Act of 1911 for trade unions and approved societies.
 2. Hutt, loc. cit., p76-77, for influence of later National Insurance on trade unions; G.A. Johnston, 'Recent International Developments of Social Work in Industry' International Labour Review XVIII (1928), p345-46, for friendly benefits and state.
 3. Chamber Minutes, 17.10.1910. M'Arly's Address: "...the great essentials to our continued commercial success must ever be prudence, capacity, and honesty in manufacture" and "if we are to keep our high position as a great industrial country, confidence must be maintained."; Wilson and Levy, op. cit., p55, for example of working class attitudes; Forward 14.3.1914. for reservations on National Insurance.

control over the administration of services, the future of private schemes or provisions, and so forth. Whilst there may have been considerable expansion in coalmining, steelmaking and shipbuilding, profit margins were affected by trend factors (such as diminishing returns in coal) as well as cyclical fluctuations.

The West Riding presents quite distinctive feature of industrial development and economic structure, with wool textiles (along with engineering and coalmining) dominating the regional economy.¹ Like many sections of Scottish heavy industry, textiles retained its labour-intensive character although there were important advances in the substitution, dilution and displacement of male labour after 1875. Facing increasing international competition and the resurgence of trade unionism in the 1880s, many woolen manufacturers were hostile to fresh regulations and constraints although the expanding clothing interest were much more sympathetic to improvement of conditions and the eradication of workshop 'sweating'.² Also, the long tradition of female and juvenile employment appears to have softened the employers' attitudes on official inspection and encouraged a movement towards both private and public provision. Once again it is vital to emphasise the qualitative differences to which the workforce and operating conditions, and the distinctive preoccupations of leading employers with particular kinds of benefits and legislation.

It was noted in the closing years of the First World War that clothing establishments included the notorious sweatshops of London and Leeds, but also the 'great clothing factories where...a high standard has been attained by the voluntary action of the employers'.³ Factors such as scale and progressive management reinforced the tendency of welfarism to spread, more especially where factories were located in isolated districts.⁴

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1. See chapter five above for a discussion of textiles and coal.
 2. Particularly prominent were Barrans; see below.
 3. Cmd. 340 (Factory Report for 1918), p34.
 4. Ibid., p35; c.f. p38, where Report notes that 84% of Leeds clothing factories employing over 100 people had established mess-rooms by 1918.

Facing as they did, much better prospects in export markets and with encouraging domestic demand for ready-made products, the mass-production clothiers were willing to improve working conditions and provide such amenities as would sustain the physical efficiency of the workforce.

Amongst the most prominent and successful of these new employers were the firm of John Barran & Co., who rose to become the largest concern of its kind before 1914.¹ When the Trade Boards Act of 1909 was passed, it received the support of J.N. Barran and his fellow-directors at Leeds, who voluntarily raised such rates as were below the suggested minimum.² The family enterprise also opposed the sweating practices of their smaller rivals and encouraged the campaign against primitive conditions at the turn of the century.³

Unlike some other leading employers, Barrans did not operate their own shop clubs or Certified Scheme after the passing of the 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act though they waited until 1907 before accepting commercial insurance.⁴ Instead the firm favoured the internal (and autonomous) sick societies of their employees, thereby involving themselves only in marginal aspects of administration. When the National Insurance Bill was introduced, the directors hastened to post notices:⁵

recommending our workpeople to join some good approved Friendly Societies for the purpose of the working of the Act, and that a short list of suitable Societies be given [to the workpeople] as a general guide.

The Barrans also provided facilities for any such Society representatives to address their employees on the subject of insurance provision, though when applied to by the Amalgamated Union of Clothiers' Operatives for permission to address the labour force on the issue, the directors replied 'saying we were not giving permission to any Approved Societies to address our workpeople on the subject'.⁶ It was precisely this kind of

1. See chapter five above for a full discussion of Barrans.
2. John Barran & Co., Barran Coll. MS 30, Minutes (1903-14), Minute 5.7.1909.
3. Ibid., MS 28, 'Newspaper Cuttings (1879-1910)'. These cuttings contain a large number on the sweating controversy.
4. MS 30, Minutes, 1.7.1907. The rate quoted was 2/6 % on wages.
5. Ibid., 17.6.1912.
6. Ibid., 15.7.1912.

preferential treatment and 'misguided individual effort' (on the part of employers and workmen alike), which the labour supporters of National Insurance feared and campaigned against though with only partial success.¹ Since the Act incorporated elements of public funding and private agency, the struggle for control of its administration continued long after the initial controversy had faded.²

One important reason for the support given to National Insurance by Barrans was their ability to absorb the additional costs by passing this on to their customers, thereby transferring the burden to consumers in an expanding market.³ Similarly, increasing production during the War enabled them to follow state directives urging the appointment of Welfare Workers to supervise the female employees.⁴ Other employers were less fortunately placed and much less optimistic about the fresh burdens which reform imposed.

Another influential manufacturer who presided over the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce without ever himself becoming very wealthy, was George Thomson of Woodhouse. Besides being an outstanding business welfarist, with an impressive range of social services covering all grades of employee, Thomson remained a firm advocate of Christian Socialism and a prominent member of the co-operative movement.⁵ Being a vice-president of the Huddersfield Liberal Association and ultimately Member of Parliament, Thomson devoted his maiden speech to supporting the case for state old age pensions.

These individuals were certainly unusual in their strong commitment to radical policies, but they were far from unique amongst the leading employers of Leeds and Bradford. These businessmen, who had been savagely attacked as amoral by George Weerth in the 1840s, appear to have given a sympathetic reception to the movement for improved conditions and relations

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1. Forward 14.3.1914. This I.L.P. weekly gave qualified support to the Act, as one step forward in rescuing the 'Collectivist department of insurance from the domain of private exploitation ...and misguided individual effort...'
 2. Hutt, loc. cit., p76-78, for discussion over long-term.
 3. MS 30, Minutes, 29.12.1911 - 15.4.1912.
 4. MS 31, Minutes (1914-21), 22.12.1916.

after 1850.¹ Certainly the well-known schemes of textiles firms, ranging from the mills of Salt, Illingworth, Holden and Priestman to the dyeworks of figures such as Ripley, indicate a strong commitment to industrial welfare.² Only with the deterioration of trading conditions and labour discipline in the 1880s were reappraisals necessary. Even then the larger units continued and expanded their benefits in accordance with needs, and their attitudes on state reform were by no means reactionary or simple.³

The natural forum for discussion on state legislation, particularly in view of the weakness of trade organisation amongst the manufacturers, was the Chamber of Commerce at both Leeds and Bradford. In both cases there were strong competing influences, whether great bankers like the Becketts to merchant traders like Barings, besides textile industrialists. There was also the broad difference in economic interests with Leeds being at once more varied and successful in its fresh activities after 1875. It is probable that this economic environment, as well as the specific position of each employer, would heavily affect the policies and groupings within the assembly. The fact that the Leeds Chamber excluded, if only by custom rather than rule, the emergent retailing section of the city helps to explain its decline in the years 1872-92.⁴ Like Glasgow it was ultimately persuaded of the need to assimilate the new elements in its midst, if only because of the growing volume of public legislation.

Among the most important measures discussed by the Leeds Chamber were Factory, Employers' Liability, and Workmen's Compensation reforms. The growing awareness of foreign

5. See chapters five and eight for a discussion of Thomson.
1. George Weerth, Werke [Collected Works] Vol. III (1884) Berlin. Translated A. Farmer (1976), Mimeo; p164, 192, etc; c.f. L. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels on Britain Fontana (1967), p542 (letter Marx to Engels, 22.6.1867, for similar comments.
2. See chapter five and discussion below.
3. C.f. M. Beresford, The Leeds Chamber of Commerce: a centenary history Pub. by Chamber (1951) Leeds, p98, for view of narrow and apolitical Chamber.
4. Leeds Chamber of Commerce, BLL Coll., Minutes (1885-95), 22.1.1892, for speech of Chairman on 'the comparatively small figure of 205' subscribing to Chamber.

competition was apparent in the Chamber's criticisms of the 1870 Factory Bill, and the members strongly opposed the proposed extension of 1874 which would shorten the hours of all labour they argued.¹ On the other hand the Chamber was pragmatic enough to favour increased state intervention in the matter of factory doctors, if payment was made through the Exchequer rather than via the owners.²

This realpolitik was also in evidence during the debate on Sir Henry James's 1891 measure, with the Leeds manufacturers anxious that workshops (including presumably sweatshops) should be included along with factories.³ The Chamber then supported the main provisions of the official Bill, quibbling only with minor details on accidents and holidays.⁴ During the trough of 1892, however, and again in 1895 the Chamber complained of adult labour restrictions and general hampering of production.⁵ They also disliked the assault on outwork manufacture - notoriously sweated occupations - as an 'interference with the liberty and privileges of private homes'.⁶ Whenever pressed by competition or with conservative elements in the ascendant, the Chamber Council were ready to call upon individualist ethics. When a bill promised to consolidate and stabilise existing regulations, as the legislation of 1901, the directors hailed this as a triumph for business and good sense.⁷ Even further restriction of female hours could be welcomed when in accordance with international agreements and humane standards.⁸ Thus, the Chamber veered from hostility to fresh burdens when conditions were difficult to support of consolidating and rationalising reforms in good periods.

1. Beresford, op. cit., p109, 146.
2. Ibid., p146-47.
3. Leeds Chamber Minutes, 17.2.1891.
4. Ibid., 26.2.1891.
5. Ibid., 17.9.1892, when President directed to testify against adult restriction before Royal Commission on Labour; 8.3.1895.
6. Ibid., 8.3.1895.
7. Minutes (1900-1905), Annual Report 1901: "On the whole...the commercial community may be congratulated on the passage into law of the Act."
8. Minutes (1905-11), Annual Report 1907.

The Chamber were markedly more hostile to the Eight Hours Bill, which directly restricted the hours of adults and thereby interfered 'with the liberty of the subject and the freedom of contract'. In his Annual Report, the Chairman of Leeds council seriously regretted that such a measure had passed, observing that:¹

..a grave responsibility rests on Parliament in having allowed it to become law, without first giving the country an opportunity of expressing a definite opinion on it.

Labour activists had been campaigning for such limitation since 1889-90, influencing key Liberals,² but the actual measure of 1908 provoked widespread resistance amongst the employers.³

The years 1880-97 also saw major debates on the question of Employers' Liability, with the Chamber giving tacit and qualified support to the legislation of 1880.⁴ One important reason for this support was the scope allowed for private schemes and contracting out, hence their criticisms of the modifications proposed by Burt and O'Connor in 1886. The President led his Chamber in resolving that these Bills as originally drafted:⁵

"would interfere with such arrangements for Mutual Insurance as are now in force in many Establishments and in this respect are objectionable."

The Parliament and Legal Committee of the Chamber also objected to the Bill of 1892, and when Asquith's draft was presented next year the Committee again favoured an amendment allowing employers to contract out.⁶ The Annual Report made

1. Ibid., Annual Report 1908.
2. Haldane Papers (NLS) MS 6010, Letter Haldane to Elizabeth Haldane 3.10.1890, on debate with John Morley over issue.
3. Beresford, op. cit., p148, quotes Chamber that "on no question in recent times has such unanimity been shown by commercial men. The Act will have a disastrous effect...".
4. Minutes, Annual Report 1880: 'It being generally recognised that some alteration was necessary to remove the anomalous condition of the law...your Council...determined not to take up any position of antagonism to it.' The Chamber's initial objections were largely met by changes to their satisfaction.
5. Ibid., 23.3.1886.
6. Ibid., 25.4.1892 - 9.11.1893.

out a strong case for their opposition on grounds of voluntary arrangements and provisions, objecting to:¹

the abolition of the right of allowing workmen to contract out of the Act, where it was ascertained by ballot that two thirds of the workmen in one employ were in favour, and feel that if the right be abolished, the result will tend to increase litigation between masters and men and lessen the friendly relations existing between them.

Similar sentiments were expressed in 1894, when the Council again clearly favoured the extension of existing benefit funds within legislative protection thereby 'making provision for compensation to workmen injured...and thus increase their friendly relations'.² This was perhaps more keenly felt against a background of serious industrial troubles throughout the woolen districts in the early 1890s.

By 1897, however, Leeds had adopted a neutral and 'open' policy on Workmen's Compensation at the Association of Chambers of Commerce,³ and after its passage the Chamber hoped that:⁴

besides pecuniarily benefiting the workman, the result of the Act will, by practically reducing the question at issue to one of account only, be to tend to increase the friendly relations between employer and employed.

In 1893 abolition of contracting out was resisted because of the fears for industrial relations, whilst Workmen's Compensation was supported for the same reason. The members were partly persuaded by such local M.P.s as Leuty, who welcomed the Act as placing the burden on enterprise rather than injured individuals.⁵ Thereafter, the Chamber sought only stability and consolidation, refusing to support the project for state insurance of small employers in 1899,⁶ and failing even to debate the 1906 Act.

Another significant reform which was actively discussed in 1896, was the new Truck Act which eliminated some of the worst abuses of the system whilst allowing shop clubs to flourish.⁷

1. Ibid., Annual Report 1893.

2. Ibid., Annual Report 1894.

3. Ibid., Resolutions of Association of Chambers of Commerce at annual conference (1897), 9.3.1897 - 11.3.1897.

4. Ibid., Annual Report 1897.

5. Ibid., Cutting of meeting of 24.1.1898, addressed by Leuty.

6. Ibid., Resolution of A.C.C. 14/16, p399.

7. Cd. 4442 (Truck Committee Report), op. cit., Para. 148, p61, for example.

The legislation was carefully considered by the Leeds Council during its passage, and they came to the conclusion that its provisions 'were fair and reasonable, and in the interests of both employers and workmen'.¹ As with the Liability reforms, they seem primarily concerned with good relations and rational operation.

If their reception of social reform affecting industry directly was mildly sympathetic, the Leeds employers were less certain about broader measures of policy. The Liberal welfare measures of 1906-12 were frequently supported in principle, though opposed for their practical remedies.²

When confronted with the National Insurance Bill, the Chamber noted that:³

"They feel that the Old Age Pension scheme the principle of which they fully approve has been marred by the hasty way in which it was through...the Act has already caused the country more than double its estimated cost and it is unsound financial policy to introduce gigantic schemes the cost of which has not been properly realised beforehand."

So although Old Age Pensions were to be financed out of direct taxation, without recourse to industry as such, the Chamber was worried about the general problems of state funding which such benefits entailed.

National Insurance itself did propose a direct levy upon the employer, and along with many other organisations the Leeds body criticised the basic assumptions of the reformers.⁴ The primary concerns of the Chamber were the burdens on industry and employers as individuals, and the need for responsible contributions from all classes. Their Memorandum urged that:⁵

"Figures like these call for careful consideration on the part of not merely the Rulers of the Country but every Citizen and the question is whether there should not in the interests of the country at large be some means of direct taxation. At the present time the vast majority of the inhabitants of this Country escape direct taxation and fail to appreciate the growth in expenditure."

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1. Leeds Minutes, Annual Report 1896.
 2. See J.R. Hay, The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms, 1906-14 Macmillan (1975); Hay, loc. cit. (1977), p448, 153-54, for more general reactions.
 3. Leeds Minutes, "Memorandum" (1), May 1911.

Thus whilst objecting to the unparalleled growth in public expenditure - in which they were joined by a number of political groupings - the Chamber members were anxious that public direct taxation rather than industrialists should finance the schemes.¹ The body went much further than a tactical manoeuvring over funding, however, and argued for a radical overhaul of Liability, Compensation, Pensions and other schemes to bring them under one comprehensive state welfare system 'to improve the condition of the masses'.² This could be financed by graduated and progressive income tax, whilst spreading the overall costs more widely. The Leeds manufacturers bolstered this campaign by another Memorandum pointing out the social service which employers already performed in sharing work and avoiding unemployment.³

It is interesting that although there was a strong groundswell of opinion against the National Insurance Bill, the head of the Parliamentary Committee and leading employer - who was Henry Barran - strongly supported the measure and was only defeated at general Council level.⁴ Large and successful enterprises such as Barrans were able and willing to operate the state scheme as well as their own welfare provisions, and therefore adopted a consistently progressive position amongst the textile firms.

The Chamber Memoranda had also been anxious about the future of friendly societies, though leaving matters largely to these organisations to state their case.⁵ After its passage they focussed upon problems of administration and encouraging

4. Ibid., "Memorandum" (2), May 1911: "He [the employer] created neither sickness nor unemployment and any share he should bear ...should in fairness be contributed by him as a Member merely of the State...it is a fallacy to suggest that such a contribution is payable by the Industry. A tax always falls upon and is paid by some individual."
5. Ibid., "Memorandum" (1), p4.
1. Ibid., "Memorandum" (2); see M. Bentley, The Liberal Mind 1914-1929 C.U.P. (1977), p15, for employers in reactionary 'Holt Cave'.
2. Leeds Minutes, "Memorandum" (1), p4.
3. Ibid., "Memorandum" (3), p1.
4. Ibid., Minutes July 1911. I owe this point to the manuscript notes of J.R. Hay on Barran's role in the Leeds Chamber (1975).
5. Ibid., "Memorandum" (1), p3: "the Bill so far as it affects the...Friendly Societies which encourage thrift and independence".

acceptable approved societies to register under the Act, though their intense dislike of the manner in which National Insurance was pushed through was not concealed.¹

A rather more peripheral issue in terms of state action before 1914, but one which merited serious discussion at Leeds was housing reform. James Hole and other campaigners had drawn attention to the importance of employers' housing as early as the 1860s, recruiting James Kitson (of the large textile firm) to his Society for the Erection of Improved Dwellings.² Kitson's grandson, Ald. F.J. Kitson, was sitting on the Chamber Council when they discussed the Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909, with President Beckett arguing for local autonomy in the matter of housing provision.³ Although the employers favoured improved conditions and sanitation, there was strong opposition to the clause prohibiting the erection of back to back dwellings for the working class, arguing that:⁴

Modern back to back houses have been extensively erected in Leeds, at a cost which brings them within the means of the working classes, and as Leeds holds the record of being one of the healthiest of the large cities...the policy...is open to serious criticism.

In actual fact the construction to such accommodation continued down to the interwar years, as municipal housing gradually addressed itself to the housing conditions of a city where a large proportion of dwellings were back to backs.⁵ Yet the resistance demonstrates the strength of vested interests amongst the employers as well as their 'local self government' beliefs.⁶

This defence of local control is another factor to consider when assessing the overall response of the employers to social policies at this period. Whilst the Chamber was acutely aware

1. Ibid., Annual Report 1911. The Chamber 'from the first [had] been opposed to the details of this Measure, and...they regret that a Bill of such magnitude and complication should not have received greater consideration.'
2. J.F.C. Harrison, Social Reform in Victorian Leeds: The work of James Hole, 1820-95 Thoresby Society Monographs No.3 (1954) Leeds, p47, for three agencies of employers, workmen and state.
3. Leeds Chamber Minutes, Annual Report 1909, cutting of speech.
4. Ibid., Annual Report 1909.

of increasing foreign competition, the need for sound finance, and the dangers of irresponsible malingering, they also recognised the broader questions of social relations. Support was given to legislation which promised to consolidate and stabilise existing schemes, raise living conditions, and strengthen the rule of law and order. When faced with such radical innovations as National Insurance, the Chamber adopted three alternative positions: firstly, it attacked certain assumptions (such as that on unemployment insurance) as unsound finance; secondly, it welcomed the principles and intentions of the measures whilst criticising the practical means of their implementation; thirdly, the Chamber pressed for a much more far-reaching and comprehensive reform which would integrate the manifold aspects of industrial injury, sickness, unemployment and retirement in one administrative system.

Perhaps the most consistent theme in their discussions was the fear of industrial and social unrest, and it is only when social reform fails to alleviate this problem that disillusionment is expressed.¹ After 1910 there was a sharp deterioration in industrial violence, which converted Leeds to the case for amendment of the Trades Disputes Act in 1911-12.² During the Carters' strike of 1913, Leeds experienced the worst conflicts since the days of Chartism and bitterly attacked the lethargy of government in dealing with picketing.³ Against this background the Chamber agree to administer even such unpopular reforms as Unemployment Insurance - for fear of worsening the crisis of legitimacy - but they also insisted that 'state intervention' be confined not merely to the amelioration of living conditions.

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5. R. Finnegan, 'Leeds Housing Policy, 1919-1939' in J. Melling (ed.), Housing, Social Policy and the State Croom Helm (1979) London, for detailed discussion.
 6. See J. Toulmin Smith, State Intervention and Local Self-Government (1849) London, for ideology of localism.
 1. Beresford, op. cit., p80, 149, for views of Cox and Kitson on the inefficacy of Old Age Pensions and National Insurance in assuaging unrest; c.f. p75, for Presidential views of 1892.
 2. Leeds Chamber Minutes, Annual Report 1911 and 1912, for A.C.C. lists for Dublin and Newcastle Conferences. On the former occasion Leeds sent their President to move for an official enquiry.
 3. Ibid., Annual Report 1913. The Chamber argued that the two major strikes interfered 'with the right of individual workmen'.

The Bradford Chamber of Commerce, centre of the Worstedopolis and founded (like Leeds) in the Great Exhibition year, was dominated by an elite of textile manufacturers led by Ackroyd, Illingworth, Fison, Foster, Ripley and Fulda, as well as powerful merchants such as Behrens.¹ They were joined by newer men such as Edward Priestman and Tom Mitchell, though these hardly matched the power and influence of families such as the Illingworths.² As at Leeds there were divisions between the moderate Liberals, their Conservative opponents, and the new alliance of Unionists and Radicals within the Chamber.³ On the Unionist side there were not only entrenched Tory dynasties such as Ackroyds, Mitchells, Fosters, Colefaxs and Cunliffe-Listers, but also lesser men who supported the Chamberlainite programme.⁴

The tempo and character of class relations were also changing in these decades, as serious industrial and social conflicts arose in the late 1880s and culminated in the Manningham troubles of 1891-92.⁵ At the same time there was a drift towards Conservatism by some of the larger (and older) manufacturers, as well as important sections of the local commercial community, whilst the Liberal Unionists attracted both old and new wealth.⁶ By the turn of the century there were clear signs of a realignment within the propertied groups, as well as altered relations between capital and labour.⁷

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1. Bradford Chamber of Commerce Minutes (BCC), 25.1.1882, for example, for list of leading members.
 2. Ibid., 19.12.1916, for appointment of A.H. Illingworth as Liberal Postmaster General. He was son of Alfred Illingworth (d. 1907).
 3. Bradford Conservative Association Coll. (BCL), General Council Minutes, 4.7.1887, for congratulations to Cunliffe-Lister and Henry Mitchell on titles.
 4. Ibid., 6.9.1886 - 15.3.1894, for lists of leading Conservative employers.
 5. Holden Collection (BUL), Alfred Illingworth, Fifty Years of Politics Bradford, p15-16, on significance of Bradford West election of 1892; see chapter five above for discussion.
 6. Bradford Conservative Assoc., General Council Minutes, 9.6.1886, for letter of T. Mitchell of Liberal Unionists to B.C.A.
 7. Ibid., 26.4.1901, where letter from Middleton of Conservative Central Office congratulating Bradford Association on 'convert-

It is in this context of shifting political forces, as well as of changing economic conditions, that we must situate the policies of the Bradford Chamber. Although the Bradford employers did not experience the rapid expansion of engineering and clothing seen at Leeds, many of the larger firms continued to secure reasonable returns and able to countenance private and public welfare provisions for their employees. They shared the anxiety of Leeds employers to maintain good relations with their workpeople, as well as restraining costs and excessive liabilities.

Factory legislation was discussed in 1879 by Bradford, after Huddersfield Chamber petitioned Parliament against limitation of hours under the 1878 Act, though the former body insisted on consulting labour organisations in the matter.¹ During the debate on the 1891 James Bill, Priestman and Arnold-Forster led the opposition to the measure whilst "welcoming any reasonable provision which would tend to the safety and well-being of the workpeople".² When Buxton's initiative followed, the Law Amendment Committee of the Chamber resolved in favour of a "Comprehensive and well considered measure instead of being dealt with piecemeal by private legislation".³ As at Leeds, a major consideration remained the creation of a coherent framework for business activity by rational comprehensive measures. Also like their neighbours, Bradford employers were willing to press for greater state intervention in the payment of Factory Doctors as Certifying Surgeons with duties to examine children as well as workmen.⁴ In 1895 the same Chamber wrote to Asquith expressing support for his measure, and in 1900 the Amendment Committee declared themselves generally

7. 'ing what was a Radical borough into a stronghold of Conservatism.'
1. Bradford Chamber Minutes, 24.6.1879 - 29.6.1879; 4.3.1883, 19.5.1885, 24.8.1886, for attempts to amend 1878 measure.
2. Ibid., 16.2.1891.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 24.3.1891. The joint Memorandum by the Chamber and Shaftoe of Bradford Trades Council also noted that they would "view with pleasure the appointment as inspectors of working men".

in favour of the Home Office Bill although again urging the Government to recognise the need for 'consolidating the various Acts now in operation relating to Factories'.¹

It was at this time that the 'Saturday Half-Day Movement' was gaining strength, with a Parliamentary proposal to enact compulsory free afternoons. The Conservative employers seem to have led the resistance to this reform, though both Priestman and Tom Mitchell argued that their practical experience showed that early closing improved relations and recruitment.²

Despite the strong opposition to the movement, Priestman fought a long rearguard action in its favour in Council.³ Some Conservatives were equally tenacious in their attacks on concessions to labour, as when Emsley succeeded in enforcing longer hours on young persons in 1909.⁴ These cases demonstrate not only the value of practical experience and initiatives in employers' campaigns, but also the search for stable conditions amongst different firms.

Employers' Liability also provoked divisions within the Bradford Chamber, with the 1879 proposals resisted since they did not ensure that responsibility rested upon many of the real culprits (i.e. the fellow workmen).⁵ The government bill of the following year was strongly supported by the radical element, with the conservative wing only compromising on the decision of 'no action' in the matter.⁶ Then in 1888 the progressives succeeded in pressing 'no action' on the Council, despite the strong measures intended by the Bill of that year 'which the Committee thought a desirable one and thoroughly approved of'.⁷ These radical sentiments were

1. Ibid., 27.3.1895 - 3.4.1900.

2. Ibid., 9.5.1900, where cutting of meeting presided over by Secretary Hooper to discuss Harwood and Kenyon's Bill found. Tom Mitchell argued that he "failed to see how the bill would bring about the disaster which was anticipated from it..".

3. Ibid., 27.3.1901. Opponents of Bill were Ripley, Oddy, Barry, Fletcher, Ackroyd, Empsall, Firth, etc., leading Conservatives.

4. Ibid., 29.9.1909. Emsley's struggle was against the 1901 Act.

5. Ibid., 12.3.1879.

6. Ibid., 6.7.1880.

7. Ibid., 17.4.1888. The Committee was the Law Amendment Committee, dominated by radicals (as was its Leeds equivalent) for periods.

apparently modified in McLaren's reported account of the Committee's findings to Council, where he suggested that they had felt the 1880 Act 'established a just and equitable relation between Employers and Employed', and that further reform was unnecessary.¹ He went on, however, to say that the principal feature of the 1888 Bill - its abolition of contracting out except where adequate contribution towards insurance was made - was approved since it 'sought legally to enforce what a large number of employers were already voluntarily doing'.² Thus, state provision would only encourage this move towards voluntary insurance as well as maintaining a minimum of compensation payment.

During the early 1890s the Chamber gave qualified support to further attempts to reform the law, being mainly concerned that fresh legislation should specify a time limit to injury compensation claims.³ When the Chamberlain measure of 1897 arrived the Bradford employers were caught unawares as to the importance of the reform, though they probably supported it in its final form.⁴ After its passage there were some attempts to protect industrial harmony by appointing local arbitration boards in the fixing of compensation, but these collapsed through legal problems.⁵ By the time the 1906 Bill was introduced, Bradford's millocrats were complaining of the 'diverse judicial decisions' to which the previous Act gave rise and were pleased to record that all but one of their proposed amendments to the 1906 measure had been adopted.⁶ Thereafter the main preoccupation of such Chambers as Bradford and Huddersfield seems to have been the prevention of malingering, particularly during the year in which National Insurance passed into law.⁷

1. Ibid., 25.4.1888.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 11.4.1890, 16.3.1892, 14.2.1893.

4. Ibid., 25.5.1897.

5. Ibid., 15.9.1898 - 30.11.1898.

6. Ibid., 16.11.1906.

7. Ibid., 31.5.1911 - 13.6.1911. On the latter occasion Bradford pledged itself to 'bring about such amendment of the law as to prevent malingering, which is on the increase.'

Another area of state intervention which touched directly the private provisions made by employers was the regulation of trucking. In 1887 the Lib-Labs Bradlaugh, Donald and Crawford introduced their Truck Bills, receiving general Chamber support, though Broadhurst's more radical proposals were censured except in his recommendation that:¹

"No deduction shall be made from a workman's wages for any sick, accident or funeral benefit provided...by an employer...to make it a condition of the hiring that a workman's wages shall be liable for deductions for subscriptions to any such fund or to any benefit, charitable, or provident institution whatsoever."

The Law Committee's support for this stipulation was a qualified one,² but it does indicate both that the Chamber was very much aware of existing private schemes and that they disapproved of coercion rather than voluntaryism in their organisation. When the 1896 Truck Bill came up for discussion a radical grouping around Priestman, Wade and Jowett pushed for stronger action on deductions from wages but the majority concurred in government initiatives.³ As with Employers' Liability, the moderates accepted state regulation as a means of establishing a minima within (and above) which schemes could continue to operate.

The two major social problems that were to be finally dealt with by National Insurance - unemployment and sickness - were being discussed from the 1880s. In the troubled years 1886-89, the labour question became a subject of widespread debate as Chamberlain's Circular suggested an alternative to Poor Law relief and legislation dealt with 'the social side of industry'.⁴ It is the evolution of ideas that social problems largely derived from the organisation (or disorganisation) of production, and that unemployment was essentially a 'problem of industry', which marks a crucial advance from the debates of the last two decades of the 19th century to the legislation of 1905-14.⁵

1. Ibid., 28.6.1887.

2. Ibid., where the Committee argued that the Broadhurst Bill was 'an unwarrantable interference between Employer and Employed', and their attitude on the first clause was 'not so much approval as...they see no reason to interfere'.

3. Ibid., 8.5.1896.

4. G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London Peregrine (1976) London, p298, for Chamberlain Circular after 1886 troubles; D. Macgregor, The Evolution of Industry (1909) London, p93: 'The period of

The emphasis upon co-operation with labour organisations in meeting the problems of unemployment and reducing conflicts is apparent even in the 1900s. During 1904 the Chamber received a deputation from Bradford Trades Council which urged the necessity of "sharing work among those who are now at work but who from pressure of circumstance might later swell the ranks of the unemployed".¹ Apart from expressing sympathy with the object of the deputation, the Chamber placed a notice in the press reiterating this point to local employers.² During the passage of the Unemployed Workmen's Bill in 1905, the radical employers led by Priestman proposed a strong resolution of support. In reply Gordon and Foster drafted a moderate motion, whilst Emsley and Best pressed for a complete shelving of the issue.³ Eventually the moderate motion was carried, thereby committing Bradford to approval of this legislation.⁴

Similar divisions emerged during the debate over National Insurance itself, though the bitterness aroused by the controversy was much greater. Notice of the Bill was first given by the Birmingham Chamber, which circularised other chambers with its own proposals for Insurance before government terms were known.⁵ Within two months the Association of Chambers of Commerce organised a deputation to Lloyd George, with Bradford particularly concerned about malingering and the machinery of administration set up by the measure.⁶ During July 1911, there occurred a full scale debate in the Chamber on the issue, with the reactionary Robinson easily defeated amidst considerable confusion in the Council.⁷ Moore and Robinson suggested that

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4. 'revision and reconsideration of industry, especially in its social aspects, may be said to have begun about the time of the Dock Strike.'
 5. W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry Longmans Green (1909 & 1930) London, p1-3.
 1. Bradford Chamber Minutes, 25.10.1904.
 2. Ibid., 27.10.1904. The Chamber noted: "The demoralization which is sure to result from a total lack of work and wages for so many of those whose efficient labour is necessary to the success of our trade, must have unfortunate results, and ought to be prevented wherever possible."
 3. Ibid., 27.4.1905.

the Liberal Government be asked to postpone their legislation with a view to:¹

"the consideration of a measure consolidating and amending law relating to old age pensions, employers' liability and workmen's compensation, and incorporate therewith a scheme for national insurance..".

Faced with uncertain circumstances and less certain alternative schemes, the Chamber agreed to take no action at all. This situation continued through the Summer and Autumn despite the complaints of the silk manufacturers,² and only in November did discussions again take place.³

The issue which provoked fresh controversy was that of representation on 'the Committees of Approved Societies and on the local Health Insurance Committees'.⁴ This warning (again from the Birmingham Chamber) roused Bradford to sudden consternation at the imminent passage of the legislation, and over the next two days the Law Committee drafted a resolution protesting "against undue haste in passing into law the National Insurance Bill", which was defeated by moderate opinion favouring the proposals.⁵

Once the Act came into force the main concern of the employers was to ascertain the position and prospects of shop clubs and 'the Benefit Societies existing in connection with works in the district'.⁶ After the President promised

4. Ibid. The moderate motion had avoided the strong terms of Priestman and merely stated that: "this Council sympathises with the object of the Bill and approves its main principles."

5. Ibid., 2.5.1911.

6. Ibid., 28.6.1911. The Council insisted that employers should have equal representation with workmen on the Health Committees.

7. Ibid., 18.7.1911. Gordon had opened the debate by suggesting that in order to illustrate the inequality of the levy, the Chamber should calculate costs as per income tax increases.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., 3.10.1911.

3. Ibid., 28.11.1911.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 29.11.1911. Gordon and Whitehead (both ex-Presidents of Chamber) led moderate and radical opinion.

6. Ibid., 26.3.1912. This was in response to an A.C.C. circular.

to consult a 'few of the leading Employers of labour', the Council decided to instigate more detailed enquiries and asked a speaker from Birmingham's Chamber to address the local manufacturers.¹ The question continued to excite interest over the following months, with one expert on clubs and friendly societies informing employers of their status vis a vis Approved Societies.² Strategic aspects of benefit administration was stressed, particularly in regard to forming Societies 'for women workers who had not previously been connected with any Friendly Society or Trade Union'.³ Like the firms and Chamber in Leeds, Bradford's spokesmen were anxious that the maximum number of workpeople be recruited to acceptable organisations and prepared pamphlet materials for their employees before learning of official moves in this direction.⁴

Their determination to protect their interests and neutralise trade union control over benefits was only sharpened by their frustrating experiences on local Health Committees, which were strongly biased towards society representatives.⁵ Maintenance of discretionary or customary benefits at individual concerns was one effective method of sustaining control, though even this was influenced by legal decisions after 1912.⁶ Even the private provision of the employer was increasingly regulated by state obligations.

The remarkable sympathy which the employers often displayed towards social legislation can only be really explained by examining the progress of class relations in Bradford and the

1. Ibid., 1.4.1912 - 15.4.1912.
2. Ibid., 15.5.1912. The visiting lecturer, Pennington, spoke on 'the way in which benefits under the Bill could be secured..'
3. Ibid., 21.5.1912. See chapter five for the industrial relations background to this development.
4. Ibid., 5.6.1912 - 14.6.1912.
5. Ibid., 28.7.1914. Fawcett complained that in a Committee of 60 he was the sole employer, and three fifths were friendly society representatives.
6. Ibid., 19.8.1913 - 2.12.1913, for progress of decisions at Lincoln County Court. On latter date it was recorded that an 'employer is bound to pay wages during sickness in the event of a custom existing in his works', despite the fact of N.H.I. benefits to the applicant.

responses of its employers to the changing pattern of industrial relations and state intervention. The city had a tradition of weak organisation and stability in its industrial relations (dating from the 1850s), which was still evident in our period.¹ The passing of the Trade Disputes Act under Asquith's government gave cause for some discussion, but it was not until 1910-11 that serious concern was expressed.² As in Leeds the situation deteriorated in 1912-13, with local Conservatives in the forefront of the protest campaign against 'syndicalism' at Bradford.³

Much as they disliked certain aspects of social reform and the practical implications of policy innovations, the employers were conscious of increasing social unrest - of which industrial troubles formed only a part - and of the need for state authority to be maintained. Balanced against this general regard for stability, were considerations of competitive conditions, working costs and liabilities, legal clarity and consolidation, and general efficiency and morale. The actual positions and tactics which Bradford Chamber adopted in pursuit of its general or long-term aims, varied enormously and frequently depended on the precise terms of the legislation. Even when one policy was agreed upon, the balance of forces within the Chamber or its Committees could shift very quickly and ensured that on certain issues (including National Insurance) the Chamber had no clear attitude. Where the body did oppose important reforms it was often in favour of a more comprehensive, rational and radical programme of legislation rather than simply a negative

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1. Ibid., 24.2.1880. In this year the first major strike at firms dyers occurred, with the Chamber offering to arbitrate in the dispute; ibid., 27.10.1904, for co-operation over unemployment.
 2. C.f. ibid., 1.3.1911, when Bradford criticises Asquith's replies in Parliament on question, and notes that experience 'confirms the strong objections expressed when the Trades Disputes Bill was passed in 1906'. The minutes do not seem to justify this strong claim.
 3. Bradford Conservative Association, General Council Minutes, 22.3.1912, for cutting of Bradford Argus on A.G.M. of B.C.A. and attack of Oddy on coal strike; Bradford Chamber Minutes, 27.5.1913, for Robinson's protests on 'the state of lawlessness which existed' in Bradford during Carters' strike.

reaction to intervention. The debates within the Chamber and the deep divisions over state proposals, suggest that the state was seen as an autonomous agency reflecting multiple interests rather than one group. In these controversies the employers might veer from objecting to interference with individual freedoms, to advocating state responsibility for whole areas of industrial life, but the persistence of conflicts within both Leeds and Bradford Chambers show that we cannot treat ideology simply as a function of economic position or immediate interest. Indeed, the complexity of local politics and the commitment to Conservative social reform makes any crude generalisation extremely dubious.¹

What does emerge with some force from these discussions is the significance of industrial welfare provisions in the consideration, passage and administration of state reforms. This was apparent not only in debates on Employers' Liability, Workmen's Compensation and National Insurance, but also in the measures involving factory regulation, shorter hours, truck prevention and housing reform. Even where parliamentary legislation superseded many voluntarist schemes, employers were still active in the administration of public policy and the organisation of private benefits which complemented or supplemented statutory services. The scope for such activity remained a major theme in the employers' responses to a wide range of measures.

Another important aspect of this connection between private and public amenities, is the part played by large and progressive welfarist employers in supporting state intervention. Clearly there are many complex factors operating in the shaping of business attitudes and policies, but there does appear to be a greater tendency on the part of larger and managerially conscious employers to favour government initiatives which formalise and extend (but do not render redundant) private efforts in the field of welfare. This seems particularly true

1. Ibid., 18.3.1909. The Conservative Association resolved that Government measures with 'reference to the question of unemployment are totally inadequate'. The B.C.A. argued for Imperial Tariff Reform on Chamberlainite lines as basis of social reform. This probably indicates influence of Mitchell, et. al.; c.f. ibid., 2.3.1903, for vote of confidence in Balfour administration.

of concerns in growth industries, with strong market prospects and healthy profit margins. Among such employers were Liberals and Radicals such as the Illingworths, Barrans and Priestmans as well as Unionists like the Ripleys and Tom Mitchell. They also inclined towards a more flexible handling of trade unionism and such sensitive subjects as Trades Disputes legislation, although the broad alliance on such issues could easily be upset by industrial and political conflict.

Such cross-currents of interests and ideas with groups and organisations also makes it difficult to generalise about Bradford attitudes as compared to those of Leeds. If anything, the latter tended to be more conservative in reviewing Bills than its neighbour, though this may be explained largely by the restricted and traditionalist membership and the presence of heavy industry as well as declining flax interests. There was also much stronger trade unionism and less intimate contacts with Trade Councils than in Bradford, where co-operation remained significant despite the struggles of 1880-93 and 1910-14.

There are a number of important parallels which can be drawn between the experiences of leading textile employers and those of such important coal masters as Briggs and Co. Although there were significant advances in technical innovation after 1880, the industry remained labour-intensive with its male workers divided into skilled hewers and lesser skilled oncost labour. The high degree of organisation amongst coalminers meant that rapid dilution, displacement and cheapening of labour costs was certainly not as easy as in textiles though market conditions could be equally bleak. Physical exhaustion of coal seams demanded movement of sites, equipment and men - with consequent implications for welfare - even when prospects for long-term growth were highly uncertain. Hence many colliery owners were sceptical of state intervention as well as extensive or elaborate industrial welfare, though there are numerous examples of impressive investment amongst the leading employers of the West Yorkshire field.¹

Briggs and Co. responded to the passage of Workmen's Compensation legislation in 1897 by instituting a Mutual Insurance

1. See chapters five and six above for a discussion of West Yorkshire collieries and conditions.

Scheme and by joining the Mutual Indemnity Association which covered the Yorkshire Owners in the 1900s.¹ The insurance provisions of the Briggs Accident Fund were only effective until the passing of the 1906 Act, however, when it declined despite the efforts of company management to sustain it.²

This case demonstrates the gradual substitution of official for voluntary efforts in important areas of welfare benefits, as minimum statutory provisions improved and employers found that the maintenance of more generous schemes impracticable.

The general response of the firm to social reforms appears to have been almost as progressive as their industrial welfare activities. The first Henry Briggs had espoused the laissez faire individualism of classical Liberalism, with strong beliefs in voluntary effort and freedom of contract.³ Henry Currer Briggs displayed a greater sense of social responsibility at Whitwood, which was extended by his successor Arthur Currer Briggs. The latter became Liberal Unionist mayor of Leeds in 1904, after considerable disagreements over choice of candidates, and like Joseph Chamberlain of Birmingham he remained interested in municipal politics until his death.⁴ His firm were perhaps less optimistic about absorbing increasing medical costs and National Insurance than employers like Barrans, but there was no apparent hostility to such innovations during the pre-War period.⁵

The West Yorkshire Coal Owners Association, formed largely through the efforts of Arthur Currer Briggs in 1890, who headed the organisation until 1902 and again from 1904 until his death two years later. It was through his energy also that the West Yorkshire Owners progressed beyond a merely reactionary position

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1. See Cd. 2334 (Dept. Committee on Compensation 1904), Q 5874 - 76 for A.J. Holiday's description of Y.C.O.M.I.Co.
 2. Briggs & Co., Minutes, Annual Report 1900 - 22.1.1908.
 3. Briggs Coll., MS 1, D.H.C. Briggs, A Merchant, A Banker and the Coal Trade 1693-1971 Pub. company Leeds, p8; c.f. MS 22, The Record of A Yorkshire Family, for activities of Henry Currer Briggs in locale.
 4. West Yorkshire Coal Owners Association, Minutes, 1.9.1906, for cutting of Yorkshire Post obituary on Arthur Currer Briggs.
 5. Briggs & Co., Minutes, 30.3.1910, for discussion of medical oversight of accidents and problems of malingering.

when confronted with important measures affecting them in particular and employers in general. Legislation controlling working conditions and hours assumed a special form in the coal mining industry, given the strength of the 'Eight Hours movement' and the successful restriction of both working hours and minimum wages of the adult colliers before 1914.¹ The Owners strongly opposed the Mining Bill of 1900 and its provisions for eight hour shifts,² though when the government introduced its own proposals in 1908 the major concern of the Association was with securing uniformity of practice throughout the mining districts.³ The local employers failed to prevent consideration for Northumberland and Durham in the final Act, and Crawshaw informed his colleagues that:⁴

although it was not quite in the form which the Mining Association had endeavoured to get it, yet he thought Colliery Owners ought to appreciate the modifications which had been made.

Acting through the Mining Association and its Parliamentary Committee, the local bodies were able to ensure that at least some of the most objectionable burdens were lifted before enactment.

The campaign to institute minimum wage rates was resisted even more strongly by the organised owners, and it was only in the midst of a worsening national strike that Asquith agreed to permit state intervention.⁵ West Yorkshire took a relatively moderate stand on the issue in late 1911 and after the M.F.G.B. rejected the employers' offer in March 1912, they still waited on events rather than condemning further initiatives.⁶ This fairly sympathetic treatment of hours and wages may indicate that the larger and more efficient employers (like Briggs & Co.), who tended to dominate the Association, were not completely hostile to the attempts which would reduce competition from the smaller and less profitable pits.

1. West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association (W.Y.C.O.A.) Minutes, 27.2.1900; see chapter five above for note on movement.
2. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes, 27.2.1900 - 14.3.1900.
3. Ibid., 24.11.1908.
4. Ibid., 12.1.1909. Crawshaw noted that though Northumberland and Durham were excluded despite 'strenuous opposition', the elimination 'of both windings had been a great gain'.

The Association was also naturally concerned at the prospect of increased liabilities under the proposed Workmen's Compensation Act in 1897, upon which the organised owners resolved that they viewed with 'the greatest apprehension', the;¹

"serious burden proposed to be imposed upon the Coal Trade by this measure. The provisions of the Bill will certainly lead to much friction and litigation between Colliery Owners and their workmen and will be the Cause of much imposition upon Colliery Owners in cases of slight injuries."

They therefore deprecated the supposedly enormous problems which the Bill entailed for owners operating in competitive conditions and with an increasing labour force.²

After the passage of the Act, about which the employers continued to complain, the Association went swiftly into action and co-operated with their South Yorkshire counterparts in protecting their interests through common indemnity.³ There was little discussion of the 1906 Act, which largely extended the coverage of industries rather than radically altering its scope in those already regulated, though some debate occurred after a legal decision of 1913.⁴ In 1919 the Association was informed of the appointment of the Holman Gregory Committee on Compensation, and the owners resolved that 'any further increase in the rate of Compensation should be strenuously resisted by the Mining Association'.⁵ In fact the Committee's Report proposed substantial increases in both lump sum settlements and weekly payments for incapacitated workmen.⁶ Only the widespread militancy of the miners and the demands for nationalisation of the whole industry seem to have deterred

5. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates XXXV No.25 (1912), 19.3.1912, Cl. 1714; Asquith's speech on first reading of Bill.

6. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes, 16.11.1911 - 14.12.1911, when West Yorks. accepted the principle of a fixed minimum; 6.3.1912.

1. Ibid., 29.6.1897.

2. Ibid., where Association protests against "the enormously increased liability" imposed by the Act.

3. Ibid., 11.1.1898 - 1.2.1898, 26.4.1898.

4. Ibid., 21.1.1913.

5. Ibid., 12.5.1919, where Committee referred to as 'a Commission about to sit'.

6. Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation, Report by the

the employers from attempting to reduce non-statutory benefits to their injured workmen.¹ It was only in 1919 that the Lloyd George government had passed the Coal Industry (Emergency) Bill, of which the Association expressed its 'strongest disapproval' - not merely to the clauses but to the principle of the legislation and its implications for managerial control.²

Similar dissatisfaction was expressed at the original proposals for National Insurance, which followed quickly upon the unpopular Finance Bill of 1909.³ Although the Association passed few comments on the general principle of National Insurance, there was critical scrutiny of each particular clause. Crawshaw informed the members that if certain sections were allowed to pass in their present form, then the Act would be 'very prejudicial to the interests of employers under the Workmen's Compensation Acts and render claims under those Acts increasingly difficult to deal with'.⁴ Like the Chambers of Commerce, the West Yorkshire Owners were anxious that a rational and comprehensive approach to unemployment and sickness insurance should be undertaken rather than a series of ill-fitting measures imposed upon each other.

In their attitudes and activities concerning Parliamentary legislation, the West Yorkshire Coal Owners were very close to the Lanarkshire Masters examined above. Scepticism concerning Workmen's Compensation, Mines Acts, and National Insurance appears to have been the characteristic reaction of these regional associations though rather more flexible approaches were necessary at national level when advantages could usually be secured by tactical manoeuvring. It is also noticeable that even the conservative coal masters were unwilling to condemn

6. Departmental Committee Appointed to Inquire into the System of Compensation for Injuries to Workmen Cmd. 816 (1920), Para. 68-69, p45; Para. 79-81, p52.

1. W.Y.C.O.A. Minutes, 15.12.1919 - 23.12.1919.

2. Ibid., 9.12.1919.

3. Ibid., 21.6.1909, for the criticisms of People's Budget by Association, and support for the Mining Association's deputation to Lloyd George.

4. Ibid., 18.7.1911.

state intervention in areas of social policy, reserving their harshest attacks for measures such as Minimum Wage and coal industry control legislation.

The comparison of textiles and coal mining firms and their respective associations tells us as much about the way in which different organisations function as about the differing interests and perceptions which shape employers' attitudes. In each case there were a number of leading concerns who dominated these bodies, though Chambers of Commerce gave a much broader spread of views than the trade associations as such. The latter were rather more narrowly defensive than the acknowledged platform of the commercial community, and were frequently unwilling to take wider considerations into account. This helps to explain the greater flexibility of Leeds and Bradford Chambers, since there were no heavy-industry organisations influencing discussions as they appear to have done at Glasgow.

The major considerations of the organisations can be divided into two sets of preoccupations: one immediate interests and the other long-term survival. Most firms and associations were anxious that working costs - and more particularly labour costs - should not become burdensome, that their market environment should remain favourable, that industrial relations should continue stable, and that the legislative framework should not obstruct business by promoting excessive interference or litigation. On the other hand, most organisations were prepared to recognise the claims for uniform extension of the law, for meeting social and industrial problems, for greater concessions to responsible trade unionism, and even for state control of whole industries in emergency conditions. Throughout their debates and deliberations the employers remained conscious of the need for stable class relations and the necessity for state intervention to resolve major conflicts or tensions, even when they disagreed over the precise remedies proposed by the government in office. However bitterly an association of coal employers or engineers might oppose Eight Hours or National Insurance, it was very unlikely that they would continue their opposition once legislation passed.

One main reason for the owners' compliance with Parliamentary statutes was the knowledge of industry's comparative weakness in the policy-making process, and the need for co-operation with government at many different levels. Even where the employers were unable to influence the drafting of an original measure, they could make an impression on government attitudes during its passage (when they could also affect Committee stages of legislation) and its administration.¹ The tactics adopted by individuals and organisations continued to operate well after royal assent was given to such key measures as National Insurance.

Another element in the willingness of organisations to accept unpopular state initiatives was the knowledge of serious divisions within the ranks of the employers themselves. There were often gaps between the leadership of an association, which tended to be staffed by larger concerns, and its membership. Even more apparent were the splits between different sections of employers, on a wide variety of grounds but usually expressed in party political terms. In their reception of social reforms the employers heard arguments from sympathetic radicals as well as conservative opponents of intervention. At some periods the two wings joined in the demand for more a comprehensive and systematic scheme of reform, as they did after the passing of Workmen's Compensation, Old Age Pensions and before the arrival of National Insurance. Considerations of costs and benefits could actually drive the employers into favouring a much more profound reform of social administration than the government ever contemplated, and on this basis the conservative groups would support progressive taxation rather than industrial levies.

These points indicate both the vital importance of economic factors in business attitudes and the futility of reducing ideological differences to a mere reflection of immediate interests. There are important connections between the shifting balance of economic interests, class relations, and the political

1. See Alexander Whitelaw Coll., Letters (1874-79): Letter to Clyde Shipbuilders' Association, 20.5.1874; and Chamber of Commerce Minutes, 14.7.1879 [obituary on Whitelaw]; for example of ways in which associations influenced the political process itself.

attitudes and activities of employers in these decades. Some indication are given in the rise of Liberal Unionism and tariff reform in such cities as Glasgow, and the related debates on the subject of social reform.¹ Even here the processes whereby business circles arrived at commitments to industrial and social improvements are much too complex to summarise easily.² The evidence suggests that employers defined and handled different situations in terms of alternative attitudes and images which could vary over time and place as well as between groups of businessmen. The same employer might adopt a different attitude when acting in local politics and government from that expressed in the boardroom or the association chambers, modifying his ideological beliefs in the context of everyday experiences.³

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the boundaries between voluntary private welfare provision and state benefits are difficult to draw because of the close connections which have traditionally existed between them. Rather than envisaging private and public services as separate spheres, it is possible to examine their origins and growth in terms of similar impulses and influences. This can be demonstrated by means of an empirical survey of key legislation and its impact on industrial welfare, followed by an examination of the functions and purposes of the alternative services. The intended purposes can only be fully understood of course, by an analysis of business motivation for welfare.

Those areas of industrial life affected by state regulation can be conveniently divided into six broad categories: firstly, the control of working conditions, hours and remuneration under the Factory Acts, Mines Acts and Minimum Wage legislation; secondly, the provision for safety and the compensation of those injured in employment under Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation reforms; thirdly, the control of the

1. See G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency Blackwell (1971) Oxford, p147; J.F. McCaffrey, "Political Reactions in the Glasgow Constituencies to the Election of 1886" Ph.D Thesis (Glasgow, 1971), 44-56, and 'The Origins of Liberal Unionism in the west of Scotland' Scottish Historical Review L No.149 (1971), p50; N.D. Price, "Aspects of the Scottish Liberal Party in the

agencies of administration and the conditions of agreement, ranging from Truck Acts to regulation of friendly and provident clubs; fourthly, the organisation of labour markets and local unemployment by Labour Exchanges and Unemployed Workmen reforms; fifthly, the protection against destitution through unemployment and sickness by National Insurance; and finally, the provision for old age by pensions and superannuation innovations.

Employers expressed interest and concern in all of these areas, although were most preoccupied with those measures which involved them in additional costs and which affected their own arrangements. The ways in which businessmen reacted to reforms naturally depended on the situation of the individual firm and trade, and upon the tactics decided upon by their organisations. In most cases employers and associations played little part in the drafting of public legislation (though they were prominent in the proposal of private measures such as superannuation funds for railways),¹ and were often sceptical of increasing state intervention. Their greatest strength was the possession of practical and technical expertise in the implementation of reforms, and so directed their energies to seeking amendments of measures at Committee. Even the most powerful federations focussed upon practical details rather than points of principle, only calling upon the latter when major industrial conflicts or radical reforms were attracting government attention.² After measures received the royal consent, the employers could rely upon their intimate knowledge of industry and their good relations with civil servants to strengthen their position - as the case of the Labour Exchanges and National Insurance demonstrated.

Once the legislation was passed, the employer interested

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1. Central Lowland Belt..." M. Litt. Thesis (Strathclyde, 1974), Summary; for discussion of this movement among employers.
 2. See P.F. Clarke, 'The End of Laissez-Faire and the Politics of Cotton' Historical Journal XV No.3 (1972), p510-12, for example.
 3. Gray, loc. cit. (1977), p78-83, for this broader argument.
 1. Departmental Committee on Railway Superannuation Funds, Minutes of Evidence... Cd. 5484 (1911), Q 3160, and passim for some excellent examples.
 2. S.E. Finer, 'The Federation of British Industries' Political Studies IV No.1 (1956), p67, for this point on F.B.I.

in the provision of industrial welfare had a number of possible alternatives. He could abandon his voluntary arrangements in favour of legislative and legal protection, or combine the two on a dual basis. He might seek to contract out of certain state schemes, as was possible with Liability and Compensation measures (though parity with state minima became a necessity after 1897). Then again he could supplement official benefits with additional benefits, as many leading employers began to do with sickness and unemployment provisions.¹ The latter usually entailed a narrowing of welfare commitments to a selective treatment of clerical, technical, supervisory and managerial staff as opposed to the broad mass of the workforce.² All of these responses, and various permutations of them, were adopted by employers in these decades.

These developments raise questions as to the discernable functions of private and state welfare, and the needs which each fulfilled. It could be argued that state social policy was the response of governments to broadly similar forces as those stimulating private welfare, with the regulation of labour markets, improvement of national efficiency, and resolution of industrial conflict all figuring in the policies of these decades. The degeneration of friendly societies, erosion of local communities, and movements in ideology were also strong considerations in the provision for unemployment, sickness, sweated conditions and housing seen in these decades.³ Although particular measures - such as the unemployment provisions of National Insurance - might arouse intense hostility among many employers, as numerous observers had forecast,⁴ industrialists were sufficiently

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1. M.B. Gilson and E.J. Riches, 'Employers' Additional Unemployment Benefit Schemes in Great Britain' International Labour Review XXI (1930), particularly p350-51.
 2. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, Report of an Enquiry into the Incidence of Incapacity for work... HMSO (1964), p15-29 for position of schemes by 1950s.
 3. See J.A.M. Caldwell, 'The Genesis of the Ministry of Labour' Public Administration XXXVII (1959), p370-71, for early concern of Board of Trade with some of these problems.
 4. I.G. Gibbon, Unemployment Insurance King & Son (1911) London, p263, for example.

perceptive to recognise this fundamental unity of purpose.

They were also reassured by the pragmatic pattern of social reform which usually involved the incorporation of voluntary efforts and control within the framework of state administration. Both observers at the time and subsequent authoritative surveys of legislation such as National Insurance were convinced of the importance of voluntarism to public services as well as private benefits.¹ Employers could hope to foster acceptable organisations and conditions even where their powers of direct control were very limited.²

The differences which continued to exist between business groups on these subjects, and their distinctive reactions to increasing state intervention, must also be answered in terms of the factors examined in previous chapters. Those larger and more progressive employers who tended to favour industrial welfare were also aware of the need for good industrial conditions and remuneration, and were happy to comply with such legislation as Factory Acts and Trade Board reforms. They also favoured the elimination of truck abuses and schemes for relieving the plight of the distressed unemployed, though perhaps differing on their approach to provident clubs and relief agencies. These points appear particularly relevant to the successful employers in expanding industries who favoured rational and more radical methods of welfare administration, such as the great Barran firm in Leeds. Those concerns facing heavier labour costs, limited growth, diminishing profits, and more serious industrial unrest, tended towards less progressive views on social policy and tighter control of unions which fortified their position by operating National Insurance and wartime benefit schemes.³

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1. Gibbon, op. cit., p254-56; R.W. Harris, National Health Insurance in Great Britain George Allen & Unwin (1946) London, p117-18 for account of 1926 Royal Commission on National Insurance.
 2. Ibid., p120-21.
 3. Brown, op. cit., p354; E.J. Hobsbawm, 'Trends in the British Labour Movement' in Labouring Men Heinemann (1965) London, p135; for this point.

Chapter Ten: Concluding chapter and summary of arguments.

The study of industrial welfare and its broader implications for the history of British employers since 1880.

This study of the industrial welfare provisions made by British employers in the four decades after 1880 suggests that these years constituted a formative period in the development of welfare and management. The services introduced by individual concerns remained particularistic, geared to the highly specific needs of different enterprises, but they also reflected much broader institutional changes in the organisation of business and the activities of government.¹ The existing literature on employers and industrial welfare suffers from both its preoccupation with the problem of 'entrepreneurial failure', and its neglect of the whole area of welfare innovation.² Only by including this aspect of business activity in our overall analysis of employers and by indicating the different levels at which such schemes operate, can we fully appraise the role of employers in economy and society.

In approaching such a survey, the initial problems of definition and method can be largely resolved by adopting the three themes of empirical description, stated motivation, and functional purpose, in analysing welfare. Generally, it has been argued that we must examine and define welfare principally in terms of the relationship between employers and labour. If industrialists themselves can be defined by the relationship they enjoy to the means of production - and in these decades it was a relationship of ownership and control - then industrial services must be seen as part of the market relations between the buyers and sellers of labour.³ In order to secure an adequate supply of labour and to maintain its

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1. A.D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business Belknap Press (1977) Cambridge, Mass., p4-5.
 2. D. McCloskey and L.G. Sandberg, 'From Damnation to Redemption...' Explorations in Economic History IX (1971), p102, for example; c.f. J. Schumpeter, 'The Instability of Capitalism' Economic Journal (Sept. 1928), p379-81.
 3. E.D. Proud, Welfare Work Bell (1916) London, p83, on central importance of the 'complete command of the local labour market'.

efficiency and discipline, employers were frequently compelled to supplement the wage contract with welfare services of various kinds.

Following the identification of three basic labour requirements, it is possible to characterise welfare amenities according to which purpose they fulfill. Infrastructural programmes are usually concerned with the creation of local labour markets, and include such heavy physical additions such as housing and drainage. Other innovations are more occupied with the enhancement of efficiency, and here such investments as canteens and incentive benefits (involving a performance bonus at some firms) are important examples. Provisions geared to sustaining managerial authority frequently involve schemes covered above, but the principal function of specific benefits can be identified as strategic in that they are designed mainly with discipline in mind.¹

The need for a study which will relate such general themes to specific economic and social conditions is suggested in the early welfare literature itself. There it is constantly stressed how welfare must form only a part of a comprehensive management programme which guaranteed good working conditions and high wages as a basis for industrial benefits.² Another point frequently made by contemporary experts was the great diversity of welfare schemes and the variations in the duties of welfare supervisors.³ Only by examining specific firms and industries - in considerable detail - can we build up an accurate picture of the particular conditions under which welfare might be provided. The thesis has three broad stages of analysis: firstly, a consideration of economic factors and industrial relations as the formative influences on welfare provision; secondly, a regional comparison of industries which explores the operation of such variables within a wider

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1. See H. Munsterberg, Psychology and Industrial Efficiency Constable (1913) London, p11; Proud, op. cit., p170; for a rather more sympathetic account of these three labour requirements.
 2. Proud, ibid., p138, for example.
 3. J. Lee (ed.), Dictionary of Industrial Administration Vol.II Pitman (1929) London, p1084, for this point on 'Welfare Worker'.

range of occupations and trades; and thirdly, the examination of the social and political aspects of industrial welfare. Only on the basis of such detailed studies and careful differentiation can accurate or significant generalisations be made.¹

Any investigation of the economic factors which contribute to the introduction of welfare, must begin with a preliminary analysis of the capitalist market economy and distinguish between the pace of economic progress and the relations to which such progress gives rise. This becomes an important qualification in the examination of such a complex industry as shipbuilding, where the substantial welfare programmes undermine the argument for welfare confined to new lighter trades, or only possible within the context of expanding domestic markets. The emphasis upon market conditions and the potential for economic growth is certainly correct, but the range of variables appear much more complex than any such simple formula would suggest. We must consider the general trends in the industry - the patterns of investment, concentration and profitability - before moving to those factors which differentiate individual concerns. The scale of the business enterprise, the structure of ownership and control, the record of technical innovation, and the personal initiatives of creative employers must all be considered relevant factors. The cyclical fluctuations which affect almost every industry ensure that the tempo of change and innovation will alter in accordance with shifting market conditions and labour requirements.²

The structure and organisation of the labour force itself must be treated as another fundamental factor in the provision of benefits. The ways in which the workforce could largely determine the profitability and pace of technical change in

1. C.f. G.D. Feldman, 'The Social and Economic Policies of German Big Business, 1918-1929' American Historical Review LXXV (1969) p50: 'It is a gross error..to argue that the necessity for differentiation in treating big business precludes generalization. ..Differentiation is..necessary because it helps us to generalize'.
2. See K. Marx, Capital Vol. III xv:1, in R. Freedman (ed.), Marx on Economics Pelican (1973), p171-72, for broader implications.

a whole industry, provided market conditions were basically favourable and craft organisation powerful enough to control changes in the work process. Even here there were significant advances in the scale and structure of firms, the pace of technical innovation and work distribution, and the organisation of labour by management.¹ Although the shipyards saw relatively few radical alterations when compared to engineering, there are definite signs that larger and more progressive employers were striving to increase the efficiency and output of the yards from the 1880s.

Within the industry there were equally important innovations by particular concerns, with an identifiable group of larger and more managerialist yards prepared to lead the way in technical, structural and organisational changes within their works. There was also a group of second-rank enterprises, such as Dennys and Stephens, who were equally anxious to consolidate their specialist expertise by reforms in the organisation of their business and production methods. It is this balance between growing scale and sophistication, and the specialist skills of production, which continued to characterise the trades before the War.

Within such a complex and diversified industry, whose products were tailored to the bespoke requirements of the customer and whose methods varied according to local customs as well as technical constraints, the experiences of individual employers differed quite sharply. The labour needs of the shipyard would depend as much upon the location in proximity to specialist labour markets, as it would upon the general state of trade and changing trends in methods of production. These variations are reflected in the industrial welfare initiatives during these decades, though the overall level of investment and expenditure remains impressive. Generally, it appears that the advances and growth of the industry increased its labour needs whilst transforming some of the more traditional productive relations in the shipyards. It was not just that some of the larger builders were moving to new and more expansive sites, but also that their scale and innovations were producing subtle changes in their

1. Third Report of the Royal Commission appointed to Inquire into

perceptions of labour and labour capacities. Those larger and more progressive builders who found their demand for skilled workmen growing most rapidly, were also among the most dynamic welfarist employers. They also possessed the ability and willpower to engage in substantial building and benefit projects where private efforts were inadequate. Consequently, we can trace the growth of housing and other investments following the general trend of capital additions and expansion within such yards as John Browns and Dennys. Here the relationship between local labour and housing markets, industrial and private building capital, within the general framework of the regional economy should be borne in mind.

Just as the structure of the labour force is not wholly within the control of the employer and the work process is partly subject to labour manipulation, so the scope for welfare expansion was limited by the attitudes and organised resistance of labour. This became particularly evident during the First World War when the employers sought to accelerate the division of labour and its interchangeability under management direction. Welfare such as housing and settlement facilities served as an instrument of dilution, though its effectiveness again depended on the specific labour conditions obtaining in the Clydeside yards after 1915.

The struggles over the introduction and administration of services illustrate the crucial importance of industrial relations in the formation of welfare. Rather than setting out a schematic model of welfare development, it is preferable to undertake a careful study of industrial relations within one or more industries. Negotiations and disputes are as much concerned with the issue of industrial control as they are with the distribution of industry's product, and the varying forms of conflict can be analysed in terms of a moving frontier of control between capital and labour. The functions and shape which welfare will assume may depend quite heavily on the balance of control at any point in the development of an industry, particularly when both sides are well organised.

1. the Depression of Trade and Industry C. 4797 (1886); Evidence of J. Price of Palmer's Shipbuilding Co., Q 10972-973, for example.

The comparison of engineering and shipbuilding trades indicates that despite the significant variation in technical development and the tempo of industrial conflict, the disputes follow the same broad pattern along a similar frontier of control. Both industries possessed a highly skilled, organised and articulate workforce, and both sets of employers were determined on pressing ahead innovations in technique, structure and management organisation of production. The disputes affected control at various levels - over the labour market, technical aids and machine tools, areas of work, rate of remuneration, and over authority itself. Those employers who stood in the forefront of innovation and organisation naturally attracted most resistance, and it is here that welfare assumed major significance.

As suggested above, the functions which particular services perform depend only partly upon their overt purpose and upon the original motives of the creative employer. Within certain situations even such clearly infrastructural amenities as housing might assume a 'strategic' function. This seems to have occurred as the struggle for industrial control between unions and management in the two industries intensified in the decades up to 1920. There were other schemes, however, which arose directly out of these situations of conflict and which were designed to maintain the loyalty of strategically important groups. One such group who occupied a pivotal position in the contest for industrial supremacy was the supervisory grade of foremen and underforemen. It was in response to the threat posed by the sectional trade societies, with their impressive range of friendly benefits and with a strong following amongst the supervisors, that the combined employers introduced the Foremen's Mutual Benefit Society. The strength of feeling among the most progressive firms is reflected in the initial support given by a minority of engineering works and the subsequent endorsement of the Society by the larger 'managerialist' shipbuilders. Where internal relations and schemes had proven effective, some welfare firms showed reluctance in joining such an overtly strategic programme though the increasing participation by industrialists suggests that internal bargaining was gradually

being eroded in favour of district negotiations.

Such schemes as the Foremen's Society followed this general trend, though the insistence on the sovereignty of individual managements in certain areas is revealed in the referral of numerous welfare issues to the membership by association leaders during the First World War. During the War years, the major kinds of industrial dispute assumed a new coherence and urgency as the dilution process provoked acute unrest in both industries during 1916-17. Here the limitations of employers' strategies and welfare schemes was demonstrated by the disaffection of the foremen and technical workers. Even in hindsight, it seems, the large federations failed to appreciate the vital significance of the issue until the crisis of authority occurred again in 1922.¹

Having outlined the primary importance of economic factors and industrial relations in the growth of industrial welfare in these two heavy industries, it is possible to extend the survey to a comparison of quite distinct economic sectors. Within the west of Scotland regional economy there emerged a range of staple capital-goods industries, alongside lighter wood-based trades stimulated by shipbuilding and urbanisation, serviced by such major employers as the large railway companies, and ultimately encouraging the growth of sophisticated retailing outlets in the city of Glasgow. Each of these sectors continued to expand in the decades after 1880, although the golden era of timber vessels and railway construction had passed by that period.²

These sectors differed widely in the product and service offered, the methods of production and operation, the skills required in the work process, the market conditions encountered, and the concentration and organisation of business within these

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1. Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation, Looking at Industrial Relations E.A.E.N.F. (1958) London, p26-27, for a partial account of these struggles.
 2. See Chandler, op. cit., p10, for relationship between the growth and variation in business practice and the changing structure of the economy.

markets. There were also marked contrasts in the conduct of industrial relations with these trades, reflecting the different level of organisation and workplace control of labour. At the same time, it is possible to trace the three broad themes of technical change, business expansion, and managerial innovation in each of the sectors surveyed. Their basic structure and the pace of advance continued to vary quite profoundly, but in each there were definite signs of the improvements which were to transform handicraft and labour-intensive production processes into the more modern, effectively organised operations that they often became by the 1920s. Within each sector there were also an identifiable group of progressive concerns who sought the consolidation, integration and reorganisation of their enterprises in order to reap competitive advantages.

This is not to suggest that such changes were either inevitable or invincible. The case of Beardmores and the natural limitations placed on further railway extensions and modifications, demonstrated the dangers of precipitate expansion and the barriers presented by market capacities. This fallibility of even the most articulate managerialist employers is likewise evident in the industrial disruptions provoked by the exercise of 'managerial prerogatives' in the railway companies' works. The sharp stratification of grades and division of responsibilities in the line and staff may have facilitated management control, but it also increased the scope for concerted action amongst separate layers of employees.

These pressures and constraints are apparent in the industrial welfare provided by the leading firms in each sector during this period. Each employer was seeking to meet his labour requirements within the context of an emerging regional economy, with its connected market arrangements and complementary development of industrial and social capital projects. Where the growth of industry outstripped the availability of speculative building capital, and in the absence of local government commitment to furnish essential housing and services, employers were drawn into such heavy investment as Springburn housing or the laying

of Dalmuir terraces. These projects were particularly noticeable during the formative years of growth in the heavy, labour-intensive industries and were necessarily confined to the more substantial enterprises. Usually such employers were interested in gaining control over the skilled labour markets, or in securing cheap female labour which would reduce overall costs. By intervening in the housing and social utilities markets, the employer could gain a foothold in local labour markets which sustained his broader investments.

From the comparison of different sectors within the regional economy arises the strong impression of welfare geared to the needs of particular industries as well as individual firms. Within the heavy steel and shipbuilding trades, firms like Beardmores were primarily concerned with stabilising their labour force of medium-skilled males, and with integrating a wide range of processes and workers in an efficient organisation.¹ It was to these ends that welfare was tailored, with a greater stress on infrastructural amenities and rather less attention to working conditions and schemes designed to raise morale within the plants. Railway giants such as Caledonian and North British were also integrating areas of production and operation, and enjoyed a relatively stable market environment. Their main objectives by the period 1880-1920 were not so much ensuring a steady supply of labour for the construction and locomotion of trains, but in improving the efficiency of these operations and in guaranteeing the loyalty of their employees to the company. Hence the firms promoted such facilities as insurance, mutual benefit, and superannuation societies - more especially for their salaried grades in positions of responsibility.² The paper and publishing occupations were somewhat heterogeneous, but the printing section was noted both for the skill of its workmen and the progressive views of its employers. Being located mainly in urban centres and possessing small numbers of highly skilled craftsmen (though with increasing mechanisation here also), the printing and publishing concerns were less concerned

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1. Proud, op. cit., p93-95, on primary concern with efficiency.
 2. Dept. Committee on Railway Superannuation Funds, Minutes of

with labour supply or even efficiency as such, than with the reactions of organised labour to their innovations in the work process and ratio of unskilled to craft labour. Hence the main thrust of such employers' welfare initiatives was in the direction of benefit and leisure facilities which would increase their employees' loyalty to the firms, thereby reinforcing the artisan culture within such urban centres as Glasgow.¹ The retailing employers were led by the large and prosperous departmental stores which had moved towards a well-defined division of labour and status within the business organisation. Their labour needs were conditioned by the clientele, hence the encouragement of personal courtesy and loyalty in dealing with customers. Unlike the heavier and male-dominated industries, such employers did not encounter widespread unionisation and attuned their welfare benefits to the individual performance of deserving employees. Discretionary rewards and recognition merely underlined the deferential tone of industrial relations which affected even the portering staff.

Thus it is possible to relate industrial welfare within different industries to the general evolution of the regional economy and its labour markets, as well as to the specific needs of individual employers. Moreover, it is impossible to chart the growth of welfare provisions without taking into account the general labour policies of different groups of employers in each sector. These policies and responses to labour depended on the balance of relations as much as the definition of productive needs, and the kinds of service provided were shaped accordingly.

The examination of one region suggests that the activities of welfarist employers tended to follow the contours of expansion and investment in the area as a whole. During the decades of

2. Evidence... Evidence of John Lamond of the North British Railway Insurance Society, Q 5046-53, for example.
1. See C. Reid, 'Middle Class Values and Working Class Culture in Nineteenth Century Sheffield - the Pursuit of Respectability' in S. Pollard and C.R. Holmes (ed.), Essays in the Economic and Social History of South Yorkshire S.Y.H.C. (1977) Sheffield, p277-81 and passim for a discussion in Yorkshire context.

industrialisation, when demands for capital and labour exceeded the supply and acute housing shortages resulted from the influx of population, large employers were frequently engaged in housing and otherwise accommodating their workforce. With the spread of urbanisation and state involvement this burden was gradually eased, though the vicissitudes of speculative building forced periodic intervention well after 1880. The emphasis of welfare expenditure shifted towards schemes designed to improve working conditions, general efficiency and labour morale in many key industries and service sectors. Employers were less worried by labour shortages and much more sensitive to the difficulties presented by organised resistance to managerial control.

Similar patterns can be traced in the comparison of two quite distinct economic and geographical regions during these decades. In both west Scotland and the West Riding, textiles had formed a staple industry in the earlier 19th century and by the 1880s both experienced competition and contraction. For the Scottish cotton manufacturers the decline proved terminal, though numerous ancillary and related trades continued to survive and even flourish before 1914. In the West Riding the woolen and worsted producers saw mixed fortunes after the boom years of the early 1870s, with traditional mixed worsteds suffering heavily from changes in taste as well as cyclical fluctuations and low prices whilst the ready-made clothiers made rapid strides towards mass production and expanding markets. Here again, the policies of individual employers fortified particular enterprises even during the period of stagnation, whilst others found the trends toward larger scale, greater mechanisation and improved organisation beyond their resources.

The evidence suggests that welfare innovation followed these changing conditions and innovations in both set of textile trades. In Scotland the great cotton magnates had constructed their mills and weaving communities, frequently away from the centres of population, during the period of rapid growth in industry. As late as the 1860s and 1870s the dyeing employers at Leven were extending their plant and communities, whilst carpet and ropework manufacturers

were constructing new plants and housing amenities as late as the 1890s. Whilst the deteriorating cotton masters did little to improve either productivity or relations, these dynamic concerns were ready to utilise a variety of welfare schemes and incentives to improve output and maintain loyalty. The employers in the West Riding were also faced with quite radical changes in market climate and forced to adapt accordingly if they were to survive. Many sought to weather the sombre years of depression by crude methods of labour exploitation, although numerous larger concerns recognised the need for creative change by the 1890s. Whilst hordes of small firms could survive only by sweated conditions and low rates of pay, the leading establishments welcomed and facilitated the improvements in state minima.¹ These larger and more advanced industrialists also favoured the provision of welfare benefits where a clear case could be made for incentives and efficiency. Many of the most impressive settlements - such as Queensbury, Saltaire and Manningham - had been planned in the years of expansion and prosperity. Their counterparts in the following decades were less spectacular and more restrained in design, though building did continue among the successful firms.

In each region those employers who adopted a positive approach to changing market conditions and favoured fresh innovations, were more likely to introduce benefits than their unadventurous competitors. It is certainly wrong to exaggerate the importance of welfare arrangements in the fortunes of business, but it may not be entirely coincidental that substantial cotton concerns in Scotland and the famous Marshall flax mill at Leeds failed to resolve their chronic labour problems and to introduce welfare amenities even for key supervisory workers in these critical years.

The parallel comparison of coalmining in both regions presents a number of interesting contrasts as well as important similarities. In product and market orientation,

1. J.A.M. Caldwell, "Social Policy and Public Administration, 1909-1911" Ph.D Thesis (Nottingham, 1956), p26 for Churchill's argument on this point; p56-62, for co-operation of larger employers with Trade Boards.

the Lanarkshire and West Yorkshire fields were remarkably similar and also shared a reputation for progressive technical and managerial policies in the face of competition from more recent and better endowed areas. This image was largely, if not completely, the result of innovations sponsored by the score of leading firms in each area. The efforts to maximise output by longwall working, buttyism and mechanisation provoked considerable controversy whilst tightening management control of underground working.

In each region the period of most widespread sinkings had passed by the 1880s, as firms grappled with problems of diminishing returns and disappointing labour productivity. Yet the nomadic character of production and the settlements required to accompany a fresh working, meant that housing commitments continued well after the peaks of the 1870s. Other welfare ventures arose to accompany these infrastructural investments as questions of efficiency and discipline perturbed colliery managements. As early as the 1840s and '50s Dixons of Govan had devised a friendly scheme which stipulated free labour commitments, and more liberal provisions were later instituted at the ironworks. The Briggs concern was also well in advance of current opinion when it inaugurated its profit sharing programme in the 1860s, largely in response to labour unrest once again. What is equally significant, however, is that each firm continued and extended its interest in welfare schemes despite the setbacks suffered in the 1870s. The declining coal deposits of Govan Colliery made the Dixon commitment less vital (especially after the Trustees assumed control), than at Whitwood where the Currer Briggs devised internal and community facilities as output continued to expand. Perhaps their most impressive achievement was the creation of a selectivist benefit fund, catering for their key staff grades, which was later adopted by the Owners' Association founded by Currer Briggs.

Although it has provided a barely adequate sketch of many important regional aspects, the general comparison of industries and regions in west Scotland and West Yorkshire has covered approximately forty-five distinct firms in ten separate industries. Most of these yielded good primary

manuscript sources and in only a handful did the survey rely on printed or secondary materials.¹ There was a clear bias towards those firms who were large and successful enough to have left significant records, although the fact remains that in the large majority of concerns some evidence of welfare activity survives. There does appear to be a positive correlation between certain market and structural conditions, patterns of innovation, and particular labour policies. Among the latter, industrial welfare played a significant part and appeared in various forms at different stages of industrial development and under contrasting conditions of industrial relations.

The impact and affects of welfare on overall efficiency and output is almost impossible to determine, given the range of variables to consider in assessing even management's contribution to production.¹ What is important, however, is the careful and deliberate calculations made by welfarist employers before engaging on any substantial project of investment and expenditure. It is certainly true that such men would not have favoured schemes which they did not believe would have fostered growth, efficiency and harmony in their enterprise - however intuitive such a decision may have been. One fundamental reason why such calculations were limited, was the unpredictability and sensitivity of labour to the variety of controls which industrial benefits often implied. The experiences of the First World War, which marked a watershed in welfare as well as productive relations, suggests that their suspicions were often justified.

Whilst the analysis of economic factors and industrial relations must provide the basis for any study of industrial welfare, this cannot reveal the wider social and political importance of such activities. We must examine the interests and commitments of employers beyond the boundaries of their individual businesses and factories, and investigate the links

1. F.R. Jervis, Bosses in British Business: Managers and management from the Industrial Revolution to the present day R.K.P. (1974) London, p146-48, for a discussion of this point.

between welfare in economy, civil society and the state itself. In each of these areas, one of the most vital considerations must be the style of administration adopted and the relations between distinct agencies of welfare. Just as collective bargaining and disputes were increasingly conducted outside the single concern, reflecting the growing organisation of both labour and capital, so the involvement with welfare extended into the district associations and even national federations.

The employers' organisations were, in fact, among the most interesting agencies of industrial welfare in these decades. They can be compared with the much longer-established, but even less well known, range of shop clubs and friendly societies which operated inside the factories and workshops of local employers. In each case the conditions of administration were closely bound up with the principle of control, and with the overall purpose of the agency involved. Given the defensive orientation of business and trade associations, it is understandable that their main preoccupation was with managerial prerogatives. Only when welfare could serve strategic ends was it widely supported by such bodies, and even then associations were anxious to refer back many welfare issues to their membership as managerial questions rather than common policy. Where large and dynamic welfarist employers were able to dominate local trade organisations, as the Briggs family did in West Yorkshire for a period, then the strategic model scheme could be disseminated by the association. During the years when intermediate staff grades displayed dangerous tendencies to unionisation, attractive welfare privileges were suggested as useful antidotes to collective action in industries as different as shipbuilding, coalmining and railway transportation. Where they shared common problems was the field of industrial relations, and given the need for an organised front against labour on general issues it was almost inevitable that they should ignore infrastructural and efficiency-oriented services for strategic designs.

Very different in formal constitution and apparent purpose were the host of works societies and shop clubs which are usually included in the generic term 'friendly societies'.

If such societies were to be registered under the Acts of 1874 and 1896 they must offer voluntary membership and be governed by elected officials free from outside control. The thousands of shop clubs which operated under the direct aegis of the employers and therefore remained unregistered, were also regulated by the Shop Clubs legislation of 1902. Despite these restraints it seems likely that employers continued to sponsor both registered and unregistered societies, which covered thousands of works and probably hundreds of thousands of employees.

Even where the sponsoring firm enjoyed much less than complete control over such societies, there were a number of advantages for the employer. The costs of the scheme fell largely upon the working members, whilst the management could hold the balance between solvency and bankruptcy. The amount of control conceded to the employees might serve to raise their participation in such an acceptable body, and even discourage the formation of a trade union offering similar benefits. In general, membership of such societies would tend to reduce labour mobility from the works and increase loyalty to particular managements. This is certainly what appears to have happened at concerns such as Pickerings of Wishaw and Brownlees of City Sawmills.

The spread of social reform and state legislation touched upon the world of the friendly societies at a number of points. Even before the major enactments of the 1870s, railway and other specified trades could apply for private legislation to establish the 'statutory societies' in their works. After 1868 the government was increasingly involved in the regulation of trade unions and employers associations as well as friendly societies, and during the most creative years of social policy these voluntary organisations were incorporated in the framework of state provision.¹ Participants and observers alike were insistent on the need to balance private interests and efforts with official action, including the sponsored friendly

1. I.G. Gibbon, Unemployment Insurance King (1911) London, p251, 254-56; R.W. Harris, National Health Insurance in Great Britain George Allen & Unwin (1946) London, p118, for examples.

societies of progressive employers.¹ In this respect the contrasting agencies of trade associations and friendly societies were fulfilling broadly similar functions in representing - to varying degrees - the interests of private industry during state intervention. The vital role which employers played in the administration of social services was recognised by government even where special preferences and concessions were not given to their schemes directly, with National Insurance being one major example.²

These private agencies of welfare were often most effective at a local, rather than central, level in social provision. The institutions of both employers and of local government helped define the boundaries of the locality and immediate 'community' surrounding workplaces. It would seem that such areas are more accurately conceived of as a network of economic and social relations, rather than as a physical proximity. Underlying these connexions was the basic market relationship between capital and labour, and the situation of local labour markets, although other commitments (such as property relationships) contributed to this class formation within the locale.

Almost as important in the constitution of such relations were the distinct images of 'community' which different groups seem to have derived from their everyday experiences. After the conflicts of the earlier 19th century, many employers sought to establish their image of the viable class society in a number of ways. The prosperity of the middle decades allowed many staple industrialists to improve their local areas and add the architectural refinements which culminated in the construction of model towns such as Saltaire.

1. Gibbon, *op. cit.*, p263-66, for a consideration of arguments; J. Brown, "Ideas Concerning Social Policy and their Influence on Legislation in Britain, 1902-11" Ph.D Thesis (London, 1964), p331, for argument of Beatrice Webb on this point.
2. Departmental Committee on Approved Society Finance and Administration, Interim Report / National Health Insurance / Cd. 8251 (1916), Para. 85-86, p28; for example, where the question of 'Employers' Provident Funds' under the National Insurance administration discussed.

Although the economic climate hardly justified the heavy expenditure in many cases, these efforts to provide educational, recreational and religious facilities seem to have continued and even spread in the decades after 1880. Even those firms deeply embedded in the urban landscape were prepared to spend thousands of pounds on workmen's institutes and local parks or gardens, which frequently complemented better working conditions inside the shops and factories. Nor were these activities restricted to particular trades or religious groups, since Bairstows and Pearce seemed equally energetic as Collins and Salt. Whilst public enquiries condemned the standards of sanitation in many Scottish colliery villages, numerous owners financed the erection of reading rooms and public baths - led by such families as Briggs in the West Yorkshire case.

At least part of the answer to this problem, must be the attempt by certain employers to sustain stable class relations in a situation of increasing tension and unrest. Employers as different as William Denny, Walter Neilson and William Fison, recognised the importance of encouraging respectable attitudes and behaviour among the skilled workmen in particular. It may be no coincidence that in the same years that Glasgow's leading retailers began to insure against civil commotion, they also funded healthy recreation for their staff and the local shipbuilders organised outings for the apprentices.

The limits of these endeavours became obvious during the troubled decade after 1910, when serious housing unrest affected the Scottish mining districts and rent strikes spread throughout the Glasgow and Clydebank area. Owners could barely afford to undertake the massive modernisation and building programmes which were needed in both west Scotland and the West Riding, nor would private builders contemplate constructing for a depressed rented sector. It was in this context that intervention was virtually forced upon the government, with employers themselves demanding great social expenditure coupled with decontrol of industry. Yet the setbacks suffered before 1921 deterred neither industry nor legislators from their commitment to a mixed welfare programme, as became clear with the setting

up of the Miners' Welfare Fund under the joint control of sympathetic masters and acceptable union officials.

The attempts to preserve the fabric of local communities in a society increasingly beset by open class antagonism, casts an interesting light on employers' ideology in these decades. Any survey of welfare principles and ideas must set them in the broader spectrum of ideology and innovations which were transforming business practice and precepts as well as social politics. The rise of management science and the growth of technical expertise in many areas of society only reinforced the position of the salaried groups, whilst leading theorists revised the tenets of classical political economy.¹ The policies of post-Gladstonian Liberal governments, influenced as they were by these and other ideas, led to a steady drift of even the most entrenched Free Traders away from the radical camp.²

These fissures and changes were also complicated by the array of religious beliefs, political commitments and personal connexions which affected individual families and groups of employers.³ Confronted by his membership of different organisations and institutions, the employer might follow a somewhat inconsistent line in business and politics, making uneasy compromises on personal and public convictions. Some of these divisions and complexities are noticeable in the ideologies of industrial welfare held at this period. The three broad streams which are most easily summarised are: firstly, an ideal of authoritarian direction combined with welfare benefits in what was essentially a deferential gift relationship; secondly, a perception of industrial welfare as a rational extension of improved working conditions and enlightened labour management; and thirdly, a radical approach to industrial welfare which

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1. See G.E. Toogood, The Principles of Industrial Administration Brown (1917) London, p14-15; L. Urwick and E.F.L. Brech, The Making of Scientific Management Vol.I Management Trust (1945) London, p169, and passim for rise of professionals.
 2. P.F. Clarke, 'The End of Laissez Faire and the Politics of Cotton' Historical Journal XV No.3 (1972), especially p508-12.
 3. See B. Webb, My Apprenticeship Penguin (1971) London, p34-37, for an account of ideas of a timber merchant family in London.

recognised the social as well as economic responsibilities of business and which accepted the need for employee participation in industrial administration.

Though differing in the emphasis placed upon discretionary powers held by the employer, these philosophies shared the recognition of work satisfaction by employees and the need for constructive relations - of which the welfare relationship formed one part. This growing awareness was usually expressed in terms of the 'human factor' in business and industry, which was both an important and sensitive factor in efficient production. The fact that the term came to cover a number of distinct programmes, ranging from industrial psychology to welfare benefits, illustrates the rich variety of ideas influencing businessmen in these formative years. These employers were not steadfastly committed to any one set of abstractions, but tended to combine principles in their pragmatic reaction to everyday problems.¹ Hence the peculiar fusion of authority, benevolence and rationalism in Beardmores labour policies and benefit provision. At the same time, it is clear that the growing organisation and professionalism of management and the trends in industrial relations, were leading more firms to favour rational rather than authoritarian styles of welfare. Those larger and more progressive employers tended to adopt enlightened, and even radical, prescriptions in their efforts to stabilise the labour force. With the serious conflicts of the First World War there occurred the parallel movements towards better industrial conditions and enlarged participation by labour.

One of the most significant factors in the transformation of business attitudes on welfare was the experience of increasing incursions by the state itself, not only in acknowledged areas of social policy but in labour markets, questions of hours and remuneration, and industrial control itself. Their reactions to such developments depended on rather similar considerations as their response to industrial

1. S.D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 University of Chicago Press (1976), p4: 'Business leaders were seldom given to abstract thought about the proper shape of a new and more human industrial order.'

welfare principles. Questions of immediate trading interests for firms and industries always loomed large, as did the issue of control over future services and the role of voluntary arrangements (including employers' schemes) in subsequent administration. Rather than isolating separate spheres of private and public policy, therefore, it is more valuable to conceive of each as deriving from similar impulses. State action arose usually where economic conditions and relations created by private enterprise resulted in inadequacies and conflicts. Just as industrial welfare was a recognition of the limitations of wage contracts and private organisation in housing and other essential facilities, so government regulation demonstrated the problems within the market economy.¹

The legislation which most directly interested employers and their organisations was that affecting industrial production and involving them in increased overheads. Within individual firms, the three main considerations when responding to state initiatives were probably; the amount of labour employed relative to other costs, the condition of the industry and regional economy during the years of reform, and the position of the enterprise. Here employers would engage in a crude (and usually intuitive) cost-benefit analysis before stating their views on official proposals. Large and more prosperous employers tended to favour the introduction of minimum standards, especially where large overheads were avoided and good conditions prevailed.

Trade associations and chambers of commerce followed a roughly similar line, despite the frequent divisions of opinion and the shifts in business attitudes. Here the wider perspective on industrial and class relations, as well as the frequent contacts with departments of state and the overview of commercial interests, enabled many bodies to accept a rather more flexible stance.² Even where business failed to affect the drafting and passage of reforms,

1. See P. Corrigan and V. Gillespie, 'State formation and Social Policy until 1871' in N. Parry (ed.), Social Work and the State Arnold (1979) London, for broadly similar analysis.

2. Caldwell, op. cit., p370-71.

employers were confident that their relationship with such bodies as the dynamic Board of Trade and the cooperation with local government in implementing policies would serve them well.¹ They realised the value of such links and were pressing throughout the period for a separate Department, or even Ministry, of Commerce - with partial success.²

One common theme in such discussions and negotiations was the industrialists' desire to maintain their voluntary arrangements wherever possible. The consequence of growing state intervention was not so much a direct substitution of public for private responsibility, as a complex shift in emphasis within both state and industrial services. Four broad trends can be identified in the relationship between government and private initiatives: firstly, the state was assuming control of whole new areas of policy which affected producers as well as consumers and in certain cases removed the incentive for private action; secondly, government growth proceeded largely by a process of incorporating and regulating voluntary arrangements which continued either as joint partners in administration or as supplementary amenities; thirdly, public schemes tended to cater for the broad mass or 'universal' level of provision while private schemes became increasingly concerned with the selective privileges of certain grades or with additional benefits outside state maxima; fourthly, the combination of state regulation and business opinion moved industrial welfare away from compulsory membership and towards voluntary participation by the end of the period.

Thus we must envisage the evolution of industrial welfare schemes not only as part of the changing connections between government and private provision, but also against the background of changing functions and contractual arrangements in both avenues of administration. This in

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1. Caldwell, op. cit., p374, 383, for Home Office and Board of Trade; Brown, op. cit., p235-37, for dynamism of latter. One key example of cooperation was of course Labour Exchanges, see Caldwell, ibid., p156-60.
 2. C. 4797, Royal Commission on Depression in Trade, op. cit., Evidence of M. Oldroyd of Dewsbury and Batley Chambers, ¶ 14175 on this point; R. Davidson, 'The Ideology of Labour Administration 1886-1914' Bulletin of Society for Study of Labour History XL (Spring 1980).

turn only chartered the altered terrain between economic interests, institutions of civil society (including agencies enjoying legal status such as friendly societies and trade associations), and the state itself. Employers were almost as anxious to preserve the autonomy of such interests and institutions against the encroachments of state administration, as they were to utilise government action in their cause and against unfriendly groups. It is from this tension between divergent objectives that we should trace business attitudes to social policy and industrial welfare activities.

Having outlined the tentative conclusions which can be made from approximately forty-five firms, nine trade associations and three chambers of commerce, there remain numerous questions as to the wider significance of these welfare schemes and labour policies. Such a study enables some evaluation to be made of the general performance and attitudes of employers within the British economy at this time. It also raises problems of comparison with the welfare activities of employers in such important rival economies as Germany and America. Finally, it offers some insights into the subsequent development of industrial welfare, management and social policy in Britain.

The debates on British economic development after 1875 have largely taken the form of arguments over entrepreneurship, at least insofar as they touch upon the role of employers.¹ After the indictments laid by various economic historians against the Victorian failures, there has been a determined attempt to rehabilitate entrepreneurship in line with generally sympathetic accounts of the late-Victorian economy.² Perhaps of greater interest and value are the recent studies which examine the structural and institutional changes in business organisation and management in America and Britain during these decades, and the emergence of the 'corporate economy' in this country.³

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1. D.H. Aldcroft, 'The Entrepreneur and the British Economy, 1870-1914' Economic History Review XVII (1964); C. Wilson, 'Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britain' Economic History Review XVIII No.1 (1965); are two surprisingly influential contributions.
 2. McCloskey and Sandberg, loc. cit.; D.N. McCloskey, 'Did Victorian Britain Fail?' Economic History Review XXIII No.3 (1970); c.f.

One of the more obvious consequences of this fresh approach has been a sharpening of focus upon those largest companies which can be readily identified as innovators and market leaders.¹ The examination of industrial welfare as related to other developments within the sample of firms surveyed, qualifies this impression in certain respects. Firstly, many of innovations in organisation and management were certainly marked in the larger firms before 1914, but were evident in a broad section of enterprises across various industries and trades. Business innovations did not flow downwards from a handful of creative pioneers, whose genius was gradually disseminated to their surviving rivals. Rather these changes were the accretion of more gradual processes and experiments carried out by employers and managers in various trades.² Secondly, there were leading concerns in particular sectors which showed themselves more progressive than others in various ways, but because of the fragmented structure of many industries and the market conditions under which they operated, they were unable to dominate whole areas of production. The cases suggest that many employers and managers did not lack drive and initiative, nor was there any sudden haemorrhage of talent among businessmen in industry, but the structural conditions under which they operated discouraged more profound improvements. Thirdly, the arguments presented here indicate that one cannot explain the rise of the modern British economy or its management, without serious attention to labour policies and industrial relations. Industrial welfare is only one of the areas where inadequate research and casual generalisation has led to an almost wholly distorted image of labour management

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2. R.A. Church, 'Nineteenth Century Clock Technology' Economic History Review XXVIII No.4 (1975), p626-30, for more sombre account of entrepreneurial initiatives.
 3. B. Supple (ed.), Essays in British Business History O.U.P. (1976), p3-5, 13-16, and passim; L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy Methuen (1976) London, p2-4, and passim.
 1. Hannah, ibid., p123-27; c.f. A.D. Chandler Jnr., Strategy and Structure M.I.T. Press (1967) Cambridge, Mass., for a similar analysis in American context.
 2. C.f. Hannah, op. cit., p131-36, for rather different argument on managerial development in the interwar years.

and welfare provision in British firms at this and later periods. There is also perhaps a fairly strong case for greater consideration of regional economic development in Britain, and certainly this comparison of distinct regions has offered insights into differential advances which general surveys can only hint at.

The refinement of methods for comparative analysis are also necessary prerequisites for any serious investigation of parallel welfare developments in Britain and other industrialised economies during these decades. Recognition must be made not only of these countries' distinctive economic progress, but also their peculiar social structure and cultural values. It was not merely differences in factor endowment and natural resources which shaped welfare programmes, but influences as varied as local traditions and political acumen.¹ Thus if we compare American, British and German employers and their welfare activities, it soon becomes clear that we are tracing movements in societies that range from the democratic competitive world of the United States to the more restrained environment of British business and the highly traditionalist setting of northern Germany.² These influences were frequently apparent in the welfare projects of leading employers at this period, with marked contrasts noted in labour attitudes between each country.³

Equally important to our understanding of comparative welfare evolution, is the realisation of significant variations within such national economies. Given the bitter confrontations in American society during the Civil War era, and the recent unification of the autonomous German states, this is more -- rather than less significant in their case. The regional contrasts in the welfarism of Southern cotton textile manufacturers and Northern industrialists,⁴ or in the 'feudalistic'

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1. D. Brody, 'The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism' in J. Braeman et. al. (ed.), Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America: The 1920s Ohio State University Press (1968).
 2. E.C. McCreary, 'Social welfare and business: the Krupp welfare program, 1860-1914' Business History Review XLII (1968), p36-38, 43, for one example of German employers.
 3. N.P. Gilman, A Dividend to Labour: A Study of Employers' Welfare Institutions Houghton (1899) New York, for a comparison.

policies of Prussian industrial barons and the more flexible strategic welfare of the Ruhr iron and steel magnates.¹

This sharp delineation of approach is also found in a study of political commitments and state legislation within each of the countries, though again the internal variations appear more marked in America and Germany. Workmen's compensation and insurance provisions were enacted at different periods by state authorities in the U.S.A., and involved a complex series of arrangements both there and in Germany.²

Even when we chart out the growth of industrial and social welfare benefits in each country at a general level, there are numerous difficulties in comparing them. The very fact that certain countries and states were more advanced in legislative reforms, meant that some cross-fertilisation of experience was inevitable. This has probably been somewhat exaggerated in the case of German examples influencing British practices and policy, but a certain degree of emulation and observation is undeniable.³ This makes the isolation of independent variables more hazardous, particularly when tracing the intricate connections between private and public provision.

Having emphasised the quite distinct pattern of economic, social and political development in each country, there remains the evidence of similar welfare arrangements and comparable initiatives among employers. The empirical content of the services, the motives behind their introduction, and the functions performed when in operation, all conform to those established in the British case. Such schemes as improved safety and working conditions, associated insurance and mutual aid benefits, were only the most widespread of provisions which including housing, profit-sharing and leisure facilities.⁴

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4. D. Nelson and S. Campbell, 'Taylorism Versus Welfare Work in American Industry' Business History Review XLVI (1972), for one study of Southern manufacturer.
 1. A. Ascher, 'Baron von Stumm, advocate of Feudal Capitalism' Journal of Central European Affairs XXII (1962); E.G. Spencer, 'Between Capital and Labour..' Journal of Social History IX (1975), for interesting examination of supervisory welfarism.
 2. R. Asher, 'Business and Workers' Welfare in the Progressive Era' Business History Review XLIII No.4 (1969), p453-54; J.M. Keech, Workmen's Compensation in North Carolina, 1929-1940 Duke University Press (1942), especially p15-17; for experience of a New England and Southern state and their employers.

The motives of American and German employers in supporting welfare schemes also appear to have been rather similar to those of British concerns, although these were as mixed and complicated as they were in Britain.¹ In essence, all of the employers were interested in the efficiency and discipline of labour within the works, and the stability of the labour force outside.² To this end, American and German businessmen were increasingly prepared to involve themselves in the local community and in the consumptive as well as productive aspects of their employees' lives.³

The objective functions of such services are obviously difficult to determine, but their main value seems to have lay in the improvement of productivity and the moralisation of industrial relations between employers and workers. As in Britain, progressive managements were conscious of the need to provide uplift as well as efficiency, and to reproduce the conditions under which capitalist production could continue.⁴ These conditions and schemes were noticeably different in each country, but their role in regulating the purchase and organisation of labour was similar enough for British progressive employers to import welfare principles along with scientific management and incentive systems.⁵

The greater publicity given to business activities and ideology in America and Germany can, therefore, be largely explained in terms of their economic and social development. Rapid industrialisation and concentration of resources led to the emergence of large corporations and an identifiable business elite, whilst the political institutions of these countries accommodated these powerful interests within the

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3. E.G. Hooper, The German State Insurance System Wilson (1908) London, p9-10; Harris, op. cit., 28-29, 35-36; Brown, op. cit., p246-47, 340-43, 350-51.
 4. Brody, loc. cit., p161, for statistical estimates; Brandes, op. cit., pp38-110.
 1. D. Nelson, Managers and Workers University of Wisconsin Press (1975), p101, for diversity of motives.
 2. Nelson and Campbell, loc. cit., p4; B. Rudin, 'Industrial Betterment and Scientific Management as Social Control, 1890-1920' Berkeley Journal of Sociology XVII (1972-73), p66-67.
 3. R. Wilson and J. Goldman, 'The Rationalisation of Leisure' Politics and Society VII No.2 (1977), p158-59.

framework of the existing state.¹ There is thus a much more explicit identification of business interests there than in Britain, and a much more coherent articulation of political objectives.² The greater advances of business organisation and economic power accounts both for the greater impetus to welfare initiatives and the stronger links between economic and political strategies. Yet within the British context, it is arguable that industrial welfare was equally important and its impact on social change just as significant. Highly diversified and fragmented benefit schemes only reflected the retarded and uneven pattern of economic advance in a country whose labour institutions were as strong as those in America were weak.

The real significance of those welfare innovations which were undertaken in the decades before 1920, can only be truly appraised by an examination of the subsequent trends in industrial schemes, management evolution, and social politics in Britain and other countries. Then it might be possible to assess the long-term contributions of industrial betterment and the claim that these years were a formative period in welfare development.

The growth of industrial welfare after 1920 continued to be moulded by the same considerations of market conditions, economic growth and industrial relations, which had been so prominent in influencing the earlier schemes. Cyclical fluctuations and levels of employment led to changes in attitudes as well as relations after 1921, as the case of the coal industry demonstrated. Whilst the plentiful supply of labour and evaporation of industrial unrest after that

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4. S. Haber, Efficiency and Uplift Chicago University Press (1964), is one interesting study.
 5. Toogood, op. cit., p15; Proud, op. cit., p138, where arguments for high wages, good conditions and welfare linked to scientific management.
 1. J. Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (1968) Boston; Feldman, loc. cit., p47.
 2. J.A. Turner, 'The British Commonwealth Union and the general election of 1918' English Historical Review XCIII No.368 (1978), p551-53, for this point.
 3. Gilman, op. cit.

year reduced the momentum of innovation, the trends in the growth of services and unionisation among the intermediate grades continued to give employers concern. After the General Strike there was also an important section of business opinion which favoured welfare as one avenue of conciliation, and the 'new' industries expanded their labour services along with their workforce in the 1920s.¹ It was the latter who figured notably in the extension of supplementary unemployment benefits for key workers in the interwar decades, led by employers who had already established a sound reputation for progressive labour management.²

After the rearmament recovery and the full employment of War and post-War years, British managements were confronted by tight labour markets and increasing state intervention in welfare and other areas. In this situation there occurred a decisive shift towards a dual welfare system in industry, which had already been foreshadowed in the days of the Liberal reforms before 1914. Employers improved basic working conditions and wages whilst allowing the state to cater for the broad mass of the workforce via the Beveridge programme.³ Their energies were channelled into providing services and benefits which would supplement official minima, particularly for their white-collar staff who were sharply segregated in such schemes from the works employees.⁴

It should be noted that the spread of company pensions and sick pay schemes during the post-1945 era was still very much conditioned by economic factors, such as trading conditions in the industry and the scale and structure of individual concerns. Pension arrangements were prominent in certain industries and size of firm, and their scales were graded according to the structure and responsibilities of the workforce.⁵ Economic

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1. G.W. McDonald and H.F. Gospel, 'The Mond-Turner Talks, 1927-1933: A Study in Industrial Co-operation' Historical Journal XVI (1973) for post-1926 era.
 2. M.B. Gilson and E.J. Riches, 'Employers' Additional Unemployment Benefit Schemes in Great Britain' International Labour Review XXI (1930), p361-82, for survey of schemes.
 3. J.R. Hay, 'British Industry and the Beveridge Report..' University of Deakin [mimeo], Australia (1980), for study of reactions.
 4. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, Report of an Enquiry into the Incidence of Incapacity for work: Scope and character-

conditions did not cease to be of primary importance in determining the origins and scope of such benefits, but the economy was itself being heavily influenced by state welfare expenditure and within this changed business environment employers were discovering fresh priorities. There was now very little need for housing or infrastructural investments, and the administration of health services, education, social security and pensions by the state had largely replaced voluntary arrangements as minimum provisions. The employers were increasingly interested in offering services as exercises in labour relations, by such means as canteens and recreation amenities, or as an instrument of privilege and rewards within the company. It was no longer a case of maintaining essential facilities, but of securing efficiency, loyalty and deference via a system of good conditions and fringe benefits.¹

This process has inevitably affected the evolution of management in Britain since the 1920s, particularly the genesis of personnel and labour management. By 1929 it was accepted that the welfare supervisor or department assumed responsibility for recruitment of employees and general supervision of working conditions, as well as superintending the safety, accommodation or comfort, and leisure activities of the workforce.² Writers such as John Lee accepted company welfare as a permanent feature of modern management, and only insisted that it should strengthen rather than counter the principles of direction and control which underpinned managerial authority.³

After a somewhat confused campaign to establish the professional autonomy of the industrial welfare workers during the early 1920s, full control was asserted by the

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4. istics of Employers' Sick Pay Schemes H.M.S.O. (1964) London, gives a detailed survey.
 5. W. Durham, Industrial Pension Schemes Industrial Welfare Society (1956) London, p26 Table I, p32-33, and passim for detailed break-down of industries and types of schemes.
 1. A.G.P. Elliot, 'Company Welfare Benefits' in G.L. Reid and D.J. Robertson (ed.), Fringe Benefits, Labour Costs and Social Security Allen & Unwin (1965) London, for example.
 2. E.T. Kelly, 'The Welfare Supervisor' in J. Lee (ed.), op. cit., p1084, for various duties as specified in 1929.
 3. Ibid., Vol.I, p161-64, for 'Direction and Control' arguments.

welfarist employers and thereafter welfare facilities were firmly tied to management prerogatives. Personnel duties had been almost fully defined by the outbreak of the Second World War, which was to give both private services and industrial management further stimuli to development.¹ During the economic growth of the 1950s there were to be significant refinements of managerial theory and practice, with the fresh emphasis upon productivity and the 'enrichment' of industrial working conditions for shop floor and higher staff.²

Although labour markets have slackened during the late 1960s and in the 1970s, the institutions of labour continue to raise problems of management control and industrial discipline. It may be more than coincidence, therefore, that the more progressive sections of business opinion have again turned to proposals for improved conditions, additional benefits and profit-sharing schemes.³ In one respect this is perceived as a method of restoring the favourable image of business by projecting the ideal of 'corporate responsibility' in modern industrial society.⁴

Such an argument must be balanced by an examination of the changing relations between private industry and state social policy since 1920. Both the Departmental Committee on Approved Societies in 1916 and the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance a decade later, made it clear that private interests and agencies had formed a major part of the 'national' schemes introduced by the reforming governments before 1914.⁵ Employers and trade unions had contributed to the creation of a social services state as much as the better publicised activities of friendly societies.

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1. International Labour Office, 'The Organisation of Personnel Management in Industrial Undertakings' International Labour Review XL (1939), for statement of contemporary trends.
 2. A.O. Martin, Welfare at Work Batsford (1967) London, is one of the more sophisticated examples.
 3. See H. Ramsay, 'Cycles of Control..' Sociology XI No.3 (1977), for similar arguments concerning industrial participation.
 4. B.J.A. Hargreaves and L.H. Peach, 'Social Responsibility: The Investment that Pays Off' Personnel Management VIII (1976).
 5. Cd. 8251, op. cit., Para. 85, p28; Harris, op. cit., p120-21.

This intimate relationship continued after 1921, despite the powerful campaign in favour of 'home rule for industry' and against state intervention. During the interwar years there was a general drift against state expenditure and social services, though there remained a strong undercurrent of industrial activity and progressive opinion which surfaced again during the recovery and war periods.¹ Most employers shared the Conservative Party's scepticism and hesitancy over radical social reforms, usually expressing this in terms of a defence of private initiative and voluntary effort. It is interesting that after his successful initiatives in the creation of the welfare state, Beveridge himself came to reassert the case for voluntary action within a liberal society.²

After the parallel growth of public and private welfare expenditure during the 1950s and 1960s, and the alternate efforts at expansion and retrenchment in state commitments, there is again a strong movement to link the two areas of provision. This became apparent during the passing of the 1973 Social Security Act and the proposals for the Social Security Pensions Act passed five years later.³ Under the latter, all employers were involved in a new pensions scheme which was designed to secure an earnings-related retirement benefit and to integrate the multifarious arrangements then in existence.⁴ Businessmen were offered the alternatives, apparently on the basis of past Workmen's Compensation practice, of either contributing solely to the state scheme or providing a supplementary occupational benefit or contracting out of the additional payments involved under state pensions and providing their own arrangements.⁵

By these years it had become clear that such services as private pension funds not only affected a very large number of employees, but also wielded enormous power within the

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1. Hay, loc. cit. (1980), for rather similar comments.
 2. W.H. Beveridge, Voluntary Action Allen & Unwin (1957) London
 3. P. Jacques, 'Bargaining could bring difficulties' The Times 28.4.1976.
 4. Lord Byres, 'From here to complexity', ibid.
 5. Ibid; F.R. Langham, 'Integration brings control', ibid.

economy as a form of investment capital.¹ The implications for industrial relations were also very much a subject of discussion then and later.² Therefore the rationale for integration went beyond the desire for administrative efficiency and neatness, and the proposals were generally welcomed by employers as well as civil servants as a useful exercise in government cooperation.

Whether we should see such reforms as merely pragmatic responses to overlapping needs, or as another chapter in the emergence of the modern corporate state, is open to question.³ What is not in doubt is the continuing importance of employers and industrial welfare in the shaping of national economic and social policy, and their influence on the relations between groups as well as the allocation of the fruits of production. Many of these trends were already evident in the decades before 1920, and it is to that period we should look for the origins of employers' attitudes and the genesis of welfare services.

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1. R.F.W. Byles, 'Rapid growth after defensive beginning', ibid;
K. Cole, 'Transfer club growth likely to be slow'.
 2. K.G. Smith, 'The problems affecting employers and unions', ibid;
Jacques, loc. cit.
 3. L.P. Carpenter, 'Corporatism in Britain, 1930-45' Journal of Contemporary History XI (1976), particularly p13-16, 19-24,
for discussion of corporatism and its links with British
business before 1945.

A P P E N D I C E S

1. Notes on sample of firms selected.
2. Notes on Clydeside industrial relations during First World War.
3. Additional material on the coalmining industry.
4. Notes on quantitative sources for the regional comparison.
5. Additional material on employers and profit-sharing & labour co-partnership in the United Kingdom, 1880-1920.
6. Additional note on employers, welfare and social policy.

Appendix I: Note on the sample of firms selected and the methodology employed.

There are a number of serious problems in selecting and interpreting the records of business enterprises and individual employers during these decades. One initial difficulty experienced was the fragmentary and incomplete nature of surviving records as well as the almost complete absence of papers relating to the private and public life of even large manufacturers.¹ Given the heavy reliance upon existing business records in tracing the development of industrial welfare during this study, it is necessary to outline some of the deficiencies which such materials impose on research.

Those collections which have survived to the present day have a natural bias towards particular kinds of firm, although there is little uniformity in the size and quality of record deposits. Enterprises which preserved their documents had obviously to survive until archival facilities were available to receive their files - which usually did not occur until well into the 20th century.² Unless the business was a limited company with restricted liability, there was no compulsion upon the employers to maintain accurate records and even then it was frequently kept down to the minutes of Annual General Meetings and statement of profit and loss. Many of the largest concerns (such as Templeton Carpets) retained their private status beyond the decades surveyed while others destroyed or refused to deposit their business accounts. Again it is only with the larger companies that extensive documentation could be undertaken and adequate clerical organisation provided. It was in these extensive collections that evidence of industrial welfare facilities tended to be found, suggesting a positive correlation between the span of material and the record of welfarism.

Since the concerns which left materials tended to be the larger limited companies, with adequate clerical staffing and a substantial corpus of business accounts, there is a

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1. See J. Hannah and D.J. Jeremy, 'Collective Business Biography: some problems' Anglo-American Historical Conference (July 1980), forthcoming, for a discussion.
 2. Some of the largest concerns developed internal archives, including Imperial Chemicals.

clear bias towards such firms in any study based on business records. This must affect any arguments touching upon the formulation and impact of welfare on enterprise, since to choose evidence from the larger, better-organised and more successful employers to prove the case for services linked to these companies raises the question of comparison with their less effective competitors. There are three points which should be made in this connection: firstly, the fact that industrial services are so often linked with economic growth and the managerial innovations of large firms, makes the case for a relationship; secondly, there is at least some evidence from acknowledged industrial 'failures' such as Marshalls of Leeds and certain Scottish cotton masters, that their managerial inadequacies at least partly consisted in the reluctance to recognise and respond to the more complex needs of labour by creative reforms (including welfarism); thirdly, it has not been claimed that industrial welfare was necessarily linked to effective management or large scale, nor that its consequences were sufficient to offset the possible failures of the employers elsewhere. Even in the largest and most dynamic businesses it was still market forces and labour utilisation which determined industrial fortunes and the scope for welfarism itself. There were also significant variations in the schemes promoted by the sample surveyed, reflecting the complex array of factors influencing employers and industry alike during these years (as detailed in chapters two to nine). In certain situations the balance of industrial relations was of greater relevance in shaping welfare than the scale or organisation of the enterprise as such, as the business materials themselves show.

Another argument worth underlining is that concerning the qualitative differences in services between different kinds and scale of firm. It is not simply that larger progressive employers were more prone to introduce facilities, but that heavy capital investment was usually associated with substantial capitalists. Those firms in the heavy industries with skilled labour were both more likely to face tight labour markets and be confronted with well-organised unions. Their preoccupation with strategic objectives would not affect larger employers in

female-dominated and less organised sectors such as textiles or food-processing. In the latter case, there might well be a recognition of the dangers of unionisation but labour market and work process conditions would determine innovations perhaps as much as physical conditions and market trading outlook.

Given the diversity of factors which contributed to the growth of industrial welfare, there is a strong case for adopting an extensive rather than intensive study of employers' schemes. Scanty records for many trades indicated that it was better to compare large firms across industries rather than concentrating upon one or two sectors whose similarities might mask different factors contributing to welfare provision. The following sample of over fifty enterprises (that is distinct business entities) cover approximately eight main industrial sectors, though many engage in the production of different manufactures and services and others specialise in one area of an industry. The conclusions from such a narrow sample must be tentative but the evidence of significant and calculate welfare activity in so many is undeniable.

Table IXIX: List of Firms Surveyed in Sample, 1880-1920

<u>Firm</u>	<u>Industry</u>	<u>Location</u>
J. & R. Allen	Retailing	Glasgow
Alley & MacLellan	Shipb./Marine Eng.	Glasgow
D. & J. Anderson	Textile dyers	Glasgow
Anderson & Robertson	Textiles	Glasgow
T.M Bairstows	Textiles	Craven (Keighley)
John Barran	Textiles	Leeds
William Beardmore	Steel/Eng./Shipb.	Glasgow, Dalmuir, etc.
Blackie & Sons	Publishing	Glasgow
Henry Briggs	Coalmining	Whitwood (Leeds)
John Brown	Steel/Shipbuilding	Clydebank, Sheffield
Brownlee (City S.M.)	Timber/Paper	Glasgow
Caledonian Railway	Rail/Loc. Eng.	Springburn (Glasgow)
I. & F. Calvert	Textiles	Halifax
Champdany Jute Co.	Textiles	Glasgow, Madras
Clydebank S.E.	Shipb./Engineering	Clydebank
William Collins*	Publishing	Glasgow
William Denny & Bros.	Shipbuilding	Dumbarton
Dennystoun Forge Co.	Iron & Steel	Dumbarton
William Dixon & Sons	Coalmining	Govan (Glasgow)
Duncan	Retailing	Glasgow
John Elder	Shipb./Mar. Eng.	Govan (Glasgow)
Fairfield S.E. Co.	Shipb./Mar. Eng.	Govan (Glasgow)
James Finlay	Textiles	Deanston, Catrine
William Fison	Textiles	Burley (Leeds)

Table LXIX (Cont.)

Firm	Industry	Location
John Foster*	Textiles	Queensbry (Bradford)
Fraser & Sons	Retailing	Glasgow
Benjamin Gott	Textiles	Leeds
Gourock Ropework Co.	Twine/ Rope	Port Glasgow
Isaac Holden	Textiles	Bradford, Rheims
A. & J. Inglis	Shipbuilding	Glasgow
John Lean	Textiles	Glasgow
S. Cunliffe-Lister*	Textiles	Bradford
Lobnitz & Simon	Mar. Eng./Shipb.	Glasgow
John Marshall*	Textiles	Leeds
Muir Simpson	Retailing	Glasgow
Neilson (Reid)	Loco. Eng.	Springburn (Glasgow)
North British Loco.	Loco. Eng.	Springburn (Glasgow)
North British Railway	Rail/Loco. Eng.	Springburn (Glasgow)
Pettigrew & Stephen	Retailing	Glasgow
R.Y. Pickering	Waggon/Loco. Eng.	Wishaw (Glasgow)
Scottish Drapery Corp.	Retailing	Glasgow
Titus Salt	Textiles	Saltaire (Bradford)
Alex. Stephen & Sons	Shipbuilding	Linthouse (Glasgow)
James Templeton	Textiles	Glasgow
Thomson Co-operative	Textiles	Huddersfield
J. & G. Thomson	Shipb./Mar. Eng.	Clydebank
Todd & Higginbotham	Textiles	Glasgow
United Turkey Red Dye	Textile dyeing	Alexandria (Glasgow)
William Weir*	Mar. Eng.	Glasgow
Walter Wilson	Retailing	Glasgow
Wood & Selbey	Retailing	Glasgow
Alfred Yarrow*	Shipbuilding	Scotsstoun

* These firms have been surveyed using mainly secondary sources.

Total = 52 Firms.

Mainly primary sources = 46 Firms.

Mainly secondary sources = 6 Firms.

If a number of criticisms can be levelled at the sample taken, they must take into account the combination of these sources with those from trade associations and other organisations. Here there is found a much broader range of business opinion, as well as serious divisions between groups of employers and the articulation of opposing views by leading firms.¹ It is noticeable that in certain industries with a large number of highly distinct trades and masses of small firms (as in textiles) the spread of trade organisation was less marked than in the

1. R. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Era Quadrangle (1968 ed.) Chicago, p10, for this point on division of 'businessmen into rival camps'.

heavier industries with more skilled and organised labour as well as greater concentration of production in some areas. On the other hand, those sectors (such as locomotive transport) dominated by a handful of large employers were able to marshall their forces without recourse to a formal regional association, though informal dialogues appear to have been maintained.

Listed below are the major organisations surveyed, with others (including Liverpool Chamber of Commerce) examined though not included for practical purposes. The qualitative differences in the forms and objectives of the organisations should also be noted.

Table LXX: List of Employers' Organisations surveyed in Sample.

<u>Title</u>	<u>Major Trades</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Bradford Chamber of Commerce	Textiles, Merchants	Bradford
Clyde Shipbuilders' Association*	Shipb., Mar. Eng.	Glasgow
Coal Owners of Scotland	Coalmining	Lanarkshire
Glasgow Chamber of Commerce	Heavy Ind., Coal, Merchants & Commerce	Glasgow
Lanarkshire Coal Masters' Association	Coalmining	Glasgow, Lanarkshire
Leeds' Chamber of Commerce	Textiles, Eng., Retail	Leeds
North West Engineering Trades Emps. Assoc.	Engineering	Glasgow
Scottish Iron & Coal Masters' Association	Iron & Coal	Glasgow
Scottish Mine Owners' Defence & Mutual Insur. Association	Coalmining	Glasgow
Scottish Pig Iron Traders' Association	Coal, Iron, Steel	Glasgow
West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association	Coalmining	Leeds

* Originally the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers' Association.

Total number of organisations = 11
 Trade associations = 8
 Chambers of Commerce = 3

Appendix II: Supplementary notes on Clydeside industrial relations during the First World War.

There were three significant movements in the engineering and marine sectors of Clydeside heavy industry during the First World War which deserve further examination. These are the wages movement of early 1915, the dilution unrest of 1915-16, and the growing demand for industrial control. The following extracts from the minutes of engineers' association illustrate these important developments in labour relations and the third section draws out the links with the spreading industrial welfare movement.

In mid-1914 there occurred the movement towards both complete union membership of engineering shops, and an increasing demand for the reduction of working hours. In June the A.S.E. District official, Brodie, wrote in the union Report:¹

During the past month the unrest against non-Unionists has been more marked than hitherto. In the Glasgow District the joining up of our District Committee with the Vigilance Committee in the Shipyards has had the effect of driving a large number of the "nons" into the Society...the toolmakers are...reaping the reward of our labour....This may lead to down tools against the sectionals in the near future, and the sooner it comes the better. I think the time has come to give up preaching amalgamation and an attempt made to force it.

The North West Engineers were naturally reluctant to countenance this bid for industrial dominance by the A.S.E., and after another confrontation with the union in December, Brodie rushed to disown the policies of his own District Committee.²

By January 1915 the wages issue had become of primary importance, and negotiations were undertaken with a number of trades.³ In early February the $\frac{3}{4}$ d per hour offer of the employers was still under consideration when the Weir troubles provoked widespread strike action.⁴ Both the firm and association were prepared to resist any excessive government concessions - despite the escalation of the conflict - whilst Bunton and Brodie worked to persuade the men to return to work.⁵ Allan Smith at the Federation telegraphed to the effect that he was in contact

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 3.7.1914, where section of Report cited.

2. Ibid., 15.1.1915.

3. Ibid., 19.1.1915 - 25.1.1915.

4. Ibid., 10.2.1915 - 17.2.1915.

5. Ibid., 17.2.1915 - 18.2.1915.

with the Admiralty on the question and asked to be left alone to settle the matter with Richmond and Henderson, already in London at this point.¹ With the Brassmoulders threatening and then striking on 26th February, the Admiralty appeared inclined to concede and were only persuaded from this course by the determination of the employers.² At this juncture the Central Labour Withholding Committee of Messer, Kirkwood, Clark and Gallacher began to function effectively.³

Between 26th February and 2nd March the Government intervened by first offering Committee on Production arbitration (supported by the A.S.E. Executive Committee in London), and then sending Isaac Mitchell to resolve the brassmoulders' strike at Glasgow.⁴ By the latter date most of the Johnstone and Renfrew engineering workers had returned but the Glasgow response was much less enthusiastic.⁵ These returned only on 27th-28th although they remained at work after the C.O.P. award of 1d hour advances,⁶ whilst the brassmoulders remained out until late March (with the Board of Trade moderating the coercive tendencies of their employers).⁷

! Even at this stage it was clear that labour supply and regulation was of critical significance, although the key issues in industrial relations still revolved around the closed shop, hours and wages rather than dilution or workshop control as such.

By June 1915 there were tensions within the Engineering Federation over the development of state Munitions policies, with bitter criticism of Federation leadership over its alleged failure to fully represent business interests in the drafting of vital legislation.⁸ Some of these internal dissensions continued through the months of preparation for the dilution of engineering production, although the Government adopted an increasingly hard line against rank and file resistance to dilution implementation.⁹ After the crisis of Spring 1916 the Government

1. Ibid., 20.2.1915.

2. Ibid., 22.2.1915.

3. J. Hinton, The First Shop Stewards' Movement Allen & Unwin (1973) London, p106-07.

4. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 2.3.1915.

5. Ibid., 2.3.1915, 16.3.1915, 23.3.1915, 30.3.1915.

again engaged in negotiations with the trade unions, making significant concessions to the latter in the attempt to incorporate them within the process of decision-making.¹

The employers responded with an attack on the neglect of 'Employers by the Government',² and went on to emphasise the failure of the administration:³

"to consult employers or invite their views and assistance in connection with the numerous questions which had arisen with respect to labour and labour conditions...matters of the highest importance had been discussed with labour interests and agreements had been entered into, even on matters involving works management, and employers had frequently not been consulted at all or only been heard after arrangements had been concluded..".

This and other incidents suggest that dilution involved complex changes in the relationship between labour and the state, which cannot be fully accounted for by the coercive actions against a small section of the Clydeside workforce. Although the importation of businessmen into government during 1916-17 was of some significance, employers still felt that their immediate interests were often ignored or contravened by the arrangements with a skillful union leadership.

Having emphasised this, the events and conflicts of the dilution crisis can be placed in perspective and the exaggerated picture of a 'servile state' be corrected.⁴ At the same time,

6. Ibid., 30.3.1915.

7. Ibid., 27.3.1915, for Board of Trade comments to employers.

8. Ibid., 18.6.1915. The Association complained to Smith that: 'no lead had been given by the Federation to Local Associations in regard to a uniform wage policy or anything else in the present crucial times and that firms in this district considered it extraordinary that the federation should be inarticulate when important labour legislation was being promoted by the Minister of Munitions'.

9. See account of dilution crisis below.

1. C.f. Hinton, op. cit., pp29-55, for rather different view.

2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 18.9.1916, for example.

3. Clyde Shipbuilders Association Minutes (Joint Meeting), 22.9.1916, insert of Memorandum to Government.

4. Hinton, op. cit.; c.f. A. Reid, 'Politics and Economics in the formation of the British working class..', for an alternative analysis to Hinton.

the strength of local resistance to dilution in the engineering and shipyard trades, and the force with which the state eventually crushed the challenge to its power, should not be underestimated. The determination of the employers to introduce dilution as a means of breaching craft control was apparent as early as October 1915, when they wrote to the Ministry of Munitions:¹

"If the employers were assured that the active support of the Ministry would be given in the event of trouble arising through the introduction of these changes, every endeavour would be made to secure such relaxations of restrictions as are permitted by the Act."

When Peterson and Cramond arrive as emissaries from the Ministry in December, they found labour and employers sceptical of the changes which could be wrought by dilution. They informed the industrialists that there was:²

at present a large unsatisfied demand for skilled labour, which demand will greatly increase when the new National Shell Factories and Extensions of existing Factories are completed.

The Munition Volunteer Scheme had only provided a few thousand skilled men...

There had been no general dilution of skilled labour.

Employers made general statements only to the effect that their workmen will not allow the practical removal of restrictions...firms should make a survey of all work at present being done, with a view to furnishing to the Ministry the extent to which dilution could be arranged, provided Trade Union restrictions were removed, and the number and classes of skilled men who could be released for other work.

The Commissioners then proceeded to arrange for dilution on a plant-by-plant basis with local shop stewards, after refusing the proposals of both Clyde Workers' Committee and A.S.E. Committee for a district scheme.³

This approach was accepted by many local shop stewards, including Kirkwood and the Parkhead tradesmen, until William Beardmore asserted his managerial prerogatives in March 1916 and thereby provoked the major crisis of that time. As the news reached the Employers' Association, rumours and exaggerated

1. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 25.10.1915.

2. Ibid., 6.12.1915.

3. Ibid., 21.1.1916, for the official A.S.E. scheme.

reports led them to demand that "the fullest power of the Defence of the Realm Act" be used against the ringleaders. They heard how the Beardmore Parkhead workers had:¹

gone on strike because a prominent member of the Clyde Workers' Committee, who was also Chairman of the Shop Stewards under "Dilution", had been refused permission to visit Departments of the Works other than the one in which he was employed.

After the North British Diesel Works had come out in sympathy, followed by the Beardmore Dalmuir employees, the employers noted:¹

Strenuous efforts were being made by the Clyde Workers' Committee to get all the men in the district to go on strike, and according to their Time Table, strikes would take place at three other large firms next day. It was known that the Clyde Workers Committee had made arrangements for destructive measures, even for dynamiting the machinery and the matter was engaging the attention of H.M. Government Commission for "Dilution".

While the strike was started nominally because of a question arising out of dilution, the real reason for the movement was understood to be the Clyde Workers' Committee's opposition to: -

- (1) Military Service Act;
- (2) All forms of Government control;
- (3) Committee of Production's recent decision on Clyde Wages Question;
- (4) Amalgamated Society of Engineers agreeing to "Dilution".

The Association noted that the Government were aware of this situation and expressed its hope that 'strong measures would be taken to deal with the trouble'.

This call for repressive intervention by the state was reiterated on 27th March 1916, when the Association telegraphed Lloyd George stating:²

"Clyde Strike has developed further and is spreading. We ask you to demand that Amalgamated Society Engineers Executive should issue clearly worded intimation to their Clyde Members that strike is unauthorised and is repudiated...action...should now be taken against shop stewards and others now on strike in defiance of their own organization and of Munitions Act."

1. Ibid., 23.3.1916.

2. Ibid., 27.3.1916.

The local officials were hardly adequately informed of developments since Kirkwood, Messer and MacManus had been arrested the day before - an action which provoked further unrest at Weirs and Coventry Ordnance as well as Dalmuir and Albion.¹

Whilst the Government had reluctantly sanctioned the deportations, it is clear that there were serious rifts in the forces of authority as well as between A.S.E. officials and tradesmen.² The suggestion of a fresh local Munitions Committee to administer dilution in each local area was raised by the Government and firmly rejected by the employers. Here again they complained of the lack of consultation over the proposals, adding that:³

"...we must enter our emphatic protest against procedure which proved as an Armaments Committee a complete failure and [thereby] increasing the unrest and trouble in this District. So strongly do the employers feel that such Committee would be harmful that the meeting decided they could not support in any way what in their considered opinion will foster unrest and still further retard output."

Here again the government is attempting to adopt a mediating role in character with its pre-War conciliation efforts and consensus policies, and it is the employers who insist on forcible coercion of dissidents.

This theme of direct repression and strong regulation of the labour market continued throughout much of 1916 and 1917, with employers welcoming the prosecution of Parkhead workers before the Munitions Tribunal soon after the March crisis.⁴ This demand for open force was echoed by many of the shipbuilding employers towards the end of 1916, as they encountered similar difficulties in the implementation of dilution.⁵ The key issues were now those of craft status and industrial control, bringing the state into contact with managerial as well as labour supply problems.

1. Hinton, op. cit., p156.

2. C. Addison, Four and a Half Years Vol. I (1934), p168: entry for 2.2.1916, for example.

3. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 27.3.1916.

4. Ibid., 29.3.1916.

5. C.S.A. Minutes, 16.12.1916.

During 1917-18 the industrial struggles in Clydeside shops and yards assumed new forms as fresh political campaigns were undertaken against a background of European war and revolution.¹ In late 1917 Christable Pankhurst visited the Engineers' Association to give an account of the Russian Revolution and related it to the concessions made to the Coventry strikers. She addressed the employers:²

as Captains of Industry and came to ask that they should preserve discipline in Industrial establishments....She desired the Employers to submit an ultimatum to the Government and request them to abandon the movement to recognise Shop Stewards otherwise serious difficulty would arise in the Clyde District. Miss Pankhurst concluded... that if the Employers would only put the case straight to the Government she felt sure their position would meet with acceptance.

Although it would be wrote to exaggerate the degree to which the Clydeside labour movement was politicised by the events of the final year of War, there is little doubt that the demand for workshop control enjoyed growing popularity in trades such as engineering. Not only were militants such as Gallacher agitating for greater power in the hands of shop committees,³ but the A.S.E. officials themselves were promoting such bodies in early 1918.⁴ The case of the Committee at Howden Engineering illustrated the support which local officials were giving to such initiatives, and the affair eventually necessitated a policy statement by the Association.⁵

Another important aspect of this trend was the erosion of both trade sectionalism and wage differentials in the last years of War. In the Howden Committee case, for example, the District Organiser argued for recognition of the body on the grounds that it was:⁶

composed of representatives from all classes of workmen in your shop...for the purpose of endeavouring to bring the workers and the management into closer touch with each other...which will work out to the interest of the firm as well as to the men, and also create the harmony which is so essential amongst all classes at the present time.

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1. Hinton, op. cit., for an account mainly based on Midlands.
 2. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 16.12.1917.
 3. William Gallacher, 'Scheme for Workshop Control' (1918) in UGD 102 4/1.

The incident suggests that the renewed 'committee movement' was not necessarily opposed to private ownership and control of works, but that the major question was now one of shop floor representation and responsibility. The Association did, in fact, recognise the role of shop stewards as agents in local bargaining although insisting on meetings outside normal working hours.¹ When these privileges were extended to general recognition in early 1918, only the skilled engineers and instrument makers were excluded.² Apparently the Federation - which led this wave of recognition - did not wish the A.S.E. to join with other trades in common negotiations at local level.³ This did not deflect the growing support within the A.S.E., shared by officials and workmen alike, for shop committees to discuss and monitor such matters as working methods and manning, piecework and bonus rates, supervision, shop rules, 'matters relating to welfare' and other points.⁴

The evolution of these committees at local level and the subsequent proposals of Whitley and others for national and industrial joint committees was complemented by the growing recruitment to both trade unions and employers' associations.⁵ Certainly such industrial leaders as Dudley Docker supported the principle of industrial participation, as did Button and A.S.E. officials.⁶

The relationship of industrial welfare to these complex developments is by no means as clear as might seem from the rather simple model of employer response suggested in chapter three. Industrial welfare was not merely a response to the

4. N.W.E.T.E.A. Minutes, 20.3.1918. The officials were particularly concerned about time allowances under the premium bonus system.

5. Ibid., 6.5.1918 - 18.5.1918.

6. Ibid., 21.5.1918. The Organiser was Kerr and the Shop Committee convenor was Frank Brown.

1. Ibid., 28.12.1917.

2. Ibid., 20.5.1918.

3. Ibid., 10.9.1918, for Allan Smith's comments on the activities of A.S.E. in local areas.

4. F.S. Button, 'Possibilities of Industrial Harmony' in S.J. Chapman (ed.), Labour and Capital After the War Murray (1918), p151-52.

5. Addison, op. cit., Vol.II, p544, 18.6.1918, for example.

6. Ibid., p434-35, 4.10.1917.

strategic and other needs of the employers, but the services themselves reflected the changing pattern of relations and conflict in industry. Whereas the early emphasis was upon welfare supervision as a means of increasing output and improving morale among women,¹ it was later affected by the growing demands for participation and committee management in the workplace.² It was precisely this aspect of welfare which was bitterly attacked by the critics of private enterprise and management.³ There was an interest in extending welfare work to men as well as involving workers more closely in its introduction and administration.

Therefore just as there was a shift from narrow considerations about pay, conditions and craft status to questions of workshop and industrial control and to social reform, so the welfare movement itself moved from the preoccupation with output to more general areas of management and politics. It is only in this light that we can explain the continuation of interest in welfarism once wartime conditions no longer prevailed.

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1. W.J. Ashley, 'The Task of the Welfare Supervisor' Economic Journal XXVI (1916), p455, for stress on human element 'in the matter of output'; for example.
 2. C.R. Borland, 'The Committee Movement in Industry' Welfare Work IX No.102 (1928), p99.
 3. J. Maclean, The War After the War. in UGD 102, for example.

Appendix III: Additional material on the coalmining industry

The following table gives the full details of Dixon housing as held by the firm in the 1870s, and registered in the 'Rent Roll of Property'.

Table LXXI: Housing Property held by Dixon Iron & Coal Co., 1870s

Locality	Site	No.Houses/Occup.*		Rent (£SD)	Total Yield
Lan./Govan	School Sq.	16+1	W	4.2.4/2.12.0	68.9.4
"	Engine Row	4	W	4.2.4	16.9.4
"	Garden Sq.	14	W	2.12.0	36.8.0
"	"	4	W	4.2.4	16.9.4
"	Hosie's B.L.	6	W	2.12.0	15.12.0
"	"	3	W	4.2.4	12.7.0
"	Hosie's Cott.	2	W	4.2.4	8.4.8
"	Hosie's F.L.	6	W	2.12.0	15.12.0
"	"	3	W	4.2.4	12.7.0
"	Waterloo Row	10	W	2.12.0	26.0.0
"	Forge Square	19	W	5.14.0	98.16.0
"	"	4	W	7.16.0	31.4.0
"	Graham's Sq.	16	W	2.12.0	41.12.0
"	"	4	W	4.2.4	16.9.4
"	"	1	W	7.0.0	7.0.0
Lan./Ruth.	'New Houses'	5	W	4.2.4-10.0.0	29.1.4
Renf./Gov.	Youngs Row	6+1	W	2.12.0/4.2.4	19.4.4
"	Pattisons R.	10	W	2.12.0	26.0.0
"	Polmadie Row	6	W	2.12.0	15.12.0
Renf./Cath.	Crosshill Hs.	1		20.0.0	20.0.0
"	Leigh Flat	1		4.2.4	4.2.4
"	"	1		2.12.0	2.12.0
"	"	1		2.12.0	2.12.0
"	Hanginshaw H.	12	W	7.16.0	93.12.0
"	"	16	W	7.16.0	124.16.0
"	"	1	W	8.10.0	8.10.0
"	"	1	W	5.4.0	5.4.0
"	"	1	W	4.2.4	4.2.4
"	"	1	W	2.12.0	2.12.0
"	Hangingshaw C	1		19.10.0	19.10.0
"	Crosvale Port.	1		5.4.0	5.4.0
"	Broomvale Ct.	1		4.2.4	4.2.4
"	Broomvale Hs.	1		16.0.0	16.0.0
"	"	1		14.0.0	14.0.0
"	Roseknowe Hs.	1		30.0.0	30.0.0
Glasgow	Farmerton	29	W	5.4.0	150.16.0
"	Alexander Row	12	W	5.4.0	62.8.0
"	Iron Wks Hs.	2		10.0.0	20.0.0
"	Alexander Row	12	W	4.2.4	57.12.8
"	Urie's Row	36	W	2.12.0	93.12.0
"	Forge Pit	1	W	4.2.4	4.2.4
"	Upper Faulds	2	W	2.12.0	2.12.0
"	"	2	W	4.2.4	8.4.8
"	Little Gov.Ld	1		4.2.4	4.2.4
"	Albert Gradens				30.10.0
"	Lt. Gov. B.Gn.				18.0.0
"	Gov. Bank Hs.	6	W	3.5.0-4.4.0	24.0.4
"	Miller House	1	M,C,O	12.0.0	12.0.0
"	McAlpine Cott	5		6.0.0-24.0.0	68.7.0
"	Engineman's H	1	E	5.0.0	5.0.0

Ruth.	Blackfaulds	5	W	2.12.0	13.0.0
"	Grass Parks				121.17.10
"	"				
"	King St.	29	Misc.*	2.8.0-9.0.0	119.19.0
"	Greenbank Ct.	1	Clk.		
"	Greenbank Hs.	1	Shp.		
"	King St.	5	Misc.**	4.10.0-7.0.0	29.10.0
"	King St. (Shop/Wksh)	2	Sm/Jnr	7.0.0-10.0.0	17.10.0
"	New St.	4		3.10.0-5.0.0	17.10.0
"	South Croft Hs.	1	Mang.	55.0.0	55.0.0
"	Shawfield Villa	1	Merch.	30.0.0	30.0.0
"	Shawfield House	1	Writ.	150.0.0	150.0.0
"	Blackfriars Hs.	1	Farm.	40.0.0	40.0.0
"	Shawfield Cott.	6	W	10.2.4	26.11.8
"	Avondale Inn	12	W	23.8.0	81.18.0
"	Shawfield Row	8	W	4.2.4	32.18.8
"	Millcroft Row	16	W	4.2.4	65.17.4
"	Millcroft Cott.	1	O	10.0.0	10.0.0
"	Shawfield Bank Toll	7		4.2.4	28.16.4
"	Shawfield House	1		40.0.0	40.0.0
Lan./Ham.	Broomelton Farm	1	Farm.	240.0.0	240.0.0
"	Sunnyside Farm	1	Farm.	40.0.0	40.0.0
Lan./Blan.	Hartfield Farm	1	Farm.	19.0.0	19.0.0
Lan./Barony	Mosesfield House	1	Rev.	50.0.0	50.0.0
"	Old Mosesfield	1		20.0.0	20.0.0
"	Mosesfield Farm	1	(Farm.)	117.15.0	117.15.0
"	Springfield	(2)	W	12.16.0	12.16.0

Source: UGD 1 55/2, Dixon Records: 'Rent Roll of Property..(1869-80)'

Note: Many of figures are compounded and reassessed for purposes of convenience.

Key to Occupation of tenants:

W = Workmen; O = Oversman or Deputy; E = Engineman; Mn = Miner;
 Lb. = Labourer; Wv. = Weaver; Dyer = Dyer; Dr. = Driver;
 Wid. = Widow; Bak. = Baker; Jnr = Joiner; Clk = Clerk; Shp =
 Shipbuilding worker; Pr. = Printer; Clm. = Clockmaker; Sm =
 Smith; Manuf. = Manufacturer; Merch. = Merchant; Writ = Writer;
 Farm = Farmer; Rev. = Clergyman.

Misc. = Misc.* - there were 5 miners, three labourers, two weavers, two dyers, three widows, one joiner, one shipbuilder, one clerk, one baker, at King St.

Misc.** - three of these five houses were occupied by two printers and one clerk, besides the smith and joiner renting the workshops.

These figures provide some additional evidence for the arguments on 'occupational communities' as well as providing an insight into the extent of company housing in the coalmining industry during the 19th century.

Appendix IV: The regional comparison of industrial welfare schemes: notes on quantitative materials

The thesis has argued that whilst quantitative sources can be used to indicate the significance of welfare expenditure within firms and industries, there are decided limits to both the availability of statistical evidence and its value in explaining the development of industrial welfare. The variables affecting the progress of services are too numerous and complex for any simple comparison of provisions in distinct enterprises and trades. Only a careful combination of quantitative and qualitative materials can give an accurate account of the emergence of welfare different areas of the economy.

At the same time, it is worthwhile considering the sources for quantitative comparison - if only to illustrate the weaknesses of primary data and the need for care in handling even the most scientific of samples. The source chosen is that collection of replies from employers received by the Royal Commission on Labour in answer to their Schedules of Questions in 1893. Of the 777 employers and 70 associations who were sent questionnaires by the Commission, 356 firms and 35 organisations (a response of 46% and 50% respectively) sent replies.¹ From these were taken 22 concerns from Glasgow and 28 firms which could be traced to the immediate Leeds-Bradford area. It is clear that both the original sample and their representativeness of particular regions was very narrow, with only one Glasgow chemical firm and nine enterprises to represent the whole woolen and worsted trades of the Leeds-Bradford area.²

Given the restricted base of the sample, there was still considerable variety of welfare provision recorded by the Replies. These included the following five types of scheme:

- i. Social 'bonus' schemes for long service and loyalty;
- ii. Various 'deferred pay' arrangements, including sick pay and pensions;
- iii. free housing or concessionary rents;
- iv. accident compensation benefits and accident provisions;
- v. industrial profit-sharing and co-partnership schemes.

1. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence of Group C Vol. III C.6894 (1892), Appendices, 'Answers to Questions' p.xxv.

2. This compares with the 143 chemical concerns listed in the Glasgow Post Office Directory (1888-89), and the hundreds of textile firms operating in the West Riding.

It is noticeable that the Questions were framed in such a way that sick pay and pensions were characterised as 'deferred pay', whilst accident compensation benefits were viewed as quite distinct from both long-service awards and deferred pay schemes. These variations seem to arise partly from the great diversity of welfare experience, and partly from the alternative terms and connotations attached to different arrangements.

Taking the sample of British employers as a whole, there were large numbers of employers even in 1892 who created and sponsored welfare schemes in their works. Amongst the 356 firms responding there were 54 with bonus systems, though most of these were geared to productivity rather than rewards for past services.¹ The 'deferred pay' category covers a range of amenities, though at least 67 of the 356 employers possessed insurance provisions - of which the Report remarks, that these were in 'connection with the firm or works', and also that:²

In a few cases these appear to be supported entirely by the employers; in others, entirely by the workpeople; but, in the majority of cases, both employers and workpeople contribute to their maintenance.

Some of these voluntary or mutual insurance provisions were made in correspondence with an outside commercial insurance company, such as Northern Accident Assurance,³ which went well beyond the boundaries of legal compulsion. Policies with commercial firms should not, therefore, be taken as necessarily a sign of minimum provisions.

Pension grants by private employers appear to have been much less widespread than voluntary insurance, with only four schemes mentioned in the survey - two of which were entirely at the employer's discretion and 'without any system of deferred pay or other regular provision'.⁴ Similarly, free and concessory housing was not as popular with employers as might be expected (and again suggests that highly specific labour needs of some industries), with only ten firms and two associations reporting cases. Even here the benefits were largely confined to 'managers, foremen, or lodge keepers', who enjoyed free housing as part of their income.⁵

1. C. 6894, op. cit., p.xxvi.

2. Ibid.

Whilst the provision of tangible benefits which could be characterised as 'deferred pay' or pecuniary privileges was confined to a fairly small (though significant) minority of firms, the question of provision for accidents provoked a much broader response. There appear to have been four main responses to voluntary schemes after the passing of the Employers' Liability Act in 1880. According to the summary of replies, a large number of employers referred to the legislation as 'affording all the compensation that is given or thought necessary'.¹ Other firms appeared as frustrated welfarists who were willing to extend discretionary benefits for sick workmen before the Act, but after its passage - in the words of a ropemaking manufacturer - 'I used to pay full wages to workers away through an accident...but...[now] I pay none and insure against possible loss'.² A third group of employers, including one Hebden Bridge manufacturer, thought that the law should be 'made more favourable to the workmen', and welcomed further reform.³ Fourthly, there was much evidence that voluntarism continued past the innovation of direct liability, since:⁴

In a large number of answers...compensation is said to be given voluntarily by the employers, or an amicable arrangement to be made between them and the workpeople.

Thus it is not possible, as was made clear in the survey of employers' organisations in chapter nine, to identify one response to legislative reform in the progress of industrial welfare - even in the same trade or industry. Taking the sample as a whole, it would appear that many of the employers furnishing welfare benefits were large and well-established concerns holding reasonably advanced views even in the very difficult conditions of 1891-92.

3. Ibid., Imperial Stone Co., were charged 1½d per £1.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p.xxvii.

1. Ibid., p.xxix.

2. Ibid. The employers were called Davis.

3. Ibid. This was Brown's of Hebden Bridge.

4. Ibid.

In comparing the firms located in Glasgow with those situated in the Leeds-Bradford area, there are a number of questions which must be considered. By taking the two regions in turn it can be seen that each area presents examples of the distinctive schemes outlined above.

Among the 22 Glasgow firms surveyed, there were three cases of deferred pay schemes acknowledged as such by the employers (who were a bakery, a cabinetmaker and a pottery manufacturer), which mainly consisted of sick pay during convalescence after injury in employment.¹ Whilst this proportion of the sample is below the overall national average, the selection is probably too limited to make firm generalisations.²

Besides these deferred pay arrangements, there were a number of provisions for accident compensation previous to the passing of the 1897 Workmen's Compensation reforms. There were two co-operative societies which furnished payments for their employees on a regular or discretionary basis.³ There were also two enterprises which made arrangements with insurance companies, perhaps with additional benefits beyond the statutory protection against liability.⁴ Most other firms either stated that there were no serious accidents at their establishments or mentioned the Employers' Liability legislation of 1880.

There were very few examples of free housing in the sample (though this does not preclude self-financing projects), with only two firms stating that they gave such benefits. One provided rent when their employees were absent through illness, whilst the chemical manufacturers A. Cross provided free accommodation for their foremen.⁵

It may seem surprising that the principles of industrial partnership and profit-sharing were fairly well-known by this period,⁶ with one co-operative firm having 'just adopted' full industrial partnership and a private printer considering the principle 'very desirable'.⁷ There was certainly some overlap between the concerns favouring different projects, but the most noticeable feature of the welfarist group is the diversity of their interests and constitution rather than any uniformity

1. Bilsland Baking Co., Cummings, and Kennedy's; Ref. 704, 760, 890.
2. Average of 3 in 22 = 13.6%; overall average of 67 in 356 = 19%.
3. Utd. Co-operative, Shieldhall Co-operative, Cummings.

in organisation and outlook. Overall, it would seem that the co-operative stores, printing firms, and particular large firms (such as the Cross chemical complex) were the most prominent in welfare provision. The analysis of scale and activities given later indicates the problems of easy generalisation.

The sample taken of the Bradford-Leeds firms is rather larger, with 28 concerns included, and the evidence of welfare activity also appears to be more marked. There were six employers with some experience of 'deferred pay' arrangements (21% of sample), with considerable variety in the schemes between enterprises. Fyfe's of Shipley (a firebrick manufacturer), organised a contributory provident scheme which levied 3d-6d per week on boys and men, as well as contributing £25 per annum towards the substantial income of the fund.¹ The Leeds Fireclay Co. was in a similar line of production but preferred to link its workplace disciplinary fines to the local 'Hospital Fund' of the employees, rather than introducing a shop club.²

One wool cloth manufacturer which did attempt to arrange a benefit scheme, reported that they had:³

started a sick fund amongst the hands, to which they and we subscribed, but it fell through, the hands seeming to prefer their own medical societies.

In contrast to this effort, one Shipley worsted manufacturer (Mason's), provided standard benefits for certain grades - especially apprentices and overlookers - whilst the weavers, spinners, dressers and twistors 'have a [separate] system, if

4. At Orr, Pollock (Greenock), a printing firm, the employers seem to have reinsured with the Employers' Liability Insurance Corp. and Boiler Insurance Co.
5. Cummings provided 'expenses' for their workmen's housing when absent through illness, besides the Cross case.
6. See Appendix VI on profit-sharing below.
7. Utd. Co-operative had adopted and George Outram, the Glasgow printing firm, thought the idea very desirable.
1. C. 6894, op. cit., Ref. 962: 'benefits 10/- per week sick pay, doctor, free trip and supper for the men; boys 5/- per week and as above'.
2. Ibid., Ref. 1027, Whitaker's of Newlay also donated their works fines to the 'Leeds Workpeople's Hospital Fund'.
3. Ibid., Ref. 889. The firm was Hudson, Sykes and Bousfield of Morley, near Leeds.

any of them fall sick', with contributions of 3d per week.¹ This system of parallel benefits is rather similar to the special arrangements for apprentices and supervisory grades often found in the heavier trades of Scottish industry.² The remaining firms had rather similar provisions to those outlined here.³

In the area of accident compensation and injury payments, the activities of the Leeds-Bradford firms were even more impressive than the deferred pay provisions. There were six employers with some kind of insurance cover (two mentioning Assurance Companies), whilst three others referred to private agreements which went beyond the statutory requirements of the time. The nature of these arrangements are often difficult to ascertain, given the cryptic comments of the respondents, but reasonable deductions can be made.⁴ Briggs of Hunslet (a flax and hemp manufacturer), stated that they awarded compensation according to 'the case and position of person injured',⁵ whilst Stansfield the waggon-builders also admitted to granting compensation.⁶ Another Leeds firm noted that they insured against injuries, whilst Hudson, Sykes and Bousfield both insured with a commercial company and paid doctor's fees.⁷ As in the Glasgow examples, there are a number of employers who combined legal protection with private arrangements, as well as discretionary awards with standard benefits.

The evidence of free housing and industrial partnership is much less impressive, with no mention of gratuitous accommodation and only one reference to industrial partnership as desirable but impracticable in the sample.⁸ This would appear to confirm the impression that the substantial amounts of company housing recorded in other sources were looked upon as self-financing (or even profit-making) ventures rather than as philanthropic benevolence. It is also surprising that such notable firms as Taylors of Batley and Thomsons of Huddersfield (with their impressive partnership schemes) were not mentioned.

1. Ibid., Ref. 1006.

2. See chapters two and three above, for example.

3. C. 6894, op. cit., Refs. 734, 1002.

4. Ibid., Ref. 937 Nicholson of Leeds: 'The firm insures'.

5. Ibid., Ref. 770.

Having considered the nature of welfare provisions made by employers in the two regions, it remains to try and relate these benefits to the scale of the firms, the conditions of the trades, and the structure and remuneration of the labour force. It is already apparent that there was a greater density of welfare provision in the West Riding sample than at Glasgow, although this may be due to any number of related variables.¹

The total number of employees in the 22 Glasgow firms was 3,737, or an average of 170 employees per business. The average scale of those three concerns providing deferred pay benefits was 177 (i.e. slightly larger). Although location may be an important consideration in the decision to build housing, the size of the two firms with free dwellings (Cummings and Cross), was only 165 and 120 employees respectively. This suggests that the welfarist employers were, at this point in time, relatively unexceptional in scale.²

In the Leeds-Bradford area, the 28 firms surveyed employed 9,078 persons, or an average of 324 per concern. The average size of the enterprises with some experience of welfare benefits was 483, which was considerably above (i.e. 49% larger) than the average. There was also a much greater range in the size of individual businesses, however, from the 123 employed at Fyfe's of Shipley to the 709 at Briggs of Hunslet and the 990 working at Masons of Shipley (near Saltaire). This would tend to confirm the impression gained from business records, that although the larger concerns were prominent in the development of industrial welfare there were numerous medium-sized works which developed less elaborate schemes.

6. Ibid., Ref. 1042, for Bradford firm.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., Ref. 945, for a 'Bradford' employer.

1. See chapters four and five for a more detailed discussion of these different variables.

2. Another point to note is the larger aggregate size of the Leeds-Bradford sample, despite the notoreity of the West Riding for small workshop production in textiles.

In attempting to relate welfare schemes to the physical conditions of the trades, there are a number of basic problems to be encountered. Firstly, if we assume that particular arrangements can be explained in terms of physical hazards and dangers then there are numerous examples in coalmining or chemicals firms to support the argument. On the other hand, it is clear from the replies given by trade unions to the written questions of the Royal Commission on Labour, that workmen felt the danger of accidents 'chiefly in the building and textile trades'.¹ If we are to link hazard and welfare then we must not only explain the absence of benefits in certain dangerous occupations and firms, or their appearance in safer sectors, but also the perceptions of both employers and workmen of the dangers posed by their line of production. Secondly, we have to recognise the important qualitative differences between the various benefits and try to understand the diversity in similar terms as those used to explain the scale of activities between employers.

The most tangible and significant forms of welfare seen in these firms were those concerned with sickness payments and accident compensation. Employers such as baking and retailing stores would presumably require a higher standard of hygiene from their staff and would be sensible to the avoidance of food contamination and untreated injuries.² This would explain the prominence of these trades in furnishing accident compensation as well as sick aliment.³ The rather different question of hazardous working conditions would help to explain the readiness of the Kennedy pottery firm to engage in similar schemes.⁴

In West Yorkshire there were the two fireclay enterprises providing sickness payments, with four textile and one dyeing employers also interested in such benefits. There were also six firms with compensation insurance and three organising private benefits, largely in the supposedly dangerous textile industry but including one waggon-building plant. Whilst there

1. C. 6894, op. cit., Answers to Questions from Employees, 'Introduction', p.xii.

2. Ibid., List of firms, Ref. 705, 792, etc.

3. Ibid., co-operative stores again prominent.

4. Ibid., though Cross is missing.

is clear evidence that certain hazardous trades were more liable to attract both state and private intervention, it would seem that these factors alone cannot explain the different responses of employers to the dangers of production.¹ In the west of Scotland, for example, the declining textile manufacturers seem less willing to provide against injury and sickness than in West Yorkshire. This might be explained by the stronger voice of trade unionism as well as the relative fortunes of the trades. Other employers, including those in food and retailing, were not so much reacting to the dangers of their occupation as aspiring towards higher standards of hygiene and health in maintaining benefit funds.

The skills, sex and general structure of the workforce is another element which should be considered in documenting the statistical significance of welfare. Once again there are difficulties in discovering just how widely such terms as 'skill' were interpreted by employers, as well as by workmen and officials. Within the Glasgow firms' workforce of 3,737 employees, there were only 350 labourers designated as 'unskilled' (i.e. only 9.3% of whole), giving an average of 16 unskilled workers per business. Taking the welfarist employers as a whole, there are only 6 unskilled men per firm in Glasgow,² though the chemical enterprise providing free housing counted all of its 120 employees as unskilled.³

Among the 9,078 workers in the Bradford-Leeds concerns, there were 991 (or about 11% of total) classified as 'unskilled', with an average of 35 non-skilled labourers to every firm. In the six concerns with some stated benefit arrangement, there was actually a higher proportion of unskilled labour (about 17% of their staff), though this number is swelled by two particular employers.⁴ This may be related to the fact that the welfarists tend to be rather larger enterprises and perhaps have displaced a greater number of skilled labourers.

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1. M. Barlow, 'The Insurance of Industrial Risks' Economic Journal VII (1897), p354-57, for some figures on accident rates and violent deaths in different industries before 1897.
 2. These are the three 'deferred pay' welfarist employers, with eighteen unskilled employees.
 3. Cross the chemical manufacturers.
 4. Leeds Fireclay and Whitackers, which both give hospital contributions rather than have internal schemes.

Since there appears to be some ambivalence about the impact of skills upon the provision of services, the sex and age of the workforce can be considered. In the Glasgow sample there were 2,498 males to 1,238 females (a ratio of 2:1), with an average 113.5 males and 41 females per firm. Within the three deferred pay enterprises, however, there was a significantly greater proportionate of men to women (a ratio of 3.3:1), suggesting that the presence of females may have been a negative influence.¹

Among the same sample, there were 662 young persons or an average of thirty adolescents per business in the Glasgow area.² The deferred pay employers recorded a significantly higher number of young persons, with forty-three per employer, so that youth may be a greater influence on provisions than sex as such. Given the narrow and uneven nature of the sample, there must again be caution before any generalisations are offered.

Within the West Riding group of employers, there was a much higher general proportion of females, with 5,330 women to only 3,758 men employed (a ratio of 1.4:1 in favour of females). In the six 'welfarist' concerns, however, the superiority in numbers was not so marked with 226 men to 263 women (ratio 1.2:1). Within each of the benefit firms there was also a substantial male component ranging from under 200 to over 650.³ Here again the presence of female labour, presumably imported because of its relative cheapness, seems to have had a negative affect on welfarism.

The same group of firms reported a total of 1,465 young persons (or 16.1% of total), with an average of 52 per firm of 324 employees. Only eighteen of the firms employed adolescents, though these tended to be the larger employers with about 350 workers each. All six of the welfarist concerns employed young persons, though their mean distribution was only half of the overall average recorded.⁴ In this situation the presence of

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1. This runs counter to the evidence collected by Factory Inspectors and others at the time. See chapter nine.
 2. Shieldhall Co-operative stated that they employed 316 young persons whilst five firms employed none.
 3. The figures were 189 to 655.

younger workers does not seem to have made any significant impact on welfare innovation and may be due to the fact that adolescent employment was much more established in the West Riding textiles trades, being regarded as useful cheap labour just as much as that of women.

Overall there is no clear pattern to emerge from these figures, though certain tendencies might be indicated. In the Scottish context the welfarists tended to employ more skilled men, less females and more young persons. The West Riding counterparts seem to have employed more unskilled workers, less females than was common in the region, and also less young persons than average. Such bald figures not only distort the sharp distinctions between trades and schemes, but also overlook the significant slant of particular arrangements. In the Mason case at Shipley, for example, the employers were concerned to provide full sick pay for their apprentices whilst the adult males to organise their own scheme.

Another important factor which should be examined in this context, is the possible links between the remuneration of the workforce and the scale of welfare benefits - particularly as many employers seem to have envisaged sickness and other schemes as 'deferred pay'. There is also the argument that welfare tended to be associated with particular industries and the 'high wage economy' outlook of certain domestic-orientated employers. Here the real problem must lie in distinguishing between those links between wages and welfare, and other important influences such as skill, sex and age, which would affect the provision of either or both.

Only two thirds of the Glasgow employers returned data specifying weekly wages, and from these responses a crude general average of £1.4s.3d can be made up. One of the main difficulties is that certain employers give highly detailed figures on rates for grades of worker,¹ whilst others provide only weekly or even annual estimates.² Only two of the three

4. The average figure was only 25 young persons per firm.

1. Bisland Baking Co., reads as follows: 'Journeymen bakers, 29s to 30s a week (a few special, workmen not foremen, paid 36s to 60s); vanmen, 30s to 42s weekly; warehousemen, 20s to 30s weekly; boys, 6 to 16s weekly'.

2. A. Cross, '18s to 30s per week' is one of the better cases.

deferred pay welfare employers provided data, with Bisland paying 28s per week as a crude average. Kennedys paid their highly structured workforce a variety of rates, ranging from £2-£3 for turners and £1.15s.0d - £2 for throwers, to 8s.6d for yard women and 12s - 15s for 'jolly women'.¹ The crude average which can be taken from their rates is just under 23s, as compare with a general average of 24s.3d for the eighteen employers submitting rates. Clearly, the Bisland bakery paid somewhat above average wages and Kennedys somewhat below the crude approximation.

The response of the West Riding concerns to questions about their wage rates was less enthusiastic than those in Glasgow, with under half of the firms replying.² There are similar problems in 'mixing' the wages data, particularly when so many enterprises give only weekly wages bills for the whole workforce.³ Accepting the difficulties, however, we can give a general mean of £1.1s.9d for the thirteen respondents. Since the two welfare employers gave wages significantly below this broad average, with Fyfes at 16s.0d and 13s.6d paid at Masons, this would lend weight to the fears of some trade unionists that welfare benefits would act as a wage substitute.⁴ Before making any statement on this point, we would need to know far more about the earnings of the workforce over a period of time, the types of schemes and subscriptions involved, and the averages for both district and trade on each count.

This review of the scale of enterprise, physical conditions of production, sex, age and skills of the workforce, and the remuneration of labour, indicate the complex influences acting upon employers in deciding to introduce welfare schemes. The sample is probably too narrow to make any sound generalisations, with significant variations in provisions as well as between the regions. On the basis of such generalised data it is difficult to make more than suggestions as to the possible

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1. 'Say..throwers, 35s to 40s; turners, 40s to 60s; kilnmen, 30s to 33s; packers, 30s to 35s; basket-makers, 20s to 30s; clay hands, &c 19s to 30s..[etc.]'
 2. Thirteen of twenty-eight firms (or 46% of sample) responded.
 3. The Bradford printers, Armitage, paid 148 men £400 per week (i.e. £2.14s.0d each) and 52 women £15 (£0.5s.9d each).
 4. In Fyfes case the scheme was also contributory.

factors affecting employers and their motivation can only be surmised from the replies. It might be suggested, for example, that industrial welfare could fulfil different needs in the distinct regions, with the more marked diversity of industry in west of Scotland and the greater emphasis on skilled labour in production (including physically strong labour to perform arduous skills), meant that employers were more concerned with attracting and securing adult males and young apprentices than with catering for females. At the same time the physical requirements of hygiene and safety meant that employers in those trades were particularly likely to favour welfare. This tended to be more marked in the larger and better organised concerns which were also willing to pay higher wages to their labour than was common.

In the West Riding, on the other hand, the structure of industry was rather more homogeneous and many more textile firms are present in the sample. Here welfare had to fit in with the market conditions in which the industry found itself, as there was a shift towards cheapening labour by a much greater use of females and young persons. The welfarists tended to be concerns significantly larger than the average employer, although the same concern for safety and minimum hygiene seems to have been present here also. These businessmen were less worried about skill than about human effort and efficiency, though the welfarists continued to employ males in greater proportions than many competitors. They were therefore less interested in adopting females and young persons, preferring (as did George Thomson of Huddersfield) to employ stronger and more diligent males. It might also be that they took advantage of the market situation to restrain wage rates and used welfare as an added incentive to loyalty and increased effort in the difficult years of the early 1890s.

Such hypotheses can only be tested by engaging in a more detailed study of individual employers and outlining more closely the objective conditions under which businessmen operated and their coloured perceptions of these conditions.

Appendix V: Additional material on employers and profit-sharing & co-partnership in Britain, 1880-1920

Most of the welfare schemes surveyed in previous chapters were concerned with the physical well-being, accommodation, safety, sustenance and recreation of the workforce. They often dealt with such contingencies as sickness, injury, old age and even unemployment. Adopting a fairly schematic model of welfare provision, it might be said that these arrangements are mainly concerned with preserving a loyal and efficient labour force rather than directly incorporating the workers (or key grades of employees) into the process of ensuring financial prosperity and managerial control. In one sense, therefore, the more elaborate schemes of profit-sharing and labour co-partnership represent an advanced stage of welfare innovation. They not only assist in the attraction of workers (and the retention of established employees), and the general improvement of efficiency and effort, but also instil into the participants the ethos of profitable endeavour. This tends to commit the recipients of such benefits to the existing management and thus legitimise the employer's authority.

The evidence for such an argument must rest on the balance of industrial relations in particular trades as well as upon the market conditions facing the employers. The following (largely statistical) material on profit-sharing and labour co-partnership surveys the schemes in operation before 1912, later comparing these with the arrangements in existence before 1920. Similar factors of market conditions, productive constraints, scale of enterprise, structure of the labour force, and remuneration of employees as were covered in Appendix IV will be investigated with regard to these employers. Then the relevance of industrial relations and the possible impact of trade unionism on welfare provision (as well as vice versa), can be discussed. Overall, it should be possible to demonstrate that despite the problems in interpreting the selection of employers surveyed, some general correlations are apparent.

One fundamental point which should be made is the distinction between the payment of profit shares and the provision of welfare benefits as non-monetary services. As the 1912 Board of Trade Report on Profit Sharing put it:¹

"By a 'share' in profits is meant 'a sum paid to an employee, in addition to his wages, out of profits,

"the amount of which is dependant on the amount of these profits.' If an employer undertakes, for example, to contribute to a Pension Fund \$1 for every \$2 contributed by his workmen, this is not a case of profit-sharing, unless the undertaking is to pay out of profits only, because the sum payable under the agreement does not depend on the amount of the year's profits."

Similarly, there is a basic distinction to make between the mere sharing of annual profits is arranged beforehand by the employer, and co-partnership implying the share in the ownership and responsibilities of the enterprise.¹ The distinction was not always as clear cut at the time, with the Labour Co-partnership Association publishing a memorandum on 'Co-partnership and Labour Unrest' in 1911 (signed by many progressive employers as well as prominent officials and academics), emphasising that the 'Co-partnership of Labour with Capital is capable of many modifications' - including both profit-sharing and shareholding.² Even if we take into account the somewhat flexible approach of the Association, eager to recruit any approximate scheme as a supporter for their theories, it is clear that there remained considerable diversity and particularity in such arrangements.³ Thus whilst it is necessary to separate the principles of welfarism and profit-sharing, as well as to distinguish sharing of yearly profits from formal shareholding in the enterprise, there was almost as much diversity between these schemes as in the industrial welfare provisions and there was also considerable overlap between monetary and non-monetary benefits during this period.⁴

When examining the growth of profit-sharing it is impossible to ignore the remarkable success which the gas industry and its employers enjoyed in this field of benefit provision. This point was made by the 1912 Report and has been reiterated by a number of subsequent works. As the Labour Department author stated:⁵

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1. Labour Dept. of Board of Trade, Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom Cd. 6496 (1912), p7, where this distinction of the International Congress on remuneration is quoted.
 1. R.A. Church, 'Profit Sharing and Labour Relations in the 19th Century' International Review of Social History XVI (1971), p3.
 2. Cd. 6496, op. cit., p9, where the Memorandum discussed. Among the signatories were W.H. Lever, T.C. Taylor, George Thomson,

..this industry is carried on under very special circumstances and enjoys exceptional advantages... Certainly the Gas Companies afford a field exceptionally favourable for the application of co-partnership methods. The absence of bonus, caused by insufficiency of profits, which in ordinary business not seldom occurs, is practically unknown in Gas Companies.

Given the natural local monopoly which each of the companies enjoyed, and in this they were even more favoured than the large railway companies, the gas manufacturers could calculate the rate of profit bonus (usually derived from both the rate of profits and the price of gas), with mathematical precision well in advance of the balance sheet. With many firms following the example of the South Metropolitan Company, the schemes spread among the employers until in 1912 there were 28,000 gas employees sharing in their companies' profits - which accounted for over one quarter of known profit-sharers at that time.¹

Before concluding that the monopolistic market conditions and the certainty of annual profits explain the success of the schemes in that sector, it is worth noting some other possible contributory causes. Like railway employers, the majority of gas firms required heavy initial capital investment and the floating of share issues. Hence there was a large proportion of public companies, and virtually all the employers were limited concerns with boards of directors. This facilitated the spread of co-partnership in a very simple way, since without shareholding it was very difficult to allocate shares in the concern. Another factor was the relatively large scale of many companies, and their relatively advanced managerial organisation. It was not the directors so much as the powerful dynasties of managers, such as the Liveseys at South Metropolitan, who appear to have been responsible for many of the welfare

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2. Benjamin C. Browne, C.M. Ludlow, and Alfred Marshall.
 3. E. Bristow, 'Profit Sharing and Co-Partnership Schemes...' in K.D. Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History Macmillan (1974) London; p268, for politics of Association, p271 for its emergence as L.C.A., with support from employers such as Browne.
 4. D. Nelson, 'The National Cash Register Company and Welfare...' Labor History (1977), p163-65, for a similar point referring to American experiments.
 5. Cd. 6496, op. cit., p11; see also P. Chantler, The British Gas Industry: An Economic Study Manchester U.P. (1938).
 1. Ibid., p54; 28,000 of 106,000.

innovations in these years.¹ Moreover, these schemes were often linked to quite specific changes in the methods of production and the physical conditions of the industry. The structure of the workforce was both more fluid and yet sharply divided into fresh sectional groups than previously. Industrial relations in the trade were undergoing quite profound changes as these groups sought to challenge managerial authority under highly unusual market conditions of seasonal demand.

Nor should the outstanding success of the gas employers' schemes obscure the prominent position occupied by other sectors in the profit-sharing movement. The following table indicates their importance:

Table LXXII: Profit-Sharing Schemes operating in 1912

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Total Schemes*</u>	<u>Abandoned</u>	<u>Surviving</u>	<u>Total Employees**</u>
Building	12	9	3	151
Mines & Quar.	6	6	-	-
Metal	9	8	1	163
Engin. & Ship	21	17	4	17336
Textiles	14	7	7	4951
Clothing	19	12	7	1637
Transport	3	2	1	173
Agriculture	18	12	6	737
Papermaking	5	1	4	794
Printing, &c.	36	25	11	3389
Woodworking	10	7	3	169
Chem., glass and potteries	22	8	14	15649
Food & Tobacco	31	18	13	6760
Gasworks	34	1	33	28246
Electric	2	-	2	414
Other	57	30	26	25620
Total	299	163	133	106189

Source: Cd. 6496, op. cit., p15. Figures adjusted slightly.

* Total number of schemes introduced down to 1912.

** Total employees of firms introducing schemes before 1912.

It is noticeable that whilst the gas companies have easily the greatest number of employees covered, and the most impressive record of success, the printing trade had a larger number of schemes and the shipbuilding and engineering trades more workers

1. J. Melling, 'Industrial strife and business welfare philosophy..' Business History XXI No.2 (1979); I.L.O., op. cit., p122-25, for the South Metropolitan case.

per scheme introduced than did the gas employers. There are also significant experiments in such industries as chemicals, glass and potteries, textiles, and food and tobacco processing. The industrial and market conditions facing these employers were very different, with a marked correlation between stability of markets and production and the propensity of schemes to survive. Thus the least impressive results were to be found in coalmining and building (experiencing the violent oscillations of cyclical demand), whilst industries geared to more regular domestic markets - including the consumer trades of food and tobacco - were more likely to survive along with regular profit levels. Those employers with a secure monopoly, such as gas, were ideally placed for the administration of schemes which depended on regular rewards to sustain their popularity.¹

It is also possible to estimate the impact of scale and capital resources on the chances of survival of a sharing scheme, as the following (rather crude) comparison indicates:

Table LXXIII: Size, Participation and Survival in P.S. Schemes to 1912

<u>Period*</u>	<u>No. Firms</u>	<u>Tot. Emps.**</u>	<u>Av. Size</u>	<u>Tot-Aver.</u>	<u>Part.+</u>	<u>Ratio^o(%)</u>
1865-78	9	19642	2182	4990	- 544	25
1881-88	7	3363	480	1648	235	49
1889-94	23	14586	634	11002	478	75
1895-98	6	4108	685	1955	326	47.5
1899-1903	19	4651	245	2918	154	63
1904-07	17	23574	1387	20150	1185	85
1908-12	52	36341	699	18996	365	52

Source: Cd. 6496, op. cit.

* Periods arranged according to phases of scheme innovations.

** Total number of employees in firms.

+ Participants in total number of employees and according to average size of firm and sharers in scheme.

^o Ratio is simply percentage of participants to total.

Although these figures are subject to distortions due to the arrival of large firms amongst the profit-sharers,² they give some indication of the phases of activity and scale of enterprise likely to engage in such activities.

1. Bristow, loc. cit., p281, quotes Benjamin Browne as arguing that low returns in engineering, low dividends and highly segregated labour in railways, and casualisation on docks hindered p.s.

2. The large average size of firm in 1865-78 and 1904-07 caused by appearance of Armstrong Whitworth (16,000) and Prudential

The average size of the firm in most periods ranged between just under 500 employees and about 700 workers, with an unusually large number of smaller employers joining at the turn of the century. There are also roughly similar proportions of the workforce involved in the schemes during these years, varying from slightly less than half the employees to three quarters in the hectic period after 1889. It would seem that the 'optimum' participation rate was within this range, though participation tended to increase with particular large enterprises.

This record can be compared with that of employers who abandoned their schemes after introducing them during these decades. Of the 163-64 listed in the 1912 Report as having jettisoned their arrangements, 128 (or 78% of total) gave details regarding the number of persons employed at time of abandonment. These latter firms employed 29,246 people or an average of 288 each, ranging enormously in size and interests from a bookbinding workshop to a large engineering works.¹ Whilst noting this range and diversity, the fact remains that the successful employers were hiring 106,265 employees or an average of 799 per concern.² This would imply that the more sizeable businesses were less likely to abandon their projects than their smaller rivals.

The opinions and attitudes of the employers were usually decisive in the cessation of such schemes, particularly insofar as the management perceived profit-sharing as affecting efficiency and loyalty amongst the workforce. As the following table shows, as much as 82% of the abandoned schemes were folded largely as a result of the employer's actions:

Table LXXIV: Causes of Failure in Profit-Sharing, 1865-1912

<u>No. of Firms</u>	<u>% of Abandoned Schemes</u>	<u>Reason for Termination</u>
59	36	'Dissatisfaction of employers'
29	18	'Want of success'*

2. Assurance (20,644 employees); as major profit-sharers and thus distorting figures.
1. From the 3-6 employees of the bookbinders to the 1,500 employed at Tangyes of Birmingham, an engineering firm.
2. Thus the failures employed only 28.5% as many people as successes.

<u>No. of Firms</u>	<u>% of Abandoned Schemes</u>	<u>Reason for Termination</u>
24	15	End of business trading
21	13	Change of business
133	82	

Source: Cd. 6496, op. cit., p114; * Includes 'decrease of profits'.

Although there had been a number of employers among the 36% of 'dissatisfied' welfarists, who gave employee apathy as a contributory factor, it is interesting that only eight - or five per cent. - of the schemes collapsed after the active opposition of employees whereas the great majority failed through lack of management support.

This evidence tends to confirm that gathered on other aspects of welfare development in the decades before 1920, and particularly that on the positive correlation between prosperity, growth and tight labour markets with welfare expansion. Thus it is an interesting point to trace the links between bonus schemes and partnership arrangements with other amenities. A brief review of the companies engaged in sharing by 1912 indicates that many such schemes had grown out of their previous welfare experiences, with Lever Bros. and Rowntrees both figuring in the list of proponents. Among the 133 schemes operating in 1912 there were at least 31 (or almost 25% of total), which were attached to some form of welfare provision. The next table gives the type of fund and the proportion of bonus being channelled into non-monetary services:

Table LXXV: Profit Sharing and Welfare Schemes in 1912

<u>Type of Welf. Fund</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Proportion of Bonus/Share Invest.</u>
General Provident	3	All of profit bonus
" "	1	Bonus over £10 p.a.
" "	18	Half of bonus/share
" "	1	Two thirds of bonus
" "	1	One third "
" "	1	One quarter "
" "	1	One tenth "
Surplus payments*	4	All of surplus bonus
Sick Fund Scheme	1	Bonus of departed emps. to Fund

Source: Cd. 6496, op. cit., p21-22.

* Surplus bonus going to the unqualified employees.

It can be seen that the most usual arrangement was for the employers to hold as much as one half of the annual bonus for payment into

a general provident fund, which would cater for such contingencies as sickness, injury and annual holidays. It seems likely that such schemes functioned as shop clubs with the active support and assistance of the employers in their administration.

The main alternative methods of payment under such bonus schemes was either to have a collective provident fund into which shares would be credited to the mass of recipients, or to the individual employee whose account would be noted quite separately. The implications for industrial control and legal recovery were quite important, for:¹

Where a fund is collective...employees leaving a company's employment for reasons other than those of sickness, old age, etc., would generally forfeit their rights to participation. Where...sums have been credited individually, employees leaving in such circumstances may usually recover these sums, either at once or after a period.

This raises the crucial issue of industrial relations in the formation and operation of the profit-sharing ventures, and the ways in which co-partnership might assist managerial discipline as well as the legitimacy of industrial control. Not only were departing employees often excluded from the fruits of profit-sharing, but most schemes in 1912 specifically disqualified persons found guilty of 'fraud or serious misconduct'.²

The following table illustrates the variety of sharing arrangements in existence by that time, and suggests the ways in which the benefits might condition particular attitudes and behaviour patterns acceptable to management.

Table LXXVI: Profit Sharing and Types of Welfare Schemes in 1912

Type of Scheme	Main Services Provided	No. Schemes
Common Fund	Sickness benefit	4
" "	Superannuation	2
" "	Disablement	1
" "	Death benefit	3
" "	Marriage Portion (Female)	2
Individual credit	Lump payments at age	8
" "	Long service payments	4
Combined Fund	Sick club benefits	1
Semi-Combined "	Provident purposes*	9

Source: Cd. 6496, op. cit., p22-23. The titles and definitions have been adjusted for clarification.

* These are funds where employees are usually encouraged to contribute part of their bonus share to benefit provision.

1. Ibid., p23.

2. Ibid.

Although many of the benefits are not explicitly 'strategic' and do not depend on the individual discretion of the employer, they do provide a powerful alternative to any trade union provident services and are also orientated towards loyalty for the particular employer. In other cases, facilities were directed at specific grades of worker or administered on a selective basis in favour of supervisory staff.¹

These themes of economic conditions and industrial relations continued past 1912 and down to 1919-20, when another wave of profit-sharing innovation swept across British industry. By 1919 there were a total of 182 schemes in operation and as many as 380 had been established since the 1860s, and by 1921 there were 205 firms with 211 schemes in existence.²

Table LXXVII Profit-Sharing Schemes in Operation, 1919

Industry	Total No.	Abandoned	Surviving
Agriculture	23	15	8
Building	14	11	3
Chems, soap, glass, potts.	22	9	13
Textiles	25	8	17
Clothing	16	11	5
Electricity	2	-	2
Food & drink	34	18	16
Gas	40	4	36
Metal	13	8	5
Eng. & Ship.	31	17	14
Mines/Quarry	6	5	1
Papermaking	6	2	4
Print, Bookbd	38	25	13
Transport	4	2	2
Woodworking	10	9	1
Merch. Warehs, retailing	58	33	25
Banking, insur.	5	-	5
Other	33	21	12
Total	380	198	182

Sources: Cmd. 544, op. cit.; I.L.O., loc. cit., p116.

1. International Labour Office, 'Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in Great Britain' International Labour Review IV No.1 (Oct. 1921); p119, p123 for South Metropolitan.
2. Ministry of Labour, Report on Profit-Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom Cmd. 544 (1920); I.L.O., loc. cit., p116.

By this period there were almost three quarters of profit schemes within the firms with over 25 employees and under 1,000 workers. The largest section within this majority came from employers with 250-1,000 employees, and the significance of this group had been growing since 1910.¹ Thus it would seem that substantial businessmen were more prone to introduce, and then to sustain, sharing and partnership arrangements than either small or very large employers.²

The links between profit-sharing and industrial welfare provisions continued through the post-War period, with most attached schemes devoting part of the bonus to provident and other benefits.³ Similarly, the division between common and individual credits remained, with common funds used for general employee benefits in many cases. The majority of arrangements continued to operate on individual accounts and crediting, however, which reduced the control of management over welfare.⁴

Industrial relations played a major part in the creation and operation of schemes throughout these years, with the high employment and industrial unrest of the post-War period generating another burst of innovation. As the International Labour Office remarked in 1921:⁵

At such times there appears to be a recurring tendency on the part of the employers to resort to profit-sharing as a possible remedy for the unrest...

With the tight labour markets and high trade union recruitment evident at this point, as in 1889-92 or 1910-14, many employers favoured incorporation rather than conflict in the conduct of their industries.

In this light, it is possible to place the spread of co-partnership in the context of the trend towards industrial participation after 1900. The election of worker directors to the board of such firms can be seen as another aspect of progressive management, just as co-partnership administration overlapped with (and contributed to) the growth of industrial welfare in these decades of innovation and conflict.⁶

1. Ibid., p117

3. I.L.O., loc. cit., p118

5. Ibid., p115

2. See Table LIII above also.

4. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p122, for administrative links of partnership and welfare.

Appendix VI: Additional notes concerning employers, industrial welfare and social policy development in Britain

There is a voluminous literature on the growth of social policy in Britain since 1880, although there is as yet only fragmentary accounts of employers' reactions to social policy. One of the most simple and yet least understood problems concerns the order of priority which different firms and associations accord to particular issues and measures in social reform. The sensitivity of colliery owners to the passing of Eight Hours and Minimum Wage legislation is fairly clear, but the reasons why organisations emphasise certain questions whilst virtually ignoring others remains problematical. Not only are their attitudes frequently at variance, but their order of priorities differ according to criteria which might range from vested interests to the initiative of progressive business leadership.

The following dates give no more than a brief general guide to the major events and legislative reforms which preoccupied employers and affected their industrial welfare activities in the decades after 1870. These give no idea of the emphasis placed on the measures by specific organisations, nor the complex attitudes of business to them, but they indicate at least some of the forces shaping industrial welfare during that period.

Table LXXVIII: Selected dates in the development of welfare, 1870-1920

<u>Date</u>	<u>Measure</u>
1871	Trade Union Act
1874	Factory Act (Mundella's Act)
1875	Friendly Societies Act
	Employers and Workmen Act
1880	Employers' Liability Act
1885-86	Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes
1886	Select Committee on Employers' Liability
	Employers' Liability Bill (Burt's Bill)
	Royal Commission on Depression in Trade and Industry
	Chamberlain Circular
1887	Truck Bills (Bradlaugh, Donald and Crawford)
1891	Factory Bill (Sir Henry James' Bill)
1892-94	Royal Commission on Labour
1893	Workmen's Compensation Bill (Asquith's Bill)
1895	Factory Bill (Asquith's Bill)
	Royal Commission on the Aged Poor
1896	Friendly Societies Act
	Truck Act
	Factory Act
1897	Workmen's Compensation Act
1901	Factory (Consolidation) Act

Date	Measure
1902	Shop Clubs Act
1904	Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation
1905	Unemployed Workmen Act
1906	Workmen's Compensation Act
	Royal Commission on Trades Disputes
	Trades Disputes Act
1908	Old Age Pensions
	Departmental Committee on the Truck Acts
	Eight Hours Act
	Sweated Industries Bill (Henderson's Bill)
1909	Finance Bill (People's Budget)
	Labour Exchanges Act
	Trade Boards Act
1909-12	Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of Distress
1910-11	Board of Trade Committee on Superannuation Funds
1911	National Insurance Act
1911-17	Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial
	Population in Scotland
1912	Minimum Wage Act
1915	Munitions of War Act
	Ministry of Munitions Act
1915-18	Emergency Orders
	Health of Munition Workers Committee Reports
1916	Police, Factories (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
	Departmental Committee on Approved Society Finance
1917	National Health Insurance Act
	Commissioners on Industrial Unrest
1918	Ministry of Labour established
1919	Housing, Town Planning Act (Addison Housing Act)
	Sankey Commission
	Joint Industrial Conference
1919-20	Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation
	(Holman Gregory Committee)

Arrangement of sources and bibliographical references:

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Please note: These works are divided by subject and theme rather than by chronology, and there is no separation of contemporary and more recent studies in the bibliography. Since a few works are difficult to isolate as belonging to one category, they are repeated in two or more cases.

Sources and Bibliography

For ease of reference and guidance to sources, full details of particular sources are given in the appropriate footnotes at the bottom of each page. The titles of secondary works are usually given, together with the author and page number, as they appear in each separate chapter. Works already used in previous chapters are therefore reproduced, with full title and details, at their first mention in each fresh chapter - in order to avoid lengthy cross-checking.

The following list of sources is restricted to those used directly in the preceding chapters, and almost all have been cited in previous footnotes. As can be seen from the following documentation, the great bulk of the thesis was derived from local business and association records as well as printed government papers. This has obviously coloured the arguments as well as the evidence employed, and should be taken into account when considering the arguments relating to business motivation. The serious dearth of private and political papers collected by businessmen must create numerous difficulties when attempts are made to sketch the personalities and opinions of welfarist (or any other) employers. Company records, official materials, and local newspapers or trade journals can provide only occasional glimpses into the attitudes of even the most articulate of businessmen, whilst organisations tend to reflect the lowest common denominator in industrial outlook or (at most) the views of particular groups within the associations.

Another problem arises in attempting to assess the impact of industrial welfare on other aspects of economy and society, in that the limited data surveyed cannot embrace the multifarious activities of employers or the state in the sphere of welfare. Such was the sparsity of information that even employers at the time could only make general, sometimes intuitive, calculations as to the impact of welfare on their economic wellbeing. One woollen manufacturer before the First World War noted of his profit-sharing scheme, for example, that:¹

After nearly 20 years' experience we have no hesitation in saying that our system of Profit-Sharing does 'call forth extra zeal'. It is, of course, impossible to say

1. Labour Dept. of Board of Trade, Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership... Cd. 6496 (1912), p70.

how far this goes in recouping us for the amount paid in bonus, but we have no doubt that it does so to a considerable extent. It has certainly helped to promote the most harmonious relations between us and our employees.

There are deficiencies in our knowledge of both conditions without perceptions and of limited perceptions without a recognition of objective circumstances. The materials listed below can give only a fragmentary insight into the actions of welfarist employers, with strong bias towards the leading figures in local industry and regional organisations. Any comprehensive study of industrial welfare would take into account materials of national business leaders, federation sources, central government records, and the archives of such bodies as the Industrial Welfare Society.

Having stated the limits of the following sources and references, they still remain a significant corpus of material upon which to base an industrial and regional comparison and any further research would extend (not supersede) this study.

I. Primary sources: business and company records

<u>Name</u>	<u>Industry</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Ref. No.</u>
<u>J & R Allan</u>	Retailing	ASRS	UGD 98
1. A.G.M. Minute Book (1899-1953)		98 14/1	
<u>Alley & MacLellan</u>	Shipbuild/Eng.	ASRS	UGD 23
1. General Meeting Minute Book No.1		23 1/1	
2. " " Minute Book No.2		23 1/2	
3. " " Minute Book No.3		23 1/3	
<u>D & J Anderson</u>	Textiles/dyes	ASRS	UGD 22
1. Memorandum & Articles of Association (1911)		22 1/1	
2. Balance Sheets (1880-1907)		22 4/1	
3. Private Letter Book		22 8/1	
4. Directors' Attendance Book		22 9/1	
5. Inventory and valuation, Atlantic Mills (1910)		22 10/1	
6. <u>Fifty Years of Calico Printing</u> (Pamphlet)		22 10/3	
7. <u>Famous Fabrics (1822-1952)</u> (1952 ")		22 10/4	
8. <u>Wages Book No.1 (1914-16)</u>		22 11/1	
<u>Anderson & Robertson</u>	Textiles	ASRS	UGD 29
1. Articles of Association (1904)		29 1/1	
2. Directors Minute Book (1895-1922)		29 10/1	
3. Newscuttings Book (1921-29)		29 22/1	
<u>T.M. Bairstows</u>	Textiles	LCA	Bairstow Coll.
1. Arrangements with workmen (1866-1919)		MS 72, 73, 75	
2. Sutton Mill Sick Society Cash Books (1901-32)		MS 178	

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|---|--------|
| 3. Contractors' Receipts for New Mill (1905-12) | MS 183 |
| 4. Box of papers regarding New Mill | MS 188 |
| 5. Nominal Ledgers (1889-1920s) | MS 189 |

John Barran Textile/Clothing LCA. Barran Coll.

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. Books of instructions, rules & arrangements (1905-20) | MS 4 |
| 2. List of Barran properties (1904-27) | MS 10 |
| 3. Notes relating to employees (1877-83) | MS 14 |
| 4. Notes " " " (1884-1907) | MS 15 |
| 5. Notes " " " (1907-14) | MS 16 |
| 6. Newscuttings re. to Sweating controversy (1879-1910) | MS 28 |
| 7. Directors and A.G.M. Minute Book (1903-14) | MS 30 |
| 8. Directors " " " " (1914-21) | MS 31 |
| 9. Plans of Hirst Barran for Chapel Allerton | MS 56 |

William Beardmore Steel, Eng., Ship. ASRS UGD 100

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. Balance Sheets & Appendices (1901-19) | 100 1 8/1-19 |
| 2. Dalmuir & West of Scotland Estate Co., Minute Book (1914-57) | 100 2 |

Blackie & Sons Publishing/Print. ASRS UGD 61

- | | |
|--|---------|
| 1. Minutes of General Meetings (1890-1912) | 61 11/1 |
| 2. Letter Book of Blackies (1902-12) | 61 12/1 |
| 3. Church Building Society of Glasgow accounts (1844-51) | 61 19/1 |
| 4. Memorial Dinner Celebrations for John Blackie Snr. (1840) | 61 27/1 |
| 5. Political Corr. of Dr. W.G. Blackie (1880s) | 61 31/1 |
| 6. Calendar of St. Mungo's College (1889-94) | 61 36/1 |
| 7. Centenary materials and historical notes | 61 54/1 |

Henry Briggs Coalowners BLUL Briggs Coll.

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. <u>D.H.C. Briggs, A Merchant, A Banker and the Coal Trade 1693-1971</u> (Pamphlet) | MS 1 |
| 2. Letters, notes and ephemera | MS 2 |
| 3. Copies of letters from Briggs' corrs. including J.S. Mill and Thomas Hughes | MS 3 |
| 4. 'Nationalisation File' No.1 | MS 6 |
| 5. Wage bonus: rules for regulating profit bonus on wages | MS 7 |
| 6. Cuttings relating to profit sharing | MS 9 |
| 7. Analysis of costs of production, etc. | MS 11 |
| 8. O.V. Smithson, 'Development of the West Yorks Coal Industry' (Types) 1925 (WYCOA) | MS 12 |
| 9. Whitwood Colliery Mutual Aid Fund: contracting out scheme (1898) | MS 16 |
| 10. Colliery contracting out fund (1904) | MS 19 |
| 11. <u>D.H.C. Briggs, Record of a Yorkshire Family</u> (1971) | MS 22 |
| 12. Methley Junction Mutual Improvement Society, <u>Rules and Regulations</u> (n.d.) | MS 23 |
| 13. Letter threatening H. Briggs Snr (1858) Cp. | MS 24 |
| 14. Report on Industrial Partnership at Whitwood (n.d. but c. 1875) | MS 26 |
| 15. <u>Down Among the Coals...</u> (Halifax Guardian) | MS 15 |

16. Minute Book No.1 (1865-82)	MS 160/1
17. Minute Book No.2 (1882-1900)	MS 160/2
18. Minute Book No.3 (1900-1916)	MS 160/3
19. Minute Book No.4 (1916-1921)	MS 160/4

John Brown Steel/Shipb. ASRS UCS: 1

1. John Brown (Clydebank Commt.) Minutes of Board (1899-1910)	1 1/13
2. Charities correspondence	1 8/75
3. File on Hospital Fund	1 8/77
4. Administrative File and Corr. regarding Shipbuilding Employers' Federation	1 9/92
5. File regarding membership of C.S.A.	1 9/107
6. File concerning funds of C.S.A.	1 9/113
7. Diaries of John Browns	1 10/1-3
8. Corr. regarding Wartime boy supervision	1 21/35
9. Corr. with Ministry of Munitions	1 22/4
10. Files on Workmen's Housing, inc. Memo. on "Shortage of Ironworkers"	1 23/1-3
11. Corr. concerning War and Trade Unions	1 58/1

Brownleas (C.S.M.) Timber Firm Company Files

1. City Saw Mills Mutual Aid Society II, Minute Book (1927-1963)	MS
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Caledonian Railway Co. Railway/Loc. Eng. SRO BR CAL I

1. Directors Minute Book 21 (1881-83)	1 27
2. Directors " " 48 (1906-07)	1 54
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8. Salaried Staff Retirements	4 49
9. Railway Conciliation Scheme	4 51
10. Reports of Assistant General Goods Man.	4 54
11. Secretary's Private Letter Book	4 59
12. Trades Apprentices (1909-10)	4 133
13. Newspaper cuttings	4 151
14. Speech of Sir James King (1896)	4 152
15. Accident and Compensation records	4 153-54
16. Baillie skethc of Thomas Hill	4 172
17. Memorandum of Staff on Salaries (1911)	7 2
18. Memo. from Officers' Guarantee Fund (1913)	7 3
19. Memorandum of Staff on Salaries (1914)	7 4
20. " " " (1916)	7 5
21. Notice of appointment of M.O.H. (1918)	8 85
22. Apprentices at St. Rollox	9 13
23. Individual staff histories	9 17
24. Civil Engineer's File on Staff (1920-26)	24 2

I & F Calvert Textiles UBL Calvert Coll.

1. Employment of minors and their educ.	MS 40-43
2. Rent Ledger of property (1886-1917)	MS 56
3. " " " (1917-1930)	MS 57

<u>Champdany Jute Co.</u>	Textiles	ASRS	UGD 91 (Finlay Coll.)
1. Accounts Current...No.2 (1908-27)			91 144
2. Letter Book No.1 (1894-1901)			91 145/1
3. Letter Book No.2 (1901-1915)			91 145/2
4. Copy Letter Book (1910-15)			91 146
5. 'Champdany' Letter Book (c. 1900)			91 149
6. Scroll and Account Books (1899-1931)			91 155/1-5
<u>Clydebank S.E. Co.</u>	Shipd./Eng.	ASRS	UCS 1 (J. Brown C.)
1. Annual Balance Sheet & A.G.M. agenda (1906)			1 4/11
2. " " " & A.G.M. agenda (1907)			1 4/12
3. " " " & A.G.M. agenda (1908)			1 4/13
4. Files including Progress Reports of Yard			1 5/2
<u>William Denny & Bros</u>	Shipd./Eng.	ASRS	UGD 3
1. Private Jotting Books of W. Denny			3 16/1-6
2. Awards Committee Ledgers			3 14/1-3
3. Workmen's Housing Ledger (1868)			3 26/5
4. Private papers of Peter Denny			3 28/1
5. Leven Shipyard Accident Fund papers			3 28/1
6. Newscuttings Book No.5			3 15/2
7. Accounts rendered (1905-13)			3 9/2
8. " " (1913-28)			3 9/3
<u>Dennystoun Forge Co.</u>	Iron	ASRS	UGD 3 (Denny Coll.)
1. Private Letter Book of Wedgwood, Manager (1886-90)			3 26
<u>William Dixon & Sons</u>	Coalmining	ASRS	UGD 1
1. Rents and feu duties (1929-55)			1 26/1
2. Govan Iron Works Accident Committee (1928-46)			1 27/1
3. Accident Report Book (1905-08)			1 34/1-2
4. Funeral Fund Roll Books			1 35/1-4
5. Register of Preference Share Members			1 36/1-2
6. Rent Roll of Property (1869-80)			1 55/2
7. Standing Rules & Regulations of Govan Colliery (1884-87)			1 55/5
8. Letter Book (1873-1906)			1 55/13
9. Property Rent Rolls			1 56/2
10. Advances and reductions in wages at Govan Collieries (1900-1916)			1 56/4
11. Directors Report to Shareholders (1909))		
Memorandum & Articles of Assoc. (1947))		1 56/7
Prospectus of William Dixon (1906))		
<u>Duncan Ltd</u>	Retailing	ASRS	UGD 98 (Fraser Coll.)
1. Minute Book No.1 of Directors and A.G.M. (1918-51)			98 61/1
<u>Fairfield E. & S. Co.</u>	Eng./Shipd.	SRA	UCS 2
1. Minute Book No.1 (1889-94)			2 1/1
2. Minute " No.2 (1894-1906)			Missing
3. Minute " No.3 (1906-12)			2 1/2
4. Minute " No.4 (1912-17)			2 1/3
5. Balance Sheet (MS) of J. Elder (1878)			2 7/1

6. Fairfield Accident Fund Account (1869-80) 2 7/18
 7. Balance Sheets of F.E.S.Co. (1890-1918) 2 5/1-28

<u>James Finlay</u>	Textiles	ASRS	UGD 91
1. Balance Sheets/Books (1789-1800)			91 3/1
2. Balance " " (1873-1899)			91 3/4
3. Balance " " (1899-1922)			91 3/5
4. 'Historical Accounts & Notes' of J. Finlays			91 19
5. Memo. of Managers' Meetings at Finlay, Muir & Co. (1898-1901)			91 25
6. Files of letters - miscellaneous (1909-40)			91 33
7. Notes and particulars regarding assistants (1880-1900)			91 39
8. Sir John Muir Trust papers (1903 onwards)			91 62
9. Muir Trust Minutes (1903-24) No.1			91 62/1
10. Valuation of Deanston & Catrine Mills (1904)			91 83
11. Newspaper cuttings relating to firm			91 143
12. Employees remittances			91 149
13. Employers' Pocket Book notes			91 151
14. Correspondence re. firm			91 158
15. Minute Book No.1 of Finlays			91 177/1
16. Directors Minute Book No.1-6			91 178/1-6
17. Correspondence with Finlay heirs (1914-16)			91 227
18. Articles of Association (revised)			91 237
19. Reports and balance sheets (1911-21)			91 239
20. Historical notes & materials on firm			91 252
21. Notes on 'Origins of Deanston Works' (Sir John Burns author?)			91 253
22. Partners' Minutes (1900s)			91 265
23. Private Letter Book (1901-06)			91 266
24. Salaried staff materials No.1			91 269
25. Salaried staff materials No.2			91 270
26. Notes re. Glasgow employees (c. 1880)			91 277
27. Plan of properties in Smith & Gardiner St.			91 294/1
28. Particulars of sporting & residential estate at Darleith (1901)			91 315
29. Papers of Imray Fund (1915-30)			91 316

<u>William Fison</u>	Textiles	BCL	Fison Coll.
1. Rents & Property Ledger of Fisons			MS 3
2. Cuttings and miscellaneous ephemera			MS 4

<u>Fraser, Sons</u>	Retailing	ASRS	UGD 98
1. Minute Book No.1 (1909-37), including A.G.M. financial statements			98 1

<u>Benjamin Gott</u>	Textiles	BLUL	Gott Coll.
1. Family and personal papers (1810-44)			MS 15
2. Letters to B. Dixons (executors of Gott's will), including corr. with employees			MS 19
3. Miscellaneous business records of firm			MS 195-201

<u>Gourock Ropework Co.</u>	Rope/Nets	ASRS	UGD 42
1. Loose correspondence in box of papers			42 22/3
2. Minute Book of Partners of Gourock (1873-1920)			42 23/3
3. Correspondence re. to overseas operations			42 24/2

4. New Lanark Mill flats materials			42 31/20
5. Works Manager's Report Book (1879-1904)			42 31/23
6. New Lanark business materials (1901-27)			42 40/7
7. Valuation of property (1918-19)			42 101/7
8. Memorandum and Articles of Association			42 104/10
9. Letters of H. Birkmyre re. New Lanark Spinning Co			42 105/7
10. Letters of H. Birkmyre re. religion			42 105/8
11. A.G.M. papers and Accounts of Company (1904-20)			42 109/1-4
12. Rent Books of Gourock (1827-1931)			42 40/1
13. Valuation of works (1908-15)			42 148/8
<u>Isaac Holden</u>	Textiles	BLUL	Holden Coll.
1. Newspaper cuttings and obituaries of I. Holden			Box III MS 5
2. Articles, printed materials and ephemera re. to Holden's life and business activities			Box IV MS 2
<u>A. & J Inglis</u>	Shipbd./Eng.	ASRS	UGD 69
1. Contract and papers of copartnership between Anthony and John Inglis & related documents (1868-83)			69 1/1
<u>John Leans & Sons</u>	Textiles	ASRS	UGD 2
1. Letter Book No. 28 (1906-07)			2 7/31
2. Letter Book No. 29 (1907-08)			2 7/32
3. Letter Book No. 30 (1908-09)			2 7/33
4. Letter Book No. 31 (1909-10)			2 7/34
5. Letter Book No. 32 (1910-11)			2 7/35
6. Petty Cash Book and accounts			2 5
<u>Samuel Cunliffe-Listers</u>	Textiles	Firm	Archive
1. Fragmentary documents of Listers, mostly dating from period after 1901			
2. Correspondence notes of C. McGowan (1977) on the welfare policies of firm			
<u>Lobnitz & Simon</u>	Mar. Eng./Shipbd.	ASRS	UCS 4
1. Minute Book No.1 (Directors Minutes)			4 1/1
2. Minute Book No.2 (" ")			4 1/2
<u>Muir Simpson</u>	Retailing	ASRS	UGD 98 (Fraser C.)
1. Minute Book No.1 (1914-47)			98 93
2. Private Journal No.1 (1914-36)			98 96
3. Private Journal No.2 (1937-47)			98 97
<u>Walter Neilson</u>	Loco. Eng.	ASRS	UGD 10
1. Autobiographical Notes of W.M. Neilson			10 5/1
2. Private Journal No.1 of W.M. Neilson			10 5/2
3. Private Journal No.2 " " " (1850-56)			10 5/3
<u>North British Loco.</u>	Loco. Eng.	ASRS	UGD 11
1. Detailed inventory of N.B.L.Co.			11 11/2
2. History of Company (printed) during First War			11 12/1

<u>North British Railway Co.</u>	Railway/Loco. Eng.	SRO	BR NBR I
1. Claims Committee Minute Book (1912-19)			1/180
2. Insurance Society Minute Book (1901-02)			1/226
3. N.B.R. Literary Society Minute Book (1900-05)			1/365
4. N.B.R. Musical Society Minute Book (1882-85)			1/406
5. Accident Reports Book (1869-81)			4/2
6. Cuttings re. financial position of Company			4/44
7. Waverly Station Ambulance Corp. materials			4/180
8. Scrap Book of N.B.R.			4/181
9. Circulars (copies) Book (1892-96)			4/215
10. Literary Society Magazine issues			4/282
11. Accident Reports Book (1861-63)			4/330
12. Memorandum of Clerical Staff regarding Salaries			7/2
13. Notes on Workmen's Housing proposed at Cadder			8/1056
14. General Manager's files on harassment of loyal labour			8/1056
15. Correspondence re. Disturbances at Riccarton			8/1056
16. General Manager's file on Wages (1890)			8/1110
17. Board of Trade Recommendations on Accidents (1913-14)			8/1187
18. Materials re. to 1920 Rent Strikes at housing			8/1486
19. Records of dismissals			15/57
20. Record of company servants fined			15/58
21. Staff records (1878-1902)			15/194
22. Claims under Workmen's Compensation Act			15/197
23. Ambulance competition of N.B.R. employees			15/201
24. Expenditure Ledger (1876-77)			23/276
25. Parliamentary expenses of N.B.R. (1872-86)			23/456
<u>North British Railway Co:2</u>		ASRS	UGD 8
1. Miscellaneous documents re. firm No.1			8 10
2. Miscellaneous " " " No.2			8 22
3. Newspaper cuttings re. N.B.R. Co.			8 51
4. Legal actions involving company			8 54
<u>Pettigrew & Stephen</u>	Retailing	ASRS	UGD 98 (Fraser C.)
1. Minute Book No.2 (1914-29)			98 106
2. General Minute Book No.2 (1920-54)			98 109
<u>R.Y. Pickering</u>	Loco. Eng.	ASRS	UGD 12
1. Income Tax account of manual workers at Wishaw (1916-20)			12 10/1
2. Wishaw Works Friendly Society Minute Book (1893-1903)			12 11/1
3. Friendly Society Minute Book No.2 (1903-07)			12 11/2
4. Friendly Society Minute Book No.3 (1907-13)			12 11/3
5. Friendly Society Cash Book (1906-12)			12 11/4
6. <u>R.Y. Pickering's, 1864-1964</u> (Brochure history)			12 18/24
<u>Scottish Drapery Corporation</u>	Retailing	ASRS	UGD 99
1. Minute Book No.1 (1926-29)			99 1
<u>Alexander Stephen & Sons</u>	Shipbd./Mar.Eng.	ASRS	UGD 4
1. Letter Book No.5 of A. Stephens (1892-93)			4 1/22
2. Annual Balance Sheets and statements of accounts (1901-1919)			4 2

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| 3. Scribbling Diary of Alex. Stephen | 4 8/1 |
| 4. Diaries of F.J. Stephen | 4 9/1-3 |
| 5. Minute Book No.1 of Directors (1900-21) | 4 12/1 |
| 6. Report of Sir E.J. Reed on "Daphne" diaster at
Linthouse Yard (1883) | 4 18/4 |

<u>James Templeton</u>	Textiles/Carpets	ASRS/T.	UGD 90/Firm
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|---|--------|
| 1. Sales Analysis Book of Templetons | 90 1/1 |
| 2. Templeton Benevolent Trust Fund Book | Firm |
| 3. Sick Payments records (MS) 1890s-1930s | " |
| 4. Oral notes of M. McGranachan (1975) | " |

<u>Thomson Co-partnership</u>	Textiles	HCL	Thomson Coll.
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| 1. Thomson Correspondence (1870s-1900s) | TC 1-86 (Box 1) |
| 2. Printed notes on Woodhouse & MS notes on USA | TZ 1 (Box 2) |
| 3. Manuscript notes and jottings mainly on Ruskin | TZ 2 (" ") |
| 4. Notes and jottings on Ruskin and others | TZ 3 (" ") |
| 5. Draft speeches and notes, including speech to
Huddersfield Town Council on technical education | TZ 4 (" ") |
| 6. Manuscript notes on profit sharing and partnership | TZ 5 (" ") |
| 7. Rough drafts re. profit sharing arrangements | TZ 6 (" ") |
| 8. Printed materials including biog. sketches of
George Thomson | TZ 7 (" ") |
| 9. Pamphlet materials on schemes including pension
provisions at Woodhouse | TZ 8 (" ") |
| 10. Rough drafts for speeches | TZ 9 (" ") |
| 11. Journal notes (MS) on devotional and religious
matters | TZ 10 (" ") |
| 12. Printed and manuscript notes on Ruskin and
Woodhouse experiment | TZ 11 (Box 3) |
| 13. Materials on copartnership and models | TZ 12 (" ") |
| 14. MS notes on Carlyle, Tennyson, Tolstoi, etc. | TZ 13 (" ") |
| 15. Notes (ms) on Guild of St. George and 1890
election of Thomson as Master of Guild | TZ 14 (" ") |
| 16. Various notes and papers on social questions | TZ 15 (" ") |
| 17. Notes (largely copies) on Ruskin | TZ 16 (" ") |
| 18. Jottings and notes on Woodhouse Scheme | TZ 17 (" ") |
| 19. Further notes on Woodhouse co-partnership | TZ 18 (Box 4) |
| 20. Cuttings (including <u>Factory Times</u> report) on
Woodhouse scheme | TZ 19 (" ") |
| 21. Draft notes for speeches and articles | TZ 20 (" ") |
| 22. Cuttings and notes on working conditions at
Woodhouse factory | TZ 21 (" ") |
| 23. Original materials on Woodhouse arrangements | TZ 22 (" ") |
| 24. Unlisted journal including jottings on Ruskin | (Box 2) |
| 25. Unlisted notes on Ruskin (loose) | (" ") |
| 26. Further materials relating to Thomson's ideas | (" ") |
| 27. Travel journal, including visit of Thomson to USA | (Box 4) |
| 28. Notes and letters including corr. regarding controversy
in press over Thomson's salary | (" ") |

<u>J & G Thomson</u>	Shipbd./Eng.	ASRS	UCS 1 (Brown C.)
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| 1. Minute Book No.1 of Thomsons (1890-97) | 1 1/12 |
| 2. Summary of Capital, Shares & Returns (1890) | 1 3/9 |
| 3. Reports of Directors, Bal. Sheets, Statements AC
(1891-96) | 1 3/10-15 |

4. Reports of Directors, Bal. Sheets, AGM Accounts (1897-99)		1 4/7-10
5. Yard Diary No.1		1 10/1
6. Yard Diary No.2		1 10/2
<u>United Turkey Red (Orr Ewing) Dyeing ASRS</u>		UGD 13
1. A.O.H. Ewing Co. Letter Book (1868-90)		13 1/8
2. A.O.H. Ewing Co. Current Accounts (1845-98)		13 2/1-54
3. Wages, Labour and Miscellaneous Book		13 4/2
4. Trades Disputes Book of U.T.R. (1912-16)		13 4/3
5. "Turkey Red Dyers", Reports, Minutes, etc. (1897-98)		13 4/5
6. Minute Book (inc. statements by Heads of Departments) (1922-30)		13 5/6
7. Private Letter Book (Box No.2 for loose letters) (1907-08)		13 5/12
8. Newspaper cuttings Book (1898-1912)		13 5/16
<u>Charles Todd & Higginbotham Textiles ASRS</u>		UGD 76
1. Memorandum of Association (1890))	
2. Minute of Agreement between partners)	76 1/1
3. Report of company liquidator (1899))	
<u>Walter Wilson Retailing ASRS</u>		UGD 98 (Fraser C)
1. Directors' Minute Book No.1 (1919-40)		98 141
2. General Meeting Minute Book No.1 (1919-42)		98 142
<u>Wood and Selbey Retailing ASRS</u>		UGD 98 (Fraser)
1. Directors' Minute Book No.1 (1915-53)		98 144

Key to location of business records:

ASRS	Adam Smith Record Store, University of Glasgow Archives
BCL	Bradford Central Library, Bradford (Yorks)
BLUL	Brotherton Library, University of Leeds (Special Collections)
HCL	Huddersfield Central Public Library, Huddersfield
ICA	Leeds City Archives, Sheepscar (Leeds)
SRO	Scottish Record Office, West Register House, Edinburgh
SRA	Strathclyde Regional Archives, Glasgow
UBL	University of Bradford Library

II. Primary sources: association and organisation records

<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Ref.</u>
<u>Bradford Chamber of Commerce</u>	BCCB	Chamber Mins.
1. Minute Books of Chamber (1851-present)		Minute Books
2. <u>Centenary Brochure History, 1851-1951 (1951)</u>		History
<u>Clyde Shipbuilders (& Engineers*) Assoc.</u>	SRA	TD 241
1. General Minutes C.S.E.A. (1865-1877)		241/1
2. Committee Minutes C.S.E.A. (1866-1890)		241/2
3. Lower Dist. Committee of C.S.E.A. Minutes (1874-77)		241/3
4. Upper Dist. Committee of " Minutes (1889-96)		241/4
5. General Association C.S.A. General Minutes (1889-94)		241/5
6. General Association " " Minutes (1894-99)		241/6

7. C.S.A. General Minutes Vol.3 (1899-1903)	241/7
8. C.S.A. " " Vol.4 (1903-1907)	241/8
9. C.S.A. " " Vol.5 (1907-1909)	241/9
10. C.S.A. " " Vol.6 (1909-1911)	241/10
11. C.S.A. " " Vol.7 (1911-1912)	241/11
12. C.S.A. " " Vol.8 (1912-1914)	241/12
13. C.S.A. " " Vol.9 (1914-1916)	241/13
14. C.S.A. " " Vol.10 (1916-1917)	241/14
15. C.S.A. " " Vol.11 (1917-1918)	241/15
16. C.S.A./N.W.E.T.E.A. Joint Committee of Clyde Shipyards (1910-1911)	241/
17. Extracts from Minutes & Recommendations	241/
18. Circular Letters from C.S.A. to Members Vol.1 (5.1.1920 - 31.3.1920) Letters No.1-238	241/

* The Clyde Shipbuilders' Association was originally the Clyde Shipbuilders and Engineers' Association, being divided into Upper and Lower Districts after 1889 and the Engineers' departing before 1896 to form the N.W.E.T.E.A.

<u>Coal Owners of Scotland</u>	SRO	CB 7
1. Production figures of Coal Committee (1915)		7 4/11
2. Output, prices, costs and exports figures		7 4/34
3. Copies of Agreements and Circulars		7 5/2
4. Coal Industry Committee, 'The Housing of Miners' (1919)		7 5/40
5. Coal Owners of Scotland, <u>The Housing of Miners</u> (1925) Pamphlet		7 5/41
6. Miners' Welfare Fund (1921-25) materials		7 5/42
7. Average earnings in the Scottish industry (1913-35)		7 6/27
8. Notes on 'The Coal Crisis' (1912)		7 8

<u>Lanarkshire Coal Masters' Association</u>	SRO	CB 8
1. Annual Reports (printed) of Association (1888-1909)		8 2
2. Annual Reports " " " (1910-1931)		8 3

<u>Glasgow Chamber of Commerce</u>	GJCG	Minutes
1. Minute Book No.10 (1871-79)		MS 10
2. Minute Book No.11 (1879-1885)		MS 11
3. Minute Book No.12 (1885-1892)		MS 12
4. Minute Book No.13 (1892-1899)		MS 13
5. Minute Book No.14 (1900-1905)		MS 14
6. Minute Book No.15 (1905-1911)		MS 15
7. Minute Book No.'16' (1909-1913)		MS 16

<u>Leeds Chamber of Commerce</u>	BLUL	ICC Coll.
1. Minute Book No.3 (1871-1885)		MS 3
2. Minute Book No.4 (1885-1895)		MS 4
3. Minute Book No.5 (1895-1908)		MS 5
4. Minute Book No.6 (1908-1921)		MS 6

<u>North West Engineering Trades Employers' Association</u>	SEEFG	Archive
1. Minute Book No.2 (1897-1904)		MS 2
2. Minute Book No.3 (1904-1909)		MS 3
3. Minute Book No.4 (1909-1912)		MS 4
4. Minute Book No.5 (1912-1913)		MS 5

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| 5. Minute Book No.6 (1913-1915) | MS 6 |
| 6. Minute Book No.7 (1915-1916) | MS 7 |
| 7. Minute Book No.8 (1916-1917) | MS 8 |
| 8. Minute Book No.9 (1917-1918) | MS 9 |
| 9. <u>Dyer Memorial Committee, Report of the Executive Committee (1898 and 1899 Reports)</u> | |
| 10. Boyd, 'The Dyer Memorial Fund: A History' (Type) | |

<u>Scottish Ironmasters' Association</u>	SRA	TD 171
1. Minute Book No.1 (1899-1909)		171/1
2. Minute Book No.2 (1909-1916)		171/2
3. Minute Book No.3 (1916-1916)		171/3
4. Minute Book No.4 (1916-1917)		171/4
5. Minute Book No.5 (1917-1918)		171/5

<u>Scottish Iron & Coal Masters' Association</u>	ASRS	UGD 49
1. Letter Book of S.P.I.T.* No.2 (1910-1913)		49 1/1
2. Letter " " No.3 (1913-1916)		49 1/2
3. Letter " " No.4 (1916-1917)		49 1/3
4. Letter " " No.5 (1917-1917)		49 1/4
5. Letter " " No.6 (1917-1918)		49 1/5
6. Standing Committee of S.M.I.T.** Minutes (1912-36)		49 7/2
7. S.P.I.T. Conciliation Board Minutes (1899-1938)		49 7/4
8. Returns of rates and conditions (1912-1919)		49 7/20
9. Memorandum on Minimum Wages Act (1912)		49 8/32
10. Miners' Welfare Society Papers (1932-1946)		49 8/38

* Scottish Pig Iron Traders. The Conciliation Board (printed) Minutes run No.1-21 reports of Proceedings (1899-1914).

** Scottish Manufactured Iron Traders, also linked to Scottish Iron and Coal Masters.

<u>Scottish Mine Owners' Defense and Mutual Insurance Association</u>	SRO	CB 20
1. Minute Book of Directors (1899-1901)		20 1/1
2. Minute Book " " (1902-1903)		20 1/2
3. Minute Book " " (1903-1905)		20 1/3
4. Minute Book " " (1905-1906)		20 1/4
5. Minute Book " " (1906-1907)		20 1/5
6. Minute Book " " (1911-1911)		20 1/6
7. Minute Book " " (1911-1912)		20 1/7
8. Minute Book " " (1912-1913)		20 1/8
9. Minute Book " " (1913-1914)		20 1/9
10. Minute Book " " (1914-1915)		20 1/10
11. Minute Book " " (1915-1916)		20 1/11
12. Minute Book " " (1916-1917)		20 1/12
13. Minute Book " " (1917-1918)		20 1/13

<u>West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association</u>	BLUL	Coll. 148
1. Association Minute Book No.1 (1890-1897)		148/1
2. Association " " No.2 (1898-1902)		148/2
3. Association " " No.3 (1902-1910)		148/3
4. Association " " No.4 (1910-1915)		148/4
5. Association " " No.5 (1916-1920)		148/5
6. Association " " No.6 (1920-1925)		148/6
7. Association " " No.7 (1925-1937)		148/7

Key to location of organisation records:

ASRS Adam Smith Record Store, University of Glasgow Archives
 BCCB Bradford Chamber of Commerce (Cheapside) Bradford
 BLUL Brotherton Library, University of Leeds
 GJCG Glasgow Junior Chamber of Commerce (George Sq.) Glasgow
 SEEFG Scottish Engineering Employers' Federation (Fyfe Chambers)
 Glasgow
 SRA Strathclyde Regional Archives, Glasgow
 SRO Scottish Record Office (West Register House) Edinburgh

III. Primary sources: Personal and political papers

<u>Joseph Chamberlain Papers</u>	BrCL	JC Coll.
1. Cabinet Memorandum on Workmen's Accident : Compensation (1897)		JC 6 3/3/18
2. Cabinet Memorandum on Workmen's Accident Compensation with diff. appendices (1897)		JC 6 3/3/20
<u>Bradford Conservative Association</u>	BCL	BCA Collection
1. Bradford Conservative Association Minutes (1876-1886)		MS 1
2. Bradford Conservative Association General Council Minutes (1886-1897)		MS 2
3. Bradford Conservative Association General Council Minutes (1902-1934)		MS 3
4. B.C.A. Municipal Sub-Committee Minutes (1887- 1900)		MS 4
5. B.C.A. Mun. Sub-Committee Minutes (1901-1910)		MS 5
6. B.C.A. Mun. Sub-Committee Minutes (1910-1927)		MS 6
7. B.C.A. Financial and General Purposes Committee Minutes (1898-1902)		MS 7
<u>Lord Haldane Papers</u>	NLSE	Haldane Manus.
1. Letters of Haldane to sister Elizabeth on various matters (1874-1893)		MS 6010
2. Letters to Elizabeth Haldane on affairs including social questions (1893-1900)		MS 6016
<u>Isaac Holden Papers</u>	BUL	Holden Coll.
1. Isaac Holden Letters (Private and Family)		5B MS 1
2. Letters concerning religion and Methodism		MS 2
3. Letters re. benefices and business affairs		MS 3
4. Correspondence concerning last will and testament and ephemera on Holden's life		MS 4
<u>Alexander Whitelaw Papers</u>	ASRS	UGD 79
1. Letter Book (Political) of Whitelaw (1874-79)		79 1
2. Letter Book (Political) of Whitelaw (1879*)		79 1

* Whitelaw, M.P. died in 1879.

Key to location of personal and political papers

BrCL Birmingham City Library, Birmingham
 NLSE National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh

(Other references as previously indicated).

IV. Primary sources: Local industrial, welfare and labour sources

- | | | |
|--|---------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>Coalmining Industry Materials</u> | SRA | D TC 6 & 14 |
| 1. Memorandum on Coal in Glasgow Green and Gorbals (1857-1871) | | TC 6 469 |
| 2. Lanarkshire Miners' County Union, <u>Rules and Regulations of the Lanarkshire Miners' County Union</u> (1908) Hamilton (copy) | | TC 6 --- |
| 3. Materials re. Miners' Strike of 1921: | | |
| i. Memorandum by Glasgow Town Clerk on Miners' Strike (1921) | | TC 6 606/1/3 |
| ii. Emergency directions from Government re. Miners' Strike (1921) Rep. 999 Vol.X | | TC 14 2/16 |
| <u>Highton Collection of Labour Materials</u> | ASRS | UGD 102 |
| 1. J.R. Richmond, <u>Some Aspects of Labour in the Engineering Industries</u> (1917) Glasgow | | 102 |
| 2. Tom Mann, <u>"Payments by Results" - "Piecework and Time Work"</u> Co-op Printing Society (1920) | | 102 |
| 3. John Maclean, <u>The War After the War: In the light of the elements of working class economics</u> (1918) | | 102 |
| 4. Glasgow and West of Scotland Association of Foremen Engineers and Draughtsmen, <u>Paths to Peace in Industry</u> (1930) Glasgow | | 102 |
| 5. William Gallacher, 'Scheme for Workshop Control' (c. 1918) | | 102 4/1 |
| <u>Miners' Welfare Fund</u> | SRO | CB 13 |
| 1. Records of Miners' Welfare Fund in Scotland (1922-36, 1942) | | 13 1/1 |
| V. Primary sources: Local government, political and civic organisations (including labour bodies) | | |
| <u>Glasgow City Corporation</u> | SRA/BIG | Corp. |
| 1. Glasgow Corporation Minutes (printed), 1879-1918 | | |
| 2. Resolutions of Corporation on housing (1915-19) | | |
| <u>Glasgow Ward Committee materials</u> | SRA | D TC 6 606 & TD |
| 1. Notes prepared by Glasgow Town Clerk for Lord Provost Steven on the Origins of Ward Committees | | TC D 606/1/43
& TC D 606/12/16 |
| 2. G.B. Esskemont, Notes on Ward Committees (1954) | | TC D 606/12/16 |
| 3. Copy of Gentler's Bill to legalize Ward Committees (1887) and notes | | TC MP 16.723 |
| 4. Minutes of Govan (1st Ward) Committee (1903-09) | | TD 90/2 |
| 5. Minutes of Cathcart (37th Ward) Committee | | TD 411 |
| 6. Minutes of Govan (29th) Committee | | TD 157/200 |
| 7. Minutes of Maryhill (18th) Committee | | TD 455 |
| 8. Minutes of Partick East (20th) Committee | | TD 491 |
| 9. Minutes of Whiteinch Committee | | TD 472 |
| <u>Glasgow Civic Society</u> | MLG | BF 76 |
| 1. Report of G.C.S. Committee (1898-99) | | 76 - A4 |
| 2. Report of G.C.S. Committee (1899-1900) | | 76 - A4 |

3. Copy of constitution, list of office-bearers, etc. 76 - D13
- Glasgow Independant Labour Party MIG G 329.9
1. Executive Committee Minutes (1917-1919) MS 1
 2. Organising Committee Minutes (1918-1923) MS 4
 3. Management Committee Minutes (1918-1933) MS 3
 4. Lectures Committee Minutes (1918-1923) MS 5
 5. Bi-monthly and Special Aggregate Meetings Minutes (1917-1930) MS 14
- Glasgow Savings Bank EHUG Reports
1. Annual Reports of Glasgow Savings Bank (1878-1936) printed and bound Vol.
- Glasgow Trades Council MIG Glasgow Coll.
1. Minutes of Trades Council (MS), c.1907-1921
 2. Materials relating to representations of Trades Council to Glasgow Corporation
- Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund SRA L167 LK
1. Report of Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund 1878-79 LK 5/521
 2. Report of Glasgow Unemployed Relief Fund 1879-80, including 'A Run Round the Ward Stations' LK 5/521
- Partick Civic Guild MIG P.C.G. Coll.
1. Annual Reports of Guild (1909-11, 1913-16, 1920, 1922-23) printed MS 1
 2. Guild Constitutions; 1908, 1920 MS 2
 3. Corr. (Belgian Relief Fund) of 1914-18 MS 3
 4. Correspondence re. to Glasgow (1913-16, 1916-31) MS 4
 5. Correspondence re. to non-Glasgow affairs (1913-24) MS 5
 6. Reports of District Secretaries (1911-26) MS 8
 7. Minute Book of Partick Civic Guild (1907-15) MS 9
 8. Miscellaneous pamphlets and ephemera MS 10
- Key to location of local government, political & civic bodies records
- BLG Baillies' Library, Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow
 EHUG Economic History Dept., University of Glasgow
 MLG Mitchell Library, Glasgow
- VI. Primary sources: Housing, building & rents (including oral sr.)
- Building and housing investment materials ASRS UGD 79 - 92
1. Bennett & Brown UGD 79
 - i. Documents including typescript report on Glasgow Association of Underwriters 79 4A1
 2. Dowanhill Estate Co. UGD 92
 - i. Journal of Estate Co. (1888-1902) 92 1/1
 - ii. " of Estate Co. (1902-1969) 92 1/2
 - iii. Minute Book No.1 of Estate Co. (1888-1902) 92 3/1
 - iv. Minute Book No.2 of Estate Co. (1902-1941) 92 3/2
 - v. Legal and financial papers (1881-97) 92 11/1
 - vi. Statement of rents 92 13/2

3. Thomas Lucas Paterson Trust		UGD 87
i. Minutes and Inventories (1874-87)		87 1/1
ii. Papers on property		87 48/1
iii. Property settlements		87 53/1
iv. Memorandum and Articles of Association of Dowanhill Estate Co.		87 64/1
v. Property papers (1890-96)		87 79/1
vi. Regulations and Rules of Govan Dean of Guild Court		87 104/1
vii. Statements of Property (1884-87)		87 111/1
viii. James Thomson to T.L. Paterson corr. regarding housing (1880-82)		87 119/1
ix. Workmen's Bills concerning No.27-43 Victoria St., Govan (1884)		87 136/1
4. Provident Property Investment Co.		UGD 80
i. Rules of Provident Property Investment Co. (1850)		80 1/1
<u>Dean of Guild materials</u>	SRA/SROCD	
1. Govan Dean of Guild registers	SRA	TD
i. References of building proposals for 1879-1886		
2. Dumbarton Dean of Guild Plans	SROCD	Office Ref.
i. Plans submitted for 1887		
ii. Plans submitted for 1893		
<u>Local government housing materials</u>	SRA/EHUG	D TC 8
1. Peter Fyfe, Report of the Sanitary Inspector of Glasgow on the Proposed Relaxation of Building Regulations (Nov. 1916)		TC 8 19/8
2. Lindsay Drummond, Report of the Glasgow Town Clerk on the Proposed Relaxation of Building Restrictions (Dec. 1916)		TC 8 19/8
3. Lanark County Medical Officer of Health, <u>Report by the Lanark M.O.H: The Housing Condition of Miners (1910) Glasgow (Copy EHUG)</u>		
<u>Clydebank Workmen's Housing</u>	SRG	
1. Clydebank Workmen's Housing & C.S.E. Co., Title Deeds of Works and Workmen's Houses at Clydebank (1870s-1910s)		
<u>Glasgow Working Men's Dwelling Co.</u>	ASRS	UGD 68
1. Memorandum and Articles of Association of Co.		68 1/1
2. Minutes of G.W.M.D.Co. (missing).		
<u>Oral history interviews on housing conditions and rent strikes</u>		EHUG
1. B. & M. McNab, Govan (14.8.1978)		Tape/Trans. 1
2. Barbour family and W. McShane (16.8.1978)		Tape/ " 2
3. J. McFarlane, Partick (17.8.1978)		Tape/ " 3
4. A. MacMahon, Glasgow (17.8.1978)		Tape/ " 4
5. H. McShane, Govan (16.8.1978)		-/ " 5
6. M. Cordiner & W. McShane (23.8.1978)		Tape/ " 6
(These interviews conducted by author in 1978).		
<u>Key to location of housing records</u>		
SROCD Sub-Regional Offices at Crosslet, Dumbarton		

VII. Primary sources: Cabinet Memoranda and reports

Cabinet Memoranda, 1911-15

PRO

CAB 37

1. G.R. Askwith, Memorandum on the Present Unrest in the Labour World (25.6.1911) CAB 37/107 No.70
2. S. Buxton, Memorandum on Industrial Unrest (1912) CAB 37/110 No.62
3. T. McKinnon Wood, Memorandum on the Glasgow Rent Strike (17.11.1915) CAB 37/137 No.29

PRO Public Record Office, Kew (London)

VIII Primary sources: Published government surveys, enquiries and reports (by subject and chronology)

Factory conditions and hours

1. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1911 (1912) Cd. 6239
2. Annual Report of the Chief Inspectors..for the Year 1913 (1914) Cd. 7491
3. Annual Report...for the Year 1914 (1915) Cd. 8051
4. Annual Report...for the Year 1916 (1917) Cd. 8570
5. Annual Report...for the Year 1917 (1918) Cd. 9108
6. Annual Report...for the Year 1918 (1919) Cmd. 340
7. War Cabinet Committee, Report of the Committee on Women in Industry (1919) Cmd. 135
8. War Cabinet Committee, Appendices and Summaries of Evidence of the Committee on Women in Industry Cmd. 167 (1919)

Labour conditions, remuneration and industrial relations

1. Royal Commission on Labour, Digest of Evidence taken before Group A Vol. I (Mining) (1892) C. 6708
2. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence before Group A (1892) Plt. Papers XXXIV
3. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence before Group C (1892) Vol. I C. 6795
4. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence before Group C (1892) Vol. III C. 6894
5. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence of Representatives of Co-operative Societies and of Various Movements, and of Public Officials (1893) C. 7063
6. Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence before Group C (1893) C. 7098
7. Royal Commission on Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations, Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Trade Disputes... (1906) Cd. 2826
8. Balfour of Burleigh & Lyden Macassey, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest in the Clyde District (1915) Cd. 8136
9. Commissioners of Enquiry into Industry Unrest, Report of the Commissioners for Scotland: No.8 Division (1917) Cd. 8669
10. Ministry of Munitions, Return of Cases heard before Munitions Tribunals (1916) Cd. 8143
11. Committee on Joint Industrial Councils, Interim Report of the Committee on Joint Standing Industrial Councils (1917) Cmd. 8606
12. Joint Industrial Conference, Report of the Provisional Joint Committee...of the Industrial Conference...of 1919 (1920) Cmd. 501
13. Committee on Trade and Industry (Balfour Committee), Survey of Industrial Relations HMSO (1926)

14. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (Donovan Commission), Selected Written Evidence HMSO (1968)

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2. Labour Dept. of Board of Trade, Annual Abstract of Labour Statistics:
 - i. Fifth Abstract of Labour Statistics (1897-98)
 - ii. Sixth Abstract of Labour Statistics (1898-99)
 - iii. Seventh Abstract of " " (1899-1900)
 - iv. Eighth Abstract of " " (1900-1901)
 - v. Ninth Abstract of " " (1901-1902)
 - vi. Tenth Abstract of " " (1902-1903)
 - vii. Eleventh Abstract of " " (1904-1905)
 - viii. Twelfth Abstract of " " (1905-1906)
 - ix. Thirteenth Abstract " " (1906-1907)
 - x. Nineteenth Abstract " " (1913-1914)
3. Advisory Committee to the Board of Trade on British Industry After the War, Report of a Sub-Committee...with Respect to Measures for Securing the Position...of certain Branches of British Industry Cd. 8181 (1916); also known as 'Firth Committee'
4. Board of Trade, Memorandum with respect to the Re-Organisation of the Board of Trade (1918) Cd. 8912
5. Ministry of Reconstruction Committee on Trusts, Report of the Committee on Trusts (1919) Cd. 9236
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Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation

1. Select Committee on the Employers' Liability legislation, Report of the Committee Plt. Papers (1886)
2. Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation, Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Law relating to Compensation for Injuries to Workmen (1904) Cd. 2208
3. Departmental Committee on Workmen's Compensation, Minutes of Evidence... Vol. II (1904) Cd. 2334
4. Home Office, Statistics of Compensation and of Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906...During the Year 1911 (1912) Cd. 6493
5. Committee to Enquire into the law on Workmen's Compensation (Holman Gregory Committee), Report of the Committee... (1920) Cmd. 816
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Friendly societies, provident schemes and National Insurance

1. Report of the Chief Register of Friendly Societies:
 - i. Report for 1892
 - ii. Report for 1901
 - iii. Report for 1902
 - iv. Report for 1903
 - v. Report for 1904
 - vi. Report for 1913
 - vii. Report for 1914

2. Departmental Committee on the Truck Acts, Report of the Committee with Appendices (1908) Cd. 4442
3. Royal Commission on Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Minutes of Evidence (1910) Cd. 5066
4. Royal Commission on Poor Laws, Written Replies from Employers of Labour to Certain Economic Questions (1910)
5. Ministry of Reconstruction, Memorandum, explanatory of the provisions of the National Health Insurance Bill 1917 (1917) Cd. 8816
6. Departmental Committee on Approved Society Finance and Administration, National Health Insurance: Interim Report (1916) Cd. 8251
7. Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance, First Report of the Royal Commission (1931) Cmd. 3872

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1. Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, Minutes of Evidence Vol. V (1885) C. 4409
2. Departmental Committee on the increase in Rental of Small Dwellings in Industrial Districts in Scotland (Hunter-Scott Committee), Report of the Committee (1915) Cd. 8111
3. Departmental Committee on the increase in Rental, Minutes of Evidence (1916) Cd. 8154
4. Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial Population in Scotland, Rural and Urban, Report of the Royal Commission (1917) Cd. 8731
5. Advisory Housing Panel on the Emergency Housing Problem, Memorandum by the Panel on Housing in England and Wales (1918) Cd. 9087
6. Departmental Committee on the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, Report on the...Acts (1919) Cd. 9235
7. Departmental Committee on the..Rent..Acts, Report of the Committee (1920) Cmd. 658

Pensions and Superannuation

1. Royal Commission on the Aged Poor, General Report of the Royal Commission (1895)
2. Board of Trade Departmental Committee on Railway Superannuation Funds, Minutes of Evidence Cd. 5484 (1911)
3. Departmental Committee on Approved Society Finance and Administration, Report of the Committee Cd. 8251 (1916)
4. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, Report of an enquiry into the...characteristics of employers' sick pay schemes HMSO (1964)

Research and Education

1. Select Committee on Scientific Instruction in Theoretical and Practical Science, Report of the Select Committee (1886)
2. Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Report of the Committee (1916) Cd. 8336
3. Industrial Fatigue Research Board (Medical Research Council), First Annual Report of the Industrial Fatigue Research Board HMSO (1920)
4. Industrial Fatigue Research Board (Medical Research Council), A Statistical Survey of Labour Turnover in Munition and Other Factories 13th Report (1921) HMSO

Health of Munition Workers' Committee Reports

1. Memorandum No.1, Report on Sunday Labour (1915) Cd. 8132
2. Memorandum No.2, Welfare Supervision (1915) Cd. 8151
3. Memorandum No.3, Report on Industrial Canteens (1915) Cd. 8133
4. Memorandum No.4, The Employment of Women (1916) 8185
5. Memorandum No.5, The Hours of Work (1916) Cd. 8186
6. Memorandum No.7, Industrial Fatigue and its Causes (1916) Cd. 8213
7. Memorandum No.12, Statistical Information concerning Output in Relation to Hours of Work (Appx. to Memorandum No.5 collected by H.N. Vernon, M.D.) (1916) Cd. 8344
8. Memorandum No.13, Juvenile Employment (1916) Cd. 8362
9. Memorandum No.17, Health and Welfare of Munition Workers Outside the Factory (1917) Cd. 85
10. Memorandum No.19, Investigations of Workers' Food and Suggestions as to Dietary (Appx. to Memorandum No.3 by L.E. Hill) (1917) Cd. 8798
11. Memorandum No.20, Weekly Hours of Employment (Supplement to Memorandum No.5) (1917) Cd. 8801
12. Interim Report, Industrial Efficiency and Fatigue (1917) Cd. 8511
13. Final Report, Industrial Health and Efficiency: Final Report of the Committee (1918) Cd. 9065

Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership

1. Labour Dept. of Board of Trade, Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom (1912) Cd. 5496
2. Ministry of Labour, Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom (1920) Cmd. 544

IX. Primary sources: Newspapers, trade press, contemporary journals

<u>Newspapers</u>	<u>Location</u>
1. <u>The Baillie</u>	BIG
2. <u>Bradford Argus</u>	BCL
3. <u>The Bulletin</u>	MIG
4. <u>Dumbarton Herald</u>	DCL
5. <u>Factory Times</u>	HCL
6. <u>Forward</u>	MIG
7. <u>Glasgow Herald</u>	GUL
8. <u>Govan Press</u>	MIG
9. <u>Kilmarnock Standard</u>	DCL
10. <u>Partick and Maryhill Press</u>	MIG
11. <u>Sunday Chronicle</u>	HCL
12. <u>Yorkshire Post</u>	BLUL

Key to location:

DCL Dumbarton Central Library
HCL Huddersfield Central Library
GUL Glasgow University Library

Trade Journals and House Magazines

1. The Engineer GUL
2. Engineering GUL
3. Glasgow Advertiser & Property Circular MIG

4. The Gourock Magazine ASRS
 5. The Linthouse Magazine ASRS

Professional, Vocational and Academic Contemporary Journals

1. Economic Journal (1890-1930) GUL
 2. Journal of Industrial Administration (1920-22) BLL
 3. Journal of National Institute of Industrial Psychology (1922-37) GUL
 4. Journal of Royal Statistical Society (1890-1920) GUL
 5. Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow (1890-1910) BLG
 6. Sociological Review (1907-1920) GUL
 7. Welfare Work: Journal of the Institute of Welfare Workers (1920-1930) BLL

BLL British Lending Library

Note on secondary sources cited

The secondary sources listed below are only those actually cited in the footnote references and used directly in the research. These are published and printed works which did not usually form part of primary collections and which were used as background or supplements to these unpublished sources, (and to primary printed works listed above). There has been no attempt to impose arbitrary dates as to qualification of works as 'contemporary' or 'historical', although a number of writings appearing in the decades before 1925 could be classed as primary materials in certain respects. The secondary works are organised according to subject area and listed alphabetically.

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II. Secondary sources: Works on industrial welfare

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- W. Ashworth, 'British Industrial Villages in the Nineteenth Century' Economic History Review III (1950-51)
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